natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kommissionen får skønsbeføjelser til at godkende eller afvise den eller de foreslåede befuldmægtigede, som skal være uafhængige af Belfius.
The Commission will have discretion to approve or reject the proposed trustee(s) who must be independent from Belfius.
Hvis Kommissionen afviser den eller de foreslåede befuldmægtigede, har de belgiske myndigheder en måned fra meddelelsen om afvisningen til at foreslå nye kandidater, som på ny skal godkendes eller afvises af Kommissionen.
If the Commission rejects all proposed trustees, the Belgian authorities will, within one month of being informed of the rejection, propose new candidates who again need to be approved or rejected by the Commission.
Hvis alle disse også afvises af Kommissionen, udpeger Kommissionen selv en uafhængig ekspert, som de belgiske myndigheder udnævner eller lader udnævne i overensstemmelse med et mandat, der er godkendt af Kommissionen.
If all the further proposed trustees are rejected by the Commission, the Commission will nominate an independent trustee, whom the Belgian authorities will appoint in accordance with a mandate approved by the Commission.
Den uafhængige eksperts funktioner
Functions of the independent trustee
Den uafhængige ekspert påtager sig de opgaver, der påhviler ham med henblik på at sikre overholdelsen af forpligtelserne.
The independent trustee will undertake the duties incumbent upon him in order to ensure compliance with the commitments.
Kommissionen kan på eget initiativ eller på anmodning fra den uafhængige ekspert give den uafhængige ekspert ordrer og instrukser for at sikre overholdelsen af vilkår og forpligtelser knyttet til nærværende afgørelse.
The Commission may, at its own initiative or at the request of the independent trustee, give any orders or instructions to the independent trustee in order to ensure compliance with the conditions and obligations attached to this Decision.
Den uafhængige ekspert skal:
The independent trustee:
i sin første rapport til Kommissionen foreslå en detaljeret plan, der beskriver, hvordan han agter at kontrollere overholdelsen af de vilkår og forpligtelser, der er knyttet til nærværende afgørelse
will propose in his first report to the Commission a detailed work plan describing how he intends to monitor compliance with the obligations and conditions attached to this Decision;
kontrollere overholdelsen af de vilkår og forpligtelser, der er knyttet til nærværende afgørelse
will monitor compliance with the conditions and obligations attached to this Decision;
forelægge Kommissionen og de belgiske myndigheder en skriftlig rapport i løbet af 50 arbejdsdage efter udgangen af hvert halvår.
will provide the Commission and the Belgian authorities with the written report within 50 working days from the end of each year and half-year.
Udskiftning, decharge og genudnævnelse
Replacement, discharge and reappointment
Hvis den uafhængige ekspert ophører med at udføre sine funktioner i henhold til sine forpligtelser eller af enhver anden god grund, herunder fordi han involveres i en interessekonflikt:
If the independent trustee ceases to perform his functions pursuant to the commitments, or for any other good cause, including the exposure of the independent trustee to a conflict of interest:
kan Kommissionen efter høring af den uafhængige ekspert kræve, at de belgiske myndigheder udskifter den uafhængige ekspert
the Commission may, after hearing the independent trustee, require the Belgian authorities to replace the independent trustee, or
de belgiske myndigheder kan udskifte den uafhængige ekspert med Kommissionens forhåndsgodkendelse.
the Belgian authorities, with the prior approval of the Commission, may replace the independent trustee.
Hvis den uafhængige ekspert afsættes i medfør af betragtning 302, kan han blive pålagt at fortsætte sit arbejde indtil indsættelse af en ny uafhængig ekspert, hvortil den afsatte uafhængige ekspert overdrager al relevant information.
If the independent trustee is removed pursuant to recital 302, he may be required to continue in his function until a new independent trustee is in place to whom the independent trustee removed has effected a full handover of all relevant information.
Den nye uafhængige ekspert udnævnes i overensstemmelse med proceduren i betragtning 298.
