natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Som anført ovenfor finder Kommissionen, at ETVA var kontraktligt forpligtet til at yde denne garanti til HDW/Ferrostaal på et tidspunkt, hvor staten stadig ejede langt hovedparten af aktierne i ETVA.
As indicated above, the Commission considers that ETVA contractually committed to grant this guarantee to HDW/Ferrostaal at a time when the State still owned the large majority of the shares of ETVA.
Da det fremgår af meddelelsen om garantier, at eksistensen af støtten skal analyseres på det tidspunkt, hvor garantien gives, og ikke senere, når garantien påberåbes, kan det konkluderes, at staten ved at forpligte sig til at yde garantien satte statsmidler på spil, og at garantien derfor indebærer statsmidler.
Since the Notice on guarantees indicates that the existence of aid has to be analysed at the time of the grant of the guarantee and not later when the guarantee is invoked, it can be concluded that by committing to grant the guarantee, the State put State resources at risk and the guarantee therefore involves State resources.
Den omstændighed, at ETVA blev solgt til Piraeus Bank kort tid efter, berører ikke denne konklusion.
The fact that ETVA was sold to Piraeus bank shortly after does not affect this conclusion.
Hvis staten således korrekt har informeret de bydende om ETVA's kontraktlige forpligtelser (herunder dette tilsagn fra ETVA om at yde garantien til HDW/Ferrostaal, hvis Kommissionen ikke udfærdiger en administrativ skrivelse), må de bydende have taget højde for dette tilsagn fra ETVA.
Indeed, if the State has correctly informed the bidders about the contractual obligations of ETVA — including this commitment of ETVA to provide the guarantee to HDW/Ferrostaal if the Commission does not issue a comfort letter — the bidders must have taken into account this commitment of ETVA.
De må derfor have nedjusteret den pris, de var rede til at betale for at købe ETVA.
They must therefore have revised downwards the price they were ready to pay to purchase ETVA.
Dette betyder, at staten solgte ETVA til en lavere pris og derfor tabte midler.
This means that the State sold ETVA at a lower price and therefore lost resources.
Selv hvis det blev konkluderet, at ETVA på det tidspunkt, hvor ETVA stadig ejedes af staten, ikke kontraktligt forpligtede sig til at udstede garantien, finder Kommissionen som nævnt, at staten ved at beslutte at privatisere HSY i januar 2001 (på et tidspunkt, hvor ETVA stadig ejedes af staten) bragte ETVA i en situation, hvor den var tvunget til at udstede en sådan garanti, eftersom sidstnævnte var uomgængelig nødvendig for at finde en køber til HSY.
As indicated above, even if it were concluded that, at the time when ETVA was still under State ownership, ETVA did not contractually commit to issue the guarantee, the Commission considers that by deciding to privatise HSY in January 2001 — at a time when ETVA was still under State ownership — the State put ETVA in a situation where it was forced to issue such a guarantee since the latter was indispensable to find a purchaser for HSY.
Dette medfører, at da de bydende afgav deres tilbud på ETVA, må de have taget højde for, at ETVA ville skulle udstede denne garanti.
This entails that when the bidders made their bid for ETVA, they must have taken into account the fact that ETVA would have to issue this guarantee.
Følgelig tilbød de en lavere pris for at købe ETVA, og dette fører derfor også til den konklusion, at statsmidler er gået tabt.
According, they proposed a lower price for purchasing ETVA and this therefore also leads to the conclusion that State resources have been lost.
Selv hvis det blev konkluderet, at der på det tidspunkt, hvor staten solgte ETVA, ikke var nogen forpligtelse (enten kontraktligt eller faktisk) til at udstede denne garanti, kan det stadig påvises, at den garanti, som ETVA ydede, indebærer statsmidler.
Even if it were concluded that when the State sold ETVA there was no obligation (neither contractually nor de facto) to issue this guarantee, it can still be demonstrated that the guarantee granted by ETVA involves State resources.
Staten ydede nemlig køberen af ETVA (dvs. Piraeus Bank) en garanti, hvorved staten gav tilsagn om at godtgøre Piraeus Bank 100 % af ethvert beløb, som ETVA skulle betale i henhold til den garanti, som ETVA vil udstede til fordel for HDW/Ferrostaal.
Indeed, the State granted to the purchaser of ETVA (i.e. Piraeus Bank) a guarantee by which the State promised to refund Piraeus Bank 100 % of any amount which ETVA would have to pay under the guarantee ETVA will issue in favour of HDW/Ferrostaal.
Denne modgaranti blev ydet i flere på hinanden følgende kontrakter.
This counter guarantee was granted in successive contracts.
I aftalen af 18. december 2001 mellem staten og Piraeus Bank vedrørende salget af 57,7 % af ETVA forpligtede staten sig til at betale Piraeus Bank 57,7 % af ethvert beløb, som ETVA skulle betale til køberen af HSY.
In the Agreement of 18 December 2001 between the State and Piraeus Bank for the sale of 57,7 % of ETVA, the State committed to pay to Piraeus Bank 57,7 % of any amount which ETVA would pay to the purchaser of HSY.
I aftalen af 20. marts 2002 mellem de samme parter, og som ændrede aftalen af 18. december 2001 forpligtede staten sig til at betale Piraeus Bank 100 % af ethvert beløb, som ETVA skulle betale til køberen af HSY.
In the Agreement of 20 March 2002 between the same parties and which amended the agreement of 18 December 2001, the State committed to pay to Piraeus Bank 100 % of any amount ETVA would have to pay to the purchaser of HSY.
Ved brev af 31. maj 2002 til Piraeus Bank bekræftede staten over for denne, at den ville godtgøre 100 % af ethvert beløb, som ETVA betalte til køberen af HSY.
By letter dated 31 May 2002 sent to Piraeus Bank, the State confirmed to the latter that it would refund 100 % of any amount paid by ETVA to HSY’s purchaser.
Da ETVA undertegnede tillægget til HSY SPA den 31. maj 2002, havde Piraeus Bank med andre ord modtaget en garanti fra staten, hvorefter den ville få godtgjort 100 % af ethvert beløb, som ETVA skulle betale på grundlag af den garanti, der efter planen skulle ydes til HDW/Ferrostaal.
In other words, when ETVA signed the Addendum to HSY SPA on 31 May 2002, Piraeus Bank had received a guarantee from the State providing that it would be 100 % indemnified for any amount ETVA would have to pay as a consequence of the guarantee planned to be granted to HDW/Ferrostaal.
Dette viser, at ethvert beløb, som ETVA betalte, i sidste instans ville blive finansieret over statens budget, og at garantien indebærer statsmidler.
This shows that any amount paid by ETVA would ultimately be financed by the State budget and that the guarantee involves State resources.
For at påvise, at der foreligger statsstøtte i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, er det nødvendigt at vise, at staten ikke handlede på samme måde, som en markedsøkonomisk investor havde handlet under lignende omstændigheder.
In order to prove the existence of a State aid in the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty, it is necessary to show that the State did not behave as a market economy investor would have behaved in similar circumstances.
I denne henseende har Grækenland, HSY og TKMS/GNSH gjort gældende, at en markedsøkonomisk investor under lignende omstændigheder havde accepteret at udstede denne garanti til fordel for HDW/Ferrostaal.
In this respect, Greece, HSY and TKMS/GNSH claim that in similar circumstances a market economy investor would have accepted to issue this guarantee in favour of HDW/Ferrostaal.
De har hævdet, at det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip bør anvendes i relation til ETVA, som var den retlige enhed, der solgte HSY, og i relation til den græske stat, som var sælgeren af ETVA.
They argue that the test of the market economy investor should be applied at the level of ETVA, which was the legal entity which sold HSY, and at the level of the Greek government, which was the seller of ETVA.
Kommissionen minder om, som anført i afsnit 3.2, at da ETVA købte HSY og direkte derefter indskød kapital for at holde det i live, handlede den ikke som en markedsøkonomisk investor, men som en offentlig myndighed, der ydede støtte for at opretholde en virksomhed, der anses for at være vigtig for den græske økonomi.
The Commission recalls that, as has been indicated in section 3.2 of the present decision, when ETVA purchased HSY and directly thereafter injected capital to keep it alive, it did not acted as a market economy investor but as a public authority granting aid to keep alive a firm deemed important for the Greek economy.
Ingen markedsøkonomisk investor havde derfor befundet sig i ETVA's situation.
Therefore, no market economy investor would have found itself in the situation of ETVA.
Ingen markedsøkonomisk investor havde befundet sig i den situation at skulle sælge disse aktier i HSY.
No market economy investor would have found itself in the situation of selling these shares of HSY.
Efter Kommissionens opfattelse kan det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip derfor ikke anvendes i dette tilfælde til at begrunde, at staten sætter yderligere statsmidler på spil (ved at yde garantien).
Therefore, the Commission considers that the market economy investor test can not be used in the present case to justify the fact that the State is putting additional State resources at risk (by granting the guarantee).
Selv hvis man alligevel antager, at det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip bør finde anvendelse, finder Kommissionen, at hvis staten havde været en privat virksomhed, der opererer under normale markedsvilkår, havde den ikke accepteret at yde garantien.
Even if nevertheless one considers that the market economy investor test should be applied, the Commission considers that if the State had been a private firm acting under normal market conditions, it would not have accepted to grant the guarantee.
Hvert af følgende tre punkter er alene tilstrækkeligt til at påvise dette.
Each of the three following points is alone sufficient to prove this.
For det første bemærker Kommissionen, at ETVA (og staten via ETVA) gav tilsagn om, selv om den kun havde en aktiepost på 51 % i HSY (de resterende 49 % ejedes af de ansatte), at betale køberen af HSY (dvs. HDW/Ferrostaal) 100 % af enhver støtte, der ville blive tilbagesøgt fra HSY.
First, the Commission observes that ETVA (and the State through ETVA), whereas it had only a 51 % shareholding in HSY (the remaining 49 % were owned by the employees), promised to pay to the purchaser of HSY (i.e. HDW/Ferrostaal) 100 % of any aid that would be recovered from HSY.
En markedsøkonomisk investor havde ikke accepteret at yde en erstatning på 100 % af den skade, som den solgte virksomhed måtte lide.
A market economy investor would not have accepted to give an indemnification amounting to 100 % of the damage suffered by the company sold.
Under visse omstændigheder kan en markedsøkonomisk investor acceptere at overtage ansvaret for visse af den solgte virksomheds fremtidige forpligtelser, men kun i forhold til vedkommendes aktiepost, som var 51 % i det foreliggende tilfælde.
In certain circumstances, a market economy investor may accept to take responsibility for certain future liabilities of the firm sold, but only in a proportion equal to its shareholding, which was 51 % in the present case.
En markedsøkonomisk investor havde anmodet de øvrige aktionærer om at påtage sig ansvaret for de resterende 49 % af de pågældende forpligtelser.
A market economy investor would have asked the other shareholders to assume responsibility for the remaining 49 % of the liabilities concerned.
Ved at acceptere at bære 100 % af den solgte virksomheds potentielt enorme forpligtelser (det skal erindres, at der i kontrakten ikke er fastsat et loft for kompensationsbetalingerne) gav ETVA de øvrige aktionærer i HSY (dvs. de ansatte) en gave.
By accepting to support 100 % of potentially huge liabilities (it is recalled that the contract does not define a ceiling for the indemnification payments) of the firm sold, ETVA made a gift to the other shareholders of HSY (i.e. the employees).
En markedsøkonomisk investor havde ikke accepteret at give en sådan gave ved at påtage sig en andel af den solgte virksomheds potentielt enorme forpligtelser, som langt overstiger vedkommendes aktiepost.
A market economy investor would not have accepted to make such a gift by assuming potentially huge liabilities of the sold firm in a proportion exceeding by far its shareholding.
Ud fra den blotte kendsgerning, at den kompensationsgaranti, som ETVA har ydet til HDW/Ferrostaal, udgør 100 % (dvs. i stedet for 51 %) af den støtte, der kunne tilbagesøges fra HSY, kan det derfor konkluderes, at ingen markedsøkonomisk investor havde ydet en sådan garanti.
Therefore, from the mere fact that the indemnification guarantee granted by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal amounts to 100 % (i.e. instead of 51 %) of the aid that could be recovered from HSY, it can be concluded that no market economy investor would have provided such a guarantee.
For det andet har Grækenland, HSY og TKMS/GNSH gjort gældende, at nettoprovenuet (dvs. indtægter minus omkostninger) var højere i tilfælde af, at HSY blev solgt — herunder de forventede betalinger i henhold til garantien — end hvis HSY var trådt i likvidation.
Second, Greece, HSY and TKMS/GNSH claim that the net proceeds (i.e. revenues minus costs) were higher in case of sale of HSY — including the expected payments due under of the guarantee — than if HSY would have been liquidated.
TKMS/GNSH har støttet sin påstand på den anden Deloitte-rapport.
TKMS/GNSH supports its claim by means of the second Deloitte report.
I denne rapport sammenlignes nettoomkostningerne i de to scenarier.
This report compares the net costs in the two scenarios.
Denne analyse er foretaget i relation til ETVA og derpå i relation til staten.
This analysis is done at the level of ETVA and then at the level of the State.
Kommissionen finder, at det er et misbrug af dette princip at anvende det i relation til ETVA.
The Commission considers that applying the test at the level of ETVA is a misuse of this test.
Hvis princippet alligevel anvendes i relation til ETVA, er det nødvendigt at sammenligne nettoprovenuet (dvs. indtægter minus omkostninger) for ETVA i tilfælde af HSY's likvidation og i tilfælde af et salg af HSY.
If the test is nevertheless applied at the level of ETVA, one has to compare the net proceeds (i.e. revenues minus costs) for ETVA in case of liquidation of HSY and in case of sale of HSY.
I tilfælde af HSY's likvidation skal det fastslås, hvilke omkostninger ETVA ville skulle afholde.
In the case of liquidation of HSY, it has to be established what would be the costs incurred by ETVA.
TKMS/GNSH har gjort gældende, at tabet ville svare mindst til de lån og garantier, som ETVA har ydet til HSY, og hvor staten ikke har stillet nogen modgaranti.
TKMS/GNSH claims that the loss would amount at least to the loans and guarantees granted by ETVA to HSY and which were not counter-guaranteed by the State.
Kommissionen bemærker imidlertid, at ingen af disse lån og garantier udgør en normalt omkostning i forbindelse med likvidation af en virksomhed.
The Commission observes however that none of these loans and guarantees constitutes a normal cost of winding up a firm.
Alle disse lån og garantier er således blevet ydet af ETVA som offentlig myndighed, fordi de enten udgjorde statsstøtte til de civile aktiviteter eller var foranstaltninger til at beskytte Grækenlands sikkerhed i overensstemmelse med EF-traktatens artikel 296.
Indeed, all these loans and guarantees have been granted by ETVA as public authority because either they constituted State aid to the civil activities or they were measures to protect the security of Greece in accordance with Article 296 of the Treaty.
Disse lån og garantier kan derfor ikke tages i betragtning ved anvendelsen af det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
These loans and guarantees can therefore not be taken into account when applying the market economy vendor test.
Det viser sig følgelig, at ETVA som en markedsøkonomisk aktør ikke havde haft betydelige omkostninger at afholde i tilfælde af HSY's likvidation.
Consequently, it turns out that ETVA as a market economy operator would have had no significant cost to support in case of liquidation of HSY.
I tilfælde af, at HSY blev solgt, ville ETVA modtage salgsprisen på 6 mio. EUR. Med hensyn til omkostningerne i tilfælde af et salg af HSY, skulle ETVA udstede den garanti, der analyseres her, og som var størrelsesmæssigt ubegrænset og derfor medførte potentielle betalinger på to- eller endog trecifrede millionbeløb i euro.
In case of sale of HSY, ETVA received the sale price of EUR 6 million. As regards the costs incurred in case of sale of HSY, ETVA had to issue the guarantee currently analysed, which was unlimited in size and therefore entailed potential payments of tens or even hundreds of millions of Euro.
En sammenligning af de to scenarier viser, at en markedsøkonomisk investor havde foretrukket en likvidation af værftet.
Comparing the two scenarios, it turns out that a market economy investor would have preferred to liquidate the yard.
ETVA handlede derfor ikke som en markedsøkonomisk investor.
ETVA therefore did not behave as a market economy investor.
Hvis sammenligningen mellem salget af HSY og likvidationen af HSY foretages i relation til staten, fører det til præcis samme konklusioner.
If the comparison between the sale of HSY and the liquidation of HSY is performed at the level of the State, it leads exactly to the same conclusions.
Staten havde ikke store omkostninger i sin egenskab af driftsherre/ejer i tilfælde af HSY's likvidation, da alle de lån og garantier, der var ydet af staten (direkte eller via ETVA) til HSY, var ydet af staten som offentlig myndighed, fordi de enten udgjorde statsstøtte til de civile aktiviteter eller foranstaltninger til at beskytte Grækenlands sikkerhed i overensstemmelse med EF-traktatens artikel 296.
There were no large costs for the State in its capacity as entrepreneur/owner in case of liquidation of HSY since all the loans and guarantees granted by the State (directly or via ETVA) to HSY have been granted by the State as public authority, because either they constituted State aid to the civil activities or measures to protect the security of Greece in accordance with Article 296 of the Treaty.
I tilfælde af, at HSY blev solgt, ville staten blot modtage nogle få millioner euro, mens den, fordi den ydede garantien, risikerede at skulle betale to- eller trecifrede millionbeløb i euro.
In case of sale of HSY, the State would just receive a few million Euro while, because it granted the guarantee, it ran the risk of having to pay tens or hundreds of millions of Euro.
Staten handlede derfor ikke på en måde, der var acceptabel for en privat virksomhed under lignende omstændigheder.
In conclusion, the State did not act in a way acceptable to a private firm in similar circumstances.
Grækenland, HSY og TKMS/GNSH har gjort gældende, at risiciene for, at HSY skulle tilbagebetale statsstøtte, var meget begrænsede, eftersom Kommissionen på daværende tidspunkt ikke var i gang med at foretage undersøgelser.
Greece, HSY and TKMS/GNSH claim that the risks of HSY having to reimburse State aid were very limited, since at that time there were no ongoing investigations by the Commission.
De har derfor påstået, at risikoen for, at ETVA og staten skulle betale erstatning i henhold til garantien, var lille.
They therefore claim that the risk for ETVA and the State of having to pay indemnification under the guarantee was small.
Kommissionen kan ikke acceptere denne påstand.
The Commission can not accept this claim.
Det svarer til at påstå, at eftersom det i de foregående år var lykkedes Grækenland at skjule den omstændighed, at ulovlig og uforenelig statsstøtte var blevet ydet til HSY, samt misbruget af støtte, der tidligere var godkendt af Kommissionen, havde det lov til at yde denne garanti.
It is akin to claim that, since Greece over the prior years had succeeded to hide the grant of unlawful and incompatible State aids to HSY and the misuses of aid previously approved by the Commission, it was allowed to grant this guarantee.
Som et subsidiært argument bemærker Kommissionen, at HDW/Ferrostaal krævede at få denne garanti og ikke var rede til at undertegne afslutningen af salget af HSY, inden den havde fået garantien.
As a subsidiary ground, the Commission observes that HDW/Ferrostaal insisted to receive this guarantee and was not ready to sign the closing of the sale of HSY before receiving the guarantee.
Den betydning, som HDW/Ferrostaal tillagde garantien, viser, at denne private investor fandt, at der ikke var en ringe sandsynlighed for, at HSY skulle tilbagebetale statsstøtte.
The importance attached to the guarantee by HDW/Ferrostaal proves that this private investor considered that the probability that HSY would have to reimburse State aid was not small.
Den omstændighed, at Grækenland fra begyndelsen af privatiseringsprocessen forpligtede sig til at yde en sådan garanti til den højstbydende, viser også, at Grækenland var af den opfattelse, at en privat investor ville finde en sådan garanti meget vigtig (en betingelse sine qua non ifølge Grækenlands brev af 23. maj 2005, som er citeret i fodnote 148 i denne beslutning, og ifølge den anden Deloitte-rapport), hvilket kun kan være tilfældet, hvis en privat investor er af den opfattelse, at sandsynligheden for tilbagesøgning ikke er særlig begrænset.
The fact that, from the beginning of the privatisation procedure, Greece committed to grant such a guarantee to the highest bidder proves also that Greece considered that a private investor would find such a guarantee very important (a condition sine qua non, according to Greece’s letter of 23 May 2005 quoted in footnote 148 of the present decision and according to the second Deloitte report), which can only be the case if a private investor considers that the probability of recovery is not very limited.
Kommissionen bemærker endvidere, at i denne sammenhæng, hvor det var vanskeligt at anslå det støttebeløb, der kunne tilbagesøges fra HSY, havde en markedsøkonomisk sælger af HSY i det mindste i salgskontrakten indføjet et loft for den potentielle betaling til køberen.
The Commission also observes that in this context where the amount of aid which could be recovered from HSY was difficult to estimate, a market economy vendor selling HSY would have at least introduced in the sale contract a ceiling limiting the potential payment to the purchaser.
En markedsøkonomisk sælger havde ikke accepteret at løbe den risiko at skulle betale flere hundrede millioner euro, selv hvis det blev antaget, at sandsynligheden for en så høj betaling kunne være meget lav.
A market economy vendor would not have accepted to run the risk of having to pay hundreds of millions of Euros, even if it were accepted that the probability of such a high payment could be very low.
Den omstændighed, at der ikke var fastsat noget loft i garantien, er derfor et yderligere bevis for, at ETVA og staten ikke handlede på en måde, der var acceptabel for en markedsøkonomisk aktør.
Therefore, the fact that no ceiling was introduced in the guarantee constitutes an additional proof that ETVA and the State did not behave in a way acceptable to a market economy operator.
For det tredje er det ved vurderingen af, om staten handlede som en markedsøkonomisk investor eller ej, nødvendigt at tage hensyn til den statslige indgriben som held.
Third, when assessing whether the State acted as a market economy investor, it is necessary to take into account the entire intervention of the State.
I dette tilfælde har staten ydet flere store støttebeløb for at lette privatiseringen af HSY (dvs. den statsstøtte, der indgår i lov 2941/2001).
In the present case, the State has granted several large aids to facilitate the privatisation of HSY (i.e. the State aid included in Law 2941/2001.
Den tilbagebetalte navnlig de ansatte i HSY det beløb på 4,3 mio. EUR, som de havde investeret i forbindelse med de tre kapitalforhøjelser i HSY.
It notably repaid to the workers of HSY the amount of EUR 4,3 million they had invested in the framework of the three capital increases of HSY.