natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Liberaliseringen af banegodstransportområdet efter 2007 vil øge konkurrencepresset endnu mere.
The liberalisation of the rail freight market from 2007 will once again increase competitive pressure.
Kommissionen konstaterer, at den belgiske regerings fem argumenter er overbevisende.
The Commission notes that the five arguments presented by the Belgian Government are convincing.
Med hensyn til det første argument finder Kommissionen, at den belgiske regering har godtgjort, at IFB har reduceret sin logistikkapacitet ved at mindske antallet af vogne med 49 %, hvilket gør det muligt at begrænse de skadelige virkninger for konkurrenterne af de pågældende foranstaltninger.
Regarding the first argument, it considers that the Belgian Government has demonstrated that IFB has reduced its logistical capacity by reducing the number of wagons utilised by 49 %, which makes it possible to limit the distortions of competition brought about by the measures in question.
Med hensyn til det andet argument er Kommissionen enig med den belgiske regering i, at IFB's markedsandele er begrænsede på logistikmarkedet, jf. punkt 36 i rammebestemmelserne fra 1999.
Regarding the second argument, the Commission agrees that the Belgian Government that IFB’s market shares of the logistics market have been reduced within the meaning of point 36 of the 1999 guidelines.
Med hensyn til det tredje argument mener Kommissionen, at Belgiens uddybende forklaringer vedrørende IFB's omsætning viser, at væksten i IFB Logistics har været langsommere end hos konkurrenterne, og at den større vækst vedrørte en undersektor, hvor IFB kun er marginalt til stede.
Regarding the third argument, the Commission considers that the explanations given by Belgium to describe in more detail IFB’s increase in turnover demonstrate that IFB Logistics has grown less quickly than its competitors, and that the most significant growth concerns a sub-sector where IFB is only marginally present.
Med hensyn til det fjerde argument mener Kommissionen, at selvom beslutningen om at give konkurrenterne adgang til terminalerne sandsynligvis også blev truffet af økonomiske hensyn, har det ikke desto mindre forstærket åbningen af de markeder, som IFB er aktiv på, og kan derfor således begrænse støttens skadelige virkninger.
Regarding the fourth argument, the Commission considers that, even if the decision to open its terminals to competitors was probably also due to economic considerations, it nevertheless has the consequence of consolidating the opening-up of the markets in which IFB is active, and can thus limit the negative effects of aid.
Med hensyn til det femte argument erkender Kommissionen, at IFB's situation har lighedspunkter med situationen for SNCF fret, i det omfang IFB som SNCF fret er aktiv i undersektorerne »jernbanetransport« og »kombineret transport«, der blev fuldstændig åbne for konkurrence fra og med 1. januar 2007. [50]
Regarding the fifth argument, the Commission recognises that IFB’s situation is in some ways similar to the situation of SNCF freight, insofar as IFB, like SNCF freight, is active in the sub-sectors ‘rail freight transport’ and ‘combined transport’, which have been completely liberalised since 1 January 2007 [50].
Kommissionen konkluderer, at Belgien har godtgjort, at der er truffet tilstrækkelige foranstaltninger for mest muligt at begrænse støttens skadelige virkninger for konkurrenterne i logistiksektoren.
The Commission concludes that Belgium has shown proof that sufficient measures have been taken to mitigate, as far as possible, the unfavourable consequences of aid on competitors in the logistics sectors.
Kommissionen konkluderer, at de belgiske myndigheder har godtgjort, at de har truffet tilstrækkelige foranstaltninger for mest muligt at afbøde støttens skadelige virkninger for konkurrenterne på de pågældende markeder.
The Commission concludes that the Belgian authorities have shown proof that they have taken sufficient measures to mitigate, as far as possible, the unfavourable consequences of aid for competitors in the two markets in question.
Støtten begrænset til et minimum
Aid limited to a minimum
Om at begrænse støtten til et minimum hedder det i rammebestemmelserne fra 1999 (punkt 40-41):
As regards the limitation of aid to a minimum, the 1999 Guidelines state (points 40 and 41):
Støttens størrelse og intensitet skal være begrænset til det strengt nødvendige minimum, så omstruktureringen gennemføres som en funktion af virksomhedens, aktionærernes eller den pågældende koncerns finansielle muligheder.
The amount and intensity of the aid must be limited to the strict minimum needed to enable restructuring to be undertaken in the light of the existing financial resources of the company, its shareholders or the business group to which it belongs.
Støttemodtagerne skal selv yde et betydeligt bidrag til omstruktureringsplanen af egne midler, herunder ved afhændelse af aktiver, som ikke er nødvendige for virksomhedens overleven, eller ved finansiering udefra på markedsvilkår.
