natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Det nye forvaltningssystem for strukturfondene hviler på, at medlemsstaterne indfører og udpeger en " forvaltningsmyndighed " for hvert program.
The new Structural Fund management system requires Member States to set up a ‘managing authority’ for each programme.
Den er det centrale punkt i programmeringsordningen og samtalepartner for alle de forskellige enheder, der ønsker støtte fra strukturfondene.
This authority constitutes the machinery of the programming system and acts as the contact point for any body seeking to obtain Structural Fund support.
Forvaltningsmyndigheden skal endvidere udarbejde en årsberetning om programmets gennemførelse.
The management authority also has to produce an annual report on the implementation of its programme.
Medlemsstaterne skal endvidere indføre en " betalingsmyndighed ", som Kommissionen overfører et acontobeløb på 7% af fondenes samlede deltagelse til, når programmet er vedtaget.
In addition, Member States must set up a ‘paying authority’, to which the Commission, once a programme has been adopted, will make a payment on account amounting to 7% of the total contribution from the Funds.
Betalingsmyndighederne, der skal kontrollere, at udgifterne er i overensstemmelse med EU-bestemmelserne, forelægge betalingsanmodningerne for Kommissionen og indkassere dem, skal - under hensyntagen til princippet om adskillelse af funktioner - tilhøre forskellige afdelinger af forvaltningsinstanserne.
The paying authorities called upon to check that expenditure is in accordance with Community rules, submit payment applications to the Commission, and receive the payments should, in keeping with the principle of separation of tasks, be attached to different departments of the managing agencies.
Hvordan er situationen i medlemsstaterne efter forordningernes ikrafttrædelse?
What is the position in the Member States since the rules entered into force?
Er overførslen af et acontobeløb på højst 7% af fondenes samlede deltagelse betinget af, at dette system er indført?
Is the maximum payment on account, 7% of the total contribution from the Funds, made if, and only if, the above system has been put in place?
Hvordan har Kommissionen endvidere kunnet forvisse sig om (eller hvilke garantier har den fået) for adskillelsen af forvaltnings- og udbetalingsorganernes funktioner, selv om disse 2 organer godt kan tilhøre samme administration?
How, moreover, has the Commission been able to ensure (or what guarantees has it obtained) that the tasks of managing and paying agencies are performed separately, even if agencies in those two categories may be part of the same authority?
For at måle strukturinterventionernes effektivitet, foretages der en forhånds-, en midtvejs- og en efterfølgende evaluering af Fællesskabets indsats.
To gauge the effectiveness of structural assistance, Community measures must be assessed beforehand ( ex ante ), at the midterm point, and after the event ( ex post ).
Midtvejsevalueringen er medlemsstaternes ansvar, men organiseres af forvaltningsmyndigheden; den skal udarbejdes af en uafhængig ekspert (artikel 42).
Midterm evaluation is the responsibility of the Member States but organised by the managing authority; it must be carried out by an independent assessor (Article 42).
Midtvejsevalueringen skal være afsluttet inden den 31. december 2003.
The deadline for its completion is 31 December 2003.
Kan denne tidsplan overholdes i betragtning af forsinkelserne med programmernes gennemførelse (navnlig programmer under mål 1)?
Will it be possible to keep to this timetable, given the delay in the launch of the programmes (especially those falling under Objective 1)?
Har Kommissionen udpeget denne ekspert?
Has the Commission appointed the above-mentioned assessor?
Er medlemsstaterne indstillet på at samarbejde med vedkommende?
Are the Member States willing to cooperate with this authority?
De nye forordninger indfører en motivationsfaktor for programforvalterne i form af tildelinger fra resultatreserven (artikel 44).
The new rules have introduced an element to motivate programme managers, namely the performance reserve (Article 44).
En del af de bevillinger, der tildeles de enkelte medlemsstater (4%) opføres i reserven indtil 2003, og uddeles derefter til de programmer, der har udvist de bedste resultater.
A portion of the appropriations allotted to each Member State (4%) has been set aside until 2003 and will thereafter will be divided out among the most successful programmes.
Det er Kommissionen, der senest den 31. marts 2004 fordeler reserven på grundlag af de forslag, medlemsstaterne har indgivet.
The Commission will allocate the reserve not later than 31 March 2004, on the basis of proposals to be submitted by each Member State.
Vil denne tidsplan blive overholdt?
Will the timetable be observed?
Hvilke reelle konsekvenser har midtvejsevalueringen for tildelingen af resultatreserven og programmeringens fremtid?
Furthermore, what actual bearing will the findings of midterm evaluation have on the share-out of the performance reserve and the future of programming?
