natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Den panik, der kunne forventes ved en mulig insolvens hos BAWAG-PSK, ville hurtigt kunne brede sig til andre banker, særlig fordi andre banker ville kunne blive inddraget i et andet kreditinstituts insolvens i medfør af den østrigske lov om indskudsgaranti.
The panic anticipated in the case of a potential insolvency of BAWAG-PSK could have quickly spread to other banks, especially because under the statutory model for securing deposits in Austria, other banks could also be called upon in the case of an insolvency of a credit institution.
Dette ville have massive følger for den samlede østrigske nationaløkonomi og frem for alt også for de omkring 70000 arbejdstagere, der er beskæftiget i banksektoren.
This would have massive consequences for the entire Austrian economy and above all also for the approximately 70000 employees in the banking sector.
Oprettelsen af to specielle selskaber (se nedenfor) ville desuden understrege den entydige støtte til BAWAG-PSK fra de største økonomisk aktører på det østrigske finansmarked, som var indstillet på at sikre stabiliteten på finansmarkedet i Østrig.
The creation of two special-purpose vehicles (see below) would also demonstrate the clear support for BAWAG-PSK by the largest participants in the Austrian financial market, willing to secure the stability of the financial market in Austria.
En insolvens ville ud over at ramme ejeren Österreichischer Gewerksschaftsbund (ÖGB) især også have ramt Østrig:
In addition to the major direct impact on the owner ÖGB, the insolvency of BAWAG-PSK would also have affected Austria:
idet forbundsstaten påtager sig den statslige opgave at sikre finansmarkedsstabilitet
as holder of the public task for capital market stability,
idet BAWAG-PSK gennemfører alle betalinger for Østrig (f.eks. betalinger i forbindelse med skatter, pensioner, arbejdsløshedsunderstøttelse og familietilskud), og
because BAWAG-PSK is the bank which effects all payments for Austria, e.g. tax payments, pension payments, unemployment payments, family assistance, etc., and
idet forbundsstaten tidligere var ejer af og garant for visse forpligtelser for Österreichische Postsparkasse.
as previous owner and guarantor for certain liabilities of the Österreichische Postsparkasse.
Derudover havde Østrig måttet overtage tjenestemændene i Österreichische Postsparkasse med deres rettigheder som statstjenestemænd (årlige lønudbetalinger på i alt […] mio. EUR).
Moreover, Austria would have had the obligation to take on the federal civil servants working at the Österreichische Postsparkasse and their rights in the public administration (total annual salaries of EUR […] million).
Da BAWAG-PSK også benytter de østrigske posthuse som filialer, ville man på grund af det reducerede forretningsvolumen med finansielle tjenesteydelser på de østrigske posthuse også være tvunget til at lukke yderligere posthuse. Dette ville have givet strukturelle problemer i landområderne.
Because BAWAG-PSK also uses the Austrian post offices as branch offices, the reduced business volume of the financial services at the Austrian post offices would also necessitate closing additional post offices and would therefore create structural problems in rural areas.
Østrig mente, at det næppe var muligt at foretage en kvantitativ vurdering af eventuelle konsekvenser for den samlede nationaløkonomi ved bankens insolvens.
Austria considered that it is hardly possible to provide a quantitative estimate of the potential consequences of an insolvency of the bank for the entire economy.
Støtteelementet ved statsgarantien
The aid element in the State guarantee
Østrig erklærede, at statsstøtten var nødvendig for at afslutte den »Bank-Run«, der var begyndt i september 2005, og for at sikre, at BAWAG-PSK og BAWAG-PSK-koncernen forblev solvent.
Austria explained that the State aid was necessary in order to end the ‘run on the bank’ which started in September 2005 and to assume the solvency situation of BAWAG-PSK and the BAWAG-PSK group.
Hvis forbundsstaten ikke havde givet denne statsgaranti til BAWAG-PSK, ville ingen privat investor have været villig til at stille midler til rådighed, der kunne betragtes som egenkapital.
Without the public guarantee for BAWAG-PSK no private investor would have been willing to provide funds which would be considered as equity capital in this case.
Ifølge Østrig skal støtteelementet i garantien vurderes efter Kommissionens meddelelse om anvendelsen af EF-traktatens artikel 87 og 88 angående statsstøtte i form af garantier [16] (herefter benævnt »meddelelsen«).
According to Austria the aid element of the guarantee must be determined on the basis of the notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees [16] (hereinafter the Notice).
Meddelelsen gav Kommissionen et yderligere spillerum for skøn med hensyn til bestemmelse af støttens størrelse.
The Notice would grant the Commission a broad discretion with regard to determining the amount of the State aid.
Det angives blot, at støtteelementet skal vurderes på grundlag af de enkelte punkter i garantien.
The only binding requirement would be that the State aid element should be assessed by reference to the details of the guarantee.
Punkt 3.2 i meddelelsen har følgende ordlyd: »Når der på det tidspunkt, hvor lånet ydes, er stor sandsynlighed for, at låntageren vil misligholde lånet, f.eks. fordi han er i finansielle vanskeligheder, kan garantiens værdi være lige så høj som det beløb, der rent faktisk dækkes af denne garanti.« Østrig erklærede, at BAWAG-PSK ikke var en låntager, som staten gav en garanti til, men en långiver.
In reference to paragraph 3.2 of the Notice, where it is mentioned that ‘where, at the time the loan is granted, there is a strong probability that the borrower will default, e.g. because he is in a financial difficulty, the value of the guarantee may be as high as the amount effectively covered by the guarantee’ Austria commented that BAWAG-PSK is not a borrower for whom the State is guaranteeing the credit in favour of the credit grantor, but the credit grantor itself.
BAWAG-PSK's finansielle situation var som følge heraf irrelevant for bedømmelsen af risikoen for misligholdelse.
Therefore in order to evaluate the default risk of the claim, the financial situation of BAWAG-PSK would be irrelevant.
Kommissionen kunne derfor ikke drage nogen konklusioner vedrørende risikoen for misligholdelse ud fra BAWAG-PSK's finansielle situation.
Thus the Commission cannot draw a conclusion about the default risk of the claim from the financial situation of the BAWAG-PSK.
Østrig anførte, at Moody’s »Financial Strength Rating« (herefter benævnt »FSR«) [17] var en velegnet indikator for BAWAG-PSK's finansielle situation, da FSR udelukkende fokuserer på den finansielle betalingsevne i virksomheden selv uden ekstern støtte.
Austria explained that Moody's Financial Strength Rating (hereafter FSR) [17] would be an appropriate indicator of the financial situation of BAWAG-PSK, because the FSR is only based on the financial ability of the company to perform without any external support.
Denne rating indeholder implicit en bedømmelse af bankens fremtidige udvikling og giver et realistisk billede af den samlede sandsynlighed for misligholdelse.
It contains an implicit statement regarding future development of the Bank and thereby provides a significant picture of the overall payment default risk. The FSR of BAWAG-PSK of ‘E+’ would correspond to a baseline risk assessment rated from B1 to B3.
En FSR på »E+« for BAWAG-PSK svarer til en »Baseline Rating« på B1 til B3 og betyder således en sandsynlighed for misligholdelse på mellem 3,2 og 10,5 % inden for et år.
The latter ratings would indicate payment default risk within one year of 3,2 % to 10,5 %.
De finansielle vanskeligheder hos en låntager er blot et tegn på, at der foreligger statsstøtte, men giver ikke mulighed for at sige noget om støttens værdi.
According to this, the financial difficulties of a borrower would only be an indication for the existence of State aid; however, they would not enable any statement about the amount of the aid element involved.
Kommissionen har i flere omstruktureringstilfælde fastsat støtteelementet i en garanti til fordel for en kriseramt virksomhed lavere end den nominelle værdi.
The Commission has in several restructuring cases determined the aid element in a guarantee granted in favour of a company in difficulty to be lower than the nominal value.
I sagen vedrørende Crédit Foncier de France (herefter benævnt »CFF«) [18] beregnede Kommissionen støtteværdien ved hjælp af prisen, som banken hypotetisk ville skulle betale for en sådan garanti på markedet.
In the case of Crédit Foncier de France [18] (hereafter CFF), the Commission calculated the amount of aid based on the market price the Bank would hypothetically have had to pay for such a guarantee on the market.
I Bankgesellschaft Berlin (herefter benævnt »BGB«) [19] fastsatte Kommissionen støtteværdien for en garanti, det såkaldte risikoskjold, efter den »økonomiske værdi« og ikke efter den nominelle værdi.
In the case Bankgesellschaft Berlin [19] (hereafter BGB), the Commission determined the amount of aid in a guarantee, the so-called risk shield, to be the ‘economic value’ rather than the nominal value.
Også i forbindelse med den omstruktureringsstøtte, som Tyskland gav Chemische Werke Piesteritz (herefter benævnt »CWP«) [20], satte Kommissionen støtteværdien for en garanti langt under lånets nominelle værdi, selv om CWP befandt sig i finansielle vanskeligheder på det tidspunkt.
Also in the case of the restructuring aid granted by Germany to Chemische Werke Piesteritz [20] (hereafter CWP), the Commission estimated the amount of aid in a guarantee far below the nominal value of the loan, although CWP was in financial difficulty at the time.
Med hensyn til garantiens korte løbetid oplyste Østrig, at forbundsfinansministeren ville kunne forlænge garantiens løbetid i medfør af § 3, stk. 2, sidste punktum, i BAWAG-PSK-sikringsloven.
Regarding the short-term character of the guarantee, Austria explained that according to paragraph 3(2) last sentence of the law, the Federal Minister of Finance can extend the guarantee.
Men det krævede forbundsregeringens godkendelse, og den skulle være enstemmig.
However, this would require the consent of the Federal Government, which would have to be unanimous.
En forlængelse afhang således af en politisk vurdering fra forbundsregeringens side.
An extension is thus left to the political discretion of the Federal Government.
BAWAG-PSK kunne med henblik på forlængelse alene lægge et effektivt pres på Østrig, hvis forudsætningerne for at gøre brug af garantien var til stede.
BAWAG-PSK could at best exert pressure on Austria with regard to an extension, if the requirements for a drawdown prevail.
Det ville kræve, at der forelå en truende insolvens hos BAWAG-PSK.
This would require the threat of insolvency of BAWAG-PSK.
BAWAG-PSK ville først skulle opfordre sine ejere til at betale og tvinge dem til at offentliggøre deres formueforhold.
In such a case BAWAG-PSK would first have to request its owners to pay and force them to disclose their financial circumstances.
Dette ville være en stor forhindring for at gøre brug af garantien, således at garantien ikke kunne siges »de facto« at have »ubestemt løbetid«.
These would be high hurdles for a drawdown so that the guarantee cannot be assumed to be of ‘de facto endless duration’.
Også økonomisk kunne man ikke gå ud fra, at garantien ville virke evigt.
Also from an economic point of view the guarantee could not be regarded as unlimited.
BAWAG-PSK havde desuden også i tilfælde af, at salget ikke kom i stand, en række muligheder for at dække sit kapitalbehov andre steder, når garantiens etårige frist udløb.
BAWAG-PSK would avail itself of a series of other options to cover its capital requirements upon expiration of the one-year guarantee term, even in case the Bank cannot be sold.
For det første vil overskuddet i banken føre til en forbedring af kapitalbehovet.
Firstly, the Bank's profits would lead to an improved equity.
For det andet kan den mindske sit kapitalbehov ved at nedbringe sine risikoaktiver.
Secondly, it could reduce its capital requirement by reducing its risk assets.
For det tredje vil det være muligt at optage kapital fra tredjepart.
Thirdly, there would always be the possibility to recourse to third party equity.
I den umiddelbare krise under »Bank-Run« i maj 2006 var disse muligheder af tidsmæssige årsager ikke til rådighed.
During the immediate ‘bank run’ crisis in May 2006, these possibilities were not made use of due to time pressure.
Hvis salget ikke havde fundet sted, ville banken have haft mulighed for at gå efter disse optioner.
Had the Bank not been sold, it would have had the possibility to follow these approaches.
Efter Østrigs opfattelse kan garantien økonomisk ikke betragtes som værende definitivt indbetalt (»paid in«) i BAWAG-PSK's formue.
According to Austria the guarantee could not be economically considered as having been durably paid into the assets of BAWAG-PSK (paid in).
En ny ejer ville skulle erstatte dette beløb med sit indskud.
A new owner would have to replace this amount by its own contribution.
Der var ikke noget automatisk element i forbindelse med en forlængelse af garantien.
There is no automatic mechanism concerning its extension.
En køber ville ikke bare stille et beløb på samme størrelse til rådighed som egenkapital, når garantien udløb. Han ville snarere have en række muligheder for at forholde sig til en eventuel kapitalknaphed hos BAWAG-PSK.
A purchaser would not simply inject equity in the same amount upon expiration of the guarantee but would have a number of options to handle possible financial straits of BAWAG-PSK.
Sandsynligheden for at gøre brug af garantien ville yderligere blive begrænset gennem de specifikke betingelser i garantien.
The probability of a drawdown would also be limited by the specific modalities of the guarantee.
Særlig ville den omstændighed, at garantien alene var en opfyldelsesgaranti, have en risikomindskende effekt.
In particular, the fact that the guarantee is only a deficiency guarantee would minimise the risk.
Østrigs garanti ville udelukkende komme på tale, hvis BAWAG-PSK stod over for en truende insolvens.
The liability of Austria is only conceivable in the event of threatened insolvency of BAWAG-PSK.
En sådan insolvens ville dog være meget usandsynlig netop på grund af garantien.
Such insolvency would be very unlikely as a result of and after the granting of the guarantee.
Med hensyn til sandsynligheden for, at der blev gjort brug af garantien, erklærede Østrig, at der på det tidspunkt, hvor garantien blev givet, var stor sandsynlighed for, at BAWAG-PSK ville blive solgt inden for et år ved en samlet investering fra købers side på mere end 2,6 mia. EUR. Købsprisen eller tilbudsgivernes samlede investering, som angivet i deres endelige bud i december 2006, var et stærkt indicium for den faktiske værdi af BAWAG-PSK i april 2006, dvs. før garantistillelsen.
Regarding the likelihood of the drawdown, Austria argued that at the time of granting the State guarantee, there was a high likelihood that BAWAG-PSK would be sold within a year for a total buyer investment of more than EUR 2,6 billion. A strong indicator of the effective value of BAWAG-PSK in April 2006, thus before the granting of the State guarantee, would be the sales price, i.e. the total investment stated by the bidders in their final offers of December 2006. Because of the basic soundness of BAWAG-PSK in spring 2006 and the limited character of the problems having led to its financial difficulties, the value of BAWAG-PSK at the moment of granting the guarantee was evaluated at about EUR 2,6 billion.
Fordi BAWAG-PSK i foråret 2006 egentlig var sund, og fordi selskabet kun på grund af helt specifikke problemer var kommet ud i finansielle vanskeligheder, var dets værdi ved garantistillelsen blevet sat til ca. 2,6 mia. EUR. Denne høje værdi afspejlede sig også i udbudsproceduren, dvs. i de endelige bud fra tilbudsgiverne i december 2006 og sluttelig i den samlede investering, der blev foretaget af Cerberus.
This high value is also reflected in the tender, notably in the final offers made in December 2006 and finally in the total investment made by Cerberus. The bids were made as part of an international tender, an open and non-discriminating procedure that left bidders enough time to assess the potential sales object before making a bid.
Tilbudsgivernes bud blev afgivet inden for rammerne af en international udbudsrunde, som blev gennemført åbent og uden forskelsbehandling, og som gav tilbudsgiverne tilstrækkelig tid til at undersøge det potentielle købeobjekt før afgivelse af et bud. Hvad angår Østrigs kendskab til BAWAG-PSK's faktiske værdi havde Østrig gennem FMA på tidspunktet for garantistillelsen tilstrækkelige oplysninger om BAWAG-PSK's økonomiske situation.
Regarding Austria's awareness of the effective value of BAWAG-PSK, given the activity of the FMA, Austria was, at the moment of granting the State guarantee, sufficiently informed about the economic situation of BAWAG-PSK.
Indtil garantien blev givet, betragtede Østrig BAWAG-PSK som en absolut levedygtig virksomhed, der kun havde brug for midlertidig støtte, indtil den blev solgt.
Up to the granting of the State guarantee, Austria saw BAWAG-PSK basically as an economically viable company, which temporarily needed support until its sale.
Med hensyn til sammenlignelighed med andre finansielle instrumenter erklærede Østrig, at statsgarantien ikke kunne sammenlignes med en kapitaltilførsel, hvis garantien ikke blev brugt.
Regarding comparability with other financial instruments, Austria explained that the guarantee would not be similar to a capital injection, provided no drawdown takes place.
Risikoen for misligholdelse udgjorde ved en FRS på E+ kun 5,49 %, således at der med 95 %’s sandsynlighed ikke ville blive udbetalt noget til BAWAG-PSK.
The default likelihood at a FSR rating of E+ being as low as 5,49 % would mean that there would not be any payment to BAWAG-PSK with a probability of almost 95 %.
Østrig mente, at statsgarantien med hensyn til beregning af støtteelementet indirekte kunne sammenlignes med den sikkerhed for gæld, der var stillet i CFF.
Austria concluded that for the purpose of calculating the aid element, the State guarantee would be indirectly comparable with a guarantee securing liabilities such as it was granted in the case of CFF.
Herigennem ville bankens resultat også være blevet forbedret.
This in turn would have improved the performance of the Bank.
Sammen med denne rating ville det i det mindste have forbedret bankens mulighed for at indtjene ny kapital betragteligt.
Together with the rating, this would at least have clearly improved its chances of obtaining fresh capital.
En sikkerhed for gælden ville derfor — indirekte — kunne tilvejebringe den nødvendige kernekapitalprocent.
A guarantee securing liabilities could thus also indirectly ensure the necessary Tier 1 capital ratio.
Beregningen af støtteelementet burde derfor være baseret på størrelsen af den økonomiske værdi ud fra et støttemodtagersynspunkt.
The calculation of the aid element should thus be based on the amount of economic benefit from the point of view of the recipient of the aid.
Det måtte dog ikke indgå i beregningen, om staten ville give en garanti eller vælge andre midler end en privat investor.
Whether the government elects to recur to a State guarantee or to different means than a private investor must in no way influence the determining of the amount of the aid element involved.
Sandsynligheden for misligholdelse på B2 forekom at være realistisk og retfærdig i lyset af de risikoreducerende årsager og den tidsmæssige begrænsning, fordi banken forventedes solgt inden for en nær fremtid.
As a result of the grounds resulting in a lower risk and the short duration due to the anticipated sale of the Bank in the near future, the probability of default of B2 would appear realistic and fair.
Garantiens støtteelement ville derfor udgøre 49,1 mio. EUR [21].
The aid element in the guarantee would therefore amount to EUR 49 million [21].
Med et garantigebyr på 0,2 % det første år vil støtteelementet netto udgøre 47,2 mio. EUR [22].
Considering the guarantee fee of 0,2 % for the first year, the net aid value would be EUR 47,2 million [22].
Man kunne også se beregningsmådens berettigelse ud fra, at renterne ved at give et lån for det samlede beløb sådan cirka ville være lige så høje som garantigebyret.
Austria explained that a plausibility check of this calculation would be that if Austria had granted the entire amount not as a guarantee but rather as a genuine loan, interest would have been owed for this in approximately the same range.
Østrig anførte endvidere, at med hensyn til de ikke opfyldte forpligtelser skulle man ikke blot tage hensyn til sandsynligheden for misligholdelse, men også til, hvor stort omfanget af ikke-opfyldte forpligtelser ville være.
Austria added that the expected loss of the guarantee does not only result from the probability of default but also from the level of the losses in the default case.
Den beregning, der er angivet i betragtning 83, er baseret på en misligholdelsesrate ved 100 %’s misligholdelse.
The above calculation is based on a default rate in the default case of 100 %.
Ved 50 %’s misligholdelse [23] ville man dog opnå en væsentlig lavere støtteværdi på ca. 25 mio. EUR. En privat investor ville også tage hensyn til kapitalomkostninger på ca. 1 0 mio. EUR [24].
The consideration of an adequate default rate in the default case of 50 % [23] would lead to a significantly lower aid value of approximately EUR 25 million. In addition, a private investor would also consider capital costs of approximately EUR 10 million [24].
Derfor ville den samlede værdi af garantien beløbe sig til ca. 35 mio. EUR, hvorfra man dog skulle trække garantigebyret på 1,8 mio. EUR.
Therefore in total the value of the guarantee would amount to approximately EUR 35 million minus the guarantee fee of EUR 1,8 million.
Østrig bedømte også garantiens værdi ved beregning af den teoretiske refinansieringsfordel, som BAWAG-PSK ville have på grund af statsgarantien.
Austria alternatively evaluated the value of the guarantee by determining the theoretical refinancing advantage for BAWAG-PSK resulting from the guarantee.
På grund af garantien blev risikopræmien reduceret med ca. 0,2 % [25].
Due to the guarantee the risk premium decreased by approximately 0,2 % [25].
Under hensyntagen til de forpligtelser på 24,7 mia. EUR, der var berørt af denne rating, ville garantiens økonomiske værdi udgøre 49,4 mio. EUR.
In taking into account the EUR 24,7 billion liabilities affected by the rating the economic value of the guarantee would amount to EUR 49,4 million.
Østrig forklarede, at støtteelementet i hvert fald ville ligge langt fra garantiens nominelle værdi.
Austria argued that the aid element would in any case be far from the nominal value of the guarantee.
På kapitalmarkedet findes hybride egenkapitalinstrumenter, der minder stærkt om forpligtelser og anerkendes som såkaldt kernekapital i banktilsynsbestemmelserne.
The capital market has hybrid equity instruments with clear features of liabilities, which the banking supervision regulations accept as Tier 1 capital.
Men disse ville på grund af banktilsynsbestemmelserne have en lang minimumsløbetid på typisk mindst 10 år.
These instruments, due to banking supervision regulations, would have lengthy minimum terms, which as a rule are at least 10 years.
For sådanne instrumenter kunne der kræves fast forrentning, som naturligvis lå højere, end hvad man skulle betale for et etårigt instrument.
Such instruments would be subject to a fixed rate of return, which is of course higher than the rate to be paid for a one-year instrument.
Banker, hvis rating kunne sammenlignes med BAWAG-PSK's rating, udstedte i foråret/sommeren 2006 hybridkapital med mindste løbetid på ti år til rentesatser på ca. 5,1 %:
Banks with a rating comparable to that of BAWAG-PSK issued hybrid capital in spring/summer 2006 with a ten-year minimum term and bearing interest rates of approximately 5,1 %: