natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I modsætning til den reform, der er omhandlet i La Poste-beslutningen, indtraf reformen af finansieringen af pensionerne til tjenestemandsansatte i France Télécom lige inden liberaliseringen i EU af de markeder, som France Télécom kunne drive forretning på.
In fact, contrary to the reform as foreseen by the La Poste decision invoked by the French Republic and France Télécom, the reform of the arrangements for financing the retirement pensions of the civil servant staff of France Télécom occurred on the eve of the opening-up, at Union level, of the markets where France Télécom could operate.
Det viser sig i øvrigt, at France Télécom drog fordel af denne liberalisering og etablerede sig på markeder i andre medlemsstater ikke kun takket være overgangen til aktieselskabsformen, men også delvist takket være fjernelsen af pensionsforpligtelser fra regnskabet og potentielt lavere forpligtelser i fremtiden som følge af reformen.
Moreover, it appears that France Télécom took advantage of this liberalisation by establishing itself in the markets of other Member States, thanks not only to its change of status into a public limited company, but also, in part, from the elimination of retirement pension commitments from its balance sheet and the lower future potential charges resulting from the reform.
Denne lempelse af pensionsforpligtelserne i France Télécoms regnskab gav mulighed for at øge selskabets solvens og lånekapacitet.
This reduction in its balance-sheet commitments enabled France Télécom to boost its solvency and borrowing capacity.
Det fremgår af tal for selskabets gældsætning, som klagerne har fremlagt i deres bemærkninger, som Den Franske Republik ikke har bestridt med hensyn til beløbenes størrelse, at France Télécom nettogæld steg fra 19,2 mia. EUR i 1997 til 83 mia. EUR i 2002.
The debt figures, supplied by the complainants in their comments and not contested by the French Republic regarding the amounts, show that the net financial debt of France Télécom rose from EUR 19,2 billion in 1997 to EUR 83 billion in 2002.
Det er korrekt, at denne volontaristiske ekspansive investeringspolitik på andre medlemsstaters markeder som følge af liberaliseringen kan være grunden til denne meget betydelige stigning i nettogælden.
It is true that a dedicated investment policy for expansion on the markets of other Member States, made possible by the liberalisation, may be at the origin of this very substantial increase in financial debt.
Derimod er de postmarkeder, som det franske selskab La Poste kan operere på i EU, endnu ikke helt liberaliseret og forventes først at blive det i 2012, dvs. seks år efter reformen af finansieringen af tjenestemandspensioner i La Poste [66].
On the other hand, the group of postal markets on which the French La Poste can operate in the Union is not yet entirely open to competition and would only have to be in 2012, i.e. six years after the reform of financing the pensions of La Poste [66].
Den konkurrencebegrænsende virkning af støtten til France Télécom på fuldt liberaliserede markeder er derfor mere mærkbar end støtten til La Poste.
The effect of restricting competition of the aid granted to France Télécom on markets which have been fully opened up is therefore greater than that of the aid to La Poste.
En fuldstændig jævnføring på de betingelser, der er nødvendige for at vurdere støttens forenelighed, er således ikke mulig, da der er tale om forskellige konkurrencemæssige situationer på markeder, hvor målet med liberaliseringen på EU-niveau og bidraget til økonomiens konkurrenceevne også var forskellige.
Complete parallelism in the conditions necessary for compatibility of the aid is not therefore required, since the competitive situations are separate on markets for which the priority in opening-up at Union level and the contribution to the competitiveness of its economy were also different.
Det følger heraf, at kriteriet om et mål af fælles interesse i henhold til artikel 107, stk. 3, litra c), i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde ikke nødvendigvis skal vurderes på samme måde i de to konkrete sager.
As a result, the common interest criterion referred to in Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU need not necessarily be assessed in an identical fashion in the two cases in point.
Endvidere kan situationen for La Poste og følgelig selskabets mulighed for en ekspansion på udenlandske markeder eller en styrkelse på det franske marked ikke sammenlignes med France Télécoms situation.
In addition, the financial situation of La Poste and, consequently, its capacity for expansion on external markets or for reinforcement on the French market were not comparable to those of France Télécom.
