natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
There does not seem to be an economic argument to back the emotional and sensitive issue of some smaller, independent operators asking for a non-discrimination clause whereby a small operator would be charged the same wholesale tariff by another operator as the one offered to a larger operator (maybe of the same network).
There does not seem to be an economic argument to back the emotional and sensitive issue of some smaller, independent operators asking for a non-discrimination clause whereby a small operator would be charged the same wholesale tariff by another operator as the one offered to a larger operator (maybe of the same network).
There is reason to believe that with such a provision, wholesale prices would stabilise at the higher end, and in some cases they could reduce the bargaining power of smaller operators.
There is reason to believe that with such a provision, wholesale prices would stabilise at the higher end, and in some cases they could reduce the bargaining power of smaller operators.
This is a problem that already exists and has not been caused by the proposed Regulation.
This is a problem that already exists and has not been caused by the proposed Regulation.
Similarly, the proposed Regulation is not the ideal medium to address it.
Similarly, the proposed Regulation is not the ideal medium to address it.
Even though there might be issues for competition authorities, that procedure might not be carried out expediently enough to be effective.
Even though there might be issues for competition authorities, that procedure might not be carried out expediently enough to be effective.
Thus, given the fact that we regard smaller, independent operators as essential for competition, we are asking the Commission to analyse the problem and present a proposal within 12 months.
Thus, given the fact that we regard smaller, independent operators as essential for competition, we are asking the Commission to analyse the problem and present a proposal within 12 months.
SMS, MMS and data
SMS, MMS and data
The analysis made by the Commission is limited to voice telephony.
The analysis made by the Commission is limited to voice telephony.
There is no analysis of the situation in the SMS, MMS and data markets, which are of a different nature even amongst them.
There is no analysis of the situation in the SMS, MMS and data markets, which are of a different nature even amongst them.
Regulation absent analysis would breach the principles of Better Regulation, would make the Regulation vulnerable, and would effectively delay legislation by at least one year.
Regulation absent analysis would breach the principles of Better Regulation, would make the Regulation vulnerable, and would effectively delay legislation by at least one year.
The Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection calls on the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following amendments in its report:
The Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection calls on the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following amendments in its report:
OJ C ... /Not yet published in OJ.
OJ C ... /Not yet published in OJ.
RECITAL 1
RECITAL 1
(1) The high level of the prices payable by users of public mobile telephone networks when using their mobile telephones when travelling abroad within the Community is a matter of concern for national regulatory authorities.
(1) The high level of the prices payable by users of public mobile telephone networks when using their mobile telephones when travelling abroad within the Community is a matter of concern for national regulatory authorities.
The European Regulators Group noted at its plenary meeting in May 2005 (inter alia) that retail charges were very high without clear justification; that this appeared to result both from high wholesale charges levied by the foreign host network operator and also, in many cases, from high retail mark-ups charged by the customer’s own network operator; that reductions in wholesale charges were often not passed through to the retail customer; and that there were strong linkages between the markets in the different Member States.
The European Regulators Group noted at its plenary meeting in May 2005 (inter alia) that retail charges were very high without clear justification; that this appeared to result both from high wholesale charges levied by the foreign host network operator and also, in many cases, from high retail mark-ups charged by the customer’s own network operator; that reductions in wholesale charges were often not passed through to the retail customer; and that there were strong linkages between the markets in the different Member States.
(1) Many operators have recently introduced tariff schemes reducing roaming charges to consumers.
(1) Many operators have recently introduced tariff schemes reducing roaming charges to consumers.
Nevertheless, the high level of the prices payable by users of public mobile telephone networks when using their mobile telephones when travelling abroad within the Community remains a matter of concern for national regulatory authorities , as well as for consumer organisations and the European Parliament .
Nevertheless, the high level of the prices payable by users of public mobile telephone networks when using their mobile telephones when travelling abroad within the Community remains a matter of concern for national regulatory authorities , as well as for consumer organisations and the European Parliament .
To reflect the current situation.
To reflect the current situation.
(9) Although the 2002 regulatory framework for electronic communications, on the basis of considerations apparent at that time, provided for the removal of all obstacles to trade in the area that it harmonises , that fact cannot prevent the adaptation of the harmonised rules in step with other considerations in order to find the most effective means of achieving a high level of consumer protection whilst improving the conditions for the functioning of the internal market .
