natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As was established in the Court’s Special Report on Twinning, this instrument improved significantly after its start-up phase and general conclusions cannot be drawn from difficulties in the start-up phase prior to the Commission’s own evaluation of the instrument and remedial measures taken. 
As was established in the CourtŐs Special Report on Twinning, this instrument improved significantly after its start-up phase and general conclusions cannot be drawn from difficulties in the start-up phase prior to the CommissionŐs own evaluation of the instrument and remedial measures taken.
To the limited extent that the respective roles of Twinning pre-accession advisers and consultants were not defined, this was a project management operational problem shared by the country administrations (mainly) and Member State project leaders responsible for these projects (and is addressed in the various replies in the Court’s Twinning Reports). 
To the limited extent that the respective roles of Twinning pre-accession advisers and consultants were not defined, this was a project management operational problem shared by the country administrations (mainly) and Member State project leaders responsible for these projects (and is addressed in the various replies in the CourtŐs Twinning Reports).
Candidate countries were requested repeatedly to designate authorities at earlier dates but internal political constraints prevented them from so doing, which was only resolved in the final stages of the negotiations as the Court indicates in several observations above. 
Candidate countries were requested repeatedly to designate authorities at earlier dates but internal political constraints prevented them from so doing, which was only resolved in the final stages of the negotiations as the Court indicates in several observations above.
However, thanks also to the Phare ESC approach (PNDPs), overall planning capacity was established and allowed candidate countries to submit their draft SF Development plans in early 2003 (in order to assure timely approval and launch in 2004 of CSFs+OPs and SPDs). 
However, thanks also to the Phare ESC approach (PNDPs), overall planning capacity was established and allowed candidate countries to submit their draft SF Development plans in early 2003 (in order to assure timely approval and launch in 2004 of CSFs+OPs and SPDs).
These plans were also approved in 2003 and this was an unprecedented achievement. 
These plans were also approved in 2003 and this was an unprecedented achievement.
C 15/26 CS Úřední věstník Evropské unie 20.1.2005 61. 
C 15/26 EN Official Journal of the European Union 20.1.2005 61.
As highlighted in replies to paragraphs 9, 25 and 27, IB was used on the whole territory, at central and regional level, for preparing the structures due to manage the ESC, whereas, as the Phare Review stipulated: „Phare investment support in the ESC must be focused on a few priorities if it is to have an impact. 
As highlighted in replies to paragraphs 9, 25 and 27, IB was used on the whole territory, at central and regional level, for preparing the structures due to manage the ESC, whereas, as the Phare Review stipulated: ÔPhare investment support in the ESC must be focused on a few priorities if it is to have an impact.
It is neither feasible nor wise to pilot test all structures and instruments that will be developed through IB. 
It is neither feasible nor wise to pilot test all structures and instruments that will be developed through IB.
This concentration requires a discipline on programming to ensure that resources are not spread too thinly across too many programmes“. 
This concentration requires a discipline on programming to ensure that resources are not spread too thinly across too many programmesŐ.
This was in accordance with the SFM principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. 
This was in accordance with the SFM principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness.
CONCLUSIONS 63. 
CONCLUSIONS 63.
Given that assisting preparations for Structural Funds was always only one of the ESC objectives and that the Commission has met the aim of delivering around 35 % of total financing for national programmes in the form of investment in the ESC, complemented by considerable related institutional building, results are consistent with the the original timeframe. 
Given that assisting preparations for Structural Funds was always only one of the ESC objectives and that the Commission has met the aim of delivering around 35 % of total financing for national programmes in the form of investment in the ESC, complemented by considerable related institutional building, results are consistent with the the original timeframe.
It is questionable as to whether arrangements similar to Sapard and ISPA (effectively a fourth instrument) would have served better. 
It is questionable as to whether arrangements similar to Sapard and ISPA (effectively a fourth instrument) would have served better.
It is also highly doubtful as to whether countries stretched to their limits by accession preparations could have sustained a second full decentralisation process without major disruptions in assistance delivery. 
