natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Har Kommissionen anledning til at formode, at der findes medlemsstater, hvor luftkvaliteten allerede for indeværende opfylder de opstillede kvalitetskrav?
Does the Commission have cause to assume that there are Member States where the air quality is everywhere compliant with the specified quality requirements?
Hvordan vil Kommissionen behandle medlemsstater, der kan forvente store overskridelser og ikke indgiver en rapport, gør det for sent eller indgiver en ansøgning om udsættelse?
How will the Commission be dealing with Member States that can indeed expect to exceed the values and do not produce a report, or produce it in time and/or submit a request for deferment?
Hvordan kan man verificere den oplyste tilstand og kontrollere udførelsen af de meddelte foranstaltninger?
How does it set about verifying the reported quality level and monitoring the measures that are announced?
I sin meddelelse om »meddelelse af udsættelse af frister...« (KOM(2008)0403) fastslår Kommissionen bl.a., at det er vigtigt »at sikre ligebehandling, når det drejer sig om gennemførelse af Fællesskabets lovgivning.
In its communication on notifying postponements, COM(2008)0403, the Commission states amongst other things that it is important ‘to ensure equal treatment when it comes to implementation of Community legislation.
Zoner, hvor der er gjort en betydelig indsats for at overholde grænseværdierne inden for den fastsatte frist, bør ikke stilles konkurrencemæssigt ringere end zoner, hvor der, uanset behovet herfor, ikke er gjort en sådan indsats.«.
Zones where significant efforts have been made to comply with the limit values by the date set for attaining them should not be put at a competitive disadvantage against zones where, though needed, no such effort has been made’.
På hvilken måde og med hvilke midler påtænker Kommissionen at sikre ligebehandling, når det drejer sig om gennemførelse af Fællesskabets lovgivning?
In what way, and by what means, does the Commission set about ensuring equal treatment when it comes to implementation of Community legislation?
SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL E-5240/08
WRITTEN QUESTION E-5240/08
Om: »Advanced status« for Marokko og menneskerettighederne vedrørende Vestsahara
Subject: Advanced status of Morocco and human rights in the case of Western Sahara
EU forhandler med Marokko om en såkaldt »advanced status«, som allerede skal afsluttes under det franske formandskab, udtalte kommissær Benita Ferrero-Waldner (eksterne forbindelser) tidligere i år.
The European Union is negotiating with Morocco on ‘advanced status’ that is to be granted before the end of the French presidency, according to an announcement by Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner (Foreign Affairs) earlier this year.
Den nordafrikanske stat underskrev allerede i 2000 en associeringsaftale med EU og var et af de første lande, der i juli 2005 underskrev en »Neighbourhood Action Plan«, der indgår i den europæiske naboskabspolitik.
The north-African country signed an association agreement with the EU as long ago as 2000 and was one of the first countries to sign a Neighbourhood Action Plan in July 2005 as part of the European Neighbourhood policy.
EU underskrev også en fiskeriaftale med Marokko, gennem hvilken europæiske skibe får tilladelse til at fiske i Vestsaharas territorialfarvande, selv om dette territorium efter international ret ikke hører ind under Marokko.
The European Union has also signed a fisheries agreement with Morocco in which European boats are authorised to fish in the territorial waters of Western Sahara, although that territory does not belong to Morocco under international law.
EU synes stadig at være meget indstillet på at anvende menneskerettighedsprincipperne på alle områder af sin udenrigspolitik.
The EU claims still to be very dedicated to ensuring that human rights principles are applied in all areas of its foreign policy.
Denne omsorg for menneskerettighederne synes ikke at være ledemotivet i forbindelserne med Marokko.
That concern for human rights does not appear to be the motive behind the expansion of relations with Morocoo.
Ifølge iagttagere vil en »advanced status« kunne føre til en de facto-forstærkning af Marokkos stilling i Vestsahara via yderligere marokkanske investeringer i området.
According to some observers, advanced status could lead to a de facto strengthening of Morocco’s position in Western Sahara as a result of further Moroccan investment in that region.
Af diverse rapporter — fra bl.a. Amnesty International (http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/regions/middle-east-and-north-africa/morocco-and-western-sahara ) — fremgår det, at Marokko regelmæssigt krænker menneskerettighederne i det annekterede område.
It is clear from from various reports — by authors including Amnesty International (http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/regions/middle-east-and-north-africa/morocco-and-western-sahara ) — that Morocco regularly violates human rights in that annexed territory.
