natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Det var en opfattelse, som deltes af nærmest alle markedsaktører, lige til den dag, hvor et af de tre ratingbureauer — og kun ét — mente, at France Télécom var på grænsen til at være insolvent, ændrede sin rating og fra den ene dag til den anden ganske lukkede markedet for selskabet ... Da dette ene ratingbureau i juni meddelte denne beslutning og blokerede for vores adgang til markedet, vidste jeg, at hvis France Télécom ikke kunne refinansiere sine lån, ville selskabet få betalingsproblemer et år senere, altså ved udgangen af første halvår 2003«.
This view was shared by almost all market operators up until the time when one of the three rating agencies — and one only — decided that France Télécom was on the verge of insolvency and reviewed its rating, denying it any market access overnight ... When, in June, that one rating agency delivered its opinion and we were denied market access, I knew that, unable to borrow again, France Télécom would be in payment difficulties a year later, towards the end of the first half of 2003’.
Se i samme forbindelse HSBC-rapporten af 12. juni 2004, side 11: »set under ét var FT ikke kriseramt i den forstand at selskabets aktiviteter var rentable, men det led under en dårligt tilpasset finansieringsstruktur med for ringe egenkapital, for korte løbetider på refinansieringsgælden og en tillidskrise over for markedsaktørerne, der var usikre på, hvad denne situation førte til«.
See, along the same lines, the HSBC report of 12.6.2004, page 11: ‘all in all, FT was not a firm in difficulty inasmuch as its business was healthy, but it did suffer from an unsuitable financing structure with a lack of capital and excessively short debt-refinancing periods, coupled with a crisis of confidence on the part of the markets born of the uncertainties to which this state of affairs gave rise’.
Domstolens dom af 24. november 1987, sag 223/85, RSV mod Kommissionen, Sml. s. 4617.
Case 223/85 RSV v Commission [1987] ECR 4617.
Domstolens dom af 20. september 1990, sag C-5/89, Kommissionen mod Tyskland, Sml. 1990 I, s. 3437.
Case C-5/89 Commission v Germany [1990] ECR I-3437.
Det viste imidlertid også, at fortiden vejede tungt på selskabet, eftersom gældsbyrden vendte den flotte nettofortjeneste på 1,9 mia. EUR før hensættelser til et underskud på 8,3 mia. EUR. Hensættelserne bragte ganske vist værdien af FT's aktiver op på et mere realistisk niveau, men det ændrede ikke ved, at selskabet fortsat havde en gigantisk gæld på 63 mia. EUR. Det var dette forhold samt den utilstrækkelige likviditet, der var skyld i disse alvorlige strukturproblemer.
Nevertheless, it also pointed up the heavy weight of the past, which wiped out the net result before exceptional provisions of EUR 1,9 billion, turning it into a EUR 8,3 billion loss. While the provisions correct the value of France Télécom's assets to a more realistic level, the colossal size of the debt, at EUR 63 billion, persists. This context, together with the inadequacy of the expected cash flow, helps explain the serious structural problems.
Rentebetalingskvote [22]
Times interest earned [22]
S & P
S & P
Moody's:
Moody's
spread (%)
Periode of Frequent Spread Inversions
Regeringen er derfor fast besluttet på at udøve sine beføjelser fuldt ud … i erkendelse af den nye situation, som forværringen af regnskabet har medført, har Michel Bon indgivet sin opsigelse til regeringen, som har taget imod den.
The State will assist in implementing the recovery measures and will contribute, for its part, to the strengthening of the company's own capital base in a manner to be determined in close collaboration with the company's chairman and board. As already indicated, the State will, if necessary, take steps to prevent the company from being faced with any financing difficulties’.
Opsigelsen træder i kraft med øjeblikkelig virkning ved et bestyrelsesmøde, som afholdes snarest muligt i de følgende uger, og hvor der ligeledes vil blive udpeget en ny bestyrelsesformand … Den nye formand fremlægger hurtigst muligt en finansiel genopretningsplan, som giver mulighed for at afvikle selskabets gæld og genoprette selskabets finansielle struktur, samtidig med at de strategiske satsninger bibeholdes.
December 2002/January 2003 (54) On 4 December 2002, at a meeting of the Company's board, an action plan entitled Ambition FT 2005(‘the Ambition 2005 plan’) was presented by France Télécom's new management, being aimed, according to the French authorities, at bringing about a noticeable improvement in the Company's operational performance and offering the prospect of a satisfactory return on capital invested.
Den 2. oktober 2002 udnævnte regeringen Thierry Breton som bestyrelsesformand i FT.