Har Kommissionen planer om rent faktisk af evaluere konsekvenserne af tildelingen af resultatreserven for programmernes effektivitet?
Has the Commission thought of making a proper assessment to determine how allocation of the performance reserve might influence the effectiveness of the programmes?
I henhold til de nye bestemmelser skal der ud over forvaltningsmyndigheder indføres "overvågningsudvalg" (DOCUP og PO), som medlemsstaterne skal nedsætte (artikel 35).
As well as the managing authorities, the new rules (Article 35) require the Member States to set up a ‘Monitoring Committee’ for each programme (SPD and OP).
Disse overvågningsudvalg nedsættes senest 3 måneder efter, at der er truffet beslutning om at yde støtte.
These Monitoring Committees must be in place within not more than three months of the decision to grant a contribution from the Funds.
Er de blevet nedsat?
Have they been set up?
En repræsentant for Kommissionen deltager i overvågningsudvalgets arbejde.
A Commission representative must attend the proceedings of each Monitoring Committee.
Har medlemsstaterne efterkommet denne bestemmelse?
Have the Member States complied with these rules?
Råder Kommissionen rent faktisk over tilstrækkelige ressourcer til at være repræsenteret i alle disse overvågningsudvalg?
Does the Commission in fact have sufficient resources to be represented on every Monitoring Committee?
De nye bestemmelser betyder en forenkling af målene, men kan man også sige, at de - på det proceduremæssige plan - har gjort systemet mindre kompliceret og lettet projektcyklen?
Although the new rules have simplified the objectives, can they be considered – as far as the procedures are concerned – to have made the system less complex and streamlined management of the project cycle?
Jo mere kompliceret bestemmelserne bliver, jo vanskeligere bliver kontrollen med anvendelsen af disse bestemmelser (se nedenfor).
The more complicated the rules, the more difficult it becomes to check on their enforcement (see below).
Den oprindelige, komplicerede struktur er blevet bevaret, idet der fortsat findes en vertikal og en horisontal struktur (målene/de forskellige fonde), hvilket i øvrigt accentueres af antallet af EF-initiativer.
The initial complexity has not been remedied, since a vertical dimension coexists with a horizontal dimension (the objectives and the different Funds), and has indeed been exacerbated by the number of Community initiatives.
Det store spørgsmål er således den fremtidige planlægning af strukturfondene (også med henblik på en udvidelse af EU).
It is therefore legitimate to raise questions about the future of Structural Fund planning (not least in anticipation of an enlarged Europe).
Revisionsrettens særberetninger (1/2001 om EF-initiativet Urban og 12/2001 om strukturinterventioner til fordel for beskæftigelsen) fremhæver svagheder i Kommissionen, for så vidt angår den manglende konsekvens og manglende præcise mål.
The special reports published by the Court of Auditors (Nos 1/2001 on the URBAN Community initiative and 12/2001 on structural measures to improve the employment situation) have highlighted the Commission’s weaknesses stemming from its inconsistent approach or its failure to pursue clear-cut aims.
I beretning 1/2001 (EF-initiativet Urban/900 mio. EUR for perioden 1994-1999) understreges det, at de gennemførte byudviklingsprojekter i 118 EU-områder havde kunnet gennemføres inden for rammerne af allerede eksisterende EF-interventioner uden nye procedurer og nye, udgiftskrævende forvaltningsstrukturer.
Special Report No 1/2001 (on the URBAN Community initiative, to which EUR 900 m was allocated in the period from 1994 to 1999) points out that the urban development projects carried out in 118 EU areas could have been implemented within the pre-existing Community assistance framework, without new procedures or costly new management machinery.
Kommissionens retningslinjer opstillede mange ambitiøse, men ikke særlig konkrete mål.
The Commission’s guidelines encompassed a plethora of vague objectives; funding was spread thinly; implementation was delayed, and operations concentrated at the end of the period; virtually no ex ante assessment was carried out; the programming was unrealistic; and so on.
Revisionsretten efterlyser en præcis metode til udvælgelse af støtteberettigede byområder og understreger, at mange områder er for store til, at den tildelte støtte kan få nogen væsentlig effekt, samtidig med at Kommissionen ikke er i besiddelse af pålidelige data eller ajourførte datasystemer, der giver et konkret overblik over de aktioner, der medfinansieres af strukturfondene i byområderne.
Furthermore, the Commission had no reliable updated data giving an accurate picture of the operations in urban areas financed in part by the Structural Funds.
Kommissionen har redegjort for de foranstaltninger, der er blevet truffet for at optimere forvaltningen af Urban II-initiativet i perioden 2000-2006.
The Commission has taken steps to enable the URBAN II initiative to be managed more efficiently in the period from 2000 to 2006.
De nye programmer skal dermed have været vedtaget i løbet af 2001 (på grund af forsinkelserne i regnskabsåret 2001).
The new programmes were accordingly supposed to have been adopted during 2001 (owing to the delay which occurred in 2000).
Under den kommende dechargeprocedure kunne man eventuelt evaluere Kommissionens forbedringer, navnlig hvad angår den type informationer, den fremover kræver af medlemsstaterne i forbindelse med den økonomiske forvaltning af transaktionerne.
The next discharge procedure may afford an opportunity to assess the improvements that the Commission has made, especially as regards the type of information which Member States now have to supply to assist in the financial management of operations.
I overensstemmelse med artikel 36 i forordningen har Kommissionen forelagt en liste over strukturfondsinterventionsområder efter kategori og underkategori.
In accordance with Article 36 of the rules, the Commission has produced a list of areas of Structural Fund assistance, broken down into categories and subcategories.
Det kan imidlertid undre, at kategori 36 vedrørende social infrastruktur og offentlig sundhed i modsætning til alle andre ikke omfatter nogen underkategori.
It is surprising, however, that, unlike all the other headings, heading 36 (social and public health infrastructure) does not comprise any subcategory; and the second area of operations (human resources) and the ‘miscellaneous’ category appear likewise to be ‘catch-all’ headings.
Tilsvarende forekommer anden kategori af interventionsområder - menneskelige ressourcer - og "diverse" at være opsamlingskategorier.
In SR No 12/2001 on structural measures to improve the employment situation (impact of ERDF assistance on employment, ESF measures to combat long-term unemployment), the Court recommends that the employment strategy (a priority for all the Member States, cf.
I SB 12/2001 om visse strukturinterventioner til fordel for beskæftigelsen: EFRU-støttens beskæftigelseseffekt og ESF-foranstaltninger mod langtidsledighed anbefaler Revisionsretten, at der sikres bedre sammenhæng mellem beskæftigelsesstrategien (et højt prioriteret spørgsmål for samtlige stater; jf. EF-traktatens artikel 126 og 127, Det Europæiske Råd i Nice) og ESF's og EFRU's foranstaltninger.
Articles 126 and 127 EC and the Nice European Council) and the ESF and ERDF be brought into a more coherent relationship.
Kommissionen gør sig ganske vist bestræbelser i denne retning, men påstår, at ansvaret for denne sammenhæng først og fremmest påhviler medlemsstaterne, der iværksætter de programmer, der modtager støtte fra strukturfondene.
Although it promises to make the necessary efforts, the Commission maintains that such coherence is first and foremost a matter for the Member States that implement the programmes supported by the Structural Funds.
25 % af EFRU's samlede budget (80 mia. EUR) var afsat til produktive investeringer i perioden 1994-1999.
A total of 25% of the overall ERDF budget (EUR 80 bn) was earmarked for productive investment in the period from 1994 to 1999.
ESF kommer først og fremmest ind i billedet i forbindelse med støtte til udvikling af menneskelige ressourcer (49 mia. EUR i perioden 1994-1999); nogle af virkningerne på beskæftigelsen er direkte (støtte til ansættelse, støtte til produktive investeringer betinget af oprettelse eller bevarelse af arbejdspladser).
The ESF is used primarily to foster the development of human resources (EUR 49 bn from 1994 to 1999); in some cases the impact on employment is direct (recruitment aid, support for productive investment granted on condition that jobs are created or preserved).
Revisionsretten konstaterer, at beskæftigelsesaspektet ikke altid tillægges den vægt, det bør have i den proces, der fører frem til medfinansieringsbeslutningen, etc.
The Court notes that employment was not always accorded its due weight in decision-making connected with financial contributions (etc.).
Mere overraskende er det, at det ikke er fastsat i nogen forordning, hvor lang overvågningsperioden skal være for at undgå, at beskæftigelsen ophører, når det sidste støttebeløb er betalt!
What is most surprising is that no body of rules laid down a supervision period to prevent jobs being cut once the full amount of aid had been paid!
I de nye forordninger fra 1999 fastsættes det, at tildelingen af støtte fremover er betinget af, at beskæftigelsen opretholdes i mindst 5 år i det område, der modtager støtte.
Under the new 1999 rules, aid may now be granted if, and only if, the employment in question is maintained for at least five years in the eligible region.
Hvad angår ESF's foranstaltninger til bekæmpelse af langtidsarbejdsløshed har Revisionsretten foretaget kontrol i Kommissionens tjenestegrene og i 9 medlemsstater (B, A, E, GR, F, IR, I, P, UK).
