natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
På denne baggrund og i betragtning af, at EREF sår tvivl om TVO's adgang til markedet for banklån på tidspunktet for transaktionen, vil Kommissionen, før den analyserer en evt. reducering af de finansielle omkostninger, efterprøve, om TVO havde adgang til kapitalmarkedet, og om den adgang var tilstrækkelig for at finansiere projektet Olkiluoto 3 i sin helhed.
In such circumstances and given the fact that EREF doubts that VTO had access to the market in bank loans at the time, the Commission, before analysing whether there was any reduction in financial charges, will ascertain whether TVO had access to the capital market and whether such access was sufficient to finance the entire Olkiluoto 3 project.
Analyse af adgangen til markedet for banklån
Analysis of access to the market in bank loans
I afsnit 2 i nærværende beslutning analyserer Kommissionen de forskellige faser af projektet Olkiluoto 3 og finansieringen heraf.
In Section 2 of this decision the Commission analysed the different stages of the Olkiluoto 3 project and its financing.
Det fremgår af analysen, at det garanterede lån formelt blev ydet i marts 2004.
It transpires that the guaranteed loan was formally provided in March 2004.
Det skal dog bemærkes, at Coface udstedte et garantitilsagn allerede den 1. december 2003. Det franske eksportkreditforsikringsråd havde allerede godkendt garantien den 17. november 2003.
However, Coface had undertaken to stand guarantor as early as 1 December 2003, a move that had been approved by the CGCCE on 17 November 2003.
Men allerede den 11. november 2003 forpligtede fem banker sig formelt til at tilvejebringe indtil 2,5 mia. EUR til TVO, hvilket udgjorde et lån for et tilstrækkeligt beløb for at finansiere projektet.
On 11 November 2003 five banks had formally undertaken to provide TVO with up to EUR 2,5 billion, this loan being sufficient to complete the financing of the project.
Det fremgår af de oplysninger, som de franske myndigheder har fremsendt, at TVO's adgang til de finansielle markeder selv inden den franske regerings indgriben var tilstrækkelig for at finansiere projektet i sin helhed.
The information provided by the French authorities demonstrates that, even before the intervention of the French Government, TVO had sufficient access to financial markets to be able to finance the entire project.
Kommissionen bemærker endvidere, at TVO havde en høj rating (»investment grade«) hos et anerkendt ratingselskab på tidspunktet for finansieringskonstruktionen for projekt Olkiluoto 3.
The Commission would also point out that TVO was classified as investment grade by a leading rating agency when setting up the different financing packages for the Olkiluoto 3 project.
En så høj rating sikrer sædvanligvis uhindret adgang til markedet for banklån og gør det muligt at udelukke, at TVO kunne betragtes som en kriseramt virksomhed.
In the normal course of events, such a rating guarantees easy access to the market in bank loans and so TVO cannot be regarded as a firm in difficulty.
Kommissionen bemærker yderligere, at beløbet for det garanterede lån — 570 mio. EUR — er begrænset i forhold til den samlede rejste kapital — mere end 3 mia. EUR. Selv efter Cofaces indgriben er langt størstedelen af projektet derfor fortsat finansieret af markedet.
Lastly, the Commission notes that the guaranteed loan (EUR 570 million) is small compared with the aggregate amount of capital raised (over EUR 3 billion). Consequently, even after the intervention of Coface, the bulk of the project is still being financed by the market.
Kommissionen bemærker endvidere vedrørende beløbet for det garanterede lån, at fem banker allerede den 11. november 2003 havde forpligtet sig til at tilvejebringe indtil 2,5 mia. EUR, svarende til ca. 500 mio. EUR fra hver bank.
As regards the amount of the guaranteed loan, the Commission would comment that on 11 November 2003 five banks had agreed to provide up to EUR 2,5 billion, i.e. up to EUR 500 million each.
Den risiko, som den franske stat bærer, kan derfor sammenlignes med den risiko, som de private banker var villige til at bære.
The risk borne by the French State is thus comparable to that which private banks were prepared to bear.
Den franske stats deltagelse i projektets finansiering har således ikke yderligere diversificeret finansieringskilderne eller reduceret de risici, som de øvrige banker måtte bære, end hvis yderligere en bank havde deltaget i projektets finansiering.
Accordingly, participation by the French State in the financing of the project did not diversify the sources of the finance or reduce the risks borne by the other banks any more than if another bank had participated in the financing of the project.
