natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
En privat investor ville således aldrig havde forpligtet sig finansielt uden mindste forbehold, selv hvis FT-koncernen ikke havde haft en så omfattende gæld.
A private investor would never have committed himself financially without entering the slightest reservation at a time when the total amount of the France Télécom group's debts had not been established.
BT tilføjer i denne forbindelse, at det i henhold til Domstolens retspraksis ikke kan hævdes, at statens hjælp til FT svarer til adfærden hos en fornuftig investor, hvis eneste mål var at gøre FT til en rentabel virksomhed.
Bouygues Telecom adds in this regard that, in accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, it cannot be maintained that the commitments entered into by the State towards France Télécom are a reflection of the conduct of a prudent investor solely on the ground that France Télécom had become a profitable company.
forskelle i en privat investors situation og statens: BT fremfører, at ingen privat investor i betragtning af den langvarige krise i verdensøkonomien, navnlig i den omskiftelige telesektor, og størrelsen af det pågældende beløb ville have planlagt en kapitaltilførsel af dette omfang uden modbetingelser, og at kun en stat med en kreditværdighed som Frankrigs kunne have påtaget sig denne usikkerhed.
Difference between the situation of a private investor and that of the State: Bouygues Telecom argues that, in view of the prolonged crisis in the world economy and more particularly in a telecommunications sector undergoing transition, and bearing in mind the size of the sum in question, no private investor could have envisaged a capital increase of that amount without conditions and only a State of the creditworthiness of France could have coped with such uncertainty.
BT bemærker også, at en kapitaltilførsel, der udelukkende finansieres via gældsætning og helt uden nogen egenkapital, ville være blevet opfattet som belastende for enhver privat investor, mens en stat kun kan straffes af vælgerne, hvis disse har andre målsætninger.
It thus points out that the financing of the strengthening of the Company's capital base, covered entirely by debt without any own funds, would have affected the credit rating of any private investor who behaved in a similar way, whereas a State, on the other hand, can be punished only by its electors, who do not have the same objectives.
En privat investors långivere og aktionærer ville have forlangt sikkerhed for investeringen i form af en forretningsplan med præcise angivelser, bl.a. for afhændelse af aktiver.
The creditors and shareholders of the private investor would have asked for the investment to be backed by a business plan containing precise commitments, including the disposal of assets.
BT konkluderer, at en fornuftig investor med finansieringsmuligheder på linje med den franske stats, som stillede en sådan garanti, under ingen omstændigheder ville nyde den store tillid på markederne, og at det tydeligvis var fordi der var tale om statsfinansiering, at tilliden til selskabet blev genoprettet.
Bouygues Telecom concludes that, at all events, a prudent investor whose financial capacity was comparable to that of the French State and who issued such a guarantee would not have inspired much confidence in the markets and that it is clear that it was due to the qualification of ‘sovereign debt’ enjoyed by the State's commitments that confidence was restored.
samtidighedskriteriet: BT hævder, at samtidighedsprincippet ikke blev overholdt.
Concomitance criterion: Bouygues Telecom argues that the concomitance principle has not been complied with.
Det kan således konstateres blot ud fra datoen for de franske myndigheders investeringsbeslutning, den 12. juli 2002, og selskabets finansielle vanskeligheder på dette tidspunkt, at kapitaltilførslen var statsstøtte, idet staten traf beslutningen om at investere uden nøjagtigt kendskab til FT's økonomiske og finansielle situation og inden finansieringsplanen var udarbejdet.
The French authorities' decision to invest dates from 12 July 2002 and France Télécom's financial difficulties on that date by themselves point to the recapitalisation being state aid, all the more so as the State took its investment decision in ignorance of the Company's exact economic and financial situation and prior to the drawing-up of the financing plan.
Da regeringen bebudede sin deltagelse i kapitaltilførslen, var det efter BT's mening hverken sikkert, at der ville komme private investorer til, eller i hvilket omfang de ville investere, selv ikke hvis man i analysen sætter datoen for investeringsbeslutningen til den 5. december.
Bouygues Telecom points out that the participation of private investors was neither certain nor significant at the time of the announcement by the Government of its participation in the capital increase, even if the analysis of the date of taking of the decision to invest is brought forward to 5 December.
Når private investorer først finder det tillokkende at investere efter at myndighederne har besluttet at yde støtte, er det i henhold til Domstolens retspraksis ikke længere relevant, at disse investorer investerer samtidig.
According to the case law of the Court of Justice, where private investors are prepared to intervene only after the authorities have decided to grant aid, the fact that those investors are then prepared to intervene at the same time is no longer relevant.
Sådanne investeringer er en følge af den støtte, staten har ydet, og ikke af en privat investors egen beslutning.
Such an intervention is the consequence of the support given by the State and not the result of a decision of a private investor.
Derfor kan det faktum, at et bankkonsortium forpligtede sig til at garantere for transaktionen, ikke i dette tilfælde tages som belæg for, at samtidighedsprincippet blev overholdt.
Hence, in the present case, the fact that a banking syndicate undertook to underwrite the transaction cannot be taken as a basis for concluding that the concomitance principle is complied with.
De franske myndigheders beslutning om at investere var klar og ubetinget, mens dette ikke gælder de private investorer, som først bidrog efter gentagne forsikringer fra staten om, at den ville deltage i transaktionen og tilmed træffe alle nødvendige foranstaltninger for at sikre FT mod enhver form for finansieringsproblemer.
The French authorities' decision to invest is firm and unconditional whereas that of the private investors is not, and the private investors made their contribution only after having received, on a number of occasions and with certainty, the assurance that the State would also participate in the transaction and especially that it would take every step to ensure that France Télécom did not have any financing problems.
Under alle omstændigheder konstaterer BT, at det i en tidligere beslutning — Seleco-beslutningens betragtning 80 — foreskrives, at selv en høj investeringsandel fra private investorers side ikke i sig selv er nok til at udelukke, at der er tale om statsstøtte.
At all events, Bouygues Telecom takes the view that, in accordance with the case law relating to the Seleco decision referred to in paragraph 80, a significant participation by private investors is not in itself sufficient to rule out any aid element.
BT fastholder også, at statens investering procentvis er højere end statens andel i FT's kapital.
It maintains, moreover, that the State's investment is higher than the amount of its participation in France Télécom's capital.
Endelig fremfører BT, at de meget høje bankgebyrer giver mulighed for at sætte aktietegningsprisen ned til underkurs.
It argues, lastly, that the very high level of banking commissions allows the bank to subscribe to the underwritten shares at a lower discount than that offered to the public.
For så vidt angår konkurrencepåvirkningen mener BT først og fremmest, at foranstaltningerne påvirkede konkurrencen i mobiltelesektoren.
As regards the effect on competition, Bouygues Telecom points out inter alia that the measures at issue have had the effect of affecting competition in the market for mobile telecommunications.
Her henviser BT til, at det var udbygningen af aktiviteterne i mobiltelesektoren, der lå til grund for FT's omfattende gæld.
In substance, it refers to the fact that the scale of France Télécom's debt can be traced back to the development of the mobile telecommunications business.
Således hæfter Orange ikke for gælden i forbindelse med opkøbet af denne virksomhed, idet det udelukkende er moderselskabet, der må afholde denne gæld.
Thus, Orange does not bear the debt linked to its acquisitions; instead, the parent company bears it in its entirety.
Da FT via de undersøgte foranstaltninger havde fået de nødvendige midler til at afvikle sin gæld, fik selskabet mulighed for at lade Orange styrke og udbygge sin position på markederne for mobiltelekommunikation.
Being endowed with the means of coping with its debt thanks to the measures at issue, France Télécom enables Orange to consolidate and develop its position in the mobile telecommunications markets.
BT minder om, at Orange med sin markedsandel på 49,8 % har en dominerede stilling på det franske mobiltelefonimarked.
With a 49,8 % market share, Orange is in a dominant position in the French mobile telephony market.
BT præciserer i sine bemærkninger af 11. april 2003, at markedsstrukturen i Frankrigs mobiltelefonimarked er en følge af en kapitalistisk investeringsstrategi fra Oranges side (endog en aggressiv forretningsstrategi) på bekostning af virksomhedens driftsrentabilitet i kraft af den støtte, virksomheden har fået fra staten via FT, navnlig den støtte, som denne sag omhandler.
In its comments of 11 April 2003, Bouygues Telecom points out that the structure of the mobile telecommunications market in France is due to a capitalistic investment strategy (together with an aggressive commercial strategy) carried on by Orange to the detriment of its operational profitability, thanks to the support granted to it by the State through France Télécom, notably via the aid at issue in the present case.
BT understreger også, at de undersøgte foranstaltninger påvirker konkurrencen i hele telesektoren, fordi de gør det mindre tillokkende for udenlandske operatører at udbyde deres tjenester i Frankrig.
It stresses, moreover, that the measures at issue affect competition throughout the telecommunications market and dissuade foreign operators from coming to propose their services in France.
Frankrig er således det eneste europæiske land, som det ikke er lykkedes en eneste udenlandsk mobiloperatør at etablere sig i.
France is thus the only European country in which no ‘foreign’ mobile operator has been able to establish itself.
I vurderingen af, om foranstaltningerne er i overensstemmelse med rammebestemmelserne, påpeger BT, at støtteforanstaltningerne ikke er ekstraordinære og dermed heller ikke kan betragtes som redningsstøtte jf. rammebestemmelserne.
As to the compatibility of the support measures within the meaning of the Guidelines, Bouygues Telecom argues that they do not possess the exceptional character required in order to be characterised as rescue aid within the meaning of the Guidelines.
BT henviser til, at ambitionsplanen 2005 ikke opfylder rammebestemmelsernes mindstekrav.
Basically, the fact is that the Ambition 2005 plan does not satisfy the minimum requirements of the Guidelines.
BT påpeger også, at ambitionsplanen 2005 ikke er en omstruktureringsplan for FT, som skal gøre selskabet mere rentabelt, men blot har til formål at øge selskabets likviditet for at afhjælpe dets øjeblikkelige vanskeligheder.
Moreover, the plan is not a restructuring plan capable of modifying the structure of France Télécom with a view to improving its profitability, but is limited to increasing the Company's liquidity so as to lessen the impact of its current difficulties.
BT holder også på, at foranstaltningerne i sagen virker utilstrækkelige i forhold til de foranstaltninger, der blev truffet af det tidligere monopolselskabs konkurrenter, navnlig KPN, Deutsche Telekom eller British Telecom, såvel hvad angår afhændelse af aktiver som arbejdsmarkedstiltag.
Bouygues Telecom insists also on the fact that the measures at issue are weak in comparison with those taken by the historical operator's competitors, such as KPN, Deutsche Telekom or British Telecom, both as regards the disposal of assets and as regards the social measures taken.
Omstruktureringsplanen indeholder i øvrigt ingen effektive modforanstaltninger til forhindring af konkurrenceforvridning som følge af statens støtte.
The restructuring plan does not contain any substantial compensatory measures capable of preventing any undue distortions of competition so as to offset the aid granted by the State.
BT peger her især på afhændelse af aktiver af kommerciel eller strategisk værdi.
Bouygues Telecom notes among other things the lack of any disposal of valuable or strategic assets.
De afhændelser, som FT planlagde, omfattede således kun ikke-strategiske aktiver til et yderst ringe beløb (3,5 mia. EUR ifølge FT's eget skøn).
Thus, the sales envisaged by France Télécom are limited to non-strategic assets worth very little (EUR 3,5 billion, according to France Télécom's own estimates).
BT påpeger subsidiært, at der skal indføres modforanstaltninger til fordel for den gamle operatørs konkurrenter på markedet for mobiltelekommunikation, især nye virksomheder, som er en forudsætning for en reel konkurrence på det franske marked.
Additionally, Bouygues Telecom maintains that compensatory measures must be adopted for the benefit of the historical operator's competitors in the mobile telecommunications market, and in particular for the benefit of the last entrant, the presence of whom is a precondition for the existence of genuine competition in the French market.
BT foreslår som modforanstaltninger i rammebestemmelsernes forstand, at Orange i en femårig periode får forbud mod at fastsætte takster, som er lavere end konkurrenternes på tilsvarende tjenester, og at Orange gennemfører en frivillig månedlig begrænsning af sin markedsandel med 33 %, indtil virksomhedens nettoandel er nede på 40 %.
It proposes inter alia as compensatory measures within the meaning of the Guidelines a five-year ban on Orange proposing lower rates than its competitors for equivalent services, and the imposition of a self-limitation on Orange's monthly market shares to 33 % until such time as Orange's net market share is reduced to 40 %.
BT foreslår også, at forbrugerne kun må kunne binde sig til Orange i 12 måneder (ved køb og fornyelse), at Orange standser sin indførelse af GSM- og GPRS-net for at skabe ligevægt i konkurrencesituationen, og at virksomheden pålægges at afhænde strategiske aktiver og begrænse sin markedsføring.
It also proposes a limitation of the length of the commitments entered into by consumers vis-à-vis Orange to 12 months (acquisition and renewal), a freezing of the deployment of Orange's GSM and GPRS network so as to re-establish a competitive balance, the obligation to dispose of strategic assets and the obligation to limit marketing activities.
I sine bemærkninger af 26. maj 2004 fremlagde BT bl.a. en økonomisk analyse, hvoraf det fremgår, at støtte fra statens side alt efter den pågældende stats holdning (og dens troværdighed) i sine konsekvenser er væsensforskellig fra en almindelig hovedaktionærs.
In its comments of 26 May 2004, Bouygues Telecom furnishes inter alia an economic analysis which states that, in view of the specific attitude of States (variable according to their own credibility), the support of the State has a substantially different scope from that of a majority shareholder.
Det understreges endvidere i analysen, at der er en lang tradition for statslig indgriben, som vurderes på grundlag af de etablerede forventninger.
The analysis also points out that state intervention is part of a long tradition and that that intervention is judged on the basis of an already established reputation.
Ifølge BT er det tydeligt, at den franske stat med sin støtte til FT lever op til disse forventninger, dvs. sandsynligheden for, at den igen griber ind til fordel for andre franske virksomheder.
In Bouygues Telecom's view, it is clear that, by supporting France Télécom, the State is staking its reputation and hence is placing on the line its ability to intervene again in favour of other French companies.
Analysen understreger også, at spørgsmålet om den franske stats troværdighed skal sammenholdes med de særlige franske omstændigheder på privatiseringsområdet.
The analysis also stresses that the question of the French State's credibility is to be seen in the context of the specific French situation with regard to privatisation.
Hvis staten ikke havde ydet støtte, ville den ikke have været i stand til at gribe ind på et senere tidspunkt, som det meget hurtigt skete med Alstom.
Any flagging in its support would have deprived the State of its capacity to act subsequently, which was speedily done in the case of Alstom.
BT har også fremlagt en analyse af, om statens tilkendegivelser er juridisk bindende i staten New York, hvor selskabet også er noteret.
Bouygues Telecom also furnishes an analysis of whether the State's declarations had any binding effect under the law of the state of New York, where the Company is also quoted.
Ifølge denne analyse er det sandsynligt, at sådanne tilkendegivelser betragtes som bindende enten som ensidige aftaler eller efter princippet om berettiget antagelse.
According to that analysis, it is probable that such declarations would be considered binding either as a unilateral contract or by virtue of the principle of estoppel.
BT har også fremlagt en analyse af, om sådanne tilkendegivelser fra den engelske regering er juridisk bindende i engelsk ret.
Bouygues Telecom furnishes, lastly, a study of whether such declarations emanating from the British Government would have a binding character under English law.
Heri konkluderes det, at sådanne tilkendegivelser er bindende eller forpligter staten til at begrunde en eventuel holdningsændring.
The conclusion of that study is that such declarations would be binding or would impose on the State the burden of justifying a change of position.
Bemærkninger fra Cable & Wireless
Comments from Cable & Wireless
Cable & Wireless mener, at de foranstaltninger, der undersøges, udgør statsstøtte.
Cable & Wireless expresses the view that the measures at issue constitute state aid.
Det forhold, at de franske myndigheders bebudelse af aktionærlånet genskabte tilliden til selskabet på markedet, var i sig selv nok til, at FT fik en fordel.
The market's confidence following the announcement of the granting by the French authorities of the shareholder loan sufficed to confer an advantage on France Télécom.
Hvis en fornuftig privat investor ikke ville have valgt at gennemføre en kapitaltilførsel i et selskab som FT, der forud for vedtagelsen af ambitionsplanen 2005 var tydeligt ineffektivt, fik selskabet en fordel, som den ikke ville have fået under normale markedsvilkår.
In so far as a prudent private investor would not have taken the decision to recapitalise a company such as France Télécom, which was clearly inefficient prior to the adoption of the 2005 Ambition Plan, the Company enjoyed an advantage which it would not have secured under normal market conditions.
Cable & Wireless påpeger også, at det sætter en farlig præcedens, hvis man lader en regering afgive garantier vedrørende alle finansielle vanskeligheder, som et offentligt selskab kan få, og at det kan skade konkurrencesituationen.
Cable & Wireless also points to the dangerous precedent that would be created by allowing a government to underwrite all the financial problems of public undertakings and to the negative dynamic that would be created for competition.
Cable & Wireless tilføjer desuden, at foranstaltningerne ikke i rammebestemmelsernes forstand kan betragtes som forenelige med fællesmarkedet.
It adds that the measures cannot be considered compatible within the meaning of the Guidelines.
Da selskabet ikke er i finansielle vanskeligheder, finder rammebestemmelserne ikke anvendelse.
Inasmuch as the Company is not in financial difficulties, the Guidelines are not applicable.
Bemærkninger fra AFORS Télécom
Comments from AFORS Télécom
AFORS Télécom (Association française des Opérateurs de Réseaux et Services de Télécommunications, sammenslutningen af franske teleudbydere) mener, at foranstaltningerne er statsstøtte, og bemærker endvidere:
AFORS Télécom (Association française des Opérateurs de Réseaux et Services de Télécommunications) observes that the measures at issue constitute state aid. More particularly, it states as follows:
Ved en række stadig tydeligere beslutninger i 2002 — bl.a. statens beslutning om at modtage udbyttet for 2002 i aktier i stedet for i kontanter — frem til tilrådighedsstillelsen af en kreditbevilling på 9 mia. EUR for FT via ERAP genoprettede de franske myndigheder investorernes tillid ved konkret at tilkendegive deres støtte til selskabet.
Through a series of step-by-step decisions taken in the course of 2002 — including the State opting for payment of the 2002 dividends in shares and not in cash — until the opening of a EUR 9 billion credit line made available to France Télécom via ERAP, the French authorities restored investors' confidence by giving formal status to their support.
AFORS Télécom påpeger ligeledes, at selv om FT aldrig udnyttede kreditbevillingen fra ERAP, var den alligevel udtryk for en garanti for støtte fra staten, som i den forstand hidrører fra statsmidler jf. traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
Moreover, even if the credit line opened by ERAP were never used by France Télécom, it symbolises the guarantee of state support and hence mobilises state resources within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty.
Vilkårene for kreditbevillingen og vederlaget herfor overholder ikke kriterierne for det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip.
The terms on which the credit line was granted and the terms governing its remuneration do not satisfy the tests of the prudent private investor principle.
AFORS Télécom påpeger, at FT's finansielle derivater fra 2000 og frem ikke havde kunnet gennemføres, hvis der havde været tale om en fornuftig markedsøkonomisk investor.
AFORS Télécom argues that France Télécom's financial failings since 2000 could not have happened in the presence of a prudent investor.
Staten opfyldte derfor ikke sin »vogterrolle«, da den lod FT øge sin gæld helt uforholdsmæssigt.
The State thus did not perform its role of ‘watchdog’ and it allowed France Télécom to increase its indebtedness on an unheard-of scale.
AFORS Télécom bemærker, at FT's opkøbsstrategi foregik uden hensyn til de underliggende risici, fordi staten som aktionær forsikrede FT om, at selskabet ville blive beskyttet mod fallit.
AFORS Télécom observes that France Télécom's past acquisitions strategy was conducted without regard to the inherent risks inasmuch as the State in its capacity as shareholder assured France Télécom of its support against any prospect of bankruptcy.
Statens støtte sikrede også FT mod at få sænket sin rating yderligere, og derfor kom FT hurtigere tilbage på markedet og fik refinansieret sin gæld på mindre belastende vilkår.
The State's support has had the effect of preventing any further downgrading of France Télécom's credit rating by the rating agencies, which has made it possible to speed up France Télécom's return to the market and the refinancing of its debt under less onerous financial conditions.
FT fik derved en fordel, som AFORS Télécom anslår til 1,5 mia. EUR. Det var således den franske stats troværdighed og høje kreditkvalitet og ikke omstruktureringsplanens kvalitet, der afgjorde vilkårene for FT's adgang til finansieringsmarkederne.
France Télécom has enjoyed an advantage which AFORS Télécom estimates is worth EUR 1,5 billion. Hence, it is the credibility of the French State, enjoying as it does excellent creditworthiness, and not that of the restructuring plan, that determined the conditions of France Télécom's return to the financial markets.