natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The Commission considers that the analysis of fraud patterns and systemic vulnerabilities should be a priority while noting that such studies are very resource-intensive. 
The Commission considers that the analysis of fraud patterns and systemic vulnerabilities should be a priority while noting that such studies are very resource-intensive.
In accordance with Article 74(2) of the Financial Regulation, the Commission has a decentralised structure for internal control, including risk analysis and anti-fraud action. 
In accordance with Article 74(2) of the Financial Regulation, the Commission has a decentralised structure for internal control, including risk analysis and anti-fraud action.
It relies on the capacities and competences of Authorising Officers by Delegation that are entrusted with management of EU funds, including the identification and mitigation of fraud risks. 
It relies on the capacities and competences of Authorising Officers by Delegation that are entrusted with management of EU funds, including the identification and mitigation of fraud risks.
This is why these risks are assessed primarily at the level of Directorates-General. 
This is why these risks are assessed primarily at the level of Directorates-General.
However, the Commission services are guided and supported in their fraud risk management at the corporate level in multiple ways, e.g. through the Commission's Internal Control Framework of 9 
However, the Commission services are guided and supported in their fraud risk management at the corporate level in multiple ways, e.g. through the Commission's Internal Control Framework of 9
2017 and the corresponding Implementation Guide, through OLAF's 2016 "Methodology and guidance for DGs' anti-fraud strategies" and through exchange of views and best practice, notably in the Commission's Fraud Prevention and Detection Network. 
2017 and the corresponding Implementation Guide, through OLAF's 2016 "Methodology and guidance for DGs' anti-fraud strategies" and through exchange of views and best practice, notably in the Commission's Fraud Prevention and Detection Network.
For the on-going update of the Commission’s Anti-Fraud Strategy (CAFS), the Commission is making use of the services' individual risk analyses, which OLAF has compiled into a qualitative corporate fraud risk assessment. 
For the on-going update of the Commission’s Anti-Fraud Strategy (CAFS), the Commission is making use of the services' individual risk analyses, which OLAF has compiled into a qualitative corporate fraud risk assessment.
Commission services act in compliance with effective and efficient internal control, as required by Article 36(1) of the Financial Regulation, both in choosing analytical methods for their fraud risk assessment and in determining the anti-fraud controls that will be deployed to mitigate fraud risks. 
Commission services act in compliance with effective and efficient internal control, as required by Article 36(1) of the Financial Regulation, both in choosing analytical methods for their fraud risk assessment and in determining the anti-fraud controls that will be deployed to mitigate fraud risks.
That said, the Commission intends to reinforce OLAF’s analytical capabilities, which will, in due course, contribute to a refinement of fraud risk assessments (see the Commission’s replies to recommendations 1, 3.1 and 4). 
That said, the Commission intends to reinforce OLAF’s analytical capabilities, which will, in due course, contribute to a refinement of fraud risk assessments (see the Commission’s replies to recommendations 1, 3.1 and 4).
Some Commission services, in particular DG REGIO, use external sources as appropriate (e.g. Transparency International and DIGIWHIST). 
Some Commission services, in particular DG REGIO, use external sources as appropriate (e.g. Transparency International and DIGIWHIST).
Without a detailed analysis of the methodology used to establish the global fraud risk register of the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, it is difficult for the Commission to assess its added value for protecting the Union's financial interests. 
Without a detailed analysis of the methodology used to establish the global fraud risk register of the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, it is difficult for the Commission to assess its added value for protecting the Union's financial interests.
Doubts in this respect are raised by the fact that the register assigns a significantly higher fraud risk to payroll fraud (41%) than to procurement fraud (32%).3 No comparable trend is reflected in OLAF’s investigations.4 46. 
Doubts in this respect are raised by the fact that the register assigns a significantly higher fraud risk to payroll fraud (41%) than to procurement fraud (32%).3 No comparable trend is reflected in OLAF’s investigations.4 46.
