natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Den 1. marts 2002 blev Siderúrgica Añóns aktiekapital forhøjet med yderligere 4207140 EUR. De tre aktionærer finansierede den i forhold til deres andele (SODIGA tilførte 495180 EUR) og på samme vilkår for alle tre med hensyn til pris pr. aktie og betaling.
On 1 March 2002 Siderúrgica Añón’s share capital was increased by a further EUR 4207140. The three shareholders subscribed according to their stakes (SODIGA contributed EUR 495180) and on the same terms for all three shareholders as to price per share and payment.
Parterne undertegnede desuden en aftale, i henhold til hvilken Hierros Añón og Rodonita (eller selve Siderúrgica Añón) forpligtede sig til at overtage SODIGA’s aktiepost den 19. april 2007 til en maksimalpris, der svarer til den højeste af følgende to størrelser: a) virksomhedens teoretiske bogføringsværdi, som om nødvendigt fastsættes ved et uafhængigt skøn, eller b) 133,82 % af det oprindelige indskud, dvs. 662650 EUR. SODIGA modtager fra Siderúrgica Añón fra og med den 30. december 2003 fire årlige rater på 41867 EUR som forskud på den endelige betaling.
The parties also signed an agreement whereby Hierros Añón and Rodonita (or Siderúrgica Añón itself) promised SODIGA to buy SODIGA’s stake by no later than 19 April 2007 for the higher of the following two amounts: (a) the theoretical accounting value of the firm, as determined, if necessary, by an independent expertise; or (b) 133,82 % of the initial contribution, i.e. EUR 662650. SODIGA will receive from Siderúrgica Añón as from 30 December 2003 four annual instalments of EUR 41867 as an advance payment against the final amount.
Årsager til at indlede proceduren
Grounds for initiating the procedure
I sine beslutninger om at indlede procedure gav Kommissionen udtryk for tvivl om, hvorvidt SODIGA’s investering i Siderúrgica Añóns aktiekapitel kunne betragtes som en reel tilførelse af risikovillig kapital, som en markedsøkonomisk investor ville foretage, og hvorvidt prisen for garantien svarede til markedsprisen.
In its decisions initiating proceedings, the Commission expressed its doubts whether the stake acquired by SODIGA in the share capital of Siderúrgica Añón could be regarded as a genuine provision of risk capital according to usual investment practice in a market economy and whether the price paid for the guarantee was a market price.
Endvidere gav Kommissionen udtryk for tvivl om, hvorvidt disse foranstaltninger samt de spanske myndigheders øvrige foranstaltninger for at finansiere investeringen, der er nævnt i foregående afsnit, var forenelige med fællesmarkedet.
Moreover, the Commission expressed its doubts as to the compatibility with the common market of those measures as well as the other measures adopted by the Spanish authorities for financing the investment, listed in the previous section.
BEMÆRKNINGER FRA DE INTERESSEREDE PARTER
COMMENTS FROM INTERESTED PARTIES
I sit brev af 22. februar 2002 mente European Independent Steel Works Association (EISA), at støtten var uforenelig med fællesmarkedet, hovedsagelig fordi a) der er overkapacitet på markedet for stangstål, b) investeringen aldrig vil blive rentabel og kun vil fordreje konkurrencen, og c) ingen privat investor ville bringe sin kapital i fare ved at investere i produktion af disse produkter under de nuværende markedsvilkår.
In their letter of 22 February 2002, the European Independent Steelworks Association (EISA) considered that the aid was incompatible with the common market mainly because (a) the market for steel bars was suffering from overcapacity, (b) the investment would never be profitable and would lead only to distortions of competition and (c) no private investor would risk capital in current market conditions for the production of these products.
I sit brev af 5. marts 2002 fandt Unión de Empresas Siderúrgicas (UNESID) det ulogisk at bruge offentlige midler til at skabe mere kapacitet i en sektor, hvor man havde anvendt store mængder offentlige midler til at nedbringe arbejdsstyrken og kapaciteten.
In their letter of 5 March 2002, the Unión de Empresas Siderúrgicas (UNESID) considered it illogical that public funds should be used to build new capacities in a sector where substantial amounts of public funds had been devoted to reducing the workforce and capacities.
I sit brev af 8. marts 2002 fremførte den italienske sammenslutning af stålproducenter, Federacciai, at der er overkapacitet på markedet for stangstål, og at investeringer i sektoren derfor er meget risikable, samt at mulighederne for at opnå rentabilitet ville være ringe.
In their letter of 8 March 2002, Federacciai, the federation of Italian steel companies, argued that the market for steel bars was suffering from overcapacity and that investments in the sector therefore involved high risk and could hardly be expected to be profitable.
Endvidere fandt man, at SODIGA’s og INESGA’s engagement skyldtes politiske hensyn.
Moreover, it considered that the involvement of SODIGA and INESGA was prompted by political considerations.
Endelig svarede rentesatsen for lånet gennem INESGA og præmien for garantien ikke til markedsvilkårene.
Finally, the interest rate of the loan granted through INESGA and the premium paid for the guarantee did not correspond to market conditions.
I sit brev af 17. oktober 2002 fremførte UK Steel Enterprise Ltd (herefter »UK Steel«), at denne sektor udmærker sig ved overkapacitet, hård konkurrence fra tredjelande og lave priser, samt at alt tyder på, at en privat investor ikke ville have investeret i at oprette kapacitet.
In their letter of 17 October 2002, UK Steel Enterprise Ltd. (hereinafter UK Steel) submitted that overcapacity, excessive third-country competition and low prices were the features of this sector and all indicated that a normal private investor would not have contributed capital towards the creation of new capacity.
Spørgsmålet er, om Hierros Añón og Rodonita selv ville have investeret i projektet uden ulovlig statsstøtte.
It should be questioned whether Hierros Añón and Rodonita themselves would have invested in this project had it not been for the availability of illegal state aid.
At Hierros Añón og Rodonita benytter 70 % af produktionen internt sætter desuden spørgsmålstegn ved Siderúrgica Añóns muligheder for at blive rentabel.
Furthermore, the fact that Hierros Añón and Rodonita were to use 70 % of the output for their own internal purposes had to put a question mark over the likely profitability of Siderúrgica Añón.
Salgsprisen på produktet kan ikke blive gennemsigtig og vil antagelig i højere grad være baseret på et ønske om at skabe størst mulig rentabilitet for Hierros Añón og Rodonita på det efterfølgende marked end for Siderúrgica Añón.
Transfer pricing of the product would be untransparent and would presumably be geared more towards maximising the downstream profitability of Hierros Añón and Rodonita than that of Siderúrgica Añón.
Ved brev af 31. juli 2002 fremsatte Siderúrgica Añón følgende bemærkninger:
By letter dated 31 July 2002, Siderúrgica Añón made the following submissions:
Ifølge virksomheden gælder Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 70/2001 af 12. januar 2001 om anvendelse af EF-traktatens artikel 87 og 88 på statsstøtte til små og mellemstore virksomheder [6] (herefter SMV-forordningen), fra og med den 23. juli 2002 for stålsektoren.
According to the company, as from 23 July 2002, Commission Regulation (EC) No 70/2001 of 12 January 2001 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to state aid to small and medium sized enterprises [6] (hereinafter the SME Regulation), applied to the steel sector.
At støtten er givet inden EKSF-traktatens udløb er irrelevant, eftersom Kommissionens beslutninger om støttes forenelighed ifølge retspraksis skal tage udgangspunkt i de faktiske og retlige forhold på beslutningstidspunktet og ikke på det tidspunkt, hvor støtten blev tildelt.
The fact that the aid was granted before the expiry of the ECSC Treaty was of no consequence since according to settled case-law, Commission decisions on compatibility of aid had to be based on the elements of fact and law existing at the moment when the decision was adopted and not at the moment when the aid was granted.
Kommissionens meddelelse om fastlæggelse af reglerne for vurdering af ulovlig statsstøtte [7], som der henvises til i Kommissionens meddelelse om visse aspekter ved behandlingen af konkurrencesager efter EKSF-traktatens udløb [8], nævner kun fællesskabsrammebestemmelser, retningslinjer og meddelelser og ikke forordninger.
Moreover, the Commission notice on the determination of the applicable rules for the assessment of unlawful state aid [7], to which the communication from the Commission concerning certain aspects of the treatment of competition cases resulting from the expiry of the ECSC Treaty [8] referred, mentioned only frameworks, guidelines, communications and notices but not regulations.
Eftersom Siderúrgica Añón er en SMV og støtteintensiteten [9] er lavere end den intensitet, der er nævnt i artikel 4 i SMV-forordningen, er støtten under disse omstændigheder forenelig med fællesmarkedet (og den er fritaget fra anmeldelseskravet).
In these circumstances, since Siderúrgica Añón was an SME and the intensity of the aid granted [9] was lower than the intensity mentioned in Article 4 of the SME Regulation, the aid was compatible with the common market (and exempted from the notification obligation).
Hvad angår tilskuddet fra IGAPE og det rentefrie lån fra ministeriet for videnskab og teknologi, fastholder virksomheden, at begge foranstaltninger indgik i ordninger, som Kommissionen havde godkendt henholdsvis den 5. juli 1995 (statsstøtte N 21/95) og den 18. maj 2001 (statsstøtte N 182/01), og at de derfor er forenelige med fællesmarkedet.
Moreover, as to the grant awarded by IGAPE and the interest-free loan granted by the Ministry of Science and Technology, the company argued that they were granted under schemes approved by the Commission on 5 July 1995 (state aid N 21/95) and 18 May 2001 (state aid N 182/01) respectively and were therefore compatible with the common market.
Hvad angår SODIGA’s investering i Siderúrgica Añóns aktiekapital, fastholder virksomheden, at det er irrelevant, at de private og offentlige aktionærer kan have forskellige interesser, da det afgørende punkt er, at private og offentlige aktionærer deltager på samme vilkår.
As to the stake acquired by SODIGA in the capital of Siderúrgica Añón, the company claimed that the fact that the interests of the private and public shareholders might be different was of no relevance since the essential factor was that the private and public investors participated on the same terms and conditions.
Til underbygning heraf fremfører virksomheden, at Kommissionen fandt, at der ikke var tale om statsstøtte, da Bayern investerede i NMH’s aktiekapital sammen med tre andre stålproducenter (beslutning af 26. juli 1988, nævnt i Kommissionens beslutning af 31. oktober 1995), og da Kommissionen indledte procedure over for de vallonske myndigheders deltagelse i Carsid, tog den ikke hensyn til forskellige interesser hos private og offentlige aktionærer.
To support this position the company contended that the Commission had considered that there was no state aid involved in the stake acquired by Bavaria in the capital of NMH along with three other steel producers (Decision of 26 July 1988, mentioned in the Commission Decision of 31 October 1995) and that when it initiated proceedings against the stake acquired by the Walloon Region in Carsid, the Commission did not take into account the different interests of the private and public shareholders.
I sit brev af 30. september 2002 hævdede virksomheden, at eftersom den periode på tre måneder til at træffe en beslutning, der er nævnt i artikel 6, stk. 5, i stålstøttereglerne, var udløbet, havde Kommissionen ikke længere ret til at træffe beslutning om de foranstaltninger, der er omhandlet i brevet af 20. december 2001.
In its letter of 30 September 2002, the company argued that, since the three-month period established in Article 6(5) of the Steel Aid Code for adopting a decision had elapsed, the Commission was no longer entitled to adopt a decision on the measures referred to in its letter of 20 December 2001.
Ved brev af 23. juni 2003 fremsatte Siderúrgica Añón supplerende bemærkninger.
By letter dated 23 June 2003, Siderúrgica Añón submitted further comments.
For det første fremførte virksomheden, at støtten ikke kunne analyseres på grundlag af EKSF-traktaten eller statsstøttereglerne.
Firstly, it claimed that the aid could not be analysed in the light of the ECSC Treaty or the Steel Aid Code.
For det andet insisterede den på, at støtten var omfattet af SMV-forordningen.
Secondly, it maintained that the aid fell within the scope of the SME Regulation.
For det tredje hævdede den, at der var tale om eksisterende støtte, som defineret i artikel 1, litra b), i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999 af 22. marts 1999 om fastlæggelse af regler for anvendelsen af EF-traktatens artikel 93 [10] (herefter »procedureforordningen«), da den blev tildelt, inden EF-traktatens statsstøtteregler trådte i kraft i jern- og stålsektoren.
Thirdly, it argued that the aid was existing aid within the meaning of Article 1(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty [10] (hereinafter the Procedural Regulation) because it was granted before the entry into force for the steel sector of the state aid rules of the EC Treaty.
SPANIENS BEMÆRKNINGER
COMMENTS FROM SPAIN
Vedrørende SODIGA’s investering i Siderúrgica Añóns aktiekapital fastholder de spanske myndigheder, at der er tale om almindelig markedsøkonomisk praksis.
As regards the acquisition by SODIGA of a stake in the share capital of Siderúrgica Añón, the Spanish authorities argued that this was done following normal practice in a market economy.
Investeringsbeslutningerne træffes udelukkende under hensyn til projekternes gennemførlighed og den forventede rentabilitet.
Investment decisions were taken considering only the viability of the projects and the expected profitability.
I den foreliggende sag foretog SODIGA sin investering i Siderúrgica Añón i forbindelse med kapitaludvidelsen og samtidig med de eksisterende aktionærer, som tilsammen tegnede sig for 83,4 % af de nye aktier.
In the present case, SODIGA’s stake in Siderúrgica Añón was acquired at the time of the increase in capital and simultaneously with the existing shareholders which, together, subscribed to 83,4 % of the new shares.
Under disse omstændigheder fastholder de spanske myndigheder, at kriteriet om en markedsøkonomisk investor i henhold til retspraksis er opfyldt.
In these circumstances, the Spanish authorities maintained that, according to the case-law, it fulfilled the private investor criteria.
Endvidere fremfører de spanske myndigheder, at SODIGA med genkøbsaftalen garanterer et mindsteafkast af investeringen på 7,2 % om året, hvilket er mere end renten på (tiårige) statsobligationer på tidspunktet for undertegnelsen af kontrakten (5,3 %).
Moreover, the Spanish authorities claimed that, through the repurchase agreement, SODIGA ensured a minimum return on the investment of 7,2 % per year, which was higher than the interest on 10-year Treasury bonds at the time the contract was signed (5,3 %).
Hvis der var tale om statsstøtte, ville den under alle omstændigheder være forenelig med fællesmarkedet i henhold til punkt VIII.3 ii) i Kommissionens meddelelse om statsstøtte og risikovillig kapital [11], da der er tale om en SMV i opstartsfasen i et støtteberettiget område.
In any case, if state aid was involved it would be compatible with the common market according to point VIII.3 (ii) of the information from the Commission on state aid and risk capital [11] because it involved a medium-sized enterprise in its start-up stage in an assisted area.
At SODIGA betalte en højere pris pr. aktie og betalte prisen umiddelbart var ifølge de spanske myndigheder kompensation for den mindstefortjeneste af investeringen, som SODIGA i modsætning til de øvrige aktionærer fik garanteret.
As to the fact that SODIGA paid a higher price per share and disbursed it immediately, the Spanish authorities maintained that this compensated for the minimum return on investment granted to SODIGA, from which the other shareholders did not benefit.
Under alle omstændigheder fremfører de, at det er almindelig praksis, at en ny aktionær betaler en højere pris for nye aktier, hvilket afspejler den kraftige impuls, de oprindelige aktionærer tilførte projektet (f.eks. i kontrakter med leverandører af udstyr og ved køb af grunde).
In any case, they maintained that it was only normal practice that a new shareholder should pay a higher price for the newly issued shares, reflecting the substantial impetus imparted to the project by the original shareholders (for example in contracts with suppliers of equipment and in the acquisition of land).
Hvad angår SODIGA’s deltagelse i den anden udvidelse af Siderúrgica Añóns kapital, fremfører de spanske myndigheder, at SODIGA's deltagelse svarede til selskabets andel og foregik på samme vilkår som de øvrige aktionærers.
As for SODIGA’s participation in the second increase in the capital of Siderúrgica Añón, the Spanish authorities argued that SODIGA participated in proportion to its holding and on the same terms and conditions as the other shareholders.
Under sådanne omstændigheder er der ikke tale om statsstøtte.
In these circumstances there was no state aid.
Hvad angår de offentlige myndigheders andel i SODIGA’s aktier, fremfører de spanske myndigheder, at det i henhold til retspraksis er Kommissionens opgave at efterprøve, om myndighederne blandede sig i beslutningen om at investere i Siderúrgica Añón.
Concerning the imputability of the actions of SODIGA to the public authorities, the Spanish authorities contended that, according to the case-law, the Commission had to provide evidence that they intervened in the decision to invest in Siderúrgica Añón.
Hvad angår lånet gennem INESGA, fastholder de spanske myndigheder, at midlerne udelukkende stammer fra private kilder (de deltagende banker), som frit kan deltage i finansiering af enhver form for transaktion, og at INESGA blot førte tilsyn hermed.
With regard to the loan granted through INESGA, the Spanish authorities maintained that the funds came exclusively from private sources (the participating banks), that those banks were free to participate in the financing of any operation and that INESGA’s involvement was limited to the follow-up.
Derfor konkluderer de, at der ikke er benyttet offentlige midler.
In this sense, they concluded that no public funds were involved.
Endvidere fastholder de, at Kommissionens sammenligning med referencesatsen ikke er rimelig, da denne referencesats svarer til gennemsnittet af de femårige interbankrentesatser for september, oktober og november i 2000, plus 75 basispoint.
Moreover, they maintained that the comparison with the reference rate used by the Commission was not appropriate since that reference rate corresponded to the average of the five-year interbank swap rates for the months of September, October and November 2000 increased by 75 percentage points.
Da den femårige interbankrentesats på tidspunktet for tildelingen af lånet var 4,769 %, burde den korrigerede referencesats være 5,519 %.
Since the five-year interbank swap rate at the date of granting the loan was 4,769 %, the corrected reference rate should be 5,519 %.
Endelig fastholder de, at rentesatsen svarer til eller endog er højere end satsen for de øvrige lån, der er givet til virksomheder i Añón-koncernen.
Finally, they contended that the interest rate was similar to, or even higher than, other loans granted to companies belonging to the Añón group.
IGAPE’s garanti er ifølge de spanske myndigheder stillet på markedsvilkår.
On the guarantee given by IGAPE, the Spanish authorities claimed that it was in line with market conditions.
De mener, at private banker kræver en præmie ved denne type projekter på 0,15 % i kvartalet.
They contended that the commission applied by private banks to these types of projects amounted to 0,15 % per quarter.
Forskellen mellem denne præmie og den, der er anvendt ved den foreliggende transaktion, skyldes følgende faktorer: a) vilkårene for at udnytte garantien er langt mere restriktive end for bankgarantier, som kan udnyttes efter første påkrav, mens IGAPE’s garanti kun kan udnyttes subsidiært (når modtageren er erklæret insolvent), b) den risiko, IGAPE løber, er meget lav, da der kun er tale om at dække 30 % af lånet, og lånet kun finansierer 40 % af investeringen, og c) projektet støttes af koncerner med anerkendt solvens.
The difference with the commission applied in the present transaction stemmed from the following factors: (a) the conditions for calling on the guarantee were much stricter than those of the bank guarantees, since these were enforceable at first request and IGAPE’s guarantee was enforceable only in a subsidiary capacity (once the beneficiary was declared insolvent); (b) the risk assumed by IGAPE was very low since it covered only 30 % of the loan and the loan financed only 40 % of the investment; and (c) the project was promoted by groups known for their solvency.
De spanske myndigheder har fremlagt erklæringer fra to banker (Caixa Galicia og Banco Pastor), hvori de udtaler, at de på baggrund af lånevilkårene og aktionærernes identitet ville have krævet en præmie på 0,20 % af garantien pr. år.
The Spanish authorities provided statements from two banks (Caixa Galicia and Banco Pastor) to the effect that, in view of the conditions of the loan and the identity of the shareholders, they would have applied a commission of 0,20 % per year for such guarantee.
Med hensyn til IGAPE’s tilskud på 0,25 % og oprettelsesgebyret oplyser de spanske myndigheder, at denne støtte blev tildelt som led i støtteordninger godkendt af Kommissionen, og at den med undtagelse af et beløb på 14299,44 EUR er omfattet af Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 69/2001 af 12. januar 2001 om anvendelse af EF-traktatens artikel 87 og 88 på de minimis-støtte [12], der også gælder i EKSF-sektoren.
As regards the IGAPE subsidy of 0,25 % and the formalisation fee, the Spanish authorities maintained that this aid was granted under schemes approved by the Commission, and that, except for EUR 14299,44, it fell within the scope of Commission Regulation (EC) No 69/2001 of 12 January 2001 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to de minimis aid [12], which applied also to the ECSC sector.
De hævder desuden, at markedet for disse produkter ikke bliver påvirket, da størstedelen af produkterne vil blive anvendt inden for koncernen, mens næsten hele den resterende mængde eksporteres til lande uden for EØS.
They also contended that the market for those products would not be affected since the majority of the products would be used within the group and almost all the rest would be exported outside the EEA.
De spanske myndigheder fremfører, at tilskuddet fra IGAPE blev givet som led i en støtteordning godkendt af Kommissionen, og at det derfor er foreneligt med fællesmarkedet.
As to the grant provided by IGAPE, the Spanish authorities argued that it was awarded under a scheme approved by the Commission and was therefore compatible with the common market.
Under alle omstændigheder udtaler de spanske myndigheder, at støtten ville være forenelig med fællesmarkedet, da den er omfattet af SMV-forordningen, der også gælder EKSF-stålsektoren.
In any event, the Spanish authorities maintained that the aid was compatible with the common market because it fell within the scope of the SME Regulation, which applied also to the ECSC steel sector.
Endvidere fremfører de, at støtten er i overensstemmelse med EF-rammebestemmelser for statsstøtte til miljøbeskyttelse [13].
They also affirmed that the aid was in line with the Community guidelines on state aid for environmental protection [13].