natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kommissionen har bemærket, at disse to led i den nukleare kæde får stadig større betydning for arbejdstagernes og befolkningens sikkerhed.
In fact, the Commission notes that these two aspects of the nuclear chain are becoming increasingly important and necessary to ensure the safety of workers and of the population.
Euratom-traktaten tager behørigt hensyn til denne målsætning, samtidig med at den sigter mod at skabe »betingelserne for udviklingen af en stærk kerneenergiindustri, der vil kunne stille store mængder energi til rådighed …«.
In this particular regard, the Euratom Treaty, takes due care of this objective while at the same time, aiming at creating the ‘conditions necessary for the development of a powerful nuclear industry which will provide extensive energy sources…’.
Disse målsætninger gentages i Euratom-traktatens artikel 1, hvori det hedder, at »Fællesskabet har til opgave gennem skabelsen af de nødvendige betingelser for den hurtige dannelse og udvikling af en kerneenergiindustri at bidrage til højnelse af levestandarden i medlemsstaterne«.
These objectives are further reiterated in Article 1 of the Euratom Treaty, which establishes that ‘it shall be the task of the Community to contribute to the raising of the standard of living in the Member States (…) by creating the conditions necessary for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear industries’.
Som det fremgår af den grønbog, Kommissionen offentliggjorde for nylig — »Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply« (COM (2002) 321 final of 22 June 2002) (foreligger ikke på dansk) — er denne målsætning også relevant i dag.
The relevance of this objective today has been underlined in the recent Green Paper of the Commission ‘Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply’ (COM (2002) 321 final of 22 June 2002).
I Euratom-traktatens artikel 2, litra b), hedder det endvidere, at til opfyldelse af sin opgave skal Fællesskabet indføre ensartede sikkerhedsnormer til beskyttelse af befolkningens og arbejdstagernes sundhed og overvåge deres anvendelse.
Furthermore, Article 2(b) of the Euratom Treaty provides that the Community, in order to perform its task, shall establish uniform safety standards to protect the health of workers and of the general public and ensure that they are applied.
I Euratom-traktatens artikel 2, litra e), hedder det også, at Fællesskabet ved passende kontrol skal garantere, at nukleart materiale ikke anvendes til andre formål end dem, det er bestemt til.
Article 2(e) of the Euratom Treaty also provides that the Community shall make certain, by appropriate supervision, that nuclear materials are not diverted to purposes other than those for which they are intended.
Ved Euratom-traktaten oprettes derfor Det Europæiske Atomenergifællesskab, som tillægges de instrumenter og det ansvar, der er skal til for at realisere de pågældende målsætninger.
On this basis, the Euratom Treaty establishes the Euratom Community, foreseeing the necessary instruments and attribution of responsibilities to achieve these objectives.
Som bekræftet af Domstolen hører nuklear sikkerhed således ind under Fællesskabets kompetencer og skal knyttes til beskyttelse mod farer fra ioniserende stråling, som omhandlet i artikel 30 i Euratom-traktatens kapitel 3 om sundhedsbeskyttelse [34].
In this regard, and as confirmed by the Court of Justice, nuclear safety is a Community competence which must be linked to the protection against the dangers arising from ionising radiations, laid down in Article 30, Chapter 3 of the Euratom Treaty, relating to Health and Supply [34].
Kommissionen skal sikre, at traktatens bestemmelser finder anvendelse, og kan derfor træffe beslutninger, som angivet i traktaten, eller afgive udtalelser, hvis den anser det for nødvendigt.
The Commission, must ensure that the provisions of this Treaty are applied and can therefore adopt decisions in the manner provided for in this Treaty or deliver opinions if it considers it necessary.
Kommissionen bemærker, at ifølge bilag fra de britiske myndigheder tjener de foranstaltninger, der er til revision, bl.a. til at bevare kernekraftværkers sikkerhed, sikre forsvarlig forvaltning af de nukleare forpligtelser, forbedre forsyningssikkerheden ved at bevare forskellige brændselskilder i Storbritannien og undgå carbondioxidudslip.
The Commission notes that the evidence provided by the UK authorities shows that the effect of the measures under review are, amongst others, to preserve the safety of nuclear power stations, to ensure the safe management of the nuclear liabilities, to enhance security of supply by maintaining diversity of fuel sources in Great Britain as well as to avoid carbon dioxide emissions.
