natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
De franske myndigheder fik spørgsmålet forelagt og gav Kommissionen en række nyttige forklaringer.
The French authorities were informed of this and submitted the appropriate explanations to the Commission.
SIDE havde bemærket, at de franske myndigheder havde byttet om på procentsatserne for elektroniske ordrer og ordrer modtaget på papir.
SIDE observed that the French authorities had switched the percentages of tele-transmitted orders with those for orders sent in on paper.
Kommissionen har kunnet konstatere, at de økonomiske konsekvenser af ombytningen udgjorde 0,24 EUR pr. bog i forbindelse med små ordrer.
The Commission was able to verify that the financial incidence of the switch amounted to EUR 0,24 per book for the cost of a small order.
Denne forskel har ingen indflydelse på den kompensationsordning, som Frankrig har beskrevet.
The difference is not such as to call into question the compensation mechanism presented by France.
Hvad angår udsvingene i omsætningen, som SIDE kunne påvise i de første regnskabsoplysninger, som Frankrig indsendte, bekræfter Kommissionen, at de franske myndigheder selv havde foretaget de nødvendige rettelser allerede ved begyndelsen af sagsforløbet i 1996, og at SIDE's påstande i de seneste bemærkninger var ubegrundede.
As regards the variations in turnover which SIDE identified in the first accounting information produced by France, the Commission confirms that the French authorities themselves made the necessary corrections as soon as the proceeding was initiated in 1996, and that consequently the claims made in SIDE's most recent comments are without foundation.
Forskellene i de øvrige taloplysninger skyldes, at der i et tilfælde henvises til indtægter udelukkende fra salg af bøger (2284536 FRF), mens det andet indberettede tal (2535818 FRF) svarer til indtægter fra bøger og tilhørende produkter (emballage, forsikring og transport).
The variation in the other figures is explained by the fact that, in one case, reference is made to the proceeds of selling the books alone (FRF 2284536), whereas, in the other, the figure communicated (FRF 2535818) is the proceeds for the books and incidental services (packaging, insurance and transport).
SIDE mener ligeledes at kunne påvise visse »skævheder« mellem det almindelige regnskab og det analytiske regnskab med hensyn til lønoplysninger.
SIDE also thought that it could identify certain ‘distortions’ between the financial accounting and the cost accounting of wages and salaries.
De franske myndigheder præciserer, at grunden til disse forskelle var, at visse afgifter ikke var medtaget i de sociale bidrag, som figurerer på angivelserne til skattevæsenet, men i stedet er direkte knyttet til lønnen.
The French authorities stated that these differences are due to the fact that certain taxes are not included in the social security contributions given in the tax forms but are levied directly on the wages.
Kommissionen har kunnet kontrollere rigtigheden af denne forklaring ved hjælp af de regnskabsbilag, som den har fået tilsendt.
The Commission was able to check the accuracy of this explanation from the accounting documents sent to it.
Kommissionen finder derfor, at SIDE's supplerende bemærkninger om manglende nøjagtighed i de regnskabsoplysninger, som de franske myndigheder har indsendt i forbindelse med indledningen af sagsforløbet i 1996, ikke kan ændre ved Kommissionens vurdering af relevansen af de forelagte regnskabsoplysninger, hvori man begrunder godtgørelsen af ekstraomkostningerne ved de små ordrer.
The Commission considers, therefore, that SIDE's additional comments, on the inaccuracy of the accounting data transmitted by the French authorities when the proceedings were initiated in 1996, do not call into question the Commission's assessment of the relevance of the accounting data justifying the compensation for the extra costs generated by small orders.
Yderligere begrænsninger på CELF
Additional constraints on CELF
Kommissionen har på grundlag af analysen af bilagene fra sagsøger selv kunnet konstatere, at CELF's udbud var langt større end SIDE's (CELF kunne tilbyde 3000 forlag, mens SIDE kunne tilbyde 200).
The Commission found, on the basis of the analysis of the documents produced by the complainant itself, that CELF's list was much larger than SIDE's ((3000 publishers offered by CELF, as opposed to 200 offered by SIDE).
Kommissionen har taget denne oplysning til efterretning (der er ikke taget hensyn til dette ved beregningen af ekstraomkostningerne) og bemærker, at CELF's større udbud er i overensstemmelse med kulturministeriets krav, hvorfra man ønskede at sikre det bredest mulige udbud af fransksprogede bøger.
The Commission took note of this factor (which is not taken into account in the calculation of the extra costs) and observes that CELF's wider list meets the requirements of the Ministry of Culture that French-language books should be marketed as widely as possible.
SIDE præciserer imidlertid, at man kunne opfylde alle typer af ordrer, men ved sammensætningen af udbuddet tager man ikke hensyn til denne kulturelle målsætning, hvilket forekommer helt legitimt.
The list offered by SIDE which stipulates, however, that it can meet all types of demand, does not take account, quite legitimately, of this cultural objective.
De franske myndigheder tilføjer, at CELF ofte har måttet tage økonomiske risici.
The French authorities add that CELF was often forced to take financial risks.
Man udbyder således fortsat sine tjenester i kriseramte lande som Algeriet tidligere eller senere i Argentina.
Thus it continued to provide its services in certain high-risk countries such as Algeria or, more recently, Argentina.
CELF har ligeledes kunnet tilbyde sine ydelser i visse lande, som ikke var omfattet af COFACE-garantien.
It was also able to provide services in certain countries not covered by the Coface guarantee.
SIDE tager helt legitimt konsekvensen af sine kommercielle valg og anfører, at man ikke ønsker at gå ind i vanskelige områder som Afrika syd for Sahara eller lande, der ikke er dækket af COFACE.
SIDE sticks quite legitimately with its commercial choices and states that it does not want to operate in difficult areas such as sub-Saharan Africa or in countries not covered by Coface.
SIDE præciserer, at der er tale om beslutninger vedrørende virksomhedernes kommercielle strategi, og at man hos SIDE har truffet andre valg.
It states that these are decisions that are part of a firm's commercial development strategy and that, for its part, it has made other choices.
Kommissionens undersøgelse af de kundeflytninger, som SIDE har gjort opmærksom på
Examination by the Commission of the customer transfers objected to by SIDE
Kundeflytninger fra SIDE til CELF
Transfers of customers from SIDE to CELF
Kommissionen har konstateret, at SIDE's påstande vedrørende kundeflytninger ikke en gang var baseret på en analyse af de forklaringer og dokumenter, som SIDE selv havde fremlagt.
The Commission found that SIDE's claims concerning customer transfers were without foundation, on the basis of an analysis of the explanations and documents produced by SIDE itself.
Kommissionen har derfor bedt SIDE dokumentere de kundeflytninger, som man påstår at have været udsat for, på grund af de fordelagtige rabatter, som »kun CELF« var i stand til at tilbyde takket være den modtagne støtte.
Thus the Commission asked SIDE to justify the customer transfers from which it claimed to have suffered as a result of the advantageous discounts which ‘only CELF’ was able to offer due to the aid it had received.
Med henblik herpå har SIDE fremlagt et meget omfattende dokument [60], hvis oplysninger Kommissionen ikke kunne anvende i den foreliggende form, især fordi de omtalte flytninger på ingen måde ikke fremgik klart.
SIDE accordingly produced a very long document [60], whose data could not be used by the Commission in the form presented, in particular because the said transfers were not absolutely apparent from it.
Kommissionen bad SIDE om yderligere forklaringer af dette punkt, og SIDE kunne navnlig [61] præcisere, at en kunde, »Librairie Française de Milan«, gradvis var gået fra at benytte SIDE til at benytte CELF i løbet af året 1987/1988, idet CELF havde tilbudt kunden mere attraktive rabatter.
The Commission asked SIDE for further explanations on this point, and the firm was able in particular [61] to state that one customer, the Librairie Française de Milan, had gradually switched its custom to CELF in 1987 to 1988, since CELF had offered it more attractive discounts.
De franske myndigheder svarede, at det italienske marked var kendt for at være konkurrencebetonet, og at CELF's voksende omsætning med den nævnte boghandler først var tydelig fra 1999, altså et godt stykke efter den periode, som SIDE omtaler.
The French authorities pointed out in reply that the Italian market was known for its competitive nature and that, in addition, the increase in CELF's turnover from the said bookshop only became significant in 1999, i.e. well after the period mentioned by SIDE.
Kommissionen har kunnet konstatere, at de øvrige eksempler, som SIDE nævner, ikke var mere relevante [62].
The Commission found that the other examples quoted by SIDE were not more relevant [62].
En af de boghandler, der nævnes af SIDE, Grupodis de Madrid, har aldrig været en stor kunde hos CELF, og de nævnte japanske boghandlere er store kunder, som aldrig har befundet sig i markedssegmentet for små ordrer.
Thus one of the bookshops cited by SIDE, Grupodis in Madrid, was never a major customer of CELF's, and the Japanese bookshops cited are in fact large-account customers who are not concerned by the small orders segment of the market.
Den liste over rabatter, som SIDE har indsendt, beviser i øvrigt ikke, at SIDE's rabatter er mindre attraktive end CELF's.
The list of discounts communicated by SIDE did not show that the discounts it offers are less attractive than those offered by CELF.
Af de 28 forlag, som SIDE har valgt til at illustrere sin påstand, konstaterer Kommissionen, at SIDE i 16 tilfælde tilbyder større rabatter end CELF, mens det modsatte gør sig gældende i 12 tilfælde [63].
Thus, of the 28 publishers which SIDE selected to illustrate its claim, the Commission finds that SIDE offers more attractive discounts in 16 cases, as opposed to 12 for CELF [63].
Forskellen er endnu større, hvis man medregner de ekstra fem procentpoint i rabat, som SIDE giver ved ordrer på over 10 eksemplarer pr. titel, idet CELF i denne situation kun giver større rabatter for 6 forlag mod SIDE's 22.
The difference is even greater, if one takes into account the extra five percentage points discount granted by SIDE for orders of more than 10 copies per title, since in that case CELF offers better discounts for only six publishers as opposed to 22 by SIDE.
Kommissionen finder det således det ikke godtgjort, at kundeflytninger fra SIDE til CELF skyldes, at CELF kunne yde større rabatter til sine kunder takket være statsstøtten, således som SIDE påstår.
The Commission considers, therefore, that customer transfers from SIDE to CELF, due supposedly to the more attractive discounts offered by CELF to its customers as a result of the aid it had received, cannot be established in reality.
Kundeflytning fra CELF til SIDE
Transfer of customers from CELF to SIDE
Som det fremgår af 69 påstår SIDE i et brev af 12. august 2002 til Kommissionen, at CELF i mindst to år har anvendt betingelser, der virker afskrækkende på små ordrer.
As was noted in recital 69, in a letter dated 12 August 2002 to the Commission, SIDE claims that CELF had been applying dissuasive conditions for small accounts for at least two years.
Kommissionen konstaterer i første omgang, at de anfægtede prisjusteringer [64] indtraf præcis på det tidspunkt, hvor den omtvistede støtte blev afskaffet og/eller reduceret betydeligt, det vil sige fra det øjeblik, hvor CELF måtte finde alternative løsninger for fortsat at kunne efterkomme de små ordrer, som man modtog.
The Commission finds, firstly, that the pricing changes objected to [64] occurred during the period when the aid in question had been abolished and/or very significantly reduced, i.e. when CELF had to find alternative solutions in order to continue to try to meet the small orders which it was sent.
Kommissionen har foretaget en sammenligning af taloplysningerne [65] for de to virksomheder og konstaterer, at denne ikke viser noget, der kan bekræfte SIDE's påstande vedrørende de seneste kundeflytninger, som SIDE gør opmærksom på. Kommissionen kan rent faktisk ikke konstatere, at SIDE har oprettet flere fakturaer.
The Commission compared [65] the figures on the two undertakings and finds that there is nothing in them to confirm the remarks of SIDE concerning the recent customer transfers to which it objects.
I 1999 var der tale om 2187 fakturaer og i 2000 2137; hvad angår antallet af kunder erindrer Kommissionen om, at den ikke kan foretage sammenligninger på dette punkt, da man ikke har kunnet få oplysninger om dette fra SIDE.
The Commission finds no increase in the number of invoices drawn up by SIDE: they were 2187 in 1999, and 2137 in 2000. As to the number of customers, the Commission would point out that it cannot make a comparison because it was not able to obtain data from SIDE.
Kommissionen kan heller ikke finde oplysninger, der kan påvise, at antallet af »små ordrer«, som SIDE har behandlet, er steget siden afskaffelsen af støtten til CELF.
The Commission cannot identify, either, any factors which show that the number of small orders met by SIDE has increased now that CELF no longer receives any aid.
Tallene fra SIDE viser tværtimod, at det gennemsnitlige antal bøger pr. faktura er stigende, fra 40,31 i 1999 til 49,38 i 2001, mens den eventuelle kundeflytning fra CELF til SIDE burde have ført til et lavere gennemsnitligt antal bøger pr. faktura.
On the contrary, the figures supplied by SIDE show that the average number of books per invoice increased from 40,31 in 1999 to 49,38 in 2001, whereas the shift in customers from CELF to SIDE, if confirmed, would have resulted in a decline in the average number of books per invoice.
Endelig bemærker Kommissionen, at det gennemsnitlige antal bøger pr. fakturalinje hos SIDE stadig er højere et det gennemsnitlige antal hos CELF. Dette gælder de samlede aktiviteter og ikke kun for små ordrer.
The Commission notes, finally, that the average number of books sold per line by SIDE is again greater than the average sold by CELF, for the whole of its activity, not just small orders.
Støttens afskaffelse har således ikke medført, at kunder er flyttet fra CELF til SIDE.
Consequently, the abolition of the aid did not involve redeploying customers from CELF to SIDE.
I forbindelse med undersøgelsen af statsstøtte er det under alle omstændigheder kun konkurrenceforvridning, der skyldes statsstøtte, der er relevante, og ikke virkninger af en nedsættelse og/eller afskaffelse af statsstøtte, som SIDE betragter som negative.
In any event, in the analysis of State aid, only distortions of competition caused by that aid are relevant, not the effects of reducing and/or abolishing the aid, regarded as negative by SIDE.
Kommissionens konklusioner vedrørende kundeflytninger
Conclusions of the Commission regarding customer transfers
På grundlag af oplysningerne fra både SIDE og de franske myndigheder finder Kommissionen, at de eneste synlige konsekvenser af støttens ophævelse er et fald i CELF's omsætning på små ordrer og et betydeligt fald i antallet af CELF's kunder (– 17,35 % mellem 1999 og 2001), hvilket fremgår af tabel 5 nedenfor:
In light of the data communicated by SIDE and the French authorities, the Commission considers that the only visible consequences of abolishing the aid are a reduction in the turnover from small orders met by CELF and a significant reduction in the number of its customers (-17,34 % between 1999 and 2001), as table 5 below shows:
Tabel 5 — Udviklingen i aktiviteten »små ordrer og små kunder«
Table 5 — Trend of activity in small orders and small accounts
Oplysninger fra de franske myndigheder
Information supplied by the French authorities
Omsætning — små ordrer
Turnover small orders
(EUR)
(euros)
Udvikling
Trend
Kommissionen finder ligeledes, at SIDE's bemærkninger strider mod SIDE's egne påstande om, at der kun skulle tages hensyn til antallet af ordrelinjer hos leverandøren, og at det samlede ordrebeløb er ligegyldigt for beregningen af rentabiliteten.
The Commission also considers that SIDE's comments contradict its own statements to the effect that only the number of lines inputted by the service provider ought to be taken into consideration, and that the total amount of the order has no effect in terms of profitability.
Hvis dette var tilfældet, havde SIDE ingen grund til at hævde, at den påståede kundeflytning fra CELF til SIDE (som tilmed ikke fremgår af de fremlagte taloplysninger), forstærker den fordrejning af konkurrencesituationen, som SIDE er udsat for [66].
If this were the case, SIDE would have no reason to think that the alleged transfer of CELF customers to its services (which, moreover, is not clear from the figures provided) increases the distortion of competition suffered by SIDE [66].
Desuden konstaterer Kommissionen, at SIDE tilsyneladende modsiger sig selv, når virksomheden i et notat af 9. december 2002 siger, at »...små ordrer er som helhed mere rentable at ekspedere end store ordrer«.
Furthermore, the Commission notes that SIDE would seem to contradict itself, when it states in a note dated 9 December 2002, that ‘(…) small orders are overall more profitable to process than large orders’.
Kommissionen har udarbejdet nedenstående tabel på grundlag af oplysninger fra de franske myndigheder og SIDE, og tabellen viser, at der ikke er nogen automatisk sammenhæng mellem stigende og faldende omsætning hos SIDE og stigninger eller fald i de tildelte støttebeløb.
Table 6, compiled by the Commission from data communicated by the French authorities and by SIDE, shows that there is no automatic link between the variation in SIDE's turnover and the variation in the grants received.
Referenceår
Reference year
Støtte til CELF i euro
Aid granted to CELF
Udsving i SIDE's omsætning
Variation in SIDE's turnover
0(236) Taloplysningerne fra såvel CELF som SIDE har givet Kommissionen mulighed for at fastslå, at størrelsen af støtten til CELF ikke pr. automatik havde nogen betydning for SIDE's aktiviteter og resultater, idet SIDE var det eneste andet ikke-specialiserede agentur på markedet [67].
0(236) The figures supplied by CELF and by SIDE enabled the Commission to establish that the level of aid granted to CELF had no automatic impact on the business and results of SIDE, the only other general agent in the market [67].
Over en årrække faldt SIDE's omsætning f.eks., selv om støtten til CELF var faldende.
For instance, over several years, SIDE's turnover fell even though the aid granted to CELF was declining.
Kommissionen har kunnet iagttage, at den eneste synlige og betydelige konsekvens af ophævelsen af støtten til CELF på markedet var et fald i omsætningen på »små ordrer« og et fald i antallet af »små kunder« hos CELF.
The Commission observed that a visible, significant consequence of abolishing the aid to CELF on the market was a fall in its small orders turnover and a decline in the number of its small accounts.
Kommissionen konstaterer på baggrund af de indsendte taloplysninger, at en del af efterspørgslen uden støtten tilsyneladende ikke længere efterkommes af CELF, og at afskaffelsen af støtten ikke har gavnet SIDE.
The Commission finds, on the basis of the figures supplied, that, without the aid, some of the orders no longer appear to be met by CELF, though SIDE does not benefit from the observed disaffection.
Kommissionen har desuden kunnet konstatere, at støtten i perioden 1994-2001 ikke kunne dække hele underskuddet ved »Programme petites commandes« og udgjorde en forholdsvis ringe del af CELF's samlede omsætning: fra 3,95 % i 1994 til 0,29 % i 2001 [68].
The Commission also observes that for the period 1994 to 2001, the grants awarded did not cover the entire deficit under the Small Orders programme and accounted for a relatively small proportion of CELF's total turnover: from 3,95 % in 1994 to 0,29 % in 2001 [68].
Alle de netop analyserede oplysninger viser, at den omtvistede støtte vedrører en yderst marginal del af eksportagenturvirksomheden, som tydeligvis ikke ville være blevet udført uden den omtvistede støtte.
In light of all the factors examined above, it is clear that the disputed aid concerns a very marginal share of the export agency business, which would obviously not have been performed without the aid in question.
Kommissionen har ligeledes kunnet konstatere, at støtten fra den franske stat ikke udgør nogen overkompensation af omkostningerne ved den pågældende aktivitet.
The Commission has also established that the aid granted by France did not over-compensate the costs inherent in the activity in question.
Kommissionen erindrer ligeledes, som anført i betragtning 132 ff., om, at samhandelen og konkurrencevilkårene på fællesmarkedet i den foreliggende sag kun påvirkes i meget begrænset omfang.
The Commission would also point out, as was mentioned in recital 132 et seq., that the effect on trade and the distortion of competition at Community level are very limited in this particular case.
Kommissionen skal tage hensyn til disse oplysninger, når den vurderer støttens forenelighed med traktatens artikel 87, stk. 3, således som Retten klart gav udtryk for i dommen af 27. januar 1998 i sagen Ladbroke Racing Ltd mod Kommissionen [69].
These factors have to be taken into account by the Commission when it assesses the compatibility of the aid with Article 87(3) of the Treaty, as the Court of First Instance clearly stated in Ladbroke Racing Ltd [69].
Dermed påvirkede støtten til CELF inden for rammerne af »Programme petites commandes« ikke samhandelen og konkurrencevilkårene i Fællesskabet i et omfang, der strider mod de fælles interesser.
Consequently, the aid granted to CELF under the Small Orders programme was not such as to affect competition and trade to an extent contrary to the common interest.
De franske myndigheders foranstaltning stod i rimeligt forhold til det forfulgte mål og betød udelukkende, at det var muligt at efterkomme en del af efterspørgslen, som ellers ikke ville blive efterkommet, uden at virksomheden behøvede at bekymre sig om rentabiliteten.
The action taken by the French authorities was proportional to the objective pursued, and simply made it possible for some of the demand, which would not otherwise have been met, to be met by the service provider without worrying about profitability.
ANVENDELSE AF BESTEMMELSERNE I TRAKTATENS ARTIKEL 86, STK. 2
APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 86(2) OF THE TREATY
DE FRANSKE MYNDIGHEDERS HOLDNING
POSITION OF THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES
De franske myndigheder fastholder som i 1998 [70], at CELF har fået overdraget ansvaret for en tjenesteydelse af almindelig økonomisk interesse, og at de omtvistede foranstaltninger skal vurderes i henhold til bestemmelserne i traktatens artikel 86, stk. 2, hvori det hedder, at »Virksomheder, der har fået overdraget at udføre tjenesteydelser af almindelig økonomisk interesse, eller som har karakter af fiskale monopoler, er underkastet denne traktats bestemmelser, navnlig konkurrencereglerne, i det omfang anvendelsen af disse bestemmelser ikke retligt eller faktisk hindrer opfyldelsen af de særlige opgaver, som er betroet dem.
The French authorities argue, as they did in 1998 [70] that CELF was entrusted with a public service task and that, consequently, the disputed measures must be assessed in the light of Article 86(2) of the Treaty, which states that ‘undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the character of a revenue producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them.
Udviklingen af samhandelen må ikke påvirkes i et sådant omfang, at det strider mod Fællesskabets interesse«.
The development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Community’.