natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Finland anfører, at den oprindelige garanti blev ydet forud for Finlands medlemskab af EU.
Finland argues that the original guarantee was granted before Finland's accession to the EU.
Da Mikkeli Kommune stillede den nye garanti den 8. marts 2004, blev der ikke ydet ny støtte, idet den eksisterende oprindelige garanti blev konverteret til en ny garanti, mens man opretholdt de tilstrækkelige modgarantier.
When the City of Mikkeli granted the new guarantee on 8 March 2004, no new aid was granted, as the existing original guarantee was converted into a new guarantee while retaining sufficient counter-securities.
Desuden ydede andre kautionister for det oprindelige pensionslån fra 1992 samtidig lån til Karjaportti.
In addition, at the same time, also other guarantors of the original pension loan of 1992 granted loans to Karjaportti.
Disse betingelser var opfyldt, da støtteelementet i garantien kun udgjorde 57835 EUR, mens Karjaporttis samlede investering i Tikkala udgjorde […] EUR.
These conditions were met, as the aid element of the guarantee was only EUR 57835 whereas the overall investments of Karjaportti in Tikkala amounted to EUR […].
Domstolsovervåget omstruktureringsprocedure (foranstaltning 6)
Court supervised restructuring proceedings (measure 6)
Finland fremfører, at alle de trufne foranstaltninger vedrørte indledningen af den domstolsovervågede omstruktureringsprocedure.
Finland argues that the measures taken were all related to the commencement of the court-supervised restructuring proceeding.
I henhold til retspraksis ved EU-Domstolen begrunder lovgivning om domstolsovervågede genopretningsordninger og insolvens ikke i sig selv, at denne lovgivning kan betragtes som støtte [37].
In accordance with the Court of Justice case-law, legislation on court-supervised recovery schemes and insolvency does not in itself justify treating that legislation as aid [37].
For det andet blev der ikke ydet nye lån under proceduren, men tilbagebetalingen af gæld, der var optaget forud for omstruktureringen, blev omlagt i overensstemmelse med den nationale lovgivning om omstrukturering af virksomheder, hvor kreditorerne blev behandlet ligeligt.
Second, no new loans were granted during the proceedings, but payment of debts granted prior to the restructuring was rescheduled in conformity with the national legislation on restructuring of enterprises, treating the creditors on an equal basis.
Ud over Mikkeli Kommunes fordringer blev private aktørers fordringer ligeledes omlagt under proceduren.
In addition to the City of Mikkeli's receivables, receivables of private players were also rearranged during the proceedings.
Karjaporttis kreditorer blev opdelt i flere grupper.
The creditors of Karjaportti were divided into several groups.
Fordringerne for hver af grupperne af kreditorer var underlagt enslydende betingelser.
The receivables of each group of creditors were subject to mutually equal and similar terms.
Finland påpeger, at dette navnlig gælder de sikrede gældsposter tilhørende Mikkeli Kommune.
Finland points out that this is in particular true as regards the secured debts of the City of Mikkeli.
Dermed må Mikkeli Kommune antages at have handlet som en markedsøkonomisk investor ved at gå med til den domstolsovervågede omstruktureringsprocedure.
Hence, it seems that the City of Mikkeli has acted like a private market economy investor when agreeing to the court-supervised restructuring proceedings.
Desuden påpeger Finland, at Mikkeli Kommune havde vurderet, at det var mere rentabelt at omlægge gældsposterne end at lade Karjaportti gå konkurs og lukke permanent, hvilket ligeledes fremgår af et likvidationsregnskab, som er vedlagt omstruktureringsprogrammet.
In addition, Finland points out that the City of Mikkeli had deemed it more profitable to reschedule the debts than to allow Karjaportti to go bankrupt and to close down permanently, which is also showed in a liquidation balance sheet attached to the restructuring programme.
For så vidt angår foranstaltningernes forenelighed efter rammebestemmelserne for redning og omstrukturering 1999, anfører Finland, at et selskab, der er genstand for omstruktureringsprocedurer, generelt bør betragtes som en kriseramt virksomhed i henhold til betydningen i rammebestemmelserne.
As regards the compatibility of the measures under the R&R Guidelines 1999, Finland argues that a company subject to restructuring proceedings should generally be deemed as firm in difficulty within the meaning of the Guidelines.
Man gentager herefter, at omstruktureringsproceduren ikke involverede statsstøtte, og at Mikkeli Kommune ikke gennemførte støtteforanstaltninger under omstruktureringsproceduren.
It then repeats that the restructuring proceeding did not involve state aid and that the City of Mikkeli did not carry out support measures during the restructuring proceedings.
Herefter fremlægger Finland argumenter vedrørende de enkelte foranstaltninger: For så vidt angår udløsningen af Mikkeli Kommunes garanti for lånet fra 2000, anfører Finland, at Mikkeli ikke ydede et nyt lån til Karjaportti, men blot indtrådte som kreditor efter anmodning fra Tapiola ved begyndelsen af den domstolsovervågede omstruktureringsprocedure, hvilket er en almindelig foranstaltning i forbindelse med sådanne omstruktureringsprocedurer.
Then Finland brings forward arguments relating to each of the measures granted: As regards the triggering of City of Mikkeli's guarantee for the loan granted in 2000, Finland argues that Mikkeli did not grant any new loans to Karjaportti, but simply stepped in as a creditor on the demand of Tapiola at the beginning of the court-supervised restructuring proceedings, which was an ordinary measure under such restructuring proceedings.
For så vidt angår betingelserne for tilbagebetalingen af lånet, påpeger Finland, at disse var fastlagt i omstruktureringsprogrammet og var de samme for alle kreditorer inden for den samme gruppe af kreditorer.
As regards the terms and conditions of the repayment of the loan, Finland points out that they had been specified in the restructuring programme and were equal for all creditors within the same group of creditors.
For så vidt angår de ubetalte afgifter, præciserer Finland, at det er kommunens ejendomsadministration og kommunens afdelinger for vandforvaltning og affaldsforvaltning, der er indehavere af fordringerne.
As regards the unpaid charges, Finland clarifies that the receivables are owed to the City property administration, the water management department and the waste management department of the City.
Fordringerne består af ubetalte afgifter, der var påløbet forud for indledningen af den domstolsovervågede omstruktureringsprocedure.
The receivables consist of unpaid charges that had arisen prior to the commencement of the court-supervised restructuring proceeding.
Mikkeli Kommune stillede ingen garanti for disse udestående beløb, eftersom der var tale om fordringer, som kommunen var indehaver af.
No guarantee was granted for those outstanding amounts by the City of Mikkeli, as they were receivables due to the City.
Da den domstolsovervågede omstruktureringsprocedure gik i gang, blev de medtaget i omstruktureringsprogrammet som et samlet beløb.
Hence, when the court-supervised restructuring proceedings started, they were entered into the restructuring programme as one sum.
Finland hævder, at aktierne i ejendomsselskabet Kiinteistö Oy Suksimäki blev købt af Karjaportti til markedspris.
Finland claims that the shares of the real estate company Kiinteistö Oy Suksimäki were purchased at a market price from Karjaportti.
Finland fremlagde en erklæring fra en uafhængig vurderingsmand, hvoraf det fremgik, at aktiernes værdi udgjorde omkring 1 mio. EUR baseret på det daværende lejeniveau.
Finland submitted an independent valuer’s statement according to which the value of the shares amounted to approximately EUR 1 million based on the prevailing rent level.
Denne værdi blev justeret i henhold til det faktisk gældende lejeniveau, og aktierne blev derfor købt til en pris på 860000 EUR. Dermed omfattede ejendomstransaktionen ikke noget støtteelement.
This value was adjusted as regards the actual prevailing rent level and the shares were accordingly bought at a price of EUR 860000. Hence, the property transaction did not include any aid element.
Med hensyn til konverteringen af de ubetalte renter til et lån anfører Finland for det første, at manglende betaling af renter er en typisk foranstaltning i forbindelse med domstolsovervågede omstruktureringsprocedurer.
Concerning the conversion of the unpaid interest into a loan, Finland firstly argues that the non-payment of interest rates is a typical measure to court-supervised restructuring proceedings.
Konverteringen af sådanne ubetalte renter til lån, som vil blive prioriteret højere end andre lån, er mulig i henhold til finsk lov.
The conversion of such unpaid interest into loans, which will be better ranked than other loans, is foreseen by Finnish legislation.
Desuden mener Finland, at konverteringen af de ubetalte renter til et lån skete i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip, idet private kreditorer konverterede ubetalte rentefordringer til lån sammen med Mikkeli Kommune.
In addition, Finland considers that the conversion of the unpaid interest into a loan was taken in accordance with the private market investor principle, as private creditors converted unpaid interest receivables into loans together with the City of Mikkeli.
Afskrivning af gæld i regnskaberne for 2006 og 2008 (foranstaltning 9 og foranstaltning 10)
Write-off of debts in the financial statements of 2006 and 2008 (measure 9 and measure 10)
Finland bekræfter, at bogføringen af gældsposterne som tab blot er en regnskabsmæssig foranstaltning fra kreditors side og sker i overensstemmelse med forsigtighedsprincippet og de respektive bestemmelser i regnskabsloven 1336/1997.
Finland confirms that recording the debts as a loss is simply a bookkeeping operation on the creditor's part, done in accordance with the principle of prudence and the respective provisions in the Accounting Act 1336/1997.
Finland anfører, at gældsafskrivningen ikke påvirker det juridiske forhold mellem kreditor og debitor, dvs. at gældsposterne ikke blev eftergivet.
Finland argues that the debt write-off does not affect the legal relationship between the creditor and the debtor, i.e. the debts were not waived.
Mikkeli Kommune har bekræftet, at man ikke har eftergivet de gældsposter, der er bogført som tab, og at den fortsætter inddrivelsen.
The City of Mikkeli has confirmed that it has not waived the debts recorded as losses and that it continues to pursue collection.
Gælden er en del af den sikrede gæld under den domstolsovervågede omstruktureringsprocedure.
The debt is part of the secured debt under the court-supervised restructuring proceedings.
Finland anfører, at omlægning af gæld er en foranstaltning inden for den domstolsovervågede omstruktureringsprocedure og ikke udgør statsstøtte.
Finland argues that rescheduling of debts is a measure inherent to court-supervised restructuring proceedings and does not involve state aid.
Ifølge Finland havde Karjaporttis kreditorer en fælles forståelse af, at omlægningen af gælden var en fornuftig løsning for at sikre deres fordringer.
According to Finland, the creditors of Karjaportti had a mutual understanding that the rescheduling of debts was a reasonable alternative in order to safeguard their receivables.
Finland meddeler Kommissionen, at den anmeldte omlægning aldrig blev gennemført, idet den administrative domstol i Kuopio (Kuopion Hallinto-Oikeus) standsede gældsomlægningen.
It informs the Commission that the notified rescheduling was never implemented, as the administrative court of Kuopio (Kuopion Hallinto-Oikeus) halted the implementation of the debt rescheduling.
Finland forklarer, at Karjaporttis gældsposter ikke desto mindre blev omlagt i henhold til adskillige forslag fra Karjaportti i perioden 2009-2011, som blev accepteret af Mikkeli Kommune.
Finland explains that Karjaportti's debts were nevertheless rescheduled, following several proposals by Karjaportti in the period 2009–2011, which were accepted by the City of Mikkeli.
Finland hævder, at denne efterfølgende omlægning var i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip, idet Mikkeli Kommune og alle andre kreditorer gennemførte omlægningen på samme vilkår.
Finland claims that this subsequent rescheduling was in line with the market economy investor principle, as the City of Mikkeli and all other creditors implemented the rescheduling at equal terms.
For det første løb Finnvera ikke nogen øget risiko, idet garantien trådte i stedet for en garanti, som Finnvera havde ydet tidligere (i 1992) for et pensionslån.
First, Finnvera's risk was not increased, as the guarantee replaced a guarantee that Finnvera granted earlier (in 1992) for a pension loan.
Dette lån blev erstattet med et nyt pensionslån i 2004, hvortil Finnvera ydede den omtalte garanti.
This loan was replaced by a new pension loan in 2004, for which Finnvera granted the guarantee in question.
Endelig var prognoserne for Karjaportti gode på det tidspunkt, hvor garantien blev ydet.
Finally, the forecasts for Karjaportti were good at the time the guarantee was granted.
Finland mener, at lånet fra 2006 ikke udgjorde statsstøtte, idet Finnvera handlede som en markedsøkonomisk kreditor, da man konverterede den ubetalte rente til et nyt lån i overensstemmelse med omstruktureringsprogrammet.
Finland considers that the loan granted in 2006 did not involve state aid as Finnvera acted like a private market creditor when converting the unpaid interest into a new loan in line with the restructuring programme.
Desuden konverterede private kreditorer deres ubetalte renter til nye lån, kort tid inden Finnvera gjorde det og på tilsvarende betingelser.
In addition, private creditors converted their unpaid interest into new loans shortly before Finnvera did so and at similar conditions.
Finland mener, at lånet fra 2007 ikke udgjorde statsstøtte, idet Finnvera handlede sammen med to private kreditorer, som ydede nye lån samtidig og på tilsvarende betingelser.
Finland considers that the loan granted in 2007 did not involve state aid as Finnvera acted together with two private creditors who granted new loans at the same time and at similar conditions.
Desuden blev det stillet sikkerhed for lånet i form af et værdifuldt pant og et erhvervspant.
In addition, the loan was collateralised by way of valuable mortgages and business mortgages.
Den interesserede part havde kun bemærkninger til foranstaltning 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9 og 10.
The interested party only commented on measures 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 10.
Den interesserede part henviser til, at garantien blev ydet for at sikre et lån på 25 mio. FIM til investering i et nyt produktionsanlæg.
The interested party states that the guarantee was granted in order to secure a loan of FIM 25 million for the investment in a new production site.
Den interesserede part hævder, at en grund blev overdraget til Karjaportti, og Mikkeli Kommune påtog sig at byggemodne den og udføre andre tekniske arbejder til en samlet omkostning på 2,5 mio. FIM.
The interested party claims that a plot of land was allocated to Karjaportti and the City of Mikkeli undertook to provide municipal engineering and other requisite technical work, with costs totalling FIM 2,5 million.
Karjaportti betalte 1,2 mio. FIM for grunden.
Karjaportti paid FIM 1,2 million for the plot.
I Karjaporttis regnskaber står grunden opført til en værdi på 403000 EUR, og den interesserede part spørger, om overdragelsen af grunden kan have været statsstøtte.
In the books of Karjaportti, the plot is valued EUR 403000 and the interested party wonders whether the allocation of the land could have been state aid.
Den interesserede part hævder, at Mikkeli Kommune købte seks forladte fabriksbygninger i Mikkeli og betalte i alt 6,7 mio. EUR for dem.
The interested party alleges that the City of Mikkeli bought six abandoned factory buildings in Mikkeli and paid a total of EUR 6,7 million for them.
En investor, der handler i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip, ville ikke have købt grunde af et selskab i dyb økonomisk krise til denne pris.
An investor acting in accordance with the market economy investor principle would not have bought properties of a company in deep financial troubles at such a price.
Den interesserede part hævder, at Karjaportti var i alvorlige problemer på det tidspunkt, hvor garantien blev ydet.
The interested party alleges that Karjaportti was in grave difficulties at the time the guarantee was granted.
Selskabet havde allerede betydelige gældsposter over for Mikkeli Kommune og den gruppe af selskaber, som Mikkeli Kommune ejede.
The company had substantial debts already towards the City of Mikkeli and the group companies owned by the City of Mikkeli.
Den interesserede part hævder, at den pris, der blev betalt for aktierne i ejendomsselskabet, lå over deres regnskabsmæssige værdi.
The interested party alleges that the price paid for the shares in the real estate company was above the book value of the shares.
I artikel 107, stk.1, i TEUF bestemmes det, at statsstøtte eller støtte, som ydes ved hjælp af statsmidler under enhver tænkelig form, og som fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene ved at begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner, er uforenelig med det indre marked.
Article 107(1) of the TFEU lays down that any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods and affects trade between Member States is incompatible with the internal market.
Bestemmelserne i artikel 107, stk. 1, i TFEU er kumulative, og for at en foranstaltning skal kunne betegnes som statsstøtte, skal alle betingelserne være opfyldt samtidig.
The conditions laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU are cumulative and thus for a measure to be qualified as state aid all the conditions must be fulfilled simultaneously.
Mens artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF indeholder et generelt forbud mod statsstøtte inden for Unionen, indeholder artikel 107, stk. 2, og 107, stk. 3, i TEUF undtagelser fra den generelle regel om, at denne støtte er uforenelig med det indre marked i henhold til artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF.
Whereas Article 107(1) of the TFEU provides for the general prohibition of state aid within the Union, Articles 107(2) and 107(3) of the TFEU provide for exemptions to the general rule that such aid is incompatible with the internal market as stated in Article 107(1) of the TFEU.
I de følgende afsnit vurderer Kommissionen, hvorvidt der er tale om statsstøtte for hver enkelt af de beskrevne foranstaltninger.
In the following sections, the Commission assesses the existence of state aid separately for each of the measures described.
Hvis en foranstaltning udgør statsstøtte, går Kommissionen videre og vurderer foreneligheden af støtteforanstaltningen.
If a measure entails state aid, the Commission goes on to assess the compatibility of the aid measure.
Kommissionen sondrer mellem foranstaltninger, der er trukket tilbage, foranstaltninger truffet af Mikkeli Kommune og foranstaltninger truffet af Finnvera.
The Commission distinguishes between measures withdrawn, measures that were granted by the City of Mikkeli and measures that were granted by Finnvera.
