natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Som begrundelse for sin beslutning om kun at godtgøre den del af den særlige IBB-reserve, der blev anvendt, anførte Tyskland bl.a., at IBB disponerede over den særlige reserve som foranstillet kapital, og at det i første omgang var LBB, der skulle afvikle sine risikobetonede aktiver eller optage efterstillet kapital på markedet, hvis den foranstillede kapital ikke slog til.
Germany justifies the decision to require remuneration only for the part of the IBB special-purpose reserve actually taken up inter alia on the grounds that the reserve was available primarily to IBB and that, if it were insufficient, it was first LBB which was obliged to reduce its risk assets or raise subordinated capital on the market.
Delstaten Berlin kunne som ejer af IBB til enhver tid trække dele ud af den særlige reserve.
As owner of IBB, the Land of Berlin was entitled to withdraw parts of the special-purpose reserve at any time.
Tyskland gjorde i den forbindelse også gældende, at de likvide midler af den særlige IBB-reserve var bundet i IBB's eksisterende forretninger, og at de ikke var disponible for LBB til finansieringsformål.
Germany also commented in this connection that the liquidity of the special-purpose reserve was tied up in IBB's existing business and was not available to LBB for financing purposes.
IBB var nødt til selv at dække sine udlånsaktiviteter med egne midler og at tage den særlige reserve i brug hertil.
IBB had to underpin its lending itself with own funds and, in so doing, to have recourse to the special-purpose reserve.
Tyskland anførte, at disse særlige forhold gjorde, at WBK-formuen ikke kunne sammenlignes med frit disponible finansielle aktiver, og at det derfor kun var garantifunktionen og dermed den forretningsudvidende funktion, der kom på tale.
Germany stated that, in the light of these specific factors, WBK's assets could not be equated with freely available financial assets and that, therefore, only the guarantee function and thus the business expansion function were at issue.
Det var i den forbindelse uvæsentligt, om godtgørelsen blev betalt til delstaten eller til IBB, da delstaten som garant for både IBB og LBB under alle omstændigheder ville drage fordel heraf, enten via LBB's værditilvækst og udbytteudlodninger eller via tilførsler til den særlige IBB-reserve, som delstaten har krav på.
Whether the remuneration was paid to the Land or to IBB was immaterial here since the Land as guarantor would, in any event, profit from both IBB and LBB, either through LBB's increase in value and distribution of profits or through inflows into IBB's special-purpose reserve, on which the Land had a claim.
Ud over disse bemærkninger om den direkte godtgørelse havde Tyskland dog helt principielt det standpunkt, at det ikke var en faktor eller ikke var den eneste faktor, når der skal tages stilling til, om man vil foretage en investering, og at der ifølge fast retspraksis skal sondres mellem investorer, der ikke har og heller ikke ønsker at have væsentlige interesser i den pågældende virksomhed, men som ønsker en hurtig forrentning af deres investering, og investorer, der som f.eks. holdingselskaber betragter investeringen på lang sigt.
Besides these comments on the direct remuneration, Germany also argued that it was not a factor, or not the only factor, in an investment decision and that ‘in accordance with the case law, … an investor who does not hold or seek to hold a significant share in the relevant company but who is interested in a rapid return on his investment must be distinguished from investors geared to the long term, such as holding companies’.
Sidstnævnte var ifølge Tyskland styret af forventningerne til virksomhedens rentabilitet på længere sigt og tog også hensyn til strategiske betragtninger.
The latter were interested in long-term return expectations and would also take account of strategic considerations.
Da investeringen blev foretaget, var delstaten som eneejer af LBB gået ud fra, at den ville drage fuld og direkte fordel af LBB's værditilvækst som følge af overdragelsen af WBK.
As sole owner of LBB, the Land assumed at the time of the investment that it would benefit fully and directly from the increase in LBB's value brought about by WBK's transfer.
Tyskland gjorde oprindelig gældende, at LBB havde en egenkapitalforrentning på 13,5 % i 1992 og 30,83 % i 1993.
Germany initially indicated that LBB's return-on-equity ratio was 13,5 % in 1992 and 30,83 % in 1993.
Disse tal, der allerede var blevet fremsendt i 1999, skulle sammenholdes med forholdet mellem resultatet før (udbytte-)skatter og den regnskabsmæssigt opførte egenkapital primo samme år.
These figures, submitted back in 1999, related to the ratio ‘earnings before (income) tax/equity capital shown in the balance sheet at the start of the same year’.
Tyskland havde dog, da man fremsendte tallene, ikke medregnet den særlige IBB-reserve i LBB's egenkapital fra 1993.
