natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Den kollektive kreditfacilitet undertegnes (uden Coface-garanti) for et beløb på 1,95 mia. EUR, hvilket dækker det samlede finansieringsbehov sammen med aktionærtilskud og de øvrige bilaterale lån
Signing of the EUR 1,95 billion syndicated credit facility (with no Coface guarantee) to cover total financing needs with the support of shareholders and the other bilateral loans
Ultimo december 2003-januar 2004
End December 2003-January 2004
TVO påbegynder drøftelserne med bankerne om vilkårene og betingelserne for en eksportkredit
TVO begins discussions with the banks on the terms and conditions of an export credit
4. februar 2004
4 February 2004
Vilkårene og betingelserne for en eksportkredit fastsættes af TVO og bankerne (især fastsættes bankernes afkast)
The terms and conditions of an export credit are agreed on by TVO and the banks (in particular, fixing of the bank spread)
Undertegnelse af lånet med Coface-garanti til et beløb af 570 mio. EUR og efterfølgende nedskrivning til 1,35 mia. EUR af den kollektive kreditfacilitet
Signing of the EUR 570 million loan guaranteed by Coface and subsequent reduction of the syndicated credit facility to EUR 1,35 billion
Kommissionen undersøgte indledningsvist i sin beslutning af 24. oktober 2006, hvorvidt foranstaltningen udgør støtte som omhandlet i EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
In its decision of 24 October 2006, the Commission examined for the first time whether the measure constituted aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Derfor undersøges det i beslutningen grundigt, hvorvidt der foreligger en fordel eller ej.
The decision ascertained in detail whether or not an advantage was conferred.
Kommissionen bemærkede, at forsikringspræmierne på [2,5-3,5] % opkrævet af Coface ikke direkte kan sammenlignes med en markedsrente, eftersom ingen forsikringsvirksomhed syntes at tilbyde et sådant finansielt produkt.
The Commission noted that the insurance premium of [2,5-3,5]% charged by Coface could not be compared directly to a market rate since no insurer seemed to offer this type of financial product.
Da statsgarantien imidlertid drejer sig om et lån, syntes det muligt at sammenligne det garanterede låns samlede omkostninger — defineret som det samlede beløb betalt i form af renter og præmie for garantien — med de omkostninger, som en låntager ville skulle bære uden en statsgaranti.
However, as the public guarantee was for a loan, it seemed that the total cost of the guaranteed loan — defined as the sum of the interest paid and the guarantee premium — could be compared with that which would have had to be borne by the borrower if there had been no public guarantee.
På grundlag af en sammenligning mellem de samlede omkostninger for det garanterede lån med omkostningerne ved kreditfaciliteten, som er beskrevet i afsnit 2.2.1, og som betragtes som en markedsrente, nåede Kommissionen til den foreløbige konklusion, at det garanterede lån ikke syntes at reducere de finansielle byrder, som låntageren normalt ville skulle bære.
On the basis of a comparison of the total cost of the guaranteed loan with the cost of the credit facility described in Section 2.2.1, the latter being regarded as a market rate, the Commission came to the preliminary conclusion that the guaranteed loan did not seem to reduce the financial charges that the borrower would normally have had to bear.
Der syntes derfor ikke at forelægge nogen fordel for TVO.
It would seem, therefore, that no advantage was conferred on TVO.
Kommissionen bemærkede imidlertid, at denne foreløbige konklusion var baseret på en række hypoteser.
The Commission would though point out that this preliminary conclusion is based on a certain number of assumptions.
Den kunne derfor ikke på daværende tidspunkt udelukke, at foranstaltningen udgjorde støtte, og besluttede derfor at give Frankrig og interesserede parter mulighed for at kommentere den anvendte metode og de hypoteser, hvorpå Kommissionen grunder sin analyse af, hvorvidt der foreligger en fordel.
And so it was unable to rule out at that stage any possibility that the measure constituted aid and it decided to allow France and the interested parties to comment on the methodology used and on the assumptions on which the Commission based its analysis of the existence of an advantage.
Med hensyn til en eventuel støttes forenelighed bemærkede Kommissionen, at selv om visse elementer talte for forenelighed på grundlag af EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 3, litra c), syntes andre elementer at tale for det modsatte.
As for the compatibility of any aid, the Commission would comment that, if some particulars suggest compatibility on the basis of Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty, others seem to point in the opposite direction.
