natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ved at afgrænse sine aktiviteter i forhold til Fortis SA/NV kunne FBN i vidt omfang undgå de problemer og omkostninger, som er typiske for et nødlidende (finansielt) selskab (f.eks. højere finansieringsomkostninger, dårligere betalingsbetingelser fra leverandører og modparter, højere personaleomkostninger med henblik på at fastholde medarbejdere, reduktion i aktiviteter og risikovægtede aktiver for at bevare kapitalen) [99].
By ring-fencing its activities from Fortis SA/NV, FBN was able to avoid to a large extent the problems and costs typical of a (financial) company in distress (for example higher funding costs, worse payment conditions from suppliers and counterparties, higher personnel costs to retain staff, reduction of activities and risk-weighted assets to preserve capital) [99].
Selv om ABN AMRO N rent driftsmæssigt forblev et særskilt selskab, frygtede den nederlandske stat en sammenblanding som følge af, at markederne kunne forbinde ABN AMRO N med dens fremtidige ejer Fortis SA/NV.
Although ABN AMRO N remained on an operational level a separate company, the Dutch State feared contamination resulting from the fact that markets might associate ABN AMRO N with its future owner Fortis SA/NV.
Foranstaltning Y1 — en betydelig komponent i de integrerede transaktioner af 3. oktober 2008 — gav også FBN en stor fordel, navnlig på grund af transaktionens størrelse og de på daværende tidspunkt gældende markedsforhold.
Measure Y1 – an important component of the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008 – also provided a major advantage to FBN, especially given the size of the transaction and the then prevailing market circumstances.
Den store likviditetsfacilitet på 45 mia. EUR [100] blev ydet, da engrosmarkederne var stort set lukkede, navnlig for store beløb og for selskaber med en relativt høj udlåns-/indlånskvote som FBN.
The large liquidity facility of EUR 45 billion [100] was provided when wholesale markets were virtually closed, particularly for large amounts and for companies with a relatively high loan-to-deposit ratio such as FBN.
At der ikke fandtes så meget likviditet på markedet, bekræftes af, at FBN skulle bruge flere kvartaler på at udskifte den kortfristede likviditetsfacilitet med andre finansieringskilder.
The fact that such a high amount of liquidity was not readily available on the market is confirmed by the fact that FBN needed several quarters to replace the short-term liquidity facility by other sources of funding.
I sidste ende betalte FBN hele den kortfristede finansiering fra den nederlandske stat tilbage i juni 2009, ni måneder efter likviditetsstøtten blev ydet.
In the end, FBN repaid all the short-term funding from the Dutch State in June 2009, 9 months after the liquidity aid was granted.
Refinansieringen skete delvist gennem statsgaranterede gældsudstedelser [101].
The refinancing was partly done via State-guaranteed debt issues [101].
Det bør derfor konkluderes, at foranstaltning Y1 udgør statsstøtte, da den gav FBN en fordel i form af finansiering, som den ikke kunne have fundet på markedet under de dagældende markedsforhold.
Therefore, it should be concluded that Measure Y1 constitutes State aid as it provided FBN with an advantage in the form of funding which it could not have found on the market in the then prevailing market circumstances.
Med hensyn til foranstaltning Y2, novationen af de langfristede lån fra Fortis Bank SA/NV, mener Kommissionen, at denne foranstaltning udgør en selektiv fordel for FBN.
With respect to Measure Y2, the novation of long-term loans made by Fortis Bank SA/NV, the Commission considers that measure provides a selective advantage to FBN.
Oplysningerne fra den nederlandske stat viser, at Fortis Bank SA/NV var berettiget til en omgående tilbagebetaling af de fastforrentede langfristede lån (med en nominel værdi på 7,9 mia. EUR) på grund af ejerskiftet hos FBN.
The information submitted by the Dutch State shows that Fortis Bank SA/NV was entitled to immediate repayment of the fixed-rate long-term loans (with a nominal value of EUR 7,9 billion) because of the ownership change at the level of FBN.
Takket være foranstaltning Y2 skulle FBN ikke finde ny finansiering på markedet for at tilbagebetale disse langfristede lån.
Thanks to Measure Y2, FBN did not have to find new funding on the market in order to repay those long-term loans.
Den kunne fortsat drage fordel af de eksisterende lån til samme priser som før krisen.
It could continue to benefit from the existing loans at pre-crisis rates.
Ved at acceptere novationen ydede den nederlandske stat FBN langfristet gæld til den rente, der var gældende før krisen.
By accepting the novation, the Dutch State provided FBN with long-term debt at pre-crisis interest rates.
En markedsøkonomisk investor ville ikke have ydet disse lån til en rente, der var gældende før krisen, men ville have forhandlet en rente, som bedre afspejlede de dagældende markedsforhold, navnlig eftersom det drejede sig om lån af en anselig størrelse.
A market economy investor would not have provided these loans at pre-crisis interest rates but would have negotiated interest rates which would better reflect the then prevailing market circumstances, especially since it concerned loans for a sizeable amount.
Det bør derfor konkluderes, at foranstaltning Y2 udgør statsstøtte for FBN, eftersom den gav FBN en selektiv fordel i form af lån til en rente, der var gældende før krisen.
Therefore, it should be concluded that Measure Y2 constitutes State aid to FBN as it provided a selective advantage to FBN in the form of a loan at pre-crisis rates.
Den nederlandske stat forsøgte ikke at indrette renten på det amortisable lån efter den rente, der var gældende før krisen, og udviste derfor ikke en adfærd som en markedsøkonomisk investor.
The Dutch State did not try to bring the interest rates of the redeemable loans in line with post-crisis interest rates, thereby not behaving like a market economy investor.
Kommissionen havde fået tilstrækkelige oplysninger til at kunne konkludere, at ABN AMRO N ikke modtog finansiering gennem foranstaltning Y1 og Y2.
The Commission has received sufficient information to conclude that ABN AMRO N did not receive funding through Measures Y1 and Y2.
Den drog således ikke fordel af disse foranstaltninger.
It therefore did not draw an advantage from those measures.
De integrerede transaktioner af 3. oktober 2008 stemmer således ikke overens med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip og giver FBN en selektiv fordel.
Thus, the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008 are not in line with the MEIP and provide FBN with a selective advantage.
Disse foranstaltninger gjorde det muligt for FBN at forblive på markedet og videreføre sine aktiviteter uden at blive yderligere påvirket af moderselskabets problemer.
Those measures allowed FBN to stay on the market and to pursue its activities, without further contamination from the problems of its parent company.
FBN modtog endvidere omfattende finansieringsstøtte, som ikke var tilgængelig på markedet med så kort varsel.
FBN also received a very large amount of funding aid which was not available on the market on such a short notice.
Foranstaltning Y1 og Y2 udgør derfor statsstøtte, mens foranstaltning X som fastlagt i betragtning 32 i beslutningen af 8. april 2009 som sådan ikke udgør statsstøtte til FBN, men er en del af en større transaktion — udskillelsen af FBN fra Fortis Bank SA/NV — som involverede statsstøtte til FBN.
Measures Y1 and Y2 therefore do constitute State aid while, as laid down in recital 32 of the Decision of 8 April 2009, Measure X as such does not constitute State aid to FBN but is part of a wider transaction – the separation of FBN from Fortis Bank SA/NV – which involved State aid to FBN.
Anvendelighed af det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip på de foranstaltninger, som blev gennemført efter den indledende støtte af 3. oktober 2008
Applicability of the MEIP for the measures implemented after the initial aid of 3 October 2008
Den nederlandske stat har truffet en lang række foranstaltninger til fordel for FBN og ABN AMRO N fordelt over en periode på omtrent 18 måneder.
The Dutch State has taken a large number of measures in favour of FBN and ABN AMRO N, spread out over a period of roughly 18 months.
Den nederlandske stat hævder, at testen for det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip burde anvendes individuelt på hver af disse foranstaltninger (og navnlig på de fusionsrelaterede foranstaltninger — B4 og B5).
The Dutch State claims that that the MEIP-test should be applied to each of those measures individually (and especially to the merger-related Measures B4 and B5).
På grundlag af foranstaltningernes kronologi (I), deres fælles formål (II) og selskabernes situation på tidspunktet for de enkelte foranstaltninger (III) konkluderer Kommissionen imidlertid, at de ikke er tilstrækkeligt tydelige til at blive bedømt uafhængigt i forhold til det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
However, based on the chronology of the measures (I), the common purpose of the measures (II) and the situation of the companies at the time of each measure (III), the Commission concludes that they are not sufficiently distinct to be judged against the MEIP independently.
Kommissionen mener, at alle foranstaltninger er led i én lang omstruktureringsproces [102], [103].
The Commission considers all measures to be part of one lengthy restructuring process [102], [103].
Foranstaltningernes kronologi (I), som er beskrevet tidligere i afsnit 2.1 og afsnit 2.4 i denne afgørelse, viser, at alle foranstaltninger hænger sammen og blev truffet inden for en kort periode.
The chronology of measures (I) described earlier in section 2.1 and section 2.4 in this Decision shows that all measures are interrelated and were taken in a short period of time.
Derudover hænger de fusionsrelaterede foranstaltninger tydeligt sammen med de foregående indgreb.
In addition, the merger-related measures are clearly linked to the preceding interventions.
Da den nederlandske stat den 21. november 2008 — lidt mere end seks uger efter redningsindgrebet af 3. oktober 2008 — besluttede at fusionere FBN og ABN AMRO N, var det kun muligt, fordi den lige havde reddet de to selskaber fra konkurs.
When the Dutch State decided on 21 November 2008 – slightly more than 6 weeks after the rescue intervention of 3 October 2008 – to merge FBN and ABN AMRO N, it could only do so because it had just rescued the two companies from bankruptcy.
I et kontrafaktisk scenarie ville det med andre ord uden indgrebet den 3. oktober 2008 ikke have været muligt, da de to selskaber enten ikke havde eksisteret længere eller kun havde eksisteret i en meget reduceret form, som kunne have ført til en meget mindre og knap så attraktiv enhed, som den nederlandske stat også indrømmer i sin omstruktureringsplan af december 2009 (se betragtning 78).
In other words, in a counterfactual scenario without the 3 October 2008 intervention, implementing the merger would not have been an option as either the two companies would no longer have existed or they would have been present only in a substantially reduced form which would have lead to a much smaller and less attractive merged entity, which the Dutch State also admits in its December 2009 Restructuring Plan (see recital 78).
Alle foranstaltningerne havde som fælles mål (II) at genoprette rentabiliteten i FBN og ABN AMRO N. Umiddelbart efter de integrerede transaktioner af 3. oktober 2008 stod det klart, at den nederlandske stat blot havde stabiliseret situationen, mens der fortsat var vigtige problemer at løse, navnlig på grund af de enkelte enheders udskillelse fra det tidligere moderselskab.
All the measures had the common objective (II) of fully restoring the viability of FBN and ABN AMRO N. Immediately after the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008, it was clear that the Dutch State had merely stabilised the situation, with important operational problems still awaiting resolution, notably because of the separation of each entity from its former parent.
Endvidere var fusionen en nødvendig foranstaltning for at nå det fælles mål og genoprette rentabiliteten fuldt ud.
Moreover, the merger was a measure needed to achieve that common goal, to fully restore viability.
Isoleret set var FBN's finansieringsposition svag, da den havde en relativt lille detailfranchise og i høj grad afhang af engrosfinansiering [104].
On a stand-alone basis, FBN’s funding position was weak as it had a relatively small retail franchise and depended to a large extent on wholesale funding [104].
ABN AMRO N havde mistet vigtige produktkompetencer og en stor del af sit internationale netværk.
ABN AMRO N had lost important product competences and a large part of its international network.
Begge selskaber stod over for driftsmæssige udfordringer i forbindelse med f.eks. it, skatteforvaltning og risikostyring, ligesom det var usikkert, om de var tilstrækkeligt store på alle de forretningsområder, som de var aktive inden for.
Both companies faced operational issues related to, for example IT, tax and risk management and it was also uncertain whether they had sufficient scale in all the businesses in which they were active.
Den nederlandske stat så på en række alternativer og besluttede hurtigt, at en fusion kombineret med yderligere kapitaltilførsler var den bedste metode til at genoprette rentabiliteten fuldt ud.
The Dutch State looked at a number of alternatives and quickly decided that a merger in combination with additional capital increases was the best way to fully restore viability.
I et fusionsscenarie kompenserede ABN AMRO N's indskudsrige detailaktiviteter for FBN's svage finansieringsposition, hvorimod FBN kunne tilføre ABN AMRO N større og internationale filialer. Endvidere var den fusionerede enhed bedre rustet til at løse praktiske problemer og kunne desuden udnytte visse stordriftsfordele.
In a merger scenario, the deposit-rich retail activities of ABN AMRO N compensated for the weak funding position of FBN, while FBN could bring larger size and international branches to ABN AMRO N. Moreover, the combined entity was in a better position to tackle practical problems and could also benefit from additional economies of scale.
Med fusionen undgik man at skulle genopbygge hver enkelt enhed særskilt.
The merger avoided having to rebuild each entity separately.
Med hensyn til selskabernes situation på tidspunktet for de enkelte foranstaltninger (III) bemærker Kommissionen, at selskabernes rentabilitet først var fuldt ud genoprettet, da alle foranstaltningerne var gennemført.
With respect to the situation of the companies at the time of each measure (III), the Commission notes that the viability of the companies was only fully restored once all the measures were implemented.
De var ikke rentable på et mellemliggende trin, som f.eks. den 21. november 2008, da beslutningen om at fusionere blev truffet.
They were not viable at an intermediate stage, such as on 21 November 2008 when the decision to merge was taken.
I denne henseende understreger Kommissionen, at FBN ved udgangen af december 2008, hvilket vil sige efter beslutningen om at fusionere, risikerede at falde ned under DNB's minimumskapitalkrav, fordi den blev nødt til at foretage en nedskrivning af ABN AMRO N. ABN AMRO N fremgik fortsat af FBN's bøger med en vurdering, som ikke længere var realistisk [105] efter den vurdering, der blev anvendt i foranstaltning X, og en nedskrivning var derfor uundgåelig.
In that regard, the Commission underlines that at the end of December 2008, and so after the decision to merge, FBN threatened to fall below the minimum capital requirements of the DNB, because it had to take a write-down on ABN AMRO N. ABN AMRO N was still in the books of FBN for a valuation which was no longer realistic [105] after the valuation used in Measure X and therefore a write-down had become inevitable.
For at løse FBN's kapitalproblem overtog den nederlandske stat ABN AMRO N fra FBN for 6,5 mia. EUR og traf yderligere korrigerende kapitalforanstaltninger i slutningen af 2009 med konverteringen af tier 2-kapital til tier 1-kapital (se betragtning 121 og fodnote 52 i denne afgørelse).
In order to sort out FBN’s capital problem, the Dutch State acquired ABN AMRO N from FBN for EUR 6,5 billion and took further corrective capital action at the end of 2009 with the conversion of Tier 2 capital into Tier 1 capital (see recital 121 and footnote 52 of this Decision).
Erklæringer fra den nederlandske stat […] og […] bekræfter, at FBN og ABN AMRO N fortsat stod over for vigtige rentabilitetsrelaterede spørgsmål efter de integrerede transaktioner af 3. oktober 2008 [106].
Declarations of the Dutch State, […] and […] confirm that FBN and ABN AMRO N still faced important viability-related issues after the 3 October 2008 integrated transactions [106].
Kommissionen bemærker desuden, at den nederlandske stat først fremsendte den fulde omstruktureringsplan, da der var truffet beslutning om alle foranstaltningerne, hvilket viser, at rentabiliteten først da var fuldt ud genoprettet.
The Commission also observes that the Dutch State only submitted a full-fledged restructuring plan once all the measures were decided, which indicates that viability was only then fully restored.
Under denne procedure anmodede Kommissionen gentagne gange om en detaljeret omstruktureringsplan (se f.eks. betragtning 137), som var uundværlig for at vurdere, om et støttet selskabs rentabilitet var blevet genoprettet fuldt ud.
During the procedure, the Commission asked repeatedly for a detailed restructuring plan (see for instance recital 137), which was indispensable to evaluate whether the viability of an aided company has been fully restored.
Den nederlandske stat fremsendte omstruktureringsplanen af december 2009 den 4. december 2009, men denne indledende plan savnede fortsat vigtige elementer, som var nævnt i omstruktureringsmeddelelsen, som f.eks. finansielle beregninger for det værst tænkelige scenarie.
The Dutch State submitted on 4 December 2009 the December 2009 Restructuring Plan but that first plan still lacked important elements mentioned in the Restructuring Communication such as financial projections for a worst case scenario.
Ifølge denne havde overgangsledelsesgruppen i ABN AMRO Group behov for tid til at udarbejde en plan og kunne ikke danne sig et fuldstændigt overblik over koncernens fremtidige form, før fusionen var gennemført.
According to it the transition management team of ABN AMRO Group needed time to prepare a plan and could not have a complete view on the future shape of the group before the merger was implemented.
Eksistensen af en fordel og konklusion om eksistensen af støtte for de foranstaltninger, der blev gennemført efter de integrerede transaktioner af 3. oktober 2008
Existence of an advantage and conclusion on the existence of aid for the measures implemented after integrated transactions of 3 October 2008
Foranstaltning af 24. december 2008 (foranstaltning Z)
Measure of 24 December 2008 (Measure Z)
Foranstaltning Z var nødvendig for at undgå, at FBN's kapitalprocenter faldt til under de lovpligtige minimumskapitalkrav.
Measure Z was necessary to avoid FBN’s capital ratios falling below the minimum regulatory capital requirements.
FBN's kapitalproblem skyldtes den høje vurdering af ABN AMRO N i regnskabet.
FBN’s capital problem was due to the high valuation of ABN AMRO N in its accounts.
