natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For at sikre en meget konservativ vurdering antager Kommissionen hypotetisk, at SACE ikke ville få nogen del af sin kapitalinvestering i SACE BT tilbage.
The Commission concludes that the second measure provided an advantage to SACE BT corresponding to the difference between the fee actually paid by SACE BT and that, at least 10 % higher, that a private reinsurer would have requested taking into consideration the higher level of risk assumed.
For at vurdere den relative fordel ved tilførslen af 70 mio. EUR til SACE BT i forhold til et likvidationsscenario skal selskabets værdi (dvs. markedsværdien af en aktiepost på 100 % i selskabet) efter denne tilførsel af 70 mio. EUR vurderes.
Presence of an advantage in the third and fourth measures
En sådan værdi af selskabet afhænger af estimeringen af den nuværende værdi af fremtidige pengestrømme (cash flow) til aktionæren.
As acknowledged by the Italian authorities, the third and the fourth measures cover the needs of capital of SACE BT in order to cope with the effects of the financial crisis [112].
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at der ikke var tegn på, at markedsværdien af SACE BT efter gennemførelsen af den tredje og fjerde foranstaltning kunne være lig med eller højere end 70 mio. EUR, idet der ikke forelå prognoser af de forventede pengestrømme for selskabet.
In the document for discussion (materiale per discussione) in the SACE BT's Board of Directors of 31 March 2009 it is provided that SACE BT ‘needs a recapitalisation (ricapitalizzazione) of up to EUR 70 million in order to constitute adequate assets to cover the reserves at the end of 2009’ [113].
Som følge deraf ville en forsigtig privat investor have foretrukket at lade SACE BT gå konkurs (eller sælge det, hvis man kunne finde en køber) i stedet for at fortsætte med rekapitalisering heraf.
The same document provides that already at the end of the first semester of 2009 the assets were insufficient to cover the reserves, i.e. an amount of EUR 23 million was needed at the end of June 2009 and EUR 68 million at the end of 2009.
Også denne yderligere analyse viser altså, at SACE ikke handlede som en markedsøkonomisk investor, da det tildelte den tredje og fjerde foranstaltning.
The opening decision indicates that it seems that SACE BT was not in a position to cover the losses registered at the end of 2008 and its assets at the time were not sufficient to cover reserves.
Som et sekundært argument kan en investor have anvendt en anden indikator til at værdiansætte selskabet, f.eks. multiplikation af et price/book-forhold beregnet for sammenlignelige børsnoterede selskaber med selskabets regnskabsværdi.
It seems that SACE BT could not have raised the capital injected into the company on the market since its expected profitability was insufficient.
Så vidt Kommissionen er bekendt, er Euler-Hermes det eneste europæiske børsnoterede kreditforsikringsselskab, og derfor kan dets price/book-forhold ses.
There is no evidence that SACE BT had a positive value at that time.
Price/book-forholdet for Euler-Hermes var pr. første kvartal 2009 ca. 0,60 [125].
In recital 108 of the opening decision, the Commission invited Italy to comment, whether the third measure was necessary to allow SACE BT to continue operating and, if so, what would be the estimated costs that could be incurred by SACE, if it were to sell or to liquidate SACE BT.
Hvis dette forhold anvendes på SACE BT's forventede regnskabsværdi ved udgangen af 2009 på 94,2 mio. EUR, ville selskabets værdi beløbe sig til 56,52 mio. EUR, hvis selskabernes risikoprofiler var sammenlignelige.
The Commission noted that a parent company would have recapitalised its subsidiary, but only if there is a reasonable likelihood that the assisted undertaking will become profitable again [114].
Kommissionen bemærker dog, at SACE BT ikke var rentabelt før krisen (i strid med dets forretningsplan), og at der ikke forelå en forretningsplan, som påviste, at det igen ville blive rentabelt.
A market economy investor would not have injected additional capital into SACE BT, if in economic terms this was more costly than to liquidate the respective assets (e.g. by selling the respective investment).
Det kan derfor betragtes som et selskab med betydelig større risikoeksponering end Euler-Hermes på daværende tidspunkt, og derfor ville selskabets værdi, da foranstaltningerne blev tildelt, have været betydeligt lavere end 56,52 mio. EUR.
In recitals 111 and 117 of the opening decision, the Commission raised doubts on the compliance of the third and fourth measures with the MEIP.