Aid beneficiaries will be expected to make a significant contribution to the restructuring plan from their own resources, including through the sale of assets that are not essential to the firm’s survival, or from external financing at market conditions.
For at støtten ikke skal få for store konkurrencefordrejende virkninger, må den ikke ydes i en form eller være af en størrelse, som giver virksomheden en overskudslikviditet, der kan anvendes til aggressive, markedsfordrejende aktiviteter uden tilknytning til strukturomlægningen.
To limit the distortive effect, the amount of the aid or the form in which the aid is granted must be such as to avoid providing the company with surplus cash which could be used for aggressive, market-distorting activities not linked to the restructuring process.
I dette øjemed undersøger Kommissionen størrelsen af virksomhedens passiver efter omstrukturering, herunder efter overførsel eller reduktion af fordringer, specielt i forbindelse med virksomhedens videreførelse efter en konkursbehandling, betalingsstandsning mv., som gennemføres efter national lovgivning.
The Commission will accordingly examine the level of the firm’s liabilities after restructuring, including the situation after any postponement or reduction of its debts, particularly in the context of its continuation in business following collective insolvency proceedings brought against it under national law.
Støtten bør heller ikke anvendes til at finansiere nye investeringer, der ikke er nødvendige for at retablere levedygtigheden.
Neither should any of the aid go to finance new investment that is not essential for restoring the firm’s viability.
Under alle omstændigheder skal Kommissionen have sikkerhed for, at støtten kun anvendes til at genoprette virksomhedens rentabilitet og ikke giver støttemodtageren mulighed for at udvide produktionskapaciteten under omstruktureringen, medmindre dette er af væsentlig betydning for at genoprette rentabiliteten uden samtidig at fordreje konkurrencen.«
In any event, it must be demonstrated to the Commission that the aid will be used only for the purpose of restoring the firm’s viability and that it will not enable the recipient during the implementation of the restructuring plan to expand production capacity, except in so far as this is essential for restoring viability without unduly distorting competition’.
Det skal derfor først kontrolleres, om støtten er begrænset til et minimum, og derefter om IFB har ydet et betydeligt bidrag af egne midler.
It is therefore necessary to verify firstly whether the aid is limited to the minimum, and then whether IFB has made an adequate contribution itself.
Begrænsning af støtten til et minimum
Limitation of aid to a minimum
For at påvise, at støtten er begrænset til et minimum, forklarer regeringen, at kapitalforhøjelsen er begrænset til at genoprette IFB's selskabskapital, som var blevet negativ på grund af tabene i 2001 og 2002, og i et omfang, der gjorde det muligt for virksomheden at genetablere rentabiliteten.
In order to demonstrate that the aid is limited to the strict minimum, the Belgian Government explains that the increase in capital is limited to restoring IFB’s capital stock, which has become negative further to losses recorded in 2001 and 2002, to a level which allows it to recover its economic viability.
Som det fremgår af denne beslutnings del 2, vil IFB's soliditetsgrad, dvs. forholdet mellem egenkapital og passiver, udgøre 35,6 % efter kapitalforhøjelsen.
As explained in section 2 of this decision, IFB’s solvency rate, that is to say the debt-to-equity ratio, will be 35,6 % after the increase in capital.
Kommissionen konstaterer i sin beslutning om at indlede undersøgelsesproceduren (punkt 268), at kapitalforhøjelsen var under 20 mio. EUR lavere end det beløb, konsulentvirksomheden McKinsey havde tilrådet i omstruktureringsplanen. Endvidere har Kommissionen anført (punkt 268), at den forventede soliditetsgrad for IFB var lavere end det tilsvarende for terminalselskaberne og også, om end i et mindre omfang, for selskaber med blandede aktiviteter.
In its decision initiating the procedure (point 268), the Commission noted that the increase in capital was EUR 20 million less than had been recommended by the consultants McKinsey in the restructuring plan; furthermore, the Commission noted (point 268) that the solvency rate envisaged by IFB was less than that of the terminal companies and also, though to a lesser extent, than that of companies with mixed activities.
Kommissionen har konstateret, at denne grad var under den gennemsnitlige soliditetsgrad for transportvirksomheder.
However, it noted that the rate was greater than the average of the rates recorded in the transport companies.
Den konkluderer derfor, at den ikke havde adgang til tilstrækkelige data til at kunne træffe endelig beslutning om, hvorvidt støtten var begrænset til et strengt minimum.
In view of that, it concluded that it did not have at its disposal sufficient factors to consider definitively that the aid was limited to the strict minimum.
