natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Med hensyn til, om kapital ville blive tilbagebetalt, når det (midlertidige) kapitalbehov forsvinder, hævdede den nederlandske stat, at den agtede at anvende ABN AMRO Groups dividendepolitik på en sådan måde, at ABN AMRO Group ikke ville have nogen overflødig kapital, som kunne medføre en fordrejning af konkurrencen [92].
As to whether capital would be repaid once the (temporary) capital needs disappear, the Dutch State argued that it intended to use the dividend policy of ABN AMRO Group in such a way that ABN AMRO Group would not have any excess capital which could result in a distortion of competition [92].
Vedrørende konkurrencefordrejning anførte den nederlandske stat, at den ikke var enig i Kommissionens holdning til, at ABN AMRO N og FBN blev styrket i Nederlandene som følge af fusionen, eller at en sådan udvikling truede med at skabe uforholdsmæssige konkurrencefordrejninger.
Concerning distortions of competition, the Dutch State indicated that it did not agree with the Commission’s position that ABN AMRO N and FBN were reinforced in the Netherlands as a result of the merger nor that such a development threatened to create undue distortions of competition.
Den var snarere af den modsatte mening og påpegede i denne henseende, at udskillelsen af FBN og ABN AMRO N fra deres respektive moderselskaber og den efterfølgende fusion var meget arbejdsintensiv og betød, at ledelsen i FBN og ABN AMRO N kunne bruge mindre tid på den daglige forretning, og den anførte derfor, at udskillelsen og den efterfølgende fusion havde en negativ indvirkning på konkurrencesituationen for FBN og ABN AMRO N (eller ABN AMRO Group efter fusionen).
It rather believed the contrary and pointed in that regard to the fact that the separation of FBN and ABN AMRO N from their respective parent companies and the subsequent merger were very labour-intensive and implied that the management of FBN and ABN AMRO N could dedicate less time to the day-to-day commercial business and therefore it argued that the separation and the subsequent merger had a negative impact on the competitive position of FBN and ABN AMRO N (or ABN AMRO Group post-merger).
Bemærkninger fra den nederlandske stat til bemærkninger fra interesserede parter
Comments from the Dutch State on the comments of interested parties
Bemærkninger fra den nederlandske stat til klagerens brev af 6. maj 2009
Comments from the Dutch State on the complainant’s letter of 6 May 2009
Generelt understregede den nederlandske stat, at den mente, at foranstaltningerne til fordel for FBN og ABN AMRO N ikke opfyldte EU’s definition af statsstøtte og derfor ikke havde en fordrejende virkning.
In general, the Dutch State underlined that in its view the measures in favour of FBN and ABN AMRO N did not meet the Union definition of State aid and therefore did not have distortive effects.
Den mente, at FBN's og ABN AMRO N's adfærd på opsparings- og indskudsmarkedet stemte overens med en rationel markedsaktør, som beskyttede sine kommercielle interesser.
It considered the market behaviour of FBN and ABN AMRO N on the savings and deposit market to be in line with that of a rational market player protecting its commercial interests.
Den nederlandske stat mente, at den rente, som FBN og ABN AMRO N tilbød, ikke var fordrejende.
The Dutch State believed that the interest rates offered by FBN and ABN AMRO N were not distortive.
Den hævdede følgelig, at Unionens konkurrencelovgivning ikke var blevet overtrådt.
As a result, it argued that there was no infringement of Union competition law.
Den nederlandske stat fremlagde en række sammenligningstabeller med de renter, der blev tilbudt på specifikke indskuds- og opsparingsprodukter.
The Dutch State presented a number of comparative tables with interest rates offered on specific deposit and savings products.
Den nederlandske stat afviste, at FBN og ABN AMRO N konsekvent fik tilbudt den højeste rente, navnlig sammenlignet med mindre nederlandske banker som SNS, NIBC og DSB.
The Dutch State denied that FBN and ABN AMRO N were consistently offering the highest interest rates, especially when compared to smaller Dutch banks like SNS, NIBC and DSB.
Den nederlandske stat påpegede endvidere, at renten på opsparingskonti allerede var høj i Nederlandene inden finanskrisen, delvist som følge af mindre bankers adfærd med en aggressiv prispolitik.
The Dutch State also pointed out that interest rates on savings accounts were already high in the Netherlands before the financial crisis, partly due to the behaviour of smaller banks with an aggressive pricing policy.
Den nederlandske stat mente, at bankerne under finanskrisen forsøgte at beskytte deres opsparingsfranchise ved at tilbyde kunderne en relativ høj rente på opsparingsprodukter.
The Dutch State believed that during the financial crisis banks tried to protect their savings franchises by offering relatively high interest rates on savings products for customers.
Den nederlandske stat anførte, at MoneYou skulle opbygge mærkebevidsthed inden for de første seks måneder og derfor skulle tilbyde en rente, som var lidt lavere end eller svarede til den rente, som tilsvarende internetbanker på markedet tilbød [93].
The Dutch State indicated that MoneYou had to build up brand recognition in the first 6 months of its existence and therefore had to offer interest rates which were mostly slightly lower or equal than those offered by similar Internet-banking marketplayers [93].
Fra andet kvartal 2009 og fremefter blev den rente, som MoneYou tilbød, sænket, og MoneYou lagde sig i det såkaldte midtersegment [94].
From the second quarter of 2009 onwards, the interest rates offered by MoneYou were lowered and MoneYou positioned itself within the so-called mid-tier segment [94].
Med hensyn til MoneYou tilføjede den nederlandske stat, at den kun rejste begrænsede midler (nemlig [0 - 5] mia. EUR), svarende til omtrent [0 - 5] % af den samlede volumen på det nederlandske opsparingsmarked.
With respect to MoneYou, the Dutch State added that it only raised limited volumes of funds (namely EUR [0 - 5] billion), representing roughly [0 - 5] % of total volume on the Dutch savings market.
Den nederlandske stat tilføjede, at tidligere Van Lanschot-kunder kun repræsenterede en mindre del af MoneYous forretning (nemlig [0 - 5000] konti eller [0 - 5] % af MoneYous konti).
The Dutch State added that ex-Van Lanschot customers only represented a small part of MoneYou’s business (namely [0 - 5000] accounts or [0 - 5] % of MoneYou’s accounts).
Den nederlandske stat afviste endvidere, at ABN AMRO N og FBN udelukkende benyttede det nederlandske opsparingsmarked til at finansiere sig selv.
The Dutch State also denied that ABN AMRO N and FBN were solely relying on the Dutch savings market to fund themselves.
Den anførte, at FBN blot havde brug for lidt tid til at iværksætte finansoperationer og udstede statsgaranterede gældsinstrumenter.
It indicated that FBN just needed some time to set up treasury operations and issue State-guaranteed debt instruments.
Den nederlandske stat anførte endvidere, at indskud og opsparingsprodukter også er vigtige i forhold til at skabe et kundeforhold og har et andet og bredere formål end andre finansieringsinstrumenter.
The Dutch State also indicated that deposits and saving products are also important to establish a customer relationship and have a different and broader purpose than that of other funding instruments.
I denne henseende påpegede den nederlandske stat, at et tab i en banks andel af opsparings- og indskudsmarkedet kunne medføre tab af markedsandele i andre bankprodukter.
In that regard, the Dutch State pointed out that a loss in a bank’s savings and deposits market share could lead to market share losses in other banking products.
Den nederlandske stat afviste endvidere, at forbrugerne og markedsdeltagerne opfattede ABN AMRO N og FBN som mere sikre banker end konkurrenterne.
The Dutch State also denied that the consumers and market participants perceived ABN AMRO N and FBN as safer banks than competitors.
Den henviste til vurderingsbureauernes vurdering af FBN og ABN AMRO N, som f.eks. lå under Rabobanks AAA-vurdering.
It referred to the ratings of FBN and ABN AMRO N at rating agencies, which were below the AAA-rating of Rabobank for example.
Dens relative CDS-margen fortalte en lignende historie.
Its relative CDS-spreads told a similar story.
Den nederlandske stat mente endvidere, at statsejerskabet ikke gjorde ABN AMRO N eller FBN mere sikker i forbrugernes og markedsdeltagernes øjne.
The Dutch State also believed that the State-ownership did not make ABN AMRO N or FBN more secure in the eyes of consumers and market participants.
I denne henseende påpegede den, at de mange ad hoc-indgreb fra statens side havde vist, at den nederlandske stat om muligt ville gribe ind med hensyn til alle privatejede banker.
In that regard, it pointed out that the many ad-hoc State interventions had shown that the Dutch State would, if possible, intervene with respect to any privately-owned bank.
Den mente dermed, at der rent faktisk ikke var nogen forskel mellem den sikkerhed, som nederlandske privatejede banker tilbød sammenlignet med nederlandske statsejede bankers sikkerhed.
Consequently, it believed that de facto there was no perceived difference between the security offered by Dutch privately-owned banks compared with that of Dutch State-owned banks.
Bemærkninger fra den nederlandske stat til klagerens argumenter af 21. og 28. august 2009
Comments from the Dutch State on the complainant’s arguments of 21 and 28 August 2009
Den nederlandske stat anførte, at dens tidligere bemærkninger, som er sammenfattet i betragtning 206 til 211, vedrørende klageren, fortsat var gældende.
The Dutch argued that its earlier comments summarized in recitals 206 to 211 concerning the complainant were still valid.
Derudover bemærkede den nederlandske stat, at klagerens påstand om, at ABN AMRO N's og FBN's markedsandel var øget, var baseret på en forkert statistik.
In addition, the Dutch State noted that the complainant’s claim that ABN AMRO N and FBN market share had increased was based on flawed statistics.
Med hensyn til den påståede stigning på 21 mia. EUR i indskud indsamlet af ABN AMRO N, hævdede den nederlandske stat, at kun 5,1 mia. EUR skyldtes nederlandsk detailopsparing, og at resten primært skyldtes opsparinger fra erhvervskunder og udenlandske indskud.
With respect to the alleged EUR 21 billion increase in deposits collected by ABN AMRO N, the Dutch State argued that only EUR 5,1 billion was due to Dutch retail savings with the rest mainly due to corporate customer savings and foreign deposits.
Den nederlandske stat gav ligeledes oplysninger, der viste, at en stor del af FBN's volumenstigning i indskud og opsparinger stammede fra corporate banking i modsætning til detailbankvirksom hed og private banking.
The Dutch State also provided data, showing that a large part of FBN’s volume increase of deposits and savings stemmed from corporate banking as opposed to retail and private banking.
Den nederlandske stat bemærkede, at nederlandske kunder havde investeret mere i deres opsparing på grund af det usikre makroøkonomiske miljø.
The Dutch State observed that that Dutch customers had invested more into their savings because of the uncertain macroeconomic environment.
Den fremhævede data fra det centrale statistikkontor, Central Bureau of Statistics (»CBS«), som anførte, at opsparingen steg med 7,7 % i første halvår af 2009 i forhold til året før.
It pointed to data of the Central Bureau of Statistics (‘CBS’) which indicated that savings increased by 7,7 % year-on-year in the first half of 2009.
ABN AMRO N's kundeopsparing steg med 7,5 % i forhold til året før, hvilket tydede på, at ABN AMRO N's markedsandel i stedet faldt.
ABN AMRO N’s customer savings increased by 7,5 % year-on-year, which indicated that the ABN AMRO N’s market share rather declined.
FBN dokumenterede endvidere, at dens kundeopsparing havde udviklet sig sammen med markedet.
FBN also presented evidence showing that its customer savings had evoled in line with the market.
Bemærkninger fra den nederlandske stat til bemærkningerne fra ABN AMRO Bank
Comments from the Dutch State on the comments of ABN AMRO Bank
Den nederlandske stat bekræftede, at den ikke havde givet ABN AMRO N en likviditetsfacilitet, og bekræftede dermed generelt ABN AMRO Banks argumenter.
The Dutch State confirmed that it had not provided a liquidity facility to ABN AMRO N, thereby broadly confirming ABN AMRO Bank’s arguments.
Eksistensen af støtte
Existence of aid
I traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, fastsættes det, at enhver støtte, der ydes af medlemsstaterne eller gennem statslige ressourcer i hvilken som helst form, som fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencen ved at favorisere visse virksomheder eller fremstilling af bestemte goder, skal, i det omfang det påvirker handelen mellem medlemsstaterne, være uforenelig med det indre marked.
Article 107(1) of the Treaty provides that any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.
Det følger, at en statsforanstaltning udgør statsstøtte, hvis den opfylder de fire følgende (akkumulerende) kriterier:
It follows that a State measure qualifies as State aid if it meets the following four (cumulative) criteria:
statslige ressourcer
State resources;
selektiv fordel
selective advantage;
fordrejende virkning på konkurrencen og
distortive impact on competition; and
virkning på handelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
impact on trade between Member States.
Det første kriterium opfyldes for foranstaltning Y1 til E i tabel 4 i betragtning 128, da alle disse foranstaltninger er direkte finansieret af den nederlandske stats ressourcer.
The first criterion is met for Measures (Y1) to (E) in Table 4 in recital 128 as all those Measures are directly financed from the Dutch State’s resources.
Hvorvidt en foranstaltning udgør en selektiv fordel for FBN, ABN AMRO N eller ABN AMRO Group efter fusionen (det andet kriterium), analyseres i betragtning 220 til 278, idet hver foranstaltning undersøges særskilt.
Whether a measure constitutes a selective advantage to FBN, ABN AMRO N or ABN AMRO Group post-merger (the second criterion) is analysed in the recitals 220 to 278, examining each measure separately.
Hvis der i dette tilfælde findes en selektiv fordel, er det tredje og fjerde kriterium også opfyldt.
If a selective advantage exists in this case, the third and fourth criteria would also be fulfilled.
Alle foranstaltninger fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencen, eftersom de giver FBN, ABN AMRO N eller ABN AMRO Group en fordelagtig position i forhold til andre konkurrerende banker (tredje kriterium).
All the measures distort or threaten to distort competition as they place FBN, ABN AMRO N or ABN AMRO Group after the merger in a beneficial position vis-à-vis other competing banks (third criterion).
Endvidere har foranstaltningerne en indvirkning på handelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
Moreover, the measures also have an impact on trade between Member States.
FBN, ABN AMRO N og ABN AMRO Group er efter fusionen internationalt orienterede banker med aktiviteter uden for Nederlandene, samtidig med at de konkurrerer på hjemmemarkedet med datterselskaber til udenlandske banker (fjerde kriterium).
FBN, ABN AMRO N and ABN AMRO Group post-merger are internationally-oriented banks with activities outside the Netherlands while also competing in their home market with subsidiaries of foreign banks (fourth criterion).
Foranstaltning Y1 og Y2 af 3. oktober 2008
Measures Y1 and Y2 of 3 October 2008
Det er relevant at minde om, at det i denne afgørelse kun er den potentielle støtte til FBN, ABN AMRO N eller ABN AMRO Group efter fusionen, der vurderes.
It is appropriate to recall that this Decision assesses only potential aid to FBN, ABN AMRO N or ABN AMRO Group post-merger.
Potentiel støtte til Fortis Bank SA/NV som følge af foranstaltning Y1 og Y2 blev vurderet i beslutningen af 3. december 2008.
Potential aid to Fortis Bank SA/NV arising out of Measures Y1 and Y2 was assessed in the Decision of 3 December 2008.
Som anført i betragtning 52 i beslutningen af 3. december 2008 [96] og i den indledende støttevurdering for disse foranstaltninger i beslutningen af 8. april 2009 hænger foranstaltningerne af 3. oktober 2008 (nemlig foranstaltning X, Y1 og Y2) uløseligt sammen.
As indicated in recital 52 of the Decision of 3 December 2008 [96] and in the initial aid assessment of those measures in the Decision of 8 April 2009, the measures taken on 3 October 2008 (namely Measures X, Y1 and Y2) are inextricably linked.
Den nederlandske stat udskilte FBN og ABN AMRO N fra deres likviditetstrængte moderselskab gennem overtagelsen af FBN, men for at isolere FBN fuldt ud fra moderselskabets likviditetsproblemer måtte den nederlandske stat ligeledes påtage sig rollen som finansieringsyder til FBN.
The Dutch State separated FBN and ABN AMRO N from their liquidity-constrained parent by means of the acquisition of FBN but, in order to fully insulate FBN from its parent’s liquidity problems, the Dutch State also had to assume the role of funding provider of FBN.
Dette mål udmøntede sig i foranstaltning Y1 og Y2.
That goal translated into Measures Y1 and Y2.
Derudover overtog den nederlandske stat den 3. oktober 2008 Fortis SA/NV's forpligtelser i aktionæroverenskomsten.
In addition, on 3 October 2008 the Dutch State took over Fortis SA/NV’s CSA-obligations.
Som anført i betragtning 50 i beslutningen af 3. december 2008, kan Kommissionen ikke acceptere, at det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip er opfyldt for de integrerede transaktioner af 3. oktober 2008, hvorved den nederlandske stat overtog FBN (herunder ABN AMRO N) for 12,8 mia. EUR og ydede FBN et meget stort finansieringsbeløb.
As indicated in recital 50 of the Decision of 3 December 2008, the Commission cannot accept that the MEIP is satisfied for the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008 by which the Dutch State acquired FBN (including ABN AMRO N) for EUR 12,8 billion and also provided FBN with a very large amount of funding.
I lyset af de daværende markedsforhold ville ingen køber have været i stand til og villig til at tilbyde så meget for at redde FBN [97].
Given the then prevailing market circumstances, no buyer would have been able and willing to offer as much to save FBN [97].
Endvidere bekræftede yderligere oplysninger fra den nederlandske stat, at den nederlandske stat den 3. oktober2008 ligeledes havde accepteret at friholde Fortis SA/NV for dens forpligtelser i henhold til aktionæroverenskomsten.
Moreover, additional information submitted by the Dutch State confirmed that, on 3 October 2008, the Dutch State also agreed to indemnify Fortis SA/NV for its CSA-obligations.
Denne aftale om aktionæroverenskomsten ville have gjort de integrerede transaktioner af 3. oktober 2008 endnu mindre acceptable for en markedsøkonomisk investor.
That CSA-agreement would have rendered the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008 even less acceptable to a market economy investor.
Uden en reel due diligence-undersøgelse var der ingen investor, som ville have overtaget Fortis SA/NV's forpligtelser i henhold til aktionæroverenskomsten, som medførte store forpligtelser på et senere tidspunkt (som den nederlandske stat allerede var delvist opmærksom på den 3. oktober 2008).
Without appropriate due diligence, no investor would have taken over the obligations of Fortis SA/NV under the CSA, which resulted in major liabilities at a later stage (of which the Dutch State was already partially aware on 3 October 2008).
For den nederlandske stat var de integrerede transaktioner af 3. oktober 2008 nødvendige for at undgå store negative bivirkninger for det nederlandske banksystem og økonomien [98].
For the Dutch State, the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008 were necessary to avoid large negative spill-over effects into the Dutch banking system and economy [98].
En markedsøkonomisk investor tager typisk ikke højde for sådanne bivirkninger.
A market economy investor typically does not take such spill-over effects into account.
Viljen til at undgå et alvorligt sammenbrud i det nederlandske banksystem og økonomien forklarer også, hvorfor den nederlandske stat traf sine beslutninger så hurtigt.
The willingness to avoid a serious disruption of the Dutch banking system and economy also explains why the Dutch State took its decisions so rapidly.
En markedsøkonomisk investor ville havde taget langt længere tid om at evaluere det potentielle behov for yderligere kapitaltilførsler og ville endvidere have undersøgt selskabernes økonomi i detaljer.
A market economy investor would have taken much more time to evaluate the potential need for additional capital injections and would also have investigated the financials of the companies in more detail.
Som følge deraf ville en markedsøkonomisk investor med tilstrækkelig tid til at udføre en reel due diligence-undersøgelse have haft et bedre syn på de opfølgende investeringer og ville have taget højde for disse oplysninger i sin vurdering.
As a result, a market economy investor – with sufficient time to carry out a proper due diligence – would have had a better view on follow-up investments and would have taken that information into account in its valuation.
Den nederlandske stat skulle reagere hurtigt for at bevare den finansielle stabilitet i Nederlandene og kunne ikke opføre sig som en markedsøkonomisk investor og bruge længere tid på at overveje de integrerede transaktioner af 3. oktober 2008 og forpligtelserne i henhold til aktionæroverenskomsten dybere.
The Dutch State having to act swiftly to preserve financial stability in the Netherlands, could not behave like a market economy investor and take more time to consider the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008 and the CSA-related obligations in further depth.
Kommissionen bekræfter derfor sin vurdering af, at de integrerede transaktioner af 3. oktober 2008 ikke stemte overens med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip (denne konklusion blev allerede truffet i beslutningen af 3. december 2008, hvoraf det fremgik, at disse transaktioner var statsstøtte til Fortis Bank SA/NV).
Therefore, the Commission confirms its assessment that the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008 were not in line with the MEIP (that conclusion was already made in the Decision of 3 December 2008, which considered those transactions to be State aid to Fortis Bank SA/NV).
Med hensyn til eventuelle fordele blev det i de samlede foranstaltninger af 3. oktober 2008 tilladt at udskille FBN og ABN AMRO N fra Fortis SA/NV, hvilket gav en betydelig selektiv fordel for FBN, som i høj grad var integreret i Fortis Bank SA/NV og navnlig var meget afhængig af sidstnævnte med hensyn til finansiering.
As regards the existence of an advantage, the measures of 3 October 2008 taken together allowed the separation of FBN and ABN AMRO N from Fortis SA/NV and therefore conferred an important selective advantage on FBN, which was highly integrated in Fortis Bank SA/NV and in particular relied heavily on the latter for funding.
I omstruktureringsplanen af december 2009 (se også betragtning 78) indrømmede den nederlandske stat, at hvis den ikke havde grebet ind, var FBN blevet trukket ned af Fortis SA/NV.
In the December 2009 Restructuring Plan (see also recital 78), the Dutch State admitted that, had it not intervened, FBN would have been dragged down by Fortis SA/NV.
Uden statsstøtteforanstaltningerne havde FBN stadig været eksponeret for Fortis SA/NV's forpligtelser, som balancerede på kanten af konkurs, og denne eksponering ville havde udgjort en betydelig hindring for FBN's aktiviteter.
Without the State aid measures, FBN would have remained exposed to the liabilities of Fortis SA/NV, which was on the verge of bankruptcy, and that exposure would have substantially hindered FBN’s activities.