natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Den danske regering understreger således, at hvis der korrigeres for virkningen af den ændrede regnskabspraksis, kan det konstateres, at væksten i egenkapitalen rent faktisk har været negativ, nemlig med 135 mio. DKK.
The Danish authorities therefore stress that, if a correction is made for the effects of the modified accounting practices, the change in equity capital was in fact negative, with a reduction of DKK 135 million;
Selskabsskatten var 32 % på tidspunktet for stiftelsesbudgettet 1999, og denne skattesats blev efterfølgende (i årene 2002, 2003 og 2004) nedsat til 30 %.
The rate of corporation tax, which was 32 % at the time of the founding budget in 1999, was subsequently lowered to 30 % (over the course of 2002, 2003 and 2004).
Den nedsatte skatteprocent har medført en uforudset gevinst på 43 mio. DKK i perioden.
That reduction in the rate of tax resulted in an unforeseen gain of DKK 43 million over the period.
Uden denne gevinst ville den negative egenkapitaltilvækst have været 178 mio. DKK.
Without that gain, there would have been a negative impact on the equity capital of DKK 178 million;
En nedjustering af egenkapitalen i åbningsbalancen på 36 mio. DKK.
The downwards revision of the equity capital on the initial balance sheet by an amount of DKK 36 million,
Efter Danmarks opfattelse viser disse oplysninger, at tilvæksten i DSB's egenkapital ikke skyldes for høje driftstilskud fra staten, og at den må ses i forhold til de ovennævnte finansielle, regnskabsmæssige og skattemæssige oplysninger.
According to Denmark, those facts show that the increase in DSB’s equity capital was not due to high operating grants paid by the State and that it must be seen in relation to the financial, accounting and tax information referred to above.
DSB har derfor ikke anvendt tilskuddet fra staten til at opbygge sin egenkapital i et omfang, der ligger ud over forudsætningerne i stiftelsesbudgettet.
DSB did not therefore use the aid received from the State to increase its equity capital to an extent greater than the amount provided for in the founding budget.
I forbindelse med de budgetterede driftsresultater før udlodning af overskud understreger den danske regering, at de konstaterede resultatforbedringer ikke kan tages til indtægt for, at DSB har modtaget overkompensation.
With regard to the projected operating results before distribution of profits, the Danish authorities point out that the observed improvements in results are not an indication of DSB receiving overcompensation.
Disse forbedringer skyldes snarere en række faktorer, der har haft både positiv og negativ indflydelse, men som det ikke er muligt at tage højde for på det tidspunkt, hvor kompensationsniveauet fastlægges.
Rather, the improvements are due to a range of factors – having both positive and negative effects – which could not be taken into consideration when the level of compensation was established.
Danmark finder, at sådanne afvigelser i forhold til det oprindelige budget ikke kan undgås, når det handler om flerårige kontrakter om opfyldelse af en offentlig serviceforpligtelse.
Denmark considers that such variations with respect to the initial budget are inevitable in the case of multiannual contracts relating to the discharging of a public service obligation.
Derfor er det i disse tilfælde ikke muligt at fastlægge kompensationsbeløbet på en sådan måde, at det efter en ex post-vurdering kan fastslås, at den svarer nøjagtigt til de faktiske omkostninger efter fradrag af indtægterne og en rimelig fortjeneste.
In such cases, it is not possible to fix the amount of compensation in a way which makes it possible to confirm, following an ex post examination, that it corresponded exactly to the real costs, minus the receipts and a reasonable profit.
Ifølge den danske regering vil der selv i tilfælde, hvor en offentlig serviceforpligtelse tildeles efter udbud, indtræffe sådanne ændringer i markedet og i den pågældende virksomheds forhold, at det faktisk realiserede resultat ikke svarer til, hvad den vindende virksomhed havde forventet på tidspunktet for kontraktens indgåelse.
According to the Danish authorities, even in cases where a public service obligation results from the award of a tender, changes may occur in the market and in the situation of the undertaking concerned, such that the results actually obtained do not correspond to the results predicted by the successful bidder when the contract was concluded.
Danmark er dermed af den opfattelse, at resultatforbedringer eller -forringelser, der skyldes sådanne uforudsete faktorer, ikke kan tages til indtægt for, at kompensationen er fastsat på en måde, der indebærer, at der er ydet over- eller underkompensation.
Denmark therefore takes the view that improvements or deteriorations in results attributable to such unforeseen factors cannot be used as an argument to claim that the compensation was fixed in a way such as to involve overcompensation or under-compensation.
I det foreliggende tilfælde skyldes de konstaterede resultatforbedringer den samlede påvirkning fra flere faktorer såsom den almindelige konjunkturudvikling, udviklingen på markedet og produktivitetsgevinster (f.eks. besparelser i arbejdsomkostninger eller adgang til infrastruktur efter at godssektoren er afhændet, færre afskrivninger eller forbedring af finansforvaltningen).
In this case, the observed improvements in results are due to the combined effects of several factors such as general economic trends, developments in the market concerned, productivity gains (for example, reductions in the cost of labour or of access to infrastructure following the sale of the cargo branch, reductions in depreciation or improvements in financial management).
Danmark tilføjer, at de kontrakter, som er indgået med DSB, netop er kendetegnet ved, at kontraktparterne har aftalt en betaling baseret på sædvanlige markedsøkonomiske overvejelser, hvor betalingens størrelse har været fastsat således, at den skulle dække DSB's omkostninger under hensyn til de forventede indtægter og en rimelig fortjeneste.
Denmark adds that the contracts concluded with DSB are characterised by the fact that the contracting partners agreed on payment on the basis of the usual considerations in a market economy, the level of payment having been determined in such a way as to cover DSB’s costs, taking account of the expected revenues and a reasonable profit.
Det forhold, at DSB i sidste ende har opnået bedre resultater end de budgetterede, er ikke udtryk for, at de i kontrakterne fastlagte kompensationsbeløb har været for høje.
The fact that DSB ultimately achieved better results than budgeted for does not mean that the amounts of compensation fixed in the contracts was too high.
Reduktion af kompensationen og udlodning af udbytte
Reduction in compensation and distribution of dividends
Den danske regering bemærker, at selv om det er regeringens opfattelse, at der ikke er sket overkompensation, er risikoen for overkompensation under alle omstændigheder blevet elimineret i kraft af regeringens udbyttepolitik, der følger af finanslovens aktstykke nr. 249/1999 og den efterfølgende reduktion af kompensationen i aftalen med DSB.
The Danish authorities point out that, even though, in their opinion, there was no overcompensation, the risk of overcompensation is in any case ruled out by the Danish Government’s dividend policy as set out in Finance Act No 249/1999 and by the subsequent reduction in compensation in the agreement concluded with DSB.
Gennem sin udbyttepolitik mener Danmark at have sikret sig, at DSB ikke har opbygget egenkapital ud over det forudsatte og dermed ud over, hvad der var nødvendigt.
Denmark takes the view that it has made sure, with its dividend policy, that DSB will not increase its equity capital beyond the level provided for and hence beyond the level that is necessary.
Uanset at der ikke har været fastsat juridisk bindende regler, er det med udbyttepolitikken søgt at forene to hensyn:
Although no binding legal rule was laid down, the dividend policy was designed to reconcile two considerations:
de sædvanlige markedsøkonomiske overvejelser om, hvad der er økonomisk forsvarligt under hensyn til virksomhedens økonomiske situation
the usual considerations in a market economy regarding what is economically justifiable taking account of the economic situation of the undertaking,
generelle samfundsøkonomiske og konkurrencepolitiske overvejelser i relation til størrelsen af DSB's egenkapital og driftstilskud.
socioeconomic considerations and considerations relating to competition having regard to the size of DSB’s equity capital and its operating grants,
Den danske regering præciserer, at udbyttebetalingerne til staten skulle anvendes som et middel til at korrigere størrelsen af DSB's egenkapital i årene efter stiftelsen og som et middel til at tilbageføre driftsoverskud i det omfang, det efterfølgende måtte vise sig, at DSB faktisk opnåede bedre resultater end forventet.
The Danish authorities state that dividend payments to the State are to be used as a means of correcting the size of DSB’s equity capital in the years following its founding, and as a means of restoring the operating surplus if it were subsequently to emerge that DSB did indeed achieve better results than expected.
Dette princip følger af finanslovens aktstykke nr. 249/1999.
That principle follows from Finance Act No 249/1999.
Udbyttebetalingen anvendes til løbende at regulere DSB's kapitalstruktur og dermed det reelle nettodriftstilskud.
The payment of dividends is to be used to regulate on an ongoing basis the structure of DSB’s capital and, hence, the real net operating grant.
Samtidig indebar udbyttepolitikken, at DSB havde et incitament til at opnå effektivitetsforbedringer, fordi udgangspunktet var, at udbyttet skulle svare til halvdelen af DSB's overskud efter skat.
The dividend policy also meant that DSB had an incentive to improve its efficiency because the starting point was that the dividends should amount to half of DSB’s surplus after tax.
Dermed ville effektivitetsforbedringer i et vist omfang komme DSB til gode og ikke blot resultere i en efterfølgende tilbageførsel af driftstilskuddet.
Efficiency improvements would therefore benefit DSB to a certain extent and not solely result in a subsequent refund of the operating grant.
Den danske regering er af den opfattelse, at det er helt i overensstemmelse med almindelige markedsøkonomiske overvejelser, at der kan opereres med incitamentskabende instrumenter ved fastlæggelsen af, hvad der forstås ved en rimelig forrentning, jf. Kommissionens anbefaling [19].
The Danish authorities consider that it is wholly in line with the general considerations of a market economy to be able to use incentives in determining what constitutes a reasonable profit, as advocated by the Commission [19].
Danmark anfører, at anvendelsen af denne udbyttepolitik har medført, at der i perioden 1999-2006 i relation til de opgaver, der blev varetaget i henhold til kontrakterne, blev udloddet næsten 3 mia. DKK mere til staten, end hvad der oprindeligt var forventet.
Denmark points out that the application of this dividend policy led, for the period 1999-2006, in relation to the activities undertaken to fulfil the contracts, to the State being paid almost DKK 3 billion more than the figure initially predicted.
Ifølge den danske regering har udbyttepolitikken fungeret som en de facto tilbagebetalingsmekanisme, der har modvirket en eventuel overkompensation.
According to the Danish authorities, the dividend policy therefore functioned de facto as a ‘refund mechanism’ making it possible to offset any overcompensation.
Regeringen understreger, at den del af DSB's kompensation, der er blevet ført tilbage til staten i form af udbytte, oven i købet klart overstiger differencen mellem DSB's budgetterede overskud og det faktisk realiserede overskud.
They emphasise that the part of DSB’s compensation which was repaid to the State in the form of dividends is, moreover, much greater than the difference between the surplus anticipated in DSB’s budget and that which was actually achieved.
Udbyttepolitikken har på denne måde bidraget til at sikre, at DSB ikke kunne udnytte driftstilskud fra staten til at opnå en konkurrencefordel, f.eks. ved opbygning af egenkapital ud over det forudsatte eller anvendelse af årlige overskud.
As such, the dividend policy therefore helped to guarantee that DSB was not able to profit from the State operating grant in order to obtain a competitive advantage – for example, by increasing its equity capital beyond the specified level or by using annual surpluses.
Derudover finder den danske regering, at det er forbundet med betydelige vanskeligheder at fastlægge regler for en efterfølgende korrektion af driftstilskuddet.
Moreover, the Danish authorities consider that it is very difficult to establish rules relating to an a posteriori correction of the operating grant.
Omvendt er staten i stand til — ved løbende udbytteudlodninger, der foretages i henhold til den danske aktieselskabslov regler — at sikre sig, at nettodriftstilskuddet reelt korrigeres, såfremt årets resultat overstiger, hvad der var forventet eller forudsat ved kontraktens indgåelse.
However, the State is able – as a result of the dividend policy, in accordance with Danish company law – to ensure that the net operating grant is effectively corrected, if the profits for the year exceed the level which was expected or anticipated when the contract was concluded.
Ifølge regeringen udgør udbytteudlodningerne derfor i praksis et overordentligt effektivt instrument til at sikre mod overkompensation.
According to the Danish authorities, distributions of dividends are therefore, in practice, an extraordinarily effective tool to guard against overcompensation.
Derudover minder den danske regering om, at Retten har fastslået, at der må overlades medlemsstaterne en vid skønsbeføjelse ved beregningen af kompensationen, når denne baserer sig på komplicerede økonomiske forhold [20].
Moreover, the Danish authorities state that the Court of First Instance also established that Member States could have a wide discretion as to the determination of compensation where that compensation depends on an assessment of complex economic facts [20].
Regeringen minder også om, at der ikke EU-retligt er noget krav om, at en efterfølgende nedregulering af nettodriftstilskuddet altid skal ske på en bestemt måde, f.eks. ved anvendelsen af kontraktlige regler eller tilsvarende.
They also point out that Community law does not contain any obligation providing that a downwards revision of the net operating grant should always be carried out in a certain way, for example by applying contractual rules or in an equivalent manner.
Det afgørende er, at staten faktisk sikrer sig, at der ikke sker en overkompensation, jf. Altmark-dommens kriterier.
What is important, according to the criteria laid down in the judgment in Altmark, is that the State truly ensures that there is no overcompensation.
Men det er op til medlemsstaterne at beslutte, hvorledes dette gøres i praksis.
However, it is for the Member States to decide how to proceed in practice.
Forsinket levering af rullende materiel
Delays in the delivery of rolling stock
Efter den danske regerings opfattelse har forsinkelsen af IC4- og IC2-togene ikke medført en økonomisk fordel for DSB.
According to the Danish authorities, the late delivery of the IC4 and IC2 trains did not lead to an economic advantage for DSB.
Regeringen bekræfter, at de nye IC4- og IC2-tog, der er bestilt forud for indgåelsen af trafikkontrakten for 2005-2014, skulle have været leveret fra 2003, men er ramt af forsinkelser hos leverandøren (AnsaldoBreda).
They confirm that the delivery of the new IC4 and IC2 trains, which were ordered before the conclusion of the transport contract for 2005-14 and should have been delivered from 2003, was affected by delays attributable to the manufacturer (Ansaldo Breda).
Den danske regering anfører, at hvis leveringen var foregået planmæssigt, ville DSB have haft nettoudgifter til forrentninger og afskrivninger af togene, hvilket var indregnet i kontraktbetalingerne.
The Danish authorities state that, if delivery had taken place as scheduled, DSB would have borne the net costs corresponding to the depreciation of the trains and to the interest, which were covered by the contractual payments.
Trafikkontrakten for 2005-2014
2005-14 transport contract
I henhold til trafikkontrakten for 2005-2014 reduceres DSB's kontraktbetaling, såfremt DSB ikke har afholdt disse udgifter.
Since DSB did not bear those costs, the contractual payments were subject to a reduction under the transport contract for 2005-14.
De sparede udgifter er eksakt opgjort på baggrund af DSB's faktiske låntagning og en afskrivningsperiode på 20 år i overensstemmelse med DSB's regnskabspraksis (dvs. en besparelse på 4 mio. DKK for et års forsinkelse på et IC4-togsæt og tilsvarende 2,7 mio. DKK for et års forsinkelse på et IC2-togsæt).
The exact amount of the costs avoided is calculated on the basis of the loans actually entered into by DSB and a depreciation period of 20 years, in accordance with DSB’s accounting practices (that is to say DKK 4 million saved on account of a 1-year delay on the IC4 train and DKK 2,7 million saved on account of a 1-year delay on the IC2 train).
I overensstemmelse med kontrakten er betalingen af DSB derfor reduceret med 645 mio. DKK (252 mio. DKK i 2005 og 393 mio. DKK i 2006).
The payments to DSB were therefore reduced under the contract by DKK 645 million (DKK 252 million in 2005 and DKK 393 million in 2006).
Det er på den baggrund regeringens opfattelse, at den forsinkede levering af IC4-og IC2-togene ikke, for så vidt angår trafikkontrakten for 2005-2014, kan siges at have medført overkompensation af DSB.
Taking those facts into consideration, Denmark is of the view that the late delivery of the IC4 and IC2 trains cannot be regarded as having led to overcompensation for DSB as far as the 2005-14 transport contract is concerned.
Tillægskontrakter
Additional contracts
For at sikre tilstrækkeligt moderne materiel har DSB siden 2001 lejet materiel i kraft af tillægskontrakter, som måtte forlænges efter 2006 på grund af de væsentlige forsinkelser hos AnsaldoBreda (i op til fire ekstra år).
To have sufficiently modern rolling stock, DSB has been using hired rolling stock since 2001 (additional contracts). The term of those contracts had to be extended after 2006 due to the considerable delays on the part of the supplier, Ansaldo Breda (extension for up to 4 additional years).
Den danske regering bemærker dels, at DSB's kontraktbetaling efter den forhandlede kontrakt ikke dækker udgifter til indsættelse af IC4- og IC2-tog (afskrivning og forrentning) i det tilfælde, hvor disse tog faktisk ikke er indsat, og dels, at der ikke efter den forhandlede kontrakt er nogen forpligtelse for DSB til at indsætte erstatningsmateriel på de ovennævnte strækninger.
The Danish authorities state firstly that the contractual payment made to DSB under the negotiated contract did not cover the costs of putting the trains into service (depreciation and interest) where those trains were not actually put into service, and, secondly that the negotiated contract did not provide for any obligation on the part of DSB to deploy replacement rolling stock on the aforementioned lines.
Ifølge den danske regering pålægges DSB i kraft af tillægskontrakten en yderligere offentlig serviceforpligtelse (indsætning af moderne erstatningsmateriel på visse strækninger) samtidig med, at DSB kompenseres for lejeudgifterne.
According to the Danish authorities, the additional contracts therefore impose additional public service obligations on DSB (putting into service of modern replacement stock on certain lines) at the same time as compensating it for the hire costs.
Trafikkontrakten for 2000-2004
2000-04 transport contract
Den danske regering er af den opfattelse, at den positive økonomiske nettoeffekt som følge af forsinkelsen skyldes, at der ikke i den oprindelige fem-årige kontrakt, herunder tillægskontrakten for perioden 2001-2004, var indsat bestemmelser om reduktion i kompensationen i tilfælde af forsinkelser af IC4-togene.
The Danish authorities consider that the net positive economic impact due to the delay is attributable to the fact that the initial 5-year contract, like the additional contract for 2001-04, did not contain any provisions relating to a reduction in compensation in the event of late delivery of the IC4 trains.
Derimod indeholder den gældende trafikkontrakt 2005-2014 netop bestemmelser vedrørende en reduktion af kompensationen i tilfælde af forsinkelser.
Conversely, the 2005-14 transport contract currently in force does contain provisions relating to a reduction in compensation in the event of delay.
Regeringen vurderer denne positive nettoeffekt for perioden 2001-2004 til 104 mio. DKK som følge af forsinkelsen af leveringen af togene.
The Danish authorities estimate that net positive effect during the period 2001-04 to be DKK 104 million as a result of the late delivery of the trains.
Denne umiddelbare effekt dækker dog ikke over de reelle økonomiske konsekvenser for DSB, som ikke har haft adgang til at anvende de nye togsæt (vedligeholdelse af ældre togsæt, tab i image og goodwill og indtægtstab).
However, that direct effect does not cover the real economic consequences of the delay for DSB, which was unable to use the new trains (maintenance of the older trains, damage in terms of image and goodwill, and loss of income).
Danmark præciserer, at de erstatninger, DSB har modtaget fra AnsaldoBreda, udelukkende er udtryk for en foreløbig kompensation for DSB's økonomiske tab som følge af forsinkelsen af leveringen af togene.
Denmark also states that the compensation received by DSB from Ansaldo Breda represents only provisional compensation for the economic losses resulting from the late delivery of the trains.
Ved leveringen skal DSB's endelige tab gøres op, og den samlede erstatning fra AnsaldoBreda kan fastlægges.
The final amount of losses suffered by DSB will be determined at the time of delivery, and it will be possible to establish the total amount of compensation payable by Ansaldo Breda.
Den danske regering er af den opfattelse, at denne kompensation vil svare nøje til DSB's økonomiske tab og derfor vil have en neutral effekt på DSB's regnskab.
The Danish authorities therefore consider that this compensation will correspond exactly to DSB’s economic losses and will therefore be neutral in terms of DSB’s accounting.
Nettoeffekten af erstatningen fra AnsaldoBreda indebærer af samme grund ikke nogen overkompensation til DSB.
For the same reason, the net effect of the compensation from Ansaldo Breda does not constitute overcompensation for DSB.
Forsinkelsen af leveringen af togene har dermed ikke medført og vil ikke medføre nogen økonomisk fordel for DSB.
The late delivery of the trains did not therefore confer an economic advantage on DSB and nor will it do so in the future.
Endelig minder den danske regering om, at selv hvis disse faktorer ikke tages i betragtning, følger det af regeringens udbyttepolitik, at en eventuel positiv effekt af kompensationen for DSB vil blive elimineret ved udbyttebetalinger.
Finally, the Danish authorities point out that, even if these factors are not taken into account, the Danish Government’s dividend policy ensures that any positive effect of the compensation received by DSB would be eliminated during the payment of dividends.
Særlige forhold angående ruten København-Ystad
Specific case of the Copenhagen – Ystad link
Kompensation for offentlig trafikbetjening
Public transport service compensation
Den danske regering præciserer, at det alene er DSB's betjening af ruten i perioden 2005-2014, der har udløst kompensation.
The Danish authorities specify that it was only the operation of the route by DSB in the period 2005-14 which gave rise to compensation.
Grundlaget for rutens drift har reelt været forskelligt i tre forskellige perioder:
Three time periods should be differentiated regarding the operation of this route: