natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Det Europæiske Råd dekreterede på sit møde i juni 2005 en tænkepause (af mindst et års varighed), der skulle anvendes til at iværksætte en bred debat i alle medlemsstater med deltagelse af både "borgerne, civilsamfundet, arbejdsmarkedets parter, de nationale parlamenter og de politiske partier".
The European Council held in June 2005 ordered a period of reflection, to last at least one year, which was to be used to enable a broad debate to be held in all the Member States 'involving citizens, civil society, social partners, national parliaments and political parties'.
Også EU-institutionerne blev opfordret til at komme med bidrag.
The European institutions were also invited to make their contribution.
I mellemtiden fortsatte ratifikationsprocessen, også ved afholdelse af folkeafstemning.
In the meantime, further ratifications have been carried out, some by means of referendums.
Parlamentet har for sin del til fulde levet op til sit ansvar på området.
For its part, Parliament has fulfilled all its responsibilities in this area.
Det har lige fra begyndelsen støttet iværksættelsen af en grundig offentlig debat på europæisk plan om hovedspørgsmålene i den europæiske integration og afvist ethvert forsøg i retning af en selektiv gennemførelse af forfatningstraktaten (den såkaldte "botanisering" eller "cherry picking").
From the outset, it supported the idea of initiating an in-depth public debate at European level on the main issues at stake in the European integration process and rejected any attempt to push through the selective implementation of the Constitutional Treaty (cherry picking).
Parlamentet gav sit eget særlige bidrag til den offentlige debat ved at lancere idéen om "interparlamentariske møder", hvor man kunne drøfte spørgsmål af afgørende betydning for Europas fremtid.
Parliament made its own particular contribution to the public debate by proposing that ‘interparliamentary forums’ should be held to discuss issues fundamental to the future of Europe.
Der blev afholdt 3 sådanne møder inden Det Europæiske Råds samling i juni 2007, hvor der blev indkaldt endnu en regeringskonference
A total of three forums were held in the period leading up to the June 2007 European Council at which the decision was taken to reconvene the IGC
Endnu et møde fandt sted den 3. og 4. december 2007, hvor der allerede var opnået politisk enighed om Lissabontraktaten. .
A fourth took place on 3 and 4 December 2007, after the political agreement on the Treaty of Lisbon had already been reached. .
Disse møder bidrog til at styrke de folkevalgtes overbevisning om, at selv om forfatningstraktaten ikke havde kunnet ratificeres, var de problemer, den skulle give et svar på, ikke forsvundet, ligesom de institutionelle reformer, den indeholdt, som helhed var en afgørende forudsætning for, at Unionen kunne tage de udfordringer op, den stod over for i en stadig mere globaliseret verden.
These forums helped to strengthen, among the elected representatives of the citizens of all the Member States, the conviction that the problems to which the Constitutional Treaty was intended as a response had not simply disappeared following the failure of the ratification process and that, although perhaps in a different form, the institutional changes it incorporated were overall still vitally needed in order to enable the Union to address the challenges awaiting it in an ever more globalised world.
Med det tyske formandskab blev det institutionelle dossier igen placeret højt på Unionens dagsorden.
The German Presidency saw institutional issues return to the top of the Union agenda.
Den procedure, som man valgte at følge, var naturligvis ikke tilfredsstillende for dem, der havde gennemlevet det klima af dialog og åbenhed, som havde præget konventet, og som i øvrigt havde haft en afsmittende virkning på regeringskonferencen i 2004.
The procedure employed inevitably disappointed those who had experienced the atmosphere of dialogue and transparency which had marked the Convention, an atmosphere which had spilled over to the 2004 IGC, moreover.
For at sikre en realistisk chance for succes blev de drøftelser, der skulle bringe traktatreformen tilbage på skinnerne, i første omgang ført på bilateralt plan mellem formandskabet og de enkelte medlemsstater.
In an effort to guarantee real chances of success, the discussions on the relaunching of the reform of the Treaties were initially held bilaterally, between the Presidency and each of the Member States.
Parlamentet deltog fra første færd i konsultationerne på "sherpa"-niveau
It should be noted that the EP was involved in the consultations from the outset through the work of the 'sherpas'
Betegnelse, der blev benyttet om de to repræsentanter fra hver medlemsstat samt fra Europa-Parlamentet og Kommissionen, som deltog i denne indledende høringsfase.
