natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Whereas all the hearings apportioned one question to all members of the committee, one or two managed to include a free round of questions at the end of the meeting which allowed for more political and even unexpected questioning.
Whereas all the hearings apportioned one question to all members of the committee, one or two managed to include a free round of questions at the end of the meeting which allowed for more political and even unexpected questioning.
The more successful hearings were those in which MEPs consciously tried to influence the policy of the future Commission, suggesting some strategic preparation for the hearings on behalf of at least some deputies.
The more successful hearings were those in which MEPs consciously tried to influence the policy of the future Commission, suggesting some strategic preparation for the hearings on behalf of at least some deputies.
In previous hearings, the Commissioner-designate had sat alongside the chair and secretariat of the committee on the podium.
In previous hearings, the Commissioner-designate had sat alongside the chair and secretariat of the committee on the podium.
This time he or she sat alone on a raised dais in front of the podium.
This time he or she sat alone on a raised dais in front of the podium.
But this layout, although an improvement, has also been criticised.
But this layout, although an improvement, has also been criticised.
All in the windowless 1A2.
All in the windowless 1A2.
A salle d'écoute was provided (3C50) and was well patronised by lobbyists and assistants.
A salle d'écoute was provided (3C50) and was well patronised by lobbyists and assistants.
The candidates had their back to the chairman and the vice-chairmen of the committees, which was both impolite and inconvenient.
The candidates had their back to the chairman and the vice-chairmen of the committees, which was both impolite and inconvenient.
The evaluation letters
The evaluation letters
For logistical reasons, no verbatim transcript was produced of the hearings.
For logistical reasons, no verbatim transcript was produced of the hearings.
Instead, each committee drafted a letter evaluating the outcome of its hearing.
Instead, each committee drafted a letter evaluating the outcome of its hearing.
In its guidelines, the Conference of Committee Chairs attempted to capture in the letters the personal qualifications of the candidate, their ability to engage with the Parliament, and their competence in the relevant policy area.
In its guidelines, the Conference of Committee Chairs attempted to capture in the letters the personal qualifications of the candidate, their ability to engage with the Parliament, and their competence in the relevant policy area.
It was intended that each express policy commitment was to be recorded in the letter ‑ possibly a counterproductive stipulation that inhibited candidates.
It was intended that each express policy commitment was to be recorded in the letter ‑ possibly a counterproductive stipulation that inhibited candidates.
In the event, the letters tend to record whether or not the candidate had a sense of humour and good communications skills.
In the event, the letters tend to record whether or not the candidate had a sense of humour and good communications skills.
All also tried to assess the preparedness of the candidates.
All also tried to assess the preparedness of the candidates.
In 1999 the letters had been sent in confidence to the President of the Conference of Committee Chairs which body had undertaken a horizontal scrutiny of the letters before transmitting them with a recommendation to the President of the Parliament.
In 1999 the letters had been sent in confidence to the President of the Conference of Committee Chairs which body had undertaken a horizontal scrutiny of the letters before transmitting them with a recommendation to the President of the Parliament.
At the request of the Conference of Presidents, under Rule 26 of the Rules of Procedure.
At the request of the Conference of Presidents, under Rule 26 of the Rules of Procedure.
In 2004 that sifting procedure in the clearing house of the CPC was eliminated, and the letters were sent directly, still ostensibly in confidence, from the chairmen of the individual committees to the President of the Parliament.
In 2004 that sifting procedure in the clearing house of the CPC was eliminated, and the letters were sent directly, still ostensibly in confidence, from the chairmen of the individual committees to the President of the Parliament.
On 13 October the Conference of Presidents received the letters and sent them on without comment to Mr Barroso, inviting his reactions.
On 13 October the Conference of Presidents received the letters and sent them on without comment to Mr Barroso, inviting his reactions.
At the same time, the letters were posted on the Parliament's website.
At the same time, the letters were posted on the Parliament's website.
Of the recommendations from the committees on the 24 candidates, three were non-committal and two were negative.
Of the recommendations from the committees on the 24 candidates, three were non-committal and two were negative.
Close observers have suggested that if all candidates had got equivalent treatment four or five other candidates would have received uncomplimentary write-ups.
Close observers have suggested that if all candidates had got equivalent treatment four or five other candidates would have received uncomplimentary write-ups.
Lack of rules about timetabling led to another suspicion being raised to the effect that committees chaired by someone of one party persuasion delayed the production of their letter until after having seen the letter prepared by a committee chair of another party.
Lack of rules about timetabling led to another suspicion being raised to the effect that committees chaired by someone of one party persuasion delayed the production of their letter until after having seen the letter prepared by a committee chair of another party.
The confidential status of the letters is also controversial.
The confidential status of the letters is also controversial.
The media was intensely interested in the hearings.
The media was intensely interested in the hearings.
The attempt to impose confidentiality excited the media into publishing leaked (and possibly distorted) versions of the truth.
The attempt to impose confidentiality excited the media into publishing leaked (and possibly distorted) versions of the truth.
It was always improbable that absolute confidentiality could be maintained over the period of 17 days from the start of the hearings until the meeting of the Conference of Presidents: nor was it.
It was always improbable that absolute confidentiality could be maintained over the period of 17 days from the start of the hearings until the meeting of the Conference of Presidents: nor was it.
Once the content of the committees' letters was revealed, so were their uneven format, variable approaches and ambiguous messages.
Once the content of the committees' letters was revealed, so were their uneven format, variable approaches and ambiguous messages.
In the case of one candidate contradictory letters were received from the two committees contesting responsibility for his portfolio.
In the case of one candidate contradictory letters were received from the two committees contesting responsibility for his portfolio.
As the approval process gathered pace, there was a growing number of MEPs who expressed reservations about the system which deprives them of the right to vote on individual candidates or to qualify their approval of the new Commission.
As the approval process gathered pace, there was a growing number of MEPs who expressed reservations about the system which deprives them of the right to vote on individual candidates or to qualify their approval of the new Commission.
It is clear that the Conference of Presidents plays a crucial role in filling in the gaps where either the Treaty or the Rules of Procedure are silent.
It is clear that the Conference of Presidents plays a crucial role in filling in the gaps where either the Treaty or the Rules of Procedure are silent.
One notices that the Rules themselves are at best vague on the role of the Conference of Presidents in the matter of the appointment of the Commission.
One notices that the Rules themselves are at best vague on the role of the Conference of Presidents in the matter of the appointment of the Commission.
Rule 24.3 says that the Conference shall be 'the authority responsible for matters relating to relations with the other institutions and bodies of the European Union'.
Rule 24.3 says that the Conference shall be 'the authority responsible for matters relating to relations with the other institutions and bodies of the European Union'.
As is normal, it is often the case that in the Conference of Presidents, which usually meets in closed session, it is partisan considerations that prevail.
As is normal, it is often the case that in the Conference of Presidents, which usually meets in closed session, it is partisan considerations that prevail.
With the best will in the world, the Conference of Presidents will find it hard to be objective if one or other candidate is targeted for especially heavy criticism.
With the best will in the world, the Conference of Presidents will find it hard to be objective if one or other candidate is targeted for especially heavy criticism.
It may be regretted that Parliament has not seen fit to put in place an assured mechanism for assessing in qualitative terms the overall performance of the Commission nominees, either individually or collectively.
It may be regretted that Parliament has not seen fit to put in place an assured mechanism for assessing in qualitative terms the overall performance of the Commission nominees, either individually or collectively.
Even today, the only criteria established for the appointment of members of the Commission is that of Article 213.1 of the Treaty which stipulates that the Commission shall consist of members "who shall be chosen on the grounds of their general competence and whose independence is beyond doubt".
Even today, the only criteria established for the appointment of members of the Commission is that of Article 213.1 of the Treaty which stipulates that the Commission shall consist of members "who shall be chosen on the grounds of their general competence and whose independence is beyond doubt".
Advice and consent
Advice and consent
The European Parliament is allowed a ‘vote of approval’ on the Commission thus nominated by the Council.
The European Parliament is allowed a ‘vote of approval’ on the Commission thus nominated by the Council.
Parliament's vote is not the end of the matter.
Parliament's vote is not the end of the matter.
Once approved by the Parliament, the Commission is then formally appointed by the Council, acting by QMV.
Once approved by the Parliament, the Commission is then formally appointed by the Council, acting by QMV.
This final phase of the process is wholly formalistic, and is retained in the Treaty solely in order to feed the pomposity of the Council.
This final phase of the process is wholly formalistic, and is retained in the Treaty solely in order to feed the pomposity of the Council.
The inability of the European Parliament to reject individual Commissioners markedly differentiates the EU from that of the USA.
The inability of the European Parliament to reject individual Commissioners markedly differentiates the EU from that of the USA.
There the role of the Senate in the confirmation process is defined in the Constitution.
There the role of the Senate in the confirmation process is defined in the Constitution.
Article II, Section 2 provides that the President 'shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint high government officials'.
Article II, Section 2 provides that the President 'shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint high government officials'.
Under the American system of advice and consent, the US Senate does not attempt a critical evaluation of the candidate but simply votes to accept or reject the nomination.
Under the American system of advice and consent, the US Senate does not attempt a critical evaluation of the candidate but simply votes to accept or reject the nomination.
(The Senate, which has to act within a strict timetable, can also reconsider its decision within a couple of days, on a proposal from a Senator who voted with the majority.)
