natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Pr. 30. juni 2012 beløb transaktionerne i Legacy Portfolio Management Division sig til 86,3 mia. EUR inklusive ikkebalanceførte transaktioner, mens de balanceførte transaktioner androg 83,9 mia. EUR.
On 30 June 2012, the Legacy Portfolio Management Division’s commitments totalled EUR 86,3 billion including off-balance-sheet commitments; balance-sheet commitments totalled EUR 83,9 billion.
De berørte medlemsstater påbegyndte en velordnet afvikling af Dexia.
The Member States concerned initiated an orderly resolution of Dexia.
Ultimo oktober 2012 havde Dexia-koncernen følgende struktur:
In late October 2012, Dexia had the following structure:
Dexia-koncernens struktur pr. 24. oktober 2012
Structure of the Dexia Group on 24 October 2012
ORGANISATIONSDIAGRAM
ORGANIZATION CHART
Belgiens føderale regering
Belgian Federal Government
Regionalregering Flandern
Regional Government Flanders
Regionalregering Wallonien
Regional Government Wallonia
Regionalregering Bruxelles
Regional Government Brussels
Belgiske kommuner/ provinser
Belgian Municipalities/ Provinces
Offentlige aktionærer
Public Shareholders
DEXIA S.A. Bruxelles, Belgien
DEXIA SA Brussels, Belgium
Dexiarall S.A., Paris, Frankrig
Dexiarall SA, Paris, France
DCL Investissements S.A. Paris, Frankrig
DCL Investissements SA, Paris, France
Dexia Nederland B.V. Amsterdam, Nederlandene
Dexia Nederland BV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Dexia Participation Belgique S.A., Belgien
Dexia Participation Belgique SA, Belgium
Dexia S.A., Etablissement Stable France
Dexia SA, Permanent Establishment France, Belgium
Dexia Crédit Local S.A., Paris, Frankrig
Dexia Crédit Local SA, Paris, France
Dexia-koncernens vanskeligheder under finanskrisen i efteråret 2008 er beskrevet i den betingede godkendelsesafgørelse.
The difficulties faced by Dexia during the financial crisis in autumn 2008 are described in the conditional authorisation decision.
De problemer, Dexia nu står over for, kan opsummeres som følger.
Dexia’s more recent difficulties may be summarised as follows.
For det første har forværringen af den statsobligationskrise, som har ramt mange europæiske banker, ført til stigende mistillid til bankerne hos investorerne, hvilket har resulteret i, at bankerne ikke har været i stand til at skaffe sig tilstrækkelig finansiering på rimelige vilkår.
First, the worsening of the sovereign debt crisis, which many European banks are facing, has increasingly sapped investors’ confidence in bank counterparties with the result that the latter are unable to obtain satisfactory volumes of financing on satisfactory terms.
Denne mistillid hos investorerne har ikke mindst gjort sig gældende for Dexia-koncernen på grund af dens høje risikoeksponering.
Furthermore, since the Dexia Group has been particularly exposed to sovereign and quasi-sovereign risk, investors have even less confidence.
Dexia har en stor beholdning af stats- og kommunelån og/eller -obligationer i lande, som markedet opfatter som risikobehæftede.
Dexia’s assets include many loans and/or bonds in countries and/or local and regional authorities in countries perceived as risky by the market.
Desuden opstod statsobligationskrisen, netop som Dexia ikke havde tid til at fuldføre sin omstruktureringsplan.
In addition, the sovereign debt crisis hit before Dexia had time to finalise the implementation of its restructuring plan.
Da gennemførelsen af omstruktureringsplanen blev forsinket, forværredes koncernens likviditetsrisikoprofil.
As a result of this delay in implementing the restructuring plan, the Group’s liquidity risk profile worsened.
Denne forværring gjorde Dexia mere sårbar end de øvrige europæiske banker over for markedets mistillid.
This deterioration made Dexia more vulnerable than other European banks to market mistrust.
Som følge af det kraftige rentefald i sommeren 2011 blev behovet for yderligere sikkerhedsstillelse øget med mindst [5-20] mia. EUR til imødegåelse af margin calls på grund af udsvingene i markedsværdien af de rentederivater, Dexia benyttede til afdækning af sin balance.
the sharp fall in interest rates during the summer of 2011 increased by at least EUR [5-20] billion the need for additional collateral to cope with the margin calls linked to the variation in the market value of the interest-rate derivatives used to hedge the balance sheet;
Mange af obligationslånene (især obligationer tidligere udstedt af Dexia med sikkerhed stillet af de berørte medlemsstater) forfaldt på et tidspunkt, hvor markedsvilkårene for refinansiering af disse obligationer ikke var optimale.
many bond issues (in particular bonds guaranteed by the Member States concerned previously issued by Dexia) matured at a time when market conditions for refinancing these bonds were not optimal;
Det kraftige fald i markedsværdien og kreditkvaliteten af de aktiver, Dexia benytter som sikkerhed for optagelse af lån.
the substantial fall in market value and decline in the credit quality of the assets that Dexia uses by way of security to obtain financing;
Stigende mistillid hos en stor del af investorerne, bl.a. da det kom frem, at Dexia havde haft store tab i andet halvår 2011 (tæt ved 4 mia. EUR) og var blevet nedgraderet af flere kreditvurderingsbureauer.
the loss of confidence by many investors following, among other things, the announcement of substantial losses in the second quarter of 2011 (almost EUR 4 billion) and downgrades by some rating agencies;
Dexias vanskeligheder havde siden begyndelsen af 2011 især tynget DBB/Belfius, som var koncernens finanscentral.
DBB/Belfius, the Group’s central treasury, was particularly badly hit by Dexia’s difficulties from early 2011.
Det er under disse omstændigheder, at de berørte medlemsstater besluttede i første omgang at træffe andre foranstaltninger for at hjælpe Dexia i form af en ny ELA-foranstaltning ydet af den belgiske og den franske centralbank, en midlertidig refinansieringsgaranti og udarbejdelsen af en plan for afvikling af koncernen.
In these circumstances, the Member States concerned initially decided to take other measures to assist Dexia: a new ELA measure granted by the Belgian and French central banks, the grant of a temporary refinancing guarantee and the drawing up of a resolution plan for the Group.
De berørte medlemsstater mener, at den resterende koncern trods de foranstaltninger, der var blevet truffet siden februar 2010, risikerer »umiddelbar forsvinden« [30], der kun kan afhjælpes ved en velordnet afvikling af koncernen.
The Member States concerned considered that, despite the measures taken since February 2010, there was a risk of ‘immediate disappearance’ [30] of the residual group that could be offset only by an orderly resolution of the Group.
Beskrivelse af Dexia Municipal Agency (»DMA«)
Description of Dexia Municipal Agency (‘DMA’)
DMA er en af de største europæiske realkreditinstitutter.
DMA is one of Europe’s leading mortgage lending companies.
Instituttets primære formål er genfinansiering af lån eller værdipapirer via udstedelse af realkreditobligationer, som er et af de betydelige elementer i det internationale marked for covered bonds.
Its main object is the refinancing of loans or securities via the issue of mortgage bonds, one of the main components of the covered bond market internationally.
Som realkreditinstitut efter loven af 22. oktober 2010 udsteder DMA strukturerede kreditobligationer karakteriseret ved den fortrinsret, som gør, at det er de summer, der hidrører fra dets aktiver, der først går til betaling af renter og afdrag.
As a mortgage lending company under the Law of 22 October 2010, DMA issues securitised bonds characterised by the legal privilege pursuant to which sums from its assets are allocated as a priority to payments of bond interest and bond reimbursement.
DMA's aktivbeholdning omfatter udelukkende engagementer i offentligretlige juridiske personer såsom lokale myndigheder eller grupper heraf eller offentlige virksomheder i Det Europæiske Økonomiske Samarbejdsområde, Schweiz, USA, Canada og Japan.
DMA’s assets exclusively include exposures to eligible public persons such as local authorities or their groupings or public establishments in the European Economic Area, Switzerland, the USA, Canada and Japan.
