natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
This, in turn, will almost automatically lead Member States to try and maximise concepts of the national benefit from the EU budget.
This, in turn, will almost automatically lead Member States to try and maximise concepts of the national benefit from the EU budget.
The more it is generally felt that it is the Member States' money that is transferred to Brussels rather than the EU’s genuinely own resources, the more Member States will concentrate on what they get in return.
The more it is generally felt that it is the Member States' money that is transferred to Brussels rather than the EU’s genuinely own resources, the more Member States will concentrate on what they get in return.
This is why the concept of “budgetary balances”, the roles of “net payers” and “net receivers”, have become so important.
This is why the concept of “budgetary balances”, the roles of “net payers” and “net receivers”, have become so important.
Budgetary balances
Budgetary balances
Nevertheless, it has to be pointed out that - although there is an established system of calculating Member States' budgetary balances
Nevertheless, it has to be pointed out that - although there is an established system of calculating Member States' budgetary balances
The method used by the Commission is based on the same principles as the method used for the calculation of the correction of budgetary imbalances in favour of the UK.
The method used by the Commission is based on the same principles as the method used for the calculation of the correction of budgetary imbalances in favour of the UK.
This is the only method that has a degree of formal recognition, based on the June 1984 Fontainebleau agreement.
This is the only method that has a degree of formal recognition, based on the June 1984 Fontainebleau agreement.
Accordingly, traditional own resources being pure Community revenue are not included in the calculation of the balances.
Accordingly, traditional own resources being pure Community revenue are not included in the calculation of the balances.
Instead, it is the allocation key of Member States' VAT-based and GNP/GNI-based payments which is used for the calculations. - this is merely an accounting exercise of the purely financial costs and benefits that each Member State derives from the Union.
Instead, it is the allocation key of Member States' VAT-based and GNP/GNI-based payments which is used for the calculations. - this is merely an accounting exercise of the purely financial costs and benefits that each Member State derives from the Union.
It does not take any account of many of the other benefits gained from EU policies such as those relating to the internal market and economic integration, not to mention political stability and security.
It does not take any account of many of the other benefits gained from EU policies such as those relating to the internal market and economic integration, not to mention political stability and security.
Bearing in mind these limitations, what do the budgetary balances actually show?
Bearing in mind these limitations, what do the budgetary balances actually show?
They show the relation between the share of a Member State in total payments of the VAT-based and GNP/GNI-based own resources and its share in total EU operating expenditure (i.e. excluding administrative expenditure) allocated to the Member States.
They show the relation between the share of a Member State in total payments of the VAT-based and GNP/GNI-based own resources and its share in total EU operating expenditure (i.e. excluding administrative expenditure) allocated to the Member States.
The following table gives a picture of these "operational" budgetary balances (after deduction of the UK rebate) between 1997 and 2003:
The following table gives a picture of these "operational" budgetary balances (after deduction of the UK rebate) between 1997 and 2003:
Letter of the Six
Letter of the Six
As can be clearly seen, this division among the Member States between net-contributors and net-receivers, as little indication as it might give on the overall benefits of EU-membership, has not significantly changed over the last few years.
As can be clearly seen, this division among the Member States between net-contributors and net-receivers, as little indication as it might give on the overall benefits of EU-membership, has not significantly changed over the last few years.
It provides the context for the famous letter signed by six Heads of State - all net-contributors - after the European Council of Brussels on the future EU expenditure level:
It provides the context for the famous letter signed by six Heads of State - all net-contributors - after the European Council of Brussels on the future EU expenditure level:
We see in this context no room for a EU-budget near the current ceiling for own resources.
We see in this context no room for a EU-budget near the current ceiling for own resources.
Average expenditure during the next financial perspective should in our view be stabilised around current expenditure levels, and should not exceed 1.0% of GNI, including agriculture spending within the ceiling set by the European Council in October 2002.
Average expenditure during the next financial perspective should in our view be stabilised around current expenditure levels, and should not exceed 1.0% of GNI, including agriculture spending within the ceiling set by the European Council in October 2002.
This would still allow for annual increases on the EU-budget well above growth rates of national budgets in most Member States, and permit a sufficient margin for policy-implementation in the enlarged Union.
This would still allow for annual increases on the EU-budget well above growth rates of national budgets in most Member States , and permit a sufficient margin for policy-implementation in the enlarged Union .
With this letter the main net-contributors to the EU budget have made a strong statement which has become almost an official starting point for the negotiations on the new financial perspectives 2007-2013.
With this letter the main net-contributors to the EU budget have made a strong statement which has become almost an official starting point for the negotiations on the new financial perspectives 2007-2013.
In the meantime, the discussion has even gone so far as to imply that the figure of 1.0% of GNI, as mentioned in the letter, refers to commitment appropriations and not to payments as initially taken for granted.
In the meantime, the discussion has even gone so far as to imply that the figure of 1.0% of GNI, as mentioned in the letter, refers to commitment appropriations and not to payments as initially taken for granted.
Comparison EU budget - national budgets
Comparison EU budget - national budgets
Judging from the Letter of the Six it might seem as if the EU budget has gone totally out of control in the recent past.
Judging from the Letter of the Six it might seem as if the EU budget has gone totally out of control in the recent past.
However, a closer look at the development of the EU budget over the last few years reveals that during the period 1996
However, a closer look at the development of the EU budget over the last few years reveals that during the period 1996
1996 was the first year when the entire EU budget involved all 15 current Member States. -2002 the EU budget only increased by 8,2 % while the national budgets increased by an average of 22.9 %:
1996 was the first year when the entire EU budget involved all 15 current Member States. -2002 the EU budget only increased by 8,2 % while the national budgets increased by an average of 22.9 %:
Current prices, € million
Current prices, € million
EU budget
EU budget
This very modest increase is even more remarkable considering the fact that, in the meantime, the Union has become responsible for more and more policies.
This very modest increase is even more remarkable considering the fact that, in the meantime, the Union has become responsible for more and more policies.
It has thus gained a great number of competencies while at the same time its financial resources have remained very limited.
It has thus gained a great number of competencies while at the same time its financial resources have remained very limited.
Discrepancy between expenditure ceilings and actual expenditure
Discrepancy between expenditure ceilings and actual expenditure
Not only has the EU budget grown much more slowly than the budgets of the Member States: Concerning payments
Not only has the EU budget grown much more slowly than the budgets of the Member States: Concerning payments
Of course, the same is true for commitments where the actual budget figures have never even come close to the ceiling established by the decision on the system of own resources of 1.31% of GNI and 1.24% in payment appropriations of GNI. , the EU budgets of the last few years have not only remained considerably under the maximum own resources ceiling of 1,27% of GNP/1,24% of GNI set by the Member States but also under the payment ceilings of the current financial perspective which range from a minimum of 1,07% of GNI in 2000 to a maximum of 1,11% of GNI for 2003 and 2004:
Of course, the same is true for commitments where the actual budget figures have never even come close to the ceiling established by the decision on the system of own resources of 1.31% of GNI and 1.24% in payment appropriations of GNI. , the EU budgets of the last few years have not only remained considerably under the maximum own resources ceiling of 1,27% of GNP/1,24% of GNI set by the Member States but also under the payment ceilings of the current financial perspective which range from a minimum of 1,07% of GNI in 2000 to a maximum of 1,11% of GNI for 2003 and 2004:
Payments in % of GNP/GNI
Payments in % of GNP/GNI
1986 to 2002 based on the outturn in payments.
1986 to 2002 based on the outturn in payments.
2003 to 2005 based on the budget.
2003 to 2005 based on the budget.
This means that the EU has spent millions of euro less than, according to the decision of the Member States, it could have.
This means that the EU has spent millions of euro less than, according to the decision of the Member States, it could have.
Especially after the budgetary procedure for 2005, when the 1% threshold introduced by the Letter of the Six for the first time played such a prominent role, the question remains how the gap between the own resources ceiling of 1,24 % and the actual payment expenditure can be justified.
Especially after the budgetary procedure for 2005, when the 1% threshold introduced by the Letter of the Six for the first time played such a prominent role, the question remains how the gap between the own resources ceiling of 1,24 % and the actual payment expenditure can be justified.
What is the margin left for?
What is the margin left for?
Criticism of Parliament's agreement to the financial perspectives with their rigid classification of expenditure and their rather inflexible heading ceilings, has always been countered by pointing out that at the same time the financial perspectives would guarantee the steady growth of expenditure necessary to finance new policies important to the European citizens.
Criticism of Parliament's agreement to the financial perspectives with their rigid classification of expenditure and their rather inflexible heading ceilings, has always been countered by pointing out that at the same time the financial perspectives would guarantee the steady growth of expenditure necessary to finance new policies important to the European citizens.
However, the real figures (see table above) indicate that this has not been the case.
However, the real figures (see table above) indicate that this has not been the case.
Small margin for manoeuvre
Small margin for manoeuvre
Overall, the structure of EU-expenditure has remained more or less the same over the past few years.
Overall, the structure of EU-expenditure has remained more or less the same over the past few years.
Despite all efforts to the contrary, agricultural expenditure still accounts for around 50% of the European Union's budget
Despite all efforts to the contrary, agricultural expenditure still accounts for around 50% of the European Union's budget
1997 to 2002 based on the outturn in payments.
1997 to 2002 based on the outturn in payments.
2003 to 2005 based on the budget. :
2003 to 2005 based on the budget. :
Share of agricultural spending in total EU expenditure
Share of agricultural spending in total EU expenditure
* Budgets EU 25
* Budgets EU 25
The agriculture share in expenditure together with the structural funds payments leave very little room for manoeuvre for flexibility with regard to the financing of new policies or priorities.
The agriculture share in expenditure together with the structural funds payments leave very little room for manoeuvre for flexibility with regard to the financing of new policies or priorities.
For example, will the resources at hand truly allow for efforts towards reaching the Lisbon goals for growth, employment and competitiveness?
For example, will the resources at hand truly allow for efforts towards reaching the Lisbon goals for growth, employment and competitiveness?
Or even more general, will it be at all possible to finance the needs of 25 (or 27) Member States with regard to maintaining the acquis communautaire, enhancing cohesion and strengthening new neighbourhood policies?
Or even more general, will it be at all possible to finance the needs of 25 (or 27) Member States with regard to maintaining the acquis communautaire, enhancing cohesion and strengthening new neighbourhood policies?
Given this financial framework, can the Union fulfil the provisions of article 6, paragraph 4, of the Nice Treaty according to which "the Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to obtain its objectives and carry through its policies" ?
Given this financial framework, can the Union fulfil the provisions of article 6, paragraph 4, of the Nice Treaty according to which "the Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to obtain its objectives and carry through its policies" ?
Accordingly, in its proposals for the new financial perspectives, the Commission moves between two options: to give the Union the means to realise its objectives (Lisbon process) on the one hand and to consider threats of budgetary cuts expressed in the Letter of the Six after the European Council of Brussels on the other.
Accordingly, in its proposals for the new financial perspectives, the Commission moves between two options: to give the Union the means to realise its objectives (Lisbon process) on the one hand and to consider threats of budgetary cuts expressed in the Letter of the Six after the European Council of Brussels on the other.
At the same time as the 1%-discussions have gained momentum, the RAL (outstanding commitments as a consequence of level of payments lower than level of commitments)
At the same time as the 1%-discussions have gained momentum, the RAL (outstanding commitments as a consequence of level of payments lower than level of commitments)
RAL, in the first place, thus are a direct and "normal" consequence of differentiated appropriations.
RAL, in the first place, thus are a direct and "normal" consequence of differentiated appropriations.
However, besides this normal RAL , overall RAL as the total of outstanding commitments which remain to be paid once the conditions for payment are fulfilled also contains potentially abnormal RAL and actually abnormal RAL .
However, besides this normal RAL , overall RAL as the total of outstanding commitments which remain to be paid once the conditions for payment are fulfilled also contains potentially abnormal RAL and actually abnormal RAL .
Per definitionem, potentially abnormal RAL are dormant commitments in respect of which no payment has been made for the last two financial years or old commitments that have been in the accounts for at least five financial years.
Per definitionem, potentially abnormal RAL are dormant commitments in respect of which no payment has been made for the last two financial years or old commitments that have been in the accounts for at least five financial years.
In contrast, actually abnormal RAL is the sum of commitments recorded in the accounts which lack a legal or factual justification for payment. have kept increasing at a steady pace, in fact, much faster than the budgets.
In contrast, actually abnormal RAL is the sum of commitments recorded in the accounts which lack a legal or factual justification for payment. have kept increasing at a steady pace, in fact, much faster than the budgets.
The following table shows the evolution of overall RAL against the budget (Section III, 1996-2005, in EUR million):
The following table shows the evolution of overall RAL against the budget (Section III, 1996-2005, in EUR million):
In 1996, overall RAL represented only 56% of the budget, while in 2003 it had already increased to 107% of the budget.
In 1996, overall RAL represented only 56% of the budget, while in 2003 it had already increased to 107% of the budget.
Since Headings 1 and 5, which together represent some 50% of the budget, are mainly composed of non-differentiated appropriations and have thus no RAL, the outstanding commitments concentrate in Headings 2, 3, 4 and 7.
Since Headings 1 and 5, which together represent some 50% of the budget, are mainly composed of non-differentiated appropriations and have thus no RAL, the outstanding commitments concentrate in Headings 2, 3, 4 and 7.
Even considering the fact that there has always been some controversy as to which amount/percentage of RAL is "normal" and which is "abnormal", the general perception of RAL as "unspent appropriations" is undoubtedly a factor that will be raised in the coming discussions on the future of own resources.
Even considering the fact that there has always been some controversy as to which amount/percentage of RAL is "normal" and which is "abnormal", the general perception of RAL as "unspent appropriations" is undoubtedly a factor that will be raised in the coming discussions on the future of own resources.
Political responsibility
Political responsibility
The current situation with the European Union's finances is also characterised by the fact that political responsibility for EU revenue and expenditure is split up among a number of independent key actors.
The current situation with the European Union's finances is also characterised by the fact that political responsibility for EU revenue and expenditure is split up among a number of independent key actors.
While it is the national parliaments which, in addition to their involvement in the own resources decisions per se, determine the Union's revenue via the tax policies of their countries, it is the European Parliament and Council which decide upon the Union's expenditure.
While it is the national parliaments which, in addition to their involvement in the own resources decisions per se, determine the Union's revenue via the tax policies of their countries, it is the European Parliament and Council which decide upon the Union's expenditure.
Here again, there is a splitting of responsibilities - which is anything but transparent - according to the nature of EU-expenditure being obligatory or non-obligatory.
Here again, there is a splitting of responsibilities - which is anything but transparent - according to the nature of EU-expenditure being obligatory or non-obligatory.
The difference between obligatory expenditure where Council has the last say and non-obligatory expenditure where it is up to Parliament to take the final decision may have historical reasons but is not logical anymore and makes the system even more obscure.
The difference between obligatory expenditure where Council has the last say and non-obligatory expenditure where it is up to Parliament to take the final decision may have historical reasons but is not logical anymore and makes the system even more obscure.
The European Council, on the other hand, more and more often takes decisions on new policies or new priorities with far-reaching financial consequences seemingly without giving too much thought to how the budgetary authority is going to make the necessary funds available within the tight framework of the headings of the financial perspective.
The European Council, on the other hand, more and more often takes decisions on new policies or new priorities with far-reaching financial consequences seemingly without giving too much thought to how the budgetary authority is going to make the necessary funds available within the tight framework of the headings of the financial perspective.
3 ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES OWN RESOURCES
3 ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES OWN RESOURCES
Scenarios for the future of the European Communities' own resources
Scenarios for the future of the European Communities' own resources
The current Council Decision of 29 September 2000 on the system of the European Communities' own resources
The current Council Decision of 29 September 2000 on the system of the European Communities' own resources
OJ L 253, 7.10.2000, p.
OJ L 253, 7.10.2000, p.
42 , in its Article 9, contains a revision clause according to which
42 , in its Article 9, contains a revision clause according to which
The Commission shall undertake, before 1 January 2006, a general review of the own resources system, accompanied, if necessary, by appropriate proposals, in the light of all relevant factors, including the effects of enlargement on the financing of the budget, the possibility of modifying the structure of the own resources by creating new autonomous own resources and the correction of budgetary imbalances granted to the United Kingdom as well as the granting to Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden of the reduction pursuant to Article 5(1)
The Commission shall undertake, before 1 January 2006, a general review of the own resources system, accompanied, if necessary, by appropriate proposals, in the light of all relevant factors, including the effects of enlargement on the financing of the budget, the possibility of modifying the structure of the own resources by creating new autonomous own resources and the correction of budgetary imbalances granted to the United Kingdom as well as the granting to Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden of the reduction pursuant to Article 5(1)
Article 5(1) restricts the financing share in the cost of the British rebate of Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden to one fourth of their normal share resulting from the calculation method. .
Article 5(1) restricts the financing share in the cost of the British rebate of Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden to one fourth of their normal share resulting from the calculation method. .
In response to a request from the European Parliament and in agreement with Council, the Commission committed itself to present the above mentioned report on the functioning of the financing system at a much earlier date.
In response to a request from the European Parliament and in agreement with Council, the Commission committed itself to present the above mentioned report on the functioning of the financing system at a much earlier date.
On 14 July 2004 it published its Report on the operation of the own resources system
On 14 July 2004 it published its Report on the operation of the own resources system
COM(2004)0505 . together with a proposal for a new Council Decision on own resources, accompanied by a proposal for a Regulation on the implementing measures for the correction of budgetary imbalances
COM(2004)0505 . together with a proposal for a new Council Decision on own resources, accompanied by a proposal for a Regulation on the implementing measures for the correction of budgetary imbalances
What Parliament expected from a new own resources system it had already formulated in its amendments to the proposal of 1999, stating the need for the European Union
What Parliament expected from a new own resources system it had already formulated in its amendments to the proposal of 1999, stating the need for the European Union
· to create a system that must be "simple and readily understood by the public"
· to create a system that must be "simple and readily understood by the public"