natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I henhold til artikel 8, stk. 1 i EMK har "enhver […] ret til respekt for sit privatliv og familieliv, sit hjem og sin korrespondance."
Pursuant to Article 8(1) of the ECHR, 'everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence'.
Beskyttelsen af denne grundlæggende ret omfatter ikke kun kommunikationens indhold, men også registrering af yderligere data vedrørende samtalen.
The scope of the protection of this fundamental right covers not only the substance of the communication, but also the act of recording external data.
Den grundlæggende ret i henhold til artikel 8, stk. 2, i EMK er ikke uindskrænket.
Pursuant to Article 8(2) of the ECHR, exercise of this fundamental right is not unrestricted.
Indgreb i denne ret kan være tilladt, hvis der er et retsgrundlag i den nationale lovgivning.
Interference in the exercise of the fundamental right to privacy may be admissible if there is a
Det drejede sig om videregivelse af medicinske oplysninger, som var vigtige for tildeling af offentlige ydelser.
In that connection, the Member States are not free to interfere in the exercise of this fundamental right as they see fit.
M.S./Schweden, 27.8.1997, Z 38, og i et tilfælde, hvor der var tale om udvisning fra Nederlanden af en person , som levede af bistandsydelser, efter at grunden for hendes opholdstilladelse var bortfaldet.
They may do so only for the purposes listed in the second paragraph of Article 8 of the ECHR, in particular in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country The justification of 'economic well-being' was accepted by the European Court of Human Rights in a case involving the transmission of medical data relevant to the award of public compensation, M.S./Sweden, 27.8.1997, line 38; and in a case involving the expulsion from the Netherlands of a person who had been living on welfare payments after the grounds for the award of a residence permit had ceased to apply, Ciliz/Netherlands, 11.7.2000, line 65. .
Ciliz/Nederlandene, 11.7.2000, Z 65. , hvilket imidlertid ikke berettiger økonomisk spionage, da artiklen kun omfatter indgreb, som "er nødvendigt i et demokratisk samfund".
However, this does not justify industrial espionage, since it only covers forms of interference 'necessary in a democratic society'.
Til hvert indgreb vælges det mest lempelige middel, der kan føre til resultat, og der må desuden være fyldestgørende garantier mod misbrug.
In connection with any instance of interference, the least invasive means appropriate must be employed to achieve the objective; in addition, adequate guarantees must be laid down to prevent misuse of this power.
Betydningen af artikel 8 i EMK for efterretningsvirkomhed
The significance of Article 8 of the ECHR for the activities of intelligence services
Hvis efterretningstjenesterne i deres virke skal respektere de grundlæggende rettigheder, skal følgende generelle principper overholdes: hvis det af hensyn til den nationale sikkerhed synes at være nødvendigt, at efterretningstjenester skal kunne aflytte telekommunikationsindhold eller i det mindste registrere oplysninger om forbindelser, skal en sådan bestemmelse optages i den nationale lovgivning.
These general principles have the following implications for the organisation of the work of intelligence services in a manner consistent with this basic right: if, for the purpose of safeguarding national security, there seems to be a need to authorise intelligence services to record the substance of telecommunications, or at least external data relating to the connections in question, this power must be established in national law and the relevant provisions must be generally accessible.
Bestemmelsen skal være alment tilgængelig, og konsekvenserne for borgeren skal være forudsigelige, samtidig med at der tages hensyn til de særlige krav med hensyn til fortrolighed.
The consequences for individuals must be foreseeable, but due account must be taken of the particular requirements in the sphere of national security.
Menneskerettighedsdomstolen, Silver m.fl., 24.10.1983, Z 97.
Invasions of privacy may not be restricted to the absolute minimum, but mere usefulness or desirability is not sufficient justification European Court of Human Rights, Silver et al, 24.10.1983, line 97. .
Den opfattelse, at aflytning af al telekommunikation er den bedste beskyttelse mod organiseret kriminalitet, ville være i strid med artikel 8 i EMK, selv om den skulle være tilladt i henhold til national lovgivning.
The view that the interception of all telecommunications, even if permissible under national law, represents the best form of protection against organised crime would amount to a breach of Article 8 of the ECHR.
På grund af efterretningsaktiviteternes særlige karakter, som kræver hemmeligholdelse og derved en særlig afvejelse af interesser, er der desto mere brug for gode kontrolmuligheder.
In addition, given the specific nature of the activities conducted by intelligence services, activities which demand secrecy and, therefore, a particularly careful weighing-up of interests, provision must be made for more stringent monitoring arrangements.
En efterretningstjenestes legitime virksomhed er kun i overensstemmelse med de grundlæggende rettigheder, hvis den pågældende EMK-stat har etableret fyldestgørende kontrolsystemer og andre garantier mod misbrug.
Accordingly, the legally authorised activities of intelligence services are only consistent with fundamental rights if the ECHR contracting party has established adequate systems of checks and other guarantees to prevent the misuse of powers.
Domstolen lagde i forbindelse med Sveriges efterretningsvirksomhed stor vægt på tilstedeværelsen af parlamentarikere i politiets kontrolorgan, og overvågningen ved justitsministeren, parlamentets ombudsmand og retsudvalget.
In connection with the activities of Sweden’s intelligence services, the European Court of Human Rights emphasised the fact that it attaches particular importance to the presence of MPs in police supervisory bodies and to supervision by the Minister of Justice, the parliamentary Ombudsman and the parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs.
Ud fra denne betragtning forekommer det betænkeligt, at Frankrig, Grækenland, Irland, Luxemburg og Spanien ikke har et tilsynsudvalg for efterretningstjenester Ordføreren er bekendt med, at hverken Luxembourg eller Irland har en udenlandsk efterretningstjeneste, og at de ikke driver Sigint.
Against this background, it must be regarded as unsatisfactory that France, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Spain have no parliamentary committee with responsibility for monitoring the secret services Your rapporteur is aware that neither Luxembourg nor Ireland has a foreign intelligence service and does not carry out SIGINT operations.
Det er derfor glædeligt, at forsvarsudvalget i den franske Assemblée Nationale bestræber sig på nedsættelse af et kontroludvalg Det franske lovforslag ("Proposition de loi tendant à la création de délégations parlementaires pour le renseignement") og betænkningen herom af Arthur Paecht, medlem af det franske parlament, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées sur la proposition de loi (N° 1497) de M. Paul Quilès et plusieurs de ses collègues tendant à la création d'une délégation parlementaire pour les affaires de renseignement, enregistré à la Présidence de l'assemblée nationale le 23. novembre 1999. , navnlig fordi Frankrig i teknisk og geografisk henseende råder over bemærkelsesværdige kapaciteter inden for efterretningsvirksomhed.
Your rapporteur therefore welcomes the efforts made by the French National Assembly Committee on National Defence to set up a monitoring committee Bill entitled ‘Proposition de loi tendant à la création de délégations parlementaires pour le renseignement’, and the related report by Arthur Paecht , Rapport fait au nom de la Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées sur la proposition de loi (N° 1497) de M. Paul Quilès et plusieurs de ses collègues tendant à la création d'une délégation parlementaire pour les affaires de renseignement, enregistré à la Présidence de l'assemblée nationale le 23. novembre 1999 , particularly as France has exceptional intelligence capabilities, in both technical and geographical terms.
Pligten til at være på vagt over for udenlandske efterretningstjenester
The requirement to monitor closely the activities of other countries’ intelligence services
Omgåelse af artikel 8 i EMK ved at inddragelse af udenlandske efterretningstjenester
Inadmissibility of moves to circumvent Article 8 of the ECHR through the use of other countries’ intelligence services
Som det allerede er udførligt belyst, skal signatarstaterne opfylde en række forudsætninger for at sikre, at deres efterretningstjenester opfylder forpligtelserne i henhold til artikel 8 i EMK.
As outlined in detail above, the contracting parties must comply with a set of conditions in order to demonstrate that the activities of their intelligence services are compatible with Article 8 of the ECHR.
Det siger sig selv, at disse efterretningstjenester ikke kan frigøre sig for disse forpligtelser ved at gribe tilbage til andre efterretningstjenester, som er underlagt mindre strenge regler.
It is quite obvious that intelligence services cannot be allowed to circumvent these requirements by employing assistance from other intelligence services subject to less stringent rules.
