natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Med hensyn til kasinoet på Korfu blev licensen under lov 2206/1994 oprindelig tildelt ETA i 2003 under lov 3139/2003 (artikel 1, stk. 3), så ETA kunne tage det med i en senere privatisering.
In the case of Corfu casino, the license provided for in Law 2206/1994 was initially granted to ETA in 2003 under Law 3139/2003 (Article 1(3)) in order for ETA to contribute it upon its later privatisation.
Det fremgik af samme bestemmelse, at entréprisen til kasinoet på Korfu ville blive fastsat ved en ny ministerbeslutning, og ministerbeslutningen fra 1995 var således angiveligt ikke gældende.
The same provision stated that the admission price to the casino of Corfu would be set by a new ministerial decision, implying in other words that the Ministerial Decision of 1995 was not applicable.
Ifølge Kommissionens oplysninger blev der aldrig truffet en ny ministerbeslutning, og kasinoet i Korfu blev ved med at opkræve 6 EUR indtil privatiseringen i august 2010, da det indførte entréprisen på 15 EUR [29].
According to the Commission’s information, no new ministerial decision has been issued and the casino of Corfu continued to charge EUR 6 until its privatisation in August 2010 [29], when it started applying the EUR 15 price of admission tickets.
Det privatejede kasino i Thessaloniki blev etableret og fik tildelt licens under lov 2206/1994 i 1995 [31].
The privately owned Thessaloniki casino was incorporated and licensed in 1995 under Law 2206/1994 [31].
Dette kasino har altid opkrævet de offentligt ejede kasinoers entrépris på 6 EUR (Mont Parnès og Korfu) på grundlag af lovdekret 2687/1953 [32], i henhold til hvilket virksomheder med udenlandske investeringer skal behandles mindst lige så gunstigt som andre tilsvarende virksomheder i landet [33].
Until the present date, it has been applying the reduced EUR 6 price of admission tickets applied by the State-owned casinos (in Mont Parnès and Corfu) by virtue of the Law 2687/1953 [32] providing that enterprises constituted with foreign investment enjoy treatment at least as favourable as the one applicable to other similar enterprises in the country [33].
Da spørgsmålet på et tidspunkt blev rejst, anmodede chefen for kasinoet (dvs. Hyatt Regency) om, at entréprisen til kasinoet i Thessaloniki skulle være den samme som i Mont Parnès, dvs. 6 EUR. Efter at have indhentet udtalelse fra statens juridiske råd (udtalelse 631/1997) blev anmodningen imødekommet.
Even later on, when the issue was further raised, the management of the Casino (i.e. Hyatt Regency) asked the price of admission tickets in Thessaloniki casino to be set at the same level as that of the Casino Mont Parnès, i.e. at EUR 6. This request was accepted, following an opinion from the Greek Legal Council of State (Opinion 631/1997/EC).
Siden tildelingen af licensen i 1995 har kasinoet i Thessaloniki været omfattet af kravet om at indbetale 80 % af billetprisen i afgift til staten [34].
The requirement to remit to the State 80 % of the face value of admission tickets was applicable to the casino of Thessaloniki since the issuance of its license in 1995 [34].
Kommissionen indledte en formel undersøgelse under artikel 108, stk. 2, i EUF-traktaten, fordi den nærede alvorlig mistanke om, at flere specifikt identificerede kasinoer i Grækenland blev afgiftsmæssigt forskelsbehandlet, idet de var omfattet af en mere gunstig afgiftsordning end andre kasinoer i landet.
The Commission initiated the formal investigation procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) expressing significant doubts about the discriminatory fiscal treatment in favour of several specifically identified casinos in Greece that benefit from a more advantageous taxation than the one to which the rest of the casinos in the country are subject.
Kommissionen fandt ikke, at foranstaltningen overholdt de generelle regler for normal opkrævning af afgifter på entrébilletter til kasinoer, men at den forbedrede støttemodtagernes konkurrencemæssige position.
The Commission considered that the contested measure departed from the general Greek legal provisions establishing the normal level of levies on admissions in casinos and therefore improved the competitive position of the beneficiaries.
Foranstaltningen så ud til at udgøre et tab af offentlige indtægter for den græske stat og begunstige de kasinoer, hvis entrébilletter var billigere.
The Commission observed that the contested measure appeared to constitute a loss of State resources for the Greek State, and it provided an advantage to the lower priced casinos.
Kommissionen besvarede de græske myndigheders argument om, at det var kunden, der opnåede den direkte fordel, med, at subsidier til forbrugerne kunne udgøre statsstøtte til virksomheder, når subsidiet var betinget af køb af en bestemt vare eller tjeneste hos en bestemt virksomhed [35].
In response to the argument by the Greek authorities that the direct beneficiary of a lower price of admission tickets is the customer, the Commission observed that subsidies to consumers can constitute State aid to enterprises when the subsidy is conditional on the use of a particular good or service from a particular undertaking [35].
Kommissionen bemærkede også, at afgiftsniveauet ikke så ud til at være fastsat efter de enkelte kasinoers forhold [36]. Kommissionen konkluderede foreløbigt, at foranstaltningen var selektiv [37].
The Commission also observed that the level of taxation did not appear to be set according to the circumstances of each individual casino [36], and it provisionally concluded that the measure is selective [37].
Kommissionen fandt, at foranstaltningen kunne fordreje konkurrencen mellem kasinoer i Grækenland eller påvirke samhandelen i Europa.
The Commission found the contested measure was liable to distort competition between casinos in Greece, as well as in the market of European business acquisition.
Kommissionen anførte, at den fuldt ud respekterede medlemsstaternes ret til at regulere hasardspil på deres område under overholdelse af EU-retten, men kunne ikke acceptere, at dette kunne være et argument for, at denne foranstaltning ikke kunne føre til konkurrencefordrejninger eller påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstater.
The Commission noted that it fully respects the right of Member States to regulate gambling on their territory subject to EU law, but cannot accept that these arguments deprive the measure at issue of any effect of distortion of competition or on trade between Member States.
Aktørerne i denne sektor var ofte internationale hotelkoncerner, hvis investeringsbeslutninger kunne blive påvirket af denne foranstaltning, og kasinoer kunne få turister til at rejse til Grækenland.
The operators in the sector are often international hotel groups, whose decision to invest could be affected by the measure, and in fact casinos may act as an attraction to tourists to visit Greece.
Kommissionen konkluderede derfor, at foranstaltningen kunne fordreje konkurrencen og påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstater [38].
The Commission therefore concluded that the measure is capable of distorting competition and affecting trade between Member States [38].
Kommissionens foreløbige holdning var, at foranstaltningen udgjorde ulovlig støtte, da de græske myndigheder havde gennemført den uden Kommissionens forudgående tilladelse, og at støtten måske skulle tilbagesøges i medfør af artikel 15 i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999 af 22. marts 1999 om fastlæggelse af regler for anvendelsen af EF-traktatens artikel 93 (procedureforordningen) [39].
The Commission reached the preliminary conclusion that the measure constitutes unlawful aid, since it had been implemented by the Greek authorities without the prior approval of the Commission, and therefore subject to the application of Article 15 of the Procedural Regulation as regards recovery [39].
Kommissionen havde ikke fundet begrundelse for at betragte foranstaltningen som forenelig med det indre marked. Foranstaltningen så ud til at udgøre uberettiget driftsstøtte til de kasinoer, der var omfattet af den [40].
The Commission did not identify any grounds for considering the contested measure compatible with the internal market since it was considered to represent undue operating aid to the beneficiary casinos [40].
Kommissionen fremførte, at hvis dens tvivl om, hvorvidt foranstaltningen indeholdt uforenelig statsstøtte, blev bekræftet, ville den i henhold til artikel 14, stk. 1, i procedureforordningen kræve, at Grækenland tilbagesøgte støtten fra modtagerne, medmindre dette ville være i strid med et generelt princip i fællesskabslovgivningen [41].
The Commission finally observed that if its doubts that the measure contains incompatible State aid are confirmed, then pursuant to Article 14(1) of the Procedural Regulation it would be obliged to order its recovery by Greece from the beneficiaries, unless this would be contrary to a general principle of law [41].
BEMÆRKNINGER FRA DE GRÆSKE MYNDIGHEDER OG INTERESSEREDE PARTER
COMMENTS FROM THE GREEK AUTHORITIES AND THE INTERESTED THIRD PARTIES
I løbet af den formelle undersøgelse modtog Kommissionen bemærkninger fra Grækenland, repræsentanter for Elliniko Kazino Parnithas AE (»Mont Parnès«) og repræsentanter for det private kasino i Loutraki (»Loutraki«).
During the formal investigation procedure, the Commission received comments from Greece, from the representative of the company ‘Elliniko Kazino Parnithas A.E.’ (‘Mont Parnès’), and from the representatives of the private Loutraki casino (‘Loutraki’).
