natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
På mødet den 13. juni 2002 meddelte Parlamentets formand, at Udvalget om Økonomi og Valutaspørgsmål havde fået tilladelse til at udarbejde en initiativbetænkning, jf. forretningsordenens artikel 163, om Den Europæiske Bank for Genopbygning og Udviklings (EBRD) aktiviteter, og at Budgetkontroludvalget var udpeget som rådgivende udvalg.
At the sitting of 13 June 2002 the President of Parliament announced that the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs had been authorised to draw up an own-initiative report, pursuant to Rule 163 of the Rules of Procedure, on the activities of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and that the Committee on Budgetary Control had been asked for its opinion.
På mødet den 15. april 2002 havde Udvalget om Økonomi og Valutaspørgsmål valgt Helmuth Markov til ordfører.
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs had appointed Helmuth Markov rapporteur at its meeting of 15 April 2002.
På møder den 1. oktober, 5. november og 28. november 2002 behandlede udvalget udkastet til betænkning.
It considered the draft report at its meetings of 1 October, 5 November and 28 November 2002.
Til stede under afstemningen var: John Purvis (mødeformand), Helmuth Markov (ordfører), Generoso Andria, Pervenche Berès, Roberto Felice Bigliardo, Hans Udo Bullmann, Ingo Friedrich, Lisbeth Grönfeldt Bergman, Brice Hortefeux, Christopher Huhne, Othmar Karas, Christoph Werner Konrad, Astrid Lulling, David W. Martin, Fernando Pérez Royo, Alexander Radwan, Bernhard Rapkay, Olle Schmidt, Peter William Skinner, Helena Torres Marques, Bruno Trentin, Theresa Villiers, Richard A. Balfe (for Jonathan Evans), Bert Doorn (for José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil), Werner Langen. (for Renato Brunetta), Thomas Mann (for Hans-Peter Mayer), Luis Berenguer Fuster (for Robert Goebbels), Ieke van den Burg (for Mary Honeyball), Harald Ettl (for Giorgos Katiforis), Manuel António dos Santos (for Christa Randzio-Plath), Elly Plooij-van Gorsel (for Carles-Alfred Gasòliba i Böhm) og Herman Schmid (for Philippe A.R. Herzog).
The following were present for the vote: John Purvis acting chairman; Helmuth Markov, rapporteur; Generoso Andria, Pervenche Berès, Roberto Felice Bigliardo, Hans Udo Bullmann, Ingo Friedrich, Lisbeth Grönfeldt Bergman, Brice Hortefeux, Christopher Huhne, Othmar Karas, Christoph Werner Konrad, Astrid Lulling, David W. Martin, Fernando Pérez Royo, Alexander Radwan, Bernhard Rapkay, Olle Schmidt, Peter William Skinner, Helena Torres Marques, Bruno Trentin, Theresa Villiers, Richard A. Balfe (for Jonathan Evans), Bert Doorn (for José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil), Werner Langen. (for Renato Brunetta), Thomas Mann (for Hans-Peter Mayer), Luis Berenguer Fuster (for Robert Goebbels), Ieke van den Burg (for Mary Honeyball), Harald Ettl (for Giorgos Katiforis), Manuel António dos Santos (for Christa Randzio-Plath), Elly Plooij-van Gorsel (for Carles-Alfred Gasòliba i Böhm), Herman Schmid (for Philippe A.R. Herzog).
Budgetkontroludvalget vedtog den 10. september 2002 ikke at afgive udtalelse.
The Committee on Budgetary Control decided on 10 September 2002 not to deliver an opinion.
Betænkningen indgivet den 4. december 2002.
The report was tabled on 4 December 2002.
FORSLAG TIL BESLUTNING Europa-Parlamentets beslutning om Den Europæiske Bank for Genopbygning og Udviklings (EBRD) aktiviteter (2002/2095(INI))
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION European Parliament resolution on the activities of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (2002/2095(INI))
– der henviser til overenskomsten om oprettelse af Den Europæiske Bank for Genopbygning og Udvikling (EBRD), der blev undertegnet den 29. maj 1990 i Paris,
– having regard to the Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which was signed in Paris on 29 May 1990,
– der henviser til EBRD's vedtægt og bestyrelsens forretningsorden,
– having regard to the By-Laws of the EBRD and the Rules of Procedure of the Board of Governors,
– der henviser til sin beslutning af 4. oktober 2000 om udvidelsen af Den Europæiske Union EFT C 178 af 22.6.2001, s. 68-122. ,
– having regard to its resolution of 4 October 2000 on the enlargement of the European Union OJ C 178, 22.6.2001, p.
