natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Støtten fra staten gav desuden FT den fordel, at selskabet ikke blev nødt til at ændre sin strategiske tilgang.
Moreover, the State's support had the advantage that France Télécom no longer had to modify its strategic perimeter.
Ambitionsplanen 2005 omfatter kun retningslinjer og ikke klart definerede, juridisk bindende og uigenkaldelige forpligtelser, og den kan på ingen måde sammenlignes med den omstruktureringsproces, der blev iværksat i Europa, f.eks. i British Telecom.
The Ambition 2005 plan consists of guidelines and not of clearly worded, binding and irreversible commitments and cannot be compared to the restructuring process implemented in Europe by, say, British Telecom.
De fordele, FT fik, viderefører den konkurrenceforvridning, medlemmerne af AFORS Télécom har lidt under.
The advantages enjoyed by France Télécom prolong distortions of competition damaging to the members of AFORS Télécom.
Ifølge AFORS Télécom forværrer den støtte, den franske stat har ydet, den eksisterende konkurrencebegrænsende praksis, som er yderst skadelig for alternative operatører.
In AFORS Télécom's opinion, the aid granted by the French State reinforces the already existing anticompetitive practices which are highly detrimental to alternative operators.
AFORS Télécom peger navnlig på Orange og Wanadoos eksklusivaftale om brug af FT's distributionsnet, tilbuddene om ubundtet adgang, som systematisk er til fordel for Wanadoo og FT, og FT's fortsatte monopolstilling på overtakseringstjenester (telefonbaserede tillægstjenester, som udbydes til slutbrugerne).
AFORS Télécom mentions among other things the exclusive utilisation of France Télécom's distribution network by Orange and Wanadoo, the unbundling offers which systematically benefit Wanadoo and France Télécom, and the monopoly position held by France Télécom in the market for shared-revenue services (the supplying to consumers of value-added content accessible by telephone).
AFORS Télécom anfører endvidere, at der er en reel risiko for, at denne praksis videreføres, fordi statsstøtten muliggør det.
AFORS Télécom points to the real risk of prolongation of this conduct which the state aid would allow.
Der skal iværksættes kompenserende foranstaltninger over for FT, som både sikrer, at statens adfærd svarer til den, der udvises af en virksomhed, som skal genoprette sin finansieringskapacitet uden ekstraordinær støtte, og at der indføres ligelig konkurrence.
Compensatory measures should be imposed on France Télécom with a view, firstly, to ensuring that the conduct of the State is analogous to that of a company which has to restore its financial capacity without benefiting from exceptional aid and, secondly, to restoring fair competition.
De kompenserende foranstaltninger skal (i) begrænse FT's investeringer til et rimeligt niveau for en gældsplaget virksomhed, hvilket f.eks. vil sige, at FT's globale investeringspolitik begrænses til investeringer, som giver afkast efter højst 12 måneder for detailaktiviteters vedkommende; (ii) sikre gennemskuelige strukturer i forbindelserne mellem koncernens forskellige aktiviteter; og (iii) forhindre, at statsstøtten anvendes til priskrig, f.eks. ved at selskabets særlige detailtilbud konsekvent skal offentliggøres.
This would involve (i) restricting France Télécom's investment to that of an indebted company, e.g. by limiting its overall investment policy to investments the return on investment period of which is less than 12 months in the case of retail activities; (ii) introducing transparent structures between each business within the group; and (iii) preventing the state aid from being used to fuel a price war, for example through the systematic publication of its tailor-made retail offerings.
Bemærkninger fra Cégétel
Comments from Cégétel
Cégétel mener, at der var tale om to særskilte støtteforanstaltninger: (i) dels de franske myndigheders bebudelse af aktionærlånet til FT, (ii) dels statens deltagelse i kapitaltilførslen til FT.
Cégétel maintains that there are two separate measures: (i) the announcement by the French authorities of the granting of a shareholder loan to France Télécom; and (ii) the participation by the State in the recapitalisation of France Télécom.
Hvad angår den første foranstaltning hævder Cégétel indledningsvis, at man ikke kan sammenligne situationen i et selskab med en privat storaktionær og et, hvor en offentlig instans har aktiemajoriteten.
As regards the first measure, Cégétel remarks first of all that the situation of a company with a private reference shareholder and that of a company with a public majority shareholder are not comparable.
Cégétel påpeger, at en tilsvarende bekendtgørelse fra en privat aktionærs side ville være blevet modtaget med største tilbageholdenhed af ratingbureauerne og have fået dem til at undersøge de nærmere detaljer i den pågældende aktionærs refinansiering af den bevilgede kredit.
