natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I deres korrespondance af 20. november 2006 anførte de franske myndigheder selv, at en dommer ikke ville tøve med at betegne staten som SNCM's faktiske leder.
In their letter of 20 November 2006, the French authorities themselves state that the court would certainly categorise SNCM’s State shareholder as de facto director of the undertaking.
Det står dog klart, at en sådan erklæring, der er afgivet i forbindelse med en procedure om statsstøtte, ikke i sig selv er tilstrækkelig som retsgyldigt bevis på, at en dommer ville betragte de nationale myndigheder som faktisk leder af den virksomhed, der har modtaget den pågældende støtte, og især ikke som bevis for graden af sandsynlighed for en sådan eventualitet.
However, it is clear that such a declaration, made in proceedings concerning State aid, cannot in itself suffice to prove satisfactorily that a court considered the national authorities as de facto directors of the undertaking which received the measures in question and, above all, the degree of probability of such an eventuality.
Under de foreliggende omstændigheder behøver Kommissionen ikke udtale sig yderligere om vurderingen af de forhold, de franske myndigheder har gjort gældende, idet den henviser til sin konklusion under afsnit 10.2.2.1 ovenfor.
In the circumstances of this case, there is no need for the Commission to take any further view on the assessment of the evidence relied on by the French authorities, having regard to the conclusion reached by the Commission in section 10.2.2.1 above.
Tilstedeværelsen af en eller flere ledelsesfejl fra den franske stats side i dens egenskab af faktisk leder af den konkursramte virksomhed
The existence of one or more acts of mismanagement by the French State, de facto managing the undertaking in compulsory liquidation
I den foreliggende sag konstaterer Kommissionen, at der i rapporten fra SNCM's ekspert på grundlag af en ikke-udtømmende liste over faktiske forhold henvises til en række tilfælde, hvor staten som faktisk leder af SNCM skulle have begået ledelsesfejl.
In the present case, the Commission notes that SNCM’s expert report referred, on the basis of a non-exhaustive list of facts, to a series of factors to show that the State mismanaged SNCM when acting as its de facto manager.
Det anføres bl.a., at den franske stat skulle have begået investeringsmæssige fejltagelser […]. Staten skulle ligeledes have begået talrige ledelsesmæssige fejl i relation til […].
In particular, it is stated that the French State made errors relating to investments […] The State also committed numerous errors of management with regard to […].
I denne forbindelse […]. De franske myndigheder betegnede i deres korrespondance af 30. april 2007 risikoen for at blive gjort ansvarlig som meget høj med henvisning til kriterierne […] for ledelsesfejl i den i handelslovens artikel L.651-2 fastsatte betydning.
In that respect, […] In their letter of 30 April 2007, the French authorities described the risk of an order for damages against the State as very high, having regard to the […] criteria of categorisation of mismanagement as provided for in Article L.651-2 of the Commercial Code.
Det står dog klart, at en sådan erklæring, der er afgivet i forbindelse med en procedure om statsstøtte, ikke i sig selv er tilstrækkelig som retsgyldigt bevis på, at en dommer ville anse de nationale myndigheder for at have begået de påståede fejl, og især ikke som bevis for graden af sandsynlighed for en sådan eventualitet.
However, it is clear that such a declaration, made in proceedings concerning State aid, cannot in itself suffice to prove satisfactorily that a court would have considered that the national authorities carried out the acts of mismanagement alleged and, above all, the degree of probability of such an eventuality.
I den foreliggende sag konstaterer Kommissionen, at de franske myndigheder i deres korrespondance af 16. november 2006 medsendte en evaluering af SNCM's insolvens baseret på de førnævnte ekspertrapporter fra CGMF et Oddo-Hastings.
In the present case, the Commission states that, in its letter of 16 November 2006, the French authorities provided a valuation of SNCM’s shortfall in assets on the basis of the expert’s reports of CGMF and Oddo-Hastings cited above.
Kommissionen noterer sig, at SNCM's ekspertvurdering fra februar 2008 af risikoen for et sagsanlæg mod staten med krav om personlig hæftelse bygger på de samme rapporter om insolvens i tilfælde af virksomhedens likvidation.
The Commission notes that SNCM’s expert’s report on the action ‘en comblement de passif’ sent to the Commission in February 2008 takes as a basis those same reports to find that there is a asset shortfall in the event of the compulsory liquidation of the company.
I Oddo-rapporten opereres der med et underskud på […] mio. EUR pr. 30. september 2005, udregnet som differencen mellem værdien af SNCM's aktiver på den ene side ([…] mio. EUR) og værdien af virksomhedens passiver (foranstillet og efterstillet gæld vurderet til henholdsvis […] mio. EUR og […] mio. EUR).
In particular, the Oddo-Hastings report points up an asset shortfall of EUR […] million at 30 September 2005, calculated as the difference between the value of SNCM’s assets (EUR […] million) and the value of the undertaking’s liabilities (preferential and non-preferential debts valued respectively at EUR […] million and EUR […] million.).
Kommissionen forstår, at der i henhold til førnævnt fransk lovgivning er konstateret insolvens, såfremt kuratoren i et konkursbo ikke råder over tilstrækkelige aktiver til at fyldestgøre såvel privilegerede som efterstillede kreditorer.
The Commission notes that, under the French legislation cited above, there is a shortfall in assets where the authorised liquidator of the company does not have sufficient assets at its disposal to pay off the creditors, whether or not they are preferential.
Da det mere specifikt drejer sig om virksomhedens sociale kreditorer, består virksomhedens sociale underskud som et minimum af traditionelle løntilgodehavender, dvs. fordringer, der hidrører direkte fra ansættelseskontrakter, kollektive overenskomster eller lovgivning, og som automatisk af kuratoren opføres under virksomhedens passiver.
In respect, in particular, of the social debts of the undertaking, the social liabilities of the company consist, at a minimum, of classic salary payables, that is to say those which originate directly in employment contracts, collective agreements or the law and are automatically entered by the authorised liquidator in the liabilities of the undertaking.
Kommissionen har tidligere anslået SNCM's underskud til […] mio. EUR pr. 30. september 2005.
The Commission previously estimated the shortfall in assets of SNCM at EUR […] million at 30 September 2005.
Spørgsmålet om en årsagsforbindelse mellem ledelsesfejlene og den konstaterede insolvens
The existence of a causal link between the mismismanagement and the state shortfall in assets
Ifølge de franske myndigheder skal sagsøgeren ifølge fransk ret i en sag om personlig hæftelse ikke fastslå størrelsen af den opståede manko som følge af ledelsesmæssige fejl.
According to the French authorities, under French law, the applicant for an action ‘en comblement de passif’ does not have to determine the amount of the increase in liabilities caused by the director’s mismanagement.
Lederen af en juridisk person kan gøres ansvarlig i medfør af artikel L. 624-3 i handelsloven, selv om hans ledelsesfejl kun er en af årsagerne til insolvensen, og kan dømmes til at hæfte for en del af eller hele virksomhedens sociale gæld, også selv om den eller de af ham begåede fejl kun ligger til grund for en del af dem.
The director of a natural person may be declared liable, on the basis of Article L.624-3 of the Commercial Code, even if his act of mismanagement is only one of the causes of the shortfall in assets and may be ordered to bear in whole or in part the social debts, even if his mismanagement is the cause of only a part of them.
I den foreliggende sag noterer Kommissionen sig, at SNCM's ekspert anser det for indlysende, at der er en sammenhæng mellem de ledelsesmæssige fejl og den konstaterede insolvens.
In this case, the Commission notes that SNCM’s expert refers to the link between the mismanagement and the stated asset shortfall as obvious.
Efter ekspertens skøn skulle de negative finansielle konsekvenser af den ikke-udtømmende liste over statens ledelsesfejl, der er omtalt i betragtning 322 i denne beslutning, beløbe sig til […] mio. EUR.
On the basis of the estimates submitted by that expert, the financial loss resulting from the non-exhaustive list of the State’s acts of mismanagement stated in recital 322 of this decision amounts to EUR […] million.
De franske myndigheder […].
The French authorities […].
Kommissionen konstaterer desuden, at de franske myndigheder i deres korrespondance af 16. november 2006, 27. april 2007 og 28. marts 2008 […]. De franske myndigheder […].
Moreover, the Commission notes that the French authorities, in their records of 16 November 2006, 27 April 2007 and 28 March 2008 […].
De franske myndigheder erkendte selv i deres korrespondance af 16. november 2005, at »det stod klart, at staten, der i sin egenskab af hovedaktionær af en domstol med sikkerhed ville blive betragtet som den reelle leder af aktieselskabet SNCM, højst sandsynligt i medfør af artikel L651-2 i handelsloven ville blive dømt til at dække hele eller en del af SNCM's underskud.«
The French authorities […] The French authorities have themselves acknowledged, in their letter of 16 November 2005, that ‘it is clear that the State shareholder, which the court would certainly refer to as the de facto director of SNCM, limited liability company, would probably be ordered pursuant to Article L.615-2 to bear the shortfall in SNCM’s assets in its entirety’.
Vedrørende de samlede anslåede omkostninger ved likvidation af SNCM
The estimate of the total cost of the compulsory liquidation of SNCM
Fastlæggelse af, for hvor stor en del af underskuddet virksomhedens faktiske leder kunne holdes ansvarlig
Determination of the proportion of the shortfall in assets chargeable to the de facto director
Med henvisning til ovenstående betragtninger skal Kommissionen ikke på indeværende stadie i sagen fastslå de faktiske økonomiske omkostninger, for hvilke hovedaktionæren ville blive holdt ansvarlig.
In the light of the foregoing, as the file currently stands, the Commission does not have to determine the actual economic cost of the shareholder’s liability.
I denne forbindelse konstaterer Kommissionen, at et konkursramt selskabs retlige og faktiske leder i henhold til handelslovens artikel L624-3 under sådanne omstændigheder ville kunne dømmes til at dække hele eller en del af det konstaterede underskud.
In that respect, the Commission notes that, on the basis of Article L.624-3 of the Commercial Code, the director at law or in fact of the company in liquidation is ordered, in such circumstances, to pay all or part of the shortfall in assets established.
Kommissionen noterer sig, at det i henhold til ovennævnte artikel er fuldstændigt overladt til retten at vurdere, om der er anledning til at dømme virksomhedens leder til at dække hele elle en del af de sociale fordringer.
The Commission notes that the aforesaid article leaves the courts entirely at liberty to assess if there is any need to order the director to bear the social debts in whole or in part.
Ud fra gældende retspraksis ser det ud til, at retsinstanserne tager hensyn til, hvordan virksomhedslederen har handlet, og lægger de kendsgerninger, de med sikkerhed kan fastslå, til grund for deres afgørelse.
In the light of the relevant case-law, it appears that the courts take into account the conduct of the director against whom proceedings are brought and adjust orders according to the facts proven.
Som anført ovenfor mener de franske myndigheder, at den franske stat ville blive dømt til at dække en anslået andel på mellem […] og […] % af det konstaterede underskud, dvs. mellem […] mio. EUR og […] mio. EUR.
As stated above, the French authorities consider that the French State would be called upon to bear a proportion estimated between […] % and […] % of the established shortfall in assets, that is, a range between EUR […] million and EUR […] million.
Kommissionen understreger, at i en situation, der ligner SNCM's, og som vedrørte selskabet Les Mines de Salsignes, der var et underliggende datterselskab under BRGM (et offentligt foretagende af industri- og forretningsmæssig karakter), dømte Kassationsrettens handelsretsafdeling BRGM og dets datterselskaber i deres egenskab af faktisk leder sammen med de øvrige ledere af Les Mines de Salsignes til at dække hele underskuddet.
The Commission states that, in a situation similar to SNCM’s relating to the company Les Mines de Salsignes, a sub-branch of BRGM (public company of an industrial and commercial nature), the commercial division of the Court of Cassation ordered BGRM and its subsidiaries, as de facto directors, to pay the entirety of the shortfall in assets jointly and severally with the other directors of the company Les Mines de Salsignes.
Den andel af de sociale fordringer, der skulle dækkes af selskabet Coframines og BRGM og dermed i sidste ende staten, udgjorde 73,6 %.
The portion of the social debts chargeable to the company Coframines and BGRM and therefore, ultimately, to the State, was 73,6 %.
Retten fandt, at bestyrelsen stod i et afhængighedsforhold til de to selskaber.
As set out in that decision, the Court of Cassation noted that the management board was a dependent of the two bodies under consideration.
Kommissionen mener dog ikke — med henvisning til de gældende regler om statsstøtte — at de franske myndigheder har påvist, at de anførte ledelsesmæssige fejl fra statens side, som skulle have skadet virksomheden, kan betegnes som fejl, som en hvilken som helst anden privat markedsøkonomisk aktionær kunne have begået.
However, the Commission takes the view that the French authorities have not shown, in the light of the rules on State aid, in what respect the aforesaid acts of mismanagement of the State prejudicial to the undertaking are acts which any other private shareholder in a market economy might have carried out.
I denne forbindelse skal det således understreges, at det kun er sådanne klart dokumenterede fejl, der kan tages i betragtning ved vurderingen af, om en fornuftig privat aktør under hensyn til risikoen for at blive dømt til at dække disse omkostninger og under hensyn til deres størrelse (dvs. nettonutidsværdien af risikoen for senere at blive dømt til at hæfte for dem) ville have foretrukket umiddelbart at betale en negativ pris på 158 mio. EUR frem for at løbe denne risiko.
In that regard, it must be stated that only such acts, duly proven, may be taken into account in order to determine whether, having regard to the likelihood of being ordered to bear those costs and to the extent of those costs (that is, the present net value of the likelihood of any such future order), a well-informed private operator would prefer to pay directly a negative price of EUR 158 million rather than run that risk.
Det er således vanskeligt at forestille sig, at en privat investor ville begå fejl begrundet i ikke-erhvervsmæssige hensyn, men af generel karakter (f.eks. med henblik på sociale formål eller regionaludvikling).
The view cannot be taken that a private investor would be led to carry out wrongful acts owing to considerations of a general rather than entrepreneurial nature (for example, for social or regional development purposes).
Kommissionen skal ikke afvise, at lovgivningen i visse lande i ganske særlige undtagelsestilfælde åbner mulighed for at tredjeparter kan gøre krav gældende over for aktionærerne i et konkursramt selskab, især hvis de pågældende aktionærer kan betragtes som retlige og faktiske ledere af virksomheden og har begået ledelsesfejl, der har skadet virksomheden.
The Commission does not deny that, in certain exceptional cases, there is national legislation which enables third parties to bring proceedings against the shareholders of a liquidated company, in particular if those shareholders may be considered to be directors at law or in fact who have carried out acts of mismanagement prejudicial to the undertaking.
Selv om en sådan mulighed eksisterer i fransk ret, mener Kommissionen ikke, de franske myndigheder i tilstrækkelig grad har bortvejret Kommissionens tvivl i den foreliggende sag med hensyn til den reelle risiko for, at den franske stat i tilfælde af, at SNCM blev erklæret konkurs, ville blive dømt til at hæfte økonomisk for selskabets underskud.
However, although such a possibility exists under French law, the Commission considers that the French authorities have not sufficiently dispelled the Commission’s doubts in the present case concerning the arguments relating to the likelihood that, in the event of SNCM’s liquidation, the French State would be ordered to make good that company’s liabilities.
Det er imidlertid ikke nødvendigt at drage en konklusion vedrørende dette aspekt, idet Kommissionen henviser til sin konklusion under afsnit 10.2.2.1 ovenfor.
It is not, however, necessary to reach a conclusion on that point in this decision in the light of the conclusion reached by the Commission in section 10.2.2.1 above.
Fastlæggelse af eventuel hæftelse for supplerende fratrædelsesgodtgørelser i tilfælde af SNCM's likvidation
Possible payment of the additional redundancy payments in the event of SNCM’s compulsory liquidation
Ud over personlig hæftelse for insolvensen ville en fransk ret ifølge de franske myndigheder med henvisning til gældende retspraksis helt sikkert have dømt den franske stat til at dække de supplerende fratrædelsesgodtgørelser (dvs. mellem […] og […] mio. EUR).
According to the French authorities, in addition to the asset shortfall, having regard to the relevant case-law, a court would certainly find it necessary to order the French State to pay the additional redundancy payments (between EUR […] million and EUR […] million).
Ifølge de franske myndigheder andrager de samlede faktiske omkostninger, som staten som hovedaktionær ville skulle dække, mellem […] mio. EUR og […] mio. EUR.
According to the French authorities, the actual costs which the French State as shareholder would have to pay as a whole fall within an inclusive range of between EUR […] million and EUR […] million.
De franske myndigheder præciserer, at de franske domstole i afgørelser for nylig har dømt den retlige eller faktiske leder af en virksomhed til ud over underskuddet i virksomheden at dække supplerende fratrædelsesgodtgørelser beregnet på grundlag af en socialplan udarbejdet af virksomheden, inden den trådte i likvidation.
The French authorities state that, in recent judgments, French courts have ordered the director at law or in fact to pay, in addition to the asset shortfall, additional redundancy payments calculated on the basis of a social plan drawn up by the undertaking before it was put into liquidation.
