natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Ligheder og uligheder i økonomiske strukturer og vækstmønstre, graden af åbenhed og den handelsmæssige integration såvel som spørgsmål om finansiel stabilitet er af betydning, når man skal vurdere fordelene ved at bevare (i det mindste en del af) den monetære uafhængighed, og det samme er graden af fleksibilitet på produkt- og faktormarkederne.
Similarities and dissimilarities of economic structures and growth patterns, the degree of openness and trade integration as well as financial stability issues matter for assessing the benefits of retaining (at least some) monetary independence, as does the degree of flexibility in product and factor markets.
Selvom små åbne økonomier ikke kan anvende valutakursen ret effektiv til at dæmme op for asymmetriske stød eller løse problemer med den internationale konkurrenceevne, kan valutakursfleksibilitet have sine fordele, idet den kan udjævne produktionssvingninger, i hvert fald i tiltrædelseslande med udviklede finansielle markeder.
Although small open economies cannot use the exchange rate very effectively to deal with asymmetric shocks or address problems of international competitiveness, exchange rate flexibility may have merits in smoothing output fluctuations, at least in acceding countries with developed financial markets.
Desuden kan nogle lande - især de lande, der på nuværende tidspunkt har fleksible valutakursordninger - drage fordel af, at de får mere tid til at fastlægge en passende centralparitet for ERM II-deltagelse og senere en passende konverteringskurs for indførelsen af euroen.
Furthermore, some countries – in particular those that currently operate flexible exchange rate regimes – may benefit from added time in order to identify a suitable central parity for ERM II participation and later an appropriate conversion rate for the adoption of the euro.
I den forbindelse bør det tilføjes, at alle tiltrædelseslandene skal være med i ERM II i mindst to år for at opfylde valutakurskriteriet.
In this regard, I should add that all acceding countries are expected to participate in ERM II for at least two years in order to fulfil the exchange rate criterion.
Imidlertid må ERM II ikke betragtes udelukkende som et forstadium til indførelsen af euroen.
However, ERM II should not just be seen as a mere waiting room for adoption of the euro.
Hensigten med deltagelse i ERM II er først og fremmest at støtte de deltagende landes bestræbelser hen imod stabilitet og fremme konvergensen.
Participation in ERM II is intended, in the first place, to support the participating countries’ orientation towards stability and foster convergence.
I den sammenhæng kan tidspunktet for indtrædelse og den tid, der tilbringes i ERM II, samt ERM II's rolle i konvergensprocessen variere fra land til land alt efter de specifikke forhold i de enkelte lande, som jeg allerede har nævnt.
In this context, the timing of entry and the amount of time spent in ERM II as well as the role that ERM II will play in the convergence process may vary from country to country depending on the country-specific circumstances I have already mentioned.
Lad mig som konklusion understrege fire punkter.
To sum up, let me highlight four points:
Nye medlemsstater vil skulle opfylde konvergenskriterierne stabilt for at kunne kvalificere sig til deltagelse i Den Monetære Union.
New Member States will have to fulfil the convergence criteria in a sustainable manner in order to qualify for participation in monetary union.
Der findes ikke en fælles vej til euroen, som passer til alle tiltrædelseslandene.
There is no uniform path to the euro that would suit all acceding countries.
Der er helt klart behov for en omhyggelig og differentieret vurdering af fordele og ulemper, for så vidt angår tidspunktet for yderligere monetær integration (ERM II, medlemskab af ØMU'en).
A careful and differentiated assessment of the merits and risks associated with the timing of further monetary integration (ERM II, EMU membership) is clearly warranted.
Eurosystemet har en tydelig interesse i at sikre en smidig monetær integrationsproces og er med henblik herpå involveret i en politikdialog med centralbankerne i alle tiltrædelseslandene vedrørende deres integrationsstrategier.
The Eurosystem has an obvious stake in ensuring a smooth process of monetary integration and, to this end, is involved in a policy dialogue with the central banks of all acceding countries with regard to their integration strategies.
C. Øvrige spørgsmål 14.
C. Other questions 14.
Hvilke konklusioner drager De af sammenligningen af Den Amerikanske Centralbanks (the Federal Reserve Bank) og ECB’s gennemsigtighedspolitikker?
