natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The ESM Treaty further specifies the involvement of the ECB in the ESM in assessing whether there is a risk to the financial stability of the euro area as a whole warranting an activation of the ESM; in assessing the actual financing needs of the Member State concerned; in contributing to the negotiation of Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) containing appropriate policy conditionality, and to the subsequent monitoring and implementation of such MoU; and in providing an analysis recognising exceptional financial market circumstances and risks to financial stability warranting activation of secondary market interventions by the ESM.
The ESM Treaty further specifies the involvement of the ECB in the ESM in assessing whether there is a risk to the financial stability of the euro area as a whole warranting an activation of the ESM; in assessing the actual financing needs of the Member State concerned; in contributing to the negotiation of Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) containing appropriate policy conditionality, and to the subsequent monitoring and implementation of such MoU; and in providing an analysis recognising exceptional financial market circumstances and risks to financial stability warranting activation of secondary market interventions by the ESM.
Any activity of the ECB in relation with the ESM should be decided by the ECB only, under the condition that it is without prejudice to the ECB primary objective of price stability.
Any activity of the ECB in relation with the ESM should be decided by the ECB only, under the condition that it is without prejudice to the ECB primary objective of price stability.
The idea has been floated recently to involve the ECB in leveraging the EFSF operations.
The idea has been floated recently to involve the ECB in leveraging the EFSF operations.
What are your views on this?
What are your views on this?
It is essential that the governments swiftly implement the new instruments of the EFSF in line with the Heads of State and Government decisions of 21 July and 26 October.
It is essential that the governments swiftly implement the new instruments of the EFSF in line with the Heads of State and Government decisions of 21 July and 26 October.
The EFSF must be given the capacity to fulfil its function for safeguarding financial stability in an effective and efficient manner.
The EFSF must be given the capacity to fulfil its function for safeguarding financial stability in an effective and efficient manner.
Leveraging is one element to maximise the effectiveness of the facility, and to make out the most of available public money.
Leveraging is one element to maximise the effectiveness of the facility, and to make out the most of available public money.
At the Eurogroup meeting of 29 November, Member States have agreed on two leverage options, both of which should be operational at the latest early January.
At the Eurogroup meeting of 29 November, Member States have agreed on two leverage options, both of which should be operational at the latest early January.
The mandates of the EFSF and of the ECB are different.
The mandates of the EFSF and of the ECB are different.
The ECB should remain focused on maintaining price stability.
The ECB should remain focused on maintaining price stability.
The current crisis is a fiscal crisis.
The current crisis is a fiscal crisis.
Therefore, the answer has to come from fiscal and structural policies and from improvements in the European governance.
Therefore, the answer has to come from fiscal and structural policies and from improvements in the European governance.
What would the issuance of Eurobonds imply for economic governance in the euro area?
What would the issuance of Eurobonds imply for economic governance in the euro area?
The introduction of Eurobonds with large or mutual fiscal obligations is critically dependent on correct sequencing.
The introduction of Eurobonds with large or mutual fiscal obligations is critically dependent on correct sequencing.
Specifically, it is only feasible as a consequence of a significant transfer of fiscal sovereignty to the EU level with the aim of achieving genuine economic union in the euro area, commensurate with monetary union.
Specifically, it is only feasible as a consequence of a significant transfer of fiscal sovereignty to the EU level with the aim of achieving genuine economic union in the euro area, commensurate with monetary union.
While some observers see Eurobond issuance as a governance tool in itself – for example, by providing greater control over government financing – without effective economic governance such mechanisms would lack credibility, create serious moral hazard and risk weakening incentives for sound fiscal policies which are essential in economic and monetary union.
While some observers see Eurobond issuance as a governance tool in itself – for example, by providing greater control over government financing – without effective economic governance such mechanisms would lack credibility, create serious moral hazard and risk weakening incentives for sound fiscal policies which are essential in economic and monetary union.
This would thereby complicate the pursuit of price stability by the Eurosystem.
This would thereby complicate the pursuit of price stability by the Eurosystem.
As implementing such fundamental changes to fiscal governance will necessarily take time, Eurobond issuance should be seen as a medium-term objective within a sequence of fiscal governance reform.
As implementing such fundamental changes to fiscal governance will necessarily take time, Eurobond issuance should be seen as a medium-term objective within a sequence of fiscal governance reform.
Do you think the ECB should need further new instruments to cope with the euro area crisis?
Do you think the ECB should need further new instruments to cope with the euro area crisis?
Like other central banks, the ECB has one main instrument to fight inflation, which is the short-term interest rate.
