natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For så vidt angår den angiveligt ikke rettidigt bevilgede adgang til det ikke-fortrolige dossier er det Kommissionens opfattelse, at RFPA's ret til at forsvare sig ikke er berørt heraf, selv hvis påstanden havde været berettiget.
Following disclosure, RFPA repeated that a number of alleged procedural irregularities would have occurred during the review, and noted the Commission's refusal to grant access to the initial version of the request filed by the applicant on 28 March 2013 as well the allegedly untimely granting of access to the non-confidential file.
For det første fremlagde Kommissionen rettidigt væsentlige oplysninger for RFPA, på grundlag af hvilke Kommissionen havde til hensigt at opretholde foranstaltningerne, og den gav RFPA tilstrækkelig tid til at reagere.
As regards the request to access the initial request for the review, the Commission services explained several times in writing and orally, including in meetings chaired by the Hearing Officer, the reasons why this request could not be accepted under the applicable legal framework.
For det andet havde RFPA inden fremlæggelsen af oplysninger fået bevilget adgang til hele det ikke-fortrolige dossier.
As regards the allegedly untimely granting of the access to the non-confidential file, the Commission considers that even if this claim would be warranted, RFPA's rights of defence were not affected.
RFPA påstod også, at de møder, der var blevet afholdt i april og maj 2014 mellem Kommissionens tjenestegrene og ansøgeren, ikke »i modsætning til normal praksis« var blevet optaget i det ikke-fortrolige dossier, og at de fortrolige oplysninger, som ansøgeren indgav i maj 2014, ikke var ledsaget af et tilsvarende ikke-fortroligt sammendrag.
First of all, the Commission disclosed to the RFPA in a timely manner the essential facts on the basis of which the Commission intended to continue the measures and gave RFPA sufficient time to react.
Det er normal praksis, at interesserede parter, der anmoder om en høring, fremfører deres synspunkter mundtligt og ledsager dem med skriftlig dokumentation.
Secondly, prior to this disclosure, RFPA had been granted access to the entire non-confidential file.
Den ikke-fortrolige udgave af sådan dokumentation lægges ind i det dossier, der stilles til rådighed og gøres tilgængelig for enhver anden interesseret part.
RFPA also claimed that ‘contrary to standard practice’, meetings held between the Commission services and the applicant in May and in April 2014 were not recorded in the non-confidential file and that the limited data submitted by the applicant in May 2014 were not accompanied by an adequate non-confidential summary.
Disse dokumenter omfatter protokoller af møder og høringer afholdt af Kommissionens tjenestegrene.
It is standard practice that interested parties requesting a hearing present their views orally and accompany them with written submissions.
Derfor afvises denne påstand som faktuel ukorrekt.
The non-confidential versions of such submissions are inserted in the file open for inspection and made available to any other interested party.
For så vidt angår den anden påstand var det ikke muligt at indgive den ikke-fortrolige udgave af de fortrolige oplysninger, der blev indgivet i maj 2014, på anden måde uden at afsløre EU-producenternes forretningshemmeligheder.
These documents record the meetings and hearing held by the Commission services.
Denne påstand kan derfor heller ikke godtages.
Therefore, this claim is dismissed as factually incorrect.
DEN PÅGÆLDENDE VARE OG SAMME VARE
As regard the second claim, the non-confidential version of the limited data submitted in May 2014 could not be submitted in a different manner without disclosing business secrets of the Union producers.
Den pågældende vare
Therefore, also this claim cannot be accepted.
Den pågældende vare i denne undersøgelse er den samme som den, der er defineret i forordning (EF) nr. 661/2008, dvs. gødninger i fast form med et indhold af ammoniumnitrat på over 80 vægtprocent, i øjeblikket henhørende under KN-kode 31023090, 31024090, ex31022900, ex31026000, ex31029000, ex31051000, ex31052010, ex31055100, ex31055900 og ex31059020, og med oprindelse i Rusland (herefter benævnt »AN« eller »den pågældende vare«).
PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT
For så vidt angår AN produceret af JSC Kirovo-Chepetsky Khimichesky Kombinat (Kirovo) er den pågældende vare dog kun AN, i øjeblikket henhørende under KN-kode 31023090 og 31024090, jf. forordning (EF) nr. 989/2009.
Product concerned
Den vigtigste råvare i produktionen af AN er gas, der tegner sig for 70-80 % af de samlede produktionsomkostninger.
