natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Belgiens argumenter vedrørende (re)investeringer: De belgiske myndigheder har ud over at angive de oplysninger om (re)investeringer, der er beskrevet i sagsfremstillingen, også gjort opmærksom på, at SNCB’s isolerede tiltag for de pågældende datterselskaber (i Tyskland, Frankrig, Nederlandene, Irland, Portugal og Belgien) er i fuld overensstemmelse med princippet om den private investor i en markedsøkonomi.
Belgium's arguments regarding the (re)investments. In addition to the indications from the Belgian authorities regarding the (re)investments as summarised in the statement of facts, the Belgian authorities also point out that SNCB's timely intervention regarding the subsidiaries in question (Germany, France, the Netherlands, Ireland, Portugal, Belgium) is in line with the principle of the private investor in a market economy.
Det bemærkes endvidere, at tiltagene vedrørende ABX LOGISTICS Singapore ikke falder ind under anvendelsesområdet for traktatens artikel 87.
What is more, it should be noted that the interventions concerning ABX Logistics Singapore are not covered by Article 87 of the Treaty.
Med hensyn til tredjeparternes bemærkninger om procedurens udvidelse har de belgiske myndigheder anført, at de allerede i deres tidligere indlæg har svaret på disse bemærkninger, som blot gengiver Kommissionens betænkeligheder.
Regarding the comments made by third parties on the extension of the procedure, the Belgian authorities point out that in their previous reactions they have already responded to comments which only echo the Commission's misgivings.
Til Robert Zieglers bemærkninger har de belgiske myndigheder svaret, at Kommissionen er blevet underrettet om det foreløbige lån på 140 mio. EUR og om den nye foranstaltning, der sigter mod at kapitalisere dette lån.
Regarding the statement by Mr Robert Ziegler, the Belgian authorities state that the Commission has been notified of the temporary loan of EUR 140 million and the new measure aimed at capitalising this loan.
SNCB eller ABX kan ikke give noget tilsagn, før Kommissionens godkendelse foreligger.
Neither SNCB nor ABX can make any commitment pending approval.
Det samme gælder for tilførslen af 157,4 mio. EUR i form af egenkapital til omstruktureringen af ABX-Tyskland og for de øvrige anmeldte foranstaltninger.
The same applies to the contribution of EUR 157,4 million of own funds for restructuring ABX-Germany as well as for the other notified measures.
Hvad angår den fordel, som ABX muligvis vil kunne opnå som følge af privatiseringen, har de belgiske myndigheder henvist til den »fairness opinion« (ekspertvurdering af købstilbuddet), der er udarbejdet af KPMG. Det fremgår af denne vurdering, der blev forelagt for Kommissionen, at »the terms of the proposed« sale to [Yvan] are fair and reasonable and represent fair market value (»Vilkårene for det foreslåede salg til [Yvan] er retfærdige og rimelige og bygger på en rimelig markedsværdi«).
Regarding the potential advantage which ABX could gain through being privatised, the Belgian authorities refer to the ‘fairness opinion’ prepared by KPMG and sent to the Commission which indicates that ‘the terms of the proposed sale to [Yvan] are fair and reasonable and represent fair market value’.
Hvad angår det påståede manglende salg af ABX Frankrig, har de belgiske myndigheder henvist til deres oplysninger om, hvilke dele der er blevet solgt.
Regarding the alleged failure to sell ABX France, the Belgian authorities note that they indicated which parts were sold.
Med hensyn til vilkårene for dette salg henviser de bl.a. til rapporten fra Ernst &Young, ifølge hvilken »the price valuation for Road Domestic Transport Activities amounting to (…) is fair«(»vurderingen af prisen for indenlandsk vejtransport til (…) er rimelig«).
Regarding the conditions of this sale, they refer in particular to the report by Ernst & Young which states that ‘the price valuation for Road Domestic Transport Activities amounting to (…) is fair’.
Til spørgsmålet om konsekvenserne af ABX-koncernens eventuelle konkurs har de belgiske myndigheder afslutningsvis bemærket, at det vil få alvorlige konsekvenser, hvis Kommissionen vedtager en negativ eller delvis negativ beslutning vedrørende både ABX LOGISTICS Worldwide og SNCB Holding.
Finally, regarding the question on the consequences of the possible bankruptcy of the ABX group, the Belgian authorities can only stress the serious consequences both for ABX Logistics Worldwide and for SNCB Holding were the Commission to adopt even a partially negative decision.
Salget af ABX-WW: Ifølge de belgiske myndigheder var SNCB Holding slet ikke forpligtet til at iværksætte en udbudsprocedure i forbindelse med privatiseringen af ABX Logistics Worldwide.
Sale of ABX-WW. According to the Belgian authorities, SNCB Holding was under no obligation to privatise ABX Logistics Worldwide by issuing an invitation to tender.
De belgiske myndigheder har undersøgt Kommissionens praksis for statsstøtte i forbindelse med privatiseringer og fastslået, at Kommissionen i tilfælde af, at der ikke er iværksat et udbud, nøjes med at kontrollere, at aktiverne er solgt til markedsprisen, på grundlag af en vurdering foretaget af en uafhængig ekspert.
The Belgian authorities point out that close examination of the Commission's state aid practices relating to privatisations shows that, in the absence of an invitation to tender, the Commission only checks that assets are sold at market price on the basis of an assessment by an independent expert.
Til det formål har de belgiske myndigheder — i overensstemmelse med disse principper — forelagt Kommissionen en uafhængig vurdering af vilkårene for salget af ABX Logistics Worldwide foretaget af konsulentfirmaet KPMG Corporate Finance.
Therefore, in line with this, the Belgian authorities submitted to the Commission an independent assessment, carried out by the consultants KPMG Corporate Finance, of the conditions of the sale of ABX Logistics Worldwide.
KOMMISSIONENS VURDERING
COMMISSION'S ASSESSMENT
Spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt der foreligger statsstøtte
Presence of state aid
Det fremgår af artikel 87, stk. 1, EF, at »statsstøtte eller støtte, som ydes ved hjælp af statsmidler under enhver tænkelig form, og som fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene ved at begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner, [er] uforenelig med fællesmarkedet i det omfang, den påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.«
Under Article 87(1) of the Treaty, ‘any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market’.
Kommissionen har indledningsvis fastslået, at de ovenfor beskrevne foranstaltninger omhandlede en række selskaber, som indgik i ABX-netværket, da det blev etableret, og som efter holdingselskabet ABX-WW’s stiftelse blev integreret i ABX-koncernen.
Firstly the Commission notes that the above measures concerned a number of companies which had formed part of the ABX network since it was established and which had then been integrated into the ABX group when the holding company ABX-WW was founded.
Den mener, at disse selskaber, også inden dette holdingselskab formelt blev stiftet, inden for rammerne af SNCB-koncernen udgjorde en klart adskilt økonomisk enhed (herefter »ABX-koncernen«), som er den enhed, der analyseres i det følgende.
It considers that even before this holding company was legally established these companies formed, within the SNCB group, a distinct financial unit (‘the ABX group’) which should be seen as the relevant entity in the following assessment.
Kommissionen har med det samme bemærket, at tre af de fire kriterier i traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, (»begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner«, »truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene« og »påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne«) er opfyldt.
The Commission notes straight away that three of the four criteria set out in Article 87(1) of the Treaty are met (‘favouring certain undertakings’‘threatening to distort competition’ and ‘affecting trade between Member States’).
De midler, som SNCB tildelte ABX-koncernen, begunstiger nemlig dette selskab i forhold til de øvrige virksomheder, der er aktive på de pågældende markeder.
The funds which the SNCB made available to the ABX group favour that company over other companies operating on its markets.
Da foranstaltningerne udelukkende var rettet mod ABX-koncernen og dens datterselskaber, fordrejer eller truer de med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene for disse aktiviteter, der er underlagt fri konkurrence.
By exclusively favouring the ABX group or its subsidiaries, these measures distort or threaten to distort competition in those activities which are subject to free competition.
Foranstaltningerne påvirker desuden samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne, eftersom den undersøgte konkurrenceprægede aktivitet også udøves i mange andre medlemsstater.
Lastly, these measures affect trade between Member States as the investigated competitive activity is also carried out in several other Member States.
Denne konklusion gælder også for foranstaltningerne til fordel for de selskaber i koncernen, der driver virksomhed uden for Fællesskabet.
This conclusion also applies to measures favouring the group's companies operating outside the Community.
For det første fremgår det nemlig af »Tubemeuse«-dommen, at det i betragtning af den indbyrdes afhængig mellem EF-virksomhedernes markeder ikke er udelukket, at en støtte kan fordreje konkurrencen inden for Fællesskabet, selv om den støttemodtagende virksomhed eksporterer næsten hele sin produktion til lande uden for Fællesskabet.
