- mener, at den europæiske anklagemyndigheds og den befuldmægtigede europæiske anklagers uafhængighed skal være garanteret under hensyntagen til magtadskillelsesprincippet og under overholdelse af princippet om retsforfølgelsens lovlighed; med hensyn til de forskellige varianter af den befuldmægtigede europæiske anklagers status vil modellen med et eksklusivt mandat være en effektiv garanti mod enhver interessekonflikt og hierarkisk afhængighed, selv om modellen med "to kasketter" kunne have visse praktiske fordele i blandede sager, hvis antal nok vil være stigende; spørgsmålet er derfor, hvordan princippet om den europæiske anklagemyndigheds fortrinsstilling vil blive anvendt og overholdt konkret, også for så vidt angår de disciplinære bestemmelser for den befuldmægtigede anklager; anmoder desuden Kommissionen om at skabe klarhed om finansieringen af hovedparten af personalebehovet og driftsbudgettet for de befuldmægtigede anklagere; - foreslår, at den europæiske anklagemyndighed og de befuldmægtigede europæiske anklagere skal arbejde sammen med medlemstaternes nationale anklagemyndigheder med henblik på at gøre undersøgelserne mere effektive og løse alle former for praktiske problemer i forbindelse med medlemsstaternes retssystemer; - er med hensyn til kontrollen med den europæiske anklagers aktiviteter af den opfattelse, at uanset om der er tale om efterforskningsaktiviteter, som den europæiske anklager iværksætter (retssikkerhedsdommeren), eller kontrol af en sags henvisning til pådømmelse (national dommer), forekommer eventuelle praktiske fordele ved anvendelse af det nationale system (en hurtigere procedure) uhensigtsmæssige i forhold til behovet for en ensartet fremgangsmåde ved anvendelse og fortolkning af fællesskabsretten, rimeligheden ved fastsættelse af den retsinstans, der skal foretage pådømmelsen, og overholdelsen af de grundlæggende rettigheder, som vil kunne garanteres af den forberedende instans i Domstolen; anser det for påkrævet, at den kommende europæiske anklagemyndighed kan underkastes en domstolskontrol, som gør det muligt at anke myndighedens afgørelser, og foretage en bedre kontrol med dens aktiviteter; opfordrer til, at det klart fastlægges, at handlinger fra den europæiske anklagemyndigheds side, som berører den enkelte persons grundlæggende rettigheder, er underlagt domstolskontrol; - mener ikke, at den europæiske anklagemyndighed skal have beføjelse til at henlægge sager, men at denne afgørelse skal træffes af domstolene; mener endvidere, at der skal fastlægges detaljerede kriterier for valg af pådømmende medlemsstat for at undgå "forum shopping"; - opfordrer desuden Kommissionen til at tage spørgsmålet om ulovlig efterforskning fra anklagemyndighedens side samt eventuelle retsmidler op; - er, hvad beviserne angår, af den opfattelse, at selv om princippet om gensidig anerkendelse er af grundlæggende betydning, bør det suppleres med fælles standarder for strafbare forhold og sanktioner; spørgsmålet er, om det ikke på grund af forskellene i de nationale retssystemer er nødvendigt at udarbejde en fælles europæisk procedure for godkendelse af beviser og en fælles samling af europæiske bestemmelser om beviser; mener desuden, at Kommissionens forslag om indførelse af en europæisk officiel protokol, bør vedtages; - mener, at med hensyn til kompetenceområdet bør den indførte ordning stå sin prøve i forbindelse med de finansielle interesser, inden den eventuelt udvides til at omfatte andre former for kriminalitet; forestiller sig, at en dynamisk tilgang kunne komme på tale, hvorved den europæiske anklagemyndighed er kompetent til at træffe afgørelser i forbindelse med overtrædelser, som er omfattet af allerede indgåede aftaler mellem medlemsstaterne, hvortil også en anden kategori af overtrædelser i overensstemmelse med Corpus Juris kunne tilføjes; mener, at det i vid udstrækning afhænger af forslagene fra konventet og regeringskonferencens afgørelse om at gøre instrumenter under tredje søjle til fællesskabsanliggende;
- regarding the independence both of the European Prosecutor and of his/her deputy: insists that such independence be unconditionally guaranteed, with due regard for the separation of powers, and that it be accompanied by the principle of mandatory prosecution; as regards the various possible statutes for deputy prosecutors, permitting such individuals to hold one office only would certainly exclude any possible conflict of interest or hierarchical dependence, even though there would be practical advantages in allowing them to wear ‘two hats’ in the event of cases falling under more than one jurisdiction, a category into which most cases are likely to fall; wonders, therefore, how the principle of subordination to the European Prosecutor would actually be applied and protected, inter alia as regards the disciplinary procedures applying to the Prosecutor’s deputy; calls, likewise, on the Commission to clarify the funding of the major portion of the deputy prosecutors’ human resources and operating costs; - takes the view that the European Public Prosecutor and his deputies must work in conjunction with the national public prosecutors in the Member States, with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of their inquiries and of working out all sorts of practical problems related to the judicial systems of the Member States. - as regards reviewing the Prosecutor’s activities, either in the case of investigations carried out under the Prosecutor’s authority (judge of freedoms) or with regard to committals for trial (national judge), any practical advantages to be derived from recourse to the national system (swifter procedure) must be set against the need for a uniform approach in the application and interpretation of Community law, for fairness in determining which court has jurisdiction and for fundamental rights (which could be guaranteed by means of a Preliminary Chamber within the Court of Justice) to be upheld; believes that it is necessary for the future European Prosecutor to be placed under a judicial control which would make it possible to lodge subsequent appeals against his decisions and better monitor his work; considers that it must be clearly established that any acts of the European Prosecutor which relate to people's fundamental rights must be subject to judicial review; - believes that the Prosecutor should not have a discretionary right to close cases, but that this decision should be subject to judicial control; also takes the view that detailed criteria should be established governing the choice of the Member State where the trial is to be held, in order to avoid the risks of ‘forum shopping’; - also calls upon the Commission to consider the case of illegal investigations by the Prosecutor and possible means of redress through the courts; - as regards evidence: if the principle of mutual recognition is fundamental it must be underpinned by common standards relating to prosecution and punishment; on account of the differences in the Member States’ systems for gathering evidence, wonders whether consideration should not be given to a harmonised EU procedure for the admission of evidence and also to a body of common EU rules on evidence; considers that the Commission proposal to devise an EU police or witness statement should be taken up; - as regards area of competence: considers that the existing system should initially prove itself in the field of financial interests before being extended - if appropriate - to other crimes; envisages that an evolutionary approach could be considered whereby the European Prosecutor becomes competent to deal with offences which are already the subject of an agreement between the Member States and a further series of offences could be added, as set out in the Corpus Juris; takes the view that this will largely depend upon the proposals from the Convention and the decisions in the IGC as concerns communitarisation of the instruments under the third pillar;