natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Denne vurdering bekræftes af, at den anvendte sats i forbindelse med kildeskat er højere, hvis omkostningerne afholdes af det udloddende selskab, og at dette selskab ikke er juridisk forpligtet til i så fald at vælte skatten over på indkomstmodtageren.
This assessment is borne out by the fact that, where a withholding is applied, the rate of tax is higher if its cost is borne by the distributor and that the latter is under no legal obligation, in such a case, to pass on the tax to the recipient of the income.
Desuden opnår 1929-holdingselskaberne en indirekte fordel ved den lettere adgang til risikovillig kapital/lånekapital, der er forbundet med det højere afkast, som investorernes skattefritagelse medfører.
Furthermore, exempt 1929 holding companies receive an indirect advantage in terms of easier access to risk/debt capital due to the higher return to investors resulting from the exemption.
Endelig er 1929-holdingselskaberne ikke forpligtede til at betale den nettoværdiskat, som gælder for selskaber, der er skattepligtige i Luxembourg.
Finally, exempt 1929 holding companies are not subject to the net worth tax applicable to companies taxable in Luxembourg.
Selv om man antager, at denne fritagelse kun har begrænset økonomisk betydning, fritager den dog 1929-holdingselskaberne for en omkostning, der normalt påhviler selskaber i Luxembourg.
Even supposing that this exemption has an economically limited scope, it nonetheless relieves exempt 1929 holding companies of a charge normally borne by companies in Luxembourg.
Det fremgår af det ovenstående, at de pågældende fordele efter Kommissionens opfattelse skal betragtes som undtagelser, der kan favorisere visse virksomheder i forhold til andre, som befinder sig i en tilsvarende faktisk og retlig situation, når det gælder ordningens målsætning — nemlig at forhindre dobbeltbeskatning.
It follows from all the foregoing that, in the Commission’s view, the advantages in question constitute exceptional measures which are capable of favouring certain undertakings compared with other undertakings which are, in the light of the objective pursued by the said scheme — namely the prevention of multiple taxation — in a comparable factual and legal situation.
Kommissionen mener i denne forbindelse, at de luxembourgske myndigheders henvisning til Banks-dommen er irrelevant.
The Commission considers in this context that the reference made by the Luxembourg authorities to the judgment in Banks is irrelevant.
I denne sag er der nemlig ingen af de forskellige beskatningsformer, der på forhånd optræder som den mest fordelagtige.
In that case, of the various possible formulas for applying certain taxes, none appeared a priori more advantageous.
I den foreliggende sag må det dog konstateres, at skattefritagelse principielt er mere fordelagtig end indkomstbeskatning.
In the present case, however, an exemption is, in principle, more advantageous than the taxation of income.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at 1929-holdingselskaberne ikke alene har mulighed for at få nedsat de omkostninger, der normalt skal afholdes over deres budget, men faktisk opnår en sådan nedsættelse i praksis.
The Commission concludes from this that exempt 1929 holding companies benefit actually and not potentially from a mitigation of the charges which are normally included in their budgets.
Kommissionen mener derfor ikke, at der er nogen grund til at tage hensyn til alle de direkte og indirekte skatter, der finder anvendelse, for at fastslå, om der er tale om en reel skattemæssig fordel for 1929-holdingselskaberne, idet det allerede i vid udstrækning er blevet påvist, at der er tale om en sådan fordel.
The Commission considers, therefore, that it is not necessary to take into account all applicable direct and indirect taxes in order to determine whether there exists an actual tax advantage granted to exempt 1929 holding companies, the existence of that advantage being already sufficiently proven.
Desuden konstaterer Kommissionen, at det ville være umuligt at foretage en sådan analyse i betragtning af det store antal situationer, der skal tages i betragtning.
The Commission would point out, moreover, that such an analysis would be impossible to carry out in view of the indeterminate number of possible situations.
Kommissionen konkluderer, at den pågældende ordning indebærer en fordel for 1929-holdingselskaberne.
In conclusion, the Commission considers that the scheme in question constitutes an advantage conferred on exempt 1929 holding companies.