The product concerned by this review is the same as the product defined in Regulation (EC) No 661/2008, i.e. solid fertilisers with an ammonium nitrate content exceeding 80 % by weight, currently falling within CN codes 31023090, 31024090, ex31022900, ex31026000, ex31029000, ex31051000, ex31052010, ex31055100, ex31055900 and ex31059020 and originating in Russia (hereinafter ‘AN’ or ‘the product concerned’).
Formålet med udvidelsen af varedækningen i 2005 var også at dække det ammoniumnitrat, der blev tilsat næringsstofferne phosphor og/eller kalium, efter det var blevet konstateret, at disse blandinger hovedsageligt havde samme grundlæggende fysiske og kemiske egenskaber og samme agronomiske egenskaber.
However, with regard to AN produced by JSC Kirovo-Chepetsky Khimichesky Kombinat (Kirovo) only AN currently falling within CN codes 31023090 and 31024090 is the product concerned pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 989/2009.
Det bemærkes, at KN-kode 31023090 og 31024090 (henholdsvis »ammoniumnitrat, ikke i vandig opløsning« og »blandinger af ammoniumnitrat med calciumcarbonat eller andre uorganiske stoffer uden gødningsværdi, med indhold af nitrogen på over 28 vægtprocent«) kan indeholde AN anvendt til industriformål (som f.eks. fremstillingen af sprængstoffer) og AN anvendt til landbrugsformål.
The main raw material used in the production of AN is gas, which accounts for 70 % to 80 % of the total costs of production.
Begge typer har samme tekniske og kemiske egenskaber, kan nemt erstatte hinanden og anses som værende den pågældende vare.
The product scope extension in 2005 aimed to cover also ammonium nitrate to which were added phosphorus and/or potassium nutrients, since it was found out that these mixtures had essentially the same basic physical and chemical characteristics and the same agronomic properties.
Efter fremlæggelsen af oplysninger påstod repræsentanterne for de russiske myndigheder, at udvidelsen af varedækningen i 2005 er uforenelig med WTO's antidumpingaftale, fordi der ikke var truffet nogen afgørelse i spørgsmålet om dumping, skade og årsagssammenhæng for så vidt angår de yderligere varer, der var omfattet af udvidelsen i 2005.
It should be noted that the CN codes 31023090 and 31024090 (respectively, ‘ammonium nitrate other than in aqueous solutions’ and ‘mixtures of ammonium nitrate with calcium carbonate or other inorganic non-fertilising substances, with a nitrogen content exceeding 28 % by weight’) can include AN used for industrial purposes (such as the production of explosives) as well as AN used for agricultural purposes.
Denne påstand er ubegrundet af de grunde, der er nævnt i betragtning 22, og afvises derfor.
Both types have the same technical and chemical characteristics, can easily be interchangeable and are considered as the product concerned.
Samme vare
Following disclosure, the representatives of the Russian authorities claimed that the product scope extension made in 2005 is inconsistent with the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement because no determination of dumping, injury and causal link would have been made with respect to the additional products covered by the 2005 extension.
Som i de foregående undersøgelser konstateredes det, at AN, der fremstilles og sælges på hjemmemarkedet i Rusland, og AN, der eksporteres til Unionen fra Rusland, har samme grundlæggende fysiske og tekniske egenskaber og anvendelser.
This claim is unfounded for the reasons already mentioned in recital 22 and therefore rejected.
De anses derfor for at være samme vare i forbindelse med denne undersøgelse, jf. grundforordningens artikel 1, stk. 4.
Like product
Det AN, der fremstilles af EU-erhvervsgrenen, er i henseende til fysiske og tekniske egenskaber samme vare som det AN, der eksporteres til Unionen fra Rusland.
As in the previous investigations, it was found that AN produced and sold on the domestic market in Russia and AN exported to the Union from Russia have the same basic physical and technical characteristics and uses.
SANDSYNLIGHED FOR FORTSAT ELLER FORNYET DUMPING
Therefore, they are like products for the purposes of the present investigation within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.
Indledende bemærkninger
The AN produced by the Union industry is a like product as regards physical and technical characteristics to the AN exported to the Union by Russia.
I overensstemmelse med grundforordningens artikel 11, stk. 2, undersøgte Kommissionen, om der var sandsynlighed for, at de eksisterende foranstaltningers udløb ville føre til fortsat eller fornyet dumping.
LIKELIHOOD OF A CONTINUATION OR RECURRENCE OF DUMPING
Dumpingimport i NUP
Preliminary remarks
Som anført i betragtning 32 var der kun én eksporterende producent (Acron) i stikprøven, der samarbejdede fuldt ud i forbindelse med undersøgelsen.
