natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Until now there has not been a clear decision as to whether such a regime should be open to all products, who should be eligible to invest and who to provide (place), and whether an originally privately placed product could be sold on to retail investors.
Until now there has not been a clear decision as to whether such a regime should be open to all products, who should be eligible to invest and who to provide (place), and whether an originally privately placed product could be sold on to retail investors.
Moreover, it is still open how to define the borderline between public offering and private placement and which parts of the already existing regulatory framework could be used for the construction of a European private placement regime (MiFID: eligible counterparties / professional client; Prospectus Directive: qualified investor).
Moreover, it is still open how to define the borderline between public offering and private placement and which parts of the already existing regulatory framework could be used for the construction of a European private placement regime (MiFID: eligible counterparties / professional client; Prospectus Directive: qualified investor).
Distribution and fees
Distribution and fees
Investors do not only have access to UCITS, but also to similar and therefore competing investment products under different legal frameworks, such as structured products (i.e. certificates and notes) and life insurance products (i.e. unit-linked).
Investors do not only have access to UCITS, but also to similar and therefore competing investment products under different legal frameworks, such as structured products (i.e. certificates and notes) and life insurance products (i.e. unit-linked).
Given the increasingly open architecture of distribution, the appropriate comparison of cost, valuation, performance and risk is even more important for retail investors.
Given the increasingly open architecture of distribution, the appropriate comparison of cost, valuation, performance and risk is even more important for retail investors.
However, it must be recognised that full comparability and hence an identical level playing field are unlikely to be achieved due to individual characteristics of different investment products (exit possibilities, taxation etc.).
However, it must be recognised that full comparability and hence an identical level playing field are unlikely to be achieved due to individual characteristics of different investment products (exit possibilities, taxation etc.).
Fee structures often remain in-transparent because fees are included in returns without any indication of how they are broken down in the value-chain.
Fee structures often remain in-transparent because fees are included in returns without any indication of how they are broken down in the value-chain.
This is particularly true for the retrocession
This is particularly true for the retrocession
Retrocession/placement fee/trailer fee: A portion of the management fee received by the manager and paid to the distributor in remuneration of its placement activity.
Retrocession/placement fee/trailer fee: A portion of the management fee received by the manager and paid to the distributor in remuneration of its placement activity.
The fee is usually recurrent and paid as long as the assets remain invested. .
The fee is usually recurrent and paid as long as the assets remain invested. .
Such lack of transparency undermines investor protection, business development and sound competition.
Such lack of transparency undermines investor protection, business development and sound competition.
MiFID and its provisions on inducements
MiFID and its provisions on inducements
Inducement = a fee, commission or non-monetary benefit that an investment firm may receive or pay in connection with the provision of investment and ancillary services to clients. aim at improving fee transparency.
Inducement = a fee, commission or non-monetary benefit that an investment firm may receive or pay in connection with the provision of investment and ancillary services to clients. aim at improving fee transparency.
However, it has to be noted that its disclosure provisions only apply to third-party funds and not to in-house distribution and do hence not foster open architecture.
However, it has to be noted that its disclosure provisions only apply to third-party funds and not to in-house distribution and do hence not foster open architecture.
Moreover, it is not yet predictable what impact MiFID will have on already existing UCITS provisions and on softing and bundling arrangements.
Moreover, it is not yet predictable what impact MiFID will have on already existing UCITS provisions and on softing and bundling arrangements.
Taxation of cross-border fund mergers
Taxation of cross-border fund mergers
Although the EU investment funds market only has two-thirds as many assets as the US market, it has over three times as many funds.
Although the EU investment funds market only has two-thirds as many assets as the US market, it has over three times as many funds.
This implies a relatively high proportion of funds with a higher cost proportional to their size.
This implies a relatively high proportion of funds with a higher cost proportional to their size.
Due to the small average fund size, European investors are charged an estimated € 2-6 billion more in annual fees than they would, if economies of scale were fully exploited
Due to the small average fund size, European investors are charged an estimated € 2-6 billion more in annual fees than they would, if economies of scale were fully exploited
European Commission, Internal Market and Services DG: Report of the Expert Group on Investment Fund Market Efficiency, July 2006, Brussels, p.
European Commission, Internal Market and Services DG: Report of the Expert Group on Investment Fund Market Efficiency, July 2006, Brussels, p.
National taxation rules are one of the major obstacles to (cross-border) fund mergers.
National taxation rules are one of the major obstacles to (cross-border) fund mergers.
Source: Own chart, based on data from EFAMA Fact Book: Trends in European investment funds, 4th edition, July 2006, page 53.
Source: Own chart, based on data from EFAMA Fact Book: Trends in European investment funds, 4th edition, July 2006, page 53.
Investment Policy and Risk Management
Investment Policy and Risk Management
In the past there have been divergent interpretations of the UCITS III Directive (1985/611) rules by European supervisory authorities.
In the past there have been divergent interpretations of the UCITS III Directive (1985/611) rules by European supervisory authorities.
Therefore, the Commission adopted a Level 2 Directive (2007/1178) which clarifies certain definitions and substantially widens the scope of eligible assets.
Therefore, the Commission adopted a Level 2 Directive (2007/1178) which clarifies certain definitions and substantially widens the scope of eligible assets.
However, UCITS are not yet allowed to invest in commodities and derivatives on commodities, hedge funds (HF), funds of hedge funds (FOHF) and open-ended real estate funds (OREF).
However, UCITS are not yet allowed to invest in commodities and derivatives on commodities, hedge funds (HF), funds of hedge funds (FOHF) and open-ended real estate funds (OREF).
The CESR work on hedge funds indices (HFI) as eligible assets is still on-going, but creates concerns among the hedge fund industry of an uneven level playing field in comparison to FoHF whose performance and transparency is often superior to the one of HFIs.
The CESR work on hedge funds indices (HFI) as eligible assets is still on-going, but creates concerns among the hedge fund industry of an uneven level playing field in comparison to FoHF whose performance and transparency is often superior to the one of HFIs.
Since the investment policy of UCITS is fairly prescriptive, there remains the question as to how far the risk management provisions of UCITS should go.
Since the investment policy of UCITS is fairly prescriptive, there remains the question as to how far the risk management provisions of UCITS should go.
Many practitioners as well as academics see the investment policy rules on the one hand and the risk management system on the other as two sides of the coin.
Many practitioners as well as academics see the investment policy rules on the one hand and the risk management system on the other as two sides of the coin.
The current provisions of UCITS III Directive (1985/611) require the management company to employ a risk-management process, which must take into account the current value of the underlying assets, the counterparty risk, future market movements and the time available for liquidating the positions.
The current provisions of UCITS III Directive (1985/611) require the management company to employ a risk-management process, which must take into account the current value of the underlying assets, the counterparty risk, future market movements and the time available for liquidating the positions.
Since the amendments to the directive (2001/107 and 2001/108) established a non-sophisticated UCITS as well as sophisticated UCITS (using financial derivative instruments), the Commission published a recommendation (2004/383/EC) on how to use financial derivative instruments in the case of sophisticated UCITS in 2004.
Since the amendments to the directive (2001/107 and 2001/108) established a non-sophisticated UCITS as well as sophisticated UCITS (using financial derivative instruments), the Commission published a recommendation (2004/383/EC) on how to use financial derivative instruments in the case of sophisticated UCITS in 2004.
This recommendation however fails to ensure a consistent definition of a sophisticated UCITS and what methods of risk management such a UCITS should use; that is whether a sophisticated UCITS should use the value-at-risk (VaR) approach and non-sophisticated UCITS a simpler commitment approach.
This recommendation however fails to ensure a consistent definition of a sophisticated UCITS and what methods of risk management such a UCITS should use; that is whether a sophisticated UCITS should use the value-at-risk (VaR) approach and non-sophisticated UCITS a simpler commitment approach.
From the supervisory side, the risk management programmes are notified to the regulator, but not authorised.
From the supervisory side, the risk management programmes are notified to the regulator, but not authorised.
It also varies in how far custodians, the administration of the fund and the fund managers contribute to the data put into the software as well as in how far depositories are involved in the oversight of this function.
It also varies in how far custodians, the administration of the fund and the fund managers contribute to the data put into the software as well as in how far depositories are involved in the oversight of this function.
Fund processing
Fund processing
Fund order-processing has not kept pace with the growth of the market and changes in distribution systems, which in turn has led to higher operational risks, processing delays and higher costs.
Fund order-processing has not kept pace with the growth of the market and changes in distribution systems, which in turn has led to higher operational risks, processing delays and higher costs.
At the moment, there is still around 50 % of cross-border transactions handled manually that costs two to three times more than automated orders
At the moment, there is still around 50 % of cross-border transactions handled manually that costs two to three times more than automated orders
Eurofi study 2007: Optimising cross-border distribution and processing of investment funds in the EU. .
Eurofi study 2007: Optimising cross-border distribution and processing of investment funds in the EU. .
Such inefficiencies do not arise from an insufficient regulatory or legal framework but from within the private sector.
Such inefficiencies do not arise from an insufficient regulatory or legal framework but from within the private sector.
Hence, the European industry should step up its projects and progress in the automation and standardisation of fund processing.
Hence, the European industry should step up its projects and progress in the automation and standardisation of fund processing.
The depositary is one of the three fundamental pillars of the UCITS framework, alongside the fund and its managers.
The depositary is one of the three fundamental pillars of the UCITS framework, alongside the fund and its managers.
But depositaries are broadly defined and have no European passport.
But depositaries are broadly defined and have no European passport.
The absence of a precise EU legislative framework has led to diverging definitions of the role and responsibilities of the depositary.
The absence of a precise EU legislative framework has led to diverging definitions of the role and responsibilities of the depositary.
So far, that divergence has not resulted in obvious problems with the protection of investors.
So far, that divergence has not resulted in obvious problems with the protection of investors.
However, there are concerns that these differences may harm the free provision of services in the internal market.
However, there are concerns that these differences may harm the free provision of services in the internal market.
Consequently, further thought should be given to the authorisation of branches of EU credit institutions to act as depositary, to the depositary's safekeeping mission and to a harmonisation of its functions in general.
Consequently, further thought should be given to the authorisation of branches of EU credit institutions to act as depositary, to the depositary's safekeeping mission and to a harmonisation of its functions in general.
The Lamfalussy process did not exist when Directive 85/611/EEC was adopted.
The Lamfalussy process did not exist when Directive 85/611/EEC was adopted.
However, Lamfalussy-style mechanisms have already been applied for instance within the Level 2 measures to the UCITS III Directive definitions of eligible assets.
However, Lamfalussy-style mechanisms have already been applied for instance within the Level 2 measures to the UCITS III Directive definitions of eligible assets.
During the forthcoming revision process, the Commission should examine where Lamfalussy style mechanisms can be extended without restructuring the whole Directive.
During the forthcoming revision process, the Commission should examine where Lamfalussy style mechanisms can be extended without restructuring the whole Directive.
Thereby, it is crucial to ensure that any further new legislation or revision of the existing legislation will include the legal basis for both Level 2 implementing directives and Level 2 implementing regulations.
Thereby, it is crucial to ensure that any further new legislation or revision of the existing legislation will include the legal basis for both Level 2 implementing directives and Level 2 implementing regulations.
Hedge Funds
Hedge Funds
Global assets under management in HFs present about $ 1,537 million
Global assets under management in HFs present about $ 1,537 million
Hedge Fund Review March 2007. compared to $ 55.0 trillion assets in the global fund management industry
Hedge Fund Review March 2007. compared to $ 55.0 trillion assets in the global fund management industry
Investment Company Institute December 2006. .
Investment Company Institute December 2006. .
Despite the lack of a clear and common definition of a HF, the concept represents unregulated investment vehicles using investment techniques which try to use market imperfections.
Despite the lack of a clear and common definition of a HF, the concept represents unregulated investment vehicles using investment techniques which try to use market imperfections.
They use shorting techniques, extensive leverage, and derivatives, which are not available to other collective investment vehicles.
They use shorting techniques, extensive leverage, and derivatives, which are not available to other collective investment vehicles.
However, many other financial institutions and investment funds share some of these features.
However, many other financial institutions and investment funds share some of these features.
HFs contribute to a dispersion of risk, higher liquidity, increased competitiveness between market makers and intermediaries as well as substantive proprietary market research that leads to better information and price discovery.
HFs contribute to a dispersion of risk, higher liquidity, increased competitiveness between market makers and intermediaries as well as substantive proprietary market research that leads to better information and price discovery.
In view of the difficulties some HFs have run into recently, there is a controversial discussion on the financial stability and systemic risk that might arise from HFs.
In view of the difficulties some HFs have run into recently, there is a controversial discussion on the financial stability and systemic risk that might arise from HFs.
Most supervisors opt for the supervision of HFs' counterparties and regulation of investors' access.
Most supervisors opt for the supervision of HFs' counterparties and regulation of investors' access.
Private Equity
Private Equity
Although often being placed under one heading of "alternative investment", the financial instruments of hedge funds and private equity are of different natures.
Although often being placed under one heading of "alternative investment", the financial instruments of hedge funds and private equity are of different natures.
"Private" in private equity refers to the way of raising capital and not to whether they invest in private or publicly listed companies.
"Private" in private equity refers to the way of raising capital and not to whether they invest in private or publicly listed companies.
Their activity thus starts with fund raising (usually from pension funds, endowments, financial institutions (banks, insurance companies), high-net worth individuals or funds of private equity funds).
Their activity thus starts with fund raising (usually from pension funds, endowments, financial institutions (banks, insurance companies), high-net worth individuals or funds of private equity funds).
It is followed by fund management activity, i.e. leveraged buy-outs (LBOs, mostly investing in publicly listed companies and taking them private), venture capital, growth capital, mezzanine capital etc.
It is followed by fund management activity, i.e. leveraged buy-outs (LBOs, mostly investing in publicly listed companies and taking them private), venture capital, growth capital, mezzanine capital etc.
LBOs are usually done by one part raised funds to three to four parts of debt, which later show on the targeted company's balance sheet.
LBOs are usually done by one part raised funds to three to four parts of debt, which later show on the targeted company's balance sheet.
Typical exit strategies are either an initial public offering (IPO), a secondary buy-out by another private equity firm or a trade sale to another corporation.
Typical exit strategies are either an initial public offering (IPO), a secondary buy-out by another private equity firm or a trade sale to another corporation.
Despite concerns about high leverage of LBOs and potential social consequences, private equity remains a great source of start up and growth capital for SMEs and in many cases - due to the restructuring of the target company - ensures its successful development.
Despite concerns about high leverage of LBOs and potential social consequences, private equity remains a great source of start up and growth capital for SMEs and in many cases - due to the restructuring of the target company - ensures its successful development.
In 2006, some 90 % of investments were made in companies with fewer than 500 employees
In 2006, some 90 % of investments were made in companies with fewer than 500 employees
EVCA Yearbook 2007. .
EVCA Yearbook 2007. .
Mariela Velichkova Baeva, Zsolt László Becsey, Pervenche Berès, Slavi Binev, Sharon Bowles, Udo Bullmann, Ieke van den Burg, Christian Ehler, Jonathan Evans, Elisa Ferreira, Robert Goebbels, Donata Gottardi, Benoît Hamon, Gunnar Hökmark, Karsten Friedrich Hoppenstedt, Sophia in 't Veld, Piia-Noora Kauppi, Wolf Klinz, Kurt Joachim Lauk, Andrea Losco, Cristobal Montoro Romero, Joseph Muscat, John Purvis, Alexander Radwan, Bernhard Rapkay, Dariusz Rosati, Heide Rühle, Eoin Ryan, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Manuel António dos Santos, Margarita Starkevičiūtė, Ivo Strejček, Cornelis Visser, Sahra Wagenknecht
Mariela Velichkova Baeva, Zsolt László Becsey, Pervenche Berès, Slavi Binev, Sharon Bowles, Udo Bullmann, Ieke van den Burg, Christian Ehler, Jonathan Evans, Elisa Ferreira, Robert Goebbels, Donata Gottardi, Benoît Hamon, Gunnar Hökmark, Karsten Friedrich Hoppenstedt, Sophia in 't Veld, Piia-Noora Kauppi, Wolf Klinz, Kurt Joachim Lauk, Andrea Losco, Cristobal Montoro Romero, Joseph Muscat, John Purvis, Alexander Radwan, Bernhard Rapkay, Dariusz Rosati, Heide Rühle, Eoin Ryan, Antolín Sánchez Presedo, Manuel António dos Santos, Margarita Starkevičiūtė, Ivo Strejček, Cornelis Visser, Sahra Wagenknecht
Harald Ettl, Ján Hudacký, Werner Langen, Thomas Mann
Harald Ettl, Ján Hudacký, Werner Langen, Thomas Mann
Holger Krahmer, Willem Schuth
Holger Krahmer, Willem Schuth
PE 390.711v02-00
PE 390.711v02-00
ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ НА МОТИВИТЕ.............................................................................................17
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT..............................................................................................16
– като взе предвид предложението на Комисията до Съвета ( COM(2007)0268 ),
– having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council ( COM(2007)0268 ),
– като взе предвид членове 36 и 37 от Договора за ЕО, съгласно които Съветът се е консултирал с него ( C6‑0203/2007 ),
– having regard to Articles 36 and 37 of the EC Treaty, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament ( C6‑0203/2007 ),
– като взе предвид доклада на комисията по земеделие и развитие на селските райони ( A6‑0461/2007 ),
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development ( A6‑0461/2007 ),
(2) С оглед на натрупания опит, перспективите за развитие на пазара, както в рамките на Общността, така и извън нея, и в новия контекст на международната търговия, е необходимо да се изработи цялостна и последователна политика за информиране и насърчаване, свързана със селскостопанските продукти и с метода им на производство, както и на хранителни продукти, произведени на базата на селскостопански продукти, на вътрешния пазар и на пазарите на трети страни, без обаче да се поощрява потреблението на който и да е продукт поради специфичния му произход.
(2) Taking account of experience gained, the prospects for market development both within and outside the EU and the new international trade situation, it is appropriate to develop an overall, coherent information and promotion policy for agricultural products and their method of production as well as for food products based on agricultural products, on the internal market and on third country markets, without encouraging the consumption of any product on grounds of its specific origins.
С цел по-голяма яснота следва регламенти (ЕО) № 2702/1999 и (ЕО) № 2826/2000 да бъдат отменени и заменени от един регламент, като се запазят специфичните особености на действията в зависимост от мястото на провеждане.
In the interests of clarity, Regulations (EC) Nos 2702/1999 and 2826/2000 should therefore be repealed and replaced by a single regulation, whilst maintaining the specific features of measures according to the market in which they are implemented.