Bemærkninger fra Grækenland og Mont Parnès
Comments from Greece and from Mont Parnès
Bemærkningerne fra repræsentanten for det begunstigede kasino Mont Parnès og fra de græske myndigheder er i det store og hele identiske og vil blive opsummeret samlet i dette afsnit.
As the comments received from the representative of the beneficiary casino of Mont Parnès are essentially identical with the comments received from the Greek authorities, their summary has been presented together under this Section.
Statsstøtte
On the presence of aid
Både de græske myndigheder og Mont Parnès afviser, at der er tale om statsstøtte.
Both the Greek authorities and Mont Parnès contest the existence of State aid.
De fremfører, at staten ikke giver afkald på indtægter, eller at dette, hvis den gør, ikke begunstiger kasinoerne.
They both argue on the grounds that the State does not forgo any revenue (or that if it does, then the casinos do not gain any advantage).
De græske myndigheder anfører, at prisforskellen er et spørgsmål om prisregulering, da den opkrævede afgift udgør samme procentdel af de respektive priser på entrébilletterne.
The Greek authorities argue that the price differentiation is only a price regulation issue, since the tax raised is a uniform proportion of the respective value of the price of admission tickets issued.
Ifølge de græske myndigheder er formålet med at fastsætte en entrépris og kræve betaling af en afgift til staten ikke at skabe indtægter til staten, men at få folk med lav indkomst til at afholde sig fra at spille hasard.
According to the Greek authorities, the objective of the setting of a price of admission tickets and the payment to the State is not to raise revenue for the State but to discourage persons of low income from gambling.
Det forhold, at entrébilletterne også giver staten en indtægt, ændrer ikke ved disses funktion som kontrolforanstaltning.
The fact that the practice of admission tickets also results in public revenues does not alter its nature as a control measure.
De græske myndigheder finder følgelig, at kravet om, at en entrébillet skal udstedes til en bestemt pris for kunder, der får adgang til kasinoets spilleområde, er en administrativ kontrolforanstaltning, som indfører en afgift, men som ikke er en skat og ikke kan betragtes som en skattebyrde som fastlagt ved statsrådets dom nr. 4027/1998, der er den administrative højesteret i Grækenland [42].
Thus, the imposition of a price of admission tickets on casino customers entering the gaming area of casinos is regarded by the Greek authorities as constituting an onerous administrative control measure, which however lacks the character of a tax and cannot be regarded as a tax burden according to Judgement No 4027/1998 of the Council of State (the supreme administrative court of Greece) [42].
Med hensyn til forskellene mellem kasinoernes entrépriser fremfører Grækenland, at kasinoernes økonomiske og sociale omstændigheder er forskellige og ikke sammenlignelige.
As for the differences between the prices of different casinos, Greece argues that the economic and social circumstances of the various casinos are different and not comparable.
Ifølge de græske myndigheder er forskellen i afgift begrundet af hensyn til den offentlige orden. De gør gældende, at de forskellige kasinoers forhold berettiger og er i fuldstændig overensstemmelse med praksis med at fastsætte forskellige entrépriser for kasinoer, der ligger i nærheden af store befolkningscentre, og for kasinoer på landet, som især bebos af en landbobefolkning, der for de flestes vedkommende har en lavere indtægt og et lavere uddannelsesniveau og derfor har større behov for at blive tilskyndet til ikke at spille hasard end indbyggere i byområder.
The Greek authorities contend that the distinction between charges is justified on public policy grounds, including that ‘the conditions applying to each casino, justify and are fully in line with the practice of setting a different ticket price for casinos located near large urban centres … and for casinos in the countryside … which is mainly inhabited by rural populations who – in their majority – have lower incomes and educational levels and are more in need of being discouraged from playing games of chance than the inhabitants of urban areas’.
Klageren Loutraki har bemærket, at entréprisen, da kasinoet på Korfu blev privatiseret i 2010, blev sat op fra 6 til 15 EUR, hvilket ifølge Loutraki står i temmelig kraftig modstrid med argumenterne om hensynet til den offentlige orden. Hertil svarer de græske myndigheder, at øen Korfu geografisk ligger meget isoleret, og at kasinoet derfor ikke er i konkurrence med de øvrige græske kasinoer.
On the observation of the complainant (Loutraki) that the price of admission tickets for the casino of Corfu changed from EUR 6 to EUR 15 when it was privatised in 2010, which rather contradicts the public policy arguments, the Greek authorities respond that the remote geographical location of the island of Corfu makes it uncompetitive compared to all other Greek casinos (therefore it does not distort competition).
