natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Forskellen i den skattemæssige behandling af fremmed- og egenkapital fører især til forvrængninger i koncerner, da moderselskabet har en vis kontrol over sine datterselskaber; f.eks. kan moderselskabet i højere grad bestemme disse datterselskabers finansieringsmuligheder og tager her ofte overvejende udgangspunkt i skattemæssige overvejelser.
The difference in tax treatment of equity and debt causes distortions particularly inside groups, since the parent company exercises some control over its subsidiaries, so that it can to a considerable extent determine their financing options, a choice often largely decided by tax considerations.
Derimod bestemmes finansieringsformen for tredjeparter som oftest ved overvejelser af ikke-skattemæssig karakter.
In dealings with third parties the funding option is often determined largely by factors other than tax considerations.
Følgelig kan det ikke antages, at den pågældende ordning er selektiv efter traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
As a consequence, it cannot be said that the scheme at issue is selective within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
VNO-NCW mener endvidere, at hvis en skattemæssig ordning udgør en statsstøtteforanstaltning blot ved i større eller mindre udstrækning at være begrænset til koncernselskaber, så strider medlemsstaternes lovgivninger om selskabsskat på en lang række punkter mod traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
In addition, according to the VNO-NCW, if the mere fact that a tax facility is to a greater or lesser extent confined to group companies prompts the conclusion that this is a State aid measure, Member States′ corporation tax systems will be at odds with Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty in many respects.
Bemærkninger fra Ungarn
Comments from the Hungarian authorities
Ungarn finder, at ordningen ikke udgør støtte, og fremfører to argumenter herfor.
The Hungarian authorities consider that the scheme is not an aid measure, and put forward two arguments.
For det første gør det ikke en foranstaltning selektiv, at den er begrænset til koncerner.
Firstly, the fact that a scheme is confined to groups does not make it selective.
I (internationale) skattespørgsmål er regler for koncernvirksomheder almindelige og uundgåelige.
In (international) taxation matters, rules for groups of companies are common practice and unavoidable.
Både OECD (interne udligninger) og Kommissionen (direktivet om renter og royalties) er kommet med en lang række retlige instrumenter, hvis anvendelsesområde er begrænset til koncerner.
Many rules whose scope is limited to groups have been brought forward by the OECD (transfer pricing) and the Commission (e.g. the Interest and Royalty Directive).
For det andet er direkte skatter en national kompetence for medlemsstaterne.
Secondly, Hungary recalls that direct taxation is a matter for Member States.
Til denne kompetence hører fastsættelse af skattesatserne for skattepligtige forhold.
Setting tax rates in relation to certain taxable events is within their domestic competence.
Endelig mener Ungarn ikke, at Nederlandene i en situation, hvor de direkte skatter ikke er harmoniseret, kan holdes ansvarlig for det højere fradrag, der følger af de højere skattesatser i andre lande.
Finally, Hungary finds it difficult to see how the Netherlands can be held responsible for the higher deduction generated by higher tax rates in other countries, in a situation where direct taxation has not been harmonised.
Den fordel, som Kommissionen beskriver, skyldes tydeligvis en disparitet mellem skattesystemer.
The advantage described by the Commission is clearly a result of a disparity between tax systems.
Bemærkninger fra Belgien
Comments from the Belgian authorities
Også Belgien finder, at ordningen ikke udgør støtte, og hævder ligesom de andre interesserede parter, at der ikke er tale om selektivitet.
The Belgian authorities also support the view that the scheme is not State aid, and put forward arguments similar to those from other interested parties with regard to the absence of selectivity.
Belgien fremhæver her, at det er logisk, at en virksomhed, der ikke hører under en koncern, heller ikke har nogen koncerninterne finansieringsaktiviteter.
Belgium underlines that it is logical that an undertaking that is not part of a group cannot by definition have intra-group financing activities.
Belgien fremfører i øvrigt, at statsstøttereglerne ikke finder anvendelse i situationer, hvor der forekommer dispariteter mellem nationale skattesystemer på grund af manglende harmonisering på EU-plan.
The Belgian authorities also argue that State aid rules are not applicable in situations where disparities between national tax systems exist due to the absence of harmonisation at EU level.
»Groepsrentebox«-ordningen skal således anses for at være en generel foranstaltning, som ikke er omfattet af statsstøttereglerne, og Kommissionen misbruger sin kompetence, hvis den gennemfører denne sag.
As a consequence, the group interest scheme is a general measure not covered by the State aid rules, and in pursuing the case the Commission is using its powers improperly.
NEDERLANDENES REAKTION PÅ TREDJEPARTERNES BEMÆRKNINGER
REACTION FROM THE NETHERLANDS TO THIRD PARTIES′ COMMENTS
Nederlandene konstaterer, at der i alle tre tilfælde er tale om bemærkninger, som støtter deres holdning.
The Dutch authorities note that the comments of all three parties support its point of view.
Både Ungarn og Belgien fremhæver, at Kommissionen misbruger sin kompetence vedrørende statsstøtte til at behandle forvrængninger, som skyldes dispariteter mellem ikke-harmoniserede skattesystemer.
Both Hungary and Belgium emphasise that in attempting to tackle disturbances that are the consequence of disparities between tax systems that have not been harmonised the Commission is abusing its State aid powers.
Dette bestyrker Nederlandenes overbevisning om, at »groepsrentebox«-ordningen ikke udgør en sådan støtteforanstaltning, som er forbudt i henhold til traktatens artikel 87.
This reinforces the Dutch view that the group interest box does not constitute an aid measure prohibited by Article 87 of the EC Treaty.
Nederlandene fremhæver endvidere, at de til fulde anerkender VNO-NCW's analyse.
The Netherlands underlines that it fully agrees with the analysis drawn up by VNO-NCW.
Særlig vigtige finder Nederlandene de detaljerede argumenter vedrørende de institutionelle rammer. Deri gøres der også klart rede for, hvilke forvrængninger af det indre marked der kan opstå som følge af medlemsstaternes nationale foranstaltninger, samt hvilke forskellige instrumenter der er fastsat i traktaten med henblik på eventuelt at fjerne disse forvrængninger.
It attaches particular importance to the detailed argument concerning the institutional framework, which clearly explains the various disturbances in the single market that can be caused by national measures taken by Member States and the instruments available under the EC Treaty to eliminate such disturbances where necessary.
Endelig er Nederlandene enige med VNO-NCW i, at det, før der er tale om selektivitet, skal vurderes, hvorvidt visse virksomheder eller produktioner begunstiges i forhold til andre, som er retligt og faktisk sammenlignelige, i medfør af den pågældende foranstaltnings formål.
Finally, the Dutch authorities support the confederation’s view that in order to establish whether there is selectivity, it must be ascertained whether certain undertakings or the production of certain goods are favoured over others that are de jure and de facto comparable in the light of the objective of the measure concerned.
Begrænsningen til koncernlån medfører ikke selektivitet, da »groepsrentebox«-ordningen har til formål at forhindre arbitrage mellem koncernintern finansiering med egen- og fremmedkapital.
The restriction to group loans does not lead to selectivity, because the objective of the group interest box is to prevent arbitrage between financing from capital and financing from loans within groups.
Ved finansiering mellem virksomheder, der ikke er forbundet i en koncern, har arbitrage ingen betydning overhovedet.
In financing between companies that are not connected in a group arbitrage plays no role whatsoever.
Begrænsningen til koncernlån er derfor logisk i medfør af ordningens formål, så den relevante referenceramme udgøres af alle virksomheder, som hører under en koncern.
The restriction to group loans is thus logical in the light of the scheme’s objective, so that the relevant frame of reference consists of all companies that are part of a group.
VURDERING AF ORDNINGEN
ASSESSMENT OF THE SCHEME
For at vurdere, om den foreliggende ordning udgør en støtteforanstaltning efter traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, skal Kommissionen undersøge, om foranstaltningen begunstiger visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner ved at yde en økonomisk fordel, om en sådan fordel fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencen, om fordelen finansieres ved hjælp af statsmidler, og om fordelen har en negativ virkning på samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
In order to ascertain whether the measure at hand constitutes aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, the Commission has to assess whether it favours certain undertakings or the production of certain goods by granting an advantage of an economic nature, whether any such advantage distorts or threatens to distort competition, whether the advantage is granted through state resources, and whether the advantage affects trade between Member States.
For at kunne betragtes som statsstøtte skal foranstaltningen være specifik eller selektiv, forstået således, at den begunstiger visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner.
To be considered State aid, a measure must be specific or selective, in that it favours only certain undertakings or the production of certain goods.
Nederlandene fremhæver, at den pågældende foranstaltning hverken er begrænset til visse sektorer, visse typer virksomheder eller visse dele af det nederlandske territorium.
The Dutch authorities argue that the measure at issue is not limited to certain sectors, certain types of companies, or certain parts of Dutch territory.
Der peges her ligeledes på, at der heller ikke gælder nogen begrænsninger med hensyn til omsætning, størrelse, antal medarbejdere, tilhørsforhold til en multinational koncern, eller hvilken type aktiviteter den modtagende virksomhed måtte udøve.
There are no further restrictions regarding the turnover, the size, the number of employees, membership of a multinational group, or the nature of the operations that the beneficiaries are authorised to perform.
Ifølge gældende retspraksis skal det ved vurderingen af, om en foranstaltning er selektiv, undersøges, om den som led i en given retlig ordning medfører en fordel for visse virksomheder i forhold til andre virksomheder, som befinder sig i en faktisk og retlig tilsvarende situation [9].
According to the applicable case-law, in order to determine whether a measure is selective, it is appropriate to examine whether, within the context of a particular legal system, that measure constitutes an advantage for certain undertakings in comparison with others which are in a comparable legal and factual situation [9].
Det kan altså ske, at en skatteregel ikke udgør statsstøtte, selv om den ikke i alle henseender stemmer overens med det generelle selskabsskattesystem i medlemsstaten.
It may thus be that a taxation regime does not constitute State aid even though it does not correspond in all respects to the general system of corporate taxation of the Member State.
Domstolen har også gentagne gange erklæret, at traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, ikke sondrer mellem støtteforanstaltningers årsager eller formål, men definerer dem i kraft af deres virkninger [10].
The Court has also held on numerous occasions that Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty does not make a distinction according to the causes or aims of State aid measures, but defines them according to their effects [10].
Særlig skattemæssige foranstaltninger, hvor der ikke er tale om en tilnærmelse af det generelle system til visse egenskaber hos visse virksomheder, men som træffes som et middel til at forbedre deres konkurrenceposition, er omfattet af traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1 [11].
In particular, tax measures which do not represent an adaptation of the general system to meet particular characteristics of certain undertakings, but have been put forward as a means of improving their competitiveness, are caught by Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty [11].
Først og fremmest skal det afgøres, om vurderingen skal foretages på koncern- eller virksomhedsniveau.
Firstly, it should be clarified at which level (group level or undertaking level) the assessment is to be made.
I beslutningen om at indlede proceduren angav Kommissionen som sin foreløbige holdning, at denne vurdering skal foretages på koncernniveau, idet den hævdede, at fordelen i form af en lavere skattesats på renter modtaget af et nederlandsk finansieringsselskab ophæves af det lavere fradrag af renter betalt af det nederlandske finansierede selskab i de tilfælde, hvor virksomhederne i en rent national koncern har valgt at benytte »groepsrentebox«-ordningen [13].
In the opening decision, the Commission indicated its preliminary view that this assessment should be made at group level, arguing that where the companies of a purely domestic group had opted for the group interest box, the advantage of a reduced taxation of the interest received by a Dutch financing company would be cancelled out by the lower deductibility of the interest paid by the Dutch-financed company [13].
Da ordningen er symmetrisk og blot forskubber skattebyrden mellem de skattepligtige enheder, finder Nederlandene, at visse virksomheder begunstiges, og andre ringerestilles, alt efter om de objektivt set er debitor eller kreditor.
The Dutch authorities consider that, because the measure is symmetric and would merely shift the tax burden between taxpayers, some companies will enjoy an advantage while others will suffer a disadvantage, depending on their objective position as debtor or creditor.
»Groepsrentebox«-ordningen udgør heller ikke i denne henseende statsstøtte.
Thus the group interest box does not involve aid.
Som Nederlandene har forklaret i brev af 18. december 2008, kan en virksomhed ikke længere frit træffe beslutninger om sin finansiering eller vælge mellem finansiering med egen- eller fremmedkapital, hvis en anden virksomhed har den faktiske kontrol over finansieringen i førstnævnte virksomhed.
As the Dutch authorities pointed out in their letter of 18 December 2008, where one company has effective control over the financing of another, the latter company is no longer free to make decisions about its financing, or to choose between financing by means of debt or equity.
Koncernens centrale ledelse beslutter, hvorvidt de eksternt tilvejebragte midler bevilges internt i koncernen ved hjælp af intern fremmedkapital eller intern egenkapital.
The group’s central management decides how externally attracted funds are to be allocated within the group, either by internal debt or by internal equity.
Kommissionen peger dog på, at den pågældende ordning vedrører en specifik aktivitet (finansiering i erhvervsmæssigt forbundne virksomheder) og ikke en konsolidering på koncernniveau.
The Commission notes, however, that the measure relates to a specific operation (the financing of related companies), and not to a consolidation at group level.
Enhver satsnedsættelse anvendes særskilt på virksomheder på baggrund af saldoen på deres renteboks.
Any reduced tax rate will be applied individually to companies on the basis of the balance of their interest boxes.
Selv om det må antages, at der træffes finansieringsbeslutninger i koncernens interesse som helhed, finder en analyse på koncernniveau ingen støtte i den nederlandske skatteret, som Nederlandene peger på.
Even if financing decisions can be expected to be taken in the best interest of the group as a whole, an analysis at the level of the group has no foundation in Dutch tax law, as the Dutch authorities have pointed out.
Konsolidering af koncerner finder ifølge nederlandsk skatteret kun sted ved en kapitalandel på 95 % eller derover.
Under Dutch law, tax consolidation occurs only in the case of a share ownership of 95 % or more.
I Nederlandene opkræves selskabsskatten med andre ord for de særskilte enheder, ikke for koncerner.
In other words, Dutch corporation tax is levied on individual entities, not on groups.
Betegnelsen »groepsrentebox« (koncernrenteboks) afspejler således ikke tilstrækkeligt, at ordningen vedrører særskilte enheder, som beskæftiger sig med specifikke finansieringsaktiviteter.
To that extent, the name given to the ‘group interest box’ does not properly reflect the fact that it applies to individual entities, engaged in specific financing operations.
Ordningen vedrører ikke en saldo over udgifter og indtægter konsolideret på koncernniveau.
The measure does not concern a cost/revenue balance consolidated at group level.
Kommissionen finder derfor, at vurderingen af ordningen skal foretages for de individuelle virksomheder.
Therefore, the Commission is of the opinion that the assessment of the scheme should be made at the level of individual companies.
Ordningen, som ændret af de nederlandske myndigheder, kan beskrives som en nedsat sats på en specifik type indtægter (henholdsvis udgifter) i form af renter på et lån, når transaktionen finder sted mellem erhvervsmæssigt forbundne virksomheder [14].
The scheme, as amended by the Dutch authorities, can be described as a reduced rate on a specific type of revenue (or cost) in the form of interest on a loan, when the transaction takes place between related companies [14].
Kommissionen finder desuden, at ordningens symmetri og dens neutrale virkning på koncernniveau ikke udelukker, at de individuelle virksomheder kan drage fordel.
Furthermore, the Commission considers that the symmetry of the measure and its neutral impact at the level of the group is not sufficient to exclude the possibility of an advantage to individual companies.
Ej heller kan en lavere beskatning af renter for én enhed i en koncern begrundes i en højere skattesats — gennem et lavere fradrag af renter — for en anden virksomhed [15].
Similarly, taxing the interest of one entity in the group at a lower rate cannot be justified by taxing another company — through reduced deductibility of interest — at a higher rate [15].
Vurdering af foranstaltningens selektive karakter
Analysis of the selective nature of the measure
Kommissionen finder, at det for beskatningen af specifikke typer indtægter kan være vigtigt at undersøge, om en ordning omfatter generelle transaktionskategorier uden forskelsbehandling.
The Commission considers that, for the taxation of specific types of revenue, it may be important to determine whether a scheme covers broad categories of transactions in a non-discriminatory manner.
Enhver forskelsbehandling, som ikke kan begrundes i objektive forskelle mellem skattepligtige enheder, kan føre til konkurrencefordrejning.
Any discrimination that cannot be justified by objective differences between taxpayers may lead to a distortion of competition.
Det skal her bemærkes, at det er et typisk træk ved mange skattesystemer, at analytiske elementer supplerer skattesystemets syntetiske karakter.
In this regard, it is worth noting that it is a typical feature of many tax systems that there are analytical elements to complement the synthetic nature of the tax system.
Dette er især tilfældet, når en differentieret skattemæssig behandling finder anvendelse på specifikke typer indtægter, som f.eks. renter eller udbytte.
This is particularly the case where specific types of revenue such as interest or dividends are subject to differentiated tax treatment.
Uafhængigt heraf skal det undersøges, om der objektivt set må anvendes en nedsat skattesats på lånetransaktioner mellem erhvervsmæssigt forbundne virksomheder.
This being said, it must be determined whether loan transactions between related companies may be objectively entitled to a reduced taxation rate.
Både Nederlandene og VNO-NCW har anført, at arbitrage mellem finansiering med egenkapital og med fremmedkapital kun er mulig i koncernforhold.
The Dutch authorities and the VNO-NCW have argued that it is only groups that there can be arbitrage between financing through capital injection and lending.
I modsætning til virksomheder uden for koncernforhold (selvstændige virksomheder) konfronteres koncernvirksomheder internt i koncernen med arbitrage mellem egenkapital og fremmedkapital.
In contrast to companies that are not part of a group (stand-alone companies), group companies are confronted with arbitrage between equity capital and loan capital within their group.
Arbitragen påvirkes oftest mere af skattemæssige end af økonomiske overvejelser.
Such an arbitrage is for the most part influenced by tax considerations rather than economic considerations.
Kommissionen finder, at den foreliggende foranstaltning medfører en mindskning af arbitragen (i en national situation), da forskellen mellem beskatningen af koncernrenter og beskatningen af koncernudbytte bliver mindre, og skattesystemets tekniske neutralitet således styrkes.
The Commission is of the opinion that the measure at issue will have the effect of reducing this arbitrage (in a domestic situation), as the difference between the taxation of intra-group interests and the taxation of intra-group dividends will be reduced, thus reinforcing the technical neutrality of the tax system.
For at illustrere dette skal der sondres mellem tre forskellige situationer (se figur 1), som vedrører erhvervsmæssigt forbundne virksomheder på den ene side og selvstændige virksomheder på den anden side (herunder finansieringsinstitutter i deres forbindelser med uafhængige tredjeparter).
To illustrate this point, it is necessary to distinguish between three different types of situation (see figure 1 below) involving related companies and stand-alone companies (including financial institutions in their relations with independent third parties).
Det antages, at A-B-C er en koncern af virksomheder, hvor A udøver kontrol med finansieringen i B og C; X er en enhed, som ikke hører under en koncern (selvstændig virksomhed), og Y er et kreditinstitut, som formidler lån til uafhængige parter.
Suppose that A-B-C is a corporate group, where A controls the financing of B and C; X is an entity that is not part of a group (‘stand-alone’ company), and Y is a credit institution, providing loans to independent parties.
Den første situation vedrører finansielle transaktioner mellem erhvervsmæssigt forbundne virksomheder.
The first situation is that of financial transactions between related companies.
Moderselskab A formidler likvide midler til sine datterselskaber B og C ved at stille egen- eller fremmedkapital til rådighed.
The parent company A provides liquidity to its subsidiaries B and C through either a loan or equity.
Af disse finansielle transaktioner udspringer en betaling (foretaget af B og C) af enten renter eller udbytte.
These financial transactions will result in the payment (by B and C) of either interest or dividends.
Valget mellem finansiering med fremmed- eller egenkapital træffes af moderselskab A i koncernens interesse som helhed.
The choice between loan and equity financing is made at the level of the parent company A in the best interest of the group of related companies as a whole.
Derfor vil der, når moderselskab A finansierer et af sine datterselskaber (eller virksomheder, der hører under koncernen), forekomme arbitrage mellem fremmed- og egenkapital på baggrund af forskellige kriterier.
As a consequence, when the parent company A finances one of its subsidiaries (or affiliates), thee will indeed be an arbitrage between loan and equity on the basis of several criteria.
Hvor et likviditetsbehov på langt sigt eller en investering normalt kræver et kapitalindskud, kræves der ved finansielle behov på kort sigt kun et (kortfristet) lån.
While a need for liquidity in the long term or an investment will generally require a capital injection, short-term financial requirements will require only the provision of a (short-term) loan.