natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
CDB afgav visse generelle oplysninger, men afslog at videregive oplysninger vedrørende vurderingen af de stikprøveudvalgte eksporterende producenters kreditværdighed eller endog risikovurderingen og af analyserapporten om solcelleindustrien.
CDB provided some general information but refused to disclose any information in relation to creditworthiness assessment of the sampled exporting producers or even the risk evaluation and assessment report of the PV industry.
I svaret på Kommissionens mangelskrivelse forelagde CDB et tal vedrørende den risikopræmie, der opkræves hos den pågældende erhvervsgren.
In the reply to the deficiency letter the CDB submitted a figure concerning the risk premium charged for the industry concerned.
Under kontrolbesøget ændrede CDB sit svar i denne henseende, men fremlagde ingen dokumentation for eller forklaring på grundlaget for dette tal på trods af gentagne anmodninger fra Kommissionen under kontrolbesøget.
During the verification the CDB corrected its reply in this respect but did not provide any supporting evidence for this figure or explanation of what was the basis for this figure, despite repeated requests from the Commission during the verification visit.
Kinesiske statsejede banker er offentlige organer
Chinese state-owned banks are public bodies
Klageren hævder, at de kinesiske statsejede banker er offentlige organer, jf. grundforordningens artikel 2, litra b).
The complainant claims that SOCBs in the PRC are public bodies within the meaning of Article 2(b) of the basic Regulation.
Nedenstående analyse fokuserer på, hvorvidt de statsejede forretningsbanker udfører funktioner, der normalt anses for en del af den statslige praksis i Kina, og hvis dette er tilfældet, hvorvidt de udøver statslig myndighed i denne forbindelse.
The following analysis focuses on whether the SOCBs in question perform functions which are ordinarily considered part of governmental practice in China and, if so, whether they exercise government authority when doing so.
Undersøgelsen viste, at det kinesiske finansmarked er kendetegnet ved statslig indgriben, idet de fleste af de større banker er statsejede.
The investigation has established that the Chinese financial market is characterised by government intervention because most of the major banks are state-owned.
De kinesiske myndigheder har kun fremlagt meget begrænsede oplysninger om aktiebeholdning/ejerskab for bankerne i Kina.
The Chinese authorities have provided only very limited information concerning shareholding/ownership of banks in the PRC.
I forbindelse med sin analyse af, hvorvidt bankerne er organer, der har, har fået overdraget eller udøver statslig myndighed (offentlige organer), søgte Kommissionen også oplysninger om ikke bare statens ejerskab af bankerne, men også andre kendetegn såsom statslig tilstedeværelse i bestyrelserne, statslig kontrol med deres aktiviteter, gennemførelsen af statens politikker eller interesser, samt hvorvidt enhederne er oprettet ved lovgivning.
In performing its analysis whether banks are entities possessing, vested with or exercising government authority (public bodies) the Commission also sought information concerning not only the government ownership of the banks but also other characteristics such as the government presence on the board of directors, the government control over their activities, the pursuit of government policies or interests and whether entities were created by statute.
På grundlag af de foreliggende oplysninger kan det konkluderes, at de statsejede banker i Kina har den største markedsandel og er de dominerende aktører på det kinesiske finansmarked.
From the available information it is concluded that the state-owned banks in the PRC hold the highest market share and are the predominant players in the Chinese financial market.
Ifølge Deutsche Banks undersøgelse af banksektoren i Kina fra 2006 [38] udgør de statsejede bankers andel muligvis mere end to tredjedele af det kinesiske marked.
According to the 2006 Deutsche Bank Research on the PRC's banking sector [38], the state-owned banks' share may amount to more than 2/3 of the Chinese market.
I samme forbindelse hedder det i WTO's handelspolitiske gennemgang af Kina, at »statens omfattende ejerskab er endnu et bemærkelsesværdigt træk ved finanssektoren i Kina [39]« og »der er kun sket få ændringer af markedsstrukturen inden for den kinesiske banksektor, som domineres af statsejede banker« [40].
For the same matter the WTO Trade Policy Review of China noted that ‘The high degree of state ownership is another notable feature of the financial sector in China’ [39] and ‘there has been little change in the market structure of China's banking sector, which is dominated by state-owned banks’ [40].
Det er relevant at bemærke, at de fem største statsejede handelsbanker (Agricultural Bank, Bank of China, Construction Bank of China, Bank of Communications og Industrial and Commercial Bank) tilsyneladende udgør mere end halvdelen af den kinesiske banksektor [41].
It is pertinent to note that the five largest state-owned commercial banks (the Agricultural Bank, the Bank of China, the Construction Bank of China, the Bank of Communications and the Industrial and Commercial Bank) appear to represent more than half of the Chinese banking sector [41].
Regeringens ejerskab af de fem største statsejede banker blev også bekræftet af den kinesiske regering i dennes svar på Kommissionens mangelskrivelse.
The government ownership of the five-largest state-owned banks was also confirmed by the GOC in its reply to the deficiency letter.
Kommissionen bad ligeledes om oplysninger vedrørende strukturen af den statslige kontrol med disse kinesiske banker samt gennemførelsen af statslige politikker eller interesser vedrørende solcelleindustrien (dvs. bestyrelser og generalforsamlinger, referater af generalforsamlinger/bestyrelsesmøder, aktionærers/bestyrelsesmedlemmers nationalitet, udlånspolitikker og risikovurdering i forbindelse med lån til de samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenter).
The Commission also requested information concerning the structure of government control in those Chinese banks and the pursuit of government policies or interests with respect to the photovoltaic industry (i.e. board of directors and board of shareholders, minutes of shareholders/directors meetings, nationality of shareholders/directors, lending policies and assessment of risk with respect to loans provided to the cooperating exporting producers).
Som bemærket i betragtning 139 fremlagde den kinesiske regering kun meget begrænsede oplysninger i denne henseende og muliggjorde ikke kontrol af mange af de afgivne oplysninger.
Nevertheless, as noted in recital (139) above, the GOC provided only very limited information in this respect and did not allow the verification of much of the submitted information.
Kommissionen måtte derfor gøre brug af de foreliggende faktiske oplysninger.
Consequently, the Commission had to use the facts available.
Den konkluderede ud fra de tilgængelige oplysninger, at disse banker er under statens kontrol gennem ejerskab og administrativ kontrol af deres »kommercielle« adfærd, herunder grænserne for indlån og rentesatser på udlån (se betragtning 164-167), og i nogle tilfælde endog gennem vedtægterne [42].
It concluded on the basis of the available data that those banks are controlled by the government by means of ownership, administrative control of their ‘commercial’ behaviour including the limits set on the deposits and loans interest rates (see recitals (164) — (167) below) and in some cases even by the statutory documents [42].
De relevante data, der blev anvendt til at nå frem til ovennævnte resultater, er hentet fra oplysninger fra den kinesiske regering, årsberetninger fra kinesiske banker, der enten blev fremsendt af den kinesiske regering eller var offentligt tilgængelige, oplysninger fra Deutsche Banks undersøgelse af den kinesiske banksektor fra 2006 [43], WTO's politiske gennemgang af Kina (2012) [44], Verdensbankens rapport om Kina frem mod 2030 [45], OECD's økonomiske analyse af Kina fra 2010 [46], oplysninger fra de samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenter og oplysningerne i klagen.
The relevant data used in order to arrive at the aforesaid findings is derived from information submitted by the GOC, the annual reports of Chinese banks that were either submitted from GOC or publicly available, information retrieved from the 2006 Deutsche Bank Research on China's banking sector [43], WTO Policy review on China (2012) [44], China 2030 World Bank Report [45] or 2010 OECD Economic survey on China [46], information submitted by the co-operating exporting producers and information existing in the complaint.
Hvad angår udenlandske banker skønner uafhængige kilder, at de udgør en mindre del af den kinesiske banksektor og derfor spiller en ubetydelig rolle i politisk betingede udlån; relevante oplysninger tyder på, at deres andel blot kan udgøre 2 % af det kinesiske marked [47].
As for foreign banks, independent sources estimate that they represent a minor part of the Chinese banking sector and consequently play an insignificant role in policy lending; with relevant information suggesting that this may represent as little as 2 % of the Chinese market [47].
Relevante offentligt tilgængelige oplysninger bekræfter også, at kinesiske banker, navnlig de store handelsbanker, stadig er afhængige af statsejede aktionærer og staten med henblik på tilvejebringelse af kapital, når der er kapitalmangel som følge af udvidet kreditgivning [48].(163) Størstedelen af de banker, der ydede lån til de samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenter, er statsejede banker.
