natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Resultaterne bekræfter, at de finansielle prognoser ikke var for optimistiske, og at Nauta var i stand til at konkurrere på markedet på trods af den generelle ugunstige økonomiske situation.
These results confirm that the financial forecasts were not overly optimistic and that Nauta was able to compete successfully on the market despite an unfavourable overall economic situation.
For det andet fremgår det af Nautas årsregnskaber, at selskabets erhvervsaktivitet var rentabel i perioden 2006-2008 forud for transaktionen samt i 2009 – året for transaktionen (se tabel 1 ovenfor).
Secondly, on the basis of the financial statements of the company, Nauta’s business activity was profitable in the pre-transaction period of 2006-2008 as well as in 2009 – the year of the transaction (see Table 1 above).
Selskabet havde en positiv egenkapitalforrentning, fortjeneste ved salg og afkastningsgrad.
The company had a positive return on equity (ROE), return on sales (ROS) and return on assets (ROA).
Ifølge de finansielle prognoser vil selskabet øge sin omsætning og fortjeneste ved salg.
Financial projections suggested that the company would increase its sales revenue and sales profit.
I lyset af markedsudsigterne og selskabets forretningsstrategi forekom denne prognose at være rimelig.
In view of the market prospects and the business strategy of the company this forecast appeared reasonable.
For det tredje var risikoen ved investeringen minimal, da Nauta forud for transaktionen havde en stor likvid beholdning (over 34 mio. PLN ved udgangen af 2008) og ingen rentebærende gæld.
Thirdly, the risk associated with the investment was limited since prior to the transaction Nauta had a large cash surplus (more than PLN 34 million at the end of 2008) and no interest-bearing debt.
Af ovennævnte grunde konkluderer Kommissionen, at den analyse, som ARP foretog forud for transaktionen, var baseret på rimelige antagelser, og at ARP handlede som en privat investor.
For the above reasons, the Commission concludes that the ex ante analysis performed by the IDA was based on reasonable assumptions and that the IDA behaved in the same way as a private investor.
Ud over at vurdere den analyse, som ARP foretog forud for transaktionen, analyserede Kommissionen også, om obligationsrenten var i overensstemmelse med den gældende referencesats.
Apart from assessing the analysis performed by the IDA prior to the investment, the Commission has also analysed whether the interest rate on the bonds was in line with the applicable reference rate.
Renten på de Nauta-obligationer, som ARP købte, var 5,15 % det første år og 5,42 % det andet år, dvs. en effektiv rente på 5,28 % p.a.
The interest rate at which Nauta’s bonds were acquired by the IDA amounted to 5,15 % in the first year and 5,42 % in the second year, i.e. effectively 5,28 % p.a.
Da basisrentesatsen for Polen i november 2009 var 4,53 %, var den rente, som ARP accepterede i forbindelse med investeringen i Nauta-obligationer, højere end den gældende referencesats (basisrentesatsen og den relevante margen), forudsat at Nautas rating som minimum var »god« (BBB) og sikkerhedsstillelsen »høj« på tidspunktet for foranstaltningens gennemførelse.
Given that the base rate for Poland in November 2009 amounted to 4,53 %, the rate accepted by the IDA for the investment in Nauta's bonds would be higher than the applicable reference rate (composed of the base rate and relevant margin) provided that the rating of Nauta when the measure was applied was at least ‘good’ (BBB) and the collateral ‘high’.
Nautas rating
Nauta's rating
De polske myndigheder kunne ikke oplyse Kommissionen om Nautas samtidige kreditvurdering, da virksomheden ikke havde nogen rentebærende gæld på tidspunktet for udstedelse af obligationerne.
The Polish authorities could not communicate to the Commission Nauta’s contemporaneous credit rating as the company did not have any interest-bearing debt when the bonds were issued.
Kommissionen sammenholdt derfor den rating, som Nauta kunne have opnået, med den rating, som ARP gav et andet polsk skibsværft (Crist) forud for en transaktion i 2010, der tidligere var blevet vurderet af Kommissionen [12].
