natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Også denne konkurrent er af den opfattelse, at de tilbudte modydelser ikke er tilstrækkelige til at opnå den begrænsning af kapaciteten på MobilComs kerneforretningsområde, der er nødvendig til at udligne konkurrencefordrejningerne.
This competitor also thinks that the quid pro quo offered is not sufficient to achieve the reduction of capacities in MobilCom's core business necessary for offsetting distortions of competition.
MobilCom ønsker at koncentrere sig om højproduktive kunder i det mellemste og det øvre segment.
MobilCom wanted to concentrate on high‐yield customers in the middle and upper segments.
Følgelig vil MobilCom trods kundetilbagegangen kunne opretholde sin tilstedeværelse på markedet, da omkostningerne kan sænkes, og omsætningen øges som følge af, at MobilCom koncentrerer sig om lønsomme kunder.
Consequently, despite a decline in customers, it would be able to maintain its market presence since, by concentrating on high‐yield customers, costs could be reduced and turnovers increased.
I den nuværende markedssituation, der er præget af et mættet marked, en lavere gennemsnitsomsætning pr. kunde og faldende fortjeneste, er MobilComs mål om at ændre sin position på markedet et mål, der forfølges af alle virksomheder, der optræder som tjenesteudbydere.
Under current market conditions, viz. saturation, lower average turnovers per customer and falling margins, the repositioning that MobilCom was trying to achieve was what all service providers were striving for.
Den støtte, som de direkte konkurrenter ikke har adgang til, udnyttes af MobilCom til at skabe sig en konkurrencemæssig fordel hos den værdifulde og ombejlede kundekreds.
The aid, which was not available to direct competitors, was being used by MobilCom to secure a competitive advantage in the valuable, and fiercely contested, customer stratum.
Tyskland har således støttet omstruktureringen af MobilCom direkte på bekostning af konkurrenterne, hvilket ikke er acceptabelt uden yderligere kompensationsforanstaltninger.
Germany had therefore supported the restructuring of MobilCom at the direct expense of competitors, which was not acceptable without further compensatory measures.
V. TYSKLANDS REAKTION PÅ BEMÆRKNINGERNE FRA TREDJEMAND
V. GERMANY'S RESPONSE TO THE COMMENTS SUBMITTED BY THIRD PARTIES
I sin reaktion på bemærkningerne fra tredjemand erklærer Tyskland med hensyn til nødvendigheden af den anden støtteforanstaltning, at den likviditet, der var nødvendig til at videreføre den løbende drift i MobilCom, ville være opbrugt i midten af november 2002.
In response to the comments submitted by third parties, Germany argues that the second aid measure was necessary because in mid‐November 2002 the liquidity needed to maintain MobilCom's current business had run out.
Uden lånet fra KfW-konsortiet ville MobilCom straks have skullet indgive en insolvensbegæring.
Without the loan from the KfW consortium, MobilCom would have had to apply for insolvency immediately.
Efter MobilComs direktions skøn ville en insolvensbegæring på kort sigt have reduceret kundekredsen i væsentlig grad, så det ikke med en omstrukturering af MobilCom ville have været muligt at undgå insolvens.
In the event of an application for insolvency, MobilCom's management board estimated that a substantial proportion of customers would very rapidly be lost; a restructuring of MobilCom on the basis of an insolvency would thus have been impossible.
Tyskland erklærer yderligere, at også France Télécom ved optagelsen af forligsforhandlingerne i anden halvdel af september 2002 hele tiden havde gjort det tydeligt, at man kun kunne forpligte sig til at frigøre MobilCom fra de UMTS-relaterede forpligtelser, hvis det kunne sikres, at MobilCom ikke behøvede at indgive en insolvenserklæring inden for de insolvensretlige anfægtelsesfrister.
Germany further states that, in the settlement negotiations in the second half of September 2002, France Télécom always made it clear that it could undertake to release MobilCom from its UMTS commitments only if it could be certain that MobilCom would not need to seek insolvency within the periods in which challenges might be possible under insolvency law.
Følgelig havde France Télécom allerede ved begyndelsen af forhandlingerne forlangt, at der blev udarbejdet en ekspertudtalelse, der indeholdt en positiv prognose for de forretningsområder, hvor MobilCom stadig skulle være aktiv, og at der fra tredjemands side kom tilsagn om at sikre den finansiering, der var påkrævet for at gennemføre en sanering med held.
