natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Jak bylo řečeno generálním advokátem Darmonem v jeho závěrech k záležitosti K 5/98„nelze odbývat nerozhodnosti, které se mohou chopit určité podniky, před“atypickými „formami podpory k potřebě nebo nepotřebě oznámit je“.
As Advocate General Darmon stated in his Opinion in Case C 5/89, ‘the doubts with which some undertakings may be assailed, when faced with “atypical” forms of aid, as to whether notification is necessary should not be made light of’.
Závěrem Komise ukončuje, že FT mohl mít podle zákona důvěru, pokud se jedná o skutečnost, že jednání Francie nevytvářelo státní podporu.
In conclusion, the Commission finds that France Télécom could legitimately have confidence in France's conduct not constituting state aid.
Podle předcházejícího Komise uznává, že nařizovat v tomto případě navrácení podpory by bylo v protikladu s obecnými zásadami práva Společenství.
In the light of the above, the Commission considers that, in the present case, ordering the aid's recovery would be contrary to the general principles of Community law.
Komise konstatuje, že v kontextu prohlášení vydaných od července 2002 představuje akcionářská půjčka (tzv. „shareholder loan“), kterou v prosinci 2002 poskytla Francie společnosti France Télécom v podobě půjčky ve výši 9 milionů eur, státní podporu,
The Commission finds that, placed in the context of the declarations made from July 2002, the shareholder loan granted by France to France Télécom in December 2002 in the form of a EUR 9 billion credit line constitutes state aid,
V kontextu prohlášení vydaných od července 2002 představuje akcionářská půjčka, kterou v prosinci 2002 poskytla Francie společnosti France Télécom v podobě půjčky ve výši 9 milionů eur, státní podporu neslučitelnou se společným trhem.
Placed in the context of the declarations made from July 2002, the shareholder loan granted by France to France Télécom in December 2002 in the form of a EUR 9 billion credit line constitutes state aid incompatible with the common market.
Vrácení podpory uvedené v článku 1 není nutno požadovat.
The aid referred to in Article 1 does not have to be recovered.
V Bruselu dne 2.8.2004.
Done at Brussels, 2 August 2004
Úř. věst. č. C 57, 12.3.2003, s. 5.
OJ C 57, 12.3.2003, p. 5.
Viz body 1 až 8 rozhodnutí o zahájení, které je nutno považovat za nedílnou součást tohoto rozhodnutí.
See paragraphs 1-8 of the opening decision, which are to be considered an integral part of this Decision.
Viz poznámka pod čarou, s. 1.
See footnote 1.
Strana, která požadovala zachovat svou totožnost jako důvěrnou.
Party wishing that its identity be kept confidential.
V tomto rozhodnutí nazývána rovněž jako MCI.
Also called MCI for the purposes of this Decision.
Ke kterým byla připojena stížnost předložená týmiž společnostmi s datem ze dne 22. ledna 2003.
To which a complaint lodged by the same companies dated 22.1.2003 was annexed.
Společnost LDCOM Komisi zaslala tiskovou chybu, která byla francouzským orgánům poslána dne 16. června 2003.
LDCOM sent the Commission a corrigendum, which was forwarded to the French authorities on 16.6.2003.
Francouzské orgány zaslaly opravenou verzi jedné z příloh elektronickou poštou ze dne 30. července 2003.
The French authorities sent a corrected version of one of the annexes by email dated 30.7.2003.
S obsahem konzultace provedené p. Sureauem.
Containing a consultation carried out by Mr Sureau.
S obsahem tří zpráv připravených třemi znalci, jmenovanými FT (p. C.D.
Containing three reports prepared by three experts appointed by France Télécom (Mr C.D.
Ehlermann, p. Y.
Ehlermann, Mr Y.
Galmot a Sir Studzinski z banky HSBC).
Galmot and Mr J. Studzinski of HSBC).
Tento dopis obsahuje studia, jejichž autoři si přejí zůstat v anonymitě.
