natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
MIDT data can add significant value to several airline core operations; specifically, sales and marketing, network planning, pricing and revenue management.
MIDT data can add significant value to several airline core operations; specifically, sales and marketing, network planning, pricing and revenue management.
This can help airlines to understand market trends and competitor information.
This can help airlines to understand market trends and competitor information.
Due to alternative booking distribution channels the value of this data has been diminishing, as it is not representative of the whole market.
Due to alternative booking distribution channels the value of this data has been diminishing, as it is not representative of the whole market.
Whilst the majority of CRS providers and airlines would like the identification of travel agents to remain available in the MIDT, the travel agents request that this should be removed from the MIDT because it might give airlines the ability to put pressure on the travel agents to reduce their bookings with rival airlines.
Whilst the majority of CRS providers and airlines would like the identification of travel agents to remain available in the MIDT, the travel agents request that this should be removed from the MIDT because it might give airlines the ability to put pressure on the travel agents to reduce their bookings with rival airlines.
The display is the screen used by the travel agent to order the CRS information.
The display is the screen used by the travel agent to order the CRS information.
The software is usually provided by the CRS to the travel agent as part of their business contract.
The software is usually provided by the CRS to the travel agent as part of their business contract.
It is crucial that the information provided by the CRS to the travel agent is neutral and fair.
It is crucial that the information provided by the CRS to the travel agent is neutral and fair.
The "principal" display is the initial screen seen by the travel agent, yet its importance should not be overstated, as in most cases the travel agent performs a more refined search using secondary screens.
The "principal" display is the initial screen seen by the travel agent, yet its importance should not be overstated, as in most cases the travel agent performs a more refined search using secondary screens.
Your Rapporteur believes that the Commission's aim to allow airlines and CRS to negotiate content and fares is a good one.
Your Rapporteur believes that the Commission's aim to allow airlines and CRS to negotiate content and fares is a good one.
Currently, lack of competition leads to higher CRS booking fees.
Currently, lack of competition leads to higher CRS booking fees.
Under the revision, CRS would have to compete more aggressively with each other for air carrier participation on the basis of lower booking fees and better service quality.
Under the revision, CRS would have to compete more aggressively with each other for air carrier participation on the basis of lower booking fees and better service quality.
Negotiation freedom typically leads to the air carriers subscribing to so-called full-content programmes by which they provide all their fares to the CRS, in exchange for lower booking fees - Commission briefing March 08.
Negotiation freedom typically leads to the air carriers subscribing to so-called full-content programmes by which they provide all their fares to the CRS, in exchange for lower booking fees - Commission briefing March 08.
Your Rapporteur is keen for this central aim to remain intact.
Your Rapporteur is keen for this central aim to remain intact.
The Commission proposal also provides for adequate protection of personal data, although the amendments to the Commission text proposed by the Rapporteur enhance the legal certainty.
The Commission proposal also provides for adequate protection of personal data, although the amendments to the Commission text proposed by the Rapporteur enhance the legal certainty.
However, some elements of the Commission proposal are unsatisfactory.
However, some elements of the Commission proposal are unsatisfactory.
The parent carrier definition (Article 2(g)) is misleading.
The parent carrier definition (Article 2(g)) is misleading.
A recent DG COMP investigation concluded that Lufthansa could not be considered a parent carrier of Amadeus.
A recent DG COMP investigation concluded that Lufthansa could not be considered a parent carrier of Amadeus.
Air France, Iberia and Lufthansa do not now consider themselves parent carriers.
Air France, Iberia and Lufthansa do not now consider themselves parent carriers.
In short, each claim these are simply financial investments.
In short, each claim these are simply financial investments.
To answer to the thorny question of why airlines should prefer to be parent carriers despite the burdens imposed by the Code of Conduct, one should note that if the participation of airlines in CRSs’ equity in the past could have been justified by their interest to promote the start up of an efficient channel of communication of data to the market, this cannot be justified today.
To answer to the thorny question of why airlines should prefer to be parent carriers despite the burdens imposed by the Code of Conduct, one should note that if the participation of airlines in CRSs’ equity in the past could have been justified by their interest to promote the start up of an efficient channel of communication of data to the market, this cannot be justified today.
This situation has changed over time as CRSs increasingly became autonomous entities following the divestment of ownership.
This situation has changed over time as CRSs increasingly became autonomous entities following the divestment of ownership.
It’s therefore legitimate to conclude that the benefits airlines expect from owning CRSs have more to do with “competition” gains (i.e. with preferential conditions – or with the risk to be discriminated) and strategic reasons rather than exclusively with costs.
It’s therefore legitimate to conclude that the benefits airlines expect from owning CRSs have more to do with “competition” gains (i.e. with preferential conditions – or with the risk to be discriminated) and strategic reasons rather than exclusively with costs.
The risk of abuse is particularly high when a dominant airline participates in a dominant CRS (e.g. which is the case in the French, German and Spanish markets).
The risk of abuse is particularly high when a dominant airline participates in a dominant CRS (e.g. which is the case in the French, German and Spanish markets).
See Elaborated Briefing Note on ' The Revision of the code of conduct for computerised reservation systems (CRS)', European Parliament, 2008, IP/B/TRAN/IC/200X_XX, p.
See Elaborated Briefing Note on ' The Revision of the code of conduct for computerised reservation systems (CRS)', European Parliament, 2008, IP/B/TRAN/IC/200X_XX, p.
Your Rapporteur believes that this should be clarified, and the definition tightened.
Your Rapporteur believes that this should be clarified, and the definition tightened.
Although generally the greater the participation in ownership, the easier the possibility to obtain preferential conditions, it would be hard to indicate a threshold over which the risk of discrimination may be presumed.
Although generally the greater the participation in ownership, the easier the possibility to obtain preferential conditions, it would be hard to indicate a threshold over which the risk of discrimination may be presumed.
That will be true in particular where, by the acquisition of a shareholding or through subsidiary clauses in the agreement, the investing company obtains legal or the facto control of the commercial conduct of the other company or where the agreement provides for commercial cooperation between the companies or creates a structure likely to be used for such a cooperation ” (par.
That will be true in particular where, by the acquisition of a shareholding or through subsidiary clauses in the agreement, the investing company obtains legal or the facto control of the commercial conduct of the other company or where the agreement provides for commercial cooperation between the companies or creates a structure likely to be used for such a cooperation ” (par.
37 - emphasis added). see page 14 , op cit,.
37 - emphasis added). see page 14 , op cit,.
In light of this, your Rapporteur advises the Committee not to impose a prohibition or a threshold to the participation of the airliners in the CRS capital, but rather to impose an unequivocal condition: any capital investment in a CRS by an airline should lead to compliance with Article 10.
In light of this, your Rapporteur advises the Committee not to impose a prohibition or a threshold to the participation of the airliners in the CRS capital, but rather to impose an unequivocal condition: any capital investment in a CRS by an airline should lead to compliance with Article 10.
This means that parent carriers of a CRS shall have to provide to the other CRSs the same fare information as to their own CRS.
This means that parent carriers of a CRS shall have to provide to the other CRSs the same fare information as to their own CRS.
This provides safeguards against discriminations and abuses of dominant position by parent carriers to air carriers or rail operators without ownership stake in CRS.
This provides safeguards against discriminations and abuses of dominant position by parent carriers to air carriers or rail operators without ownership stake in CRS.
With regard to MIDT (Article 7), the Rapporteur suggests a compromise allowing travel agent identification in MIDT if there is agreement between travel agents and CRS.
With regard to MIDT (Article 7), the Rapporteur suggests a compromise allowing travel agent identification in MIDT if there is agreement between travel agents and CRS.
The Rapporteur suggests a compensation scheme whereby remuneration for the travel agent is exchanged for such identification.
The Rapporteur suggests a compensation scheme whereby remuneration for the travel agent is exchanged for such identification.
The above proposals should be considered under the fact that we are in a sector with several actors involved, mainly air carriers or rail-transport operators, CRSs, travel agencies and consumers.
The above proposals should be considered under the fact that we are in a sector with several actors involved, mainly air carriers or rail-transport operators, CRSs, travel agencies and consumers.
Since the Commission has not presented any appraisal on its impact assessment on the MIDT, the review should include all elements of travel distribution.
Since the Commission has not presented any appraisal on its impact assessment on the MIDT, the review should include all elements of travel distribution.
Any decision to legislate on one element of distribution must take into account the relevance and consequences in other areas.
Any decision to legislate on one element of distribution must take into account the relevance and consequences in other areas.
For example, if the identification of the travel agencies in the MIDT is restricted as proposed by the Commission, then it may result in a monopoly situation from the existence of a similar system of data marketing from airliners, i.e. the IATA PaxIs.
For example, if the identification of the travel agencies in the MIDT is restricted as proposed by the Commission, then it may result in a monopoly situation from the existence of a similar system of data marketing from airliners, i.e. the IATA PaxIs.
Provisions regarding the Display have been inserted in order, first and foremost, to benefit the needs of the consumer.
Provisions regarding the Display have been inserted in order, first and foremost, to benefit the needs of the consumer.
These can be considered as additional safeguards against abuse.
These can be considered as additional safeguards against abuse.
Your Rapporteur sees this as an opportunity for the CRS to develop more user-friendly and detailed search options.
Your Rapporteur sees this as an opportunity for the CRS to develop more user-friendly and detailed search options.
Finally, provisions on the audit of parent carriers have been inserted to increase the transparency of the sector.
Finally, provisions on the audit of parent carriers have been inserted to increase the transparency of the sector.
LIST OF STAKEHOLDERS REPRESENTATIVES AND LOBBYSTS
LIST OF STAKEHOLDERS REPRESENTATIVES AND LOBBYSTS
on Code of Conduct Review of Computerised Reservation Systems
on Code of Conduct Review of Computerised Reservation Systems
The rapporteur would like to make it known that he was contacted during the preparation of his report by the following stakeholder representatives and lobbyists*:
The rapporteur would like to make it known that he was contacted during the preparation of his report by the following stakeholder representatives and lobbyists*:
Held meetings with :
Held meetings with :
Air France
Air France
British Airways
British Airways
Cabinet DN, on behalf Amadeus
Cabinet DN, on behalf Amadeus
APCO, on behalf Sabre Holdings
APCO, on behalf Sabre Holdings
Business Travel Coalition
Business Travel Coalition
Informally involved/written correspondence :
Informally involved/written correspondence :
относно предложението за регламент на Европейския парламент и на Съвета относно кодекс за поведение при компютъризирани системи за резервация
on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Code of Conduct for computerised reservation systems
The Code of Conduct for Computerised Reservation Systems (CRS) relates to the reservation by travel agents via CRS of airline and rail tickets.
The Code of Conduct for Computerised Reservation Systems (CRS) relates to the reservation by travel agents via CRS of airline and rail tickets.
Since the Regulation entered into force in 1989, it has been revised twice (1993 and 1999).
Since the Regulation entered into force in 1989, it has been revised twice (1993 and 1999).
This forthcoming third revision seeks to reinforce competition between CRSs by means of a partial liberalisation of the Code of Conduct.
This forthcoming third revision seeks to reinforce competition between CRSs by means of a partial liberalisation of the Code of Conduct.
Your draftsman acknowledges that a revision of the current CRS Code of Conduct could lead to greater flexibility and better service.
Your draftsman acknowledges that a revision of the current CRS Code of Conduct could lead to greater flexibility and better service.
However, there are also concerns that, owing to the present structure of the European airline market, in which national carriers enjoy a privileged position thanks to their dominance of their domestic markets, there could be a further expansion of dominant market positions.
However, there are also concerns that, owing to the present structure of the European airline market, in which national carriers enjoy a privileged position thanks to their dominance of their domestic markets, there could be a further expansion of dominant market positions.
The interconnection of airlines, CRSs and travel agencies where there are dominant market participants means that independent travel agencies will in future be forced to participate in a particular CRS to obtain information about the whole range of fares and availability on particular airlines.
The interconnection of airlines, CRSs and travel agencies where there are dominant market participants means that independent travel agencies will in future be forced to participate in a particular CRS to obtain information about the whole range of fares and availability on particular airlines.
The liberalisation of the Code of Conduct not only means heightened competition but also an increase in the trend towards fragmentation of the information on fares and availability which is already developing as a result of airlines’ alternative distributions channels.
The liberalisation of the Code of Conduct not only means heightened competition but also an increase in the trend towards fragmentation of the information on fares and availability which is already developing as a result of airlines’ alternative distributions channels.
Your draftsman is mostly afraid that the competitive situation for small and medium-sized travel agents will deteriorate, since they do not have sufficient resources to enter into contracts with several CRSs, and would otherwise have to use the airlines' direct distribution channels in order to have access to all services.
Your draftsman is mostly afraid that the competitive situation for small and medium-sized travel agents will deteriorate, since they do not have sufficient resources to enter into contracts with several CRSs, and would otherwise have to use the airlines' direct distribution channels in order to have access to all services.
This could gradually lead to rising prices for end users.
This could gradually lead to rising prices for end users.
Your draftsman supports the provisions of Article 10 seeking to ensure that parent carriers supply all CRS providers with the same information on fares and availability (‘full content’), including those with which they do not have a contract.
Your draftsman supports the provisions of Article 10 seeking to ensure that parent carriers supply all CRS providers with the same information on fares and availability (‘full content’), including those with which they do not have a contract.
The Commission's proposal to prevent the identification of travel agents in the Marketing Information Data Tapes (MIDTs) by deleting their IATA agency number meets with your draftsman’s full approval.
The Commission's proposal to prevent the identification of travel agents in the Marketing Information Data Tapes (MIDTs) by deleting their IATA agency number meets with your draftsman’s full approval.
He also calls for the pricing structure of each flight segment offered by a CRS to be made as transparent as possible, showing all taxes, costs and fees payable to the transport service provider.
He also calls for the pricing structure of each flight segment offered by a CRS to be made as transparent as possible, showing all taxes, costs and fees payable to the transport service provider.
Supplements for a CRS booking, imposed after the event, are unacceptable.
Supplements for a CRS booking, imposed after the event, are unacceptable.
On the definition of ‘parent carriers’, your draftsman urges that any direct or indirect participation of an airline or railway company in a CRS should lead to its classification as a ‘parent carrier’.
On the definition of ‘parent carriers’, your draftsman urges that any direct or indirect participation of an airline or railway company in a CRS should lead to its classification as a ‘parent carrier’.
He considers that any type of ownership in a CRS involves a degree of influence.
He considers that any type of ownership in a CRS involves a degree of influence.
To create fair conditions for competition, all airlines should withdraw from their participation in CRSs.
To create fair conditions for competition, all airlines should withdraw from their participation in CRSs.
Any airlines or railway companies which prefer to retain their participation in a CRS should be bound by the measures provided in Article 3a.
Any airlines or railway companies which prefer to retain their participation in a CRS should be bound by the measures provided in Article 3a.
Your draftsman proposes, prompted by Article 17 of the Commission proposal, that a periodic review of the implementation of the regulation should take place three times within five years from its entry into force.
Your draftsman proposes, prompted by Article 17 of the Commission proposal, that a periodic review of the implementation of the regulation should take place three times within five years from its entry into force.
This review will in particular focus on the effectiveness of the regulation in ensuring non-discrimination and fair competition on the market in CRS services, and evaluate their effects on the consumer's interests.
This review will in particular focus on the effectiveness of the regulation in ensuring non-discrimination and fair competition on the market in CRS services, and evaluate their effects on the consumer's interests.
Комисията по вътрешния пазар и защита на потребителите приканва водещата комисия по транспорт и туризъм да включи в доклада си следните изменения:
The Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection calls on the Committee on Transport and Tourism, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following amendments in its report:
(9а) Съгласно Регламент (…) относно общите правила за експлоатация на въздушните транспортни услуги в Общността въздушните превозвачи трябва да публикуват своите тарифи, като включват всички приложими данъци, такси, допълнителни плащания и налози, които няма как да бъдат избегнати и които са предвидими.
(9a) According to Regulation (...) on common rules for the operation of air transport services in the Community, air carriers must publish their fares inclusive of all applicable taxes, and charges, surcharges and fees which are unavoidable and foreseeable.
На екраните на КСР следва да се предоставя информация относно тарифите, обхващащи същите ценови категории, за да се гарантира, че пътническите агенции могат да предадат тази информация на своите клиенти.
CRS displays should provide information on fares inclusive of the same price categories to ensure that travel agents can communicate this information to their clients.
Consumers need to have precise information on fares.
Consumers need to have precise information on fares.
Each of the actors (air carriers, CRS operators and travel agents) must therefore be obliged to provide transparent information on the elements making up the fares.
Each of the actors (air carriers, CRS operators and travel agents) must therefore be obliged to provide transparent information on the elements making up the fares.
This is in line with the recasting of the Regulation on common rules for the operation of air transport services (currently under examination).
This is in line with the recasting of the Regulation on common rules for the operation of air transport services (currently under examination).
(11а) Комисията следва редовно да следи прилагането на настоящия регламент и по-конкретно ефективността му по отношение на предотвратяването на антиконкурентни и дискриминационни практики на пазара за разпространение на пътнически услуги чрез КСР, особено при наличието на превозвачи, които са тясно свързани със системните оператори.
(11a) The Commission should regularly monitor the application of this Regulation and in particular its effectiveness in preventing anti-competitive and discriminatory practices in the market for distribution of travel services via a CRS, notably in the presence of carriers with close links to system vendors.
Without calling into question the results of the impact assessment on parent carriers, the Commission must remain attentive and prevent anti-competitive practices.
Without calling into question the results of the impact assessment on parent carriers, the Commission must remain attentive and prevent anti-competitive practices.
(12) Настоящият регламент не накърнява прилагането на членове 81 и 82 от Договора.
(12) This Regulation is without prejudice to the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.
Той допълва общите правила за защита на конкуренцията, които остават изцяло приложими по отношение на такива нарушения на правилата на конкуренцията, като нарушаване на антитръстовите разпоредби или злоупотреби с господстващо положение.
It is complementary to general competition rules, which continue to apply in full to competitive abuses such as antitrust violations or abuse of a dominant position.
The aim of this code of conduct is to help ensure fair and unbiased conditions for air carriers in computerised reservation systems.
The aim of this code of conduct is to help ensure fair and unbiased conditions for air carriers in computerised reservation systems.