natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Den kinesiske regering påstod desuden, at Kommissionen bryder WTO-aftalen om subsidier og udligningsforanstaltninger, hvis den nægter at anerkende en retlig sondring mellem statens praktiske mulighed for at meddele oplysninger, som denne er retligt er forhindret i at fremlægge på den ene side, og andre fortrolige oplysninger, som den måtte anmode om fortrolig behandling af inden for rammerne af en undersøgelse.
The GOC also claimed that the Commission will fall foul of the ASCM if it refuses to recognise the legal distinction between a government's practical ability to provide information which it is legally prohibited from releasing, on one hand, and other sorts of confidential information for which it may request confidential treatment in the normal course of an investigation.
Endvidere påstod den kinesiske regering, at brevet af 25. marts 2013 forud for kontrolbesøget ikke var tilstrækkelig detaljeret, og at det ikke indeholdt specifikke spørgsmål, som ville blive taget op i forbindelse med kontrolbesøget.
Furthermore the GOC claimed that the pre-verification letter of 25 March 2013 was not sufficiently detailed and it did not contain specific questions which will be addressed during the on-the-spot verification visit.
Det skal i denne henseende bemærkes, at selv om der ikke er noget krav om, at Kommissionen skal sende en liste over alle spørgsmål, der vil blive stillet under kontrolbesøget (og Kommissionen mener ikke, at dette er relevant), indeholdt brevet af 25. marts 2013 forud for kontrolbesøget en specifik og detaljeret liste over spørgsmål og dokumenter, der ville blive behandlet i henhold til grundforordningens artikel 26, stk. 3, og WTO-reglerne.
In this respect it must be noted that while there is no requirement for the Commission to send a list of all questions which will be asked during the on spot verification (and the Commission does not consider this appropriate), the pre-verification letter of 25 March 2013 contained a very specific and detailed list of issues and documents which would be addressed in line with Article 26(3) of the basic Regulation and WTO requirements.
Det blev dog i brevet gjort klart, at listen ikke var udtømmende, og at andre emner og dokumentation kunne tages op, hvis det var relevant.
However, the letter made it clear that the list was non-exhaustive and that other issues and evidence may be addressed if appropriate.
Det skal i denne forbindelse også bemærkes, at den kinesiske regering ikke gjorde indsigelse mod indholdet af dette brev forud for kontrolbesøget, selv om den afviste at drøfte visse punkter, der ikke eksplicit fremgik af brevet, f.eks. oplysninger om de største banker i Kina, Kinas kommunistiske partis (»CCP«) indgriben i forvaltningen af visse banker eller visse bankers adgang til de udenlandske valutareserver i State Administration of Foreign Reserves, idet man hævdede, at man ikke var forberedt på at besvare spørgsmål om disse aspekter.
In this respect it should also be noted that the GOC did not object the contents of this letter prior to the verification, although on the other hand it refused to discuss some points not explicitly raised in the letter, such as information on biggest banks in the PRC, involvement of China Communist Party (‘CCP’) in the management of certain banks or access of some banks to the foreign currency reserves of State Administration of Foreign Reserves, claiming not to be ready to reply to questions on these issues.
Den kinesiske regering påstod endvidere, at Kommissionen ikke var fleksibel under kontrolbesøget og i realiteten »fastsatte en præklusionsfrist med hensyn til anmodninger om ændringer fra den kinesiske regerings side«.
The GOC also argued that the Commission was not flexible during the on-spot verification visit and in fact ‘fixed a peremptory time-limit in regard to any requests for changes by the GOC’.
På samme måde hævdede den, at Kommissionen ikke accepterede nogen af de praktiske løsninger, som den kinesiske regering foreslog vedrørende kontrollen af National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) og nægtede at forlænge kontrollen til mandag den 22. april 2013 for at kontrollere NBS.
In the same vein it claimed that the Commission did not accept any of the ‘workable’ solutions proposed by the GOC concerning the verification at National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and refused to extend the verification until Monday 22 April 2013 to verify NBS.
Desuden indledte Kommissionens tjenestemænd kontrollen med en vis forsinkelse næsten hver arbejdsdag, fordi de ifølge den kinesiske regering ikke mødte op til tiden.
Furthermore, the Commission officials started the verifications with a delay virtually each working day because, according to the GOC, of their late arrival.
