natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
For instance, the ECB President appears before the ECON Committee on a quarterly basis and this practice has certainly mutually benefited both institutions and Executive Board members take part in ad hoc hearings on specific topics.
For instance, the ECB President appears before the ECON Committee on a quarterly basis and this practice has certainly mutually benefited both institutions and Executive Board members take part in ad hoc hearings on specific topics.
Besides, the ECB’s Annual Report is presented to the European Parliament.
Besides, the ECB’s Annual Report is presented to the European Parliament.
I take the recent ECON report on the ECB’s Annual Report as evidence of the good interaction and understanding between the ECB and the Parliament.
I take the recent ECON report on the ECB’s Annual Report as evidence of the good interaction and understanding between the ECB and the Parliament.
Furthermore, the ECB’s publication and information activities address the general public and market participants.
Furthermore, the ECB’s publication and information activities address the general public and market participants.
Besides the monthly press conferences by the ECB President, frequent speeches and interviews are delivered by Executive Board members.
Besides the monthly press conferences by the ECB President, frequent speeches and interviews are delivered by Executive Board members.
The ECB provides an extensive amount of material on its webpage, most importantly its Monthly Bulletin, scientific publications and statistical data.
The ECB provides an extensive amount of material on its webpage, most importantly its Monthly Bulletin, scientific publications and statistical data.
All in all, I am convinced the ECB has demonstrated its strong dedication to democratic accountability and reporting.
All in all, I am convinced the ECB has demonstrated its strong dedication to democratic accountability and reporting.
I intend to keep up this track record if and when joining the institution.
I intend to keep up this track record if and when joining the institution.
What conclusions do you draw from the comparison between the transparency policies followed by the Federal Reserve Bank and by the ECB?
What conclusions do you draw from the comparison between the transparency policies followed by the Federal Reserve Bank and by the ECB?
What do you think about the publication by the Fed or the Bank of England of the minutes of their meetings?
What do you think about the publication by the Fed or the Bank of England of the minutes of their meetings?
Do you think this policy could be applied by the ECB?
Do you think this policy could be applied by the ECB?
Transparency has become one of the key features of monetary policy-making during the last decade or two.
Transparency has become one of the key features of monetary policy-making during the last decade or two.
It is about providing the public with information which is relevant to understand the central bank’s monetary policy decisions.
It is about providing the public with information which is relevant to understand the central bank’s monetary policy decisions.
This helps the public to monitor and evaluate the central bank’s performance.
This helps the public to monitor and evaluate the central bank’s performance.
Transparency has contributed to a better understanding of monetary policy aiming at price stability.
Transparency has contributed to a better understanding of monetary policy aiming at price stability.
From the start, the ECB has emphasised that transparency is an important element of its monetary policy approach.
From the start, the ECB has emphasised that transparency is an important element of its monetary policy approach.
It announced a formal monetary policy strategy with a quantitative definition of its primary objective of price stability.
It announced a formal monetary policy strategy with a quantitative definition of its primary objective of price stability.
The Governing Council regularly explains monetary policy decisions applying that strategy.
The Governing Council regularly explains monetary policy decisions applying that strategy.
The clear and unambiguous objective of maintaining price stability provides a strong focus for all of the ECB’s decisions and contributed to anchoring inflation expectations.
The clear and unambiguous objective of maintaining price stability provides a strong focus for all of the ECB’s decisions and contributed to anchoring inflation expectations.
By comparison, the Fed’s approach has evolved over time.
By comparison, the Fed’s approach has evolved over time.
Traditionally, the Fed was rather general about the quantification of its goals.
Traditionally, the Fed was rather general about the quantification of its goals.
By now, in view of explanations and further clarifications by Chairman Bernanke, it can be observed that the Fed has an understanding of the price stability objective which is from a quantitative point of view similar to the ECB’s definition.
By now, in view of explanations and further clarifications by Chairman Bernanke, it can be observed that the Fed has an understanding of the price stability objective which is from a quantitative point of view similar to the ECB’s definition.
Quite recently, the Fed has adopted a means to communicate with the public about policy decisions similar to the ECB’s practice based on giving public press conferences after the policy meeting.
Quite recently, the Fed has adopted a means to communicate with the public about policy decisions similar to the ECB’s practice based on giving public press conferences after the policy meeting.
Monetary policy committees may be subject to different accountability modes.
Monetary policy committees may be subject to different accountability modes.
Many committees emphasise collective accountability (the Fed and the ECB), but some committees, like the Bank of England, are based on individual accountability of policy-makers.
Many committees emphasise collective accountability (the Fed and the ECB), but some committees, like the Bank of England, are based on individual accountability of policy-makers.
Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and it is not always clear what transparency mode is best given circumstances.
Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and it is not always clear what transparency mode is best given circumstances.
Communicating diversity of policy-makers’ views in monetary policy discussions can help the public to better predict interest rate changes, but there may be also other means to achieve this intention.
Communicating diversity of policy-makers’ views in monetary policy discussions can help the public to better predict interest rate changes, but there may be also other means to achieve this intention.
For the Bank of England, it is obviously the right choice to publish minutes of policy meetings.
For the Bank of England, it is obviously the right choice to publish minutes of policy meetings.
But, as shown by research for the Fed, in a system of collective accountability, the voting records may not faithfully reveal the diversity during policy meetings.
But, as shown by research for the Fed, in a system of collective accountability, the voting records may not faithfully reveal the diversity during policy meetings.
The ECB’s approach is to provide information focusing on the Governing Council’s collective assessment and using well established communication tools.
The ECB’s approach is to provide information focusing on the Governing Council’s collective assessment and using well established communication tools.
Notably, the President’s Introductory Statement at the press conference, which provides a comprehensive summary of the policy-relevant assessment of economic developments, and the monthly press conference, which includes a question and answer session provides a platform for a timely and even-handed explanation of monetary policy discussions and decisions to the public.
Notably, the President’s Introductory Statement at the press conference, which provides a comprehensive summary of the policy-relevant assessment of economic developments, and the monthly press conference, which includes a question and answer session provides a platform for a timely and even-handed explanation of monetary policy discussions and decisions to the public.
What’s your opinion of the monetary dialogue with the European Parliament?
What’s your opinion of the monetary dialogue with the European Parliament?
Might ECB board members discuss monetary policy and its decisions with other political actors or would this harm the bank’s independence?
Might ECB board members discuss monetary policy and its decisions with other political actors or would this harm the bank’s independence?
The quarterly hearing of the ECB President before the ECON Committee is an essential component of the ECB’s democratic accountability.
The quarterly hearing of the ECB President before the ECON Committee is an essential component of the ECB’s democratic accountability.
The hearings have proved to be a successful forum in a variety of aspects.
The hearings have proved to be a successful forum in a variety of aspects.
First, the hearing is an opportunity for the representatives of the people of Europe to ask questions about ECB decisions and enquire detailed explanations on issues of specific interest to them.
First, the hearing is an opportunity for the representatives of the people of Europe to ask questions about ECB decisions and enquire detailed explanations on issues of specific interest to them.
Second, it allows the ECB to explain its policy decisions to Parliamentarians and the wider public.
Second, it allows the ECB to explain its policy decisions to Parliamentarians and the wider public.
This helps to enhance the understanding of the ECB’s reasoning and hence to anchor expectations.
This helps to enhance the understanding of the ECB’s reasoning and hence to anchor expectations.
The dialogue between the institutions is carried out in a constructive and rigorous manner and extends to topics outside monetary policy, such as immediate crisis response measures, economic governance as well as financial regulation.
The dialogue between the institutions is carried out in a constructive and rigorous manner and extends to topics outside monetary policy, such as immediate crisis response measures, economic governance as well as financial regulation.
Besides the interaction with the European Parliament, the ECB should maintain close relations with other EU institutions and fora, such as the Eurogroup, the ECOFIN Council and, at a more technical level, the Economic and Financial Committee and the Economic Policy Committee of the EU.
Besides the interaction with the European Parliament, the ECB should maintain close relations with other EU institutions and fora, such as the Eurogroup, the ECOFIN Council and, at a more technical level, the Economic and Financial Committee and the Economic Policy Committee of the EU.
Finally, the ECB was given a specific role in the operation of the financial assistance and crisis management frameworks that have recently been established.
Finally, the ECB was given a specific role in the operation of the financial assistance and crisis management frameworks that have recently been established.
All these contacts, however, are maintained without prejudice to the ECB’s primary mandate and the independence of the ECB and its decision making bodies and staff members.
All these contacts, however, are maintained without prejudice to the ECB’s primary mandate and the independence of the ECB and its decision making bodies and staff members.
What do you see as the most important risks and challenges facing the ECB?
What do you see as the most important risks and challenges facing the ECB?
The ongoing and deepening sovereign debt crisis poses many risks and challenges to the ECB, and more in general to Europe.
The ongoing and deepening sovereign debt crisis poses many risks and challenges to the ECB, and more in general to Europe.
Three intertwined issues in my view deserve specific attention.
Three intertwined issues in my view deserve specific attention.
First, transmitting monetary policy aimed at price stability in the whole euro area is complicated by the sovereign debt crisis.
First, transmitting monetary policy aimed at price stability in the whole euro area is complicated by the sovereign debt crisis.
Setting interest rates that will deliver price stability in the medium term is complicated by very large uncertainty on future economic and financial developments and on the degree to which changes in the monetary policy stance are ultimately transmitted to prices given impaired transmission channels.
Setting interest rates that will deliver price stability in the medium term is complicated by very large uncertainty on future economic and financial developments and on the degree to which changes in the monetary policy stance are ultimately transmitted to prices given impaired transmission channels.
Constant monitoring is therefore required, as well as the willingness to take bold steps – as regards interest rates and as regards non-standard monetary policy measures – if necessary, in an environment of high uncertainty.
Constant monitoring is therefore required, as well as the willingness to take bold steps – as regards interest rates and as regards non-standard monetary policy measures – if necessary, in an environment of high uncertainty.
Furthermore, risks to euro area financial stability increased considerably in the autumn of this year, as the sovereign debt crisis and its interplay with the banking sector worsened in an environment of weakening macroeconomic growth prospects.
Furthermore, risks to euro area financial stability increased considerably in the autumn of this year, as the sovereign debt crisis and its interplay with the banking sector worsened in an environment of weakening macroeconomic growth prospects.
The ECB from the very beginning of the crisis has taken decisive and swift action in response to intensified financial market tensions, and based on the ECB’s assessment of medium-term risks to price stability in the euro area, through both its standard and non-standard monetary policy measures.
The ECB from the very beginning of the crisis has taken decisive and swift action in response to intensified financial market tensions, and based on the ECB’s assessment of medium-term risks to price stability in the euro area, through both its standard and non-standard monetary policy measures.
Non-standard monetary policy measures taken by the ECB are temporary in nature and complementary, rather than supplementary, to its interest rate instrument.
Non-standard monetary policy measures taken by the ECB are temporary in nature and complementary, rather than supplementary, to its interest rate instrument.
In this vein, it is important to note that there is no trade-off between the objective of price stability and the contribution that the ECB can make to other areas, such as financial stability.
In this vein, it is important to note that there is no trade-off between the objective of price stability and the contribution that the ECB can make to other areas, such as financial stability.
Finally, and related to the above, the overall development of Europe, and of the euro area in particular, presents a major challenge.
Finally, and related to the above, the overall development of Europe, and of the euro area in particular, presents a major challenge.
The sovereign debt crisis has revealed weaknesses in Europe’s economic governance and the confidence of the peoples of Europe in the long-term sustainability of national budgets needs to be restored.
The sovereign debt crisis has revealed weaknesses in Europe’s economic governance and the confidence of the peoples of Europe in the long-term sustainability of national budgets needs to be restored.
As detailed previously, restoring the effectiveness of fiscal rules will be the major challenge facing the EU in the months to come.
As detailed previously, restoring the effectiveness of fiscal rules will be the major challenge facing the EU in the months to come.
Furthermore, euro area members will need to better coordinate their macroeconomic policies so as to avoid the build-up of potentially harmful imbalances.
Furthermore, euro area members will need to better coordinate their macroeconomic policies so as to avoid the build-up of potentially harmful imbalances.
This will require a strengthening of the institutional foundations of EMU and improving the functioning of the Eurogroup to reflect better the high degree of integration of the euro area economies.
This will require a strengthening of the institutional foundations of EMU and improving the functioning of the Eurogroup to reflect better the high degree of integration of the euro area economies.
Let me finally emphasise that none of these reforms will be politically sustainable if Europe cannot deliver growth and jobs.
Let me finally emphasise that none of these reforms will be politically sustainable if Europe cannot deliver growth and jobs.
They must therefore be complemented by strong action, to be taken both at a national and European level, to complete the internal market and to sustain potential growth through comprehensive reforms on the supply side.
They must therefore be complemented by strong action, to be taken both at a national and European level, to complete the internal market and to sustain potential growth through comprehensive reforms on the supply side.
Such reforms do not fall within the remit of the ECB but they should be actively encouraged since raising potential output and delivering price stability are mutually reinforcing objectives.
Such reforms do not fall within the remit of the ECB but they should be actively encouraged since raising potential output and delivering price stability are mutually reinforcing objectives.
Continued support of EU citizens will be essential to help the ECB face these challenges.
Continued support of EU citizens will be essential to help the ECB face these challenges.
The ECB will have to remain faithful to the principles of transparency and democratic accountability and devote attention to the proper communication of its decisions, speaking with one voice.
The ECB will have to remain faithful to the principles of transparency and democratic accountability and devote attention to the proper communication of its decisions, speaking with one voice.
Burkhard Balz, Sharon Bowles, Udo Bullmann, Pascal Canfin, Diogo Feio, Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Jean-Paul Gauzès, Sven Giegold, Sylvie Goulard, Liem Hoang Ngoc, Syed Kamall, Othmar Karas, Jürgen Klute, Ivari Padar, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Peter Simon, Kay Swinburne, Ramon Tremosa i Balcells
Burkhard Balz, Sharon Bowles, Udo Bullmann, Pascal Canfin, Diogo Feio, Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz, José Manuel García-Margallo y Marfil, Jean-Paul Gauzès, Sven Giegold, Sylvie Goulard, Liem Hoang Ngoc, Syed Kamall, Othmar Karas, Jürgen Klute, Ivari Padar, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Peter Simon, Kay Swinburne, Ramon Tremosa i Balcells
относно предложението за Регламент на Европейския парламент и на Съвета за изменение на Регламент (ЕО) № 1198/2006 на Съвета за Европейския фонд за рибарство по отношение на някои разпоредби относно финансовото управление за определени държави членки, които изпитват сериозни затруднения във връзка с финансовата си стабилност или са застрашени от такива затруднения
on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1198/2006 on the European Fisheries Fund, as regards certain provisions relating to financial management for certain Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability
PE 475.789v02-00
PE 475.789v02-00
относно предложението за Регламент на Европейския парламент и на Съвета за изменение на Регламент (ЕО) № 1198/2006 на Съвета за Европейския фонд за рибарство по отношение на някои разпоредби относно финансовото управление за определени държави членки, които изпитват сериозни затруднения във връзка с финансовата си стабилност или са застрашени от такива затруднения
on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No Regulation (EC) No 1198/2006 on the European Fisheries Fund, as regards certain provisions relating to financial management for certain Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability
– като взе предвид предложението на Комисията до Европейския парламент и до Съвета ( COM(2011)0484 ),
– having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council ( COM(2011)0484 ),
– като взе предвид член 294, параграф 2 и член 43, параграф 2 от Договора за функционирането на ЕС, съгласно които Комисията е внесла предложението ( C7‑0219/2011 ),
– having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 43(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament ( C7-0219/2011 ),
– като взе предвид становището на Европейския икономически и социален комитет от 27 октомври 2011 г.
– having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 27 October 2011
ОВ С … от … , стр. … ,
OJ C ..., ..., p. ,
– като взе предвид доклада на комисията по рибно стопанство ( A7-0447/2012 ),
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Fisheries ( A7-0447/2011 ),
(8) С Решение 2009/102/EО на Съвета от 4 ноември 2009 година, Решение 2009/290/EО на Съвета от 20 януари 2009 година и Решение 2009/459/EО на Съвета от 26 юни 2009 година такава финансова помощ бе предоставена на Унгария, Латвия и Румъния.
(8) By Council Decisions 2009/102/EC of 4 November 2009, 2009/290/EC of 20 January 2009 and 2009/459/EC of 26 June 2009 Hungary, Latvia and Romania were granted such financial assistance.
(8) С Решение 2009/102/EО на Съвета от 4 ноември 2009 година, Решение 2009/290/EО на Съвета от 20 януари 2009 година и Решение 2009/459/EО на Съвета от 26 май 2009 година такава финансова помощ бе предоставена на Унгария, Латвия и Румъния.
(8) By Council Decisions 2009/102/EC of 4 November 2009, 2009/290/EC of 20 January 2009 and 2009/459/EC of 26 May 2009 Hungary, Latvia and Romania were granted such financial assistance.
(9) Периодът, през който помощта е на разположение в рамките на Регламенти 407/2010 и 332/2002 , е определен в съответните решения за изпълнение на Съвета.
(9) The period during which the assistance is available under Regulations 407/2010 and 332/2002 is set out in the respective Council Implementing Decisions.
Срокът на решението на Съвета, с което се отпуска помощ на Унгария, изтече на 4 ноември 2010 г.
The Council Decision granting assistance to Hungary expired on 4 November 2010.
(9) Периодът, през който помощта е на разположение на Ирландия, Унгария, Латвия, Португалия и Румъния , е определен в съответните решения за изпълнение на Съвета.
(9) The period during which the assistance is available to Ireland, Hungary, Latvia, Portugal and Romania is set out in the respective Council Implementing Decisions.
Периодът, през който помощта беше предоставена на Унгария, изтече на 4 ноември 2010 г.
The period during which assistance was made available to Hungary expired on 4 November 2010.
(9a) Периодът, през който финансовата помощ в рамките на споразумението между кредиторите и кредитното споразумение се предоставя на Гърция, е различен за всяка държава членка, участваща в тези инструменти.
(9a) The period during which the financial assistance under the Intercreditor Agreement and the Loan Facility Agreement is available to Greece is different for each Member State participating in those instruments.