What conclusions do you draw from the comparison between the transparency policies followed by the Federal Reserve Bank and by the ECB?
Hvad mener De om, at Federal Reserve eller Bank of England offentliggør deres mødereferater?
What do you think about the publication by the Fed or the Bank of England of the minutes of their meetings?
Mener De, at ECB bør indføre denne politik?
Do you think this policy could be applied by the ECB?
Efter min opfattelse er gennemsigtighed i centralbankspørgsmål vigtige af to årsager.
In my view, transparency in central banking is important for two reasons.
For det første har de europæiske borgere, som repræsenteres af Europa-Parlamentet, ret til at blive orienteret af ECB om de foranstaltninger, der træffes med henblik på at opfylde ECB's mandat.
First, the European citizen, being represented by the European Parliament, has a right to be informed by the ECB about the measures being taken in order to fulfil the ECB’s mandate.
I den forstand tjener gennemsigtighed som grundlag for demokratisk kontrol med en uafhængig centralbank.
In this sense, transparency serves as the basis for democratic accountability of an independent central bank.
De institutionelle bestemmelser er fastsat i Maastricht-traktaten.
The institutional provisions are defined in the Maastricht Treaty.
På dette område er forslag fra Europa-Parlamentet af stor betydning, og dialogen mellem ECB og Parlamentet må fortsætte.
In this area, suggestions of the European Parliament are important and the dialogue between the ECB and the Parliament has to continue.
For det andet kan gennemsigtighed øge centralbankpolitikkens effektivitet.
Second, transparency may increase the effectiveness of central bank policy.
I den sammenhæng afhænger omfanget af gennemsigtigheden af ekspertvurderinger af transmissionsmekanismerne for den monetære politik, de finansielle markeders rolle og andre økonomiske faktorer som f.eks. skabelse af forventninger.
In this context, the adequate extent depends on expert judgments about the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, the role of financial markets and other economic factors like the formation of expectations.
Disse to gennemsigtighedsaspekter må ikke blandes sammen.
These two dimensions of transparency should not be mixed up.
Offentliggørelse af mødereferater er blot ét element blandt flere og fører ikke nødvendigvis til øget gennemsigtighed.
Publication of minutes is one element among others only and does not necessarily imply an increase in transparency.
Det skal påpeges, at der er enorme forskelle på, hvordan offentliggørelsen af mødereferater håndteres af de forskellige centralbanker.
It should be pointed out that there are huge differences in how the publication of minutes is handled by different central banks.
Mens Bank of England offentliggør sine mødereferater og de enkelte afstemningsresultater to uger efter mødet i MPC (Monetary Policy Committee = Den Pengepolitiske Komite), offentliggør Federal Reserve Board (bestyrelsen for det amerikanske centralbanksystem) på mødedagen, hvordan de enkelte medlemmer af FOMC (udvalg, der fastlægger centralbanksystemets interventioner i forbindelse med regulering af pengemængden) har stemt, mens de respektive mødereferater fra de enkelte møder offentliggøres om torsdagen efter det næste faste møde (omkring seks uger senere).
Whereas the Bank of England publishes its minutes and the individual voting records two weeks after the MPC meeting, the Federal Reserve Board publishes the individual voting records of the FOMC members on the day of the meeting, while the respective summary minutes of each meeting are made available on the Thursday after the next regularly scheduled meeting (about six weeks later).
Det er under alle omstændigheder vanskeligt at foretage en sammenligning mellem Federal Reserve Bank, Bank of England og ECB, da gennemsigtighed består af en række relaterede elementer og kan opnås på forskellige måder.
A comparative evaluation of the Fed, the Bank of England and the ECB remains very difficult in any case as transparency consists of a number of related elements and can be achieved in different ways.
De tre institutioner, Federal Reserve Bank, Bank of England og ECB, har forskellige baggrunde, forskellige politiske mål og forskellige institutionelle rammer.
The three institutions, the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the ECB, have different histories, different policy goals and are embedded in different institutional contexts.
Desuden har de tre centralbanker forskellige strategier for deres monetære politik.
Furthermore, all three central banks follow different approaches in their monetary policy strategy.
