natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Den Tjekkiske Republik anførte faktisk, at indskudsgarantien fra ČNB den 17. september 1996 aldrig blev gjort gældende, og at det på det tidspunkt, hvor AGB1 blev solgt til GECB, måtte have synes meget usandsynligt, at der ville blive fremsat krav i henhold til indskudsgarantien.
Indeed, the Czech Republic has stated that the Depositors’ Guarantee that was granted by the CNB on 17 September 1996 was never invoked and by the time AGB1 was sold to GECB it must have seemed very unlikely that claims could be brought under the Depositor’s Guarantee.
Med hensyn til salgsretten fremfører Den Tjekkiske Republik og GECB, at den under alle omstændigheder ikke ville udgøre en egentlig fordel, men kun kunne blive en fordel, når den blev udøvet.
With respect to the Put Option the Czech Republic and GECB argue that in any case it would not represent an actual advantage but only could become an advantage once it is exercised.
Kommissionen mener dog, at salgsretten allerede fra tildelingstidspunktet indebærer en rettighed med en værdi for GECB.
However, the Commission considers that the Put Option already from the day it was granted involves a right with a value to GECB.
Fordelen ved en salgsret opstår i lighed med en garanti ikke først, når salgsretten udøves (garantien påberåbes), men allerede ved foranstaltningens tildeling [16].
Similarly to a guarantee the advantage of a Put Option arises not only when the Put Option is exercised (the guarantee is invoked) but already with the granting of the measure [16].
Parterne i godtgørelsesaftalen var ČNB, GECB og GECIH.
The parties to the Indemnity Agreement were the CNB, GECB and GECIH.
Parterne i salgsretsdokumentet var ČNB og GECIH.
The Parties to the Put Option Deed were CNB and GECIH.
GECB, GECIH samt AGB som sælger af AGB1 og de bankforretninger under AGB1, der forud for den 22. juni 1998 var ejet af AGB, og derefter af GECB, er derfor de mulige støttemodtagere under foranstaltningerne.
GECB, GECIH as well as AGB as the seller of AGB1 and the banking business of AGB1 owned by AGB before 22 June 1998 and by GECB afterwards are therefore the potential beneficiaries of the measures.
Fordel for AGB
Advantage to AGB
Selv om AGB som sælger af AGB1 ikke var part i de to aftaler, drog AGB fordel af dem, da de gjorde det muligt for AGB at sælge sine bankforretninger — overhovedet eller i det mindste til en pris, der var højere, end hvad der ellers ville kunne være opnået uden garantierne og salgsretten fra ČNB.
Even though AGB as the seller of AGB1 was not a party to the two agreements, it benefited from them since they allowed it to sell its banking business – to sell it at all or at least for a purchase price that was higher than the one it could have achieved without the guarantees and the Put Option provided by the CNB.
AGB betalte ikke noget vederlag, og ČNB var ikke på nogen måde over for parterne forpligtet til at indgå godtgørelsesaftalen og salgsretsdokumentet.
AGB did not pay any remuneration and the CNB was in no way obliged vis-à-vis the parties to enter into the Indemnity Agreement and the Put Option Deed.
I lyset af bankkrisen i Den Tjekkiske Republik var ČNB's formål med foranstaltningerne snarere at omstrukturere AGB's bankforretninger for at undgå negative følger for hele den tjekkiske økonomi.
Rather, in the light of the banking crisis in the Czech Republic, the purpose of the CNB in providing the measures was to restructure AGB’s banking business in order to avoid negative consequences for the whole Czech economy.
Det forhold, at visse garantier og godtgørelser kan være standard i salgs- og købsaftaler, ændrer ikke ved foranstaltningernes fordelagtige karakter.
The fact that certain guarantees and indemnities may be standard in sale and purchase agreements does not alter the advantageous nature of these measures.
Garantidokumentet mellem sælgeren AGB og køberen GECB/GECIH er måske af sædvanlig karakter.
