natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
NAVSECGRU Instruction C5450.48A, Subj: Mission, Functions and Tasks of Naval Security Group Activity (NAVSECGRUACT) Sugar Grove, West Virginia, September 3, 1991. beskrives opgaver, funktion og mål for Naval Security Group Activity (NAVSECGRUACT), 544th Intelligence Group i Sugar Grove, West Virginia.
NAVSECGRU Instruction C5450.48A, Subj: Mission, Functions and Tasks of Naval Security Group Activity (NAVSECGRUACT) Sugar Grove, West Virginia, September 3 1991. describe the duties, function and purpose of the Naval Security Group Activity (NAVSECGRUACT), 544 th Intelligence Group, in Sugar Grove, West Virginia.
Her anføres, at en speciel opgave er: „Maintain and operate an Echelon-Site“; derudover anføres bearbejdning af efterretningsmæssige oplysninger som en opgave.
They state that one particular task is to ‘maintain and operate an ECHELON site’; they also mention that one task is the processing of intelligence information.
I dokumentet „History of the Air Intelligence Agency – 1 January to 31 December 1994 Document 12.
In the document ‘History of the Air Intelligence Agency – 1 January to 31 December 1994 Document 12.
"Activation of Echelon Units," from History of the Air Intelligence Agency, 1 January - 31 December 1994, Volume I (San Antonio, TX: AIA, 1995). anføres under punktet “Activation of Echelon Units“ Air Intelligence Agency (AIA), Detachment 2 og 3:
'Activation of Echelon Units,' from History of the Air Intelligence Agency, 1 January - 31 December 1994, Volume I (San Antonio, TX: AIA, 1995). the Air Intelligence Agency (AIA), Detachment 2 and 3, is mentioned under the heading ‘Activation of ECHELON Units’.
Dokumenterne giver ingen oplysninger om, hvad en „Echelon-site“ er, hvad der gøres på en „Echelon-site“, hvad dæknavnet Echelon står for.
These documents do not give any information on what an 'ECHELON site' is, what is done at an 'ECHELON site', or what the code name ECHELON stands for.
Dokumenterne oplyser intet om UKUSA-aftalen.
These documents do not reveal anything about the UKUSA Agreement.
Angivelse af stationer (dokument 6, 9, 12, nye dokumenter)
Mention of Stations (Documents 6, 9 and 12, new documents)
- Sugar Grove, West Virginia udpeges som SIGINT-station i NAVSECGRU INSTRUCTIONs C5450.48A Document 9.
- Sugar Grove, West Virginia, named as SIGINT station in the NAVSECGRU Instructions C5450.48A Document 9.
NAVSECGRU Instruction C5450.48A, Subj: Mission, Functions and Tasks of Naval Security Group Activity (NAVSECGRUACT) Sugar Grove, West Virginia, September 3, 1991.
NAVSECGRU Instruction C5450.48A, Subj: Mission, Functions and Tasks of Naval Security Group Activity (NAVSECGRUACT) Sugar Grove, West Virginia, September 3, 1991.
- Misawa Air Base, Japan, udpeges som SIGINT-station i History of the Air Intelligence Agency - January to 31 December 1994 Document 12.
- Misawa Air Base, Japan, named as SIGINT station in History of the Air Intelligence Agency – 1 January to 31 December 1994 Document 12.
"Activation of Echelon Units," from History of the Air Intelligence Agency, 1 January - 31 December 1994, Volume I (San Antonio, TX: AIA, 1995). og i beskrivelsen af aktiviteterne i Naval Security Group i dokumenter fra marineministeriet Department of the Navy, Naval Security Group Instruction C5450.32E af 9.5.1996.
