natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Mener Kommissionen, at overførsel af emissionskvoter til et andet land udelukkende med henblik på opsparing (banking) er et problem, og at tilbagelevering til oprindelseslandet i løbet af Kyoto-perioden på urimelig vis ændrer den samlede emissionskvote i det land, der har tilladt opsparingen, og gør det muligt for oprindelseslandet at opnå en dobbelt så stor emissionskvote i forhold til de opsparede emissionskvoter?
Does the Commission consider it a problem that a transfer to another country purely for banking purposes and back again from that country to the country of origin in the Kyoto period will unfairly alter the aggregate emission allowances of the country which has allowed banking and enable the emission allowance to be doubled in the country of origin as far as the banked amount is concerned?
Bør bestemmelserne for ændring af AAU og BSA ændres i forbindelse med revisionen af EU's direktiv om emissionshandel i 2004 eller 2006, inden de første overførsler med henblik på opsparing mellem medlemsstater finder sted?
Should the rules on adjustment of AAU and BSA amounts be revised when the EU emissions trading directive is reviewed in 2004 or 2006, before the first transfers are made between Member States for banking purposes?
2004/C 782 E/093
2004/C 782 E/093
SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL E-2791/03
WRITTEN QUESTION E-2791/03
Om: Problem med dobbelt bogføring inden for emissionshandel
Subject: Problem of double accounting in emissions trading
Den nationale AAU (BSA)-mængde justeres fra 2008 for overførsel af de grænseoverskridende emissionskvoter således, at sælgerlandets AAU- (BSA-) kvoter reduceres, og at køberlandets mængde forhøjes med den overførte mængde.
From 2008 national AAU (BSA) amount will be adjusted to take account of cross-border transfers of emission allowances so as to ensure that a selling country's AAU (BSA) amount is decreased and that of the buying country increased by the quantity transferred.
Sælgerlandets myndigheder har dermed en tilsvarende mindre mængde at tildele i den næste periode for emissionshandel.
The selling country's authorities will correspondingly have that much less to allocate in the next emissions trading period.
Da myndighederne formodentlig ikke kan behandle virksomhederne forskelligt ud fra, hvorvidt de sælger emissionskvoter i landet eller uden for landets grænser, bør sælgerens emissionskvote således altid reduceres tilsvarende i den næste periode.
Given that the authorities presumably cannot treat firms differently, according to whether they sell emission allowances within their home country or beyond its borders, a seller's emission allowance in the next period should logically be reduced in every case.
Dette vil også være i overensstemmelse med princippet om, at emissionsreduktionen kun belønnes en gang.
This would also be consistent with the principle that emission reductions should be taken into account only once.
Virksomheden kan imidlertid vælge at følge en strategi, der både baseres på salg og opsparing (banking) af emissionskvoter, for at den opnår størst mulig gevinst.
However, a firm can choose between the strategies of selling and banking emission allowances so as to derive greatest benefit.
Hvis det imidlertid forholder sig således, at virksomheden kan opspare sine emissionskvoter, for at den i den efterfølgende periode kan opnå en bedre (uændret) tildeling, bør myndighederne behandle de virksomheder, som enten har opsparet eller solgt, ens, dvs. i begge tilfælde reducere den nye tildeling med de solgte eller opsparede emissionskvoter (medmindre der ikke er tale om opsparing, der skyldes produktionssvingninger, konjunkturer).
If a firm is able to bank its emission allowance in order to secure a better (or unchanged) share in the next period, the authorities should treat firms which have banked emission allowances and firms which have sold them in the same way and hence in both cases deduct the amounts sold or banked from their new initial allocations (unless allowances have been banked purely because of fluctuations in a firm's output for reasons related to the business cycle).
Det vil i andre tilfælde være fordelagtigt for virksomheden at udskyde salget og foretage en opsparing af emissionstilladelserne, og dermed kan den i den efterfølgende periode sælge dobbelt så mange emissionskvoter.
Otherwise it would be in a firm's interest to postpone selling and bank emission allowances, in which case it would obtain twice as much to sell in the next period.
Mener Kommissionen, at der i dette tilfælde er et problem med lige behandling af virksomheder?
Does the Commission see a problem as regards equal treatment of firms?
Bør medlemsstaterne opfordres til konsekvent altid at reducere den næste tildeling med de opsparede eller solgte emissionskvoter, for at virksomheden ikke belønnes to gange?
Should the Member States all give instructions for the amounts of emission allowances banked or sold to be deducted from the next allocations for the firms concerned, thus ensuring that the problem of double accounting would not arise?
