natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
The owner/operator of a European Critical Infrastructure shall submit the Operator Security Plan to the relevant Member State authority within one year following designation of the critical infrastructure as a European Critical Infrastructure.
The owner/operator of a European Critical Infrastructure shall submit the Operator Security Plan to the relevant Member State authority within one year following designation of the critical infrastructure as a European Critical Infrastructure.
Собственикът/ операторът на Европейска критична инфраструктура представя Операторския план за безопасност на съответния пункт за връзка за ЗКИ в срок от една година след определянето на съоръжението на критична инфраструктура за Европейска критична инфраструктура.
The owner/operator of a European Critical Infrastructure shall submit the Operator Security Plan to the relevant CIP Contact Point within one year following designation of the critical infrastructure as a European Critical Infrastructure.
Where sector specific requirements concerning the Operator Security Plan are adopted based on paragraph 2, the operator security plan shall only be submitted to the relevant Member State authority within 1 year following the adoption of the sector specific requirements.
Where sector specific requirements concerning the Operator Security Plan are adopted based on paragraph 2, the operator security plan shall only be submitted to the relevant Member State authority within 1 year following the adoption of the sector specific requirements.
Когато отрасловите изисквания по отношение на Операторския план за безопасност се приемат на основание параграф 2, операторският план за безопасност се представя на съответния пункт за връзка за ЗКИ едва в срок от една година след приемането на отрасловите изисквания.
Where sector specific requirements concerning the Operator Security Plan are adopted based on paragraph 2, the operator security plan shall only be submitted to the relevant CIP Contact Point within 1 year following the adoption of the sector specific requirements.
One-stop-shop principle:
One-stop-shop principle.
Член 5, параграф 5
Article 5, paragraph 5
Compliance with Directive 2005/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on enhancing port security satisfies the requirement to establish an Operator Security Plan.
Compliance with Directive 2005/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on enhancing port security satisfies the requirement to establish an Operator Security Plan.
By listing one, you exclude others.
By listing one, you exclude others.
See the proposed addition to paragraph 1.
See the proposed addition to paragraph 1.
Each Member State shall require the owners/operators of European Critical Infrastructures on their territory to designate a Security Liaison Officer as the point of contact for security related issues between the owner/operator of the infrastructure and the relevant critical infrastructure protection authorities in the Member State.
Each Member State shall require the owners/operators of European Critical Infrastructures on their territory to designate a Security Liaison Officer as the point of contact for security related issues between the owner/operator of the infrastructure and the relevant critical infrastructure protection authorities in the Member State.
The Security Liaison Officer shall be designated within one year following the designation of the critical infrastructure as a European Critical Infrastructure.
The Security Liaison Officer shall be designated within one year following the designation of the critical infrastructure as a European Critical Infrastructure.
Всяка държава-членка изисква от собствениците/оператори на Европейска критична инфраструктура да определят служител за връзка по въпросите на сигурността, като точка на контакт по въпросите на сигурността между собственика/оператора на инфраструктурата и пункта за връзка за ЗКИ в държавата-членка.
Each Member State shall require the owners/operators of European Critical Infrastructures on their territory to designate a Security Liaison Officer as the point of contact for security related issues between the owner/operator of the infrastructure and the CIP Contact Point in the Member State.
Служителят за връзка по въпросите на сигурността се определя в срок от една година след определянето на съоръжението на критична инфраструктура за Европейска критична инфраструктура.
The Security Liaison Officer shall be designated within one year following the designation of the critical infrastructure as a European Critical Infrastructure
Each Member State shall communicate relevant information concerning identified risks and threats to the Security Liaison Officers of the European Critical Infrastructure concerned.
Each Member State shall communicate relevant information concerning identified risks and threats to the Security Liaison Officers of the European Critical Infrastructure concerned.
Чрез националния пункт за връзка за ЗКИ всяка държава-членка съобщава на служителя за връзка по въпросите на сигурността на съответното съоръжение на Европейската критична инфраструктура относимата информация за установените рискове и заплахи.
Each Member State shall communicate relevant information concerning identified risks and threats to the Security Liaison Officers of the European Critical Infrastructure concerned through the national CIP Contact Point .
One-stop-shop principle.
One-stop-shop principle.
The administrative burden should be as limited as possible.
The administrative burden should be as limited as possible.
Each Member State shall report to the Commission on a summary basis on the types of vulnerabilities, threats and risks encountered in each sector referred to in Annex I within 18 months following the adoption of the list provided for in Article 4(2) and thereafter on an ongoing basis every two years.
Each Member State shall report to the Commission on a summary basis on the types of vulnerabilities, threats and risks encountered in each sector referred to in Annex I within 18 months following the adoption of the list provided for in Article 4(2) and thereafter on an ongoing basis every two years.
В срок от 12 месеца след приемането на списъка по член 4, параграф 2, а впоследствие - на всеки две години, всяка държава-членка представя на Комисията обобщаващ доклад за различните видове структурни слабости, заплахи и рискове, открити в Европейската критична инфраструктура .
Each Member State shall report to the Commission on a summary basis on the types of structural vulnerabilities, threats and risks encountered in European Critical Infrastructures within 12 months following the adoption of the list provided for in Article 4(2) and thereafter on an ongoing basis every two years.
A common template for these reports shall be developed in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 11(3).
A common template for these reports shall be developed in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 11(3).
Единен образец за гореспоменатите доклади се изработва от Комисията и одобрява от Съвета.
A common template for these reports shall be developed by the Commission and approved by the Council.
Член 7, параграф 3
Article 7, Paragraph 3
The Commission shall assess, on a sectoral basis, whether specific protection measures are required for European Critical Infrastructures.
The Commission shall assess, on a sectoral basis, whether specific protection measures are required for European Critical Infrastructures.
Комисията и държавите-членки извършват секторна оценка , която да установи дали са необходими специфични защитни мерки за съоръженията на Европейската критична инфраструктура.
The Commission and the Member States shall assess, on a sectoral basis, whether specific protection measures are required for European Critical Infrastructures.
В този контекст се вземат предвид съществуващите добри практики и методологии.
Account shall be taken in this context of existing good practice and methodologies.
The Member States should be involved in the assessment of the critical sectors.
The Member States should be involved in the assessment of the critical sectors.
Common methodologies for carrying out vulnerability, threat and risk assessments in respect of European Critical Infrastructures may be developed on a sectoral basis in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 11(3).
Common methodologies for carrying out vulnerability, threat and risk assessments in respect of European Critical Infrastructures may be developed on a sectoral basis in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 11(3).
Ако се счете за необходимо, на ниво отрасъл могат да се изготвят единни методологии за извършване на оценка на уязвимостта, заплахите и риска по отношение на Европейска критична инфраструктура.
If deemed to be necessary, common methodologies carrying out structural vulnerability, threat and risk assessments in respect of European Critical Infrastructures may be developed on a sectoral basis.
Тези единни методологии отчитат съществуващите методологии.
Such common methodologies shall take into account existing methodologies.
The Commission shall support the owners/operators of designated European Critical Infrastructures by providing access to available best practices and methodologies related to critical infrastructure protection.
The Commission shall support the owners/operators of designated European Critical Infrastructures by providing access to available best practices and methodologies related to critical infrastructure protection.
Комисията и държавите-членки подкрепят собствениците/операторите на обозначени европейски критични инфраструктури, като им осигуряват достъп до наличните най-добри практики и методологии, свързани със защитата на критичните инфраструктури.
The Commission and the Member States shall support the owners/operators of designated European Critical infrastructures providing access to available best practices and methodologies related to critical infrastructure protection.
Any person handling confidential information pursuant to this Directive on behalf of a Member State shall have an appropriate level of security vetting by the Member State concerned.
Any person handling confidential information pursuant to this Directive on behalf of a Member State shall have an appropriate level of security vetting by the Member State concerned.
Всяко лице, обработващо поверителна информация по настоящата директива от името на държава-членка, е предмет на оптимално равнище на проверка за сигурност, извършвана от заинтересованата държава-членка.
Any person handling confidential information pursuant to this Directive on behalf of a Member State shall have an optimum level of security vetting by the Member State concerned.
Member States shall ensure that Critical Infrastructure Protection Information submitted to the Member States or to the Commission, is not used for any purpose other than the protection of critical infrastructures.
Member States shall ensure that Critical Infrastructure Protection Information submitted to the Member States or to the Commission, is not used for any purpose other than the protection of critical infrastructures.
Държавите-членки и Комисията гарантират, че предоставената им информация относно защита на Европейска критична инфраструктура не се използва за никакви други цели освен за защита на Европейска критична инфраструктура и че се отделя необходимото внимание на принципа на пропорционалност от материална гледна точка и на основните права и институции, които следва да бъдат защитени.
Member States and the Commission shall ensure that European Critical Infrastructure Protection Information submitted to them is not used for any purpose other than the protection of European Critical Infrastructures, and that due account is taken of the principle of proportionality from a material point of view and of fundamental rights and institutions which should be protected .
The Commission shall be assisted by a Committee composed of a representative of each CIP Contact Point.
