natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
However, this corporate report, which covers the whole spectrum of Commission policies and activities, will have to retain its summarising nature. 
However, this corporate report, which covers the whole spectrum of Commission policies and activities, will have to retain its summarising nature.
More information on the Commission's anti-fraud actions is provided in the annual PIF Report and in the Annual Activity Reports of the Directorates-General. 
More information on the Commission's anti-fraud actions is provided in the annual PIF Report and in the Annual Activity Reports of the Directorates-General.
The latter include a subsection dedicated to fraud prevention and detection. 
The latter include a subsection dedicated to fraud prevention and detection.
The Commission agrees with the ECA on the desirability of increasing the result orientation and measurability of its anti-fraud action. 
The Commission agrees with the ECA on the desirability of increasing the result orientation and measurability of its anti-fraud action.
See also Commission's reply to paragraph 60. 
See also Commission's reply to paragraph 60.
The Commission underlines that Article 125(4)(c) of the Common Provisions Regulation has provided the framework for the Commission services to reinforce their anti-fraud efforts in the 2014–2020 ESI Funds. 
The Commission underlines that Article 125(4)(c) of the Common Provisions Regulation has provided the framework for the Commission services to reinforce their anti-fraud efforts in the 2014–2020 ESI Funds.
However, already during the 2007-2013 programming period, the Commission services implemented effective and proportionate irregularity controls before spending occurred with a view to protect and safeguard the EU budget. 
However, already during the 2007-2013 programming period, the Commission services implemented effective and proportionate irregularity controls before spending occurred with a view to protect and safeguard the EU budget.
An overview of achievements of the Commission's earlier fraud-proofing measures is presented in a Commission Staff Working Document of 2007.5 For the Programming Period 2007–2013, the Commission initiated e.g. a review of Member States' obligations to report irregularities under shared management.6 Sector-specific legislation in the domain of shared management contains provisions on irregularities, of which fraud is a sub-category; those provisions have been in place for a long time. 
An overview of achievements of the Commission's earlier fraud-proofing measures is presented in a Commission Staff Working Document of 2007.5 For the Programming Period 2007–2013, the Commission initiated e.g. a review of Member States' obligations to report irregularities under shared management.6 Sector-specific legislation in the domain of shared management contains provisions on irregularities, of which fraud is a sub-category; those provisions have been in place for a long time.
The study initiated by the Commission on “Preventing fraud and corruption in the European Structural and Investment Funds – taking stock of practices in the EU Member States” provides an overview of the Member States implementation of article 125(4)(c) of the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR). 
The study initiated by the Commission on “Preventing fraud and corruption in the European Structural and Investment Funds – taking stock of practices in the EU Member States” provides an overview of the Member States implementation of article 125(4)(c) of the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR).
This study was finalised in 2018 and amongst others gives an overview of practices and actions taken in the Member States. 
This study was finalised in 2018 and amongst others gives an overview of practices and actions taken in the Member States.
The study is considered as a first step and on the basis of its findings follow up and further actions will be considered by the Commission. 
The study is considered as a first step and on the basis of its findings follow up and further actions will be considered by the Commission.
The lack of a standardised procedure for the follow-up of administrative recommendations, which are all different, cannot be interpreted as lack of impact of such recommendations. 
The lack of a standardised procedure for the follow-up of administrative recommendations, which are all different, cannot be interpreted as lack of impact of such recommendations.
OLAF is, in fact, working on the outcome of such recommendations on a case-by-case basis. 
OLAF is, in fact, working on the outcome of such recommendations on a case-by-case basis.
OLAF and the 5 6 SEC (2007) 1676. 
OLAF and the 5 6 SEC (2007) 1676.
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2035/2005 of 12 December 2005, OJ L 328, 15.12.2005, p. 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2035/2005 of 12 December 2005, OJ L 328, 15.12.2005, p.
Commission are currently exploring how to strengthen the monitoring of the follow-up to OLAF's administrative recommendations. 
Commission are currently exploring how to strengthen the monitoring of the follow-up to OLAF's administrative recommendations.
Assessment of fraud risk is part of the Commission’s framework for conducting impact assessments of legislative proposals. 
Assessment of fraud risk is part of the Commission’s framework for conducting impact assessments of legislative proposals.
Tool #25 on prevention of fraud was added to the Better Regulation Toolbox in its 2017 revision.7 Fraud risk should only be addressed in an impact assessment when it is relevant to do so. 
Tool #25 on prevention of fraud was added to the Better Regulation Toolbox in its 2017 revision.7 Fraud risk should only be addressed in an impact assessment when it is relevant to do so.
This is a key principle of proportionate analysis underpinning the Commission's impact assessment system. 
This is a key principle of proportionate analysis underpinning the Commission's impact assessment system.
