natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The existing set of conditions do not explicitly include transparency obligations for the purpose of ensuring that end-user access rights are protected.
The existing set of conditions do not explicitly include transparency obligations for the purpose of ensuring that end-user access rights are protected.
It is particularly important that NRAs have enough information to evaluate public communications networks providers’ compliance with their obligations to permit end-users to have access to content, services and applications of their choice.
It is particularly important that NRAs have enough information to evaluate public communications networks providers’ compliance with their obligations to permit end-users to have access to content, services and applications of their choice.
The general authorisation conditions provide a mechanism for ensuring transparency among communications network providers that do not have significant market power.
The general authorisation conditions provide a mechanism for ensuring transparency among communications network providers that do not have significant market power.
Приложение І – точка 4 – буква в
Annex I – point 4 – point c
Приложение I – част Б – точка 4
Annex I – part B – point 4
в) в точка 4, думите ‘предмет на корекциите с оглед на националния честотен план’ се заличават.
(c) In point 4 the terms ‘subject to any changes in the national frequency plan’ are deleted.
Приложение І – точка 4 – буква г
Annex I – point 4 – point d
Приложение I – част Б – точка 7
Annex I – part B – point 7
Доброволни ангажименти на предприятието, което получава права на ползване, поети в хода на конкурсна или сравнителна процедура за подбор.
Voluntary commitments which the undertaking obtaining the usage right has made in the course of a competitive or comparative selection procedure.
В случай че такъв ангажимент фактически съответства на едно или няколко от задълженията, посочени в членове от 9 до 13а от Директива 2002/19/ЕО (Директива за достъпа), ангажиментът се счита за изтекъл най-късно на 1 януари 2010 г.
If such a commitment corresponds de facto to one or more of the obligations listed in Articles 9 to 13a of Directive 2002/19/EC (Access Directive), that commitment shall be considered as having expired by 1 January 2010 at the latest.
Regulatory obligations shall only be imposed on undertakings with significant power in a market justifying ex ante regulation.
Regulatory obligations shall only be imposed on undertakings with significant power in a market justifying ex ante regulation.
Prior to the 2002 framework, the obtainment of usage rights had sometimes been made conditional upon 'voluntary commitment' by new entrants which corresponded to such regulatory obligations (non-discrimination obligations etc).
Prior to the 2002 framework, the obtainment of usage rights had sometimes been made conditional upon 'voluntary commitment' by new entrants which corresponded to such regulatory obligations (non-discrimination obligations etc).
To avoid perpetuated regulation irrespective of market power, such 'voluntary commitments' shall be regarded to be expired after a transition period.
To avoid perpetuated regulation irrespective of market power, such 'voluntary commitments' shall be regarded to be expired after a transition period.
Приложение 1 – точка 4а (нова)
Annex I – point 4a (new)
Приложение I – част В – точка 1
Annex I – part C – point 1
Определяне на услугата, за която ще се ползват номерата, включително евентуални изисквания във връзка с предоставянето на тази услуга и, за избягване на всякакви съмнения, тарифни принципи и максимални цени, приложими за конкретни номерационни блокове с цел гарантиране на защитата на потребителите в съответствие с член 8, параграф 4, буква б) от Директива 2002/21/ЕО (Рамкова директива) .”
Designations of service for which the number shall be used, including any requirements linked to the provision of that service and, for the avoidance of doubt, tariff principles and maximum prices that can apply to specific number ranges for the purposes of ensuring consumer protection in accordance with Article 8(4)(b) of Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive). "
Specific number ranges refer to particular types of service (free phone, national rate, local rate).
Specific number ranges refer to particular types of service (free phone, national rate, local rate).
It is important that NRAs can ensure that the charges operators levy for these services are within the range expected by customers.
It is important that NRAs can ensure that the charges operators levy for these services are within the range expected by customers.
For example, customers could reasonably expect a (non-geographic) national rate number to be charged at their normal national rate.
For example, customers could reasonably expect a (non-geographic) national rate number to be charged at their normal national rate.
Приложение ІІ – точка 1 – буква г
Annex II – point 1 – point d
г) метод за определяне на таксите за употреба на право на ползване на радиочестоти;
(d) the method of determining usage fees for the right of use of the radio frequencies;
г) метод за определяне на таксите за употреба на право на ползване на радиочестоти , без да се засягат системите, определени от държавите-членки, при които задължението да се заплащат такси за употреба е заменено от задължението да се изпълняват конкретни цели от общ интерес ;
(d) the method of determining usage fees for the right of use of the radio frequencies , without prejudice to systems defined by Member States where the obligation to pay usage fees is replaced by an obligation to fulfil specific general interest objectives ;
It must remain possible for Member States to maintain or introduce systems where the obligation to pay usage fees is replaced by an obligation to fulfil specific general interest objectives.
It must remain possible for Member States to maintain or introduce systems where the obligation to pay usage fees is replaced by an obligation to fulfil specific general interest objectives.
Such systems are commonplace with regard to terrestrial broadcastings frequencies where they serve media pluralism objectives.
Such systems are commonplace with regard to terrestrial broadcastings frequencies where they serve media pluralism objectives.
SPECTRUM REFORM
SPECTRUM REFORM
Spectrum, like other natural resources (sun, water, air), is a public good; market mechanisms, whilst constituting effective tools to derive optimal economic value (private and public), are not able alone to serve the general interest and provide public goods indispensable for achieving an information society for all.
Spectrum, like other natural resources (sun, water, air), is a public good; market mechanisms, whilst constituting effective tools to derive optimal economic value (private and public), are not able alone to serve the general interest and provide public goods indispensable for achieving an information society for all.
A combined policy and market approach is therefore required.
A combined policy and market approach is therefore required.
1.1 Accommodating flexibility (service and technology neutrality, trading, etc.) and harmonisation goals
1.1 Accommodating flexibility (service and technology neutrality, trading, etc.) and harmonisation goals
Better coordination and more flexibility are required if we want to achieve an efficient exploitation of this scarce resource.
Better coordination and more flexibility are required if we want to achieve an efficient exploitation of this scarce resource.
However, an adequate balance should be struck between flexibility and the degree of harmonisation which is also needed in order to increase the internal market added value of spectrum (i.e. fixing specific spectrum bands for specific services and technologies such as GSM, UMTS, MCA and MSS).
However, an adequate balance should be struck between flexibility and the degree of harmonisation which is also needed in order to increase the internal market added value of spectrum (i.e. fixing specific spectrum bands for specific services and technologies such as GSM, UMTS, MCA and MSS).
The development of an absolute ‘harmonisation agenda’ (full command & control approach) is not compatible with an ‘idealistic’ neutrality regime (full market approach).
The development of an absolute ‘harmonisation agenda’ (full command & control approach) is not compatible with an ‘idealistic’ neutrality regime (full market approach).
That is why a mixed spectrum management regime, based on balanced combinations of options (scope of harmonisation vs. service neutrality, standardisation vs. technology neutrality, spectrum assignment modes) is preferable.
That is why a mixed spectrum management regime, based on balanced combinations of options (scope of harmonisation vs. service neutrality, standardisation vs. technology neutrality, spectrum assignment modes) is preferable.
A gradual rather than a revolutionary spectrum reform seems realistic and preferable:
A gradual rather than a revolutionary spectrum reform seems realistic and preferable:
· Non-interference as well as compatibility with ITU radio regulations should be a precondition for reforms introduced;
· Non-interference as well as compatibility with ITU radio regulations should be a precondition for reforms introduced;
· The scope and nature of service and technology neutrality should be consistent with ITU definitions;
· The scope and nature of service and technology neutrality should be consistent with ITU definitions;
· Technology neutrality should be pursued with clear rules on interoperability obligations and under which conditions standards could be imposed;
· Technology neutrality should be pursued with clear rules on interoperability obligations and under which conditions standards could be imposed;
· Service neutrality should be understood as covering only electronic communication services, within their respective national frequency allocation tables and ITU regulations;
· Service neutrality should be understood as covering only electronic communication services, within their respective national frequency allocation tables and ITU regulations;
· Spectrum trading should be voluntary and compatible with the primary usage of the relevant band;
· Spectrum trading should be voluntary and compatible with the primary usage of the relevant band;
· General authorisations should remain a manageable principle and could be developed if there's a demand, even though it is a fact that most authorisations are individual rights of use;
· General authorisations should remain a manageable principle and could be developed if there's a demand, even though it is a fact that most authorisations are individual rights of use;
· Member States should guarantee spectrum efficiency, and so impose the reduction, withdrawal or sale of radio frequencies in case of inefficient use;
· Member States should guarantee spectrum efficiency, and so impose the reduction, withdrawal or sale of radio frequencies in case of inefficient use;
· More spectrum should be harmonised for license-exempt spectrum on a non-interference basis.
· More spectrum should be harmonised for license-exempt spectrum on a non-interference basis.
1.2 Enhanced Commission's coordination role
1.2 Enhanced Commission's coordination role
Spectrum does not know of frontiers.
Spectrum does not know of frontiers.
An effective use of spectrum in the Member States requires a stronger EU coordination, in particular regarding the development of pan-European services and the negotiation of international agreements.
An effective use of spectrum in the Member States requires a stronger EU coordination, in particular regarding the development of pan-European services and the negotiation of international agreements.
While spectrum management remains a national competence, only an EU approach ensures that EU interests can be effectively defended at world level.
While spectrum management remains a national competence, only an EU approach ensures that EU interests can be effectively defended at world level.
As in the case of commercial policy, power should be conferred upon the Community to conduct international negotiations based on clear mandates granted by the EU co-legislators.
As in the case of commercial policy, power should be conferred upon the Community to conduct international negotiations based on clear mandates granted by the EU co-legislators.
1.3 Digital Dividend
1.3 Digital Dividend
The issue of the digital dividend requires an immediate political response; we can not wait until the reform Directives enter into force.
The issue of the digital dividend requires an immediate political response; we can not wait until the reform Directives enter into force.
The main guiding principle to allocate the spectrum released by the switchover should be social, cultural and economic value (better public service, wireless broadband to underserved areas, growth and jobs, etc.) and not only increasing public revenues.
The main guiding principle to allocate the spectrum released by the switchover should be social, cultural and economic value (better public service, wireless broadband to underserved areas, growth and jobs, etc.) and not only increasing public revenues.
A coordinated EU approach is necessary to:
A coordinated EU approach is necessary to:
· Ensure that Member States undertake cost benefit analysis to determine the appropriate allocation of spectrum;
· Ensure that Member States undertake cost benefit analysis to determine the appropriate allocation of spectrum;
· Develop a common methodology for the cost benefit analysis;
· Develop a common methodology for the cost benefit analysis;
· Identify bands that could be harmonised for well-defined pan-European or interoperable services at EU level or to promote efficient use and social benefit;
· Identify bands that could be harmonised for well-defined pan-European or interoperable services at EU level or to promote efficient use and social benefit;
· Propose, if appropriate, binding legislation for harmonising these services.
· Propose, if appropriate, binding legislation for harmonising these services.
IMPROVING EFFECTIVE AND CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION
IMPROVING EFFECTIVE AND CONSISTENT IMPLEMENTATION
A consistent implementation of the telecom framework is decisive for achieving a well functioning electronic communications internal market and a competitive information society economy to the benefit of consumers and enterprises..
A consistent implementation of the telecom framework is decisive for achieving a well functioning electronic communications internal market and a competitive information society economy to the benefit of consumers and enterprises..
The current balance of power between the Commission (‘guardian’ of markets definition and significant market power designation) and NRAs (responsible for implementation at local level) has worked reasonably well.
The current balance of power between the Commission (‘guardian’ of markets definition and significant market power designation) and NRAs (responsible for implementation at local level) has worked reasonably well.
However, there is room for improving the consistency both regarding national decisions with internal market impact and the application of remedies.
However, there is room for improving the consistency both regarding national decisions with internal market impact and the application of remedies.
2.1 National Regulatory Authorities
2.1 National Regulatory Authorities
A consistent application requires, first and foremost, independent and adequately resourced national regulatory authorities (NRAs).
A consistent application requires, first and foremost, independent and adequately resourced national regulatory authorities (NRAs).
The rapporteur welcomes the independence provisions proposed by the Commission and stresses that these should not be compromised in the Interinstitutional negotiations.
The rapporteur welcomes the independence provisions proposed by the Commission and stresses that these should not be compromised in the Interinstitutional negotiations.
An effective regulatory framework requires also the existence of specialised appeal bodies and effective appeal mechanisms (i.e. reasonable time limits for taking decisions) in order to prevent abuse of appeal procedures.
An effective regulatory framework requires also the existence of specialised appeal bodies and effective appeal mechanisms (i.e. reasonable time limits for taking decisions) in order to prevent abuse of appeal procedures.
2.2 Consistent implementation through effective co-regulation
2.2 Consistent implementation through effective co-regulation
The most appropriate means to ensure consistency and effectiveness in a system where competences are distributed is through co-regulation.
The most appropriate means to ensure consistency and effectiveness in a system where competences are distributed is through co-regulation.
Only with such a cooperative and collaborative approach between the Commission and NRAs can results be achieved without altering the delicate institutional balance of powers or undermining the subsidiarity elements of the regulation.
Only with such a cooperative and collaborative approach between the Commission and NRAs can results be achieved without altering the delicate institutional balance of powers or undermining the subsidiarity elements of the regulation.
The Commission should play more the role of arbitrator and facilitator rather that of judge or sanction-taker .
The Commission should play more the role of arbitrator and facilitator rather that of judge or sanction-taker .
This new co-regulation role should not undermine but complement the Commission's right of initiative to lead the co-regulation agenda, to propose to the co-legislators binding legislation to address consistency problems.
This new co-regulation role should not undermine but complement the Commission's right of initiative to lead the co-regulation agenda, to propose to the co-legislators binding legislation to address consistency problems.
2.2.1 Remedies
2.2.1 Remedies
A dispute resolution procedure, rather than a veto mechanism , should be put in place to engage actively all the parties concerned, the Commission, the individual NRAs, BERT and the stakeholders in searching for constructive solutions regarding the imposition of remedies.
A dispute resolution procedure, rather than a veto mechanism , should be put in place to engage actively all the parties concerned, the Commission, the individual NRAs, BERT and the stakeholders in searching for constructive solutions regarding the imposition of remedies.
The rapporteur puts forward in Amendment 17 an alternative procedure for the consistent application of remedies.
The rapporteur puts forward in Amendment 17 an alternative procedure for the consistent application of remedies.
The procedure is based upon the principle that only if the Commission and BERT (acting by a simple majority) agree that the proposed remedy is not appropriate the Commission could issue a reasoned decision requesting the NRA concerned to amend the draft measure.
The procedure is based upon the principle that only if the Commission and BERT (acting by a simple majority) agree that the proposed remedy is not appropriate the Commission could issue a reasoned decision requesting the NRA concerned to amend the draft measure.
Functional separation, due to its far-reaching character, is subject to a special treatment whereby the Commission and BERT have to agree that it is the only effective remedy in order for the concerned NRA to be able to impose it.
Functional separation, due to its far-reaching character, is subject to a special treatment whereby the Commission and BERT have to agree that it is the only effective remedy in order for the concerned NRA to be able to impose it.
TRANSITION TOWARDS FULL COMPETITION
TRANSITION TOWARDS FULL COMPETITION
While accepting the transitory nature of ex-ante regulation a gradual approach should be followed removing regulation only and if markets become effectively competitive.
While accepting the transitory nature of ex-ante regulation a gradual approach should be followed removing regulation only and if markets become effectively competitive.
In this regard, the introduction of a qualified revision clause (requesting the Commission to monitor continuously the level of competition of regulated markets and to conduct periodic reviews) might be an adequate approach.
In this regard, the introduction of a qualified revision clause (requesting the Commission to monitor continuously the level of competition of regulated markets and to conduct periodic reviews) might be an adequate approach.
In addition, care should be taken on assessing the implications on competition of new access technologies (fibre networks), which could call for adapted methodological and regulatory tools to ensure that competition in these new markets is preserved and that, at the same time, adequate incentives for deploying these new networks are provided.
In addition, care should be taken on assessing the implications on competition of new access technologies (fibre networks), which could call for adapted methodological and regulatory tools to ensure that competition in these new markets is preserved and that, at the same time, adequate incentives for deploying these new networks are provided.
The Commission is therefore urged to take due account of the political debate on the regulation of these new access networks and to adopt any recommendation on this matter in complete accordance with it.
The Commission is therefore urged to take due account of the political debate on the regulation of these new access networks and to adopt any recommendation on this matter in complete accordance with it.
3.1 Sub-national markets
3.1 Sub-national markets
In order to deregulate where it is no more needed, a more nuanced approach to market analyses, including sub-national markets is needed.
In order to deregulate where it is no more needed, a more nuanced approach to market analyses, including sub-national markets is needed.
Regulatory obligations could be lifted in geographic areas where competition is considered to have successfully taken off and, conversely, re-introduced or reinforced in non-competitive areas of markets that are considered competitive at national level.
Regulatory obligations could be lifted in geographic areas where competition is considered to have successfully taken off and, conversely, re-introduced or reinforced in non-competitive areas of markets that are considered competitive at national level.
This could diminish the risk of dominant operators cross-subsidising between non competitive and competitive regions.
This could diminish the risk of dominant operators cross-subsidising between non competitive and competitive regions.
NRAs should address in their market analysis this possibility.
NRAs should address in their market analysis this possibility.
NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
How we treat next generation access is, together with spectrum, the two most important policy questions in the telecom sector today.
How we treat next generation access is, together with spectrum, the two most important policy questions in the telecom sector today.
Taking them into account in the Directives provides a complete view of the sector, in order to favour coherent investment.
Taking them into account in the Directives provides a complete view of the sector, in order to favour coherent investment.
Fibre networks offer much higher capacities than other telecommunications transport technologies.
Fibre networks offer much higher capacities than other telecommunications transport technologies.