natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Det var med andre ord ikke nødvendigt at opstille salget af værftet som en betingelse, eftersom der allerede eksisterende en gyldig salgskontrakt.
In other word, it was not necessary to put the sale of the yard as a condition since a valid sale contract already existed.
I beslutning C 10/94 erindres der indledningsvis om, at artikel 10 i direktiv 90/684/EØF krævede, at værftet blev solgt.
Decision C 10/94 starts by recalling that Article 10 of the Directive 90/684/EEC required the sale of the yard.
Det er derpå anført i beslutning C 10/94, at denne betingelse blev opfyldt, eftersom »49 % af aktierne i værftet blev solgt den 18. september 1995 til et kooperativ dannet af de ansatte på værftet«.
Decision C 10/94 then indicates than this condition was fulfilled since ‘49 % of the shares in the yard were sold on 18 September 1995 to a cooperative of the yard’s workers’.
Da støttebeløbet imidlertid er større end det, der var godkendt i direktiv 90/684/EØF, »kunne Kommissionen ikke give sin godkendelse på grundlag af bestemmelserne i det 7. direktiv«, som derfor blev ændret ved forordning (EF) nr. 1013/97 med henblik på at øge det støttebeløb, der kan ydes til HSY.
However, since the aid amount is larger than what the Directive 90/684/EEC authorised, ‘The Commission could not give its approval on the basis of the provisions of the 7th Directive’ which therefore was amended by Regulation (EC) No 1013/97 to increase the amount of aid that can be granted to HSY.
Eftersom betingelserne i sidstnævnte forordning og betingelserne i direktiv 90/684/EØF blev opfyldt, godkendtes støtten ved beslutning C 10/94.
Since the conditions laid down in the latter regulation and the conditions laid down in Directive 90/684/EEC were met, Decision C 10/94 authorised the aid.
Kommissionen bemærker, at man i beslutning C 10/94 igen anvendte ordet »solgt« og antog, at kontrakten mellem ETVA og de ansatte vedrørende salget af 49 % af aktierne i HSY var et gyldigt salg.
The Commission observes that Decision C 10/94 again used the word ‘sold’ and considered that the contract between ETVA and the employees concerning the sale of 49 % of HSY shares was a valid sale.
Kommissionen understreger, at den havde modtaget en kopi af salgskontrakten inden vedtagelsen af beslutning C 10/94 og derfor havde kendskab til dens indhold.
The Commission underlines that it had received a copy of the sale contract before the adoption of decision C 10/94 and was therefore aware of its content.
Kommissionen konkluderer, at den i forbindelse med vedtagelsen af beslutning C 10/94 ikke havde nogen grund til at forlange, at HSY blev solgt (dvs. anføre det som en udtrykkelig betingelse, der skulle overholdes i fremtiden), da en gyldig salgskontrakt allerede var blevet undertegnet i september 1995.
The Commission concludes that, when adopting decision C 10/94, the Commission had no reason to request the sale of HSY (i.e. to put it as an explicit condition to be respected in the future) since a valid sale contract had already been signed in September 1995.
Indtil de ansattes betaling af købsprisen ville ETVA fortsat have pant i aktierne.
Until the payment of the purchase price by the employees, ETVA will keep a pledge on the shares.
For at finansiere betalingen af de årlige afdrag til ETVA ville HSY tilbageholde en del af de ansattes månedsløn og tillæg.
In order to finance the payment of the yearly instalments to ETVA, HSY would retain a part of the monthly salary and of the allowances of the employees.
I månederne efter september 1995 blev der undertegnet en kontrakt mellem ETVA, HSY, de ansattes forening og hver enkelt af HSY's ansatte (kontrakten fra september 1995 blev indgået mellem ETVA og de ansattes forening).
In the months following September 1995, a contract was signed between ETVA, HSY, the association of the employees and each individual employee of HSY (the contract of September 1995 was concluded between ETVA and the association of employees).
Ved denne kontrakt indvilgede hver ansat i at købe et givet antal aktier i overensstemmelse med vilkårene i kontrakten fra september 1995.
By this contract, each employee agreed to purchase a given number of shares in accordance with the terms of the September 1995 contract.
Disse kontrakter gentager også, at HSY vil tilbageholde en del af månedslønnen og påske- og julegratialet til at finansiere de årlige afdrag. Kommissionen har nu fastslået, at de ansatte aldrig har betalt de årlige afdrag.
These contracts also repeat that HSY will retain a part of the monthly wage and of the Easter and Christmas allowance to finance the annual instalments.
