natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Forskningen blev gennemført af instituttet for metallurgi og omhandlede fremstilling af plader med homogen intern struktur.
The research was carried out by the Institute of Metallurgy and concerned the manufacturing of plates with homogeneous internal structure.
De polske myndigheder har anført, at støtten havde en ansporende virkning, idet oplysningerne senere blev stillet til rådighed for andre virksomheder, der arbejder med metalbehandling, da forskningen ellers ikke ville være blevet iværksat.
The Polish authorities have indicated that the aid had an incentive effect in view of the fact that the information was later made available to other companies involved in metal processing, as the research would not otherwise been commissioned.
Et tilskud af 15. november 2000 på 223200 zloty i forhold til samlede omkostninger på 496400 zloty (45 %) til industriel forskning som led i et projekt om plastometertest og identifikation af parametre for metalbearbejdningsprocesser.
A grant dated 15 November 2000 of PLN 223200 against total costs of PLN 496400 (45 %) for industrial research as part of a project involving plastometric tests and parameter identification for metalworking processes.
Dette projekt blev udført som led i det EU's femte rammeprogram, temaprogram III om vækst, med akronymet TESTIFY, og de polske myndigheder har forsikret, at virksomheden ikke ville have deltaget i projektet uden statsstøtte.
This project was carried out as part of the Fifth European Union Framework Programme, Theme Programme III GROWTH, with the acronym TESTIFY and the Polish authorities have given assurances that the company would not have participated in the project without state support.
Foranstaltninger til fordel for Huta Stali Częstochowa
Measures in favour of Huta Stali Częstochowa
HSCz drog fordel af en række forskellige finansielle foranstaltninger i perioden november 2002 — januar 2004.
HSCz benefited from a variety of financial measures between November 2002 and January 2004.
HCz udsatte sin gæld til ZUS og FGSP, men den er dog blevet betalt siden hen.
HCz deferred its debts to ZUS and FGSP which have, however, since been repaid.
For sene betalinger (betalt senere end to uger efter forfaldsdatoen) udgør i alt 18155302 zloty.
Late payments (made later than two weeks after the due date) amount to PLN 18155302 in total.
For disse for sene betalinger, som generelt ikke blev betalt mere end seks måneder for sent, blev HSCz opkrævet lovpligtig rente, dvs. 560383 zloty.
For these late payments, which were generally not more than six months overdue, HCSz was charged statutory interest, i.e. PLN 560383.
Skattekontoret i Częstochowa accepterede udsættelsen af skattebetalinger på ca. 7 mio. zloty mod betaling af lovpligtig rente, som blev behørigt betalt.
The tax office in Częstochowa accepted deferral of tax payments for an amount of around PLN 7 million in exchange for payment of statutory interest, which was duly paid.
Kontoret eftergav dog en del af den lovpligtige rente, som blev pålagt i kraft af de for sene betalinger.
However, the Office waived part of the statutory interest owed by virtue of the late payments.
Forskellen mellem den betalte rente og den samlede lovpligtige rente er 31145 zloty.
The difference between the interest paid and the full statutory interest is PLN 31145.
Formanden for PFRON eftergav rentefordringer mod HSCz på 22821 zloty og accepterede betaling af disse fordringer i afdrag på ca. 350000 zloty, dvs. en støtteværdi svarende til 8150 zloty.
The Chairman of PFRON waived interest claims against HSCz of PLN 22821 and accepted payment of these claims in instalments of around PLN 350000, i.e. an aid value equivalent to PLN 8150.
Når de skattemæssige fordele af 31145 zloty indregnes, blev HSCz fritaget for fordringer til en værdi af i alt 62116 (ca. 13077 EUR).
When fiscal benefits of PLN 31145 are factored in, HSCz was released from claims totalling PLN 62116 (about EUR 13077).
Til sidst ydede KBN den 27. november 2002 og den 20. november 2003 tilskud på i alt 1100000 zloty og 280000 zloty (1380000 zloty) i forhold til samlede omkostninger på 4370000 zloty (30,4 %) til industriel forskning og førkonkurrencemæssig udviklingsvirksomhed til et projekt, der er beregnet til at hjælpe med at analysere metoder til modernisering af den teknologiske proces i støberier ved at ændre sammensætningen af de komponenter, der anvendes til at fremstille stål med henblik på at øge både kvalitet og effektivitet.
Finally, on 27 November 2002 and 20 November 2003 the KBN awarded grants of PLN 1100000 and PLN 280000 (PLN 1380000) in total against total costs of PLN 4370000 (30.4 %) for industrial research and pre-competitive activity for a project designed to help analyse ways of modernising the technological process in foundries by amending the breakdown of components used to make steel with a view to increasing quality and efficiency.