Endvidere anerkendte Italien også, at forholdene på markedet betød, at markedsværdien af forsikringsselskaberne på de daværende tidspunkter var meget lav [126].
The Commission further provided that the two measures seemed to have conferred an advantage to SACE BT.
Endelig ville værdiansættelse baseret på et price/book-forhold — ligesom værdiansættelse baseret på fremtidige pengestrømme — også få en privat investor til at konkludere, at det ville være bedre at lade datterselskabet gå konkurs i stedet for at investere yderligere 70 mio. EUR i det.
The opening decision (recital 109) indicates that the plan available at the time of the investment plays a central role.
I medfør af ovennævnte analyse kan det derfor også konkluderes, at SACE stod i en ringere position, efter at det havde tildelt tredje og fjerde foranstaltning, end i likvidationsscenariet.
The plan has a key significance because a private investor will provide fresh capital to a company with an earnings deficit only if he expects a return to a sufficient profitability level.
Denne ville sikre sig, at der var håb om, at selskabet en dag kunne blive tilstrækkeligt rentabelt.
SACE BT expected to increase its market share in the credit insurance and surety business market up to a target level of 15 % in 2011 and to become the second market player in the credit insurance by 2011.
Kommissionen bemærker, at der i 2009 ikke blev udarbejdet finansielle prognoser, som viser, hvordan rentabilitet ville blive opnået.
For 2009, SACE BT estimated that it would rank third or fourth in the credit insurance and surety business market.
En forsigtig investor ville under disse omstændigheder ikke have investeret et så stort yderligere beløb i selskabet.
As for SACE BT's distribution network, the plan provides, inter alia, the assessment of possible opportunities for further acquisitions.
SACE hævder, at SACE BT stadig var i startfasen, og at det derfor var vanskeligere for selskabet at imødegå virkningerne af finanskrisen.
Moreover, the business plan relies, inter alia, on exogenous factors like the improvement of the economic and market scenario and a progressive opening of the reinsurance market starting with 2011 rather than on internal changes.
Kommissionen bemærker for det første, at 2008 — det år, hvor finanskrisen brød ud — allerede var det fjerde driftsår for SACE BT.
The elements submitted by Italy and SACE during the formal investigation procedure have not changed the Commission's initial assessment laid down in the opening decision.
Som udgangspunkt betragtes en virksomhed som en nyoprettet virksomhed i de første tre år efter påbegyndelsen af dens aktiviteter på det relevante forretningsområde [127].
The Commission's position regarding the qualification of the third and the fourth measures as a capital increase (‘aumenti di capitale’) has not changed.
Selv om SACE BT så stadig var i opstartsfasen, er det for det andet ikke indlysende, hvilken betydning dette ville have haft på anvendelsen af MEIP.
Even though according to Italy the operation did not increase the amount of the share capital (‘capitale sociale’), the Commission notes that it influenced positively the shareholders' equity (‘patrimonio netto’), being a wider category than the share capital (‘capitale sociale’), by means of transfer from the parent company SACE to SACE BT's capital [117].
En privat investor ville stadig sammenligne selskabets forventede markedsværdi efter rekapitaliseringen (baseret på dets forventede rentabilitet) med den værdi, der kunne opnås, hvis man lod selskabet gå konkurs eller solgte det.
According to SACE, the decisions to recapitalise SACE BT were taken in view of the expected return to profitability in 2011.
Italien og SACE påviste ikke, at SACE kunne forvente øget rentabilitet i fremtiden, fordi SACE BT stadig var i opstartsfasen.
However, the Commission recalls that, when it granted the third measure, SACE did not dispose of updated financial projections or a business plan taking into account the capital injection and the latest financial data.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at den tredje og fjerde foranstaltning giver SACE BT en fordel ved at tilføre det kapital, det ikke kunne have fundet på markedet.
Therefore, SACE had no basis to expect SACE BT's return to profitability.
Denne kapital gav selskabet mulighed for at overleve, selv om der ikke forelå prognoser, der viste, at det kunne blive rentabelt, end ikke på lang sigt.
The main document considered by SACE when granting the fourth measure consists of the business plan for 2010-2011.
Tilregnelse til staten og statsmidler
The Commission notes that this business plan was a very short document, which merely set out the negative outlook in the market and, with specific regard to SACE BT, only provided few main financial ratios and figures for 2010 and 2011.
I betragtning 73-78 i indledningsafgørelsen anvendte Kommissionen kriterierne fra Stardust Marine-sagen [128] til at påvise, at foranstaltningen skal tilregnes staten, eftersom SACE ejes fuldt ud af staten.
