natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Økonomisk set ville det ikke være fornuftigt, at et kreditinstitut, der af alle kreditvurderingsbureauer i forvejen har fået den bedst mulige rating, betaler noget for yderligere optagne midlers hæftelsesfunktion.
It would not have made sense in economic terms for a credit institution that was already accorded the top credit rating by all the rating agencies to pay a remuneration for the liability function of additional resources it had taken up.
Betingelserne for instituttets optagelse af fremmedkapital blev ikke yderligere forbedret, og der var således ingen fordel set i pengeværdi.
The terms and conditions under which the institution could take up outside capital would not have improved any further, so that no monetary advantage existed.
Investoren, i hvis interesse hele kapitalen blev overført udelt til banken, kunne derfor ikke opnå en godtgørelse for hæftelsesfunktionen.
The investor in whose interest the entire capital was transferred en bloc to the bank could therefore not have imposed any remuneration for the liability function.
Den tvivl, Kommissionen i beslutningen om at indlede proceduren gav udtryk for med hensyn til kapitalens manglende likviditet, byggede til dels på metoderne fra WestLB-beslutningen, som imidlertid ikke kan anvendes i den foreliggende sag, fordi de faktiske forhold er for forskellige.
The Commission's doubts, referred to in the decision to initiate proceedings, regarding the non-liquidity of the capital were based partly on the methodology of the WestLB decision, which could not however be applied to the present case because of the major differences in the underlying facts.
Efter Tysklands opfattelse er det i det foreliggende tilfælde brutto- og ikke kun nettorefinansieringsomkostningerne, der skal trækkes fra godtgørelsen for ellers sammenlignelige, men likvide stille indskud.
According to Germany, in the present case the gross and not just the net refinancing costs had to be deducted from the remuneration of otherwise comparable, but liquid silent partnership contributions.
Også for private kreditinstitutter er godtgørelsen for optagne stille indskuds likviditetsfunktion nemlig skattemæssigt fradragsberettiget.
This was because, even in the case of private credit institutions, the remuneration for the liquidity function of the silent partnership contributions taken up by them was tax deductible.
Hvis kun nettorefinansieringsomkostningerne blev trukket fra den fiktive godtgørelse for et likvidt stille indskud, når det drejer sig om Helaba, måtte det samme gælde for private kreditinstitutter og den af dem faktisk betalte godtgørelse for likvide stille indskud.
If, in the case of Helaba, only the net refinancing costs were deducted from the notional remuneration for a liquid silent partnership contribution, the same process would have to be applied in the case of private credit institutions as regards the remuneration actually paid by them for liquid silent partnership contributions.
Ellers ville sammenligningen ikke være rigtig.
Otherwise the comparison would be distorted.
BEMÆRKNINGER FRA KLAGEREN, BDB
COMMENTS FROM THE COMPLAINANT BDB
Efter BdB’s opfattelse har Helaba ikke betalt en passende godtgørelse for den tilførte kernekapital, og banken har dermed fået statsstøtte.
The BdB submits that Helaba did not pay an appropriate remuneration for the transferred core capital and was therefore in receipt of state aid.
I bemærkningerne af 29. juli 2003 til de Landesbank-procedurer, der blev indledt den 13. november 2002, anfører BdB, at spørgsmålet om, hvilken godtgørelse der er passende, afgøres efter de metoder, som Kommissionen har lagt til grund i sin beslutning om WestLB.
In its comments of 29 July 2003 on the proceedings initiated on 13 November 2002 in respect of the Landesbanks, the BdB states that the question of whether the remuneration was appropriate should be determined using the method employed by the Commission in its WestLB decision.
Der skal derfor i første omgang foretages en sammenligning af den kapital, der er stillet til rådighed, med andre egenkapitalinstrumenter.
The first step was therefore to compare the capital provided with other equity instruments.
Dernæst skal det fastlægges, hvilken minimumsgodtgørelse en investor ville forvente for den konkrete egenkapitalinvestering i delstatsbanken.
The second step was to determine the minimum remuneration which an investor would expect for a real equity-capital investment in the Landesbank.
Til sidst skal eventuelle tillæg og nedslag på grund af overdragelsens særlige karakter beregnes.
Finally, a calculation had to be made of any premiums and discounts applied by virtue of the peculiarities of the transfer.
Efter hvad BdB anfører, havde næsten alle delstatsbanker fra 1992 behov for ny kernekapital for at opfylde de strengere krav i henhold til det nye solvensdirektiv.
Nearly all the Landesbanks are said by the BdB to have required fresh core capital from 1992 onwards in order to meet the stricter requirements arising from the new Solvency Directive.
Uden kapitalforhøjelserne havde delstatsbankerne måttet reducere deres virksomhed.
Without these increases in capital, the Landesbanks would have had to scale down their business.
Deraf kan det ifølge BdB sluttes, at den tilførte kapital kun bør sammenlignes med egenkapitalinstrumenter, som var anerkendt og til rådighed i Tyskland det år, kernekapitalen (Tier 1-kapital) blev indskudt.
It could therefore be concluded, the BdB argues, that the capital injected could be compared only with equity instruments that were recognised as core capital (‘tier 1 capital’) and available in Germany in the year of the transfer.
Ved en sammenligning er det derfor på forhånd udelukket at anvende præferenceaktier uden stemmeret, udbytterettigheder og såkaldte perpetual preferred shares.
This immediately excluded from any comparison non-voting preference shares, profit participation rights and perpetual preferred shares.
Disse tre egenkapitalinstrumenter er ikke anerkendt som kernekapital i Tyskland, men kun som supplerende kapital (Tier 2-kapital).
In Germany, these three equity instruments were recognised not as core capital, but as additional capital (‘tier 2 capital’).
I de pågældende investeringsperioder blev kun indskudskapital og stille andele anerkendt som kernekapital i Tyskland.
At the time of the respective transfers, only share capital and silent partnership contributions were recognised as core capital in Germany.
Efter BdB’s opfattelse kunne Helaba for den konkrete investering juridisk set kun anvende mulighederne aktiekapital eller indskudskapital.
In the BdB's opinion, the only legal form properly available to Helaba for the investment was share capital.
BdB bestrider i den forbindelse ikke den faktiske anerkendelse fra de nævnte myndigheders side.
The BdB does not challenge the recognition by the relevant authorities that actually took place.
BdB anfører imidlertid, at der ikke burde være sket en sådan anerkendelse, da det konkret aftalte stille indskud fra delstaten Hessen hverken økonomisk eller retligt kan sammenlignes med »normale« stille indskud, men derimod alene med aktiekapital/indskudskapital.
It argues rather that such recognition should not have taken place, since the silent contribution by the Land of Hessen that was specifically agreed was economically and legally comparable not with ‘normal’ silent partnership contributions, but rather with share capital.
Når der nu faktisk skete en sådan anerkendelse, må i det mindste godtgørelsen for delstaten Hessens stille indskud ligge på linje med godtgørelsen for aktiekapital/indskudskapital, da en markedsøkonomisk investor ville have krævet en sådan godtgørelse på grundlag af det stille indskuds lighed med indskudskapital og dets konkrete risikostruktur.
Given then, that such recognition had actually taken place, the remuneration at least of the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen had to be based on that of share capital, since a market-economy investor would have required such remuneration on the basis of its similarity to share capital and specific risk structure.
BdB analyserer ud fra en række kriterier, hvorfor delstaten Hessens stille indskud efter BdB's opfattelse økonomisk og retligt skal sammenlignes med indskudskapital og ikke med stille indskud, som de kan ses på markedet.
The BdB gives an analysis here, based on a list of criteria, of why in its opinion the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen was, in economic and legal terms, comparable with share capital and not with silent partnership contributions observed on the market.
BdB henviser i den forbindelse til, at »normale« stille indskud kun har en begrænset løbetid eller kan opsiges, og at de ifølge principperne udstukket af Baselkomitéen for Banktilsyn ikke kan anvendes i et omfang svarende til over 15 % af kernekapitalen, mens delstaten Hessens stille indskud ligesom indskudskapital har en ubegrænset løbetid og tillader overskridelse af 15 %-grænsen.
The BdB bases this view essentially on the fact that ‘normal’ silent partnership contributions are only of limited duration and can be withdrawn and, under the principles of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, cannot be used for volumes above 15 % of core capital, whereas the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen, like share capital, was of unlimited duration and allowed the 15 % limit to be exceeded.
Desuden bør der ikke i medfør af en aftale om efterstillelse være en nedsat risiko for investoren, da den tilførte kapital udgør en betydelig del — og til dels over 50 % — af den samlede kernekapital.
Furthermore, it could not be deduced from an agreement on the junior-ranking nature of the assets that there was a lower risk for the investor, since the transferred capital represented an important part of the entire core capital, in some instances more than 50 %.
Der er dermed væsentlig større sandsynlighed for, at den tilførte kapital inddrages i tilfælde af tab, hvorfor der også skal betales en højere risikopræmie.
This meant a much higher probability that the transferred capital would be called upon in the event of a loss, for which consequently a higher risk premium should be paid.
BdB gør desuden gældende, at stille indskud i tilsynsmæssig henseende kun skal anerkendes som såkaldt Lower-Tier-1-kapital og derfor efter »Sydney-erklæringen« af 1998 fra Baselkomitéen for Banktilsyn kun må udgøre 15 % af den påkrævede kernekapitalandel.
The BdB also stated that, for banking supervisory purposes, silent partnership contributions were to be recognised only as lower tier 1 capital and hence, under the 1998 ‘Sydney Declaration’ of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, could make up only 15 % of the necessary core capital ratio.
Der kan dermed ikke anvendes stille andele for store volumener, som overstiger denne grænse.
Large-volume silent partnership contributions above this limit could not therefore be used.
Desuden kan de af Tyskland nævnte Deutsche Bank-perpetuals ikke anvendes som målestok for en passende godtgørelse, da de alle lå under 15 %-grænsen og dermed ikke var noget alternativ for Helaba ved udgangen af 1998.
Lastly, the Deutsche Bank perpetuals referred to by Germany could not be taken as a criterion for the appropriate remuneration, since they all lay below the 15 % limit and hence would not have been alternatives for Helaba at the end of 1998.
Dertil kommer, at delstaten stiller sit indskud til rådighed for Helaba uden selv at have mulighed for at opsige det, altså uden tidsbegrænsning.
Another factor was that the Land made its contribution available to Helaba without any possibility of withdrawal on its part, i.e. for unlimited duration.
En aktionær kan ganske vist heller ikke »opsige« sin aktiekapital, men kan dog frit bestemme at sælge sine aktier og investere pengene andetsteds.
Although a shareholder could not ‘withdraw’ his share capital, he was nevertheless free to decide to sell his shares and invest elsewhere.
Uafhængigt af den nærmere retlige udformning mangler der i dette tilfælde allerede af den grund en sådan omsættelighed, da der under alle omstændigheder praktisk talt ikke eksisterer et marked for en kapitalanbringelse af et sådant omfang og med ubegrænset løbetid.
Regardless of the details of the legal form, there was no such transferability in this instance if only because at all events there was virtually no market for a capital investment of this size and of unlimited duration.
Private investorer ville derimod i reglen sikre sig mulighed for at trække deres kapital ud i tilfælde af vedvarende dårlige resultater, for at de kunne investere den mere rentabelt.
Private investors, by contrast, usually kept open the possibility of withdrawing their capital again in the event of persistently bad results and of investing again more profitability.
En permanent binding af risikokapital ville en privat investor — om overhovedet — kun acceptere mod en tilsvarende høj forrentning.
A private investor would — if at all — accept the permanent tying of risk capital only in return for a correspondingly high yield.
Den her valgte form for kapitaltilførsel er derfor en normal investering af indskudskapital, som en markedsøkonomisk investor ville forvente forrentet tilsvarende.
The form of capital transfer opted for here was therefore a normal share capital investment, for which a market-economy investor would expect a corresponding yield.
Specielt er det ikke tilstrækkeligt kun at tage hensyn til den ubegrænsede løbetid med et tillæg til den basisforrentning for et (tidsbegrænset) stille indskud, der er beregnet ved en sådan sammenligning.
In particular, it was not sufficient to take account of the unlimited term merely through a premium on the basic yield, determined for comparison purposes, on a silent partnership contribution of limited duration.