Dette betyder, at de ikke betalte noget afdrag, mens de deltog i ledelsen af værftet som ejer af 49 % af aktierne.
The Commission has now established that the employees have never paid the yearly instalments. This means that they have not paid them while they were participating in the management of the yard as owner of 49 % of the shares.
De tre første afdrag, der er fastsat i kontrakten fra september 1995 — de afdrag, der skulle have været betalt i 1998, 1999 og 2000 — blev ikke betalt.
The first three instalments defined in the September 1995 contract — the ones that should have been paid in 1998, in 1999 and in 2000 — were not paid.
I 2001 indgik de ansatte og ETVA inden for rammerne af privatiseringen af HSY en kontrakt, hvorved de ansatte gav afkald på deres krav på 49 % af indtægterne ved salget af aktierne i HSY til HDW/Ferrostaal.
In 2001, in the framework of the privatisation of HSY, the employees and ETVA concluded a contract by which the employees gave up their claim on 49 % of the revenue from the sale of HSY’s shares to HDW/Ferrostaal.
Kommissionen meddelte Grækenland og HSY, at de ansattes manglende betaling af købsprisen synes at udgøre et misbrug af beslutning C 10/94, eftersom det medfører, at den delvise privatisering, som tog sigte på at genskabe værftets konkurrenceevne, aldrig fandt sted.
The Commission indicated to Greece and HSY that the non-payment of the purchase price by the employees seems to constitute a misuse of decision C 10/94 since it entails that the partial privatisation, aiming at restoring the competitiveness of the yard, never took place.
Grækenland og HSY har anfægtet disse konklusioner.
Greece and HSY contest these conclusions.
De har bl.a. fremført følgende tre anbringender for at bortvejre Kommissionens tvivl.
Among others, they raise the following three grounds to dismiss the Commission doubts.
Som et første anbringende har Grækenland gjort gældende, at privatiseringen er »reel« og »ægte«.
As a first ground, Greece claims that the privatisation is ‘real’ and ‘genuine’.
Den græske regering har navnlig understreget følgende: »De ansatte blev aktionærer i overensstemmelse med bestemmelserne i græsk ret.
In particular, the Greek Government underlines that: ‘The employees acquired the shareholder’s capacity according to the provisions of Greek law.
De blev registreret i virksomhedens aktionærbog og erhvervede alle relevante rettigheder som aktionærer, herunder retten til at deltage i og stemme på generalforsamlinger og derved udøve kontrol over og indflydelse på skibsværfternes daglige administration.
They were registered in the company’s Shareholders’ Book and acquired all relevant rights as shareholders, including the right to participate and vote in the General Meetings and thus exercising control and influence on the day-to-day administration of the shipyards.
Desuden var erhvervelsen af aktier forbundet med den risiko, at aktierne kunne miste deres værdi«.
In addition, the acquisition of shares entailed the risk that the shares might loose their value’.
»De ansatte udøvede deres forkøbsret i henhold til de relevante love og deltog i aktiekapitalforhøjelsen i forhold til deres andel af aktiekapitalen; der blev derfor investeret privat kapital i skibsværfterne«.
‘The employees exercised their pre-emption rights, provided by the relevant laws, and participated in the share capital increase, pro rata to their stake in the share capital, therefore private capital was invested in the shipyards’.
Som et andet anbringende har Grækenland gjort gældende, at betalingen af købsprisen ikke var en betingelse, der var fastsat i beslutning C 10/94, og selv hvis det var tilfældet, anså Kommissionen den som allerede opfyldt.
As a second ground, Greece claims that the payment of the purchase price was not a condition laid down in decision C 10/94, and even if it was the case, the Commission considered it as already fulfilled.
Grækenland minder navnlig om, at »Kommissionen nævnte i sin beslutning af 31. oktober 1995, at den inden for rammerne af den procedure, den havde indledt, vil fortsætte med at undersøge alle den græske stats foranstaltninger med hensyn til gennemførelsen af aftalen om at overføre 49 % af aktionerne til de ansattes forening samt indholdet heraf, inden den træffer en endelig beslutning om godkendelsen af gældsafskrivningen.
In particular, Greece recalls that ‘The Commission mentioned in its Decision of 31 October 1995 that it will continue to examine, within the procedure it had opened, all the actions of the Greek Government regarding the application of the agreement to transfer 49 % of the shares to the employees’ union, as well as its content, before taking a final decision on the authorisation of the debt write-off.
Ved at handle i overensstemmelse hermed nåede den frem til en endelig positiv beslutning i 1997, hvori afskrivningen blev godkendt, uden at stille betingelse om privatisering.
By acting accordingly, it reached a final positive decision in 1997 which approved the write-off, without imposing the condition of privatisation.
Kommissionen havde med andre ord allerede undersøgt aftalens indhold i 1997 og konkluderet, at der var tale om privatisering, inden den godkendte gældsafskrivningen«.
In other words, the Commission had already examined in 1997 the content of the agreement and had concluded that it is a matter of privatisation before authorising the debt write-off;’.
Som et tredje anbringende har Grækenland gjort gældende, at ETVA anvendte salgskontrakten korrekt.
As a third ground, Greece claims that ETVA has correctly applied the sale contract.
Da de ansatte allerede havde været nødt til at deltage i tre kapitalforhøjelser, der havde til formål at finansiere investeringsplanen, fandt de »det vanskeligt at opfylde deres forpligtelse til at betale prisen for aktierne.
Indeed, the employees, since they already had to participate in three capital increases aimed at financing the investment plan, ‘found it difficult to honour their commitment to pay the price of the shares.
ETVA traf ikke foranstaltninger med henblik på at tilbagesøge det beløb, som hver af de 2000 ansatte skyldte, da der realistisk set ikke var nogen chance for et positivt resultat af et sådant sagsanlæg […].
ETVA did not take out injunctions in order to recover the amount owed by each of the 2000 employees because, realistically, there was no chance of bringing any such action to a successful conclusion […].
I stedet for at indlede komplicerede, tidskrævende, kostbare og i sidste instans resultatløse retssager med henblik på at få opfyldt sine krav […] fuldbyrdede ETVA pantet i de ikke-betalte aktier og fik indfriet sine krav ved hjælp af provenuet af salget af de aktier, der tilhørte de ansatte, idet det nævnte provenu dækkede den pågældende gæld.« Grækenland har med andre ord gjort gældende, at eftersom ETVA inden for rammerne af privatiseringen af HSY i 2001-2002 fra HDW/Ferrostaal modtog 100 % af salgsprisen — i stedet for kun 51 % — »fremgår det, at prisen blev betalt.
Rather than engaging in complicated, time-consuming, costly and ultimately futile court proceedings in order to satisfy its claims […], ETVA enforced the pledge on the unpaid shares and recovered its claim from the proceeds of the sale of the shares belonging to the employees, in that the said proceeds covered the debt in question’, In other words, Greece claims that, since in the framework of HSY’s privatisation in 2001–2002 ETVA received from HDW/Ferrostaal 100 % of the sale price — instead of only 51 % — ‘it may be seen that the price was received.
Det er klart, at betalingen af prisen for de ansattes aktier ved hjælp af salget opfyldte ETVA's krav om betaling heraf […].
It is evident that the discharge of the price of the workers’ shares by means of the sale satisfied ETVA’s requirement to be paid the price […].
[…] der er ikke tale om manglende betaling af overtagelsesprisen.« Desuden kan det ikke anfægtes, at salget til HDW/Ferrostaal udgør en reel privatisering.
[…] there is no issue of non-payment of the buy-out price’. In addition, it can not be contested that the sale to HDW/Ferrostaal constitutes a real privatisation.
Kommissionen er nået til følgende konklusioner.
The Commission has reached the following conclusions.
Som nævnt konkluderes det i beslutning C 10/94 og forordning (EF) nr. 1013/97, at eftersom aktierne i HSY var blevet solgt til de ansatte ved kontrakten fra september 1995, var betingelsen om salget af værftet i artikel 10 i direktiv 90/684/EØF opfyldt.
As indicated earlier, decision C 10/94 and Regulation (EC) No 1013/97 concluded that, since the shares of HSY had been sold to the employees by the September 1995 contract, the condition of the sale of the yard laid down in Article 10 of the Directive 90/684/EEC was fulfilled.
Formålet med denne betingelse var som nævnt at overføre ejerskabet til ejere, som — eftersom de ville tilstræbe at opnå den størst mulige værdi af deres investering — ville træffe de foranstaltninger, der var nødvendige for at genskabe værfternes konkurrenceevne.
As indicated earlier, the purpose of this condition was to transfer the ownership to owners who, since they would aim at maximising the value of their investment, would take the measures necessary to restore the competitiveness of the yards.
I denne forbindelse accepterede Kommissionen kontrakten fra september 1995 som et gyldigt salg, da den kontraktligt forpligtede de ansatte til at betale 24 mio. EUR til gengæld for en aktiepost på 49 % i HSY.
In this context, the Commission accepted the September 1995 contract as a valid sale since it contractually obliged the employees to pay EUR 24 million in exchange of a 49 % stake in HSY.