Ellers ville legalitetsprincippet og dets to elementer - tilgængelighed og forudsigelighed - være gjort virkningsløse og Menneskerettighedsdomstolens retspraksis indholdsmæssigt svækket.
Otherwise, the principle of legality, with its twin components of accessibility and foreseeability, would become a dead letter and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights would be deprived of its substance.
Det betyder for det første, at udveksling af data mellem efterretningstjenester er underkastet begrænsninger.
The first implication of this is that exchanges of data between intelligence services are permissible only on a restricted basis.
En efterretningstjeneste kan kun få oplysninger fra en anden efterretningstjeneste, hvis videregivelsen er i overensstemmelse med landets egen lovgivning.
An intelligence service may seek from one of its counterparts only data obtained in a manner consistent with the conditions laid down in its own national law.
Den ved lov fastsatte rækkevidde af efterretningstjenesternes aktioner må ikke udvides ved aftaler med andre tjenester.
The geographical scope for action laid down by law in respect of the intelligence service concerned may not be extended by means of agreements with other services.
Ligeledes må den kun udføre efterretningsvirksomhed for en anden efterretningstjeneste efter dennes anvisninger, når den har forvisset sig om , at de er i overensstemmelse med gældende national ret.
By the same token, it may carry out operations on behalf of another country’s intelligence service, in accordance with the latter’s instructions, only if it is satisfied that the operations are consistent with the national law of its own country.
Selv om oplysninger er beregnet til en anden stat, ændrer det intet ved det forhold, at et indgreb, som ikke er forudsigeligt for borgeren, er en krænkelse af denne persons grundlæggende ret.
Even if the information is intended for another country, this in no way alters the fact that an invasion of privacy which could not be foreseen by the legal subject concerned constitutes a violation of fundamental rights.
La protection de la vie privée face à l'espionnage des communications, Journal des tribunaux, Droit Européen 2000, 187 ff.
The protection of privacy against communications espionage’, Journal of the Courts, European Law, 2000, 187 et seq. .
Konsekvenserne af at tåle ikke-europæiske efterretningstjenesters virke på EMK-staternes territorium
Implications of allowing non-European intelligence services to carry out operations on the territory of Member States which are ECHR contracting parties
Menneskerettighedsdomstolens relevante retspraksis
The relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights
Med ratificering af EMK har signatarstaterne forpligtet sig til at lade udøvelsen af deres suverænitet underkaste en kontrol med respekten for de grundlæggende rettigheder.
By ratifying the ECHR the contracting parties undertook to subject the exercise of their sovereignty to a review of its consistency with fundamental rights.
De kan ikke tilsidesætte denne forpligtelse ved at afstå fra deres suverænitet.
They cannot seek to circumvent this requirement by foregoing the exercise of that sovereignty.
Disse stater er fortsat ansvarlige for deres territorium og derved forpligtet over for EU-borgerne, også i det tilfælde, hvor udøvelse af suveræniteten sker ved en anden stats efterretningstjeneste.
These states remain responsible for their territory and thus have an obligation to European legal subjects if the exercise of sovereignty is usurped by the activities of the intelligence services of another state.
Menneskerettighedsdomstolen bekræfter imidlertid i sin retspraksis, at signatarstaterne er pligtige til at træffe positive foranstaltninger for at beskytte privatsfæren, således at den grundlæggende rettighed i henhold til artikel 8 i EMK ikke krænkes af private (!), dvs. også på horisontalt plan, hvor den enkelte ikke står over for myndighederne, men en anden person.
The established case law of the European Court of Human Rights now emphasises that the contracting parties have a duty to take positive measures to protect privacy, in order to ensure that private individuals (!) do not violate Article 8 of the ECHR.
Menneskerettighedsdomstolen, Abdulaziz, Cabales og Balkandali, 28.5.1985, Z 67; X u Y/Nederlandene, 26.3.1985, Z 23; Gaskin vs Det Forenede Kongerige 7.7.1989, Z 38; Powell og Rayner, 21.2.1990, Z 41.
