natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ved udgangen af 2000 havde Hynix en gæld på over 9,46 mia. USD, dvs. over dobbelt så meget som selskabets nettoværdi og over fire gange så meget som selskabets børsværdi.
It had over USD 9,46 billion in liabilities at the end of 2000, which was over twice its net worth and over four times the market capitalisation of the company.
Selskabet led tab i 2000, et år, hvor andre store DRAM-producenter havde overskud, og som generelt anses for et meget godt år for DRAM-industrien.
It suffered a loss in 2000, a year in which other large DRAM producers registered profits and which was generally considered to have been a very good year in the DRAM industry.
Størstedelen af Hynix' gæld forfaldt i 2001, og selskabet havde store likviditetsproblemer.
The majority of Hynix liabilities were coming due in 2001 and the company was facing intense liquidity problems.
Mange uafhængige analytikere og børsmæglerselskaber mente dengang, at selskabet ikke ville være i stand til at tilvejebringe tilstrækkelig likviditet fra den interne pengestrøm eller salg af aktiver til at betale de fordringer, der forfaldt.
Many independent analysts and brokerage houses were saying at that time that the company would not be able to generate sufficient cash flow or asset disposals to pay off its maturing liabilities.
Under sådanne omstændigheder ville banker, der forsøger at maksimere deres profit, og som arbejder under normale handelsvilkår, ikke deltage frivilligt i lån, der er forbundet med så stor en risiko for misligholdelse [15].
Under such circumstances, profit maximising banks operating under normal commercial conditions would not voluntarily participate in loans with such enormous risk of default [15].
For det andet er der tilstrækkelige beviser for, at der var andre af deltagerne i det syndikerede lån, der blev presset til at deltage i den generelle omstrukturering af Hynix' gæld.
Second, there is ample evidence on the record that other participants in the syndicated loan were pressured to participate in the overall restructuring of Hynix's debt.
For eksempel foreligger der beviser for, at en af de deltagende banker, Kookmin Bank, blev pålagt at yde lån direkte til »troubled corporate borrowers« (erhvervslåntagere i økonomiske vanskeligheder).
For example, the record contains evidence that one of the participants, Kookmin Bank, was required to lend directly to ‘troubled corporate borrowers’.
Nærmere bestemt har Kookmin Bank udtalt følgende i en erklæring til USA's Securities and Exchange Commission (i det følgende benævnt »SEC«):
Specifically, in a statement to the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States, Kookmin stated:
»Den sydkoreanske stat har fremmet og vil som led i sin politik muligvis også fremover fremme långivning til visse former for låntagere.
‘The Korean government has promoted, and, as a matter of policy, may continue to promote lending to certain types of borrowers.
Den har i den forbindelse generelt anmodet banker om at deltage i saneringsprogrammer for »troubled borrowers« (låntagere i økonomiske vanskeligheder) (som f.eks. Hynix), udpeget sektorer, den ønsker at fremme, og stillet lavt forrentede lån til rådighed for banker og finansielle institutioner, der yder lån til låntagere i disse sektorer.
It generally has done this by requesting banks to participate in remedial programs for troubled borrowers (such as Hynix) and by identifying sectors of the economy it wishes to promote and making low interest loans available to banks and financial institutions who lend to borrowers in these sectors. The government has in this manner promoted low-income mortgage lending and lending to technology companies.
Staten har således fremmet ydelsen af realkreditlån til lavindkomstgrupper og udlån til teknologivirksomheder.
We expect that all loans made pursuant to government policies will be reviewed in accordance with our credit review policies.
Kookmin Bank forventer, at alle lån, der er blevet ydet som led i statens politik, vil blive gennemgået i overensstemmelse med bankens ordninger for kreditvurdering.
However, government policies may influence us to lend to certain sectors or in a manner in which we otherwise would not in the absence of government policy.’
Statens politik kan dog foranledige banken til at yde lån til visse sektorer eller på en måde, som banken ellers ikke ville yde lån uden statens politik.« [16]Med »troubled borrowers« mener Kookmin Bank helt klart Hynix, eftersom Hynix i bankens årsberetning for 2001 nævnes som den allerstørste låntager i økonomiske vanskeligheder [17].
[16].It is clear that Kookmin refers to Hynix in mentioning ‘troubled borrowers’, because the bank's 2001 annual report lists Hynix as the single largest financially troubled borrower [17].
Desuden var Kookmin Bank som statsfinansieret selskab undergivet den sydkoreanske revisions- og kontrolmyndigheds revision og kontrol og dermed udsat for et vist pres til at følge den sydkoreanske stats politik.