En eventuel støtte kunne således ikke umiddelbart formodes at være forenelig.
The compatibility of any aid cannot, therefore, be presumed a priori.
Da det ikke kunne udelukkes, at foranstaltningen udgjorde støtte, og at det i så fald heller ikke var sikkert, at den var forenelig, besluttede Kommissionen at indlede den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure.
Since there can be no ruling out the possibility that the measure constituted aid and since, if this were the case, it was not certain that the measure would be compatible, the Commission decided to initiate the formal investigation procedure.
Ved brev af 2. januar 2007 fremsendte virksomheden TVO sine bemærkninger til Kommissionen.
By letter of 2 January 2007, TVO sent its comments to the Commission.
TVO anfører, at beslutningen om at indlede proceduren indeholder en række faktuelle fejl, og foreslår, at dette korrigeres.
It stated that the decision to initiate the procedure contained a number of factual errors and suggested some corrections.
TVO mener ligeledes, at visse af Kommissionens vurderinger udelukkende grunder på en række hypotetiske og spekulative formodninger.
It also took the view that some of the assessments made by the Commission were based solely on a certain number of hypothetical suppositions and were speculative in nature.
Med hensyn til, om der foreligger en fordel, anfører TVO, i lighed med Kommissionens foreløbige analyser på dette punkt, at lånet garanteret af Coface var dyrere end kreditfaciliteten og de øvrige finansieringskilder, der var til rådighed på det pågældende tidspunkt.
As to the existence of any advantage, TVO, referring back to the Commission's preliminary assessment, pointed out that the loan guaranteed by Coface was more expensive than the credit facility and the other sources of financing available at the time.
TVO valgte imidlertid det garanterede lån, da det havde en længere løbetid, og fordi det reducerede det lånte beløb fra bankerne, hvorefter de ikke udnyttede lånebeløb kunne forbeholdes fremtidige finansieringsbehov [7].
It opted nevertheless for the guaranteed loan because of its longer period to maturity and because it reduced the amounts lent by the banks, thus making the amounts not lent available for future financing needs [7].
TVO er således af den opfattelse, at Kommissionen bør konkludere, at garantien ikke udgør støtte som omhandlet i EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
TVO therefore considered that the Commission should come to the conclusion that the guarantee did not constitute aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Ved brev af 1. marts 2007 fremsendte Greenpeace, som var den første klager, der gav anledning til nærværende procedures indledning (se afsnit 1 i nærværende beslutning), sine bemærkninger. Greenpeace gør opmærksom på, at eksportstøtte inden for Fællesskabet altid har været forbudt, hvorfor Kommissionen bør vedtage en negativ beslutning over for den pågældende foranstaltning med påbud om støttens tilbagesøgning.
By letter of 1 March 2007, Greenpeace, which was the first to submit a complaint when the present procedure was initiated (see Section 1), set out its comments, recalling that export aids within the Community had always been prohibited so that, in its opinion, the Commission should take a negative decision on the measure in question, with the aid being recovered.
Brevet fra Greenpeace indeholder ingen bemærkninger overhovedet om åbningsskrivelsens foreløbige analyse af forekomsten af en fordel.
The letter did not comment on the preliminary analysis in the decision initiating the procedure as to the existence or otherwise of an advantage.
Ved brev ligeledes af 1. marts 2007 fremsendte EREF, som var den anden klager, der gav anledning til nærværende procedures indledning (se afsnit 1 i nærværende beslutning) sine bemærkninger til Kommissionen.
By letter also dated 1 March 2007, EREF, which was the second complainant at the time (see Section 1), set out its comments.
For EREF er det åbenlyst, at tildeling af en eksportgaranti i tilknytning til samhandel inden for Fællesskabet udgør ulovlig statsstøtte.
In its view, it was clear that the granting of an export credit for intra-Community exports constituted unlawful State aid.
EREF henviser til argumentationen i deres brev af 18. november 2005 og anmoder om, at denne argumentation optages i sagsakterne for nærværende procedure.
EREF referred back to the arguments contained in its letter of 18 November 2005 and asked that that letter be included in the file relating to the present procedure.
For EREF skaber Cofaces indgriben i projektfinansieringen et stærkt signal, der tilskynder de private banker til at indgå i finansieringen af projektet. Faktisk mener EREF, at garantien fra Coface mindsker risikoen for de banker, der deltager i projektfinansieringen, og den egenkapital, som bankerne skal mobilisere i forbindelse med de pågældende lån.
For EREF, Coface's involvement in the financing of the project gives a strong signal to private banks that they should participate too since, in its view, the Coface guarantee mitigates the risk for the banks involved in the financing and reduces the amount of own funds mobilised by the banks for the loans in question.
Ved at mindske bankernes risiko overbeviser garantien ydet af Coface bankerne om at kunne yde lån til nedsat rente til TVO.
By lowering the risks borne by the banks, the Coface guarantee would be an incentive for them to grant reduced-rate loans to TVO.
Fordelen ved garantien mangedobles således.
The advantage conferred by the guarantee would, therefore, be greater.
EREF er af den opfattelse, at projektets finansielle struktur vil kunne bryde sammen, hvis Coface skulle trække sin garanti tilbage.
EREF considers that the structure of the project financing might collapse if Coface were to withdraw its guarantee.
EREF anmoder også Kommissionen om at undersøge alle kontraktforhold mellem parterne og det forhandlingsforløb, der førte til kontrakternes indgåelse.
It asked the Commission to take a look at all the contractual relationships between the parties and at the negotiating process that led to these contracts being concluded.
Bortset fra de almindelige betragtninger, der kort beskrives i betragtning (51), indeholder brevet fra EREF ingen bemærkninger om åbningsskrivelsens foreløbige analyse af forekomsten af en fordel.
Apart from the general points summarised in paragraph 51, EREF's letter does not comment on the preliminary analysis in the decision to initiate the procedure as to the existence or otherwise of an advantage.
Ud over de tre breve med bemærkninger nævnt i betragtning (48), (49) og (50) modtog Kommissionen ligeledes bemærkninger fra seks medlemsstater — Nederlandene, Sverige, Finland, Den Tjekkiske Republik, Østrig og Tyskland — samt fra formanden for Rådets arbejdsgruppe for »Eksportkredit« [8].
In addition to the three letters mentioned in paragraphs 48, 49 and 50, the Commission received comments from six Member States — the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, the Czech Republic, Austria and Germany — and from the Chairman of the Council Export Credits Group [8].
Disse medlemsstater fremsætter ikke bemærkninger til sagens specifikke omstændigheder, men kritiserer Kommissionen for at have indledt proceduren efter EF-traktatens artikel 88, stk. 2, over for en eksportkredit og for at have ment, at det ikke var udelukket, at en sådan foranstaltning udgør uforenelig statsstøtte.
The Member States concerned do not comment on the specific features of the case but criticise the Commission for initiating the Article 88(2) procedure in respect of an export credit and for taking the view that such a measure may constitute incompatible State aid.
Disse medlemsstater mener nemlig, at eksportkreditter reguleres af OECD-arrangementet, der er gennemført i fællesskabsretten.
They consider that export credits are governed by the OECD Arrangement, which has been incorporated into Community law.
Ved at gøre en eksportkredit til genstand for en statsstøtteprocedure efter EF-traktatens artikel 88, skaber Kommissionen stor juridisk usikkerhed og risikerer at svække de europæiske eksportørers stilling over for deres udenlandske konkurrenter.
By subjecting an export credit to the state aid procedures laid down in Article 88 of the EC Treaty, the Commission is creating considerable legal uncertainty and may be weakening the position of European exporters vis-à-vis their foreign competitors.
FRANKRIGS BEMÆRKNINGER
COMMENTS BY FRANCE
De franske myndigheder indleder med på ny at beskrive projektets karakteristika og vigtigste faser, navnlig vedrørende projektets finansiering og udbudsforløbet.
The French authorities begin by recalling the characteristics and main stages of the project, especially as regards financing and the invitation to tender.
Vedrørende vurderingen af den pågældende foranstaltning fastholder de franske myndigheder først og fremmest, at foranstaltningen ikke kan betragtes som støtte.
As for the assessment of the measure in question, the French authorities argue mainly that the measure cannot be classified as aid.
Navnlig er de overbeviste om, at foranstaltningen ikke medfører nogen fordel.
They maintain in particular that it does not confer any advantage.
Efter de franske myndigheders opfattelse har Coface stillet garantien på markedsvilkår.
According to them, the Coface guarantee was granted on market terms.
De franske myndigheder kommenterer i øvrigt den metode, som Kommissionen har anvendt i sin beslutning om at indlede proceduren.
They comment on the methodology applied by the Commission in its decision to initiate the procedure.
De mener, at det drejer sig om en metode, »der løbende anvendes af bankerne«, og bemærker, at metoden gør det muligt at konkludere, at præmien for garantien er i overensstemmelse med markedsrenten.
They regard it as one commonly used by banks and note that it shows that the guarantee premium was granted at market rates.
De franske myndigheder anfører, at metoden med fordel kan suppleres og efterprøves ved hjælp af en mere kompleks metode for værdiansættelse af de finansielle aktiver, en metode som de franske myndigheder betegner »metode til sammenligning af kreditværdier«.
They go on to say that the methodology can be usefully supplemented and verified by applying a more complex method for valuing financial assets which they describe as a ‘method for comparing credit values’.
På grundlag af sidstnævnte metode når de franske myndigheder til den konklusion, at en bank ville have værdiansat det garanterede lån højere end kreditfaciliteten, dvs. at bankerne ville have anset det garanterede lån for at give et større afkast.
On the basis of this second method, the French authorities come to the conclusion that a bank would have attributed a higher value to the guaranteed loan than to the credit facility, that is to say, they would have regarded the former as being more remunerative.
Dette betyder, at det af Coface garanterede lån ikke giver nogen fordel til nogle af projektets parter i form af en reducering af finansieringsomkostningerne.
This amounts to saying that the credit guaranteed by Coface confers no advantage on any of the partners in the project in the form of lower financing costs.
De franske myndigheder fremfører endvidere, at foranstaltningen ikke kan betragtes som statsstøtte, da den hverken påvirker konkurrencevilkårene eller samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
The French authorities also argue that the measure cannot be classified as Sstate aid since it affects neither competition nor trade between Member States.
Subsidiært fastholder de franske myndigheder, at hvis foranstaltningen skulle udgøre støtte, ville den være forenelig med fællesmarkedet.
In the alternative, France argues that, if the measure were to constitute aid, it would be compatible with the common market.
Dels vil den være forenelig på grundlag af EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 3, litra c), da den fremmer en legitim målsætning og ikke ændrer samhandelsvilkårene på en måde, der strider mod den fælles interesse.
On the one hand, it would be compatible on the basis of Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty since it pursues a legitimate objective and does not affect trade to an extent contrary to the common interest.
Dels vil den være forenelig på grundlag af EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 3, litra b).
On the other hand, it would be compatible on the basis of Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty.
Endelig anfører de franske myndigheder meget subsidiært forskellige hindringer for tilbagesøgning. Desangående nævner de franske myndigheder navnlig princippet om legitime forventninger.
In the latter respect, France furthermore points to various obstacles to recovery, referring in particular to the principle of legitimate expectations.
I henhold til de franske myndigheder forholder Kommissionen sig således traditionelt inaktiv, når det drejer sig om mellemfristede eller langfristede eksportkreditter.
According to France, the Commission has traditionally taken no action with regard to medium- or long-term export credits.
Endvidere er den pågældende foranstaltning forenelig med bestemmelserne i OECD-arrangementet.
The measure is also compatible with the rules of the OECD Arrangement.
Vedrørende sidstnævnte tilslutter de franske myndigheders analyse sig de bemærkninger, der er fremsat af de øvrige medlemsstater nævnt i betragtning (53).
On these points, France's analysis reflects the comments presented by the other Member States mentioned in paragraph 53.
VURDERING AF STØTTEFORANSTALTNINGEN
ASSESSMENT OF THE MEASURE
I vurderingen af denne foranstaltning, som Frankrig har iværksat i marts 2004, skal Kommissionen først og fremmest fastlægge, hvorvidt den udgør statsstøtte som omhandlet i EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
In order to assess the measure implemented by France in March 2004, the Commission has first to establish whether it constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Kommissionen bemærker desangående, at en eksportkredit eller en garanti i tilknytning til en sådan kredit kan udgøre statsstøtte som omhandlet i EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, navnlig når det drejer sig om en transaktion mellem medlemsstater.
In this connection, it points out that an export credit or a guarantee linked to such a credit may, especially where it relates to a transaction between Member States, constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
OECD-arrangementet gør ikke muligt automatisk at udelukke, at en sådan foranstaltning udgør statsstøtte som omhandlet i EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1 [9].
The OECD Arrangement does not automatically rule out the possibility that such a measure may constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) [9].
Kommissionen anførte i sin beslutning om at indlede proceduren, at foranstaltningen på grundlag af den foreløbige analyse ikke syntes at udgøre støtte, navnlig fordi den ikke syntes at medføre en fordel for modtageren.
In its decision initiating the procedure, the Commission states that, on the basis of an initial analysis, the measure does not seem to constitute aid, in particular because it does not seem to confer an advantage on the beneficiary.
Det skal derfor efterprøves, om nye elementer ændrer på denne foreløbige analyse.
Accordingly, it should be ascertained whether there are any new elements that call the preliminary analysis into question.
Er der tale om statsstøtte? Foreligger der en fordel?
Classification as State aid: existence of an advantage
Kommissionen bemærker i sin beslutning om at indlede proceduren, at den pågældende foranstaltning er en garanti i tilknytning til et lån ydet af en række banker til TVO. Kommissionen udelukkede i sin beslutning muligheden af, at der skulle foreligge en fordel for bankerne.
In its decision initiating the procedure, the Commission notes that the measure is a guarantee in respect of a loan provided by some banks to TVO and rules out the possibility that it confers an advantage on the banks.
Denne vurdering bestrides ikke af de parter, der har fremsat bemærkninger til Kommissionen inden for rammerne af proceduren.
This assessment has not been challenged by the parties that presented their comments to the Commission under the present procedure.
I nærværende beslutning vil Kommissionen derfor begrænse sig til at efterprøve, hvorvidt der foreligger en fordel for låntageren TVO og dennes leverandør, AREVA NP.
The Commission, in this decision, will therefore simply verify the existence or otherwise of an advantage for the borrower TVO and its supplier AREVA NP.
Vedrørende sidstnævnte anføres det i beslutningen om at indlede proceduren, at det på daværende tidspunkt ikke kunne udelukkes, at Frankrig havde betinget sin garanti til TVO med indgåelse af en kontrakt med AREVA NP.
As regard the latter, the decision initiating the procedure states that it cannot be ruled out at this stage that France made the provision of the guarantee to TVO conditional on the contract being concluded with AREVA NP.
Hvis dette skulle være tilfældet, giver Frankrig en fordel til TVO på betingelse af, at AREVA NP udvælges som leverandør.
If this were the case, France would be conferring an advantage on TVO provided that AREVA NP were selected as the supplier.
Sidstnævnte vil derfor også drage fordel af foranstaltningen.
AREVA NP would, therefore, also benefit from the measure.
Det følger heraf, at det forhold, at der foreligger en fordel for TVO, er en nødvendig forudsætning for forekomsten af en fordel for AREVA NP.
It follows that the existence of an advantage for TVO is a necessary prior condition for the existence of an advantage for AREVA NP.
Kommissionen vil derfor i nærværende beslutning først efterprøve, om der foreligger en fordel for TVO.
In the present decision, the Commission will therefore ascertain initially the existence or otherwise of an advantage for TVO.
Den fordel, som en låntager som TVO kan have ved en statsgaranti ydet for et lån, er en reducering af sine finansieringsomkostninger.
The advantage that a borrower like TVO might obtain from a public guarantee in respect of a loan is a reduction in its financing costs.
Det bør derfor for at etablere, om en statsgaranti giver en fordel til låntager, fastlægges, hvilke finansieringsomkostninger denne ville have haft, hvis låntageren havde optaget banklån på markedet uden statslig indgriben, og dette beløb bør sammenholdes med de omkostninger, der foreligger efter statslig indgriben.
In order to establish whether or not a public guarantee confers an advantage on the borrower, there is a case therefore for determining which financial charges the borrower would have had to bear if it had resorted to the market in bank loans without any public intervention and for comparing this cost with the cost incurred after public intervention.
Det skal i denne henseende ligeledes erindres, at visse virksomheder simpelthen ikke har adgang til kapitalmarkedet og kun kan skaffe sig adgang til det marked takket være statslig indgriben.
It should also be ascertained whether some companies simply have no access to the capital market and can take this step only with the help of public intervention.
I så tilfælde kan den fordel, der følger af statslig indgriben, vise sig at være endnu større.
In such a case, the advantage accruing from public intervention may be even greater.