natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Dette bekræfter, at rentabiliteten i 2011 (NUP) i høj grad var påvirket af uventede og midlertidige globale økonomiske begivenheder (jf. betragtning 155), som sandsynligvis ikke vil vende tilbage og ikke kan betragtes som permanente og repræsentative for EU-erhvervsgrenens situation.
This confirms that the profitability in 2011 (RIP) was indeed largely influenced by unexpected and temporary global economic events (recital (155)) that are unlikely to recur and cannot be considered permanent and representative of the situation of the Union industry.
Efter fremlæggelsen af oplysninger anfægtede visse parter konklusionen om, at EU-erhvervsgrenen stadig befinder sig i en sårbar situation, og påstod, at EU-erhvervsgrenen var sund og havde undergået en omfattende omstrukturering siden 1999.
Following the disclosure some parties contested the conclusion that the Union industry was still fragile claiming that the Union industry was in a healthy state and has substantially transformed since 1999.
Det skal bemærkes, jf. betragtning 184, at ikke alle økonomiske indikatorer udviklede sig positivt i den betragtede periode til trods for en generel forbedring og konsolidering.
It is noted that as explained above (recital (184)), despite the overall improvement and consolidation, not all economic indicators developed positively over the period considered.
Udviklingen i EU-erhvervsgrenens rentabilitet efter NUP er dog i dette tilfælde især relevant i forbindelse med de ekstraordinære globale markedsudviklinger ved årsskiftet 2010/2011.
However, the development of profitability of the Union industry beyond RIP is in this case relevant mainly in the context of the extraordinary nature of the global market developments at the break of 2010/2011.
Det illustrerer også den typiske volatilitet i denne sektor.
It also illustrates the volatility typical for this sector.
Hvad angår de konjunkturbestemte faktorer, synes de relevante virkninger ikke at være tilstede mere, selv om den økonomiske krise havde en indvirkning på EU-erhvervsgrenens situation i 2009 (jf. betragtning 171).
As to the conjunctural factors, although the economic crises did have an impact on the situation of the Union industry in 2009, as mentioned above (recital (171) above), the relevant effects do not appear to be currently present anymore.
Hvad angår virkningen af de dårlige vejrforhold, kan dette delvist forklare det faldende forbrug i NUP, men den påståede indvirkning på EU-erhvervsgrenens situation er ikke blevet begrundet, og desuden er det lette fald i 2011 snarere forbundet med den midlertidige mangel på råvarer som følge af udviklingerne på det globale marked i 2011.
Concerning the effect of bad weather, this could partly explain the shrinking consumption in the RIP, however, on the one hand, its alleged impact on the situation of the Union industry has not been substantiated and, on the other hand, the slight drop in 2011 appears to be rather linked to temporary scarcity of raw materials due to the global market developments in 2011.
Ingen af disse påstande er således begrundet i lyset af undersøgelsesresultaterne.
Therefore, none of these claims is justified in view of the findings of the investigation.
Undersøgelsen fastslog desuden, at hvis foranstaltningerne blev ophævet, ville dette føre til en ubetydelig omkostningsreduktion for aftapperne, baseret på det forventede og/eller ønskede fald i PET-priserne som anslået af de kontrollerede aftappere selv.
The investigation has also established that based on the expected and/or desired decrease of PET prices estimated by the verified bottlers themselves, if the measures would result in negligible cost reduction for the bottlers.
På grundlag af disse skøn over faldet i PET-priserne og de beregnede omkostningstal blev de respektive omkostningsreduktioner beregnet til at udgøre mellem 0,3-0,7 % af aftappernes samlede omkostninger til deres PET-relaterede aktiviteter.
Based on these estimates of PET price decrease and the established cost ratios, the respective cost reduction was calculated to be within the range of 0,3-0,7 % of the total costs of the bottlers for their PET-related activities.
Enkelte parter påstod, at PET-producenterne i Unionen praktiserede højere priser og margener, som angiveligt skulle ligge til grund for prisstigningerne i 2011.
Some parties alleged the existence of premium prices and premium margins practised by PET producers in the Union, claiming that these would be at the origin of the price increases in 2011.
Denne påstand blev desuden understøttet af en sammenligning mellem PET-priserne fordelt over råvarerne i Unionen og situationen på det asiatiske marked og i USA.
