natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Den eneste logiske fremgangsmåde til konstateringen af et mønster i eksportpriserne, inden for rammerne af den samme dumpingberegning, er således at anvende de samme eksportpriser, der allerede er udtrykt i tyrkiske lira.
Thus, the only logical approach to establish a pattern of export prices, within the framework of the same dumping calculation, is to use the same export prices already expressed in Turkish Lira.
Derudover, som beskrevet ovenfor, kræver grundforordningen ikke en analyse af mulige årsager til målrettet dumping, såsom valutakurssvingninger [7].
In addition, as stated above, the basic Regulation does not require an analysis of possible reasons of targeted dumping, such as exchange rate fluctuations [7].
Begge de samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenter hævdede, at med henblik på at konstatere et mønster i eksportpriser bør der snarere tages hensyn til de vejede gennemsnitlige priser for sammenlignelige varetyper end de aritmetiske gennemsnitspriser.
Both cooperating exporting producers claimed that, in order to establish a pattern of export prices, weighted average prices of comparable product types should be taken into account rather than arithmetic average prices.
Dog henviser grundforordningens artikel 2, stk. 11, til et mønster i eksportpriser og ikke til et mønster i det vejede gennemsnit af eksportpriserne eller et mønster i eksportværdierne.
However, Article 2(11) of the basic Regulation refers to a pattern of export prices and not to a pattern of weighted average export prices or a pattern of export values.
Anvendelsen af et vejet gennemsnit af eksportpriserne ville fordreje analysen ved at medregne den mængde, der blev eksporteret, i stedet for kun eksportpriserne.
The use of a weighted average export price would distort the analysis by taking into account the volume of exports instead of only the export prices.
Under alle omstændigheder, også hvis der anvendes vejede gennemsnitspriser i stedet for det aritmetiske gennemsnit af eksportpriserne, kunne der stadig konstateres et mønster i eksportpriserne, som varierer betydeligt mellem forskellige købere og regioner samt tidsperioder.
In any case, even when weighted average prices are used instead of arithmetic average export prices, a pattern of export prices could still be established which differs significantly among different purchasers and regions, as well as time periods.
To af parterne anfægtede betydningen af eventuelle forskelle i mønstrene af eksportpriser, hvis der anvendes vejede gennemsnit.
Two parties contested the significance of differences in patterns of export prices, if any, in case weighted averages are used.
Det skal bemærkes, at parterne ikke anfægter de faktiske konklusioner, der er baseret på et aritmetisk gennemsnit, hvilket er den passende metode, som forklaret ovenfor.
It is noted that the parties do not contest the factual findings based on the arithmetic average, which is the appropriate methodology as explained above.
ÇIB hævdede, at anvendelsen af nulstilling ikke er berettiget ved at henvise til en rapport fra WTO-appelinstansen [8] (sengelinnedrapporten), hvori nulstillingspraksissen blev anset for at være i strid med WTO's antidumpingaftale.
The ÇIB claimed that the application of zeroing is unjustified by referring to a WTO Appellate Body Report [8] (the Bed Linen Report) in which the zeroing practice was found to be contrary to the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement.
Retten [9] har dog bekræftet, at konklusionerne i sengelinnedrapporten ikke finder anvendelse i en situation med målrettet dumping.
The General Court [9] has, however, confirmed that the findings of the Bed Linen Report are not applicable in a situation of targeted dumping.
Sengelinnedrapporten vedrører kun nulstillingsteknikken som led i den første symmetriske metode og kan ikke anses for at anvende denne mekanisme som led i den asymmetriske metode.
Indeed, the Bed linen Report concerns only the zeroing technique in the context of the first symmetrical method and cannot be considered to deal with this mechanism when it is used in the context of the asymmetrical method.
Selv hvis, som WTO-appelinstansen fastslog, det er i strid med artikel 2.4.2 i antidumpingkodeksen af 1994 og urimeligt at anvende nulstillingsteknikken som led i den første symmetriske metode, og i særdeleshed ved manglen på et mønster i eksportpriserne, er det imidlertid ikke i strid med den bestemmelse eller med grundforordningens artikel 2, stk. 11, eller urimeligt inden for betydningen af denne forordnings artikel 2, stk. 10, at anvende nulstillingsteknikken som led i den asymmetriske metode, hvor de to betingelser for anvendelsen af denne metode er opfyldt.
