natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For at vurdere, hvorvidt efterstillingen af krav og afkaldet på krav og rentebetalinger udgør statsstøtte til GfW i henhold til artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF, må det også fastlægges, hvorvidt GfW opnåede en økonomisk fordel, som virksomheden ikke ville have opnået på sædvanlige markedsbetingelser, og/eller om foranstaltningen gjorde det muligt for GfW at undgå omkostninger, der normalt skulle have været afholdt af virksomhedens egen kapital.
To establish whether the subordination of claims and the waiver of claims and interest payments constitute State aid in the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU to GfW it is necessary to establish whether GfW receives an economic advantage which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions and/or whether the measure enabled GfW to avoid having to bear costs which it would normally have had to meet out of its own financial resources.
Denne vurdering skal foretages efter de kriterier, der gælder for private kreditorer.
This assessment has to be done using the private creditor test.
Ifølge fast retspraksis kan det være nødvendigt at give delvis afkald på tilbagesøgningen for at forøge det beløb, der inddrives.
According to settled case-law, waiving part of the claim can be required in order to increase the amount which is effectively recovered.
En privat kreditor vil forsøge at mindske sine tab [23].
A private creditor would act so as to minimise his losses [23].
Hvis en fordring ikke var tilstrækkelig sikret, ville en aftale om at udsætte tilbagebetalingen øge mulighederne for tilbagebetaling uden tab, da skyldneren ville få mulighed for at overvinde krisen og rette op på sin økonomiske situation [24].
In case a claim was not sufficiently secured, agreement to postpone the repayment would increase the chances of repayment without losses as the debtor would have the chance to overcome the crisis and improve its situation [24].
I HAMSA [25]-dommen undsiger Retten Kommissionens tidligere praksis med at kræve, at private og offentlige kreditorer giver afkald på en ligelig del af fordringerne i forhold til deres andel af gælden.
In the HAMSA [25] ruling of the CFI, the court rejects the Commissions previous practice of requiring equal share of waivers of claims for private and public creditors in relation to their share of the debt.
Det hedder i præmis 168 og 169:
Paragraph 168 and 169 of the judgment reads:
Når en virksomhed, som står over for en væsentlig forringelse af sin økonomiske situation, foreslår en aftale eller en række aftaler om omstrukturering af dens gæld til sine kreditorer med henblik på at genoprette sin økonomiske situation og undgå afvikling, må hver enkelt kreditor træffe et valg dels med hensyn til det beløb, der bliver tilbudt ham i den foreslåede aftale, dels med hensyn til det beløb, som han forventer at kunne opnå i forbindelse med virksomhedens eventuelle afvikling.
When a firm faced with a substantial deterioration of its financial situation proposes an agreement or series of agreements for debt arrangement to its creditors with a view to remedying the situation and avoiding liquidation, each creditor must make a decision having regard to the amount offered to it under the proposed agreement, on the one hand, and the amount it expects to be able to recover following possible liquidation of the firm, on the other.
Dette valg er påvirket af en række faktorer, såsom om kravet er pantesikret, privilegeret eller simpelt, arten og omfanget af eventuel anden sikkerhed, en vurdering af mulighederne for genopretning af virksomheden og det udbytte, han vil kunne opnå ved en afvikling.
Its choice is influenced by number of factors, including the creditor’s status as the holder of a secured, preferential or ordinary claim, the nature and extent of any security it may hold, its assessment of the chances of the firm being restored to viability, as well as the amount it would receive in the event of liquidation.
Heraf følger navnlig, at når de faktorer, som er afgørende for at bestemme værdien af de muligheder, som tilbydes kreditorerne, ikke er kendte, er den blotte omstændighed, at der er en åbenbar ulighed mellem de beløb, som de forskellige grupper af kreditorer har eftergivet, ikke i sig selv tilstrækkelig til at nå til en konklusion hvad angår de grunde, som ledte kreditorerne til at acceptere den foreslåede gældseftergivelse.«
It follows that, in the absence of knowledge about the factors which determine the respective values of the choices offered to creditors, the mere fact that there is an apparent lack of proportion between the amounts which the various creditors have written off is not in itself conclusive as to the reasons which led them to accept the debt remissions proposed.’
I HAMSA [26]-sagen fastslog Retten endvidere, at en offentlig kreditor handler som en privat kreditor, når den offentlige kreditor beslutter at give delvis afkald på tilbagesøgningen på baggrund af en grundig og rimelig vurdering af, hvor stort et beløb der vil kunne tilbagesøges, risikoen for afvikling og mulighederne for genopretning af virksomheden.
