natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Tiscalinet understreger også, at alle de lovgivningstiltag, der havde til formål at udvide ERAP's vedtægter, så institutionen kunne eje aktier i FT, udstedelsen af en statsgaranti til fordel for ERAP, så institutionen kunne investere i FT og endelig teksten om de nærmere vilkår for statens besiddelse af aktiekapital i FT bestyrker opfattelsen af, at der var tale om en uigenkaldelig statsgaranti, som markedsaktørerne, og nærmere betegnet obligationskøberne, tog hensyn til, da de tegnede sig ved FT's forskellige finansieringsrunder efter denne dato.
Tiscalinet also stresses that the set of legislative measures aimed at extending ERAP's company objects so as to enable it to hold France Télécom shares, the provision of a state guarantee to ERAP to enable it to invest in France Télécom and the instrument dealing with the method by which the State would hold France Télécom's capital strengthen the analysis of the irrevocable character of the state guarantee on which market operators, and in particular bond holders, relied when subscribing to the successive calls made by France Télécom.
Disse forhold styrker formodningen om, at staten gjorde sig til »sidste låneinstans« for FT, hvilket en fornuftig investor ikke ville have gjort.
These factors bear out that the State is acting as a ‘last resort’ vis-à-vis France Télécom, a transaction to which a prudent investor would not have subscribed.
Tiscalinet mener ikke, at andre end den franske stat ville have været i stand til at mobilisere sådanne ressourcer.
In Tiscalinet's opinion, only the French State was capable of mobilising such resources.
Tiscalinet hævder, at den garanti, som staten gav, og dens deltagelse i kapitalforøgelsen, som ingen fornuftig privat investor ville have gennemført, gav FT mulighed for at komme uden om omfattende afhændelser af aktiver, og at det udelukkende var sigtet at bevare selskabets aktivitetsomfang og opnå forholdsvist lave obligationsrenter sammenholdt med selskabets faktiske finansieringssituation.
Tiscalinet maintains that the guarantee given by the State and the subscription to the capital increase which no prudent private investor would have made enabled France Télécom to avoid having to carry out huge asset disposals with the sole aim of maintaining its business perimeter and of benefiting from relatively low bond rates compared with its intrinsic financial situation.
Støtten er uforenelig med rammebestemmelserne.
The aid is incompatible with the Guidelines.
Tiscalinet mener ikke, at betingelserne for tilkendelse af omstruktureringsstøtte var opfyldt, især fordi ambitionsplanen 2005 ikke omfatter fyldestgørende kompenserende foranstaltninger til sikring af konkurrencen.
Tiscalinet maintains that the conditions for the granting of restructuring aid are not met, inter alia because the Ambition 2005 plan does not contain sufficient compensatory measures to safeguard competition.
Tiscalinet påpeger, at støtten fra den franske stat har konkurrenceforvridende konsekvenser for markedet for højhastighedsinternetadgang.
It refers to the distortions of competition brought about by the French State's support in the case of the high-speed Internet access market.
Tiscalinet mener, at FT for visse netelementers vedkommende har fået mulighed for at investere massivt i reklamebudgettet, hvilket er kommet Wanadoo til gode.
It maintains that France Télécom is able to invest heavily in certain aspects of the network, using advertising monies, which benefits Wanadoo.
Wanadoo har heller ikke været nødt til at afhænde vigtigere aktiver og drager fortsat fordel af indtægterne fra de gule sider og FT's salgsagenturer.
Moreover, Wanadoo has not had to dispose of major assets and continues to benefit from Yellow Pages income and from France Télécom's commercial agency network.
Tiscalinet har også fremført, at den strategi, FT satte i værk, navnlig for at få gennemført det forenklede, blandede offentlige tilbud om køb og salg af Wanadoo-aktier den 11. marts 2004, begunstigede FT skattemæssigt i en grad, som ikke havde været tilfældet uden statens støtteforanstaltninger.
Tiscalinet also points out that the strategy introduced by France Télécom, notably as regards the launch of the simplified mixed public purchase and exchange offer concerning Wanadoo's shares of 11 March 2004, had the effect of enabling France Télécom to benefit from fiscal aid which it would not have received without the State's support measures.
Tiscali understreger i øvrigt i sit brev af 5. april 2004, at den franske stats indledende støtte har medført en konkurrenceforvridning på Frankrigs DSL-marked.
Tiscali draws attention, moreover, in its letter of 5 April 2004 to the anticompetitive strategy introduced in the DSL market in France thanks to the initial aid from the French State.
