natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Det europæiske marked for charterflyvninger til Middelhavsområdet er af følgende årsager væsentligt forskelligt fra markedet for ruteflyvninger: Charterflyvninger sælges praktisk talt kun i den ene ende af en flyrute.
‘Such market shares are not included in the SH&E analysis and, consequently, in KLM's notification.
Passagerer på charterflyvninger køber deres pladser hos rejsearrangører, mens passagerer på ruteflyvninger hovedsagelig køber deres pladser hos rejsebureauer eller direkte hos luftfartsselskabet. Pladser på charterflyvninger sælges til rejsearrangører i modsætning til pladser på ruteflyvninger, der kun sælges til rejsearrangører i små kvoter.
Martinair only operates as a non- scheduled carrier on Mediterranean destinations, as a result of which there is no overlap between the activities of Martinair and Transavia within the non-scheduled Mediterranean market.
Den kommercielle risiko forbundet med charterflyvninger bæres af en eller flere rejsearrangører, mens den kommercielle risiko forbundet med ruteflyvninger bæres af luftfartsselskabet.
The European non-scheduled Mediterranean market is substantially different from a scheduled market for the reasons described below:
Ved ruteflyvninger er der ingen afbestillingsgebyrer, eller reglerne herom er i hvert fald langt mere lempelige. På chartermarkedet findes der langt flere og mere forskelligartede aktører.
non-scheduled (charter) traffic is sold virtually only at one end of the route; passengers on non-scheduled (charter) flights buy their seats from a tour operator, while passengers on scheduled flights buy predominantly from travel agents or directly with the airline involved; seats on non-scheduled (charter) flights are sold to tour operators, contrary to seats on scheduled flights which are only sold to tour operators in small allotments; non-scheduled (charter) flights are operated at the commercial risk of one or more tour operators, the commercial risk of scheduled flights is with the air carrier; penalties for cancellation on scheduled flights are non-existing or, at least, much more liberal; the non-scheduled (charter) market has many more and different players.
Medregnes Transavias ruteflyvninger i markedsunderlaget, vil det samlede markedsunderlag nødvendigvis blive betydeligt udvidet, da det så også vil være nødvendigt at medregne andre luftfartsselskabers ruteflyvninger …« [34]»Such market shares are not included in the SH&E analysis and, consequently, in KLM's notification. Martinair only operates as a non-scheduled carrier on Mediterranean destinations, as a result of which there is no overlap between the activities of Martinair and Transavia within the non-scheduled Mediterranean market. The European non-scheduled Mediterranean market is substantially different from a scheduled market for the reasons described below: non-scheduled (charter) traffic is sold virtually only at one end of the route; passengers on non-scheduled (charter) flights buy their seats from a tour operator, while passengers on scheduled flights buy predominantly from travel agents or directly with the airline involved; seats on non-scheduled (charter) flights are sold to tour operators, contrary to seats on scheduled flights which are only sold to tour operators in small allotments; non-scheduled (charter) flights are operated at the commercial risk of one or more tour operators, the commercial risk of scheduled flights is with the air carrier; penalties for cancellation on scheduled flights are non-existing or, at least, much more liberal; the non-scheduled (charter) market has many more and different players. The information provided in response to the Commission's request for information can not be added to the KLM Group's market share provided on p. 62 of the notification. Including Transavia scheduled flights into the market base would necessarily lead to a substantial increase of the total market base, since scheduled flights by other carriers should then be included as well …«
…’ [34].(31) The information required by Form CO in relation to market definition is described in Section 6.
I CO-formularens del 6 er det tydeligt angivet, hvilke oplysninger der skal gives i relation til markedsdefinitionen. Heri benyttes følgende definition af det relevante produktmarked: »Ved et relevant produktmarked forstås markedet for alle de varer og/eller tjenesteydelser, som forbrugerne på grundlag af deres art, pris og anvendelsesformål betragter som substituerende produkter.
In Section 6.I, the following definition of the relevant product market is used: ‘A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the product's characteristics, their prices and their intended use.
Et relevant produktmarked kan i visse tilfælde bestå af flere enkelte varer og/eller tjenesteydelser, som stort set frembyder identiske fysiske eller tekniske egenskaber og er indbyrdes substituerbare«.
A relevant product market may in some cases be composed of a number of individual products and/or services which present largely identical physical or technical characteristics and are interchangeable.’
