natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Endvidere minder de spanske myndigheder om, at mens en privat kreditor kan indgå aftale om en hvilken som helst rentesats med debitor, er socialsikringsmyndighederne bundet af artikel 20 i den generelle lov om social sikring, der fastsætter, at den lovbestemte mindstesats skal anvendes ved gældsomlægningsaftaler.
The Spanish Government also recalls that while a private creditor can agree any interest rate with the debtor, the Social Security authorities are bound by Article 20 of the General Law on Social Security, which lays down that the legal interest rate is to be applied in the debt rescheduling agreements.
I beslutningen om at indlede proceduren fremsatte Kommissionen den betragtning, at sammenligningen af de betingelser, der er indeholdt i den private kreditoraftale fra oktober 1996, med betingelserne for gældsomlægningsaftalen mellem socialsikringen og SNIACE muligvis ikke udgør en korrekt anvendelse af kriteriet om den »private kreditor« som defineret af Domstolen.
In its decision to initiate the procedure, the Commission considered that the comparison of the terms contained in the private creditors’ agreement of October 1996 with the terms of the rescheduling agreement between the social security authorities and SNIACE might not be the correct way of applying the ‘private creditor’ test, as defined by the Court of Justice.
I denne henseende erklærede de spanske myndigheder, at offentlige kreditorers forhold, på grund af offentlige myndigheders lovmæssige begrænsninger, faktisk ikke kan sammenlignes med private kreditorers.
In this regard, the Spanish authorities stated that, due to legal obligations of the public administration, the situation of public creditors could not be treated in the same way as the situation of private creditors.
De spanske myndigheder understregede imidlertid, at på trods af de forskellige vilkår og betingelser i aftalerne indgået mellem dels socialsikringen og SNIACE, dels FOGASA og SNIACE, var vilkårene strengere end vilkårene i aftalen indgået med private kreditorer.
However, they emphasised that, in spite of the differences, the terms and conditions of the agreements between the social security authorities and SNIACE, on the one hand, and between FOGASA and SNIACE, on the other hand, were stricter than the terms reached in the private creditors’ agreement.
De spanske myndigheder erindrede endvidere om de synspunkter, som de allerede havde givet udtryk for under den procedure, som blev afsluttet med 1998-beslutningen.
Finally, the Spanish authorities reiterated the views expressed in the procedure which led to the Decision of 1998.
VEDRØRENDE BEGRUNDELSEN FOR DEN ANDEN PROCEDUREINDLEDNING
ON THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE SECOND INITIATION OF THE PROCEDURE
De spanske myndigheder gør gældende, at indledning af en ny formel undersøgelsesprocedure ikke var nødvendig for at finde en løsning på sagen, og at overholdelsen af de interesserede parters rettigheder ikke var tilstrækkelig begrundelse for at indlede en ny procedure.
The Spanish authorities maintain that it was not necessary to initiate a new formal investigation procedure to resolve the case and that respect for the rights of interested parties was not a sufficient reason for doing so.
Kommissionen mener for sin del, at Tubacex-dommen udgjorde et element, der var tilstrækkeligt vigtigt til at bringe det til de spanske myndigheders og andre interesserede parters kendskab.
For its part, the Commission considers that the Tubacex judgment was sufficiently relevant for the Spanish authorities and the interested parties to be informed of it.
Dommen ville nemlig kunne ændre de kriterier, der lå til grund for vurderingen, der førte til beslutningen om at indlede proceduren den 7. november 1997.
Indeed, that judgment could alter the assessment criteria as laid down in the decision to initiate the procedure of 7 November 1997.
FOREKOMSTEN AF STATSSTØTTE SOM OMHANDLET I TRAKTATENS ARTIKEL 87, STK. 1
DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF AID FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARTICLE 87(1) OF THE TREATY
Kommissionen stillede sig i den anden procedureindledning det spørgsmål, om der var tale om statsstøtte i forbindelse med aftalerne indgået mellem SNIACE og virksomhedens offentlige kreditorer, og, i bekræftende fald, om sådan statsstøtte kunne erklæres forenelig.
In the second initiation of the procedure, the Commission raised the question of whether the agreements concluded between SNIACE and its public creditors included State Aid and, if so, whether they could be declared compatible.
Tubacex-dommen tillader, at offentlig indgriben i form af en gældsomlægning ikke udgør statsstøtte, hvis den opfylder de kriterier, der er indeholdt i dommen (jf. betragtning 4).
The Tubacex judgment allows State interventions in the form of debt rescheduling to be considered as not constituting State Aid if they fulfil the criteria laid down in that judgment (see recital (4))
I dommen i sag T-36/99, som annullerede 2000-beslutningen, afviste Retten i Første Instans begrundelsen for, at Kommissionen valgte at anse TGSS og FOGASA for at have udvist en adfærd, som tilsvarer en privat kreditors adfærd.
In the judgment in Case T-36/99 annulling the Decision of 2000, the Court of First Instance rejected the grounds on which the Commission had considered that the TGSS and FOGASA had behaved as a private creditor would have done.
Med henblik herpå og under hensyntagen til dommen afsagt af Retten i Første Instans bør følgende undersøges nøje:
For that purpose, and in the light of the judgment of the Court of First Instance, the following should be verified:
de offentlige kreditorers forhold sammenlignet med de private kreditorers
the situation of the public creditors compared with that of the private creditors;
Banco Español de Crédito (i det følgende benævnt »Banesto«), en privat kreditors forhold sammenlignet med TGSS og FOGASA's
the situation of the Banco Español de Crédito (hereinafter Banesto), a private creditor, compared with that of the TGSS and that of FOGASA;
TGSS og FOGASA's mulighed for at inddrive det samlede gældsbeløb uden at lide økonomiske tab, og
the prospects of recovering the total sums owed to the TGSS and FOGASA without suffering any financial loss, and
udsigterne for SNIACE's fremtidige rentabilitet og levedygtighed.
SNIACE’s prospects of future profitability and viability.
De kriterier, der er indeholdt i Tubacex-dommen og i dommen afsagt af Retten i Første Instans i sag T-36/99, kan kumuleres.
The criteria laid down in the Tubacex judgment and in the judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-36/99 are cumulative.
Hvis ikke de vilkår, som de offentlige kreditorer har fastlagt, mindst svarer til et af kriterierne, bør Kommissionen se bort fra princippet om en privat kreditor.
As soon as the measures taken by the public creditors do not fulfil at least one of them, the Commission must discard the private creditor principle.
AFTALER INDGÅET MED FOGASA
AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED WITH FOGASA
I modsætning til de forhold, der lå til grund for Tubacex-dommen, blev de to aftaler med FOGASA indgået med ca. to års mellemrum og vedrørte forskellig gæld.
Unlike the facts that gave rise to the Tubacex judgment, the two agreements with FOGASA were concluded approximately two years apart and related to different debts.
Kommissionen mener, at det ikke drejer sig om en og samme aftale.
The Commission considers that they do not constitute a single agreement.
FOGASA forsøgte heller ikke på tidspunktet for indgåelse af den anden aftale at sammenlægge de to med henblik på at få en enkelt aftale vedrørende samtlige gældsbeløb.
When the second agreement was concluded, FOGASA did not try to combine them into one agreement covering all the amounts owed.
FOGASA samlede først den resterende gæld ved aftalen af 18. marts 1999 [12], dvs. fire år efter indgåelse af den anden aftale mellem FOGASA og SNIACE.
FOGASA only unified outstanding debts by means of the agreement of 18 March 1999 [12], that is to say, four years after the second agreement was concluded between FOGASA and SNIACE.
I sin vurdering vil Kommissionen først analysere FOGASA I-aftalen og dernæst FOGASA II-aftalen under hensyntagen til de fastlagte kriterier for en privat kreditor.
For the purposes of this assessment, the Commission will first analyse the FOGASA I agreement and then the FOGASA II agreement, taking into account the criteria applicable to private creditors.
FOGASA I-aftalen
FOGASA I Agreement
SNIACE og FOGASA indgik en første aftale om gældsomlægning den 5. november 1993 for et beløb på 1362708700 ESP (inkl. renter).
SNIACE and FOGASA concluded the first debt rescheduling agreement on 5 November 1993 for the amount of ESP 1362708700 (including interest).
Aftalen blev indgået, efter at FOGASA havde udbetalt forfaldne lønninger og tillæg, som SNIACE skyldte medarbejderne.
The agreement was concluded after FOGASA paid the wages and compensation that SNIACE owed to its staff.
Kommissionen bør i sin analyse skelne mellem tidspunktet for aftalens indgåelse (ex-ante) og tidspunktet for aftalens iværksættelse (ex-post).
For the purposes of its analysis, the Commission must distinguish between the time when the agreement was concluded (ex-ante analysis) and the time when it was implemented (ex-post analysis).
Det kan forekomme, at det, efter at have analyseret en aftale i forhold til aftalens vilkår på tidspunktet for indgåelsen, konkluderes, at den ikke indeholder statsstøtteelementer, og at aftalens iværksættelse, under omstændigheder der kan være anderledes end oprindeligt forudset, ændrer denne vurdering, således at der må konkluderes, at aftalen indeholder statsstøtte.
In fact, it could be the case that, after analysing an agreement in terms of its characteristics at the time when it was concluded, the conclusion is reached that the agreement does not contain aid, and that its implementation, in different circumstances from those initially envisaged, alters that initial opinion and the conclusion is reached that it does contain aid.
Vurdering af FOGASA I-aftalen på tidspunktet for indgåelsen
Assessment of the FOGASA I agreement at the time of its conclusion
FOGASA's stilling sammenholdt med private kreditorers stilling, heriblandt Banesto
FOGASA’s position compared with that of private creditors, including Banesto
Kommissionen bemærker sig, at den første aftale om gældsomlægning med FOGASA er fra den 5. november 1993, dvs. næsten otte måneder efter at den spanske førsteinstansret erklærede SNIACE i betalingsstandsning den 25. marts 1993, hvilket var årsagen til, at FOGASA skulle betale SNIACE's ansatte.
The Commission notes that the first debt rescheduling agreement with FOGASA dates from 5 November 1993, that is almost 8 months after the suspension of payments declaration issued by the court of first instance on 25 March 1993 requiring that FOGASA pay SNIACE’s employees.
FOGASA skaffede sig på dette tidspunkt sikkerhed for i det mindste en del af sin fordring i form af pant i SNIACE's aktiver.
At that time, FOGASA linked the agreement to the mortgaging of SNIACE’s assets in order to guarantee at least a part of its loan.
FOGASA's rentesats var på 10 %, som var lovbestemt på tidspunktet for aftalens indgåelse.
The rate applied by FOGASA was 10 %, as laid down by the legislation in force when the agreement was concluded.
Banesto havde for sin del i 1987 og igen i 1991, dvs. mange år før indgåelsen af FOGASA I-aftalen, ydet nogle hypoteklån til SNIACE til en rentesats på henholdsvis 16 % og 18 % (svarende til markedsrenten på det tidspunkt).
For its part, Banesto had granted lines of mortgage credit to SNIACE in 1987 and 1991, that is to say some time before the FOGASA I agreement was concluded, at rates of 16 % and 18 % respectively (the market conditions at that time).
Det kan således konstateres, at SNIACE, da virksomheden blev erklæret i betalingsstandsning i 1992, mindst havde to kreditorer: FOGASA, for forfaldne lønudbetalinger, som SNIACE ikke havde kunnet betale til sine ansatte, og Banesto, for lån, der endnu ikke var fuldt ud tilbagebetalte.
Thus, it should be noted that, when the suspension of payments occurred in 1992, SNIACE had at least two creditors: FOGASA, to which it owed the wages that SNIACE had been unable to pay to its employees, and BANESTO, because of the loans that it had granted to SNIACE and which SNIACE had still not entirely repaid.
Banesto ville efter bekendtgørelsen af betalingsstandsningen kunne have gjort sine rettigheder gældende som privilegeret hypotekkreditor for SNIACE.
From the time when the suspension of payments was announced, BANESTO could have asserted its rights as a preferential mortgage creditor of SNIACE.
Det var imidlertid først i medfør af aftalen af 26. september 1996, dvs. tre år efter indgåelsen af FOGASA I-aftalen, at SNIACE, som betaling for en del af sin gæld, afstod de aktier, SNIACE besad i virksomheden Inquitex, og en række grunde, der var omfattet af pantet, til Banesto.
However, only under the agreement of 26 de September 1996, in other words, three years after the FOGASA I agreement was concluded, did SNIACE transfer to Banesto, as payment of part of its debts, the shares that it owned in the undertaking Inquitex and some plots of land that were covered by the mortgage.
FOGASA var for sin del lovmæssigt forpligtet til at betale lønningerne i tilfælde af betalingsstandsning.
For its part, FOGASA was legally obliged to pay the wages in the event of suspension of payments.
Fra og med det tidspunkt, hvor FOGASA skulle betale lønningerne til SNIACE's ansatte, indledte FOGASA forhandlinger om en gældsomlægningsaftale med henblik på at få tilbagebetalt sin fordring.
From the time when FOGASA had to pay the wages of the SNIACE workers, it began to negotiate a rescheduling agreement with SNAICE in order to recover its loan.
Det forhold, at Banesto ikke fuldbyrdede sine hypoteklån over for SNIACE, viser også, at FOGASA handlede med forsigtighed og klogskab ved at indgå aftalen om gældsomlægning og skaffe sig sikkerhed fra og med det øjeblik, hvor SNIACE blev erklæret i betalingsstandsning, i modsætning til den private kreditor Banesto.
The fact that BANESTO did not enforce its mortgage loans against SNIACE rather demonstrates that FOGASA acted prudently and wisely when it concluded the rescheduling agreement and obtained guarantees as soon as the suspension of payments was notified, unlike the private creditor BANESTO.
Derfor kunne FOGASA og SNIACE hurtigt indlede forhandlinger, som viste begge parters vilje til at nå til en mindelig løsning.
FOGASA and SNIACE therefore rapidly concluded negotiations that showed the parties’ willingness to arrive at an amicable solution.
Muligheden for FOGASA for at inddrive det samlede gældsbeløb uden at lide økonomiske tab
Possibility of recovering in full the sums owed to FOGASA without suffering any financial loss
Efter at have godkendt ansøgningen fra SNIACE's arbejdstagere om godtgørelse af deres tilgodehavender i form af løn og tillæg som følge af betalingsstandsningen indgik FOGASA en aftale om gældsomlægning med det formål, at SNIACE med tiden skulle tilbagebetale de pågældende beløb.
After accepting the SNIACE workers’ demand that they should be paid the wages and compensation owed to them pursuant to the judicial proceedings that had declared the suspension of payments, FOGASA concluded a debt rescheduling agreement whereby SNIACE would repay to it the sums involved.
FOGASA anvendte den lovbestemte mindstesats, dvs. 10 % på tidspunktet for parternes indgåelse af aftalen.
FOGASA applied the legal rate of interest laid down by Spanish law, namely 10 % at the time when the parties concluded the agreement.
Udsigt til fremtidig rentabilitet
Prospects of future financial profitability
På det tidspunkt, hvor aftalen blev indgået, var FOGASA bekendt med den krise, som havde ramt SNIACE, hvorfor FOGASA greb ind til fordel for arbejdstagerne, så disse kunne få de lønninger og andre beløb, som SNIACE ikke kunne betale dem på grund af betalingsstandsningen.
At the time when the agreement was concluded, FOGASA was aware of the crisis that SNIACE was undergoing, which is why it had intervened on behalf of the workers so that they could be paid the wages and compensation that SNIACE could not pay them because its payments had been suspended.
Det kan hævdes, at på daværende tidspunkt var den eneste plan for genopretning af rentabiliteten, som kunne komme i nærheden af en sådan betegnelse, den plan for gældsomlægning, som SNIACE forelagde FOGASA.
Admittedly, at the material time the only genuine viability plan for SNIACE proposed to FOGASA was to reschedule the debts.
Efter den alvorlige krise, som virksomheden gennemgik i 1992, kom der imidlertid lidt efter lidt gang i aktiviteterne igen, så der kunne skimtes en fremtidig rentabilitet, selv om virksomheden fortsat ville befinde sig i en sårbar situation.
However, after the serious social conflict that the undertaking experienced in 1992, its activity gradually revived, offering a glimpse of the prospect of future profitability, although the situation of the undertaking was still fragile.
Fraværet af en aftale med de private kreditorer samt det forhold, at disse ikke havde gennempresset afvikling af gælden efter 1993, viser med al tydelighed, at udsigterne til genopretning var begrundede, hvorfor det ikke var tilrådeligt at fremprovokere en afslutning på virksomhedens aktiviteter.
The absence of an agreement with the private creditors and the fact that they had not enforced payment of the debts since 1993 shows that there was some basis for thinking that the undertaking was on the right track and that, therefore, it was not advisable to increase the risk that the undertaking would cease activities.
Konklusion vedrørende indgåelsen af FOGASA I-aftalen
Conclusion on the FOGASA I agreement
Kommissionen er af den opfattelse, at FOGASA I-aftalen på tidspunktet for aftalens indgåelse ikke udgjorde statsstøtte.
The Commission considers that, at the time when it was concluded, the FOGASA I agreement did not constitute State Aid.
Analyse af FOGASA I-aftalens iværksættelse
Analysis of the implementation of the FOGASA I agreement
Mellem den 5. november 1993 og den 18. marts 1999, hvor FOGASA indgik en ny aftale om gældsomlægning, hvorved fristen for betalingen af gælden blev forlænget med to år, havde SNIACE kun tilbagebetalt ca. 50 % af sin gæld.
Between 5 November 1993 and 18 March 1999, the date on which FOGASA concluded a new rescheduling agreement extending the debt payment period for a further two years, SNIACE had only repaid about 50 % of its debt.
De offentlige kreditorers stilling sammenlignet med de private kreditorers
Position of the public creditors compared with that of the private creditors
I stedet for at fuldbyrde de garantier og den pantsikkerhed, den havde i medfør af aftalen fra 1993, foretrak FOGASA at ændre aftalen om gældsomlægning med henblik på at forøge mulighederne for at kunne inddrive sit tilgodehavende.
Rather than enforce the guarantees and mortgages established in its favour at the time of the 1993 agreement, FOGASA preferred to amend the rescheduling agreement in order to maximise the prospects of recovering its loans.
Til gengæld bemærker Kommissionen sig, at Banesto den 26. september 1996 som betaling for en del af SNIACE's gæld accepterede nogle af de grunde, som virksomheden ejede, samt de aktier, som SNIACE besad i virksomheden Inquitex.
On the other hand, the Commission notes that on 26 September 1996, Banesto accepted, as part-payment of SNIACE’s debt, some plots of land owned by that undertaking, as well as shares that SNIACE owned in the undertaking Inquitex.
Kommissionen mener, at FOGASA's adfærd ikke kan sammenlignes med Banestos adfærd, idet sidstnævnte forsøgte at sikre en del af sit tilgodehavende ved at indgå aftalen fra 1996 i modsætning til FOGASA, som på ingen måde forsøgte at inddrive sit tilgodehavende i medfør af den aftale, der var indgået med SNIACE.
The Commission considers that FOGASA’s behaviour is not comparable to that of BANESTO, which tried to protect a part of its loan by concluding the 1996 agreement, unlike FOGASA, which in no way tried to recover its loan under the agreement concluded with SNIACE.
Kommissionen gør opmærksom på, at på tidspunktet for aftalens genforhandling stillede FOGASA ikke krav om yderligere renter, idet det samlede skyldige beløb forblev det samme på trods af, at løbetiden blev forlænget med to år [14].
The Commission points out that, at the time when the agreement was renegotiated, FOGASA did not require additional payment of interest as the total amount payable was the same, although the final date was delayed by two years [14].
Endvidere mener Kommissionen, at de spanske myndigheders argument [15] om, at de ville beskytte deres investering mod inflation, bør afvises.
Consequently, the Commission considers that Spain’s argument [15] that it wanted to protect its investment from monetary depreciation must be rejected.
Udsigt til fremtidig rentabilitet
Prospects of future profitability
Kommissionen konstaterer på grundlag af tabel 3, som viser det videre forløb, at virksomheden på tidspunktet for indgåelsen af aftalen af 18. marts 1999, som ændrede aftalen af 5. november 1993, kunne se frem til yderligere gældsætning, gentagne tab og negativ egenkapital, hvilket rejste tvivl om udsigten til at få tilbagebetalt det skyldige beløb:
The Commission has established, in the light of Table 3 below, that at the time when the agreement of 18 March 1999 amending the agreement of 5 November 1993 was concluded, the undertaking was faced with increasing debts, recurring losses and negative equity capital, which raised doubts concerning the prospects of recovering the loan:
–24,8 –27,9
Results
Samlet gæld
Total debts
På trods af at virksomheden dog opnåede et lettere positivt resultat i 1995, må det indrømmes, at dens finansielle forhold medførte en usikker udsigt til rentabilitet.
Although it is true that the undertaking had modestly positive results in 1995, it must be recognised that its financial situation indicated that its prospects of profitability were uncertain.
Konklusion vedrørende iværksættelsen af FOGASA I-aftalen
Conclusion on the implementation of the FOGASA I agreement
Kommissionen er nået til den konklusion, at FOGASA ikke udviste en adfærd, der svarer til en privat kreditors:
The Commission has arrived at the conclusion that FOGASA did not behave as a private creditor would have done:
idet FOGASA ikke forsøgte som delvis betaling af gælden at tilegne sig de aktiver, som FOGASA havde ret til som følge af aftalen fra 1993
by not trying to obtain as partial payment of the debt certain assets over which it had acquired rights upon the conclusion of the 1993 agreement;
idet udsigterne til rentabilitet var så usikre på grund af den stadige forværring af de finansielle forhold
owing to the uncertain prospects of profitability caused by the continued deterioration of the financial situation;
idet FOGASA ikke stillede krav om en tillægsrente ved forhandlingerne om gældsomlægningsaftalen i 1999 og ikke bragte aftalens bestemmelse om morarenter for misligholdte indbetalinger i anvendelse.
by not requiring the additional payment of interest when the 1999 rescheduling agreement was negotiated or not applying default interest to the unpaid sums in accordance with the agreement.
FOGASA II-aftalen
FOGASA II agreement
SNIACE og FOGASA indgik en anden aftale om gældsomlægning den 31. oktober 1995 for et beløb på 339459878 ESP (inkl. renter).
SNIACE and FOGASA concluded a second debt rescheduling agreement on 31 October 1995 for the amount of ESP 339459878 (including interest).
Aftalen blev indgået, efter at FOGASA på ny havde lagt ud for forfaldne lønninger og erstatninger, som SNIACE skyldte medarbejderne.
That agreement was concluded after FOGASA had again paid the wages and compensation that SNIACE owed to its staff.
De offentlige kreditorers forhold sammenlignet med de private kreditorers
Situation of the public creditors compared with that of the private creditors