natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Uanset artikel 10, stk. 4, i forordning (EF) nr. 320/2006 kan medlemsstaterne i én rate udbetale 100 % af den omstruktureringsstøtte, der er fastsat i artikel 3 i nævnte forordning for produktionsåret 2009/10.
By way of derogation from Article 10(4) of Regulation (EC) No 320/2006, Member States may pay 100 % of the restructuring aid provided for in Article 3 of that Regulation in respect of the marketing year 2009/2010 in one instalment.
I så tilfælde finder udbetalingen sted i juni 2010.
In such case, the payment shall be due in June 2010.
Medlemsstaterne underretter senest den 31. marts 2010 Kommissionen om, hvorvidt de ønsker at gøre brug af muligheden i stk. 1.
Member States shall inform the Commission by 31 March 2010 if they want to make use of the possibility provided for in the first paragraph.
af 23. marts 2010
of 23 March 2010
om ændring af afgørelse 2006/109/EF i form af godtagelse af tre tilbud om at tilslutte sig det fælles pristilsagn i forbindelse med antidumpingproceduren vedrørende importen af visse former for støbegods med oprindelse i Folkerepublikken Kina
amending Decision 2006/109/EC by accepting three offers to join the joint price undertaking accepted in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain castings originating in the People’s Republic of China
under henvisning til Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1225/2009 af 30. november 2009 om beskyttelse mod dumpingimport fra lande, der ikke er medlemmer af Det Europæiske Fællesskab [1] (»grundforordningen«), særlig artikel 8 og artikel 11, stk. 3,
Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community [1] (the ‘basic Regulation’), and in particular Articles 8 and 11(3) thereof,
Ved Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1212/2005 [2] (»forordningen om endelig told«) indførtes en endelig antidumpingtold på importen af visse former for støbegods med oprindelse i Folkerepublikken Kina (»Kina«).
The Council, by Regulation (EC) No 1212/2005 [2] (the definitive Regulation), imposed a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain castings originating in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Forordningen blev senest ændret ved Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 500/2009 [3].
This Regulation was last amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 500/2009 [3].
Kommissionen godtog ved afgørelse 2006/109/EF [4] et fælles pristilsagn fra China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronics Products (»CCCME«) og 20 samarbejdsvillige kinesiske virksomheder eller samarbejdsvillige grupper af virksomheder.
The Commission, by Decision 2006/109/EC [4] accepted a joint price undertaking from the China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronics Products (CCCME) together with 20 cooperating Chinese companies or cooperating groups of companies.
Denne afgørelse blev ændret ved Kommissionens afgørelse 2008/437/EF [5].
This Decision was amended by Commission Decision 2008/437/EC [5].
Forordningen om endelig told giver nye kinesiske eksporterende producenter mulighed for at blive indrømmet samme behandling som de samarbejdsvillige virksomheder i den oprindelige undersøgelse, på den betingelse at disse producenter er blevet indrømmet behandling som ny eksporterende producent i henhold til artikel 1, stk. 4, i forordning (EF) nr. 1212/2005.
The definitive Regulation gives the possibility to new Chinese exporting producers to be granted the same treatment as the cooperating companies in the original investigation, on the condition that these producers have been granted the new exporting producer treatment (NEPT) in accordance with Article 1(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1212/2005.
Efter tre anmodninger om behandling som ny eksporterende producent i henhold til artikel 1, stk. 4, i forordningen om endelig told ændrede Rådet ved forordning (EF) nr. 426/2008 [6] forordningen om endelig told og fastsatte en individuel toldsats på 28,6 % for de eksporterende producenter HanDan County Yan Yuan Smelting and Casting Co., Ltd (»HanDan«), XianXian Guozhuang Precision Casting Co., Ltd (»XianXian«) og Wuxi Norlong Foundry Co., Ltd (»Norlong«).
Following three requests for NEPT based on Article 1(4) of the definitive Regulation, the Council, by Regulation (EC) No 426/2008 [6] amended the definitive Regulation and assigned an individual duty rate of 28,6 % to the exporting producers HanDan County Yan Yuan Smelting and Casting Co., Ltd (HanDan), XianXian Guozhuang Precision Casting Co., Ltd (XianXian) and Wuxi Norlong Foundry Co., Ltd (Norlong).
Efter en anmodning om behandling som ny eksporterende producent i henhold til artikel 1, stk. 4, i forordningen om endelig told ændrede Rådet ved forordning (EF) nr. 282/2009 [7] forordningen om endelig told og fastsatte en individuel toldsats på 28,6 % for den eksporterende producent Weifang Stable Casting Co., Ltd (»Weifang«).
Following a request for NEPT based on Article 1(4) of the definitive Regulation, the Council, by Regulation (EC) No 282/2009 [7] amended the definitive Regulation and assigned and individual duty rate of 28,6 % to the exporting producer Weifang Stable Casting Co., Ltd (Weifang).
Der mindes om, at alle fire eksporterende producenter blev indrømmet individuel behandling i den periode, hvor undersøgelsen vedrørende behandling som ny eksporterende producent stod på.
It is recalled that all four exporting producers received individual treatment (IT) during the NEPT investigation.
To af de fire ovennævnte eksporterende producenter, der blev indrømmet behandling som ny eksporterende producent (XianXian og Weifang), fremsatte sammen med CCCME bindende tilbud om at tilslutte sig tilsagnet om solidarisk hæftelse, som Kommissionen har godtaget.
Two of the four above-mentioned exporting producers granted NEPT (XianXian and Weifang) submitted together with the CCCME formal offers to join the joint liability undertaking accepted by the Commission.
Den 10. juni 2009 indledte Kommissionen ved en meddelelse i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende [8] en delvis interimsundersøgelse af de endelige foranstaltninger.
On 10 June 2009, the Commission, by a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union [8], initiated a partial interim review of the definitive measures.
Interimsundersøgelsen er begrænset til en undersøgelse af foranstaltningernes form og navnlig til en undersøgelse af, hvorvidt tilsagn fra eksporterende producenter i Kina kan godtages og gennemføres.
The review is limited in scope to the examination of the form of the measures and in particular to the examination of the acceptability and workability of undertakings offered by exporting producers in the PRC.
Efter indledningen af den delvise interimsundersøgelse af foranstaltningerne fremsatte HanDan, en anden eksporterende producent, som var blevet indrømmet behandling som ny eksporterende producent, inden for den fastsatte frist sammen med CCCME et bindende tilbud om at tilslutte sig tilsagnet om solidarisk hæftelse, som Kommissionen har godtaget.
After the initiation of the partial interim review of the measures, yet another exporting producer granted NEPT, HanDan, submitted within the deadline, together with the CCCME a formal offer to join the joint liability undertaking accepted by the Commission.
Norlong, en anden eksporterende producent, som var blevet indrømmet behandling som ny eksporterende producent, gjorde opmærksom på, at denne ikke ønsker at tilslutte sig det fælles tilsagn, som Kommissionen har godtaget, men fremsatte inden for den fastsatte frist et særskilt tilsagn.
Another exporting producer granted NEPT, Norlong, submitted that it does not wish to adhere to the joint undertaking accepted by the Commission, but offered, within the deadline, a separate undertaking.
Den 15. december 2009 blev de interesserede parter underrettet om de vigtigste kendsgerninger og betragtninger, på grundlag af hvilke det var hensigten at godtage tilbuddene om at tilslutte sig det fælles pristilsagn fra CCCME og HanDan, CCCME og XianXian og CCCME og Weifang og at afvise tilsagnet fra Norlong.
On 15 December 2009, the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it was intended to accept the offers to join the joint price undertaking submitted by CCCME and HanDan, by CCCME and XianXian and by CCCME and Weifang and to reject the undertaking offered by Norlong were disclosed to interested parties.
De fik lejlighed til at fremsætte bemærkninger.
They were given the opportunity to comment.
Deres bemærkninger blev gennemgået, før der blev taget en endelig beslutning.
Their comments have been assessed before taking a final decision.
TILBUD OM TILSAGN
UNDERTAKING OFFERS
For så vidt angår tilbuddet om tilsagn fra CCCME og henholdsvis HanDan, XianXian og Weifang, bemærkes det, at det er identisk med det kollektive tilbud om tilsagn, som blev godtaget ved afgørelse 2006/109/EF, og derfor tilbyder CCCME og de tre eksporterende producenter at sikre, at den pågældende vare eksporteres til eller over en minimumsimportpris (»MIP«), der er fastsat på et niveau, som afhjælper den skadelige virkning af dumping.
With regard to the undertaking offer submitted by CCCME together with Handan, XianXian and Weifang, it is noted that they are identical to the collective undertaking offer accepted by Decision 2006/109/EC and thus the CCCME and the three exporting producers undertake to ensure that the product concerned is exported at or above a minimum import price (MIP) set at a level that eliminates the injurious effect of dumping.
Der mindes om, at tilsagnet omfatter indeksering af minimumsimportprisen på den pågældende vare efter de offentlige internationale noteringer af det vigtigste råmateriale, nemlig råjern, da priserne på støbegods varierer betydeligt alt efter priserne på råjern.
It is recalled that the undertaking includes the indexation of the minimum import price of the product concerned in accordance with public international quotations for its main raw material, i.e. pig iron, given that casting prices vary significantly depending on the prices of pig iron.
Desuden viste en yderligere undersøgelse, at der ikke er nogen virksomhedsspecifikke grunde til at afslå tilbuddet fra CCCME og henholdsvis HanDan, XianXian og Weifang.
In addition, a further investigation showed that there are no company specific reasons that would call for a refusal of the offer submitted by CCCME together with HanDan, XianXian and Weifang.
I betragtning af ovenstående og af, at virksomhederne blev indrømmet en individuel toldsats, finder Kommissionen, at den kan godtage tilbuddet om tilsagn fra CCCME og de eksporterende producenter.
In view of the foregoing, and as the companies received an individual duty rate, the Commission considers that it can accept the undertaking offer made by CCCME and the exporting producers.
Endvidere vil de regelmæssige og detaljerede rapporter, som CCCME og virksomhederne forpligter sig til at forelægge for Kommissionen, give den mulighed for at føre et effektivt tilsyn.
Moreover, the regular and detailed reports which the CCCME and the companies undertake to provide to the Commission will allow effective monitoring.
Kommissionen anser således risikoen for omgåelse af tilsagnene for at være begrænset.
It is, therefore, considered that the risk of circumventing the undertaking is limited.
For så vidt angår det særskilte tilbud om tilsagn fra Norlong, mindes der om, at det oprindelige tilsagn, der blev godtaget ved afgørelse 2006/109/EF, var et tilsagn om solidarisk hæftelse fra 20 virksomheder og CCCME.
With regard to the separate undertaking offered by Norlong, it should be recalled that the original undertaking accepted by Decision 2006/109/EC was a joint liability undertaking of 20 companies together with the CCCME.
At det blev tilbudt som et fælles tilsagn bidrog på afgørende vis til, at Kommissionen godtog det, i betragtning af at det øgede den praktiske anvendelighed og forbedrede kontrollen af overholdelsen af de forpligtelser, som tilsagnet indeholdt, og alt dette er nødvendigt, fordi der er involveret et stort antal eksporterende producenter.
The fact that it was offered as a joint undertaking contributed in a decisive manner to its acceptability by the Commission given that it increased the practicability and improved the control of the respect of the obligations deriving from the undertaking, all of this being necessary in view of the great number of exporting producers involved.
Norlong fremførte det argument, at Kommissionen allerede tidligere havde godtaget i det mindste et individuelt tilsagn fra en virksomhed, som ikke var blevet indrømmet markedsøkonomisk behandling, men kun individuel behandling [9], som i Norlongs tilfælde.
Norlong argued that the Commission had already accepted in the past at least one individual undertaking from a company which had not been granted market economy treatment (MET) but only individual treatment [9], as is the case of Norlong.
Det bør dog understreges, at situationen i den sag, Norlong henviser til, er forskellig fra situationen i forbindelse med det oprindelige tilsagn, der blev godtaget ved afgørelse 2006/109/EF: I den sag, Norlong henviser til, blev kun et tilbud om tilsagn fra en eksporterende producent endelig godtaget.
However, it should be emphasized that the situation in the case referred to by Norlong is different from the situation in the original undertaking accepted by Decision 2006/109/EC: in the case referred to by Norlong, only one undertaking offer of one exporting producer was finally accepted.
Der mindes ligeledes om, at tilsagnet efterfølgende blev trukket tilbage af Kommissionen på grund af en lang række konstaterede misligholdelser, herunder krydskompensationsordninger [10].
It should also be recalled that that undertaking was subsequently withdrawn by the Commission because of numerous breaches found, including cross-compensation schemes [10].
For så vidt angår det tilsagn, som blev godtaget ved afgørelse 2006/109/EF, kræver de specifikke forhold ved situationen, dvs. det store antal virksomheder — over 20 — at kontrol og overvågning tilrettelægges på en særlig måde.
In the case of the undertaking accepted by Decision 2006/109/EC, the specificity of the situation, i.e. the great number of companies which exceeds 20, requires a particular set-up for a special control and monitoring.
Norlong fremkom ikke med noget relevant argument for, at virksomheden befandt sig i en situation, der var anderledes end den, de andre virksomheder, som er omfattet af det fælles tilsagn, befandt sig i, eller for at berettige Kommissionen til at behandle Norlong anderledes end de andre virksomheder, som er omfattet af det fælles tilsagn.
Norlong did not bring forward any relevant argument suggesting that it was in a different situation as the other companies part of the joint undertaking or justifying that the Commission should treat Norlong in a different way than the other companies that are part to the joint undertaking.
Endvidere ville Norlongs tilbud betyde dobbeltarbejde for Kommissionens kontrol- og overvågningssystem.
Moreover, Norlong’s offer would imply a duplication of efforts of the Commission’s control and monitoring system.
Da det ikke ville være praktisk muligt og omkostningseffektivt for Kommissionen at føre kontrol med overholdelsen af de forpligtelser, som Norlongs individuelle tilbud om tilsagn indebar, finder Kommissionen, at den ikke kan godtage Norlongs separate tilbud om tilsagn.
Since it would not be practicable and cost-effective for the Commission to control the respect of the obligations deriving from Norlong’s individual undertaking offer, the Commission considers that it cannot accept the separate undertaking offer made by Norlong.
EU-erhvervsgrenen modsatte sig tilbuddet om tilsagn fra CCCME og henholdsvis HanDan, XianXian og Weifang og fremførte, at minimumsimportprisen ville være for lav til at beskytte EU-erhvervsgrenen mod virkningerne af dumpingimporten, og at EU-erhvervsgrenen forvoldes yderligere skade.
The Union industry objected to the undertaking offer submitted by CCCME together with HanDan, XianXian and Weifang, arguing that the MIP would be too low to protect the European industry from the effect of dumped imports and that the Union industry is suffering further injury.
For så vidt angår minimumsimportprisens niveau, bør det bemærkes, at antidumpingtolden blev fastsat på niveauet for den konstaterede dumpingmargen, som var lavere end skadesmargenen.
As regards the level of the MIP, it should be noted that anti-dumping duties were imposed at the level of the dumping margins found which were lower than the injury margins.
Derfor blev minimumsimportprisen også fastsat ud fra den normale værdi og afhjælper blot den konstaterede dumping i henhold til princippet om den lavest mulige told, jf. grundforordningens artikel 8, stk. 1.
Therefore, the MIP was also set on the normal value and thus eliminates merely the dumping established, in conformity with the principle of the lesser duty rule set out in Article 8(1) of the basic Regulation.
EU-erhvervsgrenen fremførte endvidere, at — trods indførelsen af antidumpingforanstaltninger — øgedes de kinesiske eksportørers markedsandel efter den oprindelige undersøgelsesperiode [11].
The Union industry further argued that, despite the imposition of anti-dumping measures, the market share of Chinese exporters increased since the original investigation period [11].
EU-erhvervsgrenen hævdede, at dette skyldtes voksende eksport fra Kina kombineret med et voldsomt fald i EU's forbrug.
The Union industry claimed that this was due to an increase in exports from China combined with a sharp drop in Union consumption.
Der fremkom imidlertid intet afgørende bevis i forbindelse med det påståede voldsomme fald i forbruget.
However, no conclusive evidence with regard to the alleged sharp drop in consumption was submitted.
Endvidere fremgår det af de tilgængelige statistikker [12], at dumpingimporten er dalet med 14 % siden den oprindelige undersøgelsesperiode.
Moreover, from the statistics available [12], it appears that dumped imports have decreased by 14 % since the original investigation period.
I lyset af ovenstående var der ingen af de grunde, som EU-erhvervsgrenen fremkom med, der kunne ændre den konklusion, at tilbuddet om tilsagn fra CCCME og henholdsvis HanDan, Weifang og XianXian burde godtages.
In view of the above, none of the reasons put forward by the Union industry could alter the conclusion that the undertaking offer submitted by CCCME together with HanDan, Weifang and XianXian should be accepted.
For at gøre det muligt for Kommissionen effektivt at overvåge, om virksomhederne overholder tilsagnet, når der forelægges en anmodning om overgang til fri omsætning for de relevante toldmyndigheder, er fritagelsen for antidumpingtolden betinget af, i) at der forelægges en tilsagnsfaktura, som mindst indeholder de oplysninger, der er anført i bilaget til Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 268/2006 [13], ii) at de importerede varer er fremstillet, afsendt og faktureret direkte af nævnte virksomhed til den første uafhængige kunde i EU, og iii) at de varer, der er angivet og frembudt for toldmyndighederne, svarer nøjagtig til beskrivelsen i tilsagnsfakturaen.
In order to enable the Commission to monitor effectively the companies’ compliance with the undertaking, when the request for release into free circulation is presented to the relevant customs authority, exemption from the anti-dumping duty will be conditional upon (i) the presentation of an undertaking invoice containing at least the elements listed in the Annex to Council Regulation (EC) No 268/2006 [13]; (ii) the fact that imported goods are manufactured, shipped and invoiced directly by the said company to the first independent customer in the Union; and (iii) the fact that the goods declared and presented to customs correspond precisely to the description on the undertaking invoice.
Hvis der ikke fremlægges en sådan faktura, eller hvis fakturaen ikke svarer til den vare, der frembydes for toldmyndighederne, betales der i stedet antidumpingtold med den relevante sats.
Where no such invoice is presented, or when it does not correspond to the product presented to customs, the appropriate rate of anti-dumping duty shall instead be payable.
For yderligere at sikre overholdelse af tilsagnet gøres importørerne i forordning (EF) nr. 268/2006 opmærksomme på, at der, hvis nævnte forordnings betingelser ikke opfyldes, eller hvis Kommissionen trækker sin godtagelse af tilsagnet tilbage, kan opstå toldskyld i forbindelse med de pågældende transaktioner.
To further ensure the respect of the undertaking, importers have been made aware by Regulation (EC) No 268/2006 that the non-fulfilment of the conditions provided for by that Regulation, or the withdrawal by the Commission of the acceptance of the undertaking, may lead to a customs debt being incurred for the relevant transactions.
Hvis tilsagnet misligholdes eller trækkes tilbage, eller hvis Kommissionen trækker sin godtagelse af tilsagnet tilbage, finder den antidumpingtold, der blev indført i henhold til grundforordningens artikel 9, stk. 4, automatisk anvendelse, jf. grundforordningens artikel 8, stk. 9.
In the event of a breach or withdrawal of the undertaking or in case of withdrawal of acceptance of the undertaking by the Commission, the anti-dumping duty imposed in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation shall automatically apply pursuant to Article 8(9) of the basic Regulation.
I betragtning af ovenstående bør tilsagnet fra Norlong afvises.
In view of the above, the undertaking offered by Norlong should be rejected.
Tilbuddet fra CCCME og HanDan, CCCME og XianXian og CCCME og Weifang om at tilslutte sig det fælles pristilsagn, som godtaget ved afgørelse 2006/109/EF, bør godtages, og artikel 1 i afgørelse 2006/109/EF bør ændres i overensstemmelse hermed —
The offer submitted by CCCME and HanDan, by CCCME and XianXian and by CCCME and Weifang to join the joint price undertaking as accepted by Decision 2006/109/EC should be accepted, and Article 1 of Decision 2006/109/EC should be amended accordingly,
Det tilsagn i forbindelse med antidumpingproceduren vedrørende importen af visse former for støbegods med oprindelse i Folkerepublikken Kina, der er afgivet af: i) the China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronics Products (»CCCME«') og HanDan County Yan Yuan Smelting and Casting Co., Ltd, ii) CCCME og XianXian Guozhuang Precision Casting Co. Ltd og iii) CCCME og Weifang Stable Casting Co., Ltd, godtages.
The undertaking offered in connection with the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain castings originating in the People’s Republic of China by: (i) the China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronics Products (CCCME) and HanDan County Yan Yuan Smelting and Casting Co., Ltd; (ii) CCCME and XianXian Guozhuang Precision Casting Co. Ltd; and (iii) CCCME and Weifang Stable Casting Co., Ltd is hereby accepted.
Tabellen i artikel 1 i afgørelse 2006/109/EF, som ændret ved afgørelse 2008/437/EF, erstattes af følgende tabel:
The table of Article 1 in Decision 2006/109/EC as amended by Decision 2008/437/EC is replaced by the following table:
Fremstillet og solgt af GB Metal Products Co., Ltd, Zhuanlu Town, Dingzhou, Hebei
Manufactured and sold by GB Metal Products Co., Ltd, Zhuanlu Town, Dingzhou, Hebei
eller fremstillet af GB Metal Products Co., Ltd, Zhuanlu Town, Dingzhou, Hebei
or manufactured by GB Metal Products Co., Ltd, Zhuanlu Town, Dingzhou, Hebei
og solgt af det dermed forbundne salgsselskab GB International Trading Shanghai Co Ltd, B301-310 Yinhai Building., 250 Cao Xi Road., Shanghai
and sold by its related sales company GB International Trading Shanghai Co Ltd, B301-310 Yinhai Building., 250 Cao Xi Road., Shanghai
Fremstillet og solgt af Hebei Shunda Foundry Co., Ltd, Qufu Road, Quyang, 073100, PRC
Manufactured and sold by Hebei Shunda Foundry Co., Ltd, Qufu Road, Quyang, 073100, PRC
eller fremstillet af Hebei Shunda Foundry Co., Ltd, Qufu Road, Quyang, 073100, PRC
or manufactured by Hebei Shunda Foundry Co., Ltd, Qufu Road, Quyang, 073100, PRC