natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Kommissionen overvåger nøje , hvordan medlemsstaterne gennemfører dette direktiv, det gælder ikke mindst, om de foranstaltninger, der træffes, er i overensstemmelse med artikel 4 , og hvilken virkning de har på det indre marked for gas og konkurrenceudviklingen i Den Europæiske Union .
The Commission shall closely monitor the manner in which Member States implement this Directive, and in particular the compatibility of the measures taken with regard to article 4 and their effect on the internal gas market and the development of competition within the European Union.
Kommissionen overvåger nøje, at tredjeparter har adgang til lagrene på vilkår, der udelukker forskelsbehandling.
The Commission shall closely monitor the availability of third party access to storage on non-discriminatory terms and conditions.
På baggrund af denne overvågnings resultater vil Kommissionen, hvis det er påkrævet, men dog ikke senere end den 1. januar 2004, fremsætte forslag til yderligere foranstaltninger , der skal sikre effektiv lageradgang.
In the light of the results of this monitoring, the Commission shall, if necessary, no later than 1 January 2004 present proposals regarding further measures to ensure effective access to storage.
Kommissionen overvåger, hvordan medlemsstaterne gennemfører dette direktiv, det gælder ikke mindst, om de foranstaltninger, der træffes, er i overensstemmelse med artikel 4.
The Commission shall monitor the manner in which Member States implement this Directive, and in particular the compatibility of the measures taken with regard to article 4.
På baggrund af denne overvågnings resultater vil Kommissionen, hvis det er påkrævet, men dog senest fem år efter dette direktivs ikrafttræden forslag til yderligere foranstaltninger til forbedring af forsyningssikkerheden .
In the light of the results of this monitoring, the Commission shall, if necessary, no later than five years after the entry into force of this directive present proposals regarding further measures to enhance security of supply .
Der er tale om en sammenblanding af direktivforslagene om hhv. det indre marked for naturgas og forsyningssikkerhed.
Confusion of the proposal for a directive on the internal market in gas with that for a security of supply directive.
Bestemmelser vedrørende lageradgang findes allerede i gasdirektivet.
Access to storage is already dealt with in the gas directive.
Der skal i første omgang indsamles tilstrækkelige erfaringer med direktivforslaget, inden der forelægges nye forslag til forbedring.
First of all sufficient experience needs to be gathered with this proposed directive before new proposals for improvements are made.
Ændringsforslag 19 Artikel 12, stk. 1
Amendment 19 Article 12
Medlemsstaterne sætter de nødvendige love og administrative bestemmelser i kraft for at efterkomme dette direktiv inden den 1 januar 2004 .
Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 1 January 2004.
Medlemsstaterne sætter de nødvendige love og administrative bestemmelser i kraft for at efterkomme dette direktiv senest to år efter ikrafttrædelsen .
Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive no later than two years after its entry into force.
Gennemførelsesfristen skal fastsættes afhængigt af proceduren i Bruxelles, og den skal svare til de frister, der almindeligvis gælder for gennemførelse af direktiver.
Deadline for implementation should be set in line with the procedure in Brussels and with what is customary in other proposals for directives.
I dette direktivforslag går Kommissionen ud fra den antagelse, at skabelsen af et indre marked i EU for naturgas nødvendigvis kræver, at der opstilles fælles beredskabsstandarder og kriseforanstaltninger på området for forsyningssikkerhed.
This proposal for a directive assumes that the creation of an EU internal market in natural gas necessarily includes the establishment of common precautionary standards and crisis measures in the field of security of supply.
Hvad angår beskyttelsesforanstaltninger, bør det generelle ansvar for politikker på forsyningssikkerhedsområdet fortsat påhvile medlemsstaterne, der skal rette sig efter visse fælles principper.
As regards precautionary measures, general responsibility for security of supply policies should remain with the Member States, which should be guided by a number of common principles.
Derudover indføres der i artikel 4 obligatoriske forsyningssikkerhedsstandarder, der skal sikre den fortsatte forsyning af den såkaldte uafbrydelige efterspørgsel (uden kontraktmæssige afbrydelsesmuligheder i situationer med forsyningsknaphed) for visse tidsrum og under visse vejrforhold.
In addition, Article 4 introduces compulsory security of supply standards which are aimed at ensuring the continued supply of ‘non-interruptible’ demand (with no contractual provision for interruption of supply in cases of shortage) for specific periods under particular meteorological conditions.