This claim was also supported by the comparison made between PET prices and spread over the raw materials in the Union to the situation on Asian market and in the USA.
For så vidt angår analysen af brugerindustriens rentabilitet, modsiger oplysningerne fra de samarbejdsvillige brugere denne påstand.
As regards the assessment of profitability of the users' industry, the information collected from the cooperating users contradicted this claim.
Metoden blev lagt frem for alle parter.
The methodology was made available to the parties.
Ophævelse af DEPBS-ordningen og overgang til DDS
Moreover, there is no system or procedure in place to confirm which inputs are consumed in the production process of the exported product or whether an excess payment of import duties occurred within the meaning of point (i) of Annex I and Annexes II and III of the basic Regulation. Lastly, an exporter is eligible for the DEPBS benefits regardless of whether it imports any inputs at all. In order to obtain the benefit, it is sufficient for an exporter to simply export goods without demonstrating that any input material was imported. Thus, even exporters which procure all of their inputs locally and do not import any goods which can be used as inputs are still entitled to benefit from the DEPBS.
Ved offentlig bekendtgørelse nr. 54 (RE-2010)/09-14 af 17. juni 2011 blev DEPBS forlænget med 3 måneder indtil den 30. september 2011.
Abolishment of the DEPBS and transition to DDS (47) By means of Public Notice No 54 (RE-2010)/2009-2014 of 17 June 2011, the DEPBS received a final three months extension which prolonged its applicability until 30 September 2011.
Det skal bemærkes, at den indiske regering bestræbte sig på en smidig overgang fra DEPBS til DDS, hvilket fremgår af cirkulære nr. – 42/2011-Customs af 22. september 2011.
It must be noted that the GOI took steps to organise a smooth transition from DEPBS to DDS, as demonstrated in circular No. – 42/2011-Customs, dated 22 September 2011.
I en overgangsperiode vil disse varer pålægges en mindre reduktion af deres DEPB[S]-satser på mellem 1 % og 3 % for de fleste varer.
As a transitory arrangement, these items will suffer a modest reduction from their DEPB[S] rates, ranging from 1 % to 3 % for most items." In other words, this circular indicates that the duty drawback rates in force w.e.f.
Med andre ord antyder dette cirkulære, at de gældende toldgodtgørelsessatser med virkning fra 1. oktober 2011 blev fastlagt, således at de kunne give samme type fordel som den tilbagetrukne DEPBS.
1 October 2011 were determined so that they would confer a similar benefit as the withdrawn DEPBS.
Ordningen blev indført i 2009 for eksport i perioden 2009-201 og 2010-2011 og er blevet forlænget hvert år siden da. Den seneste forlængelse (jf. bekendtgørelse nr. 07/2012 – Customs af 9. marts 2012) forlængede ordningens gyldighed indtil 31. marts 2013.
The scheme was introduced in 2009 for exports made during 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 and has been extended on a yearly basis since then. The last extension (cfr. notification No 07/2012 – Customs dated 9 March 2012) prolonged the validity of the scheme until 31 March 2013.
Markedsandel for importen fra Indonesien, Malaysia, Taiwan og Thailand (%)
Market share of imports from Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand (%) 0,7
Reliance Industries Ltd.
Reliance Industries Ltd
Pearl Engineering Polymers Ltd.
Pearl Engineering Polymers Ltd
Senpet Ltd.
Senpet Ltd
Futura Polyesters Ltd.
Futura Polyesters Ltd
Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 462/2013
Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council
Kreditvurderingsbureauer skal ifølge Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1060/2009 [4] overholde visse adfærdsregler for at begrænse eventuelle interessekonflikter og sikre, at kreditvurderingerne og vurderingsprocessen er af høj kvalitet og tilstrækkelig gennemsigtig.
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council [4] requires credit rating agencies to comply with rules of conduct in order to mitigate possible conflicts of interest, and to ensure high quality and sufficient transparency of credit ratings and the rating process.
Efter de ændringer, der blev indført ved Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 513/2011 [5], har Den Europæiske Tilsynsmyndighed (Den Europæiske Værdipapir- og Markedstilsynsmyndighed) (ESMA), der blev oprettet ved Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 1095/2010 [6] fået beføjelse til at registrere kreditvurderingsbureauer og føre tilsyn med dem.
