natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Jestliže se v důsledku vyplacení záruky za jedno nebo více větších prodlení se splácením prostředky fondu sníží na méně než 50 % cílové částky, předloží Komise zprávu o mimořádných opatřeních k doplnění prostředků fondu.“
If, as a result of the activation of guarantees on one or more major defaults, resources in the Fund fall below 50 % of the target amount, the Commission shall submit a report on exceptional measures that might be required to replenish the Fund.”
Jestliže se v důsledku vyplacení záruky za jedno nebo více větších prodlení se splácením prostředky fondu sníží na méně než 75 % cílové částky, informuje Komise okamžitě rozpočtový orgán o důvodech vzniku této situace a předloží zprávu o mimořádných opatřeních k doplnění prostředků fondu.“
If, as a result of the activation of guarantees on one or more major defaults, resources in the Fund fall below 75% of the target amount, the Commission shall immediately inform the budgetary authority as to the reasons for this situation and submit a report on exceptional measures that might be required to replenish the Fund.”
Mechanismus včasného varování je rozumným řešením pro případ, že u některých vysokých úvěrů vznikne nebezpečí nesplacení.
A mechanism of early-warning is prudent in case some major loans were not to be repaid.
Mezní hodnota 75 % by poskytla rozpočtovému orgánu více času k posouzení situace na základě návrhu Komise.
A threshold figure of 75 % would give more time for the budgetary authority to assess the situation on the basis of the Commission proposal.
The Commission has put forward a proposal to modify the Regulation for the Guarantee Fund for external actions as far as the budgetary provisioning is concerned.
The Commission has put forward a proposal to modify the Regulation for the Guarantee Fund for external actions as far as the budgetary provisioning is concerned.
It is this "mechanism" of how the fund is provisioned from the EU budget that is being changed in the current proposal.
It is this "mechanism" of how the fund is provisioned from the EU budget that is being changed in the current proposal.
The way in which the actual lending mandates are established (i.e. which countries can be covered by EU guarantees for lending and, how much/which percentage of loans can be covered) is not affected by this proposal.
The way in which the actual lending mandates are established (i.e. which countries can be covered by EU guarantees for lending and, how much/which percentage of loans can be covered) is not affected by this proposal.
Due to technical factors, the new mechanism for provisioning the Fund would start working in 2007, parallel with the possible introduction of a new Financial Perspective.
Due to technical factors, the new mechanism for provisioning the Fund would start working in 2007, parallel with the possible introduction of a new Financial Perspective.
The proposal is also drafted with the new FP in mind, utilising the structure of budget headings foreseen therein.
The proposal is also drafted with the new FP in mind, utilising the structure of budget headings foreseen therein.
The rapporteur wishes to recall that the main purpose of the Guarantee Fund is to protect the EU budget from "shocks" that might otherwise occur in case of defaults on loans that are guaranteed by the EU.
The rapporteur wishes to recall that the main purpose of the Guarantee Fund is to protect the EU budget from "shocks" that might otherwise occur in case of defaults on loans that are guaranteed by the EU.
In the case of such loan defaults, the Fund (rather than the budget directly) would step in and pay back the money to the lender (normally the EIB).
In the case of such loan defaults, the Fund (rather than the budget directly) would step in and pay back the money to the lender (normally the EIB).
In order to have the necessary amounts available in the Fund, a certain percentage, currently 9%, is paid into the fund from the budget for the loans granted.
In order to have the necessary amounts available in the Fund, a certain percentage, currently 9%, is paid into the fund from the budget for the loans granted.
In this way, the total amount available in the Fund (the target amount) will be 9% of the total of outstanding loans.
In this way, the total amount available in the Fund (the target amount) will be 9% of the total of outstanding loans.
The present mechanism to provision the Fund is based on a system whereby 9% of the loans are paid into the Fund on an "ex-ante" basis.
The present mechanism to provision the Fund is based on a system whereby 9% of the loans are paid into the Fund on an "ex-ante" basis.
This has meant payments on the basis of planned loan signatures.
This has meant payments on the basis of planned loan signatures.
The present system also means that a number of transfers are presented each year to the EP (normally 2 or 3 transfers per year).
The present system also means that a number of transfers are presented each year to the EP (normally 2 or 3 transfers per year).
These transfers (which are for compulsory expenditure with only an opinion of the EP) are actually of a technical nature.
These transfers (which are for compulsory expenditure with only an opinion of the EP) are actually of a technical nature.
This is particularly the case since the Regulation itself actually specifies that, when a loan is signed, the corresponding 9% shall be transferred into the Fund.
This is particularly the case since the Regulation itself actually specifies that, when a loan is signed, the corresponding 9% shall be transferred into the Fund.
The Council would thus be breaking the law if it were to reject one of these transfers.
The Council would thus be breaking the law if it were to reject one of these transfers.
In the modified system now proposed by the Commission, the provisioning of the Fund would be done only once a year.
In the modified system now proposed by the Commission, the provisioning of the Fund would be done only once a year.
The amount necessary would be known at the time of the PDB and budgeted as other items.
The amount necessary would be known at the time of the PDB and budgeted as other items.
One single transfer would then be presented to transfer the money from the budget into the Fund.
One single transfer would then be presented to transfer the money from the budget into the Fund.
This, according to the Commission, is possible since the new system would work on an "ex-post" basis and only provision the Fund on the basis of actual net disbursements (loans actually paid out) which would lead to a more reliable target amount for the Fund at the end of each year.
This, according to the Commission, is possible since the new system would work on an "ex-post" basis and only provision the Fund on the basis of actual net disbursements (loans actually paid out) which would lead to a more reliable target amount for the Fund at the end of each year.
The amount for the one single transfer would then be budgeted, in the PDB for the next year, in order to adjust the Fund so it corresponds to 9% of the outstanding loans.
The amount for the one single transfer would then be budgeted, in the PDB for the next year, in order to adjust the Fund so it corresponds to 9% of the outstanding loans.
A major difference between the mechanisms proposed is that it is designed to operate under the new FP 2007-2013.
A major difference between the mechanisms proposed is that it is designed to operate under the new FP 2007-2013.
This means that , contrary to the present system, the budget line from which appropriations are taken to provision the Fund will be in heading 4 of the proposed FP (external actions) whereas in the present system, this budget line is in heading 6 (reserves).
This means that , contrary to the present system, the budget line from which appropriations are taken to provision the Fund will be in heading 4 of the proposed FP (external actions) whereas in the present system, this budget line is in heading 6 (reserves).
The current maximum figure of this reserve (EUR 200 m in 1999 prices) would also not exist in the new system.
The current maximum figure of this reserve (EUR 200 m in 1999 prices) would also not exist in the new system.
This is a consequence of the Commission's proposals for 2007+, not this particular proposal.
This is a consequence of the Commission's proposals for 2007+, not this particular proposal.
The reserve for external loans (article 23 of the IIA of 1999) is currently not only the line from which the Fund is provisioned but, in its own right, also a potential cushion between the budget and any loan defaults.
The reserve for external loans (article 23 of the IIA of 1999) is currently not only the line from which the Fund is provisioned but, in its own right, also a potential cushion between the budget and any loan defaults.
This stems from the fact that the full amount of EUR 200 million is automatically budgeted under heading 6 every year.
This stems from the fact that the full amount of EUR 200 million is automatically budgeted under heading 6 every year.
This reserve would disappear if the new IIA is adopted along the lines suggested by the Commission.
This reserve would disappear if the new IIA is adopted along the lines suggested by the Commission.
This approach is, however, somewhat controversial as demonstrated by the fact that the EP's resolution on the Future financial perspective asks for a continued functioning of such an instrument, to the tune of EUR 3 billion a year, but outside the new FP.
This approach is, however, somewhat controversial as demonstrated by the fact that the EP's resolution on the Future financial perspective asks for a continued functioning of such an instrument, to the tune of EUR 3 billion a year, but outside the new FP.
The rapporteur must therefore clearly ask the Commission to comment on the relationship of this proposal with an IIA which has yet to be negotiated and is not fixed.
The rapporteur must therefore clearly ask the Commission to comment on the relationship of this proposal with an IIA which has yet to be negotiated and is not fixed.
The rapporteur notes that, as the changes proposed would operate with a budget line under heading 4 of a possible new FP, a special "smoothing mechanism" is foreseen for cases (unlikely) in which the annual amount to be paid into the Fund would exceed EUR 100 million.
The rapporteur notes that, as the changes proposed would operate with a budget line under heading 4 of a possible new FP, a special "smoothing mechanism" is foreseen for cases (unlikely) in which the annual amount to be paid into the Fund would exceed EUR 100 million.
The rapporteur notes that the proposed changes could, in part, address one of the Budget Committee's long-standing criticisms as concerns the unnecessary "over-provisioning" of the Fund.
The rapporteur notes that the proposed changes could, in part, address one of the Budget Committee's long-standing criticisms as concerns the unnecessary "over-provisioning" of the Fund.
In fact, by working on the basis of actually disbursed loans rather than complicated forecasts of the signing of loans, the use of EU budgetary resources would be simplified and some excess amounts paid into the Fund (and then returned to Member States each year in the annual AB on the budgetary surplus) could actually be avoided.
In fact, by working on the basis of actually disbursed loans rather than complicated forecasts of the signing of loans, the use of EU budgetary resources would be simplified and some excess amounts paid into the Fund (and then returned to Member States each year in the annual AB on the budgetary surplus) could actually be avoided.
The rapporteur has previously called for the provisioning rate of 9% to be adjusted, perhaps to a more realistic rate of 8%.
The rapporteur has previously called for the provisioning rate of 9% to be adjusted, perhaps to a more realistic rate of 8%.
This is, however, something that should be examined in the light of the upcoming proposals of the general lending mandates (which countries? how much guaranteed? which rate?) and, again, not in the scope of the present proposal.
This is, however, something that should be examined in the light of the upcoming proposals of the general lending mandates (which countries? how much guaranteed? which rate?) and, again, not in the scope of the present proposal.
To provision the Guarantee Fund on the basis of actual disbursements of loans, instead of ex-ante forecasting, would appear to make sense and to allow for a more rational use of EU budget expenditure.
To provision the Guarantee Fund on the basis of actual disbursements of loans, instead of ex-ante forecasting, would appear to make sense and to allow for a more rational use of EU budget expenditure.
It would also cut down on some red tape.
It would also cut down on some red tape.
The new system of transfers for the EP (one single annual transfer on the basis of an amount foreseen in the PDB, instead of two or three transfers on the basis of forecasts) would not seem to be a disadvantage.
The new system of transfers for the EP (one single annual transfer on the basis of an amount foreseen in the PDB, instead of two or three transfers on the basis of forecasts) would not seem to be a disadvantage.
The EP has in any case only an opinion and these transfers "must" be adopted according to the Regulation in force.
The EP has in any case only an opinion and these transfers "must" be adopted according to the Regulation in force.
The scrapping of the fixed amount for a reserve in the budget (EUR 200m in heading 6 in the current system) is not covered by this proposal but, instead, suggested in the proposals for a new FP 2007-2013.
The scrapping of the fixed amount for a reserve in the budget (EUR 200m in heading 6 in the current system) is not covered by this proposal but, instead, suggested in the proposals for a new FP 2007-2013.
The rapporteur calls on the Commission to clarify the link between this proposal and possible outcomes of the negotiations on a new FP/IIA.
The rapporteur calls on the Commission to clarify the link between this proposal and possible outcomes of the negotiations on a new FP/IIA.
The rapporteur is initially positive to the proposed changes by the Commission as they relate to the more effective budgetary treatment of provisioning the Fund.
The rapporteur is initially positive to the proposed changes by the Commission as they relate to the more effective budgetary treatment of provisioning the Fund.
The legislative procedure which concerns the "lending Mandates" is not covered by this proposal.
The legislative procedure which concerns the "lending Mandates" is not covered by this proposal.
The EP will continue to have its current powers (opinion to the Council).
The EP will continue to have its current powers (opinion to the Council).
Finally, the rapporteur believes that the Commission may have used the wrong legal base.
Finally, the rapporteur believes that the Commission may have used the wrong legal base.
It would seem that, ever since the Treaty of Nice, article 181A should be used (economic cooperation with third countries).
It would seem that, ever since the Treaty of Nice, article 181A should be used (economic cooperation with third countries).
The Commission has suggested art.
The Commission has suggested art.
308 despite the fact that, in the last report of the rapporteur (Decision 2005/48/CE) on a modification to the general lending mandate, the Council and the EP both agreed to modify the article of the Commission's proposal to 181A instead of art.
308 despite the fact that, in the last report of the rapporteur (Decision 2005/48/CE) on a modification to the general lending mandate, the Council and the EP both agreed to modify the article of the Commission's proposal to 181A instead of art.
Výbor pro právní záležitosti
for the Committee on Budgets
Věc: Stanovisko k právnímu základu k návrhu nařízení Rady, kterým se mění nařízení Rady (ES, Euratom) č. 2728/94, kterým se zřizuje Záruční fond pro vnější vztahy ( KOM(2005)0130 – C6‑0176/2005 – 2005/0025(CNS) )
Subject: Opinion on the legal basis of the proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2728/94 establishing a Guarantee Fund for external actions ( COM(2005)0130 – C6‑0176/2005 – 2005/0025(CNS) )
Výbor projednal výše uvedenou otázku na schůzi dne 23. února 2006.
The Committee considered the above question at its meeting of 23 February 2006.
Komise předložila tento návrh podle článku 308 Smlouvy o ES a také podle článku 203 Smlouvy o Euratomu, protože určitou nevelkou část činností, na které se vztahuje záruční mechanismus, představují půjčky Euratomu.
The Commission has presented this proposal under Article 308 of the EC Treaty and also under Article 203 Euratom, since a small part of the actions covered by the guarantee mechanism also consists of Euratom loans.
Váš zpravodaj, pan Seppänen, je toho názoru, že správným právním základem pro tu část návrhu, která se týká ES, by byl článek 181a Smlouvy o ES (Hospodářská, finanční a technická spolupráce se třetími zeměmi), a předložil proto pozměňovací návrh, kterým se mění právní základ z článku 308 Smlouvy o ES na článek 181a Smlouvy o ES.
Your rapporteur, Mr Seppänen, is of the opinion that the correct legal basis for the EC part of the proposal would be Article 181a EC (Economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries) and has therefore presented an amendment changing the legal base from Article 308 EC to Article 181a EC.
V důsledku této změny by však vznikla „konfliktní“ situace, protože by pro jedno nařízení byly dva právní základy s různými způsoby hlasování v Radě – článek 181a Smlouvy o ES vyžaduje kvalifikovanou většinu a článek 203 Smlouvy o Euratomu jednomyslnost.
This change would however lead to a “conflictual” situation in that the same regulation would have two Treaty bases with different voting procedures in the Council, Article 181a EC requiring a qualified majority and Article 203 Euratom requiring unanimity.
Proto vyzývá zpravodaj Rozpočtového výboru Komisi, aby předložila samostatný právní nástroj pro tu část návrhu, která se týká Euratomu.
Consequently, the rapporteur of the Committee on Budgets invites the Commission to present a separate legal instrument for the Euratom part of the proposal.
Z ustálené judikatury Soudního dvora je zřejmé, že volba právního základu není subjektivní, ale „musí vycházet z objektivních faktorů, které mohou být přezkoumány soudem”
It is clear from settled case-law of the Court of Justice that the choice of legal basis is not a subjective one, but "must be based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review"
Věc 45/86 Komise v Rada [1987] Sb. rozh.
Case 45/86 Commission v Council [1987] ECR 1439, para.
1439, bod 5. , jako je cíl a obsah daného opatření.
5. , such as the aim and content of the measure in question.
Pokud má však opatření několik souběžných cílů, které jsou navzájem nerozlučně spjaty a žádný z nich není vzhledem k ostatním druhotný a nepřímý, musí být dané opatření založeno na různých příslušných ustanoveních Smlouvy, pokud to neznemožňuje vzájemná neslučitelnost rozhodovacích postupů, které tato ustanovení stanoví
However, where a measure has several contemporaneous objectives which are indissolubly linked with each other without one being secondary and indirect in respect to the others, the measure must be based on the various relevant Treaty provisions unless this is impossible on account of the mutual incompatibility of the decision-making procedures laid down by the provisions
I-4829, bod 58, a věc C-491/01 British American Tobacco [2002] Sb. rozh.
58, and Case C-491/01 British American Tobacco [2002] ECR I-11453, paras 103-111. .