Da visse pladser på Transavias ruteflyvninger sælges til rejsearrangører til samme pris og på samme økonomiske vilkår (garanti) som pladser på charterflyvninger, betragter Kommissionen salget af alle disse pladser som tilhørende et og samme produktmarked.
In view of the fact that certain seats on Transavia's scheduled flights are sold to package tour operators at the same price and under the same economic condition (guaranteed) as seats on charter flights, these sales are considered by the Commission to form part of the same product market.
Skønt denne markedsdefinition vil betyde, at det også kan være nødvendigt at lade det relevante produktmarked omfatte pladser solgt til andre luftfartsselskabers ruteflyvninger, kan KLM ikke blot udelade disse oplysninger.
The fact that such a market definition would mean that seats sold on scheduled flights performed by other airlines might also have to be included into the relevant product market cannot serve to allow KLM to omit this information.
Kommissionen bemærker, at KLM var af den overbevisning, at pladser solgt til rejsearrangører på Transavias ruteflyvninger ikke tilhørte samme marked som pladser solgt på charterflyvninger.
The Commission notes that KLM believed that seats sold to tour operators on scheduled Transavia flights did not form part of the same market as seats sold on charter flights.
Selv hvis det var tilfældet, burde disse aktiviteter have været nævnt i svaret på CO-formularens spørgsmål 6.2 som aktiviteter på et marked, som er nært beslægtet med det berørte marked (de såkaldte »tilgrænsende markeder«).
However, even under that assumption those activities should have been mentioned in response to Question 6.2 of Form CO as activities in a ‘market closely related to the affected market’ (so-called neighbouring markets).
Formålet med spørgsmålet om aktiviteter på tilgrænsende markeder er netop at få de fornødne oplysninger frem i de tilfælde, hvor parterne har benyttet en snævrere markedsdefinition end Kommissionen.
The purpose of the question on neighbouring markets is precisely to obtain the necessary information in cases where the parties have used a market definition which may be narrower than the one retained by the Commission.
KLM gav en detaljeret forklaring på, hvorfor selskabet mente, at ruteflyvninger ikke udgjorde en del af det relevante produktmarked, og det var derfor klar over, at dette var et marked, der var nært beslægtet med det relevante produktmarked.
KLM gave a detailed explanation of why in its view scheduled flights did not form part of the relevant product market and was therefore aware that its was a market which was closely related.
KLM efterlod ikke en blank rubrik under spørgsmål 6.2 om tilgrænsende markeder.
In its response to Question 6.2 on neighbouring markets KLM did not leave the respective chapter blank.
KLM henviste til sine egne og Martinairs interesser i rejsearrangører og til sin deltagelse i et edb-reservationssystem.
KLM referred to its and Martinair's shareholding in tour operators and to its participation in a computer reservation system.
KLM nævnte endvidere, at Martinair havde charterflyvninger til andre destinationer (Caribien), og at KLM og Martinair havde ruteflyvninger til forskellige andre destinationer [35].
It further stated that Martinair had charter flight operations to other destinations (Caribbean) and that KLM and Martinair had scheduled flights to various other destinations [35].
I denne forbindelse forstærker KLM's detaljerede beskrivelse af andre tilgrænsende aktiviteter det indtryk, at oplysningerne er komplette, og det gør udeladelsen vildledende.
In that context, the detailed description by KLM of other neighbouring activities reinforces the impression that the information is complete and makes the omission misleading.
V. RETLIG VURDERING
V. LEGAL ASSESSMENT
Oplysninger om Transavias charterdestinationer
Information on Transavia's Charter Destinations
Oplysningerne i oversigten på side 40 i CO-formularen over Transavias charterdestinationer er urigtige, idet mindst ti destinationer, hvoraf de fleste er meget betydelige destinationer, ikke er nævnt.
The information given in the table on page 40 of Form CO on Transavia charter destinations is incorrect in that at least 10 destinations, most of them very important ones, are not mentioned.
Urigtigheden af disse oplysninger forstærkes af det udsagn, der optræder lige før oversigten, nemlig at Martinairs og Transavias aktiviteter i vid udstrækning supplerer hinanden [36].
The incorrectness of the information is reinforced by the statement preceding the table that ‘Transavia's and Martinair's charter services are to a large extent complementary’ [36].
Udeladelsen af vigtige spanske, portugisiske og græske destinationer i oversigten giver ikke mindst det ukorrekte indtryk, at overlapningen mellem Transavias og Martinairs aktiviteter kun er begrænset.
In particular, by omitting important Spanish, Portuguese and Greek destinations the table gives the incorrect impression that the overlap in operations between Transavia and Martinair is only limited.
Udtalelsen om komplementaritet på side 39 kan ikke kun henvise til størrelsen af selskabernes fly, når henses til udtalelsens placering umiddelbart før oversigten.
The reference on page 39 to services being complementary can not be understood as relating only to the size of the planes, given the context in which the statement was made — immediately before the table.
Oplysningen om, at Transavia flyver til »andre« destinationer end Martinair, forstærker det falske indtryk, som læseren får af oversigten.
Furthermore, the statement that Transavia operates to destinations ‘other’ than those of Martinair supports the false impression which the reader gains from the table.
Med afgivelsen af disse urigtige oplysninger blev der handlet groft uagtsomt.
The supply of that incorrect information was grossly negligent.
Selv hvis parternes forklaring om brugen af Transavias in-flight magazine godtages, er handlingen udtryk for en høj grad af uagtsomhed.
Even if the parties' explanation concerning the use of Transavia's in-flight magazine is accepted, then a high degree of negligence is involved.
Et in-flight magazine er et markedsførings- eller reklameblad, som ikke nødvendigvis indeholder helt præcise oplysninger.
An in-flight magazine is a marketing or promotional brochure where accuracy is not necessarily guaranteed.
Parterne burde have benyttet en mere troværdig informationskilde, f.eks. interne statistikker fra Transavia eller Transavias fartplan, som Kommissionen modtog senere.
The parties should have used a more reliable source of information, such as internal statistics of Transavia or the Transavia timetable which was later sent to the Commission.
Da Transavia er et helejet datterselskab af KLM, ville disse oplysninger have været umiddelbart tilgængelige for KLM.
As Transavia is a fully controlled subsidiary that information was readily available to KLM.
KLM's manglende afgivelse af korrekte oplysninger på dette punkt udgør følgelig en overtrædelse, for hvilken selskabet kan pålægges en bøde i henhold til fusionsforordningens artikel 14, stk. 1, litra b).
Accordingly, KLM's failure to supply correct information on this point constitutes an infringement for which a fine may be imposed under Article 14(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation.
Udeladelsen af enhver oplysning om, at Transavia har ruteflyvninger til destinationer i Middelhavsområdet, og om Transavias salg af pladser på disse flyvninger til rejsearrangører gør oplysningerne om Transavia både vildledende og urigtige i den betydning, der anvendes i artikel 14, stk. 1, litra b).
The omission of any information indicating that Transavia has scheduled flights to Mediterranean destinations and that Transavia sells seats on those flights to tour operators makes the information provided on Transavia both misleading and incorrect within the meaning of Article 14 (1)(b) of the Merger Regulation.
Den manglende omtale af Transavias ruteflyvninger til Middelhavsområdet er — set i sammenhæng med resten af oplysningerne i CO-formularen — ikke blot en simpel udeladelse af oplysninger, men, som forklaret ovenfor (i afsnit III og IV), en handling, der i væsentlig grad vildleder læseren, da den tegner et fordrejet billede af virkeligheden.
Not to refer to Transavia's scheduled Mediterranean flights is, in the context of the rest of the information provided in the Form CO, not a matter of a simple omission but, as explained above (Sections III and IV), substantively misleads the reader as it gives a distorted picture of the true facts.
Oplysningerne er derfor både urigtige og vildledende i den betydning, der anvendes i fusionsforordningens artikel 14, stk. 1, litra b).
Thus, the information is both incorrect and misleading within the meaning of Article 14(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation.
Kommissionen kan ikke udelukke, at KLM forsætligt tilbageholdt oplysningerne om Transavias ruteflyvninger.
The Commission cannot exclude the possibility that KLM intentionally withheld the information on Transavia's scheduled flights.
Der er i det mindste tale om en høj grad af uagtsomhed, eftersom KLM har eller burde have haft fuldt kendskab til oplysningerne, deres relevans og kravet om at anføre dem i CO-formularen.
At the very least a high degree of negligence is involved, since the information, its relevance, and the requirement to provide it in Form CO, are or should have been well-known to KLM.
