natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Hvad angår bemærkningerne fra tredjeparten, anførte Tyskland, at garantien til Super SIV ikke udgjorde statsstøtte, fordi ejerne af Sachsen LB havde solgt banken for en alt i alt positiv pris, også selv om man medregnede de potentielle passiver hidrørende fra garantien på 2,75 mia. EUR til Super SIV, og at bidraget fra LBBW til Sachsen LB's resultat for 2007 samt forskudsbetalingen på 250 mio. EUR af LBBW blev betragtet som en del af salgsprisen, hvorfor den pris, LBBW havde betalt, afspejlede bankens markedspris.
Concerning the observations of the third party Germany argued that the guarantee granted to the Super SIV did not constitute state aid because, even including the potential liabilities stemming from the EUR 2,75 billion guarantee granted to the Super SIV, the owners of Sachsen LB had still sold the bank for an overall positive price, and that the contribution from LBBW to Sachsen LB’s 2007 results as well as the EUR 250 million prepayment had been considered by LBBW to be part of the sales price and therefore the sales price paid by LBBW to the owners reflected the market price of the bank.
Tyskland understregede, at der ikke var betalt anden kompensation for tab ud over LBBW's bidrag på 391 mio. EUR til Sachsen LB's resultat for 2007.
Germany stressed that, apart from the EUR 391 million contribution from LBBW to Sachsen LB’s 2007 results, no other loss compensation had been paid.
SPØRGSMÅLET OM STATSSTØTTE
EXISTENCE OF STATE AID
Som anført i EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, er statsstøtte eller støtte, som ydes ved hjælp af statsmidler under enhver tænkelig form, og som fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene ved at begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner, uforenelig med fællesmarkedet i det omfang, den påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
As stated in Article 87(1) EC, any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market.
Kommissionen fastholder den opfattelse, som også kom til udtryk i åbningsbeslutningen, nemlig at ingen af de to finansielle interventioner ville være blevet tilbudt af en markedsøkonomisk investor, hvorfor begge foranstaltninger udgør statsstøtte.
The Commission adheres to its opinion as expressed in the opening decision that neither of the two financial interventions would have been provided by a market economy investor and hence both measures constitute state aid.
Det skal dog bemærkes, at Kommissionen ikke i sin åbningsbeslutning gav udtryk for, at LBBW's og bankgruppens refinansiering indebar konkurrencemæssige problemer.
It should be noted, however, that already in its opening decision the Commission did not raise any competition concerns about the refinancing by LBBW and the banking pool.
Der er redegjort mere detaljeret for dette aspekt senere i dette afsnit.
This is further enlarged upon at the end of this section.
DekaBank og hovedparten af delstatsbanker er offentligretlige organer.
DekaBank and most of the Landesbanken are agencies under public law.
DekaBank ejes af delstatsbankerne og de regionale sparekasseforbund i fællesskab.
DekaBank is jointly held by the Landesbanken and the regional savings banks associations.
Delstatsbankerne ejes normalt af delstaterne og de regionale sparekasseforbund.
The Landesbanken are generally held by the Länder and the regional savings banks associations.
Kreditfaciliteten på 17,1 mia. EUR, som bankgruppen stillede til rådighed for Sachsen LB, kan derfor henføres til staten og dermed betragtes som »statsstøtte eller støtte, som ydes ved hjælp af statsmidler« i den i EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, fastsatte betydning [26].
The credit facility of EUR 17,1 billion which has been made available by the banking pool to Sachsen LB is therefore attributable to the State and can be regarded as ‘granted by a Member State or through state resources’ within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC [26].
I betragtning af Sachsen LB's transnationale og internationale aktiviteter ville enhver fordel hidrørende fra statsmidler også influere på konkurrencen i banksektoren og have konsekvenser for samhandelen i EU.
Moreover, in view of Sachsen LB’s cross-border and international activities any advantage from state resources would also affect competition in the banking sector and have an impact on intra-Community trade.
Kommissionen har noteret sig Sachsen LB's transnationale og internationale aktiviteter, som indebærer, at enhver fordel hidrørende fra statsmidler også vil influere på konkurrencen i banksektoren og have konsekvenser for samhandelen i EU [27].
Furthermore, the Commission notes Sachsen LB’s cross-border and international activities, so that any advantage from state resources would affect competition in the banking sector and have an impact on intra-Community trade [27].
Tyskland afviser, at foranstaltningen giver Sachsen LB en selektiv fordel.
Germany denies that the measure confers a selective advantage upon Sachsen LB.
Kommissionen skal med henvisning til EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, erindre om, at enhver foranstaltning, der finansieres med statsmidler, og som giver et foretagende en fordel, normalt udgør statsstøtte, medmindre den pågældende foranstaltning også ville være iværksat af en investor, der opererer på normale markedsøkonomiske vilkår.
The Commission would recall that under Article 87(1) EC any measure financed with state resources which favours an undertaking normally constitutes state aid, unless the measure would have also been taken by an investor operating under normal market economy conditions.
Bankgruppens adfærd vedrørende den pågældende likviditetsforanstaltning skal altså være i overensstemmelse med princippet om den markedsøkonomiske investor for at udelukke elementer af statsstøtte.
Thus the behaviour of the banking pool in granting the liquidity measure at issue needs to be in conformity with the market economy investor principle in order to exclude state aid elements.
Det bør derfor undersøges, om en markedsøkonomisk investor ville have tilbudt Sachsen LB kreditfaciliteten på samme vilkår som bankgruppen.
It is therefore appropriate to analyse whether a market economy investor would have granted the credit facility to Sachsen LB on the same conditions as the banking pool.
Kommissionen bemærker, at der på det tidspunkt, bankgruppen indgik deres aftale, stort set ikke var nogen efterspørgsel efter kortfristede omsætningspapirer med sikkerhed i fast ejendom, og at der derfor ikke længere var noget reelt marked for denne type investering.
The Commission would observe that, at the time the pool contract was concluded, the demand for mortgage-backed CPs had practically dried up and that therefore there was no longer any effective market for this type of investment.
Den manglende efterspørgsel betyder dog ikke, at der ikke fandtes noget markedsbenchmark.
Such lack of demand should, however, not be confused with the absence of a market benchmark.
Markedsbenchmarket var blot, at sådanne omsætningspapirer på det pågældende tidspunkt ikke havde nogen økonomisk værdi af betydning.
Instead the market benchmark was simply that such CPs had at that time no reasonable economic value.
Det vil sige, at selv om de omsætningspapirer, Ormond Quay havde udstedt, var klassificeret som AAA og gav et rimeligt udbytte, og risikoen for misligholdelse var meget ringe, var der alligevel ingen kommerciel interesse for denne type investering.
That implies that, even if the CPs issued by Ormond Quay were AAA rated, properly remunerated and the default risks were very low, there remained no commercial interest for this type of investment.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at en markedsøkonomisk investor ikke ville have indrømmet Sachsen LB den pågældende kreditfacilitet.
The Commission therefore concludes that a market economy investor would not have granted the credit facility to Sachsen LB.
Foranstaltningen udgør derfor statsstøtte.
Therefore the measure constitutes state aid.
Tyskland anfægter, at salget af Sachsen LB til LBBW kunne involvere statsstøtte.
Germany disputes that the sale of Sachsen LB to LBBW could involve state aid.
Kommissionen fastholder imidlertid det synspunkt, at delstaten Sachsen ikke handlede som en markedsøkonomisk investor ville have gjort, da Sachsen LB blev solgt.
The Commission, however, maintains its view that the Free State of Saxony did not behave like a market economy investor when selling Sachsen LB.
Salget af Sachsen LB til LBBW kunne involvere statsstøtte i to henseender: for det første til køberen (dvs. LBBW), hvis man accepterede en for lav salgspris, og for det andet til Sachsen LB, hvis en likvidation ville have været billigere end at acceptere salget med den medfølgende garanti.
The sale of Sachsen LB to LBBW could involve state aid in two respects: first, to the buyer (i.e. LBBW), if too low a sales price was accepted, and, second, to Sachsen LB, if liquidation would have been less costly than accepting the sale with the guarantee.
Kommissionen mener, at den pris, LBBW betalte, svarede til Sachsen LB's markedsværdi, og gør opmærksom på, at delstaten Sachsen førte forhandlinger med flere potentielle købere og til sidst besluttede sig for at sælge Sachsen LB til LBBW.
The Commission considers that the sales price paid by LBBW corresponds to the market value of Sachsen LB and observes that the Free State of Saxony conducted negotiations with several potential buyers and in the end decided to sell Sachsen LB to LBBW.
Kommissionen skal erindre om, at salgsprisen anses for at være markedsprisen, hvis salget foregår via et åbent udbud uden særlige betingelser tilknyttet, og aktiverne går for det højeste eller eneste bud.
The Commission would recall that the sales price is considered to be the market price if the sale is organised via an open and unconditional tender and the assets go to the highest or only offer.
Et sådant udbud kan, hvis det gennemføres korrekt, udelukke, at der foreligger elementer af statsstøtte, men det forhold, at der ikke er gennemført et sådant udbud, betyder ikke nødvendigvis, at der så er tale om statsstøtte.
While such a tender, if carried out properly, can exclude the presence of state aid elements, its absence does not automatically mean that state aid is present.
I den foreliggende sag besluttede salgsaftalens parter at lade foretage en værdiansættelse for at få fastslået Sachsen LB's værdi pr. 31. december 2007 ud fra den formodning, at finansmarkedet på det tidspunkt ville have stabiliseret sig, så der kunne foretages en mere »normal« markedsevaluering.
In the case at hand, the parties to the sales agreement decided to carry out a valuation in order to determine the value of Sachsen LB as at 31 December 2007, on the assumption that the financial market would have stabilised by then, allowing a more ‘normal’ market evaluation.
En sådan evaluering udelukker ikke automatisk, at der foreligger elementer af statsstøtte, men i denne sag har Kommissionen ikke fundet forhold, der rejser tvivl om transaktionens markedsmæssige fundering.
While such an evaluation does not automatically exclude the presence of state aid elements, in the case at hand the Commission did not find any evidence putting the market orientation of the transaction into doubt.
Kommissionen har ikke ud fra de foreliggende oplysninger grund til at mene, at virksomheden blev solgt til under markedsprisen.
On the basis of the information available, the Commission has no reason to consider that the company was sold below market price.
Som forklaret i betragtning 37, var Sachsen LB's værdi i december 2007 ansat til 328 mio. EUR [28], hvilket var den pris, LBBW betalte.
As explained in paragraph (37), the value of Sachsen LB in December 2007 was established at EUR 328 million [28], which is the price paid by LBBW.
Under den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure blev der da heller ikke fra nogen sider fremsat bemærkninger om, at salgsprisen ikke var rimelig, og Kommissionen har ikke kendskab til andre parter, der ville have været interesseret i at overtage Sachsen LB og villige til at betale en højere pris.
Also, within the formal investigation procedure no party submitted comments calling into doubt the adequacy of the sales price and the Commission is not aware of any party which would have been interested in acquiring Sachsen LB and would have been willing to offer a higher price.
Kommissionen fastholder derfor, at salget fandt sted til markedsprisen, og at der ikke blev ydet statsstøtte til LBBW i forbindelse med salget af Sachsen LB.
The Commission thus maintains its view that the sale took place at the market price and that no state aid was granted to LBBW in connection with the sale of Sachsen LB.
Kommissionen har desuden vurderet, om Sachsen LB fik en fordel, fordi en likvidation ville have været billigere for delstaten Sachsen end at acceptere salget med den tilhørende garanti.
In addition, the Commission assessed whether Sachsen LB received an advantage because liquidation would have been less costly for the Free State of Saxony than accepting the sale with the guarantee.
Undersøgelsen ændrer ikke ved Kommissionens opfattelse af, at ejerne ikke ville have medregnet forskudsbetalingen på 250 mio. EUR fra august 2007, når de skulle sammenholde omkostningerne ved en likvidation og et salg med tilhørende garanti, eftersom beløbet ikke skulle tilbagebetales, selv om salget ikke gik igennem.
The investigation did not alter the Commission’s view that the EUR 250 million prepayment of August 2007 would not have been taken into account by the owners when comparing the costs of liquidation and the sale with a guarantee as the amount was not reimbursable in the event of the sale falling through.
Det vil med andre ord sige, at eftersom Sachsen LB's tidligere ejere ikke var forpligtet til at tilbagebetale forskuddet til LBBW, hvis salget blev opgivet, ville en markedsøkonomisk investor ikke have betragtet forskuddet som en yderligere omkostning i et hypotetisk modscenario.
In other words, as there was no obligation on Sachsen LB’s previous owners to reimburse LBBW the prepayment should the sale fall through, the prepayment would not have been considered an additional cost by a market economy investor in a hypothetical counter-scenario.
Tyskland anslog det forventede tab, der kunne omfattes af garantien, til […(> 800)] mio. EUR i et pessimistisk scenario, […(< 500)] mio. EUR i et basisscenario og […(< 200)] mio. EUR i et optimistisk scenario.
Germany estimated the expected losses involved in the guarantee at EUR […(> 800)] million in a bad case, EUR […(< 500)] million in a base case and EUR […(< 200)] million in the best case.
Kommissionen var dog fortsat i tvivl om, hvorvidt den af LBBW anvendte model til kvantificering af de forventede tab under garantien afspejler støtteelementet i garantien helt korrekt.
However, the Commission’s doubts whether the model applied by LBBW to quantify the expected losses in the guarantee fully reflects the aid element involved in the guarantee could not be allayed.
Kommissionen vil med henvisning til eksisterende retspraksis pege på, at støtteelementet i en garanti til en kriseramt virksomhed kan være lige så stort som hele det beløb, der rent faktisk er dækket af garantien (dvs. i dette tilfælde 2,75 mia. EUR).
The Commission would point out that, based on established case law, the aid element involved in a guarantee to a company in difficulty may be as high as the amount effectively covered by the guarantee (i.e. in this case EUR 2,75 billion).
Kommissionen skal desuden understrege, at selv i basisscenariet, der byggede på formodningen om, at markederne hurtigt ville rette sig, ville de forventede tab have været ensbetydende med en negativ pris for delstaten Sachsen.
The Commission would stress, moreover, that, even in the base case scenario, which was based on the assumption of a quick recovery of the markets, the expected losses would have meant a negative price for the Free State of Saxony.
I modsætning til, hvad Tyskland hævder, er det ikke normal praksis altid at acceptere basisscenariet [31].
Contrary to what is claimed by Germany, accepting the base case scenario is not an established practice [31].
Kommissionen erkender dog, at en negativ salgspris undtagelsesvist kan accepteres af en markedsøkonomisk investor, hvis sælgerens omkostninger ved en likvidation ville være højere.
However, the Commission recognises that a negative sales price might exceptionally be accepted by a market economy investor if the liquidation costs for the seller would be higher.
Ved beregningen af omkostningerne ved en likvidation kan kun medregnes de forpligtelser, som en markedsøkonomisk investor ville have overtaget [32].
For the calculation of the liquidation cost only those liabilities can be considered which would have been entered into by a market economy investor [32].
Det udelukker forpligtelser hidrørende fra statsstøtte, eftersom de ikke ville være blevet overtaget af en markedsøkonomisk investor [33].
This excludes liabilities stemming from state aid as these would have not been taken over by a market economy investor [33].
En sådan forpligtelse er Gewährträgerhaftung [34].
One such liability is Gewährträgerhaftung [34].
Kommissionen hævder, at Gewährträgerhaftung er eksisterende støtte, og har foreslået passende foranstaltninger til at fjerne den [35].
The Commission has held that Gewährträgerhaftung is existing aid and has proposed appropriate measures to abandon it [35].
Kommissionen fastholder, at den ikke kan acceptere Tysklands argument om, at egenkapitalen på 880 mio. EUR stadig skulle have betydning for delstaten Sachsen, eftersom den allerede havde solgt Sachsen LB og dermed ikke ville tage hensyn til virksomhedens tab ved en potentiel likvidation, men kun de ekstra omkostninger, delstaten ville blive påført.
The Commission confirms that it cannot accept Germany’s argument that the own capital of EUR 880 million should still be of relevance for the Free State of Saxony, because it has already sold Sachsen LB and would thus not consider the losses of the firm in a potential liquidation, but only the additional costs it would be facing.
Endelig skal Kommissionen pege på, at hele garantien blev stillet af delstaten Sachsen, som kun er medejer, og at de øvrige ejere ikke bidrog til garantien.
Finally the Commission recognises that the whole guarantee was granted by the Free State of Saxony, which is only part-owner, and that the other owners were not contributing to the guarantee.
Til gengæld for en garanti, som selv i det mest optimistiske (og usandsynlige) scenario var mindst […] mio. EUR og helt op til 2,75 mia. EUR værd, fik delstaten Sachsen kun […] mio. EUR ud af salget af Sachsen LB.
In exchange for a guarantee worth, even in the best (and implausible) scenario, at least EUR […] million and up to EUR 2,75 billion, the Free State of Saxony only obtained EUR […] million from the sale of Sachsen LB.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at delstaten Sachsen solgte Sachsen LB for en negativ salgspris og ydede statsstøtte til Sachsen LB.
The Commission therefore concludes that the Free State of Saxony sold Sachsen LB for a negative sales price and granted state aid to Sachsen LB.
REFINANSIERINGEN AF SUPER SIV
THE REFINANCING OF THE SUPER SIV
Kommissionen mener ikke, at LBBW's og de øvrige delstatsbankers refinansiering af Super SIV giver anledning til konkurrencemæssige problemer, og fastholder efter sin undersøgelse det synspunkt, at denne foranstaltning ikke udgjorde statsstøtte.
The Commission did not raise any competition concerns about the refinancing of the Super SIV by LBBW and the other Landesbanken and maintains its view after the investigation that this measure does not constitute state aid.
Oprettelsen af Super SIV hænger helt klart sammen med omstruktureringen og salget af Sachsen LB til LBBW.
The creation of the Super SIV is clearly related to the restructuring and sale of Sachsen LB to LBBW.
Ikke desto mindre ville refinansieringen af Super SIV kunne betragtes som statsstøtte i to tilfælde: hvis LBBW og de øvrige delstatsbanker havde fået en uforholdsmæssig høj forrentning af den likviditet, de stillede til rådighed, og hvis LBBW og de øvrige delstatsbanker ikke havde handlet som markedsøkonomiske investorer, da de stillede likviditet til rådighed for Super SIV.
Nevertheless, one could consider the refinancing of the Super SIV to constitute state aid in two cases: if LBBW and the other Landesbanken had obtained a disproportionate remuneration for the liquidity provided; and if LBBW and the other Landesbanken had not behaved as market economy investors when providing liquidity to the Super SIV.
Tilvejebringelse af likviditet og refinansiering er bankers hovedaktiviteter.
Providing liquidity and refinancing it is the essential activity of banks.
Banker stiller likviditet til rådighed for markedsaktører og refinansierer den efterfølgende ved at låne tilsvarende beløb.
Banks provide liquidity to market operators, which they subsequently refinance by borrowing similar amounts.
Banken vil — afhængigt af strukturen i det enkelte aktiv/passiv — vælge den mest hensigtsmæssige refinansieringsstrategi (med hensyn til varighed og kilder) for at optimere sine samlede refinansieringsomkostninger og minimere risiciene.
Depending on the individual asset/liability structure, each bank will chose its appropriate refinancing strategy (in terms of duration and origins) in order to optimise its total refinancing costs and minimise the inherent risks.
Refinansiering kan indebære, at gældens løbetid forlænges eller afkortes, eller den nye gæld kan være lavere forrentet, eller der kan være tale om kombinationer af disse muligheder.
As a result of refinancing, the maturity of the debt may be extended or reduced, or the new debt may carry a lower interest rate, or some combination of these options.
Mulighederne for at tjene penge ligger i forskellen mellem provenuet ved at stille (f.eks. langfristet) likviditet til rådighed og omkostningerne ved at låne (f.eks. kortfristet) likviditet.
The opportunities to earn money come from differences between the revenues obtained from providing the liquidity (e.g. long term) and the cost of borrowing it (e.g. short term).
Kommissionen mener ikke, at LBBW og de øvrige delstatsbanker fik nogen fordel ved at stille likviditet til rådighed for Super SIV.
The Commission considers that LBBW and the other Landesbanken did not obtain any advantage from the provision of the liquidity to the Super SIV.
Det er klart, at LBBW og delstatsbankerne kunne have fundet andre anvendelsesmuligheder for den likviditet, de stillede til rådighed for Super SIV i betragtning af de enorme muligheder, der ligger på de nationale og internationale kapitalmarkeder.
It is clear that LBBW and the Landesbanken could have found alternatives for the liquidity they gave to the Super SIV, given the vast possibilities offered on the national and international capital markets.
Refinansieringen af Super SIV forøgede derfor ikke deres refinansieringsvolumen.
The refinancing of the Super SIV did not therefore increase their refinancing volume.
Afkastet fra refinansieringen af Super SIV lå heller ikke over markedsniveauet, især fordi der blev betalt et gebyr for den lavere risiko som følge af statsgarantien.
In addition, the refinancing of the Super SIV did not provide above-market returns, notably because the lower risk provided by the state guarantee was paid for through a fee.
Hele formålet med Super SIV var at beholde porteføljen til udløb.
The whole purpose of the Super SIV is to hold the portfolio until maturity.
Afkastet hidrører fra de underliggende aktiver, der er stillet som sikkerhed for porteføljens værdipapirer med forskellige løbetider.
Profits are generated from the reimbursement of the underlying assets backing the securities held in the portfolio and which have different maturities.