De franske myndigheder henviser især til Aspocomp-sagen, hvor det franske selskab Aspocomp SAS, der er et 99 % ejet datterselskab af det finske Aspocomp Group Oyj, havde indgået en firmaaftale den 18. januar 2002 indeholdende vilkårene for godtgørelser i henhold til en socialplan for 210 af i alt 550 ansatte.
The French authorities state in particular that, in the Aspocomp case, the French company Aspocomp SAS, 99 % subsidiary of the Finnish company Aspocomp Group Oyj, signed a company-level agreement on 18 January 2002 describing the conditions for indemnification of a social plan relating to 210 employees of a total of 550.
I aftalen var bl.a. fastsat beløbet for godtgørelser og supplerende godtgørelser samt støtte ved frivillig fratræden.
That agreement described, in particular, the amount of compensation and additional payments as well as assistance for voluntary redundancy.
Efter en ændring af koncernens strategi besluttede moderselskabet Aspocomp Group Oyj imidlertid den 21. februar 2002 at ophøre med at finansiere datterselskabet Aspocomp SAS og fremtvang dermed datterselskabets konkurs.
Following a change in group strategy, the parent company Aspocomp Group Oyj decided on 21 February 2002 to stop financing its subsidiary Aspocomp SAS and thus caused the voluntary liquidation of the latter.
Den pågældende beslutning forhindrede reelt datterselskabet i at opfylde sine forpligtelser i henhold til firmaaftalen og tvang det til at afskedige samtlige ansatte.
That decision de facto prevented the subsidiary from meeting the commitments under the company-level agreement and led it to lay off all of its other employees.
I den sag stadfæstede Appelretten i Rouen kendelsen fra Arbejdsretten i Evreux og dømte således selskabet Aspocomp Group Oyj, der kontrollerede 99 % af ledelsen i datterselskabet, til at betale: i) samtlige godtgørelser og supplerende godtgørelser i henhold til firmaaftalen plus erstatning for uberettiget afskedigelse til de lønmodtagere, der var omfattet af aftalen, og ii) tilsvarende godtgørelser til de medarbejdere, der blev afskediget i forbindelse med Aspocomp's konkurs, med henvisning til, at moderselskabet ved ikke at opfylde de indgåede forpligtelser, have handlet illoyalt og hensynsløst.
In those circumstances, the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Rouen confirmed the judgment of the Evreux labour court and thus ordered the company Aspocomp Group Oyj, which had 99 % control of the management of its subsidiary, to pay: (i) the employees affected by the company-level agreement, the entire compensation and additional payments provided for in that agreement alone, as well as damages for redundancy without actual and serious basis and (ii) the employees laid off under the voluntary liquidation of Aspocomp equivalent payments given that, by not meeting the commitments made, the parent company had acted unfairly and in a culpably thoughtless manner.
I den foreliggende sag bemærker Kommissionen, at det af sagsmaterialet fremgår, at en socialplan, der var forhandlet på plads på grundlag af socialplanen fra 2002 og sat i værk i foråret 2005, blev suspenderet den 25. april 2005 af SNCM's hovedaktionær uden samråd med virksomhedens ledelse.
In the present case, the Commission observes that, according to the supporting documents in the file, a negotiated social plan, based on the 2002 social plan and implemented in the spring of 2005, was suspended on 25 April 2005 by SNCM’s shareholder without consultation with the undertaking’s management.
Kommissionen konstaterer desuden, at denne socialplan blev udarbejdet, før staten traf beslutning om at afhænde SNCM.
The Commission states, moreover, that the the social plan was drawn up prior to the decision of the State to sell SNCM.
Kommissionen mener, at de ansatte ikke ville have undladt at gøre denne socialplans bestemmelser gældende i retten, hvis SNCM var trådt i likvidation.
The Commission takes the view that, had SNCM been liquidated, the employees of the undertaking would certainly have relied on the provisions of that social plan before the courts.
Skal en sådan handling have nogen relevans for den foreliggende sag, må Kommissionen vurdere, i) om en domstol ville have dømt den franske stat for uden samråd med virksomhedens ledelse at have suspenderet den pågældende socialplan, ii) hvor meget den franske stat i så fald ville være blevet dømt til at betale, og iii) graden af sandsynlighed for, at det ville ske.
In order for such a step to be relevant in a case such as this one, the Commission should ascertain (i) whether a court would censure the Member State for having suspended the social plan in question without consulting the undertaking’s management (ii) the amount which the Member State could have been ordered to pay in that eventuality and (iii) the degree of probability of that eventuality.