In particular, the business plan provided data illustrating that the market situation was worsening (the loss ratio was progressively deteriorating, increased by 71,4 % in 2008 as compared to 2007) and the losses amounted to approximately half of the turnover of the sector.
Selv om staten nemlig er i stand til at kontrollere en offentlig virksomhed og udøve en dominerende indflydelse på dennes transaktioner, er der ikke uden videre formodning for, at den faktisk udøver denne kontrol i et konkret tilfælde, jf. retspraksis (navnlig Stardust Marine-dommen).
In that context, the plan projected a significant improvement in SACE BT's credit insurance ratios so as to reach zero profitability in 2011 (see Table 5).
Det er derfor også nødvendigt at undersøge, om de offentlige myndigheder på den ene eller den anden måde må anses for at være impliceret i vedtagelsen af den pågældende foranstaltning.
However, it did not detail the changes to the pricing or how the reduction of costs would be achieved to that end.
For det andet er det normalt meget vanskeligt for tredjemand, netop på grund af de privilegerede forbindelser mellem staten og de offentlige virksomheder, at påvise i et konkret tilfælde, at en offentlig virksomhed har truffet støtteforanstaltninger efter anvisning fra offentlige myndigheder.
It also appears from the minutes of the Board of Directors of SACE approving the third and fourth measures that it agreed to the capitalisation measures so as to cover the losses and to satisfy the regulatory requirements, thus allowing the company to continue the business.
Af disse grunde må det antages, at en støtteforanstaltning, som er truffet af en offentlig virksomhed, efter omstændighederne kan tilregnes staten på grundlag af en bedømmelse af sagens omstændigheder som helhed og den sammenhæng, hvori foranstaltningen er truffet.«
No consideration of the future profitability of the company was provided in those minutes.
Domstolen har anført følgende kriterier, der kan anvendes til at afgøre, om en stat kan tilregnes en støtteforanstaltning, der er truffet af en offentlig virksomhed:
The Board did not take into consideration a potential liquidation of SACE BT, comparing a liquidation scenario with the chosen path to inject further capital into the company in difficulty.
at den pågældende virksomhed ikke kunne træffe den anfægtede beslutning uden at tage hensyn til kravene fra de offentlige myndigheder;
Hence, it did not require nor consider any estimation of liquidation costs and, therefore, was not in a position to conclude that the injection of capital would have led to a better economic outcome than the liquidation of the company.
at de offentlige virksomheder, gennem hvem støtten var ydet, var forpligtet til, ud over de organisatoriske forhold, hvorved de offentlige virksomheder var knyttet til staten, at tage hensyn til direktiverne fra en statslig myndighed, dvs. Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica (CIPE);
As a result, the Commission concludes that, when adopting those measures, SACE did not assess whether providing the additional capital was a more economically beneficial scenario for it as a shareholder than the liquidation of the subsidiary.
integration af den offentlige virksomhed i den offentlige forvaltning;
Given the market circumstances and the absence of any profitability forecasts for SACE BT at the time, a prudent private market operator would not have proceeded with the investment without such consideration.
karakteren af virksomhedens aktiviteter, og om disse udøves på markedet under normale konkurrencevilkår med deltagelse fra private erhvervsdrivende;
For this reason alone, one can therefore conclude that SACE did not behave like a prudent private market operator and, therefore, the capital injections made with the third and fourth measure should be qualified as state aid.
Kommissionen konkluderede videre i indledningsafgørelsens betragtning 79, at det var meget usandsynligt, at de omhandlede foranstaltninger ville være blevet vedtaget uden statens deltagelse.
To answer Member States' claims that these capital injections cannot be considered as aid as they are merely fulfilling a legal obligation, the MEIP Communication provides that private investors faced with such a situation would consider all other options — including the liquidation or run-down [119] — and choose the one which is financially the most advantageous.
Som svar på indledningsafgørelsen fastholder Italien og SACE, at ingen af de fire foranstaltninger kan tilregnes staten, da beslutningerne blev truffet af SACE, som handlede i fuld uafhængighed af staten.
In the present case, the Commission considers that SACE could have let SACE BT go bankrupt, as it was a limited liability company.
Italien fremlagde yderligere oplysninger og argumenter, hvori det hævdede, at foranstaltningerne ikke kunne tilregnes staten.
SACE would not have to cover the liabilities of SACE BT.
