natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
D. vzhledem k tomu, že nedostatečná koordinace Evropské unie a eurozóny spolu se zastoupením roztříštěným mezi několik volebních obvodů neumožňuje členským státům dostatečně ovlivňovat rozhodnutí přijatá MMF v míře, která odpovídá jejich úhrnné hospodářské váze,
D. whereas in particular the lack of coordination of the European Union and euro zone, combined with their representation fragmented among several constituencies, does not allow the Member States to exert influence on the IMF’s decisions commensurate with their economic weight,
E. vzhledem k tomu, že je MMF odpovědný svým podílníkům (tj. národním vládám) a ti mají následně odpovědnost vůči svým voličům,
E. whereas the IMF is responsible to its shareholders (namely, national governments) and it is the responsibility of those shareholders to be accountable in turn to their electorate,
F. vzhledem k tomu, že stabilizační politiky prováděné MMF nedosáhly vždy očekávaných cílů a že příliš rázná stabilizace hospodářství může přinést nežádoucí sociální změny; vzhledem k tomu, že zavedené programy změn vyžadují souhlas všech národních činitelů a jejich sledování by mělo mít podobu transparentní demokratické kontroly,
F. whereas the stabilisation policies implemented by the IMF have not always achieved the objectives hoped for and whereas stabilising economies too suddenly is likely to result in undesirable social adjustments; whereas the adjustment programmes which have been put in place require the involvement of all national actors and the monitoring of these programmes should be the subject of transparent democratic supervision,
G. vzhledem k tomu, že je obtížné skloubit zásadu národní odpovědnosti se stále početnějšími podmínkami spojenými s opatřeními na pomoc a snižování dluhů; vzhledem k tomu, že se tyto podmínky v minulých letech znásobily a že půjčky od multilaterálních věřitelů poskytnuté zemím subsaharské Afriky se průměrně pojí se 114 podmínkami, z nichž přibližně tři čtvrtiny souvisejí se správou a řízením,
G. whereas it is hard to reconcile the principle of nations assuming their own responsibilities with the ever-increasing number of conditions placed on aid and debt relief measures; whereas these conditions have multiplied over the past few years and, on average, multilateral loans to sub-Saharan African countries are accompanied by no less than 114 conditions, nearly three-quarters of which relate to governance,
H. vzhledem k tomu, že MMF získal v rozvojových zemích důležitou úlohu a musel se tomu příslušným způsobem přizpůsobit; vzhledem k tomu, že však podpora rozvoje v nejchudších zemích vyžaduje hledání nových nástrojů pro účinné snížení celkového dluhu a inovativních nástrojů k financování rozvoje a boje proti chudobě v rámci rozvojových cílů tisíciletí; vzhledem k tomu, že tento vývoj vyžaduje jasné a efektivní rozdělení úkolů mezi MMF, Světovou banku a systém OSN a také vysoký stupeň koordinace a spolupráce,
H. whereas the IMF has come to play an important role in developing countries and has had to adapt accordingly; whereas, however, promoting development in the poorest countries calls for the mobilisation of new instruments to effectively reduce the stock of debt, as well as a search for innovative instruments to fund development and combat poverty in the context of the MDGs; whereas such action calls for a clear and more efficient division of roles among the IMF, the World Bank and the UN institutions as well as a high level of coordination and cooperation,
1. zastává názor, že MMF jako instituce hraje i nadále důležitou roli při prosazování vyváženého globálního hospodářského růstu a stability směnného kurzu, při podpoře mezinárodního obchodu a schopnosti členských zemí přizpůsobit se globálnímu trhu a při pomoci členským státům, které mají potíže s platební bilancí;
Considers that the IMF as an institution continues to play an important role in promoting balanced global economic growth and exchange rate stability, in facilitating international trade and member countries’ ability to adapt to the global market place and in assisting member countries experiencing balance of payment difficulties;
4. poukazuje na to, že hlavními faktory, které brání rozvojovým zemím spolurozhodovat v rámci MMF úměrně podílu světové populace, kterou zastupují, jsou nedostatek hlasů ve Sboru guvernérů (obyvatelé afrických zemí představují 25 % obyvatel členských zemí a mají jen něco více než 4 % hlasů), nedostatek kvalifikované pracovní síly a technické a institucionální kapacity k tomu, aby se mohly smysluplně podílet na jednání a rozhodování;
