natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Efter Kommissionens opfattelse er der tale om væsentlige forskelle i forhold til det, Kommissionen forventede på tidspunktet for vedtagelsen af beslutning N 401/97 på grundlag af kontrakten fra september 1995.
The Commission considers that these are major differences compared to what the Commission expected at the time of adopting decision N 401/97 on the basis of the September 1995 contract.
Dette er derfor tilstrækkeligt til at ændre den vurdering, der blev foretaget på daværende tidspunkt med hensyn til, at der ikke var tale om støtte.
This is therefore sufficient to revise the non-aid assessment made at that time,
Det lykkedes ikke at opbygge en stor og rentabel ordrebeholdning i 1997 og 1998.
The company did not succeed in building a large and profitable orderbook in 1997 and 1998.
Fra udgangen af 1998 blev det derfor gradvis mere og mere sikkert, at værftet ville blive tabsgivende i de følgende år.
Therefore, from the end of 1998, it progressively became more and more certain that the yard would be loss making in the next years.
I et sådant tilfælde bør det nemlig tages i betragtning, at denne beslutning er blevet misbrugt af den statsejede bank ETVA, som ikke har opkrævet købsprisen hos de ansatte i overensstemmelse med kontrakten fra september 1995.
Indeed, in such a case, it should be considered that this Decision has been misused by the State-owned bank ETVA which has not collected the purchase price from the employees in accordance with the September 1995 contract.
Den konklusion, at ETVA's deltagelse i de fremtidige kapitalforhøjelser ikke var støtte, var således baseret på den forventning, at de ansatte ville betale købsprisen i overensstemmelse med kontrakten fra september 1995.
Indeed, the conclusion that ETVA’s participation to the future capital increases was not an aid was based on the expectation of the employees would pay the purchase price in accordance with the September 1995 contract.
Det bør derfor konkluderes, at den del af beslutning N 401/97, der godkender ETVA's deltagelse, er blevet misbrugt, og at ETVA's deltagelse derfor bør tilbagesøges fra HSY.
It should therefore be concluded that the part of Decision N 401/97 authorising ETVA’s participation has been misused and therefore that ETVA’s participation should be recovered from HSY.
ETVA udstedte forskudsgarantierne i forbindelse med kontrakten med ISAP i februar 1998 og januar 1999 og garantierne i forbindelse med kontrakten med OSE i august 1999.
ETVA issued the advance payment guarantees in relation to the ISAP contract in February 1998 and January 1999 and the guarantees in relation to the OSE contract in August 1999.
ETVA modtog på sin side tilsvarende modgarantier fra staten.
ETVA in turn received corresponding counter-guarantees from the State.
Grækenland og HSY har gjort gældende, at selv om de statslige modgarantier formelt blev udstedt i december 1999, havde ETVA allerede fået tilsagn herom, da den udstedte forskudsgarantierne i forbindelse med kontrakten med ISAP i februar 1998 og januar 1999 og garantierne i forbindelse med kontrakten med OSE i august 1999.
Greece and HSY claim that, even if the State counter-guarantees were formally issued in December 1999, they were already promised to ETVA when it issued the advance payment guarantees in relation to the ISAP contract in February 1998 and January 1999 and the guarantees in relation to the OSE contract in August 1999.
Grækenland har gjort gældende, at disse modgarantier ikke udgjorde selektive foranstaltninger.
Greece claims that these counter-guarantees did not constitute selective measures.
Som det vil fremgå nedenfor, havde en privat bank uden en statslig modgaranti forlangt mindst 480 basispoint pr. år for garantier ydet inden den 30. juni 1999. Efter denne dato havde ingen privat bank ydet sådanne garantier.
As will be shown afterwards, without State counter-guarantee, a private bank would have at least charged 480 bps per year for guarantees granted before 30 June 1999.
Det er derfor klart, at de statslige modgarantier i perioden inden den 30. juni 1999 gjorde det muligt for HSY at opnå garantier til en lavere pris.
After that date, no private bank would have provided such guarantees.
Modgarantierne i forbindelse med ISAP's forskud blev derfor ydet inden udgangen af juni 1999.
Accordingly, the counter-guarantees related to ISAP’s advance payments were granted before end of June 1999.
De samlede årlige omkostninger i forbindelse med disse garantier (garantigebyr betalt til ETVA plus gebyr for modgaranti betalt til staten) var meget mindre end 480 basispoint.
The total annual cost of these guarantees (guarantee fee paid to ETVA plus counter guarantee fee paid to the State) was much less than 480 basis points.
Programaftalerne blev iværksat i august og september 1999 gennem OSE's betaling af de forskud, der var aftalt i kontrakterne fra 1997.
The programme agreements were activated in August and September 1999 through payment by OSE of the advance payments agreed in the contracts of 1997.
OSE krævede rettidig gennemførelse af aftalerne fra og med 2000 efter de første forsinkelser i leveringen af materiellet i det pågældende år.
OSE demanded timely implementation of the agreements from 2000 onwards after the first delays in the delivery of the material in that year.
Det lykkedes således ikke HSY at færdiggøre bygningen af de to skibe, og kontrakten med Strintzis blev som følge heraf ophævet i juli 2002.
Indeed, HSY did not succeed in completing the construction of the two ships and, consequently, the contract with Strintzis was revoked in July 2002.
HSY brugte ikke mindre end to år på at sælge skrogene under bygning og fik kun 14 mio. EUR, hvilket kun svarer til en tredjedel af det beløb, man havde lånt af ETVA til at finansiere bygningen.
HSY needed not less than two years to sell the hulls in construction and HSY received only EUR 14 million, which corresponds to only a third of the amount borrowed from ETVA to finance the construction.
Kommissionen bemærker, at på grundlag af artikel 3 i forordning (EF) nr. 1540/98 kunne der ydes kontraktbetinget driftsstøtte til skibsbygningskontrakter, der blev undertegnet indtil den 31. december 2000.
The Commission observes that, on the basis of Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1540/98, contract-related operating aid was authorised for shipbuilding contracts signed until 31 December 2000.
HSY var imidlertid ikke berettiget til at modtage støtte til kontrakten med Strintzis, eftersom HSY aldrig færdiggjorde skibene, de aldrig blev leveret, og kontrakten med Strintzis blev annulleret.
However, HSY was not entitled to receive aid for the contract with Strintzis since HSY never finished the ships, they were never delivered, and the contract with Strintzis was cancelled.
Grækenland har anført, at en første garanti blev ydet den 4. marts 1999 og endnu en den 17. juni 1999.
Greece indicates that a first guarantee was granted on 4 March 1999 and a second on 17 June 1999.
Ifølge den første Deloitte-rapport, som HSY har fremlagt, udgjorde de henholdsvis 3,26 mio. EUR og 3,38 mio. EUR. Grækenland har mindet om, at ETVA ikke udbetalte nogen beløb på grundlag af garantierne efter annulleringen af kontrakten med Strintzis i 2002.
According to the first Deloitte report submitted by HSY, they respectively amounted to EUR 3,26 million and EUR 3,38 million. Greece recalls that ETVA did not pay out any amounts under the guarantees after the cancellation of the Strintzis contract in 2002.
Dette viser, at HSY ikke var en låntager, hvis risiko for misligholdelse var høj.
This proves that HSY was not a borrower whose default risk was high.
Kommissionen bemærker, at begge garantier blev ydet inden den 30. juni 1999.
The Commission observes that both guarantees were granted before 30 June 1999.
Som forklaret ovenfor finder Kommissionen, at HSY stadig havde adgang til det finansielle marked på det pågældende tidspunkt, men til en pris, som afspejlede HSY's meget skrøbelige økonomiske situation.
As explained previously, the Commission considers that HSY had still access to the financial market at that time, but at a price which reflected the very fragile economic situation of HSY.
Efter jordskælvet i september 1999 ydede ETVA den 13. januar 2000 HSY et lån på 10 mia. GRD (29,3 mio. EUR), som var sikret ved en statsgaranti ydet ved finansministerens afgørelse af 8. december 1999.
After the earthquake of September 1999, ETVA granted on 13 January 2000 a GRD 10 billion (EUR 29,3 million) loan to HSY, which was secured by a State guarantee granted by decision of the Minister of Finance dated 8 December 1999.
ETVA forlangte en rentesats på EURIBOR plus 125 basispoint, og staten forlangte en garantipræmie på 100 basispoint.
ETVA charged an interest rate of EURIBOR plus 125 basis points and the State charged a guarantee premium of 100 basis points.
Af den del af statsgarantien, der udgør støtte, er 750 mio. GRD (2,20 mio. EUR) — dvs. 25 % af 3 mia. GRD (8,8 mio. EUR) — med andre ord forenelig indtil forsikringsselskabernes udbetaling af erstatningen i første kvartal af 2002.
In other words, out of part of the State guarantee constituting aid, GRD 750 million (EUR 2,20 million) — i.e. 25 % of GRD 3 billion (EUR 8,8 million) — is compatible until the payment of the indemnification by the insurers in the first quarter of 2002.
Efter dette tidspunkt er kun 1,32 mio. EUR — dvs. 25 % af 3 mia. GRD (8,8 mio. EUR) minus 3,52 mio. EUR — forenelig.
After that date, only EUR 1,32 million — i.e. 25 % of GRD 3 billion (EUR 8,8 million) minus EUR 3,52 million — is compatible.
Resten af støtten er uforenelig med fællesmarkedet.
The rest of the aid is incompatible with the common market.
For det første bevilgede ETVA den 25. juli 1997 en kreditlinje på 1,99 mia. GRD (5,9 mio. EUR), med udløbsdato den 31. oktober 1997.
First, on 25 July 1997, ETVA granted a credit line of GRD 1,99 billion (EUR 5,9 million), with an expiration date set at 31 October 1997.
Den havde en rentesats på ATHIBOR plus 200 basispoint og blev tildelt til dækning af HSY's behov for driftskapital.
It had an interest rate of ATHIBOR plus 200 basis points and was granted to cover HSY’s needs for working capital.
Direktiv 90/684/EØF forbyder støtte til reparation af skibe, som var HSY's primære civile aktivitet i 1997 og 1998.
Directive 90/684/EEC prohibits aid to ship repair, which was the main civil activity of HSY in 1997 and 1998.
Støtten kan derfor ikke anses for at være forenelig med fællesmarkedet, og eftersom den er ydet ulovligt, skal den tilbagesøges.
The aid can therefore not be found compatible with the common market and, since it has been granted unlawfully, it has to be recovered.
For det første hedder det i HSY's ledelsesrapport for 2001, at »beløb på indtil 81,3 mio. EUR er blevet modtaget som forskud for militære aktiviteter, men blev hovedsagelig anvendt til andre aktiviteter og virksomhedens driftsomkostninger«.
First, HSY’s 2001 Management Report mentions that ‘amounts up to EUR 81,3 million have been received as advance payments for defence activities, but were mostly used on other activities and operation costs of the company’.
For det andet har konsortiet HDW/Ferrostaal anført i sit indlæg i forbindelse med en retssag ved en græsk domstol, at i det mindste en del af de midler (af Elefsis anslået til at udgøre over 40 mio. EUR), som HSY fik til konstruktionen af kanonbåde (kontrakt undertegnet den 21. december 1999), blev anvendt til andre formål.
Second, in its submission in the framework of a legal action before a Greek Court, the consortium HDW/Ferrostaal indicates that at least part of the funds (estimated by Elefsis to be in excess of EUR 40 million) given to HSY for the construction of the gunboats (contract signed on 21 December 1999) were used for other purposes.
ETVA besluttede at yde denne garanti tidligst i maj 2002.
ETVA decided to grant this guarantee not earlier than in May 2002.
TKMS/GNSH har også gjort gældende, at ETVA og staten handlende som en privat sælger.
TKMS/GNSH also claims that ETVA and the State acted as a private vendor.
TKMS/GNSH har konkluderet, at den garanti, som ETVA ydede den 31. maj 2002, er mere omfattende end den garanti, som Piraeus Bank fik den 20. marts 2002.
TKMS/GNSH concludes that the guarantee granted by ETVA on 31 May 2002 is wider than the one received by Piraeus Bank on 20 March 2002.
Dette kan derfor ikke udgøre en enkelt garantimekanisme, og den omstændighed, at ETVA ydede en mere omfattende garanti, beviser, at den handlede som enhver privat sælger.
Therefore, this can not form one single guarantee mechanism and the fact that ETVA granted a wider guarantee proves that it acted as any private vendor.
De har navnlig gjort gældende, at garantien blev ydet den 31. maj 2002 ved hjælp af tillægget til HSY SPA, på et tidspunkt, hvor ETVA ikke længere var under statslig kontrol, men kontrolleredes af Piraeus Bank.
They claim in particular that the guarantee was granted on 31 May 2002 by means of the Addendum to HSY SPA, at a date when ETVA was not under State control anymore but under the control of Piraeus Bank.
Kommissionen afviser denne påstand og finder, at der er talrige beviser på, at foranstaltningen kan tilregnes staten:
The Commission dismisses this claim and considers that there is ample evidence that the measure is imputable to the State:
Staten gav sin godkendelse ved brev af 31. maj 2002.
The State gave its authorisation by letter of 31 May 2002.
Alt dette viser, at ydelsen af garantien kan tilregnes staten.
All this shows that the grant of the guarantee is imputable to the State,
Kommissionen bemærker, at HSY's finansielle situation of HSY forværredes drastisk mellem 1998 og 2002.
The Commission observes that the financial situation of HSY deteriorated dramatically between 1998 and 2002.
Selv om HSY ikke offentliggør særskilte regnskaber for civile aktiviteter, er det rimeligt at antage, at disse aktiviteter var yderst tabsgivende i disse år.
Even if HSY does not publish separate accounts for civil activities, it is reasonable to suppose that these activities were deeply loss-making during these years.
Det er derfor rimeligt at antage, at de civile aktiviteter var stærkt tabsgivende indtil 2002.
It is therefore reasonable to suppose that the civil activities were strongly loss making until 2002.
Som det er fremgået af denne beslutning, har disse aktiviteter til stadighed modtaget støtte, hvoraf en del nu skal tilbagesøges.
As has been shown in the present decision, these activities have been constantly supported by aid, a part of which has now to be recovered.
Den anden Deloitte-rapport bekræfter, at HSY havde »driftsmæssige problemer (dvs. lav produktivitet, høje driftsomkostninger, overskydende arbejdskraft osv.)«.
The second Deloitte report confirms that HSY had ‘operational problems (i.e. low productivity, high operational costs, excess staff, etc.)’.
Hvis de civile aktiviteter ikke var blevet solgt, var de derfor hurtigt ophørt (medmindre Grækenland havde fortsat med at yde ulovlig og uforenelig støtte til disse aktiviteter).
Consequently, if the civil activities had not been sold, they should have ceased rapidly (except if Greece would have continued to provide unlawful and incompatible aid to these activities).
De rammebestemmelser, der fandt anvendelse på det tidspunkt, hvor garantien blev ydet, var rammebestemmelserne for rednings- og omstruktureringsstøtte fra 1999.
The guidelines applicable at the time of the granting of the guarantee were the 1999 R & R guidelines.
Garantien opfyldte klart ikke alle de betingelser for godkendelse af støtte, der er anført i afsnit 3.2.2 i rammebestemmelserne.
The guarantee clearly did not fulfil all the conditions for authorisation of the aid laid down in section 3.2.2 of the guidelines.
Garantien tilsidesatte også princippet om »engangsstøtte« i afsnit 3.2.3 i rammebestemmelserne for rednings- og omstruktureringsstøtte fra 1999.
The guarantee also breached the ‘one time, last time’ condition laid down in section 3.2.3 of the 1999 R & R guidelines.
Ved beslutning N 401/97 havde Kommissionen således godkendt investeringsstøtte i henhold til Rådets direktiv 90/684/EØF, som var en slags omstruktureringsstøtte.
Indeed, by decision N 401/97, the Commission had authorised investment aid under the Directive 90/684/EEC, which was a kind of restructuring aid.
750 mio. GRD (2,20 mio. EUR) af denne støtte var forenelig med fællesmarkedet indtil den 31. marts 2002.
GRD 750 million (EUR 2,20 million) of this aid was compatible with the common market until 31 March 2002.
Ifølge omstruktureringsplanen skulle aktiviteterne inden for skibsombygning også øges drastisk efter 1998.
The restructuring plan also planned a dramatic increase of the ship conversion activities after 1998.
Det lykkedes ikke HSY at opnå dette mål.
HSY did not succeed in achieving this goal.
Ifølge HSY's bestyrelsesreferat af 1. december 1998 forventedes der tab i 1999.
According to HSY’s Board of Directors Minutes dated 1 December 1998, losses were expected for 1999.
HSY's ledelse erkendte offentligt i begyndelsen af december 1999, at værftet forventede at notere tab på 10 mia. GRD (29 mio. EUR) for 1999 og for 2000 (»Hellenic boss expects profit in 2001« (Hellenic-chef forventer overskud i 2001), Lloyd ' s List, 6.12.1999).
HSY’s management publicly acknowledged at the beginning of December 1999 that the yard was planned to register losses of GRD 10 billion (EUR 29 million) for the year 1999 and for the year 2000 (H‘ellenic boss expects profit in 2001’, Lloyd’s List, 6 December 1999).
Dette bekræftes af Deloitte Financial Advisory Services selv på s. 8-8 og 8-9 i den anden rapport, der var udarbejdet den 18.6.2007 (i det følgende »den anden Deloitte-rapport«) og blev fremsendt af TKMS/GNSH til støtte for brevet til Kommissionen af 21.6.2007.
This is confirmed by Deloitte Financial Advisory Services itself in page 8-8 and 8-9 of its second report written on 18 June 2007 (hereinafter the second Deloitte report) and submitted by TKMS/GNSH in support of its letter to the Commission dated 21 June 2007.
Kommissionen finder derfor, at kriteriet »tilgængelighed af fast ejendom, der kunne behæftes« er irrelevant ved vurderingen af foranstaltningerne, og at en potentiel långiver, selv hvis det var relevant, ikke havde fundet dette element så positivt, som Deloitte har anført i den første Deloitte-rapport.
In conclusion, the Commission considers the ‘Availability of Property that could be encumbered’ is irrelevant in the assessment of the measures, and, even if it would be relevant, a potential lender would not have considered this element as positively as Deloitte indicates in the first Deloitte report.
Overdragelsen af kontraktrelaterede fordringer giver derfor ikke den långivende bank mulighed for at inddrive mange flere midler i tilfælde af HSY ' s konkurs (se f.eks. fodnote 128 og 131 i denne beslutning).
The assignment of contracts related claims therefore does not allow the lending bank to recover much money in case of bankruptcy of HSY (see for instance footnotes 128 and 131 of the present decision).
En potentiel långiver havde derfor ikke fundet dette element så positivt, som Deloitte har anført i den første Deloitte-rapport.
Consequently, a potential lender would not have considered this element as positively as Deloitte indicates in the first Deloitte report.
Kommissionen gør bl.a. opmærksom på, at det allerede i sidste kvartal af 1998 kunne forudses, at HSY ville notere et tab i 1999.
Among others, the Commission recalls that as soon as in the last quarter of 1998 it could be foreseen that HSY would show a loss in 1999.
I de følgende måneder blev det klart, at dette tab ville blive stort, og at der ligeledes kunne forventes et stort tab for 2000, således at HSY ' s nettoegenkapital næsten ville forsvinde.
In the following months, it became clear that the size of this loss would be large, and that a large loss should be expected also for the year 2000, such that the net equity of the HSY would nearly vanish.
HSY havde som nævnt ingen adgang til bankerne fra den 30.6.1999.
As established previously, HSY had no access to the banks from 30 June 1999.
Eftersom HSY ikke kunne låne på markedet, og eftersom det befandt sig i en alvorlig finansiel situation, hvis ETVA havde afslået at yde lånet eller havde forlangt højere rentesatser, havde dette forværret HSY's vanskeligheder (eller endog medført konkurs), hvilket havde været uacceptabelt for staten.
Since HSY could not borrow from the market and since it was in a precarious financial situation, if ETVA had refused to grant the loan or had required higher interest rates, this would have aggravated the difficulties of HSY (or even triggered the bankruptcy), what would have been unacceptable for the State.
HSY fremsendte bemærkninger til beslutningen om at udvide proceduren ved brev af 30.10.2006.
HSY submitted comments on the extension decision by letter of 30 October 2006.
Brev fra de græske myndigheder af 19.3.2007.
Letter of the Greek authorities dated 19 March 2007.
Dette blev gentaget i brev af 29.6.2007, punkt 62 og 63.
This was repeated in the letter of 29 June 2007, paragraphs 62 and 63.
Det er en væsentlig del af kontrakten fra september 1995.
It is an essential part of the September 1995 contract.
Grækenland burde have undersøgte, om de grundlæggende bestemmelser i kontrakten var gennemførlige, inden den blev præsenteret for Kommissionen som en privatisering.
Greece should have verified whether the basic provisions of the contract were feasible before presenting it to the Commission as a privatisation.
Noget lignende blev anført af HSY i punkt 35 og 36 i brev af 31.10.2006.
A similar statement was made by HSY in paragraphs 35 and 36 of its letter of 31 October 2006.
Inden beslutningen om at udvide proceduren var de græske myndigheder fremkommet med lignende udtalelser i det ottende kapitel af deres brev af 26.5.2005.
Before the extension decision, the Greek authorities had made similar statements in the 8th chapter of its letter of 26 May 2005.
Desuden anførte Grækenland i flere breve, at de ansatte ejede 49 % af aktierne.
In addition, in several letters Greece indicated that the employees were the owners of 49 % of the shares.
Fristen for gennemførelsen af arbejdet var januar 2004.
The timetable provided for completion of the work in January 2004.
Bestyrelsen besluttede enstemmigt ved beslutning nr. 578/4/4-9-2002 at forlænge leveringstiden til den 19.5.2004 i betragtning af, at konsortiet ikke var skyld i forsinkelsen.
The board decided unanimously in decision No 578/4/4-9-2002 to extend the delivery time to 19.5.2004, in view of the fact that the consortium was not to blame for the delay.
Arbejdet blev endeligt færdiggjort den 4. juni 2004.
The work was finally completed on 4.6.2004.
I henhold til punkt 14 i programaftalen skulle betalingen af bøder for manglende overholdelse af en aftalt leveringstid påbegyndes 40 dage efter leveringsdatoen i henhold til kontrakten, og kun hvis leverandøren var skyld i den manglende overholdelse.
Under paragraph 14 of the programme agreement, the penalties for non-compliance with an agreed delivery time were to commence 40 days after the contractual delivery date and only if the supplier was to blame for the non-compliance.
Dette bekræfter, at bortset fra de begrænsede forskud, der under alle omstændigheder allerede var blevet betalt på daværende tidspunkt og derfor ikke længere kunne inddrives, kunne resten af købsprisen ikke inddrives inden leveringen af fartøjerne.
This confirms that, except for the limited advance payments which anyway had already been paid at the time and were therefore not collectible anymore, the rest of the purchase price was not collectible before the delivery of the vessels.
Den oprindelige margen er 25 basispoint, som steg til 125 basispoint fra den 1.4.2000.
The initial margin is 25 bps, which increased to 125 bps from 1 April 2000.
Kommissionen baserer sig på den første Deloitte-rapport.
The Commission bases itself on the first Deloitte report.