Therefore, even if, as the WTO Appellate Body found, it might indeed be contrary to Article 2.4.2 of the 1994 Anti-dumping Code and unfair to employ the zeroing technique in the context of the first symmetrical method, and especially in the absence of an export price pattern, it is not contrary to that provision or to Article 2(11) of the basic Regulation, nor is it unfair within the meaning of Article 2(10) of that Regulation, to employ the zeroing technique in the context of the asymmetrical method, where the two conditions for applying that method are met.
Nulstillingsteknikken har ydermere vist sig at være matematisk nødvendig for, i forhold til resultaterne, at skelne mellem den asymmetriske metode og den første symmetriske metode.
Furthermore, the zeroing technique has proved to be mathematically necessary in order to distinguish, in terms of its results, the asymmetrical method from the first symmetrical method.
Hvis der ikke foreligger en sådan reduktion, fører den asymmetriske metode altid til samme resultat som den første symmetriske metode.
In the absence of that reduction, the asymmetrical method will always yield the same result as the first symmetrical method.
Desuden hævdede ÇIB, at anvendelsen af nulstilling forårsager en krænkelse af reglen om den lavest mulige told.
Further, the ÇIB claimed that the use of zeroing causes a violation of the lesser duty rule.
Det blev fremført, at dumpingmargenerne på grund af anvendelsen af nulstillingspraksissen er beregnet til et højere niveau, end de faktisk burde have været.
It was argued that, because of the zeroing practice used, margins of dumping have been calculated at a level higher than they should actually have been.
Men anvendelsen af nulstilling i den asymmetriske metode er ikke til hinder for anvendelsen af reglen om den lavest mulige told.
However, the use of zeroing in the asymmetrical method does not preclude the application of the lesser duty rule.
For alle de tre samarbejdsvillige virksomheder er dumpingmargenerne, uanset hvilken metode der er anvendt, blevet sammenlignet med virksomhedernes skadestærskel for at sikre, at den laveste af de to fastsætter tolden.
For all three cooperating companies the dumping margins, regardless of the methodology used, have been compared with the companies’ injury elimination levels to ensure that the lower of the two would determine the duty.
Da der ikke blev fremsat andre bemærkninger vedrørende dumpingmargenerne for de undersøgte virksomheder, bekræftes konklusionerne i betragtning 47 og 48 i forordningen om midlertidig told hermed.
In the absence of any other comments in respect of the dumping margins for companies investigated, the findings in recitals 47 and 48 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.
Dumpingmargen for ikke-samarbejdsvillige virksomheder
Dumping margin for non-cooperating companies
Da der ikke blev fremsat bemærkninger vedrørende dumpingmargenen for virksomheder, der ikke udviste samarbejdsvilje, bekræftes de foreløbige konklusioner i betragtning 49 i forordningen om midlertidig told hermed.
In the absence of any comments concerning the dumping margin for non-cooperating companies, the provisional findings in recital 49 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.
De landsdækkende endeligt fastlagte dumpingmargener udtrykt i procent af cif-prisen, Unionens grænse, ufortoldet, fastsættes til følgende:
The countrywide dumping margins finally determined, expressed as a percentage of the CIF Union frontier price, duty unpaid, are the following:
Dumpingmargen (%)
Dumping margin (%)
EU-produktionen, EU-erhvervsgrenen og EU-forbruget
Union production, Union industry and consumption
Da der ikke blev fremsat bemærkninger vedrørende EU-produktionen, EU-erhvervsgrenen og EU-forbruget bekræftes indholdet af betragtning 51-54 i forordningen om midlertidig told hermed.
In the absence of any comments with regard to Union production, Union industry and consumption the content of recitals 51 to 54 of the provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed.
Efter fremlæggelsen af de foreløbige konklusioner hævdede ÇIB, at den kumulative vurdering af dumpingimporten fra de to pågældende lande ikke er berettiget.
Following provisional disclosure, the ÇIB argued that the cumulative assessment of dumped imports from the two countries concerned is not warranted.
I princippet gentog ÇIB de bemærkninger, der blev fremsat af de tyrkiske eksporterende producenter efter indledningen og hævdede, at importen fra hhv. Rusland og Tyrkiet viser forskellige tendenser i form af mængde og priser.
In principle, they echoed the comments made by the Turkish exporting producers following the initiation and claimed that imports from Russia and Turkey show different trends in terms of volume and prices.
