natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
I kapitel 8 kommer han detaljeret ind på efterretningstjenesternes SIGINT-kapaciteter og beskriver nogle modtagestationer.
In Chapter 8 of the book he examines in detail the SIGINT capabilities of the intelligence services and describes some earth stations.
I kapitel 13 beskriver han USA's forbindelser til andre efterretningstjenester, bl.a. UKUSA-aftalen.
In Chapter 13 he outlines the USA's relations with other intelligence services, for example under the UKUSA Agreement.
2/2000, 47-51, http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/2000/ma00/ma00richelson.html http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/2000/ma00/ma00richelson.html , der udkom i 2000, gengiver han i kortform UKUSA-aftalens indhold, nævner satellitaflytningsanlæg til kommunikationssatellitter og beskriver muligheder og grænser for aflytning af civil kommunikation.
56, No. 2/2000, , which appeared in 2000, he gives brief details of the substance of the UKUSA Agreement, names installations used to intercept transmissions from communications satellites and outlines the scope for and the limits on the interception of civilian communications.
Ifølge hans seneste bog "Body of Secrets" James Bamford, Body of Secrets.
According to his new book, 'Body of Secrets' James Bamford, Body of Secrets.
Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency.
Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency.
From the Cold War Through the Dawn of a New Century, Doubleday Books (2001). , der bygger på resultaterne i "Puzzle Palace", kaldes computernetværket, der forbinder efterretningstjenesterne, "Platform".
From the Cold War Through the Dawn of a New Century, Doubleday Books (2001) , which builds on the findings outlined in 'The Puzzle Palace', the computer network linking the intelligence services is known as 'Platform'.
I senere kapitler bruger han imidlertid betegnelsen ECHELON for aflytningssystemet inden for rammerne af UKUSA-aftalen.
In the subsequent chapters, however, he also uses the term ECHELON to denote the interception system set up under the UKUSA Agreement.
I "Body of Secrets" og det i denne sammenhæng interessante kapitel "Muscle" giver Bamford en oversigt over den historiske udvikling inden for NSA's kommunikationsovervågning, samt en beskrivelse af systemets omfang, UKUSA-partnerskabets funktion og mål.
In 'Body of Secrets', and in the chapter of most relevance to the work of the Temporary Committee, entitled 'Muscle', Bamford gives a historical survey of the development of communications surveillance by the NSA and describes the scope of the system, the way the UKUSA partnership operates and its objectives.
Han understreger, at interviews med dusinvis af nuværende og tidligere NSA-ansatte har vist, at NSA ikke beskæftiger sig med konkurrencespionage for øjeblikket.
He emphasises that, according to interviews conducted with dozens of current and former NSA employees, the NSA is at present not involved in the work of gathering competitive intelligence.
Anvendelsen af NSA til konkurrencespionage ville kræve en entydig politisk beslutning på højeste politiske niveau, og en sådan var hidtil ikke blevet truffet.
The NSA could only be given the task of gathering competitive intelligence on the basis of a clear political decision taken at the very highest level, a decision which has thus far not been taken.
Under sine 20 års forskningsaktiviteter var han aldrig stødt på et bevis for, at NSA videregav efterretningsoplysninger til amerikanske virksomheder, selv om man aflyttede private virksomheder for at sikre f.eks. overholdelsen af embargoer.
In the course of 20 years' research, Bamford had never uncovered evidence of the NSA passing on intelligence to US firms, even though it intercepts communications from private firms, for example with a view to monitoring compliance with embargoes.
Ifølge Bamford er det største problem for Europa ikke spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt ECHELON-systemet stjæler forretningshemmeligheder og videregiver dem til konkurrenter, men krænkelsen af den grundlæggende ret til en privatsfære.
According to Bamford, the main problem for Europe is not the issue of whether the ECHELON system steals firms' business secrets and passes them on to competitors, but rather that of the violation of the fundamental right to privacy.
