natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Med hensyn til andre offentliggjorte AIP-priser præciserede BTS yderligere, at afgiften for indflyvning og flyvekontrol ikke er omfattet af den aftalte pris mellem BTS og Ryanair, eftersom denne tjeneste ikke ydes af BTS. BTS præciserer endvidere, at ifølge de AIP-takster, som var gældende i den pågældende periode, er det gratis at parkere fly i første to timer.
With regard to other published AIP prices, BTS further explains that the charge for approach and air traffic control is not included in the price agreed between BTS and Ryanair as this service is not provided by BTS.
BTS kan derfor ikke se, hvordan Ryanair reelt drager fordel af aftalen med hensyn til gratis parkering, eftersom denne betingelse først og fremmest svarer til den gyldige AIP-takst og Ryanairs fly dernæst ikke er længere end to timer i lufthavnen.
BTS also explains that, according to the AIP in force during the period in question, aircraft parking is free for the first 2 hours.
BTS mener, at ovennævnte oplysninger viser, at de aftalte kontraktpriser mellem BTS og Ryanair ikke adskiller sig fra AIP's vejledende priser til trods for deres forskellige struktur, at de afspejler Ryanairs forpligtelser, og at de giver BTS en økonomisk fordel, som kan sammenlignes med eller er større end andre luftfartsselskaber.
In the opinion of BTS, the information given above demonstrates that the contractual prices agreed between BTS and Ryanair are not at variance with the recommended AIP prices, despite their different structure, that they reflect the obligations assumed by Ryanair and that they provide an economic gain for BTS which is comparable to or higher than that from other carriers.
BTS præciserer endvidere, at en rabat på enhedsprisen alene ikke kan være grund til at hævde, at modtageren har fået en økonomisk fordel.
BTS also explains that a discount on the unit price alone cannot be a reason to claim that the recipient received an economic advantage.
Markedsinvestorprincippet og Ryanair-aftalen
The market economy investor principle and the Ryanair agreement
BTS forklarer endvidere, at selskabet ved at underskrive aftalen ikke i første omgang søgte at opnå regional økonomisk udvikling eller mulig intern investering.
BTS further explains that, in signing the Agreement, it did not seek to achieve regional economic development nor possible inward investment in the first place.
BTS anfører, at det vigtigste mål med den forretningsmæssige beslutning var at øge indtægterne fra luftfarts- og ikke-luftfartsaktiviteter, at sprede risikoen og afhængigheden af Sky Europe — det vigtigste luftfartsselskab i lufthavnen — og at skabe en mere stabil udvikling i antallet af passagerer i lufthavnen.
It states that the main objective of its business decision was to increase revenues from aviation and non-aviation activities, to diversify the risk and the dependence on Sky Europe — the single key air carrier at the Airport — and to create more stable development of passenger volumes at the Airport.
BTS mener, at alle disse faktorer ville bidrage til at øge markedsværdien.
In the opinion of BTS, all these factors would help to increase its market value.
Udvikling af regelmæssig befordring i lufthavnen 2004-2007 i antal passagerer
Development of regular transport at the Airport 2004 — 2007 in passenger numbers
Regelmæssig befordring i antal passagerer
Regular transport in passenger numbers
BTS argumenterer videre, at eftersom aftalen blev indgået i december 2005, bør de oplysninger, som var tilgængelige på daværende tidspunkt, anvendes til sammenligning, dvs. de gældende lufthavnsafgifter i andre europæiske lufthavne, som konkurrerer med BTS om at tiltrække luftfartsselskaber, som er sammenlignelige med Ryanair.
BTS also argues that, as the Agreement was concluded in December 2005, the data available at that time should be used for comparison, i.e. airport charges applicable at other European airports competing with BTS in attracting air carriers comparable to Ryanair.
BTS fremfører desuden, at privatejede lufthavne på baggrund af generelt kendte oplysninger normalt yder rabat til luftfartsselskaber og samtidig forventer en rentabel vækst af lufthavnen.
BTS further argues that it is generally known that privately owned airports usually provide discounts to airlines in the expectation of increasing profitability.
De rabatter, der var ydet til Ryanair, kan synes at give en økonomisk fordel ved sammenligning af enhedspriser som sådan, uden at der tages højde for de økonomiske fordele og virkninger for lufthavnen.
The discounts granted to Ryanair may seem to be providing an economic advantage if comparing unit prices as such, without taking account of the economic benefits and effects for the airport.