Kommissionen finder, at det for at få fastslået, om støtten er begrænset til et minimum, først skal undersøges, om soliditetsgraden for IFB, der bevarer sine aktiviteter i Belgien, ikke overstiger gennemsnittet for konkurrenterne, og derefter, om IFB har afviklet sine andele i Frankrig med så få omkostninger som muligt.
The Commission considers that, to establish that the aid was limited to a minimum, it is necessary to check firstly whether the solvency rate of IFB, which will retain its activities in Belgium, does not exceed the average of its competitors, and then if IFB divested its shareholdings in France at the lowest possible cost.
Soliditetsgrad, der ikke overstiger gennemsnittet for konkurrenterne
Solvency rate not exceeding the average of competitors
Belgien fremsatte supplerende oplysninger i sit svar på åbningsskrivelsen.
Belgium provided additional information in its reply to the letter initiating the procedure.
Belgien har først beregnet soliditetsgraden for de seks terminalselskaber, der er mest egnet til at blive sammenlignet med IFB, og soliditetsgraden for de seks logistikselskaber, der er mest egnet til at blive sammenlignet med IFB.
Firstly, it calculated the solvency rate of the six terminal companies which are most comparable to IFB and the solvency rate of the six logistics companies which are most comparable to IFB.
Derefter har Belgien beregnet gennemsnittet efter at have vægtet den gennemsnitlige soliditetsgrad for terminalselskaberne og logistikselskaberne ud fra disse to aktiviteters relative vægt i IFB's aktiviteter.
Then, it calculated an average, weighting the average rates of the terminal companies and the logistics companies in relation to the relative strength of these two activities within IFB.
Dette resulterer i en gennemsnitlig soliditetsgrad på 35,6 %, hvilket svarer til IFB's soliditetsgrad efter den planlagte kapitalforhøjelse.
This produced an average solvency rate of 35,6 %, which corresponds to IFB’s solvency rate after the foreseen increase in capital.
Desuden har Belgien påvist, at soliditetsgraden hos IFB's to mest direkte konkurrenter, selskaberne Gosselin og Hupac, ligger meget tæt på IFB's (hhv. 38,9 % og 34,9 %).
Furthermore, Belgium demonstrated that the two most direct competitors to IFB, namely the companies Gosselin and Hupac, have very similar solvency rates (38,9 % and 34,9 % respectively).
I lyset af de supplerende oplysninger fra Belgien og den begrænsede kapitalforhøjelse på 95,3 mio. EUR sammenholdt med den oprindelige anbefaling på 120 mio. EUR i omstruktureringsplanen fra McKinsey fra december 2003 mener Kommissionen, at kapitalforhøjelsen er begrænset til det strengt nødvendige.
In view of the additional information provided by Belgium, and the fact that the increase in capital has been reduced, in relation to the initial recommendation of EUR 120 million contained in the McKinsey plan of December 2003, to EUR 95,3 million, the Commission considers that the increase in capital is limited to what is strictly necessary.
Billigst mulige afhændelse af andelene i Frankrig
Divestiture of shareholdings in France at lowest cost
Med hensyn til afhændelsen af IFB's datterselskaber i Frankrig har Kommissionen desuden undersøgt, om IFB i forbindelse med afviklingen altid har søgt den billigste løsning for at begrænse omkostningerne til afviklingen og dermed støtten til et minimum.
As regards the divestiture of IFB’s French subsidiaries, the Commission has further verified that, during its withdrawal, IFB always chose the lowest cost option, in order to limit withdrawal costs, and therefore aid, to a minimum.
Afviklingen af Acimar i form af en betalingsstandsning kostede 3,9 mio. EUR (se del 2 i denne beslutning).
The legal divestiture of Acimar by judicial settlement cost of EUR 3,9 million (see section 2 of this decision).
Kommissionen konstaterer, at Belgien har godtgjort, at alternativet, dvs. en videreførelse af aktiviteterne, ville have krævet, at IFB finansierede det årlige cash-drain indtil udgangen af 2005, svarende til et tab på 10,8 mio. EUR, uden nogen som helst sikkerhed for at kunne inddrive fordringerne på 3,9 mio. EUR, som måtte opgives i forbindelse med betalingsstandsningen.
The Commission notes that Belgium demonstrated that the alternative, that is to say the continuation of its activities, would have necessitated the financing of the annual cash-drain by IFB until the end of 2005, which would have represented a loss of EUR 10,8 million in total, without any certainty of being able recover the debts of EUR 3,9 million which would have had to be abandoned in the judicial settlement.
Kommissionen konkluderer følgelig, at IFB har valgt den billigste løsning for Acimar.