The new independent trustee will be appointed in accordance with the procedure referred to in recital 298.
Ud over afsættelsen i henhold til betragtning 302 ophører den uafhængige ekspert ikke med at handle som uafhængig ekspert, førend Kommissionen har frataget ham hans opgaver, efter at alle de forpligtelser, der er pålagt den uafhængige ekspert, er blevet opfyldt.
Over and above the removal according to recital 302, the independent trustee will cease to act as independent trustee only after the Commission has discharged him from his duties after all the commitments with which the independent trustee has been entrusted have been complied with.
ELA YDET AF DEN BELGISKE OG DEN FRANSKE CENTRALBANK TIL DBB/BELFIUS OG DCL
THE ELAS GRANTED BY THE FRENCH AND BELGIAN CENTRAL BANKS TO DBB/BELFIUS AND DCL
Den 21. oktober 2011 underrettede Belgien Kommissionen om en ELA-foranstaltning til DBB/Belfius med en garanti fra den belgiske stat for at sætte DBB/Belfius i stand til at yde finansiering til DCL.
On 21 October 2011, Belgium notified to the Commission a measure under which DBB/Belfius could draw on the ELA guaranteed by the Belgian State in order to enable DBB/Belfius to grant financing to DCL.
Siden den 5. oktober 2011 har BNB stillet ELA til rådighed for DBB/Belfius.
From 5 October 2011, the BNB made funds available to DBB/Belfius in the form of ELA.
I overensstemmelse med loven af 22. februar 1998 om Banque Nationale de Belgiques vedtægter garanterer den belgiske stat BNB tilbagebetaling af ethvert udlån ydet i forbindelse med dens bidrag til det finansielle systems stabilitet og garanterer BNB mod ethvert tab som følge af enhver operation, der er nødvendig i så henseende.
In accordance with the Law of 22 February 1998 establishing the Statute of the National Bank of Belgium (‘BNB’), the Belgian State guarantees to repay to the BNB any financing granted as part of its contribution to the stability of the financial system and guarantees the BNB against any loss incurred following any operation necessary for that purpose.
Denne garanti har eksekutionskraft.
That guarantee is enforceable.
Den 6. oktober 2011 havde Den Europæiske Centralbanks Styrelsesråd ikke noget at indvende mod ELA fra BNB og Banque de France (herefter »BdF«) under et beløb på […] mia. EUR til DBB/Belfius og DCL.
On 6 October 2011, the Governing Council of the ECB raised no objections to the ELA measure in favour of DBB/Belfius and DCL by the BNB and the Banque de France (‘BdF’), capped at an amount of EUR […].
Ifølge de belgiske myndigheder skal BNB og BdF have aftalt at deles ligeligt om risiciene og nettofortjenesten ved den ELA, der blev givet til Dexia-koncernen.
According to the Belgian authorities, the BNB and the BdF had agreed equally to share the risks and the net revenue of the ELA granted to the Dexia Group.
Denne ELA havde sikkerhed stillet af BNB i DBB/Belfius' ikkestøtteberettigede fordringer og af BdF i DCL's ikkestøtteberettigede fordringer og værdipapirer, som skulle have en »egnet« sikkerhedsmargin (haircut).
This ELA would benefit from a pledge by the BNB on the ineligible debts of DBB/Belfius and by the BdF on the ineligible debts and securities of DCL to which ‘appropriate’ haircuts would be made.
Haircut-niveauet blev ikke oplyst til Kommissionen.
The Commission was not informed of the extent of these haircuts.
Nedenstående tabel fra underretningen om den første afviklingsplan (som var genstand for beslutningen om udvidelse af proceduren) viser data vedrørende datoen for ydelsen af og beløbet og løbetiden for ELA fra BNB til DBB/Belfius indtil den 17. oktober 2011.
The following table, taken from the notification of the initial resolution plan (forming the subject matter of the decision to extend the procedure), gives information on the date of grant, the amount and the maturity of the ELA granted by the BNB to DBB/Belfius up to 17 October 2011.