Subsidiært foreslår Tiscalinet, hvis støtten bedømmes som forenelig i medfør af rammebestemmelserne, en række vigtige kompenserende foranstaltninger på markedet for højhastighedsinternetadgang, f.eks. fastsættelse af en mindstepris for ADSL-detailtilbud fra FT til datterselskaberne, forbud mod tilbud med bundtning af FT's og Wanadoos tjenester, forbud mod distribution af Wanadoos tjenester via FT's salgsagenturer, og afhændelse af Wanadoos gule sider og udenlandske datterselskaber.
In the alternative, if the aid were to be found compatible with the Guidelines, Tiscalinet proposes compensatory measures essentially in the high-speed Internet access market, such as the setting of a minimum price for France Télécom's ADSL retail offerings to its subsidiaries, a ban on making joint offers of France Télécom's and Wanadoo's services, a ban on distributing Wanadoo's services in France Télécom's commercial agencies, and the disposal of the Yellow Pages business and of Wanadoo's foreign subsidiaries.
Bemærkninger fra D
Comments from D
D har fremlagt et dokument med titlen »Midtvejsrapport juni 2003 om gennemførelsen af præsident Jacques Chiracs valgløfter på erhvervs-, energi-, tele- og postområdet«.
D has submitted a document entitled ‘Stage report on the fulfilment of President Jacques Chirac's campaign commitments in the fields of industry, energy, telecommunications and posts of June 2003’.
For så vidt angår FT angives det i dokumentet, at: »Takket være statens resolutte støtte og udnævnelsen af Thierry Breton lykkedes det France Télécom at undgå at blive kvalt i sin egen gæld.«
On the subject of France Télécom, the document states that: ‘Thanks to the State's resolute support and to the appointment of Thierry Breton, France Télécom has been more than just saved from a life-threatening situation.’
Bemærkninger fra FT
Comments from France Télécom
FT har fremlagt sine bemærkninger i form af tre rapporter: (i) rapport af Ehlermann af 12. januar 2004, »Meddelelse til France Télécom«; (ii) rapport af Galmot af 6. januar 2004, »Støtter EF-Domstolens retspraksis, at statens finansieringsforanstaltninger til fordel for France Télécom, som Kommissionen har indledt proceduren i traktatens artikel 88, stk. 2, overfor, medførte en »overførsel af statsmidler« til selskabet?«; og (iii) rapport fra HSBC, »Udtalelse fra HSBC af 6. januar 2004«.
France Télécom has presented its comments in the form of three reports: (i) a report drawn up by Mr Ehlermann dated 12 January 2004 entitled ‘Opinion for the attention of France Télécom’; (ii) a report drawn up by Mr Galmot dated 6 January 2004 entitled ‘Does the case law of the Court of Justice of the Communities allow the conclusion to be drawn that the “financial measures introduced by the State in support of France Télécom”, regarding which the Commission has initiated the procedure provided for in Article 88(2) of the Treaty, have effected a “transfer of state resources” for the benefit of that company?’; and (iii) a report by HSBC entitled: ‘HSBC Opinion of 6 January 2004’.
De tre rapporter gennemgås kort herunder.
These three reports are described briefly below.
I den første rapport analyseres de franske myndigheders adfærd på baggrund af de gældende regler for statsstøtte i almindelighed og det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip i særdeleshed.
The first report analyses the French authorities' conduct in the light of the rules applicable to state aid in general and of the prudent investor test in particular.
De argumenter, der opstilles i rapporten for at godtgøre, at tilkendegivelsen af 5. december 2002 om aktionærlånet ikke påvirker statens midler, er i store træk som følger: (i) bebudelsen af aktionærlånet i december 2002 er ikke et uigenkaldeligt tilsagn (men blot en hensigtserklæring), og det er underlagt visse betingelser.
The arguments set out in the report, which seeks to show that the declaration of 5 December 2002 concerning the shareholder loan does not affect the State's resources, are essentially as follows: (i) the December 2002 announcement of the shareholder loan is not an irrevocable commitment (but a mere declaration of intent), and is conditional.
Bebudelsen udgør således ikke nogen garanti, langt mindre en ubegrænset garanti; (ii) beslutningen om Crédit Foncier de France (se tidligere) er ikke gyldig præcedens og vedrører desuden en erklæring, som ikke kan sammenlignes med bebudelsen i december 2002.