Ved vurderingen af den retspraksis, som Italien citerer, skal det bemærkes, at Kommissionen i Olympic Airways-sagen nævnte kriterierne fra Stardust Marine-sagen, men i realiteten ikke anvendte dem.
SACE is correct to argue that other considerations like public image [120] may be taken into account by private investors.
Domstolen bemærkede, at Kommissionen blot antog, at foranstaltningen kunne tilregnes den græske stat, uden at nævne nogen begrundelse for denne antagelse [129].
The Court of Justice ruled in ENI/Lanerossi that a parent company's temporary absorption of losses generated by a subsidiary ‘which is experiencing temporary difficulties but is capable of becoming profitable again, possibly after a reorganization’, could be justified not only by the prospect of an indirect material benefit, but also by other considerations, i.e. the protection of public image of the group and the reorientation of its operations [121].
Med hensyn til dommen i SIC-RTP-sagen [130], som de italienske myndigheder henviser til, bemærker Kommissionen, at Retten med sin dom bekræftede Kommissionens vurdering, nemlig at visse anfægtede beslutninger truffet af det tidligere statsejede selskab Portugal Telecom (som omfattede accept af forsinkede gebyrbetalinger fra den offentlige tv-virksomhed RTP) ikke kunne tilregnes staten.
Consequently, as upheld by the case-law, the arguments have limited significance in connection with the application of the private investor test in the absence of any prediction, at the time of the capital injections, that SACE BT could produce profits after 2011, not even in the longer term.
CFI-dommen var dog baseret på denne sags særlige omstændigheder.
In addition, Italy and SACE did not provide any element to show and quantify the negative economic effects that the alleged deterioration of SACE's public image would produce for this company.
I SIC-RTP-sagen konstaterede Retten bl.a., at sagsøgeren ikke bestred Kommissionens vurdering, hvorefter henstanden med betalingen hovedsageligt skyldtes en tvist mellem RTP og Portugal Telecom om niveauet for afgiften [131].
The Commission also observes that the insurance activities of SACE are operated under a state guarantee.
Retten konstaterede endvidere, at Kommissionen uden at blive modsagt af sagsøgeren gjorde det gældende, at Portugal Telecoms adfærd ikke ændredes efter dets privatisering [132].
Consequently, the insured parties know that the state will ensure that they are paid any indemnification they are entitled to under those insurances.
Det er derfor klart, at Rettens vurdering vedrørte en særlig situation, som var meget forskellig fra denne situation.
So the Commission fails to see why insured customers of SACE would be worried that a subsidiary of SACE which is not state guaranteed and has the form of a liability company is liquidated.
Kommissionen fandt endvidere bevis for, at foranstaltningerne kunne tilregnes staten, i de supplerende dokumenter, som Italien og SACE indgav.
Italy and SACE did not provide justification why these activities of SACE operated under the state guarantee would be affected.
Ligesom i indledningsafgørelsen anvendes kriterierne fra Stardust Marine i denne afgørelse til at bevise, at den anden, tredje og fjerde foranstaltning kan tilregnes staten.
Moreover, the Commission considers that, since SACE operates its insurance activities with a state guarantee, they do not constitute market activities which a private operator could carry out (precisely, the guarantee on the insurance activities of SACE does not constitute aid because these activities are considered not to be offered by the market and therefore there is no distortion of competition).
Selv om SACE ikke er integreret i den offentlige forvaltning og ikke udøver offentlig myndighed, finder Kommissionen, at følgende generelle kriterier påviser, at de foranstaltninger, som SACE tildelte, kan tilregnes staten [133]:
The Commission considers that, when assessing whether a private investor in the position of SACE would have let a subsidiary like SACE BT go bankrupt or recapitalise it, one cannot take into account the possible negative effect of the liquidation of SACE BT on these non-market activities carried out by SACE, since a private investor would never be in the position of carrying out such activities.
Alle medlemmer af SACE's bestyrelse (»Consiglio di Amministrazione«) udpeges på forslag af den italienske stat, jf. artikel 6, stk. 2, i lovdekret nr. 269/2003 [134].
As indicated, at the time when it took the third and the fourth measure SACE did not compare a liquidation scenario with the chosen path to inject further capital into SACE BT despite its difficulties.
