natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
F.eks. blev den meget store gældseftergivelse i forbindelse med militære aktiviteter nævnt i beslutning C 10/94, men ikke vurderet i henhold til statsstøttereglerne, lukningsudgifterne i forbindelse med militære aktiviteter blev nævnt i beslutning N 513/01, men ikke vurderet i henhold til statsstøttereglerne, og det samme gælder en række foranstaltninger i beslutningen om at udvide proceduren.
E.g. the very large debt waiver related to military activities was mentioned in decision C 10/94 but not assessed under State aid rules, the closure expenses related to military activities were mentioned in decision N 513/01 but not assessed under State aid rules, and the same was done with several measures in the extension decision.
F.eks. fremgår det af opfordringen til at afgive bindende tilbud på erhvervelsen af aktierne i Hellenic Shipyards S.A. af 2.7.2001, at »[d]et er stillet som en betingelse, at i tilfælde af, at der pålægges en bøde i forbindelse med en potentiel tilsidesættelse af EU's statsstøtteregler, vil den højstbydende ikke være ansvarlig for betalingen af en sådan bøde.
For instance, the invitation to submit binding offers for the acquisition of shares of Hellenic Shipyards S.A. dated 2 July 2001 indicates that ‘It is stipulated that in the event that a fine is imposed pursuant to a potential breach of EC regulations regarding State aid, the highest bidder will not be responsible for the payment of such fine.
Dette tilsagn har forrang for overførslen af aktierne«.
This assurance will take precedence over the transfer of the Shares’.
Det fremgår af referatet af mødet den 14.9.2001, som var underskrevet af parterne, at »[d]et aftales, at EU's godkendelse vil være en betingelse for afslutningen af kontrakten efter dens undertegnelse.
The minutes of the meeting held on 14 September 2001, which were signed by the parties, indicates that ‘It is agreed that EU-clearance will be a condition precedent to the closing of the contract subsequent to its signature.
Alternativt aftalte parterne i tilfælde af, at en sådan beslutning forsinkes af EU […] eller ikke er tilfredsstillende, at ETVAbank vil påtage sig den forpligtelse at give HDW/Ferrostaal en garanti i forbindelse med eventuelle udestående spørgsmål med EU, vedrørende eventuelle tidligere og nuværende statssubsidier i forbindelse med HSY«.
Alternatively, in the event that such a decision is delayed by the EU […] or it is not satisfactory, the parties agreed that ETBAbank will undertake the obligation to provide a guarantee to HDW-Ferrostaal in relation to any outstanding issues related to EU, regarding past and present state subsidies, if any, related to HSY’.
F.eks. i et brev 6.12.2001 adresseret til HDW og med kopi til Ferrostaal har Alpha Finance, som var rådgiver for staten og ETVA, anført følgende: »Vi er af Udviklingsministeriet og ETVAbank blevet bedt om at underrette Dem om den vedføjede ordlyd, der er foreslået af ETVAbank, til […] den garantierklæring, som ETVAbank skal udfærdige til HDW/Ferrostaal i tilfælde af, at klausul 1.2.3 i aftalen ikke opfyldes.« I faxmeddelelser af 23.1.2002, 31.1.2002 og 8.3.2002 fremsendte HDW bemærkninger til Alpha Finance vedrørende den nøjagtige ordlyd af garantien.
For instance, in a letter dated 6 December 2001 and addressed to HDW and copied to Ferrostaal, Alpha Finance, which was the adviser of the State and of ETVA, indicates: ‘we have been instructed by the Ministry of Development and ETVAbank to provide you with the attached language, proposed by ETVAbank, for […] the letter of guarantee to be provided by ETVAbank to HDW-Ferrostaal in the case that Clause 1.2.3 of the Agreement is not fulfilled’. In fax messages dated 23 January 2002, 31 January 2002 and 8 March 2002, HDW sent to Alpha Finance comments regarding the exact wording of the guarantee.
Bank Piraeus fremsætter en række presseartikler vedrørende perioden oktober 2001-maj 2002, hvoraf det fremgår, at staten var direkte involveret i privatiseringsprocessen af HSY.
Bank Pireaus submitted several press articles relating to the period October 2001 to May 2002 illustrating that the government was directly involved in the privatisation process of HSY.
Brevet af 23.5.2005 har følgende ordlyd:»Salget af HSY blev gennemført med denationaliseringsprocessen (lov 2001/1990).
The letter of 23 May 2005 indicates:‘The sale of HSY was conducted with the procedure of denationalisation (Law 2001/1990).
Anmeldelsesproceduren, som gik forud for indgåelsen af først stadfæstelsesaftalen af 11.10.2001 og efterfølgende udførelseskontrakten (31.5.2002), omfattede alle de væsentlige betingelser for overførslen og ligeledes fremlæggelsen af det analytiske memorandum fra finansrådgiveren (dateret april 2001) og afgivelsen af tilbud.
The procedure of declaration, which preceded the conclusion of, initially, the promissory contract of 11.10.2001, and, subsequently, of the executing contract (31.5.2002), contained all the essential conditions of the transfer, and also the delivery of the analytical memorandum of the financial advisor (dated April 2001) and the submission of offers. During all these stages, in which all the interested parties (including the complainant) had access to the information, the condition of the guarantee was stipulated.
I alle disse faser, hvor alle de interesserede parter (herunder klageren) havde adgang til oplysningerne, blev de nærmere bestemmelser for garantien fastsat.Som det også er understreget i brev af 17.12.2004, vedrører det derfor ikke kun en juridisk og finansielt almindelig betingelse, men også en betingelse, som indgår i forhandlingerne om privatiseringen af skibsværftet fra begyndelsen og navnlig i form af en afgørende (sine qua non) betingelse, uden hvilken afslutningen af salget af HSY's aktier ikke havde været muligt.
Consequently, as it is also underlined in the letter of 17.12.2004, it concerns not only a legal and financially common condition, but also a condition which is included in the negotiations for the privatisation of the Shipyard from the outset and, in particular, in the form of a critical (sine qua non) condition, without which the completion of the sale of HSY’s shares would not have been possible.
Det er karakteristisk, at denne betingelse, som det er nævnt ovenfor, med forskellige bestemmelser, men altid med det samme formål, dvs. en rimelig facilitering af transaktionen inden for rammerne af markedsreglerne, fra begyndelsen af privatiseringsprocessen fremgår af følgende tekster:udtalelse fra rådgiverenopfordringen til at afgive bindende tilbudtilbuddet fra det købende joint venture (navnlig uden at blive omfattet af erklæringen om frigørelse fra dets betingelse)i forhandlingsteksterne og endeligi aktiekøbsaftalen af 11.10.2001.Den garantierklæring, der indgår i tillægget til garantikontrakten af 31.5.2002, var følgelig rettet til den potentielle bydende fra begyndelsen og udgør derfor ikke statsstøtte for den endelige køber.
It is characteristic that, as it has been mentioned above, this condition, with different stipulations but always with the same objective, i.e. the reasonable facilitation of the transaction in the framework of the market rules, appears from the beginning of the privatisation procedure in the following texts:The Declaration of the AdvisorThe Invitation for the Submission of Binding OffersThe Offer of the Purchasing Joint Venture (particularly without being included in the Declaration of Quitting from its condition)In the texts of the Negotiations and, lastly,In the Share Purchasing Agreement of 11 October 2001.Consequently, the declaration of guarantee that is included to the addition of the guarantee contract of 31.5.2002 was addressed to the candidate bidder from the outset and therefore does not constitute state aid to the final purchaser.
Den samme betingelse havde været gældende for enhver bydende, eftersom den, som det allerede er nævnt, har indgået i denationaliseringsprocessen.
The same condition would have been valid for every bidder, since, as it has already been mentioned, it has been included in the procedure of denationalisation.
Det er også umiddelbart indlysende, at eftersom denationaliseringsprocessen blev påbegyndt i februar 2001 (på et tidspunkt, hvor hovedaktionæren i den på daværende tidspunkt sælgende bank, ETVA, var den græske stat), burde staten som den, der solgte ETVA til Bank Piraeus, også give og gav faktisk sin egen garanti til køberen af sine aktier i ETVA (Bank of Piraeus) vedrørende det aktiv, der var til salg, dvs. skibsværftet, fordi sælgeren skulle give en sådan garanti.
It is also self-evident that, since the procedure of denationalisation began in February 2001 (at a time when the main shareholder of the then selling Bank ETVA was the Greek State), the State, as a seller of ETVA to Bank Piraeus, ought to also provide and did actually provide its own guarantee to the purchaser of its shares in ETVA (Bank of Piraeus), regarding the asset that was for sale, i.e. the Shipyards, because the seller had to provide such a guarantee.
Disse garantier, der, som det allerede er blevet understreget, med absolut gennemsigtighed og klarhed indgår i alle kontrakterne i forbindelse med denationaliseringen og hovedsagelig i stadfæstelsesaftalen af 11.10.2001, vedrører transaktionens karakter (salg af et bestemt aktiv), er gældende for alle potentielle bydende og giver ikke nogen en yderligere fordel.
These guarantees, which, as it has already been stressed, are included with absolute transparency and clarity in all the contractual texts of the denationalisation and mainly in the promissory contract of 11.10.2001, pertain to the character of the transaction (sale of a definite asset), are valid for all candidate bidders and do not confer any additional benefit to anyone.
Der er derfor ikke tale om en »opfindelse« i sidste øjeblik, som klageren gerne vil vise, hvis formål er at omgå fællesskabsreglerne om lovligheden af statsstøtte.
It does not, therefore, constitute a last-minute “invention”, as the complainant desires to show, whose aim is circumventing the Community Rules on the legality of State aid.
Den græske stat gav den, eftersom den havde en kontraktlig forpligtelse og optrådte over for Bank Piraeus som part i en kontrakt, dvs. som »fiscus« og ikke som udøver af offentlig myndighed «. Kommissionen minder om, at i forbindelse med det pågældende brev ønskede Grækenland, som kommenterede Elefsis' påstand om, at garantien udgjorde støtte til HDW/Ferrostaal, at vise, at denne garanti ikke udgjorde en fordel, der selektivt var ydet til HDW/Ferrostaal, men blev tilbudt til alle de bydende (herunder Elefsis), der deltog i privatiseringsprocessen af HSY.
The Greek State gave it since it had a contractual obligation, acting towards Bank Piraeus as a party to a contract, i.e. as a fiscus, and not as an agent of public power.’The Commission recalls that at the time of that letter, Greece, commenting on Elefsis’ allegation that the guarantee constituted aid to HDW/Ferrostaal, wished to show that this guarantee did not constitute an advantage selectively granted to HDW/Ferrostaal but was offered to all the bidders (including Elefsis) that participated in the privatisation process of HSY.
I sine efterfølgende bemærkninger til Kommissionen forsøgte Grækenland i erkendelse af, at Kommissionen kunne betragte denne garanti som støtte til HSY, at sætte spørgsmålstegn ved, om foranstaltningen kunne tilregnes staten, ved at gøre gældende, at garantien tidligst blev ydet i maj 2002, hvilket er en fuldstændig modsigelse af de påstande, der er fremsat ved brev af 23.5.2005.
In its following submissions to the Commission, Greece, realising that the Commission could consider this guarantee as aid to HSY, tried to put in doubt the imputability of the measure to the State by claiming that the guarantee has been concluded not earlier than in May 2002, which is a total contradiction of the claims made in the letter of 23 May 2005.
Som anført i betragtning 59 i denne beslutning blev privatiseringen besluttet ved afgørelse nr.14/3-1-2001 truffet af det relevante tværministerielle privatiseringsudvalg.
As indicated in recital 59 of the present decision, the privatisation was decided by decision No 14/3-1-2001 of the relevant Inter-ministerial Privatisation Committee.
Kommissionen erkender, at ordlyden og strukturen af aftalen af 20.3.2002 er forvirrende.
The Commission acknowledges that the wording and the structure of the agreement of 20 March 2002 is confusing.
Ifølge artikel 8.2.4 i aftalen af 20.3.2002 vil staten med hensyn til den støtte, der er omfattet af artikel 3-6 i lov 2941/2001 (se betragtning 33 i denne beslutning, hvor loven beskrives), betale Piraeus Bank 100 % af det beløb, som ETVA ville betale til HDW/Ferrostaal.
Article 8.2.4 of the Agreement of 20 March 2002 provides that, in respect of the aid included in Article 3 to 6 of Law 2941/2001 (see recital 33 of the present decision for a description of that law), the State would pay to Piraeus Bank 100 % of the amount which would be paid by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal.
I tilfælde af tilbagesøgning af støtte, der ikke er omfattet af artikel 3-6 i lov 2941/2001, finder artikel 8.2.4 i aftalen af 20. marts 2002 imidlertid ikke anvendelse.
However, in case of recovery of aid not included in Article 3 to 6 of Law 2941/2001, Article 8.2.4 of the agreement of 20 March 2002 does not apply.
Artikel 8.2.1 vil derfor finde anvendelse.
Therefore, Article 8.2.1 would be applicable.
Ifølge denne artikel vil staten kun betale Piraeus Bank 57,7 % af det beløb, som ETVA vil betale til HDW/Ferrostaal.
This article provides that the State will pay to Piraeus Bank only 57,7 % of the amount which would be paid by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal.
Kommissionen bemærker imidlertid, at det i henhold til artikel 8.2.2 i aftalen, trods salget af majoriteten af aktierne i ETVA til Piraeus Bank, er staten — og ikke Piraeus Bank/ETVA — der skal forestå det igangværende salg af HSY.
However, the Commission observes that Article 8.2.2 of the Agreement indicates that, despite the sale of the majority of the shares of ETVA to Piraeus Bank, it is the State — and not Piraeus Bank/ETVA — that is going to manage the on-going sale of HSY.
Det fremgår af denne artikel, og navnlig artikel 8.2.2(d), at staten giver tilsagn om, at køberen (dvs. Piraeus Bank) ikke vil lide nogen skade i forbindelse med privatiseringen af Hellenic Shipyards.
This article, and in particular point 8.2.2(d), indicates that the State undertakes that the Purchaser (i.e. Piraeus Bank) will suffer no damage in relation to the privatisation of Hellenic Shipyards.
Eftersom aftalen, som det fremgår af artikel 8.2.4 (og af artikel 7.4 i aftalen af 18.12.2001), var baseret på den antagelse, at Piraeus Bank og ETVA snart ville fusionere, ville det tilsagn, som staten havde givet i artikel 8.2.2, ikke blive respekteret, hvis den kun ville betale Piraeus Bank 57,7 % af det beløb, som ETVA betalte til HDW/Ferrostaal.
Since, as shown by Article 8.2.4 (and by Article 7.4 of the Agreement of 18 December 2001), the agreement was based on the assumption that Piraeus Bank and ETVA would soon merge, the commitment made by the State in Article 8.2.2 would not be respected if it would pay to Piraeus Bank only 57,7 % of the sum paid by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal.
For at respektere det tilsagn, der er givet i artikel 8.2.2 — nemlig at sikre, at Piraeus Bank ikke vil lide skade som følge af salget af HSY — skal med andre ord mekanismen i artikel 8.2.4 finde anvendelse på alle tilfælde af tilbagesøgning af støtte og ikke kun på tilfælde af tilbagesøgning af støtte i forbindelse med lov 2941/2001.
In order words, in order to implement the commitment made in paragraph 8.2.2 — namely to ensure that Piraeus Bank will not suffer from the sale of HSY — the mechanism laid down in Article 8.2.4 must apply to all cases of recovery of aid, and not only to cases of recovery of aid stemming from Law 2941/2001.
Dette betyder, at selv hvis — i modstrid med denne konklusion — aftalen af 20.3.2002 havde forpligtet staten til kun at betale Piraeus Bank 57,7 % af det beløb, som ETVA betalte til HDW/Ferrostaal, er dette blevet ændret ved regeringens brev af 31.5.2002, hvoraf det utvetydigt fremgår, at mekanismen i artikel 8.2.4 i aftalen af 20.3.2002 (dvs. kompensation på 100 %) finder anvendelse.
This means that even if, contrary to the foregoing conclusion, the agreement of 20 March 2002 had obliged the State to pay to Piraeus Bank only 57,7 % of the amount paid by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal, this has been modified by the letter of the government of 31 May 2002, which states unambiguously that the mechanism provided in Article 8.2.4 of the Agreement of 20 March 2002 (i.e. 100 % indemnification) applies.
Som svar på et præcist spørgsmål stillet af Kommissionen ved brev af 12.12.2008 bekræftede Grækenland i sit brev af 3.3.2008, at staten ville være forpligtet til at betale Piraeus Bank det fulde (dvs. 100 % og ikke 57,7 %) beløb, som ETVA betalte til HDW/Ferrostaal.
In answer to a precise question by the Commission sent by letter of 12 February 2008, Greece confirmed in its letter of 3 March 2008 that it would be obliged to pay to Piraeus Bank the full (i.e. 100 % and not 57,7 %) amount paid by ETVA to HDW/Ferrostaal.
Som anført i forbindelse med vurderingen af foranstaltning E7 var de ansatte ejere af disse aktier, men havde ikke betalt den købspris, de skulle have betalt til ETVA.
As indicated in the assessment of measure E7, the employees were the owner of these shares but had not paid the purchase price they should have paid to ETVA.
Se betragtning 33, hvor loven beskrives.
See recital 33 of the present decision for a description of that law.
Sag C-334/99, Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland mod Kommissionen, præmis 133-141.
Case C-334/99, Federal Republic of Germany v Commission, paragraphs 133 to 141.
Endvidere bemærker Kommissionen, at så vidt den ved, er ingen af de lån og garantier, der er omfattet af artikel 296, i overensstemmelse med betingelserne i afsnit 3.1 i denne beslutning.
In addition, the Commission observes that, to its knowledge, none of the loans and guarantees covered by Article 296 comply with the conditions laid down in section 3.1 of the present decision.
De havde derfor ikke været acceptable for en markedsøkonomisk investor.
They would therefore not have been acceptable to a market economy investor.
Under hensyntagen til de økonomiske aktørers manglende risikovillighed havde man kun foretrukket et salg af HSY frem for en likvidation af HSY, hvis den statistiske forventning om betalinger på grundlag af garantien var betydeligt mindre end 6 mio. EUR.
Taking into account the risk aversion of the economic agents, the sale of HSY would be preferred over the liquidation of HSY only if the statistical expectancy of payments following from the guarantee would be significantly smaller than EUR 6 million.
Dette er allerede blevet analyseret af Kommissionen i beslutningen om at udvide proceduren, navnlig i beskrivelsen og vurderingen af foranstaltning 18(a).
This has already been analysed by the Commission in the extension decision, in particular in the description and the assessment of measure 18(a).
Kommissionen bemærker også, at følgende fremgår af den anden Deloitte-rapport: »Klausul d) ovenfor vedrørende allokeringen af vederlaget mellem et beløb bestemt til en forhøjelse af aktiekapitalen og pris tilbudt for erhvervelsen af eksisterende aktier i et fast forhold på 2:1 er på grundlag af vor erfaring i forbindelse med lignende transaktioner ikke et særlig almindeligt vilkår.
The Commission also notes that the second Deloitte report indicates: ‘The clause d) above, regarding the allocation of the consideration between an amount destined for a share capital increase and price offered for the acquisition of existing shares, at a set ratio of 2:1, from our experience in similar transactions, is not a very common term.
Under hensyntagen til virksomhedens betydelige driftsmæssige problemer og forværrede finansielle position mener vi imidlertid, at sælgernes (deres rådgiveres) beslutning om at fastsætte sådanne vilkår var både fornuftig og rimelig«. (s.
However, taking into consideration the significant operational problems and deteriorating financial position of the Company, we believe that the decision taken by the Sellers (and their Advisors) to set such terms was both rational and reasonable’ (page 9–2).
Kommissionen fortolker dette citat som en bekræftelse af, at denne allokering af købsprisen var en fornuftig og rimelig anmodning fra statens side, hvis det antages, at formålet hermed var at sikre videreførelsen af HSY ' s aktiviteter på lang sigt (mål som offentlig myndighed), ikke hvis man antager, at formålet hermed var at maksimere indtægterne fra salget (mål som markedsøkonomisk investor).
The Commission interprets this quotation as confirming that this allocation of the purchase price was a rational and reasonable request of the State if one considers that its objective was to ensure the continuation of the activities of HSY over the long term (goal as public authority), not if one considers that its objective was to maximise the revenues from the sale (goal as market economy investor).
Se fodnote 148.
See footnote 148.
Kommissionen påstår ikke, at en due diligence havde gjort det muligt at identificere alle de foranstaltninger, der skal tilbagesøges i henhold til denne beslutning, men nogle af dem.
The Commission does not claim that a due diligence would have allowed to identify all the measures which have to be recovered according to the present decision, but some of them.
Ved brev af 21.6.2007 fremsendte TKMS/GNSH nogle due diligence-rapporter, der var udarbejdet i 2001 af Arthur Andersen for HDW/Ferrostaal.
In its letter of 21 June 2007, TKMS/GNSH has submitted some due diligence reports performed in 2001 by Arthur Andersen on behalf of HDW/Ferrostaal.
Arthur Andersen anfører i disse rapporter, at det ikke er udelukket, at HSY har modtaget statsstøtte, som vil blive tilbagesøgt i fremtiden.
Arthur Andersen indicates in these reports that it is not excluded that HSY has received State aid which should be recovered in the future.
Eftersom ETVA og Grækenland havde givet tilsagn om at yde denne garanti i det udbudsmateriale, der blev fremsendt til de bydende, havde den omstændighed, at denne garanti ikke var nævnt som en betingelse i de tilbudsdokumenter, som Elefsis indgav, ikke været til hinder for, at Elefsis kunne anmode herom senere under forhandlingsprocessen.
In particular, since ETVA and Greece had promised to grant this guarantee in the tender document submitted to the bidders, the fact that this guarantee was not mentioned as a condition in the bid documents submitted by Elefsis would not have prevented it from requesting it later in the negotiation process.
Dette punkt er underbygget i den anden Deloitte-rapport, hvoraf det fremgår, at hvis HDW/Ferrostaal havde været nødt til at påtage sig risikoen for at skulle tilbagebetale statsstøtte, som HSY havde modtaget i de tidligere år, havde selskabet ikke købt HSY.
This point is underpinned in the second Deloitte report which claims that, if HDW/Ferrostaal had had to support the risk of having to reimburse State aid received by HSY in the previous years, it would not have purchased HSY.
Dette fremgår af teksten til det syvende skibsbygningsdirektiv og af dets struktur, hvor »Investeringsstøtte« indgår i »Kapitel III Støtte til omstrukturering«.
This is clear from the text of the Seventh Shipbuilding Directive and from its structure, in which ‘Investment aid’ is a part of ‘Chapter III Restructuring aid’.
Jf. den meget omfattende gældseftergivelse, der er nævnt i beslutning C 10/94, betalingen af lukningsomkostninger, der er nævnt i beslutning N 513/01, og al den finansielle støtte ydet af staten og omfattet af artikel 296, der blev nævnt i beslutningen om at udvide proceduren.
See the very large debt waiver mentioned in decision C 10/94, the payment of the closure costs mentioned in decision N 513/01, and all the financial supports provided by the State and falling under Article 296 which were mentioned in the extension decision.