natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Således erkender Kommissionen, at det i foretagendets aktuelle finansielle situation forekommer lidet sandsynligt, at det offentlige foretagende IFP som følge af mangel på egne midler, i hvert fald i den nærmeste fremtid, skulle blive ude af stand til at honorere sin gæld, og der dermed skulle blive brug for statslig indgriben.
Consequently, the Commission recognises that in its present financial position, it seems unlikely, at least in the near future, that a shortage of own resources could lead to IFP being unable to meet its debts and give rise to the need for State intervention.
Selv om det er usandsynligt på nuværende tidspunkt, er det dog ikke desto mindre muligt på længere sigt, at det offentlige foretagende IFP kommer i en situation med utilstrækkelige aktiver.
Although it is unlikely at present, it cannot be ruled out that IFP might experience such a shortage of assets in the longer term.
Når det under sådanne omstændigheder er umuligt at mobilisere ressourcer gennem afhændelse af aktiver, bliver det nødvendigt med andre garantimekanismer (lån, forsøg på at drage staten til ansvar osv.).
In such circumstances, the fact that resources cannot be mobilised by selling assets means that use has to be made of other guarantee mechanisms (advances, efforts to establish a liability on the part of the State, etc.).
I øvrigt kan lovgivernes fastsættelse af en ordning til beskyttelse af aktiver give næring til sager om statens objektive ansvar i tilfælde af det offentlige foretagende IFP's eventuelle insolvens [89].
Furthermore, in the event of a default on the part of IFP, the fact that the legislature has laid down rules protecting the assets might then be invoked in any dispute in which it was alleged that there was a strict liability resting on the State [89].
I denne henseende noterer Kommissionen sig de franske myndigheders argument [90] om, at selv om staten måtte mene, at et aktiv tilhørende et offentligt foretagende er »uundværligt« for udøvelsen af dets public service-opgave, og måtte modsætte sig en afhændelse heraf, indebærer det på ingen måde, at staten er forpligtet til at yde kompensation gennem garantiordninger.
On this point, the Commission takes note of the argument put forward by the French authorities [90] according to which even if the State considers an asset belonging to a publicly owned establishment to be ‘indispensable’ for the provision of a public service, and therefore objects to its sale, it is not bound to compensate via a guarantee mechanism.
Kommissionen bemærker imidlertid, at de franske myndigheder har medgivet (selv om de bestrider, at det offentlige foretagende IFP kan drage fordel heraf), at der stilles krav om kontinuitet i den offentlige service til statens repræsentant i forbindelse med proceduren i henhold til lov af 16. juli 1980 [91].
The Commission notes, however, that the French authorities have acknowledged that in applying the procedure laid down in the Law of 16 July 1980 the representative of the State is bound by the requirement of continuity of public service (although they deny that IFP can benefit as a result) [91].
Derfor mener Kommissionen, at en sådan beslutning fra det offentliges side om ikke at afhænde aktiver af hensyn til opretholdelsen af den offentlige service kan medføre et objektivt ansvar for staten for ulige fordeling af offentlige byrder.
The Commission therefore considers that such a choice by the public authorities to prevent sales of assets in order to maintain a public service means that the State might incur strict liability for a breach of the principle of equality before public burdens.
For det tredje har Kommissionen af de årsager, der fremlægges i betragtning 185-226 i beslutning C 56/2007, som den henviser til, den opfattelse, at de muligheder, som en kreditor har for at gøre statens ansvar gældende i det lidet sandsynlige tilfælde, at den i loven af 1980 fastsatte procedure ikke skulle sikre, at kreditoren kan få sin betaling, har karakter af garantiordning.
Thirdly, for the reasons already set out in recitals 185 to 226 of decision C 56/2007, to which it refers mutatis mutandis, the Commission considers that, in the unlikely event that the procedure laid down by the Law of 16 July 1980 does not result in payment of creditors, the courses still open to them to render the State liable have the characteristics of a guarantee mechanism.
Selv om de franske myndigheder mener, at hverken statens culpaansvar eller objektive ansvar [92] i princippet kan gøres gældende, erkender de, at det godt kan være, at dommeren træffer bestemmelse om godtgørelse til kreditor i tilfælde af, at der stilles krav om kontinuitet i den offentlige service til statens repræsentant i forbindelse med proceduren i henhold til loven af 1980.
