natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Rent proceduremæssigt fastholdt Østrig, at Kommissionen ikke kunne tage denne klage til behandling, da konsortiet, som hidtil ikke havde været aktivt på det europæiske bankmarked og derfor slet ikke var en konkurrent, ikke kunne betragtes som en »interesseret part« som defineret i artikel 1, litra h), i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999 af 22. marts 1999 om fastlæggelse af regler for anvendelsen af EF-traktatens artikel 93 [nu 88] [20].
On procedural grounds, Austria maintained that the Commission should not go into the details of this complaint as the Consortium, which had not yet entered the European banking market and was therefore not even a competitor, could not be regarded as an ‘interested party’ within the meaning of Article 1(h) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 [now Article 88] of the EC Treaty [20].
Enhver påstået diskrimination var et spørgsmål om fri etablering og frie kapitalbevægelser, og man kunne ikke tiltvinge sig adgang til det europæiske bankmarked via en statsstøttesag.
Any alleged discrimination would, rather, be linked with the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital; entry into the European banking market could not be obtained via a State aid procedure.
Desuden måtte Kommissionen også tænke på, at konsortiet ikke var begyndt at operere efter Kommissionens åbningsbeslutning og offentligt havde udtalt, at det ikke længere var interesseret i at overtage banken.
The Commission should also take into consideration the fact that the Consortium was not active subsequent to the Commission’s opening decision and had made it publicly known that it no longer had any interest in acquiring the bank.
Ifølge Østrig ville Kommissionen overskride sine skønsbeføjelser, hvis den tog denne sag til behandling.
The Commission would be exceeding its discretionary powers by examining this case.
Østrig fremhævede, at de østrigske domstole omhyggeligt havde undersøgt sagens statsstøtteaspekter, afhørt alle vidner og undersøgt sagen til bunds og var kommet til det resultat, at udbudsproceduren havde været åben, fair og gennemsigtig.
Austria stressed that the Austrian courts had dealt extensively with the case under State aid law, had intensively heard witnesses, had fully evaluated the facts and had concluded that an open, fair and transparent tender procedure had been carried out.
Kommissionen burde have tilsluttet sig denne konklusion i stedet for at indlede formel procedure.
The Commission should have endorsed this view instead of opening a formal investigation procedure.
Generelle aspekter ved udbudsproceduren og dens udfald
General issues related to the tender procedure and its outcome
Udbudsprocedurens rammevilkår
The circumstances of the tender
Østrig betoner, at udbudsproceduren foregik åbent, fair og gennemsigtigt. Dette blev også bekræftet af de østrigske domstole, da de behandlede sagen.
Austria stressed that there had been an open, fair and transparent tender procedure, confirmed by the courts in Austria dealing with the matter.
Den endelige afgørelse blev ikke truffet før den 4. marts 2006.
The final decision was not taken before 4 March 2006.
Alle bydende havde fået samme muligheder for at skaffe sig alle oplysninger af relevans for deres »due diligence«-undersøgelse, også selv om de ikke havde udnyttet disse muligheder i samme omfang.
All parties had been given the same opportunities to obtain the information they needed for their due diligence, even if the parties did not use it in the same way.
Selv om man lige fra begyndelsen nærede betydelige betænkeligheder ved konsortiet, var det rimeligt at lade konsortiet deltage i udbudsproceduren så længe som muligt, i stedet for at udelukke det på grundlag af de retningsgivende bud.
Even though there had been strong reservations against the Consortium from the start, it was legitimate to keep the Consortium in the tender procedure as long as possible, instead of excluding it on the basis of the indicative offers.
Det var, hvad en markedsøkonomisk sælger ville have gjort, for derved at opnå den højst mulige pris gennem en forstærket konkurrence mellem de bydende.
Such behaviour was in keeping with that of a private vendor, who would thus increase competition between the bidders in order to drive the price as high as possible.
Desuden var Østrig også gået ud fra, at konsortiet som bebudet under forhandlingerne ville blive støttet af en økonomisk stærk forretningspartner.
In addition, Austria had kept expecting the Consortium to put itself forward as a financially strong business partner, as it had announced during the negotiations.
Det kunne have ændret situationen betydeligt.
Such a partner could have changed the situation substantially.
GRAWE har udtalt, at GRAWE under udbudsproceduren ikke fik nogen fortrinsbehandling, hverken fra delstatens eller fra det tyske finanstilsyns side.
GRAWE submitted that it could not perceive that it had been treated in a preferential manner during the tender procedure, either by the Province of Burgenland or by the Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA).
