natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Den 9. juli 2009 underrettede den nederlandske stat Kommissionen om, at FBN havde tilbagebetalt hele den kortfristede finansiering, den havde modtaget fra den nederlandske stat under likviditetsfaciliteten af 3. oktober 2008 på 45 mia. EUR.
On 9 July 2009, the Dutch State informed the Commission that FBN had redeemed all the short-term funding it had received from the Dutch State under the 3 October 2008 liquidity facility of EUR 45 billion.
Den 15. juli 2009 underrettede den nederlandske stat Kommissionen om FBN's planer om at overtage Fortis Clearing Americas (»FCA«) fra Fortis Bank SA/NV.
On 15 July 2009, the Dutch State informed the Commission of plans by FBN to acquire Fortis Clearing Americas (‘FCA’) from Fortis Bank SA/NV.
Den 17. juli 2009 anmeldte den nederlandske stat formelt en plan med rekapitaliseringsforanstaltninger til en værdi af 2,5 mia. EUR [8] bestående af en credit default swap (»CDS«), som reducerede bankens kapitalbehov med 1,7 mia. EUR (»kapitalfrigørelsesinstrumentet«) og et obligatorisk konvertibelt værdipapir (»obligatorisk konvertibelt værdipapir«) på 800 mio. EUR. Foranstaltningerne var oprindeligt registreret under sagsnr. N429/09, men eftersom foranstaltningerne blev truffet, inden Kommissionen havde truffet beslutning om dem, blev sagen flyttet fra registret over anmeldt støtte til registret over ikke-anmeldt støtte (under nr. NN 2/10).
On 17 July 2009, the Dutch State formally notified a plan with recapitalisation measures worth EUR 2,5 billion [8] consisting of a credit default swap (‘CDS’) with a capital relief effect of EUR 1,7 billion (‘the capital relief instrument’ or ‘CRI’) and a Mandatory Convertible Security (‘MCS’) of EUR 800 million. The measures were initially recorded under case number N429/09, but since the measures were implemented before the Commission had taken a decision on them, the case was moved from the register of notified aid to the non-notified aid register (under number NN 2/10).
Den 10. september 2009 sendte den nederlandske stat et uofficielt dokument til Kommissionen med en ajourføring af udskillelsesprocessen og en indikation af, at yderligere (beløbsmæssigt ikke nærmere fastlagte) statsstøtteforanstaltninger ville være uundgåelige.
On 10 September 2009, the Dutch State sent a non-paper to the Commission with an update of the separation process and indications that additional (unquantified) State aid measures would be unavoidable.
På et møde med Kommissionen den 9. november 2009 anførte den nederlandske stat, at FBN og ABN AMRO N havde brug for nye foranstaltninger til en værdi af 4,39 mia. EUR, således at de samlede foranstaltninger (herunder den foranstaltning, der blev anmeldt den 17. juli 2009) kom op på 6,89 mia. EUR. Foranstaltningerne blev beskrevet yderligere i et tillæg af 10. november 2009 til det uofficielle dokument af 10. september 2009 og i en yderligere forklarende note af 13. november 2009.
During a meeting with the Commission on 9 November 2009, the Dutch State indicated that FBN and ABN AMRO N would need additional measures worth EUR 4,39 billion, thereby bringing the total amount of measures (including the measures notified on 17 July 2009) to EUR 6,89 billion. The measures were further detailed in an addendum of 10 November 2009 to the non-paper of 10 September 2009, and in an additional explanatory note of 13 November 2009.
Den 4. december 2009 forelagde den nederlandske stat Kommissionen en første version [9] af en omstruktureringsplan for ABN AMRO Group (»omstruktureringsplanen af december 2009«), den nye enhed, som var resultatet af fusionen mellem FBN og ABN AMRO N. I denne plan beskrives den nye enheds strategi, ligesom den indeholdt finansielle beregninger for et basisscenarie.
On 4 December 2009, the Dutch State submitted to the Commission a first version [9] of a restructuring plan for ABN AMRO Group (the ‘December 2009 Restructuring Plan’), the new entity resulting from the merger between FBN and ABN AMRO N. That plan described the new entity’s strategy and also contained financial projections for a base case scenario.
Ved afgørelse af 5. februar 2010 (»afgørelsen af 5. februar 2010«) udvidede Kommissionen undersøgelsesprocedure C11/09 til også at omfatte de foranstaltninger, der er registreret under NN2/10 og N19/10.
