natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor for det første, at hvis BE var blevet insolvent, ville BNFL have befundet sig i en meget uvis og efter al sandsynlighed ugunstig situation.
In view of the above, the Commission has come to the first conclusion that, in case of insolvency of BE, BNFL would be put in a very uncertain and most likely disadvantaged situation.
BE's insolvens ville naturligvis ikke automatisk have ført til øjeblikkelig lukning af alle BE’s kernekraftværker og ville heller ikke fuldstændigt have fjernet behovet for nedlukning af nuværende kraftværker og forvaltning af brugt brændsel fra tidligere aktiviteter.
It is true that BE insolvency would not automatically mean that all its nuclears stations would be immediately closed nor would affect completely the need of decommissioning of existing stations and the management of historical spent fuel.
Hvis BE var blevet insolvent, ville BNFL efter Kommissionens mening have haft sværere ved at forhandle med BE’s efterfølger både om kraftværkernes drift og om nedlukning.
But in the case of an insolvency of BE, the Commission considers that BNFL would have been in a more difficult position to negotiate to whoever would be BE’s successor, either for running the stations or for decommissioning them.
Det ville have indebåret mange risici og stor uvished, og sådanne forhold bliver en privat investor nødt til at tage hensyn til, når han overvejer at genforhandle ordninger, navnlig med sin største kunde.
This would have implied a lot of risks and uncertainties, that a private investor has to take into account when considering the renegotiation of arrangements, in particular with its main client.
BNFL's rådgivere undersøgte dette alternativ nøje, hvilket er en tydelig tilkendegivelse af, at BNFL tog rimeligt hensyn til disse forhold.
The fact that BNFL’s advisors studied carefully this alternative gives a clear indication that BNFL took due account of these facts.
BNFL havde derfor absolut kommerciel interesse i at forsøge at sikre omstrukturering af BE med henblik på at opnå solvens.
Trying and achieve a solvent restructuring of BE was therefore indeed the commercial interest of BNFL.
Efter at være nået til denne indledende konklusion overvejede Kommissionen derefter de genforhandlede aftalers konsekvenser for BNFL’s indtægter, navnlig i forhold til kommentarer fra tredjeparter, for at tjekke, ud fra en mere mikroøkonomisk synsvinkel, om disse genforhandlede aftaler ville være blevet accepteret af en privat virksomhed i en lignende situation.
After having established this initial conclusion, the Commission considered the impact of the renegotiated agreements on BNFL revenues in view in particular of third parties’ comments, in order to check in more microeconomic terms whether these renegotiated agreements could have been accepted by a private company in a similar position.
For så vidt angår forvaltning af brugt brændsel, skelnes der mellem forpligtelser vedrørende tidligere og fremtidige aktiviteter.
As far as spent fuel management is concerned, spent fuel obligations are split between historic and future liabilities.
I henhold til omstruktureringsplanens foranstaltning A overtager den britiske regering alle disse forpligtelser vedrørende brugt brændsel fra tidligere aktiviteter fra BE [37].
As far as the historic spent fuel liabilities are concerned, under Measure A of the restructuring plan, the UK Government will take over all these liabilities from BE [37].
Den gældende ordning for forvaltning af brugt brændsel fra fremtidige aktiviteter blev ændret.
Concerning future spent fuel management, the existing arrangements were amended.
BNFL har fremlagt følgende tabel over den nye ordning for forvaltning af brugt brændsel, som viser, at BE skal betale BNFL efter et gradueret mønster.
BNFL has submitted the following table concerning the new spent fuel management arrangements which shows that BE will pay BNFL on a sliding scale.
Kommissionen har tilføjet de data, der står med kursiv.
The data in italics have been added by the Commission:
Priser i forbindelse med den nye ordning for affaldsforvaltning
New spent fuel management arrangement prices
Faktisk elpris [39] i GBP/MWh i 2003-priser
Outturn electricity price [39] in GBP/MWh real 2003 terms
Faktisk enheds(rabat)/tillæg i GBP/MWh i 2003-priser
Unit amount of (rebate)/surcharge in GBP/MWh real 2003 terms
(i forhold til de oprindelige aftaler)
(in comparison with the original contracts)
Faktisk nettoenhedsbetaling for brugt brændsel i GBP/MWh i 2003-priser
Net unit amount of spent fuel payment in GBP/MWh real 2003 Terms
Betaling i GBP/kgU [38]
Payment in GBP/kgU [38]
14,8 og derunder
14,8 and below
21 og derover
21 and above
Det er vigtigt at være opmærksom på, at rabatter og tillæg i tabel 7 ses i forhold til den ordning for forvaltning af brugt brændsel, der forefandtes umiddelbart før omstruktureringen, frem for i forhold til tidligere ordninger.