'Activation of Echelon Units,' from History of the Air Intelligence Agency, 1 January - 31 December 1994, Volume I (San Antonio, TX: AIA, 1995). and in description of the activities of the Naval Security Group in Department of the Navy documents Department of the Navy, Naval Security Group Instruction C5450.32E, 9.5.1996
- Sabana Seca i Puerto Rico udpeges som SIGINT-station, samme og i beskrivelsen af aktiviteterne i Naval Security Group i dokumenter fra marineministeriet Naval Security Group Instruction C5450.33B af 8.8.1996
- Sabana Seca in Puerto Rico, ibid. and in description of the activities of the Naval Security Group in Department of the Navy documents Naval Security Group Instruction C5450.33B, 8.8.1996
- Guam, udpeges som SIGINT-station, samme
- Guam, named as SIGINT station, ibid.
- Yakima, Washington, udpeges som SIGINT-station, samme
- Yakima, Washington, named as SIGINT station, ibid.
- Menwith-Hill, Storbritannien, beskrivelse af aktiviteterne i Naval Security Group i dokumenter fra marineministeriet Department of the Navy, Fact and Justification Sheet for the Establishment of U.S. Naval Security Group Activity vom 23.2.1995 und Department of the Navy, Naval Security Group Instruction C5450.62 af 30.1.1996.
- Menwith-Hill, United Kingdom, description of the activities of the Naval Security Group in Department of Navy documents Department of the Navy, Fact and Justification Sheet for the Establishment of U.S. Naval Security Group Activity of 23.2.1995 and Department of the Navy, Naval Security Group Instruction C5450.62, 30.1.1996
- Bad Aibling, Tyskland, beskrivelse af aktiviteterne i Naval Security Group i dokumenter fra marineministeriet Department of the Navy, Naval Security Group Instruction C5450.63 af 25.10.1995.
- Bad Aibling, Germany, description of the activities of the Naval Security Group in Department of Navy documents Department of the Navy, Naval Security Group Instruction C5450.63, 25.10.1995
- Medina, Texas, beskrivelse af aktiviteterne i Naval Security Group i dokumenter fra marineministeriet Department of the Navy, Naval Security Group Instruction C5450.60A af 8.4.1996.
- Medina, Texas, description of the activities of the Naval Security Group in Department of Navy documents Department of the Navy, Naval Security Group Instruction C5450.60A, 8.4.1996
- Kunia, Hawaii, beskrivelse af aktiviteterne i Naval Security Group i Naval Security Group Instructions Naval Security Group Instruction C5450.55B af 8.8.1996.
- Kunia, Hawaii, description of the activities of the Naval Security Group in Department of Navy documents Naval Security Group Instruction C5450.55B, 8.8.1996
Beskyttelse af USA-borgeres privatliv (dokument 7, 7a -f, 9, 11,16)
Protection of the privacy of US citizens (Documents 7, 7 a to f, 9, 11 and 16)
NAVSECGRU Instruction C5450.48A, Subj: Mission, Functions and Tasks of Naval Security Group Activity (NAVSECGRUACT) Sugar Grove, West Virginia, September 3, 1991.
NAVSECGRU Instruction C5450.48A, Subj: Mission, Functions and Tasks of Naval Security Group Activity (NAVESCGRUACT) Sugar Grove, West Virginia, 3 September 1991 .
I forskellige dokumenter anføres at og hvordan amerikanske borgeres privatliv skal beskyttes (Baker, General Counsel, NSA, skrivelse af 9. september 1992, United States Signals Intelligence Direcive (USSID) 18, 20.
Various documents state that the privacy of US citizens must be protected and how this is to be done (Baker, General Counsel, NSA, letter of 9 September 1992, US Signals Intelligence Directive (USSID) 18, 20 October 1980, and various supplements.
