natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Reporting on the effectiveness of both the corporate and the departmental anti-fraud strategies will 26 
Reporting on the effectiveness of both the corporate and the departmental anti-fraud strategies will 26
improve once an enhanced analysis function as referred to in the Commission's reply to recommendation 1 will be operational. 
improve once an enhanced analysis function as referred to in the Commission's reply to recommendation 1 will be operational.
Strategic fraud risk management and fraud prevention are important objectives for the Commission. 
Strategic fraud risk management and fraud prevention are important objectives for the Commission.
It has put in place a decentralised model of financial management, where Authorising Officers by Delegation, e.g. Directors-General, are responsible for internal control, including risk management and fraud prevention. 
It has put in place a decentralised model of financial management, where Authorising Officers by Delegation, e.g. Directors-General, are responsible for internal control, including risk management and fraud prevention.
Respective responsibilities and duties are well defined and since 2017, all Commission services are obliged to appoint a senior manager in charge of risk management, to support and advise the Authorising Officer by Delegation on matters of internal control, including fraud risk management. 
Respective responsibilities and duties are well defined and since 2017, all Commission services are obliged to appoint a senior manager in charge of risk management, to support and advise the Authorising Officer by Delegation on matters of internal control, including fraud risk management.
Information on anti-fraud measures are reported to the College of Commissioners which takes overall political responsibility for the management of the EU budget. 
Information on anti-fraud measures are reported to the College of Commissioners which takes overall political responsibility for the management of the EU budget.
Each Member of the Commission receives fraud-related information directly by the service under his/her responsibility and reports important cases to the College. 
Each Member of the Commission receives fraud-related information directly by the service under his/her responsibility and reports important cases to the College.
The individual mission letters by the President of the Commission are committing each Commissioner to pay specific attention to sound financial management of EU funds which reinforces the Commission's political commitment to zero tolerance for fraud and to systematically ensure the protection of the EU budget from fraud. 
The individual mission letters by the President of the Commission are committing each Commissioner to pay specific attention to sound financial management of EU funds which reinforces the Commission's political commitment to zero tolerance for fraud and to systematically ensure the protection of the EU budget from fraud.
Recommendation 2 – Ensure leadership of the Commission’s anti-fraud actions The Commission considers that its current internal organisation in practical terms already reflects the recommendation 2.1. 
Recommendation 2 – Ensure leadership of the Commission’s anti-fraud actions The Commission considers that its current internal organisation in practical terms already reflects the recommendation 2.1.
The Commission partially accepts recommendation 2.2 The Commission accepts most of the substance of the recommendation. 
The Commission partially accepts recommendation 2.2 The Commission accepts most of the substance of the recommendation.
The Commission estimates that its anti-fraud strategy can only gradually be adapted to comply with the recommendation, the full implementation of which could be achieved around the mid-point of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027. 
The Commission estimates that its anti-fraud strategy can only gradually be adapted to comply with the recommendation, the full implementation of which could be achieved around the mid-point of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027.
First indent: The Commission shares the ECA’s view that its anti-fraud strategy should be preceded by a comprehensive fraud risk assessment. 
First indent: The Commission shares the ECA’s view that its anti-fraud strategy should be preceded by a comprehensive fraud risk assessment.
The implementation of such a fraud risk assessment would however take time and have important resource implications as it would require not only the establishment of an enhanced analysis function, as referred to in the Commission’s reply to recommendation 1, but also the pursuit of appropriate data collection and analysis over several years (see Commission's replies to paragraphs 14–16, 29, 33–37, 47). 
The implementation of such a fraud risk assessment would however take time and have important resource implications as it would require not only the establishment of an enhanced analysis function, as referred to in the Commission’s reply to recommendation 1, but also the pursuit of appropriate data collection and analysis over several years (see Commission's replies to paragraphs 14–16, 29, 33–37, 47).
The Commission notes that, to a considerable extent, for the 2014–2020 period fraud-proofing was carried out at the sub-legislative level, notably by drafting model contracts and agreements. 
The Commission notes that, to a considerable extent, for the 2014–2020 period fraud-proofing was carried out at the sub-legislative level, notably by drafting model contracts and agreements.
Furthermore, in shared management, clear provisions have been in place concerning irregularities, of which fraud is a sub-category. 
Furthermore, in shared management, clear provisions have been in place concerning irregularities, of which fraud is a sub-category.
See Commission's reply to paragraph 67. 
See Commission's reply to paragraph 67.
With the “Better Regulation Toolbox” of 2017 (see Commission's replies to paragraphs 71 and 72 above), fraud-proofing was formally integrated in the legislative drafting process. 
With the “Better Regulation Toolbox” of 2017 (see Commission's replies to paragraphs 71 and 72 above), fraud-proofing was formally integrated in the legislative drafting process.
