natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
During 2002, after the accession target dates were set at the Laeken European Council, a formal requirement governing EDIS was stipulated in the Act of Accession and actions already initiated were accelerated. 
During 2002, after the accession target dates were set at the Laeken European Council, a formal requirement governing EDIS was stipulated in the Act of Accession and actions already initiated were accelerated.
High-level Working Groups were only one additional tool for the Commission and the countries. 
High-level Working Groups were only one additional tool for the Commission and the countries.
In parallel, continuous guidance was provided in writing as well as during joint seminars organised by the Regional Policy and Enlargement DGs. 
In parallel, continuous guidance was provided in writing as well as during joint seminars organised by the Regional Policy and Enlargement DGs.
Consequently, there was was no material time difference in initiating extended decentralisation for Phare in comparison to ISPA. 
Consequently, there was was no material time difference in initiating extended decentralisation for Phare in comparison to ISPA.
The Commission acknowledges that introduction of the new ESC instrument in 2000 resulted in slow but progressive implementation but there is no link between introducing EDIS, due to start „at the earliest in 2002“, and initial difficulties in implementing ESC grant schemes introduced two years earlier. 
The Commission acknowledges that introduction of the new ESC instrument in 2000 resulted in slow but progressive implementation but there is no link between introducing EDIS, due to start Ôat the earliest in 2002Ő, and initial difficulties in implementing ESC grant schemes introduced two years earlier.
Initial difficulties were mainly due to the inexperienced agencies learning curve with the new „measure“ mechanism. 
Initial difficulties were mainly due to the inexperienced agencies learning curve with the new ÔmeasureŐ mechanism.
Although grant schemes meant increased work for Delegations (ex ante approval of Call for Proposal and Guidelines for Applicants), according to external aid rules (decentralised), evaluation of project applications submitted for funding is not done by Delegations but by national authorities. 
Although grant schemes meant increased work for Delegations (ex ante approval of Call for Proposal and Guidelines for Applicants), according to external aid rules (decentralised), evaluation of project applications submitted for funding is not done by Delegations but by national authorities.
Delegations give a global endorsement to the evaluation report and the final list of award proposals prepared by national authorities, not an approval to each individual grant contract. 
Delegations give a global endorsement to the evaluation report and the final list of award proposals prepared by national authorities, not an approval to each individual grant contract.
Initial difficulties were mainly due to the learning curve those countries had to undergo with this new „measure“ mechanism. 
Initial difficulties were mainly due to the learning curve those countries had to undergo with this new ÔmeasureŐ mechanism.
Administrative weaknesses and lack of inter-ministerial coordination were a reality in 1999. 
Administrative weaknesses and lack of inter-ministerial coordination were a reality in 1999.
Therefore, the requirements for the Preliminary National Development Plan (whose drafts had to be submitted by October 1999), while mirroring the Objective 1 requirements, including the partnership approach, were relatively straightforward. 
Therefore, the requirements for the Preliminary National Development Plan (whose drafts had to be submitted by October 1999), while mirroring the Objective 1 requirements, including the partnership approach, were relatively straightforward.
The Preliminary National Development Plan (PNDPs) were conceived as a first step of an on-going process which would develop over time into the type of NDP required for Structural Funds inside the EU. 
The Preliminary National Development Plan (PNDPs) were conceived as a first step of an on-going process which would develop over time into the type of NDP required for Structural Funds inside the EU.
The PNDPs fulfilled a double role of being the key steering documents for programming ESC while at the same time being the forerunners of Structural Funds Development Plans. 
The PNDPs fulfilled a double role of being the key steering documents for programming ESC while at the same time being the forerunners of Structural Funds Development Plans.
In late 2000, countries were requested to review and to develop their PNDPs by the end of 2001, to take into account the observations from the Commission on the first generation of PNDPs and to incorporate the lesson learned with the 2000 ESC programming exercise. 
In late 2000, countries were requested to review and to develop their PNDPs by the end of 2001, to take into account the observations from the Commission on the first generation of PNDPs and to incorporate the lesson learned with the 2000 ESC programming exercise.
Revised PNDPs, which were jointly passed by DG Enlargement and Structural Funds DGs, paved the way for the Structural Funds Development Plans and programming documents which were subsequently prepared by acceding countries in the course of 2002 to 2003. 
Revised PNDPs, which were jointly passed by DG Enlargement and Structural Funds DGs, paved the way for the Structural Funds Development Plans and programming documents which were subsequently prepared by acceding countries in the course of 2002 to 2003.
C 15/24 CS Úřední věstník Evropské unie 20.1.2005 35. 
C 15/24 EN Official Journal of the European Union 20.1.2005 35.
The Phare Review identified multi-annual programming (on the basis on strengthened National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis and PNDPs) as a medium-term task that, under certain conditions, could have been operational from 2002 onwards. 
The Phare Review identified multi-annual programming (on the basis on strengthened National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis and PNDPs) as a medium-term task that, under certain conditions, could have been operational from 2002 onwards.
A multiannual approach in the context of Phare CBC was easier to implement given the limited scope of the programme and its complementary nature of a programme conceived to work, since its outset, with Interreg (a programme with multiannual programming) at the EU-CC borders. 
A multiannual approach in the context of Phare CBC was easier to implement given the limited scope of the programme and its complementary nature of a programme conceived to work, since its outset, with Interreg (a programme with multiannual programming) at the EU-CC borders.
As of 1999, the further alignment with Interreg meant that Joint Programming Documents in a multiannual perspective (although only indicative: for Phare those allocations have to be decided on an annual basis) were adopted to cover the 2000 to 2002 period and revised in 2003. 
As of 1999, the further alignment with Interreg meant that Joint Programming Documents in a multiannual perspective (although only indica-tive: for Phare those allocations have to be decided on an annual basis) were adopted to cover the 2000 to 2002 period and revised in 2003.
Co-financing requirements are in all Phare investment project fiches since 2000. 
Co-financing requirements are in all Phare investment project fiches since 2000.
As preparations for accession imposed a considerable financial burden on candidate countries, both joint and parallel co-financing was permitted under Phare. 
As preparations for accession imposed a considerable financial burden on candidate countries, both joint and parallel co-financing was permitted under Phare.
Even though Phare is bound by annual financing decisions, both co-financing forms clearly require multi-annual budgetary planning of co-financing by the countries. 
Even though Phare is bound by annual financing decisions, both co-financing forms clearly require multi-annual budgetary planning of co-financing by the countries.
FUNDING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PHARE PROGRAMMES TO PREPARE CANDIDATE COUNTRIES FOR MANAGING THE STRUCTURAL FUNDS 37. 
FUNDING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PHARE PROGRAMMES TO PREPARE CANDIDATE COUNTRIES FOR MANAGING THE STRUCTURAL FUNDS 37.
The Special Preparatory Programme (SPP) was originally conceived as a horizontal multi-country programme but in 1998, in line with general policy on reducing horizontal actions, it was phased out. 
The Special Preparatory Programme (SPP) was originally conceived as a horizontal multi-country programme but in 1998, in line with general policy on reducing horizontal actions, it was phased out.
As of 1999 SPP-comparable activities were incorporated into the National Programmes, mainly through institution building support. 
As of 1999 SPP-comparable activities were incorporated into the National Programmes, mainly through institution building support.
The indicative objective of allocating approximately 35 % of Phare national programmes to ESC was „to be applied with flexibility on a country-by-country basis“ (Phare Guidelines Decision 1999). 
The indicative objective of allocating approximately 35 % of Phare national programmes to ESC was Ôto be applied with flexibility on a country-by-country basisŐ (Phare Guidelines Decision 1999).