Bør spørgsmålet tages op igen i forbindelse med revisionen af direktivet?
Should this matter be raised when the directive is reviewed?
2004/C 782 E/094
2004/C 782 E/094
SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL E-2792/03
WRITTEN QUESTION E-2792/03
Om: Muligheder for aggressiv spekulation i forbindelse med emissionshandel
Subject: Opportunities for aggressive speculation in emissions trading
Den nationale AAU (BSA)-mængde justeres fra 2008 med hensyn til overførsel af de grænseoverskridende emissionskvoter således, at sælgerlandets AAU (BSA) reduceres, og at køberlandets mængde forhøjes med den overførte mængde.
From 2008, national assigned amount units (AAU or BSA amounts) will be adjusted to take account of cross-border transfers of emission allowances so as to ensure that a selling country's AAU (BSA) amount is decreased and that of the buying country increased by the quantity transferred.
Hvis en grænseoverskridende overførsel af emissionskvoter i 2008 imidlertid skyldes, at disse emissionskvoter oprindelig kun var opsparet (banked) i det pågældende land, modrager emissionskvoternes oprindelsesland det dobbelte antal af de opsparede emissionskvoter.
If, however, a cross-border transfer of emission allowances in the period beginning in 2008 is due to the fact that the allowances in question were originally just banked in the country concerned, the country of origin will obtain the amount of banked allowances twice over.
Det er navnlig vanskeligt at forvente i større målestok, at medlemstaterne på regeringers initiativ indleder sig på sådanne spekulative overførsler, men et tredjeland, der samtidig er en bilag I-part (som tilslutter sig Kyoto-aftalen og EU's ordning for handel med emissioner inden 2007) eller en virksomhed i landet kunne tænkes at gøre dette for at opnå en dobbelt så stor kvote, som kan sælges.
Broadening out the problem onto a large scale, it is hard to believe, especially in the light of their governments' action, that the Member States will start to engage in speculative transfers of this kind, but any non-EU Annex I country (if it acceded to the Kyoto Protocol and joined the EU emissions trading scheme before 2007) or a company from such a country would be able, by proceeding as described above, to double the amount of allowances for sale.
Herudover gives der mulighed for at bruge en vis form for markedsstyrke (market power), hvis opsparingen er foretaget i et land, som konkurrerer om at sælge emissionskvoter (f.eks. fra Ukraine til Forbundsrepublikken Tyskland).
It will also be possible in a way to exploit market forces if emission allowances have been banked in a rival selling country (for instance in a transfer from Ukraine to Germany).
På denne måde svækkes sælgerens markedsstilling, samtidig med at landet selv opnår en dobbelt fordel.
The rival seller's market position will consequently be weakened, whereas the market player in question will benefit twice over.
En anden form for aggressiv spekulation er mulig, hvis den spekulation, der fandt sted for nogle år siden på valutamarkederne, overføres til markedet for emissionskvoter.
Another typical form of aggressive speculation could occur if the kind of practice seen on the foreign exchange markets some years ago were to be repeated on the emissions trading market.
En aktør uden for EU kan således i teorien også genere en konkurrent inden for EU (og inden for emissionshandel).
In theory, a non-EU operator could thus hamper a competitor operating within the EU (and within the emissions trading scheme).
Er Kommissionen forberedt på denne form for aggressiv spekulation inden for emissionshandel?
Has the Commission made plans to deal with aggressive speculation of this type in emissions trading?
I bekræftende fald, hvordan?
If so, what plans?
Mener Kommissionen stadig, at det er unødvendigt at anvende markedsinterventioner (f.eks. på initiativ af EU's centralregister) for at stabilisere markedet for emissionshandel?
Does it still see no need for the idea of employing market intervention (using an EU central register, for example) to stabilise disturbances on the emissions trading market?
2004/C 782 E/095
2004/C 782 E/095
SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL E-2793/03
WRITTEN QUESTION E-2793/03
Om: Kyoto-protokollens definition af og forbud mod varm luft
Subject: Definition of hot air and ban under the Kyoto Protocol
Bestemmelserne i EU's direktiv om emissionshandel og traktatens konkurrenceregler (artikel 87 og 88) forhindrer for øjeblikket, at virksomheder kan tildeles flere kvoter, end de sandsynligvis har brug for.
At present the obstacles to allocation to companies posed by the EU emissions trading directive and the rules on competition laid down in the EC Treaty (Articles 87 and 88) probably go beyond what is necessary.
