natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Allocation of responsibilities between home country and host country supervisors
Allocation of responsibilities between home country and host country supervisors
Article 129 of the Directive [2000/12/EC] strengthens the position of the supervisory authority responsible for consolidation (home country supervisory) vis-à-vis the host country supervisor by comparison with the current arrangements.
Article 129 of the Directive [2000/12/EC] strengthens the position of the supervisory authority responsible for consolidation (home country supervisory) vis-à-vis the host country supervisor by comparison with the current arrangements.
Article 129 permits a single application for the IRB and AMA procedures, and market price risk models, by the group of institutions, as a result of which the supervisory authorities responsible for the members of the group are supposed to adopt a joint decision on authorising the procedures.
Article 129 permits a single application for the IRB and AMA procedures, and market price risk models, by the group of institutions, as a result of which the supervisory authorities responsible for the members of the group are supposed to adopt a joint decision on authorising the procedures.
If this does not happen within six months the Commission proposal provides for a single decision, binding on all the supervisory authorities concerned, by the parent company's supervisor.
If this does not happen within six months the Commission proposal provides for a single decision, binding on all the supervisory authorities concerned, by the parent company's supervisor.
The responsibility for supervision of subsidiaries has hitherto lain with the host country supervisor.
The responsibility for supervision of subsidiaries has hitherto lain with the host country supervisor.
Some consider that the Commission proposal goes too far, in that it disregards the right of host country supervisors to be involved and leaves difficult legal issues unanswered.
Some consider that the Commission proposal goes too far, in that it disregards the right of host country supervisors to be involved and leaves difficult legal issues unanswered.
In addition, a critical view should be taken, especially where crises are concerned, of the possible collapse of national responsibility for a stable banking system and the performance of a significant slice of banking supervision by a foreign authority.
In addition, a critical view should be taken, especially where crises are concerned, of the possible collapse of national responsibility for a stable banking system and the performance of a significant slice of banking supervision by a foreign authority.
Furthermore, there are reservations about competition, since in national financial markets which are heavily dominated by foreign banking groups the internal ratings systems of competing banks would be validated by different European supervisory authorities.
Furthermore, there are reservations about competition, since in national financial markets which are heavily dominated by foreign banking groups the internal ratings systems of competing banks would be validated by different European supervisory authorities.
The counter-argument is that without the provisions of Article 129, in a worst-case scenario banks operating throughout Europe would have to work with 24 additional models or sets of capital requirements, which would, not least, generate high costs; without the six-month deadline the system would scarcely be practicable.
The counter-argument is that without the provisions of Article 129, in a worst-case scenario banks operating throughout Europe would have to work with 24 additional models or sets of capital requirements, which would, not least, generate high costs; without the six-month deadline the system would scarcely be practicable.
An extension of the powers of home country supervisors is claimed to be necessary with regard to the Second and Third Pillars.
An extension of the powers of home country supervisors is claimed to be necessary with regard to the Second and Third Pillars.
The rapporteur takes the view that the provisions of Article 129 should basically be retained.
The rapporteur takes the view that the provisions of Article 129 should basically be retained.
The prerequisites for an extension of the powers of home country supervisors include a harmonised investment protection system, common administrative law and clarification of the issue of lender of last resort.
The prerequisites for an extension of the powers of home country supervisors include a harmonised investment protection system, common administrative law and clarification of the issue of lender of last resort.
Since progress is to be expected in these areas within the next few years, the revision clause proposed by the Council is to be welcomed.
Since progress is to be expected in these areas within the next few years, the revision clause proposed by the Council is to be welcomed.
The same applies to the possibility of the stronger position of the supervisory authority responsible for consolidation failing to prove its worth.
The same applies to the possibility of the stronger position of the supervisory authority responsible for consolidation failing to prove its worth.
This directive is not a Lamfalussy directive in the original sense.
This directive is not a Lamfalussy directive in the original sense.
However, the Lamfalussy procedure is being proposed for these changes.
