natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
indtil 2002 blev ruten betjent som »fri trafik«, dvs. i fuld konkurrence uden kompensation eller forpligtelser fra staten.
until 2002, the route was operated as a ‘free traffic activity’, that is to say in conditions of full competition, with no compensation paid and no obligation imposed by the State.
DSB skulle udarbejde særskilte regnskaber for ruten, som over en samlet periode skulle udvise overskud, idet der kun medregnes indtægter, som kommer direkte fra ruten
DSB was therefore required to keep separate accounts for this route, which was to show a surplus over a total period, with only income derived directly from the route being taken into account;
i 2002 besluttede DSB at ophøre med at drive ruten som »fri trafik«, og der blev indgået en forhandlet kontrakt mellem Transportministeriet og DSB om at drive ruten som offentlig trafik fra 2002 og frem til den 31. december 2004.
in 2002, DSB decided to stop operating the route under the ‘free traffic’ scheme and a negotiated contract was concluded between the Ministry of Transport and DSB, for the operation of the route as ‘public traffic’ from 2002 to 31 December 2004 inclusive.
Kontrakten indebar derimod ikke, at der blev ydet særskilt eller yderligere betaling til DSB for varetagelsen af de offentlige serviceforpligtelser.
However, the contract did not provide that any separate or additional payment should be made to DSB for discharging public service obligations.
ved indgåelsen af trafikkontrakten for 2005-2014 blev der åbnet mulighed for, at kompensationen til DSB også kunne dække ruten København-Ystad.
when the transport contract for the period 2005-14 was concluded, it became possible for the compensation paid to DSB also to apply to the Copenhagen-Ystad route,
Danmark præciserer, at der ikke er tilført statsmidler til rutens drift før 2005.
Denmark therefore states that no public funds were paid for the operation of the route before 2005.
Den danske regering minder om, at ruten gav underskud, da den blev drevet som fri trafik, og at der ikke kan argumenteres for, at det forhold, at en ganske lille del af de faktisk oppebårne indtægter kan henføres til de indirekte virkninger af, at DSB påbegyndte driften af København-Ystad, skulle indebære, at DSB har fået tilført en overkompensation.
The Danish authorities also point out that this route made a loss when it was operated under the free traffic scheme, and the fact that a very small proportion of the revenues actually collected may be due to the indirect consequences of the start of operation of the Copenhagen-Ystad route by DSB cannot be used as an argument to claim that DSB must have received overcompensation.
Under alle omstændigheder er DSB berettiget til en rimelig fortjeneste i form af forrentning af den investerede kapital.
In any event, DSB would have been naturally entitled to obtain a reasonable profit in the form of a return on the capital invested.
Ifølge regeringen er der ikke grundlag for en påstand om, at de faktisk oppebårne indtægter har medført, at DSB har modtaget en overkompensation, når der tages hensyn til opnåelsen af en rimelig fortjeneste.
In the view of the Danish authorities, this is not sufficient to claim that the actual receipts resulted in overcompensation for DSB, if making a reasonable profit is taken into account.
Færgeoverfarten
Ferry crossing
I relation til spørgsmålet om DSB's omkostninger ved salget af billetter, der inkluderer færgeoverfarten mellem Ystad og Rønne (anløbshavnen på Bornholm), forelagde den danske regering de priser, der blev anvendt af færgeselskabet Bornholmstrafikken.
Regarding the question of DSB’s costs for the sale of tickets which include the ferry crossing between Ystad and Rønne (the port of arrival on the island of Bornholm), the Danish authorities have submitted explanations of the prices charged by Bornholmstrafikken, the ferry operator.
Ifølge den danske regering fremgår det heraf, at der ikke anvendes forskellige takster for henholdsvis DSB og Gråhundbus.
According to the Danish authorities, those explanations show that there was no application of different prices in relation to DSB and Gråhundbus.
Regeringen forelagde også oplysninger om betingelserne for selskabet Bornholmstrafikken A/S' drift af færgeruten Rønne-Ystad.
The Danish authorities have also provided information about the conditions under which the Rønne-Ystad ferry connection is operated by Bornholmstrafikken A/S.
På grundlag af en kontrakt, der er indgået med regeringen efter et udbud:
On the basis of a contract concluded with the Danish Government following a tendering procedure:
er der i kontrakten mellem regeringen og Bornholmstrafikken fastsat et generelt krav om, at Bornholmstrafikken skal koordinere sine afgangs- og ankomsttidspunkter med operatørerne på bus- og togruterne, der forbinder København og Ystad
the contract between the Danish Government and Bornholmstrafikken stipulates a general obligation requiring Bornholmstrafikken to coordinate its arrival and departure times with those of the operators of bus and train lines between Copenhagen and Ystad,
er der også krav om, at Bornholmstrafikken skal indgå i et billetsamarbejde med den eller de bus- og togoperatører, der i kontraktperioden driver bus- eller togdrift på strækningen København-Ystad, således at passagerer kan købe kombinerede færge- og bus/togbilletter med rabat
it also contains clauses requiring Bornholmstrafikken to develop cooperation in terms of tickets with the bus or train line operator operating the Copenhagen-Ystad route by train or bus during the term of the contract, so that travellers can purchase a combined ferry and bus/train ticket at a discount;
er de maksimale takster, som Bornholmstrafikken må opkræve, fastsat i kontrakten
the maximum prices which Bornholmstrafikken is authorised to charge are fixed by the contract,
indeholder kontrakten ikke nærmere bestemmelser om krav til takster eller udformningen af rabatten, og der er heller ikke hjemmel for regeringen til efterfølgende at stille nye krav herom.
the contract does not contain any other provision relating to price requirements or the introduction of discounts, and the Danish Government has no reason to stipulate further requirements subsequently in that respect,
Ifølge den danske regering indebærer dette, at regeringen ikke har mulighed for at øve indflydelse på driften af Bornholmstrafikken ud over at sikre, at Bornholmstrafikken overholder kontraktens bestemmelser.
According to the Danish authorities, it follows therefore that the Danish Government cannot exert any influence over Bornholmstrafikken’s operations other than ensuring that Bornholmstrafikken complies with the provisions of the contract.
Bornholmstrafikken anvender — og har i hele den relevante periode fra 2000 anvendt — helt ens afregningspriser over for henholdsvis DSB og Gråhundbus, og DSB har derfor ikke opnået nogen fordel.
Bornholmstrafikken applies identical prices in relation to DSB and Gråhundbus respectively (and has always done so throughout the period in question since 2000), so DSB has not received an advantage.
Den danske regering oplyser dog, at den eneste pris, der gælder særligt for DSB, er den særlige pris for DSB Orange over Storebælt.
The Danish authorities state, nevertheless, that the only price which applies only to DSB is the special price for DSB Orange with Great Belt crossing.
Der er tale om en pris på en helt særlig type af DSB's billetter, der alene kan anvendes af kunder, som køber en DSB Orange-billet fra Jylland til Bornholm.
This price concerns a very specific type of DSB ticket which can be used only by customers who purchase a DSB Orange ticket when leaving Jutland for Bornholm.
Ifølge den danske regering giver Bornholmstrafikken rabat til denne ene særlige type billet, fordi selskabet ønsker at tiltrække flere kunder fra Jylland til Bornholm.
According to the Danish authorities, Bornholmstrafikken gives a discount on this particular type of ticket because it wants to attract more custom from Jutland to Bornholm.
Denne særlige rabat er ikke pålagt i kontrakten mellem den danske stat og færgeselskabet.
This special discount is not imposed by the contract between the Danish State and the ferry operator.
Den særlige rabat er således begrundet i et forretningsmæssigt ønske om at forsøge at udvide kundekredsen i Jylland og dermed udvide den samlede kundekreds.
It is therefore the result of a commercial intention to develop business in Jutland and thereby to develop business as a whole.
Den danske regering finder, at der er tale om en almindelig forretningsmæssig disposition, hvorved der gives rabatter med henblik på at udvide kundegrundlaget.
In this respect, the Danish authorities regard it as a general commercial measure which involves giving discounts with the aim of growing the business.
Regeringen præciserer, at Gråhundbus betjener ruten København-Ystad og dermed ikke kører over Storebælt.
They specify that Gråhundbus operates the Copenhagen-Ystad route, and so does not cross the Great Belt.
Der er derfor en saglig grund til, at en tilsvarende rabat ikke indgår i afregningspriserne med Gråhundbus.
In their view, therefore, it is obvious that the discount relating to this journey should not appear in the prices charged by Gråhundbus.
Den danske regering præciserer ligeledes, at dette tilbud kun er udnyttet af ca. […] [21] passagerer i løbet af perioden 2003-2008.
The Danish authorities also specify that this offer was taken up by only around […] [21] passengers during the period 2003-08.
Da initiativet er taget af operatøren, kunne dette tilbud være åbent for busselskaber, der måtte ønske at tilbyde samme service.
Since the initiative was taken by the operator, this offer could have been opened up to bus companies wishing to offer the same service.
Regeringen anfører også, at dette forretningsmæssige tilbud siden 2009 ikke længere tilbydes.
The Danish authorities also indicate that this commercial offer was withdrawn in 2009.
På dette grundlag vurderer Danmark, at DSB ikke har opnået en fordel i forbindelse med betjeningen af ruten København-Ystad — hverken i form af overkompensation eller særligt lave afregningspriser på færgeruten Rønne-Ystad.
Denmark therefore considers that DSB did not receive an advantage associated with the operation of the Copenhagen-Ystad route, either in the form of overcompensation or in the form of particularly low prices for the Rønne-Ystad ferry crossing.
Vedrørende det fjerde Altmark-kriterium
The fourth criterion in the judgment in Altmark
Angående spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt kompensationen er fastlagt på grundlag af en analyse af de omkostninger, som en veldrevet gennemsnitsvirksomhed ville have, blev der efter den danske regerings opfattelse i forbindelse med etableringen af DSB som en selvstændig virksomhed foretaget alle de nødvendige analyser, som det var praktisk muligt at gennemføre.
Regarding the question of whether the compensation was determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which would be incurred by a typical, well-run undertaking, the Danish authorities take the view, in the context of DSB’s formation as an independent undertaking, that all the necessary and practically feasible analyses were carried out.
I forbindelse med etableringen af DSB udarbejdede den danske regering et 10-årsbudget med en række indbyggede forudsætninger, herunder en forventning om en stigning i produktiviteten, som dannede grundlag for fastlæggelsen af DSB's driftstilskud for perioden 1999-2004.
In the context of DSB’s formation, the Danish authorities established a 10-year budget, based on several initial assumptions including an improvement in productivity, which was used to fix DSB’s operating grant for the period 1999-2004.
Dette budget, der er indeholdt i aktstykke L 249 af 11. juni 1999, er udarbejdet under forudsætning af en forrentning af egenkapitalen på 6 % efter skat, hvilket efter regeringens opfattelse udgjorde en rimelig fortjeneste.
The budget, which was contained in Act No 249 of 11 June 1999, was based on the assumptions of a 6 % return on equity after tax, which the Danish authorities had deemed to constitute a reasonable profit.
Ifølge den danske regering fremkom driftstilskuddet således som et samlet skøn over omkostninger, indtægter og en rimelig fortjeneste, der er foretaget på grundlag af de oplysninger, der var tilgængelige i 1999 og i overensstemmelse med markedsøkonomiske principper.
According to the Danish authorities, the operating grant was therefore the result of an overall assessment of costs, receipts and a reasonable profit carried out on the basis of the information which was available in 1999 and in accordance with market economy principles.
Fastlæggelsen af 10-årsbudgettet og den efterfølgende beregning af kontraktbetalingen til DSB er efter regeringens opfattelse sket i overensstemmelse med det fjerde Altmark-kriterium.
They claim that the establishment of the 10-year budget and the subsequent calculation of the contractual payments made to DSB were carried out in compliance with the fourth criterion in the judgment in Altmark.
Den danske regering minder desuden om Unionens retspraksis [23] og understreger, at der ikke i den pågældende sag var mulighed for at foretage en konkret sammenligning med en anden operatør.
The Danish authorities also refer to EU case-law [23] and emphasise the difficulty, in this case, of making a specific comparison with another operator.
Angående foreneligheden
Compatibility
Såfremt Kommissionen alligevel måtte nå frem til, at der er ydet statsstøtte til DSB, er det den danske regerings opfattelse, at kompensationen til DSB under alle omstændigheder er forenelig med det indre marked.
Should the Commission conclude nonetheless that State aid was granted to DSB, the Danish authorities are of the opinion that this compensation is in any case compatible with the internal market.
Det er regeringens opfattelse, at der i forbindelse med indgåelsen af de forhandlede kontrakter er foretaget så omfattende analyser og beregninger, som det i praksis er muligt at foretage med henblik på at sikre en korrekt kompensationsberegning.
It is their view that, in the context of the conclusion of the negotiated contracts, the most exhaustive analyses and calculations possible in practice were carried out with a view to guaranteeing the correct calculation of the compensation.
Regeringen kan tilslutte sig Kommissions argumentation (i beslutningen om at indlede en procedure) for, at en kompensation kan anses for forenelig med det indre marked, hvis den lever op til det tredje Altmark-kriterium.
The Danish authorities are in agreement with the Commission’s reasoning in its decision initiating the procedure, according to which the compensation may be deemed compatible with the internal market if it fulfils the third criterion in the judgment in Altmark.
Som det fremgår ovenfor, er det den danske regerings opfattelse, at der er gjort alt, hvad der med rimelighed har kunnet kræves for at garantere, at DSB ikke modtog overkompensation, og at det — i det mindste — bør konkluderes, at den kontraktbetaling, DSB modtager i henhold til de forhandlede kontrakter, udgør støtte, der er forenelig med det indre marked.
As indicated above, the Danish authorities believe that everything that could reasonably be required to guarantee that DSB did not receive any overcompensation was done, and that it should be concluded – at the very least – that the contractual payment received by DSB under the negotiated contracts constitutes aid compatible with the internal market.
Derimod er den danske regering som før nævnt uenig i Kommissionens argumentation med hensyn til sondringen mellem henholdsvis kontrakter om offentlig trafikbetjening og offentlig serviceforpligtelse og med hensyn til støttens lovlighed.
On the other hand, as stated above, the Danish authorities do not agree with the Commission’s reasoning concerning the distinction between public transport service contracts and public service obligations as regards the legality of the aid.
Regeringen er af den opfattelse, at hvis DSB modtog statsstøtte, er der ikke pligt til at anmelde denne støtte.
They consider that if DSB received State aid, that aid would not have had to be notified.
Hvis Kommissionen fastholder sin argumentation, vil det reelt indebære en grundlæggende og ubegrundet sondring mellem, om en medlemsstat, når den pålægger en 100 % statsejet virksomhed at udføre transportopgaver, nedfælder beskrivelsen af ydelsernes omfang, kvalitet og pris i en kontrakt eller ej.
If the Commission were to maintain its reasoning, this would be tantamount to making a fundamental and unwarranted distinction according to whether or not a Member State which imposes an obligation on a wholly State-owned undertaking to discharge transport activities falls under the description of the scope, quality and price of the services in a contract.
Det følger af det allerede anførte, at det er den danske regerings opfattelse, at der ikke er grundlag for at rejse krav om, at der sker tilbagebetaling af statsstøtte, der måtte blive anset for uforenelig med det indre marked.
In the light of the above, the Danish authorities are of the view that there is no reason to require a refund of State aid which could be regarded as incompatible with the internal market.
Lønsumsafgift
Payroll tax
Den danske regering har noteret sig, at Kommissionen på baggrund af oplysninger om, at fritagelsen for lønsumsafgift forventes fjernet, ikke har vurderet spørgsmålet om denne afgift i den aktuelle procedure.
The Danish authorities point out that the Commission, having been informed that the exemption from payroll tax was due to be abolished, had not examined the issue of that tax in this procedure.
Den danske regering oplyser for en god ordens skyld, at ændringerne i lønsumsafgiften er gennemført ved lov nr. 526 af 25. juni 2008, og at ændringerne trådte i kraft pr. 1. januar 2009.
For information, the Danish authorities have stated that the changes to payroll tax were introduced by Act No 526 of 25 June 2008 and that they entered into force on 1 January 2009.
Angående retsgrundlaget med henblik på vurderingen af foreneligheden
The legal basis for the review of compatibility
Den danske regering har ved brev af 8. januar 2010 oplyst, at den ikke har bemærkninger vedrørende Kommissionens fastsættelse af det gældende retsgrundlag (forordning (EØF) nr. 1191/69 eller (EF) nr. 1370/2007).
The Danish authorities stated by letter of 8 January 2010 that they had no particular comments concerning the Commission’s determination of the applicable legal basis (Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 or Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007).
BEMÆRKNINGER FRA INTERESSEREDE PARTER EFTER INDLEDNING AF PROCEDUREN
COMMENTS BY INTERESTED PARTIES FOLLOWING THE INITIATION OF THE PROCEDURE
Der er fremsat bemærkninger fra DSB, den begunstigede virksomhed, og fra DKT, den anden klager.
Comments have been submitted by DSB, the beneficiary of the measures in question, and by DKT, the second complainant.
Det må fremhæves, at der ikke er fremsat bemærkninger fra Gråhundbus, den første klager.
It should be emphasised that Gråhundbus, the first complainant, has not submitted any comments.
DSB’S BEMÆRKNINGER
COMMENTS SUBMITTED BY DSB
Ved brev af 30. december 2008 forelagde DSB sine bemærkninger vedrørende Kommissionens beslutning om indledning af proceduren.
By letter of 30 December 2008, DSB submitted its comments on the Commission’s decision initiating the procedure.
DSB tilslutter sig fuldt ud bemærkningerne fra den danske stat og begrænser sig til at behandle spørgsmålet om Kommissionens mulighed for at kræve tilbagebetaling, hvis den måtte komme frem til, at kontrakten om offentlig trafikbetjening indebærer statsstøtte, som er uforenelig med det indre marked.
DSB indicates that it agrees with all of the Danish authorities’ comments and confines itself to examining whether the Commission may require recovery of the aid if it were to conclude that the public transport service contracts involve State aid that is incompatible with the internal market.
Det er DSB's opfattelse, at et krav om tilbagebetaling af en sådan støtte i det foreliggende tilfælde ville være i modstrid med beskyttelsen af princippet om berettiget forventning, der således hindrer anvendelsen af artikel 14, stk. 1, i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999 af 22. marts 1999 om fastlæggelse af regler for anvendelsen af EF-traktatens artikel 93 [24].
DSB considers that the recovery of such aid, in this case, would be contrary to the principle of legitimate expectations, thus obstructing the application of Article 14(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty [24].
For det første er det DSB's opfattelse, at virksomheden kunne nære en berettiget forventning om, at den danske stats kontraktbetalinger i medfør af 5-års- og 10-årskontrakten ikke udgjorde statsstøtte.
First, DSB considers that it could legitimately take the view that the contractual payments from the Danish Government relating to the 5-year and 10-year contracts did not constitute State aid.
DSB finder, at der hersker uklarhed med hensyn til den relevante statsstøttetest på transportområdet.
It considers that the situation was not clear regarding the controls to be carried out to verify the existence of State aid in the field of land transport.
DSB er af den opfattelse, at vurderingen af, om staten har tilført DSB en fordel, skal ske med udgangspunkt i det tidspunkt, hvor transaktionen blev foretaget.
DSB takes the view that it is necessary to go back to the time when the transaction took place to assess whether the Danish Government granted an advantage to DSB.
Den omstændighed, at der måtte være nogen usikkerhed vedrørende tjenesteyderens omkostninger og eventuelle øvrige indtægtskilder, kan ikke i sig selv føre til, at staten ikke skulle kunne indgå en aftale til en pris, der afspejler markedsvilkår.
The fact that there may be a degree of uncertainty concerning the costs to the service provider and other possible sources of revenue could not in itself lead to the State being prevented from concluding an agreement at a price reflecting the market conditions.
Til enhver aftale vil der normalt være knyttet usikkerhed, og i normale aftaleforhold er det virksomheden, der bærer denne risiko.
According to DSB, any agreement generally involves some uncertainty and, in normal contractual relations, it is the undertaking which takes on that risk.
En ordning, hvorefter DSB alene bærer risikoen for uforudsete udsving i billetindtægter eller omkostninger, vil bedre end nogen anden ordning motivere DSB til at forbedre sine tjenester og tiltrække flere passagerer [25], hvilket giver staten mest muligt for kontraktbetalingen til DSB, der bærer risikoen ved faldende resultater; eksempelvis i form af uhensigtsmæssig virksomhedsdrift eller indtægtstab.
An arrangement in which DSB alone bears the risk of unforeseen fluctuations in ticket sales or expenses would, more than any other, give DSB an incentive to improve its services and to attract more travellers [25], enabling the State to get the best value out of the contractual payments it makes to DSB, which bears the risk in the event of a decline in performance, for example due to poor management or loss of revenue.
Efter DSB's opfattelse har staten således på tidspunktet for begge kontrakters indgåelse ageret som en rationel køber, der har optimeret sine muligheder for at opnå størst muligt udbytte af de indgåede kontrakter.
DSB is therefore of the view that, at the time when the two contracts were concluded, the State acted as a rational investor optimising its options for obtaining the best possible yield from those contracts.
For det andet mener DSB at have en berettiget forventning om, at kontraktbetalingerne under alle omstændigheder opfyldte betingelserne i forordning (EØF) nr. 1191/69 og således var gruppefritaget i medfør af denne bestemmelse.
Second, DSB considers that it had a legitimate expectation that the contractual payments would in any case fulfil the criteria laid down by Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 and qualify for block exemption under that Regulation.
DSB stiller sig tvivlende til Kommissionens fortolkning af forordningens artikel 14.
It expresses doubts regarding the Commission’s interpretation of Article 14 of the Regulation.