From the outset of the negotiations, therefore, France Télécom had wanted an outside expert's report giving a positive forecast for the continued existence of the business areas remaining to MobilCom and had demanded undertakings from third parties ensuring that the financing necessary for a successful reorganisation would be available.
Lånet på 112 mio. EUR fra KfW-konsortiet, der skulle tjene dette formål, var derfor gjort til en betingelse i MC Settlement Agreement.
The loan of EUR 112 million granted for this purpose by the KfW consortium was accordingly made a condition of the MC Settlement Agreement.
Desuden havde France Télécom krævet, at der skulle stå de nødvendige kreditter til rådighed i mindst 18 måneder.
France Télécom also demanded that the necessary loan facilities be open for at least 18 months.
Da fristen for lånene og garantien løb indtil den 20. maj 2004, imødekom man efter Tysklands oplysninger dette krav.
The fact that the loan and guarantee ran until 20 May 2004 meant, in Germany's view, that this demand had been met.
Tyskland erklærer desuden, at statsgarantien for ydelsen af lånet var nødvendig.
Germany also submits that the State guarantee was necessary for the granting of the loan.
Lånekontrakten med KfW-konsortiet forpligtede MobilCom til at yde alle de former for sikkerhed, som virksomheden rådede over.
The loan contract with the KfW consortium required MobilCom to provide all the collateral it had at its disposal.
Disse var dog ikke tilstrækkelige til at foranledige KfW-konsortiet til at yde de nødvendige finansielle midler.
But this was not enough to convince the consortium to grant the necessary funding.
Det forholdt sig snarere sådan, at konsortialbankerne — trods intensive bestræbelser fra forbundsregeringens side for at få bankerne til at påtage sig en højere selvrisiko — krævede en sikring på 80 % af kreditbeløbet i form af en garanti fra forbundsstat og delstaten Schleswig-Holstein.
Despite intensive efforts on the part of the Federal Government to induce the banks in the consortium to assume a higher proportion of the risk, the banks insisted that there had to be a deficiency guarantee from the Federal Government and the Land of Schleswig-Holstein covering 80 % of the loan.
Uden denne offentlige risikodækning ville ingen af bankerne være rede til at stille finansielle midler til rådighed for MobilCom, hvilket ville have ført til MobilComs insolvens.
Without this official cover for the loan (risk shield), none of the banks would have been prepared to provide funding for MobilCom, and MobilCom would have become insolvent.
Med hensyn til spørgsmålet om begrænsning af støtten til det nødvendige minimum anfører Tyskland, at MobilCom i låneaftalen med KfW-konsortiet havde forpligtet sig til at anvende hele nettoprovenuet fra salget af væsentlige dele af den fysiske eller finansielle anlægsformue til at indløse lånet og dermed også statsgarantien.
On the question of whether the aid was limited to the minimum necessary, Germany argued that in the loan contract with the KfW consortium MobilCom undertook to use all net revenue from the sale of major physical or financial assets to redeem the loans, and thus also the State guarantee.
Derudover havde MobilCom forpligtet sig til meget hurtigt at begynde salget af fastnet- og internetandelene.
It also undertook to begin the sale of the landline network and the Internet business very soon.
Følgelig havde MobilCom straks indledt sine salgsbestræbelser — dette gjaldt også UMTS-formuen — og afsluttet disse så hurtigt og med så stor succes, at de udestående kreditlinjer og dermed statsgarantien kunne indløses før tiden.
It began at once efforts to sell these assets and the UMTS assets. It disposed of them so quickly and so successfully that it was able to redeem the loan financing advanced and the State guarantees ahead of schedule.
Med salget af fastnetandelene, UMTS-formuen og senere salget af Millenium-aktierne blev lånet gradvis tilbagebetalt og helt indløst ved salget af virksomhedens interesser i Freenet.de AG den 17. september 2003.
The sale of the landline business and the UMTS assets, and later the transfer of the Millenium shares, meant that the loan was gradually reduced, and the sale on 17 September 2003 of a stake in freenet.de AG ultimately brought it to zero.
Herved blev statsgarantien i realiteten kun aktuel for omkring halvdelen af løbetiden for KfW-kreditten.
The State guarantee was thus in operation only for about half of the lifetime of the KfW loan.
En endnu hurtigere realisering af formuen og dermed indløsning af statsgarantien ville ikke have været muligt.
It was not possible to realise the assets and thus to repay the State‐guaranteed loans more quickly.