I "Body of Secrets" beskriver han udførligt, hvordan beskyttelsen af "US persons" (det er US-statsborgere og personer, der opholder sig lovligt i USA) har udviklet sig, og at der også er interne begrænsninger for andre "UKUSA-residents".
In 'Body of Secrets' he describes in detail how the protection of 'US persons' (i.e. US citizens and persons legally resident in the USA) has developed and makes clear that at least internal restrictions have been laid down in respect of other UKUSA residents.
Samtidig påpeger han, at der ikke er nogen beskyttelse for andre personer, heller ingen pligt til at slette data, og at NSA's lagerkapacitet var uudtømmelig.
At the same time, he points out that other persons enjoy no protection, that there is no requirement to destroy data concerning such persons, and that the NSA's data storage capacities are unimaginably huge.
Bamford understreger imidlertid også systemets begrænsninger, der dels skyldes, at det kun er en ringe del af den internationale kommunikation, der går via satellit, og at det er langt vanskeligere at aflytte fiberoptiske kabler, og dels, at NSA kun råder over begrænset kapacitet til en endelig analyse, hvortil kommer en konstant voksende kommunikationsstrøm frem for alt via Internet.
However, Bamford also emphasises the limits of the system, which stem from the fact that, firstly, only a small proportion of international communications are now transmitted via satellites - transmissions via fibreoptic cable are much more difficult to intercept - and, secondly, that the NSA has only limited capacities when it comes to the final analysis of intercepted communications.
De to danske journalister, Bo Elkjær og Kenan Seeberg oplyste den 22. januar 2001 over for udvalget, at Echelon allerede var stærkt udviklet i 80'erne.
These two Danish journalists told the Temporary Committee on 22 January 2001 that ECHELON was already very advanced in the 1980s.
Danmark, der havde udvidet aflytningskapaciteten væsentligt inden for de sidste 10 år, arbejdede sammen med USA siden 1984.
Denmark, which greatly expanded its interception capabilities in the 1990s, has been cooperating with the USA since 1984.
Udtalelser af tidligere efterretningsmedarbejdere
Statements by former intelligence service employees 5.7.1.
5.7.1 Margaret Newsham (tidligere medarbejder i NSA) Bo Elkjær, Kenan Seeberg , Echelon was my baby – Interview with Margaret Newsham, Ekstra Bladet, 17.1.1999.
Margaret Newsham (former NSA employee) Bo Elkjaer, Kenan Seeberg , ECHELON was my baby – Interview with Margaret Newsham, Ekstra Bladet, 17.1.1999
Margaret Newsham var fra 1974 til 1984 ansat hos Ford og Lockheed og arbejdede i denne periode ifølge egne oplysninger for NSA.
Margaret Newsham was employed from 1974 to 1984 by Ford and Lockheed and says she worked for the NSA during that period.
Hun var uddannet til dette arbejde i NSA's hovedkvarter i Fort George Meade i Maryland, USA, og i 1977-1981 beskæftiget i Menwith Hill, den amerikanske jordstation på britisk territorium.
She had been trained for her work at NSA Headquarters at Fort George Meade in Maryland, USA, and had been deployed from 1977 to 1981 at Menwith Hill, the US ground station on UK territory.
Der konstaterede hun, at en samtale, som US-senator Strohm Thurmond førte, blev aflyttet.
There she established that a conversation conducted by US Senator Strohm Thurmond was being intercepted.
Allerede i 1978 kunne Echelon opfange enkeltpersoners telekommunikation, der gik via satellit.
As early as 1978, ECHELON was capable of intercepting telecommunications messages to and from a particular person via satellite.
For så vidt angik hendes egen rolle hos NSA, var hun ansvarlig for at opbygge systemer og programmer, at konfigurere dem og at installere dem på store computere.
As regards her role in the NSA, she was responsible for designing systems and programs, configuring them and preparing them for operation on powerful computers.
Softwareprogrammerne kaldtes SILKWORTH og SIRE, Echelon var derimod betegnelsen på netværket.
The software programs were named SILKWORTH and SIRE, whilst ECHELON was the name of the network.
Wayne Madsen NBC-fjernsynsinterwiev "60 Minutes" af 27.2.2000; http://cryptome.org/Echelon-60min.htm. , tidligere medarbejder i NSA, bekræfter ligeledes eksistensen af Echelon.
Wayne Madsen NBC TV interview '60 Minutes', 27.2.2000; http://cryptome.org/echelon-60min.htm , former NSA employee, also confirms the existence of ECHELON.
Han mener, at indsamling af økonomiske data har højeste prioritet og udnyttes af amerikanske virksomheder.
He is of the opinion that economic intelligence gathering has top priority and is used to the advantage of US companies.
Han giver navnlig udtryk for bekymring over, at Echelon kan udspionere ngo'er som Amnesty International og Greenpeace.
He fears in particular that ECHELON could spy on NGOs such as Amnesty International or Greenpeace.
Som begrundelse anfører han, at NSA har måttet indrømme, at det havde over 1000 sider oplysninger om prinsesse Diana, der med sin kampagne mod landminer gik imod den amerikanske politik.
He argues that the NSA had to concede that it held more than 1000 pages of information on Princess Diana, because her conduct ran counter to US policy, owing to her campaign against land mines.
Under mødet med udvalgsdelegationen i Washington D.C. var han særlig bekymret for den fare, det globale spionagesystem indebar for europæiske borgeres privatsfære.
During his meeting with the committee delegation in Washington DC Madsen expressed particular concern at the risks to the privacy of European citizens posed by the global espionage system.
Mike Frost var i over 20 år beskæftiget i den canadiske efterretningstjeneste, CSE Communication Security Establishment, under det canadiske forsvarsministerium, driver Sigint. .
Mike Frost worked for more than 20 years for the CSE, the Canadian secret service Communication Security Establishment, subordinate to the Canadian Ministry of Defense, engaged in SIGINT .
Aflytningsstationen i Ottawa er kun en del af et verdensomspændende netværk af spionagestationer.
The listening post in Ottawa was just one part of a worldwide network of spy stations.
Florian Rötzer , Die NSA geht wegen Echelon an die Öffentlichkeit;
Florian Rötzer , Die NSA geht wegen ECHELON an die Öffentlichkeit;
http://www.heise.de/bin/tp/issue/download.cgi?artikelnr=6633&rub_ordner=special Dette omfatter også civil kommunikation.
http://www.heise.de/bin/tp/issue/download.cgi?artikelnr=6633&rub_ordner=special This also included civilian communications.
Som eksempel anførte han i et interview med en australsk sender, at CSE faktisk i en databank over mulige terrorister registrerede navn og telefonnummer på en kvinde, der havde anvendt et tvetydigt udtryk i en telefonsamtale med en ven.
In an interview he gave for an Australian TV channel, he said by way of example that the CSE actually had entered the name and telephone number of a woman in a database of possible terrorists because she had used an ambiguous phrase in a harmless telephone conversation with a friend.
NBC-fjernsynsinterwiev "60 Minutes" af 27.2.2000; http://cryptome.org/Echelon-60min.htm.
NBC TV interview '60 Minutes', 27.2.2000; http://cryptome.org/echelon-60min.htm
UKUSA-staternes efterretningstjenester hjalp også hinanden på den måde, at den ene spionerede for den anden, således at man i det mindste ikke kunne bebrejde den nationale efterretningstjeneste noget.
The intelligence services of the UKUSA states also helped each other by spying on each other's behalf so that at least local intelligence services could not be accused of anything.
Således skal GCHQ have anmodet den canadiske CSE om for den at udspionere to engelske ministre, da premierminister Thatcher ville vide, om de var på hendes side.
For instance, GCHQ asked the CSE to spy on two British government ministers when Prime Minister Thatcher wanted it to tell her if they were on her side.
Interview i den australske sender Channel 9 af 23.3.1999;
Interview on the Australian Channel 9 on 23.3.1999;
Fred Stock blev ifølge egne oplysninger udelukket fra den canadiske efterretningstjeneste, CSE, fordi han havde udtalt sig imod den nye prioritering af økonomiske oplysninger og civile mål.
Fred Stock says he was expelled from CSE, the Canadian secret service, in 1993 because he had criticised the new emphasis on economic intelligence and civil targets.
Opfanget kommunikation havde rummet oplysninger om forretninger med andre lande, bl.a. også forhandlingerne om NAFTA, kinesiske kornopkøb og franske våbensalg.
The communications intercepted contained information on trade with other countries, including negotiations on NAFTA, Chinese purchases of cereals and French arms sales.
Ifølge Stock havde tjenesten også rutinemæssigt fået oplysninger om Greenpeace-skibes protester til søs.
Stock says the service also routinely received communications concerning environmental protests by Greenpeace vessels on the high seas.
Jim Bronskill , Canada a key snooper in huge spy network, Ottawa citizen, 24.10.2000, http://www.ottawacitizen.com/national/990522/2630510.html.
Jim Bronskill , Canada a key snooper in huge spy network, Ottawa Citizen, 24.10.2000, http://www.ottawacitizen.com/national/990522/2630510.html
Den tidligere CIA-direktør, James Woolsey, oplyste på en pressekonference, James Woolsey , Remarks at the Foreign Press Center, Transcript, 7.3.2000, http://cryptome.org/Echelon-cia.htm. som han afgav på anmodning af US-State Department, at USA driver spionage i Kontinentaleuropa.
James Woolsey, the former director of the CIA, said at a press conference James Woolsey , Remarks at the Foreign Press Center, Transcript, 7.3.2000, http://cryptome.org/echelon-cia.htm he gave at the request of US State Department, that the USA did conduct espionage operations in continental Europe.
"Economic Intelligence" opnås for 95 procents vedkommende gennem evaluering af offentligt tilgængelige informationskilder, kun 5% er stjålne hemmeligheder.
However, 95% of 'economic intelligence' was obtained by evaluating publicly accessible information sources, and only 5% came from stolen secrets.
Økonomiske data i andre lande udspioneres, når der er tale om overholdelse af sanktioner og dual-use-varer, samt om at bekæmpe bestikkelse i forbindelse med indgåelse af ordrer.
Espionage was used to secure economic intelligence from other countries where compliance with sanctions and dual-use goods were concerned, and in order to combat bribery in connection with the award of contracts.
Disse oplysninger videregives imidlertid ikke til amerikanske virksomheder.
Such information is not, however, passed to US companies.
Woolsey understreger, at det, selv når man under udspionering af økonomiske data støder på økonomisk anvendelige oplysninger, vil være meget tidskrævende for en analytiker at analysere den store mængde data med henblik herpå, og at det desuden ville være misbrug at bruge tid på spionage mod venligtsindede handelspartnere.
Woolsey stressed that, even if espionage yielded economically usable intelligence, it would take an analyst a very long time to analyse the large volume of available information, and that it would be wrong to use their time on spying on friendly trading partners.
Derudover påpeger han, at det, selv hvis man gjorde det, på grund af det internationale samarbejde ville være vanskeligt at afgøre, hvilken virksomhed, der hørte hjemme i USA, og som man derfor skulle videresende oplysningerne til.
He also pointed out that, even if they did so, complex international interlinkages would make it difficult to decide which companies were US companies and thus should be allowed to have the information.
I årsberetningen for 1999/2000 understreges udtrykkeligt den værdi, det snævre samarbejde under UKUSA-aftalen har, og som genspejles i kvaliteten af de efterretningsmæssige resultater.
In the Intelligence and Security Committee's 1999/2000 annual report, emphasis is specifically placed on the value of the close cooperation under the UKUSA Agreement, as reflected in the quality of the intelligence gathered.
Der henvises navnlig til, at GCHQ, da NSA-anlæggene faldt ud i tre dage, udover UK-kunderne også direkte betjente US-kunderne.
It is pointed out in particular that when the NSA's equipment was out of action for some three days, US customers as well as UK customers were served direct from GCHQ.
Udtalelser fra australsk side Martin Brady, Direktør for DSD, Skrivelse af 16.3.1999 an Ross Coulthart, Sunday Program Channel 9, http://sunday.ninemsn.com/01_cover_stories/transcript_335.asp http://sunday.ninemsn.com/01_cover_stories/transcript_335.asp; http://sunday.ninemsn.com/01_cover_stories/article_335.asp http://sunday.ninemsn.com/01_cover_stories/article_335.asp.
Australia Martin Brady , Director of the DSD, letter of 16.3.1999 to Ross Coulthart, Sunday Program Channel 9 http://sunday.ninemsn.com/01_cover_stories/transcript_335.asp; http://sunday.ninemsn.com/01_cover_stories/article_335.asp
Martin Brady, direktør for den australske efterretningstjeneste, DSD Defence Signals Directorate, australsk efterretningstjeneste, der driver SIGINT. , bekræftede i en skrivelse til programmet "Sunday" på den australske senders "Channel 9", at DSD i UKUSA-regi samarbejder med andre efterretningstjenester.
Martin Brady, Director of the Australian intelligence service DSD Defence Signals Directorate, Australian intelligence service engaged in SIGINT , confirmed in a letter to the 'Sunday' programme on Australia's Channel 9 that DSD cooperated with other intelligence services as part of the UKUSA Agreement.
I samme skrivelse understreges, at samtlige Australiens efterretningsmæssige tjenester drives af australske tjenester alene eller sammen med amerikanske tjenester.
In the same letter, he stressed that all Australia's intelligence facilities were operated by Australian services alone or jointly with US services.
I de tilfælde, hvor anlæg drives i fællesskab, er den australske regering fuldt bekendt med alle aktiviteter, og australsk personale deltager på alle niveauer.
Where use of such facilities is shared, the Australian Government has full knowledge of all activities and Australian personnel is involved at all levels.
Skrivelse fra Martin Brady , direktør for DSD af 16. marts 1999 til Ross Coulthart, Sunday Program Channel 9, http://sunday.ninemsn.com/01_cover_stories/transcript_335.asp; http://sunday.ninemsn.com/01_cover_stories/article_335.asp.
Letter of 16.3.1999 from Martin Brady, Director of the DSD, to Ross Coulthart, 'Sunday' programme; see also: http://sunday.ninemsn.com/01_cover_stories/transcript_335.asp; http://sunday.ninemsn.com/01_cover_stories/article_335.asp
How New Zealand manages its security and intelligence agencies (2000).
How New Zealand manages its security and intelligence agencies (2000) .
Den 19. januar 2001 forelagde den nederlandske forsvarsminister det nederlandske parlament en rapport om tekniske og retlige aspekter af global aflytning af moderne telekommunikationssystemer.
On 19 January 2001, the Netherlands Minister for Defence presented a report to the Netherlands Parliament on technical and legal aspects of the global surveillance of modern telecommunications systems.
Den nederlandske regering kommer til den konklusion, at global aflytning af kommunikationssystemer ikke er begrænset til de stater, der deltager i Echelon-systemet, men også gennemføres af regeringsmyndigheder i andre lande.
The Netherlands Government came to the conclusion that global interception of communications systems was not confined to countries involved in the ECHELON system, but was also carried on by government authorities of other countries.
Luigi Ramponi, tidligere direktør for den italienske efterretningstjeneste SISMI, giver i et interview i dagbladet "il mondo" udtryk for, at der ikke er tvivl om, at "Echelon" eksisterer.
Luigi Ramponi, former director of SISMI, the Italian intelligence service, leaves no room for doubt in the interview he gave for 'Il Mondo' that ECHELON does exist.
Francesco Sorti , Dossier esclusivo.
Francesco Sorti , Dossier esclusivo.
Caso Echelon.
Caso ECHELON.
Parla Luigi Ramponi.
Parla Luigi Ramponi.
Siden 1992 havde han været orienteret om stærke aflytningsaktiviteter vedrørende bølger af lav, mellem og høj frekvens.
Since 1992, he had been kept in the picture about intensive interception of low-, medium- and high frequencies.
Da han i 1991 begyndte hos SISMI, beskæftigede man sig mest med Det Forenede Kongerige og De Forenede Stater.
When he joined SISMI in 1991, most dealings were with the UK and the USA.
Allerede den 17. februar 1998 stillede Elly Plooij-van Gorsel Skriftlig forespørgsel P-0501/98 af Elly Plooij-van Gorsel (ELDR) til Rådet (17.1.1998).
On 17 February 1998 the MEP Elly Plooj-van Gorsel Written Question P-0501/98 by Elly Plooij-van Gorsel (ELDR) to the Council (17.1.1998).
Allerede den 14.5.1997 havde Jonas Sjöstedt stillet et spørgsmål ( H-0330/97 ) til Rådets resolution af 17.1.1995 om overvågning af telekommunikation, hvori der forespurgtes, om dette stod i forbindelse med ECHELON.
On 14.5.1997 Jonas Sjöstedt had tabled a question ( H-0330/97 ) on the Council Resolution of 17.1.1995 on the lawful interception of telecommunications, raising the issue of a link with ECHELON.
Denne del forblev ubesvaret.
No reply was given to this last part of the question.
Forespørgsler af Mihail Papayannakis (G-004/98) og Nel van Dijk ( H-0035/98 ) om britisk spionagevirksomhed blev den 18.2.1998 besvaret med, at efterretningsvæsenet alene henhørte under de nationale myndigheder, og at Rådet ikke havde oplysninger herom. en første omfattende forespørgsel til Rådet vedrørende STOA-rapporten om et globalt aflytningssystem drevet af USA med deltagelse at Det Forenede Kongerige, samt en eventuelt dermed forbunden skade for europæiske virksomheders kommercielle interesser.
The questions tabled by Mihail Papayannakis (G-004/98) and Nel van Dijk ( H-0035/98 ) on British espionage activities were answered, on 18.2.1998, to the effect that the activities of intelligence services were exclusively a matter for national authorities and that the Council had no information whatsoever about such activities. tabled a first comprehensive question to the Council on the STOA report and the existence of a global inception system, operated by the USA and with the involvement of the United Kingdom, and on any resulting damage to the commercial interests of European firms.
Der fulgte talrige forespørgsler til dette emne.
Many further questions on this topic followed.
Skriftlig forespørgsel E-0499/98 af Elly Plooij-van Gorsel (ELDR) til Rådet (27.2.1998), skriftlig forespørgsel E-1775/98 af Lucio Manisco (GUE/NGL) til Rådet (8.6.1998), mundtlig forespørgsel H-1086/98 til Rådet af Patricia McKenna (16.121998), mundtlig forespørgsel H-1172/98 til Rådet af Patricia McKenna (13.1.1999), mundtlig forespørgsel H-1172/98 til Rådet af Inger Schörling (13.1.1999), mundtlig forespørgsel H-0526/99 til Rådet af Pernille Frahm (6.10.1999), mundtlig forespørgsel H-0621/99 til Rådet af Lone Dybkjær (19.11.1999), m. fl.
Written Question E-0499/98 to the Council by Elly Plooij-van Gorsel (ELDR) (27.2.1998), Written question
Rådets formandskab svarede, at Rådet selv ikke havde oplysninger herom, at det ikke var involveret i sådanne spørgsmål og derfor ikke kunne svare.
E-1775/98 to the Council by Lucio Manisco (GUE/NGL) (8.6.1998), Oral Question H-1086/98 to the Council by Patricia McKenna (16.12.1998), Oral Question H-1172/98 to the Council by Patricia McKenna (13.1.1999), Oral Question H-1172/98 to the Council by Inger Schörling (13.1.1999), Oral Question H-0526/99 to the Council by Pernille Frahm (6.10.1999), Oral Question H-0621/99 to the Council by Lorna Dybkjaer (19.11.1999), etc: The Council Presidency replied that the Council itself had no relevant information, that it was not involved in such matters and could therefore give no replies.