natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
På det tidspunkt, da omstruktureringen blev godkendt, antydede en af kreditorbankernes kreditvurdering således, at Hynix var særdeles sårbar, og at det var højst usandsynligt, at selskabet ville kunne bringes på fode igen.
For example, at the time the restructuring was approved, one bank's credit rating for Hynix indicated that the company was highly vulnerable and that the possibility of the business being restored was very unlikely.
En anden af de involverede bankers kreditvurdering antydede, at risikoen for misligholdelse var stor, og at der ikke var mulighed for at genrejse selskabet.
The rating given to Hynix by another of the banks involved indicated that the possibility of default was very high and that there was no possibility of future recovery.
Alligevel godkendte bankerne omstruktureringsforslaget, også selv om det kan dokumenteres, at dette ikke var i overensstemmelse med markedsvilkårene, og rapporten fra DB modsiger på ingen måde dette.
Instead, these banks went ahead and approved the restructuring proposal, even though the evidence suggests that this was not consistent with a market-oriented approach and the DB report does not indicate otherwise.
Dette fremgik af kreditorernes håndtering af gældsforlængelsen såvel som af de aktieposter, de fik i forbindelse med ombytningen af gæld med aktier: cirka 80-90 % af Hynix' gæld var blevet afskrevet som tab — i et enkelt tilfælde var det endog 100 % — og de tildelte aktier repræsenterede en værdi af omkring 20 % af den pris, kreditorerne betalte.
This was demonstrated by the creditors' treatment of both the debt they rolled over and the equity they received under the debt-to-equity swap: around 80-90 % of the Hynix debt had been written off as a loss — in one case, even 100 % — and the equity was booked at around 20 % of the price the creditors paid.
Selskabet hævder, at de efterfølgende begivenheder viser, at kreditorerne traf den rette beslutning. Hynix har været overskudsgivende siden 2005, og kreditorerne har solgt deres aktier i selskabet med en betragtelig fortjeneste.
The company claims that subsequent events demonstrate that the creditors' decision was the correct one; Hynix has been profitable since 2005 and the creditors sold their shares in the company for a considerable profit.
Imidlertid foreligger der en efterfølgende analyse, der på ingen måde bekræfter den konklusion, at en godkendelse af omstruktureringsplanen, på det tidspunkt da kreditorerne godkendte den, var i overensstemmelse med markedsvilkårene.
However, first of all this is an ex post facto analysis, which does not at all justify the conclusion that at the time the creditors approved the restructuring plan, this was consistent with a market oriented approach.
Desuden skyldes Hynix' overlevelse de enorme subsidier, selskabet modtog.
Moreover, the fact that Hynix survived was due to the enormous subsidies it received.
Man kan ikke påstå, at fordi Hynix overlevede, så var subsidierne ikke subsidier, når overlevelsen kun var mulig på grund af subsidierne.
One cannot argue that, because Hynix survived, subsidies were not subsidies, if that survival was only possible because of those subsidies.
Endelig befandt kreditorerne sig i den situation, de befandt sig i ved udgangen af 2002, fordi de havde deltaget i omstruktureringen i 2001, som udgjorde et subsidie.
Finally, the creditors were in the position they were in at the end of 2002 because they had participated in the 2001 restructuring, which constituted a subsidy.
De kan derfor ikke hævde, at de bør sammenlignes med private kreditorer, som har taget alle skridt frem til et bestemt punkt i tiden af egen fri vilje.
Therefore, they cannot argue that they should be compared to private creditors who have taken all the steps leading to their position at a certain point in time entirely of their own volition.
Hynix' argument ændrer således ikke den konklusion, at kreditorernes handlinger ikke var i overensstemmelse med markedsvilkårene.
Thus, Hynix's argument does not affect the conclusion that the creditors were not acting conformity with a market-oriented approach.
Konklusion om finansielt bidrag
Conclusion on financial contribution
I lyset af den foreliggende dokumentation for den koreanske stats politik over for Hynix og dens indflydelse på Hynix' kreditorers beslutninger samt dokumentationen for Hynix' katastrofale situation og markedets uvilje til at stille kapital til rådighed, sammenholdt med at der ikke er fremlagt beviser for, at de eksisterende kreditorer handlede i overensstemmelse med en markedsbenchmark, som var uberørt af subsidier, konkluderes det, at den koreanske stat overdrog og pålagde Hynix' kreditorer den opgave at redde Hynix ved at godkende omstruktureringsplanen, jf. betragtning 19.
