natgillin/translations-raw huggingface dataset:
Finally, the 2007 IGC also reached agreement to strengthen the kind of revised Ioannina compromise for a transitional period which had already been adopted in 2004 (Declaration No 7 to the Final Act of the IGC): under the terms of the 2004 declaration, if members of the Council representing at least three-quarters of the number of Member States or of the population required to block a decision indicate their opposition to the adoption of a Council act by a qualified majority, the Council will continue to debate the subject with a view to reaching wider agreement within a reasonable period.
Finally, the 2007 IGC also reached agreement to strengthen the kind of revised Ioannina compromise for a transitional period which had already been adopted in 2004 (Declaration No 7 to the Final Act of the IGC): under the terms of the 2004 declaration, if members of the Council representing at least three-quarters of the number of Member States or of the population required to block a decision indicate their opposition to the adoption of a Council act by a qualified majority, the Council will continue to debate the subject with a view to reaching wider agreement within a reasonable period.
This agreement, which in 2004 was set to run until 2014, will now apply for the period from 1 November 2014 to 31 March 2017.
This agreement, which in 2004 was set to run until 2014, will now apply for the period from 1 November 2014 to 31 March 2017.
As from that date, the thresholds needed to trigger the mechanism have been reduced to 55% of the Member States or the Union population necessary to block a decision.
As from that date, the thresholds needed to trigger the mechanism have been reduced to 55% of the Member States or the Union population necessary to block a decision.
This agreement was formalised in a draft decision which the European Council approved and which will take effect on the date on which the new Treaty enters into force.
This agreement was formalised in a draft decision which the European Council approved and which will take effect on the date on which the new Treaty enters into force.
In its 2004 version, this decision was to remain in force at least until 2014, when the Council could revoke it (acting by a qualified majority, which is now the general rule for Council decisions); in its 2007 version, under the terms of a new protocol, it will remain in force for an indefinite period and may only be revoked or modified following a discussion in the European Council, which must then take a favourable decision by consensus.
In its 2004 version, this decision was to remain in force at least until 2014, when the Council could revoke it (acting by a qualified majority, which is now the general rule for Council decisions); in its 2007 version, under the terms of a new protocol, it will remain in force for an indefinite period and may only be revoked or modified following a discussion in the European Council, which must then take a favourable decision by consensus.
(5) Although the abandonment of the compromise arrived at by the Convention and the postponement of the implementation of the decisions taken in 2004 is regrettable, it should be borne in mind that the solution ultimately adopted was chosen after a heated discussion among the Member States, the purpose of which was not always entirely clear: the impact of a few percentage points more or less on the relative degree of influence of each Member State in the voting system obscured the fact that in reality divisions between all the 'large' Member States on the one hand and all the 'small' Member States on the other hardly ever emerge.
(5) Although the abandonment of the compromise arrived at by the Convention and the postponement of the implementation of the decisions taken in 2004 is regrettable, it should be borne in mind that the solution ultimately adopted was chosen after a heated discussion among the Member States, the purpose of which was not always entirely clear: the impact of a few percentage points more or less on the relative degree of influence of each Member State in the voting system obscured the fact that in reality divisions between all the 'large' Member States on the one hand and all the 'small' Member States on the other hardly ever emerge.
Often, the same action was intended to pursue contradictory objectives simultaneously, such as preserving a State's own opportunities to block decisions whilst attempting to reduce the scope for others to do so.
Often, the same action was intended to pursue contradictory objectives simultaneously, such as preserving a State's own opportunities to block decisions whilst attempting to reduce the scope for others to do so.
And above all, the whole of this debate was carried on without considering that ultimately the dynamics of Community negotiations are such that votes are very rarely taken.
And above all, the whole of this debate was carried on without considering that ultimately the dynamics of Community negotiations are such that votes are very rarely taken.
Political realities being what they are, however, Parliament can accept the agreement reached between the Heads of State and of Government, albeit without concealing its disappointments.
Political realities being what they are, however, Parliament can accept the agreement reached between the Heads of State and of Government, albeit without concealing its disappointments.
(6) Whatever the method by which decisions are taken, it must be applicable.
(6) Whatever the method by which decisions are taken, it must be applicable.
Hence the importance of the question of the scope of qualified majority voting.
Hence the importance of the question of the scope of qualified majority voting.
The Treaty of Lisbon makes significant progress in this regard: there are some 44 new cases in which qualified majority voting is to apply in various fields (cf.
The Treaty of Lisbon makes significant progress in this regard: there are some 44 new cases in which qualified majority voting is to apply in various fields (cf.
Annex 2).
Annex 2).
On the other hand, unanimity is still required in 72 cases
On the other hand, unanimity is still required in 72 cases
In that respect, the new Treaty incorporates practically all the changes provided for in the Constitution.
In that respect, the new Treaty incorporates practically all the changes provided for in the Constitution.
The only exceptions concern the agreement on accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, which will have to be adopted unanimously (QMV under the Constitution), and the creation of a new legal basis for the introduction of rules governing the processing of personal data under the CFSP (Article 39 of the TEU).
The only exceptions concern the agreement on accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, which will have to be adopted unanimously (QMV under the Constitution), and the creation of a new legal basis for the introduction of rules governing the processing of personal data under the CFSP (Article 39 of the TEU).
Although, according to the most generous interpretation, this involves nothing more than the establishment of joint rules to govern the exercise of a competence which rests solely with the Member States (everything covered by the Union's competence in the area of the protection of personal data is governed by Article 16 of the TFEU), it is regrettable that Parliament should not be involved in this procedure and that no explicit reference should have been made to legal review by the Court of Justice. .
Although, according to the most generous interpretation, this involves nothing more than the establishment of joint rules to govern the exercise of a competence which rests solely with the Member States (everything covered by the Union's competence in the area of the protection of personal data is governed by Article 16 of the TFEU), it is regrettable that Parliament should not be involved in this procedure and that no explicit reference should have been made to legal review by the Court of Justice. .
Whilst the general thrust of the changes can only be regarded as very positive, it is regrettable that the opportunity was not taken to do more in certain cases.
Whilst the general thrust of the changes can only be regarded as very positive, it is regrettable that the opportunity was not taken to do more in certain cases.
(7) Another major improvement made by the Treaty of Lisbon in terms of transparency is the requirement for meetings of the various configurations of the Council to be divided into two parts, depending on whether the Council is acting in a legislative capacity or in other ways, with the corollary that, when it deliberates or votes on legislative acts, the Council meets in public.
(7) Another major improvement made by the Treaty of Lisbon in terms of transparency is the requirement for meetings of the various configurations of the Council to be divided into two parts, depending on whether the Council is acting in a legislative capacity or in other ways, with the corollary that, when it deliberates or votes on legislative acts, the Council meets in public.
Although the Member States did not accept the Convention's proposal that a genuinely separate Legislative Council should be created, it may be considered that the essential aspect of this proposal, which was that meetings should be held in public and that the Council's legislative work should be transparent, has been preserved.
Although the Member States did not accept the Convention's proposal that a genuinely separate Legislative Council should be created, it may be considered that the essential aspect of this proposal, which was that meetings should be held in public and that the Council's legislative work should be transparent, has been preserved.
(8) As regards the configurations and functioning of the Council, the main novelty is the creation of an autonomous Foreign Affairs Council, to be chaired by the High Representative.
(8) As regards the configurations and functioning of the Council, the main novelty is the creation of an autonomous Foreign Affairs Council, to be chaired by the High Representative.
This and the General Affairs Council are the only two configurations of the Council whose existence is provided for by the new Treaty, which leaves it to the European Council to decide by a qualified majority on the creation of other configurations.
This and the General Affairs Council are the only two configurations of the Council whose existence is provided for by the new Treaty, which leaves it to the European Council to decide by a qualified majority on the creation of other configurations.
(9) The efforts to modify the existing system of rotating Presidencies of the Council in order to raise the profile and enhance the consistency and continuity of its work have had somewhat mixed results: the Member States departed from the Convention's proposal, ultimately adopting the principle of equal rotation within a system of team Presidencies determined by a decision of the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, and it is not possible to make out in advance exactly what the real benefits of this will be
(9) The efforts to modify the existing system of rotating Presidencies of the Council in order to raise the profile and enhance the consistency and continuity of its work have had somewhat mixed results: the Member States departed from the Convention's proposal, ultimately adopting the principle of equal rotation within a system of team Presidencies determined by a decision of the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, and it is not possible to make out in advance exactly what the real benefits of this will be
A declaration (No 9) annexed to the Treaty sets out the political agreement reached among the Member States on a decision providing for the establishment of Presidency teams from three Member States for periods of 18 months.