– der henviser til Europarådets parlamentariske forsamlings beslutninger 1287 (2002) Forsamling drøftelse den 25.6.2002 (19. samling). , 1254 (2001) Forsamling drøftelse den 26.6.2001 (19. samling). , 1218 (2000) Forsamling drøftelse den 27.6.2000 (19. samling). og 1192 (1999) Forsamling drøftelse den 22.6.1999 (19. samling). ,
– having regard to Resolutions 1287 (2002) Assembly debate on 25.6.2002 (19th Sitting) , 1254 (2001) Assembly debate on 26.6.2001 (19th Sitting) , 1218 (2000) Assembly debate on 27.6.2000 (19th Sitting) and 1192 (1999) Assembly debate on 22.6.1999 (19th Sitting) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe,
– der henviser til Den Europæiske Bank for Genopbygning og Udviklings (EBRD) årsberetninger fra 1991 til 2001,
– having regard to the Annual Reports of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) from 1991 to 2001,
– der henviser til den tale, som Lemierre, formand for EBRD, holdt for Udvalget om Økonomi- og Valutaspørgsmål den 1. oktober 2002,
– having regard to the speech by Mr Lemierre, President of the EBRD, to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 1 October 2002,
– der henviser til betænkning fra Udvalget om Økonomi og Valutaspørgsmål ( A5‑0421/2002 ),
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs ( A5‑0421/2002 ),
A. der henviser til, at overenskomsten om oprettelse af Den Europæiske Bank for Genopbygning og Udvikling (EBRD) (i det følgende benævnt "overenskomsten") blev undertegnet i Paris den 29. maj 1990 og trådte i kraft den 28. marts 1991,
A. whereas the Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (subsequently referred to as 'the Agreement') was signed in Paris on 29 May 1990 and entered into force on 28 March 1991,
B. der henviser til, at EBRD er en af de fire store regionale udviklingsbanker foruden Den Afrikanske Udviklingsbank, Den Asiatiske Udviklingsbank og Den Interamerikanske Udviklingsbank,
B. whereas the EBRD is one of the four big regional development banks, alongside the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank,
C. der henviser til, at EBRD i dag ejes af 62 lande samt Det Europæiske Fællesskab og Den Europæiske Investeringsbank og er aktiv i 27 lande i Europa og Asien, der er i en overgangsfase (Albanien, Armenien, Aserbajdsjan, Belarus, Bosnien-Hercegovina, Bulgarien, Estland, Georgien, Jugoslavien, Kasakhstan, Kirgisistan, Kroatien, Letland, Litauen, Makedonien, Moldova, Polen, Rumænien, Den Russiske Føderation, Den Slovakiske Republik, Slovenien, Tadsjikistan, Den Tjekkiske Republik, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Ungarn, Usbekistan),
C. whereas 62 countries, together with the European Community and the European Investment Bank, currently hold shares in the EBRD, which operates in 27 countries in Europe and Asia which are undergoing transition (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Yugoslavia),
D. der henviser til, at EU-medlemsstaterne ejer i alt 57% af EBRD's aktiekapital (og de dermed forbundne stemmerettigheder);
D. whereas the EU Member States hold between them 57% of the EBRD's capital (together with the associated voting rights),
E. der henviser til, at aktionærerne i april 1996 enstemmigt godkendte en aftale om fordobling af EBRD's aktiekapital til 20 mia. EUR, der trådte i kraft i 1997,
E. whereas in April 1996 the shareholders unanimously approved an agreement to double the EBRD's capital to EUR 20 billion, an agreement which entered into force in 1997,
F. der henviser til, at EBRD er enestående blandt de multilaterale udviklingsbanker ved både at have et politisk og økonomisk mandat; der henviser til, at EBRD's mål i henhold til artikel 1 i overenskomsten om oprettelse af Den Europæiske Bank for Genopbygning og Udvikling er "at lette overgangen til åbne markedsøkonomier samt fremme privat initiativ og foretagsomhed i de central- og østeuropæiske lande, som bekender sig til og anvender principperne om demokratisk flerpartistyre, pluralisme og markedsøkonomi";
F. whereas the EBRD is unique among multilateral development banks in having both a political and an economic mandate; whereas the purpose of the EBRD, pursuant to Article 1 of the Agreement, is to '… foster the transition towards open market-oriented economies and to promote private and entrepreneurial initiative in the central and eastern European countries committed to and applying the principles of multiparty democracy, pluralism and market economics',
G. der henviser til, at EBRD i henhold til overenskomstens artikel 2 er forpligtet til inden for rammerne af alle bankens aktiviteter "at fremme en miljømæssig sund og bæredygtig udvikling",
G. whereas the EBRD, pursuant to Article 2 of the Agreement, is required '… to promote in the full range of its activities environmentally sound and sustainable development',
H. der henviser til, at EBRD har fået overdraget ansvaret for forvaltningen af følgende fonde:
H. whereas the EBRD was given responsibility for managing the following funds:
