natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ifølge de portugisiske myndigheder [5] havde BPN haft likviditetsproblemer siden 2008, og kreditvurderingsbureauet Moody’s vurdering af banken faldt fra Baa1 til Baa3 den 18. juli 2008 [6].
According to the Portuguese authorities [5], BPN had been facing liquidity issues since the summer of 2008, with the rating agency Moody’s having downgraded BPN from Baa1 to Baa3 on 18 July 2008 [6].
BPN’s situation havde i slutningen af august en positiv likviditet på 316 mio. EUR, men den 22. oktober 2009 var der et alvorligt likviditetsminus på 831 mio. EUR, og på dens indskudskonto hos Banco de Portugal (“BdP”) blev der dagligt registreret meget små overskud, der lå meget langt fra det gennemsnit, lovgivningen kræver.
Whilst at the end of August BPN had a positive liquidity of EUR 316 million, by 22 October 2008 it had severe negative liquidity of EUR 831 million, with its deposit account with the Bank of Portugal (‘BdP’) far from the average amounts it would have had to maintain in order to comply with the legal limits.
I denne fase i løbet af oktober 2008 blev der truffet en række initiativer, der skulle gøre det muligt for banken at overvinde sine likviditetsproblemer og forhindre, at den ikke kunne opfylde sine forpligtelser med hensyn til betalinger, navnlig gennem en særlig likviditetsstøtte i form af lån og andre operationer gennemført af BdP og den statslige institution Caixa Geral de Depósitos (“CGD”) [7].
At that stage, during the month of October 2008, several initiatives were undertaken in order to allow the bank to overcome the liquidity difficulties it was facing and to prevent default in payments, in particular through the provision of special liquidity aid in the form of loans, and through other operations by the BdP and by the state-owned CGD [7].
Over for omfanget af bankens tab konkluderede de portugisiske myndigheder, at det ikke ville være rentabelt at gennemføre nye likviditetsstøtteforanstaltninger i betragtning af de meget store risici, som de deltagende institutioner (BdP og CGD) stod over for [8].
Given the volume of the losses being accumulated by BPN, further liquidity support was not considered feasible by the Portuguese authorities, in light of the ‘high risk to which [BdP and CGD] would be exposed’ [8].
BPN’s aktionærer fremlagde en plan, men regeringen konkluderede på grundlag af en vurdering foretaget af BdP, at den ikke var gennemførlig.
A plan had been put forward by the shareholders of BPN, but the Government, based on an opinion of the BdP issued on 30 October 2008, did not consider the plan to be feasible.
Eftersom BPN ikke længere opfyldte solvenskravene på grund af de mange værdiforringede aktiver [9], foreslog regeringen parlamentet, at staten overtog BPN vederlagsfrit [10].
Given that BPN no longer complied with the solvency requirements because of the high level of impairments [9], the Government then proposed to Parliament the nationalisation of BPN at zero price [10].
Dette forslag blev godkendt den 11. november 2008 med lov nr. 62-A/2008 (“lov om nationalisering”).
That proposal was approved on 11 November 2008 by Law 62-A/2008 (the ‘Nationalisation Law’).
Ifølge de portugisiske myndigheder skyldtes de værdiforringede aktiver uregelmæssigheder og ulovligheder, der blev påvist af BdP og ved eksterne revisioner gennemført i juni 2008, og som BdP senere i en rapport kvalificerede som adfærd, der var svigagtig, vedholdende og bevidst på allerhøjeste niveau i gruppen [11].
According to the Portuguese authorities, the impairments resulted from irregularities and illegal practices detected by the BdP and external audits conducted during June 2008, which were later described in a 2009 BdP report as constituting ‘fraudulent behaviour, persistent and deliberate, undertaken at the highest level of the management of the Group’ [11].
Denne praksis gav anledning til efterforskning, iværksættelse af flere procedurer for administrative overtrædelser og indgivelse af en klage hos statsanklageren.
These practices led to investigations and to the launch of several administrative infringement proceedings (‘processos de contra-ordenação’) and to the filing of a complaint with the Office of the Public Prosecutor of the Republic.