A similar announcement made by a private shareholder would have been received with the greatest circumspection by the rating agencies and would have caused them to take a close look at the arrangements for the refinancing by the shareholder in question of the credit line thus extended.
Cégétel konkluderer heraf, at det blotte faktum, at staten giver sin opbakning, var en betydelig fordel over for investorerne og forhindrede enhver yderligere forringelse af FT's rating, skønt operatørens problemer umiddelbart forinden var gået i hårdknude.
Cégétel concludes from this that the mere fact of being backed by the State confers a considerable advantage vis-à-vis investors and prevented any further downgrading of France Télécom's credit rating by the rating agencies despite the fact that the operator appeared to be in an insoluble situation.
Cégétel konkluderer her, at regeringens tilkendegivelser var formuleret med sigte på at give markedsaktørerne tillid til, at det var lige så sikkert at låne FT penge som at låne staten dem.
Cégétel concludes on this point that the government declarations were worded in such a way that the markets would be certain that lending money to France Télécom would be strictly equivalent to lending money directly to the State.
FT kunne dermed nyde godt af fordele, som selskabet ikke havde haft under normale markedsvilkår, sammenlignet f.eks. med situationen i Vivendi Universal.
France Télécom thus enjoyed advantages which it would not have secured under normal market conditions, compared, for example, with the situation of Vivendi Universal.
Hvis selskabet ikke havde haft adgang til obligationsmarkedet, havde det måttet finansiere afviklingen af sin likviditetskrise udelukkende via pengeinstitutterne, hvilket ville havde medført meget mere belastende vilkår.
The recourse to the bond market enabled it to avoid having to resort exclusively to financial institutions in order to cope with its liquidity crisis and suffering all the constraints linked to that type of financing.
Cégétel hævder, at de franske myndigheders betingelser for kreditbevillingen ikke er i overensstemmelse med de betingelser, en fornuftig investor ville stille for at deltage i en sådan investering.
Cégétel maintains that the terms of grant of the credit line by the French authorities are not in keeping with those granted by a prudent investor in relation to one of his participations.
En fornuftig investor ville f.eks. aldrig have accepteret den gældsfinansierede opkøbspolitik, som førte til, at FT var i en så kritisk finansieringssituation, at staten måtte gennemføre en kapitaltilførsel.
More particularly, a prudent investor would never have agreed to the policy of financing acquisitions through debt which placed France Télécom in a critical financial situation such that the State had to carry out a recapitalisation.
Cégétel henviser til Kommissionens anden beslutning om Crédit Lyonnais, hvoraf det fremgår, at støtteforanstaltninger ikke kan berettiges med, at staten i en årrække har været forsømmelig som aktionær.
Cégétel refers to the Crédit Lyonnais II decision, in which the Commission finds that the aid measures could not be justified by the failings over many years of the State as shareholder.
Beslutningen om at lade støtten gå igennem ERAP afspejler ifølge Cégétel heller ikke en fornuftig investors adfærd.
In Cégétel's opinion, opting to channel the aid through ERAP is not what a prudent investor would have done.
I den forbindelse hæfter Cégétel sig især ved rentesatsen for at trække på lånet samt manglen på sikkerhedsstillelse og garantier.
In this connection, Cégétel notes in particular the interest rate applicable to the drawings on the loan and the absence of securities and guarantees.
Ved værdiansættelse af støtten i form af aktionærlån henviser Cégétel til pkt. 3.2, stk. 4, i meddelelsen om statsstøtte i form af garantier; da FT takket være statens støtte fik mulighed for at låne 16 mia. EUR til at afvikle sine skyldige lån, mens FT's finansieringssituation var katastrofal, mener Cégétel, at støtteværdien svarer til det beløb, selskabet kunne låne som følge af statens bebudelse.
Regarding quantification of the aid relating to the shareholder loan, Cégétel maintains that point 3.2, fourth subparagraph, of the Notice on state aid in the form of guarantees is applicable and that, in view of the fact that, thanks to state support, France Télécom has been able to borrow EUR 16 billion to meet its maturities despite the catastrophic nature of its finances, the amount of the aid is equivalent to the amount raised thanks to the announcement.
Cégétel hævder, at det samme ræsonnement kan anvendes på kapitaltilførslen, som Cégétel fra en økonomisk synsvinkel fortolker som at FT fik mulighed for at rejse 9,2 mia. EUR som følge af statsgarantien til ERAP.
Cégétel maintains that the same reasoning applies to the recapitalisation, which it analyses, from an economic point of view, as being the transfer of EUR 9,2 billion of France Télécom's debt to ERAP, which benefits from the State's guarantee.
Cégétel værdiansætter hele dette beløb som støtte.
Cégétel counts the whole of this amount as aid.
Cégétel påpeger også et støttebeløb svarende til de afskedigelsesomkostninger, som selskabet skulle have afholdt som led i personalenedskæringer, dvs. 1,5 mia. EUR, som selskabet ikke kommer til at afholde, fordi en del af FT's ansatte som led i ambitionsplanen 2005 flyttes over i den offentlige administration.
It also highlights the amount of the aid corresponding to the redundancy costs which a company would have had to bear in terms of staff cuts, namely EUR 1,5 billion, and which the historical operator would not bear owing to its employees being transferred to civil service jobs under the Ambition 2005 plan.
Cégétel hævder, at FT også nyder godt af en formel garanti, eftersom privatretlige virksomheder med særlig retsstatus ifølge Cour de Cassation ikke er underlagt de normalt gældende procedurer for konkursbehandling (f.eks. SEITA eller Air France).
Cégétel maintains that France Télécom benefits from a formal guarantee in so far as the Court of Cassation considers that private-law companies enjoying special legal status are not subject to the applicable judicial liquidation procedures (cf., for example, SEITA or Air France).
I henhold til denne retspraksis falder FT således ikke ind under almindelige regler.
Thus, by virtue of this case law, France Télécom must be regarded as not falling within the ambit of the ordinary-law arrangements.
Cégétel erkender, at FT ikke har haft status af offentligretlig industri- og handelsvirksomhed siden 1996, men Cégétel påpeger, at garantien reelt stadig foreligger, eftersom de statslige myndigheder ved deres gentagne tilkendegivelser har bestræbt sig på at overbevise markederne om, at FT under alle omstændigheder fortsat har støtte fra sin storaktionær, og at staten om nødvendigt ville hjælpe operatøren til at afholde sine gældsforpligtelser.
Cégétel acknowledges that France Télécom has not enjoyed EPIC status since 1996, but points out that, in reality, the guarantee has not disappeared inasmuch as the state authorities have sought, through their repeated declarations, to convince the markets that France Télécom would retain, come what may, the support of its reference shareholder and that, if necessary, the State would help the operator to meet its maturities.
Endelig mener Cégétel ikke, at foranstaltningerne kan betragtes som forenelige i medfør af rammebestemmelserne.
Cégétel maintains, lastly, that the measures cannot be considered compatible within the meaning of the Guidelines.
Cégétel minder om, at hvis staten yder en kapitaltilførslen til en kriseramt virksomhed, bør det ifølge rammebestemmelserne »derimod anses for sandsynligt, at den finansielle overførsel indebærer statsstøtte«.
It recalls that, according to the Guidelines, where a State injects capital into a firm in difficulty, ‘it must be deemed likely that the financial transfers involve state aid’.
Cégétel pointerer, at de kompenserende foranstaltninger, FT traf, ikke bør betragtes som tilstrækkelige i henhold til rammebestemmelserne.
It argues that the compensatory measures taken by France Télécom cannot be considered sufficient within the meaning of the Guidelines.
Ambitionsplanen 2005 indeholder således ingen specifikke afsnit om afhændelse af aktiver eller en socialplan.
Thus, the Ambition 2005 plan does not contain any specific provisions on asset disposals or a social plan.
Cégétel foreslår subsidiært følgende kompenserende foranstaltninger på markedet for fastnetkommunikation: (i) videresalg af adgang til abonnentkredsløbet og tilhørende tjenester samt (ii) en tydeligere adskillelse af FT og virksomhederne Orange og Wanadoo.
Cégétel proposes inter alia the following compensatory measures in the fixed telecommunications market: (i) the sale of local loop access and associated services; and (ii) increased ring-fencing between France Télécom and the companies Orange and Wanadoo.
Bemærkninger fra LDCom
Comments from LDCOM
LDCom påpeger, at der er tale om to støtteforanstaltninger til fordel for FT, samtidig med at der gives mulighed for at flytte medarbejderne: (i) en ubegrænset garanti, og (ii) en kreditbevilling på 9 mia. EUR.
LDCOM identifies a dual mechanism of aid in support of France Télécom, backed by support for staff mobility, namely: (i) the provision of an unlimited guarantee; and (ii) the granting of a EUR 9 billion credit line.
Den ubegrænsede garanti: LDCom tager udgangspunkt i indholdet af de franske myndigheders tilkendegivelser fra og med den 20. juni 2002 i pressen, i pressemeddelelser fra finans- og økonomiministeriet og direkte eller indirekte til ratingbureauerne.
Provision of the unlimited guarantee: LDCOM bases its considerations on the content of the declarations by the French authorities which have appeared since 20 June 2002 in the press via press releases of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance addressed directly or indirectly to the rating agencies.
Disse tilkendegivelser, som skulle gøre finansieringsmarkederne trygge ved FT, var direkte medvirkende til at styrke FT's rating på markederne og gav selskabet mulighed for at afhjælpe sit likviditetsproblem.
These declarations, which seek to reassure the financial markets about France Télécom's situation, have contributed directly to the improvement in France Télécom's credit rating in the markets and have helped the Company to face up to the liquidity wall with which it was confronted.
Ifølge LDCom vil der sandsynligvis fra flere sider blive taget juridisk stilling til statens indgriben.
According to LDCOM, the State's intervention by may be characterised from a legal standpoint in a number of ways.
Virksomheden minder om, at der i fransk ret ikke forudsættes særlige formkrav for at etablere juridiske forpligtelser, og en mundtlig tilkendegivelse kan således under visse vilkår udgøre en retsakt, som giver modtageren juridiske rettigheder.
It points out that, under French law, no form is required for the creation of a legal obligation and that an oral declaration may therefore, under certain conditions, constitute a legal act giving rise to a right on the part of its addressee.
En ensidig tilkendegivelses juridisk bindende virkning hviler således på, at det i obligationsretten er tilstrækkeligt, at den ene part har vist vilje til at påtage sig en forpligtelse.
The binding force of the unilateral act is based on the theory of commitment by unilateral will, which is one of the sources of the law of obligations.
Forpligtelsen forudsætter, at der er tale om en klar og præcis angivelse af hensigten.
This obligation arises from the dual condition of the firm and precise nature of the will.
LDCom mener også, at statens ansvar i henhold til selskabsretten navnlig udspringer af principperne om åbenbar fuldmagt og de facto-ledelse, for sidstnævntes vedkommende især fordi staten direkte kontaktede ratingbureauerne.
LDCOM also affirms that the State's responsibility is based, in company law, on the analysis of the theory of the apparent mandate and of the de facto manager — in the latter instance for having directly contacted the rating agencies.
I international ret forpligter staten sig også aftaleretligt, når en ensidig retshandling har juridisk bindende virkning, idet det kan dokumenteres, at tilkendegivelsen var offentlig og havde til formål at binde tilkendegiveren.
Under international law, the State's contractual responsibility is also incurred in so far as a unilateral legal act has binding force where it can be shown that the declaration was expressed publicly with the intention of binding its author.
Således er blot en mundtlig, offentlig tilkendegivelse fra en stats side nok til at forpligte den juridisk.
Thus, a mere oral and public declaration made by a State may create a legal obligation on its part.
I den foreliggende sag har tilkendegivelsernes indhold efter LDComs opfattelse bindende virkning for de franske myndigheder, fordi de i deres ordlyd indebærer et klart og utvetydigt engagement fra statens side til at fungere som sidste låneinstans for FT og beskytte selskabet mod den finansieringskrise, det befandt sig i midt i 2002.
In the present case, according to LDCOM, the content of the declarations binds the French authorities as the letter of the declarations constitutes a clear and unequivocal unilateral commitment by the State to be the lender of last resort to France Télécom and not to leave the latter in the financial crisis it has known since the summer of 2002.
Da statens forpligtelse var bindende, kunne enhver misligholdelse heraf udløse et kontraktansvar (dvs. at tredjeparter kunne have tvunget staten til at opfylde sin forpligtelse).
Inasmuch as the State's commitment is of a binding nature, any failure to honour that commitment may incur the State's contractual responsibility (third parties could have forced the State to carry out its commitment).
LDCom mener også, at staten havde et ikke-kontraktligt ansvar, navnlig i henhold til selskabsretten.
LDCOM asserts that the State's tortious liability was also incurred, notably under company law.
Således hæfter en virksomhed for en tredjeparts gæld, hvis den giver indtryk af at overtage en anden virksomheds skyldsposter.
Thus, a company which gives the impression of taking over the debts of another company gives rise to a claim on itself by third parties.
Staten gav ifølge LDCom med sine tilkendegivelser tredjeparter garanti for, at den ville overtage FT's gæld, når den forfaldt.
