natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Endelig bemærker Kommissionen som svar på de berørte medlemsstaters bemærkninger, at selv om statsgældskrisen kan betragtes som en faktor, der reelt forhindrede gennemførelsen af den betingede godkendelsesafgørelse, så kan statsgældskrisen ikke påberåbes som begrundelse for den manglende overholdelse af visse forpligtelser som f.eks. RAROC-niveauet.
Lastly, in reply to the comments of the Member States concerned, the Commission notes that although the sovereign debt crisis may indeed be seen as having hampered the implementation of the conditional authorisation decision, the sovereign debt crisis may not, however, be relied on as a reason for failing to comply with certain commitments such as the minimum RAROC.
Af ovennævnte årsager blev Kommissionens tvivl, som den kom til udtryk i den midlertidige godkendelsesbeslutning [88] og beslutningen om udvidelse af proceduren [89], ikke fjernet i kraft af de bemærkninger, den modtog fra de berørte medlemsstater, som påberåbte sig at have overholdt de forpligtelser og betingelser, som er nævnt i den betingede godkendelsesafgørelse [90].
For the reasons set out above, the doubts expressed by the Commission in its temporary approval decision [88] and in its decision to extend the procedure [89] have not been allayed by the comments from the Member States concerned claiming that the commitments and conditions set out in the conditional authorisation decision have been complied with [90].
Kommissionen konstaterer derfor den manglende opfyldelse af betingelser og forpligtelser i henhold til den betingede godkendelsesafgørelse og de berørte medlemsstaters — efter artikel 108, stk. 2, i TEUF — misbrug af den støtte, som var genstand for den betingede godkendelsesafgørelse.
The Commission therefore concludes that the conditions and commitments in the conditional authorisation decision have not been complied with, and that the Member States concerned have misused, within the meaning of Article 108(2) TFEU, the aid which was the subject of the conditional authorisation decision.
Forekomst af supplerende støtte til Dexia i form af deltagelse i Arcofins rekapitalisering af Dexia
Presence of additional aid to Dexia in the form of Arcofin’s participation in Dexia’s recapitalisation
Da Kommissionen undersøgte Dexias rekapitalisering i forbindelse med den betingede godkendelsesafgørelse, konkluderede den, at denne foranstaltning opfyldte alle betingelserne i artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF, undtagen hvad angår Arcofins, Ethias' og CNP Assurances' deltagelse i kapitaltilførslen.
When the Commission examined Dexia’s recapitalisation in the context of its conditional authorisation decision, it concluded that the measure fulfilled all the conditions of Article 107(1) TFEU, except as regards the participation of Arcofin, Ethias and CNP Assurances in the capital increase.
Den konkluderede da også i betragtning 130 i denne afgørelse, at disse selskabers deltagelse i rekapitaliseringen af Dexia ikke opfyldte betingelsen om statslige midler.
It concluded in recital 130 of that decision that the participation of these companies in Dexia’s recapitalisation did not satisfy the condition that it should be financed through State resources.
Sådan som det er fremlagt i betragtning 31 i beslutningen om udvidelse af proceduren indledte Kommissionen den 3. april 2012 en formel undersøgelsesprocedure i sag SA.33927 [91] guarantee scheme protecting the shares of individual members of financial cooperatives, idet den foreløbig vurderede, at garantiordningen godt kunne udgøre støtte, der var uforenelig med det indre marked, til fordel for finansielle kooperativer, heraf bl.a. Arcofin, hvis enkeltmedlemmer var dækket af garantiordningen.
As described in recital 31 of the decision to extend the procedure, on 3 April 2012 the Commission opened a formal investigation procedure in case SA.33927 [91] ‘guarantee scheme protecting the shares of individual members of financial cooperatives’, considering, on a preliminary view, that the guarantee scheme might constitute aid incompatible with the internal market for financial cooperatives whose individual members were covered by the scheme, and therefore in particular for Arcofin.
Ifølge beslutningen af 3. april 2012 kunne garantiordningen især have hjulpet kooperativerne med at opnå mere kapital eller i det mindste bevare deres eksisterende kapital ved at overbevise de eksisterende enkeltmedlemmer om ikke at trække deres penge ud af kooperativet.
Among other things, according to the decision of 3 April 2012, the guarantee scheme might have helped cooperatives to obtain more capital or, at least, to preserve their existing capital by persuading their existing individual members not to leave their cooperative.
