natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
En samarbejdsvillig eksporterende producent havde fordel af ordningen.
One cooperating exporting producer benefited from the scheme.
Subsidieordningen er desuden specifik i henhold til grundforordningens artikel 4, stk. 3, idet den lovgivning, i henhold til hvilken den subsidieydende myndighed udøver sin virksomhed, begrænser adgangen til denne ordning til kun at omfatte virksomheder i en bestemt region.
The subsidy scheme is specific within the meaning of Article 4(3) of the basic Regulation given that the legislation itself, pursuant to which the granting authority operates, limited the access to this scheme to companies within a designated geographical region.
Tilskuddet er forbundet med og beregnet i henhold til eksportresultaterne, idet den modtagne fordel er baseret på øgede eksportmængder og -værdier fra år til år.
The grant is linked and calculated according to the export performance since benefit received is based on the increase of export quantities and values from one year to the next.
Dette subsidiebeløb (tæller) blev fordelt over den samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producents samlede omsætning i UP, da subsidiet er betinget af eksportresultater.
This amount (numerator) has been allocated over the total export turnover of the co-operating exporting producer during the IP, because the subsidy is contingent upon export performance.
Den subsidiesats, der blev fastsat i undersøgelsesperioden for de samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenter i forbindelse med denne ordning, er på 0,05 % for APP-gruppen.
The subsidy rate established with regard to this scheme during the IP for the cooperating exporting producers amounts to 0,05 % for APP Group.
Ordninger indberettet af de samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenter, men ikke undersøgt
Programmes reported by the cooperating exporting producers but not assessed
Følgende ordninger og programmer vedrørende energibesparelser og miljøbeskyttelse blev indberettet af de samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenter:
The following schemes and programmes related to energy saving and environment protection were reported from the cooperating exporting producers:
Da der kun var tale om mindre fordele, blev det ikke fundet hensigtsmæssigt at fortsætte undersøgelsen af disse ordninger og programmer.
In view of the small amount of benefits involved, it was not considered necessary to pursue our investigation of these schemes and programmes.
STATSLIG LEVERING AF VARER ELLER TJENESTEYDELSER MOD UTILSTRÆKKELIGT VEDERLAG (»LTAR«)
GOVERNMENT PROVISION OF GOODS AND SERVICES FOR LESS THAN ADEQUATE REMUNERATION (‘LTAR’)
Ordninger nævnt i klagen og undersøgt
Programmes mentioned in the complaint and assessed
Retsgrundlag og støtteberettigelse
Legal Basis and Eligibility
Det blev i klagen påstået, at GOC havde stillet brugsrettigheder til jord til rådighed for de samarbejdsvillige eksportører mod utilstrækkeligt vederlag.
The allegation in the complaint was that the GOC had provided land-use rights to the cooperating exporters for less than adequate remuneration.
Al jord er iflg. artikel 2 i Land Administration Law statsejet, idet jord ifølge den kinesiske forfatning og relevante lovbestemmelser tilhører befolkningen i Folkerepublikken Kina.
According to Article 2 of the Land Administration Law, all land is government-owned since, according to the Chinese constitution and relevant legal provisions, land belongs collectively to the People of China.
Jord kan ikke sælges, men brugsrettigheder til jord kan ifølge loven tildeles. De statslige myndigheder tildeler jorden gennem offentlige udbud, pristilbud eller auktioner.
No land can be sold but land-use rights may be assigned according to the law: the State authorities assign it through public bidding, quotation or auction.
De samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenter har indberettet oplysninger vedrørende den jord, de er i besiddelse af, samt de relevante kontrakter/certifikater vedrørende brugsrettigheder til jord, men GOC fremlagde ingen oplysninger om prisfastsættelsen på brugsrettigheder til jord.
The cooperating exporting producers have reported information regarding the land they hold as well as the relevant land-use rights contracts/certificates, but no information was provided by the GOC about pricing of land-use rights.
I overensstemmelse hermed bør GOC's indrømmelse af brugsrettigheder til jord betragtes som et subsidie i henhold til grundforordningens artikel 3, stk. 1, litra a), nr. iii), og artikel 3, stk. 2, idet der indrømmes goder, hvilket har medført en fordel for modtagervirksomhederne.
Accordingly, the provision of land-use rights by the GOC should be considered a subsidy within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(iii) and Article 3(2) of the basic Regulation in the form of provision of goods which confers a benefit upon the recipient companies.
Der findes, jf. betragtning 260-262, ikke et effektivt marked for jord i Kina, og brugen af en ekstern reference viser, at det beløb, de samarbejdsvillige eksportører betalte for brugsrettighederne til jord, er langt under de normale markedspriser.
As explained in recitals (260) to (262) below, there is no functioning market for land in China and the use of an external benchmark demonstrates that the amount paid for land-use rights by the cooperating exporters is well below the normal market rate.
GOC blev anmodet om at fremlægge oplysninger om berettigelseskriterierne for at opnå subsidiet og om brugen af subsidiet med henblik på at fastslå, i hvilket omfang subsidiet er begrænset til visse virksomheder, og om det er specifikt, jf. grundforordningens artikel 4.
The GOC was requested to provide information on the eligibility criteria for obtaining the subsidy and on the use of the subsidy, in order to determine to what extent access to the subsidy is limited to certain enterprises and whether it is specific according to Article 4 of the basic Regulation.
De faktiske oplysninger, der blev taget i betragtning, er:
The evidence of specificity submitted by the complainants.
Det skal i den forbindelse bemærkes, at artikel 7-11 i førnævnte plan indeholder specifikke regler om industriens struktur og fastsætter, hvilke typer papirindustri, der skal etableres i forskellige regioner i landet.
In this respect it is noted that Articles 7 to 11 of the aforesaid Plan set out specific rules on industrial layout by stating what type of papermaking industries shall be established in various geographical regions of the country.
Beviser (se betragtning 76) om, at papirindustrien er en »tilskyndet industri« (beslutning nr. 40).
The evidence (see recital (76)) that the papermaking industry is an ‘encouraged industry’ (Decision No 40).
Undersøgelsens konklusioner (jf. betragtning 260-262), om, at der ikke findes et effektivt marked for jord i Kina.
The findings (see recitals (260) to (262)) that there is no functioning market for land in China.
De samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenters resultater, som bekræftedes i den parallelle antidumpingundersøgelse, viste, at de blev indrømmet jord med henblik på deres papirfremstillingsprojekter [8].
The findings from the cooperating exporting producers, as confirmed in the parallel anti-dumping investigation, that land was allocated to them in view of their papermaking projects [8].
I lyset af GOC's manglende samarbejdsvilje er der ingen beviser for, at subsidiet er baseret på objektive kriterier eller betingelser, jf. grundforordningens artikel 4, stk. 2, litra b).
In the light of the GOC's non-cooperation, there is nothing to suggest that eligibility for the subsidy is based on objective criteria and conditions under Article 4(2)(b) of the basic Regulation.
I overensstemmelse hermed bør det konkluderes, at situationen vedrørende brugsrettigheder til jord i Kina ikke er markedsbetinget.
Accordingly, it should be concluded that the situation in China with respect to land-use rights is not market-driven.
Der synes ikke at findes private referencer overhovedet i Kina.
Indeed, there appear to be no available private benchmarks at all in China.
En justering for omkostninger eller priser i Kina er derfor ikke mulig.
Therefore, an adjustment of costs or prices in China is not practicable.
Det konkluderes under disse omstændigheder, at der ikke findes et marked i Kina, jf. grundforordningens artikel 6, litra d), nr. ii), og at brugen af en ekstern reference til at måle fordelens omfang er berettiget.
In these circumstances it is considered that there is no market in China and, in accordance with Article 6(d)(ii) of the basic Regulation, the use of an external benchmark for measuring the amount of benefit is warranted.
Da GOC ikke samarbejdede og ikke fremlagde forslag til en ekstern reference, måtte Kommissionen gøre brug af de foreliggende faktiske oplysninger for at fastlægge en egnet ekstern reference.
Given that the GOC did not cooperate and failed to submit any proposal for an external benchmark the Commission had to resort to facts available in order to establish an appropriate external benchmark.
Det er i den forbindelse relevant at anvende oplysningerne fra Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matscu (Chinese Taipei), herefter benævnt »Taiwan«, som en egnet reference.
In this respect it is considered appropriate to use information from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matscu (Chinese Taipei), hereafter mentioned as ‘Taiwan’, as an appropriate benchmark.
Kommissionen skønner, at jordpriserne i Taiwan giver det bedste alternativ til de områder i Kina, hvor de samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenter er etableret.
The Commission considers that the land prices in Taiwan offers the best proxy to the areas in China where the cooperating exporting producers are based.
De samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenter er alle etableret i den østlige del af Kina, i områder med højst BNP i provinser med en stor befolkningstæthed omkring Shanghai.
All the exporting producers are located in the east part of China, in developed high-GDP areas in provinces with a high population density surrounding Shanghai.
Den fordel, som modtageren har opnået, beregnes ved at tage højde for det beløb, som hver virksomhed havde betalt for brugsrettigheder til jord, og det beløb, som normalt skulle have været betalt på grundlag den taiwanesiske reference.
The benefit conferred on the recipients is calculated by taking into consideration the difference between the amount paid by each company for land-use rights and the amount that should have been normally paid on the basis of the Taiwanese benchmark.
I denne beregning anvendte Kommissionen den gennemsnitlige jordpris pr. kvadratmeter i Taiwan, justeret for valutanedskrivninger fra den dato, hvor de respektive kontrakter for brugsrettigheder til jord trådte i kraft.
In doing this calculation, the Commission used the average land price per square meter established in Taiwan corrected for currency depreciation as from the dates of the respective land-use right contracts.
Oplysningerne vedrørende de industrielle jordpriser blev indhentet på webstedet for Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs i Taiwan.
The information concerning industrial land prices was retrieved from the website of the Industrial Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs of Taiwan.
Valutanedskrivningen blev beregnet på basis af inflationen i Taiwan som offentliggjort af IMF i World Economic Outlook 2009.
The currency depreciation was calculated on the basis of inflation rates for Taiwan as published by the IMF in its 2009 World Economic Outlook.
Dette subsidiebeløb (tæller) er i overensstemmelse med grundforordningens artikel 7, stk. 3, blevet fordelt over UP ved hjælp af den normale løbetid for brugsrettigheder til erhvervsmæssig jord i Kina, dvs. 50 år.
In accordance with Article 7(3) of the basic Regulation this subsidy amount (numerator) has been allocated to the IP using the normal life time of the land-use right for industrial use land in China, i.e. 50 years.
Dette beløb blev derefter fordelt over de samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenters samlede omsætning i UP, da subsidiet ikke er betinget af eksportresultater og ikke blev ydet i forhold til de fremstillede, producerede, eksporterede eller transporterede mængder.
This amount has then been allocated over the total sales turnover of the co-operating exporting producers during the IP, because the subsidy is not contingent upon export performance and was not granted by reference to the quantities manufactured, produced, exported or transported.
Den subsidiesats, der blev fastsat i undersøgelsesperioden for de samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenter i forbindelse med denne ordning, er på 2,81 % for APP-virksomhederne og 0,69 % for Chenming-virksomhederne.
The subsidy rate established with regard to this scheme during the IP for the cooperating exporting producers amounts to 2,81 % for APP companies and 0,69 % for Chenming companies.
Ordninger nævnt i klagen, men ikke undersøgt
Schemes mentioned in the complaint but not assessed
Det blev konstateret, at de eksporterende producenter ikke havde fordel af denne ordning i UP.
It was found that the cooperating exporting producers did not benefit from this scheme during the IP.
Det blev derfor ikke yderligere undersøgt, om ordningen var udligningsberettiget.
Therefore there was no need to asses whether this scheme is countervailable or not.
BEMÆRKNINGER FRA PARTERNE VEDRØRENDE SUBSIDIERING
COMMENTS OF PARTIES IN RELATION TO SUBSIDISATION
GOC, to grupper af samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenter (APP og Chenming) og EU-klageren indsendte bemærkninger til fremlæggelsen af de endelige resultater.
The GOC, two groups of cooperating exporting producers (APP and Chenming) and the EU complainant submitted comments on the definitive disclosure.
EU-klageren støttede Kommissionens undersøgelsesresultater.
The EU complainant supported the findings of the Commission.
GOC, APP og Chenming anfægtede Kommissionens undersøgelsesresultater.
The GOC, APP and Chenming disputed the findings of the Commission.
Da argumenterne allerede til fulde er blevet behandlet i fremlæggelsen af de endelige undersøgelsesresultater, gentages de ikke i denne forordning.
To the extent that arguments have already been fully addressed in the definitive disclosure they are not repeated in this Regulation.
PÅSTANDE VEDRØRENDE DOBBELT FORDEL
ALLEGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO DOUBLE REMEDY
GOC påstod, at forslaget til udligningsforanstaltninger ville føre til dobbelt fordel.
The GOC argued that the proposal for countervailing measures amounts to a double remedy.
Det blev påstået, at den normale værdi for Kina iflg. EU-praksis for antidumpingundersøgelser fastlægges ved henvisning til tal, der indhentes fra producenter i et tredjeland med markedsøkonomi.
It was submitted that under the EU practice in anti-dumping investigations against China normal value is determined by reference to data obtained from producers in a third market-economy country.
I sådanne tilfælde vil en udligningstold give dobbelt fordel og vedrøre samme aspekter, idet antidumpingtold effektivt »udligner« enhver påstået subsidiering, der indrømmes kinesiske virksomheder.
Thus, in such cases countervailing duties would provide a double remedy to address the same matter since the anti-dumping duties effectively ‘offset’ any subsidy allegedly granted to Chinese companies.
APP påstod, at hvis den normale værdi baseres på hjemmemarkedssalg i referencelandet, vil afvisningen af anmodningen om markedsøkonomisk behandling og brug af en ikke-subsidieret normal værdi bevirke, at tolden forøges med subsidiebeløbet, og subsidierne vil da blive talt med to gange.
APP claimed that if the normal value is based on domestic sales in the analogue country, the rejection of the MET claim and the use of non-subsidised normal value have the effect of increasing the duty by the amount of subsidisation and the subsidies would be counted twice.
GOC påstod, at de samme påståede fordrejninger allerede var blevet behandlet i den parallelle antidumpingundersøgelse.
GOC submitted that the same alleged distortions have already been addressed in the parallel anti-dumping proceedings.
GOC påstod desuden, at Kommissionens praksis er et brud på EU- og WTO-lovgivning, og at Kommissionen enten burde afslutte procedurerne om udligningsforanstaltninger eller indrømme de samarbejdsvillige eksporterende producenter markedsøkonomisk behandling i de parallelle antidumpingsager.
GOC also submitted that that the practice of the Commission is in violation of EU and WTO law and that the Commission should either terminate the CVD proceedings or grant MET to the co-operating exporting producers in the parallel anti-dumping proceedings.
GOC påstod også, at man ikke kan acceptere Kommissionens argument om, at der ikke er dobbelttælling, idet skadesmargenen er lavere end dumpingmargenen.
The GOC also submitted that it does not accept the Commission's argument that there is no double counting by virtue of the injury margin that is lower than the dumping margin.
Endelig påstod GOC, at de igangværende undersøgelser burde afsluttes på grundlag af konklusionerne fra WTO's appelorgan i tvisten mellem US-PRC DS379 [9] angående dobbelttælling.
Finally the GOC argued that on the basis of the findings of the WTO Appellate Body on the US – PRC dispute DS379 [9] with respect to double remedy the current proceedings should be terminated.
Disse påstande måtte afvises.
Those claims had to be rejected.
Det skal i denne forbindelse bemærkes, at dobbelt fordel ikke spiller nogen rolle i disse undersøgelser.
In this respect it is noted that double remedy does not play any role in these proceedings.
Uanset om en samtidig indførelse af antidumping- og udligningstold i tilfælde af et land uden markedsøkonomi kan føre til en potentiel »dobbelt fordel«, kan denne situation pr. definition kun opstå, når der er kumulering af dumpingmargenen og subsidiebeløbet, dvs., hvor det kombinerede niveau af de to typer told overstiger den højeste margen, altså enten dumpingmargenen eller subsidieniveauet.
Whether or not the simultaneous imposition of anti-dumping and countervailing duties in the case of a non-market economy can lead to a potential ‘double remedy’, this situation, by definition, could only occur where there is a cumulation of the dumping margin and the amount of subsidy i.e. where the combined level of two types of duty exceeds the higher of the dumping margin or the amount of subsidy.
Som det fremgår nedenfor, er det ikke tilfældet her.
As will be explained below, this is not the case here.
Det skal først bemærkes, at EU anvender reglen om den lavest mulige told ved indførelse af antidumping- og udligningstold på samme vare.
First of all it is recalled that the EU is applying the lesser duty rule when imposing anti-dumping and countervailing duties on the same product.
Med andre ord fastsætter Kommissionen i Unionens undersøgelse det niveau af dumping, subsidiering og skade, der forvoldes EU-erhvervsgrenen.
In other words in EU investigations the Commission establishes the level of dumping, subsidization and injury caused to the Union industry.
Toldens niveau kan aldrig være højre end skadesmargenen, og skadesmargenen er den samme i begge undersøgelser.
The level of duties can never be higher than the injury margin and the injury margin here is the same for both proceedings.
I den parallelle antidumpingsag fastsatte Kommissionen en dumpingmargen, der er langt højere end skadesmargenen.
In the parallel anti-dumping proceedings the Commission established a margin of dumping that is much higher than the injury margin.
I henhold til reglen om den lavest mulige told foreslog Kommissionen, at der indføres foranstaltninger på grundlag af skadesmargenen (jf. Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 451/2011 af 6. maj 2011 om indførelse af en endelig antidumpingtold og endelig opkrævning af den midlertidige told på importen af coated finpapir med oprindelse i Folkerepublikken Kina [10].
In line with the lesser duty rule the Commission proposed the imposition of measures that are based on the injury margin (see Council Regulation (EU) No 451/2011 of 6 May 2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of coated fine paper originating in the People's Republic of China [10]).
Den konstaterede subsidiemargen i den nuværende antisubsidieundersøgelse vil derfor ikke yde EU-erhvervsgrenen yderligere beskyttelse i forhold til dumpingmargenen, da der for antidumpingtolden allerede er fastsat et loft på niveau med skadesmargenen.
Thus the subsidy margin found in the current ant-subsidy investigation will not provide any additional protection to the Union industry as compared to the dumping margin because the anti-dumping duty will already be capped by the injury margin.
Der er således ingen overlapning eller kumulering af told i de to parallelle undersøgelser, og der kan derfor, selv hvis det antages, der er er potentiale for dobbelt fordel som beskrevet i betragtning 269, ikke fremsættes krav i lovgivningen om at »udligne« dumping mod subsidiering.
Therefore there is no overlap or cumulation of duties in the two parallel proceedings and consequently, even assuming that there is a potential for a double remedy as described in recital (269) above, there can be no requirement by law to ‘offset’ dumping against the subsidy.
Forskellen mellem dumping- og subsidiemargenerne i antidumpingprocedurerne var langt højere end det subsidiebeløb, der blev konstateret i den igangværende undersøgelse.
Indeed, the difference between the dumping and injury margins found in the anti-dumping proceedings was much higher than the amount of subsidization found in the present investigation.
Det skal desuden fremhæves, at Kommissionen i forbindelse med den faktiske indførelse af tolden har for vane først at indføre udligningstolden.
It should be also highlighted that when it comes to the actual composition of the duties to be paid the Commission has a practice to first impose the duty amount resulting from the CVD investigation.
Hvis der stadig er forskel mellem førnævnte told og skadesmargenen, kan denne forskel udfyldes af antidumpingtolden.
If there is still a gap between the aforementioned duty level and the injury margin, this gap can be filled with the duty resulting from the anti-dumping investigation.
Dette betyder dog ikke, at der er dobbelttælling, da det kombinerede niveau af tolden allerede kunne være blevet begrundet som et resultat af antidumpingundersøgelsen alene.
However, this does not mean that there is double counting because the combined level of duties could already have been justified as a result of the anti-dumping investigation alone.
Dernæst skal det bemærkes, at de foranstaltninger, som GOC foreslog, ikke er lovgyldige, idet i) undersøgelsen fastslog, at der ydes udligningsberettigede subsidier, som har forvoldt EU-erhvervsgrenen væsentlig skade, og det blev konstateret, at indførelsen af foranstaltninger var i Unionens interesser, hvorfor disse undersøgelser ikke kan afsluttes, ii) ikke alle kinesiske parter anmodede om markedsøkonomisk behandling i de parallelle antidumpingsager, iii) der ikke automatisk kan indrømmes markedsøkonomisk behandling til parter, der ikke har anmodet herom, og iv) afvisningen af markedsøkonomisk behandling for de parter, der ikke blev indrømmet denne behandling, skete som følge af alvorlige mangler i henhold til kriterium 1, 2 og 3 i antidumpinggrundforordningens artikel 2, stk. 7, litra c).
Secondly, it should be noted that the remedies proposed by the GOC are not permitted by law since (i) the investigation established the existence of countervailing subsidies that caused material injury to the Union industry and imposition of measures was found to be in the Union interest thus these proceedings cannot be terminated, (ii) not all Chinese parties requested MET in the parallel anti-dumping proceedings, (iii) MET cannot be granted automatically to parties that have not requested and (iv) for those parties where MET was refused this was done because of the serious deficiencies found with respect to Criteria 1, 2 and 3 of Article 2(7)(c) of the basic anti-dumping Regulation.
PÅSTANDE VEDRØRENDE BRUG AF NEGATIVE KONKLUSIONER
ALLEGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO USE OF ADVERSE INFERENCES