natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Godtgørelsen betales i henhold til aftalens bestemmelser for den del af de etablerede reserver, som faktisk udnyttes, dvs. kun for den »reserverede« kapital.
According to the terms of the agreement, the rate of remuneration is based on the notified use of the reserves formed pursuant to the transfer agreement, i.e. only on the capital actually earmarked.
I overensstemmelse hermed er der betalt følgende beløb:
Accordingly, the following amounts have been paid:
Tilsagt kapital i mio. DEM
Earmarked capital (DEM million)
rentesats
Interest rate
Betalt godtgørelse i mio. DEM
Remuneration paid (DEM million)
Ifølge overdragelsesaftalen kan delstaten Niedersachsen desuden hæve renter og afdrag, som tilgår aktiverne, såfremt aktivernes handelsværdi er større end 1,5 mia. DEM.
Under the transfer agreement, the Land of Lower Saxony also has the right to withdraw interest payments and amortisations that flow back to the promotion-related assets, in so far as the market value of the assets exceeds DEM 1500 million.
Tyskland har oplyst, at der i tiden frem til marts 2003 i alt er hævet 473,88 mio. DEM (242,29 mio. EUR). Tyskland mener, at dette svarer til en yderligere forrentning ud over de aftalte 0,5 % pr. år på ca. 2,79-2,85 % pr. år.
Germany stated that, up to March 2003, a total of DEM 473,88 million (EUR 242,29 million) was withdrawn, which, it argues, corresponds to an interest premium of around 2,79 %-2,85 % per annum on top of the agreed 0,5 % per annum.
KAPITALOVERDRAGELSERNE FRA DEN ANDEN ANDELSINDEHAVER, NSGV
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE OTHER SHAREHOLDER (NSGV)
I indledende drøftelser om overdragelse af LTS-aktiverne til NordLB havde delstaten Niedersachsen ladet den dengang eneste anden garant, NSGV, forstå, at man gik ud fra et fælles finansieringsansvar for de to garanter, og at NSGV skulle indbringe et bidrag svarende til sin egen kapitalandel på 40 %.
In preliminary discussions on the transfer of the LTS promotion-related assets to NordLB, the Land of Lower Saxony made it clear to the only other guarantor at that time, namely NSGV, that, in its view, both guarantors bore joint financial responsibility and that NSGV would have to make its own contribution in accordance with its 40 % share of capital.
Hvis det ville være et problem, skulle man drøfte en ændring af andelsforholdene.
If this were to pose problems, a change in ownership structure would have to be discussed.
Et udkast til en overenskomst, der skulle indgås mellem de to garanter, blev vedlagt lovudkastet af 15. oktober 1991.
A draft agreement to be concluded between the two guarantors was annexed to the draft law of 15 October 1991.
Tyskland oplyser, at den umiddelbare underskrivelse af denne »garantoverenskomst« kun hindredes af det forhold, at delstaten Sachsen-Anhalt og SBV skulle medunderskrive den, idet SBV endnu ikke var oprettet på dette tidspunkt.
According to Germany, the only obstacle to this ‘guarantor agreement’ being signed immediately was the fact that it had to be co-signed by the Land of Saxony-Anhalt and SBV, and the latter had not yet been set up at that time.
Ved indgåelsen af overdragelsesaftalen den 20. december 1991 besluttede garantforsamlingen, som på dette tidspunkt bestod af delstaten Niedersachsen og NSGV, at indgå sådan en garantoverenskomst. Efter genforeningstraktatens ikrafttræden blev overenskomsten indgået med deltagelse af delstaten Sachsen-Anhalt og SBV den 5. marts 1992.
On concluding the transfer agreement on 20 December 1991, the assembled guarantors, consisting at that time of the Land of Lower Saxony and NSGV, decided to reach such a guarantor agreement which was then duly concluded on 5 March 1992 — after the entry into force of the State Treaty — with the participation of the Land of Saxony-Anhalt and SBV.
NSGV opfyldte ifølge Tyskland efterfølgende sine forpligtelser jf. garantoverenskomsten af 5. marts 1992 og forhøjede i juli og oktober 1994 NordLB’s bankretligt godkendte egenkapital ved hjælp af to foranstaltninger (nærmere beskrevet nedenfor) med i alt ca. 1 mia. DEM (svarende til sin kapitalandel i NordLB på 40 % på dette tidspunkt).
According to Germany, NSGV subsequently honoured its undertakings under the guarantor agreement of 5 March 1992 and in July and October 1994 increased NordLB's own funds recognised for supervisory purposes by a total of DEM 1000 million (in line with its 40 % share of NordLB’s capital at that time) by means of two measures described in more detail below.
Særlig LBS-reserve på 450 mio. DEM
LBS special-purpose reserve of DEM 450 million
Landesbausparkasse (LBS), som hidtil havde været integreret i NordLB, blev efter forhandlinger i slutningen af 1993 mellem delstaten, NSGV og NordLB ved lov af 6. juni 1994 med virkning fra 1. juli 1994 udskilt fra NordLB og oprettet som en offentligretlig institution med status som juridisk person.
Following negotiations between the Land, NSGV and NordLB at the end of 1993, the Landesbausparkasse (LBS), previously incorporated in NordLB, was hived off by an Act adopted on 6 June 1994 and turned into an independent public-law institution (Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts) with legal capacity, with effect from 1 July 1994.
Som integreret del af banken var garanterne delstaten Niedersachsen (60 %) og NSGV (40 %) indehavere af LBS.
Up to then, LBS had been 60 %-owned by the Land of Lower Saxony and 40 %-owned by NSGV.
LBS blev værdiansat til 900 mio. DEM.
Their value was estimated at DEM 900 million.
Det blev aftalt, at NordLB skulle trække 450 mio. DEM ud af LBS før udskillelsen, og at NSGV skulle tilføre LBS det samme beløb igen.
It was agreed that NordLB would withdraw DEM 450 million from LBS before it was hived off and that NSGV would inject the same amount into LBS.
Denne foranstaltning fik NSGV godskrevet 450 mio. DEM for mod sin forpligtelse jf. garantoverenskomsten om at tilføre NordLB 1 mia. DEM under forudsætning af, at NSGV tilførte yderligere 550 mio. DEM.
This last measure was effected by deducting DEM 450 million from NGSV’s commitment under the guarantor agreement to inject DEM 1000 million into NordLB, on condition that NSGV would make a further capital contribution of DEM 550 million.
NordLB opførte det uddragne beløb 450 mio. DEM i overskudsreserverne som en særlig reserve med status af yderligere ansvarlig egenkapital jf. banktilsynsretlige bestemmelser.
NordLB booked the sum of DEM 450 million it had withdrawn to a revenue reserve in the form of a special reserve as additional liable equity capital within the meaning of the banking supervisory rules.
Denne særlige reserve giver en kumuleret forrentning på 7,5 % pr. år før skat og tilhører i garanternes interne forhold delstaten med 60 % og NSGV med 40 %.
The special reserve yielded cumulative interest before tax of 7,5 % per annum and was owned jointly by the guarantors in accordance with their internal relationship, i.e. 60 % by the Land and 40 % by NGSV.
Passivt kapitalindskud på 550 mio. DEM
Silent partnership contribution of DEM 550 million
Tyskland oplyser, at NSGV og NordLB den 10. oktober 1994 indgik en aftale om et kapitalindskud jf. § 10, stk. 4, i KWG.
Germany states that on 10 October 1994 NSGV and NordLB concluded an agreement concerning a capital contribution under Section 10(4) KWG.
Ifølge denne aftale forpligtede NSGV sig med virkning fra 10. oktober 1994 til at indskyde kapital i form af et passivt kapitalindskud på 550 mio. DEM hos NordLB mod at få udbetalt en overskudsrelateret godtgørelse, hvis størrelse bestemmes af en nøjere specificeret rentesats for 10-årige ihændehaverobligationer på 7,91 % plus en margen på 1,2 % pr. år.
