natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I den sammenhæng var statens beslutning om, at den ville deltage i kapitaltilførslen i selskabet ved at stille en kreditbevilling til rådighed, den endelige udmøntning af statens tilkendegivelser.
In this sense, the State's decision to act upfront of the Company's recapitalisation by granting a credit line ultimately constitutes a concretisation of the State's announcements.
Kommissionen understreger for det første, at den er klar over, at kapitaltilførslen til FT i april 2003 var en succes, og at aktionærlånet aldrig blev gennemført.
The Commission would stress first of all that it is aware that the operation to recapitalise France Télécom carried out in April 2003 was a success and that the shareholder loan was never actually made.
Kommissionen minder også om, at den som led i analysen af det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip som regel undersøger, om en fornuftig privat investor af en størrelse, der er sammenlignelig med den offentlige investor, ville have udvist en adfærd, der svarer til den offentlige investors.
It would point out also that, in applying the prudent private investor test, the Commission generally enquires whether a prudent private investor of a size comparable to that of the public investor would have acted in a similar manner to the public investor.
Den faste retspraksis foreskriver, at analysen af det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip tager udgangspunkt i de oplysninger, som den offentlige investor havde til sin rådighed, da investeringsbeslutningen blev truffet.
According to well established case law, the analysis of the prudent private investor principle is based on the information the investor has at his disposal at the time he takes his investment decision.
At der i marts-april 2003 blev gennemført en vellykket kapitaltilførsel er derfor ikke relevant for vurderingen af statens adfærd i december 2002.
The success of the operation in March-April 2003 cannot therefore be taken into account in assessing the State's conduct in December 2002.
Kommissionen understreger i øvrigt, at den, når den skal bedømme overholdelsen af samtidighedskriteriet, ikke kan basere sin vurdering af statens adfærd på, hvordan andre økonomiske aktører handlede, eftersom statens tilkendegivelser havde påvirket markedet og de økonomiske aktørers adfærd.
The Commission would stress, moreover, that, in applying the concomitance criterion it cannot base the assessment of the State's conduct on the conduct of other economic operators in so far as their conduct and the market were influenced by the State's declarations.
Statens tilkendegivelser i juli og flere gange herefter om, at den ville gøre, hvad der måtte være nødvendigt for at give selskabet mulighed for at afhjælpe sine finansieringsproblemer, kuldkaster således vurderingen af samtidighedskriteriet, da man ikke kan betragte de private investorers beslutning som baseret udelukkende på selskabets situation, uanset om tilkendegivelserne viser, at der er tale om statsstøtte eller ej.
The State's declarations, made in July and then repeated, to the effect that it would take the necessary steps to enable the Company to overcome its financing difficulties distort the concomitance test in so far as private investors cannot be considered to have made up their minds on the sole basis of the Company's situation. This holds true irrespective of whether those declarations contain state aid or not.
Det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip kan tilmed ikke vurderes ud fra markedssituationen i december, men må logisk set tage udgangspunkt i et marked, hvor situationen ikke er forplumret af tidligere tilkendegivelser og indgreb.
What is more, the application of the principle of the prudent private investor in a market economy cannot be based on the market situation in December, but must logically be based on the situation of a market uncontaminated by prior declarations and interventions.
Det virker derfor logisk at bedømme de pågældende beslutninger ud fra situationen før juli 2002.
It seems logical, therefore, to examine the decisions in question from the angle of the situation prior to July 2002.
Men hvis man analyserer beslutningerne på baggrund af situationen før juli 2002, ser de ikke ud til at overholde det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
If the decisions in question are thus analysed in the context of the situation prior to July 2002, it would appear that they do not satisfy the prudent private investor test.
Som det allerede er blevet påpeget, befandt FT sig i løbet af 2002 i en vanskelig økonomisk situation.
As already indicated, in 2002 France Télécom was operating in a difficult economic context.
Den gældsomlægningsplan, som ledelsen havde bebudet og som indebar en omfattende afhændelse af aktiver, blev af ratingbureauet Moody's vurderet som uigennemførlig, og bureauet sænkede derfor selskabets rating to trin den 24. juni 2002.
The debt-reduction plan announced by the management and centred on a major assets sale had been judged unworkable by the Moody's rating agency, which had downgraded the Company's credit rating by two notches on 24 June 2002.
Dermed havde FT mistet markedsaktørernes tillid.
As a result, France Télécom had then lost the markets' confidence.
På det tidspunkt havde regeringen endnu ikke truffet tiltag for at forbedre selskabets forvaltning og resultater eller beordret en gennemgribende revision.
At that time, the Government had not yet taken any steps to improve the Company's operation and results or commissioned any in-depth audit.
Regeringen havde f.eks. endnu ikke indsat det nye ledelsesteam eller iværksat nogen genoprettelsesplan, ikke engang på undersøgelsesstadiet .
In particular, the Government had not yet appointed a new management team and no recovery plan was yet in place or even on the drawing board .
Den støtte, som den franske regering bebudede med sine tilkendegivelser fra og med juli 2002, fremstår dermed som en ensidig foranstaltning fra statens side, mens markedsaktørerne i højere grad var skeptiske over for selskabets evne til at rette op på sin finansielle situation og mens finansanalytikere manede til forsigtighed med at deltage i en eventuel konsolidering af selskabets egenkapital .
The support announced by the French Government beginning with its July 2002 declarations was therefore in the nature of a unilateral move by the State at a time when the market was somewhat sceptical about the Company's capacity to redress its financial situation and when financial analysts were recommending caution over participating in a possible operation to strengthen the Company's capital base.
I betragtning af selskabets finansielle situation som gennemgået i nærværende beslutning, og af den overordnede kontekst, hvor markedsaktørerne på daværende tidspunkt havde mistet tilliden til selskabet, og af, at der ikke forelå en troværdig og realistisk gældsomlægningsplan før i december, betragter Kommissionen det som usandsynligt, at en privat investor i tiden efter juli 2002 ville være fremkommet med tilkendegivelser svarende til den franske regerings, som ud fra en rent økonomisk synsvinkel ville kunne skade den pågældendes troværdighed og anseelse alvorligt og ud fra en juridisk synsvinkel sågar kunne forpligte vedkommende til fra da af at yde økonomisk støtte til selskabet, uanset hvad der ellers måtte ske.
In the light of the Company's financial situation as described in this Decision, the overall context of loss of market confidence at the time and the lack of any credible and realistic debt-reduction plan until December, the Commission considers it improbable that a private investor would, from July 2002, have made declarations similar to those made by the French Government, likely as they were, from a purely economic point of view, to seriously place his credibility and reputation on the line and, from a legal point of view, to even oblige him from that date to support the Company financially come what may.
Ved at gøre det ville en investor således have pådraget sig selv en betydelig risiko over for selskabet uden modydelse fra selskabet eller fra andre aktionærer i det, og uden at der var påregnet nogen form for senere modydelse for denne støtte.
In so doing, any investor would have assumed a very considerable risk vis-à-vis the Company, without being indemnified by the Company or its other shareholders and without any compensation being envisaged in return for his support.
Selv en storaktionær, som sad inde med de samme oplysninger om selskabets økonomiske situation som de franske myndigheder på daværende tidspunkt, ville sandsynligvis ikke have båret sig sådan ad uden først at have gennemgået selskabets finansielle situation grundigt og truffet de fornødne foranstaltninger for at rette op på den for dermed at få et tilstrækkelig præcist billede af, hvilken risiko vedkommende ville løbe og hvilket afkast der var udsigt til.
It is likely that even a reference shareholder in possession of the same information on the Company's economic situation as that which the French authorities had at their disposal at the time would not have taken such a step without first carrying out a thorough audit of the Company ' s financial situation and taking the measures necessary to ensure its recovery in order to gain a fairly precise idea of the risk he was about to take and of the associated remuneration prospects.
En sådan storaktionær ville under alle omstændigheder have haft brug for finansieringsmarkedernes hjælp for at rette op på situationen i selskabet, og markederne virkede på daværende tidspunkt ikke interesserede i at investere i eller yde FT omfattende kredit.
Such a reference shareholder would in any case have needed the financial markets' help in setting the company to rights, and the markets did not at that time seem prepared to invest in or grant much in the way of credit to France Télécom.
Det er usandsynligt, at en fornuftig privat investor, som stod i samme situation som den franske stat, var fremkommet med de samme støttetilkendegivelser til fordel for FT i juli 2002 på baggrund af selskabets økonomiske situation og den manglende adgang til klare og fuldstændige oplysninger herom.
It is unlikely that a prudent private investor in the same position as the French State would, in the light of France Télécom's economic situation and the unavailability of any clear, comprehensive information thereon, have made any declarations of support for the Company in July 2002.
Og det er endnu mere usandsynligt, at en sådan investor havde givet et aktionærlån og dermed påtaget sig en meget omfattende økonomisk risiko alene.
It is even less likely that he would have granted a shareholder loan, taking on himself alone a very substantial financial risk.
For så vidt angår FT's og de franske myndigheders argumenter om, at »man kan indvende, at enhver tilkendegivelse af statens opbakning indebærer en underforstået garanti i betragtning af de »ubegrænsede« midler, som staten råder over«, hvilket »reelt betyder, at det er umuligt at anvende det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip — da andre investorer altid har begrænsede midler — og at statens adfærd altid vil blive vurderet anderledes end en privat investors« og at staten dermed forhindres i at fremkomme med offentlige tilkendegivelser, så kan Kommissionen ikke godtage disse argumenter.
The argument advanced by France Télécom and the French authorities to the effect that ‘it may be objected that any show of support by the State would have an implicit guarantee effect in view of the “unlimited” means at the State's disposal’, which ‘would be tantamount to making it impossible to apply the principle of the prudent private investor — whose resources are always limited — and to treating the conduct of the State shareholder differently from that of the private investor’, and that this would prevent any public declaration by the State, cannot be accepted by the Commission.
Det er da heller ikke tanken at forhindre staten i at bære sig ad som en fornuftig privat investor og i påkommende tilfælde tilkendegive sin opbakning på samme måde, som en sådan ville gøre (f.eks. ved at erklære sin hensigt om at deltage i en eventuel kapitaltilførsel, når den er baseret på en seriøs og troværdig omlægningsplan), eller at forpligte staten til at indberette hver eneste tilkendegivelse, den fremsætter.
There is no question of preventing the State from behaving like a prudent private investor and making, if necessary, declarations of support which a prudent private investor would make (such as declaring its intention to take part in a possible recapitalisation scheme where the operation is based on a serious and credible recovery plan) or of obliging the State to notify any declaration.
Kommissionen understreger, at et udtrykkeligt forbehold om, at et påtænkt tiltag forudgående skal indberettes til Kommissionen og først gennemføres, når den har godkendt det, i sig selv ville gøre tilkendegivelserne betingede og dermed ville give mulighed for at analysere statens senere indgriben ud fra den markedssituation, der var gældende, da der blev truffet beslutning om tiltaget.
The Commission would point out that an explicit reservation to the effect that any subsequent intervention would be notified in advance to the Commission and implemented only after it had been approved would render the declarations conditional and would thus make it possible to examine the subsequent intervention by the State on the basis of the market situation existing at the time of its adoption.
Ud fra ovenstående betragtninger må det konkluderes, at det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip ikke blev overholdt.
It follows from all of the above considerations that the test of the prudent private investor in a market economy is not satisfied.
Derfor udgør den fordel, som FT fik via det påtænkte aktionærlån — når den analyseres på baggrund af de franske myndigheders forudgående tilkendegivelser og tiltag — statsstøtte, om end dens omfang er vanskeligt at beregne.
Consequently, the advantage conferred on France Télécom by the proposal to grant a shareholder loan — examined in the light of the prior declarations and interventions of the French authorities — constitutes state aid, even if the scale of the advantage is difficult to calculate.
Angående spørgsmålet, om støtten er forenelig med fællesmarkedet, henviser Kommissionen først til, at Kommissionens analyse i indledningsbeslutningens pkt. 122 og 123 stadig finder anvendelse.
As to the compatibility of the aid in question, the Commission would point out first of all that its analysis as set out in paragraphs 122 and 123 of the opening decision is still applicable in the present case.
Derfor kan støttens forenelighed med fællesmarkedet analyseres efter de kriterier, som anvendes i rammebestemmelserne.
Consequently, the aid's compatibility with the common market may be analysed in accordance with the criteria applied in the Guidelines.
Kommissionen bemærker, at France Télécom var kriseramt i rammebestemmelsernes forstand, som det fremgår af tabel 10.
The Commission would observe that France Télécom was a firm in difficulty within the meaning of the guidelines, as can be seen from Table 10.
En virksomhed betragtes således som kriseramt, »når over halvdelen af den tegnede kapital er forsvundet og over en fjerdedel af denne kapital er gået tabt i løbet af de sidste 12 måneder«.
More particularly, a firm is regarded as being in difficulty where ‘more than half of its registered capital has disappeared and more than one quarter of that capital has been lost over the preceding 12 months’.
Regnskab
Consolidated balance sheet
Kilde: France Télécoms årsregnskaber for 1999, 2002, 2003.
Source: France Télécom Annual Reports 1999, 2002, 2003.
(Beløb i mio. EUR)
(Amounts in EUR million)
(Data for 1998, 1 Euro = 6,55957 FRF)
(1998 data, EUR 1 = FRF 6,55957)
Regnskaber pr. 31. december
Financial year ended 31 December
Overkurs ved emission
Additional paid–in capital
Hensættelser
Reserves
Konsolideret nettoresultat
Group's share of net result
Omregningshensættelse
Conversion reserve
Egne aktier
Own shares
Egenkapital
Shareholders' equity
Minoritetsinteresser
Minority interests
Ikke–tilbagebetalelige midler og lignende
Non–reimbursable funds and the like
Lang– og mellemfristet finansieringsgæld
Long– and medium–term debt
Anden langfristet gæld
Other long–term liabilities
Langfristet gæld i alt
Total long–term liabilities
Andel af lang– og mellemfristet finansieringsgæld med forfald inden for ét år
Current portion of long– and medium–term debt
Kassekreditter og andre kortfristede lån
Bank overdrafts and other short–term borrowings
Leverandørgæld
Trade accounts payable
Skyldige omkostninger og andre kortfristede hensættelser
Accrued expenses and other payables
Anden gæld
Other current liabilities
Udskudt skat
Deferred income taxes
Modtagne forudbetalinger
Deferred income
Kortfristet gæld i alt
Total current liabilities
Ifølge rammebestemmelsernes angivelser af den tegnede kapital omfatter indikatorerne for en virksomheds status som kriseramt ikke samtlige dele af egenkapitalen, men kun aktiekapitalen og overkursen ved emission.
According to the letter of the Guidelines, which refer to the registered capital, the relevant indicators for the purposes of characterising France Télécom as a firm in difficulty do not include all the elements constituting the own capital but are limited to the share capital and the additional paid-in capital.
Pr. 31. december 2001 beløb den tegnede kapital sig efter denne definition til 28,8 mia. EUR (heraf 4,6 mia. EUR i aktiekapital og 24,2 mia. EUR i overkurs).
On 31 December 2001, according to this definition, the registered capital came to EUR 28,8 billion (corresponding to EUR 4,6 billion of share capital plus EUR 24,2 billion of additional paid-in capital).
Pr. 31. december 2002 beløb den tegnede kapital sig til 29,5 mia. EUR (heraf 4,8 mia. EUR i aktiekapital og 24,7 mia. EUR i overkurs).
On 31 December 2002, the registered capital came to EUR 29,5 billion (corresponding to EUR 4,8 billion of share capital plus EUR 24,7 billion of additional paid-in capital).
For regnskabsåret 2002 udgjorde koncernens nettounderskud 20,7 mia. EUR, hvilket svarer til, at 70 % af den tegnede kapital var forsvundet (20,7 mia. EUR af 29,5 mia. EUR).
For the 2002 financial year, the group's net loss came to EUR 20,7 billion, which corresponds to a 70 % loss of registered capital (EUR 20,7 billion/EUR 29,5 billion).
Hvis man også medregner de negative hensættelser på 8,9 mia. EUR, når man frem til, at hele den tegnede kapital var forsvundet.
If account were taken of the negative reserves of EUR 8,9 billion, the result would be a loss of the entire registered capital.
Det må således konstateres, at FT var en kriseramt virksomhed i rammebestemmelsernes forstand.
Hence it must be concluded that France Télécom was a firm in difficulty within the meaning of the Guidelines.
Denne konklusion bekræftes af en analyse ud fra rammebestemmelsernes punkt 6.
This finding is borne out by an analysis of point 6 of the Guidelines.
Heri angives det, hvordan en virksomheds vanskeligheder sædvanligvis viser sig.
This point mentions a number of signs illustrating the financial difficulties of a firm.
Det drejer sig bl.a. om voksende underskud, faldende omsætning, faldende selvfinansiering, stigende gældsætning, stigende finansieringsudgifter og faldende nettoformue.
They include qualitative criteria such as increasing losses, diminishing turnover, declining cash flow, mounting debt, rising interest charges and falling or nil net asset value.
Som svar på de franske myndigheders argumenter om væksten i driftsposterne påpeger Kommissionen, at en virksomheds balance, driftsresultater og udsigter for fremtidigt cashflow alt sammen indgår som væsentlige elementer i vurderingen af virksomheden.
As to the French authorities' arguments concerning the growth in the operational elements, the Commission would point out that a company's balance sheet, operating results and future cash flow forecasts are elements forming an integral part of a company's assessment.
Den gæld, der figurerer i virksomhedens balance, bebyrder f.eks. det fremtidige cashflow, selv om den hidrører fra tidligere begivenheder.
The debt in a company's balance sheet has an effect on its future cash flow even if it is due to past events.
Kommissionen understreger, at den er klar over, at selskabets omsætning var i fremgang og at bruttoavancen ved selvfinansiering var høj og i endnu kraftigere fremgang end omsætningen, men det ændrer ikke ved, hvordan markedsrealiteterne er for en dybt forgældet virksomhed.
The Commission would stress that, although it is aware of the growth in the Company's turnover and of the fact that its cash flow was both high and growing faster than its turnover, it cannot ignore the real market position of a company burdened with a colossal debt.
Kommissionen kan heller ikke vurdere en virksomheds strategiske beslutninger fuldstændig uden hensyntagen til de driftsmæssige.
Nor can it dissociate the strategic decisions taken by a company from its operational decisions.
Derfor kan man ikke betragte selskabets fokus på stigende cashflow isoleret, som de franske myndigheder ellers hævder.
Thus, contrary to what the French authorities maintain, the Company's cash flow growth cannot be viewed in isolation.
Ifølge den tidligere omtalte HSBC-rapport skulle selskabets finansieringsbehov selv efter iværksættelse af TOP-planen have været på 21,9 mia. EUR i 2004 og 2005; uden TOP-planen ville det i samme periode have været på 33 mia. EUR.
The above-mentioned HSBC report states, moreover, that, even with the TOP plan, the Company's financing requirement would be for EUR 21,9 billion in 2004 and 2005; without the TOP plan, the requirement would be for EUR 33 billion over the same period.
Omkostninger til solgte varer og tjenesteydelser
Cost of services and products sold
Handels- og administrationsudgifter
Selling and administrative expenses
Forsknings- og udviklingsudgifter
Research and development expenses
Overskud før renter, skat, af- og neds krivning (EBITDA)
Operating income/loss before amortisation of fixed assets and of actuarial adjustments in the early retirement plan (EBITDA)
Overskud(EBIT)
Operating income/loss (EBIT)
Nettofinansieringsomkostninger ud over aktieombyttelige værdipapirer
Interest expenses, net (excluding perpetual bonds redeemable for shares — TDIRA)
Renteudgifter på aktieombyttelige værdipapirer
Interest expenses on TDIRA
Nettokursdifference
Foreign exchange gain/loss, net
Følger af gennemførelse af førtidspensionsplan
Discounting of early retirement plan
Resultat for de integrerede selskaber
Current income/loss from integrated companies
Andre ikke-driftsrelaterede omkostninger, netto
Other non-operating income (expense), net
Selskabsskat
Corporation tax
Medarbejderdeltagelse
Employee profit-sharing
Resultat for de integrerede selskaber
Net income/loss from integrated companies
Andel af det samlede resultat efter indre værdi
Equity in net income/loss of affiliates
Afskrivning af værdiforskel
Goodwill amortisation
Ekstraordinær afskrivning af værdiforskel
Exceptional goodwill amortisation
Koncernresultat, netto
Net income/loss of the consolidated group
Nettoresultat (konsolideret)
Résultat net (Part du groupe)
Analysen af de forskellige kriterier, som omhandles i betragtning 237, viser, at FT havde stigende underskud både i 2001 og i 2002.
Analysis of the various criteria mentioned in paragraph 237 shows that France Télécom was incurring growing losses in 2001 and 2002.
Endvidere beløb FT's nettofinansieringsgæld (se tabel 12) sig til 63,5 mia. EUR pr. 31. december 2001, 69,7 mia. EUR pr. 30. juni 2002 og 68,0 mia. EUR pr. 31. december 2002.
Moreover, France Télécom's net financial liabilities (see Table 12) came to EUR 63,5 billion on 31 December 2001, EUR 69,7 billion on 30 June 2002 and EUR 68,0 billion on 31 December 2002.
Kilde: France Télécoms årsregnskaber og konsoliderede regnskaber pr. 30. juni 2002
Source: France Télécom annual reports and consolidated balance sheets as at 30 June 2002
i milliarder euro
(EUR billion)
Langfristet gæld i alt
Total long-term liabilities
Kassekreditter og andre kortfristede lån 11,4 13,8 10,5
Other long-term liabilities
Finansieringsgæld, netto
Net financial liabilities