A declaration (No 9) annexed to the Treaty sets out the political agreement reached among the Member States on a decision providing for the establishment of Presidency teams from three Member States for periods of 18 months.
Those Member States would divide up the task of chairing the various sectoral configurations of the Council, either for rotating six-month periods (as at present) or for the whole 18-month period. .
Those Member States would divide up the task of chairing the various sectoral configurations of the Council, either for rotating six-month periods (as at present) or for the whole 18-month period. .
Only the Foreign Affairs Council (and the European Council) will have a stable presidency.
Only the Foreign Affairs Council (and the European Council) will have a stable presidency.
(1) Another of the institutional questions which were at the centre of debate was the composition of the Commission.
(1) Another of the institutional questions which were at the centre of debate was the composition of the Commission.
The solution ultimately opted for, with its implementation deferred, departed from the Convention's proposal, but it corresponds more closely with political reality and may be considered positive: it makes it possible to respect the new Member States' aspiration to be represented in the Commission during the first years after their accession, whilst providing, after a reasonable lapse of time (2014), for the vital reduction in the number of Commissioners (to 2/3 of the number of Member States, which - in a 27-member EU - would already mean that there were fewer Commissioners than at present).
The solution ultimately opted for, with its implementation deferred, departed from the Convention's proposal, but it corresponds more closely with political reality and may be considered positive: it makes it possible to respect the new Member States' aspiration to be represented in the Commission during the first years after their accession, whilst providing, after a reasonable lapse of time (2014), for the vital reduction in the number of Commissioners (to 2/3 of the number of Member States, which - in a 27-member EU - would already mean that there were fewer Commissioners than at present).
Based on a rotation system which preserves equality between Member States (and which must reflect the demographic and geographical make-up of the Union), this solution will thus make it possible to keep the size of the Commission within acceptable limits.
Based on a rotation system which preserves equality between Member States (and which must reflect the demographic and geographical make-up of the Union), this solution will thus make it possible to keep the size of the Commission within acceptable limits.
The frequency of the period when any given Member State will not be represented by a Commissioner will be once in every three terms.
The frequency of the period when any given Member State will not be represented by a Commissioner will be once in every three terms.
(2) The Treaty of Lisbon also makes important progress regarding the appointment of the President of the Commission, who is in future to be elected by the European Parliament on a proposal from the European Council, acting by a qualified majority.
(2) The Treaty of Lisbon also makes important progress regarding the appointment of the President of the Commission, who is in future to be elected by the European Parliament on a proposal from the European Council, acting by a qualified majority.
This is a further step in the process of imparting political legitimacy to the Commission, particularly as the European Council is required to take account of the results of the elections to the European Parliament and hold ‘appropriate consultations’ before designating its candidate.
This is a further step in the process of imparting political legitimacy to the Commission, particularly as the European Council is required to take account of the results of the elections to the European Parliament and hold ‘appropriate consultations’ before designating its candidate.
Afterwards, the whole Commission, the President, the High Representative, who is appointed by means of a special procedure (see below), and the Commissioners, selected by the Council in agreement with the President-designate, will require a vote of approval en bloc by the European Parliament
Afterwards, the whole Commission, the President, the High Representative, who is appointed by means of a special procedure (see below), and the Commissioners, selected by the Council in agreement with the President-designate, will require a vote of approval en bloc by the European Parliament
It may be noted that the 2004 IGC did not accept the Convention's proposal that the government of each Member State should submit a list of three names from which the President would choose the Commissioner proposed by the Member State.
It may be noted that the 2004 IGC did not accept the Convention's proposal that the government of each Member State should submit a list of three names from which the President would choose the Commissioner proposed by the Member State.
Also, it is regrettable that the 2004 IGC did not accept the Commission's proposal that the investiture of the Commission should conclude with the vote by the European Parliament, which is politically highly symbolic, but added a stage to the procedure, which is now to conclude with the appointment of the Commission by the European Council, acting by a qualified majority. .
Also, it is regrettable that the 2004 IGC did not accept the Commission's proposal that the investiture of the Commission should conclude with the vote by the European Parliament, which is politically highly symbolic, but added a stage to the procedure, which is now to conclude with the appointment of the Commission by the European Council, acting by a qualified majority. .
This procedure as a whole should make it clear to public opinion that the Commission is a political executive which needs Parliament's confidence, and not just a group of 'anonymous and unaccountable bureaucrats', as some claim.
This procedure as a whole should make it clear to public opinion that the Commission is a political executive which needs Parliament's confidence, and not just a group of 'anonymous and unaccountable bureaucrats', as some claim.
(3) The enhanced role of the President of the Commission should also be noted, particularly as regards the internal organisation of the Commission and the right to demand the resignation of a Commissioner, which should improve the efficiency of the Commission.
(3) The enhanced role of the President of the Commission should also be noted, particularly as regards the internal organisation of the Commission and the right to demand the resignation of a Commissioner, which should improve the efficiency of the Commission.
Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
(1) One of the main institutional innovations of the Treaty of Lisbon is the creation of the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (merging in a single post the pre-existing posts of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Commissioner responsible for external relations).
(1) One of the main institutional innovations of the Treaty of Lisbon is the creation of the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (merging in a single post the pre-existing posts of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Commissioner responsible for external relations).
This innovation corresponds to the objective of ensuring that all the external actions of the EU are consistent and have a high profile.
This innovation corresponds to the objective of ensuring that all the external actions of the EU are consistent and have a high profile.
Institutionally, the High Representative will wear two 'hats': he or she will be responsible for conducting the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, for which purpose he or she will chair the Foreign Affairs Council, present proposals and implement Council decisions, while at the same time he or she will be a Vice-President of the Commission, taking on that institution's responsibilities in the field of external relations and coordinating all aspects of the EU's external action.
Institutionally, the High Representative will wear two 'hats': he or she will be responsible for conducting the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, for which purpose he or she will chair the Foreign Affairs Council, present proposals and implement Council decisions, while at the same time he or she will be a Vice-President of the Commission, taking on that institution's responsibilities in the field of external relations and coordinating all aspects of the EU's external action.
He or she will be assisted by a European External Action Service composed of officials from the Commission, the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers and national diplomatic services, which is to be set up by a decision of the Council after consulting the European Parliament and obtaining the approval of the Commission.
He or she will be assisted by a European External Action Service composed of officials from the Commission, the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers and national diplomatic services, which is to be set up by a decision of the Council after consulting the European Parliament and obtaining the approval of the Commission.
(2) Thus the High Representative will be a Vice-President of the Commission, but he or she will have a special status, reflected in the procedures for his or her appointment and the possible ending of his or her tenure: he or she will be appointed by the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission; he or she may be dismissed by the European Council using the same procedure, and must resign if the President of the Commission asks him or her to do so.
(2) Thus the High Representative will be a Vice-President of the Commission, but he or she will have a special status, reflected in the procedures for his or her appointment and the possible ending of his or her tenure: he or she will be appointed by the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission; he or she may be dismissed by the European Council using the same procedure, and must resign if the President of the Commission asks him or her to do so.
As a member of the Commission, his or her appointment must also be approved by the European Parliament when it votes on the investiture of the Commission as a whole, and if the Commission resigns en bloc following a motion of censure by the European Parliament, this also applies to him or her
As a member of the Commission, his or her appointment must also be approved by the European Parliament when it votes on the investiture of the Commission as a whole, and if the Commission resigns en bloc following a motion of censure by the European Parliament, this also applies to him or her
The transition to the new institutional situation resulting from the creation of the office of High Representative gave rise to a number of problems in the final days of the negotiations, with the EP endeavouring to safeguard its full prerogatives under two possible scenarios, either that of a temporary appointment immediately after the entry into force of the Treaty (scheduled for 1 January 2009), or the appointment of the new High Representative when the next Commission is constituted, in November 2009, following the European elections.
The transition to the new institutional situation resulting from the creation of the office of High Representative gave rise to a number of problems in the final days of the negotiations, with the EP endeavouring to safeguard its full prerogatives under two possible scenarios, either that of a temporary appointment immediately after the entry into force of the Treaty (scheduled for 1 January 2009), or the appointment of the new High Representative when the next Commission is constituted, in November 2009, following the European elections.