natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Disse data synes at afkræfte Crédit Mutuels påstand om, at banken var tvunget til at opretholde en stærk tilstedeværelse i landdistrikterne i 1990'erne.
These figures appear to refute Crédit Mutuel’s allegations that it was obliged to maintain a large number of branches in rural areas in the 1990s.
Tallene viser også, at Crédit Mutuel er i stand til at opretholde et særdeles tæt netværk, også efter at alle former for kontrol fra myndighedernes side er ophørt.
They also tend to show that Crédit Mutuel is capable of maintaining an exceptionally dense network of branches even after the removal of all controls by the authorities.
AFB sendte den 4. juni 1998 en skrivelse til Kommissionen, hvor man hævdede, at vederlaget på 1,3 % af indeståendet på Livret Bleu, der var centraliseret hos CDC, var ansat for højt, da Caisses d'Épargne og la Poste i samme periode fra CDC fik hhv. 1,2 % og 1,5 % af indskud på Livret A, der også var centraliseret hos CDC.
On 4 June 1998 the AFB sent the Commission a letter stating that the commission of 1,3 % on Livret bleu deposits centralised with the CDC was excessive given that, at the same time, the Caisses d’Épargne and la Poste received 1,2 % and 1,5 % respectively on Livret A savings, which were also held centrally by the CDC.
AFB anførte i brevet, at man i 1997 havde tilbudt de franske myndigheder at forestå modtagelsen af indskud på Livret Bleu mod en provision på kun 1 %, men myndighederne reagerede ikke på dette tilbud.
The AFB pointed out in this letter that it proposed to the French authorities in 1997 that it would ensure the collection of Livret bleu deposits for a charge of only 1 %, but that the Government had not replied to this offer.
AFB fremhævede bl.a., at det franske parlamentsmedlem Raymond Douyère i sin rapport fra april 1998 om moderniseringen af Caisses d'Épargne påpegede, at omkostningerne ved modtagelse af indskud på opsparingsordninger for en gennemsnitssparekasse som Caisse d'Épargne de Bourgogne er 0,96 % af indeståendet, og at der ikke var nogen begrundelse for, at Crédit Mutuel skulle have større administrationsomkostninger.
The AFB underlined in particular that the April 1998 report by Mr Douyère, a member of parliament, on the modernisation of the Caisses d’épargne indicated that the cost of collecting savings for an average Caisse d’épargne such as that of Burgundy was 0,96 % of its total funds, and that there was no reason why Crédit Mutuel’s management costs should be higher.
En redegørelse fra Cabinet Glais fra august 2000, fremsendt på foranledning af AFB, indeholder en række statistiske oplysninger vedrørende den konkurrencemæssige fordel, som enedistributionsretten til Livret Bleu giver Crédit Mutuel.
A memorandum produced by the Glais consultancy dated August 2000, submitted at the request of the AFB, contains statistics concerning the competitive advantage thought to be enjoyed by Crédit Mutuel as a result of the exclusive rights to distribute the Livret bleu.
Eksperten fra Cabinet Glais udleder heraf, at »Livret Bleu-effekten således synes at have tiltrukket kunder til banken, og fra midten af 1980'erne synes denne positive effekt at være fortsat, uden at indlånene er steget. Det er de oprindelige loyale kunder, som tilsyneladende har skabt grundlaget for Crédit Mutuels ekspansionsstrategi i den følgende periode«.
The Glais consultancy expert deduced that ‘the Livret bleu effect therefore seems to have worked by attracting customers and, from the mid-1980s, the positive effect seems to have continued without an increase in deposits. Thus the customers who remained loyal appear to have been the ones who financed Crédit Mutuel’s expansionist strategy from that period on’.
Eksperten bemærkede endvidere, at Crédit Mutuels aktivitet (primært udlånsvirksomhed) tilsyneladende ikke havde fulgt den normale udvikling på bankmarkedet, og det påviser han ved bl.a. at konstruere en indikator for tilfældige økonomiske rystelsers længerevarende effekt på aktivitetsvariablerne og opstille en simpel ligning for låneefterspørgslen.
The expert concluded that Crédit Mutuel’s (essentially credit) activities appear to have been unrelated to average developments in the banking market, notably on the basis of an indicator of the persistence of random economic shocks on activity variables and by creating a model based on a simple credit-demand equation.
Ifølge eksperten er den logiske forklaring på dette fænomen, at Crédit Mutuels kunder er mere loyale — f.eks. på grund af Livret Bleu-ordningen — end de andre storbankers kunder.
The expert explains this phenomenon by the fact that Crédit Mutuel’s customers remain much more loyal than those of other banking networks, for example because of the Livret bleu.
Den anden redegørelse fra Cabinet Glais (fra december 2000) indeholder en ny økonometrisk analyse af kundernes binding til de enkelte storbanker.
In a second memorandum (December 2000), the Glais consultancy proposed a new econometric analysis of the degree of loyalty of each set of customers to each banking network.
Disse resultater bekræfter ifølge eksperten formodningen om, at Crédit Mutuel og Caisses d'Épargne har langt bedre mulighed for at sikre deres kunders loyalitet end de øvrige storbanker.
According to the expert, the figures corroborate the hypothesis that Crédit Mutuel and Caisses d’Épargne have much better means of retaining their customers’ loyalty than other banks.
Men det er umuligt at afgøre, hvorvidt det er distributionen af en skattebegunstiget opsparingsordning eller det tætte net af afdelinger i de forskellige regioner (begge banker råder over begge dele), der ligger til grund for deres kunders større loyalitet.
But it is impossible to determine whether the offer of a tax-free savings account or the use of a dense network of branches in different regions (two instruments shared by these networks) is the reason for the greater customer loyalty.
Endelig påstår Association des Victimes du Crédit Mutuel i sin klage af 19. september 2006, at der er tale om »tilvendelse af offentlig opsparing med henblik på private og kommercielle formål […] på bekostning af sparerne og den franske økonomi«, men denne påstand understøttes ikke af dokumentation eller beviser for en eventuel ulovlig statsstøtte.
Finally, the complaint by the Association of Victims of Crédit Mutuel dated 19 September 2006 contains a simple allegation of ‘diversion of public savings for private and commercial ends […] to the detriment of savers and of the French economy’, which is not backed up by any serious arguments or evidence relating to potential unlawful State aid.
Som reaktion på offentliggørelsen af meddelelsen om at indlede den foreliggende procedure den 6. februar 1998 har Kommissionen modtaget bemærkninger fra en lang række interesserede parter.
Following the publication of the opening Decision of 6 February 1998, the Commission received comments from numerous third parties.
Nogle af Crédit Mutuels konkurrenter informerede om den skade, de mener at have lidt på grund af Crédit Mutuels enedistributionsret til Livret Bleu.
Some of Crédit Mutuel’s competitors cited the damage they had suffered as a result of exclusive distribution rights for the Livret bleu being granted to Crédit Mutuel.
Hovedparten af bankerne var af den opfattelse, at Livret Bleus »lokkevareeffekt« betød, at de mistede kunder, som blev tiltrukket af Livret Bleu, og bankerne ønskede derfor enedistributionsretten ophævet.
These banks generally argued that the Livret bleu generated a pull factor making them lose clients to Crédit Mutuel and they wanted to see the end of this exclusive right.
Sådanne bemærkninger er indkommet til Kommissionen fra følgende banker:
The following establishments sent comments to this effect to the Commission:
Ud over de bemærkninger til forsvar for Crédit Mutuel, for hvilke der redegøres i afsnit 4, har Kommissionen modtaget bemærkninger fra følgende tredjeparter til fordel for Livret Bleu-ordningen:
At the same time, in addition to the comments in defence of Crédit Mutuel, presented in Section 4, the Commission received comments from the following third parties which were in favour of the Livret bleu vehicle:
Bertholet, medlem af Nationalforsamlingen, valgt i Drôme
Mr Bertholet, MP (Drôme Department)
Blondel, medlem af Conseil Général i Nord
Mr Blondel, Member of the General Council of the Nord Department
Cabot, direktør for Centre Régional Information Jeunesse de Toulouse
Mr Cabot, Director of the Regional Youth Information Centre of Toulouse
Cormorèche, borgmester i Montuel
Mr Cormorèche, Mayor of Montluel
Cornelis, medlem af Conseil Général Nord
Mr Cornelis, Member of the General Council of the Nord Department
Chavannes, borgmester i Angoulême
Mr Chavannes, Mayor of Angoulême
Crépeau, medlem af Nationalforsamlingen, valgt i Charente-Maritime
Mr Crépeau, MP (Charente Maritime Department)
Debavelaere, medlem af Nationalforsamlingen, valgt i Charente-Maritime
Mr Debavelaere, Senator (Pas-de-Calais Department)
Decool, borgmester i Brouckerque
Mr Decool, Mayor of Brouckerque
Delevoye, medlem af Nationalforsamlingen, valgt i Pas-de-Calais
Mr Delevoye, Senator (Pas-de-Calais Department)
Delnatte, medlem af Nationalforsamlingen, valgt i Nord
Mr Delnatte, MP (Nord Department)
Dolez, medlem af Nationalforsamlingen, valgt i Nord
Mr Dolez, MP (Nord Department)
Ewald, regional delegeret for Association pour le Droit à l'Initiative Économique
Mr Ewald, Regional Delegate of the Association pour le Droit à l’Initiative Economique
Fronton, Union départementale des associations familiales de Haute-Garonne
Mr Fronton, Union Départementale des Associations Familiales de Haute-Garonne
Foy, medlem af Nationalforsamlingen, valgt i Nord
Mr Foy, Senator (Nord Department)
Galiègue, formand for Caisse de Crédit Mutuel de Solesmes
Mr Galiègue, President of the Solesmes Caisse de Crédit Mutuel
Gournay, borgmester i Caestre
Ms Gournay, Mayor of Caëstre
Armelle Guinebertière, medlem af Europa-Parlamentet
Ms Armelle Guinebertière, Member of the European Parliament
Hervé, borgmester i Rennes
Mr Hervé, Mayor of Rennes
Humez, formand for Comité départemental de lutte contre la mucoviscidose du Pas-de-Calais
Mr Humez, President of the Pas-de-Calais Comité départemental de lutte contre la mucoviscidose
Ingelaere, formand for Flandr'action
Ms Ingelaere, President of Flandr’action
Juppé, medlem af Nationalforsamlingen, borgmester i Bordeaux
Mr Juppé, Mayor of and MP for Bordeaux
Lapalu, formand for association Animation et gestion d'organismes privés
Mr Lapalu, President of the Association Animation et Gestion d’Organismes Privés
Lazaro, medlem af Nationalforsamlingen, valgt i Nord
Mr Lazaro, MP (Nord Department)
Lebreton, formand for Conseil général des Côtes d'Armor
Mr Lebreton, President of the General Council of Côtes d’Armor Department
Ledieu, borgmester i Cateau-Cambrésis
Mr Ledieu, Mayor of Le Cateau-Cambrésis
Leleu, bestyrer i Crédit Mutuel Nord
Mr Leleu, Director of Crédit Mutuel Nord
Maille, formand for Communauté urbaine de Brest
Mr Maille, President of the Brest urban area
Masclet, medlem af Conseil Régional i Nord-Pas-de-Calais
Mr Masclet, Member of the Nord-Pas-de-Calais Regional Council
Méhaignerie, formand for Conseil général d'Ille-et-Villaine
Mr Méhaignerie, President of the General Council of the Ille et Vilaine Department
Mio, medlem af Conseil Régional i Nord-Pas-de-Calais
Mr Mio, Member of the Nord-Pas-de-Calais Regional Council
Novak, formand for Association pour le droit à l'initiative économique
Ms Novak, President of the Association pour le Droit à l’Initiative Economique
Permuy, medlem af Conseil Régional du Nord-Pas-de-Calais
Ms Permuy, Member of the Nord-Pas-de-Calais Regional Council
Albert Rivaux, medlem af Conseil Régional i Pas-de-Calais
Mr Albert Rivaux, Member of the General Council of the Pas-de-Calais Department
de Rohan, formand for Conseil Régional i Bretagne
Mr de Rohan, President of the Brittany Regional Council
Valla, medlem af Conseil Général i Ardèche
Mr Valla, Member of the General Council of the Ardèche Department
Vanlerenberghe, borgmester i Arras
Mr Vanlerenberghe, Mayor of Arras
Villain, borgmester i Cambrai
Mr Villain, Mayor of Cambrai
de Villiers, medlem af Nationalforsamlingen, valgt i Vendée.
Mr de Villiers, MP (Vendée Department).
Langt størsteparten af disse tredjeparter har fremhævet Crédit Mutuels store betydning, navnlig på regionalt plan, for finansieringen af almennyttige formål, især foreninger, der arbejder uden gevinst for øje.
The vast majority of third parties underlined the role played by Crédit Mutuel, particularly at regional level, in financing the social economy, especially non-profit-making organisations.
De har ligeledes fremhævet Crédit Mutuels funktion som finansielt holdepunkt for den jævne befolkning, hvorfra en stor del af kunderne kommer.
They also stressed the supporting role it plays with respect to people in lower income groups, from which a large part of its customers come.
Flere lokale folkevalgte har understreget, at Crédit Mutuel har stor betydning for oprettelsen af nye virksomheder og arbejdspladser og udviklingen af lokale initiativer i samarbejde med de lokale forvaltninger.
Several local elected representatives emphasised Crédit Mutuel’s role in setting up undertakings and creating jobs, and in developing local initiatives in conjunction with the local authorities.
Andre har givet udtryk for, at Crédit Mutuel med sine decentrale strukturer bedre kan imødekomme lokale behov end de mere centraliserede pengeinstitutter og dermed bedre sikre en afbalanceret egnsudvikling.
Others considered that because of its decentralised structures, Crédit Mutuel was better able than centralised institutions to meet local needs and respond to the requirement of balanced regional development.
CRÉDIT MUTUELS BEMÆRKNINGER
CRÉDIT MUTUEL’S COMMENTS
Crédit Mutuel bebrejder Kommissionen den yderst langvarige sagsbehandling.
Crédit Mutuel criticises the Commission for having taken a particularly long time in dealing with the case.
Ifølge Crédit Mutuel vedrørte Rettens dom ikke kun en begrundelsesmangel, men indeholdt også en kritik af Kommissionens begrundelse, som denne ikke skulle have taget hensyn til i sin beslutning om udvidelse, navnlig vedrørende beregningen af den eventuelle overkompensation.
Furthermore, according to Crédit Mutuel, the judgment by the Court of First Instance, in addition to stressing the failure to state valid grounds, contained criticism of the argument presented by the Commission, which was not taken into account in the extension Decision, in particular as far as the calculation of any overcompensation was concerned.
Crédit Mutuel bebrejder Kommissionen, at den har sammenlagt de positive årsresultater uden fradrag af negative årsresultater, hvilket strider mod den metode, der anbefales i rammebestemmelserne for statsstøtte af kompensation for offentlig tjeneste (i det følgende »rammebestemmelserne fra 2005«) [23].
In this respect, Crédit Mutuel accuses the Commission of adding together the positive full-year amounts without deducting the figure for the negative full-year amounts, contrary to the method put forward in the Community framework for State aid in the form of public service compensation (hereafter ‘the 2005 Community framework’) [23].
Ifølge banken opfylder provisionen de fire betingelser i Altmark-dommen:
According to the bank, the brokerage commission fulfils the four conditions of the Altmark case-law:
Med hensyn til den første betingelse skulle Crédit Mutuel udføre to opgaver af almindelig økonomisk interesse, nemlig dels opretholdelse af et betydeligt antal afdelinger i landdistrikter af egnsudviklingshensyn, dels at modtage indskud til finansiering af socialt boligbyggeri.
With respect to the first condition, Crédit Mutuel was engaged in the provision of two services of general economic interest, firstly by maintaining a significant branch presence in rural areas for regional development purposes and secondly by gathering deposits intended to finance social housing.
For så vidt angår opretholdelsen af et stort antal afdelinger i landdistrikter, anfægter banken Kommissionens konklusion, i henhold til hvilken de franske bestemmelser af lovgivnings- og forskriftsmæssig karakter er alt for vage til at overdrage Crédit Mutuel en sådan opgave og dermed til, at den første betingelse i Altmark-dommen er opfyldt.
As far as maintaining branches in rural areas is concerned, it disputes the Commission’s conclusion that French laws and regulations remain too vague to entrust Crédit Mutuel with any such role and thus for the first condition of the Altmark case-law to be fulfilled.
Ifølge Crédit Mutuel er baggrunden for Kommissionens konklusion, at disse tekster ikke pålagde Crédit Mutuel specifikke begrænsninger, fordi de gjaldt for hele banksektoren.
According to Crédit Mutuel, the Commission draws this conclusion from the fact that this legislation did not place any specific constraints on Crédit Mutuel since it applied to the banking sector as a whole.
Det er ligeledes Crédit Mutuels opfattelse, at Kommissionen forsøger at overføre bevisbyrden til banken, for at den første betingelse i Altmark-dommen er opfyldt, hvilket der ikke er hjemmel for i den pågældende retspraksis.
Crédit Mutuel also holds that the Commission is trying to transfer to it the burden of proof that the first condition of the Altmark case-law has been met, which is not what is laid down in the case-law in question.
Med hensyn til den anden betingelse understreger Crédit Mutuel, at provisionen blev indført samtidig med forpligtelsen til at centralisere midlerne hos CDC, og at beregningsmetoden for denne provision var objektiv og gennemsigtig.
With respect to the second condition, Crédit Mutuel stresses that the brokerage commission was created at the same time as the obligation to centralise to centralise deposits with the CDC and that the conditions for calculating the commission were drawn up in an objective and transparent manner.
Provisionen var ifølge banken fastlagt på grundlag af Crédit Mutuels faktiske omkostninger ved distributionen af Livret Bleu.
The level of the brokerage commission was based on the costs actually incurred by Crédit Mutuel in distributing the Livret blue.
Crédit Mutuel var en veldrevet virksomhed ifølge Altmark-dommen, eftersom bankens administrationsomkostninger var blandt de laveste.
Crédit Mutuel is a well-run undertaking within the meaning of the Altmark case-law, since its administrative costs are amongst the lowest.
Dette havde Kommissionen for øvrigt anerkendt i beslutningen om udvidelse [24]. Ifølge banken har Kommissionen ikke i tilstrækkelig grad uddybet årsagerne til, at den ikke mener, at denne betingelse var opfyldt.
The Commission is, moreover, said to have acknowledged this in its extension Decision [24]; It is of the opinion that the Commission has not provided sufficient grounds to underpin its view that this condition has not been met.
Under alle omstændigheder mener Crédit Mutuel, at foranstaltningen er forenelig med fællesmarkedet på grundlag af artikel 106, stk. 2, i TEUF.
In any event, Crédit Mutuel holds that the measure is compatible with the internal market on the basis of Article 106(2) TFEU.
Crédit Mutuel kritiserer især metoden til beregning af overkompensationen, som denne beskrives i beslutningen om udvidelse.
Crédit Mutuel criticises, inter alia, the method used to calculate the overcompensation to which reference was made in the extension Decision.
Ifølge Crédit Mutuel var der regnefejl i Kommissionens evaluering af det samlede resultat af driftsregnskabet for Livret Bleu, fordi den var baseret på konsulentens fejlagtige konklusioner trods nogle uafklarede punkter, hvor Kommissionens og Crédit Mutuels konsulenter ikke var enige [25].
In its view, the Commission made calculation errors in its assessment of gross operating profit for the Livret bleu by making its own the mistaken conclusions of its consultant, despite the areas of disagreement outstanding between the Commission’s consultant and Crédit Mutuel’s consultant [25].
Desuden har Kommissionen ikke i sin beslutning om udvidelse taget korrekt hensyn til en rimelig fortjeneste.
In addition, in its extension Decision the Commission did not take reasonable profit into account properly.
Den baserede sin vurdering af den rimelige fortjeneste på omkostningerne ved den lovpligtige egenkapital, anslået til 6 %, men disse omkostninger udgør en omkostning i det analytiske regnskab og ikke en fortjeneste.
It based its assessment of reasonable profit on the costs of regulatory capital, estimated at 6 %, whereas these costs represent a cost accounting expense, not a margin.
Kommissionen burde have taget hensyn til afkastet af egenkapital som anbefalet af Arthur Andersen [27].
The Commission should have taken into account the return on equity recommended by Arthur Andersen [27].
Kommissionen har således beregnet en rimelig fortjeneste efter en degressiv skala, der bliver nul efter den samlede centralisering af indeståenderne hos CDC, da disse indskud ikke medførte egenkapitalomkostninger.
Moreover, the calculation of reasonable profit was made on the basis of a rapidly diminishing base, which falls to zero on the complete centralisation of deposits with the CDC, since such deposits incur no cost in terms of regulatory capital.
Crédit Mutuel fremhæver, at den af Kommissionen valgte indikator betød, at banken slet ikke fik en normal fortjeneste af Livret Bleu.
Crédit Mutuel emphasises that the indicator used by the Commission leads to it being deprived of any normal margin on the Livret bleu.
Ifølge Crédit Mutuel skal enhver bank kunne skabe en normal fortjeneste, selv i forbindelse med centraliserede indskud, som ikke indebærer egenkapitalomkostninger i en snæver juridisk fortolkning af solvensnøgletallene.
In its view, any bank must be able to generate a normal margin, even on a centralised use incurring no cost of capital within the strict regulatory meaning of the solvency ratio.
Kommissionen har heller ikke taget korrekt hensyn til omkostningerne ved den anden tjenesteydelse af almindelig økonomisk interesse, som Crédit Mutuel mener at have fået overdraget, nemlig opretholdelse af afdelinger i landdistrikter, hvis formål er at tilskynde til folkelig opsparing i hele området ved at give så mange som muligt adgang til en bank.
Nor did the Commission correctly take into account the expenses arising from the other service of general economic interest which Crédit Mutuel regards itself as providing, that is maintaining a branch presence in rural areas with a view to encouraging saving by the general public throughout the country’s territory by facilitating access to banking services to the greatest number of people.
Endelig bestrider Crédit Mutuel eksistensen af en eventuel lokkevareeffekt.
Crédit Mutuel also denies that there was ever any pull factor.
Banken gør opmærksom på, at Kommissionen i sin annullerede beslutning anførte, at denne lokkevareeffekt ikke havde kunnet bevises, og mener ikke, at der siden da er fremlagt nye beviser herfor.
It notes that the Commission had acknowledged in its annulled Decision that there was no formal evidence attesting to a pull factor and is of the view that no new evidence has appeared since then.
For så vidt angår proceduren, påberåber Crédit Mutuel sig flere generelle, fællesskabsretlige principper, der strider mod tilbagebetaling af potentiel støtte, og navnlig princippet om berettiget forventning og overskridelse af en rimelig frist.
With respect to the proceedings, Crédit Mutuel relies on a number of general principles of Community law to dispute the recovery of potential aid, inter alia, the principle of legitimate expectation and the duty to act within a reasonable time.
Frankrig mener, at betingelserne i Altmark-dommen er opfyldt:
France is of the opinion that the conditions of the Altmark case-law have been met:
Med hensyn til den første betingelse understreges det, at Kommissionen har erkendt, at Crédit Mutuel havde fået overdraget en tjenesteydelse af almindelig økonomisk interesse, nemlig modtagelse af indskud, der skulle anvendes til finansiering af socialt boligbyggeri.
With respect to the first condition, it emphasises that the Commission has acknowledged that Crédit Mutuel was attributed the task of providing a service of general economic interest by gathering deposits to finance social housing.