natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Forholdet mellem delstaten Burgenland og BB kunne sammenlignes med forholdet mellem et moderselskab og dets datterselskab, som det hæfter for.
The relationship between the Province of Burgenland and BB could be likened to the situation of a parent company giving a guarantee for its subsidiary in the form of a comfort letter (Patronatserklärung).
Ved salg af et datterselskab ville der blive taget hensyn til en sådan hæftelse på samme måde som til enhver anden ikke-balanceført risiko.
Such a guarantee would be taken into account when selling a subsidiary, as would any other off-balance sheet risk.
Som belæg for disse påstande henviste Østrig til en dom af 4. april 2006 afsagt af den østrigske højesteret [25].
Austria further supported this view by referring to a judgment of the Austrian Supreme Court of 4 April 2006 [25].
Desuden var Kommissionen og Østrig enige om, at Ausfallhaftung-ordningen som eksisterende støtte skulle afskaffes efter en overgangsperiode.
Furthermore, the Commission and Austria had agreed on the abolition of the guarantee as existing aid after a transitional period.
Indtil denne afskaffelse var Ausfallhaftung en lovlig ordning, hvilket betød, at delstaten Burgenland kunne tage hensyn til den ved salg af BB.
Until its abolition, Ausfallhaftung would be ‘legalised’, which should also allow the Province of Burgenland to take it into consideration when selling BB.
Delstaten Burgenland havde ikke stillet denne garanti med henblik på en privatisering, og Østrig havde ingen juridiske muligheder for at bringe denne hæftelse til ophør før salget af BB.
The guarantee had not been granted by the Province of Burgenland with a view to the privatisation process and Austria had had no legal means of discharging itself from its guarantee prior to the sale of BB.
Hvis det under disse omstændigheder ikke var muligt at tage hensyn til den med Ausfallhaftung forbundne risiko, ville Kommissionen faktisk hindre delstaten Burgenland i at privatisere BB.
If the risk associated with Ausfallhaftung could not be taken into account under these circumstances, the Commission would effectively be preventing the Province of Burgenland from privatising BB.
Og det ville være i strid med det påbud om privatisering af BB, der var indeholdt i Kommissionens tidligere beslutning, og indebære en urimelig indskrænkning af medlemsstaternes ret til at privatisere deres aktiver.
This would contradict the privatisation requirement in the Commission’s earlier decision on BB and would unlawfully restrict Member States' freedom to privatise their assets.
Østrigs synspunkter stemte overens med Kommissionens beslutningspraksis og EU-domstolenes retspraksis.
Austria’s view was confirmed by the Commission’s own practice and by the European Courts.
I særdeleshed havde Kommissionen således anerkendt, at der ved en privatisering tages hensyn til forpligtelser og risici uden for balancen [26].
In particular, the Commission had recognised that liabilities and off-balance sheet risks could be taken into account in a privatisation procedure [26].
I sagen Gröditzer Stahlwerke havde også EF-domstolen implicit anerkendt, at der kunne tages hensyn til en statslig kaution, som var relevant for en virksomheds likvidation [27].
In Gröditzer Stahlwerke, the Court of Justice of the European Communities also implicitly recognised that a guarantee given by the State, which was relevant to the liquidation of the undertaking, should be taken into account [27].
Derfor var anerkendelsen af Ausfallhaftung som eksisterende støtte relevant.
The recognition of Ausfallhaftung as existing aid was therefore relevant.
Risikoen for, at der blev brug for Ausfallhaftung, afhang af bankens fremtidige risikoprofil og dermed også de nye ejeres risikoprofil.
The risk that Ausfallhaftung might be called upon depended on the future risk profile of the bank and, therefore, on the risk profile of its new owner.
De risici, som ville opstå, hvis banken blev købt af konsortiet, ville ikke have været acceptable for delstaten Burgenland.
The Province of Burgenland had considered the risk associated with the Consortium as owner to be unacceptable.
At BB fortsat ville være underlagt finanstilsynets tilsyn, ændrede intet ved denne kendsgerning, eftersom det østrigske finanstilsyn først griber ind efterfølgende.
The fact that BB remained under the supervision of the FMA did not change this prognosis, as the FMA intervened only ex post.
Det af Østrig fremlagte likvidationsscenarie
The liquidation scenario presented by Austria
Østrig fremlagde en beregning af det beløb, som var dækket af Ausfallhaftung, samt et likvidationsscenarie, og oplyste, at beregningsmåden var den samme som den, Kommissionen havde fået forelagt, da den traf sin beslutning i omstruktureringssagen.
Austria provided a calculation for the amount guaranteed by Ausfallhaftung and a liquidation scenario. It pointed out that the approach used in the calculation was identical to the one presented to the Commission in the procedure leading to the restructuring decision.
GRAWE gjorde gældende, at det ville være forkert at tage hensyn til et likvidationsscenarie, eftersom det ikke var en likvidation af BB, delstaten Burgenland skulle tage stilling til, men derimod valget af en køber.
GRAWE submitted that it was wrong to use a liquidation scenario in this context as the Province of Burgenland had to decide, not on a liquidation of BB, but on which buyer it should choose.
Likvidationsscenariet var opstillet med henblik på en helt anden situation (omstruktureringsstøttesagen).
The liquidation scenario had been intended for a different situation (decision on restructuring aid).
Hvis Ausfallhaftung blev udløst, ville delstaten Burgenland desuden ikke være i stand til at kræve alle aktiver likvideret, eftersom alle kreditorer direkte kunne søge fyldestgørelse hos delstaten.
In addition, in a situation of Ausfallhaftung, the Province of Burgenland would not be able to demand the liquidation of all assets, as all creditors could address the Province directly with their claims.
Refinansiering af BB efter salget
The refinancing of BB after its sale
Efter Østrigs opfattelse hænger dette aspekt sammen med kriteriet om »BB’s fortsatte eksistens uden brug af delstatens Ausfallhaftung«. Østrig fastholder, at man efter bekendtgørelsen af BB’s salg til konsortiet måtte forvente, at refinansieringsbehovet ville blive øget og likviditeten forringet, hvilket i sidste ende ville betyde, at der måtte gøres brug af delstatens kaution.
Austria linked this element to the criterion of ‘continued operation of BB and, at the same time, avoidance of the use of the guarantee’, maintaining that the announcement of the sale of BB to the Consortium might have led to an increase in BB’s refinancing needs and a significant liquidity outflow, and eventually might have triggered Ausfallhaftung.
Og BB’s likviditet efter salget indgik som et vigtigt element i den afgørelse, der blev truffet.
BB’s liquidity in the wake of the sale had been a crucial factor in the decision-making.
Heller ikke konsortiet havde udelukket risikoen for, at mange kunder ville trække deres penge ud, og at flere interbankkreditter ville blive opsagt, men anslået denne risiko langt lavere end Østrig.
The Consortium had also not excluded the possibility of deposit withdrawal by clients or the cancellation of inter-bank credit lines, albeit to a significantly lesser extent than estimated by Austria.
Mens konsortiet gik ud fra et likviditetstab på højst 500 mio. EUR, fremlagde Østrig beregninger, ifølge hvilke nettokapitaludstrømningen i bedste fald ville ligge på omkring 750 mio. EUR og i værste fald på 1,25 mia. EUR. Konsortiet burde have fremlagt bevis for, at det kunne sikre refinansieringen, hvilket det imidlertid ikke havde gjort, men blot fremlagt uforbindende hensigtserklæringer fra forskellige banker.
While the Consortium expected a maximum of EUR 500 million of withdrawals, Austria submitted calculations which quantified the net liquidity outflow at, at best, EUR 750 million and, at worst, EUR 1,25 billion. The Consortium bore the burden of proving that it could secure the refinancing, but had failed to discharge it. Instead, it had merely provided non-binding ‘letters of intent’ from various banks.
Endvidere fremhævede Østrig, at betænkelighederne herved ville have været mindre, hvis konsortiet, således som det stillede i udsigt under forhandlingerne, var fremkommet med en solid forretningspartner.
Austria further underlined that it would have been less concerned on this score had the Consortium presented a financially strong business partner, as it had announced during the negotiations.
Spørgsmål i forbindelse med finanstilsynets godkendelse af salget
Issues regarding the authorisation of the sale by the FMA
Ifølge oplysningerne fra Østrig kan det østrigske finanstilsyn jf. § 20 i BWG først underkaste køberen af en bank den såkaldte »fit and proper«-test i det øjeblik, hvor forhandlingsparterne har undertegnet en bindende købsaftale.
Austria explained that, according to Section 20 of the Banking Act, the FMA could only carry out the so-called ‘fit & proper test’ of the buyer of a bank when the parties had already entered into a binding agreement.
Hvis finanstilsynet skulle foretage en hypotetisk vurdering af mere end én potentiel køber, ville det overskride sine beføjelser.
A hypothetical evaluation of more than one potential buyer would exceed the FMA’s powers.
Af samme grund var det ikke muligt at forelægge Kommissionen en efterfølgende vurdering, således som den havde krævet det i sin åbningsbeslutning.
For the same reason, it was not possible to provide the Commission ex post with such an evaluation, as requested in the opening decision.
Efter at såvel konsortiet som GRAWE før salget havde indgivet skriftlig anmodning om godkendelse, havde finanstilsynet derfor afvist at tage stilling til de fremlagte dokumenter [28].
Consequently, the FMA had refused to examine the documents both of the Consortium and of GRAWE, as both potential buyers had provided the FMA with documents in order to obtain permission prior to the sale [28].
Finanstilsynet er forpligtet til at undersøge ethvert salg uhildet.
The FMA was required to evaluate any deal in an unbiased manner.
Østrig udtalte, at Østrig alligevel havde forsøgt at få en vurdering af de to tiloversblivende bydende.
Austria stated that it had nevertheless tried to obtain a statement concerning the two remaining bidders.
Finanstilsynet havde antydet, at det kun havde brug for et par uger til at vurdere GRAWE, som det kendte godt i forvejen.
Informally, the FMA had indicated that an evaluation of GRAWE, which was well known to the authority, would probably only take a few weeks.
Men da der ved vurderingen af konsortiet også måtte inddrages myndigheder uden for EU, ville denne vurdering formentlig tage over tre måneder.
In contrast, the evaluation of the Consortium also involved other authorities outside the European Union and would therefore presumably take more than three months.
Finanstilsynet har imidlertid en lovmæssig forpligtelse til at nedlægge et eventuelt forbud inden for en frist på tre måneder, eller salget anses for at være godkendt.
However, the FMA was bound by law to react within three months; otherwise the sale would be deemed authorised.
Derfor ville finanstilsynet have været nødt til at nedlægge et foreløbigt forbud mod et salg til konsortiet inden for tre måneder efter anmodningen om godkendelse.
Therefore, a sale to the Consortium would inevitably lead to the FMA provisionally prohibiting the sale as a first step.
Finanstilsynet kunne dog fortsætte sin undersøgelse af konsortiets intentioner med købet af BB og eventuelt tilbagekalde sin oprindelige afgørelse.
The FMA could, however, continue with the examination and, if necessary, revoke its earlier refusal.
Hele denne proces kunne have taget et helt år.
The whole process could take up to a year.
Ifølge oplysninger fra finanstilsynet havde udfaldet »stået helt åbent«.
According to the FMA, the outcome would have been ‘entirely open’.
Østrig understregede, at delstaten Burgenland i betragtning heraf var nødt til selv at tage stilling til, om man kunne forvente, at finanstilsynet ville godkende salget af BB.
Against this background, Austria stressed that the Province of Burgenland had needed to sell BB on the basis of its own prognosis of the FMA’s final decision.
Østrig var gået ud fra, at finanstilsynet aldrig ville godkende et salg til konsortiet.
However, Austria had considered that the FMA would never have allowed a sale to the Consortium.
De vigtigste overvejelser, delstaten Burgenland havde gjort sig, beskrives nedenfor.
The main considerations underlying the prognosis by the Province of Burgenland had been as follows:
Allerede i 1994 ansøgte SLAV International Bank AG om banktilladelse for Østrig, men fik afslag den 17. november 1997.
Back in 1994 SLAV International Bank AG had applied for a banking licence in Austria. The application was rejected on 17 November 1997.
Afslaget blev dengang bl.a. begrundet med, at den daværende ejer, den ukrainske fond, ikke anvendte de internationale regnskabsstandarder (IAS).
One of the grounds for rejection had been that the Ukrainian fund which was the owner at the time did not apply International Accounting Standards (IAS).
Desuden var koncernen med undtagelse af et lille medlem, nemlig Active Bank Ltd, som kun opererer i Ukraine, ikke aktiv i banksektoren.
Apart from a small member of the Consortium, Active Bank Ltd with activities in Ukraine only, no banking activities had been carried on within the group thus far.
Ingen af konsortiets medlemmer havde en rating fra et internationalt anerkendt ratingagentur.
None of the Consortium’s members was rated by an internationally recognised rating agency.
Med GRAWE ville Bank Burgenland derimod få en partner, der havde stor erfaring med bank- og kapitalmarkedet og »A«-rating, og som var kendt af finanstilsynet.
In contrast, in GRAWE Bank Burgenland would be gaining an experienced partner in the banking and capital market sector that had an ‘A’ rating and was well known to the FMA.
Østrig pegede endvidere på erfaringerne fra de to første privatiseringsforsøg, der var mislykkedes.
Similarly, Austria referred to its experience during the two earlier unsuccessful attempts at privatising BB.
Specielt i den anden privatiseringsrunde, der sluttede i august 2005 uden resultat, havde en litauisk bank, der i sidste instans var russisk ejet, afgivet et bud, men Østrig havde gode grunde til at antage, at finanstilsynet ikke vil godkende et sådant salg.
Especially during the second attempt, which ended in failure in August 2005, a Lithuania-based bank with a Russian owner had taken part and Austria had reason to believe that the FMA would have forbidden such a deal.
Østrig henviste desuden til, at afgørelsen ville have taget meget længere tid, da der ikke fandtes noget »Memorandum of understanding« for samarbejde og informationsudveksling mellem det østrigske finanstilsyn og den ukrainske centralbank.
Austria also noted that the decision would be more time-consuming owing to the non-existence of a memorandum of understanding as a basis for mutual cooperation and information exchange between the FMA and the Ukrainian National Bank.
Af hensyn til sit omdømme havde GRAWE i øvrigt en interesse i at træde til, hvis BB kom i vanskeligheder.
Furthermore, in order to preserve its good reputation, it was in GRAWE’s interests to intervene in the event of BB experiencing difficulties.
Det var ikke tilfældet med konsortiet.
The same could not be said of the Consortium.
Østrig tilføjede, at BB med en ukrainsk ejer aldrig ville kunne opnå en rating, der kunne måle sig med GRAWE’s A-rating, men ud fra princippet om, at en virksomhed aldrig vil få en bedre rating end det land, den ligger i, nok snarere ville få mellem »BB« og »B«.
In addition, Austria stressed that, with a Ukraine-based owner, BB would never obtain a rating similar to GRAWE’s ‘A’ rating, but rather a rating between ‘BB’ and ‘B’, in accordance with the principle that an undertaking cannot secure a better rating than the country in which it is established.
Andre aspekter, der var udslaggivende for delstaten Burgenland
Further elements of the prognosis of the Province of Burgenland
Østrig fremlagde desuden et notat fra HSBC, der bekræftede alle de overvejelser, delstaten havde gjort sig med hensyn til sandsynligheden for, at finanstilsynet ville godkende salget, og for, at Ausfallhaftung ville blive udløst, hvis banken blev solgt til GRAWE.
