natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
As explained below, this is due to a number of factors, e.g. the fact that each Member State has its own prosecution policy with regards to PIF offences. 16 
As explained below, this is due to a number of factors, e.g. the fact that each Member State has its own prosecution policy with regards to PIF offences. 16
It is expected to bring a more consistent and effective prosecution policy in EPPO Member States for crimes affecting the EU budget, leading to more prosecutions, convictions and a higher level of recovery. 
It is expected to bring a more consistent and effective prosecution policy in EPPO Member States for crimes affecting the EU budget, leading to more prosecutions, convictions and a higher level of recovery.
Moreover, differences in the scope and definition of criminal offences have been further addressed by Directive (EU) 1371/2017 (the "PIF Directive") (see also reply to paragraph 97). 
Moreover, differences in the scope and definition of criminal offences have been further addressed by Directive (EU) 1371/2017 (the "PIF Directive") (see also reply to paragraph 97).
The recent proposal to amend Regulation 883/2013 aims inter alia to enhance the effectiveness of OLAF's investigative function, and it is therefore expected that the use of OLAF investigation results in judicial proceedings in Member States will be improved. 
The recent proposal to amend Regulation 883/2013 aims inter alia to enhance the effectiveness of OLAF's investigative function, and it is therefore expected that the use of OLAF investigation results in judicial proceedings in Member States will be improved.
To better understand the precise reasons for dismissals and to improve the follow-up of its investigations, OLAF has undertaken an in-depth analysis of Member States’ follow-up to its judicial recommendations issued between 1 January 2008 and 31 December 2015, examining 169 judicial recommendations issued by OLAF and dismissed by Member States’ judicial authorities, out of a total of 317 recommendations. 
To better understand the precise reasons for dismissals and to improve the follow-up of its investigations, OLAF has undertaken an in-depth analysis of Member States’ follow-up to its judicial recommendations issued between 1 January 2008 and 31 December 2015, examining 169 judicial recommendations issued by OLAF and dismissed by Member States’ judicial authorities, out of a total of 317 recommendations.
OLAF is in constant dialogue with Member States’ judicial authorities to improve the indictment rate. 
OLAF is in constant dialogue with Member States’ judicial authorities to improve the indictment rate.
As regards the comparison between numbers of indictments resulting from OLAF's judicial recommendations and numbers of national own prosecutions, the different context and conditions under which OLAF operates as compared to national authorities need to be considered. . 
As regards the comparison between numbers of indictments resulting from OLAF's judicial recommendations and numbers of national own prosecutions, the different context and conditions under which OLAF operates as compared to national authorities need to be considered. .
The responsibility to counter fraud and any other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the Union is incumbent on the Union and on the Member States8 as a shared responsibility. 
The responsibility to counter fraud and any other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the Union is incumbent on the Union and on the Member States8 as a shared responsibility.
In this context, Member States' action naturally takes a larger share in numerical terms. 
In this context, Member States' action naturally takes a larger share in numerical terms.
This is also illustrated by the figures published by the Commission on an annual basis in its reports on the protection of the European Union's financial interests (PIF Reports)9. 
This is also illustrated by the figures published by the Commission on an annual basis in its reports on the protection of the European Union's financial interests (PIF Reports)9.
Action at EU and national level is complementary and the fact that the EU level is equipped with its own investigative capacity is a crucial building block in the fight against fraud as a whole. 
Action at EU and national level is complementary and the fact that the EU level is equipped with its own investigative capacity is a crucial building block in the fight against fraud as a whole.
Both levels benefit from close cooperation. 
Both levels benefit from close cooperation.
In addition, even when not leading the investigation, OLAF often forwards information and provides assistance to the competent authorities in the Member States and, especially in the context of coordination cases, contributes to investigations carried out by national authorities. 
In addition, even when not leading the investigation, OLAF often forwards information and provides assistance to the competent authorities in the Member States and, especially in the context of coordination cases, contributes to investigations carried out by national authorities.
The Commission notes that the ECA report does not compare the indictment or dismissal rates for OLAF's judicial recommendations with comparable data from the Member States. 
The Commission notes that the ECA report does not compare the indictment or dismissal rates for OLAF's judicial recommendations with comparable data from the Member States.
This would have facilitated the assessment of whether OLAF's recommendations have an appropriate impact at national level. 
This would have facilitated the assessment of whether OLAF's recommendations have an appropriate impact at national level.
As the number of indictments in itself has limited informative value, OLAF has undertaken a more in-depth analysis of Member States follow-up to OLAF's judicial recommendations issued between 1 January 2008 and 31 December 2015, mentioned above under paragraph 94. 
As the number of indictments in itself has limited informative value, OLAF has undertaken a more in-depth analysis of Member States follow-up to OLAF's judicial recommendations issued between 1 January 2008 and 31 December 2015, mentioned above under paragraph 94.
8 9 Cf. 
8 9 Cf.
Article 325 TFEU. 
Article 325 TFEU.
For the latest version, see Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 'Protection of the European Union's financial interests – Fight against fraud 2017 Annual Report', Brussels, 03.09.2018, COM(2018) 553 final. 
For the latest version, see Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 'Protection of the European Union's financial interests – Fight against fraud 2017 Annual Report', Brussels, 03.09.2018, COM(2018) 553 final.
A similar tendency is reflected by other systems relying on complementarity of investigations at EU and national level (e.g. enforcement of EU competition rules, see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/statistics.html). 17 
A similar tendency is reflected by other systems relying on complementarity of investigations at EU and national level (e.g. enforcement of EU competition rules, see http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/statistics.html). 17
This analysis was not limited to the expenditure area – the subject of the ECA’s audit – but included also internal investigations and the revenue area, i.e. customs investigations. 
This analysis was not limited to the expenditure area – the subject of the ECA’s audit – but included also internal investigations and the revenue area, i.e. customs investigations.
First bullet point: According to the OLAF's analysis of Member States’ follow-up of OLAF’s judicial recommendations, the category of cases with “insufficient evidence” encompasses a wide range of heterogeneous factual and legal situations. 
First bullet point: According to the OLAF's analysis of Member States’ follow-up of OLAF’s judicial recommendations, the category of cases with “insufficient evidence” encompasses a wide range of heterogeneous factual and legal situations.
It includes, in particular, cases where a full collection of evidence was in practice not feasible for OLAF because of the limitations of its investigative powers as well as situations where Member States' authorities questioned the evidentiary value of OLAF's final report due to the uncertainty of the applicable legislation. 
It includes, in particular, cases where a full collection of evidence was in practice not feasible for OLAF because of the limitations of its investigative powers as well as situations where Member States' authorities questioned the evidentiary value of OLAF's final report due to the uncertainty of the applicable legislation.
In addition, the number of cases dismissed due to “insufficient evidence” (a common explanation for not opening a case) may also vary according to the different procedural rules and practices in the Member States. 
In addition, the number of cases dismissed due to “insufficient evidence” (a common explanation for not opening a case) may also vary according to the different procedural rules and practices in the Member States.
In general, the Member States have a wide margin of appreciation at the various stages of investigation and prosecution. 
In general, the Member States have a wide margin of appreciation at the various stages of investigation and prosecution.
It should also be emphasised that in a significant number of cases, OLAF does not receive the detailed reasoning on the actual grounds for dismissal. 
It should also be emphasised that in a significant number of cases, OLAF does not receive the detailed reasoning on the actual grounds for dismissal.
Second bullet point: Despite the degree of harmonisation achieved under the PIF Convention (and pending the transposition of the PIF Directive), there are still notable differences in national criminal laws at a detailed level which may affect the question of whether a certain conduct is considered an offence at Member State level. 
Second bullet point: Despite the degree of harmonisation achieved under the PIF Convention (and pending the transposition of the PIF Directive), there are still notable differences in national criminal laws at a detailed level which may affect the question of whether a certain conduct is considered an offence at Member State level.
OLAF always conducts a first assessment considering whether the facts under investigation fall under the definition of EU fraud according to the applicable EU legislation. 
OLAF always conducts a first assessment considering whether the facts under investigation fall under the definition of EU fraud according to the applicable EU legislation.
It is then the competence of national authorities to decide whether to follow-up OLAF's recommendations or not. 
It is then the competence of national authorities to decide whether to follow-up OLAF's recommendations or not.
Third bullet point: While time barring can in principle be regarded as an "objective" reason, the qualification of a certain set of facts as a crime falls under the sole competence of judicial authorities, which enjoy a considerable margin of assessment in this regard. 
Third bullet point: While time barring can in principle be regarded as an "objective" reason, the qualification of a certain set of facts as a crime falls under the sole competence of judicial authorities, which enjoy a considerable margin of assessment in this regard.
Whether a case is considered time-barred may for instance depend on the degree of gravity attributed to a given offence which may have a significant impact on the prescription period applicable. 
Whether a case is considered time-barred may for instance depend on the degree of gravity attributed to a given offence which may have a significant impact on the prescription period applicable.
Also the assessment of e.g. the question when an offence was started and when it ended, whether there was a continuous or repeated conduct, as well as questions of interruption and suspension involve complex assessments based on specificities of national legal frameworks. 
Also the assessment of e.g. the question when an offence was started and when it ended, whether there was a continuous or repeated conduct, as well as questions of interruption and suspension involve complex assessments based on specificities of national legal frameworks.
In many cases, OLAF is able to check this with national authorities and may focus on enabling financial recovery. 
In many cases, OLAF is able to check this with national authorities and may focus on enabling financial recovery.
It should be noted that avoiding time barring is the joint responsibility of all actors, in particular EU institutions and Member States who should provide information to OLAF in a timely manner. 
It should be noted that avoiding time barring is the joint responsibility of all actors, in particular EU institutions and Member States who should provide information to OLAF in a timely manner.
See also Commission's reply to paragraph 97. 
See also Commission's reply to paragraph 97.
OLAF cooperates closely and constructively with many national authorities. 
OLAF cooperates closely and constructively with many national authorities.
This applies during the investigative phase (coordination of investigative activities, exchange of information, assistance to get access to bank accounts, etc.) as well as in the subsequent phase (implementation of OLAF's recommendations by national authorities). 
This applies during the investigative phase (coordination of investigative activities, exchange of information, assistance to get access to bank accounts, etc.) as well as in the subsequent phase (implementation of OLAF's recommendations by national authorities).
Where differences appear between OLAF and national authorities regarding the interpretation of the law or the facts, a meeting can be organised. 
Where differences appear between OLAF and national authorities regarding the interpretation of the law or the facts, a meeting can be organised.
The Commission underlines that Member States' judiciaries are and should be independent from OLAF. 
The Commission underlines that Member States' judiciaries are and should be independent from OLAF.
The national authorities may therefore reach different conclusions than the ones drawn by OLAF. 
The national authorities may therefore reach different conclusions than the ones drawn by OLAF.
The challenge arising from the significant differences among Member States in the scope and definition of criminal offences as well as in statutes of limitation has been specifically addressed by the new PIF Directive (EU) 1371/2017 (in particular Articles 3 and 4). 
The challenge arising from the significant differences among Member States in the scope and definition of criminal offences as well as in statutes of limitation has been specifically addressed by the new PIF Directive (EU) 1371/2017 (in particular Articles 3 and 4).
Member States have to transpose the PIF Directive by July 2019. 
Member States have to transpose the PIF Directive by July 2019.
In addition, the PIF Directive includes for the first time specific rules on limitation periods for PIF offences (Article 12). 
In addition, the PIF Directive includes for the first time specific rules on limitation periods for PIF offences (Article 12).
The Commission's proposal 18 
The Commission's proposal 18
to amend Regulation 883/2013 addresses inter alia the need for clarification of the legal framework for OLAF's investigation measures. 
to amend Regulation 883/2013 addresses inter alia the need for clarification of the legal framework for OLAF's investigation measures.
The cooperation between OLAF and national prosecutors is well established and – in general – functioning well. 
The cooperation between OLAF and national prosecutors is well established and – in general – functioning well.
OLAF investigations often complement the national investigations by covering aspects going beyond the national case. 
OLAF investigations often complement the national investigations by covering aspects going beyond the national case.
Close coordination between national authorities and OLAF is considered as good practice in OLAF and often takes place to avoid duplication of efforts and limit risks for the respective investigative activities. 
Close coordination between national authorities and OLAF is considered as good practice in OLAF and often takes place to avoid duplication of efforts and limit risks for the respective investigative activities.
The Commission emphasises the fact that, on the basis of Article 12 of Regulation 883/2013, OLAF often informs the public prosecutors' offices before the conclusion of the investigation. 
The Commission emphasises the fact that, on the basis of Article 12 of Regulation 883/2013, OLAF often informs the public prosecutors' offices before the conclusion of the investigation.
The Commission notes that the dismissal of cases by national judicial authorities is not necessarily due to weaknesses in the cooperation between OLAF and the national authorities although there is room for improvement (see also Commission’s replies to paragraphs 97 and 98). 
The Commission notes that the dismissal of cases by national judicial authorities is not necessarily due to weaknesses in the cooperation between OLAF and the national authorities although there is room for improvement (see also Commission’s replies to paragraphs 97 and 98).
Important reasons why facts, for example, may be time-barred would be that OLAF received the initial information too late or that the recipient of the judicial recommendation did not act on it in an efficient manner. 
Important reasons why facts, for example, may be time-barred would be that OLAF received the initial information too late or that the recipient of the judicial recommendation did not act on it in an efficient manner.
OLAF generally does not deliver to judiciaries time-barred cases. 
OLAF generally does not deliver to judiciaries time-barred cases.
The Commission would like to underline the complexity of the matter. 
The Commission would like to underline the complexity of the matter.
In fact, the investigative powers of an administrative office are not comparable to those attributed to investigative bodies working for the national public prosecutor's offices. 
In fact, the investigative powers of an administrative office are not comparable to those attributed to investigative bodies working for the national public prosecutor's offices.
It may therefore happen that, despite great investigative efforts deployed by OLAF, its limited investigation powers and practical possibilities do not allow collecting clear evidence of a criminal offence. 
It may therefore happen that, despite great investigative efforts deployed by OLAF, its limited investigation powers and practical possibilities do not allow collecting clear evidence of a criminal offence.
Therefore, important elements of evidence of a fraud, such as the payment of bribes, the individual responsibilities of the persons concerned, or the mens rea, may not be obtained. 
Therefore, important elements of evidence of a fraud, such as the payment of bribes, the individual responsibilities of the persons concerned, or the mens rea, may not be obtained.
Moreover, Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013 is not per se a sufficient legal basis to allow all Member States' judicial authorities to use OLAF reports as evidence in trial. 
Moreover, Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013 is not per se a sufficient legal basis to allow all Member States' judicial authorities to use OLAF reports as evidence in trial.
Therefore, in some Member States, after receiving the OLAF final report, prosecutors start investigation activities once again in order to acquire admissible evidence. 
Therefore, in some Member States, after receiving the OLAF final report, prosecutors start investigation activities once again in order to acquire admissible evidence.
In these cases, the insufficient evidence that justifies the dismissal is not the evidence collected by OLAF, but the evidence collected by national investigators (see also Commission's reply to paragraph 102). 
In these cases, the insufficient evidence that justifies the dismissal is not the evidence collected by OLAF, but the evidence collected by national investigators (see also Commission's reply to paragraph 102).
Conversely, it appears that sometimes prosecutors expect the OLAF final report to be a ready-to-use product, which does not require any further investigation activity or, when prosecutors cannot use evidence collected by OLAF, just requires repeating investigation activities already carried out by OLAF investigators. 
Conversely, it appears that sometimes prosecutors expect the OLAF final report to be a ready-to-use product, which does not require any further investigation activity or, when prosecutors cannot use evidence collected by OLAF, just requires repeating investigation activities already carried out by OLAF investigators.
Then, if evidence is not already available in full in the OLAF final report, the case may be dismissed because evidence is deemed insufficient. 
Then, if evidence is not already available in full in the OLAF final report, the case may be dismissed because evidence is deemed insufficient.
There are also cases where dismissals appear to be motivated by limited knowledge of the rules governing EU funding and notably the obligation of the beneficiary to provide accurate information. 
There are also cases where dismissals appear to be motivated by limited knowledge of the rules governing EU funding and notably the obligation of the beneficiary to provide accurate information.
Dismissals by national authorities might also take place in politically sensitive cases. 
Dismissals by national authorities might also take place in politically sensitive cases.
Nonetheless, OLAF continuously works on improving the quality of final reports and the follow-up to its recommendations. 
Nonetheless, OLAF continuously works on improving the quality of final reports and the follow-up to its recommendations.
A number of projects are already under preparation, such as new templates for the final reports. 
A number of projects are already under preparation, such as new templates for the final reports.
The period that has elapsed since the alleged offence was committed is not only linked to the duration of OLAF's investigations, which has decreased continuously over the past years, but also to the detection of the fraud, the timing when it was communicated to OLAF and the time when the national prosecutor finally acted on OLAF’s recommendation. 19 
The period that has elapsed since the alleged offence was committed is not only linked to the duration of OLAF's investigations, which has decreased continuously over the past years, but also to the detection of the fraud, the timing when it was communicated to OLAF and the time when the national prosecutor finally acted on OLAF’s recommendation. 19
The Commission notes that the analysis concerning the follow-up of OLAF’s investigations is based on a relatively small number of interviews with Commission services and Member States' judicial authorities. 
The Commission notes that the analysis concerning the follow-up of OLAF’s investigations is based on a relatively small number of interviews with Commission services and Member States' judicial authorities.
See also Commission's reply to paragraph 99. 
See also Commission's reply to paragraph 99.
The Commission’s 2017 evaluation of the OLAF Regulation has identified as the main factor hindering the follow-up to judicial recommendations the fact that the Regulation does not sufficiently ensure the use of OLAF reports as evidence in trial in the Member States. 
The Commission’s 2017 evaluation of the OLAF Regulation has identified as the main factor hindering the follow-up to judicial recommendations the fact that the Regulation does not sufficiently ensure the use of OLAF reports as evidence in trial in the Member States.