natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Staten ville i så fald påberåbe sig sine egne ledelsesfejl for at begrunde en supplerende kapitaltilførsel i modstrid med det generelle princip om, at man ikke kan basere sin argumentation på egne fejl [151].
Regarding the net liabilities related to the disposal of the leased vessels, the Commission considers that the assumptions underpinning that calculation are justified mainly because of the EIGs’ excessive regard for contractual formalities, which restricts any substitution of SNCM by third parties and makes tax relief subject to the operation of vessels under the French flag.
Redningsordningen, som ikke kan adskilles fra denne fejl, skyldes derfor heller ikke sidstnævnte adfærd.
In the light of the foregoing, the Commission considers that on 30 September 2005 SNCM’s preferential liabilities were EUR 153,8 million and its non-preferential liabilities EUR 181,1 million.
Konsekvensen af en accept af den teori, de franske myndigheder og SNCM har fremført, ville desuden gøre det muligt for staten at give en garanti til en virksomhed, der bevidst begår en »ledelsesfejl«, hvilket næppe er acceptabelt i henhold til statsstøttereglerne.
On the finding of a shortfall in assets
I den foreliggende sag, hvor staten med den adfærd ville pådrage sig ansvar ifølge SNCM og de franske myndigheders teori, ville staten i realiteten handle som offentlig myndighed og ikke som aktionær.
In the light of the foregoing, the Commission considers that on 30 September 2005 the value of SNCM’s assets (i.e. EUR 211,4 million) was insufficient to pay off preferential creditors (EUR 153,8 million) and non-preferential creditors (EUR 181,1 million), i.e. a total of EUR 334,9 million.
Eftersom en fornuftig privat aktionær ikke ville have truffet beslutninger baseret på politiske og offentlige overvejelser, kan risikoen for personlig hæftelse som følge af sådanne beslutninger ikke tages i betragtning ved en test om en fornuftig privat investor i et samfund med markedsøkonomi [152].
Consequently, the asset shortfall amounts to some EUR 123,5 million.
De franske myndigheder erindrer om, at Kommissionen i sin ABX-beslutning af 7. december 2005 har tænkt sig at tage hensyn til, at »lovgivningen i visse medlemsstater undtagelsesvis gør det muligt for tredjeparter at søge sig fyldestgjort hos aktionærerne i et selskab, der er gået konkurs, navnlig hvis disse aktionærer betragtes som [fjernet i teksten] og/eller har udvist mangelfuld ledelse.« [153]
On taking account of action to make good the asset shortfall
Kommissionen minder dog om, at begrebet støtte skal vurderes objektivt og bemærker, at det i beslutningen i den samme sag blev præciseret, at »det endelig under den lidet sandsynlige forudsætning, at alle disse betingelser for at ifalde ansvar i henhold til national ret […] skulle være opfyldt, ikke ville udelukke, at disse foranstaltninger til fordel for datterselskabet havde karakter af statsstøtte.« [154]
The Commission also examined the French authorities’ argument that the State, as majority shareholder, could be called upon to make good the asset shortfall in the event of liquidation of the undertaking (see below).
I den foreliggende sag føler Kommissionen sig derfor ikke tilstrækkeligt overbevist af de franske myndigheders argumentation til at konkludere, at SNCM's hovedaktionær med overvejende sandsynlighed risikerede at blive holdt ansvarlig.
One of the interested parties (CFF) contested the application of the national case-law referred to by the French authorities in this particular case.
Kommissionen afviser på disse betingelser at tage hensyn til de supplerende fratrædelsesgodtgørelser (jf. betragtning 225 ff.) og konkluderer, at omkostningerne til likvidation af SNCM ville have været ugyldige for staten.
CFF holds the view that, regarding the case-law of the Rouen Court of Appeal in the Aspocom Group Oyj case, the court ordered the Finnish parent company to pay compensation to the employees of its liquidated French subsidiary because this compensation had been provided for by a social plan on the basis of a company-level agreement approved by the parent company.
Kommissionen finder nemlig, at staten som aktionær ikke kan pålægges likvidationsomkostningerne, da en aktionærs risiko hænger sammen med værdien af hans andel af virksomhedens egenkapital.
In the end, it was not paid out.
Konklusion
The French authorities consider that the total actual costs which the State would have had to bear as shareholder, through CGMF, amounted to between EUR 312,1 and EUR 361 million on 30 September 2005.
Kommissionen mener således, at en privat investor ville være gået ind for den billigste løsning, dvs. en likvidation af SNCM.
