natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It is therefore proposed to establish a procedure whereby a multi-annual policy strategy paper should be presented to the Parliament which would also contain indicative financial allocations.
It is therefore proposed to establish a procedure whereby a multi-annual policy strategy paper should be presented to the Parliament which would also contain indicative financial allocations.
The policy content and the indicative allocations should be discussed with the competent committees and be the subject of an evaluation by the Parliament (for ex. through a resolution), but only after it has adopted its annual report on the Annual Policy Strategy.
The policy content and the indicative allocations should be discussed with the competent committees and be the subject of an evaluation by the Parliament (for ex. through a resolution), but only after it has adopted its annual report on the Annual Policy Strategy.
In case the Commission were not to take the Parliament's opinion sufficiently into account when finally establishing the multi-annual strategies (in comitology), the Parliament would always have recourse to intervene in the budgetary procedure in order to establish its priorities from the budgetary side.
In case the Commission were not to take the Parliament's opinion sufficiently into account when finally establishing the multi-annual strategies (in comitology), the Parliament would always have recourse to intervene in the budgetary procedure in order to establish its priorities from the budgetary side.
This procedure would be without prejudice to Parliament's budgetary powers.
This procedure would be without prejudice to Parliament's budgetary powers.
Such a procedure could safeguard the Parliament's need to influence the policy through the existing legislative and budgetary cycles without creating inflexible and over-regulated legislation which could impede the Commission's effective delivery of aid and need for flexibility.
Such a procedure could safeguard the Parliament's need to influence the policy through the existing legislative and budgetary cycles without creating inflexible and over-regulated legislation which could impede the Commission's effective delivery of aid and need for flexibility.
As far as the financial amounts for the regulation as a whole is concerned, the rapporteur stresses that the proposal is presented under Art.181 (a) of the Treaty (economic and financial cooperation).
As far as the financial amounts for the regulation as a whole is concerned, the rapporteur stresses that the proposal is presented under Art.181 (a) of the Treaty (economic and financial cooperation).
This is not an article covered by co-decision and merely allows for consultation of the Parliament.
This is not an article covered by co-decision and merely allows for consultation of the Parliament.
" ......should the Council wish to include a financial reference, this will be taken as illustrating the will of the legislative authority and will not affect the powers of the budgetary authority as defined by the Treaty. ....."
" ...... should the Council wish to include a financial reference, this will be taken as illustrating the will of the legislative authority and will not affect the powers of the budgetary authority as defined by the Treaty. ....."
Although the article mentions only the Council, the rapporteur is of the opinion that the Parliament could suggest to include a financial reference for this instrument given the fact that it has been specifically mentioned in the resolution on the new financial perspective 2007-2013.
Although the article mentions only the Council, the rapporteur is of the opinion that the Parliament could suggest to include a financial reference for this instrument given the fact that it has been specifically mentioned in the resolution on the new financial perspective 2007-2013.
This reference should obviously be in line with that vote.
This reference should obviously be in line with that vote.
It would be of a non-binding nature according to the terms mentioned in article 34 of the IIA.
It would be of a non-binding nature according to the terms mentioned in article 34 of the IIA.
Bod 1a (nový)
Paragraph 1a (new)
Uvádí, že položky uvedené v návrhu rozhodnutí jsou čistě orientační, dokud nebude dosaženo dohody o finančním výhledu na rok 2007 a na následující roky ;
Specifies that the appropriations indicated in the proposal for a decision are purely for guidance until agreement is reached on the financial perspective for the period 2007 and the following years;
Bod 1b (nový)
Paragraph 1b (new)
(18) Akce nezbytné pro provádění složky pomoci pro přeměnu a budování institucí a složky regionální a přeshraniční spolupráce jsou řídící opatření související s prováděním programů se značnými rozpočtovými důsledky, a proto by měly být přijaty v souladu s rozhodnutím Rady 1999/468 ze dne 28. června 1999 o postupech pro výkon prováděcích pravomocí svěřených Komisi, a to předáním víceletých orientačních plánovacích dokumentů řídícímu výboru.
(18) The actions necessary for the implementation of the Transition Assistance and Institution Building Component as well as the Regional and Cross-Border Co-operation Component are management measures relating to the implementation of programmes with substantial budgetary implications, they should therefore be adopted in accordance with Council Decision 1999/468 of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred to the Commission, by submitting multi-annual indicative planning documents to a Management Committee .
It is imperative that the Parliament has influence also over the strategy documents since the proposed regulation is of a general nature.
It is imperative that the Parliament has influence also over the strategy documents since the proposed regulation is of a general nature.
It is not reasonable that the "strategy" should only be decided by the Council in a co-decision instrument.
It is not reasonable that the "strategy" should only be decided by the Council in a co-decision instrument.
