natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ud over de bemærkninger, der er anført ovenfor med hensyn til foranstaltning P2, har Elefsis gjort gældende, at eftersom foranstaltning P3 og P4 er blevet ydet på et tidspunkt, hvor det var klart, at HSY ikke havde gennemført sin omstrukturerings-/investeringsplan og ikke havde overholdt vilkårene i beslutning N 401/97, var der en væsentlig risiko for, at den sikkerhed, der var stillet for disse lån, dvs. betalingen af den godkendte investeringsstøtte, var ulovlig og dermed ugyldig og ikke mulig at håndhæve.
Elefsis claims, in addition to the comments indicated previously with respect to measure P2, that since the measures P3 and P4 have been granted at a time when it was clear that HSY had failed to implement its restructuring/investment plan and had failed to respect the terms of decision N 401/97, there was a material risk that the security given for these loans, i.e. the payment of the approved investment aid, was unlawful and thus void and unenforceable.
De græske myndigheder (og HSY) har gjort gældende, at dette lån blev ydet på markedsvilkår.
The Greek authorities (and HSY) claim that this loan was granted on market terms.
Navnlig er rentesatsen den samme som satsen i forbindelse med nogle lån, som ETVA havde ydet til andre virksomheder i denne periode.
In particular, the interest rate is similar to the one of some loans granted by ETVA to other firms during this period.
HSY kunne have optaget lån hos enhver anden bank, men foretrak logisk nok ETVA, som var dets aktionær.
HSY could have borrowed from any other bank but logically preferred ETVA which was its shareholder.
Desuden udgjorde sikkerhedsstillelsen i form af overdragelsen af fordringerne på den første rate af investeringsstøtten en sikkerhed, som var acceptabel for enhver bank.
In addition, the security in the form of the conveyance of the claims on the first tranche of the investment aid constituted a collateral acceptable to any bank.
Endelig har Grækenland bemærket, at lånet blev tilbagebetalt fuldt ud til banken.
Finally, Greece notes that the loan was fully reimbursed to the bank.
Kommissionen har allerede konkluderet i forbindelse med vurderingen af foranstaltning P2, at foranstaltning P3 ikke er omfattet af EF-traktatens artikel 296.
The Commission has already concluded in the assessment of measure P2 that measure P3 does not fall within the scope of Article 296 of the Treaty.
Den skal derfor vurderes i henhold til statsstøttereglerne.
It must therefore be assessed under State aid rule.
For det første bemærker Kommissionen, at lånet blev ydet af ETVA og ikke var dækket af en statsgaranti.
First, the Commission notes that the loan has been granted by ETVA and was not covered by a State guarantee.
Med hensyn til foranstaltningens selektivitet har Grækenland bemærket, at andre virksomheder modtog lån fra ETVA til samme rentesatser.
As regards the selectivity of the measure, Greece observes that other firms received loans from ETVA at similar interest rates.
Som allerede forklaret i forbindelse med vurderingen af foranstaltning P2, er en foranstaltning imidlertid kun en generel foranstaltning, hvis den opfylder strenge betingelser, som klart ikke er opfyldt i det foreliggende tilfælde.
However, as already explained in the assessment of measure P2, a measure is a general measure only if it fulfils strict conditions, which are clearly not fulfilled in the present case.
F.eks. er foranstaltningen ikke åben for alle virksomheder på samme vilkår, da rentesatserne varierer fra den ene låntager til den anden og afhænger af ETVA's beslutning om at yde et lån eller ej og på hvilket betingelser.
For instance the measure is not open to all firms on an equal access basis, since interest rates vary from one borrower to the other and depend on the decision of ETVA to grant the loan or not, and on which conditions.
Foranstaltningen er derfor selektiv.
The measure is therefore selective.
Med hensyn til spørgsmålet, om der foreligger en fordel, bemærker Kommissionen, at dette lån blev ydet efter den 30. juni 1999, på et tidspunkt, hvor selskabet ikke længere havde adgang til lånemarkedet, som redegjort for i afsnit 3.1 i denne beslutning.
As regards the existence of an advantage, the Commission notes that this loan was granted after 30 June 1999, at a time when the firm had no access to the loan market anymore, as explained in section 3.1 of the present decision.
Den omstændighed, at ETVA forlangte samme rentesats for nogle lån til andre virksomheder i den pågældende periode, beviser ikke, at denne rentesats havde været acceptabel for en privat bank under lignende omstændigheder.
The fact that ETVA charged a similar interest rate for some loans to other firms during that period does not prove that this interest rate would have been acceptable for a private bank in similar circumstances.
For det første er den rentesats, som en privat bank forlanger for et bestemt lån, afhængig af låntagerens kreditværdighed.
First, the interest rate demanded by a private bank on a particular loan depends on the creditworthiness of the borrower.
Grækenland har ikke påvist, at der i forbindelse med de andre låntagere på listen var samme risiko for misligholdelse som i forbindelse med HSY.
Greece has not shown that the other borrowers in the list had a risk of default similar to the risk of default of HSY.
Kommissionen minder om, at HSY's situation var meget dårlig på det pågældende tidspunkt.
The Commission recalls that the situation of HSY was very bad at the time.
Det er derfor sandsynligt, at en markedsøkonomisk investor havde forlangt en højere rentesats for lån til HSY end for lån til sunde virksomheder.
It is therefore likely that a market economy investor would have requested a higher interest rate for loans to HSY than for loans to healthy firms.
For det andet ville den liste, som Grækenland har fremlagt, selv hvis risikoen for misligholdelse var lige så stor i forbindelse med de andre låntagere som i forbindelse med HSY, stadig være utilstrækkelig til, at det kan konkluderes, at denne rentesats var markedsprisen.
Second, even if the other borrowers had a risk of default as high as HSY, the list provided by Greece would still be insufficient to conclude that this interest rate was the market price.
Den liste, som Grækenland har fremlagt, indeholder således kun lån ydet af ETVA, som var en statsejet bank (og desuden en udviklingsbank), og det er derfor muligt, at de andre lån også indeholder et støtteelement.
Indeed, the list provided by Greece contains only loans granted by ETVA, which was a State-owned bank (and in addition a development bank), and it is therefore possible that the other loans also contain an aid element.
Det beviser derfor ikke, at de havde været acceptable for en privat bank.
It therefore does not prove that they would have been acceptable to a private bank.
De græske myndigheder har også hævdet, at sikkerhedsstillelsen i form af overførslen af fordringer på den første rate af investeringsstøtten udgjorde sikkerhed, som havde gjort lånet acceptabelt for enhver privat bank.
The Greek authorities also assert that the security in the form of the conveyance of the claims on the first tranche of the investment aid constituted a collateral, which would have rendered the loan acceptable to any private bank.
Kommissionen bemærker, at ifølge den beslutning, hvorved staten godkendte investeringsstøtten, ville betalingen af den første rate af støtten finde sted, så snart det kompetente kontrolorgan havde konstateret, at investeringsudgifterne udgjorde 2,73 mia. GRD.
The Commission notes that, according to the government decision by which the investment aid was approved, the payment of the first tranche of the aid would take place once the competent control body would have observed that the investment expenses amount to GRD 2,73 billion.
Desuden skulle betalingen finde sted inden den 31. december 1999.
In addition, the payment had to take place before 31 December 1999.
Der kunne imidlertid stadig opstå forskellige problemer, som ville forhindre betalingen af støtten.
However, different problems preventing the payment of the aid could still occur.
For det første var det i tilfælde af, at HSY gik konkurs, ikke sikkert, at de græske myndigheder havde accepteret at betale investeringsstøtten til en virksomhed, der havde indstillet driften.
First, in case of bankruptcy of HSY, it was not certain that the Greece authorities would have accepted to pay the investment aid to a firm that would have ceased operations.
Banken ville i så fald skulle indlede kostbare og langvarige retssager for at inddrive midlerne.
The bank would then have had to start costly and lengthy legal actions to recover the money.
For det andet er det ikke sikkert, at de kompetente kontrolorganer havde accepteret at godkende de afholdte investeringsudgifter, således at tærsklen ikke ville blive nået rettidigt.
Second, it is not certain that the competent control bodies would have accepted to validate the investment expenses incurred, such that the threshold would not be reached in due time.
Som anført i kapitel 1 »Sagsforløb« i denne beslutning anmodede Kommissionen om, da den senere fik kendskab til forsinkelsen i forbindelse med gennemførelsen af investeringsplanen, at betalingen af den støtte, der endnu ikke var blevet udbetalt til HSY, blev suspenderet.
As indicated in chapter 1 ‘Procedure’ of the present decision, when the Commission later learnt about the delay in the implementation of the investment plan, it asked the suspension of the payment of the aid which had not yet been paid to HSY.
Kommissionen konkluderer, at statens betaling af den første rate af investeringsstøtten var sandsynlig, men ikke sikker.
The Commission concludes that the payment of the first tranche of the investment aid by the State was likely but not certain.
I betragtning af HSY's vanskelige situation havde en privat bank krævet sikkerhedsstillelse, som kunne håndhæves hurtigt og med sikkerhed, og havde ikke stillet sig tilfreds med sikkerhed, hvis værdi kunne være nul under visse omstændigheder.
In view of the difficult situation of HSY, a private bank would have required securities that could be enforced rapidly and with certainty, and would have not been satisfied with security of which the value could be zero in certain circumstances.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at en privat bank ikke havde accepteret at yde dette lån.
The Commission thus concludes that a private bank would not have accepted to grant this loan.
Som nævnt bekræftes dette af HSY's mislykkede forsøg på at skaffe midler fra markedsøkonomiske investorer.
As indicated previously, this is confirmed by HSY’s unsuccessful attempts to raise funds from market economy investors.
Grækenland har endvidere gjort gældende, at eftersom ETVA var aktionær i HSY, varetog den sine interesser ved at tilvejebringe dette lån til HSY.
Greece also claims that, since ETVA was the shareholder of HSY, it served its interests by providing this loan to HSY.
I afsnit 3.1.3 i denne beslutning har Kommissionen allerede afvist denne påstand.
In section 3.1.3 of the present decision, the Commission has already rejected this claim.
Endelig med hensyn til den omstændighed, at lånet er blevet tilbagebetalt, har Kommissionen allerede forklaret i forbindelse med vurderingen af foranstaltning P2, hvorfor en sådan omstændighed ikke viser, at en privat bank havde accepteret at tilvejebringe denne finansiering til HSY på det pågældende tidspunkt.
Finally, regarding the fact that the loan has been reimbursed, the Commission has already explained in the assessment of measure P2 why such a fact does not show that a private bank would have accepted to provide this financing to HSY at that moment.
På baggrund af ovenstående konkluderer Kommissionen, at lånet giver HSY en fordel, eftersom det ikke kunne have opnået dette lån på markedet.
From the foregoing considerations, the Commission concludes that the loan gives an advantage to HSY since it could not have received this loan from the market.
Kommissionen konkluderer, at foranstaltning P3 udgør støtte i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
The Commission concludes that measure P3 constitutes aid in the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty.
Da støtten i strid med kravet i EF-traktatens artikel 88, stk. 3, blev ydet uden forudgående anmeldelse, udgør den ulovlig støtte.
Since, contrary to the requirement laid down in Article 88(3) of the Treaty, the aid was granted without prior notification, it constitutes unlawful aid.
Ligesom foranstaltning P2 skal denne foranstaltnings forenelighed vurderes i henhold til forordning (EF) nr. 1540/98.
As measure P2, the compatibility of the present measure must be assessed under Regulation (EC) No 1540/98.
Da dette lån, som i forbindelse med foranstaltning P2, havde til formål at finansiere en investeringsplan, der indgik i en omstruktureringsplan, og da det blev ydet til en kriseramt virksomhed, bør det også betragtes som omstruktureringsstøtte, der er omfattet af artikel 5 i forordning (EF) nr. 1540/98.
Since, as measure P2, this loan aimed at financing an investment plan which was a part of a restructuring plan and since it was granted to a firm in difficulty, it should also be considered as restructuring aid covered by Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1540/98.
De rammebestemmelser, der fandt anvendelse på det tidspunkt, hvor lånet blev ydet, var de rammebestemmelser, som var blevet offentliggjort i De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende den 23. december 1994 og trådte i kraft samme dag (i det følgende »rammebestemmelserne for rednings- og omstruktureringsstøtte fra 1994«).
The guidelines applicable at the time of the grant were the ones published in the Official Journal on 23 December 1994 and which entered into force on the same day (hereinafter the 1994 R & R guidelines).
F.eks. med hensyn til betingelse i) »Genoprettelse af virksomhedens rentabilitet« bemærker Kommissionen, at statsgarantien finansierede en investeringsplan, der indgik i en omstruktureringsplan, som i juli 1999 var blevet utilstrækkelig til at genoprette HSY's rentabilitet på længere sigt.
For instance, regarding condition (i) ‘Restoration of viability’, the Commission notes that the State guarantee financed an investment plan which was part of a restructuring plan which, in July 1999, had become insufficient to restore the long term viability of HSY.
Med hensyn til betingelse iii) »Støtte i forhold til omstruktureringsomkostninger og -fordele« havde Kommissionen allerede fastslået i beslutning N 401/97, at statsstøtte maksimalt kunne udgøre 50 % af investeringsomkostningerne, og at de resterende 50 % ville blive finansieret af midler fra aktionærerne og banklån optaget på markedsvilkår.
Regarding the condition (iii) ‘Aid in proportion to the restructuring costs and benefits’, the Commission had already decided in decision N 401/97 that State aid could at the maximum amount to 50 % of the investment costs and the remaining 50 % would be financed by funds raised from the shareholders and by bank loans raised at market conditions.
Der kunne derfor ikke ydes yderligere støtte til fordel for investeringsplanen, da den førnævnte intensitet på 50 % i modsat fald ville blive overskredet, og Kommissionen kunne ikke antage, at støtten står i forhold til »omstruktureringsomkostninger og -fordele«.
Consequently, no additional aid in favour of the investment plan could be granted otherwise the aforementioned percentages of 50 % would be breached and the Commission could not consider that the aid is proportional to ‘the restructuring costs and benefits’.
På baggrund af ovenstående finder Kommissionen, at lånet udgør ulovlig og uforenelig støtte, som skal tilbagesøges.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission consider that the loan constitutes unlawful and incompatible aid, which must be recovered.
Da HSY efter den 30. juni 1999 ikke kunne have optaget noget lån på markedet, skal hele lånet tilbagesøges.
Since after 30 June 1999 HSY could not have received any loan from the market, the entire loan has to be reimbursed.
Dette er imidlertid utilstrækkeligt til at genoprette den situation, der ville have foreligget uden støtte, eftersom HSY over en årrække har draget fordel af et lån, som det ikke havde modtaget uden statslig indgriben.
This is however insufficient to restore the situation that would have prevailed without aid since during several years HSY has benefited from a loan which it would not have received without State intervention.
Med henblik på at opveje denne fordel finder Kommissionen, i overensstemmelserne med konklusionen i afsnit 3.1 i denne beslutning, at forskellen mellem rentesatsen på lånet og referencesatsen for Grækenland forhøjet med 600 basispoint bør tilbagesøges for hvert år fra udbetalingen af lånet til HSY og indtil tilbagebetalingen heraf.
In order to recover this advantage, the Commission considers, in accordance with the conclusion reached in section 3.1 of the present decision, that the difference between the interest rate of the loan and the reference rate of Greece increased by 600 basis points needs to be recovered for each year from the pay-out of the loan to HSY until its reimbursement.
Kommissionen bemærker, at staten i marts 2002 solgte hovedparten af ETVA's aktier til Piraeus Bank.
The Commission notes that in March 2002 the State sold the majority of ETVA’s shares to Piraeus Bank.
For at besvare dette spørgsmål minder Kommissionen om, at når staten yder et lån med en rentesats under markedssatsen, ydes støtten på det tidspunkt, hvor lånet optages, selv hvis fordelen først konkretiseres på hver rentebetalingsdato, når låntageren betaler en lavere rentesats.
In order to answer this question, the Commission recalls that when the State grants a loan with an interest rate below the market rate, the aid is granted at the time of the conclusion of the loan, even if the advantage only materialises at each interest payment dates, when the borrower pays a lower interest rate.
På samme måde falder markedsværdien af et lån, som har en rentesats, der ikke i tilstrækkelig grad afspejler låntagerens vanskeligheder, straks efter undertegnelsen af lånekontrakten (dvs. ikke på de fremtidige datoer, hvor låntagerne betaler en rentesats under markedsrentesatsen).
In the same manner, the market value of a loan which has an interest rate not reflecting adequately the difficulties of the borrower decreases immediately after the signature of the loan contract (i.e. not at the future dates when the borrowers pays an interest rate below the market interest rate).
Ligeledes afhænger en banks værdi af værdien af dens aktiver og navnlig dens portefølje af eksisterende lån.
In turn, the value of a bank depends on the value of its assets, and notably its portfolio of existing loans.
Ydelsen af lån på vilkår, der ikke var i overensstemmelse med markedet, nedsatte derfor værdien af ETVA og reducerede følgelig den pris, som staten senere modtog, da den solgte aktierne i ETVA.
Therefore, the granting of loans at non market conform conditions decreased the value of ETVA and therefore diminished the price that the State later received when it sold ETVA’s shares.
Dette viser, at det er staten, der bar omkostningerne ved disse støtteforanstaltninger, selv efter marts 2002.
This illustrates that it is the State which supported the cost of these aid measures, including for their duration running after March 2002.
Lån på 13,75 mio. EUR ydet i 2002 (foranstaltning P4)
EUR 13,75 million loan granted in 2002 (measure P4)
Lånet ville blive anvendt som et forskud på anden og tredje rate af investeringsstøtten.
The loan would be used as an advance on the second and third tranches of the investment aid.
Lånet blev sikret gennem overdragelse af betalingen af den anden og tredje rate af investeringsstøtten.
The loan was secured by the conveyance of the payment of the second and third tranches of the investment aid.
Elefsis’ bemærkninger til denne foranstaltning er de samme som bemærkningerne til foranstaltning P3.
Elefsis’s comments on this measure are similar to the comments on measure P3.
De græske myndigheder har gjort gældende, at dette lån blev ydet på markedsvilkår.
The Greek authorities claim that this loan was granted on market terms.
Desuden udgjorde sikkerhedsstillelsen i form af overdragelsen af fordringerne på den anden og tredje rate af investeringsstøtten en sikkerhed, som var acceptabel for enhver bank.
In addition, the security in the form of the conveyance of the claims on the second and third tranches of the investment aid constituted a collateral acceptable to any bank.
Endelig blev lånet aldrig udbetalt til HSY, og det kunne derfor ikke udgøre støtte til HSY.
Finally, the loan was never paid out to HSY and it could therefore not constitute aid to HSY.
Den omstændighed, at ETVA har afvist at udbetale lånet, da den blev klar over, at betalingen af investeringsstøtten var blevet »fastfrosset« af proceduremæssige grunde, og at betalingen af støtten var usikker, viser desuden, at ETVA handlede, som enhver anden bank ville havde gjort.
In addition, the fact that ETVA has refused to pay out the loan when it realised that the payment of the investment aid had been ‘freezed’ for procedural reasons and that the payment of the aid was uncertain illustrates that ETVA acted as any other bank would have done.
Kommissionen har tidligere konkluderet i forbindelse med vurderingen af foranstaltning P2, at foranstaltning P4 ikke er omfattet af EF-traktatens artikel 296.
The Commission has previously concluded in the assessment of measure P2 that measure P4 does not fall in the scope of Article 296 of the Treaty.
Kommissionen bemærker, at eftersom ETVA afviste at udbetale lånet til HSY, modtog HSY aldrig nogen midler i forbindelse med lånekontrakten.
The Commission observes that, since ETVA refused to pay out the loan to HSY, HSY never received any money under the loan contract.
Der er derfor ikke tale om nogen fordel for HSY, og Kommissionen kan umiddelbart konkludere, at foranstaltningen ikke udgør støtte.
Therefore, there is no advantage to HSY and the Commission can immediately conclude that the measure does not constitute aid.
Følgende to elementer vedrørende foranstaltning P4 kan, selv hvis de er irrelevante for vurderingen heraf, rejse tvivl om gyldigheden af vurderingen af andre foranstaltninger.
The two following elements concerning measure P4, even if they are irrelevant for the assessment of measure P4, may cast doubts on the validity of the assessment of other measures.
Kommissionen vil derfor analysere dem.
Therefore the Commission will analyse them.
For det første har Grækenland gjort gældende, at den omstændighed, at ETVA på grund af risikoen for, at investeringsstøtten ikke ville blive udbetalt, besluttede ikke at udbetale lånet til HSY, viser, at ETVA handlede som en normal privat långiver og ikke indrømmede HSY en favorabel behandling.
First, Greece claims that the fact that ETVA, because there was a risk that the investment aid would not be paid, decided not to disburse the loan to HSY illustrates that ETVA acted as a normal private lender and did not offer to HSY a favourable treatment.
Kommissionen bemærker, at Grækenlands påstand ikke tager hensyn til den omstændighed, at da ETVA afviste at udbetale lånet, var den allerede under Piraeus Banks kontrol og ikke længere under statslig kontrol.
The Commission notes that Greece’s claim fails to take into account the fact that when ETVA refused to pay out the loan it was already under the control of Piraeus Bank and not under State control anymore.
Afvisningen af at udbetale lånet kan derfor ikke bruges som eksempel på ETVA's adfærd, da den var under statslig kontrol.
Therefore, the refusal to pay out the loan can not be taken as an illustration of the way ETVA behaved when it was under State control.
Omvendt bekræfter dette, at en privat bank havde undgået udlån til HSY.
Conversely, this confirms that a private bank would have avoided to lend to HSY.
For det andet bemærker Kommissionen, at foranstaltning P4 har samme form for sikkerhed som foranstaltning P3. Foranstaltning P4 blev aftalt, da Piraeus Bank allerede havde overtaget ETVA.
Second, the Commission notes that measure P4 has the same type of collateral as measure P3.