Dette baseres også på en formodning om, at handel med den såkaldte varme luft (dvs. emissionskvoter, hvis salget ikke skyldes reelle emissionsreduktioner) ikke vil finde sted.
That is why it is considered unlikely that hot air (in other words emission allowances whose sale is not due to actual reductions in emissions) will come onto the market.
Selve Kyoto-aftalen indeholder ikke et forbud mod salg af varm luft eller en definition af varm luft .
The Kyoto Protocol itself does not prohibit the sale of or define hot air.
Har EU mulighed for at forhindre, at medlemsstaters regeringer direkte sælger varm luft (uden først at tildele dem til virksomheder)?
Does the EU have any means of preventing Member State governments from selling hot air directly (without first allocating it to companies)?
I benægtende fald, mener Kommissionen da, at det er nødvendigt også for at sikre en ensartet international praksis at udarbejde en definition af varm luft og foreslå en ændring af Kyoto-aftalen for at indarbejde denne definition og et forbud mod salg af varm luft i aftalen?
If not, does the Commission consider it necessary, not least in order to guarantee consistent international practice, to devise a definition of hot air and propose that the Kyoto Protocol be amended in such a way as to incorporate that definition and a ban on the sale of hot air?
2004/C 782 E/096
2004/C 782 E/096
SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL E-2794/03
WRITTEN QUESTION E-2794/03
Om: Offentliggørelse af EU's Kyoto-mål som et glidende femårsgennemsnit
Subject: Publication of the EU's Kyoto target as a five-year moving average
Ifølge Kyoto-aftalen vurderes opfyldelsen af aftalens mål som et gennemsnit for årene 2008-2012.
The Kyoto Protocol stipulates that compliance with commitments is to be gauged according to the average for the years from 2008 to 2012.
Dette er forståeligt, da ændrede vejrforhold kan indvirke betydeligt på de årlige emissioner, bl.a. begrænset muligheder for vandkraft i tørre år.
This is reasonable because weather conditions, for example, can have a great impact on annual emissions, linked among other things to the small quantities of hydroelectric power generated in dry years.
I den seneste tid har man kunnet læse modstridende vurderinger af EU's og dens medlemslandes udvikling med hensyn til at opfylde Kyoto-målet, f.eks. netop som følge af de nævnte vejrforhold.
The developments as regards achievement of the Kyoto target by the EU and its Member States have recently been the subject of conflicting assessments stemming in part from weather conditions, as mentioned above.
Pressen for ikke at tale om den brede offentlighed er ikke i stand til at forstå sådanne svingninger og vurdere, om den overordnede tendens er negativ eller positiv.
The press, to say nothing of the public at large, cannot understand such fluctuations or ascertain whether the trend after smoothing is encouraging or gloomy.
Har Kommissionen overvejet at ændre offentliggørelsen af sine egne enheder således, at den udover at offentliggøre de årlige statistikker også offentliggør et tal for distance to target, der beregnes som et glidende femårsgennemsnit?
Has the Commission thought of changing its reporting by publishing, in addition to the annual statistics, an indication of the distance to target, calculated from a five-year moving average?
Mener Kommissionen, at dette vil bidrage til, at offentligheden kan forstå den reelle udviklingstendens, der rækker ud over et år?
Does it think that this would put the public in a better position to understand the real direction in which developments were moving, viewed over a time span longer than a year?
2004/C 782 E/097
2004/C 782 E/097
SKRIFTLIG FORESPØRGSEL E-2795/03
WRITTEN QUESTION E-2795/03
Om: Problemer med periodebaseret tildeling af kvoter for emissionshandel
Subject: Emissions trading: problem of period-based allocation
En virksomhed tildeles i henhold til direktivet om emissionshandel en kvote for en treårsperiode (den første periode for emissionshandel) eller en femårsperiode (den anden periode).
Under the emissions trading directive a firm's allocation is intended to cover three (first emissions trading period) or five years (second period).
Det vil derfor være fordelagtigt for virksomheden, at den ikke i slutningen af perioden for emissionshandel sælger de overskydende emissionskvoter, hvis den dermed kan opnå en uændret emissionskvote for hele den efterfølgende femårsperiode.
It is thus in the firm's interest to refrain from selling its unused portion allowances at the end of an emissions trading period if in that way it can secure an unchanged amount for the whole of the following five-year period.
Dette skaber samtidig et incitament (der er til skade for miljøet) til at udskyde miljøinvesteringer til begyndelsen af den første periode eller til i begyndelsen af 2008, for at virksomheden kan sælge de overskydende kvoter i så mange år som muligt.