However, the Lamfalussy procedure is being proposed for these changes.
1. k návrhu směrnice Evropského parlamentu a Rady, kterými se přepracovává směrnice Evropského parlamentu a Rady 2000/12/ES ze dne 20. března 2000 o přístupu k činnosti úvěrových institucí a o jejím výkonu
1. on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council re-casting Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions
The Basel Accord in 1988 (Basel I) led to the adoption of minimum capital requirements across over 100 countries.
The Basel Accord in 1988 (Basel I) led to the adoption of minimum capital requirements across over 100 countries.
The European Union adopted, inter alia , Directive 2000/12/EC which consolidated previous directives regulating solvency ratios for credit institutions and addressed their risk arising from lending activities.
The European Union adopted, inter alia , Directive 2000/12/EC which consolidated previous directives regulating solvency ratios for credit institutions and addressed their risk arising from lending activities.
Directive 93/6/EEC on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions extended both the credit risk and market risk rules to investment firms.
Directive 93/6/EEC on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions extended both the credit risk and market risk rules to investment firms.
The new proposals (implementing in the European Union the new Basel Accord - Basel II) aim at eliminating the shortcomings that were identified so far, ensuring that financial institutions' capital is more closely aligned with the risk they face, and specifies how the requirements apply to individual investment firms, groups of investment firms and mixed groups.
The new proposals (implementing in the European Union the new Basel Accord - Basel II) aim at eliminating the shortcomings that were identified so far, ensuring that financial institutions' capital is more closely aligned with the risk they face, and specifies how the requirements apply to individual investment firms, groups of investment firms and mixed groups.
Your rapporteur wishes to express her support for the major objectives of the proposals and the necessary updating of the rules in response to the significant advances in techniques for risk measurement and management in financial services.
Your rapporteur wishes to express her support for the major objectives of the proposals and the necessary updating of the rules in response to the significant advances in techniques for risk measurement and management in financial services.
However, the rapporteur would like to propose some amendments which can contribute to the simplification of the capital requirements system.
However, the rapporteur would like to propose some amendments which can contribute to the simplification of the capital requirements system.
Several of them relate to instances of national discretion that should be deleted in order to enhance regulatory harmonisation in the internal market.
Several of them relate to instances of national discretion that should be deleted in order to enhance regulatory harmonisation in the internal market.
Many of those deletions are also recommended by the national supervisors in the CEBS.
Many of those deletions are also recommended by the national supervisors in the CEBS.
The proposal applies the 're-casting technique', in accordance with Interinstitutional Agreement 2002/C 77/01, permitting substantive amendments to existing legislation without a self-standing amending directive.
The proposal applies the 're-casting technique', in accordance with Interinstitutional Agreement 2002/C 77/01, permitting substantive amendments to existing legislation without a self-standing amending directive.
Your rapporteur takes the view that Article 47(2) of the EC Treaty is properly chosen as the legal basis for this proposal.
Your rapporteur takes the view that Article 47(2) of the EC Treaty is properly chosen as the legal basis for this proposal.
The principle of subsidiarity is respected, as the directive is the most appropriate instrument to achieve the objectives pursued.
The principle of subsidiarity is respected, as the directive is the most appropriate instrument to achieve the objectives pursued.
Having the directives confined to the necessary requirements, the principle of proportionality is also observed.
Having the directives confined to the necessary requirements, the principle of proportionality is also observed.
However, it must be noted that Basel II was agreed outside the legislative procedures of the European Community, which might justify doubts about the democratic mandate of the proposal.
However, it must be noted that Basel II was agreed outside the legislative procedures of the European Community, which might justify doubts about the democratic mandate of the proposal.
With regard to the re-casting of Directive 2000/12/EC, this is especially relevant for changes proposed to the powers of execution, where the Commission is entitled to amend Articles 56-67 regulating own funds (Section I of Chapter 2), among other issues.
