natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Det fremgår af de værdiansættelser, der blev foretaget af BTPS finansieringsevne i 1999 og 2002, hvor mindstekapitalkravene i pensionsloven fra 1995 var i kraft, at der ikke var noget underskud, som BT skulle have haft dækket for at opfylde kravene.
As a matter of fact, BTPS’ funding position resulting from the valuations carried out in 1999 and 2002, when the minimum funding requirements of the Pensions Act 1995 were in force, does not disclose any deficit which BT would have been forced to make good in application of those requirements.
Selv om BT kunne have benyttet sig af fritagelsen for pensionsloven af 1995 med hensyn til den foreskrevne metode, gjorde BT det ikke, men anvendte faktisk en metode, som stillede strengere krav til finansieringen af BTPS' underskud.
Although BT could have availed itself of the exemption from the Pensions Act 1995 as concerns the prescribed methodology, it did not do so and actually applied a methodology which placed more stringent obligations on the funding of BTPS’ deficit.
Med hensyn til fristen for at sikre fuld kapitaldækning gælder, at havde der været et underskud ifølge mindstekapitalkravene i pensionsloven af 1995, ville det ikke have været nødvendigt at dække dette øjeblikkeligt, men blot inden for den fastsatte frist på højst 10 år.
In respect of the prescribed period for return to full funding, had a deficit existed under the minimum funding requirements set out in the Pensions Act 1995, the correction needed not to be immediate but could be carried forward within prescribed periods of 10 years or less.
Det er korrekt, at BT i henhold til BTPS' regler var og stadig er forpligtet til at dække ethvert underskud i ordningens aktiver, som er konstateret i aktuarberegningen […].
It is true that BT was, and still is, obliged under the rules of BTPS to repair any deficit between the scheme assets and liabilities reported on an actuarial valuation, […].
Da der imidlertid ikke var noget underskud i BTPS ifølge den metode, som var foreskrevet i pensionsloven af 1995, ser det ikke ud til, at BT har haft en reel økonomisk fordel ved at have en længere frist til at dække et eventuelt underskud i forhold til loven.
However, in the absence of any deficit of the BTPS under the methodology prescribed by the Pensions Act 1995, the longer period within which BT could have corrected it as compared with the Act does not appear to have provided an actual economic advantage to BT.
Kommissionen tager tredjeparts argument om, at en foranstaltning godt kan udgøre statsstøtte, selv om den aldrig har været brugt, til efterretning.
The Commission notes the argument made by third parties that a measure does not cease being State aid because it has not yet been used.
Under de nuværende omstændigheder er foranstaltningen dog ikke længere i kraft, og der er intet tegn på, at BT har haft en økonomisk fordel mellem 1995 og 2004.
However, in the current circumstances, the measure in question is no longer in force and there is no evidence of an economic benefit having accrued to BP between 1995 and 2004.
Efter disse omstændigheder mener Kommissionen ikke, at det kan fastslås, at fritagelsen fra mindstekapitalkravene i pensionsloven af 1995, og endnu mindre kravene i pensionsloven af 2004, har givet eller stadig giver BT en økonomisk fordel.
In these circumstances, the Commission considers that it is not established that the exemption from the minimum funding requirements laid down in the Pensions Act 1995 and, even less so, the rules contained in the Pensions Act 2004 have procured or still procure an economic advantage to BT.
Der er derfor ikke tale om statsstøtte i denne henseende, idet de kumulative betingelser i EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, ikke er opfyldt.
There is therefore no State aid in this respect since the cumulative conditions laid down by Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty are not fulfilled.
Fritagelsen for at betale bidrag til pensionsbeskyttelsesfonden svarende til pensionsforpligtelserne, der er dækket af statsgarantien, jf. pensionsloven af 2004
The exemption from the payment of levy to the Pension Protection Fund corresponding to the pension liabilities covered by the Crown guarantee set out in the Pensions Act 2004
Ved pensionsloven af 2004 blev der oprettet en pensionsbeskyttelsesfond, hvortil pensionsfonde normalt skal yde et årligt bidrag, medmindre de er dækket af en statsgaranti og dermed er fritaget for dette bidrag.
The Pensions Act 2004 created the Pension Protection Fund, to which pension funds generally have to contribute by paying an annual levy, unless they benefit from a Crown guarantee and are as a result exempted from this payment.
Fra 2004 har der været indført en generel ordning for pensionsbeskyttelsesfonden, og erhvervspensionsordninger (og indirekte arbejdsgivere) har skullet yde bidrag til pensionsbeskyttelsesfonde, som garanterer arbejdstagere i pensionsordninger.