In 2003 there was a deliberate focus on ESC to compensate for the need to concentrate on building administrative and judicial capacity in 2002. 
In 2003 there was a deliberate focus on ESC to compensate for the need to concentrate on building administrative and judicial capacity in 2002.
Several countries devoted well over 35 % of their 2003 funds to investment in ESC. 
Several countries devoted well over 35 % of their 2003 funds to investment in ESC.
The average was 39 %. 
The average was 39 %.
In Bulgaria the 2000 programme was committed in late 2000 with a contracting deadline of end-2002. 
In Bulgaria the 2000 programme was committed in late 2000 with a contracting deadline of end-2002.
Similarly, the 2001 programme was committed in late 2001. 
Similarly, the 2001 programme was committed in late 2001.
By late 2001, little of the 2000 ESC had been contracted as the authorities coped with the new instrument including grant schemes. 
By late 2001, little of the 2000 ESC had been contracted as the authorities coped with the new instrument including grant schemes.
At this stage the implementation difficulties referred to had not emerged and there was therefore no reason to reduce ESC allocations. 
At this stage the implementation difficulties referred to had not emerged and there was therefore no reason to reduce ESC allocations.
When difficulties did emerge in 2002, the Commission acted responsibly by reducing allocations for that year. 
When difficulties did emerge in 2002, the Commission acted responsibly by reducing allocations for that year.
Despite the difficulties indicated, contracting losses for 2000 and 2001 were limited. 
Despite the difficulties indicated, contracting losses for 2000 and 2001 were limited.
2000 was the first year of ESC and the total for ESC accounted for 23 % of the National Programme. 
2000 was the first year of ESC and the total for ESC accounted for 23 % of the National Programme.
In 2000 the ESC share of the total rose to 45 %. 
In 2000 the ESC share of the total rose to 45 %.
In 2002 and 2003, given limited capacity, the allocation was reduced to allow earlier commitments to be contracted. 
In 2002 and 2003, given limited capacity, the allocation was reduced to allow earlier commitments to be contracted.
The totals were 15 % and 12 % respectively. 
The totals were 15 % and 12 % respectively.
It is in any case much more meaningful to look on a multi-annual basis, rather than focus on the annual variances. 
It is in any case much more meaningful to look on a multi-annual basis, rather than focus on the annual variances.
Overall, since introduction of ESC, 23 % of the National Programme has gone to ESC, under the 30 % indicative target, but this is reasonable for a country much further from accession than most other recipients and still developing its capacity. 
Overall, since introduction of ESC, 23 % of the National Programme has gone to ESC, under the 30 % indicative target, but this is reasonable for a country much further from accession than most other recipients and still developing its capacity.
Until 2002, most Structural Funds’ national structures were not yet designated. 
Until 2002, most Structural FundsŐ national structures were not yet designated.
Consequently it was difficult to support them. 
Consequently it was difficult to support them.
In 2000 and 2001, the Commission was already pushing for progress by making Phare ESC investment decisions under conditions of acute institutional uncertainty. 
In 2000 and 2001, the Commission was already pushing for progress by making Phare ESC investment decisions under conditions of acute institutional uncertainty.
However, this enterprising approach was in the end vindicated by the outcome of the negotiations in terms of both actual results and timing. 
However, this enter-prising approach was in the end vindicated by the outcome of the negotiations in terms of both actual results and timing.
As it turned out, the timeframe was approximately halved but nevertheless there was still some time available for actual ESC implementation. 
As it turned out, the timeframe was approximately halved but nevertheless there was still some time available for actual ESC implementation.
However, for institution building such an approach is more difficult and actions were focused on areas where the least uncertainty existed. 
However, for institution building such an approach is more difficult and actions were focused on areas where the least uncertainty existed.
An evolutionary approach is not an inconsistent one. 
An evolutionary approach is not an inconsistent one.
