natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Den kinesiske regering påstod, at den BB-vurdering, der anvendtes for de eksporterende producenter i stikprøven (med henblik på en lånreference), er »overordentlig ugunstig«, og at Kommissionen »i lyset af de faktiske oplysninger i sagen ikke forklarede, hvordan den var kommet frem til konklusionen om, at dette er den mest nøjagtige eller hensigtsmæssige konklusion«. Den kinesiske regering påstod endvidere, at denne metode er »en utilladelig omvendt følgeslutning«. Selv om denne påstand blev fremsat vedrørende en af de tidligere sager (coated finpapir) og før fremlæggelsen af oplysningerne vedrørende den vurdering, der blev anvendt for de eksporterende producenter i stikprøven i denne procedure, skal det bemærkes, at Kommissionen ikke anvendte »negative foreliggende oplysninger« i denne eller andre af de sager, som den kinesiske regering henviste til i sine bemærkninger.
The GOC claimed that the BB rating applied to the sampled exporting producers (for the purpose of the loan benchmark) is ‘extremely unfavourable’ and that the Commission ‘in light of the actual facts of the case did not explain how did it come to the conclusion that this is the accurate or most reasonable conclusion. The GOC further claimed that this methodology amounts to “an impermissible adverse inference”.’ Although this claim was made in relation to the one of the previous cases (i.e. Coated Fine Paper) and before the disclosure of the information concerning the rating applied to the sample exporting producers in this proceeding, it should be noted that the Commission did not apply ‘adverse facts available’ in this case or in any other cases to which the GOC referred in its submission.
Kommissionen drog udelukkende hensigtsmæssige konklusioner ud fra de foreliggende faktiske oplysninger, som viste en mangel på passende kreditrisikovurdering, jf. betragtning 175-178.
The Commission had only drawn appropriate conclusions from the facts on the record, which showed a lack of proper credit risk assessment, see recitals (175) to (178).
Det skal bemærkes, at den kinesiske solcelleindustri havde store tab i UP, og det var indlysende, at den befandt sig i en yderst vanskelig økonomisk situation.
It should be pointed out that during the IP the Chinese PV industry was making heavy losses and it was clear that its financial status was extremely difficult.
Virksomhederne i stikprøven fremlagde en række kreditrisikovurderinger, der viste, at en BB-vurdering for UP som helhed ikke var urimelig.
Several credit risk assessments supplied by sampled companies demonstrated that a BB assessment for the IP as a whole was not unreasonable.
Faktisk viste nogle af risikovurderingerne klart, at flere grupper var mere eller mindre insolvente.
In fact some credit risk assessments clearly demonstrate that several Groups were in fact more or less insolvent.
Kontrolbesøg hos bankerne
Verification at banks
I brevet forud for kontrolbesøget påtænkte Kommissionen at foretage kontrol af de banker, som besvarede tillæg A til spørgeskemaet og ydede en stor del af lånene til de stikprøveudvalgte eksporterende producenter, nemlig China Development Bank, Export-Import Bank of China, Bank of Shanghai og Huaxia Bank, og vedlagde en detaljeret liste over emner, der skulle behandles under kontrolbesøget.
In its pre-verification letter the Commission envisaged the verification of the banks which submitted replies to the Appendix A to the questionnaire and provided a large proportion of loans to the sampled exporting producers, i.e. the China Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank of China, the Bank of Shanghai and the Huaxia Bank and it included a detailed list of subjects that would be covered during the verification.
I det oprindelige spørgeskema til den kinesiske regering havde Kommissionen allerede gjort det klart, at oplysningerne i spørgeskemabesvarelserne kunne blive efterprøvet under kontrolbesøget.
In the initial questionnaire intended for the GOC, the Commission had already made it clear that the information provided in the questionnaire replies might be subject to an on-the-spot verification.
I brevet forud kontrolbesøget havde Kommissionen også anført, at den kinesiske regering ville blive »anmodet om at fremlægge alt det støttemateriale, der var blevet brugt til at udarbejde deres omfattende svar, herunder oprindelige kildedokumenter og ansøgninger«.
In the pre-verification letter the Commission had also stated that the GOC was ‘requested to make all supporting documents available that were used to prepare your substantive response, including original source documents and applications’.
To andre vigtige leverandører af præferentiel finansiering til de stikprøveudvalgte eksporterende producenter fremlagde enten slet ikke de ønskede oplysninger (Agricultural Bank of China), eller oplysningerne blev indgivet på deres vegne uden mulighed for at kontrollere dem (Bank of China).
Two other major providers of preferential financing to the sampled exporting producers either did not submit requested information at all (Agricultural Bank of China) or the information was submitted on their behalf without a possibility to verify it (Bank of China).
I brevet forud for kontrolbesøget af 25. marts 2013 underrettede Kommissionen den kinesiske regering om, at den agtede at kontrollere Bank of Shanghai (»BoS«), og tilbød for at lette kontrolbesøget for den kinesiske regering, hvis det skulle blive nødvendigt, at forlænge kontrolbesøget indtil den 22. april 2013 [32].
In its pre-verification letter of 25 March 2013 the Commission notified the GOC of its intention to verify the Bank of Shanghai (‘BoS’) and offered in order to facilitate the verification visit for the GOC, should it be necessary, to extend the verification visit until 22 April 2013 [32].
I sit oprindelige svar på brevet forud kontrolbesøget af 5. april, bekræftede den kinesiske regering ikke, at kontrolbesøget hos BoS ville finde sted, men spurgte, om Kommissionen ville være villig til at kontrollere banken i Shanghai et andet sted end resten af kontrolbesøget (dvs. Shanghai i stedet for Beijing).
In its initial reply to the pre-verification letter of 5 April, the GOC did not confirm whether the verification of BoS would take place but enquired whether the Commission would be willing to verify the Bank of Shanghai in another location to the rest of the verification (i.e. Shanghai instead of Beijing).
For at lette kontrolbesøget accepterede Kommissionen undtagelsesvis denne anmodning; Kommissionen opfordrede dog den kinesiske regering til at bekræfte kontrolbesøget i Shanghai senest den 9. april (dvs. tre arbejdsdage før indledningen af kontrolbesøget i Beijing), således at kontrolholdet kunne tilrettelægge de praktiske aspekter i forbindelse med en sådan ændring i planlægningen af kontrolbesøget.
To facilitate the verification visit, the Commission exceptionally agreed to this; however, it urged the GOC to confirm the verification in Shanghai by 9 April at the latest (i.e. three working days before the start of the verification in Beijing) in order for the team to be able to arrange the practicalities related to such a change in the verification planning.
Ved skrivelse af 3. juni 2013 påstod den kinesiske regering, at kontrolbesøget hos BoS ikke havde fundet sted på grund af Kommissionens manglende fleksibilitet, at Kommissionen ikke foreslog alternative datoer for kontrolbesøget og blot »afslog at overveje kontrolbesøget hos Bank of Shanghai«.
In its letter of 3 June 2013 the GOC claimed that the verification of BoS did not take place because of the inflexibility on the Commission side, that the Commission did not propose any alternative dates for the verification and simply ‘declined to consider the verification of Bank of Shanghai’.
Disse påstande er ikke korrekte.
These claims are simply incorrect.
Kommissionen gjorde det klart i brevet forud for kontrolbesøget, at det oprindeligt blev foreslået at kontrollere bankerne den 17. og 18. april 2013 med mulighed for en yderligere dag den 22. april, hvilket gav den kinesiske regering mulighed for at foreslå passende tidspunkter for kontrol af bankerne i hele perioden (dvs. en fuld arbejdsuge plus en yderligere dag).
The Commission stated clearly in its pre-verification letter that it was initially proposed to verify the banks on 17 and 18 April 2013 with a possibility of additional day on 22 April, leaving it to the GOC to propose appropriate times to visit the banks throughout the whole period of verification (i.e. full working week plus additional day).
Den kinesiske regering foreslog alligevel datoer til kontrol af BoS uden for denne periode, og kun én arbejdsdag forud for kontrolbesøget.
Yet the GOC proposed dates for verification of BoS outside this window and did so only one working day before the start of verification visit.
Det er Kommissionens opfattelse, at den var mere end tilstrækkeligt fleksibel og tilbød i alt seks alternative dage til kontrolbesøget hos BoS, i modsætning til den kinesiske regerings påstand.
In the Commission's view, the flexibility offered was more than sufficient and altogether six alternative days were offered for the verification of BoS, contrary to the GOC's claim.
Ved brev af 23. maj 2013 forklarede Kommissionen den kinesiske regering, at man ikke var i stand til at efterprøve visse dele af Huaixia Banks (»Huaxia«) svar til tillæg A, nemlig ejerforholdene, vurderingen af kreditværdigheden hos de eksporterende producenter i stikprøven og de risikopræmier, der opkræves hos forskellige erhvervsgrene og navnlig den berørte erhvervsgren.
In its letter of 23 May 2013 the Commission explained to the GOC that it was unable to verify certain parts of Huaixia Bank's (‘Huaxia’) reply to Appendix A, namely the ownership structure, the creditworthiness assessment of the sampled exporting producers and the risk premiums charged to different industries and in particular to the industry concerned.
I sit svar af 3. juni 2013 påstod den kinesiske regering, at Huaxia havde gjort rede for ejerforholdene og fremlagt yderligere oplysninger og forklaringer for Kommissionen vedrørende dens aktionærer, og at dens vurdering af kreditværdigheden af kunder er omfattet af bankhemmelighedslove og kontraktlige aftaler mellem bankerne og deres kunder.
In its reply of 3 June 2013 the GOC claimed that Huaxia explained the ownership structure and provided further details and explanations to the Commission concerning its shareholders, that the creditworthiness assessment of clients is covered by bank secrecy laws and contractual agreements between the banks and its clients.
Med hensyn til ejerforholdene bemærkes det, at Huaxia i sin besvarelse af tillæg A hævdede, at det var et holdingselskab »uden statslige aktier«, og ikke videregav oplysninger om statsligt ejerskab, selv om Kommissionen udtrykkeligt anmodede herom i tillæg A. Kommissionen påpegede, at dette er i modstrid med de øvrige oplysninger fra den kinesiske regering, og at Huaxia havde erkendt, at nogle af aktionærerne er statsejede, og havde fremlagt et dokument med oplysninger på kinesisk om nogle af dem.
In respect to the ownership structure it is noted that in its reply to the Appendix A Huaxia claimed that it was incorporated ‘without any government shares’ and did not disclose any information on the government ownership even though this was specifically requested by the Commission in the Appendix A. The Commission pointed out that this is in contradiction to the other information provided by the GOC and that Huaxia admitted that some of the shareholders are state-owned and provided a paper with information in Chinese on some of them.
Det fremgår stadig ikke klart af oplysningerne fra Huaxia, hvor stor statens andel af banken er.
It is still not clear from the information submitted by Huaxia what is the proportion of state ownership of the bank.
Hvad angår vurdering af kreditværdigheden, bemærker Kommissionen, at banken var i stand til at forelægge et dokument herom for en af virksomhederne (efter at have beskyttet virksomhedens identitet med visse ændringer i dokumentet), mens Huaxia vedrørende de andre ønskede dokumenter hævdede, at de er omfattet af regler om tavshedspligt og kontraktlige aftaler mellem bankerne og deres kunder.
As for the creditworthiness assessment, the Commission notes that the bank was able to provide such document for one of the companies (after protecting the identity of the company with some modifications in the document) while for the other requested documents it claimed that they are covered by secrecy laws and contractual agreements between the banks and its clients.
Denne forskelsbehandling er vanskelig at forstå.
This discrepancy of treatments difficult to understand.
Ved brev af 23. maj 2013 underrettede Kommissionen den kinesiske regering om, at svarene fra Export-Import Bank of China (»EXIM«) til tillæg A og mangelskrivelsen var ufuldstændige, og at EXIM havde undladt at fremsende visse dokumenter, som Kommissionen specifikt havde anmodet om, nemlig bankens vedtægter, Statsrådets meddelelse om oprettelse af Export-Import Bank of China eller foranstaltninger til Export–Import Bank of China's forvaltning af eksportsælgeres kredit til højteknologiske produkter.
In its letter of 23 May 2013 the Commission informed the GOC that the replies of the Export-Import Bank of China (‘EXIM’) to the Appendix A and to the deficiency letters were incomplete and that EXIM failed to submit certain documents which were specifically requested, i.e. Articles of Association, the Notice of Establishing Export-Import bank of China Issued by the State Council or Measures for the management of Export Sellers's Credit for Hi-Tech products of the Export –Import Bank of China.
Vedrørende vedtægterne påstod den kinesiske regering ved brev af 3. juni 2013, at EXIM som følge af bankens interne politik ikke kunne indsende vedtægterne (som er et internt dokument), men henviste til den elektroniske udgave, som man angiveligt havde tilbudt til konsultation på den laptop-computer, som EXIM stillede til rådighed under kontrolbesøget.
Concerning the Articles of Association, the GOC claimed in its letter of 3 June 2013 that EXIM, because of its internal policy, could not submit Articles of Association (which is an internal management document) but referred to the on-line version which was allegedly offered to be consulted on the laptop provided by EXIM during the verification.
Kommissionen er forundret over denne forklaring, som ikke giver mening.
The Commission is puzzled by this explanation which makes no sense.
Hvis dokumentet var tilgængeligt online under kontrolbesøget, kan Kommissionen ikke se nogen grund til, at det ikke kunne have været indsendt, hvilket Kommissionen gentagne gange anmodede om allerede i spørgeskemaet, mangelskrivelsen og igen under kontrolbesøget.
If the document was available on-line during the verification the Commission see no reason why it could not have been submitted as repeatedly requested already in the questionnaire, deficiency letter and again during the verification.
Påstanden om, at EXIM stillede dette dokument til rådighed på computeren under kontrolbesøget, er ukorrekt.
In fact, the claim that EXIM made this document available on the laptop during the verification is incorrect.
EXIM erklærede, at Kommissionen kunne læse dokumentet online, men Kommissionens repræsentant forklarede, at de ikke har internetadgang under kontrolbesøg.
EXIM stated that the Commission should review the document online but the Commission official explained that they do not have internet access on the verification premises.
Desuden oplyste EXIM ikke engang et link til den elektroniske udgave af vedtægterne.
In addition, EXIM did not even provide a link to the online version of Articles of Association.
Som for de to andre dokumenter forklarede EXIM, at de ikke kunne fremskaffes på grund af deres fortrolige karakter og de interne regler.
As for the other two documents, EXIM reasoned that they could not be provided because of their confidential nature and internal rules.
EXIM anførte selv i sin mangelskrivelse, at »EXIM bank blev oprettet og opererer i henhold til Statsrådets bekendtgørelse om etablering af Export-Import Bank of China og vedtægterne for Export-Import Bank of China«.
It was the EXIM itself which stated in its reply to the deficiency letter that the ‘EXIM bank was formed and operates in accordance with The Notice of Establishing Export-Import Bank of China Issued by the State Council and The Articles of Association of Export-Import Bank of China’.
Vedtægterne blev derfor anset for et vigtigt dokument for at kunne verificere påstandene i klagen om, at EXIM er offentligt organ, men Kommissionen blev nægtet adgang til dette dokument.
Therefore this was deemed an essential document for verification of the allegations in the complaint that EXIM is public body, but the Commission was denied access to this document.
Det skal i denne forbindelse bemærkes, at en anden politisk styret bank, nemlig CDB fremlagde et lignende dokument om etablering samt en række andre bekendtgørelser fra Statsrådet.
In this context it is noted that another policy bank, i.e. CDB provided a similar document concerning its establishment and also several other State Council notices were submitted in this investigation.
Desuden underbyggede EXIM ikke sine påstande vedrørende fortrolighed med beviser.
Also EXIM did not support its claims on the confidentiality by any evidence whatsoever.
Som forklaret i betragtning 117 kan regeringer ikke uden videre påberåbe sig interne regler for at omgå forpligtelserne i henhold til WTO-aftalen om subsidier og udligningsforanstaltninger og i grundforordningen.
In addition, as explained in recital (117), governments cannot simply invoke internal rules in order to avoid obligations under the SCM Agreement and basic Regulation.
Det samme gælder for foranstaltninger til Export–Import Bank of China's forvaltning af eksportsælgeres kredit til højteknologiske produkter, hvor EXIM påkaldte sig fortrolighedshensyn uden dokumentation og endog afslog at drøfte formålet med dette dokument.
The same applies for the Measures for the management of Export Sellers's Credit for Hi-Tech products of the Export–Import Bank of China where EXIM claimed also confidentiality without any supporting evidence and even refused to discuss the purpose of this document.
Vedrørende statistikker over eksport af forskellige varekategorier, som Kommissionen allerede anmodede om i spørgeskemaet, og som EXIM er retligt forpligtede til at rapportere til CBRC, påstod den kinesiske regering ved brev af 3. juni 2013, at der var behov for mere tid til at udarbejde disse oplysninger.
Concerning the statistics on the export of different categories of products already requested in the questionnaire and which EXIM is legally obliged to report to the CBRC, the GOC claimed in its letter of 3 June 2013 that it needed more time to prepare such information.
Det skal i den forbindelse bemærkes, at da Kommissionen anmodede om disse oplysninger allerede i det oprindelige spørgeskema, har den kinesiske regering haft over tre og en halv måned til at udarbejde disse oplysninger, men undlod at gøre det.
In this respect it is noted that, since the Commission requested this information already in the initial questionnaire, the GOC had more than three and a half months to prepare this information but failed to do so.
EXIM påstod, at »denne type oplysninger fremgår af årsregnskaberne«, men dette er ikke korrekt.
EXIM alleged that ‘this type of information can be found in annual reports’; however, this is incorrect.
De oplysninger i årsregnskaberne, som den kinesiske regering henviser til, omfatter andre perioder end dem, som Kommissionen anmodede om i spørgeskemaet og under kontrolbesøget.
The information in the annual reports the GOC referred to covers different periods than the information requested by the Commission in the questionnaire and during the verification visit.
Den kinesiske regering har med rette hævdet, at den i spørgeskemaet bl.a. oplyste størrelsen af eksportkreditter til eksport af mekaniske og elektriske produkter og nye højteknologiske produkter.
The GOC rightly claimed that in the questionnaire reply it submitted, inter alia, the amounts of export credits for exports of mechanical and electrical products and new high-tech products.
Det bemærkes, at Kommissionen aldrig har anfægtet fremlæggelsen af disse tal.
It is noted the Commission never contested the submission of these figures.
Kommissionen anfægtede, at da den forsøgte at verificere disse tal under kontrolbesøget, var EXIM ikke i stand til at fremlægge dokumentation eller endog forklare, hvor disse tal stammer fra.
The Commission contested the fact that, when it attempted to verify these figures during the verification visit, EXIM was not able to provide any supporting evidence or even explain where are these figures come from.
Tilsvarende fik Kommissionen ikke tilladelse til at kontrollere oplysningerne om andelen af eksportkreditter til solcelleindustrien, som den kinesiske regering havde oplyst i spørgeskemabesvarelsen.
Similarly, the Commission was not allowed to verify the data concerning the proportion of export credits to the PV industry which the GOC submitted in the questionnaire reply.
Interessant nok mente EXIM ikke, at disse tal var fortrolige, men da Kommissionen anmodede om kildedataene for at efterprøve dem, nægtede EXIM at fremlægge dem af fortrolighedshensyn.
Interestingly enough, EXIM did not consider any of these figures confidential but when the Commission asked for the source data to verify them, EXIM refused the access to it, citing confidentiality reasons.
EXIM anvendte samme ræsonnement vedrørende beløbet for eksportkreditter til de producenter, der indgik i stikprøven, og de samarbejdsvillige producenter.
EXIM applied the same reasoning concerning the amounts of export credits given to the sampled producers and cooperating producers.
EXIM indberettede tal i svaret på Kommissionens mangelskrivelse, men gjorde det ikke muligt for Kommissionen at kontrollere dem af fortrolighedshensyn.
It reported figures in the reply to the deficiency letter but did not allow the Commission to verify it on the basis of the confidentiality.
Faktisk var det ikke muligt at efterprøve langt de fleste af de statistikker, der blev indsendt af EXIM.
Effectively, it was not possible to verify the vast majority of the statistics submitted by EXIM.
EXIM nægtede også at forklare og fremlægge dokumentation for kreditvurderingerne af de eksporterende producenter i stikprøven og de analyser, der førte til disse kreditvurderinger.
The EXIM also refused to explain and support with relevant evidence the credit ratings of the sampled exporting producers and the analyses which led to these ratings.
China Development Bank (»CDB«)
China Development Bank (‘CDB’)
Ved brev af 3. juni 2013 var den kinesiske regering bekymret over, at Kommissionen stillede »bestyrelsesmedlemmerne og den øverste ledelse personlige spørgsmål om tilknytningsforhold til politiske partier«.
In its letter of 3 June 2013 the GOC was concerned that the Commission asked ‘personal questions concerning the political party affiliations of members of the Boards and senior management’.
Dette er ikke korrekt.
This is not correct.
Spørgsmålene om forbindelser mellem bestyrelses- og direktionsmedlemmer og Kinas kommunistiske parti var udelukkende af teknisk karakter, og som forklaret i betragtning 151, var hensigten med disse spørgsmål at fastlægge det kommunistiske partis rolle i den kinesiske økonomi.
The questions concerning the links of the Board members and senior management to the CCP were purely of technical character and, as explained in the recital (151) above, the reason for asking them was to help determine the role of the CCP in Chinese economy.
Under kontrolbesøget forsøgte Kommissionen at verificere vurderingen af kreditværdigheden for de stikprøveudvalgte eksporterende producenter.
During the verification the Commission attempted to verify the creditworthiness assessment of the sampled exporting producers.