The announcement does not therefore constitute a guarantee, and even less so an unlimited guarantee; (ii) the Crédit Foncier de France decision (referred to above) is not a valid precedent and, moreover, it concerns a declaration that is not comparable to the December 2002 announcement.
Rapporten søger i øvrigt at påvise, at FT ikke var en kriseramt virksomhed i rammebestemmelsernes forstand på det tidspunkt, hvor staten besluttede sig for at deltage i kapitaltilførslen og bebudede, at den havde til hensigt at yde et aktionærlån.
The report also seeks to show that France Télécom was not a company in financial difficulties within the meaning of the Guidelines at the time the State decided to take part in the recapitalisation and announced its readiness to provide a shareholder loan.
Rapporten understreger, at det er ganske almindeligt og gængs praksis, at hovedaktionæren yder et lån for at fremskynde sin deltagelse i en kapitaltilførsel.
It stresses that it is normal and usual for the majority shareholder to grant a loan upfront of its participation in the recapitalisation.
Den anden rapport fokuserer på det spørgsmål, om bebudelsen af et aktionærlån i form af en kredit i sig selv kan indebære en forpligtelse af statsmidler.
The second report focuses on whether the mere announcement of the making available of a shareholder loan in the form of a credit line can as such constitute a commitment of state resources.
Rapporten fremfører, at et uigenkaldeligt tilsagn om et aktionærlån i forening med den tilsyneladende tilrådighedsstillelse heraf ifølge Kommissionens foreløbige holdning er nok til at etablere en forpligtelse af statsmidler, hvilket svarer til princippet om foranstaltninger med lignende virkning som statsstøtte, som Domstolen allerede har afvist.
The report states that, according to the Commission's argument, an irrevocable announcement of a commitment to grant a loan, coupled with its apparent provision, is sufficient to establish a commitment of state resources, which corresponds to the concept of measure having an effect equivalent to state aid, which has already been rejected by the Court of Justice.
Ifølge rapporten er der ikke tale om overførsel af statsmidler, fordi der i sidste ende hverken blev gjort brug af kreditbevillingen eller ydet en garanti, idet det ville have krævet godkendelse via finansloven.
According to the report, there is no transfer of state resources because, in the end, there was no opening of a credit line or provision of a guarantee, which would have required authorisation by a finance act.
Der er for øvrigt heller ikke tale om overførsel af statsmidler, fordi mundtlige tilkendegivelser fra en offentlig myndighed ifølge fransk ret ikke kan have virkninger på de offentlige finanser og bevirke nogen form for overførsel af statsmidler, og der er i det foreliggende tilfælde kun tale om rene ministerielle tilkendegivelser uden negativ indvirkning på de offentlige finanser.
There is likewise no transfer of state resources because, under French law, no oral declaration by a public authority is capable of having any effect whatever on the public finances and of carrying out the slightest transfer of state resources. And in the present case, all that is involved is mere ministerial declarations having no negative impact on the public finances.
Den tredje rapport koncentrerer sig om den økonomiske fornuft i statens adfærd mellem den 4. september 2002 (hvor resultaterne for første halvår blev offentliggjort) og den 15. april 2003 (hvor kapitalforøgelsen blev gennemført).
The third report focuses on the economic rationale behind the State's conduct between 4 September 2002 (the announcement of the first six months' results) and 15 April 2003 (the carrying out of the capital increase).
Rapporten tager afsæt i en analyse af FT's situation i september 2002 og skelner mellem FT's driftsresultater (sund forretningsførelse med mulighed for bedring af driftslikviditeten) og operatørens gæld (omfang, forfaldstidspunkt, negativ koncernkapital som følge af tab på ikke-tilbagevendende forhold).
The report is based on an analysis of France Télécom's situation in September 2002 and draws a distinction between, on the one hand, France Télécom's operational performance (healthy activities with a potential for improving the operational cash flow) and, on the other, the amount of the operator's debt (level of indebtedness, debt maturities, negative consolidated own capital resulting from losses linked to non-recurring items).
Rapporten konkluderer i den forbindelse, at tidsforskellen mellem koncernens indtjening af likviditeten og forfaldstidspunkterne på den kortfristede finansieringsgæld (2003-2005) ville skade selskabets refinansieringsmuligheder, men ikke dets solvens.
The report concludes on this point that the time lag between the generation of the group's cash flow and the heavy short-term financial commitments (2003-2005) poses a problem of refinancing but not of solvency.
HSBC beskriver også selskabets likviditetsproblemer på kort sigt, som blev forværret af markedets manglende tillid til koncernen.
HSBC also describes the background to the short-term liquidity crisis, worsened as it was by a crisis of confidence on the part of the market vis-à-vis the group.
HSBC præciserer, at en rationel tilgang til en sådan situation foreskrev, at der hurtigst muligt blev iværksat en plan med sigte på at forbedre driftsresultaterne, en kapitalforøgelse, en gældsomlægning og en målrettet politik for afhændelse af aktiver.
It states that, in a situation such as that, reason demanded that urgent steps be taken and required the introduction of a plan to improve the operational results, an increase in capital, a rescheduling of debt and a targeted policy of disposing of assets.
HSBC præciserer, at ambitionsplanen 2005 i det foreliggende tilfælde er en komplet, rationel og konsekvent plan, fordi den bl.a. åbner mulighed for en likviditetsforøgelse på 15 mia. EUR via driftsforbedringer og afhændelse af aktiver uden for de centrale forretningsområder.
It argues that, in the present case, the Ambition 2005 plan is a complete and rational coherent plan as it permits among other things the generation of a EUR 15 billion cash flow via an operational improvement and a disposal of assets that does not involve any amputation of core businesses.
HSBC lægger vægt på, at en kapitalforøgelse til støtte for et virksomhed, der iværksætter en driftsomlægningsplan, er en naturlig løsning for at skabe balance i regnskabet.
It stresses that a capital increase in support of a company introducing an operational recovery plan is a natural way of rebalancing the accounts.
HSBC understreger, at den mundtlige støtte fra hovedaktionærens side også er gængs, fornuftig praksis, og at det er ganske almindeligt, at storaktionærer offentliggør deres beslutninger før de øvrige aktionærer.
It points out that the oral support of a majority shareholder is also usual and rational and that it is normal practice for reference shareholders to announce their decision before other shareholders do.
HSBC understreger også, at aktionærlånet i det foreliggende tilfælde var en urisikabel, rentabel og gængs transaktion — forud for en kapitalforøgelse — for at beskytte hovedaktionærens formueinteresser, mens det på grund af fristreglerne ikke var muligt at gennemføre kapitaltilførslen i december.
It also points out that in this case the shareholder loan was a low-risk, profitable and normal transaction — pending a capital increase — aimed at safeguarding the majority shareholder's financial interests at a time (the month of December) when it was not possible to recapitalise the company for reasons of scheduling.
HSBC præciserer også, at lånet skulle ydes på almindeligt gældende markedsvilkår.
It adds that the loan was to be made on market conditions.
HSBC-rapporten nævner også FT-aktiens børskursudvikling, idet det understreges, at aktien var steget i juli 2002 som følge af nationaliseringsrygter, hvorefter den faldt i september, fordi der, efter at det blev almindeligt kendt på markedet, at der måske ville blive gennemført en kapitaltilførsel på 15 mia. EUR, ikke var klarhed over de nærmere detaljer.
The HSBC report mentions also the trend in the price of France Télécom shares on the stock exchange, pointing out that the shares had risen in July 2002 as a result of rumours of nationalisation, only to fall again in September because, although the market had got wind of a possible EUR 15 billion capital increase, the practical arrangements were not as yet clear.
Rapporten understreger også, at FT's finansielle prognoser gav udsigt til et yderst tilfredsstillende afkast for staten: med tilbagediskontering af fremtidig indtjening til nytidsværdi (discounted cash flow) giver kapitaltilførslen et årligt afkast på 25 %, hvor gennemsnittet i telesektoren er 9,9 %.
It points out that France Télécom's financial projections presage, for the State, a highly satisfactory return: according to the DCF — discounted cash flow — method, the recapitalisation involves an annual rate of return of 25 %, whereas the average rate on the telecommunications market is 9,9 %.
Som reaktion på konsulentfirmaets juridiske og økonomiske rapporter fremlagde FT tre juridiske noter med kritik af disse rapporter samt en økonomirapport.
In response to the dispatch of the consultant's legal report and economic report, France Télécom submitted three legal memoranda criticising the reports' content and an economic report.
Den første note fremfører, at de forskellige juridiske kategorier i fransk civil-, handels- og forvaltningsret, som konsulentfirmaet anvender i sin analyse af statens erklæringer, ikke er relevante for vurderingen af, om de ministerielle tilkendegivelser etablerer rettigheder for tredjeparter.
The first memorandum states that the various legal categories under French civil, commercial or administrative law used by the consultant in its analysis of the State's declarations are not relevant to any finding that the ministerial declarations may be capable of creating rights on the part of third parties.
Noten anfører mere specifikt, at forudsætningerne for at kunne holde staten ansvarlig for løftebrud ikke er opfyldt i dette tilfælde.
More particularly, the memorandum claims that the conditions required for the State's responsibility to be incurred for non-compliance with its promise are not met in the present case.
Noten præciserer, at staten ikke kan forpligte sig på de offentlige finanser blot ved at afgive et løfte, endog i form af betaling af visse pengesummer, til at »binde statsmidler« uden grundlag i en retsakt.
It argues that in no way does the mere act of making a promise, even to pay certain sums of money, suffice in itself to commit public finances, to ‘immobilise state resources’, without a legal instrument.
Noten konkluderer i den forbindelse, at der ifølge fransk retspraksis ikke i den foreliggende sag forekom »overførsel af statsmidler« som følge af det betingede løfte om et aktionærlån.
It concludes on this point that there is nothing in French case law to show that there has been a ‘transfer of state resources’ in the present case due to the conditional promise of a shareholder loan.
Noten præciserer også, at der skal være en forbindelse mellem statsmidlerne og den tilkendte fordel.
It adds that there must be a link between the state resources and the advantage granted.
Løftebrudssager har kun til formål at opveje en eventuel skade, som løftemodtageren måtte have lidt.
Litigation over promises made is designed solely to compensate for any loss suffered by the promise's recipient.
Erstatningen må således ikke give modtageren en fordel.
The compensation due cannot therefore procure for the latter an advantage.
Noten konkluderer, at Domstolen ikke har fastlagt, i hvilket omfang et ubetinget og lovmæssigt bindende løfte om tilkendelse af støtte kan betragtes som »iværksat«.
The memorandum concludes by saying that the Court of Justice has not defined the extent to which an unconditional and legally binding promise to grant aid can be considered as ‘having been implemented’.
Den anden note understreger, at Kommissionen bør udvide proceduren formelt til de foranstaltninger, som er blevet analyseret af de eksperter, Kommissionen har udpeget, da indledningsbeslutningen ikke omfatter dem.
The second memorandum states that the Commission should formally extend the procedure to include the measures analysed by the experts appointed by it as they were not covered by the opening decision.
Noten præciserer desuden, at »ensidige erklæringer fra en statslig myndighed som led i dennes rolle som hovedaktionær skal efter fransk ret og EU-ret opfylde forskellige kriterier for at kunne betragtes som uigenkaldelige, utvetydige og ubetingede tilsagn og for at kunne betragtes som statsstøtte«.
It adds that ‘unilateral declarations made by a state authority, acting in its role of majority shareholder, must, under French law and under Community law, fulfil various criteria in order to be able to be characterised as an irrevocable, clear and unconditional commitment and in order to be able to be characterised as state aid’.
Noten konkluderer i den forbindelse, at de forskellige erklæringer, som eksperterne har gennemgået, tydeligvis ikke opfylder disse betingelser.
The memorandum concludes on this point that the various declarations on which the experts have focused manifestly do not satisfy these conditions.
Ifølge Ehlermann medfører den analyse, som eksperterne slår til lyd for, »at enhver statsinstans, som er hovedaktionær i en virksomhed, i praksis får mundkurv på, fordi den skal forhåndsinformere Kommissionen om enhver offentlig tilkendegivelse vedrørende sine handlinger, hensigter eller holdninger som hovedaktionær i eller til fordel for den virksomhed, den kontrollerer«.
According to Mr Ehlermann, the analysis put forward by the experts would have as a corollary ‘a muzzling effect on any state authority which, where it is the majority shareholder in a company, is required to inform the Commission in advance of any public declaration concerning its shares, intentions or opinions as majority shareholder within or in favour of the company it controls’.
Det fører på baggrund af eksperternes analyse også til »en unødig berigelse af samme instans, når den, fordi den har brudt sin »tavshedspligt«, skal tilbagesøge midler, som den ikke selv har mobiliseret.
The experts' analysis would also lead to ‘an unfounded enrichment of that same authority which, as a result of non-compliance with an obligation of silence, would benefit from an order to recover funds which it has never mobilised.
Staten belønnes således — af virksomheden, som ikke er herre over sine aktionærers tilkendegivelser — for at bryde sin »tavshedspligt«.
The State would thus be rewarded — by the company, which is not master of its shareholders' declarations — for having violated this alleged “obligation of silence”.