However, in supplying these figures, Germany had not included IBB's special-purpose reserve in LBB's equity capital from 1993 onwards.
På anmodning fra Kommissionen blev der rådet bod herpå ved at fremsende talrækker, der omfattede et længere tidsrum.
At the Commission's request, this was corrected with the sending of data series covering a longer period.
For perioden 1985-1992 gav disse tal en gennemsnitlig egenkapitalforrentning på ca. 13 %.
For the period 1985-1992 these figures gave an average return on equity of about 13 %.
Tyskland anførte, at disse tal lå inden for de værdier, som private tyske banker ville have fået i samme tidsrum. Der forelå dog ingen oplysninger, der var opnået ved hjælp af en sammenlignelig metode for andre banker.
Germany stated that these figures would fall within the range of values obtained by private German banks in the same period, but it did not initially provide data produced by a similar method for other banks.
Tyskland indsendte senere sine egne beregninger, der var foretaget på basis af de offentliggjorte resultatopgørelser for 35 tyske banker.
It subsequently submitted its own calculations based on the published profit and loss statements of 35 German banks.
Går man ud fra resultatet før skat set i forhold til den regnskabsmæssigt opførte egenkapital primo samme år, havde disse banker en gennemsnitlig egenkapitalforrentning på ca. 11 % i 1992 og 13 % i tidsrummet mellem 1988-1992.
Taking ‘earnings before tax as a percentage of equity capital shown in the balance sheet at the start of the same year’, this gave an average return-on-equity ratio for these banks of around 11 % in 1992 and just under 13 % for the period from 1988 to 1992.
Tyskland anførte videre, at rentabiliteten erhvervsøkonomisk set er afgørende, når man skal tage stilling til, om man vil foretage en investering, og at rentabiliteten for bankers vedkommende nemmest kan afledes af resultatet af de almindelige forretninger eller ved at se driftsresultatet i forhold til den regnskabsmæssigt opførte egenkapital, da der dermed ikke tages hensyn til ekstraordinære indtægter og udgifter.
Germany also stated that, from a business point of view, earning capacity was a decisive factor in an investment decision and that, in the case of banks, it could best be derived from profit from ordinary business or from operating result as a percentage of equity capital shown in the balance sheet since extraordinary earnings and expenditure would then be excluded.
I 1990-1992 havde forholdene således været ekstraordinære for LBB, særlig som følge af integreringen af »Sparkasse Ost« og den dermed forbundne opbygning af en egen pensionsordning, samtidig med at der skulle betales kompensation for at træde ud af Tysklands og delstatens pensionskasse og tages højde for de almindelige bankrisici, der gjorde sig gældende for den tidligere »Sparkasse Ost«.
In the years 1990-92 LBB faced extraordinary circumstances, in particular the integration of the East Berlin Savings Bank and the related setting up of its own pension scheme, at the same time as it had to pay a compensation fee for withdrawing from the Federal and Länder Pension Institution and to make provision for the general banking risks of the former East Berlin Savings Bank.
For så vidt angår opnåelsen af egenkapitalforrentninger ved hjælp af sammenlignelige metoder for andre banker i samme tidsrum, anførte Tyskland, at der først fra 1993 havde været krav om at opføre ekstraordinære resultater og resultater af de almindelige forretninger hver for sig i resultatopgørelsen, og at det ikke kan sammenlignes med den metode, der blev anvendt før 1993, da ekstraordinære indtægter og udgifter — og andre poster — indtil da havde været opført sammen i posten »øvrige indtægter/udgifter« og derfor ikke kunne angives præcist.
As regards obtaining methodologically comparable return-on-equity ratios for other banks in the same period, Germany stated that banks were required only as of 1993 to enter extraordinary result and profit from ordinary business separately in the profit and loss account, and that this cannot be compared with the pre-1993 method, when extraordinary income and expenditure were included, together with other items, under ‘other income and expenditure’ and therefore could not be identified precisely.
For tiden før dette tidspunkt indsendte Tyskland sine egne beregninger.
For the period pre-1993, Germany submitted its own calculations.
I sagens videre forløb rettede og supplerede Tyskland også metoden til at beregne LBB's egenkapitalforrentninger for at gøre tallene for LBB sammenlignelige med Deutsche Bundesbanks officielle undersøgelser for tyske banker i almindelighed.
In the course of the proceedings Germany also made corrections and additions to the method for calculating LBB's return on equity, in order to render the figures for LBB comparable with the Bundesbank's official survey of German banks.
Det ændrede ifølge Tyskland ikke ved den grundlæggende vurdering, at LBB's egenkapitalforrentninger lå inden for branchens gennemsnit.
According to Germany, this did not change the basic assessment that LBB's return on equity was in line with the average for the sector.
Samtlige tal viser efter Tysklands opfattelse, at LBB var en lønsom virksomhed, da kapitalen blev indskudt.
In Germany's view, all the data showed that, at the time of the capital injection, LBB had a high earning capacity.
Delstaten Berlin var ifølge Tyskland eneejer og den eneste, der ville nyde godt af bankens kommercielle succes, hvad enten der var tale om udbytteudlodninger eller en værdistigning.
The Land of Berlin was the sole owner and would alone benefit from the bank's commercial success, whether in the form of dividends or an increase in value.
Delstaten ville derfor ikke skulle dele den forventede provenustigning med andre ejere, og for en markedsøkonomisk investor var den næsten »koncerninterne« investering en fornuftig transaktion.
In this respect, the Land would not have to share the expected increase in return with other shareholders and the almost ‘intra-group’ investment was sound conduct from the point of view of an investor operating in a market economy.
Spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt der blev betalt en godtgørelse for LBB's kapitalindskud, og hvor stor den i givet fald var, var ifølge Tyskland derfor uden betydning for vurderingen af overdragelsens markedsøkonomiske karakter.
The question of whether and how large a remuneration was paid by LBB for the capital injection was therefore irrelevant to an assessment of the transfer's market-economy status.
Kommissionen havde udtrykkelig anvendt dette bedømmelseskriterium i sin beslutning 2000/392/EF: »En måde til at sikre en passende forrentning af den investerede kapital havde derfor været at øge delstatens andel i WestLB i samme omfang, såfremt bankens samlede rentabilitet svarer til den normale forrentning, som en markedsøkonomisk investor forventer af sin investering.
According to Germany, the Commission expressly laid down this assessment criterion in Decision 2000/392/EC: ‘Therefore, one way of ensuring an adequate return on the capital provided would have been to increase the Land’s participation in WestLB accordingly, provided that the bank's overall profitability corresponds to the normal rate of return that a market-economy investor would expect from his investment.
Dette havde gjort det overflødigt at undersøge spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt godtgørelsen på 0,6 % er passende, men delstaten valgte ikke denne fremgangsmåde.«
This would have avoided the discussion of whether the 0,6 % rate of remuneration is appropriate. However, this course was not adopted by the Land.’
Tyskland anførte i den forbindelse videre, at den stigning i LBB's værdi, der fulgte af WBK-formuen, efter at LBB var overdraget til BGB, tilfaldt delstaten.
In this connection, Germany also stated that LBB's increase in value as a result of WBK's assets benefited the Land after LBB's incorporation into BGB.
Overdragelsen til BGB (i tre etaper i 1994 og 1998) af 100 % af den økonomiske ejendomsret til LBB var ifølge Tyskland blevet gennemført på grundlag af ekspertvurderinger, som forskellige revisorer og en investeringsbank havde udarbejdet om værdien af delstatens passive kapitalinteresser i LBB og om, hvorvidt modydelserne — dvs. de overdragne BGB-kapitalandele, herunder også i forhold til andre ejere — svarede til almindelig markedspraksis.
The transfer, undertaken in three stages in 1994 and 1998, of 100 % of the beneficial ownership in LBB to BGB was carried out on the basis of expert reports by various chartered accountants and one investment bank on the value of the Land’s silent partnership in LBB and on whether the quid pro quo — the BGB shares transferred, including in relation to other shareholders — equated to an acceptable market price.
Tyskland fremsendte relevante uddrag af de pågældende ekspertvurderinger og brevvekslingen med revisorerne.
Germany provided relevant extracts from these reports and the related correspondence with the accountants.
LBB's værdi blev således anslået til ca. 3,5 mia. DEM i 1993 (ekskl. IBB selv, men under hensyn til LBB's øgede kernekapitalprocent som følge af den særlige reserve) og — af en anden ekspert — til næsten 6 mia. DEM pr. 31. december 1997.
According to these documents, the value of LBB was set at some DEM 3,5 billion in 1993 (excluding IBB itself, but taking account of LBB's higher core capital ratio as a result of the special-purpose reserve) and, by a further expert, at just under DEM 6 billion at 31 December 1997.
Tyskland mente desuden, at den metode, Kommissionen havde anvendt i beslutning 2000/392/EF, var forkert, fordi den byggede på, at indskuddene kunne sammenlignes med almindelige investeringer i likvid selskabskapital.
Germany also suggested, in the alternative, that the method used by the Commission in Decision 2000/392/EC was faulty in that it assumed comparability with liquid ordinary capital investment.
Metoden tog ikke højde for de særlige forhold ved den pågældende transaktion.
This approach failed to take account of the particularities of the transaction at issue in these proceedings.
Der burde ifølge Tyskland anvendes sammenlignelige egenkapitalinstrumenter som udgangspunkt for beregningen.
It was proper to use comparable equity instruments as a basis for calculating even the starting amount.
Det kunne ganske vist være svært, som Kommissionen allerede påpegede i WestLB-sagen, men vanskelighederne blev ikke overvundet, hvis man anvendte et fuldstændig uegnet egenkapitalinstrument så at sige til at »omgå« problemet.
While this might be difficult, as the Commission had explained in the WestLB case, the difficulties would not be overcome by using a completely unsuitable equity capital instrument, almost as a ‘way around’ the problem.
Tyskland gjorde videre gældende, at det var forkert at bruge den gennemsnitlige forrentning som målestok.
It was also mistaken to use average return as a benchmark.
Ifølge Tyskland var det først en forrentning, der var lavere end den margen, investorer har som spillerum, der ikke var acceptabel for private investorer.
Only a return below the range available to investors for assessment purposes was no longer acceptable to a private investor.
Endelig var det forkert kun at fratrække nettoudgifterne ved refinansiering og ikke de samlede refinansieringsomkostninger.
Lastly, it was erroneous to deduct only net refinancing costs instead of total refinancing costs.
Eventuelle skattebesparelser, virksomheden får, var ifølge Tyskland uvæsentlige for investor.
Any tax savings by the company were immaterial from the investor's point of view.
En yderligere vurdering viste desuden ifølge Tyskland, at modellen ikke er acceptabel, for en investor, der indskyder ikke-likvid kapital, råder stadig over kapitalens udbyttefunktion, så han kan reinvestere kapitalen og i hvert fald få den risikofrie forrentning, dvs. han ville få »dobbelt« udbytte.
A further consideration showed that this approach was unacceptable since with non-liquid provision of capital the earnings function of the capital was still available to the investor and could be re-invested by him to obtain at least the risk-free rate of interest, and he would thus achieve ‘double’ earnings.
Tyskland gjorde desuden gældende, at forældelsesfristen var udløbet (artikel 15, stk. 1, i forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999), og at Kommissionen derfor ikke havde beføjelse til at kræve eventuel støtte tilbagebetalt.
Germany also argued that the limitation period had expired (pursuant to Article 15(1) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999) and that the Commission therefore had no power to order recovery of any aid.
Principbeslutningen om overdragelsen af WBK var allerede blevet truffet den 16. juni 1992, dvs. over ti år før, beslutningen om at indlede proceduren blev forkyndt den 4. juli 2002.
The basic resolution on WBK's transfer had been adopted on 16 June 1992, i.e. more than ten years before the decision initiating the investigation procedure was served on 4 July 2002.
Den grundlæggende hensigt havde været at samle delstatens bankinteresser og WBK i et holdingselskab (senere BGB), forudsat at WBK's støtteaktiviteter kunne videreføres, og at funktionen som offentlig myndighed og skattefritagelsen blev sikret.
The resolution expressed the basic intention to merge the Land’s bank holdings and WBK into one holding company (later BGB), provided that WBK's promotional activities could continue and that the assumption of sovereign tasks and the tax exemption were guaranteed.
Beslutningen havde siden hen været offentligt kendt, og Kommissionen var i 1999 blevet orienteret om, hvornår beslutningen var blevet truffet.
The resolution had been in the public domain since then, and the Commission had been informed of its date in 1999.
Tyskland gjorde gældende, at Kommissionen i en række beslutninger allerede havde givet udtryk for, at den anså det ansvarlige organs hensigtserklæring — endog med betingelser — for det tidspunkt, hvor støtten blev gennemført.
In a number of decisions, the Commission had already taken the declaration of intent by the relevant body, even subject to conditions, as marking the point at which the aid was implemented.
Det var også den holdning, Kommissionen havde indtaget i beslutningen om redningsstøtte til BGB, selv om den pågældende beslutning af 22. maj 2002 stadig skulle have været godkendt af Berlins parlament og Kommissionen.
This was also the position adopted by the Commission in the decision on rescue aid for BGB, even though the resolution concerned, adopted on 22 May 2002, had still required the approval of Parliament and of the Commission.
Desuden havde fristen ifølge Tyskland ikke været afbrudt, jf. artikel 15, stk. 2, andet punktum, i forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999, der bestemmer, at fristen kun kan afbrydes af foranstaltninger truffet af Kommissionen.
Moreover, in Germany's view, the limitation period had not been interrupted pursuant to the second sentence of Article 15(2) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which states that only action taken by the Commission can interrupt the period.
Det skete først med brevet om at indlede proceduren, dateret den 4. juli 2002, og ikke med anmodningen om oplysninger, som ikke var foranstaltninger truffet af Kommissionen eller det ansvarlige medlem af Kommissionen.
The first such Commission action was the letter regarding the initiation of the procedure dated 4 July 2002, and not the requests for information, which were not measures taken by the Commission or the relevant Commission Member.
Ifølge Tyskland måtte det også betænkes, at forældelsesfristen skulle garantere retssikkerheden, ikke kun i forbindelserne mellem Kommissionen og medlemsstaterne, men også støttemodtagerens retssikkerhed.
Account should moreover be taken of the fact that the limitation period existed in the interests of legal certainty, not only in relations between the Commission and the Member States but also for the recipients of state aid.
Da det var i beslutningen om at indlede proceduren, at Tyskland første gang blev opfordret til at sende støttemodtageren en kopi af brevet, hvad man gjorde den 9. juli 2002, blev forældelsesfristen først afbrudt fra denne dag.
As Germany was asked for the first time in the decision initiating the procedure to forward a copy of the letter to the aid recipient, which it did on 9 July 2002, the limitation period was interrupted only as of that date.
Eftersom det var beslutningen af 16. juni 1992, der var den foranstaltning, der skal undersøges for at vurdere, om der var tale om støtte, ville der — hvis der i det hele taget var tale om støtte — være tale om eksisterende støtte, jf. artikel 15, stk. 3, i forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999.
Since the measure subject to state aid monitoring was the resolution of 16 June 1992, it constituted, if it were aid at all, existing aid pursuant to Article 15(3) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.
V. BEMÆRKNINGER FRA ANDRE INTERESSEREDE PARTER
V. COMMENTS FROM OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES
Efter at beslutningen om at indlede proceduren var offentliggjort i EF-Tidende, modtog Kommissionen i oktober og november bemærkninger fra hhv. Berliner Volksbank (»BV«) og den tyske bankforening, Bundesverband deutscher Banken (»BdB«).
After the decision initiating the procedure had been published in the Official Journal, the Commission received comments from the Berliner Volksbank (‘BV’) and the Bundesverband deutscher Banken (‘BdB’) in October and November respectively.
BV var af den opfattelse, at der ved overdragelsen af WBK var tale om støtte, fordi der var blevet stillet kapital til rådighed på betingelser, som en markedsøkonomisk investor ikke ville have accepteret.
The BV took the view that the transfer of WBK was aid because the capital had been made available on terms which a market-economy investor would not have accepted.
BV gjorde gældende, at udbetalingerne blev foretaget af LBB til IBB, som selv blev drevet som afdeling under LBB, og at den aftalte rentesats på 0,25 % lå langt under de normale satser på markedet, hvad der f.eks. fremgik af beslutning 2000/392/EF (WestLB) og 95/547/EF og 98/490/EF (Crédit Lyonnais), hvor man var gået ud fra en forventet egenkapitalforrentning på mindst 12 %.
Payments were made by LBB to IBB, which was itself managed as a division of LBB; moreover, the agreed interest rate of 0,25 % lay well below the normal market rates, as illustrated by Decisions 2000/392/EC (WestLB), 95/547/EC and 98/490/EC (Crédit Lyonnais), where a likely return on capital of at least 12 % was taken as a basis.
Støtten resulterede ifølge BV i en alvorlig konkurrenceforvridning i Fællesskabet, men med særlig store konsekvenser for konkurrencen i Berlin, hvor BGB, herunder også LBB (inkl. Berliner Bank og Berliner Sparkasse), var markedsførende på privat- og erhvervskundeområdet.
This aid led to a serious distortion of Community-wide competition, but with particularly serious consequences in Berlin, where BGB, including LBB (and Berliner Bank and Berliner Sparkasse), led the market in personal and corporate retail banking.
Sammenlignet hermed var BV en lille konkurrent med markedsandele på 5-7 % og var derfor særlig berørt af de negative konsekvenser af støtten.
By comparison, BV was a small competitor with market shares of 5-7 % and was thus particularly affected by the negative impact of the aid.