Name given to the two representatives from each Member State and from the EP and the Commission who took part in this preparatory phase of the talks.
Europa-Parlamentets "sherpaer" var Klaus Welle, kabinetschef hos Europa-Parlamentets formand, Hans-Gert Pöttering, og José Luís Pacheco, sekretariatsmedarbejder i Udvalget om Konstitutionelle Anliggender. og kunne således yde sit bidrag til udformningen af det mandat, det tyske formandskab forelagde for Det Europæiske Råd i juni 2007.
Parliament's 'sherpas' were Klaus Welle, the Head of President Hans-Gert Pöttering's Cabinet, and José Luís Pacheco, a member of the secretariat of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs. and was thus able to make its contribution to the drafting of the mandate which the German Presidency submitted to the June 2007 European Council.
Parlamentet var repræsenteret på sekretariatsniveau efter direkte udnævnelse ved Parlamentets formand, og der var etableret en ad hoc-informations-/konsultationsprocedure mellem formanden, formanden for Udvalget om Konstitutionelle Anliggender og de politiske gruppers koordinatorer i samme udvalg.
Since those 'sherpas' were appointed directly by the President of Parliament from among the staff of the Secretariat, an ad hoc information/consultation procedure was established involving the President, the chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the political group coordinators from that committee.
Takket være dette forberedende arbejde kunne Det Europæiske Råd i juni 2007 indkalde en ny regeringskonference for at genoptage spørgsmålet om en reform af traktaterne og definere et meget klart, præcist og detaljeret mandat, hvilket gjorde det muligt for det portugisiske formandskab at gennemføre arbejdet på regeringskonferencen effektivt og hurtigt.
This preparatory work enabled the June 2007 European Council to convene a new IGC to resume the process of reforming the Treaties and also to lay down a very clear, precise and detailed remit, on the basis of which the Portuguese Presidency was able to conduct the proceedings of the IGC quickly and effectively.
Regeringskonferencen blev åbnet den 23. juli 2007 under samlingen i Rådet (almindelige anliggender) og fungerede grundlæggende på to niveauer: på ministerplan, hvor Parlamentet var repræsenteret af tre medlemmer - Elmar Brok, Enrique Barón Crespo og Andrew Duff, og på juridisk ekspertplan, hvor arbejdet blev forberedt af Rådets Juridiske Tjeneste, og hvor Parlamentet og Kommissionen også var repræsenteret.
The IGC, which opened on 23 July 2007, at the meeting of the General Affairs Council, essentially operated on two levels: at ministerial level, with Parliament represented by three Members – Elmar Brok, Enrique Barón Crespo and Andrew Duff; and at the level of the group of legal experts, whose work had been prepared by the Council Legal Service and on which Parliament and the Commission were also represented.
På politisk plan mødtes regeringskonferencen faktisk kun tre gange inden Det Europæiske Råds møde i Lissabon.
The work of the group of legal experts proved decisive in helping the IGC reach an agreement so quickly.
Det lykkedes alligevel for regeringskonferencen at løse eller udskille et betydeligt antal ømtålelige spørgsmål - det portugisiske formandskab havde i realiteten haft held til at gennemtvinge det princip, at mandatet ikke ville blive genåbnet, medmindre der var tale om spørgsmål, som der herskede enighed om blandt medlemsstaterne - således at stats- og regeringscheferne i Lissabon kun satte sig til forhandlingsbordet for at drøfte to grundlæggende spørgsmål, hvoraf kun det ene havde sit udspring i selve traktaten: spørgsmålet om, hvordan det nye afstemningssystem med kvalificeret flertal i Rådet skulle defineres i en situation, hvor Polen vedvarende havde givet udtryk for sin utilfredshed ikke bare med den aftale, der var indgået i 2004, men også med det kompromis, der med møje og besvær var indgået på Det Europæiske Råds møde i juni 2007 i Bruxelles.
At political level, although the IGC met only three times prior to the Lisbon European Council it nevertheless resolved or excluded from discussion a large number of sensitive issues – the Portuguese Presidency having successfully imposed the rule that the remit would be changed only to deal with matters on which there was unanimous agreement among the Member States – so that in Lisbon the Heads of State or Government were left with negotiations on no more than two fundamental issues, only one of which derived from the Treaty itself: the definition of the new qualified-majority voting system in the Council, in the light of Poland's persistent dissatisfaction not only with the agreement reached in 2004, but also with the compromise laboriously thrashed out at the June 2007 European Council in Brussels.
Et andet centralt uafklaret spørgsmål vedrørte Parlamentets sammensætning fra valgperioden fra 2009 - et spørgsmål, der ganske vist ikke direkte havde sit udspring i traktaten, men var blevet en vigtig trussel mod indgåelsen af en aftale, fordi Italien ihærdigt modsatte sig det udkast til afgørelse, som Parlamentet havde udformet efter anmodning fra Det Europæiske Råd.
The other key unresolved matter was the composition of the EP as from the parliamentary term starting in 2009, an issue which, although not deriving directly from the Treaty, had become one of the main obstacles to the conclusion of an agreement, since Italy was fiercely opposed to the proposal for a decision drawn up by the EP at the request of the European Council.
Alle de øvrige omdiskuterede spørgsmål - de britiske og irske "opt-out/opt-in"-klausuler vedrørende den tidligere tredje søjle, sikring af Europa-Parlamentets rolle hvad angår udnævnelsen af næstformand i Kommissionen/Unionens højtstående repræsentant for udenrigsanliggender og sikkerhedspolitik osv. - var praktisk taget blevet løst i dagene op til Det Europæiske Råds møde, særlig på regeringskonventets møde på ministerplan, der fandt sted under samlingen i Rådet (almindelige anliggender) den 15. oktober 2007 i Luxembourg.
The other issues still under discussion – the British and Irish opt-outs/opt-ins on matters previously covered by the third pillar, the safeguarding of the EP's role in the appointment of the Vice-President/High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, etc. – had practically all been dealt with in the final days leading up to the European Council, in particular at the meeting of the IGC at ministerial level held during the General Affairs Council which took place on 15 October 2007 in Luxembourg.
Under disse omstændigheder kunne stats- og regeringscheferne hurtigt nå til enighed i Lissabon: regeringskonferencen sluttede henad kl. 1.00 om morgenen fredag den 19. oktober 2007.
In Lisbon the Heads of State or Government were thus able to reach an agreement quickly: the IGC came to an end towards 01.00 on Friday, 19 October 2007.
I den anden del af denne begrundelse er det hensigten at undersøge konsekvenserne og fordelene (eller ulemperne) ved Lissabontraktaten, der blev undertegnet ved en ceremoni den 13. december 2007 i Lissabon.
In the second part of this explanatory statement, we propose to consider the implications and the merits (or drawbacks) of the Treaty of Lisbon, which was officially signed on 13 December 2007 in Lisbon.
Hvad den nye traktat bidrager med i forhold til de gældende traktater
How does the new Treaty represent a step forward by comparison with the Treaties in force?
Lissabontraktaten indebærer en lang række væsentlige reformer og forbedringer i forhold til de nuværende traktater.
The Treaty of Lisbon incorporates a large number of significant reforms and improvements to the current Treaties.
Der er naturligvis tale om et kompromis, der bl.a. omfatter nogle i Parlamentets øjne beklagelige ændringer såsom fjernelse af visse elementer, der optrådte i forfatningstraktaten, udsættelse af ikrafttrædelsesfristen for andre elementer samt indføjelse af særforanstaltninger, der skal imødekomme bestemte medlemsstaters krav.
It is, of course, a compromise and one which, in Parliament’s eyes, regrettably abandons some important provisions of the Constitution, delays the entry into force of other provisions and contains specific measures introduced to satisfy the demands of some Member States.
Det var den politiske pris, der måtte betales for at komme ud af den krise, det franske og nederlandske nej havde kastet EU ud i.
This was the political price to be paid in order to end the crisis into which the 'no' votes in the French and Dutch referendums had plunged the Union.
Tilbagevenden til traditionel traktatrevision og opgivelse af forfatningstanken
The return to the traditional approach of revising Treaties and the abandonment of the idea of a Constitution
Det faktum, at man er vendt tilbage til den traditionelle traktatrevisionsmetode ved at vedtage en ny traktat med ændringer til de eksisterende, som fortsætter med at være i kraft, indebærer, at man har opgivet forfatningen som en enkelt konsolideret traktat, der skulle erstatte alle de nuværende.
The return to the traditional method of revising the Treaties, through the adoption of a new Treaty amending the current Treaties, which themselves remain in force, implies the abandonment of the Constitution as a single, consolidated Treaty which would replace the current Treaties in their entirety.
Det spørgsmål, som har været så omdiskuteret, nemlig om der rent faktisk var tale om en forfatning eller blot om en traktat, er således ikke længere aktuelt.
As a result, the question which has proved so controversial, that of whether the document was really a Constitution or a Treaty, is no longer relevant.
Man undgår derved en ufrugtbar debat om en falsk problemstilling: Der har nemlig aldrig været nogen tvivl om, at der formelt var tale om en traktat, som skulle vedtages og ratificeres i henhold til de gældende traktatændringsregler.
A sterile debate on an issue which is nothing more than a red herring has thus been avoided: there was never any doubt that, in formal terms, the document was a Treaty which would have to be adopted and ratified in accordance with the rules in force governing the revision of Treaties.
Anderledes kunne det ikke være.
There was no other possible procedure.
Det er imidlertid også korrekt, at forfatningstraktaten i kraft af sin karakter og sit indhold udgjorde en mere synlig "forfatning".
However, it is also true that, by virtue of its nature and substance, the Constitutional Treaty established a more recognisable ‘constitution’.
Med genoptagelsen af den traditionelle metode tales der ikke længe om en forfatning, hvorved debatten politisk er blevet kortsluttet.
The return to the traditional method involves the abandonment of the very term 'Constitution', so that the controversy has been settled politically.
Den valgte fremgangsmåde indebærer også, at teksten ikke længere fremtræder som en helhed, og at man afviser selve forestillingen om en enhedstekst af konstitutionel karakter, som efter visse iagttageres mening lå for tæt op ad en egentlig statsdannelse til at kunne anvendes på EU.
This approach also involves a splitting of the text and a rejection of the very idea of a single text of a constitutional nature, one which some regarded as being too close to State practice to be applicable to the Union.
Den nye traktat omfatter en væsentlig tydeliggørelse af de værdier, principper og mål, der danner grundlag for Den Europæiske Union virksomhed; den beskriver Unionens kompetencer; den etablerer dens institutioner, beskriver beslutningsprocedurerne og præciserer retsakterne; den definerer borgernes rettigheder i forhold til EU; den angiver bl.a. retningslinjerne for traktatændringer.
However, the new Treaty substantially clarifies the definition of the values, principles and objectives which guide the actions of the European Union (EU); it describes the Union’s competences; it lays down what institutions the EU will have, outlines its decision-making procedures, and stipulates what form its acts will take; it defines citizens' rights vis-à-vis the EU; it lays down the rules governing its own revision, etc.
I denne forstand kan man hævde, at Unionens grundlæggende traktater er en form for "forfatning" i ordets materielle betydning.
In that respect, it could be said that the Treaties on which the Union is founded in some way establish its 'constitution', taking the word 'constitution' in its material sense.
Når alt kommer til alt, er formålet med en forfatning jo at fastlægge vilkårene og begrænsningerne for udøvelsen af en politisk enheds beføjelser og sikre borgerrettighederne, hvilket den nye traktat netop gør.
After all, the role of a constitution is precisely that of laying down the conditions governing, and the limits to, the exercise of power in the context of a political entity and safeguarding citizens’ rights, something which the new Treaty does.
Men selve det forhold, at forsøget på at formalisere dette materielle princip er blevet forkastet, betyder, at man ikke har ønsket at give Unionen en "forfatning" i formel forstand, dvs. i den forstand, begrebet almindeligvis forstås politisk.
However, the very fact that the attempt to give that material concept practical form was rejected signifies that there was no desire to endow the Union with a ‘Constitution’ in the formal sense, i.e. the most commonly used political sense, of the term.
Dette er en forskel i forhold til forfatningstraktaten.
This represents a difference by comparison with the Constitutional Treaty.
Reelt har Unionen ligesom andre politiske enheder med de nuværende traktater allerede en "forfatning", som kan udledes af de traktater, den bygger sin eksistens på.
In fact, in the existing Treaties the Union effectively already has its 'Constitution', deriving from the Treaties which brought it into being, just like any other political entity.
Ved at forenkle disse traktater og give dem en mere forståelig form kan man altså tage et væsentligt skridt imod en tydeliggørelse af systemet, således at det bliver mere gennemsigtigt og forståeligt for borgerne.
By simplifying those Treaties, by giving them a more readily comprehensible structure, a vital step has been taken towards clarifying the system and making it more transparent and understandable for the public.
