natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
11. tager både højde for mangler i udformning, forvaltning og gennemførelse af Socrates- og Ungdomsprogrammerne i perioden 2000-2006 og for Kommissionens bestræbelser på at afhjælpe disse forhold og vil ved forelæggelse af forslag om en forlængelse sikre, at der gennemføres en mere effektiv forvaltning og indføres forenklede procedurer (navnlig for tildeling af beskedne støttebeløb);
Notes both the shortcomings in the design, management or implementation over the period 2000-2006 of the Socrates and Youth programmes and the Commission’s efforts to remedy them, and will seek, when it is presented with proposals for their continuation, to ensure the implementation of more effective management and simplified procedures (particularly for the grant of small subsidies); 12.
12. anmoder Kommissionen om at oplyse, hvilke offentligretlige EF-agenturer KFB'erne skal erstatte,
Insists that the Commission say what Community public-law agencies will replace the TAOs;
14. lægger endvidere vægt på, at der tages hensyn til det grundlæggende princip for programmerne, nemlig præfinansiering,
Emphasises the responsibility of the national agencies for the conduct and financing of decentralised programmes;14.
17. beder Kommissionen om at oplyse, hvilken betydning det vil få for finanskontrollen af programmerne og aktionerne at nedlægge revisionsenhederne og i stedet indføre intern revision,
Would like information from the Commission on the implications, in terms of financial control of the programmes and actions, of converting 'old-style' auditing posts into 'new-style' internal audit posts;
understreger, at evalueringsorganet bør udvælges på grundlag af sin kompetence og uafhængighed med hensyn til det program eller de aktioner, der skal evalueres, i de tilfælde, hvor EU-institutionerne mener, at det er nødvendigt med en ekstern evaluering som supplement til den evaluering, der foretages af de nationale administrationer og fællesskabsadministrationen samt af de interne og eksterne revisorer;
Stresses that, where the European Institutions feel that evaluations carried out by national and Community administrations, as well as by internal and external auditors, need to be supplemented by an external evaluation, the evaluation body must be selected on the basis of its skills and of its independence vis-à-vis the programme or the actions being evaluated.
opfordrer derfor Kommissionen til at udfase eventuelle "rammekontrakter" med eksterne organer om evaluering af de igangværende programmer og afholde sig fra i flere omgange at ansætte det samme organ til at varetage evalueringsopgaver;
Calls upon the Commission, therefore, to phase out any ‘framework’ contract concluded with external bodies for the evaluation of the current programmes and to refrain from hiring any external body on a repeated basis for the purpose of evaluation.
opfordrer derfor indtrængende Kommissionen og medlemsstaterne til at afholde sig fra at ansætte et organ til varetagelse af evalueringsopgaver, der tidligere har haft kontrakt med Kommissionen om udformning, overvågning eller evaluering af aktioner og foranstaltninger under disse programmer;
Urges the Commission and the Member States, therefore, to refrain from hiring, for evaluation purposes, any external body that has had a previous contractual relationship with the Commission for the designing, monitoring or evaluating of actions or measures involved in these programmes.
21. anmoder Revisionsretten om i sine årsberetninger specielt at fokusere på programmerne Socrates og Ungdom for Europa med henblik på at kontrollere, om Kommissionen har udbedret de konstaterede mangler,
Requests the Court of Auditors to pay particular attention to the Socrates and Youth for Europe programmes in its annual reports to enable a check to be made as to whether the Commission has rectified the shortcomings, which have arisen;
Første fase af Socrates-programmet (1995-1999) sigtede mod at bidrage til udviklingen af kvalitetsundervisning og et åbent europæisk område for samarbejde på uddannelsesområdet.
The first phase of the Socrates programme (1995-1999) was 'intended to contribute to the development of quality education and an open European area for cooperation in education'.
De vigtigste tiltag under programmet var Erasmus, der støttede universiteter og fremmede mobiliteten blandt studerende, og Comenius, der søgte at fremme partnerskaber mellem skoler.
The key actions within the programme were Erasmus, which provided support for universities and student mobility, and Comenius, which was to encourage partnerships between schools.
Der blev afsat € 998 mio. til programmet.
Ultimately, € 998 m was made available for the programme.
Programmet Ungdom for Europa var Fællesskabets særlige instrument til fremme af samarbejdet på ungdomsområdet.
The Youth for Europe (YfE) programme was the Community's most important instrument for encouraging cooperation in the youth field.
Der blev afsat € 141 mio. til dette program.
For YfE, € 141 m was made available.
REVISIONSRETTENS BERETNING
THE COURT OF AUDITORS' REPORT
Retten gennemførte revisioner i Kommissionens GD UOK, i det KFB, der stod for forvaltningen af de to programmer, i syv medlemsstater (Tyskland, Frankrig, Grækenland, Italien, Luxembourg, Spanien og Det Forenede Kongerige), og hos de endelige støttemodtagere.
The Court carried out audits in the Commission DG Education and Culture, at the TAO assisting it with programme implementation, in seven Member States (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and the United Kingdom) and on final beneficiaries' premises.
Revisionerne var koncentreret omkring beslutningsprocedurerne i forbindelse med den finansielle forvaltning og omkring overvågnings- og evalueringsprocedurerne.
The audits focused on the decision-taking procedures relating to financial management and on the monitoring and evaluation procedures.
De foranstaltninger under Socrates-programmet, der var omfattet af revisionen, tegnede sig for 76% af programmets budget, og for Ungdomsprogrammet drejede det sig om 75%.
The audited actions within the Socrates programme accounted for 76% of the programme's budget; the actions audited under YfE covered 75% of that programme's budget.
Retten medgiver, at de to programmer har bidraget til at styrke samarbejdet mellem universiteterne i EU og de øvrige deltagerlande og har muliggjort multikulturelle udviklingstiltag til fordel for unge.
The Court acknowledges that both programmes have helped to bolster cooperation between universities in the European Union and in the other participating countries and have made multicultural exchange measures possible for young people.
Den har dog også identificeret en række svagheder i programmernes udformning og forvaltning.
However, it also identified a number of weaknesses in the design and implementation of the programmes.
Svagheder i udformningen: De to programmer var for komplicerede.
Design weaknesses: The two programmes were too complex.
Socrates omfattede ikke færre end 38 aktioner, underaktioner og foranstaltninger.
Socrates comprised no fewer than 38 actions, sub-actions and measures.
Som følge heraf blev programmet fortolket forskelligt af forskellige organer, og samarbejdet mellem medlemsstaterne blev hindret.
As a result, the programme was interpreted in different ways by different agencies and cooperation between Member States was hampered.
Hverken programmets mål eller kriterierne for evaluering af resultaterne var tydelige nok.
Neither the objectives of the programmes nor the criteria for measuring the extent to which they were realised were sufficiently clear.
Dette hindrede en effektiv evaluering af programmerne fra Kommissionens side.
That hindered the Commission in making an effective appraisal of the programmes.
Endelig fandtes der ikke nogen passende ramme, der kunne sikre synergi med andre EU-programmer.
Lastly, there was no appropriate framework for creating synergy with other Community programmes.
En dårlig forvaltningsstruktur: For de enkelte programmer forvaltede Kommissionen ca. 30% af udgifterne via KFB (centraliserede foranstaltninger).
An inadequate implementation structure: For both programmes, the Commission managed about 30% of expenditure via the TAO ('centralised actions').
Det var uforholdsmæssigt dyrt og var præget af uregelmæssigheder i forbindelse med uddelegering af ansvar, potentielle interessekonflikter og risiko for EU's aktiver.
That turned out to be exceptionally costly, and there were irregularities with regard to delegation of responsibility, potential conflicts of interest and risks for the Community's assets.
70% af udgifterne blev forvaltet af NA i deltagerlandene (decentrale aktioner).
Seventy percent of expenditure was managed by national agencies in participating countries ('decentralised actions').
Men der fandtes ikke nogen klar ramme for fordelingen af ansvaret mellem Kommissionen og NA, og sidstnævnte manglede til tider de nødvendige ressourcer til at kunne gøre arbejdet ordentligt.
However, there was no clear legal framework for dividing responsibilities between the Commission and national agencies, and, on occasion, the latter did not have the wherewithal to carry out their tasks properly.
Forsinkelser: Opstarten af de to programmer blev forsinket på grund af den sene vedtagelse.
Delays: The start of the two programmes was delayed because they were adopted late.
Denne situation blev forværret på grund af manglende relevant informationspolitik, komplicerede forvaltningssystemer, utilstrækkelig styring af aftaler og IT-netværkssystemer.
That was aggravated by the lack of an appropriate information policy, complex implementation systems, inappropriate implementation of agreements and unsuitable IT network systems.
Der var sjældent tale om forfinansiering af projekter, og ind imellem modtog støttemodtagerne ikke EU-støtte, før de pågældende projekter var blevet afsluttet.
Projects were seldom prefinanced; and, on occasion, beneficiaries did not receive Community aid until after projects had been completed.
Mangler i gennemførelsen: I KFB og hovedparten af NA var der mangler i forvaltningen i hver eneste fase af gennemførelsen, lige fra udvælgelsen af projekter til overvågning af gennemførelsen.
Shortcomings in implementation: At every stage of implementation - from project selection to implementation monitoring - there were shortcomings at the TAO and in most national agencies.
Hverken de nationale forvaltningsenheder eller EU-forvaltningsenhederne afsatte tilstrækkelige ressourcer til kontrol og evaluering.
Neither the national agencies responsible for implementation nor the relevant Community departments deployed sufficient resources for control and evaluation purposes.
Retten havde mistanke om svig i forbindelse med visse individuelle projekter, den reviderede, og henviste en række af dem til OLAF.
The Court voiced suspicion of possible fraud in connection with some of the projects it audited, referring a number of them to OLAF.
Både midtvejsrapporterne og den endelige evaluering af Socrates offentliggjordes sent.
Both the mid-term report and the final evaluation report on Socrates were published late.
Midtvejsrapporten om Ungdomsprogrammet, der blev udarbejdet af et rådgivningsfirma, der tilhørte en tidligere direktør for det KFB, der forvaltede programmet, blev også offentliggjort sent.
The YfE mid-term report, which was produced by a consultancy owned by a former director of the TAO, was also published late.
Afgørelsen om Ungdomsprogrammet krævede ikke en slutrapport.
The Decision on the YfE programme did not make a final report mandatory.
En kvantitativ vurdering af programmerne var ikke mulig i mangel af klare målgrupper, præstationsindikatorer og regelmæssigt opdaterede statistiske data.
The lack of clear target groups, performance indicators and regularly updated statistics hampered a quantitative evaluation of the programmes.
Retten fandt det vanskeligt at fastslå, hvorvidt programmernes målsætninger var blevet gennemført.
The Court of Auditors did indeed find it hard to come to a judgment as to whether or not the programmes' objectives had been realised.
Evalueringsrapporterne blev udarbejdet for sent til at være til nogen nytte i forbindelse med forberedelsen af anden fase af Socrates og det nye Ungdomsprogram.
The evaluation reports were completed so late that they were of no use for preparing the second phase of Socrates and the new Youth programme.
10.september 2002 UDTALELSE FRA UDVALGET OM KULTUR, UNGDOM, UDDANNELSE, MEDIER OG SPORT
10 September 2002 OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON CULTURE, YOUTH, EDUCATION, THE MEDIA AND SPORT
om Revisionsrettens særberetning nr. 2/2002 om fællesskabshandlingsprogrammerne Socrates og Ungdom for Europa
on the Court of Auditors Special Report No. 2/2002 on the Socrates and Youth for Europe Community action programmes
På mødet den 3. juni 2002 valgte Udvalget om Kultur, Ungdom, Uddannelse, Medier og Sport Doris Pack til rådgivende ordfører.
The Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport appointed Doris Pack draftsman at its meeting of 3 June 2002.
På møder den 10.-11. juli og 10. september 2002 behandlede udvalget udkastet til udtalelse.
It considered the draft opinion at its meeting of 10-11 July 2002 and 10 September 2002.
Til stede under afstemningen var: Vasco Graça Moura (mødeformand), Mario Mauro (næstformand), Theresa Zabell (næstformand), Ruth Hieronymi (for Doris Pack, ordfører); Pedro Aparicio Sánchez, Christopher J.P. Beazley, Marielle de Sarnez, Marie-Hélène Gillig (for Lissy Gröner), Ulpu Iivari, Renzo Imbeni, Maria Martens, Pietro-Paolo Mennea, Barbara O'Toole, Roy Perry, Marieke Sanders-ten Holte, Stavros Xarchakos og Eurig Wyn.
The following were present for the vote: Vasco Graça Moura, acting chairman; Mario Mauro, vice-chairman, Theresa Zabell, vice-chairman, Ruth Hieronymi (for Doris Pack, draftsman); Pedro Aparicio Sánchez, Christopher J.P. Beazley, Marielle de Sarnez, Marie-Hélène Gillig (for Lissy Gröner), Ulpu Iivari, Renzo Imbeni, Maria Martens, Pietro-Paolo Mennea, Barbara O'Toole, Roy Perry, Marieke Sanders-ten Holte, Stavros Xarchakos and Eurig Wyn.
Første fase af Socrates-programmet sigtede mod at bidrage til udviklingen af kvalitetsundervisning og et åbent europæisk område for samarbejde på uddannelsesområdet.
The first phase of the SOCRATES programme aimed to 'contribute to the development of quality education' and an open European area for cooperation in education.
"Ungdom for Europa" programmet var Fællesskabets særlige instrument til fremme af samarbejdet på ungdomsområdet.
The 'Youth for Europe' (YFE) programme was the Community's special instrument for encouraging cooperation in the field of youth.
Retten gennemførte revisioner i Kommissionens GD UOK, i det KFB, der stod for forvaltningen af de to programmer, i syv medlemsstater, i 27 NA og hos de endelige støttemodtagere.
The Court carried out audits in Commission DG EAC, in the TAO which assisted it in the management of the two programmes, in seven Member States, in 27 NAs and on the premises of final beneficiaries.
Revisionerne var koncentreret omkring beslutningsprocedurerne i forbindelse med den finansielle forvaltning og omkring overvågnings- og evalueringsprocedurerne.
The audits concentrated on decision-making procedures relating to financial management; and on monitoring and evaluation procedures.
De foranstaltninger under Socrates-programmet, der var omfattet af revisionen, tegnede sig for 76% af programmets budget, og for Ungdomsprogrammet drejede det sig om 75%.
The actions within the SOCRATES programme which were audited account for 76% of the programme's budget; those for YFE covered 75% of its budget.
Retten medgiver, at de to programmer har bidraget til at styrke samarbejdet mellem universiteterne i EU og de øvrige deltagerlande og har muliggjort multikulturelle udviklingstiltag til fordel for unge.
The Court acknowledges that the two programmes 'contributed to a strengthening of cooperation between universities in the European Union and in the other participant countries and have made multicultural exchange activities possible for the benefit of young people'.
Den har dog også identificeret en række svagheder i programmernes udformning og forvaltning.
However, it also identifies a number of weaknesses in the design and management of the programmes.
Svagheder i udformningen: De to programmer var for komplicerede.
Design weaknesses : The two programmes were too complicated.
Endelig fandtes der ikke nogen passende ramme, der kunne sikre synergi med andre EU-programmer.
Finally, there was no appropriate framework to ensure synergy with other Community programmes.
70% af udgifterne blev forvaltet af NA i deltagerlandene (decentrale aktioner).
70% of expenditure was managed by NAs in the participating countries ('decentralised' actions).
Men der fandtes ikke nogen klar ramme for fordelingen af ansvaret mellem Kommissionen og NA, og sidstnævnte manglede til tider de nødvendige ressourcer til at kunne gøre arbejdet ordentligt.
But there was no clear legal framework for the division of responsibilities between the Commission and the NAs and the latter sometimes lacked the resources necessary to do their job properly.
Der var sjældent tale om forfinansiering af projekter, og ind imellem modtog støttemodtagerne ikke EU-støtte, før de pågældende projekter var blevet afsluttet.
Prefinancing of projects was rare and beneficiaries sometimes did not receive Community aid until after the projects in question had been completed.
Mangler i gennemførelsen: I KFB og hovedparten af NA var der mangler i forvaltningen i hver eneste fase af gennemførelsen, lige fra udvælgelsen af projekter til overvågning af gennemførelsen.
Shortcomings in implementation : In the TAO and the majority of NAs, there were management shortcomings at every stage of implementation, from selection of projects to monitoring of their implementation.
Hverken de nationale forvaltningsenheder eller EU-forvaltningsenhederne afsatte tilstrækkelige ressourcer til kontrol og evaluering.
Neither national nor Community managing bodies devoted enough resources to control and evaluation.
Retten havde mistanke om svig i forbindelse med visse individuelle projekter, den reviderede, og henviste en række af dem til OLAF.
The Court suspected possible fraud in some of the individual projects it audited and referred a number of them to OLAF.
Både midtvejsrapporterne og den endelige evaluering af Socrates offentliggjordes sent.
Both the mid-term and the final evaluation reports on SOCRATES were published late.
Midtvejsrapporten om Ungdomsprogrammet, der blev udarbejdet af et rådgivningsfirma, der tilhørte en tidligere direktør for det KFB, der forvaltede programmet, blev også offentliggjort sent.
The mid-term YFE report - which was drawn up by a consulting company owned by a former director of the TAO managing YFE - was also published late: the Decision establishing YFE required no final report.
En kvantitativ vurdering af programmerne var ikke mulig i mangel af klare målgrupper, præstationsindikatorer og regelmæssigt opdaterede statistiske data.
The absence of clear target groups, performance indicators and regularly updated statistical data, hindered a quantitative assessment of the programmes.
Retten fandt det vanskeligt at fastslå, hvorvidt programmernes målsætninger var blevet gennemført.
Indeed, the Court found it difficult to decide whether or not the objectives of the programmes had been achieved.
Evalueringsrapporterne blev udarbejdet for sent til at være til nogen nytte i forbindelse med forberedelsen af anden fase af Socrates og det nye Ungdomsprogram.
Evaluation reports were completed too late to be useful in preparing the second phase of SOCRATES and the new YOUTH programme.
Anbefalinger: Retten foreslog en række forbedringer til forvaltningen af de efterfølgende programmer (anden fase af Socrates og Ungdomsprogrammet).
Recommendations : The Court suggests a number of ways in which management of the successor programmes (the second phase of SOCRATES and the YOUTH programme) could be improved:
∙ KFB erstattes af et EU-forvaltningsorgan ∙ forholdet mellem Kommissionens og de nationale agenturers ansvar skal præciseres ∙ der skal fastsættes tydelige og målelige mål ∙ der skal fastlægges effektive gennemførelsesbestemmelser ∙ forbedret kontrol og overvågning på alle niveauer ∙ effektive og rettidige evalueringer.
∙ replacing the TAO with a Community agency; ∙ defining more clearly the relationship between the Commission's responsibilities and those of the national agencies; ∙ setting clear and measurable objectives; ∙ establishing effective implementing rules; ∙ improving control and monitoring at all levels; ∙ providing effective and timely evaluations.
DEN RÅDGIVENDE ORDFØRERS KOMMENTARER
DRAFTSMAN'S COMMENTS
Parlamentet har allerede udtalt sig om slutrapporten vedrørende første fase af Socrates-programmet.
The Parliament has already commented on the final report on the first phase of the SOCRATES programme.
Dechargeprocedurerne for den periode, der er dækket af Rettens særberetning (1995-1999), er nu alle afsluttet.
Moreover, the budget discharge procedures for the period covered by the Court report (1995-1999) have now all been completed.
Alligevel er Rettens beretning af mere end rent historisk interesse.
Nevertheless, the Court's report is of more than merely historical interest.
Kommissionen har allerede erkendt, at der var alvorlige svagheder i Socrates og Ungdomsprogrammet og har forsøgt at afhjælpe disse i Socrates II og Ungdomsprogrammerne.
The Commission has already accepted that there were serious weaknesses in SOCRATES I and YFE and has attempted to remedy these in the SOCRATES II and YOUTH programmes.
Men der er foruroligende tegn på, at det ikke helt er lykkedes.
But there is worrying evidence that it has not been entirely successful.
Mange af de problemer, Retten påpeger i forbindelse med udformningen og gennemførelsen af Socrates og Ungdomsprogrammerne, er de samme, som medførte en pinlig udgang på første fase af Leonardo da Vinci-programmet.
Many of the problems which the Court identifies in the design and implementation of the SOCRATES and YFE programmes are the same as those which brought the first phase of the LEONARDO DA VINCI programme to such an ignominious end.
Retten bemærker, at de administrative mangler i forbindelse med gennemførelsen af programmerne forværredes af manglen på ægte kontrol og evaluering fra forvaltningsorganernes side – både på nationalt plan og EU-plan.
The Court comments that management shortcomings in the implementation of the programmes it examined 'were aggravated by the lack of any genuine control and evaluation culture on the part of the managing bodies, both national and Community.'
Den fremhæver generaldirektoratets forsinkede og utilstrækkelige reaktion på problemer, der ikke blot er blevet påpeget af dets egen interne revisionsenhed, men også af Kommissionens Finansinspektion.
It singles out the belated and inadequate response of the Directorate-General's to the problems identified not only by its own Internal Audit Unit but also by the Commission's Financial Control DG.
Disse bemærkninger genkalder på foruroligende vis konklusionerne fra Den Uafhængige Ekspertgruppe om, at GDXXII's manglende evne til at reagere på påstande om svig og uregelmæssigheder i forbindelse med Leonardo/Agenor-KFB var tegn på svagheder i informationskanalerne og kontrolmekanismerne inden for Kommissionen, helt op på højeste niveau.
These comments are worryingly reminiscent of the conclusion of the Committee of Independent Experts that the failure of the then DGXXII to act on allegations of fraud and irregularities surrounding the Leonardo/Agenor Technical Assistance office was 'a demonstration of the weaknesses of the information channels and control mechanisms within the Commission, up to the highest level'.
Kort sagt stammede mange af de administrative svagheder i forbindelse med gennemførelsen af programmerne før 2000 direkte fra en selvtilfreds, letargisk og afvisende administrativ kultur.
In short, many of the management weaknesses in the implementation of the programmes before 2000 stemmed directly from a complacent, lethargic and unresponsive administrative culture.