natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Efter at den korsikanske regionalforsamling den 1. juli 2007 havde udskudt datoen for den nye delegeringsaftales ikrafttræden og en anden procedure med forhandling, foreslog OTC at afvise Corsica Ferries' tilbud [20].
After the Corsican Assembly postponed the date of entry into force of the new delegation to 1 July 2007 and another negotiation procedure took place, the Corsican Transport Board proposed rejecting the bid from Corsica Ferries [20].
Ved beslutning nr. 07/108 af 7. juni 2007 tildelte den korsikanske regionalforsamling konsortiet SNCM/CMN aftalen om delegering af offentlig tjeneste på sejlruterne mellem Marseille og havnene på Korsika, og ved en anden beslutning af samme dato blev formanden for de lokale korsikanske myndigheders conseil exécutif (forretningsudvalg) beføjet til at underskrive aftalen (herefter »de to beslutninger af 7. juni 2007«).
By Resolution No 07/108 dated 7 June 2007, the Corsican Assembly awarded the SNCM/CMN group the public service delegation for the ferry service between the port of Marseille and the Corsican ports and, by a Decision of the same day, the President of the Executive Council of Corsica was authorised to sign the public service delegation contract (‘the two decisions of 7 June 2007’).
PRØVELSE AF GYLDIGHEDEN AF DE TO BESLUTNINGER AF 7. JUNI 2007
CALLING INTO QUESTION THE VALIDITY OF THE TWO DECISIONS OF 7 JUNE 2007
CAA fastslog i sin afgørelse, at der var sket en overtrædelse af Rådets forordning nr. 3577/92 om cabotagesejlads [21] (herefter »cabotageforordningen«), og at aftalen havde karakter af ulovlig statsstøtte.
In its judgment, the Administrative Court of Appeal cited a violation of Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 on maritime cabotage [21] (‘the Cabotage Regulation’) and characterised the public service delegation contract as illegal state aid.
I afgørelsen henviser CAA til, at bestemmelserne i stk. 1 i aftalens paragraf 7 gør, at aftalen ikke opfylder det tredje kriterium i retspraksis fra Altmark-sagen [22].
The judgment on this matter stated that the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 7 of the public service delegation contract make it incompatible with the third Altmark criterion [22].
Derfor gav CAA de regionale myndigheder på Korsika påbud om at ophæve aftalen mindeligt inden 1. september 2012 [23].
The Court therefore ordered the Corsican regional authorities to rescind amicably the public service delegation contract before 1 September 2012 [23].
På anmodning fra SNCM og CMN annullerede Conseil d'Etat den 13. juli 2012 forvaltningsappelrettens afgørelse af 7. november 2011 [24] og hjemviste sagen til fornyet behandling i CAA i Marseille.
On appeal by SNCM and CMN [24], the Council of State annulled the 7 November 2011 judgment handed down by the Administrative Court of Appeal on 13 July 2012, and referred the case back to the Administrative Court of Appeal of Marseille.
RESUMÉ AF DE VIGTIGSTE BESTEMMELSER I AFTALEN
REMINDER OF THE MAIN PROVISIONS OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE DELEGATION CONTRACT
I udbudsbetingelserne i bilag 1 til aftalen defineres arten af disse tjenester.
The specifications contained in Annex 1 of the public service delegation contract define the nature of these services.
Der skelnes navnlig mellem:
In particular, it distinguishes between:
fast »passager- og godsbefordring« [25], som konsortiet SNCM-CMN skal drive hele året (herefter »basistjeneste«) og
the permanent ‘passenger and freight’ service [25] which the SNCM-CMN group must provide throughout the year (‘the basic service’) and
supplerende passagerbefordring [26] i spidsbelastningsperioder, ca. 37 uger, på ruterne Marseille–Ajaccio og Marseille–Bastia samt perioden 1. maj til 30. september på ruten Marseille–Propriano (herefter »supplerende tjeneste«).
the additional passenger service [26] to be provided during peak periods, for approximately 37 weeks, on the Marseille - Ajaccio and Marseille - Bastia routes and during the period from 1 May to 30 September on the Marseille - Propriano route (‘the additional service’).
I aftalens paragraf 2 anføres den finansielle referencekompensation, i henhold til hvilken kontrahenterne afgiver tilsagn i delegeringsperioden.
Article 2 of the public service delegation contract sets out the reference financial compensation to which concession holders commit for the duration of the concession.
Beløbene for denne finansielle referencekompensation er gengivet i tabel 4 i indledningsbeslutningen.
The amounts of this reference financial compensation are summarised in Table 4 of the opening decision.
I aftalens paragraf 3 anføres det, at DOT ikke giver eneret på de omhandlede ruter, men giver mulighed for, at andre selskaber kan drive fast rutefart uden finansiel kompensation.
Article 3 of the public service delegation contract states that the public service delegation does not confer exclusive use of the routes in question, but allows other companies to operate regular services without financial compensation.
Ikke desto mindre ville en eventuel ny aktør være underlagt en række forpligtelser, som er gengivet i indledningsbeslutningen [27].
Nevertheless, potential entrants are to be subject to obligations, as set out in the opening decision [27].
I øvrigt anføres det i paragraf 3, at kontrahenternes anmodning om finansiel kompensation er fastlagt i henhold til den sociale støtteordning [28].
In addition, Article 3 states that the requests for financial compensation from concession holders were determined according to the social assistance scheme [28].
Ifølge aftalens paragraf 5, stk. 2, tredje afsnit, er den endelige årlige finansielle kompensation til hver kontrahent begrænset til et beløb svarende til det driftsunderskud, der hidrører fra forpligtelserne i udbudsbetingelserne, idet der tages højde for, at der skal være et afkast på 15 % af flådens konventionelle værdi set i forhold til de dage, hvor den faktisk udnyttes til de overfarter, som modsvarer disse forpligtelser.
According to the third paragraph of Article 5(2) of the public service delegation contract, the final financial compensation for each concession holder for each year is limited to the operating deficit resulting from its contractual obligations, allowing for a 15 % return on the conventional value of the fleet in proportion to the days it has been effectively used for the crossings corresponding to those obligations.
Den konventionelle værdi er specificeret i bilag III til aftalen [29].
The conventional value is specified in Annex III of the public service delegation contract [29].
Ifølge aftalens paragraf 7 (herefter »beskyttelsesklausulen«) er det muligt at ændre de faste årlige beløb, der ellers er fastsat i aftalens paragraf 2 for hele kontraktperioden, for den finansielle kompensation, der udbetales til kontrahenterne i henhold til deres tilsagn.
Article 7 of the public service delegation contract (the ‘safeguard clause’) makes it possible to change the annual lump sum financial compensation payable to joint concession holders, in accordance with their commitments, set for the duration of the public service delegation contract under Article 2 thereof.
I henhold til paragraf 7, stk. 1, skal parterne mødes, hvis der sker væsentlige ændringer i aftalens tekniske, lovgivningsmæssige eller økonomiske betingelser, for at træffe foranstaltninger til genetablering af den oprindelige økonomiske ligevægt, først og fremmest med hensyn til maksimumpriser og tilpasning af tjenesterne.
Article 7(1) states that, in the event of a substantial change in the technical, regulatory or economic conditions of the contract, the parties shall meet to take steps to re-establish the initial financial equilibrium ‘with priority given to the maximum fares and the adaptation of the services’.
I aftalens paragraf 7, stk. 2, mindes der om, at beløbene for den finansielle kompensation er fastlagt ud fra de forventede indtægter ved passager- og godsbefordring.
Article 7(2) of the public service delegation contract states that the amounts of financial compensation are based on forecast passenger traffic and revenues.
Hvert år skal der, hvis den absolutte værdi af forskellen mellem de forventede [30] og de reelle indtægter overstiger 2 % af de forventede indtægter [31], foretages en op- eller nedjustering af den finansielle kompensation for hver indtægtskategori og hver kontrahent [32].
Each year, on the assumption that the absolute value of the difference between forecast revenue [30] and actual revenue is greater than 2 % of forecast revenue [31], an upward or downward adjustment of the financial compensation is provided for each category of revenue, and for each concession holder [32].
Det er fastlagt i aftalen [33], at der i løbet af det tredje år af delegeringsaftalen efter aftale mellem parterne lægges et loft over justeringerne af kompensationen i henhold til denne bestemmelse.
The public service delegation contract states [33] that adjustments in compensation under this clause should be capped by agreement between the parties in the course of the third year of the delegation.
De forventede indtægter for de to typer skibstrafik og de to kontrahenter er resumeret i tabel 5 i indledningsbeslutningen.
The forecast revenue for both types of traffic and both concession holders are summarised in Table 5 of the opening decision.
Antallet af pladser blev således sænket fra 9000 til 8000 i juleferieperioden, fra 3500 til 2300 i forårs- og efterårssæsonen og fra 85000 til 71000 i sommersæsonen på ruten Marseille-Ajaccio.
