natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Den nederlandske stat betalte ikke kontant, men betalte for købet ved at annullere langfristet gæld på 6,5 mia. EUR, som den havde fået i de integrerede transaktioner af 3. oktober 2008 som led i foranstaltning Y2.
The Dutch State did not pay in cash but paid for the purchase by cancelling EUR 6,5 billion of long-term debt it had obtained in the integrated transactions of 3 October 2008 as part of Measure Y2.
Den nederlandske stat gav med andre ord afkald på krav på 6,5 mia. EUR over for FBN for at betale for ABN AMRO N [55].
In other words, the Dutch State waived EUR 6,5 billion of claims towards FBN to pay for ABN AMRO N [55].
Foranstaltninger omfattet af afgørelsen af 5. februar 2010
Measures covered by the Decision of 5 February 2010
Kapitalfrigørelsesinstrument (foranstaltning A, kapital svarende til 1,7 mia. EUR)
Capital relief instrument (Measure A, capital equivalent of EUR 1,7 billion)
Som betaling for kreditbeskyttelsen modtog den nederlandske stat et årligt gebyr på 51,5 basispoint (beregnet som en procentdel af porteføljens værdi i begyndelsen af hver enkelt referenceperiode).
To remunerate the credit protection, the Dutch State received an annual fee of 51,5 basis points (calculated as a percentage of the portfolio value in the beginning of each reference period).
Dette beløb blev beregnet ved hjælp af den kapitalækvivalente omkostningsmetode.
That fee was calculated using the capital equivalent cost methodology.
Den nederlandske stat besluttede, hvor meget kapital ABN AMRO N kunne frigøre som følge af kapitalfrigørelsesinstrumentet (nemlig 1,7 mia. EUR, baseret på Basel I-krav, som fortsat blev anvendt på det tidspunkt, hvor aftalen om kapitalfrigørelsesinstrumentet blev gennemført), og derefter beregnede den et afkast på 10 % af denne kapitalfrigørelse (nemlig 10 % af 1,7 mia. EUR), som svarede til 51,5 basispoint af den oprindelige porteføljeværdi på 34,5 mia. EUR.
The Dutch State determined how much capital ABN AMRO N could free up due to the capital relief instrument (namely EUR 1,7 billion, based on Basel I requirements which were still applied at the time the CRI agreement was implemented) and then it calculated a return of 10 % on that capital relief (namely 10 % on EUR 1,7 billion), which was equivalent to 51,5 basis points of the initial portfolio value of EUR 34,5 billion.
Hvert år beholdt ABN AMRO N en »første tab«-tranche på 20 basispoint (beregnet i procent af den oprindelige porteføljeværdi).
Each year, ABN AMRO N kept a first loss tranche of 20 basis points (calculated as a percentage of the initial portfolio value).
ABN AMRO N beholdt en vertikal del på 5 % af den resterende risiko.
ABN AMRO N kept a vertical slice of 5 % of the remaining risk.
Prissætningen på kreditbeskyttelsesinstrumentet ville ikke blive justeret, når ABN AMRO N først havde vedtaget Basel II-kapitalkravene fuldt ud, selv om kapitalfrigørelsesvirkningen af kapitalfrigørelsesinstrumentet ville være betydeligt mindre.
The pricing of the credit protection instrument would not be adjusted once ABN AMRO N fully adopted Basel II capital requirments, even though the capital relief effect of the CRI would then be substantially smaller.
I princippet havde CDS-kontrakten en løbetid på syv år, men ABN AMRO N havde købsoptioner, der gjorde det muligt at ophæve kontrakten på en række forudbestemte datoer (f.eks. oktober 2010, januar 2011 og januar 2012) [57].
In principle, the CDS-contract had a maturity of 7 years, but ABN AMRO N had call options enabling it to terminate the contract on a number of pre-determined reference dates (for example October 2010, January 2011 and January 2012) [57].
I henhold til aktionæroverenskomsten skulle de tre partnere i konsortiet sikre, at ABN AMRO Z fortsat var tilstrækkeligt kapitaliseret.
Under the CSA, the three consortium partners had to ensure that ABN AMRO Z remained sufficiently capitalised.
Den nederlandske stat foretrak den utraditionelle løsning med kapitalfrigørelsesinstrumentet i stedet for en traditionel kapitaltilførsel, idet den inden udskillelsen ikke kunne afgrænse kapitalbidrag i ABN AMRO Bank.
The Dutch State preferred the unconventional CRI-solution over a traditional capital increase since, prior to the separation, it could not ring-fence capital contributions in ABN AMRO Bank.
Eftersom ABN AMRO N med andre ord ikke var en særskilt juridisk enhed, kunne en kapitaltilførsel i ABN AMRO Bank også have været til fordel for de to andre medlemmer af konsortiet.
In other words, since ABN AMRO N was not a separate legal entity, a capital injection in ABN AMRO Bank could also have benefited the other two consortium members.
Dette handlingsforløb kunne have haft alvorlige konsekvenser, navnlig i krisescenarier.
That course of action could have had severe implications especially in scenarios of increased distress.
Da udskillelsen fandt sted blev ABN AMRO N en særskilt juridisk enhed (den nye ABN AMRO Bank).
When the separation took place, ABN AMRO N became a separate legal entity (the new ABN AMRO Bank).
Den nederlandske stat fortsatte med at bære ansvaret i henhold til aktionæroverenskomsten for at afhjælpe kapitalunderskuddet på 2,2 mia. EUR i ABN AMRO Z. Den nederlandske stat besluttede, at ABN AMRO N skulle bruge kontanter fra obligatoriske konvertible værdipapirinstrumenter (navnlig foranstaltning B3, i det omfang den vedrørte forsigtighedsmargenen på 500 mio. EUR og 1,2 mia. EUR i foranstaltning B5) til at tilføre 1,7 mia. EUR til ABN AMRO Z, samtidig med at den beholdt kapitalfrigørelsesinstrumentet i den nye ABN AMRO Bank til at dække forsigtighedsmargenen på 500 mio. EUR og integrationsomkostninger på 1,2 mia. EUR.
The Dutch State continued to bear the responsibility under the CSA to fill the EUR 2,2 billion capital shortage of ABN AMRO Z. The Dutch State decided that ABN AMRO N should use cash from MCS-instruments (namely Measure B3 insofar as it related to the prudential margin of EUR 500 million and EUR 1,2 billion of Measure B5) to inject EUR 1,7 billion in ABN AMRO Z, while it kept the CRI in place in the new ABN AMRO Bank to cover the prudential margin of EUR 500 million and the integration costs of EUR 1,2 billion.
Obligatorisk konvertibelt værdipapir til dækning af en del af kapitalunderskuddet i ABN AMRO Z (foranstaltning B1, 500 mio. EUR)
Mandatory Convertible Security to cover part of the of ABN AMRO Z capital shortfall (Measure B1, EUR 500 million)
Eftersom kapitalfrigørelsesinstrumentet ikke rakte til at dække hele kapitalunderskuddet på 2,2 mia. EUR i ABN AMRO Z, ydede den nederlandske stat ekstra kapital til ABN AMRO Bank via et obligatorisk konvertibelt værdipapir.
Since the CRI did not suffice to cover the entire EUR 2,2 billion capital shortfall of ABN AMRO Z, the Dutch State provided extra capital to ABN AMRO Bank via an MCS.
Konverteringen fandt sted til nominel værdi [59].
The conversion took place at nominal value [59].
Foranstaltningen gjorde det muligt for ABN AMRO II (ændret til ABN AMRO Bank) at bidrage med 500 mio. EUR til ABN AMRO Z.
The measure allowed ABN AMRO II (renamed ABN AMRO Bank) to contribute EUR 500 million to ABN AMRO Z.
Obligatorisk konvertibelt værdipapir til dækning af udskillelsesomkostninger (foranstaltning B2 og B3, i alt 1,08 mia. EUR)
Mandatory Convertible Security to cover separation costs (Measures B2 and B3, EUR 1,08 billion in total)
For at dække omkostningerne i forbindelse med udskillelsen af ABN AMRO N fra ABN AMRO Bank tegnede den nederlandske stat yderligere obligatoriske konvertible værdipapirer.
In order to cover costs related to the separation of ABN AMRO N from ABN AMRO Bank, the Dutch State subscribed to additional MCS.
I juli 2009 blev der anmeldt en indledende tranche på omkring 300 mio. EUR (foranstaltning B2), og den resterende del (nemlig 780 mio. EUR) blev anmeldt i januar 2010 (foranstaltning B3).
A first tranche of roughly EUR 300 million (Measure B2) was notified in July 2009, with the remainder (namely EUR 780 million) notified in January 2010 (Measure B3).
Der var behov for det fulde beløb på 1,08 mia. EUR (nemlig foranstaltning B2 og B3 samlet) for at dække følgende omkostninger:
The full amount of EUR 1,08 billion (namely Measures B2 and B3 together) was needed to cover the following costs:
480 mio. EUR i veldefinerede udskillelsesomkostninger
EUR 480 million of well-defined separation costs;
90 mio. EUR til oprettelse af en Money Market Desk og
EUR 90 million to set up a money market desk; and
500 mio. EUR til en forsigtighedsmargen.
EUR 500 million to provide for a prudential margin.
Den nederlandske stat sørgede for en yderligere opdeling af udskillelsesomkostningerne på 480 mio. EUR. De vedrørte eksponering for krydshæftelser ([0 - 200] mio. EUR), afvikling af risikofordelingsbreve ([0 - 200] mio. EUR), tilbagekøb af securitisation værdipapirer ([0 - 200] mio. EUR), overførsel fra ABN AMRO R af ABN AMRO N's kunders handelsrelaterede markedsrisiko ([0 - 200] mio. EUR), ophør af kapitalfrigørelsesinstrumenter ([0-200] mio. EUR) og diverse udskillelses- og afviklingsomkostninger ([0 - 300] mio. EUR).
The Dutch State provided a further breakdown of the separation costs of EUR 480 million. They related to cross liabilities exposure (EUR [0 - 200] million), unwinding of risk allocation letters (EUR [0 - 200] million), repurchase of securitisation notes (EUR [0 - 200] million), the transfer from ABN AMRO R of trading-related market risk of ABN AMRO N customers (EUR [0 - 200] million), discontinuation of capital relief instruments (EUR [0 - 200] million) and sundry separation and unwinding costs (EUR [0 - 300] million).
Efter udskillelsen fra moderselskabet ABN AMRO Bank havde ABN AMRO II brug for at oprette sin egen Money Market Desk, hvilket kostede 90 mio. EUR.
After the separation from its parent company ABN AMRO Bank, ABN AMRO II needed to set up a money market desk on its own, which cost EUR 90 million.
Endelig tilførte den nederlandske stat yderligere kapital på 500 mio. EUR for at sikre, at ABN AMRO N havde en vis margen over minimumslovkravene.
Finally, the Dutch State injected another EUR 500 million in capital to ensure that ABN AMRO N could operate with some margin above the minimum regulatory requirements.
Obligatorisk konvertibelt værdipapir til dækning af kapitalunderskud som følge af salget af New HBU (foranstaltning B4, 300 mio. EUR)
Mandatory Convertible Security to cover capital shortfall due to sale of New HBU (Measure B4, EUR 300 million)
FBN og ABN AMRO N kunne først fusioneres, når de fusionsproblemer, der blev identificeret i fusionsbeslutningen, var blevet løst.
FBN and ABN AMRO N could only merge once the concentration issues identified in the Merger Decision were resolved.
Den nederlandske stat besluttede derfor at sælge New HBU og IFN til Deutsche Bank.
Therefore, the Dutch State decided to sell New HBU and IFN to Deutsche Bank.
Denne transaktion medførte imidlertid et yderligere kapitalbehov på 470 mio. EUR, som ABN AMRO N ikke kunne klare selv.
That transaction resulted however in an additional capital need of EUR 470 million, which ABN AMRO N could not deal with entirely on its own.
Den nederlandske stat besluttede at hjælpe og tilførte 300 mio. EUR i form af obligatoriske konvertible værdipapirer [60].
The Dutch State decided to help and injected EUR 300 million in the form of MCS [60].
Obligatorisk konvertibelt værdipapir til dækning af integrationsomkostninger foranstaltning B5, 1,2 mia. EUR)
Mandatory Convertible Security to cover integration costs (Measure B5, EUR 1,2 billion)
For at gennemføre fusionen skulle ABN AMRO N og FBN (og efter fusionen også ABN AMRO Group) betale for direkte integrationsomkostninger på 1,2 mia. EUR (efter skat) i forbindelse med afskedigelsesomkostninger, integration af ikt-platforme og omstrukturering af filialnettet.
To implement the merger, ABN AMRO N and FBN (and after the merger ABN AMRO Group) had to pay for upfront integration costs of EUR 1,2 billion (after tax), related to redundancy costs, the integration of ICT platforms and the restructuring of the branch network.
Eftersom ABN AMRO N og FBN ikke selv kunne finansiere disse omkostninger, besluttede den nederlandske stat at tilføre kapital i form af obligatoriske konvertible værdipapirer [61].
Since ABN AMRO N and FBN were not able to finance those costs themselves, the Dutch State decided to inject capital in the form of MCS [61].
Konvertering af FBN's tier 2-hybridkapital til tier 1-kernekapital (foranstaltning C, 1,35 mia. EUR)
Conversion of FBN Tier 2 hybrid capital into core Tier 1 capital (Measure C, EUR 1,35 billion)
FBN var forpligtet til at forhøje sin tier 1-kapital, efter at DNB [62] havde anført, at der manglede tier 1-kapital på ca. 1,26 mia. EUR. Efter udskillelsen fra moderselskabet Fortis SA/NV måtte FBN endvidere bruge 90 mio. EUR til at dække omkostninger i forbindelse med oprettelsen af en Treasury Desk, Basel-relaterede modeller, licenser og konsulentydelser.
FBN was obliged to increase its Tier 1 capital after the DNB [62] had indicated that there was a Tier 1 capital shortage of approximately EUR 1,26 billion. After the separation from its parent company Fortis SA/NV, FBN also had to spend EUR 90 million to cover costs related to the set up of a treasury desk, Basel-related models, licenses and consultancy services.
Betalingsforpligtelser over for andre medlemmer af konsortiet (foranstaltning D, 740 mio. EUR)
Payment obligations towards other consortium members (Measure D, EUR 740 million)
Da medlemmerne af konsortiet i 2007 forhandlede om at overtage ABN AMRO Holding, fandt de ud af, at det ikke var alle kendsgerninger, der var kendt på dette tidspunkt.
When the consortium members negotiated the acquisition of ABN AMRO Holding in 2007, they realised that not all facts were already known at the time.
Aktionæroverenskomsten indeholdt derfor en række generelle principper til opfyldelse af visse betalingsforpligtelser, som først ville blive synlige under udskillelsesprocessen.
Therefore, the CSA contained a number of general principles to settle certain payment obligations, which would only become apparent during the separation process.
De præcise beløb skyldes en forhandlingsproces, hvori deltog den nederlandske stat (og inden da Fortis SA/NV).
The exact amounts result from a negotiating process in which the Dutch State (and Fortis SA/NV before it) participated.
Det samlede beløb på 740 mio. EUR vedrører:
The total amount of EUR 740 million relates to:
Der kompenseres delvist for disse udgående pengestrømme ved, at den nederlandske stat modtog […] fra de andre medlemmer i konsortiet i forbindelse med strandede omkostninger.
Those cash outflows are partly compensated by the fact that the Dutch State received […] from the other consortium members related to stranded costs.
Den resterende del af betalingsforpligtelserne for andre medlemmer af konsortiet (nemlig 740 mio. EUR) blev betalt kontant, dels direkte til de andre medlemmer af konsortiet, dels til ABN AMRO Bank (nu RBS NV).
The balance of the payment obligations in respect of other consortium members (namely EUR 740 million) was paid in cash, in part directly to the other consortium members and in part to ABN AMRO Bank (now RBS NV).
Krydshæftelser (foranstaltning E, 950 mio. EUR)
Cross liabilities (Measure E, EUR 950 million)
Selv efter frasalget af New HBU vil ABN AMRO Bank (nu RBS NV) og ABN AMRO II (eller dennes retssuccessor) fortsat hæfte over for kreditorerne i New HBU, hvis New HBU ikke kan opfylde sine forpligtelser over for sine egne kreditorer.
Even after the divestment of New HBU, ABN AMRO Bank (now RBS NV) and ABN AMRO II (or its legal successors) will remain liable towards creditors of New HBU if New HBU is unable to meet its obligations towards its own creditors.
Tilsvarende vil New HBU stå over for krydshæftelser i forhold til kreditorer i ABN AMRO Bank og ABN AMRO II.
Likewise New HBU will face cross liabilities towards creditors of ABN AMRO Bank and ABN AMRO II.
Eftersom krydshæftelsen havde rod i salget af New HBU, som resulterede i en beslutning fra ABN AMRO II og dennes aktionærer, var det også deres ansvar at finde en løsning.
Since the cross liabilities were rooted in the sale of New HBU which resulted from a decision of ABN AMRO II and its shareholders, it was also their responsibility to find a solution.
Den foreslåede løsning tydede på, at den nederlandske stat og Deutsche Bank (nemlig køberen af New HBU) aftalte, at New HBU og ABN AMRO II skulle skadesløsholde hinanden for denne krydshæftelse ved at stille sikkerhed for hinanden og dermed reducere de afledte lovgivningsmæssige kapitalkrav til de ønskede 20 %.
The proposed solution implied that the Dutch State and Deutsche Bank (namely the purchaser of New HBU) agreed that new HBU and ABN AMRO II would indemnify each other for those cross liabilities by providing each other collateral, so as to reduce the induced regulatory capital requirements to a desired 20 %.
Som følge af denne aftale måtte ABN AMRO II stille sikkerhed over for New HBU for et beløb på op til 950 mio. EUR (faldende over tid i takt med, at de underliggende forpligtelser forfalder) for New HBU's forpligtelser over for ABN AMRO II og over for ABN AMRO Bank (nu RBS NV).
As a result of that agreement, ABN AMRO II had to provide collateral to New HBU for an amount up to EUR 950 million (declining over time as underlying liabilities mature) for the liabilities of New HBU towards ABN AMRO II and towards ABN AMRO Bank (now RBS NV).
Eftersom ABN AMRO II ikke havde midler til at stille den fornødne sikkerhed med hensyn til forpligtelserne over for ABN AMRO Bank (nu RBS NV), stillede staten en modgaranti i form af en garanti for gælden i ABN AMRO Bank (nu RBS NV).
Since ABN AMRO II did not have the means to provide the collateral needed in respect of the liability towards ABN AMRO Bank (now RBS NV), the State provided a counter-indemnity in the form of a guarantee on the debt of ABN AMRO Bank (now RBS NV).
Den nederlandske stat prissatte denne risiko, som om den var en statsgaranti for ABN AMRO Banks (nu RBS NV) efterstillede gæld.
The Dutch State priced that risk as if it was a State guarantee on ABN AMRO Bank (now RBS NV) subordinated debt.
Prissætningen blev — på grundlag af Den Europæiske Centralbanks (»ECB's«) rekapitaliseringshenstilling [64] — fastsat til 200 basispoint plus den gennemsnitlige CDS-margen [65].
The pricing – based on the European Central Bank (‘ECB’) Recapitalisation Recommendation [64]– was set at 200 basis points plus the median CDS-spread [65].
I tabel 4 sammenfattes de foranstaltninger, der vurderes i denne afgørelse.
Table 4 summarises the measures assessed in this Decision.
Mere specifikt blev foranstaltning A anvendt fra og med denne dato for målene i foranstaltning B3 (hvad angår forsigtighedsmargenen) og foranstaltning B5 og omvendt.
More specifically, Measure A was used from that date on for the objectives of Measure B3 (insofar as it concerns the prudential margin) and Measure B5 and vice versa.
Statsstøtte-foranstaltninger
State support measures
(i mia. EUR)
(in EUR billion)
Juridisk enhed, som foranstaltningen tildeles
Legal entity to which the measure is granted
Kortfristet finansiering
ST funding
Langfristet finansiering
LT funding
FBN (for at muliggøre tilbagebetaling til Fortis Bank SA/NV)
FBN (to allow repayment to Fortis Bank SA/NV)
Overtagelse af ABN AMRO N
Acquisition of ABN AMRO N
FBN (købspris betalt via afkald på gæld)
FBN (purchase price paid by waiving debt)
Kapitalforanstaltninger anmeldt i juli 2009 og gennemført i juli/august 2009
Capital measures notified in July 2009 and implemented in July/August 2009
Kapital-frigørelses-instrument
Capital relief instrument
CDS-beskyttelse på en portefølje på 34,5 mia. EUR (med en kapital-frigørelses-virkning på 1,7 mia. EUR)
CDS-protection on a EUR 34,5 billion portfolio (having a capital relief effect of EUR 1,7 billion)
Afhjælpning af kapitalunderskud i ABN AMRO Z
Filling the capital shortage of ABN AMRO Z
ABN AMRO Bank (nu RBS NV) og flyttet til ABN AMRO II (nu ABN AMRO Bank) på udskillelses-datoen
ABN AMRO Bank (now RBS NV) and moved to ABN AMRO II (now ABN AMRO Bank) on separation date
Foranstaltning B1
Measure B1
Foranstaltning B2
Measure B2
Første tranche af udskillelses-omkostninger
First tranche of separation costs
ABN AMRO Bank NV (nu RBS NV) og flyttet til ABN AMRO II (nu ABN AMRO Bank) efter udskillelsen
ABN AMRO Bank NV (now RBS NV) and moved to ABN AMRO II (now ABN AMRO Bank on separation)
Yderligere kapitalforanstaltninger anmeldt i januar 2010
Additional capital measures notified in January 2010
Foranstaltning B3
Measure B3
Anden tranche af udskillelses-omkostninger og forsigtigheds-margen på 0,5 mia. EUR
Second tranche of separation costs and prudential margin of EUR 0,5 billion
967 mio. EUR betalt til ABN AMRO Bank (nu RBS NV) og derefter flyttet til ABN AMRO II (nu ABN AMRO Bank) efter udskillelsen, idet det resterende betales direkte til ABN AMRO II Foranstaltning B4
EUR 967 million paid to ABN AMRO Bank (now RBS NV) and then moved to ABN AMRO II (now ABN AMRO Bank) on separation, the remainder directly paid to ABN AMRO II
Kapitalvirkning af salget af New HBU
Capital impact from sale of new HBU
Foranstaltning B5
Measure B5
Integrations-omkostninger
Integration costs
Udskiftning af tier 2 til almindelig egenkapital
Exchange Tier 2 into common equity
Tier 1-underskud på FBN-niveau
Tier 1 shortage at the level of FBN
Foranstaltning D
Measure D
Kontantbetaling til partnerne i konsortiet
Cash payment to consortium partners
Betalings-forpligtelser som følge af aktionær-overenskomsten
Payment obligations resulting from the CSA
Andre partnere i konsortiet/ABN AMRO Bank (nu RBS NV)
Other consortium partners/ABN AMRO Bank (now RBS NV)
Foranstaltning E
Measure E
Garanti for forpligtelser på 950 mio. EUR
Guarantee on liabilities of EUR 950 million
Krydshæftelser som følge af salget af New HBU
Cross liabilities resulting from sale of new HBU
ABN AMRO II (nu ABN AMRO Bank)
ABN AMRO II (now ABN AMRO Bank)
INDLEDELSESÅRSAGER
GROUNDS TO OPEN
Begrundelser for at indlede proceduren i beslutningen af 8. april 2009
Grounds to open in the Decision of 8 April 2009
I beslutningen af 8. april 2009 indledte Kommissionen en sag, fordi den havde anledning til at tro, at foranstaltning Y1, Y2 og Z [66] repræsenterede statsstøtte til fordel for FBN og ABN AMRO N. Kommissionen mente, at disse foranstaltninger gjorde det muligt for FBN og ABN AMRO N at blive på markedet og videreføre deres aktiviteter.
In the Decision of 8 April 2009, the Commission opened proceedings because it had grounds to believe that Measures Y1, Y2 and Z [66] represented State aid in favour of FBN and ABN AMRO N. The Commission believed that those measures allowed FBN and ABN AMRO N to stay on the market and pursue their activities.
Den havde grund til at tro, at disse foranstaltninger var selektivt fordelagtige for FBN og ABN AMRO N.
It had reasons to believe that those measures were selectively advantageous to FBN and ABN AMRO N.
I betragtning 29 og 30 i beslutningen af 8. april 2009 bemærkede Kommissionen, at foranstaltning X, Y1 og Y2 var en del af den samme købsaftale, som havde til formål at udskille FBN fra resten af Fortis SA/NV.
In recitals 29 and 30 of the Decision of 8 April 2009, the Commission noted that Measures X, Y1 and Y2 were part of the same sale contract, which aimed at separating FBN from the rest of the Fortis SA/NV.
Allerede i beslutningen af 3. december 2008 blev det konkluderet, at den nederlandske stat ved at indgå i aftalen af 3. oktober 2008 ikke havde optrådt som en normal investor i en markedsøkonomi.
The Decision of 3 December 2008 already concluded that by entering in that contract on 3 October 2008, the Dutch State had not acted as a normal investor in a market economy.
I betragtning 33 i beslutningen af 8. april 2009 anførte Kommissionen, at foranstaltning Y1 tilsyneladende var fordelagtig for FBN, eftersom den havde modtaget et finansieringsbeløb, som den ikke kunne have fundet på markederne, da markederne på dette tidspunkt var i fuldstændig opløsning.
In recital 33 of the Decision of 8 April 2009, the Commission argued that Measure Y1 was apparently advantageous to FBN as it had received an amount of funding, which it could not have found on the markets, the markets being at the time in complete disarray.