1/The France Télécom group is a coherent industrial entity with a remarkable track record. However, the company is now faced with an unbalanced financial structure and a need for capital and refinancing in the medium term.
Her gentog regeringen også sine løfter: »Efter forslag fra selskabets bestyrelse har ministerrådet besluttet at udnævne Thierry Breton til bestyrelsesformand for France Télécom … Derfor gør den nye formand omgående status over selskabet, og de kommende uger underrettes bestyrelsen om resultaterne heraf, som også skal danne grundlag for en plan om finansiel genopretning og strategisk udvikling af selskabet, der giver mulighed for at nedbringe selskabets gæld og styrke dets indsatsområder.
The impossibility for France Télécom to finance its growth otherwise than through debt has made the situation worse. 2/The State, as majority shareholder, has asked the new management to restore the company's financial equilibrium while maintaining the group's integrity … 3/In the light of the action plan drawn up by management and the investment return prospects, the State will participate in the EUR 15 billion strengthening of the company's capital base in proportion to its share in the capital, giving an investment of EUR 9 billion. The State shareholder thus intends to act like a prudent investor.
Thierry Breton får støtte fra staten, der som aktionær i selskabet har til hensigt at udøve alle sine beføjelser i denne forbindelse.
It will be for France Télécom to work out the detailed arrangements and precise timetable for the strengthening of its capital base. The Government wants the utmost account to be taken during the operation of the situation of individual shareholders and of employees with shares in the company.
Staten vil yde sit til iværksættelsen af sådanne genopretningsforanstaltninger og til at styrke selskabets egenkapital på vilkår, som fastsættes nærmere i et tæt samarbejde mellem formanden og bestyrelsen.
To enable the company to launch a market operation at the most opportune moment, the State is prepared to make an upfront prepayment towards the strengthening of the capital base in the form of a temporary shareholder loan, remunerated at market rates, placed at France Télécom's disposal. 4/The State's entire shareholding in France Télécom will be transferred to a public industrial and commercial entity, ERAP.
I mellemtiden træffer staten som tidligere nævnt de foranstaltninger, der måtte være nødvendige for at sikre selskabet mod enhver form for finansieringsvanskeligheder«.
The latter will borrow on the financial markets in order to finance the State's share in the strengthening of the company's capital base’ . (57) A few days after the presentation of the Ambition 2005 plan, France Télécom launched two successive bond issues on 11 and 12 December 2002 for a total amount of EUR 2,9 billion.
BT påpeger, at denne situation fremgik af den erklæring, Thierry Breton afgav til senatets finansudvalg.afkast på investeringen: BT pointerer, at perioden til beregning af afkastet på investeringen tidligst kan løbe fra den 12. juli 2002, hvor staten første gang afgav sit juridisk bindende tilsagn til FT og selskabets kreditorer, frem til senest den 4. eller 5. december 2002, hvor ambitionsplanen 2005 blev offentliggjort og hvor kreditbevillingen på 9 mia. EUR blev stillet til rådighed for selskabet.
This situation was reflected by the statement by Thierry Breton before the Senate finance committee.Return on the transaction: Bouygues Telecom indicates that the period for calculating the return on the investment begins at the earliest on 12 July 2002, the date of the first declaration by the State having the effect of binding it legally vis-à-vis France Télécom and its creditors, and ends at the latest on 4 and 5 December 2002, the dates on which the Ambition 2005 plan was made public and the EUR 9 billion credit line was opened.
BT mener, at det afkast, som en fornuftig privat investor med rimelighed kunne forvente at få, på ingen måde kunne beregnes pålideligt under sådanne omstændigheder.
It argues that the reasonable return which a prudent private investor would have been entitled to expect in such circumstances cannot be reliably calculated.
Den indeholder tiltag, som ikke vedrører redningsstøtte, f.eks. obligationsmarkedsforanstaltninger og den planlagte kapitaltilførsel.
The plan contains measures not forming part of a rescue operation, such as recourse to the bond market or the envisaged recapitalisation.
BT anfører navnlig, at kapitaltilførselsbeløbet virker overdrevent stort, hvis det blot var tanken at dække FT's driftsbehov på kort sigt og ikke at tilbagebetale lån, der var optaget i forbindelse med selskabets udbygning.
Among other things, the amount of the recapitalisation is more than is needed to cover France Télécom's short-term operating needs alone, excluding reimbursement of the loans taken out at the time of its expansion.
Efter Cégétels opfattelse er det fuldt berettiget, at Kommissionen vurderer, at den franske stat ydede FT støtte allerede inden den bevilgede selskabet en kredit på 9 mia. EUR, fordi bekendtgørelsen af denne støtte i sig selv var nok til at gøre nødfinansieringen unødvendig.
It maintains that the Commission may justifiably consider that the French State granted aid to France Télécom even before an agreement for the granting of a EUR 9 billion credit line was signed as the announcement of support was sufficient to render this emergency financing unnecessary.
Således havde kreditorerne den sikkerhed, at FT aldrig kunne misligholde sine betalinger, fordi staten til hver en tid var rede til at yde selskabet de fornødne midler til at afholde sine forpligtelser, og dermed kunne FT skaffe finansieringen direkte på markedet.
Lenders were thus certain that France Télécom could never default on its payments inasmuch as the State would always be ready to grant it the funds it needed to honour its commitments, and this enabled France Télécom to obtain financing directly on the market.
Da kreditten blev bevilget, var FT's finansieringssituation af en sådan beskaffenhed, at ingen fornuftig investor ville have gennemført en investering af denne art. B mener heller ikke, at samtidighedsprincippet blev overholdt, idet der kun var deltagelse af private investorer på grund af bebudelsen og tilrådighedsstillelsen af et aktionærlån på et så gigantisk beløb, at ingen privat investor ville have været i stand til at mobilisere tilsvarende midler.
Thus, at the time of opening of the credit line, France Télécom's financial situation was such that no prudent investor would have carried out a transaction of this type. Likewise, B maintains that the concomitance principle has not been complied with, the participation of private investors having been made possible only by the announcement and making available of a shareholder loan the amount of which was so huge that no private investor would have been able to mobilise so much money.
Hvis statens tilkendegivelser i perioden juli-oktober 2002 reelt havde svaret til, eller af markedet og ratingbureauerne var blevet opfattet som, løfter om en »ubegrænset garanti« til fordel for FT, ville FT's rating ikke være blevet nedsat i juli, ligesom FT's rating og spreads i dette tidsrum ville have afspejlet samme risiko som staten (AAA og et meget lille spread).
If the declarations made by the State between July and October 2002 had really been legally equivalent to, or even simply perceived by the market and the rating agencies as being, a promise to provide France Télécom with an “unlimited guarantee”, then there would not have been any downgrading of France Télécom's rating in July and the company's spreads and rating during that period would have reflected the state risk (AAA rating and very low spread).
Endelig kan det, at ratingbureauerne indregner statens rolle som flertalsaktionær uden hensyn til underforståede eller udtrykkelige garantier, specifikke foranstaltninger eller selskabets finansielle situation på et givet tidspunkt, ikke i sig selv betragtes som statsstøtte.
Lastly, any factoring in by the rating agencies of the State's presence as majority shareholder irrespective of any implicit or explicit guarantee or of any specific measure and irrespective of the company's specific financial situation at any given moment cannot in itself be considered state aid.
Har De som hovedaktionær med 55 % af selskabet et budskab i den forbindelse?« Ministeren kan derfor ikke være i tvivl om, at han er i færd med at sende et budskab til selskabet og dets ansatte samt de øvrige aktionærer, bankerne, kreditorerne og selskabets konkurrenter.
You are the majority shareholder in the company, do you have a message to convey?’. The Minister could not therefore have been unaware that he was sending a message to the Company and its employees as well as to the Company's other shareholders, banks, creditors and competitors.
I den foreliggende sag er hovedaktionæren den franske stat. Den franske stat er en mægtig økonomisk aktør, som er aktiv i økonomien som ejer, aktionær og, mere generelt, som leder af en lang række offentlige selskaber .
In the present case, the majority shareholder is the French State. The French State is a major economic operator, active in the economy as owner, shareholder or, more generally, manager of a large number of public undertakings .
Kilde: France Telecoms regnskaber for 2001, 2002.
Source: Rapports Annuels France Telecom 2001, 2002.
Den igangværende revurdering af såvel FT's som Oranges rating for langfristet gæld (Baa1) fortsætter.
The ongoing review for downgrade of the Baa1 long-term debt ratings of both FT and Orange plc will continue.
Det gælder fortsat«.
This indication is still valid today’.
Se rapporten på vegne af undersøgelsesudvalget vedrørende administration af offentlige selskaber med henblik på mere effektiv beslutningstagning, modtaget af nationalforsamlingens formandskab den 3. juli 2003 (herefter »undersøgelsesudvalgets rapport« eller endnu kortere »undersøgelsesrapporten«): »Udvalget ønskede en præcis analyse af strategien og fremgangsmåden bag de internationale opkøb, som France Télécom og EDF gennemførte, da de havde alvorlige følger for de to selskabers regnskaber (ekstraordinære hensættelser og afskrivninger i forbindelse med opkøb i perioden 1998-2002 udgjorde for France Télécoms vedkommende 28,5 mia. EUR for 2001 og 2002).
See the report drawn up on behalf of the commission of enquiry into the management of public undertakings with a view to improving the decision-making system, registered at the office of the President of the National Assembly on 3.7.2003 (‘the commission of enquiry report’, or ‘commission of enquiry’ for short): ‘The commission wished to carry out a precise analysis of the strategy and procedure with regard to the international acquisitions engaged in by France Télécom and EDF in view of their serious consequences for both companies' accounts (in the case of France Télécom, the losses attributable to the exceptional provisions and amortisations relating to acquisitions during the period 1998-2002 amounted to EUR 28,5 billion for 2001 and 2002).
Det er nogenlunde de samme elementer, som går igen: omfattende investeringer i store opkøb (på ét år, fra 1999 til 2000, afsatte France Télécom 65 mio. EUR hertil), manglende opmærksomhed om økonomiske, politiske og geopolitiske risici, ufornuftige finansieringsvalg … I dette usikre, travle og tvivlsomme klima kastede selskabet sig fra 1999 ud i en ambitiøs og ustadig ekstern ekspansion, hvor man først og fremmest fokuserede på at komme ind på markederne i Det Forenede Kongerige og Tyskland«.
Pretty much the same factors are at play: haste in carrying out huge acquisitions (in one year, from 1999 to 2000, France Télécom devoted EUR 65 million to this), insufficient attention to the economic, political or geopolitical risks, particularly imprudent financing arrangements … In this climate of disquiet, urgency and doubt, the company embarked as from 1999 upon an ambitious and disorganised external growth programme, according priority to access to the UK and German markets’.
For sidstnævntes vedkommende forpligtede France Télécom sig dog til at købe de overførte aktier tilbage til en minimumskurs på 104 euro.
On this last point, however, France Télécom undertook to repurchase the shares issued at a minimum price of EUR 104.
Der kan næppe være tvivl om, at sælgeren krævede disse genkøbsoptioner indfriet … Og som følge af styrtdykket på børsen fra efteråret 2000 blev risikoen for, at den franske koncern skulle blive nødt til at betale Orange 100 % i kontanter, til virkelighed med to betalinger til Vodafone på 6,631 mia. EUR og 4,973 mia. EUR i marts 2001 og 2002«.
There was scarcely any doubt that the seller would insist on these repurchase options being exercised … And, owing to the autumn 2000 stock market collapse, the risk that the French group might be forced to pay for Orange wholly in cash materialised, with two payments to Vodafone of EUR 6,631 billion and EUR 4,973 billion in March 2001 and 2002’.
Den forretningsplan, der var opstillet for driften, virker meget mangelfuld.
… In March 2000, France Télécom thus invested EUR 3,7 billion in a 28,5 % shareholding, valuing the operator at 80 times its EBITDA (compared with a stock-exchange valuation before rumours of the deal emerged of the order of 65 times EBITDA), or a premium of EUR 570 million. This contribution, which initially took the form of an irrevocable guaranteed loan, was payable by France Télécom even in the event of failure to obtain the UMTS licence.In addition, as part of a cooperation agreement of which your Rapporteur has become aware, France Télécom undertook to give Mobilcom, without restriction, the financial support necessitated by participation in the bidding mechanism and the development of UMTS activity in Germany ... In return for these commitments, the risks brought by Mobilcom were considerable. The business plan drawn up in support of the operation seems to have been highly imperfect.
Se f.eks. følgende: »Moody's forventer nu, at denne kreditbevilling i forening med den resterende del af den eksisterende konsortialkredit på 15 mia. EUR og den øgede likviditet giver mulighed for tilbagebetaling af den gæld på 15 mia. EUR, som forfalder i løbet af de kommende 12 måneder«.
See, for example, ‘Moody's now expects that a combination of this facility headroom under the existing EUR 15 billion syndicated facility and the free cash flow will enable debt maturities of EUR 15 billion to be repaid during the next 12 months.’ (Moody ' s, 9.12.2002)
Factiva, Reuters — 12. juli 2002, »Børsen — opsving i FT efter udtalelser fra Mer.« Og videre fremgår det: »Den franske regering har reduceret FT's kortfristede risiko, udtaler Guy Deslondes, analytiker i S & P, ved telefonkonference.