Points out that the main factors preventing the developing countries from having a voice in the IMF commensurate with the share of the world population they represent are the lack of votes on the Board of Governors (African countries, accounting for 25 % of the membership, have just over 4 % of the vote) and the lack of qualified human resources, technical and institutional capacity to participate in a meaningful way in deliberations and decisions;
6. konstatuje, že doporučení MMF překračují původní makroekonomickou oblast a zasahují do strukturálních politik tím, že mají, ať už přímo nebo nepřímo, vliv na vedení politik v oblasti sociální ochrany, práva na práci, zdraví, životního prostředí a vzdělávání; shledává, že tento vývoj jednoznačně nastolil otázku stanovení hranic působnosti jednotlivých institucí v rámci systému Organizace spojených národů a Světové banky;
Notes that the IMF has also extended its recommendations to matters outside the original macroeconomic field, into areas of structural policy, by means of recommendations whose wording impacts directly or indirectly on the conduct of policies on social protection, the right to work, health, the environment and education; notes that this development has clearly raised the issue of the boundaries between the competences of the various UN institutions and those of the World Bank;
8. konstatuje, že vzhledem k postupujícímu otevírání kapitálových trhů a liberalizaci pohybu kapitálu je těžké vyhnout se výskytu finančních krizí; proto zdůrazňuje, že je třeba, aby MMF prováděl systematický dohled nad všemi členskými zeměmi;
Notes that, due to the progressive opening-up of capital markets and the liberalisation of movement of capital, it is difficult to avoid the occurrence of financial crises; therefore underlines the need for the IMF to conduct systematic surveillance of all member countries;
10. zastává názor, že cíl finanční stability, který je součástí poslání MMF, je ztížen nedostatkem globální a transparentní pozornosti věnované procesu standardizace přímo ovlivňujícímu finanční trhy, provádění tohoto poslání na recipročním základě a jeho interpretaci;
Considers that the aim of financial stability that forms part of the IMF’s mission is made more difficult by the lack of global and transparent attention paid to the process of standardisation directly affecting the financial markets, to the implementation of that mission on a reciprocal basis or to its interpretation;
13. vyzývá Komisi a Radu, aby se společně s Parlamentem zabývaly možností využít Lamfalussyho postupu k definování postoje přijatého institucemi, které jsou oprávněny mluvit jménem Unie v různých mezinárodních orgánech o finančním sektoru;
Calls on the Commission and Council to look with Parliament into the possibility of using the Lamfalussy procedure to define the position taken by the bodies authorised to speak on the Union’s behalf in the various international bodies with responsibility in the financial sector;
15. konstatuje, že k cestě udržitelného rozvoje je nezbytná existence garantovaných makroekonomických politik; v souvislosti s tím tvrdí, že makroekonomická stabilita není neslučitelná se spravedlivým rozdělením růstu;
Notes that to go down the path of sustainable growth the existence of guaranteed macro-economic policies is essential; to that end, affirms that macro-economic stability is not incompatible with the fair distribution of growth;
17. je si vědom probíhajícího hodnocení podmínek MMF pro půjčky zemím s nízkými příjmy; doporučuje, aby se hodnocení přednostně zaměřilo na snižování chudoby, které je cílem všech půjček MMF zemím s nízkými příjmy;
Recognises the ongoing review of the conditions attached by the IMF to its loans to low-income countries; recommends that the review makes priority reference to poverty reduction as the goal of all IMF lending to low income countries;
19. podporuje postupnou a stabilní liberalizaci finančních systémů rozvojových zemí přizpůsobenou jejich institucionální kapacitě a umožňující účinnou regulaci a řízení pohybu kapitálu;
Advocates a gradual, sequential and stable liberalisation of the developing countries’ financial systems, adjusted to take account of their institutional capacities, thus permitting the effective regulation and management of movement of capital;
