natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
En sådan beskyttelse var særlig gunstig i perioder med finansiel usikkerhed, såsom perioden mellem efteråret 2008 og datoen for vedtagelsen af det kongelige dekret, hvor finansielle kooperativer blev effektivt afskærmet mod risikoen for store udbetalinger som følge af tilbagetrækning af kapital.
In its Opening Decision, the Commission's preliminary conclusion was that the notified measure met the four (cumulative) State aid criteria and it doubted whether the measure could be declared compatible with the internal market.
Kommissionen konstaterede ligeledes, at beskyttelsen var langtrækkende, og at Belgien ikke tog hensyn til det finansielle kooperativs finansielle situation i sin tildeling af medlemskab af ordningen.
The Commission found the measure to be imputable to the Belgian State as it was financed by the Special Protection Fund.
I ARCO's tilfælde fik de finansielle kooperativer lov til at deltage i garantiordningen for kooperativer, selv om de allerede var insolvente og trådte i likvidation kort tid derefter.
To that end, the Commission noted that Belgian legislation determined the contribution that participants had to pay to the Special Protection Fund and also determined how those funds would be used.
Kommissionen fandt også, at foranstaltningen var konkurrenceforvridende, eftersom de finansielle kooperativer konkurrerer på det private marked for investeringsprodukter, hvor de havde en selektiv fordel, som de andre aktører på markedet med tilsvarende produkter ikke havde adgang til.
Moreover, the Commission observed that the Deposit and Consignment Office would advance funds to the Special Protection Fund if the need were to arise.
Kommissionen mente også, at garantiordningen for kooperativer kunne påvirke samhandelen i Unionen.
The Commission questioned how the Deposit and Consignment Office would be repaid as it was unclear whether financial cooperatives would have sufficient financial means available.
Der er mange aktive internationale udbydere af investeringsprodukter det belgiske marked, som ikke kan opnå samme markedsandel, som et finansielt kooperativ er i stand til at fastholde takket være foranstaltningen.
The Commission also wondered whether the fact that participation is optional for financial cooperatives would hinder an effective refinancing of the Special Protection Fund.
For at være forenelig med det indre marked efter traktatens artikel 107, stk. 3, litra b), skal en foranstaltning være hensigtsmæssig, nødvendig og forholdsmæssig.
The Commission came to the conclusion that financial cooperatives could be considered as undertakings and that the measure presented a selective advantage to them.
Kommissionen betvivlede, at foranstaltningen opfyldte en eller flere af disse tre kumulative kriterier.
As regards the selective advantage the cooperative guarantee scheme seemed to have helped cooperatives to either attract new capital or maintain existing capital, convincing existing cooperative shareholders not to withdraw from financial cooperatives.
Kommissionen stillede spørgsmål ved, om det var hensigtsmæssigt at beskytte andelshavere i finansielle kooperativer.
The Commission also observed that the protection was far-reaching and that the Belgian State allowed entry into the cooperative guarantee scheme irrespective of the financial health of the applicant financial cooperative.
I den forbindelse bemærkede Kommissionen, at finansielle kooperativer ikke er pengeinstitutter, og at de på grund af deres størrelse ikke synes at være systemisk vigtige.
In the example of ARCO, financial cooperatives had been allowed to enter into the cooperative guarantee scheme when they were already insolvent, only to enter into liquidation shortly thereafter.
Den opfordrede Belgien til at forklare, hvordan investeringstab, som også blev lidt af investorer i f.eks. investeringsforeninger, ville have medført alvorlige forstyrrelser i den belgiske økonomi.
The Commission also concluded that the measure distorted competition as financial cooperatives competed on the market for retail investment products where they benefited from a selective advantage that was not available to other market players with similar products.
For det andet bemærkede Kommissionen, at det frivillige medlemskab af garantiordningen kombineret med Belgiens manglende kontrol af selskabernes levedygtighed ved tildeling af medlemsskab betød, at de finansielle kooperativer kun havde incitament til at deltage, når det var sikkert, at garantien ville blive stillet.
The Commission wondered whether the financial cooperatives could be considered financial institutions and whether that factor had implications for the applicability of the 2008 Banking Communication [45].
Det kunne føre til situationer, hvor man ville kunne nyde godt af garantien uden i vid udstrækning at skulle betale for den.
The Commission concluded that as financial cooperatives do not seem to be financial institutions in the meaning of the 2008 Banking Communication, the aid would have to be evaluated directly under the Treaty.