This letter contains studies the authors of which wish to remain anonymous.
Jedná se o hospodářskou studii, studii anglického práva, studii amerického práva a studii francouzského práva, týkající se omezující moci státních prohlášení.
They include an economic study, a study on English law, a study on American law and a study on French law concerning the binding force of declarations by the State.
S obsahem zpráv o posudku, popsaných v bodě 4.13.
Containing the expert reports described in point 4.13.
Stát neustále vlastní většinu jmění FT.
The State still holds the majority of France Télécom's capital.
Viz zdůvodnění 60.
See paragraph 60.
Body 9 až 12 rozhodnutí o zahájení.
Paragraphs 9-12 of the opening decision.
Podle zprávy 2003 v Etat actionnaire, FT čítá 240000 spolupracovníků v 39 zemích.
According to the 2003 report l'État actionnaire, France Télécom has 240000 employees in 39 countries.
Vyslechnutí p. Thierryho Bretona, předsedy představenstva a generálního ředitele FT, před komisí k vyšetřování správy veřejných podniků, zasedání ze dne 4. června 2003.
Hearing of Mr Thierry Breton, France Télécom's CEO, before the commission of enquiry into the management of public undertakings, sitting of 4.6.2003.
NERA: „Koeficient zadluženosti je definován jako poměr dlouhodobého dluhu k celkovým dlouhodobých zdrojů (dluh a jmění)“. ( ‘The debt ratio is defined as the ratio of long term debt to total long term capital (debt and equity)’)
NERA: ‘The debt ratio is defined as the ratio of long term debt to total long term capital (debt and equity)”
NERA: „Poměr k akciovému kapitálu se počítá jako poměr dlouhodobého dluhu ke jmění“. ( ‘The debt-equity ratio is calculated as the ratio of long-term debt to equity’.
NERA: ‘The debt-equity ratio is calculated as the ratio of long-term debt to equity”
NERA: „‚times-interest-earned ratio‘ nebo ‚interest cover‛ udává, v jakém měřítku jsou kryty úroky výsledkem před zatížením mírnějšími úroky a daněmi (EBIT). Toto měřítko udává úroveň přiměřenosti cash flow vytvořeného podnikem a jeho způsobilostí platit své úroky “.
NERA: ‘The “times-interest-earned ratio” or “interest cover” measures the extent to which interest is covered by earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) plus depreciation.
‘The “times-interest-earned ratio” or “interest cover” measures the extent to which interest is covered by earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) plus depreciation. The measure gives a level of the adequacy of cash flow generation and the consequent comfort a company enjoys in meeting its interest payments ’.)
The measure gives a level of the adequacy of cash flow generation and the consequent comfort a company enjoys in meeting its interest payments ”
NERA: „Výpočty se zakládají na údajích poskytnutých FT. Odhady zahrnují základní kapitál s úroky spojený s obligačními půjčkami a směnkami (úroky ze směnek byly z důvodu absence údajů k předcházejícím datům vzaty v úvahu od 25. července do 31. prosince 2003“.) ( ‘Calculations based on data supplied by France Telecom.
NERA: ‘Calculations based on data supplied by France Telecom.
Figures include bond and commercial paper interest and principal (interest on commercial paper was computed from 25 July 2002 to 31 December 2003 due to data unavailability for previous dates)’.
Figures include bond and commercial paper interest and principal (interest on commercial paper was computed from 25 July 2002 to 31 December 2003 due to data unavailability for previous dates)”
„credit ratings“ se používají investory jako ukazatel pravděpodobnosti získání úhrady v souladu s termíny, které řídí jejich investici. Ve skutečnosti vydaná označení úvěru „stupeň investice“ (třídy mezinárodně zahrnované mezi „AAA“ a „BBB“ u dlouhodobého termínu „F1“ – „F3“ u krátkodobého termínu) udávají relativně nízkou pravděpodobnost nesplnění závazku, zatímco označení tříd „spekulativní“ nebo „neinvestiční třída“ (mezinárodní označení mezi „BB“ a „D“ u dlouhodobých termínů a „B – D“ u krátkodobých termínů) mohou udávat vysokou pravděpodobnost nesplnění závazku nebo že k nesplnění závazku již došlo“ (internetová stránka Fitchs Rating: http://www.fitchratings.com/)).
‘Credit ratings are used by investors as indications of the likelihood of repayment in accordance with the terms on which they invested.
‘Credit ratings are used by investors as indications of the likelihood of repayment in accordance with the terms on which they invested. Thus, the use of credit ratings defines their function: “investment grade” ratings (international long-term “AAA” – “BBB” categories; short-term “F1” – “F3”) indicate a relatively low probability of default, while those in the “speculative” or “non-investment grade” categories (international long-term “BB”- “D”; short-term “B” – ‚D‛) may signal a higher probability of default or that a default has already occurred ’ (site internet de Fitchs Rating: http://www.fitchratings.com/).)
Thus, the use of credit ratings defines their function: “investment grade” ratings (international long-term “AAA” — “BBB” categories; short-term “F1” — “F3”) indicate a relatively low probability of default, while those in the “speculative” or “non-investment grade” categories (international long-term “BB” — “D”; short-term “B” — “D”) may signal a higher probability of default or that a default has already occurred ’ (Fitch Rating ' s Internet site: http://www.fitchratings.com/).
Moody's: ‘Moody's places France Telecom and Orange's long-term debt ratings on review for downgrade – Approximately eur60 billion of Debt Securities Affected… The France Telecom ratings under review for possible downgrade relate to the following: Convertible global bonds, Euro MTNs, Eurobonds, Floating Rate Euro MTNs, Floating Rate French Franc Bonds, French Bonds, Swiss Franc Bonds, its issuer rating and bank loan rating…. any resulting rating action should not exceed more than one notch’.
Moody's: ‘Moody's places France Telecom and Orange's long-term debt ratings on review for downgrade — Approximately EUR 60 billion of Debt Securities Affected… The France Telecom ratings under review for possible downgrade relate to the following: Convertible global bonds, Euro MTNs, Eurobonds, Floating Rate Euro MTNs, Floating Rate French Franc Bonds, French Bonds, Swiss Franc Bonds, its issuer rating and bank loan rating…. any resulting rating action should not exceed more than one notch’.
„Perspektiva dlouhodobého dluhu BBB+ France Télécom se vyvíjela negativně; hodnocení A-2 bylo potvrzeno… Toto rozhodnutí se řídí zprávou, podle které německý burzovní úřad bude vyšetřovat možnou dohodu mezi France Télécom, majoritním akcionářem – Gerhardem Schmidem – z Mobilcomu AG, v němž France Télécom vlastní 28,5 % a konsorciem evropských bank, která se týká podmínek výměny kontroly v Mobilcomu“. ( ‘France Telecom's Long-Term“BBB+” Rating Placed on CreditWatch Negative; A-2 Rating Affirmed… The action follows news that the German stock-exchange regulatory authority will investigate a possible agreement between France Telecom, the main shareholder–Gerhard Schmid–of France Telecom ' s 28,5 % -owned German associate Mobilcom AG, and a consortium of European banks regarding the conditions for a change in control of Mobilcom’.)
‘France Telecom's Long-Term“BBB+” Rating Placed on CreditWatch Negative; A-2 Rating Affirmed… The action follows news that the German stock-exchange regulatory authority will investigate a possible agreement between France Telecom, the main shareholder — Gerhard Schmid — of France Telecom ' s 28,5 % -owned German associate Mobilcom AG, and a consortium of European banks regarding the conditions for a change in control of Mobilcom’.
‘Moody's Investors Service has today placed the Prime-2 short-term rating of France Telecom (FT) on review for possible downgrade as a result of the rating agency's decision to expand the scope of the ongoing review of FT.
‘Moody's Investors Service has today placed the Prime-2 short-term rating of France Telecom (FT) on review for possible downgrade as a result of the rating agency's decision to expand the scope of the ongoing review of FT.
Although Moody's has revised its guidance, indicating that a downgrade of up to two notches is now possible for the long-term ratings, the rating agency expects the ratings to remain investment grade.
Although Moody's has revised its guidance, indicating that a downgrade of up to two notches is now possible for the long-term ratings, the rating agency expects the ratings to remain investment grade.
The review of FT's Prime-2 rating reflects Moody's increasing concerns about FT's ability to execute its debt reduction strategy.
The review of FT's Prime-2 rating reflects Moody's increasing concerns about FT's ability to execute its debt reduction strategy.
The rating agency noted that FT's slow progress in finalising asset sales, coupled with continuing deterioration in capital market conditions in this sector, could further limit FT's ability to improve its financial flexibility and meet its debt reduction targets’.
The rating agency noted that FT's slow progress in finalising asset sales, coupled with continuing deterioration in capital market conditions in this sector, could further limit FT's ability to improve its financial flexibility and meet its debt reduction targets’.
‘Standard & Poor's said today that the ratings on France Telecom (BBB+/Watch Neg/A-2) remain unchanged, including the group's short-term corporate credit rating.
‘Standard & Poor's said today that the ratings on France Telecom (BBB+/Watch Neg/A-2) remain unchanged, including the group's short-term corporate credit rating.
In its CreditWatch placement of France Telecom's long-term ratings on March 28, 2002, Standard & Poor's indicated that any long-term rating downgrade would be limited to one notch and that its short-term ratings were affirmed.
In its CreditWatch placement of France Telecom's long-term ratings on March 28, 2002, Standard & Poor's indicated that any long-term rating downgrade would be limited to one notch and that its short-term ratings were affirmed.
‘[…] Despite expectations that FT's EBITDA will grow to around €14 billion in 2002, FT's substantial interest and capex requirements means the company is not expected to generate material free cashflow for deleveraging in the near term.
‘… Despite expectations that FT's EBITDA will grow to around €14 billion in 2002, FT's substantial interest and capex requirements means the company is not expected to generate material free cashflow for deleveraging in the near term.
FT is dependant upon asset disposals and its treasury stock to make any significant inroads into reducing its debt:Moody's regard FT's ability to reduce debt within a relatively short period as having become increasingly constrained by the fall in its equity value, which reduces the potential value of the treasury stock FT holds, reducing the probability of conversion of numerous convertible bonds and potentially implying a lower realizable value for expected non-core asset disposals, although Moody's acknowledges that it is possible this may change.
FT is dependant upon asset disposals and its treasury stock to make any significant inroads into reducing its debt:Moody's regard FT's ability to reduce debt within a relatively short period as having become increasingly constrained by the fall in its equity value, which reduces the potential value of the treasury stock FT holds, reducing the probability of conversion of numerous convertible bonds and potentially implying a lower realizable value for expected non-core asset disposals, although Moody's acknowledges that it is possible this may change.
Additionally, the positive impact of expected asset disposals is expected to be partly offset by various contingent liabilities adversely impacting upon FT;The negative outlook attached to the Baa3 rating reflects the execution risks associated with FT's high debt refinancing needs of this highly leveraged company.
Additionally, the positive impact of expected asset disposals is expected to be partly offset by various contingent liabilities adversely impacting upon FT;The negative outlook attached to the Baa3 rating reflects the execution risks associated with FT's high debt refinancing needs of this highly leveraged company.
Although Moody's does not have any immediate liquidity concerns, the rating agency notes that FT faces around €15 billion of total long-term debt maturities in 2003;’
Although Moody's does not have any immediate liquidity concerns, the rating agency notes that FT faces around €15 billion of total long-term debt maturities in 2003’.
‘Standard & Poor's said today that it has lowered its long- and short-term corporate credit ratings on France Telecom (FT) to triple-“B”/ “A-3” from triple- “B”-plus/ “A-2”.
‘Standard & Poor's said today that it has lowered its long- and short-term corporate credit ratings on France Telecom (FT) to triple-“B”/ “A-3” from triple- “B”-plus/ “A-2”.
The downgrade primarily reflects Standard & Poor ' s expectations that FT will acquire the 71,5 % stake it does not already own in German wireless operator Mobilcom, as well as FT's inability to reduce debt sufficiently and rapidly enough to maintain credit measures consistent with the previous ratings.
The downgrade primarily reflects Standard & Poor ' s expectations that FT will acquire the 71,5 % stake it does not already own in German wireless operator Mobilcom, as well as FT's inability to reduce debt sufficiently and rapidly enough to maintain credit measures consistent with the previous ratings.
Standard & Poor's also lowered to triple-“B” from triple- “B”-plus its long-term corporate credit rating on Orange S.A., FT ' s majority-owned wireless subsidiary.
Standard & Poor's also lowered to triple-“B” from triple- “B”-plus its long-term corporate credit rating on Orange S.A., FT ' s majority-owned wireless subsidiary.
The long-term ratings on both companies remain on CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were placed on March 28, 2002, reflecting FT's challenging refinancing needs, including €15 billion of financial obligations in 2003’.
The long-term ratings on both companies remain on CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were placed on March 28, 2002, reflecting FT's challenging refinancing needs, including €15 billion of financial obligations in 2003’.
Fitch snížil známku FT dne 5. července 2002 a S & P ji snížil dne 12. července 2002.
Fitch reduced France Télécom's rating on 5 July 2002 and S & P reduced it on 12 July.
V tiskovém úředním oznámení ze dne 12. července, S & P potvrdil, že: „FT by se mohla při refinancování svého obligačního dluhu splatného v roce 2003 setkat s určitými potížemi“. ( ‘FT could face certain difficulties refinancing its debt obligations coming due in 2003’.)
In its 12 July press release, S & P stated that: ‘FT could face certain difficulties refinancing its debt obligations coming due in 2003’.
Vyslechnutí p. V. de la Bachelerie, účetního revizora FT, před výše uvedenou vyšetřovací komisí: „Skutečně musíme ve jménu zákona uvést v účinnost vyhlášené řízení, jakmile se projeví určité množství kritérií a ukazatelů.
Hearing of Mr V. de la Bachelerie, France Télécom's auditor, before the above-mentioned commission of enquiry: ‘By law, we have to put into effect the alert procedure as soon as a number of criteria and indicators appear.
Toto řízení nebylo použito před polovinou roku 2002, datem, ke kterému se projevil signál udaný trhem: oslabení známky France Télécom.
The procedure was not applicable before mid-2002, at which time a signal given out by the market came to our attention, namely the downgrading of France Télécom's rating.
V rámci naší úlohy účetního revizora, jsme otázku uvedli také k projednání v auditním výboru a správní radě a požadovali, aby plán krátkodobé likvidity byl poskytnut členům správní rady, abychom čelili problému ochrany likvidity.
As part of our auditor's duties, we thus had to deal with the question within the audit committee and the board of directors, demanding that board members be provided with a short-term liquidity plan in order to cope with the “liquidity wall” problem.
Je třeba říci, že tento nátlak se objevil pozdě, pokud společnost měla k tomuto datu prostředky pro své refinancování a kromě toho provedla významné financování, zejména Jumbo-účtů.
It must be said that this constraint appeared at a late stage, in so far as the company had, up to that time, the means with which to refinance itself and had, moreover, introduced substantial financing measures, including jumbos.
Když se proto likvidní bariéra objevila s oslabením známky, požadovali jsme aktualizaci předpokladů vedení financí.
Consequently, when the liquidity wall appeared with the downgrading of the rate, we ask for an update of the cash flow forecasts.
U příležitosti pololetního vyúčtování, stanoveného na počátku září 2002 a ukončeného během rady dne 12. září 2002, bylo provedeno přezkoumání stavu krátkodobé likvidity – výhled likvidity se skutečně posuzuje na krátké období, tč., na jeden rok.
At the time of the half-yearly accounts, which were adopted at the beginning of September 2002 and finalised at the board meeting on 12 September 2002, a review was carried out of the liquidity situation in the short term — liquidity visibility being assessed over the short term, that is to say, less than a year.
Situace, i když kritická, byla úředně potvrzena známkami, připojenými k finančnímu stavu dne 30. června 2002.“
The situation, which was by then critical, was made official in the notes annexed to the financial statements on 30 June 2002’.
Znění prohlášení francouzské vlády je uváděno dále, v bodu odůvodnění 204.
The wording of the French Government's declarations is reproduced in paragraph 204 below.
Goldman Sachs : „FT byl v situaci, aby byl oslaben prostřednictvím Moody's a S & P na spekulativní úroveň“. ( ‘FT was on the brink of ‚junk‛status with both Moody ' s and S & P ' s ’.)
Goldman Sachs: ‘FT was on the brink of “junk” status with both Moody ' s and S & P ' s ’.
Off Watch; Outlook Stable; Teleconf 3:30PM BST Today, Standard & Poor's Ratings direct, (12. července 2002).
Off Watch; Outlook Stable; Teleconf 3:30PM BST Today, Standard & Poor's Ratings Direct (12.7.2002)
Vyslechnutí p. Thierryho Bretona, předsedy představenstva a generálního ředitele FT komisí pro hospodářské záležitosti národního shromáždění dne 11. prosince 2002: „Poznamenal, že použitý finanční plán nebyl povinný a že byl na počátku roku 2001 ztížen tak, že v létě 2003 bylo možné očekávat krizi likvidity… P. Thierry Breton prohlásil, že podnik ohrožený zastavením plateb se nacházel ve stavu šoku … následkem velikosti jeho zadlužení, protože musel najít hotovost k úhradě 15 miliard eur v roce 2003, dále 2004, a 20 miliard eur v roce 2005“.
Hearing of Mr Thierry Breton, France Télécom's CEO, before the National Assembly's Economic Affairs Committee on 11.12.2002: ‘He pointed out that the financing plan that had been implemented had not been adhered to and matters had grown worse at the beginning of 2001 with the result that a liquidity crisis was foreseeable by the summer of 2003 … Mr Breton stated that, threatened with a suspension of payments, the company was in a state of shock … owing to the scale of its debt, as it had to find enough liquidity to reimburse EUR 15 billion in 2003 and again in 2004, and EUR 20 billion in 2005’.
Senát, 21. listopadu 2002, stanovisko předložené jménem komise pro hospodářské záležitosti plánu (1) k předloze finančního zákona na rok 2003, přijatého národním shromážděním.
Senate, 21.11.2002, opinion presented on behalf of the Committee on Economic Affairs and the Plan (1) on the draft Finance Act, 2003, adopted by the National Assembly.
Tyto údaje vycházejí z přílohy dopisu francouzských orgánů ze dne 3. prosince 2002.
These figures have been taken from the annex to the French authorities’ letter of 3.12.2002.
Tak na straně 25 tohoto dopisu francouzské orgány odhadují splatnosti obligačního oběživa v roce 2003 na 15 miliard eur. Takový rozdíl se vyskytuje v odhadu dluhu na základě dluhopisu, který je od té doby splatný koncem roku 2004, vyčíslený na 18,8 miliardy eur v příloze 2 a na 23,9 miliardy eur, strana 20 uvedeného dopisu.
Even so, on p. 25 of their letter, the French authorities estimate at EUR 15 billion the amount of outstanding bonds coming due in 2003. A similar difference is to be found in the estimate of the amount of bonds coming due by the end of 2004, which is put at EUR 18,8 billion in Annexe 2 and at EUR 23,9 billion on p. 20 of the letter.