Therefore, the Commission compared the rating Nauta could have obtained with the rating attributed by the IDA to another Polish shipyard (Crist) prior to a transaction in 2010, which had been previously assessed by the Commission [12].
De polske myndigheder anførte, at Nautas situation kunne sammenlignes med Crists situation, og at Nauta derfor kunne have opnået den samme rating.
The Polish authorities argued that the situation of Nauta was similar to the situation of Crist and therefore Nauta could have received the same rating.
Kommissionen bemærker for det første, at der var gode vækstmuligheder på Nautas primære marked, markedet for reparation af skibe.
The Commission first notes that Nauta's main market, the ship repair market, had good growth prospects.
I lighed med Crist havde Nauta opereret på markedet i lang tid og havde et netværk af faste kunder og en god konkurrencestilling.
Like Crist, Nauta had been present on the market for a long time and had an established customer network and competitive position.
For det andet var Nauta mere rentabel end Crist målt i afkastningsgrad og fortjeneste ved salg i den pågældende periode, selv om Crist havde en højere nettofortjeneste i de sidste tre år forud for transaktionen.
Secondly, although Crist reported higher net profits in the 3-year period prior to the transaction, Nauta recorded better profitability than Crist, as measured by ROA and ROS, during that period.
For det tredje havde Crist en stor gæld, hvorimod Nauta ikke havde nogen rentebærende gæld, og risikoen for Nautas misligholdelse var derfor lavere.
Thirdly, Crist was highly indebted while Nauta did not have any interest-bearing debt, therefore the risk of default of the latter was lower.
Derudover havde Nauta på tidspunktet for transaktionen en stor likvid beholdning på over 34 mio. PLN, hvorimod Crist havde en likvid beholdning på under 9 mio. PLN.
In addition Nauta had at the time of the transaction a significant cash surplus of more than PLN 34 million whereas Crist's cash surplus was less than PLN 9 million.
For det fjerde dækkede værdien af sikkerheden i begge tilfælde finansieringsrisikoen med en tabsprocent givet misligholdelse (loss given default (LGD) på mellem 0-30 %, som anført nedenfor.
Fourthly, as discussed below, in both cases the value of the collateral covered the risk of the financing with a Loss Given Default (LGD) of between 0 and 30 %.
I lyset af ovenstående er Kommissionen af den opfattelse, at det ikke var urimeligt, at ARP mente, at Nautas rating i 2009 kunne sammenlignes med Crists rating, som ARP vurderede som BBB.
In the light of the above, the Commission considers that it was not unreasonable for the IDA to consider that Nauta’s rating in 2009 could be assessed as similar to the rating of Crist, which was assessed by the IDA as BBB.
Værdi af sikkerhedsstillelse
Value of the collateral
Med hensyn til sikkerhedsstillelsens værdi gjorde Polen gældende, at den skulle vurderes som »høj«.
As regards the value of the collateral, Poland claimed that it should be assessed as ‘high’.
Ved en høj sikkerhedsstillelse skulle forstås en LGD-værdi på mellem 0-30 %.
A high value of collateral should represent a LGD value of between 0 and 30 %.
Da transaktionens nominelle værdi var 120 mio. PLN, ville sikkerhedsstillelsen være høj, hvis sikkerhedsstillelsens værdi lå i intervallet 84 mio. PLN - 120 mio. PLN.
As the transaction’s nominal value was PLN 120 million, the collateralisation would be high if the value of the collateral provided corresponded to a range between PLN 84 million and PLN 120 million.
I den eneste vurdering af Nautas grund foretaget efter transaktionen, som var tilgængelig for ARP, var værdien anslået til [>168] mio. PLN på grundlag af den antagelse, at grunden kunne anvendes til erhvervsformål, jf. byudviklingsundersøgelsen godkendt af byrådet i Gdynia.
The only ex ante appraisal of Nauta’s land available to the IDA indicated a price of PLN [> 168] million on the basis of the assumption that the land could be used for commercial purposes, as envisaged by the city of Gdynia in its approved urban development study.
Denne vurdering var blevet foretaget af […], en certificeret vurderingsmand, ved hjælp af sammenligningsmetoden.
This appraisal had been prepared by […], a certified surveyor using the comparative method.
Dette er en af de almindeligt anerkendte metoder til vurdering af jord og er fastlagt i den polske lovgivning.
This is one of the generally accepted methods for valuing land and is provided for in Polish law.
Kommissionen bemærker, at vurderingen var baseret på tilsvarende transaktioner, og at vurderingsmanden var bekendt med, at tilsvarende priser pr. kvadratmeter var blevet opnået i forbindelse med salg af nærliggende jordlodder.
The Commission notes that the valuation was based on similar transactions and that the surveyor was aware that similar values per square metre had been achieved in sales of neighbouring plots of land.
Da vurderingen var baseret på klassificering af grunden som en »erhvervsgrund«, analyserede Kommissionen ligeledes, om denne antagelse var begrundet.
As the evaluation was based on the classification of the land as ‘commercial’, the Commission also analysed whether that assumption was founded.
Kommissionen bemærker i denne forbindelse afgørelsen fra den øverste forvaltningsdomstol i Polen af 6. august 2009, der bekræfter, at byudviklingsundersøgelsen udarbejdet af byrådet i Gdynia var et vigtigt led i ændringen af lokaludviklingsplanen.
In that respect, the Commission takes note of the judgment of the Polish Supreme Administrative Court of 6 August 2009 which confirms that the urban development study prepared by the city of Gdynia constituted an important stage in amending the local development plan.
Domstolen fastslog, at administrative afgørelser såsom byggetilladelser udstedt for de arealer, der er omfattet af undersøgelsen, ikke burde være i strid med resultaterne af denne undersøgelse.
The Court stated that administrative decisions such as construction permits issued for the land covered by the study should not be incompatible with the findings of that study.
Kommissionen bemærker endvidere, at ved salget af de jordlodder, der støder op til Nautas grund, svarede de opnåede priser til værdien af ikke-industrielle grunde.
The Commission also notes that in the sales of the plots of land bordering Nauta’s land the prices achieved corresponded to the value of non-industrial land.
Da proceduren for vedtagelse af udviklingsplanen endnu ikke var blevet afsluttet, mener Kommissionen imidlertid, at en hypotetisk privat investor sandsynligvis ikke ville basere sin vurdering på grundens fulde værdi efter ændringen af lokaludviklingsplanen, men på en værdi, som hurtigt kunne opnås.
However, in view of the fact that the process of adopting the development plan had not been completed, the Commission considers that a hypothetical private investor would probably base its assessment not on the full value of the land after the change in the local development plan, but on a value that could be achieved quickly.
Kommissionen bemærker, at de uafhængige vurderingsmænd anvendte en koefficient på 0,5 af markedsværdien ved fastsættelsen af værdien for tilsvarende grunde solgt ved nødsalg i Gdynia [13].
The Commission notes that in order to establish a fire sale value for similar land in Gdynia the independent surveyors applied a coefficient of 0,5 to the market value [13].
Selv om denne koefficient forekommer at være konservativ i forbindelse med Nautas grund, ville den stadig resultere i en værdi på [>84] mio. PLN.
Whereas this ratio appears conservative, if it was applied to the land of Nauta it would still result in a value of PLN [> 84] million.
Selv på grundlag af meget forsigtige antagelser ville LGD således være lavere end 30 %, og sikkerhedsstillelsen bør betragtes som høj.
Thus, even given very prudent assumptions, the LGD would be below 30 % and the collateral should be considered as high.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at den sikkerhedsstillelse, som ARP accepterede, var »høj«.
The Commission therefore concludes that the collateral accepted by the IDA was ‘high’.
