natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Endelig understreger LDCom, at enhver anden analyse end denne vil få omfattende konsekvenser, ikke blot fordi den vil være i modstrid med principperne i gældende national ret, men også fordi den vil give medlemsstaterne mulighed for ustraffet at støtte kursen på virksomheder, som de har andel i.
Lastly, LDCOM stresses that any analysis to the contrary would be fraught with consequences inasmuch as not only would it run counter to the principles of domestic positive law but it would also open up the possibility for Member States to sustain with impunity the share price of companies in which they have an interest.
Denne ubegrænsede garanti havde tydelige konsekvenser for markedet, og markedets reaktion svarer til den værdi, som investorerne reelt tillagde garantien.
The effect of this unlimited guarantee is clearly felt in the market and the market's reaction corresponds to the value investors actually place on the guarantee.
Således steg kursen på FT-aktien fra og med juli 2002, så operatøren fik en stærkere stilling på børsen.
Thus, the stock exchange price of France Télécom's shares rose as from July 2002, leading to an increase in the operator's stock exchange value.
LDCom mener, at denne værdistigning som følge af statens bebudede støtte repræsenterer en værdi af 5,9 mia. EUR. Det samme gælder FT's spreads, som begyndte at blive bedre fra juli 2002, så operatøren fik nedsat sin finansieringsbyrde og styrket sin finansieringskapacitet.
LDCOM argues that the increase in value thus brought about by the State's announcement may be put at EUR 5,9 billion. Similarly, France Télécom's spreads started to improve as from July 2002, thereby reducing the operator ' s financial burden and permitting the rebuilding of its financial capacity.
Omfanget af selskabets spreads giver et konkret billede af den finansielle værdi af statens bebudede støtte.
These spreads make it possible to evaluate in concrete terms the financial weight of the State ' s announcement.
Dette omfang skal så sammenholdes med FT's samlede finansieringsgæld til obligationslån.
They must be related to France Télécom ' s entire debt financed through bond issues.
Omfanget af selskabets spreads ligger alt efter opgørelsesmåden mellem 2 og 3 %, dvs. en årlig besparelse mellem 1,37 og 2,05 mia. EUR. Med afsæt i en hypotetisk forudsætning, hvor FT bevarer sit nuværende gældsætningsniveau, som derfor skal finansieres løbende, vurderer LDCom denne besparelse til et beløb mellem 19,57 og 29,36 mia. EUR. Statsstøtten gav i øvrigt FT mulighed for at refinansiere sine lån på obligationsmarkederne på gunstigere vilkår, end selskabet ellers ville have fået.
Depending on the circumstances, they vary from 2 % to 3 %, equal to an annual saving of between EUR 1,37 billion and EUR 2,05 billion. Assuming that France Télécom will maintain a constant level of indebtedness and hence that the debt will be financed indefinitely, LDCOM evaluates the impact of the saving thus made at between EUR 19,57 billion and EUR 29,36 billion. Moreover, the State's support has enabled France Télécom to refinance itself on the bond markets on more advantageous terms than it would have obtained beforehand.
Bebudelsen af kreditbevillingen på 9 mia. EUR: LDCom har ikke gentaget analysen af denne foranstaltning på baggrund af traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, men henviser til Kommissionens analyse i indledningsbeslutningen med særlig fokus på ERAP's rolle.
Announcement of the making available of a EUR 9 billion credit line: LDCOM does not analyse this measure in the light of Article 87(1) of the Treaty, but refers to the analysis carried out by the Commission in its opening decision, insisting on the part played by ERAP.
Ifølge LDCom er støtten fra staten hverken i overensstemmelse med det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip hvad angår støttens beløb, nærmere vilkår eller formål.
In LDCOM's opinion, both from the point of view of its amount and of that of its modalities or its very objective, the State's support is not covered by the prudent investor criterion.
Således ville ingen fornuftig investor i september 2002 (hvor staten bebudede, at den ville yde FT finansiel støtte) have lånt en virksomhed 9 mia. EUR under sådanne vilkår uden at tage udgangspunkt i en omstruktureringsplan.
Thus, no prudent investor would, in September 2002 (when the State announced that it would be supporting France Télécom financially), have advanced EUR 9 billion under such economic circumstances without basing itself on a restructuring plan.
LDCom mener i øvrigt heller ikke, at nogen privat investor ville have finansiel kapacitet til at mobilisere sådanne summer inden for en så begrænset tidsramme.
LDCOM explains, moreover, that no private investor would have had the financial capacity to mobilise such amounts in such a short space of time.
LDCom pointerer ligeledes, at private investorer betragter bevarelsen af ligevægten i en koncerns driftsstruktur som et middel til at sikre rentabiliteten i investeringen.
It also states that, for a private investor, maintaining the integrity of a group's operational structure is a means to the end of earning a return on his investment.
I den foreliggende sag er det for de franske myndigheder imidlertid et mål i sig selv.
In the present case, for the French authorities it is an end in itself.
Det er forståeligt, at staten tager sociale og politiske hensyn, men når en sådan vurdering spiller ind på dens indgreb, er det i strid med princippet om ligestilling af den offentlige og den private sektor.
It is understandable that the State should bear social and political considerations in mind, but such a move would violate the principle of equality between public and private sectors.
LDCom mener desuden ikke, at statens synspunkt om, at en fornuftig investor med aktiemajoritet ikke ville have taget chancer med FT's funktionelle integritet holder i en analyse af, hvilken adfærd en sådan investor ville have udvist under de markedsvilkår, der reelt fandtes i juni-juli 2002.
In LDCOM's opinion, the State's position that a prudent majority investor would not have called into question France Télécom's functional integrity does not stand up to an analysis of the conduct of such an investor under the market conditions prevailing in June-July 2002.
Investorer, som har sat en betydelig del af deres formue i et selskab, der er i fare for at gå nedenom og hjem, vil være de første til at kræver en omgående og radikal strategiomlægning, som f.eks. kunne omfatte omfattende afhændelser af strategiske aktiver.
Thus, investors who invest an extremely large proportion of their assets in a company threatened with collapse will be the first to demand a radical and immediate review of its strategy, involving, if necessary, a huge sell-off of strategic assets.
Denne analyse ses at være relevant, hvis man sammenligner den situation, FT ville have været i uden støtte fra staten, med Vivendi Universal, som under hårdt pres fra markederne var tunget til at revidere sin aktivbestand.
The relevance of this analysis can be verified by comparing the situation in which France Télécom would have found itself without the State's support with that of Vivendi Universal, which was obliged, under pressure from the markets, to revise its range of assets.
LDCom mener således, at Kommissionen ikke blot bør nægte at anerkende argumentet om at bevare koncernens funktionelle integritet, men også i sin analyse bør betragte denne målsætning som værende til reel skade for konkurrencen.
LDCOM thus maintains that the Commission must not only refuse to take as point of departure the maintenance of the group's functional integrity, but also analyse the impact of such maintenance as being the veritable effect on competition.
LDCom fastholder, at FT i juli 2002 uden statslig indgriben ikke ville have haft andet valg end at nedbringe sin aktivbestand, gennemføre afskedigelser og tage sine strategiske målsætninger op til revision.
It argues that, in July 2002, without any state intervention, France Télécom would have had no choice but to reduce its range of assets, enforce redundancies and revise its strategic objectives.
LDCom vurderer den samlede støtte til 15 mia. EUR, som er det beløb, det lykkedes FT at skaffe på finansieringsmarkederne takket være støtten fra staten.
LDCOM puts the total amount of aid at EUR 15 billion, this being the sum which France Télécom succeeded in raising on the financial markets thanks to the aid granted to it by the State.
Støttebeløbet kan således ikke begrænses til de 9 mia. EUR, som staten direkte ydede, da det var på grund af de forskellige statslige indgreb (ubegrænset garanti, aktionærlån, nyansættelser), at FT kunne øge sin kapital med et så stort beløb.
The aid amount cannot therefore be limited to the EUR 9 billion provided directly by the State, since it was through various state measures (unlimited guarantee, shareholder loan, staff movements) that France Télécom was able to increase its capital by such an amount.
Ifølge LDCom er støtten fra staten en omstruktureringsstøtte.
In LDCOM's opinion, the aid granted by the State constitutes restructuring aid.