Although the French authorities consider that the State has in principle no liability, whether for a fault on its part or in the absence of any such fault [92], they acknowledge that, if there is a requirement of continuity of public service that is binding on the representative of the State in the procedure laid down by the Law of 16 July 1980, a court may order that the creditor be compensated.
I et sådant tilfælde mener de franske myndigheder imidlertid ikke, at kreditor får nogen som helst fordel, fordi erstatningen ville være sammenlignelig med den, som vedkommende havde fået efter den almindelige procedure.
But in that event the French authorities consider that the creditor is not given any advantage, as the compensation he receives is comparable to that which he would have received under ordinary law.
Kommissionen påpeger i den forbindelse visse særtræk ved den særlige lov fra 1980. Ifølge den almindelige retslige konkursbehandling får kreditorerne (især de simple) generelt ikke hele deres fordring dækket, og som oftest får en virksomhed under likvidation ikke sin gæld betalt af tredjemand.
The Commission draws attention, however, to certain specific features of the special scheme introduced by the Law of 1980: under the ordinary law governing compulsory winding up, creditors (and especially unsecured creditors) will not as a general rule recover the whole of their claims, and the enterprise being wound up will not usually have its debts paid by a third party.
De franske myndigheder anfægter ligeledes, at de muligheder for godtgørelse, som kreditorerne får ved at gøre ansvar gældende, kan sidestilles med en form for garanti.
The French authorities also further deny that any possibility of compensation of creditors that may be opened up if the State is held liable can be considered equivalent to a guarantee.
Tværtimod mener Kommissionen, at statens pådragelse af ansvar (culpøst eller objektivt) ved iværksættelse af proceduren for inddrivelse af offentligretlige juridiske personers gæld i henhold til loven af 16. juli 1980 svarer til en garantiordning i henhold til EU-retten, idet den sikrer kreditorerne betaling af deres fordring, ved at staten tvinges til at betale den i tilfælde af det offentlige foretagende IFP's insolvens.
The Commission takes the view, however, that, in the procedure for the recovery of the debts of the public bodies referred to in the Law of 16 July 1980, the liability of the State, with or without fault, is indeed equivalent to a guarantee mechanism for purposes of European Union law, because it ensures creditors that if IFP should default the State will be required to meet their claims.
Oven i købet sigter Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomstol (herefter »ECHR«) i sin retspraksis i sagen Société de gestion du port de Campoloro et Société fermière de Campoloro mod Frankrig [93] (herefter »Campoloro-sagen«) mod at anerkende eksistensen af en automatisk garanti.
The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) in Société de gestion du port de Campoloro et Société fermière de Campoloro v France [93] (the Campoloro case) also points to the existence of an automatic guarantee.
Endelig mener Kommissionen i lighed med påvisningen i betragtning 181-184 i beslutning C 56/2007, som den henviser til, at de franske myndigheders forslag om at præcisere anvendelsesdekretet til loven af 1980 ikke er tilstrækkeligt til at udelukke, at frigørelsen af ressourcer sker takket være en indsprøjtning af offentlige midler.
Finally, as shown in recitals 181 to 184 of decision C 56/2007, to which it refers mutatis mutandis, the Commission considers that the French authorities’ proposal for a clarification of the Decree implementing the Law of 1980 is not sufficient to prevent an increase in resources from being achieved by an injection of public funds.
De franske myndigheder har foreslået følgende ændring af anvendelsesdekretet til loven af 1980: »Når opfordringen ikke har givet noget resultat ved udløbet af disse frister, sørger statens repræsentant eller tilsynsmyndigheden for at opføre udgiften på den insolvente lokale myndigheds eller offentlige virksomheds budget. Den pågældende frigør evt. de nødvendige ressourcer af myndighedens eller virksomhedens budget ved at sænke de bevillinger, der er afsat til andre udgifter og endnu ikke er brugt, eller ved at hæve ressourcerne« (ændringen er understreget).
The French authorities propose to amend the Decree implementing the Law of 1980 as follows (the amendment is shown in italic): ‘If the notice given has had no effect by the time these deadlines expire, the representative of the State or the authority responsible for supervision shall enter the expenditure in the budget of the defaulting authority or publicly owned establishment. The representative of the State or the authority responsible for supervision shall, as appropriate, release the necessary resources from the budget of the defaulting authority or establishment either by reducing the appropriations allocated to other expenditures and still available or by increasing resources’.
Kommissionen påpeger imidlertid, som den har gjort i betragtning 67 i indledningsbeslutningen, at retsakterne, hverken i deres nuværende version eller i den ændrede version ifølge de franske myndigheders forslag, udelukker, at frigørelsen af ressourcer kan ske gennem en forhøjelse af ressourcer, som på forhånd er muliggjort gennem et tilskud eller en indsprøjtning af offentlige midler.
However, as the Commission pointed out in recital 67 of the opening decision, neither in its present wording nor in the amended wording proposed by the French authorities does the legislation prevent an increase in resources from being made possible by a subsidy or injection of public funds.
Af grunde, der allerede er forklaret i betragtning 204-211 i beslutning C 56/2007, som Kommissionen henviser til, mener den i øvrigt, at ECHR's afgørelse af Campoloro-sagen viser, at den franske stats ansvarspådragelse i dette tilfælde virker som en implicit garanti for offentlige myndigheders gæld og ikke er knyttet til nogen betingelse om tab.
For the reasons already set out in recitals 204 to 211 of decision C 56/2007, to which it refers mutatis mutandis, the Commission also considers that the EHCR’s judgment in the Campoloro case demonstrates that, in this instance, the liability accepted by the French State operates as an implied guarantee of the public authorities’ liabilities and is not linked to any condition relating to injury.
Kommissionen bemærker nærmere bestemt, at ECHR tilbageviste de franske myndigheders argumenter, idet de byggede deres argumentation [94] på, at der dels ikke var noget udløsende forhold, som kunne tilskrives staten, dels at der ikke forelå nogen statsgaranti til fordel for de offentlige myndigheder med status af juridisk person, og at domstolen tog sagsøgernes [95] modsatrettede argumenter til følge.
The Commission notes more specifically that the ECHR rejected the arguments of the French authorities which attempted to base their case [94] on the absence of, firstly, an operative event imputable to the State and, secondly, a guarantee on the part of the State to public authorities possessing legal personality, and accepted the contrary arguments of the applicants [95].
Kommissionen mener, at der af denne retspraksis kan uddrages følgende tre vigtige elementer:
The Commission considers that this judgment has three important implications:
Med forbehold af at sagsøgerne opnår en retsafgørelse, der anerkender deres fordring, virker statens ansvar som en implicit garanti [98], idet den franske stat dels dømmes til at betale hele den offentligretlige persons gæld [99], dels at der ikke er foretaget nogen fordeling mellem det, der kunne skyldes den offentlige skyldnermyndigheds insolvenssituation og de eventuelle misligholdelser, som kan tilskrives staten (ECHR søgte på intet tidspunkt et udløsende forhold, der kunne tilskrives staten, og henholdt sig alene til skyldnerens insolvens).
Subject to the applicants obtaining a court judgment recognising their claim, the liability of the State functions as an implied guarantee [98], in so far as the French State is required to pay the whole of the debt of the public body [99] and no distinction is made between debt conceivably due to the public authority’s insolvency and possible defaults imputable to the State (the ECHR did not at any time seek to identify an act or omission imputable to the State, and looked no further than the debtor’s insolvent status).
Dette ansvar dækker gæld hos offentlige myndigheder, som dog har status af juridiske personer.
This liability covers the debts of public authorities possessed, however, of legal personality.
Den franske regering påberåbte sig udtrykkeligt eksistensen af en juridisk person og egne midler som argument mod, at den franske stats ansvar kunne gøres gældende, men det argument blev tilsidesat af ECHR.
The existence of legal personality and of assets specific to the authority was expressly invoked by the French Government in its opposition to holding the French State liable, but this argument was rejected by the ECHR.
Anvendelsesområdet for statsgarantien dækker de dertil knyttede offentlige myndigheder.
The scope of the State guarantee extends to include public authorities dependent on the State.
Garantien er derfor tæt knyttet til skyldnerens offentligretlige status.
The guarantee is therefore intrinsically connected with the debtor’s public-law legal form.
I øvrigt konstaterer Kommissionen, at den løsning, ECHR lagde til grund i Campoloro-sagen, ikke er isoleret, men tværtimod hænger sammen med en meget fast retspraksis, f.eks. i dommene i sagerne Artico mod Italien [100] og Bourdov mod Rusland [101].
