natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Denne påstand blev også bekræftet i den anden Deloitte-rapport, som blev fremsendt af TKMS/GNSH i juni 2007.
This claim was also confirmed by the second Deloitte report, which was submitted by TKMS/GNSH in June 2007.
TKMS/GNSH er af den opfattelse, at foranstaltningen ikke kan tilregnes staten, eftersom den blev ydet af ETVA på et tidspunkt, hvor banken ikke længere var under statslig kontrol.
TKMS/GNSH considers that the measure is not imputable to the State since it was granted by ETVA at a time when it was not under the control of the State anymore.
På grundlag af HSY SPA, der blev indgået i oktober 2001, var der således ingen kontraktlig forpligtelse for ETVA til at holde GNSH skadesløs.
Indeed, on the basis of HSY’s SPA concluded in October 2001, there was no contractual obligation for ETVA to indemnify GNSH.
Sandsynligheden for, at garantien skulle udbetales, var forholdsvis lav.
The probability that the guarantee would have to be paid out was relatively low.
Omvendt ville, såfremt værftet trådte i likvidation, tabene på de lån og garantier, der var ydet til HSY, repræsentere meget større beløb (beregningen til støtte for denne påstand fremgik af den anden Deloitte-rapport, der blev fremsendt af TKMS/GNSH).
Conversely, if the yard was liquidated, the losses on the loans and guarantees granted to HSY would represent much larger amounts (The calculation justifying this claim was provided in the second Deloitte report submitted by TKMS/GNSH).
Desuden er TKMS/GNSH af den opfattelse, at staten ifølge den garanti, som den ydede til Piraeus Bank den 20. marts 2002, kun ville holde Piraeus Bank skadesløs med hensyn til 57,7 % af ethvert beløb, som ETVA betalte til køberen af HSY (dvs. HDW/Ferrostaal).
In addition, TKMS/GNSH considers that the guarantee granted by the State to Piraeus Bank on 20 March 2002 provides that the State would pay indemnification to Piraeus Bank amounting to only 57,7 % of any amount paid by ETVA to the purchaser of HSY (i.e. HDW/Ferrostaal).
Omvendt ville ETVA ifølge den garanti, som ETVA ydede til HDW/Ferrostaal den 31. maj 2002, holde HDW/Ferrostaal skadesløs med hensyn til 100 % af enhver støtte, der måtte blive tilbagesøgt fra HSY.
Conversely, the guarantee granted by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal on 31 May 2002 provides that ETVA would pay indemnification to HDW/Ferrostaal amounting to 100 % of any aid recovered from HSY.
TKMS/GNSH kan ikke se, hvorfor en sådan bestemmelse om skadesløsholdelse kunne udgøre en omgåelse af tilbagesøgningen af støtte.
TKMS/GNSH fails to see why such an indemnifying provision could constitute a circumvention of the recovery of aid.
Hvis der nemlig tilbagesøges støtte fra HSY, vil staten ikke holde HSY, men køberen af HSY (dvs. TKMS/GNSH, som er efterfølgeren for HDW/Ferrostaal) skadesløs.
Indeed, if aid would be recovered from HSY, the State would not indemnify HSY, but the purchaser of HSY (i.e. TKMS/GNSH, which is the successor of HDW/Ferrostaal).
TKMS/GNSH er endvidere af den opfattelse, at den garanti, som staten ydede til Piraeus Bank, kunne udgøre støtte til Piraeus Bank og ETVA.
TKMS/GNSH also considers that the guarantee granted by the State to Piraeus Bank could constitute aid to Piraeus Bank and ETVA.
Ifølge Grækenland og HSY udgør klausulen om skadesløsholdelse ikke støtte.
According to Greece and HSY, the indemnifying clause is not an aid.
For det første kan den ikke tilregnes staten, eftersom den blev ydet af ETVA, på et tidspunkt, hvor den ikke længere var under statslig kontrol.
First, it is not imputable to the State since it was granted by ETVA Bank, at a time when it was not under State control anymore.
For det andet har Grækenland og HSY gjort gældende, at den græske stat handlede som en markedsinvestor, da den solgte sin aktiepost i HSY i sin egenskab af hovedaktionær i ETVA.
Second, Greece and HSY claim that the Greek State acted as a market investor when it sold its stake in HSY as the main shareholder of ETVA.
Den garanti, som sælgerne af HSY ydede til køberen, er en almindelig standardbetingelse i forretningsaftaler.
The guarantee granted to the purchaser by the vendors of HSY is a standard and normal condition in commercial agreements.
Grækenland har således understreget, at det ikke ydede HSY en garanti med hensyn til forpligtelsen til at tilbagebetale ulovlig statsstøtte, men til køberen af HSY.
Indeed, Greece recalls that it did not provide a guarantee to HSY with regard to the liability to repay unlawful State aid, but to the buyer of HSY.
En sådan skadesløsholdelse bebyrder sælgeren, uanset om den indgår som en klausul i en forretningsaftale eller ej.
Such indemnification burdens the vendor regardless of whether it is included as a clause in the commercial agreement or not.
Kommissionens bemærkning om, at den græske stat kendte eller burde have kendt det store antal yderligere potentielt ulovlige og uforenelige statsstøtteforanstaltninger, og at beløbene skulle tilbagebetales og derved udløse klausulen om skadesløsholdelse, er uden grundlag.
The Commission’s statement that the Greek State knew or should have known about the considerable number of further potentially unlawful and incompatible State aid measures and that the amounts would have to be recovered and thus trigger the indemnifying clause is without basis.
I den periode, hvori klausulen om skadesløsholdelse blev indført, forelå der ingen kommissionsbeslutning, hvorefter HSY havde modtaget ulovlig statsstøtte.
In the period in which the indemnifying clause was provided, there was no Commission decision ruling that HSY had received unlawful State aid.
Desuden havde HSY's lukning og likvidation været dyrere for staten under hensyntagen til de sociale omkostninger.
In addition, the closure and liquidation of HSY would have been more costly to the State, taking account the social cost.
HSY kan desuden ikke se, hvordan det kunne have fået en finansiel fordel i forbindelse med en garanti, som blev aftalt mellem ETVA og HDW/Ferrostaal, eller i forbindelse med en garanti aftalt mellem den græske stat og Piraeus Bank.
In addition, HSY fails to see how it could have benefited financially from a guarantee, which was agreed upon between ETVA Bank and HDW/Ferrostaal, or from a guarantee agreed upon between the Greek State and Piraeus Bank.
Selv hvis HDW/Ferrostaal skulle modtage kompensation, er konsortiet ikke forpligtet til at indskyde dette beløb i HSY.
Even if HDW/Ferrostaal was to receive compensation, there is no obligation for the consortium to inject this amount in HSY.
Kommissionen har derfor heller ikke vist, hvorfor klausulen om skadesløsholdelse ville neutralisere en tilbagesøgningsbeslutning.
Therefore the Commission also fails to show why the indemnifying clause would neutralise a recovery decision.
Ifølge Domstolens praksis mister støttemodtageren fordelen, når støtten tilbagebetales, og situationen forud for støttens ydelse kan genoprettes.
According to the Courts’ case law, by repaying the aid, the recipient forfeits the advantage, and the situation prior to the granting of the aid can be restored.
Endelig har Grækenland gjort gældende, at hvis Kommissionen anså klausulen om skadesløsholdelse for at være statsstøtte, vil EF-traktatens artikel 296-298 finde anvendelse.
Finally, if the Commission considered the indemnifying clause to be State aid, Greece claims that Articles 296 to 298 of the Treaty would be applicable.
I denne forbindelse har HSY anført, at i betragtning af, at den græske marine altid har været værftets vigtigste kunde, bør proceduren og vilkårene i forbindelse med privatiseringen, herunder ikrafttrædelsen af lov 2941/2001, undersøges på grundlag af den statslige kunde, som af nationale forsvarshensyn er interesseret i at opretholde værftets drift og rentabilitet.
