natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Die gewerbliche Wirtschaft im Visier fremder Nachrichtendienste“, Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart, Stand: 1998
Firms as a target for foreign intelligence services, Baden-Württemberg Constitutional Protection Agency, Stuttgart as at 1998
Videokonference mellem José Ignacio López og VW's chef Ferdinand Piëch
Videoconference between José Ignacio López and VW boss Ferdinand Piëch
Båndoptagelse af videokonferencen og dennes videregivelse til General Motors
Videoconference recorded and forwarded to General Motors (GM)
Beskyttelse af forretningshemmeligheder i den amerikanske General Motors, som López tilsigtede at give videre til VW (prislister, hemmelige planer om ny bilfabrik og nye små biler)
Protection of commercial secrets held by GM in America, secrets which López wished to pass on to VW (price lists, secret plans for a new car plant and a new small car)
López afsløres, retssag indstilles i 1998 mod betaling af bøder
López's cover is blown, in 1998 criminal proceedings are halted in return for payment of fines.
Vedrørende NSA intet
No consequences in respect of NSA
„Abgehört“, Berliner Zeitung, 22. januar 1996
„Abgehört“, Berliner Zeitung, 22 January 1996
„Die Affäre López ist beendet“, Wirtschaftsspiegel, 28. juli 1998
„Die Affäre López ist beendet“, Wirtschaftsspiegel, 28 July 1998
Los Alamos
Los Alamos
To medarbejdere i Israels atomforskningsprogram bryder koden for centralcomputeren i atomvåbenlaboratoriet Los Alamos
Two employees of the Israeli nuclear research programme hack into the central computer of the Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratory
Fremskaffelse af informationer om nye amerikanske atomvåbentændere
Obtaining information about new fuses for US atomic weapons
Smugling af computeranlæg til DDR
Smuggling of computers into the GDR
Afsløring af teknologitransfer til Østblokken
Uncovering of technology transfer to the Eastern Bloc
Ingen særlige konsekvenser, leveringer blev ikke forhindret
No particular consequences, deliveries not prevented
Ordre til levering af højhastighedstog til Sydkorea
Contract to supply high-speed trains to South Korea
ICE-producenten går glip af ordren til fordel for Alcatel-Alsthom
The manufacturer of the ICE loses the contract to Alcatel-Alsthom
Udgiftsberegning fra AEG og Siemens med hensyn til offentligt udbud i Sydkorea til levering af højhastighedstog
Cost calculation by AEG and Siemens concerning a government contract to supply South Korea with high-speed trains
Siemens påstår, at dets telefon- og faxforbindelser er blevet aflyttet i filialen i Seoul
Siemens claims that the telephone and fax connections in its Seoul office are being tapped
Forhandlingsfordel for den britisk-franske medansøger GEC Alsthom
Negotiating advantage for the Anglo-French competitor GEC Alsthom
Ordregiverne vælger GEC Alsthom, selv om det tyske tilbud først var bedre
South Korea decides in favour of GEC Alsthom, although the German offer was initially regarded as better
Thomson-Alcatel vs.
Thomson-Alcatel v
Tildeling af en brasiliansk milliardkontrakt vedr. satellitovervågning af Amazonas til det franske Thomson-Alcatel (1,4 mia. dollars)
Award to the French firm Thomson-Alcatel of a Brazilian contract for the satellite monitoring of the Amazon Basin (US$ 1.4 bn)
Aflytning af kommunikationsforbindelserne hos vinderen af udbuddet (Thomson-Alcatel, FR)
Interception of communications to and from the successful tenderer (Thomson-Alcatel)
Afsløring af korruption (udbetaling af bestikkelsespenge)
Uncovering corruption (payment of bribes)
Clinton indgiver klage hos den brasilianske regering; efter den amerikanske regerings insisteren ny tildeling af kontrakten til det amerikanske firma "Raytheon"
Clinton complains to the Brazilian Government; under pressure from the US Government, the contract is awarded to the US firm Raytheon
Det amerikanske økonomiministerium "har gjort en indsats"
US Department of Commerce 'made efforts'
Forhandlinger om milliardprojekt til radarovervågning af den brasilianske regnskov
Negotiations on a project worth billions of dollars concerning the radar monitoring of the Brazilian rainforest
Overtagelse af kontrakten
Win contract
De franske koncerner Thomson CSF og Alcatel mister kontrakten til fordel for det amerikanske firma Raytheon
The French firms Thomson CSF and Alcatel lose the contract to the US firm Raytheon
Department of Commerce
Department of Commerce
Forhandlinger om milliardprojekt (1,4 mia. dollars) til overvågning af Amazonas (SIVA)
Negotiations concerning a project worth US$ 1.4 bn concerning the monitoring of Amazon Basin (SIVA)
Afsløring af bestikkelse af det brasilianske Selection Panels.
