natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
- its role as a co-legislator is fully recognised, thanks to the general application of the existing codecision procedure, which is elevated to the rank of the ordinary legislative procedure, but also thanks to an increase in Parliament's participation in special legislative procedures.
- its role as a co-legislator is fully recognised, thanks to the general application of the existing codecision procedure, which is elevated to the rank of the ordinary legislative procedure, but also thanks to an increase in Parliament's participation in special legislative procedures.
In future the public will clearly be able to see that European legislative acts are adopted by the chamber which represents them and by the chamber which represents States; in parallel, in the field of international agreements its approval will also be required as a general rule;
In future the public will clearly be able to see that European legislative acts are adopted by the chamber which represents them and by the chamber which represents States; in parallel, in the field of international agreements its approval will also be required as a general rule;
- it acquires a concurrent right of initiative for revision of the Treaties and participates in that procedure through its involvement in the Convention convened to prepare the revision (its approval is required for the Council to decide not to convene the Convention);
- it acquires a concurrent right of initiative for revision of the Treaties and participates in that procedure through its involvement in the Convention convened to prepare the revision (its approval is required for the Council to decide not to convene the Convention);
- its budgetary powers, which it shares with the Council on an equal footing, now extend to all Union expenditure;
- its budgetary powers, which it shares with the Council on an equal footing, now extend to all Union expenditure;
- its powers of political scrutiny are enhanced, particularly by means of the election of the President of the Commission;
- its powers of political scrutiny are enhanced, particularly by means of the election of the President of the Commission;
- various decisions which are of great importance in the life of the Union and which hitherto have rested solely with the Council are now also subject to approval by Parliament: the decision to initiate enhanced cooperation; the use of the flexibility clause enabling the Union to take measures not provided for in the Treaties in order to attain ends for which they do provide; decisions on the use of the general ‘bridging clauses’ (‘passerelles’) substituting qualified majority voting for unanimous voting or replacing special legislative procedures with the ordinary legislative procedure; certain decisions making it possible to extend the scope of legal bases provided for in the Treaties, such as those concerning the European Public Prosecutor's Office or judicial cooperation in criminal matters;
- various decisions which are of great importance in the life of the Union and which hitherto have rested solely with the Council are now also subject to approval by Parliament: the decision to initiate enhanced cooperation; the use of the flexibility clause enabling the Union to take measures not provided for in the Treaties in order to attain ends for which they do provide; decisions on the use of the general ‘bridging clauses’ (‘passerelles’) substituting qualified majority voting for unanimous voting or replacing special legislative procedures with the ordinary legislative procedure; certain decisions making it possible to extend the scope of legal bases provided for in the Treaties, such as those concerning the European Public Prosecutor's Office or judicial cooperation in criminal matters;
- even in the field of the common foreign and security policy, where it has no decision-making powers, the European Parliament acquires a general right to be informed and consulted.
- even in the field of the common foreign and security policy, where it has no decision-making powers, the European Parliament acquires a general right to be informed and consulted.
(2) In conclusion it may be said that, although it might have been possible to go further in certain areas, the European Parliament acquires powers of codecision in virtually all areas of Union policy.
(2) In conclusion it may be said that, although it might have been possible to go further in certain areas, the European Parliament acquires powers of codecision in virtually all areas of Union policy.
Basically, this is a matter of putting into practice the twofold legitimacy of the EU as a Union of States and of citizens, which, despite the lack of any explicit recognition of its importance in the new Treaties, is the basis for the European integration process.
Basically, this is a matter of putting into practice the twofold legitimacy of the EU as a Union of States and of citizens, which, despite the lack of any explicit recognition of its importance in the new Treaties, is the basis for the European integration process.
The Treaty of Lisbon thus undeniably represents a significant enhancement of the democratic dimension of the Union.
The Treaty of Lisbon thus undeniably represents a significant enhancement of the democratic dimension of the Union.
(3) The number of Members of the European Parliament is limited to 751
(3) The number of Members of the European Parliament is limited to 751
More exactly 750 'plus the President', to employ the wording of Article 14 of the TEU.
More exactly 750 'plus the President', to employ the wording of Article 14 of the TEU.
Apart from this last-minute addition made to placate Italy, the rules governing the composition of the EP and the procedure for determining that composition are identical to those set out in the Constitution.