In accordance with Article 11(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission examined whether the expiry of the existing measures would be likely to lead to a continuation or recurrence of dumping.
Men som anført i betragtning 3 godtog Kommissionen i 2008 et pristilsagn fra Acron, der stadig var gældende i NUP.
Dumping of imports during the RIP
På grund af det eksisterende pristilsagn blev Acrons eksportpriser i NUP bestemt af det pristilsagn, der fastsætter en mindsteimportpris.
As indicated in recital 32, only one sampled exporting producer (Acron) fully cooperated in the investigation.
Derfor blev disse eksportpriser ikke betragtet som et pålideligt element i forbindelse med vurderingen af, hvorvidt der var sandsynlighed for fortsat eller fornyet dumping, såfremt antidumpingforanstaltningerne får lov til at udløbe.
However, as set out in recital 3, in 2008 the Commission accepted a price undertaking offer from Acron, which was still in force during the RIP.
Efter fremlæggelsen af oplysninger fremførte RFPA, at dette betyder, at Kommissionen havde konstateret, at der ikke fandt nogen faktisk dumping sted.
Due to the existence of the price undertaking Acron's export prices during the RIP were determined by that price undertaking which sets a minimum import price.
Det er ikke korrekt.
Consequently, such export prices were not considered as a reliable element in assessing whether dumping would be likely to continue or recur should anti-dumping measures be allowed to lapse.
Da de russiske eksporterende producenter i stikprøven ikke samarbejdede fuldt ud, med undtagelse af Acron, havde Kommissionen ikke tilstrækkelige oplysninger til at foretage eventuelle dumpingberegninger på grundlag af virksomhedernes egne oplysninger.
After disclosure, RFPA argued that this means that the Commission found that no actual dumping is taking place.
Kommissionen kunne have foretaget en dumpingberegning for Acron, men som beskrevet i betragtning i 52, mente den ikke, at virksomhedens oplysninger var pålidelige i forbindelse med denne udløbsundersøgelse.
This is not accurate.
Ifølge Acron var Kommissionens argument, at virksomhedens faktiske priser til EU var upålidelige på grund af det gældende pristilsagn, og at de derfor ikke kunne anvendes til at fastsætte en eksportpris, ulovligt.
As the sampled Russian exporting producers, with the exception of Acron, did not fully cooperate, the Commission did not have sufficient data to carry out any dumping calculations on the basis of the companies' own data.
Dette var dog ikke Kommissionens argument.
For Acron it could have carried out a dumping calculation, but as explained in recital 52, the Commission considered that its data were not reliable for the purpose of this expiry review.
Kommissionen hævdede ikke, at eksportpriserne ikke som sådan kunne anvendes på grund af pristilsagnet, men konstaterede, at sådanne eksportpriser blev betragtet som et upålideligt element i forbindelse med en analyse af sandsynligheden for fortsat eller fornyet dumping for så vidt angår de særlige omstændigheder, der gør sig gældende i denne undersøgelse.
Acron claimed that the argument of the Commission that its actual prices to the EU are unreliable because of the existence of the price undertaking, and therefore cannot be used to establish an export price, was unlawful.
Ifølge Kommissionen er eksportpriser, der er baseret på et pristilsagn, ikke en relevant indikator, når eksporterende producenters fremtidige adfærd i forbindelse med fraværet af foranstaltninger og pristilsagn skal analyseres.
However, this is not what the Commission argued.
I modsætning til Acrons påstand kan virksomhedens eksportpriser til EU ikke anses for kun at være resultatet af normale markedsvilkår.
The Commission did not claim that export prices could not as such be used because of the price undertaking, but concluded that such export prices were considered an unreliable element in the analysis of the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping in the specific circumstances of this investigation.
I hele NUP var Acron den eneste russiske eksporterende producent, der drog fordel af et pristilsagn, da alle andre russiske eksporterende producenter var pålagt en told.
The Commission does not consider export prices based on a price undertaking a meaningful indicator in the analysis of future behaviour of exporting producers in the absence of measures and any price undertaking.
Disse elementer havde helt klart indflydelse på Acrons konkurrencemæssige position som eneste russiske leverandør til EU-markedet.
Contrary to what was argued by Acron, its export prices to the EU cannot be considered to be only the result of normal market conditions.
Sandsynligheden for fornyet dumping
During the full RIP, Acron was the only Russian exporting producer which benefited from a price undertaking, all other Russian exporting producers were subject to the duties.
I lyset af overvejelserne i betragtning 52 til 55 analyserede Kommissionen, om der var bevis for sandsynligheden for fornyet dumping, hvis foranstaltningerne udløber.
