natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Stramme finansieringsregler (stabile ressourcer til LPMD i form af obligationsemissioner (med/uden sikkerhed) realkreditobligationer og indskud) skal ligeledes gøre det muligt at begrænse likviditets- og forarbejdningsrisiciene i tilknytning til LPMD.
In addition, respect of strict funding rules (allocation to LPMD of stable resources: guaranteed or unguaranteed bond issues, mortgage bonds and deposits) must also allow the liquidity and transformation risks associated with LPMD to be contained.
Endelig vil udskillelsen af LPMD's aktiviteter fra resten af koncernen gøre det lettere for markedets observatører at følge dem. Dexias PWB-aktiviteter på andre end de historiske markeder (Frankrig, Belgien og Luxembourg) er blevet betydeligt indskrænket.
Finally, the segregation of the activities of LPMD from the rest of the group’s activities will facilitate their monitoring by market observers,
De italienske (Dexia Crediop med en balance på 61,2 mia. EUR pr. 30. juni 2009) og spanske (Dexia Sabadell med en balance på 15,6 mia. EUR pr. 31. december 2008) datterselskaber vil blive afhændet før henholdsvis den 31. december 2012 og den 31. december 2013, lige som Dexias aktieandel i Kommunalkredit Austria blev afsat i 2008 og i 2009 PWB's indiske enhed. PWB's lukning af sine aktiviteter på Dexias historiske markeder burde bidrag til at lette presset på margenerne for Dexias PWB-aktiviteter.
Dexia’s PWB activities outside its historical markets (France, Belgium and Luxembourg) have also been reduced significantly: the Italian subsidiary (Dexia Crediop, with a total balance sheet of EUR 61,2 billion at 30 June 2009) and Spanish subsidiary (Dexia Sabadell, with a total balance sheet of EUR 15,6 billion at 31 December 2008) will be sold by 31 December 2012 and 31 December 2013 respectively, as were Dexia’s stake in Kommunalkredit Austria in 2008 and the Indian PWB entity in 2009.
Endelig indstilles transaktionerne for egen regning fra datoen for nærværende afgørelse, og markedsaktiviteterne vil blive begrænset betydeligt, hvilket vil reducere Dexias eksponering for markedsrisici og modpartsrisikoen i forbindelse med ikkebalanceførte transaktioner.
The cessation of PWB activities outside Dexia’s historical markets should contribute to easing the pressure on the margins of Dexia’s PWB activities,
Begrænsningen af Dexias leveragevirkning og koncentrationen af koncernens aktiviteter på traditionelle bankaktiviteter vil gøre det muligt gradvist at genoprette ligevægten i balancen ved at reducere andelen af aktiviteter med lav margen (især PWB-udeståender og obligationsportefølje) og at øge andelen af mere overskudsgivende aktiviteter (især ny PWB- og RCB-produktion og projektfinansieringer).
Dexia’s deleverage and the refocusing of its activities on traditional banking business will allow the group gradually to restore the equilibrium of its balance sheet by reducing the share of the activities generating low margins (PWB outstandings and bond portfolio, in particular) and by increasing the share of the more profitable activities (new turnover PWB and RCB and project financing, in particular).
I denne sammenhæng bemærker Kommissionen med tilfredshed, at koncentrationen af Dexias aktiviteter ledsages af et nøje tilsyn med disse aktiviteters og især PWB's rentabilitet.
In this respect, the Commission takes a positive view of the fact that this refocusing of Dexia’s activities is accompanied by close supervision of the profitability of these activities and especially PWB.
Koncentrationen af Dexias aktiviteter på disse aktiviteter og på traditionelle markeder ledsages endelig af en gradvis forbedring af koncernens likviditetsprofil, idet finansieringernes løbetid vil blive yderligere tilpasset aktivernes løbetid.
Finally, the refocusing of Dexia’s activities on its traditional activities and markets is accompanied by a gradual improvement in the group’s liquidity profile, by adjusting the maturity of its funding more to the maturity of its assets.
Denne forbedring af likviditetsprofilen baserer sig på tre hovedforanstaltninger:
This improvement of the liquidity profile results from three main measures:
Forlængelse af den gennemsnitlige levetid for langsigtede finansieringer og en udvidelse af koncernens stabile finansieringskilder.
the lengthening of the average maturity of the long-term funding and the increase in the sources of stable funding of the group.
I den sammenhæng noterer Kommissionen sig med tilfredshed omstruktureringsplanens målratioer for kortsigtede finansieringer, der sættes i forhold til balancesummen, den gennemsnitlige levetid for koncernens passivelementer og kilderne til stabil finansiering, der sættes i forhold til koncernens aktiver.
In this respect, the Commission views favourably the target ratios set by the restructuring plan for the short-term funding in relation to the total balance sheet, the average maturity of the liabilities of the group and the stable sources of funding in relation to the total assets of the group.
På betingelse af at disse nøgletal overholdes inden for de fastsatte rammer, mener Kommissionen, at Dexias mindskede eksponering for likviditets- og forarbejdningsrisici vil bidrage positivt til genopretningen af koncernens rentabilitet på lang sigt.
The Commission considers that, on the strict condition that these ratios are respected at the deadlines set, the reduction in Dexia’s exposure to the liquidity and transformation risks will make a positive contribution to restoring its long-term viability.
En sådan udvikling er for øvrigt på linje med de nye internationale normer for måling af og kontrol med likviditet, som for indeværende drøftes i Baselkomitéen.
Such a trend is also consistent with the new international standards for liquidity measurement and monitoring, currently under discussion at the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
100 % ophævelse af den finansiering, Dexia har stillet til rådighed for datterselskabet DenizBank.
the ending of the funding made available by Dexia to its subsidiary DenizBank.
Denne foranstaltning vil bl.a. gøre det muligt at sikre, at den forventede udvikling af DenizBanks RCB-aktivitet bliver finansieret via sidstnævntes egne ressourcer og således ikke belaster hele koncernens finansieringsbehov yderligere.
This measure ensures that the planned development in DenizBank’s RCB activity is financed from its own funds and does not further burden the financing needs of the group as a whole.
Stressscenarier i henhold til omstruktureringsplanen
Stress scenarios communicated under the restructuring plan
Ifølge punkt 13 i meddelelsen om omstrukturering har Kommissionen anmodet de berørte medlemsstater om at stressteste Dexias modstandsevne over for en række chok, som kunne forekomme i de kommende år, og vurdere koncernens levedygtighed på lang sigt.
In accordance with point 13 of the Restructuring Communication, the Commission asked the Member States concerned to carry out some stress test exercises to test Dexia’s resilience to a series of shocks which could arise in the coming years and to draw conclusions on the long-term viability of the group.
Det er vigtigt at præcisere, at Kommissionen har baseret sin analyse på de testresultater, som de berørte medlemsstater har fremsendt.
It is important to specify that the Commission based its analysis on the results of the tests as submitted by the Member States concerned.
Første stresstest
First stress test
Den første stresstest sigter mod at teste Dexias modstandsevne over for en ændring af de makroøkonomiske hovedvariabler (BNP, rente og kurs). Kommissionen har følgende bemærkninger til denne test:
The Commission makes the following observations concerning the first stress test, which was designed to test Dexia’s resilience to a change in the main macroeconomic variables (GDP, interest rate and exchange rate):
For det første forekommer variationen i Dexias overskud forlods relativt uelastisk på de stressniveauer, der er anvendt på vækstraten.
firstly, the variation in Dexia’s profit seems at first sight to be relatively inelastic to the levels of stress applied to the growth rate.
Selv om de simulerede vækstrater er yderst stressede i henseende til de historiske observationer, vil Dexias overskud ganske vist falde på grund af de øgede risikoomkostninger, men koncernen vil stadig i vid udstrækning være overskudsgivende.
Despite simulating extremely stressed growth rates compared with historic observations, Dexia would still to a large extent remain in profit, although its profit would of course fall because of a rise in the cost of the risk.
Dette kan forklares med i) den relativt store andel og gode kreditkvalitet af porteføljen »Public Finance« og obligationsporteføljen under afvikling [48] og ii) det forhold, at Dexia har truffet det begrundede valg ikke at foretage en reel tilpasning af koncernens indtægter i tilfælde af stress i sin model.For det andet ser det ud til, at der i den model, som Dexia har valgt til stresstesten, ikke er nogen tættere forbindelse mellem vækstraten og Dexias finansieringsomkostninger, og mere generelt er variablen »finansieringsomkostninger«, dvs. margenen ud over den interbanksats, som Dexia skulle betale for nye finansieringer, ikke blevet stresstestet.
This could be imputable to (i) the relatively large proportion and good credit quality of the ‘Public Finance’ portfolio and the bond portfolio in run-off [48] and (ii) the fact that Dexia made the justified choice of not really adjusting the group income in the case of stress in its model,secondly, it appears that in the Dexia model used for the stress test, no material link is established between the growth rate and Dexia’s funding cost and, more generally, the ‘funding cost’ variable, i.e. the margin above the interbank rate which Dexia would pay for new funding, was not stressed.
Dette bidrager ligeledes til at forklare den relativt begrænsede elasticitet i Dexias overskud i tilfælde af stress.
This would also help to explain the relative inelasticity of Dexia’s profit in the case of stress.
Det er så meget mere relevant at medtage dette element, fordi Dexia i vid udstrækning er afhængig af markedsfinansieringer og kortfristede finansieringer, hvilket både øger omfanget af og den hast, hvormed en sådan stigning i finansieringsomkostningerne ville kunne få følger for Dexia.
This element is all the more pertinent when one considers that Dexia depends significantly on market-based and short-term funding, which increases both the extent to which and speed at which such an increase in the financing costs could impact on Dexia.
For at kunne analysere dette punkt har Kommissionen anmodet Dexia om separat at gennemføre en anden type stresstest.
In order to analyse this point, the Commission has asked for a second type of stress test to be carried out separately,
For det tredje med hensyn til de to andre variabler var der stor lighed mellem de hypoteser, der var valgt i et stressscenario, og dem, der blev brugt i et basisscenario.
thirdly, as regards the other two variables, the assumptions in a stress scenario were relatively similar to those used in a baseline scenario.
Med hensyn til rentesatsen var EURIBOR-rentesatserne for tremånederslån både i basisscenariet og i stressscenariet ansat til […] %, og de femårige interbankrenter (swap) var ansat til henholdsvis […] % og […] %, hvilket viser en yderst begrænset udjævning af kurven.
For example, for interest rates, in both the baseline and the stress scenarios, the 3-month EURIBOR rates were projected at […] %, and the 5-year swap rates were projected at […] % and […] % respectively, suggesting negligible flattening of the curve.
Vekselkurserne var ens i de to scenarier.
The exchange rates were also similar in both scenarios.
Kommissionen har derfor anmodet Dexia om at foretage en særskilt sensitivitetsanalyse (jf. betragtning 186-195).
For this reason, the Commission asked for a sensitivity analysis to be conducted separately (see recitals 186 to 195).
Med hensyn til den første test konkluderer Kommissionen følgelig, at Dexia på grund af den relativt store andel og gode kreditkvalitet af porteføljen »Public Finance« og obligationsporteføljen, der er under afvikling, kan håndtere en stor stigning i risikoomkostningerne i et makroøkonomisk miljø i kraftig tilbagegang og dermed består stresstesten.
Consequently, as far as this first stress test is concerned, the Commission concludes that, on account of the relatively large proportion and good credit quality of the ‘Public Finance’ portfolio and the bond portfolio in run-off, Dexia is capable of withstanding a significant increase in the cost of the risk in the event of a significant deterioration in the macroeconomic climate and consequently passes the stress test.
Anden stresstest
Second stress test
Formålet med den anden stresstest var at teste Dexias modstandsevne over for en forhøjelse af markedsfinansieringsomkostningerne, og resultaterne viser, at en supplerende stigning på 100 basispoint og 200 point for finansieringsomkostningerne i en periode på tre måneder vil reducere fortjenesten før skat med henholdsvis […] og […] mio. EUR. Indvirkningen vil sandsynligvis blive meget større, hvis Dexia bruger de hypoteser i stresstesten, som Kommissionen har krævet, […].
As regards the second stress test, designed to test Dexia’s resilience to an increase in the cost of its market-based funding, it appears that an additional rise of 100 basis points and of 200 basis points in the cost of funding over a period of 3 months would lead to a reduction in its pre-tax profit of EUR […] million and EUR […] million respectively. The impact would probably be materially greater if Dexia had used the assumptions laid down by the Commission in its stress test, […].
Det drejer sig om følgende hypoteser, ændret af Dexia:
The assumptions amended by Dexia are the following,
Stigningen i finansieringsomkostninger er simuleret over en begrænset periode på […].
the rise in the cost of funding was simulated over a shorter period of […].
Kommissionen bemærker i den sammenhæng, at nogle elementer såsom Dexias CDS eller finansieringsomkostningerne ved langfristede »senior unsecured« steg med over […] basispoint i en periode på over […].
In this respect, the Commission notes that certain factors, such as Dexia’s CDS or the cost of long-term senior unsecured funding increased by more than […] basis points and for a period exceeding […].
Vedrørende omkostningerne til kortfristede finansieringer ville disse også være steget kraftigt uden de berørte medlemsstaters og centralbankers hidtil usete indgreb, som skal bortfalde.
As regards the cost of short-term funding, without the unprecedented interventions by the Member States concerned and the central banks, which are due to disappear, this cost of funding would also have increased sharply,
Dexia ændrede sit finansieringsmiks i den periode, hvor finansieringsomkostningerne blev stresstestet, og i Dexias hypotese indgik kun kortfristede finansieringer.
Dexia changed its funding mix and assumes, during the period when the cost of funding is stressed, that only short-term funding is carried out.
Kommissionen bemærker i den sammenhæng, at sådanne hypoteser strider mod Dexias seneste erfaringer, idet banken trods de konstant stigende finansieringsomkostninger har øget andelen af langfristet finansiering.
In this respect, the Commission notes that such assumptions are not consistent with Dexia’s recent experience, since despite the sustained increase in its cost of funding, Dexia increased the proportion of long-term funding,
I stressscenariet var de hypoteser, som Dexia brugte, ikke i overensstemmelse med dem, der for nylig er blevet anvendt til lignende øvelser i Europa.
in the stress scenario, Dexia did not use assumptions in line with those used for other similar exercises recently conducted in Europe.
Kommissionen konkluderer heraf, at […].
The Commission therefore concludes from this that […].
Kommissionen bemærker ligeledes, at der faktisk ikke er taget hensyn til denne parameter i de øvrige stresstest, som Dexia har gennemført, dvs. den stresstest, der for nylig er gennemført i forbindelse med andre lignende øvelser i Europa, samt likviditetsstresstesten.
The Commission also notes that this parameter is not really taken into consideration in the other stress tests carried out by Dexia, i.e. the stress test conducted as part of other similar exercises recently carried out in Europe and the liquidity stress test.
Dexia anfører, at i) hypoteserne i forretningsplanen før simuleringen af en stigning på […] eller […] basispoint allerede var stressede, fordi de afspejlede de finansielle vilkår i juli 2009, som ganske vist var bedre end ved udgangen af 2008 eller i begyndelsen af 2009, men som ikke afspejlede den positive udvikling i anden halvdel af 2009, ii) en hypotese, hvor finansieringsmikset ikke var ændret, ville ikke afspejle en markedsaktørs adfærd under disse forhold.
Dexia maintains that (i) the assumptions made in its business plan, before simulation of an increase of […] or […] basis points, are already inherently stressed as they reflect the funding conditions in July 2009, which were admittedly better than those at the end of 2008 or the beginning of 2009, but do not reflect the positive trend in the second half of 2009; (ii) an assumption of no change in the funding mix would not reflect the behaviour of a market operator in such circumstances.
En stresstest af sidstnævnte er et nyttigt element, fordi det derved bliver muligt at konkludere, om omstruktureringsplanen skal i) mindske Dexias afhængighed af markedsfinansieringer og ii) forlænge disse finansieringers gennemsnitlige løbetid for at mindske Dexias følsomhed over for en forøgelse af finansieringsomkostningerne.
The stress test on this last element is useful, as it allows the conclusion to be drawn that it is important that the restructuring plan (i) reduces Dexia’s dependence on market-based financing and (ii) lengthens the average maturity of its funding, with a view to reducing Dexia’s sensitivity to an increase in the cost of funding.
Det er netop et af de elementer, som Dexias direktion tog hensyn til i perioden 30. september 2008-30. september 2009, og som omstruktureringsplanen dækker.
This is precisely one of the elements which Dexia’s management took into account between 30 September 2008 and 30 September 2009 and which the restructuring plan aims to cover.
Med hensyn til den anden stresstest konkluderer Kommissionen følgelig, at selv om Dexias nuværende finansieringsstruktur gør koncernen sårbar over for store chok i forbindelse med finansieringsomkostninger, vil omstruktureringsplanen gradvist, men i tilfredsstillende omfang mindske Dexias sårbarhed over for stigende finansieringsomkostninger.
Consequently, as regards this second stress test, the Commission concludes that, although Dexia’s current funding structure makes it vulnerable to extreme shocks to its cost of funding, the restructuring plan provides a gradual, satisfactory response to Dexia’s sensitivity to an increase in its funding cost.
Kommissionen noterer desuden med tilfredshed, at Dexia har en stor aktivportefølje (herunder LPMD's aktiver) af god kvalitet, hvortil der kan opnås finansiering til en marginalt lavere pris på repo-interbankmarkedet og om nødvendigt i centralbankerne.
Furthermore, the Commission takes a positive view of the fact that Dexia has a large stock of assets (including the assets of the LPMD division), which are of good quality and are eligible to obtain financing at a marginally lower cost in the interbank repo market and, if necessary, from central banks.
Tredje stresstest
Third stress test
Med hensyn til den tredje stresstest, hvis formål var at teste koncernens likviditetsprofil, bemærker Kommissionen, at både Dexias og CBFA's stresstest viser, at koncernen opfylder testens krav med en tidshorisont på en måned.
As regards the third stress test, which is designed to test the group’s liquidity profile, the Commission notes that both the stress test carried out by Dexia and that carried out by the CBFA suggest that the group meets the requirements of the test at a horizon of one month.
Kommissionen bemærker følgende elementer:
The Commission notes the following elements:
Modellerne for likviditetsstresstest, der er udformet af Dexia og myndighederne, ser ikke ud til at omfatte hypoteser vedrørende omkostningerne til denne likviditet under ekstraordinære omstændigheder og uden statsstøtte.
the liquidity stress test models, as established by Dexia and by the regulator, do not seem to make assumptions about the cost of this liquidity in exceptional circumstances and without State aid.
Kommissionen har derfor anmodet koncernen om at foretage en særskilt stresstest for simulation af varianten »finansieringsomkostninger« (jf. betragtning 180-183).
In this respect, the Commission asked the group to carry out a separate stress test designed to simulate the ‘funding cost’ variable (see recitals 180 to 183),
Hypoteserne i den stresstest, som CBFA gennemførte, og som er udformet i cirkulære af 8. maj 2009, er konservative og afspejler den nylige krises indvirkninger.
the stress test assumptions made by the CBFA, as set out in the Circular of 8 May 2009, are conservative and reflect the recent experience of the crisis.
De omfatter således følgende: i) virksomheden kan ikke længere finansiere sig »unsecured« på valuta- og kapitalmarkedet, ii) anvendelse af konservative haircut-niveauer for repo-finansieringen, iii) »retail«-kunder hæver 5 % af deres anfordringsindskud og opsparing inden for en uge og 20 % af deres indlån inden for en måned, iv) »wholesale«-kunder hæver 100 % af deres øjeblikkeligt forfaldne indskud (som ikke er sikret gennem likvide finansielle aktiver), v) ingen af koncernens tidsindskud fornyes ved forfald.
They include the following assumptions, for example: (i) the institution can no longer obtain unsecured financing on the money and capital markets; (ii) application of conservative haircut levels for repo financing; (iii) withdrawal by the retail customers of 5 % of their sight deposits and savings deposits within the period of one week and 20 % of these deposits within one month; (iv) withdrawal by wholesale customers of 100 % of their deposits repayable on sight (and not secured by liquid financial assets) and their deposits of uncertain maturity within the period of one week; (v) non-rollover of all time deposits of the institution at their next due date,
Likviditetsstresstestens positive resultater afspejler i) de forbedringer, som Dexias direktion har foretaget i løbet af 2009 for at sænke de dynamiske behov for kortfristet finansiering og ii) et gunstigt globalt miljø på finansmarkederne.
the positive results of the liquidity stress test reflect (i) improvements made by Dexia’s management during 2009 with a view to reducing the dynamic short-term funding needs, and (ii) financial market conditions which were favourable on the whole.
En vellykket gennemførelse af en likviditetsstresstest på et bestemt tidspunkt er dog ingen garanti for, at testen også vil kunne bestås i fremtiden.
However, passing a liquidity stress test at a given moment is no guarantee that it will be passed in the future.
Derfor skal Dexia sikre en vis disciplin (i finansieringspolitikken) i de kommende måneder og år for løbende at kunne bestå denne stresstest.
It is therefore important for a certain discipline (in financing policy) to be maintained during the coming months and years in order to be able to meet this stress test continuously.
I den henseende vil de forpligtelser, der er beskrevet i omstruktureringsplanen, ikke blot forbedre koncernens likviditet, men også gøre det muligt regelmæssigt at kontrollere, at de bliver overholdt.
In this respect, the commitments notified in the restructuring plan not only point towards an improvement in the liquidity of the group, but also allow their implementation to be verified periodically.
Følgelig konkluderer Kommissionen, at Dexia består den tredje stresstest.
Consequently, the Commission concludes that Dexia passes this third stress test.
Andre betragtninger vedrørende stresstestene
Other considerations concerning the stress tests