natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
pålægger sin formand at sende denne beslutning til Kommissionen, Rådet, medlemsstaternes regeringer, FN's generalsekretær, OSCE's generalsekretær, Den Internationale Røde Kors Komité, Den Internationale Kampagne for Forbud mod Landminer, Den Blandede Parlamentariske Forsamling AVS-EU, regeringerne i USA, Den Russiske Føderation og Folkerepublikken Kina samt til formanden for de kontraherende staters første gennemgangskonference om konventionen.
Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Governments of the Member States, the UN Secretary-General, the OSCE Secretary-General, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, the Governments of the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, and the President-Designate of the First Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention.
– María Antonia Avilés Perea for PPE-DE-Gruppen
– María Antonia Avilés Perea on behalf of the PPE-DE Group
– Helmut Kuhne for PSE-Gruppen
– Helmut Kuhne on behalf of the PSE Group
– Jan Mulder og Ole Sørensen for ELDR-Gruppen
– Jan Mulder and Ole Sørensen on behalf of the ELDR Group
– Freddy Blak og Jonas Sjöstedt for GUE/NGL-Gruppen
– Freddy Blak and Jonas Sjöstedt on behalf of the GUE/NGL Group
– Jens-Peter Bonde for EDD-Gruppen
– Jens-Peter Bonde on behalf of the EDD Group
– Gianfranco Dell'Alba
– Gianfranco Dell'Alba
der henviser til sin betænkning af 4. december 2003 om OLAF's aktiviteter (betænkning af Bösch), sin beslutning af 29. januar 2004 om de foranstaltninger, Kommissionen har truffet for at efterkomme bemærkningerne i den beslutning, der ledsager afgørelsen om decharge for gennemførelsen af Den Europæiske Unions almindelige budget for regnskabsåret 2001 (Kommissionen) ( A5-0004/2004 ), og sin betænkning af 21. april 2004 (betænkning af Bayona) om decharge til Kommissionen for 2002,
having regard to its report on the activities of OLAF (Bösch report) of 4 December 2003, its resolution of 29 January 2004 on the action taken by the Commission on the observations contained in the resolution accompanying the decision concerning discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the 2001 financial year (Commission) ( C5-0004/2004 ) and its report on granting discharge to the Commission in respect of 2002 (Bayona report) of 21 April 2004,
der henviser til, at det i sin dechargebeslutning fra april 2003 om regnskabsåret 2001 gav udtryk for en række bekymringer over Eurostats finansforvaltning,
whereas it highlighted a number of concerns regarding financial management at Eurostat in its April 2003 discharge resolution on the financial year 2001,
der henviser til, at Kommissionen som følge af Parlamentets vedholdenhed og adskillige forlydender i pressen i foråret 2003 indledte en intern undersøgelse af Eurostat, hvis resultater blev meddelt Parlamentet den 8. juli 2003 sammen med en række nødforanstaltninger, inkl. suspension af kontrakter og ledende medarbejdere, mens undersøgelserne pågår,
whereas, as a result of Parliament's insistence and several press reports in the spring of 2003, the Commission launched an internal investigation into Eurostat, the results of which were communicated to Parliament on 8 July, together with a number of emergency measures, including the suspension of contracts and senior management pending further examination,
der henviser til, at der indledtes tre parallelle undersøgelser af en intern task force i Kommissionen, Den Interne Revisionstjeneste og af OLAF, og at disses resultater forelagdes Parlamentet i slutningen af oktober 2003,
whereas three parallel investigations were launched by an internal Commission task force, the Internal Audit Service and OLAF, whose findings were submitted to Parliament at the end of October 2003,
der henviser til, at Romano Prodi i december 2003 over for Parlamentet i forbindelse med den årlige drøftelse af Kommissionens lovgivningsprogram varslede en handlingsplan, som kommissær Solbes gav mere detaljerede oplysninger om i februar 2004,
whereas Mr Prodi announced an action plan to Parliament in December 2003 in the context of the annual debate on the Commission's legislative programme, which was further detailed by Commissioner Solbes in February 2004,
der henviser til, at OLAF indtil nu har afsluttet en række undersøgelser af specifikke aspekter af Eurostat-sagen og har fremsendt materiale til anklagemyndigheden i Luxembourg og Frankrig, mens flere andre sager stadig undersøges,
whereas OLAF has so far concluded a number of investigations into specific aspects of the Eurostat case and forwarded some files to public prosecutors in Luxembourg and France, whilst several matters still remain under examination,
