natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Подчертава необходимостта и призовава за бързото изпълнение на решението на правителството на Судан и на ООН, относно разполагането на смесени сили на Африканския съюз и ООН, за да се засили сигурността и да се подобри защитата на цивилни граждани;
Stresses the need for, and calls for, early implementation of the decision by the government of Sudan and the UN regarding the deployment of the AU/UN joint force in order to increase security and improve the protection of civilians;
Настоятелно призовава международната общност, по-специално Обединените нации, Европейския съюз и неговите държави-членки, Съединените щати, Китай, Арабската лига и Африканския съюз, да свика отново мирни преговори за подобряване на съдържанието на мирното споразумение за Дарфур, така че то да бъде приемливо за всички страни и да подобри „собствеността“ на страните върху споразумението;
Urges the international community, especially the UN, the European Union and its Member States, the US, China, India, the Arab League and the AU, to launch peace talks to improve the content of the Darfur Peace Agreement and make it acceptable for all parties and thus improve the parties’ ownership of the Agreement;
Подчертава факта, че евентуален неуспех в решаването на конфликта в Дарфур ще доведе до сериозни последствия не само за страните от региона на Източна Африка, но и за други, относително стабилни части на африканския континент, и по-специално Централна Африка и региона на Великите езера;
Stresses the fact that failure to resolve the conflict in Darfur would have serious consequences not only for the East Africa region but also for other relatively stable parts of Africa, namely Central Africa and the region of the Great Lakes;
Настоятелно призовава международната общност да не се фокусира върху конфликта в Дарфур до степен, изключваща други конфликтни ситуации в Судан, и по-специално да признае крехкостта на мира в южен Судан, произтичаща от извършения бавен напредък в прилагането на всестранното мирно споразумение и сериозния риск от дестабилизация вследствие на напрежението по оста север-юг, междуплеменните конфликти и широко разпространеното притежание на оръжия в обществото;
Urges the international community not to focus on the Darfur conflict to the exclusion of other conflict situations in Sudan and, in particular, to recognise the fragility of the peace in Southern Sudan resulting from the slow progress made in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the high risk of destabilisation due to North-South tensions, inter-tribal conflicts and the widespread ownership of arms in society;
Осъжда чуждестранната намеса в Сомалия и призовава етиопското правителство да оттегли своите военни части от страната; подкрепя изпращането на мироопазващи части от Африканския съюз, включително в рамките на политическо споразумение между страните на конфликта, което се изразява в съставяне на правителство на националното единство, способно да ангажира тази част от ислямските трибунали, която е отворена към мирния процес и помирението, както и водачите на групировки, които не участват в съществуващото правителство;
Condemns foreign intervention in Somalia and calls on the Ethiopian Government to withdraw its army from the country; endorses the deployment of an AU peace-keeping force under an inclusive political agreement between the warring parties, leading to the creation of a government of national unity able to encompass that part of the Union of Islamic Courts which is open to a process of peace and reconciliation and the clan chiefs absent from the current government;
Застъпва мнението, че мироопазващият контингент на Африканския съюз (AMISOM) трябва да бъде в рамките на по-широк политически процес, да разчита на подкрепата на населението и да бъде с ясно формулирани мандат, цели и задачи, добър капацитет и стратегия за изтегляне;
Takes the view that the AU peacekeeping operation in Somalia, AMISOM, should be framed within a broader political process supported by the population that has a clear mandate, good capacity, clear objectives and an exit strategy;
Приветства подкрепата на ЕС за разполагане на мироопазващ контингент на Африканския съюз в Сомалия, но подчертава, че тази подкрепа трябва да бъде обусловена от всеобхватен политически диалог със сомалийските власти и помирение, като се обърне неотложно внимание на предизвикателствата, свързани с помирението, институционалното изграждане и осигуряването на мир за сомалийския народ;
Welcomes the EU's support for AMISOM but stresses that the EU's contribution must be conditional on the launch of an inclusive political dialogue and reconciliation by the Somali authorities, addressing promptly the challenges of reconciliation, institution building and providing peace for the Somali people;
Подчертава централната роля на всеобхватния политически диалог, който ще доведе до помирение и възстановяване на страната; приветства ангажимента на преходното федерално правителство (ПФП) на Сомалия за свикване на помирителна конференция (Конгрес за национално помирение) с широко участие на племенни, религиозни и граждански общности, представители на стопанските среди и политически ръководители; подчертава, че пътят напред е създаване на надеждно правителство, в което участват представители на всички заинтересовани страни;
Stresses the central role of an all-inclusive political dialogue that will lead to reconciliation and the reconstruction of the country; welcomes the commitment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for Somalia to call a broad reconciliation conference (National Reconciliation Congress) involving clans, religious communities, civil society, business communities and political leaders; points out that the way forward must be the establishment of a credible, all-inclusive government;
