natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Zpravodaj často uvádí, že by spojení mezi těmito dvěma faktory mělo být silným bodem jednání.
The rapporteur has often mentioned that the link between the two should be a strong point for the negotiations.
Byl prokázán nedostatek prostředků posledního kompromisního návrhu Rady.
The shortage of appropriations of the Council's last compromise is put in evidence.
ERF by měl být začleněn do rozpočtu: v rámci interinstitucionální dohody budou navrženy některé nástroje, které poskytnou EP více pravomocí (kontroly) nad plněním.
The EDF should be budgetised: some instruments giving more power (control) to the EP on implementation will be proposed for the Inter-institutional Agreement.
Parlament zdůraznil, že snížení počtu nástrojů pro vnější opatření ze 38 na 4 ve spojení s tím, že Ústava nevstoupila v platnost, což by rozšířilo pravomoci EP v této oblasti, není přijatelné.
Parliament has emphasised that the reduction of the number of instruments for external actions from 38 to 4 combined with the non-entry into force of the Constitution, which would extend EP's powers in this area, is not acceptable.
Zpravodaj často zdůrazňoval, že je třeba určité ustanovení umožňující vrácení k přepracování a interinstitucionální dohoda, aby bylo nové uvedení vnějších nástrojů pro EP přijatelné.
The rapporteur has often raised the need for a sort of call-back clause and an Inter-institutional Agreement to make the new presentation of external instruments acceptable for EP.
Postoj při jednáních by mohl být tento: „více peněz, více pravomocí“.
The negotiating position could be: 'more money, more power'.
Návrhy Komise by mohly být v několika málo aspektech považovány za pozitivní krok směrem k postoji Evropského parlamentu při jednáních, zejména pokud jde o potřebu pružnosti, přepracování práv EP v oblasti vnějších programů a zajištění těchto práv, přestože stále zaostávají za návrhy EP.
The Commission proposals could be considered as a positive move towards the European Parliament's negotiating position on a limitative number of aspects, notably, the need for flexibility, for revision and for ensuring EP's rights over external programmes, although they still trail behind that of the EP.
Nejsou zohledněny různé rezervy pružnosti na pokrytí nepředpokládaných potřeb, ani kvalitativní podmínky navržené Parlamentem (odst.
They are not taking into account the different flexibility reserves for covering unforeseen needs nor of the qualitative conditions proposed by Parliament (par.
46 a 50, viz. příloha) jako je finanční nařízení, zjednodušení administrativního zatížení, certifikace poskytovaná členskými státy, zjednodušení nových nástrojů financování a spolufinancování.
46 and 50, see annex) such as the Financial Regulation, simplification of administrative burden, certification by Member States, simplification of the new instruments of financing and co-financing.
Zpravodaj připomíná, že tyto prvky tvoří naprosto nedílnou část celkové dohody o finančním výhledu/interinstitucionální dohodě.
The rapporteur recalls that these elements are a non-negotiable part of the overall agreement on the Financial Perspective/Inter-institutional Agreement.
Zpravodaj lituje, že doposud nebylo možné zahájit jednání o částkách a ustanoveních interinstitucionální dohody, což zajisté neusnadní dohodu s Evropským parlamentem.
The rapporteur regrets that until now it has been impossible to open the negotiations on figures and the provisions of the IIA which will certainly not facilitate the agreement with the European Parliament.
Jak Komise tak Rada by si měly být vědomy toho, že není možné dosáhnout dohody o příštím finančním výhledu/interinstitucionální dohodě bez dohody s Evropským parlamentem a že dohoda s EP bude záviset na jeho dohodě o interinstitucionální dohodě, která by měla vzít v potaz také kvalitativní prvky.
Both the Commission and the Council should be aware that there can be no agreement on the next FP/IIA without agreement with the European Parliament, and that EP agreement will be conditional on its agreement on the IIA, which should take on board qualitative elements as well.
Zpravodaj se již zmínil o tom, že by Komise mohla navrhnout přepracovanou verzi interinstitucionální dohody, aby tak usnadnila jednání.
The rapporteur already mentioned that the Commission could propose a revised version of the IIA to facilitate the negotiations.
