natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
- establishment of a start-up fund made up of contributions from the Member States, to cover military expenditure not charged to the Union budget,
- establishment of a start-up fund made up of contributions from the Member States, to cover military expenditure not charged to the Union budget,
- laying down of a procedure for rapid access to appropriations in the Union budget.
- laying down of a procedure for rapid access to appropriations in the Union budget.
(3) The amended TEU also contains a solidarity clause under which the Member States must provide assistance to any Member State that is the victim of terrorist attack or natural disaster, if it so requests.
(3) The amended TEU also contains a solidarity clause under which the Member States must provide assistance to any Member State that is the victim of terrorist attack or natural disaster, if it so requests.
The arrangements for implementing this clause will be adopted by decision of the Council, on a joint proposal from the Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
The arrangements for implementing this clause will be adopted by decision of the Council, on a joint proposal from the Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
The Council will decide unanimously if this decision has defence implications.
The Council will decide unanimously if this decision has defence implications.
Parliament will be informed.
Parliament will be informed.
(4) These advances are therefore significant and do not undermine the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States or the commitments of the Member States that belong to NATO.
(4) These advances are therefore significant and do not undermine the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States or the commitments of the Member States that belong to NATO.
Furthermore, they are not likely to transform the Union into an aggressive military bloc, as some people seem to fear.
Furthermore, they are not likely to transform the Union into an aggressive military bloc, as some people seem to fear.
Some people would certainly have liked to go further, particularly as far as qualified majority voting is concerned.
Some people would certainly have liked to go further, particularly as far as qualified majority voting is concerned.
However, in view of the fact that this in an eminently intergovernmental policy area and of the current political climate in the Union, the final outcome can be regarded as relatively positive.
However, in view of the fact that this in an eminently intergovernmental policy area and of the current political climate in the Union, the final outcome can be regarded as relatively positive.
However, during the 2007 negotiations, under pressure from certain Member States, the wording of some provisions underwent changes which reflect an effort to provide guarantees – even where this is entirely superfluous – that in the area of the CFSP the Union will confine itself to exercising only those competences conferred on it by the Treaties.
However, during the 2007 negotiations, under pressure from certain Member States, the wording of some provisions underwent changes which reflect an effort to provide guarantees – even where this is entirely superfluous – that in the area of the CFSP the Union will confine itself to exercising only those competences conferred on it by the Treaties.
In addition, the new Treaty has been 'supplemented' with a series of equally superfluous declarations
In addition, the new Treaty has been 'supplemented' with a series of equally superfluous declarations
One example is Declaration No 13, which emphasises that the provisions concerning the CFSP 'do not affect' the responsibilities of the Member States, as they currently exist 'for the formulation and conduct of their foreign policy' and that the provisions governing the common security and defence policy do not prejudice the specific character of their national security and defence policies.
One example is Declaration No 13, which emphasises that the provisions concerning the CFSP 'do not affect' the responsibilities of the Member States, as they currently exist 'for the formulation and conduct of their foreign policy' and that the provisions governing the common security and defence policy do not prejudice the specific character of their national security and defence policies.
A further example is provided by Declaration No 14, which states that nothing in the new Treaty affects the representation of the Member States in international organisations, including a Member State's membership of the United Nations Security Council.
A further example is provided by Declaration No 14, which states that nothing in the new Treaty affects the representation of the Member States in international organisations, including a Member State's membership of the United Nations Security Council.
Particularly unjustified, not to say partially incorrect, is the second paragraph of that declaration, which states that the provisions covering the CFSP 'do not give new powers to the Commission to initiate decisions nor do they increase the role of the European Parliament'. which reiterate this idea, sometimes entirely unnecessarily.
Particularly unjustified, not to say partially incorrect, is the second paragraph of that declaration, which states that the provisions covering the CFSP 'do not give new powers to the Commission to initiate decisions nor do they increase the role of the European Parliament'. which reiterate this idea, sometimes entirely unnecessarily.
Although this practice is not genuinely harmful, since it merely involves reiterating in a rather obvious way the substance of the actual provisions of the Treaty, it nevertheless points to a rather negative approach to the European integration process, one which cannot help but send a wrong message to the public.
Although this practice is not genuinely harmful, since it merely involves reiterating in a rather obvious way the substance of the actual provisions of the Treaty, it nevertheless points to a rather negative approach to the European integration process, one which cannot help but send a wrong message to the public.
