natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
- като взе предвид резолюцията на Европейския парламент от 27 април 2006 г. относно секторните аспекти на Плана за действие относно държавната-помощ: помощ за новаторство
- having regard to its resolution of 27 April 2006 on sectoral aspects of the State Aid Action Plan: aid for innovation
- като взе предвид материала на службите на Комисията относно рамка на Общността за държавна помощ за изследователска и развойна дейност и новаторство от м. септември 2006 г.,
- having regard to the Commission staff paper on a Community Framework for State aid for Research and Development and Innovation of September 2006,
- като взе предвид насоките на Общността относно използването на държавна помощ за опазването на околната среда
- having regard to the Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection
- като взе предвид проектонасоките на Общността относно държавната помощ и инвестирането на рисков капитал в малки и средни предприятия,
- having regard to the draft Community guidelines on State aid and risk capital investments in small and medium-sized enterprises,
- като взе предвид насоките за национална регионална помощ за 2007-2013 г.
- having regard to the Guidelines on national regional aid for 2007-2013
- като взе предвид Решение 2005/842/ЕО на Комисията от 28 ноември 2005 г. относно прилагането на член 86, параграф 2 от Договора за ЕО за държавната помощ във вид на компенсация за обществена услуга, предоставена на определени предприятия, натоварени с извършването на услуги от общ икономически интерес
- having regard to Commission Decision 2005/842/EC of 28 November 2005 on the application of Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest
- като взе предвид резолюцията на Европейския парламент относно държавната помощ във вид на компенсации за обществени услуги
- having regard to its resolution of 22 February 2005 on State aid in the form of public service compensation
- като взе предвид съдебната практика на Съда на Европейските общности относно услугите от общ интерес и по-конкретно решението му от 24 юли 2003 по Дело C-280/00
- having regard to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities relating to services of general interest and, in particular, to the Court's judgment of 24 July 2003 in Case C-280/00
Дело C-280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH и Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg срещу Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH [2003] ECR I-7747. ,
Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH [2003] ECR I-7747. ,
– като взе предвид доклада на Комисията по икономически и парични въпроси ( A6‑0176/2007 ),
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs ( A6‑0176/2007 ),
3. приветства усилията на Комисията за подобряване качеството на изпълнение на решенията в контекста на ЕМК чрез засилено сътрудничество с и между националните органи по конкуренцията;
Welcomes the Commission’s efforts to improve the quality of enforcement of decisions in the context of the ECN through increased cooperation with and among national competition authorities (NCAs);
9. приветства приемането от новите държави-членки на правилата на ЕО в областта на конкуренцията и препоръчва качеството на изпълнение на тези правила да продължи да се подобрява;
Welcomes the adoption of EC competition rules by the most recently acceded Member States and recommends the continued refinement of the quality of the implementation of such rules;
19. подчертава, че завършването на разделянето на собствеността в енергийния сектор успоредно с разрушаването на вертикалните конгломерати и гарантирането на условия за ефективен достъп до пазари, следва да бъде приоритет;
Underlines that the completion of ownership unbundling in the energy sector, alongside the dismantling of vertical conglomerates and guaranteeing conditions for effective market access should be given stronger priority;
25. приветства целта на Комисията за подкрепа на взаимното свързване на инфраструктурните мрежи; призовава за да се отдели специално внимание на особеностите на периферните пазари;
Welcomes the Commission’s aim to support the inter-connectivity of infrastructure networks; calls for special attention to be paid to the specific features of peripheral markets;
34. припомня принципа на съответствие между държавната помощ и политиката на сближаване на ЕО; призовава Комисията с оглед целите на ЕО и нейната политика на сближаване, да се увери, че държавната помощ не нарушава конкуренцията, като води до преместване на предприятията от една държава-членка в друга, в търсене на по-изгодни помощи, без никаква добавена стойност с оглед общите цели на ЕО и в частност, за сметка на загубата на работни места в един регион в полза на друг; припомня, че регионалната помощ, одобрена извън външните разрешени схеми за регионална помощ, е свързана с по-високи присъщи рискове от нарушения за конкуренцията;
Recalls the principle of compatibility between State aid and EC cohesion policy; calls on the Commission, in view of the EC's objectives and its cohesion policies, to ensure that State aid does not result in distorted competition in terms of provoking the relocation of companies from one Member State to another, which may lead to subsidy-shopping by businesses without any added value for the common goals of the EC and, in particular, to the loss of jobs in one region for the benefit of another; recalls that regional aid approved outside authorised regional aid schemes intrinsically involves higher risks of distortion to competition;
39. приветства сътрудничеството на Комисията с китайските власти за създаване на орган по конкуренцията в Китай; призовава Комисията да продължи своите усилия за изграждане на истинска култура в областта на конкуренцията в Китай;
Welcomes the Commission's cooperation with Chinese authorities towards the establishment of a competition authority in that China; urges the Commission to continue its efforts towards instituting an effective competition culture in that China;
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
In 2005 a number of the broad lines previously laid down for competition policy reform entered into force and were consolidated, and important new steps were taken to update, and enhance the effectiveness, transparency, and coherence of, European competition policy.
In 2005 a number of the broad lines previously laid down for competition policy reform entered into force and were consolidated, and important new steps were taken to update, and enhance the effectiveness, transparency, and coherence of, European competition policy.
In general terms this report notes that there has been an encouraging tendency in recent years for competition policy to favour understanding of the actual or potential effects of given practices or changes to business structures and move away from application of competition rules in a strictly formal sense (i.e. the ‘rules-based’ approach).
In general terms this report notes that there has been an encouraging tendency in recent years for competition policy to favour understanding of the actual or potential effects of given practices or changes to business structures and move away from application of competition rules in a strictly formal sense (i.e. the ‘rules-based’ approach).
Though welcome, this option is more challenging than the traditional rules-based method.
Though welcome, this option is more challenging than the traditional rules-based method.
The greater complexity of the new approach must not be allowed to create uncertainty for business, especially smaller firms, or an aversion to risk that would run counter to the aims of competition policy.
The greater complexity of the new approach must not be allowed to create uncertainty for business, especially smaller firms, or an aversion to risk that would run counter to the aims of competition policy.
Also to be welcomed is the trend towards decentralisation that has increasingly been making itself felt in European competition policy; however, much more work is needed in order to harmonise the criteria for interpretation and implementation of norms in the various Member States and individual institutions.
Also to be welcomed is the trend towards decentralisation that has increasingly been making itself felt in European competition policy; however, much more work is needed in order to harmonise the criteria for interpretation and implementation of norms in the various Member States and individual institutions.
It is vital to ensure a consistent degree of enforcement in the different countries; to that end, national legal systems and especially courts need to be involved alongside the competition authorities.
It is vital to ensure a consistent degree of enforcement in the different countries; to that end, national legal systems and especially courts need to be involved alongside the competition authorities.
The report under review confirms that competition is still severely wanting on markets of strategic importance (energy, for example) and in services (including services of general economic interest).
The report under review confirms that competition is still severely wanting on markets of strategic importance (energy, for example) and in services (including services of general economic interest).
Given the concerns regarding strategic security and universal coverage, it is necessary to clarify the sector objectives governing competition rules and the brief assigned to regulators; furthermore, the need to reconcile public regulation capacity with the growing power of market players can be demonstrated more clearly by sector-based analysis.
Given the concerns regarding strategic security and universal coverage, it is necessary to clarify the sector objectives governing competition rules and the brief assigned to regulators; furthermore, the need to reconcile public regulation capacity with the growing power of market players can be demonstrated more clearly by sector-based analysis.
When determining their priority sectors, therefore, the Commission and the national competition authorities must lay down clear-cut criteria and establish a coherent basis on which to assess the impact of their actions on the well-being of consumers and protection of their interests.
When determining their priority sectors, therefore, the Commission and the national competition authorities must lay down clear-cut criteria and establish a coherent basis on which to assess the impact of their actions on the well-being of consumers and protection of their interests.
PRACTICES RESTRAINING COMPETITION (‘ANTITRUST’)
PRACTICES RESTRAINING COMPETITION (‘ANTITRUST’)
Among the most notable new steps, in the right direction, are the Green Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules and, published back in late 2005, the guidelines on the application of Article 82 to exclusionary abuses; as regards action taken, the Model Leniency Programme has been launched, as have two sector inquiries, and the guidelines for fining cartels have begun to be reviewed.
Among the most notable new steps, in the right direction, are the Green Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules and, published back in late 2005, the guidelines on the application of Article 82 to exclusionary abuses; as regards action taken, the Model Leniency Programme has been launched, as have two sector inquiries, and the guidelines for fining cartels have begun to be reviewed.
The European Competition Network (ECN) is, in addition, central to successful implementation of the new rules embodied in Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.
The European Competition Network (ECN) is, in addition, central to successful implementation of the new rules embodied in Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.
These measures all make for a more effective competition policy.
These measures all make for a more effective competition policy.
However, the Commission’s attention should be drawn in this section to certain areas in which there is room for improvement where competition is concerned.
However, the Commission’s attention should be drawn in this section to certain areas in which there is room for improvement where competition is concerned.
In the financial sector there are still serious competition and regulation problems.
In the financial sector there are still serious competition and regulation problems.
The European market continues to be subject to exceptional arrangements that serve in practice to favour national players.
The European market continues to be subject to exceptional arrangements that serve in practice to favour national players.
Further steps should also be taken towards general harmonisation of the respective criteria and practices applied by regulators and supervisory bodies.
Further steps should also be taken towards general harmonisation of the respective criteria and practices applied by regulators and supervisory bodies.
Regarding the work set in motion by the Commission on the guidelines on the application of Article 82 to exclusionary abuses, the EP’s recommendations, set out in a letter sent to the Commissioner in March 2006, emphasised the need to guarantee high standards of vigilance as regards market abuses and make decisions more consistent and predictable, proceeding on the understanding that assessment of the economic efficiency of practices had to take second place to protection of consumers’ rights.
Regarding the work set in motion by the Commission on the guidelines on the application of Article 82 to exclusionary abuses, the EP’s recommendations, set out in a letter sent to the Commissioner in March 2006, emphasised the need to guarantee high standards of vigilance as regards market abuses and make decisions more consistent and predictable, proceeding on the understanding that assessment of the economic efficiency of practices had to take second place to protection of consumers’ rights.
The Community Model Leniency Programme brings indisputable advantages from the point of view of detecting and condemning collusion, but they could be improved if the programme were implemented more effectively at the practical level.
The Community Model Leniency Programme brings indisputable advantages from the point of view of detecting and condemning collusion, but they could be improved if the programme were implemented more effectively at the practical level.
It is essential to prevent the programme being misused, whether by allowing applicants to artificially exploit leniency applications or by, in relative terms, penalising firms which, as smaller stakeholders, would be less able to add anything of relevance to the proceedings.
It is essential to prevent the programme being misused, whether by allowing applicants to artificially exploit leniency applications or by, in relative terms, penalising firms which, as smaller stakeholders, would be less able to add anything of relevance to the proceedings.
Once again, what matters is to produce initiatives enabling clear and transparent guidelines to be passed on to business, especially SMEs.
Once again, what matters is to produce initiatives enabling clear and transparent guidelines to be passed on to business, especially SMEs.
As a complement to the above initiative, Parliament welcomes the fact that the practice of ‘ damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules ’ is to be applied as provided for in the conclusions of the Green Paper, since this will create the conditions required in order to exercise the right to compensation for damage caused to citizens and firms, in particular SMEs.
As a complement to the above initiative, Parliament welcomes the fact that the practice of ‘ damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules ’ is to be applied as provided for in the conclusions of the Green Paper, since this will create the conditions required in order to exercise the right to compensation for damage caused to citizens and firms, in particular SMEs.
It will be necessary to reduce the risk of potential conflict between the incentives granted under the Community Model Leniency Programme and the obligation to make amends, as laid down in the Green Paper.
It will be necessary to reduce the risk of potential conflict between the incentives granted under the Community Model Leniency Programme and the obligation to make amends, as laid down in the Green Paper.
One final cause for concern is that firms could be drawn into new forms of unfair competition stemming from the fact that highly skilled young workers are increasingly being recruited as trainees under open-ended unregulated arrangements not conforming to minimum wage and employment rights standards.
One final cause for concern is that firms could be drawn into new forms of unfair competition stemming from the fact that highly skilled young workers are increasingly being recruited as trainees under open-ended unregulated arrangements not conforming to minimum wage and employment rights standards.
MERGERS AND ACQUISTIONS (M & A)
MERGERS AND ACQUISTIONS (M & A)
The latest developments on the single market, especially where energy and financial services are concerned, demonstrate the inadequacy of the current Community regulation applying to mergers and acquisitions.
The latest developments on the single market, especially where energy and financial services are concerned, demonstrate the inadequacy of the current Community regulation applying to mergers and acquisitions.
As the Commissioner publicly admitted in November 2005, the ‘two-thirds’ rule, referring to domestic market turnover, is no longer an appropriate cut-off point for the Commission’s power to assess mergers with Community impact.
As the Commissioner publicly admitted in November 2005, the ‘two-thirds’ rule, referring to domestic market turnover, is no longer an appropriate cut-off point for the Commission’s power to assess mergers with Community impact.
The disparities among national regulation arrangements add to the distortion, and operations with a comparable impact are thus not treated in a consistent way.
The disparities among national regulation arrangements add to the distortion, and operations with a comparable impact are thus not treated in a consistent way.
Concentration of market power in one Member State can have significant effects in one or more other Member States if their domestic markets depend on the industrial design being developed on neighbouring markets.
Concentration of market power in one Member State can have significant effects in one or more other Member States if their domestic markets depend on the industrial design being developed on neighbouring markets.
To make matters worse, it can happen that a national regulator approves mergers subject to commitments with a cross-border impact and the necessary link-up with the regulators in neighbouring countries does not exist.
To make matters worse, it can happen that a national regulator approves mergers subject to commitments with a cross-border impact and the necessary link-up with the regulators in neighbouring countries does not exist.
These problems become more severe on the more outlying markets of the Union because of the difficulties of interconnection and the typically smaller market size.
These problems become more severe on the more outlying markets of the Union because of the difficulties of interconnection and the typically smaller market size.
Parliament is therefore calling on the Commission to submit a proposal to revise the regulatory framework so as to enable the internal market to be built on foundations of coherence.
Parliament is therefore calling on the Commission to submit a proposal to revise the regulatory framework so as to enable the internal market to be built on foundations of coherence.
A further suggestion, to improve the standard and consistency of decision-making, is to set up a database as part of the ECN cooperation arrangements to provide a centralised record of M & A cases examined in order to assist comparative impact assessment of the commitments proposed when merger plans were dealt with.
A further suggestion, to improve the standard and consistency of decision-making, is to set up a database as part of the ECN cooperation arrangements to provide a centralised record of M & A cases examined in order to assist comparative impact assessment of the commitments proposed when merger plans were dealt with.
The case of energy
The case of energy
The energy sector and the solutions employed could set a pattern for other sectors.
The energy sector and the solutions employed could set a pattern for other sectors.
The sector inquiry on the gas and electricity markets has clearly revealed a complex set of obstacles to consolidation of the single market and a guarantee of genuinely fair competition.
The sector inquiry on the gas and electricity markets has clearly revealed a complex set of obstacles to consolidation of the single market and a guarantee of genuinely fair competition.
In particular, ownership unbundling has not yet happened on several national electricity markets.
In particular, ownership unbundling has not yet happened on several national electricity markets.
Worse still, there are cases in which unbundling has been carried out, but production and distribution remain vertically integrated.
Worse still, there are cases in which unbundling has been carried out, but production and distribution remain vertically integrated.
The implementation of unbundling, as called for by the Second and Third Electricity and Gas Directives, should be a priority for the Commission’s action.
The implementation of unbundling, as called for by the Second and Third Electricity and Gas Directives, should be a priority for the Commission’s action.
The experience of the Union’s most developed energy markets shows that the single market cannot be consolidated until regional markets are operating smoothly: that is a precondition.
The experience of the Union’s most developed energy markets shows that the single market cannot be consolidated until regional markets are operating smoothly: that is a precondition.
Regional markets have to be properly interconnected, but this, though necessary, is not sufficient to achieve the desired aims.
Regional markets have to be properly interconnected, but this, though necessary, is not sufficient to achieve the desired aims.
Further action is accordingly required: regulators must work together in performing standardised tasks; any form of public market protection must be abolished, as must the differences in product specifications from one Member State to another.
Further action is accordingly required: regulators must work together in performing standardised tasks; any form of public market protection must be abolished, as must the differences in product specifications from one Member State to another.
STATE AIDS
STATE AIDS
The Commission’s State Aid Action Plan should be welcomed, and the new regional aid guidelines, the drafting of which began in 2005, and the communication on aid for innovation likewise give cause for satisfaction.
The Commission’s State Aid Action Plan should be welcomed, and the new regional aid guidelines, the drafting of which began in 2005, and the communication on aid for innovation likewise give cause for satisfaction.
Despite the Commission’s efforts to harmonise practices and guarantee transparency, there is evidence of de facto incentive rivalry among EU regions and Member States; combined with the fact that other policies, not least fiscal policy, have not been harmonised, this can have the end effect of inflating the amount of aid granted and encouraging artificial company relocations within the European area, leading to serious consequence for some regions and countries.
Despite the Commission’s efforts to harmonise practices and guarantee transparency, there is evidence of de facto incentive rivalry among EU regions and Member States; combined with the fact that other policies, not least fiscal policy, have not been harmonised, this can have the end effect of inflating the amount of aid granted and encouraging artificial company relocations within the European area, leading to serious consequence for some regions and countries.