This likewise creates an incentive (unfortunate from the environmental point of view) for the firm to postpone environmental investment until the start of the first period, or beyond the beginning of 2008, to enable it to sell surplus emission allowances in as many years as possible.
Mener Kommissionen, at den ovennævnte regel for tildeling opfylder princippet om forenklet belønning?
Does the Commission consider the allocation rule described above to be compatible with the single accounting principle?
Mener Kommissionen, at man i forbindelse med en revision af direktivet bør vurdere og i givet fald ændre reglerne for tildeling således, at tildelingen til den virksomhed, som sælger emissionskvoter, ændres med den solgte mængde allerede i det efterfølgende år efter salget, selv om perioden for emissionshandel ikke er afsluttet?
Does it believe that, when the directive is reviewed, the allocation rules should be assessed and, if necessary, amended in such a way as to ensure that the allocation for a firm selling emission allowances is altered without delay, in proportion to the quantity offered for sale, in the year following the sale, even though the emissions trading period might not yet have ended?
Samlet svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Margot Wallström på skriftlige forespørgsler E-2789/03 , E-2790/03 , E-2791/03 , E-2792/03 , E-2793/03 , E-2794/03 og E-2795/03
Joint answer to Written Questions E-2789/03 , E-2790/03 , E-2791/03 , E-2792/03 , E-2793/03 , E-2794/03 and E-2795/03 given by Mrs Wallström on behalf of the Commission
(7. november 2003)
(7 November 2003)
Kyoto-protokollens første forpligtelsesperiode strækker sig fra 2008 til 2012, og ifølge protokollen kan parterne, hvis de har nået deres Kyoto-mål, opspare tildelte mængder fra perioden 2008-2012 til den næste forpligtelsesperiode.
The Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period is from 2008-2012, and the Protocol provides that Parties may bank assigned amount units from 2008-2012 into the next commitment period in the case that Parties have reached their Kyoto target.
Direktivet om emissionshandel Direktiv 2003/87/EC af 13. oktober 2003, EFT L 275 af 25.10.2003 . er i tråd med Kyoto-protokollen, idet det giver mulighed for, at personer kan opspare kvoter fra 2008-2012-perioden til den følgende periode.
The emissions trading Directive Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003, OJ L 275, 25.10.2003 . is in line with the Kyoto Protocol by providing for banking of allowances by persons from the 2008-2012 period into the next period.
Kyoto-protokollens kvantificerede krav om emissionsbegrænsning og -reduktion finder ikke anvendelse før 2008, og ifølge emissionshandelsdirektivet kan medlemsstaterne hver for sig afgøre, om operatører skal have mulighed for opsparing af kvoter fra den første periode, 2005-2007, til perioden 2008-2012.
The Kyoto Protocol's quantified emission limitation and reduction requirements do not apply before 2008, and the emissions trading Directive allows Member States to decide individually whether to provide for banking of allowances by operators from the first period, 2005-2007, into the period 2008-2012.
Ifølge emissionshandelsdirektivet får operatørerne tildelt kvoter, og overdragelse af kvoter fra 2008 vil blive ledsaget af tilsvarende overdragelser af tildelte mængder.
Under the emissions trading Directive, operators are allocated allowances, and transfers of allowances from 2008 will be accompanied by corresponding transfers of assigned amount units.
Spørgsmålet bygger på en misforstået forbindelse mellem Kyoto-protokollen og EU's emissionshandelsordning.
The question is based on a false link between the Kyoto Protocol and the Union emissions trading scheme.
Medlemsstaterne er ikke forpligtet til at bevare handelsordningskvoter; de udsteder dem til anlægsoperatører, når og hvis det er hensigtsmæssigt, uden nogen formel forbindelse med Kyoto-protokollens forpligtelser eller fleksibilitetsmekanismer.
Member States do not have to keep trading scheme allowances, they issue them to plant operators when and as appropriate without any formal link to the obligations or the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol.
Direktivet om emissionshandel giver mulighed for overdragelse af kvoter mellem medlemsstaterne som middel til omkostningseffektiv reduktion i drivhusgasemissionerne.
The emissions trading Directive provides for transfers of allowances between Member States, in order to achieve cost-effective reductions of greenhouse gas emissions.
Da overdragelser af kvoter fra 2008 vil blive ledsaget af tilsvarende overdragelser af tildelte mængder, har Kommissionen forklaret medlemsstaterne de potentielle virkninger af muligheden for opsparing af kvoter fra 2005-2007 til 2008-2012.
