natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I betragtning af disse ekstreme markedsforhold tvivlede Kommissionen endvidere på, at den rente, som den nederlandske stat krævede, havde været acceptabel for en privat investor.
Keeping in mind those extreme market circumstances, the Commission also doubted that the interest rates required by the Dutch State would have been acceptable to a private investor.
Kommissionen bemærkede endvidere, at den nye finansieringsgivers soliditet syntes at være en fordel for FBN.
The Commission also noted that the solidity of its new funding provider seemed advantageous to FBN.
FBN var ikke længere afhængig af et selskab i likviditetsmæssig krise som Fortis SA/NV, men modtog finansiering fra den nederlandske stat.
FBN was no longer dependent on a liquidity-constrained company in distress like Fortis SA/NV but received its funding from the Dutch State.
Kommissionen tvivlede på, at foranstaltning Y1 var forenelig med Kommissionens meddelelse — Støttereglernes anvendelse på foranstaltninger truffet over for pengeinstitutter i forbindelse med den aktuelle globale finanskrise (»bankmeddelelsen«) [67] eftersom den hverken var proportional eller begrænset til det nødvendige minimum.
The Commission doubted that Measure Y1 was compatible with the Communication from the Commission – The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis (the ‘Banking Communication’) [67] as it was neither proportional nor limited to the minimum necessary.
Der blev rejst mere specifikke bekymringer i betragtning 52 i beslutningen af 8. april 2009 om foreneligheden af følgende elementer: (1) den forrentning, som FBN betalte, (2) den maksimumperiode, som FBN kunne udnytte finansieringen i, (3) den maksimale løbetid for de relevante instrumenter og (4) likviditetsfacilitetens omfang.
More specific concerns were raised in recital 52 of the Decision of 8 April 2009 on the compatibility of the following elements: (1) the remuneration that FBN paid, (2) the maximum period during which FBN could benefit from funding, (3) the maximum maturity of instruments concerned and (4) the volume of the liquidity facility.
Kommissionen anførte endvidere, at foranstaltning Y2 kunne indeholde elementer af statsstøtte, hvis Fortis Bank SA/NV på tidspunktet for overtagelsen var i stand til at anmode om en omgående indfrielse af de langfristede lån, hvis FBN's ejerskab skulle ændre sig.
The Commission also indicated that Measure Y2 could contain elements of State aid if Fortis Bank SA/NV was at the time of the acquisition in a position to request the immediate redemption of the long-term loans should the ownership of FBN change.
Hvis der rent faktisk fandtes en ejerskabsrelateret indfrielsesklausul, gav foranstaltning Y2 FBN mulighed for at udnytte langfristede lån til rentesatser fra før krisen.
If there was indeed an ownership-related redemption clause, Measure Y2 allowed FBN to benefit from long-term loans at pre-crisis interest rates.
Foranstaltning Y2 betød, at FBN ikke var forpligtet til at finde alternativ finansiering under de dagældende markedsforhold.
Measure Y2 implied that FBN was not obliged to find alternative funding at the prevailing market conditions at that time.
Endvidere kunne der sættes spørgsmålstegn ved den nederlandske stats beslutning om at yde langfristede lån i stedet for kortfristede lån, eftersom Fortis Bank SA/NV havde ret til at anmode om indfrielse.
Moreover, since Fortis Bank SA/NV had the right to ask for redemption, the Dutch State choice to provide of long-term loans rather than short-term loans could be questioned.
I beslutningen af 8. april 2009 gav Kommissionen således udtryk for bekymring over, at foranstaltning Y2 indeholdt statsstøtte over en længere periode end strengt nødvendig.
Therefore, in the Decision of 8 April 2009, the Commission voiced concerns that Measure Y2 contained State aid for a longer-term period than was strictly necessary.
For at kunne vurdere de statsstøttemæssige konsekvenser af foranstaltning Y2 anmodede Kommissionen den nederlandske stat om at give yderligere oplysninger om de kontraktmæssige bestemmelser om tidlig indfrielse for de langsigtede kontrakter.
To be in a position to evaluate the State aid implications of Measure Y2, the Commission requested the Dutch State to provide more information on the contractual early redemption terms of the long-term loan contracts.
I betragtning 54 i beslutningen af 8. april 2009 udtrykte Kommissionen endvidere tvivl om, hvorvidt den nederlandske stat havde truffet tilstrækkelige foranstaltninger til at begrænse uforholdsmæssige konkurrencefordrejninger i overensstemmelse med punkt 27 i bankmeddelelsen.
In recital 54 of the Decision of 8 April 2009, the Commission also doubted whether the Dutch State had taken sufficient measures to limit undue distortions of competition, in line with point (27) of the Banking Communication.
Kommissionen var endvidere bekymret over, at ABN AMRO N — potentielt indirekte — havde draget fordel af likviditetsforanstaltningerne til FBN.
The Commission was also concerned that ABN AMRO N had – potentially indirectly – benefited from the liquidity measures provided to FBN.
Den anmodede derfor den nederlandske stat om at give yderligere oplysninger om ABN AMRO N's finansieringsposition og -strategi.
Therefore, it asked the Dutch State to provide more information on ABN AMRO N’s funding position and funding strategy.
Med hensyn til foranstaltning Z tvivlede Kommissionen på, at den nederlandske stat betalte FBN markedsprisen for overtagelsen af ABN AMRO N. Kommissionen bemærkede, at den nederlandske stat betalte mere end de aktuelle markedsforhold i vurderingen af 3. oktober 2008 fra den nederlandske stats egen vurderingsekspert […] i rapporten, som blev nævnt i betragtning 2.
With respect to Measure Z, the Commission doubted that the Dutch State paid FBN the market price for the acquisition of ABN AMRO N. The Commission observed that the Dutch State paid more than the 3 October 2008‘current market conditions’ valuation of the Dutch State’s own valuation expert […] in its report which was mentioned in recital 2.
Endvidere bemærkede Kommissionen, at den nederlandske stat ikke havde anvendt en korrektionsfaktor til at vise den nedgang på aktiemarkedet, som fandt sted i oktober og december 2008, og som var særlig udtalt for bankaktier.
Moreover, the Commission observed that the Dutch State had not applied a correction factor to reflect the stock market decline that occurred between October and December 2008 and which was especially pronounced for bank stocks.
Hvis den nederlandske stat betalte for meget, da den købte ABN AMRO N, var foranstaltning Z ensbetydende med statsstøtte, der hjalp med at rekapitalisere FBN.
If the Dutch State overpaid when buying ABN AMRO N, Measure Z was equivalent to State aid helping to recapitalise FBN.
Da der hverken fandtes en rentabilitetsplan eller en omstruktureringsplan, kunne Kommissionen ikke beslutte, om ABN AMRO N og FBN som følge af foranstaltning X, Y1, Y2 og Z havde tilstrækkelig kapital og kunne realisere et acceptabelt rentabilitetsniveau.
Because neither a viability plan nor a restructuring plan were available, the Commission was unable to determine whether, as a result of Measures X, Y1, Y2 and Z, ABN AMRO N and FBN had sufficient capital and were able to realise an acceptable level of profitability.
Årsager til at forlænge proceduren i afgørelsen af 5. februar 2010
Grounds to extend the proceedings in the Decision of 5 February 2010
Statsstøtte i overensstemmelse med traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1
Existence of State aid in accordance with Article 107(1) of the Treaty
Da den nederlandske stat den 17. juli 2009 og den 15. januar 2010 anmeldte supplerende foranstaltninger til fordel for FBN og ABN AMRO N som foranstaltninger, der ikke udgør statsstøtte, var Kommissionen bekymret for, om nogle af disse supplerende foranstaltninger udgjorde ekstra statsstøtte til FBN og ABN AMRO N.
When on 17 July 2009 and on 15 January 2010, the Dutch State notified extra measures in favour of FBN and ABN AMRO N as measures not constituting State aid, the Commission was concerned that some of these additional measures represented extra State aid to FBN and ABN AMRO N.
I afgørelsen af 5. februar 2010 bemærkede Kommissionen, at den nederlandske stat i henhold til aktionæroverenskomsten havde en række forpligtelser, som ikke var forpligtelser for ABN AMRO N. Foranstaltninger truffet af den nederlandske stat med henblik på at overholde forpligtelserne i henhold til aktionæroverenskomsten (og navnlig forpligtelsen til at bære omkostningerne for ABN AMRO Z og forpligtelsen til at udskille ABN AMRO N fra ABN AMRO Bank) udgjorde ved første øjekast ikke statsstøtte til ABN AMRO N.
In the Decision of 5 February 2010, the Commission observed that under the CSA the Dutch State had a number of obligations, which were not obligations of ABN AMRO N. Measures taken by the Dutch State to comply with its obligations under the CSA (and in particular the obligation to bear the cost of ABN AMRO Z and the obligation to separate ABN AMRO N from ABN AMRO Bank) would at first sight not qualify as State aid to ABN AMRO N.
Kommissionen anførte, at foranstaltning A og B1 primært syntes at være udformet til at dække kapitalunderskuddet i ABN AMRO Z, men samtidig var det uklart for Kommissionen, om der ikke også var en indirekte fordel for de økonomiske aktiviteter i ABN AMRO N. I denne forbindelse ønskede Kommissionen at vide, om ABN AMRO N og ABN AMRO Z — uden særskilt juridisk status — var tilstrækkeligt bundet i forhold til hinanden.
The Commission indicated that the Measures A and B1 seemed primarily designed to cover the capital shortage of ABN AMRO Z, but at the same time it was not clear to the Commission whether there was not also an indirect benefit to the economic activities of ABN AMRO N. In that regard, the Commission wanted to know whether ABN AMRO N and ABN AMRO Z – with no separate legal status – were sufficiently ring-fenced vis-à-vis one another.
Kommissionen ønskede også at modtage yderligere oplysninger om årsager til kapitalunderskuddet i ABN AMRO Z og f.eks. om overførslen af Unicredito-aktier fra ABN AMRO Z til ABN AMRO N. Kommissionen havde også spørgsmål vedrørende betalingen fra ABN AMRO N til ABN AMRO Z for udførelsen af hovedkontorfunktioner.
The Commission also wanted to receive more information on the reasons behind the capital shortfall of ABN AMRO Z and for instance on the transfer of Unicredito shares from ABN AMRO Z to ABN AMRO N. The Commission also had questions as to the remuneration by ABN AMRO N to ABN AMRO Z for the performance of head office functions.
Kommissionen mistænkte, at — i hvert fald en del af — underkapitaliseringen af ABN AMRO Z hang sammen med, at ABN AMRO N ikke betalte markedspris for ABN AMRO Z's hovedkontortjenester.
The Commission suspected that – at least part of – the undercapitalisation of ABN AMRO Z was linked to the fact that ABN AMRO N did not pay a market price for the head office services of ABN AMRO Z.
Selv om udskillelsen af ABN AMRO N fra ABN AMRO Bank i henhold til aktionæroverenskomsten er den nederlandske stats forpligtelse, kunne Kommissionen ikke udelukke, at den statslige rekapitalisering, der finansierede udskillelsesomkostningerne, kunne udgøre statsstøtte.
Even though the separation of ABN AMRO N from ABN AMRO Bank is an obligation of the Dutch State under the CSA, the Commission could not exclude that the State recapitalisation financing the separation costs could be State aid.
Kommissionen bemærkede, at ikke alle omkostninger, der kategoriseres som udskillelsesomkostninger i ordets snævreste forstand var knyttet til udskillelsesforpligtelsen som beskrevet i aktionæroverenskomsten.
The Commission observed that not all costs categorised as separation costs were strictu senso linked to the separation obligations as described in the CSA.
Kommissionen bemærkede, at kategorien »udskillelsesomkostninger« omfattede et beløb på 500 mio. EUR, som skulle bruges til at sikre ABN AMRO Group en forsigtighedsmargen over minimumskravene.
The Commission noticed that the category ‘separation costs’ included an amount of EUR 500 million which was needed to provide ABN AMRO Group with a prudential margin over minimum prudential requirements.
Kommissionen bemærkede, at den nederlandske stat hjalp FBN og ABN AMRO N med at betale omkostningerne i forbindelse med fusionen.
The Commission observed that the Dutch State helped FBN and ABN AMRO N to pay the costs related to the merger.
For at løse de fusionsproblemer, som blev skabt af fusionen, besluttede ABN AMRO N at sælge IFN og New HBU, hvilket førte til et nyt kapitalunderskud.
To resolve concentration problems created by the merger, ABN AMRO N decided to sell IFN and New HBU, which led to a new capital shortfall.
Kommissionen bemærkede, at FBN og ABN AMRO N kunne profitere af fordelene ved fusionen (f.eks. fusionssynergier, fordelene ved at være et stærkere selskab med en større markedsandel på det nederlandske marked), samtidig med, at den nederlandske stat finansierede de direkte omkostninger.
The Commission observed that FBN and ABN AMRO N were able to profit from the benefits of the merger (for example merger synergies, the advantages of being a stronger company with higher market shares on the Dutch market, …), while the Dutch State financed the upfront costs.
I den forbindelse bemærkede Kommissionen, at den nederlandske stat ikke var juridisk forpligtet til at betale disse omkostninger, eftersom de opstod i den nederlandske stats beslutning af 21. november 2008 om at fusionere FBN og ABN AMRO N og ikke i aktionæroverenskomsten.
In that regard, the Commission observed that there was no legal obligation for the Dutch State to pay those costs since they originated in the decision of the Dutch State of 21 November 2008 to merge FBN and ABN AMRO N and not in the CSA.
Kommissionen bemærkede, at fusionen og de specifikke omstændigheder i forbindelse med udskillelsen medførte krydshæftelser (foranstaltning E).
The Commission took note of the fact that the merger and the specific conditions surrounding the separation resulted in cross liabilities (Measure E).
Ifølge nederlandsk selskabslovgivning forblev ABN AMRO Bank (nu RBS NV) og ABN AMRO II ansvarlig for gældshaverne i New HBU, hvis New HBU (eller dens nye ejer Deutsche Bank) ikke opfylder sine betalingsforpligtelser.
Dutch corporate law implied that ABN AMRO Bank (now RBS NV) and ABN AMRO II remained liable for the debt-holders of New HBU should New HBU (or its new owner Deutsche Bank) fail to fulfil its payment obligations.
New HBU havde lignende forpligtelser over for gældshaverne i ABN AMRO Bank (nu RBS NV) og ABN AMRO II).
New HBU had similar obligations vis-à-vis debt-holders of ABN AMRO Bank (now RBS NV) and ABN AMRO II).
Kommissionen kunne ikke udelukke, at skadesløsholdelsesløsningen, som betød, at den nederlandske stat udstedte en garanti til gældshaverne i ABN Amro Bank (nu RBS NV) til en overkurs på 200 basispoint plus den gennemsnitlige CDS-margen, udgjorde statsstøtte.
The Commission could not exclude that the indemnification solution, which implied that the Dutch State guaranteed the debt-holders of ABN Amro Bank (now RBS NV) at a premium of 200 basis points plus the median CDS-spread, implied State aid.
Forenelighed med meddelelsen om værdiforringede aktiver
Compatibility with the Impaired Asset Communication
Kommissionen var ligeledes bekymret over udformningen af kapitalfrigørelsesinstrumentet (foranstaltning A).
The Commission also raised concerns about the design of the capital relief instrument (Measure A).
Kommissionen anerkendte, at foranstaltning A grundlæggende var forskellig fra andre foranstaltninger for værdiforringede aktiver, da den ikke havde til formål at beskytte ABN AMRO N mod yderligere fald i nødlidende aktiver (toxic assets) med en meget usikker vurdering.
The Commission acknowledged that Measure A was fundamentally different from other impaired asset measures as it was not put in place to protect ABN AMRO N against further declines in toxic assets with a highly uncertain valuation.
Ikke desto mindre mente Kommissionen, at foranstaltning A for at være forenelig med det indre marked skulle overholde de generelle principper i meddelelsen fra Kommissionen om behandlingen af værdiforringede aktiver i Fællesskabets banksektor [68] (»meddelelsen om værdiforringede aktiver«).
Nevertheless, the Commission considered that to be compatible with the internal market, Measure A should comply with the general principles of the Communication from the Commission on the treatment of impaired assets in the Community banking sector [68] (the ‘Impaired Asset Communication’).
Mere specifikt bør der være tilstrækkelig dokumentation for en præcis prissætning, hvilket betyder, at banken ikke bør overføre forventede tab til staten.
More specifically, there should be sufficient evidence of appropriate pricing, meaning that the bank should not transfer expected losses to the State.
I denne henseende ønskede Kommissionen også at forstå, hvilke konsekvenser en række specifikke kontraktmæssige bestanddele (f.eks. tilbagebetalingsmekanismen og vertikale dele) ville få for den faktiske pengestrøm og prissætning.
In that regard, the Commission also wanted to understand what impact a number of specific contractual features (for example. the clawback mechanism and the vertical slice) would have on the actual cashflows and pricing.
Endelig tvivlede Kommissionen på, om der var tilstrækkelige incitamenter til at sikre, at ABN AMRO N ville ophæve instrumentet, så snart det ikke længere var nødvendigt.
Finally, the Commission also doubted that there were insufficient incentives ensuring that ABN AMRO N would terminate the instrument as soon as it was no longer strictly necessary.
Forenelighed med omstruktureringsmeddelelsen
Compatibility with the Restructuring Communication
Kommissionen tvivlede på, om omstruktureringsplanen af december 2009 opfyldte kriterierne i meddelelsen fra Kommissionen om genoprettelse af rentabiliteten i finanssektoren under den nuværende krise og vurdering af omstruktureringsforanstaltninger på grundlag af statsstøttereglerne [69] (»omstruktureringsmeddelelsen«) med hensyn til rentabilitet, byrdefordeling og uforholdsmæssige konkurrencefordrejninger.
The Commission doubted whether the December 2009 Restructuring Plan fulfilled the criteria set forward in the Communication for the Commission on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules [69] (the ‘Restructuring Communication’) in terms of viability, burden-sharing and undue distortions of competition.
Genoprettelse af rentabiliteten på lang sigt
Restoration of long-term viability
Kommissionen anerkendte, at ABN AMRO Group ved første øjekast ville realisere en tilstrækkelig omsætning til at dække alle driftsomkostningerne (herunder værdiforringelser) og oparbejde en acceptabel egenkapitalforrentning.
The Commission acknowledged that ABN AMRO Group would at first sight realise sufficient revenues to cover all its operational costs (including impairments) and earn an acceptable return on equity.
Kommissionen bemærkede imidlertid også, at egenkapitalforrentningen i ABN AMRO Group i vid udstrækning afhang af en række nøgleforudsætninger.
However, the Commission also noted that the return on equity of ABN AMRO Group depended to a large extent on the realisation of a number of key assumptions.
Først og fremmest er det vigtigt, at ABN AMRO Group, hvis den ønsker at blive omkostningseffektiv med et acceptabelt omkostnings-/udbytteforhold, gennemfører de planlagte synergier (nemlig 1,1 mia. EUR før skat sammenlignet med et nettoresultat i 2013 på […] mia. EUR).
First, if ABN AMRO Group wants to become cost-efficient with an acceptable cost-income ratio, it is crucial that ABN AMRO Group implements the projected synergies (namely EUR 1,1 billion pre-tax which compares to a 2013 net profit of […] billion EUR).
Kommissionen bemærkede endvidere, at omstruktureringsplanen af december 2009 endnu ikke indeholdt finansielle beregninger for det værst tænkelige scenarie som krævet i punkt 13 i omstruktureringsmeddelelsen.
The Commission also noted that the December 2009 Restructuring Plan did not yet include financial projections for a worst case scenario as required by point (13) of the Restructuring Communication.
Kommissionen anmodede derfor om sådanne finansielle beregninger for det værst tænkelige scenarie, så den kunne kontrollere, hvordan ABN AMRO Group ville klare sig under mere belastende markedsforhold.
Therefore, the Commission asked for such worst case financial projections, allowing it to verify how ABN AMRO Group would perform in more stressful market conditions.
Kommissionen bemærkede endvidere, at omstruktureringsplanen af december 2009 indeholdt meget få oplysninger om de mindre underdivisioner, således at Kommissionen kunne ikke afgøre, om alle rentabilitetsspørgsmål på dette niveau var håndteret tilstrækkeligt.
The Commission also observed that the December 2009 Restructuring Plan contained little information on smaller sub-divisions, so that the Commission could not judge whether all viability issues at that level had been sufficiently addressed.
Mere specifikt tvivlede Kommissionen på, om rentabiliteten i PFS, en division i FBN, som rapporterede om store Madoff-relaterede tab i 2008, var tilstrækkeligt garanteret.
More specifically, the Commission doubted whether viability of PFS, a division of FBN, which reported major Madoff-related losses in 2008, was sufficiently guaranteed.
Støtte begrænset til det nødvendige minimum/egetbidrag
Aid limited to the minimum necessary/own contribution
Kommissionen tvivlede på, om statsstøtten var begrænset til det nødvendige minimum for at genoprette rentabiliteten i ABN AMRO Group.
The Commission questioned whether the State aid was limited to the minimum necessary to restore the viability of ABN AMRO Group.
I den forbindelse bemærkede den, at ABN AMRO Group havde anført, at den ønskede at foretage mindre tillægsovertagelser, som den fandt nødvendig for at kunne genopbygge de produktkompetencer, der gik tabt i udskillelsesprocessen fra Fortis SA/NV og ABN AMRO Holding.
In that respect, it noted that ABN AMRO Group had indicated that it wished to make small add-on acquisitions, which it deemed necessary to rebuild product competences lost during the separation processes from Fortis SA/NV and ABN AMRO Holding.
I afgørelsen af 5. februar 2010 anførte Kommissionen, at statsstøtte ikke skal anvendes til at finansiere overtagelser eller nye investeringer, medmindre dette er nødvendigt for at genoprette en virksomheds rentabilitet.
In the Decision of 5 February 2010, the Commission argued that State aid should not be used to finance acquisitions or new investments unless essential for restoring the viability of an undertaking.
Kommissionen anmodede den nederlandske stat om at kaste mere lys over ABN AMRO Groups overtagelsespolitik og bl.a. fremsende en detaljeret liste over aktiviteter, som ABN AMRO Group skulle opbygge af hensyn til rentabiliteten.
The Commission asked the Dutch State to shed more light on the acquisition policy of ABN AMRO Group and to provide it with, inter alia, a detailed list of activities that ABN AMRO Group needed to rebuild for viability reasons.
Kommissionen tvivlede desuden på, om alle udbydere af hybrid kapital til FBN og ABN AMRO N havde betalt deres andel af omstruktureringen.
The Commission also doubted whether all hybrid capital providers of FBN and ABN AMRO N had paid their share of the restructuring.
Kommissionen var f.eks. bekymret over, om FBN's præferenceaktionærer [70] i tilstrækkelig grad havde bidraget til at sikre, at den nederlandske stats indgreb ikke blev begrænset til det nødvendige minimum.
The Commission was concerned that, for instance, the preferred shareholders of FBN [70] had not sufficiently contributed to ensure that the intervention of the Dutch State was not limited to the minimum necessary.
Også med hensyn til varighed bør statsstøtten begrænses til det nødvendige minimum.
Also in terms of duration, the State aid should be limited to the minimum necessary.