Sluttelig stillede Kommissionen også spørgsmål ved, om garantiordningen for kooperativer ikke i urimelig grad ville være konkurrenceforvridende, idet andelshavere i konkurrerende selskaber ikke ville være beskyttet, hvilket ville give de finansielle kooperativer lettere adgang til kapital og øge deres markedsandele på det private marked for investeringer.
Concretely, in order to be compatible with the internal market on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty, a measure has to be necessary, appropriate and proportionate.
DE INTERESSEREDE PARTERS BEMÆRKNINGER TIL ÅBNINGSAFGØRELSEN
The Commission doubted that the measure met any of those three cumulative criteria.
ARCO's bemærkninger
It doubted whether the protection of shareholders of financial cooperatives was necessary to avoid a serious disturbance of the Belgian economy.
Ifølge ARCO vedtog og annoncerede de belgiske myndigheder den 10. oktober 2008 indførelsen af en garantiordning for kooperativer som en del af en større pakke (øget indskudsgaranti for kreditinstitutter til 100000 EUR, udvidet garantien »branche 21«-livsforsikringsprodukter og til individuelle andelshavere i finansielle kooperativer).
As regards potential spill-over effects, the Commission noted that Belgium had already put in place several measures (e.g. increasing coverage under the deposit guarantee scheme to EUR 100000 and State aid measures to several banks in different forms (recapitalisation measures, liquidity measures, impaired asset measure and ad hoc measures)).
ARCO har fremført, at beslutningen af 10. oktober 2008 blev gennemført for »branche 21«-produkter ved lov af 15. oktober 2008 og kongeligt dekret af 14. november 2008 og for andelsbeviser udstedt af finansielle kooperativer ved lov af 14. april 2009 og kongeligt dekret af 10. oktober 2011.
It did not therefore see why, in addition to all those measures, it was necessary to protect shareholders of financial cooperatives.
ARCO fremfører, at garantiordningen for kooperativer ikke udgør statsstøtte, da den ikke giver finansielle kooperativer nogen selektiv fordel.
The Commission doubted that it was appropriate to protect shareholders of financial cooperatives.
ARCO hævder også, at Kommissionen havde konkluderet, at en garantiordning for forsikringsselskabers »branche 21«-produkter ikke udgjorde statsstøtte, da den var åben for alle forsikringsselskaber, og derfor ikke var selektiv [46].
In that regard, the Commission observed that the financial cooperatives are not financial institutions and given their size did not seem to be of systemic importance.
Desuden anfører ARCO, at garantiordningen for kooperativer er åben på lige vilkår for alle finansielle kooperativer og derfor ikke selektiv.
It invited the Belgian State to explain via which channels investment losses — which also incurred for investors of, e.g., mutual funds — would have created major negative spill-over effects for the Belgian economy.
På linje med Belgiens bemærkninger fremfører ARCO, at alle kendetegnene ved andele i finansielle kooperativer bekræfter, at de svarer til de samme kundebehov som indskud og betragtes som sådan af lovgiveren.
Finally the Commission doubted whether the measure was proportionate.
ARCO understreger, at Belgien var bekymret for afsmittende virkninger.
First, it was not clear to the Commission whether financial cooperatives would be paying a fair remuneration for the guarantee.
Hvis Belgien ikke havde indført garantiordningen for kooperativer, ville investorernes tillid være undergravet, hvilket kunne have medført et investorstormløb på alle opsparingsprodukter.
Second, the Commission observed that the discretion to enter combined with the absence of a viability check in the entry procedure of the Belgian State implied that financial cooperatives had an incentive to enter only once it is clear that the guarantee would be triggered.
Belgiens bemærkninger
It could lead to situations where beneficiaries could use the guarantee while avoiding to a large extent any payment for it.
Belgien fremfører, at garantiordningen for kooperativer ikke opfylder alle de kumulative kriterier for statsstøtte i traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, og at den derfor ikke udgør statsstøtte.
Finally, the Commission also wondered whether the cooperative guarantee scheme would not unduly distort competition, as shareholders in competitors were not protected, thus facilitating access to capital for financial cooperatives and their overall retail investment market share.
Helt konkret anfører Belgien, at tre af kriterierne for statsstøtte ikke er opfyldt.
COMMENTS FROM INTERESTED PARTIES ON THE OPENING DECISION
For det første anfører Belgien, at foranstaltningen kun udgør støtte til privatpersoner og ikke til virksomheder.