Discovery that the Brazilian selection panel had accepted bribes.
Anmærkning fra Campbell: Rayethon udruster aflytningsstation i Sugar Grove
Comment by Campbell: Raytheon supplies equipment for the Sugar Grove interception station
Aflytning af forhandlingen mellem Thomson-CSF og Brasilien og videregivelse af resultaterne til Raytheon Corp.
Surveillance of the negotiations between Thomson-CSF and Brazil and forwarding of the findings to Raytheon Corp.
Afsløring af bestikkelse
Uncovering bribery
Overtagelse af kontrakten
Winning of the contract
Raytheon får kontrakten
Raytheon wins the contract
Duncan Campbell i STOA 1999, bind 2/5 under henvisning til New York Times, How Washington Inc makes a Sale, by David Sanger, 19.2.1995 og
Duncan Campbell in STOA, 1999, Part 2/5, with reference to New York Times, How Washington Inc.
http://www:rayethon:com/sivam/contract:html http://www:rayethon:com/sivam/contract:html
Makes a Sale, by David Sanger, 19 February 1995, and http://www:raytheon:com/sivam/contract:html http://www:raytheon:com/sivam/contract:html
Millionkontrakt om gas- og olieudvinding i Nordsøen
Gas and oil drilling contract in the North Sea worth millions of dollars
Aflytning af faxmeddelelser fra den udvalgte bydende (Thyssen)
Interception of faxes sent by the successful tenderer (Thyssen)
Afsløring af korruption
Uncovering corruption
BP sagsøger Thyssen for at få skadeserstatning
BP brings an action for damages against Thyssen
Forløbne år
'recent years'
Bl.a. i jordhøje nedgravet infrarød kamera, som via radiosignaler formidler billeder
Inter alia, infrared camera, fixed in a mound of earth, which transmits images by radio
Fremskaffelse af informationer om nye udviklinger
Obtaining information about new developments
VW meddeler tab i trecifret omfang
VW admits losses of profits totalling hundreds of millions of deutschmarks
„Sicherheit muss künftig zur Chefsache werden“, HB / 29. august 1996
„Sicherheit muss künftig zur Chefsache werden“, HB / 29 August 1996
VW's teststrækning i Ehra-Lessien
VW test circuit in Ehra-Lessien
Skjult kamera
Hidden camera
Oplysninger om nye modeller fra VW
Information about new VW models
I alle industrilande er tyveri af produktionshemmeligheder strafbart.
The legal systems of all the industrialised countries define the theft of commercial secrets as a criminal offence.
Som det er tilfældet med andre aspekter af strafferetsplejen er der også forskelle med hensyn til de nationale beskyttelsesniveauer.
As in all other areas of the criminal law, the degree of protection varies from country to country.
Som regel er straffen dog betydelig lavere end for spionage, der skader den militære sikkerhed.
As a rule, however, the penalties for industrial espionage are much less severe than those for espionage in connection with military security.
I mange tilfælde er det kun konkurrencespionage mod virksomheder i eget land, der er forbudt, men ikke mod virksomheder i udlandet.
In many cases, competitive intelligence operations are banned only against firms from the same country, but not against foreign firms abroad.
Det gælder også for USA.
This is also the case in the USA.
De relevante love forbyder i grunden kun spionage mellem virksomheder indbyrdes.
In essence, the relevant laws prohibit only espionage by one industrial undertaking against another.
Der er tale om grænsetilfælde, når efterretningstjenester stiller oplysninger, erhvervet ved spionage, til rådighed for den enkelte virksomhed.
A grey area develops if intelligence services seek to pass on to individual firms information gained by means of espionage.
Normalt ville en sådan handling ikke være omfattet af de love, der tildeler efterretningstjenester særlige beføjelser.
The laws which endow intelligence services with special powers would normally not cover such activities.
Navnlig indenfor EU ville det være ensbetydende med en krænkelse af traktaten.
In particular, in the EU this would represent a breach of the EEC Treaty.
I praksis vil det imidlertid være meget vanskeligt for en virksomhed at påberåbe sig retlig beskyttelse ved at henvende sig til en domstol.