By Decision of 5 February 2010 (‘the Decision of 5 February 2010’), the Commission decided to extend the investigation procedure C11/09 to include the measures registered under NN2/10 and N19/10.
Den 20. juli 2010 anmodede den nederlandske stat Kommissionen om at forlænge den midlertidige godkendelse af den redningsstøtte, der er registeret under NN2/10 og N19/10.
On 20 July 2010, the Dutch State asked the Commission to extend the temporary approval of the rescue aid measures registered under NN2/10 and N19/10.
Den nederlandske stat sendte endvidere et brev om en forlængelse af tilsagnet om forbuddet mod prisførerskab indtil den 30. juni 2011 eller indtil vedtagelsesdatoen for Kommissionens endelige afgørelse.
The Dutch State also sent a letter extending the price leadership ban commitment until the earlier of 30 June 2011 or until the adoption date of the final Decision of the Commission.
Den 30. juli 2010 besluttede Kommissionen at forlænge den midlertidige godkendelse af den redningsstøtte, der er registreret under sagsnr. NN2/10 og N19/10, indtil Kommissionen havde afsluttet sin undersøgelse (C11/09).
On 30 July 2010, the Commission decided to extend the temporary approval of the rescue aid measures registered under case numbers NN2/10 and N19/10 until the Commission had finalised its investigation C11/09.
Den 20. august 2010 sendte den nederlandske stat Kommissionen et dokument med en detaljeret redegørelse for exitstrategien.
On 20 August 2010, the Dutch State sent to the Commission a document explaining in detail its exit strategy.
Den 5. oktober 2010 fremlagde den nederlandske stat en forretningsplan for private equity-divisionen i ABN AMRO Group.
On 5 October 2010, the Dutch State provided a business plan for the private equity division of ABN AMRO Group.
En tilsvarende plan for divisionen for energi, råvarer og transport (»Energy, Commodities and Transportation«) i ABN AMRO Group blev sendt til Kommissionen den 10. januar 2010.
A similar plan for the division ‘Energy, Commodities and Transportation’ of ABN AMRO Group was sent to the Commission on 10 January 2010.
Den 15. oktober 2010 meddelte ABN AMRO Group, at den ville udnytte sin købsoption til at bringe kapitalfrigørelsesinstrumentet af 31. oktober 2010 til ophør.
On 15 October 2010, ABN AMRO Group announced that it would exercise its call option to terminate the capital relief instrument as of 31 October 2010.
I løbet af proceduren fandt der talrige udvekslinger af oplysninger, telekonferencer og møder sted mellem repræsentanter for den nederlandske stat, ABN AMRO N og FBN og Kommissionen.
During the procedure, numerous information exchanges, teleconferences and meetings between representatives of the Dutch State, ABN AMRO N and FBN and the European Commission took place.
DETALJERET BESKRIVELSE AF STØTTEMODTAGERNE OG FORANSTALTNINGERNE
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE BENEFICIARIES AND THE MEASURES
Oprettelse af ABN AMRO Group
The creation of ABN AMRO Group
I foråret 2007 oprettede konsortiets medlemmer en ny juridisk enhed, »RFS Holdings«, der skulle overtage ABN AMRO Holding.
In spring 2007, the consortium members created a new legal entity ‘RFS Holdings’ to acquire ABN AMRO Holding.
Konsortiets medlemmer havde til hensigt at dele ABN AMRO Holding op i tre dele, og denne proces blev beskrevet i aktionæroverenskomsten.
The consortium members intended to separate ABN AMRO Holding into three parts and the arrangements for that separation process were set out in the ‘CSA’.
ABN AMRO R omfattede bl.a. forretningsenhederne Global Business & Markets, Asia, Global Transaction Services og det internationale netværk, mens ABN AMRO S bl.a. omfattede forretningsenhederne Latin America og Antonveneta (Italien).
ABN AMRO R comprised, inter alia, the business unit (‘BU’) Global Business & Markets, BU Asia, BU Global Transaction Services and the international network, while ABN AMRO S comprised, inter alia, BU Latin America and BU Antonveneta (Italy).
ABN AMRO N omfattede forretningsenhederne Netherlands og Private Banking samt International Diamond and Jewelry Group.
ABN AMRO N comprised the BUs Netherlands and Private Banking and also the International Diamond and Jewelry Group.
De enheder, som de enkelte medlemmer af konsortiet ikke fik tildelt, blev samlet i den såkaldte ABN AMRO Z-andel (»ABN AMRO Z«), som f.eks. fortsat var ansvarlig for hovedkontorfunktionerne.
Items that were not allocated to the individual consortium members were brought together in the so-called ABN AMRO Z-share (‘ABN AMRO Z’), which remained responsible for head office functions for instance.
Hvert medlem af konsortiet havde en forholdsmæssig andel [12] i ABN AMRO Z.
Each consortium member held a pro-rata stake [12] in ABN AMRO Z.
Den 24. december 2008 underskrev RBS, Banco Santander og den nederlandske stat en ændring til aktionæroverenskomsten, hvorved den nederlandske stat trådte i stedet for Fortis SA/NV i aktionæroverenskomsten.
On 24 December 2008, RBS, Banco Santander and the Dutch State signed an amendment to the CSA, by which the Dutch State replaced Fortis SA/NV in the CSA.
Den 24. december 2008 overtog den nederlandske stat ABN AMRO N fra FBN for 6,5 mia. EUR og blev dermed den direkte ejer af ABN AMRO N. Forud for overtagelsen kontrollerede den nederlandske stat indirekte ABN AMRO N via FBN.
On 24 December 2008, the Dutch State acquired ABN AMRO N from FBN for EUR 6,5 billion, thereby becoming the direct owner of ABN AMRO N. Prior to that acquistion, the Dutch State controlled ABN AMRO N indirectly via FBN.
Diagram 1:
Chart 1:
Udskillelse af ABN AMRO N
Separation of ABN AMRO N
R + Z-andel
R + Z-share
S + Z-andel
S + Z-share
N + Z-andel
N + Z-share
ABN AMRO Bank NV (ændret den 6.2.2010 til The Royal Bank of Scotland NV)
ABN AMRO Bank NV (renamed on 6.2.2010 to The Royal Bank of Scotland NV)
Adskillelse ABN AMRO N den 6.2.2010
Separation ABN AMRO N On 6.2.2010
ABN AMRO II NV (ændret den 6.2.2010 til ABN AMRO Bank NV)
ABN AMRO II NV (renamed on 6.2.2010 to ABN AMRO Bank NV)
Den 21. november 2008 besluttede den nederlandske stat, at den ville fusionere ABN AMRO N med FBN (hvilket Fortis SA/NV også have haft til hensigt, men ikke gennemført).
On 21 November 2008, the Dutch State decided that it would merge ABN AMRO N with FBN (which had been the unimplemented intention of Fortis SA/NV).
Fusionen kunne først gennemføres, når ABN AMRO N var blevet udskilt fra sit moderselskab ABN AMRO Bank.
The merger could only be implemented once ABN AMRO N was separated from ABN AMRO Bank, its parent company.
Først blev ABN AMRO N's aktiviteter overført til en ny juridisk enhed i ABN AMRO Bank, som fik navnet ABN AMRO II.
As a first step, the activities of ABN AMRO N were transferred to a new legal entity within ABN AMRO Bank which was named ABN AMRO II.
Den 6. februar 2010 blev ABN AMRO II udskilt som beskrevet i betragtning 41 og ændrede navn til ABN AMRO Bank.
On 6 February 2010, ABN AMRO II was separated as described in recital 41 and renamed ABN AMRO Bank.
Samtidig fik den juridiske enhed, som tidligere hed ABN AMRO Bank, ændret navn til »The Royal Bank of Scotland NV« (»RBS NV«) (se diagrammet ovenfor).
At the same time, the legal entity formerly known as ABN AMRO Bank was renamed ‘The Royal Bank of Scotland NV’ (‘RBS NV’) (see chart above).
Inden den nye enhed, ABN AMRO Bank, kunne fusionere med FBN, skulle den først gennemføre et fusionstilsagn.
Before the new entity, ABN AMRO Bank, could merge with FBN, it first had to implement a merger remedy.
Da Fortis SA/NV overtog ABN AMRO N i 2007, havde Kommissionen konkluderet [13] (»fusionsbeslutningen«), at en fusion mellem ABN AMRO N og FBN ville føre til fusionsproblemer på det nederlandske bankmarked, navnlig inden for forretningsbank- og factoringsegmentet.
When Fortis SA/NV acquired ABN AMRO N in 2007, the Commission had concluded [13] (the ‘Merger Decision’) that a merger between ABN AMRO N and FBN would lead to concentration problems in the Dutch banking market, especially in the segments of commercial banking and factoring.
For at afhjælpe disse fusionsproblemer gav Fortis SA/NV tilsagn om at afhænde en række aktiviteter (nemlig factoringdivisionen IFN og forretningsbankaktiviteterne i »New HBU«) til Deutsche Bank.
To remedy those concentration problems, Fortis SA/NV committed to sell a number of activities (that is, the factoring division IFN and the commercial banking activities of ‘New HBU’) to Deutsche Bank.
Da den nederlandske stat overtog FBN og ABN AMRO N den 3. oktober 2008, havde Fortis SA/NV endnu ikke afsluttet det planlagte salg af New HBU og IFN til Deutsche Bank.
When the Dutch State acquired FBN and ABN AMRO N on 3 October 2008, Fortis SA/NV had not yet completed the intended sale of New HBU and IFN to Deutsche Bank.
Da den nederlandske stat havde besluttet at gå videre med fusionen mellem FBN og ABN AMRO N, genoptog den forhandlingerne med Deutsche Bank [14].
Once the Dutch State had decided to proceed with the merger between FBN and ABN AMRO N, it resumed negotiations with Deutsche Bank [14].
Salget af New HBU og IFN til Deutsche Bank blev afsluttet den 1. april 2010.
The sale of New HBU and IFN to Deutsche Bank was closed on 1 April 2010.
ABN AMRO Bank og FBN fusionerede officielt til ABN AMRO Group den 1. juli 2010 som beskrevet i diagram nr. 2 i betragtning 49.
ABN AMRO Bank and FBN officially merged to form ABN AMRO Group on 1 July 2010, as is described in the Chart 2 in recital 49.
Den nederlandske stat overførte forvaltningen af sin andel i ABN AMRO Z til den nye ABN AMRO Bank, eftersom den ikke ønskede at afsætte ressourcer til den daglige ledelse i denne del.
The Dutch State transferred the management of its stake in ABN AMRO Z to the new ABN AMRO Bank as it did not want to dedicate resources to the day-to-day management of that participation.
Ikke desto mindre er den nederlandske stat fortsat den juridiske ejer af ABN AMRO Z og er som sådan berettiget til alle potentielle fordele og hæfter for alle potentielle tab i ABN AMRO Z [15].
Nevertheless, the Dutch State has remained the legal owner of ABN AMRO Z and is entitled to all potential gains and liable for all potential losses of ABN AMRO Z [15].
Diagram 2:
Chart 2:
Oprettelse af ABN AMRO Group
Creation of ABN AMRO Group
ABN AMRO II NV (ændret til ABN AMRO Bank NV den 6.2.2010)
ABN AMRO II NV (renamed ABN AMRO Bank NV on 6.2.2010)
Z-andel
Z-share
ABN AMRO Bank NV (ændret den 6.2.2010 til RBS NV)
ABN AMRO Bank NV (renamed on 6.2.2010 to RBS NV)
Økonomiske aktiviteter i ABN AMRO N og ABN AMRO Z
Economic activities of ABN AMRO N and ABN AMRO Z
ABN AMRO N — isoleret betragtet den tredjestørste bank i Nederlandene efter Rabobank og ING — bestod af forretningsenhederne Netherlands og Private Banking.
ABN AMRO N – on a stand-alone basis the third largest bank in the Netherlands behind Rabobank and ING – consisted of BU Netherlands and BU Private Banking.
Den første forretningsenhed, Netherlands, tilbød detail- og forretningsbankydelser via et filialnetværk på 510 bankbutikker og 78 rådgivningsfilialer samt gennem alternative kanaler såsom internettet, kontanthæveautomater [16] og callcentre.
The first business unit, BU Netherlands offered retail and commercial banking services via a branch network of 510 bank shops and 78 advisory branches and also through alternative channels such as the Internet, ATMs [16] and call centres.
Forretningsenheden Netherlands beskæftigede omkring 19000 FTE’er.
BU Netherlands employed roughly 19000 FTEs.
Inden for detailbankvirksomhed havde forretningsenheden Netherlands et stærkt kundegrundlag inden for segmentet »privatkundeforretninger« (»mass retail«) (over [3,5 - 5] mio. kunder) og »fordelskunder« (»preferred banking«) (over [250000 – 420000] kunder) [17], som den tilbød en lang række produkter (såsom opsparing, investeringer, realkreditlån, forsikring, kreditkortlån og betalinger).
In retail banking, BU Netherlands had a strong customer franchise segmented in ‘mass retail’ (more than [3,5 - 5] million customers) and ‘preferred banking’ (more than [250000 – 420000] customers) [17], which it offered a wide range of products (such as savings, investments, mortgages, insurance, credit card loans and payments).
Inden for forretningsbankvirksomheden havde ABN AMRO N [300000 – 400000] SMV-kunder [18] og [9000 – 21000] større erhvervskunder (selv om ABN AMRO Banks større kunder i henhold til aktionæroverenskomsten blev tilført RBS) med en bred vifte af produkter (såsom kredit, betalings- og likviditetsstyring, opsparing, risiko- og forsikringsstyring, komplekse finansielle løsninger og produkter, leasing og factoring).
In commercial banking, ABN AMRO N serviced [300000 – 400000] SME [18] customers and [9000 – 21000] larger corporate customers (though under the terms of the CSA, ABN AMRO Bank’s larger customers were attributed to RBS) with a broad range of products (such as credits, payment & cash management, savings, treasury, risk and insurance management, complex financial solutions & products, leasing and factoring).
Den anden forretningsenhed, Private Banking, er rettet mod personer med investerbare nettoaktiver på over 1 mio. EUR med forskellige produkter inden for formueforvaltning og -planlægning.
The second business unit, BU Private Banking targeted individuals with net investable assets of more than EUR 1 million with various asset management and estate planning products.
Forretningsenheden Private Banking havde opbygget et veludviklet netværk gennem organisk vækst i Nederlandene og Frankrig og gennem overtagelser i Tyskland (Delbrück Bethmann Maffei) og Belgien (Bank Corluy).
BU Private Banking had built up a well-developed network, through organic growth in the Netherlands and France and through acquisitions in Germany (Delbrück Bethmann Maffei) and Belgium (Bank Corluy).
Forretningsenheden Private Banking omfattede endvidere det franske joint venture inden for forsikring Neuflize Vie.
BU Private Banking also included the French insurance joint venture Neuflize Vie.
De virksomheder, som den nederlandske stat overtog den 3. oktober, omfattede endvidere International Diamond and Jewelry Group, som er en division med fokus på virksomheder, der er involveret i smykkeproduktion og handel med diamanter.
The businesses acquired on 3 October 2008 by the Dutch State also included the International Diamond and Jewelry Group, which is a division dedicated to companies involved in jewellery manufacturing and the trading of diamonds.
ABN AMRO Z indeholdt ikke driftsaktiver, men bl.a. skatteaktiver, en række andele (bl.a. i Saudi Hollandi Bank) og den resterende private equity-portefølje.
ABN AMRO Z did not contain operational assets but included, inter alia, tax assets, a number of participations (amongst others in the Saudi Hollandi Bank) and the remaining private equity portfolio.
Med hensyn til forpligtelser fandtes der en hensat forpligtelse til opfyldelse af forpligtelser vedrørende det amerikanske justitsministerium, andre hensatte forpligtelser (delvist personalerelaterede) og koncernintern finansiering af selskabetsaktiver.
In terms of liabilities, there was a provision to settle obligations in respect of the United States Department of Justice, other provisions (partly personnel-related) and inter-company financing of company assets.
Som anført i fodnote 11 udgør den nederlandske stats andel i ABN AMRO Z 33,81 %.
As stated in footnote 11, the stake owned by the Dutch State represents 33,81 % of ABN AMRO Z.
En række finansielle nøgletal for ABN AMRO N er sammenfattet i tabel 1 nedenfor:
A number of pro-forma key financial data of ABN AMRO N are summarised in Table 1 below:
Kilde: ABN AMRO Bank NV, Årsberetning 2009, uden ABN AMRO Z og private equity-konsolidering, men med New HBU.
Source: ABN AMRO Bank NV, Annual Review 2009, ex ABN AMRO Z and private equity consolidation, but including New HBU.
Finansielle nøgletal for ABN AMRO N (i mio. EUR)
Key financial data ABN AMRO N (in million EUR)
Driftsindtægter i alt [19]
Total operating income [19]
Egenkapitalforrentning
Return on equity
Omkostnings-/udbytteforhold
Cost-income ratio
Egenkapital i alt
Total equity
Tier 1-procent
Tier 1 ratio
Samlet kapitalprocent eller BIS-procent
Total capital ratio or BIS-ratio
Stabil finansiering/illikvide aktiver
Stable funding/non liquid assets
I regnskabsåret 2009 rapporterede ABN AMRO N om et underskud på 117 mio. EUR. Underskuddet skyldtes større nedskrivninger på lån, pres på rentemarginalerne, højere afgifter i forbindelse med den nederlandske indlånsgarantiordning og adskillelses- og integrationsomkostninger [24].
For the financial year 2009, ABN AMRO N reported a loss of EUR 117 million. The loss was due to higher loan impairments, pressure on interest margins, higher charges related to the Dutch deposit guarantee scheme and separation and integration costs [24].
Uden adskillelses- og integrationsomkostninger ville ABN AMRO N have genereret et lille nettooverskud for 2009 på 52 mio. EUR.
Excluding separation and integration costs, ABN AMRO N would have recorded a small net profit for 2009 of EUR 52 million.
Isoleret set var FBN den fjerdestørste bank på det nederlandske marked (efter Rabobank, ING og ABN AMRO N, men før SNS REAAL).
On a stand-alone basis, FBN was the fourth largest bank on the Dutch market (after Rabobank, ING and ABN AMRO N, but before SNS REAAL).
Den nederlandske stat (og tidligere Fortis SA/NV) ejede en direkte andel på 92,6 % i FBN, idet investeringsselskabet Fortis FBN(H) Preferred Investments BV ejede den resterende andel på 7,4 % i form af præferenceaktier.
The Dutch State (and previously Fortis SA/NV) held directly 92,6 % of FBN, with the investment vehicle Fortis FBN(H) Preferred Investments BV owning the remaining stake of 7,4 % in the form of preferred shares.
Den nederlandske stat ejede 70 % af aktierne i dette investeringsselskab, idet de resterende 30 % var ejet af en række private investorer [25].
The Dutch State owned 70 % of the shares in that investment vehicle, with the remaining 30 % in the hands of a number of private investors [25].
De privatejede præferenceaktier havde en nominel værdi på 210 mio. EUR og gav en (ikke-kumulativ) dividende på 5,85 % [26].
The privately-owned preferred shares had a nominal value of EUR 210 million and a (non-cumulative) dividend of 5,85 % [26].
FBN's aktiviteter blev underopdelt i tre segmenter — detailbankvirksomhed (Retail Banking), privatbankvirksomhed (Private Banking) og merchant-bankvirksomhed (Merchant Banking).
FBN’s activities were subdivided in three segments – Retail banking, Private banking and Merchant banking.
Retail Banking omfattede de traditionelle detailbankaktiviteter (med et netværk på 157 filialer), [2 - 3] mio. individuelle kunder og [20000 – 60000] SMV-kunder), men også Directbank (som tilbød løsninger vedrørende realkreditlån via formidlere) samt forbrugerfinansiering og betalingskortprodukter fra henholdsvis Alfam og ICS.
Retail Banking activities included the traditional retail banking activities (with a network of 157 branches, [2 - 3] million individual customers and [20000 – 60000] SME customers) but also Directbank (which offered mortgage solutions via intermediaries) and the consumer finance and payment card products of respectively Alfam and ICS.
Private Banking blev primært udviklet under mærket Fortis Mees Pierson og tilbød formueforvaltningstjenester (formueplanlægning, investering, lån og forsikring) på et segmenteret grundlag til [15000 – 40000] kunder i hele Nederlandene.
Private Banking was mainly developed under the Fortis Mees Pierson brand name and offered wealth management services (estate planning, investing, lending and insurance) on a segmented basis to [15000 – 40000] customers throughout the Netherlands.
Inden for Merchant Banking skelnede FBN mellem syv forskellige underdivisioner.
In Merchant Banking, FBN distinguished seven different sub-divisions.
En række af FBN's finansielle nøgletal er sammenfattet i tabel 2 nedenfor:
A number of FBN’s key financial data are summarised in Table 2 below:
Kilde: FBN's årsrapporter for 2008/2009
Source: FBN annual reports 2008/2009.