Following the amendments introduced by Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council [5], the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) (ESMA), established by Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council [6], has been empowered to register and supervise credit rating agencies.
Nærværende forordning supplerer det nuværende lovgivningsgrundlag for kreditvurderingsbureauer.
This Regulation complements the current regulatory framework for credit rating agencies.
Visse af de vigtigste problemer såsom interessekonflikter i forbindelse med udsteder betaler-modellen og oplysning om strukturerede finansielle instrumenter er blevet behandlet, og rammen skal gennemses efter at have været gældende i en rimelig tidsperiode, for at vurdere, om den fuldt ud løser disse problemer.
Some of the most important issues, such as conflicts of interest due to the issuer-pays model and disclosure for structured finance instruments, have been addressed and the framework will need to be reviewed after having been in place for a reasonable period of time to assess whether it fully resolves those issues.
I mellemtiden har den aktuelle statsgældskrise understreget behovet for en gennemgang af timingen af offentliggørelse og de gennemsigtigheds- og procedurekrav, der gælder specifikt for vurderinger af offentlige låntagere.
Meanwhile the need to review transparency, procedural requirements and the timing of publication specifically for sovereign ratings was highlighted by the current sovereign debt crisis.
I Europa-Parlamentets beslutning af 8. juni 2011 om kreditvurderingsbureauernes fremtidsperspektiver [7] efterlystes en bedre regulering af kreditvurderingsbureauerne.
The European Parliament’s resolution of 8 June 2011 on credit rating agencies: future perspectives [7], called for enhanced regulation of credit rating agencies.
På sit uformelle møde den 30. september og 1. oktober 2010 erkendte Økofinrådet, at der bør gøres en yderligere indsats for at løse en række problemer i forbindelse med kreditvurderingsaktiviteter, herunder risikoen for overdreven afhængighed af kreditvurderinger og risikoen for interessekonflikter, der opstår som følge af den måde, hvorpå kreditvurderingsbureauerne modtager betaling.
At its informal meeting of 30 September and 1 October 2010, the Ecofin Council acknowledged that further efforts should be made to address a number of issues related to credit rating activities, including the risk of over-reliance on credit ratings and the risk of conflicts of interest stemming from the remuneration model of credit rating agencies.
Det Europæiske Råd konkluderede på sit møde den 23. oktober 2011, at det er nødvendigt at gøre en indsats for at begrænse overdreven brug af kreditvurderinger.
The European Council of 23 October 2011 concluded that progress is needed on reducing over-reliance on credit ratings.
På internationalt plan gav Rådet for Finansiel Stabilitet (FSB), som Den Europæiske Centralbank (ECB) er medlem af, den 20. oktober 2010 sin tilslutning til en række principper, som skal nedbringe myndigheders og finansielle institutioners afhængighed af kreditvurderinger (i det følgende »FSB's principper«).
At the international level, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), of which the European Central Bank (ECB) is a member institution, endorsed on 20 October 2010 principles to reduce the reliance of authorities and of financial institutions on credit ratings (‘the FSB principles’).
Kompetente sektormyndigheder bør træffe afgørelse om tilskyndelsesforanstaltninger.
The sectoral competent authorities should decide upon the measures for encouragement.
ESMA bør, hvor det er relevant i samarbejde med Den Europæiske Tilsynsmyndighed (Den Europæiske Banktilsynsmyndighed), der er oprettet ved Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 1093/2010 [8], og med Den Europæiske Tilsynsmyndighed (Den Europæiske Tilsynsmyndighed for Forsikrings- og Arbejdsmarkedspensionsordninger), der er oprettet ved Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 1094/2010 [9], træffe foranstaltninger til at fremme konvergens af tilsynspraksis i overensstemmelse med forordning (EU) nr. 1095/2010 og inden for rammerne af nærværende forordning.
ESMA, where appropriate in cooperation with the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council [8], and with the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), established by Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council [9], should take action to facilitate convergence of supervisory practices in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, and within the framework of this Regulation.
Kreditvurderingsbureauer bør gøre investorer opmærksomme på oplysningerne om sandsynligheden for mangler i kreditvurderinger og vurderingsforventninger, der er baseret på oplysninger om hidtidige resultater, som er blevet offentliggjort i ESMA's centrale register.
Credit rating agencies should make investors aware of the data on the probability of default of credit ratings and rating outlooks based on historical performance, as published on the central repository created by ESMA.
