natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Første scenario: salg af banken før juni 2007 ved en samlet investering (salgspris + kapitaltilførsel) fra købers side på over […] mia. EUR, således at garantien kan udløbe uden at være blevet brugt på handlens closing-dato
First, the sale of the Bank before June 2007 at a total investment (sale price + capital investment) of the purchaser above EUR […] billion with the consequence that the guarantee can be abolished on the day of the closing without being drawn.
Andet scenario: salg af banken før juni 2007 ved en samlet investering på mindre end […] mia. EUR, således at garantien delvis eller fuldt ud ville blive brugt
Second, the sale of the Bank before June 2007 at a total investment below EUR […] billion with the consequence that the guarantee is partially or fully drawn.
Tredje scenario: salg af BAWAG-PSK lykkes ikke før juni 2007.
Third, the sale of BAWAG-PSK is not achieved before June 2007.
I det tilfælde skal garantien — også hvis dens samlede beløb (gennem bankens årsoverskud eller reducerede risikoaktiver osv.) falder — forlænges på ubestemt tid.
In this scenario, the guarantee, even if progressively reduced (by the annual positive results of the Bank, the decreased risk assets, etc.), has to be prolonged for an unknown period.
Ellers ville garantien med stor sandsynlighed blive brugt, hvilket ville føre til et stort tab for staten.
Otherwise, the guarantee is very likely to be drawn which would imply heavy losses by the State.
Ganske vist var Østrig af den opfattelse, at BAWAG-PSK ville kunne opbygge de nødvendige kapitalreserver gennem kapitaltilførsel fra nye kapitalindskydere [37], eller gennem flere positive årsresultater, eller ved at opstille en mindre ambitiøs omstruktureringsplan, som krævede mindre kernekapital og således ville give banken mere spillerum til at reducere garantiens samlede beløb yderligere, men efter Kommissionens opfattelse ville en privat kapitalindskyder/kautionist på tidspunktet for garantistillelsen ikke have overvejet sådanne hypoteser, der ikke kunne udelukkes, idet de alternative scenarier ville have været for hypotetiske.
While Austria asserted that BAWAG-PSK could generate the necessary capital reserves, through capital injection by new investors [37] or through successive annual positive results, or could establish another, less ambitious, restructuring plan, requiring less core capital, thus giving more room to the bank to reduce further the guarantee amount, the Commission is of the opinion that such hypotheses, which cannot be excluded, would however not have been taken into account by a private investor/guarantor at the time the guarantee was granted because the alternative scenarios would have been too hypothetical.
En privat kapitalindskyder ville særlig, når der ville være tale om en mindre ambitiøs omstruktureringsplan end den, som scenarierne var baseret på, være gået ud fra, at Østrig om nødvendigt ville forlænge garantien i juli 2007.
In particular, in the case of a less ambitious restructuring plan than on which they are based, a private guarantor would have considered that Austria would prolong the guarantee in July 2007 if need be.
Kommissionen er ikke enig med Østrig i, at det ikke var sikkert, at garantien i juli 2007 ville blive forlænget, hvis banken ikke var blevet solgt før det tidspunkt.
The Commission does not share Austria's view that the prolongation of the guarantee in July 2007 would not be certain if the Bank were not sold before.
Der ville nærmere være tale om, at garantien uden forlængelse formentlig ville være blevet brugt fuldt ud, da BAWAG-PSK endnu ikke havde indtjent de nødvendige finansielle midler til at kunne leve op til solvensnøgletallene, og en ny insolvens ville være truende.
Actually, absent the prolongation, the guarantee would be drawn close to its full amount because BAWAG-PSK had not yet rebuilt the necessary financial resources to respect the prudential ratios. Therefore insolvency would threaten again.
Kommissionen har undersøgt de andre muligheder, som Østrig har fremført, for at opfylde egenkapitalkravene ved udløb af en etårig garantiperiode i en situation, hvor banken ikke ville være blevet solgt.
The Commission assessed the other options asserted by Austria to cover the Bank's capital requirements upon expiration of the one-year guarantee term in case the Bank cannot be sold.
Kommissionen nåede frem til den opfattelse, at sådanne hypoteser ganske vist ikke kan udelukkes, men de ville ikke være blevet taget i betragtning af en privat kapitalindskyder/kautionist på tidspunktet for garantistillelsen, da de alternative scenarier, de er baseret på, er hypotetiske eller har negativ effekt på bankens forretningsplan.
The Commission is of the opinion that such hypotheses, which can not be excluded, would however not have been taken into account by a private investor/guarantor at the time the guarantee was granted because the alternative scenarios on which they are based are hypothetical or have a negative impact on the Bank's business plan.
På kort og mellemlang sigt ville de forventede overskud ikke tillade banken at forbedre sin egenkapital væsentligt [38].
In the short and medium term, the planned profits would not allow the Bank to improve its equity considerably [38].
En reduktion af egenkapitalkravene gennem en forringelse af risikoaktiverne ville have negativ effekt på bankens fremtidige udbyttemuligheder [39], og tilførsel af fremmedkapital ville kunne sammenlignes med et delvist salg af banken [40].
The reduction of its capital requirement by reducing its risk assets would have a negative impact on the Bank's future profitability [39] and the recurrence to third party equity can be regarded as similar to a partial sale of the bank [40].
Det ville være ideelt, om Kommissionen kunne tildele hvert af de tre scenarier en sandsynlighedsgrad, der var baseret på tidspunktet for garantistillelsen.
Ideally, the Commission would grant a probability to each of the three scenarios at the time the guarantee was granted.
Støttebeløbet ville så kunne udledes deraf.
The aid amount could then be deducted.
Det var dog ikke muligt for Kommissionen på basis af de til rådighed værende oplysninger at fastlægge sådanne sandsynlighedsgrader.
However, on the basis of the available information the Commission was unable to determine precisely the probability of each scenario.
På tidspunktet for garantistillelsen kunne det ikke klart forudses, hvordan BAWAG-PSK ville udvikle sig.
At the time the guarantee was granted the future development of BAWAG-PSK was not clearly predictable.
Østrig anfører, at man på tidspunktet for garantistillelsen gennem FMA's aktiviteter har haft tilstrækkelige oplysninger til rådighed om BAWAG-PSK's økonomiske situation til at kunne vurdere sandsynligheden for, at de respektive scenarier ville indtræde.
Austria claimed that, in view of the activity of the FMA, it was, at the moment of granting the State guarantee, sufficiently informed about the economic situation of BAWAG-PSK, and that it made estimates on the three above mentioned scenarios.
Reelt havde man kun set det første scenario som værende realistisk.
Its conclusion would have been that only the first scenario was relevant.
Østrig har dog ikke fremsendt nogen beviser herpå.
However, no supporting evidence was provided by Austria on this issue.
F.eks. fremlagde man ingen nøjagtige data for Kommissionen vedrørende en vurdering af banken før garantistillelsen.
No precise data was transmitted to the Commission for instance on the valuation of the Bank, which would have been made before the granting of the guarantee by Austria.
BAWAG-PSK's værdi ved vedtagelsen af forbundsloven i april/maj 2006 kan kun vurderes ud fra omtrentlige beregninger:
The value of BAWAG-PSK in April/May 2006, when the Law was adopted, can only be estimated through rough calculations:
Baseret på den dokumentation, der var til rådighed, ville en privat kautionist have kunnet anvende en discounted-cash-flow-metode (DCF-metode).
using available documents, a private guarantor may have used a methodology based on discounted cash flows (DCF).
En sådan indfaldsvinkel, der er baseret på projicerede tal for et passende tidsrum, vil dog frembringe tal, hvor den endelige værdi udgør en meget høj procentsats af den samlede værdi.
However, such an approach, based on prospective figures over a reasonable timeframe, leads to figures where the terminal value represents a very high percentage of the total value.
Et eksempel: Hvis man går ud fra det nettoudbytte, som blev nævnt af Østrig i den fremlagte forretningsplan i september 2006 (der skulle repræsentere de oplysninger, som var til rådighed for en privat kautionist i april/maj 2006), når man ved hjælp af DCF frem til en værdi på […] mia. EUR [41], hvor den endelige værdi udgør 85 % af dette beløb.
As an example, using the net profit indicated in the business plan submitted by Austria in September 2006 (as proxy for the information available to the private guarantor in April/May 2006), the DCF results in a value of EUR […] billion [41], with the terminal value equal to 85 % of the latter amount.
Da denne metode afhænger for meget af den endelige værdi, mener Kommissionen i det foreliggende tilfælde ikke, at man kan drage pålidelige konklusioner ud fra metoden.
Therefore, the Commission considers that the method does not allow for sound conclusions in the present case as it is too dependent on the terminal value;
Baseret på salgsprisen for BAWAG-PSK på […] mia. EUR (ikke kendt i foråret 2006) og på egenkapitalværdien pr. 31. december 2005 på 1,7 mia. EUR kan man beregne en virksomhedsværdi (kundekreds og filialnet) på ca. […] mia. EUR. Baseret på egenkapitalsummen pr. 31. december 2005 og virksomhedsværdien minus den kapital på […] mio. EUR, som de nye ejere skal indskyde, og Refco-betalingen på […] mio. EUR i forbindelse med salgsprisen, når man frem til en anslået værdi for BAWAG-PSK på ca. […] mia. EUR [42] i foråret 2006.
using the purchase price of BAWAG-PSK, of EUR […] billion (which was not known in spring 2006), and the equity value as of 31 December 2005, of EUR 1,7 billion, a goodwill, representing the value of customers and branch network, can be computed. Its value is around EUR […] billion. Then, the sum of equity as of 31 December 2005 and of the goodwill, minus the capital injection to be made by the new owners of EUR […] million and the Refco payment of EUR […] million linked to the purchase price, lead to an estimated value of BAWAG-PSK in spring 2006 of around EUR […] billion [42].
Kommissionen skal også tage hensyn til, at tidspresset i april/maj 2006, hvor en privat kautionist ville have skullet handle, var meget stort.
The Commission has also to consider that a severe time constraint existed in April/May 2006, when the private guarantor would have had to intervene.
Der var kun nogle uger til rådighed til nøje at analysere bankens finansielle situation og til at afgive et bud.
Only a few weeks were available to assess in depth the Bank's financial situation and make an offer.
Den igangværende »Bank-Run« på BAWAG-PSK udgjorde en stor fare for bankens betalingsevne.
A run on the bank had started, creating a major danger for the liquidity of the bank.
En fortsættelse af denne udvikling ville banken heller ikke i en kort periode have overlevet.
A continuation of the development for even a short period of time would have had lethal consequences for BAWAG-PSK.
På grund af tidspresset og det høje garantibeløb, der var nødvendigt, var det næsten eller helt umuligt at få bud fra private aktører.
The time constraint, associated to the significant amount of the required guarantee, made any intervention by a private operator extremely difficult, if not at all possible.
Yderligere var der flere usikkerhedsfaktorer, f.eks. i forbindelse med Refco-sagen i USA, og en privat kautionist ville have skullet vurdere, om hans indgriben — i sammenligning med en statsgaranti — ville have været tilstrækkelig til at afslutte denne »Bank-Run«.
In addition, various uncertainties remained, for instance in respect to the Refco case in the USA. Moreover, a private guarantor would have had to assess whether its intervention would have been sufficient, compared to a State guarantee, to stop the run on the bank.
Ud fra de ovenfor beskrevne omstændigheder konkluderer Kommissionen følgende:
In view of the above described circumstances, the Commission concludes that:
Tidspunktet for salget af BAWAG-PSK og salgsprisens størrelse var to ukendte faktorer med høj risiko for en markedsorienteret kautionist.
the timing of the sale and the level of the purchase price of BAWAG-PSK were unknown variables, bearing very important risks for a market oriented guarantor;
Tidspresset gjorde det meget vanskeligt for en privat aktør at afgive et bud.
the time constraints were increasing to a very significant extent the difficulty for an operator to intervene;
Bankens substansværdi var ikke så lav, at det var helt udelukket, at en privat kautionist kunne overtage en garanti på et samlet beløb på 900 mio. EU, forudsat at der blev betalt et højt gebyr.
the intrinsic value of the Bank was not so low as to fully exclude that a market guarantor would have granted the EUR 900 million, however conditioned on the high fees.
Efter Kommissionens opfattelse havde man snarere kunnet vente en kapitaltilførsel fra en privat kapitalindskyder, som ville gøre ham til andelshaver, og som ville have givet ham indflydelse på beslutningerne med henblik på en vellykket omstrukturering. Kommissionen og Østrig er dog enige om, at ingen privat kapitalindskyder ville have været indstillet på at indskyde midler, der kom til at indgå som egenkapital.
In fact, the Commission is of the view that a private investor would have been more prone to intervene with a capital injection, which would have given a stake in the Bank, and decision-making power to ensure success of the restructuring.
En privat kapitalindskyder ville heller ikke have syntes, at en garanti ville være det helt rigtige instrument, fordi det gebyr, der blev forlangt, ville være så højt, at det ville forringe udbytteforventningerne og således have modvirket garantien.
Finally, a guarantee would not have appeared technically as a fully appropriate instrument for a market investor also because the very high fee requested would have hampered any prospect of profitability and therefore counteracted the effect of the guarantee.
At Østrig har givet garantien, genspejler i højere grad Østrigs interesser, som i første omgang bestod i at genoprette investorernes og partnernes tillid til bankens stabilitet og til den østrigske finanssektor.
Actually, the granting of the guarantee reflects the interests of Austria, which were mainly to re-establish the trust of the investors and partners in the stability of the Bank and the financial sector in Austria.
Som kautionist har Østrig meget stor kapacitet og gunstige vilkår (AAA-rating).
In addition, Austria has vast capacity and favourable conditions as a guarantor (triple A rating).
Som følge heraf kan støtteelementet i statsgarantien ifølge Kommissionen kun vurderes inden for et interval.
As a consequence, the Commission considers that the aid amount involved in the guarantee could only be estimated within a range.
Den øvre ende af dette interval ligger på 898 mio. EUR, altså garantiens nominelle beløb minus det gebyr på 0,2 %, som banken har betalt.
The upper value of this range is EUR 898 million, i.e. the nominal value of the guarantee minus the guarantee fee of 0,2 % paid by the Bank.
Fastlæggelsen af den nedre ende er noget vanskeligere; ifølge Kommissionen kunne den ligge på mindst 2/3 af garantiens nominelle beløb.
Fixing the lower value is the most complex; the Commission estimates that this lower value could be at least two-third of the nominal value of the guarantee.
Analyserne fra Østrig
Analyses put forward by Austria
Kommissionen har undersøgt de analyser, som Østrig har foretaget af garantiens støtteelement, og er nået frem til den opfattelse, at disse analyser af flere grunde er mangelfulde.
The Commission assessed the analyses conducted by Austria regarding the aid element in the guarantee and considers that these analyses are inadequate for different reasons.
Efter Kommissionens opfattelse viser BAWAG-PSK's FSR og sandsynligheden for manglende overholdelse af forpligtelserne ikke kautionistens risiko i de tre relevante scenarier.
First, the Commission is of the view that BAWAG-PSK's FSR and the corresponding payment default risk does not reflect the risk of the guarantor in the three relevant scenarios.
Moody’s FSR forbliver i det væsentlige uforandret i de tre scenarier, da garantien på 900 mio. EUR fra en investors synspunkt kan sammenlignes med den allerede gennemførte kapitaludvidelse med samme beløb. Efter det første scenario er det alene den fremtidige ejer af banken, der forhøjer kapitalen.
Essentially, Moody's FSR rating remains unchanged for each of the scenarios, because from an investor point of view the guarantee of EUR 900 million is similar to an already effected capital increase of the same amount.
Efter det andet scenario sker kapitalforhøjelsen delvis via bankens fremtidige ejer; resten af beløbet dækkes ved brug af garantien. Efter det tredje scenario består garantien stadig (om end med nedadgående værdi), så længe der ikke finder nogen egnet kapitaltilførsel sted, eller banken indtjener de nødvendige finansielle midler.
In fact, in the first scenario, the capital increase is fully executed by the future owner of the bank; in the second scenario, the capital increase is partially executed by the future owner of the bank and the remaining amount drawn on the guarantee; finally in the third scenario, the guarantee remains in place (even with a decreasing value) as long as no appropriate capital injection has been made or as long as the bank has not generated the necessary financial means.
Kautionistens risiko afhænger dog kraftigt af de enkelte scenariers sandsynlighed, da garantiens løbetid og det beløb, der er gjort brug af, varierer kraftigt alt efter tidspunktet for salget af BAWAG-PSK og den opnåede pris.
By contrast, the risk of the guarantor depends strongly on the probability of each scenario, because the duration of the guarantee and the triggered amount of the guarantee vary considerably as a consequence of the timing and price of the sale of BAWAG-PSK.
Østrig tog i sin vurdering af risikoen for brug af garantien, der var baseret på FSR, alene hensyn til det scenario, hvor der vil finde et salg sted senest den 1. juli 2007, og hvor køber foretager en samlet investering på mindst […] EUR. I dette scenario ville garantien kun blive brugt, hvis BAWAG-PSK ikke kunne overholde sine forpligtelser, inden et salg fandt sted.
In its assessment of the risk of the drawdown of the guarantee by means of the FSR, Austria only considered the scenario under which the sale of BAWAG-PSK will be completed at the latest on 1 July 2007 at a total investment by the purchaser of at least EUR […] billion. Consequently the guarantee would only be triggered in the case of deficiency of BAWAG-PSK before the sale.
Kommissionen mener derimod, at man ikke kunne forudse BAWAG-PSK's videre udvikling på tidspunktet for garantistillelsen, og at alle de beskrevne scenarier skulle indgå i risikovurderingen.
The Commission is of the view that, at the time the guarantee was granted, the future development of BAWAG-PSK was not predictable and all major scenarios described above had to be evaluated in the risk assessment.
Som følge deraf mener Kommissionen, at FSR og sandsynligheden for manglende overholdelse af forpligtelserne ikke er velegnede som indikatorer for en bedømmelse af garantiens støtteelement.
As a conclusion, the Commission considers that the FSR and the corresponding payment default risk are inappropriate indicators for the evaluation of the aid amount in the guarantee.
Kommissionen betragter den sandsynlighedsvurdering, som Østrig har foretaget, som irrelevant.
The Commission considers that the plausibility check brought forward by Austria is irrelevant.
En kredit er ifølge BWG ikke egenkapital og ville ikke forhindre et fald for kapitalkvoten til et niveau under de lovgivningsmæssige egenkapitalkrav.
A loan is not qualified as equity capital under BWG and would not prevent the capital ratio from falling below the statutory requirements.
Kommissionen mener også, at Østrigs fremgangsmåde, hvor garantien vurderes efter fastsættelse af den dermed forbundne teoretiske refinansieringsfordel for BAWAG-PSK, er uegnet.
The Commission is of the opinion that Austria's alternative evaluation of the guarantee by determining the theoretical refinancing advantage for BAWAG-PSK resulting from the guarantee is also inappropriate.
Den nævnte asset swap spread er baseret på ratings, der tager hensyn til en mulig statsstøtte og dermed ikke genspejler BAWAG-PSK's iboende stabilitet.
The indicated Asset Swap Spread is based on ratings which take into account the potential support provided by the state and thus do not reflect the intrinsic stability of BAWAG-PSK.
Kommissionen konstaterer yderligere, at den i BGB-sagen grundigt har undersøgt sandsynligheden for, at de risici, som garantien afdækker, indtræder.
The Commission also notes that regarding the BGB case, the Commission conducted an in-depth analysis on the probability that the guaranteed risks would materialise.
Da nogle risici var meget usandsynlige, nåede Kommissionen på grund af det i denne sag passende scenario (»økonomisk værdi«) frem til det resultat, at støtteelementet for den berørte garanti ligger under dens nominelle værdi.
Because some risks were very unlikely, the reasonable scenario (economic value) assessed by the Commission lead to an aid element in the guarantee below the nominal value of the latter.
I CWP-sagen kunne virksomheden takket være de østrigske garantier optage lån til gunstigere finansieringsvilkår, end det var almindeligt på markedet.
Regarding the CWP case, the guarantees referred to by Austria enabled CWP to obtain loans on better financial terms than those normally available on the financial markets.
Disse omstændigheder foreligger ikke i den aktuelle sag.
This is not the situation encountered in the present case.
Efter at Kommissionen havde undersøgt den særlige situation hos CWP, nåede den dog frem til, at markedsprisen i den aktuelle garanti svarede til referencerentesatsen plus 400 basispoint.
However, after having analysed the specific situation of CWP, the Commission concluded that the market price of the guarantees at stake would have been the reference interest rate plus 400 basis points.
I forbindelse med BAWAG-PSK gennemførte Kommissionen også en indgående undersøgelse af alle aspekter i de tre mulige scenarier for at finde frem til statsgarantiens støtteværdi.
In the BAWAG-PSK case, the Commission has also conducted a specific in-depth economic analysis of the occurrence of each aspect of the three possible scenarios in order to figure out the aid value in the State guarantee.
Derfor mener Kommissionen ikke, at metoden i den foreliggende sag med hensyn til fremgangsmåden adskiller sig fra de sager, Østrig har nævnt.
Therefore, the Commission does not consider that its methodological approach in the present case departs from the previous cases quoted by Austria.
Støttens forenelighed med fællesmarkedet
Compatibility of the illegal aid
EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 3, litra b)
Article 87(3)(b)
Efter Kommissionens opfattelse har Østrig ikke dokumenteret, at BAWAG-PSK's insolvens/konkurs ville have haft implikationer for hele det østrigske finanssystem og mere generelt for hele den østrigske økonomi.
The Commission is of the view that Austria has not demonstrated that BAWAG-PSK's insolvency/bankruptcy would have had systemic implications on the Austrian financial system and, more globally, on the whole Austrian economy.
Østrig har indrømmet, at en kvantitativ vurdering af eventuelle konsekvenser af bankens insolvens på den samlede økonomi næppe er mulig.
Austria acknowledged that it is hardly possible to provide a quantitative estimate of the potential consequences of an insolvency of the bank for the entire economy.