natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I forhold til AIP er dette dokument efter Ryanairs opfattelse kun vejledende og er ikke bindende for BTS i selskabets forhandlinger med luftfartsselskaber.
In relation to the AIP, Ryanair is of the opinion that this document provides only indications and is not binding on BTS in its negotiations with airlines.
Herudover giver AIP selv mulighed for særlige rabatter og undtagelser fra bestemmelserne og offentliggør dermed de rabatter, der kan forhandles mellem lufthavnsoperatører og luftfartsselskaber fra sag til sag.
Besides this aspect, the AIP itself provides for special discounts and exemptions from its provisions, thus publicising the availability of discounts to be negotiated between airport operators and airlines on a case-by-case basis.
Med hensyn til den standardparkeringsafgift, som finder anvendelse, når et fly parkeres i over to timer, præciserer Ryanair, at denne afgift ikke er gældende for selskabet som følge af dets særlige operationer, og fordi Bratislava lufthavn ikke er Ryanairs »base«.
With regard to the standard parking charge, which applies when an aircraft is parked for more than 2 hours, Ryanair explains that this charge would not apply to it due to the specific nature of its operations and the fact that Bratislava is not a Ryanair ‘base’.
Ryanairs fly parkeres aldrig i BTS, og som følge af den korte tid, Ryanairs fly står ved gaten, bruger flyene kun 25 minutter i lufthavnen hver gang, ligesom de aldrig befinder sig i de angivne parkeringsområder.
Ryanair’s aircraft are never parked at BTS, and because of Ryanair’s fast turnaround process, its aircraft spend only 25 minutes at the Airport each time, and they are never in the specified parking areas.
Med hensyn til indførelse af nye afgifter mener Ryanair, at Kommissionens fortolkning er misvisende, eftersom den foreslår, at de nye afgifter ikke vil være gældende for Ryanair.
With regard to the introduction of new charges, Ryanair is of the opinion that the Commission’s interpretation is misleading, because it suggests that new charges will not apply to Ryanair.
Sådanne afgifter opkræves dog direkte af BTS i stedet for Ryanair.
However, such charges will simply be collected directly by BTS instead of Ryanair.
Ryanair præciserer endvidere, at sådanne afgifter, hvis de opkræves direkte af Ryanair, ville få negative konsekvenser for selskabets forretningsmodel og antal passagerer.
Ryanair further explains that such charges, if collected directly by Ryanair, would have adverse effects on its business model and passenger numbers.
Ryanair anfører endvidere, at fjernelse eller reduktion af visse standardafgifter, der er gældende for lufthavnen, ikke vil være til fordel for selskabet, da den kombinerede landings-, afgangs- og handlingsafgift i henhold til aftalen ikke reduceres, når standardafgifterne i lufthavnen reduceres.
Furthermore, Ryanair states that if certain standard charges applicable at the Airport are eliminated or decreased, it would not enjoy any benefit since the combined landing, airport departure and handling charge provided for under the Agreement does not decrease when standard charges at the Airport decrease.
Denne risiko påtog Ryanair sig på tidspunktet for aftalens indgåelse.
This was a risk assumed by Ryanair when the Agreement was concluded.
Aftalen opfylder markedsinvestorprincippet
The Agreement meets the market economy investor principle
Ryanair bestrider Kommissionens foreløbige konklusion om, at fordi de slovakiske myndigheder har nævnt regional økonomisk udvikling og eventuelle indgående investeringer og andre sekundære og tertiære økonomiske konsekvenser blandt aftalens fordele, er markedsinvestorprincippet ikke opfyldt.
Ryanair disputes the preliminary findings of the Commission that, because the Slovak authorities mentioned regional economic development, possible incoming investment and other secondary and tertiary economic effects among the advantages provided by the Agreement, the market economy investor principle has not been fulfilled.
Ryanair anfører endvidere, at det ligeledes i en e-mail af 16. november 2004 anføres, at BTS analyserede risici i forbindelse med aftalen, som f.eks. at serviceafgiften kun omfattede afgifter under BTS' kontrol (dvs. serviceafgiften omfattede ikke flyvekontrol, da BTS ikke kontrollerer denne).
Ryanair further states that an e-mail of 16 November 2004 also indicates that BTS had analysed the risks associated with the Agreement; for instance, it agreed to include in the service charge only those charges under its control (e.g. it did not include air traffic control in its service charge as BTS does not control it).
Ryanair gav ligeledes eksempler på, at den havde givet BTS en UNISYS-rapport om sekundære lufthavnes evne til at erobre noget af de primære lufthavnes trafik.
Ryanair also gives the example that it provided BTS with a UNISYS report concerning the ability of secondary airports to capture some traffic from primary airports.
Ryanair forklarer, at de afgifter, selskabet betaler til BTS, svarer til eller er højere end afgifterne i andre sammenlignelige lufthavne (f.eks. den privatejede Blackpool lufthavn i Det Forenede Kongerige).
Ryanair explains that the charges it paid to BTS are similar to or even higher than those at other comparable airports (e.g. privately owned Blackpool Airport in the United Kingdom).
Ryanair hævder endvidere, at selskabet ligeledes gav eksempler på afgifter i talrige privatejede og privatfinansierede lufthavne til Kommissionen på forskellige stadier i den administrative og juridiske fase af Charleroi-sagen og henviser til argumenter, oplysninger og konklusioner i Charleroi-sagen med henblik på en uddybende forklaring.
Ryanair also argues that it has provided the Commission with examples of charges at numerous privately owned and privately financed airports at various stages during the administrative and judicial phases of the Charleroi case, and refers to the arguments, data, and conclusions provided in that case for further explanations.
Efter Ryanairs opfattelse er der ikke behov for en kompleks økonomisk vurdering, eftersom en enkelt sammenligning af lufthavnsafgifter i forskellige privatejede og -finansierede lufthavne burde være tilstrækkelig.
In its opinion there is no need for a complex economic assessment; a simple comparison of airport charges at different privately owned and financed airports should be sufficient.
Ryanair mener endvidere, at eftersom selskabet har forpligtet sig til mindst […] ruter om dagen — svarende til over 2 mio. passagerer om året ved en given lastfaktor på 75 % — fra Bratislava lufthavn fra den 1. juli 2009, gav det lufthavnen en stabil indtægt.
Ryanair is also of the opinion that, as it has committed itself to operate at least […] routes per day — the equivalent of over 2 million passengers per annum assuming a 75 % load factor — from Bratislava Airport starting on 1 July 2009, it provided a stable income stream for the Airport.
Ryanair påpeger endvidere, at denne indtægt var garanteret af en bod, som ville udgøre afgifter for […] ruter pr. dag, hvis Ryanair ikke opfyldte sin forpligtelse.
In addition, Ryanair points out that this income was guaranteed by a penalty which would amount to charges for […] routes per day if Ryanair did not meet its commitment.
Ryanair mener således, at de lavere afgifter i lufthavnen blev anvendt under hensyntagen til en økonomisk fordel og er dermed i overensstemmelse med markedsinvestorprincippet.
Therefore, in its opinion the lower charges at the Airport were applied with a view to an economic advantage, and it is thus in line with the market economy investor principle.
Derudover er serviceafgiften for nye destinationer baseret på flyfrekvenser (syv flyvninger pr. uge) og svarer til over 100000 passagerer pr. år (under forudsætning af en lastfaktor på 75 %).
In addition, the service charge for new destinations is based on flight frequencies (seven flights per week) and equals over 100000 passengers per year (assuming a 75 % load factor).
Ryanair forklarer, at rabatterne for nye destinationer på observationstidspunktet kun var gældende for ruten mellem Bratislava og Frankfurt Hahn.
Ryanair explains that the discounts for new destinations at the time of its observations only applied to the route between Bratislava and Frankfurt-Hahn.
Selskabet forklarer endvidere, at BTS' rabatter på nye destinationer er i overensstemmelse med praksis i branchen, eftersom mange privatejede og offentligt ejede lufthavne anvender samme eller større rabatter på nye destinationer.
It also argues that discounts granted by BTS for new destinations are in line with industry practice, as many privately and publicly owned airports apply the same, or a higher, level of discounts for new destinations.
Ryanair præciserer endvidere, at selskabet ved at tilføre lufthavnen et stort antal passagerer bidrager til at maksimere ikke-luftfartsindtægter og benyttelse af lufthavnen.
Ryanair further explains that, by providing the Airport with a large number of passengers, it helps to maximise its non-aviation revenues and terminal utilisation.
Ikke-luftfartsindtægterne omfatter parkeringsafgifter for passagerer, indtægter fra virksomheder tilknyttet lufthavnen som biludlejning, butikker, banker, postkontorer og restauranter, indtægter fra transporttjenester til nabobyer og reklameindtægter.
Non-aviation revenue includes parking charges for passengers, revenue from businesses attached to the airport such as car rental, shops, banks, post office and restaurants, revenue for shuttle services to neighbouring cities and advertising revenue.
Derudover mener Ryanair, at lufthavnen kan generere yderligere indtægter som følge af provision fra billetter og ekstra bagage og spare omkostninger, der skyldes forskellige indcheckningsprocedurer.
In addition, Ryanair is of the opinion that the Airport can generate additional revenue from ticketing and excess baggage charges and save costs by using different check-in procedures.
Ryanair afviser klagerens forudsætning om, at et flys lastfaktor angiveligt udgør 84 %, og at et flys maksimale startvægt er 69,9 tons.
Ryanair rejects the complainant’s assumptions that the load factor of its aircraft allegedly amounts to 84 % and that the maximum take-off mass per plane is 69,9 tonnes.
Disse forudsætninger overdrives for at forstørre den fordel, som Ryanair angiveligt har.
Those assumptions are exaggerated in order to magnify the amount of the alleged advantage granted to Ryanair.
Ryanair præciserer endvidere, at selskabets forudsætning om lastfaktoren pr. fly, da det forhandlede med BTS, var 75-80 %, og at dette blev bekræftet af efterfølgende statistikker.
Ryanair further explains that its assumption for the load factor per aircraft when it was negotiating with BTS was 75-80 %, which was confirmed by ex-post statistics.
Ryanairs flys maksimale startmasse til og fra Bratislava lufthavn er 67 tons.
The maximum take-off mass of Ryanair aircraft operating to and from Bratislava Airport is 67 tonnes.
Ryanair mener, at det allerede i 2005 kunne ses, at den indgåede aftale med BTS ville gøre lufthavnen mere rentabel og dermed give aktionærerne en merværdi.
In Ryanair’s view, it was foreseeable as early as 2005 that the Agreement concluded with BTS would make the Airport more profitable and thus provide an added value to shareholders.
Selskabet har indgået lignende kontrakter med andre privatejede og offentligt ejede lufthavne som London-Stansted, London-Luton, Prestwick eller Hahn.
It has concluded similar contracts with other privately and publicly owned airports such as London-Stansted, London-Luton, Prestwick or Hahn.
Manglende selektivitet
Absence of selectivity
Ryanair mener, at foranstaltningerne mangler selektivitet, da aftalen ikke blev indgået som eksklusivaftale, og andre luftfartsselskaber kunne have opnået samme betingelser som Ryanair på baggrund af forpligtelserne.
In the opinion of Ryanair, the measure lacks selectivity because the Agreement was concluded on a non-exclusive basis and any other air carrier could have obtained the same conditions granted to Ryanair on the basis of the commitments.
Selskabet mener endvidere, at aftalen er gennemsigtig og ikke diskriminerer i anvendelsen af de finansielle og driftsmæssige betingelser, som tilbydes andre luftfartsselskaber.
It is also of the opinion that the Agreement provides for transparency and non-discrimination in the application of the financial and operational conditions offered to other airlines.
Ryanair forklarer endvidere, at lufthavnen på tidspunktet for aftalens indgåelse opererede under sin kapacitet og ville have kunnet omfatte Ryanairs konkurrenter.
Ryanair further explains that, at the time the Agreement was concluded, the Airport operated below its available capacity and that it would have been able to accommodate competitors of Ryanair.
Selskabet anfører endvidere, at Sky Europe havde som minimum de samme betingelser som Ryanair, eftersom deres forpligtelser var sammenlignelige.
It further states that Sky Europe enjoyed at least the same conditions as Ryanair as its commitments were comparable.
Indvirkning på handlen mellem medlemsstaterne og konkurrenceforvridning
Effect on trade between Member States and distortion of competition
Ryanair bestrider Kommissionens foreløbige konklusioner i indledningen af proceduren i forbindelse med konkurrenceforvridning og indvirkningen på handlen mellem medlemsstaterne.
Ryanair disputes the Commission’s preliminary findings in the opening of the procedure in relation to the distortion of competition and the effect on trade between Member States.
Selskabet rejser især indsigelse mod, at Kommissionen ikke analyserede aftalerne mellem konkurrerende luftfartsselskaber og lufthavne.
In particular, it objects to the fact that the Commission did not analyse arrangements between competing airlines and airports.
BEMÆRKNINGER FRA SLOVAKIET OM BEMÆRKNINGER FRA TREDJEPARTER
COMMENTS FROM SLOVAKIA ON THIRD-PARTY COMMENTS
De slovakiske myndigheder indledte deres bemærkninger med at anføre, at de fuldt ud støtter BTS' og Ryanairs argumenter om, at aftalen ikke omfatter statsstøtte til Ryanair, og at den blev indgået på markedsvilkår.
The Slovak authorities began their observations by stating that they fully support the arguments of BTS and Ryanair that the Agreement does not involve State aid to Ryanair and that it was concluded on market terms.
Med hensyn til, om aftalen kan tilregnes staten, understreger de navnlig, at aftalen først blev indgået efter en langvarig forhandling mellem lufthavnens ledelse og Ryanair.
With regard to the imputability of the Agreement to the State, they stress in particular that the Agreement was concluded only after a long-term negotiation process between the Airport management and Ryanair.
De slovakiske myndigheder mener, at hvis aftalen kan tilregnes staten, ville forhandlingsprocessen have været kortere.
In the opinion of the Slovak authorities, if the Agreement were imputable to the State the negotiation process would have been faster.
Det er ligeledes indlysende, at aftalen ikke blev indgået under pres.
It is also evident that the Agreement was not concluded under pressure.
De hævder endvidere, at lufthavnen er uafhængig af de lokale og regionale myndigheder, og at den kunne finansiere sine driftsomkostninger af indtægterne uden de offentlige myndigheders indgriben.
They also argue that the Airport is independent of local and regional authorities and that it was able to finance its operating costs from revenue without intervention from the authorities.
De slovakiske myndigheder hævder endvidere, at BTS fungerede som markedsinvestor med det formål at opnå de mest gunstige kontraktmæssige vilkår for lufthavnen.
The Slovak authorities also argue that BTS acted as a market investor with the objective of obtaining the most favourable contract terms for the Airport.
BTS sendte for nylig en rapport til Den Slovakiske Republiks finansministerium udarbejdet i 2003 af en konsulentvirksomhed i forbindelse med lufthavnens lavprisstrategi.
BTS had recently submitted to the Ministry of Finance a report compiled in late 2003 by a consultancy firm in relation to the low-cost strategy at the airport.
Formålet med rapporten var at beskrive aktiviteter og tendenser i lavprisluftfartsselskaberne verden over og i det centrale Europa for at give lufthavnens ledelse henstillinger om priser, markedsføring og finansielle spørgsmål.
The purpose of this report was to describe the activities of and trends in the low-cost airline business worldwide and in central Europe in order to provide the airport management with recommendations on prices, marketing and financial issues.
En anden analyse blev gennemført i april 2004 med henblik på at vurdere væksten i antallet af passagerer i lufthavnen og prismulighederne.
Another analysis was conducted in April 2004 in order to assess passenger growth at the airport and pricing possibilities.
De slovakiske myndigheder bekræfter, at BTS ligeledes benyttede eller tilbød rabatter på nye planlagte destinationer til andre luftfartsselskaber som Easyjet og Sky Europe, og at aftalen med Ryanair ikke udgjorde nogen speciel undtagelse.
The Slovak authorities confirm that BTS also applied or offered discounts for new scheduled destinations to other carriers, such as Easyjet and Sky Europe, and that the Agreement with Ryanair did not constitute a special derogation.
De hævder endvidere, at definitionen af en »ny destination« kunne sammenlignes med de andre luftfartsselskabers definition, og at Ryanair på ingen måde blev favoriseret.
They also state that the definition of ‘new destination’ was comparable to the one used with other carriers and in no respect was Ryanair favoured.
De slovakiske myndigheder præciserer endvidere, at selv om de mener, at aftalen med Ryanair ikke omfatter statsstøtte, har de anmodet lufthavnen om en efterfølgende analyse af aftalens rentabilitet.
The Slovak authorities further explain that, although they are of the opinion that the Agreement with Ryanair does not involve State aid, they have asked the Airport for an ex-post analysis of the profitability of the Agreement.
Resultatet af analysen var, at lufthavnens rentabilitet som følge af aftalen var 8,5-10 % i 2006-2007.
The result of this analysis was that the Airport achieved 8,5 %-10 % profitability from the Agreement in 2006-2007.
Statsstøtte i henhold til artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF
State aid under Article 107(1) TFEU
I traktatens (TEUF) artikel 107, stk. 1, fastsættes følgende: »… er statsstøtte eller støtte, som ydes ved hjælp af statsmidler under enhver tænkelig form, og som fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene ved at begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner, uforenelig med det indre marked, i det omfang den påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.«
Under Article 107(1) TFEU, ‘any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.’
Kriterierne i artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF er kumulative.
The criteria laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU are cumulative.
For at beslutte, om den pågældende foranstaltning udgør statsstøtte i den i artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF anførte forstand, skal alle følgende kriterier opfyldes.
Therefore, in order to determine whether the measure in question constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, all of the following conditions need to be met.
Den finansielle støtte skal især:
Specifically, the financial support should:
ydes af staten eller ved hjælp af statsmidler
be granted by the State or through State resources,
begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner
favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods,
fordreje eller true med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene og
distort or threaten to distort competition,
påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
affect trade between Member States.
I nærværende sag har de slovakiske myndigheder hævdet, at BTS har handlet, som en markedsinvestor ville have gjort i samme situation.
In the present case, the Slovak authorities have argued that BTS has acted as a market economy investor would have done in a similar situation.
Hvis dette er tilfældet, har Ryanair ikke draget fordel af aftalen, og den omfatter ikke statsstøtte.
If this is the case, Ryanair has not been favoured by the Agreement and no State aid is involved.
Anvendelse af markedsinvestorprincippet
Application of the market economy investor principle
I sin vurdering af, om aftalen blev indgået på normale markedsvilkår skal Kommissionen undersøge, om en privat investor, der opererer på normale markedsvilkår, under lignende omstændigheder ville have indgået samme eller lignende handelsaftaler med BTS [20].
In assessing whether the Agreement was concluded under normal market conditions, the Commission has to examine whether, in similar circumstances, a private investor operating under normal market economy conditions would have entered into the same or similar commercial arrangements as BTS [20].
Begge interesserede parter (dvs. BTS og Ryanair) hævder, at andre privatejede og offentligt ejede lufthavne giver rabatter baseret på antal passagerer og rabatter på nye destinationer, idet de forventer øget rentabilitet og bedre udnyttelse af infrastrukturen.
Both interested parties (i.e. BTS and Ryanair) claim that other privately and publicly owned airports also grant passenger-volume-based discounts and discounts for new destinations while expecting an increase in their profitability and improved utilisation of infrastructure.
De mener derfor, at Kommissionen bør begrænse sin undersøgelse af den private markedsinvestor til en sammenligning af de afgifter, som er omfattet af aftalen, samt de lufthavnsafgifter, som anvendes i andre europæiske lufthavne over for lavprisluftfartsselskaber.
Thus they are of the opinion that the Commission should limit its private market investor test to comparing the charges contained in the Agreement with airport charges applied to low-cost airlines at other European airports.
Ryanair hævder især, at afgifterne i Bratislava lufthavn svarer til eller endda er højere end dem, der anvendes i sammenlignelige lufthavne (f.eks. Blackpool lufthavn i Det Forenede Kongerige).
In particular, Ryanair submits that charges at Bratislava Airport are similar to or even higher than those at other comparable airports (e. g. Blackpool Airport in the United Kingdom).
I denne henseende finder Kommissionen, at selv om de lufthavnsafgifter, som anvendes i andre europæiske lufthavne, kan udgøre et generelt sammenligningsgrundlag for priserne på lufthavnstjenester, kan det ikke konkluderes, at BTS i netop denne sag har handlet som en privat investor.
In this regard, the Commission considers that even though the airport charges applied at other European airports may provide a very general benchmark for the pricing of airport services, they do not allow for the conclusion that BTS acted as a private investor in this particular case.
Indtægts- og omkostningsstrukturen er forskellig fra lufthavn til lufthavn.
The revenue and cost structure differs from airport to airport.
Den afhænger især af lufthavnens udviklingsstade, navnlig med hensyn til antal passagerer, de ruter, som opereres til/fra lufthavnen, den tilgængelige kapacitet (overkapacitet, kapacitetsbegrænsninger eller behov for nye investeringer som følge af stigninger i antallet af passagerer), infrastrukturens levetid, behov for udskiftningsinvesteringer og afskrivningsniveauer, regelbyrden, som kan variere fra medlemsstat til medlemsstat, og den historiske gæld og forpligtelser.
They depend in particular on the airport’s state of development, especially with regard to passenger numbers, airlines operating from/to the airport, available capacity (overcapacity, capacity restrictions or the need for new investment due to an increase in passenger volumes), the useful life of infrastructure, the need for replacement investment, depreciation levels, the regulatory burden, which may vary from Member State to Member State, and historical debts and obligations.