(9) Although the 2002 regulatory framework for electronic communications, on the basis of considerations apparent at that time, provided for the removal of all obstacles to trade in the area that it harmonises , that fact cannot prevent the adaptation of the harmonised rules in step with other considerations in order to find the most effective means of achieving a high level of consumer protection whilst improving the conditions for the functioning of the internal market .
(9) T he 2002 regulatory framework for electronic communications, on the basis of considerations apparent at that time, aimed at remov ing all barriers to trade between Member States in the area that it harmonises, inter alia as regards measures which affect prices for users in other Member States .
(9) T he 2002 regulatory framework for electronic communications, on the basis of considerations apparent at that time, aimed at remov ing all barriers to trade between Member States in the area that it harmonises, inter alia as regards measures which affect prices for users in other Member States .
However, this should not prevent the adaptation of the harmonised rules where, in the light of experience, such adaptation proves necessary in order to improve the conditions for the functioning of the internal market and at the same time to provide more effective means of achieving a high level of consumer protection.
However, this should not prevent the adaptation of the harmonised rules where, in the light of experience, such adaptation proves necessary in order to improve the conditions for the functioning of the internal market and at the same time to provide more effective means of achieving a high level of consumer protection.
(10) It is therefore necessary to amend the 2002 regulatory framework for electronic communications to allow for a departure from the rules otherwise applicable, namely that prices for service offerings should be determined by commercial agreement in the absence of significant market power, and thereby to accommodate the introduction of complementary regulatory obligations which reflect the specific characteristics of international roaming services.
(10) It is therefore necessary to amend the 2002 regulatory framework for electronic communications to allow for a departure from the rules otherwise applicable, namely that prices for service offerings should be determined by commercial agreement in the absence of significant market power, and thereby to accommodate the introduction of complementary regulatory obligations which reflect the specific characteristics of international roaming services.
(10) The 2002 regulatory framework for electronic communications should accordingly be completed by specific rules on international roaming services.
(10) The 2002 regulatory framework for electronic communications should accordingly be completed by specific rules on international roaming services.
Those specific rules should include complementary regulatory obligations which reflect the particular characteristics of international roaming services.
Those specific rules should include complementary regulatory obligations which reflect the particular characteristics of international roaming services.
RECITAL 11
RECITAL 11
(11) The retail and wholesale roaming markets exhibit unique characteristics which justify exceptional measures which go beyond the mechanisms otherwise available under the 2002 regulatory framework.
(11) The retail and wholesale roaming markets exhibit unique characteristics which justify exceptional measures which go beyond the mechanisms otherwise available under the 2002 regulatory framework.
RECITAL 12
RECITAL 12
(12) Regulatory obligations should be imposed at both retail and wholesale level to protect the interests of roaming customers, since experience has shown that reductions in wholesale prices for international roaming services may not be reflected in lower retail prices for roaming, due to the absence of incentives to do so.
(12) Regulatory obligations should be imposed at both retail and wholesale level to protect the interests of roaming customers, since experience has shown that reductions in wholesale prices for international roaming services may not be reflected in lower retail prices for roaming, due to the absence of incentives to do so.
On the other hand, action to reduce the level of retail prices without addressing the level of the wholesale costs associated with the provision of these services could risk disrupting the orderly functioning of the international roaming market.
On the other hand, action to reduce the level of retail prices without addressing the level of the wholesale costs associated with the provision of these services could risk disrupting the orderly functioning of the international roaming market.
Particular attention should be paid to the risk that smaller, independent or newly started operators are offered terms for the provision of roaming services that impede their ability to compete, to enable prompt and appropriate action to be taken in case any abuse is ascertained.
Particular attention should be paid to the risk that smaller, independent or newly started operators are offered terms for the provision of roaming services that impede their ability to compete, to enable prompt and appropriate action to be taken in case any abuse is ascertained.
The Commission shall analyse the effects of this Regulation on the competitive situation of smaller, independent or newly started operators.
The Commission shall analyse the effects of this Regulation on the competitive situation of smaller, independent or newly started operators.
To emphasise the need to closely follow any negative impact on competition .
To emphasise the need to closely follow any negative impact on competition .