For så vidt angår den overordnede gennemsigtighed, må der også tages hensyn til, at Federal Reserve Bank f.eks. ikke har en fast strategi for den monetære politik.
In terms of overall transparency it has also to be taken into account that, for example, the Federal Reserve does not have a formulated monetary policy strategy.
ECB redegør på ECB's formands pressekonference umiddelbart efter mødet i Styrelsesrådet for alle de argumenter, der fremføres i drøftelserne om den monetære politik.
The ECB provides an account of all the arguments used in monetary policy discussions within the framework of the press conference of the President of the ECB, immediately following the meeting of the Governing Council.
Både formandens indledende erklæring og en udskrift af den efterfølgende spørgetid offentliggøres på internettet på mødedagen.
Both the Introductory Statement of the President and a transcript of the subsequent questions and answers session are made public on the Internet on the day of the meeting.
En mere detaljeret beskrivelse af den økonomiske vurdering, der tjener som grundlag for afgørelser om den monetære politik, offentliggøres i ECB's månedlige bulletin.
A more detailed description of the economic assessment which serves as the basis of monetary policy decisions is given in the Monthly Bulletin of the ECB.
En offentliggørelse af mødereferaterne vil ikke øge gennemsigtigheden, for så vidt angår de økonomiske argumenter.
A publication of the minutes would not add to transparency as far as economic arguments are concerned.
Hvad angår offentliggørelsen af afstemningsresultaterne, er der en risiko for en uønsket nationalisering af drøftelserne, da medlemmerne af Styrelsesrådet (i modsætning til medlemmerne af FOMC og MPC) kan opfattes som repræsentanter for deres respektive medlemsstater, og der kan derfor opstå et pres for at få dem til at stemme på en bestemt måde.
With respect to the publication of voting records, there might be the danger of an unwanted nationalization of the debate, as the Members of the Governing Council (unlike the Members of the FOMC or the MPC) may be perceived as representatives of their respective Member States and pressure for a particular voting behaviour may emerge.
Min personlige holdning går i retning af mere åbenhed.
My personal position is oriented towards fostering a culture of openness.
Dette opnås bedst gennem opretholdelse af en fast dialog med offentligheden og dens valgte repræsentanter og med akademiske kredse.
This is best achieved by maintaining a regular dialogue with the general public and their elected representatives as well as with the academic community.
Hvorledes fortolker De Europa-Parlamentets beslutning om at afvise ECB’s anbefalinger vedrørende reformen af afstemningsprocedurerne i Styrelsesrådet?
How do you interpret the European Parliament's decision to reject the ECB recommendation regarding the reform of the voting modalities in the Governing Council?
Hvad mener De om vores forslag på dette område?
What do you think about our proposals on this subject?
Jeg respekterer Europa-Parlamentets afgørelse om at afvise det nye afstemningssystem, som ECB har anbefalet, og jeg forstår motiverne og baggrunden for denne afvisning.
I respect the decision of the European Parliament to reject the new voting system as recommended by the ECB and I understand the motives and reasons behind this rejection.
Imidlertid mener jeg, at det er vigtigt at holde sig følgende for øje:
However, I find it important to keep the following in mind:
For det første siger Europa-Parlamentet selv i sin beslutning om ECB's henstilling, at de begrænsninger, der er fastlagt i "klausulen" i betydelig grad indskrænkede Styrelsesrådets muligheder.
First, the EP itself recognises in its Resolution on the ECB recommendation that the limits imposed by the “enabling clause” considerably restricted the options that were available to the Governing Council.
Især var enhver ændring begrænset til artikel 10, stk. 2, som fastsætter afstemningsprocedurerne.
In particular, any amendments were limited to Article 10.2, which governs the voting modalities.
Mere grundlæggende reformer som f.eks. ændringer i Styrelsesrådets sammensætning eller en anden fordeling af opgaverne mellem Direktionen og Styrelsesrådet (som bl.a. foreslået af Europa-Parlamentet) lå derfor uden for anvendelsesområdet for klausulen.
More fundamental reform options, such as changes to the composition of the Governing Council or a different distribution of tasks between the Executive Board and the Governing Council (as proposed, inter alia, by the EP), were therefore outside the scope of the enabling clause.