Situationen gør det vanskeligt for EU at opretholde sit image som troværdig forsvarer af den internationale retsgyldighed og menneskerettighederne.
The situation makes it difficult for the EU to uphold its image as a credible defender of the international rule of law and human rights.
Er Kommissionen bekendt med, at FN-mægler van Walsum for nylig fejlede i sit forsøg på mægling mellem de marokkanske myndigheder og Polisario?
Is the Commission aware that the UN mediator van Walsum has recently failed in his attempts at mediation between the Moroccan authorities and the Polisario?
Gør Kommissionen forsøg på sammen med Rådet atter at få sat gang i disse forhandlinger?
Is the Commission making efforts to ensure in conjunction with the Council that those negotiations are revived?
Er Kommissionen enig i, at det må fastslås, at der i mellemtiden, set i relation til international ret, stadig er tale om, at Marokko ulovligt besætter Vestsahara?
Does the Commission share the view that meanwhile, from the standpoint of international law, it is still correct to speak of the illegal occupation of the Western Sahara by Morocco?
Omfatter undersøgelsen vedrørende »advanced status« en grundig analyse af menneskerettighedssituationen i Vestsahara?
Does a thorough analysis of the human rights situation in Western Sahara form part of the investigation concerning advanced status?
Har Kommissionen til hensigt at stille betingelser i forbindelse med Marokkos »advanced status«?
Will the Commission be making Morocco’s advanced status subject to conditions?
SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL E-5243/08
WRITTEN QUESTION E-5243/08
Om: Udviklingsbistand og klimaændringer
Subject: Development aid and climate change
I Kommissionens svar på min forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-3792/08 bekræftes det, at bistanden på 1 mia. euro, som Kommissionen vil tildele de fattige lande fra den margin, der findes inden for den fælles landbrugspolitiks udgiftsloft, vil være underkastet de principper, der gælder for international udviklingsbistand.
In its reply to my Question E‑3792/08, the Commission says that the 1 000 million euros of aid it wishes to grant to poorer countries, taken from the existing margin within the ceiling for CAP spending, will be ‘subject to the principles governing international development aid’.
Kan Kommissionen redegøre mere eksplicit for, om disse principper omfatter miljøkrav i lighed med dem, som landmændene i EU skal opfylde (f.eks. reduktion i brugen af pesticider)?
Could the Commission be more explicit in stating whether these principles include any environmental requirement, similar to those which the EU demands of its own farmers (e.g. reducing the use of pesticides)?
Mener Kommissionen ikke, at den form for bistand burde bruges til at fremme foranstaltninger til bekæmpelse af klimaændringer, som er en kamp, Den Europæiske Union deltager meget aktivt i?
Does the Commission not think that aid of this kind should help to promote measures to combat climate change, something in which the European Union is very actively involved?
SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL E-5244/08
WRITTEN QUESTION E-5244/08
Om: Flypassagerers ret til erstatningsrejse
Subject: Air passengers' right to alternative transport
Ifølge Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten har flyselskabet Ryanair udskudt lanceringen af deres rute mellem Billund og Edinburgh fra den 23. september 2008 til den 5. november 2008, fordi de ikke kunne nå at få leveret nye fly til tiden.
According to the Danish daily Jyllands Posten , Ryanair has postponed the launch of its route between Billund and Edinburgh from 23 September 2008 to 5 November 2008 because they could not obtain delivery of the new aircraft in time.
De kunder, som allerede havde købt billet til afgange inden 5. november, fik tirsdag den 9. september en sms om, at deres fly var aflyst på grund af en strejke hos flyfabrikanten.
Customers who had already bought tickets for departure before 5 November were notified by text message on Tuesday, 9 September that their flights had been cancelled owing to a strike at the aircraft manufacturers.
Disse kunder har fået tilbud om at få pengene tilbage for turen.
These customers were offered a cash refund for their trip.
Flere af kunderne skulle afsted til Edinburgh uanset Ryanairs manglende flyvninger og måtte derfor købe billetter hos andre selskaber langt dyrere end billetten hos Ryanair.
Many of these customers had to go to Edinburgh in spite of Ryanair’s lack of aircraft, and were therefore obliged to purchase tickets from other airlines at a much higher price than from Ryanair.
Og merprisen har de selv måttet betale, for Ryanair mener kun at have pligt til at refundere billetten, ikke at sørge for en eventuel erstatningsrejse.
They had to pay the difference themselves, since Ryanair considered it was obliged only to refund the cost of the ticket, not to provide for alternative transport.
Selskabet mener ikke, at de hører ind under den EU-forordning, der kræver, at de enten skal tilbyde deres kunder en erstatningsrejse eller pengene tilbage, når de aflyser mere end to uger før afgangen.
Ryanair does not consider that it is covered by the EU regulation which requires airlines to offer their customers either alternative transport or a refund if it cancels more than two weeks before departure.
Vil Kommissionen bekræfte, at EU-reglerne om flypassagerers rettigheder forpligter et flyselskab til at tilbyde enten en erstatningsrejse eller pengene tilbage, når de aflyser et fly – uanset hvornår aflysningen sker?
Will the Commission confirm that the EU regulations on air passengers’ rights require an airline to offer either alternative transport or a refund when it cancels a flight — irrespective of when the cancellation occurs?
Er Kommissionen opmærksom på sagen, og kan Kommissionen oplyse, om lignende sager, hvor forbrugerne er blevet snydt for deres rettigheder, er forekommet?
Is the Commission aware of this case, and can it state whether similar cases have occurred in which consumers have been denied their rights?
Har Kommissionen i givet fald forslag til, hvad der kan gøres ved den manglende håndhævelse?
If so, did the Commission make any proposals about what could be done in the event of failure to implement the rules?
(5. november 2008)
(5 November 2008)
Artikel 5, stk. 1, i forordning (EF) 261/2004 Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 261/2004 af 11. februar 2004 om fælles bestemmelser om kompensation og bistand til luftfartspassagerer ved boardingafvisning og ved aflysning eller lange forsinkelser og om ophævelse af forordning (EØF) nr. 295/91 – erklæring fra Kommissionen, EUT L 46 af 17.2.2004. fastsætter, at passagerer ikke har ret til kompensation, hvis luftfartsselskabet giver meddelelse om aflysningen mindst to uger før det planlagte afgangstidspunkt.
Article 5(1) of Regulation 261/2004 Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 — Commission Statement, OJ L 46, 17.2.2004. establishes that passengers have not a right to compensation if the airline informs of the cancellation at least two weeks before the scheduled time of departure.
Luftfartsselskabet skal orientere passagererne om eventuelle alternative transportmuligheder (artikel 5, stk. 2).
The airline must provide the passengers with an explanation concerning possible alternative transport (Article5(2)).
I artikel 8, stk. 1, litra a og b, fastsættes det, at passagerer skal tilbydes valget mellem refusion af købsprisen for billetten eller omlægning af rejsen under sammenlignelige transportbetingelser.
Article 8(1)(a) and (b) establishes that passengers shall be offered the choice between refund of the ticket price or re-routing under comparable transport conditions.
Håndhævelse af forordning (EF) 261/2004 påhviler nationale myndigheder, jf. forordningens artikel 16.
The enforcement of Regulation 261/2004 is conferred to national authorities as defined under Article 16 of the regulation.
Medlemsstaterne udpeger et organ, der har ansvaret for håndhævelse af forordningen.
Member States must designate a body responsible for the enforcement of the regulation.
Dette organ træffer de nødvendige foranstaltninger til at sikre, at passagerernes rettigheder overholdes.
This body shall take measures in order to ensure that passenger rights are respected.
For at kunne gøre dette fastsætter medlemsstaterne sanktioner i tilfælde af luftfartsselskabernes manglende overholdelse.
To be able to do so, Member States must define sanction schemes in case of non-compliance by airlines.
Det udpegede organ undersøger således klager ud fra alle relevante oplysninger og beslutter, hvorvidt det er nødvendigt at fortage sig yderligere.
The designated body will thus examine complaints based on all relevant facts and decide whether any further action would be deemed appropriate.
Enhver passager kan i første omgang indbringe en klage for det pågældende luftfartselskab, og hvis han/hun ikke er tilfreds med svaret, kan klagen indbringes for den relevante nationale myndighed (det nationale håndhævelsesorgan).
Any passenger can submit a complaint first to the airline concerned and, if he/she is not satisfied with the answer, to the relevant national authority (NEB).
Det kompetente håndhævelsesorgan er organet i det land, hvor hændelsen fandt sted, i dette tilfælde det danske håndhævelsesorgan.
The competent NEB is the one where the incident took place, in this case, the Danish NEB.