Nevertheless, 27 
Nevertheless, 27
fraud-proofing of spending programmes was already required under the Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy of 2011,11 i.e. for the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–2020. 
fraud-proofing of spending programmes was already required under the Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy of 2011,11 i.e. for the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–2020.
The 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework proposal of the Commission on the Common Provisions Regulation contains a provision requiring the authority responsible for managing the programme to "put in place effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures and procedures, taking account of the risks identified". 
The 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework proposal of the Commission on the Common Provisions Regulation contains a provision requiring the authority responsible for managing the programme to "put in place effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures and procedures, taking account of the risks identified".
This provision, Article 68(1)(c), applies to the seven shared management funds. 
This provision, Article 68(1)(c), applies to the seven shared management funds.
Under shared management, it is up to Member States to take all necessary measures to protect the EU financial interests, in particular those preventing, detecting and correcting irregularities and fraud, as appropriate and on their own responsibility. 
Under shared management, it is up to Member States to take all necessary measures to protect the EU financial interests, in particular those preventing, detecting and correcting irregularities and fraud, as appropriate and on their own responsibility.
In this respect, they have access to the exclusion decisions taken as part of EDES. 
In this respect, they have access to the exclusion decisions taken as part of EDES.
As far as the feeding of information into EDES is concerned, national authorities have to transmit information of detected fraud and/or irregularity, where required by sector-specific rules. 
As far as the feeding of information into EDES is concerned, national authorities have to transmit information of detected fraud and/or irregularity, where required by sector-specific rules.
This is done through an interface between IMS and EDES. 
This is done through an interface between IMS and EDES.
See also Commission's reply to paragraph 138. 
See also Commission's reply to paragraph 138.
The Commission is continuously promoting the use of ARACHNE with the Member States (see Commission's replies to paragraphs 85-88 and recommendation 3.3). 
The Commission is continuously promoting the use of ARACHNE with the Member States (see Commission's replies to paragraphs 85-88 and recommendation 3.3).
Recommendation 3 – Increase the use of fraud-prevention tools The Commission partially accepts recommendation 3.1. 
Recommendation 3 – Increase the use of fraud-prevention tools The Commission partially accepts recommendation 3.1.
The package of legislative proposals for the Multiannual Financial Framework was launched in May and June 2018, i.e. before receipt of the ECA’s recommendation. 
The package of legislative proposals for the Multiannual Financial Framework was launched in May and June 2018, i.e. before receipt of the ECA’s recommendation.
Those proposals were fraud-proofed to the extent possible within the tight deadlines for the launch of the MFF package. 
Those proposals were fraud-proofed to the extent possible within the tight deadlines for the launch of the MFF package.
Already under the current MFF Member States are required to put in place effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures taking into account the risk identified, pursuant to Article 125(4)(c) of the Common Provisions Regulation (EU) 1303/2013. 
Already under the current MFF Member States are required to put in place effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures taking into account the risk identified, pursuant to Article 125(4)(c) of the Common Provisions Regulation (EU) 1303/2013.
The Commission considers that a fraud risk assessment is an ongoing exercise, not linked to any particular timeframe. 
The Commission considers that a fraud risk assessment is an ongoing exercise, not linked to any particular timeframe.
The Commission's Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) proposal supports the requirement to carry out a fraud risk assessment. 
The Commission's Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) proposal supports the requirement to carry out a fraud risk assessment.
However, it does not foresee a specific timing from Member States to do it. 
However, it does not foresee a specific timing from Member States to do it.
The Commission is of the opinion that adding a requirement to be met before adoption would delay the programme adoption, which goes against the objective of the CPR. 
The Commission is of the opinion that adding a requirement to be met before adoption would delay the programme adoption, which goes against the objective of the CPR.
A study on Member States’ compliance with this provision is being finalised. 
A study on Member States’ compliance with this provision is being finalised.
Member States will build on this experience for their future fraud risk assessment. 
Member States will build on this experience for their future fraud risk assessment.
The Commission is considering reinforcing OLAF’s analytical capabilities, which would, in the course of the 2021-2027 programming period, contribute to a refinement of the Commission's fraud risk assessments (see the Commission’s replies to recommendations 1 and 4). 
The Commission is considering reinforcing OLAF’s analytical capabilities, which would, in the course of the 2021-2027 programming period, contribute to a refinement of the Commission's fraud risk assessments (see the Commission’s replies to recommendations 1 and 4).
The Commission accepts recommendation 3.2 a). 
The Commission accepts recommendation 3.2 a).
In accordance with the Financial Regulation, the relevant Directorate-General is obliged to use the early detection and exclusion system where the circumstances require it. 
In accordance with the Financial Regulation, the relevant Directorate-General is obliged to use the early detection and exclusion system where the circumstances require it.
The Commission accepts recommendation 3.2 b). 
The Commission accepts recommendation 3.2 b).