It is also highly doubtful as to whether countries stretched to their limits by accession preparations could have sustained a second full decentralisation process without major disruptions in assistance delivery.
Great progress was achieved in the context of a compressed timeframe determined by the pace of the negotiations and not defined at the outset. 
Great progress was achieved in the context of a compressed timeframe determined by the pace of the negotiations and not defined at the outset.
Overall planning capacity was established and allowed these countries to submit their draft SF Development Plans in early 2003 (and gain approval in 2003). 
Overall planning capacity was established and allowed these countries to submit their draft SF Development Plans in early 2003 (and gain approval in 2003).
This was never achieved before. 
This was never achieved before.
The focus, concentration and impact standards of ESC were never at odds with the Structural Funds objective. 
The focus, concentration and impact standards of ESC were never at odds with the Structural Funds objective.
A more diffused deployment of the limited resources would have provided a bad example of management of Community funds. 
A more diffused deployment of the limited resources would have provided a bad example of management of Community funds.
The Commission considers that an overall evolutionary strategy did exist (Progress Reports and resulting Accession Partnerships) on which the Phare programme including ESC was based. 
The Commission considers that an overall evolutionary strategy did exist (Progress Reports and resulting Accession Partnerships) on which the Phare programme including ESC was based.
Most of the ESC contribution to this overall strategy continues as most ESC investment is being delivered beyond the audit period. 
Most of the ESC contribution to this overall strategy continues as most ESC investment is being delivered beyond the audit period.
Modified Phare procedures mirrored ERDF and ESF measures to the maximum extent allowed by the external assistance provisions of the Financial Regulations. 
Modified Phare procedures mirrored ERDF and ESF measures to the maximum extent allowed by the external assistance provisions of the Financial Regulations.
Progress beyond the legal limits thereby imposed was impossible. 
Progress beyond the legal limits thereby imposed was impossible.
On EDIS, the Phare Review stipulated that decentralisation could not start before 2002 at the earliest due to the preparation needed to ensure adequate management and financial control systems were in place and operational. 
On EDIS, the Phare Review stipulated that decentralisation could not start before 2002 at the earliest due to the preparation needed to ensure adequate management and financial control systems were in place and operational.
The legal obligation to move to EDIS only arose in the Act of Accession after the timeframe was compressed by the acceleration in the negotiations. 
The legal obligation to move to EDIS only arose in the Act of Accession after the timeframe was compressed by the acceleration in the negotiations.
In addition there was no legal or other procedural link between the introduction of EDIS starting at the earliest in 2002 and the initial difficulties encountered in the implementation of grant schemes introduced in 2000. 
In addition there was no legal or other procedural link between the introduction of EDIS starting at the earliest in 2002 and the initial difficulties encountered in the implementation of grant schemes introduced in 2000.
These initial difficulties were mainly due to the learning curve countries had to undergo with this new mechanism similar to ERDF/ESF measures (see also reply to paragraphs 28 to 36). 
These initial difficulties were mainly due to the learning curve countries had to undergo with this new mechanism similar to ERDF/ESF measures (see also reply to paragraphs 28 to 36).
Given the legal flexibility of the Phare Guidelines, allocations were relatively high. 
Given the legal flexibility of the Phare Guidelines, allocations were relatively high.
In 2001 to 2002, on average, ESC investment accounted for almost 37 % of national programme financing (see 38), in line with the aim in the 2000 Phare Review. 
In 2001 to 2002, on average, ESC investment accounted for almost 37 % of national programme financing (see 38), in line with the aim in the 2000 Phare Review.
The indicative (i.e. suggestive, it was not a minimum requirement) 35 % ESC allocation was „to be applied with flexibility on a country-by-country basis“ (Phare Guidelines Decision 1999). 
The indicative (i.e. suggestive, it was not a minimum requirement) 35 % ESC allocation was Ôto be applied with flexibility on a country-by-country basisŐ (Phare Guidelines Decision 1999).
Consequently, seven out of ten countries chose to allocate less than 35 % to the ESC and, as a result, more to other Accession Partnership priorities. 
Consequently, seven out of ten countries chose to allocate less than 35 % to the ESC and, as a result, more to other Accession Partnership priorities.
Three large countries allocated substantially more to the ESC, thereby raising the average to 37 %. 
Three large countries allocated substantially more to the ESC, thereby raising the average to 37 %.
In addition, the ESC institution building has accounted for about 6 % of the entire national programme financing, on average, over the same period, bringing total average allocations to well over 40 % annually. 
In addition, the ESC institution building has accounted for about 6 % of the entire national programme financing, on average, over the same period, bringing total average allocations to well over 40 % annually.
Consequently, it is not clear how ESC allocations have been insufficient in either individual countries or in overall terms. 
Consequently, it is not clear how ESC allocations have been insufficient in either individual countries or in overall terms.
Even if not all initial ambitions were realised within a timeframe reduced by rapid accelerations in the negotiations, this was primarily due to the inherent difficulties and delays in designation of the future institutions responsible for managing structural funds. 
Even if not all initial ambitions were realised within a timeframe reduced by rapid accelerations in the negotiations, this was primarily due to the inherent difficulties and delays in designation of the future institutions responsible for managing structural funds.
In certain instances, insufficient stability of some institutions indeed significantly impeded the impact of preparatory pre-accession assistance. 
In certain instances, insufficient stability of some institutions indeed significantly impeded the impact of preparatory pre-accession assistance.
Nevertheless, the evidence to date is that the main objectives were indeed realised, as reflected in the negotiations themselves and follow-up monitoring reports and in all subsequent programming developments to an extent never achieved before. 
Nevertheless, the evidence to date is that the main objectives were indeed realised, as reflected in the negotiations themselves and follow-up monitoring reports and in all subsequent programming developments to an extent never achieved before.
Meanwhile, the majority of ESC and related institution building programmes continue to deliver assistance beyond the audit period and the prognosis for the SFs is positive. 
Meanwhile, the majority of ESC and related institution building programmes continue to deliver assistance beyond the audit period and the prognosis for the SFs is positive.
RECOMMENDATIONS 68. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 68.
After accession the new Member States will continue to receive a great deal of direct support from the Structural Funds Directorates-General to help them to manage programmes effectively, just as they have in framing the programmes and designing their delivery and management systems. 
After accession the new Member States will continue to receive a great deal of direct support from the Structural Funds Directorates-General to help them to manage programmes effectively, just as they have in framing the programmes and designing their delivery and management systems.
The new Member States have all set up audit services to fulfil the financial control requirements laid down by Regulation (EC) No 438/2001 and the Commission will ensure that these begin work immediately and will itself monitor and test these systems. 
The new Member States have all set up audit services to fulfil the financial control requirements laid down by Regulation (EC) No 438/2001 and the Commission will ensure that these begin work immediately and will itself monitor and test these systems.
The lessons learned are already being taken into account and the Bulgaria and Romania Roadmaps together with the revised Phare Guidelines already outline the strategy underway. 
The lessons learned are already being taken into account and the Bulgaria and Romania Roadmaps together with the revised Phare Guidelines already outline the strategy underway.
20.1.2005 CS Úřední věstník Evropské unie C 15/27 71. 
20.1.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 15/27 71.
Designation of implementation agencies is a sovereign decision for the candidate countries themselves and the Commission has no mandate to dictate such a decision. 
Designation of implementation agencies is a sovereign decision for the candidate countries themselves and the Commission has no mandate to dictate such a decision.
Actually, in the progression of EDIS accreditation, the process is the other way round. 
Actually, in the progression of EDIS accreditation, the process is the other way round.
Phare implementing agencies, in order not to lose the experience they acquired, should become (or be integrated into) the SF managing and implementing bodies. 
Phare implementing agencies, in order not to lose the experience they acquired, should become (or be integrated into) the SF managing and implementing bodies.
In the context of the Roadmaps for Bulgaria and Romania, and in the light of the considerably enhanced amounts that will be available, both countries were invited (and have agreed) to implement EDIS two years before accession. 