Konkurrencen kan derfor ikke blive fordrejet. De græske myndigheder fremfører videre, at det er vigtigt at sikre, at entréprisen virker afskrækkende og dermed beskytter Korfus indbyggere, da ændringerne i driften af kasinoet efter privatiseringen uundgåeligt vil medføre en drastisk forøgelse af åbningstiden, det generelle aktivitetsniveau og kasinoets tiltrækningskraft.
The authorities further argue that it is imperative to make the price of admission tickets dissuasive for the sake of protecting the inhabitants of Corfu, because the change in the operating conditions of the casino following privatisation will inevitably lead to a dramatic increase in its operating hours, its activities in general and its attractiveness.
Selv hvis kasinoer med lavere entrépris bliver begunstiget, fordi de tiltrækker flere kunder, bestrider de græske myndigheder og Mont Parnès, at der nødvendigvis er tale om tab af indtægter for staten.
The Greek authorities and Mont Parnès contend that should there be an advantage to lower priced casinos (because they attract more customers) then by the same token there is no loss of State resources.
Det er heller ikke sikkert, at disse påståede støttemodtagere, hvis entréprisen var højere, ville generere større indtægter for staten, så det påståede indtægtstab er hypotetisk.
Furthermore, it is not certain that with a higher ticket price these alleged beneficiaries would generate more revenue for the State, and the alleged loss of revenues is therefore hypothetical.
De græske myndigheder og Mont Parnès gør gældende, at det er kunden, der opnår en fordel ved den lavere entrépris, og at den del af prisen, som kasinoet beholder, er større i kasinoer med en entrépris på 15 EUR, hvilket er til fordel for de kasinoer, der har den højeste entrépris.
The Greek authorities and Mont Parnès also point out that the benefit of the lower price of admission tickets is received by the customer, and that the proportion of the price kept by the casino is a higher amount in the casinos with a EUR 15 admission, which is therefore a benefit to them.
De græske myndigheder og Mont Parnès fastholder, at denne foranstaltning ikke påvirker konkurrencen eller samhandelen, da kasinoerne hver især betjener et lokalt marked.
The Greek authorities and Mont Parnès also maintain that there is no effect on competition/trade on the basis that each casino serves a local market.
De afviser muligheden af konkurrence med andre former for hasardspil, således som det påstås i beslutningen om at indlede proceduren, og påpeger, at hasardspil over internettet for indeværende er forbudt i Grækenland.
They dispute the possibility of competition with other forms of gambling cited in the Opening Decision, noting that Internet gambling is currently illegal in Greece.
De græske myndigheder og Mont Parnès hævder, at selv hvis det antages, at den reducerede entrépris på 6 EUR kan have påvirket og stadig kan påvirke en udenlandsk virksomheds beslutning om at investere i et kasino i Grækenland, vil dette udenlandske selskab altid kunne få adgang til lovdekret 2687/1953, således som Hyatt Regency Xenodocheiaki kai Touristiki (Thessaloniki) AE gjorde i forbindelse med kasinoet i Thessaloniki.
The authorities and Mont Parnès also contend that even if the view were taken that the reduced price of admission tickets of EUR 6 might have influenced or may influence the decision of a foreign company to invest in a casino business in Greece, the foreign company could always avail itself of Law 2687/1953, as did the company Hyatt Regency Hotels and Tourism (Thessaloniki) S.A. in the case of the Thessaloniki casino.
Klageren påstår, at støttemodtagerne kan vælge at give kunderne gratis adgang, forudsat at 80 % af entréprisen alligevel indbetales til staten, og dette viser ifølge klageren meget klart, at foranstaltningen udgør statsstøtte. Hertil svarer de græske myndigheder, at denne praksis er meget sjælden, da kasinoerne benytter sig af denne mulighed til at tilbyde adgang til især VIP'er eller berømtheder, og at denne praksis er i strid med skatteloven (lov 2238/1994), eftersom betaling af 80 % af entréprisen til staten ud af virksomhedens egne ressourcer ikke anerkendes som produktive udgifter og derfor ikke kan fratrækkes virksomhedens indtægter, hvorfor en virksomhed, der gør dette, påfører sig selv en betydelig skattebyrde.