Relevant publicly available information also confirms that Chinese banks, particularly the large commercial banks, still rely on state-owned shareholders and the government for replenishment of capital when there is a lack of capital adequacy as result of credit expansion [48].(163) With respect to the banks that provided loans to the cooperating exporting producers, the majority of them are state-owned banks.
På grundlag af de foreliggende oplysninger [49] blev det ganske rigtigt konstateret, at de statsejede banker og andre statsejede organer ydede de fleste lån til de samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenter.
Indeed, on the basis of the available information [49] it was found that the state-owned banks and other state-owned entities provided the great majority of loans to the cooperating exporting producers.
Disse omfattede de større forretningsbanker og politisk styrede banker i Kina såsom China Development Bank, EXIM Bank, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank og Industrial and Commercial Bank of China.
These included the major commercial and policy banks in the PRC like the China Development Bank, the EXIM Bank, the Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China, the China Construction Bank and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China.
For så vidt angår de resterende statsejede banker bad Kommissionen om de samme oplysninger, som nævnes ovenfor, med hensyn til statslig kontrol og gennemførelsen af statslige politikker eller interesser vedrørende solcelleindustrien.
With respect to the remaining state-owned banks concerned, again the Commission requested the same information mentioned above concerning the government control and the pursuit of government policies or interests with respect to the photovoltaic industry.
Det konkluderes derfor, at bankerne er under statens kontrol.
It is therefore concluded that the banks are controlled by the government.
En egentlig kontrol fremgår bl.a. af den statslige politik for støtte til den pågældende erhvervsgren, som instruerer bankerne i at handle på en bestemt måde og yde støtte (jf. betragtning 102).
Such a meaningful control is evidenced inter alia by the governmental policy of support to the industry in question, which directs banks to act in a particular supportive manner (see recital (102) above).
Derfor bør de statsejede forretningsbanker i Kina betragtes som offentlige organer.
For these reasons the state-owned commercial and policy banks in the PRC should be considered public bodies.
Et andet tegn på den kinesiske regerings involvering i det kinesiske finansmarked er den rolle, som PBOC spiller ved fastlæggelsen af de specifikke begrænsninger for fastsættelsen af rentesatserne og deres udsving.
Another sign of GOC involvement in the Chinese financial market is the role played by the PBOC in setting the specific limits on the way interest rates are set and fluctuate.
Undersøgelsen fastslog nemlig, at Kinas nationalbank har særlige regler for, hvordan renterne svinger i Kina.
Indeed, the investigation established that the PBOC has specific rules regulating the way interest rates float in the PRC.
Ifølge de foreliggende oplysninger fastlægges disse regler i PBOC's cirkulære om tilpasning af rentesatser på indlån og udlån — Yinfa (2004) No 251 (»cirkulære 251«).
According to the information available, these rules are set out in the PBOC's Circular on the Issues about the Adjusting Interest Rates on Deposits and Loans-Yinfa (2004) No 251 (‘Circular 251’).
For favorable lån og lån, for hvilke Statsrådet har fastsat særlige regler, må rentesatserne ikke bevæge sig opad.
For preferential loans and loans for which the State Council has specific regulations the interest rates are not allowed to float upwards.
Kommissionen anmodede den kinesiske regering om at uddybe definitionen og ordlyden i cirkulære 251 og i den tidligere lovgivning (PBOC's cirkulære om finansielle institutioners rentespænd — YinFa [2003] No. 250).
The Commission sought clarifications from the GOC on the definition and wording stated in the Circular 251 as well as to its preceding legislation (Circular of the PBOC concerning expansion of Financial Institution's Loan Interest Rate Float Range — YinFa [2003] No. 250).
Men som beskrevet i betragtning 135 nægtede den kinesiske regering at fremsende disse cirkulærer, hvilket forhindrede Kommissionen i at kontrollere deres indhold og udbede sig forklaringer.
However, as described in the recital (135) above, the GOC refused to provide these Circulars which prevented the Commission from verifying their content and seeking explanations.
Eftersom den kinesiske regering ikke fremlagde nogen relevante oplysninger om dette, der kunne indikere, at situationen har ændret sig siden marts 2013, da Kommissionen afsluttede sine antisubsidieundersøgelser vedrørende stålprodukter, der er overtrukket med organisk materiale [50], fastslås det, at PBOC er involveret og påvirker fastsættelsen af rentesatserne i de statsejede forretningsbanker.
Since the GOC did not provide any relevant information in this respect which would suggest the situation changed since March 2013 when the Commission concluded its anti-subsidy investigations concerning Organic Coated Steel [50] it is established that the PBOC is involved in and influences the setting of interest rates by state-owned commercial banks.
Den kinesiske regering fremlagde ingen dokumentation for, at situationen i sagen om coated finpapir og stålprodukter, der er belagt med organisk materiale, havde ændret sig.
The GOC did not provide any evidence that the situation as established in the Coated Fine Paper and Organic Coated Steel investigations has changed.
På grundlag af de foreliggende faktiske oplysninger og de øvrige beviser, der er nævnt ovenfor, blev det derfor konkluderet, at situationen vedrørende metoden til rentefastsættelse var den samme i hele UP.
Therefore, on the basis of facts available and the other evidence cited above, it was concluded that the situation concerning the methodology for determining interest rates was the same during the entire IP.
Begrænsninger på lånerentesatser og de lofter, der blev indført på indlånsområdet, skaber en situation, hvor bankerne har garanteret adgang til billig kapital (på grund af reguleringen af indlånsrenter) og er i stand til at yde lån til udvalgte industrier på gunstige vilkår.
Limits on the loans interest rates together with the ceilings imposed on deposit rates create a situation in which the banks have guaranteed access to cheap capital (because of the deposit rates regulation) and are able to lend to the selected industries at favourable rates.
Bankerne er også underkastet retlige regler, som bl.a. forudsætter, at de udfører deres udlånsvirksomhed i henhold til behovene i den nationale økonomi [51], yder kreditstøtte til tilskyndede projekter [52] eller prioriterer udvikling af industrier med højteknologi og ny teknologi [53].
Banks are also subject to legal rules which require them, inter alia, to carry out their loan business according to the needs of the national economy [51], provide credit support to encouraged projects [52] or give priority to the development of high and new technology industries [53].
Bankerne er forpligtede til at følge disse regler.
Banks are under an obligation to follow these rules.
De eksporterende producenter i stikprøven tilhører kategorien af tilskyndede projekter og industrier med højteknologi og ny teknologi.
The sampled exporting producers belong to the categories of encouraged projects as well as to the high and new technology industries category.
Forskellige uafhængige informationskilder viser, at staten i vidt omfang konstant griber ind i den finansielle sektor i Kina.
Various independent information sources suggest that the state involvement in the Chinese financial sector is substantial and on-going.
Konklusionerne i f.eks. i) IMF's arbejdspapir fra 2006 viser, at bankliberaliseringen i Kina er ufuldstændig, og at kreditrisikoen ikke er korrekt afspejlet [54], ii) IMF's rapport fra 2009 fremhævede den manglende liberalisering af rentesatserne i Kina [55], iii) IMF's landerapport fra 2010 viste, at kapitaludgifterne i Kina er forholdsvis lave, at tildelingen af kreditter undertiden sker uden hensyntagen til priserne, og at en stor opsparing hos virksomhederne til dels skyldes de lave udgifter til forskellige produktionsfaktorer (herunder kapital og jord) [56] og iv) OECD's økonomiske overblik over Kina 2010 [57] og OECD's økonomiske afdelings arbejdsdokument nr. 747 om reformerne i Kinas finanssektor [58], nævner, at ejerskabet over finansielle institutioner fortsat domineres af staten, hvilket giver anledning til bekymring over, hvorvidt bankernes udlånsbeslutninger udelukkende er baseret på forretningsmæssige overvejelser, idet bankerne traditionelt synes at udføre rollen som statslige agenturer med tætte bånd til staten.
For example the finding of the (i) IMF 2006 Working Paper suggested that the bank liberalisation in the PRC is incomplete and credit risk is not properly reflected [54]; (ii) the IMF 2009 report highlighted the lack of interest rate liberalisation in China [55]; (iii) the IMF 2010 Country Report stated that cost of capital in China is relatively low, credit allocation is sometimes determined by non-price means and high corporate saving is partly linked to low cost of various factor inputs (including capital and land) [56]; (iv) the OECD 2010 Economic Survey of China [57] and OECD Economic Department Working Paper No. 747 on China's Financial Sector Reforms [58] stated that ownership of financial institutions remains dominated by the State, raising issues as the extent to which banks' lending decisions are based purely on commercial considerations while banks' traditional role appears to be that of government agencies with ties to the government.
På baggrund af ovenstående konkluderes det, at de statsejede forretningsbanker og strategiske banker udøver offentlige funktioner på vegne af den kinesiske regering, nemlig obligatorisk fremme af visse økonomiske sektorer i tråd med statslig planlægning og politiske dokumenter.
On the basis of the above evidence, it is concluded that state-owned commercial and policy banks perform government functions on behalf of the GOC, namely mandatory promotion of certain sectors of the economy in line with state planning and policy documents.
Det omfattende statslige ejerskab i de statsejede banker og andre oplysninger om forbindelser mellem statsejede banker og staten (herunder den kinesiske regerings manglende samarbejdsvilje i denne forbindelse) bekræfter, at bankerne er under statens kontrol i forbindelse med udøvelsen af deres offentlige hverv.
The extensive government ownership in the state-owned banks and other information on links between the state-owned banks and the government (including the non-cooperation of the GOC in this regard) confirms that the banks are controlled by the government in the exercise of their public functions.
Den kinesiske regering udøver væsentlig kontrol over statsejede forretningsbanker og strategiske banker via regeringens omsiggribende indgriben i den finansielle sektor og kravet om, at statsejede banker skal følge regeringens politik.
The GOC exercises meaningful control over state-owned commercial and policy banks through the government's pervasive involvement in the financial sector and the requirement for state-owned banks to follow government policies.
De statsejede forretningsbanker og politisk styrede banker anses derfor for at være offentlige organer, da de ejer, besidder, og udøver offentlig myndighed.
State-owned commercial and Policy banks are therefore considered to be public bodies because they possess, are vested with, and exercise, governmental authority.
Private banker i Kina modtager direktiver fra den kinesiske regering
Private banks in the PRC are entrusted and directed by the GOC
Kommissionen undersøgte også, om den kinesiske regering overdrager det til eller pålægger de privatejede forretningsbanker i Kina at stille lån på favorable vilkår (subsidierede lån) til rådighed for producenter i solcelleindustrien jf. grundforordningens artikel 3, stk. 1, litra a), nr. iv).
The Commission also analysed whether the privately owned commercial banks in the PRC are entrusted or directed by the GOC to provide preferential (subsidised) loans to the photovoltaic producers, within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation.
Den kinesiske regerings politik
Existence of a GOC policy
Det fremgår klart af ovenstående afsnit om statens involvering i solcelleindustrien (jf. betragtning 101) og af konklusionerne nedenfor, at den kinesiske regering har en politik om at stille lån til rådighed for solcellesektoren på favorable vilkår, idet offentlige organer (statsejede forretningsbanker) [59] er involveret i denne långivning og indtager en dominerende stilling på markedet, hvilket giver dem mulighed for at tilbyde rentesatser, der ligger under markedsrenten.
From the section above concerning state involvement in the photovoltaic sector (recital (101)) and from the findings described below it is clear that the GOC has a policy to provide preferential lending to the photovoltaic sector, because public bodies (state-owned commercial banks) [59] are engaged in such provision and hold a predominant place in the market, which enables them to offer below-market interest rates.
I henhold til artikel 38 i denne lov skal alle forretningsbanker (dvs. også de privatejede) »fastsætte udlånsrenten i overensstemmelse med den øvre og nedre grænse for udlånsrenten som fastsat af PBOC«, og i artikel 34 i loven om forretningsbanker instrueres forretningsbankerne i at »udøve deres låneaktiviteter i henhold til nationaløkonomiens og samfundsudviklingens behov og i samme ånd som statens industripolitikker«.
For example Article 38 of this law instructs all Commercial banks (i.e. also those which are privately owned) to ‘determine the loan rate in accordance with the upper and lower limit of the loan rate set by the PBOC’, Article 34 of the Commercial Banking Law instructs the commercial banks to ‘carry out their loan business upon the needs of national economy and the social development and with the spirit of state industrial policies’.
En række statslige planer, politiske retningslinjer og lovgivninger henviser til de begunstigede låneordninger til solcelleindustrien.
Several government planning documents policy papers and laws refer to the preferential lending to the PV industry.