Other areas of external relations
Other areas of external relations
(1) Positive changes have been made in the area of common commercial policy .
(1) Positive changes have been made in the area of common commercial policy .
Its scope has been extended as regards trade in services and intellectual property.
Its scope has been extended as regards trade in services and intellectual property.
Parliament's role is enhanced: the ordinary legislative procedure will be used to lay down measures implementing the common commercial policy; and Parliament will receive regular reports on negotiations on international agreements, which may not be concluded without its consent.
Parliament's role is enhanced: the ordinary legislative procedure will be used to lay down measures implementing the common commercial policy; and Parliament will receive regular reports on negotiations on international agreements, which may not be concluded without its consent.
The Treaty of Lisbon also endorses what is referred to as the 'cultural exception'
The Treaty of Lisbon also endorses what is referred to as the 'cultural exception'
The Convention had proposed that the Council should act unanimously for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services, where these risk prejudicing the Union's cultural and linguistic diversity.
The Convention had proposed that the Council should act unanimously for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services, where these risk prejudicing the Union's cultural and linguistic diversity.
The 2004 IGC extended this 'exception' to cover the trade in social, education and health services where such agreements risk seriously disturbing the national organisation of such services and prejudicing the responsibility of Member States to deliver them.
The 2004 IGC extended this 'exception' to cover the trade in social, education and health services where such agreements risk seriously disturbing the national organisation of such services and prejudicing the responsibility of Member States to deliver them.
The Council shall also act unanimously where agreements in the fields of trade in services in general and the commercial aspects of intellectual property include provisions for which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules. , extending it to other areas.
The Council shall also act unanimously where agreements in the fields of trade in services in general and the commercial aspects of intellectual property include provisions for which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules. , extending it to other areas.
(2) Lastly, as regards humanitarian aid , Parliament can welcome the establishment of a specific legal basis coming under the ordinary legislative procedure and providing for the establishment of a voluntary humanitarian aid corps.
(2) Lastly, as regards humanitarian aid , Parliament can welcome the establishment of a specific legal basis coming under the ordinary legislative procedure and providing for the establishment of a voluntary humanitarian aid corps.
(3) It should also be noted that the Treaty of Lisbon retains the specific provisions governing the development of the Union's neighbourhood policy, in particular the legal basis which enables it to conclude agreements in that area with the countries concerned.
(3) It should also be noted that the Treaty of Lisbon retains the specific provisions governing the development of the Union's neighbourhood policy, in particular the legal basis which enables it to conclude agreements in that area with the countries concerned.
However, somewhat confusingly, it incorporates those provisions in Title I ('Common provisions') of the TEU.
However, somewhat confusingly, it incorporates those provisions in Title I ('Common provisions') of the TEU.
A significant degree of flexibility
A significant degree of flexibility
Another question of fundamental importance is whether the new institutional framework is sufficiently flexible to enable the Union to adjust to changing circumstances and meet new challenges that may arise in the future.
Another question of fundamental importance is whether the new institutional framework is sufficiently flexible to enable the Union to adjust to changing circumstances and meet new challenges that may arise in the future.
To find an answer to this question we need to address two issues: firstly, that of revision of the Treaties, and, secondly, that of whether the system can evolve within the confines of the current institutional framework, without the need for revision of the Treaties itself.
To find an answer to this question we need to address two issues: firstly, that of revision of the Treaties, and, secondly, that of whether the system can evolve within the confines of the current institutional framework, without the need for revision of the Treaties itself.
(1) The new Treaty makes a number of clear improvements to the revision procedure, first and foremost among which is the granting of a right of initiative as regards revision to Parliament, on the same basis as the Member States and the Commission.
(1) The new Treaty makes a number of clear improvements to the revision procedure, first and foremost among which is the granting of a right of initiative as regards revision to Parliament, on the same basis as the Member States and the Commission.
It also places the Convention on an institutional footing as the body responsible for preparing revisions, in recognition of both the truly decisive role the Convention played in the drafting of the Constitution and the limitations of the intergovernmental method.
It also places the Convention on an institutional footing as the body responsible for preparing revisions, in recognition of both the truly decisive role the Convention played in the drafting of the Constitution and the limitations of the intergovernmental method.
Parliament, which was the first to propose that the Convention method be used, cannot but welcome this change, which will help to make the revision procedure more transparent and democratic at the same time as making it more effective.
Parliament, which was the first to propose that the Convention method be used, cannot but welcome this change, which will help to make the revision procedure more transparent and democratic at the same time as making it more effective.
One particularly positive development is the fact that Parliament must give its consent should the Council decide not to convene a Convention on the grounds that the changes are not sufficiently major.
One particularly positive development is the fact that Parliament must give its consent should the Council decide not to convene a Convention on the grounds that the changes are not sufficiently major.
(2) Unfortunately, the new Treaty does not live up to Parliament's expectations as regards simplifying the revision procedure.
(2) Unfortunately, the new Treaty does not live up to Parliament's expectations as regards simplifying the revision procedure.
The text of Article 48 of the amended TEU does contain a simplified procedure for revising the provisions of Part III of the TFEU on the internal policies of the Union (on condition that such revision does not increase the competences allocated to the Union), but this procedure merely allows the European Council to bypass the Convention method (without requiring Parliament's consent); furthermore, unanimity and approval by all the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional provisions remain the rule.
The text of Article 48 of the amended TEU does contain a simplified procedure for revising the provisions of Part III of the TFEU on the internal policies of the Union (on condition that such revision does not increase the competences allocated to the Union), but this procedure merely allows the European Council to bypass the Convention method (without requiring Parliament's consent); furthermore, unanimity and approval by all the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional provisions remain the rule.
The EP and the Commission are consulted.
The EP and the Commission are consulted.
(3) Revision of the Treaties will thus continue to require unanimity and ratification by all the Member States in all cases, even though, at the Convention, various proposals were put forward which enjoyed broad support in Parliament and among the national parliaments and would have made this requirement a little more flexible as regards the revision of the provisions dealing with the Union's internal policies, whilst complying with the fundamental principle that any further increase in the Union's competences would need to be unanimously approved by the Member States.
(3) Revision of the Treaties will thus continue to require unanimity and ratification by all the Member States in all cases, even though, at the Convention, various proposals were put forward which enjoyed broad support in Parliament and among the national parliaments and would have made this requirement a little more flexible as regards the revision of the provisions dealing with the Union's internal policies, whilst complying with the fundamental principle that any further increase in the Union's competences would need to be unanimously approved by the Member States.
(4) Conversely, Parliament cannot but welcome the retention of the 'bridging clauses' ('passerelles') which the Convention proposed for switches from unanimity to qualified majority voting within the Council or from special legislative procedures to the ordinary legislative procedure.
(4) Conversely, Parliament cannot but welcome the retention of the 'bridging clauses' ('passerelles') which the Convention proposed for switches from unanimity to qualified majority voting within the Council or from special legislative procedures to the ordinary legislative procedure.
The fact that this decision can only be taken unanimously by the European Council with Parliament's consent - and then only if no national parliament expresses any objections within a six-month period - provides an adequate guarantee that due respect will be shown for the rights of each Member State and that the decision will be transparent and democratically valid.
The fact that this decision can only be taken unanimously by the European Council with Parliament's consent - and then only if no national parliament expresses any objections within a six-month period - provides an adequate guarantee that due respect will be shown for the rights of each Member State and that the decision will be transparent and democratically valid.
In addition to these general bridging clauses, however, other specific such clauses exist, which as a rule either require the EP’s consent (broadening of the powers of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office), or give any national parliament the power to block the Council decision.
In addition to these general bridging clauses, however, other specific such clauses exist, which as a rule either require the EP’s consent (broadening of the powers of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office), or give any national parliament the power to block the Council decision.
(5) Another positive aspect of the new text is the improvements made in connection with enhanced cooperation, which may become more important in future in view of the substantial increase in the number of Member States.
(5) Another positive aspect of the new text is the improvements made in connection with enhanced cooperation, which may become more important in future in view of the substantial increase in the number of Member States.
Whilst maintaining the conditions required to ensure the overall cohesion and institutional unity of the Union, the new Treaty extends the scope of enhanced cooperation mechanisms (which can now apply to all areas not covered by the exclusive competences of the Union, whereas under the current arrangements defence policy is excluded) and facilitates their establishment.
Whilst maintaining the conditions required to ensure the overall cohesion and institutional unity of the Union, the new Treaty extends the scope of enhanced cooperation mechanisms (which can now apply to all areas not covered by the exclusive competences of the Union, whereas under the current arrangements defence policy is excluded) and facilitates their establishment.
Enhanced cooperation must bring together at least nine Member States, with the Council acting by a qualified majority except in common foreign and security policy matters, where unanimity will continue to be required (enhanced cooperation is currently banned in this area).
Enhanced cooperation must bring together at least nine Member States, with the Council acting by a qualified majority except in common foreign and security policy matters, where unanimity will continue to be required (enhanced cooperation is currently banned in this area).
Furthermore, the requirement that Parliament's consent should be sought (except in common foreign and security policy matters) will enhance the democratic legitimacy of the decision to establish such cooperation.
Furthermore, the requirement that Parliament's consent should be sought (except in common foreign and security policy matters) will enhance the democratic legitimacy of the decision to establish such cooperation.
(6) Lastly, the fact that the new Treaty has retained a ‘bridging clause’, as proposed by the Convention, allowing a switch to qualified majority voting or the ordinary legislative procedure within the enhanced cooperation mechanism, is also a satisfactory development.
(6) Lastly, the fact that the new Treaty has retained a ‘bridging clause’, as proposed by the Convention, allowing a switch to qualified majority voting or the ordinary legislative procedure within the enhanced cooperation mechanism, is also a satisfactory development.
(7) It should also be noted that the Treaty of Lisbon amends the provisions governing the procedure for the enlargement of the Union, specifying that the EP and the national parliaments should be informed of any new application for accession and making explicit reference to the 'eligibility criteria approved by the European Council' (currently known as the 'Copenhagen criteria'), which must be taken into account when the Council takes its decision, unanimously as at present, after the EP has given its consent by a majority of its component Members.
(7) It should also be noted that the Treaty of Lisbon amends the provisions governing the procedure for the enlargement of the Union, specifying that the EP and the national parliaments should be informed of any new application for accession and making explicit reference to the 'eligibility criteria approved by the European Council' (currently known as the 'Copenhagen criteria'), which must be taken into account when the Council takes its decision, unanimously as at present, after the EP has given its consent by a majority of its component Members.
(8) Voluntary withdrawal from the Union : for the first time in the treaties establishing the European Communities and then the Union, which - with the exception of the first treaty, which established the European Coal and Steel Community - were expressly concluded for an unlimited period but which made no provision for a collective or individual withdrawal procedure, the TEU will incorporate a mechanism for 'voluntary withdrawal from the Union'.
(8) Voluntary withdrawal from the Union : for the first time in the treaties establishing the European Communities and then the Union, which - with the exception of the first treaty, which established the European Coal and Steel Community - were expressly concluded for an unlimited period but which made no provision for a collective or individual withdrawal procedure, the TEU will incorporate a mechanism for 'voluntary withdrawal from the Union'.
Admittedly even in the absence of any specific provisions such a move was anyway already permissible under international treaty law.
Admittedly even in the absence of any specific provisions such a move was anyway already permissible under international treaty law.
However, the fact that withdrawal is now explicitly provided for in the TEU, which lays down detailed arrangements for dealing with such a situation, sends out the clear message that no Member State is obliged to continue its involvement in the European project if it no longer wishes to be involved.
However, the fact that withdrawal is now explicitly provided for in the TEU, which lays down detailed arrangements for dealing with such a situation, sends out the clear message that no Member State is obliged to continue its involvement in the European project if it no longer wishes to be involved.
When taken together with the provisions on enhanced and structured cooperation, this clearly demonstrates that involvement in the Union and in the furtherance of its policies is something that must be chosen freely on the basis of a genuine political commitment.
When taken together with the provisions on enhanced and structured cooperation, this clearly demonstrates that involvement in the Union and in the furtherance of its policies is something that must be chosen freely on the basis of a genuine political commitment.
Entry into force of the new Treaty
Entry into force of the new Treaty
Since the new Treaty continues the tradition of treaties amending treaties already in force, and which will continue to exist in amended form, and since it does not seek to repeal and replace the current Treaties in their entirety, the rules governing its entry into force are those customarily applied in such cases.
Since the new Treaty continues the tradition of treaties amending treaties already in force, and which will continue to exist in amended form, and since it does not seek to repeal and replace the current Treaties in their entirety, the rules governing its entry into force are those customarily applied in such cases.