natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Af de indsamlede data om stationer, satellitter og de ovenfor anførte forudsætninger kan drages følgende konklusioner:
The following conclusions can be drawn from the information collected concerning the stations and satellites and from the requirements outlined above:
Udviklingen i INTELSAT-kommunikationen og den samtidige bygning af aflytningsstationer dokumenterer systemets globale sigte.
The expansion of INTELSAT communications and the establishment, at the same time, of the corresponding interception stations show that the system is intended to provide global coverage.
Nogle af disse stationer har ifølge officielle oplysninger til opgave at aflytte kommunikationssatellitter.
According to official information, some of these stations have the task of intercepting transmissions from communications satellites.
Oplysningerne i de deklassificerede dokumenter kan tages som belæg for de dér anførte stationer.
The information regarding stations contained in the declassified documents can be regarded as proof of the existence and activities of the stations concerned.
Der er andre stationer, der ikke har store antenner, men alligevel kan være en del af systemet, da de kan opfange kommunikation fra Beams og Spots.
There are some other stations which, although they have no large antennae, may also be part of the system, since they can receive communications from the beams and spots.
Her må man afstå fra indiciet om antennestørrelse og gribe til andre indicier.
In this case, evidence other than the size of the antennae must be adduced.
Nogle af de nævnte stationer ligger beviseligt i umiddelbar nærhed af regulære modtagestationen for kommunikationssatellitter.
Some of the stations are situated in immediate proximity to normal earth stations for telecommunications satellites.
UKUSA-aftalen er betegnelsen på en SIGINT-aftale, der blev indgået i 1948 mellem Storbritannien (United Kingdom, UK), De Forenede Stater (USA) samt Australien, Canada og New Zealand.
A SIGINT agreement signed in 1948 between the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia, Canada and New Zealand is referred to as the UKUSA Agreement.
UKUSA-aftalens historiske udvikling Christopher Andrew, “The making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance” in Hayden, Peake and Samuel Halpern (Eds), In the Name of Intelligence.
The historical development of the UKUSA Agreement Christopher Andrew , The making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance in Hayden B. Peake, Samuel Halpern (Eds.), In the Name of Intelligence.
Essays in Honor of Walter Pforzheimer (NIBC Press (1994) s. 95 -109.
Essays in Honor of Walter Pforzheimer, NIBC Press (1994), 95 -109
UKUSA-aftalen er en fortsættelse af det meget snævre samarbejde mellem De Forenede Stater og Storbritannien under Anden Verdenskrig, der allerede indledtes under Første Verdenskrig.
The UKUSA Agreement represents a continuation of the cooperation between the USA and the UK which dates back to the First World War and which became very close during the Second World War.
Smith, The Ultra Magic Deals, 38, 43f.
Smith , The Ultra Magic Deals, 38, 43-4.
Sir F.H. Hinsley , et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol.
Sir F.H. Hinsley , et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol.
Christopher Andrew , “The making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance”, s. 100: „ In the spring of 1941, Steward Menzies, the Chief of SIS, appointed an SIS liason officer to the British Joint Services Mission in Washington, Tim O´Connor, …, to advice him on cryptologic collaboration”.
Cooperation in the sphere of codebreaking began in spring 1941 Christopher Andrew The making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance, ibidem,100: ' In the spring of 1941, Steward Menzies, the Chief of SIS, appointed an SIS liaison officer to the British Joint Services Mission in Washington, Tim O´Connor, …, to advice him on cryptologic collaboration'. .
Det efterretningstjenestelige samarbejde styrkedes gennem flådernes fælles indsats i det nordlige Atlanterhav i sommeren 1941.
Intelligence cooperation was stepped up in response to the joint fleet operations in the North Atlantic in summer 1941.
I juni 1941 kunne briterne bryde den tyske flådes kode, ENIGMA.
In June 1941 the British broke the German fleet code, ENIGMA.
I 1942 begyndte amerikanske kryptoanalytikere under „naval SIGINT agency“ at arbejde i Storbritannien.
America's entry into the war led to SIGINT cooperation being stepped up.
Christopher Andrew , “The making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance”, s. 100 ( Sir F.H. Hinsley , et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol II, 56).
In 1942, US codebreakers from the Naval SIGINT Agency began work in the United Kingdom Christopher Andrew, The making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance, ibidem, 100 ( Sir F.H. Hinsley , et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol.
