natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Specielt indenfor råstofområdet (sjældne jordarter) ligger der et stort potentiale, når det kommer til det udviklingsmæssige perspektiv på Grønland samt vigtigheden for europæisk industri.
The field of raw materials (rare earths) in particular offers great potential as regards development prospects for Greenland and significance for European industry.
Har Grønlands manglende strategi indenfor sjældne jordarter qua landets tidligere nultolerance‑politik overfor udvinding af uran muligvis betydet, at Kommissionen har undladt at satse for store beløb på Grønland?
Is the Commission’s failure to invest very much in Greenland perhaps explained by the fact that Greenland has no strategy with regard to rare earths on account of the country’s previous zero-tolerance policy towards the extraction of uranium?
Er Kommissionen åben for, igennem andre instrumenter, at lave yderligere investeringer i Grønland?
Is the Commission open to investing more in Greenland through other instruments?
(22. februar 2012)
(22 February 2012)
Kommissionen er fuldt ud klar over vigtigheden af Grønlands potentiale, hvad angår naturressourcer, herunder råmaterialer.
The Commission is fully aware of the importance of Greenland's potential in terms of natural resources, including raw materials.
Kommissionen har fremsat sit forslag til en ny rådsafgørelse, der fastlægger de retlige rammer for samarbejde mellem EU og Grønland i perioden 2014‑2020.
The Commission has presented its proposal for a new Council Decision which sets the legal framework for cooperation between the EU and Greenland for the period 2014-2020.
Forslaget definerer flere mulige områder for samarbejde, bl.a. uddannelse, naturressourcer og arktiske anliggender.
The proposal defines several possible areas of cooperation, among others education, natural resources and Arctic issues.
Efter Rådets vedtagelse af afgørelsen om forbindelserne mellem Den Europæiske Union på den ene side og Grønland og Kongeriget Danmark på den anden side vil der finde forhandlinger sted mellem Grønlands landsstyre og Kommissionen med henblik på at definere de samarbejdsområder, der vil få gavn af økonomisk støtte fra EU i perioden 2014‑2020.
Upon adoption by the Council of the European Union of the decision on relations between the European Union on the one hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark on the other, negotiations between the Government of Greenland and the Commission will take place in order to define the areas of cooperation that will benefit from EU financial support during the period 2014-2020.
I sit forslag pegede Kommissionen på muligheden for politisk dialog med Grønland om et bredt spektrum af områder og sektorer af fælles interesse, mens økonomisk støtte begrænses til to målsektorer for at kunne garantere støttens virkning.
In its proposal, the Commission indicated the possibility of policy dialogue with Greenland around a broad spectrum of areas and sectors of mutual interest, while financial aid would be limited to two focal sectors in order to guarantee leverage for that EU financial support.
Hvad angår EU's råmaterialestrategi, så overvejer Kommissionen Grønlands mulige deltagelse i andre instrumenter, såsom Horisont 2020, med henblik på at stille finansiering til rådighed for samarbejde, der omfatter hele værdikæden for råmaterialer.
In addition, as regards the EU raw materials strategy, the Commission is reflecting on Greenland's possible participation in other instruments such as: Horizon 2020, with a view to make available funding for cooperation covering the entire value chain of raw materials.
Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-012587/2011
Question for written answer E-012587/2011
Om: Delstaten Brandenburgs manglende overholdelse af kravene om tilgængelighed under forordning (EF) nr.1083/2006
Subject: Failure of the Brandenburg Land to comply with accessibility requirements under Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006
EU’s forordning nr.1083/2006 kræver, at projekter skal opfylde kravene om tilgængelighed for at kunne komme i betragtning for støtte fra EU’s strukturfonde.
Regulation (EC) 1083/2006 stipulates that projects must comply with accessibility requirements in order to qualify for funding under the EU Structural Funds.
Delstaten Brandenburg havde først omsat dette krav i lovgivning den 1. september 2007.
The Land of Brandenburg introduced this requirement into law in 1 September 2007.
Regeringen henviste ikke til, at mulighederne for at komme i betragtning for EU‑støtte skulle være betinget af tilgængelighed i de støttegodkendelser, som den udstedte efter denne forordnings ikrafttræden, og efter gennemførelsen af kravet om tilgængelighed i Brandenburg.
Its government made no reference to eligibility for EU funds being conditional on accessibility, however, in the funding approvals issued after the entry into force of the regulation and the imposition in Brandenburg of the requirement for accessibility.
Den begrundede dette med, at der blev søgt om støtte til projekterne i marts 2007.
The government justified that omission on the grounds that the applications in respect of the projects were submitted in March 2007.
EU‑forordning nr. 1083/2006 var på det tidspunkt allerede trådt i kraft.
However, Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 had already entered into force by then.
Mener Kommissionen, at Brandenburgs regering har ret til at godkende støtte i form af midler fra EU‑strukturfondene i september 2007 uden at kræve, at projekterne opfylder de krav om tilgængelighed, der trådte i kraft i begyndelsen af 2007, selvom regeringen allerede havde omsat disse bestemmelser i lovgivning?
Does the Commission consider that the government of the Land of Brandenburg was entitled to approve the granting of funds from the EU Structural Funds in September 2007 without insisting that projects comply with the accessibility requirements which entered into force at the beginning of 2007, even though the government had already transposed those provisions into law?
Hvis ja, hvordan begrunder Kommissionen dette i betragtning af, at beslutningen om at yde støtte til et projekt skal være orienteret efter kvaliteten af et projekt, eller i det mindste efter, hvorvidt EU‑bestemmelserne er overholdt?
If so, how can the Commission justify its position, given that any decision to fund a project must be contingent on its quality and, at the very least, its compliance with EU regulations?
Hvis nej, vil Kommissionen så kræve disse penge tilbagebetalt af Brandenburg?
If not, will the Commission demand that the Land of Brandenburg pay the money back?
Var Kommissionen informeret om, at der blev udbetalt EU‑strukturmidler for 2007 i Brandenburg, uden at kravene om tilgængelighed var overholdt?
Was the Commission aware that EU Structural Funds for 2007 were disbursed in Brandenburg without regard to accessibility requirements?
Hvad gjorde Kommissionen, hvis dette var tilfældet?
If so, what action has it taken?
Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-012588/2011
Question for written answer E-012588/2011
Om: USA's holdning til ACTA
Subject: USA's attitude towards ACTA
Der har for nylig været rapporter fremme om, at USA ikke vil betragte sig som juridisk bundet af ACTA, mens EU vil betragte sig som bundet.
There have recently been reports suggesting that the USA will not consider itself legally bound by ACTA whereas the EU would consider itself bound.
Jeg ønsker derfor at spørge Kommissionen om følgende: 1.
Therefore, I would like to ask the following questions: 1.
Hvilken specifik undersøgelse, som Kommissionen har foretaget af de mulige risici for innovationen og konkurrenceevnen, i lyset af det faktum, at de krav og begrænsninger, der er fastsat i ACTA, ikke vil være bindende for USA-baserede virksomheder?
What specific analysis has the Commission carried out with regard to potential risks for innovation and competition related to the fact that requirements and limitations imposed by ACTA will not be binding on US-based companies?
Især, hvorvidt Kommissionen har undersøgt de mulige konsekvenser for EU af at være bundet af en aftale om strafferetlige sanktioner, hvis USA vælger ikke at anvende de samme regler?
In particular, has the Commission analysed the possible implications of the EU being bound to an agreement on criminal sanctions if the USA chooses not to apply the same rules?
Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-012589/2011
Question for written answer E-012589/2011
Om: Mærkning »Made in Israel«
Subject: Labelling ‘made in Israel’
De israelske bosættelser på Vestbredden er i vidt omfang afhængige af salg af landbrugsprodukter og varer produceret af bosættelsesvirksomhederne for at overleve økonomisk.
The economic viability of the Israeli settlements at the West Bank relies largely on sales of agricultural produce and goods produced in settlement businesses.
Som oftest eksporterer bosættelserne deres varer mærket »Made in Israel« eller »Vestbredden« eller »Jordandalen« (hvorved de antyder deres palæstinensiske oprindelse).
In most cases the settlements export their goods with a ‘Made in Israel’ or ‘West Bank’ or ‘Jordan Valley’ label (and hence suggest their Palestinian origin).
Som Kommissionen har forklaret, er mærkning med angivelse af oprindelseslandet frivillig.
As the Commission explains, labelling indicating the place of origin is voluntary.
Det står imidlertid klart og tydeligt i direktiv 2000/13/EF, at producenter og fabrikanter kan give de yderligere oplysninger, de måtte ønske, forudsat at de er præcise og ikke vildleder forbrugeren.
However, Directive 2000/13/EC clearly states that ‘Producers and manufacturers are free to provide whatever additional information they wish, provided that it is accurate and does not mislead the consumer’.