Oktober 1980, og forskellige supplementer Dissemination of U.S. Government Organizations and Officials, Memorandum 5 February 1993; Reporting Guidance on References to the First Lady, 8 July 1993; Reporting Guidance on Former President Carter’s Involvement in the Bosnian Peace Process, 15 December 1994; Understanding USSID 18, 30 September 1997; USSID 18 Guide 14 February 1998;
Dissemination of US Government Organisations and Officials, Memorandum 5 February 1993; Reporting Guidance on References to the First Lady, 9 July 1993; Reporting Guidance on Former President Carter’s Involvement in the Bosnian Peace Process, 15 December 1994; Understanding USSID 18, 30 September 1997; USSID 18 Guide, 14 February 1998.
Definitioner (dokument 4, 5a,7)
Definitions (Documents 4, 5a and 7)
Department of Defense Directive af 23. december 1971 Document 4.
The Department of Defense Directive of 23 December 1971 Document 4.
NSCID 6, "Signals Intelligence," February 17, 1972. .
NSCID 6, 'Signals Intelligence,' February 17 1972.
Ifølge disse dokumenter betyder COMINT indsamling og bearbejdning af udlandskommunikation (passed by electromagnetic means), inklusive aflytning og bearbejdning af ukodet skreven kommunikation, presse og propaganda.
According to these, COMINT means the collection and processing of foreign communications (passed by electromagnetic means) up to and including the interception and processing of unencrypted written communications, press and propaganda unless encrypted.
Allerede for 50 år siden var interessen ikke blot rettet mod oplysninger vedrørende politik og sikkerhed, men også vedrørende videnskab og økonomi.
As long as 50 years ago there was interest in information not only from the political and security spheres but also from the fields of science and economics.
Dokumenterne beviser, at NSA samarbejder med andre tjenester om COMINT.
The documents prove that the NSA works together with other services in the field of COMINT.
De dokumenter, der giver oplysninger om, hvordan NSA er organiseret, hvilke opgaver det har, og at det er underlagt Department of Defense går i det store og hele ikke ud over, hvad man kan udlede af offentligt tilgængelige kilder på NSA's hjemmeside.
The documents which reveal information about how the NSA is organised, what tasks it has and that it is responsible to the Department of Defense, do not add any essential information beyond what can be gathered from publicly accessible sources on the NSA home page.
Kabelkommunikation må aflyttes.
Cable communications may be intercepted.
544th Intelligence Group og Detachment 2 og 3 under Air Intelligence Agency deltager i indsamlingen af efterretningsmæssige oplysninger.
The 544 th Intelligence Group and Detachment 2 and 3 of the Air Intelligence Agency are involved in the collection of intelligence information.
Begrebet „Echelon“ dukker op i forskellige forbindelser.
The term ‘ECHELON’ appears in a number of contexts.
Sugar Grove i West Virginia, Misawa Air Base i Japan, Puerto Rico (dvs. Sabana Seca), Guam, Yakima i staten Washington nævnes som SIGINT-stationer.
Sugar Grove in West Virginia, Misawa Air Base in Japan, Puerto Rica (i.e. Sabana Seca), Guam, and Yakima in Washington State are named as SIGINT stations.
Der nævnes yderligere stationer, hvor Naval Security Group er aktiv, uden at disse dog betegnes som SIGNIT-stationer.
Further stations at which the Naval Security Group is active are named without being identified as SIGINT stations.
Dokumenterne giver oplysning om, hvordan amerikanske borgeres privatliv skal beskyttes.
The documents provide information on how the privacy of American citizens should be protected.
Dokumenterne giver intet bevis, men stærke indicier, der sammen med andre indicier giver grundlag for konklusioner.
The documents do not constitute proof, but provide compelling clues which enable conclusions to be drawn when taken in conjunction with other evidence.
Nicky Hager
Nicky Hager’s book
I den newzealandske forfatter Nicky Hager's bog "Secret Powers – New Zealands role in the international spy network", der udkom i 1996, beskrives Echelon-systemet for første gang grundigt.
The ECHELON system was first described in detail in the book ‘Secret Powers – New Zealand’s role in the international spy network’, published in 1996 by the New Zealand author Nicky Hager.
Han baserer sig i den forbindelse på interviews med over 50 personer, der har været beskæftiget af den newzealandske efterretningstjeneste GCSB, eller på anden vis har været involveret i efterretningstjeneste.
He draws on interviews with more than 50 persons who were employed by the New Zealand intelligence service, GCSB, or otherwise involved in intelligence activities.
Endvidere har han evalueret talrige dokumenter fra nationale arkiver, aviser og andre offentligt tilgængelige kilder.
He also analysed a wide range of documents from national archives, newspapers and other published sources.
Ifølge Hager går det globale aflytningssystem under navnet ECHELON, mens netværkets computere betegnes som ECHELON-dictionaries.
According to Hager, the global interception system is referred to as ECHELON, and the network computers as ECHELON Dictionaries.
Senere tilsluttede Canada, Australien og New Zealand sig UKUSA-aftalen.
Canada, Australia and New Zealand subsequently signed up to the UKUSA agreement.
Ifølge Hager er aflytning af satellitkommunikation nøglepunktet i det nuværende system.
Hager says that interception of satellite communications is the core activity of the current system.
Allerede i 70'erne begyndte man at aflytte afsendte meddelelser i jordbaserede stationer via Intel-satellitter - det første globale satellitkommunikationssystem Intelsat’s hjemmeside, http://www.intelsat.int/index.htm. .
The interception by ground stations of messages sent via Intel satellites – the first global satellite communication system Intelsat homepage, http://www.intelsat.int/index.htm - began in the 1970s.
Disse meddelelser blev derefter med computer gennemsøgt for fastlagte nøgleord og adresser med henblik på at kunne udskille de relevante meddelelser.
Such messages are then searched by computer for specific keywords and/or addresses in order to filter out the relevant communications.
Derefter blev overvågningen udvidet til andre satellitter, som f.eks. fra Inmarsat Inmarsat’s hjemmeside, http://www.inmarsat.org/index3.html. , der var koncentreret om maritim kommunikation.
Surveillance activity was later extended to other satellites, such as those of Inmarsat Inmarsat homepage, http://www.inmarsat.org/index3.html , which concentrated on maritime communications.
"Echelon" bliver dermed til et synonym for et globalt aflytningssystem..
ECHELON is thus synonymous with a global eavesdropping system.
I et foredrag i udvalget den 24. april 2001 understregede Hager, at aflytningssystemet ikke var almægtigt.
In his statement to the Temporary Committee, made on 24 April 2001, Hager emphasised that the interception system was not all-powerful.
Da de begrænsede ressourcer skulle anvendes så effektivt som muligt, var det ikke muligt at aflytte alt, men kun det, der kunne give vigtige oplysninger.
Since the limited resources had to be used as effectively as possible, not all communications could be intercepted, but rather only those likely to offer up important information.
Målene var derfor snarere af politisk eller diplomatisk interesse.
For that reason, the communications targeted were those of political and diplomatic interest.
Hvis der blev foretaget aflytning med henblik på økonomiske oplysninger, drejede det sig snarere om makro- end om mikroøkonomiske interesser.
If communications were intercepted with a view to obtaining economic intelligence, the information concerned the macro - rather than the microeconomic sphere.
Hvad angik aflytningssystemernes funktion, så førte hver partner egne lister over søgeord, hvorefter kommunikation blev aflyttet.
As far as the interception system's operating methods were concerned, each partner state had its own list of search words on the basis of which communications were intercepted.
Endvidere blev kommunikation også gennemsøgt efter nøgleord, som USA indgiver i systemet via såkaldte "dictionary manager".
In addition, however, communications were screened for keywords entered into the system by the USA using 'dictionary managers'.
Englænderne skulle derfor f.eks. ikke have kontrol med og vidste heller ikke, hvilke informationer der samles i Morwenstow, fordi disse videresendes direkte til USA.
The British therefore had no control over the screening process and had no idea what information was collected in Morwenstow, since it was forwarded directly to the USA.