As from 2004, the Pension Protection Fund general system has been established and occupational pension schemes, and indirectly employers, have to make contributions to the Pension Protection Fund, which guarantees the employees of any contributor scheme.
Med andre ord er det almindeligt, at arbejdsgivere skal betale et fuldt bidrag for yderligere beskyttelse.
In other words, the general system is that additional protection must be paid by the employers in the form of the payment of a full levy.
Ifølge pensionsbeskyttelsesfondens regler er den del af BTPS, som omfatter arbejdstagere, hvis rettigheder er dækket af statsgarantien, fritaget.
Under the Pension Protection Fund entry rules regulations, the section of BTPS for the part of its employees’ pension rights guaranteed by the Crown is exempted.
Pensionsbeskyttelsesfonden beregner derfor BTPS' bidrag eksklusive de arbejdstagere, der blev medlem af ordningen inden privatiseringen, ud fra den antagelse, at BT ifølge section 68 i loven af 1984 er forpligtet til at yde bidrag til BTPS, for så vidt angår disse medlemmer.
Therefore, BTPS levy is calculated by the Pension Protection Fund excluding all members of the scheme who joined before privatisation on the understanding that section 68 of the 1984 Act guarantees the liability of BT to make contributions to BTPS in respect of these members.
Der er derfor forskel på det bidrag, som BTPS faktisk har betalt til pensionsbeskyttelsesfonden siden 2005, og det bidrag, BTPS ville have haft betalt, hvis der var blevet set bort fra statsgarantien.
As a result, there is a difference between the Pension Protection Fund levy which the BTPS actually paid since 2005 and the levy which the BTPS would have paid had the existence of the Crown guarantee been ignored.
F.eks. var det bidrag, som BTPS betalte i 2005/06 på […] GBP, mens det bidrag, der skulle have været betalt, hvis der ikke havde været en statsgaranti, formodentlig ville have været på […] GBP. Det bidrag, der faktisk blev betalt, beløb sig med andre ord til mindre end […] af det beløb, som BTPS ville have haft betalt uden statsgaranti.
For instance, the levy which BTPS paid in 2005/2006 was GBP […] whilst the putative levy payable without the Crown guarantee would have been GBP […] In other words, the fee actually paid amounted to less than […] of the amount which the BTPS would have had to pay without the Crown guarantee.
I de følgende år ville bidraget uden statsgarantien have været på […] GBP i 2006/07 og på […] GBP i 2007/08.
For subsequent years, the fee payable if the existence of the Crown guarantee had been ignored would have been GBP […] in 2006/2007 and GBP […] in 2007/2008.
Kommissionen finder ikke, at »idéen bag ordningen« berettiger til en reduktion i bidraget til pensionsbeskyttelsesfonden.
The Commission does not consider that the reduction of the levy to be paid to the Pension Protection Fund is justified ‘by the logic of the system’.
Det er Kommissionens opfattelse, at pensionsbeskyttelsesfonden alene ikke kan siges at udgøre »ordningen« i Det Forenede Kongerige til beskyttelse af pensionsrettigheder.
The Commission considers that the ‘system’ set out in the United Kingdom for the protection of pension rights cannot be regarded as constituted by the Pension Protection Fund alone.
Det er snarere alle foranstaltninger til at beskytte pensionsrettigheder, der bør tages i betragtning.
Rather, all measures established in order to achieve protection of pensions must be taken into consideration.
Hvis BT bliver insolvent, og dets pensionsfond er i underskud, vil pensionen til dem, der blev ansat inden privatiseringen, blive betalt af staten snarere end af den privatejede pensionsbeskyttelsesfond, som ville have betalt efter de almindelige regler.
In case BT becomes insolvent and its pension fund is in deficit, the pensions of the pre-privatisation employees concerned will be paid by the State, rather than by the privately funded Pension Protection Fund, as would be the case if the normal rules had applied.
Som anført tidligere nyder BTPS gratis beskyttelse af statsgarantien.
As indicated above, the BTPS obtains the protection of the Crown guarantee without any payment.
Den eneste tilsyneladende »logik« i denne sag er, at hvis der er stillet statsmidler til rådighed til beskyttelse af en virksomheds pensionsordning, er private hensættelser overflødige.
The only ‘logic’ apparent in this case is that where State resources are made available for the protection of an undertaking’s pension scheme, private provision becomes superfluous.
I den påstand, som myndighederne i Det Forenede Kongerige fremsætter om, at virkningen af beskyttelsesordningen i pensionsbeskyttelsesfonden kun gælder i mangel af anden passende beskyttelse, såsom en statsgaranti, ses der bort fra, at den beskyttelsesordning, som BTPS nyder godt af, stilles gratis til rådighed for BT.
The argument put forward by the authorities of the United Kingdom to the effect that the protection system set out by the Pension Protection Fund only applies in the absence of other adequate protection arrangements being put in place, such as a Crown guarantee, disregards the fact that the protective arrangements from which the BTPS benefits are made available at no cost to BT.
Selv om man valgte at betragte pensionsbeskyttelsesfonden som et »sikkerhedsnet«, der kun skal redde pensionsordninger, som ikke nyder passende beskyttelse i tilfælde af arbejdsgiverens insolvens, er det stadig en kendsgerning, at BT ikke betaler for denne beskyttelse, for så vidt angår de pensionsrettigheder, som personale, der blev ansat inden privatiseringen, har optjent, og at staten har hjulpet BT til at yde en passende beskyttelse, som Det Forenede Kongerige mener, at andre ansatte med erhvervspensioner bør sikres.
Even if one were to admit that the Pension Protection Fund is as a ‘safety net’ intended only for pension schemes not benefiting from adequate protection in case of insolvency of the employer, the fact remains that BT does not pay for such protection as concerns the pension rights of pre-privatisation employees and has been supplemented by the State for the provision of the adequate protection which the United Kingdom deems it necessary to put in place for other employees of occupational pension schemes.
For så vidt angår de personer, der blev ansat efter privatiseringen, og hvis rettigheder ikke er dækket af statsgarantien, nyder BTPS godt af og bidrager til pensionsbeskyttelsesfonden.
Indeed, as concerns its post-privatisation employees whose rights are not covered by the Crown guarantee, BTPS benefits from and contributes to the Pension Protection Fund.
Kommissionen deler heller ikke BT's og BTPS' opfattelse af, at en foranstaltning, der tilsyneladende ikke var statsstøtte i 1984, hvor den blev truffet, ikke kan betragtes som støtte 20 år senere som følge af eksterne begivenheder.
Nor does the Commission share the view put forward by BT and BTPS that a measure which was allegedly not aid in 1984 when it was granted cannot be characterised as aid 20 years later as a result of exogenous events.
For det første finder Kommissionen ikke, at garantien i sig udgør støtte til BT.
The Commission firstly points out that it does not find the guarantee to be, in itself, an aid to BT.
Som Kommissionen anførte i sin beslutning af 28. november 2007 blev statsgarantien for pensionsforpligtelserne givet til fordel for arbejdstagerne og gav ikke BT nogen direkte økonomisk fordel.
As the Commission noted in its decision of 28 November 2007, the Crown guarantee on pension liabilities was made for the benefit of the said employees and did not confer an economic advantage directly to BT.
I dag er garantien imidlertid grunden til, at BT får en fordel i form af fritagelse for bidraget til pensionsbeskyttelsesfonden, som blev indført ved pensionsloven af 2004, og som BT kun betaler til, for så vidt angår de personer, der blev ansat efter privatiseringen.
The guarantee does however now constitute the underlying reason why BT receives an advantage in the form of the derogation from the full levy to finance the Pension Protection Fund which was introduced by the Pensions Act 2004, which BT pays only as far as its post-privatisation employees are concerned.
Denne fritagelse fandtes ikke på det tidspunkt, hvor statsgarantien blev givet, idet der ikke var nogen pligt til at bidrage til fonden eller til en tilsvarende fond, men garantien anføres i pensionsloven af 2004 som en berettiget årsag til fritagelse.
That derogation could not exist at the time when the Crown guarantee was issued because there was no obligation to contribute to the same or a similar fund, but the guarantee is recognised by the Pensions Act 2004 as justification for the derogation.
Fritagelsen for pensionsbeskyttelsesfonden og betalingen af det fulde bidrag er derimod en fordel for BT, idet fritagelsen, som skyldes, at der ydes statsgaranti, mindsker det bidrag, der ellers skulle betales.
However, the exemption from the Pension Protection Fund and the payment of the full levy is a benefit for BT insofar as it diminishes the levy which would otherwise be due and that exemption owes to the existence of the Crown guarantee.
Den udgjorde ingen fordel frem til 2004, hvor dens virkning blev væsentligt ændret af lovgivningen.
It did not imply any advantage until 2004, when its implications were substantially changed by the legislation.
På det tidspunkt, hvor BT blev privatiseret, havde statsgarantien for pensionsforpligtelserne ikke nogen mærkbar værdi for BT's aktionærer med henblik på efterfølgende og uforudsigelige ændringer af pensionslovgivningen.
At the time of the privatisation, the Crown guarantee on pension liabilities had no discernible value for BT’s shareholders in view of subsequent and unforeseeable modifications to pension legislation.
Det var i 1984 ikke muligt at forudsige, at BT ville blive forpligtet til at bidrage til den pensionsbeskyttelsesfond, der blev oprettet i 2004, eller at statsgarantien ville være en potentiel økonomisk fordel, fordi den fritog BT for denne forpligtelse.
In 1984, it was not possible to anticipate any obligation for BT to contribute to the Pension Protection Fund established in 2004, nor the potential economic advantage resulting from the exemption from these obligations by virtue of a Crown guarantee.
BTPS hævder også, at de ekstra forpligtelser og økonomiske byrder på […] GBP, som påhviler BT og BTPS som følge BTPS' særlige karakter mere end opvejer den potentielle fordel af lavere bidrag til pensionsbeskyttelsesfonden.
BTPS also argues that the potential advantage deriving from the lower levies to the Pension Protection Fund is more than compensated by extra liabilities and financial burdens of GBP […] borne by BT and BTPS because of the special nature of BTPS.
Kommissionen mener ikke, at de påståede ulemper kan bruges til at modregne fordelen:
The Commission does not consider that the alleged disadvantages could be used to offset this advantage:
For det første var den fordel, som de ansatte nød godt af, hvis BT skulle gå konkurs, af ringe interesse — om nogen overhovedet — for BT's aktionærer.
first, the benefit secured to employees in case of BT bankruptcy was of little interest, if any, to BT shareholders,
For det andet er der ingen tidsmæssig forbindelse mellem disse påståede ulemper og den fordel af et nedsat bidrag til pensionsbeskyttelsesfonden, som blev realiseret 20 år senere, og som der i lovgivningen ikke er noget, der tyder på havde til formål at tjene som modregning af de påståede ulemper.
secondly, there is no temporal link between these alleged disadvantages and the advantage resulting from a reduced contribution to the Pension Protection Fund, which materialised 20 years later and for which there is no indication in the law that it was intended to offset the alleged disadvantages.
Der er heller ikke nogen mærkbar væsentlig forbindelse mellem de påståede byrder, som BT blev pålagt, og de forpligtelser, der er dækket af statsgarantien, som i 1984 også omfattede bl.a. kortsigtede lån, varekreditorer, moms, medarbejderskat og udenlandske langsigtede lån.
Nor is there a discernable substantive link between the alleged burdens placed on BT and the liabilities covered by the Crown guarantee which in 1984 also included, inter alia, short-term borrowings, trade creditors, value added tax and payroll taxes and foreign long-term loans,
For det tredje henviser BT til de byrder, der består af ekstra forpligtelser af tjenestemandslignende rettigheder.
thirdly, BT refers to the burdens of extra liabilities of civil servant-like rights.
Det kan dog ikke udelukkes, at disse rettigheder også har givet BT fordele, såsom øget loyalitet eller accept af andre løn- og arbejdsvilkår fra de pågældende ansattes side, end hvis disse rettigheder ikke havde eksisteret.
One cannot, however, exclude that those rights have, in turn, triggered benefits for BT such as increased loyalty or acceptance of different salary and working conditions by the employees concerned than if those rights had not existed.
I modsætning til andre virksomheder inden for telekommunikation og andre sektorer, der ikke nyder godt af fritagelsen for at betale det bidrag til pensionsbeskyttelsesfonden, der er fastsat i pensionsloven af 2004, svarende til de pensionsforpligtelser, der er dækket af statsgarantien, opnår BT en økonomisk fordel ved at betale et stærkt reduceret bidrag til pensionsbeskyttelsesfonden.
Contrary to other undertakings in the electronic communications and other sectors which are not given the benefit of the exemption from the payment of levy to the Pension Protection Fund set out in the 2004 Pension Act and corresponding to the pension liabilities covered by the Crown guarantee, BT obtains an economic advantage in that it pays a greatly reduced levy to the Pension Protection Fund.
BT kan følgelig benytte disse økonomiske midler til at finansiere økonomiske aktiviteter på markeder, hvor det er aktivt.
As a result, BT can use these financial resources to finance its economic activities on the markets where it is active.
Man kan derfor konkludere, at BT tilsyneladende har fået en økonomisk fordel finansieret af staten fra det tidspunkt, hvor reglerne for pensionsbeskyttelsesfonden fra 2005 trådte i kraft.
In conclusion, an economic advantage financed by the State appears to have been granted to BT from the entry into force of the Pension Protection Fund (Entry Rules) Regulations 2005.
Virksomheder, der nyder godt at selektive foranstaltninger
Undertaking benefiting from selective measures
Med hensyn til modtageren af de pågældende foranstaltninger bør det understreges, at BTPS og BT er to forskellige juridiske enheder.
As concerns the beneficiary of the measures at hand, it must be underlined that BTPS and BT are two different legal entities.
Fritagelsen for betaling af et passende bidrag til pensionsbeskyttelsesfonden vedrører direkte BTPS, hvis bestyrelse har ansvaret for betalingen.
The exemption from payment of an adequate Pension Protection Fund levy directly concerns BTPS, whose trustees have responsibility for the payment.
Det bidrag, BTPS skulle betale for 2005/06, hævdes at være betalt med midler fra ordningen.
For instance, the 2005/2006 fee payable by BTPS was allegedly funded from the assets of the scheme.
BT må dog bidrage til at dække eventuelle underskud og administrationsomkostninger ved dets pensionsordning, så længe det er solvent.
However, BT must contribute to cover any deficit and administrative costs of its pension scheme as long as it is solvent.
Selv om BT ikke selv faktureres og ikke udbetaler pensionsbeskyttelsesbidraget, når det opkræves, er et lavere bidrag ensbetydende med færre udgifter for BTPS og til gavn for BTPS' aktiver, hvorved BT's egne forpligtelser over for BTPS bliver mindre.
Even if BT is not itself invoiced and does not disburse the amount of the pension protection levy when it becomes due, a lower levy decreases the costs of BTPS and is to the benefit of the assets of BTPS, thus diminishing BT’s own liabilities towards BTPS.
Følgelig overføres de økonomiske fordele, BTPS måtte have af foranstaltningen, fuldt ud til BT.
It follows that any economic advantage for BTPS resulting from the measure at hand is entirely transferred to BT.
Foranstaltningen er endvidere selektiv, ved det at bestemmelsen i pensionsbeskyttelsesfondens regler fra 2005 om gennemførelse af pensionsloven fra 2004, som giver fritagelse for bidraget til pensionsbeskyttelsesfonden, er selektiv, fordi den er resultatet af en statsgaranti, som blev fastlagt i loven af 1984, og som kun dækkede forpligtelser, der var overdraget til BT.
Moreover, the measure is selective in that the provision in the Pension Protection Fund (Entry Rules) Regulations 2005 implementing the Pensions Act 2004 granting an exemption from the Pension Protection Fund levy is selective because it resulted from having the benefit of the Crown guarantee, laid down in the 1984 Act which addressed liabilities vested on BT only.
Samlet set indførte disse foranstaltninger undtagelser fra de almindelige forpligtelser, som pensionsloven pålagde andre virksomheder, der ikke nød godt af nogen fordele, og de er derfor selektive.
Those measures, when read together, introduced derogations from the general obligations imposed by the Pension Acts on other undertakings not having such a benefit and are therefore selective.
Konkurrencefordrejning, der påvirker handelen mellem medlemsstaterne
Distortion of competition affecting trade between Member States
BT er gennem forskellige datterselskaber meget aktiv som leverandør af elektroniske kommunikationstjenester i flere medlemsstater, herunder Tyskland, Italien, Spanien, Nederlandene, Frankrig og ikke mindst Det Forenede Kongerige [4].
BT, through various subsidiaries, is significantly active in the provision of electronic communication services in several Member States including Germany, Italy, Spain, The Netherlands, France and, not least, in the United Kingdom [4].
Levering af elektroniske kommunikationstjenester medfører naturligvis meddelelse af indhold mellem netværk på tværs af grænser inden for fællesmarkedet, hvad enten sådanne tjenester ydes på lokalt, nationalt eller transnationalt niveau.
The provision of electronic communication services inherently entails communication of content between networks across borders within the common market, whether such services are supplied on a local, national or cross-border basis.
Navnlig i Det Forenede Kongerige har tilsynsmyndigheden for elektronisk kommunikation OFCOM fastslået, at BT ifølge EU's regler om elektroniske kommunikationstjenester og netværk har en stærk markedsposition på en række detail- og engrosmarkeder for tjenester.
Particularly in the United Kingdom, the regulatory authority for electronic communications OFCOM has identified BT as holding significant market power within the meaning of the EU regulatory framework on electronic communication services and networks on a number of retail and wholesale service markets.