natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Selv om budgetbalancer synes at være en enkel metode til at udtrykke de økonomiske nettofordele ved at være medlem af Den Europæiske Union i et enkelt tal, viser de ikke det reelle forhold mellem fordele og ulemper ved at tilhøre EU.
Although budgetary balances may be seen as a simple way of capturing through a single figure the net financial benefits of being a Member State of the European Union, they fail to capture the real balance of the advantages and disadvantages of belonging to the Union.
Som allerede fastslået i Kommissionens rapporter fra 1998 og 2004 om, hvordan ordningen for egne indtægter fungerer genda 2000, Finansieringen af Den Europæiske Union, Kommissionens rapport om, hvordan ordningen med egne indtægter fungerer, supplement 2/98 til Bulletinen for Den Europæiske Union, http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/agenda2000/reports_en.htm, og Finansieringen af Den Europæiske Union, Kommissionens rapport om, hvordan ordningen med egne indtægter fungerer, KOM(2004) 505 endelig, bind I og II af 14. juli 2004, http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/pdf/financing/com_2004_OwnRes/Fin_own_res_Com_505_vol_%20I_DA.pdf . , giver budgetbalancer naturligvis ikke noget fuldstændigt billede af gevinsterne ved EU-medlemskabet.
As already stated in the Commission’s 1998 and 2004 reports on the functioning of the EU’s own resources system ‘Agenda 2000, Financing the European Union, Commission report on the operation of the own resources system’ Supplement 2/98 to the Bulletin of the European Union, available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/agenda2000/reports_en.htm ; and ‘Financing the European Union, Commission report on the operation of the own resources system’, COM(2004) 505 final, Volume I and II, of 14 July 2004, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/furtherinfo/index_en.htm . , budgetary flows do not capture all the benefits from membership of the EU.
EU-medlemskabet, der medfører fordele af både finansiel og ikke-finansiel art såvel som forpligtelser, har en ikke-budgetmæssig dimension, der i betydning langt overskygger den rent budgetmæssige.
EU membership, which gives rise to financial and non-financial advantages as well as obligations, has a non-budgetary dimension the importance of which dwarfs the budgetary one.
Eksempelvis kan fordelene ved at forfølge fælles mål, såsom liberalisering af handelen og europæisk økonomisk integration, ikke bedømmes alene på grundlag af budgetstrømme.
For example, the benefits from the pursuit of common objectives, such as trade liberalisation and European economic integration, cannot be evaluated in terms of budgetary flows alone.
Der findes desuden en række metoder til beregning af budgetbalancer, som kræver, at der tages stilling til fire vigtige spørgsmål:
There are, furthermore, several possible methods of calculating budgetary balances, which require making assumptions about four main issues:
hvilke poster der skal medtages ved beregningen af medlemsstaternes indbetalinger til EU’s budget
the items to be included in the calculation of the payments made by Member States to the EU budget;
hvilke poster der skal medtages ved beregningen af EU’s udgifter i hver enkelt medlemsstat
the items to be included in the calculation of EU expenditure in each Member State;
anvendelsen af kasseregnskabsdata i modsætning til periodiseringsdata (problemet er, hvordan man medregner fremførsel af ubrugte balancer fra tidligere år), og
the use of cash versus accrual data (including the issue of how to account for the carry over of the unspent balances from previous years); and
Efter anmodning fra medlemsstaterne offentliggør Kommissionens Generaldirektorat for Budget i sin årsberetning tal om medlemsstaternes balancer i forhold til EU’s budget (»Allocation of EU operating expenditure by Member State« Kan findes på http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/agenda2000/reports_en.htm ).
In response to Member States’ demands, the Commission’s Directorate-General for Budget publishes figures on Member States’ balances vis-à-vis the EU budget in its annual report ‘Allocation of EU operating expenditure by Member State” Available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/agenda2000/reports_en.htm .
Efter den metode, Kommissionen anvender (metoden til beregning af UK-rabatten), fordeles betalingerne af traditionelle egne indtægter ikke på medlemsstaterne.
Under the method used by the Commission (the “UK rebate method”) payments of traditional own resources (TOR) are not allocated by Member State.
På grund af deres karakter – dvs. afgifter som led i en toldunion, hvor varer og tjenesteydelser cirkulerer frit – kan de ikke fordeles på de enkelte medlemsstater nøjagtigt.
Due to their very nature – i.e. duties levied as part of a customs union where goods and services circulate freely – they cannot be accurately apportioned to individual Member States.
De behandles derfor som indtægter, der tilfalder EU, snarere end som »nationale« bidrag til EU’s budget.
