natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I lighed med sin konklusion vedrørende iværksættelsen af FOGASA I-aftalen mener Kommissionen, at FOGASA's adfærd ikke kan sammenlignes med Banestos, som ved indgåelsen af aftalen i 1996 søgte at beskytte en del af sin fordring, hvorimod FOGASA, som kun havde kunnet inddrive en del af den gæld, der var omfattet af aftalen fra 1993, indgik en ny aftale i 1995 vedrørende ny gæld.
As with the implementation of the FOGASA I agreement, the Commission considers that FOGASA’s behaviour is not comparable to that of BANESTO, which sought to protect a part of its loan by concluding the 1996 agreement, whereas FOGASA, which had only recovered a part of the debts that were covered by the 1993 agreement, concluded a new agreement in 1995 relating to new debts.
Den nye aftale blev indgået på trods af følgende:
That new agreement was concluded despite the fact that:
aftalen af 5. november 1993 var delvis misligholdt
the agreement of 5 November 1993 had not been complied with in full;
den nye aftale vedrørte ny gæld i forhold til FOGASA, som endnu en gang havde efterkommet ansøgninger fra SNIACE's medarbejdere om udbetaling af deres løn og
it related to new debts contracted with FOGASA, which, once again, had satisfied the demands of SNIACE workers concerning the payment of their wages; and
det var en kendt sag, at SNIACE havde finansielle svagheder, at det var en virksomhed i krise på grund af gentagne tab i mange år, med en negativ egenkapital og en stor gæld, som det fremgår af tabellen i betragtning 59.
the financial fragility of SNIACE, which was an undertaking in crisis as a result of repeated losses incurred over many years, negative equity capital and its substantial debt as shown in the table contained in recital (59), was well-known.
Det er tillige klart, at FOGASA ikke overvejede muligheden for at tvangsfuldbyrde gælden ved indløsning af sit pantebrev.
Moreover, it is clear that FOGASA did not contemplate the possibility of enforcing repayment of the debt by enforcing the mortgage established in its favour.
En tvangsfuldbyrdelse ville godt nok kunne have betydet en nedlukning af virksomheden, men der hersker ikke den mindste tvivl om, at FOGASA ved en afvikling af SNIACE's aktiver ville kunne have inddrevet hele eller dele af gælden.
Admittedly, enforced repayment could have resulted in the closure of the undertaking, but there is no doubt that, if SNIACE had been liquidated, FOGASA could have recovered all or part of the debt after the undertaking’s assets were transferred.
Kommissionen gør her navnlig opmærksom på, at de spanske myndigheder gentagne gange har fremført, at det ikke var muligt at anslå virksomhedens værdi med henblik på at beregne det beløb, der kunne inddrives, og at værdien af virksomhedens aktiver under alle omstændigheder i tilfælde af en afvikling ville kunne vise sig at have tabt væsentligt i værdi [16].
On this point, the Commission notes that the Spanish authorities have repeatedly maintained that it was impossible to estimate the value of the undertaking, which would have made it possible to calculate the amount that could be recovered, and that, in any case, in the event of liquidation, the value of the undertaking’s assets could have depreciated significantly [16].
Det er derfor klart, at FOGASA afviste muligheden af en afvikling af SNIACE og i stedet foretrak en løsning i form af gældsomlægning.
Clearly, for that reason, FOGASA discarded the possibility of liquidating SNIACE in favour of the rescheduling solution.
Det blotte forhold at ville inddrive den samlede gæld, herunder eventuelt gennem en afvikling af SNIACE, er ikke tilstrækkeligt for de spanske myndigheder [17].
For the Spanish authorities, the mere fact of trying to recover the debt in full, including through the closure of SNIACE, is insufficient [17].
Konklusion vedrørende FOGASA II-aftalen
Conclusion on the FOGASA II agreement
idet FOGASA ikke krævede betaling af gælden i medfør af aftalen fra 1993 i overensstemmelse med den tidsplan, der var fastlagt i aftalen
by not requiring payment of the debts that were covered by the 1993 agreement in accordance with the schedule laid down in that agreement;
idet FOGASA indvilligede i indgåelse af en ny aftale vedrørende ny gæld.
by accepting the conclusion of an agreement relating to new debts.
TGSS-AFTALEN
THE TGSS AGREEMENT
Kommissionen mener derfor, at det drejer sig om en og samme aftale med senere ændringer.
The Commission therefore considers that these agreements amounted to a single agreement that was amended a number of times.
På tidspunktet for indgåelsen af den første aftale mellem TGSS og SNIACE, nemlig den 8. marts 1996, samt på tidspunktet for den første ændring, dvs. den 7. maj 1996, havde de private kreditorer endnu ikke indgået nogen aftale.
At the time when the first agreement was concluded between the TGSS and SNIACE, on 8 March 1996, and the time when it was first amended, on 7 May 1996, the private creditors had still not reached an agreement.
Først fra og med tidspunktet for den anden ændring af aftalen, dvs. den 30. september 1997, kan TGSS's stilling sammenholdes med de private kreditorers.
Only when the agreement was amended for the second time, that is on 30 September 1997, could the TGSS’s position be compared with that of the private creditors.
Det kan derfor for indeværende godtages, at TGSS gik videre end de private kreditorer ved at indgå en aftale med det formål at øge chancerne for at inddrive sine fordringer mest muligt.
It may be conceded, at that stage, that the TGSS went further than the private creditors by concluding an agreement to maximise the prospects of recovering their loans.
Muligheden for TGSS for at inddrive det samlede gældsbeløb uden at lide økonomiske tab
Possibility of recovering in full the sums owed to the TGSS without suffering any financial loss
TGSS kan i overensstemmelse med spansk lovgivning indgå aftaler om omlægning af gæld, såfremt det sker til den lovbestemte mindsterente på tidspunktet for aftalens indgåelse.
Under Spanish legislation, the TGSS may conclude debt rescheduling agreements provided that it applies the legal interest rate in force when the agreement is concluded.
TGSS forsøgte således at beskytte sin fordring uden at lide økonomiske tab, jf. Tubacex-dommen.
In this way, the TGSS tried to protect its loans without suffering financial losses, following the Tubacex judgment.
Udsigter for virksomhedens rentabilitet
Prospects of profitability of the undertaking
Som allerede nævnt i betragtning 63, nr. iii), var SNIACE på tidspunktet for indgåelsen af denne aftale en kriseramt virksomhed på grund af de gentagne tab over mange år, en negativ egenkapital og en stor gæld.
At the time when that agreement was concluded, as has already been stated in recital (63(iii)), SNIACE was an undertaking in crisis as a result of repeated losses incurred over several years, negative equity capital and its substantial debt.
De spanske myndigheder bekræftede derimod i deres svar af 10. september 2008, at de ikke var i besiddelse af sådanne dokumenter.
Instead, the Spanish authorities stated in their reply of 10 September 2008 that they did not have those documents.
Det står således klart, at TGSS kendte til SNIACE's finansielle forhold og navnlig misligholdelsen af aftalerne med FOGASA.
It is clear, then, that the TGSS knew SNIACE’s financial situation, in particular, its failure to fulfil its commitments towards FOGASA.
Da aftalen blev indgået i 1996, ville TGSS på grundlag af virksomhedens regnskaber kunne have efterprøvet, at SNIACE kun delvis have efterlevet aftalen fra 1993 og endvidere havde indgået en ny aftale med FOGASA i 1995 (dvs. ca. seks måneder før aftalen med TGSS), som omhandlede ny gæld.
As the agreement was concluded in 1996, the TGSS could have verified from the undertaking’s accounting documents that SNIACE had only partially honoured the agreement of 1993 and that, moreover, it had concluded a new agreement with FOGASA in 1995 (that is to say, approximately 6 months before the agreement with the TGSS), which related to new debts.
Konklusion vedrørende TGSS-aftalen
Conclusion on the agreement with the TGSS
Kommissionen er nået til den konklusion, at TGSS ikke udviste en adfærd, der svarer til en privat kreditors:
The Commission has arrived at the conclusion that the TGSS did not act as a private creditor would have done:
idet SNIACE misligholdte sin tilbagebetaling til en anden offentlig kreditor (FOGASA), som ydermere havde accepteret en kumulering af gæld, og
because SNIACE did not fully repay its loan from another public creditor (FOGASA) which, moreover, had agreed to an accumulation of debts; and
idet udsigterne til rentabilitet var så usikre på grund af de til stadighed forværrede finansielle forhold.
owing to uncertain prospects of profitability caused by the continued deterioration of the financial situation.
KONKLUSION OM FOREKOMSTEN AF STATSSTØTTE
CONCLUSION ON THE EXISTENCE OF AID
Det er Kommissionens synspunkt, at kun den foranstaltning, der førte til aftalen af 5. november 1993 mellem FOGASA og SNIACE, kan anses for at opfylde kriteriet om den private kreditor.
In the Commission’s opinion, only the measure that led to the agreement of 5 November 1993 between FOGASA and SNIACE can be regarded as fulfilling the private creditor criterion.
Den pågældende foranstaltning påfører imidlertid ikke SNIACE nogen fordel.
Therefore, that measure does not grant an advantage to SNIACE.
I lyset af ovenstående mener Kommissionen derimod, at iværksættelsen af FOGASA I-aftalen, som ændret den 18. marts 1999, af FOGASA II-aftalen og af TGSS-aftalen påfører SNIACE fordele som omhandlet i traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
On the other hand, the Commission considers that the implementation of the FOGASA I agreement, as amended on 18 March 1999, the FOGASA II agreement and the TGSS agreement grant advantages to SNIACE for the purposes of Article 87(1) of the Treaty for the reasons set out above.
Disse foranstaltninger giver SNIACE en fordel, da de sætter virksomheden i stand til at udsætte sine lovmæssige forpligtelser i forhold til indbetaling af socialsikringsbidrag og tilbagebetaling af gæld til FOGASA, forpligtelser, som SNIACE normalt ville skulle have båret, hvis kreditorerne havde været private kreditorer.
In fact, those measures grant an advantage to SNIACE by enabling it to reschedule its legal obligations relating to the payment of social security contributions and the debts contracted with FOGASA, which SNIACE would normally have had to fulfil if those creditors had been private creditors.
For så vidt angår de øvrige kriterier, mener Kommissionen for det første, at foranstaltningerne blev finansieret over statslige midler, idet både FOGASA og TGSS er offentlige institutioner, hvis midler hidrører fra indbetalingen af lovpligtige bidrag.
As regards the other criteria, the Commission considers, firstly, that the measures are financed by State funds, as both FOGASA and the TGSS are public bodies whose resources arise from the payment of compulsory contributions.
For det andet er de pågældende foranstaltninger selektive, idet de udelukkende finder anvendelse på SNIACE.
Secondly, the contested measures are selective as they apply only to SNIACE.
For det tredje er der på de markeder, hvor SNIACE er aktiv, en høj grad af samhandel mellem medlemsstaterne.
Thirdly, the markets in which SNIACE operates are characterised by a high level of trade between Member States.
SNIACE afsætter en del af sin produktion i Europa i konkurrence med andre virksomheder.
SNIACE markets part of its production in Europe, where it competes with other undertakings.
Støtten til SNIACE kan dermed påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
Consequently, the aid granted to SNIACE may affect trade between Member States.
Foranstaltningerne truer deslige med at fordreje konkurrencen mellem producenter af tekstilvarer.
Accordingly, those measures threaten to distort competition between producers of textile products.
Kommissionen mener således, at foranstaltningerne i tilknytning til iværksættelsen af FOGASA I-aftalen, FOGASA II-aftalen og TGSS-aftalen udgør statsstøtte som omhandlet i traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
Therefore, the Commission considers that the measures relating to the implementation of the FOGASA I agreement, the FOGASA II agreement and the TGSS agreement constitute State Aid for the purposes of Article 87(1) of the Treaty.
UNDERSØGELSE AF STØTTENS FORENELIGHED MED FÆLLESMARKEDET
EXAMINATION OF THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE AID
Foreneligheden af foranstaltninger, der udgør statsstøtte som omhandlet i traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, skal vurderes i forhold til de undtagelsesbestemmelser, der er indeholdt i stk. 2 og 3 i samme artikel.
The compatibility of the measures considered as State Aid under Article 87(1) of the Treaty must be assessed on the basis of the exemptions provided for in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the same article.
Undtagelsesbestemmelsen i artikel 87, stk. 2, og i artikel 87, stk. 3, litra b), d) og e), kan under ingen omstændigheder bringes i anvendelse, da foranstaltningerne ikke skulle fremme virkeliggørelsen af et projekt af fælleseuropæisk interesse eller afhjælpe alvorlige forstyrrelser i en medlemsstats økonomi, ej heller fremme kulturen eller bevare kulturarven.
The exemptions provided for in Article 87(2) and in Article 87(3)(b), (d) and (e), are clearly not applicable as the measures are not intended to promote the execution of a major project of common Community interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State, or to promote culture and heritage conservation.
Det drejer sig heller ikke om en anden form for støtte, hvorom Rådet på forslag af Kommissionen træffer beslutning med kvalificeret flertal.
Nor do they come under another category of aid determined by decision of the Council acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission.
Det drejer sig derfor om at vurdere undtagelsesbestemmelserne vedrørende udviklingen i visse regioner eller af visse erhvervsgrene omhandlet i artikel 87, stk. 3, litra a) og c).
Consequently, the exemptions relating to the development of certain regions or sectors provided for in Article 87(3)(a) and (c), should be assessed.
Når det drejer sig om støtte til at fremme udviklingen af visse erhvervsgrene, og under hensyntagen til de her omhandlede foranstaltningers karakter, er de eneste relevante kriterier dem, der finder anvendelse på rednings- og omstruktureringsstøtte til kriseramte virksomheder.
As regards aid intended to promote the development of certain sectors, and taking into account the nature of the measures in question, the only relevant criteria are those relating to aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty.
Når det drejer sig om støtte til fremme af udviklingen i visse regioner, gør Kommissionen opmærksom på, at den region, hvor SNIACE er beliggende, siden september måned 1995 er berettiget til støtte med regionalt sigte som omhandlet i artikel 87, stk. 3, litra a), og at regionen forud herfor var berettiget til støtte med regionalt sigte som omhandlet i artikel 87, stk. 3, litra c).
As regards aid intended to promote the development of certain regions, the Commission notes that the region in which SNIACE is situated may opt, from September 1995, for regional aid under Article 87(3)(a), and that, before that date, it could opt for regional aid under Article 87(3)(c).
Det påhviler således Kommissionen at vurdere foranstaltningerne på grundlag af Fællesskabets rammebestemmelser for statsstøtte til redning og omstrukturering af kriseramte virksomheder og Fællesskabets retningslinjer for statsstøtte med regionalt sigte.
Consequently, the Commission has to analyse the measures in the light of the Community guidelines on aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty and the guidelines on regional aid.
I overensstemmelse med Kommissionens meddelelse om fastlæggelse af reglerne for vurdering af ulovlig statsstøtte [19] skal foranstaltningerne vurderes i forhold til de retningslinjer og rammebestemmelser, der var gældende på tidspunktet for støttens tildeling.
Pursuant to the Commission notice on the determination of the applicable rules for the assessment of unlawful State aid [19], the measures must be assessed in accordance with the guidelines in force at the time when the aid was granted.
Statsstøtte til redning og omstrukturering af kriseramte virksomheder
Aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty
For så vidt angår reglerne for støtte til redning og omstrukturering af kriseramte virksomheder, er der ingen tvivl om, at Kommissionen siden offentliggørelsen af den Ottende Beretning om Konkurrencepolitikken i 1979 og i alle efterfølgende rammebestemmelser stiller krav om fremlæggelse af en omstruktureringsplan, der gør det muligt at genoprette rentabiliteten for de kriseramte virksomheder [20].
As regards the rules relating to aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty, it is clear that, since the publication of the Eighth Report on Competition Policy of 1979 and in all its successive guidelines, the Commission requires a restructuring plan enabling the viability of the firms in difficulty to be restored [20].
I nærværende sag har de spanske myndigheder aldrig gjort gældende, at foranstaltningerne skulle være rednings- eller omstruktureringsstøtte.
In the present case, the Spanish authorities have never argued that the measures are rescuing and restructuring aid.
De har heller ikke forsøgt at påvise, at det drejede sig om en omstruktureringsplan med henvisning til de gældende regler på tidspunktet for tildelingen af den pågældende støtte.
Nor have they tried to show that they form part of a restructuring programme for the purposes of the rules applicable on the date when the contested aid was granted.
For så vidt angår den rentabilitetsplan, som blev forelagt Kommissionen inden procedurens indledning, begrænsede de spanske myndigheder sig til at gøre gældende, navnlig i brevet af 30. juni 1997 som svar på Kommissionens brev af 16. maj 1997, at ekspertens konklusion om, at »SNIACE's levedygtighed udelukkende skyldtes, at virksomheden modtog subsidier, der muliggjorde investeringsprojekter og omlægning af gæld« var en rent personlig vurdering, udtrykt i en privat undersøgelse, og at den ikke nødvendigvis afspejlede de spanske myndigheders synspunkt [22].
As regards the viability plan that the applicant submitted to the Commission before the procedure was initiated, the Spanish authorities confined themselves to stating, in particular, in their letter of 30 June 1997 in reply to the Commission’s letter of 16 May 1997, that the expert’s conclusion that ‘SNIACE’s viability can only be guaranteed by granting subsidies enabling investment projects to be implemented and debt to be renegotiated’ was a purely personal opinion expressed in a private study, and did not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Spanish authorities [22].
Da der således ikke foreligger nogen omstruktureringsplan, kan de foranstaltninger, der vedtoges i tilknytning til iværksættelsen af FOGASA II-aftalerne, TGSS-aftalen og FOGASA I-aftalen således ikke begrundes i Kommissionens Ottende Beretning om Konkurrencepolitikken eller Fællesskabets rammebestemmelser om statsstøtte til redning og omstrukturering af kriseramte virksomheder fra 1994, 1999 eller 2004.
Consequently, as there was no restructuring programme, the measures adopted within the framework of the FOGASA II and TGSS agreements and the implementation of the FOGASA I agreement are not justified on the basis of the Eighth Report of the European Commission on Competition Policy of 1979 or the Community guidelines on State Aid for rescuing and restructuring of 1994, 1999 or 2004.
Når det drejer sig om undtagelsesbestemmelserne i artikel 87, stk. 3, litra a) og c), vedrørende støtte til fremme af udviklingen i visse regioner, gør Kommissionen opmærksom på, at den region, hvor SNIACE er beliggende, siden september måned 1995 er berettiget til støtte med regionalt sigte som omhandlet i artikel 87, stk. 3, litra a), og at regionen forud herfor var berettiget til støtte med regionalt sigte som omhandlet i artikel 87, stk. 3, litra c).
As for the exemptions laid down in Article 87(3)(a) and (c) relating to aid intended to promote or facilitate the development of certain areas, the Commission points out that the area in which SNIACE is established may opt, from September 1995, for regional aid under Article 87(3)(a), and that, before that date, it could opt for regional aid under Article 87(3)(c).
Støtten til SNIACE udviser imidlertid ingen af de kendetegn, der er nødvendige for at fremme udviklingen i visse regioner som omhandlet i nævnte artikel, da den blev ydet som driftsstøtte, dvs. uden at være betinget af nogen som helst investering eller jobskabelse.
However, the aid granted to SNIACE lacks the necessary characteristics to facilitate the development of certain economic regions for the purposes of the said article, as it was granted in the form of operating aid, that is without being subject to any condition relating to investment or job creation.
Kommission har siden 1979 [23] kun godkendt støtte, der ikke er betinget af initialinvestering eller jobskabelse i regioner, der er berettiget til regionalstøtte, når den pågældende medlemsstat har kunnet påvise regionens særlige ulemper og deres omfang, hvilket ikke har været tilfældet i denne sag.
Since 1979 [23] the Commission only authorises aid that is not subject to an initial investment or job creation in regions that may opt for regional aid where the Member State succeeds in proving the existence of handicaps and gauges their importance, which has not occurred in this case.
De foranstaltninger, der vedtoges i tilknytning til iværksættelsen af FOGASA II-aftalerne, TGSS-aftalen og FOGASA I-aftalen kan således ikke begrundes i hverken Kommissionens meddelelse fra 1979 eller retningslinjerne for statsstøtte med regionalt sigte fra 1998.
Consequently, the measures adopted within the framework of the FOGASA II and TGSS agreements and the implementation of the FOGASA I agreement cannot be justified on the basis of the Commission communication of 1979 or the Guidelines on regional aid of 1998.
Støtte til kunstfiberindustrien
Aid for the synthetic fibres sector
For så vidt angår de regler for kunstfiberindustrien, som var gældende på tidspunktet for aftalernes indgåelse [24], mener Kommissionen, at den eneste støtte, der kunne berettiges, var investeringsstøtte.
As regards the rules on the textile fibres sector applicable at the time when the agreements were concluded [24], the Commission considers that the only possible aid option was investment aid.
De pågældende foranstaltninger udviser imidlertid ingen tegn på at være investeringsstøtte.
However, the contested measures do not have any of the features of investment aid.
De foranstaltninger, der vedtoges i tilknytning til iværksættelsen af FOGASA II-aftalerne, TGSS-aftalen og FOGASA I-aftalen, kan således ikke begrundes i rammebestemmelserne fra hverken 1992 eller 1996.
The measures adopted within the framework of the FOGASA II and TGSS agreements and the implementation of the FOGASA I agreement are not justified on the basis of the guidelines of 1992 or 1996.
Konklusion vedrørende støttens forenelighed med fællesmarkedet
Conclusion on the compatibility of the aid
Kommissionen mener, at de nærmere vilkår i FOGASA I-aftalen, som ændret den 18. marts 1999, samt indgåelsen af FOGASA II-aftalen og TGSS-aftalen ikke kan erklæres forenelige med fællesmarkedet.
The Commission considers that the implementing provisions of the FOGASA I agreement, as amended on 18 March 1999, and the conclusion of the FOGASA II and TGSS agreements cannot be declared compatible.
PROCEDURE FOR TILBAGEBETALING AF ULOVLIG STØTTE
PROCEDURE FOR RECOVERY OF THE UNLAWFUL AID
Idet Kommissionen mener, at iværksættelsen af FOGASA I-aftalen, ændret den 18. marts 1999, samt af FOGASA II-aftalen og TGSS-aftalen er uforenelig med traktaten, skal støttemodtageren tilbagebetalte de modtagne beløb.
Since the Commission considers that the implementation of the FOGASA I agreement, as amended on 18 March 1999, and of the FOGASA II and TGSS agreements are incompatible with the Treaty, the beneficiary must return the amounts received.