LDCom har sammenlignet situationen før og efter det offentliges indgriben på markederne for taletelefoni og høj- og lavhastighedsinternetadgang med den situation, som ville have hersket, hvis der ikke var blevet grebet ind.
LDCOM has carried out a comparison between the situation before and after the public intervention in the markets for voice telephony, high-speed Internet access and low-speed Internet access, and that which would have obtained in the absence of any public intervention.
Denne sammenligning bekræfter, at støtten faktisk har bevaret det forudgående status quo frem til 2005 (samme drifts- og markedsføringskapacitet), og dermed kan man udlede visse af indgrebets følger ved at se på selskabets markedsandel.
This comparison confirms that the aid has had the effect of maintaining the status quo ante in the run-up to 2005 (intact operational and marketing capacities), which makes it possible by deduction to quantify in terms of market shares some of the effects of the public intervention.
LDCom foreslår, at man f.eks. i medfør af rammebestemmelsernes pkt. 35 pålægger FT kompenserende foranstaltninger for at bringe markedet tilbage til den situation, der ville have været, hvis FT havde været nødt til af egen drift at ændre sit aktivitetsomfang.
LDCOM proposes that remedies should be imposed on France Télécom under point 35 of the Guidelines, the effect of which will have to be to restore the market situation to what it would have been had France Télécom been forced to modify its business perimeter spontaneously.
Eftersom statens primære målsætning ifølge LDCom var at bevare FT som operatør af alle former for telekommunikation, er de vigtigste markeder, som foranstaltningen har berørt, mobil- og fasttelefoni, såvel de øvre udbudsled (samtrafik, DSL-adgang) som de nedre (navnlig detailsalg af kommunikationstjenester og DSL-internetadgang).
In so far as the State has, in LDCOM's view, set itself the primary objective of maintaining France Télécom as an integrated telecommunications operator, the main markets affected are that for mobile telephony and that for fixed telephony, both upstream (interconnection, DSL access) and downstream (retailing of communications, DSL Internet access, etc.).
LDCom har derfor foreslået Kommissionen at træffe tiltag over for selskabets adfærd med henblik på at begrænse den deraf følgende konkurrenceforvridning og give alternative operatører de vilkår, de ville have haft, hvis der ikke var blevet ydet støtte.
LDCOM proposes therefore that the Commission should take behavioural measures to limit the distortion of competition thus brought about and to enable alternative operators to work under the conditions which they would have enjoyed in the absence of aid.
LDCom foreslår således, at man begrænser FT's og dets datterselskabers markedsandele inden for højhastighedsinternet (maksimalt 42 % af markedet for salg af DSL-internetadgang, opgjort efter værdi) og taletelefoni (maksimalt 55 % af markedet for regional og landsdækkende taletelefoni, opgjort efter værdi) og træffer en række foranstaltninger for at begrænse FT's markedsandele.
It proposes, therefore, a reduction in the market shares of France Télécom and its subsidiaries in the high-speed Internet market (maximum of 42 % of the market for the sale of high-speed Internet access by DSL, in terms of value) and in the voice telecommunications market (maximum of 55 % of the local and national voice communications market, in terms of value) and a series of measures aimed at implementing the limitation in France Télécom's market shares.
Den anden kategori foranstaltninger, som LDCom foreslår, har til formål at sikre konkurrenternes udviklingsmuligheder.
The second category of measures proposed by LDCOM consists of the imposition of measures aimed at enabling the development of competitors.
I sine bemærkninger af 17. maj 2004 præciserede LDCom, at økonomi- og finansministerens udtalelser var en ensidig statslig tilkendegivelse, som ved misligholdelse kunne forfølges efter international ret.
In its comments of 17 May 2004, LDCOM states that the declarations by the Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance constituted a unilateral state act non-compliance with which was punishable under international law.
LDCom præciserede også, at princippet om berettiget antagelse (estoppel) er et grundprincip i international handelsret, som også gælder for staten.
It also states that the prohibition on a person denying a fact to the detriment of another person (estoppel) is a general principle of international commercial law which is binding on the State.
LDCom præciserer i den forbindelse, at dette princip ikke kan bestrides i denne sag, da den franske stat her har handlet som aktionær og dermed også som international handelsaktør.
It points out in this connection that the principle's applicability in the present case is incontestable in view of the fact that the French State is acting as a shareholder and hence also as an operator in international trade.
