natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
At basere oplysningerne på et in-flight magazine og ikke på en mere troværdig kilde, er udtryk for en alvorlig tilsidesættelse af pligten til at indsamle de fornødne oplysninger med omhu, navnlig i betragtning af, at Transavia er et helejet datterselskab af KLM.
To base the information on an in-flight magazine and not on a more reliable source shows a grave neglect of the duty to select carefully the necessary information, particularly in view of the fact that Transavia is a fully controlled subsidiary.
Transavias rutetrafik
Transavia's scheduled operations
KLM gør gældende, at det i sine kontakter med Kommissionen aldrig har lagt skjul på, at KLM-gruppen, herunder datterselskabet Transavia, gennemfører ruteflyvninger inden for Europa i almindelighed og til Middelhavsområdet i særdeleshed.
KLM argues that it never made a secret in its contacts with the Commission of the fact that the KLM Group, including its subsidiary Transavia, operates scheduled flights in Europe in general and to the Mediterranean in particular.
Det udtaler også, at det ville have givet flere oplysninger om Transavias ruteflyvninger, hvis Kommissionen havde anmodet herom under drøftelserne forud for anmeldelsen.
It also states that it would have provided more information on Transavia's scheduled flights if the Commission had requested it during the pre-notification talks.
KLM henviser til SH&E-undersøgelsen, som efter KLM's opfattelse tydeligt viser, at 47 % af alle nederlandske ferierejsende flyver med rutefly.
KLM refers to the SH&E study which it claims makes it clear that 47 % of all Dutch holiday-makers go on vacation on a scheduled flight.
KLM udtaler, at det ville være urealistisk at tro, at en stor del af disse passagerer ikke var kunder hos KLM-gruppen.
KLM states that it would be inconceivable that a large proportion of these passengers would not be attributed to the KLM group.
Drøftelserne på møderne forud for anmeldelsen handlede primært om at fastlægge en klar markedsdefinition.
The discussions in the prenotification meetings were principally concerned with clarifying the market definition.
Kommissionen medgiver, at eftersom KLM ikke fortalte, at Transavia solgte en betydelig del af pladserne på sine rutefly til rejsearrangører, havde den ikke fra starten overvejet at tage denne aktivitet med i betragtning ved afgrænsningen af markedet.
The Commission accepts that since KLM did not explain that Transavia had substantial sales of seats on its scheduled flights to package tour operators, the Commission did not initially contemplate taking those activities into account for market definition purposes.
Det betyder imidlertid ikke, at KLM ikke var forpligtet til at give komplette oplysninger om denne aktivitet, i det mindste ved besvarelsen af punkt 6.2 i CO-formularen [39].
This does not, however, remove the obligation of KLM to include full information on those activities, at least in response to Question 6.2 of Form CO [39].
Desuden vedrører oplysningerne i SH&E-undersøgelsen alle nederlandske ferierejsende og ikke blot de kunder, der køber en pakkerejse hos en rejsearrangør.
Furthermore, the information given in the SH&E study relates to all Dutch holiday-makers and not just to customers who buy a package tour from a tour operator.
Det kunne derfor ikke udledes af disse oplysninger, at Transavia solgte pladser på sine rutefly til rejsearrangører, der tilbyder pakkerejser.
It was therefore not possible to deduce from that information that Transavia sold seats on its scheduled flights to package tour operators.
Den måde, hvorpå oplysningerne om Transavia blev præsenteret i alle de udkast, der blev fremlagt, kunne ikke forventes at give anledning til sådanne spørgsmål fra Kommissionens side.
The way in which the information on Transavia was presented in all drafts submitted was not likely to prompt such questions on the part of the Commission.
Transavia blev altid fremstillet som et »charterselskab«.
Transavia was always presented as a ‘charter operator’.
Oplysningen om, at Transavia også beskæftiger sig med ruteflyvning, blev først givet i den endelige udgave af anmeldelsen i fodnote 11 på side 45, der omhandler Transavias deltagelse i KLM's bonusprogram.
The information that Transavia also operates scheduled flights was only given in the final version of the notification in footnote 11 on page 45, which concerns the participation of Transavia in the KLM frequent flyer scheme.
Denne oplysning fandtes ikke i tidligere udkast.
That information was not contained in earlier drafts.
Argumentet om, at Kommissionen kunne eller burde have anmodet om denne oplysning, er derfor grundløst.
The argument that the Commission could, or should, have asked for that information is therefore unfounded.
KLM hævder endvidere, at oplysningen om ruteflyvninger ikke ændrede noget ved KLM's markedsandel, og at udeladelsen af denne oplysning derfor var irrelevant.
KLM further claims that the information on scheduled flights did not change KLM's market share and that therefore the omission of that information was irrelevant.
Men et selskabs faktiske markedsandel er kun én af de faktorer, der benyttes til at måle dets styrke på markedet.
However, the actual market share of a company is only one element to measure its market strength.
Transavias ruteflyvninger til destinationer, som selskabet også beflyver på charterbasis, er helt klart en faktor, der kan bidrage til at styrke selskabets position på disse ruter, og oplysningen er derfor relevant for Kommissionens vurdering af konkurrenceforholdene i forbindelse med fusionen.
The operation by Transavia of scheduled services to destinations which it also serves on a charter basis is clearly a factor which can contribute to its strength on those routes and is therefore relevant to the Commission's assessment of competition in connection with the merger.
Således vil Kommissionens materielle vurdering af sagen samt typen og rækkevidden af de foranstaltninger, der måtte være nødvendige for at afhjælpe eventuelle konkurrenceproblemer, sandsynligvis blive påvirket af dens kendskab (eller manglende kendskab) til disse aktiviteter og deres art og omfang.
Accordingly, the Commission's substantive assessment of the case, and the nature and scope of any remedies that may be required, is likely to be affected by its knowledge (or lack of knowledge) of the existence of those operations and of their nature and extent.
Hvis det for eksempel virkelig forholdt sig således, at Transavia ikke havde ruteflyvninger til disse destinationer, kunne det argumenteres, at det ville være forholdsvis nemt for andre ruteselskaber at starte sådanne flyvninger og sælge pladser til enkeltpersoner og rejsearrangører, og at fusionen derfor burde godkendes.
For example, if it were really the case that Transavia had no scheduled operations to those destinations, it might be argued that it would be relatively easy for other scheduled airlines to commence such operations, selling seats to individuals and to tour operators, and that in consequence the merger should be allowed.
Tilsvarende gælder, at hvis undersøgelsen viste, at der optrådte en dominerende stilling på nogle af de pågældende ruter, ville en løsning, der udelukkende fokuserede på Martinairs flyvninger eller på Transavias charterflyvninger måske være utilstrækkelig, da den ikke ville påvirke eller tage højde for Transavias betydelige salg af pladser til rejsearrangører på sine ruteflyvninger på disse ruter.
Similarly, if a possible dominant position were found to exist on some of the routes concerned, a remedy which focused exclusively on Martinair's operations, or Transavia's charter operations, might be insufficient, since it would not affect or take into account the substantial sales to tour operators which Transavia makes on its scheduled flights on those routes.
Bødens størrelse
Amount of the fine
I forbindelse med procedurer i henhold til fusionsforordningen er det meget vigtigt, at parterne i en fusion giver alle relevante oplysninger ved anmeldelsen af fusionen.
In proceedings initiated under the Merger Regulation, it is very important that the parties to the merger supply full information in submitting the notification.
Det betyder, at virksomhederne skal være særlig omhyggelige, når de fremsætter oplysninger om deres fusion.
These constraints mean that firms must be particularly careful in submitting details of their merger.
I denne sag fremsatte KLM oplysninger, der var urigtige og vildledende, og selskabet udviste i hvert fald grov uagtsomhed.
In the present case KLM supplied information which was incorrect and misleading and KLM was at the very least, grossly negligent.
Desuden var de pågældende oplysninger tydeligvis relevante for den konkurrencemæssige vurdering af transaktionen.
Furthermore, the information was clearly relevant for the competitive assessment of the operation.
KLM gav ikke de korrekte oplysninger på eget initiativ, men kun som et resultat af Kommissionens undersøgelser.
KLM provided the correct information not on its own initiative but only as a result of the Commission's investigation.
De fuldstændige oplysninger om Transavias øvrige charterdestinationer kunne kun udledes af oplysninger, der blev givet i et svar på en begæring om oplysninger, og som senere blev bekræftet mundtligt.
Complete information on the additional Transavia charter destinations could only be derived from information provided in a response to a request for information and was finally confirmed orally.
Oplysningen om, at Transavia har ruteflyvninger til destinationer i Middelhavsområdet, blev givet som svar på en begæring om oplysninger.
The information that Transavia operates scheduled flights to Mediterranean destinations was given as a result of a request for information.
Oplysningen om, at KLM sælger pladser på sine rutefly til rejsearrangører på samme økonomiske vilkår som pladser på sine charterfly, og om omfanget af dette salg blev først endelig bekræftet i anmeldelsen af 21. december 1998 og i forbindelse med Kommissionens efterfølgende granskning af oplysningerne i denne anmeldelse.
The fact that KLM sells seats on its scheduled flights to tour operators under the same economic conditions as for its charter flights, and the importance of that activity, was only fully confirmed in the notification of 21 December 1998 and the Commission's subsequent investigation of the information contained in that notification.
Ved vurderingen af KLM's adfærd skal man huske på, at KLM er et stort europæisk selskab med omfattende aktiviteter i Europa.
In assessing the conduct of KLM, it must also be borne in mind that KLM is a large European company with significant business in Europe.
KLM havde også erfaringer fra en tidligere anmeldelse foretaget i henhold til fusionsforordningen.
KLM also had prior experience of a notification under the Merger Regulation.
Som beskrevet mere detaljeret ovenfor under betragtning 47-55, har KLM som en formildende omstændighed peget på, at de påståede overtrædelser ikke blev begået forsætligt, at Kommissionen burde have været i stand til at identificere de manglende oplysninger og burde have anmodet om disse oplysninger i perioden op til selve anmeldelsen (der i denne sag var ganske lang), og at de manglende oplysninger ikke var afgørende for sagens udfald.
In mitigation, KLM has claimed, in summary and as more fully described in paragraphs 47 to 55, that the alleged infringements were not deliberate, that the Commission should have been able to identify the missing information and request it during the prenotification period (which in this instance was quite extensive) and that the missing information was not decisive for the outcome of the case.
Med hensyn til disse påstandes indflydelse på vurderingen af overtrædelsens grovhed og dermed på bødens størrelse er det Kommissionens opfattelse, at de kun kan tillægges begrænset vægt.
In the Commission's view, only limited weight can be attached to those claims as regards their impact on the gravity of the infringement and hence on the amount of the fine that should be imposed.
Der findes ingen beviser for, at overtrædelserne blev begået forsætligt, og KLM's deltagelse i drøftelser med Kommissionen forud for anmeldelsen tyder i det mindste på, at selskabet ønskede at sikre sig, at dets anmeldelse var i orden.
There is no evidence that the infringements were intentional, and KLM's participation in prenotification contacts with the Commission indicates, at the least, a desire to ensure that its notification was acceptable.
Ikke desto mindre var det KLM's ansvar at sikre, at alle relevante oplysninger blev givet, men selskabet svigtede dette ansvar ved ikke at udvise tilstrækkelig omhu.
Nevertheless, the responsibility for ensuring that all relevant information was provided was KLM's, and it failed to exercise due care in carrying that task out.
Der er i begge tilfælde blevet udvist en betydelig grad af uagtsomhed.
The degree of negligence associated with the infringements is very substantial, in both instances.
KLM burde ikke have baseret sig på et in-flight magazine ved indsamlingen af vigtige oplysninger såsom oplysningerne om Transavias charterdestinationer.
KLM should not have relied on an in-flight magazine for crucial information such as that concerning Transavia's charter destinations.
Selskabet kunne have givet oplysningerne om Transavias ruteflyvninger - og burde have indset, at det var vigtigt at gøre det - selv uden en specifik begæring eller påmindelse herom fra Kommissionens side.
It could have provided the information about Transavia's scheduled flights, and should have appreciated the importance of doing so, even in the absence of a specific request or reminder from the Commission.
Derudover er det absolut tænkeligt, at hvis Kommissionen ikke havde afsløret de manglende oplysninger, ville den fortsatte mangel på disse oplysninger have påvirket udfaldet af den materielle beslutning om fusionen på en måde, der kunne have været til fordel for KLM.
Moreover it is certainly possible that if the Commission had failed to identify either element of the missing information, its continued absence would have affected the substantive decision on the merger, and in ways which could have benefited KLM.
På grundlag af ovenstående og under hensyntagen til sagens omstændigheder finder Kommissionen, at KLM bør pålægges en bøde på 40000 EUR i henhold til fusionsforordningens artikel 14, stk. 1, litra b) —
On the basis of the above, and taking account of the circumstances in the case, the Commission considers it appropriate to impose a fine of EUR 40000 on KLM, pursuant to Article 14(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation.
I henhold til artikel 14, stk. 1, litra b), i Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 4064/89 pålægges Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV (KLM) en bøde på 40000 EUR for at have fremsat urigtige og vildledende oplysninger i en anmeldelse indgivet til Kommissionen den 1. september 1998 i henhold til samme forordning.
A fine of EUR 40000 is hereby imposed on Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij NV (KLM) pursuant to Article 14(1)(b) of Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 for having supplied incorrect and misleading information in the notification submitted to the Commission under that Regulation on 1 September 1998.
Den i henhold til artikel 1 pålagte bøde indbetales senest tre måneder efter meddelelsen af denne beslutning på Europa-Kommissionens konto nr. 310-0933000-43 i Banque Bruxelles Lambert, Agence Européenne, Rond Point Schuman 5, B-1040 Bruxelles
The fine referred to in Article 1 shall be paid within three months of the date of notification of this Decision into bank account No 310-0933000-43 of the European Commission, Banque Bruxelles Lambert, Agence Européenne, Rond Point Schuman 5, B-1040 Brussels
Herefter pålægges der automatisk renter til Den Europæiske Centralbanks reporentesats den første arbejdsdag i den måned, hvor denne beslutning blev vedtaget, plus 3,5 procentpoint, dvs. i alt 6,5 %.
After the expiry of that period, interest shall be automatically payable at the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its repo operations on the first working day of the month in which this Decision is adopted, that is 3 %, plus 3,5 percentage points, making 6,5 %.
Denne beslutning er rettet til:
This Decision is addressed to:
Udfærdiget i Bruxelles, den 14. december 1999.
Done at Brussels, 14 December 1999.
Sag IV/M.1128 — KLM/Martinair (EFT C 281 af 10.9.1998, s. 7).
Case No IV/M.1128 — KLM/Martinair (OJ C 281, 10.9.1998, p. 7).
EFT C 298 af 26.9.1998, s. 8.
OJ C 298, 26.9.1998, p. 8.
Sag IV/M.1328 — KLM/Martinair II, (EFT C 408 af 29.12.1998, s. 8).
Case No IV/M.1328 — KLM/Martinair (OJ C 408, 29.12.1998, p. 8).
EFT C 42 af 17.2.1999, s. 9.
OJ C 42, 17.2.1999, p. 9.
Side 26 i anmeldelsen.
Page 26 of the notification.
En fartplan for charterflyvninger i sommeren 1998, der blev indsendt som bilag III til et svar (af 9. september 1998) på en begæring om oplysninger (af 4. september 1998).
The timetable ‘Charter flights summer 1998’ was provided as Annex III to a response ( 9 September 1998) to a request for information (4 September 1998).
Fartplanen nævner også destinationer på Malta og i Kroatien.
The timetable also mentions destinations in Malta and Croatia.
Bilag I til samme svar indeholder en liste over antallet af strækninger, som Transavia beflyver på charterbasis fra Nederlandene til destinationer i Middelhavsområdet (55 destinationer), og en liste over antallet af strækninger fra det øvrige Europa til destinationer i Middelhavsområdet (22 destinationer).
Annex I to the same response contains a listing of the number of stretches of Transavia non-scheduled flights to Mediterranian destinations from the Netherlands (55 destinations) and the number of stretches out of the rest of Europe to Mediterranian destinations (22 destinations).
Disse lister nævner også disse og andre destinationer, men ingen destinationer i Israel, Marokko og Tunesien.
This listing also contains these and additional destinations but no destinations in Israel, Morocco and Tunisia.
Dele af denne tekst er blevet redigeret for at sikre, at der ikke offentliggøres fortrolige oplysninger; disse dele er markeret med kantet parentes og asterisk.
Parts of this text have been edited to ensure that confidential information is not disclosed; those parts are enclosed in square brackets and marked with an asterisk.
Til beregning af sin markedsandel på markedet for charterflyvninger til Middelhavsområdet har KLM benyttet en meget bred definition af det geografiske marked.
In order to determine its market share in the market for charter flights to the Mediterranean, KLM has used a very wide geographic market definition.
KLM anfører, at parternes og andre charterselskabers fly kan operere fra alle lufthavne i Benelux-landene, Det Forenede Kongerige og Tyskland.
KLM states that the planes of the parties and of other charter companies can operate from each airport in the Benelux, the United Kingdom and Germany.
Selskabet når på det grundlag frem til en markedsandel på […]*% (side 61).
On this basis a market share of […] (*) % is calculated (page 61).
Hvis der kun tages udgangspunkt i flyvninger fra Nederlandene, ville parternes markedsandel ligge på omkring […]*% (side 62 i anmeldelsen).
If only flights from the Netherlands were taken into account, the market share of the parties would be above […] (*) % (page 62 of the notification).
Skønt denne udtalelse synes at antyde, at KLM i mindre grad er aktiv på dette marked, gives der ingen yderligere oplysninger om KLM med undtagelse af de statistiske oplysninger i bilaget til SH&E-undersøgelsen.
Although this statement seems to imply that KLM is to a small extent active on this market, no further information on KLM is given, with the exception of the statistical information in the appendix of the SH&E study.
I afsnit 3.2.1 i CO-formularen anfører KLM: »Transavia airlines B.V. (80 %) er aktivt på det europæiske chartermarked (pakkerejser), der efter fusionsparternes opfattelse ikke er et berørt marked.
In Section 3.2.1 of Form CO KLM states: ‘Transavia airlines B.V.
Det er udelukkende til Kommissionens orientering, at Transavia nævnes her«»Transavia airlines B.V. (80%) is active on the European (inclusive tour) charter market, which is in the view of the parties to the concentration, not an affected market.
(80 %) is active on the European (inclusive tour) charter market, which is in view of the parties to the concentration, not an affected market.
Solely for the Commission's information, Transavia is mentioned here«.
Solely for the Commission's information, Transavia is mentioned here.’
Fodnote 11 på side 45 i anmeldelsen.
Footnote 11 on page 45 of the notification.
KLM’s følgebrev til anmeldelsen af 1. september 1998.
KLM's covering letter with the notification of 1 September 1998.
Se side 47 i anmeldelsen.
Page 47 of the notification.
Kommissionens begæring om oplysninger af 4. september 1998.
Commission request of 4 September 1998.
Anmeldelse af 21. december 1998.
Notification of 21 December 1998.
Anmeldelse af 21. december 1998, s. 64, fodnote 18.
Notification of 21 December 1998, p. 64, footnote 18.
Anmeldelse af 21. december 1998, s. 65, fodnote 19.
Notification of 21 December 1998, p. 65, footnote 19.
Anmeldelsen af 21. december 1998, s. 66.
Notification of 21 December 1998, p. 66.
[…]* i sommersæsonen 1997 og […]* i vintersæsonen 1997/98.
[…] (*) in summer 1997 and […] (*) in winter 1997/98.
Desuden sælger KLM også ikke-garanterede pladser på sine flyvninger til rejsearrangører.
In addition, KLM also sells non-guaranteed seats on its flights to tour operators.
Jf. side 69 i anmeldelsen af 21. december 1998 og bilag XXIX (sommer 1997) og XXX (vinter 1997/98); […]* i sommersæsonen 1997 og […]* i vintersæsonen 1997/98.
Page 69 of the notification of 21 December 1998 and Annexes XXIX (summer 1997) and XXX (winter 1997/1998); […] (*) in summer 1997 and […] (*) in winter 1997/1998.
F.eks. i sommersæsonen 1997: Djerba, Faro, Funchal, Heraklion, Lissabon, Las Palmas, Malta, Mallorca, Tenerife.
E.g. in the summer season 1997, Djerba, Faro, Funchal, Heraklion, Lisbon, Las Palmas, Malta, Mallorca, Tenerife.
Der henvises desuden til SH&E-undersøgelsen i kapitel 7 i anmeldelsen (oplysninger om berørte markeder).
Further references to the SH&E study are made in chapter 7 (Information on affected markets) of the notification.
Side 34 i anmeldelsen.
Page 34 of the notification.
Brev fra KLM af 18. september 1998.
Letter from KLM of 18 September 1998.
Side 39 i anmeldelsen.
Page 39 of the notification.
Se side 32 og 39 i anmeldelsen og side 5 i brevet af 9. september 1998.
Page 32 and page 39 of the notification, page 5 of the letter of 9 September 1998.
Se betragtning 24 i denne beslutning.
See paragraph 24 of this Decision.
Sådanne oplysninger blev givet i anmeldelsen af 21. december 1998.
Such information was given in the notification of 21 December 1998.
Tenerifa
Tenerife
Preveza
Prevenza
Kefallinia
Kefalina
Istanbul
Istambul
Affected Markets« er gengivet punkt 6.1 i CO-formularen. Derpå udtaler KLM under overskriften »A.
Affected Markets’ question 6.1 of Form CO is repeated.
Det europæiske marked for charterpakkerejser«»A.
Then KLM states under the heading ‘A.
»KLM (primært gennem Transavia) [14]og Martinair er begge aktive på et produktmarked, der kan defineres som markedet for flytransport af passagerer til lande omkring Middelhavet bestilt af rejsearrangører som led i pakkerejser omfattende indkvartering.« [15]»KLM (primarily through Transavia) and Martinair are both active in the product market that can be defined as the market for transport by plane at the request of tour operators, for inclusion in an organised foreign holiday package including accommodation to countries around the Mediterranean.«
‘KLM (primarily through Transavia) [14] and Martinair are both active in the product market that can be defined as the market for transport by plane at the request of tour operators, for inclusion in an organised foreign holiday package including accommodation to countries around the Mediterranean. ’ [15].