natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The „qualified“ status of a trust service is indicated by the combination of the „Service type identifier“ („Sti“) value in a service entry and the status according to the „Service current status“ field value as from the date indicated in the „Current status starting date and time“.
A “CA/QC” “Service type identifier” (“Sti”) entry (possibly further qualified as being a “RootCA-QC” through the use of the appropriate “Service information extension” (“Sie”) additionalServiceInformation Extension)
A „CA/QC“ „Service type identifier“ („Sti“) entry (possibly further qualified as being a „RootCA-QC“ through the use of the appropriate „Service information extension“ („Sie“) additionalServiceInformation Extension)
indicates that any end-entity certificate issued by or under the CA represented by the “Service digital identifier” (“Sdi”) CA's public key and CA's name (both CA data to be considered as trust anchor input), is a qualified certificate (QC) provided that it includes at least one of the following:
indicates that any end-entity certificate issued by or under the CA represented by the „Service digital identifier“ („Sdi“) CA's public key and CA's name (both CA data to be considered as trust anchor input), is a qualified certificate (QC) provided that it includes at least one of the following:
and provided this is ensured by the Member State Supervisory Body through a valid service status (i.e. “undersupervision”, “supervisionincessation”, “accredited” or “granted”) for that entry.
and provided this is ensured by the Member State Supervisory Body through a valid service status (i.e. „undersupervision“, „supervisionincessation“, „accredited“ or „granted“) for that entry.
and IF “Sie” “Qualifications Extension” information is present, then in addition to the above default rule, those certificates that are identified through the use of “Sie” “Qualifications Extension” information, constructed as a sequence of filters further identifying a set of certificates, must be considered according to the associated qualifiers providing additional information regarding their qualified status, the “SSCD support” and/or “Legal person as subject” (e.g. certificates containing a specific OID in the Certificate Policy extension, and/or having a specific “Key usage” pattern, and/or filtered through the use of a specific value to appear in one specific certificate field or extension, etc.).
and IF „Sie“ „Qualifications Extension“ information is present, then in addition to the above default rule, those certificates that are identified through the use of „Sie“ „Qualifications Extension“ information, constructed as a sequence of filters further identifying a set of certificates, must be considered according to the associated qualifiers providing additional information regarding their qualified status, the „SSCD support“ and/or „Legal person as subject“ (e.g. certificates containing a specific OID in the Certificate Policy extension, and/or having a specific „Key usage“ pattern, and/or filtered through the use of a specific value to appear in one specific certificate field or extension, etc.).
These qualifiers are part of the following set of “Qualifiers” used to compensate for the lack of information in the corresponding certificate content, and that are used respectively:
These qualifiers are part of the following set of „Qualifiers“ used to compensate for the lack of information in the corresponding certificate content, and that are used respectively:
“QCStatement” meaning the identified certificate(s) is(are) qualified under Directive 1999/93/EC;
„QCStatement“ meaning the identified certificate(s) is(are) qualified under Directive 1999/93/ЕС;
“QCForESig” meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), is(are) qualified certificate(s) for electronic signature under Regulation (EU) No 910/2014;
„QCForESig“ meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), is(are) qualified certificate(s) for electronic signature under Regulation (EU) No 910/2014;
“QCForESeal” meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), is(are) qualified certificate(s) for electronic seal under Regulation (EU) No 910/2014;
„QCForESeal“ meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), is(are) qualified certificate(s) for electronic seal under Regulation (EU) No 910/2014;
“QCForWSA” meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), is(are) qualified certificate(s) for web site authentication under Regulation (EU) No 910/2014.
„QCForWSA“ meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), is(are) qualified certificate(s) for web site authentication under Regulation (EU) No 910/2014.
“NotQualified” meaning the identified certificate(s) is(are) not to be considered as qualified; and/or
„NotQualified“ meaning the identified certificate(s) is(are) not to be considered as qualified; and/or
“QCWithSSCD” meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), have their private key residing in an SSCD, or
„QCWithSSCD“ meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), have their private key residing in an SSCD, or
“QCNoSSCD” meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), have not their private key residing in an SSCD, or
„QCNoSSCD“ meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), have not their private key residing in an SSCD, or
“QCSSCDStatusAsInCert” meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), does(do) contain proper machine processable information about whether or not their private key residing in an SSCD;
„QCSSCDStatusAsInCert“ meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), does(do) contain proper machine processable information about whether or not their private key residing in an SSCD;
“QCWithQSCD” meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), have their private key residing in a QSCD, or
„QCWithQSCD“ meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), have their private key residing in a QSCD, or
“QCNoQSCD” meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), have not their private key residing in a QSCD, or
„QCNoQSCD“ meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), have not their private key residing in a QSCD, or
“QCQSCDStatusAsInCert” meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), does(do) contain proper machine processable information about whether or not their private key is residing in a QSCD;
„QCQSCDStatusAsInCert“ meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), does(do) contain proper machine processable information about whether or not their private key is residing in a QSCD;
“QCQSCDManagedOnBehalf” indicating that all certificates identified by the applicable list of criteria, when they are claimed or stated as qualified, have their private key is residing in a QSCD for which the generation and management of that private key is done by a qualified TSP on behalf of the entity whose identity is certified in the certificate; and/or
„QCQSCDManagedOnBehalf“ indicating that all certificates identified by the applicable list of criteria, when they are claimed or stated as qualified, have their private key is residing in a QSCD for which the generation and management of that private key is done by a qualified TSP on behalf of the entity whose identity is certified in the certificate; and/or
“QCForLegalPerson” meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), are issued to a Legal Person under Directive 1999/93/EC.
„QCForLegalPerson“ meaning the identified certificate(s), when claimed or stated as qualified certificate(s), are issued to a Legal Person under Directive 1999/93/ЕС.
if none of the id-etsi-qcs 1 statement, QCP OID or QCP + OID information is included in an end-entity certificate, and
if none of the id-etsi-qcs 1 statement, QCP OID or QCP+ OID information is included in an end-entity certificate, and
if no “Sie” “Qualifications Extension” information is present for the trust anchor CA/QC corresponding service entry to qualify the certificate with a “QCStatement” qualifier, or
if no „Sie“ „Qualifications Extension“ information is present for the trust anchor CA/QC corresponding service entry to qualify the certificate with a „QCStatement“ qualifier, or
an “Sie” “Qualifications Extension” information is present for the trust anchor CA/QC corresponding service entry to qualify the certificate with a “NotQualified” qualifier,
an „Sie“ „Qualifications Extension“ information is present for the trust anchor CA/QC corresponding service entry to qualify the certificate with a „NotQualified“ qualifier,
“Service digital identifiers” are to be used as Trust Anchors in the context of validating electronic signatures or seals for which signer's or seal creator's certificate is to be validated against TL information, hence only the public key and the associated subject name are needed as Trust Anchor information.
„Service digital identifiers“ are to be used as Trust Anchors in the context of validating electronic signatures or seals for which signer's or seal creator's certificate is to be validated against TL information, hence only the public key and the associated subject name are needed as Trust Anchor information.
The general rule for interpretation of any other “Sti” type entry is that, for that “Sti” identified service type, the listed service named according to the “Service name” field value and uniquely identified by the “Service digital identity” field value has the current qualified or approval status according to the “Service current status” field value as from the date indicated in the “Current status starting date and time”.
The general rule for interpretation of any other „Sti“ type entry is that, for that „Sti“ identified service type, the listed service named according to the „Service name“ field value and uniquely identified by the „Service digital identity“ field value has the current qualified or approval status according to the „Service current status“ field value as from the date indicated in the „Current status starting date and time“.
Specific interpretation rules for any additional information with regard to a listed service (e.g.
Specific interpretation rules for any additional information with regard to a listed service (e.g. „Service information extensions“ field) may be found, when applicable, in the Member State specific URI as part of the present „Scheme type/community/rules“ field.
“Service information extensions” field) may be found, when applicable, in the Member State specific URI as part of the present “Scheme type/community/rules” field.
Please refer to the applicable secondary legislation pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 for further details on the fields, description and meaning for the Member States' trusted lists.“
Please refer to the applicable secondary legislation pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 for further details on the fields, description and meaning for the Member States' trusted lists.’
Специфичен за доверителния списък на всяка държава членка идентификатор (URI), насочващ към описателен текст, който се отнася за доверителния списък на тази държава членка:
A URI specific to each Member State's trusted list pointing towards a descriptive text that shall be applicable to this Member State trusted list:
http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/TrustedList/schemerules/CC, където CC = двубуквеният код на държавата по ISO 3166-1 [2], използван в полето „Scheme territory“ („Територия на схемата“) (клауза 5.3.10).
http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/TrustedList/schemerules/CC where CC = the ISO 3166-1 [2] alpha-2 Country Code used in the ‘Scheme territory’ field (clause 5.3.10)
Там потребителите могат да намерят специфичните за съответната държава членка политика/правила, съгласно които се оценяват включените в списъка услуги в съответствие с нейния режим за надзор и, когато е приложимо, схема за одобряване.
Where users can obtain the referenced Member State's specific policy/rules against which trust services included in the list are assessed, in compliance with the Member State's supervisory regime and where applicable, approval scheme.
Там потребителите могат да намерят специфично за дадената държава членка описание как да използват и тълкуват съдържанието на доверителния списък по отношение на вписаните неквалифицирани удостоверителни услуги и/или удостоверителните услуги, определени на национално равнище.
Where users can obtain a referenced Member State's specific description about how to use and interpret the content of the trusted list with regard to the listed non-qualified trust services and/or to nationally defined trust services.
То може да се използва за указване на евентуална нееднородност в националната система за одобряване по отношение на доставчици на удостоверителни услуги (ДУУ), които не издават квалифицирани удостоверения (КУ), както и на начина, по който „Scheme service definition URI“ (клауза 5.5.6) и полето „Service information extension“ (клауза 5.5.9) се използват за тази цел.
This may be used to indicate a potential granularity in the national approval system related to CSPs not issuing QCs and how the ‘Scheme service definition URI’ (clause 5.5.6) and the ‘Service information extension’ field (clause 5.5.9) are used for this purpose.
Държавите членки МОГАТ да определят и използват допълнителни URI, разширяващи горепосочения специфичен за държавата членка URI (т.е.
Member States MAY define and use additional URIs expanding the above Member State specific URI (i.e. URIs defined from this hierarchical specific URI).
URI, попадащи в йерархията на този специфичен URI).
TSL policy/legal notice (clause 5.3.11)
TSL policy/legal notice („Политика/правен коментар за списъка за статута на доверителните услуги — ССДУ“) (клауза 5.3.11)
This field shall be present and shall comply with the specifications from TS 119 612 clause 5.3.11 where the policy/legal notice concerning the legal status of the scheme or legal requirements met by the scheme under the jurisdiction in which it is established and/or any constraints and conditions under which the trusted list is maintained and published shall be a sequence of multilingual character strings (see clause 5.1.4) providing, in UK English as the mandatory language and optionally in one or more national languages, the actual text of any such policy or notice built as follows:
Това поле е задължително и трябва да съответства на спецификациите в клауза 5.3.11 от TS 119 612, в които правният коментар относно правния статут на схемата или правните изисквания, на които схемата трябва да отговаря в рамките на юрисдикцията, в която е установена, и/или евентуални ограничения и условия, при които се поддържа и публикува доверителният списък, трябва да бъде последователност от многоезични символни низове (вж. клауза 5.1.4), предоставящи на британски английски като задължителен език и по избор — на един или няколко национални езици, конструираният по следния начин актуален текст за тази политика или коментар:
A first mandatory part, common to all Member States' Trusted Lists indicating the applicable legal framework, and whose English version is the following:
Първа задължителна част, обща за доверителните списъци на всички държави членки, в която се указва приложимата правна рамка и чиято версия на английски език е следната:
The applicable legal framework for the present trusted list is Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC.
Приложимата правна рамка за настоящия доверителен списък е Регламент (ЕС) № 910/2014 на Европейския парламент и на Съвета от 23 юли 2014 г. относно електронната идентификация и удостоверителните услуги при електронни трансакции на вътрешния пазар и за отмяна на Директива 1999/93/ЕО.
Text in a Member State's national language(s):
Текст на националния език или езици на държавата членка:
A second, optional part, specific to each trusted list, indicating references to specific applicable national legal frameworks
Втора, незадължителна част, специфична за всеки доверителен списък, включваща препратки към специфични приложими национални правни рамки.
Service current status (clause 5.5.4)
Service current status („Настоящ статут на услугата“) (клауза 5.5.4)
This field shall be present and shall comply with the specifications from TS 119 612 clause 5.5.4.
Това поле е задължително и трябва да съответства на спецификациите в клауза 5.5.4 от TS 119 612.
The migration of the ‘Service current status’ value of services listed in EUMS trusted list as of the day before the date Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 applies (i.e. 30 June 2016) shall be executed on the day the Regulation applies (i.e. 1 July 2016) as specified in Annex J to ETSI TS 119 612.
Миграцията на стойността на „Service current status“ за услугите, вписани в доверителния списък на държавите — членки на ЕС, към деня преди датата, от която се прилага Регламент (ЕС) № 910/2014 (т.е.
CHAPTER III
30 юни 2016 г.), се извършва в деня, от който се прилага този регламент (т.е.
CONTINUITY OF TRUSTED LISTS
1 юли 2016 г.), както е посочено в приложение J към ETSI TS 119 612.
Certificates to be notified to the Commission in accordance with Article 4(2) of this Decision shall meet the requirements of clause 5.7.1 from ETSI TS 119 612 and shall be issued in such a way that they:
ГЛАВА III
have at least a three months difference in their final date of validity (‘Not After’),
ВРЕМЕВА НЕПРЕКЪСНАТОСТ НА ДОВЕРИТЕЛНИТЕ СПИСЪЦИ
are created on new key pairs.
Удостоверенията, за които трябва да се уведоми Комисията в съответствие с член 4, параграф 2 от настоящото решение, трябва да отговарят на изискванията на клауза 5.7.1 от ETSI TS 119 612 и да се издават по такъв начин, че:
Previously used key pairs must not be re-certified.
да има най-малко три месеца разлика в крайната им дата на валидност („не по-късно от“),
In case of expiry of one of the public key certificates that could be used to validate the trusted list's signature or seal that has been notified to the Commission and that is published in the Commission's central list of pointers, Member States shall:
да са създадени въз основа на нови двойки ключове.
in case the currently published trusted list was signed or sealed with a private key whose public key certificate is expired, re-issue, without any delay, a new trusted list signed or sealed with a private key whose notified public key certificate is not expired;
Вече използвани двойки ключове не трябва да бъдат сертифицирани повторно.
when required, generate new key pairs that could be used to sign or seal the trusted list and undertake the generation of their corresponding public key certificates;
В случай на изтичане на валидността на едно от удостоверенията за публичен ключ, което би могло да се използва за валидиране на подписа или печата на доверителния списък и за което Комисията е била уведомена, като тя го е публикувала в централния си списък с указатели, държавите членки трябва:
promptly notify to the Commission the new list of public key certificates corresponding to the private keys that could be used to sign or seal the trusted list.
в случай че актуалният публикуван доверителен списък е бил подписан или подпечатан с частен ключ, валидността на чието удостоверение за публичен ключ е изтекла — незабавно да издадат нов доверителен списък, който е подписан или подпечатан с частен ключ, валидността на чието удостоверение за публичен ключ не е изтекла;
In case of a compromise or decommissioning of one of the private keys corresponding to one of the public key certificates that could be used to validate the trusted list's signature or seal, that has been notified to the Commission and that is published in the Commission's central list of pointers, Member States shall:
да генерират при поискване нови двойки ключове, които биха могли да се използват за подписване или подпечатване на доверителния списък, и да се заемат със създаването на съответстващите им удостоверения за публичен ключ;
re-issue, without any delay, a new trusted list signed or sealed with a non-compromised private key in cases where the published trusted list was signed or sealed with a compromised or decommissioned private key;
незабавно да уведомят Комисията за новия списък на удостоверения за публични ключове, съответстващи на частните ключове, които биха могли да се използват за подписване или подпечатване на доверителния списък.
In case of compromise or decommissioning of all the private keys corresponding to the public key certificates that could be used to validate the trusted list's signature, that have been notified to the Commission and that are published in the Commission's central list of pointers, Member States shall:
В случай на разкриване или на прекратяване на използването на един от частните ключове, съответстващ на едно от удостоверенията за публичен ключ, което би могло да се използва за валидиране на подписа или печата на доверителния списък и за което Комисията е била уведомена, като тя го е публикувала в централния си списък с указатели, държавите членки трябва:
generate new key pairs that could be used to sign or seal the trusted list and undertake the generation of their corresponding public key certificates;
незабавно да издадат нов доверителен списък, подписан или подпечатан с неразкрит частен ключ, в случай че публикуваният доверителен списък е бил подписан или подпечатан с частен ключ, който е разкрит или чието използване е прекратено;
re-issue, without any delay, a new trusted list signed or sealed with one of those new private keys and whose corresponding public key certificate is to be notified;
В случай на разкриване или на прекратяване на използването на всички частни ключове, съответстващи на удостоверенията за публични ключове, които биха могли да се използват за валидиране на подписа на доверителния списък и за които Комисията е била уведомена, като тя ги е публикувала в централния си списък с указатели, държавите членки трябва:
CHAPTER IV
да генерират нови двойки ключове, които биха могли да се използват за подписване или подпечатване на доверителния списък, и да се заемат със създаването на съответстващите им удостоверения за публичен ключ;
SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE HUMAN READABLE FORM OF THE TRUSTED LIST
незабавно да издадат нов доверителен списък, който е подписан или подпечатан с един от тези нови частни ключове и за чието удостоверение за публичен ключ трябва да се уведоми;
When a human readable form of the trusted list is established and published, it shall be provided in the form of a Portable Document Format (PDF) document according to ISO 32000 [3] that shall be formatted according to the profile PDF/A (ISO 19005 [4]).
ГЛАВА IV
The content of the PDF/A based human readable form of the trusted list shall comply with the following requirements:
СПЕЦИФИКАЦИИ ЗА ЧЕТИМАТА ОТ ЧОВЕК ФОРМА НА ДОВЕРИТЕЛНИЯ СПИСЪК
The structure of the human readable form shall reflect the logical model described in TS 119 612;
Ако доверителният списък е съставен и публикуван в четима от човек форма, той се предоставя като документ във формат Portable Document Format (PDF) в съответствие с ISO 32000 [3], който е форматиран съгласно профила PDF/A (ISO 19005 [4]).
Every present field shall be displayed and provide:
Съдържанието на четимата от човек форма на доверителния списък на базата на PDF/A трябва да отговаря на следните изисквания:
The title of the field (e.g.
Структурата на четимата от човек форма на доверителния списък да отразява логическия модел, описан в TS 119 612.
‘Service type identifier’);
Всяко налично поле да е изобразено и да съдържа:
The value of the field (e.g. ‘http://uri.etsi.org/TrstSvc/Svctype/CA/QC’);