natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
ACT anfører først og fremmest, at licensen udgør statsstøtte efter liberaliseringen af den audiovisuelle sektor, og at der er tale om en ny støtte, da licensen udbetales til kanalerne hvert år. ACT konkluderer, at Kommissionen burde have ladet licensen indgå i de foranstaltninger, der er omfattet af den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure.
The ACT claimed, firstly, that the licence fee constituted State aid following the liberalisation of broadcasting and that it was new aid, since the licence fee was paid to France 2 and France 3 each year.
ACT vurderer endvidere, at licensen ikke kan erklæres forenelig med det fælles marked på grundlag af traktatens artikel 87, stk. 3, litra c), og heller ikke traktatens artikel 86, stk. 2.
It concluded from this that the Commission should have included the licence fee among the measures covered by the formal investigation procedure and took the view that the licence fee could not be declared compatible with the common market under Article 87(3)(c) or Article 86(2) of the Treaty.
Finansieringen af France 2 og France 3 forekommer ACT at være ubegrundet, da de private kanaler har de samme public service-forpligtelser som de offentlige kanaler, dog uden at de modtager den samme finansielle kompensation fra staten.
The public funding of France 2 and France 3 was unjustified in its opinion insofar as the private broadcasters had similar public service obligations to those of the public broadcasters but did not receive the same financial compensation from the State.
Hvad angår investeringsstøtten og kapitalindskuddene, mener ACT ikke, at disse støtteforanstaltninger er knyttet til et bestemt kulturelt projekt, og støtten kan derfor ikke retfærdiggøres i medfør af traktatens artikel 87, stk. 3, litra d).
As regards the investment grants and capital injections, the ACT took the view that such aid was not linked to a precise cultural project and consequently could not be justified pursuant to Article 87(3)(d) of the Treaty.
ACT mener derimod, at der er tale om driftsstøtte, og at undtagelsen for statsstøtte til redning og omstrukturering af kriseramte virksomheder ikke kan finde anvendelse i dette tilfælde, da de franske myndigheder ikke har fremsendt omstruktureringsplanen for tv-kanalerne til Kommissionen.
It also considered that the measures constituted operating aid and that the exemption for rescue and restructuring aid to firms in difficulty could not be applied to the case in point since the French authorities had not communicated the restructuring plan for the broadcasters to the Commission.
Efter at have mindet om den metode, Kommissionen skal anvende for at vurdere statsstøtte på grundlag af traktatens artikel 86, stk. 2, anfører ACT endelig, at investeringsstøtten og kapitalindskuddene i denne sag ikke opfylder de kriterier, der er opstillet i denne artikel, da der er tale om ekstraordinære og midlertidige støtteforanstaltninger, der ikke blev udbetalt for at finansiere yderligere public service-forpligtelser.
Lastly, after recalling the methodology that the Commission should follow for assessing State aid in the light of Article 86(2) of the Treaty, the ACT argued that the investment grants and capital injections under examination did not meet the criteria laid down by that provision insofar as they constituted exceptional, temporary aid and were not paid in order to finance additional public service tasks.
ACT konkluderer med at anmode Kommissionen om at vedtage en endelig negativ beslutning vedrørende investeringsstøtten til France 2 og France 3 og kapitalindskuddene til France 2, at indlede en formel undersøgelsesprocedure vedrørende licensen og at fremlægge yderligere oplysninger om de to kanalers public service-forpligtelser og om indholdet af omstruktureringsplanen.
In conclusion, the ACT therefore called on the Commission to adopt a negative final decision on the investment grants paid to France 2 and France 3 and the capital injections granted to France 2, to initiate the formal investigation procedure in respect of the licence fee and to provide it with fuller information on the public service obligations of the two broadcasters and the content of their reorganisation plan.
KOMMENTARER FRA FRANKRIG
COMMENTS FROM FRANCE
Om indledningen af den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure
Decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure
De franske myndigheder fremlagde deres bemærkninger til indledningen af den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure i brev af 10. december 1999.
The French authorities commented by letter dated 10 December 1999 on the decision to initiate the formal investigation procedure.
De anfører, at deres breve af 20. december 1996 og 29. april 1999 indgår i disse kommentarer.
They stated that their letters dated 20 December 1996 and 29 April 1999 formed an integral part of those comments.
Argumenterne i disse to breve gengives kun her, hvis de ikke allerede er fremført i brev af 10. december 1999.
The points developed in those two letters will be summarised here only where they did not appear already in the letter of 10 December 1999.
De franske myndigheder redegør først for følgerne af liberaliseringen af den audiovisuelle sektor.
The French authorities began by reviewing the consequences of the liberalisation of broadcasting.
De mener, at privatiseringen af TF1 på brutal og uforudsigelig vis ødelagde France 2’s økonomiske balance, da TF1’s reklameindtægter fra 1987 tog et kraftigt opsving, mens France 2’s reklameindtægter blev udhulet.
They considered that the privatisation of TF1 had suddenly and unexpectedly weakened France 2’s financial stability since, from 1987 onwards, TF1’s advertising income rose steeply while that of France 2 stagnated.
De franske myndigheder har to forklaringer på denne udvikling: For det første blev TF1's programflade ændret af kommercielle hensyn og rettet mod »husmødre under 50 år«, der udgjorde den seergruppe, som annoncørerne var mest interesseret i, mens de offentlige kanaler henvender sig til en bredere og mere forskelligartet seerskare. For det andet foreskriver de lovgivningsmæssige og administrative bestemmelser en mere begrænset adgang til reklameindtægter for offentlige operatører end for private operatører.
The French authorities ascribed that trend to two factors: on the one hand, TF1’s programme schedule had been redirected, for commercial reasons, towards housewives under 50 years of age, the audience of most interest to advertisers, whereas the target audience for the public broadcasters was broad and diversified; on the other hand, the rules laid down by law and regulatory action allowed public broadcasters more limited access to advertising resources than private broadcasters.
Endvidere var der en kraftig inflation i omkostningerne til køb og produktion af programmer.
Programme purchase and production costs had also risen sharply.
Da antallet af operatører blev fordoblet på fire år, blev konkurrencen hårdere på markedet for programmer, mens nye operatører kom på markedet med ny likviditet.
Since the number of broadcasters had doubled in the space of four years, competition had become keener on the programmes market, while the new operators had injected additional cash into that market.
Resultatet var, at programpriserne steg uanset genre.
As a result, the costs of programmes of all types had increased.
For at opveje denne inflation trak de to public service-kanaler på deres lager af programmer.
To compensate for such inflation, the two public broadcasters drew from their stock of programmes.
Da de havde færre økonomiske ressourcer, der sjældnere blev fornyet, blev programmerne mindre attraktive, hvilket førte til et faldende seertal for France 2 og dermed til faldende reklameindtægter.
Since they received less funding and were less frequently renewed, those programmes became less attractive, causing among other things a slump in France 2’s audience and therefore a fall in its advertising revenue.
Faldende reklameindtægter og højere omkostninger betød således en forværring af de to public service-kanalers økonomiske situation.
Falling advertising incomes and rising costs thus brought about a deterioration in the financial situation of the two public broadcasters.
De franske myndigheder hævder, at staten var nødt til at gribe ind for at sikre public service-kanalernes overlevelse og udførelsen af deres public service-opgaver for på den måde at sikre pluralisme.
The French authorities claimed that the State was forced to intervene in order to ensure the continued operation of the public channels and performance of their public service tasks, thereby maintaining pluralism.
Disse public service-opgaver viser sig ved en generel kvalitativ forpligtelse og en specifik programsætning.
Those public service tasks were reflected in a general obligation to achieve certain quality standards and to broadcast specific types of programme.
De bygger på den opfattelse, at tilstedeværelsen af public service-kanaler med et generelt programudbud rettet mod et tilstrækkelig bredt publikum er en betingelse for pluralisme, programbredde og en differentieret støtte til audiovisuel og cinematografisk skabelse.
They derived from the notion that the existence of general-interest public channels reaching a sufficiently wide audience was a necessary condition for pluralism of information, variety of programmes and diversified support for TV and film production.
Udførelsen af disse opgaver medfører ekstra omkostninger for public service-kanalerne og et tab på reklamesiden.
The performance of these tasks resulted in both an additional cost and a loss of advertising income for the public broadcasters.
Fra 1988 til 1994 var forværringen af deres økonomiske situation ved at bringe selve deres eksistens i fare og skade en korrekt udførelse af deres public service-opgaver.
Between 1988 and 1994, the deterioration in their economic situation threatened to jeopardise their survival and thus obstruct the performance of their public service tasks.
Staten måtte derfor gribe ind og yde investeringsstøtte og foretage kapitalindskud.
The State therefore had to intervene through investment grants and capital injections.
Stigningen i licensen kunne imidlertid ikke opveje den hurtige stigning i programomkostningerne og dæmme op for kanalernes økonomiske deroute.
The spontaneous growth of the licence fee could not absorb the rapid increase in programme costs and halt the broadcasters’ economic decline.
De franske myndigheder fandt statens indgriben til fordel for France 2 og France 3 forenelig med fællesmarkedet, både traktatens artikel 86, stk. 2, og artikel 87, stk. 3, litra c), samt rammebestemmelserne for statsstøtte til redning og omstrukturering af kriseramte virksomheder [8].
The French authorities considered that the State intervention in favour of France 2 and France 3 was compatible with the common market pursuant to both Article 86(2) and Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty and the Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty [8].
De franske myndigheder begrundede investeringsstøtten til France 2 og France 3 med nødvendigheden af at hjælpe tv-kanalerne med at klare de stigende programomkostninger.
They argued that the investment grants awarded to France 2 and France 3 were justified by the need to help them cope with the increase in programme costs.
Som følge af en revision udført af Coopers & Lybrand udarbejdede de to public service-kanaler en strategiplan i juli 1991, der for begge kanalers vedkommende indeholdt et forslag til intern omstrukturering og en social plan, der skulle give besparelser, og som fastsatte en strategi for bedre at kunne modsvare seernes forventninger, samtidig med at kanalernes public service-karakter blev understreget.
Furthermore, following an audit by the consultants Coopers & Lybrand, the two public broadcasters drew up a strategic plan in July 1991, comprising for each channel an internal reorganisation plan and a redundancy programme designed to generate savings, and setting out a strategy for meeting viewers’ expectations more effectively while asserting their specific identity as public service broadcasters.
Staten ledsagede gennemførelsen af denne strategiplan gennem yderligere finansiering i form af den allerede nævnte investeringsstøtte, og for France 2’s vedkommende et kapitalindskud for at rette op på selskabets resultat.
The State supported the implementation of this strategic plan with additional finance in the form of the abovementioned investment grants and in the case of France 2, a capital injection in order to consolidate the structure of its balance sheet.
Da det første kapitalindskud på 500 mio. FRF viste sig at være utilstrækkeligt, besluttede staten at foretage yderligere to kapitalindskud i France 2 i 1993 og 1994, således at sidstnævnte skete som følge af en ny revision udført af Coopers & Lybrand og sideløbende med en ny besparelsesplan.
The first injection of FRF 500 million having proved insufficient, the State decided to grant France 2 two more capital injections in 1993 and 1994, the latter being implemented following a fresh audit by Coopers & Lybrand and at the same time as a further cost cutting plan.
Denne rekapitalisering gjorde det muligt at sanere France 2’s økonomiske situation.
These recapitalisation measures enabled France 2’s financial situation to be put onto a sounder footing.
De franske myndigheder mente, at disse finansielle foranstaltninger gjorde det muligt for de to public service-kanaler at indstille sig på en ny konkurrencesituation.
The French authorities consider that these financing measures enabled the two public broadcasters to adjust to the new competitive environment.
De franske myndigheder mindede om, at støtten til public service-kanalerne blev ydet som led i en generel omdefinering af deres public service-opgaver og af deres forbindelser med staten via indgåelse af målaftaler.
The French authorities pointed out that the aid measures for the public broadcasters were granted against a general background of the redefinition of their public service tasks and their relations with the State through the conclusion of target-setting contracts.
Endelig nævnte de franske myndigheder, at markedet for seertal, programmer og audiovisuel reklame er nationale markeder, og de bebrejdede Kommissionen, at den ikke havde påvist, på hvilken måde samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne var blevet påvirket af disse statslige økonomiske foranstaltninger.
They stated, lastly, that the markets in television audiences, programmes and advertising were national in size and claimed that the Commission had not demonstrated how intra-Community trade had been affected by the public financing measures in question.
I deres svar af 29. april 1999 kommenterede de franske myndigheder France 2’s og France 3’s stilling på markedet for indkøb af audiovisuelle rettigheder og reklamer.
In their reply dated 29 April 1999, the French authorities commented on the position of France 2 and France 3 on the markets in the acquisition of broadcasting rights and advertising.
De nævnte, at public service-kanalerne ikke er i stand til at true de kommercielle kanalers stilling på markedet for indkøb af audiovisuelle rettigheder og reklamer, da deres økonomiske midler er begrænsede, og da de skal tilbyde en differentieret programsætning, hvorimod de kommercielle kanaler kun tilbyder programmer, der er attraktive, hvad angår seertal. De franske myndigheder bestred ligeledes, at France 2 og France 3 havde haft en »kunstigt lav« prispolitik, hvad angår salg af reklametid.
They stated that the public broadcasters were unable to threaten the positions of the commercial channels on the markets in the acquisition of broadcasting rights, since their financial capacities were smaller and their programming had to meet standards of quality and diversity, whereas the commercial channels offered only programmes that were attractive in terms of audience ratings.
De gjorde navnlig gældende, at France 2’s priser for reklametid generelt kun ligger 5-10 % under TF1’s priser, selv om reklameeffekten er halvt så stor. Prisforskellen mellem de to public service-kanaler og TF1 afspejler kun forskellen i reklameindslagenes rækkevidde.
The French authorities also denied that France 2 and France 3 had pursued an ‘artificially low’ pricing policy in the sale of advertising slots: they argued among other things that France 2’s advertising rates were on the whole only 5 to 10 % lower than TF1’s, although the latter’s slots were twice as powerful; the difference between the prices applied by the two public broadcasters and TF1 merely reflected the difference in the power of their advertising slots.
Om ATC’s bemærkninger
Comments from the ATC
Ved brev af 15. juni 2000 modtog Kommissionen de franske myndigheders kommentarer til ACT’s bemærkninger.
By letter dated 15 June 2000, the French authorities sent the Commission their reactions to the comments from the ATC.
De minder om, at licensen efter deres opfattelse udgør en eksisterende støtte og bestrider, at de private luftbårne tv-kanaler er underlagt de samme public service-forpligtelser som de offentlige.
They reiterated their view that the licence fee constituted existing aid and denied that the private terrestrial channels were subject to similar obligations to those of the public broadcasters.
De bekræfter deres analyse, ifølge hvilken den investeringsstøtte og det kapitalindskud, som denne beslutning omhandler, er forenelige med fællesmarkedet ifølge traktatens artikel 86, stk. 2, og artikel 87, stk. 3, litra c), og de anfører, at de ikke har bedt om, at artikel 87, stk. 3, litra d), vedrørende fremme af kulturen anvendes.
They maintained that the investment grants and capital injections covered by this Decision were compatible with the common market pursuant to both Article 86(2) and Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty and pointed out that they had not requested the application of Article 87(3)(d) concerning the promotion of culture.
Endelig anfører de, at det er Kommissionens opgave at vurdere, om de oplysninger, den råder over, er tilstrækkelige til at afslutte proceduren, og at de offentlige dokumenter kan udleveres til ACT.
They ended by stating that it was for the Commission to assess whether the information in its possession was sufficient in order to bring the procedure to an end and whether the public documents could be communicated to the ACT.
V. VURDERING AF FORANSTALTNINGERNE
V. ASSESSMENT OF THE MEASURES
Det hedder i traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, at »Bortset fra de i denne traktat hjemlede undtagelser er statsstøtte eller støtte, som ydes ved hjælp af statsmidler under enhver tænkelig form, og som fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene ved at begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner, uforenelig med fællesmarkedet i det omfang, den påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne«.
Article 87(1) of the Treaty provides that ‘save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market’.
For at en finansiel foranstaltning således udgør statsstøtte efter traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, skal følgende betingelser alle være opfyldt:
Consequently, for a measure to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty, all of the following conditions must be met:
støtten skal ydes af en medlemsstat ved hjælp af statsmidler
the aid must be granted by a Member State using State resources,
støtten skal begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse sektorer og derved fordreje eller true med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene
it must favour certain undertakings or certain sectors and thereby distort or threaten to distort competition,
støtten skal påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne.
it must affect trade between Member States.
Om statsmidlerne
State resources
Den investeringsstøtte og de kapitalindskud, som denne beslutning vedrører, stammer fra statens budget.
The grants and capital injections covered by this Decision come from the French national budget.
Ydelsen af støtten og indskuddene følger af en lovgivningsmæssig eller administrativ bestemmelse.
They were awarded by virtue of a legislative instrument or a regulatory decision.
At der således er tale om statsmidler for de omhandlede foranstaltningers vedkommende, og at de kan tilskrives staten, er derfor helt uden for enhver tvivl.
Consequently, there can be no doubt that they involve State resources and can be imputed to the State.
Om den selektive fordel og konkurrenceforvridningen
Selective advantage and distortion of competition
Den støtte, som France 2 og France 3 modtog i perioden 1988 til 1994, udgjorde økonomiske midler, som de to public service-kanaler kunne anvende til at finansiere deres aktiviteter eller til at investere, og som de modtog uden at skulle trække på deres egne ressourcer og uden at skulle låne på markedet.
All the grants received by France 2 and France 3 between 1988 and 1994 constituted financial resources which the public broadcasters were able to use in order to finance their activities or make investments and which they obtained without having to draw on their own resources or borrow on the market.
Støtten udgjorde derfor en fordel.
The grants therefore constituted an advantage.
Der er endvidere tale om en selektiv fordel, da det udelukkende var de to public service-kanaler, der modtog støtte, og ikke alle tv-operatører — offentlige og private.
The advantage was also selective since only the two public broadcasters benefited and not all television operators, whether public or private.
I perioden 1988-1994 foretog den franske stat ligeledes tre kapitalindskud i France 2.
During the period 1988 to 1994, the French State also made three capital injections into France 2.
Kommissionen mener normalt ikke, at et statsligt kapitalindskud i en virksomhed udgør en selektiv fordel for virksomheden, hvis indskuddet foretages på vilkår, som en privat investor under normale markedsøkonomiske forhold ville acceptere.
The Commission normally takes the view that a State capital injection into an enterprise does not constitute a selective advantage for the latter if it is made in circumstances that would be acceptable for a private investor operating under normal market economy conditions.
Det markedsøkonomiske investorprincip kan i sagens natur kun anvendes på investeringer i kommercielle aktiviteter, hvor der forventes en normal forrentning.
This market economy private investor test can, because of its very nature, be applied only to investments in commercial activities from which a normal return is expected.
I dette tilfælde har France 2 til opgave at udvikle og programsætte tv-udsendelser i overensstemmelse med de opgaver, staten har pålagt selskabet, og en stor del af France 2’s aktiviteter er derfor direkte finansieret af staten via licensen.
In the case in point, France 2 is engaged in making and programming television broadcasts in line with the tasks entrusted to it by the State, and a large share of its activity is on that account directly financed by the State via the licence fee.
Formålet med programsætningen er ikke at maksimere den kommercielle indtjening.
Its programming is not intended to maximise its commercial revenues.
Da staten indskød kapital i France 2, var hovedformålet således ikke at opnå en maksimal forrentning. Den franske stat indskød derfor ikke kapital i France 2 med en markedsøkonomisk investors begrundelse.
By injecting capital into France 2, the French State’s prime objective was not therefore to obtain an optimum return; it therefore did not have the same motives as a private investor operating in a market economy.
I de franske myndigheders bemærkninger af 20. december 1996 og 29. april 1999 anførte disse, at staten havde optrådt som en markedsøkonomisk investor.
In their comments dated 20 December 1996 and 29 April 1999, the French authorities argued that the French State had acted as a market economy private investor would have done.