This can be assured through a procedure compatible with the existing legislative, budgetary and comitology provisions while, at the same time, ensuring that there is no rigid over-regulation which would make it difficult to react to changing needs in the international field.
This can be assured through a procedure compatible with the existing legislative, budgetary and comitology provisions while, at the same time, ensuring that there is no rigid over-regulation which would make it difficult to react to changing needs in the international field.
(19) Akce nezbytné pro provádění složky regionálního rozvoje, složky rozvoje lidských zdrojů a složky rozvoje venkova úzce souvisejí s postupy strukturálních fondů, a proto by měly být přijaty v souladu s rozhodnutím Rady 1999/468 ze dne 28. června 1999 o postupech pro výkon prováděcích pravomocí svěřených Komisi částečně poradním a částečně řídícím výborem, aby se co nejvíce využily rozhodovací postupy pro strukturální fondy,
(19) The actions necessary for the implementation of the Regional Development Component, the Human Resources Component, and the Rural Development Component are closely aligned to Structural funds practises, they should therefore be adopted, in accordance with Council Decision 1999/468 of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred to the Commission, partly by Advisory and partly by Management Committees, in order to make use as far as possible of the decision making procedures in place for Structural Funds ,
see amendment 3
See amendment 3
(1) Komise vytvoří na základě strategického přístupu a s přihlédnutím k finančnímu výhledu a k evropským partnerstvím a přístupovým partnerstvím víceletý rámec pro rozdělení prostředků podle jednotlivých složek a zemí, a v případě potřeby podle tématu.
(1) The Commission shall, on the basis of a strategic approach, taking into consideration the financial perspective , as well as the European Partnerships and Accession Partnerships, establish an indicative multi-annual framework with an allocation of funds by component and country, and where appropriate per theme.
(1) Komise vytvoří na základě strategického přístupu a v souladu s finančním výhledem a s evropským partnerstvím a přístupovým partnerstvím orientační víceletý politicko-strategický dokument pro orientační rozdělení prostředků podle jednotlivých složek a zemí, a v případě potřeby podle tématu.
(1) The Commission shall, on the basis of a strategic approach, consistent with the financial perspective , as well as the European Partnerships and Accession Partnerships, establish an indicative multi-annual policy-strategy paper with an indicative allocation of funds by component and country, and where appropriate per theme.
(2) Komise každý rok seznámí Radu a Evropský parlament s víceletým rámcem.
(2) The indicative multi-annual framework shall be communicated annually by the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament.
(2) Komise nejpozději do 30. září roku n-2 představí pro každý nástroj vnější politiky víceletý politicko-strategický dokument, který bude rovněž obsahovat zvláštní kapitolu o orientačním víceletém finančním rámci.
(2) The Commission shall, no later than 30 September of the year n-2, present for each external policy instrument a multi-annual policy strategy paper that shall also contain a specific chapter on an indicative multi-annual financial framework.
Tento dokument se bude běžně vztahovat na období tří let.
This paper will normally span three years.
Před přijetím víceletého rámce Komise předloží návrh znění Evropskému parlamentu a Radě.
Before adopting the multi-annual framework, the Commission shall submit the draft text to the European Parliament and the Council.
Do tří měsíců od předložení návrhu znění může každý orgán předložit pozměňovací návrhy, pokud se domnívá, že tento návrh znění nesplňuje cíle stanovené legislativním orgánem, nebo může nesouhlasit s přijetím tohoto znění a případně požádat Komisi, aby předložila návrh na to, aby byl legislativní akt přijat podle článku 251 Smlouvy
Within three months of the submission of the draft text, each institution may either suggest amendments, if it considers that the draft text does not meet the objectives laid down by the legislative authority, or object to the adoption of that text and, possibly, ask the Commission to submit a proposal for a legislative act to be adopted in accordance with Article 251 of the Treaty
In principle the EP could insist that the legislative procedure of article 251 be maintained for the adoption of the strategy papers.
In principle the EP could insist that the legislative procedure of article 251 be maintained for the adoption of the strategy papers.
But in order to provide some flexibility for the Commission a procedure is proposed where the strategy papers can be decided upon in comitology, provided that neither of the institutions object.
But in order to provide some flexibility for the Commission a procedure is proposed where the strategy papers can be decided upon in comitology, provided that neither of the institutions object.
This would mean that only in case that the draft texts by the Commission meet heavy opposition by the legislative authority, the legislative procedure would have to be followed.
This would mean that only in case that the draft texts by the Commission meet heavy opposition by the legislative authority, the legislative procedure would have to be followed.
It is assumed in the text of this amendment that the legal base for the Pre-accession instrument will be changed to article 251( co-decision)
It is assumed in the text of this amendment that the legal base for the Pre-accession instrument will be changed to article 251( co-decision)
Given the fact that beneficiary countries currently financed under different headings of the Financial Perspective (heading 4 and 7) will, under the new Financial Perspective, be financed under the same heading, the Budgetary Authority needs to guarantee that the change of status to "Candidate country"(normally meaning higher funding) would be compatible with the ceiling.
Given the fact that beneficiary countries currently financed under different headings of the Financial Perspective (heading 4 and 7) will, under the new Financial Perspective, be financed under the same heading, the Budgetary Authority needs to guarantee that the change of status to "Candidate country"(normally meaning higher funding) would be compatible with the ceiling.
C 172, 18.6.1999, s. 1.
1 OJ C 172, 18.6.1999, p.1.
Dohoda ve znění rozhodnutí Evropského parlamentu a Rady č. 2003/429/ES (Úř. věst.
Agreement as amended by Decision 2003/429/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council ( OJ L 147, 14.6.2003, p.
The reference amount is consistent with EP's negotiating position (Böge report).
The reference amount is consistent with EP's negotiating position (Böge report).
It is calculated on the basis of the Commission financial statement for this programme (in current prices) to which the amount of EUR 1 467 million in current prices is added.
It is calculated on the basis of the Commission financial statement for this programme (in current prices) to which the amount of EUR 1 467 million in current prices is added.
Furthermore, the l reference amount cannot be set until such time that a decision has been reached on the Financial Perspective.
Furthermore, the l reference amount cannot be set until such time that a decision has been reached on the Financial Perspective.
Once a decision is reached, the Commission shall present, if necessary, a legislative proposal to set the reference amount with respect to the appropriate ceiling of the financial perspective (see amendment to the legislative resolution).
Once a decision is reached, the Commission shall present, if necessary , a legislative proposal to set the reference amount with respect to the appropriate ceiling of the financial perspective (see amendment to the legislative resolution).
The reference amount is entered under the conditions spelled out in article 34 of the Interinstitutional Agreement (non co-decision).
The reference amount is entered under the conditions spelled out in article 34 of the Interinstitutional Agreement (non co-decision).
(1) Komise odpovídá za provádění tohoto nařízení a jedná v souladu s postupem popsaným v článku 11.
(1) The Commission shall be responsible for the implementation of this Regulation, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 11.
(1) Komise odpovídá za provádění tohoto nařízení a jedná v souladu s politickou strategií uvedenou v článku 4 a s postupem popsaným v článku 11.
(1) The Commission shall be responsible for the implementation of this Regulation, acting in accordance with the policy strategy referred to in Article 4 and the procedure referred to in Article 11.
See amendment 3
See amendment 3
(1) Pomoc podle tohoto nařízení může být mimo jiné použita na financováni investic, smluv o veřejných zakázkách, grantů včetně zvýhodněných úrokových sazeb, zvláštních půjček, záruk za půjčky a finanční pomoci, rozpočtové podpory a dalších konkrétních forem rozpočtové pomoci a příspěvku na kapitál mezinárodních finančních institucí nebo regionálních rozvojových bank.
(1) Assistance under this Regulation may, inter alia , finance investments, procurement contracts, grants, including interest rate subsidies, special loans, loan guarantees and financial assistance, budgetary support, and other specific forms of budgetary aid, and the contribution to the capital of international financial institutions or the regional development banks.
Podmínkou pro r ozpočtovou podporu a jiné zvláštní formy rozpočtové pomoci jsou dostatečně průhledná, spolehlivá a efektivní správa veřejných financí partnerské země a zavedené řádně definované sektorové a makrohospodářské politiky schválené mezinárodními finančními institucemi a Komisí.
Budgetary support and other specific forms of budgetary aid are contingent on the administration of public finances of the Partner Country being sufficiently transparent, reliable and efficient, and on well-defined sectorial or macroeconomic policies approved by international financing institutions and the Commission having been put in place.
The Commission should also take an active part to make sure that the relevant conditions are fulfilled.
The Commission should also take an active part to make sure that the relevant conditions are fulfilled.
Budgetary aid in general must require satisfactory accountability on the part of the partner country.
Budgetary aid in general must require satisfactory accountability on the part of the partner country.
O rozpočtových dopadech bude však neprve uzavřena společná dohoda s rozpočtovým orgánem.
The budgetary implication thereof shall be the subject of a prior joint agreement by the Budgetary Authority.
Návrh nařízení Rady, kterým se zřizuje nástroj předvstupní pomoci
Proposal for a Council regulation establishing an Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA)
BUDG 7.3.2005
BUDG 7.3.2005
Ville Itälä 31.1.2005
Ville Itälä 31.1.2005
Poznámky (informace přístupná pouze v jednom jazyku)
Comments (data available in one language only)
The present proposal replaces the current pre-accession instruments and also the CARDS programme in the Balkans and simplifies the previous Community assistance instruments for potential candidate countries
The present proposal replaces the current pre-accession instruments and also the CARDS programme in the Balkans and simplifies the previous Community assistance instruments for potential candidate countries
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and candidate countries
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and candidate countries
The proposal reduces the visibility of the different actions through a concentration of the financial instruments.
The proposal reduces the visibility of the different actions through a concentration of the financial instruments.
As a matter of fact, no visibility is provided concerning the levels of funding for the beneficiary countries and regions, the allocation of resources between the different objectives and components.
As a matter of fact, no visibility is provided concerning the levels of funding for the beneficiary countries and regions, the allocation of resources between the different objectives and components.
Due to the general nature of the proposal, the European Parliament is not able to control the pre-accession process and the new regulation.
Due to the general nature of the proposal, the European Parliament is not able to control the pre-accession process and the new regulation.
The Commission shall adopt rules for the implementation of this Regulation which go beyond the implementation of the policy priorities set by the Council and the European Parliament in this respect.
The Commission shall adopt rules for the implementation of this Regulation which go beyond the implementation of the policy priorities set by the Council and the European Parliament in this respect.
Indeed, the real powers for allocating resources and managing implementation are transferred to the Commission within the framework of its rather opaque comitology procedures.
Indeed, the real powers for allocating resources and managing implementation are transferred to the Commission within the framework of its rather opaque comitology procedures.
Moreover, the proposal intends to give additional legislative powers to the executive body of the EU institutions.
Moreover, the proposal intends to give additional legislative powers to the executive body of the EU institutions.
Your draftsman therefore believes that it would be desirable to present the rules of implementation to the European Parliament before any decision is taken in this respect as well as it is desirable that further clarifications are provided by the European Commission on the basic components here mentioned.
Your draftsman therefore believes that it would be desirable to present the rules of implementation to the European Parliament before any decision is taken in this respect as well as it is desirable that further clarifications are provided by the European Commission on the basic components here mentioned.
In general, wider consultations with the beneficiary countries would be appreciated for designing both the new instruments and the implementing rules.
In general, wider consultations with the beneficiary countries would be appreciated for designing both the new instruments and the implementing rules.
Even though the Commission proposes coherence, consistency and simplification across the three new geographic instruments, the pre-accession instrument is only subject to a consultation procedure.
Even though the Commission proposes coherence, consistency and simplification across the three new geographic instruments, the pre-accession instrument is only subject to a consultation procedure.
However, your draftsman considers that, because of the budgetary aspects and the political nature of the issues at stake with IPA, genuine transparency would require an appropriately revised legal basis and above all the use of the co-decision procedure fostering the involvement of the European Parliament.
However, your draftsman considers that, because of the budgetary aspects and the political nature of the issues at stake with IPA, genuine transparency would require an appropriately revised legal basis and above all the use of the co-decision procedure fostering the involvement of the European Parliament.
Moreover, it would be desirable that the proposal enhances the ex-ante control by the European Parliament so that it can be genuinely involved at all stages.
Moreover, it would be desirable that the proposal enhances the ex-ante control by the European Parliament so that it can be genuinely involved at all stages.
For instance, the European Parliament is unfortunately not involved in the multi-annual indicative planning whilst from a regional policy perspective, the multi-annual nature of financial planning and consequent planning are indispensable for the regions.
For instance, the European Parliament is unfortunately not involved in the multi-annual indicative planning whilst from a regional policy perspective, the multi-annual nature of financial planning and consequent planning are indispensable for the regions.
Based on the lessons learned in the implementation of the current pre-accession programmes, it is worth mentioning that in the past the effectiveness of institution-building projects for preparing the Structural and Cohesion Funds interventions was often hindered by changing ministerial responsibilities within candidate countries and by the lack of experience of the relevant authorities.
Based on the lessons learned in the implementation of the current pre-accession programmes, it is worth mentioning that in the past the effectiveness of institution-building projects for preparing the Structural and Cohesion Funds interventions was often hindered by changing ministerial responsibilities within candidate countries and by the lack of experience of the relevant authorities.
For better continuity and coherence the proposal should therefore foresee the nomination of implementation authorities responsible within each country for both the pre-accession instruments and the structural funds later on.
For better continuity and coherence the proposal should therefore foresee the nomination of implementation authorities responsible within each country for both the pre-accession instruments and the structural funds later on.
Indeed, the experience learnt through proper management of the pre-accession assistance is a necessary prerequisite for being able later on to benefit fully from the Structural and Cohesion Funds' interventions.
Indeed, the experience learnt through proper management of the pre-accession assistance is a necessary prerequisite for being able later on to benefit fully from the Structural and Cohesion Funds' interventions.