natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Den danske regering indrømmer, at Kommissionen ikke havde fået forelagt en omstruktureringsplan på tidspunktet for kapitalindskuddet på 300 mio. DKK og på tidspunktet for indgåelse af aftalen med Arriva i november 2000 om salget.
The Danish government concedes that no restructuring plan had been submitted to the Commission when the capital injection of DKK 300 million was made, or when agreement was reached with Arriva in November 2000 on the principles of the sale.
Den danske regering er dog ikke enig i Danske Busvognmænds fortolkning af Domstolens dom i sag C-17/99, Frankrig mod Kommissionen, nemlig at det er for sent at forelægge Kommissionen en omstruktureringsplan, når medlemsstaten allerede har ydet støtten.
However, the Danish government does not share the interpretation Danske Busvognmaend makes of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-17/99, France v Commission, namely that a restructuring plan cannot be submitted to the Commission any longer, once the Member State has granted the aid.
Den danske regering gør gældende, at rammebestemmelserne for omstrukturering fra 1999 ikke indeholder nogen regler eller anvisninger om, hvornår omstruktureringsplanen skal forelægges Kommissionen.
The Danish government first points out that the 1999 restructuring guidelines contain no rules or instructions on the question of when a restructuring plan has to be submitted to the Commission.
Den eneste klare betingelse er, at Kommissionen ikke kan godkende omstruktureringsstøtte, uden at der forinden er forelagt en omstruktureringsplan for Kommissionen.
The only clear condition is that the Commission cannot approve restructuring aid unless it has previously received a restructuring plan.
Men også i tilfælde, hvor en støtteforanstaltning er iværksat uden forudgående anmeldelse til Kommissionen, skal Kommissionen ifølge den danske regering undersøge, om betingelserne for at godkende støtten er opfyldt.
The Danish government considers that even in cases where an aid measure is implemented without first notifying the Commission, the Commission must check that the aid satisfies the conditions for approval.
Dette fremgår bl.a. af artikel 13, stk. 2, i forordning 659/1999 (procedureforordningen).
This is provided for, inter alia, in Article 13(2) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Procedural Regulation’).
Regeringen finder det altså fuldt tilstrækkeligt, at der forelægges Kommissionen en omstruktureringsplan, der godkendes, inden Kommissionen træffer sin beslutning om, hvorvidt statsstøtten er forenelig med fællesmarkedet.
It considers that it is therefore perfectly satisfactory for the Commission to receive a restructuring plan which is approved before the Commission decides whether the State aid is compatible with the common market.
For så vidt angår præmis 43 i sag C-17/99, Frankrig mod Kommissionen [40], gør Den danske regering gældende, at i henhold til præmis 41 havde Kommissionen i den beslutning, der var genstand for sagen, fastslået, at »den franske regering ikke havde forelagt Kommissionen nogen troværdig omstruktureringsplan«, og at »de franske myndigheder heller ikke efter procedurens indledning har fremlagt nogen sådan plan for Kommissionen«.
With respect to paragraph 43 in Case C-17/99, France v Commission [40], the Danish government points out that according to paragraph 41, the Commission stated, in the decision which was the subject of the case, that ‘the French Government did not submit a credible restructuring plan to the Commission’ and ‘[n]or has any such plan been submitted to the Commission by the French authorities since the proceedings were initiated.’
Ifølge den danske regering fremgår det klart af Kommissionens formulering, at det ville have været tilstrækkeligt til at opfylde kravene til omstruktureringsplanen i rammebestemmelserne for omstrukturering fra 1999, hvis den var blevet fremlagt efter procedurens indledning.
For the Danish government, it is clear from the wording used by the Commission that it would have been sufficient to satisfy the conditions in the 1999 restructuring guidelines for a restructuring plan to submit a restructuring plan after the initiation of formal proceedings.
Det afgørende er altså ikke tidspunktet for fremlæggelsen af omstruktureringsplanen, men den omstændighed, at omstruktureringsplanen rent faktisk fremlægges, inden Kommissionen træffer sin endelig beslutning.
The decisive factor was therefore not the point in time when the restructuring plan is submitted, but the fact that it is submitted before the Commission reaches its final decision.
Den danske regering gør derfor gældende, at omstruktureringsplanerne af hhv. 8. og 23. januar 2001 var fremlagt rettidigt, og at de i øvrigt opfyldte betingelserne i rammebestemmelserne for omstrukturering fra 1999.
