natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Endelig bemærker Kommissionen, at de truende finansielle vanskeligheder gav anledning til strid mellem værftets uafhængige ledelsesteam (dvs. Brown & Root, som blev udpeget i september 1996) og de ansatte/aktionærerne.
Finally, the Commission notes that the looming financial difficulties caused a dispute between the independent management team of the yard (i.e. Brown & Root, which was appointed in September 1996) and the employees/shareholders.
Navnlig fastholdt ledelsen, at det var nødvendigt at foretage en yderligere nedskæring af arbejdsstyrken på grund af det lave aktivitetsniveau.
In particular, the management insisted on the necessity to carry out additional workforce reduction due to the low level of activity.
Fagforeningslederne var imod en sådan reform, og det lykkedes dem at afsætte ledelsesteamet.
The union leaders opposed to such a reform and succeeded in getting the management team ousted.
En sådan begivenhed, som medførte en manglende kontinuitet i ledelsen og viste vanskeligheden ved at gennemføre tilstrækkelige reformer på værftet, var et yderligere element, som havde afholdt en markedsøkonomisk investor fra at yde lån til HSY.
Such an event, creating management discontinuity and illustrating the difficulty to implement sufficient reforms in the yard, was an additional element which would have deterred a market economy investor to lend money to HSY.
På baggrund af ovenstående konkluderer Kommissionen, at det fra den 30. juni 1999 ikke længere var rimeligt at forvente en genoprettelse af rentabiliteten.
From the foregoing, the Commission concludes that from 30 June 1999 it was not reasonable anymore to expect a return to viability.
Kommissionen mener derfor, at ingen bank fra det tidspunkt havde accepteret at yde lån til værftet, end ikke til høje rentesatser, og at ingen bank havde accepteret at stille en garanti, end ikke til gengæld for et højt garantigebyr.
Consequently, the Commission considers that from that date no bank would have accepted to lend to the yard anymore, even at high interest rates, and no bank would have accepted to grant a guarantee anymore, even in exchange of a high guarantee fee.
Eftersom HSY ikke havde opnået et lån eller en garanti på markedet, udgør ethvert lån eller enhver garanti, der er ydet efter den 30. juni 1999, automatisk støtte.
Since HSY would not have received a loan or guarantee from the market, any loan or guarantee granted after 30 June 1999 automatically constitutes aid.
Enhver garanti, som måtte blive anset for at være uforenelig, og som stadig er i kraft, skal straks bringes til ophør, og ethvert lån skal straks tilbagebetales.
If found incompatible and still outstanding, any guarantee has to be stopped immediately, and any loan has to be immediately reimbursed.
Tilbagebetalingen — efter den normale tidsplan, der er fastsat i lånekontrakten, og på grundlag denne beslutning — af ethvert lån, der er ydet efter den 30. juni 1999, er imidlertid ikke tilstrækkelig til at genoprette den oprindelige situation, eftersom HSY indtil tilbagebetalingstidspunktet har haft midler til rådighed, som det ikke normalt havde opnået på markedet.
The reimbursement — following the normal time schedule laid down in the loan contract and following from the present decision — of any loan granted after 30 June 1999 is however not sufficient to restore the initial situation since until the reimbursement date HSY has had at its disposal a financing that it normally would not have obtained from the market.
For at genoprette den oprindelige situation bør denne fordel, hvis størrelse kun kan anslås ved hjælp af rentesatsen på et meget risikobetonet lån, derfor også opvejes.
In order to restore the initial situation, this advantage, of which the size can only be approximated by using the interest rate of a very risky loan, should therefore also be recovered.
For perioden fra udbetalingen af lånet til HSY og indtil HSY's tilbagebetaling heraf skal Kommissionen derfor kræve betaling af forskellen mellem den rentesats, som HSY faktisk har betalt, og en rentesats, som teoretisk er passende for et lån, der er forbundet med en meget høj risiko.
Therefore, for the period running from the pay-out of the loan to HSY until the reimbursement by HSY, the Commission has to order the recovery the difference between the interest rate actually paid by HSY and an interest rate theoretically adequate for a loan presenting a very high risk.
Med hensyn til fastsættelsen af sidstnævnte rentesats bemærker Kommissionen, at risikopræmien ifølge Kommissionens meddelelse om metoden for fastsættelse af referencesatsen og kalkulationsrenten kan sættes op til 400 basispoint over referencesatsen, »hvis ingen privat bank havde accepteret at yde det omhandlede lån«, hvilket er situationen i dette tilfælde.
In order to determine the latter interest rate, the Commission notes that the Commission notice on the method for setting the reference and discount rates indicates that the risk premium may be higher than 400 basis points above the reference rate ‘if no private bank would have agreed to grant the relevant loan’, which is the situation in the present case.
I en række beslutninger har Kommissionen fundet, at en præmie på 600 basispoint over referencesatsen var et tilstrækkeligt minimum til at afspejle en situation, der er forbundet med en høj risiko.
In several decisions, the Commission has considered that a premium of 600 basis points above the reference rate was adequate minimum to reflect a situation containing a high risk.
Kommissionen finder, at dette udgør minimummet for lån i den foreliggende situation.
The Commission considers that this constitutes the minimum for loans in the present situation.
Med hensyn til statsgarantier, der er ydet efter den 30. juni 1999, vil Kommissionen anvende samme tilgang: For perioden fra udbetalingen af det garanterede lån og indtil garantiens ophør — hvad enten det er efter den normale tidsplan, der er fastsat i garantikontrakten, eller på grundlag denne beslutning — vil Kommissionen kræve betaling af forskellen mellem omkostningen ved det garanterede lån (rentesats betalt til banken plus betalt garantipræmie) og referencesatsen for Grækenland forhøjet med 600 basispoint.
As regards State guarantees granted after 30 June 1999, the Commission will use the same approach: for the period for the pay-out of the guaranteed loan until the termination of the guarantee — whether following the normal calendar laid down in the guarantee contract or following from the present decision — the Commission will order the recovery of the difference between the cost of the guaranteed loan (interest rate paid to the bank plus guarantee premium paid) and the reference rate for Greece increased by 600 basis points.
Til støtte for sin påstand om, at lånene og garantierne fra staten og ETVA kunne have været ydet på samme vilkår af en privat bank, fremlagde HSY den første Deloitte-rapport.
In order to underpin its claim that the loans and guarantees granted by the State and ETVA could have been granted at the same terms by a private bank, HSY has submitted the first Deloitte report.
I afsnit 5 i denne rapport analyserer Deloitte HSY's kreditværdighed i 1999 og i de følgende år.
In the section 5 of this report, Deloitte analyses the creditworthiness of HSY in 1999 and in the following years.
Endvidere bemærker Kommissionen, at analysen indeholder en række fejl, som i betydelig grad påvirker konklusionen.
In addition, the Commission notes that the analysis contains a series of errors, which significantly bias the conclusion.
Koncernintern analyse
Intra-group analysis
Alle lån og garantier, der er omfattet af denne procedure, blev ydet af ETVA eller af staten.
All the loans and guarantees subject to the current procedure were granted by ETVA or by the State.
De græske myndigheder har gjort gældende, at eftersom ETVA og den græske stat (via ETVA) var aktionærer i HSY, kunne lånene og garantierne betragtes som koncerninterne transaktioner.
The Greek authorities claim that since ETVA and the Greek State (through ETVA) were shareholders of HSY, the loans and guarantees could be seen as intra-group transactions.
I denne forbindelse har Grækenland fremført to påstande:
In this context, Greece makes two claims:
For det første er det normalt, at et moderselskab yder lån til sit datterselskab på gunstige vilkår.
First, that it is normal for a mother company to lend at favourable conditions to its subsidiary.
Den fordel, der indrømmes datterselskabet, øger således værdien af moderselskabets aktiepost.
Indeed, the advantage granted to the subsidiary increases the value of the shares held by the mother company.
Selv hvis Kommissionen finder, at ETVA og staten ydede lån og garantier til en pris under markedsprisen, havde dette derfor været acceptabelt for en markedsøkonomisk investor i en lignende situation.
Therefore, even if the Commission would consider that ETVA and the State granted loans and guarantees at a price below the market price, this would have been acceptable to a market economy investor in a similar situation.
Disse lån og garantier ville derfor ikke udgøre støtte.
Consequently, these loans and guarantees would not constitute aid,
For det andet er det normalt, at et moderselskab yder lån til sit kriseramte datterselskab.
Second, it is normal for a mother company to lend to its subsidiary in difficulty.
En sådan långivning har til formål at bevare værdien af moderselskabets aktiepost.
Indeed, such lending aims at preserving the value of the shareholding held by the mother company.
Selv hvis Kommissionen skulle finde, at ingen privat bank havde ydet lån til HSY i en vis periode, fordi værftets situation var for dårlig, bør lån og garantier fra ETVA og staten ikke desto mindre anses for at være acceptable for en privat investor under lignende omstændigheder.
Therefore, even if the Commission should consider that no private bank would have lend to HSY during a certain period because the yard’s situation was too bad, loans and guarantees granted by ETVA and by the State should nevertheless be considered as acceptable for a private investor in similar circumstances.
Disse lån og garantier ville derfor ikke udgøre støtte.
These loans and guarantees would therefore not constitute aid.
Efter Kommissionens opfattelse er Grækenlands konklusioner ikke korrekte.
The Commission consider that Greece’s conclusions are not correct.
For det første gør Kommissionen opmærksom på følgende to elementer.
First, the Commission notes the two following elements.
I det første tilfælde havde ingen markedsøkonomisk investor bragt sig i ETVA's situation.
In first instance, no market economy investor would have found itself in the situation of ETVA.
Det skal f.eks. erindres, at da ETVA købte HSY i 1985, var den en udviklingsbank, som handlede efter instruks fra regeringen for at undgå lukning af en virksomhed af stor betydning for den græske økonomi.
Indeed, it is recalled for instance that when ETVA purchased HSY in 1985, it was a development bank, acting upon order of the government, in order to avoid the closure of a company of significant importance for the Greek economy.
For at holde HSY i live foretog ETVA en kapitaltilførsel i 1986, som Kommissionen anså for at udgøre støtte .
In order to keep HSY alive, ETVA made in 1986 a capital injection, which was found to constitute aid by the Commission .
I 1995 bevarede ETVA »en majoritetsbesiddelse på 51 %« i HSY, da det ifølge Grækenland var »begrundet med forsvarsmæssige interesser«, i overensstemmelse med artikel 10 i direktiv 90/684/EØF.
In 1995, ETVA kept ‘a 51 % majority holding’ in HSY because Greece claimed it was ‘justified by defence interest’, in accordance with Article 10 of Directive 90/684/EEC.
I det andet tilfælde bemærker Kommissionen, at det under hensyntagen til alle de foranstaltninger, som er gennemført af staten (herunder de foranstaltninger, der er gennemført af ETVA, eftersom de kan tilregnes staten, hvilket vil blive påvist senere i denne beslutning,) til fordel for HSY — og navnlig den gentagne og store statsstøtte til HSY i perioden indtil 2002 — klart fremgår, at staten i perioden indtil 2002 ikke har handlet som en markedsøkonomisk investor.
In second instance, the Commission observes, when all the measures implemented by the State (including the measures implemented by ETVA, since, as will be demonstrated later in this Decision, they are imputable to the State) in favour of HSY are taken into account — and in particular the repeated and large State aids granted to HSY in the period until 2002 —, it appears clearly that, during the period until 2002, the State has not acted as a market economy investor.
Den har til stadighed tilvejebragt den omfattende finansielle støtte, som var nødvendig for at holde HSY i live, og dette har været meget dyrt.
It has constantly provided the large financial support necessary to keep HSY alive, what has been highly costly.
Eftersom staten (via ETVA) befandt sig i den situation, at den kun var aktionær i HSY, fordi den handlede som offentlig myndighed, der var rede til at bevare HSY's aktiviteter for enhver pris, og eftersom den aldrig har handlet som en markedsøkonomisk investor, der ønsker at tjene penge gennem sin aktiepost i HSY, er påstanden om, at ETVA og staten handlede på en for en markedsøkonomisk investor acceptabel måde, da de for lave rentesatser (eller garantigebyrer) i forbindelse med den finansiering (lån og garantier), som de ydede til HSY, blev opvejet af en stigning i værdien af aktierne i HSY, derfor ikke troværdig.
In conclusion, since the State (through ETVA) found itself in the situation of being the shareholder of HSY only because it acted as a public authority willing to preserve the activities of HSY at all costs and since it has never acted like a market economy investor who wants to make money thanks to its shareholding in HSY, the claim that ETVA and the State acted in a way acceptable for a market economy investor because the too low interest rates (or guarantee fee) charged on the financing (loans and guarantees) which they granted to HSY was compensated by an increase of the value of the share of HSY lacks credibility.
Eftersom staten (herunder ETVA) aldrig har handlet som en investor, der forsøger at opnå fortjeneste, men tværtimod accepterede at holde HSY i live til en høj pris, burde Grækenland og HSY i det mindste have underbygget deres påstand med en detaljeret analyse, som viser, at staten og ETVA som aktionær i HSY virkelig kunne forvente en kapitalgevinst (dvs. en stigning i aktiernes værdi), der var højere end de »mistede indtægter« (dvs. den for lave rentesats eller den for lave garantipræmie).
Since the State (included ETVA) has never acted like an investor trying to make profit but conversely accepted to keep HSY alive at that high price, Greece and HSY should have at least underpinned their claim by a detail analysis showing that, as shareholder of HSY, the State and ETVA could really expect a capital gain (i.e. an increase of the value of the shares) higher than the ‘foregone revenues’ (i.e. the insufficient interest rate or the insufficient guarantee premium).
Eftersom der ikke er forelagt en sådan analyse, og eftersom HSY og Grækenland fremførte deres tvivlsomme og hypotetiske påstand uden at underbygge den, afviser Kommissionen uden yderligere analyse deres påstand om, at staten (herunder ETVA) handlede som en markedsøkonomisk investor, da den finansiering, der var ydet på gunstige vilkår, førte til en stigning i værdien af aktierne i HSY, som var tilstrækkelig til at opveje de »mistede indtægter«.
Since such an analysis has not been provided and since HSY and Greece made that doubtful and hypothetical claim without any supporting evidence, the Commission dismisses without further analysis their claim that the State (including ETVA) acted as a market economy investor since the financing granted at favourable terms triggered an increase of the value of HSY shares which was sufficiently important to compensate the ‘foregone revenues’.
For det andet er der, selv hvis ovenstående ræsonnement blev afvist, og de koncerninterne aspekter skal analyseres (dvs. den potentielle stigning i værdien af aktierne i HSY), omfattende beviser for, at de transaktioner, som ETVA foretog, ikke havde været acceptable for en markedsøkonomisk investor, som havde en aktiepost på 51 % i HSY.
Second, even if the foregoing reasoning were dismissed and the intra-group aspects should be analysed (i.e. the potential increase of the value of HSY’s shares), there are ample evidence that the transactions carried out by ETVA would have not been acceptable for a market economy investor which would have hold a 51 % shareholding in HSY.
Ved udgangen af 1995 blev 49 % af ejerskabet til HSY overdraget til de ansatte i HSY.
At the end of 1995, 49 % of the ownership of HSY was transferred to the employees of HSY.
Den pris, som de ansatte skulle betale for at købe denne aktiepost på 49 %, blev fastsat på det tidspunkt.
The price that the employees would pay to purchase this 49 % stake was decided at that moment.
I de følgende år, hvor ETVA og staten tilvejebragte finansiering til HSY til en pris under det, som en (ikke-tilknyttet) privat bank havde forlangt, kom 49 % af stigningen i HSY's værdi som følge af disse besparelser (dvs. HSY betalte lavere rentesatser) derfor de øvrige aktionærer i HSY til gode.
Therefore, in the following years, when ETVA and the State were providing financing to HSY at a price below what a (non-affiliated) private bank would have charged, 49 % of the increase of the value of HSY resulting from this savings (i.e. HSY was paying lower interest rates) was benefiting the other shareholders of HSY.
Kun 51 % af den fordel (nedsættelse af de rentesatser og de garantipræmier, der skulle betales), som ETVA og staten indrømmede HSY, kom dem selv til gode i form af en stigning i HSY's værdi.
Only 51 % of the advantage (reduction of the interest rates charged and of the guarantee premiums charged) granted by ETVA and the State to HSY was returning to them in the form of an increase of the value of HSY.
Ingen markedsøkonomisk investor havde accepteret at give de øvrige aktionærer i HSY en sådan gave.
No market economy investor would have accepted to make such a gift to the other shareholders of HSY.
For at undgå at miste midler til fordel for disse andre aktionærer havde en markedsøkonomisk investor forlangt samme rentesats som (ikke-tilknyttede) private banker.
In order to avoid losing money in favour of these other shareholders, a market economy investor would have charged an interest rate similar to the one charged by (non affiliated) private banks.
De græske myndigheders første påstand er derfor ubegrundet.
The first claim of the Greek authorities is therefore unfounded.
Med hensyn til perioden efter 30. juni 1999, på et tidspunkt, hvor ingen privat bank havde tilvejebragt finansiering til HSY, fordi risikoen for konkurs var for stor, gælder samme ræsonnement.
As regards the period after 30 June 1999, at a time when no private bank would have provided financing to HSY because the risk of bankruptcy was too high, the same reasoning applies.
Navnlig havde en fornuftig investor, som kun ejer 51 % af en virksomhed, i det mindste anmodet de øvrige aktionærer om at tilvejebringe finansiering i forhold til deres aktiepost i HSY.
In particular, a rational investor holding only 51 % of a firm would have at least asked the other shareholders to provide financing in proportion to their shareholding in HSY.
Hvis disse øvrige aktionærer ikke havde midlerne til at tilvejebringe denne finansiering, havde en fornuftig investor i det mindste forhandlet om tilvejebringelsen af finansiering mod til gengæld at få en større aktiepost i HSY.
If these other shareholders did not have the resources to provide this financing, a rational investor would have at least negotiated the provision of financing to HSY against a higher shareholding in HSY.
Ved at tilvejebringe en betydelig finansiering til HSY uden medfinansiering eller uden indrømmelser fra de øvrige aktionærer påtog man sig en høj risiko for at redde værdien af aktier, som ejes af en anden.
Providing significant financing to HSY without co-financing or without concessions by the other shareholders was similar to put one’s own money at high risk to save the value of the shares held by someone else.
Ingen markedsøkonomisk investor havde under lignende omstændigheder accepteret at give de øvrige aktionærer en sådan gave.
No market economy investor in similar circumstances would have accepted to make such a gift to the other shareholders.
De græske myndigheders anden påstand skal derfor afvises.
The second claim of the Greece authorities has therefore to be rejected.
Horisontalt spørgsmål 2: Tilregnelse af ETVA's adfærd til staten
Horizontal issue 2: Imputability of ETVA’s behaviour to the State
Flere af de 16 foranstaltninger, der analyseres i denne beslutning, blev ikke ydet direkte af staten.
Several of the 16 measures analysed in the present decision were not granted directly by the State.
De blev ydet af den statsejede bank ETVA.
They were granted by the State-owned bank ETVA.
Eftersom Grækenland, HSY og TKMS/GNSH anfægter, at disse foranstaltninger kan tilregnes staten, mens Elefsis og Piraeus Bank bekræfter det, skal dette spørgsmål analyseres.
Since Greece, HSY and TKMS/GNSH contest the imputability to the State of these measures while Elefsis and Piraeus Bank confirm it, this issue has to be analysed.
ETVA, hvis initialer står for Industrial Development Bank of Greece, blev oprettet i 1964 efter fusionen af tre organisationer (Industrial Development Organisation, Economic Development Financing Organisation og Tourist Credit Organisation).
ETVA, whose initials stand for Industrial Development Bank of Greece, was founded in 1964 following the merger of three organisations (the Industrial Development Organisation, the Economic Development Financing Organisation and the Tourist Credit Organisation).
Foretagendet blev omdannet til et statsligt selskab ved lov 1369/1973.
It was converted into a corporation by Law 1369/1973.
Siden 1973 har det derfor opereret som en statsejet bank.
Since 1973 it has therefore operated as a State-owned bank.
Ifølge Grækenland»var hovedformålet som udviklingsbank ifølge ETVA's vedtægter fremme af landets udvikling gennem finansiering af produktionsaktiviteter i den græske økonomi (turisme, industriproduktion osv.)«.
According to Greece, ‘The main purpose stated in the statue of ETVA as a development bank was promotion of the development of the country through the financing of production activities in the Greek economy (tourism, industrial production, etc.)’.
ETVA var den eneste udviklingsbank i Grækenland.
ETVA was the only development bank in Greece.
ETVA bestræbte sig derfor på at spille en afgørende rolle i landets økonomiske og regionale udvikling ved at finansiere virksomheder, udvikle landets regionale infrastruktur, tilvejebringe risikovillig kapital og deltage i virksomheder med strategisk betydning for den græske økonomi.
ETVA therefore endeavoured to play a decisive role in the economic and regional development of the country by financing enterprises, developing the regional infrastructure of the country, providing venture capital and participating in undertakings with strategic importance for the Greek economy.
Efter finansielle vanskeligheder som følge af disse aktiviteter blev bankens rekapitalisering, omstrukturering og modernisering i 1995 en topprioritet for den græske regering.
In 1995, following financial difficulties resulting from these activities, the recapitalisation, restructuring and modernisation of the bank became a top priority of the Greek government.
Dette skete på grundlag af et femårigt program inden for rammerne af lov 2359/95.
This was done on the basis of a five-year programme within the framework of Law 2359/95.