Further, Kookmin, as a GOK-invested enterprise, was subject to audit and inspection by the GOK Board of Audit and Inspection and as such was under pressure to comply with GOK policy.
Andre af deltagerne i det syndikerede lån var også underlagt et vist pres fra den sydkoreanske stat til at støtte Hynix.
Other participants in the syndicated loan were also under pressure from the GOK to assist Hynix.
Hvad det angår, indeholder betragtning 55 til den endelige forordning udførlige oplysninger om, i hvilket omfang den sydkoreanske stat lagde pres på Korea First Bank (i det følgende benævnt »KFB«) for at få den til at yde løbende finansiering til Hynix.
In this respect, recital 55 of the definitive Regulation provides extensive information regarding the extent to which the GOK put pressure on Korea First Bank (KFB) to provide ongoing financing to Hynix.
Den sydkoreanske stat traf på et møde på økonomiministerplan i november 2000 foranstaltninger til at lette Hynix' likviditetsproblemer og fritog KFB, KEB og KDB for de retlige lånegrænser.
In a high-level economic ministerial meeting in November 2000 the GOK took steps to ‘alleviate Hynix's cash crunch’ and waived statutory credit limits for KFB, KEB and KDB.
Panelet gennemgik ikke beviserne angående KFB, fordi Kommissionen anså dens deltagelse for ubetydelig.
The Panel did not examine the evidence in relation to KFB, because the Commission concluded its involvement to be negligible.
Da panelet nåede frem til, at den samme fremgangsmåde, som den sydkoreanske stat havde anvendt i forbindelse med KEB, svarede til et påbud, og at den sydkoreanske stat ejer 49 % af KFB, er det imidlertid rimeligt at konkludere, at den sydkoreanske stat var i stand til at påvirke og rent faktisk påvirkede KFB i dens beslutning om at deltage i det syndikerede lån.
However, given that the Panel found that the same GOK tactics employed in relation to KEB amounted to direction and that the GOK owns 49 % of KFB, it is reasonable to conclude that the GOK was in a position to and did exert influence over KFB in relation to its decision to participate in the syndicated loan.
Disse banker var nået frem til, at de allerede havde påtaget sig for store risici med hensyn til Hynix, og omstødte deres hidtidige beslutning om at hæve loftet for den eksportkreditordning, Hynix disponerede over.
These banks had concluded that they were already over-exposed to Hynix and reversed their earlier decision to increase the export credit ceiling available to Hynix.
Det fik en repræsentant for Financial Supervisory Service (i det følgende benævnt »FSS«) til at betegne deres beslutning som »unthinkable« (uhørt) [18].
In response, an FSS official criticised their move as ‘unthinkable’ [18].
Den sydkoreanske stat ejede 18,3 % af Shinhan Bank og var bankens hovedaktionær, så den var i stand til at øve stor indflydelse på banken.
The GOK held 18,3 % of Shinhan and was its largest shareholder, thus able to exert considerable influence over the bank.
Det er klart, at Shinhan Bank ikke handlede ud fra forretningsmæssige overvejelser, eftersom banken forøgede sine hensættelser til tab på lån til Hynix, samtidig med at den fortsatte med at støtte selskabet, og eftersom den undlod at foretage den normale kreditrisikovurdering.
It is clear that Shinhan was not acting commercially given that it increased its loan loss reserves for Hynix even as it continued to assist the company and that it offered no legitimate credit risk analysis for assisting it.
KorAM Bank modtog nye trusler fra den sydkoreanske stat, da banken nægtede at købe konvertible Hynix-obligationer, fordi den havde besluttet, at det ikke var finansielt forsvarligt.
KorAM Bank again faced GOK threats when the bank refused to purchase Hynix CBs, because it decided that doing so was not financially sound.
Bankens beslutning om ikke at købe obligationerne fik en repræsentant for FSS til at irettesætte KorAm i usædvanligt skarpe vendinger for en stat, der angiveligt ikke er involveret i kreditbeslutninger.
In response to the bank's decision not to purchase the bonds, an FSS official rebuked KorAm, using language uncharacteristic of a government apparently uninvolved in credit decisions.
Som følge af disse trusler gav KorAm Bank efter og ændrede sin negative beslutning [21], forøgede sine hensættelser til tab på lån til Hynix og undlod at foretage den kreditvurdering, der normalt foretages, inden der ydes denne form for finansiel støtte.
As a result of these threats, KorAm Bank capitulated and reversed its decision [21], while at the same time increasing its loan loss reserves for Hynix and offering no legitimate credit analysis for providing such financial assistance.
De øvrige banker, der deltog i det syndikerede lån, dvs. Chohung Bank, Woori Bank, NACF, Seoul Bank, Kwangju Bank, Peace Bank, Kyongnam Bank og Industrial Bank of Korea, er alle sammen statsejede, og deres kreditbeslutninger er dermed påvirket af den sydkoreanske stats politik.
Of the remaining banks which participated in the syndicated loan, Chohung Bank, Woori Bank, the NACF, Seoul Bank, Kwangju Bank, Peace Bank, Kyongnam Bank and the Industrial Bank of Korea are all GOK-owned and thus their credit decisions are tainted by GOK policy.
Housing and Commercial Bank, hvor den sydkoreanske stat har en ejerandel på 20 %, erkendte i en edsvoren erklæring til USA's SEC at have modtaget pålæg fra staten i sine kreditbeslutninger [22].
The Housing and Commercial Bank, of which the GOK has a 20 % share, admitted government direction in its credit decisions in a sworn statement to the US SEC [22].
Denne grad af kontrol over Pusan Bank fra den sydkoreanske stats side indebærer, at bankens beslutning om at deltage i det syndikerede lån ikke kan anses for et sikkert sammenligningsgrundlag på markedet.(21) For det tredje ville det af de årsager, der er anført i betragtning 130-133 til den endelige forordning, tydeligvis ikke være passende at anvende Citibank Seoul som sammenligningsgrundlag for at afgøre, om det var forretningsmæssigt fornuftigt at deltage i det syndikerede lån.
Third, it would clearly not be appropriate to use Citibank Seoul as a benchmark to determine the commercial reasonableness of participating in the syndicated loan, for the reasons set forth in recitals 130 to 133 of the definitive Regulation.
For det første samarbejdede Citibank Seoul ikke i forbindelse med undersøgelsen, så Kommissionen var nødt til at støtte sig til de foreliggende faktiske oplysninger om Citibank Seouls deltagelse.
First, Citibank Seoul failed to cooperate in this investigation, thus forcing the Commission to rely on facts available regarding the participation of Citibank Seoul.
For det andet fremgår det af de foreliggende beviser, som nævnes i betragtning 133 til den endelige forordning, at der eksisterede et usædvanligt nært forhold mellem den sydkoreanske stat og Citibank, så der hersker tvivl om Citibanks upartiskhed ved ydelsen af lån til Hynix.
Second, the evidence on the record discussed in recital 133 of the definitive Regulation reflects an unusually close relationship between the GOK and Citibank that calls into question the impartiality of Citibank in lending to Hynix.
For det tredje arbejdede Citibank som finansiel rådgiver for Hynix ved omstruktureringen, så banken befandt sig i en interessekonflikt i forhold til at deltage i ydelsen af nye lån til Hynix [26].
Third, Citibank itself was a financial advisor to Hynix regarding its restructuring and thus had an inherent conflict with respect to participation in new lending to Hynix [26].
Den havde ikke ydet finansiering til Hynix, før den blev Hynix' finansielle rådgiver.
It had not given financing to Hynix prior to becoming Hynix's financial advisor.
For det fjerde erkendte panelet selv, at Citibank ikke kan anvendes som grundlag for at afgøre, om nogen af de lån, der blev ydet til Hynix, blev ydet ud fra forretningsmæssige hensyn [27].
Fourth, the Panel itself recognised that Citibank cannot serve as a basis for determining whether any of the loans to Hynix were made on the basis of commercial considerations [27].
Endelig er det vigtigt at bemærke, at Hynix misligholdt betalingen af renter på det syndikerede lån næsten umiddelbart efter, at lånet var blevet ydet.
Finally, it is important to note that Hynix defaulted on its interest payments on the syndicated loan almost as soon as the loan was given.
Som der fremgår af betragtning 87 til den endelige forordning, havde Hynix desuden ikke betalt afdrag på det syndikerede lån, der blev ydet i januar 2001.
As noted in recital 87 of the definitive Regulation, Hynix had not been servicing the syndicated loan that it received in January 2001.
På baggrund af ovenstående kan det konkluderes, at ingen af de andre syv banker, der deltog i det syndikerede lån, kan tjene som passende sammenligningsgrundlag for at afgøre, om det var forretningsmæssigt fornuftigt at yde lånet, eller til at beregne den fordel, Hynix opnåede som følge af KEB's og KDB's deltagelse i lånet.
Based on the foregoing, it may be concluded that none of the other seven participants in the syndicated loan can serve as an appropriate benchmark for measuring the commercial reasonableness or the amount of benefit to Hynix from the portions of the loan provided by KEB and KDB.
På denne baggrund kan det konkluderes at KEB's og KDB's deltagelse i det syndikerede lån fortsat kan betragtes som udligningsberettigede subsidier, som indebærer en fordel for Hynix.
On this basis, the participation of KEB and KDB in the syndicated loan may still be considered to be a countervailable subsidy that provides a benefit to Hynix.
Som det fremgår af betragtning 37 til den endelige forordning, blev der for ikke at foretage dobbelt beregning ikke udlignet noget subsidiebeløb i forbindelse med det syndikerede lån, da det syndikerede lån senere blev forlænget som led i foranstaltningerne fra oktober 2001.
However, as set out in recital 37 of the definitive Regulation, no subsidy amount has been countervailed under the syndicated loan in order to avoid double-counting, as the syndicated loan amount was subsequently rolled-over into the October 2001 measures.
Det er derfor ikke nødvendigt at ændre nogen af konklusionerne vedrørende denne foranstaltning.
Thus, no amendment of the findings is necessary with regard to this measure.
Beregning af fordelen
Calculation of the amount of benefit
Panelet konstaterede i punkt 7.215 i sin rapport, at beregningen af den fordel, som hvert af de finansielle bidrag indebar, ikke var forenelig med artikel 1, stk. 1, litra b), og artikel 14 i SCM-aftalen.
The Panel found, at para. 7.215 of its report, that the calculation of the amount of the benefit conferred by each of the financial contributions was inconsistent with Articles 1.1(b) and 14 of the SCM Agreement.
Den sydkoreanske stat fremførte ingen argumenter, der som sådan anfægtede bestemmelserne i grundforordningen eller retningslinjerne [28] vedrørende beregning af fordelen.
The GOK did not raise any claims challenging ‘as such’ provisions of the basic Regulation or the Guidelines [28] relating to the calculation of the amount of the benefit.
Panelet tog i sin rapport således kun stilling til, hvordan Fællesskabet havde anvendt disse bestemmelser og beregnet fordelen i forbindelse med de berørte foranstaltninger i den foreliggende sag (den endelige forordning).
Thus, the Panel report only addressed how the EC applied these provisions and calculated the amount of the benefit with respect to the measures at issue in this proceeding (the definitive Regulation).
Panelet var navnlig af den opfattelse, at Fællesskabet har handlet på en måde, der er uforenelig med artikel 1, stk. 1, litra b), og artikel 14 i SCM-aftalen, ved uanset vilkårene og betingelserne at gå ud fra, at den fordel, der var forbundet med hvert af de finansielle bidrag, som generelt havde form af lån, garantier eller egenkapital, skulle beregnes, som om der var tale om tilskud.
In particular, the Panel considered that the EC acted inconsistently with Article 1.1(b) and 14 of the SCM Agreement by taking as a starting point that the amount of the benefit conferred by each of the financial contributions, which were generally in the form of loans, guarantees or equity, was to be calculated as if those financial contributions had been grants, irrespective of their terms and conditions.
Panelet gjorde gældende, at der ved beregning af fordelen bør tages udgangspunkt i den fordel, modtageren opnår, og ikke i omkostningerne for den, der yder bidraget.
The Panel reasoned that the calculation of the amount of the benefit should be based on the benefit to the recipient, not the cost to the provider.
Panelet anførte videre, at den pågældende ydelse af midler til Hynix i form af lån, garantier og egenkapital kan have været af mindre fordel for Hynix, end hvis midlerne var blevet ydet i form af tilskud.
It further reasoned that the provision in this case of funds to Hynix in the form of loans, guarantees and equity may have been of less benefit to Hynix than if the funds had been provided in the form of grants.
Panelet gjorde navnlig gældende, at midlerne ville være blevet opført som gæld i Hynix' balance eller ville have udvandet ejerandelene tilhørende de eksisterende aktionærer i Hynix [29].
In particular, the Panel reasoned that the funds would appear as debt in Hynix's balance sheet or would have given rise to the dilution of the ownership claims of existing shareholders in Hynix [29].
Ifølge panelet burde Fællesskabet i henhold til WTO-retten i denne sag allerførst have søgt et alternativt sammenligningsgrundlag som basis for beregning af fordelen.
The Panel considered that, as a matter of WTO law, the correct starting point for the EC in this case must be the search for an alternative benchmark as a base for the calculation of the amount of benefit.
Panelet henviste i punkt 7.213 i sin rapport bl.a. til »a comparable commercial loan which the firm could actually obtain on the market« (et tilsvarende lån på markedsvilkår) (artikel 14, litra b), i SCM-aftalen) og »a comparable commercial loan absent the government guarantee« (et tilsvarende lån uden en statslig garanti) (artikel 14, litra a), i SCM-aftalen).