This estimate takes account, in particular, of the risk of the State being called upon to make up the asset shortfall if the court were to consider it to be de facto manager of SNCM, and of the risk of the State being ordered to make additional redundancy payments to staff laid off.
Kommissionen konkluderer som følge heraf, at den negative pris på 158 mio. EUR udgør statsstøtte.
The French authorities consider that those risks must be taken into account when calculating the actual cost of the possible liquidation of SNCM.
Kapitaltilførslen fra CGMF på 8,75 mio. EUR
What is at issue here is the estimated total costs which France, as shareholder, would probably have had to bear in the event of compulsory liquidation of SNCM in order to determine whether, in view of the risk of being ordered to bear these costs and given the amounts involved, a well-informed private investor would have preferred to sell its subsidiary directly at a negative price of EUR 158 million rather than run the said risk.
I deres bemærkninger til åbningsbeslutningen anførte de franske myndigheder, at statens rekapitalisering på 8,75 mio. EUR skete samtidig med de private investorers tilførsel.
Under French law, the authorised liquidator of a company in compulsory liquidation has the power to launch an action for damages against the former managers of the company, known as an ‘action en comblement de passif’ (action to make good an asset shortfall) in the event of cancellation of a recovery plan or receivership or compulsory liquidation [144].
De forklarede, at sammenfaldet styrkedes af statens mindretalsaktiepost, mens hovedparten af midlerne blev tilført af markedet.
The reason for the bringing of an action ‘en comblement de passif’ against the former directors of the insolvent company is the need to build up the company’s assets, which is one of the tasks entrusted to the authorised liquidator.
Desuden mente myndighederne, at forrentningen af statens kapitalindskud, dvs. […] [60] Fortrolige oplysninger.
In several letters to the Commission, the French authorities maintained that a situation in which the State is ordered by a national court to make good the liabilities of the undertaking which it manages is a highly plausible scenario and that it must be taken into account when calculating the actual cost of a possible liquidation of SNCM.
% om året, ville give et afkast på lang sigt, der er rimeligt for kapital investeret af en privat investor.
In its correspondence of 28 February 2008, SNCM provided the Baker & McKenzie Report evaluating the consequences of an action ‘en comblement de passif’ against the French State.
Endelig anførte de også i et notat af 16. maj 2013, at risikoen ved ophævelsesklausulen blev opvejet af de private aktionærers call-option.
That report concludes that a commercial court hearing the case would very probably hold that the State was liable and would order it to pay SNCM’s social debts in their entirety.
Statens indskud skal nu sammenlignes med indskuddet fra private købere, dvs. 26,25 mio. EUR.
The relevant legislation provides that the social debts of the company in liquidation may be made chargeable to its former de jure or de facto managers, subject to the cumulative fulfilment of four conditions.
Faktisk er alle foranstaltninger fra 2006 indeholdt i aftaleprotokollen.
The Baker & McKenzie report submitted by SNCM provided the Commission with an analysis leading to the conclusion that […] [60] Confidential information.
Parterne i denne protokol, CGMF, BCP og VT, aftalte i samme dokument at foretage tilførslen på 158 mio. EUR, kontokurantlånet på 38,5 mio. EUR og kapitalforhøjelsen på 8,75 mio. EUR.
In essence, the aforementioned expert report aims to show, in accordance with relevant case-law [145], that the State had repeatedly committed […] [60] Confidential information.
I den foreliggende sag udgør disse tre foranstaltninger en og samme transaktion, som har til formål at privatisere SNCM.
In particular, according to the report, the State took […] [60] Confidential information.
På baggrund af ovenstående konkluderer Kommissionen, at de private aktionærers indskud, dvs. 10,6 % af det samlede indskud ikke kan betragtes som væsentligt.
decisions.
Som det allerede blev konstateret i betragtning 311, udgør de tre foranstaltninger i denne sag én privatiseringstransaktion.
Moreover, it would appear that the management organs […] [60] Confidential information.
Kommissionen finder, at tilførslerne af offentlig og privat kapital dermed kan antages at være helt samtidige.
the undertaking.
Vedrørende kriteriet om tilførsler foretaget under sammenlignelige omstændigheder bemærker Kommissionen først og fremmest, at de interesserede parter, CCF og STIM, har rejst tvivl om den private foranstaltnings væsentlige karakter, og især om der er tale om sammenlignelige omstændigheder mellem den offentlige investering og de private investorer på grund af tilstedeværelsen af ophævelsesklausulen.
Finally, the State […] [60] Confidential information.
Kommissionen finder, at alene omstændighederne omkring denne kapitalforhøjelse viser, at de risici, de private og offentlige investorer løber, ikke er identiske.
The Commission notes that the French authorities, in their correspondence of 28 March 2008, did not express any reservations […] [60] Confidential information.
Alene tilstedeværelsen af og betingelserne i klausulen om ophævelse af overtagelsen viser, at risikosituationen for henholdsvis private investorer og den offentlige investor ikke er den samme, hvis betingelserne i klausulen opfyldes.
In their letter of 20 November 2006, the French authorities themselves state that the court […] [60] Confidential information.
Ifølge aftaleprotokollen har de private investorer mulighed for at trække sig og få deres indskud tilbage, hvis Kommissionen, Retten eller Domstolen træffer en negativ afgørelse, eller hvis public service-kontrakten ikke fornys.
However, the Commission takes the view that the statement made by the French authorities on 20 November 2006 in connection with a State aid procedure cannot in itself suffice to establish to the requisite legal standard that a court would have considered the national authorities to be de facto managers of the undertaking benefiting from the measures in question, or, especially, the degree of probability of such an eventuality.
Sidstnævnte del af ophævelsesklausulen er endnu mere negativ for staten, fordi den vedrører SNCM's kerneaktivitet.
In particular, as regards the decisions at issue, it is far from established that the final decision taken by the State deviates notably from the practice followed in the management by the State of its holdings.
SNCM har nemlig traditionelt været den operatør, der sikrede trafikforbindelsen mellem Korsika og det franske fastland.
Even the Baker & McKenzie report highlights the existence of a recurring controversy surrounding the desirable level of intervention by the State in the management of its shareholdings and mentions the extensive role, in general, of […] [60] Confidential information.
Ophævelsesklausulen beskytter således de private investorer mod den kommercielle risiko for størstedelen af SNCM's aktiviteter.
The examples of domestic case-law put forward by the State and by SNCM are not directly applicable to the circumstances at hand.
Den risiko er det nemlig kun staten, der løber.
The main cases cited concern local authorities, and the BRGM judgment of 6 February 2001 relates to a public industrial and commercial establishment.
Anvendelsen af ovennævnte ophævelsesklausul medfører således dels en forpligtelse for SNCM til at tilbagebetale alle overtagernes indskud til fordel for disse private investorer.
In any event, it is far from established that the State acting as public authority would be considered to be de facto manager.
Dels ville CGMF igen være ejer af 100 % af kapitalen i SNCM, mens risikoen for likvidation og dermed tab af en væsentlig del af de offentlige investeringer, vil være øget betydeligt.
The existence of one or more acts of mismanagement by the French State as de facto manager of the undertaking in compulsory liquidation
For så vidt angår private aktionærers købstilsagn, kan det ikke aktiveres af CGMF i tilfælde af SNCM's betalingsstandsning eller likvidation.
In the present case, the Commission notes that SNCM’s expert report referred, on the basis of a non-exhaustive list of factual elements, to a series of factors to show that the State, […] [60] Confidential information.
Det bekræfter, at denne mulighed ikke kan benyttes i tilfælde af vanskeligheder, og risiciene hviler i al væsentlighed på CGMF, dvs. staten.
, committed acts of mismanagement.
Kommissionen mener derfor ikke, at dette købstilsagn kan analyseres som modydelse for ophævelsesklausulen.
In particular, it is reported that the French State made errors relating to investments linked […] [60] Confidential information.
Endvidere kan Kommissionen ikke godtage de franske myndigheders argument om, at aftaleprotokollen indeholdt en række garantier med henblik på at beskytte statens investering.
The State also allegedly committed numerous acts of mismanagement with regard to capacity […] [60] Confidential information.
Faktisk udgør de forpligtelser, overtagerne får pålagt, ikke risici eller supplerende begrænsninger for overtagerne, som kunne sætte dem i en situation, der kan sammenlignes med CGMF's.
In their letter of 30 April 2007, the French authorities portrayed the risk of an order for damages against the State as very high, having regard to the criteria for categorising mismanagement as provided for in Article L. 651-2 of the Commercial Code.
De skal udelukkende sikre, at de private overtagere — i den periode, hvor de kan anvende ophævelsesklausulen — ikke foretager en juridisk ændring af SNCM og kun foretager handlinger, der er nødvendige for gennemførelse af forretningsplanen og socialpagten.