Engagementerne består i lån eller obligationer, som udgør en fordring mod disse offentligretlige juridiske personer.
Exposures take the material form of loans or bonds representing receivables from these public persons.
I DMA's balance findes også privatgældsfondsandele eller lignende enheder med pant i bagvedliggende aktiver (asset backed securities eller »ABS«).
DMA’s balance sheet can also include shares of special-purpose vehicles or similar ‘asset-backed security’ (ABS) entities.
DMA's passiver omfatter to typer gæld: realkreditobligationer og andre gældsposter, der er underordnet disse.
DMA’s liabilities include two categories of debt: mortgage bonds and other debts subordinate to those bonds.
De aktiver, der ikke er finansieret af den strukturerede gæld (overdækning af sikkerhedsstillelse), er finansieret ved hjælp af egenkapital og en gæld til DCL, som er eneaktionær i DMA.
Assets which are not financed by securitised debt (overcollaterisation) are financed from own funds and from a debt contracted with DCL, DMA’s sole shareholder.
Realkreditinstitutternes overdækningsforhold beregnes som samtlige aktiver (cover pool) sat i forhold til samtlige foranstående gældsposter.
The overcollateralisation ratio of mortgage credit companies is calculated as all the asset components (‘cover pool’) related to all privileged debt.
Størstedelen af de aktiver, der figurerer på DMA's balance, hidrører fra Dexia-koncernens kommercielle virksomhed.
The majority of the assets included in DMA’s balance sheet come from the commercial activity of the Dexia Group.
Porteføljen med de franske lokale myndigheder repræsenterede en sum på 37 mia. EUR og de offentlige virksomheder i sundhedssektoren en sum på 6,6 mia. EUR.
The French local authority portfolio was EUR 37 billion and the public health establishment portfolio was EUR 6,6 billion.
DMA's kundeportefølje
DMA’s customer portfolio
DEXMAS KUNDEPORTEFØLJE PR. 30. juni 2012 I MIO. EUR
DEXMA CUSTOMER PORTFOLIO AT 30 JUNE 2012 IN EUR MILLION
Lån/obligationer
Loans/Bonds
Departementer
Départements
Grupper af kommuner
Groups of municipalities
Offentlige virksomheder
Public establishments:
i sundhedssektoren
health
inden for socialt boligbyggeri
social housing
Andre lande i OECD
Other OECD countries
Visse af DMA-porteføljens franske udlån kan betegnes som strukturerede udlån.
Some French loans in DMA’s portfolio may be characterised as structured loans.
Pr. 31. august 2012 var DMA's franske udlånsportefølje (udeståender, kontrakter og antal kunder) sammensat som følger efter udlånstype (ikkestrukturerede, strukturerede, ikkefølsomme og følsomme strukturerede) og ifølge Gissler-klassificeringen [31] (se betragtning 194, hvor strukturens risici vurderes):
At 31 August 2012, DMA’s French loans (in terms of exposures, contracts and customer numbers) broke down as follows by type of loan (non-structured, structured, non-sensitive and sensitive structured) and according to the Gissler charter classification [31] (see recital 194) which measures the structure risk.
Klassificering af udlån
Classification of loans
Klassificering af udlån på DMA's balance (pr. 31. august 2012)
Classification of loans included in DMA’s balance sheet (at 31 August 2012)
Udeståender (mio. EUR)
Exposures (EUR million)
Antal kontrakter (tusinde)
Number of contracts (thousand)
Antal kunder (tusinde)
Number of customers (thousand)
Ikkestrukturerede udlån
Non-structured loans
Ikkefølsomme strukturerede udlån
Non-sensitive structured loans
Følsomme strukturerede udlån
Sensitive structured loans
heraf uden for klassificeringen
Off-charter
Efter en indledende periode, hvor kunden betaler en fast rente, som det meste af tiden ligger under renten på såkaldte plain vanilla-lån med samme løbetid, vil lånets strukturerede periode normalt indtræde.