Hvad angår instrumenterne, kan medlemsstaterne frit vælge en blanding af afbrydelige kontrakter, oplagring, forsyningsfleksibilitet, spotmarkeder eller andet, idet der under alle omstændigheder skal tages hensyn til oplagring.
As regards instruments, the Member States are free to select a suitable combination of any of the following: interruptible contracts, storage, flexibility of supply, spot markets or other instruments; storage should be considered at all events.
Kommissionen understreger, at langtidsforsyningskontrakter (med over et års løbetid) har særlig stor betydning for forsyningssikkerheden.
The Commission stresses as particularly important for security of supply long-term supply contracts (with a duration of more than one year).
Kommissionen skal derfor have til opgave at overvåge disse langtidskontrakters andel i gasimporten på EU-plan.
Accordingly the Commission is to have the task of monitoring the share of such long-term contracts as a proportion of total EU-wide gas imports.
Den skal desuden i første omgang rette henstillinger til medlemsstaterne om at udvide omfanget af langtidskontrakter og som næste skridt også under en komitologiprocedure kunne pålægge medlemsstaterne at gøre dette.
It is furthermore to recommend to the Member States an extension of the scope of long-term contracts and, as a second step, to have the right to impose such an extension on them in the commitology procedure.
Der indgår endvidere en krisemekanisme.
Provision is also made for a crisis mechanism.
Foranstaltningerne vedtages gennem en komitologiprocedure, først i form af henstillinger (rådgivende udvalg); dernæst som foranstaltninger med bindende karakter (forskriftsudvalg).
These measures will be enacted under the commitology procedure, initially in the form of recommendations (consultative committee), and thereafter as mandatory instructions (regulatory committee).
Endelig skal der senest den 1. januar 2004 oprettes et Europæisk Observationssystem for Olie- og Gasforsyning, som forestås af Kommissionen.
Finally, from 1 January 2004, a European Observation System for supply of hydrocarbons, managed by the Commission, is to be set up.
Ordførerens vurdering
Rapporteur’s assessment
Ordføreren har betragtelige problemer med Kommissionens forslag, såvel hvad angår situationsanalysen som de deraf afledte foranstaltninger.
Your rapporteur has considerable problems with the Commission proposal, both as regards its analysis of the situation and on the measures taken in consequence.
Kommissionen går ud fra den antagelse, at et tilstrækkeligt mål af naturgasforsyningssikkerhed hverken kan sikres af de involverede markedsdeltagere, dvs. virksomhederne selv, eller medlemsstaternes regeringer.
The Commission assumes that neither the participants in the market (i.e. the gas undertakings themselves) nor the governments of the Member States are able to guarantee an adequate level of security of gas supply.
Ordføreren deler ikke disse antagelser.
Your rapporteur disagrees with both of these assumptions in the form in which they are stated here.
Tvivlsomt retsgrundlag: Fuldendelse af det indre marked?
Questionable legal basis: Completion of the Single Market?
Kommissionen begrunder de foreslåede foranstaltninger med, at de er nødvendige for fuldendelsen af det indre marked.
The Commission justifies its proposed measures on the grounds that they are necessary for the completion of the single market.
Spørgsmålet er dog, om der ikke allerede er blevet taget højde for dette i naturgasdirektivet fra 1998, altså direktiv 98/30/EF (artikel 24).
It is, however, questionable to what extent this has not already been done by the Gas Directive of 1998, 98/30/EC (Article 24).
I henhold til dette direktiv skal de beskyttelsesforanstaltninger, som medlemmerne træffer i en krisesituation, vurderes af Kommissionen, der skal tage stilling til, om de er forenelige med konkurrencen og samhandelen, og i givet fald ophæve dem.
That directive lays down that safeguard measures of the Member States should in the event of crisis be assessed by the Commission as to their compatibility with competition and trade and where necessary abolished.
Det må derfor fastholdes, at de her foreslåede bestemmelser under ingen omstændigheder kun er en "integrerende del af markedet" (Kommissionens begrundelse) men indfører nye kompetencer på fællesskabsplan.
Accordingly we may state that the rules proposed here are by no means ‘an integral part of the internal market’ (Commission’s explanatory memorandum) but create entirely new competences at Community level.
Det er yderst tvivlsomt, om der er brug for EU-indgreb.
There are considerable doubts as to whether there is any need for action at EU level.
Kommissionen har forelagt et kombineret lovgivningsforslag om sikker forsyning med olie og gas men ser i den forbindelse bort fra det faktum, at de to sektorer er fundamentalt forskellige.
The Commission has proposed a common legislative project for security of oil and gas supply, thereby disregarding the fundamentally different nature of the two sectors.
Der har nemlig på gasforsyingsområdet hidtil ikke kunnet konstateres vanskeligheder, der kan sammenlignes med oliekriserne.
No difficulties in the field of gas supply have ever arisen which would be comparable to the oil crises, and there are structural reasons why such difficulties are less likely to occur.
De er desuden også af strukturelle grunde mere usandsynlige: For gas findes der ikke noget udbyderkartel i lighed med OPEC; der foregår tværtimod principielt konkurrence mellem leverandørerne; den gensidige afhængighed mellem eksport- og importlande er større; langtidskontrakter giver sikkerhed for en del af leverancerne; på forbrugersiden kan gas ofte erstattes i modsætning til olie, der - først og fremmest i trafikken - ikke kan.
There is no suppliers’ cartel for gas comparable to OPEC for oil, on the contrary there is in principle competition between suppliers; the mutual dependency of exporting and importing countries is greater; long-term contracts safeguard a part of supplies; gas is often replaceable on the consumer side, while oil – particularly for transport – is not.
Forsyningskriser skulle altså principielt være væsentligt mindre sandsynlige for gas end for olie.
Supply crises ought therefore in principle to be considerably less likely for gas than for oil.
Endvidere er gassituationen i de enkelte medlemsstater langt mere heterogen end for olie.
Furthermore the individual Member States’ situations vary much more in respect of gas than of oil.
F.eks. anvender EU-medlemsstaterne i stærkt varierende omfang naturgas i deres energimix (i strømproduktion fra mindre end én procent i Sverige til op til ca. 57 % i Nederlandene).
For example the various EU Member States differ widely in the extent to which gas forms part of the energy mix (ranging from less than 1% of power production in Sweden to some 57% in the Netherlands).
Også forsyningskilderne for gas er meget forskellige, transportstrukturerne dyre og - i modsætning til olie - ufleksible.
The sources of gas also differ widely, its transport structures are expensive and – unlike those for oil – inflexible.
Alle disse faktorer gør, at det er tvivlsomt, hvorvidt det er hensigtsmæssigt at behandle de to energikilder parallelt.
All these factors make it questionable whether it is right to treat these two energy sources in parallel.
Der skelnes som regel mellem følgende to komponenter af forsyningssikkerhed for gas:
Two components in security of supply are generally distinguished with regard to gas:
∙ På længere sigt kommer det an på at udvinde tilstrækkelige mængder gas til at dække efterspørgslen og transportere den til forbrugerlandene. ∙ På kort sigt kan der opstå teknisk eller politisk betingede forsyningsafbrydelser, som der så skal kompenseres for.
∙ In the long term it is important that sufficient quantities of gas should be extracted to cover demand and transported to the consumer countries; ∙ In the short term, interruptions of supply may occur for technical or political reasons which then need to be covered for.
De her foreslåede foranstaltninger refererer hovedsagelig til det andet punkt.
The measures proposed here relate chiefly to the second point.
Endelig må man ikke glemme, at forsyningsrisiciene ikke nødvendigvis forøges i takt med det voksende naturgasforbrug i Europa.
Finally it should be noted that the risks to security of supply will not necessarily rise in line with a rise in natural gas consumption in Europe.
Antallet af deltagende producenter, leverandører, forhandlere etc. vil snarere vokse, efterhånden som gassektoren udbygges, og der samtidig sker en konsekvent liberalisering.
On the contrary, with the expansion of the gas sector, provided there is consistent liberalisation at the same time, the number of producers, suppliers, dealers etc. will increase.
Det er de underudviklede markeder, der er mest sårbare over for forsyningsforstyrrelser.
It is under-developed markets which are most sensitive to interruptions of supply.
Ordføreren anser det for en grundlæggende mangel, at Kommissionen i nærværende direktivforslag primært vil opnå forsyningsssikkerhed gennem besiddelse og forvaltning af disponible naturgasreserver.
Your rapporteur regards it as a fundamental failing that the Commission seeks in its proposal for a directive to achieve security of supply primarily by means of the holding and management of available reserves of natural gas.
Det langsigtede - og måske endnu mere afgørende - aspekt af forsyningssikkerheden består dog i at udvinde tilstrækkelig mange nye ressourcer og forbinde dem med nettet.
However, the perhaps more crucial long-term aspect of security of supply is extracting enough new resources and supplying them to the grid.
Dertil er det først og fremmest nødvendigt med tilstrækkelige investeringer fra virksomhedernes side.
To this end there is a need above all for adequate investment from the business side.
Det første mål for statslige - og internationale - bestræbelser må bestå i at skabe et fordelagtigt klima, eventuelt også i aktivt at fremme investeringer i infrastruktur, sådan som det også sker inden for rammerne af TEN-programmet.
The foremost aim of state – and international – action must lie in creating a favourable climate for this purpose, where appropriate also actively promoting investment in infrastructure, as is done for example in the context of the TEN programme.
Dette er også IEA's holdning ("Natural Gas Supply Report" OECE/IEA 1995).
This is also the view of the IEA (“Natural gas supply report”, OECD/IEA 1995).
Kommissionens styringsbestræbelser vil derimod snarere afskrække investeringerne.
The Commission’s ‘planned economy’ approach, on the other hand, will tend to frighten off investment.
Den vil desuden også forringe samarbejdsviljen hos producenterne, der må frygte de eventuelle forpligtelser til langtidskontrakter og tvungen omdirigering af gas i tilfælde af krise.
It will also limit the producers’ willingness to cooperate, since they may fear being tied to long-term contracts and compulsory transfers of gas in the event of a crisis.
Tilsvarende må gasleverandørernes eget ansvar danne udgangspunkt for forsyningssikkerheden.
Consequently security of supply must start with the gas companies’ own responsibility.
Direktivet går derimod ud fra den mærkværdige antagelse, at det på et konkurrenceorienteret marked ikke er muligt at overlade det til industrien at tage vare på forsyningssikkerheden.
The directive, however, starts from the odd assumption that in a competitive market the organisation of security of supply cannot be left to the industry.
Ved at tildele statslige instanser hovedansvaret svækker Kommissionsforslaget imidlertid virksomhedernes vilje til at træffe egne foranstaltninger.
By placing the chief responsibility on state authorities, the Commission proposal weakens the preparedness of undertakings to take their own precautions.
Statens og i sidste omgang EU's opgave bør være at undersøge om leverandørernes egne foranstaltninger modsvarer de politiske overvejelser.
It should be the task of the state, and ultimately of the EU, to examine whether their precautions meet political requirements.
Det kan også undersøges, om foranstaltninger på eget ansvar kan gennemtvinges ved, at der loves administrative tvangsforanstaltninger i tilfælde af, at virksomhedernes egne foranstaltninger viser sig utilstrækkelige.
It is also possible to consider whether firms can be compelled to take their own responsibility for precautions by announcing that, if their own precautions are inadequate, compulsory administrative measures will be taken.
Direktivforslaget går den modsatte vej: Artikel 8, stk. 1, litra b og c, samt stk. 3 indebærer alvorlige indgreb i gældende aftaler kontrakter og i retten til at disponere over ledninger.
The draft directive, however, takes the opposite approach: Article 8(1) (b) and (c) and (3) involve serious interventions in existing contracts and in the right of access to pipelines.
Dette undergraver leverandørernes kriseberedskab.
That undermines the undertakings’ own crisis precautions.
I henhold til retsstatsprincipperne ville det være korrekt i nødstilfælde ved lov at indføre en forebyggende bestemmelse, der ville finde anvendelse i tilfælde af, at privatretlige løsninger skulle vise sig utilstrækkelige til at klare problemerne.
It would be consistent with the rule of law to provide by law an emergency priority rule for cases in which private solutions could not deal with the problem.
Der findes i øvrigt adskillige mere markedsorienterede instrumenter til sikring af forsyningssikkerheden, som Kommissionen enten ikke skænker tilstrækkelig opmærksomhed hhv. helt ignorerer:
There are many instruments which can be used to guarantee security of supply, more in accordance with the market, which the Commission does not sufficiently consider or even disregards altogether.
a) Pålæggelse af en forpligtelse til at træffe forholdsregler for også at kunne levere i en krisesituation,
a) Imposing an obligation to take precautionary measures so that supplies can be continued even in a crisis;
b) Forbud mod ansvarsfrihed under almindelige forsyningsbetingelser,
b) Banning exemption-from-liability clauses in general supply conditions;
c) Aftagere, der for eksempel på grund af bi- eller trivalente fyringsanlæg kun har et begrænset behov for forsyningssikkerhed, bør have ret til at indgå kontrakter med begrænset eller endda helt uden sikkerhedsgaranti for at opnå billigere priser,
c) Allowing purchasers who only have a low level of need for security of supply – e.g. because they have two- or even three-way firing systems – to conclude contracts with a low security guarantee or even none at all, in order to permit lower pricing;
d) ved mere langvarige forsyningsforstyrrelser står valget mellem den markedsøkonomiske metode med at tvinge efterspørgslen ned ved hjælp af prisstigninger og den interventionistiske metode med tildeling af kapaciteter.
d) In the case of a prolonged interruption of supply the remaining possibilities are the market economy way, forcing down demand by increasing prices, or the interventionist way, of allocating capacities.
De foreslåede regulerende foranstaltninger rejser spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt Kommissionen har til hensigt at hindre den frie prisdannelse på gasmarkederne, hvilket ville indebære risici for forsyningssikkerheden.
The proposed planned-economy measures beg the question to what extent the Commission proposes to limit free pricing, which would involve concealed risks for security of supply.
På et liberaliseret marked skal det derfor fremfor alt principielt være markedsaktørerne, der bærer ansvaret, fordi forsyningssikkerhed altid har en pris.
In a liberalised market, therefore, the participants in the market should bear the main responsibility, because security of supply always comes at a price.
Den mest opsigtsvækkende mangel ved dette direktiv er måske, at det totalt ignorerer dette.
That it ignores this fact is perhaps the most glaring shortcoming of this proposed directive.
I begrundelsen nævnes de betragtelige omkostninger ved manglende forsyningssikkerhed men ikke de betydelige omkostninger ved forebyggende foranstaltninger.
While the explanatory memorandum mentions the considerable cost of the lack of security of supply, it makes no mention of the high cost of precautions.
Den samlede økonomiske afvejning af omkostningerne, som er nødvendig, må også omfatte den faktiske størrelse af risikoen for forsyningsafbrydelse.
The necessary weighing up of overall economic costs must also take account of the actual level of risk of an interruption of supply.
Særlig iøjnefaldende er den ensidige betragtningsmåde, der kommer for dagen i de foreslåede kriseforanstaltninger i artikel 8: Kommissionen indrømmes retten til i krisesituationer at foretage en omfordeling af gassen, men der siges ikke et ord om, hvem der skal bære de dermed forbundne omkostninger.
The one-sidedness of the Commission’s view is shown up particularly sharply in the proposed crisis measures in Article 8: while the Commission is authorised to redistribute gas quantities in the event of a crisis, there is no mention of who has to bear the costs in such a case.
Det bør altså principielt gælde, at gasleverandørerne på eget ansvar skal sørge for forsyningssikkerhed som tjenesteydelse, og at gaskunderne kan afgøre, hvilken pris de vil betale.
In principle, therefore, the rule must be that the gas supply companies must ensure security of supply as a service on their own responsibility and that gas customers can decide on the price they wish to pay for this.
Forsyningssikkerhed er for så vidt et element i konkurrencen på et åbent marked.
To that extent, security of supply in the open market is an element of competition.
Til trods for dette kan det af to grunde være berettiget, at regeringer fastlægger sikkerhedsniveauer for hele gasdistributionssystemet.
Nevertheless, it can be justifiable for two reasons for governments to set the level of security for the whole gas distribution system.
På den ene side kan også tredjeparter i et sammenkoblet netsystem blive ramt, hvis leveringen til en bestemt kunde bliver afbrudt (forstyrrelser udefra, i ekstreme tilfælde gennem netsammenbrud).
First, in a complex network system, when supplies to one customer fail, third parties may also be affected (by external factors, in extreme cases a collapse of the network).
For det andet kan kunder i boligsektoren næppe i praksis opstille sådanne cost-benefit-analyser for deres eget forbrug, idet de som regel ikke har adgang til leveringsmuligheder, når leverancerne udebliver.
Secondly, domestic customers have little opportunity to make use of such cost-benefit-analyses in practice, particularly since they have no alternatives when gas supplies are interrupted.
Spørgsmålet er så, om sådanne sikkerhedsnivauer skal fastlægges på EU-plan.
The question remains whether such security levels need to be set EU-wide.
Er medlemsstaternes foranstaltninger ikke tilstrækkelige?
2.3 To what extent are Member States’ measures inadequate?