The Panel particularly referred, at para. 7.213 of its report, to ‘a comparable commercial loan which the firm could actually obtain on the market’ (Article 14(b) SCM Agreement) and ‘a comparable commercial loan absent the government guarantee’ (Article 14(a) SCM Agreement).
Panelet anførte også som eksempel de såkaldte »junkbonds« (højtforrentede obligationer med stor risiko), også kaldet affaldsobligationer, og »vulturefunds« (investeringsfonde, der investerer i værdipapirer i kriseramte selskaber for at opnå store gevinster) [30].
The Panel also referred, by way of example, to so-called ‘junk bonds’ or ‘vulture funds’ [30].
Panelet bemærkede, at der kan være omstændigheder, hvor der ikke er noget pålideligt sammenligningsgrundlag, og at undersøgelsesmyndigheden havde og har meget stor skønsmargen til at fastlægge den passende metode til at beregne den fordel, Hynix opnåede [31].
The Panel observed that there may be circumstances in which there is an absence of any comparable benchmark, and that the investigating authority was and is entitled to considerable leeway in adopting a reasonable approach to calculating the amount of the benefit to Hynix [31].
I lyset af panelets konklusioner har Kommissionen for hvert af de relevante finansielle bidrag i forbindelse med den foreliggende foranstaltning på ny gennemgået alle de relevante foreliggende faktiske oplysninger og beviser under hensyn til alle de bemærkninger, der er blevet fremsat af de berørte parter, navnlig for så vidt angår eventuelle alternative sammenligningsgrundlag, herunder de såkaldte junkbonds og vulturefunds, og den har for hvert af de relevante finansielle bidrag på ny beregnet den fordel, Hynix opnåede.
In the light of the Panel's findings, for each of the relevant financial contributions in the measure at issue, the Commission has re-examined all of the relevant facts and evidence on the record, taking into account all of the submissions of interested parties, specifically with respect to possible alternative benchmarks, including ‘junk bonds’ and ‘vulture funds’, and, for each relevant financial contribution, redetermined the amount of the benefit to Hynix.
Kommissionen har ikke på ny gennemgået sine konklusioner eller foretaget nogen nye beregninger med hensyn til de indholds- og proceduremæssige spørgsmål, der bekræftes i panelrapporten, eller som efter panelets opfattelse er uforenelige med SCM-aftalen, herunder, men ikke kun: Hynix' finansielle situation og værdi, betingelserne på DRAM-markedet, betingelserne på de finansielle markeder og anvendelsen af de foreliggende faktiske oplysninger.
The Commission has not re-examined or made any redeterminations with respect to any substantive or procedural matters confirmed by the Panel report or not found by the Panel to be inconsistent with the SCM Agreement, including, but not limited to: Hynix's financial situation or worth, conditions in the DRAM market, conditions in the financial markets and the use of facts available.
Kommissionen har begrænset sig til det konkrete spørgsmål, der er genstand for panelets konklusioner, dvs. om der findes alternative sammenligningsgrundlag.
The Commission has limited itself to the specific issue that is the subject of the Panel's findings: the availability of alternative benchmarks.
Kommissionen anvendte, da den på ny så på dette spørgsmål, »modtagerens fordel« og ikke »statens omkostninger« som kriterium til at beregne subsidierne, således som det er fastsat i grundforordningens artikel 6, hvilket stemmer overens med panelets argumentation, konklusionerne i den endelige forordning og Kommissionens faste praksis [32].
In making this redetermination, the Commission has based its calculation of subsidy on a ‘benefit to the recipient’ and not on a ‘cost to the government’ standard, as is required by Article 6 of the basic Regulation, consistent with the Panel's reasoning, with the determinations in the definitive Regulation and with the Commission's established practice [32].
Kommissionen bemærker i denne henseende, at et af de centrale kendetegn ved SCM-aftalen (artikel 14) efter Uruguay-runden var bekræftelsen af, at »modtagerens fordel« i reglen ville have forrang for »statens omkostninger« som kriterium.
In this regard, the Commission notes that one of the key features of the SCM Agreement (Article 14) following the Uruguay Round was the confirmation that the ‘benefit to the recipient’ standard would normally prevail over the ‘cost to the government’ standard.
Kommissionen bemærker videre, at førstnævnte kriterium generelt fører til et højere subsidiebeløb end sidstnævnte kriterium, fordi det kræver en sammenligning med finansiering, der ydes ud fra forretningsmæssige hensyn, og ikke med finansiering fra statens side.
The Commission further notes that the former will generally lead to a higher amount of subsidy than the latter, because it requires a comparison with commercial, rather than governmental, funding.