ÅRSAGER TIL INDLEDNING AF PROCEDUREN
GROUNDS FOR INITIATING THE PROCEDURE
I sin beslutning om at indlede en procedure betvivlede Kommissionen, at de foranstaltninger, som Polen havde gennemført, omfattede støtte, navnlig af tre årsager:
In its decision to initiate proceedings, the Commission expressed doubts that the measures implemented by Poland involved aid, essentially for three reasons:
Kommissionen havde grund til at tro, at omstruktureringen af HCz ikke opfyldte kriterierne for den private kreditor.
The Commission had reasons to believe that the restructuring of HCz did not pass the private creditor test.
Visse offentlige kreditorer afskrev tilsyneladende en større gæld i løbet af omstruktureringen, end de ville have gjort, hvis de havde stået over for en konkurs, i lyset af besiddelsen af førsteklasseskautioner, i det mindste i tilfælde af de offentlige institutionelle kreditorer.
It appeared that some public creditors were writing off more debts in the course of restructuring than they would have if they had faced bankruptcy, given the possession of first-class sureties, at least in the case of public institutional creditors.
Under disse omstændigheder tøvede Kommissionen med at acceptere det polske argument om, at omstruktureringsplanen generelt ville give et bedre afkast til staten end afvikling.
In these circumstances the Commission was reluctant to accept the Polish argument that overall the restructuring plan would produce a better return for the state than liquidation.
Endvidere var Kommissionen ikke sikker på, om de offentlige institutionelle kreditorers godkendelse var fremskaffet udelukkende på baggrund af lov af 30. oktober 2002, og om Operator reelt ville modtage værdifulde aktiver.
Moreover, the Commission was not sure whether the public institutional creditors' consent was obtained purely on the basis of the Act of 30 October 2002 and whether the Operator really would receive valuable assets.
Desuden vidste Kommissionen ikke, hvordan HSCz havde fortsat produktionen uden driftskapital, og om den havde modtaget anden finansiel støtte.
In addition, the Commission was not sure how HSCz had continued production without working capital and whether it had received other financial aid.
Endelig var Kommissionen i besiddelse af oplysninger om, at HCz havde modtaget forskellige finansielle støtteforanstaltninger mellem 1997 og 2002.
Finally, the Commission had information in its file that HCz had received various financial aid measures between 1997 and 2002.
Kommissionen udtrykte ligeledes bekymring over, om LNM i lyset af punkt 4a i protokol nr. 8 ville være berettiget til at købe aktier i HCz, eftersom LNM allerede ejede MSP, som i henhold til protokollen er modtager af statsstøtte.
The Commission also expressed concern as to whether, in the light of point 4a of Protocol No 8, LNM would be entitled to acquire shares in HCz, as LNM already owned MSP, a state aid recipient under that Protocol.
I en skrivelse af 9. september 2004 anfører UK Steel, der handler på vegne af HCz' britiske konkurrenter, at afskrivning og udsættelse af gæld svarer til statsstøtte, indtil den er betalt fuldt ud.
By letter dated 9 September 2004, UK Steel, acting on behalf of HCz's UK competitors, argues that debt write-offs and deferrals constitute state aid until such time as they are repaid in full.
Den støtter Kommissionens tanker om, at HCz' stålaktiver under normale markedsforhold ville være blevet afviklet og ikke udlejet til HSCz.
It endorses the Commission's concerns that under normal market conditions HCz's steel assets would been liquidated and not leased to HSCz.
UK Steel opfordrer endvidere indtrængende Kommissionen til at anvende punkt 4b i protokol nr. 8, som efter UK Steels mening fuldstændig ville forhindre LNM i at købe HCz' aktiver.
UK Steel also urges the Commission to apply point 4b of Protocol No 8 which, in its view, would completely bar LNM from acquiring HCz's assets.
I en skrivelse af 10. september 2004 erklærede Tjekkiet som ejer af et andet pladefremstillende stålværk, Vítkovice Steel, sin interesse i Kommissionens procedure.
By letter dated 10 September 2004, the Czech Republic, as the owner of another plate producing steel plant, Vítkovice Steel, declared its interest in the Commission proceedings.
I en skrivelse af 10. september 2004 griber LNM ind i Kommissionens procedure som en af de potentielle tilbudsgivere.
By letter of 10 September 2004, LNM intervenes in the Commission proceedings as one of the potential bidders.
LNM anfører, at dens mål er at hjælpe med at vise, at privatiseringen af HCz-stålvirksomhederne og forholdet mellem andre virksomheder i LNM-koncernen er fuldt ud forenelige med tiltrædelsestraktaten og reglerne om statsstøtte.
LNM states that its aim is to help demonstrate that the privatisation of the HCz steel companies and the relationship between other LNM group companies are fully compatible with the Accession Treaty and the state aid rules.
Navnlig bekræfter den, at dens dattervirksomhed MSP ikke er i gang med at købe HCz-virksomhederne.
It particular, it confirms that its subsidiary MSP is not acquiring the HCz companies.
Den gentager sin entydige forsikring om, at den, hvis den skulle få held med at købe HCz-virksomhederne, vil drive dem som en uafhængig enhed, fuldstændig adskilt fra MSP, og at den vil sikre, at der ikke overføres nogen statsstøtte eller kapacitet mellem dem og MSP.
It reiterates its unequivocal assurance that, should it be successful in acquiring the HCz companies, it would operate them as an independent entity, entirely separate from MSP, and that it would ensure that no state aid or capacity were transferred between them and MSP.
Virksomhedernes forhold vil være rent kommercielt, idet MSP vil levere plader til HCz. Dette forhold vil blive organiseret på en gennemsigtig måde og til markedspriser, der ikke adskiller sig fra virksomhedens konkurrenters priser.
The only relationship the companies would have would be a commercial one whereby MSP would supply slabs to HCz; this relationship would be organised in a transparent fashion and at market prices which did not differ from the prices charged by the company's competitors.
Donbass greb ind i Kommissionens procedure som en af de potentielle tilbudsgivere i en skrivelse af 13. september 2004.
Donbass intervened in the Commission proceedings as one of the potential bidders by letter dated 13 September 2004.
Donbass mente, at omstruktureringen foregår på markedsmæssige vilkår.
In Donbass' view the restructuring is taking place under market conditions.
I lyset af den omstændelige og langvarige konkursbehandling tvivler den på, at den vil være interesseret i at købe HCz' aktiver, hvis der blev indledt en konkursbehandling.
Given the cumbersome nature and length of bankruptcy proceedings, it doubts that it would be interested in purchasing HCz's assets if such proceedings were launched.
V. BEMÆKNINGER FRA POLEN
V. COMMENTS FROM POLAND
De polske myndigheder gav yderligere oplysninger.
The Polish authorities provided additional information.
De forsøger at forklare, at hverken omstruktureringen af HCz eller driften af HSCz omfattede omstruktureringsstøtte.
They attempt to explain that neither the restructuring of HCz nor the operation of HSCz involved restructuring aid.
De indrømmer blot, at HCz modtog nogen støtte inden slutningen af 2002.
They only admit that some aid was awarded to HCz prior to end-2002.
Endelig forklarer Polen, hvorfor Kommissionen bør acceptere en ændring af det nationale omstruktureringsprogram.
Finally, Poland explains why the Commission should agree to a change of the NRP.
De polske myndigheder giver først nye argumenter for, hvorfor omstruktureringen af HCz ikke bør omfatte statsstøtte.
The Polish authorities first provide new arguments as to why the restructuring of HCz did not involve state aid.
I den forbindelse fremlægger de ovennævnte analyse af konkursscenariet, som PWC har gennemført.
In that connection, they present the above-mentioned analysis of the bankruptcy scenario carried out by PWC.
De ønsker at vise, at alle offentlige kreditorers fordringer i højere grad vil blive betalt i tilfælde af omstrukturering end i tilfælde af en konkurs.
They wish to demonstrate that all public creditors' claims will be met to a greater extent in the event of restructuring than they would in the event of bankruptcy.
Analysen er baseret på en analyse af værdierne af kautionerne, som ikke var blevet gennemført tidligere.
The analysis is based on a proper analysis of the value of the sureties, which had not been conducted before.
Rent faktisk fremhæves det i PWC-analysen, at de offentlige kreditorers fordringer fortrinsvist er sikret ved ikke-produktionsaktiver med kun en lille del af sikkerheden i produktionsaktiverne, mens de private kreditorers fordringer primært er sikret ved produktionsaktiver, som er de mest værdifulde.
In fact, the PWC analysis emphasises that public creditors' claims are predominantly secured on non-productive assets, with only a small part of the security on productive assets, while civil creditors' claims are primarily secured on (the most valuable) productive assets.
Selv i tilfælde, hvor offentlige kreditorers fordringer er sikret ved HCz' produktionsaktiver, blev de registreret med en senere dato end de private kreditorers fordringer.
Moreover, even in cases where public creditors' claims are secured on HCz's productive assets, they were registered with later dates than the claims of private creditors.
I henhold til den polske konkurslov kan sådanne fordringer ikke indfries, før tidligere registrerede fordringer er blevet indfriet (dvs. de private kreditorers fordringer).
Under the Polish Bankruptcy Act, such claims cannot be satisfied until claims registered previously have been settled (i.e. the private creditors' claims).
På baggrund af denne analyse påstår Polen, at omstruktureringen opfylder kriterierne for den private kreditor.
On the basis of this analysis, Poland claims that restructuring would meet the private creditor test.
Kun få offentlige kreditorer modtager mindre ved en omstrukturering end ved en konkurs (de, der er anført med et minus i sidste kolonne i tabel 2 og 3), men dette vil under alle omstædigheder stadig være mere end i et realistisk konkursscenario.
Only a few public creditors receive less in restructuring than in bankruptcy (those which have a minus in the last column of tables 2 and 3) but, in any event, this would still be more than in a realistic bankruptcy scenario.
Polen anfører, at PWC-analysen for 2003 er et meget optimistisk scenario for offentlige institutionelle kreditorer.
Poland argues that the PWC analysis for 2003 is a very optimistic scenario for public institutional creditors.
I realiteten er en yderligere reduktion af provenuet fra konkursbehandlingen primært resultatet af de særlige konkursbehandlinger under domstolene i Polen, som omfatter den midlertidige bobestyrers omkostninger, der sædvanligvis udgør 5 % af indtægterne fra salget og, i HCz' tilfælde, sandsynligvis helt op til 10 %.
In reality, a further reduction in proceeds from bankruptcy proceedings is primarily the result of the peculiar nature of court-supervised bankruptcy proceedings in Poland, which comprise the receiver's costs, usually amounting to 5 % of receipts from sales and, in HCz's case, probably as much as 10 %.
Endvidere er konkursbehandlinger langvarige, hvilket yderligere kan reducere værdien.
In addition, bankruptcy proceedings take a long period of time, which can further diminish the value.
De polske myndigheder anfører endvidere, at konkurs kan medføre, at aktiverne ikke sælges i en ensartet proces, eftersom visse kreditorer har overført ejendomsrettigheder på enkelte aktiver og dermed kan sælge dem særskilt.
The Polish authorities also argue that bankruptcy might have the effect that assets are not sold in a uniform process, as some creditors have ownership rights transferred onto individual assets and can thus sell them separately.
I lyset heraf kan investorer ikke være sikre på, at de får hele produktionslinjen, hvilket kan medføre, at prisen reduceres.
As such, investors cannot be sure that they will obtain the full production line, which may result in the price being reduced.
Polen har givet flere eksempler på salg under en konkursbehandling, herunder i forbindelse med Huta Andrzej, hvor en opdeling af ejendomsrettighederne til produktionsaktiverne i høj grad besværliggjorde salget og medførte en reduktion af prisen.
Poland has provided several examples of sales under bankruptcy procedure, including the case of Huta Andrzej in which the breakdown of ownership of production assets made the sale very difficult and caused the price to be reduced.
Et salg under en konkursbehandling kan derfor medføre en meget lavere pris end et salg under en omstruktureringsproces.
Therefore a sale under bankruptcy procedure may result in a much lower price than a sale organised under the restructuring process.
De polske myndigheder anfører endvidere, at de offentlige kreditorer, der lider tab, stadig er bedre stillet end private kreditorer, som under alle omstændigheder valgte omstrukturering (se også tabel 2 og 3).
The Polish authorities also argue that ‘loss-making’ public creditors still get a better deal than private creditors who, in any event, opted for restructuring (for details see tables 2 and 3).
De polske myndigheder forklarer, at den primære årsag til, at kreditorerne ikke ville underskrive kreditoraftalen, var manglende tillid til, at omstruktureringsprogrammet ville give positive resultater.
The Polish authorities explain that the main reason why creditors were reluctant to sign the Creditor Agreement was a lack of trust that the restructuring programme would produce positive results.
Da omstrukturering imidlertid synes at være et realistisk scenario, da der er forholdsvis kort tid til at opnå resultater, og da der er en god chance for at få betalt tilgodehavender, er der tendens til, at sådanne aftaler falder på plads.
However, when restructuring seems to be a realistic scenario, the time needed to achieve results is not very long and there is a good chance of cashing in receivables, there is a tendency to agree to such deals.
Rent faktisk har Polen tilvejebragt skrivelser fra Kredyt Bank og ING BSK, som viser, at selv de banker, der mister mest på en omstrukturering, nu ser omstruktureringsprogrammer som en bedre løsning end konkurs.
In fact, Poland has provided letters from Kredyt Bank and ING BSK which show that even those banks which lose the most from restructuring now view restructuring programmes as a better solution than bankruptcy.
I mellemtiden har de private kommercielle kreditorer anført, at de er parate til en yderligere reduktion i rentebetalingen for at sikre, at HCz har tilstrækkelige midler til at tilbagebetale alle de forpligtelser, der ikke kan omstruktureres, og dertil hørende omkostninger.
In the meantime, the private commercial creditors have indicated that they are prepared for a further reduction in interest recovery in order to ensure that HCz retains sufficient funds to repay all its non-restructurable liabilities and associated costs.
Polen anfører endvidere, at de offentlige kommercielle kreditorer, som på baggrund af PWC-analysen ville få mindre ud af et omstruktureringsscenario end af en konkurs, under ingen omstændigheder ville have beføjelser til at forhindre, at der bliver indgået en forligsaftale i henhold til polsk lovgivning.
Poland also argues that the public commercial creditors who, on the basis of the PWC analysis, would get less from a restructuring scenario than from bankruptcy would not, in any event, have enough power to prevent a conciliatory agreement being concluded under Polish law.
I praksis ville et mindretal af utilfredse kreditorer derfor ikke have magt til at fremtvinge afvikling.
Therefore in practice a minority of unsatisfied creditors would not have the power to force liquidation.
Hvad angår offentlige institutionelle kreditorer, har de polske myndigheder anført, at frigivelse af sikkerhedsstillelse fra de offentlige kreditorer og overførsel af fordringer til en ny enhed, Operator, ikke foregår automatisk.
As regards public institutional creditors, the Polish authorities have indicated that the release of collateral held by public creditors and the transfer of claims to a new entity, the Operator, does not take place automatically.
I stedet krævet en sådan handling en individuel godkendelse fra hver af de offentlige institutionelle kreditorer, og denne godkendelse er ifølge de polske myndigheder skønsmæssig.
Instead such action shall require the sole, individual consent of each of the public institutional creditors which — according to the Polish authorities — is discretionary.
Dette illustreres bedst af de tre offentlige institutionelle kreditorer (skattekontoret i Częstochowa, FGSP og de kommunale myndigheder i Poraj), som afviste den særlige omstruktureringsordning med den begrundelse, at de ville være bedre stillet efter en konkurs.
This is best exemplified by three public institutional creditors (Częstochowa Tax office, the FGSP and Poraj municipal authorities), which rejected the special restructuring scheme on the grounds that bankruptcy would bring them a better result.
Driften af Huta Częstochowa
The operation of Huta Stali Częstochowa
Polen har ligeledes givet yderligere oplysninger om driften af HSCz.
Poland has also provided additional information on the operation of HSCz.
Til dette formål ville en privat kreditor også have accepteret en udsættelse af betalingerne i henhold til lejeaftalen.
To that end a private creditor would also have accepted a deferral of payments under the lease agreement.
Derudover er de polske myndigheder ikke enige i, at deres aktiviteter udgør statsstøtte, idet finansieringen kom fra lån, der blev ydet på kommerciel basis af leverandører og forudbetalinger fra stålværkets kunder, som ikke ville miste HCz/HSCz som kunde.
In addition, the Polish authorities do not accept that their activities constitute state aid as financing was provided from loans granted on a commercial basis by suppliers and prepayments from the steelwork's customers, who did not want to lose HCz/HSCz as a customer.
Hvad angår betaling af energiregninger til PSE, anfører Polen, at garantierne ikke udgør statsstøtte, da HSCz betalte TFS markedsrenten for kautionerne, i alt 2 % af deres reelle værdi.
As regards payment of energy bills to PSE, Poland argues that the guarantees did not constitute state aid as HSCz paid TFS the market rate for the sureties, amounting to 2 % of their real value.
Denne værdi er beregnet med udgangspunkt i, at det samlede garanterede beløb aldrig oversteg 6 mio. zloty, hvorved præmien på 120000 zloty reelt skulle svare til 2 %.
This value is calculated on the basis that the guaranteed sum was never to exceed PLN 6 million and thus the premium of PLN 120000 should actually be equivalent to 2 %.
Til sammenligning citerer de polske myndigheder den nationale fond for kreditgarantier, som tilbyder »lånegarantier« til kunderne hos over 25 banker til en aktuel rente på 1 % for et år, 1,2 % for to år og 1,4 % for tre år.
By way of comparison, the Polish authorities quote the National Fund for Credit Guarantees, which offers ‘loan guarantees’ to the clients of more than 25 commercial banks at rates that currently amount to 1 % for 1 year, 1,2 % for 2 years and 1,4 % for 3 years.