These elements definitely affected the competitive position of Acron as the sole Russian supplier of the EU market.
Den analyserede følgende faktorer:
Likelihood of recurrence of dumping
Eksportprisen ved salg fra Rusland til andre markeder, produktionskapacitet og uudnyttet kapacitet i hele Rusland samt EU-markedets og andre tredjelandsmarkeders tiltrækningskraft.
In light of the considerations set out in recitals 52 to 55, the Commission analysed whether there was evidence of likelihood of recurrence of dumping should the measures lapse.
Eksport fra Rusland til andre markeder
It analysed the following factors:
Kommissionen fastslog, at Acrons vejede gennemsnit af eksportprisen ab fabrik til tredjelande som f.eks. Brasilien, Colombia og Peru i NUP var lavere end den gennemsnitlige hjemmemarkedspris ab fabrik, der faktisk blev betalt eller skulle betales i NUP.
the export price from Russia to other destinations, the production capacity and spare capacity in Russia as a whole and the attractiveness of the Union market and other third markets.
Acron solgte derfor til dumpingpriser til tredjelandsmarkeder, særligt til Brasilien, der er langt det vigtigste eksportmarked i tredjelandene.
Exports from Russia to other destinations
For så vidt angår de tre andre eksporterende producenter i stikprøven konstaterede Kommissionen også, at deres vejede gennemsnitlige salgspriser ab fabrik til tredjelande som f.eks. Brasilien, Peru, Colombia, Ukraine og Kasakhstan var lavere for alle tre producenter end de gennemsnitlige hjemmemarkedspriser ab fabrik, der blev betalt eller skulle betales i NUP.
The Commission established that Acron's weighted average ex-works export price to third countries markets such as Brazil, Colombia and Peru during the RIP was lower than the actual average domestic ex-works price paid or payable during the RIP.
Derfor solgte de også til dumpingpriser.
Acron therefore sold at dumped prices to third country markets, in particular to Brazil, by far the main third country export market.
Denne konstatering var baseret på kontrollerede oplysninger indgivet af russiske eksporterende producenter, der tegnede sig for omkring 80 % af eksporten til tredjelande.
For the three other sampled exporting producers the Commission also established that their weighted average ex-works sales prices to third countries such as Brazil, Peru, Colombia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan were for each of the three, lower than their average domestic ex-works prices paid or payable during the RIP and were thus also sold at dumped prices.
Kommissionen behøvede derfor ikke anvende russiske eksportstatistikker, som foreslået af RFPA.
This finding was based on verified data provided by Russian exporting producers, which accounted for around 80 % of the exports to third countries.
Alle fire eksporterende producenter i stikprøven eksporterede til tredjelande til en bæredygtig pris i NUP.
Accordingly, there was no need for the Commission to resort to Russian export statistics, as the RFPA suggested.
RFPA påstod, at de oplysninger, der var tilgængelige i dokumentet med fremlæggelse af oplysninger, tydede på, at der for så vidt angår EuroChem ikke fandt dumping sted eller, at der højest var tale om ubetydelig dumping.
The export sales of all four sampled exporting producers to third countries were made at a sustainable price level during the RIP.
Argumentet er ikke relevant.
RFPA argued that data available in the disclosure document suggests that, as far as Eurochem is concerned, there is no dumping or, at best, de minimis dumping.
Formålet med analysen er ikke at beregne EuroChems nøjagtige margin, men at afgøre, om der er sandsynlighed for fornyet dumping fra Rusland, hvis foranstaltningerne får lov til at udløbe.
The argument is misplaced.
I den sammenhæng afslørede undersøgelsen, at også EuroChems gennemsnitlige priser ab fabrik ved salg til tredjelande var lavere end deres hjemmemarkedspriser ab fabrik, og at der derfor var tale om dumpingpriser.
The purpose of the analysis is not to calculate the exact dumping margin of Eurochem but to determine whether there would be a likelihood of recurrence of dumping from Russia should measures be allowed to lapse.
EuroChems prispolitik for salg til tredjelande (priser ved salg til eksport der ligger under hjemmemarkedspriserne) er en relevant faktor, som den overordnede afgørelse om, at der sandsynligvis vil finde fornyet dumping til EU sted, hvis foranstaltningerne får lov til at udløbe, er baseret på.
In that context, the investigation revealed that, also for Eurochem, average ex-works prices to third countries were lower than their average domestic ex-works prices and were thus sold at dumped prices.
RFPA anførte, at der i forbindelse med dumpingberegningerne ikke var blevet anvendt passende metoder.
The pricing policy of Eurochem for sales to third countries (selling for export below domestic prices) is one relevant factor relied upon the overall determination that dumping to the EU would be likely to recur if measures were allowed to lapse.
Som forklaret beregnede Kommissionen ikke dumpingmargener, men sammenlignede blot gennemsnitlige hjemmemarkedspriser ab fabrik med eksportpriser ab fabrik på baggrund af oplysninger fra virksomhederne i stikprøven.
RFPA argued that no appropriate methodologies were used in the dumping calculations.
I forbindelse med en analyse af sandsynligheden for fornyet dumping er det ikke nødvendigt at beregne nøjagtige dumpingmargener, så der var ingen grund til at anvende cif-priser, som foreslået af RFPA.
As explained, the Commission did not calculate dumping margins but simply compared average ex-works domestic prices with ex-works export prices based on data reported by the sampled companies.
RFPA gjorde gældende, at Kommissionen ikke sammenlignede priser for hver enkel varetype, og at der ikke blev foretaget nogen justering i forhold til handelsleddet.
In a likelihood of recurrence of dumping analysis there is no need to calculate precise dumping margins, so there was no reason to use CIF values, as suggested by RFPA.
Kommissionen analyserede påstanden og konstaterede en tilsvarende prisforskel, selv hvis sammenligningen var blevet foretaget for hver enkel varetype.
RFPA argued that the Commission did not compare prices on a product-by-product type basis and that no level-of-trade adjustment was made.
Under alle omstændigheder kunne justeringen ikke blive foretaget i forhold til handelsleddet, da virksomhederne i stikprøven, undtagen Acron, kun samarbejdede delvist og ikke indgav tilstrækkeligt detaljerede oplysninger, herunder særligt detaljerede transaktionsspecifikke oplysninger.
The Commission analysed the claim and found a similar price difference even if the comparison would have been made on a product-by-product level.
Denne påstand afvises derfor.
The level of trade adjustments could in any event not be made, as the sampled companies, except Acron, only partially cooperated and did not provide sufficiently detailed data, in particular detailed transaction-by-transaction listings.
Eksportsalg til Unionen i NUP kunne ikke anvendes til at bestemme den fremtidige adfærd for så vidt angår de tre andre eksporterende producenter i stikprøven.
Therefore this argument is rejected.
Grunden hertil var, at EuroChem ligesom Acron i NUP kun eksporterede i henhold til pristilsagnet.
Export sales to the Union during the RIP could not be used for the determining the future behaviour of the three other sampled exporting producers for the following reasons.
EuroChem solgte kun til Unionen i den periode, hvor virksomheden havde et gældende tilsagn, og den blev derimod ikke registeret for noget salg, efter Kommissionen den 11. oktober 2012 trak tilsagnet tilbage ved afgørelse 2012/629/EU.
During the RIP, EuroChem, like Acron, only exported under the price undertaking.
For så vidt angår SBU Azot og UralChem solgte de ikke den pågældende vare til Unionen i NUP.
EuroChem had sales to the Union only during the period it had an undertaking in force, while it had no sales after the undertaking was withdrawn on 11 October 2012 by the Commission by means of Decision 2012/629/EU.
Kommissionen fandt det ikke nødvendigt at fastslå, om hjemmemarkedssalg fandt sted i normal handel.
As far as SBU Azot and UralChem are concerned, they did not sell the product concerned to the Union during the RIP.
De faktiske hjemmemarkedspriser viser da også allerede, at priserne på eksportsalg til tredjelandsmarkeder er dumpet.
The Commission did not consider it necessary to determine whether the domestic sales were made in the ordinary course of trade.
En undersøgelse af hjemmemarkedssalgets rentabilitet — hvorved den normale værdi ville skulle fastsættes (på grundlag af omkostninger og rimelig fortjeneste), hvis det skulle vise sig, at sådanne salg genererer underskud — kunne derfor kun have ført til en stigning i den normale værdi og således af den dumpingmargen, der var fastsat for eksport til tredjelandsmarkeder.
Indeed the actual domestic prices already show that export sales to third country markets are dumped.
I forbindelse med en udløbsundersøgelse og en analyse af sandsynligheden for fornyet dumping er det tilstrækkeligt at fastslå, om der er sandsynlighed for fornyet dumping, hvis foranstaltningerne får lov at udløbe.
Therefore, an examination of the profitability of domestic sales, with the potential consequence that the normal value would need to be constructed (on the basis of costs and reasonable profit) if such sales were found to be loss-making, could only have led to an increase of the normal value and hence of the dumping margin found for export sales to third country markets.