natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I åbningsbeslutningen vurderede Kommissionen for det første, at foranstaltningen rejste tvivl om, hvorvidt den usædvanligt gunstige ordning, som blev indført til fordel for offentlige foretagender af industriel og kommerciel karakter (EPIC) i forbindelse med konkurs, kan sammenlignes med en ubegrænset statsgaranti, hvormed man kan mobilisere offentlige midler, og lagde følgende til grund:
In the opening decision, the Commission began by expressing doubts about the special arrangements governing the bankruptcy of EPICs, which departed from the ordinary law on such matters. It considered that these were akin to an unlimited State guarantee mechanism which mobilised public resources:
Insolvens- og konkursprocedurerne finder ikke anvendelse på EPIC'er i form af offentligretlige juridiske personer i medfør af det overordnede princip om fritagelse af offentligretlige juridiske personers ejendom for arrest eller udlæg, som siden slutningen af det 19. århundrede har været gældende retspraksis i Frankrig, især hos Cour de cassation [19].
EPICs, as legal entities governed by public law, are not subject to insolvency and bankruptcy procedures, by virtue of the general principle of the immunity from seizure of the assets of legal entities governed by public law, which has been recognised by the French courts, including the Court of Cassation [19], since the late nineteenth century.
Kommissionen henviser til nærmere detaljer i afsnit 3.2.1.1 i indledningsbeslutningen, betragtning 38-40 [20].
For further details, the Commission refers to section 3.2.1.1 of the opening decision, recitals 38 to 40 [20].
Loven af 16. juli 1980 og gennemførelsesbestemmelserne hertil finder til gengæld anvendelse på et EPIC.
EPICs are subject to the Law of 16 July 1980 and its implementing rules.
Kommissionen henviser til nærmere detaljer i afsnit 3.2.1.2 i indledningsbeslutningen, betragtning 41-45 [21].
For further details, the Commission refers to section 3.2.1.2 of the opening decision, recitals 41 to 45 [21].
I tilfælde af opløsning af et EPIC finder princippet om overførsel af gæld til staten eller en anden offentlig enhed generelt anvendelse [22], således at samtlige et EPIC's kreditorer får sikkerhed for, at de aldrig mister den fordring, de har i et offentligt foretagende.
In the event of the winding up of an EPIC, the general principle applies that its debts will be transferred to the State or to another public entity [22], which means that creditors of an EPIC have an assurance that they will not lose the money they are owed by a publicly owned establishment.
Kommissionen henviser til nærmere detaljer i afsnit 3.2.1.3 i indledningsbeslutningen, betragtning 46-51 [23].
For further details, the Commission refers to section 3.2.1.3 of the opening decision, recitals 46 to 51 [23].
EPIC'erne ville kunne få privilegeret adgang til statskassens forskudskonti.
EPICs may possibly also have preferential access to Treasury imprest accounts.
Kommissionen henviser til nærmere detaljer i afsnit 3.2.1.4 i indledningsbeslutningen, betragtning 52 [24].
For further details, the Commission refers to section 3.2.1.4 of the opening decision, recital 52 [24].
Som nævnt i betragtning 65-74 i åbningsbeslutningen, som Kommissionen henviser til med henblik på nærmere forklaring, forekom de franske myndigheders lovgivnings- og forskriftsmæssige præciseringer i øvrigt ikke at være tilstrækkelige til på forhånd at fjerne denne tvivl.
As explained in recitals 65 to 74 of the opening decision, to which the Commission refers for more details, the clarifications to legislation and regulations proposed by the French authorities did not at first sight seem sufficient to assuage these doubts.
Kommissionen anførte dernæst, at det ikke kunne udelukkes, at denne situation afføder en selektiv økonomisk fordel, især i kraft af de angiveligt mere gunstige finansieringsvilkår, også selv om det offentlige foretagende IFP og dets datterselskaber ikke har fået en kreditvurdering af et eksternt kreditvurderingsbureau.
The Commission said that it could not be ruled out that there might be a selective economic advantage, mainly through funding terms considered more favourable, even if IFP and its subsidiaries were not the subject of a financial rating by an external rating agency.
IFP-koncernen kunne også være blevet begunstiget i sine forbindelser til kunder og leverandører, idet sidstnævnte kunne have troet, at de var omfattet af en statsgaranti for deres fordringer.
The IFP group might also have been advantaged in its dealings with customers and suppliers in so far as they believed their claims to be covered by a State guarantee.
Derfor kunne det i løbet af den foreløbige undersøgelse ikke udelukkes, at leverandører eller kunder i forbindelse med en leverance eller indkøb af varer eller tjenesteydelser på kredit ville give det offentlige foretagende IFP bedre betingelser end dem, de ville indrømme en virksomhed, der ikke er omfattet af statsgaranti.
Consequently, it could not be ruled out at the preliminary examination stage that in the case of the supply or purchase of goods or services involving a claim, the suppliers or customers concerned would grant terms to IFP that were better than those they would have granted to an undertaking not benefiting from a State guarantee.
I øvrigt vurderede Kommissionen på grundlag af de oplysninger, der var resultatet af den foreløbige undersøgelse, at garantiens ubegrænsede karakter, især dens varighed, beløb og omfang, gjorde det yderst vanskeligt at beregne den markedspræmie, som det offentlige foretagende IFP burde betale staten for at yde det denne beskyttelse.
On the basis of the information available at the end of its preliminary examination, the Commission considered that the unlimited nature of the guarantee, especially as regards its duration, amount and scope, made it extremely difficult to calculate the amount of the market premium that IFP ought to pay the State for such protection.
Endelig angav Kommissionen, at den havde sine tvivl med hensyn til statsstøttens forenelighed med det indre marked, idet støtten især ikke umiddelbart forekom at være beregnet til at fremme udviklingen af visse erhvervsgrene eller økonomiske regioner.
Finally, the Commission doubted whether the aid was compatible with the internal market, particular because it did not at first sight appear to be intended to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or regions.
5 DE FRANSKE MYNDIGHEDERS BEMÆRKNINGER OG FORSLAG
5 OBSERVATIONS AND PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES
DE FRANSKE MYNDIGHEDERS INDLEDENDE BEMÆRKNINGER
INITIAL OBSERVATIONS BY THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES
I deres bemærkninger af 14. oktober 2008 mindede de franske myndigheder indledningsvis om, at proceduren mod IFP-koncernen var indledt parallelt med postsagen, og angav derfor at ville fremføre de samme argumenter, som de havde fremført i forbindelse med undersøgelsen af postsagen [26].
In their observations of 14 October 2008, the French authorities pointed out, as a preliminary point, that the procedure against the IFP group had been initiated in parallel to the postal case cited above; they said they were therefore reiterating the same arguments mutatis mutandis as those they developed during the examination of that case [26].
Trods lighedspunkterne valgte de franske myndigheder alligevel at minde om de særlige forhold, der gælder det offentlige foretagende IFP. Det drejer sig således om en forskningsorganisation med tre almennyttige opgaver (forskning, uddannelse og dokumentation), hvis aktiviteter for størstedelens vedkommende ikke er økonomiske, hvilket skulle berettige den offentlige finansiering, den får bevilget.
Despite these similarities, the French authorities nevertheless wished to draw attention to the specific features of IFP: it was a research organisation assigned a three-fold task in the general interest (research, training and documentation), with an overwhelming majority of non-economic activities, and this justified the public funding granted to it.
Derudover præciserede de franske myndigheder årsagerne til omdannelsen til et EPIC, nemlig at der skulle skabes sammenhæng mellem dels aktiviteternes art og IFP's finansieringsform, dels IFP's juridiske status, og at dette berettigede statusændringen, hvorved IFP blev bragt nærmere den offentlige sektor mod at opgive den privatretlige form af erhvervsrettet foretagende.
Moreover, they specified the reasons for its conversion into EPIC form, which they said was intended to ensure that IFP’s legal form was consistent with the nature of its activities and its method of funding; relinquishing the form of trade body governed by private law would bring IFP closer to the public sphere.
De franske myndigheder anfægtede, at der skulle være tale om statsstøtte, fordi to af de betingelser, der stilles i EUF-traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, ifølge dem ikke var opfyldt, idet den omhandlede mekanisme dels ikke omfattede overførsel af statslige midler (5.1.1), dels ikke gav det offentlige foretagende IFP nogen fordele (5.1.2).
The French authorities disputed the existence of State aid, since, in their opinion, two of the conditions laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU were not met: the mechanism at issue did not involve any transfer of State resources (5.1.1) and did not confer any advantage on IFP (5.1.2).
