natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Тази прогноза, която включва проект за щатно разписание, се предоставя от управителния съвет на Комисията най-късно до 31 март.
This estimate, including a draft establishment plan, shall be transmitted by the Administrative Board to the Commission by 31 March at the latest.
Преди приемането на прогнозата, проектът, изготвен от директора се предоставя на Съвета на регулаторите, който може да даде становище по него.
Prior to adoption of the estimate, the draft prepared by the Director shall be transmitted to the Regulatory Board, which may deliver an opinion on the draft.
Тази прогноза, която включва проект на щатно разписание, се предоставя от управителния съвет на Комисията най-късно до 31 март.
This estimate, including a draft establishment plan, shall be transmitted by the Administrative Board to the Commission by 31 March at the latest.
Преди приемането на прогнозата, проектът, изготвен от директора се предоставя на Съвета на регулаторите, който може да даде обосновано становище по него.
Prior to adoption of the estimate, the draft prepared by the Director shall be transmitted to the Regulatory Board, which may deliver a justified opinion on the draft.
The Director has a key regulatory role.
The Director has a key regulatory role.
Given this, and to ensure his regulatory independence he or she should first receive a fully justified opinion from the Board of Regulators.
Given this, and to ensure his regulatory independence he or she should first receive a fully justified opinion from the Board of Regulators.
Член 25 ‑ параграф 4
Article 25 ‑ paragraph 4
Управителният съвет може да приема разпоредби, за да позволи в изключителни случаи национални експерти от държавите-членки да бъдат командировани на работа в Агенцията.
The Administrative Board may adopt provisions to allow national experts from Member States to be employed on secondment at the Agency in exceptional cases .
Excessive recruitment of staff seconded by national authorities and regulators would diminish the Agency's independence and should be resorted to only exceptionally.
Excessive recruitment of staff seconded by national authorities and regulators would diminish the Agency's independence and should be resorted to only exceptionally.
Член 30 – параграф 1
Article 30 – paragraph 1
Комисията дава оценка на дейността на Агенцията.
The Commission shall carry out an evaluation of the activities of the Agency.
Тя обхваща резултатите, постигнати от Агенцията и нейните методи на работа по отношение на целта, мандата и задачите , определени с настоящия регламент и нейната годишна работна програма.
This shall cover the results achieved by the Agency and its working methods, in relation with its objective, mandate and tasks defined in this Regulation and in its annual work programmes.
Тя обхваща резултатите, постигнати от Агенцията , и нейните методи на работа по отношение на нейното предназначение, мандат и задачи , определени с настоящия регламент и в нейната годишна работна програма.
This shall cover the results achieved by the Agency and its working methods, in relation with its objective, mandate and tasks defined in this Regulation and in its annual work programmes.
Тази оценка се основава на провеждането на подробна консултация.
That evaluation shall be based on extensive consultation.
Specifies the evaluation method and its usefulness when drawing up the Agency’s programmes.
Specifies the evaluation method and its usefulness when drawing up the Agency’s programmes.
Член 30 – параграф 2
Article 30 – paragraph 2
Първият доклад за оценка се представя от Комисията на Европейския парламент и на Съвета най-късно четири години след като първият директор е встъпил в длъжност.
The first evaluation report shall be presented by the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council at the latest four years after the first Director has taken up his or her duties.
След това Комисията дава доклад за оценка поне на всеки пет години.
The Commission shall then present an evaluation report at least every five years.
Първият доклад за оценка се представя от Комисията на Европейския парламент и на Съвета най-късно три години след като първият директор е встъпил в длъжност.
The first evaluation report shall be presented by the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council at the latest three years after the first Director has taken up his or her duties.
След това Комисията дава доклад за оценка поне на всеки три години.
The Commission shall then present an evaluation report at least every three years.
In the course of debate on this Regulation, the Rapporteur has become more convinced of the need to move beyond the Commission's proposals for the Agency for the Co-operation of Energy Regulators, and create an Agency with more independence and decision-making powers.
In the course of debate on this Regulation, the Rapporteur has become more convinced of the need to move beyond the Commission's proposals for the Agency for the Co-operation of Energy Regulators, and create an Agency with more independence and decision-making powers.
It is the Rapporteur's opinion that, if it is to contribute effectively to the development of an integrated competitive energy market for the European Union, the Agency will need more extensive powers, independent of the Commission, to handle cross-border situations and deliver effective cooperation between TSOs and national energy regulators.
It is the Rapporteur's opinion that, if it is to contribute effectively to the development of an integrated competitive energy market for the European Union, the Agency will need more extensive powers, independent of the Commission, to handle cross-border situations and deliver effective cooperation between TSOs and national energy regulators.
Therefore, the proposed Amendments in this draft report suggest significant new decision-making powers for the Agency - in particular over the development of technical codes and the investment plans of the ENTSOs - and greater regulatory and financial independence.
Therefore, the proposed Amendments in this draft report suggest significant new decision-making powers for the Agency - in particular over the development of technical codes and the investment plans of the ENTSOs - and greater regulatory and financial independence.
However, with greater power and independence should come greater accountability - to Parliament and to key stakeholders.
However, with greater power and independence should come greater accountability - to Parliament and to key stakeholders.
Therefore, to balance its new powers, the Rapporteur proposes to significantly increase the Agency's requirement to consult, its transparency, and its accountability to Parliament.
Therefore, to balance its new powers, the Rapporteur proposes to significantly increase the Agency's requirement to consult, its transparency, and its accountability to Parliament.
It must be kept in mind at all times that the 3rd energy package has to be dealt with as a package - with the Agency as a key cross-cutting element.
It must be kept in mind at all times that the 3rd energy package has to be dealt with as a package - with the Agency as a key cross-cutting element.
The role, powers and duties Parliament adopts for the Agency in this Regulation will have to be consistent with the other draft Directives and Regulations in the package - in particular as they relate to the powers and responsibilities of the ENTSOs.
The role, powers and duties Parliament adopts for the Agency in this Regulation will have to be consistent with the other draft Directives and Regulations in the package - in particular as they relate to the powers and responsibilities of the ENTSOs.
Legal Issues: Institutional Balance and Powers of the Agency
Legal Issues: Institutional Balance and Powers of the Agency
The European Parliament understands the importance of the principle of institutional balance that the European Commission, through Treaty, is charged to defend.
The European Parliament understands the importance of the principle of institutional balance that the European Commission, through Treaty, is charged to defend.
In producing this draft report, the Rapporteur has been aware of the key legal principles set out in case law by the European Court of Justice in the 1958 Meroni judgement (and other cases):
In producing this draft report, the Rapporteur has been aware of the key legal principles set out in case law by the European Court of Justice in the 1958 Meroni judgement (and other cases):
· that a delegating authority cannot confer on another body powers different from those possessed by the delegator under the Treaty, and not subject to the same duties; and
· that a delegating authority cannot confer on another body powers different from those possessed by the delegator under the Treaty, and not subject to the same duties; and
· that it is not possible to delegate powers involving a wide margin of discretion between many different objectives and tasks, so shifting responsibilities and escaping political control.
· that it is not possible to delegate powers involving a wide margin of discretion between many different objectives and tasks, so shifting responsibilities and escaping political control.
On this basis, existing European Agencies have been mainly endowed with information and coordination tasks, with the ability to exercise decision-making powers (with legally binding impacts on third parties) being restricted only to individual cases.
On this basis, existing European Agencies have been mainly endowed with information and coordination tasks, with the ability to exercise decision-making powers (with legally binding impacts on third parties) being restricted only to individual cases.
But every Agency has its own institutional setting, and their remit must be developed first and foremost with a view to the needs of the specific sectors in which they are to operate.
But every Agency has its own institutional setting, and their remit must be developed first and foremost with a view to the needs of the specific sectors in which they are to operate.
This is the approach we must take in designing this new Agency for the energy sector.
This is the approach we must take in designing this new Agency for the energy sector.
Overall, the Rapporteur's belief is that the core Meroni principles are not affected by the nature of his proposed amendments.
Overall, the Rapporteur's belief is that the core Meroni principles are not affected by the nature of his proposed amendments.
The idea that the Agency, under the proposals set out in this report, will have a wide margin of discretionary power is questionable.
The idea that the Agency, under the proposals set out in this report, will have a wide margin of discretionary power is questionable.
The situation is completely different from the one addressed in the Meroni case, in which the delegated authority had to weigh “eight different aims”.
The situation is completely different from the one addressed in the Meroni case, in which the delegated authority had to weigh “eight different aims”.
The Agency will take decisions which require highly technical evaluations; it will not exercise the sort of discretion that requires a choice between many different and conflicting public interests.
The Agency will take decisions which require highly technical evaluations; it will not exercise the sort of discretion that requires a choice between many different and conflicting public interests.
In fact, the functions entrusted to the Agency in accordance with Article 4 as amended, do not involve general regulatory powers nor a general freedom of evaluation that can be equated to the development (even in part) of 'energy policy'.
In fact, the functions entrusted to the Agency in accordance with Article 4 as amended, do not involve general regulatory powers nor a general freedom of evaluation that can be equated to the development (even in part) of 'energy policy'.
In these proposed amendments the possibility of adopting binding decisions is limited to individual decisions or rules concerning strictly technical matters needed to ensure an efficient and safe functioning of the internal energy market.
In these proposed amendments the possibility of adopting binding decisions is limited to individual decisions or rules concerning strictly technical matters needed to ensure an efficient and safe functioning of the internal energy market.
The amendments to Article 6, paragraph 3, illustrate this approach: the Agency is empowered only to approve codes (prepared by ENTSO) which relate to the technical operation of the network.
The amendments to Article 6, paragraph 3, illustrate this approach: the Agency is empowered only to approve codes (prepared by ENTSO) which relate to the technical operation of the network.
On the other hand it only gives advice to the Commission on codes which relate mainly to competition and market rules.
On the other hand it only gives advice to the Commission on codes which relate mainly to competition and market rules.
Whilst the approval of purely technical codes is an appropriate, purely technical task for the Agency; the Commission rightly takes on responsibility for Market codes, as they relate to competition policy.
Whilst the approval of purely technical codes is an appropriate, purely technical task for the Agency; the Commission rightly takes on responsibility for Market codes, as they relate to competition policy.
The principles established in the Meroni case must therefore be seen in context, rather than being applied in a simplistic, overly conservative manner.
The principles established in the Meroni case must therefore be seen in context, rather than being applied in a simplistic, overly conservative manner.
In the case of the Agency for the Co-operation of Energy Regulators (whose legal base is Article 95 EC) they require a more careful re-evaluation.
In the case of the Agency for the Co-operation of Energy Regulators (whose legal base is Article 95 EC) they require a more careful re-evaluation.
Governance and Structure of the Agency
Governance and Structure of the Agency
The proposed changes to the structure and operation of the Agency are designed to secure the most effective balance between the needs for regulatory independence on one hand, and appropriate political control on the other.
The proposed changes to the structure and operation of the Agency are designed to secure the most effective balance between the needs for regulatory independence on one hand, and appropriate political control on the other.
A key principle for the Rapporteur is that the independence of an Agency is critical not only for its effectiveness but also for its credibility.
A key principle for the Rapporteur is that the independence of an Agency is critical not only for its effectiveness but also for its credibility.
With that in mind, the Amendments proposed by the Rapporteur introduce the following key changes:
With that in mind, the Amendments proposed by the Rapporteur introduce the following key changes:
· A stronger role for the Board of Regulators and the Parliament in the appointment of the Director .
· A stronger role for the Board of Regulators and the Parliament in the appointment of the Director .
The Director is still appointed by Administrative Board, but on the basis of a list of at least 2 names nominated by the Board of Regulators, rather than the Commission.
The Director is still appointed by Administrative Board, but on the basis of a list of at least 2 names nominated by the Board of Regulators, rather than the Commission.
· A more efficient and transparent Administrative Board .
· A more efficient and transparent Administrative Board .
Membership is streamlined considerably, with 5 members in total - 2 each nominated by the Commission and Council; but also a nominated representative of the European Parliament, to ensure that the legislature's views are reflected.
Membership is streamlined considerably, with 5 members in total - 2 each nominated by the Commission and Council; but also a nominated representative of the European Parliament, to ensure that the legislature's views are reflected.
Members will be required to undertake to act independently and make a declaration of commitments and interests that might prejudice that independence.
Members will be required to undertake to act independently and make a declaration of commitments and interests that might prejudice that independence.
· A time-limit is introduced to ensure speedy decision-making by the Agency .
· A time-limit is introduced to ensure speedy decision-making by the Agency .
The Agency will be required to make decisions within a fixed time limit - three months is suggested.
The Agency will be required to make decisions within a fixed time limit - three months is suggested.
If a decision is not forthcoming within that time, the decision reverts to the Commission.
If a decision is not forthcoming within that time, the decision reverts to the Commission.
This will avoid institutional paralysis and uncertainty for the market.
This will avoid institutional paralysis and uncertainty for the market.
It also provides the Commission with an appropriate mechanism for supervision and control.
It also provides the Commission with an appropriate mechanism for supervision and control.
· Increased financial independence for the Agency .
· Increased financial independence for the Agency .
There is increased scope for the Agency to raise finances from the marketplace (in return for services rendered/ decisions made) and national regulators.
There is increased scope for the Agency to raise finances from the marketplace (in return for services rendered/ decisions made) and national regulators.
In general, these proposals will strengthen the regulatory independence of the Agency, whilst ensuring effective political accountability.
In general, these proposals will strengthen the regulatory independence of the Agency, whilst ensuring effective political accountability.
In particular, the Agency's accountability to Parliament will be strengthened.
In particular, the Agency's accountability to Parliament will be strengthened.
Consultation, Monitoring and Reporting
Consultation, Monitoring and Reporting
The proper way to confer of binding power to the Agency (in a step which will further enhance its compatibility with the Meroni principles) is to build up an adequate legal framework that guarantees that all affected parties will be consulted; gives the Agency a clearly stated duty of transparency; and, in particular, extends the accountability (through information provision and reporting) of the Agency towards the European Parliament.
The proper way to confer of binding power to the Agency (in a step which will further enhance its compatibility with the Meroni principles) is to build up an adequate legal framework that guarantees that all affected parties will be consulted; gives the Agency a clearly stated duty of transparency; and, in particular, extends the accountability (through information provision and reporting) of the Agency towards the European Parliament.
To this end, the proposed new articles 8b (new) and 8c (new) would include in the proposed regulation precise requirements for ACER:
To this end, the proposed new articles 8b (new) and 8c (new) would include in the proposed regulation precise requirements for ACER:
· to carry out consultations with all the parties concerned in any measures undertaken under the Regulation ;
· to carry out consultations with all the parties concerned in any measures undertaken under the Regulation ;
· to ensure a high level of transparency, and provide easy access to information , through clear arrangements laid down in its Rules of Procedure; and
· to ensure a high level of transparency, and provide easy access to information , through clear arrangements laid down in its Rules of Procedure; and
· to monitor developments in gas and electricity markets - particularly consumer issues - and produce an annual report for the attention of the Parliament and the Commission , setting out (if appropriate) proposals for action to improve the opening of markets.
· to monitor developments in gas and electricity markets - particularly consumer issues - and produce an annual report for the attention of the Parliament and the Commission , setting out (if appropriate) proposals for action to improve the opening of markets.
The aim of the 3rd Energy Package is to gradually move the energy market, which up to a decade ago had been based on a monopoly system, from a liberalisation stage towards a stage at which competition is genuine and sustainable .
The aim of the 3rd Energy Package is to gradually move the energy market, which up to a decade ago had been based on a monopoly system, from a liberalisation stage towards a stage at which competition is genuine and sustainable .
To achieve this purpose the relationship between regulatory processes and market development should be governed by an approach which is:
To achieve this purpose the relationship between regulatory processes and market development should be governed by an approach which is:
· geared to the future state of the market (i.e. a forward-looking approach) in which conditions will be much more competitive and diversified; and
· geared to the future state of the market (i.e. a forward-looking approach) in which conditions will be much more competitive and diversified; and
· focused on the implementation of competition law, to minimize as much as possible the ex-ante rules applied on a case-by-case basis.
· focused on the implementation of competition law, to minimize as much as possible the ex-ante rules applied on a case-by-case basis.
These objectives can be pursued at European level, with competitive framework and ex-ante rules being harmonised.
These objectives can be pursued at European level, with competitive framework and ex-ante rules being harmonised.
This means that regulation of the energy sector will be progressively scaled down until the rules applying are competition rules.
This means that regulation of the energy sector will be progressively scaled down until the rules applying are competition rules.
It must be pointed out that unless an efficient competitive environment is achieved, sector-specific regulation will continue to play a role.
It must be pointed out that unless an efficient competitive environment is achieved, sector-specific regulation will continue to play a role.
But the energy sector will only be brought under a system based primarily on competition rules once it has been established that the industry is no longer a natural monopoly and has become a "normal" industry.
But the energy sector will only be brought under a system based primarily on competition rules once it has been established that the industry is no longer a natural monopoly and has become a "normal" industry.
The future of the European energy market and its development after the implementation of the 3rd Energy Package will therefore require an important role to be played by the Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators.
The future of the European energy market and its development after the implementation of the 3rd Energy Package will therefore require an important role to be played by the Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators.
This is why the power and independence of the Agency must be enhanced, over and above the level proposed by the Commission.
This is why the power and independence of the Agency must be enhanced, over and above the level proposed by the Commission.
Financial impact
Financial impact
The Agency’s annual costs will be covered by Community grants.
The Agency’s annual costs will be covered by Community grants.
The Agency has limited revenues stemming from fees to be paid by third parties which are charged when the Agency takes certain decisions.
The Agency has limited revenues stemming from fees to be paid by third parties which are charged when the Agency takes certain decisions.
The Commission proposes that the new Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators should have, given its tasks, a limited staff of 40-50 people.
The Commission proposes that the new Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators should have, given its tasks, a limited staff of 40-50 people.