In addition, in the HAMSA [26] case the CFI established that, a public creditor acts like a private creditor when he decides to waive a share of his claims, after extensive and reasonable evaluation of how much he might be able to recover, of the risk of liquidation and of the chance of the firm being restored to viability.
Endelig besluttede Kommissionen i Huta Cynku-sagen [27], at der ikke kan være tale om nogen fordel, og derfor ikke om statsstøtte, hvis omstruktureringen giver et mere indbringende resultat end likvidationen.
Lastly, in the Commission’s decision in the Huta Cynku [27] case, the Commission decided that no advantage and thus no State aid exists where restructuring would yield better proceeds than liquidation.
Ved vurderingen af, om en privat kreditor ville have eller har handlet på samme måde som WAK er det ifølge ovennævnte retspraksis nødvendigt at undersøge de handlemuligheder, som WAK havde, da det blev fastslået, at GfW var truet af insolvens, og hvilke økonomiske følger disse handlemuligheder ville få.
With reference to the case-law quoted above, when assessing whether a private creditor would have acted or has acted in the same way as WAK, it is necessary to examine the choices that WAK had when it was concluded that GfW was facing insolvency and what the economic implications connected to these choices would be.
Det er derefter ligeledes nødvendigt at foretage den samme undersøgelse for vinproducenterne og vinhandlerne og herefter vurdere, om WAK's situation kan sammenlignes med og vurderes på grundlag af vinproducenternes og vinhandlernes tiltag.
As a second step, it is also necessary to carry out the same examination for the winegrowing enterprises and merchants and then to evaluate whether the situation faced by WAK can be compared to and evaluated based on the actions of the winegrowing enterprises and merchants.
Da WAK blev underrettet om, at GfW var truet af insolvens, havde fonden to valgmuligheder.
When informed that GfW was facing insolvency, WAK had two choices.
Den kunne enten acceptere, at der blev indledt insolvensbehandling, eller forsøge at forhindre dette ved at indgå en aftale med GfW, som ville give GfW mulighed for at fortsætte driften.
It could either allow for insolvency proceedings to be opened, or it could try to avoid this by reaching an agreement with GfW which would enable GfW to continue trading.
Hvorvidt vinproducenterne og vinhandlerne var villige til at gøre det samme havde kun en begrænset indvirkning på beregningen af størrelsen af det inddrevne beløb, men ændrede ikke ved resultatet af sammenligningen af de to alternativer.
Whether the winegrowing enterprises and merchants were willing to do the same, only had a slight impact on the recovery calculations, but did not change the outcome on the comparison of the two alternatives.
Den skønnede tilbagebetalingsgrad på 2,4 mio. EUR i rapporten er baseret på Tysklands antagelse af, at vinproducenternes og vinhandlernes fordringer på 4,4 mio. EUR skulle indfries før WAK's fordringer.
The estimate of a recovery rate in case of insolvency of EUR 2,4 million in the report is based on the German assumption that the claims of the winegrowing enterprises and merchants of EUR 4,4 million would have to be settled before those of WAK.
Ifølge Europa-Kommissionen er det i henhold til den tyske lov om insolvens kun fordringer fra vinproducenter og vinhandlere med forlænget ejendomsforbehold, der skal indfries før WAK's fordringer.
However, according to the European Commission, the German insolvency law states that only the debt to those winegrowing enterprises and merchants with prolonged retention of title would have had to be settled before the debts of WAK.
De øvrige fordringer har samme rangorden som WAK's fordringer.
The other debts would be on an equal standing with the debt of WAK.
Europa-Kommissionens egne beregninger viser imidlertid, at selv hvis WAK's og vinproducenternes og vinhandlernes fordringer alle havde samme rangorden, kunne WAK forvente at få inddrevet højst 4,7 mio. EUR i tilfælde af insolvens (ved en maksimal samlet tilbagebetaling af 6,8 mio. EUR i tilfælde af insolvens, og hvis WAK og vinproducenterne modtog tilbagebetaling i forhold til deres andel af gælden — henholdsvis 10 mio. EUR og 4,4 mio. EUR for WAK og vinproducenterne og vinhandlerne).
The European Commission’s own calculations show however that even in the case where the claims of WAK and the winegrowing enterprises and merchants would all have equal standing, WAK could expect to recover the maximum of EUR 4,7 million in case of insolvency (based on a maximum total repayment of EUR 6,8 million in case of insolvency and that WAK and the winegrowing enterprises received repayment in proportion to what they were owed — EUR 10 million and EUR 4,4 million respectively for WAK and the winegrowing enterprises and merchants).
Det kan derfor konkluderes, at det ex-ante ville være mest fordelagtigt for WAK at give GfW mulighed for at undgå insolvens.
It can therefore be concluded that ex ante the more favourable option for WAK would be to enable GfW to avoid insolvency.
Regnestykket så derimod helt anderledes ud for vinproducenterne og vinhandlerne.
The winegrowing enterprises and merchants on the other hand faced a very different calculation.
For det første havde de allerede modtaget 80 % af betalingen for de leverede varer.
Firstly, they had already received 80 % of the payment for their delivered goods.
For det andet ville de i henhold til GfW's tilbud kun modtage 10 % af de 20 %, som de stadig havde til gode.
Secondly, according to the offer by GfW they would only receive 10 % of the 20 % still owed to them.
Det er bestemt mindre, end de kunne forvente ved en insolvensbehandling uanset deres sikkerhedsmæssige stilling (enkelt, udvidet eller forlænget ejendomsforbehold), idet de kunne forvente at modtage 48 % af deres resterende fordringer i gennemsnit (2,1 mio. EUR af de 4,4 mio. EUR, som de stadig havde til gode).
In average they could expect to receive 48 % of their remaining claims (EUR 2,1 million of the total EUR 4,4 million owed them).
Det er således ikke overraskende, at en række af vinproducenterne og vinhandlerne afslog GfW's tilbud.
It is therefore no surprise that some of the winegrowing enterprises and merchants refused the offer by GfW.
For det tredje må det have været tydeligt, at det ville være i WAK's interesse at give afkald på en del af fondens krav og forhindre insolvens, selv om vinproducenterne og vinhandlerne ikke gjorde det samme, hvilket desuden ville give vinproducenterne og vinhandlerne mulighed for at få inddrevet en større andel af deres resterende fordringer end de tilbudte 10 %.
Thirdly, it must have been evident that it would be in WAK’s interest to waive part of its claims and avoid insolvency even if the winegrowing enterprises and merchants did not do the same, which again would enable the winegrowing enterprises and merchants to get a larger share of their remaining claims back than the offered 10 %.
For det fjerde havde flere vinproducenter og vinhandlere allerede anlagt sag mod GfW, og retten havde afsagt dom til deres fordel og pålagt GfW at indfri 80 % af de resterende fordringer.
Fourthly, several of them had already taken GfW to court and the court had rules in their favour, obliging GfW to settle 80 % of the remaining claims.
Det kan konkluderes, at selv om vinproducenterne og vinhandlerne og WAK alle var GfW's kreditorer, var disse valgmuligheder og resultatet af disse valgmuligheder for WAK og vinproducenterne og vinhandlerne så forskellige, at de ikke kan sammenlignes.
It can be concluded that despite the fact that the winegrowing enterprises and merchants and WAK were all creditors to GfW, the choices and outcome of those choices for WAK and the winegrowing enterprises and merchants were so dissimilar that they are not comparable.
Det forhold, at vinproducenterne og vinhandlerne valgte ikke at give afkald på deres fordringer, burde ikke have en negativ indflydelse på vurderingen af, om WAK handlede i overensstemmelse med de kriterier, der gælder for private kreditorer.
The fact that the winegrowing enterprises and merchants chose not to waive their claims should not have a negative bearing when analysing whether WAK acted in accordance with the private creditor test.
Efter en afvejning af WAK's forskellige valgmuligheder konkluderer Kommissionen, at den delvise efterstilling af og afkald på krav den 4. december 2000 og den 21. februar 2001 på i alt 5005441,60 EUR og afkaldet på rentebetalinger pr. 31. december 2000 var den mest fordelagtige valgmulighed for WAK og således i overensstemmelse med de kriterier, der gælder for private kreditorer.
Weighing the different options for WAK against each other the Commission concludes that the partial subordination and waiver of claims of 4 December 2000 and of 21 February 2001 totalling of EUR 5005441,60 and waiver of interest payments as from 31 December 2000 was the most favourable option for WAK and is therefore in accordance with the private creditor test.
Efterstillingen og afkaldet på krav er som betalingshenstand mere fordelagtigt for kreditoren end likvidation.
The subordination and waiver of claims make out a debt deferral, which is more advantageous to the creditor compared to liquidation.
Det følger af retspraksis [28], at en offentligretlig kreditor kan afveje fordelene ved at modtage den sum, der tilbydes i henhold til en omstruktureringsaftale, eller den sum, kreditor modtager ved likvidation af virksomheden.
In accordance with settled case-law [28], a public creditor will balance the advantage inherent in obtaining the offered sum under the restructuring plan and the sum they would be able to recover via the firm’s liquidation.
GfW opnåede således ikke nogen fordel, som selskabet ikke ville have opnået på sædvanlige markedsbetingelser, og der blev derfor ikke ydet statsstøtte til GfW som følge af WAK's beslutning om at efterstille og give afkald på en del af fondens krav.
Hence, GfW did not receive any advantage it would not have received under normal market conditions and thus no State aid was awarded to GfW as a result of WAK’s decision to subordinate and waive part of its claims.
Ved indledningen af proceduren blev der udtrykt tvivl om, hvorvidt WAK's efterstilling af og afkald på krav var begrænset til et strengt minimum.
In the opening of procedures doubt was expressed as to whether WAK kept the subordination and waiver of claim to a strict minimum.
Ifølge bemærkningerne fra Tyskland gav WAK imidlertid kun afkald på den andel af fondens krav, der var nødvendig for at inddække GfW's underskud for 2000, hvilket var påkrævet i henhold til den tyske lov om insolvens (se betragtning 25) for at undgå en insolvensbehandling og give GfW mulighed for at fortsætte driften.
However, according to the comments of Germany, WAK waived the share of its claims needed to cover GfW’s deficit for 2000, which was necessary according to German insolvency law (see recital 25) in order to avoid insolvency proceedings and enable GfW to continue trading.
I den første aftale (undertegnet den 4.12.2000) mellem GfW og WAK for at forhindre GfW's insolvens aftalte WAK med GfW, at fonden ville efterstille krav svarende til underskuddet, når vinproducenterne og vinhandlerne havde indvilliget i at give afkald på 90 % af deres resterende fordringer, og give afkald på krav svarende til det efterstillede beløb, hvis det skulle vise sig nødvendigt (se betragtning 79 og 80).
In the first contract (signed on 4 December 2000) between GfW and WAK, in order to avoid GfW’s insolvency, WAK agrees with GfW on a subordination of claims of the same amount as GfW’s deficit after the winegrowing enterprises and merchants had agreed to waive 90 % of their remaining claims and to, if necessary, waive the amount of claim they had agreed to subordinate (see recitals 79 and 80).
Årsagen til, at afkaldet var større end først forventet, var vinproducenternes og vinhandlernes beslutning om ikke at give afkald på nogen af deres fordringer af de grunde, der er anført i ovennævnte betragtning 110, på trods af WAK's og GfW's bestræbelser på at overtale vinproducenterne og vinhandlerne til at yde deres bidrag og hjælpe GfW med at undgå insolvens (se betragtning 79 og 80 vedrørende de tyske bemærkninger).
The reason for the waiver being larger than first expected was that despite WAK’s and GfW’s efforts to convince the winegrowing enterprises and merchants to contribute their part in helping GfW to avoid insolvency (see recitals 79 and 80 of the German comments), the winegrowing enterprises and merchants’ decision to not waive any of their claims for the reasons mentioned in recital 110 above.
Som nævnt i betragtning 108 havde vinproducenternes og vinhandlernes beslutning om ikke at give afkald på en del af deres resterende fordringer kun en begrænset indvirkning på WAK's økonomiske vurdering og ændrede ikke ved resultatet af denne vurdering, nemlig at det økonomisk set var mest fordelagtigt for WAK at give GfW mulighed for at undgå insolvensbehandling.
As mentioned in recital 108, the decision by the winegrowing enterprises and merchants to not waive a share of their remaining claims only had a limited impact on WAKs economic assessment and did not change the outcome of this assessment: that it was economically preferential for WAK to enable GfW to avoid insolvency proceedings.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at WAK's delvise efterstilling af og afkald på krav var den mest fordelagtige valgmulighed for WAK og således i overensstemmelse med de kriterier, der gælder for private kreditorer, og at der således ikke blev ydet statsstøtte til GfW i henhold til artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF.
The Commission therefore concludes that WAK’s partial subordination and waiver of claims was the most favourable option for WAK and is therefore in according with the private creditor principle and are therefore not to be considered State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU to GfW.
Støtte til vinproducenter og vinhandlere
Existence of aid to winegrowing enterprises and merchants
Ved indledningen og den efterfølgende udvidelse af den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure blev der rejst en række spørgsmål vedrørende eventuel statsstøtte til vinproducenterne og vinhandlerne.
In the opening and subsequent extension of the formal investigation procedure questions were raised regarding possible aid to the winegrowing enterprises and merchants.
For det første forekom den sikkerhed, som vinproducenterne og vinhandlerne havde fået stillet af GfW på købstidspunktet, at være forholdsvis høj, og der blev udtrykt tvivl om, hvorvidt denne sikkerhedsstillelse egentlig var i overensstemmelse med normal forretningspraksis.
Firstly, the security position awarded the winegrowing enterprises and merchants by GfW at the time of purchase seemed relatively strong and doubts were raised whether the awarded security position was really in accordance with normal business practice.
For det andet blev det vurderet, at prisen for den indkøbte druemost lå over markedsprisen.
Secondly, the price paid for the purchased must was estimated to be above the market price.
For det tredje blev der sat spørgsmålstegn ved vinproducenternes og vinhandlernes beslutning om ikke at give afkald på nogen af deres fordringer, da GfW var truet af insolvens, samt ved WAK's beslutning om at give afkald på en del af fondens fordringer, selv om vinproducenterne og vinhandlerne besluttede ikke at give afkald på 90 % af deres resterende fordringer (20 % af lagerværdien).
Thirdly, the winegrowing enterprises and merchants decision to not waive any of their claims when GfW was faced with insolvency was put into question together with WAK’s decision to subordinate and then waive a share of its claims even though the winegrowing enterprises and merchants decided not to waive the 90 % of their remaining claims (20 % of value of stock).
På tidspunktet for indkøb af druemost — sikkerhedsstillelse
At the time of purchase of must — security position awarded
I bemærkningerne har Tyskland forsikret, at tildelingen af enkle, udvidede eller forlængede ejendomsforbehold til de forskellige vinproducenter og vinhandlere ved købet af druemost var helt i overensstemmelse med almindelig forretningspraksis.
In their comments, Germany has given their assurances that that simple, extended or prolonged retentions of title awarded to the different winegrowing enterprises and merchants in connection with the purchase of must, was indeed in accordance with normal business practise.
Selv om det gav vinproducenterne og vinhandlerne en forholdsvis høj sikkerhed, navnlig vinproducenter og vinhandlere med forlænget ejendomsforbehold, var det i overensstemmelse med almindelig forretningspraksis, og de stod ikke stærkere, end hvis de havde indgået aftaler med en privat køber.
This means that though it gave the winegrowing enterprises and merchants a relatively strong security position, especially those awarded prolonged retention of title, it was in accordance with normal business practise and was not stronger than had they made arrangements with a private purchaser.
Kommissionen henviser til de anbefalinger [29], som foreningen af tyske vinproducenter og detailhandlere i Trier, foreningen af tyske vinhandlere i Mainz og foreningen af tyske vinproducenter i Bonn (Der Bundesverband der Deutschen Weinkellereien und des Weinfachhandels e.V., Trier, der Bundesverband der Deutschen Weinkommissionäre e.V., Mainz und der Deutsche Weinbauverband e.V., Bonn) har registreret hos den tyske konkurrencemyndighed (Bundezkartellamt) i overensstemmelse med § 22, stk. 3, nr. 2, i den tyske lov om forbud mod konkurrencebegrænsninger (des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen) [30].
The Commission makes reference to the recommendations [29] registered by the Federation of German wineries and wine retailers, Trier, the Federation of German wine merchants, Mainz and the German Winegrowers’ Association, Bonn (Der Bundesverband der Deutschen Weinkellereien und des Weinfachhandels e.V., Trier, der Bundesverband der Deutschen Weinkommissionäre e.V., Mainz und der Deutsche Weinbauverband e.V., Bonn) with the German competition authorities (Bundeskartellamt) in accordance with § 22 Abs. 3 Nr. 2 of the Act against Restraints of Competition (des Gesetzes gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen) [30].
I den foreliggende sag varierede den sikkerhed, som vinproducenterne og vinhandlerne fik stillet.
The security positions awarded the winegrowing enterprises and merchants in the case at hand gave varying degree of security.
Kun vinproducenter og vinhandlere med forlænget ejendomsforbehold havde fuld sikkerhed for betaling.
Only the ones with prolonged retention of title had the full security for payment.
Vinproducenternes og vinhandlernes sikkerhed var således ikke i almindelighed så høj som tilrådet i ovennævnte anbefalinger.
This means that the security position for the winegrowing enterprises and merchants were in average not as strong as recommended in the recommendations mentioned above.