natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I den forbindelse mente Domstolen, at det forhold, at statsforanstaltninger tager sigte på at kompensere for meromkostninger, udelukker, at der foreligger støtte [42].
In this context, the Court has considered that the fact that State measures aim to compensate for additional costs cannot constitute grounds for disqualifying them from the definition of aid [42].
Frankrig påberåber sig dog det princip, som Retten fastlagde i Combus-dommen, og fastslår, at den anmeldte reform blot fritager RATP for en »unormal« byrde.
In this context, the French authorities cite the application of the principle laid down by the Court of First Instance in the Combus judgment, claiming that the reform notified simply relieves RATP of an ‘abnormal’ charge.
Kommissionen må understrege, at de materielle forhold adskiller Combus-sagen fra den foreliggende, som det fremgår af følgende:
In this respect, the Commission emphasises that a number of important factual aspects distinguish the Combus case from the present case:
Kompensationen udbetales direkte til de tjenestemænd, der er ansat i Combus, mens foranstaltningen i den foreliggende beslutning vedrører RATP’s »arbejdsgiverbidrag«.
the compensation payments are paid directly to the civil servants employed by Combus whereas the measure which is the object of the present decision concerns the ‘employer contributions’ of RATP,
Den relevante statsforanstaltning i Combus-sagen tog sigte på at erstatte den gunstige og bekostelige ordning, som gjaldt for de tjenestemandsansatte, der var beskæftiget af Combus, med overenskomstvilkår svarende til dem, der gjaldt for ansatte i andre busselskaber, som var i konkurrence med Combus.
the State measure in question in the Combus case had been introduced to replace the privileged and costly status of the officials employed by Combus with the status of employees on a contract basis comparable to that of employees of other bus transport undertakings competing with Combus.
Combus’ konkurrencesituation var anderledes end RATP’s.
the competitive context in which Combus was operating was different to that in which RATP operates.
Aktieselskabet Combus A/S skulle drive transportvirksomhed på kommercielt grundlag og operere på markedet under de samme konkurrencevilkår som de private busselskaber.
The public limited company Combus A/S had to manage its transport services on a commercial basis and operate on the market under competitive conditions comparable to those of private bus companies.
I denne forbindelse skal det bemærkes, at de offentlige transportselskaber ved en udbudsprocedure overdrager busdriften til private og offentlige virksomheder.
In this context, following invitations to tender, the public transport management companies transferred responsibility for the provision of bus services to private and public companies.
Ifølge udbudsreglerne tildeles kontrakten på grundlag af »det økonomisk mest fordelagtige tilbud«, uden at der tages hensyn til, om tilbudsgiveren er offentlig eller privat.
According to the regulations governing invitations to tender, contracts are awarded to ‘the most economically advantageous bid’, irrespective of whether or not the tenderer is a private or public undertaking.
RATP disponerer derimod over en stor ikke-liberaliseret sektor, som i henhold til forordning (EF) nr. 1370/2007 først efterhånden åbnes for konkurrence, og hvor de økonomiske påvirkninger gør sig gældende på anden måde.
RATP, however, operates in a large non-liberalised sector which will only be opened up to competition very gradually by Regulation (EC) No 130/2007; the economic constraints at play in this sector are therefore very different.
Kommissionen mener, at de faktuelle forskelle mellem Combus-sagen og den foreliggende sag er tilstrækkelige til at berettige, at de to sager behandles forskelligt.
The Commission considers that the factual differences between the Combus case and the present case are sufficient to justify a different reasoning in each case.
TILSTEDEVÆRELSE AF STATSMIDLER
INVOLVEMENT OF STATE RESOURCES
Kommissionen mener, at den undersøgte foranstaltning omfatter statsmidler til fordel for RATP, eftersom ansvaret for at sikre ligevægt i den særlige pensionsordning for ansatte hos RATP i sidste ende ikke længere ligger hos RATP, men hos staten.
The Commission considers that the measure examined involves State resources in favour of RATP in that the ultimate responsibility for the financial equilibrium of the special pension scheme for RATP employees is no longer incumbent upon RATP, but on the State.
Fra iværksættelsen af reformen sikrer staten nemlig den finansielle ligevægt for CRP-RATP gennem betaling af et udligningstilskud til socialsikringsinstitutionen, som uden reformen skulle være afholdt af RATP.
With effect of the date of implementation of the reform, the State has ensured the financial equilibrium of the CRP-RATP by means of the payment of a balancing subsidy to the social security body which, in the absence of the reform, would have had to be assumed by RATP.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at den omhandlede foranstaltning omfatter statsmidler, jf. traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
Consequently, the Commission considers that the measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
KONKURRENCEFORVRIDNING OG PÅVIRKNING AF SAMHANDLEN
DISTORTION OF COMPETITION AND ADVERSE EFFECT ON TRADE
Som det tidligere er anført, er støttemodtageren RATP moderselskab for en gruppe virksomheder, RATP-koncernen, der opererer i transportsektoren og yder dermed forbundne tjenester.
As indicated above, RATP, the beneficiary of the measure under assessment, is the parent company of a group of undertakings, the RATP group, which operate in the transport and associated services sectors.
Alle disse operatører driver virksomhed på Fællesskabets markeder for ovennævnte sektorer.
All of these operators are active in the Community markets of the above-mentioned sectors.
Det skal i den forbindelse erindres, at driftsstøtte, dvs. støtte, der skal frigøre en virksomhed for omkostninger, som den normalt skulle have båret inden for sin almindelige drift eller sine sædvanlige aktiviteter, i princippet fordrejer konkurrencevilkårene [43].
It should be recalled that, in principle, aid which is intended to release an undertaking from costs which it would normally have had to bear in its day-to-day management or normal activities distorts the conditions of competition [43].
Det blev nemlig vurderet, at enhver støtte, der ydes til en virksomhed, der opererer på Fællesskabets marked, er egnet til at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene og påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne [44].
It has been ruled that any grant of aid to an undertaking exercising its activities in the Community market is liable to cause distortion of competition and affect trade between Member States [44].
Domstolen har endvidere fastslået, at det på ingen måde er udelukket, at et offentligt tilskud til en virksomhed, som alene leverer lokale eller regionale transportydelser, og som ikke leverer transportydelser uden for sin hjemstat, ikke desto mindre kan have indvirkning på samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne i den forstand, hvori udtrykket er anvendt i traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
Moreover, the Court of Justice considered that a public subsidy granted to an undertaking which provides only local or regional transport services and does not provide any transport services outside its State of origin may nonetheless have an effect on trade between Member States within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Når en medlemsstat yder et offentligt tilskud til en virksomhed, kan den pågældende virksomheds stilling inden for levering af transportydelser nemlig derved blive opretholdt eller styrket med den konsekvens, at chancerne for de virksomheder, der er etableret i de øvrige medlemsstater, for at levere transportydelser på denne medlemsstats marked herved bliver formindsket [45].
Where a Member State grants a public subsidy to an undertaking, the supply of transport services by that undertaking may for that reason be maintained or increased with the result that undertakings established in other Member States have less chance of providing their transport services in the market in that Member State [45].
I den foreliggende sag har RATP-koncernen en gunstig position i forhold til både sine nationale konkurrenter [46] og sine konkurrenter i andre medlemsstater, der ikke modtager den pågældende støtte.
In the present case, the RATP group is in a privileged position both in relation to its domestic competitors [46] and its competitors in other Member States which cannot benefit from the measure under assessment.
I den forbindelse skal det nævnes, at forordning (EF) nr. 1370/2007 indeholder bestemmelser om gradvis åbning af de berørte markeder for konkurrence, og at en sådan sektors åbning for konkurrence indebærer, at statsstøtte til en virksomhed i denne sektor kan påvirke samhandlen mellem medlemsstaterne og fordreje konkurrencen på det pågældende marked.
In this respect, it should be mentioned that Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 provides for the progressive opening up of the markets concerned to competition and the opening up of a given sector to competition implies that State aid to an undertaking belonging to that sector is likely to have an effect on intra-Community trade and distort competition in the market in question.
Som følge heraf mener Kommissionen, at den omhandlede foranstaltning påvirker samhandlen mellem medlemsstaterne og fordrejer konkurrencen mellem disse aktører.
Consequently, the Commission considers that the measure in question does affect trade between Member States and distort competition between the relevant operators.
I overensstemmelse med traktatens artikel 88, stk. 3, skal medlemsstaten anmelde enhver påtænkt indførelse eller ændring af støtteforanstaltninger.
Pursuant to Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty, Member States must notify any plans to grant or alter aid.
Den pågældende medlemsstat må ikke gennemføre de påtænkte foranstaltninger, før den nævnte fremgangsmåde har ført til endelig beslutning.
They may not put the proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.
I den foreliggende sag har de franske myndigheder ved brev af 29. juni 2006 anmeldt reformen af finansieringen af RATP’s pensionsordning.
In the present case, the French authorities notified the reform of the method by which RATP finances its pension scheme by means of a letter dated 29 June 2006.
I brevet anfører de franske myndigheder, at de ikke mener, at denne ordning er en statsstøtte, der på forhånd skal indberettes til Kommissionen i medfør af traktatens artikel 88, stk. 3.
In their letter, the French authorities stated that the arrangements did not appear to constitute State aid notifiable to the Commission in advance under Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty.
Kommissionen konstaterer imidlertid, at Frankrig har iværksat den pågældende statsstøtte fra den 1. januar 2006, dvs. før Kommissionen har truffet en endelig beslutning.
However, the Commission observes that the State aid under assessment was implemented by France with effect from 1 January 2006, i.e. before the Commission had adopted a final decision.
På grundlag heraf konkluderer Kommissionen, at Frankrig handlede ulovligt, da man gennemførte den pågældende støtte i modstrid med traktatens artikel 88, stk. 3.
On this basis, the Commission concludes that France has acted unlawfully in implementing the aid in question contrary to Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty.
Da den omhandlede foranstaltning er statsstøtte i henhold til traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, skal dens eventuelle forenelighed med det fælles marked undersøges på baggrund af undtagelserne i traktaten.
In so far as the measure under assessment constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, its compatibility with the common market must be assessed in the light of the exceptions provided for by that Treaty.
Kommissionen mener, at det mest korrekte retsgrundlag er traktatens artikel 87, stk. 3, litra c), hvori det hedder, at støtte til fremme af udviklingen af visse erhvervsgrene kan være forenelig med fællesmarkedet, når den ikke ændrer samhandelsvilkårene på en måde, der strider mod den fælles interesse.
In this respect, the Commission considers that the most appropriate legal basis is Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty, according to which aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities may be considered to be compatible with the common market, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.
I betragtning af reformens art og virkninger mener Kommissionen, at vurderingen af, om støtteforanstaltningen er forenelig med fællesmarkedet, skal vurderes under hensyn til etablering af lige vilkår, når det gælder socialsikringsbidrag, mellem RATP og dens nuværende og kommende konkurrenter inden for den kollektive transportsektor i Ile-de-France.
Given the nature and the effects of the reform, the Commission considers that the compatibility of the aid under assessment must be assessed in relation to the creation of a level playing field in terms of mandatory social contributions between RATP and its current, potential and future competitors on the urban public transport market in the Ile-de-France region.
RATP’s bidrag i forhold til konkurrenterne i den reformerede ordning
Level of contributions paid by RATP in relation to its competitors under the reformed system
For at analysere støttens virkninger og vurdere konkurrencefordrejningernes intensitet skal Kommissionen først undersøge RATP’s bidrag i forhold til konkurrenternes på baggrund af den reformerede ordning.
In order to analyse the effects of the aid and assess the extent of distortion of competition, the Commission must first examine the level of contributions borne by RATP in relation to its competitors under the reformed system.
Derefter skal Kommissionen påvise, hvad der ville være sket, hvis RATP ikke havde modtaget den pågældende støtte.
Thereafter, the Commission will examine the situation as it would have been if RATP had not benefitted from the aid in question.
Endelig undersøges støttens positive og negative virkninger, hvorefter der kan gøres status over situationen som helhed.
Lastly, the positive and negative effects of the aid will be analysed, before assessing overall compatibility with the Treaty.
Indledningsvis bemærker Kommissionen, at finansieringen af RATP’s særlige pensionsordning før den 1. januar 2006 adskilte sig fra finansieringen af de almindelige pensionsordninger i to henseender, nemlig med hensyn til bidragenes ikke-frigørende virkning og størrelsen af »arbejdsgiverbidraget«.
Firstly, the Commission notes that, prior to 1 January 2006, the financing of the RATP special pension scheme differed from the financing of statutory pension schemes in two respects: the fact that RATP's contributions did not constitute full discharge of its obligations and the level of the ‘employer’ contribution.
Kommissionen mener, at den omhandlede støtte gav en løsning på det første element af divergens mellem RATP’s særordning og de almindelige ordninger.
The Commission considers that the aid under assessment has resolved the first area of divergence between the RATP special scheme and the statutory schemes.
Før den 1. januar 2006 betalte RATP nemlig ikke et bidrag med frigørende virkning, men skulle i henhold til loven sikre finansiel ligevægt i pensionsordningen for sine ansatte.
Prior to 1 January 2006, the contributions paid by RATP were not in full discharge of its obligations; RATP was responsible under law for ensuring the financial equilibrium of the retirement pension scheme of its staff.
Med den anmeldte reform blev der indført betaling af et frigørende bidrag, som er karakteristisk for de bidrag, en privat arbejdsgiver betaler til den kasse, der forvalter en løbende finansieret pensionsordning.
The reform notified has introduced the payment of a contribution in full discharge of RATP's obligations, a feature which characterises the contributions paid by employers subject to statutory law to funds which manage pay-as-you-go pension schemes.
Med hensyn til det andet divergerende element konstaterer Kommissionen, at den anmeldte reform har medført en udjævning af udgifterne til obligatorisk aldersforsikring mellem RATP og private virksomheder, der er omfattet af de almindelige regler for pensionsydelser.
With regard to the second area of divergence, the Commission observes that the reform notified has resulted in a harmonisation of the level of mandatory old-age pension charges borne by RATP and companies subject to statutory law in the field of retirement benefits.
Scenario uden støtteforanstaltningen
The situation without the provision of aid
Uden reformen skulle RATP have afsat bevillinger i regnskabsårene efter 2006 til sine pensionsforpligtelser over for sine vedtægtsansatte.
In the absence of the reform notified, RATP would have had to provision pension commitments for its staff in posts governed by service regulations for the financial years after 2006.
Det skyldes direkte, at »arbejdsgiverbidragene« til pensionerne til RATP’s medarbejdere ikke havde frigørende virkning.
This provision would have been a direct result of the fact that the ‘employer’ contributions for the retirement pensions of RATP staff were not in full discharge of their obligations.
For at sikre finansiel ligevægt i pensionsordningen ville RATP’s aldersforsikringsbidrag endvidere ikke være blevet tilpasset efter de potentielle konkurrenters bidrag.
In addition, RATP's contributions to the old-age pension scheme to ensure the financial equilibrium of that scheme would not have been aligned with the level paid by their potential competitors.
Uden den anmeldte reform ville RATP således have været nødt til at afholde en ekstra årlig udgift på flere hundrede millioner euro i forhold til den reformerede ordning.
In the absence of the reform notified, RATP would therefore have had to assume an additional annual expense of several hundred million euro in relation to the reformed scheme.
Pensionsudgifterne ville derfor have været et handicap for RATP på et liberaliseret marked, hvilket ville have påvirket selskabets aktiviteter betydeligt.
As a result, RATP's pension expenses would have put it at a disadvantage in the context of a liberalised market, which would have had a significant impact on its activities.
På baggrund af forordning (EF) nr. 1370/2007, der indeholder bestemmelser om en gradvis åbning af markedet for kollektiv bytrafik, følger det af ovenstående, at den gældende pensionsordning hos RATP ifølge 1948-loven frembyder særlige træk, som isoleret betragtet skaber konkurrencefordrejninger til skade for RATP og den koncern, selskabet tilhører.
It follows from the above that, considering Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 which provides for the progressive opening up of the urban public transport market, the pension scheme applicable to RATP under the 1948 law comprises a number of specific characteristics which, in isolation, give rise to a distortion of competition to the detriment of RATP and the group to which it belongs.
Støttens væsentligste virkning er, at den tilpasser RATP’s bidrag efter konkurrenternes og RATP-koncernens konkurrenters og dermed fjerner de særlige konkurrencefordrejninger, der berører RATP og RATP-koncernen.
The main effect of the aid under assessment is to align the contributions of RATP with those borne by its competitors and by competitors in the RATP group, thus removing the specific distortion of competition affecting RATP and the RATP group.
Endvidere har reformen gjort det muligt for RATP gradvist at handle som en privat investor med normale kommercielle problemer.
Furthermore, the reform will gradually enable RATP to operate as a private investor facing normal commercial constraints.
Det er i øvrigt et af reformens formål.
Indeed, this is one of the objectives of the reform in question.
Kommissionen mener desuden, at den pågældende foranstaltning står i forhold til det mål i Fællesskabets interesse, som den tager sigte på at nå.
The Commission also considers that the measure under assessment is suited to the Community objective intended.
Dette mål havde ikke kunnet nås med et mere effektivt middel.
No other mechanism could have addressed this matter in a more effective manner.
Der ville uden tvivl have kunnet opnås en public service-kompensation, men en sådan fremgangsmåde havde hverken været egnet eller holdbar på lang sigt, da problemet er af strukturbestemt art.
Public service compensation could certainly have been awarded, but such an approach would not have been suitable or sustainable in the long term given the structural nature of the problem.
Med hensyn til spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt foranstaltningerne står i forhold til målet, er det Kommissionens opfattelse, at støtten er begrænset til det strengt nødvendige.
As regards the proportionality of measures, the Commission considers that the aid granted has been limited to the strict minimum.
Siden den 1. januar 2006 har RATP betalt de samme pensionsudgifter som en virksomhed, hvis ansatte er tilknyttet almindelige ordninger.
Since 1 January 2006, the pension charges paid by RATP have been identical to those paid by companies whose employees are affiliated to statutory schemes.
Endelig mener Kommissionen, at den omhandlede foranstaltning gør det muligt at videreføre en pensionsordning, hvis finansieringsmåde var blevet forældet.
Lastly, the Commission considers that the measure under assessment serves to ensure the longevity of a retirement pension scheme, the financing of which was no longer viable.
Kommissionen mener endvidere, at reformen af pensionsydelserne fra særordningen [47] i den sammenhæng udgør et afgørende supplerende element.
The Commission also considers that the reform in progress of the retirement benefits provided by the special scheme [47] constitutes a decisive additional element in this context.
Kommissionen mener derfor, at disse foranstaltninger ligger helt inden for de mere generelle rammer for reform af medlemsstaternes pensionsordninger, som både Rådet og Kommissionen bakker op om [48].
Consequently, the Commission considers that these measures are perfectly compatible with the general drive to reform Member States' pension systems advocated by both the Council and the Commission [48].
På grundlag af en statisk analyse finder Kommissionen dels, at konkurrencefordrejningerne for det kollektive transportmarked i Ile-de-France som følge af foranstaltningen i sagens natur umiddelbart er meget begrænsede, eftersom det i betragtning af RATP’s baggrund og virksomhed er åbenbart, at de pensionsforpligtelser, der er omfattet af reformen, vedrører aktiviteter, som hidtil er foregået på et ikkeliberaliseret marked, hvor konkurrencen hidtil har været meget lille.
In a static analysis, the Commission considers firstly that the distortions of competition in the urban public transport market in the Ile-de-France region resulting from the measure under assessment are by definition and with immediate effect very limited in the sense that, given the history of RATP and its activities, it is evident that the pension commitments under the reform relate to actions historically implemented in a non-liberalised market where the level of competition has been very low to date.
Dels mener Kommissionen vedrørende de markeder, hvor RATP-koncernen opererer gennem virksomheden RATP’s datterselskaber, at den omhandlede foranstaltning kun har en meget marginal virkning.
Secondly, with regard to the markets on which the RATP group operates in the form of the subsidiaries of the RATP company, the Commission considers that the measure under assessment only has a very marginal impact.