Again, the Commission considers that this statement of 30 April 2007, made in connection with a State aid procedure, cannot in itself suffice to establish to the requisite legal standard that a court would have considered that the national authorities committed the alleged errors, or, especially, the degree of probability of such an eventuality.
Som Retten understregede i sin dom af 11. september 2012, er en analyse af den forventede rentabilitet alene ikke tilstrækkelig til at konkludere, at staten har foretaget investeringen på markedsvilkår, i den udstrækning risiciene ikke er delt ligeligt mellem offentlige og private aktionærer.
This is all the more so since the French authorities deny the very existence of acts of mismanagement, which are, however, a sine qua non for the bringing of an action ‘en comblement de passif’.
Selv om investeringsbetingelsen om ligestilling ikke er opfyldt, kan foranstaltningen stadig være i overensstemmelse med princippet om den private investor under markedsøkonomiske vilkår.
More fundamentally, SNCM, like the French authorities, relies to a large extent on very old management decisions.
Det skal derfor bevises, at statens adfærd har svaret til den, en fornuftig privat investor ville have udvist i en lignende situation, f.eks. gennem forudgående analyser af forrentningen af investeringen.
Thus the Baker & McKenzie report focuses on […] [60] Confidential information.
Imidlertid fremlagde de franske myndigheder intet bevis for en sådan forudgående analyse.
carried out up until 2000.
De franske myndigheder anførte blot efterfølgende i deres bemærkninger, at den faste forrentning på […] [60] Fortrolige oplysninger.
It does not hesitate to refer to Court of Auditors reports for the financial years 1993-99.
% ville være passende for en privat investor ved sammenligning med forrentningen af en fransk statsobligation med et afkast på det pågældende tidspunkt på mellem 3,72 og 3,95 %.
It was around the mid-1990s that the main acts of mismanagement allegedly took place.
Men de fremlagde ingen analyse, der viste, at satsen på 10 % ville have været acceptabel for en privat investor i betragtning af statens risici, f.eks. ved ophævelsesklausulen og i forbindelse med virksomhedens situation.
SNCM’s creditors were informed of these management practices when they extended credit.
Især gælder satsen på […] [60] Fortrolige oplysninger.
There was, therefore, at least implicit acceptance of the risk associated with this type of management.
% kun ved en kapitaltilførsel i størrelsesordenen 8,75 mio. EUR, men i en sådan analyse skulle hele statens tilførsel, som er accepteret i protokollen, have været medregnet.
There is nothing to indicate that the State’s liability for making good the asset shortfall can reasonably be incurred in such a situation.
Eftersom der ikke er noget afkast af den negative pris på 158 mio. EUR eller kontokurantlånet på 38,5 mio. EUR, ville forrentningen af statens samlede investering i SNCM på privatiseringstidspunktet i 2006 have ligget klart under rentesatsen for en fransk statsobligation.
Furthermore, these alleged acts of mismanagement can be explained by political choices made by the public authorities and there is nothing to indicate either that these political choices can be classed as mismanagement within the meaning of the case-law on making good a shortfall in assets.
På grund af de tilknyttede risici ville en fornuftig privat investor under markedsøkonomiske vilkår ikke have accepteret en sådan rentesats.
Finally, the Baker & McKenzie report lacks credibility, particularly when it maintains that SNCM’s situation was attributable to external communication errors committed by the State with regard to that situation.
På baggrund af ovenstående mener Kommissionen ikke, at de ved retspraksis fastsatte kriterier for på forhånd at udelukke, at den omhandlede foranstaltning har karakter af statsstøtte, er opfyldt.
All that emerges from this report is that the State mentioned a situation which was already public knowledge.
Kommissionen er derfor af den opfattelse, at statens kapitaltilførsel på 8,75 mio. EUR gav SNCM en økonomisk fordel, eftersom den blev gennemført sideløbende med en tilførsel af privat kapital og på ikkesammenlignelige vilkår i den i EU-retspraksis fastsatte betydning.
The State’s conduct therefore has nothing in common with an act of mismanagement.
Den omtvistede foranstaltning udgør derfor statsstøtte efter EUF-traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1.
The finding of a shortfall in assets
De individuelle støtteforanstaltninger (38,5 mio. EUR)
In this case, the Commission remarks that the Oddo-Hastings report points up an asset shortfall of EUR 134,4 million at 30 September 2005, calculated as the difference between the value of SNCM’s assets (EUR 190,3 million) and the value of the undertaking’s liabilities (preferential and non-preferential debts valued respectively at EUR 153,8 million and EUR 170,9 million).
