natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Dette er bekræftet ved adskillige lejligheder i sager, hvor en offentlig myndighed med ansvar for indsamling af socialsikringsbidrag tolerer manglende eller for sen indbetaling af disse bidrag, idet denne praksis utvivlsomt giver modtageren en konkurrencefordel ved at reducere de byrder for firmaet, der ellers er forbundet med normal drift af et socialsikringssystem [36].
This has been confirmed on numerous occasions in cases where a public body responsible for collecting social security contributions tolerates non-payment or late payment of such contributions, as its conduct undoubtedly gives the recipient a significant competitive advantage by reducing, for that company, the burden associated with the normal operation of the social security system [36].
I stedet for at give henstand med betalingerne kunne den offentlige kreditor have krævet omgående betaling af det skyldige beløb, om nødvendigt ved indløsning af det hypotekspant, der var udstedt i myndighedens favør [37].
Instead of a deferral of payments the public creditor could have demanded immediate repayment of the total amount owed, if necessary by relying on the mortgage in its favour [37].
Med henblik på at fastslå, at der er tale om en fordel, som kan klassificeres som statsstøtte i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, må Kommissionen påvise, at de offentlige myndigheders praksis ikke havde træk tilfælles med hypotetiske private kreditorers praksis over for deres debitorer i samme situation [38].
In order to establish that there is an advantage which can be classified as State Aid for the purposes of Article 87(1) TEC, the Commission needs to demonstrate that the public authorities acted differently from a hypothetical private creditor, who would, in so far as possible, be in the same situation vis-à-vis his debtor [38].
Indledningsvis bemærker Kommissionen, at selve den omstændighed, at en virksomhed tidligere er tildelt statsstøtte, i henhold til Domstolens praksis forhindrer, at sagen kan ses fra en privat kreditors side, idet en sådan kreditor allerede på et tidligt tidspunkt ville have afvist at yde henstand, og der derfor ellers ikke ville have været tale om støtte [39].
As a preliminary remark, the Commission notes that the very existence of previous aid to a company prevents it on the basis of established European case-law from viewing the case from the perspective of a hypothetical private creditor, since a creditor of that type would obviously not have tolerated the original waiver, as it would otherwise not have been aid [39].
Dette gælder især i en omstruktureringssituation, hvor begge foranstaltninger falder inden for omstruktureringsperioden.
This is particularly true in a restructuring scenario, where both measures fall within the restructuring period.
Den manglende opdaterede omstruktureringsplan forhindrer også en vurdering fra en hypotetisk privat investor.
The non-existence of an updated restructuring plan also prevents an assessment of a hypothetical private creditor.
Ifølge retspraksis ville en sådan investor, der opererer på markedsvilkår, ved overvejelse af en anmodning om omstrukturering af gæld have krævet en omfattende opdatering af den oprindelige omstruktureringsplan.
In this case too, according to established case-law, when considering a rescheduling agreement from a market economy investor perspective, such an investor would have required a comprehensive update of the original restructuring plan.
Ingen privat investor ville have godkendt en omstrukturering uden en sådan plan, således som det er tilfældet her [40].
No private creditor or investor would accept restructuring without such a plan [40], as was the case here.
Ydermere ville ingen privat kreditor — selv på grundlag af en hypotetisk omstruktureringsplan — have indgået yderligere en omstruktureringsaftale.
Furthermore, even on the basis of a hypothetical restructuring plan, no hypothetical private creditor would have entered into an additional restructuring agreement.
Kommissionen bestrider ikke, at den manglende tvangsfuldbyrdelse af offentligretlige fordringer, som i henhold til IBP/NRP kunne gøres til genstand for gældseftergivelse, var berettiget i en vis periode i henhold til den mekanisme, der er fastsat ved loven af 30. august 2002.
The Commission does not dispute that non-enforcement of the public debts which were eligible for waivers under the IBP/NRP was justified for a certain period of time under the mechanism envisaged in the Act of 30 August 2002.
Faktisk var tvangsfuldbyrdelse af fordringer omfattet af omstrukturering i henhold til loven af 30. august 2002 forbudt indtil omstruktureringsprocedurerne var tilendebragt eller indstillet af de i loven nævnte grunde.
Indeed, enforcement of the liabilities subject to restructuring on the basis of the Act of 30 August 2002 was prohibited pending the completion of restructuring proceedings or discontinuance of proceedings on the grounds enumerated in the Act.
