natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Improving the budget structure through more flexibility
Improving the budget structure through more flexibility
Ensuring the Union's capacity to react to new needs and challenges in a fast developing world
Ensuring the Union 's capacity to react to new needs and challenges in a fast developing world
It is of utmost importance to establish an effective multi-annual flexibility mechanism allowing the Union to mobilise additional funds, provided that this is decided jointly by the Council and the Parliament.
It is of utmost importance to establish an effective multi-annual flexibility mechanism allowing the Union to mobilise additional funds, provided that this is decided jointly by the Council and the Parliament.
Such a mechanism must be financed outside the financial framework and be applicable to different purposes e.g. as a reaction to economic developments, disasters and crises inside and outside the EU, or new unforeseen external responsibilities.
Such a mechanism must be financed outside the financial framework and be applicable to different purposes e.g. as a reaction to economic developments, disasters and crises inside and outside the EU, or new unforeseen external responsibilities.
The tighter the financial framework, the greater the need to equip the Union with such tools.
The tighter the financial framework, the greater the need to equip the Union with such tools.
Introducing new financial instruments
Introducing new financial instruments
Setting up an effective framework for a revision
Setting up an effective framework for a revision
It must be ensured that any revision or review mechanism for the period 2007-2013 is based on a positive, binding decision of both arms of the budgetary authority with effect to this period.
It must be ensured that any revision or review mechanism for the period 2007-2013 is based on a positive, binding decision of both arms of the budgetary authority with effect to this period.
Such a mechanism must contain a general clause of withdrawal for both institutions.
Such a mechanism must contain a general clause of withdrawal for both institutions.
Without a binding mechanism, the duration of the financial framework must end in 2011.
Without a binding mechanism, the duration of the financial framework must end in 2011.
Improving the quality of implementation of the budget, the access to Community programmes and democratic decision making
Improving the quality of implementation of the budget, the access to Community programmes and democratic decision making
Better execution of EU-programmes and the EU-budget
Better execution of EU-programmes and the EU-budget
Without access to the Community programmes and a more userfriendly execution of the budget, the Union will not reach the people and many policies will not have the expected effects.
Without access to the Community programmes and a more userfriendly execution of the budget, the Union will not reach the people and many policies will not have the expected effects.
The key to an easier access to Community programmes and a simpler budget execution lies with the reform of the Financial Regulation, the manual how to run the Union's programmes and budget.
The key to an easier access to Community programmes and a simpler budget execution lies with the reform of the Financial Regulation, the manual how to run the Union's programmes and budget.
A full conciliation procedure and a calendar for the revision of the Financial Regulation must be established.
A full conciliation procedure and a calendar for the revision of the Financial Regulation must be established.
Ensuring a democratic decision making in the external programmes
Ensuring a democratic decision making in the external programmes
The new generation of programmes in the external policies now consists of 6 instead of more than 40 multi-annual programmes, of which many were co-decided by the Council and the Parliament.
The new generation of programmes in the external policies now consists of 6 instead of more than 40 multi-annual programmes, of which many were co-decided by the Council and the Parliament.
The Parliament insists on being fully involved in the legislative process both in the framework regulation and in the multi-annual indicative framework (MIF).
The Parliament insists on being fully involved in the legislative process both in the framework regulation and in the multi-annual indicative framework (MIF).
The involvement of the Parliament in the adoption of strategy papers and multi-annual indicative programmes including a call back right for the Parliament should be subject to an inter-institutional agreement .
The involvement of the Parliament in the adoption of strategy papers and multi-annual indicative programmes including a call back right for the Parliament should be subject to an inter-institutional agreement .
Strengthening the responsibility of Member States
Strengthening the responsibility of Member States
80% of the budget is spent by the Member States.
80% of the budget is spent by the Member States.
The EP as discharge authority demands that the national/local authorities "certify" the management of Community funds.
The EP as discharge authority demands that the national/local authorities "certify" the management of Community funds.
A procedure and a timetable to improve the modalities of certification by Member States for the implementation of policies run under shared competence (declaration of assurance) has to be defined.
A procedure and a timetable to improve the modalities of certification by Member States for the implementation of policies run under shared competence (declaration of assurance) has to be defined.
Part II: Key points for the Interinstitutional Agreement
Part II: Key points for the Interinstitutional Agreement
In its resolution of 1 December 2005, the European Parliament:
In its resolution of 1 December 2005, the European Parliament:
"Invites the Commission to submit a formal revised proposal of the Interinstitutional Agreement which would incorporate its proposals on reserves and flexibility and other qualitative points..."
"Invites the Commission to submit a formal revised proposal of the Interinstitutional Agreement which would incorporate its proposals on reserves and flexibility and other qualitative points..."