I overensstemmelse med loven om nationalisering blev CGD pålagt at forvalte BPN, udnævne medlemmerne af dens styringsorganer og, inden for en frist på 60 dage efter nationaliseringen, at opstille bankens forvaltningsmålsætning.
Under the Nationalisation Law, CGD was assigned the task of managing BPN, appointing the members of BPN’s management bodies, and establishing the management objectives of BPN within 60 days of the nationalisation.
Loven om nationalisering fastsatte ligeledes, at Caixa Geral de Depósitos’ kredit- eller likviditetsforanstaltninger til fordel for BPN i forbindelse med nationaliseringen og som stedfortræder for staten var omfattet af statens garanti [12].
Furthermore, the Nationalisation Law also set out the provision that any credit or liquidity assistance measures undertaken by CGD ‘in favour of BPN within the context of the nationalisation or in substitution of the State … shall benefit from a state guarantee’ [12].
Indledende finansielle støtteforanstaltninger forud for nationaliseringen
The financial support measures prior to nationalisation
Forud for nationaliseringen i november 2008 havde BPN allerede nydt godt af forskellige finansielle støtteforanstaltninger, som af de portugisiske myndigheder blev beskrevet som ”særlig likviditetsstøtte” [13].
Prior to its nationalisation in November 2008, BPN had already benefited from a number of financial support measures described by the Portuguese authorities as ‘special liquidity support measures’ [13].
Den 17. februar 2010 meddelte de portugisiske myndigheder Kommissionen, at BPN i perioden frem til 30. oktober 2008 havde modtaget særlig likviditetsstøtte, både fra CGD og BdP, der beløb sig til i alt 501,6 mio. EUR bestående af fire lån fra CGD til BPN til en værdi af i alt 315 mio. EUR [14] og likviditetsredningsstøtte, der blev ydet i 2008 af BdP og beløb sig til 186,6 mio. EUR [15].
On 17 February 2010, the Portuguese authorities informed the Commission that in the period up to 30 October 2008, BPN had obtained special liquidity assistance measures from both CGD and the BdP for a total amount of EUR 501,6 million, consisting of four loans granted to BPN by CGD for a total amount of EUR 315 million [14] and emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) provided in October 2008 by the BdP for an amount of EUR 186,6 million [15].
Selv om pengene var blevet tilbagebetalt til BdP efter nationaliseringen, blev de fire lån, der var ydet af CGD, først tilbagebetalt den 9. marts 2009 med BPN’s første udstedelse af Commercial Papers (CP’er).
Whilst the BdP was reimbursed after the nationalisation, the four loans granted by CGD were reimbursed only on 9 March 2009, with the issuance of the first commercial paper by BPN.
Finansielle støtteforanstaltninger efter nationaliseringen
The financial support measures after the nationalisation
BPN gennemførte i marts 2009 en udstedelse af CP’er - hvis tegning var garanteret af CGD, og som var ledsaget af statsgarantier - til en samlet værdi af 2 mia. EUR. Kommissionen blev først informeret om disse statsgarantier den 14. august 2009.
In March 2009, BPN issued commercial paper with guaranteed subscription by CGD and a state guarantee for a global amount of EUR 2 billion. The Commission was informed only on 14 August 2009 of these state guarantees.
Ved brev af 17. februar 2010 oplyste de portugisiske myndigheder ligeledes, at CGD den 27. oktober 2008 havde fået tilladelse til at tegne CP’er til en supplerende værdi af 1 mia. EUR med statsgaranti.
By letter of 17 February 2010, the Portuguese authorities also mentioned that CGD had been authorised on 27 October 2009 to subscribe a further EUR 1 billion of commercial papers with a state guarantee.
Ved e-mail af 14. juni 2010 blev Kommissionen senere også informeret om, at de samlede statsgarantier for de CP’er, der var udstedt af BPN og tegnet af CGD, var steget til 4 mia. EUR, eftersom BNP i april 2010 gennemførte en tredje udstedelse af CP’er til et beløb på 1 mia. EUR. Disse CP’er blev tegnet af CGD.
Subsequently, by electronic mail of 14 June 2010, the Commission was further informed that the total of the state guarantees on commercial papers issued by BPN and subscribed by CGD had risen to EUR 4 billion, as in April 2010 a third issue of BPN commercial paper had been organised and was subscribed by CGD for an amount of EUR 1 billion.
Det skal i den forbindelse anføres, at BPN fra nationaliseringen i november 2008 og frem til juni 2011 hele tiden havde adgang til pengemarkedskreditfaciliteter ydet af CGD.
In this context, it should be noted that since its nationalisation in November 2008 and until June 2011, BPN had constantly made use of money market credit facilities given to it by CGD.
De beløb, som BPN skyldte CGD inden for rammerne af disse kortfristede instrumenter, beløb sig den 28. februar 2009 til ca. 2,2 mia. EUR. Ifølge de portugisiske myndigheders oplysninger blev disse beløb reduceret med udstedelsen af de CP’er, der er omhandlet i pkt. 27 og 28 [16].
The amounts owed by BPN to CGD under these short-term instruments reached approximately EUR 2,2 billion on 28 February 2009. According to the data provided by the Portuguese authorities, those amounts were reduced with the issue of the commercial paper referred to in paragraphs (27), and (28) [16].
I juni 2011 udgjorde BPN's eksponering med hensyn til pengemarkedsmidler fra CGD ca. en mia. EUR. Selv om finansieringen blev behandlet på daglig basis, havde den ifølge de portugisiske myndigheder en strukturel karakter med længere frister [17] og var ligeledes blevet erstattet med den fjerde og sidste udstedelse af CP’er i juni 2011 - over to omgange med 500 mio. EUR hver gang.
By June 2011, the exposure of BPN to CGD in money market instruments was approximately EUR 1 billion. Although the financing was being carried out on a daily basis, it was, according to the Portuguese authorities, of a structural nature with longer dates [17], and was also substituted by the fourth, and last, commercial paper issue of June 2011, with the launch of two issues of EUR 500 million each.
Ifølge de portugisiske myndigheders oplysninger fra den 3. februar 2012 var det beløb, som BPN skyldte CGD (ud over udstedelserne af CP’er), på 433,7 mio. EUR den 31. december 2011 og på 232 mio. EUR den 31. januar 2012.
According to the figures supplied by the Portuguese authorities on 3 February 2012, the outstanding amount owed by BPN to CGD (apart from the commercial paper issues) was EUR 433,7 million on 31 December 2011 and EUR 232 million on 31 January 2012.
Tabel nr. 1
Table 1
Oversigt over BPN-likviditet hidrørende fra CGD - situation pr. 31. december 2011
Overview of liquidity obtained by BPN from CGD, as at 31 December 2011
Kilde: De portugisiske myndigheder.
Source: Portuguese authorities
Med eksplicit statsgaranti
With explicit state guarantee
CGD-lån
CGD Loans
(uden eksplicit statsgaranti)
(without explicit state guarantee)
Særligt etablerede instrumenter [18]
Special Purpose Vehicles [18]
Det skal bemærkes, at i henhold til artikel 2, stk. 9, i loven om nationalisering, var alle CGD’s kredit- eller likviditetsstøtteforanstaltninger til fordel for BPN i forbindelse med nationaliseringen omfattet af den portugisiske stats garanti.
It should be noted that under Article 2(9) of the Nationalisation Law all credit or liquidity lines offered by CGD to BPN in the context of the nationalisation are to be guaranteed by the Portuguese State.
Det er således klart, at alle de beløb, der er angivet i tabel nr. 1, var omfattet af statsstøtte i medfør af artikel 2, stk. 9, i loven om nationalisering og forskellige bekendtgørelser fra økonomi- og finansministeriet.
It is therefore clear that all of the amounts described in Table 1 above benefited from a state guarantee pursuant to Article 2(9) of the Nationalisation Law and the various orders issued by the Secretary of State for the Treasury and Finance.
