natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kommissionen understreger også, at finansieringsudgifterne steg fra 2 mia. EUR i 2000 til 3,8 mia. EUR i 2001 og til 4 mia. EUR i 2002.
The Commission would also stress the growth in net interest expenses from EUR 2 billion in 2000 to EUR 3,8 billion in 2001 and EUR 4 billion in 2002.
Nettoformuen, dvs. værdien af egenkapitalen, faldt fra 33,2 mia. EUR pr. 31. december 2000 til 21 mia. EUR pr. 31. december 2001 og herefter til en negativ nettoformue på 10 mia. EUR pr. 31. december 2002.
The net asset value which corresponds to the share capital value fell from EUR 33,2 billion on 31 December 2000 to EUR 21 billion on 31 December 2001 and reached minus EUR 10 billion on 31 December 2002.
Heraf følger, at af de seks kriterier i rammebestemmelsernes punkt 6 for, hvornår en virksomhed er i vanskeligheder, var de fire opfyldt.
It follows, therefore, that, of the six criteria mentioned in point 6 of the Guidelines as being signs of a company's poor health, four are satisfied.
Endelig bekræftes selskabets finansieringsvanskeligheder af, hvor svært FT i 2002 havde ved at refinansiere sin gæld på kapitalmarkederne på fyldestgørende vilkår.
Finally, the Company's financial difficulties are confirmed by the difficulties it had in 2002 in refinancing itself on suitable terms on the capital market.
I modsætning til, hvad de franske myndigheder hævder, havde FT ikke adgang til finansieringsmarkederne i 2002 på fyldestgørende vilkår, før staten gav tilsagn om støtte i en række tilkendegivelser fra juli til december 2002.
Contrary to what the French authorities maintain, France Télécom did not have access to the financial markets in 2002 on suitable terms prior to the series of declarations of support by the State from July until December of that year.
FT's problemer med at skaffe fyldestgørende refinansiering uden støtte fra staten fremgår særlig tydeligt i finansanalytikernes rapporter.
The difficulties which France Télécom would have had in refinancing itself on suitable terms without the State's support are illustrated by the financial analysts' reports.
I juli 2002 angav en analytiker f.eks., at det med en rating på Baa3 ville være svært for selskabet skaffe ny kapital til at løse sit gældsproblem: »[Med FT's Baa3-rating var det] svært at få nogen med på en eventuel obligationsemission.
For example, one analyst has stated that, in July 2002, with a Baa3 rating the Company would have had difficulty solving its debt problem through the acquisition of new capital: ‘FT's Baa3 rating meant that it was hard to say who would buy a potential bond issue.
En dårlig prognose giver større risiko for, at selskabet ender som en »falden engel«, hvis det ikke kan løse sit gældsproblem«.
The negative outlook increases the possibility of the company becoming a fallen angel, if it is unable to solve its debt problem’.
En rapport fra JP Morgan af 2. december 2002 ser også ud til at bekræfte, at FT uden statens støtte ikke havde været i stand til at skaffe ny kapital via markedet til refinansiering af sin gæld.
A report by JP Morgan dated 2 December 2002 also seems to confirm that, without the State's support, France Télécom would not have been capable of obtaining fresh capital on the market in order to refinance its debt.
Det hedder således i rapporten: »Vi opfatter fortsat forholdet mellem risiko og afkast i FT som uattraktivt, indtil vi ser følgerne af en strategisk omlægning.
The report states: ‘We continue to view FT's risk/reward profile as unattractive pending the outcome of a strategy review.
[…] Selv om FT har et stort potentiale for at nedsætte sine omkostninger og skabe en omfattende fortjeneste, og selv om bestyrelsesformanden har et solidt ry, er regeringens rolle en afgørende faktor for, at FT kan få det råderum, selskabet behøver.
… Although we see significant scope for FT to cut costs and deliver a compelling yield and even though the CEO has strong track record execution, the government role in giving FT the flexibility it requires is pivotal.
I mellemtiden er der stadig problemer med likviditeten, og det er efter vores opfattelse kun et spørgsmål om tid, inden der skal foretages en kapitalforøgelse.
In the meantime, liquidity risk remains and in our view, a right issue is a matter of when not if.
[…] Regeringen kommer også til at spille en central rolle i refinansieringen og nedbringelsen af gælden.
… The government's role will again be pivotal in refinancing and reducing this debt.
