natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
På grundlag af Alfred Bergs vurdering besluttede den danske regering at videreføre Combus ved en rekonstruktion med henblik på et efterfølgende salg (valgmulighed 1).
Based on this assessment of Alfred Berg, the Danish government decided to keep Combus going through a restructuring process with a view to a subsequent sale (option 1 proposed by Alfred Berg).
Denne rekonstruktion er nærmere beskrevet i næste afsnit.
This restructuring process is described in detail in the next sub-section.
Den 23. april 1999 informerede Alfred Berg staten om, at der var indkommet en ny »indication of interest« fra Arriva med et tilbud om at overtage 100 % af Combus' aktiekapital for 35 mio. DKK.
On 23 April 1999, Alfred Berg informed the government that a new ‘indication of interest’ had been received from Arriva with an offer to take over 100 per cent of Combus A/S’ share capital for DKK 35 million.
Til tilbuddet var der knyttet betingelser om egenkapitalens størrelse og selskabets resultat med klausul om krone-for-krone-reduktion i tilfælde af afvigelser.
Conditions relating to the amount of the equity capital and the company’s results were attached to the offer, with a clause for a ‘krone for krone’ reduction in the event of deviations.
Tilbuddet var baseret på, at egenkapitalen udgjorde 131 mio. DKK, og Alfred Berg skønnede, at egenkapitalen var ca. 10 mio. DKK lavere.
The offer was based on the equity capital amounting to DKK 131 million, and Alfred Berg estimated that the equity capital was currently around DKK 10 million lower.
Alfred Berg anbefalede en fortsættelse af salgsprocessen med denne køber parallelt med rekonstruktionsmodellen.
Alfred Berg recommended continuing the sales process with this buyer in parallel with the development of the restructuring option.
Alfred Berg gjorde opmærksom på, at der udestod drøftelser om særdeles vanskelige forhold, som kunne gøre det vanskeligt at nå en for begge parter tilfredsstillende aftale.
Alfred Berg pointed out that particularly difficult matters still had to be discussed, which could make it difficult to achieve a satisfactory agreement for both parties.
Den 27. april 1999 underskrev Trafikministeriet og Arriva en hensigtserklæring (letter of intent) om overtagelse af Combus for 45 mio. DKK på betingelse af, at selskabets egenkapital udgjorde 131 mio. DKK på overdragelsestidspunktet.
On 27 April 1999, a letter of intent was signed by the Ministry of Transport and Arriva for the takeover of Combus for DKK 45 million, provided that the company’s equity capital at the time of transfer was DKK 131 million.
Primo juni var forhandlingerne med Arriva så vidt fremskredne, at det var rådgivernes vurdering, at det ville have været realistisk, at der kunne indgås en endelig salgsaftale i første halvdel af juli 1999. I løbet af juni 1999 var der imidlertid stor presseomtale af Combus, herunder navnlig politiske tilkendegivelser om behovet for at indføre markedsandelsbegrænsning på rutebusmarkedet i Danmark. På baggrund af spekulationerne om markedsandelsbegrænsninger mistede Arriva interessen i at erhverve Combus. Arriva understregede dog at være interesseret i at erhverve Combus på længere sigt afhængigt af, om der blev indført markedsrestriktioner.
In early June, negotiations with Arriva were so advanced that the advisers considered that a final sales agreement could realistically be concluded in the first half of July 1999.
Årsregnskabet skulle være tilgængeligt for pressen og offentligheden senest 14 dage før den årlige generalforsamling.
The annual accounts had to be available to the press and public no later than 14 days before the AGM.
Selskabets økonomiske situation var så kritisk, at revisorerne havde meddelt, at årsregnskabet ikke kunne aflægges uden forbehold for going concern.
The company’s finances had been so strained that the accountants had stated that the annual accounts could not be presented without reservations as to the going concern principle.
På baggrund af revisorgennemgangen af selskabets kontrakter, som havde vist, at der var behov for en hensættelse på ca. 65 mio. DKK til dækning af tabsgivende kontrakter, måtte selskabet gå i betalingsstandsning, medmindre der blev tilført yderligere kapital.
On the basis of the accountants’ examination of the company’s contracts, which had demonstrated a need for a provision of approx DKK 65 million to cover loss-making contracts, the company would have to go into administration unless further capital was injected.
Desuden var der overhængende fare for, at en række pengeinstitutter opsagde låneaftalerne, som alle indeholdt et minimumssoliditetskrav på 10 % af balancesummen, dog mindst 125 mio. DKK.
In addition, there was an imminent risk of a compulsory redemption of loan agreements with a number of financial institutions, all of which contained covenant provisions requiring a minimum capital base of 10 % of the balance sheet total, but no less than DKK 125 million.
I april 1999 udpegede Trafikministeriet en juridisk rådgiver, Kromann & Münter, som skulle bistå med at løse Combus' økonomiske problemer.
In April 1999, the Danish Ministry of Transport appointed a legal adviser, Kromann and Münter, to assist in solving Combus’ financial problems.
Den juridiske rådgiver foreslog i et notat udsendt medio maj 1999 en kapitaltilførsel på 300 mio. DKK.
The legal adviser suggested in a memo issued in mid-May 1999 a capital injection of DKK 300 million.
På grundlag af dette notat forelagde Trafikministeriet den 21. maj 1999 Folketingets Finansudvalg et fortroligt aktstykke med forslag om en kapitaltilførsel på 300 mio. DKK.
Based on this memo, the Ministry of Transport presented on 21 May 1999 a confidential bill to the Finance Committee of the Danish parliament, proposing a capital injection of DKK 300 million.
Aktstykket blev tiltrådt af Finansudvalgets flertal den 27. maj 1999 [20].
The bill was approved by a majority of the Finance Committee on 27 May 1999 [20].
Med hensyn til Combus' økonomiske situation hed det i aktstykket, at selskabet i 1998 flere gange havde måttet justere sine forventninger til resultatet for 1998.
As regards Combus’ financial situation, the bill stated that in 1998, the company had had to adjust its expectations regarding the result for 1998 several times.
Senere, efter vedtagelsen i december 1998 af loven om salg af alle aktierne i Combus, var der indtrådt en betydelig forværring af selskabets økonomiske situation.
Most recently, after the adoption in December 1998 of the Act on the sale of all shares in Combus, there had been a significant downturn in the company’s finances.
I aktstykket hedder det endvidere, at Combus var i overhængende fare for betalingsstandsning eller konkurs, men at en kapitaltilførsel ville sikre, at selskabet kunne holdes i live med henblik salg på et senere tidspunkt.
The bill furthermore states that Combus was in imminent danger of going into administration or going bankrupt, but that an injection of capital would ensure that the company could be kept going with a view to a sale taking place at a later date.
Man skønnede, at der behøvedes en kapitaltilførsel på omkring 300 mio. DKK, i betragtning af soliditetskravet i selskabets låneaftaler og behovet for et rimeligt forhold mellem gæld og egenkapital.
It was estimated that there was a need for a capital injection in the order of DKK 300 million, against the background of the solidity requirement in the company’s loan agreements and the need for an appropriate relationship between debt and equity capital.
I aktstykket hedder det også, at muligheden for at sælge Combus fortsat burde undersøges.
The bill also foresees that the option of selling Combus would continue to be investigated.
Det ansås for lidet sandsynligt, at staten ville kunne genvinde den tilførte kapital på kort sigt.
It was considered unlikely that the State would recoup the capital injected, in the short term.
Formålet med kapitaltilførslen var at sikre selskabets fremtidige drift, og at det havde tilstrækkelig kapital til rådighed.
The capital injection was made with a view to ensuring the future operation of the company and ensuring that it had sufficient capital available.
Aktstykket blev tiltrådt af et flertal i Finansudvalget den 27. maj 1999.
The bill was approved by a majority of the Finance Committee on 27 May 1999.
Det andet, vellykkede, forsøg på at sælge Combus
The second, successful attempt to sell Combus
Anden screening af markedet
Second market scrutiny
Salgsprocessen blev genoptaget i foråret 2000, efter at Combus' årsregnskab for 1999 var blevet godkendt på den årlige generalforsamling i maj 2000.
The sales process was resumed in the spring 2000, after Combus’ annual accounts for 1999 had been approved at the AGM in May 2000.
Alfred Berg skulle fortsat inddrages i salgsforhandlingerne som finansiel rådgiver, og Kromann & Münter som juridisk rådgiver.
Alfred Berg would continue to be involved in the sales negotiations as financial adviser, and Kromann and Münter as legal advisor.
Medio juli 2000 forelagde Alfred Berg en indikativ værdiansættelse af Combus.
In mid July 2000, Alfred Berg presented an indicative evaluation of Combus.
Det var Alfred Bergs vurdering, at traditionelle værdiansættelsesmetoder ikke kunne anvendes i forbindelse med Combus på grund af betydelig usikkerhed.
Alfred Berg considered that traditional evaluation methods could not be used with regard to Combus due to the high level of uncertainty.
Rådgiverne havde foretaget en værdiansættelse baseret på en fremskrivning af selskabets resultater til 2004 ud fra en række vægtede antagelser om udviklingen i omsætning og forbedringstiltag.
The advisers had carried out an evaluation based on a projection of the company’s results to 2004 on the basis of a number of weighted assumptions on turnover developments and restructuring measures.
Selskabets værdi blev opgjort på det fremtidige tidspunkt.
The value of the company was calculated at the future date.
Der blev taget højde for eventuelle under-/overskud i den mellemliggende periode og effekten på selskabets nettogæld på det fremtidige tidspunkt.
Account was taken of any profits/deficits in the intermediate period and the effect on the company’s negative net balance at the future date.
Den aktuelle salgsværdi fandtes ved at tilbagediskontere den beregnede fremtidige salgsværdi.
The actual sales value was found by discounting back the future sales value calculated.
Resultaterne af vurderingen fremgår af følgende tabel.
The following table shows the results of this assessment.
Resumé af Alfred Bergs værdiansættelse af Combus
Summary of Alfred Berg’s evaluation of Combus
Kilde: Indikativ værdiansættelse fra de finansielle rådgivere.
Source: Indicative valuation from the financial advisers.
Scenarie
Scenario
Neutral/negativ
Neutral/negative
Neutral/positiv
Neutral/positive
Antagelse
Assumption:
Uændret
Unchanged
Stigende
Increasing
Forbedringstiltag
Improvement measures
Værdi mio. DKK af egenkapital, juli 2005
Value in DKK millions of equity capital, July 2005
Værdi mio. DKK af egenkapital aktuelt (10 % disk.)
Value in DKK millions of equity capital current (10 % disc.)
Resultateffekten af den nye ledelses forbedringstiltag forudsattes at udgøre 48,7 mio. DKK årligt fra 2002.
The result of the effects of improvement measures adopted by the new management was assumed to be DKK 48,7 million annually from 2002.
Det fremgår af tabellen, at Combus' værdi måtte vurderes som meget negativ, navnlig fordi antagelser om stigende omsætning og bruttoindtjening samt gennemførelse af forbedringstiltag inden for en så kort årrække måtte betragtes som urealistiske.
The table shows that the value of Combus had to be assessed as very negative, particularly because the assumptions regarding rising turnover and gross earnings and the implementation of improvement measures within such a short period had to be regarded as difficult.
Af stor betydning for privatiseringen var den politiske debat om indførelse af markedsbegrænsning for busoperatører. Folketingets Trafikudvalg havde udbedt sig en rapport om koncentrations- og konkurrenceforholdene på det danske busmarked, og den blev udarbejdet i efteråret 1999 af en arbejdsgruppe bestående af repræsentanter fra Konkurrencestyrelsen samt Finansministeriet og Trafikministeriet. I rapporten anførtes det, at hovedparten af den regionale og lokale bustrafik havde været i udbud, at markedet var præget af hård konkurrence mellem entreprenørerne til trods for, at antallet af entreprenører var faldende, og at der ikke var tegn på, at en enkelt eller enkelte entreprenører dominerede markedet til skade for konkurrencen. Det var sammenfattende arbejdsgruppens vurdering, at der ikke var behov for at indføre markedsbegrænsning på det danske busmarked.
An important issue for the privatisation process was the political debate on the introduction of market caps for bus operators.
Regeringen tog på ny kontakt til en række potentielle købere.
The Danish government then contacted again a number of potential buyers.
Efter en præsentation af Combus' økonomi meddelte to potentielle købere, at de var interesseret i at erhverve 100 % af aktierne i Combus.
After a presentation of Combus’ finances, two potential buyers announced that they were interested in acquiring 100 % of the shares in Combus.
En tredje køber havde meddelt en mere forbeholden interesse for selskabets aktier.
A third buyer made a more cautious expression of interest.
Den ene af de interesserede købere var Arriva, hvis indikative tilbud svarede til en negativ salgspris på 200-250 mio. DKK.
One of the interested buyers was Arriva, whose indicative offer corresponded to a negative sales price of DKK 200-250 million.
Den anden interesserede køber var Metroline.
The other interested buyer was Metroline.
Tilbuddet fra den anden køber var umiddelbart mere attraktivt, idet det indeholdt et tilbud om at købe aktierne for mellem 10-24 mio. DKK.
Its offer was, at first sight, more attractive, as it proposed to buy the shares for a positive price in the range of DKK 10-24 million.
Metroline havde dog tilføjet, at man ved den økonomiske præsentation af selskabet var blevet opmærksom på en række forhold, som man ønskede at undersøge nøjere.
Metroline had added, however, that during the financial presentation of the company it had become aware of a number of matters that they wished to examine in greater detail.
Den 18. oktober 2000 informerede Alfred Berg regeringen om, at Metroline havde afgivet et revideret tilbud om nu at købe Combus til en negativ pris på 500 mio. DKK.
On 18 October 2000, Alfred Berg informed the Danish government that it had received a revised offer from Metroline, which now proposed to acquire Combus for a negative price of DKK 500 million.
Desuden ønskede Metroline en række garantier.
In addition, Metroline requested a number of guarantees.
Efter dette tilbud anbefalede Alfred Berg at indstille de generelle drøftelser med den tredje interesserede køber, fordi denne ifølge Alfred Berg ikke var tilstrækkeligt interesseret.
Following the submission of this offer, Alfred Berg recommended cancelling the on-going general discussions with the third interested buyer, as Alfred Berg did not consider the buyer sufficiently interested.
Styregruppen bad Alfred Berg kontakte Arriva, hvis indikative tilbud nu var klart bedre end Metrolines, for at undersøge mulighederne for et salg.
The steering group asked Alfred Berg to contact Arriva, whose indicative offer was now clearly better than Metroline’s, in order to investigate options for a sale.
Forhandlinger med Arriva
Negotiations with Arriva
Den 3. november 2000 meddelte Arriva i et brev til Alfred Berg, at selskabet havde gennemført en due diligence, og at man var i stand til at fremlægge et forslag vedrørende det videre forløb.
On 3 November 2000, Arriva announced in a letter to Alfred Berg that the company had carried out the due diligence process, and that they could now suggest how to proceed.
I brevet gjorde Arriva opmærksom på, at man havde samarbejdet med Connex ved vurderingen.
In the letter, Arriva pointed out that they had cooperated with Connex in their assessment.
Arriva havde på et tidligere tidspunkt informeret de finansielle rådgivere om de to busselskabers fælles interesse.
Arriva had previously informed the financial advisers of the two bus companies’ joint interest.
Ifølge forslaget ville Arriva tilbyde at betale 100 DKK for alle aktierne i Combus.
According to the proposal, Arriva offered to pay DKK 100 for all the shares in Combus.
Tilbuddet var betinget af, at den lånekapital på 100 mio. DKK, som Trafikministeriet havde indskudt i 1999, blev konverteret til egenkapital, og at der blev foretaget en yderligere kapitaltilførsel til Combus på 290 mio. DKK.
The offer was subject to the condition that the loan capital of DKK 100 million injected by the Ministry of Transport in 1999 was converted into equity capital, and that a further injection of capital amounting to DKK 290 million was being made into Combus.
Tilbuddet blev endvidere fremsat med forbehold for, at alle nødvendige reguleringer af selskabets balanceposter, som blev identificeret under den efterfølgende due diligence-proces, skulle dækkes ved tilførsel af midler.
The offer was furthermore subject to the condition that all necessary adjustments to the company’s balance sheet items identified during the subsequent due diligence process would be covered by the injection of funds.
Arriva nævnte en række eksempler på sådanne reguleringer, der allerede beløb sig til ca. 109 mio. DKK.
Arriva mentioned a number of examples for such adjustments, which already amounted to approx. DKK 109 million.
Arriva gav den danske stat frist til den 8. november 2000 til at nå frem til en aftale.
Arriva set the Danish government a deadline of 8 November 2000 to reach agreement.
En gennemregning af Arrivas forslag foretaget af de finansielle rådgivere viste, at tilbuddet indebar, at Combus skulle tilføres 399 mio. DKK i nye midler, og at Trafikministeriet endvidere skulle konvertere den ansvarlige lånkapital på 100 mio. DKK til egenkapital, altså i alt et tab for staten på 499 mio. DKK.
An examination of Arriva’s proposal by the financial advisers showed that the offer involved DKK 399 million of new funds being injected into Combus and that the Ministry of Transport was also to convert the subordinated loan of DKK 100 million to equity capital and therefore a total loss of DKK 499 million for the State.
Hertil kom så tabet af den resterende egenkapital i Combus, som blev anslået til 38 mio. DKK pr. 30. september 2000.
In addition, there was the loss of the remainder of the equity capital in Combus, which was estimated at DKK 38 million on 30 September 2000.
Det var Trafikministeriets og Finansministeriets opfattelse, at Arrivas tilbud var lavt.
The Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Finance considered Arriva’s offer to be low.
På den anden side havde ingen hidtidige seriøse bud været bedre end Arrivas.
On the other hand, no other previous serious offer had been better than Arriva’s.
Metroline havde tilbudt den samme negative pris som Arriva, dvs. ca. 500 mio. DKK, og den tredje interesserede køber havde kun givet et løst og helt uforpligtende bud på ca. 350 mio. DKK.
Metroline had requested the same negative price as Arriva, i.e. approximately DKK 500 million, and the third interested buyer had only made a loose and non-binding offer for a negative price of approx. DKK 350 million.
Det blev besluttet, at Trafikministeriet som et første skridt skulle kontakte Arriva med henblik på at søge selskabets pris for at overtage Combus forhandlet op.
It was decided that, as a first step, the Ministry of Transport should contact Arriva with a view to increasing the company’s price for taking over Combus.
Samtidig gennemregnede ministeriet forskellige scenarier for af-/udvikling af Combus.
At the same time, the Ministry went over several scenarios for winding up/developing Combus.
Scenarierne var ikke umiddelbart en værdiansættelse af selskabet, men en beregning af selskabets likviditetsbehov under forskellige forudsætninger sammenholdt med Arrivas bud.
The scenarios were not a direct evaluation of the company, but a calculation of the company’s liquidity needs under various conditions compared with Arriva’s offer.
Resultatet af beregningen, som blev godkendt af Combus, selskabets revisorer og advokater, fremgår af følgende tabel:
The result of the calculation, which was approved by Combus, the company’s auditors and solicitors, is shown in the following table:
Scenarier for af-/udvikling af Combus
Scenarios for winding up/developing Combus
Kilde: Trafikministeriet
Source: The Ministry of Transport
Likviditet ultimo perioden i mio. DKK
Liquidity at the end of the period in DKK million
Gradvis afvikling over 5 år
Gradual winding up over 5 years
Usikkert scenarie
Uncertain scenario
Fortsættelse med nye, bedre kontrakter i 6 år
Continuation with newer, better contracts for 6 years
Mere usikkert scenarie
More uncertain scenario
Fortsættelse i 1 år uden refinansiering af forfalden gæld
Continuation for 1 year without refinancing of due debt
Fordrede bl.a. optagelse af ny bankgæld på 107 mio. DKK.
Would require, among other things, new bank debts of DKK 107 million.
Vindes tid, men salgssituation herefter formentlig uændret.
Would win time, but the sales situation thereafter would presumably be unchanged.
Konkurs
Bankruptcy
Samlet underbalance, dividende 35-40 %.
Total deficit, dividend 35-40 %.
Lånekreditorerne vil tabe 280-300 mio. DKK.
Lenders would lose DKK 280-300 million.
Arrivas bud
Arriva's offer
I et internt notat blev det anført, at det var ministeriets vurdering, at scenarierne illustrerede, at kreditorerne næppe havde interesse i at fortsætte selskabet, hverken med henblik på gradvis afvikling eller fortsættelse, eftersom ingen af scenarierne var signifikant bedre end Arrivas tilbud.
According to an internal memo, the Ministry considered that the scenarios illustrated that the creditors had nothing to gain from continuing the company, either with a view to a gradual winding up or continued operation, as none of the scenarios was significantly better than Arriva’s offer.
Usikkerheden ved den fremtidige situation ville formentlig indebære, at kreditorerne ville foretrække at medvirke til en hurtig afhændelse.
The uncertainty for the future would probably lead to the creditors preferring to bring about a quick sale.
Scenarierne illustrerede herudover efter ministeriets opfattelse, at Arrivas tilbud formentlig netop tog udgangspunkt i Combus' finansielle situation på kortere sigt frem for en egentlig værdiansættelse af selskabet.
In addition, the scenarios illustrated, in the opinion of the Ministry, that Arriva’s offer was probably based on Combus’ financial situation in the short term rather than an actual evaluation of the company.
Sammenfattende var det formentlig på den baggrund vanskeligt at overbevise Arriva om, at ministeriet klart havde bedre alternativer i baghånden i form af gradvis afvikling eller fortsat drift.
In summary, against this background, it would probably be difficult to convince Arriva that the Ministry had better alternatives in reserve in the form of a gradual winding up or continued operation.
Det blev understreget i notatet, at det ikke helt kunne afvises, at en gradvis afvikling kombineret med en gradvis afhændelse af kørselskontrakterne i mindre — geografiske — portioner til lokale busselskaber muligvis kunne være et relevant alternativ til de skitserede scenarier.
It was emphasised in the memo that it could not be entirely ruled out that a gradual winding up, combined with the gradual disposal of the bus service contracts in small — geographical — packages to local bus companies, could be a relevant alternative to the scenarios outlined.
Dette scenarie var ikke undersøgt, men var også meget usikkert, eftersom der ifølge Combus godt nok ville være flere interesserede lokale busselskaber, men i bedste fald ville kun få have tilstrækkelig finansiel styrke til at overtage selv mindre dele.
This scenario was not investigated, but was also very uncertain as, according to Combus, there would probably be several interested local bus companies but, at best, only a few would have sufficient financial strength to take over even smaller parts.