natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
· to base it on criteria that best express "the ability to contribute of the citizens of Europe" while, at the same time, avoiding "recourse to compensation mechanisms for purposes of revenue" but instead correcting imbalances "by reforming the structure of expenditure"
· to base it on criteria that best express "the ability to contribute of the citizens of Europe" while, at the same time, avoiding "recourse to compensation mechanisms for purposes of revenue" but instead correcting imbalances "by reforming the structure of expenditure"
· to "move steadily away from dependence on transfers from Member States"
· to "move steadily away from dependence on transfers from Member States"
· to "correct those features of its existing own resources which generate confusion because of the derogations applicable to national contributions".
· to "correct those features of its existing own resources which generate confusion because of the derogations applicable to national contributions".
Generalised correction mechanism
Generalised correction mechanism
The Commission's own resources proposal does not foresee the introduction of new sources of funding for the next financial perspective.
The Commission's own resources proposal does not foresee the introduction of new sources of funding for the next financial perspective.
The major change introduced by the proposal concerns the correction mechanism for Member States' excessive budgetary burdens acknowledged as a principle in Fontainebleau in 1984.
The major change introduced by the proposal concerns the correction mechanism for Member States' excessive budgetary burdens acknowledged as a principle in Fontainebleau in 1984.
The Commission argues in favour of replacing the current system with a generalised correction mechanism (GCM).
The Commission argues in favour of replacing the current system with a generalised correction mechanism (GCM).
This proposal for a GCM is based on the fact that despite the very positive evolution of its relative prosperity it remains only the United Kingdom which receives a partial refund of its contribution, while other net contributors with similar or lesser prosperity do not.
This proposal for a GCM is based on the fact that despite the very positive evolution of its relative prosperity it remains only the United Kingdom which receives a partial refund of its contribution, while other net contributors with similar or lesser prosperity do not.
The changes in the degree of prosperity enjoyed by EU net contributors since 1984 are outlined in the following table:
The changes in the degree of prosperity enjoyed by EU net contributors since 1984 are outlined in the following table:
GNI per capita of net contributors (EU-15 average = 100)
GNI per capita of net contributors (EU-15 average = 100)
The main characteristics of the generalised correction mechanism applicable to any Member State are
The main characteristics of the generalised correction mechanism applicable to any Member State are
Ø triggering if net contributions exceed 0,35% of a Member State's GNI (this threshold would represent the maximum accepted level of financial solidarity between Member States)
Ø triggering if net contributions exceed 0,35% of a Member State's GNI (this threshold would represent the maximum accepted level of financial solidarity between Member States)
Ø refunding of contributions above this at a rate of 66% (the refund rate would be phased in for all Member States except the UK at the rate of 33%, 50%, 50% and 66%)
Ø refunding of contributions above this at a rate of 66% (the refund rate would be phased in for all Member States except the UK at the rate of 33%, 50%, 50% and 66%)
Ø limitation of the total refund volume to a maximum of EUR 7,5 billion a year, financed by all Member States based on their relative share of GNI.
Ø limitation of the total refund volume to a maximum of EUR 7,5 billion a year, financed by all Member States based on their relative share of GNI.
In order to alleviate the impact of the introduction of the new system, the UK would receive, in addition to the ordinary correction, degressive top-up payments totalling EUR 5 billion over a four-year period ending in 2011.
In order to alleviate the impact of the introduction of the new system, the UK would receive, in addition to the ordinary correction, degressive top-up payments totalling EUR 5 billion over a four-year period ending in 2011.
The cost of the financial corrections entailed by the introduction of the 0,35% triggering threshold is estimated at max.
The cost of the financial corrections entailed by the introduction of the 0,35% triggering threshold is estimated at max.
EUR 7,5 billion for the period 2008-2013, comparable with what would be the overall cost of the current rebate mechanism under the future financial perspective.
EUR 7,5 billion for the period 2008-2013, comparable with what would be the overall cost of the current rebate mechanism under the future financial perspective.
The outcome of the system would be that the net balances of the largest net contributors would be at comparable levels, as shown below:
The outcome of the system would be that the net balances of the largest net contributors would be at comparable levels, as shown below:
Estimated net budgetary balances (average 2008-2013)
Estimated net budgetary balances (average 2008-2013)
in % of GNI
in % of GNI
New correction mechanism
New correction mechanism
Current mechanism
Current mechanism
No correction
No correction
Genuinely tax-based own resource as from 2014
Genuinely tax-based own resource as from 2014
As shown above, the Commission's new own resources proposal does not foresee the introduction of new sources of funding for the next financial perspectives but rather tries to update the national contribution shares via the generalised correction mechanism.
As shown above, the Commission's new own resources proposal does not foresee the introduction of new sources of funding for the next financial perspectives but rather tries to update the national contribution shares via the generalised correction mechanism.
Nevertheless, in its Report on the operation of the own resources system, the Commission argues in favour of introducing as from 2014 a genuine fiscal own resource.
Nevertheless, in its Report on the operation of the own resources system, the Commission argues in favour of introducing as from 2014 a genuine fiscal own resource.
With this new tax based resource the Commission aims at "forging the link between citizens and the EU budget".
With this new tax based resource the Commission aims at "forging the link between citizens and the EU budget".
It would increase understanding by citizens of the resources going to the EU budget and would make decision makers more accountable.
It would increase understanding by citizens of the resources going to the EU budget and would make decision makers more accountable.
The fiscal resource would be introduced progressively as a replacement to the current VAT resource, alongside a more limited GNI resource.
The fiscal resource would be introduced progressively as a replacement to the current VAT resource, alongside a more limited GNI resource.
Since it would thus replace existing resources it would be neutral in terms of the level of EU funding.
Since it would thus replace existing resources it would be neutral in terms of the level of EU funding.
At the current stage of EU integration a fully tax-based system is considered not realistic by the Commission and is therefore not proposed.
At the current stage of EU integration a fully tax-based system is considered not realistic by the Commission and is therefore not proposed.
The Commission's three options
The Commission's three options
The Commission's three main candidates as tax based own resource are
The Commission's three main candidates as tax based own resource are
Ø a share of the tax rate on energy consumption , limited to motor fuel for road transport ("eco-tax") with consideration also being given to aviation fuel and related emissions as a possible future development to end the current tax exemption for jet fuel;
Ø a share of the tax rate on energy consumption , limited to motor fuel for road transport ("eco-tax") with consideration also being given to aviation fuel and related emissions as a possible future development to end the current tax exemption for jet fuel;
Ø a share of the national VAT rate , making the financing of the EU more understandable to citizens (EU and national VAT should appear as separate taxes on the invoices or receipts);
Ø a share of the national VAT rate , making the financing of the EU more understandable to citizens (EU and national VAT should appear as separate taxes on the invoices or receipts);
Ø a share of the corporate income tax as a longer term option.
Ø a share of the corporate income tax as a longer term option.
By chosing any of these three options the concept of the EU as a Union of Member States and citizens would be transposed into the area of financing the EU budget.
By chosing any of these three options the concept of the EU as a Union of Member States and citizens would be transposed into the area of financing the EU budget.
Strengthening the direct link of citizens to the budget would also help focussing expenditure debates on substance rather than on purely national budget net positions.
Strengthening the direct link of citizens to the budget would also help focussing expenditure debates on substance rather than on purely national budget net positions.
Feasibility of the Commission's options
Feasibility of the Commission's options
As to the feasibility of the three options the following remarks can be made:
As to the feasibility of the three options the following remarks can be made:
Option 1: Own resources system with fiscal resources related to energy consumption
Option 1: Own resources system with fiscal resources related to energy consumption
The introduction of a fiscal resource based on road transport fuel would be technically possible in around 3 - 6 years.
The introduction of a fiscal resource based on road transport fuel would be technically possible in around 3 - 6 years.
It would be relatively simple from an administrative point of view as the tax base is already harmonised at EU level by the new directive on energy taxation.
It would be relatively simple from an administrative point of view as the tax base is already harmonised at EU level by the new directive on energy taxation.
Directive 2003/96/EC of 27.10.2003 of the Council restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (OJ L 283 of 31.10.2003).
Directive 2003/96/EC of 27.10.2003 of the Council restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (OJ L 283 of 31.10.2003).
EU rates below half of the minimum rates set by the directive would be enough to finance half of the EU budget.
EU rates below half of the minimum rates set by the directive would be enough to finance half of the EU budget.
Option 2: Own resources system with a fiscal VAT resource
Option 2: Own resources system with a fiscal VAT resource
The introduction of an EU VAT rate would be technically possible in around 6 years.
The introduction of an EU VAT rate would be technically possible in around 6 years.
Contrary to the current "statistical" VAT resource, it would create a clear direct link between the financing of the EU budget and the citizen and would increase awareness of the costs of the Union.
Contrary to the current "statistical" VAT resource, it would create a clear direct link between the financing of the EU budget and the citizen and would increase awareness of the costs of the Union.
Potential difficulties with this proposal are related to incomplete harmonisation of Member States' VAT systems mainly linked to zero-rated goods.
Potential difficulties with this proposal are related to incomplete harmonisation of Member States' VAT systems mainly linked to zero-rated goods.
If the effects of zero-rates could be neutralised, the EU rate would have the same impact on comparable consumers across the Union.
If the effects of zero-rates could be neutralised, the EU rate would have the same impact on comparable consumers across the Union.
An EU rate of 1% would be enough to cover about half of the financing needs of the EU budget.
An EU rate of 1% would be enough to cover about half of the financing needs of the EU budget.
Option 3 - Own resources system with a fiscal resource based on corporate income
Option 3 - Own resources system with a fiscal resource based on corporate income
This alternative would take longest to implement, both from a political as well as from an administrative perspective.
This alternative would take longest to implement, both from a political as well as from an administrative perspective.
It would need a common consolidated tax base with a minimum tax rate instead of 25 separate national tax systems and a multiplicity of tax laws, conventions and practices.
It would need a common consolidated tax base with a minimum tax rate instead of 25 separate national tax systems and a multiplicity of tax laws, conventions and practices.
Since revenue from corporate income taxes is significant (with total revenue in the EU currently representing on average 2,6% of total EU GNI), for the needs of the EU budget less than a quarter of that revenue would need to be assigned to the EU.
Since revenue from corporate income taxes is significant (with total revenue in the EU currently representing on average 2,6% of total EU GNI), for the needs of the EU budget less than a quarter of that revenue would need to be assigned to the EU.
4 ON THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S OWN RESOURCES
4 ON THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S OWN RESOURCES
8 November 2006
8 November 2006
Starting point
Starting point
Parliament’s demands …
Parliament’s demands …
In its opinion
In its opinion
Resolution of 11 March 1999, on the need to modify and reform the European Union’s own resources system (Haug report). to the 1999 Commission proposal on which the current own resources system is based, Parliament asked for a system of EU revenue that should be
Resolution of 11 March 1999, on the need to modify and reform the European Union’s own resources system (Haug report). to the 1999 Commission proposal on which the current own resources system is based, Parliament asked for a system of EU revenue that should be
· simple and readily understood by the public,
· simple and readily understood by the public,
· based on criteria that best expressed the ability to contribute while, at the same time, avoiding recourse to compensation mechanisms for purposes of revenue,
· based on criteria that best expressed the ability to contribute while, at the same time, avoiding recourse to compensation mechanisms for purposes of revenue,
· independent of transfers from Member States and
· independent of transfers from Member States and
· that should do away with those features of the existing system which generate confusion because of the exemptions applicable to national contributions.
· that should do away with those features of the existing system which generate confusion because of the exemptions applicable to national contributions.
… and Council’s response
… and Council’s response
The Council decision
The Council decision
Council Decision 2000/597. that was finally adopted on 29 September 2000, entering into force on 1 March 2002, did anything but fulfil these demands: It has codified the UK rebate as well as the adjustments of the financing shares for the rebate of Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden - instead of planning for a phasing-out of the UK rebate a similar mechanism was extended to other Member States.
Council Decision 2000/597. that was finally adopted on 29 September 2000, entering into force on 1 March 2002, did anything but fulfil these demands: It has codified the UK rebate as well as the adjustments of the financing shares for the rebate of Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden - instead of planning for a phasing-out of the UK rebate a similar mechanism was extended to other Member States.
By raising the share of traditional own resources that can be retained by the Member States to compensate for their collection costs from 10% to 25%, the “traditional own resources”-part of EU revenue was further reduced.
By raising the share of traditional own resources that can be retained by the Member States to compensate for their collection costs from 10% to 25%, the “traditional own resources”-part of EU revenue was further reduced.
However, despite all these arrangements that were not welcomed by Parliament, the Council decision also contained some chances for a "better" future in form of a detailed revision clause.
However, despite all these arrangements that were not welcomed by Parliament, the Council decision also contained some chances for a "better" future in form of a detailed revision clause.
The “Schreyer proposals” of 2004
The “Schreyer proposals” of 2004
In July 2004, in accordance with Article 9 of the Council decision, the Commission presented its Report on the operation of the own resources system
In July 2004, in accordance with Article 9 of the Council decision, the Commission presented its Report on the operation of the own resources system
( COM(2004)0505 ). as well as proposals for a new decision on the system of own resources and for an implementing regulation for the correction of budgetary imbalances
( COM(2004)0505 ). as well as proposals for a new decision on the system of own resources and for an implementing regulation for the correction of budgetary imbalances
Both proposals contained in COM(2004)501final/2 .
Both proposals contained in COM(2004)501final/2 .
In its report, the Commission proposed that the Council reflect on the introduction by 2014 of a new funding system for the EU, centred around a main fiscal resource based on either energy, VAT or corporate income tax.
In its report, the Commission proposed that the Council reflect on the introduction by 2014 of a new funding system for the EU, centred around a main fiscal resource based on either energy, VAT or corporate income tax.
This tax based resource would replace existing resources and would therefore be neutral in terms of the level of EU funding.
This tax based resource would replace existing resources and would therefore be neutral in terms of the level of EU funding.
Three main candidates as a tax based own resource were listed, namely a share of:
Three main candidates as a tax based own resource were listed, namely a share of:
· the tax rate on energy consumption, limited to motor fuel for road transport
· the tax rate on energy consumption, limited to motor fuel for road transport
Consideration was also given to aviation fuel and related emissions as a possible future development to end the current tax exemption for jet fuel.
Consideration was also given to aviation fuel and related emissions as a possible future development to end the current tax exemption for jet fuel.
· the national VAT rate, making the financing of the EU more understandable to citizens
· the national VAT rate, making the financing of the EU more understandable to citizens
There would be no additional tax burden as the EU rate would be offset by an equivalent decrease of the national VAT rate.
There would be no additional tax burden as the EU rate would be offset by an equivalent decrease of the national VAT rate.
The EU and national VAT should appear as separate taxes on the invoices or receipts.
The EU and national VAT should appear as separate taxes on the invoices or receipts.
· a corporate income tax
· a corporate income tax
This alternative would take longest to implement since a political agreement would be needed on the principle of achieving harmonization of the tax base, before setting a minimum rate. .
This alternative would take longest to implement since a political agreement would be needed on the principle of achieving harmonization of the tax base, before setting a minimum rate. .
A fully tax-based system was not considered realistic at this stage of EU integration and not proposed by the Commission.
A fully tax-based system was not considered realistic at this stage of EU integration and not proposed by the Commission.
As for the question of the British rebate, the Commission proposed to adjust the existing correction mechanism so as to apply it to all main contributors, while giving assurances to those not benefiting from such a correction that the cost for them would not soar, by limiting the volume of corrections to a maximum amount.
As for the question of the British rebate, the Commission proposed to adjust the existing correction mechanism so as to apply it to all main contributors, while giving assurances to those not benefiting from such a correction that the cost for them would not soar, by limiting the volume of corrections to a maximum amount.
This general correction mechanism would be triggered if net contributions exceeded 0.35% of each country’s GNI.
This general correction mechanism would be triggered if net contributions exceeded 0.35% of each country’s GNI.
Contributions above this would be refunded at a rate of 66%.
Contributions above this would be refunded at a rate of 66%.
The total refund volume would be limited to a maximum of EUR 7.5 billion a year.
The total refund volume would be limited to a maximum of EUR 7.5 billion a year.
The introduction of the mechanism should be accompanied by transitional measures for the UK in order to alleviate the financial impact of the changeover, over a 4-year period.
The introduction of the mechanism should be accompanied by transitional measures for the UK in order to alleviate the financial impact of the changeover, over a 4-year period.
Your rapporteur thought the Commission’s ideas very interesting and worth serious reflection.
Your rapporteur thought the Commission’s ideas very interesting and worth serious reflection.
However, the Member States seemed not willing to pursue them and the new Commission, instituted in 2005, made no serious effort for progress.
However, the Member States seemed not willing to pursue them and the new Commission, instituted in 2005, made no serious effort for progress.
Of course, this standstill was mainly due to the ongoing negotiations for the new multiannual financial framework and to the fact that EU expenditure and revenue could not be considered isolated from each other.
Of course, this standstill was mainly due to the ongoing negotiations for the new multiannual financial framework and to the fact that EU expenditure and revenue could not be considered isolated from each other.
At the Brussels European Council in December 2005, Member States could finally agree on a new financial perspective for 2007 – 2013, an agreement on expenditure that had only become possible by granting far-reaching concessions for this, that and the other Member State on the revenue side.
At the Brussels European Council in December 2005, Member States could finally agree on a new financial perspective for 2007 – 2013, an agreement on expenditure that had only become possible by granting far-reaching concessions for this, that and the other Member State on the revenue side.
The “reform” proposed by the Brussels European Council 2005
The “reform” proposed by the Brussels European Council 2005
In consequence, the Commission proposal of 2006 aiming at implementing the results of the European Council’s conclusions makes the financing of the European Union's budget certainly not more, but less, transparent, so that not even the adherence to the principle of equity can be judged easily.
In consequence, the Commission proposal of 2006 aiming at implementing the results of the European Council’s conclusions makes the financing of the European Union's budget certainly not more, but less, transparent, so that not even the adherence to the principle of equity can be judged easily.
The requirements for a new system as adopted by the European Parliament in its position of 1999 again are certainly not met.
The requirements for a new system as adopted by the European Parliament in its position of 1999 again are certainly not met.