natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Indtil december 2002 ejede Universal Leaf Tobacco Company Inc. (Universal Leaf), der er et helejet datterselskab af Universal Corporation, 90 % af Taes' aktier.
Until December 2002 Universal Leaf Tobacco Company Inc., (Universal Leaf), a wholly owned subsidiary of Universal Corporation, held 90 % of Tae’s shares.
Siden december 2002 har Taes været et helejet datterselskab af Universal Leaf.
Since December 2002, Taes is a wholly owned subsidiary of Universal Leaf.
I 2001 aftog Taes ca. 1,6 % af den råtobak, der blev afsat i Spanien det pågældende år.
In 2001 Taes bought around 1,6 % of the raw tobacco bought in Spain that year.
Deltafina er et helejet datterselskab af Universal Corporation i Italien og dermed Taes' søsterselskab.
Deltafina is the wholly owned subsidiary of Universal Corporation in Italy and hence the sister company of Taes.
Det er ansvarligt for Universal-koncernens aktiviteter i Europa.
It is responsible for the activities of the Universal group in Europe.
Det køber størstedelen af den tobak, som Taes aftager i Spanien, samt en betydelig del af to andre spanske forarbejdningsvirksomheders tobak.
It purchases most of the tobacco bought by Taes in Spain as well as a significant part of two other Spanish processors’ tobacco.
Beslutningen er også rettet til WWTE's og Agroexpansións moderselskaber, da de hæfter solidarisk for datterselskabernes adfærd.
WWTE’s and Agroexpanión’s parent companies are also addressees for being jointly and severally liable of the behaviour of the subsidiaries.
Efter høringen af parterne besluttede Kommissionen at indstille proceduren med hensyn til Universal Corporation, Universal Leaf, Intabex og ANETAB.
Following the hearing of the parties, the Commission decided to close the proceedings against Universal Corporation, Universal Leaf, Intabex and ANETAB.
For de tre førstnævntes vedkommende mente Kommissionen ikke, at den havde tilstrækkelige beviser på, at de havde øvet afgørende indflydelse på Deltafina og Taes (for Universal Corporations og Universal Leafs vedkommende) og Agroexpansión (for Intabex' vedkommende).
For Universal Corporation, Universal Leaf and Intabex, the Commission considered that it had not sufficient evidence of their exercising decisive influence on Deltafina and Taes (as far as Universal Corporation and Universal Leaf are concerned) and Agroexpansión (as far as Intabex is concerned).
Den fastslog dog, at Agroexpansións øverste moderselskab, Dimon, var ansvarligt.
Liability is nonetheless found in respect of Dimon, Agroexpansión’s ultimate parent.
Hvad ANETAB angår, mente Kommissionen ikke, at der forelå tilstrækkelige beviser på, at ANETAB's adfærd var adskilt fra dens medlemmers adfærd.
For ANETAB, the Commission considered that it did not have sufficient evidence that ANETAB’s behaviour was distinct from the behaviour of its four member companies.
Beslutningen er også rettet til tre landbrugsforeninger (ASAJA, UPA og COAG) og sammenslutningen af landbrugskooperativer, CCAE, der alle repræsenterer tobaksproducenterne.
The decision is also addressed to three agricultural union organisations (ASAJA, UPA, and COAG) and the confederation of agricultural cooperatives, CCAE, all representing tobacco producers.
Efter høringen af parterne besluttede Kommissionen at indstille proceduren med hensyn til FNCT, ACOTAB og TABARES, idet den konkluderede, at de handlede som sektorafdelinger af ASAJA (hvad FNCT angår) og UPA (hvad ACOTAB og TABARES angår).
Following the hearing of the parties, the Commission decided to close the proceedings against FNCT, ACOTAB and TABARES, having concluded that they acted as sectoral branches of ASAJA (as far as FNCT is concerned) and UPA (as far as ACOTAB and TABARES are concerned).
DEN BERØRTE SEKTOR: SPANSK RÅTOBAK
THE SECTOR CONCERNED: SPANISH RAW TOBACCO
Produktionen af råtobak i EU udgør ca. 5 % af råtobakproduktionen på verdensplan.
The production of raw tobacco in the EU represents approximately 5 % of raw tobacco production worldwide.
Råtobakproduktionen i EU er undergivet en kvoteordning (se nedenfor).
Production of raw tobacco in the EU is subject to a quota system (see below).
Den råtobak, som fremstilles af avlerne, er ikke noget ensartet produkt.
Raw tobacco, as produced by growers, is not a homogeneous product.
EU-retten anerkender otte forskellige sorter.
Community law recognises eight different varieties.
I Spanien er Bright den almindeligste sort.
In Spain, Bright is the most common variety.
REGLER FOR RÅTOBAK
THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Den fælles markedsordning for råtobak blev indført i 1970 ved Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 727/70 [4].
The common organisation of the market in raw tobacco (CMO for raw tobacco) was established in 1970 by Council Regulation (EEC) No 727/70 [4].
Den blev i 1992 afløst af Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 2075/92 [5], der blev ændret væsentligt i 1998 ved Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1636/98 [6] og Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 2848/98 [7].Den fælles markedsordning for råtobak omfatter i) en produktionskvoteordning og ii) støtte til producenterne gennem en præmieordning for produktion af råtobak.
It was replaced in 1992 by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2075/92 [5] and substantially amended in 1998 by Council Regulation (EC) No 1636/98 [6] and Commission Regulation (EC) No 2848/98 [7].The CMO in the raw tobacco sector provides for (i) a production quota system and (ii) support of producers’ income through a premium system for the production of raw tobacco.
Der ydes kun præmier for tobak, der fremstilles inden for kvoten (med visse tilpasninger).
Premium is only granted in respect of tobacco produced within the quota (with certain adjustments).
Siden 1998 har udbetalingen af den del af fællesskabspræmien (den såkaldte variable del) været knyttet til tobakkens kvalitet, som afspejles i prisen.
Since 1998, the payment of part of the Community premium (so-called variable part) has been linked to the quality of the tobacco produced which is reflected in the price.
Ifølge den fælles markedsordning skal hver producent eller producentsammenslutning og hver virksomhed, der foretager den første forarbejdning, indgå såkaldte »dyrkningskontrakter« ved begyndelsen af hvert produktionsår (omkring marts-maj, når tobaksplanterne udplantes), hvor de aftaler »kontraktpriser« for hver kvalitet inden for de enkelte sorter.
The CMO requires each producer or producers’ group and each first processor to enter into so-called ‘cultivation contracts’ at the start of each year’s campaign (around March-May, when tobacco seedlings are transplanted) where they agree on ‘contract prices’ for each quality grade for each individual variety.
På dette trin angives priserne ofte som et prisinterval.
At this stage, prices are often expressed as a price range.
I Spanien angives kontraktpriserne som en række prisgafler for de forskellige kvaliteter inden for en bestemt tobakssort (f.eks. Bright).
In Spain, contract prices are in fact expressed as a series of price brackets for the various quality grades of a particular tobacco variety (e.g. Bright).
Prisgaflerne i dyrkningskontrakterne er ret brede.
The price brackets featuring in the cultivation contracts are quite wide.
Det skal dog bemærkes, at den endelige pris (eller »leveringsprisen«) først kan fastsættes, når høsten finder sted (dvs. mellem oktober og januar), og at den kan variere betydeligt i forhold til »dyrkningskontraktprisen«, afhængigt af kvalitet, mængder og yderligere forhandlinger.
To note, however, that the final price (or delivery price) can only be determined when the harvest takes place (i.e. between October and January) and can vary significantly from the cultivation contract price, depending on quality, quantities and further bargaining.
EU-retten fremmer oprettelsen af brancheorganisationer, hvor producenter og forarbejdningsvirksomheder kan samarbejde om at få markedet til at fungere effektivt.
Community law favours the creation of inter-branch organisations within which producers and processors should cooperate for the efficient operation of the market.
Fastsættelse af priser og kvoter er udtrykkeligt forbudt.
Practices consisting of the fixing of prices and quotas are expressly forbidden.
Ingen af de sammenslutninger, der er involveret i denne sag, er brancheorganisationer i EU-rettens forstand.
None of the associations involved in this case are inter-branch organisations within the meaning of Community law.
I Spanien er forhandling og indgåelse af standarddyrkningskontrakter mellem producentrepræsentanterne og forarbejdningsvirksomhederne reguleret ved lov af 1982 og kongeligt dekret af 1985.
In Spain, a 1982 Law and a Royal Decree of 1985 discipline the bargaining and the conclusion of standard cultivation contracts between producers’ representatives and processors.
Formålet med disse overordnede regler (herefter også landbrugsministeriets tiltag) var (indtil 2000) at anspore producenter og forarbejdningsvirksomheder til fælles forhandlinger om »dyrkningskontraktpriserne«.
The purpose of this overall regulatory framework (to include the action taken by the Agriculture Ministry thereafter) was (until the year 2000) to at least encourage joint negotiations between producers and processors on the cultivation ‘contract prices’.
Fra 2000 har en ny lov krævet, at de kontraherende parter aftaler kontraktpriserne individuelt.
Since 2000, a new law requires that the parties to cultivation contracts must individually agree the contract prices.
DEN PRAKSIS, BESLUTNINGEN VEDRØRER
PRACTICES ADDRESSED IN THE DECISION
Forarbejdningskartellet
The processors’ cartel
De fire spanske forarbejdningsvirksomheder og Deltafina aftalte den (maksimale) gennemsnitspris, de skulle betale ved levering for hver tobakssort, uanset kvaliteten ((maksimal) gennemsnitlig leveringspris), og de mængder tobak, som de hver især kunne aftage.
The four Spanish processors and Deltafina agreed on the (maximum) average price they would pay at delivery for each variety of tobacco, irrespective of quality grades ((maximum) average delivery price) and the quantities of tobacco that each of them could buy.
Herigennem ønskede forarbejdningsvirksomhederne at undgå, at forhandlingerne med producenterne på leveringstidspunktet kunne presse priserne op over et niveau, de ville finde acceptabelt.
By so doing the processors aimed at avoiding that negotiation with producers at delivery could push prices beyond the level they would consider acceptable.
Beslutningen omfatter perioden 1996-2001.
The period covered by the decision is 1996-2001.
Fra 1998 anvendte de også et avanceret kontrol- og håndhævelsessystem (herunder regelmæssig informationsudveksling og obligatoriske tobaksoverførsler) vedrørende deres respektive adfærd ved leveringen.
Since 1998, they also put in place a sophisticated monitoring and enforcement mechanism (including regular exchanges of information and mandatory transfers of tobacco) concerning their respective behaviour during delivery.
Fra 1999 til 2001 aftalte forarbejdningsvirksomhederne også indbyrdes »kontraktpriserne« (prisgafler og yderligere betingelser), som de ville foreslå producentrepræsentanterne under forhandlingerne om den årlige standarddyrkningskontrakt.
As from 1999 to 2001, processors also agreed among themselves the ‘contract prices’ (price brackets and additional conditions) which they would then propose to producer representatives during the negotiation of the annual standard cultivation contract.
Producentkartellet
The producers’ cartel
Producentrepræsentanterne aftalte de »kontraktpriser« (prisgafler og yderligere betingelser), som de ville foreslå forarbejdningsvirksomhederne under forhandlingerne om standarddyrkningskontrakten.
The producer representatives agreed on the ‘contract prices’ (price brackets and additional conditions) which they would then propose to processors during the negotiation of the standard cultivation contract.
Med hensyn til de yderligere prisbetingelser er der tale om gennemsnitlige mindstepriser pr. producent og pr. producentsammenslutning for hver tobakssort uanset de forskellige kvaliteter.
As to the additional price conditions, they take the form of minimum average prices per producer as well as per producers group for each variety of tobacco, irrespective of the various quality grades.
Det skal bemærkes, at de gennemsnitlige mindstepriser pr. producentsammenslutning i sagens natur stadig ville kunne stige efter forhandlingerne på leveringstidspunktet.
To note that, by their very nature, average minimum prices per producers group would still be open to increase following negotiation at delivery.
Kommissionen fastslår i beslutningen, at ovennævnte praksis skal betragtes som to særskilte (og vedvarende) overtrædelser af traktatens artikel 81.
In the decision, the Commission finds that the practices described above constitute two separate (single and continuous) infringements of Article 81 of the Treaty.
Alle de deltagere i overtrædelserne, som beslutningen er rettet til, er virksomheder eller virksomhedssammenslutninger som omhandlet i traktatens artikel 81.
All the participants in the infringements to which the decision is addressed are undertakings, associations of undertakings or associations of associations of undertakings within the meaning of Article 81 of the Treaty.
Aftaler og/eller samordnet praksis, der direkte eller indirekte medfører fastsættelse af salgspriser eller fordeling af mængder, er ifølge sagens natur konkurrencebegrænsende.
Agreements and/or concerted practice which directly or indirectly fix transaction prices or share quantities are by their very object restrictive of competition.
Disse former for praksis er specielt omhandlet i EF-traktatens artikel 81, stk. 1.
These conducts are specifically envisaged under Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty.
En sådan adfærd kan påvirke samhandelen mellem Spanien og andre medlemsstater, da den omfatter hele det spanske marked og vedrører et produkt (råtobak), som er et mellemprodukt til forarbejdet tobak, der eksporteres i vid udstrækning.
Such conducts are capable, at least potentially, to have an impact on the trade between Spain and other Member States, as they cover the entirety of the Spanish market and relate to a product (raw tobacco) which is an intermediate product of processed tobacco, a product which is largely exported.
Beslutningen rejser spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt Rådets forordning nr. 26 af 4. april 1962 om anvendelse af visse konkurrenceregler inden for produktion og handel med landbrugsvarer [8] (forordning nr. 26) kan anvendes på den omhandlede praksis.
The decision addresses the issue of the application of Council Regulation No 26 of 4 April 1962 applying certain rules on competition to production of and trade in agricultural products [8] (Regulation No 26) to the practices which are being considered.
Endelig konkluderes det i beslutningen, at hverken national lovgivning eller ministeriel praksis forpligtede forarbejdningsvirksomhederne til at aftale maksimale gennemsnitlige leveringspriser for råtobak eller at opdele de mængder tobak, der skulle aftages af de enkelte forarbejdningsvirksomheder.
Finally, the decision concludes that neither national law nor the Ministerial practice obliged the processors to agree on the maximum delivery average price for raw tobacco or to share out quantities of tobacco to be bought by each processor.
Den krævede heller ikke, at forarbejdningsvirksomhederne og producenterne kollektivt skulle aftale »kontraktpriserne« (prisgafler eller yderligere betingelser) og udelukkede heller ikke alle muligheder for konkurrence mellem dem.
Moreover, such regulatory framework did not require processors and producers to agree collectively on the ‘contract prices’ (price brackets or additional conditions) nor did it remove all possibility of competitive behaviour on their part.
Aftalerne og/eller den samordnede praksis mellem producentrepræsentanterne på den ene side og forarbejdningsvirksomhederne på den anden falder derfor ind under traktatens artikel 81, stk. 1.
Consequently, the agreements and/or concerted practices between the producer representatives, on the one hand, and the processors, on the other, are caught by Article 81(1) of the Treaty.
DET ANSVAR, DER PÅHVILER DELTAFINA SAMT WWTE'S OG AGROEXPANSIÓNS MODERSELSKABER
LIABILITY OF DELTAFINA AND THE MOTHER COMPANIES OF WWTE AND AGROEXPANSIÓN
Beslutningen fastslår, at Deltafina, på trods af, at selskabet ikke var nogen aktiv forarbejdningsvirksomhed i Spanien, deltog fuldt ud i forarbejdningskartellet, fordi det spillede en vigtig rolle på det spanske marked for råtobak af bl.a. følgende årsager: 1) selskabet var tre af de spanske forarbejdningsvirksomheders største kunde, 2) det var den absolut største aftager af tobak i Spanien, og 3) det var datterselskab af Universal-koncernen med ansvar for det europæiske marked.
The decision finds that Deltafina fully participated in the processors’ cartel, in spite of not being an active processor in Spain, by playing a preponderant role in the Spanish raw tobacco market by virtue of several circumstances, among which: 1. its being the most important customer of three of the Spanish processors, 2. its being the ultimate biggest buyer of tobacco in Spain and 3. its being the subsidiary of the Universal group responsible for the European market.
Beslutningen fastslår også, at Dimon (for Agroexpansión) og SCC, TCLT og SCTC (for WWTE) øvede afgørende indflydelse på deres datterselskaber i den pågældende periode og derfor bør hæfte solidarisk for deres datterselskabers adfærd.
The decision also finds that Dimon (for Agroexpansión) and SCC, TCLT and SCTC (for WWTE) exercised decisive influence on their subsidiaries during the period considered and should therefore be held jointly and severally liable for their subsidiary’s conduct.
Ved vurderingen af overtrædelsernes grovhed må der tages hensyn til, at produktionen af råtobak i Spanien udgør 12 % af EU's produktion.
In assessing the gravity of the infringements, account must be taken of the fact that the production of raw tobacco in Spain accounts for 12 % of the Community production.
Markedet er forholdsvis beskedent (i 2001 blev der købt tobak i Spanien for ca. 25 mio. EUR) og er ret koncentreret i et enkelt område i Spanien, nemlig Extremadura.
The size of the market is rather small (in 2001 the value of tobacco bought in Spain was around EUR 25 million) and quite concentrated in one region of Spain: Extremadura.
Overtrædelserne anses dog for at være meget alvorlige, da der er tale om fastsættelse af priserne på råtobaksorterne i Spanien og (hvad forarbejdningsvirksomhederne angår) fordeling af mængderne.
However, the nature of the infringements is considered as very serious, since it concerns the fixing of the prices of the varieties of raw tobacco in Spain and (as far as the processors are concerned) the sharing out of quantities.
Selv om Kommissionen ikke er i besiddelse af afgørende beviser på, hvordan producenternes og forarbejdningsvirksomhedernes overtrædelser rent faktisk har påvirket markedet, kan det siges, at forarbejdningskartellet i hvert fald siden 1998 blev anvendt og håndhævet fuldt ud og må have haft en reel indvirkning på markedet.
Although the Commission does not possess conclusive evidence of the actual effects of the producers’ and processors’ infringements on the market; it can be said that at least since 1998, the processors’ cartel was fully implemented and enforced and was liable to have a real impact on the market.
På grundlag af ovenstående konkluderer Kommissionen, at de to overtrædelser må betragtes som meget alvorlige.
On the basis of the considerations above, the Commission concludes that both infringements must be qualified as very serious.
Ved fastsættelsen af bødernes grundbeløb tager den dog hensyn til, at markedet er af forholdsvis begrænset størrelse.
The Commission however takes account of the relatively limited size of the market when setting the starting amount of the fines.
Hvad forarbejdningskartellet angår (herunder Deltafina), mener Kommissionen, at bøderne bør stå i forhold til de enkelte implicerede parters bidrag til den ulovlige adfærd og deres markedsstilling.
As far as the processors’ cartel (to include Deltafina) is concerned, the Commission considers that fines should be scaled down in consideration of the contribution to the illegal conduct of and the market position enjoyed by each party involved.
På denne baggrund konkluderer Kommissionen, at Deltafina som udgangspunkt bør pålægges den højeste bøde på grund af sin stærke markedsstilling, jf. punkt 8 ovenfor.
Bearing this in mind, the Commission concludes that Deltafina should receive the highest starting amount for its prominent market position as explained above under 8.
De spanske forarbejdningsvirksomheders bidrag til den ulovlige adfærd kan anses for at have været stort set ens.
The contribution to the illegal conduct by the Spanish processors can be broadly taken as having been similar.
Bødernes grundbeløb bør dog tage hensyn til virksomhedernes forskellige størrelse og markedsandele.
The starting amounts should however take into account the different size and the market shares of each processor involved.
Med en andel på ca. 67 % af markedet for køb af spansk råtobak er Cetarsa langt den førende spanske virksomhed, når det gælder den første forarbejdning af råtobak, og bør placeres i en kategori for sig selv og pålægges den højeste bøde.
With a market share of around 67 % of the market for the purchase of Spanish raw tobacco, Cetarsa is by far the leading Spanish first processor and should be placed in a category of its own and receive the highest starting amount of the fine.
Agroexpansión og WWTE har begge markedsandele på ca. 15 % og bør som udgangspunkt pålægges den samme bøde.
Agroexpansión and WWTE have both market shares of approximately 15 % each and should receive the same starting amount of fine.
Endelig bør Taes, som er den absolut mindste deltagende forarbejdningsvirksomhed med en markedsandel på 1,6 % pålægges den laveste bøde.
Finally, Taes, by far the smallest processor involved, with a market share of only 1,6 % should receive the lowest starting amount.
Da Agroexpansión og WWTE indgår i store koncerner, som denne beslutning også er rettet til, anvendes der en multiplikatorfaktor på henholdsvis 2 og 11/2 på deres bøder for at sikre en tilstrækkelig præventiv virkning.
As Agroexpansión and WWTE are part of large groups that are also addressees of the Decision, a multiplying factor is applied to their fines to ensure sufficient deterrence of 2 and 11/2 respectively.
Hvad producentrepræsentanternes adfærd angår, konkluderer beslutningen, at de af nedenstående årsager kun bør pålægges en symbolsk bøde.
Concerning the producer representatives’ behaviour, the Decision concludes that only a symbolic fine is appropriate for the following reasons.
Selv om de gældende nationale regler ikke pålagde producentrepræsentanterne og forarbejdningsvirksomhederne at aftale prisgafler og yderligere betingelser i fællesskab, blev det nævnt i »standarddyrkningskontrakterne«, der blev forhandlet fra 1995 til 1998, at alle producentrepræsentanterne skulle forhandle i fællesskab med hver enkelt forarbejdningsvirksomhed om prislisterne og de yderligere betingelser for tobakssalget.
Although the applicable national rules did not require the producer representatives and the processors to agree jointly on the price brackets and the additional conditions, the standard ‘cultivation contracts’ negotiated between 1995 and 1998 mentioned that all the producer representatives would negotiate jointly with each individual processor the price schedules and the additional conditions relating to the sale of tobacco.
I 1999 godkendte landbrugsministeriet endog de prislister, der allerede var blevet forhandlet i fællesskab af alle producentrepræsentanterne og de fire forarbejdningsvirksomheder.
In 1999 the Agriculture Ministry even approved the price schedules that had already been negotiated jointly by all the producer representatives and the four processors.
Disse lister var vedføjet som bilag til den »standardkontrakt«, der blev offentliggjort i den spanske statstidende det pågældende år.
These schedules were annexed to the ‘standard’ contract published in the Official Gazette that year.