The Commission shall be assisted by a Committee composed of a representative of each CIP Contact Point.
Where reference is made to this paragraph, Articles 3 and 7 of Decision 1999/468/EC shall apply having regard to the provisions of Article 8 thereof.
Where reference is made to this paragraph, Articles 3 and 7 of Decision 1999/468/EC shall apply having regard to the provisions of Article 8 thereof.
The period laid down in Article 5(6) of Decision 1999/468/EC shall be set at one month.
The period laid down in Article 5(6) of Decision 1999/468/EC shall be set at one month.
The Committee shall adopt its Rules of Procedure.
The Committee shall adopt its Rules of Procedure.
When issuing implementing measures or exchanging best practice, resort should be had to structures that already exist in the disaster prevention sector (workshops, etc.).
When issuing implementing measures or exchanging best practice, resort should be had to structures that already exist in the disaster prevention sector (workshops, etc.).
The establishment of a new committee is unnecessary.
The establishment of a new committee is unnecessary.
Член 12, параграф 1, алинея 1
Article 12, Paragraph 1, subparagraph 1
Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 31 December 2007 at the latest.
Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 31 December 2007 at the latest.
Extension of the transposition deadline is essential since transposition by the end of 2007 is unrealistic.
Extension of the transposition deadline is essential since transposition by the end of 2007 is unrealistic.
Приложение I, Заглавие
Annex I, Title
List of critical infrastructure sectors
List of critical infrastructure sectors
Списък на възможни сектори с критични инфраструктури
List of possible critical infrastructure sectors
Приложение I, раздел ІІІ, подраздел 9
Annex I, Sector III, Sub-sector 9
Radio communication and navigation
Radio communication and navigation
Радиокомуникация, навигация и спектри на радиочестотна идентификация (RFID)
Radio communication , navigation and radio-frequency identification (RFID) spectres
Приложение I, раздел VІI, подраздел 19
Annex I, Sector VII, Sub-sector 19
Payment and securities clearing and settlement infrastructures and systems
Payment and securities clearing and settlement infrastructures and systems
Инфраструктури и системи за клиринг и уреждане на сметки и ценни книжа и доставчиците на тези услуги .
Payment and securities clearing and settlement infrastructures and systems and their service providers
Приложение I, раздел VІI, подраздел 19a (now)
Annex I, Sector VII, Sub-sector 19 a (new)
19а Банково и застрахователно дело
19a Banking and insurance
GENERAL BACKGROUND:
GENERAL BACKGROUND:
The European Council of June 2004 asked the Commission to prepare an overall strategy to protect critical infrastructure.
The European Council of June 2004 asked the Commission to prepare an overall strategy to protect critical infrastructure.
The Commission adopted on 20 October 2004 a Communication on Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Fight against Terrorism which put forward suggestions on what would enhance European prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks involving Critical Infrastructures (CI).
The Commission adopted on 20 October 2004 a Communication on Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Fight against Terrorism which put forward suggestions on what would enhance European prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks involving Critical Infrastructures (CI).
The Council conclusions on “Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Terrorist Attacks” and the “EU Solidarity Programme on the Consequences of Terrorist Threats and Attacks” adopted by the Council in December 2004 endorsed the intention of the Commission to propose a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) and agreed to the set-up by the Commission of a Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN).
The Council conclusions on “Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Terrorist Attacks” and the “EU Solidarity Programme on the Consequences of Terrorist Threats and Attacks” adopted by the Council in December 2004 endorsed the intention of the Commission to propose a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) and agreed to the set-up by the Commission of a Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network (CIWIN).
In November 2005, the Commission adopted a Green Paper on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) which provided policy options on how the Commission could establish EPCIP and CIWIN.
In November 2005, the Commission adopted a Green Paper on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) which provided policy options on how the Commission could establish EPCIP and CIWIN.
In December 2005 the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council called upon the Commission to make a proposal on EPCIP by June 2006.
In December 2005 the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council called upon the Commission to make a proposal on EPCIP by June 2006.
This proposal for a Directive presents the measures that the Commission is proposing on the identification and designation of European Critical Infrastructures (ECI) and the assessment of the need to improve their protection.
This proposal for a Directive presents the measures that the Commission is proposing on the identification and designation of European Critical Infrastructures (ECI) and the assessment of the need to improve their protection.
The legal basis for the proposal is Article 308 of the Treaty establishing the European Community.
The legal basis for the proposal is Article 308 of the Treaty establishing the European Community.
Information was collected from all relevant stakeholders.
Information was collected from all relevant stakeholders.
As currently no horizontal provisions on critical infrastructure protection exist at EU level, the Commission's proposal intends to create a horizontal framework for the identification and designation of European Critical Infrastructures and for the assessment of needs to improve their protection.
As currently no horizontal provisions on critical infrastructure protection exist at EU level, the Commission's proposal intends to create a horizontal framework for the identification and designation of European Critical Infrastructures and for the assessment of needs to improve their protection.
Following the Commission's proposal only a common framework, by way of a directive, can provide the necessary basis for a coherent and uniform implementation of measures to enhance the protection of ECI, as well as defining clearly the respective responsibilities of ECI stakeholders.
Following the Commission's proposal only a common framework, by way of a directive, can provide the necessary basis for a coherent and uniform implementation of measures to enhance the protection of ECI, as well as defining clearly the respective responsibilities of ECI stakeholders.
Non-binding voluntary measures, while flexible, would not provide the necessary stable foundation as they would not provide enough clarity on who does what, nor would they clarify the rights and obligations for ECI stakeholders involved.
Non-binding voluntary measures, while flexible, would not provide the necessary stable foundation as they would not provide enough clarity on who does what, nor would they clarify the rights and obligations for ECI stakeholders involved.
RAPPORTEUR'S POSITION:
RAPPORTEUR'S POSITION:
The rapporteur supports the idea of a common framework.
The rapporteur supports the idea of a common framework.
Indeed, the damage or loss of a piece of infrastructure in one MS may have negative effects on several others and on the European economy as a whole.
Indeed, the damage or loss of a piece of infrastructure in one MS may have negative effects on several others and on the European economy as a whole.
New technologies (e.g. the internet) and market liberalisation (e.g. in electricity and gas supply) mean that much infrastructure is part of a larger network.
New technologies (e.g. the internet) and market liberalisation (e.g. in electricity and gas supply) mean that much infrastructure is part of a larger network.
In such a situation protection measures are only as strong as their weakest link.
In such a situation protection measures are only as strong as their weakest link.
The vulnerability of critical infrastructures and the ensuing vulnerability of the services they provide, require action.
The vulnerability of critical infrastructures and the ensuing vulnerability of the services they provide, require action.
And effective protection of vulnerable critical infrastructures and services requires communication, coordination and cooperation - nationally and at EU level, involving all relevant stakeholders.
And effective protection of vulnerable critical infrastructures and services requires communication, coordination and cooperation - nationally and at EU level, involving all relevant stakeholders.
Furthermore, experiences from the past do tell us that if a terrorist attack occurs, the EU Heads of State will be calling for new security proposals within forty-eight hours, thereby weakening the quality of possible proposals.
Furthermore, experiences from the past do tell us that if a terrorist attack occurs, the EU Heads of State will be calling for new security proposals within forty-eight hours, thereby weakening the quality of possible proposals.
Or even worse, they come up with measures that are disproportionate and lack transparency, like for example the measures restricting liquids aboard aircrafts.
Or even worse, they come up with measures that are disproportionate and lack transparency, like for example the measures restricting liquids aboard aircrafts.
The establishment of horizontal provisions at EU-level, whereby the complex processes and interfaces of critical infrastructures with a trans-national dimension are taken into account, is therefore a legitimate concern.
The establishment of horizontal provisions at EU-level, whereby the complex processes and interfaces of critical infrastructures with a trans-national dimension are taken into account, is therefore a legitimate concern.
At the same time, however, it should be recognised that the EU should support and not duplicate the work of the Member States.
At the same time, however, it should be recognised that the EU should support and not duplicate the work of the Member States.
A bottom-up approach should be taken, bearing in mind that national services know best what is happening in their countries.
A bottom-up approach should be taken, bearing in mind that national services know best what is happening in their countries.
Having said that, the rapporteur is of the opinion that a Community approach can only be justified if at least three Member States would be affected or at least two Member States other than that in which the critical infrastructure is located.
Having said that, the rapporteur is of the opinion that a Community approach can only be justified if at least three Member States would be affected or at least two Member States other than that in which the critical infrastructure is located.
It is important for her to recall that the primary and ultimate responsibility for protecting critical infrastructures falls on the Member States and the owners/operators of critical infrastructures.
It is important for her to recall that the primary and ultimate responsibility for protecting critical infrastructures falls on the Member States and the owners/operators of critical infrastructures.
And as private sector possesses particular experience, expertise and requirements concerning the protection of their critical infrastructures, it is of utmost importance to fully involve the private sector.
And as private sector possesses particular experience, expertise and requirements concerning the protection of their critical infrastructures, it is of utmost importance to fully involve the private sector.