natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
De opfordres også til fortsat at samarbejde med generalsekretærens personlige udsending, Christopher Ross, for at komme videre i arbejdet med at søge en retfærdig og varig politisk løsning, der er acceptabel for alle parter, og som giver Vestsaharas folk selvbestemmelse i overensstemmelse med FN's resolutioner.
It also urges them to continue working with the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, Mr Christopher Ross, towards a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution that will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, as required by the relevant UN resolutions.
Rådet glæder sig over, at de uformelle samtaler blev genoptaget i New York den 20.‑21. januar 2011.
The Council welcomes the resumption of the informal talks in New York on 20 and 21 January 2011.
Det giver sin fulde støtte til de igangværende forhandlinger og opfordrer parterne til fortsat at vise politisk vilje til at arbejde i god tro, for at forhandlingerne kan blive en succes.
It fully supports the current negotiations and calls on the parties to continue to demonstrate their political will to work in a spirit of good faith for the success of the negotiations.
På det seneste møde i Associeringsrådet EU‑Marokko, der fandt sted i Bruxelles den 13. december 2010, gentog EU sin støtte til FN's indsats.
At the last EU‑Morocco Association Council meeting, in Brussels on 13 December 2010, the European Union reiterated its support for the UN's efforts.
Det understregede over for Marokko, at det lægger stor vægt på forbedringer af menneskerettighedssituationen i Vestsahara.
It stressed to the Moroccan side the importance it attached to an improvement in the human rights situation in Western Sahara.
Det mindede også Marokko om landets forpligtelser på dette område.
It also reminded Morocco of its obligations in this area.
Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-010559/2010
Question for written answer E-010559/2010
Ifølge Parlamentets juridiske tjeneste er fiskeriaftalen mellem EU og Marokko, hvorved EU-fartøjer kan fiske i farvandene ud for Vestsahara, i strid med international ret.
According to the European Parliament's Legal Service, the EU‑Morocco fisheries agreement, which allows EU vessels to fish in waters off Western Sahara, violates international law.
Denne udtalelse blev drøftet af Europa-Parlamentets Fiskeriudvalg i februar 2010.
This opinion was debated by the European Parliament's Committee on Fisheries in February 2010.
I hvilket omfang er Kommissionen enig i og kan acceptere denne udtalelse?
To what extent does the Commission agree with and accept this legal opinion?
I hvilket omfang har Kommissionen i sinde at respektere denne udtalelse i forhandlingen af eventuelle forlængelser af fiskeriaftalen mellem EU og Marokko?
To what extent does the Commission intend to respect this legal opinion when negotiating any extension to the EU‑Morocco fisheries agreement?
I hvilket omfang er Kommissionen enig i, at indsatsen med henblik på at løse den langvarige konflikt mellem Marokko og Polisario undermineres af, at EU-fartøjer har tilladelse til at fiske i farvandene ud for Vestsahara?
To what extent does the Commission agree that allowing EU vessels to fish in waters off Western Sahara undermines efforts to resolve the long-standing conflict between Morocco and the Polisario Front?
I hvilket omfang underminerer Kommissionens indsats i denne sammenhæng EU's påstand om at være en ærlig mægler i denne konflikt?
To what extent does the Commission's action in this respect undermine the EU's claim to be an honest broker in this conflict?
Hvilke konsultationer har Kommissionen haft i løbet af de sidste to år med Polisario, ngo'er og organisationer i Sahara om fiskeriaftalen mellem EU og Marokko?
What consultations has the Commission had in the past two years with the Polisario Front, NGOs and Saharawi organisations in relation to the EU‑Morocco fisheries agreement?
Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-010560/2010
Question for written answer E-010560/2010
Om: Menneskehandel mellem Eritrea, Sudan og Somalia til Israel via Egypten
Subject: People-trafficking between Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia to Israel via Egypt
En vælger har henledt min opmærksomhed på rapporterne om et ukendt antal (måske over 80) statsborgere fra Eritrea, Sudan og Somalia, tilsyneladende »flygtninge«, som er blevet holdt som gidsler ved grænsen mellem Egypten og Israel af en bande menneskesmuglere.
A constituent has brought to my attention the case of an indeterminate number (perhaps up to 80) Eritrean, Sudanese and Somali nationals, supposedly ‘refugees’, that are allegedly being held hostage on the Egypt-Israel border by a gang of people-smugglers.
De pågældende personer begyndte deres rejse fra Libyen for at ansøge om asyl i Israel.
The individuals started their journey from Libya, with the aim of seeking asylum in Israel.
