natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at kontraktens artikel 2 vedrører de belgiske myndigheders godkendelse af foranstaltningerne og er et indicium for, at de pågældende foranstaltninger kan tilregnes den belgiske stat.
Consequently, the Commission concludes that Article 2 of the agreement implies the approval of measures by the Belgian authorities and constitutes an indication of imputability of the measures in question to the Belgian State.
Presseartikler
Press articles
Yderligere indicier for, at den belgiske regering har været inddraget i denne sag, skal findes i forskellige presseartikler.
The additional evidence of intervention by the Belgian Government in this case is also to be found in press articles [40].
I en artikel i La libre Belgique af 19. maj 2003 [40] nævnes således SNCB's pressekontor, som forklarer, at Belgien endnu ikke havde anmeldt redningsforanstaltningerne til Kommissionen den 19. maj 2003 [41], selvom rammekontrakten var underskrevet den 7. april 2003, fordi »den belgiske stat har noget at skulle have sagt«.
Thus, an article which appeared in La Libre Belgique of 19 May 2003 [41] quotes SNCB’s press department, which explains that Belgium had still not notified the Commission of the rescue measures on 19 May 2003, whereas the framework agreement had been signed on 7 April 2003, by the fact that ‘the federal authority is [was] to have its say’.
I en artikel fra marts 2003 offentliggjort på webstedet www.cheminots.be siges der følgende om Karel Vinck, daværende administrerende direktør for SNCB, i forbindelse med ABX- og IFB-sagerne: »Han kræver tilstrækkelig stor handlefrihed for selskabets management«.
In an article which appeared in March 2003 on the website www.cheminots.be, Karel Vinck, at the time the Chief Executive of SNCB, was quoted on the subject of the ABX and IFB cases as follows: ‘He demands sufficient financial headroom for the management of the company.’
Det er underforstået, at SNCB's ledelse mente, at staten blandede sig for meget i dens sager.
That allows the interpretation that SNCB’s management considered that the State was intervening too much in these cases.
Belgien tilbageviser dette indicium.
Belgium refutes this implication.
Med hensyn til artiklen i La libre Belgique anfører Belgien, at den føderale magt kun havde noget at skulle have sagt med hensyn til Belgiens anmeldelse af rammekontrakten til Kommissionen.
As regards the article in La Libre Belgique, it emphasises, as in Article 2 of the framework agreement, that the federal authority only had something to say about the Belgian Government’s communication to the Commission, by means of which the framework agreement was notified.
Men teksten i presseartiklen og SNCB's meddelelse er klar.
The text of the press article and SNCB’s press release is clear.
Hvis SNCB's pressekontor havde ønsket at sige, at den belgiske regering kun skulle godkende den tekst, der skulle fremsendes til Kommissionen, ville man have sagt, at det problem, der skulle løses, vedrørte formalia og ikke indhold.
If SNCB’s press department had wanted to say that the Belgian Government only had to approve a text for communication to the Commission, it would have indicated that the problem to be resolved was purely a problem of form, and not one of substance.
Med hensyn til Karel Vincks udtalelser mener de belgiske myndigheder, at de var begrænset til ledelsen af de offentlige tjenesteydelser.
As regards the points made by Karel Vinck, the Belgian authorities consider that these were limited to the management of the public service assignments.
Det forekommer ikke særlig troværdigt, da han især blev interviewet om ABX- og IFB-sagerne, der, som den belgiske regering også selv erkender, vedrørte SNCB's kommercielle aktiviteter og ikke de offentlige tjenesteydelser.
This does not appear very credible, as he was interviewed on the subject of the ABX and IFB files, which, as the Belgian Government itself recognised, concern SNCB’s commercial activities, and not the public service assignments.
Rammekontraktens omfang, indhold og vilkår
Scope, contents, conditions of the framework agreement
Mere generelt gør Kommissionen opmærksom på præmis 56 i ovennævnte Stardust Marine-dom, hvor det hedder, at »enhver anden omstændighed, som i det konkrete tilfælde indicerer, at de offentlige myndigheder er impliceret deri, eller som tværtimod sandsynliggør, at de ikke er impliceret i vedtagelsen af en foranstaltning, når der endvidere henses til dennes rækkevidde, indhold eller hermed forbundne betingelser« skal indgå i overvejelserne, når det fastslås, om en foranstaltning kan tilegnes en medlemsstat, og som resulterer i, at rækkevidden, indholdet og betingelserne i forbindelse med rammekontrakten udgør supplerende omstændigheder, der indicerer tilegnelse.
In a more general manner, the Commission recalls the aforementioned point 56 of the Stardust Marine ruling which states that ‘any other indicator showing, in the particular case, an involvement by the public authorities in the adoption of a measure or the unlikelihood of their not being involved, having regard also to the compass of the measure, its content or the conditions which it contains’ must be taken into account to establish the imputability of a measure to the Member State, with the result that the scope, the content, and the conditions of the framework agreement constitute additional indications of imputability.
Belgien tilbageviser den tredje omstændighed og gentager, at SNCB er fuldstændig selvstændig i henseende til at træffe alle beslutninger bortset fra ledelsen af offentlige tjenesteydelser.
Belgium refutes this third suggestion, repeating that SNCB would be completely autonomous in taking all these decisions, with the exception of the management of the public services.
Som allerede klarlagt mener Kommissionen ikke, at regeringskommissæren kunne indbringe beslutningen om at tildele et likviditetsforskud på 2,5 mio. EUR for regeringen, fordi det på grund af beløbets størrelse og dets form ikke kunne være til skade for leveringen af offentlige tjenesteydelser.
As already explained, the Commission considers that the decision to grant a cash advance of EUR 2,5 million could not be subject to appeal by the Government Commissioner as, due to its amount and its nature, it could not be prejudicial to the implementation of public service duties.
Samme vurdering kan ikke gøres gældende for beslutningen om at investere næsten 100 mio. EUR i et selskab, der var på fallittens rand.
The assessment must be different for the decision to invest nearly EUR 100 million in a company on the verge of bankruptcy.
Denne beslutning skulle få regeringskommissæren til at gribe ind eller til i det mindste informere de belgiske myndigheder, så de kunne træffe foranstaltninger, enten formelt eller uformelt, således som han f.eks. gjorde i 2000 i forbindelse med investeringerne i ABX, den italienske afdeling.
That decision should lead the Government Commissioner to intervene, or at least to inform the Belgian authorities so that they could intervene formally or informally, as he did for example in 2000 for the investments in the Italian branch of ABX.
Følgelig mener Kommissionen, at rammekontraktens rækkevidde, indhold og betingelser i sammenhæng med regeringskommissærens beføjelser er en omstændighed, der indikerer tilregnelse.
Consequently, the Commission considers that, taken together with the presence and the powers of the Government Commissioner, the scope, the contents and the conditions of the framework agreement also constitute evidence of imputability.
Kommissionen konkluderer følgelig, at de omhandlede foranstaltninger skal tilregnes den belgiske stat med hensyn til perioden efter SNCB's bestyrelses beslutning den 20. december 2002.
Consequently, the Commission concludes that the measures in question are imputable to the Belgian State as regards the period subsequent to the decision by SNCB’s Management Board of 20 December 2002.
Derfor skal det analyseres, om de foranstaltninger vedrørende IFB, som SNCB traf efter den 20. december 2002, har udgjort en fordel for modtageren, eller om SNCB tværtimod har handlet som en privat investor, der handler på normale markedsøkonomiske vilkår.
It is therefore necessary to analyse whether the measures taken by SNCB concerning IFB from 20 December onwards conferred an advantage upon the beneficiary, or if, on the contrary, SNCB behaved like an informed investor in a market economy.
Fordel for støttemodtageren i medfør af princippet om en privat investor, der handler på normale markedsøkonomiske vilkår
Advantage to the aid recipient applying the principle of an informed investor in a market economy
Det bør analyseres, om SNCB's bestyrelses beslutning af 20. december 2002 om at forhøje IFB's kapital ved at konvertere forfaldne fordringer og tildele redningsforanstaltninger, som førte til, at SNCB den 7. april 2003 underskrev rammekontrakten med IFB, har medført en økonomisk fordel for IFB, eller om en privat investor, der handler på normale markedsøkonomiske vilkår, ville have truffet en tilsvarende beslutning.
It is necessary to analyse whether the decision by SNCB’s Management Board of 20 December 2002 to increase IFB’s capital by the conversion of credits due, and to award the rescue measures, which led to SNCB’s signature, on 7 April 2003, of the framework agreement with IFB, created an economic advantage for IFB, or if this decision was the result of an assessment by a private investor in a market economy.
Da SNCB's beslutning om, at IFB fra udgangen af 2000 og til december 2002 ikke længere skulle betale sine fakturaer, og om at tildele et forskud på 2,5 mio. EUR ikke kan tilregnes Belgien, er der intet behov for en detaljeret analyse af disse beslutninger.
Since SNCB’s decision not to request any further payment of its invoices to IFB from the end of 2000 until December 2002 and SNCB’s decision to award an advance of EUR 2,5 million are not imputable to Belgium, there is no longer any need to analyse these decisions in detail.
Redningsforanstaltningerne bestod som nævnt af følgende:
For information, the rescue measures consist of:
Indrømmelse af en betalingsfrist for gælden på 63 mio. EUR
The granting of a payment extension for debts of EUR 63 million,
Tildeling af en kreditfacilitet på 15 mio. EUR
The granting of a credit facility of EUR 15 million,
Tildeling af et forskud på 5 mio. EUR, som kan kræves tilbagebetalt.
The granting of a recoverable advance of EUR 5 million.
ændelse af datterselskaberne i Frankrig samt omstrukturering og videreførelse af aktiviteterne i Belgien.
The restructuring measures consisted of the divestiture of the subsidiaries in France and the restructuring and continuation of activities in Belgium.
Disse foranstaltninger skulle i første omgang finansieres via redningsforanstaltningerne, idet denne finansiering i henhold til omstruktureringsplanen ville blive gjort vedvarende med konverteringen af følgende fordringer til selskabskapital:
The financing of these measures was initially ensured by the rescue measures, the restructuring plan providing that this finance would be secured by the conversion of the subsequent debts into capital stock:
Konverteringen af gæld på 63 mio. EUR, for hvilken der er indrømmet en betalingsfrist, til selskabskapital
The conversion of debts of EUR 63 million for which a payment extension had been granted into capital stock,
Konverteringen af kreditfaciliteten på 15 mio. EUR til selskabskapital
The conversion of the credit facility of EUR 15 million into capital stock,
Konverteringen af påløbne renter i løbet af betalingsfristen og af kreditfaciliteten til selskabskapital.
The conversion of the capitalised interest on the payment extension and on the credit facility into capital stock.
For at fastslå om SNCB har handlet som en privat investor, der handler på normale markedsøkonomiske vilkår, skal det vurderes, om en privat investor af en størrelse, der kan sammenlignes med SNCB's, og som befinder sig i en situation, der kan sammenlignes med SNCB's, under lignende forhold ville have handlet på samme måde. [42].
In order to establish whether SNCB behaved as a private investor in a market economy would have done, it is necessary to assess whether, in similar circumstances, a private investor of a size comparable to SNCB, finding itself in a situation comparable to that of SNCB, would have acted in the same way [42].
Retten har præciseret, at den fremgangsmåde, en privat investor følger, ikke nødvendigvis behøver være samme fremgangsmåde som den en almindelig investor, der placerer kapital til forrentning på kortere eller længere sigt, følger, men dog i det mindste skal være et privat holdingselskab eller en privat koncern af virksomheder, som følger en global eller sektorbestemt strukturpolitik, og som lader sig lede af mere langsigtede rentabilitetsudsigter [43].
The Court of Justice stated that, while the conduct of a private investor is not necessarily that of an ordinary investor placing capital funds with a view to their profitability in the shorter or longer term, it must, at least, be that of a private holding, or a group of private businesses pursuing a structural, global or sector policy, and guided by the prospects of profitability in the longer term [43].
Domstolen præciserer, at Kommissionen er forpligtet »til at foretage en fuldstændig gennemgang af alle de væsentlige elementer i den omtvistede transaktion og af dens sammenhæng« for at kunne vurdere, om medlemsstaten har handlet som en privat investor, der handler på normale, markedsøkonomiske vilkår [44].
The Court stated that the Commission is obliged to ‘conduct a complete analysis of all the factors pertinent to the contested action and in its context’ in order to know whether the State acted as an informed investor in a market economy would have done [44].
I sit svar på åbningsskrivelsen fremfører Belgien, at SNCB's beslutning om at anmode IFB om at afhænde koncernens franske datterselskaber og også SNCB's beslutning om at anmode IFB om at omstrukturere og videreføre aktiviteterne i Belgien svarer til de beslutninger, som en privat investor, der handler på normale, markedsmæssige vilkår, ville have truffet.
In its reply to the letter initiating the procedure, Belgium considers that SNCB’s decision to request IFB to divest the group’s French subsidiaries, and also SNCB’s decision to request IFB to restructure and continue with its activities in Belgium correspond to decisions which a private investor in a market economy would have taken.
Kommissionen finder imidlertid, at det relevante spørgsmål ikke er, om SNCB ved at afhænde sine datterselskaber i Frankrig og omstrukturere og videreføre aktiviteterne i Belgien har opført sig som en investor, der handler på normale, markedsøkonomiske vilkår, men om SNCB's beslutning om at finansiere disse to foranstaltninger er en beslutning, som en privat investor ville have truffet.
The Commission however considers that the pertinent question is not to know whether IFB, in divesting its subsidiaries in France and restructuring and continuing its activities in Belgium, acted in the same way as an investor in a market economy, but to know whether SNCB’s decision to finance these two measures is a decision that a private investor would have taken.
I 2002/2003 skulle SNCB derfor beslutte, om det overordnet set var mindre dyrt at finansiere IFB's omstrukturering (som medførte afhændelse af datterselskaberne i Frankrig og videreførelse af aktiviteterne i Belgien), eller om det var billigere at erklære IFB konkurs.
In 2002/2003, SNCB therefore had to decide whether it was cheaper overall to finance the restructuring of IFB (which involved the divestiture of the subsidiaries in France and the continuation of activities in Belgium) or to file for IFB’s bankruptcy.
Derfor skal man først beregne SNCB's omkostninger ved hvert af de to scenarier, omstruktureringen og likvidationen af IFB.
It is appropriate to establish first of all the cost to SNCB of each one of these two scenarios, i.e. the restructuring and the liquidation of IFB.
Omkostninger ved omstrukturering af IFB
Cost of restructuring IFB
I det første scenario afsætter SNCB 95,3 mio. EUR til finansiering af omstruktureringen af IFB i form af afkald på inddrivelse af fordringer, som konverteres til kapital.
In the first scenario, SNCB commits EUR 95,3 million to the financing of the restructuring of IFB by waiving the recovery of receivables which are converted into capital.
Efter omstruktureringen ejer selskabet 100 % af en virksomhed, hvis værdi anslås til 31 mio. EUR, men hvis henlæggelser udgør 34,2 mio. EUR, hvis økonomiske gæld er på 15 mio. EUR (ekskl. gæld til SNCB), og hvis nettoværdi derfor er – 18 mio. EUR. Kommissionen finder, at disse skøn, der er baseret på anerkendte metoder, er realistiske.
On completion of the restructuring, it owns 100 % of a business the value of which is estimated to be EUR 31 million, but having EUR 34,2 million in provisions, and EUR 15 million of financial debts (excluding debts to SNCB), and therefore having a net enterprise value of EUR – 18 million. The Commission considers these estimates, based on recognised methods, to be realistic.
Kommissionen konstaterer følgelig, at SNCB i tilfælde af salg af IFB kun ville have kunnet opnå en negativ salgspris.
The Commission notes therefore that, if IFB had been sold, SNCB would only have been able to obtain a negative sale price.
Hypotetiske omkostninger ved likvidationen af IFB
Hypothetical cost of the liquidation of IFB
I det andet scenario giver SNCB ligeledes afkald på at inddrive sine fordringer til en samlet værdi af 95 mio. EUR. Belgien mener på grundlag af de oplysninger, der var til rådighed på tidspunktet for indgåelsen af rammekontrakten den 7. april 2003, at likvidationen af IFB's belgiske aktiviteter ville have tvunget SNCB til at afholde yderligere omkostninger på mellem 70,6 og 161,8 mio. EUR. Dette beløb skulle svare til de beløb, som normalt ville have kunnet inddrives ved likvidationen af aktiverne (37,5 mio. EUR) med fradrag af omkostninger i forbindelse med likvidationen af IFB's passiver (67-76,9 mio. EUR) og omkostninger til de medarbejdere hos SNCB, som ville blive fritstillet (41,1 mio.-122,4 mio. EUR), når IFB's aktiviteter ophørte.
In the second scenario, SNCB also waives the recovery of its EUR 95 million of receivables. Belgium estimates furthermore that, based on information available at the time of the finalisation the framework agreement of 7 April 2003, the liquidation of IFB’s Belgian activities would have obliged SNCB to bear an additional cost of between EUR 70,6 and EUR 161,8 million. This amount would correspond to the sums which could normally have been recovered by the liquidation of assets (EUR 37,5 million), from which the costs brought about by the liquidation of IFB’s liabilities (EUR 67 to EUR 76,9 million) and the cost of SNCB personnel made redundant (EUR 41,1 to EUR 122,4 million) following the cessation of IFB’s activities are deducted.
Kommissionen tilslutter sig ikke denne analyse.
The Commission does not agree with this analysis.
For det første bestrider den, at SNCB skulle betale samtlige IFB's passiver.
First of all, it contests that SNCB would have had to meet the total cost of IFB’s liabilities.
For det andet bestrider den Belgiens beregning af det supplerende beløb til sociale udgifter.
Furthermore, it contests the amount of the additional cost calculated by Belgium.
SNCB's ansvar for IFB's passiver
SNCB’s responsibility for IFB’s liabilities
I modsætning til det af Belgien påståede betyder det forhold, at IFB havde en negativ nettoaktivbeholdning (værdien fra inddrivelsen af aktiverne med fradrag af værdien af forfaldne passiver), ikke, at SNCB i tilfælde af fallit skulle have afholdt det tilsvarende overskydende passivbeløb.
Contrary to what Belgium claims, the fact that IFB has negative net assets (value of the recovery of assets, minus the value of the current liabilities) does not mean that, in the event of bankruptcy, SNCB would have had to bear the corresponding excess liabilities.
Kommissionen erindrer om, at et selskab som IFB i princippet indestår for sine forpligtelser med virksomhedens egen selskabsformue.
The Commission points out that, in principle, a company like IFB responds to its obligations with its own capital assets.
Aktionærernes ansvar for selskabets forpligtelser overstiger normalt ikke dettes selskabskapital og påvirker derfor ikke de forskellige aktionærers egne formuer. Nogle nationale lovgivninger indeholder mulighed for, at tredjemand har regres over for aktionærerne, men det er kun i ganske særlige tilfælde og på meget strenge betingelser.
The shareholders’ responsibility for the company’s obligations does not normally go beyond the latter’s capital stock and therefore does not affect the individual capital of the various shareholders.
Var IFB gået fallit, ville SNCB således have tabt selskabskapitalen, men ikke skullet holde IFB's kreditorer skadesløse.
In the hypothetical case of IFB’s bankruptcy, SNCB would therefore have lost its capital stock, but it would not have had to repay the other IFB creditors.
SNCB's udgifter i forbindelse med IFB's fallit i førstnævntes egenskab af aktionær ville således have været nul og ikke 29,5-39,4 mio. EUR, som de belgiske myndigheder påstår.
A priori, the cost of IFB’s bankruptcy to SNCB, acting as a shareholder, would therefore have been zero, and not the EUR 29,5 to EUR 39,4 million as maintained by the Belgian authorities.
Kommissionen erkender dog i sin beslutningspraksis, at en virksomhed i SNCB's situation kunne være forpligtet til at afholde omkostninger i sin egenskab af andet end aktionær. [47] I dette tilfælde drejer det sig især om følgende udgifter:
In its decision-making process, the Commission recognises, however, that a business placed in SNCB’s situation would have been obliged to support some costs in capacities other than that of shareholder [47].
Som kreditor taber SNCB sine fordringer på IFB, i det mindste i forhold til sin andel af de af IFB's passiver, der ikke er dækket af aktiverne.
In this case, costs are notably as follows:
Kommissionen kan acceptere, at denne risiko i lyset af SNCB's rolle i likvidationen af IFB kan vurderes til at udgøre op til SNCB's samlede fordringer på IFB svarende til 95 mio. EUR.
As a creditor, SNCB will lose its receivables from IFB, at least in proportion to its share in IFB’s liabilities not covered by the assets; the Commission can accept that, taking SNCB’s role in IFB’s liquidation into account, this risk could be assessed as being up to the total amount of receivables held by SCNB in IFB, i.e. EUR 95 million,
Kommissionen kunne medgive, at det ville have været klogt af SNCB som moderselskab for at redde sit ry at påtage sig ansvaret for en del af den ubetalte gæld til IFB's leverandører, som også er SNCB's leverandører.
The Commission would be able to accept that, in order to save its reputation, it would have been advisable for SNCB, as the parent company, to take back some of the unpaid debts to IFB’s suppliers who are also suppliers to SNCB.
Der skal derfor udarbejdes et skøn over det maksimumbeløb, som SNCB i så tilfælde kunne blive tvunget til at betale.
It is necessary therefore to estimate the maximum amount which SNCB would have been led to bear in this capacity.
I den sammenhæng mener Belgien ikke, at ekstraomkostningerne for SNCB ville overstige 13 mio. EUR. I virkeligheden ville ekstraomkostningerne kunne have været lavere, fordi IFB's kreditorer for det første ville have fået godtgjort en del af deres fordringer fra likvidationen af IFB, og SNCB skulle kun have godtgjort restbeløbet.
In this respect, Belgium itself estimates that the additional costs borne by SNCB in this capacity ought not to exceed EUR 13 million. In reality, the actual additional costs could have been less, as IFB’s creditors would have first of all recovered part of their receivables from IFB’s liquidation, and would only have been recompensed by SNCB for the amount of the balance.