Som det nævnes i La Poste-beslutningen, skulle La poste som følge af overgangen til nye regnskabsstandarder i sit regnskab bogføre en henlæggelse til forpligtelser over for staten, der hidtil var angivet som en ikkebalanceført post, til et beløb på 76 mia. EUR [67].
As emphasised in the La Poste decision, without the reform of 2006, on account of the changeover to new accounting standards, La Poste had to enter into its accounts a provision for the State liability which it hitherto entered as an off-balance-sheet item for an amount of EUR 76 billion [67].
I modsætning til La Poste foretog France Télécom imidlertid henlæggelser i sit regnskab med henblik på kommende forpligtelser uden reformen, hvilket objektivt set gjorde de to virksomheders finansielle situation forskellig.
However, unlike La Poste, France Télécom set aside accounting provisions in its accounts to meet its future liabilities in the absence of the reform, which means that the financial situations of each undertaking were objectively different.
Hvis der ikke var gennemført en reform for France Télécom, og ordningen som følge af 1990-loven var fortsat, ville det ligeledes have vist sig ved stigende pensionsforpligtelser, der ville blive betydelige fra 2005-2007 ifølge de daværende prognoser, jf. betragtning 30, hvilket bekræfter de senere resultater i tabel 3.
Likewise, the absence of reform for France Télécom and the continuation of the arrangements introduced by the 1990 Law would have been reflected in an increase in the retirement pension costs which would become significant from 2005-07 according to the forecasts of the time set out in recital 30, which is corroborated ex post by the results shown in Table 3.
På tidspunktet for reformen førte fortsættelsen af ordningen ifølge den lov, der gælder for La Poste, umiddelbart til årlige merudgifter på ca. […] mio. for La Poste [68].
At the time of the reform, the continuation of the arrangements established by the Law applicable to La Poste was reflected immediately in an additional annual cost of approximately EUR […] million for La Poste [68].
Det er derfor ikke godtgjort, at situationen for de to virksomheder ifølge den lov, der var gældende før de respektive reformer og som følge deraf den konkurrencemæssige virkning, var den samme.
It has not therefore been established that the situation of the two undertakings under the effect of the law applicable before the respective reforms and, consequently, the competitive impact of these reforms, was similar.
Kendsgerningerne viser det modsatte.
The facts point to the contrary.
Det følger deraf, at en undersøgelse, der fører til samme konklusioner i de to sager, ikke er mulig.
As a result, an examination coming to similar conclusions in both cases is not justified.
I øvrigt var der i forbindelse med La Poste-beslutningen tilstrækkelige grunde til at antage, at det ekstraordinære engangsbidrag i fremtiden kunne anvendes som et forskud for betaling af bidragene i forbindelse med den ændrede sats for lige konkurrencevilkår.
Furthermore, in the case of the La Poste decision, there were sufficient reasons to consider that the exceptional flat-rate contribution could be reallocated in the future as an advance on the payment of the contributions linked to the adjusted competitively fair rate.
Disse grunde kan ikke gøres gældende i det konkrete tilfælde.
Such reasons are lacking in the present case.
Betingelsen om omfordeling af La Poste's ekstraordinære bidrag blev fastsat, efter at Kommissionen havde indledt den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure og gjort opmærksom på undervurderingen af det frigørende bidrag, der var nødvendigt for at sikre lige konkurrencevilkår.
In fact, the condition imposing the reallocation of the exceptional contribution by La Poste was established after the Commission had initiated the formal investigation procedure, calling into question the underestimation of the contribution in full discharge of liabilities necessary to attain a competitively fair rate.
Selv om de franske myndigheder ikke udtrykkeligt indrømmer det, var tildelingen af det ekstraordinære engangsbidrag, der er omhandlet i La Poste-beslutningen således i høj grad resultatet af en forhandling mellem Kommissionen og medlemsstaten, der skulle sikre betaling af et frigørende bidrag til sikring af lige konkurrencevilkår.
To a large extent, and even though the French authorities did not recognise it explicitly, the allocation of the exceptional flat-rate contribution in question in the La Poste decision was therefore the result of negotiations between the Commission and the Member State with a view to ensuring the payment of a contribution in full discharge of liabilities ensuring a competitively fair rate.
I den forhandling var de franske myndigheders udgangspunkt, således som det fremgår af anmeldelsen af 23. juni 2006 efter de første kontakter om sagen i december 2005, at La Poste's ekstraordinære bidrag ikke var nødvendigt for at sikre lige konkurrencevilkår i modsætning til det planlagte udkast til reform af det årlige bidrag.
In these negotiations, the starting point of the French authorities expressed in their notification of 23 June 2006, after the first contacts on the file in December 2005, was that the exceptional contribution for La Poste provided for was not necessary from the point of view of the level playing field, contrary to the envisaged draft reform of the annual contribution.
Kommissionens afgørelse stadfæstede således ikke en reform, der allerede var trådt i kraft, som det synes at være tilfældet for France Télécoms vedkommende.
In this way, the Commission decision did not confirm a reform which had entered into force, as France Télécom seems to maintain.
Anmeldelsen og beslutningen om at indlede proceduren af 12. oktober 2006 gik forud for fastsættelsen størrelsen af det ekstraordinære bidrag ved lov nr. 2006-1771 af 30. december 2006 (tillægsfinanslov for 2006).
In fact, the notification and the decision to initiate the procedure of 12 October 2006 preceded the establishment of the amount of the exceptional contribution by Law No 2006-1771 of 30 December 2006 (Amending Finance Act 2006).
Disse forhandlinger omhandlede flere aspekter af reformen, herunder hensyntagen til den fordel, som den anmeldte reform kunne have medført, beregningsgrundlaget for den planlagte bidragssats og retningslinjerne for hensyntagen til de særlige forhold for postbanken i forhold til postmæssige aktiviteter og det berørte personale.
These negotiations concerned several aspects of the reform and in particular, the taking into account of the advantage which the notified reform could have represented in the past, the scope of the contribution rate envisaged and the terms for taking into account the specific nature of the La Banque Postale in relation to the postal activities and the staff allocated.
Disse forhandlinger fortsatte, og først i deres bemærkninger af 8. juni 2007 accepterede de franske myndigheder retningslinjerne for tildeling af det ekstraordinære bidrag inden for rammerne af en samlet aftale om reformen, idet de ændrede deres holdning til det ekstraordinære bidrag og beregningsmåden for de kommende årlige bidrag.
These negotiations continued and it is only in their comments of 8 June 2007 that the French authorities accepted the terms of allocation of the exceptional contribution under an overall agreement relating to the reform, in this way going back on their position notified on the subject of the exceptional contribution and the method of calculating the future annual contributions.
I modsætning til bestemmelserne i finansloven for 1997 om oprettelse af Etablissement Public de Gestion de la Contribution Exceptionnelle de France Telecom, der indeholder strenge regler for de årlige betalinger til staten, var Etablissement Public de Gestion de la Contribution Exceptionnelle de La Poste ikke omfattet af specifikke regler [69].
On the other hand, contrary to the provisions of the Finance Act 1997 setting up the public body managing the contribution of France Télécom, which provided for inflexible rules concerning the annual repayments to the State, the public body managing the contribution of La Poste did not have specific rules imposed on it [69].
Da der var tale om betaling af et ekstraordinært bidrag, der ikke var øremærket, mente Kommissionen, at Den Franske Republik kunne have nedsat beløbet og samtidig forhøjet La Poste's årlige bidrag.
Since it was an exceptional contribution to be paid and was not earmarked, the Commission was able to consider that the French Republic could have reduced the amount and at the same time increased the annual contribution rate of La Poste.
Det må i øvrigt konstateres, at bestemmelserne i 1996-loven fastsætter parametrene for beregning af det årlige bidrag til staten som modydelse for tjenestemandspensionerne, uden at der er tale om at inddrage risici, som ikke er fælles for de tjenestemandsansatte og de overenskomstansatte.
Moreover, it must be noted that the terms of the 1996 Law define the parameters for the calculation of the annual contribution paid regularly to the State in return for the pensions of the civil service staff, without there being any question of taking into account the risks not common to civil servants and ordinary employees.
I den henseende har Retten og Domstolen vedrørende France Télécoms skyldige erhvervsskat fastslået, at en lempelse af forpligtelserne ikke kan opvejes af en anden specifik forpligtelse, f.eks. når medlemsstaten — i dette tilfælde Den Franske Republik — ikke har kunnet påvise, at de tidligere forpligtelser er indført med henblik på lavere fremtidige forpligtelser inden for rammerne af en anden beskatningsordning [70].
In this respect, the Court and the Court of Justice specified, with regard to the business tax payable by France Télécom, that a reduction in charges could not be offset by a different specific charge, in particular where the Member State, the French Republic in this case, has failed to demonstrate that earlier charges were introduced in anticipation of a reduced tax burden in the future under different arrangements [70].
Kommissionen er ikke uvidende om, at formålet med det ekstraordinære engangsbidrag, der allerede blev betalt i 1997, var — som udtrykkeligt anført i artikel 6 i 1996-loven — delvist at kompensere den franske stat for den finansielle byrde, den påtog sig i medfør af 1996-loven.
The Commission cannot disregard the fact that the purpose of the specific flat-rate contribution already paid in 1997 was, as expressly established by Article 6 of the 1996 Law, to compensate the French State in part for the financial burden it was assuming on account of the 1996 Law.
Endvidere følger det af senatets rapport, jf. betragtning 27, at lovgiveren ved at vedtage princippet om et ekstraordinært bidrag ikke har ønsket at tage højde for og slet ikke kompensere for forskellen mellem France Télécoms årlige bidrag og konkurrenternes relativt højere bidrag.
In addition, it is inferred from the content of the Senate report cited in recital 27 that, in adopting the principle of the exceptional contribution, the legislator did not seek to take into consideration, and still less to compensate for, the difference between the annual contributions of France Télécom and the relatively higher contributions of the competitors.
Tværtimod har lovgiveren forsætligt pålagt France Télécom at betale årlige bidrag, der ikke dækker de risici, som ikke er fælles for de to personalekategorier (tjenestemænd og ikke-tjenestemænd) uden at etablere en forbindelse mellem dette valg og opkrævningen af det ekstraordinære bidrag i 1997.
On the contrary, the legislator deliberately imposed on France Télécom the payment of annual costs not covering the risks which are not common to the two categories of staff (civil servant and non-civil servant) and did not establish a link between this choice and the levying of the exceptional contribution paid in 1997.
France Télécoms bidrag i form af engangsbidrag blev indbetalt som en almindelig indtægt på statens budget og opført hos Etablissement Public de Gestion de la Contribution Exceptionnelle de France Télécom (forvaltningsorganet) og opbrugt.
The burden for France Télécom represented by the flat-rate contribution was paid as general revenue to the State budget, assigned to the public body responsible for its management and used.
I den situation kan Kommissionen således ikke hverken helt eller delvist fiktivt og efterfølgende øremærke det allerede anvendte ekstraordinære engangsbidrag til et helt andet formål end det, de franske myndigheder og loven foreskrev, nemlig kompensation for manglende hensyntagen til bidrag, der modsvarer risici, som ikke er fælles for overenskomstansatte og tjenestemandsansatte.
Under these circumstances, the Commission cannot therefore, in whole or in part, reallocate fictitiously and retrospectively the exceptional flat-rate contribution already used for a purpose totally divorced from that assigned to it by the French authorities and not provided for by the Law, i.e. compensation of not taking into account risks not common to ordinary employees and civil servants.
Engangsbidraget blev således ikke indført med henblik på inden for rammerne af en anden lovgivningsmæssig og administrativ ordning fuldstændigt at ligestille France Télécoms årlige bidrag med konkurrenternes.
This flat-rate contribution was not therefore introduced in anticipation of full equalisation, under different legislative and regulatory arrangements, of the annual charges of France Télécom with those of its competitors.
Af disse grunde og på grund af reglerne om forvaltning og tilbagebetaling til statens budget som foreskrevet i finansloven siden 1997 og gennemført indtil nu kan Den Franske Republiks påstande og beregninger, der tager sigte på at vise, at 1996-reformen hidtil har medført et betydeligt overskud for staten, ikke godtages.
For the same reasons, on account of the rules for the management and repayment to the budget provided for in the Finance Law since 1997 and implemented up to now, the allegations and calculations of the French Republic intended to show that the 1996 reform has ended now with considerable surplus revenue for the State cannot be accepted.
I betragtning af den måde, det kompetente forvaltningsorgan har forvaltet og anvendt France Télécoms ekstraordinære engangsbidrag, jf. finansloven, og tallene for de faktisk gennemførte udbetalinger siden 1997 fra Den Franske Republik, jf. betragtning 36 og 37 og tabel 3, må det konstateres, at de indtægter, som Den Franske Republik forsøger at påberåbe sig, investeret til en rente på 7 %, aldrig har eksisteret.
In fact, taking into account the terms for the management and use of France Télécom’s exceptional flat-rate contribution by the competent public body, as laid down in a Finance Act and the figures for the actual repayments since 1997 forwarded by the French Republic, described in recitals 36 and 37 and in Table 3, it has to be concluded that the revenue which the French Republic tries to claim, with an investment producing interest at the rate of 7 %, has never existed.
Endvidere afspejler denne påstand ikke de franske myndigheders faktiske adfærd.
In addition, the allegation does not reflect the actual behaviour of the French authorities.
I betragtning af de forvaltningsregler, der er fastsat i de finanslove, som er vedtaget siden forvaltningsorganets oprettelse, har det omtalte forvaltningsorgan ikke skabt sådanne indtægter, hvilket i øvrigt heller ikke var planlagt, og har ikke skabt renteindtægter.
In view of the management rules established in the Finance Acts passed since it was set up, this public body has not generated such revenue, which for that matter was not foreseen and did not generate interest.
I øvrigt er hensyntagen til øgede selskabsskatteindtægter uberettiget, da det fører til sammenblanding af statens forskellige roller.
Also, taking into account higher revenue from corporation tax is unlawful, as it leads to confusion of the different roles of the State.
Den sammenblanding, de franske myndigheder foreslår mellem disse forskellige roller, kan ikke følges, og det er nødvendigt at skelne mellem på den ene side staten, der yder støtte til France Télécom ved at overtage betalingen af tjenestemandspensionerne for at udvikle en meritbaseret konkurrencesituation, og på den anden side staten som aktionær i France Télécom, og endelig staten som offentlig myndighed, der udøver sine skattemæssige beføjelser.
The combination of these different roles proposed by the French authorities cannot be accepted and a distinction should be maintained between on the one hand the State granting aid to France Télécom by financing the payment of the retirement pensions of the civil servants, in order to develop a merit-based competition process, and on the other hand, the State as shareholder of France Télécom and, ultimately, the State as a public authority exercising its power to raise taxes.
Endvidere skal det bemærkes, at Den Franske Republiks og France Télécoms anmodning om at tage hensyn til det ekstraordinære bidrag ved undersøgelsen af reformens forenelighed er i modstrid med Den Franske Republiks bemærkninger i brev af 17. marts 2004, hvori det hedder, at »det ekstraordinære engangsbidrag ifølge artikel 6 i loven af 26. juli 1996 kan således ikke betragtes som kompensation for en påstået »fordel«. Undersøgelsen af dette beløb er helt uden relevans i forhold til statsstøttereglerne, da dette beløb var et ekstraordinært bidrag til fordel for eneaktionæren [den franske stat], der kan sidestilles med en ekstraordinær dividende udloddet før kapitalen åbnes for private investorer«.
In addition, it should be noted that the application made by the French Republic and France Télécom to take into consideration the exceptional contribution when examining the compatibility of the reform is in contradiction with the comments the French Republic made in its letter of 17 March 2004, according to which ‘the exceptional flat-rate contribution provided for by Article 6 of the Law of 26 July 1996 could not therefore be seen as compensation for an alleged ‘advantage’. The analysis of its amount is all the less relevant in the light of the State aid rules’ since this amount was ‘an extraordinary contribution in favour of its sole shareholder [the French State], which can be assimilated to an extraordinary dividend distributed before any opening-up of the capital to private investors’.
Det ræsonnement, der ligger til grund for Den Franske Republiks daværende argument, har en vis økonomisk og finansiel logik.
The reasoning underlying the argument put forward at the time by the French Republic shows a certain economic and financial logic.
Det er fornuftigt, at en eneaktionær inden åbningen af selskabets kapital for andre investorer i videst muligt omfang tilbageholder disponible midler, inden åbning af virksomhedens kapital, hvis dette ikke gør investeringen mindre attraktiv.
It is reasonable, for a sole shareholder, on the eve of the opening-up of the capital to other investors, to absorb, for its benefit alone and as far as possible, the funds available in the undertaking before the opening-up of the capital, provided that this does not compromise the attractiveness of the investment.