De har betalt op til 2 000 USD hver til banderne for at blive fragtet tværs over Afrika. »Flygtningene« er nu blevet bedt om at betale yderligere 6 000 USD for at blive frigivet til de israelske myndigheder ved grænsen til Egypten.
They have paid up to USD 2000 each to the smuggling gangs for their trafficking across Africa.
Nyhedsbureauet AFP har rapporteret om lignende tilfælde af intimidering, mord og krænkelser af menneskerettighederne begået af menneskesmuglere i regionen for nylig.
The ‘refugees’ have now been asked to pay a further USD 6 000 for deliverance to the Israeli authorities at the border with Egypt.
I juni i år blev der rapporteret om 10 dødsfald blandt statsborgere fra Eritrea, og i august blev der rapporteret om seks dødsfald efter påstået ulovlig tilbageholdelse og tortur foretaget af banderne.
The AFP news agency has reported similar cases of intimidation, murder and human rights abuses by people-smuggling rackets in the region recently: in June of this year it reported ten Eritrean deaths, and in August up to six deaths following alleged illegal incarceration and torture by the gangs.
Vil Kommissionen rejse disse spørgsmål om nedværdigende behandling af de pågældende personer over for de egyptiske myndigheder?
Will the Commission raise these concerns about this degrading treatment of these individuals with the Egyptian authorities?
Vil Kommissionen foreslå konkrete foranstaltninger til bekæmpelse af menneskehandel i regionen?
Is the Commission proposing concrete measures to fight the scourge of human trafficking in the region?
Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-010561/2010
Question for written answer E-010561/2010
Om: Visumpligt for tjekkiske statsborgere, der rejser til Canada
Subject: Visa obligation for Czech citizens travelling to Canada
Kommissionen oplyste i sin rapport om gensidighed på visumområdet i slutningen af oktober, at der er sket visse (omend begrænsede) fremskridt i den tjekkisk-canadiske strid om visumpligt for tjekkiske borgere.
The Commission indicated in its report on visa reciprocity at the end of October that a certain (although limited) progress had been achieved in the Czech-Canadian dispute over visa obligations for Czech citizens.
Ifølge dette dokument har Canada opfyldt begge de betingelser, som Kommissionen opstillede i efteråret 2009, nemlig at gøre det lettere for tjekkiske statsborgere at få visum og at udarbejde en plan (køreplan) for visumpligtens afvikling.
According to the document, Canada has fulfilled both conditions that the Commission set in the autumn of 2009, namely to make it easier for Czech citizens to obtain a visa, and to prepare a plan (road map) leading to the dismantling of the visa obligation.
Hvilke specifikke foranstaltninger fra Canadas side udgør efter Kommissionens mening et fremskridt, når det gælder udarbejdelsen af en plan for at afvikle visumpligten?
In what specific actions by Canada does the Commission see progress as regards the preparation of a plan to dismantle the visa obligation?
Mener Kommissionen, at alene Canadas løfte om at foretage en revision af sin asylpolitik er tilstrækkeligt i den forbindelse?
Does the Commission consider the mere promise by Canada to subject its asylum policy to revision as sufficient in this context?
Hvorfor har Kommissionen slækket eller sågar givet afkald på sin holdning fra oktober 2009, hvor den ville indføre et gensidigt visum for canadiske diplomater, hvis visumpligten for tjekkiske borgere blev opretholdt?
Why has the Commission softened or even relinquished its stance of October 2009, when it was going to introduce a reciprocal visa for Canadian diplomats if the visa obligation for Czech citizens was maintained?
Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-010562/2010
Question for written answer E-010562/2010
Om: Støj fra løvblæsere i henhold til direktiv 2002/49/EF og 2000/14/EF
Subject: Noise emitted by leaf-blowing machines pursuant to EC Directives 2002/49/EC and 2000/14/EC
En vælger i London har gjort sin lokale repræsentant opmærksom på den overdrevne støj fra løvblæsere uden for hans bopæl.
A constituent in London has drawn to the attention of his local representative the excessive noise emitted by leaf-blowing machines outside his residence.
Han har forhørt sig om, om dette emne er reguleret gennem EU‑lovgivningen, om der er særlige maksimumstøjgrænser for denne type maskineri, og hvem der er ansvarlig for at håndhæve de relevante EU‑direktiver på dette område.
He has enquired whether or not this issue is regulated by EC law, whether or not there are specific maximum noise levels for this type of machinery, and who is responsible for enforcing the relevant EU directives in this area.
Kan Kommissionen derfor præcisere, hvilke standarder der i overensstemmelse med ovenstående direktiver findes (om nogen) for at regulere maksimumstøjniveauet for løvblæsere?
Can the Commission therefore clarify what standards there are (if any), in accordance with the above directives, for regulating the maximum level of noise emitted by leaf-blowing machines?
Finder disse maksimumsgrænser anvendelse på alle typer havemaskiner, eller er de specifikke for hver maskinklasse?
Are these maximum levels applicable to all garden-type machinery, or specific to each class of machine?
Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-010566/2010
Question for written answer E-010566/2010
Om: Individuel drift
Subject: Individualised management
Kommissionen erklærede i sit svar på forespørgsel E‑7437/2010, at den ikke havde »kendskab til, hvordan AENA fordeler sine udgifter og indtægter på de forskellige lufthavne«, og Kommissionen erklærede ligeledes, at økonomiske transaktioner inden for samme virksomhed (som det er tilfældet med AENA) ikke giver anledning til tvivl i forbindelse med statsstøtte.
In its reply to Question E‑7437/2010, the Commission says that it is ‘not aware of the way in which costs and revenues are allocated by AENA between its various airports’, but goes on to state that financial transfers in a single undertaking (such as in the case of AENA) do not give rise to issues of state aid concern.
Ifølge oplysninger fremlagt af det spanske ministerium for udviklingsfremme i den spanske kongres http://www.expansion.com/2009/12/28/empresas/1262036144.html. har de store spanske lufthavne ikke overskud, men derimod underskud.
According to the information presented by the Spanish Ministry of Public Work to the Congress of Deputies http://www.expansion.com/2009/12/28/empresas/1262036144.html , the major Spanish airports do not have a surplus but a deficit.
Lufthavnen Madrid Barajas havde faktisk et underskud på 301 mio. EUR i 2009, hvilket udgør 53 % af det samlede bruttodriftstab for samtlige lufthavne med underskud drevet af AENA.
In fact, Madrid Barajas airport had a deficit of EUR 301 million in 2009, i.e. 53 % of the gross operating losses of all the loss-making airports managed by the AENA.
Dokument fremlagt af ministeren for udviklingsfremme på et møde i udvalget for udviklingsfremme i den spanske kongres den 12. januar 2010, s. 3. .
Document distributed by the Minister of Public Works at the meeting of the Committee on Public Works held in the Congress of Deputies, 12 January 2010, p.
Er ovenstående model den, der blev henvist til i Kommissionens svar (»hvilket medfører, at omkostningsdækningen sker i netværket af lufthavne i stedet for hver enkelt individuel lufthavn«), når en enkelt lufthavn er ansvarlig for mere end 50 % af det samlede underskud i det netværk, der drives af AENA? 2.
Is this the network model referred to by the Commission in its reply (‘implying that cost-recovery is achieved at the level of the airport network rather than the individual airport’), when a single airport is responsible for over 50 % of the total losses of the network managed by AENA? 2.
Mener Kommissionen, at individuel drift af lufthavne i Spanien ville give bedre sikkerhed for, at lufthavnsoperatørens mål stemmer overens med målsætningen om større og bedre økonomisk udvikling af området, hvor lufthavnene er placeret? 3.
Does the Commission think that individualised management in Spain would offer better guarantees that the goals of the airport operator coincide with those of increased and improved economic development of the territory in which the airports are located? 3.
Mener Kommissionen i henhold til artikel 19 i direktiv 2009/12/EF, at den model for netværksdrift, der anvendes af AENA i Spanien, er yderst ineffektiv set fra et økonomisk synspunkt, og at den skaber et hierarki blandt de spanske lufthavne, hvor alle skal underordne sig lufthavnen Madrid Barajas' interesser?
In the light of the objectives of paragraph 19 of Directive 2009/12/EC, does the Commission not think that the network management model applied by AENA in Spain is extremely inefficient from an economic point of view, and that it creates a hierarchy of Spanish airports, subordinating all of them to the interests of Madrid Barajas airport?
Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-010567/2010
Question for written answer E-010567/2010
Om: AENA's afgifter
Subject: AENA taxes
Ifølge en undersøgelse Juan Carlos Martín, Concepción Román y Augusto Voltes-Dorta A stochastic frontier analysis to estimate the relative efficiency of the Spanish airports, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 2009, 31 (3), 163‑176. er der ingen tvivl om, at den tekniske effektivitet af driften af AENA's lufthavne kan forbedres, og faktisk viser denne undersøgelse frem til slutningen af 1990'erne, at de spanske lufthavne havde en ineffektivitetsgrad i området mellem 15‑26 %.
There is clear room for improvement in the technical efficiency of the management of AENA's airports, according to one study Juan Carlos Martín, Concepcion Román and Augusto Voltes-Dorta: A stochastic frontier analysis to estimate the relative efficiency of the Spanish airports, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 2009, 31(3), 163-176. , and indeed, that study demonstrates that until the end of the 1990s, Spain's airports were operating at inefficiency levels ranging from 15 % to 26 %.
De 13 største lufthavne, hvad angår passagertrafik i Spanien, anvender de samme afgifter, på trods af at driftsomkostningerne for hver enkelt af disse er meget forskellige.
Spain's thirteen most important passenger airports all apply the same taxes, although the operating cost of each airport is quite different.
Denne praksis med at anvende samme afgifter uden direkte forbindelse til omkostningerne finder ikke sted i andre udviklede lande, hvor afgifterne afspejler lufthavnenes omkostninger (dog ikke, hvis disse er så små, at de ikke er selvforsynende).
The application of unitary taxes with no direct relationship to costs is a phenomenon unknown in other developed countries, where the taxes reflect the costs of the airport in question (except when the latter are so small that they are incapable of being self-sufficient).
Hvad mener Kommission i lyset af aftalen om finanspolitiske stramninger og ikrafttræden af 2020‑strategien om en driftsmodel for lufthavne, der i 2009 oplevede driftstab på mere end 400 mio. EUR?
Given the Fiscal Austerity Agreement and the entry into force of the 2020 Strategy, how does the Commission view an airport management system which in 2009 suffered operating losses of over EUR 400 million?
Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-010568/2010
Question for written answer E-010568/2010
I sit svar E‑7437/2010 erklærer Kommissionen, at »Kommissionen ikke har kendskab til, hvordan AENA fordeler deres udgifter og indtægter mellem sine lufthavne.
In its reply to Question E‑7437/2010, the Commission states that it ‘is not aware of the way in which costs and revenues are allocated by AENA between its various airports.
Ifølge information fra det spanske ministerium for udviklingsfremme af 12. januar 2010 Ministeriet for udviklingsfremme - Forventede økonomiske resultater for de spanske lufthavne.
Information provided by the Spanish Ministry of Public Works on 12 January 2010 Ministry of Public Works, Spanish Airports' Economic Results' Forecast 2009-2010.
Dokument fremlagt af ministeren for udviklingsfremme på et møde i udvalget for udviklingsfremme i den spanske kongres den 12. januar 2010, s. 3. og fra AENA har regionen Madrid (dvs. lufthavnen Madrid Barajas) i perioden1985‑2008 modtaget 44,5 % af centralregeringens samlede offentlige investeringer i det spanske lufthavnssystem (antallet af passagerer i Madrid udgjorde i samme periode kun 22,5 % af det samlede antal for hele landet).
3. and by AENA, indicates that between 1985 and 2008, the Madrid region (i.e. the airport of Madrid Barajas) received 44.5 % of total public investment by central government in the Spanish airport system (over the same period, Madrid passengers accounted for only 22.5 % of the national total).
Ifølge samme kilde, hvad angår den samlede procent af henført gæld for lufthavne drevet af AENA, stod lufthavnene i Madrid (hovedsageligt Madrid Barajas) i begyndelsen af 2010 for 54,4 % af denne gæld, og det forventes, at dette tal vil være 51,9 % ved årets udgang.
Furthermore, the same source indicates that as a percentage of the total of the airports managed by AENA, the debt attributable to the Madrid airports (principally, Madrid Barajas) at the beginning of 2010 was 54.4 %, and the forecasts are that at the end of the year it will account for 51.9 % of the total.
I sit svar angav Kommissionen, at det for nogle medlemsstater gør sig gældende, »at flere lufthavne af hensyn til den territoriale samhørighed drives som en samlet enhed, hvilket medfører, at omkostningsdækningen sker i netværket af lufthavne i stedet for hver enkelt individuel lufthavn«.
In its reply, the Commission states that ‘in the interests of territorial cohesion, a number of airports are managed as a single entity, implying that cost-recoveries achieved at the level of the airport network rather than the individual airport’.
Mener Kommissionen, at dette gældsniveau, der er koncentreret om en region, er begrundet af hensyn til den territoriale samhørighed, og at den derfor drives af en samlet enhed?
Does the Commission think that such a level of debt, concentrated in one region, is justified in the interests of territorial cohesion and because it is managed by a single entity?
Anser Kommissionen disse oplysninger om gæld og investering som værende økonomiske transaktioner?
Does the Commission view these debt and investment data as ‘economic transfers’?
Anser Kommissionen disse oplysninger om gæld og investering for at være et element af den territoriale samhørighed, eller mener Kommissionen, at der er tale om en hierarkisk inddeling efter territorier af de spanske lufthavne, hvor Madrid-Barajas står først?
