natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Hvert af de forskellige lags effektivitet er et afgørende element i dybdeforsvaret for at forebygge ulykker og afbøde konsekvenserne, hvis de skulle forekomme.
They should be carried out by the licence holders under the control of the national competent regulatory authority and may be used for the assessment of the risk of a major accident, as covered by Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council [10], provided that the requirements of this Directive are met.
Dybdeforsvar er normalt struktureret i fem niveauer.
The concept of defence-in-depth is fundamental to the safety of nuclear installations and is the basis for implementing high level nuclear safety objectives.
Hvis et niveau slår fejl, anvendes det følgende niveau.
Application of the defence-in-depth principles, as recognised in international standards and guidance and by WENRA, ensures that safety activities are subject to, as far as reasonably practicable, independent layers of provisions, so that in the event that a failure were to occur, it would be detected, compensated or corrected by appropriate measures.
Formålet med det første beskyttelsesniveau er at forebygge unormal drift og systemfejl.
The effectiveness of each of the different layers is an essential element of defence-in-depth to prevent accidents and mitigate the consequences should they occur.
Hvis det første niveau slår fejl, skal det andet beskyttelsesniveau kontrollere den unormale drift og finde fejlene.
Defence-in-depth is generally structured in five levels.
Slår det andet niveau fejl, sikrer det tredje niveau, at sikkerhedsfunktionerne fortsat udføres ved at aktivere specifikke sikkerhedssystemer og andre sikkerhedsforanstaltninger.
Should one level fail, the subsequent level comes into play.
Slår det tredje niveau fejl, skal det fjerde niveau gennem ulykkeshåndtering begrænse udviklingen af en ulykke med henblik på at forebygge eller afbøde alvorlige ulykkesomstændigheder med eksternt udslip af radioaktive materialer.
The objective of the first level of protection is the prevention of abnormal operation and system failures.
Det sidste mål (det femte beskyttelsesniveau) er afbødning af de radioaktive konsekvenser af væsentlige eksterne udslip gennem en katastrofeberedskabsplan uden for anlægget.
If the first level fails, abnormal operation is controlled or failures are detected by the second level of protection.
Hvor udtrykket »så vidt det med rimelighed er praktisk muligt« anvendes i dette direktiv, bør det anvendes i overensstemmelse med almindeligt anerkendte definitioner, navnlig definitionerne i WENRA og IAEA.
Should the second level fail, the third level ensures that safety functions are further performed by activating specific safety systems and other safety features.
Peerevalueringer har vist sig at være et godt middel til at opbygge tillid med det formål at udvikle og udveksle erfaringer og sikre en fælles anvendelse af høje nukleare sikkerhedsstandarder.
and the systematic reporting of any deviation from normal operating conditions or arrangements relevant to accident management that have the potential to have an impact on nuclear safety.
Samarbejdet om nuklear sikkerhed mellem medlemsstaterne er veletableret og kan tilføre merværdi i form af nuklear sikkerhed, gennemsigtighed og åbenhed over for aktører på europæisk og internationalt niveau.
Important elements which help to achieve a strong nuclear safety culture include, in particular, effective management systems, appropriate education and training and arrangements by the licence holder to register, evaluate and document internal and external safety significant operating experience and effective resolution of issues that have been raised.
Medlemsstaterne bør hvert sjette år via deres kompetente tilsynsmyndigheder, som anvender ENSREG på relevant vis og bygger på ekspertise fra WENRA, definere en metode, vedtægter og en tidsfrist for peerevalueringer af et fælles specifikt teknisk tema vedrørende den nukleare sikkerhed af deres nukleare anlæg.
Where ‘reasonably practicable’ is used in this Directive it should be applied in accordance with established definitions, in particular the WENRA and IAEA definitions.
Det fælles specifikke tekniske tema, der skal behandles, bør identificeres blandt WENRA's sikkerhedsreferenceniveauer eller på baggrund af feedback fra driftserfaringer, hændelser og ulykker samt den teknologiske og videnskabelige udvikling.
Following the nuclear accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, the Fukushima nuclear accident highlighted once again the critical importance of the containment function, which is the last barrier to protect people and the environment against radioactive releases resulting from an accident.
Medlemsstaterne bør foretage en national selvevaluering og sørge for, at de øvrige medlemsstaters kompetente tilsynsmyndigheder foretager fælles peerevalueringer af deres nationale selvevaluering.
Therefore the applicant for a licence for the construction of a new power or research reactor should demonstrate that the design limits the effects of a reactor core damage to within the containment, i.e. the applicant should prove that a large or unauthorised radioactive release outside the containment is extremely unlikely, and that applicant should be able to demonstrate with a high degree of confidence that such a release will not occur.
Der bør udarbejdes rapporter over resultaterne af disse peerevalueringer.
More specific arrangements for accident management and on-site emergency response should be required to address the prevention and mitigation of accidents.
Medlemsstaterne bør fastlægge nationale handlingsplaner til behandling af relevante resultater og deres egen nationale evaluering under hensyntagen til resultaterne af disse peerevalueringsrapporter.
Those should be in accordance and without prejudice to the relevant provisions of the Directive 2013/59/Euratom.
Peerevalueringsrapporterne bør også danne grundlaget for enhver sammenfattende rapport om resultatet af den EU-dækkende tematiske peerevaluering, som medlemsstaternes kompetente tilsynsmyndigheder har udarbejdet i fællesskab.
The licence holder should provide for procedures, guidelines and arrangements that address accidents including severe accidents, that could occur in all operational modes, including full power, shutdown and transitional states, ensuring consistency and continuity between all such procedures and arrangements, and ensuring that they are exercised, reviewed and updated.
Den sammenfattende rapport bør ikke sigte mod at rangordne sikkerheden i nukleare anlæg, men snarere fokusere på processen og tekniske resultater af den tematiske peerevaluering, så den viden, der er indsamlet som følge heraf, kan deles.
Those arrangements should also provide for sufficient staff, equipment and other necessary resources.
Gensidig tillid bør være fremherskende i peerevalueringer, og det vil derfor være hensigtsmæssigt, at Kommissionen så vidt muligt meddeler medlemsstaterne, når den agter at anvende resultaterne af peerevalueringsrapporter i sine politiske oplæg.
An organisational structure with clear allocation of responsibilities, and coordination amongst response bodies should be provided.
Medlemsstaternes pligt til at rapportere om gennemførelsen af dette direktiv og Kommissionens pligt til at udarbejde en rapport på baggrund af de nationale rapporter bør skabe mulighed for at gøre status over og vurdere de forskellige aspekter ved gennemførelsen af dette direktiv og effektiviteten heraf.
The stress tests demonstrated the key role of enhanced cooperation and coordination mechanisms between all parties that have responsibilities for nuclear safety.
Der eksisterer på internationalt plan en række relevante rapporteringsforpligtelser, f.eks. i medfør af konventionen om nuklear sikkerhed, og resultaterne heraf kan anvendes til evalueringen af gennemførelsen af dette direktiv.
The peer-reviews have proved to be a good means of building confidence, with the aim of developing and exchanging experience and ensuring the common application of high nuclear safety standards.
Endvidere bør der i henhold til dette direktiv fastsættes yderligere indberetningskrav vedrørende resultaterne af de tematiske peerevalueringer af nukleare anlæg.
Cooperation on nuclear safety between Members States is well established and can give added value in terms of nuclear safety, transparency and openness towards stakeholders at the European and international level.
For at forenkle lovgivningen og mindske den administrative byrde bør medlemsstaternes rapporteringsforpligtelse dermed gøres mindre byrdefuld, både hvad angår rapporteringshyppigheden og rapporternes indhold.
Member States, through their competent regulatory authorities making relevant use of ENSREG, and building on the expertise of the WENRA, should every six years define a methodology, Terms of Reference and a time frame for Peer Reviews on a common specific technical topic related to the nuclear safety of their nuclear installations.
I overensstemmelse med en gradueret tilgang afhænger anvendelsen af bestemmelserne i dette direktiv af typen af nukleare anlæg på en medlemsstats område.
The common specific technical topic to be considered should be identified among the WENRA safety reference levels or on the basis of operating experience feed-back, incidents and accidents and technological and scientific developments.
Når medlemsstaterne gennemfører disse bestemmelser i national ret, bør de derfor tage hensyn til det potentielle omfang og arten af risiciene fra de nukleare anlæg, som de planlægger eller driver.
Member States should perform a national self-assessment and make arrangements for common peer reviews by other Member States' competent regulatory authorities of their national self-assessment.
Især bør den graduerede tilgang vedrøre de medlemsstater, der kun har et lille lager af nukleare og radioaktive materialer, f.eks. de materialer, der hører sammen med driften af mindre forskningsreaktoranlæg, som i tilfælde af en alvorlig ulykke ikke ville have konsekvenser, der kan sammenlignes med dem, der skabes af atomkraftværker.
Reports on the findings of those peer reviews should be produced.
Bestemmelserne i dette direktiv, som hænger uløseligt sammen med eksistensen af nukleare anlæg, nemlig dem, der vedrører tilladelsesindehaverens forpligtelser, de nye specifikke krav til nukleare anlæg og bestemmelserne om nødberedskabs- og indsatsforanstaltninger på det enkelte anlæg, bør ikke finde anvendelse i medlemsstater uden nukleare anlæg.
Member States should establish national action plans for addressing any relevant findings and their own national assessment, taking into account the results of those peer review reports.
Bestemmelserne i direktivet bør gennemføres og implementeres forholdsmæssigt i overensstemmelse med nationale omstændigheder og under hensyntagen til, at de pågældende medlemsstater ikke har nukleare anlæg, samtidig med at det sikres, at regeringen eller de kompetente myndigheder tillægger nuklear sikkerhed passende opmærksomhed.
The peer review reports should also form the basis of any summary report of the outcome of the Union-wide topical peer review exercise prepared collectively by the competent regulatory authorities of the Member States.
Ifølge direktiv 2009/71/Euratom skal medlemsstaterne indføre og opretholde passende nationale lovgivningsmæssige, tilsynsmæssige og organisatoriske rammebestemmelser for nukleare anlægs nukleare sikkerhed.
The summary report should not aim to rank the safety of nuclear installations but rather focus on the process and technical findings of the topical peer review so that the knowledge gained from the exercise can be shared.
Fastlæggelsen af, hvordan de nationale rammebestemmelser vedtages, og via hvilket instrument de anvendes, hører ind under medlemsstaternes kompetence.
Reciprocal trust should prevail in peer reviews, and it would therefore be appropriate for the Commission, whenever practicable, to inform Member States when it intends to use the results of peer review reports in its policy documents.
I henhold til den fælles politiske erklæring af 28. september 2011 fra medlemsstaterne og Kommissionen om forklarende dokumenter har medlemsstaterne forpligtet sig til i tilfælde, hvor det er berettiget, at lade meddelelsen af gennemførelsesforanstaltninger ledsage af et eller flere dokumenter, der forklarer forholdet mellem et direktivs bestanddele og de tilsvarende dele i de nationale gennemførelsesinstrumenter.
The obligations of the Member States to report on the implementation of this Directive and the obligation of the Commission to draw up a report on the basis of the national reports should provide an opportunity to take stock of, and evaluate, the various aspects of the implementation of this Directive as well as its effectiveness.
I forbindelse med dette direktiv finder lovgiver, at fremsendelsen af sådanne dokumenter er berettiget.
A number of relevant reporting obligations, such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety reports, exist at international level, the results of which might be used for the evaluation of the implementation of this Directive.
Direktiv 2009/71/Euratom bør derfor ændres i overensstemmelse hermed —
Moreover, additional reporting requirements should be established under this Directive in relation to the findings of the topical peer reviews of nuclear installations.
VEDTAGET DETTE DIREKTIV:
Consequently, with a view to simplifying the legislation and reducing the administrative burden, the reporting obligation for the Member States should be made less onerous both as regards the frequency of reporting and the content of the reports.
I direktiv 2009/71/Euratom foretages følgende ændringer:
In line with a graded approach, the implementation of the provisions of this Directive depends on the types of nuclear installations on the territory of a Member State.
Titlen på kapitel 1 affattes således:
Therefore, when implementing these provisions in national law, Member States should take into account the potential magnitude and nature of risks posed by the nuclear installations that they plan or operate.
»FORMÅL, ANVENDELSESOMRÅDE OG DEFINITIONER«.
In particular, the graded approach should concern those Member States that keep only a small inventory of nuclear and radioactive materials, e.g. those linked to the operation of smaller research reactor facilities, which in case of a severe accident would not engender consequences comparable to those generated by nuclear power plants.
Artikel 2 ændres således:
The provisions of this Directive which are intrinsically linked to the existence of nuclear installations, namely those concerning the licence holder's obligations, the new specific requirements for nuclear installations and the provisions concerning on-site emergency preparedness and response should not be applicable to Member States without nuclear installations.
Stk. 1 affattes således:
The provisions of this Directive should be transposed and implemented in a proportionate manner in accordance with national circumstances and taking into account the fact that those Member States do not have nuclear installations, whilst ensuring that nuclear safety receives appropriate attention by the government or by the competent authorities.
Dette direktiv finder anvendelse på ethvert civilt nukleart anlæg, der kræver en tilladelse.«
According to Directive 2009/71/Euratom, the Member States have to establish and maintain a national legislative, regulatory and organisational framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations.
Stk. 3 affattes således:
The decision as to how the provisions of the national framework are adopted and through which instrument they are applied rests with the competence of the Member States.
Dette direktiv supplerer de grundlæggende normer, der er omhandlet i traktatens artikel 30, med hensyn til nukleare anlægs nukleare sikkerhed og berører ikke eksisterende fællesskabslovgivning om beskyttelse af arbejdstagernes og offentlighedens sundhed mod de farer, som er forbundet med ioniserende stråling, og især Rådets direktiv 2013/59/Euratom.
In accordance with the Joint Political Declaration of 28 September 2011 of Member States and the Commission on explanatory documents, Member States have undertaken to accompany, in justified cases, the notification of their transposition measures with one or more documents explaining the relationship between the provisions of a directive and the corresponding parts of national transposition instruments.
Artikel 3 ændres således:
With regard to this Directive the legislator considers the transmission of such documents to be justified.
Nr. 1, litra a), affattes således:
Directive 2009/71/Euratom should therefore be amended accordingly,
Følgende stykker tilføjes:
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
»ulykke« enhver utilsigtet hændelse, hvis konsekvenser eller potentielle konsekvenser er væsentlige med hensyn til strålingsbeskyttelse eller nuklear sikkerhed
Directive 2009/71/Euratom is amended as follows:
»hændelse« enhver utilsigtet hændelse, hvis konsekvenser eller potentielle konsekvenser ikke er ubetydelige med hensyn til strålingsbeskyttelse eller nuklear sikkerhed
the heading of Chapter 1 is replaced by the following:
»unormal drift« et driftsforløb, der afviger fra normal drift, og som forventes at opstå mindst én gang i et anlægs driftslevetid, men som i kraft af hensigtsmæssige konstruktionsbestemmelser ikke er til væsentlig skade for vigtige sikkerhedselementer og ikke fører til tilfælde af ulykkesomstændigheder
‘OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS’.
»konstruktionsforudsætninger« den række af omstændigheder og hændelser, der eksplicit tages i betragtning ved designet, herunder opgraderinger, af et nukleart anlæg ifølge de opstillede kriterier, og som anlægget i kraft af den planlagte drift af sikkerhedssystemer kan modstå uden at overskride de tilladte grænser
Article 2 is amended as follows:
»konstruktionsbestemmende ulykke« ulykkesomstændigheder, som et nukleart anlæg er designet til at modstå ifølge de opstillede konstruktionskriterier, og hvor skaden på brændstof, hvor det er relevant, og udslippet af radioaktivt materiale holdes inden for de tilladte grænser
paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:
»alvorlige omstændigheder«
This Directive shall apply to any civilian nuclear installation subject to a licence.’;
omstændigheder, der er mere alvorlige end omstændighederne i forbindelse med konstruktionsbestemmende ulykke, og som kan skyldes flere fejl, såsom fuldstændigt tab af alle led i et sikkerhedssystem, eller en ekstremt usandsynlig hændelse.«
paragraph 3 is replaced by the following:
I kapitel 2 indsættes følgende overskrift efter overskriften »FORPLIGTELSER«:
This Directive supplements the basic standards referred to in Article 30 of the Treaty as regards the nuclear safety of nuclear installations and is without prejudice to the existing Community legislation for the protection of the health of the workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiation, and in particular Council Directive 2013/59/Euratom.
Generelle forpligtelser«.
paragraph 1(a) is replaced by the following:
Artikel 4, stk. 1, affattes således:
a nuclear power plant, enrichment plant, nuclear fuel fabrication plant, reprocessing plant, research reactor facility, spent fuel storage facility;
Medlemsstaterne indfører og opretholder passende lovgivningsmæssige, tilsynsmæssige og organisatoriske rammebestemmelser (»nationale rammebestemmelser«) for nukleare anlægs nukleare sikkerhed.
the following paragraphs are added:
De nationale rammebestemmelser fastsætter navnlig bestemmelser om:
“accident” means any unintended event, the consequences or potential consequences of which are significant from the point of view of radiation protection or nuclear safety;
fordeling af ansvarsområder og koordinering mellem relevante statslige organer
“incident” means any unintended event, the consequences or potential consequences of which are not negligible from the point of view of radiation protection or nuclear safety;
nationale nukleare sikkerhedskrav, der omfatter alle stadier af nukleare anlægs livscyklus
“abnormal operations” means an operational process deviating from normal operation which is expected to occur at least once during the operating lifetime of a facility but which, in view of appropriate design provisions, does not cause any significant damage to items important to safety or lead to accident conditions;
et system for udstedelse af tilladelser og forbud mod at drive nukleare anlæg uden tilladelse
“design basis” means the range of conditions and events taken explicitly into account in the design, including upgrades, of a nuclear installation, according to established criteria, so that the installation can withstand them without exceeding authorised limits by the planned operation of safety systems;
et system for tilsyn med nuklear sikkerhed udført af den kompetente tilsynsmyndighed
“design basis accident” means accident conditions against which a nuclear installation is designed according to established design criteria, and for which the damage to the fuel, where applicable, and the release of radioactive material are kept within authorised limits;
effektive og forholdsmæssige håndhævelsesforanstaltninger, herunder i givet fald korrektion eller suspension af driften og ændring eller tilbagekaldelse af en tilladelse.
“severe conditions” means conditions that are more severe than conditions related to design basis accidents;
Fastlæggelsen af, hvordan nationale nukleare sikkerhedskrav som omhandlet i litra b) vedtages, og gennem hvilket instrument de anvendes, hører fortsat ind under medlemsstaternes kompetence«.
such conditions may be caused by multiple failures, such as the complete loss of all trains of a safety system, or by an extremely unlikely event.’.
Artikel 5, stk. 2 og 3, affattes således:
In Chapter 2, the following title is inserted after the heading ‘OBLIGATIONS’:
Medlemsstaterne sikrer, at den kompetente tilsynsmyndighed reelt er uafhængig af uretmæssig påvirkning, når den træffer sine tilsynsbeslutninger.
‘SECTION 1
Med henblik herpå sørger medlemsstaterne for, at den kompetente tilsynsmyndighed i henhold til de nationale rammebestemmelser:
General obligations’.
er funktionelt adskilt fra alle andre organer eller organisationer, der arbejder med fremme eller anvendelse af nuklear energi, og ikke søger eller tager imod instruktioner fra sådanne organer eller organisationer under udøvelsen af sine tilsynsopgaver
Article 4(1) is replaced by the following:
træffer tilsynsbeslutninger, der er baseret på solide og gennemsigtige krav i relation til nuklear sikkerhed
Member States shall establish and maintain a national legislative, regulatory and organisational framework (“national framework”) for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations.
tildeles specifikke og tilstrækkelige budgetbevillinger til, at den kan udføre sine tilsynsopgaver som fastsat i de nationale rammebestemmelser, og er ansvarlig for gennemførelsen af det tildelte budget
The national framework shall provide in particular for:
har et tilstrækkeligt antal ansatte med de nødvendige kvalifikationer og den nødvendige erfaring og ekspertise til at kunne opfylde sine forpligtelser.
the allocation of responsibilities and coordination between relevant state bodies;
Den kan gøre brug af eksterne videnskabelige og tekniske ressourcer og ekstern ekspertise til støtte for sine tilsynsfunktioner
national nuclear safety requirements, covering all stages of the lifecycle of nuclear installations;
fastsætter procedurer for forebyggelse og løsning af eventuelle interessekonflikter
a system of licensing and prohibition of operation of nuclear installations without a licence;
leverer oplysninger i relation til nuklear sikkerhed, der ikke er underlagt andre organers eller organisationers godkendelse, forudsat at dette ikke bringer andre overordnede interesser i fare, herunder bl.a. sikkerhed, der er anerkendt i relevant lovgivning eller internationale forpligtelser.
a system of regulatory control of nuclear safety performed by the competent regulatory authority;