natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Of particular significance within this report to the latter question posed is the proposed creation of a "Human Security Volunteer Force" - the civilian component of the proposed civilian-military "Human Security Response Force" - consisting of a Civil Peace Corps (an idea already proposed and supported by the Parliament) composed of mid- and post-career professionals and a Humanitarian Aid Volunteer Service composed of students and those having recently completed their studies.
Of particular significance within this report to the latter question posed is the proposed creation of a “Human Security Volunteer Force” - the civilian component of the proposed civilian-military “Human Security Response Force” - consisting of a Civil Peace Corps (an idea already proposed and supported by the Parliament) composed of mid- and post-career professionals and a Humanitarian Aid Volunteer Service composed of students and those having recently completed their studies.
In terms of military capabilities, attention must be drawn to the fact that the Union still has significant deficiencies, which would severely impinge on its ability to undertake humanitarian intervention of high-intensity dimensions, similar to that which would have been required to halt the humanitarian catastrophe that took place in Rwanda.
In terms of military capabilities, attention must be drawn to the fact that the Union still has significant deficiencies, which would severely impinge on its ability to undertake humanitarian intervention of high-intensity dimensions, similar to that which would have been required to halt the humanitarian catastrophe that took place in Rwanda.
Among these deficiencies are:
Among these deficiencies are:
- Deployable forces - Currently there is an insufficient number of forces for maintaining the rotation necessary (1/3 on deployment, 1/3 on training, 1/3 resting) to conduct long-term/ high intensity operations.
- Deployable forces - Currently there is an insufficient number of forces for maintaining the rotation necessary (1/3 on deployment, 1/3 on training, 1/3 resting) to conduct long-term/ high intensity operations.
It is also imperative that a binding rotation scheme of forces be established for future actions, rather than obliging the EU to go "begging" for troops.
It is also imperative that a binding rotation scheme of forces be established for future actions, rather than obliging the EU to go “begging” for troops.
- Mobility of forces - Here there is a particular need for increased airlift capabilities.
- Mobility of forces - Here there is a particular need for increased airlift capabilities.
- Sustainability of operations - At this point there are still deficiencies in terms of logistical capabilities required such as medical support and transport.
- Sustainability of operations - At this point there are still deficiencies in terms of logistical capabilities required such as medical support and transport.
- Effective engagement - In order to ensure such an engagement, more modern electronic devices at disposal of the forces will be required.
- Effective engagement - In order to ensure such an engagement, more modern electronic devices at disposal of the forces will be required.
- C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) - Though certain Member States have sufficient capabilities, these are insufficient within the collective framework of ESDP .
- C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) - Though certain Member States have sufficient capabilities, these are insufficient within the collective framework of ESDP .
Though one could rely on national capabilities, the risks of problems of interoperability are not negligible.
Though one could rely on national capabilities, the risks of problems of interoperability are not negligible.
Reliance on NATO assets is an option here, but in view of the political negotiations involved in making use of theses assets, this could unduly impede the necessary rapid response to the crisis itself.
Reliance on NATO assets is an option here, but in view of the political negotiations involved in making use of theses assets, this could unduly impede the necessary rapid response to the crisis itself.
While the fulfilment of the target dates and aims set out in the Headline Goal 2010 (e.g. full deployment of battle groups in 2007) would substantially resolve these deficiencies, it must be made clear here that the Headline Goal itself is - in practical terms - deficient, as it is based on the assumption of undertaking missions of only a one year duration.
While the fulfilment of the target dates and aims set out in the Headline Goal 2010 (e.g. full deployment of battle groups in 2007) would substantially resolve these deficiencies, it must be made clear here that the Headline Goal itself is - in practical terms - deficient, as it is based on the assumption of undertaking missions of only a one year duration.
In reality, the duration of many (Petersberg) missions would be substantially longer.
In reality, the duration of many (Petersberg) missions would be substantially longer.
In this connection, it is worth noting that there is the beginning of a debate seeking to go beyond the so-called Petersberg tasks towards the search for a European Defence Strategy with questions like "what are the possible scenarios?" and "what does the EU need to cope with them?"
In this connection, it is worth noting that there is the beginning of a debate seeking to go beyond the so-called Petersberg tasks towards the search for a European Defence Strategy with questions like “what are the possible scenarios?” and “what does the EU need to cope with them?”
This debate should be further encouraged within the Parliament and also within the other institutions as well, so that the Union can undertake a more long-term view.
This debate should be further encouraged within the Parliament and also within the other institutions as well, so that the Union can undertake a more long-term view.
Homeland Security
Homeland Security
Though the coherence of the ESS deserves praise, there is a remarkable paucity of content concerning the link between internal and external security.
Though the coherence of the ESS deserves praise, there is a remarkable paucity of content concerning the link between internal and external security.
Though the Constitutional Treaty essentially does away with the odious "pillar system" for interpreting the EU, it offers no basis for any co-operation between the areas of Home Affairs and GASP.
Though the Constitutional Treaty essentially does away with the odious “pillar system” for interpreting the EU, it offers no basis for any co-operation between the areas of Home Affairs and GASP.
Though the solidarity clause of Article I-43, offers a legal basis for a concerted post -terrorist attack reaction, the question must be raised as to not only how the EU would respond in reaction to such an attack, but, more significantly, what the Union can do to prevent such an attack?
Though the solidarity clause of Article I-43, offers a legal basis for a concerted post -terrorist attack reaction, the question must be raised as to not only how the EU would respond in reaction to such an attack, but, more significantly, what the Union can do to prevent such an attack?
It must be said that the Commission has put forward some proposals for discussion here including: (a) the creation of a central alarm system (ARGUS) for circulating information and co-ordinating action responses to all sorts of crisis, be they natural, accidental or terrorist inflicted and (b) an alarm-network (CIWIN) for the protection of critical infrastructures within the EU that could be linked to the ARGUS system.
It must be said that the Commission has put forward some proposals for discussion here including: (a) the creation of a central alarm system (ARGUS) for circulating information and co-ordinating action responses to all sorts of crisis, be they natural, accidental or terrorist inflicted and (b) an alarm-network (CIWIN) for the protection of critical infrastructures within the EU that could be linked to the ARGUS system.
While these proposals are welcome as starting points, it is critical that the Commission and the Council engage in a more profound and result-oriented dialogue, so as not only to give more substance to enacting the solidarity clause (e.g. further responsibilities for the EU Counter-terrorism Co-ordinator), but also towards actively linking the broader areas of internal and external security.
While these proposals are welcome as starting points, it is critical that the Commission and the Council engage in a more profound and result-oriented dialogue, so as not only to give more substance to enacting the solidarity clause (e.g. further responsibilities for the EU Counter-terrorism Co-ordinator), but also towards actively linking the broader areas of internal and external security.
In terms of prevention, a more long-term emphasis is clearly needed in giving the Union technological capabilities to better analyse possible threats and better protect the resources and networks so vital to our everyday world.
In terms of prevention, a more long-term emphasis is clearly needed in giving the Union technological capabilities to better analyse possible threats and better protect the resources and networks so vital to our everyday world.
An important step in this direction will be the European Security Research Programme, which is to begin in 2007.
An important step in this direction will be the European Security Research Programme, which is to begin in 2007.
Besides the issue of sufficient funding for this programme, your rapporteur would encourage the Commission and the Member States to make use of the valuable experience gained through GALILEO in the realisation of future technological applications and systems.
Besides the issue of sufficient funding for this programme, your rapporteur would encourage the Commission and the Member States to make use of the valuable experience gained through GALILEO in the realisation of future technological applications and systems.
Transatlantic Relations
Transatlantic Relations
Given the substantive congruity in the threat assessments presented in both the ESS and the American National Security Strategy, it would seem evident that efforts should be undertaken to allow for both the EU and the US to re-establish, as equal partners, the dialogue, which, for all intents and purposes, has no longer existed between the two since the end of the Cold War.
Given the substantive congruity in the threat assessments presented in both the ESS and the American National Security Strategy, it would seem evident that efforts should be undertaken to allow for both the EU and the US to re-establish, as equal partners, the dialogue, which, for all intents and purposes, has no longer existed between the two since the end of the Cold War.
As regards relations with NATO, co-operation and complimentarity are the key words In terms of the former, a serious discussion should be undertaken in extending the Berlin Plus framework.
As regards relations with NATO, co-operation and complementarity are the key words In terms of the former, a serious discussion should be undertaken in extending the Berlin Plus framework.
The primary example of this would be making available the NATO response force, which currently consists of only European forces, for EU actions.
The primary example of this would be making available the NATO response force, which currently consists of only European forces, for EU actions.
Another example of co-operation could be in the area of armaments via the new European Defence Agency.
Another example of co-operation could be in the area of armaments via the new European Defence Agency.
In terms of complimentarity, it should be pointed out that such a state theoretically exists between certain policies and programmes of NATO (Partnership for Peace and the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative) and the EU (Neighbourhood Policy and the Barcelona Process).
In terms of complementarity, it should be pointed out that such a state theoretically exists between certain policies and programmes of NATO (Partnership for Peace and the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative) and the EU (Neighbourhood Policy and the Barcelona Process).
Efforts should be made to see how these programmes can mutually reinforce one another.
Efforts should be made to see how these programmes can mutually reinforce one another.
Perspectives for the Future of the ESS
Perspectives for the Future of the ESS
With the promulgation of the Constitutional Treaty, the EU has a solid basis for pursuing the ESS.
With the promulgation of the Constitutional Treaty, the EU has a solid basis for pursuing the ESS.
An effective ESS would be able to make use of the full diplomatic capacities (i.e. the new post of Minister for Foreign Affairs and of a European External Action Service (Articles I-28 and III-296(3))) and military capabilities (i.e. permanent structured co-operation between Member States for the fulfilment of high-intensity missions demanding higher military capabilities (Articles I-41(6), III-312) and the Specific Protocol) currently foreseen within.
An effective ESS would be able to make use of the full diplomatic capacities (i.e. the new post of Minister for Foreign Affairs and of a European External Action Service (Articles I-28 and III-296(3))) and military capabilities (i.e. permanent structured co-operation between Member States for the fulfilment of high-intensity missions demanding higher military capabilities (Articles I-41(6), III-312) and the Specific Protocol) currently foreseen within.
In harmony with the ESS, the use of these capacities and capabilities are to be exercised in strict adherence to international law and in respect of the principles of the UN Charter, as stated clearly in Articles I-3 and III-292, thus giving the lie to claims of an imminent "militarisation" of the EU.
In harmony with the ESS, the use of these capacities and capabilities are to be exercised in strict adherence to international law and in respect of the principles of the UN Charter, as stated clearly in Articles I-3 and III-292, thus giving the lie to claims of an imminent “militarisation” of the EU.
In the interest of giving life to the ESS, your rapporteur therefore urges the Council and the Commission to begin integrating their activities in a spirit of co-operation (i.e. no sidelining of the Commission) prior to the final ratification of the Constitutional Treaty.
In the interest of giving life to the ESS, your rapporteur therefore urges the Council and the Commission to begin integrating their activities in a spirit of co-operation (i.e. no sidelining of the Commission) prior to the final ratification of the Constitutional Treaty.
That having been said, the Constitutional Treaty has particular shortcomings in the area of parliamentary accountability (failure to extend current Community procedures to CFSP within the treaty) and the failure to remedy the issue of transparent budgeting (joint costs for ESDP-military operations remain funded through subsidiary budgets or start-up funding derived from the Member States' budgets rather than the Community's).Your rapporteur regrets these omissions and can only hope that they will be remedied at the nearest opportunity.
That having been said, the Constitutional Treaty has particular shortcomings in the area of parliamentary accountability (failure to extend current Community procedures to CFSP within the treaty) and the failure to remedy the issue of transparent budgeting (joint costs for ESDP-military operations remain funded through subsidiary budgets or start-up funding derived from the Member States’ budgets rather than the Community’s).Your rapporteur regrets these omissions and can only hope that they will be remedied at the nearest opportunity.
MENŠINOVÉ STANOVISKO SKUPINY GUE/NGL – KONFEDERACE EVROPSKÉ SJEDNOCENÉ LEVICE A SEVERSKÉ ZELENÉ LEVICE
MINORITY OPINION OF THE GUE/NGL - CONFEDERAL GROUP OF THE EUROPEAN UNITED LEFT - NORDIC GREEN LEFT
Zpráva neobsahuje to, co je nutné pro Evropu míru, a zaměřuje se na to, jak se nejlépe připravit na vojenský zásah.
The report lacks the requirements for a Europe of peace, focusing on how best to prepare for military intervention.
Zpráva například:
For example it:
· zdůrazňuje spolupráci EU – NATO, zejména pokud jde o zbrojení a o rámec Berlín –plus;
· emphasises EU-NATO cooperation especially regarding armaments and the Berlin-Plus Framework;
· nezmiňuje nebezpečí pro status neutrálních zemí EU, které z úzké spolupráce EU – NATO vyplývá;
· does not mention dangers to the status of neutral EU states arising from a close EU‑NATO cooperation;
· naléhá na EU, aby své akce vedla pouze podle zásad Charty OSN,
· urges the EU to bind its actions only to principles of the UN Charter,
· nabádá k vojenským preventivním a preemptivním (zabraňovacím) akcím a obecně k nasazování vojenských sil při řešení problémů dokonce mimo vnější hranice EU,
· encourages military preventive and pre-emptive actions and generally the use of military force to tackle problems even outside the EU’s external boarders;
· uznává shodu v hodnocení světových hrozeb ze strany EU a USA a klade důraz na nutnost společného porozumění při řešení znepokojivých otázek, jako je bezpečnost a nasazení vojenských sil;
· recognises the congruity in EU-US global threat assessments, emphasising the need for common understanding in resolving issues of concern such as security and use of military force;
· bagatelizuje nebezpečí vyplývající z ESB, mlčí o potenciálním závazku vyzbrojit vojenské síly a o nákladech, které z toho vyplývají a které budou daňoví poplatníci nucení hradit;
· plays down the dangers of ESS, remaining silent about the implicit commitment to and real cost of arming the military intervention forces, while urging European tax payers to cover this;
· ani v nejmenším neodděluje civilní a vojenské akce a namísto toho naléhá, aby byly podniknuty větší a rychlejší kroky;
· does not at least separate civil and military action instead pushes for greater and faster steps to be taken;
· poukazuje na návrh Ústavy EU s cílem ukázat, že militarizace EU bude stanovena zákonem.
· points to the draft EU Constitution to demonstrate that militarisation of the EU will be required by law.
Tobias Pflüger, Jaromír Kohlíček, Erik Meijer, Miguel Portas a Athanasios Pafilis
Tobias Pflüger, Jaromír Kohlíček, Erik Meijer, Miguel Portas and Athanasios Pafilis
Pro výbor pro zahraniční věci
for the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Výbor pro průmysl, výzkum a energetiku vyzývá Výbor pro zahraniční věci jako příslušný výbor, aby do svého návrhu usnesení začlenil tyto návrhy:
The Committee on Industry, Research and Energy calls on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:
3. požaduje, aby Rada a Komise posoudily vývoj účinnějších systémů pro společnou kontrolu a zlepšení komunikačních a průzkumných schopností v rámci EU;
Requests that the Council and the Commission give consideration to the development of more efficient and interoperable surveillance systems and to the improvement of EU communication and reconnaissance capabilities;
6. doporučuje vyvinout zvýšené úsilí při vytvoření systému včasného varování pro situace ohrožení s využitím inovačních technologií, které byly vyvinuty v civilním sektoru IT, za účelem analýzy a hodnocení zpráv, civilně-vojenské výměny informací, mnohostranného plánování a řízení zásahových sil a vytvoření příslušné projektové skupiny při EU a koordinačního pracoviště ve Vojenském výboru EU;
Recommends that increased efforts be made to set up an early warning system for threats, using innovative technologies from the civil IT field for data analysis and evaluation, an exchange of information between the civil and military spheres, the multilateral planning and leadership of operational units and the creation of a corresponding project group in the EU and a coordination body in the EU Military Committee;
ITRE 28.10.2004
ITRE 28.10.2004
Jan Christian Ehler 24.11.2004
Jan Christian Ehler 24.11.2004
Datum přijetí
Date suggestions adopted
Richard James Ashworth, Jan Březina, Jerzy Buzek, Joan Calabuig Rull, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Lorenzo Cesa, Giles Chichester, Lena Ek, Nicole Fontaine, Adam Gierek, Umberto Guidoni, Fiona Hall, Rebecca Harms, Ján Hudacký, Werner Langen, Pia Elda Locatelli, Eluned Morgan, Reino Paasilinna, Pier Antonio Panzeri, Umberto Pirilli, Vladimír Remek, Herbert Reul, Teresa Riera Madurell, Mechtild Rothe, Paul Rübig, Andres Tarand, Patrizia Toia, Catherine Trautmann, Claude Turmes, Nikolaos Vakalis, Alejo Vidal-Quadras Roca
Richard James Ashworth, Jan Březina, Jerzy Buzek, Joan Calabuig Rull, Pilar del Castillo Vera, Lorenzo Cesa, Giles Chichester, Lena Ek, Nicole Fontaine, Adam Gierek, Umberto Guidoni, Fiona Hall, Rebecca Harms, Ján Hudacký, Werner Langen, Pia Elda Locatelli, Eluned Morgan, Reino Paasilinna, Pier Antonio Panzeri, Umberto Pirilli, Vladimír Remek, Herbert Reul, Teresa Riera Madurell, Mechtild Rothe, Paul Rübig, Andres Tarand, Patrizia Toia, Catherine Trautmann, Claude Turmes, Nikolaos Vakalis, Alejo Vidal-Quadras Roca
pro Výbor pro zahrniční věci
for the Committee on Foreign Affairs
k evropské bezpečnostní strategii
on the European Security Strategy
Výbor pro občanské svobody, spravedlnost a domácí věci vyzývá Výbor pro zahraniční věci, aby jako příslušný výbor začlenil do svého návrhu usnesení tyto návrhy:
The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs calls on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions in its motion for a resolution:
První soubor návrhů: Na posílení vnitřní i vnější legitimity a účinnosti evropské bezpečnostní strategie
First set of suggestions: To reinforce the legitimacy and effectiveness of the European Security Strategy, both internally and externally
Výbor pro občanské svobody, spravedlnost a domácí věci:
The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs:
3. připomíná, že v souladu s článkem 47 Smlouvy o Evropské unii, "... se tato smlouva nedotýká smluv o založení Evropských společenství ... "; má za to, s ohledem na tuto ústavní zásadu, že uplatňování evropské bezpečnostní strategie nesmí vést k přímému nebo nepřímému oslabování základních práv chráněných právními předpisy Společenství (například evropských norem pro ochranu osobních údajů) opatřeními založenými na druhém nebo třetím pilíři;
Recalls that according to Article 47 of the TEU, “... nothing in this Treaty shall affect the Treaties establishing the European Communities ”; considers that, as a consequence of that constitutional principle, the implementation of the ESS must not lead to a weakening, directly or indirectly, of the fundamental rights as protected by Community law (for instance, the European standards on data protection) by measures based on the second or the third pillar;