natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kommissionen forklarede, at et spørgsmål, der stilles mundtligt under kontrolbesøget, har samme gyldighed som eventuelle skriftlige spørgsmål, og påpegede, at den kinesiske regering ikke anmodede om, at de andre mundtlige forespørgsler skulle fremsættes skriftligt, før de kunne besvares.
The Commission explained that a question asked during the verification visit orally has the same validity as any questions submitted in writing and pointed to the fact that for the other oral questions the GOC did not request their submission in writing before replying.
På trods af denne forklaring fremlagde den kinesiske regering stadig ikke oplysningerne.
In spite of this clarification, the GOC still did not provide the information.
I spørgeskemaet anmodede Kommissionen om de dokumenter, der lå til grund for oprettelsen af CBRC og dens mandat.
In the questionnaire the Commission requested documents which were the basis for the establishment of the CBRC and provided it with the mandate.
Den kinesiske regering fremsendte et dokument fra den nationale folkekongres, som blot omtalte den påtænkte oprettelse af CBRC.
The GOC submitted a document from the National People's Congress simply stating that the CBRC shall be created.
Da Kommissionen spurgte, om der var andre dokumenter med CBRC's mandat og formål, oplyste CBRC's embedsmænd, at der er mange andre love vedrørende CBRC, men hvis Kommissionen ønskede at få disse dokumenter, burde den have anmodet om dem før kontrolbesøget.
When the Commission inquired whether there are any other documents specifying the mandate and purpose of the CBRC, the CBRC official present stated that there are many other laws concerning the CBRC but that, if the Commission wanted to obtain these documents it should have requested them before the verification.
Det skal bemærkes, at Kommissionen i spørgeskemaet anmodede den kinesiske regering om at »tilvejebringe de dokumenter, der dannede grundlag for indførelsen af denne myndighed og dens mandat«, og Kommissionen havde således anmodet om disse dokumenter før kontrolbesøget.
It is noted that in the questionnaire the Commission requested the GOC to ‘provide documents which were the basis for the establishment of this authority and provided it with the mandate’ and therefore, it had requested these documents before the verification.
Da Kommissionen anmodede om de fornødne statistikker og rapporter fra de banker, der ydede lån til de stikprøveudvalgte eksportører i undersøgelsesperioden, henviste den til artikel 33 i Kinas lov om regulering af og tilsyn med banksektoren [29], hvoraf det fremgår, at CBRC indsamler sådanne statistikker.
When the Commission requested statistics and reports from the banks which provided loans to the sampled exporters for the IP it pointed to Article 33 of the Law of the PRC on Regulation of and Supervision over the Banking Industry [29] which suggests that the CBRC collects such statistics.
CBRC's embedsmand erklærede, at han var nødt til at indhente samtykke fra den juridiske afdeling først, men han fremlagde ingen oplysninger i den henseende inden afslutningen af kontrolbesøget.
The CBRC official present stated that he had to seek permission from the legal department first but he did not provide any information in this respect before the end of the verification.
Igen skal det bemærkes, at Kommissionen anmodede om disse oplysninger i spørgeskemaet og mangelskrivelsen, og den havde anført i brevet forud for kontrolbesøget, at man ville kontrollere statistikkerne.
Again it must be noted that the Commission requested this information in the questionnaire and deficiency letter and it had indicated in its pre-verification letter that statistics would be a topic for the verification.
Den kinesiske regering påstod endvidere, at påstandene i klagen om, at de kinesiske banker skulle være offentlige organer, udelukkende er baseret på simple påstande om statens aktiepost, der igen er baseret på »ulovlige« afgørelser i sagen om coated finpapir.
The GOC further claimed that the allegations in the complaint concerning Chinese banks being public bodies are based merely on simple assertions of state shareholding which in turn are based on ‘illegal’ determinations in the Coated Fine Paper case.
Denne påstand er en fejlfortolkning af oplysningerne i klagen.
This claim is a misinterpretation of facts in the complaint.
I klagen henviser klageren til det statslige ejerskab og derudover bl.a. til, at bankerne yder lån baseret på politiske direktiver, at regeringsorganer instruerer de finansielle institutioner i at øge långivningen til virksomhederne for at fremme nye teknologier og produkter (herunder solcelleindustrien).
In the complaint, the complainant, in addition to the state ownership, refers, inter alia, to the loans provided by banks based on political directives, to the government agencies directing financial institutions to increase credit and lending to enterprises for promoting new technologies and products (including the PV industry).
Konklusionerne i sagen vedrørende coated finpapir om, at de kinesiske banker er offentlige organer, var baseret på flere elementer end blot ejerskab (f.eks. statslig indgriben og vejledning til bankerne i at yde direkte begunstigede låneordninger til papirindustrien via statslige ordninger), og disse konklusioner er i fuld overensstemmelse med EU's og WTO's regler.
The Coated Fine Paper findings on Chinese banks being public bodies were based on more elements than merely ownership (e.g. government intervention and guidance of banks to direct preferential lending to the paper industry via Government plans) and these findings are fully in line with EU and WTO law.
Desuden blev konklusionerne om statsejede bankers status som offentlige organer bekræftet i sagen om stålprodukter, der er overtrukket med organisk materiale.
In addition, the findings on the status of state-owned banks as public bodies were confirmed in Organic Coated Steel as well.
Den kinesiske regering påstod også fortsat, at den ikke var i stand til at give oplysninger om de 3800 banker og finansielle institutioner, der findes i Kina, og at CBRC under ingen omstændigheder opbevarer fortegnelser vedrørende det procentvise statslige ejerskab i bankerne.
The GOC also continued to claim that it was not in its practical ability to provide information on 3,800 banks and financial institutions which exist in the PRC and that, in any event the CBRC does not retain records concerning the percentage of government ownership in banks.
Kommissionen forstår ikke, hvorfor den kinesiske regering gentagne gange henviser til alle banker i Kina i forbindelse med den kinesiske regerings ejerskab, når de ønskede oplysninger udtrykkeligt blev begrænset til de banker »som den kinesiske regering har direkte eller indirekte ejerskab i« [30].
The Commission does not understand why the GOC is referring repeatedly to all banks in the PRC in connection with the GOC ownership in them when the information requested was explicitly limited to those banks ‘where the GOC has direct or indirect shareholdership’ [30].
Den kinesiske regerings påstand, jf. betragtning 127, om, at CBRC (eller andre offentlige myndigheder) ikke fører fortegnelser over sit ejerskab i bankerne, synes at være i modstrid med en række kinesiske lovbestemmelser.
As explained in recital (127) above the claim of the GOC that the CBRC (or any other government authority) does not retain records on its ownership share of the banks seems to be in contradiction with several Chinese legal provisions.
Ved brev af 3. juni 2013 gentog den kinesiske regering sin påstand om, at den ikke har beføjelse til at kræve, at »uafhængige banker« tilvejebringer fortrolige oplysninger, og henviste til den skrivelse, som den angiveligt havde fremsendt til bankerne om dette spørgsmål.
In its letter of 3 June 2013 the GOC repeated its claim that it does not have the authority to require ‘independent banks’ to produce confidential information and pointed to the letter that had allegedly been sent to the banks on this matter.
Det er rigtigt, at den kinesiske regering under kontrolbesøget fremviste det originale brev til bankerne, men da Kommissionen anmodede den kinesiske regering om at indsende dokumentation for, hvilke banker og finansielle institutioner dette brev var sendt til, kunne den kinesiske regering ikke fremlægge en sådan dokumentation.
It is true that during the verification the GOC showed the original of the letter intended for the banks, but when the Commission requested the GOC to submit evidence to show to which banks and financial institutions this letter was sent the GOC was not able to provide such evidence.
Den kinesiske regering påstod også, at nogle af de institutioner, der er angivet i tillæg 7 til mangelskrivelsen, ikke er banker.
The GOC also alleged that some of the institutions indicated in Annex 7 to the deficiency letter were not banks.
I denne forbindelse bemærker Kommissionen, at de eksporterende producenter i stikprøven havde indberettet disse institutioner til Kommissionen som institutioner, der havde ydet dem lån.
In this regard the Commission notes that these institutions had been notified to the Commission by the sampled exporting producers as institutions which extended loans to them.
Den kinesiske regering påstod, at Kommissionen ikke medtog spørgsmålet om PBOC-cirkulærerne YinFa [2003] og [2004] i spørgeskemaet eller i mangelskrivelsen.
The GOC claimed that the Commission never addressed the issue of the PBOC Circulars YinFa [2003] and [2004] in its questionnaire or in the deficiency letters.
Det bemærkes, at Kommissionen i brevet forud for kontrolbesøget inkluderede »nationalbankens forordninger/cirkulærer/interne dokumentation vedrørende rentesatsregulering i Kina« blandt de emner, der skulle behandles under kontrolbesøget.
It is noted that in the pre-verification letter the Commission included ‘PBOC regulations/circulars/internal documentation concerning interest rates regulation in the PRC’ amongst the topics to be covered during the verification.
Det er klart, at begge cirkulærer falder ind under denne kategori.
It is obvious that both circulars fall into this category.
I sit svar på Kommissionens mangelskrivelse henviste den kinesiske regering endog til en artikel på den kinesiske nationalbanks websted, der henviser til et af cirkulærerne.
In its reply to the deficiency letter the GOC even referred to an article on the PBOC website which referred to one of the circulars.
Den kinesiske regering fremlagde dog overhovedet ingen cirkulærer fra Kinas nationalbank og indgav kun oplysninger fra den kinesiske nationalbanks websted, der var mangelfulde med hensyn til styringen af rentesatser for udlån og indlån i Kina sammenholdt med cirkulærerne YinFa [2003] og [2004], der begge er tilgængelige på internettet.
However the GOC did not provide any circulars from PBOC at all and only submitted information from the PBOC website which was incomplete in respect of the governance of interest rates on loans and deposits in China when compared to Circulars YinFa [2003] and [2004] which are both available on the web.
Det skal også bemærkes, at den kinesiske regering ikke nægtede at udlevere disse dokumenter under påskud af, at den ikke var forberedt på disse spørgsmål, men snarere på grund af cirkulærernes påståede fortrolighed.
It is also noted that the GOC did not refuse to submit these documents on the basis that it was not prepared for such question but rather because of the alleged confidentiality of the circulars.
Det skal i den forbindelse bemærkes, at den kinesiske regerings påstand om, at PBOC's cirkulærer er fortrolige, er i modstrid med regeringens egen praksis i denne procedure.
In this regard it must be noted that the GOC's claim concerning the confidentiality of the PBOC circulars is inconsistent with its own practice in this proceeding.
I sine bemærkninger til den endelige fremlæggelse af oplysninger indsendte den kinesiske regering den fulde version af et andet PBOC-cirkulære som dokumentation for sin påstand om, at de særlige lån, som de statsejede forretningsbanker havde ydet, var blevet ophævet, og den i andre sammenhænge påståede fortrolighed syntes ikke at være en hindring.
In its comments to definitive disclosure the GOC submitted full version of another PBOC Circular to support its claim that the special loans provided by state-owed commercial banks (SOCBs) were repealed and the confidentiality alleged elsewhere did not seem to be an obstacle.
Hvad angår uddragene fra den kinesiske nationalbanks websted, noterede Kommissionen sig dem og så ikke bort fra indholdet.
In respect to the extracts from the PBOC website, the Commission took note of them and, did not disregard their content.
For at få alle oplysninger om spørgsmålet havde Kommissionen dog også brug for oplysningerne i de to cirkulærer, som supplerede de oplysninger, som den kinesiske regering havde indsendt.
However to have the complete information on the matter also required the information in the two circulars which complemented the information submitted by the GOC.
6 samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenter anmodede om individuelle undersøgelser i henhold til grundforordningens artikel 27, stk. 3, nemlig NPV Dongying Solar Power Co. Ltd., Jiangsu Runda PV Co., Ltd., Kinve Solar Power Co., Ltd. (Maanshan), Phono Solar Technology Co. Ltd., Shandong Linuo Photovoltaic Hi-Tech Co. Ltd., og Shandong Linuo Solar Power Holdings Co. Ltd. Det var ikke muligt at indrømme disse virksomheder en individuel undersøgelse, da det på grund af det høje antal angivelige subsidieordninger og undersøgelsens tidskrævende karakter ville være urimeligt byrdefuldt og hindre en rettidig afslutning af undersøgelsen.
Claims for IE were submitted by 6 cooperating exporting producers pursuant to Article 27(3) of the basic Regulation, i.e. companies CNPV Dongying Solar Power Co. Ltd., Jiangsu Runda PV Co., Ltd., Kinve Solar Power Co., Ltd (Maanshan), Phono Solar Technology Co. Ltd., Shandong Linuo Photovoltaic Hi-Tech Co. Ltd., and Shandong Linuo Solar Power Holdings Co. Ltd. It was not possible to grant these companies individual examinations as, due to the high number of alleged subsidy schemes and time consuming nature of the investigation, it would be unduly burdensome and could prevent completion of the investigation in good time.
Præferentielle lån, anden finansiering, garantier og forsikringer
Preferential policy loans, other financing, guarantees and insurance
Præferentielle lån
Preferential policy loans;
Indrømmelse af kreditbevillinger
Provision of credit lines;
Eksportkreditstøtteordninger
Export credit subsidy programmes;
Eksportgarantier og forsikringer for grønne teknologier
Export Guarantees and Insurances for Green Technologies;
Fordele, som ydes gennem adgang til offshore-holdingselskaber og regeringens tilbagebetaling af lån
Benefits provided through granting of access to offshore holding companies and loan repayments by the government;
Export product research development fund
Export product research development fund;
Subsidier til udvikling af »Famous brands« og programmet »China World Top Brands«
Subsidies for development of ‘Famous Brands’ and China World Top Brands Programme;
Funds for outward expansion of industries i Guandong-provinsen
Funds for outward expansion of industries in Guandong Province;
Golden Sun-demonstrationsprogrammet.
The Golden Sun demonstration programme;
Ordninger for fritagelse for og nedsættelse af direkte skatter
Direct Tax Exemption ad Reduction programmes
»Two Free/Three Half«-programmet for virksomheder med udenlandsk kapital (»Foreign Invested Enterprises« — FIEer)
The two free/three half programme for foreign invested enterprises (FIEs);
Nedsættelse af indkomstskat for eksportorienterede virksomheder med udenlandsk kapital
Income tax reduction for export-oriented FIEs;
Indkomstskattefordele for FIE'er baseret på geografisk beliggenhed
Income tax benefit for FIEs based on geographical location;
Skattelempelse for FIE'er, der køber kinesisk udstyr
Tax reduction for FIEs purchasing Chinese-made equipment;
Skattefradrag for FoU gennemført af FIE'er
Tax offset for research and development by FIEs;
Skattegodtgørelse for geninvestering af overskud fra FIE'er i eksportorienterede virksomheder
Tax refunds for reinvestment of FIE profits in export oriented enterprises;
Præferenceskat for FIE'er, der anerkendes som virksomheder, der anvender højteknologi eller ny teknologi
Preferential tax programmes for FIEs recognised as high or new technology enterprises;
Skattenedsættelse for virksomheder, der anvender højteknologi og ny teknologi inden for bestemte projekter
Tax reduction for high and new-technology enterprises involved in designated projects;
Favorabel indkomstbeskatning for virksomheder i den nordøstlige region
Preferential income tax policy for enterprises in the northeast region;
Guandong-provinsens skatteordninger
Guandong province tax programmes;
Momsfritagelse og nedsættelse af importtold for brug af importeret udstyr
VAT exemptions and import tariff rebates for the use of imported equipment;
Momsnedsættelse for FIE'er til køb af udstyr produceret i Kina
VAT rebates on FIE purchases of Chinese-made equipment;
Fritagelse for moms og afgifter på køb af anlægsaktiver under »Foreign Trade Development«-ordningen
VAT ad tariff exemptions for purchases of fixed assets under the foreign trade development funds programme;
Statslig levering af varer eller tjenesteydelser mod utilstrækkeligt vederlag
Government provision of goods and services for less than adequate remuneration
Statslig levering af polysilicium mod utilstrækkeligt vederlag
Government provision of polysilicon for less than adequate remuneration;
Statslig levering af ekstruderet aluminium mod utilstrækkeligt vederlag
Government provision of aluminium extrusions for less than adequate remuneration;
Statslig levering af glas mod utilstrækkeligt vederlag
Government provision of glass for less than adequate remuneration;
Statslig levering af elektricitet
Government provision of power;
Statslig indrømmelse af jord og brugsrettigheder til jord mod utilstrækkeligt vederlag.
Government provision of land and land-use rights for less than adequate remuneration.
Finansielle markeder og institutioner i Kina
Financial market and institutions in China
Den kinesiske regering foreslog ikke nogen alternative kilder til disse oplysninger.
The GOC did not suggest any alternative source for this information.
Kommissionen vedlagde et særligt spørgeskema (tillæg A), der er bestemt for banker/finansielle institutioner, til det oprindelige antisubsidiespørgeskema og anmodede den kinesiske regering om at videresende det til banker/finansielle institutioner, som ydede lån til den pågældende erhvervsgren.
The Commission attached a specific questionnaire (Appendix A) intended for the banks/financial institutions to the initial anti-subsidy questionnaire and asked the GOC to forward it to the banks/financial institutions which provided loans to the industry concerned.
Formålet med tillæg A er at verificere påstande i klagen om, at de kinesiske statsejede banker er offentlige organer.
The purpose of Appendix A was to verify allegations in the complaint that Chinese state-owned banks are public bodies.
Kommissionen bad bl.a. om oplysninger vedrørende strukturen af den statslige kontrol med disse kinesiske banker samt gennemførelsen af statslige politikker eller interesser vedrørende solcelleindustrien (dvs. bestyrelser og generalforsamlinger, referater af generalforsamlinger/bestyrelsesmøder, aktionærers/bestyrelsesmedlemmers nationalitet, udlånspolitikker og risikovurdering i forbindelse med lån til de samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenter).
Inter alia, the Commission sought information concerning the structure of government control in those Chinese banks and the pursuit of government policies or interests with respect to the photovoltaic industry (i.e. board of directors and board of shareholders, minutes of shareholders/directors meetings, nationality of shareholders/directors, lending policies and assessment of risk with respect to loans provided to the cooperating exporting producers).
I besvarelsen af spørgeskemaet indsendte den kinesiske regering kun en besvarelse til tillæg A for fem banker (China Development Bank (CDB), EXIM Bank, Bank of Shanghai, Bank of China [31] og Huaxia Bank).
In the reply to the questionnaire, the GOC submitted a reply to Appendix A only for five banks (the China Development Bank (CDB), the EXIM Bank, the Bank of Shanghai, the Bank of China [31] and the Huaxia Bank).
I mangelskrivelsen gentog Kommissionen sin oprindelige anmodning om oplysninger.
In the deficiency letter, the Commission repeated its initial request for information.
For at gøre det lettere for den kinesiske regering at samarbejde fremsendte Kommissionen en liste over banker/finansielle institutioner, som ydede lån til virksomhederne i stikprøven, og anmodede igen den kinesiske regering om at fremsende tillæg A til disse enheder.
To facilitate the cooperation of the GOC, it provided a list of banks/financial institutions which provided loans to sampled companies and asked again the GOC to forward Appendix A to these entities.
Der blev ikke indsendt yderligere svar til tillægget sammen med besvarelsen af mangelskrivelsen.
No additional replies to Appendix A were submitted with the reply to the deficiency letter.
Kommissionen forsøgte også at indhente oplysninger om statens ejerskab af banker og finansielle institutioner.
The Commission also sought information about the state ownership of the banks and financial institutions.
I sin besvarelse af spørgeskemaet anførte den kinesiske regering, at den ikke fører nogen fortegnelser over ejerandele, og regeringen fremlagde ingen forslag til, hvordan man kunne få adgang til disse oplysninger.
In its questionnaire reply, the GOC stated that it does not retain any records concerning the ownership shares and it did not provide any suggestion on how to obtain this information.
Da Kommissionen i sin mangelskrivelse påpegede, at det er obligatorisk at medtage disse oplysninger i vedtægterne for bankerne, og at den kinesiske regering skal gøre disse oplysninger tilgængelige i sin egenskab af aktionær, indsendte den kinesiske regering oplysninger om ejerskabet af 16 banker.
When the Commission, in its deficiency letter, pointed out that it is mandatory to include this information in the Articles of Association of the banks and these are accessible by the GOC as a shareholder, the GOC submitted shareholding information of 16 banks.
Bortset fra fem banker, for hvilke den kinesiske regering henviste til de årlige rapporter som kilde, fremlagde regeringen imidlertid ingen dokumentation for disse oplysninger og fremlagde heller ikke datakilden til oplysningerne.
However, except for five banks, for which the GOC referred to the annual reports as a source, it did not provide any supporting evidence for this information and neither did it disclose what the source data for this information was.
Vedrørende de andre banker, der ydede lån til den pågældende erhvervsgren, fremlagde den kinesiske regering ingen oplysninger overhovedet om dens ejerskab.
Concerning the other banks which provided loans to the industry concerned, the GOC did not provide any information at all concerning its ownership stake.
Kommissionen kunne derfor ikke verificere nøjagtigheden og rigtigheden af de indberettede data vedrørende statens aktieposter i bankerne og andre finansielle institutioner.
Consequently, the Commission was unable to verify the accuracy and correctness of the reported data concerning the state's ownership stakes in the banks and other financial institutions.