Dette gælder både for det allerede i marts 2003 aftalte salg af fastnetandelene og for det i maj 2003 aftalte salg af UMTS-formuen samt for salget af MobilCom-aktierne gennem formueforvalteren Dr. Dieter Thoma, som først kunne finde sted fra april 2003, idet MobilCom ikke havde nogen beføjelse til at give salgsinstrukser til Dr. Thoma, som ifølge sin forvaltningskontrakt med Gerhard Schmid og Millenium var forpligtet til at opnå det størst mulige salgsprovenu.
This was true of the sale of the landline business, which was agreed in March 2003, the sale of the UMTS assets, which was agreed in May 2003, and the sale of MobilCom shares by the trustee, Dr Dieter Thoma, which was permissible only from April 2003 onwards (MobilCom had no power to instruct Dr Thoma; under his trustee contract with Gerhard Schmid and Millenium, he was obliged to obtain as high a price as possible).
Dette gjaldt ifølge Tyskland også salget af Freenet-aktier.
Germany contends that the same applied to the sale of the freenet shares.
For ifølge den tyske aktielov havde direktionen været forpligtet til i virksomhedens og aktionærernes interesse at sælge virksomhedens aktiver under den bogførte værdi.
Under the German law governing limited companies, the management board had an obligation, in the interest of the company and its shareholders, to prevent any sale of its assets below their value.
Tyskland anfører især, at et kortfristet salg af interesserne på daværende tidspunkt kun kunne være sket over børsen.
Germany states in particular that, at that time, the stake could have been sold quickly only through the stock market.
Den daværende lave børskurs på Freenet-aktien på omkring 5 EUR (hele andelens børsværdi var 68 mio. EUR) ville sandsynligvis ikke kunne have været opretholdt ved et kortfristet salg af 76,1 % af Freenet-aktierne.
The market price of a freenet share was low, at about EUR 5, which gave a market value of EUR 68 million for the entire holding; if 76,1 % of freenet shares were to be disposed of rapidly, the price would probably have collapsed.
Desuden ville tilsynsorganerne ikke have tilsluttet sig et salg i november 2002, da generalforsamlingen i France Télécom på dette tidspunkt ikke havde godkendt MC Settlement Agreement.
And the company supervisory bodies would not have agreed to a sale in November 2002 because at that time France Télécom's general meeting had not yet approved the MC Settlement Agreement.
Tyskland anfører, at der ikke havde været nogen alternative aktionsmuligheder for MobilCom for at opretholde sin position som markedsdeltager.
Germany submits that there were no alternative courses that would have enabled MobilCom to continue operating in the market.
Insolvens ville under alle omstændigheder have været i konkurrenternes interesse, fordi disse uden videre ville have kunnet overtage MobilComs stamkunder.
Insolvency would, at best, have served the interests of competitors because MobilCom's clientele would readily have moved over to them.
En opløsning af MobilCom-koncernen som følge af insolvensen var efter Tysklands opfattelse ikke begrundet.
But Germany contends that there was no justification for breaking up MobilCom through an insolvency.
I højere grad talte især hensyn vedrørende konkurrence, infrastruktur og arbejdsmarked for at yde statsgarantien.
Instead, considerations of competition, infrastructure and the labour market argued in favour of the granting of a State guarantee.
Desuden står Tyskland for det første fast på sin holdning om, at der allerede var foretaget kompensationsforanstaltninger i betydeligt omfang, nemlig især ved salget af UMTS-forretningsområdet, salget af fastnetområdet, begrænsningen af MobilComs interesser i Freenet.de AG fra et kvalificeret flertal til blot en finansiel interesse samt lukningen af forretningsstederne i Hallbermoos og Karlstein.
Germany initially maintained its view that substantial compensatory measures had already been taken, the main ones being the sale of the UMTS business, the sale of the landline business, the reduction in MobilCom's stake in freenet.de AG from a qualified majority to a financial holding only, and the closure of the Hallbergmoos and Karlstein sites.
I direkte samtaler i januar 2004 drøftede Kommissionen imidlertid eventuelle yderligere kompensationsforanstaltninger med Tyskland, især lukning af MobilComs online-butikker i et begrænset tidsrum på syv måneder, som Tyskland oprindelig var gået med til.
In direct talks held with Germany in January 2004, the Commission raised other possible compensatory measures, and in particular closure of MobilCom's online shops for a limited period of seven months, to which Germany initially agreed.
I april 2004 meddelte Tyskland imidlertid, at landet ikke definitivt kunne love, at online-butikkerne ville blive lukket.
