natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Endelig var den kendsgerning, at SNCM ikke havde til hensigt at afhænde de aktiver, der ikke var absolut nødvendige for virksomhedens overlevelse, i strid med kravene i rammebestemmelserne fra 2004.
Finally, the fact that SNCM did not provide for disposal of the assets which were not essential to the survival of the undertaking is contrary to the requirements laid down by the 2004 guidelines.
STIM forlangte derfor yderligere kompenserende modydelser for halvdelen af den udbetalte støtte, dvs. 98,25 mio. EUR, gennem salg af endnu et fartøj og afståelse af SNCM's direkte og indirekte kapitalinteresser i CMN.
Accordingly, STIM demands additional compensation of half of the aid contributed, namely EUR 98,25 million, through the disposal of an additional vessel and its direct and indirect SNCM holdings in CMN.
I den forbindelse fastholdt STIM, at de pågældende kapitalinteresser ikke var strategiske i den betydning, der var fastsat i rammebestemmelserne for støtte til omstrukturering, fordi de hverken var »nødvendige for virksomhedens overlevelse« eller havde karakter af et usælgeligt aktiv.
In that respect, STIM states that those holdings are not strategic as provided in the guidelines on restructuring aid as they are not ‘essential to the firm’s survival’ nor are they inalienable assets.
STIM gjorde også gældende, at de påståede synergier mellem SNCM og CMN ikke fandtes, eftersom SNCM ikke spillede nogen reel rolle for ledelsen og udviklingen af CMN.
STIM also submits that the alleged synergies between SNCM and CMN do not exist inasmuch as SNCM has no real role in the management and development of CMN.
STIM understregede til slut, at aktionæraftalen mellem de to virksomheder ikke havde eksisteret siden den 15. marts 2006, da den blev ophævet af CMN, hvilket var blevet fastslået af Appelretten i Paris.
STIM states, finally, that the shareholders’ agreement linking the two undertakings has not existed since 15 March 2006, when CMN gave notice that it was no longer bound by it, as held by the Cour d’Appel de Paris.
Bemærkninger fra SNCM
Comments of SNCM
SNCM havde fremsendt sagsmateriale til Kommissionen med en redegørelse for virksomhedens økonomiske og konkurrencemæssige situation, ledsaget af et juridisk responsum med en vurdering af risikoen i forbindelse med en likvidationsprocedure for et sagsanlæg mod staten i dennes egenskab af reelt ansvarlig for SNCM's ledelse i perioden forud for privatiseringen.
SNCM sent the Commission a copy of a file summarising its economic and competitive position, together with legal advice assessing the risk that, in connection with liquidation proceedings, the State intervention would be characterised by the courts as de facto management of the company for the period preceding privatisation.
Advokatfirmaet […], som SNCM havde konsulteret, havde på grundlag af selskabets ansættelseskontrakter og andet arbejdsretligt materiale samt kontrolorganernes korrespondance, indlæg og referater, skønnet, at den franske stat havde […]. Det blev i rapporten desuden understreget, at […]. Endelig blev der i samme rapport peget på […].
Consulted by SNCM, the […] firm arrived at the conclusion that, on the basis of the company’s social documents supplemented by correspondence, speeches and minutes of the auditing bodies, the French State […] The report also notes that […] Finally, the report refers to […].
På dette grundlag konkluderede SNCM's ekspert, at det var særdeles sandsynligt, at den franske stats funktion som reelt ansvarlig for ledelsen ville blive gjort gældende af Handelsretten i Marseille.
On that basis, SNCM’s expert concludes that it is very likely that the Tribunal de Commerce de Marseille would have characterised the French State as de facto manager.
Ifølge SNCM fremgik det desuden af de faktiske omstændigheder, der bl.a. var fastslået i beretninger fra den franske revisionsret, at forsømmelighed fra den franske stats side i dennes egenskab af reelt ansvarlig for SNCM's ledelse, havde medvirket til SNCM's insolvens.
Moreover, according to the findings in, inter alia, the reports of the Court of Auditors, the mismanagement attributable to the French State, de facto manager of SNCM, contributed to SNCM’s stated shortfall in assets.
De økonomiske konsekvenser af statens mangelfulde ledelse beløb sig til […].
The loss caused by mismanagement amounted to […].
I denne forbindelse mente SNCM's ekspert, at der ikke kunne være tvivl om, at den franske stat ved en retssag om statens ansvar ville blive dømt til at dække hele eller en del af underskuddet, når man betænkte statens omfattende inddragelse i SNCM's ledelse, de indlysende ledelsesmæssige fejl og størrelsen af statens finansielle ressourcer.
In that context, according to SNCM’s expert, there is no doubt that the French State would be ordered to bear all or a part of the shortfall in assets under an action ‘en comblement de passif’, having regard to the very strong involvement of the State in SNCM’s management, its manifest acts of mismanagement and the size of its financial resources.
Med henvisning til relevant retspraksis konkluderede SNCM's ekspert, at hvis SNCM var trådt i likvidation, ville staten helt sikkert være blevet dømt til at dække SNCM's sociale gæld i fuldt omfang.
On the basis of the relevant case-law, SNCM’s expert concludes that, if SNCM had been liquidated, the State would certainly have been ordered to pay all of SNCM’s social security debts.
Det ville have betydet, at staten som hovedaktionær skulle have dækket mellem […] og […] % af den konstaterede manko (svarende til mellem […] og […] mio. EUR).
That would have resulted in the State shareholder being made liable for an estimated share of between […] and […] % of the stated shortfall in assets (namely between EUR […] and […] million).
Ved at beslutte at privatisere SNCM efter at have udvidet rederiets egenkapital med 158 mio. EUR havde den franske stat derfor handlet som en fornuftig investor.
Consequently, by deciding to privatise SNCM while strengthening in advance its capital in the sum of EUR 158 million, the French State acted like a well-informed investor.
FRANKRIGS KOMMENTARER TIL BEMÆRKNINGERNE FRA DE INTERESSEREDE PARTER
OBSERVATIONS OF FRANCE ON THE COMMENTS OF THE INTERESTED PARTIES
Frankrigs kommentarer til de interesserede parters bemærkninger vedrørende beslutningen fra 2002 om at indlede den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure
Observations of France on the comments of the interested parties concerning the decision to open the 2002 formal investigation procedure
Vedrørende bemærkningerne fra Corsica Ferries (CFF)
The comments of Corsica Ferries
De franske myndigheder anførte, at visse af de af CFF forelagte data om SNCM's udbud var fejlbehæftede.
The French authorities have indicated that some of the data submitted by CFF concerning SNCM’s services were inaccurate.
Den franske stat mente, i modsætning til CFF, at omstruktureringsplanen var opbygget således, at den gjorde det muligt meget hurtigt at genoprette SNCM og skabe forudsætninger for virksomhedens overlevelse på mellemlang og lang sigt.
The French State is of the opinion that, contrary to what is maintained by CFF, the restructuring plan was devised in such a way as to turn SNCM around as soon as possible and create the right conditions to ensure its medium- and long-term viability.
De franske myndigheder erindrede om, at en væsentlig del af programmet for nedbringelse af omkostningerne allerede var sat i værk.
The French authorities note that a significant part of the cost reduction programme has already been implemented.
Desuden havde SNCM i 2001 afsat 21,3 mio. EUR til finansiering af omstruktureringsforanstaltninger, bl.a. planen for sikring af beskæftigelsen.
Further, in 2001 SNCM earmarked EUR 21,3 million to finance restructuring measures, in particular the scheme to safeguard jobs.
Med hensyn til fastsættelsen af støttebeløbet fastholdt de franske myndigheder, at en samlet gearing på 0,79 var typisk for flertallet af rederiers balance, medmindre særlige forhold gjorde sig gældende.
In respect of the determination of the amount of the aid, the French authorities confirm that a 0,79 capital/debt ratio is quite typical for the balance sheets of most shipping companies, except in special situations.
Vedrørende bemærkningerne fra Stef-TFE
Comments of Stef-TFE
De franske myndigheder mente ikke, at Stef-TFE's beskrivelse af relationerne mellem SNCM og CMN i forbindelse med opfyldelsen af public service-kontrakten var i overensstemmelse med de faktiske forhold.
The French authorities conclude that the description which Stef-TFE gives of relations between SNCM and CMN in performing the public service contract does not reflect reality.
Ifølge de franske myndigheder var valget af den model for midlertidig konsortiedannelse, hvor SNCM og CMN fik tildelt public service-kontrakten i fællesskab, men uden at hæfte solidarisk for dens opfyldelse, på ingen måde »nødvendiggjort af forhandlingernes globale karakter« i modsætning til, hvad Stef-TFE hævdede.
According to the French authorities, the decision of SNCM and CMN to enter into a joint venture in which they are jointly and not severally responsible has in no way ‘been rendered obligatory by the overall character of the consultation’, contrary to Stef-TFE’s observations.
Dannelsen af konsortiet SNCM-CMN var resultatet af en analyse foretaget af de to rederier, i henhold til hvilken en fortsættelse af deres traditionelle og naturlige partnerskab inden for denne model gav dem de største fordele — især af konkurrencemæssig art — i forbindelse med udbuddet.
The decision to set up a SNCM-CMN joint venture was the result of an analysis made by the two companies which showed that the continuation in that form of their original natural partnership gave them the best chances, in particular in terms of competitiveness, to win the tender.
CMN trådte ind i dette konsortium efter sit eget bevidste valg, baseret på en vurdering af rederiets egne interesser, og ikke som følge af en forpligtelse, der lå i den måde, udbuddet var udformet på.
CMN’s entry into that venture therefore resulted from a well-considered decision on its part based on an evaluation of its own interests and not on an obligation arising out of the tender as such.
De franske myndigheder præciserede, at de to rederier SNCM og CMN hverken var indbyrdes uafhængige eller i direkte konkurrence med hinanden, i modsætning til, hvad Stef-TFE hævdede.
The French authorities explain that, contrary to Stef-TFE’s observations, the companies SNCM and CMN are neither independent nor in direct competition.
Det ville være i strid med selve princippet i den fælles public service-kontrakt, som de begge havde undertegnet.
Such a situation would be in conflict with the very principle of the single public service delegation contract to which they are co-signatories.
De franske myndigheder fastholdt, at SNCM's aktiepost i CMN ikke kunne betragtes som et rent finansielt aktiv, således som Stef-TFE syntes at påstå.
The French authorities maintain that SNCM’s share in CMN’s capital cannot be construed as a purely financial asset, as Stef-TFE appears to allege.
Frankrig gjorde gældende, at SNCM's aktiepost i CMN i høj grad var af strategisk betydning.
In conclusion, France’s position is that SNCM’s shareholdings in CMN are highly strategic in nature.
Afståelse af aktierne ville ifølge de franske myndigheder ikke blot være i strid med forretningsplanen, men også en alvorlig strategisk fejltagelse.
In its opinion, the transfer of those holdings would not only make no sense commercially but would also be tantamount to a major strategic error.
Frankrigs kommentarer til bemærkningerne fra repræsentanterne for regionale og lokale forvaltninger
Observations of France on the comments of the representatives of the local authorities
Frankrig kunne overordnet erklære sig enig i indholdet af brevet fra formanden for regionen Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur, men gjorde dog opmærksom på, at i modsætning til, hvad der var anført i punkt 2 i nævnte brev, var udbuddet af overfarter mellem det franske fastland og Korsika ikke »for stort i forhold til efterspørgslen«, og SNCM's takstpolitik var i overensstemmelse med rederiets tilsagn om ikke at starte en priskrig og ikke være prisførende.
Although France approves as a whole of the content of the letter of the president of the Region of Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur, it is nonetheless anxious to state that, contrary to what is asserted in point 2 of that letter, the supply of services between mainland France and Corsica is not ‘in excess of demand’ and SNCM’s fares policy complies with commitments which it made not to start a fares war and not to be a ‘price leader’.
Frankrigs kommentarer til de interesserede parters bemærkninger vedrørende beslutningen fra 2006
Observations of France on the comments of the interested parties concerning the 2006 decision
Med hensyn til public service-kontrakten om overfarterne mellem Marseille og Korsika afviste Frankrig ethvert argument om, at udbudsproceduren og indgåelsen af kontrakten ikke var blevet gennemført korrekt.
Concerning the public service delegation for the Marseille-Corsica routes, France challenges any argument that the procedure for the award of the public service delegation agreement was unlawful.
Frankrig mente desuden, at de nationale retssager ved kompetente nationale retsinstanser i disses egenskab af EF-domstole på det almenretlige område betød, at Kommissionen ikke havde nogen fællesskabsinteresse i at undersøge spørgsmålene vedrørende proceduren for indgåelse af public service-kontrakten.
Further, according to France, the existence of national procedures before the competent national courts as Community courts of ordinary jurisdiction implies that there is no Community interest for the Commission in examining questions relating to the procedure to award the public service delegation agreement.
Vedrørende den fremskyndede gennemførelse af foranstaltningerne i den første omstruktureringsplan og ændringerne af denne
The early implementation of the measures laid down in the first restructuring plan and its amendments
Til den generelle bemærkning vedrørende Frankrigs fremskyndede gennemførelse af de foranstaltninger, der muligvis kunne betegnes som statsstøtte, svarede de franske myndigheder, at den fremskyndede gennemførelse var begrundet i de særlige omstændigheder ved proceduren, nemlig annullationen i 2005 af Kommissionens godkendelsesbeslutning af 9. juli 2003, og ikke i de franske myndigheders iver efter at tilsidesætte deres forpligtelser i medfør af EF-traktaten.
The answer of the French authorities to the general remark concerning the early implementation of measures which may be classified as aid by France is that that implementation is justified by the specific features of the procedure, that is to say, the annulment in 2005 of the authorisation decision of the Commission of 9 July 2003, and not by an intention on the part of the French authorities to disregard their obligations under the EC Treaty.
I øvrigt anførte Frankrig, at man altid havde holdt Kommissionen informeret om udviklingen i sagen og om de forskellige foranstaltninger, der var vedtaget siden januar 2005, ud fra princippet om loyalt samarbejde mellem medlemsstaterne og Kommissionen.
Indeed, France states that it has always kept the Commission informed of developments in the matter and with the different measures adopted since January 2005, in accordance with the duty to cooperate in good faith between the Member States and the Commission.
Hvad angik de sidstnævnte foranstaltninger, mente de franske myndigheder, at eftersom ingen af dem udgjorde statsstøtte, var EF-traktatens artikel 88, stk. 3, ikke relevant, og at der derfor ikke var grund til at udskyde gennemførelsen.
Concerning those recent measures, the French authorities consider that since none of them constitute aid, Article 88(3)EC is not, ultimately, applicable to them and, accordingly, there is no obligation to suspend their application.
For det første præciserede de franske myndigheder, at man ikke havde betvivlet Altmark-dommens relevans, men til gengæld havde peget på visse vanskeligheder ved at foretage den test, der forlanges ifølge dommen, eftersom det pågældende beløb var blevet udbetalt før dommen og dermed ikke havde kunnet tages med i de nye kriterier.
First, the French authorities state that they did not cast doubt on the applicability of the Altmark judgment while noting, on the other hand, certain difficulties in applying the test laid down by that judgment, since the amount in question preceded it and could not therefore have taken into account those new criteria.
Ifølge Frankrig satte CFF's og STIM's bemærkninger ikke spørgsmålstegn ved, om den første og den anden betingelse i Altmark-dommen var relevante i den foreliggende sag.
According to France, the observations of CFF and STIM do not call into question the applicability to the present case of the first and second Altmark conditions.
Med hensyn til den tredje betingelse i Altmark-dommen afviste de franske myndigheder CFF's og STIM's argument om, at betalingen af dette beløb nødvendigvis medførte en overkompensation, fordi Kommissionen i beslutningen af 30. oktober 2001 havde godkendt udbetalingen af 787 mio. EUR som kompensation for omkostningerne ved public service-forpligtelserne.
In respect of the third criterion in Altmark, the French authorities deny the argument put forward by CFF and STIM that the payment of that sum necessarily results in overcompensation because the Commission authorised, by its decision of 30 October 2001, the payment of EUR 787 million as compensation for public service costs.
I den henseende ønskede Frankrig at præcisere, at Kommissionen i beslutningen fra 2003 havde slået fast, at disse forpligtelser havde været underkompenseret, og at beløbet på 53,48 mio. EUR var berettiget som kompensation for public service-forpligtelser.
In that respect, France states that the Commission, in its 2003 decision, stated that those obligations had been undercompensated and that the amount of EUR 53,48 million was justified as public service compensation.
Med hensyn til den fjerde betingelse i Altmark-dommen understregede de franske myndigheder, at de, på trods af at der ikke fandtes en referencevirksomhed, hvorfor der ikke kunne foretages en overordnet sammenligning mellem SNCM og andre virksomheder, hvad CFF da også havde påpeget, havde bestræbt sig på at fremskaffe de nødvendige data til at kunne foretage en så præcis sammenligning som muligt med tilsvarende virksomheder, dvs. primært CMN.
Regarding the fourth Altmark condition, the French authorities submit that, despite the absence of a reference undertaking and thus the impossibility of establishing an overall comparison between SNCM and other undertakings, as noted also by CFF, they endeavoured to provide information serving to make the most exact comparison possible with similar undertakings, that is to say, primarily with CMN.
Frankrig anfægtede ligeledes STIM's og CFF's argument om, at SNCM's strukturelle omkostninger skulle være højere end CMN's.
France also challenges the argument raised by STIM and CFF that the structural costs of SNCM are greater than those of CMN.
Selv om det havde været tilfældet, mente de franske myndigheder, at SNCM's omkostnings-effektivitetsgrad lå meget tæt på CMN's.
Even if that were to be the case, the French authorities consider that the productivity ratios of SNCM are very similar to those of CMN.
Konklusionen var, at SNCM var lige så veldrevet som CMN, som STIM på intet tidspunkt havde betegnet som en dårligt drevet virksomhed.
In conclusion, SNCM was managed as well as CMN to which STIM at no point refers as a badly-run undertaking.
Frankrig præciserede, at underskuddene i perioden fra 1991 til 2001 ikke kun skyldtes public service-kontrakten, således som CFF syntes at påstå, men at public service-forpligtelserne havde forhindret SNCM i at tilpasse sig ændringerne i konkurrenceforholdene.
France states that the losses suffered between 1991 and 2001 were not attributable only to the public service delegation, as CFF appears to assert, but that the public service obligations prevented SNCM from adapting to the change in the competitive environment.
De franske myndigheder anførte også, at disse underskud ikke var koncentreret på perioden 2000-2001, men var accelereret i denne periode, fordi CFF havde øget antallet af overfarter.
The French authorities also state that those losses are not concentrated in the period 2000 to 2001 but gathered pace over that period on account of the increase in the round trips made by CFF.
Med hensyn til, om de 53,48 mio. EUR, der var betalt som kompensation for public service-forpligtelser var forenelige med fællesmarkedet i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 86, stk. 2, erindrede de franske myndigheder om, at Kommissionen allerede i beslutningen fra 2003 havde erklæret beløbet foreneligt i henhold til nævnte artikel, og at Retten ikke havde anfægtet det i sin dom af 15. juni 2005.
Concerning the compatibility of the EUR 53,48 million paid as compensation for public service costs in accordance with Article 86(2) EC, the French authorities note that, first, in its 2003 decision, the Commission had already declared that amount as compatible with that article and, secondly, the CFI did not call it into question in its judgment in Case T-349/03.
I relation til afståelsesprocessen præciserede Frankrig, at man helt fra starten havde fulgt de traditionelle udvælgelseskriterier, der primært var baseret på den foreslåede pris ved værdiansættelsen af SNCM's værdipapirer og sekundært på andre parametre (forretningsplan, socialplan osv.), bl.a. det beløb, som tilbudsgiverne var indstillet på at investere i rederiet i form af en rekapitalisering.
As regards the sale process, France states that from its outset it provided for classic selection criteria based primarily on the price offered for the increase in value of SNCM’s stock and, secondarily, on other criteria (industrial plan, social plan and so on), including the amount which the candidates were prepared to invest in the company for a recapitalisation.
Frankrig afviste blankt argumentet fra visse tredjeparter om, at afståelsesprocessen ikke havde været gennemsigtig, og erindrede om, at staten i den foreliggende sag endda var gået videre end de lovfæstede og administrativt fastsatte krav, som i forvejen var særdeles strenge, og som var gældende i tilfælde af, at staten ville afhænde aktieposter ejet af det offentlige.
France firmly challenges the argument put forward by third parties that the process of putting up for sale was not transparent and notes that, in the present case, the State itself went beyond its legal and statutory obligations, substantial and restrictive as they were, provided for in the event of transfer of public shareholdings.
Frankrig gjorde opmærksom på, at udviklingen efter BCP's tilbud om at overtage 100 % af SNCM's værdipapirer, var forløbet i en meget vanskelig finansiel og social kontekst, og at VT's tilknytning til BCP's tilbud ikke havde ændret ved de forretningsmæssige og finansielle betingelser for operationen (bortset fra kapitalfordelingen).
France notes that the development following BCP’s offer again to take up 100 % of SNCM’s stock occurred in a very difficult financial and social context and that VT’s joining BCP’s offer did not change the commercial and financial terms of the transaction (except for capital ownership).
Med hensyn til den negative pris på 158 mio. EUR erindrede de franske myndigheder om, at SNCM på grund af sin finansielle situation pr. 30. september 2005 var blevet afhændet til markedsprisen, og at salget rent økonomisk havde været mere fordelagtigt end en likvidation af virksomheden.
As regards the negative price of EUR 158 million, the French authorities note that, having regard to SNCM’s financial situation on 30 September 2005, the undertaking was sold at a market price and that the sale was economically more advantageous than a liquidation of the undertaking.