natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kommissionen mener imidlertid ikke, at disse tilskud er tildelt på almindelige markedsvilkår, for så vidt som en privat kreditor ikke ville have accepteret at bevilge de pågældende beløb på grund af den manglende garanti for, at FPAP’s aktiviteter vil fortsætte og sandsynligheden for dækning på forfaldstidspunktet.
However, the Commission takes the view that the advances were not granted on normal market-economy terms insofar as no private creditor would have agreed to grant the amounts in question in the absence of a guarantee of the viability of the FPAP’s activity and the probability of recovery by the expiry date.
FPAP’s startkapital består af bidrag fra medlemmerne (se betragtning 23 og 24).
The FPAP’s start-up capital is made up of its members’ contributions (see recitals 23 and 25).
Hverken Frankrig eller FPAP har fremsat tal for ressourcerne fra disse bidrag.
Neither France nor the FPAP have provided figures of the resources obtained from these contributions.
Ifølge den begrundelse, der er vedlagt svarskrivelsen af 21. april 2006, anfører de franske myndigheder først, at »disse oplysninger på tidspunktet for udarbejdelsen af svarskrivelsen af 6. december 2005 fremgik af udkastet, men var blevet slettet under den interministerielle validering«, men at de for øvrigt ikke finder, at »det er nødvendigt at komme med et svar nu.«
Also, according to the list of defensive points enclosed with the reply of 21 April 2006, after stating that ‘when the reply of 6 December 2005 was being drafted, this information was proposed in the draft but was deleted during the interministerial check’, the French authorities take the view that ‘it is not necessary to give a reply now’.
Kommissionen formoder dog, at det drejer sig om relativt beskedne beløb sammenlignet med udgifternes mulige omfang. På grundlag af oplysningerne i memorandummet, som er underskrevet af FPAP’s generalsekretær, i »FPAP’s detaljerede procedurevejledning« fra november 2004 og i »FPAP’s informationsmeddelelse« fra januar 2006 kan der dog dannes et groft skøn: ca. 2500 medlemmer (antal medlemmer af FPAP ifølge de franske myndigheder) betaler et indmeldelsesgebyr på 150 EUR eller i alt 375000 EUR, hvortil skal lægges bidrag til dækning af selve garantirisikoen (jf. betragtning 25).
Nevertheless the Commission supposes that these are relatively modest amounts compared to the probable extent of the expenditure, since, on the basis of the information given in the statement signed by the Secretary-General of the FPAP, the ‘Detailed Rules of Procedure of the FPAP’ of November 2004 and the ‘information note from the FPAP’ of January 2006, a rough estimate can be made: approximately 2500 members (the number of members of the FPAP according to the French authorities) pay a membership fee of EUR 150 each, i.e. EUR 375000, to which the contributions covering the guarantee risk proper (see recital 25) must be added.
Hvis man antager, at den samlede mængde dieselolie er forsikret, og man tager udgangsbetragtning i det af FPAP angivne vejledende forbrug for en trawler på 24 m (ca. 10 ton brændstof om ugen) og højst 48 ugers aktivitet om året, svarende til et forbrug på 480 tons (selvom antallet af aktivitetsuger sandsynligvis ligger nærmere 38-40 end 48), og enhedsværdien af bidraget til FPAP, 0,0035 EUR/l, kommer man, hvis der er tale om 2500 fartøjer, frem til et samlet beløb på 4200000 EUR årligt.
Assuming that the entire volume of diesel consumed is covered, and based on the indicative consumption of a 24-metre trawler as reported by the FPAP (approximately 10 tonnes of fuel per week), and assuming activity for a maximum of 48 weeks a year, i.e. a consumption of 480 tonnes (although the number of weeks of activity is probably closer to 38 to 40 than 48), and the unit value of the contribution to the FPAP, i.e. EUR 0,0035 per litre, the figure arrived at for 2500 vessels is a total of EUR 4200000 per year.
Den tredje kilde til bidrag stammer fra den af vedtægterne omfattede mulighed for, at fagforeningen optager »enhver, der er rede til at yde moralsk støtte til fagforeningen«, dog højst 5 % af det samlede antal medlemmer.
The third source of contributions comes from the possibility, as provided for in the articles of association, for the association to take in ‘any person willing to provide moral support for the trade association’, up to a maximum of 5 % of the number of members.
Det drejer sig sandsynligvis om et marginalt beløb.
This is probably a marginal amount.