It is important to note that the rebates and surcharge in Table 7 are in comparison with the arrangements for the management of spent fuel that were in place just before the restructuring, and not with older arrangements.
Det giver et korrekt udgangspunkt for analysen af BNFL's indrømmelser over for BE, for på den måde fremgår det, hvad BNFL ville have modtaget fra BE, hvis BE ikke havde fået problemer.
This is the right benchmark for the analysis of BNFL’s concessions to BE, since this represents what BNFL would have received from BE had BE not run into difficulties.
Sammenlignes den nye ordning derimod med tidligere aftaler, f.eks. de oprindelige aftaler om el fra grundbelastningselværker, som den første anonyme tredjepart henviser til, er det ikke muligt at få et realistisk indtryk af BNFL’s indrømmelser under forhandlingerne om omstruktureringsplanen.
In contrast, comparing the new arrangements with older contracts, like the initial, baseload, contracts to which the first anonymous third party refers, would make no sense in terms of analysing the actual concessions made by BNFL during the negotiation of the restructuring plan.
Som det fremgår af tabel 7 giver BNFL rabat til BE i forhold til forvaltningsordningen for brugt brændsel fra før omstruktureringen, hvis den faktiske pris for el ligger under strike-prisen på 16 GBP/MWh.
Table 7 shows that if the outturn electricity price is less than the strike price of GBP 16/MWh, BNFL will grant a rebate to BE in comparison with the pre-restructuring spent fuel management arrangements.
Hvis elprisen ligger over strike-prisen, modtager BNFL et tillæg i forhold til beløbet under den oprindelige forvaltningsordning for brugt brændsel.
If the electricity price is greater than the strike price, BNFL will be paid a surcharge in comparison with the payments it received under the original spent fuel management arrangements.
Som anført i betragtning 270 afhænger BNFL’s indtægter fra forvaltning og bortskaffelse af brugt brændsel fra fremtidige aktiviteter af engrospriserne for elektricitet i Det Forenede Kongerige.
As observed in recital (270), the income BNFL receives for the management and disposal of future spent fuel is dependent on wholesale UK electricity prices.
En sådan bestemmelse kan ikke i sig selv udlægges som ikke-kommerciel.
Such a disposition cannot be construed by itself as non-commercial.
Den er ret almindelig inden for sektoren, hvor aktørerne ønsker at dele de risici, der er forbundet med store potentielle prisudsving.
It is rather usual in the sector, where actors want to share the risks linked to the large potential fluctuations in prices.
For at undersøge, om en privat virksomhed ville have accepteret disse priser, tjekkede Kommissionen, om niveauet, i betragtning af den forventede udvikling i elpriserne, ville have sat BNFL i stand til at dække sine undgåelige omkostninger.
In order to check whether these price levels could have been accepted by a private company, the Commission checked to which extent they would allow BNFL to cover its avoidable costs in view of the foreseen evolution of electricity prices.
Med udsigten til at miste en så vigtig kunde, som BE er for BNFL, ville en privat virksomhed have været parat til at sænke sine priser til de omkostninger, den kunne undgå ved at standse forretningerne.
Indeed, where faced with the likelihood of losing such a crucial customer as BE is for BNFL, a private company would be ready to go as far as decreasing its prices down to those costs that it could avoid by closing its operations.
Disse omkostninger er netop de undgåelige omkostninger.
These costs are precisely the avoidable costs.
Under den nye ordning for forvaltning af brugt brændsel får BNFL ejendomsretten til det brugte brændsel, når det leveres af BE.
In this case, under the new spent fuel management arrangements, BNFL will receive title to the spent fuel when it is delivered by BE.
Det betyder, at BNFL skal sørge for affaldets endelige bortskaffelse, hvilket ikke var tilfældet under den tidligere ordning [40].
This means that final disposal of this fuel will have to be handled by BNFL, which was not the case under the previous arrangements [40].
Den nye ordning tillægger BNFL større byrder i forhold til tidligere, og derfor er det ikke tilstrækkeligt at sammenholde tidligere og nye beløb og på den baggrund konkludere, at BNFL dækker de undgåelige omkostninger, så snart brutto-elprisen ligger over […] GBP/MWh.
Since this is an additional charge for BNFL as compared to previous arrangements, one cannot simply rely on the comparison between previous payments and new payments and conclude that BNFL recovers its avoidable costs as soon as electricity wholesale price exceeds GBP […]/MWh.
På den anden side foreskriver den nye ordning for brugt brændsel ikke, hvordan BNFL skal behandle brugt brændsel, som den har ejendomsret til.
On the other hand, the new spent fuel arrangements do not prescribe the way BNFL must handle the spent fuel to which it has title.
BNFL kan eventuelt vælge at oparbejde det brugte brændsel, inden det bortskaffes endeligt.
BNFL can choose whether it wishes to reprocess the fuel before final disposal or not.
Der er behov for endnu en analyse, og den skal foretages på grundlag af de faktiske undgåelige omkostninger, herunder udgifter til endelig bortskaffelse af brugt brændsel.
A further analysis is necessary, based on the actual avoidable costs for BNFL, including charges for final spent fuel disposal.
Kommissionen bad de britiske myndigheder om en nærmere redegørelse for disse omkostninger.
The Commission asked the UK authorities to provide it with a detailed description of these costs.
I henhold til dokumentation fra de britiske myndigheder vil BNFL dække de undgåelige omkostninger, så snart elpriserne ligger over […] GBP/MWh-[…] GBP/MWh, afhængigt af risikoafdækning.
Documentation provided by the UK authorities in this respect indicates that BNFL will cover its avoidable costs as soon as electricity prices are above a GBP […]/MWh to GBP […]/MWh range, depending on whether BNFL allows for risk provisions.
Kommissionen har krydstjekket denne evaluering ved at sammenholde de undgåelige omkostninger, som de britiske myndigheder har beregnet, med beregninger fra en anden kilde.
In order to cross-check this evaluation, the Commission has compared avoidable costs as computed by the UK authorities with costs reported by another source.
Greenpeace har på sit netsted offentliggjort en rapport, som er udarbejdet af Gordon MacKerron fra National Economic Research Associates [41].
Greenpeace has published on its web site a report by Gordon MacKerron of National Economic Research Associates [41].
I rapporten angives der en pris på 200 USD/kgU (110 GBP/kgU [42]) for midlertidig deponering af brugt brændsel og på 400 USD/kgU (220 GBP/kgU) for endelig deponering.
This report quotes figures of USD 200/kgU (GBP 110/kgU [42]) for the temporary storage of spent fuel, and USD 400/kgU (GBP 220/kgU)for its final storage.
Ifølge rapportens forfatter stammer tallene fra en amerikansk undersøgelse [43].
According to the author of the report, they were extracted from an American study [43].
Der er stor forskel på de amerikanske reaktortyper (hovedsageligt LWR) og BE’s.
There are many differences between the American types of reactors (primary LWR ones) and BE’s ones.
Endvidere fremgår det ikke klart af rapporten, hvorvidt de omkostninger, der henvises til, er undgåelige omkostninger, eller hvorvidt de omfatter faste udgifter, der falder uden for følgende analyses område.
Furthermore, it is not clear from the report whether the costs to which it refers are avoidable costs or include fixed costs elements, which would be out of the scope of the following analysis.
De afhænger også i høj grad af kalkulationsrenter, eftersom de fleste omkostninger i forbindelse med endelig bortskaffelse vil opstå langt ud i fremtiden.
They are also very dependent on discount rates since most ultimate disposal costs will be incurred far in the future.
Kommissionen har dog brugt disse tal alligevel, for den anser tal offentliggjort af en tredjepart for at være en relevant kilde til krydstjekning af tallene fra de britiske myndigheder.
The Commission has used these figures nonetheless because it considered that figures published by a third party were a relevant source for the cross checking of figures sent by the UK authorities.
I henhold til de tal, der er anført i betragtning 279, ville BNFL kunne dække sine omkostninger ved en elpris på over […] GBP/MWh.
In view of the figures stated in recital (279), the electricity price above which BNFL could recover its costs would be GBP […]/MWh.
Tallene skal nu sammenholdes med den forventede udvikling i elpriserne.
These figures must now be compared with the anticipated evolution of electricity prices.
Denne sammenligning skal nødvendigvis tage udgangspunkt i den nuværende og i den fremtidige udvikling af elpriserne som forventet af BNFL, da der blev forhandlet om den nye ordning for BNFL og BE.
The proper benchmark for this comparison is the development of electricity prices now and in the future as expected by BNFL when the new arrangements between BNFL and BE were negotiated.
BNFL vurderede værdien af sine indrømmelser til BE på dette potentielle grundlag.
It is indeed against that potential background that BNFL assessed the value of its concessions to BE.
I henhold til BNFL’s materiale forventedes priserne at blive liggende på 16-19 GBP/MWh på kort sigt for derefter at stige til højere og mere bæredygtige værdier.
From the documents provided by BNFL, it appears that the general expectations were that prices would stay in the range of GBP 16/MWh to GBP 19/MWh in the near future, and then raise to higher, more sustainable values.
BNFL vurderede planens endelige vilkår på baggrund af fire scenarier.
In its assessment of the final terms of the plan, BNFL used four possible scenarios.
Kun i det værste tilfælde lå elpriserne konstant under 17 GBP/MWh og nåede kun op på 16,5 GBP/MWh på mellemlang sigt.
Only the most pessimistic of them featured electricity price values staying consistently below GBP 17/MWh, reaching only values of around GBP 16,5/MWh in the medium term.
I de tre øvrige tilfælde regnede man med, at priserne ville nå op på ca. 18 GBP/MWh allerede i 2007 for derefter at stige gradvist til ca. 19,5-23 GBP/MWh.
The three others assumed that these prices would reach values around GBP 18/MWh as soon as 2007, and then gradually reach prices ranging from around GBP 19,5/MWh to GBP 23/MWh.
BNFL vurderede derfor genforhandlingen af sin ordning med BE på baggrund af prognoser for prisudviklingen, som viste, at selv i værste fald ville priserne sætte virksomheden i stand til at dække de undgåelige omkostninger, som vurderet internt, og at priserne i alle andre tilfælde ville sætte virksomheden i stand til at dække de undgåelige omkostninger, som vurderet af Gordon MacKerron.
BNFL’s assessment of the renegotiation of its arrangements with BE was therefore done against a background of price evolution forecasts that were such that, even in the most pessimistic assumptions, prices would enable it to recover its avoidable costs as valued internally, and that in all but the most pessimistic scenario, prices would enable it to recover its avoidable costs as valued by Gordon MacKerron.
Udviklingen i elpriserne viste sig i sidste ende at overgå selv den mest optimistiske af de fire scenarier, som BNFL benyttede.
The actual evolution of electricity prices was finally higher than even the most optimistic of all four scenarios used by BNFL.
Forskellige prisindberetningsbureauer har rapporteret om kortsigtede vinterpriser for el fra grundbelastningselværker på over 20 GBP/MWh, med priser på helt op til 27 GBP/MWh [44].
Indeed, various price reporting agencies have reported values above GBP 20/MWh for winter baseload prices in the near future, even reaching figures as high as GBP 27/MWh [44].
De samme bureauer har rapporteret om sommerpriser på ca. 20 GBP/MWh.
As far as summer prices are concerned a value of around GBP 20/MWh has been reported by the same agencies.
De scenarier, BNFL benyttede, var derfor generelt ret pessimistiske.
The scenarios used by BNFL were therefore globally rather pessimistic.
Det kan derfor konkluderes, at BNFL forventede at kunne dække de undgåelige omkostninger under den nye ordning, selv om virksomheden skulle bære omkostningerne i forbindelse med den endelige bortskaffelse af brugt brændsel.
One can conclude from this that BNFL expected to be able to cover its avoidable costs under the new arrangements, despite the fact that it would bear the costs of final disposal of spent fuel.
Analysen af den nye forsyningsordning for brændsel, der er meget enklere, fordi den omfatter et variabelt beløb, der ikke er knyttet til elprisen, viser, at BNFL under alle omstændigheder vil dække de undgåelige omkostninger ved brændselsforsyning.
Similarly, the analysis of the new fuel supply arrangements, which are much simpler since they contain a variable charge that is not indexed on electricity prices, show that BNFL will cover its avoidable costs for fuel supply in all cases.
Ved en nærmere undersøgelse af de undgåelige omkostninger er der derfor intet, der tyder på, at BNFL ikke handlede på kommercielle vilkår.
An in depth examination of avoidable costs therefore reveals nothing to suggest that BNFL acted uncommercially.
Med den faktiske udvikling i elpriserne ser det tværtimod ud til, at BNFL sandsynligvis vil forbedre sin stilling i forhold til tidligere, samtidig med at virksomheden har optrådt så fleksibelt, at dens største kunde kunne blive på markedet.
To the contrary, the actual evolution of electricity prices suggests that BNFL may very well improve its position as compared to the previous situation, while at the same time having shown enough flexibility to allow its main customer to remain in the market.
Blev BNFL behandlet på lige fod med private kreditorer?
Was BNFL treated on an equal footing with private creditors?
Efter at have gennemgået genforhandlingen ud fra en mikroøkonomisk synsvinkel undersøgte Kommissionen, om BNFL blev behandlet på ligefod med BE’s private kreditorer.
After having examined the renegotiation from a microeconomic point of view, the Commission has checked whether BNFL was treated on an equal footing with that of private creditors of BE.
På dette andet trin undersøgte Kommissionen, om BNFL's indrømmelser kan sidestilles med private kreditorers.
In this second step of analysis, the Commission has examined whether the concessions made by BNFL are similar to those of the private creditors.
Af det materiale, som Det Forenede Kongerige og BNFL har forelagt, fremgår det, at:
The information submitted by the United Kingdom and BNFL show that:
selv om BNFL fastlagde vilkårene med BE, før BE havde forhandlet med hver af de større kreditorer om individuelle vilkår, krævede BNFL, at der skulle indføjes en bestemmelse om tilbagetrækning af de foreslåede indrømmelser, hvis andre større kreditorer fik tilbudt bedre vilkår end BNFL
even if BNFL established terms with BE prior to the negotiation by BE of individual terms with each of its major creditors, it required the inclusion of a clause allowing the withdrawal of the suggested concessions in the event that any other material creditor was offered more favourable terms than BNFL;
under hele forhandlingsprocessen kontrollerede BNFL konstant, om andre private BE-kreditorer blev anmodet om at bidrage på samme måde som BNFL
in the whole negotiation process, BNFL always checked that other private BE creditors would be asked to contribute in a comparable way to that of BNFL;
en detaljeret kvantificeret sammenholdelse af kreditorernes fordringer og kompromiserne i den endeligt vedtagne omstruktureringspakke viser, at BNFL gav afkald på færre udestående fordringer end de øvrige kreditorer.
detailed quantified comparison of the creditors’ claims and the amounts compromised under the finally agreed restructuring package shows that relative to other creditors, BNFL has forgone a smaller proportion of outstanding liabilities.
I den forbindelse skal det også bemærkes, at BNFL ikke havde sikkerhed for sin gæld i BE’s aktiver.
It must be also noted in this respect that BNFL had no security of its debt over any of BE’s assets.
Derfor konkluderer Kommissionen, at BNFL blev behandlet på ligefod med de private kreditorer.
Therefore, the Commission concludes that BNFL was treated on an equal footing vis-à-vis the private creditors.
Det viser også, at BNFL ikke optrådte anderledes end de private kreditorer under forhandlingerne om omstruktureringsplanen.
This further indicates that BNFL did not behave differently in the restructuring plan negotiation than private creditors.
Optrådte BNFL uafhængigt af den britiske regering?
Did BNFL act independently of the UK Government?
Kommissionen anser ovenstående konklusion for at være et tilstrækkeligt bevis for, at BNFL handlede i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske kreditorprincip, og at foranstaltning B derfor ikke omfatter statsstøtte som defineret i EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
The Commission considers that the conclusion above gives sufficient proof that BNFL acted in conformity with the market creditor principle, and that therefore Measure B does not involve State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
Endvidere mener Kommissionen ikke, at der i dette tilfælde overhovedet er noget, som tyder på, at BNFL’s handlemåde kan tilregnes staten.
Moreover, the Commission considers that in the present case there is no indication whatsoever of the imputability of BNFL's behaviour to the State.
EF-Domstolen minder i Stardust-dommen [45] om betingelsen for tilregnelse.
The imputability condition was recalled by the Court of Justice of the European Communities in its judgment in Stardust [45].
Som Domstolen statuerede, kan en foranstaltning ikke automatisk betragtes som statsstøtte, udelukkende fordi den blev truffet af en offentlig virksomhed.
As the Court held, it cannot be automatically presumed that a measure is a State aid because it was taken by a public undertaking.
Det er ikke tilstrækkeligt, at det organ, der yder støtte, er en offentlig virksomhed som defineret i artikel 2, stk. 1, litra b), i Kommissionens direktiv 80/723/EØF af 25. juni 1980 om gennemskueligheden af de økonomiske forbindelser mellem medlemsstaterne og de offentlige virksomheder [46].
It is not sufficient that the body granting the aid is a public undertaking within Article 2(1)(b) of Commission Directive 80/723/EEC of 25 June 1980 on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings [46].
Den omstændighed, at de offentlige myndigheder kan øve afgørende indflydelse, enten direkte eller indirekte, er ikke bevis for, at de rent faktisk øvede en sådan indflydelse i et givet tilfælde.
The fact that the public authorities may exercise directly or indirectly a dominant influence does not prove that they actually exercised that influence in a given case.