RECITAL 13
RECITAL 13
(13) The resulting obligations should take effect as soon as possible , while providing the operators concerned with a reasonable period to adapt their prices and service offerings to ensure compliance, and apply directly in all Member States.
(13) The resulting obligations should take effect as soon as possible , while providing the operators concerned with a reasonable period to adapt their prices and service offerings to ensure compliance, and apply directly in all Member States.
(13) The resulting obligations should take effect as soon as possible and apply directly in all Member States.
(13) The resulting obligations should take effect as soon as possible and apply directly in all Member States.
To reflect the amendment of Article 5 of the Commission proposal, providing that regulation of retail prices comes into effect after three months instead of the six months proposed by the Commission.
To reflect the amendment of Article 5 of the Commission proposal, providing that regulation of retail prices comes into effect after three months instead of the six months proposed by the Commission.
(15) The most effective and proportionate mechanism for regulating the level of prices for making international roaming calls in accordance with the above considerations is the setting at Community level of maximum per-minute charges at wholesale level.
(15) The most effective and proportionate mechanism for regulating the level of prices for making international roaming calls in accordance with the above considerations is the setting at Community level of maximum per-minute charges at wholesale level.
At retail level it is appropriate to set a Consumer Protection Tariff that operators are obliged to offer to roaming customers.
At retail level it is appropriate to set a Consumer Protection Tariff that operators are obliged to offer to roaming customers.
This will become the benchmark against which other retail offers will be compared, thus ensuring fair pricing for consumers.
This will become the benchmark against which other retail offers will be compared, thus ensuring fair pricing for consumers.
The Consumer Protection Tariff should be set at a level which guarantees a sufficient margin to operators and encourages competitive roaming offers at lower rates.
The Consumer Protection Tariff should be set at a level which guarantees a sufficient margin to operators and encourages competitive roaming offers at lower rates.
(16) This common mechanism should ensure that retail charges for international roaming provide a more reasonable reflection of the underlying costs involved in the provision of the service than has been the case whilst allowing operators the freedom to compete by differentiating their offerings and adapting their pricing structures to market conditions and consumer preference.
(16) This common mechanism should ensure that retail charges for international roaming provide a more reasonable reflection of the underlying costs involved in the provision of the service than has been the case whilst allowing operators the freedom to compete by differentiating their offerings and adapting their pricing structures to market conditions and consumer preference.
(16) This common mechanism should ensure that retail charges for international roaming provide a more reasonable reflection of the underlying costs involved in the provision of the service than has been the case , by way of introducing a set Consumer Protection Tariff offered to all roaming customers that reflects a reasonable margin over the wholesale cost of providing a roaming service, whilst allowing operators the freedom to compete by differentiating their offerings and adapting their pricing structures to market conditions and consumer preference.
(16) This common mechanism should ensure that retail charges for international roaming provide a more reasonable reflection of the underlying costs involved in the provision of the service than has been the case , by way of introducing a set Consumer Protection Tariff offered to all roaming customers that reflects a reasonable margin over the wholesale cost of providing a roaming service, whilst allowing operators the freedom to compete by differentiating their offerings and adapting their pricing structures to market conditions and consumer preference.
RECITAL 18
RECITAL 18
(18) The maximum price limits should take account of the different elements involved in the making of an international roaming call (including overheads, signalling, call origination, transit and termination) and the differences in the underlying costs of providing international roaming services in respect of calls made to a destination within a visited country, on the one hand, and calls made back to the roaming customer’s home country or a third country within the Community, on the other.
(18) The maximum price limits should take account of the different elements involved in the making of an international roaming call (including overheads, signalling, call origination, transit and termination) and the differences in the underlying costs of providing international roaming services in respect of calls made to a destination within a visited country, on the one hand, and calls made back to the roaming customer’s home country or a third country within the Community, on the other.
(18) Any regulation of the market should take account of all relevant elements involved in the making of an international roaming call (including overheads, signalling, call origination, transit and termination) and the differences in the underlying costs of providing international roaming services in respect of calls made to a destination within a visited country, on the one hand, and calls made back to the roaming customer’s home country or a third country within the Community, on the other.
(18) Any regulation of the market should take account of all relevant elements involved in the making of an international roaming call (including overheads, signalling, call origination, transit and termination) and the differences in the underlying costs of providing international roaming services in respect of calls made to a destination within a visited country, on the one hand, and calls made back to the roaming customer’s home country or a third country within the Community, on the other.
For the sake of simplicity, the wholesale price limit shall be expressed as a single blended maximum.
For the sake of simplicity, the wholesale price limit shall be expressed as a single blended maximum.
RECITAL 19
RECITAL 19
(19) The maximum price limit for the provision of an international roaming call at wholesale level should be based on the average per-minute mobile termination rate for operators with significant market power, as such termination rates are already the subject of regulatory supervision in accordance with the 2002 regulatory framework for electronic communications and, therefore, should be determined by reference to the principle of cost-orientation.
(19) The maximum price limit for the provision of an international roaming call at wholesale level should be based on the average per-minute mobile termination rate for operators with significant market power, as such termination rates are already the subject of regulatory supervision in accordance with the 2002 regulatory framework for electronic communications and, therefore, should be determined by reference to the principle of cost-orientation.
Given the characteristics of the market for call termination on individual public mobile networks and the cross-border nature of international roaming, they also provide a stable basis for regulation that is representative of the cost structures of mobile networks across the Community.
Given the characteristics of the market for call termination on individual public mobile networks and the cross-border nature of international roaming, they also provide a stable basis for regulation that is representative of the cost structures of mobile networks across the Community.
The average mobile termination rate provides a reliable benchmark for the core cost components at wholesale level and a maximum wholesale price limit based on an appropriate multiple of such an average mobile termination rate should therefore provide an assurance that the real costs of provision of regulated roaming services can be recovered.
The average mobile termination rate provides a reliable benchmark for the core cost components at wholesale level and a maximum wholesale price limit based on an appropriate multiple of such an average mobile termination rate should therefore provide an assurance that the real costs of provision of regulated roaming services can be recovered.
(19) The maximum charge for the provision of an international roaming call at wholesale level should be based on the average per-minute mobile termination rate calculated as an average of peak and off-peak rates for operators with significant market power, as such termination rates are already the subject of regulatory supervision in accordance with the 2002 regulatory framework for electronic communications and, therefore, should be determined by reference to the principle of cost-orientation.
(19) The maximum charge for the provision of an international roaming call at wholesale level should be based on the average per-minute mobile termination rate calculated as an average of peak and off-peak rates for operators with significant market power, as such termination rates are already the subject of regulatory supervision in accordance with the 2002 regulatory framework for electronic communications and, therefore, should be determined by reference to the principle of cost-orientation.
RECITAL 20
RECITAL 20
(20) The maximum price limit applicable at retail level should provide roaming customers with the assurance that they will not be charged an excessive price when making a regulated roaming call, whilst leaving the home operators sufficient margin to differentiate the products they offer to customers.
(20) The maximum price limit applicable at retail level should provide roaming customers with the assurance that they will not be charged an excessive price when making a regulated roaming call, whilst leaving the home operators sufficient margin to differentiate the products they offer to customers.
(20) The Consumer Protection Tariff applicable at retail level should provide roaming customers with the assurance that they will not be charged an excessive price when making or receiving a roaming voice call, by providing a tariff closely related to the cost of providing the service, whilst leaving the home operators sufficient margin to differentiate the products they offer to customers.
(20) The Consumer Protection Tariff applicable at retail level should provide roaming customers with the assurance that they will not be charged an excessive price when making or receiving a roaming voice call, by providing a tariff closely related to the cost of providing the service, whilst leaving the home operators sufficient margin to differentiate the products they offer to customers.
RECITAL 21
RECITAL 21
(21) Providers of international roaming services for calls made while roaming abroad as covered by this Regulation should have a period within which to adjust their retail prices voluntarily to comply with the maximum limits provided in this Regulation.
(21) Providers of international roaming services for calls made while roaming abroad as covered by this Regulation should have a period within which to adjust their retail prices voluntarily to comply with the maximum limits provided in this Regulation.
It is appropriate to allow a period of six months for this purpose, to permit market players to make the necessary adaptations.
It is appropriate to allow a period of six months for this purpose, to permit market players to make the necessary adaptations.
See justification to recital 13.
See justification to recital 13.