Forrentningen for statsgarantierne blev fastsat til 0,2 % pr. år.
The remuneration for the state guarantees was set at 0,2 % per year.
BPN’s omstrukturering
The Restructuring of BPN
Omstruktureringsplanen fra 2010
The 2010 restructuring plan
Den 16. september 2010 sendte de portugisiske myndigheder Kommissionen en indledende omstruktureringsplan dateret den 13. september 2010 (“omstruktureringsplanen fra 2010").
An initial restructuring plan of 13 September 2010 (hereinafter ‘the 2010 Restructuring Plan’) was sent to the Commission by the Portuguese authorities on 16 September 2010.
I denne plan forklarede de portugisiske myndigheder, at de havde til hensigt at opsplitte BPN i en ”god” bank og en "dårlig” bank og efterfølgende ville forsøge at sælge den gode bank.
In that plan, the Portuguese authorities explained their intention to split BPN into a good bank and a bad bank and to then try to sell the good bank.
Oversigt over den bank, der skal reprivatiseres: oprettelse af Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV'er) (virksomheder til specielle formål)
The extent of the bank to be reprivatised: creation of the SPVs
Staten havde til hensigt at sælge den ”gode” bank, BPN S.A., som udelukkende skulle være en detailbank. Salget skulle gennemføres ved offentligt udbud.
The State wanted to proceed through an open tender process with the sale of the ‘good bank’, BPN S.A., which was to be exclusively a retail bank.
Dette skulle ske ved opfordring til interessetilkendegivelse, og udbudsbetingelserne herfor blev godkendt den 16. august 2010 af de portugisiske myndigheder [19].
That process was to be conducted on the basis of a call for expressions of interest, for which the specification (‘Caderno de Encargos’) was approved on 16 August 2010 by the Portuguese authorities [19].
Ifølge omstruktureringsplanen fra 2010 var visse aktiver og passiver ikke omfattet af reprivatiseringen og ville blive overført til tre nye SPV’er, Parvalorem, Parups og Parparticipadas.
Under the 2010 Restructuring Plan, a number of BPN’s assets and liabilities were to remain outside the scope of the reprivatisation and transferred to three new Special Purpose Vehicles (‘SPVs’), Parvalorem, Parups and Parparticipadas.
Disse SPV’er skulle indledningsvis forblive inden for rammerne af BPN og efterfølgende overføres til staten efter salg.
These SPVs would initially remain within BPN and after the sale would be transferred to the State.
Lånene og kreditterne skulle overføres til Parvalorem, den faste ejendom og investeringsmidlerne skulle overføres til Parups, og filialerne skulle overføres til Parparticipadas.
Loans and credits would be transferred to Parvalorem, real estate and investment funds to Parups, and subsidiaries to Parparticipadas.
De portugisiske myndigheder godkendte værdien af de samlede aktiver, som skulle overføres til SPV'erne (3885 mio. EUR). Heraf skulle 2507 mio. EUR overføres til Parvalorem, 1228 mio. EUR til Parups og 150 mio. EUR til Parparticipadas.
The Portuguese authorities valued the total amount of assets to be transferred to the SPVs at EUR 3885 million, with EUR 2507 million transferred to Parvalorem, EUR 1228 million to Parups and EUR 150 million to Parparticipadas.
Lånene blev overført med deres nominelle værdi. Fondsandele, værdipapirerne og den faste ejendom skulle overføres til købsprisen, og de virksomheder, som BPN ejede, skulle overføres til deres bogføringsværdi.
Loans were transferred at nominal value; fund units, securities and real estate were to be transferred at purchase price, and companies owned by BPN at their book value.
Ifølge de portugisiske myndigheder blev overførslen af aktiver til SPV’erne foretaget på grundlag af objektive kriterier under hensyntagen til omfanget af værdiforringede aktiver og det forhold, at visse aktiviteter efter nationaliseringen ikke var hovedaktiviteter for BPN (forbrugslån, investeringsbank, forvaltning af aktiver, forvaltning af investeringsmidler, forsikringer og internationale aktiviteter).