I det øjeblik det nationale håndhævelsesorgan har alle relevante oplysninger, vil det handle i henhold til dets beføjelser som foreskrevet i artikel 16 i forordning (EF) 261/2004.
The moment the NEB is provided with all relevant facts, it will act according to its competences as provided for in Article 16 of Regulation 261/2004.
Nærmere information, dvs. kontaktoplysninger om de nationale organer samt EU-klageformularen, er tilgængelig på Kommissionens websted: www.apr.europa.eu.
More relevant information i.e. the contact details of these national bodies and the EU complaints' form, is available from the Commission website at: www.apr.europa.eu
Kommissionen har regelmæssig kontakt med de nationale håndhævelsesorganer for at kontrollere forordningens gennemførelse og de nationale håndhævelsesorganers opfølgning på klager indbragt af passagerer for Kommissionen.
The Commission has regular contacts with the NEBs to monitor the implementation of the regulation and the follow-up given by the NEBs to the complaints sent by passengers to the Commission.
Kommissionen vil informere Parlamentet om udfaldet af sin analyse i starten af 2009, og den vil indlede overtrædelsesprocedurer mod de medlemsstater, der endnu ikke garanterer korrekt håndhævelse af forordningen.
The Commission will inform the Parlament of the outcome of its analysis at the beginning of 2009, and it will open infringment procedures against those member states that do not still ensure a correct enforcement of the regulation.
SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL E-5245/08
WRITTEN QUESTION E-5245/08
Om: Forhandlerbetingelser for maskinforhandlere i Danmark
Subject: Conditions imposed on machinery dealers in Denmark
Traktor og mejetærskeforhandlere er i Danmark underlagt meget strenge krav via importørerne i Danmark.
Tractor and combine harvester dealers in Denmark are subjected to very stringent requirements by Danish importers.
Man skal bl.a. investere i personale, reservedele, specialværktøj, værktøj, nye maskiner til udstilling og videresalg, bygninger i bestemt stil, kurser, udstillinger, kundeinformationer, salgsopsøgende arbejde på en bestemt måde, opføre kundekartotek og vedligeholdelse heraf, hvilket er meget omkostningsfyldt.
Among other things they have to invest in staff, spare parts, specialist and regular tools, new machines for display and resale, buildings in a particular style, courses and exhibitions, they have to supply customer information, carry out proactive sales work in a particular way, and keep and maintain customer records, all of which is very expensive.
Forhandlerne er forpligtiget til at købe ovenstående via de danske importører.
Dealers are required to purchase the above via Danish importers.
Problemet er, at priser ved danske importører ikke er de samme som i resten af EU.
The problem is that the prices charged by Danish importers are not the same as in the rest of the EU.
Ofte er priserne meget billigere for de samme produkter ved andre forhandlere i EU.
The prices for the same products from other EU dealers are often much lower.
Men hvis ikke forhandlerne køber produkterne af de danske importører bliver man afskediget som forhandler, hvilket tydeligt fremgår i forhandlernes forhandlerkontrakter.
However, if dealers do not buy the products from the Danish importers, their dealers’ contracts clearly state that the contract will be terminated.
Kan der ikke være tale om konkurrenceforvridning på dette område?
Is it not possible that this constitutes a distortion of competition?
Det bør bemærkes, at EF-traktatens artikel 81 forbyder aftaler mellem virksomheder, som begrænser konkurrencen.
It should be noted that Article 81 of the EC Treaty prohibits agreements between undertakings restricting competition.
Ifølge traktatens artikel 81, stk. 3, kan dette forbud erklæres uanvendeligt for effektivitetsfremmende aftaler, som sikrer forbrugerne en rimelig andel af disse fordele.
However, according to Article 81(3) of the Treaty this prohibition may be declared inapplicable for efficiency-enhancing agreements that allow consumers a fair share of these benefits.
Med henblik herpå fastsætter gruppefritagelsesforordningen (EF) nr. 2790/1999 Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 2790/1999 af 22. december 1999 om anvendelse af EF-traktatens artikel 81, stk. 3, på kategorier af vertikale aftaler og samordnet praksis, EFT L 336 af 29.12.1999 . en kategori af aftaler for køb eller salg af varer eller tjenesteydelser, der indgås mellem ikke-konkurrerende virksomheder (»vertikale aftaler«), som normalt kan anses for at opfylde betingelserne i artikel 81, stk. 3.
For this purpose, the Block Exemption Regulation (EC) 2790/1999 (‘BER’) Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ L 336, 29.12.1999. defines a category of agreements for the purchase or sale of goods or services between non-competing companies (‘vertical agreements’), which can be regarded as normally satisfying the conditions laid down in Article 81(3).
Gruppefritagelsesforordningen giver således en sikkerhed for visse aftalekategorier, idet den fritager de kontraherende parter for at gennemgå hver enkelt aftale for at se, om den er i strid med EU's konkurrenceregler.
The BER provides thus a safe harbour for categories of agreements, relieving the contracting parties from the need to individually analyse those agreements to see whether they fall foul of EU competition rules.
Aftaler, som ikke opfylder disse betingelser, er ikke nødvendigvis ulovlige, men skal bedømmes enkeltvis.
Agreements that do not satisfy these conditions are not per se illegal but have to be individually analysed.
I gruppefritagelsesforordningen anføres dog en række alvorlige begrænsninger: En aftale, som indeholder en sådan begrænsning vil formodentlig heller ikke kunne opnå individuel fritagelse.
However, the BER enumerates a number of hardcore restrictions: an agreement that contains such a hardcore restriction is unlikely to be exempted individually either.
Med hensyn til bestemmelserne om mindstekrav og investering (i personale, udstilling, bygninger, tjenester osv.) må man formode, at disse aftaler enten er af ren kvalitativ art på grund af varens art og derfor falder uden for forbuddet i artikel 81, eller af kvantitativ art og derfor direkte begrænser antallet af forhandlere.
As concerns the provisions defining minimum standards and investment (in personnel, displays, buildings, services etc.), it can be assumed that these agreements are either of a purely qualitative nature as required by the nature of the goods and falling therefore outside the prohibition of Article 81, or of a quantitative nature, limiting the number of dealers directly.
I sidstnævnte tilfælde er aftalerne omfattet af gruppefritagelsesforordningen og derfor tilladte ifølge EU's konkurrenceret, såfremt de varer, der er omfattet af aftalerne, tegner sig for en markedsandel på under 30 %.
In the latter case the agreements are covered by the BER and therefore admissible under EU competition law if the products covered by these agreements have a market share of less than 30 %.
Hvis markedsandelen er over 30 %, afhænger sagens udfald af en individuel bedømmelse, hvor man sammenholder aftalernes effektivitetsfremmende virkning med deres virkning på konkurrencen.
In case the market share is above 30 % the admissibility would depend on an individual assessment of the case, where the efficiency-enhancing effects of the agreements are balanced against the effects on competition.
En bestemmelse, som forpligter forhandlere til kun at købe de pågældende aftalevarer via danske importører, ville dog udgøre en alvorlig begrænsning, hvis forhandlerne er medlem af et selektivt distributionssystem, dvs. et system, hvor forhandlerne forpligter sig til ikke at sælge varerne til uautoriserede distributører.
However, a provision obliging dealers to purchase the contract goods in question only via Danish importers would constitute a hardcore restriction if the dealers are members of a selective distribution system, i.e. a system where the dealers undertake not to sell the goods to unauthorised distributors.
Aftalen vil i så fald være omfattet af artikel 81, og man ville næppe få en individuel fritagelse for aftalen.
In this case, the agreement would be caught by Article 81 and individual exemption of the agreement would be unlikely.
SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL E-5246/08
WRITTEN QUESTION E-5246/08
Om: Elektronisk system for rejsetilladelser
Subject: Electronic System for Travel Authorisation
Ifølge det nye elektroniske system for rejsetilladelser (Electronic System for Travel Authorization — ESTA), der er blevet indført af det amerikanske ministerium for indenrigssikkerhed (DHS) inden for rammerne af programmet Visa Waiver Program (VWP), skal alle borgere i EU's medlemsstater — inklusiv mindreårige uanset alder — efter den 12. januar 2009 have en elektronisk rejsetilladelse, der gælder for flere rejser til USA i op til to år.
The new Electronic System for Travel Authorisation (ESTA) adopted by the American Department for Homeland Security (DHS) under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) provides that all citizens of EU Member States — including minors, regardless of their age — must, from 12 January 2009, obtain an electronic travel authorisation, which will be valid for multiple journeys to the USA for two years.
DHS skal opbevare dataene i et år efter tilladelsens udløb, og dernæst skal det af sikkerhedsgrunde lagre dem i yderligere 12 år.
The DHS will keep the data for one year after the authorisation expires, and afterwards it will store it for another 12 years for security reasons.