In other words, they must take action even at a horizontal level, where private individuals are not confronted with the actions of the state, but rather of other private individuals European Court of Human Rights, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali, 28.5.1985, line 67; X and Y/Netherlands, 26.3.1985, line 23; Gaskin v United Kingdom, 7.7.1989, line 38; Powell and Rayner,
Det forekommer kun at være logisk, at staten må føre tilsyn med, at den efterretningsvirkomhed, der udøves på dens territorium, er i overensstemmelse med menneskerettighederne.
The only logical conclusion is that states must carry out checks to ensure that the activities of intelligence services on their territory do not represent a violation of human rights.
Konsekvenser for aflytningsanlæg
Implications for stations
I Tyskland har man i Bad Aibling stillet et eget territorium til rådighed for USA udelukkende til brug for satellitovervågning.
In Bad Aibling in Germany an area of land has been declared US territory for the sole purpose of housing a satellite receiving facility.
I Menwith Hill i Storbritannien blev der givet tilladelse til anvendelse af et areal til samme formål.
In Menwith Hill in the United Kingdom authorisation has been given for the shared use of land for the same purpose.
Hvis en amerikansk efterretningstjeneste via disse anlæg foretager aflytning af ikke-militær kommunikation fra private eller virksomheder, som har oprindelse i en stat, der har tiltrådt EMK, udløser det tilsynspligten i henhold til EMK.
If, in these stations, a US intelligence service were to engage in the interception of non-military communications conducted by private individuals or firms from an ECHR contracting party, supervisory requirements would come into play under the ECHR.
Det betyder i praksis, at Tyskland og Det Forenede Kongerige som kontraherende parter i EMK er pligtige til at forvisse sig om, at den amerikanske efterretningstjeneste i sit virke respekterer de grundlæggende rettigheder.
In practical terms, as ECHR contracting parties Germany and the United Kingdom are required to establish that the activities of the American intelligence services do not represent a violation of fundamental rights.
Det er desto mere vigtigt, eftersom repræsentanter for ngo'er og medierne gentagne gange har udtrykt deres bekymring over NSA's fremgangsmåde.
This is all the more relevant because representatives of NGOs and the press have repeatedly expressed concerns regarding the activities of the US National Security Agency (NSA).
Konsekvenser for aflytning foranlediget af udenlandske tjenester
Implications for interception carried out on behalf of third parties
I Morwenstow i Storbritannien gennemføres efter oplysningerne fra GCHQ aflytning af civil kommunikation i samarbejde med NSA og strikt efter dennes anvisninger, og disse oplysninger videregives som råmateriale til USA.
According to information available to the committee, in Morwenstow in the United Kingdom GCHQ, working in cooperation with the NSA and in strict accordance with the latter’s instructions, intercepts civilian communications and passes on the recordings to the USA as raw intelligence material.
Også i de tilfælde, hvor arbejdet udføres for tredjepart, er man pligtig til at efterprøve, om opgaven opfylder kravet om respekt for de grundlæggende rettigheder.
The requirement to check that interception operations are consistent with fundamental rights also applies to work carried out on behalf of third parties.
Særlig omhu ved tredjelande
Particular duty of care in connection with third states
Er der tale om EMK-stater, kan man til en vis grad gensidigt gå ud fra, at den anden stat også opfylder sine forpligtelser i henhold til konventionen.
In the case of operations involving two ECHR contracting parties, both can assume, up to a certain point, that the other is complying with the ECHR.
Det gælder i hvert fald, indtil det er bevist, at en EMK-stat systematisk og vedvarende overtræder EMK.
At all events, this applies until evidence emerges that an ECHR contracting party is violating the Convention on a systematic, long-term basis.
USA har imidlertid ikke undertegnet EMK og har heller ikke underkastet sig et tilsvarende kontrolsystem.
Things are very different, however, in the case of the USA: it is not an ECHR contracting party and it has not made its intelligence operations subject to a similar supervisory system.
De amerikanske efterretningstjenesters aktiviteter er underlagt meget nøje regler, for så vidt angår amerikanske borgere hhv. personer, som har legalt ophold i USA.
There are very precise rules governing the activities of its intelligence services, in so far as those activities concern US citizens or persons legally present on US territory.
Der gælder imidlertid andre regler for NSA's virksomhed i udlandet, og mange af disse regler er tilsyneladende fortrolige og derved utilgængelige.
However, other rules apply to the activities of the NSA abroad, and many of the relevant rules are classified and thus inaccessible to the public.
Det forekommer endnu mere foruroligende, at den amerikanske efterretningstjeneste ganske vist er underlagt kontrol fra udvalg i Kongressen og Senatet, men at disse parlamentariske udvalg kun udviser ringe interesse for NSA's aktivitet i udlandet.
A further fact gives greater cause for concern, namely that although the US intelligence service is subject to monitoring by the relevant House of Representatives and Senate committees, these committees show little interest in the activities of the NSA abroad.
Det synes derfor at være på sin plads at appellere til Tyskland og Det Forenede Kongerige om at tage de forpligtelser, der udspringer af EMK, alvorligt og gøre NSA's udførelse af yderligere efterretningsvirksomhed på deres territorium betinget af, at den opfylder EMK-bestemmelserne.
There would seem to be good reason, therefore, to call on Germany and the United Kingdom to take their obligations under the ECHR seriously and to make the authorisation of further intelligence activities by the NSA on their territory contingent on compliance with the ECHR.
I den sammenhæng er der tre centrale aspekter, som man bør holde sig for øje:
In this connection, three main factors must be considered.
I henhold til EMK må indgreb i privatsfæren kun ske på grundlag af retsforskrifter, som er alment tilgængelige, og hvis konsekvenser er forudsigelige for borgeren.
Under the terms of the ECHR, interference in the exercise of the right to privacy may only be carried out on the basis of legal rules which are generally accessible and whose implications for individuals are foreseeable.
Dette krav er kun opfyldt, hvis USA gør det klart for den europæiske befolkning, hvordan og under hvilke forhold aflytningen finder sted.
This requirement can be met only if the USA discloses to the public in Europe how and under what circumstances intelligence-gathering is carried out.
I det omfang, hvor dette virke er uforeneligt med EMK, må bestemmelserne tilpasses til det europæiske beskyttelsesniveau.
If incompatibilities with the ECHR emerge, US rules must be brought into line with the level of protection provided in Europe.
For EU-borgeren må et indgreb, der gennemføres fra europæisk side, skønnes at være mindre alvorligt end et indgreb fra amerikansk side, da borgeren i første tilfælde kan påberåbe sig sin grundlæggende ret hos nationale instanser.
As far as European citizens are concerned, an operation constituting interference carried out by a European intelligence service must be regarded as less serious than one conducted by a US intelligence service, since only in the first instance is legal redress available in the national
Indgreb må derfor i videst muligt omfang ske fra tysk hhv. engelsk side, følgelig i hvert fald de indgreb, der sker af hensyn til strafferetsplejen.
Operations constituting interference must therefore be carried out, as far as possible, by the German or UK authorities, particularly when investigations are being conducted for law enforcement purposes .
Det bør påpeges overfor USA, at alle EU-stater råder over en velfungerende strafferetspleje.
It should be pointed out to the Americans that all EU Member States have properly functioning criminal justice systems.
Foreligger der grund til mistanke, må USA overlade retsforfølgelsen til værtslandene.
If there is evidence that crimes have been committed, the USA must leave the task of law enforcement to the host countries.
Foreligger der ingen grund til mistanke, må overvågningen anses for at være uforholdsmæssig, følgelig en krænkelse af menneskerettighederne, og derfor ikke tilladt.
If there is no such evidence, surveillance must be regarded as unproportional, a violation of human rights and thus inadmissible.
Der foreligger derfor kun forenelighed med EMK, hvis USA begrænser sig til overvågningsforanstaltninger, som er nødvendige for den nationale sikkerhed, men afstår fra overvågning med henblik på strafferetlig forfølgelse.
In other words, compliance with the ECHR can be guaranteed only if the USA restricts itself to surveillance measures conducted for the purpose of safeguarding its national security, but not for law enforcement purposes.
Som allerede anført, stiller Menneskerettighedsdomstolen i sin retspraksis tilstedeværelse af fyldestgørende kontrolsystemer og garantier mod misbrug som forudsætning for overensstemmelse med de grundlæggende rettigheder.
As already outlined above, in its case law the European Court of Human Rights has stipulated that compliance with fundamental rights is contingent on the existence of adequate monitoring systems and guarantees against abuse.