natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The ECB should continue to be vigilant with regard to M3 growth which accelerated again in the second half of 2004 (annual year end M3 growth of 6.4% compared to the ECB's target of 4.5%) and to rising oil prices which had a negative impact on Euro area growth in the second half of 2004;
The ECB should continue to be vigilant with regard to M3 growth which accelerated again in the second half of 2004 (annual year end M3 growth of 6.4% compared to the ECB's target of 4.5%) and to rising oil prices which had a negative impact on Euro area growth in the second half of 2004;
The year 2004 has been a very important year for the European Monetary Union.
The year 2004 has been a very important year for the European Monetary Union.
The ECB and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) celebrated its fifth anniversary and looked back on a successful start and implementation of a common European currency.
The ECB and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) celebrated its fifth anniversary and looked back on a successful start and implementation of a common European currency.
Furthermore, the accession of ten new member states to the European Union has enlarged the ESCB by ten new national central banks.
Furthermore, the accession of ten new member states to the European Union has enlarged the ESCB by ten new national central banks.
The ECB has to be commended for its very constructive and early preparation of the EU enlargement and the smooth transition to an enlarged General Council.
The ECB has to be commended for its very constructive and early preparation of the EU enlargement and the smooth transition to an enlarged General Council.
However, despite these very positive events and with regard to the founding principles of the common European currency, 2004 has to be seen as a particulary difficult year.
However, despite these very positive events and with regard to the founding principles of the common European currency, 2004 has to be seen as a particularly difficult year.
The discussion on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact gained ground and led to a much critised reform of the Pact, i.e. to a less credible commitment to fiscal discipline.
The discussion on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact gained ground and led to a much criticised reform of the Pact, i.e. to a less credible commitment to fiscal discipline.
Furthermore, the decision taken by the Ecofin Council in January 2005 to suspend further measures in the context of the excessive deficit procedure for Germany and France, in particular their declaration that corrective measures implemented in both countries would be effective, at a time when it was already clear that they would not lead to a adequate correction of the budget deficit, further impaired the credibility of the whole exercise.
Furthermore, the decision taken by the Ecofin Council in January 2005 to suspend further measures in the context of the excessive deficit procedure for Germany and France, in particular their declaration that corrective measures implemented in both countries would be effective, at a time when it was already clear that they would not lead to a adequate correction of the budget deficit, further impaired the credibility of the whole exercise.
In the rapporteur's view, the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) aims at a weakening of the commitment to budget discipline and contradicts the aims of the body of budgetary rules and regulations underlying the EMU in so far as the new concept of a medium term budget balancing requirement that takes into account country specific aspects and the newly added exceptions from the 3% deficit-to-GDP criteria does not sufficiently respect the criteria of budget discipline and gives more leeway to new public debt.
In the rapporteur's view, the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) aims at a weakening of the commitment to budget discipline and contradicts the aims of the body of budgetary rules and regulations underlying the EMU in so far as the new concept of a medium term budget balancing requirement that takes into account country specific aspects and the newly added exceptions from the 3% deficit-to-GDP criteria does not sufficiently respect the criteria of budget discipline and gives more leeway to new public debt.
The reform of the corrective arm of the SGP let to a higher complexity and it is to be expected that this implicate less transparency and will thus worsen the enforceability of the SGP; the ECB's clear objection to the weakening of the corrective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact during the debate is therefore broadly welcomed and there is full agreement with its stance, as emphasised by the Vice President of the ECB on the occasion of the presentation of this annual report in the Committee meeting of 26 April 2005, that a possible exceeding of the 3% deficit-to-GDP limit can only be small and short-term in nature and that the promises made by the Council with regard to the strengthening of the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact have to be taken very seriously by national governments and need to be translated into national fiscal policy.
The reform of the corrective arm of the SGP let to a higher complexity and it is to be expected that this implicate less transparency and will thus worsen the enforceability of the SGP; the ECB's clear objection to the weakening of the corrective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact during the debate is therefore broadly welcomed and there is full agreement with its stance, as emphasised by the Vice President of the ECB on the occasion of the presentation of this annual report in the Committee meeting of 26 April 2005, that a possible exceeding of the 3% deficit-to-GDP limit can only be small and short-term in nature and that the promises made by the Council with regard to the strengthening of the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact have to be taken very seriously by national governments and need to be translated into national fiscal policy.
Furthermore, the year 2004 brought the awareness that the EU member states failed to comply with the Lisbon agenda and its objectives.
Furthermore, the year 2004 brought the awareness that the EU member states failed to comply with the Lisbon agenda and its objectives.
It became clear that the common objectives of much needed structural reforms did not translate into adequate national policies.
It became clear that the common objectives of much needed structural reforms did not translate into adequate national policies.
