natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Endvidere har Ungarn en bred skønsmargen for forlængelse af tilladelsen samt for efterfølgende at ændre de relevante bestemmelser i mineloven (til trods for kendskabet til de fordele, som dette ville betyde for MOL, der som den eneste aktør på markedet for kulbrinter har indgået en aftale om forlængelse).
Moreover, Hungary had a wide margin of discretion for extending the authorisation, as well as for subsequently amending the relevant provisions of the Mining Act (despite knowing the advantageous effects this would have on MOL, this company being the sole market player for hydrocarbons to have concluded an extension agreement).
Ungarn kunne til enhver tid frit fastsætte mineafgiften, dvs. man kunne have besluttet slet ikke at ændre loven.
Hungary was free to determine the mining fee at any time, i.e. it could have decided not to amend the Mining Act at all.
I betragtning af virkningerne heraf favoriserede det samlede handlingsforløb utvetydigt én bestemt virksomhed.
From the point of view of its effects, the sequence of acts unequivocally favoured one particular undertaking.
I lyset af det ovenstående konkluderer Kommissionen, at referencesystemet er tilladelsesordningen.
In view of the above, the Commission concludes that the system of reference is the authorisation regime.
Inden for rammerne af tilladelsesordningen er aftalen om forlængelse klart selektiv.
In the framework of the authorisation regime, the extension agreement is clearly selective.
Som de ungarske myndigheder rent faktisk selv bekræfter, har parterne i forbindelse med forhandlingen om vilkårene i denne aftale et vist manøvrerum til at fastsætte de forskellige betalingskomponenter og kan mere væsentligt endog beslutte slet ikke at indgå aftalen.
Indeed, as the Hungarian authorities themselves confirm, the parties, when negotiating the terms of this agreement, have a certain margin of manoeuvre to stipulate the different payment components and, more importantly, may even decide not to conclude the agreement at all.
De ungarske myndigheder havde således tilladelse til at indgå en sådan aftale med MOL (eller med enhver anden markedsaktør) [40].
Thus, the Hungarian authorities had the discretion to conclude such an agreement with MOL (or with any other market participant) [40].
En sådan behandling kan ikke forklares på basis af systemets logik og karakter.
Such treatment cannot be explained through the logic and nature of the system.
På den ene side pålægges mineafgifterne for at sikre indtægter til staten af den udvundne værdi.
On the one hand, mining fees are imposed to ensure revenue for the State on the extracted value.
På den anden side betales betalingskomponenterne i henhold til aftalen om forlængelse som et ekstra tillæg for opnåelse af forlængelsen.
On the other hand, the payment components under the extension agreement are paid in exchange for the extension as an extra charge.
I den aktuelle sag førte indgåelsen af aftalen om forlængelse og den efterfølgende forhøjelse af afgifterne for MOL til den paradoksale situation, at MOL, der havde undladt at påbegynde produktionen inden for den fastsatte frist, drager fordel af lavere mineafgifter indtil 2020 i forbindelse med praktisk talt alle sine felter under tilladelsesordningen, hvorimod selskabets konkurrenter, der også er underlagt tilladelsesordningen, og som påbegyndte produktionen inden for den fastsatte frist og derfor ikke har indgået nogen aftale om forlængelse, skal betale højere lovpligtige afgifter.
In the present case, however, the conclusion of the extension agreement and the subsequent increase in the fees for MOL led to the paradoxical situation that MOL, having failed to commence production on time, benefits from lower mining fees until 2020 for practically all of its fields under authorisation; whereas its competitors, who are equally subject to the authorisation regime and who started production on time and therefore have not concluded an extension agreement, have to pay higher statutory fees.
Dette var den eneste aftale om forlængelse, der blev indgået på markedet for kulbrinter.
This was the only extension agreement concluded for hydrocarbons.
MOL bemærkede, at der er andre aftaler om forlængelse i kraft på markedet for faste mineraler.
MOL noted that there are other extension agreements in force for solid minerals.
Kommissionen bemærker imidlertid, at dette vedrører andre typer af mineraler, der er underlagt en anden mineafgift i henhold til loven end kulbrinter.
The Commission observes, however that this concerns other types of minerals which are subject to a different mining fee under the Mining Act than hydrocarbons.
Det skal desuden bemærkes, at der for de faste mineralers vedkommende ikke var nogen ændring i mineafgiften, der blev indført i forbindelse med ændringen af mineloven (dvs. de markedsaktører, som havde indgået en sådan aftale, var ikke blevet påvirket af det samme »foranstaltningsforløb«, og derfor havde de ikke haft nogen fordel heraf).