Призовава за преоценка на ролята на Международната контактна група за Сомалия, която включва ЕС, Италия, Швеция, Обединеното кралство, ООН, Междуправителствения орган по развитие към Африканския съюз, Лигата на арабските държави, Норвегия, Съединените щати, Кения и Танзания, създадена през м. май 2006 г. като форум за координиране на действията на международната общност в Сомалия, с цел да се съсредоточат усилията върху въпросите на управлението и институционалното изграждане, хуманитарната помощ за изселени лица и население в нужда, и върху подобряване на регионалната стабилност и сигурност;
Calls for a reassessment of the role of the International Somalia Contact Group, which involves the EU, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, UN, AU, IGAD, the League of Arab States, Norway, the United States, Kenya and Tanzania, established in May 2006 as a forum for coordination of the international community’s activities in Somalia in order to focus efforts on issues of governance and institution-building, humanitarian assistance to displaced persons and populations in need, and on improving regional stability and security;
Призовава преходното федерално правителство на Сомалия (ПФП) да сложи край на извънредното положение и да възстанови на поста си председателя на парламента, като необходимо условие за изграждане на процеса на национално помирение;
Calls on the Somali TFG to rescind the state of emergency and reinstate the speaker of parliament as a precondition for implementation of the process of national reconciliation;
Счита, че искането на Сомалиленд за независимост трябва да бъде разгледано в контекста на всеобхватната програма за сигурност в Сомалия;
Considers that the Somaliland request for independence should be examined as part of the over-arching security agenda for Somalia;
Призовава Съвета и Комисията да приложат натиск спрямо правителството на Етиопия да съобщи общия брой на задържаните лица в страната, да разреши посещения от представители на Международния комитет на Червения кръст и да осигури на всички задържани достъп до техните семейства, правна защита и всякакъв вид медицински грижи, които изисква здравословното им състояние, както и да освободи незабавно и безусловно всички политически затворници, т.е. журналисти, профсъюзни активисти, активисти за правата на човека и обикновени граждани и да изпълни задълженията си по отношение на правата на човека, принципите на демокрацията и правовата държава;
Calls on the Council and the Commission to put pressure on the Ethiopian Government to disclose the total number of persons detained throughout the country, to allow visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross and to allow all detainees access to their families, legal counsel and any medical care that their health may require, and also to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners, i.e. journalists, trade union activists, human rights defenders and ordinary citizens, and fulfill its obligations with respect to human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law;
Призовава Етиопия да приеме демаркацията и определянето на границите съгласно указанията на Граничната комисия на ООН;
Calls on Ethiopia to accept the demarcation and delimitation of its border as set out by the UN Boundary Commission;
Настоятелно призовава Съвета и Комисията да предприемат действия по освобождаването на всички политически затворници от правителството на Еритрея, изправяне на затворниците с конкретни обвинения пред бърз и справедлив процес и разкриване местонахождението на лицата, задържани в тайни затвори;
Urges the Council and the Commission to take action with regard to the Eritrean Government to release all political prisoners, bring prisoners with specific charges against them to a speedy and fair trial and disclose the place of detention of all who are detained in secret prisons;
Насърчава президента на Еритрея да поддържа чести контакти с представителите на ЕС и посланиците на различни държави-членки в Еритрея;
Encourages the Eritrean President to maintain frequent contacts with EU representatives and various Member State ambassadors to Eritrea;
Призовава Съвета и Комисията да подпомагат мирния процес в северна Уганда, който изисква от всички страни по конфликта да демонстрират реална и трайна ангажираност с мирния процес, да спазват споразумението за прекратяване на враждебните действия и да прекратят враждебната и разпалваща конфликти пропаганда;
Calls on the Council and the Commission to facilitate the peace process in Northern Uganda, which calls for all parties to the conflict to demonstrate a genuine and continuous commitment to the peace process, to respect the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and to put an end to hostile and inflammatory propaganda;
Призовава за започване на истински процес на помирение, при който отговорните за военни престъпления да бъдат признати за такива; подчертава централната роля на Международния наказателен съд за изправянето на подсъдимата скамейка на лицата, обвинени в извършването на военни престъпления; призовава Съвета и Комисията да подкрепят местните процеси за алтернативно правосъдие и помирение в северна Уганда, както и между жителите на Севера и останалата част от страната;
Calls for the launch of a real reconciliation process, with those responsible for war crimes being recognised as such; emphasises the central role of the ICC in bringing to justice those indicted on charges of war crimes; calls on the Council and the Commission to support local processes for alternative justice and reconciliation to take place in Northern Uganda as well as between Northerners and the rest of the country;
Възлага на своя председател да предаде настоящата резолюция на Съвета, Комисията, държавите-членки на Европейския съюз и на ООН, Африканския съюз и Междуправителствения орган по развитие (IGAD).
Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Member States of the European Union and to the United Nations, the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development.
In December 2005 the European Council adopted the EU-Africa Strategy, setting up a comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework for EU relations with the African continent, with the primary aims of achieving the Millennium Development Goals, the promotion of sustainable development, security and good governance in Africa.
In December 2005 the European Council adopted the EU-Africa Strategy, setting up a comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework for EU relations with the African continent, with the primary aims of achieving the Millennium Development Goals, the promotion of sustainable development, security and good governance in Africa.
As the first test case for applying such a strategy, in November 2006 the Commission issued the Communication entitled "Strategy for Africa: An EU regional partnership for peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa
As the first test case for applying such a strategy, in November 2006 the Commission issued the Communication entitled "Strategy for Africa: An EU regional partnership for peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa
Geographical scope as defined by the Communication: Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda). ", which is examined in this report.
Geographical scope as defined by the Communication: Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda). ", which is examined in this report.
The purpose of the Communication is to set up a 'Regional Political Partnership' with the Horn of Africa as a basis for a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention in the region, following the basic assumption that there is no development without lasting peace, and that there is no lasting peace without development.
The purpose of the Communication is to set up a 'Regional Political Partnership' with the Horn of Africa as a basis for a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention in the region, following the basic assumption that there is no development without lasting peace, and that there is no lasting peace without development.
The selection of this region as the first test case for the EU Strategy on Africa is based on two considerations: its strategic importance to the EU and the enormous political and cultural complexity of the three main and inter-related conflicts in the region (Sudan, Ethiopia-Eritrea and Somalia), where a regional approach would be the only viable strategy to addressing the conflicts ("nothing will be solved until everything is solved").
The selection of this region as the first test case for the EU Strategy on Africa is based on two considerations: its strategic importance to the EU and the enormous political and cultural complexity of the three main and inter-related conflicts in the region (Sudan, Ethiopia-Eritrea and Somalia), where a regional approach would be the only viable strategy to addressing the conflicts ("nothing will be solved until everything is solved").
Ambitious process
Ambitious process
The strategy proposed by the Commission aims at " setting up a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention in the Horn of Africa , tackling in the short to medium term the root causes of instability at both country and regional level and strengthening regional cooperation."
The strategy proposed by the Commission aims at " setting up a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention in the Horn of Africa , tackling in the short to medium term the root causes of instability at both country and regional level and strengthening regional cooperation."
The description of the complex security and development concerns of the region as well as the possible levels of EU intervention: regional and country based level, backed by accompanying measures, represents a basis for elaborating a range of EU concrete proposals towards the region.
The description of the complex security and development concerns of the region as well as the possible levels of EU intervention: regional and country based level, backed by accompanying measures, represents a basis for elaborating a range of EU concrete proposals towards the region.
One could hardly disagree with the urgent need to establish conflict prevention strategies, regional integration initiatives and enhancement of the African institutions.
One could hardly disagree with the urgent need to establish conflict prevention strategies, regional integration initiatives and enhancement of the African institutions.
However, one can also ask a legitimate question: in a region where five out of seven countries are in conflict with their neighbours, and where every conflict fuels the other, where one country has been lacking a functioning government for more than 15 years, where the percentage of the population below poverty is more than 22 % , will the concept of regional partnership work as a "cure-all" for such complex inter-related problems?
However, one can also ask a legitimate question: in a region where five out of seven countries are in conflict with their neighbours, and where every conflict fuels the other, where one country has been lacking a functioning government for more than 15 years, where the percentage of the population below poverty is more than 22 % , will the concept of regional partnership work as a "cure-all" for such complex inter-related problems?
According to the report, it is worth a try.
According to the report, it is worth a try.
Indeed, with all the deficiencies and gaps of the Communication, some of them unavoidable, and which the report addresses, the rapporteur agrees with four assumptions which appear to be the basis for the proposed strategy:
Indeed, with all the deficiencies and gaps of the Communication, some of them unavoidable, and which the report addresses, the rapporteur agrees with four assumptions which appear to be the basis for the proposed strategy:
There is no sustainable development without lasting peace (and vice versa), and no lasting peace without effective involvement of African regional institutions;
There is no sustainable development without lasting peace (and vice versa), and no lasting peace without effective involvement of African regional institutions;
A regional perspective, or “a regional deal”, is required to find solutions to individual conflicts;
A regional perspective, or “a regional deal”, is required to find solutions to individual conflicts;
Regional integration initiatives will be successful when addressing common challenges, and not only when addressing existing conflicts: regional integration axes should be built around water, food security, desertification, and not around boundaries or ethnic disputes;
Regional integration initiatives will be successful when addressing common challenges, and not only when addressing existing conflicts: regional integration axes should be built around water, food security, desertification, and not around boundaries or ethnic disputes;
The EU, as such, has a major role to play in the region.
The EU, as such, has a major role to play in the region.
It can and must export its own model of regional integration = lasting peace.
It can and must export its own model of regional integration = lasting peace.
Having said that, the rapporteur considers the Communication for what it was: the start of a process.
Having said that, the rapporteur considers the Communication for what it was: the start of a process.
The final goal as stated in the Communication is to set up an EU Regional Strategy for the region.
The final goal as stated in the Communication is to set up an EU Regional Strategy for the region.
At the same time, the EU Member States have their own external actions in the Horn.
At the same time, the EU Member States have their own external actions in the Horn.
Thus, this report is addressed to the EU Member Sates as much as to the Commission.
Thus, this report is addressed to the EU Member Sates as much as to the Commission.
Gaps and misconceptions: the way forward
Gaps and misconceptions: the way forward
Even if the rapporteur fully agrees with the final objective of the Communication, and commends the Commission for this initiative, the rapporteur considers that the Communication is far from outlining a truly EU strategy.
Even if the rapporteur fully agrees with the final objective of the Communication, and commends the Commission for this initiative, the rapporteur considers that the Communication is far from outlining a truly EU strategy.
The Communication appears to be compiling and combining a list of already existing activities, which is necessary but clearly insufficient.
The Communication appears to be compiling and combining a list of already existing activities, which is necessary but clearly insufficient.
The EP report brings in the following recommendations:
The EP report brings in the following recommendations:
· Elaboration of Joint EU-Africa Strategy (not mentioned in the Communication)
· Elaboration of Joint EU-Africa Strategy (not mentioned in the Communication)
During the second EU-Africa Summit, which should be held in Lisbon in 2007, the Heads of States and Governments are to approve a joint EU-Africa Strategy.
During the second EU-Africa Summit, which should be held in Lisbon in 2007, the Heads of States and Governments are to approve a joint EU-Africa Strategy.
The Joint Strategy would represent the EU's commitment to transforming the "unilaterally" adopted EU Strategy for Africa into a Joint EU-Africa commitment.
The Joint Strategy would represent the EU's commitment to transforming the "unilaterally" adopted EU Strategy for Africa into a Joint EU-Africa commitment.
The European Parliament was not consulted at any phase of the preparation of the Joint Strategy.
The European Parliament was not consulted at any phase of the preparation of the Joint Strategy.
In this case, it is difficult to argue that the document enjoys the required democratic legitimacy.
In this case, it is difficult to argue that the document enjoys the required democratic legitimacy.
· A pro-active EU diplomatic agenda for the region
· A pro-active EU diplomatic agenda for the region
The report calls for a structured and pro-active EU diplomatic agenda for the region, with the appointment of an EU special representative to the Horn of Africa, entrusted with the coordination of EU initiatives for the region.
The report calls for a structured and pro-active EU diplomatic agenda for the region, with the appointment of an EU special representative to the Horn of Africa, entrusted with the coordination of EU initiatives for the region.
This would serve the double purpose of avoiding duplication of EU activities and identifying the main interlocutor for all the Horn of Africa States.
This would serve the double purpose of avoiding duplication of EU activities and identifying the main interlocutor for all the Horn of Africa States.
A pro-active agenda implies a clear EU position for each and every conflict in the region.
A pro-active agenda implies a clear EU position for each and every conflict in the region.
Thus, including an analysis of and a set of minimum objectives for each country and regional conflict, something which is missing in the Communication, helps shaping an EU comprehensive approach towards the region.
Thus, including an analysis of and a set of minimum objectives for each country and regional conflict, something which is missing in the Communication, helps shaping an EU comprehensive approach towards the region.
· Political dialogue: Article 8 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement.
· Political dialogue: Article 8 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement.
How the EU could make full use of the text
How the EU could make full use of the text
Article 8 provides a framework for conducting a political dialogue on specific political issues of mutual concern or of general significance, such as the arms trade, excessive military expenditure, etc.
Article 8 provides a framework for conducting a political dialogue on specific political issues of mutual concern or of general significance, such as the arms trade, excessive military expenditure, etc.
Further, it stipulates that broadly based policies to promote peace and prevent, manage and resolve violent conflicts shall play a prominent role in this dialogue.
Further, it stipulates that broadly based policies to promote peace and prevent, manage and resolve violent conflicts shall play a prominent role in this dialogue.