Irrespective of this fact, however, in practice it would be very difficult for a firm to seek legal protection by bringing an action before the courts.
Aflytning efterlader ingen spor og giver intet i retten holdbart bevismateriale.
Interception operations leave no trace and generate no evidence which might be used in court.
Det er accepteret blandt staterne, at efterretningstjenester i forbindelse med fremskaffelse af generelle strategiske oplysninger også beskæftiger sig med det økonomisk område.
States accept the fact that intelligence services, in keeping with their general objective of securing strategic information, are also active in the commercial sphere.
Dette "gentlemen’s agreement" bliver imidlertid ved konkurrencespionage til fordel for egen industri krænket i vid udstrækning.
However, this gentlemen's agreement is frequently breached in connection with competitive intelligence operations designed to benefit a country's own industry.
Har en stat beviseligt gjort sig skyldig deri, får den store politiske problemer.
Any state caught red-handed comes under massive political pressure.
Det gælder også og navnlig en verdensmagt som USA, hvis krav på den politiske føring på verdensplan i så fald ville lide alvorlig skade.
This applies in particular to a world power such as the USA, whose claim to global political leadership would be drastically undermined.
Mellemstore stater ville snarere kunne tillade sig at blive anklaget, men ikke en verdensmagt.
Middle-ranking powers could probably afford to be singled out for such activities; a superpower certainly cannot.
Inden for luftfartsindustrien er det let at besvare, da der her på verdensplan kun er tale om to store leverandører.
In the aerospace sector, the answer is a simple one, because the global market is dominated by only two major firms.
I alle andre tilfælde, hvor der er tale om flere leverandører, som til og med ikke er statsejede, er det yderst vanskeligt at begunstige en bestemt virksomhed.
In all other cases where a market is supplied by a number of firms which are not state-controlled, it is extremely difficult to give preference only to one.
Ved videregivelse til individuelle virksomheder af detaljerede oplysninger om konkurrenters bud i forbindelse med internationale udbud ville man måske kunne forestille sig , at disse spionageoplysninger blev videregivet til alle konkurrenter i eget land.
In connection with international contract-award procedures, an intelligence service is more likely to forward detailed information concerning other competitors' offers to all the participating firms from its own country, rather than simply to one.
Det gælder især, hvis der er statsstøtteordninger, som de nationale konkurrenter har ligelig adgang til, som det er tilfældet i USA ved det såkaldte Advocacy Center.
This applies in particular when all the participating firms from one country can draw on the same level of government support, as is the case in the USA through the work of the Advocacy Center.
Ved tyveri af teknologi, som nødvendigvis må udmunde i en patentering, ville ligebehandling af virksomheder selvfølgelig ikke længere være muligt.
In the case of the theft of technology, which should necessarily lead to the registration of a patent, it is only logical that such equal treatment would no longer be possible.
Det ville navnlig i det amerikanske politiske system være et stort problem.
Moreover, under the US political system in particular this would give rise to a serious problem.
Amerikanske politikere er i forbindelse med finansiering af deres valgkampagne i høj grad afhængige af bidrag fra virksomhederne i deres valgkreds.
US politicians are massively dependent on contributions from firms in their constituencies to finance their election campaigns.
Hvis det blev offentligt kendt, at efterretningstjenesterne havde forfordelt en bestemt virksomhed, ville det, selv om der kun var tale om et enkelt tilfælde, skabe enorme dønninger i det politiske system.
If proof were to emerge of even one case of intelligence services favouring individual firms, the upheaval in the political system would be massive.
Som den forhenværende direktør for CIA, Woolsey udtrykte det i en samtale med repræsentanter for udvalget: "In this case the hill (i.e. the US-Congress) would go mad!".
As the former CIA Director James Woolsey put it in a discussion with representatives of the committee: 'In that case the Hill (i.e. the US Congress) would go mad!'.
USA og økonomi efter Den Kolde Krig
The USA and economic matters in the post-Cold War era
Siden 1990 har den amerikanske regering i stigende grad sat lighedstegn mellem økonomisk sikkerhed og national sikkerhed.
Since 1990, the US Administration has increasingly come to equate national security with economic security.
Årsberetningen fra Det Hvide Hus "National Security Strategy" National sikkerhedsstrategi. understreger igen og igen, " at økonomisk sikkerhed er et integrerende element ikke kun i nationens interesser, men også i nationens sikkerhed".
