natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
De franske myndigheder præciserede i den forbindelse, at anvendelsen af princippet om den private investor ved afståelse af en virksomhed, der var tæt på at træde i likvidation, ikke måtte betragtes som et »forsøg på et gøre et offentligt indgreb rentabelt«, men som et forsøg på at forhindre endnu større tab for aktionæren ved en mere omkostningsfuld likvidation.
In that respect, the French authorities state that the application of the criterion of the private investor in the event of a transfer of undertaking similar to liquidation must not be regarded in the same way as the search for ‘profitability of public action’ but as the prevention of greater losses which the shareholder would have to suffer through a more costly liquidation.
Hvad angik afståelsesprisen, afviste Frankrig, at SNCM skulle være blevet solgt til en pris, der ikke svarede til virksomhedens reelle værdi.
In respect of the price paid, France challenges the argument that SNCM was transferred at a price which did not reflect its actual value.
Over for CFF's argument om, at Gröditzer-dommen ikke var relevant, idet CFF henviste til, at statens kapitaltilførsel til SNCM var bundet til salget af 75 % af dens aktier og dermed forringede udsigterne til et positivt afkast, pegede de franske myndigheder på, at den negative afståelsespris på 158 mio. EUR stort set svarede til afståelsen af hele SNCM's kapital efterfulgt af en ny investering på 25 % fra statens side med en forrentning på […] % om året.
In response to CFF’s argument calling into question the application of the Gröditzer case-law by referring to the fact that the capital contribution of the State in SNCM was linked to the sale of 75 % of its holding, reducing in proportion the prospects of profit in return, the French authorities note that the negative sale price of EUR 158 million does correspond to the sale of the entirety of SNCM’s capital, followed by a new investment by the State of 25 % giving a return of […] % per year.
Frankrig mente derfor, at udbyttet af investeringen fortsat var sikret ved den aktiepost på 25 %, der var garanteret et meget højt afkast.
Accordingly, France takes the view that the return on investment remains guaranteed by virtue of its shareholding of 25 % in the company in so far as that holding enjoys a guarantee of very high return.
Frankrig afviste ligeledes CFF's argument om, at »ABX-modellen« ikke kunne anvendes på den foreliggende sag, fordi den især var baseret på analysen af de faktiske omkostninger ved en likvidation af SNCM og statens risiko for at blive holdt ansvarlig for virksomhedens underskud i en erstatningssag i henhold til de franske regler om kollektiv bobehandling, hvilket var bekræftet i national retspraksis (kendelse afsagt af Appelretten i Rouen den 22. marts 2005).
France also challenges the argument put forward by CFF on the non-application to the present case of the ABX approach, taking as a basis in particular the analysis of the actual liquidation costs of SNCM and the risk that the State could be considered to be liable for the liabilities of the undertaking in an action ‘en comblement de passif’ as provided for by French insolvency procedures and confirmed by national case-law (judgment of the Court of Appeal of Rouen of 22 March 2005).
Selv om de franske myndigheder ikke mente, at deres adfærd som øverste ansvarlige for SNCM's ledelse kunne betegnes som »forsømmelig« i en sådan retssag, fastholdt de, at der bestod en meget høj risiko for, at staten af en national ret ville blive kendt ansvarlig for SNCM's insolvens med henvisning til de fleksible kriterier for, hvornår der var tale om forsømmelig ledelse, jf. artikel L.651-2 i den franske handelslov og førnævnte retspraksis, der ville kunne anvendes på den foreliggende sag.
Although the French authorities consider that their conduct as manager of SNCM cannot be described as being ‘wrongful’ in that action, they insist that there is a very high risk that an order would be made against the State by a national court for the shortfall in SNCM’s assets owing to flexible criteria for characterisation of mismanagement as provided for in Article L-651-2 of the Commercial Code and pursuant to the case-law cited above which can be transposed to the present case.
Med hensyn til rekapitaliseringen på 8,75 mio. EUR erindrede Frankrig om, at denne kapitaltilførsel i modsætning til, hvad CFF og STIM påstod, ikke var statsstøtte, fordi der var tale om en samtidig investering på ensartede tegningsvilkår, og fordi staten gennem CGMF opnåede et højere afkast end normalt.
In respect of the capitalisation of EUR 8,75 million, France notes that, contrary to the contentions of CFF and STIM, that capital contribution does not constitute State aid on account of the concurrence of that investment, the similarity of its subscription conditions and the higher-than-average return obtained by the State via CGMF.
De franske myndigheder præciserede især, at princippet om ligebehandling af investorer ikke var tilsidesat på grund af tilstedeværelsen af ophævelsesklausuler, eftersom de var beregnet på 100 % afståelse af SNCM og ikke på den rekapitalisering med 35 mio. EUR, der fulgte efter afståelsen.
In particular, the French authorities submit that the principle of equality of investors is not called into question by the existence of cancellation clauses since the latter were laid down in connection with the 100 % sale of SNCM and not with the EUR 35 million recapitalisation which followed it.
Desuden erindrede Frankrig om, at statens investering var langt mindre end overtagernes, eftersom det kun var beløbet på 8,75 mio. EUR, der skulle sammenholdes med overtagernes investering (26,25 mio. EUR).
Further, France submits that its investment is much lower than that of the purchasers, since it is only the sum of EUR 8,75 million which must be compared to the investment made by the purchasers (EUR 26,25 million).
I realiteten burde undersøgelsen af den første rekapitalisering med 142,5 mio. EUR kun baseres på en sammenligning med omkostningerne ved en likvidation.
The first recapitalisation of EUR 142,5 million should be examined only in the course of the comparison with the liquidation price.
Endelig afviste Frankrig STIM's argument om, at denne kapitaltilførsel var en garanti til de private overtagere for, at SNCM ville få tildelt public service-kontrakten om besejlingen af Korsika.
Finally, France challenges STIM’s argument that that contribution is a guarantee given to private purchasers that SNCM has indeed been awarded the public service delegation to operate services to Corsica.
De franske myndigheder gjorde gældende, at denne kapitalforøgelse var velbegrundet og uafhængig af virksomhedens resultater, og at tildelingen af public service-kontrakten til SNCM ikke gav mulighed for at forbedre det forventede afkast af denne investering.
The French authorities submit that that increase in capital is prudent and irrespective of the undertaking’s performance and that the award of the public service delegation to SNCM does not serve to improve the return expected on that investment.
Hvad angik de 38,5 mio. EUR til sociale foranstaltninger, gentog Frankrig, at disse foranstaltninger var støtte til enkeltpersoner, og at den kendsgerning, at de blev dækket af staten, ikke kunne anses for at give virksomheden en indirekte fordel, eftersom de pågældende foranstaltninger lå ud over SNCM's lovfæstede og overenskomstmæssige forpligtelser.
As regards the EUR 38,5 million of social measures, France repeats the argument that those measures are aid to individuals and that their payment by the State cannot be considered to give an indirect advantage to the undertaking in so far as they are in addition to SNCM’s statutory obligations and its obligations in agreements.
Frankrig gjorde desuden opmærksom på, at disse foranstaltninger ikke tillod afskedigelse af ansatte, som, hvis foranstaltningerne ikke blev gennemført, fortsat skulle betales af SNCM.
Moreover, France recalls that those measures do not permit the departure of employees who would remain, in their absence, the responsibility of SNCM.
De franske myndigheder tilbageviste CFF's påstand med henvisning til, at de 38,5 mio. EUR ikke dækkede de personalenedskæringer, der var forudset i socialplanen fra 2003, fordi disse nedskæringer på trods af forsinkelsen allerede var sat i værk.
Contrary to CFF’s argument, the French authorities state that the EUR 38,5 million does not correspond to implementation of reductions in staff provided for in the 2003 social plan because those reductions have, despite the delay, already been implemented.
Den nye socialplan var således et supplement til de første sociale foranstaltninger fra 2003.
The new social plan is therefore in addition to the first social measures of 2003.
Vedrørende foreneligheden med rammebestemmelserne
Compatibility with the guidelines
Frankrig mente med henvisning til ovenstående argumentation, at det støttebeløb, der skulle vurderes på grundlag af rammebestemmelserne, lød på 15,81 mio. EUR.
France considers that, in the light of the foregoing, the amount of aid to be assessed in the light of the guidelines is EUR 15,81 million.