erindrer om konklusionerne og henstillingerne i Casaca-betænkningen af 29. januar 2004, der hovedsagelig vedrører opfølgning af Eurostat-sagen, og navnlig interne informanters positive rolle i forbindelse med påpegning af problemer, eksistensen af interne revisionsberetninger, der beskriver ukorrekt finanspraksis og den dårlige kommunikation og dårlige behandling af sådanne oplysninger i og mellem Kommissionens tjenestegrene, som har medført, at der i årevis ikke blev gjort noget ved dette problem;
Recalls the conclusions and recommendations contained in the Casaca report of 29 January 2004 dealing principally with the follow-up to the Eurostat affair, and in particular with the positive role of whistleblowers in raising concerns, the existence of internal audit reports detailing irregular financial practices and the poor communication and treatment of such information within and across Commission departments resulting in the problem's remaining unaddressed for several years;
beklager, at der indtil videre kun har været utilstrækkelige reaktioner på mundtlig forespørgsel ( O-0067/03 ), som blev indgivet i oktober 2003, og betænkningen om opfølgning af decharge for 2001; kræver, at Kommissionen senest den 31. juli 2004 fremlægger en fyldestgørende og fuldstændig skriftlig evaluering af forholdene omkring Eurostat-skandalen, inkl. alle OLAF-rapporter, og beklager navnlig Kommissionens langsomme reaktion på advarselstegnene og den dårlige informationsudveksling inden for Kommissionen;
Regrets the inadequate response so far received to the oral question ( O-0067/03 ) submitted last October and to the 2001 discharge follow-up report; demands that the Commission make a full and complete written evaluation by 31 July 2004 of the circumstances of the Eurostat scandal including all OLAF reports, and in particular the slow response of Commissioners to the warning signals and the poor flow of information within the Commission;
glæder sig over det førsteklasses og grundige arbejde, Kommissionens Interne Revisionstjeneste (IAS)og Eurostats Interne Revisionsenhed (IAC) har udført; finder dog, at de ekstremt lange forsinkelser og Kommissionens modstand og uvilje mod at forelægge disse vitale rapporter for Parlamentet er uacceptabel; opfordrer Kommissionen til at overveje at offentliggøre disse dokumenter i deres helhed, i det mindste i anonyme udgaver;
Recognises the quality and thoroughness of the work of the Commission's Internal Audit Service as well as Eurostat's IAC; finds, however, the extremely long delays and the resistance and hesitation of the Commission in forwarding these vital reports to Parliament unacceptable; calls on the Commission to consider the full publication of these documents, or at least anonymised versions;
konstaterer, at man i Eurostat i perioden 1999-2003 konstant overtrådte finansforordningen, og at Eurostat-ledelsen hverken reagerede på beretningerne fra de interne revisionsenheder i form af konsekvente foranstaltninger eller umisforståeligt informerede de ansvarshavende inden for Eurostat om de misforhold, der var tale om; understreger, at visse ændringer i forskrifterne ganske vist kunne ønskes, men at problemet ikke har været mangel på ordentlige forskrifter, men en dårlig anvendelse af de gældende;
Notes that the Financial Regulation was violated at Eurostat between 1999 and 2003 and that the management of Eurostat neither responded to the reports of the internal audit units by taking decisive action nor informed those in positions of responsibility within Eurostat unambiguously about abuses which had occurred; stresses that although some rule changes may be desirable, the problem was not the lack of good rules but the poor application of existing rules;
støtter i princippet Eurostat-handlingsplanen for 2004 og Kommissionens forslag til en ny OLAF-forordning (10. januar 2004);
Welcomes in principle the Eurostat action plan for 2004 and the Commission proposal for a new OLAF Regulation (10 January 2004);
understreger, at sagen har bragt alvorlige problemer for dagens lys, hvad angår arbejdsmetoderne i både Kommissionen og OLAF; mener, at Eurostat-sagen har afsløret alvorlige mangler ved forvaltningen af Kommissionens interne kontrolsystem, og at den omstændighed, at Kommissionen ikke har kunnet give overbevisende svar, undergraver selve troværdigheden ved hele systemet;
Stresses that the case has highlighted serious problems in the working methods of both the Commission and OLAF; considers that the Eurostat affair has highlighted serious shortcomings in the Commission's internal control management system and that the Commission's failure to come up with a convincing response undermines the credibility of the system as a whole;
- at hverken den kommissær, der er ansvarlig for Eurostat, eller den kommissær, der er ansvarlig for budgetkontrolanliggender, kom med en effektiv politisk reaktion på OLAF's offentliggørelser om undersøgelserne vedrørende Eurostat (juli 2002),
there was no effective political response to public announcements by OLAF about investigations into Eurostat (July 2002) by either the Commissioner responsible for Eurostat or the Commissioner responsible for budgetary control issues;
- at generalsekretæren videregav ingen af disse, omend meget vage, oplysninger fra OLAF til en politisk ansvarlig,
the Secretary-General did not pass on any of the information, albeit very vague, from OLAF to anyone with political responsibility;
erkender, at problemerne opstod inden 1999, men fastholder, at den nuværende Kommission ikke tilstrækkelig hurtigt tog skridt til at erkende og afhjælpe situationen;
Recognises that the problems originated prior to 1999, but maintains that action to identify and remedy the situation was not taken swiftly enough by the present Commission;
mener, at Eurostat-sagen til trods for Kommissionens bestræbelser på at forbedre forbindelserne mellem kommissærerne og afdelingerne klart har vist, at der var utilstrækkelig åbenhed og kommunikation dels mellem Eurostats forvaltning og Kommissionens tværsektorielle afdelinger, dels mellem Eurostat og den ansvarlige kommissær;
Considers that, despite the Commission's efforts to improve relations between Commissioners and departments, the Eurostat affair has made it clear that there was inadequate transparency and communication between Eurostat's management and the Commission's cross-sector departments and between Eurostat and the Commissioner responsible;
mener, at dette viser, at man ikke synes at have beskæftiget sig tilstrækkeligt med de systemer og metoder, som kunne have sat kommissærerne selv i stand til at påtage sig deres politiske ansvar i bekæmpelsen af svig og dårlig forvaltning;
Believes that these facts demonstrate that insufficient consideration seems to have been given to the systems and methods by which the Commissioners themselves would be able to assume their political responsibilities in the fight against fraud and mismanagement;
erindrer kommissærerne om, at de bærer ansvaret for fejl begået af ansatte i deres tjenestegrene ("Udvalget af Uafhængige Eksperter", 1999, og adfærdskodeksen for kommissionsmedlemmer, 1999); mener, at kommissærerne ikke kan komme uden om deres ansvar, fordi de ikke har fået tilstrækkelige oplysninger;
Reminds the Commissioners that they are responsible for the wrongdoings of officials in their departments ('Committee of Independent Experts', 1999 and the Code of Conduct for Commissioners, 1999); considers that Commissioners cannot be relieved of their responsibility because they did not receive enough information;
beklager manglen på forslag til strukturelle forandringer i forbindelserne mellem kommissærer og generaldirektører og anser det for afgørende at afklare kommissærers ledende rolle og deres politiske ansvar; konstaterer, at forslagene i Kommissionens evalueringsrapport om vedtagne foranstaltninger i henhold til hvidbogen fra marts 2000 om administrative reformer ikke er vidtgående nok i den henseende;
Regrets the absence of proposals for structural change in the relations between Commissioners and Directors-General, and considers it vital to clarify the leading role of Commissioners as well as their political responsibility; notes that the proposals of the Commission progress report on the actions adopted under the March 2000 White Paper on administrative reform do not go far enough in this regard;
påpeger navnlig de spørgsmål om politisk ansvar, som dette rejser i sager om finansiel forvaltning og ledelse og kontrolsystemernes svaghed i visse tjenestegrene; opfordrer Kommissionen til at fremsætte forslag om ændring af adfærdskodeksen for Kommissionens medlemmer, således at de enkelte medlemmers politiske ansvar for deres kompetenceområde får et konkret indhold; anser det for væsentligt, at Kommissionens formand råder over de virkemidler, der er nødvendige for at sikre, at kodeksens regler kan håndhæves;
Points in particular to the issues of political responsibility that this raises in matters of financial and managerial governance and the weaknesses of the control environment in some departments; calls on the Commission to make proposals for amending the Code of Conduct of Commissioners and structural changes in their relations with Directorates-General so as to make the political responsibility of Commissioners for their departments a meaningful concept; considers it essential that the President of the Commission has the measures at his/her disposal to ensure that the discipline of the Code can be applied;
kræver, at et medlem af kollegiet, som det tidligere var tilfældet, tager ansvaret for at koordinere kampen mod svig og dårlig forvaltning med særlig ansvar for bl.a.
Calls for one member of the College to take responsibility, as done in the past, for coordinating the fight against fraud and mismanagement with specific responsibility inter alia for:
mener, at hver enkelt kommissær står inde for tjenesterne under vedkommendes ansvarsområde og skal sikre, at deres mål er nået under fuld overholdelse af principperne om forsvarlig økonomisk forvaltning; fastholder, at alle kommissærer skal prioritere bekæmpelsen af svig og dårlig forvaltning inden for de generaldirektorater, de er ansvarlige for; agter at tage hensyn til de indstillede kommissærers holdning på dette punkt under høringen af de nye kommissærer;
Believes that each individual Commissioner is accountable for the services under his responsibility and must ensure that their objectives have been achieved on a basis of full respect of the principles of sound financial management; insists that all Commissioners prioritise the fight against fraud and mismanagement within the Directorates-General for which they have responsibility; intends to take into consideration the commitment of candidate Commissioners to this fight during the hearings on the new Commissioners;
kræver derfor, at en rådgiver i kommissærernes private kabinetter ud over andre opgaver får et særligt ansvar for at rådgive den pågældende kommissær om budgetkontrolspørgsmål inden for de generaldirektorater, som han/hun er ansvarlig for, og at holde kontakt med kabinettet for kommissæren med ansvar for budgetkontrolspørgsmål;
Calls therefore for one adviser in all Commissioners' Private Offices to be given specific responsibility, in addition to other tasks, for advising his/her Commissioner on issues relating to budgetary control within the DGs for which that Commissioner has responsibility and liaising with the office of the member of the College responsible for budgetary control matters;
gentager, at det mener, at kommissærerne skal spille en mere direkte og proaktiv rolle i forbindelse med overvågning af arbejdet i deres tjenestegrene og skal bære ansvaret for både fejl og succeser; har derfor til hensigt at holde den kommende Kommission ansvarlig for såvel dens forsømmelser som dens handlinger;
Reiterates its belief that Commissioners must have a more direct and proactive role in overseeing the work of their departments and taking responsibility for the failings as much as for the successes; intends therefore to hold the future Commission to account for its omissions as well as its actions;
Interne procedurer
Internal procedures
minder om, at der i forbindelse med reformen lægges stor vægt på at decentralisere finanskontrollen; mener, at der hermed til gengæld bliver et meget stærkt behov for at udvikle mere velegnede og ansvarsgivende former for central forvaltningsovervågning af de eksisterende kontrolsystemer i de enkelte afdelinger;
Recalls that the reform places a strong emphasis on decentralisation of financial controls; believes that this in turn points up the urgent need to develop more suitable and accountable forms of central management supervision of the control systems operating in individual departments;
er af den opfattelse, at Eurostat-sagen har understreget behovet for en gennemgang af forholdet mellem disse forskellige aktører og mellem de enkelte kommissærer og deres samlede kollegium samt af regnskabskædens funktionsevne, således at der med sikkerhed kan gøres fremskridt ikke blot med hensyn til den økonomiske forvaltning, men også hvad angår Kommissionens ledelsesstrukturer;
Takes the view that the Eurostat case has pointed up the need to review the relations between these different actors and between the individual Commissioners and the College of Commissioners, as well as the functioning of the accountability chain, in order to ensure progress not only in the area of financial management but also in the governance structure of the Commission;
fastholder under henvisning til de kanaler, der anvendes til udbredelse af anmodninger fra kommissærer og svarene fra afdelingerne, at sådanne svar (når de vedrører emner, der anses for at være følsomme) altid skal fremsendes af generaldirektøren til den relevante kommissær selv og ikke kun til dennes kabinetschef;
Maintains, with reference to the channels used for disseminating requests from Commissioners and the replies issued by departments, that such replies (when relating to topics deemed sensitive) should always be forwarded by the Director-General to the relevant Commissioner himself and not just to his head of office;
beklager Eurostats og Publikationskontorets hidtidige praksis med at oprette finansieringsrammer; opfordrer Kommissionen til at reagere hurtigt og undersøge, hvorvidt andre afdelinger i Kommissionen har været involveret i tilsvarende forhold, og træffe passende foranstaltninger for at afsløre sandheden om systemets faktiske udstrækning og den endelige anvendelse af midler fra disse finansieringsrammer;
