natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Den styres af en organisk lov, og dens vedtægter er godkendt ved kongelig anordning.
It is governed by an organic law and its Statute is approved by royal decree.
Direktøren og ledelsen udnævnes af kongen.
The Governor and Directors are appointed by the King.
ELA er derfor en statslig foranstaltning, der er tildelt ved hjælp af statsmidler i henhold til artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF.
The ELA thus constitutes a measure of the State granted through State resources within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
BdF er en institution, hvis kapital ejes af staten.
The BdF is an institution whose capital belongs to the State.
Uafhængigt af det primære mål om prisstabilitet støtter BdF regeringens generelle økonomiske politik og varetager de opgaver, som staten eller tredjepart beder den om med statens godkendelse.
Subject to the main objective of price stability, the BdF supports the government’s general economic policy and provides services requested by the State or carried out for third parties with the State’s agreement.
Den ELA-foranstaltning, der er udbetalt til DCL, og den, der er udbetalt til DBB/Belfius indtil Dexias afhændelse heraf til den belgiske stat, er en selektiv foranstaltning tildelt Dexia, som giver Dexia en fordel ved at tildele den en finansiering, som den ikke længere kan skaffe på markedet i lyset af sine alvorlige vanskeligheder, især med hensyn til likviditet.
The ELA paid to DCL and that paid to DBB/Belfius until Dexia sold it to the Belgian State is a measure selectively granted to Dexia, which gives it an advantage in that it provides funding which Dexia is no longer able to obtain on the market because of the serious problems it faces, particularly as regards liquidity.
På samme måde er ELA-foranstaltningen, der er udbetalt til DBB/Belfius efter Dexias afhændelse heraf til den belgiske stat, en selektiv foranstaltning tildelt DBB/Belfius, som har givet den en fordel ved at skaffe den en finansiering, som den ikke kunne finde på markedet.
Similarly, the ELA paid to DBB/Belfius after Dexia sold it to the Belgian State is a measure selectively granted to DBB/Belfius, which has given it an advantage by providing it with funding no longer available to it on the market.
I forbindelse med Dexia-koncernens alvorlige likviditetsproblemer fortsatte DBB/Belfius efter afhændelsen desuden med at tegne obligationer udstedt af DCL.
Moreover, in the context of the Dexia Group’s serious liquidity problems, DBB/Belfius continued, after it was sold, to subscribe to the bonds issued by DCL.
ELA befordrede denne investering, mens DBB/Belfius' konkurrenter ikke havde denne mulighed.
The ELA enabled it to make this investment, whereas that facility was not available to its competitors.
Da Dexia er aktiv i flere medlemsstater og, for så vidt angår størstedelen af dens aktiviteter, i konkurrence med andre finansielle institutioner i hele EU, har den ELA-foranstaltning, Dexia har fået tildelt, fordrejet konkurrencen og påvirket samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
As Dexia is active in a number of Member States and in competition, for most of its activities, with other financial institutions operating across the European Union, the ELA granted to it distorted competition and affected trade between Member States.
På lignende vis havde DBB/Belfius efter afhændelsen ELA som en kilde til finansiering, uden hvilken den ikke havde kunnet fortsætte sine aktiviteter (især tegne finansielle instrumenter udstedt af DCL), og som derfor gav den en konkurrencefordrejende fordel.
Similarly, the ELA gave DBB/Belfius, after it was sold, a source of funding without which it could not have continued its activities (particularly subscribing to financial instruments issued by DCL), and which thus gave it an advantage that distorted competition.
Den er en stor belgisk bank og er i konkurrence med andre finansielle institutioner i hele EU.
It is a major bank in Belgium and is in competition with other financial institutions operating across the European Union.
Denne fordel har dermed påvirket samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
This advantage has thus affected trade between Member States.
Derfor og uanset de fordringsporteføljer, som blev givet i pant af DBB/Belfius og DCL, mener Kommissionen, at ELA-foranstaltningerne indebærer statsstøtte.
Consequently, and notwithstanding the debt portfolios provided as security by DBB/Belfius and DCL, the Commission considers that the ELAs contain State aid.
Støtte, der hidrører fra salget af DBB/Belfius til den belgiske stat
Aid from the sale of DBB/Belfius to the Belgian State
Desuden kan transaktionen ligeledes afsløre støtte til fordel for den solgte enhed (DBB/Belfius).
Furthermore, the transaction may also prove to involve aid for the entity sold (DBB/Belfius).
Denne støtte føjer sig til den støtte, der blev draget i tvivl, og som var genstand for den betingede godkendelsesafgørelse, og som DBB/Belfius allerede havde nydt godt af som enhed i Dexia-koncernen (se afsnit 6.1.1, betragtning 387-405), og til den ELA, som DBB/Belfius modtog (se litra b) i dette afsnit).
This aid is on top of the aid — in question here — which was the subject of the conditional authorisation decision and from which DBB/Belfius has already benefited as an entity of the Dexia Group (see Section 6.1.1, recitals 387-405), and the ELA received by DBB/Belfius (see point (b) in the current section).
Støtte til fordel for sælgeren
Aid for the vendor
Den belgiske stats køb af aktier i DBB/Belfius er finansieret med statsmidler (fra SFPI).
The transaction by which the Belgian State acquired shares in DBB/Belfius was financed by State resources (from the SFPI).
Den belgiske stat greb ind til fordel for Dexia og/eller dens datterselskaber på betingelser og vilkår, som ikke ville være acceptable for en privat investor, der handler på normale markedsvilkår.
The Belgian State intervened to help Dexia and/or its subsidiaries under terms and conditions which would not be acceptable to a private investor operating under normal market conditions.
Sælgeren Dexia nyder godt af de statsmidler, der hidrører fra den for høje pris, der blev betalt af Belgien for købet af DBB/Belfius.
The vendor, Dexia, received State resources as a result of the excessively high price paid by Belgium to acquire DBB/Belfius.
Endvidere bemærker Kommissionen, at betingelserne for DBB/Belfius-transaktionen indeholder kontraktlige forpligtelser for DBB/Belfius og/eller for den belgiske stat, som er fordelagtige for Dexia/DCL, og som under normale markedsvilkår havde nedbragt transaktionsprisen.
The Commission further observes that the conditions for the DBB/Belfius transaction involved contractual obligations for DBB/Belfius and/or the Belgian State which were advantageous for Dexia/DCL and which, under normal market conditions, would have reduced the transaction price.
Disse forpligtelser er ordningen for et prissupplement, aftalen om finansiering mellem DBB/Belfius og DCL/Dexia og den belgiske stats immunisering af Dexia-koncernen mod enhver risiko for tab, der er knyttet til porteføljerne i Arco, Ethias og Holding Communal.
These obligations are the price supplement mechanism, the finance agreement between DBB/Belfius and DCL/Dexia, and the Belgian State’s immunisation of the Dexia Group against any risk of loss associated with outstanding loans to Arco, Ethias and Holding Communal.
For det første erkender Kommissionen, hvad angår ordningen for et prissupplement, at det er normalt ved banksalg, at der findes ordninger for prissupplement alt efter den solgte aktivitets fremtidige resultater.
First of all, as regards the price supplement mechanism, the Commission recognises that it is usual in bank sales for there to be price adjustment mechanisms depending on the future performance of the activity sold.
Kommissionen bemærker dog, at ordningen i det foreliggende tilfælde er af uforholdsmæssig størrelse.
The Commission points out, however, that in this particular case the mechanism is disproportionate.
Især den kendsgerning, at den belgiske stat forpligter sig til at tilbagebetale den fulde merværdi, betyder, at den accepterer at løbe en stor risiko (køb for 4 mia. EUR) ved at give afkald på enhver betaling for denne risiko (og uden godtgørelse af finansieringsomkostningerne).
In particular, the fact that the Belgian State undertook to repay 100 % of the capital gains means that it agreed to take a very large risk (acquisition for EUR 4 billion) while waiving any remuneration for that risk (and without reimbursement of its financing costs).
En sådan tilbagebetaling af merværdien ville derfor ikke blive accepteret af en privat investor uden en betydelig justering af salgsprisen.
A private investor would never have agreed to repay the capital gains without a significant reduction in the sale price.
Ifølge de oplysninger, som Belgien og rådgivningsbanken har indsendt, og på baggrund af markedsdata kan ordningen for prissupplement vurderes til mellem 40 mio. EUR og 150 mio. EUR.
According to the information provided by Belgium and its consultant bank, and on the basis of market figures, the price supplement mechanism can be valued at between EUR 40 million and EUR 150 million.
For det andet indeholder det tilbud, som den belgiske stat gav Dexia-koncernen, en progressiv nedsættelse af finansieringen af DBB/Belfius i retning af resten af koncernen og især Dexia SA og DCL.
Second, the bid formulated by the Belgian State to the Dexia Group includes a gradual reduction in the funding provided by DBB/Belfius for the rest of the Group, particularly Dexia SA and DCL.
Denne nedsættelse er dog ikke ledsaget af en klar og bindende forfaldsplan.
