natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Der kan ikke blive tale om noget krav om inddrivelse for så vidt angår denne lovgivning, og de af Gibraltars regering forudsete følger vil derfor, hvis de overhovedet opstår, blive mindsket.
There can be no recovery order in respect of this legislation and consequently the impact forecast by the Government of Gibraltar, to the extent it materialises at all, will be reduced.
Under alle omstændigheder kan Kommissionen ikke lade sådanne hypotetiske overvejelser forhindre den i så vidt muligt at genoprette den konkurrencesituation, der bestod før gennemførelsen af en ulovlig støtteforanstaltning.
In any event, the Commission cannot allow such hypothetical considerations to impede the restoration, as far as possible, of the competitive situation that existed before the implementation of an illegal aid measure.
Kommissionen noterer Gibraltar-regeringens bemærkninger om, at en række skattebegunstigede selskaber ikke vil blive beskattet i Gibraltar, at nogle af selskaberne ikke vil besidde nogen aktiver i Gibraltar, at nogle af dem vil have indstillet handelsvirksomheden, og at nogle vil modtage en støtte, der ligger under de minimis-tærskelen.
The Commission notes the Government of Gibraltar's comments that some Qualifying Companies would not be assessable to taxation in Gibraltar, that some would have no assets within its jurisdiction, that some would have ceased trading and that some would be in receipt of aid below the de minimis threshold.
Sådanne betragtninger kan dog ikke i sig selv udelukke et krav om inddrivelse.
However, such considerations cannot, by themselves, preclude a recovery order.
De kan ej heller fritage en medlemsstats myndigheder fra forpligtelsen til at foretage det nødvendige for at opfylde et krav om inddrivelse fuldt ud, idet betragtningerne alene har betydning for undersøgelsen af enkeltsager.
Nor can they relieve a Member State's authorities of the obligation to take the necessary steps to give full effect to a recovery order, since they become relevant only in the context of an examination of an individual case.
I denne forbindelse noterer Kommissionen, at fordelen ved at have status som skattebegunstiget selskab ikke er begrænset til de minimis-støtte, ligesom det ikke kun er virksomheder, der er skattepligtige i Gibraltar, eller som ikke besidder aktiver i Gibraltar, der har disse fordele.
In this context, the Commission notes that the benefits of Qualifying Company status are not limited to de minimis aid, nor are they limited to enterprises that are assessable to taxation in Gibraltar or that have no assets within the jurisdiction of the Gibraltar authorities.
Kommissionen har ingen bemærkninger til spørgsmålet om Gibraltar-myndighedernes gode eller onde tro.
The Commission makes no observation on the good faith, or otherwise, of the Gibraltar authorities.
Men det fremgår af Domstolens praksis [42], at i tilfælde af, at en eksisterende støtteforanstaltning ændres, er det en forudsætning for, at foranstaltningen i kraft af ændringen bliver en ny støtte, eller for at selve ændringen bliver en ny støtte, at ændringen udvider foranstaltningens anvendelsesområde og/eller gør fordelen ved foranstaltningen større.
However, it follows from the rulings of the Court of Justice [42] that, when an existing aid measure is altered, in order for the measure to become new aid by virtue of the modification or for the modification itself to be new aid, the alteration must widen the scope of the measure and/or increase the advantage available.
I den foreliggende sag noterer Kommissionen Rettens konstatering af, at Gibraltars lovgivning af 1967 om skattefritagne selskaber skal anses for at være en eksisterende støtteforanstaltning [43].
In the present case, the Commission notes the ruling by the Court of First Instance that Gibraltar's 1967 Exempt Companies legislation must be considered to be an existing aid measure [43].
Kommissionen noterer tillige, at lovgivningen om skattebegunstigede selskaber havde lovgivningen om skattefritagne selskaber som model.
The Commission also notes that the Qualifying Companies legislation was modelled very closely on the Exempt Company legislation.
Kriterierne for at opnå status som det ene eller det andet er stort set identiske.
The conditions for eligibility are largely identical.
De materielle forskelle vedrører fastlæggelsen af den årlige afgift/skat, der skal betales.
The substantive differences concern the determination of the annual tax due.
I stedet for kun at betale en meget lav, fast årlig afgift, betaler skattebegunstigede selskaber en procentdel af deres årlige overskud.