Dette var særlig relevant i perioden fra efteråret 2008 til datoen for vedtagelse (10. oktober 2011) af den kongelige anordning (arrêté royal), da skrøbeligheden på markederne i almindelighed og i de finansielle institutioner i særdeleshed ellers kunne have tilskyndet investorerne til at trække sig ud af kooperativerne [92].
This was particularly relevant during the period from autumn 2008 to the date when the royal decree was adopted (10 October 2011), when the fragile state of the markets in general and financial institutions in particular would otherwise have encouraged investors to leave cooperatives [92].
I beslutningen af 3. april 2012 og beslutningen om udvidelse af proceduren anførte Kommissionen:
As stated in the decision of 3 April 2012 and in the decision to extend the procedure, the Commission pointed out that:
at den belgiske regering den 10. oktober 2008 i en pressemeddelelse bekendtgjorde sin beslutning om at udvide den beskyttelse, der ydes af fonds de protection des dépôts et des instruments financiers, som dækker bankkundernes indestående [93].
on 10 October 2008, the Belgian Government issued a press release announcing its decision to extend the protection provided by the deposits and financial instrument protection fund, which covers the assets of customers of the banking institutions [93].
Denne garanti skulle udvides til også at omfatte andre institutioner i den finansielle sektor, især forsikringsselskaber [livsforsikringer i »branche 21«] eller godkendte kooperativer […] som måtte anmode herom [94].
This guarantee was to be extended to other financial sector institutions, ‘in particular insurance companies [‘branch 21’ life insurance] or recognised cooperatives … upon request’ [94].
I pressemeddelelsen hed det: Visse institutioner har allerede indsendt en anmodning
The press release stated that ‘some organisations have already submitted requests’;
at det belgiske føderale parlament den 15. oktober 2008 vedtog en lov med henblik på at fremme den finansielle stabilitet, i medfør af hvilken staten ved anordning kan indføre et system for ydelse af statsgaranti for forpligtelser indgået af de kontrollerede institutioner, nemlig forsikringsselskaber, kreditinstitutter, investeringsvirksomheder og børsselskaber
on 15 October 2008, the Belgian Federal Parliament adopted a law to promote financial stability, under which the State may introduce by decree ‘a system for granting a State guarantee for commitments given by the institutions under supervision’, i.e. insurance companies, credit institutions, investment firms and stockbrokers;
at en kongelig anordning den 14. november 2008 blev vedtaget til gennemførelse af loven af 15. oktober 2008 ved at udvide statsgarantien til at omfatte indehavere af livsforsikringsprodukter i »branche 21«.
on 14 November 2008, a royal decree implemented the Law of 15 October 2008 by extending the State guarantee to holders of ‘branch 21’ life insurance products.
En ny særlig fonds de protection des dépôts et des assurances vie blev stiftet under Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations belge.
A new ‘special’ fund to protect deposits and life insurance was set up in the Belgian Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations.
at den belgiske regering den 21. januar 2009 i en pressemeddelelse bekræftede løftet om at tilbyde en garantiordning til enkeltmedlemmer af eksisterende godkendte kooperativer, hos hvem mindst halvdelen af formuen er investeret i en eller flere virksomheder inden for den finansielle sektor, eller som er godkendt til at fungere som kreditinstitut.
on 21 January 2009, the Belgian Government issued a press release confirming its commitment to offer a guarantee scheme ‘to [individual] members of existing recognised cooperatives at least half of whose assets are invested in one or more companies active in the financial sector or which are authorised to operate as credit institutions’.
Samme dag informerede Arco-koncernen sine medlemmer om denne bekræftelse fra regeringen [96]
On the same date the Arco Group informed its members of this confirmation by the Government [96];
at det ved kongelig anordning af 14. april 2009 [97] blev pålagt finansministeren at fremlægge forslag til en lov om indførelse af et system til ydelse af statsgaranti for tilbagebetaling til enkeltmedlemmer af deres kapitalandel i godkendte kooperativer at den belgiske føderale regering den 9. september 2011 bekræftede, at der nu forelå et forslag til lovgivning om statsgaranti til fordel for enkeltmedlemmer af godkendte kooperativer [98]
on 14 April 2009 [97], a royal decree instructed the Minister of Finance to draft a law introducing a system for granting a State guarantee for the repayment to individual members of their share of the capital of recognised cooperatives;on 9 September 2011, the Belgian Federal Government confirmed that a draft regulation on the State guarantee for individual members of recognised cooperatives had been finalised [98];
at den garanti, der blev indført ved kongelig anordning af 14. november 2008, ved kongelig anordning af 10. oktober 2011 udvides til også at omfatte godkendte kooperativer, idet den særlige fond ligeledes beskytter kooperativernes kapital.
the royal decree of 10 October 2011 extended the guarantee introduced by the royal decree of 14 November 2008 to cover recognised cooperatives, so that the special fund also protected their capital.
