natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Det forhold, at Belgien ejer 100 % af SNCB's selskabskapital, at denne kapital er under konstant offentlig kontrol, og at staten på ethvert tidspunkt kan beslutte at privatisere SNCB, viser, at SNCB's formue er til den belgiske stats rådighed.
The fact that Belgium owns 100 % of SNCB’s capital, that this remains under continuous public control and that the State could at any moment decide to privatise SNCB, demonstrates that the capital of this company is at the disposal of the Belgian State.
Kommissionen konstaterer desuden, at den belgiske stat udnævner medlemmerne af tilsynsrådet og den administrerende direktør, hvilket giver den en vis kontrol med virksomheden.
Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Belgian State appoints the administrators of the Management Board, together with the Chief Executive, which bestows upon it a certain control over the business.
Argumentet om, at de foranstaltninger, som SNCB har tildelt IFB, ikke skulle medføre et tab for den belgiske stat, er forkert af følgende grunde: Da Belgien ejer SNCB, vil enhver dårlig investering, som mindsker SNCB's værdi, også mindske den belgiske stats formue.
The argument that the measures granted to IFB by SNCB do not lead to any loss of the Belgian State’s capital is factually incorrect: as Belgium is the owner of SNCB, any bad investment which diminishes the SNCB’s value also diminishes the Belgian State’s capital.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at de foranstaltninger, der er genstand for undersøgelsen, er blevet finansieret med statsmidler.
The Commission therefore concludes that the measures examined were financed by State resources.
Tilregnelse
Imputability
Ifølge retspraksis »må det af disse grunde antages, at en støtteforanstaltning, som er truffet af en offentlig virksomhed, efter omstændighederne kan tilregnes staten på grundlag af en bedømmelse af sagens omstændigheder som helhed og den sammenhæng, hvori foranstaltningen er truffet« [31].
According to the same case-law, ‘… it must be accepted that the imputability to the State of an aid measure taken by a public undertaking may be inferred from a set of indicators arising from the circumstances of the case and the context in which that measure was taken’ [31].
Domstolen forklarer derefter, hvilke kriterier der kan anvendes til at påvise tilregnelsen:
The Court of Justice then clarifies which criteria may be utilised to demonstrate imputability:
»en støtteforanstaltning, som er truffet af en offentlig virksomhed, efter omstændighederne kan tilregnes staten på grundlag af en bedømmelse af sagens omstændigheder som helhed og den sammenhæng, hvori foranstaltningen er truffet.
‘The imputability to the State of an aid measure taken by a public undertaking may be inferred from a set of indicators arising from the circumstances of the case and the context in which that measure was taken.
Hvad dette spørgsmål angår, har Domstolen eksempelvis taget hensyn til, at det pågældende organ ikke kunne træffe den anfægtede beslutning uden at tage hensyn til kravene fra de offentlige myndigheder (jf. bl.a. dommen i sagen Van der Kooy m.fl. mod Kommissionen, præmis 37), eller at de offentlige virksomheder, gennem hvem støtten var ydet, var forpligtet til, ud over de organisatoriske forhold, hvorved de offentlige virksomheder var knyttet til staten, at tage hensyn til direktiverne fra en »comitato interministeriale per la programmazione economica« (CIPE) (jf. dommene af »21.3.1991« i sag C-303/88, Italien mod Kommissionen, præmis 11 og 12, og i sag C-305/89, Italien mod Kommissionen, præmis 13 og 14).
In that respect, the Court has already taken into consideration the fact that the body in question could not take the contested decision without taking account of the requirements of the public authorities (see, in particular, Van der Kooy, paragraph 37) or the fact that, apart from factors of an organic nature which linked the public undertakings to the State, those undertakings, through the intermediary of which aid had been granted, had to take account of directives issued by a Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica (CIPE) (Case C-303/88 Italy v Commission, cited above, paragraphs 11 and 12; Case C-305/89 Italy v Commission, cited above, paragraphs 13 and 14).
Også andre omstændigheder kan have betydning for, om en stat kan tilregnes en støtteforanstaltning, der er truffet af en offentlig virksomhed, nemlig navnlig om denne er integreret i den offentlige forvaltning, karakteren af dens aktiviteter og om disse udøves på markedet under normale konkurrencevilkår med deltagelse fra private erhvervsdrivende, virksomhedens juridiske status - det være sig, om den henhører under den offentlige ret eller privatrettens regler for selskaber — udstrækningen af de offentlige myndigheders kontrol med administrationen af virksomheden eller enhver anden omstændighed, som i det konkrete tilfælde indicerer, at de offentlige myndigheder er impliceret deri, eller som tværtimod sandsynliggør, at de ikke er impliceret i vedtagelsen af en foranstaltning, når der endvidere henses til dennes rækkevidde, indhold eller hermed forbundne betingelser« [32].(202) I åbningsskrivelsen (punkt 140-150) sondrer Kommissionen i henseende til tilregnelsen af foranstaltningen mellem tidsrummet forud for kontraktens indgåelse den 7. april 2003 og tidsrummet herefter.
Other indicators might, in certain circumstances, be relevant in concluding that an aid measure taken by a public undertaking is imputable to the State, such as, in particular, its integration into the structures of the public administration, the nature of its activities and the exercise of the latter on the market in normal conditions of competition with private operators, the legal status of the undertaking (in the sense of its being subject to public law or ordinary company law), the intensity of the supervision exercised by the public authorities over the management of the undertaking, or any other indicator showing, in the particular case, an involvement by the public authorities in the adoption of a measure or the unlikelihood of their not being involved, having regard also to the compass of the measure, its content or the conditions which it contains’ [32].(202) In the letter initiating the procedure (points 140 to 150), as regards the imputability of the measure the Commission distinguished between the period prior to the conclusion of the framework agreement on 7 April 2003 and the period subsequent to this contract.
I lyset af Belgiens betragtninger forekommer det mere hensigtsmæssigt at sondre mellem tre forskellige perioder:
In view of Belgium’s observations, it would appear more appropriate to distinguish between three different periods:
perioden forud for 19. juli 2002 (hvor SNCB's bestyrelse vedtog at godkende tildelingen af et likviditetsforskud og acceptere, at en kapitalforhøjelse i IFB var »sandsynlig«)
the period prior to 19 July 2002 (date of the decision by SNCB’s Management Board to approve the granting of a cash advance and to accept that an increase in capital for IFB was ‘probable’),
perioden fra 19. juli 2002 til 20. december 2002 (hvor SNCB's bestyrelse besluttede at godkende princippet om en kapitalforhøjelse i IFB og tillade direktionen at indlede forhandlinger om rammekontrakten af 7. april 2003)
the period between 19 July 2002 and 20 December 2002 (date of the decision by SNCB’s Management Board to approve the principle of an increase in IFB’s capital and authorising the executive committee to negotiate the framework contract of 7 April 2003),
perioden efter 20. december 2002.
the period subsequent to 20 December 2002.
Perioden forud for bestyrelsens beslutning den 19. juli 2002
Period prior to the Management Board’s decision of 19 July 2002
Med hensyn til perioden forud for bestyrelsens beslutning er spørgsmålet, om den belgiske stat kan tilregnes den langmodighed, som SNCB's ledelse (direktionen) har udvist ved ikke at kræve betaling af IFB for transportserviceydelserne efter 2000.
As regards the period prior to this decision of the Management Board, the question is whether the tolerance demonstrated by SNCB’s management (Management Board) in not requiring payment from IFB for transport services from 2000 onward, is attributable to the Belgian State.
I åbningsskrivelsen (punkt 141-142) udtrykker Kommissionen tvivl om, hvorvidt beslutningen om at acceptere, at fakturaer systematisk ikke blev betalt i perioden fra udgangen af 2000 til begyndelsen af 2003, var blevet truffet uden indgreb fra den belgiske stat.
In its letter initiating the procedure (points 141 to 142), the Commission expressed doubts as to whether the decision to accept the systematic non-payment of invoices during the period from the end of 2000 to the beginning of 2003 had been taken without the intervention of the Belgian authorities.
I henhold til den belgiske regerings svar blev SNCB's bestyrelse først informeret om denne praksis den 19. juli 2002, og regeringskommissæren fik det også at vide på dette tidspunkt.
According to the Belgian Government’s response, SNCB’s Management Board was not informed of this practice until 19 July 2002; the Government Commissioner was informed at the same time.
Kommissionen har ikke modtaget bemærkninger fra tredjeparter.
The Commission has not received any observations from third parties.
Kommissionen har fundet bemærkninger om IFB i protokollerne fra kammerets og senatets forhandlinger af hhv. 6. marts 2002, 24. januar 2002 og 28. februar 2002 i forbindelse med en bredere debat mellem deputerede og senatorer om åbningen af jernbanemarkedet og indledningen af ABX-sagen.
In records of the proceedings in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of 6 March 2002, 24 January 2002 and 28 February 2002, the Commission found comments about IFB, within the context of the members’ and senators’ wider debate on the opening up of the rail market and the ABX case.
Den har efterfølgende anmodet den belgiske regering om at fremsende undersøgelserne fra Boston Consulting Group og Team Consult, som blev nævnt under disse debatter, samt den belgiske regerings beslutning af 22. februar 2002, som også var blevet drøftet.
Consequently, it asked the Belgian Government to send it the studies by Boston Consulting Group and Team Consult which were referred to during these discussions, along with the Belgian Government’s decision of 22 February 2002, which was also discussed.
En analyse af disse dokumenter har ikke afsløret, at den belgiske regering skulle have været indblandet i SNCB's beslutninger om IFB's fremtid.
Analysis of these documents has not revealed any indication of influence by the Belgian Government on SNCB’s decisions concerning the future of IFB.
Derved opstår spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt ledelsens langmodighed i en offentlig virksomhed som beskrevet i beslutningens punkt 203 kan tilregnes den belgiske stat, når der ikke er tegn på, at myndighederne har grebet specifikt ind, da situationen opstod.
Therefore, the question is whether the tolerance of the management of a public undertaking, as described in point 203 of this decision, may be imputed to the Belgian State, when there is no evidence of any specific intervention on the part of the administration as the situation emerged.
Ifølge lov af 1993 om oprettelse af SNCB som offentligretligt aktieselskab styres virksomheden af SNCB's uafhængige ledelse, dvs. den administrerede direktør og medlemmerne af direktionen, uden indgreb fra de offentlige myndigheder.
According to the 1993 Act establishing SNCB as a joint stock company under public law, SNCB’s management, that is to say the Chief Executive and the members of the executive committee, manage the business autonomously, without the intervention of the public authorities.
Da der ikke foreligger beviser for, at staten har grebet ind i IFB-sagen, må Kommissionen konkludere, at SNCB's ledelses beslutning om at acceptere, at IFB ikke betalte sine fakturer i perioden ultimo juli 2000-juli 2002, ikke kan tilregnes den belgiske stat.
Therefore, in the absence of concrete evidence of State intervention in the management of the IFB case, the Commission must conclude that the decision by SNCB’s management to tolerate the non-payment of IFB’s invoices during the period from the end of 2000 to July 2002 is not imputable to the Belgian State.
Periode fra bestyrelsens beslutning den 19. juli 2002 til bestyrelsens beslutning den 20. december 2002
Period between the Management Board’s decision of 19 July 2002 and the Management Board’s decision of 20 December 2002
Den 19. juli 2002 vidste SNCB's bestyrelse og dermed også regeringskommissæren, der repræsenterer Belgiens interesser i bestyrelsen, at IFB ikke havde betalt sine fakturaer siden udgangen af 2000, og den godkendte at tildele IFB et forskud på 2,5 mio. EUR i løbet af andet halvår af 2002.
Since 19 July 2002, SNCB’s Management Board, among whom the Government Commissioner who represents Belgium’s interests on SNCB’s Management Board, has known that IFB had not been paying its invoices since the end of 2000, and approved the granting of an advance of EUR 2,5 million to IFB during the second half of 2002.
Kommissionen skal i den sammenhæng kontrollere, om kriterierne fra Stardust Marine-sagen gør det muligt at tilregne den belgiske stat SNCB's bestyrelses beslutning. Det skal med andre ord undersøges, om regeringskommissærens tilstedeværelse i bestyrelsen, selvom han ikke konkret har grebet ind vedrørende den pågældende foranstaltning alligevel gør det muligt at tilregne den belgiske stat beslutningen.
In this respect, the Commission must verify if the criteria established by the Stardust Marine case-law allows this decision by SNCB’s Management Board to be imputed to Belgium.
Imidlertid fremgår det af de oplysninger, som Kommissionen råder over, at hverken undersøgelsen af sagen eller bemærkninger fra tredjeparter har afsløret beviser for, at den belgiske regering skulle have søgt at påvirke bestyrelsens beslutning af 19. juli 2002.
In other words, it is a question of verifying in this particular case if the presence of the Government Commissioner on the Management Board, despite his lack of any concrete intervention in the measure in question, allows the decision to be imputed to the Belgian State in any case.
[33]): Regeringskommissæren kunne ikke gribe ind i forbindelse med beslutningen af 19. juli 2002, medmindre denne beslutning kunne være til skade for SNCB's levering af offentlige tjenesteydelser.
As regards the presence of the Government Commissioner on SNCB’s Management Board, the Commission notes that the commissioner’s role was limited (see also the Audit Office report on this subject [33]:): The Government Commissioner could only intervene with regard to the decision of 19 July 2002 if it was likely to prejudice the implementation of SNCB’s public service duties.
I lyset af støttebeløbets størrelse (2,5 mio. EUR) og støttens form (rentebærende likviditetsforskud) må det konstateres, at beslutningen ikke ville kunne skade SNCB's levering af offentlige tjenesteydelser.
In view of the amount of the aid (EUR 2,5 million) and the nature of the aid (cash advance, with interest), it has to be concluded that the decision was not such as to prejudice the implementation of SNCB’s public service duties.
På baggrund af disse oplysninger konkluderer Kommissionen, at SNCB's tildeling af et forskud på 2,5 mio. EUR til IFB til at opretholde en kommerciel aktivitet, der ikke har nogen forbindelse med offentlige tjenesteydelser, ikke kan tilregnes den belgiske stat.
The Commission concludes that, in view of these factors, the granting of an advance of EUR 2,5 million to IFB by SNCB to maintain commercial activity without any link to public service is not imputable to the Belgian State.
Kommissionen konkluderer, at der i den foreliggende sag ikke findes beviser vedrørende den belgiske administrations deltagelse, aktiviteternes art eller status, som gør det muligt at tilregne den belgiske stat bestyrelsens beslutning af 19. juli 2002 om at tildele IFB et forskud på 2,5 mio. EUR.
The Commission concludes that this case does not contain any evidence in terms of the involvement of the public administration, the nature of the activities concerned or their status which would allow the Management Board’s decision of 19 July 2002 to grant an advance of EUR 2,5 million to IFB to be imputed to the Belgian State.
Perioden efter bestyrelsens beslutning den 20. december 2002
Period subsequent to the Management Board’s decision of 20 December 2002
Den 20. december 2002 besluttede bestyrelsen af indgå en kontrakt med IFB vedrørende redningsforanstaltninger og omstruktureringsforanstaltninger samt at godkende en kapitalforhøjelse i IFB.
On 20 December 2002, the Management Board decided to finalise a framework agreement with IFB, which had to include rescue measures as well as restructuring measures and increase IFB’s capital.
Kommissionens analyse af sagen, som fremgår af åbningsskrivelsens punkt 143-150, har afdækket tre konkrete beviser for, at den belgiske stat kan tilregnes disse rednings- og omstruktureringsforanstaltninger til fordel for IFB.
Analysis of the case by the Commission in its letter initiating the procedure (points 143 to 150) revealed three specific indications of the imputability to the Belgian State of these rescue and restructuring measures in support of IFB.
Disse beviser er:
These indications were:
Omstruktureringsplanen blev forelagt den belgiske stat til godkendelse
The submission of the restructuring plan to the Belgian State for approval,
Presseartikler, der påviser, at den belgiske regering havde en kraftig indflydelse på SNCB i løbet af 2003
The press articles demonstrating strong influence of the Belgian Government on SNCB during the year 2003,
Omfanget og indholdet af samt betingelserne i rammekontrakten af 7. april 2003.
The scope, contents and conditions of the framework agreement of 7 April 2003.
I deres svar på åbningsskrivelsen betvivler de belgiske myndigheder, at disse tre beviser skulle være tilstrækkelige til at fastslå, at foranstaltningerne skulle kunne tilregnes den belgiske stat i overensstemmelse med Stardust Marine-sagen.
In their reply to the letter initiating the procedure, the Belgian authorities contested that these three indications were sufficient to establish the imputability of the measures to the State within the meaning of the Stardust Marine case-law.
Kommissionen gentager nedenfor bevisernes indhold og gør rede for, hvorfor den belgiske regerings argumenter ikke kan godtages.
Below the Commission repeats the contents of the indications, and explains why the Belgian Government’s arguments could not be accepted.
De offentlige myndigheders godkendelse (præmis 56 i Stardust Marine-dommen)
Approval by public authorities (point 56 of the Stardust Marine ruling)
I Domstolens domme i sagerne Van der Kooy [34], Italien mod Kommissionen [35], og Kommissionen mod Frankrig [36] og Kommissionen mod Frankrig var godkendelsen kombineret med andre forhold, som påviste myndighedernes indflydelse.
In its rulings on Van der Kooy [34], Italy/Commission [35] and Commission/France [36], the Court of Justice decided as to the imputability of aid from the fact that the granting of aid had been submitted for the approval of the public authorities.
I sin beslutning vedrørende Space Park Development GmbH, som var den første beslutning, Kommissionen baserede på Stardust Marine-dommen, tilregnes staten en støtte, fordi det pågældende lån skulle godkendes af delstaten Bremen [37] og Kommissionen mod Frankrig var godkendelsen kombineret med andre forhold, som påviste myndighedernes indflydelse.
In the Van der Kooy ruling, this factor alone sufficed to establish imputability; in the Italy/Commission and Commission/France, approval was combined with other elements which showed the influence of central government [37].
I sin beslutning vedrørende Space Park Development GmbH, som var den første beslutning, Kommissionen baserede på Stardust Marine-dommen, tilregnes staten en støtte, fordi det pågældende lån skulle godkendes af delstaten Bremen [38].
The Space Park Development GmbH decision, which was the first decision by the Commission applying the Stardust Marine ruling, equally inferred the imputability of aid from the fact that the loan in question must been approved by the Bremen authorities [38].
Følgelig udgør forelæggelsen af en foranstaltning for en medlemsstat til godkendelse et bevis for tilregnelse.
Consequently, the submission of a measure to the Member State for approval constitutes an indication of imputability.
I den foreliggende sag er SNCB's og IFB's bestyrelser i medfør af rammekontraktens artikel 2 forpligtede til at forelægge den belgiske stat omstruktureringsplanen til godkendelse [39].
In the case in question, Article 2 of the framework agreement obliges the Boards of Directors of SNCB and the IFB to submit their restructuring plan to the Belgian State for approval [39].
Det udgør derfor et første bevis for, at SNCB ' s beslutning om at omstrukturere IFB kan tilregnes den belgiske stat.
This therefore constitutes initial evidence of imputability to the Belgian State of SNCB’s decision to restructure IFB.
Den belgiske regering anfører, at SNCB og IFB, til forskel fra hvad der er anført i rammekontrakten, i sidste instans ikke forelagde den belgiske regering omstruktureringsplanen til godkendelse, fordi det ville have været en overtrædelse af SNCB's kommercielle selvstændighed.
The Belgian Government emphasises that, in contrast to the provisions of the framework agreement, SNCB and IFB did not finally submit the restructuring plan for the approval of the Belgian Government, as that would have violated SNCB’s commercial independence.
Som allerede forklaret i åbningsskrivelsen (punkt 146-147) betyder dette forhold ikke, at beviset for tilregnelse falder bort: Det forekommer udelukket, at de to parter til kontrakten, SNCB og IFT, ville medtage en sådan klausul i kontrakten, hvis den belgiske regering ikke havde haft nogen indflydelse i den retning.
As already explained in the letter initiating the procedure (points 146 and 147), this de facto situation does not render this indication of imputability inoperative: the two parties to the contract, SNCB and IFB, would likely not have included such a clause in the contract, if there was no influence by the Belgian Government to that effect.
At den belgiske regering påstår, at den ikke er blevet formelt hørt om omstruktureringen, er ikke nok til at udelukke, at den kan have haft en uformel indflydelse i forbindelse med udarbejdelsen af rammekontrakten af 7. april 2003 og heller ikke, at planen var blevet godkendt.
The fact that the Belgian Government claims that it was not formally consulted about the restructuring does not suffice to exclude any informal influence of the Belgian Government during the preparation of the framework agreement of 7 April 2003, nor to exclude approval.
Den belgiske regering anfører i sit svar på åbningsskrivelsen, at bestemmelsen i rammekontraktens artikel 2 ikke vedrørte selve omstruktureringsplanen, men Belgiens anmeldelse af rammekontrakten til Kommissionen.
In its reply to the letter initiating the procedure, the Belgian Government explains that the clause contained in Article 2 of the framework agreement does not concern the restructuring plan itself, but the communication by means of which Belgium was going to notify the Commission of the framework agreement.
Kommissionen finder ikke dette argument overbevisende. Hvis parterne i rammekontrakten alene havde tænkt på Belgiens anmeldelse til Kommissionen, ville de have skrevet dette udtrykkeligt i kontraktens artikel 2.
The Commission considers that this argument is unconvincing: if the parties to the framework agreement had had mere notification by Belgium to the Commission in mind, they would have expressly written so in Article 2 of the agreement.
Belgiens forslag til fortolkning strider mod kontraktens bogstav.
The interpretation proposed by the Belgian Government is contrary to the letter of the agreement.