natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I betragtning af, at Bank of Piraeus ikke var involveret i denationaliseringsprocessen af HSY, bør den ifølge loven og handelssædvane sikres mod enhver forpligtelse som følge af kontrakten vedrørende overdragelsen af HSY, som den ikke deltog i. Og dette er denne sikring, som den græske stats garanti af 18.3.2002 giver den.
And it is this securing that the guarantee of the Greek State of 18.3.2002 provides to it.
Denne garanti var umiddelbart forståelig og lovlig.
This guarantee was self-explanatory and legal.
Ved brev af 28.5.2002 rådførte Piraeus Bank sig med regeringen vedrørende ordlyden af den garanti, som ETVA havde til hensigt at give HDW/Ferrostaal, og anmodede om bekræftelse af, at i tilfælde af, at denne garanti blev påberåbt, ville ordlyden i artikel 8.2.4 i aftalen af 20.3.2002 finde anvendelse.
By letter dated 28 May 2002, Piraeus Bank consulted the government on the wording of the guarantee that ETVA intended to provide to HDW/Ferrostaal and asked confirmation that, in case of calling of this guarantee, what is envisaged in Article 8.2.4 of the Agreement of 20 March 2002 would apply.
Ved brev af 31.5.2002 gav regeringen sit samtykke til, at ETVA udsteder denne garanti, og bekræftede, at i tilfælde af, at den blev påberåbt, ville ordlyden i artikel 8.2.4 finde anvendelse.
By letter of 31 May 2002, the government gave its agreement that ETVA issues this guarantee and confirmed that, in case it would be invoked, what is envisaged in Article 8.2.4 would apply.
HSY fremsendte bemærkninger ved brev af 30. oktober 2006.
HSY submitted comments by letter of 30 October 2006.
Det konkluderes, at »virksomheden alternativt kunne have optaget lån eller fået garantiskrivelser hos et andet ikke-tilknyttet finansieringsinstitut (dvs. uden nogen anden forbindelse end det almindelige kommercielle samarbejde) i undersøgelsesperioden.« Kommissionen bemærker, at det ikke forklares i rapporten, hvordan denne konklusion kan stemme overens med den omstændighed, at HSY's forsøg på at skaffe midler fra andre finansieringsinstitutter ikke lykkedes.
It concludes that ‘the Company could have alternatively borrowed or received letters of guarantee from another non-affiliated financial institution (i.e. with no other relationship, apart from the regular commercial collaboration) during the period under examination’. The Commission observes that the report does not explain how this conclusion can be reconciled with the fact that HSY’s attempts to raise funds from other financial institutions have failed.
Med hensyn til statens mulighed for at kontrollere ETVA bemærker Kommissionen, at ETVA indtil udgangen af 1999 var fuldt ud ejet af den græske stat. Staten havde en majoritetsbesiddelse indtil overførslen af hovedparten af andelene til Piraeus Bank den 20. marts 2002.
Regarding the possibility for the State to control ETVA, the Commission observes that until the end of 1999 ETVA was fully owned by the Greek State. The State kept a majority shareholding until the transfer of the majority of the shares to Piraeus Bank on 20 March 2002.
F.eks. blev princippet om »engangsstøtte« i punkt 48 i disse rammebestemmelser tilsidesat, da Grækenland allerede havde ydet omstruktureringsstøtte til HSY ved ministeriel afgørelse af december 1997.
The Commission notes that there is no doubt that HSY was a firm in difficulty after 31 December 2001. For instance, the losses accumulated over the preceding years were so important that the net equity was negative. Therefore, any aid granted to the firm, and especially aid supporting the modernisation of obsolete equipment, should have been considered as restructuring aid. The Commission considers however that the firm did not comply with the conditions for receiving aid under the 1999 R & R guidelines.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at støtten til fordel for de investeringsudgifter, der er afholdt indtil den 31. december 2001 og vedrører det investeringsprogram, der er beskrevet i beslutning N 401/97, kan anses for at være omfattet af beslutning N 401/97.
But it is not the cause of the delay of the implementation of the investment plan after 31 December 2001. As regards the freezing of the plan during the privatisation process, it does not fulfil the definition of ‘exceptional and unforeseeable circumstances’. Greece claims that the ‘one time, last time’ condition would not be breached since the aid would take place in the adaptation of an existing restructuring plan. As has been extensively explained, the Commission considers that the investment implemented after 31 December 2001 are not part of the investment programme described in decision N 401/97. In addition, paragraph 52 of the 1999 R & R guidelines indicates that ‘the revised plan must still show a return to viability within a reasonable timescale’. According to the initial plan the yard should have its viability restored by 2000. The Commission therefore considers that the planned restoration of viability in June 2004 was a too long delay compared to the initial plan and was not within a reasonable timescale anymore. Finally, the Commission observes that accepting such a long prolongation of the restructuring period would be similar to a circumvention of the ‘one time, last time’ condition. (99) In conclusion, the Commission considers that aid in favour of the investment expenses incurred until 31 December 2001 and related to the investment programme described in decision N 401/97 can be considered to be covered by decision N 401/97.
Lånet blev optaget den 29. december 1999 og udbetalt til HSY i på hinanden følgende rater fra denne dato og indtil den 26. oktober 2000, op til et samlet beløb på 12,76 mio. EUR. Rentesatsen var ATHIBOR (EURIBOR fra den 1. januar 2001) plus 25 basispoint.
By decision of 8 December 1999, the government granted a guarantee and charged an annual guarantee fee of 100 basis points. The loan was concluded on 29 December 1999 and paid to HSY in successive tranches from that date until 26 October 2000, up to a total amount of EUR 12,76 million. The interest rate was ATHIBOR (EURIBOR from 1 January 2001) plus 25 basis points.
En anden forskel i forhold til foranstaltning P3 er, at da lånekontrakten blev undertegnet den 31. maj 2002, havde to internationale virksomheder afsluttet erhvervelsen af HSY og ville investere i selskabet.
The Commission notes for instance that when the loan contract was signed on 31 May 2002, it was already known, and certainly to ETVA who was the shareholder of HSY until that date, that the payment of the investment aid had been ‘freezed’ for administrative reasons. Therefore, when ETVA signed the contract on 31 May 2002, it was already in a position to refuse to pay out the loan.
Erhvervelsen øgede mulighederne for selskabets overlevelse.
It knew that it had the possibility to refuse to pay out the loan. This is different from the situation of ETVA when it signed the loan contract in July 1999.
En sådan erhvervelse havde ikke kunnet forudses i juli 1999.
Another difference with measure P3 is that when the loan contract was signed on 31 May 2002, two international firms had completed the acquisition of HSY and would invest in it. The acquisition increased the chances of survival of the firm. Such an acquisition could not be foreseen in July 1999.
Desuden har Elefsis gjort gældende, at privatiseringen i 1995 aldrig udgjorde en reel privatisering.
In addition, Elefsis claims the privatisation of 1995 never constituted a real privatisation.
Navnlig bar de ansatte aldrig nogen finansiel risiko som aktionærer, eftersom de kun betalte en lille del af det, de burde have betalt, og eftersom de beløb, som de faktisk betalte, blev fuldstændig tilbagebetalt af staten i forbindelse med privatiseringen i 2001-2002.
In particular, the employees never supported any financial risk as shareholders since they only paid a small part of what they should have paid and since the amounts they really paid were entirely reimbursed by the State at the time of the 2001–2002 privatisation.
Skulle Kommissionen finde, at nogen af disse betingelser ikke er blevet opfyldt, kan den kræve standsning og/eller tilbagesøgning af støtten«.
Should the Commission consider that any of these conditions have not been complied with, it may require the suppression and/or recovery of the aid’.
Den omstændighed, at Kommissionen anvendte ordet »betingelser« i flertal, viser, at der var mindst endnu en betingelse foruden forbuddet mod supplerende omstruktureringsstøtte.
The fact that the Commission used the word ‘conditions’ in plural indicates that there was at least a second condition in addition to the prohibition of additional restructuring aid.
På grundlag heraf hedder det i direktivets artikel 10: »2.
On that basis, Article 10 of the Directive indicates ‘2.
Af præamblen til forordning (EF) nr. 1013/97 fremgår følgende: »trods den græske regerings bestræbelser på at privatisere alle de statsejede værfter inden marts 1993 blev skibsværftet Hellenic først solgt i september 1995 til et kooperativ dannet af de ansatte på værftet, idet staten dog har bevaret en majoritetsandel på 51 % i værftet af hensyn til forsvarsmæssige interesser; for at sikre Hellenic-værftets finansielle levedygtighed og omstrukturering er der behov for støtte, således at værftet kan indfri den gæld, der blev stiftet forud for dets forsinkede privatisering«.
The preamble of Regulation (EC) No 1013/97 indicates ‘Whereas, in spite of the efforts made by the Greek Government to privatise all its public yards by March 1993, the Hellenic shipyards was only sold in September 1995 to a cooperative of its workers, the State having kept a majority holding of 51 % for defence interests; Whereas the financial viability and the restructuring of the Hellenic shipyard necessitates the provision of aid which allows the company to write-off the debt accumulated before its delayed privatisation’.
Det hedder i artikel 1, stk. 3, i forordning (EF) nr. 1013/97: »Støtte i form af en eftergivelse af skibsværftet Hellenics gæld op til et beløb på 54525 mio. dr. svarende til gælden forbundet med værftets civile skibsbygningsaktiviteter pr. 31. december 1991 forhøjet med renter og morarenter indtil den 31. januar 1996 kan erklæres forenelig med fællesmarkedet.
Article 1(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1013/97 indicates ‘Drachma aid in the form of a waiver of debts of “Hellenic shipyards”, up to the amount of Dr 54525 million, corresponding to debts relating to civil work by the yard, as existing on 31 December 1991 and with accrued interest rates and penalties until 31 January 1996 may be regarded as compatible with the common market.
Mere præcist godkendte førstnævnte forordning eftergivelsen af renter og morarenter i forbindelse med gæld pr. 31. december 1991, der var påløbet siden da. Forordning (EF) nr. 1013/97 var gældende indtil den 31. december 1998.
More precisely, the former regulation authorised the waiver of the interests and penalties related to debts existing on 31 December 1991 and which had accrued since then. Regulation (EC) No 1013/97 was applicable until 31 December 1998.
ETVA kunne derfor anlægge sag mod HSY og de ansattes forening og behøvede ikke at anlægge sag mod de enkelte ansatte, som de græske myndigheder har gjort gældende.
ETVA could therefore sue HSY and the association for the employees and did not need to sue the individual employees, as claimed by the Greek authorities.
Dette medførte en drastisk ændring af den situation, som de ansatte befandt sig i. I stedet for at skulle betale en købspris var det ikke nødvendigt for de ansatte at sætte dette beløb af deres egne midler på spil.
This dramatically modified the situation in which the employees found themselves. Instead of having to pay a purchase price, the employees would not have to put at risk this amount of own money.
I perioden efter den 30. juni 1999 gjorde de statslige modgarantier det muligt for HSY at opnå garantier, som HSY slet ikke kunne have opnået på markedet.
It is therefore clear that in the period before 30 June 1999 the State counter-guarantees allowed HSY to obtain guarantees at a lower price. In the period after 30 June 1999, the State counter-guarantees allowed HSY to obtain guarantees, which HSY could not have received from the market at all.
Desuden har Grækenland og HSY anført, at ETVA som sikkerhed for denne garanti på 6,6 mio. EUR fik overdraget HSY's provenu i forbindelse med aftale 39 med OSE, hvor kontraktprisen udgjorde 8,5 mio. EUR for HSY.
In addition, Greece and HSY indicate that ETVA received as security for this EUR 6,6 million guarantee the assignment of proceeds of HSY resulting from Agreement 39 with OSE, of which the contractual price for HSY amounted to EUR 8,5 million.
Konsulenten har bekræftet, at HSY kunne have opnået de to garantier fra en privat bank.
The consultant confirms that HSY could have received the two guarantees from a private bank.
F.eks. fremgår det af balancen pr. 31. december 2000, at de forskud, som HSY modtog til kontrakten vedrørende kanonbåde og kontrakten vedrørende undervandsbåde, udgjorde henholdsvis 49,1 mio. EUR og 33,1 mio. EUR. Samme dato udgjorde summen af varelagre, igangværende arbejder, forskud til varelagre og varedebitorer (i regnskabssammenhæng betegnes disse poster »omsætningsaktiver«) i forbindelse med kontrakterne til marinen 14,8 mio. EUR. Forskuddene oversteg med andre ord de omsætningsaktiver, der skulle finansieres, med et beløb på 67,4 mio. EUR. Eftersom de beløb, der er nævnt i beslutningen om at udvide proceduren, ikke er blevet anfægtet, og eftersom det fremgår af en anden kilde, at de synes at være en rimelig tilnærmelse af virkeligheden, konkluderer Kommissionen, at disse forskud i mindst ét år ikke blev anvendt til at udføre de pågældende militære kontrakter.
For instance, the balance sheet as of 31 December 2000 shows that the advance payments received by HSY for the gunboats contract and the submarines contract amounted respectively to EUR 49,1 million and EUR 33,1 million. At the same date, the sum of the inventories, work in progress, advances for inventories and trade debtors (in accounting terms, these items are referred to as current assets) related to the contracts for the Navy amounted to EUR 14,8 million. In other words, the advance payments exceeded by an amount of EUR 67,4 millions the current assets which had to be financed. Since the amounts quoted in the extension decision have not been contested and since a different source shows that they seem to be a reasonable approximation of the reality, the Commission concludes that, during at least one year, these advance payments were not used for the purpose of executing the military contracts concerned.
TKMS/GNSH har anført, at det under forhandlingerne med ETVA om købet af HSY blev klart, at HSY havde modtaget en eller anden form for finansiel støtte fra den græske stat. De potentielle købere havde imidlertid hverken kendskab til omfanget af disse foranstaltninger eller de præcise omstændigheder, hvorunder de var blevet truffet.
TKMS/GNSH indicates that during the negotiations with ETVA for the purchase of HSY, it became clear that HSY had received some financial support from the Greek State. However, neither the extent of these measures nor the precise circumstances under which they had been taken was known to the potential buyers.
Som behandlet i afsnit 3.2 blev privatiseringen besluttet og finansielt støttet — se f.eks. statsstøtten i lov 2941/2001 — af staten, og ETVA har aldrig indtaget en position som en uafhængig økonomisk enhed, der frit kunne udforme salget af HSY på en måde, der maksimerede dens indtægter og minimerede dens tab. Det er derfor den statslige indgriben som helhed, der skal undersøges, og ikke adfærden hos en af dens dele.
Indeed, as discussed in section 3.2 of the present decision, the privatisation was decided and financially supported — see for instance the State aid included in Law 2941/2001 — by the government and ETVA has never been in the position of an independent economic unit free to design the sale of HSY in a way maximising its revenues and minimising its losses. It is therefore the intervention of the State as a whole that must be scrutinised and not the behaviour of one of its parts.
Efter denne dato var kun 1,32 mio. EUR forenelig med fællesmarkedet.
After that date, only EUR 1,32 million was compatible with the common market.
Oplysningerne i dette afsnit stammer for en stor dels vedkommende fra dokumentet »Hellenic Shipyards S.A Confidential Information Memorandum — Alpha Finance/Commercial Bank of Greece/KPMG/Elias SP. Paraskevas« (fortroligt informationsmemorandum), der er dateret marts 2001, og som blev udleveret til de interesserede bydende.
The information provided in this section comes to a large extent from the document: ‘Hellenic Shipyards S.A. — Confidential Information Memorandum — Alpha Finance/Commercial Bank of Greece/KPMG/Elias SP. Paraskevas’ dated March 2001 and which was distributed to the interested bidders.
I dokumentet »Hellenic Shipyards S.A — Confidential Information Memorandum — Alpha Finance/Commercial Bank of Greece/KPMG/Elias SP. Paraskevas« (fortroligt informationsmemorandum), der er dateret marts 2001, og som blev udleveret til interesserede bydende (et eksemplar af dette dokument blev fremsendt af TKMS/GNSH ved brev af 21.6.2007) findes følgende beskrivelse: »I 1999 blev virksomhedens finansielle resultater dog negative igen.
In the document ‘Hellenic Shipyards S.A. — Confidential Information Memorandum — Alpha Finance/Commercial Bank of Greece/KPMG/Elias SP. Paraskevas’ dated March 2001 and which was provided to interested bidders (a copy of this document was provided by TKMS/GNSH in its letter of 21 June 2007), the following description appears: ‘In 1999 though, the financial results of the Company became negative again.
Brown & Root insisterede på, at der skulle foretages personalemæssige strukturændringer.
Brown & Root insisted to proceed with structural personnel changes. Such changes were not accepted by the Shareholders (ETBAbank and Employees), and Brown & Root’s contract was revoked.’
Selv hvis eksistensen af fast ejendom, der kunne behæftes, var relevant, bemærker Kommissionen, at den eksisterende faste ejendom allerede var behæftet med et beløb på 199 mio. EUR indtil 1998 og med et beløb på 51 mio. EUR indtil 2003.
Even if the existence of property that could be encumbered would be relevant, the Commission observes that the existing property were already encumbered for an amount of EUR 199 million until 1998 and for an amount of EUR 51 million until 2003.
En potentiel långiver havde derfor kun været i stand til at få en første panteret på en begrænset del af den faste ejendom.
Therefore, a potential lender would have been able to get a first lien only on a limited part of the property.
F.eks. blev »portugisiske skibsværfter« nævnt som konkurrenter til HSY på s. 10 i dokumentet »Hellenic Shipyards S.A. — Confidential Information Memorandum — Alpha Finance/Commercial Bank of Greece/KPMG/Elias SP. Paraskevas« (fortroligt informationsmemorandum), der er dateret marts 2001, og som blev udleveret til de interesserede bydende.
For instance, ‘Portugal shipyards’ were mentioned as competitors of HSY on page 10 of the document ‘Hellenic Shipyards S.A. — Confidential Information Memorandum — Alpha Finance/Commercial Bank of Greece/KPMG/Elias SP. Paraskevas’ dated March 2001 and which was distributed to the interested bidders.
Det fremgår af punkt 4 i dette brev, at »[i] betragtning af, at HSY har arbejdet tæt sammen med den græske stat i forbindelse med sit svar til Europa-Kommissionen, finder virksomheden det ikke nødvendigt igen at fremsende de oplysninger, som den græske stat allerede har fremsendt, og heller ikke at fremføre de samme argumenter, hvis indhold virksomheden fuldt ud støtter, men med henblik på at give en fuldstændig besvarelse og for at bistå Kommissionen vil den opsummere de argumenter, der allerede er fremført, og fremlægge eventuelt nyt materiale, som måtte være fremkommet i perioden mellem den græske stats svar og dette svar, og vil fremføre eventuelle nye eller supplerende argumenter«.
Paragraph 4 of this letter indicates ‘Given the fact that HSY has closely cooperated with the Greek State within the context of its reply to the European Commission, the Company does not believe it is necessary neither to resubmit information that has already been submitted by the Greek State, nor to set out the same arguments, the content of which it fully supports, but for the purpose of completion of the reply and in order to assist the Commission with its task, it will summarise the arguments already put forward and will submit any new evidence that was gathered during the time that has lapsed between the Greek State’s reply and the present reply and will present any new or supplementary arguments’.
I denne beslutning vil bemærkningerne fra HSY og Grækenland til beslutningen om at udvide proceduren derfor blive slået sammen i stedet for at gentage argumenterne to gange.
In the present decision, the comments of HSY and Greece on the extension decision will therefore be merged, instead of repeating twice the arguments.
Konsulenten bemærker:»Antallet af mandetimer hos underleverandører kan udledes af omkostningerne ved at anvende en gennemsnitlig mandtimeomkostning, som er sammenlignelig mellem underleverandører i samme branche og land.I henhold til »Pay development 2006«-rapporten offentliggjort af Det Europæiske Institut til Forbedring af Leve- og Arbejdsvilkårene er bruttomånedslønnen mindst 625,97 EUR i Grækenland og 1254,28 EUR i Frankrig.Den gennemsnitlige mandtimepris inden for skibsreparation i Frankrig ligger på mellem 40 og 50 EUR, og ved at anvende det forhold på 2, der findes mellem Frankrig og Grækenland med hensyn til mindstelønninger, kan der forventes en pris på 20-25 EUR i forbindelse med mandtimeprisen inden for skibsreparation i Grækenland.Som et resultat af undersøgelser, som vi foretog, fremgår det, at denne sats lå på mellem 30 og 36 EUR i begyndelsen af 2007.
The consultant observes:‘The number of man-hours of subcontractors can be derived from the costs, by using a mean man-hour cost which is comparable between subcontractors of the same trade and country.Based on the “Pay development 2006” report published by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, the minimum monthly gross salary is equal to EUR 625,97 in Greece and to EUR 1254,28 in France.The average man-hour market price in shiprepair in France ranges between EUR 40 and EUR 50, by applying the ratio of 2 which exists between France and Greece for minimum salaries a price of EUR 20 to 25 could be expected for shiprepair man-hour price in Greece.As a result of enquiries we made, it appears that this rate was ranging between EUR 30 early 2007 and EUR 36 in early 2007.
Tillæg C til denne rapport er »The Due Diligence Report on Hellenic Shipyards S.A. titled »Copy for Presentation Purposes« and its Executive Summary prepared by Arthur Andersen, dated 19.6.2001«.
Appendix C of this report is ‘The Due Diligence Report on Hellenic Shipyards S.A. titled “Copy for Presentation Purposes” and its Executive Summary prepared by Arthur Andersen, dated 19 June 2001’.
På side 7 i denne due diligence-rapport analyseres HSY ' s udestående fordringer, og det fremgår, at Strintzis Lines ' varegæld »kun kan inddrives ved levering af fartøjerne i 2002«.
Page 7 of this due diligence report analyses the receivables of HSY and indicates that trade debt due by Strintzis Lines ‘is only collectible upon delivery of the vessels in 2002’.