(The Senate, which has to act within a strict timetable, can also reconsider its decision within a couple of days, on a proposal from a Senator who voted with the majority.)
The vote takes place in public unless the Senate decides otherwise.
The vote takes place in public unless the Senate decides otherwise.
(Even in the exceptional circumstances of a closed vote, any Senator can choose to publicise his or her vote.)
(Even in the exceptional circumstances of a closed vote, any Senator can choose to publicise his or her vote.)
Rule XXXI of the Standing Rules of the Senate.
Rule XXXI of the Standing Rules of the Senate.
Attractively simple as the US system is, if the EU Constitution continues to insist on collegial rather than individual approval of the Commission the European Parliament is obliged to continue to try to advise on each candidate in order to inform its final, collective consent.
Attractively simple as the US system is, if the EU Constitution continues to insist on collegial rather than individual approval of the Commission the European Parliament is obliged to continue to try to advise on each candidate in order to inform its final, collective consent.
But this does not necessarily mean that the Parliament cannot follow the approach of the Senate in setting out its views on individual members of the college by a vote rather than by a statement.
But this does not necessarily mean that the Parliament cannot follow the approach of the Senate in setting out its views on individual members of the college by a vote rather than by a statement.
In the present case, following Mr Barroso's presentation of his college to the House on 26 October, the various political groups tabled their motions for resolution under Rule 99.4.
In the present case, following Mr Barroso's presentation of his college to the House on 26 October, the various political groups tabled their motions for resolution under Rule 99.4.
These motions made specific adverse references to a number of individual Commission candidates.
These motions made specific adverse references to a number of individual Commission candidates.
In order to avoid retaliation on partisan grounds, a joint motion was then negotiated avoiding personal references.
In order to avoid retaliation on partisan grounds, a joint motion was then negotiated avoiding personal references.
The joint motion was tabled by the Groups of PSE, ALDE, Verts/ALE and GUE/NGL.
The joint motion was tabled by the Groups of PSE, ALDE, Verts/ALE and GUE/NGL.
The substantive paragraphs of the short motion identified Parliament's 'various concerns as to the endorsement of certain candidates' as being 'political convictions contradicting basic values of the Union; lack of political skill and knowledge and commitment with regard to the portfolio proposed; unresolved problems or unanswered questions concerning conflict of interests or possible involvement in political and legal malpractice'.
The substantive paragraphs of the short motion identified Parliament's 'various concerns as to the endorsement of certain candidates' as being 'political convictions contradicting basic values of the Union; lack of political skill and knowledge and commitment with regard to the portfolio proposed; unresolved problems or unanswered questions concerning conflict of interests or possible involvement in political and legal malpractice'.
The joint motion sought to underline the 'democratic and legal validity of the approval process of which the hearings are a crucial part'.
The joint motion sought to underline the 'democratic and legal validity of the approval process of which the hearings are a crucial part'.
It concluded by insisting that 'all the institutions draw the political consequences' from the approval process, 'which might include resignation, reshuffle or withdrawal'.
It concluded by insisting that 'all the institutions draw the political consequences' from the approval process, 'which might include resignation, reshuffle or withdrawal'.
On the day following the tabling of this motion Mr Barroso withdrew his team.
On the day following the tabling of this motion Mr Barroso withdrew his team.
The Joint Motion was not put to the vote, but it would surely have commanded a large majority.
The Joint Motion was not put to the vote, but it would surely have commanded a large majority.
Fortunately, two gatherings of heads of government were already planned to take place in quick succession: the signing of the Constitution in Rome on 29 October and an ordinary meeting of the European Council on 4-5 November.
Fortunately, two gatherings of heads of government were already planned to take place in quick succession: the signing of the Constitution in Rome on 29 October and an ordinary meeting of the European Council on 4-5 November.
The crisis over the approval of the Barroso I Commission figured largely in the discussions.
The crisis over the approval of the Barroso I Commission figured largely in the discussions.
The European Council, acting as the Council at heads of government level, agreed Mr Barroso's new team from which one member had resigned, another had been withdrawn by her government and a third reshuffled.
The European Council, acting as the Council at heads of government level, agreed Mr Barroso's new team from which one member had resigned, another had been withdrawn by her government and a third reshuffled.
New Parliamentary hearings were organised for the two new candidates as well as for the reshuffled candidate on 15-16 November during the plenary session at Strasbourg.
New Parliamentary hearings were organised for the two new candidates as well as for the reshuffled candidate on 15-16 November during the plenary session at Strasbourg.
Again, the LIBE and JURI committees insisted on having two separate hearings.
Again, the LIBE and JURI committees insisted on having two separate hearings.
On 18 November a Joint Resolution, tabled by the EPP, PES, ALDE and UEN groups, was adopted by a majority of 478 votes to 84 (with 98 abstentions).
