natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
foreslår, at Kommissionen snarest muligt vedtager de internationale revisionsstandarder (ISA), som præciseres ved hjælp af en forordning, der vil muliggøre en harmonisering af revisionen på europæisk plan og lette tilsynsorganernes arbejde; mener, at revision er en enkelt procedure uanset den reviderede virksomheds størrelse, men dens anvendelse skal tilpasses små og mellemstore virksomheders (SMV) særlige karakteristika; minder Kommissionen om, at der ud over de virksomheder, som bør være underlagt de internationale revisionsstandarder, også findes andre virksomheder, som, selv om de er fritaget fra disse standarder, bør få deres finansielle situation revideret af et autoriseret revisionsfirma;
Suggests that the Commission urgently adopt the International Standards on Auditing (ISA), clarified through a regulation, which would make it possible to harmonise audits at European level and facilitate the task of supervisory bodies; takes the view that auditing is a single procedure, regardless of the size of the audited company, but that its application needs to be adapted to the characteristics of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); reminds the Commission that, aside from those companies to which the International Standards on Auditing should apply, there are also other companies which, despite being exempted from those standards, should nevertheless have their financial situations audited by authorised audit firms;
er enig i, at det skaber en uundgåelig konflikt, at revisoren udpeges og aflønnes af den reviderede virksomhed; mener imidlertid ikke, at der i øjeblikket er grund til, at denne udpegelse foretages af tredjemand; kræver i denne forbindelse og uden at dette berører artikel 37, stk. 2, i direktiv 2006/43/EF, at revisionsudvalgets rolle styrkes;
Agrees that there is an inevitable conflict in the auditor being appointed and paid by the audited entity; does not, however, currently see any justification for this appointment to be made by a third party; calls, with this in mind and without prejudice to Article 37 (2) of Directive 2006/43/EC, for the audit committee's role to be strengthened;
mener, at hvor brug af revisor er lovpligtig, bør denne udpeges af revisionsudvalget og ikke af bestyrelsen for den virksomhed, der skal revideres, og at mindst halvdelen at revisionsudvalgets medlemmer bør have relevant erfaring med regnskabsaflæggelse og revision; mener, at revisionsudvalget bør garantere revisorens uafhængighed, navnlig med henblik på den rådgivning, som revisoren yder eller tilbyder at yde;
Takes the view that the auditor, where that role is a statutory one, should be appointed by the audit committee and not by the management board of the company to be audited, in which connection the members of the audit committee should have the relevant experience, at least half of them in accounting and auditing; considers that the audit committee should take steps to ensure that the auditor is independent, in particular as regards any consultancy services which the auditor provides or offers to provide;
mener, at bestemmelserne til sikring af både revisorers uafhængighed og revisionens kvalitet skal kontrolleres af et effektivt offentligt tilsynsorgan, som er fuldstændig uafhængigt af branchen;
Takes the view that the rules guaranteeing the independence of auditors and audit quality must undergo a detailed review by a public supervisory body entirely independent of the profession;
støtter etableringen af en international kodeks for god forvaltningspraksis for revisionsfirmaer, der reviderer virksomheder af interesse for offentligheden;
Supports the creation of an international code of good governance for auditing firms that audit public-interest entities;
er enig i, at revisorens uafhængighed er altafgørende, og at der skal træffes foranstaltninger til at undgå for tætte bånd; foreslår, at Kommissionen bør foretage en konsekvensanalyse, der omfatter en række muligheder, navnlig ekstern rotation og indvirkningen af frivillige fælles revisioner; anser det for muligt at styrke revisorens uafhængighed gennem ekstern rotation, men mener dog fortsat, at den bedste lovgivningsmæssige løsning ikke er ekstern rotation, men derimod regelmæssig ombytning af interne revisorer, som det også er blevet bekræftet i direktiv 2006/43/EF, og at den eksisterende partnerrotationsordning giver den uafhængighed, der er nødvendig for at sikre en effektiv revision;
Agrees that the independence of the auditor is of paramount importance and that steps need to be taken to prevent excessive familiarity; suggests that the Commission should undertake an impact assessment covering a range of options, in particular external rotation and the impact of voluntary joint audits; regards external rotation as a means of strengthening the independence of auditors, but reiterates its view that it is not external rotation but rather regular changes in internal auditors which represents the best regulatory solution, as confirmed by Directive 2006/43/EC, and that the existing partner rotation arrangements provide the independence necessary for audits to be effective;
opfordrer Kommissionen til at sikre, at virksomhederne benytter en praksis, der bidrager til at bevare den ydede beskyttelse, herunder beskyttelsen knyttet til den obligatoriske rotation af de primære revisionspartnere, selv når disse partnere skifter firma,
Calls on the Commission to ensure that company practices help to preserve the protections provided, including protection linked to the mandatory rotation of the main audit partners, even where those partners change firms;
foreslår, at man overvejer alternativer eller supplementer til en fast rotationscyklus, f.eks. hvis fælles revisioner anvendes, kunne rotationscyklussen fordobles, i forhold til hvis der er benyttet en enkelt revisor, da der er en anden dynamik mellem tre parter end mellem to parter, og rotationen af fælles revisioner kunne også være forskudt;
Suggests that options other than or additional to a fixed rotation cycle should be considered – for example, if joint audits are used the rotation cycle could be double that for when a single auditor is used, as the dynamics of ‘three in the room’ are different from those of ‘two in the room’, and joint audit rotation could also be staggered;
mener, at der bør trækkes en klar skillelinje mellem revisionstjenesteydelser og tjenesteydelser uden for revisionsområdet, som et revisionsfirma yder en kunde, navnlig med henblik på derefter at undgå interessekonflikter, som omhandlet i artikel 22, stk. 2, i direktiv 2006/43/EF og i overensstemmelse med adfærdskodekser for revisionspraksis; påpeger, at dette kunne begrænse »low balling«, dvs. opkrævning af kunstigt lave revisionspriser med henblik på derefter at udligne den lavere pris med andre supplerende tjenesteydelser; mener derfor, at denne adskillelse skal finde anvendelse på alle firmaer og deres kunder; opfordrer Kommissionen til på grundlag af henstillingerne fra 2002 om revisorers uafhængighed at udarbejde en oversigt over betingelser, der vil kunne bruges til at betegne disse tjenesteydelser som uforenelige med revisionstjenesteydelser; erkender, at ydelsen af tjenesteydelser uden for revisionsområdet, hvis de ikke er forenelige med revisorers uafhængighed, kan spille en væsentlig rolle for at udvide vidensgrundlaget for små og mellemstore revisionsfirmaer, men mener, at interne og eksterne revisionstjenesteydelser ikke bør ydes samtidigt;
Takes the view that there should be clear demarcation between the audit services and non-audit services that an audit firm provides to a customer, with a view to avoiding conflicts of interest as referred to in Article 22(2) of Directive 2006/43/EC and in accordance with codes of auditing practice; points out that this could restrict ‘lowballing’, the practice of offering cut-price auditing with a view to then offsetting the lower price by charging for additional services; takes the view, therefore, that the demarcation must apply to all firms and their clients; calls on the Commission, with reference to the 2002 Recommendations on Statutory Auditor Independence, to draw up a list of conditions under which such services would be deemed incompatible with audit services; recognises that the provision of non-audit services, where not incompatible with auditor independence, can play an essential role in broadening the skills base of small and medium-sized audit firms, but takes the view that internal and external audit services should not be provided simultaneously;
mener, at det er vigtigt at bevare revisorens uafhængighed; mener endvidere, at eksterne revisorer skal forbydes at yde den reviderede virksomhed tjenesteydelser, som kan stride mod gældende krav om uafhængighed eller andre etiske krav; anerkender, at det med henblik på at øge væksten i den europæiske økonomi er nødvendigt at sikre, at alle virksomheder uanset størrelse, herunder SMV'er, kan indgå kontrakt med uafhængige revisorer og revisionsfirmaer, som har en bred vifte af kompetencer;
Considers it essential to preserve the independence of the auditor; takes the view that external auditors should be banned from providing to the audited company services that could give rise to non-compliance with the applicable requirements regarding independence, or with other ethical requirements; recognises that, in order to boost growth in the European economy, it is necessary to ensure that all undertakings, regardless of their size, and including SMEs, can contract independent auditors and audit firms that have a wide range of skills;
bemærker især, at revisionstjenesteydelser, der skønnes at forårsage en interessekonflikt, ikke må ydes af samme virksomhed, herunder visse rådgivningstjenester og evalueringer af komplekse strukturerede produkter, og fastholder, at dette bør overvåges af de kompetente tilsynsmyndigheder;
Notes in particular that audit services which are deemed to give rise to a conflict of interest must not be carried out by the same company, including certain advisory services and evaluations of complex structured products, and maintain that this should be monitored by the competent supervisory authorities;
mener, at revisionsudvalget har en vigtig tilsynsrolle i sikringen af, at revisoren forbliver uafhængig, og anmoder Kommissionen om at vejlede revisionsudvalgene i denne henseende;
Believes that audit committees have an important oversight role in ensuring that the auditor remains independent, and asks the Commission to provide guidance to assist audit committees in this respect;
anbefaler, at det er revisionsudvalget som en del af tilsynsorganet, og ikke bestyrelsen, der bør afgøre, om det skal være tilladt at yde den pågældende finansielle virksomhed tjenesteydelser uden for revisionsområdet, og at det bør forhandle udbuddet og detaljerne i mandatet; opfordrer Kommissionen til at foretage en konsekvensanalyse af levedygtigheden og virkningerne af et loft over tjenesteydelser uden for revisionsområdet i forhold til indtægterne;
Recommends that the audit committee, as an entity of the supervisory board, not the executive board, should decide whether to permit the provision of non-audit services to a given financial company and should negotiate the tender and details of the mandate; calls on the Commission to conduct an impact assessment on the viability and effects of a cap on non-audit services in relation to revenue;
mener, at omfanget af de honorarer, et revisionsfirma eller et netværk af revisionsfirmaer kan modtage fra en enkelt revisionskunde, skal offentliggøres, når de overstiger en vis tærskel, og at tilsynsmyndighederne bør kunne gribe ind ved hjælp af kontroller, begrænsninger eller andre planlægningskrav, når de overstiger en bestemt procentdel af firmaets samlede revisionsindtægter for at undgå, at revisionsfirmaet bringer sig i en situation, hvor den ikke længere er økonomisk uafhængig; påpeger dog, at disse indgreb ikke må begrænse væksten for mindre virksomheder, og at sikringen af en stor og vigtig kunde, som i de tidlige stadier vil udgøre en høj procentdel af revisionsfirmaets aktiviteter, er et væsentligt element i vækstprocessen;
Takes the view that the fees an audit firm or a network of audit firms can charge a single client should be published when they exceed a given threshold and that supervisors should be able to intervene with checks, limits or other planning requirements when they exceed a certain percentage of its total income, so as to prevent a situation in which the audit firm loses its economic independence; points out, however, that for smaller firms such intervention should not restrict growth and that securing a large and significant client that provides a high percentage of the audit firm's work in the early stages is an essential part of the growth process;
mener, at revisionsfirmaer, der reviderer virksomheder af interesse for offentligheden, bør offentliggøre deres regnskaber, og at disse regnskaber og firmaets metoder bør revideres for at sikre, at de er i orden;
Believes that firms that audit public-interest entities ought to publish their accounts and that these accounts, as well as the methods used, should be checked to ensure that they are in order;
mener, at det skal være muligt at retsforfølge alle involverede parter, såfremt det bevises, at direktøren i et selskab, i en enhed af interesse for offentligheden og/eller i revisionsfirmaet, har misbrugt sin position;
Considers that, where there is proof of abuse of the position of director of an undertaking or of a public-interest entity and/or of the audit firm, it must be possible to prosecute all concerned;
mener, at partnerskabsmodellen er den mest hensigtsmæssige for revisionsfirmaer, da den sikrer deres uafhængighed;
Believes that the partnership model is the appropriate one for audit firms, since it protects their independence;
opfordrer Kommissionen og medlemsstaterne til at sikre, at revisioner af offentlige organer er eksemplariske, og til at forhindre at der opstår interessekonflikter som et resultat af forbindelserne mellem revisoren og beslutningstagerne inden for det offentlige organ, som er genstand for revision;
Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that audits of public bodies are exemplary and to prevent any conflicts of interest from arising as a result of links between the auditor and decision-makers within the public body being audited;
støtter grønbogens forslag om koncernrevisioner;
Supports the Green Paper's proposals on group audits;
opfordrer Kommissionen til at undersøge spørgsmålet om videregivelse af data i forbindelse med koncernrevisioner i forbindelse med den kommende revision af EU's lovgivningsramme for databeskyttelse;