Generally, after an initial period in which the rate to be paid by the customer is fixed and, in most cases, lower than the rate of a vanilla loan maturing at the same time, the structured period of the loan may be triggered.
Rentesatsen bliver herefter direkte knyttet til et underliggende indeks (renteindeks, valutakurs osv.) ifølge en mere eller mindre kompleks formel.
The interest rate to be paid is then directly linked to an underlying index (exchange rate index, exchange parity, etc.) according to a formula whose complexity varies.
Mange lån indekseres således direkte efter kursen mellem euroen og schweizerfrancen.
Many loans are therefore directly indexed to the euro-Swiss franc parity.
På grund af krisen og schweizerfrancens stærke fremgang de seneste år ligger den rente, som kunden skal betale, nu langt over markedsprisen.
As a result of the crisis and the very strong progression of the Swiss franc in recent years, the interest rate to be paid is now substantially above the market price.
Visse aktuelle renteniveauer har fået mange kunder til at pege på DMA og klage over følgende: 1) ingen eller fejlbehæftet angivelse af den samlede effektive rente, 2) DCL/DMA misligholder deres oplysnings- og rådgivningspligt, og 3) ugyldig kontrakt som følge af mangler ved samtykket.
As a result of the level of some of the interest rates currently being paid, many customers have decided to take action against DMA, citing the following grounds: 1) the lack or erroneous nature of the Annual Percentage Rate (APR), 2) the failure by DCL/DMA to fulfil its duty of information and advice and 3) the nullity of the contract on the ground of absence of consent.
Pr. 30. september 2012 havde 50 kunder (for et kumuleret nominelt udestående på ca. [0-2,5] mia. EUR) klaget over DCL/DMA.
On 30 September 2012, 50 customers (a total nominal exposure of some EUR [0-2,5] billion) had taken action against DCL/DMA.
Samtidig var der adskillige lån for et samlet nominelt beløb af 250 mio. EUR, der ikke blev afdraget.
At the same time, a number of loans of a total nominal amount of EUR 250 million were in a default situation.
Som nævnt ovenfor i beskrivelsen af beslutningen om udvidelse af proceduren var der i den plan for en velordnet afvikling, som blev meddelt Kommissionen i april 2012, i første omgang tale om indførelse af to garantier: i) en garanti mod tvister ydet af Dexia/DCL over for køberne af DMA vedrørende porteføljen af følsomme udlån (denne garanti blev givet med sikkerhedsstillelse fra den franske stat) og ii) en stop loss-garanti til dækning af kreditrisikoen ved hele DMA's portefølje.
As mentioned above in the description of the decision to extend the procedure, the orderly resolution plan notified to the Commission in April 2012 initially made provision for the introduction of two guarantees: (i) a guarantee against litigation granted by Dexia/DCL to the purchasers of DMA on the portfolio of sensitive loans (that guarantee being counter-guaranteed by the French State) and (ii) a stop-loss guarantee to cover the credit risks of DMA’s portfolio as a whole.
For at kunne udtale sig om foreneligheden af disse garantier med statsstøttereglerne har Kommissionen pålagt en uafhængig ekspert at foretage en analyse af porteføljen med følsomme udlån og vurdere de forventede tab herpå.
In order to decide whether these guarantees were compatible with State aid rules, the Commission appointed an independent trustee to analyse the sensitive loan portfolio and to assess the losses to be expected.
Analysen af disse tab (kreditrisiko og risiko for tab som følge af tvister) byggede på flere forskellige hypoteser for udviklingen i de underliggende indekser, som bestemmer den rente, kunden skal betale.
Analysis of these losses (credit risks and risks of litigation-related losses) was based on a number of scenarios of trends in the underlying indices which determine the interest rate payable by the customer.
Spændet mellem rentesatsen og den sats, der anses for »markedsrenten«, gjorde det muligt at fastslå sandsynligheden for tvister på baggrund af de verserende tvister og opbygge forskellige afviklingsscenarier.
The gap between the interest rate payable and the rate considered to be the ‘market rate’ then made it possible to determine the likelihood of litigation in respect of existing disputes and to construct different outcome scenarios.