I foråret 1943 blev BRUSA-SIGINT-aftalen undertegnet, og der blev foretaget en udveksling af personale.
In spring 1943 the BRUSA-SIGINT Agreement was signed, and personnel were exchanged.
Aftalens indhold omfatter bl.a. opdeling af arbejdet, hvilket er sammenfattet i de tre første afsnit: Der er tale om udveksling af al information i forbindelse med opdagelse, identifikation og aflytning af signaler samt brydning af koder og krypteringer.
The agreement primarily concerns the division of work and its main substance is summarised in the first three paragraphs: they cover the exchange of all information obtained by means of the discovery, identification and interception of signals and the cracking of codes and encryption processes.
Amerikanerne var hovedansvarlige for Japan, briterne for Tyskland og Italien Christopher Andrew , “The making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance”, s. 101f: Interviews med Sir F.H. Hinsley , „Operations of the Military Intelligence Service War Department London (MIS WD London),” 11 June 1945, Tab A, RG 457 SRH-110, NAW .
The Americans were primarily responsible for Japan, the British for Germany and Italy Christopher Andrew, The making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance, ibidem, 101-2: Interviews with Sir F.H. Hinsley, 'Operations of the Military Intelligence Service War Department London (MIS WD London),' 11 June 1945, Tab A, RG 457 SRH-110, NAW .
Efter krigen udgik initiativet til bevarelse af SIGINT-alliancen hovedsagelig fra Storbritannien.
Following the war, the UK was the prime mover behind the continuation of a SIGINT alliance.
Grundlaget for det blev aftalt på en verdensrejse for britiske efterretningsfolk (bl.a. Sir Harry Hinsley, hvis bøger danner grundlag for den citerede artikel) i foråret 1945.
The foundations were laid in the course of a world tour undertaken in spring 1945 by British intelligence agents (including Sir Harry Hinsley, whose books are used as source material in the articles quoted in the footnotes).
Et mål var at sende SIGINT-personale fra Europa mod Stillehavet til krigen mod Japan.
One aim was to transfer SIGINT personnel from Europe to the Pacific to take part in the war against Japan.
I denne forbindelse blev det aftalt med Australien at stille ressourcer og personale (briter til rådighed for de australske tjenester.
In that connection, an agreement was reached to provide the Australian intelligence services with resources and personnel (British).
Tilbagerejsen førte over New Zealand og Canada.
The intelligence agents returned to the USA via New Zealand and Canada.
1945: „The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are hereby authorised to direct the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; and Chief of Naval Oerations to continue collaboration in the field of communication intelligence between the United States Army and Navy and the British, and to extend, modify or discontinue this collaboration, as determined to be in the best interests of the United States.“ (citeret efter Bradley F. Smith , The Ultra-Magic Deals and the Most Secret Special Relationship (Presidio (1993)).
1945: 'The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are hereby authorised to direct the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; and Chief of Naval Operations to continue collaboration in the field of communication intelligence between the United States Army and Navy and the British, and to extend, modify or discontinue this collaboration, as determined to be in the best interests of the United States.' (quoted from Bradley F. Smith , The Ultra-Magic Deals and the Most Secret Special Relationship (Novato, Ca: Presidio 1993)) .
I den forbindelse blev der mellem briter og amerikanere indledt forhandlinger om en aftale.
Immediately thereafter, negotiations on an agreement opened between the British and Americans.
En britisk delegation optog derudover kontakt til canadierne og australierne for at drøfte en mulig deltagelse.
In addition, a British delegation made contact with the Canadian and Australians with a view to discussing their involvement.
I februar og marts 1946 afholdtes en strengt hemmelig angloamerikansk SIGINT-konference med henblik på at drøfte detaljer.
In February and March 1946 a top-secret Anglo-American SIGINT conference took place at which the details of an alliance were discussed.
Briterne havde mandat fra canadierne og australierne.
The British were authorised by the Canadians and Australians to act on their behalf.
Resultatet af konferencen var en stadig klassificeret aftale på ca. 25 sider, der fastlagde detaljerne i en SIGINT-aftale mellem De Forenede Stater og det britiske Commonwealth.
The conference produced what was still a classified agreement, running to some 25 pages, which laid down the detailed arrangements for a SIGINT agreement between the United States and the British Commonwealth.
I lang tid var der fra de kontraherende staters side ikke blevet sket nogen officiel anerkendelse af UKUSA-aftalen.
