1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India primarily challenges the acquisition of the petitioner's land described in the petition to be Survey No.137/2 at village Akurdi, Taluka Haveli, District Pune, under the provisions of the Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, 1961 (for short 'the MID Act '), which had attained finality in the year 1971, the possession of which was taken over on 11 February 1972 under the panchnama dated 21 January 1972 and 11 February 1972.

2. At the outset it may be stated that this petition was filed on 31 July 2010 and as seen from the cause title of the petition, the petitioner has described himself to be 45 years of age. Hence, when the land acquisition took place culminating into the possession of the land being taken over, the Page 2 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC petitioner was 7 years of age. We observe so as we are quite astonished with the verification clause to this petition, when the petitioner solemnly affirms that the facts which are pleaded in the memo of the petition (paragraphs 1 to 14) are true to "his own knowledge". Notably a survey of the averments in these paragraphs would possibly lead us to arrive at a conclusion that the verification to the petition itself would not be acceptable and legally false as the petitioner could not have deposed personal knowledge of many of these facts.

3. We may next observe that the essential principles in taking recourse to the proceedings under Article 226 in invoking the powers of judicial review, have also been completely discarded and/or deliberately overlooked, namely that what is sought in the petition is a discretionary and equitable remedy, and the nature of the reliefs which are prayed for could be asserted only when the intervention of the Court is sought at the appropriate time, and not after a prolonged and/or an inordinate, much less an unexplained delay of 38 years (as on date of filing of the petition) after the acquisition itself stood completed and the parties have changed their position. This more particularly as in the present case the acquisition in question has antecedents since the year 1963, the details of which we discuss hereinafter.

4. On such conspectus, what is intriguing is that there is not a whisper Page 3 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC or any averment whatsoever to justify such inordinate delay and laches in filing the petition which would go to the root of the matter in entertaining the causes of the nature being canvassed by the petitioner. This more particularly, when it is the petitioner's contention that one of the primary cause for the petitioner to file this petition, and in our opinion, quite cleverly, is that just before filing of the petition, the petitioner is stated to have received knowledge, that it is the Government's name which has been entered in the records of right relating to the said land, and that the petitioner was not aware about any land acquisition proceedings, hence, the petitioner was required to approach this Court in the present proceedings. This case of the petitioner can be seen from paragraph 14(g) of the writ petition, in which the petitioner has averred that respondent No.2 - MIDC (the acquiring body) without, in any manner, resorting to the acquisition proceedings by following the process of law, and without notice or without finalizing, offering and paying any compensation to the petitioner has entered its name in the record of rights relating to the land in question. This was also the basic argument repeatedly canvassed before us by the learned Counsel for the petitioner.

5. On the aforesaid preface on the nature of the cause asserted in the proceedings, we now refer to the relevant facts the pleadings reveal:- Page 4 of 60

6. It is the petitioner's contention that in or about the year 1963, his father late Vasantlal received notices under Section 32(2) of the MID Act qua different lands situated at Villages Akurdi and Chinchwad, including in respect of the said land that these lands are intended to be acquired for the purpose of a 'Railway Siding'. Late Vasantlal approached this Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (Special Civil Application No. 767 of 1966) challenging these notices received by him under Section 32(2) of the MID Act, under which the land in question was sought to be acquired. Such proceedings before this Court were settled in terms of consent terms as arrived between the parties, under which certain Page 5 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC lands forming subject matter of acquisition were released whereas certain lands were to be acquired by the respondents. The consent terms as entered between the petitioner's father and the respondents read thus:

(emphasis supplied)

7. As seen from paragraph 2 of the consent terms, the petitioner's father agreed to the acquisition of the land on Survey No.137 admeasuring 4 acres 15 gunthas and further solemnly undertook not to raise any objection to the same. He also agreed to immediately remove four structures standing on the lands which were within the alignment of the proposed railway siding, at his own cost.

8. There is no material whatsoever that late Vasantlal Mohanlal Page 7 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC Khinvasara1 between the years 1972 and 2002, that is for a period of almost 30 years, had raised any issue/dispute qua the acquisition, or had addressed a single letter/representation to any of the respondents to contend that the said land, subject matter of the present petition, was either not acquired and/or its possession was not taken over, and/or the compensation in that regard was not paid, more particularly considering the compromise and the orders passed by this Court.

9. Apart from the aforesaid position, this petition is filed after 8 years of the petitioner's father having passed away, although what is sought to be pleaded, is also, that the petitioner's mother who passed away in the year 2009, had bequeathed the land in question in favour of the petitioner. However, none of these documents supporting bequeathing of this land, form part of the record. Even otherwise a land which had stood acquired cannot be bequeathed nor the MIDC can have any control on what the testator would purport to write in the Will.

10. It is on such backdrop, the petitioner is before the Court making bald averments and raising several factual disputes asserting that no proceedings were adopted by the respondents to acquire the petitioner's land. The relevant averments in that regard are required to be noted which read thus:

11. Thus, it is on such premise that the said land being not acquired as also the possession of which was not taken over, as also disputing the panchanama, the present petition has been filed and as noted above, almost after 38 years of the possession being taken over. The original reliefs as sought by the petitioner before the petition was amended, are required to be noted, which read thus:

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c) That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a Writ of Prohibition or any other Writ, Order or Direction preventing the Respondents by themselves, their servants and agents from:

12. Additional prayers were incorporated by an amendment being prayers a-1 to a-5, which also demonstrate substantial vagueness nay deception, more particularly, when the dates of the notifications are not mentioned. The amended prayers are required to be noted which read thus:

13. We may also observe that the record in fact depicts that the pendency of this petition has been very effectively used by the petitioner by approaching different authorities so as to dig into the old graves of the concluded acquisition and generating replies from the officers of the respondents. A systematic modus operandi. After obtaining such replies that the old documents pertaining to the acquisition were not available with the concerned departments and based on such correspondence, the petitioner has attempted to cull out and fortify the theory that there is no acquisition of the land, as also the possession of the land was not taken over. Accordingly by incorporating amendments to the petition, the petitioner has attempted to change the original complexion of his case.

C. Reply Affidavit of the MIDC:-

14. On behalf of the MIDC a reply affidavit is filed opposing the petition. At the outset, it is contended that while invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has suppressed material facts. Hence, the petitioner is guilty of suppressio veri, Page 12 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC suggestio falsi, and on this ground, the petition deserves to be dismissed with costs for the reason that the land in question admeasuring 4 acres 15 gunthas from Survey No.137 had stood acquired by the State Government in the year 1971 and on several material circumstances, not fully disclosed in the writ petition, prayers assailing the acquisition are made.

15. It is further stated that the petitioner is seeking to challenge and / or reopen the acquisition of the land admeasuring 4 acres 15 gunthas from Survey No.137 after about 38 years from completion of the acquisition and in doing so the original owner i.e. petitioner's father never questioned or challenged the acquisition and accepted the same. It is hence contended that the petitioner is estopped from raising any issue or challenging the taking over of the possession, as the original owner of the land himself did not challenge the acquisition of the same.

16. It is next contended that the petition suffers from gross and inordinate delay and laches as the acquisition of such land had taken place way back in the year 1971 and the possession of the land was taken over by the MIDC in the year 1972. In such context, it is stated that the predecessor-in-title of the petitioner (petitioner's father) was fully aware of the acquisition proceedings. He had received notices in regard to such acquisition, as also had filed objections to the acquisition. It is stated that Page 13 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC such objections were rejected by the State Government and ultimately the land was acquired in the year 1971 and the possession was taken over in the year 1972.

17. It is next stated that on 11 February 1972 the possession of the said land was handed over to MIDC by the Special Land Acquisition Officer (for short, "SLAO"). It is, hence, contended that the challenge to the land acquisition which stood completed about 38 years back, is wholly untenable, being hit by the principles of delay and laches. It is contended that on such count, the petition deserves to be dismissed.

18. The MIDC has also set out the background of the acquisition in the reply affidavit to contend that in or about the year 1963, notices under Section 32(2) of the MIDC Act were issued for acquisition of lands for industrial area in respect of lands in Akurdi and Chinchwad villages which included the land belonging to the petitioner's father. Being aggrieved by such notices, the petitioner's father had approached this Court in the proceedings of Special Civil Application No.767 of 1966 filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. Such application came to be disposed of in terms of the consent terms dated 3 December 1968, as noted by us hereinabove. It is stated that as clear from the consent orders, certain lands were deleted from the acquisition whereas the land in question was agreed Page 14 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC to be acquired, for which, the petitioner's father furnished an undertaking to the Court that he will not raise any objection in respect of acquisition of the said land. The said land of the petitioner's father was agreed to be acquired including about 4 acres and 15 gunthas from Survey no.137.

19. It is next stated that subsequent to the consent terms and after this Court disposed of the petitioner's father special civil application (supra), notices under Section 32(2) of the MID Act were published on 21 January 1971 under which objections were invited for acquisition of various lands including 4 acres 15 gunthas from Survey No.137 subject matter of the present proceedings. It is stated that despite an undertaking being given to the Court, the petitioner's father had raised an objection to the acquisition contrary to the consent terms. Such objections were considered by the SLAO and were rejected by an order dated 5 October 1971. Thereafter, the SLAO issued a notice dated 16 October 1971 under Section 32(1) of the MID Act acquiring such land. Such notice was published in the Government Gazette on 4 November 1971. It is stated that after publication of the said notice under Section 32(1) of the MID Act, the land in question belonging to the petitioner's father (4 acres 15 gunthas) from Survey No.137 stood vested in the State Government absolutely and free from any encumbrances as the statutory provisions would ordain. In pursuance thereto, a notice dated 3 January 1972 was issued to the Page 15 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC petitioner's father for handing over the possession of the land alongwith the other acquired land by the SLAO. Thereafter, on 28 January 1972, the SLAO took possession of the said land by drawing a panchanama. The possession of the land was handed over to the MIDC by the SLAO on 11 February 1972. It is thus contended that the land on which the petitioner is now asserting rights belonging to the petitioner's father at the relevant time i.e. 4 acres 15 gunthas land from Survey No.137 stood acquired by the State Government under the MID Act , the possession of which was handed over to the MIDC by the State Government, accordingly the land is in possession of the MIDC since 1972.

20. It is stated that the petitioner's father (predecessor-in-title) and others were fully aware of the said position, hence they never questioned the acquisition and/or never alleged that the said land was not acquired. It is stated that the petitioner has suppressed all these facts while filing the present petition. It is therefore prayed that the petition be dismissed with exemplary costs.

D. Reply Affidavit of the State Government:-

21. Reply affidavit is filed on behalf of the State of Maharashtra of the Deputy Collector / Land Acquisition Officer No.3, Pune, inter alia contending that it is an admitted position that the land acquisition Page 16 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC proceedings in respect of the subject land were undertaken under the MID Act for which a notice under Section 32(2) of the MID Act was published on 5 January 1971. It is stated that thereafter, a notice under Section 32(1) of the MID Act regarding acquisition of the land for a particular purpose, was published on 16 October 1971, and most vitally possession of the subject land was taken on 28 January 1972. It is stated that subsequently, the land was handed over to the MIDC on 11 February 1972.

22. It is next stated that the mutation entry, recording the name of the State Government in the record of rights, was incorporated as consequence of the acquisition. It is contended that after such events had taken place upto the year 1972, the petitioner filed the present petition on 15 July 2010. It is stated that the unamended petition did not have any clear challenge to the said notices and possession proceedings, hence, amendment was carried out only in February 2024 in pursuance of the leave granted by this Court whereby for the first time the notices issued under Section 32 of the MID Act were challenged. It is hence stated that apparently there is an inordinate delay of 50 years in such cause being pursued if the amended petition is considered, and at least of more than 38 years if the original petition is to be considered.

23. The affidavit categorically states that there is no explanation Page 17 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC whatsoever either in the original petition as also in the amended petition, on such inordinate delay in filing the petition, it is hence stated that the petition is clearly barred by the principles of delay and laches. It is, hence, stated that the petitioner is not entitled to challenge the acquisition proceedings after so many years without there being sufficient cause for the same.

24. The affidavit also explains the factual position in relation to the acquisition. It is stated that the acquisition being an old acquisition had stood concluded in the year 1972. It is contended that it is an admitted position that the land stood absolutely vested with the State Government and the father of the petitioner never challenged it. It is also contended that once the land stood vested in the State Government, there is no question of the petitioner's father bequeathing the land to his wife (petitioner's mother) and the petitioner's mother thereafter bequeathing the land to the petitioner under a new Will. It is also stated that the petitioner had failed to produce any documents showing succession rights. Referring to the correspondence entered by the petitioner during the pendency of the petition namely a letter 19 September 2016 addressed to the Hon'ble Minister, it is stated that such letter does not show that the petitioner had any better rights after the subject land stood vested in the State Government. It is stated that the said letter clearly shows that Page 18 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC predecessor-in-title has not taken efforts whatsoever for challenging the vesting order or the possession proceedings. It is next stated that the petitioner is trying to base his case on non availability of the record in the government office, and he does not have any record on its own to show that the subject land was not acquired. It is next contended that the petitioner has no real or genuine cause of action to file the present petition. It is further stated that after the possession of the land was handed over by the SLAO to the MIDC, the respondent No.3 was not aware of the factual position after 1972 till date and therefore, the petitioner's contentions in regard to such period is not being dealt. It is therefore, submitted that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief as prayed for in the petitioner, and therefore, the petition be rejected.

E. Rejoinder Affidavits

25. There are two rejoinder affidavits filed on behalf of the petitioner disputing the contents in the reply affidavit as filed on behalf of the State Government as also as filed on behalf of the MIDC. The case of the petitioner in the rejoinder affidavit, is significantly surprising, inasmuch as, in his rejoinder affidavit to the affidavit in reply filed on behalf of the MIDC, the petitioner in paragraph 11 thereof has stated that he was not aware of the publication of the notice under Section 32(2) of the MID Act under the Government Gazette dated 21 January 1971. It is the Page 19 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC petitioner's contention that even assuming that such notice under Section 32(2) was published, it needs to be presumed that the acquisition of the land in question has lapsed for want of declaration of an award, referring to the provisions of Section 31(1) and 32(2) of the MID Act. The petitioner has also stated that the notice dated 3 January 1972 or of any other date was not issued to the petitioner's father for handing over possession of the said land and that even today, no copy of the notice is annexed to the reply affidavit. This is being said when more particularly in the year 1972, the petitioner was 7 years of age.

26. In the affidavit in rejoinder to the reply affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government, it is reiterated that there is no land acquisition award in terms of Section 33 of the MID Act as also that there is no proof of payment of compensation and, therefore, the land is not acquired. Insofar as the delay and laches is concerned, the petitioner has stated that the acquisition proceedings were abandoned and no award was produced by the SLAO and no compensation was paid to his predecessor-in-title (petitioner's father) and the possession remained with the petitioner's father, hence, the respondents' contention on delay and laches of the petitioner in filing this petition ought not to be accepted. It is petitioner's contention that the entry in the revenue record has not caused loss of enjoyment of the property to the petitioner, as according to the petitioner, Page 20 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC the entry depicting the respondent's name in the revenue record is illegal as seen from the several documents, namely that the MIDC maps do not show the subject land as part of the MIDC lands. It is stated that the planning authority for the subject land has always been the PCMC and at present the subject land is being shown in the residential zone, the physical possession of which is with the petitioner. Further no compensation for the land acquisition has ever been paid to the petitioner or any of his predecessors- in-title. The petitioner has also reiterated the contention that he has succession rights. The petitioner has also disputed the 'possession panchanama' as relied on behalf of the State Government on several grounds. In the rejoinder affidavit as set out in paragraphs 18 and 19, it is contended that it is wholly incorrect for the respondents to contend that the physical possession of the land was taken over. The petitioner has asserted that the physical possession of the land has remained with the petitioner. The petitioner hence states that he is entitled to the reliefs as prayed for.

F. Submission on behalf of the Petitioner:-

27. Ms. Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner has limited submissions. She has reiterated the contentions of the petitioner as raised in the writ petition and the petitioner's affidavits to which we have adverted in detail. Her emphasis is more on the documents which were obtained by Page 21 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC the petitioner during the pendency of this petition under the RTI Act , to contend that this is a case wherein there is neither an award nor compensation was paid to the petitioner, and for such reason, necessarily the land in question is deemed to be not acquired. It is her submission that the petitioner has continued to remain in possession of the land, hence, it cannot be said that there is any delay and laches in filing the petition to challenge the acquisition. Her submission is that all necessary ingredients in regard to acquisition of the land, namely, issuance of notification under Section 32 of the MID Act and the consequential steps taken thereunder of the possession being taken under such acquisition are absent in the present case. It is her submission that the petitioner's case from the record is to the effect that the acquisition of the land was not complete, as no award was published and no compensation was paid, as there is no record available indicating the payment of compensation or the award and therefore, necessarily there is a presumption that the acquisition has lapsed. It is submitted that the land in question, as stated to be the subject matter of acquisition, is surrounded by a residential area and for such reason, the relief as prayed for by the petitioner is required to be granted. In support of her contention, Ms. Agarwal has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. Versus Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors.2.

2Civil Appeal No. 6466 of 2024, decided on 16 May 2024. Page 22 of 60

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H. Submissions on behalf of State Government and SLAO (Respondent Nos.1 & 3):-

(2) Before publishing a notice under sub-section (1), the State Government shall by another notice call upon the owner of the land and any other person who in the opinion of the State Government may be interested therein, to show cause, within such time as may be specified in the notice, why the land should not be acquired. [The State Government shall also cause public notice to be given in the manner laid down in section 53 and in the Official Gazette] [Provided that, if the land proposed to be acquired falls within a scheduled Area then the State Government shall before such acquisition consult,--

(i) the Gram Sabha and the Panchayat concered if the land is falling within the area of one Panchayat;

(ii) the concerned Gram Sabhas and the Panchayat Samiti if the land falling within the area of more than one Panchayats in the Block concerned;

(iii) the concerned Gram Sabhas and the Zilla Parishad if the land is falling within the area of more than one Block in the district concerned;

such consultation shall be carried out in the manner as may be !aid down by the State Government by issuing a general or special order in this behalf:

(4) When a notice under sub-section (1) is published in the Official Gazette, the land shall, on and from the date of such publication, vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances:

(2) Where the amount of compensation has been determined by agreement between the State Government and the person to be compensated, it shall be determined in accordance with such agreement.

(3) Where no such agreement can be reached, the State Page 30 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC Government shall refer the case to the Collector for determination of the amount of compensation to be paid for such acquisition as also the person or persons to whom such compensation shall be paid:

[(5) In determining the amount of compensation, the Collector shall be guided by the provisions contained in sections 26 to 30 and other relevant provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 , subject to the modifications that, the reference in section 26 to " the date on which notification has been issued under section 11 ", shall be the reference as " the date of the service of publication of the notice under sub-section (2) of section 32 of this Act in the manner for the time being laid down under this Act ", and the reference in section 28 to "

shall be the reference as " the date of the publication of the notice under sub-section (1) of section 32 of this Act in the Official Gazette.] (6) For the purpose of determining the amount of compensation-

(a) the Collector shall have power to require any Page 31 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC person to deliver to him such returns and assessments as he considers necessary;

(b) the Collector shall also have power to require any person known or believed to be interested in the land to deliver to him a statement containing, as far as may be practicable, the name of every other person having any interest in the land as co- owner, mortgagee, tenant, or otherwise, and the nature of such interest, and of the rents and profits (if any) received or receivable on account thereof for three years next preceding the date of the statement.

(7) Every person required to deliver a return, assessment or statement under sub-section (6) shall be deemed to be legally bound to do so within the meaning of section 175 and section 176 of the Indian Penal Code.

(8) The Collector may hear expert witnesses if it be necessary to do so in any particular case.

(9) The Collector or any officer authorised by him in this behalf shall be entitled to enter on and inspect any land which is subject to proceedings before him.

(10) The Collector shall dispose of every case referred to him under sub-section (3) for determination of compensation as expeditiously as possible and in any case within such time as may be prescribed by rules.

(11) The Collector shall determine the amount of cost incurred in any case disposed of by him under the section, and by what persons and in what proportions they are to be paid. [(12) Where any case is referred to any Collector under sub- section (3), the State Government may, at any stage, by order in writing and for reasons to be recorded therein, transfer it to any other Collector, and upon such transfer, unless some special directions are given in the order, the Collector to whom the case is transferred may hear and dispose of the case from the stage at which it was transferred, or the case may be heard and disposed of by him de novo.]

34. Appeal to Court. - [(1) Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Collector determining the amount of compensation may, within sixty days from the date of such decision, so far as it affects him, by written application to the Collector require that the matter be referred by him for determination of the Authority and when any such application is made, the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 , shall mutatis mutandis apply to further proceedings in respect thereof.] (2) The decision of the [Authority] [on such reference] and Page 32 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC subject only to such decision, the decision of the Collector determining the amount of the compensation, shall be final." Discussion on the provisions (paragraphs 36 and 37):-

It also provides that the State Government may cause public notice to be given in the manner laid down in Section 53 and in the Official Gazette. A "proviso" came to be inserted in sub-section (2) by the Maharashtra Act No. 11 of 1967, which ordains that if the land proposed to be acquired falls within a Scheduled Area, then the State Government shall before such acquisition consult the bodies as set out in Clauses (i) to (iii). Sub-section Page 33 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC (3) provides that after considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner of the land and by any other person interested therein, and after giving such owner and person an opportunity of being heard, the State Government may pass such orders as it deems fit. Sub-section (4) provides that when a notice under sub-section (1) is published in the Official Gazette, the land shall, on and from the date of such publication, vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. Proviso to sub-section (4) was inserted by Maharashtra Act No. 18 of 1975, which ordains that before actual possession of such land is taken by or on behalf of the State Government, if it appears for the State Government that the land is no more required for the purposes of the Act, the State Government may, by like notice, withdraw the land from acquisition and on the publication of such notice in the Official Gazette, a consequence of which the land shall revest with retrospective effect in the person in whom it was vesting immediately before the publication of the notice under sub-section (1), subject to such encumbrances, if any, as may be subsisting at that time. Such proviso is akin to the provisions of section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Further sub-section (5) provides that where any land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (4), the State Government may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of the land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or any Page 34 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC person duly authorized by it in this behalf, within thirty days of the service of the notice. Sub-section (6) provides that if any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub-section (5), the State Government may take possession of the land, and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary. Sub-section (7) provides that where the land has been acquired for the Corporation or any local authority, the State Government shall, after it has taken possession thereof, transfer the land to the Corporation or that local authority, as the case may be, for the purpose for which it was acquired and the provisions of Section 43-A shall apply to any land so transferred. Thus, Section 32 provides for a complete scheme under which on issuance of a notice under sub-section (1) of Section 32 , the land shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances.

37. Section 33 of the MID Act is another relevant provision, providing that where any land is acquired by the State Government under Chapter VI of the MID Act , the State Government shall pay for such acquisition compensation the amount of which shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of the section. Sub-sections (2) to (12) of Section 33 provides for a complete scheme in regard to the determination of compensation. Section 34 provides for Appeal to Appellate Authority in the event a person is aggrieved by the decision of the Collector determining Page 35 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC the amount of compensation. Section 35 provides for 'Disputes as to apportionment'. Section 36 provides for 'Payment of Compensation' where the amount of compensation is determined under an agreement. The other provisions of Chapter VI need not be discussed, as they may not be relevant in the context in hand, suffice it to observe that Chapter VI appears to be a code in itself applicable to the acquisition of land under the MID Act .

38. Insofar as the present proceedings are concerned, it is not in dispute that a notification under section 32(1) of the MID Act was issued on 16 October, 1971. By virtue of such notification, land had stood vested with the State of Maharashtra and thereafter physical possession of the land was also taken over on 28 January, 1972 as evidenced by the panchanama as also the subsequent mutation entries, which came to be made in the revenue records namely the 7/12 extracts. The only method by which the land which stood acquired, to be withdrawn from the acquisition, could be by a procedure as stipulated under the proviso below sub-section (4) of Section 32 as discussed hereinabove, which came to be inserted under the Maharashtra Act No. 18 of 1975, which was not available at the relevant time when the notification under section 32(1) was issued and the possession of the petitioner's land was not on the statute book. Thus, it is from such legal perspective if the present proceedings are considered in the context of the prayers as made by the petitioner, there appears to be no Page 36 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC doubt that the said land stood acquired and vested with the State Government and handed over to the MIDC.

39. Apart from what has been observed hereinabove, what is most significant and imperative, is the objection as raised by the respondents on the petition being barred by delay and laches. We find that there is substance in the contentions as urged on behalf of the respondents, for more than one reason, which we set out hereunder:

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40. Having noted the aforesaid major reasons, we may observe that there is no dispute whatsoever on the petitioner's father giving an undertaking to this Court in the Consent Terms filed by him in the proceedings of Special Civil Application No. 767 of 1966 when he agreed to the acquisition of the land in question (Survey No. 137, area admeasuring 4 acre 15 gunthas), and it was in lieu of certain other lands of the petitioner being deleted from acquisition. This petition as filed originally (before amendments) was only on the basis of three documents, namely, consent terms, panchanama and copies of revenue records and without any assertion on any dispute being raised either by the petitioner's predecessor in title or by the petitioner. However, the pendency of the petition was sought to be utilized by the petitioner to his advantage, inasmuch as, the petitioner knocked the doors of other authorities so as to gather and/or generate documents, and on obtaining such materials, has tried to support the prayers to raise a specious plea that as no record of the acquisition is available, it needs to be presumed that the said land was never acquired and compensation not paid.

41. As rightly contended on behalf of the respondents, this was a well thought of modus operandi, as this made it possible for the petitioner to raise a plea that no record of acquisition was available with the respondents, hence, a contention could be raised of the land being not acquired. If such plea is accepted, every acquisition which had taken place about 30-50 years Page 38 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC back for want of record would be required to be held illegal. This is too much of expectation of the petitioner and in fact a frivolous plea.

42. In our opinion, the record clearly shows that much water had flown under the bridge since the time the land had stood vested with the State Government, i.e., on the publication of notice under section 32(1) of the MID Act on 16 October 1971 and the clear position on record that the possession of the land was taken over and consequential revenue entries being made in the record of rights recognizing the acquisition, which is also being disputed by the petitioner.

43. We may observe that in respect of old concluded acquisitions, it is certainly not possible for the State Government to preserve documents in respect of hundreds of acquisitions which take place long-long years back, as in the present case. The acquisition in question is not a contemporary acquisition, which could be said to have happened in the near past, and it is for such reason the State Government on affidavit has stated that it is not in a position to provide any documents of compensation being paid to his father, who had never asserted for compensation and possibly nay imminently for the reason that he has received compensation more significantly when he was a person so conscious of his legal rights, even to knock the doors of this Court questioning the acquisition in the Page 39 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC proceedings of Special Civil Application no. 767 of 1966 and thereafter compromising the said proceedings.

44. If the contention as urged on behalf of the petitioner to reopen such past acquisitions, which are very old acquisitions, is to be accepted, it would bring about a chaotic situation, inasmuch as, concluded land acquisitions would be required to be reopened on such ground, when record of such acquisitions and compensations or other record in relation to the acquisition is not available, on a presumption that the land was not acquired. Thus, such contention looked from any angle needs to fail. The reason being that non-existent or dead legal rights to assert such contentions cannot be resurrected as any right to question such acquisition as in the present case had certainly stood lapsed and deeply buried about 40 years back.

45. If at the relevant time a legitimate grievance was raised and redressed, the party who was to be aggrieved could have taken recourse to appropriate remedy available in law. Thus, the acceptance of the petitioner's arguments would also lead to a complete absurdity inasmuch as all such rights, which stood concluded during the lifetime of the petitioner's father without the petitioner's father asserting the same, cannot now be reopened. To accept the petitioner's contention, the well-settled principles of estoppel and the principles of doctrine of delay and laches would be Page 40 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC required to be discarded to entertain such plea. In our considered opinion, the respondent's contention of this petition being barred by delay and laches deserves total acceptance. The legal principles on delay and laches can be discussed.

46. In Mutha Associates & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. 5, the Supreme Court in the context of the provisions of Section 48(1) read with Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had an occasion to consider the principles of delay and laches, when it was held that the appellants therein ought to have challenged the acquisition proceedings without any loss of time and having failed to do so, they were not entitled to claim any relief in the extraordinary jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Referring to several decisions on such issue, the Supreme Court observed that the common thread running through all such decisions, was to the effect that in order to succeed in a challenge to the acquisition proceedings, the interested person must remain vigilant and watchful. It was observed that if instead of doing so, the interested person allows the grass to grow under his feet, he cannot invoke the powers of judicial review exercisable under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was observed that the failure of the interested persons to seek redressal at the appropriate stage and without undue delay, in such 5 (2013) 14 SCC 304 Page 41 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC cases would give rise to an inference that they have waived of their objections to the acquisitions. It was held that the High Court can legitimately decline to invoke its powers of judicial review to interfere with the acquisition proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution if the challenge to such proceedings is belated and the explanation offered a mere moonshine. The observations as made by the Supreme Court are required to be noted, which reads thus:

47. The applicability of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Digambar6 is apt insofar as the present proceedings are concerned, inasmuch as, on an undue delay of 20 years on the part of writ petitioner in invoking the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for grant of compensation of the land alleged to have been taken by the Government agencies, it was contended that the land was not at all taken. The Supreme Court observed that it could not be overlooked that it was easy to make such kind of allegations against anybody and that too against the State and in respect of the event which had occurred 20 years earlier, when the State may not at all be in a position to dispute such allegation, having regard to the manner in which it would be required to carry on its governmental functions. The Supreme Court accordingly set aside the order passed by the High Court. The observations of the Supreme Court are required to be noted, which reads thus:

21. Whether the above doctrine of laches which disentitled grant of relief to a party by equity court of England, could disentitle the grant of relief to a person by the High Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of our Constitution, when came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, President, Industrial Court [AIR 1967 SC 1450 : (1967) 2 LLJ 34] , it was regarded as a principle that disentitled a party for grant of relief from a High Court in exercise of its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution.

22. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329] reiterated the said principle of laches or undue delay as that which applied in exercise of power by the High Court Page 44 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC under Article 226 of the Constitution.

23. Therefore, where a High Court in exercise of its power vested under Article 226 of the Constitution issues a direction, order or writ for granting relief to a person including a citizen without considering his disentitlement for such relief due to his blameworthy conduct of undue delay or laches in claiming the same, such a direction, order or writ becomes unsustainable as that not made judiciously and reasonably in exercise of its sound judicial discretion, but as that made arbitrarily.

24. Since we have held earlier that the person seeking grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution, even if it be against the State, is required to satisfy the High Court that he was not guilty of laches or undue delay in approaching it for relief, need arises for us to consider whether the respondent in the present appeal (writ petitioner in the High Court) who had sought for relief of compensation on the alleged infringement of his legal right, had satisfied the High Court that he was not guilty of undue delay or laches in approaching it for relief. The allegation of the petitioner in the writ petition, as becomes clear from the judgment under appeal, was that although a certain extent of his land was taken away in the year 1971-72 by the agency of the State for the scarcity relief road works undertaken by the State Government in the year 1971-72, to find work for small agriculturists and agricultural labourers in the then prevailing severe drought conditions, without his consent, he was not compensated therefor, despite requests made to the State Government and various agencies in that regard ever since till the date of filing of the writ petition by him.

25. In our view, the above allegation is in no way sufficient to hold that the writ petitioner (respondent here) has explained properly and satisfactorily the undue delay of 20 years which had occurred between the alleged taking of possession of his land and the date of filing of writ petition in the High Court. We cannot overlook the fact that it is easy to make such kind of allegations against anybody that too against the State. When such general allegation is made against a State in relation to an event said to have occurred 20 years earlier, and the State's non-compliance with petitioner's demands, the State may not at all be in a position to dispute such allegation, having regard to the manner in which it is required to carry on its governmental functions. Undue delay of 20 years on the part of the writ petitioner, in invoking the High Court's extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for grant of compensation to his land alleged to have been taken by the governmental agencies, would suggest that his land was not taken at all, or if it had been taken it could not have been taken without his consent or if it was taken against his Page 45 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC consent he had acquiesced in such taking and waived his right to take compensation for it.

26. Thus, when the writ petitioner (respondent here) was guilty of laches or undue delay in approaching the High Court, the principle of laches or undue delay adverted to above, disentitled the writ petitioner (respondent here) for discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution from the High Court, particularly, when virtually no attempt had been made by the writ petitioner to explain his blameworthy conduct of undue delay or laches. The High Court, therefore, was wholly wrong in granting relief in relation to inquiring into the allegation and granting compensation for his land alleged to have been used for scarcity relief road works in the year 1971-72. As seen from the judgment of the High Court, the allegation adverted to above, appears to be the common allegation in other 191 writ petitions where judgments are rendered by the High Court following the judgment under appeal and which are subject of SLPs in this Court that are yet to be registered. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the High Court had gone wholly wrong in granting the relief which it has given in the judgment under appeal, and judgments rendered following the said judgment in other 191 writ petitions, said to be the subject of SLPs or otherwise. All the said judgments of the High Court, having regard to the fact that they were made in writ petitions with common allegation and seeking common relief, are liable to be interfered with and set aside in the interests of justice even though only learned counsel appearing for a few writ petitioners were heard by us."

48. In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board & Ors. vs. T.T. Murali Babu7 , the Supreme Court explained the importance of the doctrine of delay and laches and what it observed that the principles of delay and laches cannot be brushed aside and that a writ Court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same in a case which had four years of delay although not in the context of land acquisition. The observations of the Court on the principle of law would apply with full vigour in the facts of the present case. The Supreme Court 7(2014) 4 SCC 108 Page 46 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC held thus:

case [Lindsay Petroleum Co.v. Hurd, (1874) LR 5 PC 221] , PC pp. 239-40)"

15. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [(1986) 4 SCC 566 the Court observed that : (SCC p. 594, para 24) Page 47 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC "24. ... it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic." It has been further stated therein that : ( Nandlal Jaiswal case, [(1986) 4 SCC 566, SCC p. 594, para 24) "24. ... If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction."

Emphasis was laid on the principle of delay and laches stating that resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction at a belated stage is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in injustice.

16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant -- a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.

17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinise whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of Page 48 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons

-- who compete with "Kumbhakarna" or for that matter "Rip Van Winkle". In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold."

(emphasis supplied)

49. In Baljeet Singh (Decd.) through LR and Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.8 , the Supreme Court in considering the doctrine of delay and laches in the context of the Land Acquisition Act , made the following observations:

(emphasis supplied)

50. In a recent decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Dnyanu Bhiku Tanpure (Since deceased) through LR's Suresh Dnyane Tanpure vs. Deputy Collector, Rehabilitation, Pune & Ors. 9, to which one of us (Justice G.S. Kulkarni) was a member, the petitioner had approached this Court almost after a period of 33 years of the land acquisition award being passed to assail the acquisition. The Court dismissing the petition made the following observations:

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51. In similar circumstances, in Tatoba Rama Chavan, through her legal heir Sou. Nanda Balkrishna Mane vs. Collector & Ors. 10, the Court observed that the petition was blissfully silent on several basic requirements in maintaining a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, wherein the process of acquisition which had stood concluded in the year 1983 was sought to be reopened. It was held that the petition which was filed after an inordinate delay of almost 38 years was not maintainable. The following observations of the Court are required to be noted, which reads thus:

52. In Sureshkumar Shrikisan Bhayya & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra , through Secretary, Urban Development Dept. & Ors. 11, a Division Bench of this Court, to which one of us (Justice G.S. Kulkarni) was a member, was dealing with a case where the cause of action was being espoused after a delay of 12 years in respect of the land which had stood vested with the Municipal Corporation. Considering the objection of delay and laches in maintaining a Writ Petition, the Court observed that the petitioners have slept over their rights for a period of 12 years. The Court held that the petition being barred by the principles of delay and laches considering the principles of law as discussed in the decision of this Court in Sansar Texturisers Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors. 12 and the decisions of the 11 Writ Petition No. 638 of 2021 decided on 29 February, 2024 12 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 235 Page 52 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC Supreme Court in Shiv Dass vs. Union of India 13, Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. T.T. Murali Babu (supra), Baljeet Singh (dead) through Legal Representatives vs. State of Uttar Pradesh ( supra) and Union of India vs. N. Murugesan14 when it was held that the petition being filed with an inordinate delay was not maintainable.

53. Thus, adverting to the well-settled principles of law on the doctrine of delay and laches as applied to the facts of this case, it would be unconscionable that this Court nonetheless exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to entertain a plea against the acquisition of the land in question, which had taken place in the year 1971 and 1972 and grant reliefs to the petitioner. Thus, the reliefs as prayed for, in our opinion, surpass all cannons of judicial principles which are required to be adhered by the Court in exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

54. Although we have come to the aforesaid conclusion, for the sake of completeness, we deal with the other contentions as urged by the petitioner. The petitioner's contention that the acquisition is not completed, as there is no award passed or no compensation is paid, needs to be outrightly rejected. As observed above, the petitioner is estopped from raising such contention after 38 years of the land having stood vested with the State 13 (2007) 9 SCC 274 14 (2022) 2 SCC 25 Page 53 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC Government in regard to which there is no dispute and on which the petitioner or predecessor-in-title of the petitioner till filing of this petition, had never made any representation and/or had accepted the acquisition in its totality. Insofar as the petitioner's contention that the possession of the land is with the petitioner, we may observe that the same is wholly untenable and contrary to the panchanama and the record of the acquisition under which the possession of the land was handed over by the State Government to the MIDC. Any issue the petitioner may raise in disputing the panchanama or to assert the fact that the petitioner despite this document has remained in possession, are issues in the realm of disputed questions of facts which cannot be gone into in exercise of the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In any event, if the possession is with the petitioner, the petitioner never filed a civil suit for any declaratory relief and possibly because such suit itself would be barred by limitation and for such reason has chosen to file the present writ petition. Thus, looked from any angle, the petition needs to fail.

55. On the proposition that there cannot be lapsing of acquisition under the MID Act , Mr. Chawan has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Kiadb, Mysore & Anr. vs. Anasuya Bai (D) by Lrs . & Ors. (supra) to contend that the Court Page 54 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC in such case was dealing with Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (for short the " KIAD Act "), the provisions of which are akin to the MID Act , with which the present proceedings are concerned. The Supreme Court held that insofar as the acquisition under the KIAD Act is concerned, the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 ('2013 Act'), were not applicable. One of the questions considered by the Court was whether the provisions of the 2013 Act was applicable when the land was acquired under the provisions of KIAD Act namely whether by virtue of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, the acquisition proceedings under the KIAD Act had lapsed, as there being no award within the stipulated time. This issue was answered in the negative. The Supreme Court observed thus:

56. Thus, even if the petitioner's contention of there being no award or payment of compensation qua the land in question is to be accepted (which cannot be asserted under any imagination), there cannot be any lapsing of acquisition, so as to entertain such prayers as made by the petitioner.

57. The decision of the Supreme Court in The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Kiadb, Mysore & Anr. vs. Anasuya Bai (D) by Lrs . & Ors. (supra) was considered by the Division Bench of this Court in M/s. Super Electrical and Engineering vs. The Collector, Pune & Ors. (supra) wherein the Court Page 56 of 60 17 March 2025 ::: Uploaded on - 17/03/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 19/03/2025 21:22:08 ::: WP 6027-10.DOC repelled the proposition that there was any lapsing of the acquisition proceedings under the provisions of the MID Act . The following observations are required to be noted which read thus:

(emphasis supplied)

58. For the aforesaid reasons, we are not inclined to accept the contentions as raised on behalf of the petitioner and that too on a disputed assertion that the possession of the land, albeit taken over by the State Government and handed over to the MIDC in the year 1972, has continued to remain with the petitioner and for such reason, there is no acquisition of the land and/or the acquisition has lapsed, although wholly acquiesced and consented by the petitioner's late father in the proceedings of Special Civil Application No. 767 of 1966 filed before this Court. We are also not inclined to accept the petitioner's case that the principles of law as laid down by the Supreme Court in Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. Versus Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors. (supra) would become applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The principles of law as laid down in the said decision are salutary. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case where the acquisition had stood concluded in the year 1972, it is too late for the petitioner to raise any contention on the principles as enunciated by the Court in such decision, to reopen the concluded acquisition.

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59. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the clear opinion that the present petition is an abuse of the process of law. In fact by such proceedings, the petitioner has intended to speculate and/or tincker with the process of law so as to take a chance. In fact, the petitioner utilised the present proceedings to gather materials by making RTI applications knowing well the pendency of this petition. This is as clear from the variety of documents obtained by him under the garb of pendency of this petition, including to approach the Hon'ble Minister. The record indicates that the petitioner was successful in generating variety of correspondence which was sought to be used to support his contention that as the record of the acquisition was not available, it is deemed, that the land in question was not acquired. As a constitutional Court, all these things cannot be overlooked by us.

60. Considering the reasons which we have recorded as also the position in law, we are certain that this petition is a gross and patent abuse of the process of law. It cannot be dismissed simplicitor. It is thus dismissed with cost quantified at Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One lakhs only) which shall be deposited by the petitioner with the National Association for the Blind, Mumbai, within a period of two weeks from today.

61. Dismissed.

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62. At this stage, a prayer is made that the order be stayed. Considering the facts of the case, we reject the prayer.