natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
b) jakoukoli položku, která je půjčena, prodána nebo poskytnuta, nebo vypůjčena, nakoupena nebo obdržena v rámci transakcí, lze uznat jako uznatelný finanční kolaterál podle hlavy V kapitoly 2 oddílu 3 pododdílu 3 směrnice [2000/12/ES], aniž by se použil odstavec 8 této přílohy.
(b) any items lent, sold or provided, or borrowed, purchased or received under the transactions may be recognised as eligible financial collateral under Title V, Chapter 2, Section 3, Sub-section 3 of Directive [2000/12/EC] without the application of paragraph 8 of this Annex.
b) jakoukoli položku, která je vypůjčena, nakoupena nebo obdržena v rámci transakcí, lze uznat jako uznatelný finanční kolaterál podle hlavy V kapitoly 2 oddílu 3 pododdílu 3 směrnice [2000/12/ES], aniž by se použil odstavec 8 této přílohy.
(b) any items borrowed, purchased or received under the transactions may be recognised as eligible financial collateral under Title V, Chapter 2, Section 3, Subsection 3 of Directive [2000/12/EC] without the application of paragraph 8 of this Annex.
The rapporteur favours the amendment proposed by the Council for clarification.
The rapporteur favours the amendment proposed by the Council for clarification.
Příloha V bod 13 pododstavec 4
Annex V, paragraph 13, subparagraph 4
Pro podniky kolektivního investování se zohlední skutečné devizové pozice podniku kolektivního investování.
For CIUs the actual foreign exchange positions of the CIU shall be taken into account.
Instituce se mohou spolehnout na hlášení třetí strany o devizových pozicích v podniku kolektivního investování, je-li správnost tohoto hlášení náležitým způsobem zajištěna.
Institutions may rely on third party reporting of the foreign exchange position in the CIU, where the correctness of this report is adequately ensured.
Jestliže si instituce není vědoma devizových pozic v podniku kolektivního investování, předpokládá se, že podnik kolektivního investování v maximální možné míře povolené v rámci svého pověření investoval do devizových nástrojů, a instituce v případě pozic obchodního portfolia zohlední při výpočtu kapitálového požadavku k devizovému riziku maximální nepřímou expozici, které by mohly dosáhnout zaujmutím pozic s využitím pákového efektu prostřednictvím podniku kolektivního investování.
If an institution is not aware of the foreign exchange positions in a CIU, it shall be assumed that the CIU is invested up to the maximum extent allowed under the CIU’s mandate in foreign exchange and institutions shall, for trading book positions, take account of the maximum indirect exposure that they could achieve by taking leveraged positions through the CIU when calculating their capital requirement for foreign exchange risk.
Toto se uskuteční proporcionálním navýšením pozice v podniku kolektivního investování do úrovně maximální expozice vůči položkám podkladových investic plynoucím z investičního pověření.
This shall be done by proportionally increasing the position in the CIU up to the maximum exposure to the underlying investment items resulting from the investment mandate.
S předpokládanou pozicí podniku kolektivního investování v cizí měně se zachází jako se samostatnou měnou způsobem, jakým se zachází s investicemi ve zlatě.
The assumed position of the CIU in foreign exchange shall be treated as a separate currency according to the treatment of investments in gold.
Jestliže je však směr investic podniku kolektivního investování znám, celkovou dlouhou pozici lze přičíst k celkové dlouhé otevřené devizové pozici a celkovou krátkou pozici lze přičíst k celkové krátké otevřené devizové pozici.
If, however, the direction of the CIU’s investment is available, the total long position may be added to that the total long open foreign exchange position and the total short position may be added to the total short open foreign exchange position.
Započtení mezi takovými pozicemi před výpočtem není přípustné.
There would be no netting allowed between such positions prior to the calculation .
Jestliže si instituce není vědoma devizových pozic v podniku kolektivního investování, měla by být taková pozice izolována a mělo by se s ní zacházet v souladu s přílohou III odst.
If an institution is not aware of the foreign exchange positions in a CIU.
b) jasné a nezávislé (tzn. nezávislé na front office) linie podávání hlášení pro útvar odpovědný za postup ocenění.
(b) clear and independent (i.e. independent of front office) reporting lines for the department accountable for the valuation process.
b) jasné linie podávání hlášení pro útvar odpovědný za postup ověření.
(b) clear reporting lines for the department accountable for the verification process.
The core concept is that a clear and robust verification process should exist.
The core concept is that a clear and robust verification process should exist.
The requirement to demonstrate independence may compromise the ability of traders to function, without enhancing the risk management of the environment.
The requirement to demonstrate independence may compromise the ability of traders to function, without enhancing the risk management of the environment.
Příloha VII část B bod 6 písm. b)
Annex VII, Part B, paragraph 6, point (b)
b) tržní vstupy jsou získávány tam, kde je to možné, v souladu s tržními cenami a přiměřenost tržních vstupů vzhledem k oceňování příslušné pozice a parametry modelu jsou posuzovány každodenně ;
(b) market inputs shall be sourced, where possible, in line with market prices, and the appropriateness of the market inputs of the particular position being valued and the parameters of the model shall be assessed on a daily basis;
b) tržní vstupy jsou získávány tam, kde je to možné, v souladu s tržními cenami a přiměřenost tržních vstupů vzhledem k oceňování příslušné pozice a parametry modelu jsou posuzovány často ;
(b) market inputs shall be sourced, where possible, in line with market prices, and the appropriateness of the market inputs of the particular position being valued and the parameters of the model shall be assessed on a frequent basis;
On the basis of the document 'International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework' (Basel II) published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision on 26 June 2004, on 14 July 2004 the Commission presented a proposal for a directive recasting Directives 2000/12 EC and 93/6/EEC on own funds.
On the basis of the document 'International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework' (Basel II) published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision on 26 June 2004, on 14 July 2004 the Commission presented a proposal for a directive recasting Directives 2000/12 EC and 93/6/EEC on own funds.
On 9 July 2003 the European Parliament had presented an own-initiative report in connection with the Commission's third discussion paper on capital requirements for credit institutions and investment firms.
On 9 July 2003 the European Parliament had presented an own-initiative report in connection with the Commission's third discussion paper on capital requirements for credit institutions and investment firms.
The current European rules are based on the Basel Capital Accord of 1988 (Basel I).
The current European rules are based on the Basel Capital Accord of 1988 (Basel I).
It emerged over time that there was an increasing divergence, in terms of both scale and composition, between the capital required by supervisors, i.e. regulatory capital, and economic capital, i.e. the capital held internally by banks which is actually regarded as necessary to cover risks.
It emerged over time that there was an increasing divergence, in terms of both scale and composition, between the capital required by supervisors, i.e. regulatory capital, and economic capital, i.e. the capital held internally by banks which is actually regarded as necessary to cover risks.
The following reasons are advanced for this:
The following reasons are advanced for this:
· The current blanket underpinning of risk assets permits only limited differentiation in the consideration of capital requirements.
· The current blanket underpinning of risk assets permits only limited differentiation in the consideration of capital requirements.
· The rules currently do not require capital underpinning for what is known as operational risk, although this is a significant risk factor.
· The rules currently do not require capital underpinning for what is known as operational risk, although this is a significant risk factor.
· It is almost impossible to take new financial instruments and methods for managing credit risk into account in the current framework.
· It is almost impossible to take new financial instruments and methods for managing credit risk into account in the current framework.
· In some areas, e.g. securitisations, capital arbitrage takes place, i.e. preference is given to types of business for which, in relation to other business entailing risks, regulatory capital requirements are too low or do not exist at all.
· In some areas, e.g. securitisations, capital arbitrage takes place, i.e. preference is given to types of business for which, in relation to other business entailing risks, regulatory capital requirements are too low or do not exist at all.
Purpose and structure of the new provisions on own funds
Purpose and structure of the new provisions on own funds
The Commission proposal recasting Directives 2000/12/EC and 93/6/EEC envisages setting regulatory capital requirements so that they are more dependent on the credit risk run, and taking more recent developments on the financial markets and in institutions' risk management practices into account, in order to achieve increased convergence between economic and regulatory capital.
The Commission proposal recasting Directives 2000/12/EC and 93/6/EEC envisages setting regulatory capital requirements so that they are more dependent on the credit risk run, and taking more recent developments on the financial markets and in institutions' risk management practices into account, in order to achieve increased convergence between economic and regulatory capital.
In addition, with regard to capital requirements, for the first time operational risks are to be taken into account in addition to credit (and market) risks, and provisions on securitisations and credit risk mitigation techniques also feature.
In addition, with regard to capital requirements, for the first time operational risks are to be taken into account in addition to credit (and market) risks, and provisions on securitisations and credit risk mitigation techniques also feature.
As is the case at present both directives will be bindingly applicable to all credit institutions and investment firms, irrespective of their size, in the interests of the internal market and in order to prevent distortions of competition.
As is the case at present both directives will be bindingly applicable to all credit institutions and investment firms, irrespective of their size, in the interests of the internal market and in order to prevent distortions of competition.
A degree of national discretion is proposed, in order to take account of the structural differences in the financial markets of the 25 EU Member States and of the different sizes of the various institutions.
A degree of national discretion is proposed, in order to take account of the structural differences in the financial markets of the 25 EU Member States and of the different sizes of the various institutions.
Derogations are also provided for with regard to investment firms.
Derogations are also provided for with regard to investment firms.
The proposal for a directive adopts the three-pillar model envisaged in the Basel Framework Agreement.
The proposal for a directive adopts the three-pillar model envisaged in the Basel Framework Agreement.
The key element of the provisions is constituted by the quantitative minimum capital requirements defined in what is known as the First Pillar.
The key element of the provisions is constituted by the quantitative minimum capital requirements defined in what is known as the First Pillar.
A range of procedures of varying complexity can be chosen from here for measuring credit risk (Standardised Approach, Foundation and Advanced IRB (internal ratings-based) Approach) and operational risk (Basic Indicator Approach, Standardised Approach, Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA)).
A range of procedures of varying complexity can be chosen from here for measuring credit risk (Standardised Approach, Foundation and Advanced IRB (internal ratings-based) Approach) and operational risk (Basic Indicator Approach, Standardised Approach, Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA)).
This 'evolutionary plan' is intended to ensure that the new capital requirements will not make excessive demands on smaller institutions, and that at the same time they will have the incentive and the opportunity to move in stages to more risk-sensitive procedures and thus continue to bring regulatory capital closer to economic capital.
This 'evolutionary plan' is intended to ensure that the new capital requirements will not make excessive demands on smaller institutions, and that at the same time they will have the incentive and the opportunity to move in stages to more risk-sensitive procedures and thus continue to bring regulatory capital closer to economic capital.
In addition to the quantitative measurement procedures in the First Pillar, which are regarded as being inadequate by themselves to guarantee bank solvency, there is to be enhanced qualitative banking supervision (what is known as Pillar II) and market discipline will be tightened by the provisions laid down in Pillar III.
In addition to the quantitative measurement procedures in the First Pillar, which are regarded as being inadequate by themselves to guarantee bank solvency, there is to be enhanced qualitative banking supervision (what is known as Pillar II) and market discipline will be tightened by the provisions laid down in Pillar III.
Points for discussion
Points for discussion
Unlike the European directive on own funds, which is binding on all banks and investment firms in the European Union, the Basel Framework Agreement is a non-binding recommendation for all banks which operate internationally.
Unlike the European directive on own funds, which is binding on all banks and investment firms in the European Union, the Basel Framework Agreement is a non-binding recommendation for all banks which operate internationally.
The aim is therefore not to jeopardise the international and European competitiveness of European groups which have cross-border operations.
The aim is therefore not to jeopardise the international and European competitiveness of European groups which have cross-border operations.
In this connection, however, fair competition at national level also has to be borne in mind.
In this connection, however, fair competition at national level also has to be borne in mind.
Different structures have to be taken into account here; there must be no preferential treatment of certain groups.
Different structures have to be taken into account here; there must be no preferential treatment of certain groups.
In addition, at national level smaller institutions, in particular, which opt for the Standardised Approach fear disadvantages with regard to the recognition of loan collateral and high implementation costs relative to their size.
In addition, at national level smaller institutions, in particular, which opt for the Standardised Approach fear disadvantages with regard to the recognition of loan collateral and high implementation costs relative to their size.
At European level the large number of cases (nearly 150) in which national discretion is permitted gives cause for concern.
At European level the large number of cases (nearly 150) in which national discretion is permitted gives cause for concern.
On the other hand, it is in the interest of the vast majority of banks for the new rules to be implemented promptly.
On the other hand, it is in the interest of the vast majority of banks for the new rules to be implemented promptly.
Corporate borrowers, especially small and medium-sized firms, demand appropriate transparency in the banks' ratings process.
Corporate borrowers, especially small and medium-sized firms, demand appropriate transparency in the banks' ratings process.
The most contentious points at issue are indicated below.
The most contentious points at issue are indicated below.
The Commission has opted for an approach which diverges from Basel II where the scope of the provisions on own funds are concerned.
The Commission has opted for an approach which diverges from Basel II where the scope of the provisions on own funds are concerned.
The Basel Framework Agreement basically envisages application on a consolidated (group) basis for banks operating internationally.
The Basel Framework Agreement basically envisages application on a consolidated (group) basis for banks operating internationally.
In addition, sub-consolidation must take place, i.e. the Framework Agreement must also be applied at each level within a banking group on a fully consolidated basis.
In addition, sub-consolidation must take place, i.e. the Framework Agreement must also be applied at each level within a banking group on a fully consolidated basis.
To ensure investor protection the supervisory authorities are also required to examine whether the individual banks within a banking group also have sufficient capital by themselves.
To ensure investor protection the supervisory authorities are also required to examine whether the individual banks within a banking group also have sufficient capital by themselves.
The Commission proposal basically envisages single-institution supervision (Article 68(1) of the Directive [2000/12/EC]).
The Commission proposal basically envisages single-institution supervision (Article 68(1) of the Directive [2000/12/EC]).
Furthermore, Article 69 provides for the possibility that national supervision of subsidiary credit institutions within a banking group may result in single-institution supervision being waived if certain requirements are met, in which case the capital of the domestic subsidiaries may be held at the level of the group parent.
Furthermore, Article 69 provides for the possibility that national supervision of subsidiary credit institutions within a banking group may result in single-institution supervision being waived if certain requirements are met, in which case the capital of the domestic subsidiaries may be held at the level of the group parent.
While some call for the provisions to be applied across the board where the requirements laid down in Article 69 are met (abolition of discretion) and for the rules to be extended to European subsidiaries, others take a generally critical view, on grounds of risk, of the possibility of capital being held only at group level, and doubt whether an extension to European subsidiaries would be compatible with the Basel requirements, since in this case neither the single-institution supervision basically regarded in the European Union as being necessary nor the sub-consolidation and scrutiny at individual level envisaged in Basel II for banks 'operating internationally' would be effective.
While some call for the provisions to be applied across the board where the requirements laid down in Article 69 are met (abolition of discretion) and for the rules to be extended to European subsidiaries, others take a generally critical view, on grounds of risk, of the possibility of capital being held only at group level, and doubt whether an extension to European subsidiaries would be compatible with the Basel requirements, since in this case neither the single-institution supervision basically regarded in the European Union as being necessary nor the sub-consolidation and scrutiny at individual level envisaged in Basel II for banks 'operating internationally' would be effective.
The rapporteur takes the view that if the stringent requirements, in particular with regard to short-term transferability of own funds, are met the abolition of discretion should be considered, since this would enable a potential distortion of competition within the European Union to be avoided.
The rapporteur takes the view that if the stringent requirements, in particular with regard to short-term transferability of own funds, are met the abolition of discretion should be considered, since this would enable a potential distortion of competition within the European Union to be avoided.
However, in the light of the progress of EU integration a revision clause, whereby the preconditions for the extension of Article 69 are to be reviewed by the Commission after a certain period, is desirable.
However, in the light of the progress of EU integration a revision clause, whereby the preconditions for the extension of Article 69 are to be reviewed by the Commission after a certain period, is desirable.
Treatment of internal group lending
Treatment of internal group lending
The treatment of internal group lending, i.e. lending relationships between the parent company and subsidiaries, and between subsidiaries in the same group, laid down in Article 80(7) is also controversial.
The treatment of internal group lending, i.e. lending relationships between the parent company and subsidiaries, and between subsidiaries in the same group, laid down in Article 80(7) is also controversial.
The proposal for a directive provides that, at the discretion of the national authorities, domestic internal group lending may be assigned a risk weight of 0% provided that a banking group is concerned, the subsidiary is covered by full consolidation and there is central risk management.
The proposal for a directive provides that, at the discretion of the national authorities, domestic internal group lending may be assigned a risk weight of 0% provided that a banking group is concerned, the subsidiary is covered by full consolidation and there is central risk management.
Some, including the ECB, consider a zero weighting for internal group lending as generally inadequate in terms of risk assessment, and therefore unreliable.
Some, including the ECB, consider a zero weighting for internal group lending as generally inadequate in terms of risk assessment, and therefore unreliable.
Others point out that zero weighting of internal group lending is actually already possible, and is already used in some Member States without being condemned.
Others point out that zero weighting of internal group lending is actually already possible, and is already used in some Member States without being condemned.
In the interest of the internal market an extension of this rule to internal group lending throughout Europe should be undertaken.
In the interest of the internal market an extension of this rule to internal group lending throughout Europe should be undertaken.
There is also disagreement about the issue of the criteria which should be used for granting this privilege.
There is also disagreement about the issue of the criteria which should be used for granting this privilege.
The decisive factor here should be the risk profile.
The decisive factor here should be the risk profile.
The rapporteur takes the view that the principle should be that of treating the same risks in the same way, and that this should be a matter for the judgment of the national supervisor.
The rapporteur takes the view that the principle should be that of treating the same risks in the same way, and that this should be a matter for the judgment of the national supervisor.
Here again, in view of the current degree of integration of the European financial markets and of the legal framework a critical view should be taken of the possible extension of the rule to EU subsidiaries; however, a review of circumstances in five years' time is advocated.
Here again, in view of the current degree of integration of the European financial markets and of the legal framework a critical view should be taken of the possible extension of the rule to EU subsidiaries; however, a review of circumstances in five years' time is advocated.