natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Da »Aéro 2008« kan henføres til Frankrig, kunne det ikke udelukkes, at foranstaltningen kunne indebære statsstøtte, jf. artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF.
Given that the French State could be considered to be responsible for the Aero 2008 guarantee, it was possible that the measure may constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
For det andet var Kommissionen i tvivl om, hvorvidt der forelå en situation med markedssvigt hvad angår små, store og mellemstore virksomheders mulighed for at foretage valutakurssikring over for kort- og langsigtede virkninger af valutakursudsving mellem euroen og dollaren.
Secondly, the Commission was uncertain as to whether there was market failure in respect of hedging instruments against short-term and longer-term EUR/USD exchange rate fluctuations as regards SMES and large enterprises.
For det tredje betvivlede Kommissionen, at ordningen havde en tilskyndelseseffekt, fordi leverandørerne tilsyneladende kunne drage fordel af garantien, selv om anmodningen blev indgivet efter kontraktens undertegnelse.
Thirdly, the Commission was uncertain as to whether the measure had an incentive effect, since the suppliers were able to obtain the exchange rate guarantee even if their application was made after the date when the contract was signed.
For det fjerde nærede Kommissionen tvivl med hensyn til ordningens proportionalitet, da den ikke er begrænset til virksomheder, som har dokumenterede vanskeligheder med at få adgang til valutakurssikring hos deres banker.
Fourthly, the Commission was uncertain as regards the proportionality of the measure, which is not limited to undertakings that are known to have difficulties in obtaining exchange rate guarantees from their banks.
For det femte nærede Kommissionen tvivl om, hvorvidt støttens mulige positive virkning kan opveje dens negative virkninger, så støtten ikke ændrer samhandelsvilkårene på en måde, der strider mod den fælles interesse.
Fifthly, the Commission had concerns as to whether the potential positive impact of that aid could outweigh its negative impact, so as not to distort trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.
KOMMENTARER FRA DEN FRANSKE REPUBLIK
COMMENTS OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC
Ifølge Frankrig afspejler de præmier, der faktureredes som led i »Aéro 2008«, markedsværdien for afdækning af kursrisiko, og den omhandlede foranstaltning udgør derfor ikke statsstøtte som omhandlet i artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF.
France considers that the premiums invoiced under Aero 2008 reflect the market value of the exchange rate insurance granted and that the measure in question does not therefore constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
De franske myndigheder har tilsendt Kommissionen en detaljeret redegørelse for den metode, der danner grundlag for beregning af de præmier, der betales som led i »Aéro 2008«.
The French authorities sent the Commission a detailed description of the methodology used to determine the amounts of the premiums invoiced under Aero 2008.
Frankrig har fremlagt oplysninger, der giver mulighed for at fastslå den nøjagtige markedsværdi af de finansielle produkter, som garantiordningen kræver.
France submitted information proving the exact market value of the financial products required to set up the guarantee.
Garantien består af finansielle instrumenter, som tilsammen udgør betalingsprofilen: terminskøb i euro/dollar, køb og salg af optioner i euro/dollar.
The guarantee is subdivided into financial instruments which in combination show its payment profile: forward purchases in EUR/USD, purchases and sales of options in EUR/USD.
Markedsværdien af disse finansielle instrumenter beregnes på basis af data fra Bloomberg software, der er verdensførende inden for finansiel information.
The market value of those financial instruments is calculated on the basis of data from Bloomberg software, one of the market leaders in financial information.
Frankrig har fremlagt dokumentation fra Bloomberg-databasen vedrørende de samlede finansielle instrumenter, som tilsammen udgør de garantier, der er indrømmet de fire leverandører som led i »Aéro 2008«.
France provided extracts from the Bloomberg software for all of the financial instruments making up the guarantees granted to the four suppliers which took out the Aero 2008 guarantee.
De således definerede markedsværdier omfatter en fortjenestmargen til de finansinstitutter, som COFACE køber disse instrumenter hos.
The market values thus established include a profit margin for the financial institutions from which Coface buys those instruments.
Ifølge de franske oplysninger omfatter de produkter, som bankerne foreslår til afdækning af valutakurssrisiko, normalt ikke betaling af en præmie. Banksektoren får sin betaling over de forsikrede vekselkurser og options-priserne.
According to information provided by France, the exchange rate risk products offered by the banks do not in general include the payment of a premium since the banking sector earns money on the guaranteed rates and the option prices.
Fortjenestmargenerne er indeholdt i priserne på de finansielle instrumenter, der udgør garantien for leverandørerne, og er derfor dækket af de præmier, der faktureres af COFACE.
The margins in question are in incorporated by design in the prices of the financial products making up the guarantee offered to the suppliers and are therefore covered by the premiums invoiced by Coface.
Ved COFACE's fastsættelse af kursen er den garanterede terminskurs desuden altid højere end den aktuelle maksimale kurs på terminsmarkedet.
Moreover, the guaranteed forward rate chosen is always higher than the forward rate for the year in which the rate is fixed by Coface.
En margen på 40 basispoint er inkluderet i præmien for at dække de ekstra administrationsomkostninger i forbindelse med COFACE's administration af ordningen.
In order to cover the additional administrative costs related to the handling of the measure by Coface, a margin of 40 base points is included in the amount of the premium.
Denne margen repræsenterer mellem 17 % og 32 % [6] af den samlede værdi af de præmier, der faktureres til de fire virksomheder, som har tegnet »Aéro 2008«-garantien.
That margin represents between 17 % and 32 % [6] of the total value of the premiums invoiced to the four undertakings which took out the Aero 2008 guarantee.
Risikoen for en leverandørs misligholdelse beregnes af COFACE på basis af Score @rating, et ratingsystem over franske virksomheder, som COFACE skabte i 2002, og som bygger på 20 års erfaring med vurdering af virksomheder.
The risk of default by the supplier is determined by Coface on the basis of the Score@rating rating system of French undertakings launched by Coface in 2002 which is based on its 20 years of experience in rating businesses.
COFACE har med sit Score @rating af banktilsynet fået tildelt status som »External Credit Assesment Institution« (ECAI) for sin ratingvirksomhed i Frankrig.
With its Score@rating, Coface obtained the status of External Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI) from the Commission bancaire for its rating activities in France.
Denne godkendelse er tildelt i overensstemmelse med reglerne under Basel II aftalen.
That approval was granted in accordance with the Basel II rules.
Nedenstående oversigt giver et overblik over sammenhængen mellem de forskellige anerkendte ratingsystemer [7]:
The following table gives the equivalences between different recognised rating systems [7].
Risikovægt
Risk Weight
Risikokortlægning ifølge Basel II —
Basel mapping
AAA til AA-
AAA to AA-
Aaa til Aa3
Aaa to Aa3
A+ til A–
A+ to A-
A1 til A3
A1 to A3
BBB+ til BBB–
BBB+ to BBB-
Baa1 til Baa3
Baa1 to Baa3
Vurdering af langsigtet risiko
Evaluation of long-term risk
BB+ til BB–
BB+ to BB-
til Ba3
to Ba3
B+ til B–
B+ to B-
B1 til B3
B1 to B3
CCC+ eller derunder
CCC+ and below
Caa1 eller derunder
Caa1 and below
Score @rating er en risikorating svarende til, at risikoen for misligholdelse opdeles i trancher.
Score@rating is a risk rating which divides probability of default into phases.
Den risiko, der analyseres, er virksomhedens misligholdelse i henhold til loven eller manglende betaling af tilsvarende grovhed.
The risk analysed is default by the undertaking under the terms of the law, or a failure to pay of equivalent seriousness.
Hver rating, på en skala fra 1 til 10, svarer til en gennemsnitlig misligholdelsessats på et år.
Each rating, measured on a scale of 1 to 10, corresponds to an average annual default rate.
Nedenstående oversigt viser misligholdelsessatser på et år svarende til de forskellig ratings i Score @rating [8]:
The table below shows the annual default rate corresponding to different Score@rating ratings [8]:
Meget stor risiko
Very high risk
Middelstor risiko
Average risk
Minimal risiko
Low risk
Misligholdelsessats for et år
Annual default rate
For at imødegå risikoen for, at den forsikrede ikke betaler i en situation med en stærk dollar, må COFACE dække sig ind i et omfang svarende til risikoen for misligholdelse ved hjælp af finansinstrumenter [9].
In order to deal with the risk of default by the insured undertaking in the event of a strong dollar, Coface must be covered for the probability of default by financial instruments [9].
Ved hjælp af Bloomberg-databasen er det muligt at beregne prisen for de instrumenter, der er nødvendige til afdækning af kreditrisikoen på det tidspunkt, hvor garantien tegnes.
The Bloomberg software can calculate the price of the instruments required to cover the credit risk on the day a guarantee is quoted.
Præmien justeres herefter under hensyntagen til risikoen for misligholdelse på basis af Score @rating-systemet og prisen på de instrumenter, der er nødvendige for at afdække denne risiko.
The premium is therefore adjusted according to the default risk determined on the basis of the Score@rating system and the cost of the instruments required to cover that risk.
De elementer, der beskrives i betragtning 40-49, danner grundlag for beregning af de præmier, der anvendes i forbindelse med »Aéro 2008«.
The factors described in recitals 40 to 49 form the basis for calculating the current premiums under the Aero 2008 guarantee.
De franske myndigheder har fremlagt en detaljeret oversigt over de præmier, der er faktureret til de fire leverandører, som har tegnet garantien.
The French authorities have provided a detailed breakdown of the premiums invoiced to the four suppliers taking out the guarantee.
Det fremgår af nedenstående oversigt:
This is illustrated in the table below:
Tegningsdato
Quotation date
COFACE rating ved tegningen
Coface note on quotation
Startår
Year commencing
Slutår
Year ending
Gevinstandel
Sharing percentage
Gevinstandel, begrænset til 0,15 EUR?
15-cent ceiling?
2 mdr.
2 months
Beløb i USD
Total amount USD
Garantiens markedspris
Market price of the guarantee
Margen til administrationsomkostninger
Margin for administrative costs
Præmie — COFACE
Coface premium
Afvigelse i relation til gennemførelsesrisiko [10]
Difference related to execution risk [10]
Ifølge de franske myndigheder gør den således definerede præmie garantien mindre attraktiv i forhold til de produkter, der tilbydes af banksektoren.
According to the French authorities, the structure of the premium as set out makes the guarantee less attractive than the products offered by the banking sector.
De betingelser, der tilbydes i forbindelse med »Aéro 2008«, er derfor ikke mere fordelagtige end markedsvilkårene. Præmierne omfatter markedsværdien af de finansinstrumenter, der kræves for at tilbyde garantien, herunder en fortjenestmargen, COFACE's administrationsomkostninger og værdien af risikoen for leverandørens misligholdelse.
The conditions offered under the Aero 2008 guarantee are therefore not more favourable than market conditions and the premiums clearly incorporate the market value of the financial products required to set up the guarantee, including a profit margin, Coface’s administrative costs, and the value of the default risk of the supplier.
Frankrig hævder derfor, at foranstaltningen ikke omfatter nogen selektiv økonomisk fordel og ikke udgør statsstøtte efter artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF.
France therefore argued that the measure does not involve selective economic advantage and so does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
Frankrig anfører endvidere, at af de 11 virksomheder, der modtog et tilbud fra COFACE, besluttede syv at afvise tilbuddet.
France also stated that seven of the eleven undertakings which received an offer from Coface decided to reject the offer.
Ifølge de franske oplysninger erklærede to af de pågældende virksomheder, at bankbetingelserne var mere favorable (bl.a. ingen præmiebetaling), og to hævdede, at COFACE's betingelser ikke var interessante (garanterede kurser var ikke attraktive).
According to information provided by the French authorities, two of the undertakings in question stated that the banks’ terms were more favourable (in particular, no premium) and two others stated that the terms offered by Coface were not advantageous (in particular, unattractive guaranteed rates).
En virksomhed hævdede, at betalingsbetingelserne ikke var i overensstemmelse med den foreslåede garanti, en anden meddelte, at det var lykkedes at indgå aftalen i euro, og en tredje virksomhed anførte, at forhandlingerne med køberen ikke var afsluttet, da garantitilsagnet udløb.
One undertaking stated that its terms of payment were incompatible with the guarantee offered, another stated that it had finally managed to enter into an agreement in EUR and a third undertaking stated that the negotiations with the purchaser had broken down at the end of the validity of the guarantee commitment.
En foranstaltning udgør statsstøtte efter artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF, hvis den opfylder følgende fire betingelser: Den ydes af staten eller ved hjælp af statsmidler, den giver en selektiv fordel til bestemte virksomheder eller til bestemte produktioner, den fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencen eller påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
A measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU if it fulfils four conditions: it must be granted by the State or through State resources, confer a selective advantage to some undertakings or economic activities, distort or threaten to distort competition, and be liable to affect trade between Member States.
Som anført i betragtning 34 var beslutningen om at indlede proceduren primært begrundet i, at der var tvivl om, hvorvidt de udbetalte præmier var i overensstemmelse med markedspriserne.
As stated in recital 34, the decision to initiate a formal investigation procedure was based, first, on the existence of concerns about whether the premiums paid by the beneficiary undertakings were consistent with market prices.
Kommissionen mente især, at de franske myndigheder ikke havde dokumenteret, at de betalte præmier dækkede følgende elementer: COFACE administrationsomkostninger i forbindelse med forvaltning af garantien, risikoen for leverandørens misligholdelse, kreditrisikoen ved ratebetaling af præmier og en fortjenestemargen.
Specifically, the Commission took the view that the French authorities did not show that the premiums paid covered the following factors: the administrative costs of Coface for administering the guarantee, the risk of default by suppliers, the credit risk in respect of staggered payment of premiums, and a profit margin.
Det kunne derfor ikke udelukkes, at de leverandører, der havde tegnet garantien, kunne opnå en selektiv økonomisk fordel.
The possibility therefore remained that there was a selective economic advantage for suppliers who took out the guarantee.
Kommissionens tjenestegrene har undersøgt de oplysninger, der er fremlagt fra fransk side efter procedurens indledning efter artikel 108, stk. 2 i TEUF, for at konstatere, om foranstaltningen er i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip, dvs. om COFACE's betingelser svarer til de betingelser, der tilbydes af private aktører på markedet.
The Commission’s services analysed the information provided by the French authorities following the opening of the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) TFEU with a view to determining whether the measure is consistent with the market economy private investor principle, that is to say, whether or not the conditions offered by Coface are consistent with the market conditions offered by private operators.
Kommissionen bemærker først, at de franske myndigheder har forpligtet sig til, at COFACE over for alle virksomheder, der anmoder om kurssikring, beregner præmien på basis af samme metode som den, der bl.a. er beskrevet i afsnit IV [11].
The Commission notes, first, that the French authorities undertook to ensure that when Coface determines the applicable rate of the premium, it uses the same methodology for all undertakings applying for the guarantee, namely the methodology set out in Section IV [11].
Kommissionen konstaterer, at der på markederne findes produkter, der svares til dem, der tilbydes af COFACE.
The Commission finds that products comparable to those offered by Coface are also available on the markets.
Kommissionen har efterfølgende kontrolleret, at den markedspris, som COFACE fakturerer for garantien, svarer til den markedspris, der anvendes af private aktører.
The Commission then verified that the market price of the guarantee invoiced by Coface is consistent with the market price applied by private operators.
Kommissionen konstaterer, at priserne på de finansielle instrumenter, der er nødvendige for at tilbyde garantien, faktisk svarer til markedspriserne, hvilket fremgår af dokumentationen fra Bloomberg, som Frankrig har fremlagt, og reelt afspejler de præmier, der faktureres af COFACE.
The Commission takes the view that the price of the financial instruments required to set up the guarantee are in fact market prices, as shown by the extracts from the Bloomberg software provided by France, and that they are accurately reflected in the premiums invoiced by Coface.
Markedspriserne for disse finansinstrumenter omfatter desuden en fortjenestmargen til de finansinstitutter, hos hvem COFACE køber de omhandlede instrumenter.
In addition, the market prices of those financial products include a profit margin for the financial institutions from which Coface bought the instruments in question.
De franske myndigheder har endvidere dokumenteret, at der faktureres en supplerende margen på 40 point for at dække COFACE's administrationsomkostninger.
The French authorities also showed that an additional margin of 40 base points is invoiced in order to cover Coface’s administrative costs.
Som anført i betragtning 45 tegner denne margen sig for en væsentlig del af de fakturerede præmiers værdi.
As set out in recital 45, that margin represents a substantial proportion of the value of the premiums invoiced.
Kommissionen mener derfor, at de fakturerede præmier omfatter en fortjenestmargen og en margen, der dækker COFACE's administrationsomkostninger. Det gør det muligt at fjerne de betænkeligheder, der kom til udtryk ved indledningen af den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure.
The Commission therefore considers that the premiums invoiced incorporate a profit margin and a margin to cover Coface’s administrative costs, which removes the uncertainty expressed when the formal investigation procedure was initiated.
Kommissionen bemærker, at de private banker ikke inkluderer en sådan ekstra margen men blot modtager den margen, der er inkluderet i priserne i Bloombergs database.
The Commission observes that such an additional margin is not included by private banks, which merely receive the margin included in the Bloomberg database price.
Denne margen kan derfor anses for at svare til markedsprisen.
Accordingly, that margin may be considered to be consistent with the market price.
Kommissionen finder, at Frankrig ligeledes har dokumenteret, at risikoen for leverandørens misligholdelse [12] er korrekt afspejlet i fastsættelsen af de fakturerede præmier.
The Commission takes the view that France has also succeeded in demonstrating that the default risk by the supplier [12] was reflected correctly in the calculation of the amount of the premiums invoiced.
For at imødegå en situation, hvor den forsikrede ikke betaler, i en situation med en stærk dollar, skal COFACE dække sig ind i et omfang svarende til risikoen for misligholdelse ved:
In order to deal with the risk of default by the insured undertaking, Coface must obtain cover for the probability of default by:
køb af euro/dollar-put til striking-prisen svarende til den garanterede terminskurs for (1 % gevinstandel) x beløb i garanterede dollar
buying a EUR/USD put at a strike price equal to the guaranteed forward rate for (1 – sharing %) × the guaranteed dollar amount, or
køb af euro/dollar-put til striking-prisen svarende til den garanterede terminskurs minus 0,15 EUR for gevinstandel × beløb i garanterede dollar — hvis der er fastsat et loft for gevinstandelen.
buying a EUR/USD put at a strike price equal to the guaranteed forward rate less 15 cents for profit-sharing × the guaranteed dollar amount if there is a ceiling on the sharing rate.
Værdien af kreditrisikoen for et bestemt år svarer derfor til summen af optionspriserne multipliceret med risikoen for misligholdelse i det pågældende år.
The value of the credit risk for a year’s cover is therefore equal to the sum of the option price multiplied by the probability of default in respect of the year in question.
Denne misligholdelsessandsynlighed er defineret i et internationalt anerkendt ratingsystem, der er beskrevet i betragtning 47 og 48, og som benyttes af COFACE og dets kunder som led i deres kommercielle transaktioner.
That default probability is determined by an internationally recognised rating system, as described in recitals 47 and 48 and used by Coface and its clients in their commercial transactions.
Kommissionen finder, at det ud fra effektivitetshensyn er berettiget, at COFACE anvender sine egne ratings frem for eksterne ratings.
The Commission considers that the reason for the use by Coface of its own rather than external ratings is that it makes efficiency savings by doing so.
På basis af de supplerende oplysninger fra de franske myndigheder og det tilsagn, der er afgivet som nævnt i betragtning 56 i denne afgørelse, konkluderer Kommissionen, at COFACE's priser for de garantier, der ydes som led i »Aéro 2008«, er i overensstemmelse med de priser, private aktørers tilbyder på markedsvilkår.
On the basis of the additional information provided by the French authorities and the undertaking of the French authorities referred to in recital 56 of this Decision, the Commission concludes that Coface’s price for the Aero 2008 guarantees is consistent with the market conditions offered by private operators.
»Aéro 2008« kan derfor anses for at være i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
The Aero 2008 guarantee may therefore be considered to operate in accordance with the market economy investor principle.
De leverandører, der har tegnet denne garanti, har derfor ikke opnået en økonomisk fordel.
Accordingly, the suppliers who took out the guarantee did not obtain any economic advantage.
Det er derfor ikke nødvendigt at analysere de øvrige betænkeligheder, der lå til grund for procedurens indledning.
It is not therefore necessary to analyse the other concerns on which the opening of the formal investigation procedure was based.
Forekomst af en selektiv økonomisk fordel er en forudsætning for at dokumentere, at der foreligger statsstøtte, og det kan derfor konkluderes, at »Aéro 2008« ikke udgør statsstøtte.
Since the existence of selective economic advantage is a condition required to show that there is State aid, it may be concluded that the Aero 2008 guarantee does not constitute a State aid measure.