natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission wishes to be fully transparent on beneficiaries of EU funds, within the limitations set by the current regulatory framework. 
The Commission wishes to be fully transparent on beneficiaries of EU funds, within the limitations set by the current regulatory framework.
However, while the term “NGO” is widely used, it has no generally accepted definition either at the international level3, or at EU level. 
However, while the term “NGO” is widely used, it has no generally accepted definition either at the international level3, or at EU level.
This is the reason why the Commission has, on its own initiative, developed a system whereby organisations declare themselves as NGOs, under the pre-requisite that the legal entity concerned is flagged as both a private and not-for-profit organisation. 
This is the reason why the Commission has, on its own initiative, developed a system whereby organisations declare themselves as NGOs, under the pre-requisite that the legal entity concerned is flagged as both a private and not-for-profit organisation.
Although it may result in different groups of recipients than what stems from concepts applied at national level, the Commission prefers to follow this prudent approach, which is based on objective and verifiable criteria. 
Although it may result in different groups of recipients than what stems from concepts applied at national level, the Commission prefers to follow this prudent approach, which is based on objective and verifiable criteria.
The Commission considers that any further criteria would require an EU level harmonisation of the concept of NGO which should be agreed by the legislator. 
The Commission considers that any further criteria would require an EU level harmonisation of the concept of NGO which should be agreed by the legislator.
A cross-country analysis of the legal framework of NGOs in six European 3 International organisations use different definitions. 
A cross-country analysis of the legal framework of NGOs in six European 3 International organisations use different definitions.
For instance, the United Nations (UN) describes an NGO as any “not-for-profit, voluntary citizens’ group that is organized at a local, national or international level” (https://outreach.un.org/ngorelations/content/about-us-0). 7 
For instance, the United Nations (UN) describes an NGO as any “not-for-profit, voluntary citizens’ group that is organized at a local, national or international level” (https://outreach.un.org/ngorelations/content/about-us-0). 7
and non-European jurisdictions indicates diverse understandings and designations of “NGO” between countries, and this suggests that harmonisation of the concept may be problematic.4 68. 
and non-European jurisdictions indicates diverse understandings and designations of “NGO” between countries, and this suggests that harmonisation of the concept may be problematic.4 68.
The Commission departments use the flexibility included in the Financial Regulation to deliver aid in various ways. 
The Commission departments use the flexibility included in the Financial Regulation to deliver aid in various ways.
The rules outlined under the previous FR (Article 137) concerning the provision of financial support to third parties allowed for exceptions (e.g. the possibility to exceed the amount of EUR 60 000 in cases where the financial support is the primary aim of the action). 
The rules outlined under the previous FR (Article 137) concerning the provision of financial support to third parties allowed for exceptions (e.g. the possibility to exceed the amount of EUR 60 000 in cases where the financial support is the primary aim of the action).
Therefore, their application in a specific context, such as the one of humanitarian aid, could result in differing practices between the services, which do not however imply an incorrect application of the rules and procedures. 
Therefore, their application in a specific context, such as the one of humanitarian aid, could result in differing practices between the services, which do not however imply an incorrect application of the rules and procedures.
When providing aid through financial support to third parties, specific operational contexts, such as humanitarian aid, are now acknowledged in the new Financial Regulation, which includes under Article 204(last sentence) that "this threshold may be exceeded where achieving the objectives of the actions would otherwise be impossible or overly difficult". 
When providing aid through financial support to third parties, specific operational contexts, such as humanitarian aid, are now acknowledged in the new Financial Regulation, which includes under Article 204(last sentence) that "this threshold may be exceeded where achieving the objectives of the actions would otherwise be impossible or overly difficult".
Recommendation 2 – Check the application of rules for sub-granting The Commission accepts this recommendation. (a) The Commission accepts this recommendation. 
Recommendation 2 – Check the application of rules for sub-granting The Commission accepts this recommendation. (a) The Commission accepts this recommendation.
The Commission considers that the changes introduced in the new Financial Regulation will ensure the consistent application of rules regarding sub-granting. (b) The Commission accepts this recommendation. 
The Commission considers that the changes introduced in the new Financial Regulation will ensure the consistent application of rules regarding sub-granting. (b) The Commission accepts this recommendation.
The Commission actively monitors the implementation of projects and may conduct the necessary checks on the selection of UN implementing partners in accordance with the relevant legal framework. 
The Commission actively monitors the implementation of projects and may conduct the necessary checks on the selection of UN implementing partners in accordance with the relevant legal framework.
Furthermore, under indirect management, ex ante pillar assessments provide assurance to the Commission that it can rely on the systems, rules and procedures of the entrusted entity (including rules and procedures on providing financing to third parties, e.g. through sub-granting and procurement)(see Article 154 of the new Financial Regulation), as they are deemed equivalent to the ones used by the Commission. 
Furthermore, under indirect management, ex ante pillar assessments provide assurance to the Commission that it can rely on the systems, rules and procedures of the entrusted entity (including rules and procedures on providing financing to third parties, e.g. through sub-granting and procurement)(see Article 154 of the new Financial Regulation), as they are deemed equivalent to the ones used by the Commission.
If assessed positively, these systems, rules and procedures guarantee the protection of the financial interests of the Union. 
If assessed positively, these systems, rules and procedures guarantee the protection of the financial interests of the Union.
The Commission refers to its answers in paragraphs 43 and 44. 
The Commission refers to its answers in paragraphs 43 and 44.
In accordance with the relevant legal framework the Commission may: - Request the beneficiaries to make available all financial information concerning a project; - Conduct checks, including on-the-spot checks, related to the EU-funded operations. 
In accordance with the relevant legal framework the Commission may: - Request the beneficiaries to make available all financial information concerning a project; - Conduct checks, including on-the-spot checks, related to the EU-funded operations.
Recommendation 3 – Improve information on funds implemented by NGOs The Commission accepts this recommendation 4 European Parliament, Directorate-General for internal policies, Policy Department D: budgetary affairs, study « Democratic Accountability and Budgetary Control of Non-Governmental Organisations funded by the EU Budget”, 17 November 2016 8 
Recommendation 3 – Improve information on funds implemented by NGOs The Commission accepts this recommendation 4 European Parliament, Directorate-General for internal policies, Policy Department D: budgetary affairs, study « Democratic Accountability and Budgetary Control of Non-Governmental Organisations funded by the EU Budget”, 17 November 2016 8
(a) The Commission accepts this recommendation. 
(a) The Commission accepts this recommendation.
The different grant management systems reflect the specificities of set up for the different policies, including the modalities of contracting. 
The different grant management systems reflect the specificities of set up for the different policies, including the modalities of contracting.
For external relations, this will depend on the features of OPSYS. 
For external relations, this will depend on the features of OPSYS.
In certain policy areas (e.g. research), this is already done. (b) The Commission accepts this recommendation. 
In certain policy areas (e.g. research), this is already done. (b) The Commission accepts this recommendation.
In certain policy areas (e.g. research), this is already done. (c) The Commission accepts this recommendation The Commission actively monitors the implementation of projects and may, where deemed necessary, conduct the necessary checks in accordance with the relevant delegation/contribution/financing agreement and the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) concluded with the UN. 
In certain policy areas (e.g. research), this is already done. (c) The Commission accepts this recommendation The Commission actively monitors the implementation of projects and may, where deemed necessary, conduct the necessary checks in accordance with the relevant delegation/contribution/financing agreement and the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) concluded with the UN.
In accordance with these agreements, the execution of the delegation/contribution/financing agreement and the obligations contained therein, including on costs, may be subject to scrutiny of the Commission, or any of its authorised representatives. 
In accordance with these agreements, the execution of the delegation/contribution/financing agreement and the obligations contained therein, including on costs, may be subject to scrutiny of the Commission, or any of its authorised representatives.
Furthermore, in indirect management, an ex ante pillar assessment provides assurance that the Commission can rely on the systems, rules and procedures of the entrusted entity, as they are deemed equivalent to the ones used by the Commission. 
Furthermore, in indirect management, an ex ante pillar assessment provides assurance that the Commission can rely on the systems, rules and procedures of the entrusted entity, as they are deemed equivalent to the ones used by the Commission.
Recommendation 4 – Standardise and improve accuracy of information published The Commission accepts the recommendation (a) The Commission accepts this recommendation. (b) The Commission accepts this recommendation. (c) The Commission accepts this recommendation. 
Recommendation 4 – Standardise and improve accuracy of information published The Commission accepts the recommendation (a) The Commission accepts this recommendation. (b) The Commission accepts this recommendation. (c) The Commission accepts this recommendation.
The Commission actively monitors the implementation of projects and may conduct the necessary checks on the fulfillment of UN bodies of the disclosure obligations, in accordance with the relevant legal framework. 
The Commission actively monitors the implementation of projects and may conduct the necessary checks on the fulfillment of UN bodies of the disclosure obligations, in accordance with the relevant legal framework.
9 Приемане на окончателния доклад след съгласувателната процедура 5.12.2018 г. Получаване на официалните отговори на Комисията (или друг одитиран обект) на всички езици EN: 11.12.2018 г. 
9
За периода 2014—2017 г. Комисията е отпуснала приблизително 11,3 млрд. евро за усвояване от НПО в различни области на политиките на ЕС. 
During 2014-2017, the Commission committed an estimated €11.3 billion for implementation by NGOs in many different EU policy areas.
Одитът на Сметната палата провери прозрачността на усвояването на средствата на ЕС от НПО и обърна особено внимание на външната дейност сред всички политики — най-голямата област, в която средствата на ЕС се усвояват от неправителствени организации. 
Our audit examined the transparency of EU funds implemented by NGOs with special focus on the external action, amongst all policy areas, the largest area where EU funds are implemented by NGOs.
ЕСП констатира, че извършваното от Комисията обозначаване на субекти като НПО в нейните системи не е надеждно. 
We found that the Commission’s identification of entities as NGOs in its systems is not reliable.
Сметната палата оцени подбора на Комисията на проекти, ръководени от НПО, като прозрачен в по-голямата част от случаите. 
We assessed the Commission’s selection of NGO-led projects as generally transparent.
При някои от одитираните органи на ООН обаче процедурите за подбор на НПО не са прозрачни. 
However, for some of the audited UN bodies, the selection processes of NGOs were not transparent.
Комисията невинаги е събирала и проверявала изчерпателна информация за всички финансирани НПО. 
The Commission does not always collect and check comprehensive information on all NGOs supported.
Информацията за усвоените от НПО средства на ЕС се публикува в няколко системи, но оповестената информация е ограничена. 
The information on EU funds implemented by NGOs is published in several systems but the information disclosed is limited.
Заключението на ЕСП е, че Комисията не е работила достатъчно прозрачно по отношение на разходването на средствата на ЕС за НПО и са необходими допълнителни усилия за повишаване на прозрачността. 
We conclude that the Commission was not sufficiently transparent regarding the implementation of EU funds by NGOs, and that more efforts are needed to improve it.
Освен това Сметната палата формулира редица препоръки за подобряване на прозрачността при усвояването на средства на ЕС от неправителствени организации. 
Furthermore, we formulated a number of recommendations for improving the transparency of the EU funds implemented by NGOs.
BG 2019 Специален доклад No 01 Борба с измамите при разходването на средства от ЕС — необходими са действия (съгласно член 287, параграф 4, втора алинея от ДФЕС) 
EN 2019 Special Report NO 01 Fighting fraud in EU spending: action needed (pursuant to Article 287(4), second subparagraph, TFEU)
Кpатко изложение Описание на настоящия одит I Измамата представлява всяко умишлено действие или бездействие, предназначено да въведе другите в заблуждение, в резултата на което потърпевшото лице претърпява загуба, а извършителят получава облага. 
Executive summary About this audit I Fraud refers to any intentional act or omission designed to deceive others, resulting in the victim suffering a loss and the perpetrator achieving a gain.
Измамите с публични средства често се свързват с корупция, под която обикновено се разбира всяко действие или бездействие, при което се злоупотребява с власт или което има за цел да доведе до злоупотреба с власт, за да се получи неправомерна изгода. 
Fraud involving public funds is often linked with corruption, which is generally understood as any act or omission that abuses official authority, or seeks to bring about the abuse of official authority, in order to obtain undue benefit.
II Комисията и държавите членки носят споделена отговорност за защитата на финансовите интереси на ЕС срещу измами и корупция. 
II The Commission and the Member States have a shared responsibility to protect the EU’s financial interests against fraud and corruption.
В момента Европейската служба за борба с измамите (OLAF) е основният орган на ЕС за борба с измамите. 
The European anti-fraud office (OLAF) is currently the EU’s key anti-fraud body.
Тя допринася за разработването и изпълнението на политиката на Комисията за борба с измамите и провежда административни разследвания на измамите, засягащи бюджета на ЕС. 
It contributes to the design and implementation of the Commission’s anti-fraud policy and conducts administrative investigation into fraud against the EU budget.
През 2020 г. ще започне да функционира Европейска прокуратура (EPPO), която ще разполага с правомощия да повдига и поддържа обвинения за престъпления, засягащи финансовите интереси на ЕС в 22 държави членки. 
In 2020, a European Public Prosecutor Office (EPPO) will start operating, with powers to prosecute crimes against the EU’s financial interests in 22 Member States.
III Тъй като предотвратяването и разкриването на измами е важно за финансовото управление на ЕС, Сметната палата реши да извърши одит на изпълнението на осъществяваното от Комисията управление на риска от измами при разходването на средства от ЕС. 
III As fraud prevention and detection are important for the EU’s financial management, we decided to undertake a performance audit on the Commission’s management of fraud risk in EU spending.
По-специално Сметната палата провери: — стратегията на Комисията за борба с измамите и нейните инструменти за предотвратяване на измами, както и дали тя има достъп до подходящи данни относно мащабите, естеството и причините за измамите при разходването на средства от ЕС; — дали административните разследвания на OLAF са довели до образувани съдебни производства и възстановяване на средства. 
In particular, we examined: — the Commission’s anti-fraud strategy, its fraud prevention tools and whether it has access to appropriate data on the scale, nature and causes of fraud in EU spending; — whether OLAF’s administrative investigations have led to prosecution and recovery.
IV Сметната палата също така разгледа условията за създаване на Европейската прокуратура и извърши анализ дали новият орган притежава потенциала да се справи с настоящите слабости. 
IV We also considered the arrangements for establishing the EPPO and analysed whether the new body has the potential to address the current weaknesses.
Констатации на Сметната палата V През последните десет години Комисията предприе стъпки за борба с измамите, засягащи бюджета на ЕС. 
What we found V Over the last ten years, the Commission has taken steps to fight fraud against the EU budget.
По-специално през 2011 г. тя прие „Стратегия на Комисията за борба с измамите“ (СКБИ), като всяка главна дирекция (ГД) или група от ГД прилага своя собствена оперативна стратегия за борба с измамите. 
In particular, it adopted the ‘Commission Anti-fraud Strategy’ (CAFS) in 2011, and each Directorate-General (DGs) or group of DGs implements its own operational anti-fraud strategy.
Комисията също така създаде „Система за ранно откриване и отстраняване“ (EDES) и междуинституционална група, която предоставя консултации относно отстраняването на икономически оператори от финансирането от ЕС на основание измама или корупция, в допълнение към други възможни причини. 
The Commission has also established an ‘Early Detection and Exclusion System’ (EDES), and an inter-institutional panel which advises on whether to exclude economic operators from EU financing on the grounds of fraud or corruption, among other possible 5 reasons.
Всяка година Комисията представя доклад пред Европейския парламент и Съвета, озаглавен „Защита на финансовите интереси на Европейския съюз“ („доклад относно ЗФИ“). 
Each year, the Commission presents to the European Parliament and the Council a report on the ‘Protection of the Financial Interests of the Union’ (the ‘PIF report’).
VI Сметната палата обаче констатира, че Комисията не разполага с изчерпателна информация относно мащабите, естеството и причините за измамите. 
VI However, we found that the Commission lacks comprehensive information on the scale, nature and causes of fraud.
Официалните статистически данни на Комисията за разкритите измами са непълни, като до момента тя не е извършвала оценка на неразкритите измами. 
Its official statistics on detected fraud are not complete and it has so far not carried out any assessment of undetected fraud.
Съществува известна информация за моделите и схемите за измами, използвани в различните сектори. 
Some information is available on fraud patterns and schemes used in different sectors.
Липсва подробен анализ на причините, които подтикват някои получатели на средства от ЕС да извършват измами. 
There is no detailed analysis to identify what causes some recipients of EU money to behave fraudulently.
Тази липса на информация намалява практическата стойност на стратегическите планове на Комисията, като например СКБИ, която не е актуализирана от 2011 г. 
This lack of information reduces the practical value of the Commission’s strategic plans, such as the CAFS, which has not been updated since 2011.
VII Настоящият подход, при който OLAF предприема административни разследвания след получаване на информация от други източници и при който често след разследването от OLAF на съмнение за измама се образува наказателно разследване на национално ниво, в значителен брой случаи отнема твърде много време, което намалява шансовете за достигане до наказателно преследване. 
VII The current approach, whereby OLAF launches administrative investigations after receiving information from other sources and whereby OLAF’s investigation of suspected fraud is often followed by a criminal investigation at national level, takes up much time in a considerable number of cases and thus it decreases the chances to achieve prosecution.
В резултат на това разследванията на OLAF водят до наказателно преследване за предполагаемите извършители на измама в около 45 % от случаите. 
As a result, OLAF investigations result in the prosecution of suspected fraudsters in about 45 % of cases.
Що се отнася до възстановяването на неправомерно изплатени средства на ЕС, в редица случаи генералните дирекции констатират, че окончателните доклади на OLAF не предоставят достатъчно информация, която да се използва като основание за стартиране на процедура за събиране на недължимо платени средства. 
As for the recovery of unduly paid EU money, in a number of cases, the DGs find that OLAF’s Final Reports do not provide sufficient information to serve as a basis for initiating the recovery of unduly disbursed funds.
В тези случаи генералните дирекции предприемат (сами или чрез външен изпълнител) по-нататъшни действия с цел да решат дали е възможно да възстановят сумата, препоръчана от OLAF, или разчитат на доказателствата, събрани чрез техните собствени одити. 
In such cases, the DGs take (or outsource) further action in order to decide whether it is possible to recover the amount recommended by OLAF or they rely on evidence gathered through their own audits.
VIII Сметната палата счита създаването на Европейската прокуратура (в която ще участват 22 държави членки) за стъпка в правилната посока, но действащият регламент 6 
VIII We consider establishing the EPPO (in which 22 Member States will participate) to be a step in the right direction, but the current regulation poses several risks.
Вероятно най-сериозният от тях засяга разкриването и разследването, които ще се извършват предимно от следователите на държавите членки под ръководството на Европейската прокуратура (EPPO). 
Probably the most serious of these concerns the detection and investigation, which will be carried out primarily by the Member States’ investigators under the authority of the EPPO.
Регламентът не въвежда механизъм, който да позволява на Европейската прокуратура (или на някой друг орган на ЕС) да изисква от органите на държавите членки да отделят ресурси за активната работа, която е необходима за разследването на измами при разходването на средства от ЕС, или за случаите, с които се занимават делегираните прокурори. 
The regulation does not put in place any mechanism enabling the EPPO (or any other EU body) to urge Member State authorities to allocate resources to the pro-active work necessary for the investigation of fraud in EU spending, or to the cases handled by the delegated prosecutors.