natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Efter offentliggørelsen af beslutningen om at indlede procedurer og inden for den frist, der blev fastsat i forbindelse med offentliggørelsen, modtog Kommissionen kommentarer fra 20 tredjeparter, herunder BE selv.
Following the publication of the decision to initiate proceedings and within the deadline foreseen by that publication, the Commission received comments from 20 third parties including from BE itself.
De kan opsummeres således:
They can be summarised as follows:
BE understreger, at der på grund af den måde, som elektricitetsmarkedet fungerer på, og kernekraftværkernes økonomiske struktur er tale om en usædvanlig sag.
BE stresses that the case is unusual due to the way the electricity market operates and due to the economic structure of nuclear plants.
BE’s bidrag til omstruktureringsplanen
BE’s contribution to the restructuring plan
BE påpeger, at omkostningerne vedrørende tidligere aktiviteter i form af BE’s nukleare forpligtelser ikke længere kunne bæres af BE på grund af det betydelige fald i elektricitetspriserne, der har været i Det Forenede Kongerige.
BE stresses the fact that the costs of the past represented by BE’s nuclear liabilities could no longer be met by BE with the substantial fall in electricity prices that has taken place in the United Kingdom.
I omstruktureringsplanen kræves det også, at BE betaler en stor del af omkostningerne forbundet med tidligere aktiviteter.
Under the restructuring plan, BE is also required to make large contributions towards costs of the past.
Med hensyn til nedlukningsomkostningerne og de øvrige nukleare forpligtelser, som ikke er omfattet af de nye aftaler med BNFL, vil der blive ydet et bidrag gennem NDF/NLF.
With regard to the costs of decommissioning and the other nuclear liabilities not covered by the new contracts with BNFL, a contribution will be made through the NDF/NLF.
Andre foranstaltninger, som påvirker BE og selskabets investorer, omfatter salget af BE’s aktiver i Nordamerika, de tidligere aktionærers tab af hele deres investering, forliget med de tidligere investorer samt udstedelsen af nye obligationer.
Other measures affecting BE and its investors include the sale of BE’s North American assets, the loss by the pre-existing equity shareholders of the whole of their investment, and the settlement by the pre-existing investors as well as the issue of new bonds.
Planens varighed
Duration of the plan
BE understreger, at udbetaling af et engangsbeløb ikke vil være hensigtsmæssigt, navnlig fordi en del af udgifterne først vil opstå i en meget fjern fremtid.
BE stresses that a lump sum payment to the recipient would not be practicable, in particular because certain of these costs will be incurred at dates in the very distant future.
Afvisning af BE’s omstruktureringsplan, fordi den en gang for alle fritager BE for visse klart afgrænsede forpligtelser, som ganske vist ikke kan kvantificeres på nuværende tidspunkt, ville skabe præcedens mod godkendelse af omstruktureringsstøtte, som nødvendiggøres af omkostninger forbundet med tidligere aktiviteter.
Rejecting BE’s restructuring plan because it relieved BE once-and-for-all of certain defined, albeit presently unquantifiable, liabilities, would create a precedent against the approval of restructuring aid that was necessitated by the existence of costs of the past.
Standstill-aftalerne med BNFL og de øvrige betydelige kreditorer
The standstill agreements with BNFL and other significant creditors
BE mener ikke, at der kan drages slutninger på baggrund af en sammenligning af ordningerne med de privatejede kreditorer.
BE is of the opinion that no inferences can be drawn from a comparison of the arrangements with the privately owned creditors.
Navnlig hvad angår BNFL, ville en betydelig del af virksomhedens kerneforretning blive truet og muligvis blive urentabel, hvis driften af BE’s værker blev urentabel.
In particular, in the case of BNFL, an important part of its core business would be threatened and perhaps rendered unviable if operations of BE’s stations were unviable.
De nye aftaler med BNFL
The new contracts with BNFL
BE understreger, at BNFL indtog en ekstremt kompromisløs holdning og sandsynligvis kun i sidste ende gjorde indrømmelse af frygt for, at BE ellers ville blive insolvent.
BE stresses that BNFL adopted an extremely tough stance and may have been eventually constrained only by a concern that BE would otherwise face insolvency.
De betingelser, som blev fastlagt ved genforhandlingen, var efter BE’s mening et markedsøkonomisk minimum for en virksomhed, som ville fremstå med en vis styrke efter omstruktureringen.
The terms that were renegotiated were the least that BE believed could be commercially obtained while being robust following restructuring.
Ifølge BE kan Kommissionen have misforstået det kommercielle indhold af de nye aftaler med BNFL som følge af, at den har misforstået kendsgerningerne og navnlig forløbet.
According to BE, the Commission may have misunderstood the commercial nature of the new BNFL Contracts as a result of misunderstanding the facts and in particular their chronology.
BE har forelagt et bilag til sin meddelelse, hvori virksomheden redegør for grundene til, at den ikke finder priserne i de nye aftaler specielt gunstige.
BE provides an annex to its submission that shows why it believes that the prices under the new contracts are not particularly favourable to it.
Genoprettelse af rentabiliteten
The return to viability
BE minder om, at det problem, som omstruktureringsplanen skal løse, hovedsageligt er, at BE ikke længere kan bære omkostningerne forbundet med tidligere aktiviteter i en situation, hvor elektricitetspriserne på engrosmarkedet er meget lavere.
BE recalls that the problem to be addressed by the Restructuring Plan was essentially that in the new environment of much lower wholesale electricity prices, BE could no longer sustain the ‘costs of the past’.
Ifølge BE findes der en hensigtsmæssig løsning på dette problem i omstruktureringsplanen.
According to BE, the restructuring plan successfully addresses that problem.
Støttens virkninger for konkurrencen
The effect of the aid on competition
Med hensyn til støttepakkens virkninger for konkurrencen hævder BE, at fordi BE's kernekraftværkers kortsigtede marginalomkostninger er så meget lavere end alle andre grundbelastningselværkers kortsigtede marginalomkostninger, vil BE’s kernekraftværker altid være i drift.
Concerning the effect of the aid package on competition, BE argues that because the SRMCs of BE’s nuclear plants are so much lower than those of any other baseload supplier, BE’s nuclear plants are always bound to run.
Men det præcise omfang af BE’s kortsigtede marginalomkostninger er irrelevant for fastlæggelsen af elektricitetspriserne, som afspejler den marginale leverandørs kortsigtede marginalomkosntinger.
But the precise level of BE’s SRMCs is irrelevant for the determination of electricity prices, which reflect the higher SRMC of the marginal supplier.
BE forklarer, at kernekraftværker teknisk og økonomisk set er ufleksible, og at drift af sådanne værker som andet end grundbelastningselværker er uøkonomisk.
BE explains that nuclear stations are technically and economically inflexible and that the operation of such plants other than as baseload plant is uneconomic.
Hvad angår handelsstrategien, forklarer BE, at de økonomiske forhold vedrørende elektricitetsproduktion på kernekraftværker har tendens til at få BE til at fokusere på at sælge sin produktion på forhånd på markedet for langsigtede terminsaftaler.
As far as its trading strategy is concerned, BE explains that the economics of nuclear generation tend to lead BE to focus on selling its output forward in longer-term markets.
Efter BE’s mening er der ikke overkapacitet med hensyn til elektricitetsproduktion i Det Forenede Kongerige.
In the view of BE, there is no overcapacity in the generation of electricity in Great Britain.
Hvad angår kompensationsforanstaltninger, hævder BE, at det ville være økonomisk uhensigtsmæssigt at lukke BE’s kernekraftværker for tidligt i forhold til planen, da formålet med støttepakken er at bevare BE’s kapacitet inden for kernekraftproduktion, som, hvad angår elektricitetsproduktion, er den mest omkostningseffektive kapacitet på det britiske marked og har det lavest mulige undgåelige ressourceforbrug.
As far as compensatory measures are concerned, BE argues that requiring premature closure of any of BE’s nuclear plant would be economically inefficient since the purpose of the aid package is to preserve BE’s nuclear capacity which, in terms of production of electricity, with the minimum avoidable expenditure of resources is the most cost-effective capacity in the British market.
Derudover ville det krænke den britiske regerings ret til at vælge energiforsyningskilder i Det Forenede Kongerige og øge emissionen af miljøskadelige gasser i atmosfæren.
In addition it would encroach on the exercise by the UK Government of its competence in relation to sources of energy supply to the United Kingdom and would increase the emission of environmentally harmful gases into the atmosphere
British Nuclear Fuels plc — BNFL
British Nuclear Fuels plc - BNFL
BNFL er et offentligt ejet selskab i kernekraftsektoren.
BNFL is a publicly owned company operating in the nuclear sector.
Det leverer og oparbejder eller deponerer BE’s AGR-atombrændsel.
It supplies and reprocesses or stores BE's AGR nuclear fuel.
Ud over brændselskredsløbsaktiviteterne driver BNFL også nogle få Magnox-kernekraftværker, og selskabet medvirker også ved tegning af kernekraftværker.
Apart from its activities in the fuel cycle, BNFL also operates a few Magnox nuclear plants, and has activities as a nuclear plants designer.
I BNFL’s meddelelse fokuseres der på spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt foranstaltning B og C omfatter støtte til BE. BNFL meddeler, at alle BNFL’s tiltag, hvad angår BE’s omstruktureringsplan, fulgte det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip og derfor ikke indeholder støtteelementer.
The BNFL submission concentrates on the questions of the existence of aid to BE in Measure B and C. BNFL submits that all BNFL interventions in BE's restructuring plan followed the private investor in a market economy principle, and therefore contain no aid elements.
Forhandlingerne, som førte til de reviderede aftaler (foranstaltning B)
The negotiations that led to the revised agreements (Measure B)
BNFL forklarer, at på råd fra deres økonomiske rådgivere (NM Rothschild & Sons Limited — »Rothschild«) konkluderede BNFL allerede i april 2002, at en »hensigtsmæssig redningspakke« af værdi for BNFL var at foretrække frem for BE’s insolvens på grund af BNFL’s sårbare stilling som BE’s største kreditor, manglen på sikkerhed og svaghederne forbundet med virksomhedens retsstilling.
BNFL explains that following the advice of their financial advisers’ (NM Rothschild & Sons Limited – Rothschild), BNFL already concluded in April 2002 that an ‘orderly rescue package’ with value for BNFL was preferable to allowing BE to become insolvent given the very vulnerable position of BNFL as BE’s largest creditor, its lack of security and the weaknesses of its legal position.
BNFL tilføjer dog, at bestyrelsen godkendte en omstrukturering af de eksisterende aftaler med BE, på betingelse af at BE ikke skulle forblive solvent for enhver pris, og af at det i forbindelse med alle de pakker, som skulle foreslås BE, skulle dokumenteres, at de var kommercielt fordelagtige for BNFL, da BNFL’s egen balance udviste et underskud.
BNFL adds that its Board, however, agreed with a restructuring of the existing contracts with BE on the conditions that BE should not be kept solvent at any cost and that any package proposed to BE would need to establish the commercial advantage to BNFL, given its own balance sheet deficit.
BNFL fremlægger oplysninger om rækken af forslag og modforslag fra hver side samt om Rothschilds holdning til dem. BNFL giver også en meget detaljeret redegørelse for rækkefølgen og indholdet af de drøftelser, der fandt sted mellem BE og BNFL, og denne viser, at BNFL allerede gav udtryk for vilje til at hjælpe BE, før BE henvendte sig til den britiske regering med anmodningen om hjælp, men indså, at dette ville være umuligt uden en omfattende omstruktureringsplan.
BNFL gives details of each of the successive proposals and counterproposals from each side, together with Rothschild’s view on them.
Drøftelserne begyndte allerede i maj 2000, hvor BE — uden held — første gang anmodede om anvendelse af den nødklausul, der findes i aftalerne.
BNFL also sets out in great detail the chronology and content of the discussions that took place between BE and BNFL, which shows that BNFL already expressed itself willing to help BE before BE turned to the UK Government for assistance but realised that this would not be possible without a global restructuring plan.. The discussions already started in May 2000 when BE first requested, without success, the application of the hardship clause contained in the contracts.
Der blev indledt nye drøftelser i 2002.
New discussions were initiated during 2002.
BNFL understreger også, at virksomheden ikke deltog i drøftelserne mellem BE og den britiske regering.
BNFL also stresses that it had no involvement in the discussions between BE and the UK Government.
På grundlag af analysen fra virksomhedens uafhængige juridiske og økonomiske rådgivere konkluderede BNFL, at gennemførelse af en omstrukturering med henblik på at opnå solvens var i dens bedste forretningsmæssige interesse, og den nåede til enighed med BE om de endelige vilkår den 28. november 2002.
On the basis of the analysis of its independent legal and financial advisers, BNFL concluded that proceeding with a solvent restructuring was in its best commercial interest and came to an agreement with BE on the Final Term Sheet on 28 November 2002.
Det var først, efter at den var nået til enighed med BE om de endelige vilkår, at den fik kendskab til enkelthederne vedrørende den britiske regerings engagement.
It is only after it had agreed on its Final Term Sheet with BE that it was aware of precise details of the UK involvement.
På baggrund af sammenligningen mellem vilkårene fra den 3. september og de endelige vilkår konkluderer BNFL, at der er betydelige ligheder mellem de to sæt af vilkår, og at det endelige resultat var betragteligt tættere på BNFL’s udgangspunkt end på BE’s.
BNFL’s comparison of the 3 September term sheet and the final term sheet concludes that there are considerable similarities between the two term sheets and that the final outcome was significantly closer to BNFL’s opening position than to that of BE.
Sammenligning af konsekvenserne for BNFL af henholdsvis en omstrukturering med henblik på at opnå solvens for BE og BE’s insolvens
Comparison of the implications for BNFL of a solvent restructuring of BE versus BE’s insolvency
BNFL redegør for sin vurdering af de forretningsmæssige fordele for virksomheden ved en omstrukturering med henblik på at opnå solvens sammenlignet med BE’s insolvens på grundlag af en analyse udarbejdet af dens økonomiske og juridiske rådgivere.
BNFL gives details of its assessment of the commercial benefits to it of the solvent restructuring as compared to a BE insolvency based on the analysis by financial and legal advisers.
Den peger på, at BNFL ville løbe betydelige risici, hvis BE blev insolvent, navnlig fordi der var en stor udokumenteret långivning mellem de enkelte virksomheder i BE-gruppen, og fordi BNFL’s aftaler med BE på mange måder var enestående og der derfor kun i begrænset omfang kunne trækkes på erfaringerne fra tidligere tilfælde af insolvens.
It has identified considerable risks to BNFL in the event of BE’s insolvency in particular due to the fact that BE had large undocumented intercompany loan balances between different BE group companies and that BNFL’s contractual arrangements with BE were in many ways unique and no clear precedent could be drawn from previous insolvencies.
Derudover ville den britiske regering skulle spille en central rolle, for så vidt angår følgerne af insolvensen, da den er den eneste kreditor, som har sikkerhed i BE’s kernekraftværker.
Besides, as the only creditor that benefited from security on BE’s nuclear power plants, the UK Government would have had a central role in the outcome of insolvency.
BNFL kunne dog ikke få adgang til oplysninger om den britiske regerings sandsynlige tilgang til en eventuel insolvensbehandling.
However BNFL was not granted any insights into the UK Government’s likely approach during any insolvency proceedings.
Mens BNFL’s rolle som BE’s hovedleverandør muligvis kunne forventes at give virksomheden en stærk forhandlingsposition i forbindelse med en insolvensbehandling, blev dens mulighed for på troværdig vis at true med at stoppe leveringen af varer og tjenesteydelser til BE undermineret af en række faktorer.
While BNFL’s role as a key supplier to BE might be expected to have placed it in a strong negotiating position in any insolvency, its ability to make a credible threat to stop providing goods and services to BE was undermined by a number of factors.
BNFL bemærker navnlig, at BNFL som BE’s største enkelte kreditor ville lide det største økonomiske tab, hvis BE’s kernekraftværker skulle lukkes som følge af, at denne trussel blev ført ud i livet.
In particular, BNFL notes that BNFL as BE’s largest single creditor would be the major financial loser if BE’s nuclear power stations were to shut down as a result of it exercising this threat.
Derudover er det tvivlsomt, om den på lovlig vis kunne opsige aftalerne og returnere brugt brændsel og affald, som den allerede havde modtaget, til BE, da dette ville være i modstrid med Det Forenede Kongeriges lovgivning om nuklear sikkerhed.
In addition, it is doubtful whether it could lawfully terminate the contracts and return to BE spent fuel and waste already received by it as this would not be permitted by UK nuclear safety legislation.
Sluttelig var BNFL som en ansvarlig virksomhed, der leverer tjenesteydelser inden for kernekraft, nødt til at levere tjenesteydelser til BE, i det omfang at det ville være farligt, herunder muligvis også for tredjeparter, at stoppe leveringen.
Finally as a responsible nuclear services company, BNFL had to continue providing services to BE to the extent that not to do so would be unsafe or could even be perceived as being unsafe to third parties.
Inden for rammerne af BNFL’s analyse af BE’s insolvens blev der fokuseret på tre mulige konsekvenser: lukning af BE’s kernekraftværker, hvilket ville medføre inddrivelse af en minimal del af tilgodehavendet, BNFL's overtagelse af ejerskabet af BE’s kernekraftværker, hvilket ville medføre, at også alle BE’s nukleare forpligtelser overtages, hvilket er meget risikabelt og uinteressant, samt den britiske regerings overtagelse af ejerskabet, samtidig med at de eksisterende kreditorer anmodes om at acceptere meget betydelige afskrivninger.
BNFL’s analysis of BE insolvency focused on three possible outcomes namely the closure of BE’s nuclear plants leading to a minimal recovery, BNFL taking ownership of BE’s nuclear plants meaning that it would assume all nuclear liabilities of BE, which is highly risky and unattractive, and the UK Government taking ownership and asking the existing creditors to accept very substantial write-downs.
Følgelig syntes den foreslåede omstrukturering med henblik på at opnå solvens at være den forretningsmæssigt mest interessante løsning, da den reducerer den risiko, som BNFL løber på grund af BE, og sikrer større og sikrere indtægtskilder for BNFL end i tilfælde af insolvens.
Consequently, the proposed solvent restructuring appeared to be more commercially attractive since it reduced BNFL exposure to BE and offered a higher and more certain revenue stream for BNFL than insolvency.
BNFL skønnes derfor at have handlet som enhver anden privat kreditor.
BNFL is therefore deemed to have acted in the same way as any other private creditor.
Sammenligning med andre kreditorers stilling
Comparison with the positions of other creditors
Sluttelig sammenlignede BNFL den andel af deres tilgodehavende, som andre større kreditorer tilsammen kunne inddrive, med den andel, den selv kunne inddrive, for at sikre, at vilkårene medførte, at BNFL fik en rimelig aftale.
Finally, BNFL compared the return of other major creditors in aggregate to its own return to ensure that the terms did offer BNFL a reasonable deal.
For at beskytte sin stilling yderligere sørgede BNFL også for, at de endelige vilkår kom til at omfatte en klausul om, at de foreslåede indrømmelser ophæves, hvis andre større kreditorer tilbydes gunstigere vilkår end BNFL.
In order to protect its position further, BNFL also secured the inclusion of a clause in the Final Term Sheet allowing the withdrawal of the suggested concessions in the event that any other material creditor was offered more favourable terms than BNFL.
Rothschild ajourførte sin analyse, efter at de nærmere vilkår, som BE skulle aftale med sine øvrige større kreditorer, var blevet fastlagt, og analysen bekræftede, at BNFL’s ordninger faktisk ikke var ringere end de øvrige større kreditorers.
Rothschild updated its analysis once the detailed terms that BE was agreeing with other major creditors were established and it confirmed that BNFL’s arrangements actually appeared to be no worse than other major creditors.
Ydermere vil ingen af de reviderede ordninger træde i kraft, før omstruktureringen er gennemført i sin helhed.
Furthermore, none of the revised contractual arrangements will come into effect unless and until the restructuring is completed.
Standstill-aftalerne mellem BNFL og BE
The standstill arrangements agreed between BNFL and BE
Hvad angår foranstaltning C, oplyser BNFL, at det med bistand fra Rothschild blev kontrolleret, at virksomheden ikke giver afkald på mere end de øvrige betydelige kreditorer i forbindelse med gældsmoratoriet.
As regards Measure C, BNFL submits that, with the help of Rothschild, it checked that it did not concede more in the way of debt standstill than other significant creditors.
Da BNFL blev opmærksom på, at andre kreditorer opnåede gunstigere vilkår end BNFL i henhold til standstill-aftalerne (BNFL’s stilling kunne ganske vist ikke sammenlignes direkte med de øvrige større kreditorers stilling), overvejede virksomheden, om den skulle forsøge at få genforhandlet aftalen og anmode om betaling af renter.
When BNFL became aware that other creditors were obtaining more favourable terms than BNFL under the standstill arrangements (albeit that BNFL’s position was not directly comparable with BE’s other major creditors), it considered whether it should seek renegotiation and ask for interest.
Den konkluderede, at det var usandsynligt, at BE kunne betale renter til BNFL og skabe et overskud i standstill-perioden, som var stort nok til, at omstruktureringen med henblik på at opnå solvens kunne fortsætte.
It concluded that it was unlikely that BE could pay interest to BNFL and generate sufficient surplus cash during the standstill period to allow the solvent restructuring to proceed.
Ydermere ville BNFL på trods af sin stilling i henhold til standstill-aftalerne samlet set opnå inddrivelse af en større del af sit tilgodehavende, hvis omstruktureringen med henblik på at opnå solvens kunne iværksættes.
In addition despite its position under the standstill arrangements, BNFL would achieve better overall recovery if a solvent restructuring were to go ahead.
Forholdet mellem BNFL og den britiske regering
The relation between BNFL and the UK Government
BNFL oplyser, at beslutningen om at indgå aftaler med BE var BNFL’s egen beslutning og ikke et krav fra den britiske regerings side.
BNFL submits that its decision to enter into the arrangements with BE was an autonomous decision of BNFL and was not at the direction of the UK Government.
At BNFL er en offentligt ejet virksomhed giver ikke grundlag for at hævde, at BNFL’s beslutninger kan tilegnes den britiske regering.
The fact that BNFL is a publicly owned company does not suffice to consider that BNFL’s decisions are imputable to the UK Government.