Deplores the former practice of Eurostat and OPOCE of creating 'financial envelopes'; calls on the Commission to act swiftly and investigate the possibility of other Commission departments' having been engaged in similar practices and to take appropriate action to uncover the truth about the real extent of the system and the final use of the funds in these 'financial envelopes';
Fremskridt inden for Eurostat
Progress at Eurostat
- den grundige revision af alle gældende kontrakter med og støtte til eksterne organer og ophævelsen af enhver automatisk kontraktforlængelse,
the thorough revision of all existing contracts with and subsidies to outside bodies and the cancellation of all automatic contract renewals;
- bedre uddannelse i finansforvaltning;
improved training in financial management;
mener, at der bør gennemføres en uafhængig revision af administrationen og forvaltningen af det nye Eurostats strukturer, når OLAF's undersøgelser er fuldført, og at der i den nuværende Kommissions mandatperiode specielt bør udarbejdes en opfølgningsrapport, hvori det undersøges, om tidligere henstillinger fra IAS og Eurostat-IAC er blevet fulgt;
Takes the view that an independent administrative and management audit of the new Eurostat structure should be carried out once OLAF's investigations are complete, and specifically a follow-up report should be drawn up during the present Commission's term of office, analysing whether previous IAS and IAC-Eurostat recommendations were complied with;
mener, at der i Eurostats tilfælde herskede alt for stor afhængighed af eksterne kontorer; glæder sig i den forbindelse over løftet om, at hovedparten af Eurostats opgaver vil blive varetaget internt, og at arten af alle kontrakter med eksterne konsulenter i tilknytning til Eurostat vil blive gennemgået;
Considers that, in the case of Eurostat, there was an excessive dependency on external agencies; welcomes, in this regard, the commitment to carry out internally the bulk of Eurostat's tasks and to review the nature of all contracts with external consultants linked to Eurostat;
opfordrer desuden indtrængende Kommissionen til at afklare situationen for de mindre underleverandører, der uden egen skyld er blevet inddraget i denne sag;
Urges the Commission, in addition, to address the situation of the small sub-contracting firms unintentionally caught up in the affair;
understreger vigtigheden af et fuldt fungerende og uafhængigt organ til bekæmpelse af svig, som skal varetage komplekse og følsomme undersøgelser; gentager, at det mener, at OLAF skal være institutionelt uafhængigt af Kommissionen og skal bistås af et organ, der sikrer korrekt retlig overvågning af dets aktiviteter og fortrolighed for og beskyttelse af dem, der undersøges;
Underlines the importance of a fully-functioning and independent anti-fraud body for handling complex and sensitive investigations; reiterates its position that OLAF must have institutional independence from the Commission and be accompanied by a body providing proper legal oversight of its operations and ensuring confidentiality and protection of those under investigation;
understreger, at Kommissionens generalsekretær bør underrette den kommissær, der er ansvarlig for det pågældende generaldirektorat, direkte om eventuelle interne undersøgelser, som han/hun måske er bekendt med via OLAF, selv om de forelagte oplysninger er koncise; kommissæren skal forpligte sig til ikke uden for kredsen af kommissærer at afsløre fortrolige oplysninger, der blevet forelagt ham/hende;
Stresses that the Commission Secretary-General should be required to directly inform the Commissioner responsible for the DG concerned of any internal investigations of which he may be aware through OLAF, even if the information provided is concise; the Commissioner must undertake not to disclose outside the College of Commissioners any confidential information which might be entrusted to him or her;
Interinstitutionelle organer
Interinstitutional bodies
Kommende aktioner
Future action
indrømmer, at Eurostat-sagen er et alvorligt bagslag for offentlighedens påskønnelse af Kommissionens administrative reformproces; konstaterer imidlertid, at alle de særskilte aktioner i hvidbogen fra marts 2000 er blevet godkendt; opfordrer Kommissionen til at sikre fuldstændig og omhyggelig gennemførelse i alle dens tjenestegrene, organer og satellitorganer, så situationer, der svarer til den i Eurostat, aldrig mere kan opstå;
Admits that the Eurostat affair represents a serious set-back for public appreciation of the Commission's administrative reform process; recognises, nevertheless, that almost all of the specific actions from the March 2000 White Paper have been approved; urges the Commission to ensure full and thorough implementation throughout its services, agencies and satellite bodies so that similar circumstances to those at Eurostat can never be repeated;