The Commission will present a revised version of the IIA on 1 February 2006.
The Commission will present a revised version of the IIA on 1 February 2006.
The list of points below aims to facilitate the Commission to identify the priorities and requests of the Parliament.
The list of points below aims to facilitate the Commission to identify the priorities and requests of the Parliament.
EP negotiating position
EP negotiating position
- Reserve for competitiveness (up to a maximum of EUR 7 billion): new instrument replacing the Growth Adjustment Fund, proposed by the Commission, to be mobilised to boost growth and competitiveness and to allow the Union to react to economic changes;
- Reserve for competitiveness (up to a maximum of EUR 7 billion): new instrument replacing the Growth Adjustment Fund, proposed by the Commission, to be mobilised to boost growth and competitiveness and to allow the Union to react to economic changes;
- Reserve for cohesion (up to a maximum of EUR 3 billion): new instrument aiming to develop a mechanism to be mobilised to react to economic shocks and abrupt changes in EU regions and Member States eligible under Heading 1b) even through the reprogramming of unused appropriations;
- Reserve for cohesion (up to a maximum of EUR 3 billion): new instrument aiming to develop a mechanism to be mobilised to react to economic shocks and abrupt changes in EU regions and Member States eligible under Heading 1b) even through the reprogramming of unused appropriations;
- Reserve: Emergency Aid (up to a maximum of EUR 1.5 billion): existing instrument to be placed outside the Financial Perspective;
- Reserve: Emergency Aid (up to a maximum of EUR 1.5 billion): existing instrument to be placed outside the Financial Perspective;
- Reserve: Solidarity Fund (up to a maximum of EUR 6.2 billion) existing instrument that is already outside the Financial Perspective and that the Commission proposes to budget under the ceiling;
- Reserve: Solidarity Fund (up to a maximum of EUR 6.2 billion) existing instrument that is already outside the Financial Perspective and that the Commission proposes to budget under the ceiling;
- Reserve for loans guarantee (up to a maximum of EUR 3.0 billion): part of this reserve existed under Heading 4; the principle should be extended to guarantee the financing of transport and infrastructure projects; this instrument should be placed outside the Financial Perspective;
- Reserve for loans guarantee (up to a maximum of EUR 3.0 billion): part of this reserve existed under Heading 4; the principle should be extended to guarantee the financing of transport and infrastructure projects; this instrument should be placed outside the Financial Perspective;
- Reserve for flexibility (up to a maximum of EUR 3.5 billion): existing instrument already placed outside the Financial Perspective and with an increased amount of EUR 500 million;
- Reserve for flexibility (up to a maximum of EUR 3.5 billion): existing instrument already placed outside the Financial Perspective and with an increased amount of EUR 500 million;
Rapporteur's proposal
Rapporteur's proposal
The creation of reserves for flexibility should be an integral part of the overall Interinstitutional Agreement..
The creation of reserves for flexibility should be an integral part of the overall Interinstitutional Agreement..
The reserves for flexibility are placed outside the financial framework.
The reserves for flexibility are placed outside the financial framework.
The global amount for flexibility should represent up to 0.03% of EU cumulated GNI over a seven years period
The global amount for flexibility should represent up to 0.03% of EU cumulated GNI over a seven years period
The different flexibility reserves are created as follows:
The different flexibility reserves are created as follows:
§ reserve for competitiveness: up to a maximum of EUR 7 billion under heading 1a);
§ reserve for competitiveness: up to a maximum of EUR 7 billion under heading 1a);
§ reserve for cohesion: up to a maximum of EUR 3 billion under heading 1b);
§ reserve for cohesion: up to a maximum of EUR 3 billion under heading 1b);
§ reserve for the Solidarity Fund up to a maximum of EUR 6.2 billion under heading 3;
§ reserve for the Solidarity Fund up to a maximum of EUR 6.2 billion under heading 3;
§ reserve for emergency aid: up to a maximum of EUR 1.5 billion under heading 4;
§ reserve for emergency aid: up to a maximum of EUR 1.5 billion under heading 4;
§ reserve for loans guarantee: up to a maximum of EUR 3 billion under heading 4.
§ reserve for loans guarantee: up to a maximum of EUR 3 billion under heading 4.
In addition to those reserves, a non allocated reserve for flexibility up to a maximum of EUR 3.5 billion is created for non-programmed actions and unforeseen events.
In addition to those reserves, a non allocated reserve for flexibility up to a maximum of EUR 3.5 billion is created for non-programmed actions and unforeseen events.
The decision to mobilise a reserve for flexibility will be taken jointly by the two arms of the budgetary authority.