Den misvisende mærkning af produkter fra bosættelserne er en klar overtrædelse af denne bestemmelse.
The mislabelled settlement products clearly violate this ruling.
Kommissionen er måske også klar over, at den regel, der forbyder, at bosættelsesprodukter bliver begunstiget, har vist sig at være ineffektiv, idet de israelske myndigheder ikke giver præcise oplysninger om produktionsstedet.
The Commission might also be aware that the rule prohibiting settlement products from benefiting from preferential treatment has proven to be ineffective, as Israeli authorities do not provide accurate information on the place of production.
I betragtning af vanskelighederne med at spore produkternes oprindelse og EU’s ineffektive kontrolmekanismer, der har til formål at tjekke, hvorvidt et produkt er blevet produceret i en bosættelse eller inden for Israels grænser fra 1967, vil jeg gerne spørge, hvilke skridt Kommissionen agter at tage for at kontrollere de israelske produkters oprindelsessted mere effektivt?
In view of the difficulty of tracing the product origin, and of the ineffectiveness of EU verification mechanisms established to check whether a product was produced in a settlement or within Israel’s recognised 1967 borders, I would like to ask what steps the Commission intends to undertake to more effectively verify Israeli products’ place of origin?
Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-012590/2011
Question for written answer E-012590/2011
Om: Drab på og trusler mod vidner under UNMIK's og EULEX's tilsyn
Subject: Murder and intimidation of witnesses under the supervision of UNMIK and EULEX
I forbindelse med tidligere forsøg på at stille formodede krigsforbrydere for krigsforbryderdomstolen i Haag på grund af talrige forbrydelser har sagerne gentagne gange måttet indstilles, fordi vidner var blevet truet eller dræbt.
During previous attempts to bring suspected war criminals before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague on multiple criminal charges, the murder and/or intimidation of witnesses was repeatedly grounds for the postponement of procedures.
På baggrund af en krigsforbryderproces mod Fatmir Limaj, tidligere transportminister i den såkaldte Kosovoregering under Hashim Thaçi, og ni andre højtstående Kosovoembedsmænd, som var berammet til oktober 2011, blev kronvidnet, Agim Zogaj, fundet død den 27. september.
Against the background of the war crimes trial in October 2011 which had been arranged by the Rule of Law Mission EULEX against Fatmir Limaj, the former Minister of Transport in the so-called Government of Kosovo under Hashim Thaçi, and nine other senior Kosovar officials, the key witness, Agim Zogaj, was found dead on 27 September 2011.
Agim Zogaj havde ladet omfattende forklaringer optage på video og var villig til at vidne for retten i en retssag mod Fatmir Limaj.
Agim Zogaj had already recorded detailed statements on video and was prepared to testify before the court in a case against Fatmir Limaj.
Hvilke oplysninger har Kommissionen om drab på eller trusler mod vidner, som var villige til at afgive forklaring i forbindelse med strafferetlige efterforskninger eller forundersøgelser, der var indledt af UNMIK, EULEX samt ICTY på baggrund af de forbrydelser, der er begået i Kosovo siden 1998?
What evidence does the Commission have of the killing and/or intimidation of witnesses who are willing to testify in connection with criminal proceedings or preliminary investigations which have been initiated by UNMIK, EULEX and the ICTY in the context of the crimes committed in Kosovo since 1998?
Hvor mange vidner har Kommissionen kendskab til, som allerede er blevet truet, såret eller dræbt i forbindelse med UCK-krigsforbrydelser?
According to the Commission’s information, how many witnesses have already been threatened, wounded or killed in connection with UÇK war crimes?
Hvordan vurderer Kommissionen sikkerheden for vidner fra Kosovo, Serbien og andre steder i EULEX-retssager?
What is the Commission’s assessment of the safety of Kosovar, Serbian and other witnesses in EULEX trials?
Er Kommissionen enig i, at EULEX's vidnebeskyttelsesprogram giver tilstrækkelig beskyttelse for liv og helbred for vidner, som er villige til at afgive forklaring, eller mener den, at der er grund til at ændre på dette program?
Does the Commission believe that the EULEX witness protection programme represents adequate protection for the lives of witnesses who are willing to testify, or does it see any reason for changes in this programme?
Hvor stor mener Kommissionen risikoen er for andre vidner, som er villige til at afgive forklaring mod den formodede krigsforbryder Fatmir Limaj?
What is the Commission’s estimate of the danger for other witnesses who are prepared to testify against the suspected war criminal Fatmir Limaj?
Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-012603/2011
Question for written answer E-012603/2011
Om: Mezzaninfinansering — dansk mezzaninkautionsmodel
Subject: Mezzanine financing — Danish mezzanine surety model
Den danske Vækstfond har indsendt en ansøgning til Kommissionen for at få godkendt en mezzaninkautionsmodel i starten af 2011.
At the beginning of 2011, the Danish Growth Fund [Vækstfond] submitted an application to the Commission for approval of a mezzanine surety model.
Hvor er vi henne i processen?
What stage of the process are we at?
Hvornår kan vi forvente en afgørelse?
When can we expect a decision?
Den 17. maj 2011 anmeldte de danske myndigheder beregningsmetoden for den udvidede vækstkautionsordning, som forvaltes af Vækstfonden, til Kommissionen.
On 17 May 2011, the Danish authorities notified to the Commission the calculation methodology for the Large Growth Guarantee Scheme managed by Vaekstfonden.
Metoden blev godkendt af Kommissionen den 4. august 2011 Sag SA.33022, EUT C 271 af 14.9.2011, s. 4. .
The methodology was approved by the Commission on 4 August 2011 Case SA.33022; OJ C 271, 14.9.2011, p.
I henhold til procedurekravene skal Kommissionen træffe den relevante afgørelse inden for to måneder fra modtagelsen af en fuldstændig anmeldelse.
In accordance with the procedural requirements, the Commission is bound to adopt the relevant decision within two months from the date of receipt of a complete notification.
Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-012604/2011
Question for written answer E-012604/2011
Om: Mezzaninfinansering — medlemsstaternes forskellige modeller
Subject: Mezzanine financing — Member States' different models
Ud over EU's mezzaninfinanseringsfacilitet, der administreres af EIB, hvilke (og hvor mange og i hvilke lande findes de) nationale modeller er der så, der giver Europæiske virksomheder mulighed for at adgang til mezzaninkapital?
Apart from the EU’s mezzanine financing facility, administered by EIB, what national models have been developed (how many are there and in which countries are they found) to give European companies the opportunity to access mezzanine capital?
Har Kommissionen lavet en undersøgelse af de forskellige modellers »effektivitet« i forhold til både i hvor stor grad de anvendes, og i hvilken grad de på sigt giver mere vækst for europæiske virksomheder?
Has the Commission conducted an examination of the ‘effectiveness’ of the different models in relation both to the extent to which they are used and the extent to which they provide greater growth for European companies in the long term?
Hvad er kriterierne for, at medlemsstaterne selv kan igangsætte programmer med mezzaninkapital?
What are the criteria for Member States to implement mezzanine capital programmes themselves?
(21. februar 2012)
(21 February 2012)
Der blev i 2011 afholdt en workshop med henblik på at undersøge, hvordan det europæiske mezzaninmarked for små og mellemstore virksomheder har udviklet sig gennem de seneste år.
A workshop was organised in 2011 to review how the European mezzanine market for SMEs has developed over the past years.
Det er klart, at mezzaninfinansiering er en nyttig supplerende kilde til gælds- og egenkapitalfinansiering.
Clearly mezzanine finance is a useful complementary source to debt and equity financing.
Men mezzanininstrumenter er for øjeblikket nicheprodukter og bruges ikke så meget i forhold til lånefinansiering.
Yet mezzanine instruments are currently niche products and are little used compared to loan financing.
Niveauet for mezzaninfinansieringsmarkedets udvikling varierer i hele Europa.
The level of development of the mezzanine financing market varies across Europe.
Små og mellemstore virksomheder har ofte problemer med at få adgang til denne type finansiering.
SMEs often face difficulties in accessing this type of financing.
På nuværende tidspunkt er der ikke megen mezzaninfinansiering af mindre beløb (250 000 EUR eller derunder) til rådighed for små og mellemstore virksomheder.
At present there is little mezzanine financing of smaller amounts (EUR 250 000 or below) available to smaller SMEs.
Flere lande har alligevel programmer, der tager sigte på at støtte små og mellemstore virksomheders adgang til mezzaninprodukter.
Several countries nonetheless have programmes aimed at supporting SMEs’ access to mezzanine products.
Dertil hører for eksempel Tyskland ( KfW : www.kfw.de), Frankrig ( Oséo : www.oseo.fr) og Østrig ( Austria Wirtschaftsservice : www.awsg.at).
These include, for example, Germany (KfW: www.kfw.de), France (Oséo: www.oseo.fr) and Austria (Austria Wirtschaftsservice: www.awsg.at).
Der findes også mezzaninfinansiering udelukkende fra den private sektor, der tilbydes små og mellemstore virksomheder som f.eks. DZ Equity i Tyskland (www.dzep.de).
There is also purely private sector mezzanine financing offered to SMEs such as that of DZ Equity in Germany (www.dzep.de).
Det er imidlertid ofte investeringsfremmende banker, der dækker den nedre ende af mezzaninmarkedet for de små og mellemstore virksomheder.
It is, however, often promotional banks that have to cover the lower end of the SME mezzanine market.
Mange har ikke direkte kontakt med den endelige modtager (små og mellemstore virksomheder) og udbetaler deres produkter gennem finansielle formidlere såsom lokale banker.
Many do not have direct contact with the final beneficiary (SME) and disburse their products through financial intermediaries such as local banks.
Rækken af udbudte produkter er bredt, lige fra gældsmezzaniner (ofte subordinerede lån) til egenkapitalmezzaniner.
The range of products offered is wide, ranging from debt mezzanine (often subordinated loans) to equity mezzanine.
Betingelserne er normalt attraktive for små og mellemstore virksomheder.
The terms are usually attractive to SMEs.
De dækker vigtige aktivitetsområder: virksomhedsetableringer, innovation og forskning og virksomhedsoverdragelse.
They cover vital areas of activity: company start-ups, innovation and research and business transfer.
På europæisk plan giver de finansielle instrumenter under rammeprogrammet for konkurrenceevne og innovation (2007‑2013) mulighed for en reduceret finansiering af mezzanin-typen gennem et af vinduerne i sin garantifacilitet for små og mellemstore virksomheder (det såkaldte » Equity Guarantee Window «), og den Europæiske Fond for Regionaludvikling giver mulighed for, at medlemsstaterne/regionerne kan finansiere lignende instrumenter.
At European level, the financial instruments of the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (2007-2013) offer the possibility of smaller ticket sizes of mezzanine type financing through one of the windows of its SME Guarantee Facility (the ‘Equity Guarantee Window’) and the European Regional Development Fund provides the opportunity for Member States/Regions to finance similar instruments.
Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-012632/2011
Question for written answer E-012632/2011
Om: EFRU-midler og forskningscentret Príncipe Felipe (CIPF) i Valencia, Spanien
Subject: ERDF funding and the Príncipe Felipe Research Centre (Valencia, Spain)
Kommissionen fortjener ros for sin beslutning om at øge Fællesskabets budget til forskning til 80 mia. EUR for perioden 2014‑2020.
The Commission should be congratulated for its announcement that the EU's 2014-2020 budget for research is to be increased to EUR 80 million.
Kommissionen satser dermed på, at forskning, udvikling og ekspertise kan fungere som instrument til løsning af den økonomiske krise i EU.
It has thereby demonstrated its commitment to R+D and to excellence as tools potentially able to provide a way out of the economic crisis affecting the EU.
De nedskæringer, der er gennemført af den selvstyrende region Valencia, har medført, at en række programmer enten er blevet fjernet eller har fået mindsket sine ressourcer betydeligt.
As a result of the cuts being applied by the Valencian Government, many of these programmes will be closed down or left with so little funding that they will ultimately disappear.
Herudover kan nævnes, at samme regionalregering har reguleret beskæftigelsespolitikken, hvilket indebærer, at halvdelen af forskerstaben skal afskediges, samtidig med at der sker en halvering af antallet af forskningslaboratorier.
The situation is made worse by a labour force adjustment plan applied by the regional government, which will lead to half the Centre's scientific and support staff being dismissed and half the laboratories associated with it being forced to close.
Regionalregeringen i Valencia har ignoreret de budgetmæssige løsningsforslag, der er fremsat af forskningscentrets forskergruppe, og som omhandlede en mere effektiv forvaltning i overensstemmelse med centrets videnskabelige målsætninger.
The Valencian Government has also ignored the budgetary solutions proposed by members of the CIPF's scientific staff, to improve the Centre's management and bring it more into line with its scientific goals.
Der blev bl.a. sat spørgsmålstegn ved en bestemt leasingkontrakt, som forskningscentret havde indgået med en privat virksomhed (Oncovisión), idet kontraktens pris og formål ikke overholder bestemmelserne i rammekonventionen.
Among other things, these proposals criticised certain low-cost rental contracts agreed by the Centre's management with private companies (Oncovisión) whose aims do not match those established by the framework convention.