Austria also presented a note by HSBC confirming all considerations by the Province of Burgenland as to the probability that the FMA would authorize the deal and that Ausfallhaftung might be availed of in the event of a decision in favour of GRAWE.
Den betydeligt lavere risiko ved et salg til GRAWE ville langt opveje forskellen mellem priserne i de to bud.
The price difference was far outweighed by the much smaller risk in the event of a sale to GRAWE.
Også konsortiets forretningsplan gav anledning til betænkeligheder.
The Consortium’s business plan was also a matter for concern.
Den blev først fremlagt på et sent stadium i undersøgelserne (27. februar 2006) og gik bl.a. ud på, at BB blev lagt sammen med den ukrainske Active Bank Ltd. Det blev sågar af konsortiet gjort til en betingelse for køb af Bank Burgenland.
It had not been submitted until late in the process on 27 February 2006 and provided for the integration of Ukraine-based Active Bank Ltd. Indeed, the Consortium made this a condition precedent to acquiring BB.
Forretningsplanen indeholdt efter delstaten Burgenlands opfattelse en række elementer, som ville have truet BB’s eksistens.
However, there were a number of elements in this business plan which the Province of Burgenland considered highly dangerous to BB’s very existence.
Der blev bl.a. peget på, at kun en meget lille del af den kapitalforhøjelse, konsortiet stillede i udsigt, skulle bruges til at styrke BB’s regionale aktiviteter (17 mio. EUR af i alt 85 mio. EUR) — resten skulle tilflyde den ukrainske bank Active Bank.
In particular, only a very small part of the new capital pledged by the Consortium had been earmarked for strengthening the regional activities of BB (EUR 17 million out of a total of EUR 85 million), the rest being intended for Ukraine-based Active Bank.
Ifølge forretningsplanen skulle kernevirksomheden foregå i Ukraine og ikke i delstaten Burgenland, hvilket indebar valutakursrisici.
According to the business plan, the future main centre of gravity of the business was to be in Ukraine instead of in the Province of Burgenland — a situation which involved exchange risks.
Desuden havde delstaten Burgenland aldrig kunnet få afklaret, hvordan konsortiet helt konkret forestillede sig, at integreringen af Active Bank, hvis værdi var sat for højt, skulle foregå.
Also, the Province of Burgenland had never been able to find out how the Consortium intended to integrate Active Bank, the value of which was over-estimated.
Delstaten Burgenland gik for en sikkerheds skyld ud fra et pessimistisk scenarie for BB, ifølge hvilket Active Banks eventuelle konkurs ville bringe BB i alvorlig fare og i sidste ende kunne føre til, at BB måtte standse betalingerne.
For prudential reasons, the Province of Burgenland assumed a worst-case scenario for BB in which a failure of Active Bank would seriously jeopardise BB and, ultimately, even result in BB’s insolvency.
Med denne forretningsplan ville delstaten Burgenland ikke have solgt BB, heller ikke selv om konsortiets bud havde været det eneste [29].
Based on that business plan, the Province of Burgenland would not have sold BB even if the Consortium had been the only bidder [29].
Endvidere havde Østrig betænkeligheder ved, at finanstilsynet ville have haft brug for langt mere tid til at undersøge et salg af BB til konsortiet.
Furthermore, Austria had been concerned about the fact that the FMA would have needed considerably more time to evaluate a sale to the Consortium.
I omstruktureringsbeslutningen var det blevet krævet, at BB hurtigt skulle privatiseres.
A timely privatisation of BB was required by the decision concerning the restructuring of BB.
Derudover var GRAWE’s bud kun gældende indtil den 31. marts 2006.
In addition, GRAWE had limited the validity of its offer to 31 March 2006.
Delstaten Burgenland ville i så fald have løbet en risiko for slet ikke at have nogen køber til BB, hvis finanstilsynet ikke godkendte salget til konsortiet.
The Province of Burgenland therefore risked being left without a buyer if the FMA prohibited the sale.
Den 5. marts 2008 henviste Østrig til en tysk dom, der stadfæstede en afgørelse truffet af det tyske finanstilsyn, som forbød salg af aktier i en tysk bank til en ukrainsk virksomhedskoncern.
On 5 March 2008 Austria referred to a German court judgment confirming a BaFin decision prohibiting the sale of shares in a German bank to a Ukrainian group.
Østrig hævdede ikke, at den ukrainske koncern, det drejede sig om i denne sag, var konsortiet, men følte sig dog bekræftet i sin holdning af denne afgørelse, som det tyske finanstilsyn havde truffet efter 13 måneders forløb.
Austria did not maintain that the Ukrainian group concerned by this case was the Consortium, but it nevertheless found its own prognosis to be supported by the decision, which it had taken BaFin 13 months to reach.
Efter Østrigs opfattelse var spørgsmålet om en hurtig privatisering snævert forbundet med den nødvendige transaktionssikkerhed.
In Austria’s view, the question of a timely sale was closely linked to the required transaction security.
Hvis det tredje privatiseringsforsøg strandede, ville det bringe banken i fare, og BB ville sågar kunne træde i betalingsstandsning, hvilket ville udløse Ausfallhaftung.
A failure of the third privatisation round would have endangered the bank and might in the aftermath even have led to BB’S insolvency, triggering Ausfallhaftung.
Andre risikovurderingsmetoder fremlagt af Østrig og GRAWE
Other risk evaluation methods presented by Austria and GRAWE
Østrig fremsendte yderligere oplysninger angående HSBC’s indstilling, der var baseret på de samlede garanterede forpligtelser.
Austria submitted further explanations of the recommendation by HSBC, which follows an approach based on total guaranteed liabilities.
Blot en mindre forøgelse af sandsynligheden for, at Ausfallhaftung kunne blive udløst efter et salg til konsortiet, ville opveje forskellen mellem de to bud og dermed føre til en beslutning til fordel for GRAWE.
A moderate increase in the probability that Ausfallhaftung might be triggered if BB were sold to the Consortium was sufficient to outweigh the difference between the two offers and hence pointed to a decision in favour of GRAWE.
GRAWE fremsendte en yderligere ekspertudtalelse, som blev støttet af Østrig, og hvori de garanterede forpligtelser blev vurderet i relation til salgsmulighederne, for at forklare og retfærdiggøre BB’s salg til GRAWE.
GRAWE, supported by Austria, submitted an expert opinion based on an option pricing model to explain and justify the sale to GRAWE.
I denne udtalelse drages der den konklusion, at selv ved en minimal forøgelse af de samlede aktivers volatilitet på 1,83 % efter BB’s salg til konsortiet ville risikoen for delstaten Burgenland i kraft af Ausfallhaftung blive så meget større, at det retfærdiggjorde afgørelsen om at sælge BB til GRAWE.
This expert opinion came to the conclusion that, even assuming a small increase of 1,83 % in the volatility of the assets following the sale of BB to the Consortium, the resulting risk to the Province of Burgenland in terms of Ausfallhaftung would be increased considerably. Hence the decision to sell BB to GRAWE was justified.
Den 22. februar 2008, på et meget sent stadium i sagsbehandlingen, fremsendte Østrig en analyse af, hvordan kapitalmarkederne vurderer en hæftelse som Ausfallhaftung.
Very late in the procedure, on 22 February 2008, Austria submitted an analysis of how the capital markets valued a guarantee such as Ausfallhaftung.
Desuden blev der den 9. april 2008 fremsendt en detaljeret redegørelse fra Morgan Stanley om de metoder, der var lagt til grund i denne analyse.
A more detailed exposition of the approach taken in the analysis, produced by Morgan Stanley, was provided on 9 April 2008.