natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
However, if that turns out to be the case, the EP can only regret the fact that the citizens of two Member States may be deprived, by those States, of the full protection of fundamental rights recognised by the Charter, a document which, it should be emphasised, is primarily addressed to the Union institutions and is binding on the Member States only when they act to implement Union law.
However, if that turns out to be the case, the EP can only regret the fact that the citizens of two Member States may be deprived, by those States, of the full protection of fundamental rights recognised by the Charter, a document which, it should be emphasised, is primarily addressed to the Union institutions and is binding on the Member States only when they act to implement Union law.
The rights set out in the Charter correspond, in general terms, to the common set of fundamental rights which the Union already recognised and which were drawn from the constitutional traditions of the Member States or the European Convention on Human Rights.
The rights set out in the Charter correspond, in general terms, to the common set of fundamental rights which the Union already recognised and which were drawn from the constitutional traditions of the Member States or the European Convention on Human Rights.
The amended TEU provides for a further step towards the protection of fundamental rights at Union level by stipulating that the Union will seek accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (to which all the Member States are parties), as Parliament has long been proposing.
The amended TEU provides for a further step towards the protection of fundamental rights at Union level by stipulating that the Union will seek accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (to which all the Member States are parties), as Parliament has long been proposing.
This will entail an agreement with the Council of Europe.
This will entail an agreement with the Council of Europe.
The decision to conclude that agreement will have to be adopted by the Council unanimously (as against the qualified majority provided for in the Constitution), after approval by Parliament.
The decision to conclude that agreement will have to be adopted by the Council unanimously (as against the qualified majority provided for in the Constitution), after approval by Parliament.
Moreover, further aspects of the new Treaty could be cited which strengthen citizens’ rights of participation in the European political process (such as the people’s legislative initiative, or citizens’ initiative : Article 11(4) of the amended TEU) or which help to enhance the legal protection of their rights by facilitating access to the Court of Justice.
Moreover, further aspects of the new Treaty could be cited which strengthen citizens’ rights of participation in the European political process (such as the people’s legislative initiative, or citizens’ initiative : Article 11(4) of the amended TEU) or which help to enhance the legal protection of their rights by facilitating access to the Court of Justice.
Parliament can only welcome these improvements.
Parliament can only welcome these improvements.
A clear and readily understandable definition of the Union’s competences
A clear and readily understandable definition of the Union ’s competences
One of the most important questions which had been posed from the start of the reform process which culminated in the Treaty of Lisbon was that of ‘who does what’ in Europe.
One of the most important questions which had been posed from the start of the reform process which culminated in the Treaty of Lisbon was that of ‘who does what’ in Europe.
Such clarification is essential if citizens are to grasp properly the allocation of political responsibilities at European level.
Such clarification is essential if citizens are to grasp properly the allocation of political responsibilities at European level.
It will help to make Union action more effective.
It will help to make Union action more effective.
It will also offer an additional safeguard to all those who fear excessive intervention on the part of the Union.
It will also offer an additional safeguard to all those who fear excessive intervention on the part of the Union.
The reform Treaty broadly retains the provisions of the Constitution concerning the delimitation of the Union’s competences, which was itself based on that laid down in the existing Treaties.
The reform Treaty broadly retains the provisions of the Constitution concerning the delimitation of the Union’s competences, which was itself based on that laid down in the existing Treaties.
However, as a result of the retention of the two current Treaties in amended form, the conceptual unity of the chapter on Union competences in Part I of the Constitution has been lost: whilst the principles governing the exercise of its competences by the Union are set out in the general provisions of the TEU, the different types of competences are detailed in the TFEU, in its Title I dealing with ‘Categories and Areas of the Union’s Competences’.
However, as a result of the retention of the two current Treaties in amended form, the conceptual unity of the chapter on Union competences in Part I of the Constitution has been lost: whilst the principles governing the exercise of its competences by the Union are set out in the general provisions of the TEU, the different types of competences are detailed in the TFEU, in its Title I dealing with ‘Categories and Areas of the Union’s Competences’.
Although the two Treaties have the same legal value, this approach necessarily runs counter to the objective of providing citizens with a clear text.
Although the two Treaties have the same legal value, this approach necessarily runs counter to the objective of providing citizens with a clear text.