De franske myndigheder fandt, at denne finansiering udgør individuel støtte, som ikke gavnede virksomheden, og som derfor ikke er statsstøtte.
The Commission previously estimated the shortfall in SNCM’s assets at EUR 123,5 million at 30 September 2005 (see recital 264).
De interesserede parter CCF og STIM anfægtede, at denne foranstaltning skulle udgøre individuel støtte, fordi de bl.a. mente, at foranstaltningen kunne skabe positive indirekte virkninger for SNCM.
The existence of a causal link between the mismanagement and the established shortfall in assets
Kommissionen mener, at det forhold, at de direkte modtagere af den individuelle støtte er medarbejdere, ikke er tilstrækkeligt til at påvise, at der ikke er tale om støtte til fordel for deres arbejdsgiver.
According to the French authorities, the manager of a legal person may be declared liable, on the basis of Article L.624-3 of the Commercial Code, even if his act of mismanagement is only one of the causes of the shortfall in assets, and may be ordered to bear in whole or in part the social debts, even if his mismanagement is the cause of only a part of them [146].
Retten præciserede nemlig følgende:
According to the French authorities, the French State would be called upon to bear a proportion estimated at between 85 % and 100 % of the established shortfall in assets, i.e. between EUR 114,3 million and EUR 134,4 million.
»[…] den omstændighed, at de direkte modtagere af støtten til enkeltpersoner er medarbejdere, [er] ikke tilstrækkelig til at påvise, at der ikke foreligger en støtte til fordel for deres arbejdsgiver.« [155]
There is no sound basis for this analysis.
Som Retten ligeledes anførte i præmis 138 i dommen af 11. september 2012: »[m]ed henblik på at undersøge, om denne støtte til enkeltpersoner udgør støtte som omhandlet i artikel 87, stk. 1, EF, må det […] afgøres, om SNCM opnår en indirekte økonomisk fordel, der har gjort det muligt for selskabet at undgå omkostninger, der normalt skulle have været afholdt af virksomhedens egen kapital, og derfor hindrer, at markedskræfterne virker på sædvanlig måde.«
In so far as the alleged acts of mismanagement are based on decisions taken in the mid-1990s which immediately generated additional costs for SNCM, it is very difficult to attribute the problem to an asset shortfall in 2005, particularly since a lot of things happened between the two dates.
Endvidere bemærker Kommissionen, at denne foranstaltning ifølge aftaleprotokollen er en statslig forpligtelse over for private partnere til at finansiere »den del af omkostningerne ved medarbejderes eventuelle frivillige fratræden eller afbrydelse af ansættelseskontrakter (uanset af hvilken art), den såkaldte »kulance«, der skal lægges oven i ethvert beløb, som arbejdsgiveren skal betale (…)«.
Furthermore, if there seems to be no automatic link between the amount of compensation granted to make good the asset shortfall and the amount of the increase in liabilities caused by the manager’s mismanagement (if this were to be established), this also means that the courts may decide to set the amount to be paid by the manager at a much lower level than the established asset shortfall [147].
Som Retten anfører i præmis 145 i dommen af 11. september 2012, synes det forhold, at denne støtte til enkeltpersoner indgår i protokollen om salg, at understrege, at den skaber en fordel.
Contrary to what the French authorities (and SNCM) seem to believe, there is nothing to indicate that the decisions at issue here would be considered by the courts looking into the matter to be serious enough to warrant placing the burden of a major part of the asset shortfall on the shoulders of the public authorities.
Parterne har benyttet sig af denne mulighed, fordi de kunne opnå en vis fordel heraf.
According to the allegations under investigation, the decisions were taken for protectionist purposes in a political context (what is more, 10 years earlier for the most part) or were more recent decisions taken to spare employees from having to make productivity gains or as part of efforts to improve industrial relations.
Støtten skaber derfor en økonomisk fordel for SNCM, idet den giver selskabet mulighed for ikke at bære alle omkostningerne ved visse medarbejderes eventuelle fremtidige fratræden.
Possible payment of the additional redundancy payments in the event of SNCM’s compulsory liquidation
I den foreliggende sag viser hyppigheden af social uro i SNCM, at gennemførelsen af denne virksomheds socialplan nærmest systematisk medfører strejker og andre faglige aktioner.
The French authorities consider the actual costs to be paid by the French State as shareholder as falling somewhere in the region of EUR 212,1 million to EUR 361 million.