The ECB's emphasis on the need for an ambitious pace of structural reforms as an indispensable prerequisite for growth and for achieving the goals laid down in the Lisbon agenda should be clearly endorsed.
The ECB's emphasis on the need for an ambitious pace of structural reforms as an indispensable prerequisite for growth and for achieving the goals laid down in the Lisbon agenda should be clearly endorsed.
Structural reform as a prerequisite for growth is also considered necessary from a global perspective as this would help to reduce the still prevailing global imbalances together with medium-term fiscal consolidation in the United States and greater exchange rate flexibility in emerging Asia as has been underscored repeatedly and since long by the G7, G20 and the International Monetary Fund.
Structural reform as a prerequisite for growth is also considered necessary from a global perspective as this would help to reduce the still prevailing global imbalances together with medium-term fiscal consolidation in the United States and greater exchange rate flexibility in emerging Asia as has been underscored repeatedly and since long by the G7, G20 and the International Monetary Fund.
The implementation of the services directive proposed by the European Commission is important in view of enhancing growth and accomplishing the European internal market.
The implementation of the services directive proposed by the European Commission is important in view of enhancing growth and accomplishing the European internal market.
It has to be seen as an important prerequisite for growth and increasing welfare in the long run.
It has to be seen as an important prerequisite for growth and increasing welfare in the long run.
In addition, the year 2004 brought the awareness that government statistics in some EU countries lack accuracy which has contributed to the disappointment about the sincerity of national government in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact.
In addition, the year 2004 brought the awareness that government statistics in some EU countries lack accuracy which has contributed to the disappointment about the sincerity of national government in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact.
In the case of Greece, a country has been admitted to the EMU on the basis of incorrect statistical data and thus without complying with the Maastricht criteria.
In the case of Greece, a country has been admitted to the EMU on the basis of incorrect statistical data and thus without complying with the Maastricht criteria.
Regarding the concerns about the reliability of government finance statistics, the initiative of the Commission for the enhancement of government statistics is welcome but might not be sufficient to exclude inaccurate data notification by EMU countries in the future.
Regarding the concerns about the reliability of government finance statistics, the initiative of the Commission for the enhancement of government statistics is welcome but might not be sufficient to exclude inaccurate data notification by EMU countries in the future.
The Rapporteur welcomes the ECB's contribution to a further enhancement of the quality of euro area government finance aggregates via the Committee on Monetary, Financial and Balance of Payments Statistics.
The Rapporteur welcomes the ECB's contribution to a further enhancement of the quality of euro area government finance aggregates via the Committee on Monetary, Financial and Balance of Payments Statistics.
Overall, the year 2004 worsened the political environment in which the ECB has to operate.
Overall, the year 2004 worsened the political environment in which the ECB has to operate.
The different pace of reforms within the euro area also translates into a lack of convergence.
The different pace of reforms within the euro area also translates into a lack of convergence.
Whereas the real and nominal convergence of the new member states with the euro area gained pace, the convergence within the euro area remained a cause for concern.
Whereas the real and nominal convergence of the new member states with the euro area gained pace, the convergence within the euro area remained a cause for concern.
Looking ahead, the current concern about the ratification of the European Constitution, which can partly be interpreted as a sign for an overall fatigue of further EU integration, has to be carefully assessed with regard to its impact on the European Monetary Union.
Looking ahead, the current concern about the ratification of the European Constitution, which can partly be interpreted as a sign for an overall fatigue of further EU integration, has to be carefully assessed with regard to its impact on the European Monetary Union.
It has to be reemphasised that the European Monetary Union was based on the conviction that a common European monetary policy requires a coordination of the still nationally determined fiscal policies.
It has to be re-emphasised that the European Monetary Union was based on the conviction that a common European monetary policy requires a coordination of the still nationally determined fiscal policies.
Výroční zpráva Evropské centrální banky za rok 2004
2004 Annual Report of the European Central Bank
článek 113 SES a článek 15 statutu Evropského systému centrálních bank a Evropské centrální banky
Article 113 EC and Article 15 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank
Datum konzultace s Parlamentem
Date forwarded to Parliament
Pervenche Berès, Sharon Margaret Bowles, Udo Bullmann, Ieke van den Burg, David Casa, Jan Christian Ehler, Elisa Ferreira, Jean-Paul Gauzès, Robert Goebbels, Gunnar Hökmark, Benoît Hamon, Karsten Friedrich Hoppenstedt, Sophia in 't Veld, Othmar Karas, Piia-Noora Kauppi, Wolf Klinz, Guntars Krasts, Enrico Letta, Gay Mitchell, Cristobal Montoro Romero, Alexander Radwan, Bernhard Rapkay, Eoin Ryan, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Peter Skinner, Margarita Starkevičiūtė, Ivo Strejček, John Whittaker
Pervenche Berès, Sharon Margaret Bowles, Udo Bullmann, Ieke van den Burg, David Casa, Jan Christian Ehler, Elisa Ferreira, Jean-Paul Gauzès, Robert Goebbels, Gunnar Hökmark, Benoît Hamon, Karsten Friedrich Hoppenstedt, Sophia in 't Veld, Othmar Karas, Piia-Noora Kauppi, Wolf Klinz, Guntars Krasts, Enrico Letta, Gay Mitchell, Cristobal Montoro Romero, Alexander Radwan, Bernhard Rapkay, Eoin Ryan, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Peter Skinner, Margarita Starkevičiūtė, Ivo Strejček, John Whittaker
o společném postoji Rady k přijetí návrhu nařízení Rady, kterým se mění nařízení (ES) č. 1466/97 o posílení dohledu nad stavy rozpočtů a nad hospodářskými politikami a o posílení koordinace hospodářských politik
on the Council common position for adoption of a Council regulation on amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies
PE 359.997v02-00
PE 359.997v02-00
NÁVRH LEGISLATIVNÍHO USNESENÍ.................................................................................5
DRAFT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION.....................................................................................5
(Postup spolupráce: druhé čtení)
(Cooperation procedure: second reading)
– s ohledem na společný postoj Rady (9812/2005 – C6‑0119/2005 ),
– having regard to the Council common position (9812/2005 – C6‑0119/2005 ),
Texts Adopted P6_TA-PROV(2005)0231 o návrhu Komise Radě ( KOM(2005)0154 )
Texts Adopted P6_TA-PROV(2005)0231 on the Commission proposal to the Council ( COM(2005)0154 )
Dosud nezveřejněný v Úř. věst. ,
Not yer published in OJ ,
– s ohledem na doporučení k druhému čtení dané Hospodářským a měnovým výborem ( A6‑0204/2005 ),
– having regard to the recommendation for second reading of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs ( A6‑0204/2005 ),
252 písm. d) Smlouvy o ES;
Asks the Commission to re-examine its proposal in accordance with Article 252(d) of the EC Treaty
(3a) Komise by měla porovnat údaje, které jí poskytly členské státy, se zprávami, které předložily národní centrální banky ECB.
(3a) The Commission should compare the figures submitted to it by the Member States with the reports submitted by the national central banks to the ECB.
Poté se po dobu dvou let každoročně předkládají aktualizované programy.
Thereafter, updated programmes shall be submitted annually for a period of two years.
Členský stát, který přijme jednotnou měnu v pozdější etapě, předloží stabilizační program do šesti měsíců od rozhodnutí Rady o jeho účasti na jednotné měně.“
A Member State adopting the single currency at a later stage shall submit a stability programme within six months of the Council Decision on its participation in the single currency."
b) V odstavci 2 se slova „dvou měsíců“ nahrazují slovy „tří měsíců“
(b) In paragraph 2, the words “two months” are replaced by the words “three months”.
b) Odstavec 2 se nahrazuje tímto:
(b) Paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:
Rada přezkoumá stabilizační program uvedený v odstavci 1 nejpozději do tří měsíců od předložení.
The Council shall carry out the examination of the stability programme referred to in paragraph 1 within at most three months of the submission of the programme.
Rada podá stanovisko k programu na doporučení Komise a po konzultaci s výborem zřízeným článkem 114.
The Council, on a recommendation from the Commission and after consulting the Committee set up by Article 114, shall deliver an opinion on the programme.
Jestliže Rada v souladu s článkem 99 usoudí, že cíle a obsah programu by měly být posíleny, zejména co se týče zlepšení na cestě k dosažení střednědobého rozpočtového cíle v období hospodářské konjunktury, vyzve ve svém stanovisku dotyčný členský stát, aby svůj program upravil.“
Where the Council, in accordance with Article 99, considers that the objectives and contents of a programme should be strengthened, in particular regarding the improvement on the adjustment path toward the medium-term budgetary objective pursued in economic good times, the Council shall, in its opinion, invite the Member State concerned to adjust its programme."
It is s crucial to make sure that budgetary positions are improved on good economic times to strengthening the economic underpinnings and the effectiveness of the Pact in its preventive arm, to safeguarding the sustainability of public finances in the long run, to promoting growth and to avoiding imposing excessive burdens on future generations
It is s crucial to make sure that budgetary positions are improved on good economic times to strengthening the economic underpinnings and the effectiveness of the Pact in its preventive arm, to safeguarding the sustainability of public finances in the long run, to promoting growth and to avoiding imposing excessive burdens on future generations.
The fact that the Council did not, in its Common Position, accept any of the amendments submitted by the European Parliament mirrors once more the obvious democratic deficit in the architecture of the economic governance in place.
The fact that the Council did not, in its Common Position, accept any of the amendments submitted by the European Parliament mirrors once more the obvious democratic deficit in the architecture of the economic governance in place.
While the European Parliament made the utmost effort to complete the two readings within the shortest possible time frame, the Council totally ignores the position of the European Parliament and even goes as far as to name the European Parliament the scapegoat for the failure or delay of the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact should the Common Position not be speedily adopted.
While the European Parliament made the utmost effort to complete the two readings within the shortest possible time frame, the Council totally ignores the position of the European Parliament and even goes as far as to name the European Parliament the scapegoat for the failure or delay of the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact should the Common Position not be speedily adopted.
The rapporteur wants to express his strong disapproval of this obvious lack of respect for the Parliament and lack of political will to truly cooperate with the Parliament in the process of reforming the Stability and Growth Pact.
The rapporteur wants to express his strong disapproval of this obvious lack of respect for the Parliament and lack of political will to truly cooperate with the Parliament in the process of reforming the Stability and Growth Pact.
The rapporteur notes that the Common Position adopted by the Council states that there is already a comparison happening between the statistical data supplied by the national central banks to the ECB and the data provided by the Member States to Eurostat by means of the representation of national central banks and the European Central Bank in the Economic and Financial Committee which plays a key role in the multilateral fiscal surveillance process.
The rapporteur notes that the Common Position adopted by the Council states that there is already a comparison happening between the statistical data supplied by the national central banks to the ECB and the data provided by the Member States to Eurostat by means of the representation of national central banks and the European Central Bank in the Economic and Financial Committee which plays a key role in the multilateral fiscal surveillance process.
However, the rapporteur would like to question whether this practice has been applied in the case of Greece.
However, the rapporteur would like to question whether this practice has been applied in the case of Greece.
Furthermore the rapporteur wants to underline the importance of giving more weight to the overall debt ratio, an essential part and criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact which has not been given enough attention as yet.
Furthermore the rapporteur wants to underline the importance of giving more weight to the overall debt ratio, an essential part and criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact which has not been given enough attention as yet.
The rapporteur intended to stress the importance of the overall debt ratio within the multilateral surveillance procedure by proposing 3 amendments to Regulation 1466/97.
The rapporteur intended to stress the importance of the overall debt ratio within the multilateral surveillance procedure by proposing 3 amendments to Regulation 1466/97.
The Council itself states in part 3.5 of its report on "Improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact" that there should be an increased focus on debt and sustainability and that the debt surveillance framework should be strengthened.
The Council itself states in part 3.5 of its report on "Improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact" that there should be an increased focus on debt and sustainability and that the debt surveillance framework should be strengthened.
Although a majority of Member States and the Commission were in favour of following Parliament's proposals, a minority of influential Member States managed to block the proposals regarding the monitoring of the evolution of public debt.
Although a majority of Member States and the Commission were in favour of following Parliament's proposals, a minority of influential Member States managed to block the proposals regarding the monitoring of the evolution of public debt.
Společný postoj Rady k přijetí návrhu nařízení Rady, kterým se mění nařízení (ES) č. 1466/97 o posílení dohledu nad stavy rozpočtů a nad hospodářskými politikami a o posílení koordinace hospodářských politik
Council common position for adoption of a Council regulation on amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies
Datum prvního čtení EP – P6
Date of Parliament’s first reading – P6
Othmar Karas 6.6.2005
Othmar Karas 6.6.2005
Zsolt László Becsey, Pervenche Berès, Pier Luigi Bersani, Sharon Margaret Bowles, Ieke van den Burg, Jonathan Evans, Elisa Ferreira, Karsten Friedrich Hoppenstedt, Sophia in 't Veld, Othmar Karas, Wolf Klinz, Kurt Joachim Lauk, John Purvis, Alexander Radwan, Dariusz Rosati, Eoin Ryan, Manuel António dos Santos, Peter Skinner, Margarita Starkevičiūtė, Ivo Strejček, John Whittaker
Zsolt László Becsey, Pervenche Berès, Pier Luigi Bersani, Sharon Margaret Bowles, Ieke van den Burg, Jonathan Evans, Elisa Ferreira, Karsten Friedrich Hoppenstedt, Sophia in 't Veld, Othmar Karas, Wolf Klinz, Kurt Joachim Lauk, John Purvis, Alexander Radwan, Dariusz Rosati, Eoin Ryan, Manuel António dos Santos, Peter Skinner, Margarita Starkevičiūtė, Ivo Strejček, John Whittaker
Harald Ettl, Jules Maaten, Corien Wortmann-Kool
Harald Ettl, Jules Maaten, Corien Wortmann-Kool
Agustín Díaz de Mera García Consuegra, Fernando Fernández Martín, Kyösti Tapio Virrankoski
Agustín Díaz de Mera García Consuegra, Fernando Fernández Martín, Kyösti Tapio Virrankoski