natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
- Polen om Republikken Polens deltagelse i Den Europæiske Unions politimission (EUPM) i Bosnien-Hercegovina (EFT L 64 af 7.3.2003, s. 38)
- Poland, on the participation of the Republic of Poland in the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina (OJ L 64, 7.3.2003)
- Bosnien-Hercegovina om Den Europæiske Unions politimissions (EUPM's) aktiviteter i Bosnien-Hercegovina (EFT L 293 af 29.10.2002, s. 2)
- Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the activities of the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) (OJ L 293, 29.10.2002)
- Den Tidligere Jugoslaviske Republik Makedonien om Den Europæiske Unions Observatørmissions (EUMM's) virke (EFT L 241 af 11.9.2001, s. 2)
- the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, on the activities of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) (OJ L 241, 11.9.2001)
Eftersom proceduren for Unionens indgåelse bestemmes af unionstraktatens artikel 24 (hvortil der også refereres i artikel 38 vedrørende den tredje søjle), a) er det Rådets formandskab, der ved en afgørelse, i dette tilfælde enstemmig, fra Unionens Råd Udkast til afgørelse dok.
Since the conclusion procedure in the Union is governed by Article 24 of the EU Treaty Article 24(1) reads: Where it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more states or international organisations in implementation of this title, the Council may authorise the Presidency, assisted by the Commission as appropriate, to open negotiations to that effect.
8296/1/03 REV 1. skal bemyndiges til at undertegne , mens b) ratificeringen giver anledning til endnu en rådsafgørelse, når eventuelle "forfatningsmæssige forbehold" fra medlemsstaternes side (disse skal først have deres nationale parlamenters tilslutning) er udryddet.
Such agreements shall be concluded by the Council on a recommendation from the Presidency. (referred to in Article 38 under the third pillar), (a) signature is the responsibility of the Council Presidency which requires, in this instance, unanimous authorisation from the Council of the Union The Council acts unanimously where the agreement involves an issue in respect of which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal decisions. ; (b) ratification results in a second Council decision, once any ‘constitutional reservations’ have been lifted by the Member States which must secure prior agreement of their national parliaments.
Ganske vist er de nationale parlamenter ikke formelt involveret på unionsniveau, men de vil kunne anmode om nærmere oplysninger og garantier, som deres regering fra sin side skal sørge for fra Unionens side, og som denne om nødvendigt skal sørge for fra De Forenede Staters side.
While not being formally involved at Union level, those parliaments may seek clarification and assurances which the respective governments must themselves secure from the Union, which itself must secure them, where necessary, from the United States.
Det skal bemærkes, at forfatningsmæssige forbehold ikke forhindrer, at aftalerne midlertidigt finder anvendelse, selv om en sådan eventuelt ikke berører de lande, der har fremsat sådanne forbehold.
It should be noted that constitutional reservations do not prevent the agreements from being applied provisionally, even if such application cannot involve the country which has expressed such reservations.
Det skal desuden bemærkes, at visse medlemsstaternes repræsentanter allerede på nuværende tidspunkt har erklæret, at de vil gøre forfatningsmæssige forbehold gældende, således at deres parlamenter får mulighed for formelt at udtale sig om indholdet af disse aftaler.
It should also be noted that the representatives of some Member States have already announced that they will lift any constitutional reservations so that their national parliaments may take a formal decision on the substance of these agreements.
Afstemningen i de nationale parlamenter vil da ikke være nogen ”ratificering” i henhold til folkeretten, eftersom Unionen fortsat er den kontraherende part (og medlemsstaterne kun indirekte), men den kan forhindre, at der opnås enstemmighed i Rådet ved vedtagelsen af afgørelsen om ratificering på Unionens vegne.
The votes taken in the national parliaments would not constitute ‘ratification’ under international law, since the contracting party would still be the European Union (and the Member States only indirectly) but might prevent the securing of unanimity in the Council when the decision to ratify the agreements on behalf of the Union was taken.
Et andet spørgsmål er som allerede nævnt forholdet mellem Unionens aftaler og de bilaterale aftaler , som hver enkelt medlemsstat og De Forenede Stater allerede har indgået.
Another important issue is the one to which reference has already been made, that of the relationship between the agreements concluded by the Union and the bilateral agreements already concluded by each Member State.
Da Unionens aftaler er kommet senere end medlemsstaternes aftaler, har de forrang, hvad angår de bestemmelser, der er uforenelige med sidstnævnte aftaler Artikel 30, stk. 3, i Wienerkonventionen om traktatretten. .
Since the Union’s agreements are more recent than the agreements of the Member States, they take precedence over any incompatible provisions in the latter Article 30(3) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. .
Ud over denne folkeretlige regel gælder i øvrigt pligten til loyalt samarbejde medlemsstater imellem, som ville blive forsømt, såfremt en medlemsstat ikke opfyldte de forpligtelser i den aftale, Unionen har forhandlet sig frem til i fælles interesse.
To that rule of international law must be added the obligation incumbent upon the Member States of loyal cooperation between Member States which would be jeopardised if a Member State did not meet the obligations of the agreement negotiated by the Union in the common interest.
For at undgå enhver tvivl om fortolkningen er der desuden i de to aftalers artikel 3 fastsat regler for potentielle konflikter med gældende eller fremtidige bilaterale aftaler (medlemsstaterne er berettiget til at forhandle om mere fordelagtige betingelser, såfremt de ønsker det).
That being said, and with a view to preventing any doubts as to interpretation, Article 3 in both agreements regulate any possible conflict with current or future bilateral agreements (since the Member States are entitled, if they so wish, to negotiate more favourable terms).
Hvad med Europa-Parlamentets demokratiske kontrol i betragtning af disse aftalers betydning?
Given the importance of these agreements, what will become of democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament?
Situationen er langtfra klar og tilfredsstillende.
The situation is far from being clear and satisfactory.
Hidtil er Europa-Parlamentet ikke blevet hørt om nogen som helst af aftalerne indgået på grundlag af unionstraktatens artikel 24.
To date, the European Parliament has not been consulted on any of the agreements concluded on the basis of Article 24 of the EU Treaty.
Ganske vist er det rigtigt, at der i den artikel ikke udtrykkelig er tale om en sådan høring, men den kræves i artikel 21, når der er tale om "de vigtigste aspekter og grundlæggende valg i forbindelse med den fælles udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik".
While it is true that there is no express provision for such consultation in that Article, consultation is required by Article 21 when ‘the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy’ are involved.
Kan man sige, at aftaler med NATO eller tredjelande som Jugoslavien, Den Tidligere Jugoslaviske Republik Makedonien, Albanien og i det foreliggende tilfælde De Forenede Stater ikke er "grundlæggende valg" i forbindelse med FUSP og følgelig kræver høring af Europa-Parlamentet?
Can we imagine that the agreements with NATO or third countries such as Yugoslavia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania and, in this instance, the United States do not constitute ‘basic choices’ of the CFSP and, hence, require consultation of the European Parliament?
Sådan lyder Rådets fortolkning, som Europa-Parlamentet hidtil har tolereret.
That is, indeed, the interpretation given hitherto by the Council and accepted, to date, by the European Parliament.
Nu er spørgsmålet fortsat, om den samme fremgangsmåde også kan anvendes på Unionens internationale aftaler, der ikke blot er baseret på traktatens artikel 24, men også på artikel 38, som gælder spørgsmål inden for politisamarbejde og retligt samarbejde.
The question which now arises is to ascertain whether the same treatment may also be given to international agreements concluded by the Union which are based not only on Article 24 but also on Article 38 of the Treaty on European Union and relate to judicial and police cooperation.
Efter hvad Udvalget om Borgernes Friheder og Rettigheder og Retlige og Indre Anliggender mener, kræver sådanne aftaler altid høring af Parlamentet af flere grunde:
The Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs takes the view that such agreements still require consultation of Parliament on several grounds:
- For det første har en sådan høring hidtil været reglen ved vedtagelse af retsakter henhørende under den tredje søjle, bl.a. akter, der har karakter af internationale aftaler (f.eks. tilfældet med konventioner medlemsstater imellem om udlevering og retligt samarbejde og politisamarbejde i straffesager). - For det andet er parlamentarisk kontrol med denne form for aftaler det normale i alle medlemsstaterne og må derfor betragtes som et fælles princip, som Unionen skal bygge på i henhold til traktatens artikel 6.
- firstly, because such consultation is now the rule for the adoption of acts covered by the third pillar, including instances where such acts constitute international agreements (see, for example, the conventions between the Member States on extradition and judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters); - secondly, because parliamentary scrutiny of such agreements is the rule in all the Member States and must therefore be deemed to be a common principle on which the Union must base its actions in accordance with Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union.
Dette argument gælder så meget mere, som den parlamentariske kontrol på nationalt niveau i forbindelse med aftaler, jf. unionstraktatens artikel 24, bliver mindre direkte, eftersom ratificeringen foretages på unionsniveau.
This consideration is strengthened by the fact that parliamentary scrutiny at national level of agreements concluded pursuant to Article 24 of the EU Treaty becomes less direct, since ratification is carried out at Union level.
Derfor er det vigtigt, at den parlamentariske kontrol også sikres på selve dette niveau. - For det tredje er høring af Parlamentet sammenlignet med de teoretisk mulige alternativer den procedure, der bedst respekterer de principper om demokrati og retsstat, der nævnes i unionstraktatens artikel 6, stk. 1. - Sidst, men ikke mindst berører aftalernes indhold direkte de grundlæggende rettigheder og forpligter de medlemsstater, der måske endnu ikke har nogen lovgivning på bestemte områder.
Accordingly, parliamentary scrutiny should be carried out at the same level; - thirdly, because, given the theoretically possible alternatives, consultation of Parliament is the procedure which best respects the principles of democracy and the rule of law set out in Article 6(1) of the EU Treaty; - finally, because the agreements directly affect fundamental rights and are binding on those Member States which have not yet legislated on certain issues.
Det ville blive meget vanskeligt at forsvare unionsrettens forrang - således som det har været tilfældet med fællesskabsretten - såfremt stod klart, at proceduren for vedtagelse af disse aftaler giver anledning til alvorlig tvivl om, hvorvidt det demokratiske princip overholdes.
Defence of the primacy of Union law, as was the case for Community law, would become very difficult if it became clear that the procedure for the adoption of these agreements left serious doubts as to respect for the democratic principle.
Af alle disse grunde mener Udvalget om Borgernes Friheder, at det er nødvendigt, at Rådet vedtager princippet om høring af Europa-Parlamentet i alle tilfælde, hvor det omhandlede emne vedrører det retlige samarbejde og politisamarbejdet i straffesager.
For all these reasons, the Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs deems it necessary for the Council to adopt the principle of the consultation of the European Parliament in every instance where the issue involved concerns judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters.
Dette er absolut muligt også rent formelt, eftersom traktaten ikke udelukker en sådan høring (der endog er obligatorisk, når der er tale om de grundlæggende valg, der nævnes i artikel 21 i samme afsnit).
That is perfectly possible from the formal point of view as well, since the Treaty does not rule out such consultation (which is even obligatory with regard to the basic choices referred to in Article 21 of the same Title).
Ud fra et forfatningspolitisk synspunkt ville dette valg, som Kommissionen allerede har foreslået i en erklæring som bilag til Rådets protokol, også afspejle den politiske hovedtendens hos konventet vedrørende traktatreformen.
From the point of view of institutional policy, this option, already proposed by the Commission in a statement annexed to the minutes of the Council meeting, would also correspond to the majority policy guideline emerging at the Convention on the reform of the treaties.
Hvorfor da ikke i praksis være forud for sin tid med en procedure, der alligevel vil blive indført senere?
Why, then, should we not anticipate in practice a procedure which will subsequently be imposed?
Et sådant tiltag ville desuden have den fordel at bortfeje argumenterne fra alle dem, der ville være tilbøjelige til at bringe de foreliggende aftaler for de europæiske domstole i Strasbourg eller endog Luxembourg for at forsvare principperne om demokrati og retsstat i Unionen.
Finally, such an approach would have the advantage of cutting the ground from under the feet of anyone who might be tempted to bring an action before the European courts in Strasbourg or even Luxembourg on the grounds that the agreements in question breached democratic principles and the rule of law in the Union.
Med hensyn til indhold og den fulgte procedure for aftalernes indgåelse er situationen ifølge ordførerens opfattelse den, at det endog ville være i Rådets interesse analogt med fællesskabsrettens gældende bestemmelser i forvejen at indhente en udtalelse fra Domstolen.
Your rapporteur feels that what is at stake, with regard to the substance and the procedure followed for the conclusion of the agreements, is such that, by analogy with the current provisions of Community law, it would even be in the Council’s own interests to seek a preliminary ruling from the Court.
Hvad angår aftalernes rækkevidde, vedrører de udlevering og gensidig retshjælp i straffesager, der er begreber, som er mere eller mindre fælles for de kontraherende parter.
As regards the scope of the agreements, they concern extradition and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which concepts are more or less identical for the contracting parties.
Men da de interne regler og institutionelle rammer er meget forskellige, kan det ikke udelukkes, at der er problemer med at fortolke visse bestemmelser.
Nevertheless, since domestic legislative and institutional frameworks are so different, problems with the interpretation of certain provisions cannot be ruled out.
Det mest åbenlyse tilfælde er standarderne for beskyttelse af de grundlæggende rettigheder eller begrebet retfærdig rettergang, hvor der er tale om begreber, der for Unionen og dens medlemsstater er stadfæstet i unionstraktatens artikel 6 og i den europæiske konvention om grundlæggende frihedsrettigheder samt for De Forenede Staters vedkommende i fortolkningen af deres forfatning.
The most glaring example concerns the standards for the protection of fundamental freedoms or the concept of a fair trial, concepts which, for the Member States, derive from Article 6 of the EU Treaty and the Convention on Fundamental Rights and, for the United States, on the interpretation of its Constitution.
Da ingen af de to parter kan påtvinge den anden sit synspunkt, og for at undgå at øge fortolkningskonflikterne er der fastsat dialogstrukturer samt mulighed for medlemsstaterne for fortsat at nægte udlevering under henvisning til deres forfatningsmæssige principper (artikel 15 og 16 A i aftalen om udlevering).
Since neither party may impose its view on the other, and with a view to preventing a plethora of conflicts of interpretation, provision is made for consultation, together with the possibility for the Member States to continue to refuse extradition on grounds connected with their constitutional principles (Articles 15 and 16a of the agreement on extradition).
For de fire medlemsstater, der endnu ikke har forhandlet om aftaler om gensidig retshjælp, kan en sådan afslås under henvisning til gældende principper i landets nationale ret , bl.a. når håndhævelse af anmodningen vil kunne krænke landets suverænitet, sikkerhed, offentlige orden eller andre væsentlige interesser (artikel 11 og 13 i aftalen om gensidig retshjælp).
The four Member States which have not yet negotiated judicial cooperation agreements may refuse such cooperation on the grounds of principles applicable to their domestic law, including instances where execution of the request would infringe upon their sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests (Articles 11 and 13 of the agreement on judicial cooperation).
For Den Europæiske Unions vedkommende nævner aftalerne atter principperne i de senest vedtagne lovgivningsnormer, såsom den europæiske konvention om gensidig retshjælp i straffesager og dens protokol Meddelelse fra generalsekretæren for Rådet for Den Europæiske Union, jf. artikel 30, stk. 2, i konventionen, udarbejdet af Rådet i henhold til artikel 34 i traktaten om Den Europæiske Union, om gensidig retshjælp i straffesager mellem Den Europæiske Unions medlemsstater (2000/C 197/02) - Forklarende rapport vedrørende konventionen af 29.5.2000 om gensidig retshjælp i straffesager mellem Den Europæiske Unions medlemsstater (tekst godkendt af Rådet den 30.11.2000) (2000/C 379/02). samt rammeafgørelserne om terrorisme, den europæiske arrestordre og Schengen-reglerne Rådets rammeafgørelse af 13.6.2002 om den europæiske arrestordre og om procedurerne for overgivelse mellem medlemsstaterne (2002/584/RIA). .
As far as the European Union is concerned, the agreements incorporate the principles of bodies of legislation adopted more recently such as (a) the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and the Protocol annexed thereto Communication by the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union under Article 30(2) of the Convention, established by the Council in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union, on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union (OJ C 197, 12.7.2000) – Explanatory report on the Convention of 29 May 2000 on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union (Text approved by the Council on 30 November 2000)(OJ C 379, 29.12.2000). , together with the framework decisions on terrorism and the European arrest warrant and the Schengen acquis Framework decision of the Council of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and surrender procedures between Member States (2002/584/JHA). .
Efter ordførerens opfattelse ville det for at undgå uoverensstemmelse (f.eks. inden for databeskyttelse) være i de to parters interesse, at disse aftaler også indeholder bestemmelser om betingelserne for samarbejde mellem myndigheder i De Forenede Stater og europæiske agenturer, såsom Europol, Eurojust og Olaf (selv om sidstnævntes status i Unionen fortsat er tvetydig).
Your rapporteur takes the view that it would have been in the interests of both parties, in a bid to prevent inconsistencies (for example, with regard to data protection), for the agreements to regulate at the same time the terms for cooperation between US authorities and European agencies such as Eurojust, OLAF and Europol (even if the status of that institution within the Union remains ambiguous).
Anvendelsen af forskellige standarder og ordninger kan kun gøre det hele endnu mere uklart på et i forvejen komplekst og sårbart område.
The application of different standards and systems will only increase opacity in an area which is already complex and sensitive.
I øvrigt har de to aftaler en meget interessant bestemmelse om den fremtidige udvikling Se artikel 19 A i aftalen om udlevering og artikel 16 A i aftalen om gensidig retshjælp. , hvor der åbnes mulighed for at revidere aftalerne efter fem år samt i tilfælde af, at der vedtages en ny forfatningstraktat for Unionen .
The two agreements also provide for a most interesting review clause See Article 19a of the agreement on extradition and Article 16a of the agreement on judicial cooperation. which will enable the agreements to be reviewed in five years time as well as in the event of the adoption of the Union’s new constitutional treaty.
Der er tale om en temmelig usædvanlig bestemmelse i folkeretten, hvor reglen er, at man ikke kan påberåbe sig årsager af intern forfatningsmæssig karakter for at unddrage sig en forpligtelse fastsat i en indgået aftale Dette er en situation, som er velkendt for medlemsstaterne, der ved flere lejligheder er blevet tvunget til at tilpasse deres forfatninger for at ratificere traktater om ændring af Fællesskabet og/eller Unionen. .
This is a most extraordinary provision in international law where the rule is that issues relating to domestic constitutional order may not be invoked as a reason for failing to abide by an obligation deriving from an agreement that has been concluded This is a situation well known to the Member States which have, on several occasions, been obliged to adapt their constitutions in order to ratify treaties amending the Communities and/or the Union. .
Den vigtigste undtagelse (som allerede omtaltes i december 2001 i EP's beslutning med henblik på forhandlingerne om denne aftale) er i forbindelse med en person, der efter udlevering risikerer at blive dømt til døden (en straf, der er afskaffet i Europa i kraft af den europæiske konvention om grundlæggende frihedsrettigheder og medlemsstaternes forfatningsprincipper).
The most important exception (to which reference had already been made in December 2001 in the EP's first resolution on the negotiation of this agreement) concerns a person who, if extradited, might be sentenced to death (a penalty abolished in Europe by the European Convention on Fundamental Rights and by the constitutional principles of the Member States).
Men de fastsatte garantier i udkastet til aftale om udlevering (artikel 13) betyder, at udlevering til De Forenede Stater af en mistænkt, der risikerer dødsstraf, gøres betinget af, at der opnås tilfredsstillende sikkerhed for, at dødsdommen ikke afsiges eller ikke fuldbyrdes .
However, the guarantees laid down in Article 13 of the draft agreement on extradition provide that a suspect who might face the death penalty may be extradited to the United States only on receipt of satisfactory assurances that the death sentence will not be imposed or, if imposed, not carried out.
Desuden forekommer den fastsatte procedure, som skal sikre overholdelsen af dette princip, endog mere beskyttende end den tilsvarende i de seneste bilaterale aftaler, såsom den fransk-amerikanske bilaterale aftale fra 2001.
What is more, the procedure envisaged to ensure compliance with this principle seems to be even more protective than the one laid down in the most recent bilateral agreements, such as the Franco-American bilateral treaty signed in 2001.
I den forbindelse fastslås det klart i aftaleudkastet, at princippet er, at dødsdommen ikke afsiges .
In this respect, the draft agreement clearly states that the non-imposition of the death sentence constitutes the underlying principle.