natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Efter Kommissionens opfattelse giver bestemmelserne i vedtægterne, Heads of Agreement og MJVA1 Q-Cells større muligheder for at øve indflydelse på Sovellos forretningsbeslutninger, end en minoritetsdeltager med en ejerandel på 24,9 % efter traditionel selskabsret kan forvente (i en joint venture-aftale er dette imidlertid ikke nødvendigvis usædvanligt).
The Commission considers that the provisions contained in the Articles of Association, the Heads of Agreement, and the MJVA1 give Q-Cells a level of influence on Sovello’s business decisions that goes beyond what a minority shareholder with a participation of 24,9 % could expect under normal company law (though in a joint venture arrangement, this is not necessarily unusual).
I Heads of Agreement er fastsat følgende:
The Heads of Agreement stipulates that:
»The Governance of JVCo will generally be structured and balanced to take into account each Party's relative economic interest in JVCo and the fact that E needs initially to have a higher degree of control of JVCo as a result of the materiality of the operations of JVCo relative to E's operations on a consolidated basis. At the same time, the JVCo governance structure will include provisions that ensure that both E and Q have a shared voice in major actions of JVCo.« [JVCo's ledelse vil generelt blive struktureret og opdelt på en sådan måde, at der tages hensyn til hver partners økonomiske interesse i JVCo og den omstændighed, at E i første omgang skal kunne udøve en større grad af kontrol med JVCo som følge af den afgørende betydning af JVCo's virksomhed for E's virksomhed på et konsolideret grundlag.
‘The Governance of JVCo will generally be structured and balanced to take into account each Party’s relative economic interest in JVCo and the fact that E needs initially to have a higher degree of control of JVCo as a result of the materiality of the operations of JVCo relative to E’s operations on a consolidated basis.
Samtidig vil JVCo's ledelsesstruktur være underkastet betingelser, som sikrer, at både E og Q deltager i de vigtige forretningsbeslutninger i JVCo.] (Kommissionens fremhævelse)
At the same time, the JVCo governance structure will include provisions that ensure that both E and Q have a shared voice in major actions of JVCo.’(Underlining added)
Det hedder endvidere i Heads of Agreement, at partnerne aftaler i fællesskab at identificere visse vigtige forretningsbeslutninger, der kræver tilslutning fra begge parter.
In addition, the Heads of Agreement mentions that the parties will agree to identify certain major corporate actions that require the consent of both parties in a mutually agreed upon manner.
I de oprindelige vedtægter for Sovello er fastsat følgende:
Indeed, the initial Articles of Association of Sovello foresee that:
Bestyrelsen består af tre medlemmer (to medlemmer udnævnes af Evergreen, herunder også formanden, der skal være »acceptabel« for Q-Cells; et medlem (samtidig næstformand) udnævnes og afsættes af Q-Cells).
The Supervisory Board is composed of three persons (two nominated by Evergreen, of which the president, who should be ‘acceptable’ for Q-Cells; one by Q-Cells, who is at the same time the substitute president).
Forskellige vigtige forretningsbeslutninger (godkendelse af årsplan og balance, strategiske beslutninger vedrørende tidsplan og produktionsmængde, kapacitetsudvidelse, salg af wafere/celler foruden moduler, bestemmelse af mærker og mærkenavne, aftaler vedrørende intellektuel ejendomsret osv.) kræver tilslutning fra mindst én af de af Evergreen og Q-Cells udnævnte ledere.
The agreement of at least one of each of both Evergreen and Q-Cells nominees is required for several important corporate actions (approval of annual plan and balance sheet; strategic decisions concerning timing and volume of production, capacity extension, sale of wafers/cells additionally to module; definition of brands and brand names; agreements concerning intellectual property…).
Da Q-Cells således har væsentlige beslutningsbeføjelser, er Tysklands argument om, at Evergreen behøvede en ejerandel på over 75 % for at beskytte sine interesser (og Q-Cells' ejerandel på 24,9 % skyldtes andet end bestræbelser på at omgå bestemmelserne), ikke holdbart.
As a consequence, since Q-Cells has substantial decisional rights, the German argument that Evergreen needed a participation exceeding 75 % to protect its interests (and thus the 24,9 % participation of Q-Cells is justified by other than circumvention-considerations) cannot be upheld.
Kommissionen noterer sig, at Evergreen i første omgang faktisk tilstræbte at få en majoritetsinteresse i Sovello (se punkt 5 i Heads of Agreement: »E will be required to own a majority interest in the equity of JVCo in the near term« [E skal inden for en overskuelig fremtid have en majoritetsinteresse i JVCo's selskabskapital]), men at en sådan majoritet også kunne opnås med en anden procentdel (mellem 51 % og 75 %).
The Commission notes that Evergreen indeed desired to initially have a majority interest in Sovello (as stated in point 5 of the Heads of Agreement: ‘E will be required to own a majority interest in the equity of JVCo in the near term’), but such majority could also be achieved with another participation percentage (between 51 % and 75 %).
Den omstændighed, at Q-Cells kunne få indflydelse på strategiske beslutninger, bekræftes også i Evergreens årsberetning for 2004, hvori det hedder:
The influence of Q-Cells on strategic decisions is confirmed by Evergreen’s annual report 2004 which mentions that:
Følgende uddrag af Heads of Agreement viser, at Q-Cells' rolle i Sovello var afgørende for joint ventures funktionsevne: »It is anticipated that because the facility will be located in Germany near Q's current operations, that Q will be a major source of transferred and seconded employees for JVCo.
The following extracts from the Heads of Agreement demonstrate that the role of Q-Cells in Sovello was essential for the operability of the joint venture:
In addition, initially Q will take primary responsibility for recruiting new employees for the facility.« [Det forventes, at Q bliver en vigtig kilde til overførte og udsendte medarbejdere for JVCo som følge af, at anlægget placeres i Tyskland i nærheden af Q's nuværende produktionsanlæg.
‘It is anticipated that because the facility will be located in Germany near Q’s current operations, that Q will be a major source of transferred and seconded employees for JVCo.
Desuden vil Q i begyndelsen have hovedansvaret for at ansætte nye medarbejdere til produktionsanlægget.]
In addition, initially Q will take primary responsibility for recruiting new employees for the facility.’
»JVCo may outsource to a Party on a permanent or temporary basis, certain services (Infrastructure, management, operational and technology support and development, etc.) that can be provided by a party to JVCo on a more cost effective basis than if JVCo were to provide such services itself.
‘JVCo may outsource to a Party on a permanent or temporary basis, certain services (Infrastructure, management, operational, technology support and development, etc.) that can be provided by a party to JVCo on a more cost effective basis than if JVCo were to provide such services itself.
In particular for the early phases of JVCo, both Parties commit to enter into agreements to supply necessary services to JVCo for a period of at least 2 years, until JVCo is in a position to function cost effectively without this support from its owner entities.« [JVCo kan til en partner varigt eller midlertidigt outsource visse tjenesteydelser (infrastruktur, ledelse, driftsmæssig og teknologisk støtte og udvikling osv.), som kan udføres billigere af en partner end af JVCo selv.
In particular for the early phases of JVCo, both Parties commit to enter into agreements to supply necessary services to JVCo for a period of at least 2 years, until JVCo is in a position to function cost effectively without this support from its owner entities.’
Begge partnere forpligter sig til navnlig i JVCo's opstartsfase at indgå aftaler om levering af de nødvendige tjenesteydelser til JVCo i en periode på mindst to år, indtil JVCo er i stand til at arbejde omkostningseffektivt uden denne støtte fra ejernes side.] »[…For example, it is anticipated that because of the proximity of the JVCo facility to Q, that Q will be in a position to effectively provide JVCo with infrastructure services until such time as JVCo is able to provide such services independently.« [F.eks. antages det, at Q på grund af sin tætte beliggenhed på JVCo's produktionsanlæg vil være i stand til at levere infrastrukturtjenester til JVCo, indtil JVCo selv kan levere sådanne tjenester.]
‘For example, it is anticipated that because of the proximity of the JVCo facility to Q, that Q will be in a position to effectively provide JVCo with infrastructure services until such time as JVCo is able to provide such services independently.’
I MJVA1 er der ligeledes anført en lang række tjenesteydelser, som kan leveres til Sovello (af de to partnere Q-Cells og Evergreen): generel rådgivning inden for ledelsesspørgsmål, bistand ved ansøgning om det statslige investeringstilskud, bistand ved ansøgning om godkendelser i Tyskland, bistand ved udvælgelse og ansættelse af tyske ledende medarbejdere, bistand i skattespørgsmål, rådgivning inden for forretnings- og virksomhedsstruktur, rådgivning og bistand ved tilvejebringelse af kapital, formidling af partnernes leverandører, rådgivning i forbindelse med overførsel af partnernes teknologier, teknologisk støtte, bistand ved erhvervelse af lokale infrastrukturer, menneskelige ressourcer og ansættelse af medarbejdere (artikel 9.9 i MJVA1).
The MJVA1 also lists a whole range of services which may be provided to Sovello (by both parties Q-Cells and Evergreen): general advice regarding management issues, assistance with respect to Government investment grant application process, assistance with German permit applications, assistance with German management staff selection and recruitment process, Assistance with tax issues, advice regarding corporate and organizational structure, Advice and support regarding financing activities, making the parties’ suppliers available, advice in connection with the transfer of the Parties’ technology, technology support, local infrastructure purchasing, human resources and recruitment support (Article 9.9 of the MJVA1).
Selv om det er korrekt, at det er fastsat i disse dokumenter, at disse tjenesteydelser leveres til markedsprisen eller til kostprisen plus en fast avance, viser alt dette alligevel, at der er tætte forbindelser mellem Sovello og Q-Cells.
It is true that the texts mention that these services will be provided on a market-rate or cost-plus basis, but the above shows that there are close relations between Sovello and Q-Cells.
I en pressemeddelelse udsendt af partnerne den 24. januar 2005 hedder det: »Det planlagte anlæg forventes at blive opført på en grund i nærheden af Q-Cells' eksisterende solcellefabrikker og vil derfor formentlig opnå betydelige synergier med Q-Cells' virksomhed.«
A press release issued by the parties on 24 January 2005 states that ‘The proposed facility is expected to be constructed on property near Q-Cells’ existing solar cell factories, and should therefore capture strong synergies with Q-Cells’ operations.’
Desuden erhvervede Q-Cells det tomme selskab for at oprette Sovello, og lederne i dette selskab var Q-Cells' administrerende direktør og økonomidirektør, mens Q-Cells' vicedirektør havde tegningsfuldmagt.
Furthermore, Q-Cells acquired the shelf-company for the creation of Sovello, and the managing directors of this company were the CEO of Q-Cells and the CFO of Q-Cells, whereas the COO of Q-Cells had signing authority.
Q-Cells stillede en leder til rådighed for Sovello, og uanset Tysklands argument om, at dette kun var midlertidigt, og at Evergreen ligeledes stillede en leder til rådighed, er dette ligeledes et holdepunkt for, at forbindelserne mellem Q-Cells og Sovello var meget tætte, i det mindste i begyndelsen af joint venturet.
Q-Cells provided an executive officer to Sovello, and even if Germany argues that this was only a transitional arrangement, and that Evergreen also provided an executive officer, this nevertheless is again an indication that the relations between Q-Cells and Sovello were very close, at least at the start of the joint venture.
Tyskland gjorde gældende, at Evergreen forhandlede med andre potentielle joint venture-partnere på grundlag af en ejerandel på over 75 %, men fremsendte ingen skriftlige beviser herfor.
Germany argued that Evergreen had negotiated with other possible joint venture partners on the basis of a participation exceeding 75 %, but failed to submit evidence in writing of such negotiations.
Tyskland tilbød ganske vist i nogle breve at fremsende erklæringer på tro og love fra repræsentanter for Evergreen og Q-Cells om overvejelserne bag ejerandelen på 24,9 %, men gjorde alligevel ikke dette.
Germany offered in some correspondence to provide declarations under oath by representatives of Evergreen and Q-Cells on the considerations behind the 24,9 % share, but did finally not submit them.
Af ovennævnte grunde kan Kommissionen ikke følge det argument, at Q-Cells' ejerandel på 24,9 % nødvendigvis er et resultat af anvendelsen af den tyske selskabsret og ikke udspringer af ønsket om at opnå en SMV-bonus.
For these reasons, the Commission cannot follow the argument that the participation of 24,9 % of Q-Cells results necessarily from German company law and is not determined by the intention to obtain an SME bonus.
Kommissionen er ikke overbevist om Tysklands argument om, at den mulighed, der er fastsat i MJVA1, for at Q-Cells kan forhøje sin ejerandel til 50 %, ikke kun afhænger af, at statsstøtten opretholdes, men også af, at begge partnere træffer beslutning om at udvide produktionskapaciteten på grundlag af Sovello1's økonomiske succes, da artikel 3, stk. 6, litra c), i MJVA1 har følgende ordlyd:
The Commission is not convinced by the German argument that the possibility in the MJVA1 for Q-Cells to increase its participation to 50 % was not only conditional to the maintenance of the State subsidy, but also to a capacity expansion decision of both partners based on economic success of Sovello1, since the provisions of Article 3(6)(c) of the MJVA1 state:
»Yderligere finansielle midler.
‘Additional Financing.
Såfremt VentureCo, hvad enten det er med henblik på en kapacitetsudvidelse eller i en anden forbindelse, skriftligt anmoder E og Q om yderligere finansielle midler (»yderligere finansielle midler«) ud over »Aggregate Equity Funding« (samlet egenkapitalfinansiering) og »Alternative Funding« (yderligere kapitaltilførsel), og såfremt selskabsdeltagerne godkender en sådan kapitalforhøjelse under overholdelse af bestemmelserne i selskabskontrakten (»anmodning om yderligere finansielle midler«), gælder følgende:
If, be it in relation to a Capacity Expansion or otherwise, VentureCo requests in writing from both E and Q additional financing in addition to the Aggregate Equity Funding or Alternative Funding (an “Additional Financing”), and the Shareholders approve the corresponding capital increase in accordance with the Articles of Association (an “Additional Financing Request”), the following shall apply:
Såfremt det er muligt i henhold til de gældende støtteregler — og dette bekræftes skriftligt af den kompetente støttetildelende myndighed (»erklæring om støttens forenelighed«) - at Q forhøjer sin ejerandel i VentureCo til 50 %, uden at dette kan medføre, at en ansøgning om tildeling af statslige investeringstilskud afvises helt eller delvist af de kompetente myndigheder, eller at allerede modtagne statslige investeringstilskud helt eller delvist tilbagesøges af disse, tilbydes Q skriftligt at få yderligere finansielle midler stillet til rådighed, som sætter Q i stand til at forhøje sin ejerandel i VentureCo til et niveau svarende til E's procentdel (…) (uden at overskride denne. (…)«(Kommissionens fremhævelse).
If it is possible under the applicable grant regulations, as demonstrated by a written confirmation of the relevant grant authority (the “Grant Impunity Notice”), that Q increases its ownership interest in VentureCo to 50 %, without such increase of Q’s ownership interest in VentureCo possibly resulting in an application for Government Investment Grants being turned down, in part or in full, or Government Investment Grants already obtained being reclaimed, in part or in full, by the competent authorities, then Q shall be offered in writing to provide such amount of an Additional Financing to enable it to increase its ownership interest in VentureCo to a level equal to (but not in excess of) the percentage then held by E (…).’(Underlining added)
Efter en nøje gennemgang af forskellige virksomhedsdokumenter er Kommissionen nået til den konklusion, at Sovellos formelle ejer- og beslutningsstruktur, herunder Q-Cells' ejerandel på 24,9 % og Q-Cells' betydelige indflydelse på beslutningstagningen i Sovello, på tidspunktet for den oprindelige anmeldelse faktisk bevidst og helt igennem var fastlagt således, at Sovello kunne opnå SMV-bonussen, mens de to strategiske partnere fra begyndelsen havde til hensigt at oprette et ligeberettiget partnerskab, så snart SMV-bonussen var opnået.
As a conclusion, upon careful analysis of different company documents, the Commission considers that at the time of the original notification, the formal ownership and decisional structure of Sovello, including both the 24,9 % share of Q-Cells and substantial influence of Q-Cells on Sovello decision making, was indeed deliberately and essentially designed to enable Sovello to obtain the SME bonus, whilst at the same time it was always the objective of the two strategic partners to establish the partnership on equal terms, once the SME bonus was obtained.
Tyskland har endvidere gjort gældende, at Q-Cells' ejerandel er baseret på den tyske selskabsret.
Germany argues also that the participation of Q-Cells is based on German company law.
Tyskland har nærmere bestemt anført, at joint venturet Sovellos succesfulde udvikling var af så stor betydning for Evergreens økonomiske succes, at Evergreen ønskede at fastholde det største omfang af beslutningsbeføjelser og indflydelse på Sovello og derfor i den første fase af Sovellos udvikling ikke accepterede at have kapitalandele og stemmerettigheder, der ikke oversteg 75 %.
Germany argued in particular that the successful development of the Sovello joint venture was of such importance for the economic success of Evergreen that Evergreen wanted to keep a maximum of decisional rights and influence on Sovello, and therefore did not accept, for the first phase of development of Sovello, to have shares and voting rights which did not exceed 75 %.
Dette argument kan kun forstås således, at Evergreen ikke var rede til at overlade 25 % eller derover af kapitalandelene eller stemmerettighederne til Q-Cells.
This argument can only be understood to mean that Evergreen was not prepared to give shares and voting rights to Q-Cells which would have exceeded 25 %.
For at kunne følge denne argumentation og vurdere troværdigheden heraf analyserede Kommissionen bestemmelserne i den tyske GmbH-Gesetz og dermed den gældende nationale ret, da Sovello AG på daværende tidspunkt hed EverQ GmbH og var omfattet af GmbH-Gesetz.
To understand and assess the credibility of this line of argumentation, the Commission verified the provisions of the German GmbH Statute which is the applicable national law since Sovello AG was at the time EverQ GmbH, and fell under its provisions.
I den tyske GmbH-Gesetz er visse lovbestemte minoritetsrettigheder navnlig forankret i §§ 50, 61, 66 og 53.
The German GmbH Statute creates certain statutory minority rights in several paragraphs, in particular in §§ 50, 61, 66, and 53.
§§ 50, 61 og 66 vedrører rettigheder for selskabsdeltagere med stemmerettigheder på over 10 % og er derfor ikke relevante for denne vurdering, da Q-Cells ejer en sådan andel.
The minority rights contained in §§ 50, 61, and 66 refer to rights of shareholders exceeding 10 % of votes, and are therefore irrelevant for the present assessment, since they are acquired by Q-Cells.
Kun i § 53 er der fastsat en minoritetsrettighed, som Q-Cells ikke er omfattet af i henhold til loven på grundlag af sin ejerandel på 24,9 %.
Only § 53 contains a minority right which is not obtained by statute by Q-Cells by virtue of its share of 24,9 %.
I henhold til § 53 i GmbH-Gesetz kan minoritetsdeltagere med over 25 % af stemmerettighederne blokere en ændring af anpartsselskabets selskabskontrakt.
According to § 53, a minority of more than 25 % of the voting rights is entitled to block a modification of the Articles of Association of the limited company.
Som majoritetsdeltager med over 75 % af stemmerettighederne tilkom det derfor Evergreen ved lov at træffe alle vigtige forretningsbeslutninger, også om ændringer af selskabskontrakten.
By sole application of the law, Evergreen, as majority shareholder with voting rights exceeding 75 % could thus indeed take all important business decisions, including on changes to the Articles of Association.
Hvis bestemmelserne om beslutningsbeføjelserne i vedtægterne og i MJVA ikke fastsatte yderligere beslutningsbeføjelser til Q-Cells, ville det af Tyskland fremførte argument om, at Evergreen behøvede en andel på over 75 %, være korrekt, og Q-Cells' ejerandel på 24,9 % kunne som følge af en nøje anvendelse af lovbestemte rettigheder være begrundet og kunne derfor anses for ikke at afspejle en kunstig virksomhedsstruktur, der tager sigte på at omgå SMV-definitionen.
If the decisional rights included in the provisions of the Articles of Association and the MJVA did not contain additional decisional rights in favour of Q-Cells, the argument brought forward by Germany that Evergreen needed a share exceeding 75 % was credible, and the 24,9 % share of Q-Cells could be justified as the consequence of strict application of statutory rights, and could therefore be considered not to reflect an artificial corporate architecture aimed at circumventing the SME definition.
Efter tysk selskabsret og uanset overholdelsen af lovbestemmelserne gælder der imidlertid aftalefrihed, og vedtægterne for virksomheden kan under visse omstændigheder indeholde beskyttelsesbestemmelser, som går videre end de lovbestemte beskyttelsesbestemmelser.
However, under German company law, and notwithstanding the respect of the statutory provisions, freedom of contract applies, and the company’s articles of association may contain provisions that give protection exceeding that foreseen by statute.
Dette er netop tilfældet i forbindelse med Sovello, da partnerne har fastsat i vedtægterne, at alle vigtige beslutninger og navnlig en ændring af vedtægterne kræver tilslutning fra begge partnere.
This is exactly the situation of Sovello where the parties laid down in the Articles of Association that both of them have to agree to all important decisions, especially to a modification of the articles.
Såfremt der — som i den foreliggende sag — blev aftalt enstemmighed, gælder ovennævnte regel ikke, da den kun skal beskytte, men ikke begrænse en minoritetsdeltagers rettigheder.
If unanimity — like in the present case — is agreed, then the rule above does not apply, because it shall only protect the rights of a minority shareholder, but not restrict his rights.
På den anden side havde det selvfølgelig stået partnerne fuldstændig frit også at optage samme bestemmelse i vedtægterne, hvis de ikke havde aftalt, at Q-Cells skulle have en andel på 24,9 %, men i en anden størrelsesorden.
On the other hand, nothing of course would have restricted the parties’ freedom to insert the same clause in the Articles of Association, if they had not agreed on a share of 24,9 %, but on a different share for Q-Cells.
Derfor er argumentet med hensyn til minoritetsdeltageres vetorettigheder ikke relevant i den foreliggende sag.
Therefore, in the case at hand the argument referring to the blocking rights of minority shareholders is not relevant.