Desuden bemærker Kommissionen, at kreditorerne i forbindelse med anden gæld, som ikke var omfattet af omstrukturering, kunne have regnet med en forbedring af TB's finansielle situation efter en planlagt gældseftergivelse og derfor kunne have grund til at udsætte tvangsfuldbyrdelsen, indtil der var ydet støtte i henhold til loven af 30. august 2002.
Moreover, the Commission notes that as regards additional debts which were not subject to rescheduling, creditors could have counted on an improvement in TB's financial situation following the planned waiver, and therefore might have had reason to suspend debt enforcement until aid was awarded pursuant to the Act of 30 August 2002.
Det er imidlertid indlysende, at omstruktureringen på grundlag af loven af 30. august 2002 slog fejl, og at dette i det mindste til dels kan tilskrives manglende overholdelse af protokol nr. 8, således som anført i UOKiK's negative udtalelse (første udtalelse af 6. februar 2004), og til dels kan tilskrives virksomhedens finansielle problemer, som forhindrede TB i at overholde kravene i national lovgivning.
However, it is evident that restructuring on the basis of the Act of 30 August 2002 failed, at least partly because of non-compliance with Protocol No 8 as manifested in the negative opinion of the OCCP (the first, dated 6 February 2004), and partly because of the company’s financial problems which prevented TB from complying with national law.
Kommissionen mener, at de vigtigste offentlige kreditorer, såsom ZUS, Sosnowiec kommune og skattevæsenet, må have kendt til denne manglende overholdelse, da de alle var involveret i den oprindelige omstrukturering.
The Commission considers that such failure must have come to the knowledge of the main public creditors such as ZUS, the local authority and the Tax Office, as they all were involved in the original debt restructuring.
Desuden burde PFRON have set UOKiK's udtalelse om TB's gæld til PFRON som en advarsel.
Similarly, PFRON should have been alerted by the OCCP’s opinion on TB's debt to PFRON.
Når en tidligere omstruktureringsaftale er slået fejl, kan der forventes en særlig årvågenhed fra private kreditorers side, og det kan forventes, at de nøje vil gennemgå debitors økonomiske situation [41].
Following the failure of the previous restructuring agreement, particular alertness can be expected from private creditors, who would scrutinise the economic situation of their debtor [41].
I overensstemmelse hermed ville en grundig analyse af fordelene ved gældsomlægning have vist, at disse ikke ville have oversteget den sikre erstatning, der ville tilfalde kreditor ved likvidation af virksomheden [42].
Accordingly, careful consideration of the advantage derived from rescheduling the debt would have shown that the potential recovery would not have exceeded the safe return inherent in the firm’s liquidation [42].
Faktisk ville en ny aftale om gældsomlægning kræve omstrukturering med henblik på genoprettelse af rentabiliteten under alle omstændigheder og hindring af, at restancerne voksede, således at kreditor kunne forvisse sig om, at fordringerne ville være inddrevet inden for en rimelig tidsfrist.
In fact, a new rescheduling agreement would require restructuring to restore viability to the company in all cases and to prevent increases in arrears, so that the creditor could anticipate recovery of the loans within a reasonable time.
For TB's vedkommende var en genoprettelse af rentabiliteten ved udgangen af 2004 yderst tvivlsom, da virksomheden, som det fremgår af betragtning 46 til 50, havde driftsunderskud i 2003 og 2004.
In the case of TB, a return to viability by end-2004 was highly doubtful, as the company had had a negative operating margin throughout 2003 and 2004 as indicated in recitals (49) to (51).
Virksomhedens omsætning var ikke tilstrækkelig til at dække dens omkostninger.
Its turnover was not sufficient to cover its costs.
Desuden lykkedes det ikke TB benytte sig af de stigende konjunkturer i stålsektoren i 2004.
TB did not even benefit from the upturn in the steel sector in 2004.
Alle indikationer vedrørende TB's fremtidige rentabilitet var således negative.
As such, all indications regarding the prospects for TB's future viability were negative.
Da TB desuden ikke længere var kreditværdig, steg virksomhedens gæld støt.
In addition, given that TB was no longer creditworthy, its debts were steadily rising.
Fra november 2004 var virksomheden til trods for omstruktureringsprocessen ikke længere i stand til at indfri sine løbende forpligtelser.
As of November 2004, TB was no longer able to pay its current debts, despite being in restructuring.
Derfor var der ikke mulighed for inddrivelse af gælden ved en hypotetisk omstrukturering.
As such, there was no reasonable possibility of recovering the past debt as a result of any hypothetical new restructuring of the debt.
I betragtning af at de offentlige kreditorer, dvs. kommunen, ZUS, PFRON og skattemyndighederne alle var i besiddelse af god sikkerhed, havde de mulighed for at omsætte denne sikkerhed til kontante midler ved kollektiv konkursbehandling efter national lov.
Given that the public creditors, i.e. the local authority, ZUS, PFRON and the Tax Office all had good securities, they had a good chance of transforming them into cash in collective insolvency proceedings under Polish insolvency law.
Kommissionen kan ikke godtage ZUS’s påstand om ikke at have været i besiddelse af god sikkerhed, da førsteprioriteterne ifølge de oplysninger, de polske myndigheder har fremlagt udgjorde en betydelig del (om ikke hele) sikkerheden (jf. betragtning 38).
The Commission cannot accept ZUS's argument that it did not have good securities, since the Polish authorities have indicated that first-rank pledges accounted for a significant part, if not all, of the securities (see recital (40) above).
I betragtning af den forværrede situation for virksomheden og dens aktiver forekom det økonomisk mere fornuftigt at indløse denne sikkerhed end at omstrukturere [43].
In view of the deterioration of the company and its assets, making use of these securities appeared to make more economic sense than restructuring [43].
Ydermere ville selv en hypotetisk omstrukturering af aktiver i henhold til en hypotetisk omstruktureringsplan ikke have kunnet overvinde en privat investors modstand mod omstrukturering. Det skyldes, at alle aktiver i en virksomhed, der er så forgældet som TB, normalt er belånte og derfor næppe vil give overskud ved frasalg.
Furthermore, even if a hypothetical restructuring plan proposed some hypothetical asset restructuring, this proposal should not have reduced private creditors' resistance to restructuring.
Selv om virksomheden i 2005 ved adskillige lejligheder har bekendtgjort en omstrukturering af sine aktiver, har et salg af aktiverne ikke kunnet indbringe mere end 5 mio. PLN kontant.
This is because all the assets of a firm as indebted as TB are normally pledged and thus promise hardly any return if sold off. Indeed, although the company announced asset restructuring on several occasions in 2005, it was not able to obtain more than PLN 5 million in cash from the sale of assets.
Kommissionen er bekendt med, at TB i 2004 og ved senere lejligheder forsøgte at betale noget af sin gæld, men at disse betalinger knapt dækkede de påløbne renter (med hensyn til virkningerne af betalingen af 5 mio. PLN i 2004, jf. tabellen i betragtning 34).
The Commission understands that in 2004 and subsequently TB made attempts to repay some of the debt but notes that these repayments barely covered the amounts of interest accrued (see the table in recital (34) for the effect of the PLN 5 million repaid in 2004).
Endelig bør det med henblik på at fuldende billedet understreges, at planen fra september 2005 på ingen måde var et tilfredsstillende grundlag for yderligere omstrukturering.
Lastly, with a view to providing a complete picture, it should be noted that the September 2005 plan was by no means a proper basis for further rescheduling.
I betragtning af at virksomheden skulle likvideres, er det klart, at dens forretningsaktiviteter ikke ville give flere indtægter, og at afvikling var den eneste løsning.
Given that the company was to be wound up, it is clear that its business activities would not generate any more profits and that liquidation would be the only solution.
Det fremgik faktisk af planen, at ZUS kun kunne regne med delvis indfrielse af sine fordringer.
Indeed, the plan indicated that ZUS could count on only partial repayment.
Denne indfrielse skulle muliggøres ved omstrukturering af aktiver til en værdi af ca. 20 mio. PLN indtil slutningen af 2005, hvilket viste sig at være urealistisk af de grunde, der nævnes i ovenstående afsnit.
This was to be generated by the restructuring of assets worth about PLN 20 million up to end-2005, which proved unrealistic for the reasons stated in the previous paragraph.
De foreslåede månedlige betalinger efter 2005 på 100000 PLN afhængigt af TB's mulighed for at betale var heller ikke mulige at gennemføre, idet TB ikke længere drev forretning.
The proposed monthly payments after 2005 of PLN 100000, subject to TB’s ability to pay, were not feasible either as TB was no longer operating.
Som TB indrømmede i sin IBP for 2005, var udskilning af aktiver til BA derimod virksomhedens bedste håb for at genvinde rentabiliteten.
Instead, as TB admitted in its 2005 IBP, it saw spinning off its assets into BA as its only hope of restoring the business's viability.
Dette indebar ikke blot udskilning af virksomhedens eneste gevinstgivende forretning (BA), men beseglede også TB’s skæbne, idet den blev afviklet.
That did not just entail the spinning-off of its only profitable business (BA) but also determined TB’s fate, i.e. its liquidation.
Med andre ord finder Kommissionen, at enhver privat kreditor ville have valgt at tvangsfuldbyrde sine fordringer allerede i slutningen af 2004.
In short, the Commission finds that any hypothetical private creditor would have opted for enforcement of his claims as early as end-2004.
På dette tidspunkt blev det klart, at TB ikke var i stand til at overholde sine tidligere omstruktureringsaftaler og ikke ville være i stand til at indfri sine løbende forpligtelser; der var ikke forelagt nogen opdateret omstruktureringsplan, og det var ikke sandsynligt, at virksomheden ville blive rentabel.
At that time it became clear that TB was not able to honour its previous rescheduling agreements and would not be able to meet its current engagements. No updated plan had been presented and nor was there any perspective of the company becoming profitable.
Polen tvangsfuldbyrdede således ikke 20761 mio. PLN (angivet som 20267 mio. PLN i den 4. polske omstruktureringsrapport, men dette beløb blev senere rettet af de polske myndigheder).
Thus Poland failed to enforce PLN 20,761 million (PLN 20,267 million was indicated in the fourth Polish restructuring report, but that amount was later rectified by the Polish authorities).
Dette udgør driftsstøtte til virksomheden til fortsættelse af dens urentable forretninger og udgør derfor en fordel tildelt med statslige midler, som truer med at forvride konkurrencen, idet støtten påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne og derfor er uforenelig med fællesmarkedet i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 87.
This constitutes operating support for the firm to continue its inefficient business and is therefore an advantage granted through state resources which threatens to distort competition in so far as it affects trade between Member States, and is thereby incompatible with the common market in the sense of Article 87 of the EC Treaty.
For at kunne bestemme støttebeløbet må den hypotetiske effekt af manglende tvangsfuldbyrdelse simuleres.
In order to quantify the aid amount, the hypothetical effect of non-enforcement of debt must be simulated.
Da en privat kreditor ville have foretrukket at fuldbyrde sine fordringer, er den fordel, virksomheden har ved manglende fuldbyrdelse, lig med størrelsen af de fordringer, den ikke behøver at indfri.
Given that a private creditor would have preferred to enforce its claims, the advantage that the firm derives from non-enforcement is the full amount of the claims which it does not have to reimburse.
Med andre ord får virksomheden stillet et beløb til rådighed, som den på grund af sin situation ikke ville have kunnet indhente på markedet.
In other words, the firm has at its disposal an amount which, due to its financial situation, it would not be able to obtain on the market.
Især hvis staten havde tvangsfuldbyrdet sine fordringer, ville virksomheden ikke have været i stand til at betale det skyldige beløb og ville med al sandsynlighed være gået konkurs.
In particular, if the State had enforced its claims the firm would not have been able to pay the amount due and would most probably have gone bankrupt.
Manglende tvangsfuldbyrdelse af fordringerne havde derfor den samme virkning som tildeling af hele det ikke-tvangsfuldbyrdede beløb til virksomheden [44].
Failure to enforce the claims therefore had the same effect as granting the recipient the entire non-enforced amount [44].
Derfor andrager den fordel, der er opnået siden den 1. januar 2005, 20761 mio. PLN.
Hence the advantage obtained concerns an amount of PLN 20,761 million obtained as of 1 January 2005.
I betragtning af at en aktør, der agerer på markedsvilkår, ville have fuldbyrdet de oprindelige fordringer, bør denne gæld hypotetisk ikke eksistere og bør derfor ikke tages i betragtning to gange.
However, given that a market economy operator would have enforced the original debt, this debt should hypothetically no longer exist and should not therefore be counted twice.
Når det gælder de budgetmidler, der var angivet som støtte til reorganisering af arbejdsstyrken og tildelt efter 2004, har Kommissionen ikke længere nogen indvendinger.
As regards the budgetary funds indicated as employment restructuring and awarded after 2004, the Commission's doubts have been allayed.
Reelt kan disse midler ikke betragtes som statsstøtte, da de polske myndigheder har forklaret, at de kun er bevilget til fordel for arbejdsløse, og ikke for virksomheder; samtidig kan sådanne midler ikke relateres til arbejdsgiveren, da de bevilges, efter at arbejdstagerne er afskediget og ikke kan modregnes i andre udgifter, virksomheden ville skulle bære, hvis en sådan støtte ikke var tildelt.
Indeed they cannot be considered State Aid as the Polish authorities have explained that they are provided for the sole benefit of redundant workers, who cannot be considered as an undertaking; equally, such payments cannot be related to the employer as they are provided after the workers are laid off and do not diminish any other charges which the company would have to bear if no such aid were provided.
Ulovlig støtte
Misuse of aid
Punkt 18, litra c), i protokol nr. 8 giver Kommissionen beføjelser til at træffe »de nødvendige foranstaltninger til at sikre, at virksomheder, der måtte være berørt, tilbagebetaler al støtte, der er ydet i modstrid med de i denne protokol fastlagte betingelser […] hvis kontrollen viser, at betingelserne for de i denne protokol omhandlede overgangsordninger ikke er opfyldt«.
Point 18(a) of Protocol No 8 gives the Commission the power to take ‘appropriate steps requiring any company concerned to reimburse any aid awarded in breach of the conditions laid down in this Protocol […] if monitoring of the restructuring shows that the commitments for the transitional arrangements contained in this Protocol have not been fulfilled.’
Kommissionen finder, at TB ikke til fulde har gennemført sin omstruktureringsplan, således som det udtrykkeligt kræves i punkt 9 i protokol nr. 8, og selv bidrog til sin konkurs ved forskellige foranstaltninger, som nævnes i betragtning 56.
The Commission finds that TB did not fully implement its restructuring plan as explicitly stipulated in point 9 of Protocol No 8 and contributed to its bankruptcy with the various measures indicated in recital (56) above.
Polen har ikke bestridt dette.
Poland has not disputed this finding.
TB opfyldte desuden ikke flere af de krav, der stilles i punkt 9 i protokol nr. 8:
TB also failed to comply with several benchmarks set out in point 9 of Protocol No 8:
TB var ikke i stand til at opnå finansiel støtte fra kreditorer og lokale pengeinstitutter således som krævet i punkt 9, litra c), i protokol nr. 8.
TB was not able to obtain financial support from creditors and local financial institutions as stipulated in point 9(c) of Protocol No 8;
TB nedsatte kun delvis sine omkostninger som krævet i punkt 9, litra c) i protokol nr. 8, litra c).
TB only partially reduced its costs as stipulated in point 9(c) of Protocol No 8.
Konsulenten bekræftede, at denne forpligtelse kun delvis var overholdt [45].
The consultant confirmed that this obligation was met only in part [45];
Det lykkedes kun delvis TB at gennemføre en reorganisering af arbejdsstyrken som led i sit omkostningsbesparelsesprogram.
TB managed only partially to implement employment restructuring as parts of its cost savings programme.
Antallet af ansatte blev reduceret fra 550 til 294 kun takket være udskilning af valsningsafdelingen til HB, ikke på grund af nedskæringer i kerneaktiviteterne [46].
The number of workers was cut from 550 to 294 only thanks to the spinning-off of the rolls department into HB, not because of reductions in the core business [46];
TB var ikke i stand til at forbedre virksomhedsledelsens effektivitet og gennemslagskraft som krævet i punkt 9, litra a), andet afsnit, i protokol nr. 8.
TB was not able to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its business management as stipulated in the second recital of point 9(a) of Protocol No 8.
Faktisk er TB’s bestyrelse blevet udskiftet adskillige gange 2002.
In fact, TB’s management board has been replaced several times since 2002.
Da TB ikke opfyldte betingelserne i protokol nr. 8 og ikke gennemførte sin IBP til fulde, er omstruktureringsstøtten ulovlig og bør tilbagebetales.
Since TB failed to meet the conditions set out in Protocol No 8 and did not properly implement its IBP, the restructuring aid has been misused and must be repaid.
Støttens forenelighed
Compatibility of aid
På grundlag af KPR fra 1997 til 2003
On the basis of the NRP between 1997 and 2003
Kommissionen tilkendegav i beslutningen om at indlede proceduren, at andre grunde med hensyn til støttens forenelighed med fællesmarkedet kunne veje tungere end den omstændighed, at omstruktureringsstøtten ikke blev anvendt i overensstemmelse med omstruktureringsplanen.
The Commission indicated in the decision to initiate the procedure that other reasons of compatibility might take precedence over the fact that restructuring aid was not used in line with the restructuring plan.
I dette øjemed påpegede Kommissionen, at der under KPR ikke kun var bevilget omstruktureringsstøtte, men også andre typer støtte.
To that end the Commission observed that under the NRP not only restructuring aid but also other types of State Aid had been awarded.