It also has to be noted that for solid minerals there was no change in the mining fee introduced by the amendment to the Mining Act, (i.e. the market players having concluded such an agreement have not been affected by the same ‘sequence of measures’ and therefore no advantage has accrued to them).
På baggrund af det foregående og til trods for de argumenter, som Ungarn fremfører, finder Kommissionen, at hele forløbet, dvs. den måde, hvorpå § 26/A(5), er formuleret, indgåelsen af aftalen om forlængelse på grundlag heraf samt den efterfølgende ændring af mineloven, selektivt begunstigede MOL.
On the basis of the foregoing, despite the arguments put forward by Hungary, the Commission considers that the sequence of actions, i.e. the way Section 26/A(5) of the Mining Act is worded, the extension agreement concluded on its basis, and the subsequent amendment to the Mining Act, was selective in favour of MOL.
De kombinerede virkninger af foranstaltningernes forløb er, at det blandt indehaverne af tilladelserne til minedrift i henhold til § 5 i mineloven kun var MOL, der var underlagt en særlig ordning, som beskyttede selskabet mod en eventuel forhøjelse af den mineafgift, der normalt skal betales for udvinding af kulbrinter.
The combined effects of the sequence of measures is that, among holders of mining authorisations granted under Section 5 of the Mining Act, only MOL was subject to a specific regime which shielded it against any increase in the mining fee normally due for hydrocarbons extraction.
Konklusionen er, at selektivitetskriteriet opfyldes på grund af det vide skøn for tildeling af en aftale om forlængelse og i lyset af den kendsgerning, at undtagelsen rent faktisk er møntet på ét enkelt selskab.
In conclusion, due to the wide discretion in the granting of an extension agreement and in view of the fact that, actually, the exemption is directed to one individual company, the selectivity criterion is met.
I modsætning til de argumenter, som de ungarske myndigheder fremfører, har Kommissionen den opfattelse, at staten ikke udøver en økonomisk aktivitet ved at give tilladelse til mineaktiviteter.
Contrary to the Hungarian authorities’ arguments, the Commission takes the view that the State does not exercise an economic activity by authorising mining activities.
Tildelingen af administrative koncessioner eller tilladelser til minedrift er snarere forbundet med udøvelse af beføjelser, som er typiske for en offentlig myndighed, fordi denne aktivitet oprindeligt ikke kan udøves af en privat aktør [41].
Rather, the granting of administrative concessions or mining authorisations is connected with the exercise of powers which are typically those of a public authority because this activity cannot be originally exercised by a private actor [41].
Ligesom det er tilfældet i de andre EU-medlemsstater, forholder det sig i Ungarn således, at ingen privat aktør er den oprindelige indehaver af mineralressourcer.
In Hungary – as in other Member States of the EU – no private actor is the original owner of mineral resources.
Medlemsstaternes retssystemer overdrager generelt kontrollen over mineralressourcer til de offentlige myndigheder [42].
Member States’ legal systems generally attribute control over mineral resources to the public authorities [42].
Derfor er beslutningen om at give et selskab tilladelse til at udnytte mineralressourcer i den form, som medlemsstaten ønsker og mod betaling af en bestemt afgift, på grund af dens karakter og regler, en sag for de offentlige myndigheder og kan kategoriseres som udøvelsen af den offentlige myndigheds beføjelser.
Therefore, the decision to allow a company to exploit mineral resources, in the form the Member State chooses and against payment of certain fees, is, by reason of its nature and rules, a matter for the public authorities and can be categorised as the exercise of public authority powers.
Ungarns indgreb med at lade mineaktiviteter være underlagt administrativ kontrol tjener den almene interesse og ikke kommercielle interesser.
Hungary’s intervention in making mining activity subject to administrative supervision serves the general interest and not commercial ones.
Denne adfærd skal derfor opfattes som en form for statslig intervention af en offentlig myndighed, der ikke er beslægtet med en privat investors adfærd i en markedsøkonomi [43].
This behaviour must therefore be considered a form of state intervention by a public authority not akin to the behaviour of a private investor in a market economy [43].
Selv om tilladelse til mineudnyttelse i den nærværende sag blev anset for at være en økonomisk aktivitet, i hvilken forbindelse staten forfølger kommercielle formål (hvilket ikke er tilfældet), bemærker Kommissionen, at der ikke er nogen klar og direkte forbindelse i pengemæssig forstand mellem niveauet for mineafgifter, der er fastsat af Ungarn for MOL, og værdien af minetilladelsen.
Even if in the present case authorisation for mining exploitation were deemed to be an economic activity whereby the State pursues commercial purposes (which it is not), the Commission notes that there is no clear and direct link in monetary terms between the level of the mining fees set by Hungary for MOL and the value of the mining authorisation.
Det af Ungarn fremførte argument om, at det fungerede som en markedsaktør, da det indgik aftalen om forlængelse, kan ikke bekræftes.
Hungary’s reasoning, namely that it acted as a market operator when it concluded the extension agreement, is not borne out.
Især er der intet, som tyder på, at udbud af koncessionen for de 12 felter (som ikke ville være blevet forlænget) ikke ville have resulteret i et højere bud fra en konkurrent.
In particular, there is no indication that tendering the concession for the twelve fields (which would have not been extended) would not have resulted in a higher bid from a competitor.
Ungarn manglede også at påvise, at man tog hensyn til alle relevante faktorer og risici ud fra et kommercielt synspunkt ved indgåelse af aftalen om forlængelse, dvs. alle betalingskomponenter i aftalen om forlængelse, de mulige højere afgifter fastsat ved lov indtil 2020, aftalens varighed samt mulige konkurrenter.
Hungary also failed to demonstrate that it took into account all relevant factors and risks from a commercial point of view when concluding the extension agreement, i.e. all payment components in the extension agreement, the possible higher fees set by the Mining Act until 2020, the duration of the agreement and possible competitors.
Ungarn fremførte desuden, at der efter den omstridte ændring af loven ikke har været nogen markedsaktør, som reelt har skullet betale en højere mineafgift end MOL, da der ikke var nogen konkurrenter, som faldt ind under kategorierne med højere mineafgifter i den relevante periode.
A further argument by Hungary is that after the disputed amendment of the Mining Act, no other market participant actually had to pay a higher fee than MOL, because in fact there were no competitors falling into the categories with higher mining fees in the relevant period.
Oversigt over de gældende mineafgifter før og efter ændringerne af mineloven
Summary of the applicable mining fees before and after the amendments to the Mining Act
Afgift for felterne i henhold til MOL's kontrakt
Fee for the fields under MOL’s contract
Gældende indtil 2020
Applicable until 2020
J % [46](mindst 12 %)
J % [46](at least 12 %)
J % × c [47](mindst 12 %)
J % × c [47](at least 12 %)
Produktion påbegyndt efter 1. januar 2008 [44]
Production started after 1 January 2008 [44]
Dette argument må afvises.
This argument has to be dismissed.
Tabel 4 giver en oversigt over i hvor høj grad aftalen om forlængelse og den efterfølgende ændring af mineloven resulterede i afgifter for MOL, der var lavere end anført i loven.
Table 4 above summarises the extent to which the extension agreement and the subsequent amendment of the Mining Act resulted in fees for MOL lower than stipulated by the Mining Act.
For det første viser oplysningerne fra de ungarske myndigheder, at der rent faktisk var nogle markedsaktører, som drev felter under tilladelsesordningen, der var forpligtet til at betale en højere mineafgift end MOL i perioden mellem 8. januar 2008 og 23. januar 2009 som følge af den første ændring af mineloven og ligeledes fra 23. januar 2009 indtil dato som følge af den anden ændring af mineloven.
Firstly, the data submitted by the Hungarian authorities show that in fact there were some market players operating fields under the authorisation regime who have been subject to a higher mining fee obligation than paid by MOL, between 8 January 2008 and 23 January 2009 owing to the first amendment to the Mining Act and also from 23 January 2009 to date owing to the second amendment to the Mining Act.
Indberetningerne fra de ungarske myndigheder viser, at der i 2008 var minefelter, som blev drevet i henhold til tilladelsesordningen af andre selskaber end MOL, som betalte mere end 12 % (mellem 14,24 % og 18 %), hvilket skyldtes anvendelsen af Brent-klausulen [48].
The submissions from the Hungarian authorities show that in 2008 there were mining fields operated under authorisation by companies other than MOL who paid more than 12 % (between 14,24 % and 18 %) owing to the application of the Brent Clause [48].
For det andet bemærker Kommissionen, at selv om de ungarske myndigheder hævder, at der udelukkende er konkurrenter, som driver eller forventes at ville idriftsætte mindre felter (dvs. med en produktion på mindre end 500 m3 eller 200 kt), og selv om sådanne små felter var underlagt 12 %-kategorien, ville de stadig skulle betale Brent-tillægget, når det er relevant.
Secondly, although the Hungarian authorities claim that there are only competitors who operate or are expected to put into operation smaller fields (i.e. producing less than 500 m3 or 200 kt), the Commission observes that even if such smaller fields were subject to the 12 % category, they will still have to pay the Brent mark-up, whenever applicable.
Dette ville kunne medføre en mineafgift på op til 18 %.
This could lead to a mining fee of up to 18 %.
Kommissionen minder endnu om, at virkningen af foranstaltningerne er, at MOL ikke er underlagt Brent-klausulen, der er fastlagt i loven for alle andre aktører.
The Commission recalls once again that the effect of the measures is that MOL is not subject to the Brent Clause laid down in the Mining Act for all other operators.
Hvad angår det nuværende generelle markedsklima i Ungarn, er der for det tredje adskillige mineselskaber, som er involveret i aktiviteter i forbindelse med udvinding af kulbrinter.
Thirdly, as regards the current general market environment in Hungary, there are several mining companies engaged in hydrocarbon extraction activities.
Derudover er der flere selskaber, som udfører efterforskning, der kan idriftsætte felter og dermed blive konkurrenter til MOL.
In addition, there are several companies carrying out exploration who might put fields into operation and become MOL’s competitors.
Eventuelle nye aktører under tilladelsesordningen vil være underlagt den lovpligtige mineafgift og være i konkurrence med MOL, som er det eneste selskab, der er fritaget for den gældende afgift under den almindelige tilladelsesordning og underlagt et lavere afgiftsniveau.
Any new entrants under the authorisation regime will be subject to the statutory mining fee and face competition with MOL, the only company whose mining fields escape the fee applicable under the general authorisation regime and are subject to a lower level of fees.
Hvis minemyndigheden for det femte ikke havde givet tilladelse til en forlængelse for de 12 felter, ville alle andre MOL-felter under tilladelsesordningen også have været underlagt den betydeligt højere mineafgift, hvilket kunne have givet staten højere indtægter [49].
Fifthly, if hypothetically the Mining Authority had not agreed to the extension for the twelve fields, all other MOL fields under authorisation would have become subject to the considerably higher mining fee as well, which might have meant higher revenues for the State [49].
Desuden kunne staten som nævnt i betragtning 73 have udbudt koncessionen for de 12 felter, der ikke fik tildelt forlængelse, og dermed potentielt have opnået et højere bud fra en konkurrent.
Moreover, as mentioned in recital 73, the State could have put out a tender for the concession for the twelve fields not granted extension, and could thereby potentially have obtained a higher bid from a competitor.
Hvad angår Ungarns argument om, at MOL betalte en højere mineafgift, nemlig 12,24 % i 2006 og 2007, bemærker Kommissionen, at dette er irrelevant.
Regarding Hungary’s argument that MOL paid a higher mining fee, namely 12,24 %, in 2006 and 2007, the Commission notes that this is irrelevant.
Dette skyldtes først og fremmest det faktum, at MOL skulle betale den anførte forhøjede mineafgift (fra 12 % til 12,24 %) ligesom ethvert andet selskab, der ønsker at forlænge sine tilladelser til minedrift.
First of all, this was due to the fact that MOL had to pay the stipulated increase in the mining fee (from 12 % to 12,24 %) just as any other company wishing to extend its mining authorisation would have had to.
I denne henseende fik MOL standardbehandling og blev ikke stillet ringere.
In this respect, MOL received the standard treatment and was not put at a disadvantage.
Fordelen for MOL havde heller ikke materialiseret sig endnu: dette skete i sidste instans i forbindelse med den første ændring af loven, dvs. pr. 8. januar 2008.
Neither had the advantage to MOL materialised yet: this ultimately occurred at the time of the first amendment to the Mining Act, i.e. as of 8 January 2008.
Derudover betalte MOL i 2008 28,4 mia. HUF og i 2009 1,9 mia. HUF mindre i mineafgifter for sine produktionsfelter, end det skulle have betalt, hvis det havde været underlagt den minelov, der var gældende på dette tidspunkt.
Furthermore, in 2008 MOL paid HUF 28,4 billion and in 2009 HUF 1,9 billion less in mining fees for its producing fields than it would have paid if it had been subject to the Mining Act in force at that time.
Hvad angår de andre betalingskomponenter under § 26/A(5) (dvs. forlængelsesafgiften og engangsbetalingen), blev de betalt til gengæld for forlængelsen og ikke for retten til at have afgifter, som er lavere end dem, der gælder for konkurrenterne.
As regards the other payment components under Section 26/A(5) of the Mining Act (i.e. the extension fee and the one-off payment), these were paid in exchange for the extension and not for the right to have fees lower than those applicable to its competitors.
Disse betalingskomponenter kan heller ikke betragtes som »forudbetaling« af mineafgifter, der forfalder på senere tidspunkter.
Nor can these payment components be regarded as ‘advance payment’ of mining fees due in later periods.
I den sammenhæng er ordlyden af § 26/A(5) klar og tydelig.
The wording of Section 26/A(5) of the Mining Act is clear in this regard.
I henhold hertil hedder det især, at »selskabet skal betale en afgift, hvis der gives tilladelse til en forlængelse af aftalen«.
In particular, it states that ‘the company shall pay a charge if an extension is granted’.
De to andre elementer er knyttet til antallet af felter, som er omfattet af aftalen om forlængelse.
The two other elements are linked to the number of fields granted extension.
§ 26/A(5) etablerer således klart en forbindelse mellem forlængelsen og betalingsforpligtelsen.
Thus Section 26/A(5) of the Mining Act clearly establishes a link between the extension and the payment obligation.
Ifølge retspraksis kan statsstøtte til et selskab ikke udlignes af en afgift, der pålægges det samme selskab, og som repræsenterer en specifik og særskilt afgift uden forbindelse til den foranstaltning, der udgør støtte [50].
According to the case-law, aid given to a company cannot be offset by a charge imposed on the same company which represents a specific and distinct charge without a link with the measure constituting aid [50].
Som beskrevet i betragtning 85 repræsenterer de andre betalingskomponenter efter § 26/A(5) i denne sag en afgift for forlængelsen, der kan betragtes som en specifik og særskilt afgift uden forbindelse til den efterfølgende ændring af de lovpligtige afgifter under tilladelsesordningen.
In the case at issue, as described in recital 85, the other payment components under Section 26/A(5) of the Mining Act represent a charge for the extension which can be regarded as a specific and distinct charge without a link to the subsequent amendment of the statutory fees under the authorisation regime.
Endelig påpeger Kommissionen, at indgåelsen af aftalen om forlængelse og den efterfølgende forhøjelse af afgifterne for MOL førte til den paradoksale situation, at MOL, der havde undladt at påbegynde produktionen inden for den fastsatte frist, kommer til at betale lavere mineafgifter indtil 2020, hvorimod selskabets konkurrenter, der også er underlagt tilladelsesordningen, men som ikke har indgået nogen aftale om forlængelse, skal betale højere lovpligtige afgifter, fordi de påbegyndte produktion inden for den fastsatte tidsfrist.
Finally, the Commission points out that the conclusion of the extension agreement and the subsequent increase in the fees for MOL led to the paradoxical situation that MOL, having failed to start production on time, will be paying lower mining fees for almost all of its fields under authorisation until 2020, whereas its competitors, who have not concluded an extension agreement because they started production on time and are equally subject to the authorisation regime, have to pay higher statutory fees.
På baggrund af det ovenstående konkluderer Kommissionen, at foranstaltningen gav MOL en fordel.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that the measure conferred an advantage on MOL.
Den friholder MOL for omkostninger, som selskabet ellers skulle bære.
It shields MOL from bearing costs which it otherwise would have to bear.
Den kombinerede virkning af aftalen om forlængelse og den efterfølgende ændring af mineloven resulterer i en fordel, der gives til selskabet.
The combined effect of the extension agreement and the subsequent modification of the Mining Act result in an advantage being conferred on the company.
Foranstaltningen involverer udeblevne indtægter, som staten ville være berettiget til, og ydes derfor af statsmidler.
The measure involves forgone revenues to which the State would be entitled and is therefore granted from state resources.
Konkurrencefordrejning og indvirkning på samhandlen
Distortion of competition and affect on trade
MOL er et integreret olie- og gasselskab og opfylder betingelserne for en virksomhed.
MOL is an integrated oil and gas company and qualifies as an undertaking.
Virksomheden konkurrerer med andre virksomheder, som ikke har den samme fordel.
It competes with other undertakings which do not benefit from the same advantage.
Derfor fordrejer foranstaltningen konkurrencen.
Hence, the measure distorts competition.
Derudover er MOL aktiv inden for en sektor, hvor der er samhandel mellem medlemsstaterne. Kriteriet for indvirkning på samhandlen inden for Fællesskabet er dermed også opfyldt.
Furthermore, MOL is active in a sector in which trade exists between Member States; the criterion of affecting trade within the Union is also fulfilled.