natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
sammen med KM Europa Metal AG og Europa Metalli SpA fra 20. juni 1995 til 22. marts 2001
together with KM Europa Metal AG and Europa Metalli SpA, from 20 June 1995 to 22 March 2001.
Mueller Industries, Inc. sammen med WTC Holding Company, Inc., Mueller Europe Ltd, DENO Holding Company, Inc. og DENO Acquisition EURL fra 21. oktober 1997 til 8. januar 2001
Mueller Industries, Inc., together with WTC Holding Company, Inc., Mueller Europe Ltd, DENO Holding Company, Inc. and DENO Acquisition EURL, from 21 October 1997 until 8 January 2001;
WTC Holding Company, Inc. sammen med Mueller Industries, Inc., Mueller Europe Ltd, DENO Holding Company, Inc. og DENO Acquisition EURL fra 21. oktober 1997 til 8. januar 2001
WTC Holding Company, Inc., together with Mueller Industries, Inc., Mueller Europe Ltd, DENO Holding Company, Inc. and DENO Acquisition EURL, from 21 October 1997 until 8 January 2001;
Mueller Europe Ltd sammen med WTC Holding Company, Inc., Mueller Industries, Inc., DENO Holding Company, Inc. og DENO Acquisition EURL fra 21. oktober 1997 til 8. januar 2001
Mueller Europe Ltd, together with WTC Holding Company, Inc., Mueller Industries, Inc., DENO Holding Company, Inc. and DENO Acquisition EURL, from 21 October 1997 until 8 January 2001;
DENO Holding Company, Inc. sammen med WTC Holding Company, Inc., Mueller Europe Ltd, Mueller Industries, Inc. og DENO Acquisition EURL fra 21. oktober 1997 til 8. januar 2001
DENO Holding Company, Inc., together with WTC Holding Company, Inc., Mueller Europe Ltd, Mueller Industries, Inc. and DENO Acquisition EURL, from 21 October 1997 until 8 January 2001;
DENO Acquisition EURL sammen med WTC Holding Company, Inc., Mueller Europe Ltd, DENO Holding Company, Inc. og Mueller Industries, Inc. fra 21. oktober 1997 til 8. januar 2001
DENO Acquisition EURL, together with WTC Holding Company, Inc., Mueller Europe Ltd, DENO Holding Company, Inc. and Mueller Industries, Inc., from 21 October 1997 until 8 January 2001;
Outokumpu Oyj sammen med Outokumpu Copper Products Oy fra 29. september 1989 til 22. marts 2001
Outokumpu Oyj together with Outokumpu Copper Products Oy, from 29 September 1989 until 22 March 2001;
Outokumpu Copper Products Oy sammen med Outokumpu Oyj fra 29. september 1989 til 22. marts 2001
Outokumpu Copper Products Oy, together with Outokumpu Oyj, from 29 September 1989 until 22 March 2001;
alene fra 29. september 1989 til 8. juli 1999, og
individually from 29 September 1989 until 8 July 1999, and
sammen med Austria Buntmetall AG og Buntmetall Amstetten Ges.m.b.H. fra 9. juli 1999 til 22. marts 2001.
together with Austria Buntmetall AG and Buntmetall Amstetten Ges.m.b.H., from 9 July 1999 until 22 March 2001.
Markedet for VVS-rør af kobber
The market for Copper Plumbing tubes
Kobberrør opdeles normalt i to produktkategorier: i) industrirør, der inddeles i underkategorier efter anvendelsesformål (klimaanlæg og kølesystemer, fittings, gasvarmere, filtertørrere og telekommunikation), og ii) VVS-rør (også kaldet sanitets- eller vandrør).
Copper tubes are generally divided into two product groups: (i) industrial tubes which are segregated in sub-groups based on the end use (air-conditioning and refrigeration, fittings, gas heater, filter dryer and telecommunications), and (ii) plumbing tubes (also called sanitary tubes, water tubes or installation tubes).
VVS-rør anvendes til vand-, olie-, gas- og varmeanlæg i byggeindustrien [2].
Plumbing tubes are used for water, oil, gas and heating installations in the construction industry [2].
Traditionelt set blev VVS-rør hovedsagelig fremstillet af kobber, dvs. genindvundet kobber, nyraffineret kobber (katodekobber) eller kobberblokke, og i et vist omfang af stål.
Traditionally, plumbing tubes were mainly made of copper, i.e. recycled copper, newly refined copper (cathode copper) or copper ingots, and to some extent steel.
Siden begyndelsen af 1990'erne er VVS-rør i stigende omfang blevet fremstillet af plast eller plastsammensætninger (plast med aluminiumslag).
Since the early 1990s, plumbing tubes have increasingly been produced of plastic or compounds (plastic with layers of aluminium).
Denne udskiftningsproces blev fremmet af den offentlige debat om kvalitetsnormer for drikkevand og den efterfølgende vedtagelse af det europæiske drikkevandsdirektiv i 1998.
The substitution process was enhanced by public discussion on quality standards for drinking water and the subsequent adoption of the European Drinking Water Directive in 1998.
De største aftagere af VVS-rør er engros- og detailforhandlere, der sælger rørene til installatører og andre endelige forbrugere, mens industrirør normalt anvendes af og sælges direkte til industrikunder, originaludstyrsfabrikanter eller producenter af reservedele.
Main customers for plumbing tubes are distributors, wholesalers and retailers that sell the plumbing tubes to installers and other end consumers, whereas industrial tubes are usually used by and directly sold to industrial customers, original equipment manufacturers or part manufacturers.
I 2000 blev EØS-markedet for almindelige VVS-rør af kobber anslået til 1 mia. EUR og for plastisolerede VVS-rør af kobber til ca. 200 mio. EUR [3].
The estimated EEA market value for plain copper plumbing tubes was approximately EUR 1 billion in 2000 and for plastic-insulated copper plumbing tubes approximately EUR 200 million [3].
Europas største producenter af VVS-rør af kobber er denne beslutnings adressater.
The major producers of copper plumbing tubes in Europe are the addressees of the Decision.
Deres markedsandele i EØS (for almindelige rør) i 2000, der var det sidste hele år, hvor kartelaftalen blev anvendt, var skønsmæssigt følgende: KME […] [4] %, IMI […] %, Outokumpu […] %, Wieland Werke […] %, Mueller […] %, Boliden […]%, Buntmetall […] % (1998), HME […] %, Halcor […] %.
Their estimated EEA market shares (plain tubes) in 2000, the last full year of the implementation of the cartel agreement, were roughly as follows: KME […] [4] %, IMI […] %, Outokumpu […] %, Wieland Werke […] %, Mueller […] %, Boliden […] %, Buntmetall […] % (1998), HME […] %, Halcor […] %.
Den samlede markedsandel i EØS (for almindelige og plastisolerede VVS-rør) var skønsmæssigt følgende: KME […] % og Wieland […] %.
The estimated aggregated EEA market share (plain and plastic-insulated plumbing tubes) in 2000, the last full year of the implementation of the cartel agreement, was roughly as follows: KME […] % and Wieland […] %.
Disse virksomheder tegnede sig tilsammen for ca. 80-90 % af det samlede EØS-marked for almindelige VVS-rør af kobber.
Of the total EEA plain copper plumbing tube market these undertakings together accounted for about 80 to 90 %.
Det skal dog bemærkes, at det ikke var alle parter, der deltog i hele perioden.
However, it has to be noted that not all parties participated for the entire period.
Denne beslutnings adressater medvirkede ved en enkelt, vedvarende og kompleks overtrædelse af traktatens artikel 81 og EØS-aftalens artikel 53, som for Bolidens, KME-koncernens og Wielands vedkommende antog mange forskellige former. Overtrædelsen omfattede det meste af EØS-området, hvor de fordelte mængder og markedsandele, i visse tilfælde aftalte prismål, prisforhøjelser eller andre kommercielle vilkår for almindelige VVS-rør af kobber (og for KME's og Wielands vedkommende plastisolerede VVS-rør af kobber) og førte tilsyn med gennemførelsen af deres konkurrencebegrænsende arrangementer ved at udveksle oplysninger om afsætning, ordrer, markedsandele og prissætning og gennem et markedsførerarrangement.
The addressees of the present decision participated in a single, continuous, complex and, as far as Boliden, the KME-group and Wieland are concerned, multiform infringement of Article 81 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, covering most of the EEA territory by which they allocated volumes and market shares, agreed in certain cases on price targets, price increases or other commercial terms for plain copper plumbing tubes (and, as far as KME and Wieland are concerned, plastic-coated copper plumbing tubes), and monitored the implementation of their anti-competitive arrangements by exchanging information on sales, orders, market shares and pricing, and by a market leader arrangement.
Overtrædelsen startede i juni 1988 og ophørte i marts 2001.
The infringement started in June 1988 and finished in March 2001.
Forskellige selskaber var involveret i forskellige tidsrum.
Different companies were involved during different time periods.
Der var tale om en enkelt overtrædelse, fordi den tilsigtede et vedvarende mål, og fordi der konstant blev truffet foranstaltninger til fordeling af mængder og samordning af priser.
The infringement was single because there was a continuous aim and continuous actions and measures to allocate volumes and coordinate prices.
Den var kompleks, fordi den bestod af både aftaler og samordnet praksis.
It was complex because it was composed of both agreements and concerted practices.
Overtrædelsen antog også flere forskellige former, idet den blev tilrettelagt på tre niveauer med det formål at undgå konkurrence inden for VVS-rør af kobber.
The anti-competitive behavior also constituted a multiform infringement because it was organised on three levels with the object to avoid competition in the copper plumbing tube industry.
Samarbejdet på første niveau startede senest i juni 1988 (og varede indtil marts 2001) og involverede de såkaldte »SANCO®«-producenter (»SANCO«-klubben): KME, Tréfimétaux, Europa Metalli, Boliden og Wieland.
Cooperation on the first level started at least in June 1988 (lasting until March 2001) and involved the so-called ‘SANCO®’ producers (‘SANCO’ club): KME, Tréfimétaux, Europa Metalli, Boliden and Wieland.
Boliden begrænsede sit SANCO-samarbejde i juli 1995 og deltog fortsat i informationsudvekslingssystemet indtil marts 2001.
Boliden reduced its SANCO cooperation in July 1995 and continued in the information exchange system until March 2001.
SANCO®-producenterne fordelte markedsandele for SANCO®-rør, udvekslede fortrolige oplysninger, fastsatte og samordnede priser og rabatter.
SANCO® producers allocated market shares of SANCO® tubes, exchanged confidential information, fixed and coordinated prices and rebates.
Det ser ud til at have været det tætteste samarbejde og tjente som forberedelse til møder med producenter uden for SANCO.
It appeared to have been the tightest cooperation and served as a preparation for meetings with non-SANCO producers.
KME og Wieland samarbejdede også inden for WICU® og Cuprotherm (plastisolerede VVS-rør af kobber) fra i hvert fald begyndelsen af 1991 og indtil marts 2001.
KME and Wieland also cooperated with respect to WICU® and Cuprotherm plastic-insulated copper plumbing tubes starting from at least beginning of 1991 until March 2001.
Samarbejdet på andet niveau startede senest i september 1989 og involverede de største europæiske producenter (»gruppen af de fem«) (herunder producenter i og uden for SANCO): KME (herunder Tréfimétaux og Europa Metalli), Wieland, Outokumpu, IMI og fra oktober 1997 Mueller.
Cooperation on the second level started at least in September 1989 and involved the largest European producers (the ‘group of the five’) (including SANCO- and non-SANCO-producers): KME (including Tréfimétaux and Europa Metalli), Wieland, Outokumpu, IMI and, as of October 1997, Mueller.
Hovedformålet var at stabilisere og fordele markedsandele og at samordne priser og rabatter.
The main object was to stabilise and allocate market shares, and to coordinate prices and rebates.
Møderne blev enten holdt i forbindelse med møder i brancheorganisationerne (f.eks. International Wrought Copper Council (»IWCC«)) eller særskilt i Zürich.
Meetings were either held on the occasion of industry association meetings (e.g. International Wrought Copper Council (IWCC) meetings), or separately in Zurich.
Samarbejdet omfattede møder på toplederniveau og møder på det driftsmæssige plan.
The cooperation included top-level management meetings and meetings at the operational level.
Disse kontakter udviklede sig i tre etaper: fra september 1989 til juni/juli 1994 (etablering af informationsudvekslingen og samordningen), fra juli 1994 til juni 1997 (mindre intensive kontakter), fra juni 1997 til marts 2001 (faktisk og effektiv genetablering af samordningen).
These contacts developed in three stages: from September 1989 until June/July 1994 (establishing of the information exchange and coordination); from July 1994 until June 1997 (less intensive contacts); from June 1997 until March 2001 (effective and efficient reestablishment of the coordination).
Samarbejdet på tredje niveau startede i august 1998 og varede indtil marts 2001.
Cooperation on the third level started in August 1998 and lasted between August 1999 and March 2001.
Det involverede ovennævnte gruppe af de fem og fire mindre producenter (tilsammen »gruppen af de ni«): Halcor indtil august 1999 og HME Nederland BV, Boliden (som ikke deltog konstant) og Buntmetall indtil marts 2001.
It involved the above mentioned group of the five and four smaller producers (together ‘the group of nine’): Halcor until August 1999, and HME Nederland BV, Boliden (which did not steadily participate) and Buntmetall until March 2001.
Gruppen af de ni drøftede markedsandele og priser eller mål for avancen.
The group of nine discussed market shares and price or margin targets.
Overtrædelsen bestod hovedsagelig i prisfastsættelse og markedsdeling, som i sig selv er meget alvorlige overtrædelser af EF-traktatens artikel 81, stk. 1, og EØS-aftalens artikel 53, stk. 1.
The present infringement consisted mainly of price-fixing and market allocation practices, which are by their nature very serious violations of Articles 81(1) EC and 53(1) EEA.
Det er påvist, at kartelaftalerne også blev anvendt i praksis, og at de i hvert fald i visse perioder medførte prisstigninger på markedet.
It has been established that the cartel agreements were also implemented in practice and, at least for certain periods, that they increased prices on the market.
Kartellet omfattede hele fællesmarkedet og efter etableringen af EØS det meste af dette område.
The cartel covered the entire common market and, following its creation, most of the EEA.
Når man ser på selve den adfærd, undersøgelsen omfatter, den faktiske indvirkning på markedet for VVS-rør af kobber og det forhold, at samarbejdet omfattede et geografisk marked af en betydelig størrelse (størstedelen af EØS), begik denne beslutnings adressater en meget alvorlig overtrædelse af EF-traktatens artikel 81, stk. 1, og EØS-aftalens artikel 53, stk. 1.
Taking into account the very nature of the conduct under scrutiny, the actual impact on the copper plumbing tubes market, and the fact that the cooperation covered a geographic market of a significant size (most of the EEA), the addressees of the present Decision committed a very serious infringement of Article 81(1) EC and 53(1) EEA.
I denne sag, der involverede flere virksomheder, blev der ved fastsættelsen af bødens grundbeløb lagt særlig vægt på de enkelte virksomheders betydning på markedet for at fastslå, hvordan de enkelte virksomheders overtrædelse rent faktisk havde påvirket konkurrencen.
In the circumstances of this case, which involved several undertakings, when the basic amounts of the fine were set the specific weight of each undertaking on the market was considered, to account for the real impact of the offending conduct of each undertaking on competition.
Ved beregningen af bøden blev virksomhederne opdelt i fire kategorier på grundlag af deres andel af EØS-markedet for det pågældende produkt i det sidste hele år, hvor overtrædelsen blev begået (2000).
For the purposes of calculating the fine, the companies were divided into four categories on the basis of their EEA-wide market share for the product concerned in the last full year of the infringement (2000).
Den første kategori bestod af KME, den anden kategori omfattede Outokumpu, IMI, Mueller og Wieland Werke-koncernen, herunder BMA (ca. halvdelen af KME's markedsandel), den tredje kategori bestod af Boliden (ca. to tredjedele af markedsandelen for anden kategori), og den fjerde kategori bestod af HME Halcor (ca. halvdelen af markedsandelen for anden kategori).
The first category included KME; the second category consisted of Outokumpu, IMI, Mueller and Wieland Werke group including BMA (roughly a half of KME's market share); the third category consisted of Boliden (roughly two thirds of the market share of the second group); and the fourth group consisted of HME and Halcor (roughly a half of the market share of the second group).
Da EM og TMX udgjorde en enkelt virksomhed i perioden 1988-1995, hæfter de solidarisk for deres respektive andel i overtrædelsen.
As EM and TMX formed a single undertaking in the period from 1988 to 1995, they are jointly and severally responsible for their respective part of the infringement.
På tilsvarende måde udgjorde KME, EM og TMX en enkelt virksomhed (KME-koncernen) i perioden 1995-2001, og de hæfter solidarisk for den del af overtrædelsen.
Similarly, KME, EM and TMX formed a single undertaking (the KME-group) in the period from 1995 to 2001, and they are jointly and severally responsible for that part of the infringement.
Bødens grundbeløb blev derfor opdelt i to dele, den ene for perioden 1988-95 og den andel for perioden 1995-2001.
The basic amount of the fine was therefore divided in two parts, one for the period from 1988 to 1995 and one for the period from1995 to 2001.
Resultatet heraf var, at KME alene fik pålagt en bøde på 17,96 mio. EUR, EM og TMX hæfter solidarisk for betalingen af en bøde på 16,37 mio. EUR, og KME, EM og TMX (eller KME-koncernen) hæfter solidarisk for betalingen af en bøde på 32,75 mio. EUR.
The result of this was that KME has been individually fined EUR 17,96 million; EM and TMX are jointly and severally liable for the payment of a fine of EUR 16,37 million; and KME, EM and TMX (or the KME-group) are jointly and severally liable to pay a fine of EUR 32,75 million.
På tilsvarende måde blev der skelnet mellem to forskellige perioder ved ansvarsfordelingen inden for Wieland-koncernen.
In a similar way, two different periods were distinguished for the purposes of the allocation of liability within the Wieland-group.
Wieland Werke AG overtog enekontrollen med Buntmetall-koncernen i 1999.
Wieland Werke AG acquired sole control over the Buntmetall group in 1999.
Wieland Werke AG og Buntmetall-koncernen skal derfor først behandles som en enkelt virksomhed med solidarisk ansvar for overtrædelsen fra 1999.
Accordingly, Wieland Werke AG and the Buntmetall group were treated as a single undertaking with joint and several liabilities for the infringement only as of 1999.
For at sikre, at de pålagte bøder fik en tilstrækkelig afskrækkende virkning, blev der anvendt en multiplikationsfaktor på 1,5 på bødens grundbeløb for Outokumpus vedkommende.
In order to ensure that the fines imposed had a sufficient deterrent effect, a multiplying factor of 1,5 was applied to the starting amount of the fine set for Outokumpu.
I denne vurdering var det rimeligt at tage koncernens omsætning på verdensplan i betragtning (ca. 5 mia. EUR), da moderselskabet (Outokumpu Oyj) var involveret i overtrædelsen i 1988 gennem sin afdeling, Copper Products Division, og derefter undlod at instruere sit helejede datterselskab OCP om at bringe den til ophør.
In this assessment, it was appropriate to take into account the overall worldwide turnover of the group (approximately EUR 5 billion), since the parent company (Outokumpu Oyj) was involved in the infringement in 1988 through its Copper Products Division and thereafter did not instruct its wholly-owned subsidiary OCP to end it.
Outokumpu er mere end dobbelt så stor som hver af de øvrige parter, når det gælder den samlede omsætning på verdensplan.
With regard to the other parties, Outokumpu is more than twice the size of each of them in terms of the total worldwide turnover.
De forskellige virksomheder var involveret i forskellige perioder.
Different companies were involved for different periods.
Overtrædelsen begyndte senest den 3. juni 1988 og fortsatte til i hvert fald den 22. marts 2001.
The infringement started at the latest on 3 June 1988 and continued at least until 22 March 2001.
Nedenstående virksomheder begik en vedvarende overtrædelse i den anførte periode:
The following companies committed a continuous infringement for the respective duration indicated:
Boliden-koncernen 12 år, 9 måneder
Boliden-group 12 years 9 months,
Buntmetall-koncernen 2 år, 6 måneder
Buntmetall-group 2 years 6 months,
Halcor 12 måneder
Halcor 12 months,
HME 2 år, 6 måneder
HME 2 years 6 months,
IMI-koncernen 11 år, 5 måneder
IMI-group 11 years 5 months,
KME-koncernen 12 år, 9 måneder (i alt, opdelt efter de enkelte selskabers deltagelse)
KME-group 12 years 9 months (in total, split according to the participation of each member company)
(KME: 12 år, 9 måneder; EM/TMX: 11 år, 5 måneder)
(KME 12 years 9 months; EM/TMX: 11 years 5 months),
Mueller-koncernen 3 år, 2 måneder
Mueller-group 3 years 2 months,
Outokumpu-koncernen 11 år, 5 måneder
Outokumpu-group 11 years 5 months,
Wieland Werke 11 år, 5 måneder.
Wieland Werke 11 years 5 months.
Karteldisciplinen havde forskellig intensitet i forskellige perioder.
There were periods of different intensity in the cartel discipline.
Perioden fra midten af 1994 til midten af 1997 blev af Outokumpu betegnet som en »stille periode«.
The period from mid-1994 until mid-1997 was identified as a ‘quiet period’ by Outokumpu.
KME og Wieland fortsatte deres samarbejde inden for WICU, Cuprotherm og SANCO.
KME and Wieland continued their WICU, Cuprotherm and SANCO cooperation.
IMI, Wieland, Outokumpu og KME mødtes nogle gange i 1996.
IMI, Wieland, Outokumpu and KME met a number of times in 1996.
Selv om kartellet klart fungerede mindre effektivt, fortsatte udvekslingen af fortrolige oplysninger i hvert fald lejlighedsvis.
Although the cartel clearly functioned in a less efficient way, the exchange of confidential information continued at least occasionally.
Outokumpu bekræftede, at der var tale om en periode med mindre intensive kontakter.
Outokumpu confirmed a period of less intensive contacts.
Denne periode blev derfor karakteriseret som en periode med reduceret kartelaktivitet og ikke som en fuldstændig afbrydelse af kartelvirksomheden.
For these reasons, this period was characterised as one of reduced cartel activity rather than of complete interruption.
Overtrædelsens varighed som sådan (12 år og 9 måneder) blev derfor ikke berørt af perioderne med nedsat kartelaktivitet.
The duration of the infringement (12 years and 9 months) as such was therefore not affected by the periods of reduced cartel activity.
I Outokumpus tilfælde blev overtrædelsens grovhed forværret af, at selskabet havde været omfattet af en tidligere beslutning om en overtrædelse af samme type, nemlig Kommissionens beslutning 90/417/EKSF [5] om et kartel inden for koldvalsede flade produkter af rustfrit stål.
In Outokumpu's case, the gravity of the infringement was increased by the fact that it had been addressee of a previous Decision finding an infringement of the same type, i.e. Commission Decision 90/417/ECSC [5] relating to a cartel in the sector of rolled stainless steel flat products.
Outokumpu havde dog ikke fået pålagt nogen bøde ved den pågældende beslutning.
However, no fine was imposed on Outokumpu in that decision.