No.5, in D.B. C.W. No.11512/2025 HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEET PUROHIT Judgment CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENTS : 12.08.2025 (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (295 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] RESERVED ON : 12.08.2025 / 13.08.2025, 14.08.2025 / 25.08.2025 & 26.08.2025, PRONOUNCED ON : 14th/11/2025 REPORTABLE Per, The Bench :

PART A - PETITIONS CHALLENGING 91-148 366-414 FINAL NOTIFICATION OF DELIMITATION ISSUED U/S 101 OF THE ACT OF 1994 / SEC. 3 OF THE ACT OF 2009 PART B - WRIT PETITIONS 149-167 414-425 CHALLENGING PROCESS OF DELIMITATION INITIATED IN PURSUANCE OF ONE MONTH'S NOTICE ISSUED UNDER SECTION 101 OF THE ACT OF 1994 PART C - WRIT PETITIONS 168-177 425-430 CHALLENGING PROCESS OF DELIMITATION / ALTERATION OF WARD BOUNDARIES IN ABSENCE OF ANY CHANGE IN CENSUS DATA OR VARIATION IN THE NUMBER OF WARDS PART D - WRIT PETITIONS 178-188 430-437 CHALLENGING REMOVAL OF PANCHAYAT SAMITI MEMBERS / PRADHAN ON THE GROUND THAT THEIR RESPECTIVE ELECTORAL WARD IS INCLUDED WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF A MUNICIPALITY PART E - WRIT PETITIONS 189-200 437-444 CHALLENGING ORDERS PASSED BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT APPOINTING THE OUTGOING SARPANCH AS (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (296 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] ADMINISTRATOR OR WRIT PETITIONS SEEKING APPOINTMENT OF ONGOING CHAIRPERSON OF MUNICIPALITY AS ADMINISTRATOR PART F - WRIT PETITIONS 201-207 444-449 CHALLENGING / SEEKING DIRECTION FOR FIXING OF VILLAGE HEADQUARTER PART G - WRIT PETITIONS SEEKING 208-223 449-465 DIRECTIONS TO DECLARE / HOLD THE ELECTIONS.

(a) CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY SCHEME RELATING TO LOCAL SELF INSTITUTIONS

1. The governance mechanism in India was largely with the Union of India and the States and Union Territories, under the Constitution. However, urban local self governance and organisation of Village Panchayats was an aspiration as envisaged under Article 40 of the Constitution wherein it was provided that the State shall take steps to organise village panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government.

2. The concept of self governance was initially regulated and controlled by the executive of the States. The Parliament while bringing out amendment in the Constitution inserting Part-IXA, under its objects and reasons, recognized that the system as was being followed, was pleased with many vices and could not acquire the status and dignity of responsible people bodies.

3. Accordingly, Part-IX introduce a three tier system of Panchayat Raj Institutions at Village, intermediate and district levels, while Part-IXA introduce a system of three types of municipalities based on the size of urban areas, the lowest being an area of transition from rural area to an urban area. Articles (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (297 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] 243B and 243Q mandated institutions of local governance in the States based on ratio between population and territorial areas and number of cities. It also provided for reservation for different sections of society which deserve representation as per population. With the amendment, the governance stands distributed in between Union, States and Local Self Governance with a separate sphere of functioning as per the schedules to the Constitution.

4. While the three governance have to act in tandem with each other, the Indian federalism puts more stress on overall governance to the Union, followed by the State Government and then the local governance amongst the local bodies which, of course, has to be under the supervision of the States. The functions of the third limb of governance, namely local self governance, have been clearly outlined under Articles 243G , 243H , 243W and 243X , and Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules of the Constitution.

5. Local self governance, thus, treats a District to be a third territorial unit after the Central and the States, and local self governance for various levels under the District comprising of rural and urban areas forms the source of self governance, as envisaged in the Constitution. The essence of democracy, thus, lies in the manner the local authorities function and, therefore, periodical elections at grassroot level become a necessary ingredient. The scope and functional structure of Panchayati Raj and municipal institutions form the basis for conducting such elections. Delimitation of territory, therefore, has an important role in identifying participation of the people at large in a (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (298 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] particular territory in representation at Panchayats and municipalities. The State legislature has been empowered to enact laws for all the purposes as envisaged under Part-IXA of the Constitution.

6. Accordingly, the State of Rajasthan legislature enacted Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 and Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 , to which we may refer at appropriate stage of this judgment. The Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1953 and the Rajasthan Panchayat Samiti & Zila Parishad Act, 1959 were repealed and the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 was brought into force w.e.f. 23.4.1994 vide gazette notification. From time to time there have been certain amendments made. Similarly, Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959, wherein amendments had been made from time to time by the legislature in consonance with the provisions incorporated in Part IXA of the Constitution, was repealed and the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 , was enacted by the State legislature vide notification dated 11.9.2009 w.e.f. 15.9.2009, which comprehensively deal with all the aspects relating to local self governance at the level of municipalities.

7. The present bunch of matters are relating to delimitation exercise undertaken or concluded by the State Government relating to the Panchayati Raj Institutions or Municipality, across the State; the ancillary issues arising thereto, the consequential action taken in pursuance thereof as well as postponement of the elections of Local Self Institutions. The writ petitions have been filed before learned Single Bench as well as PIL petition before the (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (299 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] Division Bench of this Court at Principal Seat at Jodhpur as well as Bench at Jaipur. In relation to interim orders / interlocutory order passed by learned Single Judge, has given rise to some D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) also.

8. The then Chief Justice vide his order dated 14.07.2025 passed in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.7718/2025 and other connected matters, has directed to list the said bunch of writ petitions along with D.B. Civil Writ Petition (PIL) No.1285/2025 as well as some other cases listed before the learned Single Judge at Principal Seat as well as at Jaipur Bench. There were certain appeals preferred against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in certain petitions pending at Principal Seat at Jodhpur, namely D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.831/2025 ( State of Rajasthan and Ors. Vs. Dhanna Ram and Ors. ), which too was directed to be listed together for analogous hearing. The relevant portion of order dated 14.07.2025 is reproduced below :-

9. Accordingly, all these cases were taken up and with the benefit of technology of using video conferencing, we were able to hear the arguments advanced by several counsels arguing cases from Principal Seat at Jodhpur as well as counsels from Jaipur. The technology was used in a manner that all the lawyers were privy to the arguments being advanced either at Jodhpur or at Jaipur and were, therefore, able to submit arguments in rejoinder. Hearing took place for several days and the judgment was reserved.

(c) ISSUES INVOLVED

10. From the analytic and comparative analysis of the pleadings of the respective parties in the present bunch of the writ (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (301 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] petitions / special appeals, broadly following issues need to be addressed by us comprehensively and relatively :

11. The broad issues identified above, from the pleadings of the parties across this bunch of writ petitions / special appeals, along with other connected and ancillary issues, will be addressed and decided in the category-wise adjudication undertaken by this Court in the succeeding paragraphs of this judgment. PART II - SUBMISSIONS

(a) SUBMISSIONS OF PETITIONERS / APPELLANTS :

12. S/Shri Hanuman Choudhary, Shailesh Prakash Sharma, Punit Singhvi, Pradeep Kalwania, M.S. Raghav, Prem Chand Dewanda, Sunil Kumar Singodiya and R.N. Mathur, Senior Advocate mainly advanced arguments at Jaipur Bench while Sunil Joshi, Manoj Bhandari, Ramavtar Singh Choudhary, Dinesh Kumar Joshi, Ranjeet Joshi, Varda Ram Choudhary, Moti Singh, Narayan Singh Solanki, Ganesh Ram Jat, Rajesh Joshi, Senior Advocate, J.R. Ponia, Sr. Adv. have advanced arguments from Principal Seat at Jodhpur through video conferencing and Shri Rajendra Prasad, Advocate General has argued on behalf of the State. Various counsels for the petitioners / appellants as well as counsel for the respondent - State have also submitted their respective written submissions. The arguments / contentions of the respective parties are succinctly summed up below :-

13. Shri Hanuman Choudhary, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9856/2025: Banshidhar Khandela Vs. The State of Rajasthan has submitted that the power of delimitation, inclusion/exclusion of local body, Gram Panchayat in the true spirit of the statutory provisions with a predetermined approach, the (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (304 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] authorities have misused and misinterpreted the provisions to suit their purposes resulting in ousting of duly elected Pradhans. He submits that the objections which were received from the villagers were required to be addressed too by the District Collector and opportunity of hearing should have been provided to them before taking a final decision for issuing notification under Section 101 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. He submits that the order passed by the learned Single Judge at Principal Seat at Jodhpur in S.B. Civil Writ Peittion No.8576/2025, Dhanna Ram and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. was required to be followed and decision should have been taken in the said terms.

14. Mr. R.N. Mathur, learned Senior Advocate appearing in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.7043/2025: Sonu Kumari Vs. State of Rajasthan and Anr. , submitted that the notification issued under Section 3 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 is against the spirit of Article 243 of the Constitution of India and there has been a complete non-application of Mind. He submits that the notification results into violation of Provisions of the Rajashtan Panchayati Raj Act as well as the Rajasthan Municipal Act. Article 243 of the Constitution, in his submission, provides for democratic governance at village as well as urban levels. Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution provides for functions of Panchayat and Twelth Schedule of the Constitution provides for functions of Municipalities. On comparison of the same, it is apparent that the factors for consideration of village development are wider and broader in nature. By limitation excluding a Gram Panchayat results in depriving the Gram Panchayat from rural development curtailing the rights of the people living in that Panchayat. He (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (305 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] submits that firstly, in terms of Article 243Q , the rural area ought to have been first declared as transitional area and prior consultation with the Election Commissioner has not been done, more so, as it is the Election Commissioner alone who is authorized to conduct elections. He submits that the exercise has been undertaken for political considerations without due application of mind. The upliftment of rural area was required to be kept in mind before taking such decisions by the State. He relies on Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) Vs. Secretary, Governor 's Secretariat reported in ( 2020) 6 SCC 548 and The State Of Goa Vs. Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh reported in (2021) 8 SCC 401 in support of his submissions. He has also invited our attention to order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Meghraj Kothari V. Delimitation Commission reported in AIR 1967 SC 669 to submit that prior consultation with State Election Commissioner is necessary and an enquiry is required to be made at the level before conducting the delimitation exercise.

15. Shri J.R. Poonia, learned Sr. Adv. appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8748/2025: Deva Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. , has apart from supporting the submissions of Mr. R.N. Mathur, Senior Advocate has advanced his submissions pointing out that judicial review can be done by this Court even after the notification has been issued and relies on the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) Vs. Secretary, Governor 's Secretariat (supra) and The State Of Goa Vs. Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh (supra).

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16. Shri Prem Chand Dewanda, learned counsel appearing in D.B. Civil Writ (PIL) Petition No.1285/2025: Giriraj Singh Devanda and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors., has submitted written submissions with respect to the PIL and supports his submissions on the basis of judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Mahajan Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. reported in 2022 (12) SCC 770; Kishansing Tomar Vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Ors. reported in 2006(8) SCC 352; Municipal Board, Begun and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. reported in 1991 AIR Rajasthan 14; Sau. Durgeshwari Rajesh Kale Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in 2021 (3) AIR BomR 476; Guddi and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (D.B. CWP No.2002/2020) and P.K. Kunju Vs. State of Kerala and Ors. reported in 1970 AIR Kerala 252 apart from the law as already cited hereinabove.

17. He submits that violation of Article 243E of the Constitution which mandates continuing for five years only and no longer it also mandates as per Proviso to complete the election before the expiry of tenure. He submits that postponing election by way of impugned notifications is ultra vires to the Constitution. Article 243K(1) vest Superintendent direction and control for preparation of electoral rolls and they are duty bound to complete the election before expiry of the tenure, but the State Election Commission has failed to discharge its constitutional mandate.

18. He submits that the authentication by the only Governor is lacking in the impugned notification, rendering the notification to be constitutional defective. He also submits that there is misuse of (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (307 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] Section 17 and Section 95 of the Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. Further, the outgoing Sarpanch or Ward Panch could not have been appointed as Administrator and the action is arbitrary and does not have any nexus to the objects sought to be achieved. They could not have been retained in the office and continuing of the existing body beyond five years was contrary to the mandate under Article 243E of the Constitution. Even the Administrator cannot be allowed to continue for a period exceeding six months upon dissolution of Panchayats. He submits that no reasons have been provided for postponement of Panchayat Election and the notification is clearly arbitrary exercise of power which violates Article 14 of the Constitution. There has been a usurpation of the democratic rights and violates basic structure principle.

19. Mr. Pradeep Kalwania, learned counsel appearing in D.B. Special Appeal Writ Nos.628/2025, in his written submissions challenged the inclusion of the Village Gulabbari in Gram Panchayat Parmanpura in Shahpura Block and the consequential order of the learned Single Judge rejecting his petition as premature as no final decision was taken by the Government, he argues in his D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.627/2025 that the guidelines issued by the State on 10.01.2025 and 13.02.2025 which mandated proposal of reorganization and re-demarcation to be prepared on the basis of the data of the Census of the year 2011. He submits that as per the guidelines, the minimum population should be kept at 3,000 and maximum at 5,500 and the headquarter of the newly created Gram Panchayat should be kept in the village as far as possible, to which adequate means of transportation are available so that there is easy contact with all (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (308 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] the other villagers of the Gram Panchayat. There should be a Government Offices in the village with other facilities such as School, Panchayat Bhawan, Anganwadi Center, Patwal Bhawan, Kisan Seva Kendra and other Government Offices for which sufficient land should be available, but the Sub Divisional Officer in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner, issued order on 11.02.2025 whereby, the District Collector approved inclusion of Revenue Village Gulabbari in the newly created/proposed Gram Panchayat Parmanpura by excluding from the existing Gram panchayat Maharkhurd. In support of his submission that Village Gulabbadi should have been declared as headquarter of Gram Panchayat instead of Parmanpura, he has invited attention to the population as per Census 2011 of Village Gulabbadi was 2196 to that of Parmanpura was 1796. Gulabbadi was situated at State Highway No.37 while Village Parmanpura is situated in remote area. There is an English Medium School at Village Gulabbadi. A- Grade Veterinary Husbandry Hospital is also situated and an old Post Office whereas postel work is conducted for Parmanpura via Gulabadi. Main water tank is constructed and distance from District Headquarter is 47 Kilometer while distance of Parmanpura is 55 Kilometers. Village Gulabbadi is 25 Kilometers from the Sub- Divisional Headquarter, however, Village Parmanpura is 30 Kilometer away. He submits that there was no occasion of inclusion of Revenue Village of Gulabbari in the new Gram Panchayat Parmanpura.

20. Similar arguments had been advanced for Village Gomawali which has been included in the newly formed Gram Panchayat (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (309 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] Trilokpura and removed from the existing Gram Panchayat Sihodi in Panchayat Samiti Srimadhopur in District Sikar.

21. Mr. Tanmay Dhand, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.6505/2025, has raised the submission as to whether the State can withdraw previous notification issued under Article 243Q of the Constitution by virtue of notification under Section 3(1) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 and revert a municipality included as transitional area to Village Panchayat. He has referred to the notification dated 24.3.2021 whereby the Revenue Village Todiya Ka Bas, Gram Panchayat Lekri, District Alwar was declared as transitional area under Article 243Q of the Constitution and included within the limits of Nagar Palika Bansur, and the new notification dated 27.3.2025 whereby the limits of Nagar Palika Bansur were altered resulting in withdrawal and revival of Village Panchayat Todiya Ka Bas, Gram Panchayat Lekri. He relies on a judgment passed in Bhanwar Lal Mundra & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (DB Civil Writ Petition No.10491/2009) decided on 13.5.2015.

22. Mr. Rajesh Kumar Sharma and Mr. Deepak Sharma, learned counsels appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos. 6721/2025 and 9804/2023 have submitted that even if a person is disqualified on account of Ward being shifted from one Panchayat Samiti to Municipality, he would continue to remain as Pradhan as the election of Pradhan is not only the part of a village of particular area which may become part of municipal council on account of delimitation, but also represents the other Gram Panchayat of concerned Panchayat Samiti. Petitioner, therefore, cannot be removed from the post of Pradhan merely because the village (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (310 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] from where he had been elected as a Member stands dissolved and inviting attention to Sections 2(8) , 17 , 30 , 38 of the Act of 1994, he submits that the concerned person who has been elected as Pradhan would, therefore, continue to perform work upto the period of five years.

23. Mr. Ravi Kumar Palsania and Mr. Anilendra Pandey, learned counsels who are appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos. 6988/2025, 8868/2025, 9206/2025, 9187/2025, 9427/2025, 9364/2025, 9363/2025, 9428/2025, 9424/2025, 9385/2025, 9399/2025, 10542/2025, 10541/2025, 11046/2025, 11606/2025, 9427/2025, in their written submissions have submitted that the notification dated 10.01.2025 does not indicate any reasons for reorganization of all the panchayats. In number of cases, it is submitted that the parameter of 6 kilometer distance and guidelines which were laid down for delimitation have been violated. It is submitted that there is no administrative necessity for current delimitation exercise being conducted. It is further submitted that the objection filed before the Collector have remained undecided and resultantly, the litigation have been taken before this Court. He further submits that even there were provisions under the law for allowing the delimitation. The same cannot be said to be absolute and unrestricted. The State Government cannot act arbitrarily and without giving out any reasons. The democratic set up cannot be allowed to be disturbed. It is submitted that the parameters which have been laid down for delimitation in the year 2021 like, population, nature of work of the local geographical situation ought to be taken into consideration for the purpose of constitution of Municipalites. The (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (311 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] acts, as alleged, could not be undertaken without considering the public interest.

24. Mr. Indresh Sharma, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.6648/2025, in his written submission has submitted the similar arguments, as noticed above, with regard to Village Sajanpuri which has been directed to be excluded while forming Nagar Palika Laxmangarh and he submits that the village ought to have been included in the urban local body. Denial of inclusion has resulted, in his submissions, derivation of civic amenities. It is his submission that other two villages who are at equal distance have been included, the State ought to have been included the Village Sajanpuri also. He submits that the action of the respondents is not in accordance with law and there has been a complete non-application of mind in laying down the standards and while taking such arbitrary decision leaving out the village to form Municipal Council Laxmangargh. Learned counsel has relied on the judgment of Champa Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. reported in AIR 2018 SC 2352 in support of his submissions.

Mr. Indresh Sharma, learned counsel also appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.6191/2025, in his written submissions claims for inclusion of Village Mojpur.

25. Mr. Shailesh Prakash Sharma, learned counsel appearing in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.6124/2025, in his written submission has submitted that petitioners who were Ward Panchs of Gram Panchayat Hathikhera which consist of three villages (Revenue Villages Hathikhera, Boraj and Kajipura) elected in January 2021 for a fixed five-year term till 21.01.2006. However, in account of (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (312 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] the notification dated 25.03.2025, the said villages have been included in the earlier Municipal Corporation, resulting in ousting of the elected members. He submits that on account of inclusion of the villages, the petitioners' democratic mandate has been disrupted and the villages have been deprived of the rural schemes such namely MNREGA, PMAY, Bada Bandi, etc. It also increased taxation, restricts use of community land and would result in causing administrative inconvenience. It is his further submission that the post precedents have been ignored and submissions of the administrative authorities are required to follow uniform standards which have been continued to be followed previously on account of inclusion of the villages. It is submitted that local residents would face great amount of hardship and common lands for grazing and public purposes would be restricted.

26. In D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.4686/2025 filed by Ex-MLA Sanyam Lodha as a public interest litigation, the issues raised are essentially the same as raised in D.B. Civil Writ Petition (PIL) No. 1285/2025: Giriraj Singh Devanda Vs. State of Rajasthan. Shri Punit Singhvi, learned counsel, in his written submissions, has reiterated the submission with regard to the necessity to conduct election on or before expiry of the terms of the elected member of the Municipality in terms of Section 11(2)(i) read with Section 7 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009. Learned counsel further submits that the appointment of Administrator of the Municipality is not within the jurisdiction of the State. He relies on Suresh Mahajan Vs. State of MP ( 2022) 12 SCC 770 and Kishansing Tomar Vs. Municipal Corpn. : 2006 8 SCC 352.

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27. Mr. Sunil Samdariya, learned counsel appearing in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.9974/2025: Ram Kanwar Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. , in his written submissions has submitted that the guidelines dated 10.01.2025 and 13.02.2025 issued by the respondents could not have been violated and Gram Panchayats could not have been altered or created in violation of population parameters as prescribed in the aforesaid guidelines. He submits that as per guidelines dated 10.01.2025, the Government prescribed the minimum population of 3000 and maximum population of 5500 for creation of new Gram Panchayat, but they have lowered the term. It is submitted that however, 15% deviation was allowed relating to population matrix vide notification dated 13.02.2025. Policy decision requires to be adhered to strictly and he submits that the State Government cannot speak in two voices. District Collector has failed to prescribe the guidelines which provided for determinable standards. He also relies on judgment passed by the Division Bench in the case of Gram Vikas Manch Samity, Bhinay Vs. State of Rajasthan (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.5795/2022) wherein contention of the State Government that policy is not binding, was rejected. He also relies upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of " Ms X Vs. Registrar General, High Court of Madhya Pradesh" reported in (2022) 14 SCC 187 and submitted that delimitation of Gram Panchayats, Tehsil- Viratnagar was wholly unjustified and the principles laid down in the administrative guidelines and policy were required to be adhered to.

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28. Mr. Pradeep Kalwania, learned counsel appearing in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8269/2025 in his written submission has relied on judgment passed in the case of " Kuldeep Kumar Vs. U.T. Chandigarh (2024 INSC 129) and submits that on account of political pressure, notification dated 24.03.2025 was issued extending the area of the existing municipal council, Shahpura to include Revenue Village Devan, Madho Ka Bas and Lobdawas. He submits that the action has been taken to remove the petitioner who has been elected as a Pradhan under the symbol of Indian National Congress. Learned counsel submits that there has been no declaration, declaring a new area as Municipal council Shahpura and the notification dated 24.03.2025, therefore, deserves to be quashed. He submits that merely because one part of the area of the Municipal council has been declared as surplus and included in the Municipal Corporation, the Pradhan, Smt. Pista Devi who was elected and holding in-charge was required to be consulted and could not have been removed by declaring the post of Pradhan as vacant. He submits that merely because the post of Ward Member has to be treated as dissolved on account of the concerned Panchayat having been added in the Municipal areas, the Pradhan cannot be automatically removed on account of being Member of the Said Panchayat. He submits that the altered membership of a Ward Member can be removed in terms of Section 101(5A) of the Act of 1994. Since the Panchayat Samiti continues to remain in existence, therefore, the post of Pradhan should remain unaffected. He relies the submissions, as noticed hereinabove, on this aspects. It is further stated that the petitioner was elected as Pradhan for a period of 5 years in the (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (315 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] year 2021 and ought to be allowed to continue on the post till she completes her 5 years tenure. Opportunity of hearing prior to delimitation order is mandatory and keeping in with the rule of audi alteram. He also relies on judgment passed in the case of Ashok Ganpat Jadhav and Anr. Vs. State Election Commission Mumbai and Ors. reported in 2000(4) ALL MR 565 as well as Kuldeep Kumar Vs. U.T. Chandigarh (supra).

29. Mr. Naveen Dhuwan, learned counsel appearing in D.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos.8670/2025, 8714/2025, 8718/2025, 9403/2025 and 9405/2025, for Gram Panchayat Bhadwasi, in his written submission reiterates what we have already noticed in the written submissions of other cases. It is submitted that when the Nagar Parishad prepared a plan for the proposed area to include in the Municipal area, the entire area of Gram Panchayat Bhadwasi was not included and only one revenue Village Jagmalpur was included. It is his submission that the Municipality also raised concern for not including of the areas, but only the villages in the periphery ought to be included, however, vide notification dated 22.04.2025 and order dated 05.05.2025, the Panchayati Raj Department has been declared that the elected representatives of the included area in municipality would be considered to be removed. He submits that the elected members ought not to be treated as removed on account of delimitation exercise.

30. Mr. Vikash Ghosalya, learned counsel appearing in D.B. Civil Writ (PIL) Petition No.9199/2025: Sanwar Mal Chaudhary and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and ors., in his written submission has submitted that creation of Ringus as Panchayat Samiti by splitting existing Panchayat Samiti Khandela, District Sikar under the (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (316 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] process of delimitation vide notification dated 10.01.2025 is illegal, arbitrary and unjustified. He submits that as per notification dated 10.01.2025, only those Panchayat Samiti should be reconstituted if there are 40 and above Gram Panchayats of population of 2 lacks and above as per census of 2011. While there are 45 Gram Panchayat under territory of Panchayat Samiti Khandela in which two Gram Panchayats have been included in the boundaries of Municipality Khandela. Nine new Gram Panchayats have been proposed by the District Collector, Sikar and total population of the Panchayat and Gram Panchayats would be 2.57022 lacs and therefore, denial is fulfilling all the criteria for reconstitution. The Block Development Officer had made a proposal to create Ringus as new Panchayat Samiti by splitting the existing Panchayat Samiti Khandela and several Gram Panchayats have also made representations for creation of a new Panchayat Samiti Ringus from the Panchayat Samiti Khandela, but the State Government has totally ignored the creation of Ringus as a new Panchayat Samiti. It is submitted to be discriminatory and arbitrary. Learned counsel has relied on Section 13(2) of the Act of 1994 and therefore, the present public interest litigation petition has been filed demanding for creation of Panchayat Samiti Ringus.

31. Mr. Nikhil Saini, learned counsel appearing in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.7043/2025: Sonu Kumari Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. , in his written submission has stated that vide notifications dated 24.03.2025, 22.04.2025 and 28.04.2025, the Revenue Village Banwas, Moi Sadda and Village Dhani Hukma have been included in Nagar Palika Singhana and the Pradhan who was elected as a member from the said Panchayats has been deemed (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (317 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] to be removed and his charge has been handed over to respondent No.7- Smt. Sarla. The submission is similar to the as raised hereinabove alleging that there is a non-application of mind and arbitrariness in taking such decisions. It is stated that no study or survey was undertaken to exclude the Revenue Villages from Panchayat Samiti Singhana and including in Nagar Palika, Singhana. Nagar palika Singhana itself constituted by notification dated 19.04.2023 and within short span, the Revenue Villages of panchayat Samiti Singhana have been included resulting in affecting the residents of the Gram Panchayats from benefits of the rural schemes. He relies on Division Bench judgment passed in the case of Bhagwat Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. :

32. Mr. Pradeep Kalwania, learned counsel appearing in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.9640/2025: Ganesh Ram Jat Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. , similar written submission have been filed raising same grounds and arguments which have already been noticed hereinabove with respect to assertion that a Pradhan would continue to hold the post up to 5 years inspite of his being removal as a Ward Member of the Panchayat.

33. Mr. Sunil Kumar Singodiya, learned counsel appearing in D.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos.5550/2025, 5583/2025, 6804/2025, 7762/2025, 7857/2025, in his written submissions has raised similar grounds and submissions as raised by Mr. Pradeep kalwania, learned Advocate hereinabove. He asserts that the (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (318 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] scheme of Rules and Act would not deprive an elected Pradhan or Sarpanch from continuing his office up to statutory period of five years merely on account of inclusion of the Gram Panchayat in Municipal Board and consequential removal from the post of Member. They cannot be declared to be removed from the post of Pradhan/Sarpanch.

34. Mr. Manjeet Godara, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos.11997/2025: Randhir And Ors. Vs. The State of Rajasthan and Ors. , in his written submission has submitted that the proposed inclusion of Revenue Villages Sawai Chhani and Bhairu Chhani in Gram Panchayat Gadi Chhani in spite of existing inclusion in Gram Panchayat Gadi Chhani is unjustified. He submits that Revenue Village Bhairu Chhani and Sawai Chhani are situated in the same place adjacent to each other with a common Government High Secondary School. He submits that the newly formed Gram Panchayat Bhairu with headquarter Ber is wholly unjustified as the number of villagers in two villages are more than that in Ber. Village Ber is 9 kilometer away, he, therefore, submits that the action is clearly arbitrary and with non- application of mind.

35. Mr. Dinesh Kumar Joshi, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8576/2025: Dhanna Ram and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan filed at Principal Seat at Jodhpur, in his written submissions has submitted that Gram Panchayat Matora was having two revenue villages namely Matora and Shivnagar and the Sarpanch was from Village Matora. The Revenue Village Shivnagar was divided into Shivnagar and Mahadev Nagar. Revenue Village Matora was divided into Matora and Balaji Nagar. Vide notice dated (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (319 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] 07.04.2025, the Revenue Village Mahadev Nagar and Shiv Nagar and Balaji Nagar was excluded from Gram Panchayat Matora and included in Hanumansagar and Lakheta and further, Revenue Village Sanwta was excluded from Hanumansagar and included in Matora, and the same was challenged by the villagers of the villages Mahadev Nagar, Shiv Nagar and Balaji Nagar before the Tehsildar, SDM and Collector Phalodi, but their voice was not heard, therefore, they challenged the same in the present petition preferred before the Court. Learned counsel submits that it was at the instance of the counsel appearing for the State that the High Court passed a direction to decide objections raised by the villagers. It is submitted that Gram Panhayat Matora having all public facilities which is only 1 to 4 kilometers away, whereas Gram Panchayat Hanumnsagar and Lakheta is far away ranging between 9 to 11 kilometer and no public facilities are available. The action of the respondents is without application of mind, whimsical, discriminatory, arbitrary and also contrary to the guidelines laid down by the State Government dated 10.02.2025. It was submitted that the action ought to be declared null and void ab initio.

36. Mr. Pradhuman Singh, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.2148/2025: Rajasthan Panchayat Samiti Sadsya Sangh and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Anr. filed at Jodhpur, in his written submissions, has challenged the notifications dated 16.01.2025 and 18.01.2025 and submits that the administrative powers of the Gram Panchayats, term of which was completed on 31.01.2025, could not have been allowed to continue through their existing Sarpanch and Village Development (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (320 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] Officer by appointing them as Administrators in terms of Section 95 of the Act, on dissolution of the Panchayati Raj Institution, the Members and the Chairperson, on the date of dissolution, may vacate their respective offices. Thus, the District Collector and the State Government cannot appoint the Sarpanch or the Village Development Officer as Administrator as they are no more holding any authority in the concerned Panchayati Raj Institution. They can, in no manner, be said to be officer or authority and they are ceased to continue on the said post. The charge of Administrator should be given to the Block Development Officer or an officer subordinate to the State Government in terms of Section 98 of the Act. Once there is completion of term, the election was required to be held at the earliest to extending and accommodating the existing Sarpanch and Village Development Officer. The matter relates to the order passed by the District Collector, Tonk with respect to Gram Panchayat Sonva, District Tonk.

37. Mr. Ramawtar Singh Choudhary, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8698/2025: Sahdev Singh Bhati and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. filed at Jodhpur, in his written submission, has challenged the letter dated 13.02.2025 proposing the re-delimitation of Wards of Municipal Board, Taranagar. He submits that the State Government had earlier issued a notification whereby, the wards had been determined on the basis of population and various other municipalities delimitation was conducted, however, there was no action for delimitation of Municipal Board,, Taranagar. It is submitted that the impugned order dated 13.02.2025 seeks delimitation of Municipality Board whose election would be conducted in October, 2025 and (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (321 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] November, 2025. He submits that on the basis of same population, there being no change and number of 35 wards also not having been changed. There is no occasion to change the boundaries of the Wards and the same would not have any object or nexus. He submits that as per Section 6 of the Act of 2009, the number of Wards would be determined only on the basis of population as ascertained with the latest census. Municipality would be divided into number of Wards as no number of seats fixed for Municipality in terms of Sub-Section (1) of Section 6 after conducting the exercise in terms of Section 3 . The action of the respondents, in his submission, is violative of all the aforesaid provisions. He relies on the order passed in the case of Jai Singh Meena Vs. State of Rajasthan (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.997/2009 ). He also relies on the Division Bench judgement of Punjab and Haryana High Court relating to Municipal Council Dera Baba Nanak District Gurdaspur and an order passed by this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.3390/1990 ( Azizulaha Khan Vs. State of Rajasthan ) decided on 06.09.1990. He also relies on Rajesh Kumar Sharma and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab (CWP No.7548/2023) decided on 17.10.2023.

38. Mr. Devilal R. Vyas, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8858/2025: Imam and Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. and in S.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos.9094/2025, 9149/2025, 9274/2025, 9386/2025, 9412/2025, 9925/2025, 10065/2025, 11023/2025, 11053/2025, 11063/2025, 11083/2025, 11087/2025, 11112/2025, 11114/2025, 11117/2025, 11314/2025, 11493/2025, 11910/2025 and 13298/2025 filed at Jodhpur, in his written submissions has (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (322 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] submitted that there is no proper way for access to the villagers of village Rhuma Aziz Ki Basti and challenged the creation of new Gram Panchayat Harjiyaniyon Ki Dhani, wherein the said village has been included along with one other village Binjasar Dher. It is submitted that the villagers would have to first travel to Village Akaliya Dhora and thereafter, Binjram Road to the headquarters thereby covering a distance of about 11 KM. The Patwar Mandal, Binjasar has issued a certificate dated 17.04.2025 with regard to the distance, whereas he submits that another issue of Gram Panchayat Meethe Ka Tala showing an approximate distance 12 kilometer, the Sub Division Officer has reflected the distance to only 5.5 kilometers between the newly formed Gram Panchayat and Village Rahuma Aziz Ki Basti wherein petitioners are residents. Learned counsel submits that in spite of guidelines laid down in the circular, the respondents have failed to take notice of all the aspects. The objections have been raised, but they are not being considered.

39. Mr. Vivek Sharma, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.11516/2025: Pursottam Sharma Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. filed at Jodhpur, in his written submission claims inclusion of Village Chak 1-B-Chhoti in Municipal Council Sriganganagar which has been earlier included in municipal limits vide notification dated 19.03.2025, but is being sought to be separated vide notification dated 27.03.2025 issued by the order of DLB. The prayer is made by the counsel to quash the subsequent notification dated 27.03.2025.

40. Mr. Peerane Khan, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.11056/2025: Arbab Khan and Ors. Vs. State of (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (323 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] Rajasthan and Ors. filed at Jodhpur, in his written submission has challenged inclusion of Ali Khan Ki Dhani, Gram Panchayat Dedusar in a newly proposed Gram Panchayat Daulatpura. He submits that the newly proposed Gram Panchayat Daulatpura is approximately 7 kilometer away and is not connected by a proper road, and the same has been done without any form of democratic participation.

41. Mr. Jitender Singh Bhaleria, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.11010/2025: Hema Ram Vs. the State of Rajasthan and Ors. filed at Jodhpur, in his written submission has prayed to keep continue Dongre Ki Dhani in Gram Panchayat Bhaniyana, Jaisalmer, whereas the same is proposed to be included in Gram Panchayat Khinvsar-II in notice dated 07.04.2025. It is submitted that the objections were raised pointing out that the new Gram Panchayat Khinvsar is 15 kilometre away whereas the Gram Panchayat Bhaniyana is 3.5 kilometre away. It is stated that the objections were wrongly rejected, although there was a report in their favour. The power has been exercised in a colorable manner. Learned counsel also advanced the arguments commonly taken and noticed hereinabove.

42. Mr. Ikbal Khan, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.11006/2025: Jalam Singh and Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. filed at Jodhpur, in his written submission, the objection has been raised of delimitation and creation of new Gram Panchayat Harbha in place of existing Gram Panchayat Toga. It is submitted that existing Gram Panchayat Toga cannot divide the villages. The arguments as advanced earlier of being violating (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (324 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] of the policy and guidelines laid down vide notification dated 10.01.2025 have been reiterated by the learned counsel.

43. Mr. Ramawtar Singh Choudhary, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.9669/2025: Nema Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors., and S.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos........Item No.13, 31, 39, 57, 115, 121, 124, 149, 151, 176, 217, 228 and 239, filed at Jodhpur, in his written submission has raised similar objections relating to shifting/change of Village from one Gram Panchayat to another. He relies on 2020 (9) SCC 356 ( Hari Krishan Mandir Trust Vs. State of Maharashtra ).

44. Mr. Naman Mohnot, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.9292/2025: Ramdhan Meghwal and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. filed at Jodhpur, in his written submission has repeated the same submission as notice above. It is submitted that the interpretation of the words ownership and control of the material resources of the community and common good under Article 39 (b) of the Constitution covers not only the population falling under the newly created revenue village, but also population left behind in the village or villages out of which new village has been created. It is submitted that the name of Village Ridmalsar Purohitan was changed by letter dated 07.10.2014 to Ridmalsar only and the action of the respondent to convert revenue Village Ridmalsar Sipahiyan and Ridmalsar Purohitan is wholly unjustified. Learned counsel submits that the creation of new Village Ridmalsar Sipahiyan is only unjustified as the separation of Village Vas Sipahiyan and Naino ka Vas and they all are situated in dimension of 1 kilometre. It is submitted that the State has to consider the willingness of the residents of the village (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:44 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (325 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] which is also required to be taken into consideration. Land of Village Ridmalsar Sipahiyan would be new scenario to form the new revenue village, it would affect the rights of the citizens.

45. Mr. Binja Ram Jajra, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.9209/2025: Sadik Khan and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. filed at Jodhpur, in his written submission, the objections regarding delimitation notice on behalf of Gram Panchayat Aduri for formation of a new Gram Panchayat were raised. It was suggested that if new Gram Panchayat is required to be made, the same would be Village Gogliwala, but the District Collector vide notice dated 07.04.2025 has proposed Gram Panchayat Village Chak 2AD, Ambedkar Nagar to be formed. It is stated that several villages are located at more distant, i.e., more than 15 kilometres away and the villagers will have to visit through the existing Gram Panchayat Aduri. It is stated that the public sentiments have not been taken into consideration, the geographical and demographical aspects have also not been considered. He relies on the judgement passed in the case of Daulat Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. : D.B. Civil Writ Petition NO.5151/1999 decided on 21.01.2000, Ram Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan (2010) : S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1027/2009 decided on 05.01.2010 and Bhupendra Pratap Singh Rathore and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. ( 2014) and Jorawar Singh Rathore Vs. State of Rajasthan (2024) to support that the action was arbitrary and suffered from malice in law.

46. Mr. Rajat Arora, learned counsel appearing in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.12405/2025: Praveen Kumar Vs. State of Rajasthan (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (326 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] and in S.B. Civil Writ Petition Nos.11387/2025, 12580/2025 and 12732 filed at Jodhpur, filed his written submissions. Challenge has been made to the action of reorganization of Wards under Section 10 of the Act of 2009. He submits that the provisions go contrary to Section 3 , 6 and 9 of the Act of 2009. He submits that neither the boundaries/limits of Municipal Council have been altered, nor there has been any change of the Census population also. Earlier, delimitation of wards for Barmer Municipal Council was conducted through gazette notification published on 27.8.2019. In view thereto, the fresh exercise of delimitation of Wards has no legal backing and appears to be on the basis of political motivation and is not based on sound reasoning. On account of redetermination and delimitation, the number of seats reserved for Women, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, would be disturbed and there is no cogent reason for undertaking the exercise of delimitation.

47. Counsel - Mr. Manish Patel has challenged the notifications also to the extent of fixing of village headquarter. It is contended that the village as has been fixed as village headquarter is not having the required adequate facilities and the entire exercise has been conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice.

48. Counsel - Mr. Ranjeet Joshi while referring to a specific instance, has argued that village having the infrastructural facilities like Community Health Centre and Cooperative Bank has been shifted to another Gram Panchayat. Now the villagers of the petitioner's village will be deprived of adequate medical facilities and thus, action of the respondents is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

(Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (327 of 467) [CW-7718/2025]

49. In support of the contention regarding statutory force of the guidelines, Senior Advocate - Mr. Manoj Bhandari argued that Section 96 of the Act of 1994 provides for delegation of powers and therefore, the guidelines being delegated legislation is having the statutory force.

(b) SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENTS :

50. Mr. Rajendra Prasad, learned Advocate General, has submitted with regard to the local self institutions namely the Panchayati Raj Institution and the Urban Local Bodies Institution. He submits that the said decentralization of democracy at the grass root level and insertion thereto of Schedule XI and XII with appropriate amendments provided essentially for interesting certain aspects of administration to the grassroot level. The Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 and the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 were enacted to make the existing law consisting with the constitutional amendments. It is further submitted that irrespective of the working of these institutions for decades, it has been found by the Government and reported by the State Finance Commission that they have not been made functionally and financially viable to achieve the goals as mentioned in the amended provisions of the Constitution. It has been visualised that previously the governments did not take into account the ground realities in creation and alteration of these institutions (particularly their functional and financial viability), while the local areas which are still rural are being deprived of the schemes related to rural areas and those who have actually transitioned to urban areas are being deprived of the schemes related to urban areas. Thus, to strengthen and make the (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (328 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] urban/rural local bodies functionally and financially efficient, the government decided to reorganise these institutions in the entire state and accordingly two different Committee of Ministers for rural and urban local bodies were constituted to finalize the proposals made in this regard by the District Collectors before the State Government issues the final notification.

51. Apart from above, it was submitted that the previous Government before the General Elections created large number of Local Bodies as well as Districts, which was apparently not conducive to the administrative efficiency and functional/financial viability. Hence, a separate committee for assessing the position of newly created Districts was also constituted, and finally 9 out of 17 newly created Districts were abolished and the position of many local bodies had to be altered.

It has further been realised that assessment of number of seats in local bodies based on earlier parameters was also not working well and therefore after analysis fresh parameters were notified resulting in delimitation of wards in all the local bodies.

The previous elections of local bodies were adversely affected by COVID-19 situation, elections were held in different phases and, therefore, the term of the local bodies were to expire on different dates spreading over a period of more than one year. As all the aforesaid exercises were being done, necessity for appointment of Administrators arose in urban as well as rural local bodies as the rural local bodies are very large in number, a policy decision as permitted under the law to appoint outgoing chairpersons as Administrators with other provisions was taken. Whereas in case of urban local bodies, only officers are permitted (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (329 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] to be appointed as administrators in the interregnum, such appointments were being made.

The government looking to the hardships and administrative paralysis created by holding of elections in multiple phases also decided to examine the possibility of "One State-One Election". Apart from this, as per directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, a dedicated commission for OBC reservation in these bodies has been constituted, which would submit its report.

No sooner all these exercises are complete, the mandatory exercise for allotment of seats to SC/ST/OBC/Women will be fixed and then the Election Commission after finalising the election roll, would publish the election schedule.

52. Learned Advocate General has tried to delineate various arguments advanced before this court and classified the cases as under:-

53. While answering to above categories, the learned Advocate General has submitted objections inter alia as under:

determination in this regard. As a matter of fact, the very nature of these actions does not permit conferment of any right in large number of electorate to propose any such actions. There is no allegation of failure to perform any statutory/public duty by the government.

(v). The learned Advocate General submits that the guidelines which have been issued are non statutory / executive instructions laying down the procedure to guide the concerned officials who are to conduct the exercise. Neither they create any right in favour of the writ petitioners, nor any deviation made by any officer can be said to be such where the Court would strike it down. It is his submissions that the guidelines are not enforceable in law. He relies on the provisions of Section 101(1) and 101(6) of the Act of 1994 to submit that the Government has been authorized to issue orders and directions, but the learned Advocate General, in his written submissions, further submits that the provisions contained under the guidelines are (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (332 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] only to guide the concerned officer about the manner of making his proposal. Such guidelines could not be enforceable in law. While the provisions of Section 102 lay down the method enacting rules and if any provision is made under the Rules, the same can be enforced. He submits that as there is no prescription. It is his submission that the Government has not prescribed anything in this regard by making rules in official gazette. The guidelines alleged to have been not followed strictly by the officers would not be a reason for this Court to interfere with the Government functioning. He relies on the definition of the word "prescribed" under Section 2(19) of the Act of 1994 and Section 32(58) of Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955.

(vi). The learned Advocate General, in his written submission, further submits that the petitions have been filed even before making proposal to the Government for consideration of proposal by the Government, the same deserves to be dismissed as they are based on mere apprehension or conjectures and surmises with regard to a possible decision. He further submits that when the process of taking a final decision itself is not liable to judicial review, it would apply to the decision making process also, moreso, action having a legislative character would be ousted from the scope of judicial purview.

(Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (333 of 467) [CW-7718/2025]

54. In a second set of cases where the appointment of Administrator is challenged, he submits as under:

55. With regard to consequential removal of Pradhan due to the inclusion of rural area to any other urban local body, learned Advocate General relies on provisions of Section 3 (8) of the Act of 2009 and Section 101(d) , 102(d) read with section 101(5A) and Section 30 and Section 36(5) of the Act of 1994. He also relies on judgements which shall be considered at the relevant place of the judgment.

56. The next challenge is with regard to the method and manner in which delimitation of Wards has been done, in case where there is absence of fresh Census or alteration of boundaries. He submits that Section 3 of the Act of 2009 would have no bearing in case of delimitation of constituencies, as the same refers to local bodies. He submits that Section 6(2) while makes fresh determination of constituencies (wards) mandatory, Section 6(1) authorises the fixation of number of seats from time to time, by notification in official Gazette. It is subject to sub- section 6(2) in the sense that irrespective of such fixation having been done, under Section 6(1) , if the result of fresh Census has been undertaken, the refixation has to be done mandatorily.

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57. He further submits that the boundaries of wards under Section 9 and 10 of the Act of 2009 may result in refixation when:

58. With respect to the Public Interest Litigation, wherein mandamus has been sought for holding elections, the learned Advocate General argues that there is no dispute about the claim of the petitioners that elections of local bodies must be held before its duration is over by virtue of Article 243-E and 243-U of the Constitution. This has been held to be mandatory. However, there are exceptions carved out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Some of them are as under:

59. Learned Advocate General further submits that from the Introductory Facts (Part -I) it is evidently clear that there is no intention to avoid elections as within short time available to Government all necessary action have been taken. Creation of democratic institutions without their functional and financial viability is of no consequence and therefore the government in its wisdom is entitled to review its situation and carry out the overall reorganisation bonafidely to make these institutions efficient. When done in the entire State the same institution as they existed previously will not be in existence and as a matter-of-fact large- scale changes have taken place in this exercise. Thus, the position of institution themselves being of the same description would be clear on competition of the exercise and therefore in view of the aforesaid judgements, Article 243-E and Article 243-U will not have any bonafide application in the first instance. Secondly, legislative/administrative exercise for strengthening of the institutions in the entire state to achieve the goals of their creation is a valid event due to which postponement of election is permissible. Thirdly, the very fact that due to effect of COVID-19, (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (338 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] earlier elections of local bodies were held in multiple phases and therefore resulting in multiple phases for fresh elections, which is neither a healthy situation to be perpetuated nor it would be in public interest. Thus, holding of elections simultaneously, avoiding multiple phases of elections, can also not be faulted with.

60. It is lastly argued by the learned Advocate General that it has been clearly demonstrated there have been no vested interest or malice in postponingthe elections of local whose terms have expired during the course of this exercise. it is submitted that the term of several such local bodes is yet to expire. The Government is committee to expeditiously complete all these exercises and make it convenient for the election commission to hold the election for creation for efficient institutions as soon as possible.

61. The learned Advocate General, therefore, prayed that the writ petitions be dismissed and the special appeals preferred by the State, namely D.B. SAW 627/2025, D.B. SAW 628/2025 at Jaipur Bench be dismissed and D.B. SAW 831/2025 (State of Rajasthan & ors. vs. Dhanna Ram & ors.) and other connected special appeals filed at Jodhpur be allowed.

62. Learned Advocate General, in support of his submissions, has relied on various judgements such as:

Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) Vs. Secretary, Governor 's Secretariat and Ors.:

Vs. Delimitation Commission of India and Ors.:

63. In support of the contention that Gazette notification relating to delimitation of Panchayat area or formation of Constituencies in the said area or allotment of seats to the Constituencies is a legislative act in nature and therefore, it cannot be challenged, nor the Court would entertain such challenge under Articles 243-C , 243-K and 243-O of the Constitution of India, learned Advocate General has relied upon following judgments :-

64. It is also contended that redrawing of lottery resulting into change of reservation for some different categories under extraordinary circumstances cannot be faulted and therefore, challenge given in the writ petitions is not credible.

Further, variation of Gram Panchayat and reservation of seats or change in different categories of draw of lottery was (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (341 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] necessary and logical action of the State in consonance with the provisions of Section 16 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 and Rule 7 of the Election Rules of 1994, which provide for procedure for reservation. Following judgments have been relied upon in this context :

65. Panchayat and municipalities were included in the Constitution of India through the 73rd and 74th Amendment Acts of 1992, respectively. The 73 rd Amendment added Part IX for Panchayats (rural local bodies) and the Eleventh Schedule, while the 74th Amendment added Part IX-A for Municipalities (urban local bodies). These amendments gave constitutional status to these local self-governance institutions, mandating their formation and providing a framework for their powers and functions.

66. Part IX ( Article 243 to 243O) of the Constitution of India provides the Constitutional Framework for composition, constitution, functions, finance, delimitation and election etc. relating to Panchayat at village, intermediate and district level. The Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution lists 29 subjects / functions for Panchayats to handle. Following constitutional provisions of Part IX relating to Panchayat are reproduced below :-

243E. Duration of Panchayats, etc.--(1) Every Panchayat, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer.

(2) No amendment of any law for the time being in force shall have the effect of causing dissolution of a Panchayat at any level, which is functioning immediately before such amendment, till the expiration of its duration specified in clause (1).

(3) An election to constitute a Panchayat shall be completed--

(a) before the expiry of its duration specified in clause (1);

(b) before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution:

243G. Powers, authority and responsibilities of Panchayats.-- Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Legislature of a State may, by law, endow the Panchayats with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self-government and such law may contain provisions for the devolution of powers and responsibilities upon Panchayats at the appropriate level, subject to such conditions as may be specified therein, with respect to--

(a) the preparation of plans for economic development and social justice;

(b) the implementation of schemes for economic development and social justice as may be entrusted to them including those in relation to the matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule.

(Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (344 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] 243K. Elections to the Panchayats.--(1) The superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to the Panchayats shall be vested in a State Election Commission consisting of a State Election Commissioner to be appointed by the Governor.

(2) Subject to the provisions of any law made by the Legislature of a State, the conditions of service and tenure of office of the State Election Commissioner shall be such as the Governor may by rule determine:

243O. Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters.-- Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,--

(a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be made under article 243K , shall not be called in question in any court;

(b) no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State.

67. Part IX-A of the Constitution of India covering Article 243P to 243ZG provides for constitutional status to Municipalities and aims to establish a framework for governance in urban areas to promote greater participation of the elected representatives and ensures accountability. Part IX-A of the Constitution inter alia (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (345 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] provides for definition, composition, constitution, functions, delimitation and elections of the Municipality. The relevant provisions are reproduced as under :-

243Q. Constitution of Municipalities.--(1) There shall be constituted in every State,--

(a) a Nagar Panchayat (by whatever name called) for a transitional area, that is to say, an area in transition from a rural area to an urban area;

(b) a Municipal Council for a smaller urban area; and

(c) a Municipal Corporation for a larger urban area, in accordance with the provisions of this Part:

243R. Composition of Municipalities.--(1) Save as provided in clause (2), all the seats in a Municipality shall be filled by persons chosen by direct election from the territorial constituencies in the Municipal area and for this purpose each Municipal area shall be divided into territorial constituencies to be known as wards. (2) The Legislature of a State may, by law, provide--

(a) for the representation in a Municipality of--

(i) persons having special knowledge or experience in Municipal administration;

(ii) the members of the House of the People and the members of the Legislative Assembly of the State representing constituencies which comprise wholly or partly the Municipal area;

(iii) the members of the Council of States and the members of the Legislative Council of the State registered as electors within the Municipal area;

(iv) the Chairpersons of the Committees constituted under clause (5) of article 243S:

243U. Duration of Municipalities, etc.-- (1) Every Municipality, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer:

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(a) before the expiry of its duration specified in clause (1);

(b) before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution:

243W. Powers, authority and responsibilities of Municipalities, etc.-- Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Legislature of a State may, by law, endow--

(a) the Municipalities with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self-government and such law may contain provisions for the devolution of powers and responsibilities upon Municipalities, subject to such conditions as may be specified therein, with respect to--

(i) the preparation of plans for economic development and social justice;

(ii) the performance of functions and the implementation of schemes as may be entrusted to them including those in relation to the matters listed in the Twelfth Schedule;

(b) the Committees with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to carry out the responsibilities conferred upon them including those in relation to the matters listed in the Twelfth Schedule.

243ZA. Elections to the Municipalities.--(1) The superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to the Municipalities shall be vested in the State Election Commission referred to in article 243K.

(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Legislature of a State may, by law, make provision with respect to all matters relating to, or in connection with, elections to the Municipalities.

(Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (348 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] 243ZG. Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters.-- Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,

(a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be made under article 243ZA shall not be called in question in any court;

(b) no election to any Municipality shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State.]

(b) PROVISIONS OF RAJ. PANCHAYATI RAJ ACT, 1994

68. Section 101 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 held as under :-

Provided that for so long as a Panchayat or a new Panchayat is not established under Clause (a) or, as the case may be, under Clause (c), all power and duties of the Panchayat shall be exercised and performed by such administrator as the State Government may appoint in this behalf:

laws are made or issued under this Act and unless the State Government otherwise directs, all rules, notifications, orders and bye-laws applicable:-

Explanation. - In this section "appointed day" means the day from which a change referred to in Sub-Section (1), takes place."

69. The scheme of Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 envisage the Panchayat at Village level, Panchayat Samiti at Block level and Zila parishad at District level.

70. Establishment of Panchayat is provided under Section 9 , which read as under:

71. Establishment of Panchayat Samiti is provided under Section 10 , which read as under:

72. Establishment of Zila Parishad is provided under Section 11 , which read as under:

73. Composition of Panchayat is provided under Section 12 , which read as under:

(Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (353 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] [(2) The State Government shall, by such rules as may be framed on this behalf, determine the number of the wards, not being less than five for each Panchayat Circle, and thereupon so divide the Panchayat Circle into single-member wards that the population of each ward is, so far as practicable, the same throughout the Panchayat Circle.]"

74. From the perusal of the aforesaid provisions, it is apparent that it is the State Government which establishes a Panchayat as laid down in Section 9 . The State Government would also have a power to change the name or place or office of any Panchayat. Similarly, the power is available to the State relating to Panchayat Samiti as well as to the Zila Parishad.

75. As per the aforesaid provisions, it is apparent that in a Panchayat, there would be one Sarpanch and Panch and several Panchas. The Panchayat represents the wards which may be determined for each Panchayat circle and the number of Wards would be determined by the State Government. Thus, it is the administrative discretion of the State to lay down the number of wards in a Panchayat circle, which would not be less than 5. Therefore, in a Panchayat there has to be at least 5 Panchas.

Rules 3 and 4 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Election Rules, 1994 lays down the method and manner of formation of Wards and Constituencies for the Panchayat Circle at the Zila Parishad and Panchayat Samities. In terms of Rule 3(5) while dividing a Panchayat Samiti area into constituency under Section 13 , officer authorised by the Government shall as far as practicable, place contiguous Panchayats in a constituency; provided that a whole village comprising a part of Panchayat circle may be placed in a different constituency if it is necessary to do so to distribute the population in the constituencies as far as practicable equally. The (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (354 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] power thus, has been provided to the Government to divide a Panchayat Samiti area.

76. Rule 4 provides for publication of wards and constituencies which read as under:

rule (2), and shall decide the objections and thereafter amend, if necessary, the statements accordingly, finally determine the wards and constituencies and shall notify the same by affixing the final statement of wards/constituencies at the following places, namely:-

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77. Thus, we notice that a voter adult inhabitant of a Panchayat has a right to submit his objections and the officer authorised by the State Government in terms of Sub Rule (2) would decide and finally determine the Wards.

Similarly, a Panchayat Samiti having population of one lack shall consist of at least 15 constituencies and would increase by two on every fifteen thousand or part thereof increased in the population as provided under Panchayati Raj Election Rule 1994.

The reservation of seats is provided under Section 15 of the Act of 1994 for the Scheduled Casts, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Classes and Women. Their percentage being in proportion to the total number of seats as well as to the population of such castes or tribes in that Panchayati Raj institutions. The seats of backward classes would not exceed 21 to the maximum, provided that at least one seat shall be reserved for backward classes depending upon the percentage of population of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes of the said reserved seats of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes or Backward Classes, at least 50%, i.e., not less than half would be reserved for Woman candidates in the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in any Panchayati Raj institution. The Chairpersons of the Panchayati Raj Institutions namely, Sarpanch, Pradhan and Pramukh are also subject to the reservation on similar lines.

Section 30 of the Act of 1994 lays down the terms of office of Members, Chairpersons and Deputy Chairpersons which provides that they would hold the office during the term of the concerned Panchayati Raj Institution. Section 30 of Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides as under:

78. Section 95 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides the consequences of dissolution of a Panchayati Raj institutions, which read as under:

79. Section 99 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides as under:

80. Thus, in terms of Section 101 of the Act of 1994, the State Government is authorized to alter the limits of the Panchayati Raj Institutions, as noticed above by inclusion/exclusion. Upon such exclusion of the whole or part of Panchayat Circle or on account of inclusion in another Panchayat Circle, in terms of Section-101 Clause-2 Sub-clause (d), the Panchayat shall stand dissolved or, as the case may be, the members who, represent the local area which has been excluded from the Panchayat Circle shall stand removed. The provision is a deeming clause and upon on such inclusion or exclusion, the Rules, notifications, orders and bylaws will continue to apply unless new Rules are framed to such area so included or declared.

81. We further notice that Clause-(5A) empowers the State Government to alter the limits of Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad area where it is expedient to do so as a consequence of above and State Government would pass such necessary orders or directions as it may considered necessary in terms of Clause-(6). However, Section 102 , Clause-(2), Sub-clauses (b) and (c) of the Act of 1994 empowers the State Government to frame such Rules which may provide any matter which empowers the State Government or for the guidance of the Panchayati Raj Institutions and servants and authorities in relation to the subject connected for carrying out the provisions of the Act.

82. Section 117 of the Act of 1994 lays down a bar of jurisdiction of civil courts.

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83. Apart from above, it would be necessary to notice that under the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Election Rules, 1994 for each Panchayat, electoral rolls are to be prepared which are ward of constituency-wise. Rule 11 of the Rules of 1994 provides as under:

wise on the basis of list arranged under Clause (a) of this sub-rule.

(3) Whenever limits of wards or constituencies of a Panchayat Circle or Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad are revised or when a Panchayat Circle or Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad is constituted or re-constituted, such roll may be prepared afresh and shall contain names of all persons entitled to be registered after enquiry as electors under the Act, as far as possible. (4) For the purpose of preparing any roll or deciding any claim or objection to a roll, the Electoral Registration Officers and any person employed by him, shall have access to any register of births and deaths and to the admission register of any educational institution and it shall be the duty of every person in charge of any such register to give to the said officer or person such information and such extracts from the said register as he may require."

84. Thus, wherever limits of wards are revised, the electoral roll is prepared afresh after examining the persons who would be registered as electors. Thus, if there is a change of limits of a Ward, the concerned elector also losses a right of registration in the fresh electoral list and therefore, the claims and objections with regard to publication of draft rolls is provided under the said Chapter-III of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Election Rules, 1994.

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85. Rule 16 of the Rules of 1994 provides for deletion of names of such persons who seize to remain as ordinarily resident of that particular area on account of change of the Wards or constituencies. Thus, the rules provided for revision of electoral rolls through an intricate procedure, whereafter the election process commences.

(c) PROVISIONS OF RAJ. MUNICIPALITIES ACT, 2009

86. For the purpose of adjudication of the issues involved in the present bunch of matters, following relevant provisions of Act of 2009 are quoted below :

9. Division into wards. - (1) For purposes of elections, a Municipality shall be divided into such number of wards as is equal to the total number of seats fixed for the Municipality under sub-Section (1) of Section 6 . (2) The representation of each ward shall be on the basis of the population of that ward and shall, as far as possible, be in the same proportion as the total number of seats for the Municipality bear to its population.

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10. Determination of wards. - (1) The State Government shall by order determine,

(a) the wards into which each Municipality shall, for the purpose of its elections, be divided;

(b) the extent of each ward;

(c) the number of seats, if any, reserved for members of the Scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, Scheduled Tribes and for women members of such castes and tribes and for members of the Backward Classes and women members thereof; and

(d) the number of wards for women candidates. (2) The seats reserved for Scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, for Scheduled Tribes and for the Backward Classes and for women may be allotted by rotation to different wards in such manner as may be prescribed. (3) The State Government shall carry out the determination of the boundaries of the wards and allocation of seats reserved in favour of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes,the Backward Classes and women among the wards having regard to the provisions of Section 6 and also to the following provisions, namely:

11. Election to the Municipality. -

(1) The superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to the Municipality shall be vested in the State Election Commission.

(2) An election to constitute a Municipality shall be completed

(i) before the expiry of its duration specified in Section 7 ;

(ii) before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution:

322. Power of Government to dissolve Municipality in case of incompetency or having less than two third elected members. -

(1) If at any time the State Government is satisfied that the Municipality is not competent to perform, or persistently makes default in the performance of the duties imposed on it by or under this Act or otherwise by law, or has exceeded, or abused its powers, the State Government may, by an order published along with the reasons thereof, in the Official Gazette, declare the Municipality to be incompetent or in default, or to have exceeded or abused its powers, as the case may be, and may dissolve such Municipality as from a date to be specified in the order of dissolution:

Explanation.- If for any reason the number of vacancies in a Municipality exceeds two-thirds of the total number of seats, the Municipality shall be deemed to be not competent to perform the duties imposed on it by or under this Act.

(Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (363 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] (2) The State Government shall dissolve the Municipality if at any time the number of its elected members falls short of two third of its total members.

(3) When a Municipality is dissolved under sub-Section (1) or any other provision of this Act, the following consequences shall ensue:

The contentions of the respective parties are to be analysed in view of the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions as quoted above.

PART IV - ANALYSIS & REASONING

a) CATEGORIZATION OF PETITIONS

87. The common thread running through all the writ petitions concerns the delimitation of Panchayati Raj Institutions and Municipalities, which has led to the inclusion or exclusion of Gram Panchayats or municipal areas and the resulting consequences, including the postponement of elections pending such delimitation.

(Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (364 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] Based on the reliefs sought in these petitions, we deemed it appropriate to classify them into different categories, group the writ petitions and special appeals accordingly, and adjudicate the matters falling in each such category, together. For the ease of adjudication, present bunch of writ petitions / special appeals have been clubbed broadly in following categories :-

ii. Petitions challenging final notifications issued under Section 3 of the Act of 2009;

iii. Petitions challenging notices issued under Section 101 of the Act of 1994 inviting objections relating to delimitation and the process adopted in pursuance thereof;

iv. Petitions challenging removal of elected representatives on account of dissolution of Gram Panchayats;

v. Petitions challenging order of removal of representative members of Municipal Bodies on account of delimitation; vi. Petitions challenging appointment of the Administrator on completion of tenure of the Local Self Institutions; vii. Petitions challenging process of conducting delimitation of territorial constituencies / wards in Municipal areas without their being any inclusion or exclusion of territories of existing local bodies / without change of census;

viii. Petitions seeking directions for holding of elections of Local Self Institutions;

88. In D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.831/2025: State of Rajasthan and Ors. Vs. Dhanna Ram and Ors. , challenge has (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (365 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] been given to the order dated 23.05.2025 passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8576/2025 ( Dhanna Ram and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. ), wherein learned Single Judge has directed as under:

89. In D.B. Civil Writ Petition (PIL) No. 1285/2025 (Giriraj Singh Devanda Vs. State of Rajasthan), the prayer has been made seeking quashing of notification dated 16.01.2025 and directing the Election Commission to immediately declare and conduct the election programme for all Gram Panchayats in the State of Rajasthan where the tenure has concluded and commence the election process without delay and further directed the Government Officials such as Secretary Panchayat, BDO to be appointed as Administrators until the election programme is announced.

90. In D.B. Civil Writ Petition (PIL) No. 4686/2025 ( Sanyam Lodha vs. State of Rajasthan & ors.), the prayer has been made for directing the Election Commission to immediately declare and conduct the election programme for all Municipalities in the State of Rajasthan.

The category-wise analysis, reasoning and conclusion of the bunch of writ petitions / special appeals is as follow :-

91. In various writ petitions, final notification issued under Section 101 of the Act of 1994 as well as under Section 3 of the Act of 2009 regarding delimitation of Panchayat area as well as delimitation of Municipal area respectively, are challenged on various grounds. Apart from countering the averments made in the writ petition on merits, various preliminary objections were raised by the respondent regarding maintainability of the said writ petitions. The learned Advocate General submitted that in view of the constitutional as well as statutory bar of interference, the writ petitions against the final notification of delimitation are not maintainable. In view of the rival submissions, following questions emanates for adjudication by this Court.

1. Whether the writ petitions are maintainable against the final notifications of Delimitation, in view of the Bar of interference provided under Constitution of India as well as provisions of respective statutes?

2. What is the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matters relating to Delimitation notifications?

3. Whether the guidelines issued by the State Government for undertaking process of (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (367 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] delimitation are statutory in nature and therefore, required to be followed strictly?

4. Whether the petitioners have locus to maintain the writ petition challenging the delimitation notification?

5. Whether the State Government is under obligation to decide the objections submitted by the petitioners regarding the proposed delimitation while adhering to the principles of audi alteram partem?

6. Whether the writ petitions challenging the validity of delimitation notifications issued under Section 101 of the Act of 1994 and Section 3 of the Act of 2009 are sustainable in view of the grounds raised therein?

Analysis of Question No.1 & 2:

Questioning the maintainability of the bunch of writ petitions challenging the Notifications issued under Section 3 of the Act of 2009 as well as notifications issued under Section 101 of the Act of 1994, learned Advocate General, argued that in view of the Constitutional Bar provided under Article 243-O and 243-ZG , the said writ petitions are not maintainable. It is further argued that while maintaining the constitutional spirit respective Bar of interference is also provided under Section 117 of the Act of 1994 as well as Section 30 of the Act of 2009 in the matters of (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (368 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] Delimitation. Thus, once a decision regarding delimitation attains finality, its validity cannot be questioned. Reliance is placed on Articles 329 , 243-O , and 243-ZG of the Constitution of India as well as Section 117 of the Act of 1994 and Section 30 of the Act of 2009.

93. Articles 329 , 243-O , and 243-ZG of the Constitution of India which are reproduced below :-

(b) no election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature.

243-O : Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution--

(a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be made under article 243K , shall not be called in question in any court;

(b) no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State. 243ZG : Bar to interference by courts in electoral matters --

Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution--

(a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be made under article 243ZA shall not be called in question in any court;

(b) no election to any Municipality shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (369 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State. Section 117 of the Act of 2001 reads as under :-

94. Learned Advocate General also contended that law in this regard is well settled and the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court in various authoritative pronouncements have repeatedly held that the orders / notifications of Delimitation are in the nature of conditional legislation, thus the final notifications issued for Delamination having the effect of law made by the Parliament / State Legislature and validity of the same cannot be called in question in any Court. In view of the judgments cited and referred to subsequently, it was contended that this Court would not have the jurisdiction to examine the validity of the final notification of delimitation.

95. While referring to judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Meghraj Kothari vs Delimitation Commission ; AIR 1967 SC 669, learned Advocate General (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (370 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] stated that final notification of Delimitation is having legislative character, thus, not open for interference by this Court

23. .... The power of the delegate is only to make an order under s. 3 . Once the delegate has made that order its power is exhausted. Section 6 then steps in wherein the Parliament has declared that as soon as such an order comes into being that will have effect notwithstanding any inconsistency therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act."

24. Similarly it may be said here that once the Delimitation Commission has made orders under Sections 8 and 9 and they have been published under s. 10(1) , the orders are to have the same effect as if they were law made by Parliament itself.

31. In this case it must be held that the order under sections 8 and 9 published under Section 10(1) the Delimitation Commission Act were to make a complete set of rules which would govern the re-adjustment of number of seats and the delimitation of constituencies.

32. In this case the powers given by the Delimitation Commission Act and the work of the Commission would be wholly nugatory unless the Commission as a result of its deliberations and public sittings were in a position to re-adjust the number of seats in the House of the People or the total number of seats to be assigned to the Legislative Assembly with reservation for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and the delimitation of constituencies. It was the will of Parliament that the Commission could by order publish its proposals which were to be given effect to in the subsequent election and as such its order as published in the notifica- tion of the Gazette of India or the Gazette of the State was to be treated as law on the subject.

33. In the instant case the provision of section 10(4) of the Act puts orders under Sections 8 and 9 as published under section 10(1) in the same street as a law made by Parliament itself which, as we have already said, could only be done under Article 327 , and consequently the objection that the notification was not to be treated as law cannot be given effect to. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

96. In case of the judgment passed in The Tulsipur Sugar Company Ltd. Vs. The Notified Area Committee (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (371 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] Tulsipur, reported in AIR 1980 SC 882, the Hon'ble Apex Court, in para 18 has held that Delimitation notification declaring an area as urban area is in the nature of conditional legislation. Para 18 reads as under :-

97. Following the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court, the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bhupendra Pratap Singh Rathore and Ors. Vs Stated of Rajasthan, reported in 2015 (2) CurCC 303 has held as under :-

98. Similarly in case of Mushe Khan vs State of Rajasthan , reported in MANU/RH/1342/2014, this Court has held as under :-

99. In a case while dealing with the contention that opportunity of submitting objection not granted and final notification of Delimitation was issued, the learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kanhaiya Lal Jhanwar vs State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in 2016 3 WLC 443 has held as under :-

100. The law so laid down in the case of Meghraj Kothari (supra) as well as The Tulsipur Sugar Company Limited (supra), has been reiterated by the Courts of law time and again (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (374 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] and while dealing with the issues relating to Delimitation notifications and other ancillary issues and consistently held that the interference regarding actions of conditional legislative nature is clearly barred.

101. Per contra, the counsels for the petitioners have argued that this Court retains the power of judicial review even after the issuance of Delimitation notifications, on the strength of judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kishorechandra Chaganlal Vs. Union of India : 2024 INSC

579. The relevant part of the judgment is reproduced below :-

If the orders made under Sections 8 and 9 were not to be treated as final, the effect would be that any voter, if he so wished, could hold up an election indefinitely by questioning the delimitation of the constituencies from court to court. Section 10(2) of the Act clearly demonstrates the intention of the Legislature that the orders under Sections 8 and 9 published under Section 10(1) were to be treated as law which was not to be questioned in any court." [emphasis supplied]

9. Hence, the aforementioned judgement does not support the respondents' contention regarding complete restriction on judicial review. A constitutional court can undertake the exercise of judicial review within the limited sphere at an appropriate stage.

102. In view of the position of law reiterated in various authoritative pronouncements, it is well settled that the final order / notifications for Delimitation are in the nature of (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (376 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] conditional legislation and in view of the Constitutional and statutory Bar the same are not open for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Apex Court even in the case of Kishorechandra Chaganlal (supra) has held that the scope of interference in such cases is of judicial review and only at an appropriate stage. The observations so made by the Hon'ble Apex Court, seen in the light of the Constitutional Bar, it is clear that the interference in such cases can be exercised in the rarest of rare cases where the order is found to be manifestly arbitrary and irreconcilable to the constitutional values.

103. In view of the limited scope of interference as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kishorechandra Chaganlal (supra), it is desirable to explain the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by a High Court. The law in this regard is no more res integra. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tata Cellular v. Union of India , (1994) 6 SCC 651, has meticulously analyzed the jurisprudential development concerning the doctrine of judicial review and held that the power of judicial review is not unlimited in its sweep but is circumscribed within narrow and well-defined parameters. The Court observed that interference by the judiciary is justified only where the decision under challenge suffers from procedural irregularity or perversity. The relevant para read as follows:

The restraint has two contemporary manifestations. One is the ambit of judicial intervention; the other covers the scope of the court's ability to quash an administrative decision on its merits. These restraints bear the hallmarks of judicial control over administrative action.

74. Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application for judicial review is made, but the decision-making process itself.

76. In R. v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex p in Guinness plc [(1990) 1 QB 146 : (1989) 1 All ER 509] , Lord Donaldson, M.R. referred to the judicial review jurisdiction as being supervisory or 'longstop' jurisdiction. Unless that restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court will, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power.

104. Further, in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India , (1995) 6 SCC 749, the Apex Court held that the scope of judicial review is restricted to reviewing the legality and propriety of the decision- making process, rather than reassessing the merits or sufficiency of the decision itself. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced hereinbelow.

(Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (378 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] "12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.

105. Recently, the Supreme Court in the case of SBI v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 612 while reiterating the limited scope of Judicial review has observed that the scope is limited to examining whether the prescribed procedure was duly followed and not to the merits itself. The relevant para reads as follows:

106. In view of the position of law well settled through various judicial pronouncements, it is clear that in the cases of challenge given to the final notification of delimitation, in the limited scope of judicial review, Constitutional Court can only examine the manifest arbitrariness or infirmities regarding the process of issuing the notifications; however, the merits of the decision cannot be examined or interfered with by this Court. Analysis of Question No.3:

107. The challenge to the final notifications of delimitation, given in most of the cases is on the ground of non-adherence of the guidelines prescribed with the notices issued under Section 101(1) of the Act of 1994. Counsel for the petitioners argued that Section 101 requires State Government to issue the notification regarding delimitation only after issuing one month's notice "published in the prescribed manner" and under Section 101(6) , State Government is empowered to make such orders and give such directions, as it (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (380 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] may consider necessary for that purpose. Reference is also made to Section 98 of the Act of 1994, which provides for delegation of power. Counsels for the petitioners thus argued that guidelines issued by the State Government along with the one month's notice for proposed delimitation are statutory in nature and therefore, strict compliance of the same was required to be done by the State Authorities. Any deviation from the said guidelines renders the further proceedings or even the final notification invalid.

108. Responding to the said arguments, the learned Advocate General argued that Section 101 of the Act of 1994 nowhere provides for issuance of any guideline for the purpose of delimitation. The only mandate of Section 101 is issuance of one month's notice to be published "in prescribed manner" and the instructions contained in the said notice are only guiding principle for the administrative authorities for making proposal for delimitation of area concerned. Mere mentioning of such instructions along with the notice issued under Section 101(1) of the Act of 1994 would not enforce statutory character in the same.

Learned Advocate General contended that the phrase "in prescribed manner" used in Section 101 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 must be read in light of its definition of term "prescribed" under Section 2(xix) , which means "prescribed by or under this Act." He further submitted that Powers to make Rules as provided under Section 102 clearly provides that any matter to be prescribed under the Act must be done by way of making rules framed by the State Government and published in the Official Gazette. Learned Advocate General also relied upon the definition of the term 'prescribed' under Section 32(58) of the (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (381 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] Rajasthan General Clauses Act which means prescribed by rules made under an enactment. On the strength of said provision, learned Advocate General contended that the so-called guidelines referred by the petitioners were neither issued as rules under Section 102 , nor published in the Official Gazette, therefore, the same cannot be said to have statutory force. The Advocate General contended that these guidelines are merely administrative in nature, intended to guide the administrative authorities and cannot be treated as having the binding effect of law.

While responding to the argument of the counsels for the petitioners regarding power of State Government to issue orders under Section 101(6) of the Act of 1994, learned Advocate General stated that there is difference between an order of statutory in nature - having force of law vis-à-vis an order passed in reference to a statutory provision. An administrative order issued in reference to a statutory provision or while exercising to a statutory power will not ipso facto make such order of statutory nature. It is thus, contended that since the instructions contained in the notice issued under Section 101 of the Act of 1994 are not enforceable under the law, therefore, no mandamus can be issued merely on the ground of non-adherence of the same.

109. To support the said arguments, learned Advocate General relied upon the judgment passed in the case of J.R. Ragupathy vs State of A.P. , (1988) 4 SCC 364. The relevant para is reproduced as under:

110. Having considered the rival submissions, this Court finds merit in the argument advanced by the learned Advocate General. The term "in prescribed manner" used under Section 101(1) read with Section 2(xix) as well as Section 102 of the Act of 1994 clearly provides that for the purpose of infusing statutory force to any order or guidelines under the Act of 1994, the same must be laid down by way of rules made in accordance with the Act and notified in the Official Gazette. The guidelines relied upon by the petitioners have not undergone such statutory process. They are neither framed under any rule-making power nor published as rules in the Gazette, and hence, they cannot be regarded as possessing statutory character.

(Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (383 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] Accordingly, the Court holds that the guidelines in question are purely administrative in nature, intended only to facilitate internal procedural compliance, lacking statutory force and thus, not enforceable under the law. Mere non-adherence of the guiding principle cannot be a valid ground to question the final delimitation notification.

Analysis of Question No.4:

111. The present bunch of writ petitions are also opposed by the respondent State on the ground of locus standi of the petitioners to maintain the writ petitions. Learned Advocate General submitted that the petitioners have no enforceable right in the matters of delimitation and the process undertaken by the State was well within its legislative competence, guided by the procedure provided under the Statutes which does not create any right in favour of any individual.

112 Learned Advocate General contended that guidelines can be of two kinds. Some guidelines are beneficial in nature, as they confer certain advantages or benefits upon citizens and may thereby create enforceable rights, in respect of which writ petitions can be maintained. However, where the guidelines merely lay down procedural instructions for authorities to follow, without conferring any rights upon individuals, the latter would have no locus standi to file a writ petition alleging non-compliance with such guidelines.. Learned Advocate General placed reliance upon the judgment passed in the case of Ayubkhan Noorkhan Pathan vs State of Maharashtra , reported in 2013 (4) SCC

465. The relevant para is quoted below:

Only a person who has suffered, or suffers from legal injury can challenge the act/action/order etc. in a court of law. A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable either for the purpose of enforcing a statutory or legal right, or when there is a complaint by the appellant that there has been a breach of statutory duty on the part of the Authorities. Therefore, there must be a judicially enforceable right available for enforcement, on the basis of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. The Court can of course, enforce the performance of a statutory duty by a public body, using its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided that such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of such right is a condition precedent for invoking the writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is implicit in the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that, the relief prayed for must be one to enforce a legal right. In fact, the existence of such right, is the foundation of the exercise of the said jurisdiction by the Court. The legal right that can be enforced must ordinarily be the right of the appellant himself, who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief as regards the same.

113 Per contra, learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the respondent State while issuing the said notice under Section 101 of the Act of 1994 has clearly called upon the public at large to make submissions / objections in that regard. It is stated that once in pursuance of a statutory notice, the right to file objection is granted before passing the final notification for any alteration or reconstitution of the Panchayat area, the corresponding right to approach this Court under Article 226 also arises in the event of its violation. Hence, the petitioners do have the locus to maintain the writ petitions.

Reliance is placed upon the judgment in the case of Hari Krishna mandir Trust vs. State of Maharashtra 2020 (9) SCC 356.

(Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (385 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] "100. The High Courts exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, not only have the power to issue a Writ of Mandamus or in the nature of Mandamus, but are duty bound to exercise such power, where the Government or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised discretion conferred upon it by a Statute, or a rule, or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion malafide, or on irrelevant consideration."

114. We have considered the rival submissions and observed that the one-month notice issued by the State Government expressly invites the residents of the concerned village to submit their representations regarding the proposed delimitation. It is a well- established legal principle that, even in matters of delimitation, judicial review is permissible to a limited extent and may be invoked in appropriate cases through writ petitions filed by persons such as the present petitioners. In a democratic framework, citizens cannot be precluded from approaching the constitutional courts in matters concerning the administrative or legislative actions of the Government that impact democratic governance. Both the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court have, on multiple occasions, rejected objections regarding locus standi and have entertained writ petitions challenging the delimitation process. Hence, the State's objection concerning the petitioners' locus standi is untenable, and a writ petition challenging delimitation cannot be dismissed solely on that ground. Analysis of Question No.5:

115. While challenging the process of delimitation, in almost all the cases, counsels for the petitioners have vehemently contended that the authorities concerned have acted in a predetermined and mechanical manner, without adhering to the principles of fair consideration. It has been urged that the objections submitted by (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (386 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] the petitioners/villagers in response to the notice issued under Section 101 of the Act of 1994, were not objectively examined. It is further stated that since the statutory scheme envisages receipt of objections from the villagers to be considered by the concerned District Collector and to forward the same along with his recommendations to the High-Power Committee, therefore, it is obligatory on the part of the State Authorities to grant an opportunity of hearing to the objectors and to decide the objections so submitted in pursuance of the said notice.

Counsels have jointly argued that neither the principle of 'audi alteram partem' was followed, nor the objections were decided before making recommendations or passing the final notification. As per the counsels for the petitioners, the impugned notifications are liable to be set aside solely on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice and non-consideration of objections.

116. Per contra, learned Advocate General submitted that the petitioners have completely misconstrued the true import of Section 101 of the Act of 1994. It is contended that a close reading of Section 101 clearly shows that the only statutory requirement is issuance of a prior notice of thirty days before effecting any alteration in the boundaries of Panchayati Raj Institutions. The said provision does not provide any specific mandate for inviting the objections, requiring the authorities to adjudicate and decide the same after granting an opportunity of hearing. It is contended that the notice under Section 101 is merely in the nature of an intimation to the public, pursuant to which any person, if so advised, may submit his suggestions. The (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (387 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] statute does not obligate the Government to record its findings and decide each objection individually. In view of the statutory scheme, it will be presumed that the competent authorities will duly consider the suggestions so received in pursuance of the notice, before taking final decision and issuing the requisite notification.

117. Learned Advocate General contended that such legislative intent of Section 101 of the Act of 1994 can also be understood in the light of the fact that for exercising similar powers for delimitation of the Municipality, even the process of issuing one month's notice is not provided under Section 3 of the Act of 2009. Since the process of delimitation is of legislative character, there is no statutory requirement of calling upon the objection, grant of opportunity of hearing and to decide each objection.

118. This Court finds that the objections raised by the petitioners are wholly misconceived and untenable. The statutory framework clearly reflects the legislative intent, and Section 101 of the Act of 1994 does not prescribe any specific requirement for affording an opportunity of hearing or for deciding objections through a reasoned or speaking order. It is a well-established principle that delimitation constitutes a form of conditional legislation; hence, the authorities exercising such powers are neither expected nor required to function as judicial or quasi-judicial bodies. The purpose of inviting public suggestions is merely to enable the State to gather relevant material for forming its subjective satisfaction prior to issuing the final notification of delimitation. In the absence of any statutory mandate requiring the authorities to (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (388 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] invite, adjudicate, or decide objections through a hearing process, this ground of challenge is unsustainable.

119. Our view also finds support from the following observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of The Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd vs The Notified Area Committee, Tulsipur , AIR 1980 SC 882.

9. In Bates v. Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone & Ors. the facts were these: In 1964, the British Legal Association was formed. Out of about 26,000 practising solicitors some 2,900 were members of the association. The Lord Chancellor announced on May, 1, 1972, that the scale of fees under Schedule I to the Solicitors' Remuneration Order, 1883 were proposed to be abolished and that for all conveyancing transactions the system of quantum meruit was to be applied. On June 6, pursuant to section 56 (3) of the Solicitors Act 1957, the Law Society was sent by the committee set up under section 56 (1) a draft of the order proposed to be made under section 56 (2) . The draft order was published in The Law Society's Gazette on June 21. The association set out two circulars about the proposed order, the first at the end of May, to all solicitors, and the second on July 17, making a series of accusations against the Lord Chancellor and the Law Society. On July 11, the association sent printed submissions to the statutory committee, requesting that the order should not be approved at this juncture and that the Lord Chancellor should seek further consultations with the profession and professional organisations. On July 14, the association wrote to each member of the committee asking for further time and a deferment of the decision for two months. The Lord Chancellor's reply dated July 18, was that he saw no reason for postponing the meeting or for refraining from making the order in such terms as the committee approved. On July 18, the plaintiff as a member of the national executive committee of the association, took out a writ against all members of the statutory committee, seeking a declaration and an injunction, and on July 19, at 2 P.M. having previously notified the Treasury Solicitor of the intention, he moved the court ex parte, seeking to restrain the committee from holding the meeting which was to be held at 4.30 P.M. on that day. The motion was dismissed by Megarry, J. and we feel rightly with the following observations:

10. We are, therefore, of the view that the maxim 'audi alteram partem' does not become applicable to the case by necessary implication.

120. Similarly, the Division Bench of this Court in D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 20142/2024 Motan Das & Ors. Vs. State & Ors. decided on 28.02.2025, while framing specific question in this regard has held as under:

9. We are, therefore, of the view that the maxim "audi alteram partem" does not become applicable to the case by necessary implication."

19. This Court in light of the aforementioned, observes that in the instant case the maxim "audi alteram partem" in absence of any express provision, is not applicable merely by necessary implication and therefore, the impugned notifications do not suffer from any illegality on that count as well. Thus, the Issue (ii), as aforesaid, stands answered accordingly. Analysis of Question No.6:

Although the petitions present varying combinations of grounds, but there exists a substantial commonality of the issues raised across them. In this part of the judgment, the remaining factual and legal grounds assailing the final delimitation notifications shall be considered and adjudicated upon.

Almost all the writ petitions raise the issue of non- compliance with the guidelines, instructions, or parameters prescribed in the delimitation notice. The submissions made by the respective counsels, both during oral arguments and in their written submissions, clearly indicate that the challenges to the (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (391 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] final notifications are based on common grounds -- such as non- adherence to distance or population criteria, inappropriate inclusion or exclusion of certain areas, failure to decide objections, denial of opportunity of hearing, and instances where Panchayat areas previously included within a Municipality have again been brought under Panchayat jurisdiction.

It was further submitted that there exists no administrative necessity for undertaking the current delimitation exercise and that the same has been initiated arbitrarily, without adherence to the guiding principles laid down by the State itself.

In addition to these, the petitioners have also alleged arbitrary and mala fide exercise of power, political motivation behind the decisions, non-application of mind, and that the recommendations were made without due consideration of the objections or suggestions received.

Besides the challenge to the final delimitation notification itself, several petitions also question the consequential actions arising therefrom, such as, cessation of tenure of members of the affected wards, removal of a Pradhan due to exclusion of his ward from the Panchayat area, appointment of outgoing Sarpanch as Administrator, and failure to appoint the Member or Chairperson of the Municipality as Administrator. These consequential or ancillary issues, other than the main challenge to the final delimitation notification, shall be addressed in the subsequent part of this judgment.

122. While replying to the grounds of challenge on its merits, learned Advocate General reiterated that in view of the (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (392 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] preliminary objections, the adjudication upon the merits of writ petitions is not desirable. Learned Advocate General further stated that most of the grounds of challenge such as, distance / population criteria not being followed and the location of a particular area is not suitable for proposed exclusion / inclusion etc. are raised while referring to the guidelines, which are only in the nature of administrative instructions and since the same does not have any enforceability under the law, the challenge upon the said grounds is not sustainable.

Learned Advocate General further submitted that bald allegations of political interference or arbitrary exercise of powers are levelled and the same are bereft of any substance. Further, the same involves various disputed questions of facts, which cannot be decided under the writ jurisdiction. It is further contended that the petitioners have failed to make out any ground, warranting interference of this Court within the limited scope of judicial review.

123. As already concluded, the guidelines issued along with the delimitation notice do not possess any statutory force and, therefore, are not legally enforceable. Any alleged deviation from such guidelines, by itself, without making out a deserving case for interference under limited scope of judicial review, cannot constitute a sufficient ground for this Court to interfere with the final delimitation decision. The petitioners have failed to demonstrate any procedural irregularity or violation of a statutory provision in the process adopted by the State Government while issuing the final notifications. Nor have they established that the (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (393 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] authorities acted beyond their jurisdiction in exercising their powers relating to delimitation.

It has been consistently held by the courts of law that decisions regarding delimitation fall within the domain of the State's subjective satisfaction and are generally beyond judicial scrutiny as to their merits. Under the constitutional and statutory framework, delimitation decisions are required to be taken while holistically considering multiple factors--such as population, distance, financial viability for effective administration, future growth prospects, and other relevant considerations. Hence, such decisions must be assessed holistically, and the non-consideration of any single factor cannot, by itself, justify judicial interference with the final outcome.

Moreover, there have been counter-submissions concerning the allegations related to distance and population criteria, which give rise to several disputed questions of fact. The legal position in this regard is well settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot enter into or adjudicate upon such factual controversies.

Accordingly, while this Court notes the petitioners' concerns regarding deviation from the parameters mentioned in the guidelines, however such deviations do not constitute a legal infirmity capable of rendering the process invalid.

In the present cases, the petitioners have not been able to establish any procedural irregularity, legal infirmity, or manifest arbitrariness that would offend constitutional principles. Accordingly, the limited scope of judicial review does not warrant (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (394 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] any interference by this Court. The challenges raised by the petitioners on grounds relating to distance, population, or locational criteria are, therefore, unsustainable in law.

124. The petitioners have assailed the delimitation notification on the grounds of arbitrary exercise of power and non-application of mind. However, we find no merit in these contentions. The material on record clearly demonstrates that cogent reasons were recorded for undertaking the delimitation exercise, particularly in light of the fact that the outgoing Government had created 17 new districts in the State of Rajasthan. Subsequently, in 2024, upon re-evaluating that decision and for ensuring better administrative efficiency, 9 out of the said 17 districts were abolished and merged with the existing ones.

The creation and abolition of districts not only altered the boundaries of Legislative Assembly constituencies but also impacted the territorial limits of local self-government institutions. Taking note of these changes, a three-member Cabinet Committee was constituted, and thereafter, a well-considered policy decision was taken to initiate a fresh delimitation exercise. In these circumstances, the allegation of non-application of mind is devoid of substance and unsustainable in law.

Moreover, it is a settled legal position that judicial interference in matters involving such policy decisions is extremely limited. Since no element of arbitrariness has been established, this ground too must fail.

125. The petitioners' have also made unsubstantiated allegations suggesting that the notifications were politically motivated. Apart (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (395 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] from vague assertions, no specific instance of mala fides has been pleaded or established in the writ petitions. The argument that the final notifications resemble the recommendations of certain local representatives also holds no weight. Given that the process of delimitation possesses an inherent legislative character, the mere fact that public representatives offered suggestions or recommendations, does not ipso-facto render the decision invalid.

126. The observations made above finds support from the judgement passed by this Court in the case of Mod Singh and Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. reported in 1994 Supreme (Raj) 1014, wherein this Court has dealt with various similar issues, such as, nature of delimitation exercise, statutory procedural requirements, applicability of principle of natural justice, scope of interference by the Court etc, and held as under :

Therefore, if the final notification u/S. 86 (2) is subsequently cancelled or superseded only then the exercise u/s. 86 (1) of the Act r/w Rr. 342 to 345 of the Rules, 1961 has to be undertaken de novo and not otherwise. Therefore, I do not find any substance of force in the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that since the petitioners/villagers were satisfied, with the draft proposal included in the draft notification issued u/S. 86(1) of the Act, they did not choose to file any objection and that thereafter the State Government or its Delegatee had no right to drop or vary the draft: proposal without affording them any opportunity of hearing anti without again issuing notification u/S. 86 (1) of the Act inviting objections for such a change.

24. Now let us find out whether the establishment of a panchayat circle or merging a panchayat circle into another panchayat circle or inclusion of any area in a panchayat circle or exclusion of any area from a panchayat circle of transfer, which includes the constitution, re-constitution or re-delimitation of a panchayat circle, of any area from one panchayat circle to another, is a mere administrative act of the State or is a function of legislative character and whether for such an exercise, principles of natural justice apply?

25. The State Government under Sections 3 and 86 of the Act is competent and empowered to establish, constitute, reconstitute and delimit any panchayat circle and to include any area in a panchayat circle, exclude or transfer any area in a panchayat circle or from one panchayat circle to another after following the prescribed procedure.

26. In the Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd v. The Notified Arca Committee, Tulsipur (AIR 1980 SC 882). the (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (397 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] notification dated 22-5-1955 was challenged, whereby the area in which the sugar factory was situated, was declared as town area. Section 3 of the U. P. Town Area Act, 1914 made the provisions for declaration and definition of town areas. It was contended that Section 3 of the said Act by necessary implication imposed a duty on the State Government to follow the principles of natural justice. Their Lordships observed that the said contention was based on assumption that the duty imposed on the State Government was of the nature of administrative power in exercise of which the State Government should follow the principles of natural justice. Their Lordships then proceeded to examine the question as to what was the nature of function which was performed by the State Government u/S. 3 , and declared in most unambiguous, clear and cogent terms that the power of the State Government to make a declaration to define a town area u/S. 3 of the said Act was in the nature of conditional legislation and that the rule of 'audi alteram partem' did not apply.

27. The Division Bench of this Court in Ms. J. K. Synthetics Ltd. v. Municipal Board, Nimbahera 1989 (2) RLR 589, relying on the principle of law enunciated in Indian Express Newspaper (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India , AIR 1986 SC 515 and Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhathija v. Collector, Thane, Maharashtra AIR 1990 SC 261 has held that the inclusion of a new area within a municipal area by the State Government is legislative in character and that in such a legislative process, principles of natural justice are not applicable. There is no provision of law or any case law to the effect that establishment, reconstitution, delimitation of a panchayat Circle, where the area included excluded or transferred is only an area of panchayat and not an area of Municipality, shall not be a function of the State legislative in character. In my considered opinion the exercise undertaken u/S. 3 and 86 of the Act r/w. Rules 342 to 345 of the Rules, 4961 amounts to a delegated legislation and principle of audi alteram partem cannot be pressed into service except to the extent provided under those provisions. Therefore, the petitioners cannot claim as a matter of right for an opportunity of hearing for all the final decisions taken by the State Government or State Delegatee in dropping the draft proposal issued u/S. 86(1) of the Act or in varying or altering the same....

39. Therefore, when the State Government has not contravened any provisions of Rr. 342 to 345 of the Rules, 1961 and Sections 3 . 86 and 87(2) of the Act, this Court cannot sit in appeal against the final decisions taken by the State Government/State Delegatees nor can it substitute its own finding as to whether which of the village area should be included in a particular panchayat circle or in which village the headquarter of a particular panchayat circle should be located or whether a particular panchayat circle, should be bifurcated into more than one panchayat circles or whether one panchayat circle should not be (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (398 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] merged or converted into another panchayat circle and whether the name of a particular panchayat circle should be changed or not.

40. From the perusal of the relevant record, I am of the considered opinion that the act of the respondents in issuing the impugned notifications has neither been unreasonable nor arbitrary nor discriminatory and those are not violative of Article 14.

41. After the repeal of the Act and coming into force of the Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 , all the Panchayat circles established, constituted, reconstituted and re-delimited through impugned notification have become successor Panchayat Circles under the new Act. In exercise of the powers u/s. 119 and Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 , the Election Commission has already been constituted and Panchayati Raj Rules, 1994 have also been enacted. The new wards and different panchayat circles have also been constituted and notified and the election of the Panchayat Raj are on the anvil, which are likely to be held in near future.

42. Hence for the reasons mentioned above, the impugned notifications dated 10-9-92 do not warrant any interference. The aforementioned writ petitions, therefore, deserve to be and are hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. Petitions dismissed."

127. It is also pertinent to note that the delimitation exercise was undertaken uniformly across the State, rather than in a selective or targeted manner. Hence, the claim of political motivation is without basis. Considering the totality of circumstances, none of the grounds raised in the writ petitions fall within the narrow ambit of judicial review permissible before this Court. Accordingly, the challenge given to the final delimitation notifications on such grounds is not sustainable in light of the conclusions recorded herein.

128. Counsel for the petitioners while challenging the notifications issued under Section 3 of the Act of 2009, where the rural area has been excluded from the Panchayat Circle and included in the Municipal area, has contended that the said action is against the spirit of the Article 243 of the Constitution of India. It is argued (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (399 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] that Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution of India provides for functions of the Panchayat and Twelfth Schedule provides for functions of the Municipality. As per counsel for the petitioners, comparison of the same shows that factors provided in Eleventh Schedule are much wider than the functions of the Municipality as prescribed under Twelfth Schedule of the Constitution of India and by excluding the Gram Panchayat from the scope of the rural development and including the same in the Municipality, very spirit of Article 243 of the rural development would be curtailed.

129. Replying to the said contention, learned Advocate General has argued that same is absolutely misconceived. It is contended that if the said contention of the petitioners is accepted then, the Panchayat area would always remain as rural area and can, in no case, be upgraded to the urban area. It is further argued that inclusion of a rural area within an urban area is inherently an act aimed at promoting development; therefore, it cannot be concluded that such inclusion restricts or hinders rural development.

130. The argument so advanced on behalf of the petitioners is bereft of any substance and against the overall scheme of local self-governance as provided under the Constitution of India. Article 243Q of the Constitution of India, which provides for constitution of the Municipality, which also includes transition from rural area to urban area. The statutory provisions provided under the Act of 1994 as well as Act of 2009 also provide for exclusion of Panchayat area for its corresponding inclusion in the Municipal area. The validity / vires of the said provisions and the power to (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (400 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] merge the rural area into municipal area are not challenged by the petitioners and in absence thereof, mere a challenge given to the notifications on such ground while exercising the said powers, is not tenable in the eye of law.

131. Counsel for the petitioner, while referring to Article 243Q of the Constitution of India, has argued that the action of respondents in issuing the notification and directly including rural area in the urban area, without first declaring the same as transitional area, is against the mandate of Article 243Q. It is contended that Article 243Q provides for "transitional area' which is a stage prior to the inclusion of rural area into Municipal area and therefore, notifications issued directly to include a rural area into municipal area is against the Constitutional mandate.

132. A holistic reading of Article 243Q of the Constitution of India makes it evident that clause (1) delineates three distinct and independent categories of Municipalities, and there is no constitutional mandate requiring the declaration or formation of a transitional area as a prerequisite for incorporating a rural area into an urban area. In other words, under the constitutional framework, the declaration of a "transitional area" is not a mandatory condition precedent for including a rural area within an urban area.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution is clearly reflected in clause (2) of Article 243Q , wherein the use of the term "may" indicates that the Governor, at his discretion and upon consideration of relevant factors, may constitute any area as a Municipality. Furthermore, neither the provisions of the Act of (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (401 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] 2009 nor those of the Act of 1994 prescribe that a rural area must first be declared a transitional area or Nagar Panchayat before being included within an urban area.

133. Our view also get support from the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of " State of Rajasthan vs. Ashok Khetoliya " reported in 2022 (12) SCC 185, wherein it was observed in Para Nos. 16, 17 & 19 as under :-

134. Similar view has been taken by the learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8177/2025 ( Pankaj Panwar vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. ) decided on 06.05.2025, wherein it is held as under :-

State of Gujarat & Ors." (2022) 15 SCC 364, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the power of the State Legislature in the light of enabling provisions in the Constitution with regard to framing of laws cannot be whittled down by way of restrictive interpretation. The Supreme Court further observed that the power of the State to legislate within its legislative competence is plenary and the same cannot be curtailed (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (403 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] in the absence of an express limitation placed on such power in the Constitution."

135. The import of the aforementioned judgment is clear: under the statutory framework, the State Government possesses plenary powers to issue notifications for the inclusion or exclusion of any area within a Panchayat or Municipality. The State is the repository of these legislative powers, and once the State Government, in the exercise of such powers and after considering the factors specified in Article 243Q of the Constitution, issues a notification, it is not open for interference by this Court. Consequently, this ground of challenge, being inconsistent with the constitutional and statutory scheme, fails.

136. Counsel for the petitioners also argued that the impugned notifications are not sustainable as no prior consultation of the State Election Commission was done before issuing the same. Counsel for the petitioners contended that as per Articles 243K and 243ZA of the Constitution of India, the superintendence, directions and control of the respective Panchayat and Municipal elections is vested in the State Election Commission and therefore, in the matters of delimitation, prior consultation with the State Election Commission is mandatory.

137. A bare reading of the Article 243K & 243ZA provides that superintendence, direction and control of the State Election Commission is provided in preparation of electoral rolls and conduct of elections of the Panchayat / Municipality. The process of delimitation constitutes a distinct legislative function and Article 243ZA of the Constitution of India does not expressly assign any role to the State Election Commission in that regard. Therefore, in (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (404 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] the absence of any specific provision conferring such a role, it cannot be contended that prior consultation with the State Election Commission is mandatory and non-adherence of the same would vitiate the notifications impugned. Therefore, challenge given to the notifications on the wholly baseless and misconceived.

138. In some of the cases the notifications issued under Section 3 of the Act of 2009, for inclusion of some rural area into Municipality has been challenged on the ground that the said inclusion has been done merely while exercising powers under Section 3 of the Act of 2009, without undertaking the procedure as prescribed under Section 101 of the Act of 1994 and no corresponding notification under Section 101 is issued for excluding the Panchayat area. The counsel argued that in view of over-riding effect of provisions of Act of 1994, before taking any action for inclusion / exclusion of panchayat area the procedure prescribed under section 101 is mandatory to be followed. It is further stated that non-adherence of procedure as prescribed under section 101 has deprived the petitioner from there participative rights.

139. The contention so raised by the petitioners was vehemently opposed objected by the learned Advocate General. It is though admitted that Section 101 of the Act of 1994 provides for the powers and procedure for alteration in the limits of Panchayati Raj Institution and Section 101(7) of the Act of 1994 provides overriding effect to the provisions of the Act of 1994 over all other statues.

(Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (405 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] However, in cases where under Section 3 of the Act of 2009, a rural area is proposed to be included for constitution of Municipality, the Section 101 of the Act of 1994 will not be applicable and the same can be done only by issuance of notification under Section 3 of the Act of 2009. It is contended that Section (10) of Section 3 of the Act of 2009 clearly provides that "the provisions of Section 3 shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Act of 2009 or in Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 or any other law for the time being in force." Learned Advocate General submitted that the Municipality Act, 2009 being a subsequent legislation, the overriding effect as provided under section 39(10) would prevail over the overriding effect as provided under the Act of 1994.

140. In support of said contention, learned Advocate General relied upon a recent judgment passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court at Principal Seat, Jodhpur in the case of "Motan Das vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors." (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 20142/2024) and other connected writ petitions decided on 28.02.2025. The relevant paras of the said judgment are quoted below :-

17. This Court observes that, the bone of the contention in the instant case, lies in the applicability of the Act of 1994 and the Act of 2009. The relevant provisions in the present case are Section 3of the Act of 2009 and Section 101 of the Act of 1994. Section 3 does not expressly provide for any requirement vis-a-vis notice, however, Section 101 presents the requirement of one month's notice.

17.1. This Court further observes that both these provisions which expound different requisites contain non obstante clauses respectively, which ousts the applicability of the other Statute and corresponding relevant provisions within it. Therefore, for resolving the controversy at hand, it becomes pertinent to first answer the question as to which out of the two provisions will prevail if both of them have a non obstante clause. 17.2. This Court in this regard, observes that as per the judgment rendered in the case of Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited (supra),the position of law is that, when two enactments have competing non obstante provisions and nothing repugnant, then the non obstante clause of the subsequent statute would prevail over the earlier enactments and therefore the non obstante clause in the (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (407 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] Act of 2009 would prevail over the non obstante clause in the Act of 1994.

17.3. This Court therefore observes that, in such a scenario Section 3 of the Act of 2009 would prevail over Section 101 of the Act of 1994, and in such a case, the requirement of one month notice as enshrined under Section 101 is not necessary to be complied with."

141. In our considered opinion the issue raised by the petitioners regarding non-compliance of Section 101 of the Act of 1994 is completely answered in the judgment passed in the case of Motan Das (supra) and therefore, the said the ground of challenge to the final notifications in questions is also not tenable in the eye of law.

142. In some of the writ petitions, challenge has been given to the notifications issued for inclusion or exclusion of areas through delimitation, falling within the TSP area. Counsel for the petitioners stated that the Tribal Sub-Plan area is an area of special significance in the Constitution of India and the same is governed under Fifth Schedule of the Constitution of India. Counsel for the petitioners have also referred to the provisions of the Panchayat (Extension of Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as " PESA Act ") and stated that the said Act clearly mandates the participation and consultation with the Gram Sabha in every decision relating to the TSP area.

Counsel for the petitioners stated that while issuing the final notifications of delimitation, no consultation has been done with the Gram Sabha and therefore, delimitation notifications regarding such areas are against the mandate of Fifth Schedule as well as provisions of the PESA Act .

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143. Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgment passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court at Jodhpur in the case of "Bhanwar Lal Mundra & Ors. V/s The State of Rajasthan & ors." (D. B. Civil Writ Petition No.10491/2009) decided on 13.05.2015.

144. Replying to the said contention, learned Advocate General has stated that neither the constitutional provisions pertaining to the scheduled area nor the provisions of the PESA Act anywhere provide for participation of the Gram Sabha in the matters of delimitation, which are having the legislative character. Learned Advocate General has referred to Section 4 of the PESA Act, which reads as under :-

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(ii) be responsible for the identification or selection of persons as beneficiaries under the poverty alleviation and other programmes;

(f) every Panchayat at the village level shall be required to obtain from the Gram Sabha a certification of utilisation of funds by that Panchayat for the plans, programmes and projects referred to in clause(e);

(g) the reservation of seats in the Scheduled Areas at every Panchayat shall be in proportion to the population of the communities in that Panchayat for whom reservation is sought to be given under Part IX of the Constitution:

government, a State Legislature shall ensure that the Panchayats at the appropriate level and the Gram Sabha are endowed specifically with--

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(i) the power to enforce prohibition or to regulate or restrict the sale and consumption of any intoxicant;

(ii) the ownership of minor forest produce;

(iii) the power to prevent alienation of land in the Scheduled Areas and to take appropriate action to restore any unlawfully alienated land of a Scheduled Tribe;

(iv) the power to manage village markets by whatever name called;

(v) the power to exercise control over money lending to the Scheduled Tribes;

(vi) the power to exercise control over institutions and functionaries in all social sectors;

(vii) the power to control over local plans and resources for such plans including tribal sub-plans;

(n) the State legislations that may endow Panchayats with powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self-government shall contain safeguards to ensure that Panchayats at the higher level do not assume the powers and authority of any Panchayat at the lower level or of the Gram Sabha;

(o) the State Legislature shall endeavour to follow the pattern of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution while designing the administrative arrangements in the Panchayats at district levels in the Scheduled Areas."

145. After analysing the said contention and giving thoughtful consideration to the provisions of the PESA Act , it is clear that the participation of the Gram Sabha is mandated only for the functions as prescribed under Section 4 of the PESA Act, which deals with the resettlement, rehabilitation or development of the TSP area. In absence of any specific statutory requirement prescribed under the Constitution of India or the PESA Act , it cannot be held that the prior consultation of the Gram Sabha for the purpose of delimitation, TSP Area is mandatory. The judgments relied upon by the petitioners in Bhanwar Lal Mundra (supra) and other judgments are not related to the issue so raised, therefore, the same are not applicable in the facts of the present case. Hence, (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (411 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] the challenge given by the petitioners to the delimitation notifications on such grounds fails.

146. In some of the writ petitions, the petitioners have challenged the final notifications on the ground that on earlier occasion, some part of the Panchayat area has been included, whereas, while issuing the notifications impugned, the said notifications were withdrawn or the rural area is again excluded from the Municipality. Counsels for the petitioners contended that said exercise clearly shows arbitrary exercise of the powers by the State authorities and the same cannot be allowed to be sustained.

147. Learned Advocate General while responding to the said challenge, has reiterated the submission regarding scope of interference of this Court in such matters. It is contended that once the State Government after thoughtful consideration of, overall factors has taken a conscious decision, the same cannot be interfered with by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Reliance has been placed upon a recent judgment passed by the learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of Pankaj Panwar (supra). The relevant part of the judgment is quoted below :

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11. In that view of the matter, we see no reason to interfere in this matter and, accordingly, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8177 of 2025 is dismissed."

In view of the judgment cited above, the said ground of challenge is also not sustainable.

148. The conclusion emerges from the discussions made above, can be summed up as under :-

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vi) The authorities considering the objections / suggestions received in pursuance of the notices of delimitation, are not required to act as a judicial / quasi-judicial authority to decide each objections with reasoned order.

vii) The principle of audi alteram partem is not applicable in the cases of delimitation.

viii) In view of the discussions made above, with regard to different grounds raised by the petitioners in different writ petitions, as adjudicated above, no case for interference in the present bunch of writ petitions challenging the final notifications of delimitation issued under Section 3 of the Act of 2009 or under Section 101 of the Act of 1994, is made out.

PART (B) - WRIT PETITIONS CHALLENGING PROCESS OF DELIMITATION INITIED IN PURSUANCE OF ONE MONTH'S NOTICE ISSUED UNDER SECTION 101 OF THE ACT OF 1994

149. In pursuance of conscious decision taken by the State Government to undertake the process of delimitation of the Panchayati Raj Institutions, the notifications dated 10.01.2025 as well as order dated 18.01.2025 were issued directing for issuing one month notice under Section 101 of the Act of 1994 for proposed delimitation. In pursuance of said notices, objections / suggestions have been submitted by various villagers. Upon the said objections / suggestions, reports were prepared by the concerned Sub-Divisional Officer and forwarded to the concerned District Collector. In some cases, the concerned District Collector (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (415 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] has forwarded the record to the State Government for its consideration.

150. A large bunch of writ petitions was filed challenging the process so undertaken in pursuance of notification dated 10.01.2025 and also the proposals made in pursuance thereof. The challenge has been made on various common grounds including non-adherence of the guidelines issued along with the notice, alleged problems to be faced by the villagers, non- consideration of the objections submitted by the villagers or arbitrary exercise of powers on political considerations.

151. We have perused the record of all such writ petitions and found that the nature of the grounds raised in the writ petitions are of common nature apart from factual distinction of the respective cases. The issues / questions / ground of challenge involved in the said bunch of writ petitions are broadly summed- up and noted as infra.

(i) After de-limitation / exclusion / inclusion of village(s), office of the proposed Gram Panchayat shall be more than 6 k.m. away from the villages.

(ii) Two contiguous villages, which were part of existing gram panchayat have been included in newly proposed gram panchayat as there shall be no contiguity with the newly constituted gram panchayat or its constituent villages.

(iii) The creation of new revenue villages is still in offing or subject matter of the writ petitions, in which interim orders have been passed or the notification of (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:45 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (416 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] creation of revenue villages have been quashed, yet gram panchayat(s) has/have been proposed with inclusion of such villages.

(iv) The population criteria given in the Guidelines dated 10.01.2025 is not met in the proposed gram panchayat.

(v) The petitioners apprehend that there is likelihood that the Collector would agree to their proposal and send recommendation against the proposed gram panchayat yet the State Government would create such gram panchayat because of political vendetta or vested interest.

(vi) Abolition of gram panchayat or its division in two gram panchayats is not permissible in the eye of law.

(vii) A village having lesser population has been fixed as gram panchayat as against village with greater population.

(viii) The headquarter of gram panchayat has been proposed in a village where sufficient land is not available for development of essential amenities.

(ix) The headquarter of gram panchayat has been proposed in a village other than the one where sufficient development has taken place and government land is available for development of panchayat head office and other amenities, which is in defiance of the Guidelines dated 10.01.2025.

152. Record of the cases revealed that a bunch of writ petitions lead by S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.8576/2025 (Dhanna Ram (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (417 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.), the Single Bench of this Court at Principal Seat, Jodhpur has passed an interim order dated 23.05.2025 and issued directions. For ready reference, order dated 23.05.2025 is quoted below :-

153. The said interim order dated 23.05.2025 has been challenged on behalf of the State Government in D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.831/2025: State of Rajasthan & ors. Vs. Dhanna Ram and Ors. which will be dealt by us in the later part of the judgment.

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154. While objecting the maintainability of the said writ petition, learned AG argued that the said writ petitions are liable to be dismissed solely on the ground that the same being premature. Learned Advocate General contended that the writ petitions are based upon misconceived apprehension. The basic ground of challenge in the writ petitions is in reference to the guidelines / instructions issued vide notification dated 10.01.2025, however the said guidelines are not statutory in nature and therefore having no enforceability under the law. Learned Advocate General also contended that no vested right of the petitioners are violated, hence, the writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are not maintainable. It is also stated that merely because objections have been filed by few of the villagers and the writ petitions are being filed by a few amongst them, cannot give rise to a presumption that the proposal of delimitation is against interest and sentiments of public at large. Learned Advocate General further stated that the procedure as provided under the provisions of Act of 1994 was duly followed and in view of the statement made before the learned Single Bench, all the proposals will be considered by a High Level Committee while keeping in mind the constitutional as well as statutory mandate. Learned Advocate General, thus, prayed for dismissal of the said bunch of writ petitions.

155. Learned Advocate General argued that, until the notification is issued, the delimitation process remains ongoing and no rights of any person are infringed; therefore, any challenge at this stage would be premature. It is contended that the scope of interference (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (419 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] even in the cases, where final notification of delimitation is issued, is only limited to judicial review, however, entertaining the writ petition at this stage, where final notification is yet to be passed, would amount to preview of judicial review of a process in progress, which is not permissible in the eyes of law. It was further submitted that, since the delimitation process is akin to conditional legislation, entertaining such a writ petition prematurely could open a "Pandora's box," potentially allowing challenges to any legislation or bill that has been tabled but not yet enacted in the Legislature.

156. We are in agreement with the objection so raised by the learned Advocate General as it has been consistently held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the writ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked prematurely, when the administrative process remains incomplete and no final order prejudicial to legal rights of any person is issued. Writ jurisdiction can only be invoked in the cases where any action has resulted in concrete and identifiable infringement / harm and not mere upon conjecture or apprehension of anticipated consequences. The law does not countenance anticipatory challenges to any administrative / legislative / judicial processes, which is still in motion. Intermediate steps in progression, do not constitute the crystallized decision warranting judicial scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution. Reliance can be placed on the case of Santosh Kumar Mallik v. State of Orissa reported in 2015 SCC OnLine Ori 75, wherein several landmark judgments have been discussed in detail and has been held that court may dismiss (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (420 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] a petition which appears to be at a premature stage and there exist no final action affecting the rights of the parties. The relevant para has been reproduced below:

9. In Dr. Sarana (supra) the petitioner approached the High Court by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against the recommendation made by the Selection Committee in favour of one of the two candidates. It was not even scrutinized by the Executive Committee. It was for the Executive Committee either to accept the recommendation made by the Selection Committee or to reject it. Thus, the petition filed against such a recommendation was held to be premature."

157. We have considered the rival contentions advanced at Bar and also perused the record of the cases. As a matter of fact, in all the said writ petitions the process of Delimitation is still underway and has not attained finality till now. The law is well settled that the writ petitions are not maintainable merely on the basis of apprehensions. Though, there is a clear constitutional bar of interference in the case of delimitation, the scope of interference (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (421 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] is limited to the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The said power can only be exercised to check the procedural infirmity, if any, established in the decision making process and the same cannot be exercised at an intermediate stage. We are of the considered opinion that the writ petitions challenging the process of delimitation, where the final notification is not yet passed, are premature.

158. In large number of writ petitions, the ground of challenge is violation of the guidelines relating to distance criteria / population criteria. As held above, the guidelines so issued along with the notice under Section 101 of the Act of 1994 are not statutory in nature and only administrative instructions providing guiding principles for considering the proposals of delimitation by administrative authorities. Therefore, the challenge given in the present bunch of writ petitions on such grounds is not sustainable in the eye of law.

159. The other grounds raised in the writ petitions involve various disputed questions of fact, which cannot be decided under writ jurisdiction by this Court. Even as per the constitutional as well as statutory scheme, it is within the domain of the authorities to consider and decide the proposals of delimitation and this Court cannot shift its opinion in such matters.

160. During the course of arguments, learned Advocate General has maintained the stand of the State Government, as recorded in the Para 2 & 3 of the order dated 23.05.2025 that the proposals sent by the concerned District Collector will be considered by a High Level Committee constituted for that purpose. This Court (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (422 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] cannot presume at this stage that the said proposals will not be considered by the Committee in an objective manner keeping in view of the constitutional mandate. In this view of matter, no interference of this Court at this stage, in said bunch of writ petitions is called for.

161. Arguing in relation to D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 831/2025 (State of Rajasthan & ors. Vs. Dhanna Ram & Ors.) as well as other Special Appeals, challenging the interim order dated 23.05.2025, learned Advocate General argued that the directions contained in para 7 and 8 of the said order dated 23.05.2025 amounts to transgressing the powers of judicial review of the legislative functions of the State Government. Learned Advocate General contended that learned Single Judge has failed to consider that the notices issued under Section 101 are only in the nature of intimation to the public at large; the representations submitted in pursuance thereof are in only in the form of suggestions and the proposals forwarded by the District Collector are recommendatory in nature. The directions contained in the order dated 23.05.2025, for adjudicating the objections and to place the decision before the High Court for scrutiny is against the constitutional and statutory scheme. Learned Advocate General further submitted that there is no provisions requiring for adjudication of objection submitted in pursuance of notice for delimitation, therefore, the directions contained in para 7 and 8 of the order dated 23.05.2025 are not sustainable.

162. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners have argued that as a matter of fact, the order dated 23.05.2025 has been passed (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (423 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] with the consent of the learned Advocate General and therefore, such consent order cannot be allowed to be challenged. Learned counsels for the writ petitioners stated that order dated 23.05.2025 is required to be maintained as it is and writ petitioners will be satisfied, if the directions contained in the said order is allowed to be followed in its true letter and spirit.

163. We have considered the submissions made at bar and found that on bare reading of the order dated 23.05.2025, it is clear that the statement / consent of the learned Advocate General is recorded in para 2 and 3 of the said order and the same are limited to the extent that as per the guidelines, the Collector is supposed to send the proposals after considering the objections raised by the residents / concerned persons and a three Members High Level Committee has been constituted to examine the proposals so sent by the respective Collectors. There is no consent given on behalf of the learned Advocate General regarding the directions contained in para 7 and 8 of the said order and therefore, present special appeals to the extent of challenging the said directions are very much maintainable.

164. We are of the considered opinion that once it is clearly stated before the learned Single Bench that the proposals sent by the District Collector are not final and even the learned Single Judge has recorded its finding in Para 4 of the said order that "This Court has no reason to apprehend that concerned Collectors shall not consider lawfully and objectively their objections before sending proposals to the State Government", there was no (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (424 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] justification available in issuing further directions as contained in para 7 and 8 of the order dated 23.05.2025.

165. As discussed in the earlier part of this Judgment, the process of delimitation is in the nature of conditional legislation and the authority undertaking the same i.e. three Members High Level Committee in the present case, is not supposed to act as a judicial or quasi-judicial authority. Similarly, the representations made by the villagers are only in the form of the suggestions and there is no statutory requirement to adjudicate the objections and decide each such objections with reasoned order. As held above, the recommendations made or decision taken by the committee are not amenable to writ jurisdiction except within the limited scope of judicial review. Therefore, the directions contained in para 7 and 8 of the order dated 23.05.2025 cannot be allowed to sustain.

However, it is expected from the State Government to comply with the statement made before the learned Single Judge as recorded in Para 2 and 3 of the said order.

166. We have also considered D.B. Civil Writ Petition (PIL) No.9199/2025 ( Sanwar Mal Choudhary & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. ), wherein the petitioners have alleged that the District Collector, Sikar, while forwarding the final proposal to the State Government, failed to include the name of Reengus as a new Panchayat Samiti and confined the recommendation only to the reconstitution of Khandela Panchayat Samiti, thereby ignoring the proposal made by the Block Development Officer and the representations submitted by several Gram Panchayats.

(Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (425 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] Per contra, learned Advocate General submitted that the delimitation exercise is undertaken strictly in accordance with law and after due consideration of all relevant factors. It was contended that the proposal for creation of Reengus Panchayat Samiti did not satisfy the criteria of population and administrative viability as per the prescribed norms, and therefore, was not recommended. It was further argued that the matter falls within the realm of administrative discretion, and unless malafide or manifest arbitrariness is shown, judicial interference is unwarranted. It is further argued that even otherwise, the process of consideration for reconstituting the Panchayat Samiti is still not finalized, therefore, no interference at this stage is called for.

167. As held above, the interference of this Court at this premature stage is not called for. The disputes as raised in the writ petition regarding adequacy and viability of creation of Reengus as a Panchayat Samiti cannot be decided by this Court. As directed above, all the pending proposals regarding delimitation shall be considered by the High Level Committee.

PART (C) - WRIT PETITIONS CHALLENGING PROCESS OF DELIMITATION / ALTERATION OF WARD BOUNDARIES IN ABSENCE OF ANY CHANGE IN CENSUS DATA OR VARIATION IN THE NUMBER OF WARDS

168. The bunch of writ petitions led by S.B. Civil Writ petition No.8698/2025 (Sahdev Singh Bhati & Ors. V. State of Rajasthan & Ors.) was filed before this Court at Principal Seat, Jodhpur challenging the proposals relating to the reorganization of ward boundaries under the Act of 2009, where there had been no change in the census or number of wards. The matter was being (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (426 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] heard by the learned Single Judge, and by way of an interim order dated 11.06.2025, the respondent - State was restrained and prohibited from proceeding any further in respect of the proposal or scheme formulated and communicated by the District Collector or the concerned Municipal Authorities for altering or reorganizing the territorial precincts of the wards and the corresponding number of voters enrolled therein.

Aggrieved with the said interim order, the respondent - State has preferred special appeal being D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.1005/2025 ( State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs Narayan Singh Solanki & Ors. ). In light of the foregoing, this Court deems it appropriate and expedient to synchronously and concurrently entertain and adjudicate upon all the connected writ petitions along with the Special Appeal Writ so as to avoid contradictory decisions and to secure uniformity of judicial pronouncements in the matter.

169. Learned counsel for petitioners contend that, in absence of a fresh census enumeration, the figures derived from the 2011 Census alone are admissible and in absence of any change in the census, the initiation or undertaking of any delimitation regarding boundaries of the existing municipal wards is impermissible and constitutes a clear violation of Section 3 of the Act of 2009.

170. It is further contended that none of the contingencies enumerated in clauses (a) to (d) of Section 3(1) of the Act of 2009 have occurred, and therefore, the conditions precedent for invoking the provisions of Section 3(2) are not satisfied. Additionally, no statutory notification altering or changing the municipal boundaries has been issued by the competent authority.

(Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (427 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] Consequently, any proposal, scheme, or initiative put forth by authorities to modify, alter, or re-determine the territorial composition and boundaries of the wards is patently arbitrary, lacks statutory sanction, and is devoid of legal foundation.

171. Learned counsel for petitioners also contend that pursuant to the mandate contained in Section 6 of the Act of 2009, the total number of wards to be constituted within a municipality must be ascertained and determined exclusively on the basis of the population data as recorded in the latest Census.

Additionally, learned counsel submitted that in a case involving an almost identical factual matrix, the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, in Rajesh Kumar Sharma v. State of Punjab , 2023 SCC OnLine P&H 7307, had elaborately considered the legal position and quashed the delimitation exercise undertaken by the respondents therein, having found the same contrary to Rule 4 of the Delimitation of Wards of Municipalities Rules, 1972, applicable in the State of Punjab, which is pari materia to statutes of the Act of 2009.

172. Learned Advocate General relied upon the note sheet (Annx- R/3) at page 178, which records that the entire issue was considered and a decision was taken to alter the territorial boundaries of the wards. It was stated that, after following Sections 6 , 9 , and 10 , Section 3 was not relevant in the present case. The note further clarifies that the eventualities spelled out in Sections 3 and 6 are set out in the Act as guiding principles, but there is no prohibition against changing boundaries from time to time. Therefore, the boundaries of the wards were altered in the exercise of administrative power.

(Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (428 of 467) [CW-7718/2025]

173. Learned Advocate General further submitted that in cases where there is no fresh Census or alteration of boundaries, Section 3 of the Act of 2009 has no bearing on the delimitation of constituencies. While Section 6(2) makes the fresh determination of constituencies (wards) mandatory, Section 6(1) authorizes the fixation of the number of seats from time to time by notification in the Official Gazette. Section 6(1) is subject to Section 6(2) in the sense that, irrespective of any prior fixation, if a fresh Census has been undertaken, refixation of seats must be carried out mandatorily. Therefore contending that the reading Sections 3 , 6 , 9 , and 10 together demonstrates that the Government possesses the power to change boundaries without any statutory prohibition or restriction.

174. The preliminary objection raised by the respondent - State, contending that the writ petition is premature as it challenges a mere notification without any consequential adverse action, is devoid of merit. It is a settled principle that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution can be invoked not only upon actual infringement of a right but also where there exists a clear violation of the statutory provisions. This Court, upon due consideration of the issue involved, finds persuasive merit in the reasoning adopted by the learned Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Rajesh Kumar Sharma (supra), which elaborately examined an almost identical factual and legal situation. The principles laid down therein, holding that a delimitation exercise undertaken in contravention of the governing statutory provisions cannot be sustained. In view of the similarity of facts and the sound reasoning adopted in the said decision, this (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (429 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] Court is of the considered opinion that the present writ petition is maintainable. The relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:

Admittedly, there is no alteration in the Municipal limits and perusal of the record indicates that there is no increase in the population in the subsequent impugned delimitation. The number of wards as well as the total population remains the same, as discussed in detail in preceding paragraph No. 15. Thus, the non-compliance of the Rule 4 is writ large. "

175. The reliance placed by learned Advocate General on the judgment in Dule Singh Vs. State of Raj. reported in 2019 SCC OnLine Raj 3209 does not withstand since a careful reading of the Act of 2009 and the Act of 1994 reveals that the provisions of Sections 3 and 6 of the Act of 2009 clearly make the process of delimitation contingent upon the population figures as recorded in the relevant census, whereas Sections 12 , 13 , and 14 of the Act of 1994 contain no such reference or dependence on census data.

(Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (430 of 467) [CW-7718/2025]

176. In this context, the interpretation put forth by the learned Advocate General with respect to the scope and operation of Sections 3 , 6 , 9 , 10 of the Act of 2009 is found to be wholly misconceived. This Court finds no support of the arguments advanced by the learned Advocate General for such interpretation, which runs contrary to the expressed language and legislative intent underlying the Act.

177. The statutory framework under the Act of 2009, particularly Sections 3 and 6(2) , makes it manifest that any redetermination of wards or reservation of seats must be based upon the population figures ascertained in the last concluded census. In absence of a fresh census or any variation contemplated under clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 , no alteration in the territorial limits or number of wards could lawfully be undertaken. Mere use of words "time to time" does not give unbridled power to the State Government to change the boundaries of the Municipal wards at any point of time without there being any change in census or change in the number of wards or change in the territorial boundaries of the Municipality concerned. The exercise in question, therefore, appears to travel beyond the boundaries of statutory competence.

Accordingly, this Court is not inclined to uphold the legality of the procedure so adopted by the authorities, as the same appears to have been undertaken in deviation from and in disregard of the mandatory provisions contained in the Act of 2009. PART (D) - WRIT PETITIONS CHALLENGING REMOVAL OF PANCHAYAT SAMITI MEMBERS / PRADHAN ON THE GROUND THAT THEIR RESPECTIVE ELECTORAL WARD IS INCLUDED WITHIN THE (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (431 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF A MUNICIPALITY.

178. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that even if a person becomes disqualified on account of a ward being shifted from a Panchayat Samiti to a Municipality, he would nevertheless continue to hold the office of Pradhan, as the election of a Pradhan does not pertain solely to a single village or area that may subsequently fall within a Municipality due to delimitation, but represents all the Gram Panchayats within the concerned Panchayat Samiti. Therefore, the petitioners cannot be removed from the post of Pradhan merely because the village from which they were elected as a members, now stands dissolved.

Reliance was placed upon Sections 2(8) , 8 , 17 , 30 , and 38 of the Act of 1994 to contend that a person elected as Pradhan continues to discharge his duties for a full term of five years.

179. Learned Advocate General argued that Section 101(5A) provides that the provisions relating to certain principles shall be applied mutatis mutandis to the Panchayats; therefore, reference to the definition of "members" in this context is not justified, as membership ceases automatically by operation of law. Section 30 contains a non obstante clause under the Act and hence, the tenure of office is not dependent solely upon the tenure of the Panchayati Raj Institution. Section 36(5) further provides that a Pradhan must vacate office if he ceases to be a member of the Panchayati Raj Institution.

180. With regard to the consequential removal of a Pradhan due to the inclusion of a rural area into another urban local body, learned Advocate General relied upon the provisions of Section (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (432 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] 3(8) of the Act of 2009, and Sections 101(1)(d) , 101(2)(d) read with Section 101(5A) , as well as Sections 30 and 36(5) of the Act of 1994. He also placed reliance on judgment passed in the case of Ram Prasad vs. State of Rajasthan and Lal Chand Asopa vs. State of Rajasthan (S.B. CWP No. 4993/2025).

181. Having considered the submissions of the parties and the relevant statutory provisions, this Court finds that the contention raised by the petitioners lacks merit. The petitioners' argument that the office of Pradhan continues for a full term despite the ward or area from which he was originally elected being transferred from the Panchayat Samiti to a Municipality, is untenable.

182. The statutory provisions of the Act of 1994 relevant for the adjudication of the instant dispute are reproduced hereunder:

36. Resignation of Sarpanch, Up-Sarpanch, Panch, Pradhan, Up-Pradhan,Pramukh, Up-Pramukh and Members of Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad.- (1) The Sarpanch, Up-Sarpanch or Panch may resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Vikas Adhikari.

(2) A member holding office as Pradhan of the Panchayat Samiti may resign his office at any time by writing under his hand addressed to the Pramukh, Zila Parishad and the Up-Pradhan or a member of a Panchayat Samiti may resign his office at any time by writing under his hand addressed to the Pradhan, Panchayat Samiti.

(Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (433 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] (3) The Pramukh may resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Divisional Commissioner, and the Up-Pramukh or a member, Zila Parishad may resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Pramukh.

(4) Every resignation under Sub-secs. (1), (2) and (3) shall take effect on the expiry of fifteen days from the date of its receipt by the authority aforesaid unless withdrawn within this period of fifteen days. (5) Every Up-Sarpanch, Pradhan, Up-Pradhan, Pramukh and Up-Pramukh shall vacate the office if he ceases to be a member of Panchayat or, as the case may be, a Panchayat Samiti or a Zila Parishad.

183. The said provisions are required to be read along with Section 3 of the Act of 2009, relevant part of which is quoted below :

(Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (434 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] Chairperson and the members respectively of the Municipality declared for such area, as the case may be;

(d) the whole of the assets vesting in, and of the liabilities subsisting against, the panchayat so declared to be a Municipality or in case where only a part or whole of a village is so included in a Municipality, such portion of the said assets and liabilities as the State Government may direct, shall devolve upon the Municipality declared for such area or upon the Municipality in which such area of the village is so included;

(e) the Municipality so established by the inclusion of any area of a village therein or by the declaration of a village as a Municipality, shall levy or continue to levy such of the taxes as are lawfully imposed under this Act;

(f) any such area shall cease to be subject to all rules, notifications, orders and bye-laws made under the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (Act No.13 of 1994). (9) ... ... ...

(10) ... ... ..."

A bare reading of Section 30 of the Act of 1994, read with the non obstante clause therein and the provisions of Section 36(5) , clearly establishes that a Pradhan must vacate office on ceasing to be a member of the Panchayati Raj Institution.

184. Furthermore, the automatic cessation of membership occurs by operation of law, when the area represented by the Pradhan is removed from the jurisdiction of the Panchayat Samiti pursuant to delimitation or inclusion within a Municipality under the Act of 2009. The principle of mutatis mutandis application under Section 101(5A) of the Act of 1994 further supports this legislative intent. Moreover, the applicability of Section 3(8)(c) of the Act of 2009, which is expressly confined to the Sarpanch, Up-sarpanch, and Panchas of a Gram Panchayat, who are deemed to become the Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson and members, respectively, of the successor Municipality in certain circumstances. This provision (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (435 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] does not extend to the members of a Panchayat Samiti or Zila Parishad. In the absence of any analogous transitory provision for the Members and Pradhan of a Panchayat Samiti, the petitioners cannot claim immunity from the cessation of his term as Pradhan.

185. The authoritative decision in Lal Chand Asopa v. State of Rajasthan confirms that upon such territorial reorganization, the office of Pradhan held by a member elected from the affected area stands terminated, precluding any continuation on the basis that the Pradhan represents the entire Panchayat Samiti. Thus, the petitioners cannot continue to hold the office, once the ward has ceased to be part of the Panchayat Samiti and the petitioners' contention to the contrary is accordingly rejected. The relevant portion of the judgment in Lal Chand Asopa (supra) is extracted hereinbelow for ready reference:

186. Upon a comprehensive consideration of the rival submissions, statutory provisions and judicial precedents, this Court concludes that statutory framework under the Act of 1994 and the Act of 2009 unequivocally provides that when an area is excluded from the jurisdiction of a Panchayat Samiti and included within a Municipality, the Pradhan / Member of Panchayat Samiti representing such area automatically cease to hold office by operation of law. Therefore, the petitioners cannot claim to continue in office after exclusion of their respective areas from the Panchayat Samiti.

187. While challenging the removal of Pradhan, in some writ petitions, the challenge has also been given to the consequent appointment of a candidate as Pradhan, who earlier lost the elections on the said post. Counsel for the petitioners stated that (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (437 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] in case of removal of Pradhan, the charge was required to be given to the Up-Pradhan, whereas, due to political motives, the charge has been given to a defeated candidate.

Replying to the said contention, learned Advocate General stated that in all the cases, on removal of a Panchayat Samiti Member, the charge has been given strictly in accordance with law and it is only in the cases, where the seat of Panchayat Samiti Member was reserved for a particular category, such as, female or reserved category, then as per the statutory mandate, the charge could not have been given to the Up-Pradhan / Up-Zila Pramukh, rather, the same has to be given to a member belonging to the same category.

188. The petitioners have failed to showcase that any infirmity or illegality or violation of statutory provisions in such action of the State Government. In this view of the matter, the said challenge also fails.

PART (E) - WRIT PETITIONS CHALLENGING ORDERS PASSED BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT APPOINTING THE OUTGOING SARPANCH AS ADMINISTRATOR OR WRIT PETITIONS SEEKING APPOINTMENT OF ONGOING CHAIRPERSON OF MUNICIPALITY AS ADMINISTRATOR

189. In this part, we will deal the question as to whether the appointment of an outgoing Sarpanch as an Administrator under Section 95(1)(b) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, is a legally valid exercise of statutory power, especially when the analogous provision for Urban Local Bodies ( Section 322 of the Act of 2009) designates government officials for such roles ?

190. Learned counsels for the petitioners while challenging the appointment of administrators, have argued that upon the (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (438 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] completion of the tenure of a Gram Panchayat, the Sarpanch has been appointed as the Administrator, whereas, in the case of a Municipality, a Government official has been appointed as the Administrator.

191. Learned counsel for another petitioners submitted that the appointment of an Administrator for a Municipality does not fall within the jurisdiction of the State Government. Reliance has been placed upon the judgments delivered in Municipal Board, Begun and ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors reported in 1991 AIR Rajasthan 14; Kishansingh Tomar vs. Municipal Corporation reported in (2006) 8 SCC 352 and Sau. Durgeshwari Rajesh Kale vs State of Maharashtra and ors. reported in 2021 (3) AIR BomR 476.

Moreover, learned counsels for the petitioners have argued that the outgoing Sarpanch or Ward Panch could not have been appointed as Administrators, and that such action is arbitrary and bears no nexus to the object sought to be achieved. It was contended that the continuation of the existing body beyond its tenure of five years is contrary to the mandate contained in Article 243E of the Constitution of India.

It was further submitted that even an Administrator cannot be permitted to continue for a period exceeding six months after the dissolution of a Panchayat.

192. Learned Advocate General has argued that the power to appoint Administrators is strictly in consonance with Section 95 of the Panchayati Raj Act and Section 320 of the Municipalities Act. Under the Panchayati Raj Act , the power of appointment of an Administrator is not confined only to Government officers. He (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (439 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] further submitted that Section 95(1)(b) of the Act of 1994 and Section 322(3)(b) of the Act of 2009 provide for the appointment of Administrators in the event of dissolution of local bodies. Both these provisions apply to all kinds of dissolutions under their respective Acts and are not limited merely to premature dissolutions under Section 94 of the Act of 1994 or Section 322 of the Act of 2009.

It was contended that dissolution may also occur under Sections 17 and 101 of the Act of 1994, and under Sections 7 and 3 of the Act of 2009, i.e., either by efflux of term or by alteration of boundaries. In such situations, since the office-bearers and members cease to hold office, the appointment of Administrators becomes a necessary consequence.

It was further submitted that the requirement of holding elections within six months applies only in cases of premature dissolution or establishment of a new local body, and not to dissolution on completion of the regular term. The by-elections in cases of premature dissolution have already been scheduled and conducted.

193. Learned Advocate General further pointed out that Section 95(1)(b) of the Act of 1994 does not mandate that the Administrator must be a Government officer or employee, whereas Section 322(3)(b) of the Act of 2009 does contain such a stipulation. Under Section 95 , the term used is "such person,"

194. For proper appreciation, relevant provisions of above- mentioned statutes are reproduced below:

95. Consequences of dissolution.- (1) When a Panchayati Raj Institution is dissolved under this Act, following consequences shall ensue:-

322. Power of Government to dissolve Municipality in case of incompetency or having less than two third elected members. - (1) If at any time the State Government is satisfied that the Municipality is not competent to perform, or persistently makes default in the performance of the duties imposed on it by or under this Act or otherwise by law, or has exceeded, or abused its powers, the State Government may, by an order published along with the reasons thereof, in the Official Gazette, declare the Municipality to be incompetent or in default, or to have exceeded or abused its powers, as the case may be, and may dissolve such Municipality as from a date to be specified in the order of dissolution:

Explanation.- If for any reason the number of vacancies in a Municipality exceeds two-thirds of the total number of seats, the Municipality shall be deemed to be not competent to perform the duties imposed on it by or under this Act.

(2) The State Government shall dissolve the Municipality if at any time the number of its elected members falls short of two third of its total members.

(Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (442 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] (3) When a Municipality is dissolved under sub-Section (1) or any other provision of this Act,the following consequences shall ensue:

195. The petitioners' challenge, which is predicated on Article 243E of the Constitution, is untenable. The role and capacity of an elected member of a Panchayat are fundamentally distinct from those of an administrator appointed under a statute. Article 243E , which governs the duration of a duly elected Panchayat, has no applicability to an appointment made to fill an administrative vacuum.

196. The constitutional mandate under Article 243E to hold elections within six months primarily governs cases of premature dissolution or formation of new local bodies. Where the term expires naturally, the appointment of an Administrator, even one (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (443 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] who is a former office bearer, to administer the body temporarily is permissible and does not breach constitutional or statutory provisions.