Unionen arbejder i retning af at vurdere i første omgang, hvorvidt der i EU-retten er henvisninger til kreditvurderinger, der medfører eller har potentiale til at medføre udelukkende eller mekanisk afhængighed af sådanne kreditvurderinger, og i anden omgang alle henvisninger til kreditvurderinger i reguleringsøjemed, med henblik på at fjerne dem inden udgangen af 2020, forudsat at der findes frem til og gennemføres passende alternativer til vurdering af kreditrisikoen.
The Union is working towards reviewing, at a first stage, whether any references to credit ratings in Union law trigger or have the potential to trigger sole or mechanistic reliance on such credit ratings and, at a second stage, all references to credit ratings for regulatory purposes with a view to deleting them by 2020, provided that appropriate alternatives to credit risk assessment are identified and implemented.
Relevansen af vurderingsforventninger for investorer og udstedere og deres markedsmæssige virkninger kan sammenlignes med kreditvurderingers relevans og virkninger.
The relevance of rating outlooks for investors and issuers and their effects on markets are comparable to the relevance and effects of credit ratings.
Alle de krav i forordning (EF) nr. 1060/2009, der har til formål at sikre, at vurderingshandlingerne er nøjagtige, gennemsigtige og fri for interessekonflikter, bør derfor også gælde for vurderingsforventningerne.
Therefore, all the requirements of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 which aim at ensuring that rating actions are accurate, transparent and free from conflicts of interest should also apply to rating outlooks.
Ifølge den nuværende tilsynspraksis finder en række krav i forordningen anvendelse på vurderingsforventningerne.
According to current supervisory practice, a number of requirements of that Regulation apply to rating outlooks.
Denne forordning bør præcisere reglerne og skabe retssikkerhed ved at indføre en definition af vurderingsforventninger og præcisere, hvilke særlige bestemmelser der gælder for sådanne vurderingsforventninger.
This Regulation should clarify the rules and provide legal certainty by introducing a definition of rating outlooks and clarifying which specific provisions apply to such rating outlooks.
Definitionen af vurderingsforventninger bør også omfatte tilkendegivelser om kreditvurderingers forventede udvikling på kort sigt, de såkaldte »credit watches«.
The definition of rating outlooks should also encompass opinions regarding the likely direction of a credit rating in the short term, commonly referred to as credit watches.
På mellemlang sigt bør der overvejes yderligere tiltag for at tage henvisninger til kreditvurderinger i reguleringsøjemed ud af den finansielle regulering og fjerne risikovægtningen af aktiver ved hjælp af kreditvurderinger.
In the medium term, further action should be evaluated to delete references to credit ratings for regulatory purposes from financial regulation and to eliminate the risk-weighting of assets by means of credit ratings.
Indtil videre er kreditvurderingsbureauer dog vigtige deltagere på de finansielle markeder.
However, for the time being, credit rating agencies are important participants in the financial markets.
Kreditvurderingsbureauernes og kreditvurderingernes uafhængighed og integritet er således af stor betydning for at sikre deres troværdighed over for markedsdeltagerne og navnlig over for investorer og andre brugere af kreditvurderinger.
As a consequence, the independence and integrity of credit rating agencies and their credit rating activities are of particular importance in guaranteeing their credibility vis-à-vis market participants, in particular investors and other users of credit ratings.
Det fastsættes i forordning (EF) nr. 1060/2009, at kreditvurderingsbureauer skal registreres og overvåges, fordi de tjenester, de leverer, i stort omfang har offentlighedens interesse.
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 provides that credit rating agencies are to be registered and supervised as their services have considerable impact on the public interest.
Kreditvurderinger er til forskel fra investeringsanalyser ikke bare tilkendegivelser om værdien af eller prisen for et finansielt instrument eller en finansiel forpligtelse.
Credit ratings, unlike investment research, are not mere opinions about a value or a price for a financial instrument or a financial obligation.
Kreditvurderingsbureauer er ikke bare finansanalytikere eller investeringsrådgivere.
Credit rating agencies are not mere financial analysts or investment advisors.
Kreditvurderinger har en reguleringsmæssig værdi for de regulerede investorer, dvs. kreditinstitutter, forsikringsselskaber og andre institutionelle investorer.
Credit ratings have regulatory value for regulated investors, such as credit institutions, insurance companies and other institutional investors.
Selv om incitamentet til overdreven afhængighed af kreditvurderinger reduceres, vil valget af investeringer stadig være baseret på kreditvurderinger, navnlig som følge af informationsasymmetri og af hensyn til effektiviteten.
Although the incentives to rely excessively on credit ratings are being reduced, credit ratings still drive investment choices, in particular because of information asymmetries and for efficiency purposes.
Det er nødvendigt, at kreditvurderingsbureauerne i denne forbindelse er uafhængige, og at de opfattes sådan af markedsdeltagerne, og at deres vurderingsmetoder er gennemsigtige og opfattes som sådan.
In that context, credit rating agencies must be independent and must be perceived as such by market participants, and their rating methods must be transparent and be perceived as such.
Overdreven afhængighed af kreditvurderinger bør reduceres, og alle de automatiske virkninger som følge af kreditvurderingerne bør gradvist fjernes.
Over-reliance on credit ratings should be reduced and all the automatic effects deriving from credit ratings should be gradually eliminated.
Kreditinstitutter og investeringsfirmaer bør tilskyndes til at indføre interne procedurer for at foretage deres egne vurderinger af kreditrisikoen og bør tilskynde investorer til at foretage en due diligence-undersøgelse.
Credit institutions and investment firms should be encouraged to put in place internal procedures in order to make their own credit risk assessment and should encourage investors to perform a due diligence exercise.
I forordningen fastsættes i denne forbindelse, at finansielle institutioner ikke udelukkende eller mekanisk bør basere sig på kreditvurderinger.
Within that framework, this Regulation provides that financial institutions should not solely or mechanistically rely on credit ratings.
Disse institutioner bør derfor undgå at indgå aftaler, hvor de udelukkende eller mekanisk er afhængige af kreditvurderinger, og de bør undgå at anvende dem i aftaler som den eneste parameter for at vurdere investeringers kreditværdighed eller træffe beslutning om at foretage eller afhænde investeringen.
Therefore, those institutions should avoid entering into contracts where they solely or mechanistically rely on credit ratings and should avoid using them in contracts as the only parameter to assess the creditworthiness of investments or to decide whether to invest or divest.
Forordning (EF) nr. 1060/2009 indeholder allerede en række foranstaltninger, der skal sikre kreditvurderingsbureauernes og kreditvurderingernes uafhængighed og integritet.
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 already provided a first round of measures to address the question of independence and integrity of credit rating agencies and their credit rating activities.
Mange af bestemmelserne i denne forordning har til formål at garantere kreditvurderingsbureauernes uafhængighed og indkredse, håndtere og så vidt muligt undgå enhver interessekonflikt, der måtte opstå.
The objectives of guaranteeing the independence of credit rating agencies and of identifying, managing and, to the extent possible, avoiding any conflicts of interest that could arise were already underpinning several provisions of that Regulation.
Udvælgelsen af kreditvurderingsbureauer og den måde, hvorpå de modtager betaling (udsteder betaler-modellen), giver i sig selv anledning til interessekonflikter.
The selection and remuneration of the credit rating agency by the rated entity (the issuer-pays model) engenders inherent conflicts of interest.
Med denne betalingsmåde får kreditvurderingsbureauer incitament til at udstede favorable vurderinger af udstederen for at indgå en langvarig forretningsforbindelse for at sikre indtægter eller for at sikre ekstra arbejde og indtægter.
Under that model, there are incentives for credit rating agencies to issue complacency ratings on the issuer in order to secure a long-standing business relationship in order to guarantee revenues or to secure additional work and revenues.
Forholdet mellem kreditvurderingsbureauernes aktionærer og de kreditvurderede enheder kan desuden give anledning til interessekonflikter, som der ikke tages tilstrækkelig højde for i de eksisterende regler.
Moreover, relationships between the shareholders of credit rating agencies and the rated entities may cause conflicts of interest, which are not sufficiently dealt with by the existing rules.
Man kan derfor få opfattelsen af, at de kreditvurderinger, der udstedes efter udsteder betaler-modellen, tilgodeser udstederen i stedet for at opfylde investorens behov.
As a result, credit ratings issued under the issuer-pays model may be perceived as the credit ratings that suit the issuer rather than the credit ratings needed by the investor.