natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
First bullet point: The new "Handbook on reporting of irregularities in shared management", prepared by OLAF in cooperation with experts from the Member States, clearly indicates OLAF's final report as one of the facts generating the obligation on Member States to report. 
First bullet point: The new "Handbook on reporting of irregularities in shared management", prepared by OLAF in cooperation with experts from the Member States, clearly indicates OLAF's final report as one of the facts generating the obligation on Member States to report.
IMS provides for a specific field to indicate the reference number of the OLAF investigation. 
IMS provides for a specific field to indicate the reference number of the OLAF investigation.
However, this key information may not always be known at the level of the reporting authority in the Member State. 
However, this key information may not always be known at the level of the reporting authority in the Member State.
The Commission notes that the quality of the data depends on the quality of the reporting by the Member States. 
The Commission notes that the quality of the data depends on the quality of the reporting by the Member States.
Second bullet point: First sub-bullet point: Fraudulent cases arising from the activities of intermediate public bodies involved in implementing an operational programme through project selection or public tendering must be reported in IMS, with some limited exceptions (i.e. reporting threshold). 
Second bullet point: First sub-bullet point: Fraudulent cases arising from the activities of intermediate public bodies involved in implementing an operational programme through project selection or public tendering must be reported in IMS, with some limited exceptions (i.e. reporting threshold).
The reference made by the ECA is related to the definition of "economic operator", which does not include public bodies exercising their prerogatives as public authority. 
The reference made by the ECA is related to the definition of "economic operator", which does not include public bodies exercising their prerogatives as public authority.
The "Handbook on reporting of irregularities in shared management" refers to the case-law of the European Court of Justice to limit the situations in which public bodies are not considered to act as an economic operator (therefore limiting the situations which are not reported via IMS). 
The "Handbook on reporting of irregularities in shared management" refers to the case-law of the European Court of Justice to limit the situations in which public bodies are not considered to act as an economic operator (therefore limiting the situations which are not reported via IMS).
Second sub-bullet point: From a legal point of view, the obligation to report "suspected fraud" cases covers also cases for which no payment has been made. 
Second sub-bullet point: From a legal point of view, the obligation to report "suspected fraud" cases covers also cases for which no payment has been made.
However, it is true that non-fraudulent irregularities for which no payment has been made are covered by derogation to report. 
However, it is true that non-fraudulent irregularities for which no payment has been made are covered by derogation to report.
From a technical point of view, IMS has no mandatory fields, besides those related to the fund and programming period. 
From a technical point of view, IMS has no mandatory fields, besides those related to the fund and programming period.
The field "project name" can therefore be left empty and does not prevent reporting. 
The field "project name" can therefore be left empty and does not prevent reporting.
Third bullet point: The Commission acknowledges that a certain amount of information may be lost due to the reporting threshold of EUR 10 000. 
Third bullet point: The Commission acknowledges that a certain amount of information may be lost due to the reporting threshold of EUR 10 000.
However, it mainly relates to minor cases which, to a large extent, concern individual perpetrators operating simple fraudulent schemes. 
However, it mainly relates to minor cases which, to a large extent, concern individual perpetrators operating simple fraudulent schemes.
Therefore the 6 
Therefore the 6
added value of this information would be limited. 
added value of this information would be limited.
The majority of these cases are also likely to be dismissed by national prosecution services. 
The majority of these cases are also likely to be dismissed by national prosecution services.
However, Member States are obliged to follow up on detected irregularities, regardless of the reporting threshold. 
However, Member States are obliged to follow up on detected irregularities, regardless of the reporting threshold.
The Commission estimates that the “final detection rate” would change only marginally in case there were no thresholds2. 
The Commission estimates that the “final detection rate” would change only marginally in case there were no thresholds2.
The Commission acknowledges that reporting practices can vary not only per country but also per reporting authority. 
The Commission acknowledges that reporting practices can vary not only per country but also per reporting authority.
Relevant explanatory information can be found in the various Commission Staff Working Documents accompanying last years’ PIF Reports. 
Relevant explanatory information can be found in the various Commission Staff Working Documents accompanying last years’ PIF Reports.
The Commission continuously works on streamlining the reporting practice as much as possible by informing and advising Member States via meetings, trainings, manuals, guidance notes, handbooks and feedback on reported cases. 
The Commission continuously works on streamlining the reporting practice as much as possible by informing and advising Member States via meetings, trainings, manuals, guidance notes, handbooks and feedback on reported cases.
In addition, actions concerning the reliability of IMS data are taken (see reply to paragraph 30). 
In addition, actions concerning the reliability of IMS data are taken (see reply to paragraph 30).
The handbook quoted by the ECA was issued in 2017. 
The handbook quoted by the ECA was issued in 2017.
This cannot yet have had any impact on information analysed by the ECA and presented in Annex 4. 
This cannot yet have had any impact on information analysed by the ECA and presented in Annex 4.
It should be considered that the issues raised by the ECA may have an impact on the detection rate of the specific reporting year, but that such impact decreases significantly in respect of multiannual analyses or analyses focussed on a whole programming period, like those published and updated every year in the Commission Staff Working Document "Statistical evaluation of irregularities". 
It should be considered that the issues raised by the ECA may have an impact on the detection rate of the specific reporting year, but that such impact decreases significantly in respect of multiannual analyses or analyses focussed on a whole programming period, like those published and updated every year in the Commission Staff Working Document "Statistical evaluation of irregularities".
The introduction of fraud detection rates has helped to have an objective indicator to measure the performance of Member States, rather than comparing absolute numbers, representing another step forward in a continuous process. 
The introduction of fraud detection rates has helped to have an objective indicator to measure the performance of Member States, rather than comparing absolute numbers, representing another step forward in a continuous process.
While detection rates are indicators of fraud to be considered, direct comparison of detection rates must be put into context. 
While detection rates are indicators of fraud to be considered, direct comparison of detection rates must be put into context.
The overall anti-fraud framework in the different Member States is the background against which data on detections and related differences among Member States should be interpreted. 
The overall anti-fraud framework in the different Member States is the background against which data on detections and related differences among Member States should be interpreted.
OLAF analyses such data and works with Member States to improve prevention, detection and reporting in the Member States. 
OLAF analyses such data and works with Member States to improve prevention, detection and reporting in the Member States.
Analysing the underlying reasons for differences in reporting implies analysing the 28 national anti-fraud systems in detail. 
Analysing the underlying reasons for differences in reporting implies analysing the 28 national anti-fraud systems in detail.
This is a resource-intensive approach which could be only progressively implemented. 
This is a resource-intensive approach which could be only progressively implemented.
While it might be considered in the context of a broader and deeper analysis of the overall anti-fraud framework in the different Member States, the absence of a strong correlation between reported fraud detection rates and perception of corruption should not be over-emphasised. 
While it might be considered in the context of a broader and deeper analysis of the overall anti-fraud framework in the different Member States, the absence of a strong correlation between reported fraud detection rates and perception of corruption should not be over-emphasised.
Corruption is one of the many modi operandi through which fraud against the EU budget is perpetrated. 
Corruption is one of the many modi operandi through which fraud against the EU budget is perpetrated.
Furthermore, see Commission's replies to paragraphs 33–37 about perception indexes. 
Furthermore, see Commission's replies to paragraphs 33–37 about perception indexes.
2 In 2005, the reporting threshold was increased from EUR 4 000 to EUR 10 000. 
2 In 2005, the reporting threshold was increased from EUR 4 000 to EUR 10 000.
At the time, an estimation was made of the amount of information lost in the process: the increased threshold would have implied a reduction of about 45% of the reported number of irregularities, but a loss of only 5% of the related financial amounts. 
At the time, an estimation was made of the amount of information lost in the process: the increased threshold would have implied a reduction of about 45% of the reported number of irregularities, but a loss of only 5% of the related financial amounts.
Translated in terms on the fraud detection rate in 2017, this would imply a figure 0.22% instead of 0.21%. 
Translated in terms on the fraud detection rate in 2017, this would imply a figure 0.22% instead of 0.21%.
In relation to the reliability of IMS data, the Commission itself does not have the capacity of auditing it on a general scale. 
In relation to the reliability of IMS data, the Commission itself does not have the capacity of auditing it on a general scale.
However, OLAF invests in streamlining the reporting practices of the Member States (see reply to paragraph 25) and in performing basic quality checks. 
However, OLAF invests in streamlining the reporting practices of the Member States (see reply to paragraph 25) and in performing basic quality checks.
Checks relating to the irregularity reporting systems are performed in the framework of system audits. 
Checks relating to the irregularity reporting systems are performed in the framework of system audits.
Member States have to put in place effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures as part of their management and control system, based on a risk assessment. 
Member States have to put in place effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures as part of their management and control system, based on a risk assessment.
This is a specific regulatory anti-fraud requirement for 2014–2020 introduced in the Common Provisions Regulation (Article 125(4)(c) CPR). 
This is a specific regulatory anti-fraud requirement for 2014–2020 introduced in the Common Provisions Regulation (Article 125(4)(c) CPR).
In the guidance note related to this Article, the Commission indicates that the establishment of clear reporting mechanisms is a key element of prevention as well as detection. 
In the guidance note related to this Article, the Commission indicates that the establishment of clear reporting mechanisms is a key element of prevention as well as detection.
It is confirmed that suspected fraud must be reported by the authority designated by the Member State in line with the requirements under Article 122(2) CPR. 
It is confirmed that suspected fraud must be reported by the authority designated by the Member State in line with the requirements under Article 122(2) CPR.
As concerns regional policy, under Key Requirement 7, the Commission's auditors check whether under a certain Operational Programme Managing Authorities have complied with their general obligation to prevent, detect, report and correct irregularities, including fraudulent ones. 
As concerns regional policy, under Key Requirement 7, the Commission's auditors check whether under a certain Operational Programme Managing Authorities have complied with their general obligation to prevent, detect, report and correct irregularities, including fraudulent ones.
Some audit findings by the Commission services have covered e.g. the absence of reporting through IMS with regard to irregularities detected. 
Some audit findings by the Commission services have covered e.g. the absence of reporting through IMS with regard to irregularities detected.
As concerns the Common Agricultural Policy, the Commission assesses the quality of the data in IMS in the context of its EAGGF Guidance audits. 
As concerns the Common Agricultural Policy, the Commission assesses the quality of the data in IMS in the context of its EAGGF Guidance audits.
Irregularities (including fraud cases) are reported in an annex to annual accounts. 
Irregularities (including fraud cases) are reported in an annex to annual accounts.
In connection with audits, the Commission requests the audit authorities to carry out verifications on the implementation of the anti-fraud measures. 
In connection with audits, the Commission requests the audit authorities to carry out verifications on the implementation of the anti-fraud measures.
The standard scope of the Commission's own early preventive audits (EPSAs) also includes the review of the anti-fraud measures. 
The standard scope of the Commission's own early preventive audits (EPSAs) also includes the review of the anti-fraud measures.
There are no perfect systems for the collection of data on criminal cases linked to the EU financial interests investigated by national authorities, and national systems are mostly incomplete and not accessible to the Commission. 
There are no perfect systems for the collection of data on criminal cases linked to the EU financial interests investigated by national authorities, and national systems are mostly incomplete and not accessible to the Commission.
Even the Member States which collect criminal investigation statistics tend to have very generic data, which relate to violations of Criminal code articles rather than specifying the EU or national fund or the type of operation affected. 
Even the Member States which collect criminal investigation statistics tend to have very generic data, which relate to violations of Criminal code articles rather than specifying the EU or national fund or the type of operation affected.
Therefore the most complete system which systematically collects information about criminal cases linked to the EU financial interests is IMS. 
Therefore the most complete system which systematically collects information about criminal cases linked to the EU financial interests is IMS.
As any system, the Commission acknowledges that IMS may be further improved. 
As any system, the Commission acknowledges that IMS may be further improved.
Common reply to paragraphs 33–36: The Commission considers that, in the context of measuring fraud in the EU budget, estimating fraud through victimisation, encounter and perception studies is not fit-for-purpose, as these methods are more focused on identifying or using risk indicators for specific purposes and in specific sectors on the basis of administrative data. 
Common reply to paragraphs 33–36: The Commission considers that, in the context of measuring fraud in the EU budget, estimating fraud through victimisation, encounter and perception studies is not fit-for-purpose, as these methods are more focused on identifying or using risk indicators for specific purposes and in specific sectors on the basis of administrative data.
The ECA makes reference to survey-based indexes for measuring corruption and suggests that this methodology can be translated in the context of measuring undetected fraud against the EU budget. 
The ECA makes reference to survey-based indexes for measuring corruption and suggests that this methodology can be translated in the context of measuring undetected fraud against the EU budget.
These methods are open to several criticisms highlighted by the same publications referred to by the ECA itself. 
These methods are open to several criticisms highlighted by the same publications referred to by the ECA itself.
Furthermore, these difficulties are significantly increased in relation to certain areas of budget expenditure, such as development aid. 
Furthermore, these difficulties are significantly increased in relation to certain areas of budget expenditure, such as development aid.
In addition, according to paragraph 3.14 of the ECA's Annual Report 2015, the Composite Indicators Research Group (financed by the EU) has pointed to the fact that composite indicators, while they illustrate the bigger picture, may lead to simplistic policy conclusions. 8 
In addition, according to paragraph 3.14 of the ECA's Annual Report 2015, the Composite Indicators Research Group (financed by the EU) has pointed to the fact that composite indicators, while they illustrate the bigger picture, may lead to simplistic policy conclusions. 8
Therefore, while useful for other purposes, victimisation, encounter or perception surveys would not be well-suited for measuring fraud to EU spending and would risk leading to biased decision-making or, at least, to an added-value not proportionate to the cost. 
Therefore, while useful for other purposes, victimisation, encounter or perception surveys would not be well-suited for measuring fraud to EU spending and would risk leading to biased decision-making or, at least, to an added-value not proportionate to the cost.
Finally, the Financial Regulation provides that the EU budget shall be implemented in compliance with the proportionality principle and an effective and efficient internal control. 
Finally, the Financial Regulation provides that the EU budget shall be implemented in compliance with the proportionality principle and an effective and efficient internal control.
In this respect, the prevention, detection, correction and follow-up of fraud and irregularities is based on best international practices, and rests on the implementation of an appropriate risk management and control strategy coordinated among appropriate actors involved in the control chain. 
In this respect, the prevention, detection, correction and follow-up of fraud and irregularities is based on best international practices, and rests on the implementation of an appropriate risk management and control strategy coordinated among appropriate actors involved in the control chain.
The Financial Regulation provides that internal control and budget implementation should evolve with an improvement of the cost benefit ratio of controls. 
The Financial Regulation provides that internal control and budget implementation should evolve with an improvement of the cost benefit ratio of controls.
In other terms, the cost of controls must be proportionate and commensurate with results in terms of recovery. 
In other terms, the cost of controls must be proportionate and commensurate with results in terms of recovery.
The Commission is committed to improving the risk management assessment and control strategy. 
The Commission is committed to improving the risk management assessment and control strategy.
Box 1 The Commission underlines that the quality of control of corruption was only one of the indicators used in the study "Assessing the quality of government at the regional level using public procurement data". 
Box 1 The Commission underlines that the quality of control of corruption was only one of the indicators used in the study "Assessing the quality of government at the regional level using public procurement data".
The Commission considers that the examples of the ECA illustrate that the Commission can enhance its fraud analysis. 
The Commission considers that the examples of the ECA illustrate that the Commission can enhance its fraud analysis.
However, the illustrated methods are not cost-effective to estimate the scale of undetected fraud or corruption in a robust, reliable and defendable manner to support evidence-based policy initiatives, given the diversity of the EU budget. 
However, the illustrated methods are not cost-effective to estimate the scale of undetected fraud or corruption in a robust, reliable and defendable manner to support evidence-based policy initiatives, given the diversity of the EU budget.
OLAF analyses fraud also to comply with Regulation 883/2013. 
OLAF analyses fraud also to comply with Regulation 883/2013.
OLAF contributes to the design and development of methods of preventing and combating fraud, corruption and any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the Union. 
OLAF contributes to the design and development of methods of preventing and combating fraud, corruption and any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the Union.
OLAF promotes and coordinates, with and among the Member States, the sharing of operational experience and best procedural practices. 
OLAF promotes and coordinates, with and among the Member States, the sharing of operational experience and best procedural practices.
Common reply to paragraphs 40-42: The PIF Report refers to the whole budget of the EU and for this reason it must keep a general approach. 
Common reply to paragraphs 40-42: The PIF Report refers to the whole budget of the EU and for this reason it must keep a general approach.
The analysis is deepened, refined and enriched year after year (as recognised by the main stakeholders: the Member States and the European Parliament). 
The analysis is deepened, refined and enriched year after year (as recognised by the main stakeholders: the Member States and the European Parliament).
The PIF Report 2017, for instance, includes a detailed analysis by component in the agricultural policy and adds an analysis of "Transport", another priority area. 
The PIF Report 2017, for instance, includes a detailed analysis by component in the agricultural policy and adds an analysis of "Transport", another priority area.
OLAF analyses the nature or modus operandi of fraud, in general (through the PIF Report) and more in-depth (through specific projects). 
OLAF analyses the nature or modus operandi of fraud, in general (through the PIF Report) and more in-depth (through specific projects).
OLAF’s own analytical work on fraud patterns and systemic vulnerabilities could indeed be intensified and broadened, as suggested by the ECA, depending on the resources devoted to analysis and prevention. 
OLAF’s own analytical work on fraud patterns and systemic vulnerabilities could indeed be intensified and broadened, as suggested by the ECA, depending on the resources devoted to analysis and prevention.
Although spending programmes develop over time, the fundamentals of the programmes, and therefore the risks of fraud, will not change substantially. 
Although spending programmes develop over time, the fundamentals of the programmes, and therefore the risks of fraud, will not change substantially.
The case compendiums therefore remain valid and useful. 
The case compendiums therefore remain valid and useful.