With regard to the re-casting of Directive 2000/12/EC, this is especially relevant for changes proposed to the powers of execution, where the Commission is entitled to amend Articles 56-67 regulating own funds (Section I of Chapter 2), among other issues.
In the case of Directive 93/6/EEC, the Commission is entitled inter alia to amend the categories of investment firms in Article 20(2) and (3) as well as technical provisions in Annexes I to VII.
In the case of Directive 93/6/EEC, the Commission is entitled inter alia to amend the categories of investment firms in Article 20(2) and (3) as well as technical provisions in Annexes I to VII.
In order to ensure proper control over the subsequent changes to the substantive regulation, it is thus necessary to introduce the appropriate comitology system, including the so-called 'sunset clause' already used, for example, in Directive 2003/6/EC on market abuse.
In order to ensure proper control over the subsequent changes to the substantive regulation, it is thus necessary to introduce the appropriate comitology system, including the so-called 'sunset clause' already used, for example, in Directive 2003/6/EC on market abuse.
Výbor pro právní záležitosti vyzývá Hospodářský a měnový výbor jako příslušný výbor, aby do své zprávy začlenil tyto pozměňovací návrhy:
The Committee on Legal Affairs calls on the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following amendments in its report:
POZMĚŇOVACÍ NÁVRHY K NÁVRHU 1
AMENDMENTS TO PROPOSAL 1
C ... /Dosud nezveřejněné v Úředním věstníku.
OJ C ... /Not yet published in OJ.
Bod odůvodnění 63a (nový)
Recital 63 a (new)
(63a) Evropskému parlamentu by měla být poskytnuta lhůta tří měsíců počínaje dnem prvního předložení pozměňovacích návrhů a prováděcích opatření, aby měl příležitost je prozkoumat a vyjádřit k nim své stanovisko.
(63a) The European Parliament should be given a period of three months from the first transmission of draft amendments and implementing measures to allow it to examine them and to give its opinion.
V naléhavých a řádně odůvodněných případech by nicméně mělo být možné tuto lhůtu zkrátit.
However, in urgent and duly justified cases, it should be possible to shorten this period.
Přijme-li během této lhůty Evropský parlament usnesení, Komise tyto pozměňovací návrhy nebo opatření znovu přezkoumá,
If, within that period, a resolution is adopted by the European Parliament, the Commission should re-examine the draft amendments or measures,
This recital seeks to protect the powers of the European Parliament within the comitology procedure established by the amended Article 151.
This recital seeks to protect the powers of the European Parliament within the comitology procedure established by the amended Article 151.
In view of the difficulty with developing fine-tuned ratings models even where there is a substantial number of counterparties in the exposure class referred to in Article 86(1)(a) (central governments and central banks), it should be possible for smaller credit institutions, in particular, to apply the Standardised Approach on a partial basis if either of the two conditions for such application exists.
In view of the difficulty with developing fine-tuned ratings models even where there is a substantial number of counterparties in the exposure class referred to in Article 86(1)(a) (central governments and central banks), it should be possible for smaller credit institutions, in particular, to apply the Standardised Approach on a partial basis if either of the two conditions for such application exists.
Společné rozhodnutí podle prvního pododstavce a rozhodnutí podle druhého pododstavce bude společně s vyčerpávajícím odůvodněním navrženo příslušným orgánem uvedeným v odstavci 1 a předáno žadateli a dalším příslušným orgánům.
A joint decision pursuant to the first subparagraph and a decision pursuant to the second subparagraph shall be drawn up, together with a full statement of reasons, by the competent authority referred to in paragraph 1 and furnished to the applicant and to the other competent authorities.
Každý žadatel má právo podat odvolání proti rozhodnutí, které se týká jeho instituce.
Any applicant may appeal against a decision concerning itself.
Úvěrové instituce seznámí malé a střední podniky žádající o úvěr s klíčovými prvky svého postupu při ratingovém hodnocení.
Credit institutions shall inform small and medium-sized enterprises which request financing of the key elements of their rating process.