Kommissionen konkluderer på grundlag af de oplysninger, den har til sin rådighed, at TVO havde tilstrækkelig adgang til de finansielle markeder, inden der blev tale om statslig indgriben.
On the basis of the information at its disposal, the Commission has come to the conclusion that TVO had sufficient access to financial markets prior to any public intervention.
I modsætning til hvad EREF hævder har den franske regering ikke haft en rolle som »frontløber« blandt investorerne og stillede sin garanti på et tidspunkt, hvor projektets finansiering i sin helhed allerede var sikret.
Contrary to what EREF states, the French Government did not play the role of lead investor and provided its guarantee at a time when the financing for the entire project had already been secured.
Selv hvis den franske stat havde haft en frontløberrolle, tegnede statens indgriben sig for et begrænset beløb i forhold til de samlede midler, der er nødvendige for at finansiere projektet, og dermed i utilstrækkeligt omfang til at kunne udgøre en frontløber i forhold til de private investorer.
What is more, if the French Government had acted as lead investor, its intervention was in respect of an amount that was small compared with all the funds needed to finance the project and therefore insufficient to have a knock-on effect on private investors.
På den baggrund konkluderer Kommissionen ligeledes, at man med rimelighed kan udelukke den mulighed, som EREF nævner, nemlig at projektets finansiering i sin helhed ville have brudt sammen, hvis Coface skulle have trukket sin garanti tilbage.
The Commission also comes to the conclusion here that the possibility — referred to by EREF — of the financing for the project collapsing if the Coface guarantee were withdrawn can reasonably be ruled out.
Analyse af forekomsten af en reducering af TVO's finansieringsomkostninger
Analysis of the existence of a reduction in financial charges for TVO
Når det således er etableret, at TVO, i modsætning til hvad EREF hævder, havde tilstrækkelig adgang til kapitalmarkedet, bør det analyseres, om den præmie, som den franske stat opkræver for garantien, medfører en reducering af de finansieringsomkostninger, som TVO skulle have båret uden statslig indgriben.
Since it has been established that, contrary to EREF's assertion, TVO had sufficient access to the capital market, it should be ascertained whether or not the level of the guarantee premium asked by the French Government led to a reduction in the financial charges that TVO would have had to bear in the absence of public intervention.
Kommissionen anfører i sin beslutning om at indlede proceduren, at intet forsikringsselskab eller andet finansieringsinstitut for øjeblikket udbyder præcist den form for forsikring, som Coface tilbyder i nærværende sag, dvs. en forsikring mod TVO's misligholdelse af betalingerne på lang sigt.
In the decision initiating the procedure, the Commission stated that no insurer or financial institution currently offered the precise type of insurance as that offered by Coface in the present case, i.e. insurance against a payment default by TVO in the long term.
Det forhold, at markedet ikke for øjeblikket tilbyder denne form for forsikring, bekræftes af de franske myndigheder og bestrides ikke af klagerne.
The fact that the market does not at present offer this type of insurance is confirmed by the French authorities and has not been challenged by the complainants.
Forholdet er ikke i strid med Kommissionens meddelelse til medlemsstaterne i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 93, stk. 1, med henblik på anvendelse af traktatens artikel 92 og 93 på kortfristet eksportkreditforsikring [10], hvori det hedder, at selv om der findes et marked for kortfristet eksportkreditforsikring, er det ikke altid tilfældet for mellemfristet og langfristet forsikring.
This is not contradicted by the Commission communication to the Member States pursuant to Article 93(1) of the EC Treaty applying Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty to short-term export-credit insurance [10], according to which, while there is a market for short-term export-credit insurance, this is not always the case for medium- and long-term insurance.
Det er således ikke muligt direkte at sammenligne den præmie, der opkræves af de franske myndigheder, med en markedspris.
Consequently, the price charged by the French authorities cannot be directly compared to a market price.
Det forhold, at der ikke findes noget marked for denne form for forsikring, har ikke en automatisk virkning for, hvorvidt der foreligger en fordel eller ej.
The fact that there is no market for this type of insurance does not have any automatic consequences for the existence or otherwise of an advantage.
I betragtning af, at den pågældende foranstaltning udgør en lånegaranti, skulle TVO uden den statslige indgriben have finansieret sit projekt ved at optage et lån uden sikkerhedsstillelse.
Since the measure in question is a loan guarantee, TVO would, in the absence of public intervention, have had to obtain financing in the form of an unguaranteed loan.
For at fastslå, hvorvidt der foreligger en fordel, bør det derfor efterprøves, om TVO har nydt fordel af en reducering af sine finansieringsomkostninger ved at sammenligne de samlede omkostninger ved det garanterede lån (bankernes rentesats plus beløbet for garantipræmien) med den rentesats, som de private banker ville have opkrævet for et lignende lån uden statslig garanti.
To establish the existence of an advantage, it should therefore be ascertained whether TVO benefited from a reduction in its financing costs by comparing the total cost of the guaranteed loan (the interest rate charged by the banks plus the amount of the guarantee premium) with the interest rate that would have been charged by private banks for a similar loan in the absence of a public guarantee.
Kommissionen bemærker, at TVO ud over det garanterede lån inden for rammerne af det aktuelle projekt har gjort brug af bankfinansiering i form af en kreditfacilitet.
The Commission notes that, in addition to the guaranteed loan, TVO had recourse to bank financing in the form of a credit facility for the project.
Det må derfor undersøges, om bankernes rentesats i tilknytning til kreditfaciliteten giver en pålidelig rettesnor for, hvilken rentesats private banker ville have opkrævet ved et lignende lån som det garanterede lån uden statslig garanti.
It should, therefore, be examined whether the rate charged by the banks for the credit facility is a reliable indicator of the rate that would be charged by private banks for a loan similar to the guaranteed loan if no public guarantee had been provided.
EREF bestrider, at rentesatsen for kreditfaciliteten udgør en rimelig anslåelse af bankernes markedsrente, når der ikke foreligger en statsgaranti.
EREF disputes the assertion that the interest rate for the credit facility is a sound estimate of the market rate that would have been charged by the banks in the absence of a public guarantee.
Først og fremmest mener EREF, at BLB's deltagelse i kreditfaciliteten udgør støtte og i gunstig retning har påvirket de vilkår, som TVO har fået kreditfaciliteten tilbudt på.
Firstly, it takes the view that BLB's role regarding the credit facility constitutes aid and favourably influenced the conditions on which it was granted to TVO.
Kommissionen bemærker, at den i sin beslutning i sag nr. NN 62/B/2006 [11] udelukkede muligheden for, at BLB's indgriben kunne udgøre en støtte.
The Commission notes that, in its decision in Case NN 62/B/06 [11], it ruled out the possibility that BLB's role might constitute aid.
Kommissionen afviser derfor klagerens argument på dette punkt.
It therefore rejects the complainant's first assertion.
For det andet mener EREF, at garantien fra Coface reducerede risikoen ved kreditfaciliteten, hvorfor den har tilskyndet bankerne til at tilbyde kreditfaciliteten på mere gunstige vilkår end et lån, hvortil der ikke er knyttet en statslig garanti.
Secondly, EREF considers that the Coface guarantee reduced the risk attaching to the credit facility and thus encouraged the banks to grant the latter on more favourable conditions than a loan not backed by a public guarantee.
Kommissionen bemærker på dette punkt, at EREF ikke anfører præcist, ved hvilken mekanisme Coface-garantien skulle reducere risikoen ved kreditfaciliteten.
On this point, la Commission notes that EREF does not indicate the precise mechanism by which the Coface guarantee would reduce the risk attaching to the credit facility.
Kommissionen har grundigt undersøgt finansieringen af projektet Olkiluoto 3.
It has analysed in detail the financing of the Olkiluoto 3 project.
Selv om det er åbenlyst, at Cofaces garanti reducerer risikoen ved det garanterede lån for bankerne og dermed reducerer rentesatsen for det garanterede lån, har Kommissionen imidlertid ikke kunnet kortlægge nogen mekanismer eller kontrakt, hvorefter garantien fra Coface skulle reducere risikoen ved kreditfaciliteten.
Although the Coface guarantee clearly reduces the risk attaching to the loan as regards the banks that provided it and therefore lowers the interest rate charged by them for the guaranteed loan, the Commission has not identified any mechanism or contract whereby the Coface guarantee would lower the risk attaching to the credit facility.
Det skal erindres, at garantien fra Coface på ingen måde dækker kreditfaciliteten.
It should be pointed out that the Coface guarantee in no way covers the credit facility.
Kommissionen afviser dermed klagerens påstand, hvorefter garantien fra Coface skulle reducere risikoen ved kreditfaciliteten.
Accordingly, the Commission rejects the complainant's assertion that the Coface guarantee reduces the risk attaching to the credit facility.
Kommissionen har ikke kunnet kortlægge andre elementer, der sætter den i stand til at konkludere, at rentesatsen for kreditfaciliteten ikke udgør en pålidelig rettesnor for den rentesats, som de private banker ville kunne opkræve for et lignende lån som det garanterede lån uden en statslig garanti.
The Commission has not identified any other factors that might suggest that the interest rate for the credit facility is not a valid indicator of the interest rate that private banks would charge for a loan similar to the guaranteed loan in the absence of a public guarantee.
Kommissionen bemærker desangående, at det garanterede lån ikke udgør ansvarlig lånekapital, dvs. et lån, der først tilbagebetales, hvis kreditfaciliteten tilbagebetales.
It notes that the guaranteed loan is not a subordinated loan, i.e. a loan the repayment of which would be conditional on the prior repayment of the credit facility.
Det garanterede lån har nemlig samme rang som kreditfaciliteten.
The guaranteed loan has the same ranking as the credit facility.
Kommissionen bemærker ligeledes, at der til kreditfaciliteten ikke er tilknyttet nogen form for forrang eller pantsættelse, som skiller den ud i forhold til det garanterede lån [12].
The Commission also points out that the credit facility does not enjoy any preference or have any collateral that would distinguish it from the guaranteed loan [12].
I lyset af ovenstående betragtninger konkluderer Kommissionen, at rentesatsen for kreditfaciliteten udgør en pålidelig rettesnor for den rentesats, som de private banker ville kunne opkræve for et lignende lån som det garanterede lån uden en statslig garanti.
In view of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that the interest rate for the credit facility is a valid indicator of the interest rate that private banks would charge for a loan similar to the guaranteed loan in the absence of any guarantee.
Kommissionen har allerede sammenlignet de samlede omkostninger ved det garanterede lån med omkostningerne ved kreditfaciliteten under punkt 59 og 63 i beslutningen om procedurens indledning.
The Commission has already compared the total cost of the guaranteed loan with the cost of the credit facility in paragraphs 59 and 63 of the decision initiating the procedure.
Denne sammenligning tager udgangspunkt i den gennemsnitlige løbetid for det garanterede lån.
The comparison is based on the average period to maturity of the guaranteed loan.
Den rentesats [13], der ville gælde for en sådan løbetid, er beregnet ved lineært at ekstrapolere rentesatsen for kreditfaciliteten.
The interest rate [13] that would be charged for such a period is calculated by linear extrapolation of the rate for the credit facility.
Sammenligningen viser, at de samlede omkostninger — den rentesats, der opkræves af bankerne plus den præmie som Coface opkræver for garantien — ved det garanterede lån ikke er mindre end den rentesats, der opkræves af bankerne for kreditfaciliteten.
This shows that the total cost (the interest rate charged by the banks plus the guarantee premium charged by Coface) of the guaranteed loan is not lower than the interest rate charged by the banks for the credit facility.
Kommissionen bemærker, at de franske myndigheder mener, at sammenligningsmetoden beskrevet i punkt 59 og 63 i beslutningen om procedurens indledning, er gyldige, hvorimod klagerne ikke har udtrykt sig om dette punkt og ikke har foreslået nogen alternativ sammenligningsmetode.
The Commission notes that the French authorities consider the method of comparison described in paragraphs 59 and 63 of the decision initiating the procedure to be valid even though the complaints have not commented on this and have not proposed any alternative method of comparison.
TVO anfører derimod i lighed med Kommissionens analyser på dette punkt, at lånet garanteret af Coface var dyrere end kreditfaciliteten og de øvrige finansieringskilder, der var til rådighed på det pågældende tidspunkt.
Agreeing with the Commission's analysis in this respect, TVO points out that the loan guaranteed by Coface was more expensive than the credit facility and the other sources of financing available at the time.
Kommissionen konkluderer, at garantien ikke medfører en reducering af TVO's finansieringsomkostninger i forhold til de omkostninger, som TVO skulle have båret, hvis TVO havde henvendt sig til bankerne uden nogen statslig garanti.
The Commission concludes that the guarantee has not led to any reduction in TVO's financial charges compared with those that it would have had to bear if it had turned to the banking market without the backing of a public guarantee.
Kommissionen understreger, at klagerne hverken i deres bemærkninger til procedurens indledning eller i deres tidligere bemærkninger har foreslået nogen beregningsmetode, der gør det muligt at efterprøve, om niveauet for den præmie, som Frankrig opkræver for garantien, medfører en reducering af TVO's finansieringsomkostninger eller ej.
The Commission would emphasise that neither in their comments on the initiation of the procedure nor in their previous comments had the complainants proposed a calculation method that would have made it possible to ascertain whether or not the level of the guarantee premium charged by France led to a reduction in TVO's financing costs.
Er der tale om statsstøtte? Konklusion
Classification as State aid: conclusion
Som det fremgår af analysen i afsnit 6.1 har Kommissionen ikke kunnet fastlægge, at der foreligger en fordel for TVO.
As the analysis described in Section 6.1 shows, the Commission has been unable to establish the existence of an advantage for TVO.
Kommissionen anførte i punkt 69 og 70 i beslutningen om procedurens indledning, at det er muligt, at konkurrencen mellem leverandører af kernekraftværker ikke kun har drejet sig om den pris, der kræves for opførelse af selve værket, men også om de finansieringsvilkår, der blev tilbudt TVO.
In points 69 and 70 of the decision initiating the procedure, the Commission stated that suppliers of nuclear power stations might have competed not only on the price asked for the construction of the power station itself but also on the financing conditions offered to TVO.
Kommissionen har fundet, at efter denne hypotese, hvor konkurrencen skulle have drejet sig om en »samlet pris« inklusive finansieringen, ville garantien have kunnet sætte AREVA NP i stand til at foreslå sin kunde, TVO, en finansiering til en gunstigere rente og dermed tilbyde en mere attraktiv »samlet pris« end andre leverandører af kernekraftværker.
It noted that, if this were so and suppliers competed on the ‘overall price’ including the financing, the guarantee might have allowed AREVA NP to propose to its customer TVO financing at a more advantageous rate and thus to propose a more attractive ‘overall price’ than the other suppliers of nuclear power stations.
I så fald ville garantien havde medført en fordel for AREVA NP og udgjort eksportstøtte.
In such a case, the guarantee would have conferred an advantage on AREVA NP and would have constituted export aid.
Det kronologiske forløb som beskrevet af de franske myndigheder og opstillet i oversigtsform i tabel 2 gør det muligt at udelukke muligheden for, at konkurrencen mellem leverandørerne skulle have drejet sig om en »samlet pris« inklusive finansiering.
The chronology of events described by the French authorities and summarised in Table 2 rules out the possibility that suppliers might have competed on an ‘overall price’ including the financing.
For det første blev konsortiet AREVA NP/Siemens udvalgt som »preferred bidder« af TVO, før garantien formelt blev stillet og langt før det præcise niveau for præmien blev fastlagt.
Firstly, the AREVA NP/Siemens consortium was selected as the preferred bidder by TVO before the guarantee had been formally agreed and well before the precise level of the premium had been fixed.
For det andet blev kontrakten for opførelsen af kraftværket formelt undertegnet med konsortiet AREVA NP/Siemens før det præcise niveau for præmien formelt blev fastlagt.
Secondly, the contract for the supply of the power station had been formally signed with the AREVA NP/Siemens consortium before the precise level of the guarantee premium has been formally fixed.
Disse elementer viser, at TVO valgte AREVA NP/Siemens, før TVO kendte de præcise omkostninger ved garantien og dermed projektets finansieringsomkostninger.
These facts demonstrate that TVO chose AREVA NP/Siemens before knowing the precise cost of the guarantee and hence the cost of financing the project.
Hertil kommer, at selv om denne sidste konklusion skulle vise sig at være ukorrekt, og hvis konkurrencen mellem leverandørerne drejede sig om en »samlet pris«, har Kommissionen allerede i betragtning (75) i nærværende beslutning konkluderet, at det garanterede lån ikke udgjorde en billigere finansieringskilde end de øvrige finansieringskilder, som TVO havde til rådighed.
For the rest, even if this latter conclusion were to prove incorrect and if suppliers did indeed compete on an ‘overall price’, the Commission has already come to the conclusion in paragraph 75 of the present decision that the guaranteed loan was not a less expensive source of financing than the other sources available to TVO.
Da garantien ikke havde til virkning at reducere finansieringsomkostningerne for TVO i forhold til de omkostninger, der var forbundet med de øvrige disponible finansieringskilder, som ikke er dækket af garantien, reducerede garantien ikke den »samlede pris« for tilbuddet fra konsortiet AREVA NP/Siemens, og dermed var tilbuddet ikke mere attraktivt.
Since the guarantee did not have the effect of reducing TVO's financing costs relative to the cost of other financing not covered by the guarantee that was available, it did not reduce the ‘overall price’ of the bid submitted by the AREVA NP/Siemens consortium and did not therefore make this bid more attractive.