Konklusion vedrørende den første foranstaltning
Conclusion on the first measure
Kommissionen konkluderer, at de antagelser, der ligger til grund for analysen af Nautas finansielle stilling foretaget forud for investeringen, var rimelige, og at resultaterne af denne analyse begrundede konklusionen om, at den foreslåede obligationsrente garanterede et markedsdrevet risikojusteret afkast.
The Commission concludes that the assumptions underlying the analysis of the financial standing of Nauta performed prior to the investment were reasonable and that the results of this analysis justified the conclusion that the proposed interest rate on the bonds guaranteed a market-conform risk-adjusted return.
Ifølge referencesatsmeddelelsen og i lyset af BBB-ratingen, den høje sikkerhedsstillelse og referencesatsen på 4,53 % for Polen i november 2009 skulle renten på de obligationer, som ARP købte i 2009, være 5,28 % (4,53 % + 75 basispoint), hvilket er den effektive rente, som ARP rent faktisk accepterede.
Additionally, according to the reference rate Communication, considering a BBB rating, the high collateralisation and the reference rate of 4,53 % for Poland in November 2009, the bonds which the IDA acquired in 2009 should have been subject to an interest rate of 5,28 % (4,53 % + 75 bps), which is the effective rate actually accepted by the IDA.
Den første foranstaltning giver derfor ikke Nauta en fordel.
The first measure therefore does not entail an advantage for Nauta.
Undersøgelsen foretaget af […] tre år efter transaktionen, hvoraf det fremgår, at ARP's investering i Nauta-obligationer var meget rentabel, er ikke afgørende, da den blev foretaget efter transaktionen, men den bekræfter denne vurdering.
The study conducted by […] 3 years after the transaction, which shows the considerable profitability of the IDA’s investment in Nauta bonds is not decisive in view of its ex post nature, but confirms this assessment.
Kommissionen bemærker, at det forventede afkast i de første to scenarier ville være lig med værdien af sikkerhedsstillelsen.
The Commission observes that in the first scenario the expected return would be equal to the value of the collateral.
Som anført i betragtning 61 ovenfor ville en privat investor sandsynligvis ikke basere sin vurdering på grundens fulde værdi, men på en værdi, som hurtigt kunne opnås, dvs. [> 84] mio. PLN.
As mentioned in recital 61 above, a private creditor would probably base its assessment not on the full value of the land but on a value that could be achieved quickly, i.e. PLN [> 84] million.
I det andet scenario er det forventede afkast lig med obligationernes fulde nominelle værdi, dvs. 120 mio. PLN plus en rente på 8,46 % p.a. i to år (den gældende rentesats i dette tilfælde er 1M WIBOR plus 3,7 %, hvilket for WIBOR i december 2011 resulterede i en samlet rente på 8,46 %).
In the second scenario the expected return equals the full nominal value of the bonds, i.e. PLN 120 million plus interest of 8,46 % p.a. for 2 years (the interest applicable in this case equalled 1M WIBOR plus 3,7 %, which for the WIBOR in December 2011 resulted in a total interest rate of 8,46 %).
Den samlede værdi blev således anslået til [> 190] mio. EUR af den certificerede vurderingsmand.
The total value thus reached an estimated PLN [> 190] million, as appraised by the certified surveyor.
Når de administrative procedurer i forbindelse med ændringen af lokaludviklingsplanen (eller fremskridt i denne retning) afsluttes, vil prisen for det andet tilnærme sig grundens fulde markedsværdi, da usikkerheden for potentielle investorer mindskes.
Secondly, the completion of the administrative procedures to change the local development plan (or progress in that direction) should lead to an increase in the price towards the full commercial value of the land as legal uncertainty for potential investors decreases.
Der skal ligeledes taget højde for, at ARP allerede ejede Nauta på tidspunktet for den oprindeligt planlagte indløsning af obligationerne og således også var interesseret i at maksimere kapitalinvesteringsafkastet.