Rather than pay only a very low, fixed annual tax, Qualifying Companies pay a percentage of their annual profits.
Skattebegunstigede selskaber betaler således en højere skat af deres overskud end skattefritagne selskaber.
It therefore follows that Qualifying Companies pay tax on their profits at a higher rate than Exempt Companies.
Den mere restriktive ordning for skattebegunstigede selskaber kan derfor anses for at give en mindre fordel i traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1’s forstand end ordningen for skattefritagne selskaber.
The more restrictive Qualifying Companies regime can therefore be considered to offer a reduced advantage, within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty, compared with the Exempt Companies regime.
Kommissionen noterer tillige, at skulle det usandsynlige ske, at den af et skattebegunstiget selskab betalte skat er lavere end den faste årlige afgift, der betales af et tilsvarende skattefritaget selskab, ville forskellen ligge under de minimis-tærskelen.
The Commission also notes that in the unlikely event that the tax paid by a Qualifying Company would be lower than the fixed annual tax of an equivalent Exempt Company, the difference would fall below the de minimis threshold.
Ifølge lovgivningen er minimumsskattesatsen for et skattebegunstiget selskab 0 %, mens skattefritagne selskaber betaler en fast årlig afgift på mellem 225 GBP og 300 GBP.
The legislation provides for a minimum tax rate of 0 % for a Qualifying Company, whilst Exempt Companies pay a fixed annual tax of between GBP 225 and 300.
Det fremgår af Domstolens faste praksis, at når forudseende og påpasselige erhvervsdrivende kan påregne gennemførelsen af en fællesskabsforanstaltning, der kan påvirke deres interesser, kan de ikke påberåbe sig princippet om beskyttelsen af den berettigede forventning, når foranstaltningen gennemføres [44].
The Court of Justice has consistently ruled that where a diligent businessman could have foreseen the adoption of a Community measure likely to affect his interests, he cannot rely on the principle of protection of legitimate expectations if the measure is adopted [44].
I betragtning af lighederne mellem ordningen for skattefritagne selskaber og ordningen for skattebegunstigede selskaber er det vanskeligt at se, hvorledes en forudseende og påpasselig erhvervsdrivende kunne have forudset, at de to ordninger ville blive genstand for forskellige statsstøtteprocedurer.
Given the similarities between the Exempt Companies and Qualifying Companies regimes, it is hard to see how a diligent operator could have anticipated that the two regimes would be subject to different State aid procedures.
Forskellene mellem de to ordninger er ikke forskelle, der kan tilskrives ordningernes udformning, men derimod en afspejling af de gibraltarske myndigheders praksis, der går ud på at kræve, at offshoreselskaber med et forretningssted i Gibraltar skal betale skat, om end til en lav sats.
The differences between the two schemes, rather than being inherent in their design, reflect the practice of the Gibraltar authorities to require those offshore companies with a physical presence in Gibraltar to pay tax, albeit at a low level.
Det er derfor rimeligt at antage, at en samvittighedsfuld erhvervsdrivende, der handler i god tro, har været berettiget til at tro, at han ved at vælge den mindre gunstige ordning for skattebegunstigede selskaber frem for den åbenbart lovlige (og i statsstøtteterminologi eksisterende) ordning for skattefritagne selskaber har valgt en ordning, hvis lovlighed ikke kan drages i tvivl.
It is therefore reasonable to assume that a conscientious businessman, acting in good faith, could legitimately have believed that by opting for the less generous Qualifying Companies regime rather than the manifestly legal (in State aid terms, existing) Exempt Companies regime, he would also enter a regime whose legality was not in doubt.
Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at et krav om inddrivelse under de ekstraordinære omstændigheder, der er tale om i denne sag, vil være i strid med et almindeligt fællesskabsretligt princip.
Accordingly, the Commission concludes that an order for recovery would, in the exceptional circumstances of this case, be contrary to a general principle of Community law.
Det konkluderes, at Gibraltars ordning for skattebegunstigede selskaber udgør statsstøtte som defineret i traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, og at ingen af undtagelserne i artikel 87, stk. 2 og 3, finder anvendelse.
It is concluded that the Gibraltar Qualifying Companies regime constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty and that none of the derogations provided for in Article 87(2) or Article 87(3) apply.
Det konkluderes tillige, at Det Forenede Kongerige ulovligt har gennemført den pågældende ordning i strid med traktatens artikel 88, stk. 3.
