natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Da der ikke fandtes et hypotetisk alternativt distributionsnet i Spanien i 2005, blev de pågældende distributionsselskaber udpeget og forsynede både det frie marked og det regulerede marked.
EXISTENCE OF STATE AID PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 107(1) TFEU
Distributionsselskaberne spiller en vigtig rolle, fordi de muliggør elforsyningen, uanset hvilke specifikke ordninger eller politikker fastsættes, og uanset om de konkurrencebetingelser, der gælder for forsyningen, er baseret på markedsmekanismer eller regulering.
A measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU if all of the following conditions are fulfilled:
I et system med regulerede takster som det spanske system i 2005 vil manglende ressourcer i systemets regnskab det ene år som led i den normale forretningsførelse normalt blive indhentet i det efterfølgende år via højere takster og/eller tilslutningsafgifter for slutkunderne, mens faldende omkostninger ville generere et overskud, som ville gøre det muligt derefter at sænke taksterne eller tilslutningsafgifterne.
the measure (a) confers an economic advantage on the beneficiary;
Når specifikke kategorier af indtægter ikke er øremærket til omkostninger, vil stigningen (faldet) i indtægter og/eller omkostninger muligvis ikke føre til et tilsvarende underskud eller overskud til gavn for distributionsselskaberne.
is granted by the State or through State resources;
Figur 1 i betragtning 27, viser f.eks., at de energipriser, der indgik i de regulerede takster, generelt lå under engrosmarkedspriserne i de fleste måneder af 2005, mens det modsatte gjorde sig gældende fra november 2006 til december 2007, uden at dette udmøntede sig i øgede overskud for distributionsselskabernes aktivitet vedrørende levering af elektricitet til regulerede takster.
is selective;
Dette er i overensstemmelse med det lovbestemte system, hvor distributionsselskaberne ikke skal bære omkostningerne ved skævheder i systemets omkostninger og indtjening, hverken helt eller delvist, ligesom de heller ikke kan opnå overskud ved denne aktivitet, idet ethvert overskud af salget af elektricitet til regulerede takster vil blive anvendt til at dække andre systemomkostninger.
has an impact on intra-Community trade and is liable to distort competition within the Union.
Distributionsselskaberne handlede som finansielle formidlere i elsystemet, idet de centraliserede alle finansielle strømme, både indgående (reguleret indtjening fra takster og tilslutningsafgifter) og udgående (alle systemets generalomkostninger).
Since these conditions must be met cumulatively, the Commission will confine its assessment to the existence of an economic advantage conferred on the beneficiaries.
Elsystemets regulerede indtægter og omkostninger omfattede i 2005, som forklaret i betragtning 19, 20 og 28, en lang række markedsstyrede og politisk styrede regulerede omkostninger, som f.eks. omkostninger til køb af elektricitet, herunder fra vedvarende energikilder, yderligere elproduktionsomkostninger på de spanske øer, transport- og distributionsomkostninger osv., uden at specifikke indtægter blev øremærket til bestemte omkostninger.
Existence of an economic advantage
Den regulerede indtjening blev aldrig distributionsselskabernes ejendom, bortset fra vederlaget for ren distribution, som de beholdt efter fradrag af alle andre systemomkostninger.
Undertakings are favoured within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU if they obtain an economic advantage which they would not otherwise obtain under market conditions.
Et underskud i regnskabet som det, der opstod i 2005, ville — uanset dets årsager — derfor fremgå af distributionsselskabernes regnskaber, uden at de havde mulighed for at træffe beslutninger vedrørende niveauet af reguleret indtjening og omkostninger eller finansieringen af specifikke omkostninger med specifikke indtægter.
In this respect, the Court of Justice of the European Union has held that, in specific cases, fees for services provided in return for obligations which Member States impose, which do not exceed annual uncovered costs and which are intended to ensure that the undertakings concerned do not make losses, do not constitute aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU but rather consideration for the services performed by the undertakings concerned [21].
Det er derfor ikke helt berettiget at betegne underskuddet for 2005 som »distributionsselskabernes tab«, fordi underskuddet ikke kan tilregnes distributionsselskabernes handlinger, men i stedet lovbestemmelserne vedrørende slutkundernes ret til elforsyning til regulerede takster og i en vis grad de lovgivningsmæssige og politiske valg, der er truffet for at støtte elproduktionen fra eksempelvis vedvarende energikilder og kraftvarmeværker.
