natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Et conduitselskab — også kendt under betegnelsen »særlig virksomhed« (SPV) eller »særligt investeringsselskab« (SIV) — er en juridisk person (normalt et anparts- eller aktieselskab eller eventuelt et kommanditselskab), der er oprettet med henblik på opfyldelse af snævre og helt specifikke eller midlertidige formål, primært isolering af en finansiel risiko (normalt en konkurs, men i visse tilfælde en bestemt skatte- eller lovgivningsmæssig risiko).
A conduit — also known as a special purpose vehicle (SPV) or special investment vehicle (SIV) — is a corporate body (usually a limited company of some type or, sometimes, a limited partnership) created to fulfil narrow, specific or temporary objectives, primarily to isolate financial risk (usually bankruptcy but sometimes a specific taxation or regulatory risk).
SIV anvendes, fordi de kan holdes ude fra balancen og ikke skal medtages i bankernes regnskab.
SIVs have been used because they can remain off balance sheet and not be consolidated by banks.
Det giver bankerne mulighed for at finansiere udlån til lavere rente, end den, de selv kan tilbyde (primært på grund af de lovfæstede solvenskrav).
This allows banks to fund lending at cheaper rates than those they would provide themselves (due notably to the obligations of regulatory liquidity ratios).
Conduitselskaber refinansierer investeringer i obligationer udstedt med sikkerhed i specificerede aktiver (ABS) ved at optage lån på markedet for kortfristede omsætningspapirer med sikkerhed i fast ejendom [3].
The conduit refinances investments in asset-backed securities (ABSs) by borrowing in the short-term asset-backed commercial paper [3] (CP) market.
Conduitselskabernes potentielle likviditetsbehov (hvis ikke samtlige kortfristede gældsbeviser bliver solgt) dækkes via kreditlinjer hos forretningsbankerne.
Potential liquidity needs of the conduits (where the commercial papers are not sold completely) are bridged by credit lines provided by commercial banks.
Sachsen LB brugte Ormond Quay til at finansiere investeringer i ABS, som omfattede amerikanske værdipapirer med sikkerhed i fast ejendom.
Ormond Quay was used by Sachsen LB to fund investments in ABSs which included US mortgage-backed securities.
For at sikre conduitselskabets likviditetsbehov i tilfælde af, at forretningsbankerne lukkede kreditlinjerne, måtte Sachsen LB stille garanti for Ormond Quays likviditet og påtage sig særlige likviditetsfaciliteter.
In order to guarantee the liquidity needs of the conduit in case the commercial banks withdrew the credit lines, Sachsen LB had to guarantee the liquidity of Ormond Quay and assume special liquidity facilities.
Til gengæld for denne risiko fik Sachsen LB overskuddet fra conduitselskabet i form af et årligt gebyr.
In return for assuming the risk, Sachsen LB received the generated surplus of the conduit in the form of an annual fee.
Ormond Quay gav et betydeligt overskud ved at finansiere langfristede og højtydende ABS-investeringer gennem kortfristede og lavtydende omsætningspapirer.
Ormond Quay generated a significant surplus by financing the long-term and high-yield ABS investments through short-term and low-yield commercial papers.
Markedsvilkårene forværredes imidlertid som følge af subprimekrisen.
Market conditions deteriorated, however, as a result of the subprime crisis.
Under den fortsatte krise på subprime-realkreditmarkedet i USA nedklassificerede de tre største kreditvurderingsselskaber en meget stor del af alle papirer med sikkerhed i fast ejendom med ratings på mellem A+ og BB helt ned til CCC på grund af de mange misligholdte lån og tvangsauktioner.
In the course of the ongoing crisis in the US subprime mortgage market, the three major rating agencies downgraded a huge part of assets backed by mortgages which ranged from A + to BB, to as low as CCC because of high default and foreclosure rates.
Det påvirkede omgående vurderingen af ABS i negativ retning.
This immediately had a negative impact on the valuations of these ABSs.
På baggrund af disse markedsvilkår afviste hedgefonde og institutionelle investorer at reinvestere i kortfristede omsætningspapirer med sikkerhed i fast ejendom.
In the light of these market conditions the hedge funds and institutional investors refused to reinvest in mortgage-backed commercial papers.
Conduitselskaberne var dermed ikke længere i stand til at optage lån på markedet for kortfristede omsætningspapirer.
SPVs were thus no longer able to borrow in the short-term asset-backed commercial paper market.
Ormond Quay blev alvorligt ramt af dette fænomen.
Ormond Quay was seriously affected by this phenomenon.
De forretningsbanker, der havde stillet kreditlinjer til rådighed for Ormond Quay, trak sig ligeledes ud, hvilket gjorde det nødvendigt at trække på den likviditetsfacilitet, Sachsen LB havde garanteret.
The commercial banks providing credit lines to Ormond Quay also withdrew, making it necessary that it draw upon the liquidity facility provided by Sachsen LB.
»Brandudsalg« [4] af aktiver på et kriseramt marked ville have medført store tab for Sachsen LB og gjort banken insolvent.
Fire sales [4] of assets in depressed market conditions would have led to considerable losses for Sachsen LB and would have resulted in the insolvency of the bank.
Det var grunden til, at der blev truffet forskellige foranstaltninger.
For this reason various measures were taken.
STØTTEMODTAGEREN
THE BENEFICIARY
Som forretningsbank udførte Sachsen LB alle former for banktransaktioner.
As a commercial bank, Sachsen LB executed banking transactions of all kinds.
Sachsen LB Europe plc (herefter benævnt »Sachsen LB Europe«) var et fuldt ejet datterselskab af Sachsen LB med hjemsted i Dublin.
Sachsen LB Europe plc (hereinafter called Sachsen LB Europe) was a wholly owned subsidiary of Sachsen LB and was based in Dublin.
Det formidlede strukturerede finansielle investeringer og var frem til midten af 2007 den største indtægtskilde for Sachsen LB-gruppen.
It was a service provider for structured financial investments and was until mid-2007 the main source of profits for the Sachsen LB group.
Frem til den 18. juli 2005 nød Sachsen LB stadig godt af de ubegrænsede statsgarantier »Anstaltslast« og »Gewährträgerhaftung«, som måtte ophæves efter en række aftaler mellem Tyskland og Kommissionen.
Until 18 July 2005 Sachsen LB still profited from the unlimited state guarantees ‘Anstaltslast’ and ‘Gewährträgerhaftung’, which had to be abolished following a number of understandings between Germany and the Commission.
I henhold til den første aftale fra 17. juli 2001 kunne ny gæld fortsat dækkes af Gewährträgerhaftung i en overgangsperiode frem til 18. juli 2005 (en såkaldt »bedstefarklausul«), forudsat at forfaldsdatoen lå før 31. december 2015 [5].
According to the first of the understandings dated 17 July 2001, within a transitional period until 18 July 2005 new liabilities could still be covered by Gewährträgerhaftung (so-called grandfathering), provided their maturity did not go beyond 31 December 2015 [5].
Den 26. oktober 2007 blev Sachsen LB's selskabsretlige status ændret fra en offentligretlig institution (Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts) til et aktieselskab.
On 26 October 2007 the legal form of Sachsen LB was changed from a public-sector institution (Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts) into a joint stock company.
KØBEREN AF STØTTEMODTAGEREN
THE BUYER OF THE BENEFICIARY
Sammen med sin regionale detailbank BW-Bank tilbyder den hele spektret af bankprodukter.
LBBW functions as the central bank for the savings banks in Baden-Württemberg.
LBBW fungerer som centralbank for sparekasserne i Baden-Württemberg, og sammen med Landesbank Rheinland-Pfalz, der blev overtaget af LBBW den 1. januar 2005, fungerer den som centralbank for sparekasserne i Rheinland-Pfalz.
For the savings banks in Rhineland-Palatinate it is the central banking institution together with Landesbank Rheinland-Pfalz, which was taken over by LBBW on 1 January 2005.
LBBW-modellen, der nu også dækker delstaten Sachsen, er baseret på lokale pengeinstitutter, der fokuserer på små og mellemstore virksomheder og privatkunder (BW-Bank for Baden-Württemberg, RP-Bank for Rheinland-Pfalz og nu Sachsen Bank for Sachsen), og centraliserede funktioner i Stuttgart, støttet af en direkte LBBW-afdeling i hver af de to delstater Sachsen og Rheinland-Pfalz.
The LBBW model, which has now been extended to Saxony, is based on locally rooted banks concentrating on SMEs and private banking (BW-Bank for Baden-Württemberg, RP-Bank for Rhineland-Palatinate, and now Sachsen Bank for Saxony) and centralised functions in Stuttgart, supported by one direct LBBW branch in each, Saxony and Rhineland-Palatinate.
Som detaljeret beskrevet i åbningsbeslutningen [6] blev Sachsen LB trukket med ned af den fortsat igangværende amerikanske subprimekrise, især på grund af conduitselskabet Ormond Quay, der ikke var i stand til at refinansiere sig selv og havde et likviditetsbehov på 17,1 mia. EUR for at undgå »brandudsalg«.
As described in detail in the opening decision [6] Sachsen LB got caught in the maelstrom of the still ongoing US subprime crisis in particular because of one off-balance conduit, Ormond Quay, which was unable to refinance itself and was in need of liquidity of up to EUR 17,1 billion in order to avoid fire sales.
LIKVIDITETSFORANSTALTNINGEN
THE LIQUIDITY MEASURE
Den 19. august 2007 indgik en gruppe på ti tyske delstatsbanker sammen med DekaBank (et offentligretligt organ, der hører under delstatsbankerne og DSGV) (herefter benævnt »bankgruppen«) en konsortieaftale, der forpligtede dem til at opkøbe de af Ormond Quay udstedte kortfristede omsætningspapirer op til et beløb på 17,1 mia. EUR, hvis de ikke kunne afsættes på markedet.
On 19 August 2007, a group of 10 German Landesbanken and DekaBank (an agency under public law which is jointly held by the German Landesbanken and by DSGV) (hereinafter called ‘the banking pool’) entered into a pool contract, committing them to buying the CPs emitted by Ormond Quay up to an amount of EUR 17,1 billion if these could not be placed on the market.
Hver enkelt bank i gruppen skulle opkøbe omsætningspapirerne i eget navn og for egen regning.
Each pool bank would acquire the CPs in its own name and for its own account.
Bankerne i gruppen hæftede ikke solidarisk.
The pool banks were not jointly liable.
DekaBank havde en andel på ca. […] [7].
DekaBank had a share of around […] [7].
Den resterende del blev overtaget af de øvrige delstatsbanker i forhold til deres respektive størrelse og økonomiske resultater.
The remaining part was taken over by the other Landesbanken according to their respective size and performance.
Ifølge oplysninger fra Tyskland andrager det maksimale beløb for de omsætningspapirer, bankgruppen rent faktisk opkøbte i henhold til konsortieaftalen frem til starten af januar 2008, […] mia. EUR.
According to the information received by Germany, the maximum amount of CPs actually bought until the beginning of January 2008 by the banking pool under the pool contract was EUR […] billion.
Prisen på omsætningspapirerne blev fastsat til referencekursen (Euribor eller Libor afhængigt af, hvor de underliggende aktiver stammede fra) plus en margin på […] basispoint.
The remuneration for the CPs was fixed at the reference rate (Euribor or Libor depending on the origin of the underlying assets) plus a margin of […] bps.
Omsætningspapirernes løbetid kunne højst være en måned.
The duration of the CPs could not exceed one month.
Konsortieaftalen var begrænset til seks måneder.
The pool contract was limited to a period of six months.
Konsortiebankerne skulle kun opkøbe de omsætningspapirer, der ikke kunne afsættes på markedet.
The pool banks only had to buy the CPs which could not be placed on the market.
I august 2007 var efterspørgslen efter omsætningspapirer med sikkerhed i fast ejendom helt væk, og der var ikke noget reelt marked for denne type investeringer, men derefter blev situationen gradvist bedre.
Whereas in August 2007 the demand for mortgage-backed CPs had completely dried up and there was no efficient market for this type of investment, the situation gradually improved.
Siden oktober 2007 er nogle investorer (primært […(banker i den offentlige sektor)]) igen begyndt at købe kortfristede omsætningspapirer på markedet, uden at det har forbindelse med konsortieaftalens ringe vilkår, dvs. til en pris på under […(50-100)] basispoint, hvorefter konsortieaftalens oprindelige formål ikke længere var relevant.
Since October 2007 some investors (mainly […(banks belonging to the public sector)]) had started again to buy CPs on the market outside the context and the detrimental conditions of the pool contract, i.e. for a remuneration of less than […(50-100)] bps, so that the pool contract lost its initial purpose.
Konsortieaftalen blev officielt ophævet den 23. februar 2008.
The pool contract came formally to an end on 23 February 2008.
SALGET AF SACHSEN LB
THE SALE OF SACHSEN LB
Sachsen LB var allerede i 2005 begyndt at se sig om efter en strategisk partner, især blandt de øvrige delstatsbanker [8].
Sachsen LB had already in 2005 started to look for a strategic partner in particular among the other Landesbanken [8].
Som følge af disse forhåndssonderinger kunne forhandlingerne om salget af Sachsen LB afsluttes allerede den 23. august 2007, dvs. en uge efter undertegnelsen af konsortieaftalen, da Sachsen LB havde lidt tab på 250 mio. EUR, som nævnt i åbningsbeslutningen [9].
Due to these pre-negotiations it was possible for negotiations on the sale of Sachsen LB to progress swiftly on 23 August 2007, i.e. one week after the signing of the pool contract, when Sachsen LB recorded losses of EUR 250 million as described in detail in the opening decision [9].
Eftersom tabene på Sachsen LB's strukturerede investeringsportefølje ville have medført yderligere udhuling af egenkapitalen, som nærmede sig de lovfæstede mindstekrav til bankers og pengeinstitutters solvens, måtte Sachsen LB's aktionærer finde en bæredygtig løsning for banken.
Since the losses in Sachsen LB’s structured finance portfolio would have implied a further decrease in Sachsen LB’s equity, approaching the minimum regulatory capital requirements, the shareholders of Sachsen LB had to find a sustainable solution for the bank.
Der blev derfor fortsat ført drøftelser med interesserede købere og intense forhandlinger med flere interesserede parter.
Talks with interested buyers were therefore continued and intensive negotiations were held with several interested parties.
Det resulterede i salget til LBBW, der ifølge oplysninger fra Tyskland afgav det økonomisk mest fordelagtige bud.
This led to the sale to LBBW because it submitted, according to Germany, the economically best offer.
LBBW havde en særlig interesse i at købe Sachsen LB for at sikre sin markedsekspansion ikke kun i Sachsen, men også i Østeuropa.
LBBW had a particular interest in buying Sachsen LB in order to ensure its market expansion not only in Saxony but also in Eastern Europe.
Den 26. august 2007 blev der underskrevet en salgsaftale, i henhold til hvilken Sachsen LB ville være solgt med virkning fra 1. januar 2008 til LBBW, men ifølge aftalen skulle prisen fastsættes ved en evaluering foretaget af en uafhængig ekspert, og det skulle først ske, når den igangværende finansmarkedskrise var overstået, hvilket den forventedes at være i slutningen af 2007.
On 26 August 2007 a sales agreement was signed which stipulated that Sachsen LB would be sold with effect from 1 January 2008 to LBBW. However, the agreement envisaged that the price to be paid should be determined by an evaluation of an independent expert which should take place after the current financial market crisis had been overcome, which was then envisaged for the end of 2007.
På tidspunktet for salget forventede parterne, at krisen snart ville være overstået.
At the time of the sale, the parties expected that the crisis would soon be over.
Ud fra formodningen om, at markederne ville have normaliseret sig ved årets udgang, etablerede LBBW ingen særlige ordninger vedrørende Sachsen LB's portefølje af strukturerede investeringer og ville have overtaget den.
On the assumption that the markets would have normalised by the end of the year, LBBW did not make any special arrangements for the structured investment portfolio of Sachsen LB and would have acquired it.
Det forventedes især, at Ormond Quays problemer ville løse sig selv med tiden, og at selskabet igen ville blive i stand til refinansiere sig selv på markedet.
In particular, it was considered that Ormond Quay’s problems would resolve themselves over time and it would again be able to re-finance itself on the market.
I slutningen af 2007 viste det sig, at der var yderligere risici forbundet med Sachsen LB's portefølje af strukturerede investeringer.
At the end of 2007, further risks involved in Sachsen LB’s structured investment portfolio appeared.
Inden salget blev vedtaget, forværredes situationen på finansmarkederne endnu mere, og især Ormond Quay blev problematisk, da mark-to-market-vurderingen [10] af selskabets aktiver udviste tab på ca. […(0,5-1,5)] mia. EUR.
Before closure of the sale, the situation in the financial markets further deteriorated and in particular Ormond Quay became problematic because the mark-to-market [10] evaluation of its assets amounted to losses of about EUR […(0,5-1,5)] billion.
Det bragte det endelige salg af banken i fare, eftersom kernekapitalen potentielt kunne være kommet under den krævede minimumsgrænse.
This endangered the final sale of the bank, given that the core capital could potentially have fallen below the required minimum threshold.
Mark-to-market-nedskrivninger måtte bogføres som tab og nedbragte dermed kernekapitalen på balancen.
The mark-to-market devaluations had to be accounted as losses and as a consequence reduced the core capital in the balance sheet.
Det så ud til, at Sachsen LB's kernekapitalprocent ville komme under […] %, hvilket gav LBBW ret til at genforhandle salget.
It appeared that Sachsen LB’s core capital ratios would fall below […] %, which gave LBBW the right to renegotiate the sale.
For at handelen kunne afsluttes, måtte der findes en løsning, der forhindrede, at disse tab blev medregnet i værdiansættelsen af Sachsen LB. I modsat fald ville LBBW komme til at betale for disse tab ud over den mindstepris på 300 mio. EUR, der blev fastsat i august.
Otherwise, LBBW would have to pay for these losses, in addition to the minimum purchase price of EUR 300 million that had been set in August.
Efter intense forhandlinger blev der den 13. december 2007 underskrevet en endelig og bindende aftale om salget af banken (Eckpunktevereinbarung).
After intensive negotiations, a final and non-reversible agreement concluding the sale of the bank (Eckpunktevereinbarung) was signed on 13 December 2007.
Løsningen gik ud på at undgå, at mark-to-market-tabene fra Sachsen LB's conduitselskaber blev medregnet i balancen, så LBBW var beskyttet mod potentielle tab fra conduitselskaberne, hvis værdipapirerne i porteføljen måtte ligge til udløb.
The solution found was to avoid consolidation of the mark-to-market losses coming from Sachsen LB’s conduits and to protect LBBW from potential losses that could be incurred from the conduits if the securities in the portfolio were held to maturity.
En alternativ løsning kunne f.eks. have været at medregne mark-to-market-tabene og skaffe yderligere kapital for et tilsvarende beløb fra ejerne af Sachsen LB (anslået til ca. […(0,5-1,5)] mia. EUR), før banken blev solgt til LBBW.
An alternative solution could have been e.g. to consolidate the mark-to-market losses and to obtain additional capital from the owners of Sachsen LB for the corresponding amount (estimated to be about EUR […(0,5-1,5)] billion), before selling the bank to LBBW.
I stedet for at lide mark-to-market-tab foretrak delstaten Sachsen at yde en statsgaranti for en portefølje af strukturerede investeringer.
Instead of incurring the mark-to-market losses, the preferred solution was for the Free State of Saxony to provide a state guarantee on a portfolio of structured investments.
Samtlige Sachsen LB's strukturerede investeringer var specificeret i den endelige aftale og opdelt i to porteføljer.
The final agreement identified the entire structured investments of Sachsen LB and divided them into two portfolios.
For at undgå indregning af alle de strukturerede investeringer hos LBBW blev én portefølje med en nominel værdi på 17,5 mia. EUR [12] holdt uden for salget.
In order to avoid the consolidation of all the structured investments into LBBW, one portfolio with a nominal value of EUR 17,5 billion [12] was excluded from the sale.
Disse aktiver blev derfor overført til et nydannet særligt investeringsselskab (det såkaldte »Super SIV«).
These assets were therefore transferred into a newly founded special investment vehicle (the so-called Super SIV).
På denne måde forblev kun strukturerede porteføljeinvesteringer [13] med et refinansieringsbehov på ca. 11,8 mia. EUR i Sachsen LB og overgik dermed til LBBW.
In this way only structured portfolio investments [13] with a refinancing requirement of about EUR 11,8 billion remained in Sachsen LB and thus were sold to LBBW.
For at dække potentielle tab på disse investeringer blev der fra salgsprisen fratrukket et beløb på 500 mio. EUR.
In order to cover potential losses from these investments, an amount of EUR 500 million was deducted from the sales price.
Super SIV er et investeringsinstrument, der blev oprettet med det formål at trække strukturerede investeringsporteføljer med lav mark-to-market-værdi ud af Sachsen LB før salget med henblik på at lade dem ligge til udløb.
The Super SIV is an investment vehicle which was created for the purpose of transferring structured investment portfolios with a low mark-to-market value out of Sachsen LB before the sale with the intention of holding them until maturity.
For at overføre porteføljen til SIV var det nødvendigt at reorganisere dets refinansiering.
In order to transfer the portfolio into the Super SIV its refinancing needed to be organised.
Det blev dels klaret af LBBW (juniortranchen), dels af de øvrige delstatsbanker (seniortranchen).
This was provided partly by LBBW (junior tranche) and partly by the other Landesbanken (senior tranche).
For at undgå indregning af Super SIV i LBBW's balance, måtte LBBW's andel være under 50 %.
In order to avoid consolidation of the Super SIV in the LBBW balance sheet, LBBW’s participation had to remain below 50 %.
Efter intense forhandlinger overtog delstatsbankerne 50 % af refinansieringen af Super SIV men accepterede kun at deltage i refinansieringen på betingelse af, at deres refinansiering i tilfælde af tab rangerede over den finansiering, LBBW havde bidraget med.
Following intensive negotiations, the Landesbanken took over 50 % of the refinancing of the Super SIV but only agreed to participate in the refinancing on condition that in case of losses their financing ranked above the financing provided by LBBW.
Disse tab ville svare til en risiko for misligholdelse.
These losses would correspond to a risk of default.
Delstaten Sachsen gik omsider ind på at stille en garanti på 2,75 mia. EUR for tab fra Super SIV.
The Free State of Saxony finally agreed to grant a guarantee to the amount of EUR 2,75 billion for losses from the Super SIV.
Dette beløb blev fastsat under intense forhandlinger mellem LBBW og delstaten Sachsen og baseret på værdiansættelser foretaget af investeringsbanker, som skønnede, at refinansieringsbankernes risici for misligholdelse i dette tilfælde var tæt ved nul [14].
This amount was established during intensive negotiations between LBBW and the Free State of Saxony and based on valuations by investment banks which estimated that in this case the default risks for the refinancing banks was close to zero [14].
Det svarer til […(> 90)] mio. EUR over ti år, hvis garantien ikke blev udnyttet.
This corresponds to EUR […(> 90)] million within 10 years assuming the guarantee is not used.
Super SIV blev, som nævnt, finansieret i to trancher.
As mentioned above, the Super SIV was financed in two tranches.
Første tranche på lige under 50 % (8,75 mia. EUR) blev finansieret af LBBW.
The first tranche of just below 50 % (EUR 8,75 billion) was financed by LBBW.