natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Inden der foretages en vurdering af foreneligheden efter EF-traktatens artikel 87, skal det undersøges, om EF-traktatens artikel 296 finder anvendelse.
Before undertaking an assessment of the compatibility under Article 87 of the Treaty, the applicability of Article 296 of the Treaty needs to be considered.
Kommissionen bemærker, at HSY på grundlag af beslutningen om ydelsen var forpligtet til at anvende det garanterede lån samt de to andre lån, der var omfattet af beslutningen om at indlede proceduren (dvs. foranstaltning P3 og P4), til finansieringen af investeringsprogrammet.
The Commission notes that on the basis of the granting decision, HSY was obliged to use the guaranteed loan as well as the two others loans covered by the opening decision (i.e. measures P3 and P4) for the financing of the investment programme.
Som konkluderet i forbindelse med vurderingen af foranstaltning P1 er investeringsprogrammet ikke omfattet af EF-traktatens artikel 296.
As concluded in the assessment of measure P1, the investment programme does not fall within the scope of Article 296 of the Treaty.
Kommissionen finder derfor, at disse tre lån, der var øremærket til finansieringen af investeringsprogrammet, er omfattet af statsstøttereglerne og ikke EF-traktatens artikel 296.
The Commission therefore considers that these three loans earmarked for the financing of the investment programme are subject to State aid rules and are not covered by Article 296 of the Treaty.
Det skal først undersøges, om statsgarantien opfylder betingelserne for at være statsstøtte efter EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
It first needs to be verified whether the State guarantee fulfils the conditions to be State aid in the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty.
Grækenland anfægtede ikke denne anvendelse.
Greece did not contest that application.
Omvendt anvendte Grækenland den også til at vurdere foranstaltning P2.
Conversely, Greece also applied it to assess measure P2.
For at en foranstaltning falder ind under artikel 87, stk. 1, skal den for det første omfatte statsmidler.
First, in order to fall under Article 87(1), a measure must involve State resources.
Dette er tilfældet med hensyn til foranstaltning P2, da staten ved at yde denne garanti sætter statsmidler på spil.
This is the case for measure P2 since, by granting this guarantee, the State put State resources at risk.
For det andet skal det undersøges, om foranstaltningen er selektiv eller ej.
Second, it needs to be established whether the measure is selective.
Grækenland har gjort gældende, at staten har ydet forskellige garantier til andre virksomheder og også forlangt en præmie på 1 %.
Greece claims that the State has granted several guarantees to other firms and charged also a premium of 1 %.
Grækenland fremlagde en liste over disse virksomheder.
Greece provided a list of these firms.
Efter Kommissionens opfattelse viser denne omstændighed ikke, at foranstaltningen var en generel foranstaltning.
The Commission considers that this fact does not show that the measure was a general measure.
For at være en generel foranstaltning skal en foranstaltning gælde alle erhvervsdrivende på en medlemsstats område.
In order to be a general measure, a measure must be open to all economic agents operating within a Member State.
Den skal reelt være åben for alle virksomheder på samme vilkår, og den må ikke i praksis kunne gøres mindre generel, f.eks. ved at staten har diskretionær beføjelse til at yde støtten, eller gennem andre faktorer, der begrænser dens virkning i praksis.
It must be effectively open to all firms on an equal access basis, and they may not de facto be reduced in scope through, for example, the discretionary power of the State to grant them or through other factors that restrict their practical effect.
Den foreliggende foranstaltning kan derfor ikke anses for at være en generel foranstaltning.
The present measure can therefore not be considered to be a general one.
Blot fordi visse virksomheder har modtaget en statsgaranti, betyder dette ikke, at alle virksomhederne kunne få en garanti.
In particular, it is not because certain firms have received a State guarantee that all the firms could receive one.
Grækenland har ikke påvist, at ydelsen af en statsgaranti er åben for alle erhvervsdrivende på samme vilkår.
Greece has not shown that the granting of a State guarantee is open to all economic agents on an equal access basis.
Desuden er alle virksomhederne på den liste, som Grækenland har fremlagt, statsejede virksomheder eller virksomheder, der udfører en række militære aktiviteter.
In addition, all the firms that appear in the list provided by Greece are State-owned firms or firms carrying out some military activities.
Det lader derfor til, at private virksomheder ikke havde kunnet få en sådan garanti til finansieringen af deres normale aktiviteter.
It seems therefore that private firms could not have received such a guarantee for the financing of their normal activities.
Grækenland anfører faktisk ikke det retsgrundlag, hvorpå finansministeren den 8. december 1999 besluttede at yde garantien.
In fact, Greece does not indicate the legal basis on the basis of which the Minister of Finance decided on 8 December 1999 to grant the guarantee.
Det er sandsynligt, at det er lov 2322/1995, der er en selektiv foranstaltning, som det vil blive forklaret i forbindelse med vurderingen af foranstaltning E12b.
It is likely that it is Law 2322/1995, which is a selective measure as it will be explained in the assessment of measure E12b.
For det tredje skal det påvises, at der foreligger en fordel.
Third, the existence of an advantage must be demonstrated.
I overensstemmelse med punkt 2.2.2 i meddelelsen om garantier er der ingen formodning om støtte til långiveren, eftersom garantien blev ydet inden ydelsen af lånet og ikke »efterfølgende«.
In accordance with point 2.2.2 of the Notice on guarantees, since the guarantee was granted before the granting of the loan and not ‘ex post’, there is no presumption of aid to the lender.
Det er derfor støtten til låntageren, der skal undersøges, som defineret i punkt 2.1.1 i meddelelsen om garantier.
It is therefore the aid to the borrower that needs to be investigated, as defined in point 2.1.1 of the Notice on guarantees.
Grækenland har gjort gældende, at der ikke er tale om nogen fordel, eftersom HSY kunne have opnået et lignede lån ved at tilbyde en bank anden sikkerhed i stedet for en statsgaranti.
Greece claims that there is no advantage since HSY could have obtained a similar loan by offering a bank other securities instead of a State guarantee.
Efter Kommissionens opfattelse behøver den ikke at undersøge, om HSY ved at tilbyde anden sikkerhed kunne have opnået dette lån eller ej.
The Commission considers that it does not have to investigate whether, by offering other securities, HSY could have obtained this loan.
Kommissionen skal dog vurdere, om den faktiske transaktion, som staten har gennemført, nemlig ydelse af en garanti for et lån uden nogen sikkerhed, havde været acceptabelt for en markedsøkonomisk investor.
Indeed, the Commission must assess whether the actual transaction implemented by the State, namely granting a guarantee on a loan without benefiting of any security, would have been acceptable to a market economy investor.
En garanti for et lån, der er sikret ved et pant i aktiver eller ved overdragelse af fordringer, udgør en anden transaktion.
A guarantee on a loan secured by a lien on some assets or by the conveyance of claims constitutes a different transaction.
Som anført i punkt 2.1.1 i meddelelsen om garantier er en af de potentielle fordele ved statsgarantien låntagerens mulighed for at »stille mindre sikkerhed«.
As indicated in section 2.1.1 of the Notice on guarantee, one of the potential advantages of the State guarantee is the possibility for the borrower ‘to offer less security’.
Selv om muligheden for at opnå finansiering ved at tilbyde mere sikkerhed skulle vurderes, har Kommissionen desuden allerede konkluderet i afsnit 3.1 i denne beslutning, at HSY ikke havde opnået lån eller garantier hos private banker efter den 30. juni 1999, selv hvis selskabet havde tilbudt banken sikkerhed.
In addition, even if the possibility to obtain a financing by offering more securities had to be assessed, the Commission has already concluded in section 3.1 of the present decision that after 30 June 1999 HSY would not have received loans or guarantees from private banks, even by offering a security to the bank.
Kommissionen konkluderer, at eftersom statsgarantien blev ydet i december 1999, gav den HSY en fordel ved at tilvejebringe finansiering, som HSY ikke kunne have opnået på markedet.
The Commission concludes that, since the State guarantee was granted in December 1999, it gave an advantage to HSY by providing financing which HSY could not have received from the market.
Grækenland har også gjort gældende, at garantigebyret på 1 % var markedsprisen, og at der derfor ikke er tale om nogen fordel.
Greece also claims that the guarantee fee of 1 % was the market price and there is therefore no advantage.
Kommissionen bemærker, at Grækenland ikke fremlagde nogen markedsdata, som viser, at banker var rede til at yde en garanti til den pris.
The Commission notes that Greece did not provide any market data showing that banks were ready to grant a guarantee at that price.
Grækenland fremlagde kun en liste over garantier, som staten havde ydet i samme periode til samme pris.
Greece only provided a list of guarantees provided by the State during the same period for the same price.
Kommissionen forstår ikke, hvordan denne liste over statsgarantier kunne bevise, at det garantigebyr, der blev forlangt af HSY, er i overensstemmelse med markedet og ikke udgør støtte.
The Commission fails to understand how this list of State guarantees could prove that the guarantee fee asked from HSY is market conform and does not constitute aid.
Denne liste kan navnlig ikke betragtes som »en statsgarantiordning [, der] ikke udgør statsstøtte efter artikel 87, stk. 1«, da den, som garantien til fordel for HSY viser, ikke opfylder mange af betingelserne i punkt 4.3 i meddelelsen om garantier.
In particular, this list can not be considered as ‘a State guarantee scheme [which] does not constitute State aid under Article 87(1)’ since, as the guarantee in favour of HSY illustrates, it does not fulfil many of the conditions laid down in section 4.3 of the Notice on guarantees.
Selv om et garantigebyr på 1 % kunne være i overensstemmelse med markedet for andre (sunde) virksomheder, ville dette endvidere ikke automatisk betyde, at det var tilfældet med hensyn til en kriseramt virksomhed som HSY.
Furthermore, even if a guarantee fee of 1 % might have been market conform for other (healthy) companies, this would not automatically make it market conform for a company in difficulties like HSY.
Med hensyn til påstanden om, at et garantigebyr under markedsprisen kunne være acceptabelt for en privat investor under lignende omstændigheder, fordi Grækenland var aktionær i HSY, har Kommissionen allerede afvist denne påstand i afsnit 3.1 i denne beslutning.
As regards the claim that a guarantee fee below the market price could be acceptable for a private investor in similar circumstances because Greece was shareholders of HSY, the Commission has already dismissed this claim in section 3.1 of the present decision.
Grækenlands argumentation i denne henseende må derfor afvises.
The corresponding point made by Greece must therefore be dismissed.
Endelig med hensyn til den omstændighed, at lånet, som Grækenland har gjort gældende, tilbagebetales i overensstemmelse med vilkårene i kontrakten, kan Kommissionen ikke se, hvordan det kunne bevise, at en privat bank ville have ydet det pågældende lån.
Finally, as regards the fact raised by Greece that the loan is reimbursed in accordance with the terms of the contract, the Commission fails to see how it could prove that a private bank would have granted the loan in question.
Det afgørende er således virksomhedens situation og de oplysninger, der var tilgængelige på det tidspunkt, hvor garantien blev ydet.
Indeed, what matters is the situation of the firm and the information available when the guarantee was granted.
Som et subsidiært element bemærker Kommissionen, at værftet i overensstemmelse med de oplysninger, der var tilgængelige på det tidspunkt, hvor garantien blev ydet, og på grundlag af hvilke det kunne forventes, at værftet ville notere alvorlige tab i de følgende år, virkelig har registreret store tab i de følgende år, og dens nettoegenkapital blev virkelig meget negativ.
As a subsidiary element, the Commission observes that, in accordance with the information available at the time of the granting of the guarantee and on the basis of which it could be expected that the yard would book severe losses in the following years, the yard has really recorded heavy losses in the following years and its net equity really became very negative.
Desuden overlevede HSY kun (og er derfor i stand til at tilbagebetale lånet) på grund af den fortsatte støtte i form af statsstøtte.
In addition, HSY only survived (and thus is able to reimburse the loan) because of the continued support by State aid.
På baggrund af ovenstående er Kommissionen af den opfattelse, at foranstaltningen giver HSY en fordel.
From the foregoing, the Commission considers that the measure gives an advantage to HSY.
Denne selektive fordel fordrejer konkurrencen, fordi den tilvejebringer finansiering på et tidspunkt, hvor HSY ikke havde modtaget finansiering fra markedet og var kriseramt.
This selective advantage distorts competition because it provides financing at a time when HSY would not have received financing from the market and was in difficulty.
Foranstaltningen bidrog derfor til at holde HSY i live og finansiere dets aktiviteter.
The measure therefore contributed to keep HSY alive and to finance its activities.
Eftersom nogle af HSY's konkurrenter er etableret i andre medlemsstater, påvirker denne konkurrencefordrejning samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne .
Since some competitors of HSY are located in other Member States, this distortion of competition affects trade between Member States .
Da garantien opfylder alle betingelserne i EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, udgør den statsstøtte.
Since it fulfils all the conditions laid down in Article 87(1) of the Treaty, the guarantee constitutes State aid.
Da støtten i strid med kravet i EF-traktatens artikel 88, stk. 3, blev ydet uden forudgående anmeldelse, udgør den ulovlig støtte.
Since, contrary to the requirement laid down in Article 88(3) of the Treaty, it was granted without prior notification, it constitutes unlawful aid.
Da Kommissionen lige har påvist, at en selektiv fordel, som er tildelt HSY, fordrejer konkurrence og samhandel, vil Kommissionen ikke gentage analysen af, om der foreligger en fordrejning af konkurrencen og samhandelen, i sin vurdering af de resterende foranstaltninger.
Since the Commission has just demonstrated that a selective advantage granted to HSY distorts competition and trade, the Commission will not repeat the analysis of the existence of a distortion of competition and trade anymore when it will assess the remaining measures.
Med hensyn til foreneligheden i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 2 og 3, bemærker Kommissionen, at ingen af bestemmelserne i artikel 87, stk. 2, og artikel 87, stk. 3, litra b) og d), finder anvendelse.
As regards the compatibility under Article 87(2) and (3) of the Treaty, the Commission notes than none of the provisions laid down in Article 87(2) and Article 87(3)(b) and (d) apply.
Med hensyn til foreneligheden i henhold til artikel 87, stk. 3, litra a), c) og e), blev støtte til skibsbygning fra den 1. januar 1999 reguleret ved Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1540/98 af 29. juni 1998 om nye regler for støtte til skibsbygningsindustrien (i det følgende »forordning (EF) nr. 1540/98«).
As regards the compatibility under Article 87(3)(a), (c) and (e), aid to shipbuilding was regulated from 1 January 1999 by Council Regulation (EC) No 1540/98 of 29 June 1998 establishing new rules on aid to shipbuilding (hereinafter ‘Regulation (EC) No 1540/98’).
Eftersom det garanterede lån havde til formål at finansiere en investeringsplan, der indgik i en omstruktureringsplan, og eftersom HSY desuden var kriseramt, bør statsgarantien vurderes på grundlag af artikel 5 i forordning (EF) nr. 1540/98.
Since the guaranteed loan aimed at financing an investment plan which was a part of a restructuring plan and since in addition HSY was in difficulty, the State guarantee should be assessed on the basis of Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 1540/98.
Det er klart, at foranstaltningen ikke opfylder betingelserne i denne artikel.
It is clear that the measure does not fulfil the conditions laid down in this article.
Det fremgår navnlig af artikel 5, at omstruktureringsstøtte »undtagelsesvis [kan] betragtes som forenelig med fællesmarkedet, forudsat at den er i overensstemmelse med Fællesskabets rammebestemmelser for statsstøtte til redning og omstrukturering af kriseramte virksomheder«.
In particular, Article 5 indicates that restructuring aid ‘may exceptionally be considered compatible with the common market provided that it complies with the Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulties’.
De rammebestemmelser, der fandt anvendelse på det tidspunkt, hvor garantien blev ydet, var rammebestemmelserne for rednings- og omstruktureringsstøtte fra 1999, som var blevet offentliggjort i De Europæiske Fællesskabers Tidende den 9. oktober 1999 og trådte i kraft samme dag.
The guidelines applicable at the time of the grant were the 1999 R & R guidelines, which had been published in the Official Journal on 9 October 1999 and which entered into force on the same day.
Flere af de betingelser for godkendelse af støtte, der er anført i afsnit 3.2.2 i disse rammebestemmelser, er ikke opfyldt.
Several of the conditions for authorisation of the aid laid down in section 3.2.2 of these guidelines are not fulfilled.
F.eks. med hensyn til betingelse b) »Genoprettelse af virksomhedens rentabilitet« bemærker Kommissionen, at statsgarantien finansierede en investeringsplan, der indgik i en omstruktureringsplan, som i december 1999 var blevet fuldstændig utilstrækkelig til at genoprette HSY's rentabilitet på længere sigt.
For instance, regarding condition (b) ‘Restoration of viability’, the Commission notes that the State guarantee financed an investment plan which was part of a restructuring plan which, in December 1999, has become totally insufficient to restore the long term viability of HSY.
Med hensyn til betingelse d) »Støtten begrænses til et minimum« havde Kommissionen allerede fastslået i beslutning N 401/1997, at statsstøtte maksimalt kunne udgøre 50 % af investeringsomkostningerne, og at de resterende 50 % ville blive finansieret af midler fra aktionærerne og banklån optaget på markedsvilkår.
Regarding the condition (d) ‘Aid limited to the minimum’, the Commission had already decided in decision N 401/97 that State aid could at the maximum amount to 50 % of the investment costs and the remaining 50 % would be financed by funds raised from the shareholders and by bank loans raised at market conditions.
Der kunne derfor ikke ydes yderligere støtte til fordel for investeringsplanen, da den maksimale støtteintensitet på 50 % i modsat fald ville blive overskredet.
Consequently, no additional aid in favour of the investment plan could be granted otherwise the maximum aid intensity of 50 % would be breached.
Statsgarantien tilsidesatte også princippet om »engangsstøtte« i afsnit 3.2.3 i rammebestemmelserne for rednings- og omstruktureringsstøtte fra 1999, da Kommissionen ved beslutning N 401/1997 havde godkendt investeringsstøtte, som i henhold til direktiv 90/684/EØF var en slags omstruktureringsstøtte.
The State guarantee also breached the ‘one time, last time’ condition laid down in section 3.2.3 of the 1999 R & R guidelines since by decision N 401/97, the Commission had authorised investment aid, which, under Directive 90/684/EEC, was a kind of restructuring aid.
Denne støtte blev ydet til HSY ved ministeriel afgørelse af december 1997 (men som beskrevet i betragtning 84 i denne beslutning har Grækenland oplyst, at den endnu ikke er blevet udbetalt til HSY).
This aid has been granted to HSY by Ministerial Decision of December 1997 (but, as described in recital 84 of the present decision, Greece indicates that it has not been paid out to HSY yet).
På baggrund af ovenstående finder Kommissionen, at statsgarantien udgør ulovlig og uforenelig støtte, som skal tilbagesøges.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Commission considers that the State guarantee constitutes unlawful and incompatible aid, which must be recovered.
Hvis statsgarantien stadig er i kraft, skal den straks bringes til ophør.
If it is still outstanding at the time of this decision, the State guarantee has to be stopped immediately.
Dette er imidlertid utilstrækkeligt til at genoprette den situation, der ville have foreligget uden støtte, eftersom HSY over en årrække har draget fordel af et lån, som det ikke havde modtaget uden statslig indgriben.
This is however insufficient to restore the situation that would have prevailed without aid since HSY has during several years benefited from a loan which it would not have received without State intervention.
Med henblik på at opveje denne fordel finder Kommissionen, i overensstemmelserne med konklusionen i afsnit 3.1 i denne beslutning, at forskellen mellem de samlede omkostninger ved det garanterede lån (rentesats og garantipræmie) og referencesatsen for Grækenland forhøjet med 600 basispoint bør betales for de år, hvori garantien løb.
In order to recover this advantage, the Commission considers, in accordance with the conclusion reached in section 3.1 of the present decision, that the difference between the total cost of the guaranteed loan (interest rate and guarantee premium) and the reference rate for Greece increased by 600 basis points needs to be recovered for the years during which the guarantee was running.
Efter Kommissionens opfattelse vil dette genoprette den situation, der havde eksisteret uden en statsgaranti.
The Commission considers that this will restore the situation that would have existed without a State guarantee.
Tilsidesættelsen af forbuddet mod statsgarantier og finansiering under markedssatsen i beslutning N 401/97 er derved afhjulpet.
Thereby, the breach of the prohibition of State guarantees and financing below market rate laid down in decision N 401/97 is eliminated.
Lån på 1,56 mia. GRD (4,58 mio. EUR) ydet i 1999 (foranstaltning P3)
GRD 1,56 billion (EUR 4,58 million) loan granted in 1999 (measure P3)
I 1999 modtog HSY et lån på 1,56 mia. GRD (4,58 mio. EUR) fra ETVA, der som sikkerhed fik ret til betalingen af den første rate af den investeringsstøtte, der var godkendt ved N 401/97.
In 1999, HSY received a loan amounting to GRD 1,56 billion (EUR 4,58 million) from ETVA, which received as securities a right on the payment of the first tranche of the investment aid authorised by decision N 401/97.
Lånet blev optaget den 28. juli 1999 og udbetalt fuldt ud til HSY den følgende dag.
The loan was concluded on 28 July 1999 and fully paid out to HSY the next day.
I beslutningen om at indlede proceduren har Kommissionen anført, at lånet kunne udgøre støtte, hvis forenelighed er tvivlsom.
In the opening decision, the Commission indicates that the loan could constitute aid, the compatibility of which is doubtful.
Hvis det desuden viste sig, at dette lån var omfattet af en statsgaranti, synes det at tilsidesætte beslutning N 401/97, hvoraf det fremgik, at der til finansiering af investeringsprogrammet ville blive optaget banklån på normale markedsvilkår uden statsgarantier.
In addition, if it turned out that this loan benefited from a State guarantee, it seems to infringe decision N 401/97, which indicated that, in order to finance the investment programme, bank loans would be raised at normal market conditions without State guarantees.