natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Endvidere hævdede den nederlandske stat, at Kommissionen — hvis den skulle drage den konklusion, at foranstaltning Z udgjorde statsstøtte — skulle anvende en korrektion.
Furthermore, the Dutch State claimed that the Commission – if it were to come to the conclusion that Measure Z implied State aid – should apply a correction.
Eftersom tilsvarende instrumenter i andre banker blev handlet til en betydelig rabat i forhold til pari [80], var det logisk, at markedsværdien af de gældsinstrumenter, som den nederlandske stat havde givet afkald på, også var under pari. De aktuelle markedsforhold tydede med andre ord på, at den nederlandske stat ikke var berettiget til pari, men til en lavere markedsværdi.
Since similar instruments of other banks were trading at a substantial discount to par [80], it was logical that the market value of the debt instruments waived by the Dutch State was also below par. In other words, the prevailing market circumstances suggested that the Dutch State was not entitled to par value but to a lower market value.
Den nederlandske stat anførte, at den under hensyntagen til de aktuelle markedsforhold kun var berettiget til en markedsværdi på [4,55 - 5,85] mia. EUR (så pariværdien af lånene på 6,5 mia. EUR korrigeret for en markedsrabat på [0,65 - 1,95] mia. EUR).
The Dutch State argued that, taking into account the then prevailing market circumstances, it was only entitled to a market value of EUR [4,55 - 5,85] billion (so the par value of the loans of EUR 6,5 billion corrected for a market discount of EUR [0,65 - 1,95] billion).
Bemærkninger fra den nederlandske stat om afgørelsen af 5. februar 2010
Comments from the Dutch State on the Decision of 5 February 2010
Generelt anførte den nederlandske stat, at de trufne foranstaltninger ikke udgør statsstøtte, fordi foranstaltningerne:
In general, the Dutch State argued that the measures taken did not constitute State aid because the measures:
ikke var til fordel for ABN AMRO N eller FBN,
did not benefit ABN AMRO N nor FBN,
var nødvendige for at udskille ABN AMRO N og FBN fra deres respektive tidligere moderselskaber og var en følge af den nederlandske stats kontraktmæssige forpligtelser som retssuccessor til Fortis SA/NV i aktionæroverenskomsten eller
were necessary to separate ABN AMRO N and FBN from their respective former parent companies and followed from contractual obligations of the Dutch State as successor to Fortis SA/NV in the CSA, or
var økonomisk rationelle ud fra en privat investors synspunkt.
were economically rational from the viewpoint of a private investor.
Den nederlandske stat hævdede, at Kommissionen skulle anvende det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip på alle de foranstaltninger, som den nederlandske stat havde truffet.
The Dutch State argued that the Commission should apply the MEIP to every individual measure that the Dutch State had taken.
Navnlig med hensyn til de fusionsrelaterede foranstaltninger (dvs. foranstaltning B4 og B5) understregede den nederlandske stat, at fusionen var en investering med en positiv nettonutidsværdi og derfor forenelig med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
Particularly concerning the merger-related measures (namely Measures B4 and B5), the Dutch State underlined that the merger was an investment with a positive net present value (‘NPV’) and therefore compatible with the MEIP.
Den nederlandske stat accepterede med andre ord ikke Kommissionens foreløbige udtalelse i betragtning 96 i afgørelsen af 5. februar 2010 om, at det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip ikke fandt anvendelse på foranstaltningerne efter de integrerede transaktioner af 3. oktober 2008, eftersom disse foranstaltninger udgjorde en del af en større rednings- og omstruktureringsoperation.
In other words, the Dutch State did not accept the Commission’s preliminary position, as developed in recital 96 of the Decision of 5 February 2010, that the MEIP did not apply to the measures following the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008 State, since those measures were part of a larger rescue and restructuring operation.
Den nederlandske stat anerkendte, at statsstøttereglerne betyder, at det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip ikke finder anvendelse, når der foretages flere sammenhængende kapitaltilførsler inden for en kort periode.
The Dutch State acknowledged that the State aid rules imply that the MEIP does not apply when several interconnected capital injections are made in a short time period.
Ikke desto mindre anførte den, at denne analyse ikke holdt stik i forhold til FBN og ABN AMRO N, da de integrerede transaktioner af 3. oktober 2008 — efter statens mening — ikke indeholdt statsstøtteforanstaltninger, og eftersom de opfølgende foranstaltninger endvidere ikke var knyttet til den indledende transaktion.
Nevertheless it argued that this analysis did not hold true for FBN and ABN AMRO N as the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008 – in its view – did not contain State aid measures and, in addition, the follow-up measures were not connected to the initial transaction.
Den nederlandske stat anførte, at Kommissionen burde tage højde for de meget specifikke omstændigheder, hvorunder den nederlandske stat skulle købe FBN.
The Dutch State argued that the Commission should take into account the very specific circumstances under which the Dutch State was obliged to buy FBN.
Den nederlandske stat påpegede derudover, at salget af New HBU havde været en stor byrde for den nederlandske stat og for ABN AMRO N med en negativ kapitalvirkning på 470 mio. EUR.
The Dutch State also pointed out that the sale of New HBU had been very burdensome for the Dutch State and for ABN AMRO N with a negative capital impact of EUR 470 million.
Den nederlandske stat hævdede at have baseret alle sine foranstaltninger på principperne i bankmeddelelsen [84] og meddelelsen fra Kommissionen — Rekapitalisering af pengeinstitutter under den aktuelle finanskrise: Støttens begrænsning til det nødvendige minimum og sikkerhedsforanstaltninger mod uforholdsmæssige konkurrencefordrejninger [85] (»rekapitaliseringsmeddelelsen«).
The Dutch State claimed to have based all its measures on the principles set forward in the Banking Communication [84] and the Communication from the Commission — The recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition [85] (the ‘Recapitalisation Communication’).
Generelt hævdede den nederlandske stat, at dens foranstaltninger var velfokuserede, stod i forhold til de aktuelle udfordringer og udformet, så de minimerede de negative bivirkninger i forhold til konkurrenterne.
In general, the Dutch State argued that its measures were well-targeted, proportionate to the challenges faced and designed so as to minimise negative spill-over effects to competitors.
Den nederlandske stat hævdede, at foranstaltning A og B1 ikke udgjorde statsstøtte, eftersom staten var kontraktmæssigt forpligtet til at løse de kapitalproblemer, som ABN AMRO Z stod over for. Den nederlandske stat var under en kontraktmæssig forpligtelse i aktionæroverenskomsten til at gennemføre udskillelsen fra ABN AMRO Holding.
The Dutch State argued Measure A and Measure B1 did not qualify as State aid, since the State was contractually obliged to resolve capital problems faced by ABN AMRO Z. The Dutch State was contractually obliged under the CSA to implement the separation of ABN AMRO Holding.
DNB tillod kun, at udskillelsen af ABN AMRO II blev påbegyndt, hvis alle medlemmerne af konsortiet havde betalt deres andel af ABN AMRO Z's kapitalunderskud. Den nederlandske stat indrømmede, at den ydede kapital til ABN AMRO Z via ABN AMRO N, men understregede, at ABN AMRO N kun fungerede som mellemled.
DNB only allowed the separation of ABN AMRO II to start if all the consortium members had paid their share in the capital shortage of ABN AMRO Z. The Dutch State admitted that it had provided capital to ABN AMRO Z via ABN AMRO N but it underlined that ABN AMRO N only acted as an intermediate vehicle.
I sidste ende havde ABN AMRO N kun sendt kapital videre til ABN AMRO Z, og foranstaltning A gav ikke nogen selektiv fordel for ABN AMRO N.
Ultimately, ABN AMRO N had only passed capital through to ABN AMRO Z and Measure A did not selectively advantage ABN AMRO N.
Med hensyn til om kapitalunderskuddet i ABN AMRO Z skyldtes selektive fordele for ABN AMRO N, anførte den nederlandske stat, at medlemmerne af konsortiet allerede på tidspunktet for konsortiets overtagelse af ABN AMRO Holdings (se betragtning 33) havde sikret, at aktiviteterne i de forskellige sporingsaktier (som defineret i betragtning 35) var tilstrækkelig afgrænset i forhold til hinanden.
As to whether the capital shortage of ABN AMRO Z was the result of selective advantages granted to ABN AMRO N, the Dutch State stated that the consortium members had already ensured at the time of the acquisition of ABN AMRO Holdings by the consortium (see recital 33) that the activities of the different tracking shares (as defined in recital 35) were sufficiently ring-fenced vis-à-vis one another.
Denne ordning betød, at der også var en klar skelnen mellem aktiviteterne i ABN AMRO N og ABN AMRO Z. Det betød f.eks., at ABN AMRO N havde sin egen virksomhedsledelsesstruktur og sin egen rapportering.
That arrangement meant that there was also a clear distinction between the activities of ABN AMRO N and ABN AMRO Z. It meant for instance that ABN AMRO N had its own corporate governance structure and its own reporting.
Den nederlandske stat henledte også Kommissionens opmærksomhed på, at ABN AMRO N havde særskilt juridisk status pr. 6. februar 2010 [86].
The Dutch State also drew the Commission’s attention to the fact that ABN AMRO N had separate legal status as of 6 February 2010 [86].
Den nederlandske stat dokumenterede endvidere, at ABN AMRO Z's kapitalunderskud allerede eksisterede på overtagelsestidspunktet den 3. oktober 2008.
The Dutch State also provided evidence that the ABN AMRO Z capital shortfall already existed at the time of the acquisition of 3 October 2008.
Med hensyn til ABN AMRO Z's omkostninger i forbindelse med hovedkvarterfunktioner understregede den nederlandske stat, at disse omkostninger faldt drastisk, efter at medlemmerne af konsortiet overtog ABN AMRO Holding som beskrevet i betragtning 33.
With respect to the costs borne by ABN AMRO Z related to head office functions, the Dutch State underlined that those costs decreased dramatically after the acquisition of ABN AMRO Holding by the consortium members described in recital 33.
Eftersom medlemmerne af konsortiet ikke havde nogen interesse i at bevare et stort integreret hovedkontor, var det logisk at holde disse omkostninger så lave som muligt.
Since the consortium members had no interest in maintaining a large integrated head office, it was logical to keep those costs as low as possible.
Tallene fra den nederlandske stat viste, at ABN AMRO Z's koncernfunktionsomkostninger udgjorde [0 - 0,5] mia. EUR i 2008 og [0 - 0,2] mia. EUR i 2009, hvilket den nederlandske stat anså for at være ubetydeligt.
Figures provided by the Dutch State showed that group function costs borne by ABN AMRO Z were EUR [0 - 0,5] billion in 2008 and EUR [0 - 0,2] billion in 2009, which the Dutch State considered to be negligible.
Den nederlandske stat understregede endvidere, at den påtog sig forpligtelsen til at absorbere disse omkostninger, da den erstattede Fortis SA/NV som part i aktionæroverenskomsten efter overtagelsen af FBN (inklusive ABN AMRO N) den 3. oktober 2008.
The Dutch State also underlined that it incurred the obligation to absorb those costs when it replaced Fortis SA/NV as a party to the CSA, following the acquisition of FBN (including ABN AMRO N) on 3 October 2008.
Hvis Kommissionen mente, at foranstaltning A er statsstøtte, hævdede den nederlandske stat, at meddelelsen om værdiforringede aktiver [87] ikke bør finde anvendelse.
Should the Commission consider Measure A as State aid, the Dutch State argued that the Impaired Asset Communication [87] should not apply.
Ifølge den nederlandske stat var der ingen usikkerhed i vurderingen af de beskyttede aktiver, som derfor ikke kunne anses for at være »værdiforringede« i den i meddelelsen anvendte forstand.
According to the Dutch State, there was no uncertainty on the valuation of the protected assets, which therefore could not be considered ‘impaired’ in the sense used in the Communication.
Hvis Kommissionen ikke var enig i dette, medgav den nederlandske regering, at ABN AMRO N's CDS fortsat opfyldte de generelle principper i denne meddelelse.
Should the Commission not share its point of view, the Dutch government contended that ABN AMRO N’s CDS still complied with the general principles of that Communication.
Endvidere hævdede den, at kreditbeskyttelsesinstrumentet var nødvendigt og proportionalt, samtidig med at konkurrencefordrejningerne blev holdt på et minimum.
Moreover, it argued that the credit protection instrument was necessary and proportional, while keeping competition distortions to the minimum.
Den nederlandske stat slog fast, at forrentningen af kapitalfrigørelsesinstrumentet — et afkast på 10 % af den frigjorte kapital — var tilstrækkelig høj.
The Dutch State asserted that the remuneration of the CRI – a 10 % return of the freed up capital – was sufficiently high.
Den nederlandske stat mente også, at kapitalfrigørelsesinstrumentet indeholdt tilstrækkelige exitincitamenter.
The Dutch State also believed that the CRI contained sufficient exit incentives.
Den nederlandske stat henledte Kommissionens opmærksomhed på inddrivelsen i kapitalfrigørelsesinstrumentet og på, at kapitalfrigørelsesinstrumentet ikke længere ville være attraktivt, når ABN AMRO Group fik lov til at operere under Basel II-kravene.
The Dutch State drew the Commission’s attention to the calls included in the CRI and to the fact that the CRI would become rather unattractive once ABN AMRO Group was allowed to operate under Basel II requirements.
På denne baggrund mente den nederlandske stat, at ABN AMRO N sandsynligvis ville inddrive kapitalfrigørelsesinstrumentet i januar 2011, hvor overgangen til Basel II-kravene forventedes at medføre en reduktion i den frigjorte kapital.
Against that background, the Dutch State believed that ABN AMRO N would probably call the CRI in January 2011, when the transition to Basel II requirements was expected to result in a reduction of the freed up capital.
Den nederlandske stat afviste, at disse omkostninger gav ABN AMRO N en fordel, og den forklarede, at den betalte udskillelsesomkostningerne, eftersom det var statens kontraktmæssige ansvar at gennemføre udskillelsen.
The Dutch State denied that those costs provided ABN AMRO N with a benefit and it also explained that it paid for the separation costs as it was the State’s contractual obligation to implement the separation.
Hvad angår forsigtighedsmargenen på 500 mio. EUR — ligeledes kategoriseret under udskillelsesomkostninger — anførte den nederlandske stat, at det var almindelig bankpraksis.
With respect to the prudential margin of EUR 500 million – also categorised under separation costs -, the Dutch State argued it was common banking practice.
Banker kan ikke operere med kun minimumskapitalkravet, men har brug for en yderligere sikkerhedsmargen.
Banks cannot operate with only the minimum required capital but need an additional comfort margin.
Ellers ville bankerne, hvis de oplever et — om end lille — tilbageslag, omgående støde ind i finansielle problemer.
Otherwise, should banks face – even a small – setback, they would immediately run into financial trouble.
Den nederlandske stat anførte imidlertid, at bidraget til forsigtighedsmargenen bør være midlertidigt, og at ABN AMRO N på længere sigt selv bør generere forsigtighedsmargenen uden hjælp fra den nederlandske stat.
The Dutch State indicated, however, that its contribution to the prudential margin should be temporary and that, in the longer-term, ABN AMRO N should generate the prudential margin itself without any help by the Dutch State.
Med hensyn til foranstaltning B4 hævdede den nederlandske stat, at foranstaltningen ikke udgjorde statsstøtte.
With respect to Measure B4, the Dutch State argued that the measure did not constitute State aid.
Den nederlandske stat hævdede, at beslutningen om at fusionere begge banker allerede var truffet og delvist gennemført, da den overtog FBN.
The Dutch State argued that the decision to merge both banks was already taken and partly implemented when it acquired FBN.
Den nederlandske stat anførte derudover, at ABN AMRO N's finansielle midler i sidste ende ikke ville øges, og den forsvarede derfor den holdning, at foranstaltning B4 ikke udgjorde statsstøtte.
The Dutch State also indicated that ultimately ABN AMRO N’s financial means would not increase and therefore it defended the position that Measure B4 did not constitute State aid.
Den nederlandske stat anførte, at statslige midler, der blev ydet til at finansiere integrationsomkostninger (foranstaltning B5), skulle ses som en rationel investering, der gav sunde afkast i form af synergier.
The Dutch State indicated that the State funds granted to finance integration costs (Measure B5) should be seen as a rational investment, leading to healthy returns in the form of synergies.
Den nederlandske regering anslog, at disse synergier havde en værdi på omkring 1,1 mia. EUR om året (før skat), mens de direkte integrationsomkostninger udgjorde 1,2 mia. EUR (efter skat).
The Dutch government estimated those synergies at around EUR 1,1 billion a year (pre-tax), while the upfront integration costs amount to EUR 1,2 billion (after-tax).
Ifølge den nederlandske stat burde den samlede nettonutidsværdi af fusionen (under hensyntagen til synergier, integrationsomkostninger og omkostningerne i forbindelse med fusionstilsagnet) udgøre et positivt beløb på 2,88 mia. EUR [89].
According to the Dutch State, the total NPV of the merger (taking into account synergies, integration costs and the cost of the Merger Remedy) should amount to a positive EUR 2,88 billion [89].
Ifølge den nederlandske stat var konverteringen fra tier 2- til tier 1-kapital (foranstaltning C) ikke selektivt til fordel for FBN.
According to the Dutch State, the conversion of Tier 2 into Tier 1 capital (Measure C) did not selectively advantage FBN.
Den nederlandske stat hævdede, at konverteringen var i den nederlandske stats interesse, eftersom den kunne konvertere lån med en gennemsnitlig kuponrente på 2,976 % til egenkapital, som efter dens mening havde en attraktiv forrentning.
The Dutch State claimed that the conversion was in the Dutch State’s interest as it was able to convert loans with an average coupon of 2,976 % into equity that, in its view, had an attractive remuneration.
I denne forbindelse henviste den nederlandske stat til ABN AMRO Groups forventede normaliserede egenkapitalforrentning for 2012 på ca. […] % som anført i omstruktureringsplanen for december 2009.
In that regard, the Dutch State referred to ABN AMRO Group’s projected normalised 2012 RoE of approximately […] % as put forward in the December 2009 Restructuring Plan.
Hvis Kommissionen mener, at foranstaltning C er statsstøtte, anførte den nederlandske stat, at Kommissionen ikke skulle anse alle frafaldne lån for at være statsstøtte.
Should the Commission consider Measure C to be State aid, the Dutch State argued that the Commission should not consider all loans waived as State aid.
Den forklarede, at konverteringen kunne inddeles i tilbagebetaling af tier 2-kapital til pari kombineret med tilførsel af tier 1-kernekapital (uden nettokontantvirkninger).
It explained that the conversion could be broken down in a repayment of Tier 2 capital at par in combination with a core Tier 1 capital injection (with no net cash implications).
Ifølge den nederlandske stat kunne den ikke med rimelighed have forventet en tilbagebetaling af tier 2-kapital til pari på det pågældende tidspunkt, eftersom sammenlignelige instrumenter fra andre banker blev handlet med en anselig rabat i forhold til pari, hvilket viser de skrøbelige forhold på markedet.
According to the Dutch State, it could not have reasonably expected repayment of Tier 2 capital at par at that time, since comparable instruments of other banks were trading at a substantial discount to par reflecting fragile market circumstances.
Den nederlandske stat anførte, at en rabat på [135 - 405] mio. EUR var berettiget baseret på sammenlignelige tal.
The Dutch State indicated that a discount of EUR [135 - 405] million was justified, based on comparable figures.
Den nederlandske stat anførte, at betalingen på 740 mio. EUR (foranstaltning D) var en af dens forpligtelser i henhold til aktionæroverenskomsten.
The Dutch State indicated that the payment of EUR 740 million (Measure D) was one of its obligations stemming from the CSA.
Endvidere understregede den nederlandske stat, at der kun var betalinger til de andre medlemmer af konsortiet og ikke til ABN AMRO N, så ABN AMRO N modtog heller ikke statsstøtte.
Moreover, the Dutch State underlined that there were only payments to the other consortium members and not to ABN AMRO N, so that there was also no State aid provided to ABN AMRO N.
Vedrørende foranstaltning E anførte den nederlandske stat, at ABN AMRO II ikke drog fordel af modgarantien (beskrevet i betragtning 126), men at foranstaltning E blot satte ABN AMRO II i stand til at yde Deutsche Bank en modgaranti.
Regarding Measure E, the Dutch State argued that ABN AMRO II did not benefit from the counter-indemnity (described in recital 126), but that Measure E merely put ABN AMRO II in a position to provide a counter-indemnity to Deutsche Bank.
Den hævdede, at modgarantien ikke kunne anvendes af banken til at udvikle nye forretninger og derfor ikke ville medføre nogen konkurrencefordrejninger.
It claimed that the counter-indemnity could not be used by the bank for development of new business and would therefore not give rise to any distortion of competition.
Den nederlandske stat mente, at modgarantien stemte overens med Kommissionens rekapitaliseringsmeddelse.
The Dutch State considered the counter-indemnity to be in line with the Commission’s Recapitalisation Communication.
Den nederlandske stat understregede, at den havde baseret sin prissætning på Den Europæiske Centralbanks rekapitaliseringshenstilling.
The Dutch State underlined that it had based its pricing on the ECB Recapitalisation Recommendation.
Den nederlandske stat kommenterede også Kommissionens mistanke om, at FBN's præferenceaktionærer [90] ikke i tilstrækkelig grad havde bidraget i forhold til byrdefordeling.
The Dutch State also commented on the Commission’s suspicion that the preferred shareholders of FBN [90] had not sufficiently contributed in terms of burden-sharing.
Den nederlandske stat forklarede, at præferenceaktieinvestorerne ikke havde modtaget dividende i 2008 (hverken kontant eller periodiseret), og at præferenceaktierne blev handlet under pari. Den nederlandske stat tilføjede, at FBN's betalingsevne eller evne til at henlægge en fast dividende i fremtiden afhang af, om FBN havde tilstrækkelige IFRS-overskud.
The Dutch State explained that the investors in preferred shares had not received dividends in 2008 (neither in cash nor in accrual) and that preferred shares were trading below par. The Dutch State added that FBN’s ability to pay or reserve fixed dividends in the future depended on FBN having sufficient IFRS profits.
Den nederlandske stat bemærkede, at dividendebestemmelsen om FBN's præferenceaktier indeholder såkaldte »dividend stopper/pusher«-sprog [91], og at usikkerheden omkring ABN AMRO Groups dividendepolitik reducerede den tryghed, som præferenceaktieinvestorerne kunne udlede af »dividend stopper/pusher«-sproget.
The Dutch State noted that the dividend clause governing the FBN preferred shares included so-called dividend stopper/pusher language [91] and that the uncertainty around the dividend policy of the ABN AMRO Group reduced the comfort that the investors in preferred shares could derive from the dividend stopper/pusher language.