Hvad angår ovenstående påstande, skal Kommissionen understrege, at dens tjenestemænd under kontrolbesøget var fuldt ud og ubetinget fleksible.
In respect of the above claims, the Commission underlines that the degree of flexibility shown by its officials on the spot has been full and unconditional.
Kommissionens tjenestemænd tilbød undtagelsesvis at kontrollere dokumenter og dokumentation, som den kinesiske regering søgte at fremlægge efter afslutningen af et bestemt emne, hvilket gik langt ud over den normale arbejdstid ved en række lejligheder.
The Commission officials have exceptionally offered to verify documents and evidence the GOC sought to introduce well after the close of a certain subject, well beyond the regular working hours on a number of occasions.
Dette skete adskillige gange, også i tilfælde, hvor Kommissionens tjenestemænd på et meget sent tidspunkt skulle tage til/tilbage til andre kontrolsteder, hvor de allerede havde været og havde tilbudt at kontrollere dokumenter.
This was done several times, even if it meant having to move at a very late hour to other verifications sites and/or return to sites where the Commission officials had already been and had already provided an opportunity to verify documents.
Desværre tog den kinesiske regering ikke imod disse tilbud i de pågældende tilfælde, hvilket tydeligt viser, at den manglende fremlæggelse af de dokumenter, som Kommissionen havde bedt om inden for almindelig arbejdstid, ikke skyldtes tidsmæssige begrænsninger eller manglende vilje fra Kommissionen tjenestemænd til at kontrollere dem.
Unfortunately, however, the GOC did not take up these offers in the cases in question, which strongly suggest that the failure to submit the documents requested by the Commission during the regular hours had not been due to their time constraints or to the unwillingness of the Commission to verify them.
Med hensyn til den forsinkede start på kontrolbesøget bemærker Kommissionen, at tjenestemændene ankom til tiden hver dag, men at visse forsinkelser desværre skyldtes de af den kinesiske regering krævede daglige registreringsprocedurer for at få adgang til de forskellige kontrolsteder eller blot, at der manglede repræsentanter for den kinesiske regering til at ledsage tjenestemændene, når de ankom til kontrolstederne, hvilket tvang dem til at vente længe, inden kontrollen kunne starte.
As regards the delay on the start of the verification visit, the Commission notes that the officials were present on time every day but that, unfortunately, some delays were caused by the daily registration procedures to access the different verification sites required by the GOC or simply by the lack of GOC representatives to accompany the officials when they arrived at verification sites which forced them to wait long time before the start.
Kommissionen bemærker også, at kontrolbesøget hver dag varede langt ud over den normale arbejdstid, og at det var den kinesiske regering, der aflyste mødet om eftermiddagen på kontrolbesøgets første dag, da repræsentanterne for ministeriet for teknologi besluttede ikke at deltage i besøget (jf. betragtning 122).
The Commission also notes that the verification visits lasted every day well beyond the normal working hours, and that it was the GOC that cancelled the afternoon session of the verification visit the first day as the representatives of the Ministry of Technology decided not to participate in the visit (see recital (122)).
Hvis Kinas regering havde accepteret alle de gentagne tilbud fra Kommissionens tjenestemænd om at verificere dokumenter uden for arbejdstid, ville besøget faktisk have varet længere, men dette skete ikke, idet den kinesiske regering ikke samarbejdede fuldt ud.
In fact, if the GOC had accepted all the repeated offers by the Commission officials to verify documents beyond the working hours, the visits would have lasted longer and it was because of the GOC failure to fully cooperate that this was not the case.
Den kinesiske regering anfægtede desuden Kommissionens praksis med ikke at godtage nye dokumenter og bevismateriale, som kræver verifikation efter afslutningen af det kontrolbesøg, som de tilhører.
The GOC further contested the Commission's practice not to accept new documents and evidence which require verification after the end of the verification session to which they belong.
Det skal i denne forbindelse præciseres, at det ikke er og aldrig har været Kommissionens hensigt blankt at se bort fra oplysninger, der fremlægges på denne måde.
In this respect it must be clarified that it is not and never was the intention of the Commission to disregard information provided in this way outright.
Kommissionen tog hensyn til alle fremlagte oplysninger, analyserede deres kvalitet (f.eks. behandles uddrag af reviderede regnskaber anderledes end et simpelt Excel-skema eller Word-dokument med tal, der ikke understøttes af officielle kilder) og tilskrev dem en passende vægtning, da den ikke var i stand til at efterprøve disse oplysninger under kontrolbesøget.
The Commission took account of all the information submitted, analysed its quality (e.g. the extract of audited financial statements is treated in different way from a simple excel table or word document with figures not supported by any official source) and attributed it the appropriate weight given the fact that it was unable to verify this information during the on-the-spot verification visit.
Vedrørende de seks dokumenter [25], som blev indsendt af den kinesiske regering i løbet af undersøgelsen, og hvis indhold regeringen nægtede at drøfte under kontrolbesøget, påstod den kinesiske regering, at Kommissionen ikke har noget grundlag for at benytte de foreliggende faktiske oplysninger i overensstemmelse med grundforordningens artikel 28.
Concerning the six documents [25] submitted by the GOC in the course of the investigation and the content of which the GOC refused to discuss during the on-the-spot verification visit, the GOC claimed that the Commission has no basis to apply facts available in line with Article 28 of the basic Regulation.
Den hævdede ligeledes, at Kommissionen ikke hjalp regeringen med at forstå kravet om at fremlægge disse dokumenter og påvise, at alle de pågældende dokumenter var relevante på trods af, at den kinesiske regering »specifikt inden starten af kontrolbesøget havde anmodet Kommissionen om hjælp til at forstå kravet om at fremlægge disse dokumenter og om at godtgøre, at alle de pågældende dokumenter var relevante«.
It also claimed that the Commission failed to assist the GOC in understanding the requirement to provide these documents and to demonstrate that all the documents concerned were relevant despite that the GOC ‘had specifically invited the Commission before the start of the verification to assist the GOC in understanding the requirement to provide these documents and to demonstrate that that all the documents concerned were relevant’.
Det skal i den forbindelse først bemærkes, at alle dokumenterne direkte vedrører den pågældende erhvervsgren [26], og at det derfor er yderst relevant at inddrage dem i kontrolbesøget.
In this respect, firstly, it is noted that all the documents directly pertain the industry concerned [26] and therefore their inclusion within the scope of verification was highly relevant.
Da alle disse dokumenter, som det fremgår af ordlyden, direkte vedrører den pågældende erhvervsgren og endog særlige subsidieordninger såsom de begunstigede låneordninger eller præferentielle skatteordninger, forstod Kommissionen ikke, hvad der kan tilføjes for at demonstrere deres relevans yderligere.
Since all these documents directly concern the industry concerned and even particular subsidy schemes such as preferential lending or preferential tax schemes, as is obvious from their wording the Commission did not understand what could be added to demonstrate their relevance even more.
Det var overraskende for Kommissionen, at den kinesiske regering tilsyneladende ikke syntes at have et problem med relevansen af disse dokumenter, da de blev indgivet, men først da Kommissionen udbad sig yderligere redegørelser.
It was surprising for the Commission that the GOC did not appear to have a problem with the relevance of these documents when they were submitted, but only when the Commission requested explanations.
Ved brev af 23. maj 2013 meddelte Kommissionen, at den var forhindret i at kontrollere de fleste af de fremlagte oplysninger som oprindelig dokumentation og krydstjekke dem med de kildedata, der var blevet brugt til at udarbejde den kinesiske regerings svar med hensyn til oplysningerne om de finansielle markeder og finansielle institutioner i Kina.
In its letter of 23 May 2013 the Commission stated that it was prevented from verifying most of the submitted information to original documentation and cross-checking it with the source data which were used to prepare the replies of the GOC in respect to the information on the financial market and financial institutions in the PRC.
Den kinesiske regering påstod, at Kommissionen i betragtning af de »meget generelle og upræcise oplysninger« ikke har givet den kinesiske regering mulighed for at kunne fremsætte relevante bemærkninger og dermed ikke giver regeringen mulighed for at udøve sin ret til at forsvare sig på en hensigtsmæssig måde.
The GOC objected that given the ‘very general and unspecific quote’ the Commission has not provided the GOC an opportunity to meaningfully comment and therefore does not enable the GOC to exercise its right of defence in proper way.
Dette har ikke hold i virkeligheden.
This claim does not represent reality.
I spørgeskemaet stillede Kommissionen meget specifikke spørgsmål og forsøgte i tråd med normal praksis for mange undersøgelsesmyndigheder at kontrollere den kinesiske regerings besvarelse under kontrolbesøget.
In the questionnaire the Commission asked very specific questions and, in line with normal practice of many investigating authorities it attempted to verify the GOC answers during the on spot verification visit.
I sin spørgeskemabesvarelse anførte den kinesiske regering navnlig, at »lån til den pågældende erhvervsgren udgør en meget lille del af den samlede lånmasse. Visse banker har f.eks. i deres tillægsspørgeskema anført, at lån til den pågældende erhvervsgren udgjorde under 1 % af de samlede lån«.
In particular, the GOC in its reply to the questionnaire stated that ‘the loans to the industry concerned account for very small portion of the total loans granted. For example, some banks have described in their appendix questionnaire that the loans granted to the industry concerned accounted for less than 1 % of total loans’.
Under kontrolbesøget var den kinesiske regering ikke i stand til at underbygge denne påstand og henviste blot Kommissionen til bankerne.
During the verification the GOC was not able to support this statement with any evidence at all and simply referred the Commission to the banks.
Kommissionen anmodede også om statistikker over lån til den pågældende erhvervsgren.
The Commission also requested statistics on the loans to the industry concerned.
Den kinesiske regering påstod, at man ikke fører sådanne fortegnelser.
The GOC claimed that it does not keep such records.
Da Kommissionen forespurgte, om den kinesiske regering forsøgte at udarbejde sådanne statistikker og anmodede om disse oplysninger fra bankernes hos CBRC (banktilsynet i Kina), svarede den tilstedeværende embedsmand under kontrolbesøget, at han ikke havde kendskab hertil, og at det var en anden tjenestegren i CBRC, der var ansvarlig for statistikker.
When the Commission inquired whether the GOC attempted to compile such statistics and requested this information from the banks the CBRC (Banking regulatory authority in the PRC) official present during the verification replied that he did not know about this as another department in the CBRC would be responsible for statistics.
Den kinesiske regering fremlagde ingen af de statistikker, som der er blevet anmodet om i spørgeskemaet, og som Kommissionen anmodede om gentagne gange i forbindelse med mangelproceduren.
No statistics as requested in the questionnaire and repeatedly in the deficiency process were submitted by the GOC.
Kommissionen anførte desuden i brevet forud for kontrolbesøget, at dette spørgsmål ville være omfattet.
The Commission indicated again in its pre-verification letter that this topic would be covered.
For bankernes vedkommende stillede Kommissionen også under kontrolbesøget spørgsmål til risikovurdering og vurdering af kreditværdigheden, den samlede driftssituation, ledelsessituationen, kreditniveau, brug af finanser, tilbagebetalingsevne, garantimønster og forretningssamarbejde mellem banker og låntagere, da den kinesiske regering havde fremsat påstande vedrørende disse spørgsmål i sin spørgeskemabesvarelse.
With regard to banks, the Commission also inquired during the verification visit about the risk and creditworthiness assessment, overall operating situation, management situation, credit level, financial usage, repayment ability, guarantee pattern and business cooperation between the banks and the borrowers, as the GOC made claims concerning these issues in its reply to the questionnaire.
Selv om disse emner blev anført i brevet forud kontrolbesøget, var den kinesiske regering ikke i stand til at fremlægge dokumentation til støtte for sine påstande og henviste Kommissionen til bankerne.
Again, despite the fact that these topics were indicated in the pre-verification letter the GOC was not able to provide any evidence supporting its own claims and referred the Commission to the banks.
I sit svar på Kommissionens mangelskrivelse fremlagde den kinesiske regering nogle oplysninger vedrørende statens procentvise ejerskab i visse banker.
In its reply to the deficiency letter the GOC submitted some information concerning the percentage of government ownership in some banks.
Indledningsvis skal det bemærkes, at den kinesiske regering i spørgeskemaet anførte, at den ikke er i besiddelse af disse oplysninger, og at den kun indsendte oplysninger i denne forbindelse, efter at Kommissionen påpegede, at artikel 24 i Commercial Bank Law faktisk forpligter bankerne til at indberette disse oplysninger til CBRC.
It is noted that initially the GOC in the questionnaire reply stated that it does not possess such information and that it only submitted information in this respect after the Commission pointed out that Article 24 of the Commercial Bank Law actually requires banks to report this information to the CBRC.
Da Kommissionen under kontrolbesøget spurgte om kilden til disse oplysninger, svarede embedsmanden fra CBRC, at han ikke havde kendskab hertil, da en anden afdeling i CBRC er ansvarlig for indsamling af sådanne oplysninger.