På baggrund af de afskrækkende gældsposter, som forfalder og skal refinansieres i 2003, fokuserer FT og ratingbureauerne på kort sigt på selskabets likviditets- og refinansieringsproblemer.
However it is liquidity or refinancing risk that is the near-term focus of FT and rating agencies alike, with a daunting refinancing schedule ahead in 2003.
Det kunne ikke lade sig gøre uden regeringens indgriben — det har selv France Télécom indrømmet under telefonkonferencen i tredje kvartal«. (understregning tilføjet).
[…] This would be impossible without government intervention — even FT acknowledged this in its Q3 conference call’ (emphasis added).
To rapporter fra Goldman Sachs og SG Equity Research bekræfter, at det først var efter en række tilkendegivelser fra staten, at kapitalmarkedet gav FT mulighed for at refinansiere sin gæld på fyldestgørende vilkår.
Two reports by Goldman Sachs and SG Equity Research confirm that it was only after the series of declarations by the State that the capital market allowed France Télécom to refinance itself on suitable terms.
Global Equity Research pointerer den 20. februar, at »[de] umiddelbare likviditetsproblemer er løst: efter at staten har fremskyndet sin deltagelse i kapitalforøgelsen på 15 mia. euro med en kreditbevilling på 9 mia. euro, har FT igen kunnet få adgang til obligationsmarkedet for at reducere sine umiddelbare likviditetsindskrænkninger«.
Global Equity Research stated on 20 February 2003 that: ‘[the] immediate liquidity issues are solved: since the government's upfront prepayment of its €15bn equity offering in the form of a €9bn standby facility, FT has been able to re-access the debt capital markets to solve its immediate liquidity challenges’.
Finansanalytikernes standpunkt bakkes op af udtalelser fra selskabets daværende bestyrelsesformand Michel Bon, som blev citeret i flere artikler, samt fra de franske myndigheder i indberetningen i december 2002 .
The financial analysts' views are borne out by statements by the Company's then CEO, Mr Bon, as reported in several press articles, and by the French authorities themselves at the time of their December 2002 notification .
Selv om de franske myndigheder hævder, at FT's tidligere bestyrelsesformands opfattelse ikke er relevant på grund af de omstændigheder, den blev udtrykt under, står det dog fast, at den blev bekræftet af FT's nye bestyrelsesformand, som blev udnævnt i oktober 2002, da han på mødet den 5. december 2002 i senatets finansudvalg tilkendegav, at koncernens situation var bekymringsvækkende: »Selskabet havde en enorm gældsætning og havde åbenbart ikke villet indse betydningen af, at koncernens rating blev forringet og at den dermed ikke længere kunne benytte sig af kapitalmarkederne …«.
Although the French authorities maintain that the opinion of France Télécom's former CEO is irrelevant in view of the circumstances in which it was formulated, it nevertheless remains that that opinion was borne out by the new CEO appointed in October 2002 when, at his hearing on 5 December 2002 before the Senate finance committee, he also stated that the group was in a worrying situation: ‘Despite being faced with huge debts, the company did not seem to have woken up to the fact that its credit rating was being downgraded, that it no longer had access to the capital markets ...’.
De dokumenter, som de franske myndigheder fremlagde for at godtgøre, at FT kunne benytte sig af markedet, er heller ikke overbevisende.
Similarly, the documents furnished by the French authorities to illustrate France Télécom's access to the markets are unconvincing.
De tilbud, som […] og […] fremsatte om ombytning af omsættelige obligationer af kort løbetid med obligationer af længere løbetid, underbygger således ikke de franske myndigheders påstand om, at FT havde adgang til kapitalmarkederne.
The exchange offers proposed by […] and […] to replace the short-term bonds by longer-term ones do not bear out the French authorities' argument as to France Télécom's access to the capital market.
Ombytningstilbuddet fra […], som er dateret juli 2002 og skulle være blevet fremsendt til FT den 17. juli, indeholder kun indledende bemærkninger om mulighederne for en ombytning og angiver kun en vejledende pris på Euribor + 380 basispoint og en kuponrente på 8,50 %.
The exchange offer by […], which was dated July 2002 and which is said to have been made to France Télécom on the 17th of that month, thus contains only preliminary remarks on a possible exchange transaction and mentions only an indicative price of Euribor + 380 base points and a coupon of 8,50 %.
Tilbuddet fra […] fra september 2002 er ikke underskrevet af parterne og indeholder ingen angivelse af refinansieringskursen.
The September 2002 offer by […] was not signed by the parties and contains no refinancing rate.
