natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The latter document includes a requirement for different scenarios, including the worst case, taking into account the specific risk factors and other cha-racteristics of the Member State. (a) Contingency plans are based on a risk assessment in relation to both virus incursion and subsequent spread. 
The latter document includes a requirement for different scenarios, including the worst case, taking into account the specific risk factors and other characteristics of the Member State. (a) Contingency plans are based on a risk assessment in relation to both virus incursion and subsequent spread.
They are assessed during real-time exercises conducted by the Member States. 
They are assessed during real-time exercises conducted by the Member States.
In the Decision and the Guidelines the Commission could not indicate to the Member States the number of personnel required to comply with the plans, as it then had little authority, especially in the field of animal health, and therefore scarce expertise to interfere with the organisation of administrative action by the Member States when issues of po-lice, public order and civil liberties were involved. (b) Missions have been carried out since 1999 to investigate the implementation of the contingency plans. 
In the Decision and the Guidelines the Commission could not indicate to the Member States the number of personnel required to comply with the plans, as it then had little authority, especially in the field of animal health, and therefore scarce expertise to interfere with the organisation of administrative action by the Member States when issues of police, public order and civil liberties were involved. (b) Missions have been carried out since 1999 to investigate the implementation of the contingency plans.
These inspections were carried out in application of Decision 91/42/EEC and the aforementioned Guidelines which address such points as propagation of the plan to the national farming community and regular exercises. 
These inspections were carried out in application of Decision 91/42/EEC and the aforementioned Guidelines which address such points as propagation of the plan to the national farming community and regular exercises.
3.3.2005 CS Úřední věstník Evropské unie C 54/33 (c) Article 13(3) of Directive 85/511/EEC provided that a decision on emergency vaccination may be taken by the Commission in collaboration with the Member State concerned (Committee procedure) ‘when FMD is confirmed and threatens to become extensive’. 
3.3.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 54/33 (c) Article 13(3) of Directive 85/511/EEC provided that a decision on emergency vaccination may be taken by the Commission in collaboration with the Member State concerned (Committee procedure) Ôwhen FMD is confirmed and threatens to become extensiveŐ.
Such a decision would specify the conditions under which emergency vaccination would be carried out. 
Such a decision would specify the conditions under which emergency vaccination would be carried out.
In addition, the decision to introduce emergency vaccination around an outbreak could be taken by the affected Member State following notification to the Commission, provided that basic Community interests would not be endangered and these national measures would be reviewed in the Standing Veterinary Committee and harmonised by Commission decision. 
In addition, the decision to introduce emergency vaccination around an outbreak could be taken by the affected Member State following notification to the Commission, provided that basic Community interests would not be endangered and these national measures would be reviewed in the Standing Veterinary Committee and harmonised by Commission decision.
Work on laying down criteria at Community level started in 1991 and continued in 1999. 
Work on laying down criteria at Community level started in 1991 and continued in 1999.
In 2001 all the criteria were used to assess whether it was advisable to carry out emergency vaccination in the Member States requesting it. Directive 2003/85/EC requires preparations to be made for vaccination after the first confirmed outbreak, but for it to be initiated depending on the epidemiological situation and only if there is more than one outbreak. 
In 2001 all the criteria were used to assess whether it was advisable to carry out emergency vaccination in the Member States requesting it. Directive 2003/85/EC requires preparations to be made for vaccination after the first confirmed outbreak, but for it to be initiated depending on the epidemiological situation and only if there is more than one outbreak.
This Directive also provides guidance for the decision-making process on emergency vaccination, based on the report of the Scientific Committee of 1999. (d) In the case of suspicion, Directive 85/511/EEC required a census of all animals on the holding in question by species and category, already dead, infected or liable to be infected or contaminated to be prepared and kept up to date, in order to take account of animals born and animals dying. 
This Directive also provides guidance for the decision-making process on emergency vaccination, based on the report of the Scientific Committee of 1999. (d) In the case of suspicion, Directive 85/511/EEC required a census of all animals on the holding in question by species and category, already dead, infected or liable to be infected or contaminated to be prepared and kept up to date, in order to take account of animals born and animals dying.
Only these figures are important for the control of the disease. 
Only these figures are important for the control of the disease.
However, records available on the holding or in a central/veterinary database in accordance with Community systems for the identification and registration of animals should be consulted and cross checked. (e) The need to incorporate livestock valuers in the local disease control centres is laid down in document VI/5211/95. (f) At the end of 2003 the Commission sent a questionnaire to the Member States and to the accession countries on the system for recruiting assessors, the general principles governing their remuneration and a system for compensating livestock farmers. 
However, records available on the holding or in a central/veterinary database in accordance with Community systems for the identification and registration of animals should be consulted and cross checked. (e) The need to incorporate livestock valuers in the local disease control centres is laid down in document VI/5211/95. (f) At the end of 2003 the Commission sent a questionnaire to the Member States and to the accession countries on the system for recruiting assessors, the general principles governing their remuneration and a system for compensating livestock farmers.
Contingency plans are to be considered as implementing legislation. 
Contingency plans are to be considered as implementing legislation.
The measures provided for in the plans may have a serious impact on the economic and social situation of the rural community and the national economy as a whole. 
The measures provided for in the plans may have a serious impact on the economic and social situation of the rural community and the national economy as a whole.
Until evaluated against harmonised criteria and formally approved they can neither be implemented nor tested. 
Until evaluated against harmonised criteria and formally approved they can neither be implemented nor tested.
Real-time alert exercises cannot be easily carried out within a short time-span. 
Real-time alert exercises cannot be easily carried out within a short time-span.
In addition, the European Commission for the Control of FMD at the FAO, of which all Member States are members and to which the Commission contributes financially, carried out an evaluation of the contingency plans in 1999. 
In addition, the European Commission for the Control of FMD at the FAO, of which all Member States are members and to which the Commission contributes financially, carried out an evaluation of the contingency plans in 1999.
An exceptional situation in Member States should not be taken as indicative of potential FMD outbreaks. 
An exceptional situation in Member States should not be taken as indicative of potential FMD outbreaks.
The contingency plan for FMD of the United Kingdom may have changed little during the years following its adoption. 
The contingency plan for FMD of the United Kingdom may have changed little during the years following its adoption.
However, by the end of 2000 the United Kingdom was reviewing certain aspects of its contingency planning in the light of the experience with CSF (1). 
However, by the end of 2000 the United Kingdom was reviewing certain aspects of its contingency planning in the light of the experience with CSF (1).
The recommendation by the Commission in 1995 was that any veterinary service had to provide the capacity for the instant control of 10 (2) simultaneous outbreaks, with an option to expand should the epidemiological situation so require. 
The recommendation by the Commission in 1995 was that any veterinary service had to provide the capacity for the instant control of 10 (2) simultaneous outbreaks, with an option to expand should the epidemiological situation so require.
The preliminary results of an Expert Elicitation Workshop on the risk of introduction of FMD to Europe were discussed at the meeting of the Research Group of the European Commission for the Control of FMD at the FAO in 2000. 
The preliminary results of an Expert Elicitation Workshop on the risk of introduction of FMD to Europe were discussed at the meeting of the Research Group of the European Commission for the Control of FMD at the FAO in 2000.
This report estimated the risk of virus introduction into the islands and the northern Member States of the EU as very remote. 
This report estimated the risk of virus introduction into the islands and the northern Member States of the EU as very remote.
It is important to note that the situation in the United Kingdom, with infection already seeded in more than 50 premises prior to the confirmation of the first outbreak, cannot be compared with the situation in other affected Member States that had a sufficient period of warning. 
It is important to note that the situation in the United Kingdom, with infection already seeded in more than 50 premises prior to the confirmation of the first outbreak, cannot be compared with the situation in other affected Member States that had a sufficient period of warning.
The current practice of identifying bovine animals should ensure traceability of these animals both on national territory and in intra-Community trade. 
The current practice of identifying bovine animals should ensure traceability of these animals both on national territory and in intra-Community trade.
Animals intended for export to third countries are accompanied to the exit point by an animal health certificate established for bovine animals for slaughter. 
Animals intended for export to third countries are accompanied to the exit point by an animal health certificate established for bovine animals for slaughter.
If such animals were to be re-imported they would be subject to the established import requirements which include a mandatory residence in the approved country of dispatch as well as pre-export isolation and testing verified by appropriate veterinary certification. 
If such animals were to be re-imported they would be subject to the established import requirements which include a mandatory residence in the approved country of dispatch as well as pre-export isolation and testing verified by appropriate veterinary certification.
(1) FMD 2001-Lessons to be Learned Inquiry Report (p. 34). 
(1) FMD 2001-Lessons to be Learned Inquiry Report (p.
(2) Document VI/5211/95 point 6.12. 
34) (2) Document VI/5211/95 point 6.12.
C 54/34 CS Úřední věstník Evropské unie 3.3.2005 Traceability of bovine animals in third countries is therefore of concern to the Commission as far as the approval of third countries for exports are concerned, but is from an animal health point of view not a Community responsibility. 
C 54/34 EN Official Journal of the European Union 3.3.2005 Traceability of bovine animals in third countries is therefore of concern to the Commission as far as the approval of third countries for exports are concerned, but is from an animal health point of view not a Community responsibility.
Identification of sheep and goats is one of the aspects to be controlled by the FVO during specific missions for the eradication of B. melitensis. 
Identification of sheep and goats is one of the aspects to be controlled by the FVO during specific missions for the eradication of B. melitensis.
However, the United Kingdom, Ireland and the Netherlands are free of B. melitensis throughout their territories and have therefore been spared from such missions. 
However, the United Kingdom, Ireland and the Netherlands are free of B. melitensis throughout their territories and have therefore been spared from such missions.
Identification of sheep and goats allowing the tracing of the holding of origin was already being regulated by Directive 92/102/EEC. 
Identification of sheep and goats allowing the tracing of the holding of origin was already being regulated by Directive 92/102/EEC.
Following difficult discussions in the Council and the European Parliament, in 2003 the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No 21/2004 which requires individual identification of sheep and goats and record keeping on the registered farms. 
Following difficult discussions in the Council and the European Parliament, in 2003 the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No 21/2004 which requires individual identification of sheep and goats and record keeping on the registered farms.
In accordance with Directive 92/102/EEC sheep, goats and pigs were identified as a group so as to allow tracing of the holding of origin. 
In accordance with Directive 92/102/EEC sheep, goats and pigs were identified as a group so as to allow tracing of the holding of origin.
Article 3(2) of that Directive provides for a derogation in relation to small holdings keeping not more than three animals of the ovine or caprine species or one pig, provided that any such animal was subject to the controls laid down by legislation prior to movement. 
Article 3(2) of that Directive provides for a derogation in relation to small holdings keeping not more than three animals of the ovine or caprine species or one pig, provided that any such animal was subject to the controls laid down by legislation prior to movement.
Regulation (EC) No 21/2004 withd-rew this derogation in relation to sheep and goats. 
Regulation (EC) No 21/2004 withdrew this derogation in relation to sheep and goats.
Difficulties have been encountered in relation to triangular trade in fattening sheep forwarded from the Member State of first destination to another and accompanied by a new certificate recorded in a new ANIMO message. 
Difficulties have been encountered in relation to triangular trade in fattening sheep forwarded from the Member State of first destination to another and accompanied by a new certificate recorded in a new ANIMO message.
Clarification of such movements required close cooperation between Member States. 
Clarification of such movements required close cooperation between Member States.
This problem is related to the particular trade conditions for fattening sheep that had not provided for a mandatory residence before dispatched to another Member State. 
This problem is related to the particular trade conditions for fattening sheep that had not provided for a mandatory residence before dispatched to another Member State.
Directive 2003/50/EC addressed this problem by introducing a residence and stand-still period prior to dispatch to another Member State. 
Directive 2003/50/EC addressed this problem by introducing a residence and stand-still period prior to dispatch to another Member State.
In other cases tracing of sheep was hampered when the sheep originating in the United Kingdom had been moved under national conditions from the holding of destination indicated in the ANIMO message to another holding within the same Member State. 
In other cases tracing of sheep was hampered when the sheep originating in the United Kingdom had been moved under national conditions from the holding of destination indicated in the ANIMO message to another holding within the same Member State.
The Commission has taken steps to permanently include information on the transit through staging points in the messages issued by the new TRACES computer system, integrating the functions of the ANIMO and SHIFT systems into a single architecture (Decision 2004/292/EC of 30 March 2004). 
The Commission has taken steps to permanently include information on the transit through staging points in the messages issued by the new TRACES computer system, integrating the functions of the ANIMO and SHIFT systems into a single architecture (Decision 2004/292/EC of 30 March 2004).
In addition, the sanitary conditions for the operation of staging points were strengthened by the introduction of a sanitary break with compulsory disinfection between the occupation by subsequent consignments (Decision 2003/483/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1040/2003). 
In addition, the sanitary conditions for the operation of staging points were strengthened by the introduction of a sanitary break with compulsory disinfection between the occupation by subsequent consignments (Decision 2003/483/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1040/2003).
42 and 43. or indeed the entire territory of a Member State is already an ex-tremely serious restriction of animal health policy, having wide-ranging consequences for public order and civil liberties. 
The ANIMO system as a management tool oper-42 and 43. or indeed the entire territory of a Member State is already an extremely serious restriction of animal health policy, having wide-ranging consequences for public order and civil liberties.
It is applied by the Member State under the responsibility of the competent authorities. 
It is applied by the Member State under the responsibility of the competent authorities.
The Commission did adopt Decision 2001/190/EC of 8 March 2001 which introduced EC-wide restrictions on the movement of susceptible animals within and between Member States other than the United Kingdom, and which had the above-mentioned effects. 
The Commission did adopt Decision 2001/190/EC of 8 March 2001 which introduced EC-wide restrictions on the movement of susceptible animals within and between Member States other than the United Kingdom, and which had the above-mentioned effects.
On 19 February 2001 the disease was noticed in sows at the abattoir in Essex and subsequently confirmed on 20 February 2001. 
On 19 February 2001 the disease was noticed in sows at the abattoir in Essex and subsequently confirmed on 20 February 2001.
Tracing to source farms led on 21 February 2001 to the conclusion that the abattoir was contaminated before these animals had arrived. 
Tracing to source farms led on 21 February 2001 to the conclusion that the abattoir was contaminated before these animals had arrived.
Also, about 600 holdings that had supplied slaughter pigs, first of all swill-feeders, and their respective contacts had to be visited. 
Also, about 600 holdings that had supplied slaughter pigs, first of all swill-feeders, and their respective contacts had to be visited.
On 23 February 2001 the disease was reported in cattle on a holding from where sheep had been sent to a big livestock market days before. 
On 23 February 2001 the disease was reported in cattle on a holding from where sheep had been sent to a big livestock market days before.
The national movement ban was immediately introduced. 
The national movement ban was immediately introduced.
The question of a transport ban on a large part 
The question of a transport ban on a large part
3.3.2005 CS Úřední věstník Evropské unie C 54/35 Movement of mainly sheep before the detection of the disease and the installation of movement restrictions accounts for nine out of 12 of the major geographical groups of outbreaks. 
3.3.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 54/35 Movement of mainly sheep before the detection of the disease and the installation of movement restrictions accounts for nine out of 12 of the major geographical groups of outbreaks.
Eight out of the nine areas, which account for 89 % of the outbreaks diagnosed by 15 June 2001, were infected before the first case of FMD was diagnosed. 
Eight out of the nine areas, which account for 89 % of the outbreaks diagnosed by 15 June 2001, were infected before the first case of FMD was diagnosed.
The minimum requirements described in Article 9 of Directive 85/511/EEC, which aim to prevent airborne spread or spread through fomites of the FMD virus, have been effective in the context of the outbreaks in other Member States to which the Court referred previously and also in relation to more isolated outbreaks in the United Kingdom. 
The minimum requirements described in Article 9 of Directive 85/511/EEC, which aim to prevent airborne spread or spread through fomites of the FMD virus, have been effective in the context of the outbreaks in other Member States to which the Court referred previously and also in relation to more isolated outbreaks in the United Kingdom.
By contrast with the scientific studies carried out afterwards on archive data of the 2001 epidemic, the competent authorities had to operate at the time of the first outbreaks on a much less complete set of information. 
By contrast with the scientific studies carried out afterwards on archive data of the 2001 epidemic, the competent authorities had to operate at the time of the first outbreaks on a much less complete set of information.
The NAO report reads on page 14: ‘Between confirmation and a national movement ban being imposed on 23 February 2001 another 62 premises are believed to have been infected, involving another seven counties.’ The NAO in its report on page 56 point 3.53 explains the concerns of the department to introduce on 20 February 2001 on the basis of existing epidemiological evidence a nationwide movement ban. 
The NAO report reads on page 14: ÔBetween confirmation and a national movement ban being imposed on 23 February 2001 another 62 premises are believed to have been infected, involving another seven counties.Ő The NAO in its report on page 56 point 3.53 explains the concerns of the department to introduce on 20 February 2001 on the basis of existing epidemiological evidence a nationwide movement ban.
Such a drastic measure, with far-reaching consequences for stranded animals and feed supply, was considered dispro-portionate, as the disease at that stage existed only in pigs and the pig industry does not tend to move animals through markets. 
Such a drastic measure, with far-reaching consequences for stranded animals and feed supply, was considered disproportionate, as the disease at that stage existed only in pigs and the pig industry does not tend to move animals through markets.
The NAO also makes it clear that the conclusions quoted by the Court were based on a developing model and that data had been subsequently improved. 
The NAO also makes it clear that the conclusions quoted by the Court were based on a developing model and that data had been subsequently improved.
COMMISSION ACTION DURING THE CRISIS 44. 
COMMISSION ACTION DURING THE CRISIS 44.
The responsible services in the Commission have been and are available 24/24 not only during crisis situations, as can be gathered from the rapid response to the notification of the first outbreak. 
The responsible services in the Commission have been and are available 24/24 not only during crisis situations, as can be gathered from the rapid response to the notification of the first outbreak.
The Commission agrees with the Court that during the crisis the procedures for completing a mission report had been accelerated. 
The Commission agrees with the Court that during the crisis the procedures for completing a mission report had been accelerated.