The Better Regulation Guidelines prior to 2017 did not prevent fraud risk assessments. 
The Better Regulation Guidelines prior to 2017 did not prevent fraud risk assessments.
For the 2014–2020 period, such assessments were carried out, even if not required by the Better Regulation Guidelines at the time. 
For the 2014–2020 period, such assessments were carried out, even if not required by the Better Regulation Guidelines at the time.
Spending programmes were fraud-proofed in cooperation between the spending departments and OLAF, in accordance with the 2007 Commission Communication on fraud-proofing and the 2011 CAFS. 
Spending programmes were fraud-proofed in cooperation between the spending departments and OLAF, in accordance with the 2007 Commission Communication on fraud-proofing and the 2011 CAFS.
The 2017 revision of the Better Regulation Guidelines now explicitly provides for a fraud prevention tool. 
The 2017 revision of the Better Regulation Guidelines now explicitly provides for a fraud prevention tool.
Prevention, detection, correction and follow-up of fraud and irregularities are amongst the objectives of internal controls (Article 32 of the Financial Regulation). 
Prevention, detection, correction and follow-up of fraud and irregularities are amongst the objectives of internal controls (Article 32 of the Financial Regulation).
In the context of shared management, which concerns 80% of the EU budget, the risk of fraud has to be assessed by the managing authority in its programme's context (Article 125(4)(c) of the Common Provisions Regulation). 
In the context of shared management, which concerns 80% of the EU budget, the risk of fraud has to be assessed by the managing authority in its programme's context (Article 125(4)(c) of the Common Provisions Regulation).
The proposals for the 2021–2027 programmes contain a provision requiring that the authority responsible for managing the programme "put in place effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures and procedures, taking account of the risks identified". 
The proposals for the 2021–2027 programmes contain a provision requiring that the authority responsible for managing the programme "put in place effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures and procedures, taking account of the risks identified".
This provision, once adopted, will apply to the seven shared management funds covered by the Common Provisions Regulation. 
This provision, once adopted, will apply to the seven shared management funds covered by the Common Provisions Regulation.
While the requirement of fraud risk assessments in the process of designing spending programmes will be formalised even more strongly for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) post-2020, fraud-proofing was already a principle upheld by the Commission in the current MFF. 
While the requirement of fraud risk assessments in the process of designing spending programmes will be formalised even more strongly for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) post-2020, fraud-proofing was already a principle upheld by the Commission in the current MFF.
More specifically, the Commission considers that it has properly addressed the issue of fraud prevention and detection controls by proposing a range of substantial measures in each of its legislative proposals of 29 May 2018 accompanying the MFF package:  the legislative financial statements list measures to be taken for preventing fraud and irregularities;  dedicated provisions identify who (e.g. Commission, Member States) shall impose proportionate anti-fraud measures and procedures, taking into account the risks identified;  a specific recital recalls the competences of OLAF (and EPPO from 2020) and lists the regulations from which those competences originate. 
More specifically, the Commission considers that it has properly addressed the issue of fraud prevention and detection controls by proposing a range of substantial measures in each of its legislative proposals of 29 May 2018 accompanying the MFF package:  the legislative financial statements list measures to be taken for preventing fraud and irregularities;  dedicated provisions identify who (e.g. Commission, Member States) shall impose proportionate anti-fraud measures and procedures, taking into account the risks identified;  a specific recital recalls the competences of OLAF (and EPPO from 2020) and lists the regulations from which those competences originate.
OLAF has examined the pertinence of those measures for fraud-proofing prior to their adoption by the Commission. 
OLAF has examined the pertinence of those measures for fraud-proofing prior to their adoption by the Commission.
In addition, the new Financial Regulation has brought about simplified methods of financing, which are less prone to fraud, such as the possibility to use lump sums, flat-rate financing and unit costs for grants. 
In addition, the new Financial Regulation has brought about simplified methods of financing, which are less prone to fraud, such as the possibility to use lump sums, flat-rate financing and unit costs for grants.
7 https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/better-regulation-toolbox-25_en. 
7 https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/better-regulation-toolbox-25_en.
The Commission proposed in the Multiannual Financial Framework post-2020 spending programmes horizontal recitals and provisions regarding the protection of the EU financial interests against unreliable economic operators. 
The Commission proposed in the Multiannual Financial Framework post-2020 spending programmes horizontal recitals and provisions regarding the protection of the EU financial interests against unreliable economic operators.
In accordance with the Financial Regulation, the necessary and equivalent rights and access have been granted to the Commission, OLAF, the EPPO and the ECA. 
In accordance with the Financial Regulation, the necessary and equivalent rights and access have been granted to the Commission, OLAF, the EPPO and the ECA.
