natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Regeringen redegør også for vanskeligheden ved at gennemføre sådanne sammenligninger (forskelle i kapitalstruktur, niveau af investeret kapital, driftsrisici, makroøkonomiske og strukturelle faktorer, der spiller ind på virksomhedernes regnskabstal), og den citerer en rapport, som Europa-Kommissionen har udarbejdet, hvoraf det ikke fremgår, at DSB skulle være mere rentabel end sine konkurrenter på det europæiske marked.
They also highlight the difficulty of carrying out such comparisons (differences in capital structure and level of capital invested, operating risks, macroeconomic and structural factors influencing undertakings’ accounting data) and cite a report by the European Commission which does not portray DSB as being more profitable than its competitors on the European market.
Danmark bestrider ikke, at DSB's resultater har udviklet sig mere gunstigt end forudsat i de oprindelige budgetter.
Moreover, Denmark does not dispute that the progression in DSB’s trading performance proved more favourable than envisaged in the initial budgets.
Den danske regering kaster imidlertid lys over virkningerne af udviklingen i skatteprocenter og forelægger en sammenfattende tabel over DSB's resultater.
However, the Danish authorities provide clarification concerning the effects of the changes in rates of taxation and submit a summary table of DSB’s results.
Endelig forelagde Danmark nyere oplysninger om DSB's finansielle situation, hvori det præciseres, at resultaterne efter skat for virksomhedens offentlige servicevirksomhed beløb sig til henholdsvis 670 mio. DKK i 2007 og 542 mio. DKK i 2008.
Finally, Denmark has submitted recent data relating to DSB’s financial situation, specifying that the after-tax profit for the public service activity was DKK 670 million in 2007 and DKK 542 million in 2008 respectively.
Udbyttepolitikken
Dividend policy
Danmark vurderer, at udbyttepolitikken sammen med et grundigt budget udgør en meget effektiv sikring mod overkompensation, da udbyttepolitikken er et smidigt redskab til at sikre sig mod overkompensation, hvis forudsætninger i budgettet måtte svigte.
Denmark takes the view that, combined with a detailed budget, dividend policy is a highly effective way of guarding against overcompensation because it is a tool which offers flexibility in avoiding overcompensation in the event that the working hypotheses in the budget prove deficient.
Udbyttepolitikken fungerer som et supplement til det grundige budget, der er lagt til grund for trafikkontrakten.
Dividend policy acts as an addition to the detailed budget underlying the transport contract.
Den danske regering minder om, at kompensationen er fastlagt på forhånd ud fra et kvalificeret skøn over omkostninger og indtægter, og kompensationen udgør derfor ikke en ressource, som DSB kan trække ubegrænset på.
The Danish authorities state that the compensation is defined in advance on the basis of a substantiated estimate of income and costs and that it is not an unlimited resource for DSB.
Regeringen præciserer ligeledes, at såfremt de reelle tal afviger negativt fra det budgetterede — eksempelvis en utilsigtet omkostningsstigning (administrative fejl, lønstigninger, øgede afgifter eller indkøb) eller et indtægtstab som følge af lavere trafikmængder end forventet, kan DSB heller ikke trække yderligere kompensation ud af staten.
They also specify that if the real figures indicate a shortfall compared with the provisional budget – for example, due to an unintended increase in costs (management errors, increases in wages, costs or purchases) or due to a loss of income associated with a decline in business compared with predicted levels, DSB is also unable to obtain additional compensation from the State.
DSB påtager sig derfor en del af risikoen i tilfælde af dårlige resultater.
DSB therefore assumes a share of the risk in the event of poor performance.
Udbyttepolitikken fungerer derfor reelt som en ekstra sikkerhed mod overkompensation i de tilfælde, hvor resultatet afviger positivt fra budgettet.
Consequently, dividend policy plays the role of an additional safeguard against overcompensation in cases where the results indicate a positive discrepancy compared with the provisional budget.
Den udgør et fleksibelt instrument, hvormed staten kan sikre sig, at et givet beløb trækkes ud af selskabet.
It is a flexible instrument which the State can use to ensure that a given amount is collected from the company.
Danmark præciserer, at DSB ikke har haft mulighed for at udnytte en eventuel likviditetsfordel til at fordreje konkurrencen på markedet ved bud på andre opgaver m.v., herunder krydssubsidiering.
Denmark specifies that DSB was not able to profit from any advantage in terms of liquid assets so as to distort competition on the market by offering other services etc., in particular by means of cross-subsidisation.
Den danske regering anfører, at DSB samlet set har betalt 3469 mio. DKK mere i udbytte for regnskabsårene 1999-2007 end budgetteret.
The Danish authorities specify that DSB has in total paid DKK 3,469 billion more in dividends for the financial years 1999. to 2007 than projected.
DSB har betalt den danske stat udbytte på 607 mio. DKK i 2007 og 359 mio. DKK i 2008.
DSB paid the Danish State dividends of DKK 607 million in 2007 and 359 million in 2008.
Det er korrekt, at udbyttebetalingerne ikke udelukkende er sket på baggrund af en beregning af, hvorvidt der er sket »overkompensation«, men regeringen har opkrævet udbytte i et omfang, der klart har oversteget forskellen mellem de budgetterede og realiserede resultater.
Even though it is true that the dividend payments were not made exclusively on the basis of a calculation aimed at determining any overcompensation, the amount of the dividends charged by the Government clearly exceeded the disparity between the predicted results and the actual results.
I det omfang DSB har leveret resultater, der oversteg det budgetterede, er dette »ekstra« beløb til fulde blevet trukket ud af selskabet via udbytte.
In so far as DSB achieved results in excess of the provisional figures, all of that surplus was taken out of the company in the form of dividends.
Danmark finder derfor, at overkompensation ikke har fundet sted.
Consequently, Denmark considers that no overcompensation took place.
Indførelse af en tilbagebetalingsmekanisme
Introduction of a refund mechanism
I forbindelse med udarbejdelsen af bemærkninger og drøftelser med Kommissionen tilkendegav Danmark, at det var hensigten at indføre en tilbagebetalingsmekanisme i de relevante kontrakter om offentlig trafikbetjening med DSB.
In formulating its observations and in discussions with the Commission, Denmark indicated that it intended to introduce a refund mechanism in the relevant public transport service contracts with DSB.
Den påtænkte mekanisme opfylder følgende karakteristika.
The mechanism under consideration has the following features.
Tilbagebetalingsmekanismens virkemåde
Operation of the refund mechanism
Den danske regering oplyser, at såfremt den på forhånd havde fuldt overblik over DSB's resultater, skulle kompensationsmekanismen opstilles efter følgende ligning:
According to the Danish authorities, if they had perfect information about DSB’s performance in advance, the compensation mechanism would have to be expressed using the following formula:
Indtægter i alt (passagerer + kontraktbetalinger) – rimelig fortjeneste – udgifter i alt = 0
Total revenue (passengers + contractual payments) – reasonable profit – Total expenditure = 0
Den danske regering bemærker imidlertid, at den ikke på forhånd har fuldt overblik over hele den flerårige kontraktperiode, og at denne lignings resultat derfor i praksis sjældent er 0.
The Danish authorities point out, however, that they do not have access to perfect information for the whole term of multiannual contracts and that, consequently, this formula is rarely equal to zero in practice.
I det aktuelle system tilpasses ligningen i realiteten til resultatet (ligningens højre side) via udbyttepolitikken.
In the current system, the formula is in fact adjusted on the results side (right side of the formula) by using the dividend policy.
En anden løsning, som overvejes af den danske regering, går ud på at tilpasse de samlede indtægter (ligningens venstre side) ved at tilpasse kontraktbetalingen hvert år via en tilbagebetalingsmekanisme.
Another solution considered by the Danish authorities would be to carry out adjustments to the total revenue (left side of the formula) by adjusting the contractual payments using an annual refund mechanism.
Størrelsen af denne regulering bør svare til bruttoreduktionen i den nedenstående ligning.
The size of the adjustment should correspond to the gross reduction expressed in the formula below.
Indtægter i alt – rimelig fortjeneste – udgifter i alt = bruttoreduktion
Total revenue – reasonable profit – Total expenditure = gross reduction
Berigtigelser vedrørende effektivitet og kvalitative forbedringer (nettoreduktion)
Corrections concerning efficiency and qualitative improvements (net reduction)
For at sikre, at DSB fortsat har et incitament til at opnå effektivitetsforbedringer og tiltrække nye passagerer, bør tilbagebetalingsbestemmelsen efter den danske regerings opfattelse åbne mulighed for at belønne virksomhedens præstationsforbedringer i henseende til forud fastsatte parametre.
In order to ensure that DSB continues to have an incentive to improve its efficiency and to attract new passengers, the refund clause should make it possible, according to the Danish authorities, to reward improvements in the undertaking’s performance gauged by predetermined parameters.
DSB bør således kunne beholde en del af bruttoreduktionen, i det omfang bruttoreduktionen (hvilket kan sidestilles med en rimelig fortjeneste/egenkapitalforrentning, der er højere end fastsat i ligningen) skyldes:
DSB should therefore be able to retain part of the gross reduction in so far as the gross reduction (which is equivalent to a reasonable profit/return on equity greater than that specified in the formula) is due to:
reducerede omkostninger målt pr. passagerkilometer og/eller
a reduction in costs per passenger-kilometre and/or,
en stigning i antallet af passagerer målt i passagerkilometer.
an increase in the number of passengers measured in terms of passenger-kilometres.
Den danske regering påtænker derfor at modulere tilbagebetalingsmekanismen på følgende måde:
The Danish authorities are therefore considering modulating the refund mechanism as follows:
hvis DSB reducerer sine omkostninger (pr. passagerkilometer) i forhold til gennemsnitsomkostningerne i de fire forløbne år, beregnes denne forbedring (procentvis omkostningsforskel multipliceret med det samlede omkostningsgrundlag), og
if DSB has reduced its costs (per passenger-kilometre) compared with the average cost over the past 4 years, that improvement will be calculated (cost differential as a percentage multiplied by a total cost base), and
hvis antallet af passagerer stiger, multipliceres stigningen i passagertrafikken målt i passagerkilometer med 0,80 DKK, og bruttoreduktionen mindskes ligeledes med dette beløb [32].
if the number of passengers increases, the increase in passenger traffic measured in passenger-kilometres will be multiplied by DKK 0,80, and the gross reduction will also be reduced by that amount [32].
Den danske regering præciserede, at den samlede reduktion som følge af præstationsforbedringer ikke kan overstige bruttoreduktionen i et givet år.
The Danish authorities have specified that the total reductions on account of improvements in performance may not exceed the gross reduction in a given year.
Nettoreduktionen ligger dermed mellem 0 og bruttoreduktionen.
The net reduction will therefore be between zero and the gross reduction.
Tilbagebetalingsmekanismen defineres dermed ved følgende ligning:
The refund mechanism would therefore have to follow this formula:
Tilbagebetalingsmekanisme = bruttoreduktion – variablen (Δ.
Refund mechanism = gross reduction – variable (Δ.
+ Pas.km Δ) = nettoreduktion
+ Pas.km Δ) = net reduction
Indflydelse på udbyttepolitikken
Effect on dividend policy
Den danske regering understregede, at indførelsen af en sådan tilbagebetalingsmekanisme ville få betydelig indflydelse på den danske stats udbyttepolitik som angivet i nedenstående skema:
The Danish authorities have stressed that the introduction of such a refund mechanism would have a significant impact on the Danish State’s dividend policy, as indicated in the table below:
Offentlig servicevirksomhed
Public service activities
Indtægter i alt
Total Revenue
Udgifter i alt
Total Costs
Tilbagebetalingsmekanisme
Refund mechanism
Resultat — offentlige serviceforpligtelser
Profit/loss- Public service activities
Kommercielle aktiviteter
Comercial activities
Udgifter
Revenue
Resultat — kommercielle aktiviteter
Profit/loss- Commercial activities
Udbyttepolitik DSB
DSB divident policy
+ Resultat — kommercielle aktiviteter
+ Profit/loss- Commercial activities
DSB's resultat
DSB's results
Skat, nettoresultat og udbytte
Tax, net profit/loss and dividends
Tilbagebetalingsmekanisme og overgrænse for rimelig fortjeneste
Refund mechanism and maximum level of reasonable profit
Den danske regering har ligeledes anført, at denne tilbagebetalingsmekanisme vil blive udbygget med en overgrænse, så det sikres, at DSB ikke tildeles en fortjeneste, der overstiger, hvad der betragtes som et rimeligt niveau.
The Danish authorities have also indicated that this refund mechanism would be supplemented by the introduction of an upper limit which will ensure that DSB is not awarded an amount of profit exceeding what is regarded as a reasonable level.
Den danske regering påtænker at fastsætte denne overgrænse i forhold til DSB’s egenkapitalforrentning, som ud over de 6 %, der er fastlagt i kontrakten, tager hensyn til det yderligere overskud, som skabes ved effektivitetsgevinster eller et øget antal passagerer.
The Danish authorities are considering setting this upper limit in relation to DSB’s return on equity which, above the 6 % level established in the contract, would take account of the additional profits generated by increases in efficiency or in passenger numbers.
Denne overgrænse defineres ved følgende ligning:
This upper limit would be established using the following formula:
En rimelig fortjeneste (6 %) + variablen (Δ. + Pas.km Δ)
Reasonable profit (6 %) + variable (Δ. pas.km Δ +)
Derigennem kan tilbagebetalingsmekanismens incitamenter give DSB en yderligere fordel, hvis virksomheden forbedrer sin omkostningsstruktur, eller hvis passagertallet stiger (Δ.
The incentive factors in the refund mechanism may therefore give DSB an additional advantage if the company improves its costs structure or if passenger numbers increase (Δ.
Den danske regering har præciseret, at der i beregningen kun tages hensyn til den del af DSB's egenkapital, som svarer til virksomhedens offentlige servicevirksomhed, på grundlag af en regnskabsmæssig adskillelse.
The Danish authorities have specified that the calculation takes into account only the share of DSB’s equity capital which corresponds to its public service activity on the basis of the accounting separation.
Ifølge denne mekanisme kunne overgrænsen for en rimelig fortjeneste fastsættes til en egenkapitalforrentning på 12 %.
According to this mechanism, the upper limit on the reasonable profit could be fixed at a 12 % return on equity capital.
Den danske regering præciserer, at grænsen sættes til 10 % pr. år set over en treårig periode.
The Danish authorities specify that the annual limit is set at 10 % spread over 3 years.
Empirisk demonstration
Empirical demonstration
Den danske regering har forelagt Kommissionen en analyse, der empirisk demonstrerer virkningen af en sådan tilbagebetalingsmekanisme for perioden 2004-2008, jf. nedenstående tabel:
The Danish authorities have provided the Commission with an analysis demonstrating empirically what the impact of such a refund mechanism would have been over the period 2004-08, as indicated in the table below:
Offentlig servicevirksomhed (mio. DKK)
Public service activities (million DKK)
Resultat før skat
Pre-tax result
Rimelig fortjeneste (6 % før skat)
Reasonable profit (return on equity 6 % before tax)
Bruttoreduktion
Gross refund
Skønnet egenkapital
Estimate of equity capital
Passagerkm (mio.)
Passenger km (million)
Omkostning pr. passagerkm (DKK/km)
Cost per passenger km (DKK/km)
Forskel i omkostning pr. passagerkm (4 år)
Difference cost per passenger km (4 years)
DSB's effektivitetsgevinst
DSB’s increase in efficiency
Stigning i antal passagerkm
Improvements in passenger km
DSB's samlede gevinst
DSB’s total improvements
Tilbagebetaling — nettoreduktion
Refund – net reduction
Egenkapitalforrrentning efter tilbagebetalingsmekanismen (%)
Return on equity after refund mechanism (%)
Gennemsnitlig gennemsnitligegenkapitalforrentning efter tilbagebetaling (%)
Average return on equity after refund (%)
Dermed ville anvendelsen af tilbagebetalingsmekanismen have medført, at DSB's egenkapitalforrentning i perioden 2004-2008 ville have varieret mellem 8,8 % og 11,9 %.
The application of the refund mechanism would therefore have led to returns on equity for DSB varying between 8,8 % and 11,9 % over the period 2004-08.
På grund af reglen om gennemsnitligt 10 % over 3 år, der overskrides med 0,2 % i 2006, ville tilbagebetalingsmekanismen have indebåret en tilbagebetaling på 38 mio. DKK for dette regnskabsår.
Due to the rule specifying 10 % on average over 3 years, which was exceeded by 0,2 % in 2006, the refund mechanism would have resulted in a repayment of DKK 38 million for that financial year.
Danmark minder om, at fritagelsen for lønsumsafgiften i mellemtiden er afskaffet.
Denmark states that the payroll tax exemption has now been abolished.
Ifølge den danske regering har denne fritagelse ikke medført økonomiske fordele for de fritagne virksomheder, heriblandt DSB.
According to the Danish authorities, that exemption did not result in any economic advantage for the companies which benefited from it, such as DSB.
Der er taget hensyn til fritagelsen i kontrakten, ligesom den er regnet med i forbindelse med udbud af transportkontrakter mv., således at alle tilbudsgivere blev behandlet på lige fod.
The exemption was taken into account in the contract, just as it was taken into account during the tendering procedures relating to the transport contracts etc., thus ensuring that all bidders were on an equal footing.
Angående en eventuel kompensation af DSB som følge af, at virksomheden ikke længere er fritaget for lønsumsafgift, bemærker den danske regering, at DSB's kontraktbetaling oprindeligt blev beregnet ud fra, at DSB ikke skulle betale lønsumsafgift.
As regards possible compensation for DSB following its no longer being exempt from payroll tax, the Danish authorities point out that the contractual payments made to DSB had initially been calculated on the basis that DSB was not required to pay payroll tax.
Kompensationen er således »reduceret« med dette beløb.
The compensation had therefore been ‘reduced’ by that amount.
Efter at DSB er blevet pålagt lønsumsafgift, gælder forudsætningen for kompensationsberegningen således ikke længere, og DSB kompenseres derfor for denne ændring i forudsætningerne.
As DSB is now liable for payroll tax, the basis on which the compensation is calculated was no longer valid, and compensation was paid to DSB to take account of this change in the calculation parameters.
Denne kompensation beløber sig til ca. 80 mio. DKK pr. år og vedrører udelukkende DSB's offentlige servicevirksomhed.
The compensation amounts to approximately DKK 80 million a year and relates solely to DSB’s public service activities.
Ifølge Danmark har fritagelsen for lønsumsafgiften og den efterfølgende ophævelse af fritagelsen således haft en neutral virkning på DSB's økonomi.
According to Denmark, the payroll tax exemption and its subsequent abolition consequently had a neutral effect on DSB’s finances.
BEDØMMELSE AF BESTEMMELSERNE I KONTRAKTERNE OM OFFENTLIG TRAFIKBETJENING
ASSESSMENT OF THE MEASURES CONTAINED IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE CONTRACTS
RÆKKEVIDDEN AF AFGØRELSEN
SCOPE OF THE DECISION
I denne afgørelse tages der stilling til, om kontrakter om offentlig trafikbetjening, der er indgået mellem Transportministeriet og Danske Statsbaner, er forenelige med Fællesskabets regler om statsstøtte.
This Decision concerns the compatibility with the Community rules on State aid of the public transport service contracts concluded between the Danish Ministry of Transport and Danske Statsbaner.
Indledningen af proceduren af 10. september 2008 og navnlig kommentarerne fra de danske myndigheder og de interesserede parternes bemærkninger har givet Kommissionen mulighed for at få klarhed over rækkevidden af og anvendelsesområdet for de pågældende kontrakter om offentlig trafikbetjening, de nærmere vilkår for fastlæggelsen af kompensation for offentlig service og et overblik over de omstændigheder, som har kunnet føre til, at Danske Statsbaner modtog overkompensation.
The initiation of the procedure on 10 September 2008 and, in particular, the comments of the Danish authorities and the observations of the interested parties have enabled the Commission to define the extent and scope of the various public transport service contracts at issue, the procedures for determining the public service compensation and all of the circumstances that could have led to Danske Statsbaner being overcompensated.
Kommissionen har således identificeret fire kontrakter om offentlig trafikbetjening for perioden 2000-2004 og 2005-2014 for transportydelser i fjern-, regional- og lokaltrafik, der kunne indeholde elementer af statsstøtte (se ovenstående betragtning 28, 46, 50 og 69).
Consequently, the Commission has identified four public transport service contracts relating to the periods 2000-04 and 2005-14 and concerning main line, regional and suburban transport services, which are likely to contain elements of State aid (see recitals 28, 46, 50 and 69 above).
Dertil kommer de tillægskontrakter, der er indgået for at tage højde for den forsinkede levering af rullende materiel (se betragtning 114).
There are also the additional contracts concluded to deal with the late delivery of rolling stock (see recital 114).
Kommissionen bemærker i den forbindelse, at de interesserede parter har forelagt deres bemærkninger om de forskellige udestående problemer og tvivlsspørgsmål, som Kommissionen gav udtryk for i sin beslutning om at indlede proceduren, i relation til alle disse kontrakter.
The Commission points out in that regard that the interested parties have submitted their observations on the various outstanding problems and doubts expressed by the Commission in its decision initiating the procedure, in relation to all of those contracts.
Kommissionen undersøger ligeledes, om der forekommer andre afgiftsrelaterede foranstaltninger af relevans for foreneligheden af den pågældende kompensation for offentlig service [33].
The Commission has also examined whether there are any other fiscal measures of relevance to the compatibility of the public service compensation at issue [33].
ER DER TALE OM STATSSTØTTE?
EXISTENCE OF AID
I artikel 107, stk. 1, i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde hedder det: »Bortset fra de i denne traktat hjemlede undtagelser er statsstøtte eller støtte, som ydes ved hjælp af statsmidler under enhver tænkelig form, og som fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene ved at begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner, uforenelig med det indre marked i det omfang, den påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.«
Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union reads as follows: ‘Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market’.