natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Anden tranche på lige over 50 % (8,75 mia. EUR) blev finansieret af medlemsbankerne i delstatsbankernes garantifond (Sicherungsreserve, svarende til pengeinstitutternes indskydergaranti).
The second tranche of just above 50 % (EUR 8,75 billion) was provided by member banks of the Guarantee Fund (Sicherungsreserve, comparable to a deposit and institute guarantee scheme) of the Landesbanken.
I december 2007 bestilte delstaten Sachsen revisionsfirmaet Susat & Partner til at ansætte værdien af Sachsen LB som vedtaget i salgsaftalen.
In December 2007 the Free State of Saxony commissioned auditors Susat & Partner to assess the value of Sachsen LB as agreed in the sales agreement.
[…] nåede til den konklusion, at Sachsen LB var ca. […] mia. EUR værd.
[…] arrived at the conclusion that Sachsen LB was worth about EUR […] billion.
Ved efterfølgende forhandlinger enedes parterne om at anvende værdien på […] mia. EUR for Sachsen LB.
During the ongoing negotiations the parties then agreed to use the value of EUR […] billion for Sachsen LB.
I den endelige aftale blev nettosalgsprisen for Sachsen LB fastsat til 328 mio. EUR, der skulle betales kontant [15].
The final agreement determined the net sales price of Sachsen LB at EUR 328 million, to be paid in cash [15].
Refinansieringen af den strukturerede investeringsportefølje, der blev overført til Super SIV, førte til, at delstaten Sachsens Gewährträgerhaftung for denne portefølje udløb.
The refinancing of the structured investment portfolio transferred to the Super SIV led to the expiry of the Gewährträgerhaftung of the Free State of Saxony for this portfolio.
OMSTRUKTURERINGSPLANEN
THE RESTRUCTURING PLAN
Ifølge planen skal Sachsen LB AG integreres i LBBW men fortsat eksistere som et afhængigt datterselskab (unselbständige Anstalt) ved navn Sachsen Bank.
According to the plan Sachsen LB AG will be integrated into LBBW, but will continue to exist in the form of a dependent subsidiary (unselbständige Anstalt), named Sachsen Bank.
Denne enhed skal desuden overtage erhvervs- og privatbankforretninger fra LBBW's eksisterende lokale filialer i Sachsen (BW-Bank).
This entity will also take over the corporate and private banking business of the existing local retail branches of LBBW in Saxony (BW-Bank).
Andre former for bankforretninger end betjeningen af erhvervs- og privatkunder skal imidlertid trækkes ud af Sachsen LB og overgå til LBBW-afdelingen i Sachsen.
However, kinds of business other than corporate and private banking will be taken out of Sachsen LB and transferred to the LBBW branch in Saxony.
Resultatet bliver, at Sachsen Bank kun overtager den ene af Sachsen LB's to grene samt Sachsen LB's forholdsvis underudviklede forretningsområde med betjening af privatkunder, som sammen med det tilsvarende forretningsområde for BW-Bank bliver Sachsen Banks nye anden gren.
As a result, Sachsen Bank will take over only one of the two legs of Sachsen LB, namely the corporate banking business, as well as the rather underdeveloped private banking business of Sachsen LB, and make it together with the corresponding business of BW-Bank its new second leg.
Sachsen Bank vil dermed kunne konkurrere på egen hånd i og uden for Sachsen.
Sachsen Bank will be able to compete in Saxony and outside on its own merits.
Sachsen LB's anden gren, dvs. kapitalmarkedsforretninger, forbliver hos LBBW og vil i Sachsen blive tilbudt gennem en ny afdeling af LBBW.
The second leg of Sachsen LB, i.e. the capital markets business, will remain in LBBW and will be offered in Saxony by a branch of LBBW.
LBBW overtager også back-office-funktionerne og skal til dels fungere som centralbank for sparekasserne i Sachsen.
LBBW will also take over back-office functions and will partly function as central bank for the savings banks in Saxony.
Analysen af omstruktureringsplanen for at sikre Sachsen LB's levedygtighed er baseret på bankens forretningsaktiviteter før integreringen i LBBW [16].
The analysis of the restructuring plan regarding the restoration of viability is based on the business activities of Sachsen LB before its integration into LBBW [16].
Omstruktureringen omfatter outsourcing af den første portefølje til Super SIV.
The restructuring includes the outsourcing of the first portfolio into the Super SIV.
Desuden opereres der i planen med som kompensationsforanstaltning at nedlægge hele Sachsen LB's afdeling i Dublin (Sachsen LB Europe), der forestod udviklingen og forvaltningen af hele Sachsen LB's internationalt strukturerede porteføljer.
Moreover, the plan indicates as an option by way of compensatory measures the closing down of the whole of Sachsen LB’s Dublin-based subsidiary (Sachsen LB Europe), which was in charge of developing and managing all of Sachsen LB’s internationally structured portfolios.
Sachsen LB vil derfor ikke få nogen nye aktiviteter på det internationale kapitalmarked.
Therefore, no new international capital market activities will be performed by Sachsen LB.
Kun aktiverne i den anden portefølje på 11,8 mia. EUR forbliver i LBBW.
Only the assets of the second portfolio of EUR 11,8 billion remain in LBBW.
På dette grundlag er der udarbejdet prognoser, hvoraf det fremgår, at banken vil have genskabt sin rentabilitet i løbet af omstruktureringsperioden på fire år.
On this basis the projections indicate that the bank will restore its profitability within the restructuring period of four years.
Som bevis for bankens levedygtighed fremlagde Tyskland primært følgende tal:
As proof of viability, Germany provided in essence the following figures:
Bruttoindtjening (worst case)
Gross revenues (worst case)
SÅV 2007-2012 [17](%)
CAGR 2007-2012 [17](in %)
Erhvervsfinansiering
Corporate finance
Kapitalmarkeder [18]
Capital markets [18]
I alt før synergier
Total before synergies
Indtjeningssynergier (ny forretningsmodel)
Revenue synergies (new business model)
I alt inkl. synergier
Total incl. synergies
Driftsresultat før skat (worst case)
Operating income before tax (worst case)
SÅV 2007-2012
CAGR 2007-2012
Kapitalmarkeder
Capital markets
Synergier
Synergies
Tyskland oplyste desuden, at LBBW forventer en forrentning af det tidligere Sachsen LB's egenkapital på […(> 8)] % fra 2009 og ca. […(> 15)] % for den nyoprettede Sachsen Bank.
In addition, Germany indicated that LBBW expects as of 2009 a return on equity for the former Sachsen LB of […(> 8)] % and for the newly created Sachsen Bank of around […(> 15)] %.
DEN FORMELLE UNDERSØGELSESPROCEDURE
THE FORMAL INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE
BEGRUNDELSE FOR AT INDLEDE PROCEDUREN
REASONS FOR OPENING THE PROCEDURE
Kommissionen udtrykte i åbningsbeslutningen tvivl om likviditetsstøttens forenelighed med konkurrencereglerne, fordi foranstaltningen syntes at give Sachsen LB en selektiv fordel, da det var usandsynligt, at en markedsøkonomisk investor ville have indrømmet Sachsen LB kredit på samme vilkår som bankgruppen.
In the opening decision the Commission questioned the liquidity support because the measure seemed to confer a selective advantage upon Sachsen LB, it being unlikely that a market economy investor would have granted the credit facility to Sachsen LB on the same conditions as the banking pool.
Kommissionen udelukkede dog ikke muligheden for, at foranstaltningen kunne udgøre redningsstøtte, som er forenelig med fællesmarkedet.
The Commission did not, however, rule out the possibility that the measure might constitute rescue aid compatible with the common market.
Kommissionen vurderede desuden, om salget af Sachsen LB til LBBW involverede statsstøtte.
The Commission further assessed whether the sale of Sachsen LB to LBBW involved state aid.
Kommissionen udelukkede heller ikke, at garantien kunne udgøre omstruktureringsstøtte, der var forenelig med fællesmarkedet, hvis betingelserne i Fællesskabets rammebestemmelser for statsstøtte til redning og omstrukturering af kriseramte virksomheder [19] (herefter benævnt »rammebestemmelserne«) var opfyldt.
Nor did it exclude that the guarantee might constitute restructuring aid compatible with the common market if the conditions of the Community Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring of firms in difficulty [19] (hereinafter called the Guidelines) were met.
En tredjepart hævdede, at garantien til Super SIV udgjorde statsstøtte, at LBBW's bidrag på 391 mio. EUR til Sachsen LB's resultat i 2007 og garantistillelsen for årets nettotab ved afsætning af værdipapirer op til 641,6 mio. EUR ligeledes udgjorde statsstøtte, samt at den pris, LBBW betalte til ejerne, oversteg Sachsen LB's markedsværdi.
The third party argued that the guarantee granted to the Super SIV constituted state aid, that LBBW’s EUR 391 million contribution to Sachsen LB’s 2007 results and the underwriting of the year’s net loss to the tune of EUR 641,6 million likewise constituted state aid, and that the sales price paid by LBBW to the owners exceeded Sachsen LB’s market value.
BEMÆRKNINGER FRA TYSKLAND EFTER ÅBNINGSBESLUTNINGEN
COMMENTS FROM GERMANY FOLLOWING THE OPENING DECISION
VEDRØRENDE VURDERINGEN AF LIKVIDITETSFORANSTALTNINGEN
AS REGARDS THE ASSESSMENT OF THE LIQUIDITY MEASURE
Tyskland hævdede, at den likviditetsforanstaltning, bankgruppen havde stillet til rådighed, også ville være stillet til rådighed af en markedsøkonomisk investor, fordi de pågældende bankers provenu fra de kortfristede omsætningspapirer, Ormond Quay udstedte, lå over markedsrenten og dermed fulgte markedet.
Germany argued that the liquidity measure provided by the banking pool would also have been provided by a market investor, because the remuneration the pool banks received for the CPs issued by Ormond Quay was above the market remuneration and thus market conform.
Bankgruppen ville desuden ikke dække potentielle tab ved udsving i markedsprisen på conduitselskabets værdipapirer med sikkerhed i specificerede aktiver.
Moreover, the banking pool would not cover potential losses related to fluctuations in the market price of the ABSs in the conduit.
Selv hvis aktivernes markedsværdi faldt, ville risikoen for misligholdelse være meget ringe, og hvis man fulgte en køb og hold-strategi, ville de forventede tab være marginale.
Even if the market value of the assets suffered, the default risk would be very low and in the case of a hold strategy the expected losses would be marginal.
Tyskland anførte desuden, at bankerne primært havde handlet med det formål at forhindre, at insolvens hos en af deres søsterbanker skulle udløse en generel bankkrise.
Furthermore, Germany argued that the banks had acted mainly in order to prevent a general banking crisis triggered by the insolvency of one of its sister Landesbanken.
De havde fundet det mindre risikabelt at købe omsætningspapirerne end at håndtere Sachsen LB's insolvens, især hvis indskydergarantiordningen måtte aktiveres.
They had considered it less risky to buy the CPs than to deal with the insolvency of Sachsen LB, in particular if the deposit scheme were to be activated.
Tyskland påpegede også, at man kunne fastsætte markedsbenchmarks hypotetisk, også selv om der slet ikke var noget marked.
In addition, Germany pointed out that, even in the absence of a market, market benchmarks could be determined hypothetically.
Endelig hævdede Tyskland, at hvis Kommissionen fandt, at likviditetsforanstaltningen indeholdt elementer af statsstøtte, ville den under alle omstændigheder kunne betragtes som redningsstøtte, der var forenelig med fællesmarkedet, fordi de kortfristede omsætningspapirer fra bankgruppen for det første kunne sidestilles med et lån, for det andet ikke var af strukturel art, og for det tredje var begrænsede til seks måneder.
Finally, Germany argued that, if the Commission were to consider the liquidity measure as involving state aid elements, it would in any event qualify as rescue aid compatible with the common market because the CPs provided by the banking pool were, first, similar to a loan, second, in any event not structural, and, third, limited to six months.
VEDRØRENDE VURDERINGEN AF SALGET AF SACHSEN LB
AS REGARDS THE ASSESSMENT OF THE SALE OF SACHSEN LB
Hvad angår salget af Sachsen LB, anførte Tyskland, at delstaten Sachsen havde udvist samme adfærd som en markedsøkonomisk investor.
Concerning the sale of Sachsen LB, Germany argued that the Free State of Saxony had behaved like a market economy vendor.
Købsprisen, som var resultatet af forhandlinger med flere potentielle købere og baseret på værdiansættelser foretaget af revisorer i henhold til almindeligt anerkendte revisionsregler, afspejlede Sachsen LB's korrekte markedsværdi.
The purchase price, which was the result of negotiations conducted with several potential buyers and was based on valuations by auditors according to generally acknowledged auditor rules, reflected the fair market value of Sachsen LB.
Selv når man medregnede de forpligtelser, der hidrørte fra garantien på 2,75 mia. EUR til Super SIV, havde ejerne af Sachsen LB alligevel solgt banken for en alt i alt positiv pris.
Furthermore, even including the liabilities stemming from the EUR 2,75 billion guarantee granted to the Super SIV, the owners of Sachsen LB had still sold the bank for an overall positive price.
Tyskland henviste atter til, at man havde overvejet tre forskellige metoder til at fastslå de risici, der var forbundet med garantien til Super SIV.
Germany reiterated that three different approaches had been considered in order to determine the risks inherent in the guarantee granted to the Super SIV.
Den anden metode, der var baseret på modeller, som afspejlede potentielle makroøkonomiske udviklinger, gik ud på at beregne de potentielle tab på porteføljen i tre forskellige scenarier.
The second approach, based on models reflecting potential macroeconomic developments, calculated the potential losses of the portfolio in three different scenarios.
De forventede tab blev anslået til ca. […(> 800)] mio. EUR i et pessimistisk scenario, […(< 500)] mio. EUR i basisscenariet og […(< 200)] mio. EUR i et optimistisk scenario.
The expected losses were estimated at about EUR […(> 800)] million in a bad case, EUR […(< 500)] million in a base case and EUR […(< 200)] million in the best case.
Metoden var udviklet af LBBW og Sachsen LB på grundlag af eksisterende interne modeller.
The approach was developed by LBBW and Sachsen LB on the basis of existing internal models.
Den tredje metode var baseret på de underliggende aktivers klassificering.
The third approach was based on the rating of the underlying assets.
Ifølge Tyskland var næsten alle aktiver i porteføljen AAA-klassificeret [20], og der var ikke sket nogen nedklassificering.
According to Germany, nearly all the assets included in the portfolio were AAA rated [20] and no downgrading had occurred.
Eftersom den sandsynlige risiko ved AAA-klassificerede aktiver var næsten nul, blev de forventede tab på porteføljen sat til nul.
Based on the probability of failure of AAA-rated assets of nearly zero, the expected losses of the portfolio amounted to zero.
Ifølge Tyskland var garantibeløbet, dvs. 2,75 mia. EUR, resultatet af forhandlinger mellem parterne, hvor LBBW forsøgte at få beløbet så højt op som muligt for at begrænse sine egne forpligtelser, medens delstaten Sachsen forsøgte at reducere garantien til et minimum.
According to Germany, the total amount of the guarantee, i.e. EUR 2,75 billion, was the result of negotiations between the parties, where LBBW tried to increase it as much as possible to limit its own liability, while the Free State of Saxony tried to reduce the guarantee to a minimum.
Tyskland anførte, at resultaterne af alle tre metoder var tilgængelige på det tidspunkt, der blev ført forhandlinger.
Germany submitted that the results of all three approaches were available at the time of the negotiations.
Tyskland forklarede, at den anden metode, dvs. modelmetoden, blev accepteret af forhandlingsparterne som en hensigtsmæssig metode til at fastslå de risici, garantien skulle dække.
It explained that the second, i.e. the model, approach was accepted by the negotiating parties as the appropriate way of determining the risks which needed to be covered by the guarantee.
Tyskland fremlagde de forskellige scenarieberegninger for at vise, at salget af banken resulterede i en positiv pris for ejerne, også selv om basisscenariet for udnyttelsen af garantien blev realiseret.
Germany provided different scenario calculations to demonstrate that the sale of the bank resulted in a positive price for the owners, even if the base default scenario of the guarantee was considered.
Tyskland hævdede, at det var Kommissionens normale praksis at tage udgangspunkt i basisscenariet frem for et mere pessimistisk scenario [21].
It argued that it was the Commission’s constant practice to rely on the base case scenario rather than a worse case scenario [21].
Tyskland anførte, at hvis Kommissionen fandt, at salget af banken indeholdt elementer af statsstøtte, ville den under alle omstændigheder i henhold til rammebestemmelserne være forenelig med fællesmarkedet.
Germany argued that, if the Commission were to consider the sale of the bank as involving state aid elements, it would in any event qualify under the Guidelines as restructuring aid compatible with the common market.
LBBW havde i den forbindelse fremlagt den ovennævnte omstruktureringsplan, hvoraf det fremgik, hvordan Sachsen LB's levedygtighed skulle genskabes.
To this end LBBW had provided the abovementioned restructuring plan which indicated how Sachsen LB was to restore its viability.
Tyskland anførte, at planen indeholdt flere interne foranstaltninger såsom personalenedskæringer, foranstaltninger til forbedring af risikostyringen, integrering af bestemte segmenter i LBBW og standardisering på it-området.
Germany claimed that the plan indicated several internal measures, such as staff reductions, measures to improve risk management, integration of segments into LBBW and IT standardisation.
Det var desuden et klart mål for forretningsplanen at gøre Sachsen LB mindre afhængig af provenu fra kapitalmarkeder og især fra forretningssegmentet »kapitalforvaltning og strukturerede produkter«.
Moreover, a clear aim of the business plan was to reduce the dependence of Sachsen LB on profits from capital markets and in particular from the ‘asset management & structured products’ business segment.
Tyskland hævdede desuden, at den investering på flere hundrede millioner euro, som LBBW havde foretaget for at overtage Sachsen LB, skulle kunne betale sig, og at LBBW derfor ville gøre sit yderste for at genskabe Sachsen LB's levedygtighed på lang sigt.
Germany argued further that the investment of several hundred million euro which LBBW had made to acquire Sachsen LB had to pay off and that LBBW would therefore do its utmost to restore Sachsen LB’s long-term viability.
Hvad angik bidraget med egne midler, var argumentet, at LBBW og de øvrige banker havde ydet et meget stort bidrag med egne midler på i alt […(ca. 30)] mia. EUR, og at det opfyldte kravene i rammebestemmelserne. Beløbet på […(ca.
Regarding its own contribution, Germany argued that considerable own efforts had been made by LBBW and the other banks totalling EUR […(about 30)] billion and that this met the standards set forth in the Guidelines.
30)] mia. EUR var baseret på omkostningerne ved at oprette Super SIV ([…] mio. EUR), integreringen af Sachsen LB ([…] mio. EUR) og finansieringen af portefølje 2 (17,5 mia. EUR) og portefølje 1 (11,8 mia. EUR).
The amount of EUR […(about 30)] billion was based on costs for the setting-up of the Super SIV (EUR […] million), the integration of Sachsen LB (EUR […] million) and the financing of portfolio 2 (EUR 17,5 billion) and portfolio 1 (EUR 11,8 billion).
Ifølge Tyskland var salget af kriseramte virksomheder et vigtigt skridt på vejen til en varig omstrukturering af de pågældende virksomheder.
According to Germany, the sale of companies in difficulty constituted an essential step toward their durable restructuring.
Det måtte generelt antages, at en virksomhed ville have større chancer for at overleve under en større og veletableret tysk banks kontrol, og det gav sikkerhed for, at virksomheden ikke igen ville blive afhængig af statsstøtte.
It could generally be assumed that a company would more likely be viable under the control of a well established major German bank and that this ensured that the company would not have to rely on state aid again.
Salget ville således vise sig at være et centralt element i omstruktureringen af Sachsen LB.
The sale would thus prove to be a central element of the restructuring of Sachsen LB.
Der var desuden ingen konkurrenter, der havde fremsat bemærkninger til Kommissionens åbningsbeslutning.
Furthermore, no competitor had submitted comments on the Commission’s opening decision.
Salget af banken ville således ikke efter andre konkurrenters opfattelse føre til konkurrencefordrejninger.
The sale of the bank would thus not lead in the eyes of other competitors to a distortion of competition.
Tyskland afgav med LBBW's samtykke (på vegne af modtageren af støtten, dvs. Sachsen LB) følgende tilsagn [22]:
Germany provided in agreement with LBBW (on behalf of the beneficiary of the aid, i.e. Sachsen LB) the following commitments [22]:
Følgende af Sachsen LB's aktiver, som i forbindelse med integreringen overgår til LBBW, sælges eller likvideres:
The following assets of Sachsen LB, which during the course of the integration have gone over to LBBW, will be sold or liquidated:
Sachsen LB Europe afhændes eller likvideres inden […].
Sachsen LB Europe will be sold or liquidated by […].
LBBW-gruppen overtager ingen medarbejdere fra Sachsen LB Europe, medmindre det kræves i henhold til lovgivningen, og tilbyder derfor ingen nuværende medarbejdere i Sachsen LB Europe nye ansættelseskontrakter og indgår ingen nye ansættelseskontrakter med nuværende medarbejdere i Sachsen LB Europe [23].
The LBBW group will not take over any staff from Sachsen LB Europe, unless it is required to do so by legal obligations, and will therefore neither propose to nor conclude with existing staff of Sachsen LB Europe any new working contracts [23].
Tyskland giver tilsagn om, at Sachsen Bank, repræsenteret ved LBBW, ikke i nogen af sine filialer i delstaten Sachsen aktivt beskæftiger sig med proprietary trading som en selvstændig forretningsaktivitet for egen regning og risiko ud over, hvad der vedrører kundebetjeningen i forbindelse med bankens kerneforretningsaktiviteter.
Germany commits that SachsenBank, represented through LBBW, will not carry out actively in any of its branches in Saxony as an independent business activity proprietary trading activities on its own account and at its own risk going beyond those of customer service in its core business activities.
Denne forpligtelse er gældende i hele omstruktureringsperioden på fire år.
This behavioural commitment is valid for the restructuring timeframe of four years.
Tyskland giver tilsagn om, at Sachsen Bank, repræsenteret ved LBBW, ikke i nogen af sine filialer i Sachsen aktivt beskæftiger sig med international realkredit som selvstændig forretningsaktivitet ud over, hvad der vedrører kundebetjeningen i forbindelse med bankens kerneforretningsaktiviteter.
Germany commits that SachsenBank, represented through LBBW, will not carry out actively in any of its branches in Saxony as an independent business activity international real estate business going beyond that of customer service in its core business activities.
Tyskland bekræftede, at […].
Germany confirmed that […].
Tyskland hævder, at aktiviteten er overskudsgivende og ikke relateret til den aktuelle krise på subprimeboligsegmentet, som blev udløst ved øgede udlån til højrisikolåntagere med lavere indkomst eller ringere kredithistorie end førsteklasses låntagere.
Germany claims that the activity is profitable and not related to the current crisis in the subprime housing segment, which was triggered by increased lending to higher-risk borrowers with lower income or lesser credit history than prime borrowers.
Tyskland bekræftede desuden, at […] [25].
Germany further confirmed that […] [25].
VEDRØRENDE BEMÆRKNINGERNE FRA TREDJEPARTEN
AS REGARDS THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE THIRD PARTY