As regards the ESF measures to combat long-term unemployment, the Court carried out checks at the Commission and in nine Member States (Belgium, Germany, Spain, Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and the United Kingdom).
Gennemførelsen af foranstaltninger til bekæmpelse af langtidsarbejdsløshed i medlemsstaterne har lidt under manglen på en klar definition af målgrupperne (foranstaltningerne er blevet prioriteret lavt af de nationale forvaltninger, og gennemførelsen har været forsinket).
Implementation of these measures in the Member States was hampered because the target groups were not clearly defined (and national authorities treated the measures as a low priority, and the aid was slow to be implemented).
De forhold, Revisionsretten kritiserer, skulle blive korrigeret i forbindelse med de nye bestemmelser, der tager højde for virkningerne på beskæftigelsen i programmeringsperioden 2000-2006.
The matters criticised by the Court should be put right in the new rules, which will allow for the effects on employment during the 2000-2006 programming period.
Kommissionen understreger, at de nye lovbestemmelser afhjælper de svagheder, Revisionsretten har påpeget, som for en stor dels vedkommende skyldes mangler ved medlemsstaternes programmering.
The Commission points out that the new legislation corrects the weaknesses identified by the Court but maintains that these stem largely from programming imperfections in the Member States.
Hvad angår Samhørighedsfonden , var der ingen af de støtteberettigede medlemsstater (Spanien, Grækenland, Irland og Portugal), der havde for store offentlige underskud.
As regards the Cohesion Fund , none of the recipient countries (Spain, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal) recorded an excessive government deficit.
Kommissionen har derfor ikke foretaget nogen evaluering af disse medlemsstaters overholdelse af forudsætningerne for støtte i 2000.
The Commission therefore did not assess how far they complied with conditionality in 2000.
Bevillingerne i 2000 var på 2,659 mia. EUR.
The amount of resources earmarked for 2000 was EUR 2.659 bn.
Disse bevillinger finansierer programmer inden for miljø (46,2% af de samlede forpligtelser) og transport (53,8% af de samlede forpligtelser).
These funds were used to finance programmes related to the environment (46.2% of the total commitments) and in the transport sector (53.8%).
På baggrund af Revisionsrettens kritik (RS 12/2000 vedrørende Samhørighedsfonden) har Kommissionen ønsket, at interventionerne fremover gennemføres på grundlag af en koordineret, strategisk tilgang og bedre koordineret med de øvrige EF-instrumenter.
In response to the Court’s criticism (in SR No 12/2000 on the Cohesion Fund), the Commission has called for operations to be implemented in future in accordance with a coordinated strategic approach and dovetailed more effectively with the other Community financial instruments.
Hvordan agter Kommissionen helt konkret at gennemføre denne koordination?
How in practical terms does the Commission intend to pursue such coordination?
Er Kommissionen helt generelt i stand til at fastslå, på hvilket stadium i projektforløbet de konstaterede mangler i strukturfondsforvaltningen opstår?
In general, is the Commission able to say at what stage projects are affected by the problems found to exist in the management of the Structural Funds?
Hvilke foranstaltninger agter den i bekræftende fald at træffe?
What steps, if any, will it take?
Strukturfondenes regnskabsafslutning (ansvarlig: Gabriele Stauner)
Clearance of Structural Fund accounts (responsible: Gabriele Stauner)
I lighed med landbrugsudgifterne skal der for strukturfondene vare tale om en endelig regnskabsafslutning, der også virkelig lever op til sit navn.
It is high time that the Structural Funds were dealt with by the same procedure as agricultural expenditure, in other words accounts clearance genuinely worthy of the name.
Lykkes det at inddrive uretmæssigt eller svigagtigt udbetalte beløb og bruge dem på ny efter hensigten?
Can moneys used unjustifiably or even with fraudulent intent be recovered and reused in accordance with the rules?
Begge spørgsmål må i øjeblikket desværre besvares med et entydigt "nej".
Regrettably, the answer to both questions at present has to be a resounding ‘no’.
Indberettede tilfælde af svig/andre uregelmæssigheder i forbindelse med strukturfondene - år 2000
Reported cases of fraud or other irregularities affecting the Structural Funds in 2000
Antal tilfælde
Number of cases
Andel (%) af den sektorielle budget
Proportion of Structural Funds budget (%)
Meddelelser fra medlemsstaterne
Notifications from Member States
114 mio. €
EUR 114 m
Sager undersøgt af OLAF
Cases investigated by OLAF
25 mio. €
EUR 25 m
139 mio. €
EUR 139 m
Dette beløb på i alt 139 mio. € (0,55% af den sektorielle budget), der stammer fra Kommissionens seneste årsberetning om beskyttelse af Fællesskabernes finansielle interesser og bekæmpelse af svig KOM(2001)0255 endelig/2 af 23.05.01. , ligger dog langt under beløbet på 577 mio. € (1,42% af den sektorielle budget), som blev indberettet for svig og uregelmæssigheder i forbindelse med landbrugsudgifterne.
These figures, taken from the Commission’s latest annual report on fraud prevention COM(2001) 255 final /2 of 23 May 2001. , which show a total of EUR 139 m (0.55% of the Structural Funds budget), admittedly amount to far less than the cases of fraud and irregularities reported in connection with agricultural expenditure, which involved a total of EUR 577 m (1.42% of the agricultural budget).
Det ville imidlertid være en fejlslutning at konkludere, at der for strukturfondenes vedkommende i sammenligning hermed var tale om få uregelmæssigheder.
To infer, however, that relatively few irregularities occur where the Structural Funds are concerned would be to labour under a complete and utter misapprehension.
Ikke mindst fordi der indtil videre ganske simpelt er kigget mindre nøje på strukturfondenes udgifter end på de øvrige udgiftsområder.
It is rather the case that scrutiny over the Structural Funds has to date simply not been as searching as in other expenditure areas.
Det er kun isbjergets top
Just the tip of the iceberg
Beretning fra Kommissionen - 12. årsberetning om strukturfondene, KOM(2001) 0539 af 03.10.2001, s, 89.
Quotation from the Commission’s ‘Twelfth annual report on the Structural Funds (2000)’, COM(2001) 539 of 3 October 2001, p.
Revisionsrettens stikprøver viser, at antallet af fejl For skatteyderen er det en ringe trøst, at omfanget af de støtteberettigede udgifter efter at beløbene svarende til de konstaterede fejl var trukket fra, stadig kunne begrunde de beløb, som er udbetalt over fællesskabsbudgettet.
The Court’s spot checks show that the incidence of errors is unacceptably high The fact that, even after discounting the errors uncovered, the volume of eligible expenditure is often still sufficient to warrant the payments made under the Community budget is not necessarily a consolation to the taxpayer.
Forsømmelser og fejl i forbindelse med EU-midler vil i mange tilfælde kunne gå side om side med tilsvarende forsømmelig omgang med nationale budgetmidler, som stilles til rådighed til samfinansiering. er uacceptabelt højt:
Careless or improper use of EU budget resources presumably goes hand in hand in many cases with equally careless handling of the money earmarked for co-financing in national budgets. :
f) den kontrol de nationale instanser havde foretaget for at sikre sig, at de anmeldte udgifter var støtteberettiget, var utilstrækkelig.
Going further than in its latest annual report, the Court expressed itself even more plainly in a special report on financial controls in the context of the Structural Funds Special Report No 10/2001, OJ C 314, 8.11.2001, p.
g) procedurereglerne i forbindelse med indgåelse af offentlige aftaler var ikke overholdt.
26. , also submitted in the autumn.
I sin beslutning af 29. november 2001 Jf. punkt 9-11 i beslutning om beskyttelse af Fællesskabets finansielle interesser og bekæmpelse af svig ( A5-0393/2001 , Del II af protokollen fra mødet den 29. november 2001. konstaterede det, " at det må betegnes som en katastrofe, at Revisionsretten i punkt 106 i sin særberetning nr. 10/2001 når til den konklusion, at de data, som medlemsstaternes myndigheder indsender til OLAF, selv efter at Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 1681/94 EFT L 178 af 12.7.1994, s. 43. om indberetning af uregelmæssigheder har været i kraft i over seks år, stadig i mange tilfælde er ufuldstændige, upålidelige, vildledende og forældede og derfor ikke til megen nytte ; "
43. on the reporting of irregularities, the data forwarded to OLAF by Member State authorities was in many cases incomplete, unreliable, misleading, out-of-date and therefore of little value ’ .
Kommissionen har til dato ikke forelagt Parlamentet en liste over samtlige uregelmæssigheder
The Commission has not yet submitted a list of reported cases to Parliament
Parlamentet har opfordret Kommissionen til inden den 15. december 2001 at forelægge en liste over samtlige uregelmæssigheder, der er indberettet, siden forordning (EF) nr. 1681/94 trådte i kraft.
Parliament set the deadline of 15 December 2001: not later than that date the Commission was requested to submit a complete list of irregularities reported since Regulation (EC) No 1681/94 entered into force.