Článek 181a Smlouvy o ES byl vložen Niceskou smlouvou s cílem vyřešit ten problém, že žádný článek neupravoval hospodářskou, finanční a technickou spolupráci se třetími zeměmi, které nejsou rozvojovými zeměmi.
Article 181a of the EC Treaty was introduced by the Treaty of Nice in order to get around the problem that no treaty article covered economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries which were not developing countries.
V důsledku toho bylo nutno přijímat opatření na základě článku 308, případně ve spojení s články týkajícími se společné obchodní politiky nebo rozvojové spolupráce.
This meant having to adopt measures on the basis of Article 308, possibly in combination with the articles on the common commercial policy or development cooperation.
Nový článek 181a vytváří jednoznačný právní základ pro takovou spolupráci se třetími zeměmi.
The new Article 181a provides for an explicit legal basis for such cooperation with third countries.
Účelem návrhu je zlepšení pravidel upravujících dotační mechanismus záručního fondu, který byl zřízen na základě nařízení Rady (ES, Euratom) č. 2728/94 ze dne 31. října 1994, s cílem pokrýt rizika spojená s úvěry a zárukami za úvěry poskytnutými třetím zemím na projekty uskutečňované ve třetích zemích.
The purpose of the proposal is to improve the rules of the provisioning mechanism of the Guarantee Fund, which has been set up pursuant to Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2728/94 of 31 October 1994 in order to cover the risks related to loans and guarantees covering loans granted to third countries or for projects executed in third countries.
Zdroje fondu se vynakládají na splacení příslušných částek věřitelům ve Společenství v případě prodlení dlužníka při splácení úvěru poskytnutého nebo zaručeného Společenstvím.
The resources are used to repay the Community's creditors in the event of default by the beneficiary of a loan granted or guaranteed by the Community.
Záruční fond a jeho dotační mechanismus jsou – jak vyplývá z jejich účelu – součástí systému finanční spolupráce se třetími zeměmi.
Tt follows from its purpose that the Guarantee Fund and its provisioning mechanism are part of the system of financial cooperation with third countries.
Je zřejmé, že je zde přímá vazba na konkrétní opatření finanční spolupráce.
It is evident that there is a direct link with the concrete measures of financial cooperation.
Dotační mechanismus záručního fondu nelze oddělit od dané politiky jako pouhé „rozpočtové“ opatření.
The provisioning mechanism of the Guarantee Fund cannot be separated as a merely "budgetary" measure from the policy in question.
Je však nutno mít na zřeteli, že podle prohlášení č. 10 připojeného k Niceské smlouvě, které se týká článku 181a Smlouvy o založení Evropského společenství, nespadají podpory platební bilance pro třetí země do oblasti působnosti článku 181a.
However, it must be noted, that according to Declaration No 10 annexed to the Treaty of Nice on Article 181a of the Treaty establishing the European Community, balance-of-payments aid to third countries falls outside the scope of Article 181a.
Zdá se nicméně, že tyto podpory platební bilance nejsou součástí činnosti záručního fondu.
It appears, however, that those balance-of-payments measures are not underwritten by the Guarantee Fund.
Pro onu velmi malou část fondu, která se týká půjček Euratomu, by byl správným právním základem článek 203 Smlouvy o Euratomu.
For the very small part of the Fund which is related to Euratom loans, Article 203 Euratom would be the correct legal basis.
V důsledku toho vzniká „konfliktní“ situace, pokud jde o způsoby hlasování v Radě, protože článek 203 Smlouvy o Euratomu vyžaduje jednomyslnost, zatímco článek 181a Smlouvy o ES vyžaduje kvalifikovanou většinu.
This leads to a "conflictual" situation of voting procedures in the Council, as Article 203 Euratom requires unanimity, whereas Article 181a EC requires a qualified majority.
Tato situace by se vyřešila, pokud by byl pro část týkající se Euratomu předložen samostatný návrh založený na článku 203 Smlouvy o Euratomu.
This situation could be resolved if a separate proposal were to be presented based on Article 203 Euratom concerning the Euratom part.
Na schůzi dne 23. února 2006 Výbor pro právní záležitosti rozhodl jednomyslně
At its meeting of 23 February 2006 the Committee on Legal Affairs accordingly decided, unanimously