The Deed of Warranties between the seller AGB and the purchaser GECB/GECIH may be of a standard nature.
Godtgørelsesoverenskomsten, som er en vidtfavnende statslig modgaranti, og salgsretten med henblik på at lette salget af en privat virksomhed udgør imidlertid ikke sædvanlig praksis og indebærer finansielle fordele for sælgeren og den solgte virksomhed.
The Indemnity Agreement, which is a wide-ranging State counter-guarantee, and the Put Option provided to ease the sale of a private business are, however, not a standard practice and involve financial benefits for the seller and the business sold.
Med hensyn til salgsretten fremfører Den Tjekkiske Republik og GECB, at dens særlige karakter ikke muliggør en vurdering af statsstøtteelementet nu, da prisen, som GECB kan sælges til ČNB for, først fastsættes i fremtiden.
With respect to the Put Option, the Czech Republic and GECB argue that its particular nature would not allow an assessment of the State aid character now, since the purchase price for which GECB may be sold to CNB will only be determined in the future.
Dette er imidlertid kun et spørgsmål om kvantificering og ændrer intet ved det forhold, at salgsretten udgjorde en øjeblikkelig finansiel fordel for AGB.
This is however merely a matter of quantification and does not detract from the fact that the Put Option represented an immediate financial advantage for AGB.
Det er ikke nødvendigt nøjagtigt at kvantificere denne fordel, som egentlig er forskellen mellem købsprisen betalt af GECB og den pris, AGB ville have opnået for salget af AGB1's bankforretninger uden salgsretten tildelt af ČNB.
It is not necessary to exactly quantify this advantage which in fact is the difference of the purchase price paid by GECB and the price AGB would have achieved for the sale of AGB1’s banking business without the Put Option given by the CNB.
Fordel for bankforretningerne under AGB1 og for GECB og GECIH
Advantage to the banking business of AGB1 and GECB and GECIH
Vedrørende AGB's bankforretninger, AGB1, som solgtes gennem aktiverne til GECB, mener Kommissionen, at garantiordningerne og salgsretten udgør fordele, da de gjorde det muligt for AGB1's forretninger at blive videreført.
Concerning AGB’s banking business, AGB1, that was sold in an asset deal to GECB, the Commission considers the guarantee arrangements and the Put Option as beneficial since they allowed AGB1’s business to continue.
Det forhold, at AGB1's bankforretninger blev solgt i et åbent og betingelsesløst udbud til GECB, fjerner ikke fordelene, da købsprisen for AGB1 var negativ, idet værdien af støtteforanstaltningerne tildelt AGB's bankforretninger oversteg det beløb, der indkom ved salget.
The fact that AGB1’s banking business was sold in an open and unconditional tender procedure to GECB did not remove the advantages since the purchase price for AGB1 was negative in that the value of the aid measures granted to AGB’s banking business exceeded the amount realised by its sale.
Købsprisen på 304 mio. CZK kompenserede ikke ČNB for foranstaltningen tildelt under omstruktureringsforløbet, da ČNB ikke er AGB1's ejer, og købsprisen ikke blev betalt til ČNB, men til sælger (AGB).
The purchase price of CZK 304 million did not compensate the CNB for the measure granted in the course of the restructuring since the CNB is not AGB1’s owner and the purchase price was not paid to the CNB but to the seller (AGB).
Modgarantien, hvorved GECIH påtog sig ČNB's forpligtelser under indskudsgarantien, opvejede ikke de foranstaltninger, som ČNB tidligere havde tildelt AGB.
Also, the Counter Indemnity by which GECIH assumed CNB’s obligations under the Depositors’ Guarantee did not offset the measures granted earlier by CNB to AGB.
I garantiaftalen påtog GECB sig ČNB's ansvar i henhold til indskudsgarantien.
In the Indemnity Agreement, GECB agreed to assume CNB’s liabilities under the Depositors’ Guarantee.
Indskudsgarantien er en garanti, der blev stillet af ČNB, da AGB blev sat under administration den 17. september 1996, over for AGB's kreditorer og indskydere med henblik på at forhindre et run på banken.
The Depositors’ Guarantee is a guarantee that was issued by CNB upon the imposition of forced administration on AGB on 17 September 1996 towards the creditors and depositors of AGB in order to avoid a run on the bank.
Foranstaltningen blev anmeldt af de tjekkiske myndigheder inden for rammerne af overgangsordningen og blev erklæret ikke gældende efter tiltrædelsen i Kommissionens beslutning af 14. juli 2004.
The measure was notified by the Czech Republic within the interim mechanism procedure and was declared not being applicable after accession in the Commission Decision of 14 July 2004.
Kommissionen mener, at det forhold at påtage sig ČNB's ansvar under indskudsgarantien ikke kompenserer ČNB for at tildele foranstaltningerne garantier og godtgørelser samt salgsretten, idet forpligtelserne under indskudsgarantien vender tilbage til ČNB, hvis GECIH udøver salgsretten.
The Commission considers that the assumption of CNB’s liabilities under the Depositors Guarantee does not compensate the CNB for the granting of the Warranties and Indemnities and the Put Option since the obligations under the Depositors’ Guarantee revert to the CNB in the event that GECIH exercises the Put Option.
Kommissionen mener derfor, at GECIH's forpligtelser ikke kan anses for fuld overtagelse af ČNB's forpligtelser i henhold til indskudsgarantien.
The Commission therefore considers that GECIH’s commitment cannot be considered as full assumption of CNB’s obligations under the Depositors’ Guarantee.
På tidspunktet for salget af AGB1 i juni 1998 var ČNB's potentielle finansielle eksponering hidrørende fra indskudsgarantien (tildelt den 17. september 1996) endvidere beskeden, da sandsynligheden for et run på banken var minimal, fordi det allerede var næsten to år siden, at AGB var sat under administration.
Moreover, by the time of the sale of AGB1 in June 1998 CNB’s potential financial exposure resulting from the Depositors’ Guarantee (granted on 17 September 1996) was negligible since the likelihood of a run on the bank was minimal since the imposition of forced administration on AGB dated back already almost two years.
Den Tjekkiske Republik anførte selv i anmeldelsen, at ČNB aldrig forventede at skulle foretage betalinger i henhold til indskudsgarantien.
The Czech Republic itself stated in the notification that the CNB never expected to make any payments under the Depositors’ Guarantee.
Faktisk var der indtil datoen for GECB's overtagelse af AGB1 ikke foretaget betalinger i henhold til indskudsgarantien.
In fact, up to the date GECB acquired the business of AGB1, no payments had been made under the Depositors’ Guarantee.
Da der kun var tale om en teoretisk eksponering for ČNB, kan GECB ikke med rimelighed argumentere, at de kompenserede ČNB ved at overtage forpligtelserne i henhold til indskudsgarantien til gengæld for foranstaltningerne garantier og godtgørelser samt salgsretten.
As there was only a theoretical exposure of the CNB, GECB cannot reasonably argue that they compensated the CNB by way of taking over the obligations under the Depositors’ Guarantee in exchange for the Warranties and Indemnities and the Put Option.
De maksimale beløb for de garantier og godtgørelser, som Kommissionen indledte proceduren over for, beløb sig alene til 126000 mio. CZK, hvilket langt overstiger enhver teoretisk finansiel eksponering i henhold til indskudgarantien og også købsprisen på 304 mio. CZK.
The maximum amounts of the Warranties and Indemnities on which the Commission opened proceedings alone sum up to CZK 126000 million and thus by far exceed any theoretical financial exposure under the Depositors’ Guarantee and also the purchase price of CZK 304 million.
Domstolen præciserede i sagen Tyskland mod Kommissionen [17], at en åben og gennemsigtig procedure uden nogen form for betingelser ikke opfylder kriteriet vedrørende en privat investor, og dermed indebærer elementer af statsstøtte, når en virksomhed sælges til en negativ købspris, og det ville have været billigere at afvikle virksomheden.
The Court clarified in Germany v Commission [17] that an open transparent and unconditional tender procedure does not satisfy the private market investor test and therefore entailed State aid where a business is sold at a negative price and it would have cost less to liquidate that business.
Kommissionen mener derfor, at i den nærværende sag fjernede ejernes salg af AGB1's bankforretninger på egne vegne ikke de økonomiske fordele, idet de pågældende fordele overgik til GECB ved salget af virksomheden.
The Commission therefore considers that in the present case, the sale by its owners of AGB1’s banking business for their own account did not remove the economic advantages; those directly in issue here were conferred to GECB on the sale of that business.
GECB og GECIH drog fordel af godtgørelsesaftalen og salgsretten, da de opnåede rettigheder i henhold til de aftaler. Disse rettigheder opnåede de med henblik på omstruktureringen af AGB1.
GECB and GECIH benefited from the Indemnity Agreement and the Put Option Deed since they obtained rights under those agreements; they obtained these rights for the purpose of allowing a restructuring of AGB1.
Garantier og godtgørelser samt salgsretten indebærer således økonomiske fordele for sælger (AGB) og GECB og sidstnævntes moderselskab, GECIH, for driften af AGB1's bankforretninger.
Accordingly, the Warranties and Indemnities and the Put Option involve economic advantages for the seller (AGB) and GECB and its parent company GECIH for the operation of the banking business of AGB1.
GECB fremfører, at garantier og godtgørelser samt salgsretten ikke var selektive som omhandlet i EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, da de var tilgængelige for alle tilbudsgivere for AGB1.
GECB argues that the Warranties and Indemnities and the Put Option were not selective within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC since they were available to all bidders for AGB1.
Dette argument kan ikke accepteres. De pågældende foranstaltninger var specifikt begrænset til køberen af AGB1 og er derfor selektive af karakter.
This argument cannot be accepted; the measures in question were specifically limited to the buyer of AGB1 and are thereby selective in their very nature.
Godtgørelsesoverenskomsten og salgsretten var ydermere individuelt forhandlet, efter at GECB var blevet enetilbudsgiver for AGB1, idet udbudsmaterialet ikke nævnte nogen mulighed for statsgarantier, og slet ikke at samme garantier ville være tilgængelige for alle tilbudsgivere.
Furthermore, the Indemnity Agreement and the Put Option Deed were individually negotiated after GECB had become the sole bidder for AGB1, the invitation to tender making no mention of the availability of State guarantees, far less that the same guarantees would be available to any bidder.
Foranstaltningerne er derfor selektive.
The measures are therefore selective.
Fordrejende virkninger for konkurrencevilkårene og samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne
Distortive effects on competition and trade between Member States
Inden AGB blev sat under administration, var det en af de største banker i Den Tjekkiske Republik.
Before AGB entered into forced administration, it was one of the largest banks in the Czech Republic.
I betragtning af, at AGB er under afvikling, er der ikke længere nogen fordrejning af konkurrencen fra sælgers side (AGB).
In view of the fact that AGB is in the liquidation process there is no longer a distortion of competition in respect of the seller (AGB).
Der er imidlertid fordrejning af konkurrencen fra de af AGB1's bankforretninger, der blev solgt til GECB.
However, there is a distortion of competition in respect of the banking business of AGB1 that was sold to GECB.
AGB1/GECB er aktive overalt i Den Tjekkiske Republik og tilhører GE-koncernen, som er en global markedsaktør.
AGB1/GECB is active throughout the Czech Republic and belongs to the GE-group which is a global player.
De tjekkiske myndigheder anfører selv, at banker fra EU nøje fulgte det tjekkiske marked på det pågældende tidspunkt med henblik på investeringer.
The Czech authorities themselves state that banks from the EU were looking closely at the Czech market for investment purposes at the relevant time.
Hvis AGB1's bankforretninger var blevet afviklet, ville andre europæiske og ikke-europæiske banker kunne have opnået de forretninger, som GECB fastholdt.
If the banking business of AGB1 had gone into liquidation, other European and non–European banks would have been able to obtain the business GECB retained.
I lyset af alt dette mener Kommissionen, at garantiordningerne og salgsretten kan fordreje konkurrencevilkårene og påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne [18].
In view of all this the Commission considers that the guarantee arrangements and the Put Option are capable of distorting competition and have an effect on the trade between the Member States [18].
Det kan konkluderes, at samtlige elementer i EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, er opfyldt, hvorfor de dele af garantier og godtgørelser samt salgsretten, som er gældende efter tiltrædelsen, udgør statsstøtte som omhandlet i traktaten til GECB med det formål at overtage AGB1's bankforretninger.
In conclusion, all the elements of Article 87(1) EC being met, the parts of the Warranties and Indemnities and the Put Option which are applicable after accession constitute State aid within the meaning of the Treaty to GECB, for the purpose of it taking over the banking business of AGB1.
STØTTENS FORENELIGHED
COMPATIBILITY OF THE STATE AID
EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 2, litra b), og artikel 87, stk. 3, litra b)
Article 87(2)(b) and Article 87(3)(b) EC
EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 2 og 3, fastsætter, under hvilke betingelser støtte er forenelig eller kan betragtes som forenelig med fællesmarkedet.
Article 87(2) and (3) EC sets out the conditions according to which aid is compatible or may be considered compatible with the common market.
I modsætning til GECB argumenter, er det ikke muligt i nærværende sag at fastholde, at der forelå usædvanlige begivenheder eller noget »meget lig en naturkatastrofe« som omhandlet i EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 2, litra b).
Contrary to what GECB argues, it is not possible to maintain that in the present case there existed exceptional occurrences or something ‘very close to a natural disaster’ pursuant to Article 87(2)(b) EC.
Offentlighedens mulige tab af tillid til banksystemet kan ikke betragtes som en »naturkatastrofe« som omhandlet i traktatens bestemmelse.
A possible loss of confidence of the public in the banking system cannot be regarded as a ‘natural disaster’ within the meaning of that provision.
Begrebet usædvanlige begivenheder dækker endvidere ikke over økonomiske tab som følge af de økonomiske aktørers kommercielle beslutninger.
Also, the notion of exceptional occurrences does not cover financial losses caused by commercial decisions of economic operators.
De begivenheder, der førte til støttens tildeling, kan ikke siges at udgøre uforudsigelige og usædvanlige begivenheder.
The events which led to the granting of the aid cannot be said to constitute unforeseeable and exceptional occurrences.
Støtten kan heller ikke være omfattet af undtagelsesbestemmelsen i artikel 87, stk. 3, litra b).
Nor can the aid be exempted on the basis of Article 87(3)(b).
Støtten var ikke led i en sektorspecifik ordning, der fandt horisontal og ensartet anvendelse på alle tjekkiske banker [19].
It was not part of a sectoral scheme applied horizontally in the same way to all Czech banks [19].
EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 3, litra c), og rammebestemmelserne for redning og omstrukturering
Article 87(3)(c) EC and the Guidelines on Rescue and Restructuring
Da støtten fornemste formål var at genoprette den langsigtede rentabilitet for en kriseramt virksomhed, er det kun undtagelsesbestemmelsen i EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 3, litra c), der kan berettige godkendelse af statsstøtte, som ydes til fremme af udviklingen af visse erhvervsgrene, når den ikke ændrer samhandelsvilkårene på en måde, der strider mod den fælles interesse.
As the primary objective of the aid concerns the restoration of the long-term viability of an undertaking in difficulty, only the exemption of Article 87(3)(c) EC Treaty provides for the authorisation of State aid that is granted to promote the development of certain economic sectors, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.
For foranstaltninger vedtaget inden den 9. oktober 1999 opstiller 1994-rammebestemmelserne betingelserne for, om støtte kan anses for at være forenelig med fællesmarkedet [20].
For measures adopted before 9 October 1999, the 1994 Guidelines set out the conditions under which such aid is considered compatible with the common market [20].
Aftalerne vedrørende garantier og godtgørelser samt salgsretten blev undertegnet den 21. og 22. juni 1998 [21].
The agreements concerning the Warranties and Indemnities and the Put Option were signed on 21 and 22 June 1998 [21].
Selv om disse foranstaltninger som konkluderet ovenfor fortsat gælder efter tiltrædelsen, og Den Tjekkiske Republik dermed endnu kan tildele støtte, hvis karakter og beløb mestendels ikke er afgrænset, vil dette ske i henhold til foranstaltninger vedtaget på et tidspunkt, hvor 1994-rammebestemmelserne stadig var gældende, hvorfor det er hensigtsmæssig at vurdere dem i lyset af 1994-rammebestemmelserne [22].
Although, as found above, those measures are still applicable after accession, and the Czech Republic may thereby yet grant aid whose nature and amount is substantially undefined, this would be done pursuant to measures adopted whilst the 1994 Guidelines were still in force and it is therefore appropriate to consider them in the light of the 1994 Guidelines [22].
Kommissionen beskrev i sin beslutning af 14. juli 2004 sin alvorlige tvivl med hensyn til, om betingelserne i 1994-rammebestemmelserne var opfyldt.
In its Decision of 14 July 2004 the Commission described its serious doubts that the requirements of the 1994 Guidelines were met.
Kommissionens alvorlige tvivl navnlig med hensyn til opfyldelse af de formelle kriterier i rammebestemmelserne er ikke fjernet.
The Commission’s serious doubts in particular with regard to the fulfilment of the formal criteria of the Guidelines have not been removed.
Kommissionen har kun beføjelse til at vurdere de støtteforanstaltninger, som anses for gældende efter tiltrædelsen.
The Commission has the power to review only those aid measures that are considered to be applicable after accession.
Med henblik på at vurdere foreneligheden af omstruktureringsstøtte er det imidlertid nødvendigt at se på samtlige omstruktureringsforanstaltninger som helhed.
However, in order to assess the compatibility of restructuring aid it is necessary to look at the full set of restructuring measures.
I nærværende sag var der tale om en række indgreb besluttet af de tjekkiske myndigheder.
In the present case, there was a set of interventions decided by the Czech authorities.
Alle disse omstruktureringsforanstaltninger bør tages i betragtning ved vurdering af foreneligheden af foranstaltninger, der fortsat gælder efter tiltrædelsen, i forhold til de kriterier, der er fastlagt i 1994-rammebestemmelserne, såsom genoprettelse af rentabilitet, støttens proportionalitet og forhindring af urimelig konkurrencefordrejning.
All these restructuring measures have to be taken into account when assessing the compatibility of measures still applicable after accession against the criteria set out in the 1994 Guidelines, such as restoration of viability, proportionality of the aid and avoidance of undue distortions of competition.
1994-rammebestemmelserne anser en virksomhed for at være kriseramt, hvis den ikke kan klare sig ved hjælp af egne midler eller ved at rejse den fornødne kapital hos aktionærer eller gennem låntagning.
The 1994 Guidelines consider a firm to be in difficulties if it is unable to recover through its own resources or by raising the funds it needs from shareholders or borrowing.
AGB havde i september 1996 et tab på 8487 mio. CZK og en egenkapitalbalance på –5476 mio. CZK.
In September 1996 AGB had losses of CZK 8487 million and an equity balance of minus CZK 5476 million.