natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Det indberettede et tab på 1030 mia. KRW for de første ni måneder af 2002. Det var åbenlyst, at selskabet ikke var i stand til at betale forfaldne gældsforpligtelser.
It reported a loss of KRW 1,03 trillion for the first nine months of 2002; it was obvious that it was in no position to pay any maturing debt.
Nøgletallene i regnskabet for 2002 viser, at Hynix ikke kunne dække sin kortfristede gæld med sine omsætningsaktiver, at indtægterne ikke var tilstrækkelige til at dække renteudgifterne, at selskabet i langt højere grad blev finansieret med lån end med egenkapital, og at det led store nettotab.
Its ratios, based on its 2002 financial statement, show that it could not cover its current liabilities with current assets, could not cover its interest expense with its earning, was financed with significantly more debt than equity and had large net losses.
Selv om redningsforsøgene i oktober 2001 i nogen grad havde hjulpet på situationen, var selskabet stadig i store vanskeligheder.
Although the October 2001 bail out had helped matters to some degree, the company was still in considerable distress.
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, en af Hynix' eksterne konsulenter, skrev i en rapport, der blev udsendt i september 2002, at det var meget usandsynligt, at Hynix i løbet af de næste to år ville være i stand til at fremskaffe tilstrækkelige midler til at betale sine forfaldne gældsforpligtelser eller til at udvide kapaciteten og finansiere den teknologiske modernisering og de FoU-investeringer, der var nødvendige for at bevare sin position som konkurrencedygtig producent af DRAM.
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, one of Hynix's external advisors, in a report produced in September 2002, stated that Hynix would be very unlikely to ‘accumulate enough cash in the next two years to meet maturing debt obligations’ or ‘expand capacity and fund the technological upgrades and R&D necessary for it to remain a competitive DRAM producer.’
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter skrev videre, at Hynix teknisk set var konkurs og kun blev holdt i live ved hjælp af gældomlægningsprogrammer, og at det så ud til at ville kræve for mange økonomiske ressourcer at få selskabet tilbage i konkurrencedygtig stand.
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter went on to say that ‘Hynix is technically bankrupt, kept alive only though debt restructuring programmes’ and that ‘The financial commitment required to bring the company back to a competitive level looks too great.
Merrill Lynch udtalte, ligeledes i september 2002: »Vi bliver mere og mere bekymret over Hynix' udsigtsløse indtjeningsmuligheder.
Merrill Lynch, again in September 2002, stated, ‘We are increasingly concerned about Hynix's dismal earnings prospects.
Selskabet selv anfægter ikke, at det havde store økonomiske problemer på det pågældende tidspunkt.
The company itself does not dispute the severity of its financial difficulties at the relevant time.
Den nye omstrukturering
The New Restructuring
I oktober 2001 vedtog CFIC en virksomhedsplan for at videreføre saneringen af selskabet.
In October 2001, a business normalisation plan was adopted by the CFIC to pursue the reconstruction of the company.
CFIC var sammensat af banker og andre institutter med tilgodehavender hos Hynix.
The CFIC was made up of banks and other institutions which were Hynix's creditors.
De enkelte institutter blev tildelt et antal stemmer i forhold til deres udestående hos Hynix.
The voting rights of each institution were determined in accordance with its exposure to Hynix.
Hynix var underlagt loven til fremme af selskabsomstrukturering (the Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act, »CRPA«) og dermed reelt kontrolleret af kreditorerne.
Hynix was under the Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act (the CRPA) and, as such, was effectively under the control of its creditors.
CFIC besluttede at sælge selskabet eller dele af selskabet til en tredjepart.
The CFIC decided to sell the business or part of the business to a third party.
I december 2002 indledte omstruktureringsudvalget, som er et underudvalg til CFIC, forhandlinger med Micron Technology Inc. Disse forløb over fem måneder. Parterne nåede frem til at undertegne et aftalememorandum, men salgsvilkårene blev forkastet af Hynix' bestyrelse.
In December 2002, the Restructuring Committee, which is a sub-committee of the CFIC, initiated negotiations with Micron Technology Inc. These lasted for five months; a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the parties, but the terms of the sale were eventually rejected by the Hynix Board of Directors.
I maj 2002 greb CFIC på grund af den fortsatte forværrelse af Hynix' økonomiske situation på ny ind og engagerede et antal eksterne konsulentvirksomheder, bl.a. Deutsche Bank (DB), Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Deloitte & Touche og A. D. Little, som skulle analysere Hynix' situation og udarbejde en redningsplan.
In May 2002, as a follow-up measure given the continuing deterioration of Hynix's finances, the CFIC hired a number of external advisors, including Deutsche Bank (DB), Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Deloitte & Touche and A. D. Little, to analyse Hynix and come up with a plan to rescue the company.
Sammen med de nævnte eksterne konsulenter førte KEB, der som ledende kreditor stod i spidsen for CFIC, omhyggeligt tilsyn med Hynix frem til november 2002.
Together with these external advisors, KEB, which was the head of the CFIC as lead creditor, performed due diligence on Hynix until November 2002.
DB og KEB udarbejdede og forelagde CFIC en rapport (DB-rapporten).
The resulting report, prepared by Deutsche Bank and KEB (the DB Report), was submitted to the CFIC.
Den 30. december 2002 besluttede CFIC at omstrukturere og sælge virksomheden efter anbefalingerne i DB-rapporten.
On 30 December 2002, the CFIC decided to implement a corporate turnaround and sell-off of the business, as outlined in the DB Report.
Omstruktureringen omfattede:
The corporate turnaround involved a restructuring, comprising:
en ombytning af gæld med aktier i størrelsesordenen 1861,5 mia. KRW
a debt-to-equity swap of KRW 1861,5 bn,
en nedskrivning af kapitalen i forholdet 21:1
a capital write-down on a ratio of 21:1,
en gældsforlængelse for 3293 mia. KRW, og
a rollover of debt amounting to KRW 3293 bn, and
ændring af rentebetalingsvilkårene for den forlængede gæld.
changes to the interest payment conditions of the rolled-over debt.
Beskrivelse af foranstaltningerne
Description of the Measures
Ombytning af gæld med aktier
Debt-to-equity swap
CFIC besluttede at ombytte gæld for 1861,5 mia. KRW med Hynix-aktier. Dette beløb svarede til cirka 50 % af Hynix' ikke-sikrede lån.
The CFIC decided to swap debt amounting to KRW 1861,5 bn for Hynix shares; this amounted to approximately 50 % of Hynix's unsecured loans.
Den pris, aktierne kunne ombyttes til, blev i december 2002, da beslutningen blev truffet, fastsat til 435 KRW på grundlag af den gennemsnitlige markedspris for en måned.
The swap share price was fixed to KRW 435 at the time the decision was taken in December 2002, by taking the one-month average market price.
CFIC er i henhold til CRPA forpligtet til at anvende en rimelig metode ved beregningen af ombytningsprisen, men der er ikke krav om nogen bestemt metode.
Although there is an obligation under the CRPA on the CFIC to use a reasonable method in calculating the swap price, no specific method is provided.
Omstruktureringsplanen foreskrev, at der skulle foretages en kapitalnedskrivning inden ombytningen, hvilket krævede aktionærernes accept. Ombytningen kunne derfor ikke finde sted med det samme.
The restructuring plan involved a capital write-down prior to the swap taking place, which required shareholder approval; hence the swap could not take place immediately.
Efter kapitalnedskrivningen, som blev gennemført i forholdet 21:1, var ombytningsprisen 9135 KRW (21 × 435 KRW), og ombytningen blev effektueret.
Once the capital write-down was implemented, at a ratio of 21:1, the share swap price became KRW 9135 (21 × KRW 435) and the swap went ahead.
Da ombytningsaktierne ikke skulle udstedes før april 2003, var denne pris en minimumspris, mens der ikke blev fastsat en maksimumspris.
As the shares pursuant to the swap were not to be issued until April 2003, this price was to serve as a floor, but no ceiling was set.
Den faktiske pris på beslutningstidspunktet var 280 KRW, den faldt til 167 KRW i april 2003.
The actual share price at the time of the decision was in fact KRW 280; it fell to KRW 167 in April 2003.
Gældsforlængelse
Debt rollover
Løbetiden for den del af Hynix' gæld, der ikke blev ombyttet med aktier, blev forlænget til december 2006.
The maturity of the Hynix debt which was not converted to equity was extended to December 2006.
Den forlængede gæld androg i alt 3293 mia. KRW.
This rolled-over debt amounted, in total, to KRW 3293 bn.
Ændring af rentebetalingsvilkårene
Changes in the terms of interest payments
Renten på den forlængede gæld blev nedsat til 3,5 % fra 6,5 %.
The interest rate on the rolled-over debt was reduced to 3,5 % from 6,5 %.
Forskellen på 3 % blev behandlet som tillæg til hovedstolen og blev føjet til den tilbageværende gæld, ligeledes med betalingsfrist i december 2006.
The 3 % difference was treated as additional principal and was added on to the outstanding debt, with a maturity date of December 2006, as well.
Renten på dette tillæg til hovedstolen blev sat til 6 % med kvartalsvis betaling.
Interest on this additional principal was set at 6 %, to be paid quarterly.
V. Den koreanske stats politik over for Hynix
V. The Policy of the GOK as regards Hynix
Som beskrevet i den foreløbige og den endelige toldforordning havde den koreanske stat stor interesse i Hynix-sagen.
As described in the provisional and the definitive duty Regulations, the GOK had a keen interest in the fact of Hynix.
Den koreanske stat indrømmede, at Hynix' situation betød, at udenlandske investorer var uvillige til at investere i Korea, fordi de koreanske banker var så udsatte på grund af deres engagement i Hynix. Den koreanske stat havde brug for, at problemet med Hynix blev løst, så denne usikkerhed kunne fjernes.
The GOK admitted that, due to Hynix's situation, foreign investors were not willing to invest in Korea, because the Korean banks' exposure to Hynix was so high.
Faktisk blev »den strukturelle tilpasning« af Hynix omtalt som det vigtigste politiske emne i andet halvår af 2002 i en rapport fra økonomi- og finansministeriet.
It need the Hynix problem to be solved, in order to remove the uncertainty; in fact, Hynix's ‘structural adjustment’ was cited as a main policy issue for the second half of 2002 in a report by the Ministry of Finance and Economy.
En rapport fra oppositionspartiet GNP (Grand National Party) til det koreanske parlament kritiserede den koreanske stat for at insistere på at redde Hyundai-gruppen, som Hynix indgik i, og erklærede, at den koreanske stat i sit forsøg på at redde Hynix »smed penge i et bundløst hul«.
A report submitted to the National Assembly by Korea's Grand National Party (GNP), in opposition, criticised the GOK's insistence on rescuing the Hyundai Group, in which Hynix was a subsidiary, stating that the GOK, by saving Hynix, was ‘injecting money into bottomless pits’.
Hynix hævder, at rapporten, eftersom den blev indgivet i november 2002, ikke bør anses for at være et bevis for den koreanske stats engagement i den nye omstrukturering.
Hynix claims that, as the report was submitted in November 2002, it should not be considered as evidence of the GOK's involvement in the new restructuring.
I årets første halvdel var budskabet fra vicefinansministeren det, at kreditorerne skulle finde en løsning på Hynix' problemer så hurtigt som muligt for at begrænse de negative virkninger for økonomien til et minimum.
During the first half of the year, the Vice Minister for Finance stated that ‘creditors will have to find a solution to Hynix as soon as possible to minimise the adverse impact on the economy’.
I dette øjemed havde der fundet et møde sted mellem den koreanske stat og Hynix' kreditorer, hvor den koreanske stat fremlagde sine synspunkter vedrørende de på det tidspunkt igangværende forhandlinger med Micron.
To that end, a meeting between the GOK and Hynix's creditors had taken place to express the GOK's views with regard to the then ongoing negotiations with Micron.
Økonomi- og finansministeriet kunne hverken be- eller afkræfte, om der havde fundet andre møder sted, og hævdede, at ikke alle møder blev ført til protokols.
The MOFE could neither confirm nor deny whether other meetings had taken place and claimed that records of meetings were not always kept.
Finanstilsynskommissionen på sin side meddelte, at der ikke havde fundet andre møder sted, selv om den blev orienteret om, hvad der foregik, gennem uformelle telefonopkald.
The FSC, on the other hand, said that no other meetings had taken place, although it was kept abreast of what was happening by informal telephone calls.
Foreliggende dokumentation tyder dog på, at den koreanske stat med tanke på De Europæiske Fællesskabers og USA's tidligere undersøgelser af dens engagement i Hynix havde givet instrukser om, at alle meddelelser om Hynix skulle overdrages mundtligt, så de ikke kunne spores [7].
However, evidence on the record suggests that the GOK, mindful of the previous investigations in its involvement in Hynix by the European Communities and the United States, directed that any communication relating to Hynix should be made orally to avoid being traceable [7].
Finanstilsynskommissionen udtalte, at den ikke have bemyndigelse til at intervenere i hvert enkelt selskabs omstruktureringsbestræbelser, men den førte i nogen omfang tilsyn med processen, f.eks. når den mente, at processen indebar et potentielt chok for markedet.
The FSC stated that it had no power to intervene in the restructuring efforts of each company, but that it did conduct partial monitoring of the process, for example, where they thought there could be a potential shock to the markets.
Finanstilsynskommissionens tilsyn foregår gennem kontakter med personer i selskaberne, men der føres ikke noget register over sådanne kontaktpersoner.
The FSC conducts such monitoring by contacts with ‘work-level’ persons, but not records are kept of such contacts.
Finanstilsynskommissionen indrømmede, at Hynix blev omstruktureret, fordi det var meget stort, men insisterede på, at det var kreditorerne alene, der bestemte hvordan og hvorledes omstruktureringen skulle foregå.
Although the FSC admitted that Hynix was restructured because it was so big, it insisted that the manner and mode of such restructuring was determined solely by the creditors.
Hynix' kreditorbanker bekræftede, at Finanstilsynskommissionen holdt sig nøje informeret om omstruktureringen gennem telefonopkald og anmodninger om oplysninger.
The Hynix creditor banks confirmed that the FSC kept a close eye on the restructuring by telephone calls and requests for information.
På møderne i april 2002 meddelte den koreanske stat Hynix' kreditorer, at dens officielle holdning var, at Hynix enten skulle sælges eller reddes for at afbøde chokket.
The GOK, in the meetings of April 2002, communicated its official position to Hynix's creditors, which was either to sell Hynix or to rescue it to buffer the shock.
Den koreanske stat insisterede på, at spørgsmålet om opløsning af selskabet helt og aldeles var op til kreditorerne. Dette modsiges dog af regeringens udtalelser om, hvor vigtigt det var at redde Hynix (gennem omstrukturering eller salg) for at genskabe tilliden til de koreanske markeder.
Although the GOK insisted that the decision of whether liquidation was on the table or not was left to the creditors, its statements regarding the importance of rescuing Hynix (by a restructuring or a sale) in order to restore confidence in the Korean markets belies such insistence.
Den koreanske regerings tro på, at Hynix var for stor til at krakke, underbygges af en udtalelse fra en af kreditorbankerne, ifølge hvilken Hynix var så stort et selskab og havde så mange ansatte og kontrakter, at »man kan tænke sig til, hvad der ville ske, hvis det gik fallit eller blev erklæret insolvent«.
The GOK's belief that Hynix was too big to fail is corroborated by a statement by one of the creditor banks that Hynix was such a big company, employing such a large number of people and contracts you can imagine what would happen if it went bankrupt or insolvent.
Desuden skrev en af Hynix' eksterne konsulentvirksomheder i det brev, hvori den accepterede at påtage sig opgaven, at den ville hjælpe »… med at finde en realistisk og bæredygtig løsning til omstrukturering af Hynix, som kan minimere skaderne på arbejdsmarkedet …« (fremhævelse tilføjet).
Further, one of Hynix's external advisors, in its engagement letter wrote that it would assist … in (the) effort to find a realistic and viable restructuring solution for Hynix that would minimise social damage … (emphasis added).
Det var tydeligt, at en opløsning af Hynix ikke var en udvej, man opererede med.
It was plain that the liquidation of Hynix was not an option.
Den koreanske stats engagement i Hynix' kreditorbanker
GOK involvement in Hynix creditor banks
Den koreanske stat er storaktionær i en lang række af Hynix kreditorbanker.
The GOK is a major shareholder in a large number of Hynix creditor banks.
Ifølge de foreliggende oplysninger fra bankerne, Hynix og den koreanske stat har den koreanske stat mindst en væsentlig aktiebeholdning (dvs. > 20 %) i kreditorbanker/finansieringsinstitutter, som igen har mere end 75 % af stemmerne i CFIC.
The information on the record provided by the banks, Hynix and the GOK shows that the GOK has at least a significant shareholding (> 20 %) in creditor banks/financial institutions holding at least 75 % of the voting rights in the CFIC.
Det erindres, at det krævede flertal i CFIC var 75 %. Der kan derfor ikke være tvivl om, at den koreanske stat har haft indflydelse på beslutningerne truffet af CFIC.
It is recalled that the required majority in the CFIC was 75 %; therefore, the GOK's involvement in the decisions taken by the Creditors' Council cannot be doubted.
Som i den oprindelige undersøgelse er KDB og NACF 100 % statsejede foretagender og anses derfor for at være offentlige organer efter grundforordningens artikel 1, stk. 3.
As in the original investigation, KDB and NACF are wholly-owned government entities and are thus considered public bodies within the meaning of Article 1(3) of the basic Regulation.
Der foreligger ingen oplysninger, der tyder på, at Woori Banks situation har ændret sig i forhold til den situation, der er beskrevet i betragtning 80-82 i den foreløbige toldforordning.
There is no evidence on the record to suggest that the situation as regards Woori Bank changed from the one described in recitals 80 to 82 of the provisional duty Regulation.
Desuden indgik Chohung Bank, nu Shinhan Bank efter fusionen med Shinhan Bank, den 1. april 2006, som det fremgår af den foreløbige toldforordning, et aftalememorandum med Korean Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) i januar 2002, ifølge hvilket KDIC, et offentligt organ, fik afgørende indflydelse på Chohung Banks beslutninger.
Further, as stated in the provisional duty Regulation, Chohung Bank, now called Shinhan Bank since its merged with Shinhan Bank on 1 April 2006, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Korean Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) in January 2002, giving KDIC, a public body, a decisive influence over Chohung Bank's decision-making.
Premierministerens anordning 408 er et yderligere vidnesbyrd om, at den koreanske stat har retshjemmel til at intervenere i finanssektoren af politiske årsager.
Prime Minister's Decree 408 is further evidence that there is legal scope for GOK intervention in the financial sector for policy reasons.
Den koreanske stat henviser til anordningen som dokumentation for, at den officielt har tilkendegivet, at den ikke vil intervenere i forhold til banker og finansieringsinstitutter.
The GOK cites the Decree as evidence that the Korean government officially stated that it would not intervene in banks and financial institutions.
Hynix hævdede, at KEB ikke var kontrolleret af den koreanske stat og fremviste Commerzbanks aktiebeholdning som bevis for dens uafhængighed af intervention fra den koreanske stats side.
Hynix claimed that KEB was not controlled by the GOK and presented Commerzbank's shareholding as evidence of its independence from GOK intervention.
Den fremlagde også dokumenter angående Commerzbanks vetoret i en række spørgsmål, bl.a. risikostyring.
It also submitted documents which refer to Commerzbank's veto right over some issues, including risk management.
KEB kunne imidlertid ikke bekræfte, at Commerzbank, som ganske vist havde udpeget en person som medlem af kreditgruppen, faktisk udøvede nogen kontrol over kreditbeslutninger, og erklærede ligefrem, at de ikke kendte til sådanne vetorettigheder.
However, KEB could not confirm that Commerzbank, although it had sent a person to become a member of the credit team, actually exercised any control over credit decisions and, in fact, stated that they were unaware of the existence of such veto rights.
Som endnu et eksempel på den koreanske stats engagement i Hynix' kreditorbanker kan nævnes, at styringsudvalget for Hynix' CFIC udpegede en tidligere minister for handel og industri som formand for CFIC's omstruktureringsudvalg, hvorefter han blot få måneder senere blev genudnævnt til minister.
Another example of GOK involvement in the Hynix creditor banks was the appointment of a former Minister of Industry and Commerce as Chairman of the Restructuring Committee of Hynix's CFIC, by the Steering Committee of that body, only for him to be re-appointed Minister a few months later.
Kookmin Bank og Woori Bank har også oplyst, at den koreanske stats indblanding kunne få dem til at træffe politisk baserede beslutninger ved udarbejdelse af prospekter til børstilsynet i 2002.
Kookmin and Woori Bank have also indicated that GOK interference might lead them to make policy-based decisions in their prospectuses to the Securities Exchange Commission in 2002.
Hynix har fremlagt dokumentation til støtte for den påstand, at den pågældende ordlyd ikke specifikt refererer til Hynix og ikke skal forstås sådan, at den koreanske stat kontrollerer den koreanske banksektor.
Hynix has submitted evidence that the wording in question did not refer specifically to Hynix and should not be taken as intending to imply that the GOK exercised control over the Korean banking sector.
Den af Hynix fremlagte dokumentation bestrider dog ikke andre dele af prospektadvarslerne, f.eks. at den koreanske stats aktieposter »kunne få os til at træffe foranstaltninger eller forfølge politiske mål i strid med kreditorernes interesser«.
However, the evidence submitted by Hynix does not dispute other parts of the prospectus warning, for example, that GOK shareholding ‘could cause us to take actions or pursue policy objectives that may be against (creditors') interests’.
Kommissionen bad om adgang til at se intern dokumentation vedrørende kreditinstitutternes beslutninger om at godkende omstruktureringsplanen.
The Commission asked to see the internal documentation relating to creditors institutions' decision to approve the restructuring plan.
Disse fortrolige dokumenter viser, at selv om kreditorerne hver især fulgte deres respektive interne standardprocedurer, da de traf beslutning om at deltage i omstruktureringen, handlede de ikke i overensstemmelse med deres egen kreditvurdering af Hynix i den pågældende periode.
These confidential documents show that, although the creditors each went through their standard internal procedures in deciding to participate in the restructuring, they did not act in accordance with the credit rating they had each ascribed to Hynix for the period in question.
Alle kreditorerne havde tildelt Hynix en kreditværdighed svarende til Standard & Poor's »selective default«, men ikke desto mindre godkendte de omstruktureringsplanen.
Although all creditors had given Hynix a rating equivalent to Standard & Poor's Selective Default, they nevertheless proceeded to approve the restructuring plan.