The new Treaty defines the Union's competences, dividing them into three categories, each with a different legal status and each implying a different degree of Union intervention: the Union's exclusive competences; the competences it shares with the Member States; and action to support or complement that taken by the Member States.
The new Treaty defines the Union's competences, dividing them into three categories, each with a different legal status and each implying a different degree of Union intervention: the Union's exclusive competences; the competences it shares with the Member States; and action to support or complement that taken by the Member States.
By virtue of their specific nature, the common foreign and security policy and the coordination of economic and employment policies warrant specific provisions which fall outside the three categories (cf.
By virtue of their specific nature, the common foreign and security policy and the coordination of economic and employment policies warrant specific provisions which fall outside the three categories (cf.
Annex 1).
Annex 1).
This definition of the Union's competences is consistent with the basic principle governing the allocation of competences, i.e. that the Union enjoys only those competences which have been conferred on it by the Member States in the Treaties with a view to achieving the objectives laid down in those documents.
This definition of the Union's competences is consistent with the basic principle governing the allocation of competences, i.e. that the Union enjoys only those competences which have been conferred on it by the Member States in the Treaties with a view to achieving the objectives laid down in those documents.
This principle is in itself sufficient to prevent the emergence of any kind of centralised superstate, since it implies that all competences rest with the States, except in those cases where they transfer them to the Union.
This principle is in itself sufficient to prevent the emergence of any kind of centralised superstate, since it implies that all competences rest with the States, except in those cases where they transfer them to the Union.
The Treaty of Lisbon does not increase the Union’s competences: the small number of ‘new’ competences laid down correspond essentially to areas in which the Union already took action under existing articles, or even Article 308 of the EC Treaty, and for which the new text establishes a precise legal basis.
The Treaty of Lisbon does not increase the Union’s competences: the small number of ‘new’ competences laid down correspond essentially to areas in which the Union already took action under existing articles, or even Article 308 of the EC Treaty, and for which the new text establishes a precise legal basis.
The changes made in the TFEU essentially reflect the need to bring its provisions into line with the new decision-making procedures and the new legal instruments (see below, point 7).
The changes made in the TFEU essentially reflect the need to bring its provisions into line with the new decision-making procedures and the new legal instruments (see below, point 7).
In addition, the Treaty of Lisbon strengthens the requirement for the Union to comply with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality when exercising its competences; monitoring of that compliance is already a matter for the Member State governments, in the Council, and Parliament.
In addition, the Treaty of Lisbon strengthens the requirement for the Union to comply with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality when exercising its competences; monitoring of that compliance is already a matter for the Member State governments, in the Council, and Parliament.
Although the definition of these principles set out by the new Treaty corresponds to that already employed in the Treaties in force, the protocol on the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality provides for new mechanisms to guarantee compliance with those principles, in particular by substantially strengthening the role of the national parliaments.
Although the definition of these principles set out by the new Treaty corresponds to that already employed in the Treaties in force, the protocol on the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality provides for new mechanisms to guarantee compliance with those principles, in particular by substantially strengthening the role of the national parliaments.
Above all, the latter gain the right to be informed in good time of all Commission legislative proposals, which must be duly substantiated as regards compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
Above all, the latter gain the right to be informed in good time of all Commission legislative proposals, which must be duly substantiated as regards compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
This provision will enable the national parliaments to exercise more effectively the rights they enjoy at national level and will, in particular, enhance their ability to influence the actions of their governments in the Council of Ministers.
This provision will enable the national parliaments to exercise more effectively the rights they enjoy at national level and will, in particular, enhance their ability to influence the actions of their governments in the Council of Ministers.
Moreover, as regards the subsidiarity principle in particular, in accordance with a protocol annexed to the Treaty
Moreover, as regards the subsidiarity principle in particular, in accordance with a protocol annexed to the Treaty
Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. the national parliaments may, within eight weeks following the forwarding of the proposal, send directly to the Union institutions, which must take due account of them, opinions setting out the reasons why they take the view that a proposal is not consistent with the subsidiarity principle.
Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. the national parliaments may, within eight weeks following the forwarding of the proposal, send directly to the Union institutions, which must take due account of them, opinions setting out the reasons why they take the view that a proposal is not consistent with the subsidiarity principle.
An 'early warning' mechanism even requires the Commission to reconsider its proposal should one-third of the national parliaments consider that the proposal in question does not comply with the subsidiarity principle.
An 'early warning' mechanism even requires the Commission to reconsider its proposal should one-third of the national parliaments consider that the proposal in question does not comply with the subsidiarity principle.
The 2007 IGC supplemented this mechanism, already provided for under the Constitution, with a provision which works as follows: if, under the ordinary legislative procedure, the number of reasoned opinions on the non-compliance of a proposal for a legislative act with the principle of subsidiarity represents at least half the number of national parliaments, and if the Commission, following its review of the proposal, decides to maintain it, it must also justify that step in a reasoned opinion.
The 2007 IGC supplemented this mechanism, already provided for under the Constitution, with a provision which works as follows: if, under the ordinary legislative procedure, the number of reasoned opinions on the non-compliance of a proposal for a legislative act with the principle of subsidiarity represents at least half the number of national parliaments, and if the Commission, following its review of the proposal, decides to maintain it, it must also justify that step in a reasoned opinion.
All these opinions will then be forwarded to the two branches of the legislative authority, the EP and the Council, which must assess the issue of subsidiarity before the first reading.
All these opinions will then be forwarded to the two branches of the legislative authority, the EP and the Council, which must assess the issue of subsidiarity before the first reading.
If the EP, acting by a majority of its component Members, or the Council, acting by a 55% majority of the Member States, decides to uphold the objection raised by the national parliaments, the legislative procedure is halted.
If the EP, acting by a majority of its component Members, or the Council, acting by a 55% majority of the Member States, decides to uphold the objection raised by the national parliaments, the legislative procedure is halted.
Finally, that same protocol also offers the Member States the possibility, if the national legal system allows such provision, of bringing an action before the Court of Justice, on behalf of their national parliament or one of its chambers, against a legislative act on the grounds that it violates the subsidiarity principle.
Finally, that same protocol also offers the Member States the possibility, if the national legal system allows such provision, of bringing an action before the Court of Justice, on behalf of their national parliament or one of its chambers, against a legislative act on the grounds that it violates the subsidiarity principle.
The Committee of the Regions also gains the right to bring such actions against legislative acts on which, under the Treaties, it must be consulted prior to their adoption.
The Committee of the Regions also gains the right to bring such actions against legislative acts on which, under the Treaties, it must be consulted prior to their adoption.
These mechanisms offer further important safeguards against any potentially ill-considered exercise of Union competences and will clear the way for much more detailed democratic scrutiny of Community legislation.
These mechanisms offer further important safeguards against any potentially ill-considered exercise of Union competences and will clear the way for much more detailed democratic scrutiny of Community legislation.
In particular, they also strengthen substantially the role of the national parliaments.
In particular, they also strengthen substantially the role of the national parliaments.
It is true that in order to gain a full picture of the specific methods for implementing these competences the definition must be read in conjunction with the specific provisions set out in Parts III and IV of the TFEU.
It is true that in order to gain a full picture of the specific methods for implementing these competences the definition must be read in conjunction with the specific provisions set out in Parts III and IV of the TFEU.
However, it is equally true that a simple reading of these provisions will give European citizens a fairly clear insight into who does what in Europe.
However, it is equally true that a simple reading of these provisions will give European citizens a fairly clear insight into who does what in Europe.
This represents a degree of improvement in terms of transparency, but that improvement could have been greater if all the provisions concerning the Union’s competences had been brought together in a single title in the TEU, as they were in Part I of the Constitution.
This represents a degree of improvement in terms of transparency, but that improvement could have been greater if all the provisions concerning the Union’s competences had been brought together in a single title in the TEU, as they were in Part I of the Constitution.
One of the further welcome features is that the new Treaty provides the system with the requisite degree of flexibility by means of a clause similar to the current Article 308 TEC (new Article 352 TFEU), which authorises the Council, should the need arise, to adopt measures in areas where the Union has no explicit competences.
One of the further welcome features is that the new Treaty provides the system with the requisite degree of flexibility by means of a clause similar to the current Article 308 TEC (new Article 352 TFEU), which authorises the Council, should the need arise, to adopt measures in areas where the Union has no explicit competences.
This flexibility clause offers the Member States full safeguards: decision-making by unanimity and clause to be used only in the context of the policies defined in the Treaties or to achieve the objectives laid down therein; the procedure to put it into effect has become more democratic, in that it is subject to approval by Parliament and the national parliaments must be notified in good time before the decision is taken.
This flexibility clause offers the Member States full safeguards: decision-making by unanimity and clause to be used only in the context of the policies defined in the Treaties or to achieve the objectives laid down therein; the procedure to put it into effect has become more democratic, in that it is subject to approval by Parliament and the national parliaments must be notified in good time before the decision is taken.
In addition, the 2007 IGC went further by making clear that measures based on that clause cannot provide for legislative harmonisation in areas where the Treaties rule this out.
In addition, the 2007 IGC went further by making clear that measures based on that clause cannot provide for legislative harmonisation in areas where the Treaties rule this out.
This article can likewise not be used with a view to achieving objectives under the common foreign and security policy.
This article can likewise not be used with a view to achieving objectives under the common foreign and security policy.
A revamped institutional framework for a stronger, more democratic and more transparent Union
A revamped institutional framework for a stronger, more democratic and more transparent Union
One of the key questions which the new Treaty was required to resolve was that of the changes to be made to the Union institutions in order to enable them to deal with the new situation resulting from the enlargement, particularly as the Union's institutional organisation has essentially been based on the same structures for almost 50 years, even though the Union’s range of tasks has expanded substantially and the number of Member States has increased from six to 27.
One of the key questions which the new Treaty was required to resolve was that of the changes to be made to the Union institutions in order to enable them to deal with the new situation resulting from the enlargement, particularly as the Union's institutional organisation has essentially been based on the same structures for almost 50 years, even though the Union’s range of tasks has expanded substantially and the number of Member States has increased from six to 27.
Despite the work of a series of Intergovernmental Conferences, the key institutional issues had remained unresolved and the solutions agreed on at Nice were not satisfactory even to some of those who had negotiated them.
Despite the work of a series of Intergovernmental Conferences, the key institutional issues had remained unresolved and the solutions agreed on at Nice were not satisfactory even to some of those who had negotiated them.
For its part, Parliament has repeatedly drawn the attention of the public and the leaders of the Member States to the need for a radical institutional reform to endow the Union with effective, democratic and transparent institutions, whilst safeguarding the institutional balance and the Community method: the Commission which proposes legislation, Parliament and the Council which take the decisions, and the Court of Justice which guarantees the application of the texts adopted.
For its part, Parliament has repeatedly drawn the attention of the public and the leaders of the Member States to the need for a radical institutional reform to endow the Union with effective, democratic and transparent institutions, whilst safeguarding the institutional balance and the Community method: the Commission which proposes legislation, Parliament and the Council which take the decisions, and the Court of Justice which guarantees the application of the texts adopted.
The Constitution already contained significant institutional changes which satisfied that need and which had not been fundamentally called into question during the ratification procedure.
The Constitution already contained significant institutional changes which satisfied that need and which had not been fundamentally called into question during the ratification procedure.
Apart from certain changes stemming directly from the abandonment of the idea of a constitution and the retention of the two current Treaties in amended form, and from the abandonment of symbols or vocabulary which might prompt comparisons with a State, institutional issues were not set to be a focal point of the 2007 negotiations.
Apart from certain changes stemming directly from the abandonment of the idea of a constitution and the retention of the two current Treaties in amended form, and from the abandonment of symbols or vocabulary which might prompt comparisons with a State, institutional issues were not set to be a focal point of the 2007 negotiations.
Not only had these issues not been at the heart of the public debates, in particular in those Member States which had voted against the Constitutional Treaty, but what is more, most Member States did not want to re-open the discussion on the institutional package, aware that any such step would call the whole agreement into question.
Not only had these issues not been at the heart of the public debates, in particular in those Member States which had voted against the Constitutional Treaty, but what is more, most Member States did not want to re-open the discussion on the institutional package, aware that any such step would call the whole agreement into question.
Nevertheless, although some of these questions were central to the discussions at the 2007 IGC, the 2004 agreement was essentially left untouched.
Nevertheless, although some of these questions were central to the discussions at the 2007 IGC, the 2004 agreement was essentially left untouched.
(1) The Treaty of Lisbon substantially enhances the role of the European Parliament, the only European institution directly elected by citizens:
(1) The Treaty of Lisbon substantially enhances the role of the European Parliament, the only European institution directly elected by citizens: