natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I punkt 12 i 1999-rammebestemmelserne fastslås det, at det ikke er tilladt at yde omstruktureringsstøtte til en nyoprettet virksomhed, selv om virksomhedens finansielle stilling fra begyndelsen er vanskelig.
Point 12 of the 1999 Guidelines stipulates that a newly created firm is not eligible for restructuring aid, even if its initial financial position is insecure.
Det vil f.eks. være tilfældet, når den nye virksomhed er opstået ved likvidation af en tidligere virksomhed eller ved erhvervelse af dens aktiver.
This is the case, for instance, where a new firm emerges from the liquidation of a previous firm or merely takes over such firm’s assets.
I rammebestemmelserne bestemmes det, at en virksomhed som udgangspunkt vil blive betragtet som en nyoprettet virksomhed i de første tre år efter påbegyndelsen af dens aktiviteter på det relevante forretningsområde.
The Guidelines specify that a firm will in principle be considered to be newly created for the first three years following the start of operations in the relevant field of activity.
De polske myndigheder hævder, at SSN blot er en anden betegnelse for ASS, der eksisterede og samarbejdede med SSPH og SS før deres konkurs.
The Polish authorities claim that SSN is just another name for ASS, which existed and cooperated with SSPH and SS prior to their bankruptcy.
Alle omstændighederne peger imidlertid i retning af, at SSN ikke overtog SSPH's eller SS' gæld, og at disse gældsforpligtelser således fortsat påhvilede disse to selskaber og blev behandlet i forbindelse med konkursbehandlingen.
However, all the circumstances suggest that SSN did not take over the debts of SSPH or SS and that those debts stayed with those two companies and were dealt with under the bankruptcy procedure.
Polen har anført, at SSN overtog SSPH's leverandørgæld, der beløb sig til 15 mio. PLN, men har ikke fremsendt yderligere oplysninger herom eller dokumentation herfor.
Poland has stated that SSPH’s supplier-related debts in the amount of PLN 15 million had been taken over by SSN, but has not provided any further details or any documentation.
SSN påbegyndte således sine aktiviteter som en virksomhed, der var fri af sine forgængeres gældsforpligtelser.
Thus SSN started its operations free of the debts of its predecessors.
De polske myndigheder har ikke fremlagt beviser for, at SSN overtog nogen form for gældsforpligtelser.
The Polish authorities have not provided any evidence that SSN took over any debts.
I betragtning af størrelsen af værftets forretning ville gælden på 15 mio. PLN, der angiveligt blev overtaget, desuden ikke begrunde påstanden om, at der var tale om økonomisk kontinuitet mellem SSPH/SS og SSN.
Furthermore, considering the size of the yard’s business, the liability of PLN 15 million which was allegedly taken over would not justify the assertion that there was economic continuity between SSPH/SS and SSN.
Kommissionen bemærker endvidere, at de igangværende kontrakter blev overtaget i løbet af deres produktionscyklus, hvor gælden blev modsvaret af tilgodehavender og derfor ikke udgjorde en supplerende nedarvet hæftelse.
In addition, the Commission notes that the ongoing contracts were taken over during the production cycle, when liabilities were offset by receivables, and therefore did not represent any additional inherited burden.
Desuden indgik SSN faktisk nye kontrakter vedrørende disse skibe [33].
Moreover, SSN in fact concluded new contracts for those ships [33].
Mens Kommissionen har noteret sig, at ASS var aktiv i skibsbygningsindustrien sammen med SS før SSPH's konkurs (rammeaftale og leasingaftale fra januar 2002), bemærker Kommissionen for det andet, at SSN's ringe størrelse efter juni 2002 sammenlignet med ASS størrelse før juni 2002 underminerer påstanden om, at der var økonomisk kontinuitet mellem disse to virksomheder.
Secondly, while the Commission notes that ASS was active in the shipbuilding business together with SS before the bankruptcy of SSPH (framework agreement and lease agreement of January 2002), the Commission also notes that the sheer size of SSN after June 2002 as compared to that of ASS before June 2002 undermines the assertion that there was economic continuity between these two entities.
Resultatopgørelsen viser, at omsætningen steg fra 88 mio. PLN i 2001 til 425 mio. PLN i 2002 og 1100 mio. PLN i 2003.
The profit and loss account shows that turnover increased from PLN 88 million in 2001 to PLN 425 million in 2002 and PLN 1100 million in 2003.
Kommissionen konkluderer således, at den ikke kan tage de polske myndigheders påstand om, at SSN blot var en videreførelse af ASS, der havde eksisteret lang tid før SSPH's konkurs, til efterretning.
The Commission therefore concludes that it cannot accept the assertion of the Polish authorities that SSN was simply a continuation of ASS, which had existed long before the bankruptcy of SSPH.
På det økonomiske plan er der en klar opdeling mellem de to virksomheders aktiviteter, hvilket hovedsagelig illustreres af det forhold, at der ikke blev overtaget nogen form for gæld.
In economic terms, there is a clear split between the activities of these two entities, which is illustrated primarily by the fact that no liabilities were taken over.
SSN var derfor en nyoprettet virksomhed, der ikke var berettiget til omstruktureringsstøtte.
SSN was therefore a new company, which was not eligible for restructuring aid.
I rammebestemmelsernes punkt 12 betragtes en virksomhed som en nyoprettet virksomhed i de første tre år efter påbegyndelsen af dens aktiviteter.
Under point 12 of the Guidelines a firm is considered to be newly created for the first three years following the start of its operations.
Den foreliggende situation er en konkret situation, hvor en nyoprettet virksomhed opstod ved likvidation af en tidligere virksomhed.
The situation under consideration is a specific one in which a new firm emerged from the liquidation of a previous firm.
I medfør af rammebestemmelsernes punkt 12 gør denne situation en virksomhed uberettiget til rednings- og omstruktureringsstøtte.
Under Point 12 of the Guidelines this scenario is one which disqualifies a firm from eligibility for rescue and restructuring aid.
I nærværende sag er det Kommissionens opfattelse, at SSPH's og SS' konkursbegæring i juli 2002 er afgørende i denne forbindelse.
In the present case, the Commission considers that the filing for bankruptcy of SSPH and SS in July 2002 is decisive in this respect.
Det var denne konkurs, der markerede bruddet mellem den gamle økonomiske enhed og den nye økonomiske enhed, som var beskyttet mod den gamle økonomiske enheds gældsforpligtelser.
It is this bankruptcy that marked the rupture between the old economic entity and the new economic entity, which was protected from the liabilities of the old economic entity.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at SSN ikke var berettiget til rednings- og omstruktureringsstøtte i de tre år, der blev indledt i juli 2002, da SSN påbegyndte sine nye aktiviteter uden at være tynget af tidligere gældsforpligtelser.
The Commission therefore concludes that SSN was not eligible for rescue and restructuring aid in the three years starting from July 2002, when it started its new operations, free of old liabilities.
I punkt 12 i rammebestemmelserne anerkendes det, at en virksomhed, der oprindelig måtte være blevet anset for at være nyoprettet, vil blive berettiget til rednings- eller omstruktureringsstøtte ved udløbet af den treårsperiode, der følger efter oprettelsen af virksomheden, forudsat at virksomheden kan betragtes som en kriseramt virksomhed i den i rammebestemmelserne anførte betydning.
Point 12 of the Guidelines recognises that a firm initially considered to be newly created will become eligible for rescue or restructuring aid on expiry of the three year period following its start-up, provided that it qualifies as a firm in difficulty within the meaning of the Guidelines.
Kommissionen har iagttaget, at SSN efter treårsperiodens udløb opfyldte de i rammebestemmelserne anførte betingelser for at være støtteberettiget.
The Commission observes that the conditions for SSN being eligible under the Guidelines were met after the three year period had elapsed.
Det forholdt sig især sådan, at SSN konstant var tabsgivende, og at det kun skyldtes statslig indgriben, at virksomheden adskillige gange blev reddet fra konkurs.
In particular, SSN steadily made losses and was saved several times from bankruptcy only by State intervention.
Således kunne SSN fra juli 2005 betragtes som en kriseramt virksomhed i betydningen i rammebestemmelsernes punkt 11.
It therefore qualified from July 2005 as a firm in difficulty within the meaning of point 11 of the Guidelines.
GENOPRETTELSE AF RENTABILITET
RESTORATION OF VIABILITY
I medfør af rammebestemmelsernes punkt 34 skal støtten tildeles på betingelse af, at der gennemføres en omstruktureringsplan, der skal gøre det muligt for virksomheden at genoprette sin rentabilitet inden for en rimelig tidshorisont.
Under point 34 of the Guidelines, the grant of the aid must be conditional on implementation of the restructuring plan, which must enable the company to restore its viability within a reasonable time-scale.
En genoprettelse af rentabilitet betyder, at virksomheden efter omstruktureringen vil kunne dække alle omkostninger og skabe et tilstrækkeligt afkast af egenkapitalen, der gør det muligt at klare sig ved egen hjælp.
Restoration of viability means that the company, after completing its restructuring, is able to cover all its costs and to generate a sufficient return on capital to enable it to compete on its own merits.
Omstruktureringen skal strække sig over en så kort periode som muligt.
The duration of the restructuring must be as short as possible.
Kommissionen bemærkede indledningsvis, at den i løbet af denne undersøgelse har gennemgået to omstruktureringsplaner, den fra 2002 og den fra 2006, der blev udarbejdet af værftets ledelse og godkendt af staten.
The Commission first notes that in the course of this investigation it reviewed two restructuring plans, that of 2002 and that of 2006, which were prepared by the yard’s management and approved by the State.
For så vidt angår begge planer konkluderede Kommissionen, at Polen havde undladt at dokumentere, at planerne var tilstrækkelige til at genoprette værftets rentabilitet på lang sigt.
The Commission concluded with regard to both plans that Poland had failed to demonstrate that they were sufficient to restore the yard’s long-term viability.
Eftersom 2006-omstruktureringsplanen erstattede 2002-omstruktureringsplanen, vil Kommissionen i det nedenstående redegøre for årsagerne til sin konklusion vedrørende 2006-omstruktureringsplanen.
Since the 2006 restructuring plan replaced the 2002 restructuring plan, the Commission will explain below the grounds for its conclusion concerning the 2006 restructuring plan.
Omstruktureringsplanen af september 2006
Restructuring plan of September 2006
Den planlagte strategi, som indebar, at fokus skulle rettes mod nichemarkeder, hvorpå værftet antog, at det havde en konkurrencemæssig fordel, og hvorpå det vurderede, at de generelle konkurrence- og markedsforhold var gunstige, syntes faktisk at være passende for SSN.
The planned strategy of focusing on niche markets in which the yard assumed that it had a competitive advantage and where it considered that the general competitive and market environment was favourable did indeed seem appropriate for SSN.
Det forhold, at næsten 70 % af fartøjerne i værftets ordrebeholdning for de kommende år var containerskibe, vidnede ikke desto mindre ikke om en væsentlig ændring i værftets fokus.
Nevertheless, the fact that almost 70 % of the vessels on the yard’s order book for the following years were container ships did not indicate that there had been a major change in the orientation of the yard.
Der var ingen andre tegn i form af f.eks. omfattende undersøgelses- og udviklingsprojekter eller markedsføringsaktiviteter, der underbyggede konklusionen om, at værftet ville kunne gennemføre sin strategi på kort sigt.
There were no other indications, such as major research and development projects or marketing activities, to support the conclusion that the yard would be able to implement this strategy in the short term.
Kommissionen var derfor ikke overbevist om, at denne markedsstrategi var realistisk at følge.
The Commission was therefore not convinced that this market strategy was realistically achievable.
Omfanget af de planlagte investeringer på i alt 200 mio. PLN, var tydeligvis utilstrækkeligt i betragtning af, at værftets faciliteter var i ringe stand og var faldet væsentligt i værdi.
The planned level of investment, amounting to PLN 200 million, was clearly insufficient, given that the yard’s facilities were in poor condition and had significantly depreciated.
Selv om aktivernes bogførte værdi i 2006 udgjorde 130 mio. PLN, blev den ventede afskrivning i perioden 2006-2009 opgjort til 85 mio. PLN.
While the book value of the assets in 2006 was PLN 130 million, projected depreciation in 2006-2009 amounted to PLN 85 million.
Dette tydede på, at en stor del af investeringen umiddelbart ville blive modregnet i afskrivninger, og at en reel modernisering ville være begrænset.
This indicated that a large part of the investment would immediately be offset by depreciation and genuine modernisation would be limited.
Kommissionens analyse, hvorefter de planlagte investeringers omfang var utilstrækkeligt, blev underbygget af det forhold, at det i 2006-omstruktureringsplanen blev antaget, at SSN's produktivitet i 2011 ville nå EU's gennemsnitlige produktivitet i 2000 (på daværende tidspunkt lå SSN's produktivitet på niveau med EU-gennemsnittet i 1992), og Kommissionen skønnede, at dette var utilstrækkeligt og ville gøre det umuligt for værftet at konkurrere på markedet uden langvarig statsstøtte.
The Commission’s opinion that the scope of the planned investments was not sufficient was reinforced by the fact that the 2006 restructuring plan assumed that in 2011 SSN’s productivity would reach the level of average EU productivity in 2000 (whereas its productivity at the time was comparable to the EU average in 1992), and the Commission deemed this insufficient to enable the yard to compete on the market without long-term State support.
Kommissionen betvivlede, at de planlagte årlige lønstigninger på ca. 5 % ville være nok til at motivere de ansatte til at blive på værftet, idet den høje fraværsprocent og manglen på kvalificeret arbejdskraft — som følge af, at de kvalificerede medarbejdere havde forladt værftet for at få en højere løn på andre europæiske værfter — var (og stadig er) et af værftets største problemer.
The Commission doubted whether the planned pay increases of about 5 % per annum would be sufficient to motivate workers to remain at the yard, while a high level of absenteeism and a shortage of qualified workers — as these had been leaving to earn better pay in other European yards — were (and still are) one of the yard’s major problems.
I planen beregnes det, at forrentningen af den investerede kapital (ROCE) uden hensyntagen til lønstigninger gennemsnitligt vil udgøre 19 % p.a., hvilket angiveligt var det forrentningsniveau, som en privat investor ville forvente.
The plan forecast that the return on capital employed (ROCE), not taking pay increases into account, would be on average 19 % per annum in 2007-2011, which was allegedly the level of return expected by a private investor.
Hvis man imidlertid tager højde for de uundgåelige lønstigninger, ville ROCE i samme periode ligge på ca. 1,45 % p.a., hvilket var et godt stykke under det niveau, som en privat investor ville finde acceptabelt.
However, taking the unavoidable pay increases into account, the ROCE in the same period would be about 1,45 % per annum, which was well below the level acceptable to any private investor.
Overordnet set bemærkede Kommissionen, at bortset fra de fysiske investeringer, som værftet identificerede, specificerede, kvantificerede, prioriterede og planlagde, var de planlagte foranstaltninger formuleret vagt og i generelle vendinger, hovedsagelig i form af anbefalinger om opfølgende analyser.
In general, the Commission noted that, apart from the physical investments, which the yard identified, detailed, quantified, ranked by priority and scheduled, the planned measures were formulated vaguely and in general terms, mostly in form of recommendations for follow-up analyses.
Kommissionen var derfor ude af stand til at vurdere virkningerne af disse foranstaltninger og var således ikke overbevist om, at de var rimelige og vidtrækkende nok til at tackle værftets strukturproblemer.
The Commission was therefore unable to assess the impact of these measures and hence was not convinced that they were reasonable and far-reaching enough to tackle the structural problems of the yard.
På grundlag af det ovenstående vurderede Kommissionen, at den planlagte industrielle og organisatoriske omstrukturering ville være utilstrækkelig til at genoprette værftets rentabilitet på lang sigt.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission considered that the planned industrial and organisational restructuring would not be sufficient to restore the long-term viability of the yard.
Planen var ikke vidtrækkende nok, og resultatmålene for 2011 var ikke tilfredsstillende.
The plan did not go far enough and the target results for 2011 were not satisfactory.
Det var tydeligt, at værftet manglede yderligere kapital, der kunne anvendes til at opgradere og forbedre effektiviteten.
The yard clearly lacked additional capital that could be used to upgrade and improve efficiency.
Kommissionen betvivlede, at værftet kunne tilvejebringe den nødvendige kapital til vidtrækkende omstruktureringer på markedet.
The Commission doubted whether the yard could raise the capital necessary for far-reaching restructuring on the market.
Den faktiske udvikling i SSN's privatiseringsproces har bestyrket denne tvivl.
These doubts were confirmed by actual developments in the SSN privatisation process.
Som beskrevet ovenfor forsøgte ARP som SSN's hovedaktionær at finde en privat investor, der var villig til at overtage værftet.
As described above, as the majority owner of SSN, ARP attempted three times to find a private investor ready to take over the yard.
Ingen af privatiseringsforsøgene (hverken den delvise privatisering i 2006 eller de to forsøg på at sælge en aktiemajoritet i værftet i 2007) lykkedes.
None of the privatisation attempts (the partial privatisation in 2006 or the two attempts to sell a majority share in the yard in 2007) succeeded.
Kommissionen bemærker, at privatiseringsforsøgene blev gjort på et tidspunkt, hvor skibsbygningsmarkedet var kendetegnet ved et opsving uden fortilfælde, der således skabte optimale vilkår for et salg af værftet.
The Commission notes that the privatisation attempts took place at a time when the shipbuilding market was characterised by an unprecedented boom and therefore offered optimal conditions for the sale of the yard.
Privatiseringsprocessens negative udfald kan kun tolkes som manglende tillid fra markedsaktørernes side til værftets mulighed for at genoprette sin rentabilitet på lang sigt.
The negative outcome of the privatisation process can only be interpreted as a lack of confidence on the part of market players in the ability of the yard to restore its long-term viability.
Ambers tilbagetrækning fra privatiseringsprocessen efter en grundig due diligence illustrerer blot dette yderligere [34].
The withdrawal of Amber from the privatisation process after an in-depth due diligence only illustrates this further [34].
Kommissionen har noteret sig de polske myndigheders fornyede indsats for at finde en privat investor til SSN, efter at Amber trak sig.
The Commission has noted the renewed efforts of the Polish authorities to find a private investor for SSN following the withdrawal of Amber.
Indtil datoen for denne beslutning er der imidlertid ikke sket noget, der kan overbevise Kommissionen om, at de fornyede privatiseringsbestræbelser kan udmønte sig i en positiv konklusion i den nærmeste fremtid og i overensstemmelse med rammebestemmelserne.
However, up to the date of this Decision nothing has happened to convince the Commission that the renewed privatisation effort can reach a positive conclusion in the near future and in accordance with the Guidelines.
Juni 2008-omstruktureringsplanen
Restructuring plan of June 2008
Ikke desto mindre led planen af alvorlige mangler, som fik Kommissionen til at konkludere, at det i planen ikke var dokumenteret, at værftet ville få genoprettet sin rentabilitet inden for en rimelig tidshorisont.
Nevertheless, in certain respects it contained serious deficiencies which lead the Commission to conclude that it failed to demonstrate that the yard would return to viability within a reasonable time-frame.
Kommissionen mener navnlig ikke, at der var dokumenteret en troværdig forretningsstrategi med hensyn til skibsbygningssektoren.
In particular the Commission considers that the credibility of the business strategy with regard to the shipbuilding sector was not demonstrated.
Planen indeholdt ingen detaljerede oplysninger ud over den enkle erklæring om, at værftet fortsat ville bygge skibe.
The plan did not offer any detail beyond a simple statement that the yard would continue to build ships.
Den indeholdt ingen analyser af værftets evne til at bygge Ro-Pax og multi-purpose-skibe (f.eks. konstruktionskapacitet og -kvalifikationer) eller dets evne til at indgå kontrakter om bygningen af sådanne skibe på kort til mellemlang sigt (f.eks. kontakt med kunder eller med andre værfter angående muligheden for at udlicitere arbejde), ingen markedsprognoser for disse segmenter, hvoraf det fremgik, om den ventede efterspørgsel begrundede denne forretningsstrategi, og ingen prognose vedrørende disse segmenters rentabilitet.
It contained no analysis of the yard’s ability to build ro-pax and multipurpose vessels (e.g. design capacities, skills) or its ability to conclude contracts for such ships in the short to medium term (e.g. contacts with clients, or with other yards on the possibilities of subcontracting work), no market forecasts for these segments showing whether the expected demand justified this business strategy and no forecast as to the profitability of these segments.
Kommissionen bemærker, at Mostostal anerkendte sin manglende erfaring inden for skibsbygningssektoren, og at virksomhedens reelle hensigt var at finde en strategisk partner, som kunne administrere værftets skibsbygningsaktiviteter.
The Commission notes that Mostostal recognised its lack of experience in the shipbuilding sector and that its actual intention was to find a strategic partner to manage the shipbuilding activity of the yard.
Selv om Kommissionen blev underrettet om, at Mostostal faktisk førte forhandlinger med nogle potentielle samarbejdspartnere, var der ikke etableret et sådant samarbejde, før udarbejdelsen af den omstruktureringsplan, som blev fremsendt til Kommissionen.
Although the Commission was informed that Mostostal was indeed in talks with some potential cooperation partners, no such cooperation was established before the restructuring plan submitted to the Commission was drawn up.
Det eneste, som fremgik af den hensigtserklæring, der blev undertegnet med Ulstein, var, at parterne ville forhandle om, hvorvidt det var muligt at indlede et samarbejde og i givet fald, hvilken form for samarbejde der var muligt.
The letter of intent with Ulstein merely showed that the parties would negotiate on whether and what cooperation was possible.
På grundlag af den reviderede omstruktureringsplan, der blev fremsendt den 7. juli 2008, og hensigtserklæringen kan det konkluderes, at Ulstein undersøgte muligheden for at udnytte SSN's produktionsfaciliteter — ikke som ejer, men derimod som part i et kontraktforhold.
It may be concluded from the revised restructuring plan submitted on 7 July 2008, combined with the letter of intent, that Ulstein was looking at the possibility of exploiting SSN’s production facilities, but not as an owner but as part of a contractual relationship.