natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
It is therefore beyond doubt that the after-effects of the 1968 crash persisted until the relevant date, which is 13 May 2000.
It is therefore beyond doubt that the after-effects of the 1968 crash persisted until the relevant date, which is 13 May 2000.
Article 55 provides that Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with the Directive before 13 May 2000.
Article 55 provides that Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with the Directive before 13 May 2000.
Territorial application of the EAEC Treaty to Greenland
Territorial application of the EAEC Treaty to Greenland
The question here is whether the Directive can apply to the after-effects of a crash in Greenland, to which the EAEC Treaty has not applied since 1 January 1985.
The question here is whether the Directive can apply to the after-effects of a crash in Greenland, to which the EAEC Treaty has not applied since 1 January 1985.
At the time of the crash, Greenland was a part of the territory of the Kingdom of Denmark.
At the time of the crash, Greenland was a part of the territory of the Kingdom of Denmark.
However, as regards the territorial application of the EAEC Treaty, it is relevant to have regard to the Treaty amending, with regard to Greenland, the Treaties establishing the European Communities (OJ L 29, 01/02/1985, p 1, hereinafter the Greenland Treaty).
However, as regards the territorial application of the EAEC Treaty, it is relevant to have regard to the Treaty amending, with regard to Greenland, the Treaties establishing the European Communities (OJ L 29, 01/02/1985, p 1, hereinafter the Greenland Treaty).
Article 5 of this Treaty introduced the following amendment to Article 198 of the EAEC Treaty: " This Treaty shall not apply to Greenland ".
Article 5 of this Treaty introduced the following amendment to Article 198 of the EAEC Treaty: " This Treaty shall not apply to Greenland ".
As the Greenland Treaty entered into force on 1 January 1985 (see Article 6), it follows that the EAEC Treaty has no application to Greenland after this date.
As the Greenland Treaty entered into force on 1 January 1985 (see Article 6), it follows that the EAEC Treaty has no application to Greenland after this date.
Thus the EAEC Treaty applied to Greenland for twelve years from Denmark's accession in 1973 to the entry into force of the Greenland Treaty.
Thus the EAEC Treaty applied to Greenland for twelve years from Denmark's accession in 1973 to the entry into force of the Greenland Treaty.
However, given that this Treaty has no retroactive effect, the Kingdom of Denmark remains bound by any existing legal obligations relating to events having occurred on the territory of Greenland before 1 January 1985.
However, given that this Treaty has no retroactive effect, the Kingdom of Denmark remains bound by any existing legal obligations relating to events having occurred on the territory of Greenland before 1 January 1985.
Furthermore, the after-effects on human health of the 1968 crash are not confined to Greenland, as it is apparent that many of the workers, including European citizens, have since moved to mainland Denmark.
Furthermore, the after-effects on human health of the 1968 crash are not confined to Greenland, as it is apparent that many of the workers, including European citizens, have since moved to mainland Denmark.
Thus, the Kingdom of Denmark is bound to provide medical surveillance and relevant information to those persons whose health still suffers from the long-term effects of the Thule accident, notwithstanding the exclusion of Greenland from the territorial scope of the EAEC Treaty.
Thus, the Kingdom of Denmark is bound to provide medical surveillance and relevant information to those persons whose health still suffers from the long-term effects of the Thule accident, notwithstanding the exclusion of Greenland from the territorial scope of the EAEC Treaty.
In this regard, it is relevant to note that the provisions of the Directive do not necessarily oblige a Member State to adopt implementing measures in the very same place as the site where a radiological emergency occurred.
In this regard, it is relevant to note that the provisions of the Directive do not necessarily oblige a Member State to adopt implementing measures in the very same place as the site where a radiological emergency occurred.
In fact, performance of these obligations could be ensured at another place within the territory of a Member State.
In fact, performance of these obligations could be ensured at another place within the territory of a Member State.
It must consequently be ascertained whether any provision of the Directive obliges the Kingdom of Denmark to take the action required by the petitioner.
It must consequently be ascertained whether any provision of the Directive obliges the Kingdom of Denmark to take the action required by the petitioner.
Applicability of the EAEC Treaty to "military activities"
Applicability of the EAEC Treaty to "military activities"
The Commission argued in its oral submissions to the Petitions Committee that the EAEC Treaty and secondary law adopted under it are inapplicable to the facts of the petition because "the Treaty is not applicable to uses of nuclear energy for military purposes".
The Commission argued in its oral submissions to the Petitions Committee that the EAEC Treaty and secondary law adopted under it are inapplicable to the facts of the petition because "the Treaty is not applicable to uses of nuclear energy for military purposes".
Case 61/03 Commission v United Kingdom "Jason Reactor" , 12 April 2005, paragraph 44.