As transfers of allowances from 2008 will be accompanied by corresponding transfers of assigned amount units, the Commission has explained to Member States the potential effects of allowing banking of allowances from 2005-2007 to 2008-2012.
Rådet og Parlamentet har besluttet, at medlemsstaterne kan tillade opsparing af kvoter fra 2005-2007 til 2008-2012, og vedtog en betragtning i direktivet, som angiver, hvordan medlemsstaterne kan tillade opsparing fra 2005-2007 til 2008-2012.
The Council and the Parliament have decided that Member States may allow the banking of allowances from 2005-2007 to 2008-2012, and agreed a recital which indicates how Member States may decide to allow the banking from 2005-2007 to 2008-2012.
Kommissionen har ikke til hensigt at genåbne dette spørgsmål.
The Commission does not intend to re-open this issue.
Kommissionen kan ikke se, at der foreligger noget problem med dobbelt bogføring eller med ligebehandling af virksomhederne.
The Commission does not see a problem of double accounting nor one in respect of the equal treatment of firms.
Den mængde, der er tildelt hver af parterne i Kyoto-protokollen, er fastlagt.
The Assigned Amount of each Party to the Kyoto Protocol is fixed.
Tillægning og fratrækning af Kyoto-mængder vil blive taget i betragtning i forbindelse med vurderingen heraf i Kyoto-protokollens Compliance Committee , men det vil ikke ændre de enkelte Kyoto-parters tildelte mængde.
The addition and subtraction of Kyoto units will be taken into account in the compliance assessment by the Kyoto Protocol's Compliance Committee, but will not change the Assigned Amount of each Party to the Kyoto Protocol.
Ved tildelinger til operatører efter 2012 vil der blive taget hensyn til medlemsstaternes forpligtelser for perioderne efter 2012.
Allocations to operators after 2012 will take into account the commitments of Member States for periods after 2012.
Fratrækning af kvoter fra en operatørs efterfølgende tildeling ville endvidere betyde, at opsparing de facto ikke er mulig.
Deducting allowances from an operator's subsequent allocation would furthermore imply that banking is de facto not possible.
EU's emissionshandelsordning er tænkt som et markedsbaseret instrument til at mindske overholdelsesomkostningerne for de deltagende aktører og for samfundet som helhed.
The Union emissions trading scheme is designed as a market based instrument to lower compliance cost for participating actors and for society.
Et markedsinstrument er karakteriseret ved, at det udnytter de afgørelser, aktørerne træffer i deres bestræbelser på at optimere deres udbytte af systemet.
The nature of a market instrument is to use the individual decisions actors take in their efforts to optimize their profits from the system.
Som for alle markeder er der risiko for spekulation.
As on all markets there may be speculation also on this one.
Et vigtigt mål ved udarbejdelsen af ordningen var derfor at gøre dette marked så bredt og stabilt som muligt.
One important issue when designing the scheme was therefore to make this market as broad and stable as possible.
Da der kan forventes at være flere tusind aktører lige fra starten, kan dette marked forventes at blive rimeligt stabilt.
As there should be several thousands of actors already from the start this market could be expected to be reasonably stable.
Tegn på misbrug af dominerende stilling skal naturligvis som altid overvåges og behandles på tilbørlig måde.
Of course, signs of market domination abuse must, as always, be monitored and addressed appropriately.
EF-traktatens konkurrenceregler gælder under alle omstændigheder, og Kommissionen griber ikke ind, medmindre disse regler overtrædes.
The rules of the EC Treaty on anti-competitive behaviour apply in any case, and the Commission does not intend to intervene unless those rules are breached.
Medlemsstaterne kan købe og sælge tildelte mængder i overensstemmelse med de regler, der er fastsat under Kyoto-protokollen og i gennemførelsesbestemmelserne herfor.
Member States can buy and sell assigned amount units in accordance with the rules agreed under the Kyoto Protocol and its implementing provisions.
Kommissionen finder det ikke hensigtsmæssigt at foreslå til ændring af Kyoto-protokollen med henblik på indførelse af en definition på og et forbud med salg af varm luft .
The Commission does not consider it appropriate to propose an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol relating to a definition and a ban on the sale of hot air .
Kommissionen har gjort sin stilling vedrørende rapportering klar i sit forslag til beslutning om en overvågningsmekanisme for emissioner af drivhusgasser i Fællesskabet og om gennemførelse af Kyoto-protokollen KOM(2003) 51 endelig udg. .
The Commission has made its position on reporting clear in its proposal for a Decision on the monitoring of greenhouse gas emissions and the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol COM(2003) 51 final. .