They are therefore treated as revenue belonging to the EU rather than as “national” contributions to the EU budget.
I den økonomiske redegørelse fra Danmarks Finansministerium, som det ærede medlem henviser til, specificeres det ikke, hvordan man har beregnet nettobalancerne.
The report from the Danish Ministry of Finance that the Honourable Member refers to (Økonomisk Redegørelse 2004) does not specify how the net balances therein have been calculated.
Kommissionen foreslår det ærede medlem at henvende sig direkte til Danmarks Finansministerium for at få belyst dette spørgsmål.
The Commission suggests that the Honourable Member addresses this question directly to the Danish Ministry of Finance.
Den danske budgetbalance over for EU i perioden 1995–2003 beregnet efter den metode, Kommissionen anvendte i sin beretning »Allocation of 2003 EU operating expenditure by Member State«, fremgår af nedenstående tabel 1 En detaljeret beskrivelse af metoden kan findes på side 101–103 i 2003-beretningen om fordelte udgifter. :
Denmark’s budgetary balance vis-à-vis the EU budget during the period 1995–2003, according to the method used by the Commission in its report ‘Allocation of 2003 EU operating expenditure by Member State’, is set out in table 1 below A detailed description of the method can be found on pages 101–103 of the 2003 allocated expenditure report :
Danmarks nettobalancea over for EU’s budget
Denmark’s net balancea vis-à-vis the EU budget
Efter betaling af UK-rabatten og eksklusive administrationsudgifter
After UK rebate payments and excluding administrative expenditure
% af BNP/BNIb
% of GNP/GNIb
a A + (-) angiver et overskud (underskud).
a A + (-) indicates a surplus (deficit).
b Begrebet bruttonationalprodukt (BNP) blev erstattet af bruttonationalindkomst (BNI) i EU’s budget fra og med 2002.
b The concept of gross national product (GNP) was replaced by gross national income (GNI) in the area of the EU budget as from the year 2002.
For at imødekomme konklusionerne fra Det Europæiske Råds møde i Berlin i 1999 (se fodnote 3) indgår administrationsudgifter ikke i de budgetbalancer, der offentliggøres i beretningen om fordeling af EU’s aktionsudgifter på medlemsstaterne.
In order to respect the conclusions of the 1999 Berlin European Council (see footnote 3) administrative expenditure is excluded from the budgetary balances published in the report on allocation of EU operating expenditure by Member State.
Tabel 2 nedenfor viser de samme balancer som tabel 1, men omfatter desuden administrationsudgifter i medlemsstaterne.
Table 2 below presents the same balances as in table 1, but including also administrative expenditure in the Member States.
Det skal bemærkes, at Kommissionens forslag til en generel ordning for korrektion af budgetuligevægte Selve forslaget (KOM(2004) 501 endelig) samt den fuldstændige analyse af, hvordan ordningen med egne indtægter fungerer (KOM(2004) 505 endelig, bind II), kan findes på: http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/furtherinfo/index_en.htm , ligesom den nuværende korrektion for Det Forenede Kongerige, er baseret på den definition, der er anvendt i tabel 2 nedenfor.
It could be mentioned that the Commission’s proposal for a generalised mechanism for correcting budgetary imbalances The proposal itself (COM(2004) 501 final) as well as the full analysis of the operation of the own resources system (COM(2004) 505 final, Volume II) is available at the following address: http://europa.eu.int/comm/budget/furtherinfo/index_en.htm , like the current UK correction, is based on the definition used in table 2 below.
Efter betaling af UK-rabatten og inklusive administrationsudgifter
After UK rebate payments and including administrative expenditure
SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL P-3404/04
WRITTEN QUESTION P-3404/04
Om: Problemer med atomreaktoren i Petten og standsning af den strafferetlige efterforskning
Subject: Abuses at the Petten nuclear reactor and suspension of the related criminal investigation
Den nederlandske anklagemyndighed indledte da også en strafferetlig efterforskning, men det ser ud, som om Kommissionen har blokeret for denne efterforskning ved udgangen af 2003.
The Netherlands Public Prosecution service therefore started a criminal investigation but at the end of 2003 the European Commission intervened to prevent criminal proceedings.
Kommissionen ejer reaktoren og påberåber sig den såkaldte hjemstedsaftale fra 1961, ifølge hvilken medarbejderne ved atomreaktoren er nyder immunitet.
The Commission is the owner of the nuclear reactor and has invoked the 1961 headquarters agreement, which apparently gives employees of the nuclear reactor immunity from prosecution.
Ifølge de Volkskrant indgik Nederland derefter en aftale med Euratom, der indebar, at Euratom genopretter området til oprindelig tilstand og lover forbedringer.
According to the Volkskrant report, the Netherlands then concluded an agreement with Euratom (a Commission operating company), under which Euratom has agreed to restore the site to its former state and promised to make improvements.
Denne aftale faldt imidlertid, fordi Euratom nægtede at acceptere uanmeldte inspektioner.
However, this deal has backfired because Euratom refuses to accept unannounced inspections.
Den tidligere MEP for De Grønne, Alexander de Roo, har allerede tidligere anmodet Kommissionen om foranstaltninger til forbedring af sikkerheden i Petten, men dette har tydeligvis ikke givet resultat.
The former Green Member of the European Parliament, Alexander de Roo, urged the Commission some time ago to take steps to improve the safety situation at Petten but this has evidently not produced satisfactory results.
Er det korrekt, at Kommissionen har blokeret for strafforfølgningen, og hvorfor er det i bekræftende fald sket?
Is it correct that the European Commission has blocked criminal proceedings and, if so, why?
Hvilke skridt vil Kommissionen som ejer af reaktoren tage for at sikre, at problemerne denne gang løses og de ansvarlige dog stilles til regnskab?
What measures is the Commission taking, as owner of the nuclear reactor, to ensure that on this occasion the abuses are in fact tackled and those responsible are prosecuted?
Hvorfor nægter Euratom at acceptere uanmeldte kontroller?
Why does Euratom refuse to accept announced inspections?
SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL P-3415/04
WRITTEN QUESTION P-3415/04
Om: Europæisk musikobservatorium
Subject: European Music Observatory
I forbindelse med rådsmødet i 1997 (kulturministrene), der blev afholdt under det luxemburgske formandskab, blev det enstemmigt vedtaget at oprette et europæisk musikobservatorium, der skulle begynde sit arbejde efter gennemførelsen af en række forberedende foranstaltninger i samarbejde med Europa-Parlamentets kulturudvalg.
The 1997 Council of Ministers of Culture held under the Luxembourgish Presidency unanimously adopted a resolution to set up a European Music Observatory, following preparatory work by the EP’s Committee on Culture.
To år efter oprettelsen af det europæiske musikobservatorium blev det nedlagt.
Two years after being set up, the European Music Observatory ceased operating.
Jeg har fra Kommissionens tjenestegrene modtaget en skrivelse om baggrunden herfor, og det fremgår heraf, at Kommissionen som følge af nedlæggelsen af observatoriet har undersøgt mulighederne for at oprette et observatorium for kulturelt samarbejde, men med negativt resultat.
The Commission’s services have sent me a note about what happened; it seems that the Commission, following the closing down of the project, commissioned a study on the appropriateness of setting up a Cultural Cooperation Observatory, which recommended not doing so.
I det nye program »Kultur 2007« lægges der op til støtte til »analyser samt til indsamling og formidling af informationer vedrørende kulturelt samarbejde«.
The new Culture 2007 programme refers to providing support for carrying out analyses and collecting and diffusing information in the field of cultural cooperation.
Målsætningen fra 1997 er således blevet taget op igen og udvidet, men i mellemtiden har arbejdet med at undersøge problemerne inden for musikområdet kostet megen tid.
In other words, the 1997 idea has been picked up again and extended, but in the interim, much time has been lost as far as research into the musical world and its problems has been lost.
Hvordan forsøger Kommissionen i samarbejde med Europa-Parlamentets Kulturudvalg at tage hensyn til Rådets afgørelser?
How is the Commission going to honour the decisions taken by the Council of Ministers in collaboration with the European Parliament’s Committee on Culture?
SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL P-3428/04
WRITTEN QUESTION P-3428/04
Om: Anvendelse af metoden med neddeling, befugtning og forbrænding til bortskaffelse af asbest
Subject: The use of the shredding, dowsing and burning process for the disposal of asbestos
SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL P-3436/04
WRITTEN QUESTION P-3436/04
Om: Finansielle overslag og den fjerde fællesskabsstøtteramme
Subject: Financial perspective and fourth CSF
På baggrund af, at der hidtil ikke har været enighed om finansieringsdelen i de finansielle overslag for 2007-2013, bedes Kommissionen besvare følgende: 1.
Given that no agreement exists so far on funding for the 2007-2013 financial perspective, will the Commission say: 1.
Hvilke frister har Kommissionen fastsat til vedtagelsen af forslagspakken om de nye finansielle overslag? 2.
What time limit has it set for the adoption of the package of proposals on the new financial perspective? 2.
Garanterer Kommissionens finansieringsforslag med henblik på at sikre ressourcer på baggrund af den nye situation i EU efter udvidelsen med de ti nye lande, at de fællesskabsmæssige omkostninger pr. indbygger vil blive stillet til rådighed for Strukturfondene og Samhørighedsfonden på et niveau, der i absolut værdi ikke er lavere end den absolutte værdi i programmeringsperioden 1999-2006? 3.
Will its financial proposals to secure resources in the new enlarged Europe including the ten new countries ensure that the financial resources per EU inhabitant available to the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund will not be lower, in absolute terms, than during the 1999-2006 programming period? 3.
Hvor langt er man nået med den endelige fastlæggelse af den fjerde fællesskabsstøtteramme? 4.
How close is the fourth CSF to being finalized, and 4.
Vil de regioner, der udelukkes fra mål et, men som har problemer med strukturel tilpasning, fortsat modtage støtte fra EU, sådan som den afgående kommissionsformand har erklæret?
Will the regions which will be outside Objective 1 but face structural adjustment problems continue to be financed by the European Union, as the previous Commission President had stated?
SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL P-3444/04
WRITTEN QUESTION P-3444/04
Om: Dialog med religiøse og konfessionsløse organisationer
Subject: Dialogue with religious and non-confessional organisations
Den 16. november 2004 indbød Kommissionen via Gruppen af Politiske Rådgivere (GOPA) repræsentanter for kirker og trossamfund, herunder Scientology-kirken og en række andre religiøse organisationer, for at informere dem om de beslutninger, der var blevet truffet på det seneste møde i Det Europæiske Råd den 4. og 5. november 2004.
On 16 November 2004, the Commission, via the Group of Policy Advisers (GOPA), invited representatives of churches and religions, including the Church of Scientology and numerous medium-sized organisations of a religious character, to a meeting in order to inform them of the decisions adopted at the last European Council summit on 4 and 5 November.
Repræsentanter for konfessionsløse organisationer, bl.a. European Humanist Federation, blev dog ikke indbudt.
However, representatives of non‑confessional organisations, including the European Humanist Federation, were not invited.
Har Kommissionen (eller GOPA) herved ikke krænket princippet om upartiskhed, og indebærer dette ikke en forskelsbehandling af det sekulære og humanistiske tankegods i EU? —
In doing so, did the Commission (or the GOPA) not violate the principle of impartiality, and does this not imply discrimination against secular and humanist thinking within the EU? —
Er dette ikke i strid med princippet om deltagelsesdemokrati i forfatningen for Europa, i henhold til hvilket der skal føres en åben og gennemsigtig dialog med religiøse og konfessionsløse organisationer (som fastsat i artikel I-53)? —
Is this not contrary to the idea of participatory democracy enshrined in the European Constitution, which provides for an open and transparent dialogue with religious and non-confessional organisations (as laid down in Article I-53)? —
Har Kommissionen nu informeret de konfessionsløse organisationer om resultaterne af Det Europæiske Råds møde den 4. og 5. november 2004? —
Has the Commission meanwhile informed non-confessional organisations about the European Council summit on 4 and 5 November 2004? —
Kan Kommissionen garantere, at dette var en fejltagelse, der ikke vil gentage sig?
Can the Commission guarantee that this was a one-off slip?
SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL P-3445/04
WRITTEN QUESTION P-3445/04
Om: Britiske GSM-udbyderes forskelsbehandling af statsborgere fra andre EU-medlemsstater
Subject: Discriminatory policy practices by Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) providers in the UK
En af mine London-vælgere, en irsk statsborger, som af arbejdsmæssige årsager er flyttet til Det Forenede Kongerige fra Irland, har henledt min opmærksomhed på, at britiske udbydere af det globale system for mobilkommunikation (GSM) gør sig skyld i forskelsbehandling, idet statsborgere fra andre EU-medlemsstater, der for nylig er kommet til Det Forenede Kongerige for at arbejde, nægtes tilladelse til at indgå en regulær kontrakt med en mobilnetoperatør med den begrundelse, at deres kreditværdighed ikke er stor nok, eftersom de ikke har boet i Det Forenede Kongerige i tilstrækkelig lang tid.
It has been brought to my attention by one of my London constituents, an Irish national who moved to the UK for work purpose from Ireland, that the Global System for Mobile Communications providers in the UK practice a discriminatory policy whereby nationals of other EU Member states who have recently come to the UK for work are refused permission to sign up for a proper contract with a mobile operator on the basis that their credit rating is inadequate as they have not lived in the UK for a sufficient period of time.
Dette forekommer urimeligt, da mange har eller har haft kontrakter med mobilnetoperatører i andre EU-medlemsstater uden på nogen måde at have gjort sig skyld i misligholdelse, men udbyderne synes ikke at være villige til at foretage kreditkontrol uden for Det Forenede Kongerige.
This would appear to be unfair as many have or have had contracts with mobile providers in other EU Member states with spotless credit histories but there seems to be unwillingness by the service provider to do credit checks outside of the UK.
Eftersom EU har et indre marked for tjenesteydelser, skulle det være muligt at foretage kreditværdighedskontrol på tværs af grænserne, således at borgerne kan bevæge sig frit omkring.
As we have a single market in services throughout the EU, cross border credit checks should be possible so that people can move around freely.
Har Kommissionen kendskab til britiske mobilnetoperatørers forskelsbehandling af statsborgere fra andre EU-medlemsstater?
Is the Commission aware of this discriminatory approach of UK mobile phone service providers towards other EU nationals?
Hvad kan den gøre for at afhjælpe denne skæve situation?
What can the Commission do to remedy this anomalous situation?
SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL P-3446/04
WRITTEN QUESTION P-3446/04
Om: Respekt for vedtagne beslutninger i Bolivia
Subject: Respect for decisions taken in Bolivia
I Bolivia, som er Latinamerikas fattigste land, findes verdensdelens største forsyninger af olie og naturgas.
The biggest oil and natural gas reserves in Latin America are to be found in Bolivia, the poorest country on that continent.
Udnyttelsen af disse forsyninger har primært gavnet olieselskaber fra bl.a. USA og Storbritannien og ikke den bolivianske befolkning.
These resources have been exploited mainly for the benefit of US and UK oil companies rather than the Bolivian people.
Landets korrumperede regeringer har bidraget til at opretholde situationen i landet.
Corrupt governments in the country have helped to preserve this state of affairs.
I år afholdtes en folkeafstemning i Bolivia, som ifølge landet præsident Carlos Mesa viste, at den bolivianske befolkning krævede, at der skulle »opnås større kontrol med landets naturressourcer, gas og olie«.
This year, a referendum was held in Bolivia which, according to President Carlos Mesa, demonstrated that the Bolivian people demanded greater control over the country's natural resources, gas and oil.
Det bolivianske parlament besluttede også for nylig, at landets gas- og olieressourcer skal nationaliseres.
Recently, the Bolivian Parliament also decided that the country's gas and oil reserves should be nationalised.
Det har bl.a. ført til reaktioner fra landets præsident Carlos Mesa, som har truet med at afgå som præsident, hvis beslutningen gennemføres, og fra USA, som truer med at standse sin bistand.
This decision has provoked various reactions, including a threat by President Carlos Mesa to resign if it is implemented, and a US threat to suspend its aid.
Både præsidenten og USA forsøger ved hjælp af trusler og afpresning at modarbejde en demokratisk beslutning, samtidig med at spændingerne mellem regeringen og befolkningen øges.
Both the President and the USA are using threats and blackmail to overturn a democratic decision, while tensions rise between government and people.
Kan Rådet oplyse, om det har forsøgt eller vil forsøge at påvirke den bolivianske regering til at respektere resultatet af folkeafstemningen samt beslutningen i parlamentet om den bolivianske befolknings forsyninger af olie og naturgas?
Has the Council tried to persuade the Bolivian Government to respect the outcome of the referendum and its parliament's decision concerning the Bolivian people's oil and natural gas resources and, if not, does it intend to do so?
Det tilkommer ikke Rådet at forsøge at påvirke indenrigspolitiske beslutninger i et tredjeland i hverken den ene eller den anden retning.
It is not for the Council to attempt to influence domestic policy decisions of a third country in one direction or another.
Efter folkeafstemningen den 18. juli 2004 fremsatte missionscheferne for medlemsstaternes ambassader følgende erklæring:
Following the referendum of 18 July 2004, the heads of delegations of the Member States' embassies made the following statement:
»Den Europæiske Unions missionschefer i La Paz noterer sig med tilfredshed, at folkeafstemningen den 18. juli 2004 om gas foregik fredeligt og i en positiv atmosfære, hvorved det bolivianske folk fik en historisk mulighed for direkte at udtrykke sin mening om et spørgsmål af stor betydning for landet.
‘The Heads of Mission of the European Union in La Paz note with satisfaction the positive atmosphere and tranquillity in which the gas referendum of 18 July 2004 took place, providing the Bolivian people with an historic opportunity to directly express their opinion on an issue of great national importance.