According to LDCOM, the State, by its declarations, guaranteed third parties that it would take over France Télécom's maturing debt.
LDCom bemærker mere specifikt, at staten med sine erklæringer om, at den »fra sin side ville bidrage til en betragtelig styrkelse af selskabets egenkapital« påtog sig en juridisk og finansiel forpligtelse.
More precisely, LDCOM maintains that the State's declarations to the effect that it ‘will contribute to the very substantial strengthening of the company's capital base’ give rise to an obligation on its part incurring its legal and financial responsibility.
Her går man ud fra følgende princip: »hvis staten ikke opfylder den forpligtelse, den således har påtaget sig, kan den ubestrideligt holdes til ansvar herfor ved forvaltningsdomstolene, som tager stilling til sager om løftebrud fra statens side«.
According to learned opinion: ‘if the State did not respect the commitment thus entered into, its responsibility would incontestably be incurred before the administrative courts, the forum for hearing cases involving promises not kept by the State’.
LDCom pointerer for øvrigt, at der i henhold til paragraf L465-1, stk. 3, i den franske lov om valuta og finanser (Code monétaire et financier) kan gribes ind over for personer, som forhindrer markedets normale funktion ved ulovlige handlinger, som påvirker børskursernes udvikling.
LDCOM states that Article L465-1, third subparagraph, of the Monetary and Financial Code provides for the punishment of persons who distort the normal functioning of markets by illicit actions which influence the trend of stock prices.
Det fremgår heraf ifølge LDCom klart, at staten på ingen måde udtalte sig om hypotetiske fremtidsforhold, men reelt bebudede, hvad den havde til hensigt at gøre.
Consequently, according to LDCOM, it is clearly established that the State did not at all intend to announce hypothetical future events but was in fact announcing its future line of conduct.
Efter LDComs mening bekræfter EU-retspraksis også, at enhver ubetinget tilkendegivelse af denne art i pressen fra en involveret virksomhed eller fra en regeringsinstans nødvendigvis må tages som udtryk for tilrådighedsstillelse af statsmidler.
In LDCOM's opinion, Community case law also confirms that any press article, emanating either from the company concerned or from the Government, which is of an unconditional nature necessarily indicates that state resources are being made available.
Men i den foreliggende sag kommer tilkendegivelserne direkte fra regeringen, ligesom de ikke indeholder nogen form for betingelser.
In the present case, the declarations emanate directly from the Government and are of an unconditional nature.
Det fremgår af ovenstående, at de juridisk og finansielt bindende støttetilsagn, som de franske myndigheder afgav fra den 2. juni 2002, nærmest havde karakter af en garanti, som skulle forhindre FT i at gå fallit og sikre selskabets overlevelse inden for de eksisterende aktivitetsparametre.
It follows from the above that the legally and financially binding declarations of support made by the French authorities on and after 2 June 2002 are akin to a guarantee the purpose of which is to enable France Télécom to avoid bankruptcy and to survive within its existing business perimeter.
Der er efter LDComs mening tale om en ubegrænset garanti.
In LDCOM's opinion, the guarantee is an unlimited one.
LDCom præciserer, at det således ikke blot er kreditbevillingen og det i denne forbindelse ydede beløb, men også bebudelsen heraf, som udgør støtte.
LDCOM states that it is therefore not only the provision of a credit line and the amount thus granted but the very announcement of that provision which constitutes the aid.
I henhold til meddelelsen om statsstøtte i form af garantier er kriteriet om statsmidler opfyldt, hvad enten garantien bringes i anvendelse eller ej.
In accordance with the Notice on state aid in the form of guarantees, the criterion relating to state resources is fulfilled, whether or not the guarantee is called.
Eftersom foranstaltningerne i den foreliggende sag ikke opfylder meddelelsens kriterier, ud fra den betragtning, at FT ikke på daværende tidspunkt kunne have skaffet de nødvendige midler på markederne, mener LDCom, at foranstaltningerne udgør statsstøtte.
Considering that the measures at issue did not satisfy the criteria of the said Notice, on the grounds that France Télécom could not then find the necessary funds on the markets, LDCOM observes that the measures constitute aid.
LDCom hævder også, at »i betragtning af de beløb, der var tale om, var kun staten i stand til at stille en sådan garanti, idet ingen fornuftig investor kunne have »bragt FT på fode igen« over for markederne«.
LDCOM also argues that ‘in view of the amounts involved, the State alone was capable of providing such a guarantee, no prudent investor being able to ensure the credibility vis-à-vis the markets of the “taking in hand” of France Télécom’.