In the context of the Roadmaps for Bulgaria and Romania, and in the light of the considerably enhanced amounts that will be available, both countries were invited (and have agreed) to implement EDIS two years before accession.
This will be monitored through the High-level Working Group process and all projects in the 2004 national programmes are being designed for implementation under EDIS. 
This will be monitored through the High-level Working Group process and all projects in the 2004 national programmes are being designed for implementation under EDIS.
The Phare Guidelines have been revised and the Programming Guide for 2004 has already been revised to introduce multi-annual planning for ESC and, where appropriate and feasible, also for institution building. 
The Phare Guidelines have been revised and the Programming Guide for 2004 has already been revised to introduce multiannual planning for ESC and, where appropriate and feasible, also for institution building.
C 29/2 CS Úřední věstník Evropské unie 4.2.2005 OBSAH SHRNUTÍ................................................................... 
C 29/2 EN Official Journal of the European Union CONTENTS SUMMARY ................................................................
Všeobecnýkontext ....................................................... 
INTRODUCTION ...........................................................
Cotojesystémidentifikaceaevidenceskotu? .................................. 
Generalcontext.........................................................
Neexistujípřesnápravidlaprořízenínárodníchdatabází .......................... 
Thevariouskeepersofcattle...............................................
Neexistujíkritériaprouznáníplnéfunkčnostidatabází ........................... 
Introduction ...........................................................
DohledKomise .......................................................... 
The Commission has no mandate to adopt implementing measures in respect of national databases..............................................................
ZJIŠTĚNÍ AUDITU ÚČETNÍHO DVORA PROVEDENÉHO V ČLENSKÝCH STÁTECH . . . . . . . . 
There is room for improvement in the CommissionŐs rules concerning on-the-spot checks andpenalties.......................................................... .
ZÁVĚRYADOPORUČENÍ ..................................................... 
TheCommissionŐsreplies ..............................................................
31 Odstavce Strany I–IX 3 1–6 4 1–3 4 4–6 4 7–26 5 7–10 5 11–17 9 18–26 9 27–32 12 27 12 28 13 29–31 13 32 13 33–46 13 33–34 13 35–37 13 38–39 14 40–41 15 42–46 17 47–77 18 47–54 18 55–64 20 65–71 22 72–77 24 72–74 24 75–77 24 78–91 25 92–99 29 4.2.2005 CS Úřední věstník Evropské unie SHRNUTÍ I. 
31 4.2.2005 Paragraph Page I-X 3 1-6 4 1-3 4 4-6 4 7-32 5 7-10 5 11-17 9 18-26 9 27-32 12 27 12 28 13 29-31 13 32 13 33-46 13 33-34 13 35-37 13 38-39 14 40-41 15 42-46 17 47-78 18 47-54 18 55-64 20 65-71 22 72-77 24 72-74 24 75-77 24 78-91 25 92-99 29
Identifikace a evidence skotu je základním předpokladem, který zaručí vysledování hovězího masa, a je také jednou z podmínek pro získání různých prémií na skot, které v roce 2002 činily více než 7 miliard EUR a v roce 2004 dosahovaly více než 8 miliard EUR. 
4.2.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union SUMMARY I. Identifying and registering the bovine herd is an essential prerequisite in guaranteeing the traceability of beef and veal and is also an element in the conditions attached to the various bovine premiums. These premiums amounted to more than 7 000 million euro in 2002 and more than 8 000 million euro in 2004.
Hlavím cílem auditu bylo posoudit systém identifikace a evidence skotu (SIEB) na úrovni Komise (kon-cepce, kontroly realizace a monitorování) a na úrovni členských států (operační systém umožňující účinné sledování zvířat od narození až po porážku a ověžení správnosti veškeré vyplacené přímé pomoci). 
The main objective of the audit was to evaluate the cattle identification and registration system, at the Commission (design, implementation controls and follow-up) and in the Member States (operational system allowing effective monitoring of animals from birth until slaughter and allowing verification of correct payment of all direct aid).
Audit proběhl ve čtyřech členských státech, které jsou největšími chovateli skotu (Německo, Francie, Itálie a Spojené království). 
The audit was carried out in the four Member States with the largest bovine herds (Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom).
Systém identifikace tvoří čtyři složky, kterými jsou ušní značky, zvířecí pasy, registr zvířat a počítačová databáze s podrobnými údaji o každém zvířeti. 
The identification system has four components: ear tags, passports, herd registers and the computerised database containing the details of all cattle.
Tato databáze je jednou ze součástí systému a měla být funkční nejpozději 31. prosince 1999. 
This database is one component of the system and was to be operational on 31 December 1999 at the latest.
Systém identifikace a evidence skotu byl ve čtyřech členských státech zaveden s více než dvouletým zpožděním po stanoveném termínu 31. prosince 1999 a nadále vykazuje určité nedostatky. 
Cattle identification and registration systems were set up in the four Member States more than two years after the target date of 31 December 1999 and still have some weaknesses.
Například zvířecí pasy skotu, se kterým se obchoduje mezi členskými státy, nejsou monitorovány, nedochází k výměně informací mezi národními databázemi, databáze jsou aktualizované se zpožděním a míra spolehlivosti informací obsažených v databázích je často považována za nedostatečnou. 
For example, the passports of animals traded between Member States are not monitored, there is no exchange of information between national databases, there are delays in updating the databases and the level of reliability of the information contained in the databases must often be considered inadequate.
Hlavním zjištěním auditu je, že navržený systém identifikace a evidence skotu nezaručuje vysledování pohybu skotu v rámci Společenství ani mimo členské státy. 
The main finding is that the cattle identification and registration system that was designed does not guarantee the traceability of intra-Community or extra-Community cattle movements.
Tyto přesuny se týkají přibližně tří milionů kusů skotu za rok (cca 4 % celkového počtu zvířat). 
These movements nevertheless involve approximately three million head of cattle per year (approximately 4 % of the herd).
V. Parlament a Rada vytvořily obecný rámec systému. 
V. The general framework of the system was laid down by the Parliament and the Council.
Komise měla za úkol vypracovat prováděcí pravidla k některým složkám systému, ale za zavedení systému odpovídaly členské státy. 
The Commission was given the task of implementing certain components of the system, but responsibility for implementing the system lies with the Member States.
Právní předpisy neobsahovaly ustanovení o výměně údajů týkajících se přemisťování skotu mezi členskými státy a tato výměna údajů byla ve skutečnosti kompromisem, neboť formáty údajů jednotlivých členských států se liší. 
The legislation did not include procedures for Member States to exchange data on cattle movements and the exchange was in any case compromised by the fact that data format varies from one Member State to another.
Všechny pokusy o harmonizaci informací pocházejících z různých databází byly neúspěšné. 
All attempts to reconcile information from the various databases have failed.
Členské státy si vykládaly různými způsoby některá ustanovení právních předpisů Společenství týkající se dodržování lhůt pro označování zvířat ušní značkou a nahlašování veškerých přesunů zvířat, pojmu „držitel“ skotu a odevzdání zvířecích pasů. 
The Member States interpreted certain elements of Community regulations in different ways, in respect of the deadlines for tagging and reporting, the fundamental concept of Ôkeeper of bovine animalsŐ and return of animal passports.
Komise nebyla pověřená přijetím prováděcích pravidel pro vytváření databází a jejich kontroly. 
The Commission was not given responsibility for adopting implementing measures for setting up and checking the databases.
Tato skutečnost zčásti vysvětluje rozdíly, které byly shledány mezi členskými státy. 
This explains, in part, the differences found between the Member States.
Zavedené kontrolní a sankční mechanismy nejsou přizpůsobeny držitelům zvířat, kterými jsou například obchodníci, shromažďovací střediska a provozovatelé jatek. 
The control and penalty systems in place have not been adapted to ensure that they are appropriate to the various keepers of cattle, such as traders, assembly centres or slaughterhouses.