The petitioners' reliance on judgments such as Municipal Board, Begun (supra); Kishansingh Tomar (supra) and Sau. Durgeshwari Rajesh Kale (supra) is inapposite, given these cases arose from very different circumstances and legal issues.

197. The appointment of administrators is governed by Section 95 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. The said provision confers discretionary power upon the State to appoint "such administrator as the State Government may appoint in this behalf". The State has exercised this statutory power and provided a rational justification for appointing the outgoing office-bearers, citing their institutional knowledge and experience as crucial for maintaining administrative continuity. The petitioner's allegation of the action being arbitrary and tainted with mala fides is wholly misconceived, especially in light of the fact that this measure has been implemented as a uniform, state-wide policy, thereby negating any suggestion of arbitrariness or improper motive.

198. Conversely, Section 322(3)(b) of the 2009 Act mandates the appointment of a "such officer" as Administrator for Municipalities. This deliberate distinction reflects a rational legislative intent considering the differing administrative structures and needs of these local bodies. It is a cardinal principle of statutory interpretation that where the language of a provision is plain, clear, and unambiguous, effect must be given to its ordinary and grammatical meaning, as the legislative intent is best discerned from the express words used. The legislature, in its (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (444 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] wisdom, has conferred discretionary power upon the State Government to appoint an officer as it deems fit, and to read it in any other manner such as precluding the appointment of a Government officer would amount to rewriting the statute, which is impermissible. Therefore, the appointment of the said Government officer is squarely in conformity with the explicit mandate of the statute. In this view of the matter, the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner are rejected.

199. The contention that the appointment of Government officers as Administrators in Urban Local Bodies renders the appointment of Administrators in Panchayati Raj Institutions, as per the impugned notifications, arbitrary or unjustified, cannot be accepted. The Urban Local Bodies and the Panchayati Raj Institutions constitute distinct and separate classes, as is evident from the provisions of the Constitution as well as the respective enactments governing their composition, functions, and administration. Consequently, the nature of appointments made in Urban Local Bodies and Panchayati Raj Institutions cannot be equated, and the differentiation in the method adopted stands on reasonable classification founded on intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved.

200. In view of the above discussion, this Court holds that in the present cases, the orders of appointment of Administrator are in accordance with the provision of the Act of 1994 and Act of 2009 and do not violate constitutional or statutory provisions, therefore, the interference of this in these cases is not called for. PART (F) - WRIT PETITIONS CHALLENGING / SEEKING DIRECTION FOR FIXING OF VILLAGE HEADQUARTER (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (445 of 467) [CW-7718/2025]

201. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the guidelines issued by the State on 10.01.2025 and 13.02.2025 have been disregarded. It was submitted that these guidelines mandate that headquarters of a newly created Gram Panchayat should, as far as possible, be established in a village with adequate means of transportation to ensure convenient access for all residents of the Gram Panchayat concerned. It was further contended that the designated village must have government offices and other essential facilities, including a School, Panchayat Bhawan, Anganwadi Center, Patwar Bhawan and Kisan Seva Sadan, for which sufficient land ought to be available. However, it is submitted that in the present matter, the prescribed 6 km distance parameter and other foundational guidelines for delimitation have been violated. The petitioners assert that there was no administrative necessity to conduct the current delimitation exercise, rendering it arbitrary.

202. Learned Advocate General countering the petitioner's contentions, submitted that the provisions of Sections 101(1) and 101(6) of the Act of 1994 manifest that the Government is empowered to issue orders and directions; however, learned Advocate General further submitted that the provisions contained in the guidelines are only meant to guide the concerned officers regarding the manner of preparing proposals, and therefore, such guidelines cannot be treated as having statutory force.

203. It was further contended that Section 102 of the Act lays down the procedure for framing rules, and unless any provision is made under such Rules and published in the Official Gazette, it (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (446 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] cannot be enforced. As there exists no such prescription, the Government has not framed any rules in this regard. Consequently, non-compliance with the guidelines by the officers cannot be a ground for this Court to interfere with the functioning of the Government. Learned Advocate General also relied upon the definition of the term "prescribed" under Section 2(19) of the Act of 1994 and Section 32(58) of the General Clauses Act, 1955.

204. It is to be noticed that in the case of J. R. Raghupathy v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in AIR 1988 SC 1681, the matter involved the State of Andhra Pradesh's decision on locating Mandal headquarters, which the High Court had interfered with by directing a different location based on its own assessment of public convenience. Hon'ble Supreme Court overturned this, ruling the High Court's intervention as patently illegal. It was held that guidelines issued by the government to its officers for determining such locations are merely administrative instructions and do not possess statutory force unless published as law. Consequently, these guidelines do not create enforceable legal rights for citizens, and a writ of mandamus cannot be issued to enforce them. The Court emphasized that the ultimate decision-making authority rests with the government, which is entitled to deviate from its own guidelines for reasons of administrative convenience. The judiciary cannot act as an appellate authority to evaluate the comparative merits of different locations for an administrative headquarters, as such a function falls squarely within the executive's domain.

(Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (447 of 467) [CW-7718/2025]

205. In the present batch of petitions, the challenge is premised upon the alleged non-adherence to the guidelines dated 10.01.2025 and 13.02.2025, which lay down certain criteria regarding population, distance from headquarters and the availability of public facilities. The arguments advanced by the learned Advocate General, citing Sections 101 and 102 of the Act of 1994, find strong support in the abovementioned case of Raghupathy (supra). These guidelines, having not been framed and published as "rules" under the prescribed statutory procedure, remain within the domain of executive guidelines / instructions. Their purpose is to provide a uniform framework for the authorities preparing proposals, not to create a rigid and inflexible legal mandate that can be challenged in the court upon every minor deviation. Therefore, the decision-making process for reorganisation and the selection of a Gram Panchayat headquarters is an intricate administrative function, dependent on a multitude of factors that include administrative convenience, geographical contiguity, public accessibility and local demands. It is not the province of this Court, in the exercise of its powers of judicial review, to undertake a comparative evaluation of the merits of one village over another for being designated as a headquarters. To do so would be to effectively step into the shoes of the executive and substitute the Court's own wisdom for that of the administration, a path that is impermissible in law.

206. Further reliance is placed upon the judgment rendered in the case of Mod Singh and others v. State of Rajasthan and another (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6132 of 1992), decided (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (448 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] on 23.12.1994. For ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are quoted below:

207. Accordingly, this Court holds that non-observance or deviation from the guidelines does not vitiate impugned delimitation process or the determination of the Gram Panchayat headquarters. The petitioners, therefore, fail to establish any (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (449 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] illegality or procedural infirmity warranting interference in the exercise of powers of judicial review.

PART (G) - WRIT PETITIONS SEEKING DIRECTIONS TO DECLARE / HOLD THE ELECTIONS.

208. In D. B. Civil Writ Petition (PIL) No.4686/2025 [Sanyam Lodha Vs. State of Rajasthan] as well as D.B. Civil Writ Petition (PIL) No. 1285/2025 (Giriraj Singh Devanda vs. State of Rajasthan), apart from the other prayers, the principally directions have been sought to hold the elections of Municipalities and Panchayati Raj Institutions, respectively, immediately on completion of tenure of concerned local body.

209. Learned counsels for the petitioners have argued that Article 243E of the Constitution of India provides the duration of Panchayat shall be for five years only and 243E (3) provides that an election to constitute a Panchayat shall be completed before the expiry of its tenure. Further, Article 243K(1) vests the State Election Commission with the power of superintendence, direction, and control over the preparation of electoral rolls, and obliges it to complete elections before the expiry of the tenure. Similarly, tenure of five years is provided for municipalities under Article 243U of the Constitution of India and 243U(3) requires completion of election of municipalities before expiry of its duration. Similar power of Superintendence and control regarding conduct of election to the municipalities is provided to the State Election Commission under Article 243ZA of the Constitution of India. Counsels for the petitioners submitted that postponing the elections by issuing the impugned notification is ultra vires to the (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (450 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] Constitutional provision. It is also contended that the State Election Commission has failed to discharge this constitutional mandate. Counsels further submitted that in no eventualities the tenure of the Panchayati Raj Institution or Municipalites can be extended nor the elections can be postponed beyond the durations provided under the Constitution of India.

210. In support of the said contention, reliance was placed upon the judgment passed in the case of Suresh Mahajan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr reported in (2022) 12 SCC 770. Relevant part of the judgment is reproduced below :-

211. Further reliance has been placed upon the judgment passed in the case of Kishan Singh Tomar vs. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad reported in (2006) 6 SCC 352. The relevant part of the judgment is quoted below :-

212. Replying to the said contentions, learned Advocate General argued that there is no dispute regarding the constitutional mandate regarding elections of local bodies and the same must ordinarily be held before the expiry of their tenure by virtue of Articles 243E and 243U of the Constitution of India. However, in various authoritative pronouncements, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has recognized certain exceptions, some of which are outlined as follows :

year timeline. The provisions themselves contemplate the possibility of premature dissolution of local bodies.

ii) In Kishan Singh Tomar case, while it is held that holding elections prior to the expiry of tenure is generally mandatory, the judgment, on a careful reading of paragraphs 19 and 21, recognizes that exceptional circumstances, including man-made situations, may (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (453 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] necessitate the postponement of elections. The crux is that elections cannot be postponed merely due to situations created by vested interests. If the situation arises for bona fide reasons, it constitutes a valid exception to the general rule.

iii) In the Jalgaon Municipal Council case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the mandate of Article 243U applies only when the nature of local bodies remains unchanged. Paragraphs 20 and 21 clarify that any hiatus arising from the conversion of a local body into another is unavoidable, and Article 243U cannot apply where an area of one description is converted into an area of another description. This implies that the tenure requirement applies only to a local body of the same type and its immediate successor of the same type. Consequently, the argument that the entire electoral exercise must be completed before the expiry of the previous term was rejected. This position was reiterated also in the case of Pranay Roy, where the Supreme Court allowed elections to be held after the reconstitution exercise was completed, declining to follow the High Court's directions despite the ongoing reconstitution.

213. Learned Advocate General stated that the State Government is alive to the Constitutional requirements and also committed to hold the elections of the local bodies at the earliest. However, submitted that there are bonafide and compelling reasons behind the conscious decision taken by the State Government for postponing the elections, awaiting the completion of Delimitation (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (454 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] exercise. Learned Advocate General stated that the said grounds clearly falls within exceptions carved out or approved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various cases while dealing with cases of similar circumstances. To substantiate the said argument, learned Advocate General has relied upon following judgments.

214. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Vs. Secretary, Governor 's Secretariat & ors. reported in (2020)6 SCC 548 has held as under :-

On the basis of said observations, the Hon'ble Apex Court in para 15 of the said judgment , has directed to first complete the Delimitation process and then to hold the elections within specified period.

215. Reliance is also placed upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State Of Maharashtra & Ors vs Jalgaon Municipal Council & Ors reported in (2003) 9 SCC

371. The relevant paras of this judgment are quoted below :-

216. Learned Advocate General also referred to para 15 and 21 of the judgement passed in the case of " Kishan Singh Tomar Vs. Municipal Corporation Ahmednagar reported in (2006) 8 SCC

217. Counsel for the State has relied upon the judgment passed in the case of " State Of West Bengal Vs Pranoy Roy And Ors "

218. As per learned Advocate General, the judgment passed in the case of Atma Singh Vs. State of Punjab also requires relevance in the present case. The "7. The whole purpose of delimitation of municipalities into wards is to ensure that every citizen should get a fair representation in the municipalities. When a municipality is re-constituted by the inclusion of any local area within the limits of a municipality under Sub- section (3) of Section 5 or by the exclusion of any local area from the limits of a municipality u/s 7 , i.e. when there is an alteration of the limits of the municipality, there must of necessity be a division of the re- constituted municipality into new wards without which the elections cannot be held. There can be no disenfranchisement of a part of the electorate of a municipality. The question was dealt with at some length by the Gujarat High Court in Bhaichandbhai Maganlal Shah Vs. The State of Gujarat , 8 Guj LR 210:

8. There can be no dispute with the principle that the State Government without re-constituting a municipality into new wards, cannot proceed to hold an election of councillors, when there is an extension of the municipal limits, but the difficulty is about the applicability of that principle to the facts of the present case. There is no denying the fact that the effect of the stay order passed by the learned Single Judge staying the operation of the notification issued under Sub- section (3) of Section 5 was to put the said notification in abeyance, with the result that the local areas to which it related were not brought within the municipal limits. It is also an undisputed fact that the stay order passed by the learned Single Judge was in force from August 2, 1978 to October 23, 1978. It is, however, urged that with the dismissal of the writ petition by the learned Single Judge on October 23, 1978, the impugned notification was brought into effect and, therefore, the State Government could not proceed with the election without delimitation of wards and preparation of fresh electoral rolls. We are afraid, the contention cannot be accepted."

219. While considering the rival submissions made at Bar, it is clear that even while taking into account the Constitutional mandate of holding the election before the expiry of term of local bodies, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various cases while taking note of exceptional circumstances, has permitted the (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (462 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] postponement of the elections. Pendency of the Delimitation process is also considered as one such exceptional circumstance and while considering the same, the Hon'ble Apex Court has issued direction to first complete the process of Delimitation and then to hold the elections. We are in agreement with the contention of the learned Advocate General that the facts of the present case also akin to the judgments as relied upon on behalf of the State and the reason for issuing the notification for appointment of Administrator / postponement of election in the peculiar facts and circumstances of present case cannot be said to be unjustified or arbitrary.

220. The respondent-State, while justifying its action of deferment of elections to various Panchayati Raj Institutions and Urban Local Bodies, has primarily contended that the State has undertaken a massive and complex exercise for the complete reorganisation and restructuring of these local self-governing bodies across the entire State. It is submitted that this exercise was necessitated by a number of factors, including the haphazard creation and elevation of municipalities by the previous government without ensuring their financial viability, and the administrative and financial strain caused by staggered election cycles, a situation exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The State has highlighted its policy decision, reflected in the budget presented on 10.07.2024, to constitute a High-Level Committee to recommend the restructuring and delimitation of these bodies and to examine the feasibility of a 'One State, One Election' model to save public resources.

(Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (463 of 467) [CW-7718/2025]

221. The record indicates that the State Government has taken concrete steps to actualize this policy. A series of meetings of the Cabinet Sub-Committees and a High-Level Expert Committee were held to review the creation of new districts, divisions and the overall structure of rural and urban local bodies. Pursuant to these recommendations, the State has not only abolished certain newly created districts but has also issued detailed guidelines and timelines for the reconstitution and delimitation of Village Panchayats, Panchayat Samitis, Zila Parishads and Municipalities. The State's argument is that this comprehensive overhaul will result in large-scale alteration of territorial jurisdictions, dissolution of some existing bodies, creation of new ones, and changes in the very character of these institutions from rural to urban and vice-versa.

222. Consequently, the State contends that holding elections for the existing local bodies, whose form, nature, and territorial limits are subject to imminent and substantial change, would be a futile and wasteful exercise. It is argued that such elections would be for a very brief term and would squander significant public funds and administrative resources. Furthermore, any election would have to be preceded by a fresh delimitation of wards, revision of electoral rolls and determination of reservations for various categories, including for OBCs, for which an independent commission is also being constituted as per the mandate of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The State submits that this entire reorganisation is being conducted in the larger public interest to strengthen these institutions financially and functionally, and it is (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (464 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] committed to holding the elections expeditiously as soon as this bona fide exercise is completed.

223. Having perused the detailed contentions and the plethora of documents submitted by the respondent-State, this Court finds merit in the justification provided for the inability to adhere to the statutory election schedule. The decision to undertake a complete reorganisation of local bodies is a significant policy matter falling within the executive domain. The series of actions taken, from the formation of high-level committees to the issuance of statutory notifications and timelines for delimitation, demonstrates that the State is not merely seeking to postpone elections indefinitely but is actively engaged in a complex, large-scale administrative restructuring. The reasoning that it would be contrary to public interest to expend vast resources on elections for institutions that may cease to exist or be fundamentally altered in the near future is rational and persuasive. The underlying objective, particularly holding the elections simultaneously, represents a futuristic and economically prudent approach. Such a synchronized electoral cycle may result in substantial savings of public funds, minimization of administrative stasis caused by the recurrent imposition of the Model Code of Conduct, and the optimal deployment of state machinery.

Thus, this Court concludes that exercise of the State appears to be bona fide and aimed at achieving long-term systemic improvements in local self-governance, however, looking to the constitutional mandate, this Court deems it proper to issue appropriate directions to the State Government to hold the (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (465 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] elections of the Local Self Institutions without any unnecessary delay and to conduct and conclude the same in a time bound manner.

FINAL DIRECTIONS 224.1 In view of the adjudication made and conclusion drawn in Part-A of the judgment, the writ petitions challenging the final notifications issued under Section 3 of the Act of 2009 as well as Section 101 of the Act of 1994, are dismissed. 224.2 In view of the adjudication made and conclusion drawn in Part-B of the judgment, D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No.831/2025 ( State of Rajasthan and Ors. Vs. Dhanna Ram and Ors. ) and other special appeals challenging the interim order dated 23.05.2025 to the extent of Para 7 & 8 of the same, are allowed.

All the writ petitions challenging the process of delimitation initiated in pursuance of the notices issued under Section 101 of the Act of 1994, are dismissed.

It is directed that the concerned District Collectors shall send the proposal for delimitation to the state Government and the three members high-level committee constituted for the purpose of examining the same, shall take final decision upon the proposals for delimitation so sent by the concerned District Collectors in an objective manner. The State Government shall complete the entire exercise of delimitation on or before 31.12.2025. 224.3 In view of the adjudication made and conclusion drawn in Part-C of the judgment, the writ petitions challenging the (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (466 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] process of delimitation/change of boundaries of the municipal wards in absence of change of census or change in the number of wards or change in the territorial boundaries of the municipality, are allowed. The respondents are directed not to effect any change in the internal boundaries of the municipal wards in such cases.

Consequently, D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.1005/2025 ( State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs Narayan Singh Solanki & Ors. ) filed for challenging the interim order dated 11.06.2025, is hereby dismissed.

224.4 In view of the adjudication made and conclusion drawn in Part-D of the judgment, the writ petitions challenging removal of Panchayat Samiti Member / Pradhan, on account of delimitation of respective areas / wards, are hereby dismissed.

224.5 In view of the adjudication made and conclusion drawn in Part-E of the judgment, the writ petitions relating to appointment of the administrator, are dismissed. 224.6 In view of the adjudication made and conclusion drawn in Part-F of the judgment, the writ petitions praying for fixing/nominating the village headquarter are dismissed. 224.7 In view of the adjudication made and conclusion drawn in Part-G of the judgment, D. B. Civil Writ Petition (PIL) No.4686/2025 [Sanyam Lodha Vs. State of Rajasthan] as well as D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1285/2025 (Giriraj Singh Devanda vs. State of Rajasthan & ors.) praying for a direction for holding the elections of Municipality or (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) [2025:RJ-JP:34853-DB] (467 of 467) [CW-7718/2025] Panchayati Raj Institutions, respectively, are disposed of with a direction to the State Government that after completing the delimitation exercise, elections of all the Local Self Bodies i.e. Panchayats as well as Municipality, shall immediately be conducted simultaneously and the entire exercise for such elections shall be completed on or before 15.04.2026.

224.8 To promote the spirit of 'Save Paper - Save Environment', the Registry of this Court is directed that, while placing a copy of this judgment in concerned files as well as while processing applications for issuance of certified copies of this judgment pertaining to any specific writ petition or special appeal, it shall issue a certified copy comprising the first page of the judgment, the relevant page showing the cause title of the respective writ petition/special appeal, and the full text of the judgment beginning from Page No.288 of this judgment.

224.9 Stay applications and all pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

224.10 A copy of this judgment shall be kept in each connected file.

(SANJEET PUROHIT),J (SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA),ACTING CJ GOVINDSHARMA/INDERKUMAR/TNKUSHWAHA (Uploaded on 18/11/2025 at 02:44:27 PM) (Downloaded on 19/11/2025 at 12:33:46 AM) Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)