natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
»Rigsrevisionens undersøgelser har vist, at Trafikministeriet ved udarbejdelsen af aktstykker om kapitaltilførsel til Combus måtte være klar over selskabets mangelfulde økonomistyring og usikre grundlag for at træffe økonomiske dispositioner, herunder manglende grundlag for at kunne kontrollere lønsomheden af de enkelte, indgåede kontrakter om buskørsel og manglende kontrol med udviklingen i selskabets omkostninger.«
‘The Court of Auditors’ investigation has shown that, when the file on the injection of capital into Combus was drawn up, the Transport Minister must have been aware of the undertaking’s poor management and the lack of a solid basis for taking any economic decisions, especially as regards monitoring the profitability of the bus transport contracts and the control of general cost trends.’
Danske Busvognmænd mener, at der var så stor usikkerhed ved lønsomheden i investeringen, at det ikke er muligt at anvende det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
Danske Busvognmaend considers that the uncertainty as to whether the investment would return a profit was such that it is impossible to apply the principle of the investor in a market economy.
Organisationen mener, at indskuddet af 300 mio. DKK i maj 1999 blev gennemført for at afbøde en forestående, truende konkurs (jf. replikkens punkt 38 og de deri anførte citater).
It takes the view that the injection of DKK 300 million was made in May 1999 to prevent the undertaking from going bankrupt, which it was about to do (see point 38 of the reply and the citations therein).
Ifølge Danske Busvognmænd blev det faktiske forløb anderledes end officielt meddelt af Trafikministeren.
Danske Busvognmaend takes the view that the subsequent course of events was not that officially stated by the Transport Minister.
Der viste sig behov for allerede i foråret 2001 at indskyde yderligere kapital samt gennemføre gældseftergivelse på i alt 240 mio. DKK.
From spring 2001 onwards, it was necessary to inject new capital and to cancel debt totalling DKK 240 million.
Desuden måtte de private kreditorer akkordere deres tilgodehavender med 100 mio. DKK.
Furthermore, private creditors had to find an arrangement for their loans which amounted to DKK 100 million.
Danske Busvognmænd konkluderer, at ingen markedsøkonomisk investor ville have handlet som staten gjorde, fordi der ikke kunne forventes et positivt afkast af investeringen.
Danske Busvognmaend concludes that no investor in a market economy would have acted like the State had done since the capital could not be expected to be repaid.
En normal privat investor ville ifølge Danske Busvognmænd have gjort forsøg på at opgive de tabsgivende kontrakter og lade andre overtage dem for på den måde at gøre Combus rentabel.
According to Danske Busvognmaend, a normal private investor would have tried to terminate the loss-making contracts and would have let other undertakings take them over, thus ensuring that Combus remained profitable.
For Danske Busvognmænd er det derfor oplagt, at en privat investor ville have analyseret muligheden for at overdrage de eksisterende kontrakter, alternativt lade selskabet gå konkurs.
For Danske Busvognmaend, it is therefore clear that a private investor would have considered as carefully as possible whether it could transfer the existing contracts or declare the undertaking bankrupt.
Sådan vurdering fandt ikke sted.
No such evaluation took place.
Det gøres gældende, at det er meget nærliggende, at en række andre operatører på busmarkedet ville have været interesseret i at overtage busruterne.
A whole series of other operators in the bus transport market would clearly have been interested in taking over the bus routes.
Ifølge Danske Busvognmænd viser flere af Domstolens udtalelser, at det kan være i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip at yde støtte til en virksomhed i en periode, mens der gøres forsøg på at sælge den, ud fra den betragtning, at det vil være dyrere at lade virksomheden gå konkurs.
Danske Busvognmaend considers that certain statements by the Court of Justice of the European Communities suggest that it may be consistent with the principle of the investor in a market economy to provide help for an undertaking when trying to sell it since having the undertaking file for bankruptcy would cost more.
Men en sådan fremgangsmåde må, hvis den skal være legitimeret ud fra et markedsøkonomisk investorprincip, forudsætte, at der kan fremlægges dokumentation i form af pålidelige, økonomiske data, der viser, at fremgangsmåden ville medføre et bedre økonomisk resultat for det offentlige end en likvidation eller en konkurs.
However, for such a measure to be justifiable from the point of view of the investor in a market economy, there has to be documentation in the form of reliable economic figures to show that such a measure will provide better results for the public authorities than winding up or bankruptcy.
Der er ifølge Danske Busvognmænd ikke fra dansk side fremlagt nogen form for dokumentation for, at det ville have været dyrere for staten at likvidere Combus eller lade selskabet gå konkurs end at holde det i gang og sælge det på den måde, det er sket.
According to Danske Busvognmaend, the Danish authorities have not provided any documents showing that it would have cost the State more to wind up Combus or declare it to be bankrupt than to keep it alive and sell it the way it was sold.
Det gøres tværtimod gældende, at det ville have været en økonomisk fordel for staten at likvidere Combus eller at lade Combus gå konkurs.
On the contrary, it considers that it would have been more beneficial for the State to wind up Combus or declare it bankrupt.
Ved en overdragelse af kontrakterne til andre transportører kunne man have undgået de efterfølgende store underskud på driften og øget gæld og have solgt materiellet m.v. til anden side til realistiske priser.
Transferring the contracts to other transport undertakings would have allowed the major losses and substantial debts which ensued to be avoided, and equipment and installations could have been sold to the other party at realistic prices.
OVERHOLDELSE AF RAMMEBESTEMMELSERNE FOR OMSTRUKTURERING FRA 1999
RESPECT OF THE 1999 RESTRUCTURING GUIDELINES
Ifølge Danske Busvognmænd er betingelserne i rammebestemmelserne for omstrukturering fra 1999 ikke opfyldt.
Danske Busvognmaend considers that the conditions set out in the 1999 restructuring guidelines are not fulfilled.
Ifølge Danske Busvognmænd skal støtteforanstaltningerne betragtes som to separate støtteforanstaltninger.
Danske Busvognmaend considers the aid measures to constitute two separate aid measures.
Efter organisationens opfattelse har hverken den danske regering eller Arriva godtgjort, at støtteforanstaltningerne udgør to trancher af den samme støtte.
According to them, neither the Danish government nor Arriva has demonstrated that the aid measures should form two tranches of the same aid.
Tværtimod peger alle data på, at Combus var et selskab under dårlig ledelse og organisation, og at den danske regering vidste dette og desuagtet ikke foretog sig de nødvendige skridt til at sikre sig, at den støtte, der blev ydet i 1999, var korrekt opgjort og fuldført, hvorfor det var nødvendigt at give yderligere økonomisk støtte i 2001.
Rather, the present case clearly indicates that Combus was a poorly managed company to the well awareness of the Danish government and that the financial support in 1999 was granted to Combus without a proper evaluation and follow-up, hence the need to grant further financial support in 2001.
Ifølge Danske Busvognmænd forelå der ikke en omstruktureringsplan fra den danske regering før kapitalindskuddet i 1999.
Danske Busvognmaend considers that no restructuring plan has been provided by the Danish government prior to the first capital injection in 1999.
Den mener ikke, at det er muligt at efterkonstruere en sådan [38].
In their view, it is not possible to submit a restructuring plan in arrears [38].
Danske Busvognmænd bestrider Kommissionens udtalelse i betragtning 36, 48 og 49 i beslutningen om at indlede proceduren.
Danske Busvognmaend opposes in this respect the Commission’s position as outlined in recitals 36, 48 and 49 of the decision to initiate the procedure.
Økonomisk rentabilitet
Economic viability
Danske Busvognmænd bestrider, at Combus nogensinde ville være blevet overskudsgivende og dermed økonomisk rentabelt som offentlig virksomhed.
Danske Busvognmaend contests that Combus would ever have been profitable and, hence, economically viable as a public enterprise.
Organisationen mener, at virksomheden kun kunne opnå rentabilitet ved salg til Arriva.
It considers that the economic viability could only be achieved through the sale to Arriva.
Den henviser i den forbindelse til Kommissionens beslutning om at indlede proceduren og Rettens dom i Combus-sagen, præmis 115-116.
It refers in this respect to the Commission’s decision to initiate the proceedings and the CFI’s stance in the Combus judgment, paragraphs 115 to 116.
Foranstaltninger til afbødning af urimelig konkurrencefordrejning
Measures to mitigate undue distortions of competition
Det er Danske Busvognmænds opfattelse, at støtten til Combus rent faktisk medførte konkurrencefordrejning på markedet, fordi den gav Arriva mulighed for at erhverve markedsandele på op til ca. 70 % ved købet af Combus. Derfor fik Arriva en dominerende stilling på det danske marked.
It is Danske Busvognmaend position that the aid measures granted to Combus did de facto distort competition on the market, as they created the opportunity for Arriva to acquire market shares of up to approximately 70 % via the purchase of Combus.
Samtidig befandt mange busselskaber sig på randen af konkurs.
Consequently, Arriva came to hold a dominant position on the Danish market.
Ifølge Danske Busvognmænd gjorde den danske regering intet for at undgå konkurrencefordrejning.
Meanwhile, many bus companies found themselves on the verge of bankruptcy.
Combus afbrød ikke nogen af sine kontrakter, da det fik støtte i 1999, og den støtte, der blev ydet i 2001, gav oven i købet Arriva en gevinst.
In Danske Busvognmaend perspective, the Danish government did nothing to avoid distortions of competition; Combus did not renounce from any of its contracts when granted aid in 1999, while the aid measures in 2001 even awarded Arriva a profit.
Derfor videresolgte Arriva en del af Combus til Connex med gevinst på bekostning af sine konkurrenter.
As a consequence, Arriva made a profit when selling a part of Combus to Connex, to the disadvantage of its competitors.
I lyset af rammebestemmelserne og forpligtelsen til at begrænse støttens skadelige virkninger for konkurrenterne, ville det have været rigtigst af Combus at afbryde kontrakterne.
In light of the guidelines and the condition to mitigate as far as possible any undue distortions on competition, Combus should at least have renounced from its contracts.
I den henseende deler Danske Busvognmænd Kommissionens holdning i betragtning 112 i beslutningen om at indlede proceduren.
In this respect, Danske Busvognmaend shares the stance of the Commission as outlined in the decision to initiate the procedure, recital 112.
Begrænsning af støtten til et minimum
Limitation of aid to the strict minimum
Ifølge Danske Busvognmænd tog den danske regering overhovedet ikke hensyn til dette forhold ved salget af Combus, og det er ikke sikkert, at salget fandt sted til markedsprisen, hvilket ville have været den bedste måde til at sikre, at støtten blev begrænset til et minimum.
Danske Busvognmaend considers that no consideration of this point at all was taken by the Danish government in relation to the sale of Combus and that there is no certainty that the sale took place at the market price, which would be the best way to ensure that the aid was limited to a minimum.
Danske Busvognmænd mener, at den danske regering klart har erkendt, at der ingen kontrol er foretaget af, hvorvidt den ydede støtte udgør et minimum.
Danske Busvognmaend considers that the Danish government has clearly recognised that there was no monitoring of the measure whereby the aid granted is limited to the minimum necessary.
Danske Busvognmænd mener, at der er grund til stærkt at betvivle, at støtten til Combus i forbindelse med salget til Arriva udgør et minimum.
Danske Busvognmaend believes there are good reasons for seriously doubting whether the aid granted to Combus in conjunction with the sale to Arriva was restricted to the minimum.
Det er tværtimod Danske Busvognmænds opfattelse, at Arriva gjorde et heldigt køb, jf. processkriftet fra Danske Busvognmænd af 24. februar 2003, afsnit 8.
On the contrary, it takes the view that Arriva got a good deal and refers in this regard to Chapter 8 of its memo of 24 February 2003.
Organisationen bemærker, at det ville have været hensigtsmæssigt, om den danske regering i forbindelse med salget havde anvendt valuarer, som det ofte forudsættes fra Kommissionens side, når det offentlige afhænder aktiver, uden at der er gennemført et salg på transparente vilkår og en procedure, der har været åben for alle konkurrenter på et givet område.
It comments that the Danish government should have called in independent experts during the sale, as the Commission often provides for during the divestiture of assets, and that the sale was not on transparent terms, nor were the procedures open to all competitors in a given field.
ARRIVAS BEMÆRKNINGER
COMMENTS SUBMITTED BY ARRIVA
Kommissionen modtog også bemærkninger fra Arriva Danmark A/S.
The Commission received also comments from Arriva Denmark A/S.
De vedrørte kun et forhold, nemlig den aftalte salgspris mellem Arriva og Connex, og er således behandlet i del II i nærværende beslutning.
These concerned only a factual point, namely the sales price agreed between Arriva and Connex, and are thus outlined in part II of the present decision.
DEN DANSKE REGERINGS SVAR PÅ DANSKE BUSVOGNMÆNDS OG ARRIVAS BEMÆRKNINGER
REPLY OF THE DANISH GOVERNMENT TO THE COMMENTS SUBMITTED BY DANSKE BUSVOGNMAEND AND ARRIVA
DET MARKEDSØKONOMISKE INVESTORPRINCIP
THE MARKET ECONOMY INVESTOR PRINCIPLE
Først og fremmest mener den danske regering, at Danske Busvognmænd med det løsrevne citat fra Rigsrevisionens beretning søger at efterlade et fordrejet billede af Rigsrevisionens vurderinger.
First of all, the Danish government considers that by quoting the passage of the report of the Office of the Auditor General of Denmark out of context, Danske Busvognmaend is giving a distorted impression.
Ifølge den danske regering stammer det anførte citat fra beretningens side 47 under punktet »Rigsrevisionens bemærkninger« og vedrører de faktiske oplysninger, der udgjorde grundlaget for det aktstykke, som Trafikministeriet forelagde for Folketingets Finansudvalg, og som indeholdt hjemmel til at foretage en kapitaltilførsel på 300 mio. DKK til Combus.
According to the Danish government, the quoted passage is from page 47 of the report, under the heading ‘Remarks by the Office of the Auditor General of Denmark’, and relates to the factual information which formed the basis for the bill presented by the Ministry of Transport to the Parliamentary Finance Committee, which was the legal basis for the capital injection of DKK 300 million being made into Combus.
Om grundlaget for aktstykket anfører Rigsrevisionen på side 47:
On page 47, the Office of the Auditor General says of the basis for the bill:
»Af oplysningerne i aktstykket må man forstå, at der efter indregningen af en hensættelse på 65 mio. DKK i selskabets årsregnskab for 1998 forelå et rimeligt korrekt udtryk for Combus' økonomiske situation ultimo 1998 og dermed også et rimeligt udgangspunkt for en fastsættelse af selskabets kapitalbehov.
‘From the information in the bill, it must be understood that, after factoring in a provision of DKK 65 million in the company's annual accounts for 1998, the impression of Combus’ financial situation at the end of 1998 was reasonably accurate and thereby also a reasonable starting point for establishing the company’s need for capital.
Men Trafikministeriet oplyste ikke, at de økonomiske oplysninger, som lå til grund for fastsættelsen af en hensættelse på 65 mio. DKK, alene baserede sig på budgetter og skøn samt planlagte besparelser ifølge selskabets bestyrelse.
But the Ministry of Transport did not state that the financial information on the basis of which the provision of DKK 65 million was fixed was merely derived from budgets, estimates and planned savings according to the company’s board.
Det er Rigsrevisionens opfattelse, at Trafikministeriet havde ansvaret for at vurdere det forelagte materiale med henblik på at give ministeren og Finansudvalget alle relevante oplysninger i forbindelse med aktstykket.
The Office of the Auditor General of Denmark takes the view that the Ministry of Transport was responsible for assessing the material presented with a view to providing the Minister and the Finance Committee with all relevant information in connection with the bill. The Ministry of Transport should not have introduced a bill on the existing basis.
Alternativt burde ministeriet under hensyntagen til behovet for en hurtig kapitaltilførsel til Combus have fremhævet, at aktstykket baserede sig alene på overordnede budgetter og skøn udarbejdet af selskabet.«
Alternatively, the Ministry should have emphasised, taking into account the need for a quick injection of capital into Combus, that the bill was only based on general budgets and estimates drawn up by the company.’
Som det fremgår heraf vedrører den af Rigsrevisionen rejste kritik ifølge den danske regering således ikke selve den omstændighed, at ministeriet anbefalede kapitaltilførslen på de 300 mio. DKK, men blot det forhold, at det ikke over for Finansudvalget udtrykkeligt blev fremhævet, at aktstykket baserede sig på budgetter og skøn udøvet af ledelsen i Combus.
According to the Danish government, the Office of the Auditor General was not therefore criticising the fact that the Ministry recommended the capital injection of DKK 300 million, but rather the fact that it did not emphasise to the Finance Committee that the bill was based on budgets and estimates drawn up by Combus’ board.
Da der bestod et akut behov for tilførsel af yderligere kapital, havde Trafikministeriet imidlertid reelt ikke anden mulighed end at anbefale den kapitaltilførsel, der blev vurderet som nødvendig for at undgå en konkurs og dermed også nødvendig for, at salget af Combus kunne gennemføres.
As an injection of capital was urgently required, the Ministry of Transport had no choice but to recommend the capital injection which was considered necessary to avoid bankruptcy and therefore also necessary if Combus was to be sold.
For det andet fremhæver den danske regering, at Danske Busvognmænds bemærkninger udelukkende fokuserer på spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt en privat investor ville have foretaget en tilsvarende kapitaltilførsel i 1999 baseret på en forventning om, at fremtidige afkast i Combus i sig selv ville indebære en passende forrentning af investeringen.
Secondly, the Danish government points out that the comments by Danske Busvognmaend focus exclusively on the question of the extent to which a private investor would have made a similar capital injection in 1999 based on the expectation that a future profit from Combus in itself would give a suitable return on the investment.
Den danske regerings synspunkter vedrørende det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip er dog ikke blot baseret på, hvad der med rimelighed kunne forventes at være statens direkte forrentning af investeringen.
However, the Danish government’s view on the market economy investor principle is not merely based on the direct return which could reasonably be expected on the State’s investment.
Tværtimod skal der tages hensyn til de latente indirekte tab og skadelige virkninger i relation til bl.a. fremtidige privatiseringer, som ville være konsekvensen af en konkurs.
On the contrary, account must be taken of the latent indirect losses and damaging effects on, amongst other things, future privatisations, which bankruptcy would entail.
For det tredje bestrider den danske regering, at der var interesserede erhververe til de tabsgivende kontrakter.
Thirdly, the Danish government refutes the assertion that there were buyers interested in acquiring the loss-making contracts.
Selv om der skulle have været sådanne interesserede erhververe, ville en overdragelse blot have indebåret en øjeblikkelig konstatering af tabet på kontrakterne og dermed øjeblikkeligt have skabt uoverskuelige økonomiske konsekvenser for Combus.
Even if there had been any such buyers, a transfer would merely have meant immediate confirmation of the losses on the contracts and thereby immediate, incalculable financial consequences for Combus.
Den danske regering bestrider i øvrigt, at nogen busoperatør ville have overtaget de tabsgivende kontrakter til en pris, der lå over kontrakternes negative værdi.
The Danish government also disagrees that any bus operator would have taken on the loss-making contracts at anything above the contracts’ negative value.
Et salg af kontrakterne ville derfor kun kunne ske til en negativ købesum.
A sale of the contracts would therefore only have been possible for a negative purchase price.
Et salg af enkelte kontrakter og/eller enkelte anlægs- eller driftsaktiver ville under alle omstændigheder ikke være den mest profitable løsning set i forhold til et samlet salg.
In any case, the sale of individual contracts and/or individual fixed assets or operating assets would not be a more profitable solution than an overall sale.
Dette er tiltrådt af Rigsrevisionen [39].
This view is supported by the Office of the Auditor General of Denmark [39].
Danske Busvognmænd har med henvisning til præmis 94 i Combus-dommen anført, at andre erhvervsdrivende hurtigt kunne have overtaget Combus' transportkontrakter i tilfælde af selskabets konkurs.
With reference to paragraph 94 in the Combus judgment, Danske Busvognmaend states that other operators could have taken over Combus’ transport contracts at short notice in the event of the company going bankrupt.
Det er ifølge den danske regering formentlig rigtigt, men oplysningen har ingen betydning for den retlige vurdering af, om der er handlet i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
The Danish government considers that this may be correct, but that this has no bearing on the legal assessment of whether the State acted in accordance with the market economy investor principle.
Oplysningen kan derimod have betydning i relation til spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt en konkurs i Combus ville få konsekvenser for afviklingen af den offentlige trafik og eventuelle forstyrrelser i transporttjenesten.
The information may, however, be useful with regard to the question of the extent to which Combus going bankrupt would affect the management of public transport and any disruptions to transport services.
For så vidt angår Danske Busvognmænds bemærkninger anfører den danske regering, at et eventuelt forbehold for udbetaling af senere støtte ikke har betydning for, om flere støttebeløb må betragtes som én samlet støtteforanstaltning udbetalt ad flere omgange.
With respect to the arguments presented by Danske Busvognmaend, the Danish government states that any reservation regarding the payment of aid on subsequent occasions does not affect whether more than one amount of aid can be regarded as a single aid measure paid out in more than one instalment.
Afgørende i den henseende er tværtimod en helhedsbedømmelse af, om de enkelte støttebeløb har en sådan tidsmæssig og formålsmæssig sammenhæng, at de skal betragtes som én støtteforanstaltning.
On the contrary, the decisive factor in this connection is an overall assessment of whether the individual amounts of aid are connected in time and purpose in such a way that they can be regarded as a single aid measure.