For det andet havde Styrelsesrådet selv opstillet en række principper, som det forsøgte at overholde i forbindelse med udarbejdelsen af det nye afstemningssystem.
Second, the Governing Council had set itself a number of principles which it sought to respect in the design of the new voting system.
Dette var en enorm udfordring.
This was a formidable challenge.
Nogle af disse principper - som f.eks. princippet om "et medlem, en stemme" eller "personlig deltagelse" - er bærende elementer i de institutionelle rammer for Eurosystemet og har været af stor betydning for dets hidtidige succes.
Some of these principles – such as the principles of “one member, one vote” or “ad personam participation” represent core pillars of the institutional framework of the Eurosystem and have been instrumental to its success thus far.
For det tredje må man ikke glemme, at Styrelsesrådet skulle udarbejde et nyt afstemningssystem, som ikke blot skulle kunne godkendes enstemmigt af alle medlemmerne, men som også skulle kunne få støtte fra alle 15 medlemsstater og deres nationale parlamenter.
Third, it should not be forgotten that the Governing Council had to design a new voting system which would not only find the unanimous approval of all its members, but which would also be capable of gaining the support of all 15 Member States and their national parliaments.
Jeg er godt klar over, at det nye afstemningssystem ikke er enkelt ved første øjekast, og jeg forstår Europa-Parlamentets kritik i den forbindelse.
I do recognise that the new voting system is not simple at a first glance and I understand the EP’s criticism in this regard.
Imidlertid er ethvert rotationssystem uundgåeligt kendetegnet ved, at det i et vist omfang er kompliceret.
However, any rotation system is inevitably characterised by a degree of complexity.
At systemet er relativt kompliceret er en følge af målsætningen om på en gang at leve op til de principper, der er nævnt ovenfor.
The relative complexity of the system is a consequence of the aim to simultaneously fulfil the principles referred to earlier.
Det er interessant at bemærke, at det rotationssystem, der blev vedtaget, i ret høj grad ligner afstemningssystemet i FOMC i USA.
It is interesting to note that the agreed rotation system is rather similar to the voting system in the Federal Open Market Committee in the United States.
Her placeres formændene for de regionale Federal Reserve Banks i grupper og udøver deres stemmeret med forskellig hyppighed (af de 12 regionale Federal Reserve Banks har New York fast stemmeret, Cleveland og Chicago er i en gruppe på to og alle andre i en gruppe på tre).
There, the Presidents of the Regional Federal Reserve Banks are also assigned to groups and exercise their voting right with different frequencies. (of the 12 Regional Federal Reserve Banks, New York has a permanent voting right, Cleveland and Chicago are in a group of two, all others in groups of three).
Europa-Parlamentets forslag om en mere omfattende reform af ECB's styringsstruktur - dvs. en reform, der går ud over de begrænsninger, som den nuværende "klausul" giver - er i tråd med de forslag, som eksterne observatører er kommet med.
The EP’s proposals regarding a more far-reaching reform of ECB governance structures – i.e. one that goes beyond the limits imposed by the current “enabling clause” – are in line with the suggestions which outside observers have put forward in this discussion.
På mellemlang og lang sigt kan fordelingen af ansvaret mellem Direktionen og Styrelsesrådet tages op til fornyet overvejelse, ligesom det også sker i andre institutioner.
In the medium to longer term the allocation of responsibilities between the Executive Board and the Governing Council might be reviewed as it is the case in other institutions as well.
Hvad angår den anden del af Europa-Parlamentets forslag, dvs. indførelsen af et dobbelt flertalssystem for Styrelsesrådet, hvor det træffer "strategiske og generelle monetærpolitiske afgørelser", har jeg mine tvivl.
However, as regards the second part of the EP’s proposal, i.e. the introduction of a double key majority system for the Governing Council when it decides on “strategic and general monetary policy decisions” I have certain doubts.
Et system med dobbelt flertal er i realiteten næsten det samme som vægtet afstemning (artikel 10, stk. 3) og er således uforenelig med princippet om "et medlem, en stemme".
A double majority system is de facto rather similar to weighted voting (Art. 10.3) and thus incompatible with the “one member, one vote” principle.
Desuden er det usandsynligt, at systemet med dobbelt flertal vil fremme en effektiv beslutningstagning, da det giver flere blokeringsmuligheder og skaber problemer, for så vidt angår den rolle, som medlemmerne af Styrelsesrådet skal spille, da det vil være vanskeligt at vægte dem korrekt.
Furthermore, the double majority system is unlikely to make efficient decision making easier, as it offers additional blocking opportunities and creates problems with regard to the role of the members of the Executive Board, since it would be difficult to assign to them an appropriate weight.
Som konklusion mener jeg, at det rotationssystem, som ECB's Styrelsesråd har foreslået enstemmigt, og som Rådet for Den Europæiske Union har godkendt, giver et godt grundlag for at tage de udfordringer op, som udvidelsen vil føre med sig.
In conclusion, I am of the opinion that the rotation system as proposed unanimously by the Governing Council of the ECB and agreed by the EU Council provides a good basis for the challenges enlargement will entail.
Hovedmålet, nemlig at skabe en effektiv og brugbar ramme for beslutningsprocessen i forbindelse med den monetære politik i et udvidet euroområde, er nået.
The main purpose, namely to provide an efficient and workable framework for the monetary policy decision making process in an enlarged euro area, has been achieved.
BILAG 3: OPENING STATEMENT OF THE CANDIDATE
ANNEX 3:OPENING STATEMENT OF THE CANDIDATE
Dr Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell
Dr Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell
at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
29 April 2003
29 April 2003
Madam President,
Madam Chairman,
ladies and gentlemen of the European Parliament,
ladies and gentlemen of the European Parliament,
I am delighted to have this opportunity to present my views to your committee and to answer your questions.
I am delighted to have this opportunity to present my views to your committee and to answer your questions.
I have already endeavoured to set out my opinions as comprehensively as possible in response to the written questions that were sent to me in advance.
I have already endeavoured to set out my opinions as comprehensively as possible in response to the written questions that were sent to me in advance.
First of all I should like to introduce myself briefly before going on to review four years of monetary union, to outline the main challenges for the future and, finally, to deal with the role of monetary strategy.
First of all I should like to introduce myself briefly before going on to review four years of monetary union, to outline the main challenges for the future and, finally, to deal with the role of monetary strategy.
The American economist Alan Blinder, who also spent some time as a central banker, once said, ‘Having looked at monetary policy from both sides now, I can testify that central banking in practice is as much art as science’.
The American economist Alan Blinder, who also spent some time as a central banker, once said, ‘Having looked at monetary policy from both sides now, I can testify that central banking in practice is as much art as science’.
To put it another way, besides sound objective judgement, a central banker also needs a sharp eye and intuition.
To put it another way, besides sound objective judgement, a central banker also needs a sharp eye and intuition.
My career to date has covered five areas of activity.
My career to date has covered five areas of activity.
I have worked in the realm of economic analysis and monetary policy.
I have worked in the realm of economic analysis and monetary policy.
I have been an adviser on economic policy, I have done international work in European bodies, including the Economic and Financial Committee, of which I have been a member for many years, and I currently chair the Banking Advisory Committee.
I have been an adviser on economic policy, I have done international work in European bodies, including the Economic and Financial Committee, of which I have been a member for many years, and I currently chair the Banking Advisory Committee.
I have dealt with the financial markets, with mechanisms for the regulation of financial markets and with the management of change, which I had to address in connection with the preparation of the Austrian National Bank for Austrian accession to the European Union and again when Austria signed up for monetary union.
I have dealt with the financial markets, with mechanisms for the regulation of financial markets and with the management of change, which I had to address in connection with the preparation of the Austrian National Bank for Austrian accession to the European Union and again when Austria signed up for monetary union.
I believe that this experience, gathered over almost 28 years in a wide variety of domains, is a good basis for future work on the ECB Executive Board.
I believe that this experience, gathered over almost 28 years in a wide variety of domains, is a good basis for future work on the ECB Executive Board.
And so to my experience of monetary union.
And so to my experience of monetary union.
We can look back on four years in which the euro has been able to successfully establish itself as a stable currency.
We can look back on four years in which the euro has been able to successfully establish itself as a stable currency.