As regards the allegations of complainant that the beneficiaries are able to grant admission gratuitously, while the 80 % contribution still has to be paid and which therefore illustrates most clearly the aid character of the measure, the Greek authorities claim that the practice is ‘exceptional’, as casinos allegedly make use of this exception to offer free admission (as a courtesy) mainly to VIPs or famous customers and as this practice is contrary to tax law (Law 2238/1994), since the expenditure from paying 80 % of the ticket price to the State from own resources is not recognised as productive expenditure and cannot be deducted from the company’s revenues (which would expose the company applying this practice to substantial tax burdens).
Myndighederne og Mont Parnès gør endvidere Kommissionen opmærksom på andre forskelle mellem kasinoerne under forskellige skatte- og lovgivningsforanstaltninger.
The authorities and Mont Parnès further draw the attention of the Commission to other differences between casinos in terms of various fiscal/regulatory measures.
De siger, at disse forskelle begunstiger klageren Loutraki og opvejer de fordele, som støttemodtagerne har på grund af den lavere entrépris.
Thus, these differences which allegedly favour Loutraki (the complainant) would counter-balance the advantages that the beneficiaries enjoy due to the lower price of admission tickets.
Alle kasinoer betaler en andel af bruttofortjenesten til staten. Den væsentligste foranstaltning i denne sammenhæng er en foranstaltning om, at loven kræver en lavere andel af Loutraki end af de andre.
The main measure invoked is that each casino pays a proportion of annual gross profits to the State but under the law the proportion is lower for Loutraki than for others.
Kommissionen påpeger for det første, at hvis de andre foranstaltninger, som de græske myndigheder og Mont Parnès nævner, rent faktisk findes, kan de udgøre en særskilt støtteforanstaltning, der begunstiger Loutraki, forudsat at alle bestemmelser i gældende EU-lovgivning om statsstøtte er opfyldt.
On this point however, the Commission firstly observes that these other measures invoked by the Greek authorities and Mont Parnès, in case of existence, might constitute a separate aid measure in favour of Loutraki, if all conditions provided by the applicable EU State aid law are met.
Men under alle omstændigheder vedrører de ikke den foranstaltning, der er under vurdering, og falder uden for rammerne for nærværende beslutning.
In any event these measures are distinct from the measure under assessment and therefore they are not covered by the present Decision.
Endelig har Grækenland anført, at man overvejer at ændre prispolitikken for kasinoer for at fjerne forskelsbehandlingen mellem dem.
Finally, Greece has indicated that it is examining a potential change of the pricing policy of casinos, in order to eliminate discriminations between casinos.
Kommissionen er dog endnu ikke blevet informeret om, at man er i færd med at gennemføre en sådan ændring.
However, it has not yet informed the Commission of the implementation of any such change.
De græske myndigheder og Mont Parnès har ikke fremsendt bemærkninger vedrørende støttens forenelighed og lovlighed.
The Greek authorities and Mont Parnès did not submit any observations concerning the compatibility and the legality of the aid.
Støttens størrelse og tilbagebetaling
On the quantification and recovery of the aid
Alternativt hævder de græske myndigheder og Mont Parnès, at selv hvis det konstateres, at foranstaltningen udgør ulovlig og uforenelig statsstøtte, strider tilbagebetaling af den mod to principper. Det strider mod princippet om borgernes berettigede forventninger.
The Greek Authorities and Mont Parnès contend by way of subsidiary argument that even if it were found that the measure under assessment is unlawful and incompatible State aid, any recovery of that aid would run counter to:
Spørgsmålet om entréprisen til kasinoer, og mere specifikt i hvilket omfang entréprisen skal være en økonomisk byrde for kasinoerne, blev forelagt statsrådet for omkring 15 år siden [43].
The principle of reasonable confidence of the subject of administration: the issue of the price of admission tickets to the casinos, and particularly the extent to which this price of admission tickets is a financial burden on the casinos, was brought before the Council of State approximately 15 years ago [43].
Statsrådet besluttede i henhold til national lov, at entréprisen ikke havde karakter af en afgift, hvilket indirekte viste, at den ikke var en økonomisk byrde for kasinoerne.
The Council of State ruled, under national law, that the price of admission tickets did not have a fiscal nature, which indirectly shows that it was not a financial burden on the casinos.
De begunstigede kasinoer kunne derfor med rimelighed handle ud fra den antagelse, at der ikke kunne være tale om statsstøtte på grund af en differentiering af disse priser, der ikke blev betragtet som en økonomisk byrde under national lov. Det strider mod princippet om, at en rettighed ikke må misbruges.
Therefore, the beneficiary casinos could reasonably base their conduct on the assumption that there could be no question of State aid arising from differentiation in these prices, which are not considered a financial burden under national law.