natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
BEMÆRKNINGER FRA UAFHÆNGIGE LEVERANDØRER
Dec
Der blev modtaget bemærkninger fra Céntrica og ACIE, sammenslutningen af uafhængige energileverandører.
As a % of supply sites
Deres argumenter og konklusioner er generelt enslydende og behandles samlet.
As a % of energy
Céntrica fokuserer i sine bemærkninger primært på den påståede statsstøtte til eldistributionsselskaber.
CNE Report ‘Nota Informativa sobre los suministros de electricidad y gas natural en los mercados liberalizados, actualización 31 de diciembre de 2006’.
Céntrica påpeger, at gennemsnitsomkostningen til køb af elektricitet på engrosmarkedet i 2005 var næsten 70 % højere end de forudsagte gennemsnitlige købsomkostninger, der indgik i de integrerede takster, som regeringen havde fastsat ved kongeligt dekret 2329/2004.
Although the impact of the losses borne by suppliers began to be felt by mid-2005, when wholesale prices started to increase considerably, supply contracts could not be terminated immediately.
Som følge af denne uoverensstemmelse mellem forudsigelserne og de faktiske omkostninger var indtjeningen fra systemet ikke stor nok til at dække omkostningerne, især fordi den pris, som distributionsselskaberne skulle betale for elektriciteten, var højere end den regulerede pris, de skulle sælge den til.
As a result, suppliers in the free market, particularly those which did not have generation capacity but had to procure electricity in the wholesale market, were forced to choose between making offers under free-market conditions which matched the regulated tariff, despite the possibility of incurring losses, and charging higher prices reflecting actual procurement costs, thereby losing market share.
Distributionsselskaberne måtte derfor registrere et underskud på deres regnskaber.
DECISION TO INITIATE THE PROCEDURE UNDER ARTICLE 108(2) OF THE TFEU
Som følge af den ordning, som de spanske myndigheder indførte for at udfylde indtjeningshullet (som krævede, at berettigede producenter skulle præfinansiere underskuddet til gengæld for en ret til efterfølgende godtgørelse), bevarede distributionsselskaberne imidlertid ligevægten i deres regnskaber, og deres tab blev i realiteten udlignet af staten.
The Commission decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure was based on the following grounds:
De var desuden i realiteten bundet af det niveau for den integrerede takst, som regeringen havde fastsat for hver kundekategori, fordi de ellers ikke ville have mulighed for at tiltrække nye kunder eller fastholde eksisterende kunder.
The decision compared the regulated tariffs paid by the various categories of end-user with the estimated prices they would have had to pay in the free market in the absence of the tariffs, and found that there seemed to be an advantage in favour of most user categories.
ACIE påpeger f.eks., at dets medlemmer i begyndelsen af 2005 indgik kontrakter baseret på regeringens forudsigelser af engrospriser, og at de senere var nødt til at opfylde disse kontrakter, selv om de viste sig at være urentable.
The alleged aid in favour of end-users is the object of a separate decision in Case SA.21817 — Regulated Electricity Tariffs:
I henhold til ACIE og Céntrica fordrejede kompensationen af distributionsselskabernes tab konkurrencen.
consumers.
Den diskriminerede de uafhængige leverandører og burde betragtes som statsstøtte.
As regards distributors, the opening decision indicated that, by encouraging end-users to switch back to the regulated market, the system might have benefited distributors, who appeared to have enjoyed a guaranteed profit margin on their regulated activities.
Ud over påstanden om, at kompensationen af tab i sig selv udgør en fordel, fremsatte Céntrica den påstand, at de etablerede markedsaktører (vertikalt integrerede foretagender) kunne fastholde deres markedsandel og undgå tab ved at opfordre kunder til at skifte fra deres tabsgivende forsyningsdivisioner til deres distributionsdivisioner, der ville modtage den fornødne kompensation.
This advantage seemed to have been granted selectively to distributors, as they were the only market operators allowed to sell electricity at regulated tariffs.
I henhold til ACIE og Céntrica var fordelen for de etablerede foretagender »specifik«, dvs. selektiv, idet finansierings- og kompensationsordningen specifikt gavnede distributionsselskaberne ved at give dem en finansiel og konkurrencemæssig fordel i forhold til leverandørerne på det frie marked.
The decision also found that the system involved a transfer of State resources, since the price surcharge used to repay the deficit constitutes a parafiscal levy, the proceeds of which transit through the Spanish regulator CNE (a public body) before being channelled to the final beneficiaries.
Céntrica hævdede, at sondringen mellem distributionsselskaber og leverandør på det frie marked alene var en formalitet, fordi begge kategorier konkurrerede på det samme marked (detailsalg af elektricitet), begge blev berørt af integrerede takster (fordi de var fastsat ved lov, eller fordi de fungerede som et de facto-loft for markedspriserne), og begge indkøbte elektricitet til samme pris og led de samme tab.
The decision concluded that, in the light of Court of Justice case-law on this matter, these funds should be regarded as State resources.
I henhold til Céntrica kunne fortrinsbehandlingen af distributionsselskaber ikke begrundes i elsystemets logik og struktur, og den kunne heller ikke betragtes som kompensation for en tjenesteydelse af almen økonomisk interesse.
Considering that both large end-users and distributors operate in markets which are generally open to competition and trade within the Union, in the opening decision the Commission concluded that all the criteria laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU were fulfilled and the measure constituted State aid in favour of end-users and distributors.
Céntrica hævder, at systemet var i strid med elektricitetsdirektivet, ikke kun på grund af underskudsordningernes diskriminerende karakter, men også fordi kunderne blev frataget retten til gennemsigtige priser og takster [18].
After noting that none of the derogations provided for in Article 107 TFEU seemed applicable, the opening decision assessed whether the supply of electricity at regulated tariffs could be considered a service of general economic interest (SGEI) and as such benefit from the derogation provided for in Article 106(2) TFEU.
Eftersom en del af elektricitetsprisen, som skulle betales for 2005, blev udskudt til senere år, fremgik de endelige priser ikke tydeligt for kunderne.
The opening decision stated that, in the electricity sector, Member States' margin of discretion in establishing public service obligations is limited by the provisions of Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC [15] (‘The Electricity Directive’).
Céntrica finder, at den selektive fordel ved underskudsordningerne ikke kun gavnede distributionsselskaberne, men også de vertikalt integrerede foretagender, de tilhørte.
The Electricity Directive requires Member States to establish a universal service obligation (including notably the right to be supplied at reasonable prices) only for household consumers and small enterprises [16].
I henhold til Céntrica skal et vertikalt integreret foretagende opfattes som ét foretagende, for så vidt angår anvendelsen af statsstøttereglerne.
The decision concluded that, in the light of the above Directive, the supply of electricity at regulated tariffs to medium-sized and large undertakings, as opposed to households and small businesses, could not be considered an SGEI in the strict sense of the term.
Céntrica hævder, at det spanske system gav produktionsselskaberne mulighed for at hæve priserne på engrosmarkedet og fortsat opnå overskud.
The Commission thus expressed serious doubts as to whether the elements of aid in the regulated tariffs that were applied to undertakings other than small enterprises and to distributors could be considered compatible with the internal market.
Under disse omstændigheder havde disse foretagender en interesse i at fastholde den markedsandel, som deres distributionsdivisioner var afhængige af.
COMMENTS BY INTERESTED PARTIES
De vertikalt integrerede foretagender skulle derfor også betragtes som modtagere af statsstøtte.
The Commission's invitation to submit comments on the decision to open the in-depth investigation attracted numerous submissions from large industrial consumers, distributors, independent suppliers and governments of Spain's Autonomous Communities.
BEMÆRKNINGER FRA DISTRIBUTIONSSELSKABER
Only the observations relevant to the position of distributors will be examined here.
Bemærkninger blev modtaget fra UNESA (sammenslutningen af distributionsselskaber), Iberdrola Distribución, Union Fenosa Distribución, Enel Viesgo Distribución og Endesa Distribución.
COMMENTS FROM INDEPENDENT SUPPLIERS
Distributionsselskaberne kunne ikke afvise at levere elektricitet til regulerede kunder og kunne ikke skaffe andre kunder end dem, der valgte regulerede takster.
The main focus of Céntrica's submission is the alleged State aid granted to electricity distributors.
Distributionsselskaberne kunne heller ikke tilbyde yderligere tjenesteydelser, mens leverandører frit kunne fastlægge deres leveringsbetingelser.
Céntrica points out that in 2005 the average cost of buying electricity in the wholesale market was nearly 70 % higher than the forecast average procurement cost embedded in the integral tariffs set by the Government by Royal Decree 2329/2004.
Leverandører
According to Céntrica and ACIE, suppliers in the free market were subject to similar procurement costs as distributors [17].
Alle spanske kunder
Moreover, they were de facto bound by the level of the integral tariff set by the Government for each customer category because otherwise they would have been unlikely to attract new customers or retain existing customers.
Enhver ordning
In particular, ACIE points out that, at the beginning of 2005, its members concluded contracts based on government forecasts of wholesale prices and that they later had to honour such contracts even though they turned out to be unprofitable.
Distributionsselskaber
As a result, independent suppliers suffered losses.
Kun kunder tilsluttet deres net
However, unlike distributors, independent suppliers' losses were not offset by the State.
Via puljen eller fra producenter underlagt særordningen
Céntrica estimates that in 2005 it suffered losses of EUR 10 million.
Engroskøbspris
According to ACIE, several suppliers, including Saltea Comercial, Electranorte, CYD Energia and RWE, were forced out of the market.
Salgspris
According to ACIE and Céntrica, the compensation of distributors' losses distorted competition, created discrimination vis-à-vis independent suppliers and should be regarded as State aid.
Fortjenstmargen
Apart from asserting that the compensation of losses constitutes an advantage per se, Céntrica argued that incumbent market players (vertically integrated undertakings) could retain their market share and avoid losses by encouraging customers to switch from their loss-making supply divisions to their distribution divisions, which would receive compensation, where appropriate.
Fri
According to ACIE and Céntrica, the advantage for incumbent undertakings was ‘specific’ i.e. selective, since the financing and compensation mechanism specifically benefited distributors by giving them a financial and competitive advantage over free-market suppliers.
Bruttoavance
Céntrica argued that the distinction between distributors and free-market suppliers was purely formal, because both categories competed in the same market (retail electricity sales), both were affected by integral tariffs (either because they had been imposed by law or because they acted de facto as a cap on market prices) and both procured electricity at the same price and suffered the same losses.
Puljepris eller reguleret pris under særordning
In Céntrica's view, the preferential treatment of distributors was not justified by any reason pertaining to the logic and structure of the electricity system, nor could it be considered compensation for a service of general economic interest.
Regulerede takster
Céntrica maintains that the system breached the Electricity Directive, not only because of the discriminatory nature of the deficit arrangements, but also because consumers were deprived of the right to transparent prices and tariffs [18].
Ingen fortjenstmargen
Since part of the electricity price payable for 2005 was deferred to future years, the final prices charged were not clear to consumers.
Distributionsselskaberne konkluderer derfor, at leverandører på det frie marked på grund af de retlige rammer og øvrige omstændigheder ikke konkurrerede med distributionsselskaberne, men med de regulerede takster, der fungerede som referencepris på markedet.
Céntrica takes the view that the selective advantage afforded by the deficit arrangements benefited not only distributors, but also the vertically integrated undertakings to which they belonged.
Distributionsselskaberne påpeger, at selve leveringen af elektricitet til den takst ikke sikrede dem nogen form for overskud eller fordele.
According to Céntrica, a vertically integrated group should be regarded as one undertaking for the purpose of applying the State aid rules.
De omkostninger, der »anerkendtes« for et distributionsselskab, var f.eks. baseret på den gennemsnitlige vægtede pris, der blev betalt for elektricitet i referenceperioden.
In these circumstances, the groups had a vested interest in maintaining the market share that their distribution divisions counted on.
Under visse omstændigheder kunne disse anerkendte omkostninger være lavere end de faktiske omkostninger for et distributionsselskab.
Therefore, the vertically integrated groups should also be regarded as recipients of State aid.
Når den regulerede salgsaktivitet gav et overskud, tilfaldt disse midler ikke distributionsselskaberne, men blev under afregningsprocessen fordelt til finansieringen af systemets øvrige generalomkostninger.
COMMENTS FROM DISTRIBUTORS
Det beløb, som staten anerkendte, var lig med forskellen mellem den gennemsnitlige vægtede pris for elektricitetskøb ganget med energimængden transporteret af hvert distributionsselskab efter korrektion for standardtab.
Comments were received from UNESA (the association representing distributors), Iberdrola Distribución, Union Fenosa Distribución, Enel Viesgo Distribución and Endesa Distribución.
Distributionsselskaberne hævder endvidere, at de ikke opnåede hverken direkte eller indirekte økonomiske fordele, når kunder fra det frie marked skiftede tilbage til regulerede takster, fordi deres vederlag fra distributions- og markedsføringsaktiviteter alene afhang af antallet af kunder på regulerede takster eller den mængde elektricitet, der blev solgt til taksten.
Their observations largely overlap and will be dealt with together.
For det første blev — som forklaret ovenfor — kun omkostningerne dækket ved levering til reguleret takst.
Distributors (as represented by UNESA) make a distinction between pure distribution/commercial management activities, which they view as an SGEI, and supply at regulated tariffs, which according to them did not involve any State aid because it did not provide a financial advantage.
For det andet var vederlaget for ren distribution også afhængigt af antallet af kunder på regulerede takster, da det var baseret på mængden af »transporteret energi«, som omfattede al den elektricitet, der blev transporteret af distributionsselskaberne på nettet, uanset om energien blev solgt til de regulerede takster eller til priserne på det frie marked.
Distributors recall that the legal context in which suppliers and distributors carried on their activities was very different; distributors were obliged to purchase electricity for supply at regulated tariffs in specific ways (either from the pool or from ‘special scheme’ producers), whereas suppliers were free to negotiate their prices.
For det tredje var vederlaget for forretningsaktiviteter også afhængigt af antallet af kunder, der blev forsynet til regulerede takster, da betalingerne i loven er fastsat på grundlag af det indgåede antal kontrakter (for både tilslutningstakster og regulerede takster), og var derfor ikke relateret til antallet af kunder med regulerede takster.
Distributors could not refuse to supply regulated customers and could not acquire customers other than those opting for regulated tariffs.
Distributionsselskaberne skulle under alle omstændigheder håndtere alle kundehenvendelser, som f.eks. ændringer i tilslutningstype, kontrakter, fakturering af tilslutningstakster, måleraflæsning osv., uanset leveringstype.
Distributors could not offer auxiliary services either, whereas suppliers were free to establish their supply conditions.
Distributionsselskaberne konkluderer derfor, at den »kompensation«, de modtog i forbindelse med levering til regulerede takster, i stedet skulle ses som godtgørelse af de midler, de skulle betale på forskud i overensstemmelse med loven, som kompensation for tab og skade.
The table below summarises the differences between free-market suppliers and distributors as regards retail sales of electricity [19]:
Iberdrola hævder specifikt, at det ville være juridisk og økonomisk forkert, hvis underskuddet blev tilregnet distributionsselskaberne.
Obligation to supply
De omkostninger, der opstår ved køb at elektricitet for det regulerede marked, skulle tilregnes elektricitetssystemet og ikke distributionsselskaberne, som blot gennemførte lovbestemmelser.
Potential market
Indtægterne fra salg til regulerede priser blev aldrig distributionsselskabernes ejendom, men tilhørte elsystemet som helhed, og systemet skulle derfor ses som »sælger« af elektricitet til regulerede priser.
Energy purchases
I et system, der er så reguleret som det spanske, ville det i henhold til Iberdrola være urimeligt, hvis de finansielle skævheder, der var forårsaget af den lovbestemte systemstruktur eller fejl i estimaterne af fremtidige energiomkostninger, blev tilregnet distributionsselskaberne.
Suppliers
Iberdrola påpeger også, at distributionsselskaberne ikke beholdt indtægterne fra ekstraafgiften, der som et »specifikt øremærket bidrag« straks blev overført til CNE's depotkonto og videreført til de producenter, der præfinansierede underskuddet.
All Spanish users
BEMÆRKNINGER FRA ASTURIAS' REGIONALE REGERING
Any mechanism
Bemærkningerne fra Asturias' regionale regering svarer til dem, som den spanske regering har fremsat, og som er anført nedenfor.
Distributors
BEMÆRKNINGER FRA SPANIEN
Only users connected to their networks
Spanien hævder, at systemet med regulerede takster i 2005 ikke omfattede støtte, hverken til slutkunder eller distributionsselskaber.
Via the pool or from special scheme generators
Med hensyn til distributionsselskaber er den kompensation, de modtog, efter Spaniens overbevisning i overensstemmelse med EU-Domstolens retspraksis i Altmark-sagen og udgør derfor ikke statsstøtte.
Wholesale purchase price
FOREKOMST AF STATSSTØTTE
Sales price
INGEN ÅRSAGSSAMMENHÆNG MELLEM STATSLIG FORANSTALTNING OG UNDERSKUD, OG UNDERSKUD KAN IKKE TILREGNES STATEN
Profit margin
Spanien fastholder, at underskuddet ikke kunne tilregnes staten, da det var forårsaget af uforudsigelige udefrakommende omstændigheder og ikke af statens bevidste hensigt om at støtte visse aktiviteter.
Free
Spanien anfører, at leveringen til regulerede takster fastsat af staten ikke var i strid med EU-lovgivningen i 2005.
Margin on sales
Statens lovgivningsmæssige indgreb var derfor retsgyldigt, da det var et udtryk for national suverænitet.
Pool price or regulated 'special scheme' price
Et af disse suveræne privilegier består i at fastsætte takster, således at de forventede omkostninger matcher den forventede efterspørgsel.
Regulated tariffs
Distributionsselskaberne inddrev midler gennem integrerede takster og tilslutningstakster og overførte derefter en del af denne indtjening til dedikerede konti (i overensstemmelse med de procentdele, der var fastsat i det årlige dekret om takster).
No profit margin
Efterfølgende trak de elektricitetskøb fra puljen og fra producenterne underlagt særordningen.
Distributors thus conclude that, given the different legal and factual context, free-market suppliers were not in competition with distributors, but rather with the regulated tariffs, which acted as the reference price in the market.
Hvis indtjeningen fra de integrerede takster og tilslutningstaksterne ikke dækkede omkostningerne til regulerede aktiviteter, skabtes der et takstunderskud.
Distributors submit that the activity of supplying electricity at the tariff did not bring them profits or advantages of any nature.
Spanien hævder, at underskuddet i 2005 var forårsaget af en uoverensstemmelse mellem regeringens forudsigelser af engrospriserne på elektricitet og de faktiske priser, der blev registreret for puljen.
Whereas for pure distribution and commercial management the distributors' remuneration included a profit margin to remunerate invested capital, for supply at regulated tariffs, distributors obtained only a reimbursement of their costs without any profit margin.
De usædvanligt høje priser i 2005 skyldtes uforudsigelige forhold, der kunne betegnes som force majeure (se betragtning 26).
In particular, the costs ‘recognised’ to a distributor were based on the average weighted price paid for electricity during the reference period.
Eftersom den påståede støtte blev genereret som følge af en stigning i engrospriserne, der var højere end forventet, kunne den påståede fordel ikke tilskrives nogen retsakt.
In certain circumstances, these recognised costs could be lower than the actual total costs borne by a distributor.
Selv om det antages, at der havde været tale om en sådan fordel, ville den have været forårsaget af omstændigheder, der ikke var relateret til statens hensigt.
When the regulated sales activity yielded a surplus, these funds did not stay with distributors but were allocated, during the settlement process, to the financing of other general costs of the system.
Forekomsten af force majeure bryder i henhold til Spanien årsagssammenhængen mellem den administrative beslutning om fastsættelsen af takstniveauet og den konkurrencemæssige fordel, der foranledigede statsstøtte.
The amount recognised by the State equalled the difference between the average weighted price of electricity purchases, multiplied by the quantity of energy transported by each distributor, after correction for standard losses.
Selv om det antages, at den objektive betingelse om en årsagssammenhæng var opfyldt, ville den subjektive betingelse om hensigt (tilregnelse) fra statens side ikke være opfyldt.
Distributors further contend that they did not draw any direct or indirect financial benefit from free-market customers switching back to regulated tariffs, as their remuneration for pure distribution and commercial management was entirely independent of the number of customers on regulated tariffs or the quantity of electricity sold at the tariff.
INGEN STATSMIDLER
First, as explained above, for supply at the regulated tariff there was only a reimbursement of costs.
Spanien bemærker, at taksterne ikke involverede offentlige midler.
Second, the remuneration of pure distribution was also independent of the number of customers on regulated tariffs, as it was based on the volume of ‘transported energy’, which included all electricity transported by distributors on the network, irrespective of whether the energy was sold at the regulated tariffs or at free-market rates.
Spanien hævder i den henseende for det første, at ekstraafgiften ikke er en »afgift« som defineret i EU-Domstolens retspraksis vedrørende parafiskale afgifter, fordi den ikke inddrives af staten og ikke svarer til en fiskal afgift.
Third, the remuneration for commercial management activities was also independent of the number of customers supplied on regulated tariffs, as the law provided for payments based on the number of contracts concluded (for both access tariffs and regulated tariffs) and was therefore unrelated to the number of customers on regulated tariffs.