1. The only question raised before us in this appeal is whether the Armed Forces Tribunal (for short, “the Tribunal”) was right in concluding that Summary Court Martial (SCM) of the respondent was vitiated due to the admitted fact that the respondent’s signature was not obtained on the ‘plea of guilty’ taken by the respondent. The incident for which the respondent was charged and tried is not of much relevance in the present case. Suffice it to say that the respondent along with another Gunner Ram Kumar said to have molested and outraged the modesty Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by of two girls. Ram Kumar held convicted on evidence. CHARANJEET KAUR Date: 2020.03.02 16:28:16 IST Reason: The respondent was also convicted. Though the respondent was convicted, it is an admitted fact that 2 the evidence of the two girls does not implicate him with any overt act. He was apparently convicted because of his presence. However, the respondent raised the plea that so called ‘plea of guilty’ which he took before SCM was not recorded in accordance with law and, therefore, the entire trial was vitiated. According to the respondent, the law in this regard requires the ‘plea of guilty’ to be recorded. The Tribunal upheld the contention of the respondent and concluded the matter in his favour.

2. Before us, Col. R. Balasubramanian, learned Senior Counsel submitted that there is no requirement in the law, i.e., under the Army Act, 1950 (for short, “the Act”)and the Army Rules,1954 (for short, “the Rules”) that when an accused plead guilty, such a plea should be recorded and signed by the accused. Learned counsel relies on Rule 115 of the Rules which reads as follows :

1[(2A) Where an accused pleads "Guilty", such plea and the factum of compliance of sub-rule (2) of this rule, shall be recorded by the court in the following manner:— “Before recording the plea of "Guilty" of the accused the court explained to the accused the meaning of the charge (s) to which he had pleaded "Guilty" and ascertained that the accused had understood the nature of the charge

(s) to which he had pleaded "Guilty". The court also informed the accused the general effect of the plea and the difference in procedure, which will be followed consequent to the said plea. The court having satisfied itself that the accused understands the charge (s) and the effect of his plea of “Guilty”, accepts and records the same. The provisions of rule 115(2) are thus complied with.] (3) Where an accused person pleads guilty to the first of two or more charges laid in the alternative, the court may, after sub-rule (2) of this rule has been complied with and before the accused is arraigned on the alternative charge or charges, withdraw such alternative charge or charges without requiring the accused to plead thereto, and a record to that effect shall be made upon the proceedings of the court.”

3. In any event, according to learned counsel Rule 125 of the Rules saves the plea of guilty recorded by the SCM. Rule 125 reads as follows :

4. The Tribunal relied on the administrative instructions issued by the Army in the year 1984, 4 specifically requiring a ‘plea of guilty’ to be signed by the accused who take such a plea. These administrative instructions have been issued in exercise of powers of the Chief of Army staff as an officer commanding the Regular Army. There is no dispute about the validity or the efficacy of the said instructions. There is no doubt that the administrative instructions require that signature of the accused must be obtained on a ‘plea of guilty’. In this backdrop we must consider whether the Tribunal committed any mistake in law in upholding the trial to be vitiated and acquitting the respondent for failure of the SCM to obtain signature of the respondent on the ‘plea of guilty’.

5. We have given our anxious consideration to the judgment and find that the lacuna in not obtaining the respondent’s signature is serious. Non observance of the requirement must indeed have the effect of vitiating the entire trial. It is not disputed before us that the status of an administrative instruction is clearly to supplement the Rule and to fill up the gaps. Once promulgated, an administrative instruction has the force of Rules (See: judgments of this Court in the case of State of 5 Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. M/s. G.S. Dall and Flour Mills and connected matters, 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 150 and in the case of Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Allahabad and Ors. vs. Izhar Hussain , (1989) 4 SCC 318). Paragraph 19 of the judgment in the case of M/s G.S. Dall and Flour Mills’ case (supra) reads as follows :

6. We must therefore hold that the law in this regard is that the signature of accused must be obtained on a plea of guilty. We find that this is also the view of the several High Courts in the decisions which have been noted by the Tribunal. 6

7. Col. R. Balasubramanian, learned senior counsel next contended that Rule 125 provides that at the end of the trial, the Court is required to date and sign and that such signature has the effect of authentication on whole of the proceedings. According to the learned counsel, the Court having done so in the present case, the entire proceeding stood authenticated. In other words, the ‘plea of guilty’ required by the Court also stood authenticated. The question really is whether the authentication of proceedings can substitute the effect of curing a non-compliance of the Rules in a matter as important as not obtaining signature of the accused on the ‘plea of guilty’. We are afraid that Rule 125 of the Rules cannot have this effect. The effect of Rule 125 is only that the entire proceeding is authenticated. The Black’s Law dictionary defines the word ‘authenticate’ as follows :

(See: the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 06.12.1974, in the case of Dhondiba Parshuram Kakade vs. Shri Someshwar Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. , 7 (1979) 81 BOMLR 31) Relevant portion of the aforementioned judgment reads as follows :

C.A. NO. 3909 of 2015 8

11. For the reasons recorded in C.A. No. 5006/2012, this appeal is also dismissed. We,however, direct that the respondent shall be entitled to continuation in service for all other benefits, including, notional pay fixation. Needless to say that he is not entitled to the back wages for the period when he has not worked.

.................CJI.

[ S.A. BOBDE ] ...................J. [ B.R. GAVAI ] ....................J. [ SURYA KANT ] NEW DELHI, FEBRUARY 25, 2020 9 ITEM NO.101 COURT NO.1 SECTION XVII S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal No(s). 5006/2012 UNION OF INDIA & ORS. Appellant(s) VERSUS MANGE LAL Respondent(s) WITH C.A. No. 3909/2015 (XVII) Date : 25-02-2020 These appeals were called on for hearing today.