natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I denne henseende bemærker Kommissionen, at sandsynligheden for, at kontrakterne ville blive fuldført inden for en rimelig tidshorisont, blev større, da HSY blev privatiseret, eftersom den nye private ejer havde erfaring med at håndtere komplekse projekter og var en privat virksomhed, der var profitorienteret og derfor ønskede at begrænse forsinkelsen for at begrænse de negative finansielle konsekvenser.
In this respect, the Commission observes that the probability that the contracts would be completed in a reasonable timeframe increased when HSY was privatised since the new private owner had experience with the management of complex projects and was a private firm motivated by profit and therefore willing to limit the delay to limit the negative financial consequences.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at der ikke foreligger noget afgørende bevis for, at OSE's og ISAP's adfærd ikke havde været acceptabel for en privat virksomhed under lignende omstændigheder.
In conclusion, the Commission considers that there is not convincing evidence that the behaviour of OSE and ISAP would not have been acceptable to a private company in similar circumstances.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at den måde, hvorpå kontrakterne med OSE og ISAP blev gennemført, og de begrænsede ændringer af kontrakterne, som OSE godkendte i 2002-2003, ikke indeholder støtteelementer.
The Commission therefore concludes that the way in which the contracts with OSE and ISAP were implemented and the limited amendments of the contracts accepted by OSE in 2002–2003 do not involve aid elements.
Lån fra ETVA til finansiering af kontrakten med Strintzis (foranstaltning E13a)
Loan of ETVA to finance the Strintzis contract (measure E13a)
Den 29. oktober 1999 ydede ETVA et lån på 16,9 mia. GRD (49,7 mio. EUR) til HSY til finansiering af bygningen af to færger, der var bestilt af virksomheden Strintzis.
On 29 October 1999, ETVA granted a GRD 16,9 billion (EUR 49,7 million) loan to HSY to finance the construction of the two ferries ordered by the company Strintzis.
Rentesatsen var LIBOR plus 100 basispoint.
The interest rate was LIBOR plus 100 basis points.
I juni 2001 blev der oprettet et privilegeret pant i de to skibe under bygning.
In June 2001, a preferential mortgage on the two ships under construction was created.
Lånet blev fuldt tilbagebetalt til den långivende bank den 8. oktober 2004.
The loan was repaid in full to the lending bank on 8 October 2004.
I beslutningen om at udvide proceduren blev der udtrykt tvivl med hensyn til, om overdragelsen af et pant i skibene og af forsikringspræmier udgjorde en tilstrækkelig sikkerhed.
The extension decision raised doubts whether the conveyance of a mortgage on the ships and of insurance premiums constituted a sufficient security.
Desuden så det ud til, at lånet straks var blevet udbetalt til HSY, mens det skulle have været udbetalt parallelt med bygningsomkostningerne.
In addition, it seemed that the loan was immediately paid out to HSY, whereas it should have been paid in parallel with the construction costs.
Desuden syntes rentesatsen utilstrækkelig i betragtning af værftets vanskeligheder.
Moreover, the interest rate seemed insufficient in view of the difficulties of the yard.
Endelig viser kombinationen af dette lån og den næste foranstaltning (foranstaltning E13b), at en betydelig del af finansieringen af de to skibe, der var bestilt af Strintzis, var støttet af ETVA.
Finally, the combination of this loan and the next measure (measure E13b) indicates that a substantial part of the financing of the two ships ordered by Strintzis was supported by ETVA.
Elefsis har gjort gældende, at ingen private banker havde ydet dette lån.
Elefsis claims that no private banks would have granted this loan.
For det første havde ETVA ingen sikkerhed, da lånet blev oprettet, eftersom pantet i skibene blev oprettet meget senere.
First ETVA had no security when the loan was concluded since the mortgage on the ships was created much later.
Desuden er Elefsis enig i, at markedsværdien af skrog under bygning er lav.
In addition, Elefsis agrees that the market value of hulls in construction is low.
Grækenland og HSY har understreget, at lånebetingelserne var sædvanlige på daværende tidspunkt.
Greece and HSY stress that the conditions of the loan were usual for that time.
Det bekræftes i Deloitte-rapporten, at både den specifikke bank (ETVA) og generelt de græske banker ydede lån til virksomheder til en lignende rentesats.
The Deloitte report confirms that both the specific bank (ETVA) and in general the Greek banks were granting loans to firms at a similar interest rate.
HSY har givet nærmere oplysninger om de sikkerhedsstillelser, der blev ydet ETVA på tidspunktet for lånekontrakten (overdragelsen af prisen for de to fartøjer, forsikringsgodtgørelser og alle fordringer over for tredjemand i forbindelse med chartringen eller generelt udnyttelsen af skibene) og på et senere tidspunkt (pantet i skibene), og konkluderet, at de var tilstrækkelige.
HSY gives details on the securities which were granted to ETVA at the time of loan contract (assignment of the price of the two vessels, of the insurance indemnities, and of all claims against third party arising from the charter or generally the exploitation of the ships) and at a later date (the mortgage on the ships), and conclude that they were adequate.
Grækenland har også angivet den kalenderplan, hvorefter ETVA udbetalte lånet til HSY, og hvoraf det fremgår, at det blev udbetalt parallelt med udviklingen i bygningsomkostningerne.
Greece also gives the calendar according to which the loan was paid out by ETVA to HSY and which shows that it was paid in parallel with the evolution of the construction costs.
Dette lån blev oprettet efter juni 1999, på et tidspunkt, hvor ingen bank fortsat havde ydet lån til HSY.
This loan was concluded after June 1999, at a time when no bank would have lent to HSY anymore.
Grækenland har gjort gældende, at sikkerheden i forbindelse med lånet reducerede risikoen så meget, at ydelsen af lånet havde været acceptabel for en privat investor.
Greece claims that the security attached to the loan were reducing the risk so much that the granting of the loan would have been acceptable to a private investor.
Denne påstand kan ikke accepteres.
This claim can not be accepted.
Overdragelsen af prisen for skibene udgør kun en solid sikkerhed, hvis værftet færdigbygger skibet, hvilket er usikkert.
The assignment of the price of the ships represents a solid security only if the yard brings the construction of the ship to a good end, what is uncertain.
Hvis værftet går konkurs under bygningen af skibet, har denne sikkerhed ingen værdi, eftersom der ikke kan gøres krav på købsprisen over for Strintzis, da sidstnævnte ikke har modtaget de bestilte fartøjer.
If the yard goes bankrupt during the construction of the ship, this security has no value since the purchase price can not be claimed from Strintzis because the latter has not received the ordered vessels.
Dette betyder, at sikkerheden vil være værdiløs netop i det scenarie, hvor der ville være behov for den.
This means that the security would be worthless exactly in the scenario where it would be needed.
Med hensyn til oprettelsen af et pant i hvert af skibene under bygning, blev det først ydet til ETVA i juni 2001, længe efter at lånet var blevet udbetalt til HSY.
As regards the constitution of a mortgage upon each one of the ships under construction, it was granted to ETVA only in June 2001, well after the loan had been paid out to HSY.
Desuden bemærker Kommissionen, at værdien af skibe under bygning er forholdsvis lav, og de er vanskelige at sælge.
In addition, the Commission observes that the value of ships under construction is relatively low and they are difficult to sell.
Dette fremgår af denne sag.
This is illustrated by the present case.
Med hensyn til Grækenlands, HSY's og Deloittes påstand om, at rentesatsen på det lån, der blev ydet til HSY, var den samme som rentesatsen i forbindelse med mange andre lån, som ETVA og græske banker havde ydet i samme periode, viser det ikke, at det lån, der blev ydet til HSY, ikke er støtte.
As regards the assertion of Greece, HSY and Deloitte that the interest rate of the loan granted to HSY was similar to the interest rate of many other loans granted during the same period by ETVA and by Greek banks, it does not show that the loan granted to HSY is not an aid.
Grækenland, HSY og Deloitte har således hverken analyseret eller vist, at de andre låntagere, der er anvendt som sammenligningsgrundlag, befandt sig i samme finansielle situation som HSY, dvs. at denne var lige så dårlig som HSY's situation.
Indeed, Greece, HSY and Deloitte have neither analysed nor shown that the financial situation of the other borrowers used as comparison point was similar to the one of HSY, i.e. that their financial situation was as bad as the situation of HSY.
De har derfor ikke vist, at private banker var rede til at yde lån til kriseramte virksomheder til samme rentesats som satsen på det foreliggende lån.
They have therefore not shown that private banks were ready to lend to firms in difficulty at an interest rate similar to the one of the present loan.
Det er meningsløst at sammenligne rentesatsen på lån, der er ydet til forskellige virksomheder, uden at undersøge, om risikoen for de långivende banker er den samme.
Comparing the interest rate of loans granted to different firms without verifying that the risk supported by the lending banks is similar is a pointless exercise.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at ingen markedsøkonomisk investor under lignende omstændigheder havde ydet dette lån til HSY, som derfor udgør støtte.
The Commission therefore concludes that no market economy investor in similar circumstances would have granted this loan to HSY, which therefore constitutes aid.
Som konkluderet ovenfor gjorde lånet det faktisk muligt for HSY at påtage sig denne kommercielle kontrakt, som det ikke havde kunnet finansiere ved at skaffe midler på markedet.
As concluded here above, the loan in fact allowed HSY to undertake this commercial contract, which HSY could not have financed by raising funds from the market.
Desuden blev skrogene først solgt til en ny køber i 2004, dvs. flere år efter den 31. december 2000.
In addition, the hulls were sold to a new purchaser only in 2004, i.e. several years after 31 December 2000.
Eftersom støtten er ulovlig og uforenelig, skal den tilbagesøges.
Since the aid is unlawful and incompatible, it has to be recovered.
Da lånet er blevet tilbagebetalt, er en del af den fordel, som HSY har opnået, allerede blevet inddraget.
Since the loan has been reimbursed, part of the advantage received by HSY has already been withdrawn.
Takket være dette lån fra ETVA havde HSY imidlertid over en årrække lånebeløbet til rådighed, et beløb, som HSY ikke ellers kunne have haft til rådighed i den pågældende periode.
However, thanks to this loan of ETVA, HSY had at its disposal the amount of the loan during several years, an amount which HSY could otherwise not have had at its disposal during that period.
Denne fordel skal også opvejes.
This advantage needs also to be recovered.
Kommissionen finder således, at der skal tilbagesøges støtte svarende til forskellen mellem den rentesats, der er betalt til ETVA, og referencesatsen for Grækenland plus 600 basispoint for perioden fra udbetalingen af lånet til HSY og indtil den dato, hvor lånet blev sikret ved et pant i skrogene.
The Commission thus considers that aid has to be recovered which amounts to the difference between the interest rate paid to ETVA and reference rate for Greece plus 600 bps for the period from the payment of the loan to HSY until the date when the loan was secured by a mortgage on the hulls.
For perioden derefter og indtil tilbagebetalingen af lånet er den støtte, der skal tilbagesøges, forskellen mellem den rentesats, der er betalt til ETVA, og referencesatsen for Grækenland plus 400 basispoint.
For the period thereafter until the reimbursement of the loan, the aid to recover is the difference between the interest rate paid to ETVA and the reference rate for Greece plus 400 bps.
Nedsættelsen med en tredjedel af denne risikopræmie afspejler den omstændighed, at pantet i skrogene delvis havde reduceret långiverens tab i tilfælde af misligholdelse fra HSY's side og derfor reducerede ETVA's risiko i forbindelse med lånet.
The reduction by one third of this risk premium reflects the fact that the mortgage on the hulls would have partially reduced the loss of the lender in case of default of HSY, and therefore reduced the risk of the loan for ETVA.
Navnlig lykkedes det som nævnt HSY at sælge skrogene til en pris, der stort set svarede til en tredjedel af lånet fra ETVA.
In particular, as just indicated, HSY succeeded to sell the hulls at a price roughly equivalent to one third of the money lent by ETVA.
Garanti fra ETVA i forbindelse med kontrakten med Strintzis (foranstaltning E13b)
Guarantee of ETVA in relation to the Strintzis contract (measure E13b)
I 1999 anvendte HSY to garantier fra ETVA til at sikre Strintzis’ forskud på 6,6 mio. EUR. Garantierne blev annulleret i juli 2002, da skibsbygningskontrakten med Strintzis blev annulleret.
In 1999, HSY used two guarantees from ETVA to secure Strintzis’s advance payments amounting to EUR 6,6 million. The guarantees have been cancelled in July 2002 when the shipbuilding contract with Strintzis was cancelled.
Ifølge beslutningen om at udvide proceduren kunne de to garantier, hvis vilkår ikke var kendt på tidspunktet for beslutningen, udgøre støtte.
The extension decision considers that the two guarantees, the terms of which were not known at the time of the decision, could constitute aid.
Elefsis har understreget den omstændighed, at staten/ETVA i forbindelse med HSY på samme tid har påtaget sig rollen som kautionist, kreditor, aktionær og største kunde.
Elefsis emphasizes the fact that the State/ETVA has at the same time assumed the role of guarantor, creditor, shareholder and largest customer of HSY.
Herved udsatte staten sig for en alvorlig finansiel risiko.
By doing so, the State was putting itself in a situation of serious financial risk.
Ved at påtage sig disse forskellige roller tilvejebragte staten faktisk finansiering uden sikkerhed, eftersom staten i tilfælde af virksomhedens misligholdelse og/eller insolvens ikke havde nogen regres og ville lide et endeligt tab, da værdien af værftets aktiver ville blive anset for at være utilstrækkelige til at dække alle passiverne.
In assuming this multiple role, the State was in effect providing finance with no security since in the event of the company’s default and/or insolvency, the State would have no recourse and would sustain a definite loss since the value of the yard’s assets would be considered to be insufficient to cover all the liabilities.
Grækenland og HSY har gjort gældende, at overdragelsen af provenuet i forbindelse med aftale 39 med OSE var en tilstrækkelig sikkerhed, som ville gøre ydelsen af garantien acceptabel for en privat investor.
Greece and HSY claim that the assignment of proceeds resulting from Agreement 39 with OSE was an adequate security which would render the grant of the guarantee acceptable for a private investor.
Kommissionen bemærker, at i tilfælde af HSY's konkurs havde denne sikkerhed ikke gjort det muligt for en bank at inddrive midler.
The Commission observes that, in case of bankruptcy of HSY, this security would not have allowed a bank to recover money.
Hvis HSY således var gået konkurs, var produktionen af det rullende materiel standset, der var ikke foretaget levering til OSE, og der kunne ikke forlanges betaling af OSE i henhold til aftalen.
Indeed, if HSY had gone bankrupt, the construction of the rolling stock would have stopped, no delivery would have been made to OSE and no payment could be requested from OSE under that Agreement.
Kommissionen kan derfor ikke forstå, hvordan denne sikkerhed havde mindsket risikoen i forbindelse med et lån til HSY betydeligt.
The Commission therefore fails to understand how this security would have significantly decreased the risk of a loan to HSY.
HSY har ikke været i stand til at angive over for hverken Kommissionen eller sin egen konsulent (se første Deloitte-rapport, s. 4-9), om HSY var kontraktligt forpligtet til at betale en garantipræmie til ETVA, og hvor stor denne præmie var.
HSY has been able to indicate neither to the Commission nor to its own consultant (see first Deloitte report, page 4–9) whether HSY was contractually obliged to pay a guarantee premium to ETVA and what was the level of this premium.
Som forklaret i forbindelse med vurderingen af foranstaltning E12b skulle HSY have betalt en årlig præmie på mindst 480 basispoint for en sådan garanti.
As explained in the assessment of measure E12b, HSY should normally have paid an annual premium of at least 480 basis points for such a guarantee.
Når man kender størrelsen af de andre garantipræmier, som HSY har betalt til ETVA, er det højst usandsynligt, at den garantipræmie, som HSY faktisk har betalt, var så høj som 480 basispoint.
Knowing the level of the other guarantee premiums paid by HSY to ETVA, it is highly unlikely that the guarantee premium actually paid by HSY was as high as 480 basis points.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at den garanti, som ETVA ydede, udgør statsstøtte, som beløber sig til forskellen mellem den årlige garantipræmie, der faktisk er betalt til ETVA, og en garantipræmie på 480 basispoint.
The Commission therefore concludes that the guarantee granted by ETVA constitutes State aid, which amounts to the difference between the annual guarantee premium actually paid to ETVA and a guarantee premium of 480 basis points.
Som anført i forbindelse med vurderingen af foranstaltning E13a finder Kommissionen, at støtte af denne type udgør driftsstøtte, som ikke kan anses for at være forenelig i henhold til forordning(EF) nr. 1540/98.
As indicated in the assessment of measure E13a, the Commission considers that aid like the present one constitutes operating aid, which can not be found compatible on the basis of Regulation (EC) No 1540/98.
Den er derfor ulovlig og uforenelig og skal tilbagesøges.
It is therefore unlawful and incompatible and must be recovered.
Statsgaranti for et lån på 10 mia. GRD (29,3 mio. EUR) (foranstaltning E14)
State guarantee securing a GRD 10 billion (EUR 29,3 million) loan (measure E14)
I betragtning af HSY's finansielle situation på daværende tidspunkt, er det tvivlsomt, at vilkårene for garantien havde været acceptable for en markedsøkonomisk investor.
Given the financial situation of HSY at the time, it is doubtful that the terms of the guarantee would have been acceptable to a market economy investor.
Med hensyn til foreneligheden på grundlag af artikel 87, stk. 2, litra b), har Grækenland ikke vist, at foranstaltningens størrelse stod i rimeligt forhold til den af HSY lidte skade.
As regards the compatibility on the basis of Article 87(2)(b), Greece has not shown that the size of the measure was commensurate to the damage suffered by HSY.
Elefsis er af den opfattelse, at ingen bank havde ydet lån til HSY på daværende tidspunkt i betragtning af dets finansielle situation.
Elefsis considers that no bank would have lent money to HSY at that time in view of its financial situation.
Garantien bør kun anses for at være forenelig støtte, hvis den er begrænset til de beløb, der er strengt nødvendige for at råde bod på skader, der er forårsaget af en specifik naturkatastrofe.
The guarantee should be considered compatible aid only if it is limited to amounts strictly necessary to make good damage resulting from a specific natural disaster.
Grækenland og HSY har anfægtet, at foranstaltningen er selektiv, eftersom garantien blev ydet i henhold til bestemmelserne i lov 2322/1995, som foreskriver vilkårene og betingelserne for at yde en garanti på vegne af den græske stat til en ansøgende virksomhed.
Greece and HSY contest that the measure is selective since the guarantee was granted according to the provisions of Law 2322/1995, which stipulates the terms and conditions for the granting of a guarantee on behalf of the Greek State to any applying company.
Desuden har de gjort gældende, at garantipræmien på 1 % havde været acceptabel for en privat investor.
In addition, they claim that the guarantee premium of 1 % would have been acceptable for a private investor.
Endvidere kunne HSY have optaget lån på markedet uden en statsgaranti ved at anvende andre former for sikkerhed, f.eks. overdragelse af fordringer i forbindelse med større kontrakter og pant i dets aktiver.
In addition, HSY could have borrowed from the market without a State guarantee by using other forms of security, as for example the cession of claims from major contracts and the mortgage of its assets.
Selv hvis foranstaltningen skulle udgøre støtte, er den delvis forenelig på grundlag af artikel 87, stk. 2, litra b), for så vidt som den nævnte kapital blev ydet som kompensation for den skade, som HSY havde lidt som følge af jordskælvet, og er delvis omfattet af EF-traktatens artikel 296, for så vidt som den direkte vedrører HSY's militære aktiviteter.
Even if the measure should constitute aid, it is partially compatible on the basis of Article 87(2) b) insofar as the said capital was granted as compensation for the damage that HSY suffered by the earthquake and partially falls within Article 296 of the Treaty insofar as it relates directly to the military activities of HSY.
Med hensyn til anvendelsen af artikel 296 fremgår det af teksten til den beslutning, hvorved ETVA besluttede at yde det garanterede lån, at ETVA bl.a. var optaget af videreførelsen af HSY's militære aktiviteter.
As regards the applicability of Article 296, the text of the decision by which ETVA decided to grant the guaranteed loan shows that ETVA was among others concerned by the continuation of the military activities of HSY.
Der er imidlertid ingen kontraktbestemmelse, der tvinger HSY til at anvende det garanterede lån til at finansiere de militære aktiviteter.
However, there is no contractual provision that forces HSY to use the guaranteed loan for the financing of the military activities.
ETVA ønskede med andre ord at holde HSY i live for at sikre videreførelsen af de militære aktiviteter, men den øremærkede ikke det garanterede lån til finansieringen af en bestemt aktivitet.
In other words, ETVA wanted to keep HSY alive in order to ensure the continuation of the military activities, but it did not assign the guaranteed loan to the financing of a particular activity.
HSY kunne frit anvende midlerne, som det ønskede.
HSY was free to use the money as it wished to.
Som allerede forklaret er Kommissionen med hensyn til foranstaltninger, som ydes til værftet som helhed, af den opfattelse, at 25 % af det garanterede lån blev anvendt til civile aktiviteter og 75 % til militære aktiviteter.
As already explained, for such measures which are granted to the yard as a whole, the Commission considers that 25 % of the guaranteed loan was used for civil activities and 75 % for military activities.
Derfor skal kun 25 % af statsgarantien (dvs. et oprindeligt beløb på 2,5 mia. GRD (7,34 mio. EUR)) vurderes i henhold til statsstøttereglerne og kan tilbagesøges, hvis der er tale om uforenelig støtte.
Therefore, only 25 % of the State guarantee (this means initially an amount of GRD 2,5 billion (EUR 7,34 million) has to be assessed under State aid rules, and could be recovered if constituting incompatible aid.
75 % af statsgarantien er omfattet af EF-traktatens artikel 296 og ikke omfattet af statsstøttereglerne.
75 % of the State guarantee falls within the scope of Article 296 of the Treaty and is not covered by State aid rules.
Med hensyn til foranstaltningens selektivitet har Kommissionen allerede vist i forbindelse med vurderingen af foranstaltning E12b, at lov 2322/1995 ikke er en generel foranstaltning.
As regards the selectivity of the measure, the Commission has already shown in the assessment of measure E12b that Law 2322/1995 is not a general measure.