The decision to mobilise a reserve for flexibility will be taken jointly by the two arms of the budgetary authority.
50. […] - Financial Regulation: is convinced that the principles of sound management contained in the Financial Regulation and its implementing rules need to be reviewed to facilitate implementation and accelerate repayments (or reimbursements) to Member States; urges the Commission and the Council to agree on a recasting of the provisions which must facilitate implementation and simplify procedures,
50. […] - Financial Regulation: is convinced that the principles of sound management contained in the Financial Regulation and its implementing rules need to be reviewed to facilitate implementation and accelerate repayments (or reimbursements) to Member States; urges the Commission and the Council to agree on a recasting of the provisions which must facilitate implementation and simplify procedures,
The Interinstitutional Agreement is used as a mean to secure the conciliation procedure and to guarantee a number of key elements with the aim of facilitating the implementation of the Budget.
The Interinstitutional Agreement is used as a mean to secure the conciliation procedure and to guarantee a number of key elements with the aim of facilitating the implementation of the Budget.
Council should agree to proceed according to the conciliation procedure foreseen by the joint 1975 declaration already used for the 2002 revision in order to involve the two arms of the budgetary authority on an equal footing.
Council should agree to proceed according to the conciliation procedure foreseen by the joint 1975 declaration already used for the 2002 revision in order to involve the two arms of the budgetary authority on an equal footing.
Certification by Member States
Certification by Member States
50. […] - Certification by Member States: considers that the European Parliament, as part of the budgetary authority, has a responsibility to optimise the implementation of funding allocated by the Member States to the EU budget; is determined to improve the implementation of the programmes to be financed under the next financial framework; urges the Member States to provide a certification of their financial commitments for all policies run under shared competencies through a formal ex-ante disclosure statement and an annual ex-post declaration of assurance, made by the Member States' highest political and managing authority (Finance Minister); in consequence, asks the Commission to introduce the appropriate mechanisms to suspend payments in the event of non-compliance with this request; is not ready to propose any significant increases in funding to programmes without guarantees by the Member States that they will commit the appropriations; considers the acceptance of the concept of "disclosure statements" to be a condition for the European Parliament's consent to a new Interinstitutional Agreement on the Financial Perspective;
50. […] - Certification by Member States: considers that the European Parliament, as part of the budgetary authority, has a responsibility to optimise the implementation of funding allocated by the Member States to the EU budget; is determined to improve the implementation of the programmes to be financed under the next financial framework; urges the Member States to provide a certification of their financial commitments for all policies run under shared competencies through a formal ex-ante disclosure statement and an annual ex-post declaration of assurance, made by the Member States' highest political and managing authority (Finance Minister); in consequence, asks the Commission to introduce the appropriate mechanisms to suspend payments in the event of non-compliance with this request; is not ready to propose any significant increases in funding to programmes without guarantees by the Member States that they will commit the appropriations; considers the acceptance of the concept of "disclosure statements" to be a condition for the European Parliament's consent to a new Interinstitutional Agreement on the Financial Perspective;
The Interinstitutional Agreement is used as a mean to secure the procedure and the timetable.
The Interinstitutional Agreement is used as a mean to secure the procedure and the timetable.
The Commission has presented an action plan (COM(2006)009) which could be a step in the right direction.
The Commission has presented an action plan (COM(2006)009) which could be a step in the right direction.
Members States should identify the national bodies to be responsible and accountable for national declarations of funds from the EU budget spent for policies run under shared competences.
Members States should identify the national bodies to be responsible and accountable for national declarations of funds from the EU budget spent for policies run under shared competences.
New financial instruments
New financial instruments
50. […] - Financial instruments and co-financing asks the Commission to make proposals to accompany the implementation of all common policies with new financial instruments and co-financing mechanisms; these instruments should address market failures and act as catalysts for private investors; budget optimisation and a high leverage effect should be key objectives, to be achieved, in particular, by SME guarantee instruments, but also by targeted venture capital support, including to business angels networks and technology transfer;
50. […] - Financial instruments and co-financing asks the Commission to make proposals to accompany the implementation of all common policies with new financial instruments and co-financing mechanisms; these instruments should address market failures and act as catalysts for private investors; budget optimisation and a high leverage effect should be key objectives, to be achieved, in particular, by SME guarantee instruments, but also by targeted venture capital support, including to business angels networks and technology transfer;
The institutions agree to encourage all types of financial instruments acting as catalysts for public and private investors.
The institutions agree to encourage all types of financial instruments acting as catalysts for public and private investors.
The Commission should make appropriate proposals, in line with point 11 of the conclusions.
The Commission should make appropriate proposals, in line with point 11 of the conclusions.
EIB loans represent in general about one third of actual investments by catalysing other resources of the public and private sector.
EIB loans represent in general about one third of actual investments by catalysing other resources of the public and private sector.
The EIB financial support combined with EU budget in areas such as competitiveness, SMEs, TENs or Research and Innovation could create an important leverage effect by boosting investments.
The EIB financial support combined with EU budget in areas such as competitiveness, SMEs, TENs or Research and Innovation could create an important leverage effect by boosting investments.
33. […] - Duration Points out that the duration of the legislative proposals could remain independent from the timeframe of the Financial Perspective; therefore requests its delegation negotiating the Interinstitutional Agreement to insist that the future Interinstitutional Agreement include provisions guaranteeing a longer (up to 7 years) duration for multi-annual programmes, compared to the duration of the future financial perspective, in particular for major policies such as agricultural policy, structural and cohesion policy and research;
33. […] - Duration Points out that the duration of the legislative proposals could remain independent from the timeframe of the Financial Perspective; therefore requests its delegation negotiating the Interinstitutional Agreement to insist that the future Interinstitutional Agreement include provisions guaranteeing a longer (up to 7 years) duration for multi-annual programmes, compared to the duration of the future financial perspective, in particular for major policies such as agricultural policy, structural and cohesion policy and research;
The IIA, including the annex (table on Financial Perspective) should be subject to a revision clause to make the necessary adjustment in a fast developing environment and to redeploy the spending priorities if needed.
The IIA, including the annex (table on Financial Perspective) should be subject to a revision clause to make the necessary adjustment in a fast developing environment and to redeploy the spending priorities if needed.
On a mid-term basis, the Commission undertake a full, wide-ranging review covering all aspects of the Financial Perspective, own resources and expenditure with a clearly defined role for the European Parliament, as indicated by the European Council.
On a mid-term basis, the Commission undertake a full, wide-ranging review covering all aspects of the Financial Perspective, own resources and expenditure with a clearly defined role for the European Parliament, as indicated by the European Council.
Reforming the system of own resources
Reforming the system of own resources
50. […] - Own resources and correction mechanism : endorses the conclusions of the European Council of December 2004 that the negotiations on the European Union's expenditure must be seen in an overall context including the question of own resources, the correction mechanism and the examination of a possible simplification of the system; calls for a revision of the own resources system which leads in the short term to a fairer distribution of net burdens and establishes, before the end of the next Financial Perspective, an independent EU funding system; proposes that the work of preparing such a new system should be conferred on an interparliamentary conference, involving the European Parliament and the national parliaments, in keeping with the spirit of the protocol to the Constitution on the role of the national parliaments,
50. […] - Own resources and correction mechanism : endorses the conclusions of the European Council of December 2004 that the negotiations on the European Union's expenditure must be seen in an overall context including the question of own resources, the correction mechanism and the examination of a possible simplification of the system; calls for a revision of the own resources system which leads in the short term to a fairer distribution of net burdens and establishes, before the end of the next Financial Perspective, an independent EU funding system; proposes that the work of preparing such a new system should be conferred on an interparliamentary conference, involving the European Parliament and the national parliaments, in keeping with the spirit of the protocol to the Constitution on the role of the national parliaments,
The European Union should have a transparent and independent own resources system to replace the existing one.
The European Union should have a transparent and independent own resources system to replace the existing one.
The preparatory work for setting up such a system should be conferred to a conference involving the European Parliament and the national parliaments.
The preparatory work for setting up such a system should be conferred to a conference involving the European Parliament and the national parliaments.
39. […] - Agencies: Calls for an approach similar to that requested for the Commission's administrative expenditure, based on the establishment of a binding ceiling for the agencies, outside the Financial Perspective table, which can be increased only by a decision of the budgetary authority using all means offered by the future interinstitutional agreement; intends by these means to improve control and transparency over the agencies without adverse effects on the programmes;
39. […] - Agencies: Calls for an approach similar to that requested for the Commission's administrative expenditure, based on the establishment of a binding ceiling for the agencies, outside the Financial Perspective table, which can be increased only by a decision of the budgetary authority using all means offered by the future interinstitutional agreement; intends by these means to improve control and transparency over the agencies without adverse effects on the programmes;
A binding ceiling should be created for the agencies under each heading concerned as a reference outside the table of the financial framework to ringfence the agencies and the Community programmes.
A binding ceiling should be created for the agencies under each heading concerned as a reference outside the table of the financial framework to ringfence the agencies and the Community programmes.
In this way, the increase of funds for the agencies (expansion or creation of new agencies) will not reduce operational programmes.
In this way, the increase of funds for the agencies (expansion or creation of new agencies) will not reduce operational programmes.