LDCom understreger også, at staten ikke kunne trække sine tilkendegivelser tilbage uden at skabe tvivl om sin egen kreditværdighed.
LDCOM also stresses that the State cannot go back on its declarations without harming its own financial credibility.
Staten indtager ved indgreb på markedet både en rolle som långiver og som hovedaktionær i en række virksomheder.
In its intervention on the market, the State plays a role of borrower and a role of majority shareholder in a number of companies.
Som følge af denne dobbeltrolle får staten to ratings, dels som långiver, dels som aktionær via ratingen på de offentlige selskaber.
This dual role leads to a dual credit rating by the rating agencies, in its capacity as borrower and in its capacity as shareholder through the ratings given to public undertakings.
Denne dobbelte interventionsmulighed forudsætter en særlig omhu, eftersom ethvert fejltrin i en af disse to roller kan få konsekvenser for den anden rolle og afspejles i ratingen (LDCom henviser til den vurdering, Moody's foretager af offentlige selskaber).
This twofold intervention possibility calls for particular vigilance as any deficiency established in either of these two roles is likely to have consequences for its other role and for its rating (LDCOM refers to Moody's assessment of public undertakings).
LDCom lægger også vægt på, at statens troværdighed er fundamentalt anderledes fra den, der gør sig gældende for andre virksomheder, der befinder sig i en tilsvarende situation og ikke kan sikre sig markedets tillid (som Vivendi Universal).
LDCOM further stresses the fact that the credibility of the State is fundamentally different from that of other enterprises in a similar situation which cannot reassure the market (as in the case of Vivendi Universal).
Den sikkerhed, der for finansieringsmarkederne ligger i offentlige franske lån, skaber derfor ubetinget tillid fra investorerne til statens tilkendegivelser, fordi staten altid har opfyldt sine forpligtelser.
The security which, for the financial markets, French public borrowings represent is therefore the justification for the unconditional confidence placed by investors in the State's declarations, the State having always respected its commitments.
Når statens støtte således indgik i overvejelserne efter statens direkte kontakt til ratingbureauerne, som skal være yderst kritiske over for finansielle investeringers underliggende risiko, fremgår det klart, at statens støtte til FT havde en tillidsskabende effekt.
The taking into account of the support given by the State following its entering into direct contact with the rating agencies, the role of which is be extremely critical as regards the risk inherent in a financial investment, highlights the credibility of the State's support for France Télécom.
LDCom understreger også, at statens rating har maksimumskarakteren Aaa, fordi den opfylder sine forpligtelser.
LDCOM also points out that the State's rating attains the top mark of Aaa as it honours its commitments.
LDCom understreger, at hvis staten ikke holdt sine løfter, ville dens rating blive nedsat, hvilket også ville medføre en revurdering af statsgældens renteniveau.
A disengagement by the State would lead to a fall in its rating, which would result in a re-evaluation of public debt interest.
Et løftebrud over for én offentlig virksomhed kunne også smitte af på de øvriges rating.
Likewise, a disengagement from one public undertaking might have an impact on the credit rating of all the others.
Bemærkninger fra B
Comments from B
Efter B's opfattelse svarer tilkendelsen af midler og statens offentlige tilsagn om støtte til FT til, at der blev ydet en finansiel garanti med henblik på at gengive ikke blot selskabets kreditorer, men også hele markedet, tilliden til selskabet, hvilket var med til at bedre FT's stilling på børsmarkederne.
In B's opinion, the making available of funds, coupled with the public commitment by the State to support France Télécom, is comparable to the providing of a financial guarantee capable of reassuring not only the Company's creditors but also the entire market, which has helped to improve France Télécom's situation vis-à-vis the stock markets.
B konkluderer således, at den foreliggende foranstaltning blev ydet ved hjælp af statsmidler.
Hence, B concludes, the measure at issue has been granted through state resources.
Da statens adfærd ikke kan betragtes som svarende til en privat markedsøkonomisk investors, fik selskabet en fordel, som den ikke ville have haft under normale markedsvilkår.
Given that the State's conduct cannot be considered to be that of a private investor in a market economy, the Company enjoyed an advantage which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions.
B understreger, at støtteforanstaltningerne gav de private investorer tillid til, at der ikke var den mindste risiko for, at FT gik fallit.
It points out that the support measures reassured private investors that any risk of France Télécom's becoming bankrupt could be ruled out.
B fremfører også, at kapitaltilførslen til FT (som svarede til 80-100 % af selskabets børsværdi) var af et sådant omfang, at det i betragtning af FT's økonomiske situation er helt utænkeligt, at en privat investor ville have gennemført den, hvis ikke regeringen havde erklæret sin støtte og foretaget de indledende finansieringstiltag.
It also argues that the amount of France Télécom's recapitalisation (between 80 and 100 % of its stock exchange valuation) is such that, in the light of France Télécom's economic situation, no private investor would have carried out such a transaction were it not for the declarations of support and the prefinancing measures taken by the Government.
B mener ikke, at foranstaltningerne kan betragtes som forenelige i medfør af rammebestemmelserne.
B maintains that the measures cannot be considered compatible within the meaning of the Guidelines.
Subsidiært foreslår B imidlertid kompenserende foranstaltninger, især på markederne for fasttelefoni, internetadgang og mobiltelefoni.
In the alternative, it proposes compensatory measures, inter alia in the market for fixed telephony, in the market for Internet access and in the market for mobile telephony.
B påpeger også de forskellige skadevirkninger for konkurrenceudviklingen på det franske marked.
It points to the various effects on the development of competition in the French market.
For så vidt angår fasttelefonimarkedet ønsker B f.eks. regnskabsmæssig adskillelse og reelle administrative besparelser på FT's netaktiviteter for at undgå konkurrenceforvridende praksis.
In the fixed telephony market, it advocates, among other things, accounting separation and the creation of a genuine management system for France Télécom's network activities so as to prevent the pursuit of anticompetitive practices.
B foreslår også, at FT får pligt til at informere fasttelefonikunder om muligheden for frit operatørvalg på telefonopkald for at mindske den »enorme konkurrencefordel, som selskabet har ved nærmest at have monopol på markedet for telefontilslutninger og markederne for fremføring af telefonopkald«.
It also proposes the imposition on France Télécom of an obligation to inform fixed telephony subscribers about the possibility for them to choose their operator for the routing of their telephone calls so as to attenuate the ‘tremendous “competitive leverage” afforded it by its virtual monopoly in the market for access to the telephone network and in the markets for the routing of telephone communications’.
For mobiltelefonimarkedets vedkommende foreslår B bl.a., at Orange skal have pligt til at give adgang til mobile virtuelle netværksoperatører, som ønsker at komme ind på dette marked.
In the mobile telephony market, B proposes inter alia the imposition on Orange of an obligation to make a MVNO (Mobile Virtual Network Operator) offer to operators wishing to penetrate this market.
Bemærkninger fra Tiscalinet
Comments from Tiscalinet
Tiscalinet gør gældende, at statens tilkendegivelser fra 2. juli 2002 og frem viste markedet, at det var udelukket, at FT kunne gå i betalingsstandsning.
Tiscalinet argues that the declarations made by the State as from 2 July 2002 signal to the market that any compulsory administration of France Télécom is ruled out.
Samtidig valgte staten at modtage sit udbytte for 2002 i aktier i stedet for i kontanter, hvilket også var en måde for staten at vise markedet, at FT havde opbakning fra staten, mens en fornuftig investor ville have valgt at få udbyttet udbetalt kontant.
At the same time, the State's option for its 2002 dividends to be paid in shares and not in cash is another signal by the State to the market that it supports France Télécom even though a prudent investor would have opted for payment of the dividends in cash.
Tiscalinet tilføjer endvidere, at økonomi- og finansministerens indgriben over den franske offentlige finansieringsinstitution Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, der ejer 5 % af aktiekapitalen i selskabet, for at få institutionen til at blokere for omsætningen af aktierne og dermed gøre dem mindre flygtige og styrke investorernes tillid til dem, må rejse det spørgsmål, hvilken privat investor der kunne have handlet således.
Tiscalinet adds that the approaches made by the Minister for Economic Affairs and Finance to the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, which holds 5 % of the historical operator's capital, to induce it to block the securities to make them less volatile and strengthen investor confidence raises the question as to what private investor would have acted in that way.