natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Visse faktorer skal ifølge fast retspraksis [78] tages i betragtning i denne evaluering, og det drejer sig bl.a. om overførslens genstand, prisen på overførslen, identiteten på aktionærerne eller ejerne af den overtagende virksomhed eller den overtagne virksomhed, tidspunktet for overførslen og den økonomiske sammenhæng i overførslen.
DBB/Belfius cannot be considered to be an entity continuing Dexia’s economic activity because of a range of elements which, in accordance with settled case law [78], have to be taken into account when making such an assessment and which in particular concern the purpose of the transfer, the transfer price, the identity of the shareholders or owners of the acquiring firm or the acquired firm, the time of the transfer and the economic logic of the transfer.
DBB/Belfius' aktiviteter er efter den belgiske stats overtagelse blevet kraftigt reduceret i forhold til den tidligere koncerns større, og DBB/Belfius har skiftet navn til Belfius for at fjerne enhver opfattelse af tilhørsforhold til den tidligere koncern.
The DBB/Belfius operation acquired by Belgium is significantly smaller than the size of the former Group and DBB/Belfius changed its name in order to rule out any perception of a link between it and the former Group.
Endvidere skete overtagelsen af DBB/Belfius ikke til under markedsprisen, hvilket gør det muligt at forsikre sig om, at køberen betaler tilstrækkeligt for den støtte, som DBB/Belfius kunne have modtaget som enhed i Dexia-koncernen.
DBB/Belfius was not, moreover, acquired below market price and the acquirer would thus be paying appropriately for any aid from which DBB/Belfius benefited as a Dexia Group entity.
Kriteriet om uafhængighed mellem Dexia og de nye ejere og den nye ledelse af DBB/Belfius er også blevet opfyldt.
The criterion of independence between Dexia and the new owners and new management of DBB/Belfius has also been met.
Endvidere planlægges det at fjerne ethvert finansielt bånd mellem DBB/Belfius og Dexia.
It is planned, moreover, to cut all financial links between DBB/Belfius and Dexia.
Desuden omfatter Belgiens overtagelse af DBB/Belfius hverken overførsel af kapital eller andre ressourcer fra staten til DBB/Belfius.
The purchase of DBB/Belfius by Belgium contains no transfer of capital or other State resources to DBB/Belfius.
Endelig indeholder omstruktureringsplanen for DBB/Belfius elementer, der er tilstrækkelige til at kunne kaldes rentabilitetsforanstaltninger, egetbidrag og kompenserende foranstaltninger, hvilket overflødiggør enhver supplerende foranstaltning eller forpligtelse fra DBB/Belfius' side.
Lastly, the restructuring plan for DBB/Belfius contains sufficient elements that may be characterised as viability restoration, own contribution and compensatory measures, precluding any additional measure or commitment on the part of DBB/Belfius.
Bemærkninger fra de belgiske myndigheder til bemærkningerne fra de interesserede tredjeparter om overtagelsen af DBB/Belfius
Comments by the Belgian authorities on the comments of interested third parties in respect of the purchase of DBB/Belfius
For så vidt angår bemærkning A, mener de belgiske myndigheder ikke, at DBB/Belfius får noget ud af at være overtaget af staten.
As regards comment A, the Belgian authorities consider that DBB/Belfius is not profiting from the fact that it has been purchased by the State.
DBB/Belfius har ikke fået lovgivningsmæssig særbehandling som følge af den belgiske stats overtagelse af den, kundernes indlån nyder nøjagtig samme statsgaranti som alle andre banker i Belgien, og dens rating er ikke blevet hævet siden overtagelsen.
DBB/Belfius has not received any favourable regulatory treatment as a result of its acquisition by the Belgian State, its customers’ deposits benefit from exactly the same State guarantee threshold as all other banks in Belgium and its rating has not been revised upwards since then.
I øvrigt udløser statens overtagelse af den ikke nogen præferenceadgang til likviditet fra BCE.
Its acquisition by the State has not, moreover, given it any preferential access to the liquidity provided by the ECB.
Prisstrategierne Treasury Plus og Treasury Plus Special overholder gældende lov i Belgien og skaber ingen overdreven likviditetsrisiko.
The pricing strategies of the Treasury Plus and Treasury Plus Special accounts comply with the regulatory framework in force in Belgium and do not create a risk of excessive liquidity.
De retlige rammer pålægger ingen prispolitiske forpligtelser for det enkelte produkt, men tjener til overvågning af en banks samlede likviditetssituation.
Rather than imposing pricing policy obligations by product, the regulatory framework oversees the overall liquidity situation of a bank.
I øvrigt tager DBB/Belfius hensyn til sine kunders adfærdsbestemte løbetidsprofil, som for banken er mere realistisk end den kontraktlige løbetidsprofil.
DBB/Belfius takes account, moreover, of the behavioural maturity profile of its customers which the bank considers to be more realistic than the contractual maturity profile.
I øvrigt har priserne på disse produkter ikke ændret sig siden sommeren 2011 og synes at være på linje med markedet.
The prices offered on these products have not, moreover, changed since summer 2011 and appear to be in line with the market.
Samlet set er mængden af disse to produkter forblevet stabil siden ultimo 2009, hvilket viser, at der ikke har været konkurrencefordrejning i denne henseende.
Overall, the volumes of these two products have remained stable since late 2009, demonstrating the lack of distortions of competition in this respect.
For så vidt angår bemærkning B, mener de belgiske myndigheder ikke, at DBB/Belfius har haft for store udgifter til markedsføring og til navnskiftet fra DBB/Belfius til Belfius.
As regards comment B, the Belgian authorities do not consider that DBB/Belfius incurred excessive marketing expenditure or expenditure connected with its change of name from DBB/Belfius to Belfius.
Disse omkostninger har været uundgåelige for bankens fremtid, idet banken har lidt særlig meget under at blive forbundet med navnet Dexia.
These costs were unavoidable if the bank was to continue in the future as it had suffered greatly from its association with the Dexia name.
Omkostningerne ligger på ca. [25000-50000] EUR pr. bankafdeling og er i overensstemmelse med andre markedsaktører i Belgien og Europa, hvad det angår.
These costs amounted to some EUR [25000-50000] per bank branch and are in line with other similar market players in Belgium and in Europe.
I øvrigt var sponsorering inden for sport og kultur allerede gældende før statens køb af DBB/Belfius og er almindelig praksis også for andre banker i Belgien og Europa.
Sports and cultural sponsorship was already taking place prior to the acquisition of DBB/Belfius by the Belgian State and is a current practice by other banks in Belgium and in Europe.
I øvrigt er DBB/Belfius' andel af det belgiske reklamemarked for banker faldet i perioderne januar 2010-oktober 2011 og november 2011-februar 2012.
Moreover, DBB/Belfius’ share of the Belgian bank advertising market fell between January 2010 and October 2011 and between November 2011 and February 2012.
I øvrigt skaber DBB/Belfius' forretningspolitik ikke konkurrencefordrejning på det belgiske marked.
The commercial policy of DBB/Belfius is not, moreover, creating distortions of competition in the Belgian market.
DBB/Belfius' priser på realkreditlån, internetkonti og tidsbestemte indlån er i overensstemmelse med de største belgiske konkurrenters.
DBB/Belfius prices for mortgage loans, internet accounts and savings bonds are in line with its main Belgian competitors.
I øvrigt har DBB/Belfius' markedsandel siden oktober 2011 været […] for realkreditlån og […] for internetkonti og tidsbestemte indlån.
Since October 2011, the market shares of DBB/Belfius have been […] for mortgage loans, and […] for internet accounts and savings accounts.
Det viser, at DBB/Belfius ikke har udøvet konkurrencefordrejning på sine forretningsområder.
This demonstrates the lack of distortions of competition by DBB/Belfius in these areas.
BEMÆRKNINGER FRA DE BERØRTE MEDLEMSSTATER TIL BESLUTNINGEN OM UDVIDELSE AF PROCEDUREN OG BESLUTNINGEN OM FORHØJELSE AF GARANTILOFTET
COMMENTS BY THE MEMBER STATES CONCERNED ON THE DECISION TO EXTEND THE PROCEDURE AND THE DECISION TO INCREASE THE GUARANTEE CEILING
Den 2. juli 2012 sendte myndighederne i de tre berørte medlemsstater sammen Kommissionen deres bemærkninger til beslutningen om at udvide proceduren og den midlertidige godkendelsesbeslutning.
On 2 July 2012, the authorities of the three Member States concerned provided the Commission with their joint comments on the decision to extend the procedure and the temporary approval decision.
De berørte medlemsstater hævder, at omstruktureringsplanen, som var godkendt ved den betingede godkendelsesafgørelse, er korrekt gennemført, og at de eventuelle få afvigelser fra forpligtelserne skyldes eksterne faktorer (der henvises til fremstillingen af de argumenter, som er fremsat i samme henseende af Dexia, i betragtning 332-334 ovenfor).
The Member States concerned contend that the restructuring plan approved by the conditional authorisation decision has been properly implemented and that the few possible failures to comply with the commitments are due to external factors (reference is made to the presentation of the arguments put forward on this point by Dexia, in recitals 332 to 334 above).
Bemærkninger til, at foranstaltningerne i planen for en velordnet afvikling betegnes som støtte
Comments on the characterisation of the measures contained in the orderly resolution plan as aid
Først og fremmest bestrider de berørte medlemsstater, at BNB's og BdF's ELA-foranstaltninger har karakter af støtte.
First, the Member States concerned dispute the characterisation of the ELAs decided by the BNB and BdF as aid.
De belgiske myndigheder minder om, at BNB selvstændigt og efter eget skøn træffer beslutning om ELA-beløbet og ydelsen og forlængelsen heraf i forbindelse med sin pligt til at bidrage til stabiliteten i det finansielle system.
The Belgian authorities point out that that the BNB decides autonomously and at its own discretion on the grant, prolongation and amount of ELA, as part of its task of keeping the financial situation stable.
ELA-foranstaltningerne er midlertidige foranstaltninger, der indgår i de traditionelle opgaver for nationale centralbanker og er godkendt af Den Europæiske Centralbanks Styrelsesråd.
ELA operations are temporary measures that are part and parcel of the conventional tasks of national central banks and are endorsed by the Governing Council of the ECB.
Ifølge de berørte medlemsstater fik Dexia tildelt ELA til meget høje, næsten afskrækkende rentesatser, og der blev stillet tilstrækkelig sikkerhed herfor og anvendt store sikkerhedsmarginer afhængigt af kvaliteten heraf.
According to the Member States concerned, the ELA was granted to Dexia at penalising, even prohibitive, interest rates and was guaranteed by adequate securities to which safety margins that were substantial and depended on their quality were applied.
I øvrigt er garantien stillet af Belgien ifølge de belgiske myndigheder ikke specifikt tildelt for ELA-foranstaltningerne, men vedrører alle de kreditter, der ydes af BNB i forbindelse med dens bidrag til det finansielle systems stabilitet.
According to the Belgian authorities, moreover, the guarantee granted by Belgium was not granted specifically for the ELAs, but covered all the loans granted by the BNB as part of its contribution to the stability of the financial system.
Endelig bestemmer de belgiske myndigheder, at Belgiens garanti, som ydes for kreditter givet af BNB, ikke falder ind under begrebet krydsgaranti, sådan som det nævnes i Kommissionens meddelelse om statsstøttereglernes anvendelse på foranstaltninger truffet over for pengeinstitutter i forbindelse med den aktuelle globale finanskrise [79] (herefter »bankmeddelelsen«).
Lastly, the Belgian authorities point out that Belgium’s guarantee on the loans granted by the BNB cannot be construed as a ‘counter-guarantee’ as referred to in the Communication from the Commission — The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis [79] (‘the Banking Communication’).
Faktisk ydes Belgiens specifikke garanti ikke specifikt for ELA-foranstaltningerne, men garanterer alle de kreditter, der ydes af BNB, for så vidt som de tildeles i forbindelse med BNB's bidrag til det finansielle systems stabilitet, som ifølge de belgiske myndigheder rækker langt ud over kriseforanstaltningerne.
Belgium’s specific guarantee does not cover the ELAs alone, but guarantees all the BNB’s loans provided that they are granted as part of its contribution to maintaining the stability of the financial system which, in the view of the Belgian authorities, goes well beyond measures to tackle the crisis.
I øvrigt bemærker de berørte medlemsstater, at en sådan fortolkning i sidste ende svarer til Kommissionens beslutningspraksis og henviser som eksempel til Northern Rock [80]-beslutningen fra 2007.
The Member States concerned also point out that such an interpretation is ultimately in line with the Commission’s decision-making practice and cite the 2007 Northern Rock decision [80] by way of example.
Vedrørende aftalen mellem BNB og BdF [81] minder de belgiske myndigheder om, at Kommissionen i betragtning 108 i den betingede godkendelsesafgørelse anførte, at Banque de France »dog ikke [er] omfattet af en udtrykkelig sikkerhedsstillelse fra den franske stat, og den belgiske stats sikkerhedsstillelse kan naturligvis ikke dække en operation, der udføres for en fremmed centralbanks regning og risiko«, og de mener, at den belgiske stats garanti til fordel for BNB [82] ikke kan anvendes på en operation udført for en udenlandsk banks regning og risiko.
As regards the agreement between the BNB and BdF [81], the Belgian authorities point out that the Commission observed in recital 108 of the conditional authorisation decision that ‘the Banque de France … does not benefit from any explicit guarantee on the part of the French State and the guarantee by the Belgian State obviously cannot apply to an operation carried out on behalf of and at the risk of a foreign central bank’ and consider that the guarantee by the Belgian State in favour of the BNB [82] cannot be applied to an operation carried out on behalf of and at the risk of a foreign bank.
De berørte medlemsstater mener, at 1) det er BNB, der er part i garantikontrakten, ikke staten, at 2) garantikontrakten tydeligt fordeler de risici/gældsposter, der er opbygget som følge af de relevante operationer udført af henholdsvis BNB og BdF, og at 3) kun den del af tabene, som BNB skulle have lidt som følge af anvendelsen af garantikontrakten, under alle omstændigheder ville være garanteret af staten, dvs. at den belgiske stat ikke garanterer risici eller gæld stiftet af BdF.
The Member States concerned consider that 1) the BNB, and not the State, is party to the guarantee contract; 2) the guarantee contract clearly assigns the risks of/the debt incurred by the relevant operations by the BNB and the BdF; and 3) in any case only the share of the losses that the BNB could suffer following the application of the guarantee contract is guaranteed by the State, i.e. the Belgian State is not guaranteeing any risks or debts on the part of the BdF.
For så vidt angår modtagerne af potentiel støtte i forbindelse med omstruktureringen af Dexia, bemærker de berørte medlemsstater i øvrigt, at der ikke findes en struktur af typen »ny realkreditstruktur«, og at man bør skelne mellem de økonomiske aktiviteter hos NEC, JV og DMA.
Moreover, concerning the beneficiaries of potential aid in the context of Dexia’s restructuring, the Member States point out that there is no structure that can be considered to be a ‘new mortgage lending structure’ and that the economic activities of the NEC, the JV and DMA should be differentiated.
Disse enheder, som har forskellig aktionærsammensætning og følger deres egen selskabsinteresse, er vertikalt integreret gennem servicingforbindelser.
These entities, which have different shareholders and pursue their own business interest, are vertically integrated by service links.
Med hensyn til garantierne ifølge planen for en velordnet afvikling af Dexia mener de berørte medlemsstater, at kun den franske stats garanti for DCL's forpligtelser vedrørende følsomme udlån ville være statsstøtte, ikke de øvrige garantier (stop loss-garantien, de øvrige salgsgarantier, som ikke er krydsgaranteret af staten, og garantien for »følsomme udlån«) [83].
Concerning the guarantees planned in the orderly resolution plan for Dexia, the Member Stares concerned consider that only the guarantee by the French State of DCL’s commitment in relation to the sensitive loans constitutes State aid and not the other guarantees (the ‘stop-loss’ guarantee, the other vendor guarantees non counter-guaranteed by the State and the ‘sensitive loans’ guarantee) [83].
Den franske stats garanti for DCL's forpligtelser giver kun den resterende del af koncernen, ikke DMA eller en hypotetisk »ny realkreditstruktur«, en fordel ifølge de berørte medlemsstater.
The guarantee by the French State in respect of DCL’s commitment confers an advantage, in the view of the Member States concerned, only for the residual group and not for DMA or a hypothetical ‘new mortgage lending structure’.
I mangel af større nedskrivninger af værdien kan den dog ikke betegnes som en foranstaltning til behandling af værdiforringede aktiver.
Without substantial downward value adjustments, it could not be characterised, however, as a measure to treat impaired assets.
De øvrige garantier (stop loss-garantien, de øvrige salgsgarantier, der ikke er krydsgaranterede af staten, og garantien for »følsomme udlån«) er ifølge de berørte medlemsstater ydet af en privat virksomhed, hvis midler ikke kontrolleres af staten, og hvis beslutninger ikke kan tilskrives staten.
The other guarantees (the ‘stop-loss’ guarantee, the other vendor guarantees not counter-guaranteed by the State and the ‘sensitive loans’ guarantee) were granted, in the view of the Member States concerned, by a private enterprise whose resources are not under State control and whose decisions cannot be imputed to the State.
Kun beslutninger i overensstemmelse med Dexia SA's selskabsinteresse og gældende lovgivning kan vedtages af selskabets ledende instanser.
Only decisions in the company interest of Dexia SA and in keeping with the applicable regulations may be adopted by its managing organs.
I øvrigt er kriterierne i Stardust Marine-dommen [84] ikke opfyldt: Dexia er ikke integreret i den offentlige forvaltning, dens aktiviteter udøves på et marked med normale konkurrencevilkår, den hører under de privatretlige regler for selskaber, og ingen offentlig enhed øver kontrol over Dexia.
Moreover, the criteria of the Stardust Marine judgment [84] are not met: Dexia is not integrated into the public administration, its activities take place in the market in normal conditions of competition, its status is subject to ordinary company law and no public entity supervises Dexia.
Endelig bestrider de berørte myndigheder på det kraftigste, at det skulle være muligt at konstatere, at salgsgarantier for »følsomme udlån« indeholder elementer af støtte som følge af statens krydsgaranti.
Lastly, the authorities concerned strongly dispute that the vendor guarantee in respect of the ‘sensitive loans’ can be considered to contain elements of State aid as a result of the counter-guarantee by the State.
Sagen om Hellenic Shipyard [85], som Kommissionen påberåber sig i sin beslutning om udvidelse af proceduren for at begrunde sin indledende vurdering, adskiller sig fra den foreliggende sag på forskellige vigtige faktuelle punkter.
The Hellenic Shipyard [85] case that the Commission invoked in support of its preliminary assessment in its decision to extend the procedure is factually very different from the present case.
I øvrigt mener de berørte medlemsstater, at salgsgarantierne er blevet ydet på markedsvilkår og derfor ikke udløser nogen selektiv fordel.
The Member States concerned consider, moreover, that the vendor guarantees were granted under market conditions and do not therefore confer any selective advantage.
De bemærker, at den dækkede risiko er særlig beskeden i betragtning af de forfatningsmæssige og lovfæstede regler for de lokale myndigheders finansielle forhold.
They observe that the risk covered is particularly low in relation to the constitutional and legislative framework for local authority finances.
Denne type garanti er normal i kontrakter om afhændelse af virksomheder.
This type of guarantee is conventional in business sale contracts.
Trods manglende loft er ydelsen af disse garantier fortsat aldeles relevante for en privat investor, der handler på markedsvilkår, på grund af de særlige omstændigheder ved den dækkede risiko, som ikke påhviler DMA og dens købere, men dem, der afhænder DMA.
Even though there is no ceiling, the grant of these guarantees is entirely pertinent for a private market economy investor because of the particular nature of the risk covered which cannot be attributed to DMA and its acquirers, but to the vendors of DMA.
Betegnelsen værdiforringede aktiver kan ikke anvendes og kan under alle omstændigheder ikke vedrøre alle DMA's aktiver.
Characterisation as impaired assets is not applicable and in any case cannot concern all of DMA’s assets.
DMA's aktiver er ikke udsat for større værdiforringelser eller nedskrivninger.
DMA’s assets are not exposed to substantial impairments or substantial downward value adjustments.
Det er heller ikke kvaliteten af DMA's aktiver, som ligger til grund for tvivlen med hensyn til Dexias rentabilitet, men en forretningsmodel, der forener langsigtede aktiver med kortfristet refinansiering.
It is not, moreover, the quality of DMA’s assets that gave rise to the scepticism about Dexia’s viability, but a business model combining long-term assets and short-term refinancing.
Endvidere hævder de berørte medlemsstater vedrørende afhændelsen af DMA, at CDC's og Banque Postales beslutninger om at investere i DMA ikke kan tilskrives staten, og at afhændelsesprisen for DMA svarer til markedsprisen, mens en afvikling af DMA ville være mere bekostelig for Dexia end at afhænde den på de planlagte vilkår.
Concerning the sale of DMA, the Member States concerned contend that the decisions of the CDC and La Banque Postale in relation to their investment in DMA cannot be imputed to the State and that the sale price of DMA is in keeping with the market price, whereas placing DMA in run-off would have been more costly for Dexia than its disposal under the planned conditions.
De berørte medlemsstater bemærker med hensyn til tilregnelsen til staten af CDC's og Banque Postales beslutninger, at CDC's beslutning om at overtage en kapitalandel i NEC var et strategisk valg om at udnytte en markedsmulighed.
The Member States concerned point out, as to whether or not the decisions of the CDC and La Banque Postale can be imputed to the State, that the CDC’s decision to acquire a holding in the capital of the NEC is a strategic choice to seize a market opportunity.
De hævder, at Kommissionens holdning som bekræftet af Retten i Første Instans i Air France-dommen fra 1996 ikke længere er relevant set i lyset af senere retspraksis (Stardust Marine) og de vedtægtsændringer, som CDC havde indført.
They maintain that the Commission’s position upheld by the Court of First Instance in the 1996 Air France judgment is no longer relevant in view of the subsequent case law (Stardust Marine) and the changes in the status of the CDC.
Selv om CDC ganske vist er en offentlig virksomhed, giver dens vedtægter den stor uafhængighed af staten, og beslutningsprocessen hos CDC er identisk med privatbankernes.
While there is no doubt that the CDC is a public establishment, its status gives it considerable autonomy from the State and its decision-making process is the same as that of any other private bank.