The number of seats available thus decreased from 9000 to 8000 during the Christmas holidays, from 3500 to 2300 during the ‘spring-autumn’ period and from 85000 to 71000 in the ‘summer’ period on the Marseille - Ajaccio route.
Den supplerende tjeneste blev indskrænket med 7000 pladser på ruten Marseille-Propriano.
The capacity of the additional service decreased by 7000 seats on the Marseille - Propriano route.
OTC omdefinerede ligeledes de enkelte trafikperioder til henholdsvis højsæson – 11 sommeruger fra sidste uge i juni til primo september – og mellemsæson – 22 uger fra april til juni og fra primo september til ultimo oktober undtagen skoleferierne i foråret og allehelgensdag.
The Corsican Transport Board also redefined traffic periods into a high season (an 11-week summer period between the last week of June and early September) and the mid-season period (22 weeks from April to June and from early September to late October, excluding spring and November school half-term holidays).
Taksterne og den finansielle kompensation blev også ændret.
The fares and financial compensation were also changed.
Med hensyn til den finansielle referencekompensation ender ændringen (i 2007-priser) fra 2010 og indtil 2013 i en nedsættelse af de årlige beløb på 6,5 mio. EUR for begge kontrahenter.
The correction (at 2007 values) from 2010 to 2013 led to a reduction in the annual amounts of the reference financial compensation of EUR 6,5 million for the two concession holders.
De reviderede kompensationsbeløb og de forventede indtægtsbeløb fremgår af tabel 7 og 8 i indledningsbeslutningen.
The revised amounts of compensation and forecast revenue are set out in Tables 7 and 8 of the opening decision.
Ifølge aftalen [34] udbetales 95 % af de indekserede forventede kompensationsbeløb i månedlige rater inden syv dage efter fremsendelse af en kortfattet rapport over udført tjeneste.
Under the public service delegation contract [34], 95 % of the forecast amount of indexed compensation is paid in monthly instalments within 7 days of the operator sending a brief report on service implementation.
Resten af kompensationen med tillæg eller fradrag for justeringer udbetales årligt inden 15 dage efter fremsendelse af den endelige rapport over udført tjeneste.
The remaining compensation, which is adjusted upwards or downwards, is paid annually within 15 days of the operator sending the final report on service implementation.
SNCM i alt
Total SNCM
heraf basistjeneste
of which basic
heraf supplerende tjeneste
of which additional
Den kompensation, der blev udbetalt til SNCM, og som blev fastlagt under ét i aftalens paragraf 2, er fordelt på basistjenesten (udført af stykgodsskibene) og den supplerende tjeneste (udført af passagerskibene) ifølge et sæt tildelingsregler, som primært går ud på at fordele resultatet – som er negativt [35] – forholdsmæssigt før finansiel kompensation til hver type tjeneste, sådan som det ville fremgå af resultatopgørelsen i konsortiet SNCM/CMN's tilbud [36].
The compensation paid to SNCM, established comprehensively by Article 2 of the public service delegation contract, is divided between the basic service (operated by passenger cargo vessels) and the additional service (operated by passenger ferries) according to a set of allocation rules that essentially provide for a proportional distribution of the - negative - result [35] before financial compensation for each type of service, as set out in the income statement in the bid tendered by the SNCM-CMN group [36].
BEGRUNDELSE FOR AT INDLEDE DEN FORMELLE UNDERSØGELSESPROCEDURE
REASONS FOR INITIATING THE FORMAL EXAMINATION PROCEDURE
For det første udtrykte Kommissionen tvivl om, hvorvidt forpligtelsen til offentlig tjeneste er nødvendig og proportionel, navnlig da den både omfatter basistjeneste og supplerende tjeneste.
First of all, the Commission expressed doubts about the necessity and proportionality of the public service obligation imposed, particularly since it encompasses both the basic and the additional services.
Kommissionen vurderede, at inddragelsen af den supplerende tjeneste i delegeringen af offentlig tjeneste formentlig udgjorde en overtrædelse af bestemmelserne i førnævnte forordning 3577/92 og dermed førte til manglende opfyldelse af det første Altmark-kriterium (klart definerede forpligtelser til offentlig tjeneste).
The Commission found that the inclusion of the additional service in the public service delegation could constitute a violation of the provisions of Regulation No 3577/92, cited above, leading to a breach of the first Altmark criterion (clearly defined public service obligations).
Kommissionen konstaterede da også, at de franske myndigheder ikke påviste et reelt behov for offentlig tjeneste i forbindelse med den supplerende tjeneste, og at denne ikke forekom at være uundværlig for den korrekte udførelse af basistjenesten.
Indeed, the Commission considered that the French authorities had not shown that there was a real public service need in the case of the additional service and that it did not seem essential to the proper performance of the basic service.
For det andet udtrykte Kommissionen tvivl med hensyn til parametrene for kompensation for offentlig tjeneste, der var fastsat i paragraf 7 i aftalen om delegering af offentlig tjeneste (se betragtning 86-94 i indledningsbeslutningen), og deres opfyldelse af det andet Altmark-kriterium (forud fastsatte parametre for fastlæggelse af kompensationsbeløb).
Second, the Commission expressed doubts about the parameters of public service compensation under Article 7 of the public service delegation contract (see paragraphs 86-94 of the opening decision) and their compliance with the second Altmark criterion (parameters on which the compensation is calculated established beforehand).
Desuden foretog Kommissionen den foreløbige vurdering, at udsvingene i de forventede indtægter mellem de forskellige tilbud, som kontrahenterne havde afgivet, kunne have bevirket, at kompensationsmekanismens parametre blev uigennemsigtige.
In addition, the Commission considered initially that variations in the amounts of the forecast revenues between the different tenders submitted by the concession holders may have had the effect of depriving the parameters of the compensation mechanism of transparency.
Endelig tyder visse oplysninger på, at der kan være givet finansielle kompensationer til kontrahenterne uden for rammerne af aftalen.
Lastly, there was evidence to suggest that financial compensation may have been awarded to the concession holders outside the framework of the public service delegation contract.
For det tredje udtrykte Kommissionen tvivl med hensyn til opfyldelsen af det tredje Altmark-kriterium (rimelig kompensation for de omkostninger, der påløber ved opfyldelsen af forpligtelsen til offentlig tjeneste).
Third, the Commission expressed doubts as to whether the third Altmark criterion had been fulfilled (fair compensation for the costs incurred in the discharge of public service obligations).
Den understregede, at den ikke var i besiddelse af oplysninger, der var tilstrækkelige til at bekræfte, at kontrahenterne ikke blev overkompenseret, især i henseende til vurderingen af den rimelige fortjeneste.
It underlined that it did not have at its disposal all the information required to be able to assert that the joint concession holders had not received any overcompensation, in particular as far as the assessment of reasonable profit was concerned.
Den var navnlig i tvivl om, hvorvidt paragraf 5, stk. 2, i aftalen (se betragtning 95-102 i indledningsbeslutningen) var tilstrækkelig til at undgå enhver overkompensation af tjenesteydernes omkostninger.
It wondered in particular whether Article 5(2) of the public service delegation contract (see paragraphs 95 to 102 of the opening decision) were sufficient to avoid overcompensation of the costs of providers.
Endelig udtrykte Kommissionen tvivl om, hvorvidt det var muligt at sikre reel og åben konkurrence i udbudsproceduren, som skulle have gjort det muligt kun at vælge den kandidat, som var i stand til at levere de omhandlede tjenester til den laveste pris for samfundet, i overensstemmelse med det fjerde Altmark-kriterium (udvælgelse af tjenesteyderen).
Finally, the Commission expressed doubts about the real and open competition allowed by the public procurement procedure, which is the only means of selecting a tenderer capable of providing those services at the least cost to the community, according to the fourth Altmark criterion (selection of the service provider).
Kommissionen kunne navnlig ikke udelukke, at udbudsbetingelserne, især dem, der omhandlede fartøjernes maksimale alder og muligheden for at give et samlet tilbud for alle ruterne, har kunnet bevirke, at en egentlig konkurrence om tildeling af aftalen er blevet forhindret.
The Commission had not particularly ruled out that the contractual conditions, in particular those relating to the maximum age of the fleet and the possibility of submitting a global offer covering all the routes served, might have had the effect of preventing effective competition in the award of the public service delegation contract.
Derfor udtrykte Kommissionen i indledningsbeslutningen alvorlig tvivl om, at aftalen skulle have opfyldt alle Altmark-kriterierne.
Accordingly, the Commission expressed serious doubts in the opening decision about the public service delegation contract having met all of the Altmark criteria.
Kommissionen kunne derfor ikke udelukke, at SNCM og CMN har fået en selektiv fordel i kraft af aftalen.
Therefore the Commission could not exclude the possibility that SNCM and CMN had enjoyed a selective advantage through the public service delegation contract.
Idet de to virksomheder er aktive på et marked, der har været fuldt liberaliseret siden den 1. januar 1993 [37], bemærkede Kommissionen desuden, at en sådan selektiv fordel kunne forvride konkurrencen i det indre marked og påvirke medlemsstaternes samhandel.
In addition, given that both companies have operated in a fully liberalised market since 1 January 1993 [37], the Commission also found that this selective advantage was likely to distort competition in the internal market and affect trade between Member States.
Kommissionen konkluderede, at den således ikke kunne udelukke, at de kompensationer, der i forbindelse med aftalen er udbetalt til SNCM og CMN, udgør statsstøtte i henhold til artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF.
The Commission concluded that it could not rule out that the compensation received by SNCM and CMN under the public service delegation contract constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
I sin indledningsbeslutning vurderede Kommissionen tillige – med forbehold for at det er muligt at konkludere, at forpligtelserne til offentlig tjeneste har været korrekt defineret – at de specifikke bestemmelser for anvendelsen af artikel 106, afsnit 2, i TEUF kunne finde anvendelse herpå.
Furthermore, with regard to the compatibility of any aid contained in the compensation under investigation, and provided that it can be concluded that the public service obligations have been correctly defined, the Commission considered that the specific rules on the application of Article 106(2) TFEU would apply.
Nærmere betegnet havde Kommissionen identificeret Den Europæiske Unions rammebestemmelser for statsstøtte i form af kompensation for offentlig tjeneste (2011) [38] (herefter »SGEI-rammebestemmelserne«) som retsgrundlag, uden at det berører et eventuelt andet grundlag for forenelighed, som det er op til Frankrig at påberåbe sig.
More specifically the Commission had identified the 2011 European Union framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation [38] (‘the SGEI Framework’) as the applicable legal basis that France should invoke, without prejudice to any other possible basis for compatibility.
De franske myndigheder anfører allerførst, at der findes separate driftsregnskaber for ruterne uden for offentlig tjeneste, så de kan skelnes fra DOT-driften.
The French authorities note first of all that non-public service delegation routes have cost accounting mechanisms that are different to those of routes operated under the delegation.
De understreger dernæst, at privatiseringsprotokollen indeholdt en ophævelsesklausul.
They then point out that the privatisation protocol included a single termination clause.
Denne klausul kunne navnlig bringes i anvendelse, hvis de regionale myndigheder på Korsika besluttede at igangsætte en høring om tildeling af en aftale om delegering af offentlig tjeneste med virkning fra 1. januar 2007, i tilfælde af at denne DOT i hovedsagen ikke var i overensstemmelse med de retningslinjer, som Korsikas regionalforsamling havde fastlagt [39].
This particular clause could be implemented in the event that the Corsican regional authorities decided to launch a consultation on the awarding of a public service delegation contract effective from 1 January 2007 if that public service delegation were not to meet the guidelines adopted by the Territorial Assembly of Corsica [39].
De franske myndigheder præciserer, at denne klausul ligeledes kan bringes i anvendelse, hvis delegeringen blev tildelt en tredjepart eller SNCM på betydeligt forringede økonomiske vilkår.
The French authorities state that the clause could also be implemented if the concession was awarded to a third party, or to SNCM in significantly less favourable economic conditions.
De franske myndigheder bemærker endvidere, at SNCM ikke siden 2. oktober 2009 har ejet en indirekte andel af CMN, hvorved enhver kapitalforbindelse mellem de to kontrahenter således er fjernet.
The French authorities also note that CMN ceased to have an indirect interest in SNCM from 2 October 2009 and therefore any financial relationship between the two joint concession holders was removed.
De nævner i øvrigt, at udviklingen i parametrene i konsortiet SNCM/CMN's tilbud fra februar 2007 til den 28. marts 2007 skyldes, at der skulle tages hensyn til ændringer i prognoserne for trafikbelastningen og driftsomkostningerne.
They also mention that the change of the parameters of the bid by the SNCM/CMN group between February 2007 and 28 March 2007 was due to consideration of amendments to the forecast level of traffic and to operating costs.
Vurderingen af salgsværdien skulle foretages af et uvildigt internationalt mæglerkontor, som skal have revideret sin vurdering i perioden mellem SNCM's to tilbud.
They claim that the assessment of the market value was due to the appraisal of an independent international brokerage firm, which reviewed its estimate in the interval between the two bids tendered by SNCM.
DEFINITIONEN AF STØTTE
CHARACTERISATION AS AID