natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Afslutningsvis havde de italienske myndigheder tilføjet, at skøn og foreliggende oplysninger viser, at den pågældende ordning »ikke er til skade for et velfungerende indre marked eller medfører konkurrenceforvridning« (henvisning til betragtning 24 i Rådets direktiv 2003/96/EF).
To conclude, the Italian authorities added that, according to the estimates and data available to them, the planned scheme ‘[would] not be detrimental to the proper functioning of the internal market and [would] not result in distortions of competition’ (reference to Recital 24 to Directive 2003/96/EC).
V. BEMÆRKNINGER FREMSAT AF TREDJEPART EFTER FØRSTE INDLEDNING AF PROCEDUREN I EF-TRAKTATENS ARTIKEL 88, STK. 2
V. COMMENTS SUBMITTED BY THIRD PARTIES FOLLOWING INITIAL OPENING OF THE PROCEDURE UNDER ARTICLE 88(2) OF THE TREATY
Ved brev af 19. april 2004, der blev registreret den 21. april 2004, modtog Kommissionen bemærkninger fra en interesseret tredjepart efter indledningen af proceduren efter EF-traktatens artikel 88, stk. 2.
By letter dated 19 April 2004, registered as received on 21 April 2004, the Commission received comments from an interested third party following opening of the procedure under Article 88(2) of the Treaty.
Den interesserede tredjepart beskriver i brevet usikkerheden på det marked, hvor han udøver sin virksomhed, og problemerne som følge af prisstigningerne på olie, der anvendes til opvarmning af væksthuse.
In that letter, the interested party described the fragility of the market in which it operated and the problems connected with the increase in the price of fuels that can be used to heat glasshouses.
Den interesserede tredjepart mener, at hvis udfaldet af Kommissionens afgørelse om nævnte fritagelse bliver negativt, vil mange virksomheder inden for sektoren blive tvunget til at lukke eller reducere forbruget af brændstof til opvarmning af væksthuse, der vil medføre en forringelse af deres produktkvalitet.
In the interested third party’s view, if the Commission were to rule against the exemption in question, many undertakings in the sector would be forced to close or to reduce the amount of fuel consumed to heat their glasshouses, with a resulting reduction in the quality of their products.
Ifølge den interesserede tredjepart er priserne på brændstof, der anvendes til opvarmning, i Belgien og Nederlandene (methan og fyringsolie) 20 % til 40 % lavere end den pris, der betales for fyringsolie i landbruget, og fritagelsen vil derfor ikke bevirke konkurrenceforvridning.
Furthermore, according to the interested third party, the prices of the heating fuels used in Belgium and the Netherlands (methane and fuel oil) were 20 % to 40 % lower than the price of agricultural diesel in Italy and that, therefore, applying the exemption in question would in no way distort competition.
Endelig fremfører tredjeparten, at stadig flere og flere virksomheder inden for hans aktivitetsområde benytter methangas til opvarmning af væksthuse.
Lastly, again in this party’s view, the number of farms in its sector using methane gas to heat glasshouses was constantly increasing.
ANDEN INDLEDNING AF PROCEDUREN EFTER EF-TRAKTATENS ARTIKEL 88, STK. 2 (SAG C 5/05)
SECOND OPENING OF THE PROCEDURE UNDER ARTICLE 88(2) OF THE TREATY (CASE C 5/05)
Kommissionen lancerede anden indledning af proceduren efter EF-traktatens artikel 88, stk. 2, efter at være kommet i besiddelse af oplysninger, der viste, at den fritagelse for punktafgifter, som var indrømmet producenterne af væksthusafgrøder, reelt var en del større, end den fritagelse, som var blevet undersøgt i forbindelse med første indledning af proceduren.
The Commission initiated a second procedure under Article 88(2) of the Treaty after obtaining information demonstrating that the excise duty exemption enjoyed by glasshouse growers was actually significantly higher than that analysed when the procedure was first opened.
Den rejste tvivl i forbindelse med første indledning, som blandt andet skyldtes, at de italienske myndigheder ikke havde besvaret det fremsendte påbud om oplysninger, blev styrket af de italienske myndigheders reaktion ved første indledning af proceduren.
The doubts expressed when the procedure was first opened, the causes of which included the fact that the Italian authorities had not replied to the information injunction sent to them, were corroborated by those authorities’ reaction to the initial opening of the procedure.
