natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Common reply to paragraphs 122-123: The Commission notes that also DG NEAR and DG ECHO are recipients of OLAF financial recommendations in the field of indirect management. 
Common reply to paragraphs 122-123: The Commission notes that also DG NEAR and DG ECHO are recipients of OLAF financial recommendations in the field of indirect management.
The ECA states that at the time of the audit recoveries had been made regarding 38% of OLAF's financial recommendations. 
The ECA states that at the time of the audit recoveries had been made regarding 38% of OLAF's financial recommendations.
Given the time it takes to make meaningful progress in the recovery process, this percentage will further increase over time. 
Given the time it takes to make meaningful progress in the recovery process, this percentage will further increase over time.
With regard to the sample, see Commission’s reply to paragraph 117 on direct management which applies mutatis mutandis also for the sample on indirect management. 
With regard to the sample, see Commission’s reply to paragraph 117 on direct management which applies mutatis mutandis also for the sample on indirect management.
The Commission notes that DG DEVCO’s operations are implemented in a particular context: geographically dispersed operations, high number of operations, diversity of implementing organisations and partner countries and a diversity of aid delivery methods. 
The Commission notes that DG DEVCO’s operations are implemented in a particular context: geographically dispersed operations, high number of operations, diversity of implementing organisations and partner countries and a diversity of aid delivery methods.
In addition, the legal and law enforcement contexts applicable to DG DEVCO's operations are very different compared with operations under shared management and much more diverse. 
In addition, the legal and law enforcement contexts applicable to DG DEVCO's operations are very different compared with operations under shared management and much more diverse.
OLAF takes this and the likelihood of recovery into account in its selection procedure. 
OLAF takes this and the likelihood of recovery into account in its selection procedure.
It should be noted that many beneficiaries also of external aid are based in Europe and therefore can be excluded from future funding following an OLAF investigation. 
It should be noted that many beneficiaries also of external aid are based in Europe and therefore can be excluded from future funding following an OLAF investigation.
The default approach of DG DEVCO is to follow OLAF's recommendations. 
The default approach of DG DEVCO is to follow OLAF's recommendations.
However, when there are important reasons not to follow OLAF's recommendations, DG DEVCO reports back to OLAF on the decision and measures taken. 
However, when there are important reasons not to follow OLAF's recommendations, DG DEVCO reports back to OLAF on the decision and measures taken.
The high-risk environment in which DG DEVCO operates can therefore explain why DG DEVCO sometimes does not follow up on the financial recommendations of OLAF. 
The high-risk environment in which DG DEVCO operates can therefore explain why DG DEVCO sometimes does not follow up on the financial recommendations of OLAF.
OLAF and DG DEVCO will engage in a still closer cooperation in order to increase the number of successful recoveries. 
OLAF and DG DEVCO will engage in a still closer cooperation in order to increase the number of successful recoveries.
The EPPO will be a single, independent European prosecution office operating across the participating Member States. 
The EPPO will be a single, independent European prosecution office operating across the participating Member States.
European Delegated Prosecutors will be responsible to investigate, prosecute and bring to judgement crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union, thereby working hand in hand with national law enforcement and judicial authorities. 
European Delegated Prosecutors will be responsible to investigate, prosecute and bring to judgement crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union, thereby working hand in hand with national law enforcement and judicial authorities.
European Prosecutors located at central level will, on behalf of the Permanent Chambers, supervise the investigations and prosecutions carried out by the European Delegated Prosecutors or, in exceptional cases, conduct the investigations themselves. 
European Prosecutors located at central level will, on behalf of the Permanent Chambers, supervise the investigations and prosecutions carried out by the European Delegated Prosecutors or, in exceptional cases, conduct the investigations themselves.
This novel approach will substantially enhance the current level of effectiveness and efficiency in the fight against crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union. 
This novel approach will substantially enhance the current level of effectiveness and efficiency in the fight against crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union.
See Commission's replies to paragraphs 97-104. 
See Commission's replies to paragraphs 97-104.
First bullet point: The EPPO represents a very substantial improvement to the current mechanisms of judicial cooperation among Member States. 
First bullet point: The EPPO represents a very substantial improvement to the current mechanisms of judicial cooperation among Member States.
Moreover, its structure (Permanent Chambers and European Prosecutors from each Member State) is designed to bring in the necessary national expertise while ensuring the development of European investigation and prosecution policies. 
Moreover, its structure (Permanent Chambers and European Prosecutors from each Member State) is designed to bring in the necessary national expertise while ensuring the development of European investigation and prosecution policies.
The decision-making processes in the EPPO take due account of the need for swift investigatory and prosecutorial action and for ensuring a common investigation and prosecution policy of the EPPO. 
