natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The key provision of its resolution of 18 November 2004 stipulated that, where the Parliament voted to withdraw confidence in an individual member of the college, 'the President shall either require the resignation of that Member or justify his refusal to do so before Parliament'.
The key provision of its resolution of 18 November 2004 stipulated that, where the Parliament voted to withdraw confidence in an individual member of the college, 'the President shall either require the resignation of that Member or justify his refusal to do so before Parliament'.
A refusal to accept the Parliament’s vote of no confidence, therefore, will risk the survival of the President himself.
A refusal to accept the Parliament’s vote of no confidence, therefore, will risk the survival of the President himself.
MEPs have found the escalator that will lead them, if necessary, to a position where they can use their constitutional ‘nuclear option’ – the power to sack the whole Commission.
MEPs have found the escalator that will lead them, if necessary, to a position where they can use their constitutional ‘nuclear option’ – the power to sack the whole Commission.
Article 201 TEC.
Article 201 TEC.
Lest this all sounds too bloodthirsty, it seems desirable to reassure the public that somebody somewhere is responsible for running Europe.
Lest this all sounds too bloodthirsty, it seems desirable to reassure the public that somebody somewhere is responsible for running Europe.
Arguably, those who brought about the crisis were those heads of governments who failed to provide Mr Barroso with the best possible raw material with which to build the strong independent executive that the EU needs.
Arguably, those who brought about the crisis were those heads of governments who failed to provide Mr Barroso with the best possible raw material with which to build the strong independent executive that the EU needs.
The laziness of the European Council had unintended consequences.
The laziness of the European Council had unintended consequences.
The outcome of the political crisis surrounding the approval of the new Commission in 2004 is to have made the government of the Union a bit more parliamentary in character and a bit less presidential.
The outcome of the political crisis surrounding the approval of the new Commission in 2004 is to have made the government of the Union a bit more parliamentary in character and a bit less presidential.
The Constitution
The Constitution
The Parliament and the Commission must consider what changes might be necessary in view of the impending Constitution, which is intended to be in force in time for the appointment of the next Commission in 2009.
The Parliament and the Commission must consider what changes might be necessary in view of the impending Constitution, which is intended to be in force in time for the appointment of the next Commission in 2009.
First, the Constitution adorns the criteria for membership of the Commission.
First, the Constitution adorns the criteria for membership of the Commission.
Article I-26.4 reads:
Article I-26.4 reads:
The members of the Commission shall be chosen on the ground of their general competence and European commitment from persons whose independence is beyond doubt.
The members of the Commission shall be chosen on the ground of their general competence and European commitment from persons whose independence is beyond doubt.
The main change made by the IGC is to the method of appointment of the President.
The main change made by the IGC is to the method of appointment of the President.
Article I-27 reads:-
Article I-27 reads:-
Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held the appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for President of the Commission.
Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held the appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for President of the Commission.
This candidate shall be elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component members.
This candidate shall be elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component members.
Note that, in contrast to Article 214.2 TEC, the Constitution says that the President shall be 'elected' rather than 'approved', and that an absolute majority of MEPs is now to be required.
Note that, in contrast to Article 214.2 TEC, the Constitution says that the President shall be 'elected' rather than 'approved', and that an absolute majority of MEPs is now to be required.
If he or she does not obtain the required majority, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall within one month propose a new candidate who shall be elected by the European Parliament following the same procedure.
If he or she does not obtain the required majority, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall within one month propose a new candidate who shall be elected by the European Parliament following the same procedure.
The Council, by common accord with the President-elect, shall adopt the list of the other persons whom it proposes for appointment as members of the Commission.
The Council, by common accord with the President-elect, shall adopt the list of the other persons whom it proposes for appointment as members of the Commission.
They shall be selected, on the basis of the suggestions made by Member States, in accordance with the criteria set out in Article I-26(4) and (6), second subparagraph.
They shall be selected, on the basis of the suggestions made by Member States, in accordance with the criteria set out in Article I-26(4) and (6), second subparagraph.
The President, the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and the other members of the Commission shall be subject as a body to a vote of consent by the European Parliament.
The President, the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and the other members of the Commission shall be subject as a body to a vote of consent by the European Parliament.
On the basis of this consent the Commission shall be appointed by the European Council, acting by a qualified majority.
On the basis of this consent the Commission shall be appointed by the European Council, acting by a qualified majority.
The President of the Commission shall:
The President of the Commission shall:
(a) lay down guidelines within which the Commission is to work;
(a) lay down guidelines within which the Commission is to work;
(b) decide on the internal organisation of the Commission, ensuring that it acts consistently, efficiently and as a collegiate body;
(b) decide on the internal organisation of the Commission, ensuring that it acts consistently, efficiently and as a collegiate body;
(c) appoint Vice-Presidents, other than the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, from among the members of the Commission.
(c) appoint Vice-Presidents, other than the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, from among the members of the Commission.
A member of the Commission shall resign if the President so requests.
A member of the Commission shall resign if the President so requests.
Note that, in contrast to Article 217.4 TEC, the President will now not need the approval of the college in order to sack one of its members.
Note that, in contrast to Article 217.4 TEC, the President will now not need the approval of the college in order to sack one of its members.
The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall resign, in accordance with the procedure set out in Article I-28(1), if the President so requests.
The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall resign, in accordance with the procedure set out in Article I-28(1), if the President so requests.
The Constitution means that the European Parliament is enjoined to play a very much more important role in the initial choice of presidential candidate.
The Constitution means that the European Parliament is enjoined to play a very much more important role in the initial choice of presidential candidate.
The Commission President-designate who enjoys the early backing of the European Parliament should be better placed than Mr Barroso was to reject unsuitable nominations for the college from member states.
The Commission President-designate who enjoys the early backing of the European Parliament should be better placed than Mr Barroso was to reject unsuitable nominations for the college from member states.
If the prior consultation of the Parliament is to have any meaning, therefore, and on the assumption that, as now, the new Commission is destined to take office on 1 November, the new Parliament will have to establish its strategy with respect to the nomination in time for the late June European Council.
If the prior consultation of the Parliament is to have any meaning, therefore, and on the assumption that, as now, the new Commission is destined to take office on 1 November, the new Parliament will have to establish its strategy with respect to the nomination in time for the late June European Council.
Assuming no change to this end date, it would be wise to bring forward the elections by one month, to early May ('Europe Week'), in order to give it and the heads of government sufficient time to reflect on the best nomination for President of the Commission.
Assuming no change to this end date, it would be wise to bring forward the elections by one month, to early May ('Europe Week'), in order to give it and the heads of government sufficient time to reflect on the best nomination for President of the Commission.
A reversion to the original Commission start date of January would in any case require a change in primary law, viz.
A reversion to the original Commission start date of January would in any case require a change in primary law, viz.
Article 45 of the Final Act of the Conference on the Treaty on Enlargement, 2003.
Article 45 of the Final Act of the Conference on the Treaty on Enlargement, 2003.
The institutions will also have to plan for the contingency that MEPs reject the European Council's first candidate.
The institutions will also have to plan for the contingency that MEPs reject the European Council's first candidate.
And they should try to arrive at a more structured concept of what the three criteria imply: general competence, European commitment and indubitable independence.
And they should try to arrive at a more structured concept of what the three criteria imply: general competence, European commitment and indubitable independence.
The current approval procedure has been accepted not only by the Commission and the Parliament but also by the Council and the Member States.
The current approval procedure has been accepted not only by the Commission and the Parliament but also by the Council and the Member States.
It is an important exercise for the media.
It is an important exercise for the media.
It is a legitimate process with political consequences.
It is a legitimate process with political consequences.
As President Barroso has said, the approval process is far more rigorous than anything pertaining to the appointment of national governments.
As President Barroso has said, the approval process is far more rigorous than anything pertaining to the appointment of national governments.
Nevertheless, it is clear that there is room for considerable improvement in the procedures if we are to ensure in the future a greater degree of fairness between the candidates, a more robust dialogue between the Commission and the Parliament, and a sharper verdict.
Nevertheless, it is clear that there is room for considerable improvement in the procedures if we are to ensure in the future a greater degree of fairness between the candidates, a more robust dialogue between the Commission and the Parliament, and a sharper verdict.
In any case, some revision will be required to reflect the greater powers the Parliament will enjoy once the Constitution is in force.
In any case, some revision will be required to reflect the greater powers the Parliament will enjoy once the Constitution is in force.
The Constitutional Affairs Committee discussed a Working Document on which this Explanatory Memorandum is based on two occasions.
The Constitutional Affairs Committee discussed a Working Document on which this Explanatory Memorandum is based on two occasions.
Vice-President Wallström presented to the Committee the reactions of the Commission to their experience of the hearings process.
Vice-President Wallström presented to the Committee the reactions of the Commission to their experience of the hearings process.
The rapporteur also presented his findings to the Conference of Committee Chairs.
The rapporteur also presented his findings to the Conference of Committee Chairs.
The main conclusions of the rapporteur are reflected in the accompanying Resolution.
The main conclusions of the rapporteur are reflected in the accompanying Resolution.
Once the Parliament has taken its position on the report, it will be necessary to consider if, and if so how, the agreed changes should be reflected in revised Rules of Procedure.
Once the Parliament has taken its position on the report, it will be necessary to consider if, and if so how, the agreed changes should be reflected in revised Rules of Procedure.
Pravidla schvalování Evropské komise
Guidelines for the approval of the European Commission
AFCO 10.3.2005
AFCO 10.3.2005
Nezaujaté stanovisko Daum rozhodnutí
Not delivering opinion(s) Date of decision
Jiný(é) návrh(y) doporučení začleněný(é) do zprávy
Motion(s) for resolution(s) included in report
Andrew Duff 20.4.2005
Andrew Duff 20.4.2005
James Hugh Allister, Jens-Peter Bonde, Richard Corbett, Andrew Duff, Bronisław Geremek, Jo Leinen, Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, Borut Pahor, Rihards Pīks, Alexander Stubb, Riccardo Ventre, Johannes Voggenhuber
James Hugh Allister, Jens-Peter Bonde, Richard Corbett, Andrew Duff, Bronisław Geremek, Jo Leinen, Íñigo Méndez de Vigo, Borut Pahor, Rihards Pīks, Alexander Stubb, Riccardo Ventre, Johannes Voggenhuber
o zúčtování a vypořádaní v Evropské unii
on Clearing and settlement in the European Union
PE 353.491v03-00
PE 353.491v03-00
VYSVĚTLUJÍCÍ PROHLÁŠENÍ..............................................................................................11
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT..............................................................................................20
o zúčtování a vypořádání v Evropské unii
on Clearing and settlement in the European Union
– s ohledem na sdělení Komise ze dne 28. dubna 2004 nazvané „Zúčtování a vypořádání v Evropské unii – cesta vpřed“ ( KOM(2004)0312 ),
– having regard to the Commission's communication of 28 April 2004 entitled "Clearing and Settlement in the European Union - The way forward" ( COM(2004)0312 ),
– s ohledem na první a druhou zprávu Giovanniniho skupiny o struktuře přeshraničního zúčtování a vypořádání v EU, vydané v listopadu 2001 a v dubnu 2003,
– having regard to the first and second reports of the Giovannini Group on Cross Border Clearing and Settlement Arrangements in the EU, issued in November 2001 and April 2003 respectively,
– s ohledem na své usnesení ze dne 15. ledna 2003 o sdělení Komise Radě a Evropskému parlamentu nazvaném „Zúčtování a vypořádání v Evropské unii: hlavní otázky politiky a budoucí úkoly“
– having regard to its resolution of 15 January 2003 on the communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament entitled "Clearing and settlement in the European Union: main policy issues and future challenges"
– s ohledem na poradní a monitorovací expertní skupinu (skupina CESAME), kterou zřídila Komise a jejíž první schůzka se konala dne 16. července 2004,
– having regard to the establishment of the Clearing and Settlement Advisory and Monitoring Expert Group (“the CESAME Group”) by the Commission which held its first meeting on 16 July 2004,
– s ohledem na prohlášení čtyř po sobě následujících předsednictví EU – Irské republiky, Nizozemska, Lucemburska a Spojeného království ze dne 26. ledna 2004, v němž je zdůrazněn význam lisabonského procesu a potřeba zlepšit kvalitu regulace a posoudit jiné než legislativní možnosti,
– having regard to the declaration on 26 th January 2004 by the 4 successive EU presidencies of the Republic of Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom, which stressed the importance of the Lisbon process and the need to improve the quality of regulation and to consider alternatives to legislation,
– s ohledem na připomínky vznesené prezidentem Evropské centrální banky v průběhu diskuse v plénu dne 25. října 2004;
- having regard to the observations made by the President of the European Central Bank during the debate in plenary on 25 October 2004;
– s ohledem na zprávu Hospodářského a měnového výboru ( A6‑0180/2005 ),
– having regard to the report of its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs ( A6-0180/2005 ),
Vzhledem k tomu, že by Komise měla náležitě rozlišovat mezi službami po uskutečnění obchodu, v jejichž zajišťování mezi sebou soutěží tyto instituce:
Whereas the Commission should properly distinguish between the post-trade functions provided in competition by the following institutions:
a) centrální depozitáře cenných papírů (CSD), které vedou centrální evidenci a současně také zajišťují konečné (centrální) vypořádání.
(a) central securities depositories (CSDs), which combine central register and ultimate (central) settlement activities.
V určitých případech mohou rovněž provádět jiné než klíčové operace, např. netting, ve sdělení Komise popisovaný jako zúčtování (clearing).
They may also in certain cases provide non-core activities such as netting services, which are currently described by the Commission as clearing.
V některých případech rovněž zajišťují správu cenných papírů a bankovní služby;
In some instances, they also provide custody and banking services;
b) mezinárodní centrální depozitáře cenných papírů (ICSD), které provádějí dvojí činnost: (1) působí jako centrální depozitáře cenných papírů pro vypořádání obchodů s eurobondy (mezinárodně obchodovatelnými dluhopisy), a (2) provádějí rovněž globální správu cenných papírů, pro něž nefungují jako depozitáře.
(b) international central securities depositories (ICSDs), which perform two activities: (1) acting as CSDs for the settlement side of Eurobond transactions and (2) also performing global custodian activities on securities for which they are not acting as depositories.
Jako součást této globální správy zajišťují úvěrové programy a ostatní tripartitní služby; a
As part of these global custodian activities, ICSDs provide lending programme and other tri-party services; and
c) centrální protistrany (CCP), které poskytují centrální záruku a v mnoha případech provádějí nettingové operace (obojí je ve sdělení Komise definováno jako zúčtování).
(c) central counterparts (CCPs), which perform central guarantee and, in most cases, netting activities (both defined as clearing in the Commission's communication).
Protože základní poslání centrálních protistran spočívá v tom, že zastupují každou protistranu obchodu tak, že samy vstupují do transakcí, nesou rizika ze zastoupení spolu se členy svého zúčtovacího centra;
Since the essential mission of CCPs consists of replacing each counterparty to the trade by interposing themselves in the transactions, they concentrate replacement risks together with their Clearing Members;
d) banky spravující cenné papíry klientů, které nabízí služby zúčtovaní a vypořádání a mohou se podílet na poskytování služeb centrálních protistran jako členové zúčtovacího centra;
(d) custodian banks, which offer clearing and settlement services and which can participate in CCP services as Clearing Members.
1. vřele podporuje cíl stanovený ve sdělení Komise o efektivním, integrovaném a bezpečném trhu zúčtování a vypořádání cenných papírů v EU;
Warmly supports the goal set out in the Commission's communication of an efficient, integrated and safe market for clearing and settlement of securities in the EU;
2 Směrnice 2004/39/ES Evropského parlamentu a Rady ze dne 21. dubna 2004 o trhu s finančními nástroji a o investičních službách (Úř. věst L 145, 30.4.2004, s.1).
Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments (OJ L 145, 30.4.2004, p1).
2 (MiFid) a měla by se soustředit na (a) snížení nákladů na přeshraniční zúčtování a vypořádání, (b) zajištění řádného řízení a regulace každého systémového rizika při přeshraničním zúčtování a vypořádání, (c) podporu integrace zúčtování a vypořádání odstraněním deformací hospodářské soutěže a (d) odpovídající průhlednost a opatření v oblasti správy a řízení;
(MiFid) and focus on: (a) bringing down the cost of cross-border clearing and settlement; (b) ensuring that systemic or any other remaining risk in cross-border clearing and settlement is properly managed and regulated; (c) encouraging the integration of clearing and settlement by removing competitive distortions; and (d) ensuring proper transparency and governance arrangements,3.
3. domnívá se, že by měla platit obecná zásada, že právní předpisy Evropské unie by měly podléhat analýze nákladů a přínosů a že by se EU měla uchýlit k právní úpravě tam, kde existuje zřetelné riziko selhání trhu a kde je právní úprava tím nejúčinnějším a nejpřiměřenějším způsobem řešení jasně definovaných problémů;
Believes that, as a general principle, legislation by the EU should be subject to a cost-benefit analysis and that the EU should resort to legislation where there is clear risk of market failure and where legislation is an effective and proportionate way to remedy clearly identified problems; 4.
4. důrazně požaduje, aby jakákoli nová právní úprava v této oblasti nezdvojovala stávající právní úpravu pro konkrétní subjekty; upozorňuje, že je to zejména důležité v zájmu vyloučení duplicitní právní úpravy v sektoru bankovních a investičních služeb; upřednostňuje funkční přístup k regulaci, který zohledňuje odlišnou povahu rizika a konkurenční situaci různých subjektů a také úlohu centrálního depozitáře cenných papírů uznávanou většinou členských států;
Strongly asserts that any new regulation in this area should not duplicate existing regulation for specific entities; notes that this is particularly important in order to avoid double regulation of the banking and investment services sector; prefers a functional approach to regulation which takes into account different risk profiles and competitive situations of different entities as well as the role of CSDs recognised by most Member States; 5.
6. domnívá se, že nic nenasvědčuje tomu, že by na vnitrostátní úrovni byla regulace poskytovatelů služeb zúčtování a vypořádání špatná (i když je v rámci EU prováděna různým způsobem), nebo že by řízení jakýchkoli systémových rizik, které tyto služby představují, bylo nedostatečné; konstatuje, že existují rozsáhlá opatření k řízení provozních rizik (selhání systémů), které jsou příčinou systémových rizik, jimiž je zúčtování a vypořádání nejvíce ohroženo; upozorňuje však na potřebu ochrany před každým systémovým rizikem, ať již jde o provozní riziko nebo riziko týkající se likvidity, úvěrů atd.; poukazuje na to, že přirozená tendence služeb centrálního zúčtování a vypořádání ke koncentraci v důsledku síťových externalit, úspor z rozsahu a jiných faktorů nevyhnutelně povede ke koncentraci rizik, která jsou nyní rozptýlena do mnoha systémů vypořádání;
Sees no evidence that the providers of clearing and settlement services are poorly regulated at the national level, albeit in different ways across the EU, or that any systemic risk they pose is inadequately controlled; notes the arrangements in place to manage operational risk (systems breakdown) which is the source of systemic risk most relevant to clearing and settlement; draws attention however to the need to guard against any systemic risk whether it be operational, liquidity-related or credit-related; notes that the natural tendency of central clearing and settlement functions to concentrate due to the existence of network externalities, economies of scale and other factors will inevitably concentrate risks, which are today dispersed among many settlement systems;7.