11 COM (2011) 376 final, p. 
11 COM (2011) 376 final, p.
8, paragraph 'Fraud prevention'. 
8, paragraph 'Fraud prevention'.
A modification of the Financial Regulation by the legislator would be necessary in order to oblige, as far as shared management is concerned, the Member States to flag fraudulent economic operators. 
A modification of the Financial Regulation by the legislator would be necessary in order to oblige, as far as shared management is concerned, the Member States to flag fraudulent economic operators.
The Commission had initially proposed (COM (2014)358) a clear obligation for the Member States to use IMS data as a ground for exclusion. 
The Commission had initially proposed (COM (2014)358) a clear obligation for the Member States to use IMS data as a ground for exclusion.
The Commission accepts recommendation 3.3. 
The Commission accepts recommendation 3.3.
The Commission has provided information, targeted training and active support and guidance on the ARACHNE tool to all Member States. 
The Commission has provided information, targeted training and active support and guidance on the ARACHNE tool to all Member States.
The Commission will continue to provide active assistance to all authorities and encourage those Member States which do not sufficiently (or not at all) use Arachne to do so, as outlined in the "Charter for the introduction an application of the Arachne Risk Scoring Tool in the management verifications" shared with all Member States. 
The Commission will continue to provide active assistance to all authorities and encourage those Member States which do not sufficiently (or not at all) use Arachne to do so, as outlined in the "Charter for the introduction an application of the Arachne Risk Scoring Tool in the management verifications" shared with all Member States.
See Commission replies to paragraphs 85–88. 
See Commission replies to paragraphs 85–88.
With regard to the overall impact of OLAF’s investigations, it is important to note that the precautionary measures issued by OLAF (see Article 7 of Regulation 883/2013) and the overall deterrent effect of OLAF’s actions are also important elements of fighting fraud which need to be assessed. 
With regard to the overall impact of OLAF’s investigations, it is important to note that the precautionary measures issued by OLAF (see Article 7 of Regulation 883/2013) and the overall deterrent effect of OLAF’s actions are also important elements of fighting fraud which need to be assessed.
The analysis concerning the follow-up of OLAF’s investigations is based on a relatively small number of interviews with Commission services and Member States judicial authorities. 
The analysis concerning the follow-up of OLAF’s investigations is based on a relatively small number of interviews with Commission services and Member States judicial authorities.
The Commission highlights that also other actors, in particular other EU institutions and Member States, have in the current system important roles and responsibilities to detect and investigate irregularities and to take appropriate follow-up measures. 
The Commission highlights that also other actors, in particular other EU institutions and Member States, have in the current system important roles and responsibilities to detect and investigate irregularities and to take appropriate follow-up measures.
It is frequent good practice that OLAF and national judicial authorities work in parallel and coordinate their operational activities without losing time. 
It is frequent good practice that OLAF and national judicial authorities work in parallel and coordinate their operational activities without losing time.
OLAF has also improved its cooperation with the judicial authorities on the follow-up to its recommendations. 
OLAF has also improved its cooperation with the judicial authorities on the follow-up to its recommendations.
Also, the recent Commission proposal to amend Regulation 883/2013 aims to improve the follow-up to OLAF's judicial recommendations, notably by clarifying the admissibility of OLAF investigation results in judicial proceedings in Member States. 
Also, the recent Commission proposal to amend Regulation 883/2013 aims to improve the follow-up to OLAF's judicial recommendations, notably by clarifying the admissibility of OLAF investigation results in judicial proceedings in Member States.
See also Commission's replies to paragraphs 94–104. 
See also Commission's replies to paragraphs 94–104.
OLAF has taken action with the aim of clarifying the information provided in final reports and the content of the recommendations in relation to estimated amounts to be recovered. 
OLAF has taken action with the aim of clarifying the information provided in final reports and the content of the recommendations in relation to estimated amounts to be recovered.
See also Commission's replies to paragraphs 106–124. 
See also Commission's replies to paragraphs 106–124.
29 Recommendation 4 – Reconsider OLAF’s role and responsibilities in combatting fraud in EU spending in light of the establishment of the EPPO The Commission partially accepts the recommendation. 
29 Recommendation 4 – Reconsider OLAF’s role and responsibilities in combatting fraud in EU spending in light of the establishment of the EPPO The Commission partially accepts the recommendation.
As regards the investigative function of OLAF, the Commission has taken action to adapt OLAF's framework for investigations to the establishment of the EPPO in its proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013, of 23 May 2018, COM(2018)338. 
As regards the investigative function of OLAF, the Commission has taken action to adapt OLAF's framework for investigations to the establishment of the EPPO in its proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013, of 23 May 2018, COM(2018)338.
The proposed relationship between the two bodies should be based, as prescribed by the EPPO Regulation, on the principles of close cooperation, exchange of information, complementarity and non-duplication. 
The proposed relationship between the two bodies should be based, as prescribed by the EPPO Regulation, on the principles of close cooperation, exchange of information, complementarity and non-duplication.
In addition, the proposal foresees targeted changes to enhance the effectiveness of OLAF investigations. 
In addition, the proposal foresees targeted changes to enhance the effectiveness of OLAF investigations.
OLAF's administrative investigations will maintain their specific added value to the benefit of the overall protection of the Union budget. 
OLAF's administrative investigations will maintain their specific added value to the benefit of the overall protection of the Union budget.
See also Commission’s replies to paragraphs 126–128. 
See also Commission’s replies to paragraphs 126–128.
With regard to fraud prevention and fraud risk analysis, the Commission intends to reinforce OLAF’s role (see Commission's replies to recommendations 1–3). a) The Commission shares the ECA’s view that OLAF could assume a stronger role in the anti-fraud policies of the Commission services and executive agencies. 
With regard to fraud prevention and fraud risk analysis, the Commission intends to reinforce OLAF’s role (see Commission's replies to recommendations 1–3). a) The Commission shares the ECA’s view that OLAF could assume a stronger role in the anti-fraud policies of the Commission services and executive agencies.
Such a strengthened role is being considered in the upcoming update of the CAFS (see Commission's replies to paragraphs 50-54 and recommendation 2.1). 
Such a strengthened role is being considered in the upcoming update of the CAFS (see Commission's replies to paragraphs 50-54 and recommendation 2.1).
As far as real time detailed analysis of fraud patterns and the causes of fraud is concerned, please refer to the Commission's replies to recommendations 1 and 2.2. 
As far as real time detailed analysis of fraud patterns and the causes of fraud is concerned, please refer to the Commission's replies to recommendations 1 and 2.2.
To the extent possible, the Commission will increasingly present fraud patterns found in OLAF investigations in case compendiums. b) Vis-à-vis the Member States, OLAF will continue to perform its coordinating and advisory functions, notably as the lead service for irregularity reporting and the Advisory Committee for the Coordination of Fraud Prevention. 
To the extent possible, the Commission will increasingly present fraud patterns found in OLAF investigations in case compendiums. b) Vis-à-vis the Member States, OLAF will continue to perform its coordinating and advisory functions, notably as the lead service for irregularity reporting and the Advisory Committee for the Coordination of Fraud Prevention.
Likewise, the Authorising Officers Responsible in the Directorates-General in charge of shared management will continue to exercise their supervisory role over the Member States. 
Likewise, the Authorising Officers Responsible in the Directorates-General in charge of shared management will continue to exercise their supervisory role over the Member States.
OLAF will then in turn review the anti-fraud policies of those spending Directorates-General, as outlined above. 
OLAF will then in turn review the anti-fraud policies of those spending Directorates-General, as outlined above.
The analytical component of OLAF's enhanced role can only gradually be implemented and will not be fully operational before the mid-point of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027 (please refer to the Commission's reply to recommendation 2.2.). 
The analytical component of OLAF's enhanced role can only gradually be implemented and will not be fully operational before the mid-point of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027 (please refer to the Commission's reply to recommendation 2.2.).
As the ECA acknowledges, a comprehensive fraud risk assessment forms the basis for fully effective fraud risk management. 
As the ECA acknowledges, a comprehensive fraud risk assessment forms the basis for fully effective fraud risk management.
Consequently, the OLAF’s analytical capabilities and its reinforced oversight role will gain effectiveness in a gradual process. 
Consequently, the OLAF’s analytical capabilities and its reinforced oversight role will gain effectiveness in a gradual process.
ЕСП подбира и разработва одитните си задачи така, че да окажат максимално въздействие, като отчита рисковете за изпълнението или съответствието, проверявания обем приходи или разходи, предстоящите промени, както и политическия и обществения интерес. 
The ECA selects and designs these audit tasks to be of maximum impact by considering the risks to performance or compliance, the level of income or spending involved, forthcoming developments and political and public interest.
Одитът беше осъществен под ръководството на члена на ЕСП Juhan Parts. В него участваха Ken-Marti Vaher — ръководител на неговия кабинет, и Margus Kurm — аташе в кабинета; Judit Oroszki — главен ръководител и ръководител на задача; Tomasz Plebanowicz — заместник-ръководител на задача; Rogelio Abarquero Grossi, Daria Bochnar, Jana Janeckova и Anzela Poliulianaite — одитори. 
The audit was led by ECA Member Juhan Parts, supported by Ken-Marti Vaher, Head of Private Office and Margus Kurm, Private Office Attaché; Judit Oroszki, Principal Manager and Head of Task; Tomasz Plebanowicz, Deputy Head of Task; Rogelio Abarquero Grossi, Daria Bochnar, Jana Janeckova and Anzela Poliulianaite, Auditors.