Does the Commission consider these debt and investment data to be a territorial cohesion factor, or do they constitute a factor in the creation of a territorial hierarchy of Spanish airports, headed by Madrid Barajas?
Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-010569/2010
Question for written answer E-010569/2010
Om: Status for forhandlingerne om en frihandelsaftale mellem EU og Colombia samt Peru
Subject: State of negotiations towards a free-trade agreement between the EU and Colombia and Peru
På topmødet mellem EU og Latinamerika i maj 2010 afsluttede EU forhandlingerne med Columbia og Peru om en frihandelsaftale.
At the EU-Latin America summit of May 2010, the European Union finalised negotiations for a free-trade agreement with Colombia and Peru.
Hvordan ser den vejledende tidsplan for frihandelsaftalen ud?
What is the indicative timescale for implementation of this agreement?
Kan Kommissionen give en kort sammenfatning af indholdet og aftalens positive og negative sider for EU?
Can the Commission provide a summary of its content and its benefits and key points with regard to the EU?
Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-010570/2010
Question for written answer E-010570/2010
Om: Børneslaver i kakaoplantager i Vestafrika
Subject: Child slavery on cocoa plantations in West Africa
I en reportage i tysk fjernsyn blev det berettet, at børn udfører slavearbejde i kakaoplantager i Vestafrika.
A report on German television has revealed cases of child slavery on cocoa plantations in West Africa.
Det blev nævnt, at de store europæiske importører af kakaobønner i 2001 underskrev en aftale om, at det fra 2007 skulle forbydes at bruge børneslaver ved kakaohøsten.
The report also mentioned that, in 2001, the major European cocoa bean importers signed an agreement that promised to eliminate child slavery in cocoa harvesting by 2007.
De indgik en frivillig forpligtelse til ikke mere at købe kakaobønner fra plantager, som beskæftiger børneslaver.
They also undertook to stop purchasing cocoa beans from plantations on which child slavery is practised.
Men reportagen kunne dokumentere, at der i 2010 stadig findes børneslaver på kakaoplantagerne.
This report, however, provides evidence that child slavery persists on cocoa plantations in 2010.
De store importører ønskede ikke at kommentere reportagen.
The major importers have refused to comment on this report.
Er Kommissionen bekendt med, at der arbejder børneslaver i kakaoplantager i Vestafrika, og at denne aftale ikke overholdes?
Is the Commission aware of the existence of child slavery on cocoa plantations in West Africa and the breach of this agreement?
Hvilke stater drejer det sig om?
Which countries are involved?
Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-010571/2010
Question for written answer E-010571/2010
Om: Udledning af CO 2 i Tyrkiet
Subject: CO 2 emissions in Turkey
Hvad er Tyrkiets præstation med hensyn til reducering af udledningen af kuldioxid, og hvad er planen for de næste to år? 2.
What is Turkey's record in reducing carbon dioxide emissions and what is the forecast for the next two years? 2.
Er Kommissionen tilfreds med Tyrkiets indsats i sit forsøg på at efterleve målene i Kyotoprotokollen?
Is it satisfied with the efforts being made by Turkey to meet the targets of the Kyoto Protocol?
Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-010572/2010
Question for written answer E-010572/2010
Om: EU‑reformen inden for sukkersektoren og de heraf opståede problemer i Grækenland
Subject: EU reform of the sugar sector and problems created in Greece
Målet med EU‑reformen inden for sukkersektoren var sikring og forbedring af konkurrencedygtigheden inden for denne sektor generelt samt styrkelse af de berørte lokale landbrugssamfund med henblik på en blidere overgang til mere konkurrencedygtige afgrøder, men også at bevare sukkerfabrikkernes konkurrenceevne og beståen, så de ville kunne opretholde produktionen.
The objective of the EU reform of the sugar sector was to safeguard and improve the competitiveness of the sector as a whole and to assist the local rural communities affected in order to facilitate their smooth changeover to other, more competitive crops, as well as to maintain the competitiveness and viability of the sugar factories that would continue to produce.
Grækenland er et af de lande, som overvejende har deltaget aktivt i denne reform, eftersom landet har givet afkald på 50,01 % af sin sukkerkvote og dermed formindsket sin kvote med 158 799,80 t sukker, og som nu har ret til at producere 158 702 t sukker.
Greece is one of the main countries to take part in this reform, ultimately renouncing 50.01 % of its national sugar quota, reducing its quota by 158 799.80 tonnes of sugar and now being entitled to produce 158 702 tonnes of sugar.