Kommissionen understreger, at da tilbuddene ikke blev formaliseret og der kun angives en vejledende kurs — som er højere end FT's gennemsnitlige emissionskurs i 2002— i ét af tilbuddene, så er disse to tilbud ikke relevante.
In the Commission's opinion, inasmuch as the offers were not formalised and only one of the two offers mentions an indicative rate, which was higher than the average of France Télécom's issue rates in 2002, these two offers are irrelevant.
Under alle omstændigheder ser tilbuddene ud til at være fremsat efter statens udtrykkelige støttetilkendegivelser i juli 2002, og de kan derfor ikke godtgøre, at FT havde normal adgang til kapitalmarkederne.
At all events, the offers seem to postdate the State's explicit declarations of support of July 2002 and hence cannot serve as evidence that France Télécom had normal access to the capital market.
For så vidt angår de forskellige transaktioner, som de franske myndigheder omtaler, f.eks. FT's udstedelse af obligationer og aktieombyttelige obligationer i 2002, viser de efter Kommissionens mening heller ikke, at FT havde adgang til markedet på brugbare vilkår.
As to the various operations mentioned by the French authorities, and in particular the issuance by France Télécom of ordinary bonds and mandatory convertible bonds (‘ORA’) in the course of 2002, the Commission would point out that they likewise do not prove that France Télécom had access to the market on suitable terms.
I den forbindelse må Kommissionen pointere, at det samlede emissionsbeløb ligger langt under gennemsnittet for FT i perioden 1997-2003.
The total amount of the issues is far below the average for France Télécom over the period 1997-2003.
Kun aktieombyttelige obligationer blev udstedt i større omfang, men her er der netop tale om en værdipapirtype, som bruges, når risikoen er høj og det ville være for bekosteligt at udstede almindelige obligationer.
Only the ORA issue is of any significant size, but this is precisely an instrument that is used where the risk is high and the cost of an ordinary bond issue would be too great.
De franske myndigheder hævder, at de hellere ville have benyttet sig af syndikerede lån end af obligationsmarkedet til refinansieringen, men det siger intet om FT's evne til at gennemføre en refinansiering på fyldestgørende vilkår.
As to the French authorities' assertion that they preferred to resort to a syndicated loan than to the bond market for the purpose of refinancing France Télécom, this is not indicative of the Company's capacity to refinance itself on suitable terms.
Den bevilling af syndikerede lån, som de franske myndigheder henviser til i deres bemærkninger af 22. januar 2004, stammer faktisk fra den 14. februar 2002, dvs. før ratingbureauerne nedsatte FT's rating.
The syndicated loan to which the French authorities refer in their comments of 22 January 2004 dates from 14 February 2002, that is to say, from before the downgrading of France Télécom's credit rating by the rating agencies.
Når dette kortfristede kreditinstrument i flere måneder blev brugt i stedet for emissioner af mere langfristede obligationer, som havde givet mulighed for at refinansiere en del af selskabets gæld, forekommer det nærmere at bekræfte, at FT ikke uden videre kunne få adgang til markedet.
On the other hand, the use for several months of this short-term credit instrument instead of a longer-term bond issue which would have made it possible to refinance part of the Company's debt seems rather to confirm that France Télécom's access to the capital market was not easy.
Den situation bekræftede de franske myndigheder desuden selv i deres bemærkninger af 22. januar 2004, hvor det angives, at det var mindre bekosteligt for FT at benytte sig at syndikerede lån end af obligationsmarkedet.
This situation was confirmed, moreover, by the French authorities in their comments of 22 January 2004, when they stated that recourse to the syndicated loan was less costly for France Télécom than access to the bond market.
På baggrund af ovenstående er det Kommissionens opfattelse, at FT i første halvår af 2002 måtte betragtes som en kriseramt virksomhed i rammebestemmelsernes forstand.
In the light of all the above considerations, the Commission is of the opinion that France Télécom must be considered, during the first half of 2002, to have been a firm in difficulty within the meaning of the Guidelines.
De foranstaltninger, der undersøges, kan imidlertid ikke betegnes som støtte til redning og omstrukturering af virksomheden, da de ikke opfylder rammebestemmelsernes godkendelsesbetingelser.
However, the measures at issue cannot be characterised as aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty as they do not fulfil the conditions for authorisation laid down in the Guidelines.
Kommissionen understreger i den forbindelse indledningsvis, at de franske myndigheder ikke har fremført noget argument herom og ikke på noget tidspunkt har hævdet, at de undersøgte foranstaltninger havde til formål at redde og omstrukturere FT.
The Commission would point out first of all here that the French authorities have not advanced any argument along these lines and have never asserted that the measures at issue had as their purpose the rescuing and restructuring of France Télécom.
De franske myndigheder har tværtimod til stadighed afvist, at FT skulle kategoriseres som en kriseramt virksomhed i rammebestemmelsernes forstand, og understreget, at selskabet driftsmæssigt var i bedste velgående.
On the contrary, the French authorities have always denied that France Télécom should be characterised as a firm in difficulty and have stressed the Company's good operational health.
De undersøgte foranstaltninger kan ikke være støtte til redning af selskabet.
The measures at issue cannot constitute rescue aid.
Rammebestemmelserne foreskriver, at lån skal indebære en modydelse, hvilket ikke er tilfældet i denne sag.
The Guidelines provide that the loan must be remunerated, which is not the case here.
Støtten skal ligeledes være begrundet i alvorlige sociale vanskeligheder, men Kommissionen har ingen oplysninger om, at det ville have haft udtalte negative konsekvenser på det sociale plan, hvis støtten ikke var blevet givet.
Similarly, the aid must be justified by serious social reasons, but the Commission has no evidence in its possession to suggest that, in the absence of such aid, a situation of social distress would have been brought about.
Hvis FT's aktiver ud fra en driftsmæssig vurdering var sunde, så ville der i en situation, hvor FT var nødt til at afhænde aktiver for at opfylde sit finansieringsbehov, sandsynligvis ikke have været alvorlige sociale problemer.
In so far as its assets were healthy from an operational standpoint, had France Télécom been obliged to dispose of assets to meet its financing requirements there would in all probability have been no serious social difficulties.
Det fremgår også af rammebestemmelserne, at redningsstøtte beløbsmæssigt skal være begrænset til, hvad der er nødvendigt for at sikre virksomhedens drift i den periode, som støtten er godkendt for.
The Guidelines also provide that rescue aid must be restricted to the amount needed to keep the firm in business for the period during which the aid is authorised.
Men Kommissionen har i den foreliggende sag ingen oplysninger, som giver mulighed for at kontrollere, om statens støtte til selskabet kun gjaldt FT's drift.
In the present case, however, the Commission has seen no evidence to the effect that the State's commitment to support France Télécom was limited to keeping the Company in business.
De franske myndigheder har desuden hverken formelt indberettet de pågældende foranstaltninger som redningsstøtte eller hævdet, at foranstaltningerne havde til formål at redde FT.
Moreover, the French authorities have not formally notified the measures in question as rescue aid, or affirmed that the measures are aimed at rescuing France Télécom.
Redningsstøtte skal være tilbagebetalt senest 12 måneder efter den sidste indbetaling, men tilbagebetaling i form af FT-aktier kan ikke betragtes som en tilbagebetaling i rammebestemmelsernes forstand, men udgør blot en ren kapitaltilførsel, eftersom intet sikrer, at aktiernes nominelle værdi svarer til støttebeløbet.
Rescue aid must be repaid within 12 months of the date of the last payment; however, repayment in France Télécom shares cannot constitute repayment within the meaning of the Guidelines, being instead a mere capital injection as there is no guarantee that the shares' nominal value will correspond to the aid amount.
Ifølge rammebestemmelserne må der endvidere højst tilkendes redningsstøtte i seks måneder.
The Guidelines provide, furthermore, that rescue aid may be granted for a maximum period of six months.
Men kreditbevillingen gjaldt i 18 måneder og overskrider således den tilladte tidsramme.
Inasmuch, therefore, as the credit line was opened for a period of 18 months, the period authorised has been exceeded.
De undersøgte foranstaltninger kan heller ikke være omstruktureringsstøtte.
Nor can the measures at issue constitute restructuring aid.
Efter anmodning fra Kommissionen i forbindelse med indledningsbeslutningen fremlagde de franske myndigheder ambitionsplanen 2005.
In response to a request made by the Commission at the time of the opening decision, the French authorities submitted the Ambition 2005 plan.
En gennemlæsning af planen bekræftede, at FT her påbegyndte en dybtgående omstrukturering både på forretnings- og finansieringsplan.
A perusal of the plan has confirmed that France Télécom was entering upon a phase of in-depth restructuring, both industrially and financially.
Derfor kunne de franske myndigheders finansielle foranstaltninger til fordel for FT udgøre omstruktureringsstøtte i rammebestemmelsernes forstand.
The Commission accordingly considers that the financial measures granted by the French authorities in support of France Télécom were capable of constituting restructuring aid within the meaning of the Guidelines.
Men Kommissionen betragter ikke desto mindre foranstaltningerne som værende uforenelige med fællesmarkedet i medfør af traktatens artikel 87, stk. 3, litra c), og rammebestemmelserne.
That being so, the Commission cannot consider the measures compatible with the common market under Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty and under the Guidelines.
Det fremgår nemlig af rammebestemmelserne, at »omstruktureringsstøtte rejser særlige konkurrenceproblemer«.
According to the Guidelines, ‘aid for restructuring raises particular competition concerns’.
Derfor må denne form for støtte kun tilkendes »hvis støtten opfylder strenge kriterier, og hvis der er sikkerhed for, at eventuel konkurrencefordrejning opvejes af fordelene ved at holde virksomheden i live ... og eventuelt af tilstrækkelige modydelser til konkurrenterne«.
Consequently, such aid may be granted ‘only if strict criteria are met, and if it is certain that any distortions of competition will be offset by the benefits flowing from the firm's survival … and, where appropriate, there are adequate compensatory measures in favour of competitors’.
I denne sag indeholder de oplysninger, som de franske myndigheder har fremlagt, imidlertid ingen angivelse heraf, ligesom de franske myndigheder ikke har videregivet de oplysninger til Kommissionen, som omhandles i rammebestemmelsernes bilag I, herunder navnlig en detaljeret beskrivelse af støtten (med påtænkte modforanstaltninger) samt markedsanalyser, som er en forudsætning for, at Kommissionen kan tage stilling til, i hvilket omfang støtten kan medføre konkurrencefordrejning og dermed hvilke modforanstaltninger der er nødvendige for at sikre støttens forenelighed.
In the present case, however, the information furnished by the French authorities is silent on this point, and the authorities have not transmitted to the Commission certain information referred to in Annex I to the Guidelines, such as a detailed description of the aid (proposing compensatory measures) and market studies, which is essential if the Commission is to be able to rule on the scale of the distortions of competition involved and hence of the compensatory measures needed in order to verify the compatibility of the aid.
Kommissionen konkluderer således, at de finansielle foranstaltninger, hvormed de franske myndigheder har støttet FT, er uforenelige med fællesmarkedet i medfør af traktatens artikel 87, stk. 3, litra c), og rammebestemmelserne.
The Commission concludes that the financial measures granted by the French authorities in support of France Télécom are incompatible with the common market within the meaning of the Treaty's Article 87(3)(c) and of the Guidelines.
TILBAGEBETALING AF STØTTEN
RECOVERY OF THE AID
På baggrund af ovenstående udgør aktionærlånet i december 2002 en statsstøtte, som er uforenelig med fællesmarkedet.
In the light of the above, the shareholder loan of December 2002 constitutes state aid incompatible with the common market.
I henhold til artikel 14 i forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999 skal Kommissionen således principielt kræve støtten tilbagebetalt.
Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 requires, therefore, in principle that the Commission should demand its recovery.
Men for at kunne opfylde denne forpligtelse må man i beslutningen enten kunne fastlægge støttebeløbet forholdsvis nøjagtigt, eller — hvor en sådan fastlæggelse ikke er mulig — inddrage parametre, som giver medlemsstaten mulighed for efterfølgende i samarbejde med Kommissionen at foretage en sådan beregning.
A precondition for carrying out that obligation is either that the amount of the aid should be fairly precisely quantified in the Decision or — if that is not possible — that the parameters should be included whereby the Member State, in cooperation with the Commission, might subsequently carry out such a calculation.
I denne sammenhæng er Kommissionen på nuværende tidspunkt ikke i stand til nøjagtigt at fastlægge støttens omfang.
In this respect, the Commission is not able at this stage to precisely quantify the aid in question.
Analysen ud fra markedssituationen forud for statens tilkendegivelser i juli 2002 antyder ganske vist, at FT fik en betydelig fordel. Men efter Kommissionens opfattelse vil det ikke være hensigtsmæssigt kun at lægge disse oplysninger til grund for fastlæggelsen af støttebeløbet.
While it is true that the analysis based on the market situation before the July 2002 declarations suggests the existence of a considerable advantage conferred on France Télécom, the Commission does not consider it appropriate to rely on this factor alone in quantifying the aid.