Moreover, the Commission notes that the solution adopted by the ECHR in the Campoloro case is not an isolated one and stems from a well established line of case-law, notably in the judgments in the cases Artico v Italy [100] and Bourdov v Russia [101].
Af de grunde, der allerede er forklaret i betragtning 212-220 i beslutning C 56/2007, som Kommissionen henviser til, mener den, at de franske myndigheders bemærkninger ikke vil kunne afkræfte denne påvisning.
For the reasons already set out in recitals 212 to 220 of decision C 56/2007, to which it refers mutatis mutandis, the Commission considers that the observations made by the French authorities are not of a nature to invalidate this reasoning.
På baggrund af ovenstående og i lighed med den konklusion, som Kommissionen drog i postsagen ifølge betragtning 222 i beslutning C 56/2007 og indledningsbeslutningen, konkluderer Kommissionen, at en kreditor, som ikke har opnået betaling af sin fordring i det offentlige foretagende IFP gennem procedurerne i lov af 16. juli 1980, ifølge gældende fransk retstilstand kan få hele beløbet svarende til den ikke fyldestgjorte fordring ved som sidste udvej at påberåbe sig statens ansvar i modsætning til det, der sker i forbindelse med en almindelig likvidationsprocedure, hvor tilbagebetalingen til kreditor er begrænset til værdien af de disponible aktiver.
As it argued in the postal case, in recital 222 of decision C 56/2007, and in the opening decision, the Commission concludes that, as French law currently stands, a creditor of IFP who has not obtained the payment of his claim by recourse to the procedures introduced by the Law of 16 July 1980 may receive all of the sums corresponding to the unmet claim by invoking the State’s last-resort liability. This is the opposite of what happens within the framework of winding-up proceedings under ordinary law, where the reimbursement of the creditor is limited by the value of the available assets.
Som følge heraf mener Kommissionen, at statens ansvar behandles som en garanti, at det ikke er begrænset af nogen fransk retsakt, og at det er uløseligt forbundet med skyldnerinstitutionens offentligretlige status.
In consequence of the above, the Commission considers that the State’s liability is treated as a guarantee, it is not the subject of any limitation by French legislation, and is intrinsically linked to the public-law legal form possessed by the debtor body.
I øvrigt tager Kommissionen af de grunde, der allerede er gjort rede for i betragtning 223-226 i beslutning C 56/2007, som den henviser til, det franske forslag til efterretning, ifølge hvilket der indføjes en anmærkning om, at der ikke foreligger nogen garanti, i samtlige det offentlige foretagende IFP's kontrakter, som indebærer en fordring, for at fjerne risikoen for, at statens objektive ansvar gøres gældende alene med henvisning til det offentlige foretagende IFP's insolvens.
Furthermore, for the reasons already set out in recitals 223 to 226 of decision C 56/2007, to which it refers mutatis mutandis, the Commission takes note of the French proposal to include a clause in all IFP contracts involving claims so as to limit any risk of triggering the State’s strict liability based on IFP’s insolvency alone.
Den mener ikke desto mindre, at en sådan juridisk ramme vil være skrøbelig, og at der vil være tvivl om dens fortsatte eksistens, idet undtagelsen på grund af accepteret risiko er en regel i henhold til retspraksis, som altid kan udvikle sig.
It considers that such a legal framework would remain fragile and that there are doubts about its durability, because the plea of accepted risk is a rule established by case-law, which could always evolve.
Kommissionen vurderer imidlertid, at et sådant forlag i sig selv er utilstrækkeligt, for det dækker ikke alle tilfælde. Det gør det ikke muligt at udelukke, at statsgarantien kan bringes i anvendelse for alle typer ansvar (navnlig ansvar uden for kontraktforhold og strafansvar).
The Commission considers, however, that such a proposal is inherently inadequate as it does not cover all eventualities: it would not mean that the State guarantee could never come into play for any type of liability (in particular non-contractual liability and criminal liability).
I øvrigt er det kontraktligt umuligt at bestemme, at staten ikke hæfter for det offentlige foretagende IFP's gæld, idet det offentlige foretagende IFP f.eks. kan være skyldner over for tredjemand gennem forskellige juridiske mekanismer, især i tilfælde af overtagelse af en anden enhed [102], som har gæld til tredjeparter, som ikke i første omgang kan identificeres.
Moreover, it is impossible to make it contractually clear to its debtors that the State will not be liable for IFP’s debts, as IFP may find itself indebted towards a third party through a variety of judicial mechanisms, in particular if it were to absorb another entity holding claims by initially unidentifiable third parties [102].
For så vidt angår tredjeparternes individuelle fordringer, mener Kommissionen endelig, at kun en almengyldig lov, hvori det hedder, at staten ikke er garant for det offentlige foretagende IFP, og som gælder i alle forhold og for alle typer tredjeparter, vil kunne »afskaffe« den ubegrænsede garanti.
Ultimately, as regards the individual claims held by third parties, the Commission considers that only a text of general scope applicable in any situation and to any type of third party, indicating that the State is not the guarantor of IFP, would be enough to eliminate the unlimited guarantee.
Såfremt de franske forslag skulle blokere for enhver mulighed for, at en kreditor hos det offentlige foretagende IFP skulle gøre statens ansvar gældende for at opnå betaling af sin fordring (et tilfælde, som ifølge Kommissionen ikke er verificeret), gør disse forslag det desuden ikke muligt klart at fastslå, hvad der ville ske i tilfælde af det offentlige foretagende IFP's insolvens [103].
In addition, even if the French proposals were to make it quite impossible for a creditor of IFP to hold the State liable for paying its claim (something which in the Commission’s view has not been shown), such proposals would not enable it to be clearly established what would happen in the event of IFP becoming insolvent [103].
For det fjerde kan en kreditor hos et offentligt foretagende, selv om han ikke bliver fyldestgjort, knytte retsvirkninger til den legitime fejltagelse, han begik ved etablering af fordringen, idet den altid vil blive imødekommet.
Fourthly, even if he were to fail obtain satisfaction, the creditor of a publicly owned establishment could invoke legal effects arising from a legitimate mistake he made at the time the claim arose, when he believed that the claim would always be honoured.
Af de grunde, der er gjort rede for i betragtning 227, 228 (stk. 1-3) og 229 i beslutning C 56/2007, som Kommissionen henviser til, mener den, at teorien om ydre fremtræden [104] gør det muligt at bekræfte, at det offentlige foretagende IFP's kreditorer på baggrund af en vifte af samstemmende indicier med rette kan tro, at en sådan garanti faktisk eksisterer (og det endda under antagelse af, at det offentlige foretagende IFP's status af EPIC ikke retligt vil kunne give det en ubegrænset garanti fra den franske stats side).
For the reasons already set out in recitals 227, 228 (first to third indents) and 229 of decision C 56/2007, to which it refers mutatis mutandis, the Commission believes that the theory of appearance [104] provides confirmation that the creditors of IFP would be justified in believing, on the basis of a body of consistent evidence, that such a guarantee does indeed exist (even assuming, quod non, that the fact that IFP has the legal form of an EPIC is not of a nature to confer on it, in law, an unlimited guarantee given by the French State).
De primære relevante indicier i henseende til teorien om ydre fremtræden ligger dels i, at forskellige retsakter (loven fra 1980 og gennemførelsesbestemmelserne hertil) eller officielle dokumenter (budgetdokumenter) giver kreditor anledning til at tro, at staten vil påtage sig et EPIC's gæld i tilfælde af utilstrækkelig likviditet eller vil påtage sig sit ansvar, dels i, at de franske myndigheders manglende præcisering af loven på området efter Campoloro-sagen og de første procedurer, som Kommissionen indledte om status af EPIC, ligeledes giver kreditorerne grund til at stole på, at der findes en sådan garanti, og endelig i, at den manglende klare oplysning om retsvirkningerne af et EPIC's betalingsstandsning også peger i den retning.
The main relevant indices in relation to the theory of appearance derive firstly from the fact that a variety of legislative instruments (Law of 16 July 1980 and the measures implementing it) or official (budgetary) documents lead the creditor to believe that the State would take over EPICs’ debts in the event of their having a shortage of funds or that it would assume liability for those debts; secondly from the fact that the lack of clarification by the French authorities of the legal situation following the Campoloro case and of the initial proceedings undertaken by the Commission on the legal form of EPICs also increases creditors’ confidence that such a guarantee does in fact exist; and finally from the fact that the lack of any clear indication as to the effects of a situation in which an EPIC is in default also militates in favour of this view.