Det præciseres heri, at den tilbudte beskyttelse fra den særlige fond af indlån og livsforsikringer og de godkendte kooperativers kapital træder i kraft fra modtagelsen af betalingen af det årlige bidrag og kontingent fra den forsikringsvirksomhed eller det kooperativ, der har anmodet om deltagelse i fonden
It stated that the protection offered by the special fund protecting deposits, life insurance and the capital of recognised cooperatives was effective from receipt of payment of the annual contribution and the entrance fee by the insurance company or cooperative applying to participate in the fund;
Så vidt Kommissionen ved, er Arco-koncernen — eller rettere dens tre datterselskaber Arcofin, Arcopar og Arcoplus — de første godkendte finansielle kooperativ, der har søgt om ordningen til fordel for sine enkeltmedlemmer, og indtil videre også det eneste finansielle kooperativ, der har udnyttet garantiordningen.
As far as the Commission is aware, the Arco Group — or more accurately its three subsidiaries Arcofin, Arcopar and Arcoplus — was the first recognised financial cooperative to have applied for the scheme for its individual members and remains, to date, the only financial cooperative covered by the guarantee scheme.
Ifølge rapporten fra den særlige kommission i det belgiske Chambre des Représentants, som skulle undersøge de omstændigheder, der har fremtvunget afviklingen af Dexia SA, var der ikke nogen egentligt økonomisk interesse for Arcofin i at deltage i rekapitaliseringen af Dexia, og den operation skete under pres fra myndighederne:
According to the report by the Special Commission of the Belgian House of Representatives tasked with examining the circumstances which led to the break-up of Dexia SA, there was no particular financial interest for Arcofin in participating in the recapitalisation of Dexia, and the operation was carried out under pressure from the authorities:
»Begivenhederne foregik i en sammenhæng, hvor de private referenceaktionærer allerede befandt sig i en svag position.
‘The events occurred in a context where the private shareholders in question were already in a weak position.
[…] Holding Communal og Arco-koncernen var bidragydere til indtægterne fra porteføljen, som de ejede i Dexia, og havde yderst begrænsede egne ressourcer.
Holding Communal and the Arco Group relied on income from the portfolio which they held in Dexia, and their own resources were extremely limited.
For at forstå den situation, som Arco og Holding Communal stod i, må man se på rekapitaliseringen i 2008, som var hårdknuden i deres fælles problem.
In order to understand the situation facing Arco and Holding Communal, we need to look at the 2008 recapitalisation operation, which was where their shared problem really started.
Dengang var Arco inde i en proces med diversificering af porteføljen for at afhjælpe en konstateret for stor koncentration på deres primære position, nemlig Dexia.
At that time Arco was actively diversifying its portfolio, following a diagnosis that its main position was too heavily concentrated in Dexia.
Der er ikke økonomisk interesse i at koncentrere deres portefølje yderligere, ud over rene finansieringsovervejelser, som i øvrigt er problematiske — se kapitlet om denne analyse.
There was no economic interest in further concentrating its portfolio, beyond considerations relating purely to funding, which was also causing problems — see the section analysing this.
Da nødkapitaliseringen imidlertid skulle besluttes i oktober 2008, besluttede disse to aktionærer at gøre det nødvendige for at ikke få udvandet deres aktieandel for meget.
However, when the emergency recapitalisation was to be decided in October 2008, these two shareholders decided to do whatever was needed to avoid diluting their holding too much.
Resultatet af deres valg […] er en klart større koncentration af deres kapitalandelsportefølje og en stor centrering omkring Dexia-koncernen, som de facto bliver deres problem nr. 1.
The result of this decision … was that their portfolio of holdings was much more concentrated, with a major focus on the Dexia Group, which de facto became their biggest problem.