I første omgang vurderes det, hvornår Karjaportti kunne betragtes som en kriseramt virksomhed.
As a preliminary point, it is assessed at what point in time Karjaportti could be considered a company in difficulty.
Kriseramt virksomhed
Company in difficulty
Både når det drejer sig om at vurdere, hvorvidt der er tale om statsstøtte, og foranstaltningernes forenelighed, er det relevant, hvorvidt støttemodtageren var kriseramt på det tidspunkt, hvor foranstaltningerne blev truffet.
For both, the existence of state aid and the compatibility of the measures in question it is relevant whether the beneficiary was in difficulty at the time when the measures were granted.
I henhold til rammebestemmelserne for redning og omstrukturering 1999 kan et selskab betragtes som kriseramt, når det opfylder de såkaldte hårde kriterier i punkt 5 i disse rammebestemmelser, dvs. når mere end halvdelen af aktiekapitalen er tabt eller kan gøres til genstand for kollektive insolvensprocedurer i henhold til national lovgivning.
According to the R&R Guidelines 1999, a company can be considered as being in difficulty when it meets the so called hard criteria laid down in Point 5 of those Guidelines, that is when it lost more than half of its registered capital or could be subject to collective insolvency proceedings under national law.
Hvis de hårde kriterier ikke er opfyldt, kan en virksomhed stadig udvise "de typiske kendetegn for kriseramte virksomheder" i henhold til punkt 6 i rammebestemmelserne for redning og omstrukturering 1999, f.eks. stigende tab, faldende omsætning, voksende lager, overskudskapacitet, faldende likviditet, stigende gældsætning, stigende rentebyrde eller faldende eller opbrugt nettoformue (såkaldte bløde kriterier).
If the hard criteria are not met, a company can still show the "usual signs of a firm being in difficulty" according to point 6 of the R&R Guidelines 1999, such as increasing losses, diminishing turnover, growing stock inventories, excess capacity, declining cash flow, mounting debt, rising interest charges and falling or nil net asset value (so-called soft criteria).
Rammebestemmelserne for redning og omstrukturering 2004 omfatter tilsvarende hårde og bløde kriterier i punkt 10 og 11.
The R&R Guidelines 2004 include similar hard and soft criteria in Points 10 and 11.
På denne baggrund bemærker Kommissionen, at Karjaportti ikke har tabt kapital eller har udvist de "typiske tegn" på at være en kriseramt virksomhed i 2000.
Against this background, the Commission notes that in the year 2000, Karjaportti has not lost capital nor has it shown the "usual signs" of a firm being in difficulty in the year 2000.
Det lader rent faktisk til, at Karjaportti var en sund virksomhed med en stor omsætning, et positivt driftsresultat, en stabil aktiekapital og forholdsvis store reserver i perioden mellem 2000 og 2002 (se ligeledes tabel I).
In fact it seems that Karjaportti was a healthy company which recorded a high turnover, a positive operating result, stable share capital and reserves at relatively high levels for the period between 2000 and 2002 (see also Table I).
Situationen var mere dyster i de følgende år.
The situation looked gloomier in the following years.
Det ser ligeledes ud til, at Karjaportti havde en vis overskudskapacitet.
It also seems that Karjaportti had some excess capacities.
Desuden må der tages hensyn til, at allerede i 2004 kunne Karjaporttis tab ikke længere dækkes af nødreserven (se tabel I).
In addition, it has to be taken into account that already in 2004, Karjaportti's losses were not covered by the contingency fund anymore (see Table I).
Med undtagelse af 2006 har Karjaportti kørt med tab siden 2003.
With the exception of the year 2006, Karjaportti has since 2003 been loss making.
Overskuddet i 2006 kan ikke ses som et tegn på genopretning af selskabet, da det ikke stammede fra selskabets kerneaktivitet.
The profit made in 2006 cannot be perceived as a sign of recovery of the company as it did not stem from the core activity of the company.
Karjaporttis driftsoverskud var fortsat negativt i lighed med det foregående og det efterfølgende år.
Karjaportti's operational profit remained negative, similarly to the preceding and the following years.
Overskuddet i 2006 var ikke tilstrækkeligt til at kompensere for det underskud, der var blevet akkumuleret i løbet af de tidligere regnskabsperioder, eller til at udligne den negative aktiekapital.
The profit in 2006 was not sufficient to offset the amount of deficit accumulated over past accounting periods nor to compensate for the negative equity.
Generelt var Karjaporttis økonomiske situation særdeles ugunstig.
Overall the financial situation of Karjaportti remained considerably unfavourable.