Apart from this last-minute addition made to placate Italy, the rules governing the composition of the EP and the procedure for determining that composition are identical to those set out in the Constitution.
The June 2007 European Council asked the EP to submit, in time for the October European Council, a proposal for the redistribution of seats in the EP in accordance with the new rules, which Parliament then did by adopting the resolution contained in the Lamassoure-Severin report (Parliament resolution of 11 October 2007 on the composition of the European Parliament, P6_TA-PROV(2007)0429 ).
The June 2007 European Council asked the EP to submit, in time for the October European Council, a proposal for the redistribution of seats in the EP in accordance with the new rules, which Parliament then did by adopting the resolution contained in the Lamassoure-Severin report (Parliament resolution of 11 October 2007 on the composition of the European Parliament, P6_TA-PROV(2007)0429 ).
In that report, the EP endeavoured to propose a redistribution which was more consistent with the concept of degressive proportionality laid down in the new Treaty and which did not involve any further loss of seats for any Member State beyond what had already been agreed in the Accession Treaty for Bulgaria and Romania.
In that report, the EP endeavoured to propose a redistribution which was more consistent with the concept of degressive proportionality laid down in the new Treaty and which did not involve any further loss of seats for any Member State beyond what had already been agreed in the Accession Treaty for Bulgaria and Romania.
Italy was not satisfied with that proposal and ultimately secured agreement that the Treaty should make provision for an additional seat, in a departure from the principle of digressive proportionality, in order to maintain its parity with the United Kingdom.
Italy was not satisfied with that proposal and ultimately secured agreement that the Treaty should make provision for an additional seat, in a departure from the principle of digressive proportionality, in order to maintain its parity with the United Kingdom.
A declaration (No 4) annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon states that 'the additional seat in the European Parliament shall be allocated to Italy'.
A declaration (No 4) annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon states that 'the additional seat in the European Parliament shall be allocated to Italy'.
Naturally enough, the new distribution of seats will take effect only once the Treaty has entered into force and the decision provided for in Article 9c has been formally adopted. .
Naturally enough, the new distribution of seats will take effect only once the Treaty has entered into force and the decision provided for in Article 9c has been formally adopted. .
The amended TEU does not state how the seats are to be distributed among Member States, but instructs the European Council, acting on the initiative of the European Parliament and with its assent, to decide, before the 2009 elections, what its composition should be, on the basis of the principle of ' degressively proportional ' representation, with a minimum of six and a maximum of 96 seats per Member State (the Convention proposed a minimum of four and no maximum).
The amended TEU does not state how the seats are to be distributed among Member States, but instructs the European Council, acting on the initiative of the European Parliament and with its assent, to decide, before the 2009 elections, what its composition should be, on the basis of the principle of ' degressively proportional ' representation, with a minimum of six and a maximum of 96 seats per Member State (the Convention proposed a minimum of four and no maximum).
This solution will make it possible to respond more flexibly to the future development of the EU, whilst preserving the interests of each Member State, although the raising of the minimum number of seats to 6 will ultimately give rise to problems.
This solution will make it possible to respond more flexibly to the future development of the EU, whilst preserving the interests of each Member State, although the raising of the minimum number of seats to 6 will ultimately give rise to problems.
European Council
European Council
The European Council is recognised as an autonomous institution whose role is to impart political impetus: the TEU expressly states that it is not to perform any legislative functions
The European Council is recognised as an autonomous institution whose role is to impart political impetus: the TEU expressly states that it is not to perform any legislative functions
Although the role assigned to the European Council in operating an 'emergency brake' in connection with certain decisions concerning social security and judicial cooperation in criminal matters may mean that, even if it does not directly perform legislative functions (it does not participate in the adoption of legally binding rules) it may at least interfere in a virtually decisive manner in a legislative procedure - cf. below, points 9.1. and 9.2 . .
Although the role assigned to the European Council in operating an 'emergency brake' in connection with certain decisions concerning social security and judicial cooperation in criminal matters may mean that, even if it does not directly perform legislative functions (it does not participate in the adoption of legally binding rules) it may at least interfere in a virtually decisive manner in a legislative procedure - cf. below, points 9.1. and 9.2 . .
The most important innovation introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, taking its cue, moreover, from the Constitution, is the abolition of the six-month rotating Presidency and its replacement with a President elected by the members of the European Council for a term of 30 months, which may be renewed once.
The most important innovation introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, taking its cue, moreover, from the Constitution, is the abolition of the six-month rotating Presidency and its replacement with a President elected by the members of the European Council for a term of 30 months, which may be renewed once.
The President's duties will be to prepare and direct the work of the European Council and represent the Union externally in order to raise the Union's profile and improve the continuity and consistency of its representation, both internal and external.
The President's duties will be to prepare and direct the work of the European Council and represent the Union externally in order to raise the Union's profile and improve the continuity and consistency of its representation, both internal and external.
Provisions are included to prevent the President from exercising executive powers and to avoid any conflicts with the President of the Commission or the Vice-President/High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
Provisions are included to prevent the President from exercising executive powers and to avoid any conflicts with the President of the Commission or the Vice-President/High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
Only practice will show whether these provisions are adequate.
Only practice will show whether these provisions are adequate.
(1) One of the key issues of the reform process was that of the procedure for voting within the Council when it acts by a qualified majority.
(1) One of the key issues of the reform process was that of the procedure for voting within the Council when it acts by a qualified majority.
The failure of the Brussels summit in December 2003 was partly due to differences of opinion between Member States on this subject.
The failure of the Brussels summit in December 2003 was partly due to differences of opinion between Member States on this subject.
In the view of one of the rapporteurs, the introduction of population as a criterion for both the distribution of seats in the European Parliament and votes in the Council may not guarantee a balanced system, and he expressed himself in favour of the weighted votes system for the Council.
In the view of one of the rapporteurs, the introduction of population as a criterion for both the distribution of seats in the European Parliament and votes in the Council may not guarantee a balanced system, and he expressed himself in favour of the weighted votes system for the Council.
However, since the Dimitrakopoulos-Leinen report
However, since the Dimitrakopoulos-Leinen report
Parliament resolution of 18 November 1999 on the preparation of the reform of the Treaties and the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference (OJ C 189, 7.7.2000, p.
Parliament resolution of 18 November 1999 on the preparation of the reform of the Treaties and the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference (OJ C 189, 7.7.2000, p.
222). , the European Parliament had opted by a large majority for the double majority system.
222). , the European Parliament had opted by a large majority for the double majority system.
This is why, since the beginning of the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference, the European Parliament had insisted that a solution could only be acceptable to it if it adhered to the principle of a double majority (of Member States and the population), in order to draw attention to the twofold legitimacy underpinning the development of the Union – that conferred by the Member States and that conferred by the citizens – and that the new procedure must make decision-making easier than the system provided for in the Nice Treaty.
This is why, since the beginning of the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference, the European Parliament had insisted that a solution could only be acceptable to it if it adhered to the principle of a double majority (of Member States and the population), in order to draw attention to the twofold legitimacy underpinning the development of the Union – that conferred by the Member States and that conferred by the citizens – and that the new procedure must make decision-making easier than the system provided for in the Nice Treaty.
(2) It was indeed the double majority system proposed by the Convention that was finally adopted instead of weighting of votes.
(2) It was indeed the double majority system proposed by the Convention that was finally adopted instead of weighting of votes.
It may reasonably be considered that, although the thresholds have been set higher than proposed by the Convention (the new Treaty now requiring 55% of States rather than 50%, and 65% of the population rather than 60%), the new system will make decision-making easier, as, in many combinations, the weighting system required far higher population thresholds for the adoption of a decision, and because, in many cases, the fact that at least four Member States will be required to form a blocking minority will have the effect of considerably reducing the 65% population threshold
It may reasonably be considered that, although the thresholds have been set higher than proposed by the Convention (the new Treaty now requiring 55% of States rather than 50%, and 65% of the population rather than 60%), the new system will make decision-making easier, as, in many combinations, the weighting system required far higher population thresholds for the adoption of a decision, and because, in many cases, the fact that at least four Member States will be required to form a blocking minority will have the effect of considerably reducing the 65% population threshold
The fact that the IGC introduced the requirement that at least four Member States should vote against a proposal in order to form a blocking minority means that in some circumstances a decision could be adopted with the support of far less than 62% of the population, which is the threshold set for the population criterion in the Nice Treaty: thus a decision opposed, for example, by Germany, France and the United Kingdom would nonetheless be adopted, even though its proponents represented only just over 58% of the population, as these three Member States cannot by themselves form a blocking minority even though between them they represent more than 41% of the population of the EU (in its current 27-member form).
The fact that the IGC introduced the requirement that at least four Member States should vote against a proposal in order to form a blocking minority means that in some circumstances a decision could be adopted with the support of far less than 62% of the population, which is the threshold set for the population criterion in the Nice Treaty: thus a decision opposed, for example, by Germany, France and the United Kingdom would nonetheless be adopted, even though its proponents represented only just over 58% of the population, as these three Member States cannot by themselves form a blocking minority even though between them they represent more than 41% of the population of the EU (in its current 27-member form).
Moreover, it is necessary to bear in mind that at present the vagaries of the various possible combinations whereby it is possible to attain the minimum number of weighted votes required for a qualified majority has the effect that in many cases the required percentage of the population is substantially greater.
Moreover, it is necessary to bear in mind that at present the vagaries of the various possible combinations whereby it is possible to attain the minimum number of weighted votes required for a qualified majority has the effect that in many cases the required percentage of the population is substantially greater.
On the other hand, raising the threshold for the number of Member States will not, in practice, have any effect, since it only made sense in a Union with 25 Member States, as was the case in 2004: 55% of Member States instead of half (50%) meant that in the 25-member EU 14 Member States would be required to vote in favour instead of 13, without the additional requirement formulated by the IGC that the majority must include at least 15 Member States; the number of Member States required to prevent a decision from being adopted will now be 12 instead of 13.
On the other hand, raising the threshold for the number of Member States will not, in practice, have any effect, since it only made sense in a Union with 25 Member States, as was the case in 2004: 55% of Member States instead of half (50%) meant that in the 25-member EU 14 Member States would be required to vote in favour instead of 13, without the additional requirement formulated by the IGC that the majority must include at least 15 Member States; the number of Member States required to prevent a decision from being adopted will now be 12 instead of 13.
However, in a Union of 27 55% of Member States in any case equals 15.
However, in a Union of 27 55% of Member States in any case equals 15.
Moreover, in practice, the possible increase in the risks of blockage due to this increase is certainly not very great.
Moreover, in practice, the possible increase in the risks of blockage due to this increase is certainly not very great.
In reality, decisions are never taken with the Member States divided into two antagonistic blocs of virtually identical proportions. .
In reality, decisions are never taken with the Member States divided into two antagonistic blocs of virtually identical proportions. .
(3) Unfortunately, the addition of mechanisms serving to delay the entry into force of the new system and to grant supposed safeguards to certain Member States which fear that the new system will weaken their position has meant that the progress made in terms of transparency and clarity of the system, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired.
(3) Unfortunately, the addition of mechanisms serving to delay the entry into force of the new system and to grant supposed safeguards to certain Member States which fear that the new system will weaken their position has meant that the progress made in terms of transparency and clarity of the system, on the other hand, leaves much to be desired.
Admittedly, the logic of the double majority is far easier to understand than any weighting of votes, but there is a risk that the public may regard the thresholds which have been adopted as rather arbitrary, and above all, the combination of different, complementary criteria greatly reduces the gains in terms of simplification and comprehension of the system.
Admittedly, the logic of the double majority is far easier to understand than any weighting of votes, but there is a risk that the public may regard the thresholds which have been adopted as rather arbitrary, and above all, the combination of different, complementary criteria greatly reduces the gains in terms of simplification and comprehension of the system.
(4) In order to overcome Poland's opposition to the introduction of the system agreed in 2004, the 2007 IGC added additional mechanisms.
(4) In order to overcome Poland's opposition to the introduction of the system agreed in 2004, the 2007 IGC added additional mechanisms.
Firstly, the agreement reached provides for the entry into force of the system to be delayed until November 2014.
Firstly, the agreement reached provides for the entry into force of the system to be delayed until November 2014.
Accordingly, the Nice system will continue to apply until that date.
Accordingly, the Nice system will continue to apply until that date.
Secondly, a protocol annexed to the new Treaty stipulates that, until 31 March 2017, whenever a decision must be adopted by a qualified majority at the request of a Member State the voting system laid down in the Nice Treaty which is currently in force will still apply.
Secondly, a protocol annexed to the new Treaty stipulates that, until 31 March 2017, whenever a decision must be adopted by a qualified majority at the request of a Member State the voting system laid down in the Nice Treaty which is currently in force will still apply.