More specifically in the electricity sector, nor has the Commission taken the view, in its extensive decision-making practice in application of Article 107(1) and (3)(c) TFEU regarding the obligations imposed on distributors to purchase electricity from certain energy sources at a price above the market price, that compensation covering the difference between purchase costs and market prices entailed an economic advantage benefiting distributors.
Den formelle undersøgelse har ikke påvist, at distributionsselskaberne er blevet begunstiget af andre fordele.
In those cases, the operators in question were acting under regulatory obligations as mere intermediaries in the electricity system and were compensated for their costs, without this compensation being held to entail an economic advantage, whereas, arguably, the legislation could have merely imposed a purchase obligation without cost compensation.
Distributionsselskaberne overførte hele fordelen ved lave regulerede takster til slutkunder, opnåede intet overskud af salget og opnåede ingen fordele i form af kunder, der vendte tilbage til det regulerede marked.
The same is true, more specifically in the area of the supply of electricity at regulated tariffs, as regards compensation intended to finance differences between revenues and wholesale electricity procurement costs at regulated tariffs requested by eligible consumers [22].
Fra et finansielt synspunkt havde de spanske distributionsselskaber således samme position som en systemformidler.
It follows that compensation of the electricity purchase costs of distributors in the electricity sector does not necessarily imply an economic advantage within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
I den henseende adskilte anerkendelsen af omkostningerne til levering af elektricitet til regulerede takster i det spanske elsystem i 2005 sig ikke fra kompensationen af omkostningerne til køb af elektricitet, som Kommissionen ikke har klassificeret som statsstøtte som defineret i artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF, med hensyn til elektricitet fra bestemte kilder (betragtning 90) og engroselektricitet til levering til regulerede takster (betragtning 91).
The alleged compensation to Spanish distributors for the costs of supply at regulated tariffs must be examined in the light of these precedents.
Selv om indledningsafgørelsen ikke er målrettet mod de vertikalt integrerede foretagender, som distributionsselskaberne tilhører, med regnskabsmæssig og delvis retlig adskillelse, har Kommissionen — som led i behandlingen af Céntricas bemærkninger — også vurderet, om sådanne enheder kan have haft indirekte fordele, der kunne udgøre statsstøtte.
The preliminary conclusion of the Commission decision opening the formal investigation was that there was an economic advantage over market conditions in favour of Spanish distributors on the basis of two arguments.
Céntrica bemærkede f.eks., at integrerede foretagender med aktiviteter på det frie detailmarked for elektricitet (gennem en forsyningsdivision) kunne undgå tab ved at opfordre kunder til at skifte til deres egne distributionsdivisioner.
First, distributors allegedly obtained a guaranteed profit margin on the activity of supply at the regulated tariff.
Det anførte også, at en producent, der tilhørte et integreret foretagende, havde et incitament til at opretholde høje engrospriser, fordi det integrerede foretagendes distributionsdivision (som solgte til den regulerede takst) ville være beskyttet mod tab.
Second, by encouraging users to switch to the regulated market served by distributors, the tariffs allegedly increased the distributors' income.
Kommissionen har ikke kunnet konstatere, at der blev opnået en økonomisk fordel, fordi elkunder valgte et distributionsselskab frem for en leverandør.
These two arguments can be subsumed into the single proposition that distributors' profit increased in proportion to their supplies of electricity at regulated tariffs in 2005.
Dette udgør dog ikke en fordel for de fire pågældende foretagender, da forsyningsdivisionerne under alle omstændigheder kunne have undgået disse tab ved blot at opsige forsyningskontrakterne.
The available description of the Spanish electricity system and the information supplied in the course of the proceedings, which is reflected in recitals 16, 19, 20, 57 and 58, does not lend support to this proposition.
For så vidt angår forsyningsdivisionerne, indebar systemet derfor ikke en fordel, men en ulempe:
Whereas, for pure distribution, the remuneration received by distributors in 2005 included a profit margin, for supply at the regulated tariff distributors received only a reimbursement (‘recognition’) of costs without any profit margin.
De mistede kunder.
Similarly, the distributors' remuneration in respect of their pure distribution activities was independent of the number of customers on regulated tariffs and the quantity of electricity sold at the tariff, and therefore their revenue would not have increased if they had served a larger number of customers on regulated tariffs.
Systemet var også finansielt neutralt for distributionsselskaberne (af de årsager, der er forklaret ovenfor).
It follows that the information gathered during the proceedings does not support the assertion that sales of electricity at regulated tariffs increased the profits of Spanish distributors in 2005 because they enjoyed a guaranteed profit margin.
Producenterne ville på deres side have solgt deres elektricitet på engrosmarkedet under alle omstændigheder.
On the question whether the recognition of supply costs and compensation thereof provided distributors with an economic advantage which they would otherwise not have obtained under market conditions, it must be stressed that the recognition of the costs incurred in the form of collection rights granted to the five undertakings designated by Article 24 of Royal Decree-Law 5/2005, namely Iberdrola, SA, Unión Eléctrica Fenosa, SA, Hidroeléctrica del Cantábrico SA, Endesa, SA and Elcogás, SA. was not remuneration for their distribution activity.
Med hensyn til producenternes påståede incitament til at holde engrospriserne på et højt niveau, skal det bemærkes, at taksterne i sig selv ikke medførte højere engrospriser, selv om det markedsmiljø, som de spanske myndigheder skabte, uden tvivl kunne have givet producenterne et incitament til at hæve priserne.
As already explained in recitals 29 and 30, although Elcogás SA, which did not own any subsidiaries, was not operating in the distribution sector in 2005 (or in later years), the undertakings in questions were designated by virtue of their existing right to receive stranded costs, possibly taking into account their generation activity, but not their distribution activity at regulated tariffs.
En forhøjelse af priserne ville faktisk have krævet komplekse strategier og konkurrencebegrænsende foranstaltninger fra producenternes side.
Second, even assuming that the collection rights that reflect the obligation for the five undertakings referred to above to prefinance the deficit in the electricity system for 2005 could be interpreted as compensation for the costs of distribution for the four undertakings that operated in the distribution sector at regulated tariffs, account should be taken of the actual conditions under which distributors were obliged to carry on this fully regulated activity.
Kommissionen har også vurderet muligheden for, at systemet ved at presse konkurrenter fra det frie marked ud af elmarkedet kan have givet de etablerede foretagender en fordel ved at øge og »omorganisere« deres markedsandel, således at den generelt faldt sammen med størrelsen af hvert foretagendes distributionsnet, for så vidt angår de fire vertikalt integrerede foretagender.
As already described in recitals 54-55, distributors could make neither profits nor losses, could not choose how to procure electricity, could not select their customers, could not determine the sales price or offer any additional services yielding a profit margin.
Denne hypotetiske fordel kunne dog heller ikke konstateres af følgende grunde:
The distributors themselves, and also the vertically integrated groups to which they belonged, had no economic interest, whether direct or indirect, in engaging in the supply of electricity at the regulated tariff.
Det var for det første ikke altid muligt at flytte rundt på kunderne inden det samme foretagende.
A vertically integrated group would rather have an interest in serving end-users on free-market terms, as its supply division would have made a profit on such sales, which would not be the case if users were supplied by the group's distributor at regulated tariffs.
En kunde, der blev betjent af Endesas forsyningsdivision i et område, hvor det lokale distributionsselskab var Iberdrola, kunne f.eks. ikke skifte til Endesas distributionsdivision, men kun til Iberdrolas.
It follows that a comparison with the terms of supply under free market conditions disregards the different legal and factual situation between free-market suppliers and distributors supplying at regulated tariffs.
Dette skifte til det regulerede marked medførte desuden en nettoomkostning for de integrerede foretagender, da det øgede de underskud, de skulle finansiere på ufordelagtige vilkår.
Whereas the State can, in principle, impose purchase and selling prices and other trading conditions on distributors in an electricity system, this does not mean that the compensation of costs incurred by the latter confers on them an economic advantage which they would not otherwise obtain under market conditions.
For det andet opnåede foretagenderne intet overskud ved distributionsselskabernes salg.
Indeed, tariff regulation further backed with an obligation to supply leaves no freedom to decide on the most fundamental drivers of supply, such as prices and output.
Den mulige fordel, som en højere markedsandel indebar, kunne derfor ikke omsættes til overskud i 2005 (det undersøgte år), men først i senere år, da det frie marked igen var rentabelt.
It is not only under hypothetical market conditions, i.e. in the absence of regulatory constraints regarding such fundamental parameters, that distributors would be able to charge a much higher, cost-covering tariff to end-customers.
For at denne fordel kunne realiseres, skulle de kunder, der blev betjent af et foretagendes distributionsselskab, skifte tilbage til foretagendets forsyningsdivision.
Moreover, and even more importantly, in the Spanish electricity system in 2005, as in every electricity system, the distributor — or the operator of the high-voltage network for energy-intensive consumers — is simply an intermediary which physically connects the user to the network, as a necessary condition for the supply of electricity.
I denne fase ville en kunde, der overvejede igen at skifte leverandør, frit kunne vælge mellem alle de forskellige leverandører på det spanske marked.
Given the absence of a hypothetical alternative distribution network in Spain in 2005, the distributors in question were designated and supplied both the free market and the regulated market.
Kommissionen har derfor ikke kunnet konstatere, at en højere markedsandel for foretagenderne i den omhandlede periode i sig selv indebar en konkret fordel.
Distributors play an essential role because they make the supply of electricity possible, regardless of the specific regulatory arrangements or policy, or of whether the competitive conditions governing supply are based on market mechanisms or regulation.
Det betød, at inddrivelsesrettighederne blev securitiseret med et vederlag, der var lavere end det, de kunne have opnået, hvis en markedsrente var blevet anvendt.
However, in the absence of the earmarking of specific categories of revenues to costs, the increase (decrease) in revenues and/or costs may not result in a corresponding deficit or surplus benefiting distributors.
Påstanden er for det første klart grundløs med hensyn til Elcogás S.A., som fik indrømmet inddrivelsesrettigheder, selv om det ikke opererede i distributionssektoren.
Distributors acted as financial intermediaries of the electricity system in that they centralised all the financial flows, both incoming (regulated revenues from tariffs and access charges) and outgoing (all the general costs of the system).
Det er for det andet ikke blevet påvist, at de fire andre udpegede foretagender, Iberdrola, S.A., Unión Eléctrica Fenosa, S.A., Hidroeléctrica del Cantábrico, S.A. og Endesa, S.A., modtog kompensation i medfør af deres aktivitet som distributionsselskab, der leverede elektricitet til regulerede takster, som allerede påpeget i betragtning 30.
The electricity system's regulated revenues and costs in 2005, as described in recitals 19, 20 and 28, include a wide variety of market-driven and policy-driven regulated costs, such as costs of electricity purchases, including from renewable sources, additional electricity generation costs in the Spanish islands and transport and distribution costs, etc., without the earmarking of specific revenues to certain costs.
For det tredje var distributionsselskaber og leverandører på det frie marked under alle omstændigheder ikke i samme faktiske og retlige situation.
Regulated revenues never became the property of distributors, with the exception of the remuneration for pure distribution, which was retained by them after deduction of all other system costs.
Forpligtelsen til at levere elektricitet til regulerede takster blev opfyldt under lovbestemte begrænsninger, som betød, at distributionsselskaberne handlede som finansielle og forsyningsmæssige formidler, der gennemførte lovbestemmelser, mens levering på markedsvilkår var en fuldt liberaliseret aktivitet.
Any deficit in the accounts such as the one that occurred in 2005, regardless of its causes, would therefore appear in the distributors' accounts, without them having any leeway to decide either on the level of regulated revenues and costs or on the financing of specific costs with specific revenues.
Den forskel i behandling, som Céntrica anfægtede, udgør derfor ikke forskelsbehandling, selv om de regulerede taksters niveau kan have været skadeligt for liberaliseringsprocessen.
Indeed, as is apparent from the figures cited in recital 28, the transport and distribution costs of the electricity system in 2005 stood at EUR 4410 million, consistent with the same cost categories in 2004 and 2006 respectively.
Dette var dog ikke konsekvensen af indrømmelsen af ulovlig statsstøtte til distributionsselskaberne.
So the level of the distributors' costs bears no relation to the amount of the deficit in 2005.
KONKLUSION
Therefore, the classification of the 2005 deficit as ‘distributors' losses’ does not seem justified because the deficit is not imputable to action on the part of distributors, but rather to the regulatory provisions establishing the right of end-users to be supplied at regulated tariffs and, to a certain extent, to the regulatory and policy choices made to support electricity production from renewable sources and cogeneration, for instance.
Den tvivl, som Kommissionen udtrykte i sin indledningsafgørelsen, blev fjernet i løbet af den formelle undersøgelse.
It follows that the financing of the deficit in the electricity system's accounts through the mechanisms described in recitals 29 to 32 is not a way to absorb the distributors' specific losses but rather the system's overall losses.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at foranstaltningen ikke udgør statsstøtte til fordel for eldistributionsselskaberne.
Distributors passed on the entire benefit of low regulated tariffs to end-users, did not make any profit on sales and did not draw any benefit from users returning to the regulated market.
Denne konklusion omhandler den situation og periode, der er omfattet af klagen, og udelukker derfor ikke, at Kommissionen undersøger foranstaltninger, som Spanien har gennemført siden 2005 —
It follows that, from a financial perspective, the position of distributors in Spain was fully comparable with that of a system intermediary.
VEDTAGET DENNE AFGØRELSE:
In that respect, the recognition of the costs of supplying at regulated electricity tariffs under the Spanish electricity system in 2005 is, in its principle, no different from the compensation of the costs of purchase of electricity which the Commission has not classified as State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, both as regards electricity from certain sources (recital 90) and wholesale electricity for supply at regulated tariffs (recital 91).
Artikel 1
Even though the opening decision does not target the vertically integrated entities to which distributors belong, with accounting and partial legal unbundling, with a view to addressing Céntrica's representations, the Commission has also assessed whether such entities may have reaped indirect advantages liable to constitute State aid.
Kongeriget Spaniens anerkendelse af de omkostninger, som distributionsselskaber har pådraget sig i forbindelse med levering af elektricitet til regulerede takster til mellemstore og store virksomhedskunder i 2005, i form af inddrivelsesrettigheder til Iberdrola, S.A., Unión Eléctrica Fenosa, S.A., Hidroeléctrica del Cantábrico, S.A., Endesa, S.A. og Elcogás, S.A. fastsat ved kongeligt lovdekret 5/2005, udgør ikke statsstøtte som defineret i artikel 107, stk. 1, i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde.
Céntrica notably submitted that integrated entities active in electricity retail sales in the free market (through a supply division) were able to avoid losses by encouraging users to switch to their own distribution division.
Artikel 2
It also maintained that there was an incentive for a generator belonging to an integrated entity to keep wholesale prices high, considering that the distribution division of the integrated entity (selling at the regulated tariff) would be shielded from losses.
Denne afgørelse er rettet til Kongeriget Spanien.
The Commission has not been able to establish the presence of an economic advantage arising from electricity users choosing distributors rather than suppliers.
På Kommissionens vegne
for its part, Elcogás operated only in the electricity generation sector.
Næstformand
However, this cannot amount to an advantage for the other four companies in question, as the supply divisions could have avoided these losses in any event by simply terminating the supply contracts.
EUT C 43 af 27.2.2007, s. 9.
For the supply divisions, therefore, the system did not entail an advantage but a penalty:
Se fodnote 1.
they lost customers.
Markedsoperatøren (OMEL) varetager køb og salg af elektricitet på engrosmarkedet.
The system was financially neutral for distributors too (for the reasons explained above).
Systemoperatøren (Red Eléctrica de España) er ansvarlig for at garantere elforsyningssikkerheden og koordinere produktions- og transportsystemet.
The generators, for their part, would have sold their electricity anyway on the wholesale market.
I artikel 11 i kongeligt dekret 281/1998 defineres distribution som »den aktivitet, hvis primære formål er transmission af elektricitet fra transportnettet til forbrugspunkter i overensstemmelse med passende kvalitetskrav, og salg af elektricitet til kunder eller distributionsselskaber til regulerede priser«.
With regard to the generators' alleged incentive to keep wholesale prices high, it should be noted that, although the market environment created by the Spanish authorities might arguably have created an incentive for generators to raise prices, the tariffs per se did not lead to higher wholesale prices.