natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Angiv retsgrundlag for de nævnte foranstaltninger.
Please also indicate where relevant the legal basis for the measures taken/planned.
Hvornår er tilbagebetalingen senest udført?
By what date will the recovery be completed?
Oplysninger om de enkelte aktører, som har iværksat skatteincitamentet
Information by individual beneficiary
I vedlagte skema skal der angives data for hver enkelt aktør, som skal tilbagebetale den ulovligt ydede støtte.
Please provide details for each subject from whom the tax incentives unlawfully granted under the scheme are to be recovered in the table overleaf.
Oplysninger om aktør
Identity of the subject
Beløb på ulovligt ydet støtte [1]valuta: ...
Amount of the incentive unlawfully granted [1]Currency: …
Tilbagebetalt beløb ( [2]) valuta: ...
Amounts reimbursed [2]Currency: …
Støtte, der er udbetalt til støttemodtager (bruttosubventionsækvivalent, priser …)
Amount put at the disposal of the beneficiary (in gross grant equivalent; at … prices).
Tilbagebetalte bruttobeløb (inklusive renter).
Gross amounts reimbursed (including interest).
For det andet skal Italien kræve den ydede støtte tilbagebetalt af investeringsvirksomhederne eller af de virksomheder, der forvalter de investeringsvirksomheder, der har kontraktmæssig form, som samtidigt er de første støttemodtagere og forpligtede til at betale erstatningsskat af kapitalindtægter til den italienske stat. Støtten, der skal tilbagebetales, svarer til forskellen på den ordinære erstatningsskat og den nedsatte skat fra det omhandlede skatteincitament.
Secondly, Italy must recover the aid from the investment vehicles or from the undertakings managing contractual investment vehicles that are at the same time the first beneficiaries of the aid and the persons required by tax legislation to pay to the State the substitute tax on their net operating result. The aid to be recovered corresponds to the difference between the standard substitute tax and the reduced tax resulting from the tax incentives in question.
om Italiens planlagte statsstøtte til Fincantieri
on the State Aid which Italy is planning to implement for Fincantieri
(meddelt under nummer K(2005) 4433)
(notified under document number C(2005) 4433)
under henvisning til Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1540/98 af 29. juni 1998 om nye regler for støtte til skibsbygningsindustrien,
Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1540/98 of 29 June 1998 establishing new rules on aid to shipbuilding,
efter at have opfordret interesserede parter til at fremsætte deres bemærkninger i overensstemmelse med disse artikler, under hensyntagen til disse bemærkninger, og
Having called on interested parties to submit their comments pursuant to the provisions cited above and having regard to their comments,
Ved brev af 22. oktober 2004 underrettede Kommissionen Italien om, at den havde besluttet at indlede proceduren efter EF-traktatens artikel 88, stk. 2, med hensyn til ovennævnte foranstaltning.
By letter dated 22 October 2004, the Commission informed Italy that it had decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty in respect of the aid.
Kommissionen modtog bemærkninger fra interesserede parter. Disse bemærkninger blev videresendt til Italien med anmodning om eventuelle kommentarer.
The Commission received comments from interested parties.
Italien fremsendte sine kommentarer ved brev af 12. april 2005.
It forwarded them to Italy, which was given the opportunity to react; its comments were received by letter dated 12 April 2005.
Kommissionen modtog andre breve fra Italien af henholdsvis 25. november 2005, 18. maj 2005 og 12. oktober 2005.
Other letters were received from Italy dated 25 November 2005, 18 May 2005 and 12 October 2005.
I henhold til artikel 3 i forordning (EF) nr. 1540/98 om nye regler for støtte til skibsbygningsindustrien (»skibsbygningsforordningen«), som regulerer kontraktbetinget driftsstøtte, har Italien anmodet Kommissionen om forlængelse af en leveringsfrist, der er fastsat til den 31. december 2003.
Italy requested the Commission to grant an extension of the delivery limit of 31 December 2003 provided for in Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1540/98 of 29 June 1998 establishing new rules on aid to shipbuilding (‘the Shipbuilding Regulation’) as a condition for receiving contract-related operating aid.
Denne forlængelse, som Fincantieri har anmodet om, vedrører leveringen af fem krydstogtskibe til en samlet kontraktværdi på 2,1 mia. EUR og med et støttebeløb på 243 mio. EUR.
The extension was requested for Fincantieri, for the delivery of five cruise ships, for a total contract value of € 2,1 billion and an aid amount of € 243 million.
Fincantieri er et offentligt selskab med seks værfter i Italien (Monfalcone, Marghera, Sestri Ponente, Ancona, Palermo, Castellammare, Muggiano og Riva Trigoso).
Fincantieri is a state-owned company operating eight shipyards (Monfalcone, Marghera, Sestri Ponente, Ancona, Palermo, Castellammare, Muggiano, Riva Trigoso) in Italy.
Det er specialiseret i bygning af krydstogtskibe, men bygger også andre skibstyper, der er beregnet til hav- eller kystsejlads, og militærfartøjer.
It is specialised in building cruise ships but also builds other types of seagoing vessels and military ships.
Italien har forklaret, at de endelige kontrakter om de pågældende skibe blev undertegnet i december 2000, og at leveringen ifølge kontraktbestemmelserne skulle ske i juni eller december 2003.
Italy explained that the final contracts for the ships concerned were signed in December 2000 and delivery, according to the contracts, was planned for June and December 2003.
Skibene var blevet bestilt af forskellige datterselskaber af det amerikanske krydstogtselskab, Carnival Corporation (»Carnival«).
The ships were ordered by various subsidiaries of Carnival Corporation (‘Carnival’), a US cruise operator.
På dette grundlag havde Italien lovet kontraktbetinget driftsstøtte til bygningen af skibene.
Italy promised, on this basis, contract-related operating aid for the building of the ships.
Fincantieri efterkom anmodningen, og Italien bad Kommissionen om en forlængelse af leveringsfristen, for at der fortsat kunne ydes driftsstøtte til bygningen af skibene.
Fincantieri agreed to this and Italy requested an extension of the delivery limit so that the ships could still qualify for operating aid.
De italienske myndigheder henviste i deres anmeldelse til Kommissionens beslutning af 5. juni 2002, hvorved den godkendte en tilsvarende forlængelse af leveringsfristen for et krydstogtskib, der var under bygning på det tyske værft Meyer Werft.
In their notification the Italian authorities referred to the Commission's decision of 5 June 2002 authorising a similar extension of the delivery date for a cruise ship under construction at Meyer Werft, Germany.
Italien understregede lighederne mellem de to sager, hvad angår (i) begrundelsen for forlængelsen (virkningen af terrorangrebene den 11. september 2001), (ii) det berørte marked (krydstogtsejlads) og (iii) det kommercielle afhængighedsforhold mellem værftet og rederiet (Carnival er Fincantieris største kunde).
Italy emphasised the similarities between the two cases in terms of (i) the reason given for the extension (the impact of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks), (ii) the relevant market (cruises) and (iii) the commercial dependency existing between the shipyard and the shipowner (Carnival is Fincantieri's largest customer).
Ved beslutning af 20. oktober 2004 forlængede Kommissionen leveringsfristen for fire af skibene, men udtrykte tvivl om muligheden for at forlænge leveringsfristen for det femte.
By decision dated 20 October 2004 the Commission granted the extension of the delivery limit for four of the ships, but expressed doubts that it could grant the extension for the fifth.
Tvivlen vedrørte skib nr. 6079, der efter planen skulle leveres i oktober 2005.
The doubts concerned ship 6079 with planned delivery in October 2005.
Leveringsfristen for dette skib var oprindelig 2005, men senere, hen imod udgangen af 2000, blev leveringsfristen ændret til december 2003, da der ellers ikke kunne ydes driftsstøtte til bygning af skibet.
This ship was originally intended to be delivered in 2005 but the delivery date was changed to December 2003 in late 2000; otherwise the ship would not have been eligible for operating aid.
Den støtte, som Italien ville yde Fincantieri, hvis Kommissionen forlængede leveringsfristen for skib nr. 6079, var på ca. 33 mio. EUR (9 % af skibets kontraktværdi).
The aid amount that Italy would grant to Fincantieri if the Commission were to extend the delivery limit for ship 6079 is approximately € 33 million (9 % of the contract value of the ship).
Desuden var der aldrig blevet bygget så komplicerede skibe i Ancona, hvilket såede tvivl om, hvorvidt værftet kunne klare en sådan operation, ikke mindst når det gjaldt apteringen.
Furthermore, Ancona had never built a ship of similar complexity before, casting doubts on the ability to manage this operation, not least concerning outfitting.
I denne forbindelse skal det præciseres, at bygning af skib nr. 6077 i Ancona ville medføre et usædvanlig stort apteringsarbejde på værftet i Palermo på grund af flytningen af produktionen fra Ancona til Palermo.
Linked to this, the construction of ship 6077 at Ancona would have implied an exceptionally high amount of outfitting at the Palermo shipyard because of the shift of production from Ancona to Palermo.
For det andet var der tvivl om det apteringsarbejde, som Fincantieri skulle have påtaget sig, hvis alle fem skibe skulle have været leveret i 2003.
The second reason for initiating the formal procedure was doubts concerning the estimated amount of outfitting that would have had to be done by Fincantieri if all five ships had been delivered in 2003.
Efter Kommissionens skøn ville der for 2003 have været tale om det dobbelte af det apteringsarbejde, som Fincantieri hidtil havde udført.
This would have involved, in the Commission's estimation, twice as much outfitting work in 2003 as Fincantieri had ever done in any other year.
For Marghera-værftets vedkommende ville den planlagte aptering for 2003 have udgjort ca. 40 % mere end det arbejde, værftet hidtil havde udført på dette område.
Furthermore, for the shipyard at Marghera, the outfitting planned for 2003 would have amounted to around 40 % more than the yard had ever done before.
Kommissionen tvivlede derfor på, at produktionsplanen for Fincantieri i almindelighed og for Marghera i særdeleshed var realistisk.
The Commission therefore had doubts as to whether the production plan for Fincantieri in general, and for Marghera in particular, was realistic.
Ifølge Kommissionen hersker der størst tvivl om skib nr. 6079, som er tredje søsterskib til 6077, og som også bygges på Marghera-værftet og efter planen skulle leveres i oktober 2005.
The Commission considered that the main doubts concerned ship 6079, which is the third sister ship to 6077, built at the same yard, Marghera, with planned delivery in October 2005.
Leveringen af dette skib er blevet udsat væsentligt i forhold til produktionsplanen fra december 2000 som følge af beslutningen om at bygge skib nr. 6077 i Marghera.
The delivery of this ship was postponed in relation to the December 2000 production plan owing to the decision to build ship 6077 at Marghera.
Kommissionens tvivl skyldes desuden oplysninger om, at det nuværende produktionsforløb med et meget forsinket leveringstidspunkt for skib nr. 6079 havde været planlagt allerede fra begyndelsen (der var blevet undertegnet en hensigtserklæring, inden de endelige kontrakter blev undertegnet i december 2000).
These doubts are also based on indications (letter of intent signed before the final contracts were signed in December 2000) that the current production sequence, with a very late delivery for ship 6079, was originally intended.
Fincantieri fremsendte sine bemærkninger ved brev af 3. marts 2005.
Fincantieri submitted comments in a letter dated 3 March 2005.
Fincantieri har fremført, at et hvilket som helst af selskabets anlæg, hvad enten det hørte ind under afdelingen for krydstogtskibe eller afdelingen for fragtskibe, ville have kunnet fremstille de samme skibsdele uden at skulle ændre produktionsmetoderne eller arbejdsplanlægningen, da de også kunne regne med et net af underleverandører, der i påkommende tilfælde var i stand til at opfylde produktionskravene med hensyn til kvalitet og mængde.
It stated that any of the company's yards, irrespective of whether they were part of the cruise ship or transport vessel divisions, were in a position to build the same ship components, without any need to alter production engineering choices or executive planning in the workshop, as it would be possible to count on a network of subcontractors that could meet quality and quantity requirements.
Fincantieri har desuden fremført, at værftet i Ancona uden problemer kunne have fremstillet et helt krydstogtskib af de samme dimensioner og med de samme egenskaber som skib nr. 6077 (søsterskib til nr. 6079), inklusive alle apteringsaktiviteterne, ved udelukkende at benytte sine egne produktionsstrukturer, infrastrukturer og anlæg, hvis blot den aftale mellem Fincantieri, de lokale og regionale myndigheder, havnemyndighederne og metalarbejdernes fagforeninger, der var nedfældet i hensigtserklæringen af 6. december 1999, var blevet gennemført omgående.
It also stated that the Ancona shipyard would have had no problems building an entire cruise ship of the dimensions and design characteristics of ship 6077 (the sister ship of 6079), including all fittings, using only its own production facilities, infrastructure and plant, if only the agreement between Fincantieri, the local and regional authorities, the port authorities and the metalworkers’ unions set out in the memorandum of intent of 6 December 1999 had been implemented immediately.
Dette var dog ikke tilfældet.
However, this did not take place.
Ved undersøgelsen af produktionsmetoderne vedrørende skib nr. 6077 (søsterskib til nr. 6079) blev det besluttet at bygge skibet i to dele: den største del i Ancona og den mindste i Riva Trigoso.
When the production engineering of ship 6077 was examined it was decided to build the ship in two parts: the larger section at Ancona and the smaller section at Riva Trigoso.
Den samme produktionsplan var blevet fastlagt for bygningen af hangarskibet, Conte di Cavour, på værftet i Riva Trigoso og Muggiano og var allerede blevet anvendt på værftet i Ancona og Marghera i 1997 i forbindelse med krydstogtskibet Disney Magic.
The same production plan had been devised for building the aircraft carrier Conte di Cavour at the Riva Trigoso and Muggiano yards, and had been employed for the construction of the Disney Magic cruise ship at the Ancona and Marghera shipyards in 1997.
Forlængelsen af skibet skulle efter planen finde sted i ATSM's tørdok i Trieste.
The so-called jumboisation was planned at the ATSM dry dock in Trieste.
Da ATSM råder over et velegnet anlæg til aptering og færdiggørelse af skibe, kunne det have løst alle Ancona-værftets eventuelle produktionsvanskeligheder, ud over at det også indebar den betydelige fordel — der absolut ikke må undervurderes — at det ikke ligger langt fra industriområdet omkring Monfalcone-værftet.
As the latter had a dock that was suitable for fitting out and finishing ships, it could have overcome any production difficulties encountered at the Ancona shipyard while offering the significant advantage, which should not be underestimated, of proximity to the industrial area around the shipyard at Monfalcone.
Ved at vælge at bygge skib nr. 6077 i Ancona, i hvert fald når det gjaldt en stor del af skroget og meget af apteringen, vedtog Fincantieri i sidste instans en effektiv og fremsynet strategi, som gik ud på, at der i tilfælde af problemer kunne benyttes en række alternative produktionsmuligheder baseret på værfternes integration og fleksibilitet for at sikre, at det ville være muligt at levere skibet ved udgangen af 2003 som fastsat i kontrakten.
In the final analysis, in choosing to build the 6077 at Ancona, at least for a large section of the hull and much of the outfitting work, Fincantieri adopted an effective and far-sighted strategy which, should problems arise, offered a number of alternatives that would take advantage of the integrated nature and flexibility of its yards to ensure that it would be possible to deliver the ship by the end of 2003 as required by the contract.
DE ITALIENSKE MYNDIGHEDERS KOMMENTARER
COMMENTS FROM ITALY
De italienske myndigheders bemærkninger som led i den formelle procedure afspejler Fincantieris, dvs. at planen fra december 2000 ganske vist var en udfordring, men realistisk.
The comments from Italy following the initiation of the formal procedure reflect the comments made by Fincantieri, i.e. that the December 2000 plan was challenging but realistic.
De italienske myndigheder mener, at leveringstidspunktet kunne have været overholdt på grund af Fincantieris produktionsfleksibilitet, dvs. dens mulighed for at bygge skibet med bistand fra andre værfter (herunder værfter, der normalt ikke bygger krydstogtskibe), som følge af et infrastruktur- og anlægsinvesteringsprojekt med dette formål for øje og som følge af avancerede skibsbygningsmetoder.
Italy considers that the delivery dates could have been kept thanks to Fincantieri's production flexibility, in other words its ability to ‘pool’ the construction process by outsourcing to other yards (including some not normally engaged in the building of cruise ships), through an infrastructure and plant investment project dedicated to that end and through advanced building techniques.
Hvad angår ATSM's planlagte medvirken ved bygningen af et af skibene, afspejler de italienske myndigheders bemærkninger Fincantieris, dvs. at ATSM let kunne have samlet de to apterede sektioner i forbindelse med skib nr. 6077, selv om denne metode er et alternativ, som på visse måder er mindre tilfredsstillende end det normale bygningsforløb.
Concerning the planned involvement of ATSM in the construction of one of the ships, Italy's comments reflected those of Fincantieri, i.e. that ATSM could easily have combined the two outfitted sections of vessel 6077, although this method of construction is an alternative, and in some ways a less satisfactory one, to the ‘normal’ sequence of construction phases.
Under alle omstændigheder er samling af forskellige sektioner nu blevet rutinearbejde for Fincantieri.
In any event, the work of joining sections has now become routine for Fincantieri.
Med hensyn til Kommissionens tvivl om, hvorvidt Ancona-værftet havde tilstrækkelige erfaringer inden for bygning af lige så komplicerede skibe, nævner Italien værftets erfaringer med bygning og aptering af ca. halvdelen af skibet Disney Magic og med passagerskibet »Danielle Casanova«.
As regards the Commission's doubts about Ancona's previous experience in building ships of similar complexity, Italy considers that it had gained such experience with the construction and outfitting of around half of the Disney Magic and with the passenger ship Danielle Casanova.