Firstly, in accordance with the ‘Tubemeuse’ decision and taking account of the interdependence between the markets on which Community undertakings operate, it is possible that aid might distort competition within the Community, even if the undertaking receiving it exports almost all its production outside the Community.
Da der for det andet er tale om en international transportkoncern, som driver virksomhed over hele verden i konkurrence med andre erhvervsdrivende fra Fællesskabet, vil den støtte, der gives til et selskab i koncernen, som er aktiv i tredjelande, styrke hele koncernen og dermed påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne og fordreje eller true med at fordreje konkurrencen inden for Fællesskabet.(170) Da de omhandlede foranstaltninger mobiliserer midler fra SNCB, skal de desuden anses for at være finansieret med statsmidler (offentlige midler).
Secondly, as this is a case of an international transport group operating globally in competition with other Community operators, the aid granted to one of the group's companies operating in third countries strengthens the group as a whole and therefore affects trade between Member States and distorts, or threatens to distort, intra-Community competition.(170) In addition, as the measures in question mobilise SNCB's resources, they must be regarded as implementing State resources (public funds).
SNCB ejes nemlig af staten, og dens særlige status som offentlig virksomhed giver anledning til at konkludere, at SNCB’s midler til stadighed er undergivet offentlig kontrol.
Due to the fact that SNCB is state-owned and its specific status as a public undertaking, the SNCB's resources remain constantly under public control.
Denne konklusion understøttes af, at SNCB er underlagt bestemmelserne i loven af 21. marts 1991, som sikrer selskabet en særlig beskyttelse mod risikoen for konkurs svarende til en statslig garanti.
This conclusion is backed up by the observation that SNCB is subject to the Law of 21 March 1991 under which it is granted specific protection against the risk of bankruptcy, comparable to a guarantee from the State.
I Stardust Marine-dommen, præmis 52, bemærkede Domstolen desuden, at: »… den omstændighed, at en offentlig virksomhed er undergivet statslig kontrol, er ikke i sig selv tilstrækkeligt til at tilregne staten de af den trufne foranstaltninger, såsom finansiel støtte.
In addition, also in Stardust Marine, at paragraph 52, the Court states that: ‘…the mere fact that a public undertaking is under State control is not sufficient for measures taken by that undertaking, such as the financial support measures in question here, to be imputed to the State.
Det er også nødvendigt at undersøge, om de offentlige myndigheder på den ene eller den anden måde må anses for at være impliceret i vedtagelsen af disse foranstaltninger«.
It is also necessary to examine whether the public authorities must be regarded as having been involved, in one way or another, in the adoption of those measures’.
En anden betingelse skal også være opfyldt, for at de foranstaltninger, der træffes af en offentlig virksomhed, kan betragtes som statsstøtte, nemlig at disse foranstaltninger ikke afspejler den handlemåde, som en privat investor ville have fulgt i en lignende situation.
Another condition needed for measures taken by a public undertaking to constitute State aid is that the measures are not the same as those which would be taken by a private investor in a similar situation.
I det følgende gennemgår Kommissionen derfor alle de foranstaltninger, SNCB iværksatte til fordel for ABX-koncernen, for at se, om de både kan tilregnes staten og afviger fra den handlemåde, som en sådan privat investor sandsynligvis ville have fulgt.
As a result, the Commission will assess each of the measures taken by the SNCB in favour of the ABX group to check whether each one is both imputable to the State and not the likely behaviour of a private investor in this situation.
Hvis begge betingelser er opfyldt, har foranstaltningerne karakter af statsstøtte. Kommissionen gør rede for, hvad formålet med støtten er, og hvor stort et beløb der er tale om.
If both these conditions are fulfilled, the measures are deemed to constitute State aid and the Commission will analyse the subject and amount of this.
Investeringerne i 2001 og de parallelle bidrag
Investments made in 2001 and parallel contributions
De belgiske myndigheder har oplyst, at de reinvesteringer, som SNCB foretog i ABX-koncernens tyske, nederlandske og franske aktiviteter i 2001, var baseret på positive økonomiske prognoser og råd fra eksperter i virksomhedsudvikling.
The Belgian authorities pointed out that the reinvestments made in 2001 by SNCB in the ABX group's German, Dutch and French operations were based on positive financial forecasts and the advice of business development experts.
De tidligere anførte beregninger af rentabiliteten bygger på de forventninger til udviklingen, som SNCB med rimelighed kunne have i 2001.
The profitability calculations set out above appear to be based on acceptable business development forecasts, as far as SNCB was able to predict in 2001.
Investeringerne i Tyskland var baseret dels på en sagkyndig undersøgelse, som pegede på, at en vellykket omstrukturering af ABX-D ville gøre det muligt at videreføre ABX’s strategi og realisere et potentiale for værdiskabelse på 300 mio. EUR mod et indskud på 50 mio. EUR, dels på en tilfredsstillende intern forrentning.
The investments in Germany are based on an expert opinion which calculated that by successfully turning around ABX-D the ABX strategy could be continued, potentially creating EUR 300 million compared with the injection of EUR 50 million, and based on an adequate intrinsic return.
Ser man på investeringen på 30 mio. EUR i Frankrig, fremgår det af rentabilitetsberegningen, at SNCB kunne regne med en intern forrentning på mellem 8 og 14 %.
Regarding the investment of EUR 30 million in France, the profitability calculations indicate that the SNCB could achieve an internal rate of return of between 8 and 14 %.
Investeringen gjorde det desuden muligt at lancere et program for securitisation af fordringer, som betød, at selskabet kunne opnå en kreditlinje på 70 mio. EUR.
Moreover, this investment has made it possible to start a programme to securitise receivables so the company can get a bank credit line of EUR 70 million.
Hvad angår den investering, der blev foretaget i ABX-NL i 2001, mener Kommissionen ikke, at der er tilstrækkeligt grundlag for, at IRR som foreslået af de belgiske myndigheder beregnes ud fra det beløb, kapital blev forhøjet med, efter fratrækning af omkostningerne til købet af Wegtransport.
The Commission considers that there is insufficient justification, in the case of the investment made in 2001 in ABX-NL, for basing the calculation of the IRR on the capital gain after deducting the costs of acquiring Wegtransport, as is proposed by the Belgian authorities.
Da SNCB’s samlede investering imidlertid indbefatter omkostningerne til dette køb, og derfor beløber sig til 19,2 mio. EUR i stedet for 12,2 mio. EUR, kommer IRR for denne investering til at ligge på mellem 8,9 og 10,2 %, hvilket er et acceptabelt niveau, navnlig i betragtning af, at man på investeringstidspunktet forventede, at hele ABX-NL ville blive rentabel igen i løbet af bare to år.
However, considering that the SNCB's total investment includes this acquisition cost and as a result is EUR 19,2 million rather than EUR 12,2 million, the IRR of the investment is between 8,9 % and 10,2 %, and therefore remains acceptable, in particular in the light of the fact that when the investment was made, the entire ABX-NL was expected to become profitable again within the very short period of two years.
Rentabiliteten af de »parallelle bidrag« til kapitalen i ABX-koncernens selskaber i Irland, Belgien, Portugal og Singapore (der ikke var i finansielle vanskeligheder) er beregnet til en IRR på mellem 9,6 og 12,7 %, hvilket er acceptabelt.
Likewise, the estimation of rates of profitability of the ‘parallel contributions’ to the capital of the companies in the ABX group in Ireland, Belgium, Portugal and Singapore (which were not in financial difficulty) gave an expected IRR of between 9,6 % and 12,7 %, and appears acceptable.
Kommissionen gør desuden opmærksom på, at SNCB’s finansielle struktur indtil udgangen af 2001 gjorde det muligt for selskabet at finansiere sin kommercielle udvikling uden at belaste den finansielle struktur mere end nødvendigt (forholdet mellem gæld og egenkapital gik fra 0,6 til 0,9 i perioden fra 1997 til 2001). Fra 2002 var det ikke længere tilfældet.
The Commission also points out that until the end of 2001 SNCB's financial structure allowed it to finance its commercial development without placing an excessive burden on its financial structure (debt/equity ratio rising from 0,6 to 0,9 between 1997 and 2001), which was not the case from 2002.
Det skal endelig understreges, at alle disse investeringsbeslutninger indgår i en koncernstrategi.
Lastly, it should be noted that all these investment decisions are part of a group strategy.
Det var under disse omstændigheder berettiget, at SNCB ikke bare tog hensyn til den interne rente af hver af de enkelte dispositioner, men også til de positive virkninger, der kunne forventes for koncernen.
In these circumstances SNCB was justified in taking account not only of the expected intrinsic return on each of these operations, but also the positive effects expected at group level.
Kommissionen fastslår derfor, at SNCB, da den ud fra de daværende forventninger valgte at foretage reinvesteringerne i 2001 og at yde de »parallelle bidrag«, handlede på samme måde som en privat investor, og at disse foranstaltninger ikke udgør statsstøtte.
The Commission therefore concludes that, in the light of the prospects at the time, SNCB acted as a private investor would have done by making reinvestments in 2001 and making ‘parallel contributions’, and that these measures do not constitute state aid.
Til gengæld har Kommissionen konstateret, at SNCB har stillet garanti for ABX Singapore uden at kræve vederlag for det, og det ville en privat investor ikke have gjort.
However, the Commission notes that SNCB gave a guarantee to ABX Singapore without requiring payment, which is not what a private investor would have done.
I betragtning af at denne garanti blev udstedt i juni 2000, hvor offentligheden begyndte at vise interesse for ABX, og hvor de offentlige myndigheder iværksatte en række tiltag til fordel for SNCB, og for at tage hensyn til alle potentielle støtteelementer i sin vurdering mener Kommissionen, at denne garantistillelse uden vederlag kan udgøre statsstøtte.
Given that this guarantee was granted in June 2000 when ABX started arousing public interest and the public authorities intervened with regard to SNCB, and taking account in its analysis of all potential forms of aid, the Commission feels that granting this guarantee without payment may involve state aid.
Da garantien blev udstedt til et selskab i ABX-koncernen på et tidspunkt, hvor omlægningen og omstruktureringen af netværket allerede var blevet besluttet og ved at blive realiseret, vil Kommissionen undersøge denne støtte sammen med de øvrige foranstaltninger i forbindelse med omstruktureringen af ABX-koncernen, som ABX Singapore var en del af.
As this guarantee was awarded to a company in the ABX group at a time when the decision to reorganise and restructure the network had already been taken and this was underway, the Commission will investigate this aid together with the other restructuring measures taken by the ABX group, which has incorporated ABX Singapore.
Rekapitaliseringen
Recapitalisation measures
Mødet i det belgiske ministerråd i februar 2002 er et uigendriveligt bevis for, at den belgiske regering fra dette tidspunkt var impliceret i SNCB’s behandling af ABX-sagen.
The meeting of the Belgian Council of Ministers in February 2002 constitutes irrefutable proof of the Belgian Government's involvement, from that day on, in SNCB's management of the ABX case.
Rekapitaliseringen af ABX Tyskland (for et beløb på 157,4 mio. EUR) og ABX-Nederlandene (for et beløb på 10,6 mio. EUR) blev anmeldt af Belgien efter dette tidspunkt og er endnu ikke gennemført.
The measures taken to recapitalise ABX Germany (for a sum of EUR 157,4 million) and ABX Netherlands (for a sum of EUR 10,6 million) were notified by Belgium after this date, and have not yet been implemented.
Belgien præsenterede ikke disse foranstaltninger som påtænkte investeringer, men som omstruktureringsstøtte.
Belgium has presented these measures not as wise investments, but as restructuring aid.
Der er derfor ingen tvivl om, at disse foranstaltninger skal betragtes som statsstøtte og undersøges nærmere, for så vidt som der er tale om omstruktureringsstøtte.
There is therefore no doubt that these measures must be classed as state aid and investigated as restructuring aid.
SNCB var nødt til at sende en administrativ skrivelse til sit tyske datterselskab, da det allerede få måneder efter erhvervelsen udviste en negativ egenkapital. Hvert år indtil 2005 sendte SNCB en ny skrivelse, også i det tidsrum, hvor det var klart, at SNCB’s beslutninger vedrørende ABX kunne tilregnes staten.
The letter of intent which SNCB had to issue for its German subsidiary because the latter's equity was negative from the month in which it was bought, was re-issued annually until 2005 by SNCB, including during a period when there is no doubt that SNCB's decisions regarding ABX can be imputed to the State.
Da skrivelsen indeholder tilsagn svarende til dem, der gives i en garanti, og ikke har udløst et vederlag til SNCB, mener Kommissionen, at der foreligger statsstøtteelementer.
As this letter contains commitments comparable to a guarantee and SNCB received no payment for this, the Commission considers that there are elements of state aid.