It should also be taken into account that at the time of the initially planned bond redemption, the IDA was already the owner of Nauta and, as such, was also interested in maximising the return from the capital investment.
En tvungen indløsning i 2011 kunne underminere bæredygtigheden af den overordnede strategi baseret på erhvervelsen af nye aktiver og flytning af forretningsstedet til en ny lokalitet og mindske hele selskabets værdi.
Forced redemption in 2011 could undermine the viability of the overall strategy based on the acquisition of new assets and transfer of the business to a new location and lead to a decrease in the value of the whole company.
Konklusion vedrørende den anden foranstaltning
Conclusion on the second measure
I lyset af ovenstående mener Kommissionen, at en hypotetisk privat investor ville have valgt at acceptere forlængelsen af obligationernes udløb i stedet for at gennemtvinge en omgående indløsning.
In the light of the above, the Commission considers that a hypothetical private creditor would have preferred to agree to the extension of the bonds' maturity rather than forcing immediate redemption.
Den anden foranstaltning giver derfor ikke Nauta en fordel.
The second measure therefore does not entail an advantage for Nauta.
KONKLUSION VEDRØRENDE FORDELEN
CONCLUSION ON THE ADVANTAGE
På grundlag af de nye elementer, som de polske myndigheder har fremlagt, og i lyset af ovenstående konklusioner, konkluderer Kommissionen, at selskabet ikke fik en uretmæssig fordel på grund af de betingelser, som ARP købte obligationerne på i 2009, og på grund af forlængelsen af obligationernes udløb i 2011.
On the basis of the new elements put forward by the Polish authorities and in view of the above findings, the Commission concludes that the company did not derive any undue advantage from the conditions under which the bonds were acquired by the IDA in 2009 and from the extension of the bonds' maturity in 2011.
Da de elementer, der indikerer, at der foreligger statsstøtte efter artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF er kumulative, er fraværet af et af dem afgørende.
In view of the fact that the elements indicating the existence of state aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU are cumulative, the absence of any one of them is decisive.
Der er derfor ingen grund til at analysere de øvrige elementer, der er nævnt i betragtning 41 ovenfor —
There is therefore no need to analyse the other elements identified in recital 41 above.
Foranstaltningen, som Republikken Polen har truffet til fordel for Nauta S.A. i form af køb af obligationer til en værdi af 120 mio. PLN til en effektiv rente på 5,28 % i 2009-2011 og 8,46 % i 2011-2013, udgør ikke statsstøtte efter artikel 107, stk. 1, i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde.
The measure which the Republic of Poland has implemented in favour of Nauta S.A. in the form of acquisition of bonds worth PLN 120 million at an effective interest rate of 5,28 % in 2009-2011 and 8,46 % in 2011-2013 does not constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
EUT C 213 af 19. juli 2012, s. 30.
OJ C 213, 19.7.2012, p. 30.
Kommissionens beslutning af 6. november 2008 om Polens statsstøtte C 19/05 (ex N 203/05) til Stocznia Szczecińska, EUT L 5 af 8.1.2010, s. 1, og Kommissionens beslutning af 6. november 2008 om Polens statsstøtte C 17/05 (ex N 194/05 og PL 34/04) til Gdynia skibsværft, EUT L 33 af 4.2.2010, s. 1.
Commission Decision of 6 November 2008 on State aid C 19/05 (ex N 203/05) granted by Poland to Stocznia Szczecińska (OJ L 5, 8.1.2010, p. 1), and Commission Decision of 6 November 2008 on State aid C 17/05 (ex N 194/05 and PL 34/04) granted by Poland to Stocznia Gdynia (OJ L 33, 4.2.2010, p. 1).
Nautas værdi var anslået til [90-150] mio. PLN i en ekspertvurdering fra april 2009 og til [90-150] mio. PLN i en opdatering af 21. april 2010.
Nauta's value was estimated at PLN [90-150] million in an expert evaluation dated April 2009 and at PLN [90-150] million in an update on 21 April 2010.
1 EUR = ca. 4 PLN.
EUR 1 = PLN 4 approx.
De resterende 6,85 % af aktiekapitalen tilhørte finansministeriet.
The remaining 6,85 % of share capital belonged to the Treasury.
Den 30. september 2010 overførte ARP sin andel i Nauta til sit helejede datterselskab MS Investment Fund (»MS TFI«).
On 30 September 2010 the IDA transferred its stake in Nauta to its wholly owned subsidiary MS Investment Fund (‘MS TFI’).
Den 25. oktober 2010 overførte MS TFI aktierne til fondens delfond MARS Investment Fund.
On 25 October 2010 MS TFI transferred the shares to its sub-fund MARS Investment Fund.
Som følge af disse transaktioner er ARP fortsat majoritetsaktionær i Nauta.
As a result of those transactions the IDA remains the majority shareholder in Nauta.
De nuværende minoritetsaktionærer er ansatte i Nauta (3,19 %) og finansministeriet (3,66 %).
The current minority shareholders are Nauta's employees (3,19 %) and the Treasury (3,66 %).
Provenuet fra obligationsudstedelsen skulle ikke blot dække købet af aktiverne, men også den tilpasning og modernisering, der blev skønnet nødvendig, før Nauta kunne flytte sine aktiviteter til et nyt sted.
The proceeds from the bond issue were intended to cover not just the purchase of the assets but also their adaptation and modernisation deemed necessary before Nauta could move its operations to a new location.
Værdien af obligationerne var højere end værdien af de aktiver, der blev erhvervet for at dække disse yderligere omkostninger.
The value of the bonds was higher than the value of the assets acquired to provide for this additional expenditure.
Kommissionens afgørelse C(2012) 5057 final af 25. juli 2012 om statsstøtte SA.33114 (2012/C) (ex. 2011/NN) Påstået støtte til skibsværftet Crist, EUT L 12 af 16. januar 2013, s. 38-50.
Commission Decision C(2012) 5057 final of 25 July 2012 on the State aid SA.33114 (2012/C) (ex. 2011/NN) Alleged aid to CRIST Shipyard (OJ L 12, 16.1.2013, p. 38-50).
Vurdering af grunde tilhørende Gdynia skibsværft af 4. marts 2009.
Valuation of land belonging to Gdynia Shipyard dated 4 March 2009.
Kommissionen afholdt et møde med de polske myndigheder den 15. juli 2010, den 10. september 2010, den 22. oktober 2010 og den 6. december 2011.
The Commission met the Polish authorities on 15 July 2010, 10 September 2010, 22 October 2010 and 6 December 2011.
Der var en brevveksling mellem Kommissionens næstformand Joaquín Almunia og den polske finansminister Aleksander Grad om likvidationsproceduren den 28. juni 2011, den 18. juli 2011, den 7. oktober 2011 og den 25. oktober 2011.
An exchange of letters between Vice-President Almunia and the Minister for the Treasury, Mr Grad, on the liquidation procedure took place on 28 June 2011, 18 July 2011, 7 October 2011 and 25 October 2011.
Polen fremsendte yderligere oplysninger den 26. oktober, den 8. november og den 5. december 2012.
Further information was provided by Poland on 26 October, 8 November and 5 December 2012.
Obligationerne blev ikke indløst af Nauta som oprindeligt planlagt den 30. november 2011.
The bonds were not redeemed by Nauta as originally scheduled on 30 November 2011.
ARP gik med til at udskyde indløsningen til den 30. november 2013 mod en renteforhøjelse til 8,46 % p.a.
The IDA agreed to postpone the redemption date until 30 November 2013 at an increased interest rate of 8,46 % p.a.
ARP og Nauta undertegnede en ny kontrakt i november 2011 om forlængelse af obligationernes udløb indtil den 30. november 2013.
A new contract between the IDA and Nauta was signed in November 2011 to extend the maturity of the bonds until 30 November 2013.