Simuleringer i […]s due diligence-rapport viser, at en nedbringelse af ABN AMRO N's værdi til 6,5 mia. EUR ville føre til en tier 1-kapitalprocent og en samlet kapitalprocent på henholdsvis 3,8 % og 7,6 % for FBN [107].
Simulations in […]’s due diligence report show that bringing the book value of ABN AMRO N down to EUR 6,5 billion would lead to Tier 1 and total capital ratios of 3,8 % and 7,6 % respectively for FBN [107].
Der var med andre ord en risiko for, at FBN ville falde under de lovgivningsmæssige minimumskrav, som kræver en samlet kapitalprocent på mindst 8 % (idet højst halvdelen udgøres af tier 2).
In other words, there was a risk that FBN would fall below the minimum regulatory ratios requiring a minimum total capital ratio of 8 % (with maximum half of it Tier 2).
Ifølge […]-rapporten løftede salget af ABN AMRO N til den nederlandske stat for i alt 6,5 mia. EUR tier 1-kapitalprocenten og den samlede kapitalprocent for FBN til henholdsvis 7,8 % og 15,7 %, hvilket løste FBN's kapitalproblem og lod selskabet blive på markedet.
According to the […]-report, selling ABN AMRO N to the Dutch State for a price of EUR 6,5 billion lifted the Tier 1 and total capital ratios of FBN to respectively 7,8 % and 15,7 %, thereby sorting out FBN’s capital problem and allowing the company to stay on the market.
Foranstaltningen betød, at FBN havde en fordel i form af kapital, som den ikke kunne have fundet på markedet.
The measure provided FBN with an advantage in the form of capital it could not have found on the markets.
Selskabet kunne desuden ikke anvende internt genererede underliggende overskud til at løse (en del af) problemet, delvist fordi det blev påført et tab på 922 mio. EUR i 2008 i forbindelse med Madoff-svindelaffæren.
The company was also unable to use internally generated underlying profits to sort out (part of) the problem, partly because it incurred losses of EUR 922 million in 2008 related to the Madoff fraud.
Eftersom der var en risiko for, at FBN ville falde ned under minimumkapitalkravene, tillod foranstaltningen selskabet at overholde lovkravene og forfølge sine aktiviteter.
Since FBN ran the risk of falling below minimum capital requirements, the measure allowed the company to comply with regulatory requirements and to pursue its activities.
Kommissionen er nået til den konklusion, at den nederlandske stats køb af AMRO N af nedenstående årsager ikke fandt sted på markedsvilkår.
The Commission has come to the conclusion that the purchase of ABN AMRO N by the Dutch State did not take place at market conditions for the reasons which follow.
En markedsøkonomisk investor [108] med en interesse i at overtage ABN AMRO N i december 2008 ville have anvendt en markedspris og taget højde for markedsforholdene på det pågældende tidspunkt.
A market economy investor [108] with an interest in acquiring ABN AMRO N in December 2008 would have used a market price, taking into account the market conditions at that particular point in time.
En rettelse til »aktuelle markedsforhold«-vurderingen ville under alle omstændigheder være nødvendig for at tage højde for de forværrede markedsforhold mellem den 3. oktober 2008 (nemlig datoen for […]-vurderingsrapporten) og den faktiske dato, hvor den nederlandske stats overtagelse af ABN AMRO N blev besluttet.
A correction to the ‘current conditions’ market valuation would be needed in any event to take into account the deterioration of the market conditions between 3 October 2008 (namely the date of the […] valuation report) and the actual date when the acquisition of ABN AMRO N by the Dutch State was decided upon.
I denne periode faldt Euro Stoxx 50-indekset med 22,2 %, mens Euro Stoxx Banks-indekset faldt med 45,3 %.
In that period, the Euro Stoxx 50 index fell by 22,2 % while the Euro Stoxx Banks index fell by 45,3 %.
Den nederlandske stats argument om, at der ikke var behov for nogen justering i lyset af ABN AMRO N's konservative risikoprofil (dvs. ingen nødlidende aktiver, god finansieringsposition osv.) kan ikke accepteres.
The Dutch State’s argument that no correction is needed given ABN AMRO N’s conservative risk profile (namely no toxic assets, good funding position, etc.) cannot be accepted.
Markedets nedgang ramte bredt og navnlig blandt bankaktier, hvilket viste, at nedgangen ikke i så høj grad skyldtes aktier alene, men snarere de forværrede økonomiske og finansielle markedsforhold og den dermed forbundne stigning i de krævede risikopræmier.
The market decline was widespread, and especially so amongst banking stocks, indicating that it was not so much linked to stock-specifics but rather to worsened economic and financial market conditions and the associated increase in required risk premiums.