En detaljeret beskrivelse af betingelserne for ELA findes i Belgiens underretning af 21. oktober 2011.
A detailed description of the ELA conditions is included in Belgium’s notification of 21 October 2011.
I et dokument fra de belgiske myndigheder af 29. juni 2012 som svar på en række spørgsmål fra Kommissionen fra april, maj og juni 2012 om Belfius' forretningsplan findes i en tabel over ELA til DBB/Belfius, herunder i en periode efter den belgiske stats køb af DBB/Belfius.
A document from the Belgian authorities of 29 June 2012 responding to the Commission’s questions of April, May and June 2012 on the business plan for Belfius includes a table setting out the ELA in favour of DBB/Belfius, including during a period subsequent to its purchase by the Belgian State.
ELA-niveau til DBB/Belfius fra 5. oktober til 1. februar 2012
Level of ELA in favour of DBB/Belfius from 5 October to 1 February 2012
De maksimale beløb, BNB tildelte DBB/Belfius, lå i nærheden af […] mia. EUR ultimo november/primo december 2011.
The maximum amounts granted by the BNB to DBB/Belfius were close to EUR […] billion in late November/early December 2012.
De faldt fra primo 2012 og udløb 1. februar 2012 [68].
They fell from early 2012 and ended on 1 February 2012 [68].
Det skal bemærkes, at Dexia-koncernen ikke længere modtager ELA gennem DBB/Belfius efter afhændelsen af denne enhed til den belgiske stat den 20. oktober 2011.
It should be noted that the Dexia Group no longer received ELA via DBB/Belfius after that entity had been sold to the Belgian State on 20 October 2011.
I deres underretning af 21. oktober 2011 om ELA fra BNB til DCL i forbindelse med »ELA Framework Agreement« af 5. oktober 2011 mellem BNB og DBB oplyste de belgiske myndigheder om eksistensen af en foreløbig aftale om fordeling af fortjeneste og tab knyttet til ELA:
In their notification of 21 October 2011 concerning the ELA granted to DCL by the BNB under the ‘ELA Framework Agreement’ of 5 October 2011 between the BNB and DBB, the Belgian authorities referred to a provisional agreement on the sharing of the ELA-related income and losses:
NBB and BdF have provisionally agreed (but have not signed yet the relevant agreement) to share the risk as well as the net income of the ELA provision to the Dexia Group on a 50/50 basis.«
BNB and BdF have provisionally agreed (but have not yet signed the relevant agreement) to share the risk as well as the net income of the ELA provision to the Dexia Group on a 50/50 basis’.
Efter et spørgsmål stillet pr. e-mail fra Kommissionens tjenestegrene den 19. april 2012 til de belgiske myndigheder om den ligelige fordeling af risikoen og ELA-indtjeningen mellem den belgiske og den franske centralbank oplyste de belgiske myndigheder om eksistensen af en garantiaftale underskrevet af de to centralbanker den 2. februar 2012.
Following an e-mail question of 19 April 2012 from the Commission’s services to the Belgian authorities in relation to the equal sharing of the ELA-related risks and income between the Belgian and French central banks, the Belgian authorities said that a guarantee agreement had been signed by both central banks on 2 February 2012.
På baggrund af at BdF og BNB har aftalt i fornødent omfang at yde kredit til henholdsvis Dexia Credit Local (DCL) og Dexia Banque Belgique (DBB) for at levere nødlikviditet til de nævnte kreditinstitutter og deles om eventuelle fortjenester og tab, som hidrører derfra, ifølge fordelingsnøglen 50 % til BNB og 50 % til BdF,
‘Whereas the BdF and the BNB have agreed, where necessary, to grant loans to Dexia Crédit Local (DCL) and Dexia Banque Belgique (DBB) in order to provide emergency liquidity to those credit institutions and to share any income and losses arising therefrom on a 50/50 basis;
forpligter Banque de France sig til:
The Banque de France:
at holde BNB skadesløs for halvdelen af ethvert tab, der efter indfrielse af de sikkerheder eller andre garantier, der er nævnt i punkt 3), 6) og 7), måtte forekomme som følge af en eventuel misligholdelse fra DBB's side i forbindelse med levering af nødlikviditet til DBB.
undertakes to repay to the BNB, 50 % of any loss arising, after provision of the securities and other guarantees set out in paragraphs 3, 6 and 7, from a default by DBB in respect of the ELA provision to DBB;
forpligter Banque Nationale de Belgique sig til:
The Banque nationale de Belgique:
at holde BdF skadesløs for halvdelen af ethvert tab, der efter indfrielse af de sikkerheder eller andre garantier, der er nævnt i punkt 3), 6) og 7), måtte forekomme som følge af en eventuel misligholdelse fra DCL's side i forbindelse med levering af nødlikviditet til DCL. […]
undertakes to repay to the BdF, 50 % of any loss arising, after provision of the securities and other guarantees set out in paragraphs 3, 6 and 7, from a default by DCL in respect of the ELA provision to DCL; […]’
De berørte medlemsstater har oplyst, at de maksimale beløb, der blev bevilget af BdF til DCL lå i nærheden af […] mia. EUR ultimo december 2011.
The Member States concerned indicated that the maximum amounts granted by the BdF to DCL were close to EUR […] billon at the end of December 2011.
De maksimale beløb bevilget af BdF siden den 2. februar 2012 var på […] mia. EUR (primo februar 2012).
The maximum amounts granted by the BdF from 2 February 2012 were EUR […] billion (early February 2012).
BEGRUNDELSE FOR AT INDLEDE FORMELLE UNDERSØGELSESPROCEDURER
GROUNDS FOR INITIATING FORMAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURES
BEGRUNDELSE FOR AT INDLEDE DEN FORMELLE UNDERSØGELSESPROCEDURE VEDRØRENDE SALGET OG OMSTRUKTURERINGEN AF DBB/BELFIUS
GROUNDS FOR INITIATING A FORMAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE INTO THE SALE AND RESTRUCTURING OF DBB/BELFIUS
Kommissionen har indledt en procedure vedrørende den belgiske stats køb af DBB/Belfius, idet denne operation forekom at kunne indeholde statsstøtte, der var uforenelig med det indre marked.
The Commission initiated a procedure in respect of the purchase of DBB/Belfius by the Belgian State as it considered that this operation could contain State aid incompatible with the internal market.
Kommissionen hæfter sig ved, at den pris, den belgiske stat skal betale for overtagelsen af alle aktier i DBB/Belfius, er sat på basis af dataene for bankens balance og resultatopgørelse pr. 30. juni 2011 og dermed ikke tager hensyn til den seneste udviklings negative indvirkninger på DBB/Belfius' finansielle situation (udtrækning af indlån og den seneste stigning i det koncerninterne finansieringsbehov som følge af kravet om kontant sikkerhedsstillelse for derivattransaktioner).
The Commission observed that the purchase price paid by the Belgian State to acquire all the shares of DBB/Belfius had been evaluated on the basis of balance sheet and profit and loss account data as at 30 June 2011 which did not therefore include the negative impact of the most recent developments in the financial situation of DBB/Belfius (withdrawals of deposits and the latest increase in the intragroup financing needed to constitute the cash collateral to cover derivative-related transactions).
Vurderingen er desuden baseret på finansielle prognoser for DBB/Belfius, som er opstillet af Dexia uden de granskninger, der normalt foretages ved sådanne transaktioner.
The evaluation was also based on the financial forecasts for DBB/Belfius which Dexia had supplied without undertaking the due diligence generally carried out for this kind of operation.
Kommissionen understregede også, at købet er forbundet med en række parametre, der kan medføre, at den erlagte pris ikke er i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip, især det forhold, at en mekanisme for deling af overskud aktiveres, hvis DBB/Belfius sælges med en fortjeneste til en anden investor inden fem år, og at den belgiske stat beskytter Dexia mod ethvert tab som følge af de vanskeligheder, som visse af dens aktionærer kunne få (Arco, Ethias og Holding Communal).
The Commission also stressed that the purchase was coupled with a set of parameters which could mean that the price paid was not in line with the market investor economy principle, especially the fact that a profit-sharing mechanism would be initiated if DBB/Belfius was sold at a profit to another investor within five years and the fact that the Belgian State was immunising Dexia against any loss arising from the problems that certain of its shareholders (Arco, Ethias and Holding Communal) could encounter.
Kommissionen var derfor ikke overbevist om, at den pris, som den belgiske stat har betalt — i tilknytning til andre foranstaltninger, som den belgiske stat i samråd med Dexia overvejer at træffe til fordel for denne (f.eks. finansieringsgarantien) — er den rette pris og sikrer en passende byrdedeling.
The Commission was not therefore convinced that the price paid by the Belgian State, combined with the other measures in favour of Dexia under discussion with the latter (especially the refinancing guarantee), was appropriate and ensured adequate burden-sharing.
I øvrigt har Kommissionen bemærket, at selv om købet af DBB/Belfius bidrager til at retablere dens rentabilitet, så er denne foranstaltning knyttet til opretholdelsen af finansieringen, som indtil da var »koncernintern« fra DBB/Belfius til Dexia med datterselskaber i størrelsesordenen ca. 24 % af DBB/Belfius' balance.
The Commission also observed that, even if the purchase of DBB/Belfius helped to restore its viability, the measure included continued financing from DBB/Belfius to Dexia and its subsidiaries, which had been ‘intragroup’ until then, for amounts representing some 24 % of the balance sheet of DBB/Belfius.
En sådan ordning vil potentielt være en betydelig belastning for DBB/Belfius' fremtidige rentabilitet og langsigtede rentabilitet i tilfælde af fremtidige tab i resten af koncernen.
These provisions could have a substantial impact on the future profitability and long-term viability of DBB/Belfius if the remainder of the Group were to record losses in the future.
Set ud fra Dexias synspunkt er overtagelsen af DBB/Belfius oven i købet ikke i sig selv nok til at sikre hele Dexia-koncernens langsigtede rentabilitet, hvilket er årsagen til de andre foranstaltninger, som de berørte medlemsstater overvejer at iværksætte.
For Dexia, moreover, the purchase of DBB/Belfius was not enough on its own to restore the long-term viability of the Dexia Group as a whole, hence the other measures that the Member States concerned were envisaging at that time.
I øvrigt har Kommissionen bemærket, at den belgiske stats overtagelse af DBB indgik i en mere overordnet sammenhæng med nye foranstaltninger til fordel for Dexia SA, som Kommissionen ikke havde modtaget præcise oplysninger om på tidspunktet for indledningen af undersøgelsen af salget af DBB.
The Commission also observed that the purchase of DBB by the Belgian State was taking place in a broader framework of new measures in favour of Dexia SA in respect of which it had not, at the time of initiating the investigation procedure into the sale of DBB, received any detailed information.
Endelig bad de belgiske myndigheder Kommissionen om (efter overtagelsen) i videst muligt omfang at frigøre DBB/Belfius fra de forpligtelser, som var fastlagt i omstruktureringsplanen for Dexia, der var godkendt af Kommissionen i dens betingede godkendelsesafgørelse.
Lastly, the Belgian authorities had asked the Commission to release DBB/Belfius (post-sale) as far as possible from the commitments included in the restructuring plan for Dexia approved by the Commission in its conditional authorisation decision.
Kommissionen anførte, at hvis det var fastslået, at overtagelsen af DBB indebærer elementer af statsstøtte, ville de konkurrencefordrejninger, en sådan støtte kan forårsage, derfor ikke blive afhjulpet, så længe de belgiske myndigheder ikke har foreslået nogen foranstaltning hertil.
The Commission pointed out that, if the purchase of DBB/Belfius was found to include elements of State aid, the distortions of competition caused by this aid could not then be remedied as the Belgian authorities had not proposed any measures in this respect.
For så vidt angår Dexia og dens datterselskaber, har Kommissionen i indledningsbeslutningen om salget af DBB anført, at den ikke var i stand til at fastslå, at enhver konkurrencefordrejning, som foranstaltningens potentielle elementer af statsstøtte kunne forårsage, ville kunne afhjælpes.
Concerning Dexia and its subsidiaries, the Commission had pointed out in its opening decision on the sale of DBB that it was unable to determine whether any distortion of competition caused by the potential aid elements of the measure could be duly remedied.
BEGRUNDELSE FOR AT INDLEDE OG UDVIDE DEN FORMELLE UNDERSØGELSESPROCEDURE VEDRØRENDE DEXIA EFTER DEN BETINGEDE GODKENDELSESAFGØRELSE
GROUNDS FOR INITIATING AND EXTENDING A FORMAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE CONCERNING DEXIA AFTER THE CONDITIONAL DECISION
I sin midlertidige godkendelsesbeslutning om en ny midlertidig refinansieringsgaranti til fordel for Dexia SA og DCL indledte Kommissionen en ny undersøgelsesprocedure, idet den mente, at den midlertidige refinansieringsgaranti i lighed med købet af DBB og andre fremtidige støtteforanstaltninger udgør en supplerende støtte, der i betydeligt omfang ændrer betingelserne for omstrukturering, som blev godkendt ved den betingede godkendelsesafgørelse.
In its temporary approval decision in respect of a new temporary refinancing guarantee in favour of Dexia SA and DCL, the Commission initiated a new investigation procedure, considering that ‘the temporary refinancing guarantee, like the purchase of DBB and other future aid measures, is additional aid substantially modifying the restructuring conditions’ approved by the conditional authorisation decision.
Et af nøgleelementerne i denne plan var salget af DMA til en ny enhed, der var godkendt som kreditinstitut, og hvori CDC, DCL og den franske stat skulle være aktionærer.
One of the key elements of this plan was the sale of DMA to a new entity approved as a credit institution in which the CDC, DCL and the French State were to be shareholders.
I øvrigt fik Kommissionen kendskab til oplysninger, som tydede på, at Arcofins bidrag til rekapitaliseringen af Dexia, der blev godkendt ved den betingede godkendelsesafgørelse, var blevet besluttet på basis af en garantiordning fra den belgiske stat til fordel for enkeltmedlemmer i finansielle kooperativer, bl.a. Arcofin.
The Commission was also aware of information suggesting that Arcofin’s contribution to the recapitalisation of Dexia, approved by the conditional authorisation decision, had been decided on the basis of a scheme by the Belgian State to guarantee the individual members of financial cooperatives, including those of Arcofin.
I lyset heraf finder Kommissionen, at dens konklusion i den betingede godkendelsesafgørelse om, at Arcofins bidrag ikke udgør statsstøtte, som hviler på en antagelse om, at der ikke var statsmidler indblandet, kan have været baseret på ukorrekte oplysninger.
In the light of this information, the Commission considered that its finding that Arcofin’s contribution did not constitute State aid because it did not involve State resources, could well be based on incorrect information.
I beslutningen om at udvide proceduren indledte Kommissionen en formel undersøgelsesprocedure som følge af flere mangler fra Dexias side med hensyn til at overholde visse forpligtelser i henhold til den betingede godkendelsesafgørelse (se betragtning 47 i nærværende afgørelse).
In the decision to extend the procedure, the Commission initiated a formal investigation procedure following a number of failures by Dexia to comply with certain commitments in the conditional decision (see recital 47 of this Decision).
Den 21. og 22. marts 2012 sendte de berørte medlemsstater Kommissionen den første plan for en velordnet afvikling af Dexia-koncernen.
On 21 and 22 March 2012, the Member States concerned notified to the Commission an initial version of the orderly resolution plan for the Dexia Group.