However, in April 2004 Germany informed the Commission that it could not make a definite commitment to close the online shops.
VURDERING AF FORANSTALTNINGERNE
ASSESSMENT OF THE MEASURES
Ifølge artikel 87, stk. 1, i EF-traktaten er statsstøtte eller støtte, som ydes ved hjælp af statsmidler under enhver tænkelig form, og som fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene ved at begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner, uforenelig med fællesmarkedet i det omfang, den påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne, bortset fra de i traktaten hjemlede undtagelser.
Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty states that, save as otherwise provided in the Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is incompatible with the common market, insofar as trade between Member States is affected.
Kommissionen fastslår, at Tysklands anmodning om at godkende forlængelsen af statsgarantierne for kreditterne indtil 2007, ikke længere er aktuel, efter at kreditterne blev tilbagebetalt den 22. september 2003, og garantidokumenterne skulle tilbageleveres til garanterne.
The Commission notes that the question of Germany's application to the Commission for authorisation to extend the loan guarantees until 2007 is now closed because the loans were repaid on 22 September 2003, with the guarantee bonds subsequently being returned to the guarantors.
Kommissionen skal således ikke længere træffe afgørelse om denne anmodning.
Thus the Commission no longer has to consider this application.
Den 21. januar 2003 godkendte Kommissionen statsgarantien for kreditten på 50 mio. EUR på grundlag af EF-rammebestemmelserne.
The Commission approved the State guarantee on the EUR 50 million loan as rescue aid within the meaning of the Community guidelines on 21 January 2003.
Denne støtte skal derfor ikke vurderes på ny.
This aid need not, therefore, be considered afresh.
Statsgarantien for lånet på 112 mio. EUR som støtte
The State guarantee on the EUR 112 million loan as aid
Med hensyn til statsgarantien på 80 % for det lån på 112 mio. EUR, der blev ydet den 20. november, finder Kommissionen, at der er tale om støtte i den betydning, der er anvendt i EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
The Commission considers that it has been shown that the 80 % State guarantee on the EUR 112 million loan granted on 20 November constitutes aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Garantien blev ydet af forbundsfinansministeriet og ministeriet for økonomi, teknologi og samfærdsel i delstaten Schleswig-Holstein, begge to statslige myndigheder.
The guarantee was granted by the Federal Ministry of Finance and by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Technology and Communications of the Land of Schleswig‐Holstein, both of which are State authorities.
Støtten skal derfor betragtes som statsstøtte.
The aid must therefore be considered as having been granted by the State.
Statsgarantier falder principielt inden for anvendelsesområdet for EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, når der ikke betales en markedsbestemt præmie, og samhandelen påvirkes.
State guarantees generally fall within the scope of Article 87(1) if no market premium is paid and trade between Member States is affected.
Kommissionen er af den opfattelse, at den præmie, der blev betalt for statsgarantien, ikke var markedsbestemt.
The Commission takes the view that the premium paid for the State guarantee was not a market premium.
Tyskland har meddelt, at den præmie, som MobilCom skulle betale til forbundsstaten, i hvert tilfælde androg 0,8 % p.a.
Germany stated that the premium which MobilCom had to pay to the Federal Government for the guarantee was 0,8 % per annum plus an application fee of EUR 25000 in each case.
Desuden skulle der hver gang betales et ansøgningsgebyr på 25000 EUR. Delstaten Schleswig-Holstein skulle have en garantipræmie på 1 % p.a. og et behandlingsgebyr på 25564 EUR. Tyskland giver dog ikke yderligere oplysninger om, hvorvidt præmierne var afpasset efter risikoen eller markedsvilkårene.
The Land of Schleswig‐Holstein was entitled to a guarantee premium of 1 % per annum and a processing fee of EUR 25564. But Germany did not supply any further data that might show that that the premiums were appropriate to the risk or in line with market conditions.
Tværtimod betegner Tyskland også garantien for det andet lån som støtte.
Rather, Germany itself always refers to the guarantee on the second loan too as ‘aid’.
På denne baggrund og i betragtning af den vanskelige finansielle situation som MobilCom befandt sig i samt det forhold, at virksomheden var truet af insolvens, kommer Kommissionen til den konklusion, at modydelsen ikke afspejlede den risiko, som forbundsstat og delstat påtog sig ved at give garantien, og at ingen privat markedsdeltager ville have ydet en garanti under disse betingelser.
Against this background, and given MobilCom's difficult economic situation and the fact that it was on the brink of insolvency, the Commission concludes that the premium did not reflect the risk that the Federal Government and the Land were running by giving the guarantee; no private investor would have granted a guarantee on those terms.
Garantien gav derfor MobilCom en selektiv fordel, som virksomheden ikke ville have opnået på normale markedsvilkår.
The guarantee thus conferred a selective advantage on MobilCom which it would not have received under normal market conditions.
Især blev virksomhedens muligheder for at optage lån forbedret.
In particular, its access to borrowing was improved.
På grundlag af garantien kunne virksomheden MobilCom, som befandt sig i en vanskelig finansiel situation, optage lån på betingelser, der ikke svarede til den faktiske finansielle situation og den af långiveren overtagne risiko ved ydelse af lån til virksomheder i en sammenlignelig finansiel situation uden en statsgaranti.
MobilCom was in financial distress and the guarantee enabled it to obtain loans on terms that did not correspond to its real financial position or to the risk accepted by a lender lending to a firm in a comparable position without a State guarantee.
Under normale markedsbetingelser vil kun få banker afvise at yde et lån til virksomheder, når tilbagebetaling af lån er sikret af staten.
Under normal market conditions, few banks will refuse to grant a loan to a firm if reimbursement is guaranteed by the State.
Desuden kan garantien påvirke konkurrencen og handelen mellem medlemsstater.
Moreover, the guarantee may affect competition and trade between Member States.
MobilCom tilbyder GSM-mobiltjenester af anden generation i hele Tyskland.
MobilCom provides second‐generation GSM mobile telephony services throughout Germany.
Den garanti, der blev stillet af Tyskland, forbedrede MobilComs konkurrencestilling og er således egnet til at påvirke de konkurrencemæssige muligheder for andre udbydere af mobiltjenester af anden generation.
The loan guarantee granted by Germany improved MobilCom's competitive position and is such as to have an adverse effect on the ability of other second‐generation mobile telephony providers to compete.
Garantien bidrog ligeledes til en konsolidering af MobilComs stilling i en EU-sammenhæng, da muligheden for udbydere fra andre medlemsstater for at opbygge eller udbygge deres stilling i Tyskland blev begrænset.
The guarantee also helped to reinforce MobilCom's position at Community level because it made it less likely that providers from other Member States might set up or expand operations in Germany.
Der hersker skarp konkurrence mellem udbydere fra forskellige medlemsstater på telemarkedet i EU.
On the Community telecommunications market there is intense competition between providers from different Member States.
Mange (aktuelle eller potentielle) konkurrenter til MobilCom, der udbyder mobiltjenester af anden generation, er virksomheder, der har deres hovedkontor i andre medlemsstater (f.eks. O2, E-Plus, Vodafone D2, Talkline og Debitel).
Many of MobilCom's current or potential competitors in the provision of second‐generation mobile telephony services are firms with their head offices in other Member States (e.g. O2, E‐Plus, Vodafone D2, Talkline and Debitel).
Af denne grund er der i forbindelse med den ydede statsgaranti tale om statsstøtte i den betydning, der er anvendt i EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
The State guarantee accordingly constitutes State aid caught by Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Den statsgaranterede kredit indeholder i sig selv ikke efter Kommissionens opfattelse noget støtteelement, der går ud over garantien.
The Commission takes the view that the loan on which the guarantee was granted does not itself contain any aid element.
Med garantien var lånet sikret i overensstemmelse med markedsforholdene.
The guarantee meant that the loan was secured in line with market requirements.
Ligeledes var den rentesats, som MobilCom skulle betale på lånet på 112 mio. EUR (2,5 % p.a. over Euribor), sammenlignelig med rentesatserne for sunde virksomheder og lå derfor ikke under Kommissionens referencesatser.
The interest rate charged to MobilCom on the EUR 112 million loan (2,5 % per annum above Euribor) was comparable to interest rates charged in the case of healthy firms and was not below the Commission's reference rates.
Forenelighed med det fælles marked
Compatibility with the common market
I artikel 87 i EF-traktaten er der fastsat undtagelser fra princippet om statsstøttes uforenelighed med det fælles marked.
Article 87 of the EC Treaty lays down exceptions to the principle that State aid is incompatible with the common market.
Undtagelsesbestemmelsen i artikel 87, stk. 2, kunne begrunde støttens forenelighed med det fælles marked.
It has to be considered first of all whether the aid at issue here is compatible with the common market under Article 87(2).