natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Golden, Miriam и Picci, Lucio (2005 г.), Proposal for a New Measure of Corruption, and Tests using Italian Data, Economics and Politics („Предложение за нова мярка за корупцията и за тестове, като се използват италианските данни, икономика и политика“). 
Golden, Miriam and Picci, Lucio (2005), Proposal for a New Measure of Corruption, and Tests using Italian Data, Economics and Politics.
Том 17, 2005 г., стр. 37 – 75. 
17, 2005, pp. 37-75.
Mark Button и Jim Gee (2015 г.), The financial cost of fraud 2015 - What the latest data from around the world shows („Финансовата цена на измамите за 2015 г. – Какво показват последните данни от целия свят“), PKF Littlejohn LLP и PKF; вж. също така Brooks, G., Button, M. и Gee, J. 
Mark Button and Jim Gee (2015), The financial cost of fraud 2015 - What the latest data from around the world shows, PKF Littlejohn LLP and PKF; See also Brooks, G., Button, M. and Gee, J.
(2012 г.), The scale of healthcare fraud: a global evaluation („Мащабите на измамите в здравеопазването: глобална оценка“), Security Journal, т. 
(2012), The scale of healthcare fraud: a global evaluation, Security Journal, Vol.
25, бр. 2, стр. 76 – 87. 
25 No. 2, pp. 76-87.
Mark Button, Chris Lewis, David Shepherd, Graham Brooks и Alison Wakefield (2012 г.), Fraud and Punishment: Enhancing Deterrence Through More Effective Sanctions („Измама и наказание: засилване на възпиращия ефект чрез по-ефективни санкции“), Centre for Counter Fraud Studies, University of Portsmouth. 
Mark Button, Chris Lewis, David Shepherd, Graham Brooks and Alison Wakefield (2012), Fraud and Punishment: Enhancing Deterrence Through More Effective Sanctions, Centre for Counter Fraud Studies, University of Portsmouth.
Mihaly Fazekas и Peter Lawrence King (2018 г.), Perils of development funding? 
Mihaly Fazekas and Peter Lawrence King (2018), Perils of development funding?
The tale of EU Funds and grand corruption in Central and Eastern Europe („Рискове от финансирането за развитие? 
The tale of EU Funds and grand corruption in Central and Eastern Europe.
Regulation & Governance 2018, стр. 14 – 15. 
Regulation & Governance 2018, pp. 14-15.
Mihaly Fazekas и Gábor Kocsis (2017 г.), Uncovering High-Level Corruption: Cross-National Corruption Proxies Using Public Procurement Data („Разкриване на случаите на корупция на високо равнище: показатели за междунационална корупция, за които се използват данни за обществените поръчки“). 
Mihaly Fazekas and Gábor Kocsis (2017), Uncovering High-Level Corruption: Cross-National Corruption Proxies Using Public Procurement Data.
British Journal of Political Science, на разположение онлайн. 
British Journal of Political Science, av. online.
Mihaly Fazekas, István János Tóth и Peter Lawrence King (2016 г.), An Objective Corruption Risk Index Using Public Procurement Data („Индекс за обективния риск от корупция, за който се използват данни за обществените поръчки“). 
Mihaly Fazekas, István János Tóth and Peter Lawrence King (2016), An Objective Corruption Risk Index Using Public Procurement Data.
European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research, 22(3), стр. 
European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research, 22(3), pp. 369–397.
Mihaly Fazekas и István János Tóth (2017 г.), Corruption in EU Funds? 
Mihaly Fazekas and István János Tóth (2017), Corruption in EU Funds?
Europe-wide evidence on the corruption effect of EU-funded public contracting („Корупция при фондовете на ЕС? 
Europe-wide evidence on the corruption effect of EU-funded public contracting.
In J. Bachtler и др. (редактори.), EU Cohesion Policy. 
In J. Bachtler et al (Eds.), EU Cohesion Policy.
Reassessing performance and direction („Политиката на сближаване на ЕС. 
Reassessing performance and direction.
Routledge, Лондон, стр. 
Routledge, London, p.
186 – 205. 
186-205.
Paulo Mauro (1996 г.), The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment and Government Expenditure („Влиянието на корупцията върху растежа, инвестициите и държавните разходи“), Международен валутен фонд, WP/96/98. 
Paulo Mauro (1996), The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment and Government Expenditure, International Monetary Fund, WP/96/98.
Paulo Mauro (1998 г.), Corruption and the composition of government expenditure („Корупцията и структурата на държавните разходи“), Международен валутен фонд, Journal of Public Economics 69. 
62 Paulo Mauro (1998), Corruption and the composition of government expenditure, International Monetary Fund, Journal of Public Economics 69.
Jajkowicz, O. и Drobiszova, A. 
Jajkowicz, O. and Drobiszova, A.
(2015 г.), The Effect of Corruption on Government Expenditure Allocation in OECD Countries („Влиянието на корупцията върху разпределянето на държавните разходи в държавите от ОИСР“), Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, т. 63. 
(2015), The Effect of Corruption on Government Expenditure Allocation in OECD Countries, Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Volume 63. 63
76 Акроними и съкращения АФКОС Координационни служби за борба с измамите ГД Генерална дирекция ГДУИ Годишен доклад за управление и изпълнение ГОД Годишен отчет за дейността ЗФИ Защита на финансовите интереси на Европейския съюз ИОСА Институции, органи, служби и агенции на ЕС МФР Многогодишна финансова рамка ОРБК Оправомощен разпоредител с бюджетни кредити СБИ Стратегия за борба с измамите СЕС Съд на Европейския съюз СКБИ Стратегия на Комисията за борба с измамите СУН Система за управление на нередностите EDES Система за ранно откриване и отстраняване EPPO Европейска прокуратура OLAF Европейска служба за борба с измамите PACA: Първоначално заключение по административен или съдебен ред 
Acronyms and abbreviations AAR: Annual activity report AFCOS: Anti-fraud coordination services AFS: Anti-fraud strategy AMPR: Annual management and performance report AOD: Authorising officer by delegation CAFS: Commission anti-fraud strategy DG: Directorate-General ECJ: European Court of Justice EDES: Early detection and exclusion system EPPO: European Public Prosecutor’s Office IBOAs: EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies IMS: Irregularity management system MFF: Multi-annual financial framework OLAF: European Anti-fraud Office PACA: Primary administrative or judicial finding PIF: Protection of the European Union’s financial interests 64
По-добро регулиране: Разработване на политики и закони, които да постигнат своите цели при минимални разходи. 
Glossary Better regulation: The design of policies and laws so that they achieve their objectives at minimum cost.
По-доброто регулиране се изразява в това да се гарантира, че ЕС действително постига амбициозните цели на политиките, които си е поставил. 
Better regulation is about making sure that the EU actually delivers on the ambitious policy goals it has set itself.
Идеята е да се гарантира, че избраното решение във връзка с политиката е най-доброто за постигането на тези цели и създава възможно най-малка тежест. 
It is about ensuring that the policy solution chosen is the best and least burdensome way to reach those objectives.
Този начин на функциониране има за цел да гарантира, че политическите решения се изготвят по открит и прозрачен начин, въз основа на най-добрите налични доказателства, и се подкрепят от широкото участие на заинтересованите страни. 
It is a way of working to ensure that political decisions are prepared in an open, transparent manner, informed by the best available evidence and backed by the comprehensive involvement of stakeholders.
(Източник: Инструментариум за по-добро регулиране). 
(Source: Better regulation toolbox).
Разкрита измама: Разкритата измама включва предполагаема и установена измама. 
Detected fraud: Detected fraud includes suspected and established fraud.
Система за ранно откриване и отстраняване (EDES): EDES е новата система за отстраняване, създадена от Комисията от 1 януари 2016 г., за да се защитят финансовите интереси на ЕС срещу ненадеждни икономически оператори. 
Early detection and exclusion system (EDES): The EDES is the new debarment system established by the Commission as of 1 January 2016 to protect the EU's financial interests against unreliable economic operators.
Нейната цел е да улесни ранното откриване на такива оператори, тяхното отстраняване от получаването на средства от ЕС, налагането на финансови санкции и в най-тежките случаи — публикуване на информация, свързана с отстраняването или финансовата санкция. 
Its purpose is to facilitate the early detection of such operators, their exclusion from receiving EU funds, the imposition of financial penalties and, in the most severe cases, the publication of information related to such exclusions or penalties.
Система за управление на нередностите (СУН): Системата за управление на нередностите е обезопасен електронен инструмент за докладване, управление 
Irregularity Management System (IMS): The Irregularity Management System is a secure electronic tool for reporting, management and analysis of irregularities.
СУН е част от Информационната система за борба с измамите (AFIS), разработена и поддържана от OLAF, която улеснява обмена на информация между OLAF и съответните администрации. 
IMS is part of the Anti-fraud Information System (AFIS), developed and maintained by OLAF, which facilitates the exchange of information between OLAF and relevant administrations.
Съдебно преследване: Решение на прокурора да обвини обвиняемия в извършване на престъпление. 
Prosecution: A prosecutor’s decision to charge the defendant with a crime.
Съмнение за измама: Нередност, която води до образуване на административно или съдебно производство на национално ниво, с цел да се установи дали става въпрос за умишлено поведение, категоризирано от Комисията и държавите членки като „съмнение за измама“. 
Suspected fraud: An irregularity that gives rise to the initiation of administrative or judicial proceedings being brought at national level to establish whether behaviour was intentional is categorised by the Commission and Member States as ‘suspected fraud’.
REPLIES OF THE COMMISSION TO THE SPECIAL REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS "FIGHTING FRAUD IN EU SPENDING: ACTION NEEDED" EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Introduction The Commission agrees with the ECA on the importance of fighting fraud in EU spending and therefore welcomes the decision of the Court to do a Special Report on the topic. 
REPLIES OF THE COMMISSION TO THE SPECIAL REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS "FIGHTING FRAUD IN EU SPENDING: ACTION NEEDED" EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Introduction The Commission agrees with the ECA on the importance of fighting fraud in EU spending and therefore welcomes the decision of the Court to do a Special Report on the topic.
It is a complex and multi-faceted subject matter that challenges any observer attempting to get an overview. 
It is a complex and multi-faceted subject matter that challenges any observer attempting to get an overview.
This challenge is heightened by factors such as the joint responsibility of the Commission and the Member States for the protection of the financial interests of the EU and the multitude of actors involved in the fight against fraud at both levels. 
This challenge is heightened by factors such as the joint responsibility of the Commission and the Member States for the protection of the financial interests of the EU and the multitude of actors involved in the fight against fraud at both levels.
The ECA, although an experienced observer, does not take these factors fully into account. 
The ECA, although an experienced observer, does not take these factors fully into account.
Because of the importance it attaches to financial management and control in general, and to fighting fraud specifically, the Commission created OLAF and reformed its entire system for financial management and control almost 20 years ago, allowing the College of Commissioners to take overall political responsibility for the management of the budget. 
Because of the importance it attaches to financial management and control in general, and to fighting fraud specifically, the Commission created OLAF and reformed its entire system for financial management and control almost 20 years ago, allowing the College of Commissioners to take overall political responsibility for the management of the budget.
The architecture of this system has since been continuously improved and refined through sustained efforts by the Commission, not least thanks to successive audits by the ECA (notably two Special Reports on OLAF in 2005 and 2011). 
The architecture of this system has since been continuously improved and refined through sustained efforts by the Commission, not least thanks to successive audits by the ECA (notably two Special Reports on OLAF in 2005 and 2011).
These efforts have been intensified in recent years, with the first CAFS of 2011 which is currently being updated, the creation of EDES in 2016, the updated internal control framework of 2017, the new Financial Regulation of 2018, the recent proposal to revise the OLAF Regulation and the ongoing process of setting up the EPPO, just to mention a few of numerous initiatives. 
These efforts have been intensified in recent years, with the first CAFS of 2011 which is currently being updated, the creation of EDES in 2016, the updated internal control framework of 2017, the new Financial Regulation of 2018, the recent proposal to revise the OLAF Regulation and the ongoing process of setting up the EPPO, just to mention a few of numerous initiatives.
The Commission also considers that the benefits of these initiatives, and the overall progress achieved in the past years aimed at reinforcing the financial management and control system of the Commission, are substantial. 
The Commission also considers that the benefits of these initiatives, and the overall progress achieved in the past years aimed at reinforcing the financial management and control system of the Commission, are substantial.
The Commission would furthermore like to emphasise that it focuses its limited financial and human resources on areas where it can make the biggest difference, ensuring the highest level of cost-effectiveness, and respecting the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. 
The Commission would furthermore like to emphasise that it focuses its limited financial and human resources on areas where it can make the biggest difference, ensuring the highest level of cost-effectiveness, and respecting the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity.
This means that it has deliberately chosen not to perform some of the activities that the ECA is suggesting it should perform in the present Special Report. 
This means that it has deliberately chosen not to perform some of the activities that the ECA is suggesting it should perform in the present Special Report.
The Commission is currently considering the resource implications of the recommendations of the ECA in the context of the ongoing revision of the CAFS. 
The Commission is currently considering the resource implications of the recommendations of the ECA in the context of the ongoing revision of the CAFS.
V. The specific issues raised by the ECA regarding the Commission's anti-fraud policy cannot be seen in isolation from the important developments listed below:  Revision of the Staff Regulations for officials and other servants of the European Union in 2013;  Updated integrated control framework and peer review of fraud risk in 2017;Directive (EU) 2017/1371 on the fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law (PIF Directive);  Regulation 2017/1939 setting up the EPPO;  Proposal of 2018 to amend the OLAF Regulation 883/2013;  New Financial Regulation 2018/1046;  Initiative for a revision of the Financial Framework Regulation on decentralised agencies;  Proposals for post-2020 spending programmes; 1 
V. The specific issues raised by the ECA regarding the Commission's anti-fraud policy cannot be seen in isolation from the important developments listed below:  Revision of the Staff Regulations for officials and other servants of the European Union in 2013;  Updated integrated control framework and peer review of fraud risk in 2017;Directive (EU) 2017/1371 on the fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law (PIF Directive);  Regulation 2017/1939 setting up the EPPO;  Proposal of 2018 to amend the OLAF Regulation 883/2013;  New Financial Regulation 2018/1046;  Initiative for a revision of the Financial Framework Regulation on decentralised agencies;  Proposals for post-2020 spending programmes; 1
 Ongoing update of the Commission’s Anti-Fraud Strategy (CAFS). 
 Ongoing update of the Commission’s Anti-Fraud Strategy (CAFS).
It should be noted that the recommendations of the EDES Panel go much beyond cases of fraud or corruption: they encompass also, inter alia grave professional misconduct, serious breach of contractual obligations, irregularities in the meaning of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95. 
It should be noted that the recommendations of the EDES Panel go much beyond cases of fraud or corruption: they encompass also, inter alia grave professional misconduct, serious breach of contractual obligations, irregularities in the meaning of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95.
There is no cost-effective method to estimate undetected fraud reliable and defendable enough for evidence-based policy. 
There is no cost-effective method to estimate undetected fraud reliable and defendable enough for evidence-based policy.
The methods mentioned by the ECA would not be well-suited in this specific context (see Commission's replies to paragraphs 14–16, 33–37). 
The methods mentioned by the ECA would not be well-suited in this specific context (see Commission's replies to paragraphs 14–16, 33–37).
In its annual PIF Report, the Commission provides statistics on suspected and detected fraud based on the reporting of the Member States. 
In its annual PIF Report, the Commission provides statistics on suspected and detected fraud based on the reporting of the Member States.
The current reporting system represents a good practice in the field of data collection on fraud and is continuously improving. 
The current reporting system represents a good practice in the field of data collection on fraud and is continuously improving.
Its limits are overstated in the present Special Report (see Commission's replies to paragraphs 23-31). 
Its limits are overstated in the present Special Report (see Commission's replies to paragraphs 23-31).
The Commission considers that an analysis of what causes some recipients of EU money to behave fraudulently would not be the best use of its limited resources. 
The Commission considers that an analysis of what causes some recipients of EU money to behave fraudulently would not be the best use of its limited resources.
The Commission gears the analysis of fraud towards the areas and tools that provide maximum effectiveness and efficiency (see Commission's replies to paragraphs 14–16, 29, 33–37, 47). 
The Commission gears the analysis of fraud towards the areas and tools that provide maximum effectiveness and efficiency (see Commission's replies to paragraphs 14–16, 29, 33–37, 47).
With regard to the overall impact of OLAF’s investigations, it is important to note that the precautionary measures issued by OLAF (see Article 7 of Regulation 883/2013) and the overall deterrent effect of OLAF’s actions are also important elements which need to be assessed. 
With regard to the overall impact of OLAF’s investigations, it is important to note that the precautionary measures issued by OLAF (see Article 7 of Regulation 883/2013) and the overall deterrent effect of OLAF’s actions are also important elements which need to be assessed.
The analysis concerning the follow-up of OLAF’s investigations is based on a relatively small number of interviews with Commission services and Member States' judicial authorities. 
The analysis concerning the follow-up of OLAF’s investigations is based on a relatively small number of interviews with Commission services and Member States' judicial authorities.
Moreover, the analysis of the role and responsibilities of other actors in the current system, in particular other EU institutions and Member States, to detect and investigate irregularities and to take appropriate follow-up measures, is limited. 
Moreover, the analysis of the role and responsibilities of other actors in the current system, in particular other EU institutions and Member States, to detect and investigate irregularities and to take appropriate follow-up measures, is limited.
Analysing the anti-fraud action of the Commission and of OLAF requires a comprehensive approach. 
Analysing the anti-fraud action of the Commission and of OLAF requires a comprehensive approach.
As regards the indictment rate, the efficiency of OLAF's investigations cannot be measured by this single criterion, as indictment is only one of the many outcomes of OLAF investigations. 
As regards the indictment rate, the efficiency of OLAF's investigations cannot be measured by this single criterion, as indictment is only one of the many outcomes of OLAF investigations.
It is frequent good practice that OLAF and national judicial authorities work in parallel and coordinate their operational activities. 
It is frequent good practice that OLAF and national judicial authorities work in parallel and coordinate their operational activities.
OLAF has in recent years improved its cooperation with the judicial authorities on the follow-up to its recommendations. 
OLAF has in recent years improved its cooperation with the judicial authorities on the follow-up to its recommendations.
The difficulties regarding the follow-up given by national authorities to OLAF’s judicial recommendations are a long-standing challenge, well-known to OLAF, the Commission and the Member States. 
The difficulties regarding the follow-up given by national authorities to OLAF’s judicial recommendations are a long-standing challenge, well-known to OLAF, the Commission and the Member States.
To address this challenge, the Commission has proposed the creation of the EPPO. 
To address this challenge, the Commission has proposed the creation of the EPPO.
Also, the recent Commission proposal to amend Regulation 883/2013 aims to improve the follow-up to OLAF's judicial recommendations, notably by clarifying the admissibility of the results of OLAF's investigations in judicial proceedings in Member States. 
Also, the recent Commission proposal to amend Regulation 883/2013 aims to improve the follow-up to OLAF's judicial recommendations, notably by clarifying the admissibility of the results of OLAF's investigations in judicial proceedings in Member States.
With regard to recovery, OLAF has taken action to clarify the information provided in its final reports and the content of the recommendations in relation to estimated amounts to be recovered. 
With regard to recovery, OLAF has taken action to clarify the information provided in its final reports and the content of the recommendations in relation to estimated amounts to be recovered.
OLAF issued "Instructions on drafting Financial Recommendations and related sections of the Final Report" in October 2016 which should make OLAF recommendations easier to implement. 
OLAF issued "Instructions on drafting Financial Recommendations and related sections of the Final Report" in October 2016 which should make OLAF recommendations easier to implement.
The effect of these instructions on financial recommendations will only be fully visible in the future. 
The effect of these instructions on financial recommendations will only be fully visible in the future.
Furthermore, in July 2017 OLAF issued new "Guidelines on Financial Monitoring" designed inter alia to shorten the period for the spending Directorates-General to calculate the amounts to be recovered. 
Furthermore, in July 2017 OLAF issued new "Guidelines on Financial Monitoring" designed inter alia to shorten the period for the spending Directorates-General to calculate the amounts to be recovered.
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