The Commission consequently concludes that IFB chose the lowest cost option for Acimar.
Med hensyn til NFTI-ou, som blev kontrolleret i fællesskab af IFB og Port Autonome de Dunkerque og drev terminalerne i Dunkerque havn, har IFB afsøgt to muligheder: enten at videreføre aktiviteterne eller afhænde den ved at sælge sin andel.
As regards NFTI-ou, which was a company controlled jointly by IFB and Port Autonome de Dunkerque, operating the terminals in the port of Dunkerque, IFB explored two possibilities: the pursuit of activities, or divestiture by selling its shareholding.
Afhændelsen medførte omkostninger på 18,5 mio. EUR (se detaljeret beskrivelse i del 2 i denne beslutning).
Divestiture would have led to costs of EUR 18,5 million (see detailed description in section 2 of this decision).
Med hensyn til alternativet, dvs. at videreføre aktiviteterne, har Belgien i sit svar godtgjort, at det ville have medført et tab på 36,2 mio. EUR (se detaljeret beskrivelse i del 3 i denne beslutning).
As regards the alternative, that is to say the continuation of activities, Belgium demonstrated in its reply that this would have generated losses of EUR 36,2 million (see detailed description in section 3 of this decision).
I lyset af omkostningerne ved de to scenarier mener Kommissionen, at IFB har valgt den billigste løsning.
In view of the cost of these two options, the Commission considers that IFB chose the least expensive option.
Overdragelsen af IFB France, som efterfølgende blev til AGEP, til NFTI-ou kostede 0,9 mio. EUR (se detaljeret beskrivelse i del 2 i denne beslutning).
The handover of IFB France, which subsequently became AGEP, to NFTI-ou cost EUR 0,9 million (see detailed description in section 2 of this decision).
Spørgsmålet er derefter, om det ville have kostet IFB mindre at lade IFB France erklære konkurs.
The question arises as to whether allowing IFB France to file for bankruptcy would not have been less costly for IFB.
Som i salgsscenariet ville IFB have været forpligtet til at give afkald på sine fordringer i IFB France, hvis værdi var 0,8 mio. EUR. Belgien påstår imidlertid, at en konkurserklæring ville medføre yderligere omkostninger, da IFB ikke ville have kunnet opnå salgsprisen på 0,1 mio. EUR, hvilket ville have medført en værdiforringelse af selskabets andel, og IFB skulle i medfør af fransk arbejdsmarkedslovgivning have betalt i alt 0,8 mio. EUR til 14 medarbejdere, som ville have mistet arbejdet efter konkursen.
As in the assumption of its sale, IFB would have had to abandon its receivables to IFB France for a value of EUR 0,8 million. Belgium however claims that filing for bankruptcy would have generated additional costs: IFB would not have been able to achieve the sale price of EUR 0,1 million, which would have generated capital losses on its shareholding, and IFB would have had to pay a total of EUR 0,8 million to 14 employees, who would have lost their employment following the bankruptcy, by virtue of French social law.
Kommissionen finder ikke, at Belgien har fremlagt bevis for denne risiko for dækningen af gælden.
The Commission considers that Belgium has not presented evidence of this risk of coverage of liabilities.
Kommissionen må derfor afvise dette argument.
Therefore, the Commission must reject this argument.
Kommissionen konkluderer, at overdragelsen af IFB France kostede mindst det samme, som det ville have kostet at videreføre virksomheden.
The Commission concludes that the handover of IFB France cost at least the same as its continuation would have done.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at IFB har valgt en af de to billigste løsninger.
The Commission therefore concludes that IFB selected one of the two least expensive options.
For Dry Port de Dunkerque blev det besluttet at opløse selskabet med i første omgang salget af en del af aktiverne, nemlig andelen på 8,6 % i NFTI-ou.
For the Dry Port of Dunkerque, it had been decided to liquidate this company, by the preliminary sale of a part of the assets, namely the shareholding of 8,6 % in NFTI-ou.
Det kostede 7,9 mio. EUR (se detaljeret beskrivelse i del 2 i denne beslutning).
That cost EUR 7,9 million (see detailed description in section 2 of this decision).
I det alternative scenario, dvs. en videreførelse af aktiviteterne, skulle IFB have finansieret det årlige cash-drain, der skyldtes selskabets tab, hvilket ville have været en yderligere udgift på 2,6 mio. EUR.
In the alternative scenario, i.e. the continuation of activities, IFB would have had to finance the annual cash drain generated by the company’s losses, which would have presented an additional charge of EUR 2,6 million.
Likvidationen var således den billigste løsning.
Consequently, liquidation was the least costly option.
På baggrund af den strategiske beslutning om at forlade det franske marked var beslutningen om at sælge SSTD for 0,2 mio. (se detaljeret beskrivelse i del 2 i denne beslutning) den mest fordelagtige løsning for IFB.
In view of the strategic decision to leave the French market, the decision to sell SSTD for EUR 0,2 million (see detailed description below in section 2) was the most attractive option for IFB.
Kommissionen konkluderer, at IFB har afhændet sine andele i Frankrig med de lavest mulige omkostninger, og at SNCB's finansieringsbidrag til denne afhændelse, der var nødvendig for at sikre rentabilitet i den resterende del af IFB, var begrænset til et minimum.
The Commission concludes that IFB divested its shareholdings in France at the lowest possible cost, and that as a consequence the finance allocated by SNCB to finance this divestiture, which was necessary for the viability of the remainder of IFB, was limited to the minimum possible.
Modtagerens eget bidrag
Beneficiaries’ own contribution
Det hedder i punkt 40 i rammebestemmelserne fra 1999:
Point 40 of the 1999 guidelines states that:
»Støttemodtagerne skal selv yde et betydeligt bidrag til omstruktureringsplanen af egne midler, herunder ved afhændelse af aktiver, som ikke er nødvendige for virksomhedens overleven, eller ved finansiering udefra på markedsvilkår.«
‘Aid beneficiaries will be expected to make a significant contribution to the restructuring plan from their own resources, including through the sale of assets that are not essential to the firm’s survival, or from external financing at market conditions.’
I åbningsskrivelsen (punkt 270) bemærker Kommissionen, at IFB i henhold til omstruktureringsplanen ikke skulle yde et særlig stort bidrag til omstruktureringen af egne midler, og at Kommissionen derfor udtrykte tvivl om, hvorvidt IFB bidrog til omstruktureringen i tilstrækkelig grad.
In the letter initiating the procedure (point 270), the Commission noted that, according to the restructuring plan, IFB did not appear to make a significant contribution of its own to its restructuring, and therefore the Commission had doubts as to whether IFB contributed sufficiently to its restructuring.
Belgien gav i sit svar på åbningsskrivelsen en detaljeret redegørelse for, hvad man betragter som IFB's eget bidrag til omstruktureringen (se detaljeret beskrivelse i del 3 i denne beslutning, punkt 194-201).
Belgium, in its reply to the letter initiating the procedure, explained in detail what it considered IFB’s own contributions to be (see description in section 3 of this decision, points 194 to 201).
Kommissionen vurderer Belgiens redegørelse som følger.
The Commission assesses Belgium’s explanations as follows:
Omkostninger ved omstruktureringen
Costs of restructuring
Kommissionen beregner først de samlede omkostninger til omstruktureringen uden produktivitetsforbedringer og reduktion af behovet for driftskapital.
The Commission starts by determining the total cost of restructuring, net of productivity gains and reduction in working capital requirement.
Nettoomkostninger ved omstruktureringen
Net costs of restructuring
Nettodriftstab
Net operating loss
Øget behov for driftskapital
Increase in working capital requirement
Genanskaffelsesinvesteringer i ikke-finansielle anlægsaktiver
Investments and replacement of non-financial assets
Investeringer i finansielle anlægsaktiver
Investments in financial assets
Betaling af renter til andre virksomheder end SNCB
Interest payments to businesses other than SNCB
Tilbagebetaling af finansiel gæld
Repayment of financial debt
Delvis tilbagebetaling af gæld og renter til SNCB
Partial repayment of debt and interest to SNCB
Skattegæld
Tax debts
Kommissionen finder i denne sammenhæng, at det i overensstemmelse med dens beslutningspraksis [52] er rimeligt at basere sig på tallene i ovenstående skema og ikke de tal for omkostninger, som Belgien har fremlagt (se skema i punkt 184) af især følgende grunde:
In this respect, the Commission considers that it is justified, in accordance with its decision-making process [52], in retaining the costs in the table above, rather than the costs presented by Belgium (see the table in point 184), in particular for the following reasons:
Driftstab (cash-drain).
The operating loss (the ‘cash drain’).
Belgien havde anført et beløb på 27,916 mio. EUR som »bruttodriftstab« under omkostninger til omstrukturering.
Belgium had included EUR 27,916 million as ‘gross operating loss’ in the restructuring costs.
Kommissionen mener i overensstemmelse med sin beslutningspraksis [53] kun, at man skal medtage nettodriftstabet i omkostningerne til omstrukturering.
The Commission considers that, in line with its decision-making practice [53], only the net operating loss should be included in the restructuring costs.