Case 61/03 Commission v United Kingdom "Jason Reactor" , 12 April 2005, paragraph 44.
In case C-61/03 " Jason Reactor ", both the Advocate General and the Court of Justice concurred that in the negotiations leading up to the signing of the EAEC Treaty, its application to nuclear energy used for military purposes was envisaged, but left unresolved.
In case C-61/03 " Jason Reactor ", both the Advocate General and the Court of Justice concurred that in the negotiations leading up to the signing of the EAEC Treaty, its application to nuclear energy used for military purposes was envisaged, but left unresolved.
The Court went on to accept the arguments of the United Kingdom and France whereby the fact that there were public security exceptions in the EC Treaty, but none in the EAEC Treaty meant that it was implicit that the EAEC Treaty did not apply at all to nuclear energy used for military purposes.
The Court went on to accept the arguments of the United Kingdom and France whereby the fact that there were public security exceptions in the EC Treaty, but none in the EAEC Treaty meant that it was implicit that the EAEC Treaty did not apply at all to nuclear energy used for military purposes.
"However, it is clear that the application of such provisions to military installations, research programmes and other activities might be such as to compromise essential national defence interests of the Member States.
"However, it is clear that the application of such provisions to military installations, research programmes and other activities might be such as to compromise essential national defence interests of the Member States.
Consequently, as the United Kingdom and the French Republic have rightly argued, the absence in the Treaty of any derogation laying down the detailed rules according to which the Member States would be authorised to rely on and protect those essential interests leads to the conclusion that activities falling within the military sphere are outside the scope of that Treaty."
Consequently, as the United Kingdom and the French Republic have rightly argued, the absence in the Treaty of any derogation laying down the detailed rules according to which the Member States would be authorised to rely on and protect those essential interests leads to the conclusion that activities falling within the military sphere are outside the scope of that Treaty."
Para.36 of C-61/03
Para.36 of C-61/03
This restrictive interpretation of the scope of the EAEC Treaty was confirmed in case C-65/04 " HMS Tireless ".
This restrictive interpretation of the scope of the EAEC Treaty was confirmed in case C-65/04 " HMS Tireless ".
Case 65/04 Commission v United Kingdom , 9 March 2006, n.y.r.
Case 65/04 Commission v United Kingdom , 9 March 2006, n.y.r.
However, the particular set of facts relating to the petition must be distinguished from the two aforementioned judgments for several reasons.
However, the particular set of facts relating to the petition must be distinguished from the two aforementioned judgments for several reasons.
It is clear from paragraph 36 of the " Jason Reactor " case that the rationale for excluding the military sphere from the scope of the EAEC Treaty is the protection of the "essential national defence interests of the Member States" .
It is clear from paragraph 36 of the " Jason Reactor " case that the rationale for excluding the military sphere from the scope of the EAEC Treaty is the protection of the "essential national defence interests of the Member States" .
This is reinforced by the second sentence of that paragraph which states that the absence of an explicit EAEC Treaty exclusion would prevent Member States from adequately protecting " those [essential national defence] interests ".
This is reinforced by the second sentence of that paragraph which states that the absence of an explicit EAEC Treaty exclusion would prevent Member States from adequately protecting " those [essential national defence] interests ".
It is therefore apparent that the Court clearly linked its restrictive interpretation to the need to protect the essential national defence interests of the Member States .
It is therefore apparent that the Court clearly linked its restrictive interpretation to the need to protect the essential national defence interests of the Member States .
The " Jason Reactor " case concerned the application of certain EURATOM information reporting requirements to the United Kingdom’s disposal of radioactive waste from a decommissioned military nuclear reactor.
The " Jason Reactor " case concerned the application of certain EURATOM information reporting requirements to the United Kingdom’s disposal of radioactive waste from a decommissioned military nuclear reactor.
Similarly, the " HMS Tireless " case concerned the application of information reporting requirements to the United Kingdom’s emergency plan for the evacuation of Gibraltar in the event of a radiological emergency during maintenance and repair work on a military submarine with a nuclear reactor.
Similarly, the " HMS Tireless " case concerned the application of information reporting requirements to the United Kingdom’s emergency plan for the evacuation of Gibraltar in the event of a radiological emergency during maintenance and repair work on a military submarine with a nuclear reactor.
Both situations concerned the obligations imposed on a Member State concerning the use of nuclear energy for military purposes by, on this occasion, the same, Member State .
Both situations concerned the obligations imposed on a Member State concerning the use of nuclear energy for military purposes by, on this occasion, the same, Member State .
It seems unreasonable to conclude that the rationale for excluding nuclear energy used for military purposes was that the national defence interest of any State could be compromised without an additional element of connection with a Member State.
It seems unreasonable to conclude that the rationale for excluding nuclear energy used for military purposes was that the national defence interest of any State could be compromised without an additional element of connection with a Member State.
It cannot therefore be that this exclusion covers use of nuclear energy by a third country where a Member State has not authorized this (ie. acquiesced, identified itself with that use thereby taking ownership of it), but where the health hazard is merely situated in that Member State.
It cannot therefore be that this exclusion covers use of nuclear energy by a third country where a Member State has not authorized this (ie. acquiesced, identified itself with that use thereby taking ownership of it), but where the health hazard is merely situated in that Member State.
In such a scenario, the essential national defence interests of a Member State are in no way compromised.
In such a scenario, the essential national defence interests of a Member State are in no way compromised.
Therefore the health and safety provisions of the EAEC Treaty extend to situations where the defence interest has nothing whatsoever to do with the Member State (or any other Member State), and moreover, where the use of nuclear energy is in breach of an international agreement, and where the only feasibly present connecting factor is that the release of nuclear material occurred on the territory of a Member State.
Therefore the health and safety provisions of the EAEC Treaty extend to situations where the defence interest has nothing whatsoever to do with the Member State (or any other Member State), and moreover, where the use of nuclear energy is in breach of an international agreement, and where the only feasibly present connecting factor is that the release of nuclear material occurred on the territory of a Member State.
Moreover, such an interpretation does not seek to impose an obligation to evaluate whether there is an essential national defence interest at play on a case-by-case basis.
Moreover, such an interpretation does not seek to impose an obligation to evaluate whether there is an essential national defence interest at play on a case-by-case basis.
Such an approach, which was advocated by the Commission before the Court of Justice, was clearly rejected.
Such an approach, which was advocated by the Commission before the Court of Justice, was clearly rejected.
Applying this analysis to the facts of the petition, the Kingdom of Denmark has never had a domestic energy programme either for the civilian or military use of nuclear energy.
Applying this analysis to the facts of the petition, the Kingdom of Denmark has never had a domestic energy programme either for the civilian or military use of nuclear energy.
As such, (unlike the United Kingdom and France), Denmark has no activities concerning the military use of nuclear power which would exempt it from the reporting requirements, or any other obligations, of the EURATOM Treaty or secondary legislation.
As such, (unlike the United Kingdom and France), Denmark has no activities concerning the military use of nuclear power which would exempt it from the reporting requirements, or any other obligations, of the EURATOM Treaty or secondary legislation.
There is no evidence linking such monitoring to any current defence activities by Denmark employing the military use of nuclear energy.
There is no evidence linking such monitoring to any current defence activities by Denmark employing the military use of nuclear energy.
The radiation-producing accident in question was caused by the United States, a third country, not by Denmark.
The radiation-producing accident in question was caused by the United States, a third country, not by Denmark.
Although Denmark had a defence agreement with the US at the time of the B- 52 crash, the agreement prohibited the United States from storing or deploying nuclear weapons in Greenland or flying over Danish airspace with such weapons.
Although Denmark had a defence agreement with the US at the time of the B- 52 crash, the agreement prohibited the United States from storing or deploying nuclear weapons in Greenland or flying over Danish airspace with such weapons.
The Danish government publicly confirmed to the Danish people that no such permission to store, deploy or over- fly with nuclear weapons had, or would be given to the United States, and no amendments to that effect were made to the defence agreement by the Danish Parliament.
The Danish government publicly confirmed to the Danish people that no such permission to store, deploy or over- fly with nuclear weapons had, or would be given to the United States, and no amendments to that effect were made to the defence agreement by the Danish Parliament.
Therefore, reference to the bilateral agreement is in no way determinative of the case.
Therefore, reference to the bilateral agreement is in no way determinative of the case.
The mere fact that there was an agreement covering certain military activities does not mean that by virtue of this, any military activity by a third country on a Member State's territory is de facto excluded from the scope of the EAEC Treaty.
The mere fact that there was an agreement covering certain military activities does not mean that by virtue of this, any military activity by a third country on a Member State's territory is de facto excluded from the scope of the EAEC Treaty.
Such a conclusion would be arbitrary and would go against common sense.
Such a conclusion would be arbitrary and would go against common sense.
Relevant primary law and its interpretation by the Court of Justice
Relevant primary law and its interpretation by the Court of Justice
Article 2(b) EA states that the Community must, as provided in the EAEC Treaty, " establish uniform safety standards to protect the health of workers and of the general public and ensure that they are applied ".
Article 2(b) EA states that the Community must, as provided in the EAEC Treaty, " establish uniform safety standards to protect the health of workers and of the general public and ensure that they are applied ".
Title II of the EAEC Treaty, entitled " Provisions for the encouragement of progress in the field of nuclear energy ", includes a Chapter 3 entitled " Health and safety ", which consists of Articles 30 to 39.
Title II of the EAEC Treaty, entitled " Provisions for the encouragement of progress in the field of nuclear energy ", includes a Chapter 3 entitled " Health and safety ", which consists of Articles 30 to 39.
In this context, the first paragraph of Article 30 EA requires in particular the establishment in the Community of " basic standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiations ".
In this context, the first paragraph of Article 30 EA requires in particular the establishment in the Community of " basic standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiations ".
As provided in the second paragraph of that Article, the expression " basic standards " means:
As provided in the second paragraph of that Article, the expression " basic standards " means:
" (a) maximum permissible doses compatible with adequate safety;
" (a) maximum permissible doses compatible with adequate safety;
(b) maximum permissible levels of exposure and contamination;
(b) maximum permissible levels of exposure and contamination;
(c) the fundamental principles governing the health surveillance of workers ".
(c) the fundamental principles governing the health surveillance of workers ".
Article 31 EA lays down the procedure for working out and adopting those basic standards, whilst the first paragraph of Article 32 EA enables them to be revised or updated, at the request of the Commission or of a Member State, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 31 EA.
Article 31 EA lays down the procedure for working out and adopting those basic standards, whilst the first paragraph of Article 32 EA enables them to be revised or updated, at the request of the Commission or of a Member State, in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 31 EA.
The Court of Justice has held that the EAEC Chapter on Health and Safety forms a "coherent whole conferring on the Commission powers of some considerable scope in order to protect the population and the environment against the risks of nuclear contamination" .
The Court of Justice has held that the EAEC Chapter on Health and Safety forms a "coherent whole conferring on the Commission powers of some considerable scope in order to protect the population and the environment against the risks of nuclear contamination" .
Case 187/87 Saarland [1988] ECR 5013, paragraph 11.
Case 187/87 Saarland [1988] ECR 5013, paragraph 11.
It has also upheld a broad interpretation of those provisions in order "to ensure consistent and effective protection of the health of the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiations, whatever their source" .
It has also upheld a broad interpretation of those provisions in order "to ensure consistent and effective protection of the health of the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiations, whatever their source" .
Case 70/88 Parliament v Council [1991] ECR I-4529, paragraph 14.
Case 70/88 Parliament v Council [1991] ECR I-4529, paragraph 14.
Moreover, the Court has explicitly stated that this broad interpretation applies to the particular Directive at issue in the present petition.
Moreover, the Court has explicitly stated that this broad interpretation applies to the particular Directive at issue in the present petition.
Case 29/99, Commission v Council [2002] ECR I-11221, paragraph 81.
Case 29/99, Commission v Council [2002] ECR I-11221, paragraph 81.
Material scope of the Directive
Material scope of the Directive
The Directive, which was adopted on the basis of Articles 31 and 32 of the EAEC Treaty, has the objective of revising the existing basic standards
The Directive, which was adopted on the basis of Articles 31 and 32 of the EAEC Treaty, has the objective of revising the existing basic standards
As stated in the preamble to the Directive, the Community laid down basic standards for the first time in 1959 pursuant to Article 218 of the Treaty.
As stated in the preamble to the Directive, the Community laid down basic standards for the first time in 1959 pursuant to Article 218 of the Treaty.
These standards were subsequently revised on five further occasions (in 1962, 1966, 1976, 1979 and 1984). by taking account of the development of scientific knowledge concerning radiation protection.
These standards were subsequently revised on five further occasions (in 1962, 1966, 1976, 1979 and 1984). by taking account of the development of scientific knowledge concerning radiation protection.
The scope of the Directive is set out in its Article 2 under Title II "Scope" and is arguably more extensive than the previous Directives which it replaced, and in particular Directive 80/836 EURATOM of 15 July 1980.
The scope of the Directive is set out in its Article 2 under Title II "Scope" and is arguably more extensive than the previous Directives which it replaced, and in particular Directive 80/836 EURATOM of 15 July 1980.
L246, 17/09/1980, p 1-72).
L246, 17/09/1980, p 1-72).
Article 2 of Directive 80/836 defines its scope simply as follows: " This Directive shall apply to the production, processing, handling, use, holding, storage, transport and disposal of natural and artificial radioactive substances and to any other activity which involves a hazard arising from ionizing radiation. "
Article 2 of Directive 80/836 defines its scope simply as follows: " This Directive shall apply to the production, processing, handling, use, holding, storage, transport and disposal of natural and artificial radioactive substances and to any other activity which involves a hazard arising from ionizing radiation. "
As provided for in the first subparagraph of Article 2:
As provided for in the first subparagraph of Article 2: