natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It includes concentration, coherence, coordination, harmonisation, ownership by the beneficiaries and involvement of all stakeholders.
It includes concentration, coherence, coordination, harmonisation, ownership by the beneficiaries and involvement of all stakeholders.
The Commission seeks to move outside this framework and, in doing so, has greatly diluted the development focus of the Regulation.
The Commission seeks to move outside this framework and, in doing so, has greatly diluted the development focus of the Regulation.
There is a major imbalance between a desire on the part of the Commission for more flexibility at the level of micro-management (which is perfectly understandable) and the need for accountability and for an open and transparent democratic debate on the strategies and priorities of EU aid.
There is a major imbalance between a desire on the part of the Commission for more flexibility at the level of micro-management (which is perfectly understandable) and the need for accountability and for an open and transparent democratic debate on the strategies and priorities of EU aid.
Defending Parliament's democratic role and influence can and must be seen as a worthy objective in itself.
Defending Parliament's democratic role and influence can and must be seen as a worthy objective in itself.
It may also be necessary for achieving the modifications to the Commission package which Parliament deems necessary.
It may also be necessary for achieving the modifications to the Commission package which Parliament deems necessary.
Accountability to the elected representatives of EU citizens should not be abandoned for managerial and efficiency imperatives.
Accountability to the elected representatives of EU citizens should not be abandoned for managerial and efficiency imperatives.
A good balance between the two principles is feasible and must be struck.
A good balance between the two principles is feasible and must be struck.
The proposed regulation is so out of step with the development cooperation policies favoured by the European Parliament and is so inherently deleterious to Parliament’s powers as to be unamendable.
The proposed regulation is so out of step with the development cooperation policies favoured by the European Parliament and is so inherently deleterious to Parliament’s powers as to be unamendable.
It is consequently proposed that the Commission withdraw this draft regulation and replace it with forward-thinking proposals that would correspond to current thinking on development while respecting the powers and prerogatives of the European Parliament.
It is consequently proposed that the Commission withdraw this draft regulation and replace it with forward-thinking proposals that would correspond to current thinking on development while respecting the powers and prerogatives of the European Parliament.
As a starting point Parliament must insist that the Commission take account of its concerns, as set out in this report, in the drafting of proposals to replace the current draft regulation.
As a starting point Parliament must insist that the Commission take account of its concerns, as set out in this report, in the drafting of proposals to replace the current draft regulation.
pro Výbor pro rozvoj
for the Committee on Development
k návrhu nařízení Evropského parlamentu a Rady o zřízení nástroje pro financování rozvojové a hospodářské spolupráce
on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation
Po důkladném zvážení návrhu nařízení Komise o zřízení nástroje pro financování rozvojové a hospodářské spolupráce je navrhovatelka nucena dojít k závěru, že návrh je ve své současné podobě nepřijatelný.
After a careful consideration of the Commission's Proposal for a Regulation establishing a financing instrument for development co-operation and economic co-operation, the draftsman is forced to conclude that the proposal in its present form is unacceptable.
Mnoho myšlenek obsažených v návrhu Komise je značně zajímavých, a jestliže budou řádně provedeny, mohly by politice vnějších vztahů EU dodat novou dynamiku a poskytnout daleko konkrétnější výsledky.
A number of the ideas contained in the Commission proposal are of considerable interest and, if properly implemented, could grant a new dynamism and provide far more concrete results for the EU's external action policy, and as such they will deserve a proper debate at a later time.
Avšak v důsledku podstatného narušení pravomocí Parlamentu, které by z přijetí navrhovaného nástroje tak, jak stojí, vyplynulo, zpravodajka doporučuje, aby výbor hlasoval proti návrhu, konkrétně z těchto důvodů:
However, because of the substantial erosion of Parliament's powers that would result from the adoption of the proposed instrument as it stands, the rapporteur recommends that the committee vote against the proposal, specifically for the following reasons:
Komise navrhuje „nový rámec upravující plánování a provádění podpůrných činností…, aby byla zlepšena účinnost vnější podpory Společenství“, a za tímto účelem představuje několik nových finančních nástrojů.
The Commission is proposing "a new framework for planning and delivery assistance ..... in order to make the Community's external assistance more effective", and is presenting several new financial instruments to do this.
Je však zřejmé, že tato čtyři nová nařízení o vnějších finančních nástrojích musí být chápána jako součást balíčku a musí se k nim takto přistupovat.
It is clear, however, that the four new regulations on external financial instruments have to be seen and treated as part of a package.
Výbor pro zahraniční věci uznává význam racionalizovaného/konsolidovaného přístupu, aby bylo možné vnější pomoc lépe koordinovat.
The Committee on Foreign Affairs recognises the importance of having in place a rationalised/consolidated approach so that external assistance can be better co-ordinated.
Upozorňuje však také na skutečnost, že tyto nástroje tak, jak jsou navrhovány, by do značné míry narušily koncepční úlohu Parlamentu.
However, it also draws attention to the fact that the instruments, as proposed, would erode Parliament's policy-making role very considerably.
Výsledkem by bylo, že by Parlament již nemohl vykonávat svou demokratickou úlohu v koncepčním postupu přidělování finančních prostředků konkrétním programům.
The result would be that Parliament would no longer be able to exercise its democratic role in the policy-making procedure of allocating funding to specific programmes.
Je nutné, aby Evropský parlament mohl vykonávat pravomoci, které mu byly svěřeny podle smluv, a tedy aby mohl pro jakékoliv nové finanční nástroje zajistit větší legitimitu, demokratickou kontrolu a transparentnost.
It is imperative that the European Parliament be able to exercise the powers accorded it under the Treaties, thus providing any new financial instruments with enhanced legitimacy, democratic control and transparency.
Další – a hlavní – obava se týká toho, že nová nařízení jsou otevřená, pokud jde o načasování.
A further - and major - concern is that the new regulations are open-ended as regards timing.
Článek 26 posuzovaného navrhovaného nařízení (finanční nástroj pro rozvojovou spolupráci a hospodářskou spolupráci) odkazuje na možnost přezkoumání, ale je třeba upozornit, že se jedná pouze o možnost („Do 31. prosince 2011 předloží Komise Evropskému parlamentu a Radě návrhy o budoucnosti tohoto nařízení a v případě potřeby vhodné změny“).
Art. 26 of the proposed Regulation under examination here (the financing instrument for development co-operation and economic co-operation) refers to the possibility of a review, but it should be noted that this is only a possibility ("The Commission shall submit to the European Parliament and the Council by 31 December 2011 any proposals concerning the future of this Regulation and any amendments that may be necessary").
Je zapotřebí jasná specifikace pevně stanoveného období použitelnosti nařízení, aby se po jejím uplynutí Parlament mohl plně podílet na přezkoumání nástroje/nástrojů.
What is needed is a clear specification of a fixed period of application for the regulation so that, when it expires, Parliament will be able to participate fully in a review of the instrument(s).
Jelikož výše uvedené prvky jsou zřetelně zcela neuspokojivé, navrhuje Výbor pro zahraniční věci schválit stanovisko hlavního výboru, Výboru pro rozvoj, a doporučuje, aby Parlament návrh Komise zamítl.
As the above elements are clearly far from satisfactory, the Committee on Foreign Affairs proposes to endorse the position of the lead committee, the Committee on Development, and recommend that Parliament reject the Commission proposal.
Zároveň vyzývá Komisi, aby bez prodlení znovu posoudila celý „balíček“ a vzala plně v úvahu obavy Parlamentu.
At the same time, it calls on the Commission to re-examine the entire "package" without delay, and to take full account of Parliament's concerns.
Legislativní návrh
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
Výbor pro zahraniční věci doporučuje návrh Komise zamítnout.
The Committee on Foreign Affairs recommends that the Commission proposal be rejected.
Návrh nařízení Evropského parlamentu a Rady o zřízení nástroje pro financování rozvojové a hospodářské spolupráce
Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation
Vittorio Emanuele Agnoletto, Monika Beňová, André Brie, Elmar Brok, Paul Marie Coûteaux, Simon Coveney, Ryszard Czarnecki, Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos, Anna Elzbieta Fotyga, Maciej Marian Giertych, Ana Maria Gomes, Jelko Kacin, Bogdan Klich, Joost Lagendijk, Cecilia Malmström, Willy Meyer Pleite, Francisco José Millán Mon, Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck, Justas Vincas Paleckis, Tobias Pflüger, José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, György Schöpflin, Ursula Stenzel, István Szent-Iványi, Konrad Szymański, Charles Tannock, Jan Marinus Wiersma, Josef Zieleniec
Vittorio Emanuele Agnoletto, Monika Beňová, André Brie, Elmar Brok, Paul Marie Coûteaux, Simon Coveney, Ryszard Czarnecki, Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos, Anna Elzbieta Fotyga, Maciej Marian Giertych, Ana Maria Gomes, Jelko Kacin, Bogdan Klich, Joost Lagendijk, Cecilia Malmström, Willy Meyer Pleite, Francisco José Millán Mon, Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck, Justas Vincas Paleckis, Tobias Pflüger, José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, György Schöpflin, Ursula Stenzel, István Szent-Iványi, Konrad Szymański, Charles Tannock, Jan Marinus Wiersma, Josef Zieleniec
k návrhu nařízení Evropského parlamentu a Rady, kterým se zřizuje finanční nástroj pro rozvojovou a hospodářskou spolupráci
on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation
Po pečlivém zvážení návrhu nařízení Komise, kterým se zřizuje finanční nástroj pro rozvojovou a hospodářskou spolupráci, je navrhovatel nucen dojít k závěru, že v důsledku podstatného narušení pravomocí Parlamentu, ke kterému by došlo po přijetí navrženého nástroje, je návrh v současné podobě nepřijatelný.
After careful consideration of the Commission's Proposal for a Regulation establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation, the draftsman is forced to conclude that, because of the substantial erosion of Parliament's powers that would result from the adoption of the proposed instrument, the proposal in its present form is unacceptable.
I když navrhovatel vítá celkový cíl zjednodušit a racionalizovat legislativní nástroje týkající se vnější politiky, je přesvědčen, že nový návrh Komise vážně zasahuje do pravomocí vykonávaných v současné době Parlamentem ve shodě se smlouvami v rámci postupu spolurozhodování a každoročního rozpočtového procesu.
While welcoming the overall objective of simplifying and rationalising the legislative instruments relating to external policy, the draftsman believes that the new Commission proposal seriously impinges on the powers currently exercised by Parliament in conformity with the Treaties under the co-decision and the annual budgetary procedures.
Čtyři nové návrhy vnějších finančních nástrojů, které by podle logiky samotné Komise měly být chápány jako balíček, značně omezují úlohu Parlamentu.
The four new proposals on external financial instruments which, according to the very logic of the Commission, should be understood as a package, curb Parliament's role very considerably.
Nové nástroje ve své současné podobě brání Parlamentu vykonávat demokratickou úlohu v postupu vytváření politik týkajících se přidělování finančních prostředků konkrétním programům.
In their current form, the new instruments prevent Parliament from exercising its democratic role in the policy-making procedure of allocating funds to concrete programmes.
Navíc oproti dosavadní a standardní praxi jsou nová nařízení otevřená, a bránila by tedy Parlamentu podílet se na budoucím přezkoumání nástrojů.
Moreover, compared with past and standard practice, the new regulations are open-ended and would therefore prevent Parliament from participating in future reviews of the instruments.
Parlament by si měl zachovat možnost pravidelně plně spoluurčovat cíle, rozsah a metody různých nástrojů.
Parliament should maintain the possibility of fully co-determining, on a regular basis, the objectives, scope and methods to be employed by the different instruments.
Proto je zapotřebí pevně stanovit období uplatňování.
A fixed period of application is therefore needed.
Stručně řečeno, má-li být vnější pomoc Společenství účinnější, je nezbytně nutné, aby Evropský parlament mohl nadále vykonávat pravomoci, které mu byly uděleny smlouvami, čímž se novým finančním nástrojům dostane větší legitimity, demokratické kontroly a průhlednosti.
It is, in short, imperative that, in order to make the Community's external assistance more effective, the European Parliament continues to be able to exercise the powers that have been accorded to it by the Treaties, thus providing the new financial instruments with enhanced legitimacy, democratic control and transparency.
Ze všech těchto důvodů Výbor pro mezinárodní obchod navrhuje, aby byl návrh Komise zamítnut.
For all these reasons the Committee on International Trade proposes that the Commission proposal be rejected.
Výbor pro mezinárodní obchod vyzývá Komisi, aby spolu s Parlamentem bez prodlení podnikla příslušné kroky k předložení nového balíčku finančních nástrojů, který bude brát v úvahu zájmy Parlamentu.
The Committee on International Trade calls on the Commission to take, without delay, appropriate steps together with Parliament to submit a new package of financial instruments that takes into account Parliament's concerns.
LEGISLATIVNÍ NÁVRH
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
Výbor pro mezinárodní obchod doporučuje, aby byl návrh Komise zamítnut.
The Committee on International Trade recommends that the Commission proposal be rejected.
Návrh nařízení Evropského parlamentu a Rady o zřízení finančního nástroje pro rozvojovou a hospodářskou spolupráci
Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation
David Martin 16.11.2004
David Martin 16.11.2004
Daniel Caspary, Françoise Castex, Béla Glattfelder, Jacky Henin, Sajjad Karim, Caroline Lucas, Erika Mann, David Martin, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Georgios Papastamkos, Peter Šťastný, Robert Sturdy, Johan Van Hecke a Zbigniew Zaleski
Daniel Caspary, Françoise Castex, Béla Glattfelder, Jacky Henin, Sajjad Karim, Caroline Lucas, Erika Mann, David Martin, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Georgios Papastamkos, Peter Šťastný, Robert Sturdy, Johan Van Hecke and Zbigniew Zaleski
Jorgo Chatzimarkakis a Pierre Jonckheer
Jorgo Chatzimarkakis and Pierre Jonckheer
k návrhu nařízení Evropského parlamentu a Rady, kterým se zřizuje finanční nástroj pro rozvojovou a hospodářskou spolupráci
on the proposal for a regulation of the European parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation
The draftsman notes that the proposed Regulation is a piece of "enabling" legislation (concentrating very much on procedure and only referring to other documents where policy is actually formulated).
The draftsman notes that the proposed Regulation is a piece of "enabling" legislation (concentrating very much on procedure and only referring to other documents where policy is actually formulated).
The Parliament would seem to have little influence of the real policy formulation.
The Parliament would seem to have little influence of the real policy formulation.
The scope of the Regulation is large encompassing 16 current ones and ranging from poverty alleviation in Africa to trade promotion with industrialised countries.
The scope of the Regulation is large encompassing 16 current ones and ranging from poverty alleviation in Africa to trade promotion with industrialised countries.
From a point of view of parliamentary oversight, clear objectives and transparency the draftsman finds this doubtful although it will be for the lead committees to evaluate.
From a point of view of parliamentary oversight, clear objectives and transparency the draftsman finds this doubtful although it will be for the lead committees to evaluate.
The draftsman notes, however, that the proposal has been met with very grave concerns by the committees responsible in the external field.
The draftsman notes, however, that the proposal has been met with very grave concerns by the committees responsible in the external field.
The proposed Instrument would operate at four different levels:
The proposed Instrument would operate at four different levels:
· The Co-Decision Financial Framework proposed in Article 24 : EUR 44 229 million for 2007-2013 out of which EUR 23 572 for the ACP States (budgetization of the EDF).
· The Co-Decision Financial Framework proposed in Article 24 : EUR 44 229 million for 2007-2013 out of which EUR 23 572 for the ACP States (budgetization of the EDF).
This framework would replace the budgetary envelopes of 16 current regulations (some co-decisions and some not).
This framework would replace the budgetary envelopes of 16 current regulations (some co-decisions and some not).
· A "Strategic Level" at which geographical or thematic programmes will be drawn up (by the Commission in co-ordination with Member States) and under which Strategy Papers will be adopted.
· A "Strategic Level" at which geographical or thematic programmes will be drawn up (by the Commission in co-ordination with Member States) and under which Strategy Papers will be adopted.
· Multi-Annual Indicative Programmes (normally 3 years) setting the medium-term planning and the priority areas selected.
· Multi-Annual Indicative Programmes (normally 3 years) setting the medium-term planning and the priority areas selected.
These will set out the indicative financial allocations, overall and per priority area.
These will set out the indicative financial allocations, overall and per priority area.
· Annual Action Programmes based on the levels above.
· Annual Action Programmes based on the levels above.
These will specify in more detail the objectives and lay down the management procedures and the total amount of financing planned.
These will specify in more detail the objectives and lay down the management procedures and the total amount of financing planned.
Article 14 states that "Budget commitments shall be made on the basis of decisions taken by the Commissi o n in accordance with Articles 7(1), 8(1) and 11(2) ".
Article 14 states that "Budget commitments shall be made on the basis of decisions taken by the Commissi o n in accordance with Articles 7(1), 8(1) and 11(2) ".
This means in accordance with Strategy Papers (art.
This means in accordance with Strategy Papers (art.
7.1), multi-annual indicative programme s (art.8.1) and other support measures (art.
7.1), multi-annual indicative programme s (art.8.1) and other support measures (art.
The Parliament has no say in establishing these.
The Parliament has no say in establishing these.
The draftsman has noticed great concern among committees as to the influence the Parliament would have.
The draftsman has noticed great concern among committees as to the influence the Parliament would have.
At the same time, questions have surfaced as to whether the budgetary powers of Parliament could/should offset this perceived lack of influence over policy.
At the same time, questions have surfaced as to whether the budgetary powers of Parliament could/should offset this perceived lack of influence over policy.
The draftsman is not ready to proceed along those lines, as there are limits to what could reasonably be expected through the annual budget.
The draftsman is not ready to proceed along those lines, as there are limits to what could reasonably be expected through the annual budget.
For example, even if the Parliament where to adopt budget appropriations for a particular priority, there could be real problems of implementation if the Commission considered that it was not in line with the letter and objectives of the legal text.
For example, even if the Parliament where to adopt budget appropriations for a particular priority, there could be real problems of implementation if the Commission considered that it was not in line with the letter and objectives of the legal text.
This creates some serious problems of interpretation because, as mentioned before, the regulation itself is only of a framework nature and does not really contain the policy.
This creates some serious problems of interpretation because, as mentioned before, the regulation itself is only of a framework nature and does not really contain the policy.
The draftsman must conclude that it would be dangerous to simply hope to use the budgetary powers of Parliament as a "saviour" if there is a serious problem with the legal text as it is proposed.
The draftsman must conclude that it would be dangerous to simply hope to use the budgetary powers of Parliament as a "saviour" if there is a serious problem with the legal text as it is proposed.
Therefore, the lack of involvement of the Parliament in policy choices would lead the draftsman to support the lead committee's draft report recommending the rejection of the draft regulation, and asking the Commission to bring forward new proposals.
Therefore, the lack of involvement of the Parliament in policy choices would lead the draftsman to support the lead committee's draft report recommending the rejection of the draft regulation, and asking the Commission to bring forward new proposals.
Lastly, it should be recalled that the draft Constitution will confer new powers upon the European Parliament during the period covered by the next financial framework ; therefore is determined to reject any legal commitment which would undermine the Parliament’s legislative and budgetary prerogatives in future .
Lastly, it should be recalled that the draft Constitution will confer new powers upon the European Parliament during the period covered by the next financial framework ; therefore is determined to reject any legal commitment which would undermine the Parliament’s legislative and budgetary prerogatives in future .
Rozpočtový výbor doporučuje, aby byl návrh Komise zamítnut.
The Committee on Budgets recommends that the Commission proposal be rejected.
Návrh nařízení Evropského parlamentu a Rady o zřízení finančního nástroje pro rozvojovou a hospodářskou spolupráci
Proposal for a regulation of the European parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation
Reimer Böge, Den Dover, Bárbara Dührkop Dührkop, Markus Ferber, Salvador Garriga Polledo, Dariusz Maciej Grabowski, Catherine Guy-Quint, Anne Elisabet Jensen, Janusz Lewandowski, Jan Mulder, László Surján, Kyösti Tapio Virrankoski, Ralf Walter
Reimer Böge, Den Dover, Bárbara Dührkop Dührkop, Markus Ferber, Salvador Garriga Polledo, Dariusz Maciej Grabowski, Catherine Guy-Quint, Anne Elisabet Jensen, Janusz Lewandowski, Jan Mulder, László Surján, Kyösti Tapio Virrankoski, Ralf Walter
Členové přítomní při závěrečného hlasování
Members present for the final vote