FRAVÆR AF EN GARANTI, DER KAN TILSKRIVES STATEN OG INDEBÆRER OVERFØRSEL AF STATSLIGE MIDLER
THERE IS NO GUARANTEE IMPUTABLE TO THE STATE INVOLVING A TRANSFER OF STATE RESOURCES
Ifølge de franske myndigheder er de offentlige virksomheder for det første ikke automatisk omfattet af en garanti i kraft af deres status (A), og for det andet er Kommissionens ræsonnement i indledningsbeslutningen forkert (B).
According to the French authorities, (A) publicly owned establishments do not enjoy any guarantee because of their legal form, and (B) the Commission’s argument in the opening decision is flawed.
Fravær af enhver ubegrænset statsgaranti
No unlimited State guarantee
Som nævnt i betragtning 41-45 i beslutning C 56/2007, som Kommissionen henviser til, fremlægger de franske myndigheder fem anbringender til støtte for deres argumentation.
As explained in recitals 41 to 45 of decision C 56/2007, to which the Commission refers mutatis mutandis, the French authorities develop five pleas in law in support of their arguments.
For det første er der ikke i nogen retsakt eller beslutning fastsat det princip, at staten principielt giver en ubegrænset garanti for gæld stiftet af et EPIC.
First, no legislation or decision lays down the principle that the State would, out of principle, indefinitely guarantee the debts of EPICs.
For det andet er der ifølge retspraksis hos Frankrigs øverste forvaltningsdomstol Conseil d'Etat ikke tale om garanti, jf. bl.a. afgørelsen om Société de l'hôtel d'Albe [27] og de to beslutninger, der blev truffet i Campoloro-sagen [28].
Second, the Council of State has found against the existence of guarantees, in particular in its judgment in Société de l’hôtel d’Albe [27] and in its two judgments in the Campoloro case [28].
Den gæld, der er stiftet siden den 1. januar 2005, er således ikke omfattet af en implicit garanti.
Debts contracted since 1 January 2005 are therefore not covered by an implied guarantee.
Med hensyn til gæld stiftet før den 1. januar 2005 mener eksperten, at det i mangel af en anfægtet afgørelse ikke kan fastslås, hvorvidt man af hensyn til respekten for kreditorernes forfatningssikrede rettigheder kan se bort fra ugyldigheden af de implicitte garantier, som blev givet før den 1. januar 2005, og som ikke var udtrykkeligt bemyndiget i finansloven.
As for debts incurred before 1 January 2005, the expert takes the view that, in the absence of a court judgment, it is impossible to determine whether it might be held that implied guarantees given before 1 January 2005 which were not expressly authorised by a finance act retain their validity on the basis of respect for the constitutionally protected rights of creditors.
For det fjerde mener Frankrig, at hvis et EPIC var omfattet af en statslig garanti, ville en ændring af dets status kræve iværksættelse af foranstaltninger til beskyttelse af fordringshavernes rettigheder.
Fourth, France considers that if EPICs enjoyed a State guarantee, the change in their legal form would require the introduction of new measures to protect creditors’ rights.
Da en sådan mekanisme aldrig er indført [32], slutter de, at et EPIC tværtimod ikke er omfattet af nogen form for statsgaranti.
Since such a mechanism has never been introduced [32], France concludes conversely that EPICs do not benefit from any State guarantee.
For det femte citerer de franske myndigheder en artikel [33] af den tidligere retsformand for Conseil d'Etats afdeling for tvistemål, Daniel Labetoulle. Ifølge denne »er der juridisk set ingen automatik i bevillingen, fordelen og omfanget af denne garanti [en statsgaranti, der uden videre skulle gælde for statens offentlige foretagender].«
Fifth, the French authorities refer to an article by Mr Labetoulle, a former president of the litigation division of the Council of State, according to which ‘in law, there is nothing automatic about the granting, enjoyment and scope of this guarantee [a State guarantee that applies automatically to State-owned public establishments]’ [33].
Kommissionens forkerte ræsonnement [34]
Flawed Commission argument [34]
De franske myndigheder mener hverken, at der er garanti for tilbagebetalingen af individuelle fordringer i tilfælde med EPIC (a), eller at der er garanti for opretholdelsen af det offentlige foretagendes eller dets forpligtelsers eksistens (b).
The French authorities consider that, as far as EPICs are concerned, (a) the reimbursement of individual claims is not guaranteed, and (b) there is no assurance of the continued existence of the publicly owned establishment or of its obligations.
Fravær af garanti for tilbagebetalingen af individuelle fordringer
The reimbursement of individual claims is not guaranteed
Som nævnt i betragtning 50-53 i beslutning C 56/2007, som Kommissionen henviser til, hævder de franske myndigheder i øvrigt, at statens objektive ansvar ikke kan gøres gældende alene begrundet i utilstrækkelige aktiver.
Furthermore, as indicated in recitals 50 to 53 of decision C 56/2007, to which the Commission refers mutatis mutandis, the French authorities maintain that the State cannot incur strict liability solely on the ground of a lack of assets.
Ifølge de franske myndigheder forudsætter enhver garanti da også, at garanten påtager sig ansvaret for den garanteredes forhold.
According to the French authorities, any guarantee requires the guarantor to accept the fact of the guarantee.
Når det drejer sig om at have udvist skyld eller i tilfælde af objektivt ansvar at påtage sig ansvaret for følgerne af egne foranstaltninger, kan der derfor ikke være tale om garanti.
Where liability arises out of responsibility for a fault or, in the case of strict liability, for the consequences of one’s own actions, there can be no question of a guarantee.
Ifølge de franske myndigheder kan statens ansvar ikke gøres gældende udelukkende med den begrundelse, at præfekten eller tilsynsmyndigheden på grund af myndighedens eller det offentlige foretagendes finansielle og formuemæssige situation ikke har kunnet træffe en foranstaltning, der kunne gøre det muligt at betale fordringen.
According to France, the liability of the State cannot be incurred on the sole ground that the prefect or supervising authority was unable to take any measures that could allow the claim to be repaid because of the financial and asset situation of the publicly owned establishment.
Der bør ses bort fra skyld, idet præfektens eller tilsynsmyndighedens undladelse ikke i sig selv er culpøs.
There is no fault: inaction on the part of the prefect or the supervising authority is not necessarily a fault.
Dog anerkender de franske myndigheder, at kravet om kontinuitet i den offentlige service er afgørende for statens repræsentant i forbindelse med håndhævelsen af den procedure, der er indført ved lov af 16. juli 1980, men mener, at selv om dommeren skulle træffe bestemmelse om erstatning til kreditor, ville en sådan erstatning sætte kreditor i den samme situation som efter de almindelige bestemmelser, eftersom det omhandlede aktiv i sidstnævnte tilfælde ville være blevet solgt, og kreditorerne tilsammen ville have fået det tilsvarende beløb.
The French authorities recognise that when implementing the procedure laid down by the Law of 16 July 1980 the representative of the State is subject to the requirement of continuity of the public service, but consider that even if a court were to order that a creditor be compensated, such compensation would merely place the creditor in the same position that he would have been in under ordinary law, because under ordinary law the asset would have been sold and the body of creditors would have received the corresponding sum.
Kreditor ville derfor ikke have nogen fordel som følge heraf.
There is therefore be no advantage to the creditor.
Fravær af garanti for opretholdelsen af det offentlige foretagendes eller dets forpligtelsers eksistens
The continued existence of IFP or of its obligations is not guaranteed
Som nævnt i betragtning 54-56 i beslutning C 56/2007, som Kommissionen henviser til, mener de franske myndigheder, at den manglende anvendelse af den almindelige procedure for rekonstruktion og likvidation på offentligretlige juridiske personer ikke udelukker muligheden for, at et EPIC kan gå konkurs, eller at der kan indledes en konkursbehandling imod det.
As explained in recitals 54 to 56 of decision C 56/2007, to which the Commission refers mutatis mutandis, the French authorities consider that the inapplicability to legal persons governed by public law of the administration and winding-up procedures provided for under ordinary law does not exclude the possibility of the bankruptcy of an EPIC or prevent bankruptcy proceedings being brought against it.
De anfægter Kommissionens analyse, der bygger på meddelelsen om statsstøtte i form af garantier [38] (herefter »meddelelsen om garantier«), og mener, at Kommissionen i det foreliggende tilfælde ikke har påvist eksistensen af »mere gunstige finansieringsvilkår«, der kan tilskrives udelukkelsen af muligheden for konkurs eller andre insolvensprocedurer, og heller ikke har fastslået, at det offentlige foretagende IFP ikke kan gå konkurs, eller at en insolvensprocedure ikke er mulig, fordi loven af 1985 kun er en procedurelov, og fordi den omstændighed, at EPIC ikke falder ind under anvendelsesområdet, kun indebærer, at der ikke kan iværksættes en rekonstruktions-, likvidations- eller konkursprocedure mod den ad hoc.
They challenge the Commission’s analysis, which is based on its Notice on State aid in the form of guarantees (‘the Guarantees Notice’) [38], and consider that in the case in point the Commission has not demonstrated the existence of ‘more favourable funding terms’ attributable to the exclusion of the possibility of bankruptcy, and has not established that IFP cannot go bankrupt, nor that insolvency proceedings are impossible: the Law of 1985 is merely a procedural law, and the fact that EPICs lie outside its scope does not mean that administration, winding-up or ad hoc bankruptcy proceedings cannot be brought against them.
Som forklaret i betragtning 57-67 i beslutning C 56/2007, som Kommissionen henviser til, hævder de franske myndigheder i øvrigt, at anvendelsen af den »procedure«, der blev indført ved lov af 16. juli 1980, frem for den almindelige kollektive bobehandling ikke giver kreditor nogen fordel.
Moreover, as explained in recitals 57 to 67 of decision C 56/2007, to which the Commission refers mutatis mutandis, the French authorities maintain that the application of the ‘procedure’ introduced by the Law of 16 July 1980, rather than the collective procedure under ordinary law, does not confer any advantage on the creditor.
De bestrider, at det var nødvendigt at opfylde kravene om offentlighed [39] og ækvivalens [40], som Kommissionen stiller i betragtning 81 i indledningsbeslutningen, for at vurdere om anvendelsen af en specifik procedure i tilfælde af insolvens giver den enhed en fordel, som er omfattet heraf, i forhold til de øvrige virksomheder, der er omfattet af handelsretten [41], men de fastholder de samme krav i analysen af den procedure, der blev indført ved lov af 16. juli 1980.
To assess whether the application of a specific procedure in the event of insolvency confers an advantage on the entity subject to the procedure as compared with undertakings subject to commercial law, they challenge the need to fulfil the criteria of publicity [39] and equivalence [40] referred to by the Commission in recital 81 of the opening decision [41], but they use these same criteria to analyse the procedure established by the Law of 16 July 1980.
De mener, at denne procedure, for så vidt angår offentlighedskriteriet, er korrekt identificeret af kreditvurderingsbureauerne som den, der skal anvendes i tilfælde af insolvens hos et EPIC, mens de vedrørende ækvivalenskriteriet skelner mellem, om der skal anvendes et krav om kontinuitet i den offentlige service eller ej, samtidig med at de bemærker, at den finansielle situation i det offentlige foretagende IFP og dets datterselskaber gør det usandsynligt, at der skulle være tale om utilstrækkelige aktiver i IFP-koncernen, hvis likvide beholdninger og bundne aktiver (150,3 mio. EUR) i slutningen af 2007 omtrent androg det femdobbelte af koncernens samlede passiver (25,2 mio. EUR). De lægger følgende til grund:
As regards the publicity criterion, they consider that the procedure is correctly identified by the rating agencies as applicable in the event of the insolvency of an EPIC; as regards the equivalence criterion, they draw a distinction depending on whether or not there is a requirement for continuity of the public service, at the same time noting that the financial situation of IFP and its subsidiaries makes it unlikely that IFP might be short of assets, since available funds and investments at the end of 2007 (EUR 150,3 million) represented approximately five times the amount of borrowings and financial liabilities (EUR 25,2 million):
I tilfælde, hvor der ikke gælder noget krav om offentlig service, og det offentlige foretagende har utilstrækkelige aktiver, sætter anvendelsen af proceduren, der blev indført ved lov i 1980, ifølge de franske myndigheder ikke kreditorerne i en mere gunstig situation end, hvis den almindelige procedure var blevet anvendt. De får nemlig det samme beløb som kreditorerne hos en enhed, der er omfattet af handelsretten, hvilket vil sige det beløb, der hidrører fra realiseringen af aktivsiden, og har udtømt deres retsmidler ved procedurens afslutning [42], idet staten ifølge de franske myndigheder ikke kan ifalde ansvar alene på grund af utilstrækkelige midler.
If there is no requirement for continuity of the public service, in the event of lack of assets of the publicly owned establishment, application of the procedure introduced by the Law of 1980 would not place the creditors in a more favourable position than if the procedure under ordinary law had been applied: they would recover the same amount as the creditors of an entity subject to commercial law, i.e. the proceeds from the sale of the assets, and would no longer have any redress at the end of the procedure [42], since, according to France, the State cannot be held liable solely on the ground of lack of assets.
Kun to aspekter er ifølge dem forskellige, nemlig at der ikke sker massebehandling af kreditorerne.
Only two aspects would be different: