natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Endelig skal Kommissionen undersøge, om de foranstaltninger, der blev bevilget Gdynia skibsværft, gav værftet en uretmæssig fordel og dermed forvred eller truede med at forvride konkurrencen.
Lastly, the Commission needs to determine whether the measures granted to Gdynia Shipyard conferred an undue advantage on it and thereby distorted or threatened to distort competition.
Kommissionen bemærker, at de polske myndigheder ikke har gjort indsigelse over for klassificeringen af de foranstaltninger, der er omfattet af nærværende beslutning som statsstøtte, med undtagelse af lån ydet af KPS og garantier stillet af KUKE, som efter de polske myndigheders opfattelse overholder principperne vedrørende private investorer.
The Commission notes that the Polish authorities did not dispute the classification of the measures covered by the present decision as State aid, with the exception of the loans granted by KPS and the guarantees provided by the Export Credit Insurance Corporation which, in the view of the Polish authorities, comply with the market economy investor principle.
I det følgende vil Kommissionen først beskrive, hvorfor den finder, at den konsekvente forsømmelse af fuldbyrdelsen af offentligretlige forpligtelser ikke overholdt principperne vedrørende private kreditorer.
Below the Commission first explains why it took the view that the continuous non-enforcement of public-law debt did not pass the market economy creditor test.
Dernæst vurderer Kommissionen især de foranstaltninger, der bestrides af Polen.
The Commission then assesses the measures disputed by Poland.
Endelig vurderer Kommissionen de omstændigheder, som de foranstaltninger, der er omfattet af denne beslutning, blev bevilget under, og deres indvirkning på konkurrencen.
Finally, the Commission considers the circumstances in which the aid covered by this decision was granted and its impact on competition.
Den konsekvente forsømmelse af tvangsfuldbyrdelsen af offentligretlige forpligtelser
Continuous non-enforcement of public-law debt
Det fremgår af retspraksis [57], at princippet om, at konsekvent forsømmelse af tvangsfuldbyrdelsen af offentligretlige fordringer i sig selv kan udgøre statsstøtte.
The principle that continuous non-enforcement of public-law debt can in itself constitute State aid is established in case-law [57].
Polen forklarede, at støttemodtageren havde til hensigt at indfri sine offentligretlige udeståender pr. 30. september 2007 (i alt 443 mio. PLN) ved hjælp af den kapitaltilførsel, finansministeriet ville foretage som en del af værftets privatisering.
Poland explained that the recipient intended to repay public liabilities outstanding as at 30 September 2007 (PLN 443 million in total) using the capital injection by the Treasury following the yard’s privatisation.
Da der hersker usikkerhed med hensyn til denne privatisering og datoen for den, tyder værftets hensigt på, at dets offentligretlige forpligtelser i praksis blev udskudt på ubestemt tid og kun blev indfriet sporadisk, alt efter om værftets cash-flow tillod det.
This being an uncertain event with an uncertain timing, the yard’s intention suggests that in practice the public-law liabilities were deferred for an unlimited or unspecified period of time and were repaid only occasionally as permitted by the yard’s cash flow.
Kommissionen mener ikke, at nogen kreditor på baggrund af markedsøkonomiske principper ville have givet så ubegrænset betalingshenstand med sine fordringer betinget af en så usikker privatiseringsbegivenhed og af kapitaltilførsler fra statens side (denne kapitaltilførsel udgjorde i sig selv statsstøtte, der giver anledning til tvivl om dens lovlighed og dens forenelighed med fællesmarkedet).
The Commission considers that no market economy creditor would accept such an unlimited deferral of its liabilities, which would be contingent on the uncertain event of privatisation and recapitalisation by the State (this constituting State aid of doubtful legality and compatibility with the single market).
Desuden er der intet, der tyder på, at de relevante offentligretlige kreditorer har truffet nogen foranstaltninger til fuldbyrdelse af deres offentligretlige fordringer fra Gdynia skibsværft, især ved tvangsfuldbyrdelse eller ved hjælp af konkurslovgivningen.
In addition, there is no indication whatsoever that the relevant public creditors have undertaken any action to enforce their public-law receivables from Gdynia Shipyard, in particular by way of forced recovery or bankruptcy law.
På denne baggrund finder Kommissionen, at den fortsatte manglende fuldbyrdelse af offentligretlige fordringer udgør en fordel, som støttemodtageren ikke kunne have opnået hos en kreditor, der agerer ud fra markedsøkonomiske principper, og derfor udgør statsstøtte svarende til et (rentefrit) lån.
The Commission therefore concludes that continuous non-enforcement of public-law liabilities represents an advantage that the recipient would have not obtained from a market economy creditor and therefore constitutes State aid similar to an (interest-free) loan.
Foranstaltninger, som Polen mener opfylder kravene vedrørende private investorer
Measures which Poland regards as passing the private investor test
Lån ydet af KPS
KPS loans
Kommissionen kan ikke acceptere Polens argument, der går ud på, at støtte i form af lån til driftskapital ikke udgør statsstøtte.
The Commission cannot accept Poland’s argument that aid in the form of working capital loans was free of State aid.
Kommissionen bemærker, at den rente, KPS tog, var ca. 400 basispoint over referencerenten.
The Commission observes that the interest rate charged by KPS was about 400 basis points above the reference rate.
Værftets driftskapital blev finansieret ved forudbetalinger, der var fuldt dækket af garantier stillet af KUKE, ved fuldt statsgaranterede lån og ved KPS-lån.
Its working capital was financed by advance payments fully covered by guarantees from the Export Credit Insurance Corporation, by loans fully covered by Treasury guarantees and by KPS loans.
Den rente, KPS tog, afspejler derfor tilsyneladende ikke den risiko, KPS påtog sig.
The interest rate charged by KPS therefore does not appear to correctly reflect the risk incurred.
KPS krævede sikkerhed, men værdien af denne kan betvivles; det bør erindres, at KUKE og finansministeriet krævede lignende sikkerhed, og i betragtning af Gdynia skibsværfts aktiv/passiv-situation forekommer det sandsynligt, at KPS ikke kunne opnå sikkerhed af første prioritet blandt værftets aktiver.
Although KPS did require collateral, its value remains questionable; it should be remembered that the Export Credit Insurance Corporation and Treasury required similar collateral and, considering Gdynia Shipyard’s assets/liabilities ratio, it seems likely that KPS was not able to obtain first-rank collateral on the yard’s assets.
Under alle omstændigheder har Polen ikke fremlagt detaljerede oplysninger, der har gjort det muligt for Kommissionen at bestemme den reelle værdi af den krævede sikkerhed.
In any event, Poland has not provided detailed information enabling the Commission to determine the real value of the required collateral.
Desuden er der ikke forskel på de lån, KPS ydede, og lån ydet af ARP, idet ARP ejer KPS.
Furthermore, there is no difference between loans granted by KPS and loans granted by the Industrial Development Agency, which owns KPS.
Det er svært ligesom Polen på én og samme tid at fastholde, at lån ydet af ARP er støtte, mens lån ydet af dets datterselskab, KPS, overholder principperne vedrørende private investorer.
It is difficult to maintain simultaneously, as Poland does, that the loans granted by the Industrial Development Agency constitute State aid whereas the loans granted by its subsidiary, KPS, meet the requirements of the market economy investor principle.
Endelig finder Kommissionen, at KPS blev etableret som en fuldt statskontrolleret fond med offentlige politiske mål for øje, og dets midler tilvejebragtes fuldt ud eller blev garanteret af staten via ARP.
Lastly, the Commission notes that KPS was established as a government-controlled fund with public policy objectives, the funding of which was fully provided, or guaranteed, by the State via the Industrial Development Agency.
I overensstemmelse med dokumentet »En strategi for skibsbygningssektoren (skibsværfter) i Polen 2006-2010«, blev KPS oprettet med henblik på »at organisere finansieringen af skibsværfters produktion, indtil private investorers overtagelse af kontrollen med visse selskaber«.
According to the document ‘A strategy for the shipbuilding sector (maritime construction shipyards) in Poland 2006-2010’, KPS was ‘founded to organise the financing of shipyard production until such time as private investors took control’.
Denne strategi, som er udformet med henblik på at nå ikke blot økonomiske, men også makroøkonomiske mål [59], giver KPS, ARP, finansministeriet og andre kompetente offentlige myndigheder visse beføjelser.
The strategy, which is designed to achieve not only economic but also social and macroeconomic aims [59], mandates KPS with various powers, along with the Industrial Development Agency, the Treasury and other competent public bodies.
De finansielle forbindelser mellem KPS og ARP og finansministeriet er klare, og KPS fungerer i denne forbindelse nærmest som et redskab til overførsel af midler, der i statens budget er afsat til skibsværfter i Polen, herunder Gdynia skibsværft.
The financial links of KPS to the Industrial Development Agency and the Treasury are clear and KPS acts rather like a vehicle for the transfer of assets earmarked by the State budget for shipyards in Poland, including Gdynia.
På baggrund af ovenstående finder Kommissionen, at KPS ikke fungerede som markedsøkonomisk investor, da det ydede driftskapitallån til Gdynia skibsværft.
In the light of the above, the Commission concludes that KPS did not act as a market economy investor when it granted working capital loans to Gdynia Shipyard.
Disse lån, der er opført i betragtning 158, tabel 1 og 2, udgør derfor statsstøtte.
These loans, listed in recital 158, Tables 1 and 2, therefore constitute State aid.
KUKE-garantier
Export Credit Insurance Corporation guarantees
I de bemærkninger, Polen fremsatte efter vedtagelsen af beslutningen om indledning af den officielle undersøgelse, hævdede Polen, at de garantier, KUKE havde stillet for Gdynia skibsværft, ikke udgjorde statsstøtte.
In its comments following the adoption of the decision to open the formal investigation, Poland argued that the guarantees granted by the Export Credit Insurance Corporation to Gdynia Shipyard did not constitute State aid.
Kommissionen kan ikke godtage denne påstand.
The Commission cannot accept this assertion.
Først og fremmest minder Kommissionen om, at garantier stillet af KUKE for forudbetalinger er omfattet af statsgaranti, og transaktioner forbundet hermed er knyttet til en separat bankkonto under navnet »Interes Narodowy«.
First, the Commission would point out that Export Credit Insurance Corporation advance payment guarantees are guaranteed by the Treasury and that related transactions are entered to a separate bank account in the name of ‘Interes Narodowy’.
Hvis der ikke er tilstrækkelige midler til rådighed på denne konto, kan KUKE enten trække på lån fra finansministeriet eller på kreditgarantier fra finansministeriet.
If insufficient funds are available on that account, the Export Credit Insurance Corporation can either draw down loans from the Treasury or benefit from Treasury loan guarantees.
For det andet minder Kommissionen om sin beslutning af 18. juli 2007 i sag N 105/07 [60], hvor Kommissionen bekræftede, at den ordning, hvorved KUKE gennemførte sit statsgaranterede eksportgarantiprogram, ikke indebar elementer af statsstøtte.
Second, the Commission recalls its decision of 18 July 2007 in Case N 105/07 [60] whereby it approved as free of State aid the scheme under which the Export Credit Insurance Corporation operated its programme of export insurance guaranteed by the Treasury.
Denne ordning omfatter for tiden den type produktionsgarantier, Gdynia skibsværft har modtaget i de seneste år.
This scheme currently covers the type of production guarantees that Gdynia Shipyard has been receiving for the last few years.
Kommissionen finder, at ordningen udtrykkeligt udelukker [61] kriseramte virksomheder i den betydning, der er fastsat i Fællesskabets rammebestemmelser for statsstøtte til redning og omstrukturering af kriseramte virksomheder.
The Commission notes that the scheme explicitly excludes [61] companies in financial difficulty within the meaning of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty.
Denne ordning er først og fremmest kendetegnet ved, at garantipræmier fastsættes på basis af risikovurderinger.
The main feature of the scheme is that guarantee premiums are determined on the basis of a risk assessment.
For eksempel fastsættes garantipræmien for en virksomhed, der tilhører den højeste risikokategori, til […] % p.a. for garantier på under to år og til […] % p.a. for garantier på over to år.
For example the guarantee premium for a company belonging to the highest risk category corresponds to […] % p.a. for guarantees under 2 years and […] % p.a. for guarantees above 2 years.
Basispræmien er på […] % p.a.
The base premium is equal to […] % p.a.
Til sammenligning blev der stillet garantier for Gdynia skibsværft af KUKE for en præmie på 2 % p.a., hvis garantien ikke oversteg 35 mio. PLN, og 1 % p.a., hvis garantien oversteg dette beløb.
By way of comparison, guarantees to Gdynia Shipyard were given by the Export Credit Insurance Corporation against a premium of 2 % p.a. if the guarantee did not exceed PLN 35 million and against a premium of 1 % p.a. if the guarantee exceeded that amount.
Det er dermed klarlagt, at Gdynia skibsværft ikke er berettiget til garantier omfattet af ovenfor beskrevne ordning, der af Kommissionen er godkendt som ikke indebærende elementer af støtte.
It is therefore clear that Gdynia Shipyard is not eligible for guarantees covered by the scheme described above and approved by the Commission as free of aid.
Dermed kan det ikke fastslås, at de garantier, der blev stillet for Gdynia skibsværft ikke indebærer elementer af støtte.
Accordingly, the guarantees granted to Gdynia Shipyard are not free of aid.
Desuden er det åbenbart, at den garantipræmie, Gdynia skibsværft måtte betale, er betragteligt lavere end den basispræmie, der anvendes ved garantier stillet for sunde virksomheder og adskillige gange lavere end den præmie, der kræves for højrisikovirksomheder, der imidlertid stadig er berettigede til deltagelse i ovennævnte ordning.
Furthermore, it is obvious that the guarantee premium charged to Gdynia Shipyard is well below the base premium used for guarantees to healthy companies and several times lower than the premium charged to high-risk companies which are, however, still eligible under the scheme described above.
Kommissionen finder, at den garantipræmie, der anvendtes over for Gdynia skibsværft, ikke svarer til markedspræmien, og at disse garantier derfor udgør statsstøtte.
The Commission concludes that the guarantee premium applied to Gdynia Shipyard does not correspond to a market premium and that therefore these guarantees constitute State aid.
For det tredje må låneren i forbindelse med individuelle statsgarantier i henhold til Kommissionens meddelelse om anvendelsen af EF-traktatens artikel 87 og 88 på statsstøtte i form af garantier [62], ikke være kriseramt, for at garantien ikke skal udgøre statsstøtte.
Third, pursuant to the Commission Notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees [62], for an individual State guarantee not to constitute State aid, the borrower must not be in financial difficulty.
Denne betingelse er tydeligvis ikke overholdt i den foreliggende sag.
This is clearly not the case here.
I overensstemmelse med samme meddelelse må støtteelementet i garantien være af samme størrelse som det beløb, der er omfattet af garanti, når låneren er kriseramt.
Pursuant to the same Notice, when the borrower is in financial difficulty the aid element of the guarantee may be as high as the amount covered by that guarantee.
Endelig bemærker Kommissionen, at Gdynia skibsværft udelukkende fik garantier fra KUKE og finansministeriet, og at det ikke lykkedes virksomheden at opnå garantier på markedet.
Finally, the Commission notes that Gdynia Shipyard relied exclusively on guarantees provided by the Export Credit Insurance Corporation and the Treasury and did not manage to obtain any guarantees on the market.
På denne baggrund finder Kommissionen, at KUKE ikke fungerede som markedsøkonomisk investor, da det stillede garantier for Gdynia skibsværft.
In the light of the above, the Commission concludes that the Export Credit Insurance Corporation did not act as a market economy investor when it gave guarantees to Gdynia Shipyard.
Konkurrenceforvridning forårsaget af statsstøtten til Gdynia skibsværft
Distortion of competition caused by the State aid to Gdynia Shipyard
Kommissionen finder, at Gdynia skibsværft, da det takket være sin fulde afhængighed af statsstøtte kunne prissætte under produktionsomkostningerne uden at bære de konsekvenser, en sådan politik normalt medfører, nemlig eliminering fra markedet, forvred konkurrencen.
The Commission takes the view that full reliance on State aid enabled Gdynia Shipyard to engage in anti-competitive practice such as pricing below production costs without suffering the consequences that such practices normally entail, namely elimination from the market.
Kommissionen bemærker endvidere, at en af Gdynia skibsværfts vigtigste langvarige problemer var indgåelsen af kontrakter, der viste sig at være tabsgivende, da zlotyen steg i værdi over for dollar, som er den dominerende valuta inden for skibsbygning, og prisen på stålplader steg på verdensplan.
Furthermore, the Commission notes that one of Gdynia Shipyard’s main long-term problems was the conclusion of contracts which proved to be loss-making as the zloty appreciated against the dollar, the dominant currency in the shipbuilding business, and the price of steel plates increased worldwide.
Disse eksterne faktorer var allerede identificeret som de vigtigste trusler mod værftets fortsatte drift i omstruktureringsplanen fra 2002, og ligeså i den efterfølgende ændrede version fra 2004, i den nye omstruktureringsplan fra 2006 og endelig i forbindelse med privatiseringen i 2008.
These external factors were already identified as the main threats to the yard’s continued operation in the 2002 restructuring plan, and then subsequently in the amended version of 2004, in the new 2006 restructuring plan and, lastly, in the course of privatisation in 2008.
Til trods for at værftets ledelse havde kendskab til disse trusler, fortsatte det med at indgå kontrakter uden at træffe nogen foranstaltninger til imødegåelse af risikoen.
Despite the fact that the yard’s management was aware of these threats, the yard continued to conclude contracts without taking any measures to mitigate the risk.
Denne forretningspraksis fortsattes under det hidtil usete opsving på skibsbygningsmarkedet mellem 2004 og 2008, da priserne på produkter fra skibsværfter steg til rekordhøjde.
This business practice continued during the unprecedented boom in the shipbuilding market between 2004 and 2008, when shipbuilding prices rose to record levels.
Som et resultat af denne praksis lykkedes det værftet at opretholde aktiviteten og beskæftigelsen, men der var til gengæld store tab på den normale skibsproduktion.
As a result of this practice, the yard managed to maintain activity and employment, but at the cost of large losses on regular shipbuilding production.
Ifølge due diligence-undersøgelsen udført af Amber i første halvdel af 2008 — og bekræftet af Polen — er den nuværende ordrebog med leverancer i 2008 og 2009 også tynget af risikoen for betragtelige tab på grund af tabsgivende kontrakter indgået, uden at der var truffet foranstaltninger til imødegåelse af risikoen.
According to the due diligence report produced by Amber in the first half of 2008, the current order book with deliveries scheduled for 2008 and 2009 is also burdened by a risk of significant losses due to loss-making contracts concluded without any risk-mitigating measures; this has been confirmed by Poland.
På denne baggrund finder Kommissionen, at al støtte tildelt Gdynia skibsværft, som er beskrevet i del II, punkt 7, var konkurrenceforvridende eller truede med at forvride konkurrencen på skibsbygningsmarkedet.
On that basis, the Commission concludes that all the aid granted to Gdynia Shipyard described in Part II, point 7 was such as to distort or threaten to distort competition on the shipbuilding market.
På denne baggrund finder Kommissionen, at alle foranstaltninger, som blev bevilget Gdynia skibsværft, er statsstøtte i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
In conclusion, the Commission takes the view that all the measures granted to Gdynia Shipyard are State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Mulighed for at Polen og tredjepart kan fremsætte bemærkninger
Possibility for Poland and third parties to submit comments
Ved sin beslutning af 1. juni 2005 indledte Kommissionen en officiel undersøgelse af en række foranstaltninger, herunder omstrukturering af gæld (eftergivelse, henstand, ændring af tidsplanen for betaling) baseret på forskelligt retsgrundlag og omfattende en række offentlige kreditorer, kapitaltilførsler, produktionsgarantier stillet af finansministeriet og foranstaltninger til tilvejebringelse af kapital til virksomheden (udstedelse af obligationer og gæld-for-aktie-bytte).
By its decision of 1 June 2005, the Commission opened a formal investigation into a series of measures, including debt-restructuring (write-offs, deferrals, changes to the payment schedule) based on various legal grounds and concerning a certain number of public creditors, capital injections, Treasury production guarantees and capital-raising measures (bond issues and debt-for-equity swap).
Kommissionen fastslog også klart, at Polens argument om, at forudbetalinger fra redere kunne betragtes som egetbidrag, ikke kunne accepteres.
The Commission also clearly stated that Poland’s argument that advance payments from shipowners should be considered as an own contribution could not be accepted.
I denne forbindelse betvivlede Kommissionen, om ikke garantier af forudbetalinger stillet af KUKE, udgjorde statsstøtte, og den meddelte, at den ville undersøge karakteren af disse forudbetalinger.
In that connection, the Commission expressed doubts as to whether the advance payment guarantees provided by the Export Credit Insurance Corporation constituted State aid and announced that it would investigate the nature of those advance payments.
Både Polen og støttemodtageren fremsatte bemærkninger; selv om de bestred Kommissionens kompetence til at vurdere nogle af de pågældende foranstaltningers forenelighed med fællesmarkedet, gjorde de ikke indsigelse mod Kommissionens konklusion, ifølge hvilken disse foranstaltninger, i det omfang de var bevilget efter Polens tiltrædelse af EU, udgjorde statsstøtte i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
Both Poland and the recipient submitted comments; however, whereas they disputed the competence of the Commission to assess the compatibility of some of the measures concerned, they did not contest the Commission’s conclusion that, in so far as these measures had been granted after Poland’s accession to the EU, they constituted new aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Den eneste undtagelse herfra var karakteren af de garantier, der stilledes af KUKE, som angiveligt ikke indebar elementer af statsstøtte.
The sole exception was the nature of the guarantees provided by the Export Credit Insurance Corporation, which were alleged to be free of State aid.
Senere i forløbet hævdede Polen også, at lånene ydet af KPS ikke udgjorde statsstøtte.
Poland subsequently also argued that the loans granted by KPS did not constitute State aid.
Kommissionen har taget stilling til ovennævnte argumenter fremsat af Polen og støttemodtageren.
The Commission has addressed the arguments put forward by Poland and the recipient above.