It is also concluded that the United Kingdom has unlawfully implemented the scheme in question, in breach of Article 88(3) of the Treaty.
De af ordningen begunstigede kunne dog have en berettiget forventning om, at der ikke var tvivl om ordningens lovlighed.
However, beneficiaries of the scheme were entitled to entertain a legitimate expectation that the legality of the scheme was not in doubt.
Der bør derfor ikke kræves inddrivelse af støtte ydet i henhold til lovgivningen om skattebegunstigede selskaber —
Recovery of aid granted under the Qualifying Companies legislation should therefore not be required,
Den statsstøtte, Det Forenede Kongerige har ydet i henhold til ordningen for skattebegunstigede selskaber, og som er fastsat i Gibraltars Income Tax (Amendment) Ordinance af 14. juli 1983 og Income Tax (Qualifying Companies) Rules af 22. september 1983, er uforenelig med fællesmarkedet.
The State aid which the United Kingdom has implemented under the Qualifying Companies regime, contained in the Gibraltar Income Tax (Amendment) Ordinance of 14 July 1983 and the Gibraltar Income Tax (Qualifying Companies) Rules of 22 September 1983, is incompatible with the common market.
Det Forenede Kongerige skal ophæve den i artikel 1 omhandlede ordning.
The United Kingdom shall withdraw the scheme referred to in Article 1.
Det Forenede Kongerige underretter senest to måneder efter meddelelsen af denne beslutning Kommissionen om, hvilke foranstaltninger der er truffet for at efterkomme beslutningen.
The United Kingdom shall inform the Commission, within two months of notification of this Decision, of the measures taken to comply with it.
EFT C 26 af 30.1.2002, s. 9.
OJ C 26, 30.1.2002, p. 9.
Forenede sager T-195/01 R og T-207/01 R, Gibraltar mod Kommissionen R, Sml. 2001 II, s. 3915.
Joined Cases T-195/01 R and T-207/01 R Gibraltar v Commission R [2001] ECR II-3915.
Forenede sager T-195/01 og T-207/01, Gibraltar mod Kommissionen, Sml. 2002 II, s. 2309.
Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01 Gibraltar v Commission [2002] ECR II 2309.
Jf. fodnote 1.
See footnote 1.
Omkring 12 selskaber falder uden for dette 2-10 %-interval. I disse tilfælde er der blevet forhandlet om satsen fra sag til sag.
Approximately 12 companies fall outside this 2 to 10 % range.The tax rates for such companies have been negotiated on a case-by-case basis.
Satserne for disse selskaber ligger mellem 0,5 % og 1,5 % og mellem 21 % og 34 %.
They range from 0,5 to 1,5 % and from 21 to 34 %.
Der er ingen sammenhæng mellem den anvendte skattesats og selskabets virkefelt.
There is no correlation between the tax rate applied and the area of activity of the company.
Selskaberne virker inden for forskellige sektorer, herunder virksomhed som privat investeringsholdingselskab, markedsføring og salg af ferieboliger, offshorebankvirksomhed, skibsreparationer og marketingkonsulentvirksomhed.
The companies operate in diverse sectors including private investment holdings, marketing and selling holiday homes, offshore banking, ship repair and marketing consulting services.
Skattefritagne selskaber beskattes ikke af deres overskud, men betaler i stedet en fast årlig afgift på 225-300 GBP.
Exempt Companies do not pay tax on their profits, but instead pay a fixed annual tax of GBP 225 to 300.
EFT C 2 af 6.1.1998, s. 2.
OJ C 2, 6.1.1998, p. 2.
EFT L 150 af 23.6.2000, s. 50, betragtning 90, 91 og 93.
OJ L 150, 23.6.2000, p. 50, recitals 90, 91 and 93.
EFT C 384 af 10.12.1998, s. 3.
OJ C 384, 10.12 1998, p. 3.
Som ændret ved tiltrædelsesakten af 2003.
Regulation as amended by the 2003 Act of Accession.
EFT C 395 af 18.12.1998, s. 19.
OJ C 395, 18.12.1998, p. 19.
Sag 43/75, Defrenne mod Sabena, Sml. 1976, s. 455, præmis 72, 73 og 74.
Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 455, paragraphs 72, 73 and 74.
Forenede sager T-132/96 og T-143/96, Freistaat Sachsen m.fl. mod Kommissionen, Sml. 1999 II, s. 3663, præmis 167 ff.
Joined cases T-132/96 and T-143/96, Freistaat Sachsen and others v Commission [1999] ECR II-3663 p. 167 et seq.
Forenede sager T-195/01 R og T-207/01, præmis 104 og 113.
Joined Cases T-195/01 R and T-207/01, paragraphs 104 and 113.
Sag 223/85, Rijn-Schelde-Verolme mod Kommissionen, Sml. 1987, s. 4617.
Case 223/85, Rijn-Schelde-Verolme v Commission [1987] ECR 4617.
Jf. f.eks. sag C-156/98, Tyskland mod Kommissionen, Sml. 2000 I, s. 6857, præmis 26.
See, for instance, Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission [2000] ECR I-6857, paragraph 26.
Kommissionens beslutning af 30. marts 2004, endnu ikke offentliggjort.
Commission decision of 30 March 2004, not yet published.
Jf. forenede sager T-195/01 og T-207/01, præmis 117-131.
See Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01, paragraphs 117-131.
Sag 173/73, Italien mod Kommissionen, Sml. 1974, s. 709, præmis 13.
Case 173/73, Italy v Commission, [1974] ECR 709, paragraph 13.
Forenede sager T-269/99, T-271/99 og T-272/99, Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoa m.fl. mod Kommissionen, Sml. 2002 II, s. 4217, præmis 79.
Joined cases T-269/99, T-271/99 and T-272/99, Diputación Foral de Guipúzcoaand others v Commission [2002] ECR II-4217, paragraph 79.
Jf. forenede sager T-195/01 og T-207/01.
See Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01.
EFT C 395 af 18.12.1998, s. 14.
OJ C 395, 18.12.1998, p. 14.
Forenede sager T-195/01 og T-207/01, præmis 120 og 123.
Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01, paragraphs 120 and 123.
Sag C-295/97, Piaggio mod Ifitalia m.fl., Sml. 1999 I, s. 3735.
Case C-295/97 Piaggio v Ifitalia and others, [1999] ECR I-3735.
Forenede sager T-195/01 og T-207/01, præmis 121.
Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01, paragraph 121.
Jf. meddelelsens punkt 6.
See point 6 of the Notice.
EFT C 272 af 23.9.2000, s. 43, samt Kommissionens godkendelsesskrivelse nr. SG(2000) D/106293 af 17.8.2000.
OJ C 272, 23.9.2000, p. 43 and Commission approval letter No SG(2000) D/106293 of 17 August 2000.
Jf. forenede sager T-132/96 og T-143/96, Freistaat m.fl. mod Kommissionen, Sml. 1999 II, s. 3663, præmis 166, 167 og 168.
See Joined cases T-132/96 and T-143/96, Freistaat and others v Commission, ECR [1999] II-3663, paragraphs 166, 167 and 168.
Forenede sager T-132/96 og T-143/96.
Joined cases T-132/96 and T-143/96.
Jf. f.eks. sag C-169/95, Spanien mod Kommissionen, Sml. 1997 I, s. 135, præmis 47.
See for example Case C-169/95, Spain v Commission [1997] ECR I-135, paragraph 47.
Jf. f.eks. sag C-5/89, Kommissionen mod Tyskland, Sml. 1990 I, s. 3437, sag T-67/94, Ladbroke Racing mod Kommissionen, Sml. 1998 II, s. 1, og sag T-459/93, Siemens mod Kommissionen, Sml. 1995 II, s. 1675.
See for example Cases C-5/89 Commission v Germany [1990] ECR I-3437), T-67/94 Ladbroke Racing v Commission [1998] ECR II-1, T-459/93 Siemens v Commission (ECR [1995] II 1675.
Jf. fodnote 23.
See footnote 23.
Jf. f.eks. Kommissionens beslutning 95/452/EF af 12. april 1995 om de i artikel 3 i den italienske lov nr. 19 af 9. januar 1991 omhandlede støtteforanstaltninger i form af skattefordele for virksomheder, der arbejder i Centret for Finansielle Ydelser og Forsikringsydelser i Trieste (EFT L 264 af 7.11.1995, s. 30, betragtning 10).
See, for example, Commission Decision 95/452/EC of 12 April 1995 on State aid in the form of tax concessions to undertakings operating in the Trieste Financial Services & Insurance Centre pursuant to Article 3 of Italian Law No 19 of 9 January 1991 on, OJ L 264, 7.11.1995, p. 30, recital 10.
Forenede sager T-195/01 R og T-207/01, Gibraltar mod Kommissionen, præmis 113.
Joined Cases T-195/01 R and T-207/01 Gibraltar v Commission, paragraph 113.
Jf. f.eks. forenede sager C-278/92, C-279/92 og C-280/92, Spanien mod Kommissionen, Sml. 1994 I, s. 4103.
See, for example, Joined cases C-278/92, C-279/92 and C-280/92 Spain v Commission [1994] ECR I-4103.
Jf. f.eks. sag C-24/95, Rheinland-Pfalz mod Alcan, Sml. 1997 I, s. 1591.
See for example case C-24/95 Rheinland Pfalz v Alcan, [1997] ECR I-1591.
Forenede sager T-195/01 R og T-207/01, Gibraltar mod Kommissionen, præmis 94-105.
Joined Cases T-195/01 R and T-207/01 Gibraltar v Commission, paragraphs 94 to 105.
Forenede sager T-195/01 og T-207/01, præmis 115.
Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01, paragraph 115.
Forenede sager T-195/01 og T-207/01, præmis 111.
Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01, paragraph 111.
Forenede sager T-195/01 og T-207/01, præmis 113.
Joined Cases T-195/01 and T-207/01, paragraph 113.
Jf. f.eks. sag 265/85, Van den Bergh og Jurgens mod Kommissionen, Sml. 1987, s. 1155, præmis 44.
See for example Case 265/85, Van den Bergh and Jurgens v Commission [1987] ECR, 1155, paragraph 44.
Skattesatserne er fastsat som følger.
The tax rates are:
I stedet for at være pålagt indkomstskat til Gibraltars normale sats for selskabsskat på 35 %, forhandler skattebegunstigede selskaber om deres skattesats med Gibraltars myndigheder, jf. betragtning 9 ovenfor.
According to point 9 of the Notice, the tax advantage may be granted through different types of reduction in the company's burden and, in particular, through a reduction in the amount of tax. The Qualifying Companies regime clearly fulfils this criterion. Rather than be subject to income tax at the standard Gibraltar corporate rate of 35 %, Qualifying Companies negotiate their rate of tax with the Gibraltar authorities as described in recital (9) above.
Kommissionen noterer Det Forenede Kongeriges bemærkninger om regional specificitet, og at Det Forenede Kongerige ikke har hævdet, at ordningen for skattebegunstigede selskaber er en generel foranstaltning inden for Gibraltars skattesystem.
The Commission notes the United Kingdom's observations on regional specificity. The Commission also notes that the United Kingdom has not attempted to argue that the Qualifying Companies regime constitutes a general measure within the Gibraltar tax jurisdiction.
om ændring af afgørelse 2001/844/EF, EKSF, Euratom
amending Decision 2001/844/EC, ECSC, Euratom
(2005/78/EF, Euratom)
(2005/78/EC, Euratom)
under henvisning til traktaten om Den Europæiske Union, særlig artikel 28, stk. 1, og artikel 41, stk. 1, og
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 28(1) and Article 41(1) thereof,
Kommissionens sikkerhedsordning er baseret på principperne i Rådets afgørelse 2001/264/EF af 19. marts 2001 om vedtagelse af Rådets sikkerhedsforskrifter [1] med det formål at sikre, at Unionens beslutningsproces fungerer tilfredsstillende.
The Commission’s security system is based on the principles set out in Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council’s security regulations [1] with a view to ensuring a smooth functioning of the decision-making process of the Union.
Kommissionens sikkerhedsbestemmelser er fastsat i bilaget til Kommissionens afgørelse 2001/844/EF, EKSF, Euratom af 29. november 2001 om ændring af dens forretningsorden [2].
The Commission’s provisions on security are contained in the Annex to Commission Decision 2001/844/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 29 November 2001 amending its internal Rules of Procedure [2].
Tillæg 1 til sikkerhedsforskrifterne i bilaget til disse bestemmelser indeholder en sammenlignende oversigt over de nationale klassifikationsgrader.
Appendix 1 to the Rules on security annexed to those provisions contains a table of equivalence including national security classifications.
Den 16. april 2003 undertegnede Tjekkiet, Estland, Cypern, Letland, Litauen, Ungarn, Malta, Polen, Slovenien og Slovakiet traktaten om deres tiltrædelse af Den Europæiske Union [3].
On 16 April 2003, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia signed the Treaty concerning their accession to the European Union [3].
Tillæg 1 til sikkerhedsforskrifterne bør ændres af hensyn til disse stater.
Appendix 1 to the Rules on security should be amended in order to take account of those States.
Den 14. marts 2003 undertegnede Den Europæiske Union en aftale med NATO om informationssikkerhed [4].
On 14 March 2003 the European Union signed an agreement [4] with NATO on the security of information.
Det bør derfor også i tillæg 1 til sikkerhedsforskrifterne angives, hvordan forholdet er til NATO-klassifikationerne.
It is therefore also necessary to establish correspondence with NATO classification levels in Appendix 1 to the Rules on security.
Den franske og nederlandske lovgivning om klassifikation er blevet ændret.
France and the Netherlands have changed their legislation on classification.
Tillæg 1 til sikkerhedsforskrifterne bør derfor af klarhedshensyn udskiftes.
In the interests of clarity, Appendix 1 to the Rules on security should be replaced.
Samtidig bør bilaget til Kommissionens afgørelse 2001/844/EF, EKSF, Euratom ændres, så det sikres, at de fire klassifikationsgrader anvendes ens i alle sprogversioner —
At the same time, the Annex to Decision 2001/844/EC, ECSC, Euratom should be corrected in order to ensure that the four classification terms are used homogeneously in all language versions,
Tillæg 1 til sikkerhedsforskrifterne i bilaget til afgørelse 2001/844/EF, EKSF, Euratom affattes som angivet i bilaget til nærværende afgørelse.
Appendix 1 to the Rules on security contained in the Annex to Decision 2001/844/EC, ECSC, Euratom is replaced by the Annex to this Decision.
I bilaget til afgørelse 2001/844/EF, EKSF, Euratom ændres de fire klassifikationsgrader i alle sprogversioner til følgende, som altid skrives med store bogstaver:
The Annex to Decision 2001/844/EC, ECSC, Euratom is corrected by replacing in all linguistic versions the four classification terms, as appropriate, by the following terms which shall always be written in capital letters:
»RESTREINT UE«
‘RESTREINT UE’,
»CONFIDENTIEL UE«
‘CONFIDENTIEL UE’,
»SECRET UE«
‘SECRET UE’,
»TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET«.
‘TRES SECRET UE/EU TOP SECRET’.
Ændret ved afgørelse 2004/194/EF (EUT L 63 af 28.2.2004, s. 48).
Decision amended by Decision 2004/194/EC (OJ L 63, 28.2.2004, p. 48).
EUT L 80 af 27.3.2003, s. 36.
OJ L 80, 27.3.2003, p. 36.
SAMMENLIGNENDE OVERSIGT OVER NATIONALE KLASSIFIKATIONSGRADER
COMPARISON OF NATIONAL SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS
Klassifikationsgrad i EU
EU classification
Klassifikationsgrad i WEU
WEU classification
Klassifikationsgrad i Euratom
Euratom classification
Klassifikationsgrad i NATO
NATO classification
Restricted«
Restricted’
Klassifikationsgraden “Très Secret Défense” anvendes i forbindelse med vigtige regeringsanliggender og kan kun ændres med premierministerens tilladelse.
The classification Très secret défense, which covers governmental priority issues, may only be changed with the Prime Minister’s authorisation.
Abr.: ΑΑΠ
Abr: ΑΑΠ
Abr.: (ΑΠ)
Abr: (ΑΠ)
Αbr.: (ΕΜ)
Αbr: (ΕΜ)
Abr.: (ΠΧ)
Abr: (ΠΧ)
Stg.
Stg [3].
Zeer Geheim
Zeer Geheim
Stg. = staatsgeheim.
Stg = staatsgeheim.
Berigtigelse til Kommissionens afgørelse 2005/78/EF, Euratom af 1. februar 2005 om ændring af afgørelse 2001/844/EF, EKSF, Euratom
Corrigendum to Commission Decision 2005/78/EC, Euratom of 1 February 2005 amending Decision 2001/844/EC, ECSC, Euratom