natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Each Member State must create a »Trusted List of supervised/accredited Certification Service Providers« providing information about the supervision/accreditation status of certification services from Certification Service Providers (CSPs) who are supervised/accredited by the relevant Member State for compliance with the relevant provisions of Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures.
Each Member State must create a ‘Trusted List of supervised/accredited Certification Service Providers’ providing information about the supervision/accreditation status of certification services from Certification Service Providers (CSPs) who are supervised/accredited by the relevant Member State for compliance with the relevant provisions of Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures.
The applicable »supervision« system (respectively »voluntary accreditation« system) is defined and must meet the relevant requirements of Directive 1999/93/EC, in particular those laid down in Article 3(3), Article 8(1), Article 11 (respectively, Article 2(13), Article 3(2), Article 7(1)(a), Article 8(1), Article 11).
The applicable ‘supervision’ system (respectively ‘voluntary accreditation’ system) is defined and must meet the relevant requirements of Directive 1999/93/EC, in particular those laid down in Article 3(3), Article 8)(1), Article 11 (respectively, Article 2(13), Article 3(2), Article 7(1)(a), Article 8(1), Article 11).
A »CA/QC«»Service type identifier« (»Sti«) entry (similarly a CA/QC entry further qualified as being a »RootCA/QC« through the use of »Service information extension« (»Sie«) additionalServiceInformation Extension)
A ‘CA/QC’‘Service type identifier’ (‘Sti’) entry (similarly a CA/QC entry further qualified as being a ‘RootCA/QC’ through the use of ‘Service information extension’ (‘Sie’) additionalServiceInformation Extension)
indicates that from the »Service digital identifier« (»Sdi«) identified CA (similarly within the CA hierarchy starting from the »Sdi« identified RootCA) from the corresponding CSP (see associated TSP information fields), all issued end-entity certificates are Qualified Certificates (QCs) provided that it is claimed as such in the certificate through the use of appropriate EN 319 412-5 defined QcStatements (i.e. QcCompliance, QcSSCD, etc.) and/or EN 319 411-2 defined QCP(+) OIDs (and this is guaranteed by the issuing CSP and ensured by the Member State Supervisory/Accreditation Body)
indicates that from the ‘Service digital identifier’ (‘Sdi’) identified CA (similarly within the CA hierarchy starting from the ‘Sdi’ identified RootCA) from the corresponding CSP (see associated TSP information fields), all issued end-entity certificates are Qualified Certificates (QCs) provided that it is claimed as such in the certificate through the use of appropriate EN 319 412-5 defined QcStatements (i.e. QcCompliance, QcSSCD, etc.) and/or EN 319 411-2 defined QCP(+) OIDs (and this is guaranteed by the issuing CSP and ensured by the Member State Supervisory/Accreditation Body)
Note: if no »Sie«»Qualifications Extension« information is present or if an end-entity certificate that is claimed to be a QC is not further identified through a related »Sie«»Qualifications Extension« information, then the »machine-processable« information to be found in the QC is supervised/accredited to be accurate.
Note: if no ‘Sie’‘Qualifications Extension’ information is present or if an end-entity certificate that is claimed to be a QC is not further identified through a related ‘Sie’‘Qualifications Extension’ information, then the ‘machine-processable’ information to be found in the QC is supervised/accredited to be accurate.
»QCForLegalPerson« qualifier value meaning »Certificate issued to a Legal Person«.
‘QCForLegalPerson’ qualifier value meaning ‘Certificate issued to a Legal Person’.
Please refer to the Technical specifications for a Common Template for the »Trusted List of supervised/accredited Certification Service Providers« in the Annex of Commission Decision 2009/767/EC for further details on the fields, description and meaning for the Member States' Trusted Lists.«
Please refer to the Technical specifications for a Common Template for the ‘Trusted List of supervised/accredited Certification Service Providers’ in the Annex of Commission Decision 2009/767/EC for further details on the fields, description and meaning for the Member States’ Trusted Lists.’
http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/TrustedList/schemerules/CC hvor CC = ISO 3166-1 [14] alpha-2 landekode brugt i »Scheme territory«-feltet (punkt 5.3.10)
http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/TrustedList/schemerules/CC where CC = the ISO 3166-1 [14] alpha-2 Country Code used in the ‘Scheme territory’ field (clause 5.3.10)
hvor brugere kan få den pågældende medlemsstats særlige beskrivelse af, hvordan indholdet i positivlisten anvendes og fortolkes for så vidt angår de certificeringstjenester, der ikke vedrører udstedelsen af QC'er.
Where users can obtain a referenced Member State’s specific description about how to use and interpret the content of the Trusted List with regard to the certification services not related to the issuing of QCs.
Dette kan bruges til at indikere en potentiel granularitet i de nationale overvågnings-/akkrediteringssystemer med hensyn til CSP'er, som ikke udsteder QC'er, og hvordan felterne »Scheme service definition URI« (punkt 5.5.6) og »Service information extension« (punkt 5.5.9) anvendes til dette formål.
This may be used to indicate a potential granularity in the national supervision/accreditation systems related to CSPs not issuing QCs and how the ‘Scheme service definition URI’ (clause 5.5.6) and the ‘Service information extension’ field (clause 5.5.9) are used for this purpose.
Medlemsstater KAN definere og bruge yderligere URI'er fra ovennævnte medlemsstatsspecifikke URI (dvs. URI'er defineret af denne hierarkisk specifikke URI).
Member States MAY define and use additional URIs from the above Member State specific URI (i.e. URIs defined from this hierarchical specific URI).
Dette felt er PÅKRÆVET og SKAL være i overensstemmelse med specifikationerne fra TS 119612 punkt 5.3.11, hvor den politiske/juridiske erklæring om ordningens retslige status eller retslige krav, som ordningen overholder i henhold til den jurisdiktion, hvor den er oprettet, og/eller enhver hindring og betingelse for vedligeholdelsen og offentliggørelsen af positivlisten, SKAL være en multisproget tekststreng (klartekst) i to dele:
This field SHALL be present and SHALL comply with the specifications from TS 119 612 clause 5.3.11 where the policy/legal notice concerning the legal status of the scheme or legal requirements met by the scheme under the jurisdiction in which it is established and/or any constraints and conditions under which the trusted list is maintained and published SHALL be a multilingual character string (plain text) made of two parts:
En første obligatorisk del, som er fælles for alle medlemsstaters positivlister (med UK EN som obligatorisk sprog og med potentielt et eller flere nationalsprog), hvori det angives, at de gældende retlige rammer er direktiv 1999/93/EF og den dertil svarende gennemførelse i medlemsstaternes love, som er angivet i feltet »Scheme Territory«.
A first mandatory part, common to all Member States’ Trusted Lists (with UK English as the mandatory language, and with potentially one or more national languages), indicating that the applicable legal framework is Directive 1999/93/EC and its corresponding implementation in the laws of the Member State indicated in the ‘Scheme Territory’ field.
En valgfri del, som er specifik for hver positivliste, (med UK EN som obligatorisk sprog og med potentielt et eller flere nationalsprog) med henvisninger til specifikke gældende nationale retlige rammer (især for så vidt dette vedrører nationale overvågnings-/akkrediteringsordninger for CSP'er, som ikke udsteder QC'er).
A second, optional, part, specific to each Trusted List (with UK English as the mandatory language, and with potentially one or more national languages), indicating references to specific applicable national legal frameworks (e.g. in particular when related to national supervision/accreditation schemes for CSPs not issuing QCs).
POSITIVLISTERS KONTINUITET
CONTINUITY OF TRUSTED LISTS
Certifikater, der meddeles til Kommissionen i henhold til artikel 3, litra c), i nærværende afgørelse, SKAL udstedes sådan, at:
Certificates to be notified to the Commission under Article 3(c) of the present Decision SHALL be issued in such a way that they:
der er mindst tre måneder mellem deres gyldighedsdatoer
have as a minimum three months between their validity dates,
de er genereret på nye nøglepar, idet ingen tidligere brugte nøglepar gencertificeres.
are created on new key pairs as no previously used key pair are to be re-certified.
I tilfælde af at EN af de private nøgler, der svarer til den offentlige nøgle, der kan bruges til at validere positivlistens signatur, og er blevet meddelt til Kommissionen og offentliggjort i Kommissionens centrale pointerlister, er blevet kompromitteret eller afviklet, SKAL medlemsstaterne:
In case of a compromise or decommissioning of ONE of the private keys corresponding to the public key that could be used to validate the trusted list’s signature and that has been notified to the Commission and is published in the Commission’s central lists of pointers, Member States SHALL:
straks genudstede en ny positivliste med en ikke-kompromitteret privatnøgle i tilfælde af, at den offentliggjorte positivliste var underskrevet med en kompromitteret eller afviklet privat nøgle
re-issue, without any delay, a new trusted list signed with a non-compromised private key in case the published trusted list was signed with a compromised or decommissioned private key,
straks underrette Kommissionen om den nye liste af offentlige nøglecertifikater, der svarer til de private nøgler, der kan bruges til at underskrive positivlisten.
promptly notify to the Commission the new list of public key certificates corresponding to the private keys that could be used to sign the trusted list.
I tilfælde af at ALLE de private nøgler, der svarer til de offentlige nøgler, der kan bruges til at validere positivlistens signatur, og er blevet meddelt til Kommissionen og offentliggjort i Kommissionens centrale pointerlister, er blevet kompromitteret eller afviklet SKAL medlemsstaterne:
In case of compromise or decommissioning of ALL the private keys corresponding to the public keys that could be used to validate the trusted list’s signature and that have been notified to the Commission and are published in the Commission’s central lists of pointers, Member States SHALL:
generere nye nøglepar, der kan bruges til at underskrive positivlisten og deres tilsvarende offentlige nøglecertifikater
generate new key pairs that could be used to sign the trusted list and their corresponding public key certificates,
straks genudstede en ny positivliste, der er underskrevet med en af disse nye private nøgler, og hvis tilsvarende offentlige nøglecertifikat skal meddeles
re-issue, without any delay, a new trusted list signed with one of those new private keys and whose corresponding public key certificate is to be notified,
FORSKRIFTER FOR DEN MENNESKELIGT LÆSBARE UDGAVE AF POSITIVLISTEN
SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE HUMAN READABLE FORM OF THE TRUSTED LIST
Hvis en menneskeligt læsbar form af positivlisten er genereret og offentliggjort, BØR den foreligge som pdf (Portable Document Format) i overensstemmelse med ISO 32000 [15], som SKAL have et format i overensstemmelse med profil PDF/A (ISO 19005 [16]).
If a human readable form of the trusted list is established and published, it SHOULD be provided in the form of a Portable Document Format (PDF) document according to ISO 32000 [15] that MUST be formatted according to the profile PDF/A (ISO 19005 [16]).
Indholdet i de PDF/A-baserede menneskeligt læsbare udgaver af positivlisten BØR opfylde følgende krav:
The content of the PDF/A based human readable form of the trusted list SHOULD comply with the following requirements:
Opbygningen af den menneskeligt læsbare udgave BØR afspejle den logiske model, der er beskrevet i TS 119612
The structure of the HR form SHOULD reflect the logical model described in TS 119 612,
Feltets titel (f.eks. »Service type identifier«)
The title of the field (e.g. ‘Service type identifier’),
Feltets værdi (f.eks. »CA/QC«)
The value of the field (e.g. ‘CA/QC’),
Betydningen (beskrivelse) af feltets værdi, såfremt dette er relevant (f.eks. »En certificeringsmyndighed, der udsteder offentlige nøglecertifikater.«)
The meaning (description) of the value of the field, when applicable (e.g. ‘A Certification authority issuing public key certificates.’),
Flere versioner i naturligt sprog som angivet i positivlisten, såfremt dette er relevant.
Multiple natural languages versions as provided in the Trusted List, when applicable.
Følgende felter med tilhørende værdier i de digitale certifikater, som findes i feltet »Service digital identity«, BØR som minimum vises i den menneskeligt læsbare udgave:
The following fields and corresponding values of the digital certificates present in the ‘Service digital identity’ field SHOULD, as a minimum, be displayed in the HR form:
Signaturalgoritme
Signature algorithm
Offentlig nøgle
Public key
Certifikatpolitikker
Certificate Policies
Identifikator for emnenøgle
Subject Key Identifier
CRL-distributionspunkter
CRL Distribution Points
Identifikator for Authority Key
Authority Key Identifier
Nøglebrug
Key Usage
Grundlæggende begrænsninger
Basic constraints
Tommelfingeraftryksalgoritme
Thumbprint algorithm
Tommelfingeraftryk
Thumbprint
Den menneskeligt læsbare udgave BØR let kunne udskrives
The HR form SHOULD be easily printable
Den menneskeligt læsbare udgave SKAL underskrives af operatøren i overensstemmelse med PAdES's baseline profile for signaturer [17].
The HR form MUST be signed by the Scheme Operator according to PAdES Signatures baseline profile [17].
Bemærk, at der findes en række elektroniske tjenesteydelser, som er baseret på simpel AdES, hvis anvendelse på tværs af grænserne også ville blive lettere, forudsat at de understøttende certificeringstjenester (f.eks. udstedelse af ikke-kvalificerede certifikater) indgår i de overvågede/akkrediterede tjenesteydelser, som er omfattet af den frivillige oplysningsdel af medlemsstatens positivliste.
Note that there are a number of electronic services based on simple AdES whose cross-border use would also be facilitated, provided that the supporting certification services (e.g. issuing of non-qualified certificates) are part of the supervised/accredited services covered by a Member State in the voluntary information part of their Trusted List.
ETSI TS 119612 v1.1.1 (2013-06) — Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Trusted Lists.
ETSI TS 119 612 v1.1.1 (2013-06) – Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Trusted Lists.
F.eks. kan en certificeringstjenesteudbyder, der er oprettet i en medlemsstat, og som udbyder en certificeringstjeneste, som oprindeligt blev kontrolleret af medlemsstaten (overvågningsorgan), efter et bestemt tidsrum beslutte at indføre en frivillig akkreditering for den for tiden overvågede certificeringstjeneste.
E.g. a certification service provider established in a Member State that provides a certification service that is initially supervised by the Member State (Supervisory Body), can, after a certain time, decide to pass a voluntary accreditation for the currently supervised certification service.
Modsat kan en certificeringsudbyder i en anden medlemsstat f.eks. af forretningsmæssige og/eller økonomiske årsager beslutte ikke at stoppe en akkrediteret certificeringstjeneste, men at flytte den fra akkrediteringsstatus til overvågningsstatus.
Conversely, a certification service provider in another Member State can decide not to stop an accredited certification service but to move it from an accreditation status to a supervision status, e.g. for business and/or economic reasons.
Jf. ETSI TS 319 412-5 (Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI), Profiles for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates, Part 5: Extension for Qualified Certificate profile) for definitionen af en sådan erklæring.
Refer to ETSI EN 319 412-5 (Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Profiles for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 5: Extension for Qualified Certificate profile) for the definition of such a statement.
De sidste to oplysningskategorier er af afgørende betydning for, at afhængige parter kan vurdere kvaliteten og sikkerhedsniveauet ved sådanne overvågningssystemer/akkrediteringsordninger, der anvendes for CSP'er, der ikke udsteder QC'er.
The last two sets of information are of critical importance for relying parties to assess the quality and security level of such supervision/accreditation systems applicable to CSPs not issuing QCs.
ISO 3166-1:2006 »Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions Part 1: Country codes«.
ISO 3166-1:2006: ‘Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions Part 1: Country codes’.
ETSI TS 103172 (March 2012) — Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); PAdES Baseline Profile
ETSI TS 103 172 (March 2012) - Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); PAdES Baseline Profile
Yderligere »kvalifikationsoplysninger« defineret i forbindelse med nationale overvågnings-/akkrediteringssystemer for CSP'er, der ikke udsteder QC'er, kan i det omfang, det er relevant og påkrævet, angives ved tjenesteniveau (f.eks. for at skelne mellem flere kvalitets-/sikkerhedsniveauer ved at anvende »additionalServiceInformation Extension« (punkt 5.5.9.4) som led i »Service information extensions« (punkt 5.5.9).
Additional ‘qualification’ information defined at the level of national supervision/accreditation systems for CSPs not issuing QCs may be provided at the service level when applicable and required (e.g. to distinguish between several quality/security levels) through the use of ‘additionalServiceInformation Extension’ (clause 5.5.9.4) as part of ‘Service information extensions’ (clause 5.5.9).
Yderligere oplysninger om de tilhørende tekniske forskrifter findes i de detaljerede forskrifter i kapitel I.
Further information on the corresponding technical specifications is provided in the detailed specifications in Chapter I.
»Qualifiers« der anvendes til de filtrerede (sæt) af QC'er om »kvalificeret« status, SSCD-sttotestatus og/eller udstedelse til juridisk person, dvs.:
“Qualifiers” to be applied to those filtered (sets of) QC’s about “qualified” status, SSCD support status and/or issuance to Legal Person, i.e.:
Kommissionens beslutning 2009/767/EF af 16. oktober 2009 om fastlæggelse af foranstaltninger, der skal lette anvendelsen af elektroniske procedurer ved hjælp af »kvikskranker« i henhold til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2006/123/EF om tjenesteydelser i det indre marked [2], der forpligter medlemsstaterne til at stille de oplysninger, der er nødvendige til validering af avancerede elektroniske signaturer understøttet af et kvalificeret certifikat, til rådighed. Disse oplysninger opstilles ensartet gennem de såkaldte »positivlister«, der indeholder oplysninger om certificeringstjenesteudbydere, som udsteder kvalificerede certifikater til offentligheden i henhold til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 1999/93/EF af 13. december 1999 om en fællesskabsramme for elektroniske signaturer [3], og som medlemsstaterne overvåger/akkrediterer.
Commission Decision 2009/767/EC of 16 October 2009 setting out measures facilitating the use of procedures by electronic means through the ‘Points of Single Contact’ under Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the internal market [2] obliges Member States to make available information necessary for the validation of advanced electronic signatures supported by a qualified certificate. This information is to be set out uniformly using the so-called ‘trusted lists’ containing information on certification service providers issuing qualified certificates to the public in accordance with Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures [3] and are supervised/accredited by the Member States.
Ved at udfylde felterne »Service type identifier« (»Sti«), »Service name« (»Sn«), og »Service digital identity« (»Sdi«) for tjenesteindgangen i positivlisten med de oplysninger, der er angivet i feltet »Service information extensions« (»Sie«), kan en specifik type kvalificeret certifikat udstedt af en på listen angivet CSP-certificeringstjeneste, der udsteder QC'er, fuldt ud defineres og give oplysninger om, hvorvidt det er understøttet af et SSCD (når sådanne oplysninger ikke findes i det udstedte QC). Der er knyttet en specifik oplysning »Service current status« (»Scs«) til denne indgang.
Completing the ‘Service type identifier’ (‘Sti’), ‘Service name’ (‘Sn’), and ‘Service digital identity’ (‘Sdi’) fields of the service entry in the Trusted List with information provided in the ‘Service information extensions’ (‘Sie’) field allows for the full determination of a specific type of qualified certificate issued by a listed CSP certification service issuing QCs and provides information about whether or not it is supported by an SSCD (when such information is missing in the issued QC). A specific ‘Service current status’ (‘Scs’) information is associated with this entry.
Når en tjeneste optages på listen ved blot at angive »Sdi« af (Root) CA betyder det, at det sikres (af den QC-udstedende CSP, men også af det organ, som er ansvarligt for overvågningen/akkrediteringen af den pågældende CSP), at et eventuelt slutenhedscertifikat under dette (Root) CA (hierarki) indeholder tilstrækkeligt mange ETSI-definerede og maskinprocesserbare oplysninger til at vurdere, hvorvidt det er et QC, og hvorvidt det er understøttet af et SSCD. Såfremt sidstnævnte påstand ikke er sand (f.eks. hvis der ikke er nogen ETSI-standardiseret maskinprocesserbar angivelse i QC'et af, hvorvidt det understøttes af et SSCD), kan det ved blot at angive »Sdi« for dette (Root) CA kun antages, at QC'er udstedt under dette (Root) CA-hierarki ikke er understøttet af et SSCD. For at indikere, at disse QC'er skal betragtes som værende understøttet af et SSCD, skal »Sie«-feltet anvendes til at angive denne kendsgerning (dette indikerer også, at denne oplysning er garanteret af den QC-udstedende CSP og overvåget/akkrediteret af henholdsvis overvågnings-eller akkrediteringsorganet).
Listing a service by just providing the ‘Sdi’ of a (Root) CA would mean that it is ensured (by the CSP issuing QCs but also by the Supervisory/Accreditation Body in charge of the supervision/accreditation of this CSP) that any end-entity certificate issued under this (Root) CA (hierarchy) contains enough ETSI defined and machine-processable information to assess whether or not it is a QC, and whether or not it is supported by an SSCD. In the event, for example, that the latter assertion is not true (e.g. there is no ETSI standardised machine-processable indication in the QC about whether it is supported by an SSCD), then by listing only the ‘Sdi’ of that (Root) CA, it can only be assumed that QCs issued under this (Root) CA hierarchy are not supported by any SSCD. In order to indicate that those QCs must be considered as supported by an SSCD, the ‘Sie’ field should be used (this also indicates that this information is guaranteed by the CSP issuing QCs and supervised/accredited by the Supervisory or Accreditation Body respectively).