natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Disse strukturmangler er bl.a. blevet afhjulpet ved at implementere en risikostyring og forstærke den interne revision som led i en omfattende organisatorisk omstrukturering af banken.
These structural shortcomings had been resolved, among other things, by implementing a risk management system and strengthening internal auditing as part of an extensive organisational restructuring of the bank.
Dette resultat og dermed den vellykkede gennemførelse af omstruktureringsforanstaltningerne bekræftes klart på grundlag af den østrigske nationalbanks kontrol, som fandt sted i februar 2003 på vegne af banktilsynsmyndigheden.
This result and hence the successful implementation of the restructuring measures were highlighted in a review conducted by the Austrian National Bank in February 2003 on behalf of the banking supervisory authority.
En »helhedsvurdering« af BB fører til den konklusion, at BB på en række punkter adskiller sig fra de fleste andre kriseramte virksomheder som omhandlet i rammebestemmelserne, da nogle af de karakteristika, som efter Kommissionens opfattelse er typiske symptomer i forbindelse med en kriseramt virksomhed, ikke findes i forbindelse med BB.
A comprehensive assessment by BB acknowledged that the bank differed from most other firms in difficulty within the meaning of the guidelines in a number of ways since it did not display some of the characteristics listed by the Commission as being typical of a firm in difficulty.
Efter gennemførelsen af de nedskrivninger, der var nødvendige som led i porteføljeomlægningen, har BB's løbende aktiviteter således principielt været og vil fortsat være rentable selv i forbindelse med en forsigtig vurdering af den fremtidige udvikling.
For instance, following the necessary value adjustments made in 2000 with a view to tidying up the portfolio, BB’s current business activities were basically viable and would remain so even on a cautious assessment of future developments.
Udviklingen i de to seneste år har vist, at indlånsområdet igen er blevet stabiliseret, eller at tabene i 2000 til dels igen kunne udlignes.
Developments in the last two years had shown that deposit business had stabilised once again and that the losses suffered in 2000 could be recovered in part.
Østrig vedlagde også resultaterne af BB's ordinære drift.
Austria also provided the results for BB’s ordinary business activities.
Østrig redegjorde for BB i forhold til den østrigske banksektor.
Austria compared BB with the Austrian banking sector.
Der var ikke overkapacitet på det for BB relevante marked og hos Bank Burgenland selv, og med sine 300 ansatte var banken nærmest en mindre regionalbank, som på markedet i Burgenland kun tegnede sig for 16 af i alt 264 bankfilialer.
There was no excess capacity on what was the relevant market for BB or at BB itself and, with 300 employees, BB was a rather small regional bank accounting for only 16 of the 264 bank branches in total in Burgenland.
Med hensyn til den planlagte privatisering af BB har Østrig anført, at banken ifølge de foreliggende planer skal privatiseres inden udgangen af 2004.
As regards the planned privatisation of BB, Austria makes the point that, according to the plans available at the moment, BB should be privatised by the end of 2004 at the latest.
Med henblik herpå er der blevet nedsat en arbejdsgruppe, som skal forberede salget, og Bankhaus HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt har fået til opgave at gennemføre privatiseringen.
To this end, a working group had been set up to prepare the sales procedure and the banking firm HSBC Trinkaus&Burkhardt had been placed in charge of the privatisation process.
Østrig fremsendte de makroøkonomiske rammebetingelser og strategiske mål for BB, på grundlag af hvilke der blev udarbejdet en prognose, som viser en kontinuerlig forbedring af rentabiliteten til ca. 15 % i en periode på syv år.
Austria described the general economic position of BB and its strategic objectives, which had provided the basis for calculations indicating that there would be a steady improvement in profitability of around 15 % over seven years.
På grundlag af antallet af engagementer, gennemsnitlige forrentninger og tilbageførsler fra likviditetsregnskabet fra januar 2003 har controllingafdelingen inden for rammerne af en planlægningsproces i samarbejde med lederne af fagafdelingerne og direktionen fastsat planlagte volumener og vilkår.
On the basis of inventory volumes, average interest and flows from liquidity calculations for January 2003, planning volumes and conditions had been drawn up as part of a planning process by the control department in conjunction with the heads of specialist departments and the board of management.
Renteindtægterne er i hele planlægningsperioden beregnet på grundlag af det aktuelle renteniveau, dvs. at der ikke blev anvendt hypoteser for den fremtidige renteudvikling i prognosen.