The annual White House report entitled ‘National Security Strategy’ repeatedly emphasises that ‘economic security is fundamental not only to our national interests, but also to national security’ .
Denne udvikling har flere årsager.
This development can be traced back to a number of sources.
Der er faktisk tale om tre faktorer, der har spillet sammen:
Essentially, three factors came together:
Denne sammenlægning af regeringsinteresser har haft følger i praksis.
This combination of interests had practical consequences.
Som en konsekvens har FBI har siden 1992 koncentreret sine kontraspionageaktiviteter omkring økonomisk spionage og iværksatte i 1994 et "Economic Counterintelligence Program".
As a logical response, since 1992, the FBI has focused its counterintelligence activities on industrial espionage and, in 1994, it set up an Economic Counterintelligence Program.
Som en konsekvens, i det mindste set ud fra en amerikansk synsvinkel, har regeringen givet CIA og dernæst NSA til opgave at hindre konkurrencefordrejninger, der skyldes bestikkelse.
As a logical response, at least from an American point of view, the Administration has used the CIA, and subsequently the NSA, to prevent distortions of competition by means of bribery.
Tidligere CIA-direktør James Woolsey gjorde dette helt klart på en pressekonference, som han holdt den 7. marts 2000 efter udenrigsministeriets ønske State Department Foreign Press Center Briefing, Subject: Intelligence Gathering and Democracies: The Issue of Economic and Industrial Espionage, Washington DC, 7.3.2000. .
The former Director of the CIA, James Woolsey, made this explicitly clear at a press conference he gave on 7 March 2000 at the request of the US State Department State Department Foreign Press Center briefing, Subject: Intelligence Gathering and Democracies: The Issue of Economic and Industrial Espionage, Washington DC, 7.3.2000 .
Som en konsekvens har handelsministeriet koncentreret sine eksportfremmeaktiviteter på en sådan måde, at amerikanske firmaer kun har kontakt med en enkelt partner, når de ønsker at eksportere.
As a logical response, the US Department of Commerce has focused its efforts to foster exports in such a way that a US firm wishing to export goods need only deal with one agency.
I den forbindelse sker der ikke kun en passiv, men også en aktiv koncentration af alle regeringens muligheder (se nærmere herom i kapitel 10, 10.9.4).
Active use is made of all the weapons at the Administration’s disposal (for further details, see Chapter 10, 10.9.4).
Det er hverken usædvanligt eller nyt, at den amerikanske økonomi udsættes for efterretningsoperationer.
Intelligence operations directed against the US economy are neither unusual nor new.
Både USA og andre vigtige industristater har i årtier været mål for økonomisk spionage.
For decades, both the USA and other leading industrialised countries have been targets for industrial espionage.
Under Den Kolde Krig kom tilvejebringelsen af økonomiske og teknologiske informationer imidlertid først i anden række efter den klassiske spionage.
During the Cold War, however, economic and technological intelligence-gathering took second place to conventional espionage.
FBI-direktør Louis J. Freeh gjorde under en kongreshøring i 1996 omfattende rede for, hvordan USA's erhvervsliv er mål for andre staters efterretningstjenesters økonomiske spionage.
In 1996, speaking to the US Congress, the Director of the FBI, Louis J. Freeh, gave a detailed account of the way the US economy has become a target for industrial espionage by other countries’ intelligence agencies.
"Consequently, foreign governments, through a variety of means, actively target U.S. persons, firms, industries and the U.S. government itself, to steal or wrongfully obtain critical technologies, data, and information in order to provide their own industrial sectors with a competitive advantage".
As he put it, ‘consequently foreign governments, through a variety of means, actively target US persons, firms, industries and the US Administration itself, to steal or wrongfully obtain critical technologies, data and information in order to provide their own industrial sectors with a competitive advantage’.
På samme måde stiger imidlertid også antallet af tyverier af informationer, som amerikanere står bag.
However, the theft of information by Americans was increasing just as much.
Nedenfor følger et kortfattet resumé af direktør Freeh's indlæg under kongreshøringen.
The further remarks made by Mr Freeh to the US Congress are summarised below.
Ordføreren beklager på dette sted, at den amerikanske regering ikke ville give en delegation fra udvalget lov til at drøfte disse spørgsmål med FBI.
At this point, your rapporteur would like to express regret at the fact that the US Administration did not allow a delegation from the Temporary Committee to discuss these issues with the FBI.
Dermed ville oplysningerne have kunnet ajourføres.
Up-to-date information could then have been obtained.
På det tidspunkt, hvor høringen fandt sted, havde FBI gang i undersøgelser mod personer eller organisationer fra 23 stater på grund af økonomisk spionage mod USA.
At the time of the hearing, the FBI was investigating persons or organisations from 23 countries who were suspected of industrial espionage against the USA.
Andre regeringer driver derimod økonomisk og teknologisk spionage til trods for, at de længe har været USA's militære og politiske allierede.
In contrast, other governments carry out industrial and technological espionage, even though they have long been the USA’s military and political allies.
De udnytter i den forbindelse ofte deres lettere adgang til amerikanske informationer.
In so doing, they often exploit their ease of access to US information.
Nogle har udviklet deres egen infrastruktur for udnyttelse af højteknologiske informationer og sætter dem ind i konkurrencen med amerikanske firmaer.
Some have developed agencies which assess information concerning high‑technology products and use that information in competition with US firms.
Målene for økonomisk spionage
Objectives of industrial espionage
De mål for økonomisk spionage, der nævnes af FBI, adskiller sig ikke fra dem, der er omtalt i kapitel 10, 10.1.1.
The objectives of industrial espionage named by the FBI in no way differ from those outlined in Chapter 10, 10.1.1.
Men som prioriterede mål nævnes højteknologi og forsvarsindustrien.
However, high-technology products and the defence industry are given as priority objectives.
FBIU har som led i Economic Counterintelligence Program konstateret en række forskellige spionagemetoder.
In the context of the Economic Counterintelligence Program , the FBI has identified a series of espionage methods.
For det meste anvendes en kombination af metoder og kun sjældent en enkelt metode.
A combination of methods is employed in most cases, a single method only rarely.
Ifølge FBI er den bedste kilde en person i en virksomhed eller en organisation, hvilket gælder generelt og ikke kun i USA (se kapitel 10, 10.3. og 4.).Under høringen udtalte FBI sig om, hvordan personer anvendes til spionage, men mærkeligt nok ikke om elektroniske metoder.
According to the information obtained by the FBI, the best source is a person employed by a firm or organisation, something which is not only true for the USA (see Chapter 10, 10.3. and 10.4.).
USA overvåger international telekommunikation for at få generelle oplysninger om økonomiske udviklinger, leveringer af dual use-varer og overholdelsen af embargoregler.
The USA monitors international telecommunications in order to obtain general information about economic developments, shipments of dual-use goods and compliance with embargoes.
USA foretager målrettet overvågning af kommunikation fra bestemte virksomheder i forbindelse med udbud for at forhindre konkurrenceforvridning som følge af bestikkelse til skade for amerikanske virksomheder.
The USA monitors on a targeted basis communications by individual firms in connection with contract-award procedures in order to prevent corruption-related distortions of competition to the detriment of US firms.
Woolsey gav imidlertid ingen konkrete eksempler på et spørgsmål herom.
Questioned more closely, however, Woolsey gave no specific examples.
Det er forbudt for amerikanske virksomheder at benytte sig af bestikkelse, og revisorer er pligtige til at melde det, hvis de opdager udbetaling af bestikkelsesbeløb.
US firms are banned by law from payment bribes and accountants are required to report evidence of such payments.
Hvis der ved kommunikationsovervågning konstateres bestikkelse i forbindelse med offentlige udbud, vil den amerikanske ambassadør rette henvendelse herom til regeringen i det pågældende land.
If a telecommunications surveillance operation reveals evidence of bribery in connection with public contracts, the US ambassador makes representations to the government of the country concerned.
De amerikanske virksomheder, der deltager i udbuddet bliver derimod ikke direkte orienteret.
However, US firms competing for the contract are not directly informed.
Ren konkurrencespionage udelukkede han kategorisk
He categorically ruled out the possibility of espionage solely for the purposes of obtaining competitive intelligence.
Den fungerende direktør for CIA, George J. Tenet, udtalte sig tilsvarende under en høring i udvalget om tilsyn med efterretningstjenester i Repræsentanternes Hus den 12. april 2000 „It is not the policy nor the practice of the U.S. to engage in espionage that would provide an unfair advantage to U.S. Companies“. : "Det er hverken USA's politik eller praksis at drive spionage, som ville give amerikanske virksomheder en unfair fordel".
At a hearing before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence held on 12 April 2000, the current Director of the CIA, George J. Tenet, echoed Woolsey’s comments: ‘It is not the policy nor the practice of the United States to engage in espionage that would provide an unfair advantage to US companies’.