KLM's manglende angivelse af disse oplysninger udgør derfor også en overtrædelse, for hvilken selskabet kan pålægges en bøde.
Accordingly, KLM's failure to include this information is also an infringement in respect of which a fine can be imposed.
BØDEPÅLÆG
IMPOSITION OF FINES
I henhold til fusionsforordningens artikel 14, stk. 1, litra b), kan Kommissionen ved beslutning pålægge de i artikel 3, stk. 1, litra b), omhandlede personer samt virksomheder eller sammenslutninger af virksomheder bøder på 1000 til 50000 EUR, såfremt de forsætligt eller uagtsomt fremsætter urigtige eller vildledende oplysninger i en anmeldelse i henhold til artikel 4.
Under Article 14(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation, the Commission may impose on undertakings fines of from EUR 1000 to EUR 50000 where, intentionally or negligently, they supply incorrect or misleading information in a notification pursuant to Article 4 of the Merger Regulation.
Ved fastsættelsen af bødens størrelse skal Kommissionen tage hensyn til overtrædelsens art og grovhed, jf. artikel 14, stk. 3.
Under Article 14(3), in setting the amount of the fine, the Commission is to take account of the nature and gravity of the infringement.
Kommissionen skal i den forbindelse tage hensyn til eventuelle skærpende eller formildende omstændigheder.
The Commission thereby takes account of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Overtrædelsens art
Nature of the infringement
Overtrædelsen begået af KLM bestod i, at selskabet, som beskrevet ovenfor, fremsatte urigtige og vildledende oplysninger som omhandlet i fusionsforordningens artikel 14, stk. 1, litra b).
The infringement committed by KLM took the form of the supply of incorrect and misleading information within the meaning of Article 14(1)b of the Merger Regulation.
Fremsættelsen af disse urigtige og vildledende oplysninger var i det mindste udtryk for grov uagtsomhed.
The supply of this incorrect and misleading information was at the very least grossly negligent.
Overtrædelsens grovhed
Gravity of the infringement
KLM's overtrædelse af fusionsforordningen er at betragte som en alvorlig overtrædelse, og dét af følgende årsager:
The infringement of the Merger Regulation by KLM should be regarded as a serious infringement for the reasons set out below.
Relevansen af de urigtige eller vildledende oplysninger
relevance of the incorrect or misleading information
Oplysninger om en eventuel overlapning mellem parterne på individuelle destinationer er af oplagt relevans for vurderingen af transaktionen.
Information concerning any overlap between the parties on individual destinations is clearly of relevance to the competition assessment of the operation.
Det gælder, uanset om det relevante marked består af individuelle ruter eller af alle eller bestemte ruter til destinationer i Middelhavsområdet.
This is regardless of the question whether the relevant market consists of individual routes or of all or certain Mediterranean destinations.
De af Transavias destinationer, der ikke blev nævnt, er vigtige spanske, portugisiske og græske feriemål, som tiltrækker et stort antal rejsende.
The Transavia destinations which were not mentioned are the important Spanish, Portuguese and Greek holiday destinations which attract a high volume of passengers.
Oplysningen om, at Transavia flyver til alle de relevante Martinair-destinationer, er også relevant for vurderingen af den faktiske konkurrence mellem Martinair og Transavia, navnlig når den sammenholdes med parternes gentagne udtalelser om, at Martinairs og Transavias aktiviteter supplerer hinanden [37].
The information that Transavia operates to all relevant Martinair destinations is also relevant for the assessment of the amount of actual competition between Martinair and Transavia, in particular if seen in the context of the parties' repeated statements that Martinair's and Transavia's operations are complementary [37].
Oplysningen om, at Transavia flyver til mange store feriemål med både rutefly og charterfly, har tydeligvis også betydning for vurderingen af Transavias stilling på markedet.
The information that Transavia is operating towards many major holiday destinations scheduled and charter services in parallel is also clearly of importance in order to assess Transavia's market position.
Uanset om pladser på ruteflyvninger udgør en del af det relevante produktmarked eller ej, er oplysningen om, at Transavia har et stort antal ruteflyvninger til sine charterdestinationer, relevant for vurderingen af Transavias markedsstyrke på disse ruter.
Regardless of whether or not seats sold on scheduled flights form part of the relevant product market, the information that Transavia has substantial scheduled operations to its charter destinations is relevant to an assessment of the market strength of Transavia on those routes.
Formildende omstændigheder gjort gældende af KLM
mitigating factors invoked by KLM
KLM understreger, at det deltog i adskillige møder med Kommissionen for at forberede anmeldelsen, at der på disse møder blev diskuteret adskillige udkast til anmeldelsen, og at selskabet velvilligt tog Kommissionens forslag og bemærkninger til sig.
KLM emphasises that it had several meetings with the Commission in order to prepare the notification, that it discussed several drafts of the notification in those meetings and that it complied in good faith with the suggestions and remarks made by the Commission.
Selskabet nævner også, at anmeldelsen i denne sag var meget kompliceret, da der ikke fandtes umiddelbart tilgængelige oplysninger.
It also points out that the notification in this matter was very complex because of the lack of readily available data.
KLM udtaler endvidere, at det ikke er bevist, at det fremsatte »urigtige og vildledende« oplysninger, og at de særlige omstændigheder i sagen gør, at en eventuel afgivelse af sådanne oplysninger ikke kan lægges til grund for pålæggelse af en bøde.
KLM further states that it is not proven that it provided ‘incorrect or misleading’ information, or that at any rate, in view of the particular circumstances of the case, any such provision cannot be taken as grounds for the imposition of a fine.
Kommissionen deler ikke dette synspunkt af følgende årsager:
The Commission cannot share this view for the reasons set out below.
Transavias charterdestinationer
Transavia's charter destinations
I sine bemærkninger til klagepunktsmeddelelsen forklarer KLM, at udeladelsen af oplysninger om Transavias charterdestinationer skyldtes en administrativ fejl [38].
In its comments on the statement of objections, KLM explains the omission of the Transavia charter destinations as the result of an administrative error [38].
KLM hævder endvidere, at fejlen burde have været åbenlys for enhver, der gennemgik anmeldelsen.
KLM further argues that the mistake should have been evident to anybody examining the notification.
KLM hævder, at den pågældende oversigt kun blev inkluderet i besvarelsen af CO-formularen efter anmodning fra Kommissionen, og at der endnu ikke forelå detaljerede tal for markedsandelene i den endnu uafsluttede 1998-sommersæson.
KLM argues that the table in question was only included in the text of Form CO at the request of the Commission and that for the ongoing summer season 1998 detailed market share data were not yet available.
Oversigten på side 40 i anmeldelsen præsenteres imidlertid ikke som et tillæg til eller en ajourføring af oplysningerne indeholdt i den SH&E-undersøgelse, der er nævnt under betragtning 26 i denne beslutning.
However, the table on page 40 of the notification is not presented as an addendum or an update to the information contained in the SH&E study referred to in paragraph 26 of this Decision.
Den er en belysning af KLM's udtalelse om, at Transavias og Martinairs aktiviteter »i vid udstrækning supplerer hinanden«.
It is an illustration following the KLM's statement that Transavia's and Martinair's activities are ‘to a large extent complementary’.
KLM's påstand om, at denne oversigt kun kunne læses i sammenhæng med undersøgelsen, er grundløs, da der ikke engang findes en henvisning til undersøgelsen.
KLM's claim that this table could only have been read in conjunction with the study is unfounded as there is not even a reference to the study.
KLM's påstand om, at det var åbenlyst, at oversigten var ukorrekt, er også grundløs.
KLM's claim that the incorrectness of the table was obvious is also unfounded.
Udeladelsen af de pågældende charterdestinationer blev ikke opdaget af KLM selv, der har et meget bedre kendskab til sine aktiviteter end nogen anden, så der var bestemt ikke tale om en så åbenlys fejl, at enhver grundig læser kunne have opdaget den.
If the omission of the charter destinations in question was not detected by KLM, which has a much better knowledge of its activities than anybody else, it was certainly not such an obvious mistake that it could have been detected by any careful reader.
KLM understreger, at det ikke var selskabets hensigt at tilbageholde oplysningerne for Kommissionen, og at Kommissionen overdriver den administrative fejls alvor.
KLM emphasises that it was not its intention to withhold that information from the Commission and that the seriousness of its administrative error is exaggerated by the Commission.
Men KLM's forklaring på, hvordan det indsamlede oplysningerne om Transavias charterdestinationer, vidner om betydelig skødesløshed.
However, the explanation of how KLM collected the information on Transavia's charter destinations shows a large degree of carelessness.