natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I denne forbindelse bemærkede Kommissionen, at der var behov for en række foranstaltninger til håndtering af midlertidige problemer, men Kommissionen tvivlede på, om den nederlandske stat havde taget tilstrækkelige skridt til at sikre, at foranstaltningerne ville blive afviklet, når der ikke længere var brug for dem.
In that regard, the Commission observed that a number of measures were needed to address temporary problems, but the Commission doubted whether the Dutch State had taken sufficient steps ensuring that the measures would be unwound once they were no longer necessary.
Med hensyn til foranstaltning A bemærkede Kommissionen, at kapitalfrigørelsesinstrumentet ikke ville være attraktivt, når først ABN AMRO N fik lov til at gennemføre Basel II-krav.
With regard to Measure A, the Commission observed that the CRI would become unattractive once ABN AMRO N was allowed to implement Basel II requirements.
Selv om kapitalfrigørelsesinstrumentet indeholdt købsfunktioner, der gjorde det muligt at ophæve kontrakten før tid, bemærkede Kommissionen, at der ikke var nogen klar tidsplan for den nederlandske stats exit.
Although the CRI contained call features allowing for an early termination of the contract, the Commission observed that there was no clear timetable for the Dutch State’s exit.
Endvidere bemærkede Kommissionen med hensyn til forsigtighedsmargenen på 500 mio. EUR, at hensigten var, at ABN AMRO Group skulle erstatte dette beløb med selvfinansieret kapital.
Also with regard to the prudential margin of EUR 500 million, the Commission noted that the intention was that ABN AMRO Group replaced that amount by self-financed capital.
Igen bemærkede Kommissionen, at der ikke var nogen som helst angivelse af tidsforløbet.
Again the Commission observed that there was no indication whatsoever on timing.
Med hensyn til integrationsomkostningerne på 1,2 mia. EUR (nemlig foranstaltning B5) bemærkede Kommissionen, at den nederlandske stat hævdede, at disse ville føre til vigtige synergier på 1,1 mia. EUR (før skat) om året, hvilket i princippet kunne anvendes til at betale statsstøtten tilbage.
With respect to the integration costs of EUR 1,2 billion (namely Measure B5), the Commission observed that the Dutch State claimed that these would lead to important synergies of EUR 1,1 billion (pre-tax) per year, which could in principle be used to repay the State aid.
Alligevel bemærkede Kommissionen, at den nederlandske stat ikke havde sørget for en mekanisme, der sikrede en sådan tilbagebetaling.
Yet, the Commission observed that the Dutch State had not put in place a mechanism ensuring such a repayment.
Med hensyn til kapitalbehovet i forbindelse med salget af New HBU konkluderede Kommissionen, at kapitalkravet vedrørende kreditordningen ville falde brat i takt med, at lånene gradvist forfaldt til betaling.
On the capital needs related to the sale of New HBU, the Commission concluded that the capital requirements related to the credit umbrella would decline rapidly as loans would gradually mature.
Igen understregede Kommissionen, at statsstøtte skal tilbagebetales, når der ikke længere er behov for den.
Again, the Commission underlined that the State aid should be repaid once it was no longer necessary.
Begrænsning af konkurrencefordrejning
Limitation of distortions of competition
Med hensyn til konkurrencefordrejning bemærkede Kommissionen, at FBN's og ABN AMRO N's kapitalbehov til en vis grad stammede fra deres udskillelse fra deres tidligere moderselskaber og fra direkte integrationsomkostninger og ikke fra overdreven risikotagning eller dårlig forvaltning i FBN og ABN AMRO N. På denne baggrund konkluderede Kommissionen, at der sandsynligvis ikke ville blive behov for yderligere frasalg.
In terms of distortion of competition, the Commission noted that the capital needs of FBN and ABN AMRO N stemmed to a certain extent from their separation of their former parent companies and from upfront integration costs, and not from excessive risk-taking or mismanagement within FBN and ABN AMRO N themselves. Against that background, the Commission concluded that further divestments were unlikely to be necessary.
Samtidig udtrykte Kommissionen imidlertid tvivl om, hvorvidt omstruktureringsplanen af december 2009 indeholdt tilstrækkelige adfærdsmæssige foranstaltninger til at sikre, at FBN og ABN AMRO N ikke ville bruge statsstøtten til at vokse på bekostning af deres konkurrenter, f.eks. ved at gennemføre en ikke-bæredygtig prissætningspolitik eller overtage andre finansielle institutioner, som kan svække ikke-støttemodtageres incitament i forhold til konkurrence, investeringer og innovation og dermed afholde nye deltagere fra at komme ind på det nederlandske bankmarked.
At the same time however, the Commission expressed doubts that the December 2009 Restructuring Plan contained sufficient behavioural measures to ensure that FBN and ABN AMRO N would not use the State aid to grow at the expense of their competitors, for example by implementing an unsustainable pricing policy or acquiring other financial institutions, which could weaken the incentives of non-beneficiaries to compete, invest and innovate and could discourage entry in the Dutch banking market.
Hvad angår exit, anførte Kommissionen, at det ville være nyttigt, hvis den nederlandske stat udviklede og tydeligt kommunikerede en exitstrategi.
In terms of exit, the Commission argued that it would be helpful if the Dutch State developed and clearly communicated an exit strategy.
Gentagne og massive indgreb fra den nederlandske stat kunne rent faktisk blive opfattet som permanent støtte fra indskyderne.
Indeed, the repeated and massive interventions of the Dutch State could be perceived by depositors as a sign of its permanent support.
Første sæt bemærkninger fra Van Lanschot (brev af 6. maj 2009)
First set of comments from Van Lanschot (letter of 6 May 2009)
Klageren hævdede, at FBN og ABN AMRO N (herunder deres datterselskaber som MoneYou og Mees Pierson) takket være statsstøtte og statsligt ejerskab tilbød uholdbart høje renter på individuelle opsparings- og indlånskonti og dermed destabiliserede det nederlandske bankmarked.
The complainant argued that thanks to the State aid and State ownership, FBN and ABN AMRO N (including their subsidiaries such as MoneYou and Mees Pierson) offered unsustainably high interest rates on individual savings and deposit accounts, thereby destabilising the Dutch banking market.
Klageren mente derudover, at den rente, som FBN og ABN AMRO N tilbød, var tabsgivende.
The complainant believed that interest rates offered by FBN and ABN AMRO N were loss-making.
I denne henseende henviste den til, at EURIBOR-renten faldt fra 5 % i september 2008 til under 2 % i januar/februar 2009, mens den rente, som FBN og ABN AMRO N tilbød på opsparing, rent faktisk steg.
In that regard, it referred to the fact that EURIBOR rates declined from 5 % in September 2008 to less than 2 % in January/February 2009, while interest rates offered by FBN and ABN AMRO N on savings accounts actually rose.
Klageren påpeger endvidere de særlige kendetegn på det nederlandske marked for private banking i forhold til detailbankmarkedet, som har en tendens til at øge den fordrejende virkning af de trufne foranstaltninger.
The complainant also points at the specificities in the Dutch private banking market when compared to the retail banking market, which tend to increase the distortive effect of the measures taken.
Opsparingsbeløb inden for private banling er i gennemsnit større end inden for detailbankvirksomhed.
Saving amounts in private banking are on average larger than in retail banking.
Hvad angår mindre opsparingsbeløb bekymrer kunderne sig mindre om bankens risikoprofil, eftersom de er beskyttet af den nederlandske indlånsgarantiordning (op til 100000 EUR).
For low savings amounts, customers care less about their bank’s risk profile as they are protected by the Dutch Deposit Guarantee Scheme (up to an amount of EUR 100000).
Opmærksomheden på risici øges imidlertid, når denne tærskel passeres, hvilket er ret normalt inden for private banking.
Risk awareness increases however once that threshold is passed, which is rather common in private banking.
