natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
afdrag og renteudgifter på lån ydet af Banken til køb af anparter, og
the annual repayments and financial costs of the bank loan granted by the Bank to acquire the shares, and
selskabernes administrationsudgifter.
the companies’ operating expenses.
Disse likviditetsbehov skulle dækkes af investorerne, som formelt forpligtede sig til hvert år at reinvestere — i form af kapitalforhøjelser i deres respektive anpartshaverselskaber — de skattemæssige besparelser, de opnåede ved at fradrage tab fra driften af skibet i anpartsselskabet (bortset fra sidste driftsår, hvor investorerne kunne beholde de skattemæssige besparelser).
The cash requirements were to be covered by the investors who formally undertook to reinvest each year the tax savings made as a result of deducting the vessel’s operating losses in the joint ownership in the form of capital increases by the respective joint-ownership companies (other than in the last operating year, when the investors had the right to retain the tax savings).
Disse reinvesteringer af de skattemæssige besparelser udgjorde anpartshaverselskabernes eneste finansieringskilde i driftsperioden.
The reinvestment of the tax savings would be the sole source of financing for the joint-ownership companies during the operating phase.
Transaktionens afslutning
End of the operation
Anpartshaverselskaberne havde ved gensidig overenskomst forpligtet sig til at sælge deres anparter til Banken (og Banken til at købe dem) til en samlet pris på 124861905 FRF (ca. 19 mio. EUR) ved driftsperiodens ophør.
The joint-ownership companies promised to sell the shares to the Bank (and the Bank promised to buy them) for a total price of FRF 124861905 (about EUR 19 million) at the end of the vessel’s operating phase.
Denne pris, den såkaldte »basispris«, kunne dog variere afhængigt af en på forhånd defineret formel baseret på den skattesats, der reelt blev anvendt i den øverste indkomstskattegruppe i perioden 1997-2003.
This price (the ‘base price’) could however vary according to a predefined formula on the basis of the actual rates applied in the top income tax bracket for the years 1997-2003.
Basisprisen blev reduceret med anpartshaverselskabernes passiver på overdragelsestidspunktet (hovedsagelig svarende til den garanti, der var stillet af CIL med kapitaliserede renter).
The base price would be reduced by the joint-ownership companies’ liabilities on the date of transfer (consisting essentially of the CIL’s deposit of guarantee plus capitalised interest).
Nettoprisen blev anslået til 56494213 FRF (ca. 8,7 mio. EUR), dvs. 153101 FRF (ca. 23500 EUR) for to anparter.
The net price was estimated at FRF 56494213 (about EUR 8,7 million), or FRF 153101 (about EUR 23500) per set of two shares.
Denne overdragelse skulle ifølge planen finde sted senest den 29. februar 2004.
The transfer was expected to take place by 29 February 2004 at the latest.
Banken og CIL var bundet af gensidige tilsagn om, at CIL skulle overtage alle Bankens anparter til en pris, der svarede til den pris, som Banken havde betalt.
For their part, the Bank and CIL made a mutually binding promise according to which CIL would acquire all the Bank’s shares at a price corresponding to the price paid by the Bank.
Denne overdragelse, hvorved CIL skulle blive den retmæssige ejer af Le Levant, skulle finde sted senest den 29. februar 2004.
This transfer, which would make the CIL the legal owner of Le Levant, would take place not later than 29 February 2004.
De franske myndigheders godkendelse
The approval of the French authorities
Banken og CIP forelagde det i punkt 2 omhandlede projekt for de franske myndigheder for at få den godkendelse, der var nødvendig for at der kunne bevilges skattelettelser efter Pons-loven.
The Bank and CIP submitted the scheme summarised in section 2 to the French authorities in order to obtain the necessary approval to benefit from the tax advantages under the Loi Pons.
Ved godkendelse af 26. november 1996 på grundlag af artikel 238 bis HA III ter og quater i CGI besluttede det franske finansministerium, at:
By approval dated 26 November 1996, granted pursuant to Article 238a HA IIIb and c CGI, the budget minister decided that:
anpartshaverselskaberne kunne fradrage deres investeringsbeløb fra deres skattepligtige resultat i det regnskabsår, hvor de havde erhvervet deres skibsanparter (samlet basisfradrag fastsat til 228,5 mio. FRF, forhøjet med eventuelle administrationsudgifter), og at
the joint-ownership companies could deduct the amount of their investments from their tax results for the year of purchase of their shares (the total basis for deduction was set at FRF 228,5 million, plus any bridging costs), and that,
bestemmelserne i artikel 156 1obis i CGI ikke fandt anvendelse på underskud, der var en følge af køb og drift af skibet (hvilket derfor gav deltagerne mulighed for at fratrække disse underskud fra deres indkomster).
Article 156(1a) CGI would not apply to losses arising from the acquisition and operation of the vessel (which would thus allow the shareholders of the joint-ownership companies to deduct these losses from their income).
I godkendelsesteksten noterede de franske myndigheder sig udtrykkeligt visse elementer i transaktionen, herunder bl.a., at CIP og Banken »garanterer deltagerne i de selskaber, der er oprettet for at købe anparterne, at den vil tilbagekøbe deres anparter efter udløbet af det 5. driftsår til en værdi svarende til 56,756 FRF«.
In the text of the approval decision the French authorities expressly noted certain elements of the operation, in particular that CIP and the Bank would ‘guarantee … holders of shares in the companies set up to purchase the shares that they would buy back their shares at the end of the 5th year of operation at a value of FRF 56756 million’.
Til aftalen var knyttet en betingelse om, at anpartshaverselskaberne skulle beholde deres anparter i anpartsselskabet i fem år regnet fra skibets leveringsdato, og at dette skulle drives i fem år i et oversøisk område, især fra Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon.
The approval was subject to the condition that the joint-ownership companies keep their joint-ownership shares for five years from the delivery of the vessel and that the vessel operate overseas, notably out of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, for a period of five years.
I denne periode skulle deltagerne beholde deres anparter i deres EURL.
The shareholders should keep their shares in the joint-ownership companies for the same period.
Det fremgår i øvrigt af godkendelsesansøgningen, at Banken og CIP var vidende om, at den omhandlede skattemæssige fordel udgjorde statsstøtte efter traktatens artikel 87 [12].
The application for approval also reveals that the Bank and CIP were aware that the tax benefit claimed constituted State aid within the meaning of Article 87 of the Treaty [12].
Banken og CIP har alligevel gennemført finansieringskonstruktionen, selv om godkendelsesbeslutningen ikke indeholdt noget om, hvorvidt denne støtte eventuelt skulle anmeldes til Kommissionen i medfør af traktatens artikel 88 og om, hvorvidt den var forenelig med fællesmarkedet.
The Bank and CIP implemented the financing scheme despite the fact that the approval decision made no mention of notifying the Commission of the aid in accordance with Article 88 of the Treaty or of its compatibility with the common market.
Ifølge de oplysninger, Kommissionen råder over, er finansieringen af Le Levant gennemført efter den konstruktion, der er nævnt i afsnit 2.
According to information at the Commission’s disposal, the Le Levant financing operation was implemented in accordance with the package summarised in section 2.
De forskellige løfter om køb og salg, der forbandt parterne i konstruktionen, er gennemført som planlagt, og CIL blev derfor i januar 2004 ejer af alle anparter i Le Levant til en pris på 17825989 EUR.
The various binding promises of sale and purchase between the parties in the package were applied as expected, as a result of which CIL took ownership of all the shares in Le Levant in January 2004 for a price of EUR 17825989.
Kommissionen bemærker sig, at et skibsanpartsselskab ifølge fransk ret opløses, hvis alle anparter i et skib samles på én hånd.
The Commission notes that, under French law, the fact that all shares in a vessel have come to be held by a single shareholder requires the joint-ownership vehicle to be dissolved.
Anpartshaverselskaberne (EURL) er angiveligt blevet opløst og slettet af handelsregistret i maj og juli 2004 [13].
The joint-ownership companies were dissolved and deleted from the company register in May and July 2004 [13].
I sine beslutninger af 2. december 1999 og 6. december 2006 fandt Kommissionen, at anvendelse af Pons-loven i konstruktionen for at finansiere Le Levant indebar en fordel for anpartshaverselskaberne (i det følgende benævnt »investorerne«) og CIL, og at denne fordel, der resulterede i en nedsættelse af skattepligtige indtægter, blev indrømmet ved hjælp af statsmidler.
In its initiation decisions of 2 December 1999 and 6 December 2006, the Commission found that the application of the Loi Pons to the Le Levant financing package had provided an advantage to shareholders in the joint-ownership companies (‘the investors’) and to CIL and that that advantage, which led to a shortfall in tax revenue, had been granted through State resources.
Med hensyn til selektiviteten i forbindelse med denne fordel anførte Kommissionen, at Pons-lovens anvendelsesområde var selektivt, da den kun fandt anvendelse på investeringer i visse franske oversøiske territorier.
As regards the selectivity of the advantage, the Commission noted that the Loi Pons was selective in scope as the scheme applied only to investments in certain French overseas communities.
Endelig fandt Kommissionen, at støtten ville kunne fordreje konkurrencen på markedet for krydstogtskibe, der er et marked, som er præget af samhandel mellem medlemsstaterne.
Lastly, the Commission considered that the aid was likely to distort competition in the cruise market, a market which was characterised by trade between Member States.
Kommissionen fastslog derfor, at den omhandlede foranstaltning udgjorde statsstøtte.
The Commission therefore found that the measure in question constituted State aid.
Hvad angår støttens forenelighed med fællesmarkedet fandt Kommissionen, at den tilsyneladende ikke opfyldte betingelserne for tildeling af udviklingsstøtte i artikel 4, stk. 7 i direktiv 90/684/EØF.
As regards the compatibility of the aid with the common market, the Commission felt that it did not appear to satisfy the conditions applicable to the development assistance referred to in Article 4(7) of Directive 90/684/EEC.
Kommissionen udtrykte specielt tvivl med hensyn til betingelsen om, at den faktiske ejer af skibet skal have hjemsted i et område, der er berettiget til udviklingsstøtte, samt til hvorvidt projektet havde et reelt »udviklingsindhold«.
In particular, the Commission expressed doubts regarding the condition that the real owner of the vessel must reside in the territory eligible for development assistance and as to the existence of a real development component.
Kommissionen indledte derfor den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure.
The Commission therefore initiated a formal investigation procedure.
Kommissionen har modtaget bemærkninger fra CIL samt fra repræsentanter for investorerne, der støttes af Banken.
The Commission received comments from CIL and from the investors’ representatives, backed by the Bank.
Bemærkninger fra CIL
CIL comments
CIL udtrykker først og fremmest tvivl med hensyn til, hvorvidt direktiv 90/684/EØF finder anvendelse.
CIL first questions the applicability of Directive 90/684/EEC.
Ifølge CIL fastsætter direktiv 90/684/EØF primært retningslinjer for tildeling af støtte, direkte eller indirekte, til skibsværfter i Fællesskabet. Det konkluderes, at ovennævnte direktiv kun gælder for støtte til et skibsværft.
CIL believes that the aim of that Directive is to manage the aid for which shipyards established in the Community may be directly or indirectly eligible and concludes that the Directive applies only to aid that benefits a shipyard.
Da Kommissionen ikke har dokumenteret, at der er tale om en sådan støtte, kan den ikke basere sin vurdering af støtten på direktiv 90/684/EØF.
As the Commission had not demonstrated such a benefit, the Commission could not base its assessment of the aid on Directive 90/684/EEC.
CIL bestrider derefter tilstedeværelsen af støtte efter kriterierne i traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
Secondly, CIL disputes the existence of State aid with reference to the criteria of Article 87(1) of the Treaty.
Med hensyn til den fordel, som CIL skulle have opnået ved køb af de anparter, som investorerne havde i skibet, anfører CIL, at selskabet har tilbagekøbt skibsanparterne hos anpartshaverselskaberne til en pris på 17825989 EUR. Denne pris skulle ligge over skibets handelsværdi, der i juni 2004 blev anslået til at ligge mellem 14,5 og 16,1 mio. EUR af det velrenommerede skibsmæglerfirma Barry Rogliano Salles.
Regarding the advantage allegedly obtained by CIL on the purchase of the investors’ shares in the vessel, CIL points out that it bought the shares in the vessel from the joint-ownership companies for a price of EUR 17825989. This price was higher than the vessel’s market value, estimated in June 2004 by the reputable shipbrokers Barry Rogliano Salles at between EUR 14,5 and 16,1 million.
CIL anfører tre bemærkninger med hensyn til den fordel, som selskabet skulle have opnået ved driften af »Le Levant«.
Regarding the advantage that CIL allegedly gained from operating Le Levant, CIL makes the following three observations.
Selskabet finder for det første, at det ikke er korrekt at betragte CIL som det selskab, der har drevet skibet, da det kun har handlet som bestyrer på vegne af anpartsselskabets deltagere, som reelt har drevet skibet.
Firstly, it is incorrect to regard CIL as operator of the vessel as, in fact, it had acted only in the capacity of manager on behalf of the joint-ownership which was the vessel’s real operator.
CIL finder endvidere, at Kommissionen ikke har dokumenteret, at støtten skulle have gjort det muligt at drive Le Levant på mere fordelagtige vilkår end dem, der gælder for andre operatører, da Kommissionen ikke har beregnet omfanget af den påståede fordel.
Secondly, CIL believes that the Commission has failed to prove that the aid helped to operate Le Levant under more favourable conditions than those available to other operators as the Commission had not quantified the size of the alleged advantage.
Hvad angår endelig kriteriet om påvirkning af samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne anfører CIL, at Le Levant er et skib med begrænset kapacitet, som aldrig i de fem første driftsår har været udnyttet i Fællesskabets farvande, at skibet i denne periode hovedsagelig har haft et nordamerikansk og ikke et europæisk klientel og endelig, at der ikke findes nogen europæisk konkurrent inden for denne niche.
Lastly, as regards the effect on trade between Member States, CIL notes that Le Levant is a low-capacity vessel, that it did not once operate in Community waters in the first five years of operation, that its clientele in this period consisted mainly of North Americans, i.e. non-Community nationals, and finally that it had no European competitors in its market niche.
CIL betvivler derfor, at driften af Le Levant kan anses for at påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
CIL doubts whether the operation of Le Levant can be considered to have affected trade between Member States.
CIL har i øvrigt ikke haft nogen fordel af støtten i sin egenskab af anpartshaver, da selskabet, der ikke er hjemmehørende i Frankrig og ikke skattepligtig her, derfor ikke har kunnet foretage noget skattemæssigt fradrag.
Nor did CIL benefit from aid in its capacity as investor-shareholder given that, as a company established outside mainland France, it did not pay tax in France and could not therefore make any tax deductions.
Bemærkninger fra investorerne
The investors’ comments
Investorerne finder først og fremmest, at Kommissionens procedure har været præget af uregelmæssigheder.
The investors consider first that the procedure adopted by the Commission was flawed.
Ved sin dom af 22. februar 2006 erklærede Førsteinstansretten beslutningen af 2. december 1999 om procedurens indledning ugyldig, da denne var uløseligt forbundet med den annullerede endelige beslutning. Kommissionen kunne derfor ikke supplere denne beslutning ved sin beslutning af 6. december 2006.
The Court of First Instance judgment of 22 February 2006 had invalidated the initiation decision of 2 December 1999, as this was inextricably linked to the final decision annulled, so the Commission could not legitimately supplement it with its Decision of 6 December 2006.
For at overholde procedurekravene skulle Kommissionen have vedtaget en ny beslutning om procedureindledning, og den supplerende beslutning af 2. december 2006 burde betragtes som en sådan.
In accordance with the procedure, the Commission should have adopted a new initiation decision and its supplementary decision of 2 December 2006 must thus be regarded as initiating proceedings from scratch.
Investorerne finder desuden, at den supplerende beslutning af 6. december 2006 omfatter en række fejl og mangler svarende til de mangler, som Retten henviste til i sin dom af 22. februar 2006 og som især omhandlede karakteren af de økonomiske relationer mellem investorerne, Banken og CIL.
Secondly, the investors believe that the supplementary decision of 6 December 2006 contains a number of errors and shortcomings, in short the omissions identified by the Court of First Instance in its judgment of 22 February 2006 relating in particular to the nature of the business relationship between the investors, the Bank and CIL.
Investorerne understreger, at de har undertegnet en af Banken foreslået medlemsaftale med det formål at få del i de optimerede skattefordele.
The investors stress that they had signed a membership contract proposed by the Bank which was designed to bring them the benefits of a tax optimisation scheme.
Det fremhæves, at de ikke har nogen som helst kompetence til at drive et krydstogtskib, idet de fleste er personer i ledende stillinger eller inden for liberale erhverv (læger, farmaceuter, advokater, embedsmænd, notarer) eller pensionister.
They also point out that they were not qualified to operate a cruise business as most of them were senior managers or professionals (doctors, chemists, lawyers, bailiffs, solicitors) or had retired.
Selv om det formelt er korrekt, at de har været tilknyttet anpartshaverselskaberne, har disse selskaber, der ikke har andre aktiver end de omhandlede skibsanparter, aldrig været virksomheder i den i traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1 anførte betydning.
While it is formally correct that they were shareholders in the joint-ownership companies, the latter had no assets other than the shares and at no stage were they undertakings within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty.
Investorerne har ikke været økonomiske aktører, som har påtaget sig de risici, der er forbundet med en økonomisk aktivitet, men blot købere at et finansielt produkt med et minimumsudbytte, der var garanteret af de personer, der havde skabt konstruktionen.
Rather than economic operators bearing the risks inherent to an economic activity, the investors had merely subscribed to a financial product with a minimum return guaranteed by the promoters of the package.
Resultatet var, at hverken investorerne, deres deltagende UERL eller det anpartsselskab, som knyttede dem sammen, kunne være modtagere af statsstøtte, da de ikke udøvede en økonomisk aktivitet.
As a result, neither the investors, nor their joint-ownership companies, nor the joint-ownership vehicle to which they belonged were eligible to receive State aid as they were not engaged in an economic activity.
Investorerne mener derfor, at Kommissionen har begået en fejl ved at anvende direktiv 90/684/EØF på den omhandlede støtte.
The investors further contend that the Commission made a mistake by applying Directive 90/684/EEC to the aid in question.
De finder, at det pågældende direktiv kun gælder for den støtte, som skibsbyggeren har draget fordel af (dvs. skibsværftet), en mulighed, som Kommissionen i det foreliggende tilfælde har udelukket.
They believe that the Directive applies only to aid received by a vessel’s constructor (i.e. the shipyard), a fact which the Commission had dismissed in this case.
Investorerne mener i den forbindelse, at Kommissionen er nået frem til denne konklusion på grundlag af en overfladisk analyse, og at en grundigere undersøgelse ville have vist, at den tildelte støtte var en fordel for skibsværftet.
In this connection, the investors are also of the opinion that the Commission’s conclusion is based on a superficial analysis and that a closer examination of the facts would have shown that the aid granted had benefited a shipyard.
Tildelingen af kontrakten havde været en reel saltvandsindsprøjtning for værftet, der befandt sig i økonomiske vanskeligheder.
Winning the contract had given the shipyard, which was in financial difficulties, a genuine lifeline.
Da skibet ikke ville være blevet bygget uden den finansielle konstruktion, som Pons-loven gav mulighed for, har de omhandlede skattemæssige fordele resulteret i, at værftet opnåede en økonomisk fordel.
As the vessel would not have been built without the financing scheme which the Loi Pons allowed, the tax benefits at issue did indeed confer a financial advantage on the yard without any reciprocal concession.
V. DE FRANSKE MYNDIGHEDERS BEMÆRKNINGER
V. COMMENTS OF THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES
I sine bemærkninger anfører de franske myndigheder først, at hovedsigtet med Pons-loven er at hjælpe de oversøiske erhvervsdrivende med at udvikle deres aktiviteter for at kompensere for de handicaps, som de er konfronteret med.
In their observations, the French authorities first point out that the real purpose of the Loi Pons was to help overseas operators develop their activities in order to compensate for the specific disadvantages they faced.
Der er på ingen måde tale om støtte til skibsbygning, og der er i øvrigt ikke ydet nogen direkte støtte til bygningen af skibet som led i projektet.
It was not therefore aid for shipbuilding and, moreover, no direct construction aid was granted under the project.
De franske myndigheder bemærker i denne forbindelse, at hvis der for at finansiere skibet ved hjælp af Pons-loven skal skabes en model, hvor eksterne investorer samles i et skibsanpartsselskab, som stiller skibet til rådighed for den reelle operatør, medvirker disse investorer kun i deres egenskab af købere af et nøglefærdigt finansprodukt, hvor udbyttet er af skattemæssig karakter, og hvor støtten kanaliseres over til operatøren, som er den egentlige støttemodtager i det omfang, at ordningen i sidste ende giver ham mulighed for at erhverve skibet på fordelagtige vilkår.
In this connection the French authorities also comment that, although the financing of the vessel under the Loi Pons requires an outsourcing scheme to bring in investors — in the form of a joint-ownership vehicle — who supply the vessel to the actual operator, the investors’ role is merely as subscribers to a ready-made financial product with potential tax benefits which transmits the aid to the operator who is the real beneficiary insofar as the scheme allows him eventually to acquire the vessel on favourable terms.
De bestrider derfor formelt, at investorerne kan betragtes som støttemodtagere.
They therefore formally dispute the fact that the investors can be qualified as beneficiaries of State aid.
Hvad angår støttens selektivitet afviser de franske myndigheder det argument, som Kommissionen gentagne gange har fremført vedrørende myndighedernes skønsmargin ved tildeling af de fornødne godkendelser til at udnytte skattefordelene i Pons-loven.
Regarding the selective nature of the aid, the French authorities dispute the additional argument made by the Commission on the basis of the margin of discretion left to the authorities to issue the approvals necessary for granting tax benefits under the Loi Pons.