V případě, že se národní asociace úvěrových institucí nedohodnou s asociacemi malých a středních podniků na vnitrostátních zásadách pro dobrovolné uveřejňování informací do 31. prosince 2006, příslušné orgány zavedou opatření potřebná k zavedení takových zásad.
If national associations of credit institutions and of small and medium-sized enterprises do not agree by 31 December 2006 on a national voluntary information code, the competent authorities shall apply appropriate rules to ensure that the relevant information is provided.
The transparency of the rating process is an important issue for SME.
The transparency of the rating process is an important issue for SME.
Banks should make public the most important features of their rating process to those applying for funding.
Banks should make public the most important features of their rating process to those applying for funding.
This can best be done at national level.
This can best be done at national level.
Komisi je nápomocen Evropský bankovní výbor zřízený rozhodnutím Komise 2004/10/ES (dále jen „výbor“).
The Commission shall be assisted by the European Banking Committee instituted by Commission Decision 2004/10/EC (hereinafter referred to as "the Committee").
Uplatňování opatření této směrnice, které vyžaduje přijetí technických předpisů, pozměňovacích návrhů a rozhodnutí v souladu s odstavcem 2, bude pozastaveno po uplynutí lhůty 4 let ode dne vstoupení směrnice v platnost, aniž by byla dotčena již schválená prováděcí opatření.
Without prejudice to the implementing measures already adopted, upon expiry of a four-year period following the entry into force of this Directive, the application of its provisions requiring the adoption of technical rules, amendments and decisions in accordance with paragraph 2 shall be suspended.
Na základě návrhu Komise mohou Evropský parlament a Rada obnovit zmíněná opatření v souladu s postupem stanoveným v článku 251 Smlouvy a pro tento účel tato opatření znovu podbrobí přezkumu před vypršením výše uvedené lhůty.
Acting on a proposal from the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council may renew the provisions concerned in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 251 of the Treaty and, to that end, they shall review them prior to the expiry of the period referred to above.
Democratic control over significant changes to the legislative act must be maintained.
Democratic control over significant changes to the legislative act must be maintained.
The sunset clause protects the powers of the European Parliament in case the relevant provisions enter into force with the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.
The sunset clause protects the powers of the European Parliament in case the relevant provisions enter into force with the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.
Konkrétní číslo spadá do rozmezí 90 a více dnů až do 180 dnů, jestliže je to vhodné vzhledem k místním podmínkám.
The specific number shall fall within 90- up to a figure of 180 days if local conditions make it appropriate.
V případě expozic vůči protistranám tohoto typu, které se nacházejí na území jiných členských států, příslušné orgány stanoví počet dnů po splatnosti, který není vyšší než počet dnů, který stanovil příslušný orgán daného členského státu.
For exposures to such counterparts situated in the territories of other Member States, the competent authorities shall set a number of days past due which is not higher than the number set by the competent authority of the respective Member State .
Drafting adjustment resulting from the deletion of the reference to Article 154(4) in Annex VII, Part 4, paragraph 44.
Drafting adjustment resulting from the deletion of the reference to Article 154(4) in Annex VII, Part 4, paragraph 44.
Tato lhůta se může lišit v závislosti na typech produktů.
This period may vary in accordance with product lines.
Příslušné orgány, které při expozici vůči protistranám nacházejícím se v jejich oblasti působnosti nevyužijí možnosti zmíněné v prvním pododstavci, mohou zavést delší lhůtu pro činnosti vykonávané ve vztahu k protistranám nacházejícím se na území členských států, jejichž příslušné orgány zmíněné možnosti využily.
Competent authorities which do not make use of the option referred to in the first subparagraph, for exposures to counterparties located within their territory, may introduce a longer deadline for activities relating to counterparties situated in the territory of Member States whose competent authorities have exercised this option.
Stanovená lhůta musí být mezi 90 dny a počtem dnů, který určily příslušné orgány v souvislosti s expozicí vůči protistranám nacházejícím se na jejich území působnosti.
The actual deadline must be between 90 days and the number of days fixed by the other competent authorities for exposures to counterparts situated within their respective territories.
The provisions included in this amendment were clearly overlooked during the recent negotiations in Basel, creating a clear imbalance between the IRB and the standard approach.
The provisions included in this amendment were clearly overlooked during the recent negotiations in Basel, creating a clear imbalance between the IRB and the standard approach.
Failure to correct the text could easily be interpreted as an imbalance in the entire new regulatory structure to the detriment of small banks which adopt the standard approach.
Failure to correct the text could easily be interpreted as an imbalance in the entire new regulatory structure to the detriment of small banks which adopt the standard approach.
A similar text was agreed moreover at the December 2004 European Council.
A similar text was agreed moreover at the December 2004 European Council.
Příloha VI část 1 odstavec 5
Annex VI, Part 1, paragraph 5
This amendment is aimed at establishing a level playing field within one Member State.
This amendment is aimed at establishing a level playing field within one Member State.
Příloha VI část 1 odstavec 7 úvodní věta
Annex VI, Part 1, paragraph 7, introductory phrase
Externí rating vypracovaný exportní úvěrovou agenturou lze uznat za předpokladu, že je splněna jedna z následujících podmínek:
A credit assessment by an Export Credit Agency may be recognised only if either of the following conditions are met:
Exportní úvěrovou agenturu příslušné orgány uznají za předpokladu, že je splněna jedna z následujících podmínek:
An Export Credit Agency shall be recognised by the competent authorities if either of the following conditions are met:
A clarifying amendment.
A clarifying amendment.
Příloha VI část 1 odstavec 9
Annex VI, Part 1, paragraph 9
Pokud tak příslušné orgány učiní, děje se to nezávisle na diskrečním právu příslušných orgánů podle článku 80 .
Exercise of this discretion by competent authorities is independent of the exercise of discretion by competent authorities as specified in Article 80.
Preferenční zacházení s krátkodobými expozicemi podle odstavce 30, 31 a 36 se nepoužije.
The preferential treatment for shortterm exposures specified in paragraphs 30, 31and 36 shall not be applied.
Aniž by tím byly dotčeny odstavce 10 až 12, přidělí se expozicím vůči regionální a místní správě stejná riziková váha jako expozicím vůči institucím.
Without prejudice to paragraphs 10 to 12, exposures to regional governments and local authorities shall be risk-weighted as exposures to institutions.
Příloha VI část 1 odstavec 10
Annex VI, Part 1, paragraph 10
Bez ohledu na diskréční právo, lze s expozicemi vůči regionální a místní správě zacházet jako s expozicemi vůči centrální vládě, do jejíž pravomoci tato regionální a místní správa spadá, pokud neexistuje rozdíl v riziku mezi těmito expozicemi vzhledem ke specifickým možnostem získávání příjmů na straně regionální a místní správy a k existenci zvláštního institucionálního uspořádání, které snižuje jejich riziko selhání.
Subject to the discretion of competent authorities, exposures to regional governments and local authorities may be treated as exposures to the central government in whose jurisdiction they are established where there is no difference in risk between such exposures because of the specific revenue-raising powers of the former, and the existence of specific institutional arrangements the effect of which is to reduce their risk of default.
S expozicemi vůči regionální a místní správě se zachází jako s expozicemi vůči centrální vládě, do jejíž pravomoci tato regionální a místní správa spadá, pokud neexistuje rozdíl v riziku mezi těmito expozicemi vzhledem ke specifickým možnostem získávání příjmů na straně regionální a místní správy a k existenci zvláštního institucionálního uspořádání, které snižuje jejich riziko selhání.
Exposures to regional governments and local authorities shall be treated as exposures to the central government in whose jurisdiction they are established where there is no difference in risk between such exposures because of the specific revenue-raising powers of the former, and the existence of specific institutional arrangements the effect of which is to reduce their risk of default.