natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
ARP-formanden var ikke i stand til at træffe en fuldstændig omstruktureringsafgørelse før tiltrædelsen, da han på det tidspunkt ikke, således som det kræves i kapitel 5a, havde hverken alle de relevante offentlige kreditorers samtykke til, at gælden blev omlagt, eller operatørens samtykke.
The Chairman of the IDA was not in a position to issue a complete restructuring decision before accession because, at that time, he did not possess, as required by Chapter 5a, either the agreement of all the relevant public-law creditors to the restructuring of their liabilities or the agreement of the Operator.
Kommissionen bemærker, at ARP-formanden anerkendte dette, da han i sin afgørelse af 30. april 2004 anførte, at det var nødvendigt med en yderligere afgørelse for at kunne gennemføre omlægningen af offentlig gæld efter kapitel 5a, og da han endelig traf omlægningsafgørelsen den 30. december 2004, dvs. efter Polens tiltrædelse af EU.
The Commission notes that the Chairman of the IDA recognised this fact when he mentioned in his decision of 30 April 2004 that a further decision would be necessary to complete restructuring of public-law liabilities under Chapter 5a and when he eventually issued the restructuring decision on 30 December 2004, i.e. after Poland’s accession to the EU.
Kommissionen kan ikke acceptere Gdynia skibsværftskoncerns argument om, at det var alle de offentlige kreditorers samtykke i, at deres tilgodehavender blev omlagt efter kapitel 5a, der udgjorde den retligt bindende akt, som kræves ifølge polsk lovgivning.
The Commission cannot accept the argument of Gdynia Shipyard Group that the agreement of all the public-law creditors to the restructuring of their receivables under Chapter 5a constituted the legally binding act required by Polish law.
Gdynia skibsværftskoncern gjorde gældende, at kapitel 5a ikke udgjorde nogen lex specialis i forhold til andre love om omlægning af offentlig gæld, og at ARP-formandens opgave bestod i at forvalte og lette omlægningsprocessen og ikke at handle på vegne af de relevante offentlige kreditorer.
Gdynia Shipyard Group argued that Chapter 5a was not lex specialis in relation to other laws permitting restructuring of public law liabilities and that the function of the Chairman of the Industrial Development Agency was to administer and facilitate the restructuring process, not to act for the relevant public-law creditors in respect of specific liabilities.
Kommissionen bemærker, at denne fortolkning af polsk ret ikke stemmer overens med alt, hvad Polen hidtil har anført, eller med selve indholdet og logikken i kapitel 5a.
The Commission notes that this interpretation of Polish law is at odds with all the submissions from Poland to date and with the text and logic of Chapter 5a itself.
Gdynia skibsværftskoncern har da ret i, at loven af 30. oktober 2002»ikke er til hinder for, at omstruktureringsmyndighederne træffer afgørelser om eftergivelse af gæld i det omfang, dette er tilladt i henhold til generelle bestemmelser«.
Admittedly, as Gdynia Shipyard Group argued, the Act of 30 October 2002‘does not prohibit the restructuring authorities from issuing any write-off decisions in so far as they are allowed to do so by general provisions’.
Men hvis de gjorde det, ville de pågældende forpligtelser ikke længere falde ind under kapitel 5a med alle de dermed forbundne fordele: berettigelse til lån fra ARP, indstilling af enhver igangværende tvangsfuldbyrdelse, indstilling af konkursbehandling og intet påløb af renter.
Nevertheless, if they did so, those liabilities would no longer fall under Chapter 5a with all the advantages associated therewith: eligibility for a loan from the IDA, suspension of any ongoing enforcement proceedings, suspension of bankruptcy and non-accrual of interest on amounts due.
Kommissionen kan ikke godtage Gdynia skibsværftskoncerns påstand om, at der ikke påløb nogen renter efter 30. juni 2006 på den gæld, der blev omlagt efter kapitel 5a.
The Commission cannot accept the argument of Gdynia Shipyard Group that no interest accrued after 30 June 2006 on the liabilities restructured under Chapter 5a.
Denne fortolkning af polsk ret er blevet afvist af Polen.
This interpretation of Polish law has been rejected by Poland.
Foranstaltning 23 i del B i bilag II til åbningsbeslutningen
Measure 23 of part B of Annex II to the decision to open the formal investigation
Kommissionen kan ikke acceptere Polens påstand om, at denne støtte reelt blev ydet på grundlag af mundtlige udtalelser fra alle de relevante støtteydende myndigheder på et møde i regeringens arbejdsgruppe om omstruktureringen af skibsværfterne i Polen (værftsgruppen).
The Commission cannot accept Poland’s argument that this aid was granted de facto by virtue of the fact that all the relevant awarding authorities made verbal statements at a meeting of the Government working group on the restructuring of shipyards in Poland (the shipbuilding industry team).
Disse eventuelle erklæringer var rent mundtlige, og det ville helt klart kræve yderligere gennemførelsesforanstaltninger, hvis de skulle kunne skabe berettigede forventninger efter polsk ret.
Such statements, if any, were purely verbal and further implementing measures were clearly necessary to create legitimate expectations under Polish law.
I henhold EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, er enhver støtte ydet af en medlemsstat eller med statsmidler under enhver tænkelig form, som fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencen ved at begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner, og som påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstater, uforenelig med fællesmarkedet.
Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty states that any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods and affects trade between Member States is incompatible with the common market.
Kommissionen finder, at alle de foranstaltninger, der er beskrevet under betragtning 105-170 og i tabel 4, blev ydet af staten eller med statsmidler, og at de var selektive, da de var rettet mod en bestemt virksomhed.
The Commission finds that all the aid described in recitals 105-170 and in Table 4 was granted by the State or through State resources and, being directed to one particular undertaking, was selective.
Gdańsk skibsværft er et stort europæisk skibsværft og en aktiv konkurrent på skibsbygningsmarkedet.
Gdańsk Shipyard is a large European shipyard and a major competitor on the shipbuilding market.
Efter den 1. maj 2004 fortsatte værftet med at bygge containerskibe i konkurrence med især værfter i Tyskland og Danmark, hvilket Polen og Gdynia skibsværftskoncern har anerkendt, og hvilket blev fremført af Danmark og den danske skibsværftsforening i deres bemærkninger til Kommissionens åbningsbeslutning.
After 1 May 2004 the yard continued building container ships, competing with shipyards in Germany and Denmark in particular, as Poland and Gdynia Shipyard Group have acknowledged and as was noted by Denmark and the Danish shipbuilding association in their comments on the Commission’s decision to open the formal investigation.
Ved udgangen af 2006 tegnede containerskibe sig for 26 % af de europæiske skibsværfters ordrebøger [33].
Container vessels accounted for 26 % of European shipyards’ order books at the end of 2006 [33].
Værftet har fortsat produceret stålstrukturer, blokke og sektioner i konkurrence med mange andre virksomheder der opererer som underleverandører til andre skibsværfter, som bygger færdige skibe.
The yard has been producing steel structures, blocks and sections, thereby competing with many other companies acting as subcontractors for other shipyards building complete vessels.
Igennem de sidste to år er værftet begyndt at bygge offshore-skibe, som er et segment, inden for hvilket andre europæiske værfter er aktive, bl.a. norske værfter.
In the last two years the yard has started to produce off-shore vessels, which is a segment in which other European shipyards, for example the Norwegian ones, are active.
Den fortsatte subsidiering af Gdańsk skibsværft, f.eks. i form af manglende inddrivelse af offentlige fordringer, produktionsgarantier samt adskillige kapitaltilførsler og lån, satte værftet i stand til at indgå kontrakter, uden at der blev taget fuld højde for de dermed forbundne risici.
The continuous subsidising of Gdańsk Shipyard, for example via non-enforcement of public liabilities, production guarantees as well as numerous capital injections and loans, allowed the yard to conclude contracts without full recognition and remuneration of all the risks involved.
I modsat fald kunne konkurrenterne have overtaget i det mindste en del af værftets markedsandel.
Otherwise its competitors might have taken over at least part of its market share.
På grundlag af det ovenstående finder Kommissionen, at den statsstøtte, der blev ydet til Gdańsk skibsværft, påvirkede samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
On the basis of the above, the Commission concludes that the State aid granted to Gdańsk Shipyard affected trade between Member States.
Kommissionen må også afklare, om de foranstaltninger, der blev truffet til fordel for Gdańsk skibsværft, gav værftet en uberettiget fordel og dermed fordrejede eller truede med at fordreje konkurrencen.
The Commission also needs to determine whether the measures granted to Gdańsk Shipyard conferred an undue advantage on it and thereby distorted or threatened to distort competition.
Det er Kommissionens opfattelse, at forvisningen om at kunne opnå statsstøtte satte Gdańsk skibsværft i stand til at anlægge en konkurrenceskadelig adfærd og f.eks. sætte priserne under produktionsomkostningerne uden at måtte bære de konsekvenser, dette normalt er forbundet med, dvs. uden at blive trængt ud af markedet.
The Commission takes the view that reliance on State aid enabled Gdańsk Shipyard to engage in anti-competitive practice such as pricing below production costs without suffering the consequences that such practices normally entail, namely elimination from the market.
Kommissionen bemærker også, at et af Gdańsk skibsværfts største langsigtede problemer var, at der blev indgået kontrakter, som viste sig at blive tabsgivende, efterhånden som zlotykursen steg i forhold til dollaren, der er den dominerende valuta inden for skibsbygning, og i takt med stigningerne i verdenspriserne på stålplader.
The Commission also notes that one of Gdańsk Shipyard’s main long-term problems was the conclusion of contracts which proved to be loss-making as the zloty appreciated against the dollar, the dominant currency in the shipbuilding business, and the price of steel plates increased worldwide.
Disse eksterne faktorer var allerede identificeret som de vigtigste trusler mod værftets overlevelse i omstruktureringsplanen for 2003-2008 og derefter i den ændrede version fra marts 2004, i den nye omstruktureringsplan fra 2006 og endelig i 2009-omstruktureringsplanen.
These external factors were already identified as the main threats to the yard’s continued operation in the Restructuring Plan for 2003-08, and then subsequently in the amended version of March 2004, in the new 2006 Restructuring Plan and, lastly, in the 2009 Restructuring Plan.
Selv om værftets ledelse var klar over disse trusler, fortsatte værftet med at indgå kontrakter uden at træffe nogen foranstaltninger til at mindske denne risiko.
Despite the fact that the yard’s management was aware of these threats, the yard continued to conclude contracts without taking any measures to mitigate the risk.
Det blev man ved med under det rekordopsving, der fandt sted på skibsbygningsmarkedet i årene mellem 2004 og 2008, hvor skibsbygningspriserne nåede hidtil usete niveauer.
This business practice continued during the unprecedented boom in the shipbuilding market between 2004 and 2008, when shipbuilding prices rose to record levels.
Og det gjorde, at det lykkedes værftet at opretholde aktiviteten og beskæftigelsen, men det skete på bekostning af store tab på den regulære skibsbygning.
As a result of this practice, the yard managed to maintain activity and employment, but at the cost of large losses on regular shipbuilding production.
Kommissionen drager på grundlag heraf den konklusion, at al den støtte til Gdańsk skibsværft, der er beskrevet under betragtning 105-170, kunne fordreje eller true med at fordreje konkurrencen på skibsbygningsmarkedet.
On that basis, the Commission concludes that all the aid granted to Gdańsk Shipyard described in recitals 105-170 was such as to distort or threaten to distort competition on the shipbuilding market.
Kommissionen bemærker, at de polske myndigheder ikke har bestridt de her omhandlede foranstaltningers karakter af statsstøtte, dog med to undtagelser.
The Commission notes that the Polish authorities did not dispute the classification of the measures covered by the present decision as State aid, with two exceptions.
For det første hævdede de, at KPS's lån til Gdańsk skibsværft ikke var statsstøtte.
Firstly, they claimed that the loans granted to Gdańsk Shipyard by KPS did not constitute aid.
For det andet satte de spørgsmålstegn ved statsstøttekarakteren af de garantier, der blev stillet af KUKE, angiveligt i overensstemmelse med markedsøkonomiske principper.
Second, they questioned the aid character of the guarantees provided by the Export Credit Insurance Corporation which were alleged to comply with the market economy operator principle.
Desuden havde de polske myndigheder ikke anmeldt den fortsatte manglende inddrivelse af offentlige fordringer som en særskilt statsstøtteforanstaltning.
In addition, the Polish authorities did not give notification of the continuous non-enforcement of public-law liabilities as a separate State aid measure.
I det følgende vil Kommissionen redegøre for, hvorfor den finder, at disse tre foranstaltninger indebærer en konkurrencefordrejende fordel.
The Commission will explain below why it regards these three measures as constituting a competition-distorting advantage.
Manglende inddrivelse af offentlige fordringer
Continuous non-enforcement of public-law liabilities
Ifølge fast retspraksis [34] kan en konsekvent undladelse af at inddrive offentlige fordringer i sig selv udgøre statsstøtte.
According to established case-law [34], continuous non-enforcement of public-law debt can in itself constitute State aid.
Ifølge de polske myndigheder [36] var værftet på grund af sin vanskelige finansielle situation efter den 1. maj 2004 ude af stand til at betale sine bidrag til det offentlige og havde bestandigt fået henstand med betalingen af denne gæld, uden at der var truffet nogen formel afgørelse herom fra de relevante offentlige kreditorers side.
As explained by the Polish authorities [36], due to its precarious financial situation, after 1 May 2004 the yard was unable to pay its public-law liabilities on time and its outstanding debt was been continuously deferred without any formal decision on the part of the relevant public creditors.
2009-omstruktureringsplanen bygger på, at den akkumulerede gæld til det offentlige vil blive betalt i september 2009, efter at værftet har modtaget ny statsstøtte.
The 2009 Restructuring Plan assumes that the accumulated public-law liabilities will be repaid in September 2009 after the yard receives new State aid.
Det viser, at betalingen af disse bidrag til det offentlige, der havde ophobet sig siden 2004, blev udskudt i en ubegrænset eller ikke nærmere fastsat periode, kun lejlighedsvis blev betalt, når værftets likviditet åbnede mulighed herfor, og nu kun vil kunne blive betalt i fuldt omfang med yderligere statsstøtte.
This shows that in practice the public-law liabilities accrued since 2004 were deferred for an unlimited or unspecified period of time, have been repaid only occasionally as permitted by the yard’s cash flow and can now be fully repaid only thanks to additional State aid.
Kommissionen finder ikke, at nogen markedsøkonomisk kreditor ville acceptere en sådan ubegrænset betalingshenstand.
The Commission considers that no market economy creditor would accept such an unlimited deferral of its liabilities.
Efter privatiseringen af værftet og kapitaltilførslen fra ISD Polska på 305 mio. PLN har de polske myndigheder desuden ikke taget skridt til at inddrive disse beløb.
Furthermore, even after the yard’s privatisation and the capital injection by ISD Polska of PLN 305 million, the Polish authorities have not undertaken measures to enforce repayment of liabilities.
Oplysningerne fra de polske myndigheder indeholder intet, der tyder på, at offentlige kreditorer har taget noget skridt til at inddrive deres fordringer fra Gdańsk skibsværft, f.eks. via tvangsfuldbyrdelse eller gennem konkurslovgivningen.
The information submitted by the Polish authorities contains no indication that public creditors have undertaken any action to enforce their public-law receivables from Gdańsk Shipyard, in particular by way of forced recovery or bankruptcy law.
Kommissionen drager derfor den konklusion, at den konsekvente manglende inddrivelse af de offentlige fordringer udgør en fordel, som modtageren ikke kunnet have opnået hos en markedsøkonomisk kreditor, og derfor udgør statsstøtte svarende til et (rentefrit) lån.
The Commission therefore concludes that continuous non-enforcement of public-law liabilities represents an advantage that the recipient would have not obtained from a market economy creditor and therefore constitutes State aid similar to an (interest-free) loan.
Ifølge 2009-omstruktureringsplanen udgør den samlede ikke-inddrevne gæld til det offentlige 63013631 PLN.
According to the 2009 Restructuring Plan the total amount of non-enforced public liabilities is PLN 63013631.
Ifølge oplysningerne fra de polske myndigheder i deres brev af 9. januar 2008 beløb Gdańsk skibsværfts samlede akkumulerede gæld til det offentlige på det tidspunkt sig til 90245096,76 PLN (inkl. påløbne renter).
However, according to the information submitted by the Polish authorities in their letter of 9 January 2008, the accumulated public liabilities of Gdańsk Shipyard at that time accounted to PLN 90245096,76 (including accrued interest).
I forbindelse med beregningen af omstruktureringsomkostningerne angives det desuden i 2009-omstruktureringsplanen, at værftet vil være nødt til at betale et beløb på 95354830,90 PLN i akkumuleret gæld til det offentlige.
Furthermore, when quantifying the restructuring costs, the 2009 Restructuring Plan indicates that the yard will need to repay an amount of PLN 95354830,90 in accumulated public liabilities.
På grundlag heraf finder Kommissionen, at den samlede værdi af den ikke-inddrevne gæld til det offentlige inklusive renter udgør 95354830,90 PLN, hvilket er det i tabel 4 ovenfor anførte beløb.
On that basis the Commission considers that the total value of non-enforced public liabilities, with interest, amounts to PLN 95354830,90; that amount was indicated in Table 4 above.
Lån fra KPS
KPS loans
Kommissionen kan ikke godtage Polens påstand om, at driftskapitallånene fra KPS ikke var forbundet med statsstøtte.
The Commission cannot accept Poland’s argument that aid in the form of working capital loans from KPS was free of State aid.
Kommissionen bemærker, at KPS beregnede en rente, der lå ca. 400 basispoint over referencesatsen.
The Commission observes that the interest rate charged by KPS was about 400 basis points above the reference rate.
Kommissionen bemærker også, at Gdańsk skibsværft i adskillige år har befundet sig i meget store finansielle vanskeligheder, haft store tab og øget sin gæld.
The Commission also notes that Gdańsk Shipyard has been in a very precarious financial situation for several years, making significant losses and accumulating debts.
Gdańsk skibsværft har ikke været i stand til at skaffe finansiering til sin produktion fra andre eksterne kilder.
Gdańsk Shipyard has not been able to obtain funding for its production from any other external source.
Værftets driftskapital blev finansieret ved hjælp af forskudsbetalinger, der i fuldt omfang var dækket af garantier stillet af KUKE, fuldstændigt statsgaranterede lån og lån fra KPS.
Its working capital was financed by advance payments fully covered by guarantees from the Export Credit Insurance Corporation, by loans fully covered by Treasury guarantees and by KPS loans.
Den rente, KPS beregnede sig, ser derfor ikke ud til at afspejle den dermed forbundne risiko i fuldt omfang.
The interest rate charged by KPS therefore does not appear to correctly reflect the risk incurred.
Selv om KPS krævede sikkerhed, var værdien af denne sikkerhed tvivlsom.
Although KPS did require collateral, its value remains questionable.
Det forekommer sandsynligt, at KPS ikke var i stand til at opnå førsteprioritet i værftets aktiver.
It seems likely that KPS was not able to obtain first-rank collateral on the yard’s assets.
Under alle omstændigheder har Polen ikke givet de detaljerede oplysninger, der sætter Kommissionen i stand til at vurdere den reelle værdi af den krævede sikkerhed.
In any event, Poland has not provided detailed information enabling the Commission to determine the real value of the required collateral.
Kommissionen bemærker desuden, at KPS er oprettet som en statskontrolleret fond med almene målsætninger, hvis finansiering blev tilvejebragt eller garanteret af staten via ARP.
Furthermore, the Commission notes that KPS was established as a government-controlled fund with public policy objectives, the funding of which was fully provided, or guaranteed, by the State via the IDA.
Ifølge notatet »En strategi for skibsbygningssektoren i Polen 2006-2010« blev KPS »oprettet for at tilrettelægge finansieringen af skibsbygningen, indtil den overtages af private investorer«.
According to the document ‘A strategy for the shipbuilding sector (maritime construction shipyards) in Poland 2006-10’, KPS was ‘founded to organise the financing of shipyard production until such time as private investors took control’.
Denne strategi, som ikke alene tog sigte på økonomiske, men også sociale og makroøkonomiske mål [37], gav KPS en række beføjelser ved siden af ARP, finansministeriet og andre kompetente offentlige organer.
The strategy, which is designed to achieve not only economic but also social and macroeconomic aims [37], mandates KPS with various powers, along with the IDA, the Treasury and other competent public bodies.
KPS har klare finansielle forbindelser til ARP og finansministeriet, og KPS optræder nærmest som et middel til at formidle midler, som på statsbudgettet er afsat til skibsværfterne i Polen, videre til disse værfter, bl.a. Gdańsk skibsværft.
The financial links of KPS to the IDA and the Treasury are clear and KPS acts rather like a vehicle for the transfer of assets earmarked by the State budget for shipyards in Poland, including Gdańsk Shipyard.
Endelig bemærker Kommissionen, at de polske myndigheder i anmeldelsen af 2009-omstruktureringsplanen anerkendte, at lånene fra KPS var statsstøtte.
Finally, the Commission notes that in the letter giving notification of the 2009 Restructuring Plan the Polish authorities acknowledged that the KPS loans constituted State aid.
I lyset af det ovenstående drager Kommissionen den konklusion, at KPS ikke handlede som en markedsøkonomisk investor, da der blev ydet driftskapitallån til Gdańsk skibsværft.
In the light of the above, the Commission concludes that KPS did not act as a market economy investor when it granted working capital loans to Gdańsk Shipyard.
Disse lån, som er anført i tabel 4, udgør derfor statsstøtte.
These loans, listed in Table 4, therefore constitute State aid.
Garantier fra KUKE
Export Credit Insurance Corporation guarantees
Indledningsvis bemærker Kommissionen, at produktionsgarantierne fra eksportkreditforsikringsfonden KUKE rent formelt blev stillet for Gdynia skibsværftskoncern.
First, the Commission observes that the Export Credit Insurance Corporation production guarantees were formally granted to Gdynia Shipyard Group.