Det skal erindres, at en statsforanstaltnings særlige karakter, dvs. dens selektive karakter, er et af de afgørende elementer i statsstøttebegrebet efter traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
The specific nature of a state measure, namely its selective application, constitutes one of the necessary elements of the concept of state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty.
I denne forbindelse er det vigtigt at efterprøve, om de pågældende skatteregler medfører fordele, som udelukkende gavner bestemte virksomheder eller bestemte sektorer.
In that regard, it is necessary to determine whether or not the tax scheme in question entails advantages accruing exclusively to certain undertakings or certain sectors of activity.
I den foreliggende sag mener de luxembourgske myndigheder ikke, at ordningen for 1929-holdingselskaberne er selektiv, fordi den gælder for alle virksomheder i tilsvarende situationer, dvs. virksomheder, som udelukkende beskæftiger sig med forvaltningsaktiviteter og valorisering af kapitalinteresser i kontrollerede selskaber samt opkrævning af provenuet af disse aktiviteter.
In the present case, according to the Luxembourg authorities, the exempt 1929 holding companies scheme is not selective because all undertakings in comparable situations, i.e. those carrying on exclusively the activities of managing and maximising the value of participations held in controlled companies and of receiving income derived from those activities, can benefit from it.
Kommissionen er i enig med de luxembourgske myndigheder i, at en foranstaltnings selektivitet, såsom skattefritagelse for holdingaktiviteter, nødvendigvis må vurderes på grundlag af tilsvarende situationer.
The Commission shares the view of the Luxembourg authorities that the selectivity of a measure such as the tax exemption for holding activities must be assessed in the light of comparable situations.
Kommissionen mener dog, at der som sammenligningsgrundlag i det foreliggende tilfælde skal tages hensyn til selskaber, der opnår et provenu svarende til 1929-holdingselskabernes.
It considers, however, that what should be taken into consideration for comparison purposes here are companies receiving income comparable to that of exempt 1929 holding companies.
Men Kommissionen bemærker, at det blandt de luxembourgske selskaber kun er 1929-holdingselskaberne, der er helt fritaget for beskatning af alle deres indtægter uafhængigt af, om deres indkomster eventuelt allerede er blevet beskattet i de foregående omsætningsled af de selskaber, hvori de har kapitalinteresser
It would observe though that, among Luxembourg companies, only the exempt 1929 holding companies are completely exempted from tax on all the income they receive, irrespective of any tax already borne upstream on their income by companies in which they hold a participation.
Under disse omstændigheder kan Kommissionen kun konkludere, at en sådan fritagelsesordning er selektiv, fordi den blandt alle de forskellige virksomheder og aktiviteter, der er udsat for risikoen for dobbeltbeskatning, favoriserer bestemte virksomheder, der udelukkende udøver bestemte aktiviteter.
In these circumstances, the Commission can only conclude that such an exemption scheme is selective since it favours certain undertakings carrying on exclusively certain activities among the various undertakings and activities which are subject to the risk of multiple taxation.
Denne vurdering bekræftes desuden af, at lov af 31. juli 1929 ifølge de luxembourgske myndigheder tager sigte på at forhindre, at denne ordning i for høj grad udvides til at omfatte andre selskaber end 1929-holdingselskaberne, så det undgås, at ordningen bliver for stor en belastning for statsbudgettet.
This assessment is borne out, moreover, by the fact that, according to the Luxembourg authorities, the Law of 31 July 1929 is designed to prevent an excessive extension of this favourable regime to companies other than exempt 1929 holding companies so as to prevent it from placing an undue burden on the state budget.
Kommissionen erindrer i denne forbindelse om, at »princippet om, at en støtteforanstaltning kan være begrundet i skattesystemets karakter eller opbygning, henviser til en konkret skattemæssig foranstaltnings overensstemmelse med det generelle skattesystems art og indretning«.
The Commission would point out in this connection that a justification based on the nature or overall structure of the tax system must reflect the consistency of a specific tax measure with the internal logic of the tax system in general.
Dette kan dog ikke være tilfældet i den foreliggende sag, da Luxembourg ikke har begrundet den skattefritagelsesordning, der kun gælder for 1929-holdingselskaberne, med det nationale skattesystems karakter og opbygning.