On 18 November a Joint Resolution, tabled by the EPP, PES, ALDE and UEN groups, was adopted by a majority of 478 votes to 84 (with 98 abstentions).
The Barroso II Commission was then approved by 449 votes to 149 (with 82 abstentions) and took office, three weeks late, on 22 November.
The Barroso II Commission was then approved by 449 votes to 149 (with 82 abstentions) and took office, three weeks late, on 22 November.
The framework agreement
The framework agreement
Before the final vote, Mr Barroso responded in detail to the substantive parts of the Joint Resolution that referred to revision of the Framework Agreement.
Before the final vote, Mr Barroso responded in detail to the substantive parts of the Joint Resolution that referred to revision of the Framework Agreement.
The main result of the process of the European Parliament's approval of the Prodi Commission in 1999 had been the conclusion of a formal Framework Agreement between the incoming Commission and the Parliament, negotiated and approved by the Conference of Presidents.
The main result of the process of the European Parliament's approval of the Prodi Commission in 1999 had been the conclusion of a formal Framework Agreement between the incoming Commission and the Parliament, negotiated and approved by the Conference of Presidents.
The Framework Agreement, agreed on 29 June 2000, forms Annex XIII of the Rules of Procedure.
The Framework Agreement, agreed on 29 June 2000, forms Annex XIII of the Rules of Procedure.
It upgraded and replaced an informal code of conduct adopted in 1990 and amended in 1995.
It upgraded and replaced an informal code of conduct adopted in 1990 and amended in 1995.
The Framework Agreement was based on the resolution passed by the Parliament at the same time as it formally approved the Prodi Commission, according to Rule 99.4.
The Framework Agreement was based on the resolution passed by the Parliament at the same time as it formally approved the Prodi Commission, according to Rule 99.4.
Although the agreement ran to twelve pages, there was no mention of the Commission's appointment procedure.
Although the agreement ran to twelve pages, there was no mention of the Commission's appointment procedure.
However, at the Parliament's request the Commission, after a struggle, agreed the following clause with regard to the resignation of a member of the Commission pursuant to Article 217.4 TEC:-
However, at the Parliament's request the Commission, after a struggle, agreed the following clause with regard to the resignation of a member of the Commission pursuant to Article 217.4 TEC:-
The Commission also agreed that, in the event of a reshuffle of portfolios pursuant to Article 217.2, affected Commissioners should appear before the relevant committee of the Parliament, as follows:-
The Commission also agreed that, in the event of a reshuffle of portfolios pursuant to Article 217.2, affected Commissioners should appear before the relevant committee of the Parliament, as follows:-
The President of the Commission shall immediately notify the European Parliament of any decision concerning the allocation of responsibilities to any of the Members of the Commission.
The President of the Commission shall immediately notify the European Parliament of any decision concerning the allocation of responsibilities to any of the Members of the Commission.
In the case of substantial changes affecting an individual Commissioner (such as the assignment of an entirely new portfolio or an important set of new responsibilities), he or she shall appear before the relevant parliamentary committee at its request.
In the case of substantial changes affecting an individual Commissioner (such as the assignment of an entirely new portfolio or an important set of new responsibilities), he or she shall appear before the relevant parliamentary committee at its request.
The phrase in paragraph 10 of the Framework Agreement concerning a vote of no confidence in a member of the Commission ‑ "subject to political support for such a view, in terms both of substance and of form" ‑ may provide something of a clue as to what the Prodi Commission, at least, expected from the Parliament in circumstances in which relations between the two institutions were to reach a critical stage.
The phrase in paragraph 10 of the Framework Agreement concerning a vote of no confidence in a member of the Commission ‑ "subject to political support for such a view, in terms both of substance and of form" ‑ may provide something of a clue as to what the Prodi Commission, at least, expected from the Parliament in circumstances in which relations between the two institutions were to reach a critical stage.
It should be recalled that the Conference of Presidents accepted this formula on behalf of Parliament.
It should be recalled that the Conference of Presidents accepted this formula on behalf of Parliament.
One presumes that what was meant is, first, that the vote has to be carried by a large ‑ that is, cross-party ‑ majority, and, second, that the complaint must not be fanciful or glib.
One presumes that what was meant is, first, that the vote has to be carried by a large ‑ that is, cross-party ‑ majority, and, second, that the complaint must not be fanciful or glib.
Five years later, MEPs returned to the charge.
Five years later, MEPs returned to the charge.
The Commission and Parliament will emerge from the crisis surrounding the approval of the Barroso Commission with a refurbished Framework Agreement.
The Commission and Parliament will emerge from the crisis surrounding the approval of the Barroso Commission with a refurbished Framework Agreement.