22. žádá MMF, aby pokračoval ve svém úsilí o zvýšení transparentnosti a budování institucionální struktury odpovídající jejímu poslání a měnícím se podmínkám mezinárodní finanční politiky;
Calls on the IMF to continue its efforts to increase transparency and build an institutional structure conducive to its mission and the changing circumstances of international financial policy;
24. vyzývá členské země EU k používání stávajícího systému volebních obvodů, aby bylo zajištěno, že volební skupiny, do kterých patří, náležitě podpoří rozvojový program zaměřený na dosažení rozvojových cílů tisíciletí do roku 2015 a že věnují zvláštní pozornost technické a institucionální zaostalosti rozvojových zemí ve své volební skupině a poskytnou jim nezbytnou technickou pomoc k překonání těchto problémů;
Calls on the EU Member States to use the existing constituency system to ensure that the constituencies of which they are members forcefully promote a pro-development agenda based on reaching the MDGs by 2015, and that their constituencies give special attention to the technical and institutional weakness of the developing countries in the constituency and provide the necessary technical assistance to overcome them;
28. trvá na tom, že mezinárodní finanční stabilitu lze prosazovat pouze v případě, že reforma MMF půjde ruku v ruce s udržitelnou rozpočtovou politikou a dobře uzpůsobenou platební bilancí v každé členské zemi;
Insists that international financial stability can only be promoted if the reform of the IMF goes hand in hand with a sustainable budgetary policy and a well-adjusted balance of payments in every member country;
32. obecně vítá program MMF Facilita pro snížení chudoby a hospodářský růst (PRGF), ale obává se, že MMF v tomto programu i nadále používá stejný rigidní ekonomický model a neuznává různé makroekonomické rámce; obává se proto, že toto vysoce vyzdvihované zaměření programu PRGF na chudobu bude do značné míry zdiskreditováno;
Welcomes the IMF’s Poverty and Growth Facility (PRGF) programme in general terms but is concerned that in the PRGF the IMF continues to use the same rigid economic model and fails to recognise different macroeconomic frameworks; fears, therefore, that the much-hailed poverty focus of the PRGF will become largely discredited;
35. vybízí ke zlepšení spolupráce mezi MMF, Evropským parlamentem a národními parlamenty zejména v rozvojových zemích v zájmu zvýšení transparentnosti, demokratické odpovědnosti a legitimity MMF a jeho politik;
Encourages better cooperation between the IMF and the European Parliament and national parliaments, especially in developing countries, in order to strengthen transparency, democratic responsibility and the legitimacy of the IMF and its policies;
Introduction - transformation of the IMF
I. Introduction - transformation of the IMF
The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), created in 1944 under the Bretton Woods agreements, include among the IMF’s objectives the following:
The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), created in 1944 under the Bretton Woods agreements, include among the IMF’s objectives the following:
- to promote international monetary stability;
– to promote international monetary stability;
- to facilitate the expansion of international trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income;
– to facilitate the expansion of international trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income;
- to promote exchange stability and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation;
– to promote exchange stability and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation;
- to lessen the degree of disequilibrium in balances of payments;
– to lessen the degree of disequilibrium in balances of payments;
To achieve these objectives, the IMF:
To achieve these objectives, the IMF:
- monitors the development of financial and economic policies, and supplies advice on economic policy;
– monitors the development of financial and economic policies, and supplies advice on economic policy;
- lends to Member States which are experiencing balance of payments problems, and stimulates adjustment and reform policies it regards as likely to correct the underlying problems;
– lends to Member States which are experiencing balance of payments problems, and stimulates adjustment and reform policies it regards as likely to correct the underlying problems;
- supplies governments and central banks with technical assistance in its areas of expertise.
– supplies governments and central banks with technical assistance in its areas of expertise.
This extremely ambitious programme shows the scale of the task which devolves on the IMF.
This extremely ambitious programme shows the scale of the task which devolves on the IMF.
In practice, through its role as lender of last resort, and in particular through the conditionalities associated with these loans, the IMF has become a major actor in the economic, financial and social policies of the world’s poorest countries.
In practice, through its role as lender of last resort, and in particular through the conditionalities associated with these loans, the IMF has become a major actor in the economic, financial and social policies of the world’s poorest countries.
The developed countries remain covered by the Article IV multilateral surveillance system, and are always potential clients of the IMF in the event of a major financial crisis.
The developed countries remain covered by the Article IV multilateral surveillance system, and are always potential clients of the IMF in the event of a major financial crisis.
Today the IMF is faced with a legitimacy crisis resulting from two factors.
Today the IMF is faced with a legitimacy crisis resulting from two factors.
The first relates to the nature and the increasingly wide scope of its recommendations and of the structural adjustment policies which it implements through the conditions attached to its loans.
The first relates to the nature and the increasingly wide scope of its recommendations and of the structural adjustment policies which it implements through the conditions attached to its loans.
The second relates to the allocation of voting rights within the IMF, the under-representation of the emergent countries and the marginal influence of the developing countries.
The second relates to the allocation of voting rights within the IMF, the under-representation of the emergent countries and the marginal influence of the developing countries.
This adds up to a crisis of legitimacy which harms the reputation both of the IMF’s operations and of the substance and impact of its policies.
This adds up to a crisis of legitimacy which harms the reputation both of the IMF’s operations and of the substance and impact of its policies.
The Bretton Woods system was originally intended to support growth by liberalising international trade while at the same time guaranteeing global financial stability through fixed exchange rates and limited and controlled capital flows.
The Bretton Woods system was originally intended to support growth by liberalising international trade while at the same time guaranteeing global financial stability through fixed exchange rates and limited and controlled capital flows.
However, the 1972 agreement changed everything.
However, the 1972 agreement changed everything.
Floating exchange rates replaced fixed ones, financial deregulation and privatisation became widespread, initially in the OECD countries, and then elsewhere under IMF pressure through the conditions attached to its loans and its consultancy activity.
Floating exchange rates replaced fixed ones, financial deregulation and privatisation became widespread, initially in the OECD countries, and then elsewhere under IMF pressure through the conditions attached to its loans and its consultancy activity.
There was an explosive growth in cross-border capital flows, as well as in financial speculation, leading to multiple financial crises.
There was an explosive growth in cross-border capital flows, as well as in financial speculation, leading to multiple financial crises.
This contrasts starkly with the IMF’s original role of maintaining international financial stability.
This contrasts starkly with the IMF’s original role of maintaining international financial stability.
It therefore appears essential to encourage the IMF to refocus its activities on the prevention and surveillance of financial crises.
It therefore appears essential to encourage the IMF to refocus its activities on the prevention and surveillance of financial crises.
Moreover, in applying the Washington consensus principles across the board to all Member States (numbering 29 in 1944, and 184 today), the IMF strayed outside the strictly macroeconomic field to take an interest in all public policies, including education, public health and regulation of the labour market, because of the influence on budgetary balance, and economic impact, which these policies have.
Moreover, in applying the Washington consensus principles across the board to all Member States (numbering 29 in 1944, and 184 today), the IMF strayed outside the strictly macroeconomic field to take an interest in all public policies, including education, public health and regulation of the labour market, because of the influence on budgetary balance, and economic impact, which these policies have.
And yet there are specialist international organisations such as the ILO, the WHO, the UNDP, UNCTAD, the World Bank and many others with much greater expertise in these areas of IMF intervention.
And yet there are specialist international organisations such as the ILO, the WHO, the UNDP, UNCTAD, the World Bank and many others with much greater expertise in these areas of IMF intervention.
The policies ultimately pursued by the IMF’s debtor countries follow its recommendations more closely than those of the specialised institutions, because the IMF – with its power to grant or refuse a loan, and thanks to the influence of its decisions on the whole donor and lending community – has at its disposal a powerful instrument in support of its policies which the other international organisations lack.
The policies ultimately pursued by the IMF’s debtor countries follow its recommendations more closely than those of the specialised institutions, because the IMF – with its power to grant or refuse a loan, and thanks to the influence of its decisions on the whole donor and lending community – has at its disposal a powerful instrument in support of its policies which the other international organisations lack.
This potential conflict between the standards issuing from the various international organisations is a source of incoherence and imbalance.
This potential conflict between the standards issuing from the various international organisations is a source of incoherence and imbalance.
In practice there is a hierarchy of norms at work in which the IMF’s recommendations have the highest status of all the regulations and programmes implemented by international and multilateral institutions.
In practice there is a hierarchy of norms at work in which the IMF’s recommendations have the highest status of all the regulations and programmes implemented by international and multilateral institutions.
Now that a global debate has been launched on the reform of global governance, we should question the legitimacy of this de facto hierarchy and push for a process whereby the IMF’s action is refocused on its real area of expertise, while leaving the other international organisations to take the lead in their own fields.
Now that a global debate has been launched on the reform of global governance, we should question the legitimacy of this de facto hierarchy and push for a process whereby the IMF’s action is refocused on its real area of expertise, while leaving the other international organisations to take the lead in their own fields.
Governance of the IMF
Governance of the IMF
The IMF has no machinery for internal democratic parliamentary control, and lies outside the UN system, which is an admittedly imperfect but unique form of world democracy.
The IMF has no machinery for internal democratic parliamentary control, and lies outside the UN system, which is an admittedly imperfect but unique form of world democracy.
The debates which precede IMF decisions are thus confined to a restricted circle of experts, drawn mainly from the staff of the IMF itself, from finance ministries and central banks, often sharing the same kind of training and experience.
The debates which precede IMF decisions are thus confined to a restricted circle of experts, drawn mainly from the staff of the IMF itself, from finance ministries and central banks, often sharing the same kind of training and experience.
Then there is the IMF’s decision-making procedure, based essentially on the principle of “one dollar one vote”, thus ensuring that the bulk of voting rights are reserved for the richest countries, headed by the USA.
Then there is the IMF’s decision-making procedure, based essentially on the principle of “one dollar one vote”, thus ensuring that the bulk of voting rights are reserved for the richest countries, headed by the USA.
This situation cries out for reform in many respects:
This situation cries out for reform in many respects:
Firstly, we should look to see the IMF diversify in terms of the origin, training and expertise of its staff, so as to improve their understanding of the complexity of local situations and challenges.
Firstly, we should look to see the IMF diversify in terms of the origin, training and expertise of its staff, so as to improve their understanding of the complexity of local situations and challenges.
Secondly, the IMF should considerably increase its transparency and step up its dialogue with NGOs and civil society.
Secondly, the IMF should considerably increase its transparency and step up its dialogue with NGOs and civil society.
Thirdly, the IMF should embark upon a new type of relationship with parliamentary assemblies, characterised by greater openness, dialogue and transparency.
Thirdly, the IMF should embark upon a new type of relationship with parliamentary assemblies, characterised by greater openness, dialogue and transparency.
The need for this is particularly pressing in the indebted countries, since the essential negotiations between these countries and the IMF must not marginalise the democratic parliamentary debate – not only out of respect for democratic institutions but also to ensure that these countries can take charge of their stabilisation and development programmes, which is the only lasting guarantee of these programmes’ being put into practice.
The need for this is particularly pressing in the indebted countries, since the essential negotiations between these countries and the IMF must not marginalise the democratic parliamentary debate – not only out of respect for democratic institutions but also to ensure that these countries can take charge of their stabilisation and development programmes, which is the only lasting guarantee of these programmes’ being put into practice.