I modsætning til CFF's påstande mente de franske myndigheder, at den første rekapitalisering — jf. punkt 11 i rammebestemmelserne fra 2004 — nok havde gjort det muligt for SNCM at gendanne sin egenkapital, men alligevel ikke havde betydet, at virksomheden ikke længere kunne betegnes som kriseramt, eftersom den pågældende rekapitalisering havde haft til formål at sikre opretholdelsen af aktiviteten i virksomheden.
Contrary to the contentions of CFF, the French authorities consider that, having regard to point 11 of the 2004 guidelines, the first recapitalisation, although enabling SNCM to build up its capital, did not take away its nature of an undertaking in difficulty in so far as that recapitalisation was intended to ensure the continuation of the company’s activities.
Frankrig afviste CFF's påstand om, at staten ikke burde have tilført virksomheden ny kapital, eftersom SNCM kunne have optaget lån i bankerne.
France refutes CFF’s contentions that it did not again have to inject money into the undertaking given that SNCM could have had recourse to bank credit.
I denne forbindelse erindrede de franske myndigheder om, at bankerne den 24. august 2005 havde afvist at stille nye kreditlinjer til rådighed for SNCM, og at de eneste mulige alternativer derfor var at privatisere virksomheden eller lade den træde i likvidation.
In that regard, the French authorities note that, on 24 August 2005, the banks refused to grant new cash lines to SNCM and that, accordingly, the only alternatives conceivable were privatisation or the liquidation of the undertaking.
Frankrig mente, at SNCM havde gode udsigter til at blive rettet op, og at de foranstaltninger, de nye aktionærer havde planlagt, navnlig gennemførelsen af socialplanen, omlægning af ruter og udskiftning af visse skibe, ville kunne gøre virksomheden rentabel.
France takes the view that SNCM has good prospects for recovery and that the measures contemplated by the new shareholders, in particular the implementation of the social plan, the reinstatement of services and the renewal of certain vessels, will enable the undertaking to return to viability.
I den forbindelse bemærkede Frankrig, at public service-kontrakten som følge af indtægterne herfra (ca. […] af SNCM's omsætning) og på grund af de faste omkostninger og vanskelighederne ved at anvende de seks skibe, der havde besejlet ruterne Marseille-Korsika, andre steder, var et væsentligt element i virksomhedens strategi og en vigtig faktor for dens levedygtighed.
In that regard, France observes that on account of the revenues deriving from the public service delegation (approximately […] of SNCM’s turnover) and in view of the extent of the fixed costs and the difficulties in redeploying the 6 vessels used on the Marseille-Corsica route, the public service delegation constitutes an essential element of the undertaking’s strategy and its viability.
Med hensyn til begrænsningen af støtten til et minimum mente Frankrig, at man havde begrænset omkostningerne ved omstruktureringen til, hvad der var absolut nødvendigt for at gennemføre omstruktureringsplanen.
On the limitation of the aid to the minimum, France believes that it limited to the strict minimum the restructuring costs necessary to enable the restructuring to be carried out.
Vedrørende betingelserne i Kommissionens beslutning fra 2003 og eventuelle nye kompenserende modydelser
The conditions imposed by the Commission decision of 2003 and the possible new compensatory measures
De franske myndigheder afviste STIM's og CFF's påstande og fastholdt, at man havde opfyldt alle betingelserne i beslutningen fra 2003, der havde været gældende frem til udgangen af 2006, bl.a. kravene vedrørende flåden på 11 skibe og forbud mod lavere takster end konkurrenterne.
Contrary to the contentions of STIM and CFF, the French authorities state that they complied with all of the conditions imposed by the 2003 decision, to which they were bound until the end of 2006, in particular the maintenance of the fleet of 11 vessels and the application of lower fares than those of its competitors.
I øvrigt mente Frankrig, at man i forbindelse med den foreliggende beslutning burde justere niveauet for de kompenserende modydelser fra SNCM, eftersom beløbet for omstruktureringsstøtten nu var 15,81 mio. EUR i stedet for 69,3 mio. EUR.
Indeed, France considers that, under the new final decision, the level of compensatory measures to be imposed on SNCM must be adapted in so far as the amount of restructuring aid was henceforth EUR 15,81 million rather than EUR 69,3 million.
I den forbindelse anfægtede Frankrig STIM's bemærkninger vedrørende Kommissionens mulighed for at pålægge SNCM at afhænde sin aktiepost i CMN som kompenserende modydelse.
In that respect, France challenges STIM’s observations concerning the possibility that the Commission may require SNCM to sell its shareholding in CMN as a compensatory measure.
Frankrig afviste STIM's argument om, at definitionen på strategiske aktiver skulle være blevet ændret i rammebestemmelserne fra 2004 i forhold til bestemmelserne fra 1999.
France challenges STIM’s argument that the description of strategic assets was called into question in the 2004 guidelines as opposed to those of 1999.
Med hensyn til de af CFF omtalte foranstaltninger, der skulle have til formål at begrænse SNCM's tilstedeværelse på markedet, erindrede de franske myndigheder om — hvad Kommissionen i øvrigt også havde påpeget i beslutningen fra 2003 (betragtning 87) — at der ikke var overkapacitet på de berørte markeder (Frankrig-Korsika og Maghreb), og at en indskrænkning og/eller omlægning af ruterne til Korsika i strid med, hvad der var fastsat i public service-kontrakten, kunne bringe virksomhedens levedygtighed i fare.
As regards measures referred to by CFF intended to reduce SNCM’s market presence, the French authorities recall that, as the Commission noted, moreover, in its 2003 decision (recital 87), there is no excess capacity on the markets concerned (France — Corsica — the Maghreb) and that a reconfiguration of services to Corsica under and outwith the public service delegation would jeopardise the viability of the undertaking.
Over for CFF's argument om, at gennemførelsen af de ovennævnte foranstaltninger til fordel for SNCM indebar en alvorlig risiko for, at SNCM's vigtigste konkurrent, dvs. CFF, måtte trække sig ud af markedet for sejlads mellem det franske fastland og Korsika, gjorde de franske myndigheder gældende, at i betragtning af dette markeds aktuelle konfiguration, hvor CFF fremover ville være den vigtigste aktør, afhang opretholdelsen af en konkurrencebaseret struktur af, om omstruktureringsplanen for SNCM blev godkendt, og af SNCM's fortsatte tilstedeværelse på det pågældende marked.
As for the argument raised by CFF that the implementation of the measures described above in favour of SNCM involves a serious risk of eliminating its main competitor on the mainland France-Corsica market, namely CFF, the French authorities submit that, having regard to the current structure of the market on which CFF is in the majority, the maintenance of a competitive structure depends on the authorisation of SNCM’s restructuring plan and the presence of the latter on the market in question.
I EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, står der: »Bortset fra de i denne traktat hjemlede undtagelser er statsstøtte eller støtte, som ydes ved hjælp af statsmidler under enhver tænkelig form, og som fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene ved at begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner, uforenelige med fællesmarkedet i det omfang, den påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne«.
Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty provides: ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market’.
For at en national foranstaltning kan betegnes som statsstøtte i den i EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, fastsatte betydning, skal følgende kumulative betingelser være opfyldt: 1) den pågældende foranstaltning medfører en selektiv økonomisk fordel, 2) denne fordel finansieres med statsmidler, 3) denne fordel fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencen, og 4) denne fordel påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstater.
The classification of a national measure as State aid as provided for in Article 87(1) EC requires the following cumulative conditions to be fulfilled, namely: (1) the measure in question confers a selective economic advantage; (2) that advantage is financed via State resources; (3) that advantage distorts or threatens to distort competition and, finally, (4) that advantage has an effect on trade between Member States.
Kommissionen konstaterer, at SNCM har modtaget statsmidler for et samlet beløb på 274,54 mio. EUR via CGMF, der ejes 100 % af den franske stat.
The Commission notes that SNCM received State resources totalling EUR 274,54 million via CGMF wholly owned by the French Government.
Eftersom SNCM opererer i sektoren for søtransport, der er åben for konkurrence på europæisk plan, vil den fordel, virksomheden har fået, kunne fordreje konkurrencen og påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
Since SNCM operates in the maritime transport sector, open to competition within Europe, the potential economic advantage that it has received is likely to distort competition and to have an effect on trade between Member States.
Det forhold, at markedet for cabotagesejlads på øerne i Middelhavet indtil den 1. januar 1999 var midlertidigt undtaget fra Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 3577/92 af 7. december 1992 om anvendelse af princippet om fri udveksling af tjenesteydelser inden for søtransport i medlemsstaterne (cabotagesejlads), betyder ikke, at det på forhånd kan udelukkes, at støtte, der er ydet til besejlingen af cabotageforbindelser med øerne i Middelhavet i forbindelse med public service-forpligtelser, har kunnet påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne og fordreje konkurrencen.