The programming approach followed in 2000 was evolutionary for the pre-accession period, moving towards the full Structural Funds approach (i.e. thematic and regional programmes covering the whole national territory) as quickly as was feasible. 
The programming approach followed in 2000 was evolutionary for the pre-accession period, moving towards the full Structural Funds approach (i.e. thematic and regional programmes covering the whole national territory) as quickly as was feasible.
Concerning the regional versus sector approach, see replies to paragraphs 9, 21 and 24. 
Concerning the regional versus sector approach, see replies to paragraphs 9, 21 and 24.
The change in ministries responsible for drafting PNDPs and subsequently NDPs followed the designation of authorities responsible for SFs which took place late in the process (2002). 
The change in ministries responsible for drafting PNDPs and subsequently NDPs followed the designation of authorities responsible for SFs which took place late in the process (2002).
As higlighted in the reply to paragraph 33, the countries were not familiar with ESC projects, and namely with their implementing tool: ESC grant schemes. 
As higlighted in the reply to paragraph 33, the countries were not familiar with ESC projects, and namely with their implementing tool: ESC grant schemes.
This required a learning process which, although causing delay in the implementation, was a valuable building block essential for future Structural Funds implementation. 
This required a learning process which, although causing delay in the implementation, was a valuable building block essential for future Structural Funds implementation.
In regard to Bulgaria, the Commission agreed with the Court’s observations in September 2002 and corrective measures were taken. 
In regard to Bulgaria, the Commission agreed with the CourtŐs observations in September 2002 and corrective measures were taken.
In keeping with its objective to prepare for Structural Funds, Phare ESC investments closely mirrored ESF and ERDF-type investments. 
In keeping with its objective to prepare for Structural Funds, Phare ESC investments closely mirrored ESF and ERDF-type investments.
Under the latter, investments in basic economic infrastructure are fully eligible if they help to increase the economic potential of the regions, thus supporting the productive environment. 
Under the latter, investments in basic economic infrastructure are fully eligible if they help to increase the economic potential of the regions, thus supporting the productive environment.
In other words, improving the standard of the infrastructure is a basic pre-condition for any economic and social development. 
In other words, improving the standard of the infrastructure is a basic pre-condition for any economic and social development.
20.1.2005 CS Úřední věstník Evropské unie C 15/25 45. 
20.1.2005 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 15/25 45.
The 1999 Project Preparation Facility (PPF) was the only horizontal multi-country programme of its type. 
The 1999 Project Preparation Facility (PPF) was the only horizontal multi-country programme of its type.
In line with the general policy of moving from horizontal/multi-country programming to national programming, candidate countries were urged to establish PPFs within their national programmes (including for developing a pipeline of projects for the Structural Funds). 
In line with the general policy of moving from horizontal/multi-country programming to national programming, candidate countries were urged to establish PPFs within their national programmes (including for developing a pipeline of projects for the Structural Funds).
However, if candidate countries decide that sufficient investment in building up a project pipeline has been done, that is their prerogative. 
However, if candidate countries decide that sufficient investment in building up a project pipeline has been done, that is their prerogative.
See also replies to paragraphs 33 and 43. 
See also replies to paragraphs 33 and 43.
The Commission is of the view that initial data indicating a disbursement rate of almost 72 % for 2000, the first year of the new ESC instrument, at the end of 2003 is under the circumstances a good performance. 
The Commission is of the view that initial data indicating a disbursement rate of almost 72 % for 2000, the first year of the new ESC instrument, at the end of 2003 is under the circumstances a good performance.
Not surprisingly, start-up difficulties indeed revealed administrative capacity constraints. 
Not surprisingly, start-up difficulties indeed revealed administrative capacity constraints.
However, this did not slow down efforts to improve capacity but in fact contributed to speeding them up. 
However, this did not slow down efforts to improve capacity but in fact contributed to speeding them up.
This was evident in the 2002 Accession Partnerships priorities and Action Plans for Administrative Capa-city, including for ESC institution building, which averaged about 6 % of national programmes. 
This was evident in the 2002 Accession Partnerships priorities and Action Plans for Administrative Capacity, including for ESC institution building, which averaged about 6 % of national programmes.
Consequently, during the audit period most countries allocated more of their programmes to institution building. 
Consequently, during the audit period most countries allocated more of their programmes to institution building.
The drafts of the first generation of PNDPs were due to be submitted to the Commission by the end of October 1999 with or without Twinning assistance in order to facilitate ESC programming in 2000. 
The drafts of the first generation of PNDPs were due to be submitted to the Commission by the end of October 1999 with or without Twinning assistance in order to facilitate ESC programming in 2000.
However, Twinning had a significant impact on the revised (second generation) PNDP submitted in 2001 (see paragraph 34). 
However, Twinning had a significant impact on the revised (second generation) PNDP submitted in 2001 (see paragraph 34).
Any impact on implementation of pilot projects of the clarification or modification of procedures was quite marginal in comparison to other fundamental factors identified in the report i.e. institutional uncertainty and weaknesses on the part of the administrations as outlined in observations 51 to 60. 
Any impact on implementation of pilot projects of the clarification or modification of procedures was quite marginal in comparison to other fundamental factors identified in the report i.e. institutional uncertainty and weaknesses on the part of the administrations as outlined in observations 51 to 60.
Start-up problems are almost inevitable with any new initiative, and this was also the case with the PPF facility. 
Start-up problems are almost inevitable with any new initiative, and this was also the case with the PPF facility.
Indeed due to weak administrative capacity in one country, the Head of Delegation decided on derogation from the standard tendering period. 
Indeed due to weak administrative capacity in one country, the Head of Delegation decided on derogation from the standard tendering period.
However no tendering rules were „broken“ in the sense of an irregularity. 
However no tendering rules were ÔbrokenŐ in the sense of an irregularity.
The reasons for derogation were justifiable and documented. 
The reasons for derogation were justifiable and documented.
Twinning delays in a particular selection of Member State partners were invariably due to the slow designation of ministry and implementation agency responsibilities which only took place under the pressure of the negotiations. 
Twinning delays in a particular selection of Member State partners were invariably due to the slow designation of ministry and implementation agency responsibilities which only took place under the pressure of the negotiations.
The Commission could not interfere in the internal political processes of the candidate countries while these issues were being resolved. 
The Commission could not interfere in the internal political processes of the candidate countries while these issues were being resolved.
Both in terms of its ESC investment decisions and institution-building actions, the Commission was pushing the limits of what was feasible and possible. 
Both in terms of its ESC investment decisions and institution-building actions, the Commission was pushing the limits of what was feasible and possible.
See replies to paragraphs 33 and 43. 
See replies to paragraphs 33 and 43.
Commission Delegations played a great role in contributing to improving the quality and soundness of the grant schemes-related documents and procedures, thus contributing to the learning process that candidate countries had inevitably to go through. 
Commission Delegations played a great role in contributing to improving the quality and soundness of the grant schemes-related documents and procedures, thus contributing to the learning process that candidate countries had inevitably to go through.
Given that only the first year of ESC (2000 projects) are finishing implementation, the evidence available makes it difficult to base reasonable doubts on such limited data as well as taking into account the fact that countries had competing priorities in their preparations for accession. 
Given that only the first year of ESC (2000 projects) are finishing implementation, the evidence available makes it difficult to base reasonable doubts on such limited data as well as taking into account the fact that countries had competing priorities in their preparations for accession.
RESULTS OF INSTITUTION-BUILDING PROJECTS TO PREPARE CANDIDATE COUNTRIES FOR MANAGING THE STRUCTURAL FUNDS 56. 
RESULTS OF INSTITUTION-BUILDING PROJECTS TO PREPARE CANDIDATE COUNTRIES FOR MANAGING THE STRUCTURAL FUNDS 56.