Comments from ARCO
Dernæst fremfører man, at foranstaltningen ikke udgør en selektiv fordel for finansielle kooperativer, og endelig at foranstaltningen ikke er konkurrenceforvridende.
According to ARCO, the Belgian government decided and announced on 10 October 2008 the creation of the cooperative guarantee scheme as part of a broader package (increasing of deposit guarantee for savings deposits of credit institutions to EUR 100000 and extending the guarantee scheme to ‘branch 21’ life insurance products and to individual shareholders of financial cooperatives).
For så vidt angår påstanden om, at støtten ikke tilgodeser virksomheder, fremfører Belgien, at den almindelige indskudsgarantiordning for kreditinstitutter, herunder udvidelsen heraf (dvs. garantiordningen for kooperativer) blev vedtaget i medfør af og i overensstemmelse med Økofinrådets afgørelser, direktiv 94/19/EF som ændret og direktiv 97/9/EF.
ARCO argued that the decision of 10 October 2008 was implemented for ‘branch 21’ products by the law of 15 October 2008 and Royal Decree of 14 November 2008 and for share certificates issued by financial cooperatives by the law of 14 April 2009 and Royal Decree of 10 October 2011.
Belgien forsvarer det synspunkt, at privatpersoners andele i finansielle kooperativer har samme kendetegn som indskud og erhverves på samme måde.
ARCO claimed that the cooperative guarantee scheme is not State aid as it does not confer a selective advantage on financial cooperatives.
Belgien fremhæver følgende kendetegn:
ARCO also argued that the Commission concluded that a guarantee scheme for branch 21 products of insurance companies did not entail State aid, because it was open to all insurance companies and therefore not selective [46].
De (private) støttemodtagere under garantiordningen for kooperativer fortjener den samme beskyttelse som indskyderne i andre enheder, der er aktive i samme sektor og underlagt den samme kontrol.
In addition ARCO affirms that the cooperative guarantee scheme is open to all financial cooperatives on equal terms and therefore not selective.
I skatteøjemed fritages både udbytte betalt af finansielle kooperativer og renter af indskud op til et fastsat beløb for kildeskat [47].
In line with observations of the Belgian government, ARCO argued that all the characteristics of shares in financial cooperatives confirm that they respond to the same client needs as deposits and are treated by the legislator as such.
Finansielle kooperativers individuelle andelshavere kan kun tegne sig for et fast maksimumbeløb, jf. det finansielle kooperativs vedtægter.
ARCO underlined that the Belgian government was concerned about a contamination effect.
Andelshavere i finansielle kooperativer må kun træde ud af selskabet i de første seks måneder i regnskabsåret, og ønsker en andelshaver at træde ud, har denne ikke ret til en pro rata-del af kooperativets kapitalgevinst.
If the Belgian State had not introduced the cooperative guarantee scheme, it would have undermined investor confidence and could have led to a run on all savings products.
Ifølge Belgien afspejler andelenes værdi ikke de underliggende aktivers værdi, og derfor konkurrerer andelene ikke med investeringsprodukter i almindelighed, men kun med den underkategori af produkter, der allerede er omfattet af en statsgaranti (dvs. indskud og »branche 21«-livsforsikringsprodukter).
Comments from the Belgian State
Andele i finansielle kooperativer registreres, og muligheden for at overdrage dem er indskrænket ved lov [48].
The Belgian State argued that the cooperative guarantee scheme does not meet all of the cumulative State aid criteria of Article 107(1) of the Treaty and is therefore not State aid.
De kan ikke sælges frit for at opnå en kapitalgevinst.
Concretely, the Belgian State stated that three State aid criteria are not met.
Andelshaverne i finansielle kooperativer har kun ret til et beskeden (skattefri) udbytte og en tilbagebetaling, når de træder ud af selskabet.
First, the Belgian State defended the viewpoint that the measure represents only aid to individuals and not to undertakings.
Andele i finansielle kooperativer kan ikke betragtes som en investering i et børsnoteret selskab eller enhed.
Next, the Belgian State argued that the measure does not represent a selective advantage to financial cooperatives and finally, the Belgian State contended that the measure is not distortive.
Andele i finansielle kooperativer kan ikke betragtes som en risikobetonet investering, da andelshaverne i finansielle kooperativer ikke er berettiget til at få udbetalt kapitalgevinster.
As regards the argument that the aid does not benefit undertakings, the Belgian State argued that the normal deposit guarantee scheme for credit institutions, including its extension (i.e. the cooperative guarantee scheme) had been adopted in implementation of and in accordance with the Decisions of the ECOFIN Council, the DGS Directive as amended and the Investor Compensation Scheme Directive.
