natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Denne konklusion ville have været endnu tydeligere, hvis analysen var blevet foretaget i juni 2004 (275 mio. SKK; 7,2 mio. EUR), stadig i så god tid, at skattekontoret kunne gøre brug af sin vetoret og afvise forslaget og dermed standse kreditorproceduren.
This conclusion would have been even stronger if the analysis had been made in June 2004 (SKK 275 million; EUR 7,2 million), still well in time for the tax office to exercise its right of veto and reject the proposal, with the effect of terminating the arrangement procedure.
Også i denne forbindelse skal det bemærkes, at disse resultater er opnået ved anvendelse af EKORDA's antagelser og metode.
Again, it is noted that these results were obtained using EKORDA's assumptions and methodology.
Kommissionen er imidlertid ude af stand til at acceptere den metode, der er anvendt af EKORDA, og finder ikke antagelserne i dets analyse troværdige.
The Commission, however, is unable to accept the methodology used by EKORDA and does not find the assumptions of its analysis credible.
Denne konklusion understøttes af de slovakiske myndigheders tvivl som beskrevet i betragtning 55 og 60.
This conclusion is reinforced by the doubts of the Slovak authorities as described in paragraphs 55 and 60.
For det første forklarer EKORDA ikke i sin rapport, hvordan det fastsatte de 3 likvidationsfaktorer.
To start with, in its report EKORDA does not explain how it determined the three liquidation factors.
De slovakiske myndigheder erklærede, at likvidationsfaktoren for lagerbeholdningen burde være på over 20 %.
The Slovak authorities stated that the liquidation factor for the stocks should be higher than 20 %.
Kommissionen bemærker, at modtageren i 2004 var i stand til at opnå [mindre end 150] mio. SKK ved salget af sin lagerbeholdning (jf. betragtning 30).
The Commission observes that in 2004 the beneficiary was able to generate SKK [less than 150] million from the sale of its stocks (see paragraph 30).
Dette er mere end [40-50] % af lagerbeholdningens bogførte værdi, som EKORDA lagde til grund for sin vurdering.
This is more that [40-50] % of the book value of stocks on which EKORDA based its assessment.
Dette tyder i høj grad på, at likvidationsfaktoren på 20 % var for lav.
This strongly suggests that the liquidation factor of 20 % was too low.
Ændringerne i regnskabet i 2004 med hensyn til lagerbeholdning støtter denne konklusion.
The changes in the balance sheet in 2004 with regard to stocks supports this conclusion.
Desuden skønnede modtageren selv i sin forretningsplan, at provenuet af salget af lagerbeholdningen over perioden marts-maj 2004 ville være [mindre end 110] mio. SKK (jf. betragtning 30).
In addition, the beneficiary itself in its business plan estimated the yield from the sale of stocks over the period March-May 2004 to be SKK [less than 110] million (see paragraph 30).
EKORDA ignorerede dette skøn.
EKORDA ignored this estimate.
Endelig kan det ud fra modtagerens aktiviteter antages, at lagerbeholdningen omfattede færdige produkter, som let kunne være solgt direkte til forhandlere eller forbrugere, og ikke halvfabrikata, der krævede yderlige forarbejdning.
Finally, from the nature of the beneficiary's activities it can be assumed that the stocks comprised final products that could have been easily sold direct to distributors or consumers, rather than semi-finished products requiring further processing.
Endvidere anvendte EKORDA en dobbeltjustering med hensyn til kortfristede handelstilgodehavender.
Furthermore, EKORDA used double adjusting with regard to the short-term commercial receivables.
Det justerede først deres bogførte værdi med 40 % (den bogførte værdi var 166 mio. SKK, og den værdi, EKORDA brugte i sine beregninger, var 98 mio. SKK) og anvendte dernæst den lave likvidationsfaktor på 20 %.
First, it adjusted their book value by 40 % (the book value being SKK 166 million and the value that EKORDA used in its calculations being SKK 98 million) and then applied the low liquidation factor of 20 %.
Denne metode er tvivlsom.
This methodology is questionable.
Det er acceptabelt at justere bogføringsværdien af tilgodehavender, så den afspejler deres faktiske værdi på et givet tidspunkt.
It is acceptable to adjust the book value of receivables to reflect their actual value at a given time.
EKORDA giver imidlertid ingen forklaring på, hvorfor udbyttet ved konkurs/likvidation kun ville være en femtedel (20 mio. SKK) af, hvad modtageren selv mente at kunne opnå fra sine debitorer (98 mio. SKK).
However, EKORDA does not provide any clarification as to why the yield in the bankruptcy/liquidation would be only one fifth (SKK 20 million) of what the beneficiary itself believed it would be able to obtain from its debtors (SKK 98 million).
Endvidere synes likvidationsfaktoren på 45 % for langfristede aktiver at være for lav.
Furthermore, the liquidation factor of 45 % for non-current assets seems to be too low.
Ifølge modtageren var værdien af de aktiver, skattekontoret havde pant i, 194 mio. SKK.
According to the beneficiary, the value of its assets pledged in favour of the tax office was SKK 194 million.
Denne værdi er ifølge modtageren udtrykt i priser, som blev anslået af uafhængige eksperter omkring udgangen af 2003/begyndelsen af 2004.
This value is, according to the beneficiary, expressed in prices estimated by independent experts at around the end of 2003/beginning of 2004.
Efter Kommissionens opfattelse skulle en sådan »ekspertpris« normalt afspejle aktivets generelle pris og være udtryk for den pris, som aktivet kunne sælges til på det tidspunkt.
In the Commission's view, such an ‘expert price’ should normally reflect the general price of the asset, expressing the price at which the asset could be sold at the time.
EKORDA giver ingen forklaring på, hvorfor udbyttet ved konkurssalget af langfristede aktiver kun ville udgøre 45 % af deres bogførte værdi på 205 mio. SKK, når modtageren selv vurderede disse aktiver meget højere.
EKORDA does not provide any clarification as to why the yield from the bankruptcy sale of the non-current assets would generate only 45 % of their book value of SKK 205 million whereas the beneficiary himself valued these assets much higher.
Hvad angår modtagerens udsagn om, at det ville være vanskeligt at finde en køber, fordi størstedelen af de pantsatte maskiner og det pantsatte inventar var begrænset til produktion af alkohol og alkoholholdige drikkevarer, alkoholfri drikkevarer eller produkter på dåse, har Kommissionen følgende to kommentarer.
As to the argument of the beneficiary that it would be difficult to find a buyer because most of the pledged machinery was confined to the production of spirit and spirit-based beverages, non-alcoholic beverages or canned products, the Commission has the following two comments to make.
For det første skal det bemærkes, at »ekspertprisen« på den pantsatte faste ejendom var 105 mio. SKK, hvilket i sig selv er højere end det totale udbytte efter EKORDA's skøn (92 mio. SKK).
First, it is noted that the ‘expert price’ of the pledged real estate was SKK 105 million, which in itself is higher than the total yield forecast by EKORDA (SKK 92 million).
For det andet viser den faktiske udvikling i selskabet, at nogle af disse produktionsaktiver hurtigt fandt en bruger, Old Herold, s.r.o., da først modtageren havde mistet sin tilladelse til at producere alkohol og alkoholholdige drikkevarer.
Second, the actual developments in the company show that some of these production assets quickly found a user, Old Herold, s.r.o., once the beneficiary had lost its licence to produce spirit and spirit-based beverages.
Der ser derfor ud til at have været en umiddelbar interesse i disse produktionsaktiver fra en konkurrents side.
It seems therefore that there was an imminent interest from a competitor for these production assets.
Endvidere påvirkes EKORDA-rapportens troværdighed også af beregningsmetoden for de forskellige gebyrer, der i forbindelse med en konkursprocedure skulle trækkes fra det samlede udbytte af salget af aktiver.
In addition, the credibility of EKORDA's report is also affected by the manner of calculating the various fees involved in a bankruptcy procedure that were to be subtracted from the total yield from the sale of the assets.
Mens EKORDA trak 45 mio. SKK fra i gebyrer, gav modtageren i sin erklæring et tal på 36 mio. SKK, og revisoren fr. Kochovás angiver et skøn på højst 22 mio. SKK.
Whereas EKORDA deducted SKK 45 million in fees, the beneficiary in its submission gave the figure of SKK 36 million and the estimate of the auditor Ms Kochová is SKK 22 million at most.
Sådanne uoverensstemmelser rejser tvivl om rigtigheden af EKORDA's antagelser med hensyn til gebyrernes størrelse og derfor også med hensyn til det udbytte, der kunne være opnået ved en konkursprocedure.
Such discrepancies raise doubts as to the accuracy of EKORDA's assumptions regarding the level of the fees and, therefore, also the level of the yield that could have been obtained in a bankruptcy procedure.
Det bemærkes ikke desto mindre, at udbyttet ved konkurs i betragtning af modtagerens situation den 17. juni 2004 ville have været større end ved den foreslåede ordning, selv med gebyrer på 36 mio. SKK.
It is noted, nevertheless, that, considering the beneficiary's situation on 17 June 2004, even with fees of SKK 36 million, the yield in bankruptcy would have been higher than with the proposed arrangement.
Endelig bemærker Kommissionen, at de slovakiske myndigheder ikke støtter modtagerens påstand om, at skattekontoret skulle have haft EKORDA's rapport til sin rådighed før kreditorernes møde den 9. juli 2004.
Finally, the Commission notes that the Slovak authorities do not support the beneficiary's claim that the tax office would have had EKORDA's report at its disposal prior to the creditors' meeting on 9 July 2004.
Hvad angår fr. Kochovás rapport, kan Kommissionen ikke vurdere den, da den ikke har en kopi af den.
As to the report by Ms Kochová, the Commission cannot assess it because it does not have a copy of it.
Ud fra de foreliggende oplysninger er det ikke klart, hvornår og til hvilket formål denne rapport blev udarbejdet, eller hvilke antagelser og data den byggede på.
From the information submitted it is not clear when and for what purpose this report was drawn up or on what assumptions and data it was based.
Kommissionen bemærker dog, at denne revisors konklusioner er væsentligt forskellige fra EKORDA's konklusioner.
The Commission, however, observes that the conclusions of this auditor are significantly different from the conclusions of EKORDA.
Bobestyreren fr. Holovačovás rapport erklærer blot, at kreditorproceduren generelt er mere fordelagtig for kreditorer end konkurs.
The report of the receiver Ms Holovačová states only that, in general, the arrangement procedure is more advantageous for creditors than bankruptcy.
Kommissionen kan ikke godtage nogen af disse to rapporter som bevis for eller imod modtagerens påstand om, at det markedsøkonomiske kreditorprincip er overholdt.
The Commission cannot accept either of these two reports as evidence in support of or against the beneficiary's assertion that the market economy creditor test was met.
På grundlag af det foreliggende bevismateriale konkluderer Kommissionen derfor, at salget af aktiverne ved en konkursprocedure efter al sandsynlighed ville have givet modtagerens kreditorer et højere udbytte.
On the basis of the evidence available, the Commission therefore concludes that the sale of the assets in a bankruptcy procedure would, in all probability, have led to a higher yield for the beneficiary's creditors.
I betragtning af at skattekontoret ville blive fyldestgjort i første gruppe som separatist og desuden ville få det meste af det udbytte, der blev udloddet i anden gruppe (på grund af dets kravs størrelse sammenlignet med andre kreditorers), konkluderer Kommissionen, at næsten hele udbyttet i forbindelse med konkurs ville tilfalde skattekontoret.
Considering that the tax office would be satisfied in the first group as a separate creditor and, in addition, obtain most of the yield distributed in the second group (owing to the size of its claims when compared to other creditors), the Commission concludes that almost the entire yield obtained in the bankruptcy would accrue to the tax office.
Sammenligning af kreditor- og skattefuldbyrdelsesproceduren
Comparison of the arrangement procedure and tax execution
Skattekontoret havde til forskel fra private kreditorer ret til på eget initiativ at indlede skattefuldbyrdelsesproceduren gennem salg af fast ejendom, maskiner og inventar eller firmaet som helhed.
The tax office, unlike the private creditors, was entitled to initiate on its own initiative the tax execution through the sale of real estate, machinery or the firm as a whole.
Kommissionen finder modtagerens udsagn om, at kreditorproceduren beskytter selskabet mod skattefuldbyrdelsesproceduren, irrelevant.
The Commission finds irrelevant the argument of the beneficiary that the arrangement procedure shelters the company from the tax execution procedure.
Som bekræftet af de slovakiske myndigheder var skattefuldbyrdelsesproceduren et reelt alternativ for skattekontoret, enten før iværksættelsen af kreditorproceduren eller efter skattekontorets veto mod den foreslåede ordning.
As confirmed by the Slovak authorities, the tax execution procedure was indeed an option for the tax office, either prior to the launch of the arrangement procedure or after the tax office's veto on the proposed arrangement.
Det er derfor nødvendigt at overveje denne mulighed, når det skal fastslås, om det markedsøkonomiske kreditorprincip er overholdt.
This possibility therefore needs to be considered when applying the market economy creditor test.
Modtageren sammenligner ikke den foreslåede ordning med det mulige resultat af skattefuldbyrdelsen.
The beneficiary does not compare the proposed arrangement with the possible outcome of tax execution.
Kommissionen har i sin analyse anvendt både modtagerens og de slovakiske myndigheders oplysninger.
In its analysis the Commission relies on the data provided by both the beneficiary and the Slovak authorities.
I denne sammenhæng skal det bemærkes, at de slovakiske myndigheder har bekræftet, at skattekontoret havde en panteret svarende til 397 mio. SKK, som anført i beslutningen om indledning af den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure.
In this context it is noted that the Slovak authorities confirmed that the pledge in favour of the tax office equalled SKK 397 million, as stated in the decision to open the formal investigation procedure.
Denne værdi siges at være opnået på grundlag af modtagerens regnskaber.
This value is said to have been obtained from the beneficiary's accounts.
Modtageren fremfører for sit vedkommende, at værdien af de pantsatte aktiver udtrykt i »ekspertpriser« er 194 mio. SKK (jf. betragtning 17).
The beneficiary, for its part, submits that the value of the pledged assets expressed in ‘expert prices’ is SKK 194 million (see paragraph 17).
Kommissionen behøver ikke at fastslå, hvilket tal der er korrekt, men kan ikke desto mindre drage følgende konklusioner.
While the Commission does not need to determine which figure is correct, the following conclusions can nevertheless be made.
For det første udgjorde pantet modværdien af modtagerens udsatte skattegæld, som fastsat i skatteforvaltningsloven.
First, the pledge was the countervalue of the deferred tax debt of the beneficiary, required by the Tax Administration Act.
Hvis værdien af modtagerens aktiver faktisk kun beløb sig til halvdelen af pantet, som anført i den ekspertudtalelse, modtageren fremlagde, var den pantesikkerhed, som staten krævede for denne henstand, utilstrækkelig.
If the value of the beneficiary's assets actually amounted to only half of the pledge, as suggested by the expert opinion submitted by the beneficiary, then the securities required by the State for those deferrals were insufficient.
Under disse omstændigheder opfyldte den skattehenstand, skattekontoret tillod mellem november 2002 og november 2003 på i alt 477 mio. SKK, efter al sandsynlighed ikke det markedsøkonomiske kreditorprincip.
In these circumstances, the tax deferrals permitted by the tax office between November 2002 and November 2003 for a total amount of SKK 477 million therefore in all probability did not meet the market economy creditor test.
Da denne skattehenstand blev iværksat før tiltrædelsesdatoen og ikke er gyldig derefter, er Kommissionen ikke kompetent til at vurdere disse foranstaltningers forenelighed med fællesmarkedet.
As these tax deferrals were put in effect before the date of accession and are not applicable thereafter, the Commission is not competent to assess the compatibility of those measures with the common market.
I forbindelse med denne sag behøver Kommissionen heller ikke at fastslå, om disse foranstaltninger udgjorde statsstøtte.
For the purpose of this case, it is also unnecessary for the Commission to determine whether those measures constituted state aid.
Hvis den tidligere henstand allerede udgjorde statsstøtte, kan der dog ikke længere henvises til det markedsøkonomiske kreditorprincip, når den udsatte gæld senere (delvis) afskrives.
However, if the earlier deferrals already constituted state aid, the market economy creditor principle can no longer be referred to when the deferred debts are later (partly) written off.
For det andet ville en kreditor, der opererer under markedsøkonomiske forhold — selv i det tilfælde, hvor det lavere tal, modtageren har fremlagt, blev anvendt ved beregningen af provenuet af en skattefuldbyrdelsesprocedure — have foretrukket denne procedure frem for kreditorproceduren, hvis muligheden havde foreligget.
Second, even if the lower figure submitted by the beneficiary were used in the calculation of the proceeds from a tax execution procedure, a market economy creditor would, had he had the possibility, have favoured this procedure over the arrangement procedure.
Under en skattefuldbyrdelsesprocedure kan skattemyndigheden sælge debitors aktiver (tilgodehavender og andre kortfristede aktiver, løsøre, fast ejendom) direkte.
In a tax execution procedure the tax authority can sell the debtor's assets (receivables and other current assets, movable assets, real estate) directly.
På det tidspunkt, hvor skattekontoret stemte for ordningen, havde modtageren en lagerbeholdning med en værdi af 84 mio. SKK, inddrivelige tilgodehavender på 63 mio. SKK og en kontantbeholdning på 161 mio. SKK (jf. betragtning 54).
At the time when the tax office voted in favour of the arrangement, the beneficiary had stocks worth SKK 84 million, enforceable receivables of SKK 63 million and cash of SKK 161 million (see paragraph 54).
Det skal bemærkes, at værdien af de kortfristede aktiver alene (308 mio. SKK; 8,1 mio. EUR) ville overstige det udbytte, ordningen ville medføre (225 mio. SKK; 5,93 mio. EUR).
It should be noted that the value of the current assets alone (SKK 308 million; EUR 8,1 million) would exceed the yield obtained under the arrangement (SKK 225 million; EUR 5,93 million).
Selv om tilgodehavenderne blev trukket helt fra, ville alene værdien af de kortfristede aktiver (245 mio. SKK; 6,4 mio. EUR) stadig overstige det udbytte, ordningen ville medføre.
Even if the receivables were wholly deducted, the value of the current assets alone (SKK 245; EU-6,4 million) would still exceed the yield obtained under the arrangement.
Desuden havde modtageren andre aktiver, hvis værdi var mindst 194 mio. SKK.
In addition, the beneficiary had other assets, the value of which was at least SKK 194 million.
Skattefuldbyrdelsesproceduren ville heller ikke medføre administrationsgebyrer, som det var tilfældet med konkursproceduren.
Furthermore, tax execution would not involve administrative fees as in the case of bankruptcy proceedings.
Det er en procedure, som indledes og styres af skattemyndigheden selv, så det kan antages, at den ville blive gennemført hurtigt.
It is a procedure that is initiated and controlled by the tax authority itself, so it can be assumed that it would be conducted in a speedy manner.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at skattefuldbyrdelsesproceduren på grundlag af modtagerens aktiver ville have ført til et større udbytte end ordningen.
The Commission therefore concludes that tax execution against the beneficiary's assets would have led to a higher return than the arrangement.
Andet bevismateriale
Other evidence
Kommissionen noterer sig især det brev, der er fremlagt af de slovakiske myndigheder, og som skattedirektoratets direktør har sendt til sin underordnede, direktøren for det pågældende skattekontor (jf. betragtning 57).
The Commission takes particular note of the letter submitted by the Slovak authorities from the director of the Tax Director to his subordinate, the director of the tax office in question (see paragraph 57).
Brevet er et klart bevis på, at skattedirektoratet (som tidligere havde haft direkte kontakt med modtageren) modsatte sig den foreslåede ordning og gav det lokale skattekontor en klar instruks om ikke at stemme for ordningen.
The letter is clear proof that the Tax Directorate (which had had prior direct contacts with the beneficiary) opposed the proposed arrangement and gave the local tax office a clear instruction not to vote in favour of the arrangement.
Den grund, der blev nævnt i brevet, var, at den foreslåede ordning var »ufordelagtig« for staten.
The reason mentioned in the letter was that the proposed arrangement was ‘not advantageous’ for the State.
Det blev også påvist af de slovakiske myndigheder, at finansministeriet i begyndelsen af 2004 havde givet skattekontorerne en klar instruks om ikke at acceptere ordninger med forslag om afskrivning af skattekontorernes tilgodehavender.
It was also shown by the Slovak authorities that there was a clear policy instruction given by the Ministry of Finance at the beginning of 2004 to tax offices to the effect that they should not accept arrangements that propose writing off tax offices' receivables.
Denne instruks blev givet i forbindelse med ændringen af skatteforvaltningsloven pr. 1. januar 2004 som led i bestræbelserne på at styrke disciplinen i skatteopkrævningen.
This instruction was given in connection with the amendment of the Tax Administration Act as of 1 January 2004, in an effort to strengthen discipline in tax collection.
Desuden bemærker Kommissionen, at skattekontoret selv havde anket denne ordning allerede den 2. august 2004, dvs. ikke engang en måned efter, at der blev opnået enighed om ordningen.
In addition, the Commission notes that the tax office itself had appealed against this arrangement as early as 2 August 2004, i.e. not even one month after the arrangement was agreed upon.
Modtageren fremførte, at skattekontoret havde meddelt, at det var enigt i ordningen, allerede før modtageren indledte proceduren.
The beneficiary submitted that the tax office had signalled its agreement to the arrangement even prior to the beneficiary launching the procedure.
Det er Kommissionens opfattelse, at det bevismateriale, modtageren har fremlagt, indikerer det modsatte.
The Commission considers that the evidence submitted by the beneficiary indicates quite the opposite.
Ved brev af 3. februar 2004 skriver direktøren for skattekontoret til modtageren, at han ganske vist ikke principielt er modstander af brugen af kreditorproceduren, men at han ikke kan tilslutte sig modtagerens forslag om en ordning med en tilbagebetaling af 35 % af gælden.
In his letter of 3 February 2004 to the beneficiary, the director of the tax office writes that, although in principle he is not against the use of the arrangement procedure, he does not agree with the beneficiary's proposal for an arrangement featuring 35 % repayment of the debt.