natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Med det observerede procentvise fald i Euro Stoxx 50-indekset og Euro Stoxx Banks-indekset (22,2 % og 45,3 %) fås et markedsprisniveau for december på mellem [2,2 - 3,6] mia. EUR og [3,1 - 5,1] mia. EUR (dvs. [4 - 6,5] mia. EUR reduceret med 22,2 % og 45,3 %) [110].
Applying the observed percentage declines of the Euro Stoxx 50 index and the Euro Stoxx Banks index (22,2 % and 45,3 %) leads to a market price range for December 2008 of between EUR [2,2 - 3,6] billion and EUR [3,1 - 5,1] billion (namely [4 - 6,5] billion EUR decreased by 22,2 % and by 45,3 %) [110].
I […]-rapporten blev der endvidere taget udgangspunkt i den pris, som den nederlandske stat betalte for FBN og ABN AMRO N den 3. oktober 2008.
The […] report also used as a basis the price paid by the Dutch State for FBN and ABN AMRO N on 3 October 2008.
Som anført ovenfor er transaktionen af 3. oktober 2008 ikke en markedsbaseret transaktion.
As set out above, the transaction of 3 October 2008 is not a market-based transaction.
Kommissionen bemærker, at der ikke var nogen kontraktlig eller økonomisk forpligtelse til at fusionere FBN og ABN AMRO N, da den nederlandske stat overtog disse selskaber.
The Commission observes that there was no contractual or economic obligation to merge FBN and ABN AMRO N when the Dutch State acquired those companies.
Formueforvaltningsdivisionen i ABN AMRO N var blevet integreret i Fortis Bank SA/NV, men denne division er ikke en nødvendig forretning for banker, eftersom mange andre banker får deres formueforvaltningsprodukter fra specialiserede eksterne leverandører.
The asset management division of ABN AMRO N had indeed been integrated within Fortis Bank SA/NV, but that division is not a must-have business for banks as many other banks source their asset management products from specialised external providers.
Hvis den nederlandske stat ikke havde konverteret sin tier 2-kapital til tier 1-kapital, havde FBN været nødt til at afbryde sin drift eller været forpligtet til at lede efter alternative løsninger som f.eks. at nedbringe sine risikovægtede aktiver for at frigøre tier 1-kapital.
If the Dutch State had not converted its Tier 2 capital into Tier 1 capital, FBN would have had to discontinue its operations or would have been obliged to look for alternative solutions, such as reducing its RWA to free up Tier 1 capital.
Takket være denne foranstaltning sluttede FBN med mere kapital og en stærkere konkurrencemæssig position end i et »ingen støtte«-scenarie.
Thanks to the measure, FBN ended up with more capital and in a stronger competitive position than in a ‘no aid’ scenario.
Omstruktureringsplanen af december 2009 og den ajourførte omstruktureringsplan af november 2010 kan således kun erklæres forenelig med rentabilitetskravene i omstruktureringsmeddelelsen på den betingelse, at ABN AMRO Group bestræber sig på at realisere de ajourførte nettorenteindtægter i henhold til omstruktureringsplanen af november.
Therefore, the December 2009 Restructuring Plan and the updated November 2010 Restructuring Plan can only be declared compatible with the viability requirements of the Restructuring Communication on the condition that ABN AMRO Group will strive to realise the updated net interest revenues set out in the November 2010 Restructuring Plan.
ABN AMRO Group bør løbende rapportere sine fremskridt til Kommissionen — som minimum hvert kvartal.
ABN AMRO Group should report on its progress to the Commission on a regular basis – at least every quarter.
På denne baggrund synes en hybrid kupon og et forbud mod indfrielse af hybrid kapital i to år [123] at give en passende byrdefordeling fra selskabets kapitalejere [124].
Against that background, a hybrid coupon and hybrid call ban of 2 years [123] seems to provide appropriate burden-sharing from the company’s capital holders [124].
ABN AMRO Group skal sigte mod at opnå de nettorenteindtægter, som blev forelagt Kommissionen den 8. november 2010.
ABN AMRO Group must aim to achieve the net interest revenues as presented to the Commission on 8 November 2010.
ABN AMRO Group bør derfor træffe passende foranstaltninger, så snart den bemærker, at den ligger under beregningen, navnlig hvis dette skyldes lave rentemarginaler.
ABN AMRO Group should therefore take appropriate action as soon as it observes that it undershoots its projections, especially when the latter is due to low interest margins.
ABN AMRO Group bestræber sig på at opnå de beregninger (herunder nettorenteindtægter), som blev forelagt Kommissionen i omstruktureringsplanen af december 2009 og den ajourførte omstruktureringsplan af november 2010.
ABN AMRO Group shall use its best efforts to achieve the projections (including net interest revenues) submitted to the Commission in the December 2009 Restructuring Plan, as updated by the November 2010 Restructuring Plan.
Beregningerne fra 2010 skal opnås på konsolideret plan i ABN AMRO Group.
The November 2010 projections shall be achieved, at ABN AMRO Group’s consolidated level.
Senest den 30. juni 2011 betaler ABN AMRO Group Nederlandene en justeret rente på de lån, der er identificeret i en e-mail fra Kommissionen til den nederlandske stat af 24. juni 2010.
By 30 June 2011 at the latest, ABN AMRO Group shall pay to the Netherlands an adjusted interest rate on the loans identified in the electronic mail from the Commission to the Dutch State dated 24 June 2010.
Det justerede beløb med rente beløber sig til 18152722 EUR.
The amounts adjusted with interest come to EUR 18152722.
Strukturen i Fortis SA/NV inden den finansielle krise — som er relativt kompliceret — er beskrevet i punkt 6 i beslutningen af 3. december 2008.
The pre-financial crisis structure of Fortis SA/NV – which is relatively complex – is described in point (6) of the Decision of 3 December 2008.
Holdingselskabet Fortis SA/NV havde samlet sine bankaktiviteter i den juridiske enhed Fortis Bank SA/NV.
The holding company Fortis SA/NV had grouped its banking activities in the legal entity Fortis Bank SA/NV.
Nettorenteindtægterne faldt fra EUR 3223 mio. EUR (2008) til 2994 mio. EUR (2009), primært som følge af pres på rentemarginalerne i første halvår af 2009.
Net interest income fell from EUR 3223 million (2008) to EUR 2994 million (2009) due mainly to interest margin pressure in the first half of 2009.
Ikke-rentemæssige indtægter faldt med 61 mio. EUR eller 3 % til 1905 mio. EUR, og nedskrivninger på lån faldt fra 776 mio. EUR i 2008 til 1172 mio. EUR i 2009 (kilde: pressemeddelelse om resultatet for regnskabsåret 2009 af 26. marts 2010).
Non-interest income decreased by EUR 61 million or 3 % to EUR 1905 million and loan impairments increased from EUR 776 million in 2008 to EUR 1172 million in 2009 (source: FY 2009 result press release of 26 March 2010).
Mens de samlede udgifter faldt fra 2010 mio. EUR i 2008 til 1827 mio. i 2009, steg nedskrivningerne fra 331 mio. EUR i 2008 412 mio. EUR i 2009.
While total expenses decreased from EUR 2010 million in 2008 to EUR 1827 million in 2009, impairments increased from EUR 331 million in 2008 to EUR 412 million in 2009.
Andre elementer, der påvirkede resultaterne, var overskuddet fra salget af Intertrust (81 mio. EUR), hensatte forpligtelser vedrørende den nederlandske bank DSB's konkurs (15 mio. EUR) samt adskillelses- og integrationsomkostninger (66 mio. EUR).
Other elements influencing the results were the profit on the sale of Intertrust (EUR 81 million), provisions related to the bankruptcy of the Dutch bank DSB (EUR 15 million) and separation and integration costs (EUR 66 million).
Ved brev dateret den 17. december 2009 og registreret den 5. januar 2010 skrev DNB til Kommissionen, at den den 3. september 2009 havde underrettet FBN om resultatet af tilsyns- og evalueringsprocessen for 2009 (»Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process 2009«).
In a letter dated 17 December 2009 and registered on 5 January 2010, the DNB wrote to the Commission that it had informed FBN on 3 September 2009 on the results of its ‘Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process 2009’.
Van Lanschots nettooverskud udgjorde 215,4 mio. EUR, 30,1 mio. EUR og 14,8 mio. EUR i henholdsvis 2007, 2008 og 2009.
Van Lanschot’s net profit figures were EUR 215,4 million, EUR 30,1 million and EUR 14,8 million in respectively 2007, 2008 and 2009.
I første halvår af 2010 rapporterede selskabet et nettooverskud på 20,3 mio. EUR.
In the first half of 2010, the company reported a net profit of EUR 20,3 million.
Nedskrivningen af ABN AMRO N skulle tages fra de tilgængelige reserver, hvilket reducerede tier 1-kapitalen.
The write-down of ABN AMRO N had to be taken from available reserves thus reducing Tier 1 capital.
Ved at foretage en nedskrivning og straks sælge andelen skulle FBN ikke længere anvende forsigtighedsfilteret på kapitalandele i forhold til tier 1- og tier 2-kapital.
By taking a write-down and immediately selling the stake, FBN had no longer to apply the prudential filter to equity accounted stakes to its Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital.
Da den finanstilsynsførende hørte om denne situation, konkluderede han, at FBN ikke længere havde skønsmæssige beføjelser over kuponbetalingerne på instrumentet, og at det derfor ikke længere udgjorde tier 1-kapital.
When the financial supervisor learnt about this situation, he concluded that FBN had lost discretion over its coupon payments on the instrument and that therefore the instrument would no longer qualify as Tier 1.
Finanstilsynet argumenterede, at et andet tier 1-instrument i ABN AMRO Group — hvis kuponer efter fusionen blev skubbet af FCC-instrumentet, så ABN AMRO Group reelt også mistede sine skønsmæssige beføjelser over dette instrument — ikke længere udgjorde tier 1-kapital. På grundlag af argumenter om rentabilitet som følge af det potentielle tab af tier 1-kapital og den særlige udskillelsessammenhæng kan Kommissionen acceptere, at FCC-instrumentet undtages fra forbuddet mod indfrielse af hybrid kapital.
The financial supervisor argued that also another Tier 1 instrument of ABN AMRO Group – whose coupons after the merger were pushed by the FCC-instrument, so that de facto ABN AMRO Group had lost discretion also over the coupons of that instrument – would no longer qualify as Tier 1.Based on viability arguments stemming from the potential loss of Tier 1 capital and the specific separation context, the Commission can accept the FCC-instrument to be exempted from the hybrid call ban.
Den 3. oktober 2008 overtog den nederlandske stat Fortis Bank Nederland (»FBN«) (det nederlandske bankdatterselskab af finansieringsholdingselskabet Fortis SA/NV [2]), herunder aktiver i ABN AMRO Holding ejet af FBN (»ABN AMRO N«) for et beløb af 12,8 mia. EUR. I samme transaktion indtrådte den nederlandske stat i stedet for Fortis Bank SA/NV, Fortis SA/NV's belgiske bankdatterselskab, som fordringshaver i lån til FBN med en nominel værdi på 16,1 mia. EUR [3]. Den nederlandske stat bevilgede endvidere FBN en kortsigtet likviditetsfacilitet på 45 mia. EUR og accepterede at skadesløsholde Fortis SA/NV for omkostninger og forpligtelser, der stammede fra konsortiets aktionæroverenskomst ( »aktionæroverenskomsten«). Aktionæroverenskomsten indeholdt de tre finansielle institutioners rettigheder og forpligtelser (Fortis SA/NV, Banco Santander og Royal Bank of Scotland (»RBS«) eller de tre »medlemmer af konsortiet«), som i fællesskab havde budt på ABN AMRO Holding via den nyoprettede juridiske enhed »RFS Holdings«. Den 7. oktober 2008 anmeldte den nederlandske stat sine foranstaltninger af 3. oktober 2008 (overtagelse af FBN for 12,8 mia. EUR, novation af langfristede lån med en nominel værdi på 16,1 mia. EUR og den kortfristede likviditetsfacilitet på 45 mia. EUR, i det følgende benævnt »de integrerede transaktioner af 3. oktober 2008«) som foranstaltninger, der ikke udgør statsstøtte, for at få juridisk vished om disse foranstaltninger. Eftersom foranstaltningerne allerede var blevet gennemført, registrerede Kommissionen sagen som en NN-sag (nemlig NN53b/08).
On 3 October 2008, the Dutch State acquired Fortis Bank Nederland (‘FBN’) (namely the Dutch banking subsidiary of the financial holding company Fortis SA/NV [2]) including ABN AMRO Holding assets owned by FBN (‘ABN AMRO N’) for an amount of EUR 12,8 billion. In the same transaction, the Dutch State also replaced Fortis Bank SA/NV, the Belgian banking subsidiary of Fortis SA/NV, as obligee in loans to FBN with a nominal value of EUR 16,1 billion [3]. The Dutch State also granted FBN a short-term liquidity facility of EUR 45 billion and agreed to indemnify Fortis SA/NV for costs and obligations which stemmed from the consortium shareholders agreement ( ‘CSA’). The CSA described the rights and obligations of the three financial institutions (Fortis SA/NV, Banco Santander and Royal Bank of Scotland (‘RBS’) or the three ‘consortium members’) which had jointly bid for ABN AMRO Holding via the newly created legal entity ‘RFS Holdings’. On 7 October 2008, the Dutch State notified the Commission of its measures of 3 October 2008 (namely the acquisition of FBN for EUR 12,8 billion, the novation of long-term loans with a nominal value of EUR 16,1 billion and the short-term liquidity facility of EUR 45 billion, hereafter ‘the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008’) as measures not constituting State aid in order to get legal certainty on those measures. Since the measures had already been implemented, the Commission registered the case as an NN-case (that is, NN53b/08).
I beslutningen af 8. april 2008 havde Kommissionen opfordret det nederlandske finanstilsyn »DNB« til at kommentere FBN's og ABN AMRO N's finansielle situation.
In the Decision of 8 April 2009, the Commission had invited the Dutch financial supervisor (‘DNB’) to comment on the soundness of FBN and ABN AMRO N respectively.
Kommissionen modtog de ønskede oplysninger om FBN ved brev af 18. juni 2009 og en ajourføring den 5. januar 2010.
The Commission received the requested information on FBN by letter of 18 June 2009 and an update on 5 January 2010.
Den 14. januar 2010 anmeldte den nederlandske stat formelt de nye statsstøtteforanstaltninger på 4,39 mia. EUR ud over de allerede anmeldte foranstaltninger i juli 2009.
On 14 January 2010, the Dutch State formally notified the new State aid measures of EUR 4,39 billion in addition to the measures already notified in July 2009.
Kommissionen registrerede de nye foranstaltninger under nr. N19/10.
The Commission registered the new measures under number N19/10.
I denne afgørelse godkendte Kommissionen midlertidigt disse foranstaltninger som redningsstøtte frem til den 31. juli 2010.
In that Decision, the Commission temporarily approved those measures as rescue aid measures until 31 July 2010.
Den nederlandske stat sendte Kommissionen et brev, hvori den gav tilsagn om et forbud mod prisførerskab frem til udgangen af 2010.
The Dutch State sent the Commission a letter with a price leadership ban commitment applicable until the end of 2010.
Kommissionen stillede yderligere spørgsmål den 8. april 2010, som blev besvaret den 7. maj 2010.
The Commission asked additional questions on 8 April 2010, which were answered on 7 May 2010.
Den nederlandske stat gav endvidere Kommissionen yderligere oplysninger om krydshæftelse som følge af gennemførelsen af fusionstilsagnet [10] den 26. maj 2010.
The Dutch State also provided the Commission with extra information on cross liabilities resulting from the implementation of the Merger Remedy [10] on 26 May 2010.
For at lette opdelingen oprettede konsortiets medlemmer såkaldte »sporingsaktier«, der repræsenterede det økonomiske ejerskab af virksomhederne, som blev tillagt de enkelte medlemmer af konsortiet. Som følge deraf blev RBS, Banco Santander og Fortis SA/NV de økonomiske [11] ejere af henholdsvis den såkaldte R-andel, S-andel og N-andel (»ABN AMRO R«, »ABN AMRO S« og »ABN AMRO N«).
In order to facilitate the break-up, the consortium members created so-called ‘tracking shares’ representing the economic ownership of the businesses attributed to each consortium member. As a result, RBS, Banco Santander and Fortis SA/NV became the economic [11] owners of respectively the so-called R-share, S-share and N-share (‘ABN AMRO R’, ‘ABN AMRO S’ and ‘ABN AMRO N’).
New HBU havde samlede aktiver til en værdi af [10 - 20] mia. EUR og beskæftigede omkring [1000-1500] fuldtidsækvivalenter (»FTE’er«). New HBU omfattede Hollandsche Bank Unie (»HBU«) (en forretningsbank ejet af ABN AMRO N), nogle af ABN AMRO’s salgskontorer (13 ud af i alt 78) og nogle af ABN AMRO’s erhvervskundeenheder (to ud af i alt fem).
New HBU had total assets of EUR [10 - 20] billion and employed around [1000 - 1500] full time equivalents (‘FTEs’). New HBU included Hollandsche Bank Unie (‘HBU’) (a commercial bank owned by ABN AMRO N), some ABN AMRO sales offices (13 out of a total of 78) and some ABN AMRO Corporate Client Units (2 out of a total of 5).
I divisionen »Commercial Banking« (1) havde FBN 23 erhvervscentre, der tilbød flere forskellige produkter til selskaber med en omsætning på op til 250 mio. EUR. Virksomheder med en omsætning på over 250 mio. EUR samt den offentlige sektor blev betjent af en anden underdivision, nemlig »Corporate & Public Banking« (2). Ligeledes fandtes der underdivisionerne »Investment banking« (3) [27], »Specialised Financial Services« (4) [28], »Energy, Commodities & Transportation« (5), »Global Markets & Institutional Banking« (6) [29] og »Clearing Funds & Custody« (7) [30].
In the division ‘Commercial Banking’ (1), FBN had 23 business centres offering multiple products to companies with a turnover of up to EUR 250 million. Companies with a turnover of more than EUR 250 million as well as the public sector were serviced by another subdivision, ‘Corporate & Public Banking’ (2). There were also ‘Investment banking’ (3) [27], ‘Specialised Financial Services’ (4) [28], ‘Energy, Commodities & Transportation’ (5), ‘Global Markets & Institutional Banking’ (6) [29] and ‘Clearing Funds & Custody’ (7) [30] sub-divisions.
Inden for »Retail and Private banking« har den integrerede ABN AMRO Group markedsandele på [15 - 20] % og [15 - 20] % [38] inden for henholdsvis »Mass Retail« (privatkundeforretninger) og »Preferred Banking« [39] (fordelskunder), hvilket gør den til den tredjestørste på det nederlandske bankmarked med hensyn til markedsandel. Inden for Private Banking (ABN AMRO Mees Pierson) er ABN AMRO Group langt den største på det nederlandske marked med en markedsandel på omkring [30 - 40] % [40]. Inden for »Commercial and Merchant Banking« udgør ABN AMRO Groups markedsandel omkring [15 - 25] % [41].
In ‘Retail and Private banking’, the integrated ABN AMRO Group has market shares of [15 - 20] % and [15 - 20] % [38] in respectively ‘mass retail’ and ‘preferred banking’ [39], which makes it third-largest on the Dutch banking market in terms of market share. In private banking (branded ABN AMRO Mees Pierson), ABN AMRO Group is by far the largest in the Dutch market with a market share of approximately [30 - 40] % [40]. In ‘Commercial and Merchant banking’, the market share of ABN AMRO Group is around [15 - 25] % [41].
En fusion mellem FBN og ABN AMRO N er central for det forretningskoncept, der blev udviklet i omstruktureringsplanen af december 2009.
A merger between FBN and ABN AMRO N is central to the business concept developed in the December 2009 Restructuring Plan.
ABN AMRO Group, den nye bank, som opstod efter omstruktureringsplanen af december 2009, vil fokusere på mid-market-segmentet i Nederlandene [44] og vil være aktiv inden for »Retail and Private Banking« og »Commercial and Merchant Banking«.
ABN AMRO Group, the new bank emerging from the December 2009 Restructuring Plan, will focus on the mid-market segment in the Netherlands [44] and will be active in ‘Retail and Private Banking’ and ‘Commercial and Merchant Banking’.
For at afbryde de eksisterende forbindelser gav den nederlandske stat den 3. oktober 2008 FBN en kortfristet likviditetsfacilitet på 45 mia. EUR (»foranstaltning Y1«). Denne likviditetsfacilitet gav FBN mulighed for at tilbagebetale kortfristede lån på 34 mia. EUR til Fortis Bank SA/NV. Den nederlandske stat trådte endvidere i stedet for Fortis Bank SA/NV som långiver af langfristede lån til FBN for et nominelt beløb på 16,1 mia. EUR i en såkaldt »novation« (»foranstaltning Y2«) [49].
To cut the existing links, the Dutch State granted FBN a short-term liquidity facility of EUR 45 billion (‘Measure Y1’) on 3 October 2008. That liquidity facility allowed FBN to repay to Fortis Bank SA/NV short-term loans of EUR 34 billion. The Dutch State also replaced Fortis Bank SA/NV as a lender of long-term loans to FBN for a nominal amount of EUR 16,1 billion in a so-called ‘novation’ (‘Measure Y2’) [49].
I januar 2010 anmeldte den nederlandske stat supplerende kapitalforanstaltninger til en værdi af 4,39 mia. EUR. Den nederlandske stat tegnede yderligere obligatoriske konvertible værdipapirinstrumenter til en værdi af 2,28 mia. EUR til dækning af yderligere udskillelsesomkostninger (780 mio. EUR, »foranstaltning B3«), kapitalunderskuddet som følge af salget af New HBU (300 mio. EUR, »foranstaltning B4«) og integrationsomkostninger (1,2 mia. EUR, »foranstaltning B5«). For at bringe FBN's tier 1-kapital i overensstemmelse med kapitalkravene, konverterede den nederlandske stat endvidere 1,35 mia. EUR af FBN's tier 2-kapital, som den allerede ejede, til tier 1-kapital (»foranstaltning C«). Den nederlandske stat betalte endvidere de andre medlemmer af konsortiet 740 mio. EUR kontant (»foranstaltning D«) som forudset i aktionæroverenskomsten til løsning af spørgsmål, der først opstod i løbet af udskillelsesprocessen. Endelig gav den nederlandske stat en garanti for krydshæftelser som følge af salget af New HBU (»foranstaltning E«).
In January 2010, the Dutch State notified additional capital measures worth EUR 4,39 billion. The Dutch State subscribed to additional MCS-instruments of EUR 2,28 billion to cover additional separation costs (EUR 780 million, ‘Measure B3’), the capital shortfall resulting from the sale of New HBU (EUR 300 million, ‘Measure B4’) and integration costs (EUR 1,2 billion, ‘Measure B5’). To bring FBN’s Tier 1 capital in line with regulatory requirements, the Dutch State also converted EUR 1,35 billion of FBN-Tier 2 capital it already owned into Tier 1 capital (‘Measure C’). The Dutch State also paid the other consortium members EUR 740 million in cash (‘Measure D’) as was foreseen in the CSA to settle issues that only emerged in the course of the separation process. Finally, the Dutch State also provided a guarantee on cross liabilities resulting from the sale of New HBU (‘Measure E’).
Den nederlandske stat solgte kreditbeskyttelse via en CDS på ABN AMRO N's nederlandske realkreditportefølje, svarende til omkring [30 - 80] % af ABN AMRO N's samlede boliglånsportefølje.
The Dutch State sold credit protection via a CDS on a Dutch mortgage portfolio of ABN AMRO N, representing around [30 - 80] % of ABN AMRO N’s total home loan portfolio.
Denne foranstaltning medførte en reduktion i ABN AMRO N's risikovægtede aktiver.
That measure had the effect of reducing the risk weighted assets of ABN AMRO N.
I den forbindelse skulle den nederlandske stat bidrage med 2,2 mia. EUR til ABN AMRO Z's kapitalunderskud.
In that context, the Dutch State had to contribute EUR 2,2 billion to the ABN AMRO Z capital shortfall.
Målet med kapitalfrigørelsesinstrumentet var at gøre det muligt for ABN AMRO N at yde en del af dette bidrag på 2,2 mia. EUR til ABN AMRO Z.
The aim of the CRI was to allow ABN AMRO N to make part of that EUR 2,2 billion contribution to ABN AMRO Z.
Obligatorisk konvertibelt værdipapir
Measure B4 MCS
Generelt bemærkede Kommissionen endvidere i beslutningen af 8. april 2009, at den nederlandske stat endnu ikke havde fremsendt DNB’s vurdering af FBN og ABN AMRO N. Den nederlandske stat havde heller ikke fremsendt en rentabilitetsplan eller en omstruktureringsplan med detaljerede finansielle beregninger.
In general, the Commission also observed in the Decision of 8 April 2009 that the Dutch State had not yet submitted an evaluation of FBN and ABN AMRO N by the DNB. Nor had the Dutch State provided a viability plan or a restructuring plan with detailed financial projections.