In view of the evidence on the record regarding the GOK's policy as regards Hynix and its involvement in the decision-making process of Hynix's creditors, as well as the evidence relating to the dire state of Hynix and the market's unwillingness to advance capital, as well as the lack of evidence that the existing creditors acted in accordance with a market benchmark, itself undistorted by subsidies, it is concluded that the GOK entrusted and directed Hynix's creditors to rescue Hynix by approving the restructuring described in recital 19 above.
Dette udgjorde et finansielt bidrag efter grundforordningens artikel 2, stk. 1.
This constituted a financial contribution within the meaning of Article 2(1) of the basic Regulation.
Hynix hævdede, at den koreanske stat intet havde at gøre med den nye omstrukturering, som var planlagt af kreditorerne bistået af eksterne konsulenter.
Hynix claimed that the GOK had nothing to do with the new restructuring, which was devised by the creditors with the help of the external advisors.
Hynix hævdede desuden, at den foreliggende dokumentation kun viste, at den koreanske stat var bekymret for Hynix' fremtid, men at den ikke som krævet godtgjorde, at der var en forbindelse mellem den koreanske stat og bankernes handlinger.
Further, it claimed that the evidence on record only showed that the GOK was concerned about Hynix's future, but that it fell short of the requirement for a demonstrable link between the GOK and the banks' actions.
Den koreanske stats aktiepost er ikke et afgørende bevis for, at den har overdraget eller pålagt bankerne en bestemt opgave, men det er en klar indikation af, i hvilket omfang den koreanske stat kan påvirke bankernes beslutninger.
Although GOK shareholding is not conclusive proof of direction or entrustment, it is strong evidence of the extent to which the GOK can influence the banks' decision-making process.
Som det var tilfældet i den oprindelige undersøgelse, viser det foreliggende materiale, at den koreanske stat som storaktionær kan udpege bestyrelsesmedlemmer og derved har mulighed for at påvirke afstemningsresultaterne på bestyrelsesmøderne.
As was the case in the original investigation, evidence on the record shows that, as major shareholder, the GOK can appoint directors and is thus able to influence the outcome of voting at board meetings.
Desuden fremgår det med tydelighed af artikler i pressen og af foreliggende rapporter, at den koreanske stat ikke ville tillade Hynix at gå konkurs. Dette understøttes yderligere at det forhold, at en af de banker, der er 100 % ejet af den koreanske stat, købte Hynix-gæld af andre kreditorer for at fjerne noget af den finansielle byrde fra de banker, der var blevet pålagt at redde Hynix.
Further, the various press articles and reports on record demonstrate clearly that the GOK would not allow Hynix to fail; this is also demonstrated by the fact that one of the wholly-owned GOK banks purchased Hynix debt from the other creditors to ease the financial burden on the banks that had been entrusted to save Hynix.
Det anfægtes ikke, at den nye omstruktureringsplan var udarbejdet af Hynix' eksterne konsulenter i samarbejde med kreditorerne. De foreliggende dokumenter tyder dog på, at den koreanske stat havde pålagt Hynix' kreditorer at omstrukturere Hynix og havde instrueret dem om, at de ikke måtte lade Hynix gå fallit.
It is not disputed that the new restructuring plan was devised by Hynix's external advisors in conjunction with its creditors; however, the evidence on the record suggests that the GOK had entrusted and directed Hynix's creditors to restructure Hynix and not let it fail.
Bankernes fremfærd viser også tydeligt, at de ikke handlede ud fra normale kommercielle overvejelser.
The behaviour of the banks also clearly demonstrates that they were not acting in accordance with normal commercial considerations.
Ingen af bankerne vurderede Hynix til at være et sundt investeringsobjekt. Faktisk viste alle kreditorernes kreditvurderinger, at de anså Hynix for at udgøre en væsentlig risiko og tvivlede på, at det ville være i stand til at overleve.
None of the banks rated Hynix as an investment grade company; in fact, all the rating ascribed to Hynix by its creditors show that they considered it a substantial risk and doubted that it would be able to survive.
Hynix hævdede, at kreditorernes adfærd burde bedømmes fra en »eksisterende kreditors« synspunkt.
The company claimed that the creditors' behaviour should be examined from the point of view of an ‘existing creditor’.
Som nærmere omtalt i betragtning 36 og i betragtning 41-44 er det i dette tilfælde, hvor situationen er påvirket af meget store og lignende subsidier indrømmet kun cirka et år tidligere, den »private investor«-test, der bør anvendes for at vurdere, om kreditorernes adfærd var rimelig set i forhold til markedsvilkårene.
However, as is discussed in more detail in recital 36 and recitals 41 to 44, certainly in this case, which is affected by very large and similar subsidies having been granted only around a year earlier, the correct test to be applied with regard to the commercial reasonableness of the creditors is the private investor test.
Det er derfor ikke nødvendigt at tage stilling til, om en eksisterende kreditor ville have handlet på samme måde som Hynix' kreditorer.
Therefore, the question of whether an existing creditor would have behaved in a manner similar to that of the Hynix creditors need not be addressed.
Hvad angår eventuelle fordele for Hynix, hævdede KEB, Woori Bank, Shinhan Bank, KDB og NACF alle sammen, at de havde deltaget i den nye omstrukturering ud fra et ønske om at kunne gendrive mest muligt af de lån, de allerede havde ydet Hynix.
With regard to any benefit conferred to Hynix, KEB, Woori Bank, Shinhan Bank, KDB and NACF all argued that they had participated in the new restructuring because they wanted to maximise the recovery rate for the loans already granted to Hynix.
De fandt, at værdien af Hynix som igangværende virksomhed var større end den umiddelbare likvidationsværdi.
They considered that the value of Hynix as a going concern was higher than its immediate liquidation value.
Denne sammenligning, uanset om den måtte være en brugbar standard i en undersøgelse af, om Hynix har nydt godt af fordele, ville dog ikke kunne bruges i den aktuelle sag af de årsager, der er forklaret i betragtning 36 og 41-44.
Nevertheless, this comparison, whatever its merits are as a standard for analysis of the existence of a benefit, would in any case not be applicable in the present case for the reasons explained in recital 36 and 41 to 44 below.
Desuden udelukker det forhold, at der er fordele for de meget udsatte kreditorer, ikke, at der også kan være fordele for Hynix.
Furthermore, the existence of a potential benefit to the heavily exposed creditors does not demonstrate that there was no benefit to Hynix.
Hynix hævder, at den nye omstrukturering var baseret på markedsvilkårene, eftersom den var planlagt af eksterne konsulentvirksomheder såsom DB og Deloittes efter måneders omhyggeligt tilsyn og var baseret på DB's rapport, som anbefalede den fulgte fremgangsmåde.
Hynix claims that the new restructuring was market-based, as it was devised by external advisors, such as DB and Deloittes, after months of due diligence and was based on the DB report which recommended the course of action which was eventually followed.
Rapporten fra DB var dog rettet mod Hynix' kreditorer.
However, the DB report was addressed to Hynix's creditors.
Formålet var at sætte kreditorerne i stand til at gendrive så meget som muligt af deres udeståender og samtidig forhindre selskabet i at gå konkurs.
Its aim was to maximise debt recovery for such creditors while keeping the company from failing.
Hynix hævdede, at den test, der skal bruges til at påvise, hvilke fordele den nye omstrukturering har givet selskabet, skal være den »private kreditor«-test og ikke den »private investor«-test.
Hynix argued that the test to be applied to ascertain the benefit received by the company from the new restructuring should be the ‘private creditor’ test and not the ‘private investor’ test.
Kreditorernes situation er en faktor, som kunne indgå i en undersøgelse, men som det forklares i betragtning 36 og fremefter kan denne faktor ikke tages i betragtning i dette tilfælde.
The position of the creditors is a factor which could be considered in an analysis; however, as explained in recital 36 and following, it cannot play a role in this case.
Sagt med almindelige ord er sammenligningsgrundlaget, om en investor med eller uden fordringer på Hynix på grundlag af de gældende markedsvilkår ville have vurderet, at den foreslåede investering i Hynix var risikoen værd.
In general terms, the relevant standard is whether or not a market-oriented investor with or without an existing exposure to Hynix, would have assessed the proposed investment in Hynix as one worth making.
DB's rapport giver ikke noget pålideligt svar på dette spørgsmål, eftersom den er henvendt til de eksisterende kreditorer og lægger Hynix' bestående gælds- og egenkapitalforhold til grund for de foreslåede investeringer og dermed reducerer selv den mest hypotetiske mulighed for en investering udefra på samme vilkår til noget nær nul.
The DB report does not provide a reliable response to that question, because, being addressed to the existing creditors, it is premised on using what are in general terms the existing Hynix debt and equity structures as a vehicle for the proposed investment, thus reducing to vanishing point any possibility for hypothetical outside investment on the same terms.
Rapporten fra DB godtgør på ingen måde, at nye private investorer ville have haft nogen som helst interesse i at skyde penge i Hynix.
The DB report contains no evidence that outside private investors would have had any interest in putting money into Hynix.
DB's råd til private investorer var da også ikke at investere i Hynix, hvilket underbygges af det forhold, at bankens arbitrageafdeling ikke fulgte Hynix' aktier.
Indeed, DB's advice to private investors was, in fact, not to invest in Hynix, as shown by the fact that its research department did not follow Hynix equity.
Under alle omstændigheder var Hynix' økonomiske situation på tidspunktet for den nye omstrukturering som beskrevet i betragtning 14 katastrofal, og det var åbenbart, at Hynix ikke var i stand til at betale renter og afdrag på gælden. Derfor var det ikke muligt at finde finansieringskilder på markedet, hvilket tydeligt understreges af udtalelserne fra de økonomiske konsulenter, jf. betragtning 14 og 15.
In any event, the financial situation of Hynix at the time of the new restructuring, as described in recital 14, was dire and it was evident that Hynix was not in a position to service its liabilities; hence, no funding was forthcoming from the market, as is evident from the statements of financial advisors cited in recitals 14 and 15.
DB's rapport anbefaler Hynix' kreditorer at minimere deres tab, men den kaster ikke lys over, hvorfor markedet fortsat skulle have lånt eller investeret midler i Hynix, hvis kreditværdighed stod på »selective default«.
While the DB report points the way for Hynix's creditors to minimise their losses, it gives no indication as to why the market would have continued to lend or invest money in Hynix, a company in selective default.
Andre foreliggende oplysninger om Hynix' situation og markedssituationen bekræfter, at DB's rapport ikke giver et pålideligt svar på spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt en investor på grundlag af de gældende markedsvilkår ville have vurderet, at den foreslåede investering i Hynix var risikoen værd.
Therefore, such other data as are available concerning the position of Hynix and the market situation confirm that the DB report does not provide any reliable response to the question of whether or not a market-oriented investor would have assessed the proposed investment in Hynix as one worth making.
Ganske uanset spørgsmålet om, hvilke muligheder der bød sig eller ikke bød sig for parterne i 2002 på baggrund af den foreliggende situation, er det ydermere en kendsgerning, at Hynix var havnet i denne situation på grund af økonomisk ukloge investerings- og lånebeslutninger truffet af eller på vegne af den koreanske stat i 2001, hvis virkninger lod sig mærke også i 2002 og derefter.
In addition, leaving aside the question of what course of action might or might not have been open to the parties in 2002 given the situation as it then existed, the fact remains that Hynix had been put in this situation by economically irrational investment and lending decisions taken by or on behalf of the GOK in 2001, the effects of which continued into 2002 and beyond.
Det umiddelbare formål med den nye omstrukturering var at tilføre Hynix ny finansiering, og det lader sig ikke adskille fra det oprindelige redningsforsøg i 2001.
The express purpose of the new restructuring was to re-finance Hynix and it cannot be divorced from the initial 2001 bail-out.
De to hænger uløseligt sammen.
The two are inextricably linked.
Sagt på en anden måde er det alene en følge af den foregående omstrukturering, som stred imod al fornuft og sidenhen slog fejl, at det blev nødvendigt at forlænge de eksisterende kreditorers tilgodehavender i 2002-foranstaltningen.
In other words, it is only because of the irrational nature and the subsequent failure of the earlier restructuring that it became necessary to rollover the exposure of the existing creditors in the 2002 measure.
Den løsning, der blev foreslået i rapporten fra DB, var derfor kun mulig på baggrund af 2001-foranstaltningen.
Therefore, the solution proposed in the DB report was only possible on the back of the 2001 measures.
Man kan ikke anse en bestemt fremgangsmåde for at være i overensstemmelse med markedsvilkårene, hvis den pågældende fremgangsmåde i sig selv er en videreførelse af en tidligere uforstandig statslig beslutning.
It is not possible to treat a certain proposed course of action as a market benchmark if that course of action is itself a continuation of a previous unreasonable government investment decision.
Dette er endnu en årsag til, at der ikke af DB's rapport kan udledes et pålideligt svar på spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt en investor på grundlag af de gældende markedsvilkår ville have vurderet, at den foreslåede investering i Hynix var risikoen værd.
For this reason also, the DB report does not provide a reliable answer to the question of whether or not a market-oriented investor would have assessed the proposed investment in Hynix as one worth making.
Den nye omstrukturering anses derfor at have givet Hynix en fordel, jf. grundforordningens artikel 2, stk. 2.
It is therefore considered that the new restructuring conferred a benefit to the company, within the meaning of Article 2(2) of the basic Regulation.
Da de foranstaltninger, der blev truffet som led i den nye omstrukturering, udelukkende blev truffet af hensyn til Hynix, anses gældsforlængelsen, renternes tilskrivning til hovedstolen og ombytningen af gæld med aktier for at være specifikke efter grundforordningens artikel 3.
As the measures comprising the new restructuring were taken exclusively for Hynix, the debt rollover, the principalisation of interest and the debt-to-equity swap are considered to be specific within the meaning of Article 3 of the basic Regulation.
Beregning af fordelens værdi
Calculation of the amount of benefit
Fordelens indtræden
Timing of the benefit
I henhold til artikel 5 i grundforordningen beregnes det udligningsberettigede subsidiebeløb udtrykt ved den fordel, som modtageren har opnået i den periode, der er omfattet af subsidieundersøgelsen.
According to Article 5 of the basic Regulation, the amount of countervailable subsidies shall be calculated in terms of the benefit to the recipient which is found to exist during the investigation period of subsidisation.
Et beløb svarende til det gældsbeløb, der skulle ombyttes med aktier, blev udtaget af lånene og bogført som regulering af egenkapitalen, da beslutningen om omstrukturering blev truffet den 30. december 2002 (note 14 til Hynix' regnskab for 2002).
The amount of debt equivalent to the amount to be swapped into equity was moved away from loans and booked as a capital adjustment when the decision for the restructuring was taken on 30 December 2002 (Note 14 to Hynix's Financial Statements 2002).
Desuden blev Hynix fritaget for sine rentebetalingsforpligtelser for så vidt angår denne gæld pr. samme dato.
Similarly, Hynix was released from its interest payment obligations with regard to this debt on the same date.
EF-erhvervsgrenen hævdede, at fordelen ved den nye omstrukturering ikke kom Hynix til gode før den 13. april 2003, da aktierne faktisk blev udstedt til kreditorerne.
The Community industry argued that the benefit from the new restructuring did not accrue to Hynix until 13 April 2003, when shares were in fact issued to the creditors.
På den anden side hævdede selskabet, at datoen for fordelens reelle virkning var den 30. december 2002, som var den dato, hvor kreditorerne traf beslutningen om at godkende omstruktureringen, og hvor Hynix blev fritaget for gældsforpligtelserne.
On the other hand, the company argued that the effective date of the benefit is, in fact, December 2002, as that was the date when the decision to approve the restructuring was taken by the creditors and the date on which Hynix was released from its obligations as regards its debt.
Da Tvistbilæggelsesorganets panel vedrørende DRAMs fastslog, at fordelen ved et subsidie skal ses fra modtagerens synspunkt, og da selskabet ikke længere havde nogen forpligtelser som følge af gælden til kreditorerne fra den dato, da beslutningen om at iværksætte den nye omstrukturering blev truffet, anses den 30. december 2002 for at være den dato, hvor fordelen reelt fik betydning for Hynix.
As the DSB Panel on DRAMs stated that the benefit of a subsidy must be viewed form the point of view of the recipient and the company was no longer under any obligation vis-à-vis its debt exposure to its creditors from the date the decision to proceed with the new restructuring was taken, it is considered that the effective date for the accrual of the benefit to Hynix was 30 December 2002.
Gældsforlængelse og ændring af rentesats og betalingsbetingelser
Debt rollover and changes to the interest rate and payment conditions
I henhold til den metode, der blev anvendt i den oprindelige undersøgelse, betragtes en gældsforlængelse som et lån ved beregningen af fordelen.
In accordance with the methodology adopted in the original investigation, a debt rollover is taken to be a loan for the purposes of the benefit calculation.
Renternes tilskrivning til hovedstolen betragtes også som et lån i denne sammenhæng.
The principalised interest will also be treated as a loan for these purposes.
I den oprindelige undersøgelse blev subsidiet anset for at være lig med lånets nominelle hovedstol fordelt over den normale femårige afskrivningsperiode for aktiver.
In the original investigation, the subsidy was considered to be the face amount of the principal of the loan, allocated over the normal five-year depreciation period of assets.
Det således fordelte beløb pr. år blev forhøjet med den almindelige handelsrente i Korea (7 %).
Each annual amount so allocated was increased by adding the standard commercial interest rate in Korea (7 %).