European Parliament resolution on Policy Challenges and Budgetary Means of the enlarged Union 2007-2013 ( 2004/2209(INI) ) of 8 June 2005
European Parliament resolution on Policy Challenges and Budgetary Means of the enlarged Union 2007-2013 ( 2004/2209(INI) ) of 8 June 2005
Stresses that the principle of creating reserves for flexibility is a non-negotiable part of the overall agreement on the financial framework; considers that the level of flexibility should be closely linked to the global ceiling of the financial framework and that the amounts devoted to unforeseen needs should:
Stresses that the principle of creating reserves for flexibility is a non-negotiable part of the overall agreement on the financial framework; considers that the level of flexibility should be closely linked to the global ceiling of the financial framework and that the amounts devoted to unforeseen needs should:
- be placed outside the financial framework,
- be placed outside the financial framework,
- be mobilised pursuant to a Commission proposal by a decision of the budgetary authority,
- be mobilised pursuant to a Commission proposal by a decision of the budgetary authority,
- be financed:
- be financed:
· through re-programming within the headings,
· through re-programming within the headings,
· through the redeployment of unused appropriations within and across headings,
· through the redeployment of unused appropriations within and across headings,
· through new appropriations in the event that the first two means are insufficient;
· through new appropriations in the event that the first two means are insufficient;
Asks that in the event of new appropriations, the funds should be called from Members States only after the decision has been taken, reducing to an absolute minimum the burden for taxpayers; proposes that the budgetary authority should agree on a simplified procedure to speed up the implementation of each decision;
Asks that in the event of new appropriations, the funds should be called from Members States only after the decision has been taken, reducing to an absolute minimum the burden for taxpayers; proposes that the budgetary authority should agree on a simplified procedure to speed up the implementation of each decision;
Considers that this overall flexibility should represent 0.03% of GNI (in line with point 20 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 6 May 1999) and should be used for attainment of the following objectives:
Considers that this overall flexibility should represent 0.03% of GNI (in line with point 20 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 6 May 1999) and should be used for attainment of the following objectives:
- Reserve for competitiveness (up to a maximum of EUR 7 billion):
- Reserve for competitiveness (up to a maximum of EUR 7 billion):
new instrument replacing the Growth Adjustment Fund, proposed by the Commission, to be mobilised to boost growth and competitiveness and to allow the Union to react to economic changes;
new instrument replacing the Growth Adjustment Fund, proposed by the Commission, to be mobilised to boost growth and competitiveness and to allow the Union to react to economic changes;
- Reserve for cohesion (up to a maximum of EUR 3 billion):
- Reserve for cohesion (up to a maximum of EUR 3 billion):
new instrument aiming to develop a mechanism to be mobilised to react to economic shocks and abrupt changes in EU regions and Member States eligible under Heading 1b) even through the reprogramming of unused appropriations;
new instrument aiming to develop a mechanism to be mobilised to react to economic shocks and abrupt changes in EU regions and Member States eligible under Heading 1b) even through the reprogramming of unused appropriations;
- Reserve: Emergency Aid (up to a maximum of EUR 1.5 billion):
- Reserve: Emergency Aid (up to a maximum of EUR 1.5 billion):
existing instrument to be placed outside the Financial Perspective;
existing instrument to be placed outside the Financial Perspective;
- Reserve: Solidarity Fund (up to a maximum of EUR 6.2 billion)
- Reserve: Solidarity Fund (up to a maximum of EUR 6.2 billion)
existing instrument that is already outside the Financial Perspective and that the Commission proposes to budget under the ceiling;
existing instrument that is already outside the Financial Perspective and that the Commission proposes to budget under the ceiling;
- Reserve for loans guarantee (up to a maximum of EUR 3.0 billion):
- Reserve for loans guarantee (up to a maximum of EUR 3.0 billion):
part of this reserve existed under Heading 4; the principle should be extended to guarantee the financing of transport and infrastructure projects; this instrument should be placed outside the Financial Perspective;
part of this reserve existed under Heading 4; the principle should be extended to guarantee the financing of transport and infrastructure projects; this instrument should be placed outside the Financial Perspective;
- Reserve for flexibility (up to a maximum of EUR 3.5 billion):
- Reserve for flexibility (up to a maximum of EUR 3.5 billion):
existing instrument already placed outside the Financial Perspective and with an increased amount of EUR 500 million;
existing instrument already placed outside the Financial Perspective and with an increased amount of EUR 500 million;
Believes that the negotiations should not only focus on percentages and figures but should also introduce other elements such as the principles of equity and gradualness which are fundamental to the EU, with a view to striking a balance which can meet the expectations of both Member States and citizens; calls on the Commission and the Council to consider these elements as sine qua non conditions for reaching an agreement with the European Parliament; states in this regard that it:
Believes that the negotiations should not only focus on percentages and figures but should also introduce other elements such as the principles of equity and gradualness which are fundamental to the EU, with a view to striking a balance which can meet the expectations of both Member States and citizens; calls on the Commission and the Council to consider these elements as sine qua non conditions for reaching an agreement with the European Parliament; states in this regard that it:
- Aspects linked to the Constitution:
- Aspects linked to the Constitution:
is determined to reject any legal commitment which would have a negative binding effect once the Constitution is in force; therefore urges the Council and the Commission to conclude a gentleman's agreement to safeguard the legislative powers of Parliament and to introduce a revision clause for legislative acts for which the procedure will change with the entry into force of the Constitution, increasing the role of the European Parliament; urges the Commission and the Council to agree on such a commitment in the next Interinstitutional Agreement,
is determined to reject any legal commitment which would have a negative binding effect once the Constitution is in force; therefore urges the Council and the Commission to conclude a gentleman's agreement to safeguard the legislative powers of Parliament and to introduce a revision clause for legislative acts for which the procedure will change with the entry into force of the Constitution, increasing the role of the European Parliament; urges the Commission and the Council to agree on such a commitment in the next Interinstitutional Agreement,
- Financial Regulation:
- Financial Regulation:
is convinced that the principles of sound management contained in the Financial Regulation and its implementing rules need to be reviewed to facilitate implementation and accelerate repayments (or reimbursements) to Member States; urges the Commission and the Council to agree on a recasting of the provisions which must facilitate implementation and simplify procedures,
is convinced that the principles of sound management contained in the Financial Regulation and its implementing rules need to be reviewed to facilitate implementation and accelerate repayments (or reimbursements) to Member States; urges the Commission and the Council to agree on a recasting of the provisions which must facilitate implementation and simplify procedures,
- Administrative Burden:
- Administrative Burden:
stresses that the Commission should take action to simplify and improve the effectiveness of administrative management with regard to the implementation of Community programmes for its own services, Member States and final beneficiaries, especially as regards small scale projects; considers that a thorough analysis of the effectiveness of the administrative management of Community legislation should be made on each of these four levels, thus identifying the possibilities for increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the use of administrative costs; proposes that this analysis should apply globally to the whole budget;
stresses that the Commission should take action to simplify and improve the effectiveness of administrative management with regard to the implementation of Community programmes for its own services, Member States and final beneficiaries, especially as regards small scale projects; considers that a thorough analysis of the effectiveness of the administrative management of Community legislation should be made on each of these four levels, thus identifying the possibilities for increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the use of administrative costs; proposes that this analysis should apply globally to the whole budget;
- Certification by Member States :
- Certification by Member States :
considers that the European Parliament, as part of the budgetary authority, has a responsibility to optimise the implementation of funding allocated by the Member States to the EU budget; is determined to improve the implementation of the programmes to be financed under the next financial framework; urges the Member States to provide a certification of their financial commitments for all policies run under shared competencies through a formal ex-ante disclosure swatement and an annual ex-post declaration of assurance, made by the Member States' highest political and managing authority (Finance Minister); in consequence, asks the Commission to introduce the appropriate mechanisms to suspend payments in the event of non-compliance with this request; is not ready to propose any significant increases in funding to programmes without guarantees by the Member States that they will commit the appropriations; considers the acceptance of the concept of "disclosure statements" to be a condition for the European Parliament's consent to a new Interinstitutional Agreement on the Financial Perspective;
considers that the European Parliament, as part of the budgetary authority, has a responsibility to optimise the implementation of funding allocated by the Member States to the EU budget; is determined to improve the implementation of the programmes to be financed under the next financial framework; urges the Member States to provide a certification of their financial commitments for all policies run under shared competencies through a formal ex-ante disclosure swatement and an annual ex-post declaration of assurance, made by the Member States' highest political and managing authority (Finance Minister); in consequence, asks the Commission to introduce the appropriate mechanisms to suspend payments in the event of non-compliance with this request; is not ready to propose any significant increases in funding to programmes without guarantees by the Member States that they will commit the appropriations; considers the acceptance of the concept of "disclosure statements" to be a condition for the European Parliament's consent to a new Interinstitutional Agreement on the Financial Perspective;
- Own resources and correction mechanism :
- Own resources and correction mechanism :
endorses the conclusions of the European Council of December 2004 that the negotiations on the European Union's expenditure must be seen in an overall context including the question of own resources, the correction mechanism and the examination of a possible simplification of the system; calls for a revision of the own resources system which leads in the short term to a fairer distribution of net burdens and establishes, before the end of the next Financial Perspective, an independent EU funding system; proposes that the work of preparing such a new system should be conferred on an interparliamentary conference, involving the European Parliament and the national parliaments, in keeping with the spirit of the protocol to the Constitution on the role of the national parliaments,
endorses the conclusions of the European Council of December 2004 that the negotiations on the European Union's expenditure must be seen in an overall context including the question of own resources, the correction mechanism and the examination of a possible simplification of the system; calls for a revision of the own resources system which leads in the short term to a fairer distribution of net burdens and establishes, before the end of the next Financial Perspective, an independent EU funding system; proposes that the work of preparing such a new system should be conferred on an interparliamentary conference, involving the European Parliament and the national parliaments, in keeping with the spirit of the protocol to the Constitution on the role of the national parliaments,
- Financial instruments and co-financing
- Financial instruments and co-financing
asks the Commission to make proposals to accompany the implementation of all common policies with new financial instruments and co-financing mechanisms; these instruments should address market failures and act as catalysts for private investors; budget optimisation and a high leverage effect should be key objectives, to be achieved, in particular, by SME guarantee instruments, but also by targeted venture capital support, including to business angels networks and technology transfer;
asks the Commission to make proposals to accompany the implementation of all common policies with new financial instruments and co-financing mechanisms; these instruments should address market failures and act as catalysts for private investors; budget optimisation and a high leverage effect should be key objectives, to be achieved, in particular, by SME guarantee instruments, but also by targeted venture capital support, including to business angels networks and technology transfer;
WORKING DOCUMENT N° 3 ON EP KEY POINTS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE COUNCIL BASED ON THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT'S NEGOTIATING POSITION OF 8 JUNE 2005
WORKING DOCUMENT No 3 ON EP KEY POINTS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE COUNCIL BASED ON THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT'S NEGOTIATING POSITION OF 8 JUNE 2005
7 of the conclusions of the European Council of 15-16 December 2005 reads as follows:
7 of the conclusions of the European Council of 15-16 December 2005 reads as follows:
"Building on the institutional dialogue to date, the European Council calls on the Council , on the basis of a common position and subject to acceptable terms being attainable , to reach agreement with the European Parliament and Commission on a new IIA reflecting the outcome of these conclusions .
"Building on the institutional dialogue to date, the European Council calls on the Council , on the basis of a common position and subject to acceptable terms being attainable , to reach agreement with the European Parliament and Commission on a new IIA reflecting the outcome of these conclusions .
In this context, the European Council takes note that the Commission will make concrete proposals in order to increase the flexibility of the financial framework ."
In this context, the European Council takes note that the Commission will make concrete proposals in order to increase the flexibility of the financial framework ."
On 18 January 2006, the European Parliament adopted a resolution, of which the following points summarise the spirit for the negotiations:
On 18 January 2006, the European Parliament adopted a resolution, of which the following points summarise the spirit for the negotiations:
" Rejects the European Council’s conclusions in their current form , because they do not guarantee an EU budget which will enhance prosperity, competitiveness, solidarity, cohesion and security in the future, in compliance with policies already decided by the Council itself; …"
" Rejects the European Council’s conclusions in their current form , because they do not guarantee an EU budget which will enhance prosperity, competitiveness, solidarity, cohesion and security in the future, in compliance with policies already decided by the Council itself; …"
"Underlines the importance it attaches to a higher degree of flexibility ;"
"Underlines the importance it attaches to a higher degree of flexibility ;"
"Is willing to enter into constructive negotiations with the Council on the basis of respective positions provided the Austrian Presidency is entrusted with a real negotiating mandate ; is determined to defend the quantitative, structural and qualitative elements of its negotiating position and to enhance the European dimension of agricultural, internal and external policies;"
"Is willing to enter into constructive negotiations with the Council on the basis of respective positions provided the Austrian Presidency is entrusted with a real negotiating mandate ; is determined to defend the quantitative, structural and qualitative elements of its negotiating position and to enhance the European dimension of agricultural, internal and external policies;"
On 18 January 2006 also, President Borrell, President Barroso and Chancellor Schüssel officially opened the negotiations between the three institutions.
On 18 January 2006 also, President Borrell, President Barroso and Chancellor Schüssel officially opened the negotiations between the three institutions.
The first trialogue took place on 23 January.
The first trialogue took place on 23 January.
At his preliminary stage, the rapporteur has found it useful outline the major issues of EP's negotiating position (Part I), as well as present a list of key points for the new Interinstitutional Agreement (Part II).
At his preliminary stage, the rapporteur has found it useful outline the major issues of EP's negotiating position (Part I), as well as present a list of key points for the new Interinstitutional Agreement (Part II).
Part I: A negotiating position based on three pillars
Part I: A negotiating position based on three pillars
Matching political priorities and financial needs
Matching political priorities and financial needs
The political priorities jointly defined by the institutions for the period of the next financial framework 2007-2013 must be sufficiently financed.
The political priorities jointly defined by the institutions for the period of the next financial framework 2007-2013 must be sufficiently financed.
The policies dedicated to fostering growth, employment and competitiveness (Lisbon agenda, research and development, lifelong learning), internal security and citizenship and the policies allowing the Union to comply with its international role (ENPI, IPA, DCECI) are as important as those ensuring cohesion and reflecting the solidarity between the Member states.
The policies dedicated to fostering growth, employment and competitiveness (Lisbon agenda, research and development, lifelong learning), internal security and citizenship and the policies allowing the Union to comply with its international role (ENPI, IPA, DCECI) are as important as those ensuring cohesion and reflecting the solidarity between the Member states.
These policies stand for prosperity, solidarity and security and reflect the modernisation of the EU-budget.
These policies stand for prosperity, solidarity and security and reflect the modernisation of the EU-budget.