According to the Portuguese authorities, the transfer of assets to the SPVs was done on the basis of objective criteria, taking into account the volume of impairments as well as the fact that certain activities were not core for BPN after the nationalisation (consumer credit, investment bank, asset management, investment fund management, insurance and international business).
BPN skulle omstille sig til udelukkende at være en detailbank med en begrænset eksponering over for den usikkerhed, der er forbundet med finansiering inden for engrosbankvirksomhed.
BPN was to reposition itself as a pure retail bank with reduced exposure to the uncertainty of wholesale funding.
SPV’erne finansierede erhvervelsen af disse aktiver over to finansieringslinjer på hver 3895 mio. EUR bestående af obligationer til en værdi af 3100 mio. EUR erhvervet af CGD og lån fra CGD med sikkerhed i aktiver på i alt 795 mio. EUR. Indtægterne fra salget af aktiverne til SPV’erne gjorde det muligt for BPN at tilbagebetale den finansiering på 3,9 mio. EUR, som banken havde fået hos CGD – 3,6 mia. af de oprindelige 4 mia. EUR hidrørende fra CP’er (hvilket indebar, at BPN ikke skulle betale et beløb på 400 mio. EUR i gældsbeviser med statsgaranti) og kortfristede lån for 300 mio. EUR hidrørende fra pengemarkedet.
The SPVs financed the acquisition of the assets through two financing lines for EUR 3895 million, consisting of bonds with a state guarantee for EUR 3100 million acquired by CGD and loans from CGD with pledged assets for an aggregated value of EUR 795 million. The revenues from the sale of the assets to the SPVs allowed BPN to pay back EUR 3900 million of financing which it had obtained from CGD - EUR 3600 billion of the initial EUR 4 billion of commercial paper (meaning that an amount of EUR 400 million of commercial paper guaranteed by the State would remain unpaid by BPN), as well as EUR 300 million of short-term money market loans.
Balancesummen for BPN blev som følge af overførslen af aktiver reduceret med ca. 30 %.
Following the transfer of assets, BPN’s balance sheet was reduced by around 30 %.
Det fremgår af de oplysninger, der blev modtaget fra de portugisiske myndigheder, at staten - for at BPN kunne opfylde de retlige krav (herunder navnlig nå de 9 %, der var krævet som tier 1-kernekapital for 2011 [21]), og eftersom BPN’s egenkapital blev ved med at være negativ efter overførslen af aktiver til SPV’erne – var nødt til at tilføre ny kapital til BPN (ca. 417 mio. EUR) [22].
According to information received from the Portuguese authorities, in order to allow BPN to comply with legal and regulatory requirements (namely in order to reach the 9 % core tier 1 capital required for 2011 [21]), and given that the own capital of BPN would still be negative after the transfer of assets to the SPVs, the State would have had to recapitalise BPN by about EUR 417 million [22].
De første to indkaldelser af forslag om reprivatisering
The first two calls for reprivatisation
Grundprisen for BPN (ekskl. aktiver, der skulle overføres til SPV’erne), som var fastsat i det udbud, der blev offentliggjort af Portugal, var på 171,1 mio. EUR i overensstemmelse med de vurderinger, der var foretaget af eksterne konsulenter: Deloitte ([…] [23] mio. EUR) og Deutsche Bank ([…] mio. EUR).
The base price set for BPN (which excluded the assets to be transferred to the SPVs) in the tender published by Portugal was fixed at EUR 171,1 million based on the valuations of third party consultants Deloitte (EUR […] [23] million) and Deutsche Bank (EUR […] million).
BPN’s nye CGD-ledelse havde i mellemtiden indledt en omstrukturering af banken.
BPN’s new CGD management had in the meantime started a restructuring process for the bank.
Driftsomkostningerne blev reduceret med [1-10] % mellem december 2008 og december 2010. BPN’s aktiviteter blev reduceret, således at banken kunne koncentrere sig om kun at drive detailbankvirksomhed.
Operational costs were reduced by [1-10] % from December 2008 to December 2010; BPN’s activity was reduced in order to achieve a bank exclusively focused on retail commercial banking.
Denne reduktion af aktiviteterne medførte ikke kun en nedgang i indlånene som følge af nationaliseringen, men også overførsler af aktiver til de tre SPV’er.
That reduction in activity resulted partly from the drop in deposits following the nationalisation, but also from the transfer of assets to the three SPVs.
Den nye ledelse traf også forskellige foranstaltninger for at forbedre risikostyringen og bankens interne kontrolsystemer.
Measures to improve the risk management and internal control systems of the bank were also implemented by the new management.
Efter de to første indkaldelser af privatiseringsforslag var der ingen tredjeparter, der udviste interesse før den 30. september og den 30. november 2010.
No interested parties came forward in response to the first two calls for privatisation by 30 September and 30 November 2010.
Som følge af den fejlslagne udbudsprocedure gav Portugal i januar 2011 udtryk for, at man havde til hensigt at omstrukturere BPN og styrke dens selvstændighed i forhold til CGD ved at udpege en ny bestyrelse, som var uafhængig af CGD.
Following the failure of the tender process, in January 2011 Portugal indicated its intention to restructure BPN, making it more independent of CGD by appointing a new board, independent of the latter.
Den portugisiske stat søgte ligeledes at fremskynde forbedringen af bankens drift ved at ændre dens branding og erhvervsmæssige identitet og ved at styrke genopretningsplanen gennem reduktion af omkostninger og fremme af den kommercielle dynamik.
It also sought to accelerate the operational recovery of BPN, by redefining the bank’s brand and corporate identity and by reinforcing the recovery plan through cost cuts and enhancing commercial dynamics.
På trods af flere anmodninger blev der ikke indsendt nogen omstruktureringsplan til Kommissionen.
However, despite several requests, no updated restructuring plan was provided to the Commission.
I aftalememorandummet fra 17. maj 2011 forpligtede regeringen sig til at iværksætte en ny privatiseringsproces.
In the MoU of 17 May 2011, the Government gave an undertaking to launch a new privatisation process.
I aftalememorandummet forpligtede de portugisiske myndigheder sig til at indlede en salgsprocedure for BPN i henhold til en fremskyndet tidsplan og uden en minimumspris. Til dette formål er der en ny plan på vej til EU, som skal godkendes i overensstemmelse med konkurrencereglerne. Formålet er at finde en køber, senest inden udgangen af juli 2011.
In the MoU, the Portuguese authorities committed to ‘launching a process to sell Banco Português de Negócios (BPN) on an accelerated schedule and without a minimum price. To this end, a new plan is submitted to the EC for approval under competition rules. The target is to find a buyer by end-July 2011 at the latest. To facilitate the sale, the three existing special purpose vehicles holding its non-performing and non-core assets have been separated from BPN, and more assets could be transferred into these vehicles as part of the negotiations with prospective buyers. BPN is also launching another program of more ambitious cost cutting measures with a view to increase its attractiveness to investors. Once a solution has been found, CGD’s state guaranteed claims on BPN and all related special purpose vehicles will be taken over by the state according to a timetable to be defined at that time’ [24].
Salg til BIC
Sale to BIC
Der blev i starten af maj 2011 lanceret et tredje privatiseringsinitiativ uden minimumspris med henblik på at finde en køber til BPN inden den 31. juli 2011 som fastsat i aftalememorandummet.
A third privatisation attempt was launched at the beginning of May 2011 without a minimum price in order to find a buyer for BPN by 31 July 2011, as agreed in the MoU.
Der blev iværksat en udbudsprocedure, inden for hvilken der blev etableret kontakter med mulige interesserede købere.
A tender procedure was held during which contacts with potential interested buyers took place.
Der blev ligeledes udarbejdet en oversigt over investeringspotentialet (”Investment Opportunity Overview” – ”IOO”).
An Investment Opportunity Overview (‘IOO’) was also produced.