natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
En interesseret part hævdede, at konklusionerne i betragtning 189 i forordningen om midlertidig told var i strid med konklusionerne i betragtning 124 og 186 i forordningen om midlertidig told, uden dog at give yderligere forklaringer eller præcisere arten eller omfanget af de påståede modstridende konklusioner.
One interested party alleged that the conclusions in recital (189) to the provisional Regulation contradicted the findings made in recitals (124) and (186) to the provisional Regulation without however giving any further explanations specifying the nature or extend of the alleged contradictions.
Efter den endelige fremlæggelse af oplysninger anfægtede en række interesserede parter, at EU-erhvervsgrenens kapacitetsforøgelser var rimelige og fulgte udviklingen på markedet og navnlig udviklingen i EU-forbruget.
Following the final disclosure, some interested parties contested that the capacity additions of the Union industry were reasonable and followed market developments and in particular the development of the Union consumption.
For så vidt angår moduler, voksede produktionskapaciteten imidlertid med 106 %, mens EU-forbruget voksede med 221 % i den betragtede periode, altså med mere end det dobbelte.
However, as far as modules are concerned the production capacity increased by 106 %, while the Union consumption increased by 221 % over the period considered, i.e. more than double.
For så vidt angår celler, voksede produktionskapaciteten ligeledes med 39 %, mens EU-forbruget voksede med 87 % i den betragtede periode.
Likewise, as far as cells are concerned, the production capacity increased by 39 %, while the Union consumption increased by 87 % during the period considered.
Dette viser, at kapacitetsforøgelsen var væsentligt lavere end stigningen i forbruget og derfor ikke kan betragtes som urimelig, da der ikke på noget tidspunkt var overkapacitet i Unionen.
This shows that the increase in capacity was substantially below the increase in consumption and can therefore not be considered as unreasonable given that there never was overcapacity in the Union.
Desuden bør analysen af, om kapacitetsforøgelserne var rimelige, ikke bygge på en år til år-analyse, men bør tage hensyn til tendensen i hele den betragtede periode.
Moreover, the analysis whether the capacity additions were reasonable should not be based on a year to year analysis, but should take into consideration the trend during the whole period considered.
Kapacitetsforøgelser vil derfor typisk først blive fuldt operationelle en vis tid efter, at investeringen blev foretaget, og analysen af et særskilt år kan føre til et fordrejet billede.
Thus, capacity additions will typically only become fully operational after a certain period of time after the investment made and the isolated analysis of one year may lead to a distorted picture.
Da der ikke blev fremsat andre bemærkninger vedrørende EU-erhvervsgrenens overkapacitet, bekræftes konklusionerne i betragtning 185-190 i forordningen om midlertidig told.
In absence of any other comments regarding the Union's industry overcapacity, the findings in recitals (185) to (190) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed.
En række interesserede parter gentog, at EU-erhvervsgrenen eller i det mindste en del af den ikke kunne drage fordel af prisfaldet på polysilicium i UP på grund af langtidskontrakter på råmaterialer.
Some interested parties reiterated that the Union industry or at least part of it could not benefit from the decrease in prices of polysilicon, during the IP, because of long term contracts for raw material.
Med henvisning til konklusionerne i betragtning 193 i forordningen om midlertidig told om, at EU-erhvervsgrenen var i stand til at genforhandle sine langsigtede aftaler med sine leverandører (herunder waferproducenter) og derfor kunne drage fordel af lavere priser, hævdede disse parter, at genforhandlingerne eller opsigelsen af langtidskontrakter på polysilicium og/eller wafere medførte sanktioner.
With reference to the findings in recital (193) to the provisional Regulation stating that the Union industry was able to renegotiate its long term contracts with its suppliers (including wafers producers) and therefore could benefit from lower prices, these parties claimed that the renegotiations or termination of long term contracts of polysilicon and/or wafers resulted in penalties.
Til støtte for dette argument fremlagde disse parter presseartikler, hvoraf det fremgik, at visse EU-producenter var involveret i tvister eller havde opsagt deres kontrakter.
To support this argument, these parties provided press articles reporting that some Union producers were facing litigation or that they terminated their contracts.
Nogle parter fremlagde oplysninger, der angiveligt bekræfter, at de langfristede kontrakter ikke kunne genforhandles.
Some parties provided information allegedly confirming that the long term contracts could not be re-negotiated.
Polysilicium er det vigtigste råmateriale for producenter af wafere.
Polysilicon is the main raw material for the wafers producers.
Undersøgelsen afslørede, at priserne på polysilicium steg i 2008, hvor de toppede på omkring 500 USD pr. kg, men faldt igen i 2009 og nåede ned på omkring 50-55 USD pr. kg i slutningen af 2009 med kun en let stigning i 2010 og starten af 2011.
The investigation revealed that polysilicon prices increased in 2008 when they reached their peak at around 500$/kg, but decreased again in 2009 reaching about 50-55 $/kg at the end of 2009 with only a slight upwards trend in 2010 and early 2011.
Priserne faldt betydeligt i UP og endte på 30 USD pr. kg (FFC Scientific and Policy Reports, PV Status Report 2012).
Prices dropped significantly during the IP resulting in the 30$/kg (JRC Scientific and Policy Reports, PV Status Report 2012).
Det bør bemærkes, at polysiliciumprisernes indvirkning på EU-erhvervsgrenen kun kunne være ret marginal, da enhver indvirkning på produktionsomkostningerne til fremstilling af celler og moduler blev overvæltet på værdikæden.
It should be noted that the impact of polysilicon prices on the Union industry could only be rather marginal as any effect on the cost of production of cells and modules was diluted through the value chain.
Desuden henviste ovennævnte artikler i pressen til udviklinger efter UP, som ikke påvirkede situationen for de berørte EU-producenter i UP og derfor ikke kan tages i betragtning.
Moreover, the above mentioned press articles referred to post-IP developments, which did not affect the situation of the Union producers concerned during the IP, and cannot therefore be taken into account.
Dette spørgsmål blev undersøgt yderligere efter indførelsen af midlertidige foranstaltninger, og som følge heraf kan det bekræftes, at EU-erhvervsgrenen faktisk var i stand til at genforhandle ikke alene priserne i de langfristede kontrakter, men også kontraktmæssige bøder vedrørende disse langfristede kontrakter.
This matter was further investigated after the imposition of provisional measures and, as a result, it can be confirmed that the Union industry was indeed able to renegotiate not only the prices of the long-term contracts but also any contractual penalties relating to these long-term contracts.
En af ovennævnte interesserede parter anførte desuden, at det er tilstrækkeligt, at kun nogle af EU-producenterne er blevet berørt af langfristede kontrakter, og at situationen for den samlede EU-erhvervsgren er irrelevant.
One of the above interested parties argued further that it is sufficient that only some Union producers have been affected by the long term contracts and that the situation of the overall Union industry is irrelevant.
Denne hævdede, at højere omkostninger ikke nødvendigvis behøver at påvirke alle erhvervsdrivende på samme måde.
It claimed that higher costs do not necessarily have to affect all operators in the same way.
Dette argument overser den konklusion, at for EU-erhvervsgrenen som helhed kunne man konstatere, at de gennemsnitlige polysiliciumpriser i mange tilfælde ikke var højere end markedspriserne eller priserne på spotmarkedet, og at spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt højere omkostninger påvirker alle eller kun få erhvervsdrivende, derfor ikke blev anset for relevant.
This argument ignores the finding that overall, for the Union industry, the average polysilicon prices were in many cases not found to be higher than the market prices or than the spot prices and that therefore the issue whether higher costs affect all or only few operators was not considered pertinent.
En anden interesseret part anmodede om, at Kommissionen udskilte, sondrede imellem og kvantificerede virkningerne af de enkelte faktorer, der har indflydelse på EU-erhvervsgrenens situation; navnlig virkningen af det betydelige fald i polysiliciumpriserne bør betragtes særskilt.
Another interested party requested that the Commission separate, distinguish and quantify the effects of each factor having an impact on the situation of the Union industry; in particular the effect of the significant drop in polysilicon prices should be considered separately.
I den forbindelse blev det fremført, at det snarere var faldet i polysiliciumpriserne end pristrykket fra importen fra Kina, der medførte faldet i salgspriserne.
In this regard, it was argued that it was the decrease in the polysilicon prices rather than the price pressure from the Chinese imports that caused the decrease in sales prices.
For så vidt angår EU-erhvervsgrenen, bør det bemærkes, at de gennemsnitlige salgspriser faldt langt mere end svarende til faldet i de gennemsnitlige produktionsomkostninger, på hvilket råmaterialepriserne kunne have en virkning.
As far as the Union industry is concerned it should be noted that the average selling prices decreased much further than the decrease of the average cost of production, on which the decline of raw material prices could have an impact.
Efter den endelige fremlæggelse af oplysninger gentog en række interesserede parter, at indvirkningen af faldet i priserne på polysilicium på EU-erhvervsgrenens omkostninger ikke blev begrænset eller overvæltet på værdikæden, således som det blev konkluderet i undersøgelsen.
Following the final disclosure, some interested parties reiterated that the impact of the decrease of polysilicon prices on the Union industry's cost was not limited or diluted through the value chain as concluded in the investigation.
Som allerede anført i betragtning 276 ovenfor er polysilicium imidlertid den vigtigste råvare for producenter af wafere, derfor blev det konstateret, at eventuelle indvirkninger på produktionsomkostningerne for celler og moduler overvæltes på værdikæden.
However, as already mentioned in recital (276) above, polysilicon is the main raw material for wafers producers, thus any impact on the production cost of cells or modules was found to be diluted in the value chain.
De interesserede parter fremlagde ingen dokumentation, der kunne have ændret denne konklusion.
The interested parties did not provide any evidence which could have devaluated this finding.
Undersøgelsen viste ydermere, at faldet i priserne på polysilicium i den betragtede periode blev afspejlet i de stikprøveudtagne EU-producenters gennemsnitlige produktionsomkostninger for celler og moduler, som faldt i samme takt som polysiliciumpriserne.
Moreover, the investigation showed that the decrease of polysilicon prices over the period considered was reflected in the average cost of production of cells and modules of the sampled Union industry which decreased to a similar degree than the polysilicon prices.
En interesseret part rejste tvivl om virkningen af påståede bøder, som EU-erhvervsgrenen måtte betale som følge af genforhandling af leverandørkontrakter.
One interested party questioned the impact of alleged penalties that the Union industry had to pay due to the re-negotiation of the supplier contracts.
Det kan i den forbindelse ikke udelukkes, at et begrænset antal producenter måtte betale bøder for annullering af kontrakter om levering af wafere i den betragtede periode.
In this regard, it cannot be excluded that a limited number of producers may have had to pay penalties for the cancellation of wafers supply contracts during the period considered.
Kommissionen fandt imidlertid ingen beviser for, at disse bøder kunne have haft en indvirkning på EU-erhvervsgrenens situation som helhed eller ville være repræsentative.
However, the Commission did not find any evidence that these penalties could have had an effect on the situation of the Union industry as a whole or would be representative.
Den pågældende interesserede part fremlagde heller ikke sådanne beviser.
Such evidence was also not provided by the interested party in question.
Mens det derfor ikke helt kan udelukkes, at bøder kunne have haft en vis negativ indvirkning på et begrænset antal EU-producenter, er den samlede indvirkning på EU-erhvervsgrenen i bedste fald marginal og kunne derfor ikke bryde årsagssammenhængen mellem dumpingimporten og den væsentlige skade, der er forvoldt EU-erhvervsgrenen som helhed.
While it can therefore not be completely excluded that penalties could have had a certain negative impact on a limited number of Union producers, the overall impact on the Union industry is at best marginal and hence could not break the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury suffered by the whole Union industry.
En anden interesseret part hævdede, at faldet i salgspriserne på den undersøgte vare i Unionen til dels skyldes faldet i priserne på polysilicium.
Another interested party claimed that the decrease of sales prices of the product under investigation in the Union is partly due to the reduction in the price of polysilicon.
Det bør imidlertid i den forbindelse bemærkes, at undersøgelsen viste, at importen fra Kina skete til dumpingpriser, der i væsentlig grad underbød EU-erhvervsgrenens priser.
However, in this regard, it should be noted that the investigation showed that the imports from the PRC were dumped and substantially undercutting the prices of the Union industry.
Prisfaldet er derfor større end besparelserne i produktionsomkostningerne, der kan forklares ved et fald i råvarepriserne.
The price decrease therefore goes beyond the reduction in production costs that can be explained by the decrease in the raw material prices.
Hvis prisfaldet udelukkende skyldtes virkningen af faldet i råvarepriserne, ville EU-erhvervsgrenen ikke have været tvunget til at sænke sine salgspriser til et niveau under sine produktionsomkostninger.
If the price decrease was merely the effect of the decrease of the raw material prices, the Union industry would not have been forced to decrease their sales prices below their cost of production.
En anden interesseret part gentog, at en EU-producents tvist efter UP kan have påvirket i hvert fald denne EU-producents situation allerede i UP.
Another interested party reiterated that the litigation of one Union producer after the IP may has affected the situation of at least this Union producer already during the IP.
Denne part uddybede imidlertid ikke, hvordan og i hvilket omfang en sådan begivenhed efter UP egentlig kunne have haft en indvirkning på denne producents situation i UP.
This party did not explain however how and to what extend such event that occurred after the IP could indeed have had an effect on this producer's situation during the IP.
Undersøgelsen afslørede heller ikke nogen beviser for disse virkninger.
Likewise, the investigation did not reveal any evidence showing such effects.
Derfor måtte denne påstand afvises.
Therefore this claim had to be rejected.
Samme interesserede part rejste desuden tvivl om ovennævnte konklusioner, da der angiveligt ikke blev fremlagt beviser herfor.
Moreover, the same interested party questioned the above mentioned findings, as allegedly no evidence was shown.
Konklusionerne i undersøgelsen byggede imidlertid på kendsgerninger og positivt bevismateriale, hvoraf ikke fortrolige udgaver var tilgængelige for alle interesserede parter.
However, the findings of the investigation were based on facts and positive evidence, non-confidential versions of which were available to all interested parties.
Da der ikke blev fremsat andre bemærkninger vedrørende råvareprisernes virkninger, bekræftes konklusionerne i betragtning 191-194 i forordningen om midlertidig told.
In absence of any other comments with regard to the impact of the raw material prices, the findings in recitals (191) to (194) to the provisional Regulation are confirmed.
Selvforskyldt skade: indvirkning af automatisering, størrelse, stordriftsfordele, konsolidering, innovation, omkostningseffektivitet, EU-erhvervsgrenens import
Self-inflicted injury: impact of automation, size, economies of scale, consolidation, innovation, cost efficiency, imports of the Union industry
Efter den foreløbige fremlæggelse af oplysninger genfremsatte visse interesserede parter den påstand, at den skade, EU-erhvervsgrenen forvoldtes, skyldtes EU-erhvervsgrenens mangel på tilstrækkelige stordriftsfordele.
Following the provisional disclosure, certain interested parties reiterated the claim that the injury suffered by the Union industry was due to the Union industry's lack of sufficient economies of scale.
Det blev hævdet, at mindre producenter var dårligere stillet end store vertikalt integrerede producenter, og at små producenters skade derfor ikke kan tilskrives dumpingimporten.
It was reiterated that small-scale producers had a disadvantage compared to larger vertically integrated producers and therefore any injury suffered by small scale producers cannot be attributed to the dumped imports.
En anden interesseret part fremførte, at automatisering af produktionsprocessen er dyr, og at stordriftsfordele derfor er endnu vigtigere for at nedbringe produktionsomkostningerne.
Another interested party argued that the automation of the production process is costly and that therefore economies of scale are even more important to reduce the cost of production.
Undersøgelsen viste, at EU-erhvervsgrenen, selv de større, vertikalt integrerede producenter, på grund af dumpingimporten ikke var i stand til fuldt ud at udnytte den høje kapacitetsudnyttelsesgrad til at opnå stordriftsfordele.
The investigation showed that the Union industry, even the larger and vertically integrated ones, due to the dumped imports, could not fully benefit from high capacity utilization rates to achieve economies of scale.
Under alle omstændigheder afslørede undersøgelsen ikke nogen sammenhæng mellem størrelse, vertikal integration og bedre rentabilitet, da det høje pristryk fra dumpingimporten har ændret denne sammenhæng.
In any event, the investigation did not reveal any correlation between size, vertical integration and better profitability rates, as the high price pressure from dumped imports has altered this correlation.
Undersøgelsen viste, at fordelen ved stordriftsfordele ikke længere fandtes på et marked, hvor udnyttelsesgraden var lav, hvilket også var tilfældet for de kinesiske producenter.
The investigation has showed that the benefit of economies of scale no longer existed in a market where the utilization rates were low, which was also true for the Chinese producers.
Derfor blev disse påstande afvist.
Therefore, these arguments were rejected.
Endvidere hævdede en interesseret part, at investorer og banker ikke ville finansiere projekter, hvis modulfabrikanten er for lille, da større producenter yder bedre garantier og er mere attraktive for banker.
Furthermore, one interested party claimed that investors and banks would not finance projects if the module manufacturer is too small, as larger producers provide better guarantees and are more ‘bankable’.
Med andre ord er investorer og banker tilbageholdende med at finansiere solcellerelaterede projekter, der anvender moduler produceret i Unionen.
In other terms, investors and banks are reluctant to finance PV related projects using modules produced in the Union.
Undersøgelsen viste imidlertid, at investorers og bankers mulige præference for at finansiere kinesiske producenter, der har større produktionskapacitet, er et resultat af den forvridning, som dumpingimporten har skabt på EU-markedet.
However, the investigation showed that any possible preference of investors and banks to finance Chinese producers which have larger production capacities is the result of the distortion that dumped imports have created on the Union market.
Som nævnt ovenfor i betragtning 285 spiller størrelsen af produktionslinjerne ikke nogen rolle, hvis udnyttelsesgraden fortsat er lav.
As mentioned above in recital (285), the size of the production lines does not play a role if utilisation rates remain low.
Derfor blev dette argument afvist.
Therefore, this argument was dismissed.
En interesseret part gentog, at EU-erhvervsgrenen havde en ugunstig omkostningsstruktur i forhold til sine kinesiske konkurrenter, da sidstnævnte havde lavere omkostninger til arbejdskraft, elektricitet og afskrivninger, og desuden havde det nyeste udstyr.
One interested party reiterated that the Union industry had an unfavourable cost structure compared to its Chinese competitors, as the latter enjoyed lower labour, electricity and depreciation cost, and in addition had the newest equipment.
Den berørte part var imidlertid ikke i stand til at fremlægge nye oplysninger eller dokumentation, som kunne ændre denne undersøgelses konklusioner i så henseende.
However, the party concerned was unable to provide new information or supporting evidence that could reverse the findings of this investigation in this regard.
Navnlig påstanden om, at de kinesiske producenter brugte det nyeste udstyr, blev behandlet i betragtning 203 i forordningen om midlertidig told, hvori det hedder, at de eksporterende producenter i Kina ikke havde nogen komparativ fordel, især fordi maskiner og udstyr blev importeret fra Den Europæiske Union.
In particular, the claim that the Chinese producers were using the newest equipment was addressed in recital (203) to the provisional Regulation, stating that the exporting producers in the PRC did not enjoy any comparative advantage, in particular because machinery and equipment was imported from the European Union.
Ovennævnte påstande blev derfor afvist.
The above claims were therefore rejected.
En anden part hævdede, at de kinesiske producenter havde en komparativ fordel, for så vidt angår polysiliciumpriser og stordriftsfordele, som medførte lavere omkostninger for maskinerne.
Another party claimed that the Chinese enjoyed a comparative advantage with regard to polysilicon prices and to economies of scales which resulted in lower cost of the machinery.
Denne part fremlagde ingen nye oplysninger eller dokumentation i den forbindelse, som kunne rokke ved konklusionerne i betragtning 195 og 196 samt 203 i forordningen om midlertidig told.
This party did not provide any new information or supporting evidence in this regard that could reverse the findings as set out in recitals (195) and (196) as well as (203) to the provisional Regulation.
Denne parts påstand måtte derfor afvises.
The claim of this party had therefore to be rejected.
Der mindes om, at som nævnt i betragtning 203 i forordningen om midlertidig told og i betragtning 287 ovenfor har de eksporterende producenter i Kina ikke nogen komparativ fordel med hensyn til anvendte råmaterialer og maskiner, da begge hovedsageligt blev importeret fra Unionen.
It is recalled that as set out in recital (203) to the provisional Regulation and mentioned also in recital (287) above the exporting producers in the PRC do not enjoy any comparative advantage with regard to raw materials and the machinery used as both were mostly imported from the Union.
En interesseret part anfægtede ovenstående uden dog at fremlægge beviser herfor.
One interested party contested the above, without however providing any evidence.
For så vidt angår løn- og generalomkostninger, herunder afskrivninger, udgjorde de i gennemsnit under 10 % af de samlede omkostninger til et modul i UP og anses ikke for at have spillet en væsentlig rolle.
As far as labour and overhead costs, including depreciation costs are concerned, they represented on average less than 10 % of the total cost of a module in the IP and are not considered to have played any significant role.