Betalingen af denne pris indebar, at de ansatte, når de deltog i ledelsen af værftet, ville sørge for at opretholde og øge værdien af deres investering.
This price to pay entailed that, when participating to the management of the yard, the employees would take care of preserving and increasing the value of their investment.
ETVA kontrollerede HSY, som havde juridisk ret til at opkræve beløbene i de ansattes lønninger og tillæg.
ETVA controlled HSY, which was legally entitled to collect the amounts from the wages and allowances of the employees.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at de græske myndigheder bevidst ikke anmodede de ansatte om betaling af de årlige afdrag.
The Commission therefore concludes that the Greek authorities consciously did not request the payment of the annual instalments from the employees.
Ved at handle på denne måde viste Grækenland, at det ikke havde til hensigt at opnå betaling af købsprisen fra de ansatte.
By adopting this behaviour, Greece showed that it did not intend to obtain from the employees the payment of the purchase price.
Dette betyder, at da de deltog i ledelsen af værftet, lagde de mindre vægt på opretholdelsen og forhøjelsen af aktiernes værdi og genoprettelsen af den finansielle levedygtighed (og større vægt på at bevare beskæftigelsen og arbejdsvilkårene).
This means that, when participating in the management of the yard, they attached less importance to the preservation and the increase of the value of the shares and the restoration of financial viability (and more to the preservation of the employment and of the working conditions).
Da de desuden ikke betalte købsprisen, kunne det forventes, at ETVA på mellemlang eller lang sigt ville fuldbyrde sit pant i aktierne, og at de ansatte derfor ikke længere ville have nogen aktiepost i værftet.
In addition, since they were not paying the purchase price, it could be expected that over the medium or long term, ETVA would enforce its pledge on the shares and therefore the employees would simply have no shareholding anymore in the yard.
I denne forbindelse kan Kommissionen ikke se, hvordan de ansatte kunne være interesseret i at opretholde og øge HSY's værdi og træffe de nødvendige foranstaltninger til at genskabe dets konkurrenceevne.
In this context, the Commission fails to see how the employees could have been interested in preserving and increasing the value of HSY and taking the necessary measures to restore its competitiveness.
Kommissionen finder derfor, at den omstændighed, at staten ikke forsøgte at opnå betaling af købsprisen fra de ansatte i henhold til kontrakten fra september 1995, ændrede drastisk de ansattes situation, da de deltog i ledelsen af værftet.
The Commission therefore considers that the fact that the State did not seek to obtain the payment of the purchase price from the employees under the terms of the September 1995 contract dramatically changed the situation of employees when they were participating in the management of the yard.
Da ETVA ikke forsøgte at opnå betaling af købsprisen fra de ansatte, udgjorde den ændring af ejerskabet, der fandt sted i september 1995, derfor ikke et reelt »salg«, der tog sigte på at genskabe værftets konkurrenceevne, som det kræves i direktiv 90/684/EØF.
Consequently, because ETVA did not seek the payment of the purchase price from the employees, the change of ownership that took place in September 1995 did not constituted a real ‘sale’, aiming at restoration of competitiveness of the yard, as requested by Directive 90/684/EEC.
Ved ikke at forsøge at opnå betaling af købsprisen fra de ansatte har Grækenland derfor misbrugt beslutning C 10/1994.
In conclusion, by not seeking the payment of the purchase price from the employees, Greece has misused decision C 10/94.
Sidstnævnte blev således vedtaget af Kommissionen på grundlag af den berettigede forventning, at kontrakten fra september 1995 ville blive gennemført af den statsejede bank ETVA, og navnlig, at ETVA ville opkræve betalingen af købsprisen hos HSY's ansatte i overensstemmelse med de præcise bestemmelser i kontrakten og herved sikre, at disse nye ejere har en finansiel interesse i at støtte de foranstaltninger, der er nødvendige for at genoprette konkurrenceevne og rentabilitet.
Indeed, the latter was adopted by the Commission on the basis of the legitimate assumption that the September 1995 contract would be implemented by the State-owned bank ETVA, and in particular that ETVA would collect the payment of the purchase price from HSY employees in accordance with the precise provisions laid down in the contract, hereby ensuring that these new owners have a financial interest in supporting the measures necessary to restore competitiveness and viability.
Kommissionen kunne ikke forvente, at Grækenland, efter selv at have præsenteret kontrakten fra september 1995 som et salg af HSY, bevidst ville afstå fra at opnå betaling af købsprisen fra køberen, selv om der fandtes en række kontrakt- og lovbestemmelser, der muliggjorde opkrævningen af prisen.
The Commission could not expect that Greece, after having itself presented the September 1995 contract as a sale of HSY, would consciously refrain from obtaining the payment of the sale price from the purchaser, despite the existence of several contractual and legal provisions allowing the collection of the price.
Kommissionen finder, at en sådan adfærd er ensbetydende med afgivelse af ukorrekte oplysninger til Kommissionen og et misbrug af støtte.
The Commission considers that such behaviour is similar to the submission of incorrect information to the Commission and to a misuse of aid.
Den støtte, der er godkendt ved beslutning C 10/94, bør derfor tilbagesøges fra HSY.
The aid authorised by Decision C 10/94 should therefore be recovered from HSY.
Kommissionen er nået til den konklusion, at de tre anbringender, som Grækenland og HSY har fremført, og som er opsummeret ovenfor, bør afvises.
The Commission has reached the conclusion that the three grounds raised by Greece and HSY which have been summarised earlier should be dismissed.
Med hensyn til det første anbringende (dvs. at privatiseringen var ægte og reel, fordi de ansatte fik ejerskab til aktierne og den tilsvarende kontrol med HSY) bemærker Kommissionen, at overførslen af ejerskabet var en nødvendig, men ikke tilstrækkelig betingelse.
As regards the first ground — the privatisation was genuine and real because the employees got ownership of the shares and the corresponding control over HSY — the Commission observes that the transfer of the ownership was a necessary but not sufficient condition.
Da de ikke skulle betale prisen, befandt de sig som nævnt i en anden situation end en markedsøkonomisk ejer.
As indicated earlier, since they did not had to pay this price, they were in a different situation from a market economy owner.
Med hensyn til Grækenlands påstand om, at »erhvervelsen af aktier var forbundet med den risiko, at aktierne kunne miste deres værdi«, bemærker Kommissionen, at selv om det er ubestridt, at de ansatte formelt blev ejer af aktierne, var de meget mindre optaget af udviklingen i aktiernes værdi, eftersom de ikke skulle betale en høj pris (dvs. nedsættelse af lønninger og tillæg i tolv år) for at opnå dem.
As regards Greece’s claim that ‘the acquisition of shares entailed the risk that the shares might loose their value’, the Commission notes that, while it is undisputed that the employees become formally the owner of the shares, they were much less concerned by the evolution of the value of the shares since they did not have to pay a high price (i.e. reduction of the wages and allowances during 12 years) to obtain them.
Da de ansatte desuden ikke betalte købsprisen, måtte de forvente, at ETVA ville fuldbyrde sit pant i aktierne, således at de ansatte ikke ville forblive ejer af disse aktier.
In addition, since the employees were not paying the purchase price, they had to expect that ETVA would enforce its pledge on the shares, such that the employees would not remain the owners of these shares.
Endelig med hensyn til Grækenlands påstand om, at »[d]e ansatte […] deltog i aktiekapitalforhøjelsen i forhold til deres andel af aktiekapitalen; der blev derfor investeret privat kapital i skibsværfterne«, anfægter Kommissionen ikke, at de ansatte deltog i kapitalforhøjelsen (dette vil blive beskrevet i forbindelse med beskrivelsen og vurderingen af foranstaltning E10).
Finally, as regards Greece’s claims that ‘The employees […] participated in the share capital increase, pro rata to their stake in the share capital, therefore private capital was invested in the shipyards’, the Commission does not contest that the employees participated to the capital increase (this will be described in the description and assessment of measure E10).
Kommissionen minder imidlertid om, at ifølge kontrakten fra september 1995 gav deltagelse i kapitalforhøjelsen ikke de ansatte ret til nye aktier i HSY.
However, the Commission recalls that, according to the September 1995 contract, the participation to the capital increase did not entitle the employees to any new shares of HSY.
Kommissionen kan derfor ikke se, hvordan denne deltagelse alene kunne tilskynde de ansatte til at forvalte værftet på en måde, der opretholder eller øger værdien af aktierne, eftersom denne deltagelse ikke gav dem nye aktier.
The Commission therefore fails to see how this participation alone could incite the employees to manage the yard in a way that preserves or increases the value of the shares since this participation did not give them any new shares.
Kommissionen kan heller ikke se, hvordan denne deltagelse kunne udgøre et »salg« af HSY, eftersom de ansatte ikke modtog yderligere aktier som modydelse for deres investeringer.
The Commission also fails to see how this participation could constitute a ‘sale’ of HSY since the employees did not receive additional shares in exchange of their investments.