natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
But this needs to go hand in hand with increased transparency, coordination of network operators, harmonisation of market rules and convergence of national regulations including competition policy.
But this needs to go hand in hand with increased transparency, coordination of network operators, harmonisation of market rules and convergence of national regulations including competition policy.
The Commission proposal does not require the forced privatisation of state-owned transmission networks following ownership unbundling.
The Commission proposal does not require the forced privatisation of state-owned transmission networks following ownership unbundling.
The Independent Systems Operator model, where a company can own but not run an electricity network, implies bureaucracy and costly regulatory control and is therefore not a viable alternative to full ownership unbundling.
The Independent Systems Operator model, where a company can own but not run an electricity network, implies bureaucracy and costly regulatory control and is therefore not a viable alternative to full ownership unbundling.
The experience of Member States indicates that full ownership unbundling leads to increased investment and improved network performance.
The experience of Member States indicates that full ownership unbundling leads to increased investment and improved network performance.
The ten year investment plans required under the regulation should ensure that long term strategies are set in place which put the needs of consumers first and not those of share holders.
The ten year investment plans required under the regulation should ensure that long term strategies are set in place which put the needs of consumers first and not those of share holders.
This investment strategy should ensure that the quality and numbers of the workforce are sufficient to deliver service obligations.
This investment strategy should ensure that the quality and numbers of the workforce are sufficient to deliver service obligations.
It should be approved and monitored by NRAs and overseen by the new European Regulatory Agency.
It should be approved and monitored by NRAs and overseen by the new European Regulatory Agency.
Investment plans should take account of the need to ultimately work towards a European network.
Investment plans should take account of the need to ultimately work towards a European network.
b) Renewables and decentralised generation
b) Renewables and decentralised generation
The full ownership unbundling model will ensure better access to grids for renewable energy, however we should go further and ensure that renewable energy and micro generation should have priority access to the grids, except when technical balancing issues make this impossible.
The full ownership unbundling model will ensure better access to grids for renewable energy, however we should go further and ensure that renewable energy and micro generation should have priority access to the grids, except when technical balancing issues make this impossible.
We must ensure that power is returned to the people through support for local and micro generation and local combined heat and power plants.
We must ensure that power is returned to the people through support for local and micro generation and local combined heat and power plants.
This will require massive investments in smart grids.
This will require massive investments in smart grids.
Today, vertically integrated electricity companies have no incentive to make these investments, as they will not be building or controlling much of this local generation.
Today, vertically integrated electricity companies have no incentive to make these investments, as they will not be building or controlling much of this local generation.
Modernization of distribution networks is essential for the development of decentralized generation and for improving energy efficiency.
Modernization of distribution networks is essential for the development of decentralized generation and for improving energy efficiency.
The Directive should ensure that district systems can be encouraged.
The Directive should ensure that district systems can be encouraged.
III - Implementation and the regulators
III - Implementation and the regulators
The Commission should rigorously pursue Member States who have failed to implement current directives.
The Commission should rigorously pursue Member States who have failed to implement current directives.
Policing and clear sanctions are necessary to ensure that the next model is successful; this is particularly true for energy networks, which are natural monopolies.
Policing and clear sanctions are necessary to ensure that the next model is successful; this is particularly true for energy networks, which are natural monopolies.
National regulators must be truly independent from both government and industry, and minimum standards in the harmonisation of their powers should be achieved via the establishment of common rules on transparency and accountability.
National regulators must be truly independent from both government and industry, and minimum standards in the harmonisation of their powers should be achieved via the establishment of common rules on transparency and accountability.
They should also be given responsibility for ensuring that the needs of European consumers are taken into account when taking decisions notably on cross-border investments.
They should also be given responsibility for ensuring that the needs of European consumers are taken into account when taking decisions notably on cross-border investments.
NRAs should be able to impose measures to stimulate competition, and be responsible for reviewing which companies enjoy significant market dominance.
NRAs should be able to impose measures to stimulate competition, and be responsible for reviewing which companies enjoy significant market dominance.
NRAs should be given the tools to achieve a more competitive outcome, through close cooperation with national and EU cartel authorities, and should be legally empowered to enter in to agreements with other EU and national regulatory authorities (e.g. on sharing data).
NRAs should be given the tools to achieve a more competitive outcome, through close cooperation with national and EU cartel authorities, and should be legally empowered to enter in to agreements with other EU and national regulatory authorities (e.g. on sharing data).