Den tvivl, som Kommissionen havde givet udtryk for i forbindelse med anden indledning af proceduren, var i det væsentlige begrundet i følgende betragtninger:
Essentially, the doubts expressed by the Commission when the procedure was opened for the second time were based on the following considerations:
de italienske myndigheder mener, at fritagelsen for punktafgifter på brændstoffer uanset deres omfang ikke er statsstøtte, men derimod foranstaltninger af fiskal karakter, der er berettiget på baggrund af den pågældende ordning; de italienske myndigheder har imidlertid ikke fremlagt dokumentation til underbygning af disse argumenter
the Italian authorities considered that, regardless of their level, excise duty exemptions on fuels did not constitute State aid but rather tax measures justified by the nature of the system of which they were part. However, they did not supply any information in support of this argument;
et andet argument, som de italienske myndigheder har fremført, er, at punktafgiftsfritagelsen ikke medfører nogen fordrejning af konkurrencevilkårene, da det står gartnerierne frit for at udnytte fritagelsen i og med, at de kan vælge at drive væksthusgartneri; argumentet forekommer dog tvivlsomt, eftersom målet med fritagelsen ikke var at tilskynde til omlægning til væksthusdyrkning, men snarere at lette allerede etablerede gartnerier for en finansiel byrde ved udøvelsen af deres virksomhed
the Italian authorities further argued that the excise duty exemption did not distort competition, inasmuch as nursery growers were free to avail themselves of the exemption by practising greenhouse growing. This argument appears doubtful, inasmuch as the exemption was aimed not at encouraging a changeover to glasshouse growing, but rather to provide greenhouse growers who were already in business with relief from a financial burden linked to exercise of their activity;
for så vidt angår konkurrenceforvridningsaspektet anfører de italienske myndigheder også, at officielle tal viser, at fuld fritagelse for gartnere ikke bevirker konkurrenceforvridning; efter Kommissionens opfattelse er det ikke klart, hvordan de italienske myndigheder kan støtte dette argument, efter som de i svaret pr. telex den 10. juni 2004 (jf. betragtning 14 ovenfor) til Kommissionen anfører, at de ikke er i stand til at give præcise tal for, hvor store besparelser den fuldstændige fritagelse har givet gartnerierne
again as regards the issue of distortion of competition, the Italian authorities asserted that, according to the official data available to them, the total exemption granted to glasshouse growers did not distort competition. In the Commission’s view, it is unclear how the Italian authorities can make such an argument since, in their reply sent by telex to the Commission on 10 June 2004 (see recital 14 above), they stated that they could not supply precise data on the sums that glasshouse growers could save as a result of the total exemption;
de italienske myndigheder har til støtte for antagelsen om, at der ikke er tale om statsstøtte, ikke anført, hvilken konkurrenceregel der efter deres mening berettiger, at fuld punktafgiftsfritagelse er forenelig med det indre marked
although the Italian authorities asserted that there were no elements of State aid, they failed to indicate which rule of competition would, in their opinion, support the compatibility with the common market of the total excise duty exemption;
det kan ikke udelukkes, at punktafgiftsfritagelsen har været en overtrædelse af direktiv 92/81/EØF og 2003/96/EF.
the fact that the exemptions were granted contrary to Directives 92/81/EEC and 2003/96/EC could not be ruled out.
DE ITALIENSKE MYNDIGHEDERS SVAR PÅ ANDEN INDLEDNING AF PROCEDUREN EFTER EF-TRAKTATENS ARTIKEL 88, STK. 2
REACTION OF THE ITALIAN AUTHORITIES TO THE SECOND OPENING OF THE PROCEDURE UNDER ARTICLE 88(2) OF THE TREATY
Ved brev af 21. februar 2005 gjorde de italienske myndigheder navnlig gældende, at den anden procedure vedrørte samme materielle spørgsmål som dem, der blev behandlet i første indledning af proceduren, og at de bemærkninger, som de allerede havde givet som svar på første indledning, stadig var gældende.
By letter dated 21 February 2005, the Italian authorities asserted that the matters of substance covered by the second procedure were identical to those dealt with when the procedure was first opened and that the comments that had already been made in relation to the first procedure remained valid.
De supplerede endvidere svaret med følgende bemærkninger:
They also supplemented their reply by stating the following:
medlemsstaters graduering af punktafgifter er ikke statsstøtte i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1: Økofin-Rådets konklusioner af 19. marts 2003 — ifølge hvilke undtagelser fra den generelle beskatningsordning eller differentiering inden for denne ordning begrundet med arten eller generelle træk af skatteordningen ikke indebærer statsstøtte — bekræfter på afgørende vis, at Fællesskabets afgiftsmyndigheder har den primære beføjelse; de ville derfor have givet oplysninger om ordningens art og overordnede principper til omtalte afgiftsmyndigheder, så snart sidstnævnte havde anmodet herom
adjustments to excise duties by Member States did not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty. The conclusions of the Ecofin Council of 19 March 2003, according to which derogations from a general tax system or differences within it that were justified by the nature or general characteristics of the tax system did not constitute State aid, were a decisive factor confirming the primacy of the powers of the Community’s financial authorities. Accordingly, they would send information on the nature or general characteristics of the system to those financial authorities as soon as the latter requested them to do so;
ordlyden »medmindre andet gælder i henhold til andre EF-bestemmelser« i artikel 15, stk. 1, i direktiv 2003/96/EF kan ikke tolkes i den retning, at EF-traktatens artikel 87 og 88 finder anvendelse på enhver foranstaltning til nedsættelse af eller fritagelse for afgifter, eftersom — hvis fællesskabslovgiveren havde villet lade enhver foranstaltning til graduering af afgifter i henhold til EF-traktatens omfatte af artikel 87 og 88 — ville fællesskabslovgiveren have indføjet dette ønske i form af en henvisning til disse artikler, jf. det grundlæggende princip for fortolkning af loven lex ubi voluit dixit. Desuden forholder det sig således, at i enhver fællesskabsretsakt er lovgivers ønske om at lade bestemte foranstaltninger være omfattet af regler om statsstøtte udtrykt klart og ikke med en generel ordlyd som »medmindre andet gælder i henhold til andre EF-bestemmelser«. Dertil kommer, at en præcis og udtrykkelig vending er desto mere nødvendig, eftersom kategorisering af en foranstaltning som »indebærer statsstøtte« eller »indebærer ikke statsstøtte« har afgørende betydning for arten, vilkårene og varigheden af den pågældende ordnings gennemførelse
the expression ‘without prejudice to other Community provisions’ in Article 15(1) of Directive 2003/96/EC could not be interpreted in such a way as to render Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty applicable to every measure reducing excise duties or creating an exemption therefrom and that, if the Community legislature had wished to make every measure adjusting excise duties subject to compliance with Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty, it would have expressed this wish by inserting a reference to them in accordance with the fundamental rule of statutory construction that ‘lex ubi voluit dixit’ [‘that which the law intends, it states’]. Moreover, in any other Community act, the legislature’s wish for given measures to be subject to the rules on State aid was expressed clearly and not through a generic wording such as ‘without prejudice to other Community provisions’. In addition, clear and explicit wording was all the more necessary insofar as stating that a measure ‘constituted State aid’ or ‘did not constitute State aid’ had a significant impact on the nature, arrangements and duration of implementation of the measure;
det forhold, at foranstaltningen ikke er til skade for det indre markeds funktion og ikke bevirker konkurrenceforvridninger kan objektivt konstateres, og derfor er de besparelser, som producenterne har kunnet opnå takket være foranstaltningen, irrelevante.
the fact that the measure did not jeopardise the proper functioning of the internal market and did not distort competition was an objective fact and thus rendered irrelevant the savings that the producers had been able to make thanks to the measure.
DE ITALIENSKE MYNDIGHEDERS SVAR PÅ PÅBUDDET AF 5. DECEMBER 2008 OM OPLYSNINGER
REPLY FROM THE ITALIAN AUTHORITIES TO THE INFORMATION INJUNCTION OF 5 DECEMBER 2008
Ved brev af 5. februar 2009 vendte de italienske myndigheder navnlig tilbage til spørgsmålet om støttens forenelighed med bestemmelserne i direktiv 92/81/EØF, som efter deres opfattelse ikke med tilstrækkelig tydelighed præciserer kravet om, at afgiftsfritagelse eller afgiftslempelse skal være forenelig med konkurrencelovgivningen.
In their letter dated 5 February 2009, the Italian authorities firstly returned to the argument concerning the compatibility of the aid with the provisions of Directive 92/81/EEC which, in their view, did not provide sufficient clarification on the question of the compatibility of excise duty exemptions or reductions with competition rules.
De underbygger deres synspunkt med en henvisning til artikel 8 i direktivet, som blandt andet fastsætter, at »uden at det berører andre fællesskabsbestemmelser, kan medlemsstaterne anvende hel eller delvis afgiftsfritagelse eller afgiftslempelse for mineralolier […], der under afgiftsmyndighedernes kontrol [udelukkende] anvendes... inden for landbrug, gartneri, skovbrug...«.
In order to illustrate their position, they referred to Article 8 of the Directive, according to which ‘without prejudice to other Community provisions, Member States may apply total or partial exemptions or reductions in the rate of duty to mineral oils used under fiscal control […] exclusively in agricultural and in horticultural works, and in forestry […]’.
De italienske myndigheder konkluderer derfor, jf. artikel 8 i direktiv 92/81/EØF, at medlemsstaterne med fuld berettigelse kan anvende afgiftslempelse eller afgiftsfritagelse i gartnerisektoren.
Accordingly, the Italian authorities concluded that, taking account of Article 8 of Directive 92/81/EEC, the Member States could legitimately apply excise duty reductions or exemptions in the horticulture sector.
De italienske myndigheder understreger dernæst, at anvendelsen af direktiv 92/81/EØF og dermed direktiv 2003/96/EF faktisk bevirker konkurrenceforvridning på det indre marked, fordi de påtænkte lempelser og fritagelser er til fordel for de medlemsstater, der har flere økonomiske midler til rådighed og derfor kan anvende afgiftslempelser på ensartet vis i hele landbrugssektoren.
The Italian authorities then stressed that implementing Directive 92/81/EEC and thus Directive 2003/96/EC resulted in de facto distortion of competition within the internal market, since the reductions and exemptions provided for benefited those Member States that had greater financial resources and could thus apply excise duty reductions in a uniform manner throughout the entire agricultural sector.
Italien har kun begrænsede midler til rådighed og har derfor besluttet kun at gribe ind til fordel for væksthusgartnerierne, da afgiftslempelser og afgiftsfritagelser er blevet anvendt i en krisesituation, der er opstået på grund af prisstigningerne på brændstof til opvarmning.
As it had limited resources, Italy had decided to take action only in favour of glasshouse growers, insofar as the excise duty reduction and exemption measures were adopted in the context of a crisis caused by price increases for heating products.
De italienske myndigheder påpeger i den forbindelse, at Kommissionen ikke har beføjelse til at gribe ind i en medlemsstats valg af prioriteter.
In this connection, the Italian authorities stated that it was not the Commission’s place to intervene in relation to a Member State’s choice of priorities.
den pågældende afgift skal have en mærkbar virkning, hvad angår miljøbeskyttelse
the tax in question must have an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection;
undtagelserne til fordel for modtagervirksomhederne skal være fastlagt ved vedtagelsen af afgiften, eller skal være blevet nødvendige på grund af en betydelig ændring af de økonomiske vilkår, som stiller virksomhederne i en særlig vanskelig situation i konkurrencemæssig henseende.
the derogations for the firms concerned must have been decided on when the tax was adopted or must have become necessary as a result of a significant change in economic conditions that placed the firms in a particularly difficult competitive situation.
I sidstnævnte tilfælde kan afgiftsbeløbet ikke nedsættes mere end, hvad der svarer til den omkostningsforhøjelse, som er forårsaget af de ændrede økonomiske vilkår.
In the latter instance, the amount of the tax reduction may not exceed the increase in costs resulting from the change in economic conditions.
Ifølge de italienske myndigheder skal afgifter på brændstoffer til brug i landbruget, især gas til opvarmning, betragtes som miljøafgifter. De har en gunstig indvirkning på miljøet, eftersom de tilskynder producenterne til at reducere forbruget af brændstoffer.
According to the Italian authorities, the excise duties on fuels used in agriculture, in particular gas for heating, can be considered environmental taxes and have a positive impact on the environment in that they encourage producers to reduce fuel consumption.
Hvad angår navnlig punkt 51.2, litra b), i rammebestemmelserne, hvorefter undtagelser til fordel for virksomheder skal være besluttet på det tidspunkt, hvor afgiften blev vedtaget, henviser de italienske myndigheder til Kommissionens beslutning K(2005) 4436 af 7. december 2005.
As regards in particular point 51.2(b) of the guidelines, on the basis of which derogations for firms must have been decided on when the tax was adopted, the Italian authorities referred to Commission Decision C(2005) 4436 of 7 December 2005.
De italienske myndigheder anfører endvidere, at prisudviklingen på fyringsolie i den pågældende periode steg med henholdsvis 37 % i perioden 1999-2000, 26 % i perioden 1999-2001 og 26 % i perioden 1999-2002.
The authorities indicated that, in the period under consideration, the price of diesel for heating varied as follows: + 37 % in 1999-2000, + 26 % in 1999-2001 and + 26 % in 1999-2002.
Prisstrukturen var derimod følgende (i EUR/liter som årsgennemsnit):
Meanwhile the price structure was as follows (annual average in EUR per litre):
(EUR/liter)
EUR per litre
Industripris
Price net of tax
Afgifter
Tax
Forbrugerpris
Consumer price
De italienske myndigheder påpeger på den anden side, at anvendelsen af punkt 51 i rammebestemmelserne under alle omstændigheder pålægger virksomhederne at betale en del af afgiften.
The Italian authorities pointed out, on the other hand, that applying point 51 of the guidelines in any event required undertakings to pay part of the tax.
Den ordning, Italien har indført, opfylder efter deres opfattelse kravet om forenelighed, hvis de begunstigede betaler det mindstebeløb, der er fastsat på fællesskabsplan (mindstebeløbet var ifølge selvsamme myndigheder 13 EUR/1000 kg i perioden 2000-2003 og efterfølgende 21 EUR/1000 kg).
In their view, the measure adopted by Italy could be compatible if beneficiaries paid the minimum amount set at Community level (which, according to the authorities, was EUR 13 per 1000 kg in the 2000-2003 period and EUR 21 per 1000 kg thereafter).
Hvad endelig angår det samlede støttebeløb, anfører de italienske myndigheder, at tallene i de forskellige finanslove er skøn baseret på antagelser om forbruget af fyringsolie, og at de skal betragtes som manglende indtægter snarere end tildeling af midler.
Lastly, as regards the total amount of aid granted, the Italian authorities indicated that the figures in the various Finance Laws were estimates based on forecasts of consumption of heating fuels and should be viewed as revenue not collected rather than as resources allocated.
Efter deres opfattelse er det vanskeligt at måle, hvilken fordel den enkelte producent hidtil har opnået, eftersom forvaltningen af afgiftssystemet varetages af regionerne, provinserne eller endog kommunerne.
In their opinion, it was difficult at that stage to quantify the advantage obtained by each producer, since responsibility for administering the tax system lay with the regions, the provinces or even the municipalities.
Tallene vil blive oplyst, så snart de foreligger.
The figures would be sent as soon as they were available.
BREVET AF 18. MAJ 2009
LETTER SENT ON 18 MAY 2009
I dette brev gør de italienske myndigheder især gældende, at afgifterne er eksisterende afgifter og derfor kan omfattes af de undtagelser, der gælder herfor i henhold til bestemmelserne i rammebestemmelserne for statsstøtte til miljøbeskyttelse med de begrundelser, der er anført i betragtning 42 ovenfor.
In this letter, the Italian authorities asserted, firstly, that the excise duties were existing taxes and that, as such, they could be covered by the derogations applicable to them by virtue of the provisions of the guidelines on State aid for environmental protection, for the reasons set out in recital 42 above.
Bemærkningerne ledsages af en opdateret version af den tabel, der er anført under betragtning 42 ovenfor (kolonnen med afgifter er delt op i afgifter og moms).
This argument was followed by an updated version of the table given in recital 42 above (the tax column is split between excise duties and VAT).
Ifølge den nye tabel har prisstrukturen i den pågældende periode været således (denne gang angives tallene i EUR/1000 l):
According the new table, the price structure in the period considered was as follows (this time the data are expressed in EUR per 1000 litres):
(EUR/1000 liter)
EUR per 1000 litres
Afgifter
Excise duties
De italienske myndigheder understreger, at mellem 1999 og 2004 vedblev forbrugerpriserne på fyringsolie at stige, når der ses bort fra et mindre fald mellem 2000 og 2001.
The Italian authorities underlined that, between 1999 and 2004, consumer prices of diesel for heating had constantly been on the rise, except for a slight decrease between 2000 and 2001.
Herefter gentages de bemærkninger, som allerede er fremført i betragtning 42 og 43.
The arguments already illustrated in recitals 42 and 43 above were then repeated.
Hvad angår ordningens berettigelse i forhold til det italienske skattesystem, anfører de italienske myndigheder, at i Italien fordeles mængden af afgiftsfritaget brændstof efter arealstørrelse, afgrødekvalitet og det reelt anvendte landbrugsmateriel.
As regards the justification for the measure in the light of the Italian tax system, the Italian authorities clarified that, in Italy, the quantities of exempted fuel were apportioned on the basis of surface area, crop quality and amount of agricultural equipment actually used.
Det kan derfor udledes, at fritagelsen beregnes efter arten af den virksomhed, der udøves. Ved væksthusgartneri beregnes fritagelsen proportionelt, fordi denne dyrkningsform i høj grad afhænger af fyringsolie og er kendetegnet ved produktionsvilkår, der er helt anderledes end for frilandsdyrkning.
Accordingly, it could be stated that the exemption was calculated on the basis of the type of activity carried out and, for glasshouse growing, proportionately since this type of growing was clearly dependent on diesel and marked by completely different conditions of production from open-field crops.