The fact that the cabotage market to the Mediterranean islands was, until 1 January 1999, temporarily exempt from the application of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 of 7 December 1992 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member States (maritime cabotage) does not exclude prima facie that subsidies granted for operating cabotage routes to the Mediterranean islands under a public service delegation could have an effect on trade between Member States and distort competition.
Under alle omstændigheder gælder det, at selv om den støtte, der er ydet til besejling af cabotageruter, ikke har kunnet påvirke samhandelen og medføre konkurrencefordrejninger i perioden frem til den 1. januar 1999, har situationen ændret sig, eftersom alle EF-operatører siden da har kunnet udføre cabotagesejlads i overensstemmelse med forordning (EØF) nr. 3577/92.
In any event, even if subsidies granted for operating cabotage routes could not have an effect on trade between Member States or entail distortions in competition before 1 January 1999, the situation changed after that date since, in accordance with Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92, cabotage activities were from then on open to all Community operators.
Det skal desuden understreges, at SNCM ikke udelukkende driver cabotagesejlads, men også opererer på det internationale søtransportmarked, der blev liberaliseret ved Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 4055/86 af 22. december 1986 om anvendelse af princippet om fri udveksling af tjenesteydelser på søtransportområdet.
In addition, it should be stated that SNCM does not carry on only cabotage transport but also operates on the international maritime market, which was liberalised by Council Regulation (EEC) No 4055/86 of 22 December 1986 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport between Member States and between Member States and third countries.
Kommissionen mener derfor, at de tre sidste kriterier i EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, der er nævnt under betragtning 220 ovenfor, er opfyldt i den foreliggende sag.
Accordingly, the Commission considers in the present case that the last three criteria of Article 87(1) EC cited in paragraph 220 of this decision are fulfilled.
I det følgende undersøges det for hver foranstaltnings vedkommende, hvorvidt der foreligger en selektiv økonomisk fordel, og om de foranstaltninger, der i givet fald kan betegnes som statsstøtte, er forenelige med fællesmarkedet.
The following sections examine in turn, in respect of each measure, the existence of a selective economic advantage and, where applicable, compatibility with the common market of measures classified as State aid.
Kapitaltilførslen på 53,48 mio. EUR som kompensation for public service-forpligtelser
The capital contribution of EUR 53,48 million for public service compensation
Selv om Kommissionen i beslutningen fra 2003 anerkendte, at en del af de 76 mio. EUR, nemlig 53,48 mio. EUR, havde karakter af kompensation for public service-forpligtelser i forbindelse med besejlingen af Korsika fra 1991 til 2001, havde Kommissionen vurderet hele kapitaltilførslen, dvs. 76 mio. EUR som omstruktureringsstøtte, eftersom den af de franske myndigheder var blevet anmeldt som sådan.
Although in its decision of 2003 the Commission recognised the public service compensation nature of a part of the EUR 76 million, namely EUR 53,48 million, for operating services to Corsica between 1991 and 2001, the Commission had assessed the capital contribution in its entirety, namely EUR 76 million, in terms of restructuring aid in so far as that amount had been notified by the French authorities for that purpose.
Retten i Første Instans havde i dommen af 15. juni 2005, der annullerede Kommissionens beslutning fra 2003, opfordret Kommissionen til at undersøge beløbet på 53,48 mio. EUR på grundlag af Domstolens dom af 24. juli 2003 i Altmark-sagen.
In its judgment in Case T-349/03 annulling the Commission decision of 2003, the Community judicature called on the Commission to examine the sum of EUR 53,48 million in the light of the its judgment in the Altmark case.
De franske myndigheder havde desuden anmodet Kommissionen om i lyset af Altmark-dommen at overveje, om ikke en del af omstruktureringsstøtten i 2002 på grund af dens karakter af »kompensation for public service-forpligtelser« kunne betegnes som ikke-statsstøtte.
Moreover, the French authorities requested the Commission to consider that, by virtue of its ‘public service compensation’ nature, a part of the 2002 restructuring aid does not constitute aid in the light of the Altmark case-law.