natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Purely temporary effects of commodity price increases do not require a monetary policy response as monetary policy has a medium-term orientation.
Purely temporary effects of commodity price increases do not require a monetary policy response as monetary policy has a medium-term orientation.
However, monetary policy may have to react in case of sustained upward trends in commodity prices or if the initial temporary effect starts being translated into second-round effects on consumer price inflation.
However, monetary policy may have to react in case of sustained upward trends in commodity prices or if the initial temporary effect starts being translated into second-round effects on consumer price inflation.
This could for instance take place if (temporary) higher inflation feeds through in higher wages or higher inflation expectations.
This could for instance take place if (temporary) higher inflation feeds through in higher wages or higher inflation expectations.
Changes in ECB official interest rates may then be required to return to a situation of price stability and well-anchored inflation expectations over the medium term.
Changes in ECB official interest rates may then be required to return to a situation of price stability and well-anchored inflation expectations over the medium term.
In case of a short-term conflict between fighting a recession and maintaining price stability, the Treaty is very clear about the ECB’s mandate.
In case of a short-term conflict between fighting a recession and maintaining price stability, the Treaty is very clear about the ECB’s mandate.
In the longer term, there is no such trade off.
In the longer term, there is no such trade off.
Maintaining price stability over the medium term is the best contribution to fostering sustainable economic growth.
Maintaining price stability over the medium term is the best contribution to fostering sustainable economic growth.
What is your view on the heterogeneity of monetary conditions across the euro area and its impact on unitary monetary policy of the ECB?
What is your view on the heterogeneity of monetary conditions across the euro area and its impact on unitary monetary policy of the ECB?
With a large number of economies that have different macroeconomic characteristics, it is inevitable that there is some heterogeneity among euro area countries.
With a large number of economies that have different macroeconomic characteristics, it is inevitable that there is some heterogeneity among euro area countries.
A low and inappropriate level of real interest rates in some countries in the years prior to the crisis has led to a high degree of heterogeneity in growth rates and in inflation rates.
A low and inappropriate level of real interest rates in some countries in the years prior to the crisis has led to a high degree of heterogeneity in growth rates and in inflation rates.
Currently, a fairly high degree of heterogeneity in inflation and economic growth is observed as a result of some countries having to correct developments that proved to be unsustainable, as evidenced by asset price booms, current account deficits, and a highly leveraged banking and private sector.
Currently, a fairly high degree of heterogeneity in inflation and economic growth is observed as a result of some countries having to correct developments that proved to be unsustainable, as evidenced by asset price booms, current account deficits, and a highly leveraged banking and private sector.
Unsustainable positions need correction at the national level through relative-price adjustment and sound structural and fiscal policies.
Unsustainable positions need correction at the national level through relative-price adjustment and sound structural and fiscal policies.
The ECB’s monetary policy only has one interest rate instrument available and this instrument can therefore only target developments in the euro area as a whole.
The ECB’s monetary policy only has one interest rate instrument available and this instrument can therefore only target developments in the euro area as a whole.
However, country-specific developments affect the single monetary policy to the extent that they affect developments at the level of the euro area, either directly or indirectly through spill-overs to other countries, and demand for liquidity may differ across countries and thereby introduce differences in liquidity provision.
However, country-specific developments affect the single monetary policy to the extent that they affect developments at the level of the euro area, either directly or indirectly through spill-overs to other countries, and demand for liquidity may differ across countries and thereby introduce differences in liquidity provision.
Do you judge that there has been overreliance in euro area banks on liquidity provision by the ECB?
Do you judge that there has been overreliance in euro area banks on liquidity provision by the ECB?
The ECB currently provides to euro area banks the volume of liquidity that they demand, at fixed rates in all its refinancing operations, against eligible collateral.
The ECB currently provides to euro area banks the volume of liquidity that they demand, at fixed rates in all its refinancing operations, against eligible collateral.
Demand for liquidity is very high at the moment as a result of lack of confidence in financial markets, notably the money market and bond markets, and non-euro denominated funding markets, limiting the possibilities for banks to fund themselves there.
Demand for liquidity is very high at the moment as a result of lack of confidence in financial markets, notably the money market and bond markets, and non-euro denominated funding markets, limiting the possibilities for banks to fund themselves there.
The intermediation role of the ECB has grown over time with an increasing number of countries and markets being affected by the sovereign debt crisis, but part of the borrowed liquidity is being deposited at the ECB, signalling that liquidity demand is of a precautionary nature.
The intermediation role of the ECB has grown over time with an increasing number of countries and markets being affected by the sovereign debt crisis, but part of the borrowed liquidity is being deposited at the ECB, signalling that liquidity demand is of a precautionary nature.
A return of confidence in markets by decisive national action would facilitate banks’ access to funding via financial markets, reducing the role of the ECB in providing liquidity to more usual proportions.
A return of confidence in markets by decisive national action would facilitate banks’ access to funding via financial markets, reducing the role of the ECB in providing liquidity to more usual proportions.
Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, how in your view should the ECB fulfil its secondary obligations under the Treaty (to contribute to economic growth and full employment) and what instruments could the ECB use to do so?
Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, how in your view should the ECB fulfil its secondary obligations under the Treaty (to contribute to economic growth and full employment) and what instruments could the ECB use to do so?
Article 127 of the Treaty assigns the Eurosystem the primary objective of maintaining price stability.
Article 127 of the Treaty assigns the Eurosystem the primary objective of maintaining price stability.
Price stability is the most important contribution that monetary policy can make to achieve a favourable economic environment and a high level of employment.
Price stability is the most important contribution that monetary policy can make to achieve a favourable economic environment and a high level of employment.
In order to clarify the meaning of price stability in numerical terms, the ECB’s Governing Council announced a quantitative definition of price stability, and thereby provided the public with a benchmark for accountability.
In order to clarify the meaning of price stability in numerical terms, the ECB’s Governing Council announced a quantitative definition of price stability, and thereby provided the public with a benchmark for accountability.
In line with it, the monetary policy of the ECB aims to maintain inflation below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.
In line with it, the monetary policy of the ECB aims to maintain inflation below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.
Without endangering price stability, the ECB has been giving a sufficient degree of support to the economy by using its interest rate instrument – most lately through the decision of 8 December 2011.
Without endangering price stability, the ECB has been giving a sufficient degree of support to the economy by using its interest rate instrument – most lately through the decision of 8 December 2011.
During the financial crisis, the ECB gave ongoing support to the economy by making its monetary policy stance very accommodative without negatively affecting price stability over the medium term.
During the financial crisis, the ECB gave ongoing support to the economy by making its monetary policy stance very accommodative without negatively affecting price stability over the medium term.
What do you think of the "economic governance package" as recently adopted?
What do you think of the "economic governance package" as recently adopted?
What further steps would you see as necessary to strengthen the economic governance in the EU?
What further steps would you see as necessary to strengthen the economic governance in the EU?
[Note: the answer to this question does not take into account the outcome of the European Council of 9 December 2011.]
[Note: the answer to this question does not take into account the outcome of the European Council of 9 December 2011.]
The sovereign debt crisis has shown that macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances can seriously endanger the smooth functioning of EMU.
The sovereign debt crisis has shown that macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances can seriously endanger the smooth functioning of EMU.
The prevention and correction of such imbalances has been weak or lacking in the past.
The prevention and correction of such imbalances has been weak or lacking in the past.
The strengthening of the Stability and Growth Pact and creation of a new macroeconomic surveillance procedure in the so-called “Six-Pack” have been decisive steps towards a good functioning of the monetary union, on which any further progress should be built.
The strengthening of the Stability and Growth Pact and creation of a new macroeconomic surveillance procedure in the so-called “Six-Pack” have been decisive steps towards a good functioning of the monetary union, on which any further progress should be built.
The “Six-Pack” should now be implemented swiftly.
The “Six-Pack” should now be implemented swiftly.
With its new prerogatives, it is important that the Commission in full independence uses the new tools at its disposal decisively.
With its new prerogatives, it is important that the Commission in full independence uses the new tools at its disposal decisively.
Furthermore, the Council must exert adequate peer pressure on the non-compliant countries.
Furthermore, the Council must exert adequate peer pressure on the non-compliant countries.
In particular, greater automaticity in decision-making through the use of reverse qualified majority voting where this was agreed will be essential.
In particular, greater automaticity in decision-making through the use of reverse qualified majority voting where this was agreed will be essential.
The contribution of the European Parliament in its trilogue with the Commission and the Council over the “Six-Pack” was highly valuable, especially regarding the creation of the economic dialogue through which the European Parliament can and should play a useful role in the surveillance process.
The contribution of the European Parliament in its trilogue with the Commission and the Council over the “Six-Pack” was highly valuable, especially regarding the creation of the economic dialogue through which the European Parliament can and should play a useful role in the surveillance process.
To make this framework even more credible, further steps can be taken, such as agreeing on a European balanced-budget rule to be introduced by Member States in their Constitutions or at equivalent level.
To make this framework even more credible, further steps can be taken, such as agreeing on a European balanced-budget rule to be introduced by Member States in their Constitutions or at equivalent level.
Transposition of the European rule at a national level should be verified by the EU Court of Justice.
Transposition of the European rule at a national level should be verified by the EU Court of Justice.
Institutional reforms can also contribute to strengthening euro area governance, such as providing the EFC/EWG with a full-time chairperson.
Institutional reforms can also contribute to strengthening euro area governance, such as providing the EFC/EWG with a full-time chairperson.
Looking forward, it is necessary to ensure a degree of fiscal policy coordination that is commensurate with a smooth functioning of monetary union – what has been called the “fiscal stability union”.
Looking forward, it is necessary to ensure a degree of fiscal policy coordination that is commensurate with a smooth functioning of monetary union – what has been called the “fiscal stability union”.
This requires elements of shared fiscal sovereignty within the euro area.
This requires elements of shared fiscal sovereignty within the euro area.
It is essential in my view that shared fiscal sovereignty comes along with democratic responsibility through adequate implication of the European Parliament and of national parliaments.
It is essential in my view that shared fiscal sovereignty comes along with democratic responsibility through adequate implication of the European Parliament and of national parliaments.
Member States should also continue structural reforms in an ambitious manner as well as the implementation of policies aimed at continuing fiscal consolidation and, where needed, macroeconomic rebalancing.
Member States should also continue structural reforms in an ambitious manner as well as the implementation of policies aimed at continuing fiscal consolidation and, where needed, macroeconomic rebalancing.
At a European level, further progress and stronger resolve is needed in the implementation of the Single Market, in particular (but not only) in the field of services, as well as a more integrated approach in the regulation and supervision of the financial sector including a common framework for resolution and deposit guarantee in the euro area, especially as regards the large and complex cross-border banking groups.
At a European level, further progress and stronger resolve is needed in the implementation of the Single Market, in particular (but not only) in the field of services, as well as a more integrated approach in the regulation and supervision of the financial sector including a common framework for resolution and deposit guarantee in the euro area, especially as regards the large and complex cross-border banking groups.
All legal options should be explored to achieve these objectives, including a Treaty change.
All legal options should be explored to achieve these objectives, including a Treaty change.
What would be your critical assessment of the French budgetary policy in the last years, especially as regards the rules of the stability and growth pact?
What would be your critical assessment of the French budgetary policy in the last years, especially as regards the rules of the stability and growth pact?
In your views, is the strict adherence to the stability and growth pact desirable?
In your views, is the strict adherence to the stability and growth pact desirable?
Preserving France’s AAA rating has implications for the stability of the euro area as a whole.
Preserving France’s AAA rating has implications for the stability of the euro area as a whole.
Since becoming subject to the Excessive Deficit Procedure in 2009, the French authorities have shown resolve to live up to their obligations under the SGP.
Since becoming subject to the Excessive Deficit Procedure in 2009, the French authorities have shown resolve to live up to their obligations under the SGP.
The fiscal consolidation process which started in 2010, in line with the Council Recommendation, was stepped up in 2011 and allowed reducing the deficit-to-GDP ratio from 7.6% of GDP in 2009, the highest level since the start of EMU, to (almost) 5.7% of GDP in 2011.
The fiscal consolidation process which started in 2010, in line with the Council Recommendation, was stepped up in 2011 and allowed reducing the deficit-to-GDP ratio from 7.6% of GDP in 2009, the highest level since the start of EMU, to (almost) 5.7% of GDP in 2011.
The 2012 budget further pursues this endeavour (it targets a deficit-to-GDP ratio of 4.5% instead of 4.6% in the EDP) and the two additional consolidation packages of August and November 2011, and their stronger emphasis on expenditure reduction compared to the past, are an example of the French government’s determination to fulfil its SGP commitments.
The 2012 budget further pursues this endeavour (it targets a deficit-to-GDP ratio of 4.5% instead of 4.6% in the EDP) and the two additional consolidation packages of August and November 2011, and their stronger emphasis on expenditure reduction compared to the past, are an example of the French government’s determination to fulfil its SGP commitments.
In particular, the November package provides for a balanced effort between tax increase and expenditure reduction at the 2016 horizon, including through the acceleration of the 2010 pension reform.
In particular, the November package provides for a balanced effort between tax increase and expenditure reduction at the 2016 horizon, including through the acceleration of the 2010 pension reform.
Outlining for the first time the full path towards fiscal balance is an important contribution to anchor expectations and mitigate the adverse short-term impact of fiscal consolidation on growth.
Outlining for the first time the full path towards fiscal balance is an important contribution to anchor expectations and mitigate the adverse short-term impact of fiscal consolidation on growth.
The return to sustainable public finances will remain a serious challenge for French governments until 2016 at least.
The return to sustainable public finances will remain a serious challenge for French governments until 2016 at least.
Along this path, further consolidation measures may prove necessary.
Along this path, further consolidation measures may prove necessary.
The authorities must actively reflect on ways to reduce the level of government spending (which is among the highest in Europe), further improve the efficiency and clarify the priorities of the public sector, and design the consolidation process in a way that minimizes its short-term impact on growth, does not hamper long-term investment and preserves social cohesion.
The authorities must actively reflect on ways to reduce the level of government spending (which is among the highest in Europe), further improve the efficiency and clarify the priorities of the public sector, and design the consolidation process in a way that minimizes its short-term impact on growth, does not hamper long-term investment and preserves social cohesion.
In particular, reform of the French tax system is needed so that it becomes more friendly to growth.
In particular, reform of the French tax system is needed so that it becomes more friendly to growth.
In a book written a few years ago, you wrote that the SGP was increasingly challenged for "weak analytical foundations", "no regard for quality of spending" and "disputable zero deficit target".
In a book written a few years ago, you wrote that the SGP was increasingly challenged for "weak analytical foundations", "no regard for quality of spending" and "disputable zero deficit target".
Will you argue for a change in the ECB's position in that regard?
Will you argue for a change in the ECB's position in that regard?
The implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has proven to be insufficient to prevent the accumulation of major fiscal imbalances in the majority of euro area countries.
The implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has proven to be insufficient to prevent the accumulation of major fiscal imbalances in the majority of euro area countries.
One reason was that countries failed to use the good times to create budget surpluses, which would have created room for manoeuvre in bad times.
One reason was that countries failed to use the good times to create budget surpluses, which would have created room for manoeuvre in bad times.
In addition, such room for manoeuvre would also allow a better allocation in favour of quality expenditures.
In addition, such room for manoeuvre would also allow a better allocation in favour of quality expenditures.
Another reason was that insufficient attention was paid to debt sustainability.
Another reason was that insufficient attention was paid to debt sustainability.
In the book mentioned above, I explored ways to address this shortcoming and considered options where the deficit target would be adjusted to the level of government debt and off-balance-sheet liabilities, such as civil servant pensions.
In the book mentioned above, I explored ways to address this shortcoming and considered options where the deficit target would be adjusted to the level of government debt and off-balance-sheet liabilities, such as civil servant pensions.
This has been addressed in the “Six-Pack” through the introduction of numerical benchmarks for debt reduction.
This has been addressed in the “Six-Pack” through the introduction of numerical benchmarks for debt reduction.
As a consequence of insufficient attention paid to debt, we are currently facing a severe sovereign debt crisis which is undermining confidence and macroeconomic and financial stability in the euro area as a whole.
As a consequence of insufficient attention paid to debt, we are currently facing a severe sovereign debt crisis which is undermining confidence and macroeconomic and financial stability in the euro area as a whole.
The agreement on the “Six-Pack” fully draws the consequences of the shortcomings of the initial SGP.
The agreement on the “Six-Pack” fully draws the consequences of the shortcomings of the initial SGP.
It is most welcome as it strengthens both the preventive and the corrective arm of the SGP, emphasizes debt sustainability, and establishes minimum requirements for national budgetary frameworks.
It is most welcome as it strengthens both the preventive and the corrective arm of the SGP, emphasizes debt sustainability, and establishes minimum requirements for national budgetary frameworks.
What roles, relationships and challenges do you see for the ECB and the forthcoming European Stability Mechanism?
What roles, relationships and challenges do you see for the ECB and the forthcoming European Stability Mechanism?
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the European Central Bank (ECB) have different mandates to fulfil.
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the European Central Bank (ECB) have different mandates to fulfil.
Generally speaking, the mandate of the ESM is to safeguard macro-financial stability in the euro area as a whole.
Generally speaking, the mandate of the ESM is to safeguard macro-financial stability in the euro area as a whole.
The primary mandate of the ECB is to maintain price stability in the euro area over the medium-term.
The primary mandate of the ECB is to maintain price stability in the euro area over the medium-term.
These two mandates are complementary to each other, not least as price stability is a necessary condition for broad macro-financial stability.
These two mandates are complementary to each other, not least as price stability is a necessary condition for broad macro-financial stability.
However, they are distinct insofar as the role of the ECB is not to ensure financing for governments.
However, they are distinct insofar as the role of the ECB is not to ensure financing for governments.