Such cannot be the case here, however, inasmuch as Luxembourg has not justified, by reference to the nature or overall structure of the national tax scheme, the exceptional arrangement from which exempt 1929 holding companies alone benefit.
Kommissionen konstaterer desuden, at fritagelsen efter lov af 31. juli 1929 blandt andet er betinget af, at der findes et registreringssystem, som myndighederne fører tilsyn med, at en række retlige krav med hensyn til den minimale nettoværdi overholdes, og at selskaberne kun udøver en række strengt definerede aktiviteter.
The Commission would point out, moreover, that the benefit of the exemption under the Law of 31 July 1929 is subject to fulfilment of several conditions linked essentially to the existence of a registration system monitored by the authorities and to compliance with certain legal requirements relating to minimum net worth and to the actual, exclusive pursuit of certain strictly defined activities.
Efter Kommissionens opfattelse styrker disse strenge kriterier den pågældende ordnings selektive karakter.
In the Commission’s view, the existence of these stringent criteria enhances the selective nature of the scheme in question.
I denne forbindelse konstaterer Kommissionen, at 1929-holdingselskaberne skal begrænse deres aktiviteter til erhvervelse af kapitalinteresser under en hvilken som helst form i andre virksomheder og til forvaltning og valorisering af disse kapitalinteresser.
The Commission would note in this respect that exempt 1929 holding companies must limit their activities to the acquisition of participations, in whatever form, in other undertakings and to the management and value maximisation of those participations.
Den korte definition af valorisering af kapitalinteresser, som lov af 31. juli 1929 indeholder, er blevet præciseret af myndighederne (Administration de l'Enregistrement et des Domaines), som har anlagt en bred fortolkning og fremført, at den bør omfatte flere økonomiske aktiviteter, der er direkte eller indirekte forbundet med valoriseringen af kapitalinteresser, og det vil især sige finansieringsvirksomhed.
The summary definition of the value maximisation of participations given in the Law of 31 July 1929 has been clarified by the Land Registration and Estates Department, which has interpreted it broadly as including several economic activities, directly or indirectly linked to the value maximisation of participations, taking the form notably of financing activities.
Holdingselskaberne har således tilladelse til at yde forskud og lån på lang eller kort sigt til selskaber, hvor de har en direkte kapitalinteresse.
Holding companies are thus authorised to grant long- or short-term advances and loans to companies in which they directly hold a participation.
I henhold til lov af 31. juli 1929 omfatter begrebet valorisering af kapitalinteresser også sikkerhedsstillelse over for kreditorer, når det drejer sig om selskaber, hvor 1929-holdingselskaberne har en kapitalinteresse, samt kaution for deres kapitaludvidelser.
Under the Law of 31 July 1929, collateralisation in favour of creditors of companies in which exempt 1929 holding companies hold a participation and collateralisation of their capital increases also come under the concept of the value maximisation of participations.
Ud over kapitalinteresser i form af aktier kan 1929-holdingselskaberne være indehavere af offentlige eller private obligationer, der eventuelt kan være noteret på regulerede eller uofficielle markeder, og kan være udstedt af den offentlige sektor eller ej.
Moreover, in addition to equity participations, exempt 1929 holding companies may hold public or private bonds, whether or not quoted on the regulated markets, and whether or not issued by the public sector.
1929-holdingselskaberne kan således kun være i besiddelse af obligationer uafhængigt af eller sideløbende med forvaltningsaktiviteterne.
Exempt 1929 holding companies may also hold only bonds, independently of or in conjunction with participation management activities.
For finansielle holdingselskaber er det således muligt at udvide kredsen af potentielle begunstigede i forbindelse med finansieringer og i denne forbindelse yde lån til alle de selskaber, der indgår i koncernen, og dermed til alle selskaber med samme navn, som for mindst 25 % vedkommende ejes af et fælles moderselskab.
It is thus possible for financial holding companies to broaden the circle of potential financing beneficiaries and in so doing to grant loans to all companies forming part of the group and hence to all companies sharing a common name which are at least 25 %-held by a common parent company.