Interest income was calculated over the entire planning horizon on the basis of the current interest rate, i.e. no assumptions regarding future interest rates were made in the calculation.
I betragtning af det nuværende lave renteniveau er denne tilgang under alle omstændigheder i overensstemmelse med princippet om forsigtig planlægning.
Given the present low level of interest rates, this approach complied in any event with the principle of cautious planning.
De omstruktureringsforanstaltninger, som BB indledte i tilknytning til bedragerisagen for dels at reagere hensigtsmæssigt på årsagerne på de økonomiske vanskeligheder, dels at forberede virksomheden bedst muligt på udviklingen og mulighederne på markedet i de kommende år, kan beskrives med følgende stikord: »omfattende reorganisering af kreditrisikostyringen«, »koncentration af BB om hovedaktiviteterne«, »konsolidering af BB som regional bank« og »omfattende effektivisering af omkostningsstyringen«.
The restructuring measures taken by BB following the fraud with a view, on the one hand, to addressing in an appropriate fashion the causes of its financial difficulties and, on the other, to preparing the bank in the best possible way for market developments and opportunities in the years ahead could be summed up under the headings ‘comprehensive reorganisation of credit risk management’, ‘concentration by BB on core business’, ‘strengthening of BB’s role as a regional bank’ and ‘comprehensive streamlining of cost management’.
På baggrund af BB's ringe størrelse foretager Østrig en omhyggelig afvejning af kriterierne om genopretning af virksomhedens rentabilitet og forhindring af urimelig konkurrencefordrejning og har henvist til, at små og mellemstore virksomheder ifølge rammebestemmelserne (nr. 36) principielt ikke skal præstere nogen modydelse.
In view of the small size of BB, Austria made a cautious assessment of the criterion of restoring long-term viability and that of avoiding undue distortions of competition, indicating that, under the guidelines (point 36), small and medium-sized enterprises are not generally required to implement any compensatory measures.
Dernæst har Østrig redegjort for, hvorfor BB kun i ringe udstrækning overskrider de lofter, der er fastsat for SMV.
Austria then gave the reasons why BB only slightly exceeded the threshold for an SME.
I betragtning af bankens ringe størrelse er det ifølge Østrig på ingen måde overraskende, at BB ikke er i stand til at præstere meget betydelige modydelser.
Austria explained that, given the bank’s small size, it came as no surprise that BB was not in a position to offer any very substantial compensatory measures.
BB har ganske vist datterselskaber, men disse varetager væsentlige områder af BB's bankvirksomhed, og en afhændelse af sådanne interesser ville derfor i vidt omfang gøre indhug i virksomhedens fundament.
It was true that BB had subsidiaries that were active in key areas of banking, but a sale of such holdings would significantly erode the bank’s substance.
Endvidere har BB ingen nævneværdige udenlandske aktiviteter, og det indenlandske filialnet er ligeledes yderst begrænset med nu 16 filialer.
Moreover, BB had no appreciable foreign business and even the number of its domestic branches (16) was extremely small.
Efter Østrigs opfattelse udelukker BB's ubetydelige markedsstilling risikoen for konkurrencefordrejning, og Østrig har gjort opmærksom på, at BB's vanskeligheder på ingen måde skyldes aggressive markedsaktiviteter, men derimod de nævnte, afgrænsede hændelser i forbindelse med navnlig bedragerisagen.
According to Austria, the insignificant market position of BB ruled out any danger of competition being distorted and its difficulties were attributable in no way to aggressive market behaviour but to the events of lesser magnitude mentioned above, particularly in connection with the fraud.
Østrig har også peget på, at støtteforanstaltningerne til fordel for BB ikke har øget bankens egenkapital, men kun medført, at bankens nødlidende fordringer er blevet sikret, således at det ikke var nødvendigt at nedskrive dem, og det dermed kunne forhindres, at passiverne oversteg BB's kernekapital.
Austria also maintained that the aid for BB had not increased the bank’s equity but had simply provided collateral for its non-performing loans, with the result that no value adjustments had to be carried out and its liabilities could be prevented from exceeding BB’s core capital.
Østrig har endvidere anført, at BB og dens hovedaktiviteter ligger i et støtteberettiget område efter EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 3, litra a, og har i den forbindelse henvist til såvel de relevante bestemmelser i rammebestemmelserne (nr. 20) som de vanskelige forhold på tidspunktet for de økonomiske vanskeligheder.
Furthermore, Austria pointed out that BB and its almost exclusive area of activity were located in an assisted area covered by Article 87(3)(a) of the EC Treaty. It referred both to the corresponding rules in the guidelines (recital 20) and to the aggravated circumstances that obtained at the time of the financial difficulties.
Med hensyn til modydelserne (afhændelse af kapitalinteresser, lukning af en filial, ophør med at udstede statslån) har Østrig givet detaljerede oplysninger om værdien af de enkelte foranstaltninger og deres reduktionsvirkning og anført grundene til, at yderligere reduktionsforanstaltninger ville true bankens levedygtighed.
As regards the compensatory measures (sale of holdings, closure of a branch, decision to desist from granting Federal loans), Austria provided details on the value and the reduction effect of each measure and gave the reasons why further reductions would jeopardise the bank’s viability.
Østrig har understreget, at de pågældende støtteforanstaltninger er begrænset til et minimum, da garantiaftalerne alene ikke var i stand til at opretholde en tilstrækkelig solvens, og at BB selv har foretaget yderligere nedskrivninger på 41 mio. EUR og også ved egen hjælp har afviklet tilgodehavender på 218 mio. EUR. Endvidere har BB ikke fået tilført kapital fra delstaten til afhjælpning af bankens vanskeligheder, hvilket dokumenterer delstatens bestræbelser på at begrænse støttens art og omfang til et minimum.
Austria stressed that the aid in question was limited to the minimum since the guarantee agreements alone were not sufficient to maintain a satisfactory level of solvency and that BB had made the further value adjustments totalling EUR 41 million out of its own resources and also coped with the loss of balances totalling EUR 218 million out of its own resources. Moreover, the Province had not provided BB with any capital to offset its difficulties, and this bears witness to its attempt to limit the type and amount of the aid to the minimum.
BB har endvidere gjort en betydelig indsats for at bringe sine personaleudgifter ned på et niveau svarende til det almindelige gennemsnit i banksektoren og har på mellemlang sigt til hensigt at afhænde fast ejendom, som banken ikke har behov for.
BB also made considerable efforts to bring staff costs down to the average level customary in the banking sector and planned in the medium term to sell off property that was not needed.
Det er derfor ikke muligt at gennemføre foranstaltninger, der går videre end dette, da banken traditionelt har haft en forholdsvis trimmet organisation.
Further measures were not, therefore, possible as the bank had always striven to be a relatively streamlined business.
V. ÆNDRING AF STØTTEFORANSTALTNINGERNE
V. AMENDMENTS TO THE AID MEASURES
Ved brev af 19. december 2003 meddelte de østrigske myndigheder, at de inden for rammerne af BB's privatiseringsproces havde til hensigt at ændre de anmeldte støtteforanstaltninger.
By letter dated 19 December 2003, the Austrian authorities notified the Commission that, as part of BB’s privatisation, they intended to amend the aid measures notified previously.
Garantiaftalen af 20. juni 2000 ændres som følger:
The guarantee agreement of 20 June 2000 is to be amended as follows:
BB's årlige overskud anvendes ikke længere til at nedbringe det af delstaten Burgenland garanterede beløb. Det af delstaten Burgenland garanterede beløb nedbringes nu med de beløb, som står i forbindelse med de garanterede kreditforpligtelser vedrørende HOWE-sagen og skal inddrives af BB i de kommende år.
BB’s annual profits will no longer be used to reduce the amount guaranteed by the Province of Burgenland, which will be reduced only by the amounts that are represented by the guaranteed claims arising from the HOWE affair and will accrue to BB in the years ahead.
Garantibetalingerne forlænges på følgende måde: BB vil tidligst med afslutningen af årsregnskabet for 2025 (og ikke som nu allerede af årsregnskabsåret for 2010) gøre delstaten Burgenlands garanti gældende.
The guarantee payments will be extended as follows: BB will be able to call on the guarantee provided by the Province of Burgenland at the earliest when the annual accounts for the financial year 2025 (instead of 2010 as at present) are closed.
Det skal dog stå delstaten frit for allerede ved afslutningen af årsregnskabet for 2010 helt eller kun delvis at foretage den åbne garantibetaling til BB.
However, the Province will have the right to make the open guarantee payment to BB in full or only in part as from the moment that the annual accounts for the financial year 2010 are closed.
Indtil den 30. juni 2011 skal den hidtidige rente på 5 % og fra den 1. juli 2011 den på denne dag aktuelle 5-årige rente p.a. (kontokurant) af det til enhver tid gældende garantibeløb være gældende.
Until 30 June 2011 the current interest rate of 5 % and, as from 1 July 2011, the then five year interest rate will apply each year on a current-account basis in respect of the amount of the guarantee.
Ligeledes skal fra henholdsvis den 1. juli 2016 og den 1. juli 2021 den aktuelle 5-årige rente p.a. (kontokurant) af det til enhver tid gældende garantibeløb være gældende.
Similarly, as from 1 July 2016 and 1 July 2021, the then five-year interest rate will apply each year on a current-account basis in respect of the guaranteed amount.
Rammeaftalen af 23. oktober 2000 ændres som følger:
The framework agreement of 23 October 2000 is to be amended as follows:
BB's årlige overskud anvendes ikke længere til at opfylde tilbagebetalingsforpligtelsen (Besserungsverpflichtung) over for Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG.
BB’s annual profits will no longer be used to meet the better-fortune obligation towards Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG;
Delstaten Burgenland opfylder tilbagebetalingsforpligtelsen over for Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG og betaler det endnu udestående beløb fra garantiaftalen umiddelbart før privatiseringen af BB i form af en samlet engangsbetaling til Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG.
the Province of Burgenland will meet the better-fortune obligation towards Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG and will pay the amount still outstanding under the guarantee agreement immediately prior to the privatisation of BB with a one-off payment to Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG.
Ifølge de østrigske myndigheder træder ændringen med hensyn til anvendelsen af det årlige overskud til at nedbringe garantibeløbene kun i kraft, hvis BB i realiteten bliver privatiseret.
According to Austria, the amendment regarding use of annual profits to reduce the amounts guaranteed will take effect only if BB is actually privatised.
Hvis delstaten Burgenland ikke skulle sælge BB, forbliver begge garantier uændrede, og garantibeløbene nedbringes fortsat med BB's årlige overskud, eller BB's tilbagebetalingsforpligtelse vil være uændret.
If the Province of Burgenland were not to sell BB, the two guarantees would thus remain unchanged, the amounts guaranteed would be further reduced by BB’s annual profits and BB’s better-fortune obligation would remain unchanged.
KOMMENTARER FRA ØSTRIG VEDRØRENDE PROCEDURENS UDVIDELSE
POSITION OF AUSTRIA ON THE DECISION TO EXTEND THE PROCEDURE
Ifølge Østrig tilstræber delstatsregeringen som en væsentlig del af omstruktureringsplanen for BB, at banken privatiseres for dermed på bedst mulig vis at sikre dens rentabilitet på længere sigt.
According to Austria, the Provincial Government regarded BB’s privatisation as the key component of the restructuring plan that will provide the best possible guarantee of the bank’s long-term viability.
Med indrykningen af annoncer i medierne den 17. november 2003 blev opfordringen til interessetilkendegivelse bekendtgjort.
By way of announcements placed in the media on 17 November 2003, the call for expressions of interest was published.
Senest i marts/april 2004 vil der — efter gennemførelsen af den obligatoriske due diligence-proces — blive indledt forhandlinger med de enkelte bydende.
By March/April 2004 at the latest, after completion of the compulsory due diligence process, negotiations with the individual bidders would begin.
For at opnå det bedst mulige provenu i tilfælde af salg af BB er det derfor nødvendigt, at delstaten Burgenland frigør BB fra alle forpligtelser i forbindelse med aftalen med Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG om tilbagebetaling på grundlag af fremtidige overskud.
In order to obtain the best possible price for BB, it would be necessary, therefore, for the Province of Burgenland to release BB from all its obligations under the better-fortune agreement with Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG.
Det samme gælder også for garantiaftalen af 20. juni 2000 mellem delstaten Burgenland og BB, da hverken BB eller køberen af BB bør pålægges byrder i denne forbindelse.
The same would apply accordingly to the guarantee agreement of 20 June 2000 between the Province of Burgenland and BB since, here too, neither BB nor the buyer of BB should be encumbered in any way.
Efter Østrigs opfattelse ville det i tilfælde af, at BB's forpligtelse til at udrede garantibeløbet af overskuddet, være tvivlsomt, om der i det hele taget ville kunne findes en køber, da potentielle købere af banken ville være mindre interesserede i et køb, hvis der i en årrække ikke kan forventes noget overskud heraf.
In the view of Austria, if BB were still required to transfer its profits, it would be doubtful whether any buyer for the bank could be found since potential buyers would have little interest in a transaction from which they could not expect any profits for a number of years.
Ophævelsen af BB's forpligtelse til at udrede garantibeløbet af overskuddet er derfor en nødvendig betingelse for den forestående privatisering, hvis den anmeldte omstruktureringsplan, der som en væsentlig bestanddel indeholder en privatisering af BB, skal have realistiske udsigter til at blive gennemført med et godt resultat.
Abolition of the requirement for BB to transfer its profits would, therefore, be a necessary condition for its forthcoming privatisation if the notified restructuring plan, of which BB’s privatisation was an essential component, were to have any realistic chance of success.
Dermed er der stillet en potentiel køber af BB i udsigt, at han straks kan nyde godt af BB's årlige afkast, hvilket igen er en nødvendig forudsætning for at realisere en maksimal overdragelsespris.
This would provide a potential buyer of BB with the prospect of availing itself immediately of BB’s profits, which would in turn be a necessary condition for obtaining the best possible sales price.
VURDERING AF STØTTEFORANSTALTNINGERNE
ASSESSMENT OF THE AID MEASURE
Begge garantiaftaler fra delstaten Burgenland til fordel for BB indeholder statsmidler.
The two guarantee agreements between the Province of Burgenland and BB involve State resources.
Foranstaltningerne træffes på betingelser, som ikke ville være acceptable for en investor, der handler ud fra markedsøkonomiske betragtninger.
They were concluded on conditions that would not be acceptable to a market-economy private investor.
Østrig er ganske vist af den opfattelse, at delstaten Burgenland gennem de indgåede garantiaftaler har undgået et større økonomisk tab, for så vidt som aftalerne har været begrænset til det strengt nødvendige minimum med henblik på at forhindre, at banken blev sat under tvungent tilsyn.
Austria maintained that, through the guarantee agreements, the Province of Burgenland avoided greater financial loss since the agreements would have been restricted to providing the absolute minimum necessary to prevent the imposition of court-supervised management.
Skulle delstaten Burgenland på grundlag af den lovbestemte forpligtelse have indestået som kautionist, ville omfanget af de økonomiske forpligtelser i forbindelse med begge garantier være overskredet med hensyn til den beløbsmæssigt ubegrænsede kaution.
If, as a result of the statutory requirement, the Province had had to step in as deficiency guarantor, the unlimited deficiency liability would have meant that the financial obligations under the two guarantees would have been exceeded.
Østrig er derfor af den opfattelse, at delstaten Burgenland har handlet i overensstemmelse med den markedsøkonomiske investors princip.
Accordingly, Austria maintained the legal view that the Province of Burgenland had acted in accordance with the ‘market-economy private investor’ principle.
Over for dette argument kan imidlertid anføres, at de østrigske myndigheder ikke har fremlagt beregninger, der ville kunne støtte dette argument.
In this connection, however, it must be objected that Austria has not submitted any calculations that could have supported this assertion.
I den i betragtning 13 nævnte rapport fra KPMG af 17. juni 2000 fastsættes et beløb på 247 mio. EUR, som delstaten Burgenland skal dække i tilfælde af BB’s insolvens. Det er mindre end totalbeløbet for de to garantier.
The KPMG report of 17 June 2000, referred to in paragraph 13, puts at EUR 247 million the amount that would have to be covered by the Province of Burgenland in the event of BB’s insolvency.
Det anføres i denne forbindelse, at dette beløb blev fastsat inden den beordrede anden »omfattende« debitorgennemgang i andet halvår 2000, og som ud fra en aktuel betragtning måtte være højere.
This is lower than the aggregate value of the two guarantees, although it should be pointed out that this figure was calculated before the second comprehensive audit of accounts receivable conducted in the second half of 2000 and, viewed from today’s perspective, should therefore be higher.
Disse omkostninger står imidlertid ikke i forbindelse med delstatens rolle som aktionær i BB.
However, those costs bear no relationship to the role of the Province of Burgenland as owner of the shares of BB.
De er derimod en følge af en særlige lovbestemt forpligtelse, nemlig den statslige garantiforpligtelse, som en privat investor ikke kan indgå.
Instead, they are the result of a special statutory requirement, namely the State default liability, that can never concern a private investor.
Begge foranstaltninger blev truffet til fordel for en virksomhed, der befandt sig i alvorlige økonomiske vanskeligheder.
Both measures were taken for the benefit of an undertaking in serious financial difficulties.
Alt i alt er der med 359,8 mio. EUR tale om et betydeligt beløb.
All things considered, the total involved (EUR 359,8 million) is a considerable amount.