natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
henviser samtidig til, at Revisionsopfølgningsudvalget bistår kommissærkollegiet i bestræbelserne på at sikre, at Kommissionens tjenestegrene tager hensyn til Den Interne Revisionstjenestes arbejde, og i den forbindelse kan foreslå Kommissionen hensigtsmæssige foranstaltninger;
Stresses that the Audit Progress Committee has the further function of assisting the College of Commissioners in its task of ensuring that the work of the Internal Audit Service is taken into account by the Commission's services, and that it may therefore make proposals to the Commission for suitable action;
bekræftede, at det ikke var i overensstemmelse med almindelig praksis, at formanden for et revisionsudvalg kunne have en funktion i organisationen, der kunne give anledning til interessekonflikt (punkt 9.56); mener, at det i den forbindelse vil være på sin plads at stramme reglerne for dette udvalg op med henblik på at
, stated that the existing practice is 'contrary to the usual rules forbidding the chairman of an audit board from playing a role in the organisation that is likely to give rise to a confusion of interest' (9.56); believes that, in this connection, it would be desirable to revise the Committee's rules in order to:
sikre, at der ikke opstår interessekonflikter
ensure the absence of conflicts of interest;
lægge udvalgets sekretariat ind under generalsekretariatet, således som udvalget selv foreslår i sin årsberetning
attach its secretariat directly to the Secretary-General's office, as suggested by the Committee itself in its annual report; and
offentliggøre dets årsberetninger, som skal indeholde en vurdering af, i hvilket omfang bemærkningerne i revisionsberetningerne er efterkommet;
ensure publicity for its annual reports, which should include an assessment of follow-up action on the recommendations of the auditors' reports;
Intern revisionskapacitet (GD-niveau)
The Internal Audit Capabilities (DG level)
påpeger, at Kommissionen, selv om der i finansforordningen kun tales om en intern revisor, i 2000 vedtog at oprette intern revisionskapacitet i hver enkelt afdeling for at bistå generaldirektørerne og tjenestegrenenes ledere med at varetage deres nye ansvar i forbindelse med den økonomiske forvaltning;
Notes that, whilst the Financial Regulation only provides for an Internal Auditor, the Commission decided in 2000 to set up Internal Audit Capabilities (IAC) in each department in order to assist Directors-General and Heads of Service in their new responsibilities as regards financial management;
anmoder Kommissionen om at gennemføre en reform af bestemmelserne for de interne revisionskapaciteter på baggrund af den nye finansforordning;
Calls on the Commission to review the rules governing the Internal Audit Capabilities in the light of the new Financial Regulation;
mener, at en sådan reform vil kunne sikre fleksibilitet og funktionel autonomi i forbindelserne mellem de interne revisionskapaciteter og Den Interne Revisionstjeneste og dermed styrke alle de bånd og relationer, der er behandlet i Neil Kinnocks meddelelse til Kommissionen om betingelserne for etablering af en intern revisionskapacitet i de enkelte tjenestegrene i Kommissionen (SEK(2000)1803/3) http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/internal_audit/documents/audit_dg_sec1803_en.pdf
Considers that this reform must ensure the smooth flowing and functional autonomy of relations between the Internal Audit Capabilities and the Internal Audit Service, consolidating where applicable all the links and relationships referred to in Vice-President Kinnock's communication to the Commission on the conditions for establishing Internal Audit Capabilities in each Commission service (SEC(2000)1803/3) http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/internal_audit/documents/audit_dg_sec1803_en.pdf
Den centrale finanstjeneste i Generaldirektoratet for Budget
The Central Financial Service in DG Budget
gør opmærksom på, at der som led i reformen er lagt særlig vægt på decentralisering af finanskontrollen; mener, at dette til gengæld gør det bydende nødvendigt at finde frem til mere hensigtsmæssige og gennemførlige former for centralt tilsyn med forvaltningen af de kontrolsystemer, der findes i de forskellige afdelinger; mener endvidere, at dette centrale tilsyn med forvaltningen bør munde ud i en officiel rapport om kvaliteten af de interne kontrolsystemer i afdelingerne, som bør offentliggøres i deres oprindelige form som led i den sammenfattede rapport;
Recalls that the reform places a strong emphasis on the decentralisation of financial controls; believes that this in turn highlights the urgent need to develop more suitable and accountable forms of central management supervision of the control systems operating in individual departments; takes the view that this central management supervision should result in a formal opinion on the quality of the departments' internal control systems, which should be published in its original form within the synthesis report;
er foruroliget over den store udskiftning af personale i Kommissionen og anmoder derfor denne om at træffe de nødvendige foranstaltninger til at undersøge og afhjælpe årsagerne til dette problem;
Is concerned about the high turnover of administrative staff at the Commission and calls on the Commission to take the measures required to investigate and eliminate the causes of this problem within its organisation;
anser det for nødvendigt, at forholdet mellem de centrale finanskontrolorganer og finanskontrolorganerne i de enkelte generaldirektorater eller tjenester fungerer smidigt og gnidningsløst, således at der sikres lige så hensigtsmæssige forbindelser som på revisionsområdet;
Believes that there must be a fluid relationship between the central financial control bodies and the individual DGs' or services' financial control organs, so as to ensure the same relationship as is considered desirable in the audit field;
Regnskabsafdelingen under Generaldirektoratet for Budget
The Accounting Officer's Department in DG Budget
henviser til, at regnskabsføreren i overensstemmelse med finansforordningens artikel 61, stk. 1, litra e), har ansvaret for "udformning og godkendelse af regnskabssystemer og, når det er relevant, godkendelse af de systemer, som den anvisningsberettigede har udformet med henblik på at levere eller dokumentere regnskabsmæssige oplysninger";
Recalls that the Accounting Officer, according to Article 61(e) of the Financial Regulation, is responsible for 'laying down and validating the accounting systems and where appropriate validating systems laid down by the authorising officer to supply or justify accounting information';
understreger, at regnskabsføreren for at kunne varetage denne opgave modtager alle oplysninger, der er nødvendige for opstillingen af et årsregnskab, der giver et retvisende billede af Fællesskabernes formue og budgetgennemførelsen, fra de anvisningsberettigede, som garanterer pålideligheden heraf (finansforordningens artikel 61, stk. 2);
Points out that Article 61(2) of the Financial Regulation states that in order to assume this responsibility the Accounting Officer 'shall obtain from authorising officers, who shall guarantee its reliability, all the information necessary for the production of accounts which give a true image of the Communities' assets and of budgetary implementation';
tilslutter sig Kommissionens opfattelse af, at det er nødvendigt at bevare de arbejdsmæssige synergier i den økonomiske forvaltning, uden at dette på nogen måde griber ind i kontrolorganernes funktionelle uafhængighed eller anerkendelsen af den hensigtsmæssige indplacering af de ansvarlige i disse tjenester Idem.
Agrees with the Commission on the need to maintain operational synergies for financial management without prejudice to the functional independence of the supervisory bodies and the proper recognition of the roles of those responsible for the services concerned idem
Det Europæiske Kontor for Bekæmpelse af Svig (OLAF)
The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)
glæder sig over Kommissionens forslag til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning om ændring af forordning (EF) nr. 1073/1999 ( KOM(2004) 103 ); bekræfter punkt 38 i sin beslutning om årsberetningen 2002 vedrørende bekæmpelse af svig, hvori det fastslår, at Kommissionens lovgivningsforslag til dels går i den rigtige retning, men at følgende punkter er helt uacceptable og næsten må betragtes som en provokation:
Welcomes the Commission proposal ( COM(2004) 103 ) amending Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999; reiterates paragraph 38 of its resolution on the 2002 annual report on the fight against fraud, in which it states that the legislative proposals submitted by the Commission point to some extent in the right direction but that the following points are totally unacceptable and must almost be regarded as provocation;
i stedet for at foreskrive, at OLAF endelig i fuldt omfang skal varetage de kerneopgaver inden for interne undersøgelser, det har forsømt i så lang tid, giver Kommissionens forslag nu udtrykkeligt OLAF mulighed for at give afkald på interne undersøgelser selv i tilfælde af, at der foreligger tilstrækkelig mistanke om tilfælde af svig, bestikkelse eller andre ulovlige handlinger til skade for Fællesskabets finansielle interesser,
instead of stipulating that OLAF should finally carry out to the full extent its long-neglected core task of internal investigations, the Commission's proposal expressly offers OLAF the possibility of not opening internal investigations even when there is sufficiently strong suspicion that acts of fraud or corruption or other illegal acts have been committed to the detriment of the financial interests of the Community;
i stedet for administrativt at henlægge sekretariatet for OLAF-Overvågningsudvalget til Europa-Parlamentets Generalsekretariat foreslår Kommissionen nu en administrativ henlæggelse under Kommissionens sekretariat; dermed sættes der spørgsmålstegn ved Overvågningsudvalgets uafhængighed,
instead of assigning the secretariat of the OLAF Supervisory Committee administratively to the secretariat of the European Parliament, the Commission now proposes that the secretariat should be administratively assigned to the Commission, thereby calling into question the independence of the Supervisory Committee;
i stedet for at styrke rettighederne for personer, der er involveret i en intern undersøgelse, fratages de den hidtidige mulighed efter OLAF-forordningen for at anlægge sag ved EF-Domstolen, såfremt OLAF som led i undersøgelserne træffer foranstaltninger, der berører dem; på den måde åbner man døren på vid gab for magtmisbrug (f.eks. indledning af undersøgelser uden tilstrækkeligt grundlag, uforholdsmæssig lang varighed af undersøgelser), fordi sådanne forhold for fremtiden ikke er underlagt domstolsprøvelse;
instead of strengthening the rights of persons subject to an internal investigation, they are to be deprived of the possibility hitherto provided by the OLAF Regulation to appeal to the European Court of Justice if OLAF, in the course of its investigations, acts in a way which adversely affects them; this would open the floodgates to abuses of power (e.g. opening an investigation without sufficient grounds, inordinately long investigations) as such offences would no longer be subject to the scrutiny of a court;
henviser til sin ovennævnte beslutning af 4. december 2003, hvori det støttede forslagene fra Kommissionens formand om at prioritere OLAF's nøgleopgaver højere, at forbedre informationsstrømmen mellem OLAF og institutionerne, bedre at iagttage den ret til forsvar, som de berørte af undersøgelserne har, og at styrke Overvågningsudvalgets rolle;
Recalls its abovementioned resolution of 4 December 2003 in which it supported the announcement made by the President of the Commission that he would accord greater priority to OLAF's core tasks, improve the flow of information between OLAF and the institutions, do more to safeguard the rights of defence of persons under investigation and enhance the role of the Supervisory Committee;
stiller sig uforstående over for, at Kommissionen først med over et års forsinkelse har forelagt den rapport, der er udarbejdet i henhold til artikel 15 i forordning (EF) nr. 1073/1999, og at det har varet næsten tre måneder efter Europa-Parlamentets vedtagelse af ovennævnte beslutning af 4. december 2003, inden den vedtog en sådan forslagspakke den 9. februar 2004; konstaterer, at det på grund af disse forsinkelser er blevet næsten umuligt at gennemføre en forbedring af forordning (EF) nr. 1073/1999 inden valget til Europa-Parlamentet;
Cannot understand why the Commission was more than a year late in submitting the progress report required by Article 15 of Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 and why now, after Parliament's adoption of its abovementioned resolution of 4 December 2003, the Commission required almost three months before taking a decision on a corresponding set of proposals on 9 February 2004; notes that these delays have made it practically impossible for improvements to be made to Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 before the European elections;
mener, at OLAF-Overvågningsudvalget bør være fuldstændig uafhængigt af Kommissionen;
Believes that the OLAF Supervisory Committee should be fully independent of the Commission;
er dybt foruroliget over, at OLAF's direktør har tilkendegivet, at han ikke vil følge Ombudsmandens henstilling om at genåbne sagen om firmaet Blue Dragon; bemærker, at Overvågningsudvalget sætter et stort spørgsmålstegn ved OLAF's behandling af sagen; opfordrer OLAF til at efterkomme henstillinger fra Overvågningsudvalget; påskønner, at Kommissionen har genåbnet sagen;
Is deeply disturbed by the announcement of the Director of OLAF to the effect that he does not intend to follow the Ombudsman's recommendation to reopen the case of the firm of Blue Dragon; notes that the OLAF Supervisory Committee has raised serious doubts about OLAF's handling of the case; calls on OLAF to comply with the recommendations of the Supervisory Committee; welcomes the Commission's reopening of the case;
bemærker, at de fleste af de 1000 sager, som OLAF arvede fra UCLAF, er afsluttede; beder Overvågningsudvalget undersøge, hvor mange sager som er blevet afsluttet uden resultat; opfordrer Overvågningsudvalget til at holde særligt øje med, at sager ikke er blevet afsluttet uberettiget;
Notes that most of the 1000 cases which OLAF inherited from UCLAF have been closed; calls on the Supervisory Committee to investigate how many of the cases were closed without any result; calls on the Supervisory Committee to pay particular attention to ensuring that cases have not been closed without proper justification;
Forelæggelse af revisionsresultater
Presentation of audit results
understreger betydningen af princippet om den revideredes ret til at udtale sig om de revisionsresultater, revisor har fremlagt; henleder opmærksomheden på, at effektiviteten af den parlamentariske kontrol af den økonomiske forvaltning i EU i høj grad afhænger af kvaliteten og informationsværdien af Revisionsrettens særberetninger og årsberetninger;
Stresses the importance of the principle of an auditee's right to comment on audit results submitted by an auditor, and draws attention to the fact that the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight over financial management in the EU is very much dependent on the quality and information value of the Court of Auditors' special reports and annual reports;
understreger, at dechargeproceduren er en proces, der bl.a. har til formål at forbedre den økonomiske forvaltning i EU ved, at der på baggrund af Revisionsrettens beretninger og institutionernes svar og udtalelser skabes et bedre grundlag for at træffe beslutninger; glæder sig over, at Retten i sin praksis ikke blot medvirker til fejlrettelse, men også til at udvikle og forbedre forvaltningen i EU ved at identificere og påpege løsninger, der vil kunne medføre forbedringer; minder om, at forbedringer naturligvis forudsætter, at den reviderede er modtagelig for revisionens anbefalinger;
Stresses its view that the discharge procedure is a process seeking, inter alia, to improve financial management in the EU by improving the basis for decision-making in the light of the Court's reports and the replies and opinions of the institutions; welcomes the fact that, in practice, the Court contributes not only to correcting mistakes, but also to developing and improving management in the EU by identifying and pointing to sub-optimal solutions; points out that improvements naturally presuppose that an auditee is receptive to audit recommendations;
understreger, at Revisionsretten - trods sit navn - ikke er nogen retsinstans, at den ikke har beslutningstagende beføjelser, og at den udelukkende kan opnå resultater i kraft af kvaliteten af sine beretninger;
Notes that the Court of Auditors, despite its name, is not a court of law, does not have decision-making powers and can only achieve results on the strength of the quality of its reports;
mener, at effekten af Revisionsrettens undersøgelser i væsentlig grad afhænger af dechargemyndighedens behandling og opfølgning af Rettens undersøgelsesresultater, og at Retten og dechargemyndigheden derfor har en fælles interesse i til stadighed at forbedre kvaliteten af beretningerne og af det kompetente udvalgs behandling af beretningerne;
Takes the view that the impact of examinations by the Court of Auditors is very much dependent on how the discharge authority deals with, and follows up, the results of the Court's examinations, and that improvement in the quality of reports, and in the way in which the competent committee deals with them, is therefore in the common interest of the Court and the discharge authority;
bemærker, at Kommissionens holdning til Rettens revisionsresultater varierer alt efter, hvilke undersøgte sektorer, der er tale om; konstaterer, at Kommissionen ofte erklærer sig enig i Rettens anbefalinger hvad angår egne indtægter, men at den hvad angår den fælles landbrugspolitik, strukturpolitikken og eksterne aktioner ofte er kritisk over for Rettens revisionsresultater og bemærkninger;
Observes that the Commission's position on the results of Court audits often varies, depending on the areas examined; notes that, with regard to own resources, the Commission often declares itself to be in agreement with the Court's recommendations, but that, with regard to the common agricultural policy, structural policy and external actions, it is frequently critical of the results of the Court's audits and its observations;
mener, at det ligger i sagens natur, at Kommissionen og Retten kan have forskellige opfattelser af, hvilken betydning et revisionsresultat skal tillægges, men påpeger, at det er utilfredsstillende, at de to institutioner ikke altid er enige om, hvilke præmisser og kriterier der skal lægges til grund for en undersøgelse, og at dette går ud over budskabets klarhed;
Takes the view that the Commission and the Court can self-evidently have differing views as to the importance to be accorded to the results of an audit, but points out that it is unsatisfactory for the two institutions not always to be in agreement about the underlying premises and criteria for an audit, since this affects the clarity of the message;
forventer, at såvel Kommissionen som Revisionsretten i fremtiden vil styrke indsatsen for at sikre, at revisionsresultater fremlægges for dechargemyndigheden på en så klar og entydig måde som overhovedet muligt;
Looks to both the Commission and the Court of Auditors to make greater efforts in future to ensure that audit results are presented to the discharge authority as clearly and as unambiguously as possible;
glæder sig over den positive udvikling i samarbejdet mellem Revisionsretten og Europa-Parlamentets kompetente udvalg, og bemærker navnlig den nye procedure for forelæggelse af særberetninger for udvalget, som bl.a. indebærer, at disse beretninger offentliggøres på et møde i det kompetente udvalg samt på de forberedende møder i denne forbindelse;
Welcomes the positive development as regards cooperation between the Court of Auditors and Parliament's competent committee, and points in particular to the new procedure for submitting reports for the committee, under which, inter alia, special reports are made public at a meeting of the competent committee and at the relevant preparatory meetings;
håber, at denne personlige kontakt, som er positiv og af væsentlig betydning for den fortsatte udvikling af samarbejdet mellem de to institutioner, vil kunne fastholdes og udbygges også i fremtiden; anser det for formålstjenligt, at der fastlægges mere præcise regler og procedurer for det kompetente udvalgs behandling af Revisionsrettens særberetninger;
Hopes that it will be possible for this personal contact, which is positive and highly important for continuing development of cooperation between the two institutions, to be maintained and expanded in the future; considers it appropriate for more precise rules and procedures to be laid down on how the competent committee deals with the Court of Auditors' special reports;
opfordrer de to parter til yderligere at udvikle proceduren, således at såvel revisionsresultaterne som Kommissionens svar herpå bliver genstand for en fyldestgørende drøftelse i udvalget; er overbevist om, at en drøftelse i det kompetente parlamentariske udvalg medvirker væsentligt til at skabe opmærksomhed om de problemer, der er påpeget i revisionsberetningen, og dermed bidrager til forbedring af den økonomiske forvaltning i Unionen;
Calls on both sides to develop the procedure further so that both the results of audits and the Commission's replies are satisfactorily considered in committee; is convinced that consideration in the competent parliamentary committee makes a major contribution towards drawing attention to the problems identified in the audit report and thus helps to improve financial management in the Union;
understreger ligeledes Kommissionens afgørende rolle i formidlingen af oplysninger om den økonomiske forvaltning til dechargemyndigheden og offentligheden og opfordrer Kommissionen til fortsat at sikre, at politik-gennemførelse får mindst samme opmærksomhed som politik-udvikling; mener, at mange af sagerne om uregelmæssigheder og "kreative forvaltningsmetoder" er en følge af den skik og brug, der er fremherskende i Kommissionen, som tillægger udvikling af de forskellige politikker langt større betydning og prestige end gennemførelse af de allerede fastlagte politikker;
Stresses also the Commission's crucial role in disseminating information on financial management to the discharge authority and the public; calls on the Commission to continue to ensure that policy implementation is given at least as much attention as policy development; takes the view that many instances of irregularities and 'creative management methods' are an inevitable consequence of the dominant tradition at the Commission of according far more importance and prestige to policy development than to the implementation of policies already decided on;
opfordrer Kommissionen til at øge sin indsats for at støtte tiltrædelseslandenes, kandidatlandenes og medlemsstaternes strategi for at bekæmpe korruption, navnlig hvad angår områder som offentlige indkøb, told- og grænsetjenester samt finansiering af politiske partier;
Calls on the Commission to make greater efforts to support the anti-corruption strategies of the accession countries, candidate countries and of the Member States, in particular as regards areas such as public procurement, customs and border control services, and the financing of political parties;
mener, at det overalt er nødvendigt at skærpe opmærksomheden med hensyn til den offentlige forvaltnings gennemskuelighed, ansvarlighed og effektivitet og gennem kampagner gøre offentligheden opmærksom på, at korruption medfører fare for økonomien og samfundet som helhed; opfordrer Kommissionen til at støtte nationale og navnligt lokale ngo'er, som arbejder for større offentlig opmærksomhed om korruption;
Takes the view that there is a need everywhere to raise awareness concerning public administration transparency, accountability and efficiency and, by means of campaigns, to make the public aware that corruption jeopardises the economy and society as a whole; calls on the Commission to support national and, in particular, local NGOs working for greater public awareness of corruption;