Calls on the Commission to examine the issue of forwarding of data during group audits in the context of the future revision of the EU data protection legislative framework;
mener, at koncernrevisorer bør have et godt overblik over koncernen og bør indgå i en dialog med den koncerntilsynsførende, når der er tale om finansielle institutioner, der overvåges på koncernbasis;
Considers that group auditors should have a clear overview of the group and, in the case of financial institutions supervised on a group basis, should engage in dialogue with the group supervisor;
opfordrer Kommissionen til at forelægge et forslag til en forbedring af kommunikationen mellem revisoren for virksomheder af interesse for offentligheden og reguleringsmyndighederne;
Calls on the Commission to submit a proposal to improve communication between auditors of public-interest entities and the regulatory authorities;
mener, at der bør etableres protokoller for kommunikation og fortrolighed, og at dialogen reelt bør gå begge veje;
Believes that communication and confidentiality protocols should be laid down and that the dialogue should be genuinely two-way;
kræver en styrket tovejskommunikation mellem revisorer og finansielle tilsynsmyndigheder for de finansielle institutioner, navnlig i forbindelse med specifikke problemområder, herunder de forskellige finansielle produkters indvirkning på hinanden; kræver, at den samme kommunikation etableres mellem revisorer og de europæiske tilsynsmyndigheder i forbindelse med grænseoverskridende enheder;
Calls for enhanced, two-way communication between auditors and financial supervisors of financial institutions, especially in relation to specific areas of concern, including the interaction between different financial products; calls for the same communication to be established for cross-border entities by auditors and the European supervisory authorities;
påpeger behovet for harmonisering af tilsynspraksis for revision og opfordrer Kommissionen til at overveje at integrere Den Europæiske Gruppe af Revisionstilsynsorganer i det europæiske finanstilsynssystem, eventuelt gennem ESMA;
Points to the need to harmonise audit supervisory practices and asks the Commission to consider integrating the European Group of Auditors' Oversight Bodies into the European System of Financial Supervision, possibly through the ESMA;
kræver, at de finansielle institutioners eksterne revisorer regelmæssigt forelægger sektorbaserede rapporter for Det Europæiske Udvalg for Systemiske Risici for at identificere tendenser inden for sektorerne og mulige kilder til systemiske risici og mulige fejl, og bemærker, at dette bør foregå på en rimelig måde;
Calls for the external auditors of financial institutions to report periodically, on a sectoral basis, to the ESRB in order to identify sectoral trends and potential sources of systemic risk and potential failures, and observes that this should be done in a proportionate way;
opfordrer Kommissionen og medlemsstaterne til at sikre overensstemmelsen med de konklusioner, som de nationale revisionsretter har fremsat i forbindelse med deres revisionsopgave;
Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure compliance with the findings published by national audit offices in pursuit of their audit remit;
mener i betragtning af markedets nuværende udformning, at et sammenbrud blandt et af de såkaldte »fire store« firmaet vil undergrave hele revisorerhvervets troværdighed;
Believes, in view of the current configuration of the audit market, that the collapse of one of the Big Four firms would undermine the credibility of the auditing profession as a whole;
mener, at selv om et revisionsfirmas konkurs muligvis ikke har en direkte dominoeffekt for resten af økonomien, kan firmaer, der betragtes som »for store til at krakke« medføre risiko for »moral hazard«, og mener, at beredskabsplanerne i forbindelse med store revisionsfirmaer bør styrkes; mener endvidere, at formålet med disse planer bør være at minimere muligheden for, at et revisionsfirma forlader markedet uden rimelig grund og at reducere den usikkerhed og de forstyrrelser, som en sådan forsvinden ville medføre;
Takes the view that, even though audit firm failure may not have a direct domino effect on the rest of the economy, firms that are deemed ‘too big to fail’ could create the risk of moral hazard and that the contingency plans relating to the major auditing firms should be reinforced; believes, furthermore, that these plans should be designed to minimise the risk of an audit firm leaving the market without good reason and to reduce the uncertainty and disruption that would cause;
mener, at beredskabsplanerne er et vigtigt element i forebyggelsen af en uordnet afvikling af et firma, og at planerne skal indeholde en mekanisme, hvorved tilsynsmyndigheden informeres om ethvert problem, der truer et revisionsfirma på nationalt eller internationalt plan, så tilsynsmyndigheden kan udfylde sin funktion og håndtere disse situationer med fornøden omhu;
Takes the view that the contingency plans are an important means of preventing the disorderly break-up of a firm and that the plans ought to include a mechanism via which the regulator is informed of any problems threatening an audit firm nationally or internationally, in order to allow the regulators to play their role and handle such situations with due care;
tilslutter sig, at der indføres livstestamenter for de »fire store« revisionsfirmaer og de revisorer, der yder væsentlige revisortjenesteydelser til den finansielle sektor, herunder at der oprettes grænseoverskridende beredskabsplaner for en korrekt overførsel af kundekontrakter, i tilfælde af at en vigtig aktør trækker sig tilbage fra markedet;
Supports the introduction of living wills for the Big Four audit firms and those auditors providing significant audit services to the financial sector, as well as the laying down of cross-border contingency plans for the orderly transfer of client contracts should a significant player withdraw from the market;
understreger, at et af målene med enhver foranstaltning, der træffes på revisionsområdet, må være at øge konkurrencen blandt sektorens forskellige firmaer, samtidig med at revisionernes kvalitet, nøjagtighed og grundighed opretholdes;
Emphasises that one of the aims of every action undertaken in the field of auditing must be to develop competition among the various firms operating in the sector, while maintaining audit quality, accuracy and thoroughness;
anmoder Kommissionen om at sørge for lige konkurrencevilkår for alle firmaer på revisionsmarkedet og forenkle bestemmelserne for revisionssektoren på europæisk plan; mener, at lettere adgang til markedet og fjernelse af hindringer for adgangen for firmaer, der ønsker at komme ind på markedet, er afgørende elementer, hvis et større antal deltagere skal tiltrækkes af revisionsmarkedet; mener, at revisionsudvalg og ikke virksomheders bestyrelser er de bedst placerede til at vælge den form for revision, der bedst opfylder den reviderede enheds behov, og til at overvåge effektiviteten og kvaliteten af denne revision, og at man navnlig bør fremhæve revisorens uafhængighed; mener, at Kommissionen bør undersøge, hvordan virksomheder af interesse for offentligheden, den offentlige sektor og de europæiske institutioner får bedre mulighed for at bedømme kvaliteten af de revisionstjenesteydelser, som alle revisionsfirmaer uanset deres størrelse kan yde;
Calls on the Commission to establish equal competitive conditions for all firms operating on the auditing market and to simplify the rules governing auditing at European level; takes the view that easier access to the market and the removal of obstacles for firms wishing to enter the market are vital if a larger number of participants is to be attracted on to the auditing market; considers that audit committees and not the boards of companies are best placed to select the type of audit that best meets the audited entity's needs and to monitor the effectiveness and quality of that audit, and that particular emphasis should be placed on the auditor's independence; believes that the Commission should explore ways that will allow public-interest entities, the public sector and European institutions better to judge the quality of audit services provided by audit firms, irrespective of their size;
anerkender, at indførelsen af fælles revisioner kunne have positiv indflydelse på forskelligheden i revisionsmarkedet; minder om, at forskellige medlemsstater har forskellige markedssituationer og forskellige erfaringer med fælles revisioner; opfordrer Kommissionen til at vurdere mulige indtægter og udgifter ved obligatorisk indførelse både for revisionsfirmaer, navnlig små firmaer, og for reviderede virksomheder og især finansielle institutioner, og hvordan dette kan påvirke koncentrationen på revisionsmarkedet og den finansielle stabilitet;
Recognises that the implementation of joint audits could have positive effects on the diversification of the audit market; recalls that different Member States have different market situations and different experiences of joint audits; calls on the Commission to assess the potential benefits and the costs of mandatory introduction both for audit firms, in particular small audit firms, and for audited companies – in particular financial institutions – and how it might affect the concentration of the audit market and financial stability;
mener, at »de fire stores« overtagelser skal ses i lyset af, hvilken betydning overtagelsen vil få for væksten i andre firmaer eller netværker;
Considers that takeovers by the Big Four must be considered in the light of their impact on the growth of other firms or networks;