De italienske myndigheder fremfører desuden, at Palermo-værftet tidligere (1996-1997) har gennemført mere krævende produktionsplaner end den, der var fastsat for 2000.
Italy also argues that the Palermo yard has in the past (1996-97) carried out much more demanding production plans than the one envisaged in 2000.
Med hensyn til Kommissionens vurdering af, at produktionsplanen fra 2000 ville have medført en apteringsmængde i 2003 svarende til det dobbelte af det apteringsarbejde, Fincantieri hidtil havde udført, benægtes dette af de italienske myndigheder, som desuden fastslår, at produktionsplanen fra 2000 ville have medført, at næsten alle værfter ville have udnyttet »standardkapaciteten«, og at det kun var nogle enkelte, der ville være nået op på maksimumskapaciteten.
As regards the Commission's estimation that the December 2000 production plan would have involved, in 2003, twice as much outfitting work as Fincantieri had ever done in any other year, Italy refutes that statement and claims that in almost all the yards the December 2000 production plan would have relied on the ‘standard capacity’ of the yard in question, and only in certain cases would peak capacity have been reached.
Som svar på Kommissionens udtalelse om, at det apteringsarbejde, der var planlagt for 2003 på Marghera-værftet, ville have oversteget værftets hidtidige aktiviteter på dette område med ca. 40 %, fastslår de italienske myndigheder, at arbejdsbyrden (herunder aptering) for Marghera-værftet ifølge planen fra 2000 absolut var i overensstemmelse med værftets faktiske kapacitet og muligheder, som det tidligere havde leveret beviser på, da det var lykkedes for det at levere fire skibe på femten måneder, som planlagt for 2003.
In reply to the Commission statement that for the Marghera shipyard the outfitting planned for 2003 would have amounted to around 40 % more than the yard had ever done before, Italy states that the workload (including outfitting) scheduled for the Marghera yard in the plan dating from 2000 was absolutely consistent with the capacities and capabilities actually demonstrated by the yard since it had previously managed to deliver four ships in 15 months, as was planned for 2003.
Italien havde desuden fået lejlighed til at udtale sig om væsentlige elementer i udtalelsen fra den uafhængige ekspert, som Kommissionen havde bedt om at vurdere Italiens oplysninger inden indledningen af den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure.
Italy was also offered the opportunity to comment on the essential elements of the report by the independent expert whom the Commission consulted when it assessed the information provided by Italy prior to the launch of the formal investigation procedure.
I svaret af 18. maj 2005 fremsatte de italienske myndigheder kommentarer til tre hovedpunkter i ekspertudtalelsen.
In its reply dated 18 May 2005 Italy commented on three main aspects of the expert's report.
Ifølge de italienske myndigheder har eksperten først og fremmest baseret sine vurderinger på den samlede leverede tonnage i 2003 uden at tage hensyn til produktionscyklen, dvs. den gradvise forøgelse af de kompenserede bruttoregisterton (k.brt) i hele bygningsperioden.
First, according to Italy, the expert based his assessments on total delivery in the year 2003, without taking account of the production cycle, in other words the gradual increase in compensated gross tonnage (cgt) that occurs throughout the construction period.
Eksperten har glemt at fordele tonnagen vedrørende de nye skibe, der efter planen skulle leveres i 2003 (hvor bygningsfasen for nogles vedkommende allerede var langt fremskreden sidst i 2002), over det tidsrum, der er nødvendigt for den faktiske produktion, og konkluderer, at Fincantieri i 2003 skulle producere dobbelt så mange k.brt som tidligere.
By not distributing, over the time-span necessary for actual production, the tonnage relating to the nine ships scheduled for delivery in 2003 (some of which were at an advanced stage of construction by the end of 2002), the expert had concluded by asserting that in 2003 Fincantieri would have had to produce twice the cgt it had produced in the past.
Denne konklusion er ifølge de italienske myndigheder forkert, fordi den tonnage, der blev leveret i 2003, ikke falder sammen med den faktisk producerede tonnage i samme år.
That finding was, in Italy's opinion, incorrect since, for the purposes of assessing Fincantieri's production capacities, the tonnage delivered in 2003 did not correspond to the tonnage actually produced in that year.
Italien fremfører, at produktionstallene var i overensstemmelse med den tidligere kapacitet, og at de under ingen omstændigheder overskred maksimumskapaciteten.
Italy claims that the production data were consistent with capacities observed in the past and in any event did not exceed the maximum capacity levels.