Da der ikke foreligger tal for antallet af medlemmer, som er rede til at yde moralsk støtte, og for deres beløb, kan man gå ud fra den meget højt satte hypotese, at der er et indtægtssupplement på 125000 EUR (125 medlemmer, hvis aktivitet ikke vedrører fiskeriet, eller det maksimum, som er tilladt i henhold til FPAP’s vedtægter [5 % af 2500 medlemmer ] × 1000 EUR).
In the absence of any indication of the number of such members willing to provide moral support and the amount that they contribute, we will assume, as a very generous estimate, additional revenue of about EUR 125000 (125 members whose activities do not relate to fishing, i.e. the maximum permitted by the FPAP’s articles of association (5 % of 2500 members) × EUR 1000).
De samlede indtægter fra forskellige bidrag udgør således 4200000 + 375000 + 125000 eller 4700000 EUR årligt.
Thus the total revenue from the various contributions would amount to EUR 4200000 + EUR 375000 + EUR 125000, i.e. EUR 4700000 per year.
Dette er et yderst optimistisk skøn beregnet på et vejledende forbrug for en trawler på 24 meter med en aktivitetsvarighed på 48 uger årligt og på, at hele forbruget er forsikret.
This is an extremely optimistic assumption, calculated on the basis of an indicative consumption of a 24-metre trawler operating for 48 weeks a year, and on the assumption that all the fuel consumed is covered.
Kommissionen har alene valgt dette skøn for at kunne beregne det maksimale teoretiske indtægtsbeløb for FPAP.
The Commission is only taking it to find out what the theoretical maximum amount of revenue for the FPAP could be.
Men i lyset af at Frankrigs tal for medlemsfartøjer er 2385, hvoraf en ikke ubetydelig del er kystfiskerfartøjer på under 12 meter, hvis årlige brændstofforbrug ligger nærmere 200 end de 480 ton, der er valgt i ovenstående beregning, er det reelle beløb sandsynligvis betydeligt lavere.
However, if we consider that France indicates that the number of member vessels is 2385, including a considerable proportion of coastal vessels of less than 12 metres, whose annual fuel consumption is closer to 200 tonnes that the 480 tonnes used in the above calculation, it is probable that the actual amount is significantly less.
Da den franske flåde tæller omkring 1500 fartøjer på over 12 meter, og 95,3 % af alle fartøjer af denne længde er dækket af FPAP [9], svarende til 1400 fartøjer, kan det antages, at ca. 1000 fartøjer på under 12 meter også er dækket af FPAP.
This is because, since the French fleet comprises approximately 1500 vessels of more than 12 metres and 95,3 % of the vessels of that size are covered by the FPAP [9], i.e. approximately 1400 vessels, it can be deduced that approximately 1000 vessels of less than 12 metres are also covered by the FPAP.
De samlede årlige indtægter er derfor helt sikkert lavere end disse 4,7 mio. EUR.
It is therefore highly certain that the total annual revenue is below this amount of EUR 4,7 million.
På baggrund af disse hypotetiske indtægtsberegninger bemærker Kommissionen, at FPAP dels tilsyneladende ikke ejer fast ejendom, dels kun i meget begrænset omfang ejer løsøre, som alene består af medlemmernes bidrag.
Following calculation of this hypothetical revenue, the Commission observes that the FPAP, on the one hand, apparently has no real estate and that, in addition, its current assets, made up only of its members’ contributions, are very small.
Kommissionen vurderer derfor, at en bank såsom Crédit Maritime, der beskriver sig selv som »den naturlige parter i fiskeriet«, under almindelige markedsøkonomiske forhold aldrig ville have lånt (eller »ydet som tilskud« for at gengive ordlyden i aftalerne mellem staten og FPAP) de pågældende summer (eller blot en del af dem) til FPAP med henblik på dennes operationer på et terminsmarked, uden i rimeligt omgang forud at have sikret sig, at denne ville være solvent, når lånet skulle tilbagebetales.
For this reason, the Commission takes the view that, under normal market-economy conditions, a bank, such as Crédit Maritime, for example, which describes itself in its own terms as ‘the natural partner of the fishing industry’, would never have lent (or ‘advanced’ to use the terms of the agreements concluded between the State and the FPAP) the amounts in question (or even only part of the amounts) to the FPAP to operate on a futures market, without having obtained reasonable assurance beforehand of its probable solvency on expiry of the loan.
Frankrig indvender, at denne konklusion er »en påstand, der ikke er baseret på en nøjagtig reaktion fra bankinstitutioner, og at der kunne have været indført kautionsordninger.« En rundspørge, som det franske nationalkammer for finansrådgivning [10] har foretaget blandt 35 banker, giver imidlertid et ret nøjagtigt billede af de almindeligt gældende normer i de franske bankinstitutioner, når disse yder lån til deres kunder.
France objects, claiming that this conclusion is ‘an allegation not based on any precise survey of banking organisations, and that a system of securities could have been set up’. However, a survey carried out by the Chambre nationale des conseils et experts financiers (National chamber of financial advisers and experts) [10] at thirty-five banks provides a fairly accurate picture of the standards applied in French financial institutions when granting loans to their customers.
Ønsket om at begrænse kreditrisikoen over for deres kunder betyder, at bankinstitutionernes ledelser har indført maksimumgrænser, som baseres på en række parametre, der gør det muligt at analysere en virksomheds økonomiske sundhed og evne til at betale gælden på baggrund af forskellige kriterier såsom egenkapital, regnskaber, lang- og kortfristet gældsætning, omsætning og finansielle udgifter.
To limit their credit risk vis-à-vis their customers, the management of financial institutions requires compliance with standard ceilings based on a number of ratios allowing the financial health of the undertaking and its ability to serve its debt to be assessed, according to various criteria such as its own funds, balance sheet, the level of long-term indebtedness, turnover and financial costs.
Det fremgår navnlig af denne analyse, at et forhold mellem »samlet bankgæld og egenkapital« på over 2,50 udløser en risikoalarm, som ganske vist ikke betyder et endegyldigt afslag på tildeling af et lån, men medfører, at der skal stilles større sikkerhed.
It follows from this analysis in particular that a ratio of ‘total banking debt to own funds’ higher than 2,50 triggers a risk indicator which, although it does not totally compromise the granting of a loan leads the establishment to take increased securities.
Hvis man for FPAP’s vedkommende optimistisk anslår forholdet mellem de ovenfor nævnte 65 mio. EUR og den optimistisk skønnede egenkapital (4,7 mio. EUR, jf. betragtning 56), bliver forholdet 13,82 eller næsten seks gange højere end den maksimale risikogrænse.
In the case of the FPAP, if the EUR 65 million in advances are set against the optimistic estimate of its own funds set out above (EUR 4,7 million, see recital 56), the ratio is 13,82, i.e. almost six times the maximum risk.
Hvis det reelle tilskudsbeløb var højere (77 mio., hvis man medregner det mulige tillægstilskud på 12 mio. EUR, der er nævnt i betragtning 22), eller hvis det reelle tal for egenkapitalen var lavere, ville dette hypotetiske forhold stige endnu mere.
Of course, if the actual amount of the advances were higher (EUR 77 million, taking into account the possible additional advance of EUR 12 million referred to in recital 22), or if the actual amount of own funds were appreciably smaller, this hypothetical ratio would increase further.
Med dette risikoniveau ville en bankinstitution aldrig have overvejet at yde et lån, selvom adgang til tingslig sikkerhed (såsom sikkerhed i købsoptionerne eller håndpant i de brændstoflagre, som FPAP købte) eller personal surety (pant i medlemmernes personlige ejendom og fartøjer) rent faktisk indgår i de bankteknikker, der gør det muligt at mindske risikoen for insolvens.
With such a risk level, a bank would never have considered granting a loan, even though the use of real securities (such as pledging the purchase options or the fuel stocks acquired by the FPAP as collateral) or personal securities (taking out a mortgage on the members’ personal assets and pledging their vessels as collateral) is in fact one of the methods used by banks to minimise the risk of insolvency.
Det skal dog bemærkes, at fiskerivirksomhederne, hvis der skulle udtages pant i medlemmernes personlige ejendom, sandsynligvis ville have været mere tøvende over for at blive medlem af FPAP.
However, it will be observed that, if the personal securities of the members were liable to be claimed, the fisheries undertakings would probably have been more reluctant to become members of the FPAP.
Der findes også andre teknikker til overførsel eller deling af kunderisici, såsom at flere banker er fælles om at finansiere lånet, adgang til kautionsselskaber eller støtte fra regionale eller departementale garantifonde (som ofte selv kautioneres af kautionsselskaber), men under alle omstændigheder ydes kautionen kun til virksomheder, der er grundlæggende sunde og potentielt solvente, og for et beløb, som aldrig overstiger 50 % af gælden (eller i FPAP’s tilfælde til et beløb på lidt over 30 mio. EUR, hvilket betyder, at der fortsat resterer en risiko, som er næsten tre gange større end den maksimale risikotærskel).
There are also other client risk transfer or sharing methods, such as part-financing the loan by several banks, the use of guarantee companies or subscribing to regional or departmental guarantee funds (as a rule themselves counter-guaranteed by guarantee companies) but, in all cases, a guarantee is generally extended only to basically healthy and potentially profitable undertakings, and only ever up to an amount not exceeding 50 % of the debt (i.e. in the case of the FPAP, an amount of slightly more than EUR 30 million, leaving a residual risk of almost three times the maximum risk).
Når Frankrig vedrørende disse teknikker anfører, at der »kunne være indført« kautionssystemer, er det en indirekte erkendelse af, at dette ikke var sket i den foreliggende sag, og at staten har ydet tilskuddet uden at indhente garantier, der svarer til de garantier, som bankinstitutioner normalt kræver.
When France comments on these methods, saying that security systems ‘could have been’ set up, it implicitly admits that they were not set up in this case and that the State advance was granted without securities comparable to those in use by banks being sought.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at Frankrig ikke har optrådt som en privat kreditor, og at man ikke havde sikring for, at FPAP ville være i stand til at tilbagebetale de pågældende midler.
Under these circumstances, the Commission concludes that France did not behave like a private creditor and that it did not have any security that the FPAP was in a position to repay the funds placed at its disposal.
Gennem sin bestyrelse bemærker FPAP desuden, at fonden er civilretligt ansvarlig i henhold til fransk lovgivning, og at dette ansvar er ubegrænset, samtidig med at det anføres, at fagforeningsvirksomheden kan afføde et ansvar for store beløb.
In addition, the FPAP, through its Board, points out that it bears civil liability under French law and that this liability is unlimited, noting that trade association action may entail responsibility for large amounts.
Der er ikke fremlagt dokumentation (vedtægter, procedurevejledning, informationsmeddelelse o.l.) for eksistensen af en sådan mekanisme.
None of the documents provided (articles of association, rules of procedure or information note) refers to such a mechanism.
Den eneste betragtning af finansiel art i disse dokumenter vedrører bidragene, hvor det fremgår, at de tilfalder fagforeningen, når et medlem melder sig ud (artikel 10).
The only financial consideration appearing in these documents relates to the contribution, for which it is indicated that it is forfeited to the trade association when a member steps down (Article 10).
På den anden side bemærker Kommissionen, at loven af 21. marts 1884, der er retsgrundlaget for grundlæggelsen af FPAP, er den lov, der tillod oprettelse af fagforeninger i Frankrig.
The Commission also observes that the act of 21 March 1884, under which the FPAP was set up, is the act which has allowed the creation of trade associations in France.
Det er bestemt ikke i denne lovs ånd at påføre medlemmerne af den pågældende fagforening et økonomisk og dermed finansielt ansvar.
It is certainly not in the spirit of such an act to entail the commercial, and therefore financial, liability of the members of the trade association concerned.
I tilfælde af store tab kan Kommissionen følgelig ikke se, hvordan disse tab kan dækkes af medlemmerne.
As a result, in the event of major financial losses, the Commission does not see how the losses can be compensated by its members.
I lyset af ovenstående elementer finder Kommissionen ikke, at princippet om den private kreditor er overholdt.
Taking all of the above factors into account, the Commission takes the view that the private creditor principle has not been complied with.
Forekomst af en finansiel fordel opnået ved hjælp af statsmidler
Existence of a financial advantage granted by means of State resources
Kommissionen finder, at det anslåede indtægtsbeløb, der stammer fra forskellige bidrag fra medlemmerne, aldrig, selv ikke ifølge den optimistiske antagelse, ville have gjort det muligt for FPAP at operere på et terminsmarked uden tilførsel af eksterne midler.
The Commission takes the view that, even in the case of the higher assumption, the estimated amount of revenue from the various member contributions would never have enabled the FPAP to operate on a futures market without the assistance of external funding.
Disse udefra kommende midler kommer fra staten og er ydet via OFIMER i form af mindst tre forskud ydet i perioden november 2004 — oktober 2005, ifølge de franske myndigheders oplysninger i alt 65 mio. EUR. Der er sandsynligvis også udbetalt et fjerde tilskud på 12 mio. EUR; det fremgår implicit af argumentationen i betragtning 22, at aftalen var fremlagt til underskrivelse på dette tidspunkt.
This external funding was provided by the State, via Ofimer, in the form of at least three advances spread out between November 2004 and October 2005, covering a total amount, according to the information forwarded by France, of EUR 65 million. A fourth advance of EUR 12 million was probably also paid, since the list of defensive points quoted in recital 22 implies that the agreement was in the course of being signed at that date.
Frankrig har ikke fremlagt dokumentation, der bestrider denne analyse.
France has not submitted any evidence contradicting this assessment.
Man kan desuden læse følgende i argumentation: »FPAP betragtes [af Kommissionen] som værende ude af stand til at gennemføre sine aktiviteter ved hjælp af egne midler og uden det tilbagebetalingspligtige statstilskud.
The list of defensive points also states: ‘As regards its funding, the FPAP is considered [by the Commission] not to be able to operate without the repayable State advance. No argument can be put forward against this’.
Der kan ikke fremsættes argumenter imod dette.« For Kommissionen er disse tilskud derfor tildelt på vilkår, der ikke er almindelige markedsvilkår (jf. beslutningens betragtning 51 til 60).
In addition, for the Commission, the advances were granted under conditions which are not normal market conditions (see recitals 51 to 61 of this Decision).
Kommissionen bemærker for øvrigt, at hverken Frankrig eller FPAP har givet Kommissionen oplysninger om, hvor mange midler FPAP har opereret med på terminsmarkederne, eller om resultatet af disse transaktioner.
Also, the Commission observes that neither France nor the FPAP have given it any indication of the amount of funds invested by the FPAP on the futures markets, or of the result of the transactions carried out on them.
Endelig finder Frankrig og FPAP’s bestyrelse ikke, at Kommissionen kan foregribe eksistensen af en statsstøtte, så længe man ikke har kunnet konstatere, at tilbagebetaling ikke er sket (Frankrig: »det tilbagebetalingspligtige forskud kan ikke betragtes som statsstøtte, så længe fristen for tilbagebetaling ikke er overskredet«. FPAP: »Kan dette beløb tilbagebetales eller ikke?
Lastly, France and the FPAP and its Board take the view that the Commission cannot prejudge the existence of State aid as long as no repayment default has been established (France: ‘the repayable advance cannot be regarded as State aid as long as the repayment deadline has not fallen’; FPAP: ‘Can this amount be repaid or not?
Det er det hovedspørgsmål, som Kommissionen stiller)«. MQA: »Ingen af de lån, som den franske stat har ydet FPAP, er forfaldet til tilbagebetaling.
That is the main question being asked by the Commission’; MQA: ‘None of the loans to the FPAP granted by France has expired.
Der er på nuværende tidsbetragtning ikke tale om misligholdelse af tilbagebetaling eller tilkendegivelse fra den franske stats side af, at den blot annullerer gælden ved dens forfald«).
At this stage there is no repayment default nor any indication by the French government suggesting that the debt will be purely and simply cancelled on expiry’).
Kommissionen erindrer i den sammenhæng om, at betegnelsen som statsstøtte til fordel for FPAP for det første hænger sammen med Frankrigs beslutning om at tildele FPAP et lån, som fonden ellers ikke havde kunnet opnå, heller ikke hvis tilbagebetalingsfristen var blevet overholdt.
The Commission would point out in this respect that regarding the aid to the FPAP as State aid is first and foremost the result of the French Decision to grant a loan to the FPAP that it would not otherwise have obtained, even if the repayment deadlines had been met.
Når Kommissionen derfor stiller spørgsmål vedrørende FPAP’s solvens på tidspunktet for lånets forfald, er det først og fremmest, fordi dette spørgsmål om FPAP’s solvens er det centrale betragtning i vurderingen af fondens situation i henseende til en privat bankinstitutions normale betingelser for tildeling af lån, og ikke, fordi den forventer, at lånet ændres til finansiel bistand.
The Commission questions the solvency of the FPAP on expiry of the loan because this question is at the core of the assessment of its situation in relation to the normal conditions for granting a loan by a private bank and not because it suspects that a loan has been transferred into straightforward financial assistance.
Selvom om det fra denne synsvinkel skulle vise sig, at tilskuddene ikke blev tilbagebetalt inden for fristen eller endog slet ikke blev tilbagebetalt, ville dette bekræfte, at FPAP ikke var i stand til at gennemføre de aktiviteter, der er angivet i vedtægterne, uden eksterne midler, og at disse midler aldrig ville være bevilget af en bankinstitution på almindelige markedsvilkår.
From this point of view, if it turned out that advances were not repaid within the time limits, or not repaid at all, this would confirm both that the FPAP was not in a position to perform the tasks provided for in its articles of association without external loans, and that it would never have been granted such assistance by a bank under normal market conditions.
Hertil bemærker Kommissionen, at Frankrig ikke har fortalt, om der eventuelt er sket en tilbagebetaling af tilskuddene til FPAP.
However, in this connection the Commission observes that France has not informed it of any repayment of advances granted to the FPAP.