natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Det bør ikke kræves, at det ophørende og det fortsættende investeringsinstitut medtager andre oplysninger i informationsdokumentet end dem, der er omhandlet i artikel 43, stk. 3, i direktiv 2009/65/EF og artikel 3, 4 og 5 i nærværende direktiv.
The merging UCITS or the receiving UCITS should not be required to include information other than that referred to in Article 43(3) of Directive 2009/65/EC and Articles 3 to 5 of this Directive in the information document.
Det ophørende og det fortsættende investeringsinstitut kan dog supplere med andre oplysninger, der er relevante i forbindelse med den påtænkte fusion.
The merging UCITS or the receiving UCITS may however add other information of relevance in the context of the proposed merger.
Selv om informationsdokumentet, jf. artikel 43, stk. 1, i direktiv 2009/65/EF, ledsages af et resumé, fritages investeringsinstitutterne ikke fra kravet om at undgå lange eller tekniske forklaringer i den øvrige del af informationsdokumentet.
Where the information document pursuant to Article 43(1) of Directive 2009/65/EC is supplemented by a summary, it should not relieve the UCITS of the obligation to avoid the use of long or technical explanations in the rest of the information document.
I de oplysninger, der skal gives til det fortsættende investeringsinstituts deltagere, jf. artikel 43, stk. 1, i direktiv 2009/65/EF, bør det antages, at de pågældende deltagere i forvejen er rimelig bekendte med det fortsættende investeringsinstituts karakteristika, deres rettigheder i forhold til investeringsinstituttet og dets driftsmåde.
The information to be provided to the unit-holders of the receiving UCITS pursuant to Article 43(1) of Directive 2009/65/EC should assume that those unit-holders are already reasonably familiar with the features of the receiving UCITS, the rights they enjoy in relation to it, and the manner of its operation.
Oplysningerne bør derfor fokusere på, hvordan fusionen foregår, og hvilke konsekvenser den kan have for det fortsættende investeringsinstitut.
It should therefore focus on the operation of the merger and its potential impact on the receiving UCITS.
Måden, hvorpå oplysningerne, jf. artikel 43 og 64 i direktiv 2009/65/EF, gives til deltagerne, bør harmoniseres.
The way the information pursuant to Articles 43 and 64 of Directive 2009/65/EC is provided to unit-holders should be harmonised.
Oplysningerne har til formål at sætte deltagerne i stand til på et kvalificeret grundlag at vurdere, om de ønsker at fortsætte deres investering eller at forlange indløsning, når et investeringsinstitut indgår i en fusion, konverteres til et feeder-institut eller ændrer master-institut.
That information aims to enable unit-holders to make an informed judgement about whether they want to continue investing or request redemption, where a UCITS is either part of a merger, converts into a feeder UCITS or changes the master UCITS.
Deltagerne bør have kendskab til, at sådanne større ændringer af investeringsinstitutter er i gang, og de bør have mulighed for at læse oplysningerne.
Unit-holders should be aware of the aforementioned major change the UCITS is undergoing and be in a position to read the information.
Derfor bør oplysningerne stiles til deltagerne personligt enten i papirform eller på et andet varigt medium, f.eks. e-mail.
For that reason the information should be personally addressed to unit-holders either on paper or in another durable medium such as electronic mail (e-mail).
Investeringsinstitutterne bør ved anvendelse af elektroniske midler kunne give oplysningerne på en omkostningseffektiv måde.
The use of electronic means should allow UCITS to provide the information in a cost-efficient way.
Der bør i nærværende direktiv ikke fastsættes krav om, at investeringsinstitutterne informerer deres deltagere direkte, idet der bør tages behørigt hensyn til særlige forhold i visse medlemsstater, hvor investeringsinstitutterne eller deres administrationsselskaber af juridiske eller praktiske grunde ikke eri stand til at kontakte deltagerne direkte.
This Directive should not require UCITS to directly inform their unit-holders, but should take due account of the specificities in certain Member States in which UCITS or their management companies, for legal or practical reasons, are unable to directly contact unit-holders.
Investeringsinstitutterne bør endvidere være i stand til at give oplysningerne ved at videregive dem til depositarer eller formidlere, forudsat at det sikres, at alle deltagere får oplysningerne i tide.
UCITS should also be able to provide the information by passing it on to the depositary or to intermediaries provided that it is ensured that all unit-holders receive the information in due course.