Like other central banks, the ECB has one main instrument to fight inflation, which is the short-term interest rate.
In normal times the combination of one goal (price stability), and one instrument is sufficient.
In normal times the combination of one goal (price stability), and one instrument is sufficient.
During a financial crisis, the picture may change, because concerns towards “secondary” objectives like financial stability get more prominence.
During a financial crisis, the picture may change, because concerns towards “secondary” objectives like financial stability get more prominence.
During a financial crisis, a central bank can reduce the key interest rate towards the lower nominal bound, and thereby make a contribution to financial stability.
During a financial crisis, a central bank can reduce the key interest rate towards the lower nominal bound, and thereby make a contribution to financial stability.
This is what the ECB and other leading central banks have done in response to the shocks.
This is what the ECB and other leading central banks have done in response to the shocks.
At the zero lower bound, central banks cannot do much using their conventional instruments.
At the zero lower bound, central banks cannot do much using their conventional instruments.
Instead of developing new instruments, which is not a straightforward task, the ECB has resorted to a broad set of non-standard measures with the aim to restore the functioning of the transmission mechanism.
Instead of developing new instruments, which is not a straightforward task, the ECB has resorted to a broad set of non-standard measures with the aim to restore the functioning of the transmission mechanism.
It provided to the euro area banking system an exceptional high degree of liquidity support throughout the financial crisis and is committed to continue to do so as long as such support is needed.
It provided to the euro area banking system an exceptional high degree of liquidity support throughout the financial crisis and is committed to continue to do so as long as such support is needed.
In order to do so, the ECB enhanced its operational framework e.g. through longer term refinancing operations and broader collateral and invented new programmes such as the Enhanced Credit Support, the Covered Bonds Purchase Program, and the Securities Markets Programme.
In order to do so, the ECB enhanced its operational framework e.g. through longer term refinancing operations and broader collateral and invented new programmes such as the Enhanced Credit Support, the Covered Bonds Purchase Program, and the Securities Markets Programme.
It also introduced swap operations with other central banks, notably the US Federal Reserve for the provision of dollar liquidity.
It also introduced swap operations with other central banks, notably the US Federal Reserve for the provision of dollar liquidity.
All these measures are thought to be of temporary nature, and will be conducted as long as they are needed.
All these measures are thought to be of temporary nature, and will be conducted as long as they are needed.
The ECB is constantly reviewing the overall situation, as evidenced by the decisions taken on 8 December 2011 to support bank lending and money market activities.
The ECB is constantly reviewing the overall situation, as evidenced by the decisions taken on 8 December 2011 to support bank lending and money market activities.
As it currently looks, the available tools are sufficient.
As it currently looks, the available tools are sufficient.
What role should sovereign ratings have in your view on ECB policy?
What role should sovereign ratings have in your view on ECB policy?
Do you think that ECB should accept as a rule all euro area government bonds as securities?
Do you think that ECB should accept as a rule all euro area government bonds as securities?
In the assessment of the credit standards of eligible assets as collateral at monetary policy operations, well-comparable standards to assess the quality of the assets are necessary.
In the assessment of the credit standards of eligible assets as collateral at monetary policy operations, well-comparable standards to assess the quality of the assets are necessary.
Ratings from credit rating agencies are one important, but not the only, input used for that.
Ratings from credit rating agencies are one important, but not the only, input used for that.
The Eurosystem also takes into account other features guaranteeing a high risk protection.
The Eurosystem also takes into account other features guaranteeing a high risk protection.
For instance, in the case of a country under an IMF-EU adjustment programme, the ECB’s assessment of the programme and country's compliance with it are of crucial importance.
For instance, in the case of a country under an IMF-EU adjustment programme, the ECB’s assessment of the programme and country's compliance with it are of crucial importance.
The Eurosystem Credit Assessment Framework includes the standards that the ECB applies for securities, including government bonds of euro area countries.
The Eurosystem Credit Assessment Framework includes the standards that the ECB applies for securities, including government bonds of euro area countries.
If needed to ensure an adequate risk protection of the Eurosystem, the Eurosystem can reject securities, limit their use or apply additional haircuts to them, on the basis of any information it considers relevant.
If needed to ensure an adequate risk protection of the Eurosystem, the Eurosystem can reject securities, limit their use or apply additional haircuts to them, on the basis of any information it considers relevant.
What is your view on a European Credit Rating Agency?
What is your view on a European Credit Rating Agency?
The proposals currently on the table in this area assume that a European Credit Rating Agency would be funded wholly or partially by public money.
The proposals currently on the table in this area assume that a European Credit Rating Agency would be funded wholly or partially by public money.
The degree of independence of such a European Credit Rating Agency will therefore be questioned.
The degree of independence of such a European Credit Rating Agency will therefore be questioned.
The requirement of validation and the practical issue of building a track record over several years could make the Agency not operative for some time.
The requirement of validation and the practical issue of building a track record over several years could make the Agency not operative for some time.
Finally, it remains to be ascertained whether the creation of a semi-public agency would result in increasing competition, or rather create artificial barriers to entry for new private entities and therefore ultimately reduce competition.
Finally, it remains to be ascertained whether the creation of a semi-public agency would result in increasing competition, or rather create artificial barriers to entry for new private entities and therefore ultimately reduce competition.
As a result, priority should be given to reducing the reliance on ratings of the financial regulatory apparatus.
As a result, priority should be given to reducing the reliance on ratings of the financial regulatory apparatus.
What is your view on the Securities Markets Programme (SMP)?
What is your view on the Securities Markets Programme (SMP)?
In particular, in your view does it turn the ECB to a de facto fiscal player and thus possibly endanger its independence?
In particular, in your view does it turn the ECB to a de facto fiscal player and thus possibly endanger its independence?
The SMP aims to support the transmission of monetary policy decisions.
The SMP aims to support the transmission of monetary policy decisions.
Dysfunctional securities markets – and dysfunctional government bond markets in particular, given the crucial role of government bond markets – hamper the normal transmission of changes in policy interest rates to the real economy and ultimately to prices.
Dysfunctional securities markets – and dysfunctional government bond markets in particular, given the crucial role of government bond markets – hamper the normal transmission of changes in policy interest rates to the real economy and ultimately to prices.
The SMP therefore fulfils a monetary policy purpose, and clearly falls within the mandate of the ECB.
The SMP therefore fulfils a monetary policy purpose, and clearly falls within the mandate of the ECB.
One therefore cannot claim that the ECB has become a fiscal player.
One therefore cannot claim that the ECB has become a fiscal player.
The ECB assesses the situation and takes decisions where needed in full independence.
The ECB assesses the situation and takes decisions where needed in full independence.
The ECB can deliver liquidity to certain financial market segments in order to improve their functioning, and thereby limit spill-overs from dysfunctional government securities market segments to countries with fundamentally sound fiscal positions.
The ECB can deliver liquidity to certain financial market segments in order to improve their functioning, and thereby limit spill-overs from dysfunctional government securities market segments to countries with fundamentally sound fiscal positions.
However, only effective government action to return to sound and sustainable fiscal positions can durably ensure a better functioning of government securities markets.
However, only effective government action to return to sound and sustainable fiscal positions can durably ensure a better functioning of government securities markets.
For when do you foresee the ECB's effective exit from the current non-standard measures?
For when do you foresee the ECB's effective exit from the current non-standard measures?
All non-standard monetary policy measures taken by the ECB are temporary in nature.
All non-standard monetary policy measures taken by the ECB are temporary in nature.
They have been taken to enhance the transmission process of monetary policy, in view of impaired financial markets.
They have been taken to enhance the transmission process of monetary policy, in view of impaired financial markets.
Therefore, the pace and timing of the exit from the measures taken is closely linked to financial market developments.
Therefore, the pace and timing of the exit from the measures taken is closely linked to financial market developments.
In turn, these developments depend to a large degree on appropriate national fiscal consolidation and structural reform policies.
In turn, these developments depend to a large degree on appropriate national fiscal consolidation and structural reform policies.
Such action could limit risk premiums in bond yields, thereby also improving the financial positions of banks and corporations.
Such action could limit risk premiums in bond yields, thereby also improving the financial positions of banks and corporations.
Strengthening the capital of banks experiencing financial problems would help restoring access of these banks to financial markets as needed, which could reduce their reliance on ECB refinancing operations.
Strengthening the capital of banks experiencing financial problems would help restoring access of these banks to financial markets as needed, which could reduce their reliance on ECB refinancing operations.
Do you foresee the stance of the ECB to change as regards the strong opposition towards a restructuring of Greek debt?
Do you foresee the stance of the ECB to change as regards the strong opposition towards a restructuring of Greek debt?
The ECB has repeatedly made the point that honouring sovereign debt obligations has to be an essential principle of a well functioning economic system.
The ECB has repeatedly made the point that honouring sovereign debt obligations has to be an essential principle of a well functioning economic system.
This requires the adoption of needed fiscal consolidation measures and structural reforms to boost the potential of the economy.
This requires the adoption of needed fiscal consolidation measures and structural reforms to boost the potential of the economy.
A country in distress can also seek financial assistance from the IMF and other European member states via the EFSF under strict conditionality.
A country in distress can also seek financial assistance from the IMF and other European member states via the EFSF under strict conditionality.
Given the exceptional situation in Greece, euro area political leaders have decided for private sector involvement.
Given the exceptional situation in Greece, euro area political leaders have decided for private sector involvement.
The ECB has emphasised that, in order to minimise the spillovers to other euro area countries, private sector involvement should be of voluntary nature and that a ‘credit event’ should be avoided.
The ECB has emphasised that, in order to minimise the spillovers to other euro area countries, private sector involvement should be of voluntary nature and that a ‘credit event’ should be avoided.
The decisions taken by the Heads of State or Government have been consistent with the ECB’s concerns in this regard.
The decisions taken by the Heads of State or Government have been consistent with the ECB’s concerns in this regard.
It is very significant that Heads of State or Government have recognised that the approach followed for Greece was exceptional and unique in response to an exceptional and unique situation.
It is very significant that Heads of State or Government have recognised that the approach followed for Greece was exceptional and unique in response to an exceptional and unique situation.
This should be understood and accepted by financial market participants, so that government bond markets can again play their central role in the good functioning and stability of the financial system.
This should be understood and accepted by financial market participants, so that government bond markets can again play their central role in the good functioning and stability of the financial system.
This requires as a precondition that individual member countries stick to their commitments to sustainable fiscal consolidation and structural reform.
This requires as a precondition that individual member countries stick to their commitments to sustainable fiscal consolidation and structural reform.
To prevent countries in future from the effects of a negative debt spiral, the full respect of the enforced Stability and Growth Pact is of the essence.
To prevent countries in future from the effects of a negative debt spiral, the full respect of the enforced Stability and Growth Pact is of the essence.
How will you ensure transparency regarding the SMP and Covered Bond Purchase Programme?
How will you ensure transparency regarding the SMP and Covered Bond Purchase Programme?
I fully share the principles of transparency and openness.
I fully share the principles of transparency and openness.
As regards the SMP and the CBPP2, the ECB provides, on a weekly basis, information on the amounts purchased (net of the amounts redeemed).
As regards the SMP and the CBPP2, the ECB provides, on a weekly basis, information on the amounts purchased (net of the amounts redeemed).
However, providing detailed information on the bond purchase programmes, especially on the SMP which is carried out in the form of an intervention operation, could harm the effectiveness and efficiency of these programmes.
However, providing detailed information on the bond purchase programmes, especially on the SMP which is carried out in the form of an intervention operation, could harm the effectiveness and efficiency of these programmes.
How do you evaluate the grown Target II liabilities and receivables of the ECB members?
How do you evaluate the grown Target II liabilities and receivables of the ECB members?
The settlement of cross-border payment flows between banks in the euro area in the payment system TARGET2 results in intra-Eurosystem balances.
The settlement of cross-border payment flows between banks in the euro area in the payment system TARGET2 results in intra-Eurosystem balances.
Their netting out throughout the Eurosystem results in NCBs displaying a TARGET2 claim or a TARGET2 liability vis-à-vis the ECB, the central counterparty.
Their netting out throughout the Eurosystem results in NCBs displaying a TARGET2 claim or a TARGET2 liability vis-à-vis the ECB, the central counterparty.
TARGET2 liabilities have increased sizeably during the financial crisis for some NCBs: this is because their banking systems face payment outflows which are not matched by payment inflows and cannot be compensated by fund raising in the market.
TARGET2 liabilities have increased sizeably during the financial crisis for some NCBs: this is because their banking systems face payment outflows which are not matched by payment inflows and cannot be compensated by fund raising in the market.
Compensation comes instead from borrowing at the NCB.
Compensation comes instead from borrowing at the NCB.
Thus, the imbalanced cross-border payment flows imply that the banking systems need more central bank liquidity in some countries than in others where commercial bank money is inflowing.
Thus, the imbalanced cross-border payment flows imply that the banking systems need more central bank liquidity in some countries than in others where commercial bank money is inflowing.
This uneven distribution within the Eurosystem provides stability as it allows financially sound banks – even those in countries under financial stress – to cover their liquidity needs, against eligible collateral.
This uneven distribution within the Eurosystem provides stability as it allows financially sound banks – even those in countries under financial stress – to cover their liquidity needs, against eligible collateral.
Ensuring that solvable banks are not constrained in their short-term funding has been a key feature of the ECB’s non-standard measures.
Ensuring that solvable banks are not constrained in their short-term funding has been a key feature of the ECB’s non-standard measures.