The possibility to reuse the contributions from the funds as provided for in Common Provisions Regulation serves as an incentive for the Member States to apply financial corrections themselves. 
The possibility to reuse the contributions from the funds as provided for in Common Provisions Regulation serves as an incentive for the Member States to apply financial corrections themselves.
The Commission provides systemic fraud proofing and is revising the way the fraud proofing is done in the context of the ongoing update of the CAFS. 
The Commission provides systemic fraud proofing and is revising the way the fraud proofing is done in the context of the ongoing update of the CAFS.
See also reply to paragraph 72. 
See also reply to paragraph 72.
Decisions on sanctions are not only based on information received by the entities listed in this observation. 
Decisions on sanctions are not only based on information received by the entities listed in this observation.
They can also be based i.a. on information from audits by authorising officers or under their responsibility, disciplinary measures by competent supervisory bodies responsible for the verification of the application of standards of professional ethics, and decisions by the Commission or competent national authorities relating to the infringement of EU or national competition law. 
They can also be based i.a. on information from audits by authorising officers or under their responsibility, disciplinary measures by competent supervisory bodies responsible for the verification of the application of standards of professional ethics, and decisions by the Commission or competent national authorities relating to the infringement of EU or national competition law.
In the future, facts established in the context of audits or investigations carried out by the EPPO should also be a source of information. 
In the future, facts established in the context of audits or investigations carried out by the EPPO should also be a source of information.
Exclusion of unreliable economic operators on the basis of a recommendation by the panel referred to in Article 143 of the Financial Regulation (formerly Article 108 of the 2012 Financial Regulation) requires a certain procedure, to respect the right to be heard and the proportionality principle. 
Exclusion of unreliable economic operators on the basis of a recommendation by the panel referred to in Article 143 of the Financial Regulation (formerly Article 108 of the 2012 Financial Regulation) requires a certain procedure, to respect the right to be heard and the proportionality principle.
Fraud or corruption frequently matches other grounds of exclusion. 
Fraud or corruption frequently matches other grounds of exclusion.
Therefore, where exclusion for fraud or corruption was not legally possible for facts committed before 2016, exclusion was taken on other applicable grounds, such as grave professional misconduct and serious breach of contract, and the deterrent impact of the system was ensured. 
Therefore, where exclusion for fraud or corruption was not legally possible for facts committed before 2016, exclusion was taken on other applicable grounds, such as grave professional misconduct and serious breach of contract, and the deterrent impact of the system was ensured.
For facts dating from before the entry into force of the new Financial Regulation in August 2018, the legislation will allow excluding natural persons in exclusion situations and who are essential for the award or for the implementation of legal commitments. 
For facts dating from before the entry into force of the new Financial Regulation in August 2018, the legislation will allow excluding natural persons in exclusion situations and who are essential for the award or for the implementation of legal commitments.
For facts dating from 2016 onwards, the Financial Regulation allows for the exclusion of economic operators where a manager is in a situation of exclusion. 
For facts dating from 2016 onwards, the Financial Regulation allows for the exclusion of economic operators where a manager is in a situation of exclusion.
Where applicable, the Commission will make use of this possibility and considers that other institutions and EU bodies should do the same. 
Where applicable, the Commission will make use of this possibility and considers that other institutions and EU bodies should do the same.
The new Financial Regulation provides for means to counter shell companies and the use of tax havens by intermediaries managing EU funds. 
The new Financial Regulation provides for means to counter shell companies and the use of tax havens by intermediaries managing EU funds.
It is important to note that the legal constraints in which both systems operate are different. 
It is important to note that the legal constraints in which both systems operate are different.
In particular the World Bank decisions are not subject to appeal and/or national judicial legal orders. 
In particular the World Bank decisions are not subject to appeal and/or national judicial legal orders.
Common reply to paragraphs 85 and 86: ARACHNE can form an important support for effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures according to Article 125(4)(c) of the Common Provisions Regulation (EU) 1303/2013. 
Common reply to paragraphs 85 and 86: ARACHNE can form an important support for effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures according to Article 125(4)(c) of the Common Provisions Regulation (EU) 1303/2013.
It is designed to help Member States authorities to prevent and detect errors and irregularities among projects, beneficiaries, contracts and contractors. 
It is designed to help Member States authorities to prevent and detect errors and irregularities among projects, beneficiaries, contracts and contractors.
Since 2013, the Commission services have been informing the Member State authorities on a regular basis about the potential benefits of using ARACHNE. 
Since 2013, the Commission services have been informing the Member State authorities on a regular basis about the potential benefits of using ARACHNE.
The Commission is investigating whether the data from the EDES system (and potentially ABAC) can be integrated into ARACHNE, also with a view to allowing direct management spending to be tested for the presence of fraud indicators. 
The Commission is investigating whether the data from the EDES system (and potentially ABAC) can be integrated into ARACHNE, also with a view to allowing direct management spending to be tested for the presence of fraud indicators.
The development of ARACHNE was completed in May 2013 (first installation) and the data from the Member States who decided to integrate ARACHNE in their anti-fraud strategy have since then been gradually included. 
The development of ARACHNE was completed in May 2013 (first installation) and the data from the Member States who decided to integrate ARACHNE in their anti-fraud strategy have since then been gradually included.
EDES applies to all aspects of direct and also indirect management, since the entry into application of the new Financial Regulation. 
EDES applies to all aspects of direct and also indirect management, since the entry into application of the new Financial Regulation.
The new EDES system was put in place in 2016 and thus the ECA’s findings are based on public figures only relating to the initial period up to 30 June 2018. 
The new EDES system was put in place in 2016 and thus the ECA’s findings are based on public figures only relating to the initial period up to 30 June 2018.
This does not allow for an assessment of the functioning of the system, including of its deterrent effects. 
This does not allow for an assessment of the functioning of the system, including of its deterrent effects.
The Commission notes the following additional and important aspects for assessing the impact of OLAF's administrative investigations:  an in-depth analysis of administrative recommendations to address systemic shortcomings;  precautionary measures issued by OLAF in the course of an investigation pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation 883/2013 to avoid further aggravation of fraud or irregularities;  the deterrent effect of OLAF investigations on potential fraudsters;  the responsibilities for Commission services and Member States (reporting to OLAF and implementing its recommendations) to render OLAF's work effective in practice. 
The Commission notes the following additional and important aspects for assessing the impact of OLAF's administrative investigations:  an in-depth analysis of administrative recommendations to address systemic shortcomings;  precautionary measures issued by OLAF in the course of an investigation pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation 883/2013 to avoid further aggravation of fraud or irregularities;  the deterrent effect of OLAF investigations on potential fraudsters;  the responsibilities for Commission services and Member States (reporting to OLAF and implementing its recommendations) to render OLAF's work effective in practice.
Furthermore the Commission and/or OLAF have initiated a number of key reforms to increase the effectiveness of OLAF's investigative activities . 
Furthermore the Commission and/or OLAF have initiated a number of key reforms to increase the effectiveness of OLAF's investigative activities .
These reforms include:  OLAF instructions to investigators on financial recommendations (2016);  OLAF's review of its monitoring regime for recommendations to ensure quicker follow-up (2017);  the PIF Directive (2017);  the revision of the Financial Regulation (2018);  the proposal to amend Regulation 883/2013 to improve, inter alia, the investigative tools to OLAF and facilitate the uptake of OLAF's final reports (2018). 
These reforms include:  OLAF instructions to investigators on financial recommendations (2016);  OLAF's review of its monitoring regime for recommendations to ensure quicker follow-up (2017);  the PIF Directive (2017);  the revision of the Financial Regulation (2018);  the proposal to amend Regulation 883/2013 to improve, inter alia, the investigative tools to OLAF and facilitate the uptake of OLAF's final reports (2018).
OLAF's judicial recommendations may also contain general proposals to the judiciary to consider OLAF's findings in the final report in their entirety which widens the scope of judicial action. 
OLAF's judicial recommendations may also contain general proposals to the judiciary to consider OLAF's findings in the final report in their entirety which widens the scope of judicial action.
In line with Article 11(1) of the OLAF Regulation, OLAF's recommendations indicate the action to be taken by the IBOA and the competent authorities of the Member States. 
In line with Article 11(1) of the OLAF Regulation, OLAF's recommendations indicate the action to be taken by the IBOA and the competent authorities of the Member States.
Pursuant to Article 11(2), OLAF's final reports constitute admissible evidence in administrative or judicial proceedings in Member States in the same way and under the same conditions as administrative reports drawn up by national administrative inspectors. 
Pursuant to Article 11(2), OLAF's final reports constitute admissible evidence in administrative or judicial proceedings in Member States in the same way and under the same conditions as administrative reports drawn up by national administrative inspectors.
In order to further improve the impact of OLAF's investigations, the Commission has in its proposal for amending Regulation 883/2013 introduced measures to strengthen the usability of OLAF's final reports in national proceedings. 
In order to further improve the impact of OLAF's investigations, the Commission has in its proposal for amending Regulation 883/2013 introduced measures to strengthen the usability of OLAF's final reports in national proceedings.
The follow-up given by national authorities to OLAF’s judicial recommendations is a long-standing challenge, well-known to OLAF and the Commission. 
The follow-up given by national authorities to OLAF’s judicial recommendations is a long-standing challenge, well-known to OLAF and the Commission.