natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Det er vigtigt at skærpe betingelserne vedrørende kreditvurderingsbureauers uafhængighed for at gøre de kreditvurderinger, som udstedes efter udsteder betaler-modellen, mere troværdige.
It is essential to reinforce the conditions of independence applying to credit rating agencies in order to increase the level of credibility of credit ratings issued under the issuer-pays model.
For at øge konkurrencen i et marked, som er blevet domineret af tre kreditvurderingsbureauer, bør der træffes foranstaltninger for at tilskynde til at anvende mindre kreditvurderingsbureauer.
In order to increase competition in a market that has been dominated by three credit rating agencies, measures should be taken to encourage the use of smaller credit rating agencies.
Det har i den seneste tid været praksis, at udstedere eller tilknyttede tredjeparter anmoder om kreditvurderinger fra to eller flere kreditvurderingsbureauer, og derfor bør udstederen eller en tilknyttet tredjepart, når der anmodes om to eller flere kreditvurderinger, overveje at udnævne mindst et kreditvurderingsbureau, som ikke har mere end 10 % af den samlede markedsandel, og som udstederen eller en tilknyttet tredjepart vurderer som værende kompetent til at vurdere den pågældende udstedelse eller enhed.
It has been the practice in recent times for issuers or related third parties to seek credit ratings from two or more credit rating agencies, and therefore, where two or more credit ratings are sought, the issuer or a related third party should consider appointing at least one credit rating agency which does not have more than 10 % of the total market share and which could be evaluated by the issuer or a related third party as capable of rating the relevant issuance or entity.
Kreditvurderingsbureauerne og de kreditvurderede enheder etablerer traditionelt langvarige forbindelser på kreditvurderingsmarkedet.
The credit rating market shows that, traditionally, credit rating agencies and rated entities enter into long-lasting relationships.
Dette øger risikoen for fortrolighed, idet kreditvurderingsbureauet kan blive for imødekommende over for den kreditvurderede enheds ønsker.
This raises the risk of familiarity, as the credit rating agency may become too sympathetic to the desires of the rated entity.
Under disse omstændigheder vil der med tiden kunne sås tvivl om kreditvurderingsbureauers uafhængighed.
In those circumstances, the impartiality of credit rating agencies could, over time, become questionable.
Kreditvurderingsbureauer, som udnævnes og betales af en udstedende virksomhed, får således incitament til at udstede overdrevent positive vurderinger af den vurderede enhed eller dens gældsinstrumenter for at bevare forretningsforbindelsen med denne udsteder.
Indeed, credit rating agencies appointed and paid by a corporate issuer have an incentive to issue overly favourable ratings on that rated entity or on its debt instruments in order to maintain the business relationship with such issuer.
Udstederne kan også have incitament til at opretholde langvarige forbindelser, som ved fastholdelseseffekten, hvorved en udsteder afholder sig fra at skifte kreditvurderingsbureau, fordi det kunne skabe usikkerhed hos investorerne om udstederens kreditværdighed.
Issuers are also subject to incentives that favour long-lasting relationships, such as the lock-in effect whereby an issuer refrains from changing credit rating agency as this could raise concerns of investors regarding the issuer’s creditworthiness.
Dette problem påpeges allerede i forordning (EF) nr. 1060/2009, som indeholder krav om, at kreditvurderingsbureauerne anvender en rotationsordning, der sikrer en gradvis udskiftning af de analytiske hold og kreditvurderingsudvalgene og samtidig sikrer analytikernes og de valideringsansvarliges uafhængighed.
This problem was already identified in Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009, which required credit rating agencies to apply a rotation mechanism providing for gradual changes in analytical teams and credit rating committees so that the independence of the rating analysts and persons approving credit ratings would not be compromised.
Virkningen af disse regler afhænger dog i høj grad af den løsning, man finder internt i kreditvurderingsbureauet, nemlig kreditvurderingsbureauets ansattes faktiske uafhængighed og professionalisme i forhold til kreditvurderingsbureauets egne kommercielle interesser.
The success of those rules, however, was highly dependent on a behavioural solution internal to the credit rating agency, namely the actual independence and professionalism of the employees of the credit rating agency vis-à-vis the commercial interests of the credit rating agency itself.
Hensigten med reglerne er ikke at give tredjeparter en tilstrækkelig garanti for, at de interessekonflikter, der måtte opstå på grund af den langvarige forbindelse, begrænses eller undgås effektivt.
Those rules were not designed to provide a sufficient guarantee towards third parties that the conflicts of interest arising from the long-lasting relationship would effectively be mitigated or avoided.
En måde at opnå dette på kan være at begrænse den periode, hvor et kreditvurderingsbureau kan fortsætte med at foretage kreditvurderinger af den samme udsteder eller dennes gældsinstrumenter.
A way to achieve this could be by limiting the period during which a credit rating agency can continuously provide credit ratings on the same issuer or its debt instruments.
Incitamentet til at udstede positive kreditvurderinger af den udsteder, der vurderes, eller dennes gældsinstrumenter, der vurderes, forsvinder, hvis der fastsættes en øvre grænse for, hvor længe kontraktforholdet mellem denne udsteder og kreditvurderingsbureauet må vare.
Setting out a maximum duration of the contractual relationship between the issuer which is rated or which issued the rated debt instruments and the credit rating agency should remove the incentive for issuing favourable credit ratings with respect to that issuer.
Kravet om rotation af kreditvurderingsbureauer som en almindelig og udbredt markedspraksis bør effektivt afhjælpe fastholdelseseffekten.
Additionally, requiring the rotation of credit rating agencies as a normal and regular market practice should also effectively mitigate the problem of the lock-in effect.
En rotationsordning for kreditvurderingsbureauer bør desuden få positive konsekvenser for kreditvurderingsmarkedet ved at fremme nye markedsaktører og give eksisterende kreditvurderingsbureauer mulighed for at udvide deres virksomhed til nye områder.
Finally, the rotation of credit rating agencies should have positive effects on the credit rating market, as it would facilitate new market entries and offer existing credit rating agencies the opportunity to extend their business to new areas.
Det er imidlertid vigtigt, at indførelsen af en rotationsordning udformes på en sådan måde, at fordelene ved ordningen mere end opvejer dens negative følger.
It is, however, important that the implementation of a rotation mechanism is designed in such a way that the benefits of the mechanism more than outweigh its possible negative consequences.
Hyppig rotation kan for eksempel medføre øgede omkostninger for udstedere og kreditvurderingsbureauer, idet omkostningerne i forbindelse med vurdering af en ny enhed eller et nyt finansielt instrument typisk er højere end omkostningerne ved at overvåge en kreditvurdering, der allerede er blevet udstedt.
For example, frequent rotation could result in increased costs for issuers and credit rating agencies because the cost associated with rating a new entity or financial instrument is typically higher than the cost of monitoring a credit rating that has already been issued.
Det kræver endvidere forholdsvis lang tid og ressourcer at blive etableret som et kreditvurderingsbureau, uanset om det er som nicheaktør eller et, der dækker alle aktivklasser.
It also takes a considerable amount of time and resources to get established as a credit rating agency, whether as a niche player or covering all asset classes.
Endvidere kunne en fortsat rotation af kreditvurderingsbureauer have en betydelig indvirkning på kvaliteten og kontinuiteten af kreditvurderinger.
Further, ongoing rotation of credit rating agencies could have a significant impact on the quality and continuity of credit ratings.
Lige så vigtigt er det, at en rotationsordning bør indføres med tilstrækkelige beskyttelsesforanstaltninger for at gøre det muligt for markedet at tilpasse sig gradvist, inden ordningen eventuelt udvides i fremtiden.
Equally important, a rotation mechanism should be implemented with sufficient safeguards to allow the market to adapt gradually before possibly enhancing the mechanism in the future.
Dette kan opnås ved at begrænse anvendelsesområdet for ordningen til gensecuritisationer, som er en begrænset finansiel kilde til bankfinansiering, samtidig med at det tillades, at allerede udstedte kreditvurderinger fortsat overvåges på opfordring, selv efter at rotation bliver obligatorisk.
This could be achieved by limiting the scope of the mechanism to re-securitisations, which is a limited source of bank funding, while allowing credit ratings that are already issued to continue to be monitored upon request even after rotation becomes mandatory.
Rotation bør derfor generelt kun berøre nye gensecuritisationer med underliggende aktiver fra den samme initiativtager.
Thus, as a general rule, rotation should only affect new re-securitisations with underlying assets from the same originator.
Kommissionen bør vurdere, om det er hensigtsmæssigt at opretholde en begrænset rotationsordning eller tillige at anvende den på andre aktivklasser, og i bekræftende fald, hvorvidt disse andre klasser kræver anden behandling f.eks. med hensyn til grænsen for, hvor længe kontraktforholdet må vare.
The Commission should review whether it is appropriate to maintain a limited rotation mechanism or to apply it to other asset classes as well and, if so, whether other classes warrant different treatment with respect to, for example, the length of the maximum duration of the contractual relationship.
Såfremt rotationsordningen indføres for andre aktivklasser, bør Kommissionen vurdere behovet for at indføre en forpligtelse for kreditvurderingsbureauet til ved afslutningen af den maksimale varighed af kontraktforholdet at forelægge oplysninger om udstederen og de kreditvurderede finansielle instrumenter (overdragelsesmateriale) for det nye kreditvurderingsbureau.
If the rotation mechanism is established for other asset classes, the Commission should evaluate whether it is necessary to introduce an obligation on the credit rating agency to provide, at the end of the maximum duration period of the contractual relationship, information on the issuer and on the rated financial instruments (a handover file), to the incoming credit rating agency.
Det er hensigtsmæssigt at indføre rotation på kreditvurderingsmarkedet for gensecuritisationer.
It is appropriate to introduce rotation on the credit rating market for re-securitisations.
For det første er det det segment af det europæiske marked for securitisationer, der siden den finansielle krise har klaret sig dårligst, og det er derfor det segment, som det er mest relevant at behandle interessekonflikterne for.
First, that is the segment of the European securitisations market that has underperformed since the financial crisis, and it is therefore the one in which the need to address conflicts of interest is greatest.
For det andet er kreditrisikoen på gensecuritisationer generelt unik for hver transaktion, mens kreditrisikoen på gældsinstrumenter, der eksempelvis udstedes af virksomheder, i høj grad afhænger af selve udstederens evne til at opfylde gældsforpligtelser.
Second, while the credit risk on debt instruments issued by, for instance, corporates to a high degree depends on the debt servicing capacity of the issuer itself, the credit risk on re-securitisations is generally unique to each transaction.
Når der etableres en ny gensecuritisation er risikoen for, at der går viden tabt ved at engagere et nyt kreditvurderingsbureau ikke stor.
Therefore, when a re-securitisation is created the risk of knowledge being lost by hiring a new credit rating agency is not high.
Selv om der med andre ord for øjeblikket kun findes et begrænset antal kreditvurderingsbureauer, der er aktive på kreditvurderingsmarkedet for gensecuritisationer, er dette marked mere åbent for konkurrence, og en rotationsordning kunne være drivkraften til opnåelse af mere dynamik i dette marked.
In other words, although there is currently only a limited number of credit rating agencies active in the credit rating market for re-securitisations, that market is more naturally open to competition and a rotation mechanism could be a driver for creating more dynamics in that market.
Endelig er kreditvurderingsmarkedet for gensecuritisationer domineret af få store kreditvurderingsbureauer, men der er andre aktører, som har opbygget ekspertise på dette område.
Finally, the credit rating market for re-securitisations is dominated by a few large credit rating agencies but there are other players who have been building up expertise in this area.
Regelmæssig rotation af de kreditvurderingsbureauer, der kreditvurderer gensecuritisationer bør gøre det muligt at foretage en mere nuanceret vurdering af kreditværdighed.
Regular rotation of credit rating agencies issuing credit ratings on re-securitisations should bring more diversity to the assessment of creditworthiness.
Når kreditvurderingsbureauerne anvender mange forskellige synspunkter, perspektiver og metoder, bør det resultere i mere nuancerede kreditvurderinger og i sidste instans forbedre vurderingen af gensecuritisationernes kreditværdighed.
Multiple and different views, perspectives and methodologies applied by credit rating agencies should produce more diverse credit ratings and ultimately improve the assessment of the creditworthiness of re-securitisations.
For at udnytte denne nuancering og undgå laden stå til hos såvel initiativtagere som kreditvurderingsbureauer er det nødvendigt at begrænse den maksimale periode, hvori kreditvurderingsbureauet har mulighed for at kreditvurdere gensecuritisationer fra samme initiativtager, til et niveau, som sikrer, at der med jævne mellemrum foretages nye vurderinger af kreditværdigheden.
For such diversity to play a role and to avoid complacency of both originators and credit rating agencies, the maximum period during which the credit rating agency is allowed to rate re-securitisations from the same originator must be restricted to a level that guarantees regular fresh assessments of creditworthiness.
Disse faktorer sammenholdt med behovet for at sikre en vis kontinuitet i tilgangen til kreditvurderinger medfører, at en periode på fire år er passende.
Those factors, together with the need to provide certain continuity of approach to credit ratings, mean that a period of four years is appropriate.
Når der er udnævnt mindst fire kreditvurderingsbureauer, er formålene med rotationsordningen allerede opfyldt, og kravet om rotation bør derfor ikke finde anvendelse.
Where at least four credit rating agencies are appointed, the objectives for a rotation mechanism have already been achieved so the requirement to rotate should not apply.
Med henblik på at sikre reel konkurrence bør en sådan undtagelse kun finde anvendelse, hvis mindst fire af de kreditvurderingsbureauer, der er udnævnt, kreditvurderer en vis andel af initiativtagerens udestående finansielle instrumenter.
In order to ensure real competition, such an exemption should only be applicable where at least four of the appointed credit rating agencies rate a certain proportion of the outstanding financial instruments of the originator.
Det er hensigtsmæssigt at strukturere en rotationsordning for gensecuritisationer omkring initiativtageren.
It is appropriate to structure a rotation mechanism for re-securitisations around the originator.
Gensecuritisationer udstedes af special purpose vehicle-selskaber uden nogen særlige muligheder for at opfylde gældsforpligtelser.
Re-securitisations are issued out of special-purpose vehicles without any significant capacity to service the debt.
En strukturering af rotationen omkring udstederen vil derfor bevirke, at ordningen forbliver ineffektiv.
Therefore, structuring rotation around the issuer would render the mechanism ineffective.
En strukturering af rotationen omkring sponsoren vil derimod indebære, at undtagelsen næsten altid vil finde anvendelse.
Conversely, structuring rotation around the sponsor would mean that the exemption would almost always apply.
En rotationsordning kan være et vigtigt instrument til at reducere hindringerne for at komme ind på kreditvurderingsmarkedet for gensecuritisationer.
A rotation mechanism could be an important tool for lowering the barriers to entry to the credit rating market for re-securitisations.
Samtidigt kunne det dog gøre det vanskeligere for nye markedsaktører at få fodfæste på markedet, idet de ikke ville kunne fastholde deres kunder.
At the same time, however, it could make it more difficult for new market players to secure a foothold in the market because they would not be allowed to hold on to their clients.
Det er derfor hensigtsmæssigt at indføre en undtagelse for rotationsordningen for små kreditvurderingsbureauer.
It is therefore appropriate to introduce an exemption from the rotation mechanism for small credit rating agencies.
For at kunne fungere effektivt skal rotationsordningen håndhæves på en fornuftig måde.
In order to be effective, the rotation mechanism needs to be enforced in a credible manner.
Rotationskravet ville ikke opfylde sit formål, hvis det hidtidige kreditvurderingsbureau i løbet af for kort en periode igen fik lov til at kreditvurdere gensecuritisationer fra den samme initiativtager.
The rotation requirement would not achieve its objectives if the outgoing credit rating agency were allowed to rate re-securitisations from the same originator again within too short a period.
Det er derfor vigtigt at fastsætte en passende periode, hvori det hidtidige kreditvurderingsbureau ikke kan udnævnes til at kreditvurdere gensecuritisationer fra den samme initiativtager.
Therefore, it is important to provide for an appropriate period within which the outgoing credit rating agency cannot be appointed to rate re-securitisations from the same originator again.
Denne periode bør være tilstrækkelig lang til at give det nye kreditvurderingsbureau reel mulighed for at levere sine kreditvurderingstjenester, til at sikre, at gensecuritisationerne rent faktisk analyseres på ny ud fra en anden vinkel, og til at garantere, at der er den fornødne kontinuitet i de kreditvurderinger, der udstedes af det nye kreditvurderingsbureau.
That period should be sufficiently long to allow the incoming credit rating agency to provide its credit rating services effectively, to ensure that the re-securitisations are truly exposed to a new scrutiny under a different approach, and to guarantee that the credit ratings issued by the new credit rating agency provide enough continuity.
For at en rotationsordning kan fungere ordentligt, begrænses periodens længde samtidig til antallet kreditvurderingsbureauer med tilstrækkelig erfaring inden for gensecuritisationer.
At the same time, for a rotation mechanism to function properly, the length of the period is constrained by the supply of credit rating agencies with sufficient expertise in the area of re-securitisations.
Periodens længde bør derfor være rimelig og normalt svare til længden af den udløbne kontrakt for det hidtidige kreditvurderingsbureau, men bør ikke være længere end fire år.
Therefore, the length of the period should be proportionate, should generally be equal to the length of the expired contract of the outgoing credit rating agency but should not exceed four years.
Kravet om en regelmæssig rotation af kreditvurderingsbureauer står i rimeligt forhold til det mål, der forfølges.
Requiring a regular rotation of credit rating agencies is proportionate to the objective pursued.
Kravet gælder kun for registrerede kreditvurderingsbureauer, som er regulerede, og som leverer en ydelse, der er i offentlighedens interesse (kreditvurderinger, der kan anvendes i reguleringsøjemed), efterudsteder betaler-modellen og for en bestemt aktivklasse (gensecuritisationer).
The requirement only applies to registered credit rating agencies, which are regulated and which provide a service affecting the public interest (credit ratings that can be used for regulatory purposes) under the issuer-pays model and for a particular asset class (re-securitisations).
Det privilegium, det er at opnå anerkendelse for den vigtige rolle, kreditvurderingsbureauets ydelser spiller for reguleringen af markedet for finansielle tjenesteydelser, og bureauets godkendelse til at varetage denne funktion, indebærer til gengæld, at bureauet skal opfylde visse forpligtelser for at sikre, at det under alle omstændigheder er uafhængigt og også anses for at være det.
The privilege of having its services recognised as playing an important role in the regulation of the financial services market and being approved to carry out this function, gives rise to the need to respect certain obligations in order to guarantee independence and the perception of independence in all circumstances.
Et kreditvurderingsbureau, der forhindres i at kreditvurdere gensecuritisationer fra en bestemt initiativtager, vil stadig have ret til at kreditvurdere gensecuritisationer fra andre initiativtagere såvel som andre aktivklasser.
A credit rating agency which is prevented from rating re-securitisations from a particular originator would still be allowed to rate re-securitisations from other originators as well as rating other asset classes.
I en markedssituation, hvor rotationsreglen gælder for alle deltagere, vil der opstå nye forretningsmuligheder, fordi alle kreditvurderingsbureauer skal rotere.
In a market context where the rotation rule applies to all participants, business opportunities will arise since all credit rating agencies would need to rotate.
Kreditvurderingsbureauerne vil desuden altid kunne udstede uopfordrede kreditvurderinger af gensecuritisationer fra den samme initiativtager og derved drage fordel af deres erfaringer.
Moreover, credit rating agencies can always issue unsolicited credit ratings on re-securitisations from the same originator capitalising on their experience.
Uopfordrede kreditvurderinger er ikke bundet af udsteder betaler-modellen og påvirkes derfor teoretisk mindre af potentielle interessekonflikter.
Unsolicited credit ratings are not constrained by the issuer-pays model and therefore are theoretically less affected by potential conflicts of interest.
Reglerne om, hvor længe kontraktforholdet med et kreditvurderingsbureau må vare, og kravet om, at der skal engageres mere end et kreditvurderingsbureau, udgør også begrænsninger af retten til fri erhvervsudøvelse for alle kreditvurderingsbureauernes kunder.
For the clients of credit rating agencies, the maximum duration of the contractual relationship with a credit rating agency and the requirement to employ more than one credit rating agency also represent restrictions on their freedom to conduct their own business.
Disse restriktioner er imidlertid nødvendige i offentlighedens interesse, fordi udsteder betaler-modellen kan gøre det vanskeligt for kreditvurderingsbureauerne at bevare den uafhængighed, der er nødvendig for at sikre uafhængige kreditvurderinger, som investorerne kan anvende i reguleringsøjemed.
However, those restrictions are necessary on public-interest grounds considering the interference by the issuer-pays model with the necessary independence of credit rating agencies to guarantee independent credit ratings that can be used by investors for regulatory purposes.
Restriktionen går heller ikke ud over, hvad der er nødvendigt og bør snarere anses for at forbedre gensecuritisationens kreditværdighed i forhold til andre parter og i sidste instans markedet.
At the same time, those restrictions do not go beyond what is necessary and should rather be seen as increasing the creditworthiness of re-securitisations towards other parties, and ultimately the market.