Factiva, Reuters — 12.7.2002, ‘Stock exchange — FT takes off after Mer's remarks.’ And: ‘FT's short term risk has been mitigated by the French government said S & P analyst Guy Deslondes in a conference call.
[…] Fredagens rating afspejler S & P's tiltro til, at den franske regering vil hjælpe FT med refinansieringen af selskabet, som minimum hvad angår den gæld, der forfalder i 2003.
[…] Friday's rating action took into account S & P's confidence that the French government will help FT refinance itself, at least for its 2003 obligations. The stable outlook shows that the rating has bottomed out, added Deslondes’.
Som markedet er nu, kan det simpelthen ikke lade sig gøre for os at refinansiere vores gæld«.
In the current markets, the refinancing of our debt is simply out of question’.
NERA: »Resultaterne af en analyse af, hvordan bebudelsen den 12. juli 2002 påvirkede aktie- og obligationskurserne.
NERA: ‘The results of an event study analysing the effect on share and bond prices of the announcement on 12th July 2002.
Det kan være i form af lån på markedsvilkår fra banker eller fra regeringen (s. 21).
This could take the form of banks or the government providing the necessary loans at market prices ’ (p. 21). However ‘what is the market price for, say, 10 bn of new debt to a BBB- credit?
FT ' s aktuelle rating, BBB-, forekom i det væsentlige nærmere at være baseret på regeringens løfte om at sikre likviditeten end på de grundlæggende forretningsfaktorer (s. 30).
FT current BBB- rating appears to be based largely on the promise of government support providing liquidity, rather than on fundamentals’ (p. 30).
Ifølge Deutsche Banks beregninger var forholdet mellem FT ' s gæld og overskud før skatter, afgifter og afskrivning 1: 4,9 i andet halvår af 2002 og 1:5,20 pr. 31. december 2002.
According to Deutsche Bank ' s calculations, France Télécom ' s debt/EBITDA ratio was 4,9 during the second half of 2002 and 5,20 on 31.12.2002.
Se også s. 22.
See also p. 22.
(Sag COMP/M.3696 — E.ON/MOL)
(Case COMP/M.3696 — E.ON/MOL)
(meddelt under nummer K(2005) 5593)
(notified under document number C(2005) 5593)
Den 21. december 2005 vedtog Kommissionen en beslutning i en fusionssag i henhold til Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004 af 20. januar 2004 om kontrol med fusioner og virksomhedsovertagelser (»EF-fusionsforordningen«) [1], særlig forordningens artikel 8, stk. 2.
On 21 December 2005 the Commission adopted a Decision in a merger case under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) [1], and in particular Article 8(2) of that Regulation.
En ikke-fortrolig version af hele beslutningen på sagens autentiske sprog og på Kommissionens arbejdssprog kan findes på Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrences hjemmeside på følgende adresse: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/index_en.htmlI.
A non-confidential version of the full Decision can be found in the authentic language of the case and in the working languages of the Commission on the website of the Directorate-General for Competition, at the following address: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competiton/index_en.htmlI.
Denne sag vedrører det tyske selskab E.ON's køb af to datterselskaber af MOL, et integreret ungarsk olie- og gasselskab, som er aktive inden for engrossalg og markedsføring af og handel med gas samt lagring af gas.
This case concerns the acquisition by E.ON (Germany) of two subsidiaries of MOL, an integrated Hungarian oil and gas company, which are active in the wholesale, marketing and trading of gas, and the storage of gas.
MOL har også en put option for to år på at sælge sit datterselskab for gastransmission til E.ON.
MOL also has a put option for two years to sell its gas transmission subsidiary to E.ON.
MOL har allerede før transaktionen næsten fuldstændig kontrol med adgangen til gasressourcerne og gasinfrastrukturerne i Ungarn.
MOL already has, prior to the transaction, an almost exclusive control over the access to gas resources and gas infrastructures in Hungary.
MOL ejer gastransmissionsnettet og alle de ungarske gaslagerfaciliteter og har en monopollignende stilling på engrosmarkederne for gas.
MOL owns the gas transmission network, all Hungarian gas storage facilities and has a quasi-monopoly position on the gas wholesale markets.
MOL er allerede i dag »gatekeeper« for gasressourcerne (både import og indenlandsk produktion) og gasinfrastrukturerne.
MOL is already today the ‘gatekeeper’ for gas resources (both imports and domestic production) and gas infrastructure.
Denne »gatekeeper«-stilling vil nu blive overtaget af E.ON.
This gatekeeper position will now be taken over by E.ON.