Denne kapitaltilførsel, som i øvrigt har været finansielt gavnlig for [Dexia-]koncernen, gjorde derfor især disse to referenceaktionærer skrøbelige, for de var ikke tilstrækkeligt solidt polstrede til at modstå operationen med den systematiske risiko i deres portefølje; for dem blev Dexia-risikoen en specifik ikkediversificeret risiko« [99].
This capital increase, which was financially beneficial for the Group [Dexia], thus placed these two shareholders in particular in a much weaker position, since they were not financially strong enough to absorb the operation in the systematic risk of their portfolio; for them, the Dexia risk became a specific, non-diversified risk’ [99].
Ifølge den belgiske presse erklærede finansministeren i den foregående regering den 25. januar 2012 ved en høring i den særlige kommission i det belgiske Chambre des Représentants, som skulle undersøge de omstændigheder, der har fremtvunget afviklingen af Dexia SA, at statsgarantien til fordel for enkeltmedlemmernes andele i Arcofin stammede fra et politisk kompromis fra 2008 i forbindelse med den første redningsplan for Dexia:
According to the Belgian press, the Minister of Finance in the previous government had stated on 25 January 2012, at a hearing before the Special Commission of the Belgian House of Representatives tasked with examining the circumstances which led to the break-up of Dexia SA, that the State guarantee for the shares of Arcofin’s members was the result of a political compromise dating back to 2008 and the first Dexia rescue plan:
»Han [den belgiske finansminister] sagde ligeledes [onsdag den 25. januar 2012 ved høringen af parlamentskommissionen vedrørende afviklingen af Dexia], at han ikke straks følte sig overbevist af Arco-garantierne, især på grund af tvivl om, hvorvidt de ville blive accepteret af EU.
‘He [the Belgian Finance Minister] also confided [on Wednesday, 25 January 2012, during his hearing before the Parliamentary Commission on the break-up of Dexia] that he had not been entirely sure about the Arco guarantees, particularly because he rather feared that Europe would not agree to them.
At disse garantier alligevel blev indført, skyldtes ifølge vicepremierministeren [den belgiske finansminister] et politisk kompromis fra 2008 i forbindelse med den første redning af Dexia.
The fact that the guarantees were still set up was the result, according to the Deputy Prime Minister [the Belgian Finance Minister], of a political compromise dating from 2008 and the first Dexia rescue plan.
Det er første gang, at en berørt person indrømmer dette kompromis, hvis eksistens allerede var kendt.
This is the first time that anyone involved has admitted that such a compromise existed, even though it was by no means a secret.
Ifølge [ministeren] blev spørgsmålet om at yde beskyttelse […] til Arcos samarbejdspartnere allerede stillet i slutningen af september 2008 natten til den første redning af Dexia i Palais Egmont.
According to [the Minister], the question of protection … for Arco’s members had already been raised in late September 2008 at the Egmont Palace, on the night of the first Dexia rescue.
[…] Med hensyn til Arco kom spørgsmålet fra det begrænsede ministerråd [Kernkabinet] selv, forklarede [finansministeren], som ikke oplyste andet.
‘… Regarding Arco, the question had come from the inner Cabinet (‘Kernkabinet’] itself’, declared the [Finance Minister], who did not give any further details.
[Ministeren] sagde, at det politiske kompromis da var nødvendigt for at kunne redde Dexia.
[The Minister] said that the political compromise had been necessary at that point to be able to save Dexia.
»[Den belgiske finansminister] har også sagt til Dexia-kommissionen, at han ikke i første omgang var for denne garanti, som var konsekvensen af et politisk kompromis, der blev indgået i 2008, bekræftede den tidligere finansminister. Han mindede om, at det natten til den første redning af Dexia i september 2008 var et spørgsmål om at udvide den garanti, der blev tilbudt opsparerne for branche 21-produkterne og Arcos samarbejdspartnere. […] For Arcos vedkommende blev spørgsmålet stillet direkte til Kern [det begrænsede ministerråd].« [101]
‘Before the Dexia Commission [the Belgian Finance Minister] also confided that he had not initially been in favour of this guarantee, which was the result of a political compromise reached in 2008, the former Finance Minister confirmed. He recalled that around the time of the first Dexia rescue in September 2008, the idea had been to extend the guarantee for savers to branch 21 products, …, and to Arco members. ‘… On Arco, the question was raised in the inner Cabinet itself’ ’ [101].
Ifølge et parlamentsmedlems indlæg i forbindelse med drøftelsen af rapporten fra den særlige kommission i det belgiske Chambre des Représentants, som skulle undersøge de omstændigheder, der har fremtvunget afviklingen af Dexia SA, var den adgang, som staten gav medlemmerne af Arco-koncernen til garantiordningen, modydelsen til Arcofins deltagelse i kapitalforhøjelsen af Dexia, som blev gennemført under pres fra regeringen:
According to a statement by an MP during the debate on the report by the Special Commission of the Belgian House of Representatives tasked with examining the circumstances which led to the break-up of Dexia SA, the State had given Arco Group members access to the guarantee scheme in return for Arcofin’s participation, under government pressure, in Dexia’s capital increase:
»I 2008 deltog ARCO-koncernen og Holding Communal i kapitaltilførslen til koncernen med et for stort beløb, der var umuligt at nå.
‘In 2008, the ARCO Group and Holding Communal participated in the Group’s capital increase for a huge amount that would be impossible to raise.
For dette lån [lån tildelt af DBB til ARCO og Holding Communal for at de kunne deltage i kapitaltilførslen] kunne de kun henvende sig til Banque Dexia Belgique, og der er derfor i det foreliggende tilfælde tale om en cirkulær finansiering.
For this loan [the loan granted by DBB to ARCO and Holding Communal to enable them to participate in the capital increase], they could only apply to Banque Dexia Belgique, so it was actually circular financing.
Denne kapitaltilførsel skulle tjene til at sikre udbyttet og blev gennemført under pres fra regeringen.
The capital increase was designed to safeguard dividends and was carried out under government pressure.
Til gengæld fik ARCO adgang til Dépôt de fonds de garantie, således at opsparerne kunne holdes skadesløse for forvaltningsfejl.
In return, ARCO was given access to the guarantee fund, with savers having to be paid compensation for management errors.
ARCO skulle kun betale for deltagelsen, hvis det var nødvendigt.
In order to join, ARCO only had to pay if this was necessary.
Regeringen belønnede endnu engang ARCO udtrykkeligt ved at give en gave på 1,5 mia. EUR« [102].
So once again the government explicitly rewarded ARCO by handing it EUR 1,5 billion on a plate’ [102].
Af de grunde, der er nævnt i betragtning 397-400 blev Kommissionens tvivl i beslutningen om at udvide proceduren ikke fjernet af de berørte medlemsstaters bemærkninger.
For the reasons set out in recitals 397-400, the doubts expressed by the Commission in the decision to extend the procedure have not been allayed by the comments received from the Member States concerned.
Derfor mener Kommissionen, at statsgarantien til fordel for medlemmerne af Arcofin blev udtænkt af de belgiske myndigheder for at overbevise Arcofin om at deltage i rekapitaliseringen af Dexia.
The Commission therefore considers that the State guarantee for members of Arcofin was planned by the Belgian authorities in order to persuade Arcofin to participate in Dexia’s recapitalisation.
Den nævner samtidigheden af bekendtgørelsen af garantiforslaget (den 10. oktober 2008) og forberedelsen af rekapitaliseringen af Dexia (der blev endelig den 3. oktober 2008, hvorfor forberedelsen lå før denne dato) og vurderer i lyset af førnævnte oplysninger [103], at Arcofin ikke havde deltaget i rekapitaliseringen af Dexia, hvis den ikke havde kunnet regne med garantiordningen til at beskytte den investering, som enkeltmedlemmerne af kooperativerne foretog, idet offentliggørelsen af forslaget til garantiordning var det, der fik den til at gå i gang med kapitalindsprøjtningen.
It points to the fact that the announcement of the guarantee plan (on 10 October 2008) was concomitant with the preparations for Dexia’s recapitalisation (which became definitive on 3 October 2008, and was thus prepared before that date), and it considers, in the light of the evidence set out above [103], that Arcofin would not have participated in the recapitalisation of Dexia if it had not been able to count on the guarantee scheme protecting the investment of individual members in cooperatives, disclosure of the plans for which encouraged it to go ahead with the injection of capital.
Foranstaltningen kan således tilskrives staten.
The measure is thus imputable to the State.
Rekapitaliseringen af Dexia med 350 mio. EUR fra det finansielle kooperativ Arcofin i forbindelse med den første redningsplan for Dexia kan derfor tilskrives staten.
The EUR 350 million recapitalisation of Dexia by the Arcofin financial cooperative as part of the first Dexia rescue plan is thus imputable to the State.