Indstillingen
The recommendation
Østrig fremfører, at der med indstillingen fra HSBC alene var tale om en sammenfatning af privatiseringsprocessen, og at den i sig selv ikke kunne betragtes som det eneste grundlag for den afgørelse, der blev truffet.
Austria pointed out that HSBC’s recommendation was no more than a summary of the privatisation process and could not in itself be regarded as the only basis for the decision taken.
Indstillingen skulle kun give et overblik over udbuddet og de indkomne bud.
The recommendation was only intended to give a short overview of the procedure and the offers.
Udfaldet var blevet mere indgående diskuteret med de beslutningstagende.
Its findings had been complemented by oral explanations given to the decision makers.
Ud over disse oplysninger havde Østrig også fået forelagt et notat, som HSBC havde udarbejdet for delstaten Burgenland til forberedelse af delstatens svar på Kommissionens første begæring om oplysninger af 12. april 2006, og som indeholdt en nærmere gennemgang af udfaldet.
Austria supplemented this information by providing a note which had been drafted by HSBC for the Province of Burgenland to help it prepare its reply to the Commission’s first request for information of 12 April 2006, and in which the findings were further commented on.
Ifølge Østrig skulle denne indstilling ikke betragtes som en sagkyndig rapport om bankens forretningsværdi, hvilket ikke kræves efter europæisk ret.
According to Austria, the recommendation should not be regarded as an expert opinion on the value of the bank, which was not required by European law.
Afgørelsen af 5. marts 2006 var i langt højere grad baseret på de hidtidige erfaringer fra de tidligere privatiseringsforsøg samt anbefalinger, mundtlige vurderinger og fortrolige udtalelser fra repræsentanter for HSBC.
The decision made on 5 March 2006 was instead based on experience acquired in the course of the privatisation process, the recommendation, oral valuations and confidential explanations by HSBC representatives.
Sammenligneligheden mellem GRAWE’s og konsortiets bud
The comparability of the offers by GRAWE and the Consortium
Både Østrig og også GRAWE har gentagne gange bragt sammenligneligheden mellem de to bud ind i billedet.
A number of elements in both the submissions by Austria and the comments by GRAWE address the comparability of the offers made by the two bidders.
I forbindelse med kompensationen for førtidig opsigelse af garantiaftalen af 20. juni 2000 har Østrig gjort gældende, at Kommissionen har misforstået aftalerne herom, der indgår i begge de to sidste bud.
As far as the compensation for early discharge (Vorfälligkeitsentschädigung) of the 4guarantee agreement of 20 June 2000 is concerned, Austria argued that the Commission had misinterpreted the relevant arrangements provided for in the offers of both final bidders.
Denne kompensation beroede på, at delstaten Burgenland ville indfri sine forpligtelser i henhold til garantiaftalen flere år før planlagt [21].
The compensation related to the fact that the Province of Burgenland would be making its payments under the guarantee agreement several years earlier than planned [21].
Men ifølge Østrig var denne kompensation, i modsætning til hvad Kommissionen syntes at mene, ikke en del af købsprisen.
This was not an element of the purchase price, as apparently assumed by the Commission.
Desuden ville denne ordning ikke anfægte den tidligere beslutning om BB’s omstrukturering, men derimod hjælpe med til at nedbringe den støtte, som Kommissionen dengang havde godkendt.
Furthermore, the scheme did not call the earlier decision on the restructuring of BB into question, but helped reduce the aid which had at the time been authorised by the Commission.
Med hensyn til de garantiklausuler angående statsstøtte og fristerne herfor, der indgik i salgsaftalerne med GRAWE og konsortiet, fremfører Østrig, at det var, hvad man forhandlede sig frem til med hver af de bydende.
In regard to the warranty clauses and the warranty periods provided for in the sales contracts with GRAWE and the Consortium, Austria argued that they were the result of the individually conducted negotiations with each party.
De forskelle, der var med hensyn til hæftelsesgrænser, fribeløb og garantifrister (to år for konsortiet og tre år for GRAWE), beroede ikke på nogen forskelsbehandling mellem de bydende.
The different arrangements in regard to the limits of liability, the amounts of exemption and the warranty periods (two years for the Consortium and three years for GRAWE) did not discriminate between bidders.
Det var kun i udkastet til salgsaftale med konsortiet, at der figurerede et årligt gebyr på 100000 EUR for Ausfallhaftung, som indtil 2017 skulle betales til delstaten Burgenland.
Only the draft contract with the Consortium stipulated an annual fee of EUR 100000 for Ausfallhaftung, to be paid until 2017 to the Province of Burgenland.
I aftalen med GRAWE var der ikke et sådant beløb, da det ifølge Østrig allerede var indregnet i GRAWE’s bud.
In explanation, Austria pointed out that the contract with GRAWE did not stipulate an annual fee as this was already included in the sales price offered by GRAWE.
Hvad angår udstedelsen af de nye obligationer, gjorde Østrig gældende, at bestyrelsens beslutning om, at banken ud over de obligationslån på 320 mio. EUR, der blev optaget i henhold til en beslutning fra september 2005 vedtaget på grundlag af forretningsplanen for BB, igen skulle udstede obligationer for 380 mio. EUR, blev truffet uafhængigt af den forestående privatisering og af, hvem der købte BB.
Concerning the issue of new bonds, Austria argued that the decision of the management board to issue new bonds to the amount of EUR 380 million, complementing the prior decision — based on the planning in BB’s business plan — to issue bonds worth EUR 320 million in September 2005, had been independent of the forthcoming privatisation and from the future owner of BB.
Delstaten Burgenland var af den opfattelse, at disse nye lån ikke havde nogen betydning for salget og havde derfor ikke nævnt dem i sit »Process Letter«.
The Province of Burgenland did not think that the issue of those additional bonds had been worth mentioning in the process letter, as this would not have been decisive for the sale.
Begge de bydende var dog under »due diligence«-undersøgelsen blevet orienteret om de nye obligationer, som skulle udstedes, uanset hvem køberen blev.
However, both bidders had been informed during the due diligence and the issue would have taken place regardless of the identity of the buyer.
Det var imidlertid kun GRAWE, der tog hensyn til dem i sit aftaleudkast.
GRAWE alone had incorporated this in its draft contract.
Østrig betonede, at de nye obligationslån på 380 mio. EUR blev emitteret for at udnytte de gunstige refinansieringsmuligheder inden for Ausfallhaftungs rammer bedst muligt.
Austria stressed that the issue of an additional EUR 380 million of bonds was done in order to benefit as much as possible from the favourable refinancing conditions under Ausfallhaftung.
Og det var gentagne gange blevet nævnt i forhandlingerne med konsortiet.
This had been mentioned repeatedly in the course of the negotiations with the Consortium.
Hvis BB var blevet solgt til konsortiet, ville konsortiet have fået meget større gavn af de bedre refinansieringsmuligheder end GRAWE.
Indeed, had BB been sold to the Consortium, it would have profited from the better refinancing conditions to a considerably higher extent than GRAWE as buyer.
Østrig pegede på, at BB’s refinansieringsomkostninger ville have været højere, hvis banken blev solgt til konsortiet, eftersom konsortiet i modsætning til GRAWE ikke har nogen rating og har hovedsæde i Ukraine, hvilket betød, at BB højst — om overhovedet — ville kunne opnå refinansiering på basis af en »hypotetisk« rating på »BB« eller »B«.
Austria argued that the refinancing conditions of BB in the event of a sale to the Consortium would have been more costly, given that GRAWE was rated and the Consortium was not only not rated, but had its seat in Ukraine and BB could therefore expect at most refinancing conditions for a — hypothetical — rating of ‘BB’ or ‘B’, if at all.
Med hensyn til den særskilte aftale med GRAWE om før handelens afslutning at overføre BB’s ejendomsselskaber til delstaten Burgenland til en pris svarende til deres bogførte værdi på 25 mio. EUR, gør Østrig gældende, at i betragtning af, at BB’s revisorer den 31. december 2005 havde bekræftet, at regnskabsværdien svarede til markedsværdien, ville dette udelukkende få indvirkning på likviditeten.
In regard to the special arrangement with GRAWE to transfer four of BB’s real estate subsidiaries back to the Province of Burgenland prior to closing at their book value of EUR 25 million, Austria pointed out that, given that BB’s auditor confirmed on 31 December 2005 that the market value of the property would be equal to its book value, this transfer would have only a liquidity effect.
Denne likviditetseffekt skulle der derfor ikke tages hensyn til ved sammenligningen mellem de to bud.
This liquidity effect therefore did not need to be taken into account in the comparison of the two offers.
Konsortiet havde tilbudt at indbetale 15 mio. EUR på en blokeret konto i den ukrainske bank Active Bank på dagen for kontraktens undertegnelse.
An advance payment of EUR 15 million into a trust account with Ukraine-based Active Bank on the day of signing of the contract was offered by the Consortium.
GRAWE ville betale hele købsprisen ved kontraktundertegnelsen.
GRAWE had to transfer the sales price in full on the day of closing.
Garantiklausulen angående statsstøtte i aftalen med GRAWE
The warranty clause concerning State aid in the contract with GRAWE
Østrig er af den opfattelse, at denne klausul, der også figurerede i salgsaftalen med konsortiet [22], er en normal del af købsvilkår og pris i den type handler og stemmer overens med statsstøttereglerne.
Austria took the view that the clause, which was also part of the draft contract with the Consortium [22], was standard in any sales contract in such transactions as part of the sales conditions and price and was in line with the State aid rules.
Den var i køberens interesse, for køberen af BB ville ikke være interesseret i at byde en højere pris, men ville i tilfælde af et tilbagebetalingskrav i en statsstøttesag kunne blive tvunget til at betale en højere pris.
It was in the legitimate interest of BB’s buyer, who had not been willing to bid a higher price and might be asked to pay more through a recovery order as a consequence of a State aid decision.
Desuden måtte Kommissionen tage hensyn til, at klausulen gav køberen ret til at hæve købet, hvis klausulen skulle vise sig at være ugyldig efter statsstøttereglerne.
Besides, the Commission should also take into account the fact that the clause included a right of the buyer to withdraw from the contract if the clause was invalid under the State aid rules.
GRAWE er af den opfattelse, at Kommissionens betænkeligheder er irrelevante, så længe der ikke er noget tilbagebetalingskrav.
According to GRAWE, the Commission’s doubts were irrelevant as long as there was no recovery order.
GRAWE pegede på, at en bydende i en udbudsprocedure kun har meget begrænsede muligheder for at forhindre en adfærd fra sælgers side, der kunne stride mod statsstøttereglerne.
GRAWE stressed that the buyer in a tender procedure had very limited means to prevent behaviour by a public seller that was potentially relevant to a State aid assessment.
Denne klausul ville efter GRAWE’s mening få staten til at overholde statsstøttereglerne, hvilket igen måtte være i Kommissionens interesse.
GRAWE considered that such a clause gave the State even more reason to comply with the State aid rules and was therefore in turn in the Commission’s interest.
Den af GRAWE betalte pris og dens overensstemmelse med markedsprisen
The market conformity of the sales price paid by GRAWE
Efter Østrigs opfattelse er det faktum, at der indkom tre retningsgivende bud, hvoraf GRAWE’s var det næstbedste, et bevis på, at der blev gennemført et åbent og gennemsigtigt udbud, der resulterede i, at banken blev solgt til markedsprisen.
According to Austria, the existence of an open and transparent tender procedure which produced the market price was demonstrated by the fact that three bidders came forward with an indicative offer, of which GRAWE’s offer was second.
Deraf kan man ifølge Østrig udlede, at GRAWE’s bud ikke lå under BB’s markedsværdi.
This indicated that GRAWE’s offer had not been below BB’s market value.
Østrig taler her om resultatet af det andet forsøg på at privatisere BB.
Austria referred to the outcome of the second attempt to privatise BB.
Alle fire bud lå dengang mellem 85 mio. EUR og 93 mio. EUR, og den af GRAWE betalte pris på 100,3 mio. EUR kunne derfor siges at stemme overens med markedsværdien.
All four offers at the time had been within a range of EUR 85 million to EUR 93 million. The EUR 100,3 million paid by GRAWE could therefore also be considered to be in line with market conditions.
Ifølge statsstøttereglerne var Østrig slet ikke forpligtet til at afhænde banken inden for rammerne af et åbent udbud, men kunne i stedet have indhentet en sagkyndig vurdering.
According to the State aid rules, Austria was not obliged to sell the bank in an open tender procedure at all but was free to choose either an open tender procedure or an expert evaluation.
Så længe salgsprisen stemte overens med den før salget indhentede vurdering, ville der ikke foreligge nogen statsstøtte.
As long as the sales price was in keeping with these prior evaluations, State aid was not involved.
I den forbindelse havde Kommissionen undladt at tage hensyn til, at Østrig i en tidligere undersøgelsesfase allerede havde bestilt flere vurderingsrapporter, der bekræftede Østrigs opfattelse af, at den af GRAWE betalte købspris stemte overens med markedsprisen.
In this context, the Commission had disregarded the fact that Austria had already presented a number of studies in the early phase of the investigation confirming its view that the price paid by GRAWE had been in line with market conditions.
Østrig og GRAWE underbygger deres argumenter med følgende rapporter og dokumenter:
Austria and GRAWE backed up their arguments by referring to the following studies and documents:
En vejledende vurdering af BB foretaget af HSBC: I denne rapport drages der den konklusion, at værdien af BB i tilfælde af en privatisering med afhændelse af banken til en køber med god rating alt efter værdiansættelsen af det skattemæssige underskud ville ligge på mellem 50 mio. EUR og 70 mio. EUR. Egenkapitalværdien ville da udgøre 33,4 mio. EUR [23].
an indicative evaluation of BB made by HSBC: this study concluded that, if BB was privatised and sold to a buyer of good credit standing, its value would be in the range of EUR 50-70 million depending on the value attributed to the tax loss carry-over. The value of the equity would then amount to EUR 33,4 million [23];
En vurdering af BB’s »stand alone«-værdi foretaget af revisionsfirmaet gmc-unitreu Wirtschaftsprüfungs- und Steuerberatungs GmbH i forbindelse med delstaten Burgenlands opkøb af alle aktierne til forberedelse af privatiseringen af BB: Ifølge denne vurdering, der var baseret på nogenlunde samme tal som HSBC-vurderingen, lå BB’s værdi pr. 30. juni 2004 på mellem 44,4 mio. EUR og 53,9 mio. EUR [24].
an evaluation of the stand-alone value of BB carried out by gmc-unitreu Wirtschaftsprüfungs- und Steuerberatungs GmbH on the occasion of the acquisition of all the shares by the Province of Burgenland in order to prepare the ground for the privatisation of BB. On the basis of figures similar to those used by HSBC, the study concluded that on 30 June 2004 BB was worth between EUR 44,4 million and EUR 53,9 million [24];
Den af konsortiet foretagne vurdering, der satte BB’s standalone-værdi til mellem 50 mio. EUR og 75 mio. EUR.
the Consortium’s own assessment, which assumed a stand-alone equity value of BB in the range of EUR 50-75 million.
Derudover gør Østrig gældende, at de bydende havde indregnet udbudsvilkårene i deres bud, og at begge bud derfor lå over den faktiske markedspris.
In addition, Austria argued that the bidders had priced in the conditions of the tender procedure and therefore both offers had been higher than the actual market value.
Østrig tilbød at lade en uafhængig ekspert foretage endnu en vurdering for at godtgøre, at købsprisen stemte overens med markedsværdien.
Austria offered to commission a further study by an independent expert in order to establish that a price in line with market conditions had been paid.
Ausfallhaftungs betydning for salget af BB
The role of Ausfallhaftung in the sale of BB
Under hele sagsbehandlingen har Østrig gentagne gange fremhævet Ausfallhaftungs betydning og delstaten Burgenlands deraf følgende interesse i at få solgt BB, og disse argumenter blev støttet af GRAWE.
Throughout the investigation Austria repeatedly stressed the importance of Ausfallhaftung and the ensuing financial interest of the Province of Burgenland in the sale of BB, and in this was supported by GRAWE.
Det kriterium, der drejede sig om BB’s fortsatte eksistens uden brug af delstatens garanti, var blevet offentligt bekendtgjort af Østrig i forbindelse med udbudsproceduren, og alle de implicerede var derfor bekendte med det.
The criterion of ‘continued operation of Bank Burgenland and, at the same time, avoidance of the use of Ausfallhaftung’ was one of the conditions Austria had made public in the tender procedure and hence was known to all concerned.
I den sammenhæng har Østrig og GRAWE navnlig gjort følgende gældende:
In this connection, Austria and GRAWE presented the following arguments in particular.
Ausfallhaftung har hjemmel i den østrigske lovgivning.
The basis for Ausfallhaftung could be found in statute.
Eftersom BB er et privatretligt aktieselskab, og Ausfallhaftung er en privatretligt kautionsordning (§ 1356 i ABGB), vil det altid være de privatretlige regler, der er afgørende for betingelserne for og omfanget af delstaten Burgenlands hæftelse — som ejer af Bank Burgenland optrådte staten netop ikke som offentlig myndighed.
However, as a company limited by shares (‘AG’), BB had a private-law legal form and the guarantee itself was a private-law institution (Section 1356 of the General Civil Code); the conditions and extent of the liability of the Province of Burgenland were therefore governed by private-law provisions. The State had acted as owner of Bank Burgenland and not in its public-law capacity.
Hvis Kommissionen ikke kunne godtage dette argument, lod den hånt om magtadskillelsen i Østrig: Det var den lovgivende magt, der var ophavsmanden til Ausfallhaftung, mens det var den udøvende magt, nemlig delstaten Burgenland, der havde truffet beslutningen om at sælge BB.
In not accepting this argument, the Commission was ignoring the separation of powers in Austria between the legislature (the source of Ausfallhaftung), on the one hand, and the executive (the Province of Burgenland, which had taken the decision to sell BB), on the other.