Efter BTS' opfattelse kan enhedspriser ikke vurderes, uden at der tages hensyn til andre kontraktmæssige ordninger, og uden at de holdes op mod det transporterede antal passagerer, det samlede antal passagerer om året, flyenes vægt, regelmæssigheden og antallet af flyvninger om året, sæsonkorrigering og tilsvarende omkostninger og andre faktorer, der påvirker lufthavnens rentabilitet som sådan.
In BTS’s opinion, unit prices cannot be assessed without considering other contractual arrangements and without their relation to the number of passengers carried, the total annual number of passengers, the weight of aircraft, the regularity and number of flights during a year, seasonality and corresponding costs and other factors influencing the profitability of the airport as a whole.
Alle disse faktorer påvirker lufthavnens indtægter og omkostninger og skal tages i betragtning, når priserne i forhold til de enkelte luftfartsselskaber sammenlignes.
All these factors affect an airport’s revenues and costs and must be taken into account when comparing prices charged to individual carriers.
BTS mener, at selskabet ved indgåelse af aftalen handlede som en privat investor i en markedsøkonomi.
BTS is of the opinion that, in concluding the Agreement, it acted as a private investor in a market economy.
BTS gennemførte finansielle beregninger af rentabiliteten af aftalen med Ryanair, inden den blev underskrevet.
BTS carried out financial calculations of the profitability of the Agreement with Ryanair before signing it.
BTS' ledelse og Ryanair holdt flere telefonmøder for at forhandle betingelserne på plads.
Several conference calls between the management of BTS and Ryanair took place in order to negotiate the conditions.
BTS vurderede i sine beregninger omkostninger og forventede indtægter fra aftalen baseret på erfaringer fra forskellige lufthavne med lavprisluftfartsselskaber.
BTS’s calculations assessed the costs and expected revenue resulting from the Agreement and were based on the experiences of various airports with low-cost carriers.
BTS forklarer endvidere, at lufthavnen ved aftalens indgåelse havde tilstrækkelig driftskapacitet til at øge antallet af passagerer i de følgende år, så den havde ikke forventet en yderligere stigning i de faste omkostninger i forbindelse med den øgede kapacitet.
BTS further explains that, when the Agreement was concluded, the airport had sufficient operational capacity to increase passenger numbers in subsequent years, and therefore did not expect an additional increase in fixed costs related to increased capacity.
Den anfører endvidere, at en aftale med et andet luftfartsselskab, der sikrer en stigning i antallet af passagerer, som er sammenlignelig med Ryanair, ville blive indgået på sammenlignelige betingelser.
It also states that an agreement with another air carrier to ensure an increase in passenger numbers comparable to that provided by Ryanair would be concluded under comparable conditions.
I forhold til arten af de tjenester, som BTS ydede Ryanairs passagerer og fly, forklarer den, at disse tjenester er betydeligt billigere end dem, der ydes til traditionelle luftfartsselskaber.
In relation to the nature of services provided by BTS to Ryanair’s passengers and aircraft, it explains that those services are significantly cheaper than those provided to standard carriers.
BTS gør endvidere gældende, at indtægterne fra aftalen med Ryanair udgør en »garanteret indtægt«.
BTS further explains that the revenue from the Agreement with Ryanair represents a ‘guaranteed income’ stream.
Det skyldes især, at Ryanair i henhold til aftalens artikel 2.1 i perioden fra den 1. juli 2009 til den 30. juni 2016 er forpligtet til at betale BTS for mindst […] flyvninger pr. dag, også selv om selskabet opererer færre flyvninger i denne periode.
This is in particular because, according to Article 2.1 of the Agreement, in the period from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2016 Ryanair is obliged to pay BTS for a minimum of […] flights per day, even if it operates fewer flights in this period.
BTS mener, at Ryanairs forpligtelse gør det lettere at planlægge investeringer på land sigt i lufthavnen.
In BTS’s opinion, this commitment from Ryanair allows for better planning of long-term investment at the Airport.
BTS forklarer endvidere, at lufthavnens indtægter, der ikke er luftfartsindtægter, er steget betydeligt på grund af Ryanair.
In addition, BTS explains that, due to Ryanair, non-aviation revenue at the Airport has increased substantially.
For så vidt angår mekanismen for anvendelse af aftalerabatten på nye destinationer, understreger BTS, at rabatten ikke kan beregnes i forhold til det første år af aftalens gyldighed, men til de første 12 måneder fra idriftsættelsen af de berettigede destinationer.
In relation to the mechanism for the application of the Agreement-based discount for new destinations, BTS emphasises that the discount cannot be calculated in relation to the first year of the Agreement’s validity, but to the first 12 months from the commencement of links to the relevant destinations.