Dette direktiv bør kun harmonisere måden, hvorpå oplysningerne, jf. artikel 43 og 64 i direktiv 2009/65/EF, gives til deltagerne.
This Directive should only harmonise the manner in which the information pursuant to Articles 43 and 64 of Directive 2009/65/EC is provided to unit-holders.
Medlemsstaterne kan selv fastsætte nationale regler om, at deltagerne skal have andre typer oplysninger.
Member States may regulate the provision of other types of information to unit-holders by national rules.
I aftalen mellem master-instituttet og feeder-instituttet bør der tages hensyn til særlige behov hos et feeder-institut, der investerer mindst 85 % af sine aktiver i master-instituttet, samtidig med at det fortsat skal overholde alle krav som et investeringsinstitut.
The agreement between the master UCITS and the feeder UCITS should take account of the specific needs of the feeder UCITS, which invests at least 85 % of its assets in the master UCITS, while at the same time remaining subject to all obligations as a UCITS.
Aftalen bør derfor sikre, at master-instituttet giver feeder-instituttet alle nødvendige oplysninger i tide, så feeder-instituttet kan overholde sine egne forpligtelser.
The agreement should therefore ensure that the master UCITS provides the feeder UCITS with all necessary information in due course to allow the feeder UCITS to comply with its own obligations.
Begge parters øvrige rettigheder og forpligtelser bør også fremgå af aftalen.
It should also stipulate the other rights and duties of both parties.
Medlemsstaterne bør ikke forlange, at aftalen mellem master- og feeder-instituttet, jf. artikel 60, stk. 1, første afsnit, i direktiv 2009/65/EF, omfatter andre elementer end dem, der er omhandlet i kapitel VIII i direktiv 2009/65/EF og artikel 8-14 i nærværende direktiv.
Member States should not require the agreement between master and feeder UCITS pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 60(1) to cover elements other than those referred to in Chapter VIII of Directive 2009/65/EC and Articles 8 to 14 of this Directive.
Aftalen kan dog omfatte andre elementer, hvis master-instituttet og feeder-instituttet fastsætter det.
The agreement may however cover other elements, if the master UCITS and the feeder UCITS so stipulate.
Hvis handelsordningerne mellem master-instituttet og feeder-instituttet ikke er forskellige fra dem, der gælder for alle master-instituttets ikke-feeder-deltagere, og hvis de pågældende ordninger er fastlagt i master-instituttets prospekt, bør det ikke kræves, at aftalen mellem master-instituttet og feeder-instituttet skal gentage de pågældende standardhandelsordningen, men den kan krydshenvise til de relevante dele af master-instituttets prospekt for at hjælpe branchen med at spare omkostninger og reducere den administrative byrde.
Where the dealing arrangements between master UCITS and feeder UCITS do not differ from those applying to all non-feeder unit-holders of the master UCITS and where those arrangements are laid down in the prospectus of the master UCITS, the agreement between master UCITS and feeder UCITS should not have to replicate those standard dealing arrangements, but may cross-refer to the relevant parts of the prospectus of the master UCITS in order to help industry to save costs and reduce the administrative burden.
Aftalen mellem master-instituttet og feeder-instituttet bør omfatte passende procedurer for håndtering af forespørgsler og klager fra deltagere med henblik på at behandle korrespondance, der ved en fejl er blevet sendt til master-instituttet i steder for feeder-instituttet eller omvendt.
The agreement between master UCITS and feeder UCITS should include appropriate procedures for the handling of enquiries and complaints from unit-holders with a view to dealing with correspondence which has mistakenly been sent to the master UCITS instead of the feeder UCITS or vice versa.
For at spare transaktionsomkostninger og for at undgå negative skattemæssige konsekvenser kan master-instituttet og feeder-instituttet evt. aftale en overførsel af aktiver i form af naturalier, medmindre det er forbudt ifølge national lovgivning eller er inkompatibelt med master-instituttets eller feeder-instituttets fondsbestemmelser eller vedtægter.
In order to save transaction costs and to avoid negative tax implications, the master UCITS and the feeder UCITS may wish to agree on a transfer of assets in kind, unless this is prohibited under national law or incompatible with the fund rules or instruments of incorporation of either the master UCITS or the feeder UCITS.
En overførsel af aktiver i form af naturalier til feeder-instituttet bør ikke begrænses til kun at anvendes i tilfælde af master-instituttets likvidation, fusion eller opsplitning.
A transfer of assets in kind to the feeder UCITS should not be limited to the cases of a liquidation, merger or division of the master UCITS, but should also be available under other circumstances.
For at bevare den nødvendige fleksibilitet og samtidig tage hensyn til investorernes interesse bør et feeder-institut, der har modtaget aktiver ved en overførsel af aktiver i form af naturalier, være i stand til enten at overføre alle eller dele af disse aktiver til sit master-institut, hvis master-instituttet accepterer det, eller at realisere værdierne i kontanter med henblik på at investere kontanter i master-instituttet.
In order to preserve the necessary flexibility, while at the same time taking account of the best interests of investors, a feeder UCITS which has received assets through a transfer of assets in kind should be able to either transfer some or all of those assets to its master UCITS where the master UCITS so agrees, or to realise assets for cash in order to invest cash in the master UCITS.
På grund af master-feeder-strukturens særlige kendetegn er det nødvendigt, at aftalen mellem master-instituttet og feeder-instituttet indeholder lovvalgsregler, der fraviger artikel 3 og 4 i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 593/2008 af 17. juni 2008 om lovvalgsregler for kontraktlige forpligtelser (Rom I) [2], således at den lov, der finder anvendelse på den pågældende aftale, enten er loven i den medlemsstat, hvor feeder-instituttet er etableret, eller den, hvor master-instituttet er etableret.
Due to the specificities of the master-feeder structure it is necessary that the agreement between the master and the feeder UCITS provides for conflict of law rules which derogate from Articles 3 and 4 of Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) [2] in such a way that the applicable law to this agreement should be either the law of the Member State where the feeder UCITS is established, or that of the master UCITS.
Det bør være op til parterne at vurdere fordele og ulemper ved valget og tage i betragtning, om master-instituttet har flere feeder-institutter, og om de pågældende feeder-institutter er etableret i én eller flere medlemsstater.
The parties should be free to assess the advantages and disadvantages of that choice and to take into account whether the master UCITS has several feeder UCITS and whether those feeder UCITS are established in only one or in several Member States.
I tilfælde af en likvidation, fusion eller opsplitning af master-instituttet, hvor direktiv 2009/65/EF giver feeder-instituttets deltagere ret til at forlange indløsning, bør feeder-instituttet ikke undergrave den ret ved midlertidigt at udsætte tilbagekøb eller indløsning, medmindre ekstraordinære omstændigheder kræver det for at beskytte deltagernes interesser eller de kompetente myndigheder giver det instrukser om at gøre det.
In the case of a liquidation, merger or division of the master UCITS in respect of which Directive 2009/65/EC grants unit-holders of the feeder UCITS the right to request redemption, the feeder UCITS should not undermine that right by temporarily suspending repurchase or redemption, unless exceptional circumstances require it to do so to protect the interests of unit-holders or it is directed to do so by its competent authorities.
Eftersom en fusion eller opsplitning af et master-institut kan få virkning i løbet af 60 dage, kan feeder-instituttets frist til at ansøge om og få godkendt sine nye investeringsplaner og til at give feeder-instituttets deltagere ret til at forlange tilbagekøb eller indløsning inden for 30 dage under ekstraordinære omstændigheder være for kort til, at feeder-instituttet kan vide med sikkerhed, hvor mange af dets deltagere der vil forlange indløsning.
Since a merger or division of the master UCITS may become effective within 60 days, the time limit for the feeder UCITS to apply for and obtain approval of its new investment intentions and to grant the unit-holders of the feeder UCITS the right to request repurchase or redemption within 30 days, may in exceptional circumstances be too short to allow the feeder UCITS to know for sure how many of its unit-holders will request redemption.
Under sådanne omstændigheder bør feeder-instituttet i princippet være forpligtet til at forlange indløsning af alle sine andele i master-instituttet.
Under such circumstances the feeder UCITS should in principle be obliged to request redemption of all its units in the master UCITS.
For at undgå unødvendige transaktionsomkostninger bør feeder-instituttet dog kunne anvende andre metoder til at sikre, at dets deltagere kan anvende deres ret til at forlange indløsning, samtidig med at det kan nedbringe transaktionsomkostningerne eller undgå andre negative konsekvenser.
In order to avoid unnecessary transaction costs, the feeder UCITS should however be able to use other means to ensure that its unit-holders may make use of the right to request redemption, while allowing it to reduce transaction costs or to avoid other negative impacts.
Feeder-instituttet bør bl.a. ansøge om godkendelse så tidligt som muligt.
The feeder UCITS should in particular apply for approval as soon as possible.
Endvidere bør feeder-instituttet f.eks. ikke være forpligtet til at forlange indløsning i det omfang, dets egne deltagere vælger ikke at benytte denne mulighed.
Furthermore, the feeder UCITS should for instance not be obliged to request redemption to the extent its own unit-holders choose not to make use of that facility.
Når feeder-instituttet forlanger indløsning fra master-instituttet, bør det overveje, om en indløsning i form af naturalier kan nedbringe transaktionsomkostningerne og undgå andre negative konsekvenser.
Where the feeder UCITS requests redemption from the master UCITS, it should consider whether a redemption in kind might reduce transaction costs and avoid other negative impacts.
Aftalen om udveksling af oplysninger mellem master-instituttets og feeder-instituttets depositarer bør muliggøre, at feeder-instituttets depositar modtager alle relevante oplysninger og dokumenter, vedkommende har brug for for at kunne varetage sine forpligtelser.
The information-sharing agreement between the depositaries of the master UCITS and the feeder UCITS should allow the depositary of the feeder UCITS to receive all relevant information and documents which it needs in order to be able to perform its duties.
Indberetningen af uregelmæssigheder, som master-instituttets depositar konstaterer i forbindelse med gennemførelsen af sit hverv som depositar i henhold til sit hjemlands nationale lovgivning, har til formål at beskytte feeder-instituttet.
The reporting of irregularities, which the depositary of the master UCITS detects in the course of carrying out its depositary function under the national law of its home Member State, aims to protect the feeder UCITS.
Der bør derfor ikke kræves indberetning, hvis de pågældende uregelmæssigheder ikke har negative konsekvenser for feeder-instituttet.
For that reason no reporting should be required when those irregularities do not have a negative impact on the feeder UCITS.
Hvis uregelmæssigheder vedrørende master-instituttet har negative konsekvenser for feeder-instituttet, bør feeder-instituttet også orienteres om, hvorvidt og hvordan uregelmæssighederne er blevet klaret.
Where irregularities with regard to the master UCITS have a negative impact on the feeder UCITS, the latter should also be informed as to whether and how the irregularities have been resolved.
Master-instituttets depositar bør derfor oplyse feeder-instituttets depositar om, hvordan master-instituttet har klaret eller agter at klare uregelmæssigheden.
The depositary of the master UCITS should therefore inform the depositary of the feeder UCITS of how the master UCITS has resolved or proposes to resolve the irregularity.
Hvis feeder-instituttets depositar ikke finder, at løsningen er i feeder-instituttets deltageres interesse, bør den pågældende straks indberette sin holdning til feeder-instituttet.
If the depositary of the feeder UCITS is not satisfied that the resolution is in the interests of the unit-holders of the feeder UCITS, it should promptly report its view to the feeder UCITS.
Aftalen om udveksling af oplysninger mellem master-instituttets og feeder-instituttets revisorer bør muliggøre, at feeder-instituttets revisor modtager alle relevante oplysninger og dokumenter, vedkommende har brug for for at kunne varetage sine forpligtelser.
The information-sharing agreement between the auditors of the master UCITS and the feeder UCITS should allow the auditor of the feeder UCITS to receive all relevant information and documents which it needs in order to be able to perform its duties.
På grund af denne aftales særlige karakter bør den foreskrive samme lovvalgsregler som dem, der er fastlagt i aftalen mellem master-instituttet og feeder-instituttet, som fraviger artikel 3 og 4 i Rom I-forordningen.
Given the specificity of this agreement it should provide for the same conflict of law rules as foreseen in the agreement between master and feeder UCITS derogating from Articles 3 and 4 of the Rome I Regulation.
Omfanget af de oplysninger, der skal gives elektronisk adgang til, jf. artikel 91, stk. 3, i direktiv 2009/65/EF, bør specificeres, for at der kan herske retssikkerhed med hensyn til, hvilke kategorier af oplysninger der skal være omfattet.
The scope of the information to be made accessible by electronic means in accordance with Article 91(3) of Directive 2009/65/EC should be specified in order to provide for legal certainty as to what categories of information should be included.
For at skabe fælles rammer for, hvordan de kompetente myndigheder i investeringsinstituttets værtsland bør have elektronisk adgang til de dokumenter, der er omhandlet i artikel 93, stk. 2, i direktiv 2009/65/EF, er det nødvendigt at kræve, at hver enkelt investeringsinstitut eller dets administrationsselskab udpeger et websted, hvor sådanne dokumenter foreligger i et almindelig anvendt elektronisk format.
In order to provide for a common approach to how the documents referred to in Article 93(2) of Directive 2009/65/EC should be made accessible by electronic means to the competent authorities of the UCITS host Member State, it is necessary to require that each UCITS or its management company designates a website where such documents are made available in an electronic format that is in common use.
Det er endvidere nødvendigt at fastsætte en procedure for elektronisk meddelelse om ændringer af sådanne dokumenter til de kompetente myndigheder i investeringsinstituttets værtsland, jf. samme direktivs artikel 93, stk. 7.
It is also necessary to set out a procedure for electronic notification of changes to these documents to the competent authorities of the UCITS host Member State, in accordance with Article 93(7) of that Directive.
For at investeringsinstitutterne og deres administrationsselskaber har mulighed for at tilpasse sig til de nye krav til, hvordan der gives oplysninger til deltagerne i tilfælde omhandlet i artikel 7 og 29 i direktiv 2009/65/EF, bør medlemsstaterne have en længere frist til at gennemføre kravene i deres nationale lovgivning.
In order to allow UCITS and their management companies to adapt to the new requirements on the method and manner to provide information to unit-holders in the cases referred to in Articles 7 and 29, Member States should be granted a longer period for the transposition of those requirements into their national legal systems.
Dette er især vigtigt i de tilfælde, hvor investeringsinstitutterne eller deres administrationsselskaber af juridiske eller praktiske grunde ikke er i stand til at orientere deltagerne direkte.
This is particularly important in those cases where the UCITS or their management companies are unable for legal or practical reasons to inform the unit-holders directly.
Investeringsinstitutter med dematerialiserede ihændehaveraktier bør være i stand til at træffe alle fornødne foranstaltninger til at sikre, at deltagerne får oplysningerne i de tilfælde, der omhandlet i nævnte artikel 8 og 32.
UCITS with dematerialised bearer shares should be able to prepare all arrangements necessary to ensure that unit-holders receive the information in the cases specified in Articles 8 and 32.
Investeringsinstitutter med ikke-dematerialiserede ihændehaveraktier bør være i stand til at konvertere dem til registrerede aktier eller dematerialiserede ihændehaveraktier, hvis de ønsker at kunne indgå i en fusion, konverteres til et feeder-institut eller ændre master-institut.
UCITS with materialised bearer shares should be able to convert them into registered shares or dematerialised bearer shares, if they want to be able to merge, convert into a feeder UCITS or change the master UCITS.
Det Europæiske Værdipapirtilsynsudvalg, der er nedsat ved Kommissionens afgørelse 2009/77/EF [3], er blevet hørt om tekniske spørgsmål.
The Committee of European Securities Regulators, established by Commission Decision 2009/77/EC [3] has been consulted for technical advice.
I dette direktiv fastsættes gennemførelsesbestemmelser til artikel 43, stk. 5, artikel 60, stk. 6, litra a) og c), artikel 61, stk. 3, artikel 62, stk. 4, artikel 64, stk. 4, litra a), og artikel 95, stk. 1, i direktiv 2009/65/EF.
This Directive lays down detailed rules for the implementation of Article 43(5), Article 60(6)(a) and (c), Articles 61(3) and 62(4), Article 64(4)(a) and Article 95(1) of Directive 2009/65/EC.
»rebalancering af porteføljen«: en markant ændring af et investeringsinstituts porteføljesammensætning
‘rebalancing of the portfolio’ means a significant modification of the composition of the portfolio of a UCITS;
»syntetiske risk/reward-indikatorer«: syntetiske indikatorer som omhandlet i artikel 8 i Kommissionens forordning (EU) nr. 583/2010 af 1. juli 2010 om gennemførelse af Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2009/65/EF for så vidt angår central investorinformation og de betingelser, der skal opfyldes, når central investorinformation eller prospektet udleveres på et andet varigt medium end papir eller via et websted] [4].
‘synthetic risk and reward indicators’ means synthetic indicators within the meaning of Article 8 of Commission Regulation (EU) No 583/2010 of 1 July 2010 implementing Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards key investor information and conditions to be met when providing key investor information or the prospectus in a durable medium other than paper or by means of a website [4].
FUSIONER AF INVESTERINGSINSTITUTTER
UCITS MERGERS
Indholdet af fusionsoplysningerne
Content of the merger information