Nedenstående to tabeller viste de vigtigste forskelle mellem det »stille indskud« i Helaba og andre egenkapitalformer, der stod til rådighed på investeringstidspunktet:
The following two tables showed the essential differences between Helaba's ‘silent partnership contribution’ and other forms of equity capital available at the time of the investment:
»Stille ind-skud« i Helaba
Helaba's ‘silent partner-ship contribution’
Indskuds-kapital
Share capital
Stille andel
Silent partner-ship
Præfe-renceaktier
Preference shares
Udbytte-rettigheder
Profit participation rights
Til rådighed på det tyske marked 1998
Availability on the German market in 1998
Tilsyns-mæssig status
Status for banking supervisory purposes
Kernekapital kun på bestemte betingelser og med 15 %-grænse
Core capital only under certain conditions and 15 % limit
Sup-plerende kapital
Additional capital
Supplerende kapital på særlige betingelser
Additional capital subject to special conditions
Supplerende kapital eller kernekapital med 15 %-grænse
Additional capital or core capital with 15 % limit
»Stille indskud« i Helaba
Helaba's ‘silent partnership contribution’
Stille andel
Silent partnership
Anvendelig for store volumener
Usability for large volumes
Ubegrænset løbetid
Unlimited duration
Investor har ingen opsigelsesret
Investor has no right of withdrawal
Deltagelse i løbende tab
Participation in current losses
Tilbagebetaling ved insolvens efter kreditorer
Repayment in insolvency proceedings, by creditor
Ingen intern »efterstillelse« i forhold til indskudskapital
No internal ‘junior-ranking nature’ compared with share capital
Tilbagebetaling før indskudskapital
Repayment before share capital
Godtgørelse i form af overskudsandel
Profit-share remuneration
Ingen efterbetaling ved manglende godtgørelse
No subsequent payment in the event of absence of remuneration
nej Kumulativ efterbetaling mulig
Cumulative subsequent payment possible
SKATTEMÆSSIG FRADRAGSRET
TAX DEDUCTIBILITY
BdB betvivler, at delstaten Hessens overskudsandel er skattemæssigt fradragsberettiget som driftsudgift.
The BdB doubts that the profit share of the Land of Hessen is tax deductible as operating expenditure.
Det må formodes, at delstaten Hessen overtager en betydelig driftsherrerisiko med det stille indskud.
In its view, it was to be assumed that the Land of Hessen was incurring a substantial business risk with the silent partnership contribution.
Det tyder både kapitalindskuddets størrelse og uopsigelighed på.
This was evident not only from the size of the capital investment, but also from the fact that the participation was not withdrawable.
Denne driftsherrerisiko taler for, at der består et partnerskab i form af Mitunternehmerschaft (såkaldt atypisk stille selskab), at det stille indskud skattemæssigt karakteriseres som partnerskabets egenkapital, og at den stille deltagers overskudsandel ikke er fradragsberettiget som driftsudgift for Helaba.
This business risk justified the existence of a partnership (so-called atypical silent partnership), the ranking of the silent partnership contribution for tax purposes as partnership equity capital and the non-deductibility of the silent partner's profit share as operating expenditure on the part of Helaba.
MINIMUMSGODTGØRELSE FOR INDSKUDSKAPITAL I EN DELSTATSBANK
MINIMUM REMUNERATION FOR A SHARE-CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN A LANDESBANK
BdB anfører, at samtlige metoder til beregning af en passende godtgørelse (forrentning) for den egenkapital, der blev stillet til rådighed, gik ud fra en risikofri forrentning og lagde en risikopræmie til.
The BdB argues that all methods of determining an appropriate remuneration (return) for the provision of equity capital start from a risk-free return and add a risk premium.
De byggede på følgende grundprincip:
They can be traced back to the following basic principle:
Forventet forrentning af en risikobehæftet investering
Expected return on a high-risk investment
= risikofri forrentning + risikopræmie for den risikobehæftede investering
= risk-free return + risk premium for the high-risk investment
Ved beregningen af den risikofri forrentning tager BdB udgangspunkt i forrentningen af langfristede statsobligationer, da fastforrentede værdipapirer fra statslige emittenter står som den investeringsform, der har den laveste eller ingen risiko.
To determine the risk-free return, the BdB uses the returns on long-term government bonds, fixed-rate securities issued by state bodies being the form of investment with the least or no risk.
For at nå frem til risikopræmien beregner BdB først den såkaldte markedsrisikopræmie, altså forskellen mellem den langsigtede gennemsnitsforrentning af aktier og af statsobligationer.
To derive the risk premium, the BdB first works out the ‘market risk premium’, i.e. the difference between the long-term average return on shares and that on government bonds.
For det tyske aktiemarked går BdB på grundlag af en undersøgelse fra Stehle-Hartmond (1991) ud fra en langfristet markedsrisikopræmie på 4,6 % samlet set.
For the German share market, the BdB assumes, on the basis of a study by Stehle-Hartmond (1991), a uniform long-term market risk premium of 4,6 %.
Derefter bestemmer BdB delstatsbankernes betaværdi, dvs. den individuelle risikopræmie for bankerne, som den generelle markedsrisikopræmie skal tilpasses efter.
The BdB then determines the beta value for the Landesbanks, i.e. the individual risk premium for the banks, on the basis of which the general market risk premium was to be adjusted.
BdB beregner, efter hvad den har oplyst, betaværdierne statistisk, hvilket betyder, at betaværdierne fastlægges på grundlag af en historisk datastikprøve.
The BdB stated that it had determined the beta values statistically, which means that it had estimated them on the basis of a historical data sample.
BdB når til det resultat, at samtlige betaværdier for samtlige delstatsbanker og betragtede tidsrum er større end 1.
The BdB concludes that all the beta values for all the Landesbanks and periods considered are greater than one.
Den forventede minimumsgodtgørelse for en indskudskapitalinvestering i Helaba på tidspunktet for tilførslen af investeringsfremmeformuen pr. 31. december 1998 er efter BdB’s beregninger på 11,66 % p.a.
The BdB therefore calculates the expected minimum remuneration for an investment in the share capital of Helaba to be 11,66 % a year at the time when the promotion-related assets were transferred on 31 December 1998.
TILLÆG OG NEDSLAG PÅ GRUND AF TRANSAKTIONERNES SÆRLIGE ART
PREMIUMS AND DISCOUNTS ON ACCOUNT OF THE PARTICULARITIES OF THE TRANSACTIONS
BdB anfører, at den sats på 4,2 %, som Kommissionen som følge af WfA-formuens manglende likviditet trak fra minimumsgodtgørelsen på 12 % i WestLB-beslutningen, er blevet bekræftet af Retten i Første Instans.
The BdB notes that the Commission's deduction in its decision on WestLB of 4,2 % from the minimum remuneration of 12 % to take account of the lack of liquidity of the Wfa assets was upheld by the Court of First Instance.
I de foreliggende tilfælde er der således ingen grund til at afvige fra denne metode; også her er et likviditetsnedslag berettiget.
It therefore sees no reason to depart from this method in the present case, with the result that a deduction for liquidity should also be made here.
Størrelsen af fradraget som følge af den manglende likviditet fastlægges efter WestLB-metoden ud fra nettorefinansieringsomkostningerne (bruttorefinansieringsomkostningerne minus den pågældende virksomhedsskat).
The amount of the discount for lack of liquidity would be calculated, using the WestLB method, on the basis of net refinancing costs (gross refinancing costs minus the applicable corporation tax).
Likviditetsfradraget beregnes for Helaba på grundlag af en bruttorefinansieringssats på 6,57 % p.a. (svarende til den langfristede risikofri basisrentesats på tilførselstidspunktet 1998), som den til enhver tid gældende samlede skatteprocent skal anvendes på for at nå frem til nettorefinansieringssatsen.
The liquidity deduction would be calculated for Helaba on the basis of a gross refinancing rate of 6,57 % a year (corresponding to the long-term risk-free base rate at the time of the transfer in 1998), to which the overall tax rate should be applied to obtain the net refinancing rate.
Efter BdB’s opfattelse var der ved overdragelsen tre faktorer, der medvirkede til at forhøje risikoen i forhold til en »normal investering af indskudskapital«: den til dels usædvanligt store formueoverdragelse, undladelsen af at udstede nye selskabsandele og dermed renonceringen på yderligere stemmerettigheder samt investeringens ikke fungible karakter, dvs. den manglende mulighed for til enhver tid igen at trække den investerede kapital ud af virksomheden.
In the BdB's view, three aspects of the transfer increase its risk compared with a ‘normal share capital investment’: the in part exceptionally high volume of assets transferred, the failure to issue new shares in the company and the related forgoing of additional voting rights, and the lack of fungibility of the investment, i.e. the impossibility of withdrawing the invested capital from the company again at any time.
BdB anser derfor i overensstemmelse med WestLB-metoden et tillæg på mindst 1,5 % p.a. for berettiget.
The BdB considers a premium of at least 1,5 % a year justified here in line with the WestLB methodology.
KAPITALGRUNDLAG OG GODTGØRELSESELEMENTER
CAPITAL BASE AND ELEMENTS OF REMUNERATION
BdB påpeger for det første, at der ved beregningen af en passende godtgørelse i Helaba-sagen skal tages udgangspunkt i det samlede beløb, der blev anerkendt som kernekapital som grundlag for konkurrencepræget virksomhed, og ikke kun i den faktisk anvendte eller disponible del.
The BdB stresses firstly that, in calculating the appropriate remuneration in the case of Helaba, the total amount which was recognised as core capital for underpinning competitive business should be taken as the basis and not solely the actually used or usable part.
Dette begrundes med, at en markedsøkonomisk investor ikke ville acceptere, at godtgørelsen begrænsedes til den faktisk anvendte del.
It backs up this argument by stating that a market-economy investor would never agree to limit his remuneration to the portion of funds actually used.