EU legislation should set out clearly the policy objectives and precise scope of NRAs' duties and powers, covering the power to fix or approve network access tariffs and the methodology used to set the tariffs.
EU legislation should set out clearly the policy objectives and precise scope of NRAs' duties and powers, covering the power to fix or approve network access tariffs and the methodology used to set the tariffs.
NRAs must each have the power to obtain relevant information from gas and electricity companies and impose effective sanctions together with appropriate rights of investigation and sufficient powers for dispute settlement.
NRAs must each have the power to obtain relevant information from gas and electricity companies and impose effective sanctions together with appropriate rights of investigation and sufficient powers for dispute settlement.
National regulators should be encouraged to use the right to impose price caps in uncompetitive markets for a defined and limited period where member states are slow to implement EU laws so customers remain protected against market abuse.
National regulators should be encouraged to use the right to impose price caps in uncompetitive markets for a defined and limited period where member states are slow to implement EU laws so customers remain protected against market abuse.
Commission authorities should prosecute regulated tariffs lower than the market rate as this impedes competition and distorts competition especially amongst high-energy users within the EU.
Commission authorities should prosecute regulated tariffs lower than the market rate as this impedes competition and distorts competition especially amongst high-energy users within the EU.
The Commission suggests a number of provisions, which would delegate powers to the Commission to adopt binding guidelines through Comitology.
The Commission suggests a number of provisions, which would delegate powers to the Commission to adopt binding guidelines through Comitology.
However legislative powers should be addressed through codecision where appropriate, and not through Comitology, so as not to undermine the European Parliament's powers.
However legislative powers should be addressed through codecision where appropriate, and not through Comitology, so as not to undermine the European Parliament's powers.
IV - The European Regulatory Energy Agency (Agency)
IV - The European Regulatory Energy Agency (Agency)
Clear duties of national and European regulatory bodies should be set out to ensure no duplication.
Clear duties of national and European regulatory bodies should be set out to ensure no duplication.
The Regulatory Authority should monitor any conditions set out in the Directive for National Regulators.
The Regulatory Authority should monitor any conditions set out in the Directive for National Regulators.
Failure to comply with the rules set out in the directive should lead to clear sanctions.
Failure to comply with the rules set out in the directive should lead to clear sanctions.
The powers and independence of the proposed European Regulatory Agency should be assured through accountability to the European Parliament.
The powers and independence of the proposed European Regulatory Agency should be assured through accountability to the European Parliament.
On cross border issues there is a need to recognise the regulatory gap and the need for better interconnections in parts of the European market.
On cross border issues there is a need to recognise the regulatory gap and the need for better interconnections in parts of the European market.
Thus the proposal to give the Agency the power to decide on exemptions for interconnectors and on exemptions if the infrastructure is located on the territory of more than one Member State is welcome.
Thus the proposal to give the Agency the power to decide on exemptions for interconnectors and on exemptions if the infrastructure is located on the territory of more than one Member State is welcome.
If the competent NRAs are unable to reach agreement on an appropriate regulatory regime the European Agency may put essential interconnectors out to tender in consultation with the appropriate authorities.
If the competent NRAs are unable to reach agreement on an appropriate regulatory regime the European Agency may put essential interconnectors out to tender in consultation with the appropriate authorities.
Costs should be passed on to the consumer in a regulated and transparent framework.
Costs should be passed on to the consumer in a regulated and transparent framework.
The Agency should have a more active role in regulation of cross-border issues.
The Agency should have a more active role in regulation of cross-border issues.
V - Regional Electricity Markets
V - Regional Electricity Markets
Ultimately our goal should be to work towards a single European network in electricity through appropriate, clear and incremental steps.
Ultimately our goal should be to work towards a single European network in electricity through appropriate, clear and incremental steps.
It should be made clear that this should be carried out along with full ownership unbundling and not considered an alternative model.
It should be made clear that this should be carried out along with full ownership unbundling and not considered an alternative model.
TSOs should be given a clear route map and timetable to ensure that this is moved on.
TSOs should be given a clear route map and timetable to ensure that this is moved on.
A balance has to be found on which powers are with the TSOs and which are with regulatory authorities.
A balance has to be found on which powers are with the TSOs and which are with regulatory authorities.
In general regulators are better placed to define codes for commercial activities – e.g. balancing rules, congestion rules whereas technical codes should be the responsibility of TSOs.
In general regulators are better placed to define codes for commercial activities – e.g. balancing rules, congestion rules whereas technical codes should be the responsibility of TSOs.
Development of an EU grid code would ensure that regional markets would not drift apart.
Development of an EU grid code would ensure that regional markets would not drift apart.
Defining regions and stimulating regional cooperation to ensure a smoothly integrated market in the wider European context is crucial.
Defining regions and stimulating regional cooperation to ensure a smoothly integrated market in the wider European context is crucial.
It is essential to link up "energy islands" like the Baltic states which have not been connected to the UCTE (Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity) grid.
It is essential to link up "energy islands" like the Baltic states which have not been connected to the UCTE (Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity) grid.
We need incentives in place to tackle the obstacles that cause delays in the creation of new energy import and export infrastructure.
We need incentives in place to tackle the obstacles that cause delays in the creation of new energy import and export infrastructure.
The Agency should thus operate also with respect to the regional dimension.
The Agency should thus operate also with respect to the regional dimension.
VI - Third Country ownership
VI - Third Country ownership
Energy is undoubtedly an area where national and European interests should be considered paramount in particular in the context of security of supply.
Energy is undoubtedly an area where national and European interests should be considered paramount in particular in the context of security of supply.
There is a further need for clarification on what the impact of this clause would be in relation to current third country investments in EU transmission systems, and the limitation on an investment pool for the buying up of divested infrastructure as a result of the unbundling requirements.
There is a further need for clarification on what the impact of this clause would be in relation to current third country investments in EU transmission systems, and the limitation on an investment pool for the buying up of divested infrastructure as a result of the unbundling requirements.
The rapporteur should point out that her preferred option for ownership of infrastructure would be a majority holding by the public sector.
The rapporteur should point out that her preferred option for ownership of infrastructure would be a majority holding by the public sector.
The European legislator decided in 1996, in its first "energy package", to gradually liberalise the then monopoly-based European energy system.
The European legislator decided in 1996, in its first "energy package", to gradually liberalise the then monopoly-based European energy system.
In its 2003 "second package" Parliament and Council decided to extend market opening to all consumers by mid-2007, thereby giving detailed provisions on the regulatory approach.
In its 2003 "second package" Parliament and Council decided to extend market opening to all consumers by mid-2007, thereby giving detailed provisions on the regulatory approach.
However, the European markets for gas and electricity still show dysfunctions concerning fair access to transmission grids, interconnection between national energy markets (cross border interconnections) and the maintenance of security of supply.
However, the European markets for gas and electricity still show dysfunctions concerning fair access to transmission grids, interconnection between national energy markets (cross border interconnections) and the maintenance of security of supply.
The current Commission proposal, the "third energy package", therefore suggests several measures as to how to overcome these dysfunctions and to move forward in the creation of a fully integrated internal market.
The current Commission proposal, the "third energy package", therefore suggests several measures as to how to overcome these dysfunctions and to move forward in the creation of a fully integrated internal market.
Unbundling provisions
Unbundling provisions
It goes without saying that legal, functional and management unbundling provisions, as provided by the "second energy package", are of fundamental importance and must be implemented effectively in all Member States.
It goes without saying that legal, functional and management unbundling provisions, as provided by the "second energy package", are of fundamental importance and must be implemented effectively in all Member States.
However, the discussion on the future design of the internal market sometimes seems to be centred too exclusively on the possible merits of unbundling provisions.
However, the discussion on the future design of the internal market sometimes seems to be centred too exclusively on the possible merits of unbundling provisions.
It is doubtful if ownership unbundling (OU) as practiced in certain Member States, where it has been developed as part of national competition law, can be used as a model for the whole of the EU.
It is doubtful if ownership unbundling (OU) as practiced in certain Member States, where it has been developed as part of national competition law, can be used as a model for the whole of the EU.
In fact, the Commission impact assessment does not provide enough evidence to conclude that OU is really the most appropriate measure to both, increase competition and to create a functioning internal market.
In fact, the Commission impact assessment does not provide enough evidence to conclude that OU is really the most appropriate measure to both, increase competition and to create a functioning internal market.
Furthermore, it could cause problems in Member States concerning the protection of property rights as laid down in their respective constitutions.
Furthermore, it could cause problems in Member States concerning the protection of property rights as laid down in their respective constitutions.
That is why we suggest giving Member States the option to choose a regulatory model which is most appropriate to their own economy.
That is why we suggest giving Member States the option to choose a regulatory model which is most appropriate to their own economy.
Apart from OU and Independent Systems Operators (ISO), the two models contained in the original Commission proposal, a comprehensive third option , elaborated by several Member States, is proposed.
Apart from OU and Independent Systems Operators (ISO), the two models contained in the original Commission proposal, a comprehensive third option , elaborated by several Member States, is proposed.
This should lead to an internal market where different models could coexist.
This should lead to an internal market where different models could coexist.
All models would be subject to strict regulation at EU level through the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) in close cooperation with the National Regulatory Agencies (NRAs) as well as the national and EU competition authorities.
All models would be subject to strict regulation at EU level through the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) in close cooperation with the National Regulatory Agencies (NRAs) as well as the national and EU competition authorities.
This approach could ensure transparent and fair access to the grid and provide a liberalized EU energy market.
This approach could ensure transparent and fair access to the grid and provide a liberalized EU energy market.
Transparent access to the transmission networks and investment opportunities
Transparent access to the transmission networks and investment opportunities
Transmission System Operators (TSOs) should be responsible for transparent non-discriminatory procedures for connection to the grids.
Transmission System Operators (TSOs) should be responsible for transparent non-discriminatory procedures for connection to the grids.
These procedures should be approved by NRAs.
These procedures should be approved by NRAs.
TSOs should be obliged to provide all necessary information to all interested companies seeking to connect new power plants (including nuclear ones), transport the electricity through the TSO's grids or invest in the transmission systems interconnections (thereby enhancing security of supply).
TSOs should be obliged to provide all necessary information to all interested companies seeking to connect new power plants (including nuclear ones), transport the electricity through the TSO's grids or invest in the transmission systems interconnections (thereby enhancing security of supply).
Regional cooperation could be promoted for better and smoother coordination within and between the regions by NRAs and ACER.
Regional cooperation could be promoted for better and smoother coordination within and between the regions by NRAs and ACER.
A balanced regulatory approach: ENTSO, NRAs, ACER, Commission
A balanced regulatory approach: ENTSO, NRAs, ACER, Commission
The right regulatory balance, in particular if Members States opt for models other than OU, plays the most important role in the creation of an internal energy market.
The right regulatory balance, in particular if Members States opt for models other than OU, plays the most important role in the creation of an internal energy market.
In order to protect the public interest it seems crucial that the NRAs as well as ACER dispose of the highest degree possible of independence, bereft of any political or business interference.
In order to protect the public interest it seems crucial that the NRAs as well as ACER dispose of the highest degree possible of independence, bereft of any political or business interference.
Furthermore, it must be guaranteed that the regulatory model is coherent, disposing of a clear-cut repartition of competencies and responsibilities.
Furthermore, it must be guaranteed that the regulatory model is coherent, disposing of a clear-cut repartition of competencies and responsibilities.
It is in this regard that the Commission proposal does not give a satisfactory answer: It foresees, on the one hand, to assign ACER an almost purely advisory role, leaving it very limited scope to take individual decisions which are legally binding on third parties.
It is in this regard that the Commission proposal does not give a satisfactory answer: It foresees, on the one hand, to assign ACER an almost purely advisory role, leaving it very limited scope to take individual decisions which are legally binding on third parties.
On the other hand however, very wide scope is given to the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO), which means that TSOs are assigned a role of "para self-regulation", a role which TSOs, following their various position papers, are not inclined to assume.
On the other hand however, very wide scope is given to the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO), which means that TSOs are assigned a role of "para self-regulation", a role which TSOs, following their various position papers, are not inclined to assume.
The entire approach leads to a regulatory framework which is unclear and unbalanced, leaving ACER in a very weak position vis-à-vis both, the Commission and ENTSO.
The entire approach leads to a regulatory framework which is unclear and unbalanced, leaving ACER in a very weak position vis-à-vis both, the Commission and ENTSO.
Finally, it is questionable from Parliament's point of view whether, as foreseen by the Commission, such a big number of key regulatory issues should be dealt with by Comitology procedure.
Finally, it is questionable from Parliament's point of view whether, as foreseen by the Commission, such a big number of key regulatory issues should be dealt with by Comitology procedure.
The Regional Approach
The Regional Approach