natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The executive agencies that have been set up to implement certain programmes and that are fully financed from the respective operational programme envelopes, also have a substantial rate of increase for 2008, as compared to 2007, of 18 % for their overall budgets and their staff numbers.
The executive agencies that have been set up to implement certain programmes and that are fully financed from the respective operational programme envelopes, also have a substantial rate of increase for 2008, as compared to 2007, of 18 % for their overall budgets and their staff numbers.
The fact that, also in 2008, all staff and administrative expenditure of decentralised agencies as well as the full costs of the executive agencies, which are purely administrative by nature, will be financed from the operational headings of the MFF decreases the margins in Headings 1, 2, 3 and 4 by a total of EUR 385 million
The fact that, also in 2008, all staff and administrative expenditure of decentralised agencies as well as the full costs of the executive agencies, which are purely administrative by nature, will be financed from the operational headings of the MFF decreases the margins in Headings 1, 2, 3 and 4 by a total of EUR 385 million
EUR 312 million as the total figure for all subsidies to Titles 1 + 2 of the decentralised agencies plus EUR 73 million as the total cost of all executive agencies in 2008. .
EUR 312 million as the total figure for all subsidies to Titles 1 + 2 of the decentralised agencies plus EUR 73 million as the total cost of all executive agencies in 2008. .
In other words, moving staff costs and administrative expenditure for the agencies (decentralised and executive) to Heading 5 would improve the margin available in 2008 in Heading 1a by EUR 206 million (from EUR 77 million to 283 million), in Heading 2 by EUR 25 million, in Heading 3a by EUR 51 million (from EUR 56 million to EUR 107 million), in Heading 3b by EUR 86 million (from EUR 17 million to EUR 103 million) and in Heading 4 by EUR 17 million.
In other words, moving staff costs and administrative expenditure for the agencies (decentralised and executive) to Heading 5 would improve the margin available in 2008 in Heading 1a by EUR 206 million (from EUR 77 million to 283 million), in Heading 2 by EUR 25 million, in Heading 3a by EUR 51 million (from EUR 56 million to EUR 107 million), in Heading 3b by EUR 86 million (from EUR 17 million to EUR 103 million) and in Heading 4 by EUR 17 million.
Given the PDB 2008 margin of EUR 121 million in Heading 5, such a manoeuvre would lead to surpassing the ceiling of this MFF category by EUR 264 million but would, at least, allow for establishing the real share of the EU's administrative expenditure in a transparent way.
Given the PDB 2008 margin of EUR 121 million in Heading 5, such a manoeuvre would lead to surpassing the ceiling of this MFF category by EUR 264 million but would, at least, allow for establishing the real share of the EU's administrative expenditure in a transparent way.
If the current outsourcing tendency of the European Commission is not accompanied by a corresponding reduction in staff numbers in the parent DG of the Commission proper, an ever increasing share of the Union's operational funds will be spent for administrative purposes in addition to the existing, though modest, growth rate of the correctly labelled Heading 5 expenditure.
If the current outsourcing tendency of the European Commission is not accompanied by a corresponding reduction in staff numbers in the parent DG of the Commission proper, an ever increasing share of the Union's operational funds will be spent for administrative purposes in addition to the existing, though modest, growth rate of the correctly labelled Heading 5 expenditure.
The agencies' figures in the PDB 2008 clearly reflect this development.
The agencies' figures in the PDB 2008 clearly reflect this development.
Pilot projects and preparatory actions
Pilot projects and preparatory actions
The very low level of margins available, in particular under headings 1a , 3a , 3b and 4 of the MFF reduce the scope for Parliament to finance pilot projects and preparatory actions (which are budgeted as "pour mémoire", or p.m., in the PDB 2008 such that any commitments voted by Parliament count against the margins).
The very low level of margins available, in particular under headings 1a , 3a , 3b and 4 of the MFF reduce the scope for Parliament to finance pilot projects and preparatory actions (which are budgeted as "pour mémoire", or p.m., in the PDB 2008 such that any commitments voted by Parliament count against the margins).
In line with his recent working document with the 2007 general budget rapporteur, your rapporteur has proposed a number of areas in which Parliament may come forward with ideas for new pilot project and preparatory actions during the course of the 2008 budget procedure.
In line with his recent working document with the 2007 general budget rapporteur, your rapporteur has proposed a number of areas in which Parliament may come forward with ideas for new pilot project and preparatory actions during the course of the 2008 budget procedure.
However, he recalls the limitations that Parliament's internal timetable for preparing its first reading amendments (with deadlines in September) places upon its capacity to meet the 15 June deadline for presentation of ideas for the coming budget procedure in annex II of the 17 May 2006 IIA.
However, he recalls the limitations that Parliament's internal timetable for preparing its first reading amendments (with deadlines in September) places upon its capacity to meet the 15 June deadline for presentation of ideas for the coming budget procedure in annex II of the 17 May 2006 IIA.
Working document on "Structural Funds" - state of implementation
Working document on "Structural Funds" - state of implementation
This Working Documents focuses on the state of implementation of the structural intervention (mainly 2000-2006 programmes and state of play of the implementation so far in 2007).
This Working Documents focuses on the state of implementation of the structural intervention (mainly 2000-2006 programmes and state of play of the implementation so far in 2007).
The information compiled in this Working Document will be of special interest for this year´s budgetary procedure.
The information compiled in this Working Document will be of special interest for this year´s budgetary procedure.
Special emphasis is put on the RAL ("reste à liquider") and the implementation by EUR-10.
Special emphasis is put on the RAL ("reste à liquider") and the implementation by EUR-10.
The overall figures on structural interventions mentioned in this Working Document also include the European Fisheries Fund (EFF) and rural development (EAFRD and EAGGF) under Heading 2 (Natural Resources)
The overall figures on structural interventions mentioned in this Working Document also include the European Fisheries Fund (EFF) and rural development (EAFRD and EAGGF) under Heading 2 (Natural Resources)
) The source of all tables included in this Working Document is the European Commission. .
) The source of all tables included in this Working Document is the European Commission. .
However, more detailed information is provided for structural action under heading 1 b (cohesion).
However, more detailed information is provided for structural action under heading 1 b (cohesion).
Implementation of payments in 2006
Implementation of payments in 2006
Payments on programmes for the 2000-2006 period
Payments on programmes for the 2000-2006 period
The available appropriations amounted to €29.2 billion.
The available appropriations amounted to €29.2 billion.
The payments fell short of the voted budget by €2.8 billion (after Amending budget n°6 the amount left unpaid was €0.1 billion).
The payments fell short of the voted budget by €2.8 billion (after Amending budget n°6 the amount left unpaid was €0.1 billion).
a) Execution of EU-15 programmes
a) Execution of EU-15 programmes
Payments from the EU-15 programmes amounted to €26 027 million (innovative actions and technical assistance excluded).
Payments from the EU-15 programmes amounted to €26 027 million (innovative actions and technical assistance excluded).
Table 1 compares actual execution with the assumptions implicit in the initial Financial Perspectives for the period
Table 1 compares actual execution with the assumptions implicit in the initial Financial Perspectives for the period
) Commission Communication COM(2002)528 .
) Commission Communication COM(2002)528 .
It shows that the gap between the original expectations for payments concerning the 2000-2006 programmes and actual implementation increased to €4.1 billion, some €1.9 billion more than in 2005.
It shows that the gap between the original expectations for payments concerning the 2000-2006 programmes and actual implementation increased to €4.1 billion, some €1.9 billion more than in 2005.
It is remarkable though that if the payments to Spain and the UK had continued in 2006 at the normal pace, the gap between the expectations in the financial perspectives and the actual payments would have decreased for the first time in the period.
It is remarkable though that if the payments to Spain and the UK had continued in 2006 at the normal pace, the gap between the expectations in the financial perspectives and the actual payments would have decreased for the first time in the period.
The cumulative “backlog” of payments from the years 2000 to 2006 is €29.6 billion.
The cumulative “backlog” of payments from the years 2000 to 2006 is €29.6 billion.
Table 1: Comparison between assumptions in the financial perspectives and budget outturn, EU-15
Table 1: Comparison between assumptions in the financial perspectives and budget outturn, EU-15
b) Execution of EU-10 programmes
b) Execution of EU-10 programmes
All the payments, €2 966 million, from the EU-10 programmes (INTERREG programmes, innovative actions and technical assistance excluded) consisted of reimbursements of expenditure.
All the payments, €2 966 million, from the EU-10 programmes (INTERREG programmes, innovative actions and technical assistance excluded) consisted of reimbursements of expenditure.
The outturn was around €0.3 billion below the respective envelope agreed by the European Council of Copenhagen, but the gap was much smaller than in 2005, when the disappointingly low execution of interim payments led to a difference of €1.4 billion between the "Copenhagen" expectations and the actual payments.
The outturn was around €0.3 billion below the respective envelope agreed by the European Council of Copenhagen, but the gap was much smaller than in 2005, when the disappointingly low execution of interim payments led to a difference of €1.4 billion between the "Copenhagen" expectations and the actual payments.
Actual execution has also trailed behind initial expectations for the EU-15 programmes at the beginning of the 2000-2006 period, but the gap was more pronounced for EU-10.
Actual execution has also trailed behind initial expectations for the EU-15 programmes at the beginning of the 2000-2006 period, but the gap was more pronounced for EU-10.
The cumulative backlog of payments (relative to the "Copenhagen" expectations) from years 2004-2006 was €1.8 billion.
The cumulative backlog of payments (relative to the "Copenhagen" expectations) from years 2004-2006 was €1.8 billion.
Table 2: Comparison between assumptions in the financial perspectives and budget outturn, EU-10
Table 2: Comparison between assumptions in the financial perspectives and budget outturn, EU-10
2.2 Payments on old programmes
2.2 Payments on old programmes
The follow-up of pre-2000 programmes should certainly be finished as soon as possible.
The follow-up of pre-2000 programmes should certainly be finished as soon as possible.
The bulk of the final payments has already been carried out, and consequently the RAL is quite low.
The bulk of the final payments has already been carried out, and consequently the RAL is quite low.
The payments made concern programmes for which additional information has been required to the national authorities or programmes whose closure had been delayed due to ongoing legal procedures.
The payments made concern programmes for which additional information has been required to the national authorities or programmes whose closure had been delayed due to ongoing legal procedures.
The closure payments in 2006 amounted to €254 million.
The closure payments in 2006 amounted to €254 million.
The cap between the initial budget of €140 million and the actual execution was covered by transfers from the 2000-2006 budget lines.
The cap between the initial budget of €140 million and the actual execution was covered by transfers from the 2000-2006 budget lines.
Transfers made in 200 6
Transfers made in 200 6
The above-mentioned figures are only one part of the truth: apart from the voted budget and the Amending budgets, one has to take into account as well all the transfers made in 2006 in order to get a full picture of the implementation in 2006.
The above-mentioned figures are only one part of the truth: apart from the voted budget and the Amending budgets, one has to take into account as well all the transfers made in 2006 in order to get a full picture of the implementation in 2006.
This makes the whole procedure rather in-transparent and makes it difficult to follow closely the correct implementation of the budget.
This makes the whole procedure rather in-transparent and makes it difficult to follow closely the correct implementation of the budget.
The EAGGF received a reinforcement of €220.11 million in payment appropriations in the Global Transfer.
The EAGGF received a reinforcement of €220.11 million in payment appropriations in the Global Transfer.
Two transfer requests were sent for information to the Budgetary Authority.
Two transfer requests were sent for information to the Budgetary Authority.
They concerned transfers between chapters of the budget lines for administrative expenditure for the ESF (€211.094, payment appropriations) and FIFG (€200.000, commitment and payment appropriations).
They concerned transfers between chapters of the budget lines for administrative expenditure for the ESF (€211.094, payment appropriations) and FIFG (€200.000, commitment and payment appropriations).
A large number of transfers were made by the Commission itself under its own prerogatives established in the Financial Regulation.
A large number of transfers were made by the Commission itself under its own prerogatives established in the Financial Regulation.
According to the Commission the transfers of payment appropriations were required to adapt the budget to the different pace of execution across funds and budget lines.
According to the Commission the transfers of payment appropriations were required to adapt the budget to the different pace of execution across funds and budget lines.
End-of-year concentration of payments in 2006
End-of-year concentration of payments in 2006
In the Structural Funds most of the commitments are made at the beginning of the year but payments are concentrated at the end of the year The Structural Funds Regulation invites the Member States to group their payment applications in three batches over the year with the last one to be sent by 31 October.
In the Structural Funds most of the commitments are made at the beginning of the year but payments are concentrated at the end of the year The Structural Funds Regulation invites the Member States to group their payment applications in three batches over the year with the last one to be sent by 31 October.
However, the Commission continues to receive significant amounts of payment claims after the regulatory deadline.
However, the Commission continues to receive significant amounts of payment claims after the regulatory deadline.
Implementation by Member States (see as well chapter 5 on RAL)
Implementation by Member States (see as well chapter 5 on RAL)
Since 2003, the absolute amount of outstanding commitments (RAL) for some Member States has decreased, but this is not the rule and it is essentially explained by faster closure of the pre-2000 programmes for some countries.
Since 2003, the absolute amount of outstanding commitments (RAL) for some Member States has decreased, but this is not the rule and it is essentially explained by faster closure of the pre-2000 programmes for some countries.
In 2006, only two Member States, the United Kingdom (€572 million) and Ireland (€99 million) reduced the RAL, i.e. payments exceeded the commitments.The five biggest beneficiaries, in ranking order, Spain (accounting for almost ¼ of total payments), Germany, Italy, Portugal and Greece, absorb over 70% of all payments.
In 2006, only two Member States, the United Kingdom (€572 million) and Ireland (€99 million) reduced the RAL, i.e. payments exceeded the commitments.The five biggest beneficiaries, in ranking order, Spain (accounting for almost ¼ of total payments), Germany, Italy, Portugal and Greece, absorb over 70% of all payments.
As can be expected after an implementation period of only three years against the seven years of the EU-15, none of the new Member States were among the biggest beneficiaries from the Structural Funds.
As can be expected after an implementation period of only three years against the seven years of the EU-15, none of the new Member States were among the biggest beneficiaries from the Structural Funds.
Overall, 39% of the amounts committed have been paid to the EU-10.
Overall, 39% of the amounts committed have been paid to the EU-10.
The biggest beneficiary was Poland with payments representing over half of all the payments made to the EU-10.
The biggest beneficiary was Poland with payments representing over half of all the payments made to the EU-10.
As for 2007, both commitments and payments are forecast to be concentrated in the last months of the year, with a clear peak in December.
As for 2007, both commitments and payments are forecast to be concentrated in the last months of the year, with a clear peak in December.
Further and unforeseen delays, even minor, could therefore have a major impact on overall implementation in 2007.
Further and unforeseen delays, even minor, could therefore have a major impact on overall implementation in 2007.
N+2 Decommitments
N+2 Decommitments
Table 3 below shows the relative importance of the N+2 de-commitments made in 2006 in terms of the corresponding 2003 commitment tranche for each Member State.
Table 3 below shows the relative importance of the N+2 de-commitments made in 2006 in terms of the corresponding 2003 commitment tranche for each Member State.
According to the Commission, this is arguably a better indicator of each Member State’ performance than the absolute amount of the de-commitments because the annual commitments vary significantly amongst Member States.
According to the Commission, this is arguably a better indicator of each Member State’ performance than the absolute amount of the de-commitments because the annual commitments vary significantly amongst Member States.
Denmark also had high de-commitments (14%).
Denmark also had high de-commitments (14%).
The de-commitments for INTERREG (2.4%), Belgium (2%), Germany (1.4%) and France (1.1%) are also noteworthy.
The de-commitments for INTERREG (2.4%), Belgium (2%), Germany (1.4%) and France (1.1%) are also noteworthy.
De-commitments were made for seven other Member States, but in each case they accounted for less than 1% of the respective commitment tranches.
De-commitments were made for seven other Member States, but in each case they accounted for less than 1% of the respective commitment tranches.
Table 3: N+2 de-commitments per Member State in 2006 and in relation to 2003 commitments
Table 3: N+2 de-commitments per Member State in 2006 and in relation to 2003 commitments
* INTERREG is multi-country
* INTERREG is multi-country
The lower the part of the commitments that is lost over time, the more successful is a Member State/Fund/Objective in actually making use of the respective financial allocation of the period 2000-2006.
The lower the part of the commitments that is lost over time, the more successful is a Member State/Fund/Objective in actually making use of the respective financial allocation of the period 2000-2006.
The corresponding performance indicator is the share of total accumulated de-commitments in the value of all the commitment tranches (from 2000 up to 2003) that have so far been subject to n+2 de-commitments.
The corresponding performance indicator is the share of total accumulated de-commitments in the value of all the commitment tranches (from 2000 up to 2003) that have so far been subject to n+2 de-commitments.
By Member State, the Netherlands, Denmark and Luxembourg, Interreg (multi-country), Belgium, Ireland and Sweden all have de-commitments higher than the average, which is 0,68 %.
By Member State, the Netherlands, Denmark and Luxembourg, Interreg (multi-country), Belgium, Ireland and Sweden all have de-commitments higher than the average, which is 0,68 %.
Nevertheless, the Netherlands stands out as de-commitments for this Member State are several orders of magnitude above the others
Nevertheless, the Netherlands stands out as de-commitments for this Member State are several orders of magnitude above the others
The Dutch de-commitments are mainly linked to a slow start of ESF-funded programmes .
The Dutch de-commitments are mainly linked to a slow start of ESF-funded programmes .
By Funds, the ERDF and the EAGGF have lower-than-average de-commitments.
By Funds, the ERDF and the EAGGF have lower-than-average de-commitments.
For objectives, this is true for both objectives 1 and 2, all other objectives/initiatives having above-average de-commitments.
For objectives, this is true for both objectives 1 and 2, all other objectives/initiatives having above-average de-commitments.
Table 4: Relative significance of the cumulative de-commitments up to the end of 2006, by Member State
Table 4: Relative significance of the cumulative de-commitments up to the end of 2006, by Member State
* INTERREG multi-country
* INTERREG multi-country
Outstanding commitments (RAL)
Outstanding commitments (RAL)
Status quo of RAL - an issue of concern
Status quo of RAL - an issue of concern
On 5 July 2007, the outstanding commitments amounted to €92 693 million (!!).
On 5 July 2007, the outstanding commitments amounted to €92 693 million (!!).
Most of them (more than €65 billion relate to objective 1 projects).
Most of them (more than €65 billion relate to objective 1 projects).
Note that this figure does not include any RAL from pre-2000 (which amounted to €923 million end of 2006).
Note that this figure does not include any RAL from pre-2000 (which amounted to €923 million end of 2006).
According to the Commission the relatively high stock of outstanding commitments (RAL) is a consequence of the regulatory framework.
According to the Commission the relatively high stock of outstanding commitments (RAL) is a consequence of the regulatory framework.
The Commission considers a RAL close to two years of commitments as a normal pattern.
The Commission considers a RAL close to two years of commitments as a normal pattern.
However, at present RAL is already approaching the magnitude of three years of commitments.
However, at present RAL is already approaching the magnitude of three years of commitments.
Furthermore, your rapporteurs question if RAL amounting to two years´ commitment can really be regarded as "normal.
Furthermore, your rapporteurs question if RAL amounting to two years´ commitment can really be regarded as "normal.
Your rapporteurs would therefore urge Commission and Member States to make progress on this issue.
Your rapporteurs would therefore urge Commission and Member States to make progress on this issue.
Table 5 and 6 show the evolution of the overall RAL for the Structural Funds (all programming periods combined) since 1994.
Table 5 and 6 show the evolution of the overall RAL for the Structural Funds (all programming periods combined) since 1994.