I den forbindelse understregede Hager den risiko, de britiske aflytningsstationer indebar for Kontinentaleuropa.
In that connection, Hager emphasised the risk posed to continental Europe by the British interception stations.
Han anførte flere eksempler på, at UKUSA-partnerne udspionerede handelspartnere i Stillehavsområdet.
Citing several examples, he pointed out that the UKUSA partner states were spying on allies and trading partners in the Pacific.
De eneste, der var undtaget fra spionage, var UKUSA-partnerne selv.
The only countries not being spied on were the UKUSA partner states themselves.
Efter hans opfattelse ville den engelske efterretningstjeneste i lighed med den newzealandske meget nødigt sætte UKUSA-partnerskabet på spil ved at vægre sig ved at kooperere og aflytte Kontinentaleuropa.
In Hager's view, like their New Zealand counterparts the British secret services would probably be very loath to call the UKUSA partnership into question by refusing to cooperate and intercept communications originating from continental Europe.
Man kunne ikke forstille sig nogen grund til, at Storbritannien skulle give afkald på interessante efterretningsoplysninger, og da de altid ville være hemmelige, ville spionage inden for rammerne af UKUSA-aftalen ikke udelukke en officiel loyalitetspolitik over for Europa.
There would be no reason for the United Kingdom to forfeit information of interests to its intelligence services, and, since that information would always remain secret, espionage under the UKUSA Agreement would not rule out an official policy of loyalty vis-à-vis Europe.
Den engelske journalist Duncan Campbell baserer sig i sine mange udgivelser på Hagers og Richelons arbejde, samt på samtaler med tidligere efterretningsmedarbejdere og andre forskningsarbejder.
In his many publications the British journalist Duncan Campbell draws on the work of Hager and Richelson, on conversations with former intelligence service staff and on other research.
Ifølge ham er ECHELON del af et globalt aflytningssystem, der aflytter og forarbejder international satellitkommunikation.
According to his statements, ECHELON is part of the global system which intercepts and analyses international satellite communications.
Hver medlemsstater råder over "Dictionary" Computer, der gennemsøger den aflyttede kommunikation efter nøgleord.
Each partner state uses 'dictionary' computers which screen the intercepted messages for keywords.
Duncan Campbell har i STOA-studie 2/5 fra 1999, der beskæftiger sig indgående med den tekniske side, redegjort for, at og hvordan ethvert medium, der anvendes til transmission af kommunikation, kan aflyttes.
In STOA Study 2/5 of 1999, which provides an in-depth analysis of the technical aspects, Campbell describes in detail how any medium used for transmitting information can be intercepted.
Der findes heller ikke udstyr, der har kapacitet til at bearbejde og genkende indholdet af enhver sproglig meddelelse eller enhver telefonsamtale."
Nor is equipment available with the capacity to process and recognise the content of every speech message or telephone call.’
Duncan Campbell , Inside Echelon.
Duncan Campbell , Inside ECHELON.
Om historie, teknik og funktion i forbindelse med det globale aflytnings- og filtersystem, der er kendt som Echelon, 1, http://www.heise.de/tp/deutsch/special/ech/6928/1.html http://www.heise.de/tp/deutsch/special/ech/6928/1.html.
The history, structure and function of the global surveillance system known as ECHELON, 1
I en tale for udvalget den 22. januar 2001 var Capbell af den opfattelse, at USA anvendte efterretningstjenesten til at støtte amerikanske virksomheder med at få kontrakter.
In his statement to the Temporary Committee, made on 22 January 2001, Campbell expressed the view that the USA used its intelligence services to help US firms win contracts.
Relevante oplysninger skulle via CIA og med bistand fra Advocacy Center og Office of Executive Support i Handelsministeriet blive videregivet til virksomhederne.
Relevant information was passed on to firms via the CIA with the assistance of the Advocacy Center and the Office of Executive Support in the Department of Commerce.
Advocay Centers hjemmeside, http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/advocacy/index.html.
Homepage of the Advocacy Center, http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/advocacy/index.html
Ordføreren ville give Advocacy Center mulighed for at tage stilling til disse anklager i forbindelse med en rejse til Washington DC.
In the course of his visit to Washington DC your rapporteur wanted to give the Advocacy Center an opportunity to respond to these accusations.
Det aftale møde blev imidlertid aflyst med kort varsel af Commerce Department Center.
However, a pre-arranged meeting was cancelled by the Department of Commerce at short notice.
At Advocacy Centers resultater skyldes aflytning er ren spekulation og underbygges ikke af dokumenter.
The claim that the success of the Advocacy Center is based on the interception of communications is speculation and is not supported by the documents.
Campbell understregede i sit indlæg, at flere europæiske landes aflytningskapacitet var vokset betydeligt inden for de seneste år, f.eks. i Schweiz, Danmark og Frankrig.
Campbell emphasised that the interception capabilities of several European countries (e.g. Switzerland, Denmark, France) had increased substantially in recent years.
Der var også en stigning i det bilaterale og multilaterale samarbejde inden for efterretningssektoren.
The intelligence sector had also seen an expansion in bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
Den amerikanske forfatter Jeffrey Richelson, tidligere medlem af National Security Archives, har pr. Internet gjort 16 tidligere klassificerede dokumenter tilgængelige; disse giver et indblik i NSA's (National Security Agency) Jeffrey T.Richelson, The National Security Agency Declassified, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no. 24, George Washington University, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/index.html http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/index.html. opståelse, udvikling, management og mandat.
The US author, Jeffrey Richelson, a former member of the National Security Archives, has made available on the Internet 16 previously classified documents which give an insight into the inception, development, management and remit of the National Security Agency Jeffrey T. Richelson , The National Security Agency Declassified, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No 24, George Washington University, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/index.html .
Derudover har han skrevet forskellige bøger og artikler om efterretningstjenestelige aktiviteter i USA.
In addition, he is the author of various books and articles on the intelligence activities of the USA.
I arbejdet baserer han sig på talrige deklassificerede dokumenter, på Hagers forskningsarbejde samt egne undersøgelser.
In his work he draws on many declassified documents, the research carried out by Hager and his own research.
Under mødet med udvalgets delegation i Washington D.C. den 11. maj 2001 forklarede han, at ECHELON var betegnelsen på et computernetværk, der filtrerede data, der blev udvekslet mellem efterretningstjenesterne.
During his meeting with the delegation from the Temporary Committee, held in Washington DC on 11 May 2001, he stated that ECHELON referred to a computer network used to filter data which was then exchanged between intelligence services.
I sin bog fra 1985 „The Ties That Bind“ Jeffrey T. Richelson, Desmond Ball, The Ties That Bind, Boston UNWIN HYMAN (1985). beskriver han udførligt UKUSA-aftalens tilblivelse og de aktiviteter, de hemmelige tjenester i USA, Det Forenede Kongerige, Canada, Australien og New Zealand gennemfører under denne aftale.
In his 1985 book 'The Ties That Bind' Jeffrey T. Richelson, Desmond Ball, The Ties That Bind, Boston UNWIN HYMAN (1985) he describes in detail the negotiations which led up to the signing of the UKUSA Agreement and the activities under that agreement of the secret services of the USA, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
I sin meget omfattende bog fra 1999 „ The U.S. Intelligence Community“ Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community4, Westview Press (1999). giver han et overblik over USA's efterretningstjenestelige aktiviteter, han beskriver tjenesternes organisationsstrukturer, deres metoder til indsamling og analyse af information.
In his very comprehensive 1999 book 'The US Intelligence Community' Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community4, Westview Press (1999) he gives a survey of the USA's intelligence activities and describes the organisational structure of the intelligence services and their methods of collecting and analysing information.