Klageren hævdede også, at FBN og ABN AMRO N drager fordel af en iboende statsgaranti.
The complainant also argued that FBN and ABN AMRO N benefit from an implicit State guarantee.
Den hævdede, at FBN's og ABN AMRO N's kunder er overbeviste om, at den nederlandske stat ikke lader statsejede banker gå konkurs.
It argued that customers of FBN and ABN AMRO N are convinced that the Dutch State will not allow State-owned banks to go bankrupt.
Klageren — som red krisen af uden statsstøtte — understregede, at den var stærkt påvirket af FBN's og ABN AMRO N's fordrejende adfærd, da den traditionelt i stort omfang gjorde brug af det nederlandske opsparingsmarked til finansiering af aktiver [71].
The complainant – which weathered the crisis without State aid – underlined that it was severely affected by FBN and ABN AMRO N distortive behaviour as it relied traditionally to an important extent on the Dutch savings market to fund its assets [71].
I absolutte tal havde klageren opsparing og indlån til 15 mia. EUR, hvilket betød, at en rentestigning på 1 % kunne koste selskabet ca. 150 mio. EUR om året [72].
In absolute figures, the complainant had savings & deposits of EUR 15 billion, which implied that a 1 % increase in interest rates could cost the company approximately EUR 150 million per year [72].
Ud over denne omkostningsstigning var der ydermere en volumenpåvirkning, eftersom Van Lanschot mistede kunder.
In addition to that cost increase, there was also a volume effect as Van Lanschot lost customers.
Opfølgende bemærkninger fra Van Lanschot (brev af 21. og 28. august 2009)
Follow-up comments of Van Lanschot (letters of 21 and 28 August 2009)
Ifølge klageren varede FBN's og ABN AMRO N's usædvanlige adfærd ved hen over sommermånederne i 2009.
According to the complainant, the unusual behaviour of FBN and ABN AMRO N persisted over the summer months of 2009.
Som et yderligere argument henviste klageren til unormalt store ændringer i volumen og markedsandele på det traditionelt stabile nederlandske opsparingsmarked.
As an additional argument, the complainant referred to unusually large volume and market share changes in the traditionally stable Dutch savings market.
I denne henseende påpegede klageren FBN's og ABN AMRO N's pressemeddelelser, som meldte om indskud på henholdsvis 9 mia. EUR og 21 mia. EUR i første halvår af 2009 [73].
In that regard, the complainant pointed to FBN and ABN AMRO N press releases which reported deposit inflows of respectively EUR 9 billion and EUR 21 billion in the first half of 2009 [73].
Klageren mente, at disse tal var anselige i lyset af, at værdien af det samlede nederlandske opsparingsmarked er ca. 287 mia. EUR.
The complainant deemed those figures to be sizeable given the fact that the total Dutch savings market is worth approximately EUR 287 billion.
Som et andet eksempel på usædvanlig prissætning henviste klageren til, at renten på opsparing i nabolande som Belgien, Frankrig og Tyskland havde fulgt faldet i EURIBOR-renten, mens nederlandske opsparingsrenter fortsat var stædigt høje.
As another illustration of unusual pricing, the complainant referred to the fact that savings interest rates in neighbouring countries such as Belgium, France and Germany had followed the decline in EURIBOR rates, while Dutch savings interest rates had remained stubbornly high.
Bemærkninger fra ABN AMRO Bank (brev af 6. juli 2009)
Comments from ABN AMRO Bank (letter of 6 July 2009)
I en bemærkning om beslutningen af 8. april 2009, der indledte den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure, gav ABN AMRO Bank (dvs. ABN AMRO N's moderselskab) yderligere oplysninger om sin finansieringsposition og finansieringsstrategi.
Commenting on the Decision of 8 April 2009 launching the formal investigation procedure, ABN AMRO Bank (i.e. the parent company of ABN AMRO N) provided more information on its funding position and funding strategy.
ABN AMRO Bank afviste, at den — direkte eller indirekte — havde udnyttet nogen form for finansieringsstøtte til FBN (foranstaltning Y1 og Y2).
ABN AMRO Bank denied it had benefitted – directly or indirectly – from any funding aid given to FBN (Measures Y1 and Y2).
ABN AMRO Bank påpegede, at den ikke havde behøvet hjælp til finansiering under hele krisen takket være sin diversificerede finansieringsstrategi.
ABN AMRO Bank pointed out that it had not needed help to fund itself throughout the crisis thanks to its diversified funding strategy.
Den understregede desuden, at dens likviditetsstatistik holdt sig inden for både de lovgivningsmæssige grænser og dens egne interne grænser.
It also underlined that its liquidity statistics remained well within regulatory limits and within its own internal limits as well.
BEMÆRKNINGER FRA DEN NEDERLANDSKE STAT
COMMENTS FROM THE DUTCH STATE
Bemærkninger fra den nederlandske stat til beslutningen af 8. april 2009
Comments from the Dutch State on the Decision of 8 April 2009
Den nederlandske stat anerkendte, at FBN havde været i stand til at forfølge sine aktiviteter på grund af statens overtagelse [74], men hævdede, at overtagelsen stemte overens med det såkaldte »markedsøkonomiske investorprincip«.
The Dutch State acknowledged that FBN had been able to pursue its activities because of its acquisition by the State [74], but it argued that the acquisition was in line with the so-called ‘market economy investor principle’ (MEIP).
Derfor var der ifølge den nederlandske stat ikke nogen selektiv fordel og dermed ikke nogen statsstøtte.
As a result, according to the Dutch State there was no selective advantage and consequently no State aid.
Den nederlandske stat hævdede, at den — selv om de integrerede transaktioner af 3. oktober 2008 primært skulle forhindre en destabilisering af FBN og ABN AMRO N og det nederlandske banksystem generelt — ved at købe andele i FBN og ABN AMRO N agtede at generere et positivt afkast på langt sigt.
The Dutch State claimed that – even though the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008 were primarily meant to prevent the destabilisation of FBN and ABN AMRO N and the Dutch banking system in general – by purchasing participations in FBN and ABN AMRO N it aimed to make a positive long-term return.
Den nederlandske stat understregede, at prisen for FBN (inklusive ABN AMRO N) lå inden for den eksterne vurderingseksperts vurderingsniveau.
The Dutch State underlined that the price for FBN (including ABN AMRO N) was within the valuation range of its external valuation expert.
Den nederlandske stat hævdede, at den havde betalt en rimelig markedspris for FBN, men understregede, at selv om den havde betalt for meget, ville betalingen have udgjort statsstøtte til Fortis SA/NV (som var det sælgende selskab) og ikke statsstøtte til FBN.
The Dutch State claimed that it had paid a fair market price for FBN but it pointed out that even if it overpaid, that payment would have been State aid to Fortis SA/NV (which was the selling company) and not State aid to FBN.
Hvad angår foranstaltning Y1, hævdede den nederlandske stat, at den havde ydet kortfristet finansiering til FBN på markedsvilkår.
With respect to Measure Y1, the Dutch State claimed that it provided short-term funding to FBN at market conditions.
Den hævdede, at FBN inden krisen modtog finansiering fra sit moderselskab til EONIA- eller EURIBOR-rente uden ekstra marginal.
It argued that before the crisis FBN received funding from its parent company at EONIA or EURIBOR rates without any extra spread.
Den nederlandske stat fremførte, at den prissætning, de anvendte (som beskrevet i betragtning 96), stemte overens med praksis på markedet.
The Dutch State argued that the pricing it applied (as described in recital 96) was in line with market practice.
Mere specifikt anførte den, at det prissætningssystem, der blev anvendt i perioden efter den 5. november 2008 (med en marginal på 50 basispoints for lån med en løbetid på over tre måneder) var i tråd med den nederlandske garantiordning [75].
More specifically, it also argued that its pricing system used for the period after 5 November 2008 (with a 50 basis points spread for loans of more than 3 months) was aligned with the Dutch Guarantee Scheme [75].
Med hensyn til den periode, hvor FBN's likviditetsfacilitet blev stillet til rådighed, forklarede den nederlandske stat, at den indledte forhandlinger om at afvikle likviditetsfaciliteten i januar 2009 med det formål at afvikle den hurtigst muligt.
With respect to the period during which FBN’s liquidity facility was made available, the Dutch State explained that it started negotiations on ending the liquidity facility in January 2009 with the aim of ending the liquidity facility as fast as possible.
Med dette mål in mente indførte den nederlandske stat i marts 2009 et nyt prissætningssystem i to trin, som gjorde finansiering dyrere, hvis den overskred en foruddefineret tærskelværdi.
With that objective in mind, the Dutch State introduced in March 2009 a new two-step pricing system, which made funding more expensive if it exceeded a pre-defined threshold.
Likviditetsfaciliteten var allerede afviklet den 1. juli 2009.
The liquidity facility was already ended on 1 July 2009.
Den nederlandske stat hævdede, at den maksimale løbetid for likviditeten i likviditetsfaciliteten var proportionel.
The Dutch State argued that the maximum maturity of the liquidity provided under the liquidity facility was proportional.
I denne henseende forklarede den nederlandske stat, at den i den første periode (dvs. fra den 6. til den 23. oktober 2008) havde ydet likviditet med en løbetid på højst et par uger.
In that regard, the Dutch State explained that in the first period (i.e. from 6 to 23 October 2008), it had granted liquidity with a maturity of not more than a few weeks.
Da likviditetsfaciliteten efterfølgende blev justeret, blev den maksimale løbetid forlænget til ni måneder for at undgå indløsningstoppunkter.
When the liquidity facility was subsequently adjusted, the maximum maturity was prolonged to 9 months to avoid redemption peaks.
Den nederlandske stat forklarede, at den samlede volumen under likviditetsfaciliteten (dvs. 5 mia. EUR for dag-til-dag-finansiering og 40 mia. EUR for langfristet finansiering) var baseret på FBN's reelle finansieringsbehov og derfor var det nødvendige minimum.
The Dutch State explained that the total volume of the liquidity facility (namely EUR 5 billion overnight and EUR 40 billion longer-term funding) was based on FBN’s real financing needs and was therefore the minimum necessary.
Den kortfristede likviditetsfacilitet på 45 mia. EUR tog højde for den normale volatilitet i FBN's likviditet og gav FBN mulighed for omgående at tilbagebetale ca. 34 mia. EUR til Fortis SA/NV.
The short-term liquidity facility of EUR 45 billion took into account the normal volatility of FBN’s cash position and it also allowed FBN to immediately repay approximately EUR 34 billion to Fortis SA/NV.
Hvad angår de langfristede lån (dvs. foranstaltning Y2), anerkendte den nederlandske stat, at Fortis Bank SA/NV kunne have anmodet om en tilbagebetaling af de fastforrentede lån (men ikke de variabelt forrentede lån) [76].
With respect to the long-term loans (namely Measure Y2), the Dutch State acknowledged that Fortis Bank SA/NV could have requested the repayment of the fixed-interest rate loans (but not of the variable-rate loans) [76].
Den nederlandske stat hævdede imidlertid, at den blot var trådt i stedet for Fortis Bank SA/NV, og at alle betingelserne i de eksisterende kontrakter var uændrede.
The Dutch State argued however that it had only replaced Fortis Bank SA/NV leaving all the conditions of the existing contracts unchanged.
Ifølge den nederlandske stat var kontrakten mellem Fortis Bank SA/NV og FBN en normal markedskontrakt mellem aktører på det private marked.
According to the Dutch State, the contract between Fortis Bank SA/NV and FBN was a normal market contract between private market actors.
Den nederlandske stat anførte, at dens adfærd — fordi den var trådt i stedet for en markedsøkonomisk investor — automatisk var i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
The Dutch State argued that – because it had replaced a market economy investor – its behaviour was automatically in line with the MEIP.
Den nederlandske stat mente som sådan ikke, at den skulle begrunde, hvorfor renten kunne have været højere, eller hvorfor den burde have udskiftet de langfristede lån med kortfristede lån [77].
As such, the Dutch State considered it did not have to justify why rates could have been higher or why it should have replaced those long-term loans by shorter-term loans [77].
Den nederlandske stat anførte derudover, at det var ret almindeligt for selskaber, når de foretog overtagelser, at de samtidig ydede likviditet til nyovertagne datterselskaber.
The Dutch State also argued that it was quite common for companies, when pursuing acquisitions, to simultaneously provide liquidity to newly-acquired subsidiaries.
Med hensyn til, om ABN AMRO N havde modtaget direkte eller indirekte statsstøtte, afviste den nederlandske stat, at ABN AMRO N modtog finansiering fra den nederlandske stat eller FBN.
As to whether direct or indirect State aid had been provided to ABN AMRO N, the Dutch State denied that ABN AMRO N received funding from the Dutch State or FBN.
Den nederlandske stat forklarede, at ABN AMRO N med sin store franchise inden for private banking og detailbankvirksomhed havde tilstrækkelig finansiering selv.
The Dutch State explained that ABN AMRO N, with its large retail and private banking franchise, had sufficient funding of its own.
Med hensyn til foranstaltning Z hævdede den nederlandske stat, at transaktionsprisen på 6,5 mia. EUR var en rimelig markedspris.
With respect to Measure Z, the Dutch State claimed that the transaction price of EUR 6,5 billion was a fair market price.
Den understregede, at prisen lå mellem »aktuelle markedsforhold«-vurderingen på [4 - 6,5] mia. EUR og »through-the-cycle«-vurderingen på [6,5 - 9] mia. EUR som beregnet af den eksterne vurderingsekspert i begyndelsen af oktober 2008 (forud for transaktionen den 3. oktober 2008).
It underlined that the price was between the ‘current market conditions’ valuation of EUR [4 - 6,5] billion and the ‘through the cycle’ valuation of EUR [6,5 - 9] billion as calculated by its external valuation expert at the beginning of October 2008 (prior to the 3 October 2008 transaction).
ABN AMRO N skilte sig derimod med sin stabile profil som detailbank og kommerciel bank grundlæggende ud fra de andre banker.
ABN AMRO N, by contrast, with its stable retail and commercial bank profile, was fundamentally different to other banks.
På denne baggrund hævdede den nederlandske stat, at det ikke gav mening at justere kursen analogt med andre banker.
Given that context, the Dutch State argued that a price correction by analogy to other banks made no sense.
Den nederlandske stat understregede desuden, at de øvrige medlemmer af konsortiet og navnlig RBS skulle godkende transaktionen, og at […].
The Dutch State also underlined that the other consortium members, and in particular RBS, had to approve the transaction and that […].
Den nederlandske stat henviste også til punkt 166 og 177 i den foregående ekspertrapport til generalforsamlingen i Fortis SA/NV den 11. februar 2009 i Bruxelles [79], idet den hævdede, at disse punkter støtter den nederlandske stats argument om, at den betalte en rimelig pris for FBN, ABN AMRO N, Fortis Insurance og Fortis Corporate Insurance den 3. oktober 2008, hvilket dermed udgør en gyldig referencepris for salget fra december 2008.
The Dutch State also refers to points (166) and (177) of the preliminary report of experts to the General Shareholders’ Meeting of Fortis SA/NV on 11 February 2009 in Brussels [79], claiming that those points support the Dutch State’s argument that it paid a fair price for FBN, ABN AMRO N, Fortis Insurance and Fortis Corporate Insurance on 3 October 2008, which constitutes therefore a valid reference price for the sale of December 2008.
Den nederlandske stat gennemførte foranstaltning Z ved at give afkald på de krav, den havde over for FBN.
The Dutch State implemented Measure Z by waiving claims it had towards FBN.