Desuden antages en række aktiviteter at være sidestillet med erhvervelse af kapitalinteresser, selv om det pågældende 1929-holdingselskab ikke er i besiddelse af nogen andel.
Furthermore, certain activities are presumed to be equivalent to the acquisition of a participation, even if no shares are held by the exempt 1929 holding company in question.
Et holdingselskab kan således være indehaver af patenter og kan, selv om det ikke kan udnytte eller sælge dem, meddele licenser på udnyttelsen af dem til andre udenforstående selskaber eller andre selskaber i den koncern, det tilhører, og dermed opkræve royalties, uden at fritagelsen bortfalder.
A holding company may thus hold patents and, although it may not exploit or negotiate them, it may grant exploitation licences to other companies either outside or within the group to which it belongs and hence collect a royalty without losing the benefit of exemption.
Blandt de tilladte aktiviteter for 1929-holdingselskaberne figurerer også rådgivningsvirksomhed i forbindelse med forvaltning og investering gennem investeringsfonde.
The activities which exempt 1929 holding companies are authorised to carry on also include the provision of advice on management and investment by investment funds.
Når visse betingelser er opfyldt, er det dog muligt for et rådgivningsselskab at vælge status som 1929-holdingselskab.
However, where certain specific conditions are met, it is possible for a consultancy firm to opt for 1929 holding company status.
Det fremgår af ovenstående, at de aktiviteter, et 1929-holdingselskab kan udøve, er stærkt begrænset af lov af 31. juli 1929, og at udøvelse af andre aktiviteter straffes med, at de fratages deres status som skattefritaget.
It follows from the above that the activities which a 1929 holding company may carry on are strictly limited by the Law of 31 July 1929, the pursuit of other activities being sanctioned by the withdrawal of tax-exempt status.
Kommissionen mener, at disse restriktioner bekræfter, at skattefritagelsesordningen for 1929-holdingselskaberne er selektiv.
The Commission considers that these restrictions confirm the selective nature of the exemption scheme for exempt 1929 holding companies.
Som Kommissionen har nævnt i sin beslutning af 9. februar 2006, kan man også konstatere, at en række erhvervssektorer ikke kan opnå de fordele, som denne ordning giver.
Moreover, as the Commission mentioned in its decision of 9 February 2006, it suffices to point out that several economic sectors cannot benefit from the advantages offered by the scheme.
Virksomheder, der udøver andre aktiviteter end dem, der er tilladt med hensyn til valorisering af kapitalinteresser og aktiviteter vedrørende flere andre sektorer, såsom fremstillingsvirksomhed, landbrug eller handel, er således udelukket fra denne ordning.
Thus, undertakings carrying on activities other than those authorised concerning participation value maximisation and activities falling within several sectors, such as manufacturing, agriculture and commerce, are excluded from the benefit of the scheme.
Kommissionen mener ikke, at der kan gives nogen objektiv begrundelse for en sådan skattemæssig behandling, der specielt er forbeholdt 1929-holdingselskaber, og som ved at være begrænset til bestemte virksomheder tager sigte på at favorisere disse i forhold til deres konkurrenter.
The Commission considers that no objective explanation can justify such a tax treatment specifically reserved for exempt 1929 holding companies, seeking as it does, by thus limiting its application to certain undertakings, to place them at an advantage compared with their competitors.
Denne vurdering styrkes desuden af, at den pågældende ordning kun er tilgængelig for luxembourgske selskaber, der udøver et begrænset antal aktiviteter.
The fact that the scheme in question is accessible only to Luxembourg undertakings carrying on a limited number of activities strengthens this assessment.
For at kunne være omfattet af ordningen skal selskaber, der ønsker at valorisere deres investeringer, oprette et særskilt selskab i Luxembourg, som udelukkende har til formål at udøve de aktiviteter, der er tilladt efter loven af 1929.
In order to benefit from the exemption scheme in question, any undertaking wishing to maximise the value of its investments must set up a separate entity in Luxembourg for the purpose of carrying on exclusively the activities authorised by the 1929 legislation.
Etableringen af et sådant selskab medfører dermed yderligere investeringer i forhold til de normale omkostninger ved en investeringsaktivitet.
The establishment of such a structure therefore entails investments on top of the normal costs of an investment activity.
Denne ordning kan således kun omfatte virksomheder med en koncernstruktur og betydelige økonomiske ressourcer, som er tilstrækkelige til, at de kan etablere et selskab i Luxembourg, der skal varetage forvaltning og finansiering af kapitalinteresser.
Only undertakings with a group structure and significant financial resources of sufficient amount to establish in Luxembourg a structure devoted to the activities of managing and financing participations are able to benefit from the scheme.
Det drejer sig for eksempel om milliardær-holdingselskaberne.
Such undertakings include, for example, exempt billionaire holding companies.
Med hensyn til spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt de fordele, som anvendelsen af den pågældende ordning indebærer, skyldes statsmidler, skal det erindres, at støttebegrebet er mere generelt end tilskudsbegrebet, fordi det ikke blot omfatter positive ydelser, såsom selve tilskuddet, men også omfatter indgreb, der under forskellige former letter de byrder, som normalt belaster en virksomheds budget, og derved, uden at være tilskud i ordets egentlige forstand, er af samme art og har tilsvarende virkninger.
With regard to the state origin of the advantages resulting from the application of the scheme in question, it should be pointed out that the concept of aid is more general than that of subsidy because it embraces not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which, therefore, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect.
Det følger heraf, at en ordning som den foreliggende, hvorved de offentlige myndigheder fritager en række virksomheder for normal beskatning, der ganske vist ikke medfører overførsel af statsmidler, men sætter de begunstigede virksomheder i en bedre økonomisk situation end andre skatteydere, skal betragtes som statsstøtte efter traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
It follows that a scheme, such as the one at issue here, by which the public authorities grant to certain undertakings exemption from the tax normally due, which, although not involving a transfer of state resources, places beneficiaries in a more favourable financial situation than other taxpayers constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty.
Selv om fritagelserne efter ordningen for 1929-holdingselskaberne i det foreliggende tilfælde ikke medfører overførsel af statsmidler, kan det dog ikke nægtes, at de medfører et skatteprovenutab og dermed skal betragtes som statsfinansiering.
In the present case, therefore, although the exemptions resulting from the application of the exempt 1929 holding companies scheme do not constitute transfers of state resources, it cannot be denied that they lead to a loss of tax revenue and hence constitute state financing.
Fordrejning af konkurrencevilkårene og påvirkning af samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne
Distortion of competition and effect on trade between Member States
Ifølge de luxembourgske myndigheder vil ordningen for 1929-holdingselskaberne ikke kunne fordreje konkurrencevilkårene og påvirke samhandelen inden for Fællesskabet, da de begunstigede holdingselskaber udelukkende er passive indkomstmodtagere og ikke befinder sig i samme situation som andre aktører, der fungerer som selvstændige tjenesteydere.
According to Luxembourg, the exempt 1929 holding companies scheme is not capable of distorting competition and trade within the Community because the beneficiary holding companies are exclusively passive recipients of income and are not in situations comparable to those of other operators acting as independent service providers.
De mener heller ikke, at Kommissionen har påvist, at ordningen styrker 1929-holdingselskabernes stilling i forhold til andre holdingselskabers.
Nor, according to Luxembourg, has the Commission proved that the scheme has the effect of strengthening the position of exempt 1929 holding companies compared with that of other holding companies.
Kommissionen bemærker, at det fremgår af EF-Domstolens faste retspraksis, dels at det er tilstrækkeligt for, at en foranstaltning kan anses for at fordreje konkurrencen, at støttemodtageren konkurrerer med andre virksomheder på konkurrenceudsatte markeder, dels at en foranstaltning påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne, når statsstøtten styrker en virksomheds stilling i forhold til andre virksomheder, som den konkurrerer med i samhandelen inden for Fællesskabet.
The Commission would point out that, under the settled case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, for a measure to distort competition it is sufficient that the recipient of the aid competes with other undertakings on markets open to competition and that a measure affects intra-Community trade when state financial aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-Community trade.