natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
GOC påstod også, at Kommissionen ulovligt anvendte negative konklusioner som et resultat af utilstrækkelig samarbejdsvilje.
The GOC also argued that the Commission used illegally adverse inferences as a result of the insufficient cooperation.
De henviste i denne forbindelse til grundforordningens artikel 28, stk. 6, hvoraf det bl.a. fremgår, at hvis en interesseret part ikke samarbejder eller kun delvist samarbejder, kan resultatet blive mindre favorabelt, end hvis parten havde samarbejdet.
In this context, they refer to Article 28(6) of the basic Regulation that inter alia mentions that if an interested party does not cooperate or cooperates partially the result may be less favourable to the party than if it had cooperated.
GOC mener, at denne anvendelse af negative konklusioner er et brud på artikel 12, stk. 7, i SCM-aftalen og på bilag II til WTO's antidumpingaftale.
According to the GOC the application of adverse inferences is in violation of Article 12(7) of the SCM Agreement as well as of Annex II of the WTO Anti Dumping Agreement.
Hvad angår denne påstand, skal det bemærkes, at GOC's fortolkning af grundforordningens artikel 28, stk. 6, er ubegrundet.
With respect to this point it is noted that the GOC understanding of Article 28(6) of the basic Regulation is groundless.
Kommissionen pålagde ikke GOC »negative konklusioner«, idet Kommissionen ikke bevidst valgte et mindre favorabelt resultat for de pågældende eksportører eller søgte at indføre straffe, hvad angår subsidiering eller udligningstoldens omfang.
The Commission did not impose any ‘adverse inferences’ to the GOC, in that the Commission did not deliberately choose a less favourable outcome for the exporters concerned, nor did it seek to impose a punitive option with regard to the existence of subsidies or amount of countervailing duties.
Kommissionen anmodede i sin egenskab af undersøgende myndighed GOC om at fremlægge en række oplysninger inden for en rimelig frist.
The Commission as investigating authority requested a set of information from the GOC within a reasonable period of time.
GOC fremlagde dog ikke disse oplysninger, som var nødvendige for undersøgelsen (f.eks. kopier af planer, oplysninger om banker, bankernes vurderinger i forbindelse med lån til de samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenter, prisfastsættelse for brugsrettigheder til jord).
However, the GOC failed to provide the information deemed necessary for the investigation (e.g. copies of plans, information on banks, the assessment that banks carried out when attributing loans to the cooperating exporting producers, pricing of land-use rights).
Kommissionen var under disse omstændigheder tvunget til at gøre brug af grundforordningens artikel 28 vedrørende de foreliggende oplysninger med henblik på at træffe repræsentative konklusioner.
Under these circumstances the Commission was forced to use the provisions of Article 28 of the basic Regulation concerning facts available in order to arrive at a representative finding.
Det skal også understreges, at dette ikke skete ved at pålægge GOC straffende konklusioner.
It is pertinent to underline that this was not done by imposing punitive findings to the GOC.
Det skal eksempelvis bemærkes, at Kommissionen ikke afviste oplysninger vedrørende brugsrettigheder til jord. GOC fremlagde derimod ikke alle de ønskede oplysninger om prisfastsættelse for brugsrettigheder til jord.
By way of example, it is noted that the Commission did not reject information concerning LUR; rather, the GOC did not submit all the required information on the pricing of LUR.
Kommissionen pålagde ligeledes heller ikke GOC negative konklusioner vedrørende de begunstigede låneordninger til sektoren for coated finpapir, men måtte derimod finde de manglende oplysninger om planer, bankernes rolle og bankernes lånepolitik over for de samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenter, da GOC ganske enkelt ikke fremlagde disse oplysninger.
In the same way the Commission did not apply any adverse inferences to the GOC with respect to preferential lending to the coated paper industry but had to find the missing information with respect to plans, the role of the banks and the lending policies of the banks to the cooperating exporting producers, since such information was simply not provided by the GOC.
Kommissionen gjorde således brug af de oplysninger, som GOC havde indsendt.
Thus the Commission used whatever information provided by the GOC.
Hvor de indsendte oplysninger ikke var tilstrækkelige eller ikke var dokumenterede, måtte Kommissionen supplere dem med andre relevante oplysninger med henblik på nå frem til undersøgelsesresultaterne.
Whenever information submitted was not sufficient or not found to be probative the Commission had to complement it with other relevant data in order to make its findings.
Det kan i visse tilfælde ikke udelukkes, at resultaterne var mindre favorable for GOC, end hvis de havde samarbejdet til fulde, men Kommissionen søgte ikke dette resultat.
In some instances, it cannot be excluded that the result was less favourable to the GOC than if it had fully cooperated but this outcome was not sought by the Commission.
Kommissionens tilgang i denne sag kan ses i kontrast med WTO-panelernes måde at anvende begrebet »negative konklusioner« på, jf. afsnit 7 i bilag V til SCM-aftalen.
The Commission's approach in this case can be contrasted with the manner in which the notion of ‘adverse inferences’ under paragraph 7 of Annex V of the SCM Agreement has been applied by WTO panels.
EF-Aircraft-panelet anvendte f.eks. negative konklusioner i to tilfælde vedrørende den spanske FoU-ordning »PROFIT« i tilfælde, hvor Unionen ikke havde fremlagt tilstrækkelige oplysninger.
For example, the EC-Aircraft panel applied adverse inferences on two occasions with regard to the Spanish ‘PROFIT’ R&D programme in cases where insufficient data was provided by the EU.
Vedrørende både støttebeløbet og spørgsmålet om de facto-specificitet så panelet bort fra Unionens dokumentation og anvendte i stedet den løsning, som klageren (USA) havde foreslået, til sine resultater [11].
With regard to both the amount of funding and the issue of de-facto specificity, the panel disregarded the evidence submitted by the EU and substituted the solution proposed by the complainant (the USA) for its findings [11].
Dette var ikke tilfældet i den foreliggende sag, da Kommissionen ikke så bort fra tal og oplysninger indsendt af GOC og ikke blot substituerede klagerens løsning, men derimod anvendte samtlige de oplysninger, den havde til sin rådighed, for at drage konklusioner.
This was not the case in the present investigation as the Commission did not disregard any data provided by the GOC and simply substitute the solution proposed by the complainant but rather used the totality of information it had available to come to a conclusion.
Ud fra ovenstående konkluderes det, at ovennævnte påstande måtte afvises.
In view of the above it is concluded that the aforesaid claims had to be rejected.
Da Kommissionen ikke anvendte negative konklusioner på GOC eller nogen eksportører, er påstanden om, at anvendelsen af negative konklusioner på statslige myndigheder er et brud på WTO's bestemmelser, ubegrundet.
As the Commission did not use adverse inferences in relation to the GOC or any exporter, the claim that the application of adverse inferences to a government is in violation of the WTO legal provisions is devoid of any purpose.
Denne påstand måtte afvises, da den ikke er understøttet af faktiske beviser.
This had to be rejected as this allegation is not supported by the actual facts.
Kommissionen underrettede GOC om bestemmelserne i artikel 28 og om, i hvilke tilfælde disse bestemmelser kan anvendes, i det første brev til GOC efter indledningen af disse procedurer samt i det sidste brev til GOC inden kontrolbesøgene.
The Commission informed the GOC on the provisions of Article 28 and on which cases these provisions may apply in the first letter the GOC received upon the initiation of these proceedings as well as in the last letter the GOC received before the on-the-spot verification visit.
Desuden blev GOC gjort opmærksom på konsekvenserne af manglende samarbejdsvilje, jf. betragtning 59.
Furthermore the GOC was made aware of the consequences of non-cooperation as explained under recital (59) above.
GOC påstod desuden, at Kommissionen aldrig anmodede myndighederne om at arrangere møder med de statsejede banker.
The GOC also claimed that the Commission never requested it to arrange meetings with state-owned banks.
Denne påstand måtte afvises.
That claim had to be rejected.
Det skal i den forbindelse bemærkes, at Kommissionen anmodede om GOC's direkte engagement ved planlægning af møder med de banker, som havde ydet lån til de samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenter.
In this respect it is noted that the Commission requested the direct involvement of the GOC when arranging meetings with those banks that have provided loans to the cooperating exporting producers.
GOC blev i den forbindelse også anmodet om at fremlægge en liste over banker, der havde ydet sådanne lån.
For this purpose, the GOC was also provided with a list of the banks that had provided such loans.
GOC blev desuden anmodet om at sørge for, at politisk styrede banker og andre finansielle institutioner ville være til stede under kontrolbesøget hos GOC for at besvare spørgsmål om den del af spørgeskemaet, som er rettet mod disse parter.
The GOC was also requested to ensure that policy banks and other financial institutions would be present during the on-the-spot verification visit at the premises of the GOC in order to reply to questions referring to the part of the questionnaire intended for these parties.
Ingen af ovennævnte anmodninger blev imødekommet af GOC.
None of the above requests was ever acted upon by the GOC.
GOC påstod, at brugen af negative konklusioner var uberettiget i dette tilfælde, da GOC efter bedste evne fremlagde de oplysninger, de var i besiddelse af.
The GOC argued that the use of adverse inferences is unjustified in the present case as the GOC provided to its best of its abilities the information it had available.
GOC påstod, at bankerne er tredjeparter i disse procedurer og ikke interesserede parter, jf. definitionen i artikel 12, stk. 9, i SCM-aftalen, og at de således ikke er forpligtede til at samarbejde.
GOC submitted that banks are third parties to these proceedings and not interested parties as defined in Article 12(9) of the SCM Agreement and thus there is no obligation for them to cooperate.
Det blev desuden påstået, at Kommissionen udviste vilkårlighed og ikke handlede i henhold til WTO-reglerne, idet GOC fremlagde tilstrækkelige oplysninger vedrørende bankernes udlån og brugsrettigheder til jord.
It was also submitted that the Commission displayed arbitrariness and acted inconsistently to WTO rules since GOC provided sufficient information with respect to lending from banks and land-use rights.
Det skal i denne forbindelse erindres, at Kommissionen ikke anvendte negative konklusioner over for GOC.
In this respect it is recalled that the Commission did not apply adverse inferences to the GOC.
Desuden anvendte Kommissionen, jf. betragtning 276, de oplysninger, som GOC havde fremlagt, men da der manglede væsentlige oplysninger, måtte Kommissionen supplere disse tal og oplysninger med andre disponible kilder med henblik på at nå frem til repræsentative undersøgelsesresultater.
Furthermore, as it is stated under recital (276) above, the Commission used whatever information the GOC provided but since significant information was missing it had to complement data provided with other available sources in order to arrive at a representative finding.
Vedrørende påstandene om interesserede parter erindres det, at artikel 12, stk. 9, i SCM-aftalen klart fastsætter, at andre indenlandske eller udenlandske parter end dem, der fremgår heraf, kan indgå som interesserede parter.
With respect to the claims made on interested parties it is recalled that Article 12(9) of the SCM Agreement clearly states that domestic or foreign parties other than the ones mentioned therein could be included as interested parties.
I disse undersøgelser har Kommissionen på grundlag af klagen anmodet om oplysninger vedrørende begunstigede låneordninger til sektoren for coated finpapir.
With respect to these proceedings the Commission, on the basis of the complaint, requested information concerning the preferential lending to the coated paper industry.
Disse oplysninger er desuden direkte forbundet med banker, som overvejende er statsejede.
Moreover, such information is directly linked to banks that are majority State-owned.
Både de samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenter og GOC blev gjort bekendt med dette.
Both the cooperating exporting producers and the GOC were made aware of this.
Da der ganske enkelt ikke blev fremlagt tilstrækkelige oplysninger om bankernes udlån, var Kommissionen nødt til at gøre brug af de foreliggende faktiske oplysninger i overensstemmelse med grundforordningens artikel 28.
The fact that sufficient information with respect to lending from banks was simply not provided forced the Commission to resort in the application of facts available in line with the provisions of Article 28 of the basic Regulation.
PÅSTANDE VEDRØRENDE BRUG AF DE FORELIGGENDE OPLYSNINGER
ALLEGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO USE OF BEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE
APP påstod, at Kommissionen ikke kan se bort fra oplysninger, der ikke er ideelle i alle aspekter, hvis den interesserede part, der har fremlagt oplysningerne, ikke desto mindre har handlet efter bedste evne.
APP claimed that the Commission is prevented from discarding information that is not ideal in all respects if the interested party that supplied the information has, nevertheless, acted to the best of its ability.
APP påstod endvidere, at selv i tilfælde, hvor en part ikke har samarbejdet efter bedste evne, skal Kommissionen, når den anvender de foreliggende faktiske oplysninger, tage højde for dokumenterede oplysninger indsendt af en interesseret part, selv om disse oplysninger ikke udgør samtlige de oplysninger, parten blev anmodet om at fremlægge.
APP further claimed thatEeven in cases where a party failed to cooperate to the best of its ability, when using facts available to it, the Commission must take into account all the substantiated facts provided by an interested party even if those facts may not constitute the complete information requested of the party.
Kommissionen er således i henhold til både grundforordningen og SCM-aftalen tvunget til ikke at se bort fra sådanne oplysninger.
The Commission is therefore compelled, under both the basic Regulation and the SCM Agreement, not to disregard such information.
GOC påstod, at det er ulovligt at gøre brug at de foreliggende faktiske oplysninger, hvis en interesseret medlemsstat eller part har bevist, at den har handlet efter bedste evne og på korrekt vis fremlagt oplysninger, der kunne efterprøves og bruges i undersøgelsen, inden for fristen og i et format eller edb-program, som anmodet om af den undersøgende myndighed.
The GOC submitted that recourse to facts available is not permissible if an interested Member or interested party has demonstrated that it has acted to its best of its abilities and provided information that was verifiable, appropriately submitted so it can be used in the investigation, supplied in timely fashion and in a medium or computer language requested by the investigating authorities.
Dette var ikke tilfældet i den foreliggende sag.
This was not the case here.
Det skal i denne forbindelse erindres, at Kommissionen gjorde brug af de foreliggende faktiske oplysninger i henhold til grundforordningens artikel 28 og artikel 12, stk. 7, i SCM-aftalen, idet GOC og eksporterende producenter til trods for gentagne anmodninger ikke fremlagde de oplysninger, der var nødvendige for undersøgelsen med henblik på at træffe repræsentative konklusioner.
In this respect it is recalled that the Commission resorted to facts available in line with the provisions of Article 28 of the basic Regulation and Article 12(7) of the SCM Agreement because the GOC and exporting producers, although repeatedly requested to do so, did not provide information that was considered necessary for the investigation in order to arrive at a representative finding.
Kommissionen måtte søge at løse det grundlæggende problem, den stødte på i sin egenskab af undersøgende myndighed, nemlig at GOC nægtede at give adgang til eller at fremlægge faktiske oplysninger om planer, bankernes rolle, kreditrisikovurdering i forbindelse med lån til samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenter, prisfastsættelse for brugsrettigheder til jord eller juridiske dokumenter om de forskellige undersøgte ordninger.
Indeed, the Commission had to seek to repair the fundamental problem it encountered as investigating authority i.e. the fact that the GOC refused access or failed to provide actual information on plans, role of the banks, evaluation of credit risk when granting loans to cooperating exporting producers, pricing of LUR or legal documents referring to the various investigated schemes.
De samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenter fremlagde ligeledes heller ikke oplysninger om lån fra de kinesiske banker.
In the same way the co-operating exporting producers failed to provide information concerning loans attributed by Chinese banks.
GOC's og de eksporterende producenters form for samarbejde opfylder således ikke de standarder, som blev fastsat af WTO's appelorgan i sagen United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, hvori det konkluderedes, at de interesserede parters samarbejdsgrad skal være »høj«, og at en interesseret part skal »handle efter bedste evne« [12].
Therefore, the way the GOC and the exporting producers cooperated does not meet the standards established by the WTO Appellate Body in United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, which concluded that the level of cooperation required of interested parties is a ‘high’ one and that interested parties must act to the ‘best of their abilities’ [12].
Kommissionen har svært ved at forstå, hvorfor det ikke var muligt for GOC og de eksporterende producenter at fremlægge/tilrettelægge de manglende oplysninger, og GOC og eksporterende producenter gav ingen troværdig forklaring.
The Commission fails to understand why it was not possible to the GOC and the exporting producers to submit/arrange the missing items and no credible explanation was provided by the GOC or the exporting prodcuers.
GOC påstod også, at betingelserne for at gøre brug af de foreliggende faktiske oplysninger ikke var opfyldt, og at GOC måske ikke havde fremlagt visse oplysninger, blot fordi disse oplysninger ikke findes, ikke længere er relevante eller ikke foreligger, ikke indgik i spørgeskemaet eller brevene forud for kontrolbesøget.
The GOC also submitted that the conditions for resorting to the use of best information available were not fulfilled and that GOC may have failed to provide certain information simple because such information does not exist, is no longer relevant or is unavailable, it was not requested in the questionnaire or in advance before verification.
Denne påstand måtte afvises.
That argument had to be rejected.
Det skal i den forbindelse bemærkes, at det allerede tydeligt er bevist under afsnittet om subsidiering (betragtningerne 64-73), at brugen af de foreliggende faktiske oplysninger var den eneste mulighed for Kommissionen som undersøgende myndighed for at komme frem til repræsentative resultater.
In this respect it is noted that as it has been clearly demonstrated under the Subsidisation section (recitals (64)-(73)) that the use of facts available was the only available option for the Commission as investigating authority in order to arrive at a representative finding.
Hvad angår de typer oplysninger, der blev anmodet om, skal det bemærkes, at Kommissionen anmodede om oplysninger, der findes (f.eks. oplysninger om planer, bankernes rolle, kreditrisikovurdering i forbindelse med lån til samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenter, prisfastsættelse for brugsrettigheder til jord eller juridiske dokumenter om de forskellige undersøgte ordninger), og gav GOC mulighed for at fremlægge disse oplysninger ved flere lejligheder efter indledningen af disse undersøgelser.
With respect to the type of information requested it is recalled that the Commission requested information that existed (e.g. information on plans, role of the banks, evaluation of credit risk when granting loans to cooperating exporting producers, pricing of LUR or legal documents referring to the various investigated schemes) and offered the possibility to the GOC to provide such information on numerous occasions following the initiation of these proceedings.
Derudover bør det desuden understreges, at Kommissionen som undersøgende myndighed skulle undersøge de påstande i klagen, der var behørigt begrundede, for at indlede en undersøgelse (f.eks. brug af femårsplaner og industripolitik om begunstigede låneordninger til sektoren for coated finpapir, bankernes rolle som offentlige organer, direkte/indirekte skatteordninger og tilskudsordninger), og GOC blev i deres egenskab af interesseret part anmodet om at fremlægge alle de oplysninger, der blev fundet nødvendige.
Furthermore, it should also be highlighted that the Commission, as investigating authority, had to investigate allegations made in the complaint and for which sufficient evidence had been provided to initiate an investigation (e.g. use of five-year plans and industrial policies for preferential lending to the coated paper industry, role of the banks as public bodies, existence of direct/indirect tax and grant programmes) and thus the GOC as interested party was requested to provide all the information deemed necessary.
GOC havde dog en anden tilgang, der svarede til at opfatte sig selv som den undersøgende myndighed.
However, the GOC took a different approach that was tantamount to substituting themselves for the investigating authority.
GOC ville nemlig selv bestemme, hvad der var relevant, og begrænse deres fremlæggelser til dokumenter, som de betragtede som relevante uden at give den undersøgende myndighed mulighed for at undersøge spørgsmålet.
Indeed, the GOC wanted to judge for itself what they considered relevant and limit their submissions to documents that they considered relevant without allowing the investigating authority to examine these matters.
Dette fremgår tydeligt af GOC's tilgang til statsejede banker (jf. betragtning 282).
This is perfectly illustrated by the GOC's approach to state-owned banks (see recital (282) above).
GOC påstod, at disse banker var »tredjeparter«. Der var dog i klagen tilstrækkelige beviser for, at de er »offentlige organer«, og Kommissionen var derfor berettiget til at anmode GOC om at fremlægge de ønskede oplysninger om bankernes aktiviteter.
The GOC claimed that such banks were ‘third parties’: however, the complainant had provided sufficient evidence that they are ‘public bodies’ and the Commission was therefore entitled to require the GOC to provide the requested information on their activities.
GOC svarede ved selv at beslutte, at disse banker ikke var offentlige organer, og nægtede at fremlægge oplysninger om bankerne.
In response, the GOC took it upon itself to decide that these banks were not public bodies and to refuse to provide any information on them.
Det er dog den undersøgende myndighed, altså Kommissionen, der træffer denne beslutning, og ikke GOC.
However, this decision belongs to the investigating authority i.e. the Commission and not to the GOC.
En sådan adfærd er tydeligvis ikke i tråd med ovennævnte WTO-retspraksis, der fastsætter, at interesserede parter skal handle »efter bedste evne«.
Such behaviour is clearly not in line with the abovementioned WTO case law stating that interested parties must act to the ‘best of their abilities’.