Under that agreement, NSGV undertook to make a capital contribution to NordLB in the form of a silent partnership amounting to DEM 550 million, with effect from 10 October 1994, in return for payment of a profit-linked remuneration the amount of which would be derived from the interest rate (specified in more detail) on 10-year bearer bonds amounting to 7,91 % plus a margin of 1,2 % per annum.
De tyske myndigheder kommer derved frem til en samlet forrentning på 9,11 %, som svarer til den almindelige markedsforrentning for passive kapitalindskud og samtidig svarer til den godtgørelse, som delstaten Niedersachsen skal have for at overdrage aktiverne til den ansvarlige egenkapital.
This produces a total interest rate of 9,11 %, which, according to the German authorities, corresponds to the normal market remuneration for silent partnerships and at the same time to the remuneration payable to the Land of Lower Saxony for contributing the promotion-related assets as liable equity capital.
Indskuddet er ifølge de tyske myndigheder et aftaleretligt indskud og banktilsynsretligt godkendt som ansvarlig egenkapital for NordLB.
The German authorities state that the contribution was made in accordance with the agreement and was recognised for supervisory purposes as liable equity capital of NordLB.
KLAGE OG BEMÆRKNINGER FRA BDB
COMPLAINT AND OBSERVATIONS BY THE COMPLAINANT (THE BDB)
BdB anser overdragelsen af LTS-aktiverne og den dermed forbundne forhøjelse af NordLB's egenkapital for en konkurrencefordrejning til dennes fordel og i modstrid med den markedsøkonomiske investors princip, da der ikke gives en rimelig godtgørelse.
In BdB's view, the transfer of the LTS promotion-related assets and the associated increase in NordLB's capital distorted competition in favour of NordLB since the latter did not pay remuneration consistent with the market-economy investor principle.
Efter BdB's opfattelse er anvendelsen af den markedsøkonomiske investors princip ikke begrænset til tabgivende eller saneringsmodne virksomheder.
The BdB submits that the application of the market-economy investor principle is not limited to enterprises which are loss-making or in need of financial restructuring.
En sådan investor lader sig i forbindelse med sin investeringsbeslutning ikke lede af spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt den pågældende virksomhed i det hele taget arbejder rentabelt, men undersøger, om forrentningen svarer til den normale markedssats.
An investor is not guided by the question of whether the enterprise in question is profitable at all but rather by whether the profitability corresponds to the market rate.
Hvis kapitaltilførsler fra de offentlige myndigheder kun blev undersøgt i støttemæssig henseende i forbindelse med tabgivende virksomheder, ville private virksomheder blive stillet dårligere, hvilket ikke er i overensstemmelse med EF-traktatens artikel 86, stk. 1.
If capital injections by the public authorities were examined only in the case of loss-making enterprises, this would discriminate against private enterprises and thus infringe Article 86(1) of the EC Treaty.
EF-traktatens artikel 295 kan heller ikke anvendes til at undtage overdragelsen af LTS’ formue fra konkurrencereglernes anvendelsesområde. Det kan af denne artikel højst udledes, at delstaten frit kan opbygge en sådan særlig formue, men så snart denne overgår til en kommercielt arbejdende virksomhed, skal konkurrencereglerne finde anvendelse.
It also submits that Article 295 of the EC Treaty cannot be used to exempt the transfer of the LTS from the competition rules, arguing that the Article in question may well protect the freedom of the State to create such a special asset but, as soon as it is transferred to a commercial enterprise, the competition rules must be applied.
BdB konstaterede i sin klage, at spørgsmålet om, hvilken godtgørelse der vil være rimelig for overdragelsen af aktiverne, navnlig for så angår NordLB, skal besvares ved hjælp af de samme metoder, som Kommissionen anvendte i sin afgørelse om WestLB af 8. juli 1999.
The BdB states that the question of what remuneration was appropriate for the transfer of the promotion-related assets, particularly in the case of NordLB, should be determined using the method employed by the Commission in its WestLB decision of 8 July 1999.
Det betyder, at den kapital, der er blevet stillet til rådighed, allerførst skal sammenholdes med andre egenkapitalinstrumenter.
The first step is therefore to compare the capital provided with other equity instruments.
Derefter skal det fastslås, hvilken minimumsgodtgørelse en investor ville forvente for den konkrete egenkapitalinvestering i delstatsbanken.
The second step is to determine the minimum remuneration which an investor would expect for a real equity-capital investment in the Landesbank.
Til sidst skal der beregnes eventuelle tillæg og nedslag som følge af de særlige forhold, der gjorde sig gældende ved overdragelsen.
Finally, a calculation must be made of any premiums and discounts applied by virtue of the particularities of the transfer.
BdB nåede frem til, at overdragelsen af LTS-aktiverne til NordLB — ligesom alle andre sager i forbindelse med kapitalindskud i delstatsbanker — må sidestilles med en aktiekapitaltilførsel.
The BdB comes to the conclusion that the transfer of the LTS promotion-related assets to NordLB — and the transfer of capital in all the other Landesbank cases — can be compared to an injection of share capital.
Indskuddet af aktiver kan ikke sammenlignes med kapital i form af udbyttebeviser, da udbytterettigheder kun udgør supplerende kapital.
It argues that the promotion-related assets transferred cannot be compared with capital in the form of profit participation certificates, as profit participation rights constitute only additional capital.
I Tyskland udgjordes kernekapital på de forskellige overdragelsestidspunkter, dvs. navnlig i slutningen af 1991, udelukkende af aktiekapital (og reserver jf. § 10, stk. 2 KWG) og passive kapitalindskud.
At the time of the respective transfers, in particular at the end of 1991, only share capital (and reserves within the meaning of Section 10(2) KWG) and silent partnership contributions were recognised as core capital in Germany.
Indskuddene kunne derfor ifølge BdB under ingen omstændigheder sammenlignes med en passiv kapitalinteresse.
Any comparison with silent partnership contributions could be ruled out across the board.
For det første stiller investoren kun passive kapitalindskud til rådighed i et begrænset tidsrum.
First, such contributions were made available by an investor for a limited period only.
En investor kan derfor ikke forvente at få samme godtgørelse for et passivt kapitalindskud som for egenkapitalinstrumenter, der af banktilsynet var blevet godkendt for en ubestemt periode.
An investor could not therefore expect to receive the same return on a silent partnership contribution as for equity instruments recognised for supervisory purposes for an unlimited period, in particular a injection of share capital.
Hvis det for det andet gøres gældende, at den indskudte kapital efter aftaler mellem delstatsbankens ejere var efterstillet aktiekapitalen, betyder dette ikke nødvendigvis en mindre risiko for investor.
Second, although it was asserted that the transferred capital was subordinate in liability to share capital pursuant to agreements between the Landesbanks' owners, this did not necessarily mean a lower risk for the investor.
Den indskudte kapital udgør en betydelig del af den samlede kernekapital. Det er derfor meget sandsynligt, at der ved tab i hvert fald kunne være blevet gjort brug af dele af den indskudte kapital.
The injected capital made up a significant proportion of the total core capital, making it extremely likely that it would be drawn on — at least in part — in the event of losses.
For det tredje var forskellen mellem passive kapitalindskud og kapital, som ved overdragelse tilføres delstatsbankerne, også blevet bekræftet af Basel-komitéen for Banktilsyn, for så vidt angår banktilsynets definition af kernekapital. Efter denne definition kunne banktilsynet kun godkende passive kapitalindskud som såkaldt lower tier 1-kapital.
Third, the BdB submits that the difference in quality between silent partnership contributions and the capital transferred to the Landesbanks as promotion-related assets is confirmed by the definition of core capital for supervisory purposes adopted by the Basle Committee for Banking Supervision.
Denne kapital måtte nu kun udgøre 15 % af den krævede kernekapitalandel, dvs. ved en kernekapitalandel på 4 % skulle grundkapital og oplyste reserver (f.eks. de særlige reserver, der var blevet overdraget til delstatsbankerne) udgøre 3,4 %.
According to this definition, silent partnership contributions must be recognised for supervisory purposes as no more than lower tier I capital, which may account for no more than 15 % of the requisite core-capital ratio. In other words, where the core-capital ratio is 4 %, 3,4 % must be made up of nominal capital and open reserves (e.g. the special-purpose reserves transferred to the Landesbanks).
Desuden optager banker kun meget få efterstillede egenkapitalinstrumenter, f.eks. præferenceaktier eller udbytterettigheder.
Furthermore, banks only ever took up subordinate equity instruments such as preference shares or profit participation rights in small volumes.
Under pres fra ratingbureauerne tegnede de sig — til forskel fra de foreliggende tilfælde — næsten aldrig for mere end 10 % af en banks samlede kernekapital.
Under pressure from the rating agencies, such instruments hardly ever accounted for more than 10 % of a bank's total core capital — a very different situation from that in the cases under examination.
På denne baggrund kan passive indskud ikke anvendes på store investeringer fra én enkelt investor.
Against this background, silent partnership contributions could not be used for large volumes invested by a single investor.
Minimumsgodtgørelse for en aktiekapitalinvestering i en delstatsbank
Minimum remuneration for a share-capital investment in a Landesbank
BdB gør gældende, at alle metoder til at beregne en passende godtgørelse (forrentning) for aktiekapital, der stilles til rådighed, går ud fra en risikofri forrentning tillagt en risikopræmie.
The BdB argues that all methods of determining an appropriate remuneration (return) for the provision of share capital start from a risk-free return and add a risk premium.
De kunne ifølge BdB føres tilbage til følgende grundprincip:
These methods can be traced back to the following basic principle:
Forventet forrentning af en risikobehæftet investering
Expected return on a risky investment
risikofri forrentning + risikopræmie for den risikobehæftede investering.
risk-free return + risk premium for the risky investment
BdB beregner den risikofrie forrentning ud fra forrentningen ved langfristede statsobligationer, da fastforrentede værdipapirer fra statslige emittenter er den investeringsform, der er forbundet med mindst eller slet ingen risiko.
To determine the risk-free return, the BdB uses the returns on long-term government bonds, fixed-rate securities issued by state bodies being the form of investment with the least or no risk.
For at tage højde for virkningerne af inflation skal forrentningssatsen for en langfristet statsobligation uden hensyn til den forventede inflation ifølge BdB allerførst fastlægges for hver overdragelsesperiode.
To offset the effects of inflation, the rate of return on a long-term government bond should be determined for each transfer period, initially disregarding the inflation expectations.
For at anslå den langfristede risikofrie basisrentesats lægger man derefter på referencetidspunktet den anslåede langfristede, gennemsnitlige forventede inflation (3,6 %) til den »virkelige basisrentesats«.
Then, to estimate the long-term risk-free basic rate, the estimated figure for average long-term inflation expectations (3,6 %) is added to the ‘real basic rate’ at the time in question.
BdB mener, at markedsrisikopræmien udgøres af forskellen mellem den langfristede gennemsnitlige forrentning af hhv. aktier og statsobligationer.
According to the BdB, the first step in working out the market-risk premium is to determine the difference between the long-term average return on shares and that on government bonds.
Derefter bestemmes delstatsbankernes betaværdi, dvs. bankernes individuelle risikopræmie, med hvilken den generelle markedsrisikopræmie skal justeres.
As a second step, the BdB determines the beta value for the Landesbanks, i.e. the individual risk premium for the banks by which the general market-risk premium was to be adjusted.
Tillæg og nedslag som følge af transaktionernes særlige karakter
Premiums and discounts on account of the particularities of the transactions
BdB konstaterede, at den sats, som Kommissionen i sin beslutning 2000/392/EF havde fratrukket fra minimumsgodtgørelsen, fordi Wfa-formuen ikke var likvid, var blevet godkendt af Retten i Første Instans.
The BdB notes that the Commission's deduction, in Decision 2002/392/EC, from the minimum remuneration to allow for the lack of liquidity of Wfa’s assets was upheld by the Court of First Instance.
BdB ser derfor ingen grund til ikke også at gøre dette i de foreliggende tilfælde, hvorfor der også her bør foretages et nedslag på grund af manglende likviditet.
It therefore sees no reason to depart from this method in the present case, with the result that a deduction for liquidity should also be made here.
Størrelsen af nedslaget for manglende likviditet kunne ved hjælp af WestLB's metode fastsættes ud fra nettoudgifterne ved refinansiering (bruttoudgifterne minus den gældende selskabsskat).
The amount of this discount would be calculated using the WestLB method, on the basis of net refinancing costs (gross refinancing costs minus the applicable corporation taxes).
Kommissionens tillæg jf. beslutning 2000/392/EF var ligeledes blevet bekræftet af Retten i Første Instans.
The Court of First Instance also upheld the premium applied by the Commission in Decision 2000/392/EC.
BdB mener, at et tillæg vil være begrundet, hvis der også i andre sager vedrørende delstatsbanker foreligger omstændigheder, som øger risikoen sammenlignet med en »klassisk investering i aktiekapital«, f.eks. at formueoverdragelsen omfattede et ekstraordinært stort beløb, at der ikke blev udstedt nye andele med tilhørende stemmerettigheder i selskabet, eller at investeringen ikke var ombyttelig, dvs. den investerede kapital kunne ikke trækkes ud af virksomheden på et hvilket som helst tidspunkt.
If the circumstances leading to an increase in risk compared with a ‘normal share-capital investment’ are also present in the other Landesbank cases (the in part exceptionally high volume of assets transferred, the failure to issue new shares in the company and the related forgoing of additional voting rights, and the lack of fungibility of the investment, i.e. the impossibility of withdrawing the invested capital from the company again at any time), the BdB considers that a premium is also justified here.
BEMÆRKNINGER FRA DELSTATEN NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN OG WESTLB
COMMENTS BY THE LAND OF NORTH RHINE-WESTPHALIA AND WESTLB
Den 30. oktober 2003 fremsendte Tyskland delstaten Nordrhein-Westfalens og WestLB's bemærkninger til Kommissionens beslutning af 13. november 2002 om at indlede proceduren, hvori de bestrider, at formueoverdragelserne til delstatsbankerne, navnlig for NordLB’s vedkommende, kan sammenlignes med aktiekapital.
On 30 October 2003 Germany forwarded a response from the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia and WestLB to the Commission's decision to initiate the investigation procedure in which they disputed the statement that the assets transferred to the Landesbanks, including NordLB, could be compared to share-capital.
De påpegede, at passive kapitalindskud og såkaldte perpetuals havde været godkendt som kernekapital i Tyskland siden 1991. Desuden afhang godtgørelsen ikke af banktilsynets klassificering af en investering, men af dens risikoprofil.
They argued that silent partnership contributions and ‘perpetuals’ had in fact been recognised as core capital in Germany since 1991, adding that remuneration for an investment depended not on how it was classified by the banking supervisory authorities, but on its risk profile.
De bemærkede, at risikostrukturen, idet formuen er tegnet som efterstillet kapital, bedre kan sammenlignes med passive kapitalindskud eller såkaldte perpetuals end med investeringer i aktiekapital.
Since the assets were junior-ranking, the risk pattern had more in common with silent partnership contributions or ‘perpetuals’ than with share-capital investments.