Garantiordningen for kooperativer beskytter kun fysiske personers andele (i modsætning til institutionelle andelshavere).
The Belgian State defended the viewpoint that individual shares in financial cooperatives have all the characteristics of deposits and are also purchased as such.
Den belgiske stat præciserer endvidere, at ARCO ikke havde udstedt nye andele siden september 2008.
It pointed to the following features:
Belgien benægter også, at garantiordningen for kooperativer skulle have hjulpet finansielle kooperativer med at fastholde eksisterende kapital.
The (individual) beneficiaries of the cooperative guarantee scheme deserve the same protection as depositors with other institutions active in the same business area and subject to the same supervision.
Til støtte herfor fremfører Belgien, at pressemeddelelsen af 10. oktober 2008 blot var et foreslået politisk initiativ, som bl.a. nævnte finansielle kooperativer.
For tax purposes, dividends paid by financial cooperatives and interest paid on deposits are both — up to a fixed amount — exempted from withholding tax [47].
Ifølge den belgiske stat var pressemeddelelsen af 10. oktober 2008 ikke en detaljeret aftale, som var blevet offentliggjort samtidig med pressemeddelelser fra de finansielle kooperativer.
Individual shareholders of financial cooperatives can only subscribe to a specific maximum amount of capital, in line with provisions in the Articles of Association of the financial cooperative.
I denne henseende sondrer Belgien mellem sin pressemeddelelse og pressemeddelelserne fra den britiske regering og Lloyds i Lloyds-sagen [49], som Kommissionen henviser til i åbningsafgørelsen.
Shareholders of financial cooperatives can only exit the company in the first six months of a financial year and a shareholder wishing to exit is not entitled to a pro rata part of the capital gains of the cooperative.
For så vidt angår den efterfølgende pressemeddelelse af 21. januar 2009, anså Belgien det som værende normalt, at ARCO straks lagde regeringens pressemeddelelse ud på sit websted, da alle finansielle kooperativer (herunder ARCO) fulgte sagen nøje på daværende tidspunkt.
The shares in financial cooperatives are registered and their transferability is limited by law [48].
Belgien insisterer på, at Kommissionen bør følge den samme tilgang som over for Ethias og derfor konkludere, at garantiordningen for kooperativer ikke er selektiv.
They cannot be sold freely in order to realise capital gains.
Belgien fremfører også, at de ægte kooperativers særlige status allerede var blevet anerkendt af Domstolen i Paint Graphos-sagen [50].
Shareholders in financial cooperatives are only entitled to a modest (tax-exempt) dividend and a reimbursement when they cease to be shareholders.
Belgien fremhæver navnlig præmis 61 i Paint Graphos-dommen, hvoraf det tydeligt fremgår, at sådanne kooperativer, hvad angår deres særlige kendetegn, ikke kan anses for at befinde sig i en faktisk og retlig situation, som er sammenlignelig med den, som kommercielle selskaber befinder sig i.
Shares in financial cooperatives cannot be qualified as an investment in shares in a corporation or listed entity.
Belgien indsendte også oplysninger om antallet af ARCO's andelshavere, der har forladt selskabet siden starten af krisen.
Shares of financial cooperatives cannot be considered to be a risk investment as shareholders of financial cooperatives are not entitled to receive capital gains.
I regnskabsårene op til den frivillige afvikling beløb antallet af ARCO-andelshavere, som bad om at få deres kapital tilbage, sig til 9764 i 2007/08, 21150 i 2008/09 og 23762 i 2010/11.
The cooperative guarantee scheme only protects the shares of natural persons (as opposed to institutions).
Hvad angår foranstaltningens konkurrenceforvridende virkning, argumenterer Belgien, at Kommissionen i et rimeligt omfang burde have forklaret, hvilke finansielle produkter andele i finansielle kooperativer konkurrerer med, selv om de belgiske myndigheder erkender, at Kommissionen i forbindelse med en statsstøttesag ikke er forpligtet til at give sig i kast med en detaljeret markedsafgrænsning.
As to the absence of a selective advantage, the Belgian State pointed out that the cooperative guarantee scheme only covers financial cooperative shares issued before 10 October 2011.
Belgien anfører, at private andelshavere i finansielle kooperativer har haft fordel af samme beskyttelse som investorer i tilsvarende indskuds-/opsparingsprodukter.
The Belgian State observed that after that date financial cooperatives could not use the cooperative guarantee scheme to position themselves in any market.
Belgien forklarer også, at garantiordningen for kooperativer tjener det samme formål som direktiv 94/19/EF, dvs. at beskytte de private opspareres indskud, at bevare indskydernes tillid og at sikre større stabilitet på de finansielle markeder.
The Belgian State also clarified that ARCO had not issued any new shares since September 2008.
Den belgiske stat mener, at andre medlemslandes indskudsgarantiordninger undertiden også dækker over ukonventionelle indskudsprodukter og argumenterede for, at Kommissionen bør tage hensyn til dette.
The Belgian State also denied that the cooperative guarantee scheme helped financial cooperatives to maintain existing capital.
[51]
In support of that argument, the Belgian State stated that the 10 October 2008 press release was merely a proposed policy initiative, making only a passing reference to financial cooperatives.
Belgien insisterer også på, at hvis Kommissionen skulle komme til den konklusion, at garantiordningen for kooperativer udgør statsstøtte, så bør støtten anses som værende forenelig med det indre marked efter traktatens artikel 107, stk. 3, litra b).
According to the Belgian State, the 10 October 2008 press release was not a detailed agreement which had been coordinated with any concurrent press releases by financial cooperatives.
Belgien forsvarer det synspunkt, at foranstaltningen er nødvendig, at dens virkninger er begrænset til det nødvendige minimum, og at der findes byrdefordelingsmekanismer.
In that regard, the Belgian State distinguished its press release from the press releases issued by the UK government and Lloyds in the Lloyds case [49] to which the Commission referred in the Opening Decision.
Først fremfører Belgien, at garantiordningen for kooperativer er hensigtsmæssig og nødvendig for at berolige indskyderne i Belgien.
The Belgian State concluded that the 10 October 2008 press release is not the type of measure that could grant a selective advantage to financial cooperatives.
Den belgiske stat påstår, at garantiordningen for kooperativer var nødvendig for at undgå et fald i offentlighedens tillid til det belgiske finansielle system.
As regards the subsequent press release of 21 January 2009, the Belgian State considered it normal that ARCO had immediately put that press release of the government on its website, as all financial cooperatives (including ARCO) were closely following that matter at the time.
Eftersom andele i kooperativer grundlæggende har de samme kendetegn som opsparingsprodukter, og at mere end halvdelen af indestående midler i kooperativerne investeres i banker, bekræfter det deres lighed med indskud og deres betydning for det belgiske banksystem.
The Belgian State insisted that the Commission should follow the same approach as it had taken in regard to Ethias and conclude that the cooperative guarantee scheme was not selective.
En ukontrolleret misligholdelse fra de finansielle kooperativers side ville have skabt en sneboldeffekt for alle finansielle enheder og for den belgiske økonomi.
The Belgian State also argued that the special position of genuine cooperatives had already been recognised by the Court of Justice in Paint Graphos [50].
Det ville i høj grad påvirke offentlighedens tillid til alle indskudsprodukter i Belgien og udgøre en systemisk risiko.
The Belgian State also provided information on the number of shareholders of ARCO exiting the entity since the start of the crisis.
Til støtte for sine påstande henviser den belgiske stat til det faktum, at antallet af andelshavere (fysiske personer) i finansielle kooperativer er højt i forhold til Belgiens samlede befolkning [52].
In the financial years leading up to the voluntary liquidation, the number of ARCO shareholders which asked to have their capital refunded amounted to 9764 in 2007/08, 21150 in 2008/09 and 23762 in 2010/11.
Hvad angår foranstaltningens forenelighed, henviser Belgien til Kommissionens afgørelse vedrørende Ethias.
The Belgian authorities also explained that the cooperative guarantee scheme serves the same purpose as the DGS Directive i.e. to protect the deposits of individual savers, to maintain depositor confidence and to attain greater stability of the financial markets.
Ifølge Belgien godkendte Kommissionen foranstaltningerne til fordel for Ethias, herunder udvidelsen af indskudsgarantiordningen til »branche 21«-produkter og anså dem for hensigtsmæssige og nødvendige for at forhindre en alvorlig forstyrrelse i den belgiske økonomi.
The Belgian State believes that deposit guarantee schemes of other Member States sometimes also cover non-classic deposit products and argued that the Commission should take that factor into account [51].
For det andet gentager den belgiske stat, at foranstaltningen er forholdsmæssig.
The Belgian State also insisted that — if the Commission were to conclude that the cooperative guarantee scheme represented State aid — the aid should be considered compatible with the internal market on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty.