natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Skattekontoret anså ikke ordningen for en form for statsstøtte, og modtageren blev derfor ikke bedt om at fremlægge en omstruktureringsplan, som er forskellig fra den forretningsplan, der fremlægges for domstolen i henhold til insolvenslovgivningen.
The tax office did not consider the arrangement as a form of state aid and therefore the beneficiary was not requested to provide a restructuring plan, which differs from the business plan submitted to the court pursuant to the insolvency legislation.
De slovakiske myndigheder fremsatte følgende kommentarer til støttemodtagerens bemærkninger.
In their response to the comments submitted by the beneficiary, the Slovak authorities submitted the following observations.
De slovakiske myndigheder mente ikke, at modtagerens bemærkninger om konkursprocedurens gennemsnitlige varighed og det gennemsnitlige provenu fra salg af aktiver under en konkursprocedure var relevante i den foreliggende sag.
The Slovak authorities would not find relevant in the present case the beneficiary's observations on the average length of the bankruptcy procedure and the average return from the sale of assets in a bankruptcy procedure.
Ifølge dem ville konkursprocedurens varighed — i betragtning af det beskedne antal kreditorer og beholdningen af aktiver med en positiv likvidationsværdi, som oversteg det beløb, staten fik udbetalt efter ordningen — have været kortere end gennemsnitsperioden, og skattekontorets udbytte ville have været større, end det var tilfældet ved ordningen.
According to them, given the low number of creditors and the existence of assets with a positive liquidation value which exceeded the amount paid to the State after the arrangement, the bankruptcy procedure would have been completed in a shorter-than-average period and the yield of the tax office would have been higher than in the case of the arrangement.
De slovakiske skattemyndigheder gennemførte en inspektion hos selskabet den 21. juni 2004 og fandt, at modtageren pr. 17. juni 2004 havde en kontantbeholdning på 161,3 mio. SKK, tilgodehavender på 62,8 mio. SKK, lagre af alkohol og alkoholholdige drikkevarer til en værdi af 84 mio. SKK og anlægsaktiver med en bogført værdi på 200 mio. SKK.
The Slovak tax authorities carried out an on-the-spot inspection at the company on 21 June 2004 and found that, as at 17 June 2004, the beneficiary had cash amounting to SKK 161,3 million, receivables of SKK 62,8 million, stocks of spirit and spirit-based beverages with a value of SKK 84 million and fixed assets with a book value of SKK 200 million.
De slovakiske myndigheder mener, at skattefuldbyrdelsesproceduren var et reelt alternativ for skattekontoret.
The Slovak authorities consider that the tax execution procedure was a genuine alternative for the tax office.
De bekræfter, at skattekontoret havde mulighed for at indlede denne procedure forud for kreditorproceduren, hvilket det også kunne have gjort, hvis domstolen havde afvist at bekræfte ordningen (fordi skattekontoret som separatist ikke havde stemt for den).
They confirm that the tax office had the possibility of initiating this procedure prior to the arrangement procedure, as it could have done even if the court had refused to confirm the arrangement (because the tax office as separate creditor would not have voted in its favour).
De slovakiske myndigheder er ikke enige i modtagerens påstand om, at dennes økonomiske vanskeligheder skyldtes ændringen i skatteforvaltningsloven.
The Slovak authorities do not agree with the assertion of the beneficiary that his financial difficulties were due to the change in the Tax Administration Act.
Ifølge dem skyldtes modtagerens økonomiske vanskeligheder den økonomiske strategi, der bestod i, at modtageren brugte indirekte skatter til at drive sin forretning med.
According to them the financial difficulties of the beneficiary were due to the financial strategy of using indirect taxes for the running of its own business.
I stedet burde modtageren blot have opkrævet skatterne fra sine kunder og overført dem til staten.
Instead, the beneficiary should have simply collected the taxes from its clients and transferred them to the state budget.
De slovakiske myndigheder er heller ikke enige i, at mødet med Den Slovakiske Republiks skattedirektorat i december 2003 er bevis på en foreløbig accept af ordningen fra skattekontorets side.
The Slovak authorities do not agree that the meeting with the Tax Directorate of the Slovak Republic in December 2003 is evidence of preliminary agreement with the arrangement on the part of the tax office.
De fremlagde et brev af 6. juli 2004, som var blevet sendt af Den Slovakiske Republiks skattedirektorat til det underordnede skattekontor med besked om ikke at acceptere den ordning, modtageren havde foreslået, fordi den var ufordelagtig for staten.
They submitted a letter of 6 July 2004 that had been sent by the Tax Directorate of the Slovak Republic to the subordinate tax office, instructing it not to agree with the arrangement proposed by the beneficiary because it was unfavourable for the State.
Dette brev henviste dernæst til et andet, mere generelt brev af 15. januar 2004 fra finansministeren til det underordnede skattedirektorat med besked om ikke at acceptere forslag til ordninger med kreditorer, som ville betyde, at skattemyndighederne skulle give afkald på skattetilgodehavender.
This letter then referred to another, more general, letter of 15 January 2004 from the Minister of Finance to the subordinate Tax Directorate, instructing it not to agree to proposals for arrangements with creditors that would involve the tax authorities writing off tax receivables.
Endvidere fortolkede de slovakiske myndigheder det brev af 3. februar 2004, som modtageren henviste til (jf. betragtning 37), som en udtrykkelig afvisning af 35 % ordningen.
Moreover, the Slovak authorities interpreted the letter of 3 February 2004, referred to by the beneficiary (see paragraph 37), as explicitly disagreeing with the 35 % arrangement.
De slovakiske myndigheder fremfører, at modtageren ikke havde betalt punktafgifter inden for den foreskrevne henstandsperiode (januar 2001-marts 2004) og regelmæssigt havde fået sine skatteforpligtelser udsat.
The Slovak authorities submit that the beneficiary had not paid excise duties within the prescribed deferment period (January 2001 to March 2004) and had had its tax obligations regularly deferred.
Ifølge de slovakiske myndigheder rejser de betydelige forskelle i vurderingerne i de to revisorers rapporter tvivl om begge rapporters troværdighed.
According to the Slovak authorities, significant differences in the estimates of the two auditors' reports raise doubts as to the credibility of both reports.
De tvivler især på den likvidationsfaktor, EKORDA tilskriver nuværende aktiver.
They have, in particular, doubts regarding the liquidation factor assigned to current assets by EKORDA.
Denne faktor burde være højere end 20 %.
This factor should be higher than 20 %.
Endelig havde modtageren ifølge de slovakiske myndigheder ikke udarbejdet en realistisk omstruktureringsplan, og de foranstaltninger, der blev foreslået i forbindelse med kreditorproceduren, kunne ikke betragtes som omstruktureringsforanstaltninger.
Finally, according to the Slovak authorities, the beneficiary had not drawn up a viable restructuring plan and the measures proposed in the context of the arrangement procedure could not be considered to be restructuring measures.
Da nogle af de relevante begivenheder i den foreliggende sag fandt sted før Den Slovakiske Republiks tiltrædelse af Den Europæiske Union den 1. maj 2004, skal Kommissionen først fastslå, om den er kompetent til at behandle den omstridte foranstaltning.
As some of the relevant events in the present case took place before the accession of the Slovak Republic to the European Union on 1 May 2004, the Commission first has to determine whether it is competent to act with regard to the disputed measure.
Foranstaltninger, der er iværksat før tiltrædelsen og ikke længere gælder efter tiltrædelsen, kan ikke undersøges af Kommissionen hverken i henhold til overgangsordningen efter punkt 3 i bilag IV til tiltrædelsesakten, eller i henhold til de procedurer, der er fastlagt i EF-traktatens artikel 88.
Measures that were put into effect before accession and are no longer applicable after accession cannot be examined by the Commission either under the so-called interim mechanism procedure, governed by Annex IV, point 3 of the Accession Treaty, or under the procedures laid down in Article 88 of the EC Treaty.
Hverken tiltrædelsesakten eller EF-traktaten forpligter eller bemyndiger Kommissionen til at undersøge disse foranstaltninger.
Neither the Accession Treaty nor the EC Treaty requires or empowers the Commission to review these measures.
Foranstaltninger iværksat efter tiltrædelsen falder imidlertid klart inden for Kommissionens kompetenceområde i henhold til EF-traktaten.
However, measures put into effect after accession clearly do fall within the field of competence of the Commission under the EC Treaty.
For at fastslå, på hvilket tidspunkt en given foranstaltning blev iværksat, er det relevante kriterium det juridisk bindende dokument, hvormed de kompetente nationale myndigheder tilkender støtte.
In order to determine the moment when a certain measure was put into effect, the relevant criterion is the legally binding act by which the competent national authority undertakes to grant aid.
Modtageren hævdede i den foreliggende sag, at den omstridte foranstaltning blev iværksat før tiltrædelsen og ikke gælder derefter (jf. betragtning 37).
The beneficiary claimed in the present case that the disputed measure was put into effect before accession and is not applicable thereafter (see paragraph 37).
Kommissionen kan ikke acceptere de argumenter, der fremlægges af modtageren.
The Commission cannot accept the arguments put forward by the beneficiary.
Forslaget om at indlede kreditorproceduren er ikke et dokument udstedt af den bevilgende myndighed, men modtagerens eget tiltag.
The proposal to initiate the arrangement procedure is not an act of the granting authority, but an act of the beneficiary.
Domstolens afgørelse om at iværksætte kreditorproceduren er heller ikke et dokument udstedt af den bevilgende myndighed.
The decision of the court to commence the arrangement procedure is likewise not an act of the granting authority.
Denne afgørelse tillod kun modtageren og dennes kreditorer at gå videre med forhandlingerne om ordningen, men udgjorde klart ikke den bevilgende begivenhed.
This decision only permitted the beneficiary and his creditors to proceed with negotiations on the arrangement, but clearly did not constitute the granting event.
Der foreligger intet bevis for, at skattedirektoratet skulle have givet udtryk for sin enighed i den omstridte foranstaltning på mødet i december 2003.
There is no evidence that the Tax Directorate would have expressed its agreement with the disputed measure at the meeting in December 2003.
De slovakiske myndigheder benægtede tværtimod, at der skulle have foreligget en sådan foreløbig aftale.
On the contrary, the Slovak authorities denied any such preliminary agreement.
Brevet af 3. februar 2004 afviser udtrykkeligt forslaget om 35 % ordningen.
The letter of 3 February 2004 is explicit in refusing to accept the proposal to settle at the level of 35 %.
Den kompetente myndigheds beslutning om at give afkald på nogle af sine krav blev truffet den 9. juli 2004, da skattekontoret accepterede den ordning, der blev foreslået af modtageren.
The decision of the competent authority to write off some of its claims was taken on 9 July 2004, when the tax office agreed to the arrangement proposed by the beneficiary.
Spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt foranstaltningen er gældende efter tiltrædelsen, er derfor ikke længere relevant.
Accordingly, the question of whether the measure is applicable after accession no longer arises.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at den er kompetent til at vurdere den omstridte foranstaltning i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 88.
The Commission therefore concludes that it is competent to assess the disputed measure pursuant to Article 88 of the EC Treaty.
Statsstøtte som omhandlet i EF-traktatens Artikel 87, stk. 1
State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty
I henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, er statsstøtte eller støtte, som ydes ved hjælp af statsmidler under enhver tænkelig form, og som fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene ved at begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner, uforenelig med fællesmarkedet i det omfang, den påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty states that any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods and affects trade between Member States is incompatible with the common market.
Indtil de begivenheder, som udløste insolvensproceduren, opererede modtageren på markedet for produktion af alkohol og alkoholholdige drikkevarer, alkoholfri drikkevarer samt frugt og grønsager på dåse.
Until the events that triggered the insolvency procedure, the beneficiary operated in the market for the production of spirit and spirit-based beverages, non-alcoholic beverages and canned fruit and vegetables.
I 2003 var modtageren den tredjestørste producent af alkohol og alkoholholdige drikkevarer i Slovakiet.
In 2003 it was the third-largest producer of spirit and spirit-based beverages in Slovakia.
Siden inddragelsen af tilladelsen til produktion af alkohol og alkoholholdige drikkevarer i marts 2004 har modtageren været aktiv på engrosmarkedet for alkohol og alkoholholdige drikkevarer produceret af et andet selskab, Old Herold, s.r.o., som anvender de produktionsfaciliteter, det lejer af modtageren.
Since the loss of its licence for the production of spirit and spirit-based beverages in March 2004, it has been active on the wholesale market for spirit and spirit-based beverages produced by another company, Old Herold, s.r.o., using the production facilities it rents from the beneficiary.
Alle segmenter, hvor modtageren var aktiv før kreditorproceduren, og hvor den er aktiv i øjeblikket, er omfattet af samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
In all segments in which the beneficiary was active prior to the arrangement procedure and in which it is active at present there is trade between Member States.
I beslutningen om at indlede den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure rejste Kommissionen tvivl om, hvorvidt foranstaltningen fordrejede eller truede med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene ved at give modtageren en fordel, som selskabet normalt ikke ville kunne opnå på markedet.
In the decision to open the formal investigation procedure, the Commission raised doubts as to whether the measure distorted or threatened to distort competition by conferring on the beneficiary an advantage that it would normally not be able to obtain on the market.
Kommissionen tvivlede med andre ord på, om staten havde opført sig som en markedsøkonomisk kreditor i forhold til modtageren.
In other words, the Commission had doubts as to whether the State had behaved as a market economy creditor in relation to the beneficiary.
Det blev fastslået, at ordningen indeholdt de samme gældssaneringsvilkår for både de private kreditorer og skattekontoret.
It was established that the arrangement contained the same debt arrangement conditions for both the private creditors and the tax office.
35 % af gælden skulle udbetales til kreditorerne inden for en fastsat periode — et krav, som modtageren opfyldte.
The creditors were to be paid 35 % of the debt within a prescribed period, a requirement with which the beneficiary complied.
De resterende 65 % blev afskrevet.
The remaining 65 % was written off.
Før ordningen var skattekontoret imidlertid i en juridisk og økonomisk mere fordelagtig position end kreditorerne.
However, prior to the arrangement, the tax office was in a legally and economically more advantageous position than the creditors before the arrangement.
Det er derfor nødvendigt at undersøge i detaljer, om skattekontoret brugte alle disponible midler for at opnå den størst mulige tilbagebetaling af sine tilgodehavender, som en markedsøkonomisk kreditor ville gøre.
It therefore needs to be examined in detail whether the tax office used all the means at its disposal to obtain the highest possible repayment of its receivables, as a market economy creditor would do.
For at fastslå, om det markedsøkonomiske kreditorprincip blev overholdt, skal Kommissionen fastslå, om skattekontoret opnåede mere ved at acceptere den ordning, som modtageren havde foreslået, end ved en konkursprocedure eller en skattefuldbyrdelsesprocedure.
In order to determine whether the market economy creditor test was met, the Commission has to determine whether the tax office was better off accepting the conditions of the arrangement as proposed by the beneficiary compared with the possible outcome of a bankruptcy procedure or a tax execution procedure.
Den Slovakiske Republik fremfører kort sagt, at foranstaltningen efter dens opfattelse skal betragtes som statsstøtte.
In brief, the Slovak Republic submits that, in its view, the measure constitutes state aid.
Den erkender, at spørgsmålet om statsstøtte ganske enkelt ikke blev overvejet på det tidspunkt, hvor ordningen blev iværksat.
It acknowledges that, at the time of the arrangement, the question of state aid was simply not considered.
I modsætning hertil fremfører modtageren, at foranstaltningen ikke omfatter støtte, og fremlægger især ovennævnte rapporter fra to revisorer.
Contrary to this, the beneficiary argues that the measure is free of aid and submits documents described above, in particular reports from two auditors.
På grundlag af de oplysninger, som både modtageren og de slovakiske myndigheder har fremlagt, har Kommissionen med hensyn til modtagerens økonomiske situation i det pågældende år fastslået følgende forhold, der er relevante for anvendelsen af det markedsøkonomiske kreditorprincip.
On the basis of the information submitted by both the beneficiary and the Slovak authorities, the Commission established the following facts on the financial situation of the beneficiary in the year in question to the extent relevant for the application of the market economy creditor test.
Kommissionen kan ikke kontrollere modtagerens tal pr. 31. marts 2004 og de slovakiske myndigheders tal pr. 17. juni 2004 på grundlag af modtagerens regnskaber.
The figures as at 31 March 2004 provided by the beneficiary and the figures as at 17 June 2004 provided by the Slovak authorities cannot be verified by the Commission in the beneficiary's accounts.
Kommissionen har imidlertid ingen grund til at betvivle disse tal.
The Commission, however, has no reason to doubt any of these data.
Modtagerens økonomiske situation 2003-04 [mio. SKK]
Financial situation of the beneficiary 2003-04 [SKK million]
Langfristede aktiver [20]
Non-current assets [20]
Lagerbeholdning
Stocks
Kortfristede handelstilgodehavender
Short-term commercial receivables
Kommissionen vil først undersøge den dokumentation, modtageren har fremlagt til støtte for sin udtalelse om, at konkursproceduren ville have stillet skattekontoret ringere end kreditorproceduren.
The Commission will first examine the evidence submitted by the beneficiary in support of its opinion that the bankruptcy procedure would leave the tax office worse off than the arrangement procedure.
Eftersom hverken de slovakiske myndigheder eller modtageren har fremlagt nogen beregning angående skattefuldbyrdelsesproceduren, vil Kommissionen undersøge, hvad skattekontoret kunne have opnået via denne procedure.
As neither the Slovak authorities nor the beneficiary submitted any calculation with regard to the tax execution procedure, the Commission will examine what the tax office could have obtained via this procedure.
Endelig vil den undersøge indirekte beviser, som både de slovakiske myndigheder og modtageren har fremlagt.
Finally, it will examine circumstantial evidence submitted by both the Slovak authorities and the beneficiary.
Sammenligning af kreditor- og konkursproceduren
Comparison of the arrangement procedure and bankruptcy
Kommissionen anser ikke EKORDA-rapporten for et pålideligt sammenligningsgrundlag for den foreslåede ordning og en eventuel konkursprocedure.
The Commission does not consider the EKORDA report a reliable basis for comparing the proposed arrangement with a potential bankruptcy procedure.
De slovakiske myndigheder deler Kommissionens betænkeligheder.
The Slovak authorities share these doubts.
Indledningsvis noterer Kommissionen, at EKORDA ved udgivelsen af sin rapport den 7. juli 2004 (kun to dage før kreditorernes møde) lagde modtagerens aktiver pr. 31. marts 2004 til grund for sine beregninger.
At the outset, the Commission notes that, in issuing its report on 7 July 2004 (just two days before the creditors' meeting), EKORDA used for its calculations the status of the beneficiary's assets as at 31 March 2004.
Det fremgår klart af tabel 3, at de forskellige aktivers niveau ændredes betydeligt efter 31. marts 2004.
It is clear from Table 3 that the level of the various assets changed considerably after 31 March 2004.
Især blev en betydelig del af lagerbeholdningen solgt, hvilket førte til en øget kontantbeholdning.
In particular, a considerable portion of the stocks was sold, which led to an increase in cash.
Disse ændringer er af stor betydning for anvendelsen af EKORDA's likvidationsfaktorer, som strækker sig fra 20 % for lagerbeholdning og kortfristede tilgodehavender til 100 % for kontanter.
These changes are of great importance when applying EKORDA's liquidation factors, ranging from 20 % for stocks and short-time receivables to 100 % for cash.
Hvis det antages, at EKORDA's likvidationsfaktorer er korrekte, og man anvender EKORDA's metode, viser følgende tabel, at resultatet af EKORDA's beregning ville have været anderledes, hvis den havde været baseret på tal fra 28. april 2004 og 17. juni 2004, dvs. stadig før kreditorernes møde den 9. juli 2004.
Assuming that the liquidation factors estimated by EKORDA are correct and applying the methodology used by EKORDA, the following table shows how the outcome of EKORDA's calculation would have been different if based on figures from 28 April 2004 and 17 June 2004, i.e. still before the creditors' meeting on 9 July 2004.
Disse tal viser også, at EKORDA's likvidationsfaktorer ikke er realistiske.
These figures also show that the liquidation factors proposed by EKORDA are not realistic.
Sammenligning af det sandsynlige provenu af salget af modtagerens aktiver ved en konkursprocedure [mio. SKK]
Comparison of the probable yield from the sale of the beneficiary's assets in a bankruptcy procedure [SKK million]
Situation den:
Situation on:
Likvidationsfaktor [ %]
Liquidation factor [ %]
Provenu
Yield
Langfristede aktiver
Non-current assets
Det skal bemærkes, at den forretningsplan, som modtageren har forelagt domstolen, omfatter salg af lagerbeholdning for [mindre end 150] mio. SKK over perioden marts-maj 2004.
It must be noted that the business plan submitted by the beneficiary to the court forecast the sale of stocks at [less than SKK 150] million over the period March-May 2004.
EKORDA må derfor have været klar over, at modtagerens aktiver ville undergå betydelige ændringer efter 31. marts 2004, men tog ikke hensyn til det.
EKORDA must have therefore been aware that the assets of the beneficiary would be subject to significant changes after 31 March 2004 and did not take this into account.
Hvis EKORDA havde taget hensyn til den bogførte værdi af modtagerens aktiver fra 28. april 2004, ville det være nået frem til den konklusion, at udbyttet ved konkurs ville have været højere (238 mio. SKK; 6,3 mio. EUR) end det, som modtageren foreslog i ordningen (225 mio. SKK; 5,93 mio. EUR).
If EKORDA had taken into account the book value of the beneficiary's assets from 28 April 2004, it would have arrived at the conclusion that the yield obtained in bankruptcy would have been higher (SKK 238 million; EU-6,3 million) than what the beneficiary proposed in the arrangement (SKK 225 million; EUR 5,93 million.