Med hensyn til rabatter på de såkaldte »nye destinationer« mener BTS endvidere, at en sådan rabat ikke udgør en selektiv økonomisk fordel for Ryanair, eftersom BTS kun er parat til at yde sådanne rabatpriser på destinationer, der opfylder de respektive kriterier i aftalen og giver lufthavnen en økonomisk fordel.
In relation to discounts for the so-called ‘new destinations’, BTS is also of the opinion that such a discount does not constitute a selective economic advantage to Ryanair, since BTS is only ready to provide the discounted prices for destinations meeting the respective criteria set out in the Agreement and providing an economic gain for the Airport.
BTS forklarer endvidere, at det er nødvendigt at understrege, at luftfartsselskabet kun er berettiget til rabatprisen på betingelse af, at det er en fast destination med mindst […] flyvninger om ugen.
BTS also emphasises that the carrier is eligible for the discounted price only in the case of a regular destination with at least […] flights per week.
Med den forventede mindste udnyttelse af kapaciteten i et B 737-800-fly (63 %) [17] udgør dette mindst 90000 nye passagerer om året, svarende til over 6,5 % af det samlede antal passagerer, som lufthavnen ekspederede ved aftalens indgåelse, og som fortsat tegner sig for over 4,3 % af det samlede antal passagerer, som lufthavnen ekspederede i 2007.
With the anticipated minimum utilisation of the capacity of B 737-800 aircraft (63 %) [17], this represents at least 90000 new passengers per year, representing more than 6,5 % of the total number of passengers handled by the airport at the time the Agreement was signed and more than 4,3 % of the total number of passengers handled by the airport in 2007.
Samtidig skal det anføres, at det kun er en enkelt af Ryanairs destinationer, der siden aftalens indgåelse har opfyldt betingelserne for rabatten, nemlig destinationen Frankfurt-Hahn.
At the same time it must be stated that, to date, only one of Ryanair’s destinations since the signature of the Agreement has complied with the conditions for granting the discount, namely Frankfurt-Hahn.
På tidspunktet for aftalen indgåelse var der ingen andre luftfartsselskaber, der havde eller i dag har regelmæssige flyvninger til denne destination. Ryanair overtog således ingen eksisterende passagerer fra et andet luftfartsselskab.
At the time of signing the Agreement, no other air carrier operated regular flights to this destination, nor do they now, so there was no takeover of existing passengers of another air carrier by Ryanair.
Endvidere præciserer BTS, at hvis et luftfartsselskab opfylder betingelserne for en såkaldt »ny destination«, er det økonomiske udbytte af en sådan destination, selv efter den største rabat i det første år, over […] om året, hvilket er […] mere end for en almindelig gennemsnitlig destination for et andet luftfartsselskab med tre flyvninger om ugen i henhold til AIP's priser (dvs. […]) og næsten […] som et andet luftfartsselskabs destination med fem flyvninger om ugen i henhold til AIP's priser (dvs. […]).
In addition, BTS explains that if an air carrier complies with the conditions of a ‘new destination’, the economic gain from such a destination, even after granting the highest discount in the first year, is more than […] per year, which is […] more than for a common average destination served by another carrier with three flights per week under AIP prices (i.e. […]) and nearly […] more than for another carrier’s destination with five flights per week under AIP prices (i.e. […]).
BTS mener, at en ny destination i høj grad bidrager til lufthavnens vækst og udvikling, navnlig som følge af en højere udnyttelse af lufthavnens kapacitet (terminalbygninger og start- og landingsbaner), hvor udbyttet fra de højere indtægter som følge af indførelsen af en sådan ny destination er meget større end de ydede rabatter og i høj grad bidrager til selskabets eksisterende faste omkostninger [18] og samtidig til bæredygtigheden af priserne på de tjenester, som lufthavnen yder (se udviklingen i AIP's priser).
BTS is of the opinion that a new destination contributes significantly to the growth and development of the airport, particularly due to higher utilisation of airport capacity (terminal building and runways), where the gain from the high volume of revenues obtained as a result of introducing this new destination greatly exceeds the discounts provided and significantly contributes to the company’s existing fixed costs [18] and, at the same time, to the sustainability of prices for services provided by the Airport (see AIP price development).
BTS anfører endvidere, at en sådan ny destination ligeledes bidrager til en stigning i andelen af regelmæssig trafik i lufthavnen og reducerer den uregelmæssige udnyttelse af lufthavnens kapacitet som følge af sommerflyvninger (charterflyvninger), hvilket er de væsentligste faktorer, som påvirker behovet for investeringer i nye lufthavnsfaciliteter, og som udgør en byrde for lufthavnens budget som følge af afskrivninger og renter og efterfølgende medfører et behov for højere priser på de ydede tjenester.
BTS further states that such a new destination also helps to increase the share of regular traffic at the airport and reduces the irregular utilisation of airport capacity caused by summer (charter) flights, which are the most significant factors affecting the need for investment in new airport capacity, and which place a burden on the airport’s budget through depreciation and interest, and subsequently result in the need to increase prices for services provided.
BTS fastholder endvidere, at betingelserne for at yde rabatter på nye destinationer skal overholde en frekvens på syv flyvninger om ugen, hvilket kun blev opfyldt af Ryanair i forbindelse med destinationen Frankfurt-Hahn.
BTS further explains that the conditions for granting discounts for new destinations must respect a seven-flights-per-week frequency, which was fulfilled by Ryanair only in the case of Frankfurt-Hahn.
Ryanair åbnede imidlertid flere »nye« destinationer, som selskabet ikke fik rabat på, da frekvensen af de ugentlige flyvninger var utilstrækkelig (f.eks. Stockholm-Skavsta, East Midlands, Bristol og Bremen).
However, Ryanair opened several ‘new’ destinations for which it did not receive discounts because of insufficient weekly flight frequencies (e.g. Stockholm-Skavsta, East Midlands, Bristol and Bremen).
Med hensyn til ruternes rentabilitet forklarer BTS, at selskabet ikke er i besiddelse af disse oplysninger, og at en rutes rentabilitet kun kan vurderes af luftfartsselskabet.
With regard to the profitability of routes, BTS explains that it does not have this information at its disposal and that the profitability of a route can only be evaluated by the air carrier.
Siden Ryanairs start i BTS har selskabet kun annulleret en enkelt destination (Bratislava — Bremen, Tyskland).
Since the beginning of its services at BTS, Ryanair cancelled only one route (Bratislava-Bremen, Germany).
Ruten blev nedlagt efter otte måneders drift, selv om Ryanair betalte en forhandlet pris for den (dvs. lavere end AIP's pris).
The route was cancelled after 8 months of operation, even though Ryanair paid a negotiated price for it (that is, lower than the price declared in AIP).
BTS påpeger, at disse oplysninger viser, at enhver rabat på destinationer, der ydes på normale markedsvilkår, er utilstrækkelig i forhold til at bevare en urentabel rute.
BTS points out that this illustrates that the provision of any discount for destinations under normal market conditions is not sufficient for maintaining an unprofitable route.
BTS mener, at aftalen ikke udgjorde en fordel for Ryanair, eftersom den var baseret på markedsvilkår og derfor ikke udgør statsstøtte.
BTS is of the opinion that the Agreement did not provide an advantage to Ryanair as it was based on market terms and therefore does not constitute State aid.
BTS gav derfor ingen forklaringer på kriterierne for forenelighed.
It did not therefore provide explanations on compatibility criteria.
BTS mener endvidere, at 2005-retningslinjerne ikke udgør retlig bindende lovgivning i henhold til fællesskabslovgivningen, dvs. at de ikke er bindende for EU's medlemsstater og fysiske og juridiske personer.
BTS is also of the opinion that the 2005 Guidelines do not constitute legally binding legislation in Community law, i.e. that they are not binding on EU Member States and natural and legal persons.
Kun forordninger, direktiver og afgørelser er bindende.
Only Regulations, Directives and Decisions are binding.
Henstillinger og udtalelser er ikke bindende.
Recommendations and opinions have no binding force.
Derudover hævder BTS, at aftalen blev indgået den 5. december 2005, og at 2005-retningslinjerne blev offentliggjort den 9. december 2005, og at de i dette tilfælde ikke har tilbagevirkende kraft.
In addition, BTS argues that the Agreement was concluded on 5 December 2005 and the 2005 Guidelines were published on 9 December 2005, and are not retroactively applicable in the present case.
Ryanair indledte sine bemærkninger af 8. august 2008 med at anføre, at iværksættelsen af en formel undersøgelsesprocedure efter selskabets opfattelse var uberettiget og unødvendig.
Ryanair began its observations (dated 8 August 2008) by stating that in its opinion the initiation of a formal investigation procedure was unjustified und unnecessary.
Selskabet anførte endvidere, at det beklager, at Kommissionen ikke gav Ryanair mulighed for at blive inddraget i den foreløbige undersøgelse.
It also stated that it regrets that the Commission did not give Ryanair the possibility to engage itself in the preliminary examination.
Med hensyn til sagens genstand mener Ryanair, at Kommissionen skulle have taget udgangspunkt i standardhandelsaftaler, bl.a. i dokumentationen vedrørende sammenlignelige lufthavne, som Ryanair havde fremsendt i Charleroi-undersøgelsen, og Kommissionen burde på dette grundlag have besluttet, at den pågældende aftale overholder markedsinvestorprincippet og dermed ikke omfatter statsstøtte.
On the substance of the case, Ryanair is of the opinion that the Commission should have based itself on standard commercial arrangements and, inter alia, on the evidence of comparable airports submitted by Ryanair in the Charleroi investigation, and on this basis the Commission should have decided that the Agreement in question complies with the market economy investor principle and hence does not involve State aid.
Med hensyn til spørgsmålet om aftalens finansiering ved hjælp af statsmidler, og om den kan tilregnes de slovakiske myndigheder, forstår Ryanair det sådan, at BTS handlede egenhændigt, da selskabet indgik aftalen, og at der derfor ikke var nogen statsstøtte involveret.
With regard to the financing of the Agreement through State resources and its imputability to the Slovak authorities, Ryanair’s understanding is that BTS was acting autonomously when it entered into the Agreement and that therefore no State measure was involved.
Ryanair er af den opfattelse, at klageren synes at have været forudindtaget af Ryanairs indvendinger mod Wien lufthavns overtagelse af BTS og tidspunktet for aftalens indgåelse som dokumentation for ydelsen af statsstøtte, og at have blæst det tilsyneladende omfang af den påståede fordel for Ryanair op.
In Ryanair’s opinion, the complainant appears to have been biased, taking Ryanair’s objections to the takeover of BTS by Vienna Airport and the timing of the conclusion of the Agreement as evidence of the granting of State aid, and to have magnified the apparent extent of the alleged advantage granted to Ryanair.
Ryanair bekræfter, at selskabet ganske vist har givet udtryk for konkurrencebetingede forbehold mod valget af køber i BTS' privatiseringsproces [19], men mener, at det på grundlag af Ryanairs holdning ville være absurd at konkludere, at selskabet er imod privatiseringen af lufthavnen, eller at det var imod, at lufthavnen i Wien købte BTS, da aftalen angiveligt kun var gældende, hvis lufthavnen var offentligt ejet som følge af nødvendigheden af statsstøtte.
While Ryanair confirms that it is true that it had raised competition concerns regarding the choice of buyer in the BTS privatisation process [19], it is of the opinion that it would be absurd to conclude from Ryanair’s position that it is against the privatisation of the Airport, or that it was opposed to Vienna Airport acquiring BTS because the Agreement could allegedly only work if the Airport was publicly owned, due to the necessity of State aid.
Ryanair præciserer endvidere, at selskabet ikke var imod privatiseringen af BTS som sådan, men imod valget af lufthavnens køber, Wien lufthavn, da dette ville have fjernet det konkurrencemæssige pres, som Bratislava lufthavn lagde på Wien lufthavn og afskaffet valgmulighederne for de luftfartsselskaber, som ønskede at betjene det opland, som dækker dele af Den Slovakiske Republik, Østrig, Ungarn og Den Tjekkiske Republik.
Ryanair further explains that it was not against the privatisation of BTS per se, but against the choice of buyer (Vienna Airport), because this would have removed the competitive pressure created by Bratislava Airport on Vienna Airport and eliminated choice for airlines wishing to serve the catchment area covering parts of the Slovak Republic, Austria, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
Derudover forklarer Ryanair også, at selskabet efter planen skulle aftage 20 fly mellem september 2005 og marts 2006, hvoraf op til fire var sat af til at operere på BTS.
In addition, Ryanair also explains that it was scheduled to take delivery of 20 aircraft between September 2005 and March 2006, up to four of which were to be dedicated to BTS operations.
Af disse operationelle årsager kunne indgåelsen af aftalen ikke blive sat i venteposition i 10 måneder, indtil privatiseringsbuddene og godkendelsen af Den Slovakiske Republiks monopoltilsyn var afsluttet (første tidsfrist var den 15. august 2006 med en forlængelse med 45 dage indtil oktober 2006).
For these operational reasons, the process of concluding the Agreement could not be put on hold for over 10 months pending the conclusion of privatisation bids and approval by the Anti-Monopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (with a first deadline on 15 August 2006 and an extension of 45 days until October 2006).
Redegørelser vedrørende AIP og serviceafgifter i lufthavnen
Explanations concerning the AIP and its charges for services at the Airport