natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For den private investor, der kan risikere at miste sit indskud, er det uden betydning, om kreditinstituttet faktisk udnytter den tilførte kapital til udvidelse af sin forretningsvirksomhed.
For a private investor bearing the risk of losing his investment, it is irrelevant whether the credit institution actually uses the injected capital to expand its business.
For denne investor spiller det en langt større rolle, at han ikke længere selv kan råde over beløbet forretningsmæssigt og dermed ikke kan opnå en tilsvarende forrentning.
What matters to the investor is that he himself can no longer invest that amount and obtain a corresponding return.
Beregningen af godtgørelsen i årene 1998-2002 på basis af årligt trinvis stigende trancher var ikke berettiget som nedslag på grund af den undgåede »opdeling« af den tilførte kapital eller på grund af, at tilførslen »en bloc« havde en belastende virkning for Helaba.
The calculation of the remuneration in the period 1998 to 2002 on the basis of tranches rising in annual steps had been justified not as a discount because of the fact that the transferred capital had not been ‘split up’ or by the fact that transfer ‘en bloc’ to Helaba would have had the effect of imposing a burden on it.
Også selv om kapitaltilførslen måske ikke var påkrævet til opfyldelse af solvenskriterierne, øgede den Helabas egenkapitalgrundlag betydeligt og muliggjorde en stærk udvidelse af dens konkurrenceprægede virksomhed.
Even if the capital transfer was perhaps not necessary to meet solvability criteria, it had nevertheless considerably increased Helaba's equity capital base and had allowed a strong expansion in its competitive activity.
En markedsøkonomisk investor ville derfor have sørget for at få en godtgørelse for hele det beløb, der var anerkendt som ansvarlig egenkapital.
A market-economy investor would therefore require a full remuneration on the entire amount on the basis of its recognition as liable equity capital.
Den hæftelsesprovision på 0,3 % p.a., som Kommissionen gik ud fra i WestLB-beslutningen, og som den havde beregnet ved at sammenligne kapitalbeløbet med en garanti, skal betales for den del af den tilførte kernekapital, der ikke kan udnyttes som grundlag for konkurrencepræget virksomhed.
The 0,3 % a year guarantee commission (Haftungsprovision) applied by the Commission in its WestLB decision, which it calculated by comparing the amount of capital with a guarantee, had to be charged for the part of the transferred core capital that could not be used to underpin competitive business.
Som godtgørelseselementer kunne kun den såkaldte »hæftelsesprovision« og »varighedstillægget« tages i betragtning.
Only the guarantee commission (Haftungsprovision) and the perpetuity premium (Permanenzzuschlag) could be taken into account as components of the remuneration.
Erhvervsskatten, der for størstedelens vedkommende heller ikke skal betales til delstaten, men til kommunen, er ikke et godtgørelseselement.
Trade tax, most of which went not to the Land at all, but to the municipality, was not a part of the remuneration.
Den er en ved lov pålagt byrde, som uafhængigt af parternes intentioner knytter sig til et skattemæssigt forhold.
It was a charge imposed by law, stemming from tax-related circumstances that were independent of the intentions of the parties.
Sluttelig betales afkastet ikke til delstaten Hessen, men tilføres — efter fradrag af udbytteskat — »særformuen som nettobeløb«.
Lastly, the return was paid not to the Land of Hessen, but — after deduction of capital yield tax — ‘allocated as a net amount to the special fund’.
Da Helaba er (ene)ejer af særformuen, betaler den i sidste instans til sig selv.
Since Helaba was the (sole) owner of the special fund, it was in reality paying itself.
Det ville en privat investor imidlertid ikke have accepteret som godtgørelse for sin investering.
A private investor would not have accepted this as a return for his investment.
BEMÆRKNINGER FRA DELSTATEN NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN OG WESTLB
COMMENTS FROM THE LAND OF NORTH RHINE-WESTPHALIA AND WESTLB
I de bemærkninger, som delstaten Nordrhein-Westfalen og WestLB den 30. oktober 2003 via Tyskland fremsendte vedrørende Kommissionens beslutning af 13. november 2002 om indledning af proceduren, bestrider de, at formuetilførslerne til delstatsbankerne kan sammelignes med indskudskapital.
On 30 October 2003, Germany forwarded a response from the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia and WestLB to the Commission's decision of 13 November 2002 to initiate proceedings in which they disputed the statement that the assets transferred to the Landesbanks could be compared to share capital.
Stille indskud og såkaldte perpetuals har allerede siden 1991 været anerkendt som kernekapital i Tyskland.