However, no clear and binding timetable is given for this reduction.
Kommissionen mener ikke, at nogen privat investor ville have accepteret på disse vilkår at købe en bank, der beholder en så stor eksponering for Dexia og dens datterselskaber, en koncern i store vanskeligheder, uden en justering af salgsprisen.
The Commission considers that no private investor would have agreed to buy under these conditions a bank that retained such a substantial exposure to Dexia and its subsidiaries, a group in major difficulties, without a reduction in the sale price.
For det tredje ville den belgiske stats immunisering af Dexia-koncernen mod enhver risiko for tab knyttet til udeståendet i Arco, Ethias og Holding Communal, som det fremgår af den belgiske stats tilbud til Dexia, der blev offentliggjort den 10. oktober 2011, ikke have været acceptabel for en fornuftig investor.
Third, the Belgian State’s immunisation of the Dexia Group against any risk of loss associated with outstanding loans to Arco, Ethias and Holding Communal, as shown in the Belgian State’s bid to Dexia published on 10 October 2011, would not have been acceptable to an informed investor.
Der mindes om, som angivet i indledningsbeslutningen om salget af DBB/Belfius [123] og bekræftet i den midlertidige godkendelsesbeslutning [124] og beslutningen om udvidelse af proceduren [125], at salget af DBB/Belfius til den belgiske stat på for Dexia fordelagtige vilkår er en støtteforanstaltning, som skal ses som led i de berørte medlemsstaters indførelse af en samling af supplerende strukturelle foranstaltninger til fordel for Dexia (om hvilke Kommissionen på tidspunktet for vedtagelsen af indledningsbeslutningen om salget af DBB/Belfius endnu ikke var tilstrækkelig præcist informeret, men som senere viste sig at være refinansieringsgarantien, ELA-foranstaltningen og de foranstaltninger, der indgik i den reviderede plan for en velordnet afvikling af Dexia), som ikke ville have været acceptable for en fornuftig investor.
As stated in the opening decision on the sale of DBB/Belfius [123] and confirmed by the temporary approval decision [124] and the decision to extend the procedure [125], the sale of DBB/Belfius to the Belgian State under conditions that were advantageous to Dexia is an aid measure which forms part of the introduction by the Member States concerned of a serious of additional structural measures to help Dexia (about which the Commission did not yet have enough accurate information when it adopted the opening decision on the sale of DBB/Belfius, but which subsequently turned out to be the refinancing guarantee, the ELA and the measures provided for in the revised orderly resolution plan for Dexia), which would not have been acceptable to an informed investor.
Det følger heraf, at købet af DBB/Belfius ikke kan adskilles fra de øvrige støtteforanstaltninger til fordel for Dexia [126].
It follows that the purchase of DBB/Belfius cannot be seen in isolation from the other support measures provided for Dexia [126].
Således burde prisen på DBB have været justeret nedad for at tage højde for de forpligtelser, der er nævnt i betragtning 441-445, og som kom Dexia/DCL til gode.
The price of DBB should therefore have been adjusted downwards to take account of the obligations described in recitals 441-445 which benefited Dexia/DCL.
Kommissionen mener derfor, at salgsprisen på DBB/Belfius var overvurderet og højere, end en privat investor ville have accepteret.
The Commission thus considers that the sale price of DBB/Belfius was overvalued and higher than a private investor would have accepted.
Støtten til DCL/Dexia kan derfor skønnes til et beløb af mellem 1 og 2 mia. EUR.
The aid for DCL/Dexia can thus be estimated at somewhere between EUR 1 billion and EUR 2 billion.
Dexia er i konkurrence med udenlandske koncerner, så samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne er påvirket, og dette salg til en for høj pris fordrejer konkurrencen.
Dexia is in competition with foreign groups, so that trade between Member States has been affected and the sale at too high a price has distorted competition.
Støtte til fordel for DBB/Belfius
Aid for DBB/Belfius
Kommissionen mener, at det er fastslået, at den belgiske stat ikke opførte sig som en fornuftig investor i en markedsøkonomi, da den erhvervede DBB/Belfius, idet salgsprisen var højere end markedsværdien, og den belgiske stat købte DBB/Belfius for at undgå en forværring af den finansielle situation i koncernen og dermed det belgiske finansielle system.
The Commission considers that it has been established that the Belgian State did not behave like an informed market economy investor when it acquired DBB/Belfius since the sale price was higher than the market value and the Belgian State acquired DBB/Belfius to prevent the financial situation of the Group and therefore of the Belgian financial system from deteriorating.
Kommissionen bemærkede allerede i sin indledningsbeslutning, at det ville være meget usandsynligt, at en privat investor overtog bankkoncernen, på grund af den forlangte pris og eksponeringen for DCL/Dexia, som kun skulle reduceres gradvis.
The Commission already noted in its opening decision that it was highly unlikely that a private investor would take the banking group over because of the asking price and because of its exposure to DCL/Dexia, which would be only gradually reduced.
Kommissionen bemærker også, at DBB/Belfius direkte nyder godt af at være udskilt fra Dexia-koncernen, hvilket er en fordel i sig selv.
The Commission also notes that DBB/Belfius directly benefits from the fact of being separate from the Dexia Group, which is an advantage in itself.
Tilhørsforholdet til Dexia-koncernen har fremkaldt tilbagetrækning af store indlån fra DBB/Belfius og sat dens rentabilitet på spil.
Membership of the Dexia Group led to a substantial run on deposits from DBB/Belfius and jeopardised its viability.
De belgiske myndigheder har kraftigt understreget dette aspekt af transaktionen med henblik på at berolige indskyderne.
The Belgian authorities placed great emphasis on this aspect of the transaction in order to reassure depositors.
De fordele, som DBB/Belfius får ved foranstaltningen, fordrejer konkurrencen ved at tillade DBB/Belfius at præsentere en bedre situation for sine kreditorer og indskydere.
The advantages conferred on DBB/Belfius by the measure distort competition by allowing DBB/Belfius to present a better picture to its creditors and depositors.
DBB/Belfius er i konkurrence med udenlandske koncerner, så samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne er påvirket.
DBB/Belfius is in competition with foreign groups, so that trade between Member States is affected.
Derfor konkluderer Kommissionen, at den belgiske stats køb af aktierne i DBB/Belfius på de ovenfor beskrevne vilkår udgør statsstøtte til fordel for DBB/Belfius.
The Commission consequently concludes that the purchase of shares in DBB/Belfius by the Belgian State under the conditions described above constitutes State aid for DBB/Belfius.
Til gengæld fandt Kommissionen, hvad angår DBB/Belfius' tegning af obligationer garanteret af de berørte medlemsstater og udstedt af Dexia SA og/eller DCL, ikke tilstrækkelige beviser blandt oplysningerne for, at DBB/Belfius fik en specifik konkurrencefordel ud af at tegne disse obligationer, dvs. en fordel som andre købere af DCL-obligationer i en lignende situation ikke kunne have fået.
However, in the case of DBB/Belfius’ subscription to bonds guaranteed by the Member States concerned and issued by Dexia SA and/or DCL, the Commission has not found sufficiently conclusive evidence proving satisfactorily that DBB/Belfius derived a specific competitive advantage from subscribing to these bonds, in other words a benefit which other subscribers to DCL bonds placed in a similar position would not have derived.
I betragtning af de oplysninger, der er til dens rådighed, kan Kommissionen derfor ikke konkludere, at der foreligger støtte i den henseende.
On the basis of the evidence available to it, therefore, the Commission cannot conclude that this constitutes aid.
Supplerende støtte, som skal betales i forbindelse med den reviderede plan for en velordnet afvikling af Dexia (med oprettelse af en udviklingsbank)
Supplementary aid to be paid in connection with the revised orderly resolution plan and the sale of DMA (with the introduction of a development bank)
Endelig refinansieringsgaranti til fordel for Dexia SA, DCL og deres datterselskaber
Definitive refinancing guarantee for Dexia SA, DCL and their subsidiaries
Som den midlertidige refinansieringsgaranti, der blev tilladt midlertidigt ved den midlertidige godkendelsesbeslutning, beslutningen om den første forlængelse af garantien, beslutningen om forhøjelse af garantiloftet og beslutningen om den anden forlængelse af garantien, udgør den endelige refinansieringsgaranti på 85 mia. EUR statsstøtte.
Like the temporary refinancing guarantee provisionally authorised by the temporary approval decision, the decision on the first prolongation of the guarantee, the decision to increase the guarantee ceiling and the decision on the second prolongation of the guarantee, the final refinancing guarantee for EUR 85 billion constitutes State aid.
Den endelige refinansieringsgaranti omfatter statsmidler.
The final refinancing guarantee involves State resources.
I fravær af statsgaranti kunne Dexia ikke finde finansiering på markederne, hvorfor garantien giver Dexia en fordel.
Without a State guarantee Dexia would not have been able to raise any finance on the markets, so the guarantee gives Dexia an advantage.
Intet tyder på, at denne foranstaltning, som er truffet med det formål at bevare den finansielle stabilitet, overholder det markedsøkonomiske princip.
There is nothing to suggest that this measure, taken in order to preserve financial stability, would meet the requirements of a private market economy investor.
Den vedrører selektivt kun virksomheden Dexia.
It relates selectively to Dexia alone.
Den har til formål at undgå øjeblikkelig og uordnet afvikling af Dexia, hvilket på grund af bankens betydelige størrelse ville påvirke bankmarkedsstrukturen i EU.
It is designed to avoid an immediate and disorderly resolution of Dexia, which, because of the bank’s considerable size, would affect the structure of the banking market in the Union.
Kommissionen mener derfor, at denne foranstaltning påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne og fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencen.
The Commission therefore considers that this measure affects trade between Member States and distorts or threatens to distort competition.
Rekapitalisering af Dexia SA med 5,5 mia. EUR
EUR 5,5 billion recapitalisation of Dexia SA
Med hensyn til om der er tale om støtte i forbindelse med kapitaltilførslen, henviser Kommissionen til sin beslutning af 13. marts 2009 og den betingede godkendelsesafgørelse, hvori den fastslår, at den belgiske og franske stats indgreb udgør statsstøtte i henhold til artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF.
As for whether there is aid associated with the capital increase, the Commission refers to its decision of 13 March 2009 and its conditional authorisation decision, which established that the interventions of the Belgian and French States constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
Kommissionen finder det åbenlyst, at foranstaltningen er selektiv og kan tilskrives de to medlemsstater, idet den kun vedrører en enkelt virksomhed, Dexia-koncernen, og at den er truffet direkte af den belgiske og den franske stat.
The Commission considers it evident that the measure is selective and imputable to the two Member States given that it relates to one single enterprise, the Dexia Group, and that it was taken directly by the Belgian and French States.
Som fremlagt ovenfor [127] er rekapitaliseringen af Dexia SA nødvendig for at give afviklingen af Dexia en velordnet karakter.
As explained earlier [127], the recapitalisation of Dexia SA is necessary in order to ensure that Dexia’s resolution is orderly in nature.
Virksomheden har derfor fået en fordel ud af en rekapitalisering, som den ikke ville have fået af en fornuftig privat investor.
The undertaking thus derives an advantage from a recapitalisation which it would not have obtained from an informed private investor.
Rekapitaliseringen bidrager til at undgå en umiddelbar og ikke velordnet afvikling af Dexia.
The recapitalisation is helping to avoid the immediate and disorderly break-up of Dexia.
I mangel af foranstaltningen ville banken være trådt i afvikling og hurtigt være forsvundet fra bankmarkedet.
Without the measure the bank would be placed in liquidation and would leave the banking industry sooner.
Dens aktiver ville endnu hurtigere blive omfordelt.
Its assets would be redistributed more rapidly.
Foranstaltningen påvirker på grund af bankens betydelige størrelse derfor bankmarkedsstrukturen i EU, og den påvirker således samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne og fordrejer konkurrencen.
Because of the bank’s considerable size, therefore, the measure affects the structure of the banking market in the Union and thus affects trade between Member States and distorts competition.
Derfor konkluderer Kommissionen, at rekapitaliseringen af Dexia SA indebærer statsstøtte til fordel for Dexia.
The Commission consequently concludes that the recapitalisation of Dexia SA involves State aid for Dexia.
Støtte til fordel for udviklingsbanken
Aid for the development bank
Kommissionen vurderer, at der forekommer støtte til fordel for udviklingsbanken, hvor DMA udøver sine aktiviteter:
The Commission considers that aid is being provided for the development bank through which DMA is to carry out its activities:
i kraft af den kapital, som aktionærerne har forpligtet sig til at indsprøjte, og
because of the capital which the shareholders have undertaken to inject; and
i kraft af den likviditet, som disse aktionærer forpligter sig til at levere til NEC.
because of the liquidity which those same shareholders have undertaken to provide for the NEC.
Denne støtte føjer sig til den støtte, der blev draget i tvivl, og som DMA allerede har nydt godt af som enhed i Dexia-koncernen.
This aid is on top of the aid — at issue here — which DMA has already received as an entity of the Dexia Group.
På dette punkt henviser de franske myndigheder i deres skrivelse af 4. december 2012 om DMA-operationen til, at der findes »forskellige økonomiske aktiviteter«, der dels udøves af NEC og DMA, dels af JV. [133]
On this point, in their memorandum of 4 December 2012 on the DMA operation of 4 December 2012, the French authorities allude to the existence of ‘ ‘different economic activities’ carried out by the NEC and DMA on the one hand, and by the JV on the other’ [133].