natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Foranstaltningerne giver ikke Combus en fordel, hvis de kun kompenserer selskabet for forpligtelser til offentlig tjeneste og opfylder de fire Altmark-kriterier.
The measures do not confer an advantage for Combus, if they serve only to compensate the company for obligations of public service and respect the four Altmark criteria.
Anvendeligheden af det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip
Applicability of the Market Economy Investor Principle
Kernen i det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip blev fastlagt i Kommissionens meddelelse til medlemsstaterne om anvendelse af EF-traktatens artikel 92 og 93 og artikel 5 i Kommissionens direktiv 80/723/EØF på offentlige virksomheder i fremstillingssektoren (i det følgende benævnt »meddelelsen«) [42].
The essence of the market economy investor principle was established by the Commission in its Communication to the Member States on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EU Treaty and Article 5 of Commission Directive 80/723/EEC concerning public companies in the manufacturing sector, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Communication’) [42].
Herudover har Fællesskabets retsinstanser præciseret begrebet yderligere i deres retspraksis [43].
In addition hereto, judgments by the ECJ and the CFI have given the notion further precision [43].
Ifølge meddelelsen og retspraksis skal Kommissionen tage hensyn til, hvorvidt en modtagervirksomhed har konkrete muligheder for at fremskaffe tilsvarende finansielle midler på det normale kapitalmarked.
According to these texts and judgments, the Commission shall take into account the genuine possibilities for a beneficiary undertaking to obtain equivalent financial resources by having recourse to the normal capital market.
Der er ikke tale om statsstøtte, hvis ny kapital tilføres på vilkår, som ville være acceptable for en privat investor, der driver virksomhed på normale markedsøkonomiske vilkår [44].
State aid is not involved where it is a question of new capital being contributed in conditions which would be acceptable for a private investor operating under the normal conditions of a market economy [44].
Punkt 35 i meddelelsen finder anvendelse på kapitalindskud.
Paragraph 35 of the Communication applies to capital injections.
Heri hedder det, at der er tale om statsstøtte, når selskabets finansielle situation og især dets struktur og omfanget af dets gæld er af en sådan art, at et normalt afkast (i form af udbetalinger af udbytte eller værdistigning) ikke kan ventes inden for en rimelig tidsramme.
It states that aid is present where the financial position of the company, and particularly the structure and volume of its debt, is such that a normal return on investment (in dividends or capital gains) cannot be expected within a reasonable timeframe from the capital invested.
Meddelelsens punkt 39 opstiller lignende kriterier for lån, idet det hedder, at hvis der ydes et usikret lån til et selskab, som under normale omstændigheder ikke ville være i stand til at fremskaffe kapital (f.eks. fordi dets muligheder for at tilbagebetale lånet er ringe), vil lånet faktisk svare til et tilskud, og Kommissionen vil betragte det som sådant.
Paragraph 39 of the Communication sets out similar criteria for loans stating that where an unsecured loan is given to a company which under normal circumstances would be unable to obtain finance (for example because its prospects of repaying the loan are poor) then the loan effectively equates a grant payment and the Commission would evaluate it as such.
Den offentlige investors adfærd bør derfor sammenlignes med den hypotetiske adfærd, man kunne forvente af en privat investor som for eksempel et privat holdingselskab eller et privat konsortium, der følger en global eller sektorbestemt strukturpolitik og lader sig lede af mere langsigtede rentabilitetsudsigter [45].
The conduct of the public investor should therefore be compared with the hypothetical conduct of a private investor, such as a private holding company or a private group of undertakings pursuing a structural, global or sectoral policy and attracted by prospects of longer-term profitability [45].
Tilførsel af den nødvendige kapital for at sikre overlevelsen af en virksomhed, som midlertidigt er i vanskeligheder, men som igen vil kunne blive rentabel, når først den er omstruktureret, udgør ikke nødvendigvis støtte, hvis også en privat investor ville have udvist samme adfærd.
A capital contribution necessary in order to ensure the survival of an undertaking experiencing temporary difficulties but which, where appropriate, following the implementation of the necessary measures would be in a position to return to profitability does not necessarily constitute aid if a private investor would have made the same analysis.
Kommissionen skal derfor vurdere, om en privat investor og ejer af et selskab af samme art som Combus ville have handlet som den danske regering, da den traf de pågældende støtteforanstaltninger.
Accordingly, the Commission needs to assess whether a private investor and owner of a company similar to Combus would have acted as the Danish government did when granting the measures under assessment.
Finder Kommissionen, at den danske regering handlede i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip i tilknytning til den ene eller begge foranstaltningerne, udgør denne eller disse ikke statsstøtte som omhandlet i EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
If the Commission finds that the Danish government did act in accordance with the market economy investor principle for one or for both of the measures, the measure, respectively the measures, do not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC.
I betragtning 82 til 89 i beslutningen om at indlede proceduren rejste Kommissionen tvivl om, hvorvidt en privat investor ville have handlet på samme måde som den danske stat i en tilsvarende situation.
In recitals 82 to 89 of the decision to initiate the procedure, the Commission raised doubts as to whether a private investor would have acted as the Danish government did in a similar situation.
Vurdering af 1999-foranstaltningen ud fra det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip
Assessment of the 1999 measure against the Market Economy Investor Principle
Den danske regering har fremført, at 1999-foranstaltningen er i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
The Danish government argues that the 1999 measure respects the private investor principle.
Dette er også grunden til, at foranstaltningen ikke blev anmeldt til Kommissionen forud for gennemførelsen.
This is also the reason why it had not been notified to the Commission prior to its realisation.
Kommissionen bemærker, at Danmark ikke på noget tidspunkt har forelagt en økonomisk analyse, som kunne vise, at det med rimelighed kunne forvente en forrentning af investeringen svarende til den forrentning, som en privat investor i bustransportsektoren ville forvente.
The Commission notes that Denmark has at no point in time presented an economic analysis which would demonstrate that it could reasonably expect on this measure a return on investment comparable to the return on investment a private investor in the bus sector would expect.
Kommissionen bemærker desuden, at den danske regerings finansielle rådgiver, Alfred Berg, både i sit notat fra november 1998 og i sit notat fra april 1999 udtrykte betænkelighed ved, at »der ingen garanti var for et positivt afkast på investeringen«, hvis den danske stat besluttede at videreføre ejerskabet af Combus med henblik på omstrukturering efter et kapitalindskud.
The Commission furthermore observes that the financial adviser of the Danish government, Alfred Berg, has expressed both in its memo of November 1998 and in its memo of April 1999 its concern that there was ‘no guarantee for a positive return on investment’ if Denmark decided to continue its ownership of Combus with a view of restructuring it following a capital injection.
Også i det aktstykke om godkendelse af kapitalindskuddet, som Folketinget vedtog i maj 1999, hedder det, at det var lidet sandsynligt, at staten ville kunne genvinde den kapital, den agtede at investere i Combus.
Also the bill adopted by the Danish Parliament in May 1999, authorising the capital increase, sets out that it was unlikely that the State would be able to recoup the capital it was about to invest in Combus.
Kommissionen konkluderer, at Danmark ikke har forelagt overbevisende dokumentation for, at staten med rimelighed kunne forvente en forrentning af sin investering på samme niveau, som en privat investor ville have krævet.
The Commission concludes that Denmark has not provided convincing evidence that the State could reasonably expect a return on its investment comparable to the return a private investor would have requested.
Hvad angår argumentationen ud fra en »koncernvurdering«, jf. ovennævnte retspraksis (sag 303/88), udelukker Kommissionen ikke, at staten eller offentlige selskaber kan påtage sig at dække tabene i et af deres datterselskaber, således at datterselskabet kan standse driften på de bedst mulige betingelser, hvis de kan dokumentere, at de omkostninger, de må bære i forbindelse hermed, er mindre end den økonomiske skade, de ville have lidt under andre omstændigheder.
As regards the ‘group assessment’ reasoning, in accordance with the jurisprudence cited above (Case 303/88), the Commission does not exclude that the State or public companies may bear the losses of one of their subsidiaries in order to enable it to close down its operations under the best possible conditions, if they can prove that the associated cost they bear is lower than the economic damage they would have suffered in other scenarios.
Kommissionen har f.eks. anvendt denne argumentation i beslutning 2006/947/EF om Belgiens statsstøtte til ABX Logistics [46], præmis 196 til 216, hvor Kommissionen tog hensyn til omkostninger, der blev båret af resten af koncernens aktiviteter, som var i direkte forretningsforbindelse med det kriseramte datterselskab, og hvor forholdet mellem lukningen af datterselskabet og virkningerne for resten af koncernen var dokumenteret.
For example, the Commission has applied this reasoning in Case C 53/03, ABX [46], point 196 to 216, in which the Commission took into account costs supported by activities of the rest of the group which were in direct business link with the ailing subsidiary, and for which the relation between the closure of the subsidiary and the effect on the rest of the group had been actually proven.
Efter Kommissionens mening er dette ikke tilfældet i den foreliggende situation, eftersom de danske myndigheder ikke har dokumenteret, at forbindelsen mellem Combus' økonomiske aktivitet og statens andre økonomiske aktiviteter (navnlig som ejer af andre selskaber, der ikke har nogen dokumenteret forbindelse med Combus) er stærk nok til at underbygge en sådan konklusion.
The Commission considers that this is not the case in the present situation, since the Danish authorities have not proven that the link between the economic activity of Combus and the other economic activities of the State (especially as owner of other companies which have no proven particular connection with Combus) is strong enough to reach such a conclusion.
Da der ikke foreligger andre argumenter, er Kommissionen navnlig ikke overbevist om, at andre offentlige selskabers omdømme, som normalt beror på det enkelte selskabs egne resultater, ville have lidt væsentlig skade som følge af Combus' skæbne.
In particular, in the absence of other arguments, the Commission is not convinced that the ratings of other public companies, which are normally based on the merits of each individual company, would have been significantly affected by the fate of Combus.
Kommissionen kan heller ikke tilslutte sig argumentet, hvorefter Combus' konkurs ville have skadet statens omdømme som investoreller ville have bragt statens privatiseringsprogram i fare ved at så tvivl om dens tidligere tjenestemænds jobsikkerhed.
The Commission is not either convinced by the argument that the bankruptcy of Combus would have damaged the reputation of the State as an investor, or would have unduly endangered its privatisation programme by casting a doubt on the job security of its former civil servants.
Hvad det første punkt angår, må fornuftige investorer jo til tider konkludere, at de må opgive urentable aktiviteter. Hvad det andet punkt angår, forekommer det temmelig selvmodsigende at påstå, at staten var nødt til at betale for, at tjenestemænd ville acceptere private kontrakter, og at den tilmed fortsat skulle bære omkostningerne ved at sikre dem fortsat ansættelse.
Indeed, as regards the first point, reasonable investors sometimes come to the conclusion that they have to close down unprofitable activities; as regards the second point, it seems rather contradictory to argue that the State had to pay for civil servants to accept private contracts, and, in addition, still had to keep on bearing the costs of ensuring the permanency of their jobs.
Vurdering af 2001-foranstaltningen ud fra det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip
Assessment of the 2001 measure against the Market Economy Investor Principle
Hvad 2001-foranstaltningen angår, bemærker Kommissionen, at den danske regering efter modtagelsen af Arrivas oprindelige tilbud i efteråret 2000 foretog en vurdering af de forskellige muligheder i Combus-sagen, nemlig gradvis afvikling over fem år, fortsættelse med bedre kontrakter i seks år, fortsættelse i et år uden refinansiering af gælden, øjeblikkelig konkurs og Arrivas tilbud.
With respect to the 2001 measure, the Commission notes that the Danish government, following the receipt of Arriva’s initial offer in autumn 2000, carried out an evaluation of the different options available to Denmark with respect to Combus, namely a gradual wind-up over 5 years, a continuation with better contracts for 6 years, a continuation for one year without re-financing of debts, an immediate bankruptcy, and Arriva’s offer for sale.
Resultaterne af denne undersøgelse, som er anført i tabel 5 i nærværende beslutning, viser, at alternativet »fortsættelse i et år« (positiv værdi på 71 mio. DKK) var langt det mest attraktive, efterfulgt af gradvis afvikling over fem år (–331 mio. DKK) og fortsættelse med bedre kontrakter i seks år (–315 mio. DKK).
The results of this study, set out in table 5 of the present decision, show that the option ‘continuation for one year’ (positive value of DKK 71 million) was by far the most attractive, followed by the gradual wind up over 5 years (DKK –331 million) and the continuation with newer better contracts for 6 years (DKK –315 million).
Salget til Arrivas oprindelige tilbud blev vurderet til –390 mio. DKK.
The sale at Arriva’s initial offer was valued at DKK –390 million.
Der er intet, der tyder på, at den danske regering gentog denne vurdering efter forbedringen af Arrivas tilbud.
There is no indication that the Danish government did again this evaluation following the improvement of the offer of Arriva.
I betragtning af, at den danske regerings investering som led i 2001-foranstaltningen, nemlig 140 mio. DKK, kombineret med beløbsmæssigt ubegrænsede garantier og garantier på op til 58,9 mio., er væsentlig større end den første af de valgmuligheder, som vurderes i undersøgelsen, kunne de danske myndigheder, da de traf afgørelse om 2001-foranstaltningen, efter Kommissionens opfattelse ikke med rimelighed forvente, at en privat investor ville have handlet på samme måde.
Given that the amount of money invested by the Danish government through the 2001 measure, namely DKK 140 million, coupled with unlimited guarantees and guarantees capped to 58,9 million, is substantially higher than the first option assessed in the study, the Commission considers that the Danish authorities, when deciding the 2001 measures, could not reasonably expect that a private investor would have acted in the same manner.
Med hensyn til koncernvurderingen og beskyttelsen af den danske regerings image afviser Kommissionen de fremførte argumenter af samme grund som for 1999-foranstaltningen.
With respect to the group assessment and the protection of the image of the Danish government, the Commission rejects the arguments for the same reason as for the 1999 measures.
Kommissionen konkluderer, at en privat investor ikke ville have handlet som den danske regering, hvad 2001-foranstaltningen angår.
In conclusion, the Commission considers that a private investor would not have acted as the Danish government did with respect to the 2001 measure.
Anvendelse af Altmark-dommen
Application of the Altmark jurisprudence
I Combus-dommen erklærede Retten imidlertid, at mindst en af disse betingelser ikke var opfyldt i denne sag, da grundlaget for beregningen af omstruktureringsforanstaltningen ikke blev fastlagt forud for indgåelsen af de offentlige kørselskontrakter på en objektiv og gennemsigtig måde [48].
The CFI, however, in its Combus judgment, declared that at least one of these conditions were not fulfilled in the present case, as the factors on the basis of which the restructuring measure had been calculated had not been established prior to the conclusion of the public service contracts in an objective and transparent manner [48].
Altmark-dommen kan derfor ikke anvendes i forbindelse med den danske stats omstruktureringsstøtte til Combus [49].
Accordingly, the Altmark jurisprudence cannot be applied in relation to the restructuring measure granted by the Danish government to Combus [49].
Konklusion: Forekomst af en fordel
Conclusion: presence of an advantage
Både 1999-foranstaltningen og 2001-foranstaltningen indebar således en økonomisk fordel for Combus.
Accordingly, both the 1999 and the 2001 measure did confer an economic advantage to Combus.
PÅVIRKNINGER AF SAMHANDELEN MELLEM MEDLEMSSTATERNE OG KONKURRENCEN
EFFECT ON INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE AND COMPETITION
Endvidere skal foranstaltningen fordreje konkurrencen og påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne for at kunne betegnes som støtte.
Furthermore, the measure must distort competition and affect trade between Member States to be qualified as aid.
I denne sammenhæng bemærkes for det første, at et offentligt tilskud til en virksomhed, som alene leverer lokale eller regionale transportydelser, og som ikke leverer transportydelser uden for sin hjemstat, ikke desto mindre kan påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
In this respect, it must be observed, first, that a public subsidy granted to an undertaking which provides only local or regional transport services and does not provide transport services outside its State of origin may nonetheless have an effect on trade between Member States.
I dommen i Altmark-sagen udtalte Domstolen, at »når en medlemsstat yder et offentligt tilskud til en virksomhed, kan den pågældende virksomheds stilling inden for levering af transportydelser derved blive opretholdt eller styrket med den konsekvens, at chancerne for de virksomheder, der er etableret i de øvrige medlemsstater, for at levere transportydelser på denne medlemsstats marked herved bliver formindskede (jf. i denne retning dom af 13.7.1988, sag 102/87, Frankrig mod Kommissionen, Sml. s. 4067, præmis 19, af 21.3.1991, sag C-305/89, Italien mod Kommissionen, Sml. I, s. 1603, præmis 26, og dommen i sagen Spanien mod Kommissionen, præmis 40)« [50].
In its Altmark judgment, the Court held that ‘[w]here a Member State grants a public subsidy to an undertaking, the supply of transport services by that undertaking may for that reason be maintained or increased with the result that undertakings established in other Member States have less chance of providing their transport services in the market in that Member State (see, to that effect, Case 102/87 France v Commission [1988] ECR I-4067, paragraph 19; Case C-305/89 Italy v Commission [1991] ECR I-1603, paragraph 26; and Spain v Commission, paragraph 40)’ [50].
Siden 1995 er flere medlemsstater således begyndt ensidigt at åbne visse transportmarkeder for konkurrence fra virksomheder, der er etableret i andre medlemsstater, således at flere virksomheder allerede tilbyder transportydelser i byer, forstæder eller regioner i andre medlemsstater end deres hjemstat [51].
Indeed, several Member States have since 1995 started unilaterally to open certain transport markets to competition from undertakings established in other Member States, so that a number of undertakings are already offering their urban, suburban or regional transport services in Member States other than their State of origin [51].
I Danmark har dereguleringen af busmarkedet siden 1990 ændret markedet for bustransport fra et monopoliseret marked til et marked, der er åbent for konkurrence mellem virksomhederne.
In Denmark, the deregulation of the bus market since 1990 has changed the nature of the provision of bus services from a reserved market to one in which competition between undertakings is possible.
Både danske og andre virksomheder i Fællesskabet kan konkurrere om at tilbyde ydelser, der udliciteres af regionale og lokale myndigheder.
Both Danish and other EU companies can compete to provide services tendered by regional and local government authorities.
Tilsvarende forhold gør sig gældende i andre medlemsstater. Arriva opererer f.eks. også i Sverige og Nederlandene.
Similar conditions apply in other Member States; Arriva operates for example also in Sweden and the Netherlands.
Liberaliseringen af busmarkedet i Danmark og andre medlemsstater skete på baggrund af direktiv 92/50/EØF, som forpligter medlemsstaterne til at udbyde offentlige tjenesteydelseskontrakter for bustransport.
The liberalisation of the bus market in Denmark and other Member States has been accompanied at the Community level by Directive 92/50/EEC, which obliges Member States to tender out public service bus contracts.
I lyset af direktiv 92/50/EØF udtalte Domstolen i Concordia-sagen, at formålet med at samordne fremgangsmåderne ved indgåelse af offentlige tjenesteydelsesaftaler er at fjerne hindringerne for fri udveksling af tjenesteydelser og frie varebevægelser [52].
In the light of Directive 92/50/EEC, the ECJ, in the Concordia case, has held that the purpose of coordinating at Community level the procedures for the award of public contracts is to eliminate barriers to the free movement of services and goods [52].
Busmarkedet er delvist liberaliseret i Fællesskabet som følge af flere medlemsstaters ensidige beslutning om at åbne deres busmarked, hvilket skete på baggrund af ikrafttrædelsen af direktiv 92/50/EØF, og dette betyder, at der er konkurrence mellem udbyderne på busmarkedet.
As the bus market is partially liberalised within the Community due to the unilateral decision of several Member States to open up their bus markets, which has been accompanied by the entry into force of Directive 92/50/EEC, competition between the bus market suppliers exists.
Omstruktureringsforanstaltningen kan derfor forbedre stillingen for Combus og dets køber i forhold til virksomhedens konkurrenter i Fællesskabet og derved både påvirke konkurrencen mellem virksomheder og samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
Consequently, the restructuring measure may improve the position of Combus and its buyer in relation to its competitors in the EU, thereby affecting both competition between undertakings and trade between Member States.
KONKLUSION: STATSSTØTTE
CONCLUSION: PRESENCE OF STATE AID
Kommissionen konkluderer, at omstruktureringsforanstaltningen udgør statsstøtte efter EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
The Commission concludes that the restructuring measure constitutes State aid in the meaning of Article 87(1) EC treaty.
VURDERING AF STØTTENS FORENELIGHED MED FÆLLESMARKEDET
ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE AID WITH THE COMMON MARKET
ER STØTTEN FORENELIG MED FÆLLESMARKEDET?
COMPATIBILITY OF THE AID WITH THE COMMON MARKET
Ifølge EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, er statsstøtte i princippet uforenelig med fællesmarkedet.
According to Article 87(1) EC State aid is in principle incompatible with the common market.