For a long time, the signatory states refused officially to acknowledge the existence of the UKUSA Agreement.
I årsberetningen fra den engelske Intelligence and Security Committee, Det Forenede Kongeriges parlamentariske kontrolorgan, nævnes UKUSA-aftalen imidlertid udtrykkeligt: "Den samlede informations kvalitet viser klart værdien af det snævre samarbejde under UKUSA-aftalen.
However, the annual report of the Intelligence and Security Committee, the UK's parliamentary monitoring body, refers explicitly to the agreement: 'The quality of intelligence gathered clearly reflects the value of the close co-operation under the UKUSA agreement.
Dette fremgik klart for nylig, da National Security Angency's faciliteter brød sammen og både US-klinter og GCHQ's normale UK-klienter blev betjent direkte af GCHQ i tre dage".
A recent illustration of this occurred when the US National Security Agency's (NSA) equipment accidentally failed and for some three days US customers, as well as GCHQ's normal UK customers, were served directly from GCHQ'.
Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 1999-2000.
Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 1999-2000.
Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, November 2000, 8 Rz 14.
Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, November 2000, 8, 14
Det new zealandske statsministeriums offentliggørelser
Publication of the New Zealand Department of the Prime Minister
Også i det newzealandske statsministeriums offentliggørelser fra sidste år om håndteringen af de nationale sikkerheds- og efterretningstjenester henvises der udtrykkeligt hertil: "Arbejdet i GCSB (Government Communications Security Bureau) foregår udelukkende under den newzealandske regerings ledelse.
A publication of the New Zealand Department of the Prime Minister from the year 2000, dealing with the management of the New Zealand's security and intelligence services, also refers clearly to the agreement: .'The operation of the GCSB is directed solely by the New Zealand Government.
Det er dog medlem af et langvarigt internationalt partnerskab omkring udveksling af udenlandsk efterretning og fælles udnyttelse af kommunikationsteknologi.
It is, however, a member of a long-standing collaborative international partnership for the exchange of foreign intelligence and the sharing of communications security technology.
De øvrige medlemmer af partnerskabet er National Security Agency (NSA) i USA, Government Communications Headquarter (GCHQ) i Det Forenede Kongerige, Defence Signal Directorate (DSD) i Australien og Communications Security Establishment (CSE) i Canada.
The other members of the partnership are the USA's National Security Agency (NSA), the UK's Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) Australia's Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), and Canada's Communications Security Establishment (CSE).
New Zealand har store fordele af denne ordning, og New Zealand alene ville ikke være i stand til at opvise samme effektivitet som dette partnerskab af 5 lande."
New Zealand gains considerable benefit from this arrangement, as it would be impossible for New Zealand to generate the effectiveness of the five nation partnership on its own'.
Domestic and External Secretariat des Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet i New Zealand, Securing our Nation's Safety.
Domestic and External Secretariat of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet of New Zealand, Securing our Nation's Safety.
How New Zealand manages its security and intelligence agencies (2000).
How New Zealand manages its security and intelligence agencies (2000).
Derudover er der andre belæg for dennes eksistens.
Moreover, there is further evidence of the agreement's existence.
UKUSA står ifølge US-Navy „Terms/Abbreviations/Acronyms“ offentliggjort af US Nave and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Centre (NMITC) bei http://www.cnet.navy.mil/nmitc/training/u.html. for „United Kingdom – USA“ betegner en „5-nation SIGINT agreement“.
According to the US Navy 'Terms/Abbreviations/Acronyms' published by the US Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Centre (NMITC) at http://www.cnet.navy.mil/nmitc/training/u.html , UKUSA stands for 'United Kingdom-USA' and refers to a '5-nation SIGINT agreement'.
Udtalelse af DSD's direktør
Statement by the Head of the DSD
Betænkning fra Canadian Parliamentary Security and Intelligence Committee
Report by the Canadian Parliamentary Security and Intelligence Committee
I denne betænkning oplyses, at Canada i efterretningsspørgsmål samarbejder med nogle af sine nærmeste og længstvarende allierede.
This report describes how Canada cooperates with some of its closest and longest-standing allies in the intelligence sphere.
Betænkningen anfører disse allierede: De Forenede Stater (NSA), Storbritannien (GCHQ), Australien (DSD) og New Zealand (GCSB).
The report names the allies concerned: the United States (NSA), the United Kingdom (GCHQ), Australia (DSD) and New Zealand (GCSB).
Aftalens navn nævnes ikke i betænkningen.
The report does not name the agreement.
Den tidligere GCHQ-direktør Joe Hooper, nævner UKUSA-aftalen i en skrivelse af …. til den tidligere NSA-direktør, Marshall S. Carter.
The former Head of GCHQ, Joe Hooper, refers to the UKUSA Agreement in a letter of 22 July 1969 to the former Director of the NSA, Marshall S. Carter.
Ordføreren har drøftet aftalen med flere personer, der på grund af deres opgaver må kende UKUSA-aftalen og dens indhold.
Your rapporteur has spoken about the agreement with several persons who, by virtue of their duties, must be aware of the UKUSA Agreement and its substance.
Herunder er aftalens eksistens i alle tilfælde blevet indirekte bekræftet af svarenes art.
In all cases, the existence of the agreement was indirectly confirmed by the nature of the answers given.
Inden for rammerne af „Freedom of Information Acts“ fra 1966 (5 U.S.C. § 552) og af Forsvarsministeriets bestemmelser (DoD FOIA Regulation 5400.7-R fra 1997) er tidligere klassificerede dokumenter deklassificeret og dermed gjort tilgængelige for offentligheden.
Under the 1966 Freedom of Information Acts (5 USC § 552) and the Department of Defense's 1997 FOIA Regulation 5400.7-R, formerly classified documents were declassified and thus made available to the public.
Via det i 1985 grundlagte National Security Archive ved George Washington University i Washington D.C. er dokumenterne tilgængelige for offentligheden.
The documents concerning the National Security Archive, founded in 1985 at George Washington University in Washington DC, are accessible to the public.
Forfatteren Jeffrey Richelson, tidligere medlem af National Security Archives, har via Internet gjort 16 dokumenter tilgængelige, der giver indblik i ledelsen af og mandatet for NSA (National Security Agency).
The author Jeffrey Richelson, a former member of the National Security Archive, has published 16 documents on the Internet which give an insight into the emergence, development, management and mandate of the National Security Agency (NSA).
Disse dokumenter citeres igen og igen af forskellige forfattere, der har skrevet om Echelon, og tages som bevis for eksistensen af det globale spionagesystem Echelon.
These documents have repeatedly been cited by various authors writing about ECHELON as evidence for the existence of the ECHELON global espionage system.
Derudover finder man i de dokumenter, Richelson stiller til rådighed, nogle, der bekræfter eksistensen af NRO (National Reconnaissance Office) og beskriver dettes funktion som manager og operatør af opklaringssatellitter.
The documents made available by Richelson also include some which confirm the existence of the National Reconnaissance Office and its function as a manager and operator of intelligence satellites.
Dokumenterne indeholder fragmentarisk beskrivelser eller omtale af følgende spørgsmål:
The documents contain fragmentary descriptions of or references to the following topics:
NSA's opgave og arbejde (dokument 1, 2b, 4, 10 og 16)
Purpose and structure of the NSA (Documents 1, 2b, 4, 10 and 16)
I National Security Council Intelligence Directive 9 (NSCID 9) af 10. marts 1950 Document 1.
In National Security Council Intelligence Directive 9 (NSCID 9) of 10 March 1950 Document 1.
NSCID 9, "Communications Intelligence," March 10, 1950. defineres udlandskommunikation med henblik på COMINT; ifølge denne definition omfatter udlandskommunikation enhver regeringskommunikation i bredeste forstand (ikke kun militært) samt al anden kommunikation, der kan rumme oplysninger af militær, politisk, videnskabelig eller økonomisk værdi.
NSCID 9, 'Communications Intelligence,' March 10 1950. the term ‘foreign communications’ is defined for COMINT purposes: it comprises any government communications in the widest sense (not only military) and all other communications which might contain information of military, political, scientific or economic value.
Direktivet (NSCID 9 ændr. af 29.12.1952) fastlægger udtrykkeligt, at FBI er eneansvarlig for indre sikkerhed.
The Directive (NSCID 9 rev, 29.12.1952) Document 2b.
9, Communications Intelligence, December 29, 1952.
December 29 1952 expressly states that the FBI alone is responsible for internal security.
Direktivet fra Department of Defense (DoD) af 23. december 1971 Document 4.
The Department of Defense (DoD) Directive of 23 December 1971 Document 4.
Department of Defense Directive S-5100.20, "The National Security Agency and the Central Security Service," December 23, 1971. om NSA Central Security Service (CSS) definerer konceptet for NSA som følger:
Department of Defense Directive S-5100.20, 'The National Security Agency and the Central Security Service,' December 23 1971 on the NSA and the Central Security Service (CSS) outlines the concept for the NSA as follows:
- NSA er et separat organiseret tjenestested under Department of Defense under ledelse af en „Secretary of Defense.
- The NSA is a separately organised office within the DoD headed by the Secretary of Defence;
- NSA sørger dels for opfyldelse af USA's SIGINT-mission, dels stiller den sikre kommunikationssystemer til rådighed for ministerier og tjenestegrene.
- The NSA’s task is firstly to fulfil the USA’s SIGINT mission, and secondly to provide secure communications systems for all departments and offices;
Statement for the Record of NSA Director Lt Gen Michael V. Hayden, USAF before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, April 12, 2000. definerede NSA-direktor Hayden NSA's opgaver som følger:
Statement for the Record of NSA Director Lt Gen Michael V. Hayden, USAF before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, April 12 2000. , Gen. Michael Hayden, the NSA Director, defined the NSA’s tasks as follows:
- via elektronisk overvågning samles udlandskommunikation til militær og politikere (policymakers);
- Collecting foreign communications for the military and for policymakers by means of electronic surveillance;
- NSA leverer oplysninger til „U.S. Government consumers“ om international terrorisme, narkotika, våbenspredning;
- Supplying intelligence for US Government consumers about international terrorism, drugs and arms proliferation;
- det er ikke NSA's opgave at indsamle al elektronisk kommunikation
- The NSA does not have the task of collecting all electronic communications.
- NSA må kun videregive oplysninger til modtagere, der er godkendt af USA's regering, ikke direkte til amerikanske firmaer.
- The NSA may only pass on information to recipients authorised by government, not direct to US firms.
I et memorandum, viceadmiral i U.S. Navy, W. O. Studeman, afgav for regeringen den 8.april 1992 Document 10.
In a memorandum by Vice-Admiral W.O. Studeman of the US Navy on behalf of the Government on 8 April 1992 Document 10.
Farewell from Vice Admiral William O. Studeman to NSA Employees, April 8, 1992. , henvises til NSA's voksende globale opgave (access) ud over støtte til militære operationer.
Farewell from Vice Admiral William O. Studeman to NSA Employees, April 8 1992. , reference was made to the increasingly global access of the NSA in addition to ‘support of military operations’.
Intelligence Agencies' beføjelser (dokument 7) Document 7.
Powers of the Intelligence Agencies (Document 7) Document 7.
United States Signals Intelligence Directive [USSID] 18, "Legal Compliance and Minimization Procedures," July 27, 1993.
United States Signals Intelligence Directive [USSID] 18, 'Legal Compliance and Minimization Procedures,' July 27 1993.
Af United States Signals Intelligence Directive 18 (USSID 18) fremgår, at såvel kabel- som radiosignaler aflyttes.
It is clear from US Signals Intelligence Directive 18 (USSID 18) that both cable and radio signals are intercepted.
Samarbejde med andre tjenester (dokument 2a og 2b)
Cooperation with other services (Documents 2a and 2b)
Til opgaverne for U.S. Communications Intelligence Board hører bl.a. at overvåge alle „arrangements“ med udenlandske regeringer på COMINT-området.
The duties of the US Communications Intelligence Board include monitoring all ‘arrangements’ with foreign governments in the COMINT field.
Til de opgaver, direktøren for NSA har, hører at afvikle alle forbindelser med udenlandske COMINT-tjenester.
One of the tasks of the NSA Director is to arrange all contacts with foreign COMINT services.
Document 2a.
Document 2a.
Memorandum from President Harry S. Truman to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Communications Intelligence Activities, October 24, 1952.
Memorandum from President Harry S. Truman to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Communications Intelligence Activities, October 24 1952.
Document 2b.
Document 2b.
National Security Council Intelligence Directive No.
National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9, Communications Intelligence,
9, Communications Intelligence, December 29, 1952.
December 29 1952.
Enheder, der er aktive på „Echelon-Sites“ (dokument 9, 12)
Mention of units active in ‘ECHELON sites’ (Documents 9 and 12)
I NAVSECGRU INSTRUCTIONs C5450.48A Document 9.
The NAVSECGRU Instructions C5450.48A Document 9.