SACE udøver ikke sine aktiviteter »på markedet under normale konkurrencevilkår med deltagelse fra private erhvervsdrivende«:
For the sake of completeness, in the paragraphs below the Commission will in any event show that, if SACE had made such a comparison, it would have realised that the liquidation of SACE BT would have been more convenient than injecting further 70 million of capital in SACE BT despite its difficulties.
SACE's regnskaber kontrolleres af Revisionsretten, og økonomi- og finansministeriet skal fremlægge årsberetninger om dets aktiviteter for det italienske parlament.
The Commission observes that at the end of May 2009 and early July 2009, when the Board of SACE BT decided to grant the third and fourth measures, it was already expected that, on top of the large losses recorded in 2008 (EUR 29,5 million), SACE BT was estimated to generate further significant losses in 2009 (of EUR 53,4 million [123]), such that the remaining capital at the end of 2009 was expected to amount to EUR 24,2 million.
Med hensyn til statens indflydelse på fordelingen af SACE's ressourcer skal CIPE hvert år inden den 30. juni vurdere de finansielle prognoser og de finansielle behov i forbindelse med bestemte risici og definere globale grænser for risici, der accepteres af SACE for garantiperioder, der er kortere og længere end 24 måneder [135].
In particular, at the end of first quarter 2009 (1Q2009) SACE BT's book value of equity (taking into account the losses recorded in that period of EUR 22,6 million) was of EUR 55 million and the expected losses for the whole year 2009 were of EUR 53,4 million.
I henhold til SACE BT's vedtægter er SACE BT i tillæg til de juridiske bestemmelser, der almindeligvis gælder for private forsikringsselskaber, også underlagt en lovgivningsbestemmelse [136] om, at SACE ikke må besidde mere end 30 % af kapitalen, hvis en ny juridisk enhed etableres med henblik på at dække markedsmæssige risici.
Hence, in a pre-injection scenario the expected book value of equity at the end of 2009 would amount to the difference between book value at 1Q2009, EUR 55 million, and the remainder of the expected losses for the year, i.e. EUR 30,8 million (EUR 53,4 million minus EUR 22,6 million), equalling EUR 24,2 million.
Selv efter etableringen af SACE BT havde den italienske stat tilsyneladende stadig indflydelse på den støtte, som selskabet løbende fik tildelt (anden, tredje og fjerde foranstaltning), for så vidt ovennævnte lovgivningsbestemmelse udelukkede, at sådanne risici som helhed kunne afvikles og/eller sælges til en markedsoperatør [137].
In the post-injection scenario, the book value of the equity would be expected to be increased by the amount of the recapitalisations (EUR 70 million) and to amount to EUR 94,2 million.
Ud over de generelle kriterier, der er nævnt i betragtning 177, kan andre kriterier, der er specifikke for tildelingen af den anden, tredje og fjerde foranstaltning, identificeres:
In that context, it has to be noted that in the liquidation scenario, shareholders are only entitled to the residual proceeds, if any remain after covering all liabilities of the company and all due costs of liquidation.
To af de fire medlemmer (»Consiglieri«) af SACE's bestyrelse (»Consiglio di Amministrazione«) besad ledende stillinger i den italienske forvaltning [138], nemlig det tidligere ministerium for udenrigshandel (det nuværende ministerium for økonomisk udvikling) og udenrigsministeriet, da den anden, tredje og fjerde foranstaltning blev tildelt.
The outcome of the liquidation depends on the value and saleability of the assets of the company.
Den rolle, som moderselskabet, SACE, og de øvrige selskaber i gruppen — og dermed SACE BT — spillede, blev anerkendt som vigtig for genoprettelsen af den italienske økonomi.
To make a very conservative assessment, the Commission considers the hypothesis that in the liquidation scenario SACE would not have recovered any of its capital investment in SACE BT.
På sit møde den 1. april 2009 anerkendte SACE's bestyrelse betydningen af at støtte SACE BT, således at SACE-gruppen opfylder sin institutionelle funktion til støtte for italienske virksomheder [141].
As a next step, in order to assess the relative attractiveness of the injection of EUR 70 million of capital in SACE BT compared to a liquidation scenario, it has to be assessed what was the value of the company (i.e. market value of a 100 % equity stake in the company) after this EUR 70 million injection.
Sådanne erklæringer bekræfter ovennævnte konklusion om, at SACE's aktiviteter ikke kun er profitorienterede og underlagt normale konkurrencevilkår [143].
If the value of the company after the 2009 capital injections was equal or higher than EUR 70 million, then a private investor could have been inclined to proceed with this investment.