På grundlag af denne analyse, som Kommissionen fremskyndede, ville DMA's samlede tab (tab på ubetalte lån og tab som følge af tvister) beløbe sig til [1,5-4,5] mia. EUR i et basisscenarie og [3-8] mia. EUR i et stressscenarie.
On the basis of this analysis commissioned by the Commission, total losses (losses from unpaid amounts and litigation-related losses) for DMA were EUR [1,5-4,5] billion in a baseline scenario and EUR [3-8] billion in a stress scenario.
De berørte medlemsstater vurderer, at en nedbragt følsomhed for disse udlåns vedkommende kunne mindske tabene med 70-80 %.
The Member States concerned considered that these losses could be reduced by some 70 % to 80 % if the loans were desensitised.
Beskrivelse af Crediop
Description of Crediop
Det italienske datterselskab Crediop, som DCL ejer 70 % af, opererer på det italienske marked for finansielle tjenesteydelser til den offentlige og halvoffentlige sektor (herefter »Public and Wholesale Banking« – »PWB«) med en markedsandel på ca. 20 %.
The Italian subsidiary Crediop, in which DCL has a 70 % holding, trades in the Italian market for financial services for the public and semi-public sector (‘Public and Wholesale Banking’ or ‘PWB’) and has a market share of some 20 %.
Det finansierer ligeledes private projekter i forskellige sektorer.
It also finances private projects in various sectors.
Beskrivelse af DBB/Belfius
Description of DBB/Belfius
DBB/Belfius er primært aktiv på det belgiske marked for finansielle tjenesteydelser til den offentlige og halvoffentlige sektor (herefter »Public and Wholesale Banking« – »PWB«), finansielle tjenesteydelser til private (herefter »Retail and Commercial Banking« eller »RCB«) og forsikringer.
DBB/Belfius trades mainly in the Belgian market for financial services for the public and semi-public sectors (‘Public and Wholesale Banking’ or ‘PWB’), financial services for individuals (‘Retail and Commercial Banking’ or ‘RCB’) and insurance.
DBB/Belfius har en markedsandel på [10-15 %] af det belgiske marked [32] for PWB-udlån, 13 % for RCB-opsparing, 15 % for RCB-realkredit, 9,5 % for livsforsikringer og 5 % for andre forsikringer.
DBB/Belfius has a market share [32] in Belgium of [10-15] % of PWB loans, 13 % of RCB saving, 15 % of RCB mortgage loans, 9,5 % of life insurance and 5 % of non-life insurance.
DBB/Belfius tæller ca. 3,8 mio. kunder.
DBB/Belfius has some 3,8 million customers.
BESKRIVELSE AF PLANEN FOR EN VELORDNET AFVIKLING AF DEXIA
DESCRIPTION OF THE ORDERLY RESOLUTION PLAN FOR DEXIA
Den reviderede plan for en velordnet afvikling af Dexia omfatter bl.a. afhændelse af salgbare enheder i koncernen samt afvikling af alle koncernens andre enheder og aktiver.
The revised orderly resolution plan for Dexia in particular includes the disposal of the Group’s saleable entities and the run-off management of all the Group’s other entities and assets.
Ifølge den reviderede plan for velordnet afvikling bevares porteføljen af obligationer og udlån i princippet indtil udløbet for at bevare værdien og undgå et brandudsalg af aktiverne (»fire sales«).
Under the revised orderly resolution plan, the bond and loan portfolio will in principle be held until maturity in order to preserve its value and avoid ‘fire sales’.
Dexia og de berørte medlemsstater skal ligeledes undersøge, på hvilke betingelser koncernen kan gribe en chance for hurtigt at nedbringe gearingen, hvis markedet er til det.
Dexia and the Member States concerned will also look into the ways in which the Group could speed up opportunistic deleveraging if market conditions so allow.
Den foreslåede strategi skal resultere i en betydelig reduktion af Dexias balance.
The proposed strategy will significantly reduce the size of Dexia’s balance sheet.
Pr. 30. juni 2012 var den allerede faldet til 411 mia. EUR, et fald på over 37 % i forhold til Dexias balance pr. 31. december 2008 (651 mia. EUR), da den første statsstøtte blev ydet.
On 30 June 2012, it had already fallen to EUR 411 billion, i.e. a decrease of over 37 % in comparison with the size of Dexia’s balance sheet on 31 December 2008 (EUR 651 billion), when the first State aid was granted.
Koncernens aktiver skal være på [200-250] mia. EUR ultimo 2013 efter afhændelse af DMA (virkning på [60-80] mia. EUR) og bestå af PWB-lån ([80-100] mia. EUR), legacy-aktiver ([60-80] mia. EUR), kontant sikkerhedsstillelse ([20-40] mia. EUR) og andre aktiver ([40-60] mia. EUR).
The Group’s assets should be EUR [200-250] billion at the end of 2013, after the sale of DMA (impact of EUR [60-80] billion), breaking down into PWB loans (EUR [80-100] billion), legacy assets (EUR [60-80] billion), cash collateral (EUR [20-40] billion) and other assets (EUR [40-60] billion).
I forhold til 2008 vil balancen været faldet med [70-80] % i 2020.
In comparison with 2008, there will be a balance sheet reduction of [70-80] % by 2020.
Sammensætningen af Dexias aktivbeholdning
Breakdown of Dexia’s assets
Den reviderede plan for en velordnet afvikling omfatter ligeledes en sammenligning med alternativet, som er manglende honorering af Dexias forpligtelser efterfulgt af konkurs (scenariet umiddelbar afvikling) uden supplerende statsstøtte, og den konklusion, at dette scenarie ikke udgør et troværdigt alternativ i betragtning af risiciene for de berørte medlemsstater, der er forbundet med udnyttelsen af den tidligere stillede refinansieringsgaranti, virkningen for den finansielle stabilitet, stabiliteten på markederne for ikkestruktureret gæld, afledte produkter og markeder for statsobligationer, de samfundsmæssige omkostninger og de umiddelbare store tab af kapital.
The revised orderly resolution plan also includes a comparison with the alternative option of a default by Dexia followed by bankruptcy (immediate liquidation scenario) with no additional State aid and concludes that this scenario is not a viable option given the risks for the Member States concerned raised by the call for guarantees on refinancing granted in the past, its impact on financial stability and the stability of non-securitised debt, derivatives and sovereign bond markets, social costs and the immediate major capital losses.
Likviditet og finansiering
Liquidity and financing
Dexia udnyttede de berørte medlemsstaters refinansieringsgaranti i størrelsesordenen 73 mia. EUR (spidsbelastning) i 2012.
Dexia drew down EUR 73 billion (peak) of the refinancing guarantee from the Member States concerned in 2012.
Fordeling af garantiudnyttelsen
Breakdown of the drawdown of guarantees
Udnyttelsen af centralbankfinansieringen (Eurosystem-operationer) skal gradvis nedsættes, og egenudnyttelsen (own use) af garanterede værdipapirer skal begrænses til [10-20] mia. EUR og falde til 0 fra 2016.
The use of Central Bank financing (Eurosystem operations) will be gradually reduced and own use of collateral guaranteed securities will be limited to EUR [10-20] billion and will fall to zero from 2016.
Den mindre udnyttelse af centralbankfinansiering skal kompenseres ved større udnyttelse af struktureret finansiering (repooperationer) og investeringer i markedet for garanterede værdipapirer.
This reduced use of Central Bank operations will be offset by a greater use of securitised financing (repo operations) and market placement of guaranteed securities.
Eventuelle yderligere behov for finansiering skal dækkes i følgende prioriterede rækkefølge: repomarkedet, investering i nye statsgaranterede værdipapirer på markedet, refinansiering via centralbankerne (Eurosystem-operationer) og træk på ELA-foranstaltningen.
Any additional financing needs will be met in the following order of priority: repo market, market placement of new State-guaranteed securities, Central Bank refinancing (Eurosystem operations) and ELA drawdown.
Finansieringsmiks
Financing mix