The decision-making processes in the EPPO take due account of the need for swift investigatory and prosecutorial action and for ensuring a common investigation and prosecution policy of the EPPO.
The need for internal consultation and translation is inherent to an EU body operating across Member States and tackling cross-border crime. 
The need for internal consultation and translation is inherent to an EU body operating across Member States and tackling cross-border crime.
The investigations of the EPPO will be primarily carried out by the European Delegated Prosecutors under the supervision of the European Prosecutor coming from the same Member State as the European Delegated Prosecutor, and under the direction and instruction of the competent Permanent Chamber. 
The investigations of the EPPO will be primarily carried out by the European Delegated Prosecutors under the supervision of the European Prosecutor coming from the same Member State as the European Delegated Prosecutor, and under the direction and instruction of the competent Permanent Chamber.
The European Prosecutors sitting in the Permanent Chambers are familiar with the legal system and know the language of the European Delegated Prosecutors they supervise. 
The European Prosecutors sitting in the Permanent Chambers are familiar with the legal system and know the language of the European Delegated Prosecutors they supervise.
In addition, the staff in the EPPO headquarters supporting the College and chambers will need to reflect an appropriate coverage and balance of legal systems and languages to support their work. 
In addition, the staff in the EPPO headquarters supporting the College and chambers will need to reflect an appropriate coverage and balance of legal systems and languages to support their work.
The EPPO Regulation also allows the Permanent Chambers to delegate its decision-making powers to the supervising European Prosecutor in specific cases, where an offence is not serious enough or the proceedings are not complex. 
The EPPO Regulation also allows the Permanent Chambers to delegate its decision-making powers to the supervising European Prosecutor in specific cases, where an offence is not serious enough or the proceedings are not complex.
The work of the EPPO should, in principle, be carried out in electronic form. 
The work of the EPPO should, in principle, be carried out in electronic form.
This will further facilitate the communication between the European Delegated Prosecutors, the supervising European Prosecutors and the Permanent Chambers. 
This will further facilitate the communication between the European Delegated Prosecutors, the supervising European Prosecutors and the Permanent Chambers.
Should there be need for additional translations, the EPPO may seek such services from the Translation Centre of the bodies of the EU. 
Should there be need for additional translations, the EPPO may seek such services from the Translation Centre of the bodies of the EU.
Second bullet point: The Commission does not share the ECA's assessment. 
Second bullet point: The Commission does not share the ECA's assessment.
The EPPO will be directly responsible for the investigations, prosecutions and bringing to judgement of crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union. 
The EPPO will be directly responsible for the investigations, prosecutions and bringing to judgement of crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union.
In this respect, European Delegated Prosecutors, who will be equipped with the same powers as national prosecutors in addition to those following directly from the EPPO Regulation, will carry out the investigations hand in hand with national authorities, while the latter shall ensure that all instructions given by the European Delegated Prosecutors are followed. 24 
In this respect, European Delegated Prosecutors, who will be equipped with the same powers as national prosecutors in addition to those following directly from the EPPO Regulation, will carry out the investigations hand in hand with national authorities, while the latter shall ensure that all instructions given by the European Delegated Prosecutors are followed. 24
The EPPO Regulation contains also very specific obligations on Member States to provide European Delegated Prosecutors with the resources and equipment necessary to exercise their functions (Article 96(6)). 
The EPPO Regulation contains also very specific obligations on Member States to provide European Delegated Prosecutors with the resources and equipment necessary to exercise their functions (Article 96(6)).
In addition, OLAF, because of its very mandate in the area of PIF, is called on to become an important source of information to the EPPO. 
In addition, OLAF, because of its very mandate in the area of PIF, is called on to become an important source of information to the EPPO.
Union institutions and bodies may use OLAF for a preliminary verification of allegations in cases where they lack the expertise to assess whether certain information may need reporting to the EPPO. 
Union institutions and bodies may use OLAF for a preliminary verification of allegations in cases where they lack the expertise to assess whether certain information may need reporting to the EPPO.
Third bullet point: Article 24 of the EPPO Regulation clearly states that all institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union and the authorities of the Member States shall without undue delay report to the EPPO any criminal conduct in respect of which it could exercise its competence. 
Third bullet point: Article 24 of the EPPO Regulation clearly states that all institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union and the authorities of the Member States shall without undue delay report to the EPPO any criminal conduct in respect of which it could exercise its competence.
It is the EPPO that will thereupon decide whether to exercise its competence by either initiating a criminal investigation or use its right of evocation. 
It is the EPPO that will thereupon decide whether to exercise its competence by either initiating a criminal investigation or use its right of evocation.
The purpose of the preliminary evaluation mechanism is to allow IBOAs to make use of OLAF and its specialised expertise to assess information available to the IBOA and to provide the EPPO with good quality information. 
The purpose of the preliminary evaluation mechanism is to allow IBOAs to make use of OLAF and its specialised expertise to assess information available to the IBOA and to provide the EPPO with good quality information.
It shall be efficient and not hamper the decision making process by the EPPO. 
It shall be efficient and not hamper the decision making process by the EPPO.
The Commission proposal for the revision of Regulation 883/2013 contains a specific provision on the preliminary evaluation by OLAF, including a strict deadline for its completion. 
The Commission proposal for the revision of Regulation 883/2013 contains a specific provision on the preliminary evaluation by OLAF, including a strict deadline for its completion.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 130. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 130.
The specific issues raised by the ECA regarding the Commission's anti-fraud policy cannot be seen in isolation from the important recent legislative initiatives and other developments in the area of the fight against fraud listed below:  Revision of the Staff Regulations for officials and other servants of the European Union in 2013;  Updated integrated control framework and peer review of fraud risk in 2017;  Directive (EU) 2017/1371 on the fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law (PIF Directive);  Regulation 2017/1939 setting up the EPPO;  Proposal of 2018 to amend the OLAF Regulation 883/2013;  New Financial Regulation 2018/1046;  Initiative for a revision of the Financial Framework Regulation on decentralised agencies;  Proposals for post-2020 spending programmes;  Ongoing update of the Commission’s Anti-Fraud Strategy (CAFS). 
The specific issues raised by the ECA regarding the Commission's anti-fraud policy cannot be seen in isolation from the important recent legislative initiatives and other developments in the area of the fight against fraud listed below:  Revision of the Staff Regulations for officials and other servants of the European Union in 2013;  Updated integrated control framework and peer review of fraud risk in 2017;  Directive (EU) 2017/1371 on the fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law (PIF Directive);  Regulation 2017/1939 setting up the EPPO;  Proposal of 2018 to amend the OLAF Regulation 883/2013;  New Financial Regulation 2018/1046;  Initiative for a revision of the Financial Framework Regulation on decentralised agencies;  Proposals for post-2020 spending programmes;  Ongoing update of the Commission’s Anti-Fraud Strategy (CAFS).
Please see Commission's reply to paragraph 9. 
Please see Commission's reply to paragraph 9.
The legal constraints of the current irregularity reporting system and the complexity of the task have not been sufficiently reflected in the ECA report. 
The legal constraints of the current irregularity reporting system and the complexity of the task have not been sufficiently reflected in the ECA report.
The Commission is aware of certain limits of its reporting system but has progressively and continuously worked to improve the irregularity reporting by Member States (see Commission's replies to paragraphs 24 and 25). 
The Commission is aware of certain limits of its reporting system but has progressively and continuously worked to improve the irregularity reporting by Member States (see Commission's replies to paragraphs 24 and 25).
As the ECA itself indirectly acknowledges in paragraph 31, currently there is no other system (national or within the EU institutions) collecting data on fraud to the same level of detail as IMS. 
As the ECA itself indirectly acknowledges in paragraph 31, currently there is no other system (national or within the EU institutions) collecting data on fraud to the same level of detail as IMS.
There is no cost-effective method to estimate undetected fraud reliable and defendable enough for evidence-based policy (see Commission's replies to paragraphs 14–16). 
There is no cost-effective method to estimate undetected fraud reliable and defendable enough for evidence-based policy (see Commission's replies to paragraphs 14–16).
The methods mentioned by the ECA would not be well-suited in this specific context (see replies to paragraphs 33–37). 
The methods mentioned by the ECA would not be well-suited in this specific context (see replies to paragraphs 33–37).
The Commission agrees that the analysis of fraud patterns and vulnerabilities should be a priority while taking into account that such studies are very resource-intensive. 
The Commission agrees that the analysis of fraud patterns and vulnerabilities should be a priority while taking into account that such studies are very resource-intensive.
The Commission considers that an identification of the motivation of fraudsters would not add significant value to its fight against fraud. 
The Commission considers that an identification of the motivation of fraudsters would not add significant value to its fight against fraud.
Furthermore, some of the causes highlighted in the report have already been targeted by legislative proposals such as the 2018 Financial Regulation or the relevant risks have been duly taken into consideration in the audit activity of the Management and Control Systems in shared management. 
Furthermore, some of the causes highlighted in the report have already been targeted by legislative proposals such as the 2018 Financial Regulation or the relevant risks have been duly taken into consideration in the audit activity of the Management and Control Systems in shared management.
See Commission's replies to paragraphs 39–49. 
See Commission's replies to paragraphs 39–49.
In the domain of public procurement, the EU has broadened and facilitated market access, in particular for SMEs, with the reform of the Public Procurement Directives in 2014 and further initiatives. 
In the domain of public procurement, the EU has broadened and facilitated market access, in particular for SMEs, with the reform of the Public Procurement Directives in 2014 and further initiatives.
Those policy impulses, aiming at e.g. enhanced transparency, more digitalised processes and simplification, are also reflected in the new Financial Regulation and will contribute to reducing the risk of corruption. 
Those policy impulses, aiming at e.g. enhanced transparency, more digitalised processes and simplification, are also reflected in the new Financial Regulation and will contribute to reducing the risk of corruption.
Recommendation 1 – Gain better insight into the scale, nature and causes of fraud in EU spending The Commission partially accepts the recommendation. 
Recommendation 1 – Gain better insight into the scale, nature and causes of fraud in EU spending The Commission partially accepts the recommendation.
The Commission is committed to further improve the reporting of irregularities and fraud and the analysis of the nature of fraud on the basis of tailored data collection and a better understanding of the overall anti-fraud framework in the different Member States. 
The Commission is committed to further improve the reporting of irregularities and fraud and the analysis of the nature of fraud on the basis of tailored data collection and a better understanding of the overall anti-fraud framework in the different Member States.
It is, however, not possible to establish an estimate of the scale of the undetected level of fraud which is reliable and defendable enough for evidence-based policy, also taking into account the constraint of the efficient use of the limited resources available to the Commission. a) The Commission partially accepts recommendation 1 a). 
It is, however, not possible to establish an estimate of the scale of the undetected level of fraud which is reliable and defendable enough for evidence-based policy, also taking into account the constraint of the efficient use of the limited resources available to the Commission. a) The Commission partially accepts recommendation 1 a).
The Commission agrees to enhance IMS further, subject to a feasibility study and availability of resources. 
The Commission agrees to enhance IMS further, subject to a feasibility study and availability of resources.
The inclusion of all spending areas may imply significant development costs and may impact significantly on the overall performance of IMS. 
The inclusion of all spending areas may imply significant development costs and may impact significantly on the overall performance of IMS.
It would also require legislative proposals. 
It would also require legislative proposals.
From the Commission’s point of view, integrating completed OLAF investigations should in principle be possible. 
From the Commission’s point of view, integrating completed OLAF investigations should in principle be possible.
However, due to data protection rules and confidentiality requirements, ongoing investigations would have to be excluded. 
However, due to data protection rules and confidentiality requirements, ongoing investigations would have to be excluded.
Also for completed investigations, reporting should be done by the Member States in order to ensure that national confidentiality rules on criminal investigations are respected. 
Also for completed investigations, reporting should be done by the Member States in order to ensure that national confidentiality rules on criminal investigations are respected.
Furthermore, as regards investigations by the future EPPO, it is not up to the Commission to make any commitment. 
Furthermore, as regards investigations by the future EPPO, it is not up to the Commission to make any commitment.
It should also be pointed out that the Commission proposed in 2014 abolishing the threshold of EUR 10000 as of which Member States must report investigations concerning fraudulent irregularities in IMS. 
It should also be pointed out that the Commission proposed in 2014 abolishing the threshold of EUR 10000 as of which Member States must report investigations concerning fraudulent irregularities in IMS.
Member States, however, rejected this proposal. b) The Commission partially accepts recommendation 1 b). 
Member States, however, rejected this proposal. b) The Commission partially accepts recommendation 1 b).
The Commission intends to enhance the analysis of the risks of fraud and corruption against the EU budget, including the analysis of the nature and causes of fraud. 
The Commission intends to enhance the analysis of the risks of fraud and corruption against the EU budget, including the analysis of the nature and causes of fraud.
In this context, risk indicators could be identified. 
In this context, risk indicators could be identified.
The methods suggested by the ECA (encounter surveys and indexes based on administrative data) are, however, not suitable for the EU budget and their cost would not be justified in relation to the expected results. 
The methods suggested by the ECA (encounter surveys and indexes based on administrative data) are, however, not suitable for the EU budget and their cost would not be justified in relation to the expected results.
While the Commission's anti-fraud strategies currently use few measurable objectives and indicators, general principles and priorities set out in anti-fraud strategies contribute to a coherent approach in the Commission's fight against fraud (see Commission replies to paragraphs 59–64). 
While the Commission's anti-fraud strategies currently use few measurable objectives and indicators, general principles and priorities set out in anti-fraud strategies contribute to a coherent approach in the Commission's fight against fraud (see Commission replies to paragraphs 59–64).