The Commission agrees, in general, that the analysis of fraud-related data could be strengthened (see Commission's reply to recommendation 1). 
The Commission agrees, in general, that the analysis of fraud-related data could be strengthened (see Commission's reply to recommendation 1).
However, the Commission is not of the opinion that the suggested avenues of analysis are superior to assessment methods currently used by Commission services. 
However, the Commission is not of the opinion that the suggested avenues of analysis are superior to assessment methods currently used by Commission services.
As concerns DG AGRI, EU bodies managing Common Agricultural Policy funds are closely followed by the audit services of DG AGRI to ensure they have the appropriate management and control systems in place. 
As concerns DG AGRI, EU bodies managing Common Agricultural Policy funds are closely followed by the audit services of DG AGRI to ensure they have the appropriate management and control systems in place.
Through this exercise, beneficiaries are surveyed indirectly, too. 
Through this exercise, beneficiaries are surveyed indirectly, too.
The assurance framework established by the Commission to ensure legality and regularity of expenditure minimises at the same time the risk of fraud. 
The assurance framework established by the Commission to ensure legality and regularity of expenditure minimises at the same time the risk of fraud.
The Commission services’ priority is engaging in identifying vulnerabilities and fraud schemes and in awareness-raising actions about these schemes. 
The Commission services’ priority is engaging in identifying vulnerabilities and fraud schemes and in awareness-raising actions about these schemes.
Regarding the causes of fraud, the Commission is considering intensifying work on profiling fraudsters targeting the EU budget, as one of the tasks of an enhanced analysis function as recommended by the ECA.. 
Regarding the causes of fraud, the Commission is considering intensifying work on profiling fraudsters targeting the EU budget, as one of the tasks of an enhanced analysis function as recommended by the ECA..
The “modus operandi” referred to by the ECA (i.e. the nature of fraud, such as artificially created conditions) is covered by OLAF’s analytical work. 
The “modus operandi” referred to by the ECA (i.e. the nature of fraud, such as artificially created conditions) is covered by OLAF’s analytical work.
Because complex rules tend to be error and fraud prone, the Commission has proposed simplification of general and sectoral financial rules. 
Because complex rules tend to be error and fraud prone, the Commission has proposed simplification of general and sectoral financial rules.
Evidence shows that this is working for instance in reducing irregularities and fraud in Horizon 2020. 
Evidence shows that this is working for instance in reducing irregularities and fraud in Horizon 2020.
The 2018 Financial Regulation further 3 4 https://www.moorestephens.co.uk/news-views/november-2017/misspending-public-money-is-top-risk-area-for-frau See OLAF Report 2016, pp. 15-18, for the importance of procurement fraud. 
The 2018 Financial Regulation further 3 4 https://www.moorestephens.co.uk/news-views/november-2017/misspending-public-money-is-top-risk-area-for-frau See OLAF Report 2016, pp. 15-18, for the importance of procurement fraud.
simplifies the rules on reimbursement of costs, promoting the use of the simplified cost options (lump-sums) and of forms of financing not linked to costs. 
simplifies the rules on reimbursement of costs, promoting the use of the simplified cost options (lump-sums) and of forms of financing not linked to costs.
By doing so, it provides simpler and less fraud prone financial rules for the 2021-2027 spending programmes. 
By doing so, it provides simpler and less fraud prone financial rules for the 2021-2027 spending programmes.
Box 2 The Commission shares the ECA’s concern. 
Box 2 The Commission shares the ECA’s concern.
To prove artificial conditions, the strict conditions set out by the European Court of Justice need to be followed. 
To prove artificial conditions, the strict conditions set out by the European Court of Justice need to be followed.
It is vital to preserve legal certainty of beneficiaries who act in accordance with the applicable legislation. 
It is vital to preserve legal certainty of beneficiaries who act in accordance with the applicable legislation.
Therefore, paying agencies can only refuse payment based on clearly established evidence, and not on mere suspicions. 
Therefore, paying agencies can only refuse payment based on clearly established evidence, and not on mere suspicions.
Accordingly, they often invest time and effort to gather conclusive evidence and subsequently launch recovery procedures. 
Accordingly, they often invest time and effort to gather conclusive evidence and subsequently launch recovery procedures.
The "opportunity for discretionary spending" referred to by the ECA is linked to the subsidiarity principle but not without limits: eligibility criteria and conditions must be agreed with the Commission and cannot be subsequently modified unilaterally. 
The "opportunity for discretionary spending" referred to by the ECA is linked to the subsidiarity principle but not without limits: eligibility criteria and conditions must be agreed with the Commission and cannot be subsequently modified unilaterally.
In that sense, spending is never fully discretionary. 
In that sense, spending is never fully discretionary.
The "allowed" degree of discretionary spending is related only to certain areas of shared management, where Member States must formally designate authorities that will manage the funds and also have the obligation to put in place a Management and Control System (MCS) with adequate management verifications and an independent audit body. 
The "allowed" degree of discretionary spending is related only to certain areas of shared management, where Member States must formally designate authorities that will manage the funds and also have the obligation to put in place a Management and Control System (MCS) with adequate management verifications and an independent audit body.
The Commission conducts audits (system audits and audits of operations) where risks are identified. 
The Commission conducts audits (system audits and audits of operations) where risks are identified.
Payments to programmes can be interrupted in cases of serious deficiencies to the MCS. 
Payments to programmes can be interrupted in cases of serious deficiencies to the MCS.
Therefore, the legal framework for shared management in the Programming Period 2014-2020 ensures that controls are in place at all levels, taking into due account the risks linked to discretionary spending. 
Therefore, the legal framework for shared management in the Programming Period 2014-2020 ensures that controls are in place at all levels, taking into due account the risks linked to discretionary spending.
Managing Authorities have some discretionary powers, but programme implementation is scrutinised by an Independent Audit Body and they remain subject to EU law, Commission/ECA audits and OLAF investigations. 
Managing Authorities have some discretionary powers, but programme implementation is scrutinised by an Independent Audit Body and they remain subject to EU law, Commission/ECA audits and OLAF investigations.
Nevertheless, the Commission will consider the ECA's suggestion to analyse how discretion in EU co-financed programmes affects the risk of fraud. 
Nevertheless, the Commission will consider the ECA's suggestion to analyse how discretion in EU co-financed programmes affects the risk of fraud.
Common reply to paragraphs 50-54: Strategic fraud risk management and fraud prevention are important objectives for the Commission. 
Common reply to paragraphs 50-54: Strategic fraud risk management and fraud prevention are important objectives for the Commission.
It has put in place a decentralised model of financial management, where Authorising Officer by Delegation, e.g. Directors-General, are responsible for internal control, including risk management and fraud prevention. 
It has put in place a decentralised model of financial management, where Authorising Officer by Delegation, e.g. Directors-General, are responsible for internal control, including risk management and fraud prevention.
Since 2017, all Commission services are obliged to appoint a senior manager in charge of risk management, to support and advise the Authorising Officer by Delegation on matters of internal control, including fraud risk management. 
Since 2017, all Commission services are obliged to appoint a senior manager in charge of risk management, to support and advise the Authorising Officer by Delegation on matters of internal control, including fraud risk management.
In addition, it should be noted that Member States also play an important role in the fraud risk management for the EU budget, in particular in the areas under shared management. 
In addition, it should be noted that Member States also play an important role in the fraud risk management for the EU budget, in particular in the areas under shared management.
The Member of the Commission in charge of anti-fraud steers and puts forward initiatives to improve the fight against fraud, while the College of Commissioners takes overall political responsibility for the management of the EU budget. 
The Member of the Commission in charge of anti-fraud steers and puts forward initiatives to improve the fight against fraud, while the College of Commissioners takes overall political responsibility for the management of the EU budget.
Each Member of the Commission receives fraud-related information directly by the service under his or her responsibility and reports important cases to the College. 
Each Member of the Commission receives fraud-related information directly by the service under his or her responsibility and reports important cases to the College.
The individual mission letters by the President of the Commission are committing each Commissioner to pay specific attention to sound financial management of EU funds which 11 
The individual mission letters by the President of the Commission are committing each Commissioner to pay specific attention to sound financial management of EU funds which 11
reinforces the Commission's political commitment to apply the principle of zero tolerance for fraud and to systematically ensure the protection of the EU budget from fraud. 
reinforces the Commission's political commitment to apply the principle of zero tolerance for fraud and to systematically ensure the protection of the EU budget from fraud.
The Commission considers that OLAF could assume a stronger and more strategic role as a coordinator with regard to the anti-fraud policies of the Commission services and executive agencies. 
The Commission considers that OLAF could assume a stronger and more strategic role as a coordinator with regard to the anti-fraud policies of the Commission services and executive agencies.
The Commission notes that Annex V is a simplified presentation of its governance model. 
The Commission notes that Annex V is a simplified presentation of its governance model.
The Commission also notes that, in reality, its model of financial management differentiates between political and operational responsibilities. 
The Commission also notes that, in reality, its model of financial management differentiates between political and operational responsibilities.
The Commission takes the view that OLAF already has a role in providing an overview of anti-fraud actions and reporting on outputs. 
The Commission takes the view that OLAF already has a role in providing an overview of anti-fraud actions and reporting on outputs.
Inter alia, OLAF is lead service for the design of the corporate anti-fraud strategy and coordinates its implementation. 
Inter alia, OLAF is lead service for the design of the corporate anti-fraud strategy and coordinates its implementation.
Moreover, OLAF provides methodological guidance for departmental anti-fraud strategies and monitors their implementation by taking part in the central review of Management Plans and Annual Activity Reports. 
Moreover, OLAF provides methodological guidance for departmental anti-fraud strategies and monitors their implementation by taking part in the central review of Management Plans and Annual Activity Reports.
OLAF’s oversight role is being considered in the ongoing update of the CAFS. 
OLAF’s oversight role is being considered in the ongoing update of the CAFS.
The 2014–2020 Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) has introduced for the first time a regulatory requirement obliging Member States to put in place effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures, based on a risk assessment. 
The 2014–2020 Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) has introduced for the first time a regulatory requirement obliging Member States to put in place effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures, based on a risk assessment.
The Commission launched a stock-taking study on the implementation of Article 125(4)(c) in all Member States in 2017. 
The Commission launched a stock-taking study on the implementation of Article 125(4)(c) in all Member States in 2017.
This study was finalised in 2018 and the findings demonstrate that overall Member States have put in place proportionate anti-fraud measures in relation to the risks identified. 
This study was finalised in 2018 and the findings demonstrate that overall Member States have put in place proportionate anti-fraud measures in relation to the risks identified.
A thematic audit on the effectiveness and proportionality of anti-fraud measures has been launched by DG EMPL in 2018 (covering DG REGIO and DG EMPL programmes). 
A thematic audit on the effectiveness and proportionality of anti-fraud measures has been launched by DG EMPL in 2018 (covering DG REGIO and DG EMPL programmes).
The Commission is monitoring with the Member States’ programme authorities in cohesion policy each fraud case brought to its attention. 
The Commission is monitoring with the Member States’ programme authorities in cohesion policy each fraud case brought to its attention.
Regular exchanges of best practices take place in the Advisory Committee for the Coordination of Fraud Prevention (COCOLAF) and are reported in the annual PIF Report. 
Regular exchanges of best practices take place in the Advisory Committee for the Coordination of Fraud Prevention (COCOLAF) and are reported in the annual PIF Report.
Important recurrent activities provided for in the 2011 CAFS (such as updating departmental anti-fraud strategies, fraud-proofing of funding instruments and anti-fraud training) continue still today and are accounted for in the services' Annual Activity Reports. 
Important recurrent activities provided for in the 2011 CAFS (such as updating departmental anti-fraud strategies, fraud-proofing of funding instruments and anti-fraud training) continue still today and are accounted for in the services' Annual Activity Reports.
Likewise, the principles guiding the Commission's fight against fraud as announced in the 2011 CAFS remain valid. 
Likewise, the principles guiding the Commission's fight against fraud as announced in the 2011 CAFS remain valid.
The Commission confirms that the objectives in its anti-fraud strategy are largely of a general nature; however, the objectives are implemented through very specific actions which are accompanied by output indicators. 
The Commission confirms that the objectives in its anti-fraud strategy are largely of a general nature; however, the objectives are implemented through very specific actions which are accompanied by output indicators.
Where possible and adequate the Commission has defined quantitative targets (e.g. participation in anti-fraud trainings or fraud awareness level in the Directorates-General), which are embedded in the anti-fraud strategies (AFS) and in the relevant strategic planning and programming documents (Management Plans/Annual Activity Reports). 
Where possible and adequate the Commission has defined quantitative targets (e.g. participation in anti-fraud trainings or fraud awareness level in the Directorates-General), which are embedded in the anti-fraud strategies (AFS) and in the relevant strategic planning and programming documents (Management Plans/Annual Activity Reports).
That said, the Commission agrees with the ECA on the desirability of increasing the result-orientation and measurability of its anti-fraud action. 
That said, the Commission agrees with the ECA on the desirability of increasing the result-orientation and measurability of its anti-fraud action.
Further improvements in this respect will have to build on an enhanced analysis function as recommended by the ECA, which can, however, only gradually be implemented. 
Further improvements in this respect will have to build on an enhanced analysis function as recommended by the ECA, which can, however, only gradually be implemented.
The annual PIF Report presents the outputs of the Commission's and Member States' anti-fraud actions but also assesses, albeit at a limited level, the effectiveness of some of these actions, especially the anti-fraud measures taken by the Member States. 
The annual PIF Report presents the outputs of the Commission's and Member States' anti-fraud actions but also assesses, albeit at a limited level, the effectiveness of some of these actions, especially the anti-fraud measures taken by the Member States.
Although the PIF Report does not provide an absolute assessment of the effectiveness of all horizontal anti-fraud actions adopted by the EU and its Member States, it does achieve its mission according to Article 325(5) TFEU with its comprehensive overview on anti-fraud actions taken. 
Although the PIF Report does not provide an absolute assessment of the effectiveness of all horizontal anti-fraud actions adopted by the EU and its Member States, it does achieve its mission according to Article 325(5) TFEU with its comprehensive overview on anti-fraud actions taken.
As concerns the assessment of the total effectiveness of these actions, more targeted, in-depth and resource-intensive studies would be required. 
As concerns the assessment of the total effectiveness of these actions, more targeted, in-depth and resource-intensive studies would be required.
The Annual Management and Performance Report (AMPR) for the EU budget is a report built on the information made available by the Authorising Officers by Delegation in their Annual Activity Reports. 
The Annual Management and Performance Report (AMPR) for the EU budget is a report built on the information made available by the Authorising Officers by Delegation in their Annual Activity Reports.
As far as anti-fraud action is concerned, it includes a section with information on anti-fraud strategies and, as of 2017, a section on the protection of the EU budget. 
As far as anti-fraud action is concerned, it includes a section with information on anti-fraud strategies and, as of 2017, a section on the protection of the EU budget.
The Commission will give further consideration to the most suitable way of presenting its anti-fraud policies in the AMPR. 
The Commission will give further consideration to the most suitable way of presenting its anti-fraud policies in the AMPR.