natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
WestLB havde ingen indvendinger mod den CAPM-model, der var blevet anvendt til at beregne minimumsgodtgørelsen ved en investering i aktiekapital. WestLB mente dog ikke, at de betaværdier, som BdB var nået frem til, og som lå væsentligt over 1, var rimelige.
WestLB had no objections to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) method for calculating the minimum remuneration for a share-capital investment but felt that the beta values determined by the BdB — at well over 1 — were inappropriate.
En betafaktor på over 1 betyder nemlig, at en aktie i en virksomhed var forbundet med større risiko end markedet som helhed.
A beta factor of more than 1 meant that a company's shares represented a higher risk than the market as a whole.
Risikoen ved at investere i en delstatsbank havde imidlertid været betydeligt mindre end risikoen på markedet som helhed på grund af delstatens Anstaltslast (ejers forpligtelse til at sikre institutionens økonomiske grundlag) og Gewährträgerhaftung (ejers hæftelse for alle institutionens gældsforpligtelser), som den uden tvivl eksisterede dengang.
Yet the risk of investing in a Landesbank was well below the overall market risk because of the institutional liability (Anstaltslast) and guarantor liability (Gewährträgerhaftung) which it enjoyed and which were not challenged at the time.
I delstatsbankernes særlige tilfælde var det desuden forkert at gå ud fra den forrentning, der kunne forventes, på det tidspunkt, hvor formuerne blev overdraget til delstatsbankerne. Denne tilgang kunne anses for almengyldig for en privat investor.
Moreover, they argued that, in the specific case of the Landesbanks, it was a mistake to use as a benchmark the return expected at the time that the assets were transferred to the banks.
I det foreliggende tilfælde ville det dog betyde, at det var den forrentning, der forventedes i 1991, der skulle lægges til grund.
Although this was generally a sensible approach to adopt in relation to the private-investor test, it here meant using as a basis the returns expected in 1991.
For så vidt angår nedslaget, fordi de overdragne formuer ikke var likvide, mener WestLB og delstaten Nordrhein-Westfalen, at satsen for risikofrie statsobligationer fuldt ud skulle fratrækkes basisforrentningen.
As regards the discount for the lack of liquidity of the transferred assets, WestLB and the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia considered that the rate for risk-free government bonds should be deducted in full from the basic return.
Delstatsbankerne havde ikke modtaget likvide midler ved formueoverdragelserne.
They argued that the Landesbanks had received no liquidity as a result of the asset transfers.
Det ville være økonomisk uforsvarligt at reducere denne sats med skattebesparelsen, da prisen på kapitalmarkedsinstrumenter er uafhængig af skatteforholdene.
It was not defensible in economic terms to reduce this rate by the tax savings since the remuneration for capital market instruments was independent of the tax situation.
Var det ikke tilfældet, ville prisen på et kapitalmarkedsinstrument variere alt efter skatteforholdene.
Otherwise the price of a capital market instrument would have to differ according to tax considerations.
Endelig påpegede parterne, at det måtte betragtes som risiko- og dermed vederlagsnedsættende, at likviditeten på grund af formuernes manglende likviditet ikke var forbundet med nogen risiko. Dette måtte der tages højde for med et tilsvarende nedslag.
Finally, the fact that the assets’ lack of liquidity did not pose a risk to the liquidity position should be seen as reducing the risk — and hence the remuneration — and should be taken into account by applying a corresponding deduction.
Tilsvarende måtte der foretages et nedslag på grund af den såkaldte indehavervirkning, fordi en investor, der allerede har aktier i en virksomhed, betragter en yderligere investering anderledes end en ny investor.
Likewise, a discount should be granted on account of the ‘owner effect’ since an investor who already owned shares in a company took a different view of an additional investment from that of a new investor.
BEMÆRKNINGER FRA NORDLB OG DELSTATEN NIEDERSACHSEN
COMMENTS BY NORDLB AND THE LAND OF LOWER SAXONY
De bemærkninger, der blev fremsat af NordLB og delstaten Niedersachsen, blev også fremført af Tyskland. Disse bemærkninger præsenteres derfor sammen bemærkningerne fra Tyskland.
Since the observations made by NordLB and by the Land of Lower Saxony were also presented by the Federal Government, they are included here together with the comments by Germany.
BEMÆRKNINGER FRA TYSKLAND
COMMENTS BY GERMANY
Tyskland er af den opfattelse, at der også efter afgørelsen fra Retten i Første Instans, hersker grundlæggende tvivl om, hvorvidt offentlige investeringer i rentable virksomheder kan vurderes ud fra samme målestok som en privat investors investeringer.
Germany argues that, even after the decision by the Court of First Instance, there are still fundamental doubts as to whether investments in profitable undertakings by public authorities can be assessed using the private investor test.
Tyskland er også overbevist om, at delstaten Niedersachsens overdragelse af aktiver til NordLB ikke udgør statsstøtte, hvis man vurderer sagen ud fra de principper, som Kommissionen har anvendt i beslutning 2000/392/EF.
It is also convinced that the transfer of promotion-related assets to NordLB by the Land of Lower Saxony does not constitute aid according to the principles applied by the Commission in Decision 2000/392/EC.
På tidspunktet for overdragelsen af aktiverne til NordLB forpligtede NSGV, der foruden delstaten var den eneste anden andelshaver, sig til at foretage et indskud svarende til sin andel og på samme betingelser som delstaten, hvilket også senere skete.
In NordLB’s case, the only other partner besides the Land at the time the assets were transferred, i.e. NSGV, undertook to make a contribution corresponding in volume to that of the Land — proportionate to its own shareholding — and under similar conditions. It duly made such a contribution.
Allerede i denne situation har delstaten forholdt sig som en privat investor ved overdragelsen af aktiverne til NordLB.
In this respect, the Land already acted like a private investor in its transfer of the promotion-related assets to NordLB.
Derudover har NordLB også betalt en passende godtgørelse.
Moreover, Germany argued, NordLB also paid an appropriate remuneration.
Beregningsmetoden for minimumsgodtgørelsen, som BdB og Kommissionen (beslutning 2000/392/EF) har anvendt, er fejlbehæftet.
Germany argues that the BdB and the Commission were mistaken in the way they calculated the minimum remuneration in the Decision 2000/392/EC.
Af flere grunde er CAPM-modellen ikke egnet til at bestemme markedsforretningen.
The CAPM method is said to be unsuitable for determining the market return for a number of reasons.
Der havde ikke været uindskrænket rådighed over den formue, som blev overdraget til NordLB.
First, the assets transferred to NordLB were not freely available.
Die investeringsalternativer, som forudsættes med CAPM-modellen, fandtes hermed ikke i praksis.
This meant that the investment alternatives assumed under the CAPM method were practically non-existent.
Desuden havde den risiko, der blev ansat for markedsudsving ved CAPM-modellen, ikke foreligget, eftersom delstatsbankerne ikke var børsnoteret, indskuddet blev godtgjort med en fast rente, og delstatsbankerne på det pågældende tidspunkt stadig var omfattet af Anstaltslast og Gewährträgerhaftung.
The risk assumed in the CAPM to account for market fluctuations did not exist either, as the Landesbanks were not quoted on the stock exchange, the investment was remunerated at a fixed rate and at that time the Landesbanks still benefited from Anstaltslast (institutional liability) and Gewährträgerhaftung (guarantor liability).
Der var derfor heller ingen historiske data for betaværdier.
There were therefore no historical data series for beta factors.
I forbindelse med de særlige forhold ved overdragelsen af aktiverne skal der tages hensyn til, at formuens garantivirkning i forholdet indadtil er begrænset til en andel svarende til delstaten Niedersachsens andel af NordLB’s aktiekapital, og at delstaten kan gøre kompensationskrav gældende over for andre NordLB-garanter.
Among the special circumstances of the asset transfer, consideration should be given to the fact that the liability of the promotion-related assets is limited in accordance with the proportion of NordLB’s share capital held by the Land of Lower Saxony and that the Land is entitled to compensation from NordLB's other guarantors.
En investor ville ved sin investeringsbeslutning i høj grad have taget hensyn til, at formuen i forholdet udadtil hæfter ubegrænset for tab, men i forholdet indadtil kun hæfter for en andel svarende til delstaten Niedersachsens andel af NordLB’s aktiekapital.
In deciding to invest, an investor would pay particular attention to the fact that, although externally the promotion-related assets were exposed to loss without limitation, internally their liability was restricted to an amount corresponding to the share of NordLB’s capital held by the Land of Lower Saxony.
Delstaten Niedersachsen ville derfor kunne gøre kompensationskrav gældende over de andre NordLB-garanter, som alle er offentligretlige institutioner, og som ikke har risiko for at blive insolvente.
The Land was therefore entitled to compensation from NordLB's other guarantors — all of them public-law corporations — which ran no risk of insolvency.
For så vidt angår berettigelsen af et tillæg på grund af transaktionens ekstraordinært store volumen er det uforståeligt, hvordan dette skulle kunne bestemmes, og hvorfor det skulle berettige et tillæg.
With regard to a premium on account of the exceptionally high volume of the transaction, Germany cannot understand how such a volume is to be defined or why such a premium is justified.
Den overdragne formues andel af NordLB-koncernens banktilsynsretlige egenkapital udgjorde i 1992 kun 34,89 %.
In 1992 the assets transferred represented only 34,89 % of the total equity of the NordLB group recognised for supervisory purposes.
Denne andel er faldet til kun 9,62 % frem til 2001.
This proportion had fallen to a mere 9,62 % by 2001.
Disse beregninger bygger på, at NordLB’s egenkapital var 4,298 mia. DEM i 1992 og 15,596 mia. DEM i 2001.
The figures for NordLB’s equity capital used as a basis for these calculations are DEM 4298 million in 1992 and DEM 15596 million in 2001.
Disse tal for egenkapitalen inkluderer allerede LTS-formuen.
They already include the LTS assets.
Den undladte udstedelse af nye andele til delstaten Niedersachsen begrunder heller intet tillæg.
Germany also argues that no premium is justified on account of the failure to issue new shares to the Land of Lower Saxony.
På tidspunktet for overdragelsen af formuen havde NSGV forpligtet sig til at indskyde kapital svarende til sin andel af NordLB, hvilket også senere skete.
At the time of the transfer, NSGV gave an undertaking to inject capital in line with its share of NordLB, which it subsequently did.
Der havde derfor ikke været nogen grund til at forhøje delstatens andele.
There was therefore no reason to increase the shares held by the Land.
Endelig berettiger formuens manglende ombyttelighed heller ikke noget tillæg.
Finally, in Germany’s view, no premium is justified either for the lack of fungibility of the promotion-related assets.
Indskuddet af formuen sammenligner BdB og Kommissionen med en aktiekapitalinvestering i forbindelse med beregningen af mindsteforrentningen.
For the purposes of calculating the minimum return, the BdB and the Commission compared the asset transfer to a share-capital investment.
Aktiekapitalinvesteringer er dog lige så lidt ombyttelige som LTS-formuen.
But the fungibility of share-capital investments was just as low as that of the LTS promotion-related assets.
I tilfælde af at NordLB skulle være blevet begunstiget af overdragelsen af formuen, er denne begunstigelse kun en kompensation for de omkostninger, der pålægges NordLB på grund af udførelsen sine offentlige opgaver.
If NordLB were indeed favoured by the transfer of the promotion-related assets, the favourable treatment consisted only in compensation for NordLB for the costs it incurred for carrying out its public mandate.
NordLB er ikke kun en delstatsbank, men også en sparekasse i Braunschweig-området.
NordLB was not only the Land bank but also a savings bank in the Braunschweig area.
Derfor udfører banken ikke kun en delstatsbanks sædvanlige opgaver med de dermed forbundne omkostninger, banken har også en sparekassefunktion.
It therefore performed not only the traditional public tasks of a Land bank, with the attendant costs, but also the function of a savings bank.
Skulle der alligevel være tale om en støtte, så er der i alle tilfælde tale om en bestående støtteforanstaltning, da overdragelsen af formuen skete på grund af den endelige aftale vedrørende Anstaltslast, som blev endeligt aftalt i Bruxelles den 17. juli 2001.
If, nevertheless, there were aid in this case, it was in any event existing aid since the promotion-related assets had been transferred on the basis of Anstaltslast, on which a final settlement was reached by the Brussels compromise of 17 July 2001.
AFTALEN MELLEM BDB, DELSTATEN NIEDERSACHSEN OG NORDLB
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN BDB, THE LAND OF LOWER SAXONY AND NORDLB
Den 7. oktober 2004 modtog Kommissionen resultaterne af en aftale mellem klageren BdB, delstaten Niedersachsen og NordLB.
On 7 October 2004 the Commission was informed of the outcome of an understanding reached between the complainant BdB, the Land of Lower Saxony and NordLB.
Uden at det berører de principielle retsopfattelser, som aftaleparterne fortsat har, er parterne blevet enige om, hvad de selv anser for passende parametre til at fastsætte en passende godtgørelse, og om en passende godtgørelse.
Irrespective of their basic interpretations of the legal situation, which remained unchanged, the parties to the understanding agreed on what they themselves would regard as suitable parameters for determining an appropriate remuneration and as an appropriate remuneration.
Parterne har anmodet Kommissionen om at tage hensyn til resultaterne af aftalen, når den træffer sin afgørelse.
The parties asked the Commission to take account of the outcome of the understanding in its decision.
Parterne beregnede på basis af CAPM-modellen først den forventede minimumsgodtgørelse for en hypotetisk investering i NordLB's aktiekapital.
Applying the CAPM, the parties first determined a minimum remuneration for a hypothetical share-capital investment in NordLB.
Ifølge denne beregning skal en passende minimumsgodtgørelse for LTS-formuen fastsættes til 10,03 %.
They arrived at an appropriate minimum remuneration of 10,03 % for the LTS promotion-related assets.
Beregningen gik ud fra de langfristede risikofrie rentesatser, som delstatsbankerne var nået frem til ved hjælp af Deutsche Börse AG's REX10 Performance-indeks, og de betafaktorer, der var blevet anslået ud fra KPMG’s ekspertvurdering af 26. maj 2004 udarbejdet på foranledning af delstatsbankerne (og som er Kommissionen i hænde).
They took as their basis the risk-free interest rates of the REX1O Performance Index of Deutsche Börse AG and, for the beta factors, a KPMG report of 26 May 2004 drawn up on behalf of the Landesbanks (and now in the Commission's possession).
For NordLB betød det konkret en risikofri basisrentesats på 7,15 % på overdragelsestidspunktet pr. 31. december 1991. På grundlag af KPMG-undersøgelsen blev der anvendt en betafaktorværdi på 0,72.
In practical terms, a risk-free basic interest rate of 7,15 % was calculated for NordLB as at 31 December 1991 and a beta value of 0,72 was applied on the basis of the KPMG study.
Markedsrisikopræmien blev fastsat til 4 % (for alle delstatsbanker under ét).
The market-risk premium was set at 4 % (for all Landesbanks).
Derefter blev der fastsat et nedslag, fordi kapitalen ikke var likvid. Hertil blev den risikofri rentesats på 7,15 % igen anvendt som udgangspunkt for bruttoudgifterne ved refinansiering.
A deduction was then determined for the capital's lack of liquidity on the basis of the risk-free interest rate of 7,15 % as gross refinancing costs.
For at nå frem til nettoudgifterne ved refinansiering blev NordLB's samlede skattebyrde på overdragelsestidspunktet ansat til 50 %, hvilket giver et likvidetsnedslag på 3,75 %.
To determine the net refinancing costs, the standard tax burden of NordLB at the transfer date was fixed at a flat rate of 50 %, giving a liquidity discount of 3,75 %.
Endelig blev der fastsat et tillæg på 0,3 %, fordi der ikke blev tildelt stemmerettigheder.
Lastly, a premium of 0,3 % was added to allow for the failure to issue voting rights.
Efter skat gav det en passende godtgørelse for LTS-formuen på 6,76 % pr. år efter skat for den del af LTS-formuen, der kunne anvendes til konkurrencemæssige aktiviteter.
This resulted overall in an appropriate remuneration of 6,76 % per annum after tax for that portion of the LTS proportion-related assets that could be used for the competitive activities of NordLB.
Denne godtgørelse skal betales fra slutningen af måneden, hvor godkendelsen som kerneegenkapital fandt sted (30. november 1993).
This remuneration was payable as of the end of the month when the assets were recognised as core capital (30 November 1993).
Aftalen siger ikke noget om godtgørelse for den del af LTS-formuen, som ikke er til rådighed til NordLB’s konkurrencemæssige aktiviteter (garantiprovision).
The understanding makes no mention of any remuneration for that portion of the LTS promotion-related assets that could not be used for the competitive activities of NordLB (bank guarantee — Avalprovision).
Til vurdering af foranstaltningen i henhold til traktatens statsstøtteregler skal det i første række undersøges, om foranstaltningen udgør statsstøtte i medfør af EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
The first step in appraising the measure under the state aid rules of the EC Treaty is to assess whether it constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.
STATSMIDLER OG BEGUNSTIGELSE AF EN BESTEMT VIRKSOMHED
STATE RESOURCES AND FAVOURING OF A PARTICULAR UNDERTAKING
Som fremstillet i det foregående blev delstatens Niedersachsens andele af de tre LTS’ formuer overdraget til NordLB som egenkapital.
As described above, the Land of Lower Saxony’s shares in the promotion-related assets of the three LTS were transferred to NordLB as equity capital.
Hvis offentlige midler med kommerciel værdi overdrages til en virksomhed på denne måde, er der tale om statsstøtte jf. EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.
If state assets of this kind, which have a commercial value, are transferred to an undertaking, then state resources within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty are involved.
Ved undersøgelsen af, om overdragelsen af statsmidler til en offentlig virksomhed begunstiger denne virksomhed og dermed kan udgøre statsstøtte i medfør af EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, anvender Kommissionen »den markedsøkonomiske investors princip«.
In order to verify whether the transfer of state resources to a publicly owned undertaking favours the latter and is therefore liable to constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, the Commission applies the ‘market-economy investor principle’.
Dette princip blev accepteret (og videreudviklet) af Domstolen i en række sager.
This principle has been accepted (and developed) by the Court in a number of cases.
Vurderingen på grundlag af dette princip foretages i afsnit V, nr. 93 ff.
The assessment under that principle will be made in paragraph 93 et seq. below.
FORDREJNING AF KONKURRENCEVILKÅRENE OG PÅVIRKNING AF SAMHANDELEN MELLEM MEDLEMSSTATERNE
DISTORTION OF COMPETITION AND EFFECT ON TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES
Liberaliseringen af de finansielle tjenesteydelser og integrationen af finansmarkederne gør, at banksektoren i Fællesskabet bliver stadig mere følsom over for konkurrencefordrejninger, navnlig fordi de tilbageværende hindringer for fri konkurrence på markederne for finansielle tjenesteydelser gradvis fjernes.
As a result of the liberalisation of financial services and the integration of financial markets, banking within the Community has become increasingly sensitive to distortions of competition, especially since remaining obstacles to competition in the financial services markets are being gradually dismantled.
NordLB er en universalbank og en betydelig aktør på de internationale kapitalmarkeder.
NordLB is an all-purpose bank and an important player on the international capital markets.
NordLB udbyder banktjenester i konkurrence med andre europæiske banker i Tyskland og andre lande.
It offers banking services in competition with other European banks inside and outside Germany.
Støtte til NordLB har derfor en konkurrencefordrejende virkning, som påvirker samhandlen mellem medlemsstaterne.
Aid given to NordLB therefore distorts competition and affects trade between the Member States.
Der gøres endvidere opmærksom på, at der er en meget tæt sammenhæng mellem et kreditinstituts egenkapital og dets bankaktiviteter.
It should also be recalled that there is a close link between the equity of a credit institution and its banking activities.
En bank kan kun arbejde og udvide sine kommercielle aktiviteter, hvis der er tilstrækkelig godkendt egenkapital.
Only on the basis of sufficient accepted equity capital can a bank operate and expand its commercial operations.
Da NordLB som følge af den statslige foranstaltning fik et sådant egenkapitalgrundlag til solvensmæssige formål, blev bankens aktivitetsmuligheder direkte påvirket.
As the state measure provided NordLB with such equity capital for solvency purposes, it directly influenced the bank's business possibilities.
For at kunne vurdere, om en finansiel foranstaltning, som en offentlig kapitalindskyder træffer i sin virksomhed, indeholder elementer af statsstøtte jf. EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, anvender Kommissionen »den markedsøkonomiske investors princip«.
In deciding whether a financial measure taken by a public owner of an enterprise constitutes aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, the Commission applies the market-economy investor principle.
Dette princip er anvendt af Kommissionen i mange sager og accepteret og videreudviklet af Domstolen i en række afgørelser.
This principle has been applied by the Commission in many cases and has been accepted and developed by the Court of Justice of the European Communities in several decisions.
Det gør det muligt for Kommissionen at se nærmere på de særlige omstændigheder i den enkelte sag, f.eks. kan der tages hensyn til bestemte strategier i et holdingselskab eller en gruppe af foretagender eller sondres mellem en investors kort- og langsigtede interesser.
It allows the Commission to bear in mind the specific circumstances of each case, e.g. to take into account certain strategies of a holding company or group of companies or to distinguish between the short- and long-term interests of an investor.
Den markedsøkonomiske investors princip finder også anvendelse i den foreliggende sag.
The market-economy investor principle will also be applied to the case at hand.
Ifølge dette princip skal det ikke betragtes som statsstøtte, hvis der stilles midler til rådighed på »vilkår, som en privat investor ville finde acceptable at tilstå en tilsvarende privat virksomhed, når den private investor handler under normale markedsøkonomiske vilkår«.
According to the principle, no state aid is involved if funds are made available on ‘terms which a private investor would find acceptable in providing funds to a comparable private undertaking when the private investor is operating under normal market-economy conditions’.
Det understreges, at en finansiel foranstaltning ikke er acceptabel for en markedsøkonomisk investor, når den forventede forrentning af de indskudte midler er lavere end de godtgørelser, der betales for tilsvarende investeringer på markedet.
In particular, a financial measure must be considered unacceptable to a market-economy investor if the proposed remuneration arrangements are less attractive than the market-rate remuneration paid for comparable investments.