In this context, HSY indicates that, given that the Hellenic Navy was always the most important client of the yard, the procedure and the terms of the privatisation, including the entry into force of Law 2941/2001, should be examined under the light of the State-client, which for national defence reasons is interested in maintaining the operation and the viability of the yard.
I dette tilfælde har den græske stat truffet foranstaltninger, som enhver privat virksomhed, hvis interesser vedrører en anden virksomheds rentabilitet, ville have truffet.
In the present case, the Greek State has adopted such measures, which any private company, whose interests are related to the viability of another undertaking, would have adopted.
Desuden er denne vurdering endnu vigtigere, når staten er forpligtet til at bære byrden og tabene ved virksomhedens opløsning og likvidation, som havde været dyrere og derfor urentabel.
Moreover, this assessment is even more important when the State has the obligation to bear the burden and the losses of the company’s dissolution and liquidation, which would be more costly and thus non-profitable.
Kommissionen finder, at foranstaltningen ikke er omfattet af EF-traktatens artikel 296.
The Commission considers that the measure does not fall within the scope of Article 296 of the Treaty.
Mekanismen med skadesløsholdelse finder således anvendelse i tilfælde af, at statsstøtte tilbagesøges fra HSY.
Indeed, the indemnification mechanism applies in case of recovery of State aid from HSY.
Som Grækenland har gjort gældende og Kommissionen hidtil har godkendt i sin praksis er HSY's militære aktiviteter af afgørende betydning for Grækenlands sikkerhed og er omfattet af artikel 296; statsstøttereglerne finder derfor ikke anvendelse på disse.
As has been claimed by Greece and accepted consistently by the Commission, the military activities of HSY are essential for Greece’s security, are falling under Article 296 and therefore the State aid rules do not apply to them.
Eftersom al statsstøtte til HSY's militære aktiviteter er fritaget fra statsstøttereglerne, kan en eventuel tilbagesøgning af statsstøtte kun være tilbagesøgning af statsstøtte ydet til HSY's civile aktiviteter.
Since all State support provided to the military activities of HSY is exempted from State aid rules, any recovery of State aid can only be the recovery of State support provided to the civil activities of HSY.
Denne garanti vedrører derfor direkte og udelukkende HSY's civile aktiviteter.
Consequently, the present guarantee is directly and exclusively related to the civil activities of HSY.
Nogle parter har gjort gældende, at uden denne garanti havde ingen investor købt HSY, og værftet ville formentlig være gået konkurs.
Some parties claim that, without this guarantee, no investor would have purchased HSY and the yard would probably have gone bankrupt.
Selv hvis denne foranstaltning udelukkende vedrører HSY's civile aktiviteter, var den derfor ikke desto mindre nødvendig for at sikre, at HSY's militære aktiviteter overlevede, og er derfor omfattet af artikel 296.
Therefore, even if it relates exclusively to the civil activities of HSY, this measure was nevertheless indispensable to ensure the survival of the military activities of HSY and therefore falls under Article 296.
På grundlag af artikel 296 kunne Grækenland til de militære aktiviteter have ydet den finansielle støtte, der var nødvendigt for at sikre videreførelsen heraf.
On the basis of Article 296, Greece could have granted to the military activities the financial support they needed to ensure their continuation.
Grækenland havde derved undgået de militære aktiviteters ophør.
Greece would have thereby avoided the demise of the military activities.
Alternativt kunne Grækenland have ydet den finansielle støtte, der var nødvendig til at gøre de militære aktiviteter attraktive for en potentiel investor, således at disse militære aktiviteter kunne være blevet købt og videreførelsen heraf derved sikret.
Alternatively, Greece could have granted the financial support necessary to render the military activities attractive for a potential investor, such that these military activities would have been purchased and thereby their continuation would have been ensured.
En investor, der køber de militære aktiviteter, havde ikke behøvet en garanti som denne, da støtte som nævnt ikke kunne tilbagesøges i forbindelse med HSY's militære aktiviteter.
An investor purchasing the military activities would not have needed a guarantee like the present one since, as just explained, no aid could be recovered from the military activities of HSY.
Denne foranstaltning var derfor udelukkende nødvendig for at finde en køber til hele HSY, dvs. inklusive de civile aktiviteter.
Consequently, the present measure was solely necessary in order to find a purchaser for the entire HSY, i.e. including the civil activities.
Virkningen af denne foranstaltning var således at gøre det muligt at finde en køber til HSY's civile aktiviteter og derved sikre videreførelsen af disse aktiviteter.
The effect of the present measure was thus to permit to find a purchaser for the civil activities of HSY, and thereby to ensure the continuation of these activities.
Foranstaltningen var ikke nødvendig for at sikre videreførelsen af de militære aktiviteter.
It was not necessary to ensure the continuation of the military activities.
Den er derfor ikke omfattet af EF-traktatens artikel 296.
It does therefore not fall within the scope of Article 296 of the Treaty.
Eftersom nogle parter har anfægtet, at de to garantier (dvs. den, der blev ydet af staten til Piraeus Bank, og den, der blev ydet af ETVA til HDW/Ferrostaal) udgør en enkelt garantimekanisme, og at HSY er modtageren af de to garantier, vil Kommissionen først særskilt vurdere den garanti, som ETVA ydede til HDW/Ferrostaal, og påvise, at den udgør statsstøtte i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
Since some parties contests that the two guarantees — the one granted by the State to Piraeus Bank and the one granted by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal — constitute one single guarantee mechanism and that HSY is the beneficiary of the two guarantees, the Commission will first assess separately the guarantee granted by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal and demonstrates that it constitutes State aid in the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty.
For at udgøre statsstøtte i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, skal en foranstaltning kunne tilregnes staten.
In order to constitute a State aid in the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty, a measure must be imputable to the State.
Nogle parter har anfægtet, at den garanti, som ETVA ydede til HDW/Ferrostaal, kan tilregnes staten.
Some parties contest that the guarantee granted by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal is imputable to the State.
De har gjort gældende, at beslutningen om at yde denne garanti blev truffet uafhængigt og frit af ETVA.
They claim that the decision to grant this guarantee was taken independently and freely by ETVA.
For det første fremgik denne garanti i forbindelse med privatiseringsprocessen af HSY af de dokumenter, der blev fremsendt til potentielle bydende.
First, during the privatisation process of HSY, this guarantee was appearing in the documents submitted to the potential bidders.
Der var med andre ord allerede i forbindelse med privatiseringsprocessen et tilsagn om, at køberen af HSY ville blive holdt skadesløs for enhver statsstøtte, der tilbagesøges fra HSY.
In other words, already during the privatisation process, there was a promise that the purchaser of HSY would be indemnified for any State aid recovered from HSY.
Endvidere forpligtede ETVA sig den 14. september 2001 udtrykkeligt og utvetydigt til at give HDW/Ferrostaal denne garanti, hvis EU udfærdigede en attest vedrørende tidligere og nuværende støtte, der var ydet til HSY.
In addition, on 14 September 2001, ETVA explicitly and unambiguously committed to provide this guarantee to HDW/Ferrostaal if the European Union would not give clearance regarding past and present State aid granted to HSY.
I klausul 1.2.3 i HSY SPA, der blev undertegnet den 11. oktober 2001, henvises der udtrykkeligt til det dokument, der blev undertegnet den 14. september 2001.
Clause 1.2.3 of HSY SPA signed on 11 October 2001 explicitly refers to the document signed on 14 September 2001.
Diskussionen om den nøjagtige ordlyd af garantien fortsatte i de følgende måneder.
The discussion regarding the precise wording of the guarantee continued in the following months.
Eftersom Kommissionen ikke udfærdigede en administrativ skrivelse/negativattest vedrørende tidligere og nuværende støtte til HSY, var ETVA den 31. maj 2002 nødt til at udstede den garanti til fordel for HDW/Ferrostaal, som parterne havde aftalt den 14. september 2001 og i klausul 1.2.3 i HSY SPA.
Since the Commission did not give a letter of comfort/negative clearance regarding past and present aids to HSY, ETVA had on 31 May 2002 to issue the guarantee in favour of HDW/Ferrostaal, as had been agreed by the parties on 14 September 2001 and in Clause 1.2.3 of HSY SPA.
Det fremgår af ovenstående, at selv om tillægget med garantien til HDW/Ferrostaal blev undertegnet den 31. maj 2002, forpligtede ETVA sig allerede til at yde denne garanti (hvis EU ikke godkendte tidligere og nuværende støtte) på et tidspunkt, hvor ETVA stadig var under statslig kontrol.
All the foregoing illustrates that, even though the Addendum containing the guarantee to HDW/Ferrostaal was signed on 31 May 2002, ETVA already committed to grant this guarantee (if the EU did not clear past and present aids) at a time when ETVA was still under the control of the State.
Tillægget af 31. maj 2002 er med andre ord udførelsen af en kontrakt, som ETVA indgik, da den stadig var under statslig kontrol.
In other words, the Addendum of 31 May 2002 is the execution of a contract entered into by ETVA when it was still under State control.
Som vist i afsnit 3.2 i denne beslutning kan alle de foranstaltninger, som ETVA har gennemført i forhold til HSY, da ETVA var under statslig kontrol, anses for at kunne tilregnes staten.
As shown in section 3.2 of the present decision, when ETVA was under State control, all the actions it took towards HSY can be considered imputable to the State.
Alle disse elementer blev bekræftet af Grækenland ved brev af 23. maj 2005.For det andet ville foranstaltningen stadig kunne tilregnes staten, selv hvis det blev antaget, at ETVA på grundlag af de førnævnte dokumenter, som den havde undertegnet, da den var under statslig kontrol (dvs. indtil udgangen af marts 2002), ikke havde nogen kontraktlig forpligtelse til at yde denne garanti til HDW/Ferrostaal.
All these elements were confirmed by Greece in its letter of 23 May 2005,Second, even if it were considered that, on the basis of the aforementioned documents concluded by ETVA when it was under the control of the State (i.e. until end March 2002), there existed no contractual obligation of ETVA to grant this guarantee to HDW/Ferrostaal, the measure would still be imputable to the State.
Kommissionen bemærker i den henseende, at Grækenland fortsat forestod salget af HSY, selv efter at ETVA var blevet solgt til Piraeus Bank.
Indeed, the Commission observes that Greece continued to manage the sale of HSY even after the sale of ETVA to Piraeus Bank.
Ifølge artikel 8.2.2 i aftalen af 20. marts 2002 mellem staten og Piraeus Bank vil ETVA ikke være ansvarlig for salgsprocessen af HSY, som staten fortsat vil forestå.
Article 8.2.2 of the Agreement of 20 March 2002 between the State and Piraeus Bank provides that ETVA will not be responsible for the sale process of HSY, which the State will continue to manage.
Det hedder f.eks. i artikel 8.2.2.(b), at staten »tager sig af og påtager sig kontrollen med og ansvaret for akterne og forhandlingerne med den tredje køber af aktieposten i Hellenic Shipyards«.
Article 8.2.2.(b) for instance provides that the State ‘shall assume the control, care and responsibility of the acts and negotiations with the third purchaser of the Holding in Hellenic Shipyards’.
I overensstemmelse med artikel 8.2.2 i aftalen af 20. marts 2002 anmodede Piraeus Bank ved brev af 28. maj 2002 om statens samtykke vedrørende den garanti, som ETVA havde til hensigt at yde til HDW/Ferrostaal.
In accordance with Article 8.2.2 of the Agreement of 20 March 2002, Piraeus Bank asked by letter of 28 May 2002 the agreement of the State regarding the guarantee that ETVA intended to grant to HDW/Ferrostaal.
For det tredje ville garantien stadig kunne tilregnes staten, selv hvis de to foregående punkter blev afvist.
Third, even if the two foregoing points were dismissed, the guarantee would still be imputable to the State.
Kommissionen bemærker i den henseende, at staten besluttede at privatisere HSY.
The Commission indeed observes that the State decided to privatise HSY.
Da Piraeus Bank overtog kontrollen med ETVA, var den derfor i henhold til loven forpligtet til at privatisere HSY.
When Piraeus Bank took control of ETVA, it was therefore obliged by law to privatise HSY.
Som erkendt af TKMS/GNSH selv havde HDW/Ferrostaal ikke købt HSY, hvis de ikke havde fået en sådan garanti.
As acknowledged by TKMS/GNSH itself, HDW/Ferrostaal would not have purchased HSY if they would not have received such a guarantee.
Eftersom staten besluttede, at HSY skulle sælges, og eftersom ydelsen af garantien var uomgængelig nødvendig for at sælge HSY, kan det konkluderes, at staten bragte ETVA i en situation, hvor den var tvunget til at udstede garantien.
Since the State decided that HSY had to be sold, and since the grant of the guarantee was indispensable to sell HSY, it can be concluded that the State put ETVA in a situation where it was forced to issue the guarantee.
Selv hvis det blev konkluderet, at ETVA besluttede at yde garantien i maj 2002 uden statens direkte inddragelse, vil foranstaltningen derfor fortsat kunne tilregnes staten.
Therefore, even if it would be concluded that ETVA decided to grant the guarantee in May 2002 without any direct involvement of the State, the measure would remain imputable to the State,
For det fjerde bør det konkluderes, selv hvis alle de tidligere punkter blev afvist, at ETVA kun accepterede at yde garantien den 31. maj 2002, fordi dens kontrollerende aktionær (dvs. Piraeus Bank) havde modtaget en garanti fra staten, der beskytter vedkommende mod en eventuel økonomisk skade som følge af denne garanti.
Fourth, even if all the previous points were dismissed, it should be concluded that ETVA accepted to grant the guarantee on 31 May 2002 only because its controlling shareholder (i.e. Piraeus Bank) had received a guarantee from the State protecting him against any financial damage stemming from this guarantee.
Som det vil fremgå, havde en markedsøkonomisk investor således aldrig ydet en sådan garanti uden at have modtaget en modgaranti fra staten.
Indeed, as will be shown, a market economy investor would never have granted such a guarantee without having received a counter guarantee from the State.
Garantien blev kun ydet, fordi staten havde beskyttet den økonomiske enhed (dvs. koncernen), der ydede garantien, mod eventuelle negative konsekvenser (ved at yde en modgaranti).
The granting of the guarantee occurred only because the State had protected the economic unit (i.e. the group) granting the guarantee from any negative consequence (by granting a counter guarantee).
I et sådant tilfælde, hvor en virksomhed blot overdrager en støtte til anden virksomhed, kan ydelsen af foranstaltningen tilregnes staten.
In such a case, where a firm simply transfer an aid to a second firm, the granting of the measure is imputable to the State.
For at udgøre statsstøtte i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, skal en foranstaltning være finansieret af statsmidler.
In order to constitute a State aid in the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty, a measure must be financed by State resources.
Det fremgår af meddelelsen om garantier, at »[s]tøtten ydes på det tidspunkt, hvor garantien gives, ikke det tidspunkt, hvor garantien påberåbes, eller det tidspunkt, hvor der foretages udbetalinger i henhold til garantien.
The Notice on guarantees indicates that ‘The aid is granted at the moment when the guarantee is given, not the moment at which the guarantee is invoked or the moment at which payments are made under the terms of the guarantee.
Om en garanti udgør statsstøtte eller ej, […] skal vurderes på det tidspunkt, hvor garantien gives«.
Whether or not a guarantee constitutes State aid […] must be assessed at the moment the guarantee is given’.