natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Af denne liste skal det fremgå, hvor stort det økonomiske tab var i hvert enkelt tilfælde, og om og i hvilket omfang det er lykkedes at tilbagesøge beløbene.
In each case the list was to specify the amount of financial loss and whether and to what extent it had been possible to recover the money involved.
Kommissionen har indtil dato ikke fremlagt en sådan liste , hvilket rejser følgende spørgsmål:
The Commission has still not produced such a list , a fact which prompts the following questions:
c) Kan Parlamentet give Kommissionen decharge, når det fortsat ikke får de ønskede oplysninger?
c) Can Parliament give discharge to the Commission when the information that is has requested is continuing to be withheld?
Antallet af kontrolbesøg fra Kommissionen er faldet siden 2000
The number of spot checks carried out by the Commission fell in 2000
I 2000 er der sket en yderligere nedgang i antallet af kontrolbesøg , som Kommissionens tjeneste aflægger på stedet og som Revisionsretten allerede tidligere har kritiseret som værende for lavt.
In 2000 the Commission carried out even fewer spot checks than in previous years, although the Court of Auditors had already expressed criticism in the past because it considered their number to be too low.
Svar fra Kommissionen til punkt 3.72 i Revisionsrettens årsberetning.
The questions to be asked in this connection are:
Revisionsrettens beretninger viser, at medlemsstaternes egne kontrolbesøg ofte er helt utilstrækkelige og at visse overtrædelser af reglerne derved slet ikke kan afsløres.
The Court’s reports show that the checks carried out by the Member States themselves are often totally inadequate and manifestly insufficient to uncover certain infringements of the rules.
Det er navnlig tilfældet, når det ikke er beløbsmodtagerne, der begår overtrædelserne, men selve den tjeneste i medlemsstaten, som er ansvarlig for forvaltning af midlerne.
This applies especially when infringements, rather than being committed by those who receive money, occur in the administration of the funds by the departments concerned in the Member States.
Uregelmæssigheder og nepotisme ved forvaltning af EQUAL-programmet i Tyskland
Irregularities and favouritism in the EQUAL programme in Germany
Det seneste eksempel herpå er gennemførelsen af EQUAL-programmet i Tyskland, hvor der i forbundsministeriet for beskæftigelse har været tale om et opsigtsvækkende tilfælde af nepotisme, idet et privatfirma fik en kontrakt til flere millioner uden den behørige udbudsprocedure.
The latest example is the handling of the EQUAL programme in Germany, in which a blatant case of favouritism has occurred in the Federal Ministry of Labour and a contract worth millions has been awarded without a proper invitation to tender.
Det er et særligt tungtvejende tilfælde, fordi der var tale om vedholdende og gentagen begunstigelse af det pågældende firma, skønt tildelingsproceduren i dens første runde, som blev indledt i 2000, allerede var indklaget for retten.
The case is also particularly serious because the firm involved benefited from repeated and persistent special treatment even though the first round of the award procedure, which began in 2000, had already been challenged in court.
Det rejser følgende spørgsmål:
This case raises questions, namely:
a) I sit svar på skriftligt spørgsmål E-2870/01 har Kommissionen meddelt, at den nu ville undersøge andre kontrakter tildelt af forbundsministeriet for beskæftigelse, hvor der er tale om en kombination af statslige kompetencer og andre tjenesteydelser.
(a) In its answer to Written Question E-2807/01 the Commission stated that it was in the process of examining other contracts awarded by the Federal Ministry of Labour in which a transfer of government responsibilities was combined with other services.
Derved skulle man sikre ubetinget overholdelse af fællesskabsreglerne for tildeling af offentlige kontrakter.
The aim was to ensure that Community rules on the award of public contracts were fully observed.
I bekræftende fald, hvad er resultatet?
If so, what was the outcome?
Andre tilfælde af nepotisme i Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
A further case of favouritism: Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania
Det forlyder, at der også i delstaten Mecklenburg-Vorpommern skulle være tale om alvorlige uregelmæssigheder og nepotisme ved tildeling af en kontrakt for tjenesteydelser inden for rammerne af den såkaldte faglige bistand under den europæiske socialfond.
It is alleged that serious irregularities and favouritism occurred in the German Land of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania when a service contract was awarded in connection with technical assistance under the European Social Fund.
I sit svar på skriftligt spørgsmål E-2806/01 meddelte Kommissionen i begyndelsen af december 2001, at delstatens kompetente tjenester endnu ikke havde besvaret Kommissionens henvendelse.
In reply to Written Question E-2806/01 the Commission indicated that it had raised the matter but the Land authorities concerned had yet to respond.
a) Er svaret i mellemtiden indgået?
(a) Have the authorities now given an answer? (b) When did OLAF start the investigations mentioned in the Commission’s answer?
b) Hvornår har OLAF indledt de undersøgelser, som er bebudet i Kommissionens svar, og omfatter disse undersøgelser også kontrolbesøg på stedet i delstatens hovedstad Schwerin?
Do those investigations also include spot checks in the Land capital, Schwerin?
Hvornår kan regne med et resultat?
When are findings likely to emerge?
Den finansielle kontrol af strukturfondene ( ansvarlig: Helmut Kuhne)
Financial control of the Structural Funds (responsible: Helmut Kuhne)
Hvad angår forordning 2064/97, er Retten af den opfattelse, at Kommissionen undlod at give medlemsstaterne nøjagtige og klare instrukser, navnlig med hensyn til opfyldelsen af kontrolmålet på 5% for alle udgifter, der anmeldes som støtteberettigede, og ved den sene udsendelse af retningslinjer for stikprøvekontroller efter forordning 2064/97.
Regarding the former, the Court takes the position that the Commission failed to provide the Member States with precise and clear instructions particularly as regards fulfilling the 5% audit quota for all expenditure submitted for co-financing as well as in the delayed publication of guidelines for conducting random sample examinations in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2064/97.
Selv om medlemsstaternes indberetning af uregelmæssigheder for år 2000 som omtalt andetsteds i dette arbejdsdokument rent faktisk er steget fire gange, kan man nok stille det spørgsmål, om Belgiens og Luxembourgs manglende indberetning af uregelmæssigheder for året udelukkende kan henføres til en sund og effektiv økonomisk forvaltning fra deres side.
Though the number of irregularities for the year 2000 as reported by the Member States increased virtually fourfold, as mentioned earlier in this working document, it has to be asked whether the fact that Belgium and Luxembourg reported no irregularities for the year was purely due to sound and efficient financial management on their part.
For at være fair mod Kommissionen må det her nævnes, at nogle af de problemer, der behandles i såvel Revisionsrettens særberetning som årsberetningen – navnlig problemet med nedgangen i antallet af kontrolbesøg, der er gennemført i medlemsstaterne – , til dels skyldes den interne reformproces.
It must be said here in fairness to the Commission, that some of the problems dealt with in both the Court’s special report as well as in its Annual Report – particularly that of the drop in the number of control checks conducted in the Member States – are in some measure a result of the internal reform process.
Kommissionen anfører i sine svar på de forskellige punkter i Revisionsrettens årsberetning, at koncentrationen af revisionskapaciteten i de operationelle generaldirektorater vil medføre en stigning i såvel antallet som kvaliteten af kontrolbesøgene.
In its replies to the Court’s Annual Report, the Commission claims that the concentration of auditing capacity in the operational directorates-general will lead to an improvement in not only the number, but also the quality of the checks.
Det bør også nævnes, at Kommissionen har vedtaget to nye forordninger, nemlig nr. 438/2001, der erstatter forordning nr. 2064/97 med undtagelse af interventioner bevilget i programmeringsperioden 1994-1999. , og nr. 448/2001 om proceduren for finansielle korrektioner.
Mention should also be made of the fact that the Commission has adopted two new regulations, Regulation (EC) No 438/2001, which replaces Regulation (EC) No 2064/97 With the exception of assistance granted for the programming period 1994 to 1999. , and Regulation (EC) No 448/2001 concerning the procedure for making financial corrections.
Det må afventes, hvordan medlemsstaterne vil gennemføre forordning 438/2001 i praksis, og hvordan Kommissionen vil kontrollere den, men på papiret er forordningen afgjort langt mere detaljeret end forordning 2064/97 og imødegår således til en vis grad Rettens kritik.
Though it remains to be seen how Regulation (EC) No 438/2001 will be implemented in practice by the Member States and controlled by the Commission, the regulation on paper certainly goes into much more detail than Regulation (EC) No 2064/97 and to that extent goes some way towards addressing the Court’s critique.
Hvad angår forordning 448/2001, opfordres medlemsstaterne til at indberette alle tilfælde af uregelmæssigheder, således at tilbagesøgte midler kan omfordeles til en anden form for intervention.
With regard to Regulation (EC) No 448/2001, the Member States are encouraged to report any cases of irregularity known to them so that the moneys recovered might be reallocated to another form of assistance.
I de tilfælde, hvor Kommissionen opdager uregelmæssigheder, vil de pågældende midler imidlertid blive inddrevet uden efterfølgende omfordeling.
Where the Commission discovers a case of irregularity, however, it is the intention of the Community to recover these moneys without allowing for their subsequent reallocation.
Forordningen er i sig selv et positivt skridt, men det må sikres, at Kommissionen er i stand til at gennemføre kontrolbesøg, således at medlemsstaterne ikke bliver efterladende med hensyn til at foretage indberetninger.
While the regulation itself is a positive step, it must be ensured that the Commission is capable of conducting such checks so as to deter any laxity in the reporting of such measures by the Member States.
I forbindelse med disse to nye forordninger skal der også her omtales det politiske pres fra medlemsstaternes side, som Kommissionen udsættes for, særlig for så vidt angår komitologiproceduren, hvor Kommissionens oprindelige forslag er blevet ændret af de forskellige komiteer bestående af repræsentanter fra medlemsstaterne.
In connection with these two new regulations, it is worth taking note here of the political pressure to which the Commission is subjected by the Member States, particularly as regards the ‘commitology’ process in which the original proposals of the Commission were amended via the various committees of representatives from the Member States.
Som led i denne procedure vedtog det tyske Forbundsråd som repræsentant for de 16 tyske delstater en beslutning, som videresendtes til Forbundsstaten Tysklands regering, hvori det anbefalede at afvise at godkende forordningsforslaget som forelagt af Kommissionen, medmindre der blev foretaget omfattende ændringer under komitologiproceduren.
During the course of this process, the German Bundesrat , as representative of the 16 Bundesländer , passed a resolution, consequently forwarded to the German Federal Government, in which it recommended that adoption the regulation proposals as put forward by the Commission be refused, barring significant changes during the ‘commitology’ process.
Mange af de ændringer, Forbundsrådet foreslog, kunne ganske vist anses for at være rimelige, men visse andre demonstrerede kun alt for godt den langt fra eksemplariske nidkærhed, visse organer i medlemsstaterne lægger for dagen, når det gælder om at påtage sig ansvaret for egne aktioner:
While many of the changes proposed by the Bundesrat could be judged as reasonable, some others demonstrate all too well the less than exemplary zeal of certain entities within the Member States to take responsibility for their own actions:
"I en toårig overgangsperiode fra tidspunktet for programmets vedtagelse gennemføres Kommissionens undersøgelser af medlemsstaternes forvaltnings- og kontrolsystemer som præventive undersøgelser.
‘During a transition period of two years beginning at the time of the adoption of the programme, the examinations of the administrative and control systems of the Member States by the Commission should be implemented as preventative examinations.
I denne periode foretages der ingen finansielle nettokorrektioner."
During this time no net financial corrections shall be applied’ Bundesrat resolution on financial control for the purposes of the EU Structural Funds, 14 July 2000. .
Det står ganske vist ikke klart, om det var den tyske regering, der ikke ville støtte dette krav, eller om Kommissionen selv havde held til at blokere det, men en gennemgang af de oprindelige forslag sammenholdt med de endeligt vedtagne viser, hvilke problemer Kommissionen står overfor, når den forsøger at bevare "fællesskabskarakteren" af sine forslag.
Though it is not at all clear whether it was the German Federal Government which refused to support this demand or whether the Commission itself was successful in blocking it, an examination of the original draft proposals in comparison with those finally adopted demonstrates the difficulties with which the Commission is faced in trying to preserve the ‘Community character’ of its proposals.
Det skulle måske på denne baggrund overvejes, om ikke det ville være hensigtsmæssigt, hvis Parlamentet fik adgang til som observatør at deltage i møderne som led i komitologiproceduren samt på alle andre trin af forhandlingerne mellem Kommissionen og medlemsstaterne, således at Kommissionens stilling blev styrket med hensyn til bevarelse af fællesskabskarakteren af dens forslag i forhold til andre (i første række nationalt-administrative) interesser.
In view of this, it seems appropriate to consider that Parliament should participate as an observer in the meetings within the framework of the ‘commitology’ process as well as all other stages of negotiation between the Commission and the Member States so as to strengthen the position of the Commission in preserving the Community character of its proposals in the face of other (primarily national administrative) interests.
Mange medlemsstater er generelt modvillige over for at skulle acceptere præcise regulativer fra Kommissionen, som måske kunne medføre en minimal ændring af deres administrative praksis, og de anvender derfor hellere bilaterale møder med Kommissionen, jf. bestemmelserne i f.eks. forordning 2064/97, som det forum, hvor gennemførelsesbestemmelser antager mere konkret form.
Given the general unwillingness of many Member States to accept precise regulations from the Commission which could possibly lead to the smallest change in their administrative practice, it lies in their interests to make use of bilateral meetings between themselves and the Commission, as provided for in Regulation (EC) No 2064/97 for example, as the forum in which implementation decisions are to be given more concrete form.
En sådan fleksibilitet kommer måske medlemsstaternes administrative strukturer til gode, men virkningen heraf er decideret skadelig for Fællesskabets finansielle kontrolmål.
While such flexibility may benefit the administrative structures of the Member States, its effect is quite detrimental to the financial control goals of the Community.
Som eksempel herpå nævnte Revisionsretten i sin særberetning, at Kommissionen tre år efter vedtagelsen af forordning 2064/97 stadig forhandlede med medlemsstaterne om, hvilken myndighed der skulle have ansvaret for at gennemføre kontrollen.
As an example of this, the Court pointed out in its special report that virtually three years after the adoption of Regulation (EC) No 2064/97, the Commission was still in the process of negotiating with the Member States as to which authority was to be responsible for implementing the control checks OJ C 314, 8.11.2001, p.
Ligeledes i forbindelse med forordning 2064/97 må nævnes Rettens konstatering af, at Kommissionen var under stærkt pres fra de tyske myndigheder som følge af de tyske delstaters krav om godkendelse af de allerede eksisterende tyske administrations- og kontrolsystemer som værende i overensstemmelse med forordningens krav, selv om Retten selv under sine undersøgelser fandt, at i det mindste det system, der anvendtes i forbindelse med regionalfondene, ikke opfyldte alle Kommissionens krav. ibid., s. 34.
Also worthy of note in connection with Regulation (EC) No 2064/97 was the observation by the Court that the Commission was placed under heavy pressure from German authorities, as a result of the demands of the Bundesländer to approve the existing system of administration and controls used within Germany as corresponding to the demands of the regulation, although the Court itself in the course of its own examination took the position that at least the system used in relation to the regional funds did not correspond to all of the demands of the Commission.
Kommissionen forsvarer sig med, at aftalen senere blev ændret, efter at Kommissionen havde påpeget forskellige svagheder ved det tyske system, således at problemerne i forbindelse med gennemførelsen af forordningen kunne løses på et partnerskabsgrundlag.
In its defence, the Commission states that the agreement was subsequently modified, after the Commission had identified certain weaknesses in the German system, which allowed for a solution to problems arising in the implementation of the regulation on the basis of a partnership approach.
Der kan sikkert sættes spørgsmålstegn ved, i hvor høj grad medlemsstaterne selv tager en sådan løsning alvorligt.
To what extent the Member States take this approach seriously themselves would appear to be open to question.
Endelig skal her nævnes det arbejde, der udføres af Gruppen af Personlige Repræsentanter for Finansministrene (PRG), der som led i initiativet SEM 2000 blev oprettet som et forum, hvor Kommissionen og repræsentanter for medlemsstaternes finansministerier kunne bidrage til at gøre den fælles forvaltning af forskellige aspekter af EF(EU)-budgettet mere effektiv.
A final note here should be made concerning the work of the PRG, which was established in the framework of the SEM 2000 programme as a forum in which the Commission and representatives of the finance ministries of the Member States could contribute to enhancing the efficiency of the shared management exercised over various aspects of the Community (Union) budget.
På det seneste møde den 8. juni 2001 drøftede PRG Revisionsrettens særberetning om den finansielle kontrol af strukturfondene.
During its last meeting on 8 June 2001, the PRG discussed the special report of the Court of Auditors regarding financial control of the Structural Funds.
Af protokollen fra mødet fremgår det, at mange af deltagerne selv var usikre på, hvordan forordning 2064/97 skulle gennemføres korrekt.
From the minutes of this meeting, it would appear that a large number of the participants were themselves unaware of how Regulation (EC) No 2064/97 was to be properly implemented.
Kommissionen henviste i sine svar til den forvaltningskomite, som forordningen selv indeholder bestemmelser om, og hvor Kommissionen forhandler med (andre) repræsentanter for medlemsstaterne.
In responding to these answers the Commission made reference to the administrative committee provided for in the regulation itself, within which the Commission negotiates with (other) representatives of the Member States.
Selv om det af protokollen fremgår, at Kommissionen er til sinds at bruge dette forum, fremgår det på ingen måde klart, at disse møder skulle have fået medlemsstaterne til af foretage en koordineret opfølgning af resultaterne af disse møder.
Though the minutes would appear to demonstrate the goodwill of the Commission and its intentions to use this forum, it is not at all clear that these meetings have led to the Member States following up on the results of these meetings in a coordinated manner.
For at gøre møderne mere effektive ville det også her være hensigtsmæssigt at give en observatør fra Europa-Parlamentet adgang til disse, således at resultaterne heraf og medlemsstaternes kommentarer kunne behandles og følges op.
In order to raise the productivity of these meetings, it would also be advisable here to guarantee the presence of an observer from the European Parliament so that the findings and results of these meetings, as well as the observations of the Member States, could be subjected to examination and followed up.
Med henblik på at sikre en bedre koordinering mellem Kommissionen og medlemsstaterne samt varetagelse af Fællesskabets interesser bør nedenstående henstillinger tages op som led i dechargeproceduren:
With a view to improved coordination between the Commission and the Member States as well as the preservation of the Community interest, the following recommendations should be taken into account within the framework of the discharge procedure:
4. insisterer på, at en eller flere repræsentanter for Europa-Parlamentets Budgetkontroludvalg får adgang til at deltage aktivt i PRG's halvårlige møder med henblik på at øge følgevirkningerne for EU-budgettet af disse møder.
Insists on the active participation of one or more representatives of the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control at the twice-yearly meetings of the PRG, so as to raise the efficiency of these meetings in terms of their effects on the Community budget.
På mødet den 8. januar 2002 traf medordførerne for decharge 2000 afgørelse om tilrettelæggelse og fordeling af arbejdet og anmodede undertegnede om at bidrage til udarbejdelsen af betænkningen ved at udarbejde kapitlet "Problemer i medlemsstaterne med gennemførelsen af budgettet for år 2000, hvad strukturfondene angår".
At the meeting of 8 January 2002, the co-rapporteurs on the discharge for 2000 decided on the organisation and allocation of work, and this author was assigned responsibility for the chapter of the report entitled 'Problems encountered by Member States in implementing the 2000 budget in respect of the Structural Funds'.
Eftersom den tilstræbte strenge kontrol med gennemførelsen af budgettet kun kan accepteres generelt, hvis den følges op af en retfærdig fordeling af ansvaret, har jeg prøvet at fastslå, om medlemsstaterne har stået over for objektive vanskeligheder, for dermed at betone nødvendigheden af, at man tager fat på at udrydde disse vanskeligheder der, hvor de fortsat findes.
Given that the stringency required in monitoring the implementation of the budget is generally acceptable only if accompanied by a fair division of responsibilities, I attempted to ascertain whether the Member States encountered objective difficulties so as to stress the need of finding a method of overcoming such difficulties wherever they persist.
Mine indledende bemærkninger er altså:
My initial findings are therefore:
År 2000 var et særligt regnskabsår, fordi parallelt med behandlingen af de forslag, medlemsstaterne forelagde vedrørende fællesskabsstøtterammen, blev der samtidig ført drøftelser om vedtagelse af gennemførelsesbestemmelser for den generelle strukturfondsforordning og om retningslinjer for Fællesskabsinitiativerne.
The year 2000 was an exceptional financial year since, at the same time as the Member States' proposals in relation to the Community Support Framework (CSF) were submitted for consideration, discussions were also being held on adoption of the implementing provisions for the general regulation on the Structural Funds and the guidelines for Community initiatives.
Vedtagelsen af fællesskabsstøtterammen og de samlede programmeringsdokumenter blev meget forsinket, og de fastsatte tidsfrister blev ikke overholdt.
The adoption of the CSF and the single programming documents was considerably delayed and the original deadlines were not met.