- kontoen for nuklear sikkerhed, - tre internationale fonde til understøttelse af nedlukning af kernereaktorer i Bulgarien, Litauen og Den Slovakiske Republik, - fonden for Tjernobyl-sarkofagen, der har til formål at stabilisere den eksisterende reaktor og foretage indkapsling,
- the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA), - three international funds to support the decommissioning of nuclear reactors (IDSFs) in Bulgaria, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic, - the Chernobyl Shelter Fund (CSF), the aim of which is to stabilise the existing reactor and build a shelter,
I. der henviser til, at EBRD ifølge artikel 11 i overenskomsten om oprettelse af banken er forpligtet til at placere mindst 60% af sine investeringer i den private sektor, hvad der er en undtagelse i forhold til de øvrige multinationale investeringsbanker, da disse som regel begrænser sig til lån, der dækkes af statsgarantier,
I. whereas the EBRD, pursuant to Article 11 of the Agreement, is required to effect more than 60% of its investment in the private sector, this being an exception among multinational investment banks, since they usually restrict themselves to lending backed by State guarantees,
J. der henviser til, at EBRD bygger sin investeringspolitik på følgende tre principper: bidrag til overgangsprocessen, additionalitetsprincippet (evnen til ikke at fortrænge private finansieringskilder) og sunde bankprincipper,
J. whereas the EBRD bases its investment policy on three principles: making a contribution to the transition process, additionality (the capacity not to squeeze out private sources of finance) and sound banking principles,
K. der henviser til, at EBRD's aktivitetsområde blev udvidet til de stater, der er opstået efter USSR's og Jugoslaviens sammenbrud; der henviser til, at der er store forskelle i omfanget af EBRD-fondenes investeringer pr. indbygger i de enkelte lande, idet Estland, Slovenien og Kroatien har modtaget flest midler og Ukraine, Jugoslavien, Belarus og Tadsjikistan færrest midler,
K. whereas the EBRD's sphere of operations was extended to include the States which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; whereas there are substantial differences in the level of investment per capita by EBRD funds in the various countries, with Estonia, Slovenia and Croatia receiving the most resources and Ukraine, Yugoslavia, Belarus and Tajikistan the least,
L. der henviser til, at EBRD arbejder i et udpræget ustabilt og omskifteligt miljø, hvilket giver sig udslag i problemer såsom politisk ustabilitet, dårlig økonomisk forvaltning, vidt udbredt korruption og nepotisme, styring af virksomheder på grundlag af statslige privilegier, forarmelse og ineffektiv offentlig forvaltning,
L. whereas the EBRD operates in a highly unstable and changeable environment, which manifests itself in problems such as political instability, economic mismanagement, widespread corruption and nepotism, management of businesses based on State privileges, impoverishment and ineffective public administrations,
M. der noterer og glæder sig over, at EBRD har været en god støtte for kandidatlandene, som bl.a. med bankens hjælp nu næsten har opnået en markedsøkonomi med fri konkurrence,
M. noting and welcoming the fact that the EBRD has given solid support to the candidate countries, which, partly with the EBRD’s help, have now nearly achieved a market economy with free competition,
N. der henstiller til EBRD regelmæssigt at gennemgå sin organisation for at sikre sig, at bankens ressourcer anvendes effektivt,
N. reminding the EBRD that it should regularly monitor its organisation so as to ensure that the Bank’s resources are effectively used,
3. påskønner EBRD's risikovillighed og er af den opfattelse, at det indgår som et grundlæggende element i en offentlig banks opgaver at engagere sig i projekter, som af private banker anses for at være for risikable; mener, at større risikovillighed nødvendigvis indebærer en øget forsknings- og gennemførelsesindsats, som ikke kan undgå at øge bankens videns- og handlingskompetence og dermed også indvirker positivt på banken; konstaterer, at EBRD-medarbejdernes faglige ekspertise og kompetence generelt anerkendes og påskønnes;
Expresses its appreciation of the EBRD's willingness to take risks and considers that it is an original part of the mandate of a public bank to commit itself to projects which are deemed by private banks to be too risky; takes the view that a greater willingness to take risks necessarily entails increased research and implementation efforts which can only enhance the Bank’s knowledge and operating skills, and thus also has positive effects on the Bank; notes that the technical expertise and competence of EBRD staff are widely acknowledged and valued;
7. minder om, at artikel 2 i overenskomsten udtrykkeligt fastsætter, at fremme af små og mellemstore virksomheder indgår i EBRD's opgaver; understreger SMV'ernes særlige rolle i skabelsen og sikringen af uddannelses- og arbejdspladser; forventer derfor, at EBRD gennem øget engagement bidrager til styrkelse af SMV'ernes kapitalgrundlag, især i Rusland, hvor i øjeblikket kun 10% af arbejdsstyrken er beskæftiget i SMV'er;
Points out that Article 2 of the Agreement explicitly lays down the promotion of small and medium-sized businesses as part of the EBRD's mandate; emphasises the special role of small and medium-sized firms in creating and securing training places and jobs; therefore expects the EBRD to step up its involvement and thereby help to boost the capital base of such firms, especially in Russia, where only 10% of the workforce is employed in small and medium-sized firms;
10. konstaterer, at der er stor forskel på omfanget af EBRD's finansiering i de mere udviklede lande og de svagere stillede lande; bifalder i denne forbindelse EBRD's nye strategi med i højere grad at orientere sig mod de mindst udviklede lande i Kaukasus og Centralasien; konstaterer, at der i Rusland og Ukraine er et stort behov for investeringer, forudsat at de nationale og lokale myndigheder viser, at de er fast besluttede på at videreføre reformkursen; fastslår, at overgangsprocessen i Central- og Østeuropa også i de mest udviklede lande endnu er langt fra fuldendt, og opfordrer til, at der fortsat føres en aktiv politik også efter disse landes tiltrædelse af EU;
Notes that there are substantial differences between the levels of EBRD financing in the more highly developed countries and in the weaker countries; in this connection, welcomes the new EBRD strategy of focusing more on the least-developed countries in the Caucasus and in Central Asia; notes that investment is badly needed in Russia and the Ukraine, provided that the national and local authorities demonstrate their resolve to continue on the path of reform; notes that the process of transition in Central and Eastern Europe is far from complete even in the most highly advanced countries, and calls for active policies to be continued after their accession to the European Union;
12. er af den opfattelse, at EBRD ikke burde forsøge at gå frem efter samme fremgangsmåde i alle lande, men derimod tilpasse sin politik til de lokale forhold; mener især, at EBRD bør respektere politiske afgørelser truffet af demokratisk valgte regeringer og derfor ikke bør øve indflydelse på opdelingen mellem den offentlige og den private sektor i de enkelte lande;
Takes the view that the EBRD should not attempt to operate in the same way in every country, but should tailor its policies to local circumstances, instead; considers, in particular, that the EBRD should respect political decisions taken by democratically elected governments, and consequently should not influence the division between the public and private sectors in each country;
14. henstiller til EBRD at følge en helhedsstrategi, der hjælper med til at etablere hele værditilvækstkæder lige fra forarbejdning af råvarer til salg af produktet på lokalt plan og dermed bidrager til at fremme regionale og økonomiske og sociale kredsløb;
Recommends that the EBRD pursue an integrated approach designed to help entire value-added chains – from the processing of raw materials to the sale of the product at local level – get established, and thus contribute to the promotion of regional economic and social flows;
18. henstiller til EBRD at udnytte sine erfaringer med virksomheder med likviditetsproblemer for at yde kompetent bistand til de virksomheder, der uforskyldt lider tab på grund af afmatningen i den økonomiske aktivitet;
Recommends that the EBRD use its experience in dealing with firms with liquidity problems to provide competent support for firms which, through no fault of their own, are suffering losses owing to the weakness of economic activity;
20. henstiller til EBRD at udbygge sit netværk af lokale repræsentationer og til at oprette regionale kontorer, især i Rusland og Ukraine, hvor der er store regionale forskelle;
Recommends that the EBRD extend its network of local representations and set up regional offices, especially in Russia and the Ukraine, where there are huge regional disparities;
23. minder EBRD om, at udvidelsen betyder, at EU får nye naboer, og at bankens strategier i Ukraine og Moldova derfor bør styrkes; påpeger, at man derfor bør prioritere projekter, som støtter udviklingen af demokratiet, der i forbindelse med Belarus bedst vil kunne opnås ved hjælp af ikke-statslige organisationer i stedet for direkte af EBRD;
Reminds the EBRD that enlargement will mean new borders for the EU and that consequently the Bank’s strategies in Ukraine and Moldova should be stepped up; points out that priority should be given to projects which support the development of democracy, which in the case of Belarus, could most sensibly be done through NGOs rather than directly by the EBRD;
Forbindelser med andre institutioner
Relations with other institutions
35. pålægger sin formand at sende denne beslutning til Rådet og Kommissionen samt Den Europæiske Bank for Genopbygning og Udvikling (EBRD), Den Europæiske Centralbank, Den Europæiske Investeringsbank og medlemsstaternes og kandidatlandenes parlamenter.
Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and Commission, as well as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Central Bank, the European Investment Bank and the national parliaments of the Member States and the candidate countries.
Kommentarer og meningstilkendegivelser om denne ikke særlig kendte udviklingsbank er sjældne.
Comments and expressions of opinion about the activities of this little-known development bank are rare.
Det hænger måske sammen med, at denne bank ikke ligesom Den Europæiske Investeringsbank er bundet til Den Europæiske Union.
This may be connected with the fact that the Bank, unlike the European Investment Bank, is not linked to the European Union.
EBRD er heller ikke nogen global udviklingsbank under Verdensbankgruppen som for eksempel Den Asiatiske Udviklingsbank eller Den Afrikanske Udviklingsbank.
Nor is the EBRD a global development bank, akin to the Asiatic Development Bank or the African Development Bank, coming under the umbrella of the World Bank group.
I stedet for stammer dens kapital fra over 60 lande, som har interesse i Central- og Østeuropas fremtid efter Berlinmurens fald.
Its capital derives instead from more than 60 countries with an interest in the future of Central and Eastern Europe, following the fall of the Berlin Wall.
I de sidste tolv år af overgangsperioden er EBRD blevet stillet over for mange udfordringer.
Over the last 12 years of transition the EBRD has had to tackle many challenges.
I Jacques Attalis formandsperiode blev banken hurtigt skydeskive for offentlig kritik på grund af dens ambitiøse personalepolitik og de enorme omkostninger forbundet med hovedsædet i London.
Under the leadership of Jacques Attali, the Bank swiftly became a target of public criticism on account of its ambitious personnel policy and the massive costs of its head office in London.
Den næste formand, Jacques de Larosière, genoprettede institutionens troværdighed.
The next President, Jacques Delarosière, restored the institution's credibility.
Personaleomkostningerne stabiliserede sig mellem 1993 og 1998.
Staff costs remained stable between 1993 and 1998.
I 1997 kunne den udvise finansieringstilsagn på i alt 13,9 mia. ecu, efter at den havde indledt sit arbejde i 1991.
However, the Bank's funding potential continued to be under-exploited.
Horst Koehler havde netop overtaget ledelsen af banken, da Rusland-krisen brød ud i 1998.
Horst Koehler had just taken over the helm at the Bank when the Russian crisis broke in 1998.
Indtil 1997 havde banken investeret i den russiske finanssektor for at reformere den indefra.
Up to 1997 the Bank had invested in the Russian financial sector in order to reform it from the inside out.
Chokket var stort.
The shock was huge.
EBRD havde investeret betragtelige summer og kunne således for første gang i sin historie notere underskud.
The EBRD had invested substantial sums, and as a result it went into the red for the first time in its history.
Senere indrømmede den selvkritisk, at visse risici, der opstod på baggrund af nogle virksomheders tvivlsomme forretningsstandarder, var blevet undervurderet.
It later admitted, exercising self-criticism, that certain risks arising from companies' questionable business standards had been underestimated.
Banken havde tilsvarende overvurderet sin evne til at øve indflydelse på virksomheder med det formål at forbedre tvivlsomme forretningsstandarder.
Similarly, the Bank had overestimated its ability to exercise influence over firms with the aim of raising low business standards.
Dog gjorde banken det udtrykkelig klart, at den til trods for de yderst vanskelige økonomiske betingelser ikke agtede at trække sig tilbage fra Rusland.
The Bank nonetheless made it abundantly clear that even in the most difficult economic circumstances it would not withdraw from Russia.
Ruslandserfaringerne viser, hvilken høj strukturel risiko banken var udsat for via sine aktiviteter.
The experience with Russia shows the scale of the structural risk to which the Bank was exposed through its operations.
I årene 2000 og 2001 sørgede de stigende råvarepriser og den fremskyndede vækst i verdensøkonomien for et øget investeringsbehov i Østeuropa og Rusland, hvor banken gennemførte enkelte store projekter i energisektoren.
In 2000 and 2001 rising raw materials prices and faster economic growth worldwide meant that there was a greater need for investment in Eastern Europe and Russia, where the Bank was running several major energy projects.