natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Som det sidste punkt anfægter Frankrig ligeledes påstanden om, at tilstedeværelsen af en påstået ulovlig statsstøtte til fordel for IFP/Axens skulle have skadet konkurrenterne og forhindret innovationsudviklingen.
Fifthly, France also contests the assertion that the existence of alleged unlawful State aid in favour of the IFP/Axens entity has caused loss or damage to competitors and impaired the innovation dynamic.
Frankrig bemærker, at UOP Limited er den eneste af mange eksisterende konkurrenter, der har fremsendt bemærkninger til Kommissionen.
France points out that UOP Limited is the only competitor among the many in existence to have submitted comments to the Commission.
Frankrig understreger desuden, at der ikke er fremlagt nogen form for dokumentation for de påståede skader.
France stresses, moreover, that no proof has been furnished of such alleged loss or damage.
Frankrig mener således, at innovationsudviklingen ikke er blevet hindret på markedet for raffinering og petrokemi.
Lastly, France considers that the innovation dynamic is not impaired in the refining and petrochemicals market.
I den forbindelse skulle det af analysen af markedsandele på markedet for teknologilicenser og katalysatorer fremgå, at UOP-koncernen indtager en klart dominerende stilling.
In this connection, in the process licensing and catalyst market, market share analysis shows clear domination by the UOP group.
Hvis man overhovedet kan tale om markedsstyrke, ligger den ifølge Frankrig hos UOP og ikke hos Axens.
If there is any market power, it lies in France’s view with UOP and not with Axens.
Frankrig tilføjer, at selv om UOP’s markedsstyrke skulle være blevet svækket, skyldes det UOP’s egne strategiske fejltagelser, bl.a. på markedet for afsvovling, hvor UOP har undladt at investere og dermed har udelukket sig selv fra en stærkt indtægtsgivende aktivitet.
France adds that, if UOP’s market power has weakened, this can be attributed to UOP’s own strategic errors, inter alia, in the desulphurisation market, in which UOP has ceased to invest, thereby missing out on a strong revenue-generating activity.
Svar på den anonyme klage
In response to the anonymous complaint
For det første fastholder Frankrig, at reorganiseringen af IFP’s aktiviteter blev anmeldt til Kommissionen.
First, France reaffirms that the reorganisation of IFP’s activities was indeed notified to the Commission.
Korrespondancen fra 2001, hvorved Frankrig informerede Kommissionen om den plan om en intern reorganisering, der førte til, at IFP’s kommercielle aktiviteter blev lagt ud i datterselskaber, var at betragte som en anmeldelse i den i traktatens artikel 88, stk. 3, fastsatte betydning.
The 2001 letters, by which it informed the Commission of the internal reorganisation plan which led to IFP’s commercial activities being split off into a subsidiary, did constitute notifications within the meaning of Article 88(3) of the Treaty.
For det andet henviser Frankrig til argumentationen i sine bemærkninger (jf. punkt 4.3) og sine svar på UOP’s bemærkninger (jf. betragtning 95 ff.), der tilbageviser påstanden om, at IFP og Axens skulle udgøre én samlet økonomisk enhed.
Secondly, France repeats the arguments advanced both in its own comments (see Section 4.3) and in response to the comments from UOP (see recitals 95 et seq.) which contradict the assertion that IFP and Axens form a single economic unit.
For det tredje insisterer Frankrig på, at IFP’s forskning inden for resultatcentret »Raffinering-Petrokemi« er til fordel for forskellige industrielle partnere fra flere forskellige stater […] [15] Oplysninger, der skal behandles fortroligt.
Thirdly, France emphasises that the research carried out by IFP at the ‘Refining-Petrochemicals’ results centre benefits various industrial partners from several countries […] [15] Information covered by professional secrecy.
og ikke kun for Axens som påstået af klageren.
, and not just Axens as the complainant claims.
For det fjerde anfører Frankrig, at i modsætning til klagerens påstand om, at halvdelen af Axens’ indtjening skulle hidrøre fra salget af proceslicenser og levering af dertil knyttede tjenesteydelser, var teknologilicensernes (process licensing) andel af Axens’ omsætning i 2003, 2004 og 2005 henholdsvis 36 %, 38 % og 31 %.
Fourthly, contrary to the complainant’s assertion that over half of Axens’s income is generated by the sale of process licences and the provision of related services, France indicates that the share of Axens’s turnover in 2003, 2004 and 2005 accounted for by process licensing came to 36 %, 38 % and 31 % respectively.
For det femte anfægter Frankrig klagerens påstand om, at Axens ikke skulle have sine egne forskningsfaciliteter.
Fifthly, France contests the complainant’s assertion that Axens does not have any research facilities of its own.
Axens råder tværtimod over sine egne menneskelige og materielle ressourcer til at udføre prækompetitiv forskning med henblik på godkendelse forud for markedsføringen: dimensioneringsprogrammel, værktøjer til processimulationer, apparatur til evaluering af katalysatorer og adsorptionsmidler og forsøgsanlæg til udvikling af katalysatorer og simulation af sammenkædning af enkeltstadier før industriel ekstrapolation.
On the contrary, Axens has its own human and material resources with which to carry out its pre-competitive development work with a view to pre-market type approval, namely: dimensioning software, process simulation tools, catalyst and adsorbent evaluation apparatus, and pre-industrial-extrapolation catalyst development and unit step sequence simulation pilot plants.
Axens’ ressourcer skulle i øvrigt have gjort det muligt for selskabet at færdiggøre udviklingen af produkter og processer, der var forelagt af andre tredjeparter end IFP.
Axens’s resources have, moreover, according to France, enabled it to finalise the development of products and processes proposed by third parties other than IFP.
For det sjette fastholder Frankrig, at IFP stadig i kraft af sin opgave og sine aktiviteter fremstår som et nonprofit-foretagende, der udelukkende udfører en almennyttig opgave, som er det pålagt af staten.
Sixthly, France reaffirms that, through its mission and its activities, IFP still possesses the characteristics of a non-profit-making institution performing fully a general-interest mission conferred by the State.
Denne analyse understøttes af IFP’s og dets datterselskabers drift og organisation, eftersom IFP har sørget for, at dets datterselskaber er helt selvstændige og uafhængige.
This analysis is borne out by the functioning and organisation of IFP and its subsidiaries insofar as IFP has ensured that its commercial subsidiaries are completely autonomous and independent.
Frankrig mener derfor med henvisning til punkt 2.4, første afsnit, i F & U-rammebestemmelserne fra 1996, at finansieringen af IFP som et forskningsinstitut med et almennyttigt formål ikke kan betragtes som statsstøtte.
France considers therefore that, in accordance with the first subparagraph of point 2.4 of the 1996 R & D framework, the financing of IFP, a non-profit institution, does not constitute State aid.
For det syvende afviser Frankrig specifikt påstanden om, at IFP’s forskningsaktivitet skulle kunne sammenlignes med simpel udvikling af en »teknologiproces« (technology process), der kan anvendes direkte af kommercielle virksomheder i deres industriproduktion.
Seventhly, France refutes specifically the point that IFP’s research activity ought to be seen as the mere development of a technology process capable of being used directly by commercial enterprises for their industrial production.
Frankrig fremlægger i den forbindelse detaljerede oplysninger om udviklingscyklusserne for processer og produkter.
It provides on this point detailed information concerning the development cycles of processes and products.
For det ottende henviser Frankrig til de bemærkninger, man efter åbningen af proceduren fremsendte vedrørende klagerens påstand om, at vederlaget for den forskning, IFP udfører for Axens, ikke skulle svare til markedsvilkårene (jf. betragtning 60).
Eighthly, France refers to the comments transmitted following the initiation of the procedure concerning the complainant’s assertion that the remuneration for the research work carried out by IFP on behalf of Axens is not in line with market conditions (see recital 60).
For det niende anfægter Frankrig påstanden om, at den støtte, Axens i givet fald skulle modtage, skulle andrage 50 mio. EUR i 2003, og henviser i den forbindelse til de fremsendte finansielle oversigter.
Ninthly, France contests the assertion that the amount of aid allegedly received by Axens came to EUR 50 million for 2003, basing itself in this respect on the financial schedules provided.
UOP lægger desuden en del af sin forskning uden for virksomheden via partnerskaber med forskningsinstitutter og -laboratorier eller universiteter, der selv modtager offentlige midler.
It outsources, moreover, part of its research through partnerships with research institutes and laboratories or with universities, which are themselves in receipt of public funding.
UOP samarbejder således med Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, Synchrotron Catalysis Consortium under Delaware Universitet samt med College of Engineering under Illinois Universitet i Urbana-Champaign og med norske SINTEF.
UOP thus collaborates with the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, the Argonne National Laboratory, the Synchrotron Catalysis Consortium of the University of Delaware, the College of Engineering of the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, and Sintef in Norway.
Tilstedeværelsen af statsstøtte
Existence of State aid
Identificering af de potentielle modtagere
Identification of potential beneficiaries
Kommissionen mente i beslutningerne fra 1996 og 1998, at den offentlige støtte til IFP’s F & U-aktiviteter ikke faldt ind under bestemmelserne i traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, eftersom IFP var en almennyttig forskningsorganisation, der ikke havde kommercielle aktiviteter.
In its 1996 and 1998 decisions, the Commission found that the State aid granted for IFP’s R & D activities did not fall within the scope of Article 87(1) of the Treaty insofar as IFP was a non-commercial, non-profit-making research organisation.
I sin beslutning om at indlede den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure drog Kommissionen imidlertid denne analyse delvist i tvivl med den begrundelse, der er opsummeret i betragtning 37 i den foreliggende beslutning.
However, in its decision to initiate the procedure the Commission, for the reasons set out in recital 37 of this Decision, partly called this analysis into question.
Kommissionen mente bl.a., at IFP gennem sine datterselskaber Axens, Beicip-Franlab og Prosernat havde involveret sig i økonomiske aktiviteter på henholdsvis markedet for raffineringsteknik og petrokemi, markedet for rådgivning om udnyttelse af olieforekomster og udgivelse og formidling af programmel til olieudvinding samt markedet for teknologi til gasbehandling og genindvinding af svovl (i det følgende benævnt »de berørte markeder«).
It found, inter alia, that, through its subsidiaries Axens, Beicip-Franlab and Prosernat, IFP was engaged in economic activities in, respectively, the market for refining and petrochemicals technologies, the market for oilfield operation consultancy services and the contract development of oilfield software, and the market for gas treatment and sulphur recovery technologies (hereinafter called ‘the relevant markets’).
Det bør derfor undersøges, om den offentlige støtte til IFP ikke resulterer i statsstøtte på de berørte markeder.
Consequently, it must be examined whether or not the public subsidy paid to IFP amounts to State aid in the relevant markets.
For at fastslå, om der foreligger statsstøtte, har Kommissionen forsøgt at identificere de eventuelle modtagere.
In order to establish the existence of State aid, the Commission has identified potential beneficiaries.
Ud fra en konkurrencemæssig analyse mener Kommissionen ikke, at IFP og dets datterselskaber Axens, Beicip-Franlab og Prosernat kan betragtes som særskilte økonomiske aktører.
The Commission considers that, from a competition standpoint, IFP and its subsidiaries Axens, Beicip-Franlab and Prosernat cannot be deemed distinct economic operators.
Kommissionen baserer sig først og fremmest på, at IFP direkte ejer 100 % af aktiekapitalen i henholdsvis Axens og Beicip-Franlab og indirekte ejer 100 % af aktiekapitalen i Prosernat.
It bases this view primarily on the direct holding by IFP of 100 % of Axens’s capital and 100 % of Beicip-Franlab’s capital and on the indirect holding of 100 % of Prosernat’s capital.
Kommissionen baserer sig i sine konkurrencemæssige analyser normalt på kapitalstrukturen som udtryk for virksomheders uafhængighed.
Capital structure is commonly used by the Commission in its competition analyses as a measure of enterprises’ independence.
I den forbindelse skal Kommissionen erindre om, at hvis man benytter kriteriet om kapitalstrukturen, således som det er præciseret artikel 3, stk. 3, i bilaget til SMV-henstillingen, vil virksomhedskoncerner af større økonomisk styrke end en SMV under ingen omstændigheder kunne betegnes som SMV.
In this connection the Commission would reiterate that, by taking into account the capital structure criterion as specified in Article 3(3) of the Annex to the SME Recommendation, it is possible to eliminate from the SME category groups of enterprises whose economic power may exceed that of an SME.
Ifølge SMV-henstillingen er der tale om »tilknyttede« virksomheder, hvis en virksomhed råder over flertallet af aktionærstemmerne i en anden virksomhed.
The SME Recommendation states that enterprises are ‘linked’ where one enterprise has a majority of the shareholders’ or members’ voting rights in another enterprise.
Samme henstilling er desuden blevet benyttet i andre meddelelser fra Kommissionen, bl.a. i Fællesskabets rammebestemmelser for statsstøtte til redning og omstrukturering af kriseramte virksomheder [25], når det skal afgøres, om der er tale om en uafhængig virksomhed.
This recommendation is also used in other Commission communications, including the Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty [25], to determine whether or not an enterprise is independent.
Kapitalstrukturen er ligeledes nævnt i artikel 5, stk. 4, litra b), i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004 af 20. januar 2004 om kontrol med fusioner og virksomhedsovertagelser (»EF-fusionsforordningen«) [26] samt i artikel 1, stk. 2, i Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 772/2004 af 27. april 2004 om anvendelse af traktatens artikel 81, stk. 3, på kategorier af teknologioverførselsaftaler [27].
Capital structure is also referred to in Article 5(4)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (‘the EC Merger Regulation’) [26] and in Article 1(2) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements [27].
Ud over kriteriet om kapitalstrukturen tager Kommissionen hensyn til flere andre forhold, der samlet set bekræfter Kommissionens analyse, hvorefter IFP og dets datterselskaber set fra kunders og konkurrenters synspunkt ikke kan holdes adskilt.
Besides the criterion of capital structure, the Commission takes into account several elements which, taken together, confirm the Commission’s analysis that IFP and its subsidiaries are, in the eyes of customers and competitors in the relevant markets, indistinguishable.
EF-Domstolen fastslår således i sin dom i sagen om Intermills/Kommissionen [28], »at de tre virksomheder i sagen, på trods af, at de hver især har status som selvstændige juridiske personer i forhold til det tidligere Intermills-selskab, tilsammen udgør en enhed, i hvert fald for så vidt angår den støtte, der er ydet af de belgiske myndigheder.
As the Court of Justice of the European Communities stated in its judgment in Intermills/Commission [28], ‘in spite of the fact that the three manufacturing companies each has a legal personality separate from the former SA Intermills, all those undertakings together form a single group, at least as far as the aid granted by the Belgian authorities is concerned.
Kommissionen var derfor ved anvendelse af traktatens artikel 92 berettiget til at betragte den samlede koncern som en enkelt virksomhed«.
The Commission was therefore justified in considering the entire group to be a single “undertaking” for the purposes of the application of Article 92 of the Treaty’.
Hvad angår IFP’s og dets datterselskabers opgaver, konstaterer Kommissionen, at nok adskiller IFP’s hovedformål og vedtægter sig fra datterselskabernes, men udnyttelsen af IFP’s F & U-resultater på markedet figurerer ikke desto mindre blandt de vigtigste formål, staten har opstillet i sin formålsaftale med IFP, og indgår i IFP’s udviklingsstrategi.
As regards the tasks and activities of IFP and its subsidiaries, the Commission notes that, whereas the principal object and the statutes of IFP differ from those of its subsidiaries, the exploitation in the market of IFP’s R & D results numbers among the priorities laid down by the State in its contract of objectives with IFP and forms part of IFP’s development strategy, the aim being to ‘secure a financial return on its R & D expenditure, thereby enhancing its research effort’ (obtenir un retour financier sur ses dépenses de R & D, qui vient amplifier son effort de recherce) while profiting from the opportunities afforded by the markets:
Det drejer sig således om at opnå et finansielt udbytte af IFP’s F & U-udgifter, som skal anvendes til at udvide IFP’s forskningsaktiviteter yderligere, idet man skal udnytte de muligheder, der ligger på markederne:
in the ‘Refining-Petrochemicals’ field, the contract of objectives states that ‘It is IFP’s ambition, during the current decade, to widen its field of activity and increase its market share so as to become a key player at world level … [The aim is] to strengthen the new business hub formed by IFP’s Industrial Division and Procatalyse [Axens], which is to benefit from the fillip provided by licence sales and to make the most of IFP’s R & D potential in this field’.
på området »Prospektering-Produktion« skal man i de enkelte projekter udnytte »hele koncernens kompetencer« bedst muligt, især dem, der ligger i de direkte datterselskaber, og dermed skabe synergier, hvor det overhovedet er muligt, for at sikre den mest effektive markedsdækning [29].
in the ‘Exploration-Production’ field, ‘the best use should be made, on a case-by-case basis, of “Group competencies”, in particular those of direct subsidiaries, and every possible synergy should be harnessed from this arrangement in order to ensure the most effective possible coverage of markets’ (il convient, au cas par cas, d’utiliser au mieux les ‘compétences Groupe’, notamment celles des filiales directes, et de tirer toutes les synergies possibles de ce dispositif, pour assurer la couverture la plus efficace possible des marchés) [29].
Hvad angår den reelle kontrol over datterselskaberne, har Kommissionen dels noteret sig, at ledende medarbejdere fra IFP sidder i datterselskabernes besluttende instanser, dels hvilke beslutningscentre der fastlægger strategierne og træffer de grundlæggende beslutninger:
On the question of effective control of the subsidiaries, the Commission has taken account, first, of the presence of IFP managers in the subsidiaries’ decision-taking bodies and, secondly, of the decision-taking centres for strategic planning and key decisions:
Axens: Pr. 10. november 2005 havde bestyrelsen ni medlemmer, hvoraf de seks var ledende medarbejdere hos IFP, de fem endda medlemmer af IFP’s forretningsudvalg.
Axens: as at 10 November 2005, of the nine members of its management board, six also belonged to IFP’s senior management, and five in particular sat on IFP’s executive committee.
Prosernat: Pr. 1. januar 2003 var tre medlemmer af de i alt fem medlemmer af Prosernats bestyrelse samtidig medlemmer af IFP’s forretningsudvalg.
Prosernat: as at 1 January 2003, three of the five members of Prosernat’s management board also belonged to IFP’s executive committee.
Prosernats bestyrelse træffer beslutning om strategiplaner, oprettelse af nye aktiviteter og almindelige virksomhedsaftaler.
Prosernat’s management board decides on strategic plans, the annual budget, the creation of new activities and joint venture agreements.
Kommissionen noterer sig, at eneretsaftalerne i deres egenskab af aftaler reguleret ved lov er indgået i henhold til helt præcise regler, hvorefter IFP’s repræsentant i bestyrelsen ikke deltager i afstemninger om spørgsmål i relation til eneretsaftalerne.
The Commission notes that, as regulated agreements, the exclusive agreements are governed by specific rules according to which IFP’s representative on the management board does not participate in voting on matters to do with the exclusive agreements.
Men selv om IFP’s repræsentant ikke deltager i afstemningen, stemmer de øvrige medlemmer af bestyrelsen, også dem, der er ledende medarbejdere hos IFP.
Notwithstanding this, even if the IFP representative does not take part in the vote, other members of the management board who are also senior IFP managers do take part.
Kommissionen medgiver, at eneretsaftalerne ikke i sig selv er bevis for, at der ikke er tale om uafhængige virksomheder.
The Commission concedes that the exclusive agreements do not in themselves constitute evidence of an absence of autonomy on the part of the enterprises.
Men Kommissionen noterer sig, at disse aftaler er væsentlige for datterselskabernes økonomiske aktiviteter.
It notes, however, that the agreements are essential to the subsidiaries’ economic activities.
Kommissionen henviser desuden til, at mulighederne for at deltage i samarbejdsforskningsprojekter med andre virksomheder inden for datterselskabernes forretningsområder er nøje fastlagt i eneretsaftalerne.
The Commission also takes account of the fact that the possibilities for collaborative research with other enterprises in the subsidiaries’ fields of activity are strictly defined in the exclusive agreements.
IFP kan således kun deltage i et forskningsprojekt inden for de berørte datterselskabers forretningsområder, såfremt datterselskaberne afstår fra at gøre deres forhåndsret gældende og ikke selv ønsker at gennemføre forskningsprojektet [30].
Thus, IFP can embark on a research project in the fields of activity of the subsidiaries concerned only insofar as the latter do not wish to carry out the project after exercising their right of first refusal [30].
IFP har ligeledes forhåndsret til de forskningsprojekter, de berørte datterselskaber ønsker at gennemføre.
Similarly, IFP has a right of first refusal over all the research work the subsidiaries concerned may wish to carry out.
Først når IFP har afstået fra at gøre sin forhåndsret gældende, kan de berørte datterselskaber tilbyde forskningsprojektet til andre virksomheder [31].
It is only after IFP has exercised its right of first refusal that the subsidiaries concerned may propose the research project to other enterprises [31].
Efter Kommissionens opfattelse er disse restriktioner udtryk for en markant økonomisk integration mellem IFP og de berørte datterselskaber.
The Commission considers these restrictions to be evidence of strong economic integration between IFP and the subsidiaries concerned.
Kommissionen har desuden noteret sig, at der foreligger aftaler om tilrådighedsstillelse af bl.a. lokaler og personale:
The Commission has taken account, moreover, of the existence of assignment contracts for, among other things, the provision of premises and staff:
for Axens: lokaler, kantine, personale, administrative ydelser
for Axens: premises, corporate catering, staff, administrative services,
for Beicip-Franlab: likviditet, personale
for Beicip-Franlab: liquidity, staff,
for Prosernat: juridiske og finansielle tjenesteydelser.
for Prosernat: legal and financial services.