When the Commission inquired during the verification visit what was the source of this information, the CBRC official present stated that he did not know as another department of the CBRC is responsible for the collection of such data.
I henhold til artikel 2 i Interim Regulations on the Boards of Supervisors in Key State-owned Financial Institutions (den midlertidige forordning vedrørende tilsynsrådet i vigtige statsejede finansielle institutioner) (forelagt af EXIM Bank i sit svar på Kommissionens mangelskrivelse) skal listen over statsejede finansielle institutioner, til hvilke Statsrådet udsender tilsynsråd, anbefales af administrationsorganet for tilsynsråd i statsejede finansielle institutioner.
According to Article 2 of the Interim Regulations on the Boards of Supervisors in Key State-owned Financial Institutions (submitted by EXIM Bank in its reply to the deficiency letter) ‘the list of state-owned financial institutions to which the State Council dispatches boards of supervisors shall be recommended by the administrative organ for boards of supervisors in state-owned financial institutions’.
Da denne bestemmelse henviser til administrationsorganet for tilsynsråd i statsejede finansielle institutioner, ser det ud til, at den kinesiske regering er klar over, hvilke finansielle institutioner den ejer.
Since this legal provision refers to the administrative organ for boards of supervisors in state-owned financial institutions, it seems that the GOC is aware of which financial institutions it owns.
Dog var Kommissionen ikke i stand til at efterprøve disse oplysninger, eller blot identificere kilden til oplysningerne på grund af det manglende samarbejde fra den kinesiske regering.
Nevertheless, the Commission was not able to verify this information or even to identify the source of the information because of the non-cooperation from the GOC.
De offentligt tilgængelige oplysninger peger i retning af, at der også er andre statsejede banker (der ydede lån til de stikprøveudvalgte eksporterende producenter) ud over dem, der er rapporteret af den kinesiske regering i dens svar på Kommissionens mangelskrivelse [27].
The publicly available information suggests that there are also other state-owned banks (which provided loans to the sampled exporting producers) in addition to those reported by the GOC in its reply to the deficiency letter [27].
Den kinesiske regering påstod i et brev af 3. juni 2013, at Kommissionen hverken i spørgeskemaet eller i mangelskrivelsen »anmodede om dokumentation eller datakilder« og »nu pludselig påstår, at der mangler dokumentation og datakilder«.
In its letter of 3 June 2013 the GOC claimed that the Commission did not either in its questionnaire or in the deficiency letter, ‘ask for the “supporting evidence or data source”’ and ‘now suddenly alleges lack of supporting evidence or data source’.
For klarheds skyld kontrollerer Kommissionen lige som alle andre undersøgende myndigheder de data, der indsendes af samtlige parter i undersøgelsen, hvilket den kinesiske regering var bekendt med, da Kommissionen allerede gjorde det klart i spørgeskemaet og i følgebrevet til spørgeskemaet, at besvarelserne evt. ville blive kontrolleret under kontrolbesøget.
To set the record straight the Commission, like any other investigating authority, verifies the data submitted by all parties in the proceeding and the GOC was aware of this as Commission pointed out already in its questionnaire and in the cover letter to the questionnaire that the replies could be subject to verification.
Desuden omtalte Kommissionen i brevet forud for kontrolbesøget, at dette aspekt kunne gøres til genstand for kontrol [28].
Moreover, in its pre-verification letter the Commission included also this particular topic among the issues to be covered during the verification [28].
Det kunne således ikke være overraskende for den kinesiske regering, at Kommissionen anmodede om dokumentation for den kinesiske regerings påstande; der er derimod tale om en standardprocedure, som Kommissionen følger i hver eneste sag.
Therefore the fact that the Commission is asking for supporting evidence of the statements made by the GOC was certainly not a surprise for the GOC but the standard procedure followed but the Commission in each and every case.
Da Kommissionen under kontrolbesøget anmodede den kinesiske regering om at fremlægge en liste over de ti største banker i Kina og den andel af markedet, de repræsenterer, svarede CBRC, at man kan fremlægge sådanne oplysninger, men at det først var muligt, når spørgsmålet var blevet stillet skriftligt.
When, during the verification, the Commission asked the GOC to submit a list of 10 biggest banks in the PRC and the share of the market they represent, the CBRC replied that it is able to submit such information but that it could not answer the question before it was submitted in a written format.