Den valgte fremgangsmåde - en traktat med ændringer til de eksisterende to traktater - gør derimod teksten ulæselig for borgerne.
However, the method chosen – a Treaty containing amendments to the two Treaties in force – makes the text unreadable for ordinary citizens.
Det er nødvendigt, at der kommer en konsolideret udgave.
A consolidated version is now a necessity.
Det står således klart, at medlemsstaterne har ønsket at bortvejre enhver frygt, hvor grundløs den end er, for, at en EU-forfatning vil være første skridt til dannelsen af centraliseret "superstat", som vil give nationalstaterne dødsstødet og ændre Den Europæiske Unions karakter.
It is clear, therefore, that the Member States wanted to dispel any fear, however unfounded, that endowing the Union with a Constitution would represent the first step towards the creation of a centralised 'superstate' which would inevitably sound the death knell for national States and change the nature of the European Union.
Parlamentet, som lige fra processens begyndelse har arbejdet for "konstitutionaliseringen" af EU, er bevidst om, at denne frygt ikke tager tilstrækkeligt hensyn til en forfatnings betydning som grundlæggende regelsæt for magtudøvelsen i enhver politisk enhed (medmindre man da ønsker at benægte EU's "politiske" karakter).
Parliament, which has been campaigning from the start of the process for the 'constitutionalisation' of the Union, is aware of the fact that this fear fails to take proper account of the significance of a constitution as a fundamental act governing the exercise of power in a political entity (unless the aim is to deny the 'political' nature of the Union).
Anskuet i dette perspektiv udgør forfatningsprincippet endog en formel garanti for medlemsstaterne og borgerne mod en eventuel "afsporing" af Fællesskabets virksomhed.
Seen in this way, a 'constitution' could even be said to offer the Member States and Union citizens formal safeguards against unwelcome Union action.
Selv om det i lyset af den politiske situation i medlemsstaterne må erkendes, at der ikke var nogen anden måde at komme ud af det institutionelle dødvande på, kan Parlamentet således kun beklage, at man har måttet opgive den konstitutionelle fremgangsmåde.
On that basis, whilst acknowledging that the political situation in the Member States made such a step the only way out of the institutional impasse which had been reached, the EP can only regret the abandonment of the constitutional approach.
Ligeledes kan ordførerne kun beklage, at Unionens symboler - flaget, hymnen, mottoet, euroen og Europadagen - ikke er blevet medtaget i den nye traktat, således som det var tilfældet i forfatningstraktaten.
By the same token, your co-rapporteurs can only deplore the fact that the new Treaty makes no reference to symbols of the Union – the flag, the anthem, the motto, the euro, and Europe Day – as the Constitutional Treaty did.
Selv om denne udeladelse ikke betyder, at disse symboler er ophørt med at eksistere - de har allerede været en realitet i meget lang tid uden nogensinde at blive nævnt i traktaterne, og de vil leve videre på samme måde - ville det være fuldstændig logisk, at de blev nævnt i de tekster, som definerer Unionens status i retlig og politisk henseende.
Although this does not mean that these symbols no longer exist – they had already existed for a long time without ever being mentioned as such in the Treaties and will continue to exist in the same way – it would only be logical for texts which define the legal and political status of the Union to refer to them.
Visse medlemsstater krævede, at disse symboler blev udeladt, under henvisning til, at anerkendelsen af symboler i traktaterne ville skabe forvirring omkring Unionens påstået "statslige"' karakter.
This abandonment of the symbols was forced through by certain Member States on the pretext that recognising them in the Treaties would enable people to claim erroneously that the Union was in fact a 'State-like' structure.
Der hersker bestemt ikke enighed om dette synspunkt, hvilket fremgår af den erklæring om Unionens symboler, som 16 medlemsstater har knyttet til traktaten som bilag (erklæring nr. 52 vedrørende Den Europæiske Unions symboler), og hvori de erklærer, at de nævnte symboler "fortsat vil være symboler på borgernes fælles tilhørsforhold til Den Europæiske Union og deres tilknytning hertil".
That this viewpoint is by no means unanimously held seems to be borne out by the declaration on the symbols of the Union which 16 Member States have annexed to the Treaty (Declaration No 52 on the symbols of the Union) reiterating that in their view the symbols mentioned continue 'to express the sense of community of the people in the European Union and their allegiance to it'.