natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Grundforordningens artikel 2, stk. 5, henviser ikke til »produktionsomkostningerne i oprindelseslandet«, men giver udtrykkeligt institutionerne ret til at anvende produktionsomkostninger fra »andre repræsentative markeder« i andre lande end oprindelseslandet.
Article 2(5) of the basic Regulation does not refer to the ‘cost of production in the country of origin’, but explicitly entitles the Institutions to use the cost of production coming ‘from other representative market’ in other countries than the country of origin.
Ansøgerens påstand blev derfor afvist.
The applicant’s argument therefore had to be rejected
Endelig er konklusionerne i betragtning 18 og 19 ovenfor heller ikke i strid med grundforordningens artikel 1, som påstået af ansøgeren.
Finally, the findings set out above in recitals (18) and (19) are also not in contrast to Article 1 of the basic Regulation, as claimed by the applicant.
Selv om grundforordningens artikel 1 fastsætter, at den normale værdi fastsættes på grundlag af data fra eksportlandet, gøres det samtidig klart i grundforordningen, at denne regel er underlagt visse undtagelser.
Indeed, although Article 1 of the basic Regulation indicates that normal value should be established by reference to data from the country of export, the basic Regulation makes also clear that this rule is subject to exceptions.
Ansøgerens påstand i den henseende måtte derfor afvises.
The applicant’s arguments in this respect had therefore to be rejected.
Ansøgeren påstod endvidere, at hvis der skulle foretages en justering af virksomhedens omkostninger til naturgas på hjemmemarkedet, burde den baseres på enten
The applicant further claimed that if an adjustment were to be made to its cost of natural gas on the domestic market, such adjustment should be based on either the
ikke-regulerede gaspriser i Rusland eller
non-regulated gas prices available in Russia, or
den gennemsnitlige eksportpris for naturgas til de baltiske lande, eller alternativt
the average export price of Russian natural gas to the Baltic countries, or alternatively
de faktiske omkostninger til produktion af naturgas i Rusland plus en rimelig fortjenstmargen.
on the basis of the actual cost of production of natural gas in Russia plus a reasonable profit margin.
For det første er valget af Waidhaus ikke urimeligt, selv om Kommissionen kunne have valgt et andet grundlag.
Firstly, the fact that the Commission could have chosen a different basis does not render the choice of Waidhaus unreasonable.
Det vigtigste kriterium for valget af grundlaget for beregning af gaspriserne er, at det på en rimelig måde afspejler den pris, der normalt betales på et marked uden konkurrenceforvridninger.
The primary criterion for the choice of the basis on which to establish the gas prices is that it reasonably reflects a price normally payable in undistorted markets.
Denne betingelse er uomtvisteligt overholdt, hvad angår priserne i Waidhaus.
It is undisputed that this condition is met with respect to the prices at Waidhaus.
Det forhold, at der kun blev solgt små mængder gas til ikke-regulerede priser på hjemmemarkedet i den fornyede undersøgelsesperiode, og at disse priser lå betydeligt tættere på de regulerede hjemmemarkedspriser end eksportprisen, der fastsættes frit, antyder kraftigt, at de ikke-regulerede priser forvrides af de gældende regulerede priser.
Secondly, the fact that the volume of gas sold at non-regulated prices in the domestic market was only minor during the RIP and that such prices were significantly closer to the regulated domestic price than to the freely-determined export price strongly suggests that these non-regulated prices were distorted by the prevailing regulated prices.
Derfor kunne de ikke-regulerede hjemmemarkedspriser ikke anvendes.
Therefore, the unregulated domestic prices could not be used.
Det blev også fundet, at de russiske eksportpriser for gas til de baltiske lande ikke var tilstrækkeligt repræsentative, da der kun eksporteres små mængder til disse lande.
It was also considered that Russian export prices of gas to the Baltic States were not sufficiently representative, due to the relatively low export volumes to these countries.
Desuden forelå der ingen oplysninger vedrørende transport- og distributionsomkostninger, og derfor kunne der ikke fastsættes pålidelige priser ved eksport til de baltiske lande.
Furthermore, necessary data concerning transportation and distribution cost were not available and therefore, reliable prices to the Baltic States could not be established.
Langt størstedelen af gassen eksporteres via Waidhaus, som derfor udgør et passende grundlag for en justering.
Indeed, by far the greatest volume of gas is exported via the Waidhaus hub which represents therefore an appropriate basis for an adjustment.
Ansøgeren fremlagde ingen beviser vedrørende andre repræsentative markeder bortset fra Waidhaus, hvor priserne på en rimelig måde afspejler den pris, der normalt betales på markeder uden forvridninger.
The applicant did not provide any evidence regarding the existence of representative markets, other than the Waidhaus hub, where prices reasonably reflect a price normally payable in undistorted markets.
Disse påstande afvistes derfor.
Consequently, these arguments were rejected.
I den forbindelse påstod ansøgeren endvidere, at virksomheden køber ca. 50 % af den naturgas, der anvendes til produktionen af gødning, på det ikke-regulerede marked i Rusland.
In this context, the applicant also claimed that it purchased approximately 50 % of the natural gas consumed in its production of fertilisers on the non-regulated market in Russia.
Ansøgeren påstod, at det derfor ville være diskriminerende at justere virksomhedens gasomkostninger, mens der ikke blev foretaget justeringer for andre eksportører med højere omkostninger, der svarer til ansøgerens.
The applicant claimed it would therefore be discriminatory to adjust its gas costs while no such adjustments would be made for other exporters with higher cost levels similar to those of the applicant.
Det skal bemærkes, at ansøgerens køb af naturgas på det ikke-regulerede marked i Rusland, jf. den verificerede besvarelse af spørgeskemaet, var marginale i den fornyede undersøgelsesperiode.
It should be noted that according to the verified questionnaire reply, the applicant’s purchases of natural gas on the un-regulated market in Russia were marginal during the RIP.
Påstanden blev derfor afvist.
This claim had therefore to be rejected.
Hvad angår det tredje alternativ, jf. nr. iii) i betragtning 28 ovenfor, dvs. forslaget om at basere justeringen på de faktiske omkostninger til produktion af naturgas i Rusland, skal det først og fremmest bemærkes, at et sådant alternativ ikke, som anført af ansøgeren, udtrykkeligt er omhandlet i grundforordningens artikel 2, stk. 5.
As far as the third alternative mentioned under (iii) in recital (28) above is concerned, i.e. to base the adjustment on the actual cost of production of natural gas in Russia, it should first be noted that such alternative is not, as claimed by the applicant, expressively foreseen in Article 2(5) of the basic Regulation.
Det vigtigste kriterium, jf. betragtning 29, for valget af grundlaget for beregning af gaspriserne er, at det på en rimelig måde afspejler den pris, der normalt betales på et marked uden konkurrenceforvridninger.
Furthermore, as mentioned in recital (29), the primary criterion for the choice of the basis on which to establish the gas prices is that it reasonably reflects a price normally payable in undistorted markets.
Det er derfor i denne forbindelse irrelevant, om den gaspris, som kunderne blev opkrævet af leverandøren, giver fortjeneste.
Thus, whether the price of gas charged by the supplier to the customers is made at a profit as such is irrelevant in this context.
Påstanden blev derfor afvist.
This argument had therefore to be rejected.
Ansøgeren påstod desuden, at de statsregulerede hjemmemarkedspriser for naturgas i Rusland konstant stiger og når et niveau, hvor de dækker omkostningerne til produktion af gas.
The applicant furthermore argued that domestic prices for natural gas in Russia regulated by the State are increasing constantly and reaching levels covering the cost of production of gas.
Prisen på hjemmemarkedet kan derfor ikke betragtes som konkurrencefjendtlig eller urimeligt lav.
Therefore, the price on the domestic market cannot be considered as uncompetitive or unreasonably low.
Denne påstand er ubegrundet, da det korrekte grundlag for at vælge et repræsentativt marked ikke vedrører spørgsmålet om fortjenstgivende priser, men derimod spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt priserne på en rimelig måde afspejler den pris, der normalt betales på markeder uden forvridninger, jf. betragtning 29 ovenfor.
This argument has no grounds since the correct standard for choosing a representative market is not whether prices are profitable as such but whether prices reasonably reflect a price normally payable in undistorted markets, as explained in recital (29) above.
Dette er ikke tilfældet for de statsregulerede priser.
This is not the case for prices regulated by the State.
Desuden er denne påstand i modstrid med den russiske gasleverandørs offentlige udtalelser (som bekræftet i de offentliggjorte reviderede regnskaber), hvori det hedder, at gaspriserne på hjemmemarkedet i Rusland ikke dækker produktions-, transport- og salgsomkostningerne.
Furthermore, this argument also contradicts public statements of the Russian gas supplier (as confirmed by its published audited accounts) that the Russian domestic gas prices do not cover production, transportation and sales cost.
Påstanden blev derfor afvist.
Therefore, this argument was rejected.
Hvad angår metoden til beregning af gasprisen i Waidhaus, påstod ansøgeren, at den russiske eksporttold, som skal betales for al eksport, skulle have været fratrukket Waidhaus-prisen, da eksporttolden ikke gør sig gældende på hjemmemarkedet.
As regards the calculation method of the gas price at Waidhaus as such, the applicant claimed that the Russian export duty payable for all exports should have been deducted from the Waidhaus price, because the export duty is not incurred domestically.
Markedsprisen i Waidhaus, som blev betragtet som et repræsentativt marked, jf. grundforordningens artikel 2, stk. 5, er prisen efter eksportafgifter og ikke priserne før disse afgifter.
Indeed the market price at Waidhaus, which was considered as representative market within the meaning of Article 2(5) of the basic Regulation, is the price after export taxes and not the prices before these taxes.
Set fra køberens perspektiv er det den pris, der skal betales i Waidhaus, der er afgørende, og i den forbindelse er det irrelevant, hvilken procentdel af prisen der udgør en eksporttold, og hvilken procentdel der betales til gasleverandøren.
From the perspective of the buyer it is the price it has to pay at Waidhaus which is relevant, and in this regard it is irrelevant what percentage of that price constitutes an export tax and what percentage is paid to the gas supplier.
Gasleverandøren derimod vil altid søge at maksimere sine priser og således opkræve den højeste pris, som kunderne er villige til at betale.
The latter, on the other hand, will always try to maximise its price and therefore charge the highest price its customers are willing to pay.
Da denne pris altid ligger højt over produktionsomkostningerne, hvorved gasleverandøren får stor fortjeneste, er prisfastsættelsen ikke primært påvirket af størrelsen af eksporttolden, men af den pris, som kunderne er villige til at betale.
Given that this price is always well above its costs of production, allowing the gas supplier to make huge profits, its price setting is not primarily influenced by the amount of the export tax but by what price its customers are willing to pay.
Det blev derfor konkluderet, at prisen inkl. eksporttold er den pris, der er styret af et marked uden konkurrenceforvridninger, og ikke prisen før denne afgift.
It was therefore concluded that the price including the export tax, and not the price before that tax, is the undistorted market driven price.
Ansøgerens påstande i denne henseende blev derfor afvist.
Consequently, the arguments of the applicant in this regard were rejected.
Ansøgeren påstod endvidere, at prisen i Waidhaus skulle have været justeret for kvalitet, disponibilitet, omsættelighed, transport og andre salgsbetingelser, som ville være anderledes på eksport- og hjemmemarkedet for naturgas.
The applicant further claimed that the price at Waidhaus should have been adjusted for quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of sale which would be different in the export and the domestic market of natural gas.
Det skal først bemærkes, at Waidhaus-prisen faktisk blev justeret for forskellige transportomkostninger for eksport- og hjemmemarkedet, og at ansøgerens påstand i den forbindelse ikke var berettiget og måtte afvises.
It should first be noted that the price of Waidhaus was indeed adjusted by different transportation cost for the export and the domestic market and that the applicant’s claim in this regard was not warranted and had to be rejected.
For så vidt angår de øvrige elementer, fremlagde ansøgeren ingen nye oplysninger eller beviser.
As far as the other elements are concerned the applicant did not provide any further information or any supporting evidence.
Ansøgeren påviste i særdeleshed ikke og fremlagde heller ikke andre tilgængelige oplysninger om forskelle i kvalitet, disponibilitet, omsættelighed eller andre salgsbetingelser, som kunne havde begrundet yderligere justeringer. Desuden søgte ansøgeren heller ikke at anslå disse påståede forskelle.
In particular, the applicant did not show, nor was there any other information available, that there were differences in quality, availability, marketability and other conditions of sales which would have justified further adjustments, nor did the applicant attempt to quantify these alleged differences.
I den forbindelse påstod ansøgeren endvidere, at Waidhaus-prisen ikke var blevet justeret for naturlige komparative fordele.
In this context, the applicant further argued that no adjustments for natural comparative advantages have been made to the price at Waidhaus.
Det blev i den sammenhæng påstået, at priserne i Rusland ville være naturligt lavere end prisen for eksporteret gas, da gas er bredt tilgængeligt i Rusland, men ikke i Fællesskabet.
In this regard, it was claimed that since gas is largely available in Russia but not in the Community, prices in Russia would be naturally lower than the price of the exported gas.
Det blev desuden påstået, at eksportkapaciteten ville være begrænset af begrænsningerne for det eksisterende gastransportsystem, hvilket kunne bevirke stigninger i Ruslands eksportpriser.
Furthermore, it was alleged that the export capacity would be limited by the limits of the existing gas transportation system which would increase export prices of Russia.
Ansøgeren hævdede endvidere, at den russiske gasleverandørs »unormalt høje fortjeneste« på eksportmarkedet skulle fratrækkes den anvendte Waidhaus-pris.
The applicant also argued that the ‘abnormal high profits’ of the Russian gas supplier on the export market should be deducted from the Waidhaus price used.
Det vigtigste kriterium, jf. betragtning 29, for at vælge Waidhaus-priserne som grundlag for beregning af gaspriserne er, at de på en rimelig måde afspejler den pris, der normalt betales på et marked uden konkurrenceforvridninger.
As mentioned in recital (29) above, the primary criterion for the choice of Waidhaus prices as basis on which to establish the gas prices is that they reasonably reflect a price normally payable in undistorted markets.
De gældende markedsbetingelser på hjemmemarkedet er irrelevante i den forbindelse.
The market conditions prevailing in the domestic market are irrelevant in this context.
Påstandene måtte derfor afvises.
Therefore these arguments had to be rejected.
Ansøgeren gjorde endvidere indsigelse mod, at de lokale distributørers prisstigning var blevet lagt til den justerede gaspris, og hævdede, at distributørernes fortjeneste allerede var blevet indarbejdet i Waidhaus-prisen.
The applicant also objected that the mark-up of the local distributors has been added to the adjusted gas price, claiming that profits of distributors would already be included in the price at Waidhaus.
I den forbindelse påstod ansøgeren, at de lokale distributører i Rusland var helejede datterselskaber af gasleverandører, og at disse distributørers fortjeneste derfor ville blive talt med to gange, hvis den blev lagt til.
In this regard, the applicant claimed that the local distributors in Russia were fully owned subsidiaries of the gas supplier and therefore addition of the profit of these distributors could constitute double counting.
Det skal først bemærkes, at de lokale distributørers prisstigning ikke kun omfatter virksomhedernes fortjenstmargen, men også deres omkostninger mellem køb og videresalg af naturgas.
It is first noted that the mark-up of local distributors do not only include the profit margin of these companies but also their costs between purchase and re-sale of the natural gas.
For det andet kunne denne påstand ikke længere bekræftes tilstrækkeligt.
Secondly, this argument could not be sufficiently verified anymore.
Dette skyldes, at gasleverandøren i Rusland og dennes tilknyttede virksomheder ikke var genstand for denne undersøgelse, og at der derfor ikke forelå tilstrækkelige oplysninger om organisationen og dens omkostningsstruktur.
This is due to the fact that the gas supplier in Russia and its affiliations were not subject to the present investigation and that therefore there was insufficient information of the organisation and its cost structure available.
Det skal også bemærkes, at situationen i Rusland i den forbindelse bl.a. skyldes, at den tætte forbindelse mellem gasleverandører og den russiske regering ikke er tilstrækkelig gennemsigtig til at give tilstrækkelig adgang til den nødvendige dokumentation.
It is also noted that the situation in Russia in this regard due to, inter alia, the close links between the gas supplier and the Russian government is not sufficiently transparent to allow sufficient access to the necessary evidence.
Desuden var ansøgeren, der har bevisbyrden, ikke i stand til at fremlægge yderligere oplysninger eller beviser, der viste, om og i hvilket omfang distributionsomkostningerne rent faktisk var inkluderet i Waidhaus-prisen.
Moreover, the applicant, who has the burden of proof, was not able to submit any further information or evidence which showed whether and in what extent distribution costs were indeed included in the Waidhaus price.
Men da kunderne på hjemmemarkedet købte gas fra lokale leverandører, må det antages, at de skulle betale de lokale distributionsomkostninger, som ikke er inkluderet i den ikke-justerede Waidhaus-pris.
However, since domestic customers were purchasing the gas from local suppliers, it had to be assumed that they would have to pay local distribution costs which are not as such included in the unadjusted Waidhaus price.
Derfor blev det på dette tidspunkt i undersøgelsen konkluderet, at denne justering var berettiget, og påstanden blev derfor afvist.
Therefore, at this stage of the proceeding it had to be considered that this adjustment was warranted and consequently the argument was rejected.
Fællesskabets institutioner konkluderede dog også, at denne særlige justering kan have en betydelig indvirkning på beregningen af dumpingmargenen.
However, the Community Institutions also considered that the impact on the calculation of the dumping margin of this specific adjustment may be significant.
Derfor blev det på grundlag af den særlige situation, jf. betragtning 41 ovenfor, konkluderet, at hvis ansøgeren fremlægger tilstrækkelige verificerbare beviser, vil Kommissionen overveje en eventuel genoptagelse af undersøgelsen af dette aspekt.
Therefore, given the particular situation described above in recital (41), it was considered that if the applicant supplies sufficient verifiable evidence, the Commission may consider the re-opening of the investigation in this regard.
Ansøgeren fremsatte endvidere påstande om konkurrencefjendtlige gaspriser i Tyskland.
The applicant also made allegations about non-competitive domestic pricing on gas in Germany.
Det skal bemærkes, at de tyske konkurrencemyndigheders igangværende undersøgelse vedrører de priser, som de største tyske gasdistributører opkræver på hjemmemarkedet, og undersøgelsen vedrører derfor slet ikke prisen for russisk gas, når den sælges til eksport i Waidhaus.
It is noted that ongoing investigations by German antitrust authorities concern prices at which German main gas distributors sell the gas on the domestic market, and therefore it is not linked at al to the price at which Russian exported gas is sold at Waidhaus.
Efter en justering af fremstillingsomkostningerne, jf. ovenfor, fandt salget på hjemmemarkedet ikke sted i normal handel, jf. grundforordningens artikel 2, stk. 4.
After adjusting the cost of manufacturing as described above, no domestic sales were made in the ordinary course of trade pursuant of Article 2(4) of the basic Regulation.
Det blev derfor konstateret, at hjemmemarkedspriserne ikke kunne bruges som et rimeligt grundlag for fastsættelse af den normale værdi, og der måtte således anvendes en anden metode.
It was therefore considered that domestic prices did not provide an appropriate basis for the establishment of the normal value and another method had to be applied.
I overensstemmelse med grundforordningens artikel 2, stk. 3 og 6, blev den normale værdi beregnet ved at tilføje et rimeligt beløb for SA&G-omkostninger og et rimeligt beløb for fortjeneste til eksportørens omkostninger til fremstilling af den pågældende vare, evt. justeret, jf. betragtning 19 ovenfor.
In accordance with Article 2(3) and (6) of the basic Regulation, normal value was constructed by adding to the exporter’s manufacturing costs of the product concerned, adjusted where necessary as mentioned in recital (19) above, a reasonable amount for SG&A and a reasonable amount for profit.
SA&G-omkostninger samt fortjeneste kunne ikke fastslås ud fra grundforordningens artikel 2, stk. 6, da ansøgeren ikke havde et repræsentativt hjemmemarkedssalg af den pågældende vare i normal handel.
SG&A costs and profit could not be established on the basis of the chapeau of Article 2(6) of the basic Regulation because the applicant did not have representative domestic sales of the product concerned in the ordinary course of trade.
Grundforordningens artikel 2, stk. 6, litra a), kunne ikke anvendes, da kun en producent er underlagt undersøgelsen.
Article 2(6)(a) of the basic Regulation could not be applied, since there is only one producer subject to the investigation.
Artikel 2, stk. 6, litra b), fandt heller ikke anvendelse, da ansøgerens fremstillingsomkostninger for varer af samme generelle varekategori også skulle justeres for gasomkostninger af de grunde, der er nævnt i betragtning 18 ovenfor.
Article 2(6)(b) was not applicable either, since the manufacturing cost of the applicant for products belonging to the same general category of goods would also need to be adjusted in respect of gas costs, for the reasons indicated in recital (18) above.
Derfor blev SA&G-omkostningerne samt fortjenesten fastsat i henhold til grundforordningens artikel 2, stk. 6, litra c).
Therefore, SG&A costs and profit were established pursuant to Article 2(6)(c) of the basic Regulation.
I overensstemmelse med grundforordningens artikel 2, stk. 6, litra c), blev SA&G-omkostningerne fastsat på grundlag af en rimelig metode.
In accordance with Article 2(6)(c) of the basic Regulation, the SG&A costs were based on a reasonable method.
På det nordamerikanske marked var der et betydeligt hjemmemarkedssalg og en betydelig konkurrence fra både indenlandske og udenlandske virksomheder.
The North American market showed a significant volume of domestic sales and a considerable level of competition from both domestic and foreign companies.