natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
36. domnívá se, že by mělo být přezkoumáno snižování státní podpory regionům postiženým „statistickým dopadem“, pro něž rozšíření znamenalo relativní zvýšení příjmů, nedosáhly však skutečného růstu, ani konvergence a trpí vysokou mírou nezaměstnanosti;
Considers that there should be a review of the reductions in State aid to the "statistical effect" regions, which have benefited from a relative increase in income as a result of enlargement but which have not achieved real growth or convergence and which suffer a high unemployment rate;
38. podporuje Komisi, aby v souladu s lisabonskými a göteborgskými strategiemi důkladněji a podrobněji vyhodnotila různé druhy státní podpory a jejich účinnost tak, aby mohla stanovit, zda jsou některé formy podpory z hlediska trvalého, pozitivního vlivu, jež mohou mít na regionální rozvoj, výhodnější než jiné;
Encourages the Commission, in line with the Lisbon and Gothenburg strategies, to assess in greater depth and detail the different types of State aid and their effectiveness so that it can indicate whether certain forms of aid are more advantageous than others as regards any lasting, positive impact they may have on regional development;
40. domnívá se, že státní podpora na ochranu životního prostředí, je-li řádně a transparentně uplatňována, může při dosahování cíle udržitelného rozvoje v EU hrát zásadní roli; zejména podněcováním dlouhodobých investic do technologií a patentováním těchto technologií v EU v souladu s cílem stabilizovat emise skleníkových plynů stanoveným v rámcové úmluvě OSN o změně klimatu;
Considers that environmental State aid, where fair and transparent in its application, can play a crucial role in achieving the goal of sustainable development in the EU, particularly by stimulating investment in technology over the long term and its patenting of such technology in the EU, in line with the objective of stabilising greenhouse gas emissions laid down in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change;
odstavec 4.2.3. ;
Paragraph 4.2.3. ;
Lepší řízení
Better governance
45. důrazně podporuje myšlenku vytvoření užší sítě kontrolních orgánů v členských státech, jako jsou účetní dvory, která by usnadnila důslednost při uplatňování pravidel státní podpory;
Strongly supports the idea of forming a closer network of supervisory authorities, such as courts of auditors, in the Member States, which could facilitate the objective of consistency in the application of State aid rules;
48. vyjadřuje svou nespokojenost nad skutečností, že jsou sankce za neoznámení v současnosti prosazovány pouze vůči příjemcům a ne vůči členským státům; podporuje proto Komisi při hledání nových preventivních prostředků zaměřených na nesprávné uplatňování pravidel státní podpory členskými státy a vyzývá Komisi, aby v této věci zajistila vhodné sankce;
Expresses its discontent that sanctions for non-notification are currently enforced only against beneficiaries and not against Member States; supports the Commission, therefore, in exploring new deterrent mechanisms with a view addressing the incorrect implementation of the State aid rules by Member States, and invites the Commission to provide for appropriate sanctions in this regard;
In the perspective of the Lisbon process the European Union's competition policy is of crucial importance.
In the perspective of the Lisbon process the European Union's competition policy is of crucial importance.
European companies must be able to merge, invest and develop in order to strengthen and improve their competitiveness.
European companies must be able to merge, invest and develop in order to strengthen and improve their competitiveness.
It is essential that innovation and entrepreneurship are preconditions for companies' success.
It is essential that innovation and entrepreneurship are preconditions for companies' success.
It is also of utmost importance that new markets, new products and new services be developed in the European economy.
It is also of utmost importance that new markets, new products and new services be developed in the European economy.
Investments of this kind require more than anything else a level-playing field, where bigger companies aren't unduly favoured at the expense of smaller ones, where political decisions don’t favour any single company,.
Investments of this kind require more than anything else a level-playing field, where bigger companies aren't unduly favoured at the expense of smaller ones, where political decisions don’t favour any single company,.
In a dynamic a market economy, stable institutions foster equal conditions for newcomers as well as for traditional businesses, for entrepreneurs with the new ideas as well as for established companies launching traditional products.
In a dynamic a market economy, stable institutions foster equal conditions for newcomers as well as for traditional businesses, for entrepreneurs with the new ideas as well as for established companies launching traditional products.
It is inherent to successful business innovations that only very few companies manage to grasp and profit from real opportunities.
It is inherent to successful business innovations that only very few companies manage to grasp and profit from real opportunities.
New innovations that have changed markets and sometimes the world, like Tetra Pak, the light bulb, IKEA, Apple or Internet-services, had very rarely the backing of public institutions or political majorities.
New innovations that have changed markets and sometimes the world, like Tetra Pak, the light bulb, IKEA, Apple or Internet-services, had very rarely the backing of public institutions or political majorities.
This is even more striking regarding the knowledge- and information society.
This is even more striking regarding the knowledge- and information society.
We can see very few examples where new inventions have had broad political support.
We can see very few examples where new inventions have had broad political support.
More often the political interest has been focussed on already existing industries.
More often the political interest has been focussed on already existing industries.
The ship-yards of the seventies, the steel-industry and the airlines, not to mention the textile industry are some examples on how huge amounts of money have been invested in industries of the past, damaging thereby future growth and the emergence of new jobs.
The ship-yards of the seventies, the steel-industry and the airlines, not to mention the textile industry are some examples on how huge amounts of money have been invested in industries of the past, damaging thereby future growth and the emergence of new jobs.
State aid has a clear tendency to maintain uncompetitive industries with low wages.
State aid has a clear tendency to maintain uncompetitive industries with low wages.
In this respect State aid runs the risk of protecting old industries which will continuously need support.
In this respect State aid runs the risk of protecting old industries which will continuously need support.
A development like that would be contrary to the aims of the Lisbon process.
A development like that would be contrary to the aims of the Lisbon process.
In the end we would maintain low-competitive industries with low wages instead of fostering emerging new ones.
In the end we would maintain low-competitive industries with low wages instead of fostering emerging new ones.
There is no prosperity and social security in a Europe supporting its non-competitive sectors while underinvesting in its true competitiveness.
There is no prosperity and social security in a Europe supporting its non-competitive sectors while underinvesting in its true competitiveness.
The following rules are important in this respective:
The following rules are important in this respective:
· competitive industries do not need State aid,
· competitive industries do not need State aid,
· it is difficult for any public institution to define future business opportunities better than entrepreneurs continuously testing their products and services on the market itself,
· it is difficult for any public institution to define future business opportunities better than entrepreneurs continuously testing their products and services on the market itself,
· State aid tends to change the behaviour and management of subsidised companies, as they are more dependent on State aid than on the market which erodes their competitiveness,
· State aid tends to change the behaviour and management of subsidised companies, as they are more dependent on State aid than on the market which erodes their competitiveness,
· State aid tends to create a demand for new claims for support,
· State aid tends to create a demand for new claims for support,
· State aid finally has more often delayed change than supported it.
· State aid finally has more often delayed change than supported it.
The companies and the jobs of the future do rarely have advocates and interest groups supporting them and are never a political issue during election campaigns.
The companies and the jobs of the future do rarely have advocates and interest groups supporting them and are never a political issue during election campaigns.
The future business life has no trade unions, no employers' federations and no political interest groups that are standing up for them today but they should have the freedom of establishment, dynamic capital markets, and fair legislation on competition and State aid.
The future business life has no trade unions, no employers' federations and no political interest groups that are standing up for them today but they should have the freedom of establishment, dynamic capital markets, and fair legislation on competition and State aid.
It tends to change the balance between, not only companies, but also between different markets and Member States.
It tends to change the balance between, not only companies, but also between different markets and Member States.
Markets that are supported for political reasons have an advantage over other markets, regardless of whether the economy's future lies with ship-yards or computers.
Markets that are supported for political reasons have an advantage over other markets, regardless of whether the economy's future lies with ship-yards or computers.
Products and services that have this special treatment tend to defend their markets at the expense of other products and services.
Products and services that have this special treatment tend to defend their markets at the expense of other products and services.
Member States that are distributing State aid to their companies tend to give them an advantage at the cost of companies from other countries operating in the same market.
Member States that are distributing State aid to their companies tend to give them an advantage at the cost of companies from other countries operating in the same market.
The competitiveness of the European economy as a whole is the main looser with this approach.
The competitiveness of the European economy as a whole is the main looser with this approach.
State aid also does have the effect of hiding the real cost for consumers, and even increases costs.
State aid also does have the effect of hiding the real cost for consumers, and even increases costs.
State aid is financed by taxpayers, which means that other public spending is reduced or tax reductions in favour of jobs and companies are made impossible.
State aid is financed by taxpayers, which means that other public spending is reduced or tax reductions in favour of jobs and companies are made impossible.
It is from this perspective that your Rapporteur welcomes the Commissions road map for less but better targeted State aid.
It is from this perspective that your Rapporteur welcomes the Commissions road map for less but better targeted State aid.
It is important to state that the overriding goal is to reduce the total amount of State aid in the Union.
It is important to state that the overriding goal is to reduce the total amount of State aid in the Union.
It is also important to put the question of State aid in the perspective of other political measures, which can fulfil political ambitions better.
It is also important to put the question of State aid in the perspective of other political measures, which can fulfil political ambitions better.
It is important to achieve uniformity in the Member States bringing State aid to more or less the same level in all countries.
It is important to achieve uniformity in the Member States bringing State aid to more or less the same level in all countries.
It is crucial to compare State aid with the risk of State aid failure and government failure and not only with the so-called market failures.
It is crucial to compare State aid with the risk of State aid failure and government failure and not only with the so-called market failures.
State aid is normally motivated by the ambition to correct market failures, in order to improve the functioning of markets and thereby enhance European competitiveness.
State aid is normally motivated by the ambition to correct market failures, in order to improve the functioning of markets and thereby enhance European competitiveness.
State aid has also been motivated by the aim of influencing income- and wealth distribution within the EU (for example social and regional cohesion), even if such ambitions, in many cases, are in conflict with aspects like efficiency and competitiveness.
State aid has also been motivated by the aim of influencing income- and wealth distribution within the EU (for example social and regional cohesion), even if such ambitions, in many cases, are in conflict with aspects like efficiency and competitiveness.
In economic theory, when markets are allowed to function freely, market failures of various kinds may exist, which may in turn produce socially inefficient economic outcomes.
In economic theory, when markets are allowed to function freely, market failures of various kinds may exist, which may in turn produce socially inefficient economic outcomes.
The origin of market failures can be of various kinds:
The origin of market failures can be of various kinds:
Externalities imply that market agents can have negative or positive effects on other actors in the market that is not reflected in the pricing system.
Externalities imply that market agents can have negative or positive effects on other actors in the market that is not reflected in the pricing system.
It is not obvious whether such externalities should best be solved by a subsidy or a tax.
It is not obvious whether such externalities should best be solved by a subsidy or a tax.
Sometimes a negative externality, like pollution can be more efficiently solved by allowing emission trading rights.
Sometimes a negative externality, like pollution can be more efficiently solved by allowing emission trading rights.
Positive externalities, like education, generally lead to underinvestment in the activity.
Positive externalities, like education, generally lead to underinvestment in the activity.
A subsidy can in this case correct the problem, but care must be taken to avoid wasteful subsidies.
A subsidy can in this case correct the problem, but care must be taken to avoid wasteful subsidies.
Imperfect information is another market failure that might call for intervention if the imperfection needs to be removed.
Imperfect information is another market failure that might call for intervention if the imperfection needs to be removed.
In some cases this may call for subsidies, but in other cases a first-best solution would be to act against the malfunctioning banking system.
In some cases this may call for subsidies, but in other cases a first-best solution would be to act against the malfunctioning banking system.
Public goods is another market failure where a good or service can be beneficial to society, but the market cannot provide the service since it is impossible to exclude anyone from using the good and making them pay for it.
Public goods is another market failure where a good or service can be beneficial to society, but the market cannot provide the service since it is impossible to exclude anyone from using the good and making them pay for it.
Against this background the following principles can be laid out for the use of State aid:
Against this background the following principles can be laid out for the use of State aid:
· The EU should be very restrictive when using State aid.
· The EU should be very restrictive when using State aid.
It can in many cases be a fact that a subsidy is not the first best solution when curing a market failure .A subsidy is in many cases a second best solution when a market failure cannot be solved at its origin.
It can in many cases be a fact that a subsidy is not the first best solution when curing a market failure .A subsidy is in many cases a second best solution when a market failure cannot be solved at its origin.
Subsidies may have negative secondary effects when influencing market behaviour of various agents, besides the ones originally targeted.
Subsidies may have negative secondary effects when influencing market behaviour of various agents, besides the ones originally targeted.
· Since subsidies in many cases make the recipient of State aid dependent of the specific measure it should be made clear from the start that the subsidy is of a temporary character, limited in time.
· Since subsidies in many cases make the recipient of State aid dependent of the specific measure it should be made clear from the start that the subsidy is of a temporary character, limited in time.
A new decision has to be taken if it should be prolonged (similar to a "sun-set clause").
A new decision has to be taken if it should be prolonged (similar to a "sun-set clause").
· A subsidy should not be larger than the underlying market failure it is supposed to correct.
· A subsidy should not be larger than the underlying market failure it is supposed to correct.
All enterprises in the same sector should be permitted support, on equal terms.
All enterprises in the same sector should be permitted support, on equal terms.
· State aid must not give advantage to state-owned companies or public services operating on the market
· State aid must not give advantage to state-owned companies or public services operating on the market
· State aid must be general in its character, not favouring any special company or market solution
· State aid must be general in its character, not favouring any special company or market solution
· State aid shall be based on an analysis that it is the best way to go, and that the goals will be achieved.
· State aid shall be based on an analysis that it is the best way to go, and that the goals will be achieved.
The fact that so much of State aid has been counterproductive to its aims underlines the need to analyze State aid with the experience of State aid projects as a base.
The fact that so much of State aid has been counterproductive to its aims underlines the need to analyze State aid with the experience of State aid projects as a base.
· The Commission should take the initiative of a follow-up procedure, summarizing the effects of European State aid projects and present State aid activities.
· The Commission should take the initiative of a follow-up procedure, summarizing the effects of European State aid projects and present State aid activities.
· When State aid is applied there must be an added value that no other political measures can achieve and which is to the benefit of a region, the research and development sector, the environment or the economy as a whole.
· When State aid is applied there must be an added value that no other political measures can achieve and which is to the benefit of a region, the research and development sector, the environment or the economy as a whole.
· State aid should be given in a way that does not distort the market, hinders new entrepreneurs or favours specific companies.
· State aid should be given in a way that does not distort the market, hinders new entrepreneurs or favours specific companies.
· The Commission has to make a follow-up, ensuring that Member States do not increase State aid by using loopholes.
· The Commission has to make a follow-up, ensuring that Member States do not increase State aid by using loopholes.
Companies that receive State aid should present their figures in annual reports consolidating their received State aid in the EU in total.
Companies that receive State aid should present their figures in annual reports consolidating their received State aid in the EU in total.
Owners have a fair reason to be informed about how much of turnover and profits are dependant on State aid rules.
Owners have a fair reason to be informed about how much of turnover and profits are dependant on State aid rules.
Total State Aid as percentage of GDP
Total State Aid as percentage of GDP
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
EU (15 countries) 1.09 1.18 1.10 1.00 0.95 1.15 0.74 0.63 0.60 0.59 0.61 0.57
EU (15 countries) 1.09 1.18 1.10 1.00 0.95 1.15 0.74 0.63 0.60 0.59 0.61 0.57
Euro-zone 1.24 1.37 1.26 1.12 1.06 1.35 0.85 0.73 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.63
Euro-zone 1.24 1.37 1.26 1.12 1.06 1.35 0.85 0.73 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.63
Euro-zone (12 countries) 1.26 1.37 1.27 1.13 1.07 1.36 0.84 0.73 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.63
Euro-zone (12 countries) 1.26 1.37 1.27 1.13 1.07 1.36 0.84 0.73 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.63
Belgium 0.96 0.92 0.64 0.61 0.64 0.46 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.53 0.40
Belgium 0.96 0.92 0.64 0.61 0.64 0.46 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.52 0.53 0.40
Czech Republic : : : : : : : : 2.60 1.82 3.87 2.76
Czech Republic : : : : : : : : 2.60 1.82 3.87 2.76
Denmark 0.49 0.72 0.68 0.67 0.79 0.80 0.82 0.84 0.96 0.96 0.88 0.67
Denmark 0.49 0.72 0.68 0.67 0.79 0.80 0.82 0.84 0.96 0.96 0.88 0.67
Germany 1.64 2.02 1.87 1.40 1.17 1.02 0.90 0.89 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.77
Germany 1.64 2.02 1.87 1.40 1.17 1.02 0.90 0.89 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.77
Estonia : : : : : : : : 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.12
Estonia : : : : : : : : 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.12
Greece 2.23 1.34 1.31 1.58 1.36 1.41 0.73 0.59 0.70 0.60 0.41 0.40
Greece 2.23 1.34 1.31 1.58 1.36 1.41 0.73 0.59 0.70 0.60 0.41 0.40
Spain 0.68 0.76 0.85 1.07 0.89 0.84 0.83 0.65 0.80 0.76 0.69 0.54
Spain 0.68 0.76 0.85 1.07 0.89 0.84 0.83 0.65 0.80 0.76 0.69 0.54
France 0.82 0.96 0.96 0.82 1.03 2.76 0.82 0.65 0.60 0.56 0.60 0.57
France 0.82 0.96 0.96 0.82 1.03 2.76 0.82 0.65 0.60 0.56 0.60 0.57
Ireland 0.77 0.85 0.85 0.64 0.60 0.61 1.13 1.27 1.10 1.10 0.86 0.69
Ireland 0.77 0.85 0.85 0.64 0.60 0.61 1.13 1.27 1.10 1.10 0.86 0.69
Italy 1.71 1.54 1.23 1.26 1.24 1.02 0.86 0.54 0.48 0.49 0.55 0.54
Italy 1.71 1.54 1.23 1.26 1.24 1.02 0.86 0.54 0.48 0.49 0.55 0.54
Cyprus : : : : : : : : 2.65 3.08 3.30 2.36
Cyprus : : : : : : : : 2.65 3.08 3.30 2.36
Latvia : : : : : : : : 0.54 0.31 0.12 0.10
Latvia : : : : : : : : 0.54 0.31 0.12 0.10
Lithuania : : : : : : : : 0.33 0.11 0.39 0.13
Lithuania : : : : : : : : 0.33 0.11 0.39 0.13
Luxembourg 0.84 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.52 0.50 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.41 0.30
Luxembourg 0.84 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.52 0.50 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.41 0.30
Hungary : : : : : : : : 1.15 1.07 1.09 0.86
Hungary : : : : : : : : 1.15 1.07 1.09 0.86
Malta : : : : : : : : 3.29 4.01 4.28 :
Malta : : : : : : : : 3.29 4.01 4.28 :
Netherlands 0.41 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.44 0.67 0.47 0.57 0.51 0.41 0.45 0.33
Netherlands 0.41 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.44 0.67 0.47 0.57 0.51 0.41 0.45 0.33
Austria : : : 1.05 0.97 0.89 0.79 0.71 0.64 0.66 0.62 0.66
Austria : : : 1.05 0.97 0.89 0.79 0.71 0.64 0.66 0.62 0.66
Poland : : : : : : : : 0.98 0.84 0.71 2.76
Poland : : : : : : : : 0.98 0.84 0.71 2.76
Portugal 0.83 0.89 1.44 0.95 1.41 2.07 1.23 1.22 0.89 1.17 1.15 1.24
Portugal 0.83 0.89 1.44 0.95 1.41 2.07 1.23 1.22 0.89 1.17 1.15 1.24
Slovenia : : : : : : : : 0.83 0.86 0.49 0.58
Slovenia : : : : : : : : 0.83 0.86 0.49 0.58
Slovakia : : : : : : : : 0.64 0.59 0.36 0.46
Slovakia : : : : : : : : 0.64 0.59 0.36 0.46
Finland : : : 2.84 1.95 1.88 1.73 1.49 1.40 1.41 1.42 1.41
Finland : : : 2.84 1.95 1.88 1.73 1.49 1.40 1.41 1.42 1.41
Sweden : : : 0.45 0.43 0.39 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.60
Sweden : : : 0.45 0.43 0.39 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.60