Det skal i den forbindelse gentages, som allerede anført i betragtning 59 i forordningen om midlertidig told, at undersøgelsen konstaterede, at mens importen fra Tyrkiet er forholdsvis stabil målt i mængde, steg importen fra Rusland i absolutte tal.
It is reiterated in this regard, as already stated in recital 59 of the provisional Regulation, that the investigation established that while imports from Turkey are relatively stable in terms of volumes, imports from Russia are increasing in absolute terms.
Samtidig synes deres priser ikke at være væsentligt forskellige, hvor de russiske gennemsnitspriser er noget lavere men meget tæt på de gennemsnitlige tyrkiske priser.
At the same time their pricing do not appear to be substantially different, with Russian average prices being somewhat lower but very close to the average Turkish prices.
Det skal også i den forbindelse gentages, at undersøgelsen for virksomhederne i begge lande konstaterede et betydeligt underbud på op til ca. 30 % (jf. betragtning 65 i forordningen om midlertidig told).
It is also reiterated in this regard that for companies in both countries the investigation established significant undercutting of up to ca. 30 % (see recital 65 of the provisional Regulation).
ÇIB fremførte også, at importen fra Tyrkiet bør anses for ubetydelig, og påpegede, at i en tidligere sag vedrørende en lignende vare, nemlig i »rørfittings fra Folkerepublikken Kina, Kroatien, Slovakiet, Taiwan og Thailand [10]«, blev importen fra Slovakiet og Taiwan anset for at være ubetydelig (selv om den lå over bagatelgrænsen) og kunne derfor ikke kumuleres med dumpingimporten fra andre lande.
The ÇIB also argued that imports from Turkey should be considered insignificant and pointed out that in a previous case concerning a similar product — namely in ‘pipe and tube fittings from the PRC, Croatia, Slovakia, Taiwan and Thailand’ [10] — imports from Slovakia and Taiwan were considered insignificant (although they were above the de minimis threshold) and therefore not cumulated with dumped imports from other countries.
Det skal bemærkes i denne forbindelse, at i rørfittings fra Folkerepublikken Kina, Kroatien, Slovakiet, Taiwan og Thailand fandtes importen fra Slovakiet og Taiwan faktisk at være dumping, og selv om den var over markedsandelstærsklen på 1 %, blev den ikke kumuleret med anden dumpingimport.
It is noted in this regard that in pipe and tube fittings from the PRC, Croatia, Slovakia, Taiwan and Thailand, imports from Slovakia and Taiwan were indeed found to be dumped and despite being above the 1 % market share threshold they were not cumulated with other dumped imports.
Situationen i denne sag var imidlertid meget forskellig fra den foreliggende, da importen fra Slovakiet og Taiwan faktisk mistede en stor del af markedsandelen og ikke blev betragtet som væsentlig i forhold til importen fra de øvrige lande, og den blev derfor ikke anset for at forvolde skade.
The situation in that case, however, was very different from the current one, as imports from Slovakia and Taiwan were actually sharply losing their market share and were not considered significant when compared to the volume of imports from the other countries and consequently were considered not to be causing injury.
I den foreliggende sag derimod øges markedsandelen gennem importen fra både Tyrkiet og Rusland, og de to landes import er indbyrdes sammenlignelige med hensyn til mængde.
In contrast, in the case at hand imports from both Turkey and Russia are increasing their market share and are comparable to each other in terms of volumes.
ÇIB fremførte også, at importen fra Tyrkiet og Rusland ikke kan sidestilles med hensyn til konkurrencevilkårene, da der er »forskelle i den geografiske koncentration af salget«.
The ÇIB also argued that imports from Turkey and Russia are not similar in terms of conditions of competition as there are ‘differences in geographical concentration of sales’.
De har fremlagt statistiske oplysninger, der viser, at Tyrkiet i undersøgelsesperioden har koncentreret over 70 % af sit salg i Spanien, Frankrig, Italien og Polen, mens Rusland koncentrerede næsten al sit salg i Tjekkiet og Tyskland.
They have provided statistics showing that during the IP Turkey has concentrated over 70 % of their sales on Spain, France, Italy and Poland, while Russia concentrated almost all of their sales on the Czech Republic and Germany.
Det skal i den forbindelse bemærkes, at forskelle i den geografiske koncentration af salget ikke anses for at være en angivelse af forskellige konkurrencevilkår.
It is noted in this regard that differences in geographical concentration of sales cannot be considered to be an indication of different conditions of competition.
Da Unionen er et indre marked, vil indgangsstedet for enhver import normalt ikke være afgørende for konkurrenceevnen for disse importvarer over for hinanden og over for samme vare.
Given that the Union is a single market, the point of entry of any imports will normally not be decisive for the competitiveness of those imports with each other and vis-à-vis the like product.
Det skal endvidere gentages med hensyn til konkurrencevilkårene, at prismæssigt er den russiske og den tyrkiske import sammenlignelig, og de blev begge fundet at underbyde EU-erhvervsgrenens priser, og at deres salgskanaler er sammenlignelige.
It is also reiterated with respect to conditions of competition that Russian and Turkish imports are similar in respect of price and were both found to undercut Union prices and that their channels of sales are similar.
Da der ikke er fremsat andre bemærkninger vedrørende kumulativ vurdering af dumpingimporten fra de pågældende lande, bekræftes indholdet af betragtning 55-60 i forordningen om midlertidig told hermed.
In the absence of any other comments with regard to cumulative assessment of the dumped imports from the countries concerned the content of recitals 55 to 60 of the provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed.
Importmængde, markedsandel af den pågældende dumpingimport, dens importpriser og underbud.
Volume, market share of the dumped imports concerned, their import prices and undercutting
Da der ikke er fremsat bemærkninger vedrørende mængde og markedsandel af den pågældende dumpingimport, dens importpriser og underbud, bekræftes indholdet af betragtning 61-65 i forordningen om midlertidig told hermed.
In the absence of any comments with regard to volume and market share of the dumped imports concerned, their import prices and undercutting, the content of recitals 61 to 65 of the provisional Regulation is hereby confirmed.
Det skal gentages, at den pågældende dumpingvare med oprindelse i de pågældende lande, som blev solgt i Unionen, underbød EU-erhvervsgrenens priser med op til omtrent 30 %.
It is reiterated that the dumped product concerned originating in the countries concerned sold in the Union undercut the Union industry’s prices by up to about 30 %.
Efter fremlæggelsen af de foreløbige konklusioner hævdede ÇIB og den tyrkiske regering, at eftersom EU-erhvervsgrenen øgede sin markedsandel med ca. 3 % mellem 2008 og UP, skulle Kommissionen have konkluderet, at EU-erhvervsgrenen ikke har lidt væsentlig skade i den betragtede periode.
Following provisional disclosure, the ÇIB and the Turkish Government claimed that given that the Union industry increased their market share by some 3 % between 2008 and the IP, the Commission should have concluded that the Union industry did not suffer material injury in the period considered.
Det bemærkes i denne forbindelse, at for det første blev det klart erkendt i forordningen om midlertidig told (jf. f.eks. betragtning 72, 86 og 91 i forordningen om midlertidig told), at der var en svag stigning i EU-erhvervsgrenens markedsandel.
It is noted in this regard that firstly, it was clearly recognised in the provisional Regulation (see for example recitals 72, 86 or 91 of the provisional Regulation) that there was a slight increase in the market share of the Union industry.
For det andet præciseres det i betragtning 72 i forordningen om midlertidig told, at den øgede markedsandel afspejler, at EU-producenternes salgsmængde faldt en smule mindre end forbruget i den betragtede periode.
Secondly, recital 72 of the provisional Regulation clarifies that the increased market share is a reflection of the fact that the sales volumes of the Union producers dropped slightly less than the consumption in the period considered.
Bortset fra de faldende lagerbeholdninger, som anført nedenfor, er det desuden den eneste skadesindikator, der viser en positiv udvikling i den betragtede periode.
Moreover, apart from falling stocks referred to below, it is the only injury indicator that shows a positive development over the period considered.
Den tyrkiske regering hævdede også, at de faldende ultimolagre for de EU-producenter, der indgik i stikprøven, er et tegn på en situation uden skade for EU-erhvervsgrenen.
The Turkish government also claimed that a dropping closing stock of the sampled Union producers is an indication of a non-injurious situation of the Union industry.
Det skal i den forbindelse bemærkes, at som nævnt i betragtning 79 i forordningen om midlertidig told faldt ultimolagrene hos de EU-producenter, der indgik i stikprøven, med 18 % mellem 2008 og UP.
It is noted in this regard that indeed as stated in recital 79 of the provisional Regulation the closing stock of the sampled Union producers decreased by 18 % between 2008 and the IP.
Samtidig erkendes det, at et fald i lagerbeholdningerne kan opfattes som et positivt tegn, men kun i en situation, hvor salget stiger i et hurtigere tempo end produktionen.
At the same time it is recognised that a drop in stocks could be seen as a positive sign but only in a situation when sales would be growing at a pace faster than production.
Dette er dog ikke tilfældet i den foreliggende undersøgelse.
However, this is not the case in the current investigation.
Tværtimod afspejler faldet i lagerbeholdningerne i dette tilfælde kun, at produktionsmængderne faldt i et hurtigere tempo end salget.
On the contrary, the drop in stocks in this case is merely a reflection of production volumes dropping at a faster pace than sales.
I denne situation kan faldet i lagerbeholdningerne ikke ses som en positiv udvikling.
In this situation the drop in stocks cannot be seen as a positive development.
Da der ikke er fremsat andre påstande eller bemærkninger, bekræftes indholdet af betragtning 66-88 i forordningen om midlertidig told, herunder den konklusion, at EU-erhvervsgrenen har lidt væsentlig skade, jf. grundforordningens artikel 3, stk. 5, hermed.
In the absence of any other claim or comments, the content of recitals 66 to 88 of the provisional Regulation, including the conclusion that Union industry has suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation, is hereby confirmed.
Da der ikke er fremsat nogen specifikke bemærkninger, bekræftes betragtning 90-93 i forordningen om midlertidig told hermed.
In the absence of any specific comments, recitals 90 to 93 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.
Efter fremlæggelsen af de foreløbige konklusioner hævdede ÇIB og den tyrkiske regering, at den faktiske årsag til enhver skade, som EU-erhvervsgrenen måtte lide, ville være lavprisimport fra andre tredjelande, især fra lande, der er underlagt antidumpingforanstaltninger.
Following the provisional disclosure, the ÇIB and the Turkish Government claimed that the actual cause of any injury suffered by the Union industry would be low priced imports from other third countries and in particular from countries under anti-dumping measures.
I denne forbindelse bemærkes det, at som nævnt i betragtning 96 i forordningen om midlertidig told fortsatte importen fra de otte lande, der er underlagt antidumpingforanstaltninger, med at komme ind på EU-markedet, selv om deres markedsandel faldt fra 21 % i 2008 til 17 % i UP.
In this regard it is noted that, as already stated in recital 96 of the provisional Regulation, imports from the eight countries under anti-dumping measures continued to penetrate the Union market although their market share declined from 21 % in 2008 to 17 % in the IP.
Gennemsnitsprisen af denne import er generelt lavere end prisen for dumpingimportvarerne fra de pågældende lande.
The average prices of those imports are generally lower than those of the dumped imports from the countries concerned.
Selv om der tages højde for den relevante antidumpingtold, forbliver priserne på denne import lave og kan sammenlignes med priserne på den russiske og den tyrkiske import, og de er langt under EU-producenternes gennemsnitspriser.
Even when the applicable anti-dumping duty is taken into account, the prices of those imports remain low and comparable with the prices of Russian and Turkish imports and are below the average prices of the Union producers.
Det skal dog bemærkes, at der for de lande, der er underlagt antidumpingforanstaltninger (som for tredjelandene) kun findes begrænsede statistiske oplysninger og gennemsnitspriser, og den beregnede prisforskel er ikke nødvendigvis afgørende og kan skyldes et forskelligt varesortiment.
However, it is noted that for the countries under anti-dumping measures (as for all third countries) only limited statistical information and average prices are available and the established price difference is not necessarily conclusive and may be a result of a different product mix.
Derudover viser importen fra de lande, som er underlagt antidumpingforanstaltninger, en klar nedadgående tendens.
Moreover, imports from countries under anti-dumping measures show a clear downward trend.
Derfor er konklusionen, at de ikke bryder årsagssammenhængen mellem skade for EU-erhvervsgrenen og den øgede dumpingimport fra Tyrkiet og Rusland.
Hence, the conclusion that they were not breaking the causal link between injury to the Union industry and the increased dumped imports from Turkey and Russia.
Med hensyn til importen fra andre tredjelande faldt dens markedsandel i den betragtede periode fra 7 % i 2008 til 6 % i UP, mens markedsandelen for Rusland og Tyrkiet steg.
With regard to imports from other third countries, their market share declined during the period considered from 7 % in 2008 to 6 % in the IP while those of Russia and Turkey increased.