I afsnit III og IV gengives de argumenter, som de britiske myndigheder og tredjeparter har fremsat i den forbindelse.
Sections III and IV above detail the arguments brought forward by the UK authorities and by third parties in this respect.
Kommissionen har i forbindelse med at skulle vurdere disse informationer og navnlig afgøre, om foranstaltningerne er nødvendige eller falder ind under Euratom-traktatens målsætninger, bemærket, at statens støtte og foranstaltninger sigter mod de risici, der er forbundet med BE’s nuværende situation og dens eventuelle konsekvenser for de pågældende målsætninger i traktaten.
When assessing this information and notably in determining as to whether these measures are necessary or fall within the objectives of the Euratom Treaty, the Commission notes that the state aids and measures are addressing the risks linked to the current situation of British Energy and its eventual impact on the referred objectives of the Treaty.
De britiske myndigheder har faktisk besluttet at intervenere til fordel for BE bl.a. med det formål at fastholde betingelserne for en sikker nuklearindustri samtidig med, at kernekraftværkerne bliver ved med at fungere som en betydelig energikilde.
In fact, the UK authorities have decided to intervene in support of British Energy, inter alia, with a view of ensuring the continuity of the conditions for a safe and secure nuclear industry, whereas at the same time maintaining in functioning the nuclear plants as an extensive energy resource.
Interventionen har fundet sted på et tidspunkt, hvor Storbritanniens store kraftværksoperatør var truet af konkurs.
This intervention has taken place in a context of risk of bankruptcy of the major UK nuclear operator.
Videreførelsen af en bestemt økonomisk aktør er ikke direkte knyttet til videreførelsen af aktørens nukleare aktiviteter.
The continuity of a specific economic operator is not directly linked to the continuity of its nuclear activities.
Men i forbindelse med insolvens er det nødvendigt at behandle spørgsmålet om sikkerhed og/eller forsyningssikkerhed.
However in a case of insolvency, safety and security and/or security of supply issues have to be dealt with.
Kommissionen kan derfor se, at de britiske myndigheder har behandlet de givne risici korrekt og ansvarligt i overensstemmelse med Euratom-traktatens målsætninger.
The Commission therefore understands that the UK authorities have addressed these risks in a correct and responsible manner in a way which is compatible with the objectives of the Euratom Treaty.
De tre kompensationsforanstaltninger, som beskrives i det følgende, medvirker i endnu højere grad til at realisere Euratom-traktatens målsætninger ved at sikre, at offentlig intervention kun anvendes til at finansiere nukleare forpligtelser.
The three compensatory measures that will be described below even further reinforce the fulfilment of the Euratom Treaty objectives by ensuring that the public intervention will not be used for other purposes that than payment of nuclear liabilities.
Endelig vil en ordning med lofter og tærskler for de tre former for finansiering af forpligtelser vedrørende tidligere aktiviteter sikre, at der er tilstrækkelige midler til at nå målene, samtidig med at interventionen begrænses til et minimum.
Finally, a system of cap and threshold for the three types of historic liabilities payment will ensure that enough funds are available for the fulfilment of these goals, while restricting the intervention to the minimum necessary for their achievement.
Kommissionen konkluderer, at de foranstaltninger, som de britiske myndigheder har planlagt, er egnet til at realisere den givne kombination af målsætninger, som har fuld dækning i Euratom-traktaten.
The Commission concludes that the measures foreseen by the UK authorities are appropriate to address the combination of objectives pursued and which are fully endorsed by the Euratom Treaty.
Støtte efter artikel 87, stk. 1, i EF-traktaten
Aid in the sense of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty
I EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, defineres statsstøtte som støtte, der ydes af en medlemsstat eller ved hjælp af statsmidler under enhver tænkelig form, og som fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene ved at begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner og påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
According to Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, State aid is defined as aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods and affects trade between Member States.
Statens intervention i BE’s omstruktureringsplan er helt klart selektiv, for den kommer kun én virksomhed til gode.
It is obvious that the State’s intervention in BE’s restructuring plan is selective, since it favours only one undertaking.
Det Forenede Kongerige og andre medlemsstater handler med elektricitet via samkøringslinjer til Frankrig og Irland.
Electricity is traded between the UK and other Member States via interconnectors to France and Ireland.
Medlemsstaterne har længe handlet med elektricitet, navnlig siden Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 96/92/EF af 19. december 1996 om fælles regler for det indre marked for elektricitet [35] trådte i kraft.
Electricity has been traded between Member States for a long time and in particular since the entry into force of Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity [35].
I henhold til Det Forenede Kongeriges tal i meddelelsen har BE den andenstørste elproduktionskapacitet i England og Wales og den tredjestørste i Skotland.
According to figures sent by the UK in the notification, BE is the second largest electricity producer in capacity in England and Wales, and the third in Scotland.
Derfor kan statens intervention i omstruktureringsplanen let få konsekvenser for medlemsstaternes samhandel.
The State’s intervention in the restructuring plan may therefore clearly affect trade between Member States.
Tre af de syv omstruktureringsforanstaltninger: foranstaltning D (Omstruktureringspakke for de vigtigste kreditorer), foranstaltning E (Ny handelsstrategi) og foranstaltning F (Afhændelse af aktiver) er ikke baseret på offentlige ressourcer.
Among the seven restructuring measures, three: Measure D (Significant creditors restructuring package), Measure E (the new trading strategy) and Measure F (Assets disposal) do not derive from public resources.
De kan derfor ikke betegnes som statsstøtte i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
They can therefore not be qualified as State aid under Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Foranstaltning A er derimod baseret på offentlige ressourcer, for den består af en række betalinger eller løfter om betalinger fra den britiske regering.
Measure A, in contrast, derives from public resources since it consists of a number of payments or undertakings to make payments by the UK Government.
Da betalingerne fra den britiske regering vil dække en del af de nukleare forpligtelser, som BE normalt skulle have indfriet, giver foranstaltning A også BE en fordel.
Since the payments from the UK Government will take over part of the Nuclear Liabilities that BE should normally have borne, Measure A also provides an advantage to BE.
Af ovennævnte årsager konkluderer Kommissionen, at foranstaltning A er statsstøtte som defineret i EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
Taking into account all the above, the Commission concludes that Measure A is State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Det bestrides ikke af Det Forenede Kongerige.
This is not disputed by the United Kingdom.
Foranstaltning B og C er (henholdsvis helt og delvist) baseret på ressourcer fra BNFL, som er en offentlig virksomhed.
Measures B and C involve resources from BNFL (totally for Measure B and partly for Measure C), which is a publicly owned undertaking.
Ressourcer, som tilhører en offentlig virksomhed, er statsmidler.
Resources belonging to a publicly owned undertaking are State resources.
Foranstaltning B og C er derfor kun statsstøtte som defineret i EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, hvis de giver BE en konkurrencefordel, der skal tilregnes staten.
In view of the above, Measures B and C are State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty if and only if they provide a competitive advantage to BE and the granting of this advantage is imputable to the State.
Spørgsmålet blev rejst i beslutningen om at indlede proceduren og analyseres derfor nærmere i afsnit VI.2.b).
Since this question was raised in the decision to initiate procedings, it will be analysed in depth in section VI(2)(b) below.
Foranstaltning G omfatter også ressourcer fra lokale myndigheder.
Measure G also involves resources from local authorities.
Ressourcer fra sådanne myndigheder svarer til statsmidler.
Resources from such authorities constitute State resources.
Foranstaltning G er derfor kun statsstøtte som defineret i EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, hvis den giver BE en konkurrencefordel, der skal tilregnes staten.
Measure G is therefore State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty if and only if it provides a competitive advantage to BE and the granting of this advantage is imputable to the State.
Spørgsmålet blev rejst i beslutningen om at indlede proceduren og analyseres derfor nærmere i afsnit VI.2.a).
Since this question too was raised in the decision to initiate proceedings, it will be analysed in depth in section VI(2)(a) below.
Vedrørende tilstedeværelsen af støtte under foranstaltning G
On the existence of aid in Measure G
De britiske myndigheder godtgjorde, at BE havde betalt lokale skatter under foranstaltning G med renter beregnet ved hjælp af den referencesats og kalkulationsrente, som Kommissionen har foreskrevet for Det Forenede Kongerige.
The UK authorities proved that local taxes addressed in Measure G were paid by BE with interest computed with the use of the reference and discount rate prescribed by the Commission for the United Kingdom.
Der er ingen særlige bestemmelser i den britiske lovgivning om, at der skal anvendes højere rentesatser i det tilfælde, lokale myndigheder udsætter lokal beskatning.
There is no specific provision in UK law that would require the use of any higher interest rate in the event that local taxes are deferred by local authorities.
Kommissionen mener derfor, at det er korrekt at lægge den anvendte sats til grundlag for en afgørelse om, hvorvidt skatteudsættelsen giver BE en konkurrencefordel.
The Commission therefore considers that the rate that was used is a proper benchmark for deciding whether the tax deferral provides a competitive advantage to BE.
Af ovennævnte årsager konkluderer Kommissionen, at foranstaltning G ikke er statsstøtte som defineret i EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
In view of the above, the Commission concludes that Measure G does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Vedrørende tilstedeværelsen af støtte under foranstaltning B og C
On the existence of aid in Measures B and C
I Kommissionens beslutning om at indlede proceduren hedder det, at på indeværende tidspunkt i vurderingen mener Kommissionen, at genforhandlingen af aftalerne mellem BNFL og BE kan betragtes som statsstøtte.
In its decision to initiate proceedings, the Commission stated that ‘at this stage of its assessment, the Commission thinks that the renegotiation of the contracts between BNFL and BE can be considered as being State aid’.
BNFL, som er en offentlig virksomhed, meddelte nemlig, at den ikke var villig til at ændre de kommercielle vilkår i sine løbende aftaler med BE, før BE havde meddelt, at der var indledt forhandlinger med den britiske regering om finansiel støtte.
This was based on the fact that BNFL, a publicly owned company, announced that it was willing to amend the commercial terms of its existing contracts with BE only once BE had announced that it had initiated talks with the UK Government with a view to obtain financial support.
Det forekom tvivlsomt, om disse aftaler blev genforhandlet på almindelige markedsvilkår.
It seemed doubtful that these contracts were renegotiated at arm’s length.
Kommissionen kom til de samme foreløbige konklusioner i forbindelse med foranstaltning C.
The Commission came to the same preliminary conclusions as regards Measure C.
Med udgangspunkt i de data, der er stillet til rådighed, siden proceduren blev indledt, har Kommissionen foretaget en mere tilbundsgående analyse for at fastlægge, hvorvidt foranstaltning B og C opfyldte kriterierne for statsstøtte, og navnlig om de gav BE en konkurrencefordel.
Using the data that was made available to it since the initiation of proceedings, the Commission has carried out a more in depth analysis as to whether Measures B and C met the criteria to be considered as State aid, and in particular whether they entailed a competitive advantage to BE.
Den nåede til følgende konklusioner:
It came to the following conclusions:
For så vidt angår foranstaltning B
As regards Measure B
Foranstaltning B er genforhandlingen af aftaler mellem BNFL, en offentlig virksomhed, og BE.
Measure B consists of the renegotiation of contracts between BNFL, a publicly owned company, and BE.
Kommissionen har undersøgt, om foranstaltning B giver BE en fordel, som private operatører ikke ville have givet denne kriseramte virksomhed under lignende omstændigheder.
The Commission has examined whether Measure B confers an advantage on BE that no private operator would have conceded to this ailing firm in similar circumstances.
Kommissionen undersøgte med andre ord, om BNFL handlede i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske kreditorprincip, da den godkendte foranstaltning B.
In other words, the Commission has considered whether BNFL acted in conformity with the market economy creditor principle when agreeing to Measure B.
I den forbindelse undersøgte Kommissionen navnlig, om genforhandlingen af BNFL’s aftaler med BE skete på almindelige markedsvilkår, og om BNFL’s indrømmelser var af kommerciel karakter.
For this purpose, the Commission has in particular examined whether the renegotiation of BNFL’s contracts with BE were done at arm’s length and whether the concessions made by BNFL were of a commercial nature.
Handlede BNFL i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske kreditorprincip?
Did BNFL act in conformity with the private creditor principle?
For det første skal Kommissionen overveje, om BNFL’s og BE’s nye ordning blev forhandlet på almindelige markedsvilkår.
The first question the Commission has to consider is whether the new arrangements between BNFL and BE were negotiated at arm’s length.
Det er vigtigt at huske på, at BNFL er BE’s største enkeltstående kreditor, og at BE er BNFL’s største kunde.
It has to be recalled that BNFL is BE’s largest single creditor and that BE is BNFL’s biggest customer.
Kommissionen har derfor undersøgt, om en privat operatør i en lignende situation ville have accepteret de vilkår, BNFL accepterede.
The Commission has therefore examined whether the conditions accepted by BNFL could have been accepted by a private operator put in a similar position.
I en situation, hvor en leverandør er konfronteret med problemer hos sin største kunde, går det ud på at kontrollere, om BNFL handlede som en ansvarlig privat kreditor i et forsøg på at få så stor dækning for sine tilgodehavender som muligt [36].
Within the context of a supplier faced with the difficulties of its major customer, this consists in checking whether BNFL acted as a diligent private creditor trying to maximise the chances of recovering its claims [36].
Kommissionen har gennemgået de relevante rapporter fra BNFL’s juridiske og økonomiske rådgivere og uddrag af referater fra BNFL’s bestyrelsesmøder, som BNFL forelagde.
The Commission has examined the relevant reports of BNFL’s legal and financial advisers and extracts of BNFL’s board meetings, which were submitted by BNFL.
Kommissionen konstaterer for det første, at BNFL allerede anmodede sine rådgivere om at overveje situationen i forhold til BE i begyndelsen af 2002, da BE første gang påberåbte sig nødklausulen i aftalerne med BNFL.
First, the Commission notes that BNFL already asked its advisers to consider its position vis-à-vis BE at the beginning of 2002, when BE first invoked the hardship clause of its agreements with BNFL.
Det var ikke muligt at konkludere endeligt, at betingelserne for anvendelse af nødklausulen var opfyldt, men bestyrelsen pålagde BNFL at overveje, hvordan BE's problemer kunne løses, dog på den udtrykkelige betingelse, at enhver aftale skulle være til kommerciel fordel for BNFL.
It was not possible to reach the definitive conclusion that the conditions of the hardship clause were indeed fulfilled, but its board instructed BNFL to consider the possible deals which would address BE’s difficulties, under the ex plicit condition that any deal must be commercially advantageous for BNFL.
De rapporter, som BNFL har forelagt, og som blev udarbejdet på det pågældende tidspunkt, giver et indtryk af den særlige situation, BNFL befandt sig i som BE’s kreditor og leverandør, og indeholder en analyse af konsekvenserne af BE’s insolvens for BNFL.
The reports submitted by BNFL, that were written at that time, illustrate the particular situation of BNFL as a creditor and supplier of BE and analyse the impact of BE’s insolvency on BNFL.
Det konkluderes i rapporterne, at i betragtning af BNFL’s store eksponering, ville en omstrukturering med henblik på at opnå solvens være i BNFL’s interesse, dog ikke for enhver pris.
They conclude that in view of the great exposure of BNFL, a solvent restructuring would be in BNFL’s best interests, but not at any cost.
Der defineres derfor et forslag til en indrømmelsespakke til BE og pakkens udvikling følges under forhandlingerne med BE.
They therefore define a proposed package of concessions to BE, and follow the evolution of this package during the negotiations with BE.
Som det tydeligt fremgår af rapporterne, holdt BNFL under drøftelserne fast ved sin oprindelige tanke om at bestræbe sig på beskytte sine interesser ved at undgå, at BE blev sat under administration, dog ikke for enhver pris og inden for rammerne af en ligebyrdig aftale.
It is clear from these reports that during these negotiations, BNFL always kept its initial idea which was to try and best preserve its interest by avoiding that BE be put under administration, but not at all cost, and within a balanced deal.
De britiske myndigheder har gjort gældende, at BNFL’s genforhandlede aftaler skal ses som en samlet pakke og i forhold til den situation, BNFL ville have befundet sig i, hvis BE var gået konkurs, frem for som enkeltdele.
The UK authorities have submitted that BNFL’s renegotiated agreements must be seen as a package, and compared with the position BNFL might have been in if BE had become insolvent, rather than picking out individual elements.
I de rapporter, som de britiske myndigheder og BNFL har fremlagt, konkluderes det, at de endelige vilkår er bedre for BNFL end enhver form for insolvens.
The reports submitted by the UK authorities and by BNFL conclude that the Final Term Sheets are more advantageous to BNFL than any insolvency scenario.