The Danish government therefore considers that the restructuring plans of 8 and 23 January 2001 were submitted in time, and that they satisfied the conditions in the 1999 restructuring guidelines.
I sine bemærkninger fra februar og april 2007 peger regeringen på, at der forelå en finansiel og en driftsmæssig omstruktureringsplan, da Finansudvalget godkendte kapitaltilskuddet i 1999.
In its submissions of February and April 2007, the Danish government points out that a financial and an operational restructuring plan have been available when the Danish parliaments’ finance committee approved the 1999 capital injection.
Afbødning af støttens skadelige virkninger
Mitigating the adverse effects of the aid
Ifølge den danske regering opnåede Arriva ved salget til Connex ikke en gevinst, der lå ud over de forventninger og beregninger, som den danske regering og Arriva foretog på tidspunktet for salget af Combus til Arriva.
The Danish government considers that Arriva’s sale to Connex did not result in a profit which exceeded the expectations and calculations of the Danish government and Arriva at the moment of the sale of Combus to Arriva.
Begrænsning af støtten til et minimum
Limiting the aid to a minimum
Som svar på Danske Busvognmænds påstand om, at salget ikke skete ved udbud, gør den danske regering gældende, at der var der tale om en særdeles langvarig, konkurrencepræget, ikke-diskriminerende og transparent salgsproces, hvor den endelige pris ikke afveg væsentligt fra det oprindelige bud.
In response to the claim of Danske Busvognmaend, according to which the sale was not subject to a public tender, the Danish government argues that the sales process was particularly protracted, competitive, non-discriminatory and transparent, and the final price did not differ significantly from the original bid.
Som svar på påstanden om, at der ikke var nogen uvildig kontrol af markedsprisen, gør den danske regering gældende, at salget skulle godkendes af Folketingets Finansudvalg på baggrund af økonomiske analyser udarbejdet af statens økonomiske rådgiver Alfred Berg.
In response to the claim that there were no independent checks of the market price, the Danish government points out that the sale had to be approved by the Parliamentary Finance Committee on the basis of financial analyses carried out by the financial adviser to the State, Alfred Berg.
Den danske regering mener, at der dermed er foretaget tilstrækkelig kontrol.
The Danish government considers that this constitutes a sufficient check.
De passager fra retssagens bilag, som Danske Busvognmænd citerer, indeholder ifølge den danske regering ingen erkendelse af manglende kontrol af støttens karakter af minimumsstøtte.
In the view of the Danish government, the passages from the Annex to the CFI case, cited by Danske Busvognmaend, contain no acknowledgement of any failure to check that the aid was kept to a minimum.
Den danske regering forklarer endvidere, at der efter salget blev foretaget tre uafhængige undersøgelser af salgsprisen, nemlig Beretning om Granskning af Combus A/S, Advokatundersøgelse om Statens Varetagelse af Ejerskabet til Combus A/S og Beretning fra Rigsrevisionen.
The Danish government furthermore explains that after the sale, three independent investigations have been carried out on the sales price, namely the ‘Report on the investigation of Combus A/S’, the ‘Solicitor's investigation on the State’s management of the ownership of Combus A/S’ and the ‘Report from the Auditor General’.
På denne baggrund bestrider den danske regering, at der ikke har været kontrol af, hvorvidt støtten var begrænset til et minimum.
Against this background the Danish government disagrees that no checks were carried out as to whether the aid was limited to a minimum.
Danske Busvognmænds henvisning til retssagens bilag K og I er uden enhver betydning for spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt støtten var begrænset til et minimum.
The reference to Annexes K and I to the case by Danske Busvognmaend has no bearing whatsoever on the matter of whether the aid was limited to a minimum.
Citaterne belyser derimod ganske klart, at salget til Arriva var forberedt på baggrund af en business case, og at salgsprisen svarede til markedsprisen.
However, the quotes clearly show that the sale to Arriva was prepared on the basis of a business case, and that the sales price reflected the market price.
Endelig gør den danske regering gældende, at anvendelse af valuarer hverken ville have ført til en ændret vurdering eller en ændret salgspris for aktierne i Combus.
Finally, the Danish government does not consider that using independent auditors would have resulted in a different assessment or in a different sale price for the Combus shares.
Ifølge den danske regering var den afgørende test markedstesten.
For the Danish government, the decisive test was the market test.
KOMMISSIONENS RETLIGE VURDERING
LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMISSION
VURDERING AF, OM DER ER TALE OM STØTTE EFTER EF-TRAKTATENS ARTIKEL 87, STK. 1
ASSESSMENT OF THE EXISTENCE OF AID WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 87(1) EC TREATY
Det fremgår af EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, at »bortset fra de i EF-traktaten hjemlede undtagelser er statsstøtte eller støtte, som ydes ved hjælp af statsmidler under enhver tænkelig form, og som fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene ved at begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner, uforenelig med fællesmarkedet i det omfang, den påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne«.
Article 87(1) EC foresees that, ‘save as otherwise provided in the EC Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market’.
INDLEDENDE SPØRGSMÅL: SKAL 1999-FORANSTALTNINGEN OG 2001-FORANSTALTNINGEN BETRAGTES SOM ÉN FORANSTALTNING ELLER TO SEPARATE FORANSTALTNINGER, DER SKAL VURDERES I HENHOLD TIL EF-TRAKTATENS ARTIKEL 87, STK. 1?
PRELIMINARY QUESTION: DO THE 1999 AND THE 2001 MEASURES CONSTITUTE ONE SINGLE OR TWO SEPARATE MEASURES TO BE ASSESSED UNDER ARTICLE 87(1) EC TREATY?
Som allerede beskrevet modtog Combus økonomisk støtte fra den danske stat i form af kapitaltilførsler (i 1999 og 2001), en ansvarlig lånekapital (i 1999), efterfølgende konvertering af den ansvarlige lånekapital til aktiekapital og garantier til køberen (i 2001).
As described above, Combus received financial support from the Danish government in the form of capital injections (in 1999 and in 2001), of a subordinated loan (in 1999), of the subsequent conversion of the subordinated loan into share capital and of guarantees given to the buyer (in 2001).
Det er derfor af betydning for anvendelsen af EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, at fastslå, om den økonomiske støtte, der i forbindelse med privatiseringen blev givet i henholdsvis 1999 og 2001, udgør to trancher af én foranstaltning eller to separate foranstaltninger.
It is therefore important for the application of Article 87(1) EC treaty to establish whether the financial support granted during the privatisation process in 1999 and 2001 respectively constitutes two tranches of a single measure or two separate measures.
I BP Chemicals-sagen fandt Retten følgende elementer relevante for at kunne afgøre dette spørgsmål:
The CFI has in BP Chemicals considered the following considerations to be relevant in making such a determination:
den tidsmæssige rækkefølge af kapitalindskuddene
The chronology of the capital injections in question;
disses formål
Their purpose;
selskabets situation på det tidspunkt, hvor beslutningerne om de enkelte indskud blev truffet [41].
The situation of the company at the time when the decision to make an injection was made [41].
Kommissionen vil herefter på baggrund af den danske regerings og de interesserede parters bemærkninger vurdere, om de kriterier, som Retten opstillede i BP Chemicals, er opfyldt i det foreliggende tilfælde.
The Commission, in the light of the observations of the Danish government and third parties, will hereinafter assess whether the criteria established by the CFI in BP Chemicals are fulfilled in the present case.
Foranstaltningernes tidsmæssige rækkefølge
Chronology of the measures
Foranstaltningerne blev truffet henholdsvis den 27. maj 1999 og den 15. januar 2001.
The measures were taken respectively on 27 May 1999 and 15 January 2001.
De to beslutninger blev derfor truffet med ca. halvandet års mellemrum.
Therefore, approximately 18 months elapsed between the two decisions.
Den danske regering fremfører, at halvandet år må betragtes som en rimeligt kort periode i betragtning af, hvor kompliceret privatiseringsprocessen var.
The Danish government argues that in the light of the complexity of the privatisation process, 18 months constitute a reasonably short period of time.
Den henviser desuden til BP Chemicals, hvor der gik 22 måneder mellem første og sidste tranche.
It also refers in this context to BP Chemicals, where the time between the first and the last tranche of the aid was 22 months.
Kommissionen er ikke overbevist af den danske regerings argumenter.
The Commission is not convinced by the arguments put forward by the Danish government.
Først og fremmest er der en vigtig faktuel forskel mellem BP Chemicals-sagen og den foreliggende sag.
First of all, there is an important factual difference between the BP Chemicals file and the present case.
I BP Chemicals-sagen foretog den offentlige virksomhed ENI tre kapitalindskud i ENIChem i 1992, 1993 og 1994.
In BP Chemicals, the public undertaking ENI made three capital injections into ENIChem, which took place in 1992, 1993 and 1994.
Retten skulle kontrollere, om Kommissionen med rette havde anset det tredje kaptaltilskud for at opfylde det private investor-princip, mens de to første blev betragtet som statsstøtte.
The CFI had to verify whether the Commission had rightly qualified the third capital injection as fulfilling the private investor test, whereas the first two had been qualified as State aid.
Hvad foranstaltningernes tidsmæssige rækkefølge angik, fandt Retten, at kapitalindskuddet allerede indgik i en omstruktureringsplan, som ENI's bestyrelse havde vedtaget samme dag som det andet kapitalindskud i december 1993.
The CFI found with respect to the chronology of the measures that the third capital injection was already foreseen by a restructuring plan, which had been adopted by the board of ENI the same day as the second capital injection, in December 1993.
Den egentlige beslutning om at godkende det tredje kapitalindskud blev truffet mindre end en måned senere, nemlig i januar 1994.
The actual decision to authorise the third capital injection had been taken less than a month later, in January 1994.
I den foreliggende sag er der derimod intet, der tyder på, at de danske myndigheder, da de traf beslutning om det første kapitalindskud i 1999, havde planer om at foretage et yderligere kapitaltilskud på et senere stadium i omstruktureringen.
In the present case, on the contrary, nothing indicates that the Danish authorities planned in 1999, when they decided the first capital injection, to proceed with a second capital injection at a later stage of the restructuring.
Tværtimod var det første kapitalindskud blevet beregnet på en sådan måde, at det i sig selv skulle være tilstrækkeligt til at genoprette Combus' rentabilitet.
On the contrary: the first capital injection had been calculated in a way that it should be sufficient to restore in itself the economic viability of Combus.
Der blev truffet beslutning om det andet kapitalindskud over et år og seks måneder efter det første kapitalindskud i december 2000, da det blev klart, at det første kapitalindskud ikke havde været tilstrækkeligt.
The second capital injection has been decided more than one year and six months after the first capital injection in December 2000, when it became clear that the first capital injection had not been sufficient.
Set ud fra foranstaltningernes tidsmæssige rækkefølge er der således to vigtige argumenter, der taler for, at de to kapitalindskud skal betragtes som to selvstændige foranstaltninger:
There are, in conclusion, two important arguments from a chronological point of view for considering that the two capital injections constitute two separate measures:
De danske myndigheder havde ikke planlagt det andet kapitalindskud, da de traf beslutning om det første kapitalindskud, hvorimod dette havde været tilfældet i BP Chemicals-sagen
The second capital injection has not been foreseen by the Danish authorities at the point in time when they decided to make the first capital injection, whereas this had been the case in BP Chemicals;
Der blev truffet beslutning om det andet kapitalindskud et år og seks måneder efter det første kapitalindskud, mens der i BP Chemicals-sagen kun gik en måned mellem de to foranstaltninger.
The second capital injection was decided one year and six months after the first capital injection, whereas in BP Chemicals, there was only one month between the two measures.
Formålet med foranstaltningerne
Purpose of the measures
Ifølge den danske regering havde 1999-foranstaltningen og 2001-foranstaltningen samme formål, nemlig at omstrukturere Combus og tilføre selskabet ny kapital med henblik på at gennemføre privatiseringen.
The Danish government is of the opinion that the 1999 and the 2001 measures had the same purpose, namely to restructure and to recapitalise Combus in view of its successful privatisation.
Kommissionen deler ikke dette synspunkt.
The Commission does not share this point of view.
Beskrivelsen af omstændighederne ovenfor viser, at der blev truffet beslutning om kapitalindskuddet i 1999 for at undgå den overhængende fare for, at Combus ville gå konkurs.
The detailed description of the facts above shows that the capital injection in 1999 was decided in order to avoid the imminent bankruptcy of Combus.
Sigtet med kapitalindskuddet var ikke privatisering af Combus, men var snarere blevet nødvendigt, fordi det første forsøg på at privatisere Combus mislykkedes.
It did not have as a purpose the privatisation of Combus, but rather had become necessary because the first attempt to privatising Combus had failed.
Det andet kapitalindskud tjente til at forhøje Combus' kapital til et niveau, hvor køberen, Arriva, var villig til at betale en symbolsk pris for foretagendet.
The second capital injection served the purpose of increasing the capital of Combus to a level where the purchaser, Arriva, was willing to pay a symbolic price for the undertaking.
Kommissionen erkender, at begge kapitalindskud var ledsaget af omstruktureringsforanstaltninger, og at de begge tjente til at absorbere tabene ved de kontrakter, som Combus havde vundet på grundlag af for lave tilbud.
The Commission recognises that both capital injections have been accompanied by restructuring measures, and that both capital injections have been linked to absorbing the losses generated by the contracts for which Combus had made offers which were too low.
Ikke desto mindre mener Kommissionen, at det primære formål med de to kapitalindskud ikke var det samme, men at det i det første tilfælde var at forhindre konkurs og i det andet tilfælde at forberede privatisering.
Nevertheless, it takes the view that the primary purpose of the two capital injections was different, namely the prevention of bankruptcy in the first case and the preparation of privatisation in the second case.
Situationen i selskabet på det tidspunkt, foranstaltningerne blev truffet
Situation of the company at the time of the measures
Combus' situation på tidspunktet for foranstaltningerne havde ikke ændret sig væsentligt, eftersom selskabet led underskud, især på grund af de offentlige kørselskontrakter, det havde indgået til en pris, hvor det ikke kunne yde de pågældende tjenester.
The situation of Combus at the time of the measures had not significantly changed, as it was experiencing losses, mainly due to the public-service contracts concluded at a price at which it could not produce the services.
Konklusion: 1999-foranstaltningen og 2001-foranstaltningen er to selvstændige foranstaltninger
Conclusion: The 1999 and the 2001 measures constitute two separate measures
Kommissionen konkluderer på grundlag af parternes bemærkninger og Rettens begrundelse i BP Chemicals, at de to trancher af omstruktureringsforanstaltninger, der blev truffet henholdsvis i 1999 og 2001, udgør to selvstændige foranstaltninger med henblik på vurderingen i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
In conclusion, the Commission, having taken the submissions of the parties into consideration, and applying the reasoning of the CFI in BP Chemicals, finds that the two tranches of restructuring measures taken in 1999 and 2001 respectively constitute two separate measures for the assessment under Article 87(1) EC treaty.
Især tre forhold ligger til grund for denne vurdering:
Three main reasons motivate this assessment:
Kapitalindskuddet i 2001 var ikke planlagt, da der blev truffet beslutning om kapitalindskuddet i 1999.
The 2001 capital injection was not foreseen at the time the 1999 capital injection was decided.
Tværtimod gik de danske myndigheder ud fra, at 1999-kapitalindskuddet var tilstrækkeligt.
On the contrary: the Danish authorities assumed that the 1999 capital injection was sufficient.
Der forløb et år og seks måneder mellem beslutningen om det første kapitalindskud og beslutningen om det andet kapitalindskud.
There has been a period of one year and six months between the decision to proceed with the first capital injection and the decision to proceed with the second capital injection.
Formålet med det første kapitalindskud var at undgå den overhængende fare for Combus' konkurs, mens det andet kapitalindskud skulle muliggøre privatiseringen for en symbolsk positiv værdi.
The purpose of the first capital injection was to avoid the imminent bankruptcy of Combus, whereas the purpose of the second capital injection was to render the privatisation for a symbolic positive value possible.
Foranstaltningerne vil derfor blive analyseret som to forskellige foranstaltninger i resten af den retlige vurdering.
Accordingly, they will be analysed as two different measures in the reminder of the legal assessment.
STATSMIDLER OG SPECIFICITET
STATE RESOURCES AND SPECIFICITY
Den danske regering finansierede begge foranstaltningerne over statsbudgettet.
Denmark financed both measures from its budget.
Foranstaltningerne blev således finansieret ved hjælp af statsmidler.
The measures were thus financed from State resources.
Foranstaltningerne begunstiger én virksomhed, nemlig Combus, og er dermed specifikke.
The measures concern one single undertaking, Combus, and are thus specific.
EKSISTENSEN AF EN FORDEL FOR DEN BEGUNSTIGEDE VIRKSOMHED
EXISTENCE OF AN ADVANTAGE FOR THE BENEFICIARY UNDERTAKING
For at blive betragtet som statsstøtte skal foranstaltningerne give virksomheden en fordel.
In order to be qualified as State aid, the measures must confer an advantage on the firm.
I den forbindelse tages der udgangspunkt i to kriterier:
In this connection, two questions arise:
Foranstaltningerne giver ikke Combus en fordel, hvis den danske regering optrådte som en privat markedsøkonomisk investor.
The measures do not confer an advantage to Combus if the Danish government behaved as a private investor in a market economy.