natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Formålet med lånet, som Renault fik i april 2009, var at finansiere virksomhedens generelle likviditetsbehov, fordi finansmarkederne frøs til i fjerde kvartal af 2008 og første kvartal af 2009.
The object of the loan granted to it in April 2009 was to finance the general needs of the undertaking arising from the contraction in the financial markets during the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009.
I øvrigt var Renaults optagelse i FMEA begrundet i både økonomi, erhvervsmæssige hensyn og finansielle forhold. Det er nemlig strategisk og finansielt nødvendigt for Renault at konsolidere sine forsyninger på langt sigt ved at støtte sig til sunde og konkurrencedygtige leverandører og samtidig forvente et afkast af sine finansielle investeringer.
Furthermore, Renault’s subscription to the FMEA was justified for economic, industrial and financial reasons: it is in fact strategically and financially essential for Renault to consolidate its supply on a permanent basis by relying on sound, competitive suppliers, while at the same time expecting a return on its financial investment.
FMEA tillader således Renault at investere i virksomheder, der er uundværlige for branchen som selskabet Trèves, der fortsat er en væsentlig leverandør til den europæiske bilindustri.
The FMEA in this way enables Renault to invest in undertakings which are absolutely essential for the sector, such as Trèves, which remains a key supplier for the European motor vehicle industry.
Derfor følger FMEA i sine investeringer samme taktik som Renault, der er en fornuftig investor, der arbejder under markedsøkonomiske vilkår.
Consequently, the FMEA interventions follow the same approach as that adopted by Renault, which is itself a prudent investor operating in a market economy.
Endelig deler selskabet Renault uforbeholdent de synspunkter, som FMEA fremsætter i sit svar på Kommissionens beslutning om at indlede en formel undersøgelsesprocedure, vedrørende sin rolle i forvaltningen af FMEA, dennes funktionsmåde og selvbestemmelse og dens forvaltningsselskabs selvbestemmelse i forhold til de offentlige myndigheder.
Finally, Renault unreservedly endorses the FMEA’s comments, presented in response to the Commission’s decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure, on its role in the governance of the FMEA, how the FMEA operates, its autonomy and that of its management company in relation to the public authorities.
Peugeot-koncernen
The Peugeot group
Ved brev af 6. juli 2010 sendte PSA sine bemærkninger til Kommissionen.
PSA forwarded its comments to the Commission by letter dated 6 July 2010.
Ifølge PSA er FMEA's investering i selskabet Trèves ikke kun rentabel, men modsvarer også dens økonomiske og strategiske interesser.
According to PSA, the FMEA investment in Trèves is not only profitable, but also in keeping with its economic and strategic interests.
PSA's medlemskab af FMEA skyldes, at bilfabrikanten og fonden begge ønsker at investere i strategiske virksomheder med stor innovationskapacitet, som er i stand til at sikre forsyningssikkerheden og konsolidere leverandørerne til bilindustrien på optimal vis.
PSA’s participation in the FMEA is part of the joint wish of the manufacturer and the Fund to invest in strategic undertakings with strong innovative capacity, capable of ensuring security of supply and optimum consolidation of the automobile parts manufacturers sector.
I øvrigt mener PSA, at FMEA's investering opfylder dens krav til rentabilitet set ud fra risikoen.
Furthermore, PSA considers that the FMEA investment meets its profitability requirements in the light of the risk assumed.
Endelig fastholder PSA, at beslutningen om at gå med i FMEA ikke var betinget af indgåelsen af en låneaftale om 3 mia. EUR mellem den franske stat og bilfabrikanten i marts 2009 eller omvendt.
Finally, PSA emphasises the lack of conditionality between its decision to participate in the FMEA and the conclusion of a loan agreement for EUR 3 billion between the French State and the manufacturer in March 2009.
En konkurrent til Trèves
One of Trèves’ competitors
Ved brev af 23. juni 2010 sendte en konkurrent til Trèves, som ønsker at være anonym, sine bemærkninger til Kommissionen.
By letter dated 23 June 2010, one of Trèves’ competitors, which wishes to remain anonymous, forwarded its comments to the Commission.
I øvrigt skal den statsstøtte, som Trèves eventuelt kunne få uanset sin økonomiske situation, være ledsaget af omfattende kompenserende foranstaltninger på grund af de meget mærkbare negative virkninger for konkurrencen.
Moreover, irrespective of Trèves’ economic situation, the State aid from which it could benefit must be accompanied by substantial compensatory measures, on account of the very significant negative effects on competition.
Så at give statsstøtte med det ene formål at holde en virksomhed kunstigt i live i en sektor med strukturel overkapacitet på langt sigt er ikke berettiget.
In fact aid with the sole aim of maintaining an undertaking artificially in existence in a sector experiencing long-term structural overcapacity is unjustified.
Konkurrenten mener, at selskabet Trèves burde være forpligtet til at begrænse sin tilstedeværelse på markederne ved at sælge sine datterselskaber eller reducere sine aktiviteter drastisk og bidrage mere med egne midler til sin omstrukturering.
It considers that Trèves should be obliged to limit its presence on the markets by selling subsidiaries or by reducing its activities drastically and contributing more from its own resources to its restructuring.
Ved brev af 15. juni 2010 sendte det italienske ministerium for økonomisk udvikling sine bemærkninger til Kommissionen.
The Italian Ministry of Economic Development forwarded its comments to the Commission by letter dated 15 June 2010.
Det erklærer sig enigt i Kommissionens »argumenter« [14] på to grundlæggende punkter, nemlig at FMEA's investering uden tvivl udgør statsstøtte på grund af den afgørende tilstedeværelse af offentlige midler, og at denne type støtte er beregnet til at understøtte virksomheder, der indtil andet kvartal af 2008 havde vanskeligheder ifølge retningslinjerne.
It endorses the Commission’s ‘arguments’ [14] on two fundamental points: the FMEA investment is undoubtedly State aid on account of the decisive presence of public funds and this type of aid is intended to support undertakings which, before the second quarter of 2008, were encountering difficulties within the meaning of the guidelines.
Ved brev af 25. marts 2010 sendte de franske myndigheder deres bemærkninger til Kommissionen efter indledningen af den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure, som blev besluttet den 29. januar 2010.
By letter dated 25 March 2010, the French authorities forwarded their comments to the Commission in response to the initiation of the formal investigation procedure on 29 January 2010.
Ifølge de franske myndigheder falder de nærmere bestemmelser og betingelser for FMEA's investering i selskabet Trèves ikke ind under EUF-traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, idet investeringen ikke er foretaget for statens midler, men for midler, der hovedsagelig er private og ikke kan tilskrives staten.
In their opinion, the terms and conditions of the FMEA investment in Trèves do not fall within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU, as the investment was not financed by state resources, but by funds of predominantly private origin and not imputable to the State.
Hvis FMEA's midler alligevel kunne betragtes som statslige midler, eller investeringsbeslutningen kunne tilskrives staten, mener de franske myndigheder, at denne investering har alle de karakteristika, der gælder for en fornuftig investering under markedsøkonomiske vilkår.
Even if the FMEA resources were to be considered state resources or the investment decision were to be imputable to the State, the French authorities consider that this investment displays all the characteristics of a prudent investment in a market economy.
I øvrigt mener de ligeledes, at omlægningen af skatterestancer og sociale restancer, som de offentlige kreditorer har indrømmet selskabet, opfylder kriterierne for en privat kreditor, der forsøger at inddrive de beløb, han har til gode.
Furthermore, they also consider that the rescheduling of the tax and social security debt authorised by the public creditors meets the criteria of the private creditor seeking to recover the sums due to it.
De franske myndigheder hævder, at FMEA's investering på ingen måde har at gøre med overførsel af statslige midler i henhold til retspraksis i sagen »Stardust Marine« [15].
The French authorities point out that the FMEA investment in no way involved the transfer of state resources within the meaning of the ‘Stardust Marine’ case-law [15].
FMEA's midler er, for så vidt angår bilfabrikanterne PSA og Renault (2/3), rent private midler og, for så vidt angår FSI's andel (1/3), midler, som ikke er underlagt statens faste kontrol, om end de oprindelig er offentlige.
Concerning the share of the manufacturers PSA and Renault (2/3), the FMEA funds are purely private; concerning the share of the FSI (1/3), these funds, although public in origin, are not under the permanent control of the State.
FSI, der bygger på samme model som et privat investeringsselskab, er stiftet i form af et aktieselskab i konkurrence med andre private investeringsselskaber.
The FSI, created according to the private investment fund model, is constituted in the form of a joint stock company (société anonyme) in competition with other private investment funds.
FSI foretager langsigtede investeringer med rentabilitet for øje.
It makes long-term investments with profitability as their objective.
I øvrigt hører FMEA's forvaltningsselskab CDC Entreprises i kraft af sine vedtægter og sin funktionsmåde ikke ind under de offentlige myndigheder.
Furthermore, on account of its status and operating procedures, the FMEA management company, CDC Entreprises, is not under the surveillance of the public authorities.
Ifølge sine vedtægter er selskabet juridisk uafhængigt af CDC og investerer udelukkende til gavn for sine investorer i konkurrence eller sammen med private investorer.
On account of its status, it is legally independent of the CDC and invests for the exclusive benefit of its subscribers, in competition or together with private investors.
CDC Entreprises er således en fuldstændig uafhængig forvalter af FMEA's midler.
CDC Entreprises therefore manages FMEA’s funds entirely independently.
Med hensyn til investeringen i Trèves har den fulgt anbefalingerne fra FMEA's udvælgelsesudvalg og investeringsudvalg uden nogen indblanding fra staten.
As regards the investment in Trèves, it followed the FMEA selection and investment committee recommendations without any state intervention.
Derfor konkluderer de franske myndigheder dels, at de investerede midler ikke er statslige, idet de ikke konstant er underlagt offentlig kontrol og dermed til rådighed for nationale myndigheder, dels at beslutningen om at investere ikke kan tilskrives staten, idet CDC Entreprises udelukkende handler i FMEA's investorers interesse og i fuld uafhængighed.
Consequently, the French authorities conclude on the one hand that the resources invested are not state resources in so far as they are not constantly under public control and therefore available to the national authorities and, on the other hand, that the decision to invest is not imputable to the State as CDC Entreprises is acting only in the exclusive interest of the FMEA subscribers and totally independently.
For så vidt angår FMEA's investerings overholdelse af princippet om en fornuftig investors handlemåde under markedsøkonomiske vilkår, minder de franske myndigheder om, at FMEA's investeringspolitik begunstiger rentable projekter, der er strategiske for bilindustrien og har et stærkt vækstpotentiale og stor innovationskapacitet.
As regards the conformity of the FMEA investment with the principle of the prudent investor operating in a market economy, the French authorities recall that FMEA’s investment policy gives preference to viable projects of strategic interest to the motor vehicle sector, with strong growth and strong innovative capacity.
I Trèves's tilfælde er investeringen foretaget på basis af en realistisk og stram forretningsplan, der er kontrolleret af flere private analytikere.
In the case of Trèves, the investment was made on the basis of a realistic, rigorous business plan, validated by several private analysts.
Og FMEA erhvervede kapitalandele i Trèves's egenkapital og tegnede ORAPA samtidig med andre private investorer og på de samme vilkår (investeringer på lige fod).
In addition, the acquisition of the FMEA’s participating interest in Trèves’ capital and the subscription to convertible bonds with adjustable parity occurred at the same time as other private investments and under the same conditions (‘pari passu’ investments).
Ifølge de franske myndigheder er disse elementer tilstrækkelige til at fastslå investeringens overensstemmelse med praksis for markedet.
According to the French authorities, these factors are sufficient to establish that the investment is in conformity with market practices.
Hvad angår anvendelsen af kriteriet om en privat kreditors adfærd under markedsøkonomiske forhold, vurderer de franske myndigheder, at planen for omlægning af skatterestancer og sociale restancer, der blev indrømmet Trèves, er tro mod tanken bag anvendelsen af dette kriterium, nemlig at den offentlige kreditor i lighed med den private skal forsøge at inddrive de beløb, de har til gode hos en debitor i finansielle vanskeligheder.
As regards the application of the principle of the private creditor operating in a market economy, the French authorities consider that authorisation of Trèves’ tax and social security debt rescheduling plan is in keeping with the idea underlying the application of this criterion, i.e. that the public creditor, like the private creditor, must seek to recover the sums due to it by a debtor experiencing financial difficulties.
De franske myndigheder præciserer først og fremmest, at Trèves-koncernen hverken har fået eftergivet skatterestancer eller sociale restancer.
The French authorities specify firstly that no remission of tax or social security debts was granted to the Trèves group.
De mener, at de to grundlæggende elementer, det gør det muligt at vurdere kriteriet om den private kreditor, nemlig forekomsten af bøder og morarenter og den anvendte rente, er opfyldt i det foreliggende tilfælde.
They consider that the two basic elements allowing the assessment of the private creditor principle, i.e. the presence of penalties and supplements for late payment and the interest rate charged, are observed in this case.
Faktisk rummer omlægningsplanen morarenter og bøder, der er fastsat forud for tilsagnet om planen, og de indgår i beregningen af de månedlige beløb, som Trèves skal betale.
In fact, the rescheduling plan provides for interest and penalties for late payment, defined prior to the agreement on the rescheduling plan and taken into account in the calculation of the monthly instalments payable by Trèves.
Dette er i øvrigt i overensstemmelse med artikel 1153 i den franske civillov (code civil), hvorefter forsinkelse af betaling af et skyldigt beløb til en privat kreditor i mangel af kontraktvilkår straffes med morarenter til den lovbestemte rente.
Furthermore, this is in accordance with Article 1153 of the Civil Code, which provides that, in the absence of a contractual term, lateness in payment of a sum due to a private creditor gives rise to the imposition of the payment of interest on arrears at the statutory rate.
Subsidiært minder de franske myndigheder om, at også de banker, der ydede lån til Trèves-koncernen, tilbød en omlægning af deres egne passiver i form af et konsolideringslån — samtidig med planen for omlægning af skatterestancer og sociale restancer.
In the alternative, the French authorities recall that, at the same time as the tax and social security debt rescheduling plan, the lending banks of the Trèves group granted a rescheduling of their own liabilities through a consolidation loan.
Trèves's private kreditorer har således også givet betalingslettelser for at sikre tilbagebetalingen af deres fordringer.
Trèves’ private creditors therefore also granted payment facilities to ensure the repayment of their claims.
De franske myndigheder konstaterer for det første, at hovedparten af de fremsendte bemærkninger bekræfter, at FMEA's investering i selskabet Trèves ikke kan betegnes som statsstøtte.
The French authorities find firstly that the majority of the comments received confirm that the FMEA investment in Trèves cannot be categorised as State aid.
Derfor vil de franske myndigheder ikke kommentere disse bemærkninger yderligere.
Consequently, the French authorities will make no further comments on this subject.
Derimod ønsker de franske myndigheder, for så vidt angår bemærkningerne fra de italienske myndigheder og det anonyme selskab, der præsenterer sig som en konkurrent til Trèves, at sende Kommissionen følgende bemærkninger:
On the other hand, concerning the comments presented by the Italian authorities and the anonymous company presenting itself as one of Trèves’ competitors, the French authorities wish to communicate the following comments to the Commission.
De franske myndigheder konstaterer, at de italienske myndigheder nøjes med at hævde, at FMEA's investering i selskabet Trèves bør betegnes som statsstøtte på grund af den »afgørende rolle«, som de offentlige midler spiller heri.
The French authorities find that the Italian authorities confine themselves to asserting that the FMEA investment in Trèves must be categorised as State aid on account of the ‘decisive role’ played by public resources.
De påviser eller begrunder ikke på nogen måde deres påstand.
This assertion is not substantiated by any demonstration or justification.
De franske myndigheder mener desuden, at det konkurrerende selskab ligeledes formoder uden at påvise det, at der er tale om statsstøtte, som ville være uforenelig med retningslinjerne og med den midlertidige ramme, som Kommissionen vedtog i december 2008 i forbindelse med den økonomiske krise og finanskrisen.
Still according to the French authorities, the company competing with Trèves also presumes, without proving it, the existence of State aid which would be incompatible with the guidelines and with the temporary framework adopted by the Commission in December 2008 in the context of the economic and financial crisis.
De elementer, som dette selskab støtter sig til, er enten unøjagtige eller taget ud af deres sammenhæng og dermed genstand for en fejlagtig eller delvis fortolkning.
The factors relied upon by this company are either entirely inaccurate or taken out of context and therefore interpreted in an erroneous and biased manner.
V. VURDERING AF DE UNDERSØGTE FORANSTALTNINGER
V. ASSESSMENT OF THE MEASURES UNDER INVESTIGATION
Når Kommissionen undersøger en national foranstaltning, skal den først undersøge, om foranstaltningen kan betegnes som statsstøtte efter artikel 107, stk. 1, i TEUF.
When the Commission investigates a national measure, it must first examine whether this measure can be categorised as State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
Når det er fastslået, kan Kommissionen vurdere, i hvilket omfang foranstaltningen kan betragtes som forenelig med det indre marked på grundlag af de undtagelser fra princippet om forbud mod statsstøtte, som er tilladt ifølge TEUF.
Once this categorisation has been established, the Commission can then assess the extent to which this measure can be considered compatible with the common market on the basis of the derogations permitted by the TFEU to the principle of prohibition of State aid.
Hvis den undersøgte foranstaltning ikke udgør statsstøtte, er der ikke anledning til at undersøge dens forenelighed.
If the measure under investigation does not constitute State aid, the examination of the compatibility of the aid is not applicable.
Vurdering af, om der er tale om statsstøtte i henhold til EUF-traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1
Evaluation of the presence of State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU
Efter EUF-traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, »er statsstøtte eller støtte, som ydes ved hjælp af statsmidler under enhver tænkelig form, og som fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene ved at begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner, uforenelig med det indre marked, i det omfang den påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne«.
Article 107(1) of the TFEU provides that: ‘any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.’
I denne bestemmelse nævnes de kriterier, ifølge hvilke en national foranstaltning kan betegnes som statsstøtte.
This provision mentions the criteria according to which a national measure can be categorised as State aid.
Som Domstolen minder om i sin dom af 15. juni 2006, er disse kriterier »en sådan foranstaltnings finansiering af staten eller ved hjælp af statsmidler, tilstedeværelsen af en fordel for en virksomhed, den nævnte foranstaltnings selektivitet samt foranstaltningens indvirkning på samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne og den konkurrenceforvridning, der følger heraf« [16].
As the Court of Justice recalls in its judgment of 15 June 2006, these criteria are ‘the financing of that measure by the State or through State resources, the existence of a benefit for an undertaking, the selective nature of the said measure, and its effect on trade between Member States and the distortion of competition resulting therefrom’ [16].
Disse kriterier er kumulative og skal således alle være opfyldt, for at en foranstaltning kan betegnes som statsstøtte.
These criteria are cumulative and must therefore all be satisfied in order for it to be possible to categorise a measure as State aid.
Så snart Kommissionen fastslår, at et af kriterierne ikke er opfyldt, kan den derefter med sikkerhed fastslå, at den undersøgte foranstaltning ikke udgør statsstøtte efter EUF-traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1.
Consequently, as soon as the Commission establishes that one of these criteria is not satisfied, it can assert with certainty that the measure under investigation does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
FMEA's investering på 55 mio. EUR
The FMEA investment of EUR 55 million
Med hensyn til FMEA's investering i Trèves på 55 mio. EUR skal det først og fremmest verificeres, at kriteriet om fordel er opfyldt.
As regards the FMEA investment in Trèves amounting to EUR 55 million, it should first be verified whether the criterion of benefit is met.
Ifølge fast retspraksis [17] udgør indskud af kapital i en virksomhed ikke statsstøtte, hvis dette indskud foretages under omstændigheder, som ville være acceptable for en privat investor, der arbejder under sædvanlige markedsøkonomiske vilkår (»det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip«).
According to settled case-law [17], a contribution of funds to an undertaking does not constitute State aid if this contribution is made in circumstances which would be acceptable for a private investor operating in the normal conditions of a market economy (‘criterion of private investor operating in a market economy’).
Hvis man i den forbindelse forestiller sig, at FMEA sælger sin andel i Trèves i løbet af 2012, er den interne rente (»TRI«), som FMEA beregner af sin investering, [> 12 %] pro anno.
In this respect, assuming that the FMEA will sell its participating interest in Trèves during 2012, the internal rate of return (‘IRR’) calculated by the FMEA on the basis of its investment is [> 12 %] per year.
Denne rente udgør rentabiliteten før skat af hele FMEA's investering, dvs. dels det direkte kapitalindskud på [5-15] mio. EUR, dels de [40-50] mio. EUR, der blev tilført i form af konvertible obligationer (ORAPA).
This rate represents the pre-tax rate of return on the entire FMEA investment, i.e. both the direct capital injection of EUR [5-15] million and the contribution in the form of debt securities giving access to capital (convertible bonds with adjustable parity) amounting to EUR [40-50] million.