natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
This assessment is based on an analysis of the staff requirements of national regulatory authorities and an analysis of the minimum resources necessary to carry out the tasks proposed, in particular in the light of possibilities for synergies in harnessing the resources within national regulatory authorities to assist the work of the agency.
This assessment is based on an analysis of the staff requirements of national regulatory authorities and an analysis of the minimum resources necessary to carry out the tasks proposed, in particular in the light of possibilities for synergies in harnessing the resources within national regulatory authorities to assist the work of the agency.
According to the Commission, the proposed staff numbers are in line with these authorities' needs.
According to the Commission, the proposed staff numbers are in line with these authorities' needs.
Besides, the Commission argues that if the Commission itself were to endeavour to perform the Agencies' tasks, the number of staff required would be much higher.
Besides, the Commission argues that if the Commission itself were to endeavour to perform the Agencies' tasks, the number of staff required would be much higher.
From a budgetary point of view , your draftswoman has some concerns regarding the setting-up of the new Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators because of uncertainties regarding its financing .
From a budgetary point of view , your draftswoman has some concerns regarding the setting-up of the new Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators because of uncertainties regarding its financing .
These concerns centre around the following points:
These concerns centre around the following points:
1) The new Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators has to be financed under subheading 1a of the multiannual financial framework 2007 - 2013 where margins have become particularly limited.
1) The new Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators has to be financed under subheading 1a of the multiannual financial framework 2007 - 2013 where margins have become particularly limited.
In this heading, some reprogramming was already necessary in order to come to an agreement on the financing of Galileo.
In this heading, some reprogramming was already necessary in order to come to an agreement on the financing of Galileo.
The resulting margin of subheading 1a for 2008 was consequently 0.
The resulting margin of subheading 1a for 2008 was consequently 0.
The financing of the new Energy Agency is included neither in the Commission's last financial programming of 31 January 2008 nor in the tables annexed to the APS for 2009, in which it is simply stated that the agency " will be financed by corresponding reductions in other actions (mostly actions under institutional prerogatives) within the transport and energy policy area."
The financing of the new Energy Agency is included neither in the Commission's last financial programming of 31 January 2008 nor in the tables annexed to the APS for 2009, in which it is simply stated that the agency " will be financed by corresponding reductions in other actions (mostly actions under institutional prerogatives) within the transport and energy policy area."
No further details of this exercise are provided.
No further details of this exercise are provided.
To the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Commission confirmed that it aims at financing the agency without reducing the margin in subheading 1a, i.e. by redeployment outside any co-decided lines.
To the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Commission confirmed that it aims at financing the agency without reducing the margin in subheading 1a, i.e. by redeployment outside any co-decided lines.
The Commission has so far been unable to specify exactly how this will be done.
The Commission has so far been unable to specify exactly how this will be done.
However, even if this manoeuvre were to leave the margin untouched on paper, this means that the financing of the agency will be carried out using the last "freely available" resources in subheading 1a and that any newly emerging priority in the future will require formal reprogramming (as has already been announced to be necessary for the creation of the planned new Electronic Communications Market Authority).
However, even if this manoeuvre were to leave the margin untouched on paper, this means that the financing of the agency will be carried out using the last "freely available" resources in subheading 1a and that any newly emerging priority in the future will require formal reprogramming (as has already been announced to be necessary for the creation of the planned new Electronic Communications Market Authority).
This seems unacceptable to your draftswoman (see Amendment 1).
This seems unacceptable to your draftswoman (see Amendment 1).
2) In this context, it has to be pointed out once more that agencies such as the new agency proposed here fulfil predominantly administrative tasks.
2) In this context, it has to be pointed out once more that agencies such as the new agency proposed here fulfil predominantly administrative tasks.
Some serious thought should therefore be given to the possibility of financing such bodies under heading 5 of the MFF, which has the additional advantage that margins are not as tight as with the other, operational headings (see Amendment 2).
Some serious thought should therefore be given to the possibility of financing such bodies under heading 5 of the MFF, which has the additional advantage that margins are not as tight as with the other, operational headings (see Amendment 2).
3) Of course, an Article 47 IIA procedure will be required for the setting-up of this new agency once the Commission has finally made public the details of its intended financing.
3) Of course, an Article 47 IIA procedure will be required for the setting-up of this new agency once the Commission has finally made public the details of its intended financing.
If the legislator should decide in favour of setting up this agency, the budgetary authority will have to come to an agreement on its financing within the framework of the provisions of the IIA (see Amendment 3).
If the legislator should decide in favour of setting up this agency, the budgetary authority will have to come to an agreement on its financing within the framework of the provisions of the IIA (see Amendment 3).
Комисията по бюджети приканва водещата комисия по промишленост, изследвания и енергетика да отхвърли настоящото предложение на Комисията поради несигурност относно финансирането му и да включи в проекта си на законодателна резолюция следните изменения:
The Committee on Budgets calls on the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, as the committee responsible, to reject the current Commission proposal on the grounds of uncertainties regarding its financing, and to incorporate the following amendments in its draft legislative resolution:
Счита, че референтната сума, посочена в законодателното предложение, не е съвместима с горната граница на подфункция 1а на настоящата многогодишната финансова рамка за 2007 - 2013 без да се нарушава финансирането на други приоритети; отбелязва, че Комисията е съобщила намерението си да финансира новата Агенцията за сътрудничество между енергийните регулатори изключително чрез преразпределяне в рамките на подфункция 1а; въпреки това отново заявява, че бюджетният орган все още не е получил никаква информация по отношение на подробностите, свързани с това преразпределяне и затова до момента все още не е ясно кои програми или приоритети са засегнати и какви последствия възникват от това през финансовия период, както и дали ще остане достатъчен марж в подфункция 1а;
Considers that the reference amount indicated in the legislative proposal is not compatible with the ceiling of subheading 1a of the current multiannual financial framework 2007 - 2013 without jeopardising the financing of other priorities; notes that the Commission has communicated its intention to finance the new Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators exclusively by redeployment within subheading 1a; reiterates, however, that the budgetary authority has not yet received any information as to the details of this redeployment exercise so that it remains unclear, to date, which programmes or priorities are affected and what consequences arise from this throughout the financial period, and whether a sufficient margin will remain in subheading 1a;
Подчертава, че предложената Агенция ще изпълнява главно административни задачи и ще подпомага Комисията; следователно е на мнение, че всички възможности от многогодишната финансова рамка за 2007 - 2013, включително и функция 5, където изглежда все още съществуват достатъчни маржове, следва да бъдат разгледани за финансирането на новата агенция;
Points out that the proposed Agency will fulfil mainly administrative tasks and assist the Commission; is consequently of the opinion that all possibilities of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2007 - 2013, including Heading 5 where sufficient margins still seem to be available, should be explored to finance the new agency;
Параграф 1 в (нов)
Paragraph 1 c (new)
8.4.2008 г.
Date adopted
The Commission’s proposal to set up a European agency to coordinate national energy regulators is a timely one and is the logical consequence of the evolution of the European energy programme over a number of years.
The Commission’s proposal to set up a European agency to coordinate national energy regulators is a timely one and is the logical consequence of the evolution of the European energy programme over a number of years.
Initially, public electricity and gas services in the 27 Member States were most commonly provided by companies – usually public – which had a virtual national or regional monopoly.
Initially, public electricity and gas services in the 27 Member States were most commonly provided by companies – usually public – which had a virtual national or regional monopoly.
However, these entities had for a long time been selling each other energy, so that rules had to be drawn up to ensure healthy competition between these and other, new entities which might appear on the market.
However, these entities had for a long time been selling each other energy, so that rules had to be drawn up to ensure healthy competition between these and other, new entities which might appear on the market.
The principle which slowly emerged was the separation of the two energy transmission networks (electricity and gas) on the one hand and the large number of energy production and distribution companies on the other.
The principle which slowly emerged was the separation of the two energy transmission networks (electricity and gas) on the one hand and the large number of energy production and distribution companies on the other.
This disconnection is intended to ensure the neutrality of the transmission system vis-à-vis the energy producers.
This disconnection is intended to ensure the neutrality of the transmission system vis-à-vis the energy producers.
How the disconnection is achieved (with or without ownership unbundling) is not relevant to the present regulation.
How the disconnection is achieved (with or without ownership unbundling) is not relevant to the present regulation.
Similarly, the Commission specifies that this disconnection must be carried out, irrespective of the system of ownership (public or private) of the transmitters and the producers/suppliers.
Similarly, the Commission specifies that this disconnection must be carried out, irrespective of the system of ownership (public or private) of the transmitters and the producers/suppliers.
The result of this evolution is that the system of European national transmission networks has been transformed into natural monopolies, just as happens with the system of roads, ports and airports between which lorries, ships and aircraft belonging to thousands of companies travel.
The result of this evolution is that the system of European national transmission networks has been transformed into natural monopolies, just as happens with the system of roads, ports and airports between which lorries, ships and aircraft belonging to thousands of companies travel.
The Commission has gone so far as to specify that part of the gas storage capacity must be integrated into the transmission system, which is a European public asset.
The Commission has gone so far as to specify that part of the gas storage capacity must be integrated into the transmission system, which is a European public asset.
This poses three problems:
This poses three problems:
- Guaranteeing free access for all producers, whether big or small (from the owner of a wind turbine to the owner of a number of nuclear power plants), to the transport system in a way which is completely transparent, without discrimination according to size or nationality.
- Guaranteeing free access for all producers, whether big or small (from the owner of a wind turbine to the owner of a number of nuclear power plants), to the transport system in a way which is completely transparent, without discrimination according to size or nationality.
- Regulating the energy market on the basis of the EU’s energy policy (which includes policies for social and regional integration and environmental protection, particularly regarding climate).
- Regulating the energy market on the basis of the EU’s energy policy (which includes policies for social and regional integration and environmental protection, particularly regarding climate).
- Achieving physical interconnection and harmonisation of technical standards between networks at European level and opening them up to third countries which, for example, supply gas (Russia) or transmit electricity (Switzerland).
- Achieving physical interconnection and harmonisation of technical standards between networks at European level and opening them up to third countries which, for example, supply gas (Russia) or transmit electricity (Switzerland).
The need for this interconnection and harmonisation is the rationale behind setting up a national regulator coordination body (the Agency).
The need for this interconnection and harmonisation is the rationale behind setting up a national regulator coordination body (the Agency).
Interconnection of the national transport network system and coordination of their regulators by the Agency in this way would constitute a real public energy service, which would be founded on European-level cooperation.
Interconnection of the national transport network system and coordination of their regulators by the Agency in this way would constitute a real public energy service, which would be founded on European-level cooperation.
The rapporteur agrees with the Commission’s proposals, although clarification is needed on two points.
The rapporteur agrees with the Commission’s proposals, although clarification is needed on two points.
Firstly, the Agency’s powers .
Firstly, the Agency’s powers .
The Commission is right to reject the idea of amending the treaties with the sole aim of granting the Agency binding powers, recognising that it has neither the technical means nor the staff to achieve this.
The Commission is right to reject the idea of amending the treaties with the sole aim of granting the Agency binding powers, recognising that it has neither the technical means nor the staff to achieve this.
It therefore proposes an agency which would be primarily consultative and would refer matters to the Commission for decisions and, if necessary, sanctions.
It therefore proposes an agency which would be primarily consultative and would refer matters to the Commission for decisions and, if necessary, sanctions.
The rapporteur considers that there are sufficient legal bases for increasing the powers of the Agency in the areas of the internal market and the fight against abuses of dominant positions, while at the same time leaving the power to impose fines with the Commission.
The rapporteur considers that there are sufficient legal bases for increasing the powers of the Agency in the areas of the internal market and the fight against abuses of dominant positions, while at the same time leaving the power to impose fines with the Commission.
On the other hand, monitoring the conformity of the national regulators’ policies with the EU energy policy can, as things stand at present, only be subject to non-binding opinions.
On the other hand, monitoring the conformity of the national regulators’ policies with the EU energy policy can, as things stand at present, only be subject to non-binding opinions.
Secondly, the Agency’s accountability .
Secondly, the Agency’s accountability .
The Agency’s credibility in the eyes of the market means that it must be completely independent from the agents whose behaviour it is required to regulate, whether these be energy transmission managers or energy producers/distributors.
The Agency’s credibility in the eyes of the market means that it must be completely independent from the agents whose behaviour it is required to regulate, whether these be energy transmission managers or energy producers/distributors.
An agency with this kind of decision-making power over private or public agents must have a legitimacy which is derived from democratic accountability.
An agency with this kind of decision-making power over private or public agents must have a legitimacy which is derived from democratic accountability.
In suggesting that the capacity of the Agency for direct action be increased (without the mediation of the Commission), the rapporteur has endeavoured to balance these powers with a democratic accountability to Parliament and the Council.
In suggesting that the capacity of the Agency for direct action be increased (without the mediation of the Commission), the rapporteur has endeavoured to balance these powers with a democratic accountability to Parliament and the Council.
The Agency must not only act in conformity with the treaties and secondary legislation, it must also give an account of its decisions and opinions to the European legislative bodies from which it derives its authority.
The Agency must not only act in conformity with the treaties and secondary legislation, it must also give an account of its decisions and opinions to the European legislative bodies from which it derives its authority.
(4( През пролетта на 2007 г. Европейският Съвет прикани Комисията да предложи мерки по отношение на установяването на независим механизъм за сътрудничество между националните регулатори .
(4) The European Council in the spring of 2007 invited the Commission to propose measures to set up an independent mechanism for national regulators to co-operate .
(4) През пролетта на 2007 г. Европейският Съвет прикани Комисията да предложи мерки по отношение на установяването на независим механизъм с цел националните енергийни регулаторни органи да си сътрудничат помежду си и да вземат решения във връзка с важни трансгранични въпроси .
(4) The European Council in the spring of 2007 invited the Commission to propose measures to set up an independent mechanism for energy-regulating bodies to cooperate with each other and take decisions on important cross-border issues.
(4а) За да бъдат постигнати целите на енергийната политика за Европа, държавите-членки следва тясно да си сътрудничат и да премахнат пречките пред трансграничния обмен.
(4a) Тhe Member States should cooperate closely and eliminate obstacles to cross-border exchanges in order to achieve the objectives of EU energy policy.
Приемането на независим инструмент, който да запълни съществуващия в момента вакуум, ще служи на двойната цел за включване на европейската перспектива в упражняването, от страна на националните регулаторни органи, на техните компетенции, както и за принос към ефективността на принципите на Общността за равно третиране, еднакви условия за всички по отношение на достъпа до европейските преносни системи за газ и електроенергия и правилно функциониране на вътрешния пазар.
Adopting an independent instrument to fill the existing gap would serve the dual purpose of incorporating the European perspective in the national regulatory authorities’ exercise of their powers and of contributing to the effectiveness of the Community principles of equal treatment and fair conditions of access to the trans-European networks for transporting gas and electricity, and contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market.
Европейската агенция за сътрудничество на енергийните регулатори, наричана по-долу "Агенцията", се създава като организация, за да могат националните регулаторни органи да засилят своето сътрудничество от европейска перспектива и да участват, разполагайки с обща основа, в изпълнението на функции с европейско измерение.
The Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, hereinafter ‘the Agency’ is to be established as an organisation to enable national regulatory authorities to step up their cooperation from a European perspective and participate, on common bases, in the exercise of Europe-related functions.
(5) Въз основа на оценка на въздействието във връзка с изискваните ресурси за функционирането на централен орган, бе направено заключението, че един независим централен орган предлага редица дългосрочни преимущества в сравнение с други възможности.
(5) On the basis of the impact assessment of the resource requirements for a central entity, it was concluded that an independent central entity offered a number of long-term advantages over other options.
Поради това, следва да се създаде Агенция за сътрудничество между енергийните регулатори, наричана по-долу „Агенцията“ .
An Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Agency’, should therefore be established .
Моделът на агенцията беше предпочетен пред други модели, като напр.
The "agency" model was chosen rather than any other, such as ERGEG+.
The Commission has discarded a number of other options, such as ERGEG+ or a structure similar to the European System of central Banks.
The Commission has discarded a number of other options, such as ERGEG+ or a structure similar to the European System of central Banks.
Should the agency model retained not deliver the expected results, the Commission should reconsider the other options and modify the regulation accordingly.
Should the agency model retained not deliver the expected results, the Commission should reconsider the other options and modify the regulation accordingly.
За тази цел е необходимо да се гарантира нейната независимост, технически и регулаторен капацитет , прозрачност и ефективност.
To that end, it is necessary to guarantee the independence of the Agency, its technical and regulatory capacities and its transparency and efficiency.
За тази цел е необходимо да се гарантира независимостта на Агенцията и нейните преки потребители, производителите на енергия и оператори на преносни и разпределителни системи, както държавни, така и частни, и да се гарантира съответствието на нейните действия със законодателството на Общността , нейния технически капацитет, способността му да се приспособява към развитието в регулирането и нейната прозрачност, отговорност пред демократичен контрол и ефективност.
To that end, it is necessary to guarantee the independence of the Agency and its members vis-à-vis consumers, energy producers and transmission and distribution system operators, whether public or private, and to ensure the conformity of its actions with Community legislation , its technical capacity, its capacity to adjust to regulatory developments and its transparency , amenability to democratic control and efficiency.
(8) Целесъобразно е да се създаде интегрирана рамка, в която националните регулаторни органи да могат да участват и да си сътрудничат.
(8) It is appropriate to provide an integrated framework within which national regulatory authorities are able to participate and cooperate.