natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Denne model giver ikke umiddelbart nogen sikkerhed for, at selskabets nuværende kreditorer vil komme ud af deres engagement med Combus uden tab. De nuværende kreditorer vil derfor formentlig stille krav om en eller anden form for statsgaranti eller lignende.«
This model does not directly provide any security that the company’s creditors will emerge from their commitments with Combus without losses. The creditors are therefore likely to demand some form of State guarantee, etc.’
Rekonstruktion for at forberede salget af Combus: kapitaltilførsel i maj 1999
In the remainder of June 1999, however, there was a lot of press coverage on Combus, particularly with regard to statements from several political parties on the need for legal regulation of bus operations in Denmark as regards significant market shares. In the light of the speculations about market caps, Arriva lost interest in acquiring Combus. Arriva stressed, however, that depending on the introduction of any market restrictions, they would be interested in acquiring Combus in the long term.
Det var blevet bydende nødvendigt at gennemføre en rekonstruktion af Combus i april 1999, fordi Combus ifølge årsregnskabsloven skulle holde sin årlige generalforsamling inden udgangen af maj 1999 og fremlægge sit reviderede årsregnskab for 1998.
Restructuring in order to prepare the sale of Combus: the capital injection of May 1999 (48) The restructuring of Combus had become very urgent in April 1999, as, pursuant to the Danish Annual Accounts Act, Combus had to hold its Annual General Meeting (AGM) before the end of May 1999 and to submit its audited accounts for 1998.
Følgende uddybende bemærkninger er nødvendige for at forstå værdiansættelsen: »Uændret omsætning« var udtryk for, at kontrakterne i region København ved udløb ikke blev erstattet af nye kontrakter, men at kontrakterne i regionerne forudsattes at fortsætte. »Stigende omsætning« indebar, at omsætningen i de øvrige regioner øgedes, i takt med at de eksisterende kontrakter i region København udløb.
The following additional observations are necessary for the understanding of this evaluation: ‘Unchanged turnover’ assumes that the contracts in the Copenhagen region are not replaced by new contracts when they expire, while contracts in the regions continue unchanged. ‘Increasing turnover’ assumes that turnover in the other regions is increasing as the existing contracts in the Copenhagen region expire.
I efteråret 1999 afgav Trafikudvalget beretning i sagen, hvor det tilsluttede sig rapportens konklusioner om, at det ikke var hensigtsmæssigt at fastsætte en grænse for markedsandele.
The Danish Parliamentary Transport Committee had requested a report on concentration and competition in the Danish bus market, which had been drafted in autumn 1999 by a working group consisting of representatives from the Danish Competition Authority, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Transport. The report found that the majority of regional and local bus services were subject to public tenders, that the market was characterised by tough competition between contractors, despite an on-going concentration process, and that there were no signs that a single or individual contractor was dominating the market to the detriment of the competition. The working group concluded that their assessment of the Danish bus market had revealed no need to introduce market caps. In reaction to the report, the Transport Committee issued a statement in the autumn 1999, in which it approved the conclusions in the report and re-iterated that it was inappropriate to introduce market caps.
Kapitaltilførslerne i 1999 og 2001 blev ledsaget af omstruktureringsforanstaltninger.
THE 1999 AND 2001 RESTRUCTURING MEASURES (95) The capital injections of 1999 and 2001 have been accompanied by restructuring measures.
Kilde: Notat om lønsomheden af udvalgte kørselskontrakter i 1999-2001.
Accumulated budgets for the period 1999-2001 Source: Memo on the profitability of selected bus service contracts in the period 1999-2001.
De fire andre forhold vedrører det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip og vurderingen af omstruktureringsforanstaltningerne efter rammebestemmelserne for omstrukturering fra 1994 og/eller 1999, i fald de udgør statsstøtte.
The first concerns the question of whether the 1999 and the 2001 restructuring measures constitute two separate measures, or whether they should be assessed as one single measure. The subsequent four doubts concern the private investor test, and the assessment of the restructuring measures under the 1994 and/or 1999 restructuring guidelines, in case they constitute State aid.
På trods af at salget således for en umiddelbar betragtning var »dyrere« end en konkurs, blev salget alligevel foretrukket af den danske regering. Den danske regering var på grundlag af sine rådgiveres analyse således af den opfattelse, at det formentlig ville have været mere bekosteligt på længere sigt at lade Combus gå konkurs end at sælge selskabet, når henses til de latente indirekte tab og de skadelige virkninger i relation til fremtidige privatiseringer. For at understrege disse synspunkter fremlægger den danske regering en »koncernvurdering« af beslutningen om at privatisere Combus og anfører, at det var vigtigt at værne om statens omdømme af hensyn til fremtidige privatiseringer.
However, despite the fact that at face value, the sale was therefore ‘more expensive’ than a bankruptcy, a sale was nevertheless preferred by the Danish government. Indeed, the Danish government, following the analysis provided by its advisers, considered that it would probably have been more costly in the long term to allow Combus to go bankrupt than to sell the company, due to latent indirect losses and damage to future privatisations. In order to underline these considerations, the Danish government presents a ‘group assessment’ of the decision to privatise Combus and argues that, with regard to the prospect of future privatisations, it was important to preserve the State’s reputation.
Også et salg af jernbanevirksomheden DSB kunne på sigt blive aktuelt med henblik på privatisering.
Another option for privatisation under consideration is the sale of the Danish railway company DSB. DSB is an independent public company that operates passenger transport as a public service after negotiations on the basis of a transport contract entered into with the Danish State.
Den danske regering bemærker i den forbindelse, at Kommissionen i punkt 3.4.6 i den oprindelige beslutning anførte følgende om spørgsmålet om engangsstøtte:
The Danish government notes in connection with this that the Commission stated the following in point 3.4.6 of the initial decision with regard to the question of ‘one time, last time’ aid:
»Hvad Combus angår, tyder den tidsmæssige rækkefølge af og formålet med den danske stats kapitalindskud samt Combus' situation på, at de to foranstaltninger bør betragtes som led i en igangværende omstrukturering.
‘In the case of Combus, the chronology and the purpose of the capital injections made by the Danish government, as well as Combus’ situation also suggest that the two measures should be treated as part of a continuing restructuring process.
Det første kapitalindskud i 1999 havde til formål at reducere selskabets gæld, som kunne henføres til selskabets store tab i de foregående år.
In particular, the first injection of capital in 1999 served to reduce the debts of the company that had resulted from the heavy losses in previous years.
Man havde også taget skridt til at ændre chaufførernes kontrakter.
There had also been efforts to modify drivers’ contracts.
Hensigten var helt klart at privatisere selskabet, og det udgør sidste skridt i omstruktureringsstrategien.«
The clear intention was the privatisation of the company, which forms the final part of the restructuring strategy.’
Combus' situation på tidspunktet for kapitalindskuddene: Den danske regering kan tilslutte sig Kommissionens beskrivelse i betragtning 75 i beslutningen om at indlede proceduren, hvorefter Combus i 1999 og 2001 var i alvorlige økonomiske vanskeligheder, som hovedsageligt skyldtes, at selskabet i årene forinden havde indgået underskudsgivende kontrakter om bustransport.
Combus’s situation at the dates of the capital injections. The Danish government endorses the Commission’s description in recital 75 of the decision to initiate the procedure, according to which Combus was in serious financial difficulties in 1999 and 2001, which was mainly due to the company having entered into unprofitable contracts for bus transport in previous years.
Det er den danske regerings opfattelse, at Combus efter kapitalindskuddene i 1999 og 2001 var rentabelt.
Therefore the requirement for ‘one time, last time’ aid laid down in the restructuring guidelines is met in relation to the total injections of capital in 1999 and 2001. Economic viability of Combus (200) It is the opinion of the Government that, following the injections of capital in 1999 and 2001, Combus was economically viable.
Til grund for denne påstand anfører Danske Busvognmænd, at Retten i sag T-157/01 i præmis 94 har vurderet, »at det danske marked for bustransport hurtigt kan tilpasse sig trafikselskabernes efterspørgsel, og at der i tilfælde af en busvirksomheds konkurs hurtigt og effektivt er indtrådt andre virksomheder, indtil der har kunnet afholdes fornyet licitation.
In support of this theory, Danske Busvognmaend points out that, in Case T-157/01, the Court of First Instance considers, in paragraph 94, that the Danish bus transport market is capable of adapting quickly to demands from the transport authorities and that, in the event of liquidation of an undertaking which has secured a contract, recourse may easily be had to other undertakings until a new round of tenders has been initiated.
Andre erhvervsdrivende ville derfor have kunnet overtage Combus' transportkontrakter i tilfælde af selskabets konkurs«.
Consequently, in the eventuality that Combus were to be liquidated, its contracts could be taken over by other operators.
Combus var blandt andet i hovedstadsområdet tynget af at have afgivet et lavt bud, og at der samtidig skulle bygges nye garager m.v.. Man kunne have forestillet sig, at Arriva ville være interesseret i at overtage kontrakter, som Combus havde forhindret selskabet i at opnå, idet Arriva havde garageanlæg, infrastruktur m.v. og derfor ville være i stand til at gennemføre transporten med færre omkostninger.
In the capital region especially, Combus was penalised because its bid was particularly low, and also because it would have to build the facilities which it did not have at its disposal (garages, etc.). It is conceivable that Arriva would have been interested in taking over contracts which Combus prevented it from obtaining since Arriva had the necessary installations at its disposal (garages, infrastructures, etc.), and could therefore run the transport operations at lower cost.
I Combus-sagens bilag K, side 6, anfører den danske regering: »The negotiated capital injection, which Arriva has required in order to take over the shares, is based on a business case which is of course not known to the selle«. Den anfører yderligere i bilag I, side 6: »… The government finds that the required capital injection by Arriva reflects the present market value of the company …«.
In this regard, it quotes page 6 of Annex K to the Combus case in which the Danish government states: ‘The negotiated capital injection, which Arriva has required in order to take over the shares, is based on a business case which is of course not known to the seller’. In Annex I, page 6, it also states: ‘The government finds that the required capital injection by Arriva reflects the present market value of the company, etc.’.
I Altmark-dommen hedder det: »Offentlige tilskud, som har til formål at muliggøre virksomhed med rutetransport i byer, forstæder eller regioner, falder dog ikke ind under denne bestemmelse, for så vidt som sådanne tilskud skal anses for at være en kompensation, der er et vederlag for de af de begunstigede virksomheder leverede ydelser til opfyldelse af forpligtelser til offentlig tjeneste« [47]. I forbindelse hermed har Domstolen opstillet fire betingelser, som skal opfyldes, for at en offentlig støtte kan udgøre »en kompensation for forpligtelse til offentlig tjeneste«.
According to the Altmark judgment ‘public subsidies intended to enable the operation of urban, suburban or regional scheduled transport services are not caught by that provision where such subsidies are to be regarded as compensation for the services provided by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge public service obligations’ [47]. In relation hereto, the ECJ has defined four conditions to be fulfilled in order for a public subsidy to constitute ‘a compensation for a public service obligation’.
Kommissionen vedtog de oprindelige rammebestemmelser for statsstøtte til redning og omstrukturering af kriseramte virksomheder i 1994 [53].
The Commission adopted its original guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty in 1994 [53]. A new version of the guidelines was adopted in 1999 [4] OJ C 288, 9.10.1999, p. 2.
Det er derfor rammebestemmelserne fra 1994, der finder anvendelse på 1999-foranstaltningen.
It was granted prior to the coming into force of the 1999 guidelines. Consequently, the 1994 restructuring guidelines apply to the 1999 measure.
Omstruktureringsplan: Omstruktureringsstøtten skal være betinget af et bæredygtigt omstrukturerings-/saneringsprogram, som skal forelægges Kommissionen i alle detaljer.
Restructuring plan. The restructuring aid must be linked to a viable restructuring/recovery programme submitted in all relevant detail to the Commission.
Økonomisk rentabilitet: Virksomhedens rentabilitet skal genoprettes.
Economic viability. The viability of the company must be restored.
Afbødning af skadelige virkninger for konkurrenterne: Der bør træffes foranstaltninger for mest muligt at afbøde støttens skadelige virkninger for konkurrenterne.
Mitigation of adverse effects on competitors. Measures must be taken to mitigate as far as possible any adverse effects of the aid on competitors.
Proportionalitet: Støtten skal stå i et rimeligt forhold til omkostningerne og fordelene ved omstruktureringen.
Proportionality. The aid must be in proportion to the restructuring costs and benefits.
Årlig rapportering og tilsyn: Medlemsstaten skal hvert år forelægge en rapport om støtten, så Kommissionen kan føre tilsyn med, om omstruktureringsplanen gennemføres korrekt.
Annual report and monitoring. The Member State must provide an annual report on the aid to allow the Commission to monitor that the restructuring plan is being implemented properly.
Princippet om engangsstøtte: Omstruktureringsstøtte bør kun ydes én gang.
One time, last time. Restructuring aid should be granted once only.
Forelæggelse af omstruktureringsplanen for Kommissionen: Kommissionen har, som den danske regering rigtigt har påpeget, i sine bemærkninger til Domstolen i dommen i sagen Frankrig mod Kommissionen [57], anført, at »den franske regering ikke havde forelagt Kommissionen nogen troværdig omstruktureringsplan«, og at »de franske myndigheder heller ikke efter procedurens indledning har fremlagt nogen sådan plan for Kommissionen«.
Submission of the restructuring plan to the Commission. The Commission has, as rightly pointed out by the Danish government, in its submission to the ECJ in France v Commission, stated that ‘the French Government did not submit a credible restructuring plan to the Commission’ and ‘[n]or has any such plan been submitted to the Commission by the French authorities since the proceedings were initiated’ [56].
I Combus-dommen udtalte Retten, at »Kommissionens argumentation må forstås som udtryk for en alvorlig tvivl om, hvorvidt Combus var rentabel ifølge nævnte traktatbestemmelse [EF-traktatens artikel 87] og rammebestemmelserne, hvilken tvivl Kommissionen imidlertid ikke anså sig for forpligtet til at afklare, når den fandt, at artikel 73 EF udgjorde et tilstrækkeligt retsgrundlag til at godkende støtten.
In its Combus judgment, the CFI found that ‘the Commission's reasoning must be considered as expressing serious doubt as to Combus’s viability for the purposes of that article [i.e. article 87 EC treaty] and the Guidelines, a doubt which the Commission did not, however, believe it was bound to clarify since article 73 EC seemed to be a sufficient legal basis for the authorisation of the aid in question.
Da den sidstnævnte bestemmelse imidlertid ikke kan påberåbes i denne forbindelse (…), indeholder den anfægtede beslutning ikke noget gyldigt grundlag for at godkende udbetalingen af beløbet på 300 millioner DKK.
Since that latter provision may not be so relied on (…), the payment of DKK 300 million is no longer validly authorised in the contested decision.
(…) Det kan derfor ikke under nogen omstændigheder anses for godtgjort, at Combus var rentabel« [62].
(…) Consequently, Combus’s viability cannot in any manner be considered as established [61].’
Selv om den samlede støtte [64], baseret på 1999-foranstaltningen og 2001-foranstaltningen taget under ét, måske kunne have bragt Combus på fode fra 2006 (se overslag over Combus' omsætning og overskud i tabel 7 ovenfor), er dette ikke realistisk, hvis Combus skal tilbagebetale 300 mio. til den danske regering, fordi der er tale om ulovlig og uforenelig statsstøtte.
Even if the total aid [62] See Table 7 in the initial decision; as explained above, these figures are expressed in 2001 net present value, rather than real terms. , foreseen by the 1999 and the 2001 measures together, might have allowed that Combus returns to viability as of 2006 (see forecast of turnover and profits in table 7 above), the return to viability becomes unrealistic if Combus has to repay DKK 300 million to the Danish government, because they constitute illegal and incompatible State aid.
Ifølge Domstolen kan tilbagebetalingsforpligtelsen udvides til at omfatte et tredje selskab, hvis dette er oprettet for at omgå tilbagebetalingsforpligtelsen [72].
The ECJ considers that the recovery order can be extended to a third undertaking, if this undertaking has been set up to circumvent the recovery order [70]. Typical cases of circumvention are cases where the transfer does not reflect any economic logic other than the invalidation of the recovery order [71]. As the ECJ points out, ‘such is the case when, following a Commission investigation or decision, the assets and liabilities of the firm as an ongoing concern are transferred to another firm controlled by the same persons at below-market prices or by way of procedures that lack transparency. The purpose of such a transaction can be to place the assets out of reach of the Commission decision and to continue the economic activity in question indefinitely’ [72].
Combus 28 %, Arriva 25 %, City-Trafik 7 % og Linjebus 10 %.
Combus 28 %, Arriva 25 %, City-Trafik 7 %, Linjebus 10 %.
EUT C 272 af 15.11.2007, s. 4.
Since the entry into force of the Commission recovery notice of 2007 (cited above), such a case cannot arise anymore. Indeed, it is stated in the latter that ‘in the event of a privatisation of a company that received State aid declared compatible by the Commission, the Member State can introduce a liability clause in the privatisation agreement to protect the buyer of the company against the risk that the initial Commission decision approving the aid would be overturned by the Community Courts and replaced by a Commission decision ordering the recovery of that aid from the beneficiary. Such a clause could provide for an adjustment of the price paid by the buyer for the privatised company to take due account of the new recovery liability.’
om ændring af beslutning 2009/177/EF for så vidt angår udryddelsesprogrammer og status som sygdomsfri for visse medlemsstater, zoner og segmenter med hensyn til visse sygdomme hos vanddyr
amending Decision 2009/177/EC as regards eradication programmes and disease-free status of certain Member States, zones and compartments for certain aquatic animal diseases
under henvisning til Rådets direktiv 2006/88/EF af 24. oktober 2006 om dyresundhedsbestemmelser for akvakulturdyr og produkter deraf og om forebyggelse og bekæmpelse af visse sygdomme hos vanddyr [1], særlig artikel 44, stk. 2, første afsnit, og artikel 49, stk. 1, og
Having regard to Council Directive 2006/88/EC of 24 October 2006 on animal health requirements for aquaculture animals and products thereof, and on the prevention and control of certain diseases in aquatic animals [1], and in particular the first subparagraph of Article 44(2) and Article 49(1) thereof,
Kommissionens beslutning 2009/177/EF af 31. oktober 2008 om gennemførelse af Rådets direktiv 2006/88/EF for så vidt angår overvågnings- og udryddelsesprogrammer og status som sygdomsfri for medlemsstater, zoner og segmenter [2] indeholder modeller til de blanketter, som medlemsstaterne skal forelægge med henblik på godkendelse af deres udryddelsesprogrammer i henhold til direktiv 2006/88/EF, og som de skal anvende, når de forelægger dokumentation med henblik på godkendelse af status som sygdomsfri i henhold til direktiv 2006/88/EF.
Commission Decision 2009/177/EC of 31 October 2008 implementing Council Directive 2006/88/EC as regards surveillance and eradication programmes and disease-free status of Member States, zones and compartments [2] lays down model forms for submission by Member States for approval of eradication programmes pursuant to Directive 2006/88/EC and for submission of documentation for approval of disease-free status pursuant to that Directive.
Del B i bilag I til beslutning 2009/177/EF indeholder lister over medlemsstater, zoner og segmenter, der er omfattet af godkendte udryddelsesprogrammer i henhold til direktiv 2006/88/EF.
Part B of Annex I to Decision 2009/177/EC sets out lists of Member States, zones and compartments subject to eradication programmes approved in accordance with Directive 2006/88/EC.
Del C i bilag I indeholder lister over medlemsstater, zoner og segmenter, der er erklæret sygdomsfrie i henhold til direktiv 2006/88/EF.
Part C of that Annex sets out lists of Member States, zones and compartments declared disease-free in accordance with that Directive.
Danmark har forelagt Kommissionen et flerårigt program for udryddelse af egtvedsyge (i det følgende benævnt »VHS«) i henhold til Rådets beslutning 90/424/EØF af 26. juni 1990 om visse udgifter på veterinærområdet [3] for perioden 1. januar 2009 til 31. december 2013.
Denmark submitted to the Commission a multi-annual programme for the eradication of viral haemorrhagic septicaemia (VHS) pursuant to Council Decision 90/424/EEC of 26 June 1990 on expenditure in the veterinary field [3] for the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2013.
Det pågældende program blev godkendt ved Kommissionens beslutning 2008/897/EF af 28. november 2008 om godkendelse af årlige og flerårige programmer for udryddelse, bekæmpelse og overvågning af visse dyresygdomme og zoonoser, som medlemsstaterne har forelagt for 2009 og efterfølgende år, og om fastsættelse af EF-tilskuddet hertil [4].
That programme was approved by Commission Decision 2008/897/EC of 28 November 2008 approving annual and multi-annual programmes and the financial contribution from the Community for the eradication, control and monitoring of certain animal diseases and zoonoses presented by the Member States for 2009 and following years [4].
Programmet opfylder kravene til godkendelse i beslutning 2009/177/EF og bør derfor godkendes i overensstemmelse med artikel 44, stk. 2, i direktiv 2006/88/EF.
That programme complies with the requirements for approval laid down in Decision 2009/177/EC and should therefore be approved according to Article 44(2) of Directive 2006/88/EC.
De zoner, der er omfattet af programmet, bør derfor indsættes i del B i listen i bilag I til direktiv 2006/88/EF.
Accordingly, the zones covered by that programme should be inserted in Part B of the list set out in Annex I to that Decision.