natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Is of the opinion that the use of soft law has become a recognised practice and is, under special, clearly defined circumstances, an appropriate instrument; believes that, in some cases, soft law makes it possible to respond swiftly to developments; considers, however, that, when soft law arrangements are drawn up, steps should be taken to ensure that they are flexible, afford the parties concerned the utmost freedom as regards enforcement, and serve to avert overregulation and red tape;
Is of the opinion that the use of soft law has become a recognised practice and is, under special, clearly defined circumstances, an appropriate instrument; believes that, in some cases, soft law makes it possible to respond swiftly to developments; considers, however, that, when soft law arrangements are drawn up, steps should be taken to ensure that they are flexible, afford the parties concerned the utmost freedom as regards enforcement, and serve to avert overregulation and red tape;
Is of the opinion that soft law cannot, on the other hand, replace formal law; notes that soft law appears at first sight to be legally non-binding, but can give rise to a ‘political commitment’ that can even assume the character of a legally binding obligation; considers that democracy and the imperative of the rule of law therefore require the legislature, Parliament and the Council, to be involved whenever obligations are to be imposed on individuals; considers that the parties concerned should likewise not be deprived of the legal protection afforded by the Court of Justice; calls on the Commission to consult with Parliament on how Parliament may be consulted before soft law instruments are adopted, in order to enable proposed soft law measures to be scrutinised and to avoid any misuse of powers on the part of the executive;
Is of the opinion that soft law cannot, on the other hand, replace formal law; notes that soft law appears at first sight to be legally non-binding, but can give rise to a ‘political commitment’ that can even assume the character of a legally binding obligation; considers that democracy and the imperative of the rule of law therefore require the legislature, Parliament and the Council, to be involved whenever obligations are to be imposed on individuals; considers that the parties concerned should likewise not be deprived of the legal protection afforded by the Court of Justice; calls on the Commission to consult with Parliament on how Parliament may be consulted before soft law instruments are adopted, in order to enable proposed soft law measures to be scrutinised and to avoid any misuse of powers on the part of the executive;
Is of the opinion that there is a need for further clarification as to how far and under what conditions soft law may be used; believes that it is the responsibility of Parliament and the Council to establish the criteria for the use of soft law; agrees with the Court that in most cases soft law is not legally binding
Is of the opinion that there is a need for further clarification as to how far and under what conditions soft law may be used; believes that it is the responsibility of Parliament and the Council to establish the criteria for the use of soft law; agrees with the Court that in most cases soft law is not legally binding
Judgment in Case C-57/95 France v Commission [1997] ECR I-1627, at p.
Judgment in Case C-57/95 France v Commission [1997] ECR I-1627, at p.
1651 (" Pension funds "). but that, in some cases, its politically binding force is, de facto, entirely comparable to law-making
1651 (" Pension funds "). but that, in some cases, its politically binding force is, de facto, entirely comparable to law-making
Judgments in Case 108/83 Luxembourg v Parliament [1984] ECR 1945, at p.
Judgments in Case 108/83 Luxembourg v Parliament [1984] ECR 1945, at p.
1957; Case 310/85 Deufil v Commission [1987] ECR 901, at p.
1957; Case 310/85 Deufil v Commission [1987] ECR 901, at p.
927; Case C-313/90 CIRFS and Others v Commission [1993] ECR I-1125, at p.
927; Case C-313/90 CIRFS and Others v Commission [1993] ECR I-1125, at p.
Is aware that classic regulation is not always the most effective way to achieve desired policy objectives, especially given that compliance cannot always be guaranteed and that, sometimes, classic regulation invites the creation of administrative burdens which undermine outcomes;
Is aware that classic regulation is not always the most effective way to achieve desired policy objectives, especially given that compliance cannot always be guaranteed and that, sometimes, classic regulation invites the creation of administrative burdens which undermine outcomes;
Is of the opinion that the Community’s obligation is to legislate only where it is necessary, in accordance with the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, and recognising the need, in suitable cases or where the Treaty does not specifically require the use of a legal instrument, to use alternative regulation mechanisms;
Is of the opinion that the Community’s obligation is to legislate only where it is necessary, in accordance with the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, and recognising the need, in suitable cases or where the Treaty does not specifically require the use of a legal instrument, to use alternative regulation mechanisms;
Is of the opinion, as regards Commission communications, that green and white papers do not give rise to any direct legal obligations; takes the view, however, that the adoption of consultation papers and political declarations of intent should not be seen as implying any legal obligation to enact the corresponding regulations;
Is of the opinion, as regards Commission communications, that green and white papers do not give rise to any direct legal obligations; takes the view, however, that the adoption of consultation papers and political declarations of intent should not be seen as implying any legal obligation to enact the corresponding regulations;
Is of the opinion that Commission interpretative communications serve the legitimate purpose of providing legal certainty but that their role should not extend beyond that point; considers that, when they serve to impose new obligations, interpretative communications constitute an inadmissible extension of law-making by soft law; maintains that when a communication lays down detailed arrangements not directly provided for by the freedoms established under the Treaty, it is departing from its proper purpose and is thus null and void
Is of the opinion that Commission interpretative communications serve the legitimate purpose of providing legal certainty but that their role should not extend beyond that point; considers that, when they serve to impose new obligations, interpretative communications constitute an inadmissible extension of law-making by soft law; maintains that when a communication lays down detailed arrangements not directly provided for by the freedoms established under the Treaty, it is departing from its proper purpose and is thus null and void
Case C-57/95 France v Commission cited above, at p.
Case C-57/95 France v Commission cited above, at p.
Is of the opinion that communications satisfying the criteria referred to above should consequently be issued only in those cases where Parliament and the Council, in other words the legislature, have instructed the Commission to draw up the necessary interpretative communications; considers that translating the Treaty into reality is the responsibility of the legislature and that its interpretation is the responsibility of the Court of Justice;
Is of the opinion that communications satisfying the criteria referred to above should consequently be issued only in those cases where Parliament and the Council, in other words the legislature, have instructed the Commission to draw up the necessary interpretative communications; considers that translating the Treaty into reality is the responsibility of the legislature and that its interpretation is the responsibility of the Court of Justice;
Is of the opinion that standardisation and codes of conduct are important elements of self-regulation; considers, however, that standardisation must not lead to overregulation and hence constitute an additional burden for small and medium-sized enterprises in particular; believes, therefore, that the legal bases concerned should incorporate built-in safeguards against overregulation, for example by providing for the projected activities to be coordinated more closely with Parliament and the Council; calls on the Commission to brief Parliament and the Council on the cases in which self- and co-regulation are used in the EU, so as to enable Parliament and the Council to assess more accurately how these legal instruments operate;
Is of the opinion that standardisation and codes of conduct are important elements of self-regulation; considers, however, that standardisation must not lead to overregulation and hence constitute an additional burden for small and medium-sized enterprises in particular; believes, therefore, that the legal bases concerned should incorporate built-in safeguards against overregulation, for example by providing for the projected activities to be coordinated more closely with Parliament and the Council; calls on the Commission to brief Parliament and the Council on the cases in which self- and co-regulation are used in the EU, so as to enable Parliament and the Council to assess more accurately how these legal instruments operate;
Considers the open method of coordination to be legally dubious, as it operates without sufficient parliamentary participation and judicial review; believes that it should therefore be employed only in exceptional cases and that it would be desirable to consider how Parliament might become involved in the procedure;
Considers the open method of coordination to be legally dubious, as it operates without sufficient parliamentary participation and judicial review; believes that it should therefore be employed only in exceptional cases and that it would be desirable to consider how Parliament might become involved in the procedure;
Considers that interinstitutional agreements can produce legal effects only on relationships between EU institutions and that they therefore do not constitute soft law defined in terms of a legal effect in relation to third parties;
Considers that interinstitutional agreements can produce legal effects only on relationships between EU institutions and that they therefore do not constitute soft law defined in terms of a legal effect in relation to third parties;
Calls on the Commission to give special consideration to the effect of soft law on consumers and their possible means of redress before proposing any measure involving soft law instruments.
Calls on the Commission to give special consideration to the effect of soft law on consumers and their possible means of redress before proposing any measure involving soft law instruments.
Institutional and legal implications of the use of ‘soft law’ instruments
Institutional and legal implications of the use of ‘soft law’ instruments
Andreas Schwab 1.3.2007
Andreas Schwab 1.3.2007
Daniela Buruiană-Aprodu, Charlotte Cederschiöld, Gabriela Creţu, Mia De Vits, Rosa Díez González, Evelyne Gebhardt, Małgorzata Handzlik, Malcolm Harbour, Edit Herczog, Pierre Jonckheer, Alexander Lambsdorff, Kurt Lechner, Lasse Lehtinen, Toine Manders, Arlene McCarthy, Béatrice Patrie, Zita Pleštinská, Guido Podestà, Zuzana Roithová, Luisa Fernanda Rudi Ubeda, Heide Rühle, Christel Schaldemose, Andreas Schwab, Alexander Stubb, Eva-Britt Svensson, Marianne Thyssen, Horia-Victor Toma, Jacques Toubon, Barbara Weiler
Daniela Buruiană-Aprodu, Charlotte Cederschiöld, Gabriela Creţu, Mia De Vits, Rosa Díez González, Evelyne Gebhardt, Małgorzata Handzlik, Malcolm Harbour, Edit Herczog, Pierre Jonckheer, Alexander Lambsdorff, Kurt Lechner, Lasse Lehtinen, Toine Manders, Arlene McCarthy, Béatrice Patrie, Zita Pleštinská, Guido Podestà, Zuzana Roithová, Luisa Fernanda Rudi Ubeda, Heide Rühle, Christel Schaldemose, Andreas Schwab, Alexander Stubb, Eva-Britt Svensson, Marianne Thyssen, Horia-Victor Toma, Jacques Toubon, Barbara Weiler
on institutional and legal implications of the use of 'soft law' instruments
on institutional and legal implications of the use of 'soft law' instruments
A. whereas the notion of soft law, based on common practice, is ambiguous and pernicious and should not be used in any documents of the Community institutions,
A. whereas the notion of soft law, based on common practice, is ambiguous and pernicious and should not be used in any documents of the Community institutions,
B. whereas the distinction between dura lex/mollis lex, being conceptually aberrant , should not be accepted or recognised,
B. whereas the distinction between dura lex/mollis lex, being conceptually aberrant , should not be accepted or recognised,
C. whereas so-called soft law instruments, such as recommendations, green and white books or Council conclusions, do not have any legal value or binding force,
C. whereas so-called soft law instruments, such as recommendations, green and white books or Council conclusions, do not have any legal value or binding force,
D. whereas such instruments, which can be used as interpretative or preparatory tools for binding legislative acts, should neither be treated as legislation nor be given any norm-setting effectiveness,
D. whereas such instruments, which can be used as interpretative or preparatory tools for binding legislative acts, should neither be treated as legislation nor be given any norm-setting effectiveness,
E. whereas such a situation would bring confusion and insecurity to a field in which clarity and legal certainty should prevail, in the interest of the Member States and of the citizens ,
E. whereas such a situation would bring confusion and insecurity to a field in which clarity and legal certainty should prevail, in the interest of the Member States and of the citizens ,
Recalls that so-called soft law cannot be a substitute for legal acts and instruments, which are available to ensure the continuity of the legislative process, especially in the field of culture and education;
Recalls that so-called soft law cannot be a substitute for legal acts and instruments, which are available to ensure the continuity of the legislative process, especially in the field of culture and education;
Emphasises that Parliament, as the only democratically-elected Community institution, is not currently consulted about the use of so-called soft-law instruments, such as Commission recommendations, based on Article 211 of the EC Treaty, and interpretative communications and other documents of a similar nature;
Emphasises that Parliament, as the only democratically-elected Community institution, is not currently consulted about the use of so-called soft-law instruments, such as Commission recommendations, based on Article 211 of the EC Treaty, and interpretative communications and other documents of a similar nature;
Points out that, especially in the fields of education, training and youth, the open method of coordination is a common form of cooperation; deplores the fact that Parliament's involvement is weak;
Points out that, especially in the fields of education, training and youth, the open method of coordination is a common form of cooperation; deplores the fact that Parliament's involvement is weak;
Calls on the Commission to guarantee the formal consultation of Parliament and transparent and broad stakeholder and consumer consultation about a possible Commission recommendation; emphasises that so-called soft law instruments should be used with caution;
Calls on the Commission to guarantee the formal consultation of Parliament and transparent and broad stakeholder and consumer consultation about a possible Commission recommendation; emphasises that so-called soft law instruments should be used with caution;
5. reiterates the importance of Parliament participating, as the main representative of the interests of EU citizens, in all decision-making processes, in order to help reduce their current mistrust in European integration and values;
5. reiterates the importance of Parliament participating, as the main representative of the interests of EU citizens, in all decision-making processes, in order to help reduce their current mistrust in European integration and values;
Stresses, therefore, that the expression of soft law, as well as its invocation, should be avoided at all times in any official documents of the European institutions.
Stresses, therefore, that the expression of soft law, as well as its invocation, should be avoided at all times in any official documents of the European institutions.
CULT 15.2.2007
CULT 15.2.2007
Vasco Graça Moura 27.2.2007
Vasco Graça Moura 27.2.2007
Maria Badia I Cutchet, Ivo Belet, Marie-Hélène Descamps, Jolanta Dičkutė, Věra Flasarová, Milan Gaľa, Ovidiu Victor Ganţ, Vasco Graça Moura, Lissy Gröner, Luis Herrero-Tejedor, Manolis Mavrommatis, Doris Pack, Zdzisław Zbigniew Podkański, Christa Prets, Karin Resetarits, Pál Schmitt, Gheorghe Vergil Şerbu, Nikolaos Sifunakis, Hannu Takkula, Thomas Wise
Maria Badia I Cutchet, Ivo Belet, Marie-Hélène Descamps, Jolanta Dičkutė, Věra Flasarová, Milan Gaľa, Ovidiu Victor Ganţ, Vasco Graça Moura, Lissy Gröner, Luis Herrero-Tejedor, Manolis Mavrommatis, Doris Pack, Zdzisław Zbigniew Podkański, Christa Prets, Karin Resetarits, Pál Schmitt, Gheorghe Vergil Şerbu, Nikolaos Sifunakis, Hannu Takkula, Thomas Wise
Giusto Catania, Den Dover, Ignasi Guardans Cambó, Gyula Hegyi, Erna Hennicot-Schoepges, Nina Škottová, Grażyna Staniszewska, Jaroslav Zvěřina, Tadeusz Zwiefka
Giusto Catania, Den Dover, Ignasi Guardans Cambó, Gyula Hegyi, Erna Hennicot-Schoepges, Nina Škottová, Grażyna Staniszewska, Jaroslav Zvěřina, Tadeusz Zwiefka
Институционални и правни последици от използването на актове с незадължителна юридическа сила
Institutional and legal implications of the use of 'soft law' instruments
JURI 15.2.2007 г.
JURI 15.2.2007
IMCO 15.2.2007 г.
IMCO 15.2.2007
CULT 15.2.2007 г.
CULT 15.2.2007
AFCO 15.2.2007 г.
AFCO 15.2.2007
Manuel Medina Ortega 18.12.2006 г.
Manuel Medina Ortega 18.12.2006
Bert Doorn, Cristian Dumitrescu, Giuseppe Gargani, Lidia Joanna Geringer de Oedenberg, Othmar Karas, Piia-Noora Kauppi, Klaus-Heiner Lehne, Manuel Medina Ortega, Hartmut Nassauer, Francesco Enrico Speroni
Bert Doorn, Cristian Dumitrescu, Giuseppe Gargani, Lidia Joanna Geringer de Oedenberg, Othmar Karas, Piia-Noora Kauppi, Klaus-Heiner Lehne, Manuel Medina Ortega, Hartmut Nassauer, Francesco Enrico Speroni
Sharon Bowles, Luis de Grandes Pascual, Kurt Lechner, Marie Panayotopoulos-Cassiotou, Gabriele Stauner, József Szájer, Jacques Toubon
Sharon Bowles, Luis de Grandes Pascual, Kurt Lechner, Marie Panayotopoulos-Cassiotou, Gabriele Stauner, József Szájer, Jacques Toubon
PE 390.436v01-00
PE 390.436v02-00
– като взе предвид препоръката на Комисията до Съвета ( COM(2007)0215 )
– having regard to the Commission recommendation to the Council ( COM(2007)0215 )
– като взе предвид член 3, параграф 4 от Акта за присъединяване на България и Румъния, съгласно който Съветът се е допитал до него ( C6‑0169/2007 ),
– having regard to Article 3(4) of the Act of Accession of Bulgaria and Romania, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament ( C6-0169/2007 ),
– като взе предвид доклада на комисия по граждански свободи, правосъдие и вътрешни работи ( A6‑0260/2007 ),
– having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs ( A6-0260/2007 ),
The 2005 Act of Accession of Bulgaria and Romania
The 2005 Act of Accession of Bulgaria and Romania
OJ 2005, L 157, p.203 provides for a simplified system for accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the conventions (and protocols) concluded by the Member States on the basis of Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union.
OJ 2005, L 157, p.203 provides for a simplified system for accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the conventions (and protocols) concluded by the Member States on the basis of Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union.
Annex I to the above-mentioned Act of Accession gives the list of the seven conventions and protocols concerned in the Justice and Home Affairs area, including the Convention of 26 July 1995 on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), the Protocol of 24 July 1996 on the interpretation, by way of preliminary rulings, by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office, both based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, the Protocol of 19 June 1997, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 41 (3) of the Europol Convention, on the privileges and immunities of Europol, the members of its organs, the deputy directors and employees of Europol, the Protocol of 30 November 2000, drawn up on the basis of Article 43(1) of the Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention) amending Article 2 and the Annex to that Convention, the Protocol of 28 November 2002 amending the Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention) and the Protocol on the privileges and immunities of Europol, the members of its organs, the deputy directors and the employees of Europol, and the Protocol of 27 November 2003, drawn up on the basis of Article 43(1) of the Convention on the Establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), amending that Convention.
Annex I to the above-mentioned Act of Accession gives the list of the seven conventions and protocols concerned in the Justice and Home Affairs area, including the Convention of 26 July 1995 on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), the Protocol of 24 July 1996 on the interpretation, by way of preliminary rulings, by the Court of Justice of the European Communities of the Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office, both based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, the Protocol of 19 June 1997, drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 41 (3) of the Europol Convention, on the privileges and immunities of Europol, the members of its organs, the deputy directors and employees of Europol, the Protocol of 30 November 2000, drawn up on the basis of Article 43(1) of the Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention) amending Article 2 and the Annex to that Convention, the Protocol of 28 November 2002 amending the Convention on the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention) and the Protocol on the privileges and immunities of Europol, the members of its organs, the deputy directors and the employees of Europol, and the Protocol of 27 November 2003, drawn up on the basis of Article 43(1) of the Convention on the Establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), amending that Convention.
Taking into account the above-mentioned simplified system, it is not anymore necessary to negotiate and conclude specific accession protocols.
Taking into account the above-mentioned simplified system, it is not anymore necessary to negotiate and conclude specific accession protocols.
In order to make the Europol Convention and its related protocols enter into force for Bulgaria and Romania, the Council should only adopt a decision determining the date on which the Convention and its protocols shall enter into force, after having consulted the European Parliament
In order to make the Europol Convention and its related protocols enter into force for Bulgaria and Romania, the Council should only adopt a decision determining the date on which the Convention and its protocols shall enter into force, after having consulted the European Parliament
According to article 3(3) and 3 (4) of the 2005 Act of Accession of Bulgaria and Romania, OJ 2005, L 157, p.203 .
According to article 3(3) and 3 (4) of the 2005 Act of Accession of Bulgaria and Romania, OJ 2005, L 157, p.203 .