natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Denne foranstaltning, som havde til formål at sikre, at de ansatte ikke ville hindre salget af HSY, havde været uacceptabelt for en markedsøkonomisk investor, bl.a. da der ikke var nogen kontraktlig forpligtelse til at gøre dette, og eftersom de ansatte desuden stadig skyldte ETVA 24 mio. EUR som købspris for aktierne.
This measure, which aimed at ensuring that the employees would not hinder the sale of HSY, would have been unacceptable to a market economy investor, among others since there was no contractual obligation to do it and since in addition the employees still owed EUR 24 million to ETVA as purchase price for the shares.
Endelig anmodede staten de bydende om at betale en del af købsprisen for HSY i form af en kapitalforhøjelse.
Finally, the State asked the bidders to pay a part of the purchase price of HSY in the form of a capital increase.
Alle disse elementer viser, at staten i forbindelse med salget af HSY ikke handlede med henblik på at maksimere sine indtægter og minimere sine omkostninger, men med det formål at lette salget af HSY og videreføre værftets drift.
All these elements illustrate that during the sale of HSY, the State did not behave with the objective of maximising its revenues and minimising its costs, but with the goal of facilitating the sale of HSY and the continuation of the yard’s operations.
I forbindelse med salget af HSY handlede den græske stat derfor ikke som en markedsøkonomisk investor.
Therefore, during the sale of HSY, the Greek State did not act as a market economy investor.
På baggrund af hver af de tre ovenstående betragtninger konkluderer Kommissionen, at en markedsøkonomisk investor ikke havde ydet garantien.
On the basis of each of the three foregoing considerations, the Commission concludes that a market economy investor would not have granted the guarantee.
Med hensyn til spørgsmålet, om der foreligger en fordel, og identifikationen af modtageren finder Kommissionen, at ingen investor havde købt hele HSY (dvs. inklusive de civile aktiviteter) uden garantien.
As regards the existence of an advantage and the identification of the beneficiary, the Commission considers that no investor would have purchased the entire HSY (i.e. including the civil activities) without the guarantee.
Den anden Deloitte-rapport bekræfter denne konklusion: »På grundlag af vor erfaring og ovennævnte analyse hælder vi mod den opfattelse, at ingen fornuftig investor havde været rede til at erhverve HSY og parallelt hermed påtage sig enhver yderligere risiko i forbindelse med statsstøtte (som på daværende tidspunkt hverken var sikker eller kvantificeret af Kommissionen) for virksomheden, som a) var under en statsejet virksomheds (ETVA Bank) ejerskab og ledelse i en årrække og samtidig b) havde en betydelig negativ egenkapital, blandt andre driftsmæssige problemer (dvs. lav produktivitet, høje driftsomkostninger, overskydende arbejdskraft osv.)«.
The second Deloitte report confirms this conclusion: ‘Based on our experience and the above analysis, we tend to believe that no rational investor would have been prepared to acquire HS and in parallel assume any additional risk related to State aid (which at that time was neither certain nor quantified by the EC), for the company that a) was under the ownership and management of a State-owned company (ETVA Bank) for a number of years, and at the same time b) had a significant negative shareholders’ equity position, amongst other operational problems (i.e. low productivity, high operational costs, excess staff, etc.)’.
Denne konklusion bekræftes også af, at Grækenland i forventning om, at en sådan garanti ville være nødvendig for at tiltrække private investorer, i udbudsmaterialet gav tilsagn om, at den højstbydende ville få en sådan garanti.
This conclusion is also confirmed by the fact that Greece, anticipating that such a guarantee would be necessary to attract private investors, promised in the tender documents that the highest bidder would receive such a guarantee.
Denne konklusion, at en sådan garanti var nødvendigt for at finde en køber til HSY, er logisk, eftersom en investor, der foretog en due diligence af HSY, havde fundet, at HSY havde været omfattet af en række foranstaltninger, der kunne udgøre støtte, som Kommissionen senere kunne kræve tilbagesøgt.
This conclusion that such a guarantee was necessary to find a purchaser for HSY is logic since an investor performing a due diligence of HSY would have found that HSY had benefited of several measures which could constitute aid of which the recovery could be asked by the Commission.
I modsætning til denne konklusion har Elefsis gjort gældende, at denne garanti ikke var nødvendig, og har navnlig hævdet, at selskabet havde været rede til at købe HSY uden en sådan garanti, hvilket fremgår af, at det i sit tilbud på købet af HSY ikke opstillede denne garanti som en betingelse for at købe HSY.
Contrary to this conclusion, Elefsis claims that this guarantee was not necessary and claims in particular that it would have been ready to purchase HSY without such a guarantee, what is illustrated by the fact that, in its bid for the purchase of HSY, it did not put this guarantee as a condition for purchasing HSY.
Kommissionen finder, at Elefsis’ påstand mangler troværdighed.
The Commission considers that Elefsis’ claim lacks credibility.
Kommissionen minder for det første om, at selv hvis det var korrekt, at Elefsis ikke anmodede om en sådan garanti i sit tilbud, beviser det ikke, at hvis Elefsis var blevet valgt som den foretrukne bydende, havde det ikke anmodet om denne garanti i en senere fase af forhandlingen med sælgeren.
The Commission first recalls that, even if this it was true that Elefsis did not request such a guarantee in its bid, it does not prove that, if Elefsis had been selected as the preferred bidder, it would not have requested this guarantee at a later stage of the negotiation with the seller.
Det er meget sandsynligt, at Elefsis havde gjort dette.
This is very likely that Elefsis would have done so.
Så snart HSY var blevet solgt til HDW/Ferrostaal, begyndte Elefsis således at indgive klager til Kommissionen med påstand om, at HSY havde draget fordel af adskillige og omfattende støtteforanstaltninger, som Kommissionen burde tilbagesøge.
Indeed, as soon as HSY was sold to HDW/Ferrrostaal, Elefsis started to file complaints with the Commission, claiming that HSY had benefited from several and large aid measures that the Commission should recover.
En investor, som er overbevist om, at en virksomhed har modtaget statsstøtte til et tocifret millionbeløb i euro vil ikke selv påtage sig den risiko at købe denne virksomhed, medmindre vedkommende får en garanti.
An investor convinced that a firm has received tens of millions of Euro of incompatible aid will not himself take the risk of purchasing this firm, except if he receives a guarantee.
Kommissionen afviser derfor Elefsis’ påstand og er af den opfattelse, at uden denne garanti havde ingen markedsøkonomisk investor købt HSY i dets helhed, dvs. HSY inklusive de civile aktiviteter.
The Commission therefore dismisses Elefsis’ claim and considers that without this guarantee no market economy investor would have purchased the entire HSY, i.e. HSY including the civil activities.
Som anført ovenfor kunne Grækenland, hvis HSY ikke var blevet solgt, fortsat have støttet de militære aktiviteter på grundlag af EF-traktatens artikel 296.
As indicated earlier, if HSY had not been sold, Greece could have continued to support the military activities on the basis of Article 296 of the Treaty.
Omvendt havde Grækenland på grund af EF-traktatens artikel 87 ikke lov til at yde finansiel støtte til de civile aktiviteter.
Conversely, because of Article 87 of the Treaty, Greece would not have been allowed to provide financial support to the civil activities.
Foruden skibsreparationsaktiviteten var de tre væsentligste ikke-militære kontrakter, der blev udført i disse år, kontrakterne med ISAP, OSE og Strintzis.
Besides the ship repair activity, the three main civil contracts performed during these years were the contracts with ISAP, OSE and Strintzis.
Som forklaret i denne beslutning (se beskrivelse og vurdering af foranstaltning E12c) blev kontrakterne med ISAP og OSE udført med betydelige forsinkelser, som tvang HSY til at betale høje bøder og tilvejebringe rullende materiel gratis, hvilket også udgjorde høje omkostninger for HSY.
As has been explained in the present decision (see description and assessment of measure E12c), the contracts with ISAP and OSE were executed with significant delays, forcing HSY to pay high penalties and to provide rolling stock for free, what also represented a high cost for HSY.
Det er derfor klart, at disse kontrakter var yderst tabsgivende.
It is therefore clear that these contracts were highly loss-making.
Som det også er forklaret i denne beslutning, var den kontrakt, der blev indgået med Strintzis i begyndelsen af 1999, en stor fejltagelse for HSY.
As has also been explained in the present decision, the contract concluded with Strintzis at the beginning of 1999 was a big failure for HSY.
Kontrakten blev annulleret i 2002, HSY skulle betale erstatning til Strintzis i henhold til kontrakten og solgte skrogene i 2004 til en pris, som kun var en brøkdel af det tocifrede millionbeløb i euro, som HSY havde brugt på at bygge disse skrog.
The contract was cancelled in 2002, HSY had to pay the contractual indemnities to Strintzis and sold the hulls in 2004 at a price which was only a small fraction of the tens of millions of Euro of costs which HSY had incurred to build these hulls.
Denne kontrakt var derfor også særdeles tabsgivende.
This contract was therefore also highly loss-making.
Endelig var den sidste civile aktivitet skibsreparation.
Finally, the last civil activity was the ship repair.
Det er et forretningsområde med en lille margen, da der er en hård konkurrence mellem værfterne.
It is a low margin business since there is fierce competition between yards.
Kommissionen tvivler derfor på, at denne aktivitet har været rentabel, og under alle omstændigheder var den absolut ikke i stand til at opveje de store tab i forbindelse med kontrakterne med ISAP, OSE og Strintzis.
The Commission therefore doubts that this activity has been profitable, and, in any event, it was certainly unable to compensate the big losses stemming from the ISAP, OSE and Strintzis contracts.
Den omstændighed, at kontrakterne med ISAP, OSE og Strintzis ikke kunne udføres korrekt, beviser frem for alt, at de civile aktiviteter var forblevet tabsgivende, hvis de ikke var blevet købt af en stor virksomhed og ikke havde kunnet nyde godt af dennes tekniske og projektledelsesmæssige færdigheder.
Above all, the failure to carry out correctly the ISAP, OSE and Strintzis contracts proves that, without being purchased by a large firm and without benefiting from the technical and project management skills of the latter, the civil activities would have remained loss-making.
Sammenfattende har Kommissionen vist i denne betragtning, at uden garantien havde ingen investor købt HSY's civile aktiviteter, og hvis disse aktiviteter ikke var blevet købt, var de hurtigt ophørt.
In summary, the Commission has shown in this paragraph that without the guarantee, no investor would have purchased the civil activities of HSY and, if these activities had not been purchased, they would have stopped rapidly.
Kommissionen konkluderer, at modtageren af garantien er HSY, og at fordelen er at muliggøre videreførelsen af de civile aktiviteter.
The Commission concludes that the beneficiary of the guarantee is HSY and that the advantage is to allow the continuation of the civil activities.
Elefsis er uenig i den tidligere konklusion vedrørende identifikationen af modtageren.
Elefsis disagree with the prior conclusion regarding the identification of the beneficiary.
Elefsis har gjort gældende, at foruden HSY var HDW/Ferrostaal også modtager af den garanti, som ETVA ydede.
Elefsis claims that, in addition to HSY, HDW/Ferrostaal was also a beneficiary of the guarantee granted by ETVA.
Kommissionen er uenig i denne vurdering.
The Commission disagrees with this assessment.
Som det er vist, fremgik det allerede af det udbudsmateriale, der blev fremsendt til de bydende, at de ville blive kompenseret, hvis statsstøtte blev tilbagesøgt fra HSY.
As has been shown, in the tender document submitted to the bidders, it was already indicated that they would be indemnified in case of recovery of State aid from HSY.
Dette betyder, at da HDW/Ferrostaal afgav tilbud på købet af HSY, antog selskabet, at hvis støtte blev tilbagesøgt fra HSY, ville det modtage en tilsvarende erstatning fra ETVA.
This means that when HDW/Ferrostaal made its bid for the purchase of HSY, it made the assumptions that, if any aid would be recovered from HSY, it would receive a corresponding indemnification from ETVA.
Den købspris, som HDW/Ferrostaal tilbød, tog med andre ord allerede hensyn til garantien om skadesløsholdelse.
In order words, the purchase price proposed by HDW/Ferrostaal was already taking into account the indemnification guarantee.
Garantien har derfor ikke givet HDW/Ferrostaal en fordel.
The guarantee has therefore not favoured HDW/Ferrostaal.
Kommissionen konkluderer, at den garanti, som ETVA ydede til HDW/Ferrostaal, udgør statsstøtte i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, og at modtageren af denne støtte er HSY.
The Commission concludes that the guarantee granted by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal constitutes State aid in the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty and the beneficiary of this aid is HSY.
Med hensyn til den garanti, som den græske stat ydede til Piraeus Bank, udgør den også støtte.
As regards the guarantee granted by the Greek State to Piraeus Bank, it also constitutes aid.
Det er en selektiv foranstaltning, der er finansieret af statsmidler.
It is a selective measure financed by State resources.
En markedsøkonomisk investor, der skulle sælge ETVA, ville ikke have ydet en sådan garanti.
A market economy investor selling ETVA would not have granted such a guarantee.
Den eneste begrundelse for at yde denne garanti, var den garanti, som ETVA havde ydet til HDW/Ferrostaal.
Indeed, the only justification for granting this guarantee was the guarantee granted by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal.
Hvis sidstnævnte garanti ikke var blevet ydet, havde det ikke været nødvendigt at give garantien til Piraeus Bank.
If the latter guarantee had not been granted, it would not have been necessary to provide the guarantee to Piraeus Bank.
Da ingen markedsøkonomisk investor som nævnt ville have ydet den garanti, som ETVA ydede, og som udgør statsstøtte, ville ingen markedsøkonomisk investor have ydet garantien til Piraeus Bank (eftersom sidstnævnte garanti ikke havde været nødvendig, dvs. den have været irrelevant).
Since, as has been explained, no market economy investor would have granted the guarantee granted by ETVA, which constitutes State aid, no market economy investor would have granted the guarantee to Piraeus Bank (since the latter guarantee would not have been necessary, i.e. it would have been irrelevant).
Med hensyn til identifikationen af modtageren af den garanti, som staten ydede til Piraeus Bank, minder Kommissionen om, at denne procedure vedrører potentiel statsstøtte til HSY.
As regards the identification of the beneficiary of the guarantee granted by the State to Piraeus Bank, the Commission recalls that the present procedure concerns potential State aid to HSY.
Ingen anden potentiel støttemodtager er nævnt i beslutningen om at udvide proceduren.
No other potential beneficiary is mentioned in the extension decision.
Derfor kan kun støtte til HSY undersøges inden for rammerne af denne procedure.
Therefore, only aid to HSY can be investigated in the framework of the present procedure.
Hvis den garanti, som staten ydede til Piraeus Bank, udgør statsstøtte til HSY, vil den ikke udgøre yderligere statsstøtte oveni den statsstøtte, der indgår i den garanti, som ETVA ydede til HDW/Ferrostaal.
If the guarantee granted by the State to Piraeus Bank were to constitute aid to HSY, it would not constitute additional State aid on top of the State aid included in the guarantee granted by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal.
Det er således takket være den sidstnævnte garanti, at en privat investor accepterede at købe HSY, og at HSY's civile aktiviteter derved blev reddet.
Indeed, it is thanks to the latter guarantee that a private investor accepted to purchase HSY and that the civil activities of HSY were thereby saved.
Den garanti, som staten ydede til Piraeus Bank, giver med andre ord ikke HSY en yderligere fordel og kan derfor ikke udgøre yderligere støtte til HSY: Hele fordelen for HSY gives i forbindelse med den garanti, som ETVA ydede til HDW/Ferrostaal.
In other words, the guarantee granted by the State to Piraeus Bank does not provide an additional advantage to HSY and can therefore not constitute additional aid to HSY: all the advantage to HSY is granted by the guarantee granted by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal.
I denne procedure, som vedrører potentiel statsstøtte til HSY, behøver Kommissionen derfor ikke at tage endelig stilling til identiteten af modtageren af den garanti, som den græske stat ydede til Piraeus Bank, og Kommissionen behøver ikke at undersøge sidstnævnte garanti yderligere.
In the present procedure which concerns potential State aid to HSY, the Commission therefore does not have to take a final view on the identity of the beneficiary of the guarantee granted by the Greek State to Piraeus Bank and the Commission does not have to further investigate the latter guarantee.
Det er tilstrækkeligt at undersøge den førstnævnte garanti — den garanti, som ETVA ydede til HDW/Ferrostaal — og annullere den, hvis den udgør uforenelig støtte til HSY.
It is sufficient to investigate the former guarantee — the guarantee of ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal — and to cancel it if it constitutes incompatible aid to HSY.
Med hensyn til den garanti, som ETVA ydede til HDW/Ferrostaal, kan Kommissionen ikke se, hvordan denne støtte kan anses for at være forenelig på grundlag af EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 2 og 3.
As regards the guarantee granted by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal, the Commission fails to see how this aid could be found compatible on the basis of Article 87(2) and (3) of the Treaty.
Med hensyn til EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 3, litra c), bemærker Kommissionen, at HSY var kriseramt.
As regards Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty, the Commission observes that HSY was in difficulty.
Kommissionen har allerede anført, at støtte til skibsbygning fra den 1. januar 1999 var reguleret ved Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1540/98.
The Commission has already indicated that aid to shipbuilding was regulated from 1 January 1999 by Regulation (EC) No 1540/98.
Det fremgår af artikel 5, at omstruktureringsstøtte »undtagelsesvis [kan] betragtes som forenelig med fællesmarkedet, forudsat at den er i overensstemmelse med Fællesskabets rammebestemmelser for statsstøtte til redning og omstrukturering af kriseramte virksomheder«.
Article 5 indicates that restructuring aid ‘may exceptionally be considered compatible with the common market provided that it complies with the Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulties’.
F.eks. med hensyn til betingelse b) »Genoprettelse af virksomhedens rentabilitet« skal der, for at der kan ydes støtte, »iværksættes en omstruktureringsplan, der skal godkendes af Kommissionen, for al individuel støtte«.
For instance, under condition (b) ‘Restoration of viability’, the granting of the aid must be ‘conditional on implementation of the restructuring plan which must be endorsed by the Commission in the case of all individual aid measure’.
Kommissionen bemærker, at ydelsen af garantien ikke var betinget af, at der blev iværksat en omstruktureringsplan.
The Commission observes that the grant of the guarantee was not conditional on implementation of a restructuring plan.
Eftersom denne plan ikke blev forelagt Kommissionen, er den derfor heller ikke blevet godkendt af den.
In addition, this plan, since it was not submitted to the Commission, has not been endorsed by it.
Det fremgår ligeledes af rammebestemmelserne, at »plan[en] skal forelægges Kommissionen med alle nødvendige detaljer«.
The guidelines also indicate ‘the plan must be submitted in all relevant detail to the Commission’.
Denne forudgående konsultation af Kommissionen var navnlig nødvendig i dette tilfælde, eftersom Kommissionen allerede havde godkendt en omstruktureringsplan i 1997, hvormed det ikke var lykkedes at genoprette HSY's rentabilitet.
This pre-consultation of the Commission was especially necessary in the present case since the Commission had already approved a restructuring plan in 1997, which had failed to restore the viability of HSY.
Som bemærket i analysen af foranstaltning P1 ydede staten denne støtte i december 1997 (men udbetalte den ikke).
As noted in the analysis of measure P1, the State granted this aid in December 1997 (but did not pay it out).
Som det er vist i denne beslutning, har virksomheden også modtaget flere ikke-anmeldte og uforenelige støtteforanstaltninger i årene inden privatiseringen i 2001-2002.
As has been shown in this decision, the firm also received several non-notified and incompatible aids in the years before the 2001–2002 privatisation.
Den omstruktureringsstøtte, der blev godkendt ved beslutning C 10/94, blevet ydet til værftet, men betingelserne for godkendelsen heraf blev ikke overholdt.
The restructuring aid authorised by decision C 10/94 was granted to the yard but the conditions attached to its approval were not respected.
Eftersom den garanti, som ETVA ydede til HDW/Ferrostaal, udgør uforenelig støtte til fordel for HSY, finder Kommissionen, at den straks skal bringes til ophør.
Since the guarantee granted by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal constitutes incompatible aid in favour of HSY, the Commission considers that it has to be stopped immediately.
Per se forbud mod garantien
Per se prohibition of the guarantee
Som anført i beslutningen om at udvide proceduren er den garanti, der er ydet til HDW/Ferrostaal, uforenelig med fællesmarkedet af en anden årsag.
As indicated in the extension decision, the guarantee granted to HDW/Ferrostaal is incompatible with the common market for a second reason.
Kommissionen finder, at den per se er uforenelig, da den ved at forhindre, at enhver tilbagesøgning af støtte fra HSY har en »effektiv virkning«, er til hinder for anvendelsen af statsstøttereglerne.
The Commission considers that it is per se incompatible since, by preventing any recovery of aid from HSY to have an ‘effect utile’, it prevents the application of the State aid rules.
TKMS/GNSH og HSY har anfægtet denne opfattelse.
TKMS/GNSH and HSY contest this position.
De har navnlig understreget, at HSY ikke er modtager af nogen erstatning.
In particular, they recall that HSY is not the recipient of any indemnity payment.
Den garanti, som ETVA udstedte, forsikrer således HDW/Ferrostaal og ikke HSY.
Indeed, the guarantee issued by ETVA insures HDW/Ferrostaal and not HSY.
Hvis Kommissionen derfor krævede tilbagebetaling af støtten, skulle HSY foretage tilbagebetalingen, og dette ville genoprette den oprindelige situation.
Therefore, if the Commission would order the reimbursement of aid, HSY would have to make the reimbursement and this would restore the initial situation.
TKMS/GNSH kan ikke forstå, hvorfor kompensationen til TKMS/GNSH (som efterfølger for HDW/Ferrostaal) ville ændre ved denne konklusion.
TKMS/GNSH fails to understand why the indemnification of TKMS/GNSH (as successor of HDW/Ferrostaal) would invalidate this conclusion.
Der er således ingen forpligtelse for TKMS/GNSH til at geninvestere den modtagne erstatning i HSY.
Indeed, there is no obligation for TKMS/GNSH to re-invest in HSY the indemnification received.
Kommissionen bemærker, at 100 % af aktierne i HSY blev købt af HDW/Ferrostaal og nu ejes af TKMS/GNSH.
The Commission observes that 100 % of the shares of HSY were purchased by HDW/Ferrostaal and are now held by TKMS/GNSH.
Dette betyder, at selv hvis HSY og dets aktionær er to forskellige retlige enheder, udgør de en enkelt økonomisk enhed.
This means that, even if HSY and its shareholder are two different legal entities, they form one single economic unit.