They argued that silent partnership contributions and ‘perpetuals’ had in fact been recognised as core capital in Germany since 1991.
Desuden retter godtgørelsen sig ikke efter den tilsynsmæssige klassificering, men efter investeringens risikoprofil.
They added that remuneration for an investment depended not on how it was classified by the banking supervisory authorities, but on its risk profile.
Da formuerne hæftede som efterstillet kapital, kan risikostrukturen bedre sammenlignes med stille indskud eller såkaldte perpetuals end med indskudskapitalinvesteringer.
Since the assets were junior-ranking, the risk pattern had more in common with silent partnership contributions or ‘perpetuals’ than with share-capital investments.
Hvad angår beregningen af minimumsgodtgørelsen for en indskudskapitalinvestering, kan der efter WestLB’s opfattelse principielt ikke indvendes noget mod CAPM-metoden. Men de af BdB anførte betaværdier på klart mere end 1 er ikke rimelige.
WestLB had no objections to the CAPM method for calculating the minimum remuneration for a share-capital investment, but it felt that the beta values determined by the BdB — at well over one — were inappropriate.
En betafaktor på over 1 betyder, at virksomhedsaktien frembyder en højere risiko end det samlede marked.
A beta factor of more than one meant that a company's shares represented a higher risk than the market as a whole.
Med den dengang ubestridt eksisterende Anstaltslast og Gewährträgerhaftung lå risikoen ved investering i en delstatsbank imidlertid klart under risikoen på markedet som helhed.
Yet the risk of investing in a Landesbank was well below the overall market risk because of the institutional liability (Anstaltslast) and guarantor liability (Gewährträgerhaftung) which it enjoyed and which were not challenged at the time.
Desuden er det specielt i forbindelse med delstatsbankerne en fejl at gå ud fra den forrentning, der kan forventes på tidspunktet for formuetilførslerne til delstatsbankerne. Denne fremgangsmåde er ganske vist i princippet fornuftig ved sammenligning med den private investor.
Moreover, in the specific case of the Landesbanks, it was a mistake to use as a benchmark the return expected at the time that the assets were transferred to the banks.
Her ville den betyde, at den forrentning, der kunne forventes i 1991, skulle lægges til grund.
Although this was generally a sensible approach to adopt in relation to the private-investor test, it here meant using as a basis the returns expected in 1991.
Det modsiger imidlertid enhver økonomisk realitet, at en investor i 2003 får den forrentning, der forventedes i 1991, og som ligger langt over de faktiske forrentningssatser.
But for an investor to receive in 2003 the return expected in 1991, which was much higher than the returns actually achieved, flew in the face of all economic realities.
Ved en systematisk vedvarende anvendelse af en forrentningssats på ca. 12 % vil delstatsbankerne uberettiget blive ugunstigt stillet i forhold til de private konkurrenter.
Permanently and systematically applying a rate of return of around 12 % placed the Landesbanks at an unjustifiable disadvantage compared with private competitors.
Angående nedslaget på grund af formueoverdragelsernes manglende likviditet er WestLB og delstaten Nordrhein-Westfalen af den opfattelse, at satsen for risikofri statsobligationer fuldt ud skal trækkes fra basisforrentningen.
As regards the discount for the lack of liquidity of the transferred assets, WestLB and the Land of North Rhine -Westphalia considered that the rate for risk-free government bonds should be deducted in full from the basic return.
Delstatsbankerne fik ingen likviditet ved formueoverdragelserne.
They argued that the Landesbanks had received no liquidity as a result of the asset transfers.
Det er økonomisk ikke holdbart at nedsætte denne sats med skattebesparelsen, da prissætningen for kapitalmarkedsinstrumenter er uafhængig af beskatningssituationen.
It was not defensible in economic terms to reduce this rate by the tax savings since the pricing of capital market instruments was independent of the tax situation.
Ellers måtte der være forskellige priser for et kapitalmarkedsinstrument alt efter beskatningssituationen.
Otherwise the price of a capital market instrument would have to differ according to tax considerations.
Sluttelig skal det som en risiko- og dermed godtgørelsesformindskende faktor tages i betragtning, at som følge af formuernes manglende likviditet er likviditeten heller ikke udsat for risiko.
Lastly, the fact that the assets' lack of liquidity did not pose a risk to the liquidity position should be seen as reducing the risk — and hence the remuneration.
Der skal tages hensyn til dette ved et tilsvarende nedslag.
This should be taken into account by applying a corresponding deduction.
Der skal ligeledes foretages et nedslag på grund af den såkaldte ejereffekt, da en investor, der allerede har en andel i et foretagende, vurderer en yderligere investering anderledes end en ny investor.
Likewise, a discount should be granted on account of the ‘owner effect’ since an investor who already owned shares in a company took a different view of an additional investment from that of a new investor.
V. TYSKLANDS REAKTION PÅ BDB’S BEMÆRKNINGER
V. GERMANY'S RESPONSE TO THE BDB'S COMMENTS
Efter Tysklands opfattelse lykkes det ikke BdB at omfortolke det stille indskud til en indskudskapitalinvestering eller at så tvivl om, at den aftalte og til delstaten Hessen betalte godtgørelse er passende.
In Germany's view, the BdB was not successful in its attempt to reinterpret the silent partnership contribution as a share capital investment, nor was it able to raise doubts as to the appropriateness of the remuneration which was agreed and paid to the Land of Hessen.
Der er derfor ikke tale om støtte.
In Germany's view, therefore, there was no aid.
Ved beregning af godtgørelsen er det ikke rimeligt at gå en omvej over godtgørelsen for en fiktiv indskudskapitalinvestering.
In Germany's view, there was no justification, in calculating the remuneration, for taking the roundabout approach of calculating the remuneration on a fictitious share capital investment.
Delstaten Hessen overførte fra første færd sin formue til fremme af boligbyggeri som stille indskud i banken.
The Land of Hessen had from the outset transferred its housing-promotion assets as a silent partnership contribution to the bank.
Der er således tale om et selskabs-, skatte- og banktilsynsretligt defineret finansieringsinstrument, der grundlæggende adskiller sig fra en indskudskapitalinvestering, som delstaten ikke var interesseret i, og som bankens ejere ikke ønskede.
What was involved was therefore a financing instrument which was defined in company, tax and banking supervision law and which differed fundamentally from a share capital investment, in which the Land was not interested and which the owners of the bank did not want.
BdB overser på den ene side vigtige forskelle mellem indskudskapital og stille indskud og påberåber sig på den anden side ikke-eksisterende forskelle mellem »normale« stille indskud og delstaten Hessens stille indskud.
The BdB ignored important differences between share capital and silent partnership contributions and tried to identify non-existent differences between ‘normal’ silent partnership contributions and the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen.
BdB anfører i det væsentlige, at stille andele kun har en begrænset løbetid eller kan opsiges og derfor efter principperne udstukket af Baselkomitéen for Banktilsyn kun anerkendes som kernekapital i et omfang svarende til højst 15 % af et kreditinstituts samlede kernekapital.
The BdB essentially argued that silent partnerships were of only limited duration or could be withdrawn and consequently, in accordance with the principles of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, were recognised as core capital only up to 15 % of the entire core capital of a credit institution.
Da delstaten Hessens stille indskud er blevet stillet til rådighed for Helaba uden tidsbegrænsning og ikke falder ind under 15 %-grænsen og derfor ikke er noget »normalt« stille indskud, men funktionelt set indskudskapital, skal der ved beregning af godtgørelsen ikke gås ud fra andre stille indskud eller andre innovative kapitalinstrumenter, men fra indskudskapitalinvesteringer.
Since the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen had been made available to Helaba without any time limit and was not covered by the 15 % limit and therefore did not represent a ‘normal’ silent partnership contribution, but functionally represented share capital, the criterion in assessing the remuneration should not be other silent partnership contributions or other innovative capital instruments, but share capital investments.
Dette hovedargument, som BdB fremfører, er af flere grunde forkert.
This core argument on which the BdB was relying was, for a number of reasons, erroneous.
Begrænset løbetid eller mulighed for opsigelse er således hverken selskabsretligt eller banktilsynsretligt set et afgørende og uomgængeligt kendetegn for stille andele.
For example, limited duration or withdrawability were not a necessary and indispensable feature of silent partnerships either under company law or under banking supervision law.
Og omvendt er indskudskapital heller ikke nødvendigvis tidsubegrænset og uopsigelig.
Conversely, share capital was not necessarily of unlimited duration and unwithdrawable.
Efter tysk selskabsret kan i øvrigt alle selskaber uanset deres retsform stiftes for et bestemt tidsrum eller med aftale om mulighed for opsigelse af et indskud, hvilket ikke er til hinder for anerkendelse som kernekapital efter tysk banktilsynsret.
Under German company law, rather, all companies irrespective of their legal form could be set up for a limited period or it could be agreed that a contribution could be withdrawn subject to notice, which did not stand in the way of its recognition as core capital under German banking supervision law.
BdB ignorerer endvidere, at 15 %-grænsen for anerkendelse som kernekapital efter international banktilsynsret ifølge »Sydney-erklæringen« fra Baselkomitéen for Banktilsyn og den tyske tilsynsmyndigheds deraf følgende praksis ikke gælder for permanente kapitalinstrumenter, som kun kan opsiges på initiativ af udstederen (men ikke af investor).
The BdB was also wrong in arguing that the 15 % limit for recognition as core capital under international banking supervision law did not, under the ‘Sydney declaration’ of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and the practice of the Germany supervisory authority based on it, apply to permanent capital instruments, which could be withdrawn only on the initiative of the issuer (but not of the investor).
I øvrigt går det tyske banktilsyns praksis imidlertid ud fra, at et indskud også med en løbetid på mindst 30 år og en udtrykkeligt fastsat manglende opsigelsesmulighed for investor bliver stillet »permanent« til rådighed og dermed ikke falder ind under 15 %-grænsen.
Furthermore, the practice of the German supervisory authority was now based on the assumption that a contribution with a term of at least 30 years and the explicit exclusion of withdrawal was made available to the investor on a ‘permanent’ basis and consequently did not come under the 15 % limit.
Også dette viser, at forskellen mellem tidsbegrænsede og tidsubegrænsede indskud på ingen måde er så skarp, som BdB hævder.
This too showed that the difference between contributions of limited and unlimited duration was by no means as great as the BdB was arguing.
Hvad en passende godtgørelse angår, er det dermed hverken nødvendigt eller berettiget at omfortolke stille indskud til indskudskapital.
As far as the appropriate remuneration was concerned, there was no cause or justification on this account for reinterpreting silent partnership contributions as share capital.
Kun nogle få måneder efter Helaba optog Deutsche Bank i form af såkaldte »perpetuals« et »evigt« indskud, som den hentede på kapitalmarkedet.
Only a few months after Helaba, the Deutsche Bank had taken up a ‘permanent’ contribution in the form of ‘perpetuals’, and had done so on the capital market.
I modsætning til, hvad BdB hævder, gælder 15 %-grænsen ifølge en fremlagt relevant avisartikel ikke for dette, da der ikke er aftalt nogen forhøjelse af rentesatsen for det tilfælde, at banken ikke udnytter en opsigelsesret, som den indrømmes (ingen »step-up«-klausul).
Contrary to what the BdB asserted, the 15 % limit did not, according to a newspaper report submitted on the subject, apply to this contribution, since no increase in the interest rate had been agreed if the bank did not exercise a right of withdrawal that had been accorded to it (no ‘step-up’ clause).
Deutsche Banks perpetuals udgør heller ikke på nogen måde en undtagelse, da mange andre kreditinstitutter i den følgende tid optog »evige« indskud på markedet, hvilket Tyskland også har fremlagt eksempler på.
The Deutsche Bank perpetuals were by no means exceptional in character, since in the subsequent period numerous other credit institutions had taken up ‘permanent’ contributions on the market, examples of which Germany provided.
Ikke en af emissionerne, der ved stærk efterspørgsel havde et volumen på fra 150 mio. EUR til over 2 mia. EUR, gav en forrentning blot nogenlunde i nærheden af indskudskapital; godtgørelsen ligger snarere på mellem 110 og 290 basispoint over mid-swaps.
No single issue, whose volumes ranged from EUR 150 million to over EUR 2 billion, provided anything like the return of share capital; the remuneration lay in the range between 110 and 290 basis points above mid-swaps.
Heller ikke i 1999 tillagde markedet det afgørende betydning for godtgørelsen, om der var tale om tidsbegrænsede eller ikke-tidsbegrænsede kapitalinstrumenter, eller om emissionsprovenuet lå under 15 %-grænsen.
Already in 1999, the market had, as regards remuneration, not attached any major importance either to the distinction between capital instruments of limited and unlimited duration or to the question of whether the issue proceeds fell under the 15 % limit or not.
De af BdB selektivt anvendte kriterier holder heller ikke stik. De skulle på den ene side underbygge ligheder mellem indskudskapital og delstaten Hessens stille indskud og på den anden side forskelle mellem dette stille indskud og »normale« stille indskud.
Nor did Germany accept the criteria selectively applied by the BdB, which were supposed on the one hand to demonstrate common features between share capital and the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen and, on the other, differences between this silent partnership contribution and a ‘normal’ silent partnership contribution.
BdB ignorerer for det første, i hvor høj grad stille indskud kan udformes efter aftale mellem parterne, og for det andet forhold, som er væsentlige og uomgængelige for sondringen mellem indskudskapital og stille andele.
The BdB was overlooking on the one hand the extent to which the shaping of silent partnership contributions could be shaped by agreement between the parties and, on the other, features that were essential and indispensable to the distinction between share capital and a silent partnership.
Indskudskapital er ikke »rentebærende«, men giver ret til betaling af et udbytte, som ikke blot er afhængigt af overskuddet, men først og fremmest udgør en del af overskuddet.
Share capital did not yield interest, but conferred a claim to payment of a dividend, which was not only dependent on profits, but above all in proportion to profits.
Godtgørelsen for et stille indskud er derimod kun afhængig af overskuddet.
The remuneration on a silent partnership contribution, by contrast, was only profit-dependent.
Om der for et stille indskud ydes efterbetalinger, afhænger af aftalen mellem parterne, og det er under ingen omstændigheder et af de særlige kendetegn for en »normal« stille andel.
Whether or not provision was made for retrospective payments in the case of a silent partnership contribution was a matter for agreement between the parties and was not in any case one of the constitutive features of a ‘normal’ silent partnership.
Påstanden om, at der for meget store volumener kun kan anvendes indskudskapital og ikke »normale« stille andele, modbevises af størrelsen af de stille indskud, som private kreditinstitutter optog på kapitalmarkedet i 1998-1999 og også nu optager.
The assertion that for very large volumes only share capital and not ‘normal’ silent partnerships could be used was contradicted by the size of the silent partnership contributions which private credit institutions had taken up on the capital market in 1998/99 and were also currently taking up.
Et aktuelt bevis for, at 15 %-grænsen kan overskrides, kan ses i den kapitalforanstaltning, som Deutsche Bank, der er medlem af BdB, traf den 2. december 2003.
Current evidence of the possibility of the 15 % limit being exceeded was provided by a capital measure taken on 2 December 2003 by a BdB member institution, the Deutsche Bank.
Det drejer sig om optagelse af stille kapitalindskud fra private investorer for et samlet beløb på 300 mio. EUR og med ubegrænset løbetid (såkaldt »perpetual«).
This was the taking up of silent partnership contributions from private investors totalling EUR 300 million for an unlimited term (a so-called ‘perpetual’) .
Det viser endnu engang, hvor likvidt og gennemsigtigt markedet for stille kapitalindskud i tyske banker er, også når det drejer sig om store volumener.
This illustrated once again how liquid and transparent the market for silent partnership contributions in respect of German banks was, even where large volumes were involved.
Med et aftalt hæftelsestillæg på 0,99 % er foranstaltningen desuden et yderligere bevis for, at den hæftelsesgodtgørelse, der blev aftalt for delstaten Hessens stille indskud i Helaba, er fastsat og passende i forhold til markedet.
With an agreed liability premium of 0,99 %, moreover, the measure provided further evidence that the liability remuneration that had been agreed for the silent partnership contribution of the Land of Hessen to Helaba had been calculated in a way that was market-related and market-adequate.
På anmodning af Kommissionen fremlagde Tyskland i tabelform en oversigt over udviklingen i stille kapitalindskud og anden hybrid kernekapital for udvalgte private storbanker i perioden 1998-2003.
In response to a request from the Commission, Germany submitted a table showing the trend of silent partnership contributions and other hybrid core capital instruments for selected large banks in the private sector from 1998 to 2003.
Efter Tysklands opfattelse kan det heraf tydeligt ses, i hvilket omfang de anførte institutter også optog hybrid kernekapital uden for den tilsynsmæssige 15 %-grænse, da den andel, denne kapital tegner sig for af den samlede kernekapital, overstiger 15 %:
Germany argued that this made it clear that the institutions listed had also taken up hybrid core capital beyond the 15 % limit set for banking supervisory purposes, and the extent to which they had done so, since the proportion of total core capital accounted by such instruments exceeded 15 %.
Hybride kernekapital-instrumenter (deraf stille indskud) (mio. EUR)
Hybrid core capital instruments(of which silent partnership contributions)
Kerne-kapital (mia. EUR)
Core capital (€ millions)
Andel hybrid kerne-kapital ( %)
Share of hybrid core capital ( %)
Hybride kernekapital-instrumenter (mio. EUR)
Hybrid core capital instruments (€ millions)