natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
SERNAM 2-BESLUTNINGEN AF 20. OKTOBER 2004
THE SERNAM 2 DECISION OF 20 OCTOBER 2004
I sin Sernam 2-beslutning konstaterede Kommissionen, at støtten på 503 mio. EUR, der var godkendt i Sernam 1-beslutningen, blev ydet på andre betingelser end dem, der var godkendt i Sernam 1-beslutningen, bl.a. fordi Geodis havde overtaget 15 % (i stedet for de 60 %, der var fastsat) af kapitalandelene i SCS Sernam.
In its Sernam 2 Decision, the Commission found that the aid amounting to EUR 503 millions authorised under the Sernam 1 Decision, was paid out on conditions differing from those provided for in the Sernam 1 Decision, in particular the takeover by Géodis of 15 % (instead of the envisaged 60 %) of the shares in SCS Sernam.
Geodis gav desuden afkald på selv at bidrage til virksomhedens omstruktureringsomkostninger med 67 mio. EUR.
Géodis also renounced contributing itself to the restructuring costs of the undertaking to the amount of EUR 67 million.
Samtidig skal Sernam i en periode på to år at regne fra datoen for meddelelsen af nærværende beslutning foretage en fuldstændig udskiftning af sine egne midler og tjenester til landevejstransport med midler og tjenester fra en eller flere virksomheder, der er juridisk og økonomisk uafhængige af SNCF, og som vælges efter en åben, gennemskuelig og ikke-diskriminerende procedure.
In return, Sernam shall, in the next two years as from the day on which this Decision is notified, fully replace its own road transport resources and services by road transport resources and services of one or more companies that are legally and economically independent of SNCF and are chosen in accordance with an open, transparent and non-discriminatory procedure.
Ved Sernams egne midler og tjenester til landevejstransport forstås samtlige midler til landevejstransport, herunder køretøjer til landevejstransport, som virksomheden ejer eller leaser/lejer.
Sernam’s own road transport resources and services means all of the road resources — i.e. road transport vehicles — of the Sernam company of which it has full ownership or which it leases or rents.
Hvis Sernam sælger sine aktiver »en bloc« inden den 30. juni 2005 til markedsprisen til en virksomhed, der ikke har nogen juridisk forbindelse med SNCF, efter en åben, gennemskuelig og ikke-diskriminerende procedure, finder betingelserne i stk. 1 ikke anvendelse.«
In the event that Sernam sells its assets en bloc by 30 June 2005 at market price, through a transparent and open procedure, to a company that has no legal link with SNCF, the conditions of paragraph 1 shall not be applicable.’
OVERDRAGELSEN AF SERNAM SAS AKTIVITETER TIL FINANCIÈRE SERNAM
THE TRANSFER OF THE ACTIVITIES OF SERNAM SA TO FINANCIÈRE SERNAM
Med henblik på at gennemføre Sernam 2-beslutningen hævder Frankrig at have opfyldt betingelsen i artikel 3, stk. 2.
For the purposes of implementing the Sernam 2 Decision, France claims to have respected the condition provided for in Article 3(2).
Frankrig forklarer, at SNCF i en pressemeddelelse [11] har opfordret alle interesserede parter til at kontakte Banque ABN AMRO.
It explains that SNCF, in a press release [11], invited any interested party to contact Bank ABN AMRO.
34 industri- eller finanskoncerner eller konsortier blev anmodet om at undersøge sagen.
Thirty-four industrial groups, financial groups or consortiums were allegedly invited to examine the file.
Opfordringsskrivelserne til den første runde, som ABN AMRO sendte til de parter, der havde bedt om sagen, indeholder en opfordring til at afgive bud på overtagelse af samtlige aktiver (da brevet var på engelsk, benyttes termen »assets«) i Sernam SA.
The letters of invitation for the first round, sent by ABN AMRO to the parties which had requested the file, contain a call for tenders concerning the takeover of all the assets of Sernam SA.
Ifølge de franske myndigheder var det på grund af Sernams økonomiske situation ikke muligt at få forslag til positiv værdiansættelse.
According to the French authorities, Sernam’s economic situation failed to elicit any proposals based on a positive valuation.
Alle bud, der blev afgivet i forbindelse med proceduren, var på en særdeles negativ værdi:
Apparently, all the offers submitted under this procedure concluded that the value was very negative:
[tilbudsgiver 1] (foreløbigt bud): -120 mio. EUR
[candidate 1] (preliminary offer): EUR -120 million;
[tilbudsgiver 2] (foreløbigt bud): -90,4 mio. EUR
[candidate 2] (preliminary offer): EUR -90,4 million;
[tilbudsgiver 3] (foreløbigt bud): -90,4 mio. EUR
[candidate 3] (preliminary offer): EUR -90,4 million;
[tilbudsgiver 4] (bud i anden runde): -65,2 mio. EUR
[candidate 4] (second-round offer): EUR -65,2 million;
[tilbudsgiver 5] (bud i anden runde): -56,4 mio. EUR.
[candidate 5] (second-round offer): EUR -56,4 million.
Da der ikke indkom et fast tilbud, fremsatte ledelsen i Sernam SA et overtagelsestilbud gennem et kommende selskab, som først blev kaldt Bidco og siden Financière Sernam.
In view of the absence of a firm offer, the Sernam SA management team, through a company still to be set up and initially called Bidco, then Financière Sernam, made a takeover offer.
Dato for den faktiske overdragelse af Sernams aktiviteter til Financière Sernam
Effective date of the operations for the transfer of Sernam’s activities to Financière Sernam
Dette bud blev fremsendt til SNCF den 30. juni 2005 og principielt accepteret samme dag af SNCFs øverste ledelse.
This offer was forwarded to SNCF on 30 June 2005 and accepted in principle by the SNCF General Management on the same day.
Imidlertid var der forbundet visse formaliteter med den formelle indgåelse af aftaleprotokollen mellem alle parter.
However, formalities were necessary for the formal conclusion of the memorandum of understanding between all the parties involved.
Aftaleprotokollen mellem SNCF, Sernam SA, Sernam Xpress (et af Sernam SAs 10 helejede datterselskaber, oprettet i 2002) og ledelsen i det fremtidige selskab Financière Sernam blev undertegnet den 21. juli 2005 (i det følgende benævnt »aftaleprotokollen af 21. juli 2005«).
The memorandum of understanding between SNCF, Sernam SA, Sernam Xpress (one of the 10 wholly-owned subsidiaries of Sernam SA, set up in 2002) and the managers of the future company Financière Sernam, was signed on 21 July 2005 (hereinafter: the ‘memorandum of understanding of 21 July 2005’).
De forskellige transaktioner i forbindelse med overdragelsen af Sernams aktiviteter til Financière Sernam
The various operations for the transfer of Sernam’s activities to Financière Sernam
De franske myndigheder meddelte, at overdragelsen af Sernams aktiviteter til Financière Sernam blev fordelt på fire etaper:
The French authorities indicated that the transfer of Sernam’s activities to Financière Sernam took place in four stages:
SNCF rekapitaliserede sit helejede datterselskab Sernam SA med 57 mio. EUR
SNCF recapitalised its wholly-owned subsidiary Sernam SA to the amount of EUR 57 million;
Sernam SA foretog en tilførsel til sit helejede datterselskab Sernam Xpress, der omfattede alle aktiver, inkl. de 57 mio. EUR fra rekapitaliseringen i litra a) og Sernams passiver undtagen de rene såkaldt »finansielle« passiver (lånekapital, selskabet Sernam havde optaget hos SNCF-koncernen, passiver vedrørende ophævelsen af »IBM-GPS-kontrakten«) på 38,5 mio. EUR. [12] Til gengæld for denne tilførsel fik Sernam SA en andel i Sernam Xpress til en nominel værdi på 100 EUR
Sernam SA made a contribution to its wholly-owned subsidiary Sernam Xpress of all the assets, including the EUR 57 million from the recapitalisation described in point (a), and the liabilities of Sernam with the sole exception of the ‘financial’ liabilities (equity loan contracted by Sernam SA with the SNCF group, liability relating to the cancellation of the ‘IBM-GPS’ contract) amounting to EUR 38,5 million [12]. In return for this contribution, Sernam SA received a share in Sernam Xpress with a nominal value of EUR 100;
Sernam Xpress foretog herefter en kapitalforhøjelse på 2 mio. EUR, der udelukkende blev tegnet af SNCF. Efter denne transaktion havde SNCF majoriteten i Sernam Xpress
Sernam Xpress then undertook a capital increase of EUR 2 million which was underwritten in full by SNCF; following this operation, SNCF held the majority of the shares in Sernam Xpress;
Sernam SA og SNCF afhændede hele deres selskabsandel i Sernam Xpress til Financière Sernam til en pris på 2 mio. EUR, hvilket udgjorde hele sidstnævntes kapital.
Sernam SA and SNCF assigned to Financière Sernam, for a price of EUR 2 million, all their shares in Sernam Xpress, which represented the entire capital of the latter.
Transaktionerne er vist i følgende oversigt:
The operations are shown in the following table:
Tilbage står gælden til SNCF på 38,5 mio. EUR. Pålægget om tilbagebetaling af 41 mio. EUR er opført som underskud ved likvidationen. SNCF
The debts to SNCF remain amounting to EUR 38,5 million.
57 mio. EUR Ikkefinansielle passiver
Recapitalisation EUR 2 million
2 mio. EUR: den pris, Financière Sernam betalte SNCF og Sernam SA for købet af Sernam Xpress
Recapitalisation EUR 57 million
Sernam Xpress
Assets
Financière Sernam
EUR 57 million
(helejet af de tidligere medarbejdere hos Sernam SA)
Non-financial liabilities
Endvidere indeholdt aftaleprotokollen en ophævelsesklausul i tilfælde af, at Kommissionen skulle træffe en negativ beslutning inden for fem år efter indgåelsen af aftaleprotokollen (som er beskrevet nærmere i pkt. 117 i indledningsbeslutningen).
The memorandum of understanding of 21 July 2005, besides the recapitalisation by SNCF, of Sernam SA by EUR 57 million and of Sernam Xpress by EUR 2 million, provided for guarantees granted by SNCF to Financière Sernam (described in detail in recitals 72 to 85 of the opening decision) and a cancellation clause in the case of a negative decision by the Commission within five years following the conclusion of the memorandum of understanding (described in detail in recital 117 of the opening decision).
I sin beslutning af 16. december 2008 ønskede Kommissionen at kontrollere, om Frankrig rent faktisk havde overholdt artikel 3, stk. 2, i Sernam 2-beslutningen, således som myndighederne hævdede, og om den metode til tilbagesøgning af den uforenelige støtte på 41 mio. EUR, Frankrig havde valgt, nemlig at anmelde statens fordring til Sernam SAs konkursbo, gjorde det muligt at fjerne den konkurrencefordrejning, støtten medførte.
In its decision of 16 July 2008, the Commission wished to verify whether France had in fact, as it claims, complied with Article 3(2) of the Sernam 2 Decision and whether the procedure for the recovery of the incompatible aid amounting to EUR 41 million chosen by France, i.e. entering the debt to the State in the liabilities of the liquidation account of Sernam SA, in fact enabled the distortion of competition caused by this aid to be eliminated.
Endvidere ønskede Kommissionen at kontrollere, at overførslen af Sernam SAs aktiver ikke gav anledning til ny statsstøtte, der var uforenelig med det indre marked.
In addition, the Commission wished to check whether the operation transferring the assets of Sernam SA did not give rise to new State aid to be regarded as incompatible with the internal market.
DE INTERESSEREDE PARTERS BEMÆRKNINGER
COMMENTS BY INTERESTED PARTIES
Bemærkninger fra klagerne
Comments by the complainants
Indledningsvis mener den første klager, at betingelserne i Sernam 2-beslutningen om salg af Sernam SAs aktiver ikke var opfyldt.
Firstly, the first complainant considers that the conditions laid down in the Sernam 2 Decision for the sale of Sernam SA’s assets were not complied with.
For det første var fristen for at gennemføre overdragelsen i henhold til Sernam 2-beslutningen, dvs. den 30. juni 2005, ikke blevet overholdt, eftersom overdragelsestransaktionerne først blev godkendt den 17. oktober 2005, og aktieoverdragelsen skulle være sket den samme dag.
To start with, it was alleged that the deadline imposed by the Sernam 2 Decision, i.e. 30 June 2005, to make the sale was not respected, as the transfer operations were approved only on 17 October 2005 and the sale of the shares should have occurred on the same day.
Endvidere mener den første klager, at overdragelsesprisen udelukkende blev fastsat under henvisning til det tilbud, Financière Sernam havde fremsat.
Then, regarding the price of the transfer, the first complainant considers that it was set solely by reference to the offer made by Financière Sernam.
Endvidere udgjorde overdragelsestransaktionerne i realiteten en »share deal«, dvs. en fastholdelse af den støttemodtagende virksomhed på markedet, idet kun virksomhedens ejer blev ændret.
Moreover, it is alleged that the transfer operations in reality constitute a share deal, i.e. the beneficiary entity is kept on the market with a mere change of owner.
Klageren gør ligeledes opmærksom på overtrædelsen af betingelsen om at organisere salget efter en gennemskuelig og åben procedure.
It also criticises the infringement of the condition of organising the sale through a transparent and open procedure.
Ifølge klageren burde salget af Sernam Xpress være blevet sendt i offentlig høring og udbud i stedet for Sernam SA efter rekapitaliseringen af både Sernam SA og Sernam Xpress.
In its opinion, the sale of Sernam Xpress should have been subject to public consultation and invitation to tender after the dual recapitalisation of Sernam SA and Sernam Xpress, rather than that of Sernam SA.
For det andet gør den første klager gældende, at der er manipuleret med værdiansættelsen af de overførte aktiver og passiver, og at den solgte virksomhed er undervurderet.
Second, the first complainant criticises manipulations in the valuation of the assets and liabilities transferred and the undervaluation of the entity sold.
For det tredje oplister den første klager en række foranstaltninger, som ifølge klageren udgør ny støtte: rekapitaliseringen på 57 mio., den manglende inddrivelse af de 41 mio. i ulovlig støtte og SNCFs eftergivelse af Sernam SAs gæld.
Third, the first complainant lists a series of measures which, in its opinion, constitute new aid: the recapitalisation of EUR 57 million, the non-recovery of the EUR 41 million in unlawful aid, the write-off of Sernam SA’s financial debts to SNCF.
Alle disse foranstaltninger er ifølge klageren støtte, der er uforenelig med det indre marked.
All these measures, in its opinion, constitute aid which is incompatible with the internal market.
For det fjerde understreger den første klager, at Sernam SA skulle have været likvideret i stedet for at blive afhændet.
Fourth, the first complainant emphasises that Sernam SA should have been wound up rather than sold.
Klageren deler Kommissionens tvivl om medregningen af bestemte omkostninger i likvidationsberegningen og mener ikke, at det på noget tidspunkt fremgår, at de reelle omkostninger ved omstruktureringen af Sernam har været lavere end omkostningerne ved en likvidation.
It shares the Commission’s doubts that certain costs were taken into account in the calculation of the liquidation and considers that it is not shown at any time that the real cost of restructuring Sernam was less than that of liquidation.
Den første klager konkluderer på det grundlag, at de franske myndigheder ikke blot har unddraget sig forpligtelsen til at tilbagesøge en støtte på 41 mio. EUR, som er erklæret for uforenelig, men har ydet ny støtte på mindst 95 mio. EUR, hvortil kommer forskellige støtteforanstaltninger i form af garantier.
The first complainant concludes from this that the French authorities have not only eluded the obligation to recover EUR 41 million in aid declared to be incompatible, but have also granted new aid amounting to at least EUR 95 million, to which should be added various aid measures granted in the form of guarantees.
Den anden klager har ikke fremsat bemærkninger om indledningsbeslutningen.
The second complainant, for its part, did not submit comments on the opening decision.
Bemærkninger fra interesserede parter, der mener, at Sernam 2-beslutningen er overholdt
Comments by interested parties considering that the Sernam 2 Decision was duly complied with
Bemærkninger fra SNCF
Comments by SNCF
SNCF mener at have overholdt betingelsen i artikel 3, stk. 2, i Sernam 2-beslutningen.
SNCF considers that it respected the condition provided for in Article 3(2) of the Sernam 2 Decision.
SNCF hævder at have solgt alle Sernams aktiver »en bloc« inden den 30. juni 2005 til markedsprisen og til et selskab, der ikke har nogen juridisk forbindelse med SNCF, og efter en åben og gennemskuelig procedure.
It claims to have sold all of Sernam’s assets en bloc, before 30 June 2005, at market price, to a company that has no legal link, through a transparent and open procedure.
Ifølge SNCF er overdragelsestransaktionerne uadskillelige og samtidige.
According to SNCF, the transfer operations were indissociable and simultaneous.
Kommissionen kan derfor ikke foretage en kunstig opsplitning af dem.
The Commission could not therefore break them down artificially.
Selskabet mener, at princippet om en privat investor under markedsøkonomiske vilkår vil være overholdt i tilfælde af en negativ pris, hvis omkostningerne ved afhændelsen er mindre end de likvidationsomkostninger, staten som aktionær ville skulle afholde, og fremsender detaljerede bemærkninger til støtte herfor.
It considers that in the case of a negative price, the principle of the private investor in a market economy would be respected if the cost of the transfer is lower than the cost of winding up, which the State would have borne as shareholder, and submits detailed observations to prove this.
Endelig understreger SNCF, at forpligtelsen til at tilbagebetale støtten på 41 mio. EUR var blevet opført som underskud ved likvidationen af Sernam SA.
Finally, it emphasises that the obligation relating to the recovery of the aid amounting to EUR 41 million has been entered in the liabilities of the liquidation account of Sernam SA.
Bemærkninger fra Butler Capital Partners
Comments by Butler Capital Partners
For det første giver BCP nærmere oplysninger om selskabets erhvervelse af kapitalandele i Sernam Xpress.
Firstly, BCP provides details of its involvement in the capital of Sernam Xpress.
For det andet præciserer BCP, hvad formålet var med at opkøbe selskabet Coulonge.
Secondly, BCP specifies the objective pursued by the takeover of the company Coulonge.
For det tredje anfægter BCP, at Sernam Xpress skulle have rådet over et likviditetsoverskud efter rekapitaliseringen på 57 og 2 mio. EUR. BCP måtte indskyde 6 mio. EUR i likvid kapital for at bringe likviditeten tilbage på et acceptabelt niveau i betragtning af det tab, der skulle finansieres.
Thirdly, BCP denies that Sernam Xpress had a cash surplus following the capital injections of EUR 57 million and EUR 2 million. BCP would have had to reinject EUR 6 million to bring the cash flow to an acceptable level given the losses to be financed.
For det fjerde anfægter BCP, at støtten på 41 mio. EUR var blevet overført til Sernam Xpress.
Fourthly, BCP disputes that the benefit of the aid of EUR 41 million was transferred to Sernam Xpress.
BCP vurderer, at man kun ville kunne forestille sig en sådan situation, hvis det blev påvist, at overdragelsen af Sernam SAs aktiviteter ikke skete til markedspris.
BCP considers that such a situation would be conceivable only if it were proved that the transfer of Sernam SA’s activities was not made at market price.
Men ifølge BCP blev overdragelsen foretaget efter en åben, gennemskuelig og ikkediskriminerende procedure.
However, according to BCP, the transfer was made following an open, transparent and non-discriminatory procedure.
BCP anfører ligeledes, at overdragelsesprocessen var ledsaget af en ekspertvurdering.
BCP recalls too that the transfer process was accompanied by an expert valuation.
Med hensyn til følgerne af BCPs overtagelse af kontrollen med Sernam analyserer BCP endelig kapitalforhøjelsen som et salg og mener i overensstemmelse med Banks [14]- og SMI [15]-dommene ikke, at tilbagebetalingen af en hypotetisk støtte kan pålægges Financière Sernam eller dets datterselskab Sernam Xpress.
Finally, regarding the consequences of its takeover of Sernam, BCP analyses the capital increase as a sale and considers that, in accordance with the Banks [14] and SMI [15] case-law, the recovery of hypothetical aid cannot be imposed on Financière Sernam or its subsidiary Sernam Xpress.
Overholdelse af Sernam 2-beslutningen
Concerning compliance with the Sernam 2 Decision
Overholdelse af fristen for salg
Concerning observance of the deadline for the sale
De franske myndigheder mener, at det for køber juridisk bindende faste tilbud om overtagelse blev afgivet den 30. juni 2005 og accepteret samme dag af SNCF, hvilket gjorde aftalen uigenkaldelig i henhold til fransk aftaleret.
The French authorities consider that the firm takeover offer, which is legally binding on the purchaser, was submitted on 30 June 2005 and accepted on the same day by SNCF, which made the agreement irrevocable under French contract law.
Salgsprisen
Concerning the selling price
De franske myndigheder anfører, at Sernam 2-beslutningen ikke forbød salg til en negativ pris, og at denne i henhold til retspraksis kan være en markedspris.
The French authorities consider that the Sernam 2 Decision did not prohibit sale at a negative price and that case-law recognises that this can constitute a market price.
Det var blevet valideret af flere uafhængige eksperter (ABN Amro, Oddo Corporate Finance/Paul Hastings og den franske kommission for kapitalerhvervelser og overførsler, Commission des Participations et Transferts).
It was purportedly endorsed by several independent valuations (ABN Amro, Oddo Corporate Finance/Paul Hastings and the French Privatisations Board).
Ifølge de franske myndigheder er SNCFs forudgående rekapitalisering kun en gennemførelsesforanstaltning.
According to the French authorities, the prior recapitalisation undertaken by SNCF is merely an implementation arrangement.
Kommissionen kan derfor ikke anfægte markedsværdien af Sernams aktiver under henvisning til denne rekapitalisering, når der foreligger en markedspris, som udelukker, at der kan være tale om støtte, for så vidt angår hele den negative pris.
The Commission could not therefore refer to this recapitalisation to challenge the market value of the Sernam assets, since the existence of a market price precluded any categorisation as aid for the entire negative price.
Salget af aktiver
Concerning the sale of assets
Som svar på Kommissionens analyse, hvorefter overdragelsen af Sernam SAs aktiviteter til Financière Sernam består af to successive transaktioner, dvs.: 1) en koncernintern overførsel af aktiver »en bloc« fra Sernam SA til Sernam Xpress (som på det tidspunkt var Sernam SAs helejede datterselskab) og 2) et salg af Sernam Xpress til Financière Sernam svarende til en »share deal« og ikke til et salg af aktiver, anfører de franske myndigheder, at der er tale om en kunstig og uberettiget opsplitning.
The French authorities consider the Commission’s analysis, according to which the transfer of Sernam SA’s activities to Financière Sernam comprises two successive operations, i.e.: (1) an intra-group transfer of assets en bloc from Sernam SA to Sernam Xpress (at this stage a wholly-owned subsidiary of Sernam SA), then (2) a sale of Sernam Xpress to Financière Sernam, corresponding to a share deal and not to a sale of assets, to be artificial and unjustified.
For det første svarede overdragelsestransaktionerne til en »tilførsel og overførsel«, som blev iværksat gennem en rekapitalisering, dvs. en uløseligt forbundet transaktion, der blev gennemført af to grunde: 1) fransk ret giver ikke mulighed for at sælge aktiver til en negativ pris, og 2) det skulle sikres, at køber ikke havde nogen juridisk forbindelse med SNCF.
Firstly, the transfer operations were considered to correspond to a ‘contribution and disposal operation’ implemented through recapitalisation, i.e. an operation which is inextricably linked and undertaken for two reasons: (1) French law did not permit a sale of assets to be undertaken at a negative price, and (2) it was appropriate to ensure that the acquiring party has no legal link with SNCF.