2025:HHC:28472 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 776 of 2025.

Reserved on: 13.08.2025.

Date of Decision: 22.08.2025.

Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes For the Petitioner : Mr. Shivank Singh Panta, Advocate.

The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of complaint No. 279 of 2021, titled "Sanjeev Vaid Vs Smt. Uma Rani", pending before the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Paonta Sahib (learned Trial Court). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned trial Court for convenience.) 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the complainant filed a complaint against the .

petitioner-accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act). It was asserted that the accused and the complainant were known to each other. The accused required money for her domestic purposes, so she borrowed an amount of ₹ 8,00,000/- from the complainant in June 2019.

r The accused promised to repay ₹ 75,000/- in cash and the balance amount through cheque. She issued post-dated cheque dated 19.02.2021 for ₹ 7,25,000/- drawn on Oriental Bank of Commerce, Branch Bhamian Khurd, Mundian Kalan, Ludhiana, Punjab, to discharge her legal liability. The accused failed to repay the money; hence, the complainant presented the cheque to his bank, Punjab National Bank, from where it was sent to the bank of the accused. The bank of the accused dishonoured the cheque with an endorsement 'Insufficient Funds'. The complainant served a notice upon the accused asking her to repay the amount within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice. The accused refused to receive the demand notice.

She failed to repay the amount. Hence, a complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court for taking action, as per the law.

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3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to proceed against the accused and ordered the issuance of the summons.

4. Being aggrieved by the filing of the complaint and issuance of the summons, the accused has filed the present petition for quashing of the complaint and the consequential proceedings.

It was asserted that the essential ingredient of Section 138 of the NI Act, that the cheque was issued towards the legally enforceable debt or liability, is absent. The cheque was issued on an oral request. No written promissory note, loan agreement or acknowledgement exists to demonstrate any legally enforceable debt or liability. The complaint is to be filed within one month from the date of the cause of action. The notice was issued on 16.03.2021, which was returned to the complainant on 25.03.2021.

The statutory period of 15 days is to be calculated from the date of refusal, i.e. 22.03.2021. The criminal complaint was filed on 25.11.2021, much beyond the statutory period of one month for filing the complaint. The legal notice was not served upon the accused because she was not residing at the address furnished by her. She has been residing outside India since June 2019, and the refusal to accept the delivery does not constitute a valid service.

The presumption of service can be drawn when the notice is sent to ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:22 :::CIS 4 2025:HHC:28472 the correct address. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the complaint, as well as consequential .

proceedings arising out of the complaint, be quashed.

5. Mr. Shivank Singh Panta, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is residing outside India and the notice issued to her was not served. The cheque was not issued in discharge of the legal liability, and the complaint was filed beyond the period of limitation. Continuation of the proceedings before the learned Trial Court amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the complaint, as well as consequential proceedings arising out of the same, be quashed. He relied upon the judgments of R.L.Varma & Sons (Huf) Vs P.C. Sharma , ( 2019) 263 DLT 586, and Jugesh Sehgal Vs Shamsher Singh Gogi , 2009 (14) SCC 683, in support of his submission.

6. I have given considerable thought to his submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

7. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P. , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal , 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:

8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) .

would be of relevance to us in this case.

In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed."

8. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

9. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

10. It was submitted that, as per the complaint, the cheque was issued as security and does not attract the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by this Court in Hamid Mohammad Versus Jaimal Dass 2016 (1) HLJ 456, that even if the cheque was issued towards the security, the accused will be liable. It was observed:

11. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao vs. Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Limited 2016(10) SCC 458 that issuing a cheque toward security will also attract the liability for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of N.I. Act.

It was observed: -

12 SCC 53 with reference to the explanation to Section 138 of the Act and the expression "for the discharge of any debt or other liability" occurring in Section 138 of the Act. We are of the view that the question of whether ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:22 :::CIS 10 2025:HHC:28472 a post-dated cheque is for "discharge of debt or liability" depends on the nature of the transaction. If on the date of the cheque, liability or debt exists or the .

amount has become legally recoverable, the Section is attracted and not otherwise.

11. Reference to the facts of the present case clearly shows that though the word "security" is used in clause 3.1(iii) of the agreement, the said expression refers to the cheques being towards repayment of instalments. The repayment becomes due under the agreement, the moment the loan is advanced and the instalment falls due. It is undisputed that the loan was duly disbursed on 28th February 2002, which was prior to the date of the cheques. Once the loan was disbursed and instalments have fallen due on the date of the cheque as per the agreement, the dishonour of such cheques would fall under Section 138 of the Act. The cheques undoubtedly represent the outstanding liability.

12. Judgment in Indus Airways (supra) is clearly distinguishable. As already noted, it was held therein that liability arising out of a claim for breach of contract under Section 138 , which arises on account of dishonour of a cheque issued, was not by itself at par with a criminal liability towards discharge of acknowledged and admitted debt under a loan transaction. Dishonour of a cheque issued for the discharge of a later liability is clearly covered by the statute in question. Admittedly, on the date of the cheque, there was a debt/liability in praesenti in terms of the loan agreement, as against the case of Indus Airways (supra), where the purchase order had been cancelled and a cheque issued towards advance payment for the purchase order was dishonoured. In that case, it was found that the cheque had not been issued for discharge of liability but as an advance for the purchase order, which was cancelled. Keeping in mind ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:22 :::CIS 11 2025:HHC:28472 this fine, but the real distinction , the said judgment cannot be applied to a case of the present nature where the cheque was for repayment of a loan instalment .

which had fallen due, though such deposit of cheques towards repayment of instalments was also described as "security" in the loan agreement. In applying the judgment in Indus Airways (supra), one cannot lose sight of the difference between a transaction of the purchase order which is cancelled and that of a loan transaction where the loan has actually been advanced and its repayment is due on the date of the cheque.

13. The crucial question to determine the applicability of Section 138 of the Act is whether the cheque represents the discharge of an existing enforceable debt or liability, or whether it represents an advance payment without there being a subsisting debt or liability. While approving the views of different High Courts noted earlier, this is the underlying principle as can be discerned from the discussion of the said cases in the judgment of this Court." (Emphasis supplied)

12. This position was reiterated in Sripati Singh v. State of Jharkhand , 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1002: AIR 2021 SC 5732, and it was held that a cheque issued as security is not waste paper and a complaint under section 138 of the NI Act can be filed on its dishonour. It was observed:

13. Therefore, the fact that the cheque was issued as a security is not sufficient to quash the complaint.

14. It was specifically stated in the complaint that the accused borrowed ₹ 8,00,000/- from the complainant. She promised to repay ₹ 75,000/- in cash and issued a cheque of ₹7,25,000/- to discharge her legal liability. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi ), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the averments in the complaint are to be taken as correct while exercising inherent jurisdiction. It was observed: -

15. Therefore, prima facie, the complaint discloses the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. r

16. It was submitted that there was no proof of the payment of ₹ 8,00,000/- and the cheque was not issued in discharge of the legal liability. This submission will not help the petitioner-

accused. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State (NCT of Delhi ), 2022 SCC OnLine SC 513 that the cheque carries with it a presumption of consideration which is to be rebutted by leading evidence, and any factual dispute is to be resolved by weighing evidence. It was observed:

2025:HHC:28472 "17. There is, therefore, no requirement that the complainant must specifically allege in the complaint that there was a subsisting liability. The burden of .

proving that there was no existing debt or liability was on the respondents. This they have to discharge in the trial. At this stage, merely on the basis of averments in the petitions filed by them, the High Court could not have concluded that there was no existing debt or liability."

11. The legal presumption of the cheque having been issued in the discharge of liability must also receive due weightage. In a situation where the accused moves the Court for quashing even before the trial has commenced, the Court's approach should be careful enough not to prematurely extinguish the case by disregarding the legal presumption which supports the complaint. The opinion of Justice K.G. Balakrishnan for a three-judge Bench in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441 would, at this stage, deserve our attention: --

12. At any rate, whenever facts are disputed, the truth should be allowed to emerge by weighing the evidence. On this aspect, we may benefit by referring to the ratio in Rajeshbhai Muljibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat (2020) 3 SCC 794, where the following pertinent opinion was given by Justice R. Banumathi: --

2025:HHC:28472 "22. .............. When disputed questions of fact are involved, which need to be adjudicated after the parties adduce evidence, the complaint under Section .

138 of the NI Act ought not to have been quashed by the High Court by taking recourse to Section 482 CrPC. Though the Court has the power to quash the criminal complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act on legal issues like limitation, etc. criminal complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act against Yogeshbhai ought not to have been quashed merely on the ground that there are inter se disputes between Appellant 3 and Respondent 2. Without keeping in view the statutory presumption raised under Section 139 of the NI Act, the High Court, in our view, committed a serious error in quashing the criminal complaint in CC No. 367 of 2016 filed under Section 138 of the NI Act."

13. Bearing in mind the principles for the exercise of jurisdiction in a proceeding for quashing, let us now turn to the materials in this case. On careful reading of the complaint and the order passed by the Magistrate, what is discernible is that a possible view is taken that the cheques drawn were, in the discharge of a debt for the purchase of shares. In any case, when there is a legal presumption, it would not be judicious for the quashing Court to carry out a detailed enquiry on the facts alleged, without first permitting the trial Court to evaluate the evidence of the parties. The quashing Court should not take upon itself the burden of separating the wheat from the chaff where facts are contested. To say it differently, the quashing proceedings must not become an expedition into the merits of a factual dispute, so as to conclusively vindicate either the complainant or the defence."

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17. It was further held that the Courts should be slow in scuttling the complaint at a pre-trial stage. It was observed:

15. In the impugned judgment, the learned Judge had rightly relied upon the opinion of Justice J.S. Khehar for a Division Bench in Rajiv Thapar (supra), which succinctly expresses the following relevant parameters to be considered by the quashing Court, at the stage of issuing process, committal, or framing of charges, "28. The High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, must make a just and rightful choice. This is not a stage of evaluating the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant against the accused. Likewise, it is not a stage for determining how weighty the defences raised on behalf of the ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:22 :::CIS 17 2025:HHC:28472 accused are. Even if the accused is successful in showing some suspicion or doubt, in the allegations levelled by the prosecution/ .

complainant, it would be impermissible to discharge the accused before trial. This is so because it would result in giving finality to the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without allowing the prosecution or the complainant to adduce evidence to substantiate the same."

16. The proposition of law as set out above makes it abundantly clear that the Court should be slow to grant the relief of quashing a complaint at a pre-trial stage, when the factual controversy is in the realm of possibility, particularly because of the legal presumption, as in this matter. What is also of note is that the factual defence without having to adduce any evidence needs to be of an unimpeachable quality, to altogether disprove the allegations made in the complaint.

17. The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a pre-trial stage can be grave and irreparable. Quashing proceedings at preliminary stages will result in finality without the parties having had an opportunity to adduce evidence, and the consequence then is that the proper forum, i.e., the trial Court, is ousted from weighing the material evidence. If this is allowed, the accused may be given an unmerited advantage in the criminal process. Also, because of the legal presumption, when the cheque and the signature are not disputed by the appellant, the balance of convenience at this stage is in favour of the complainant/prosecution, as the accused will have due opportunity to adduce defence evidence during the trial, to rebut the presumption.

18. Situated thus, to non-suit the complainant, at the stage of the summoning order, when the factual controversy is yet to be canvassed and considered by the ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:22 :::CIS 18 2025:HHC:28472 trial court, will not, in our opinion, be judicious. Based upon a prima facie impression, an element of criminality cannot entirely be ruled out here, subject to .

the determination by the trial Court. Therefore, when the proceedings are at a nascent stage, the scuttling of the criminal process is not merited."

18. Therefore, the Court cannot hold that the cheque was issued without any legal liability and quash the complaint without allowing the complainant to prove his case before the learned Trial Court.

19. to It was submitted that the complaint was filed beyond the period of 30 days from the accrual of the cause of action. The cause of action accrued to the complainant on 22.03.2021, when the accused is stated to have refused the receipt of the notice and the complaint was filed on 25.11.2021, which is beyond the period of one month, provided under the law. This submission overlooks the fact that the Hon'ble Supreme Court excluded the period of limitation w.e.f. 15.3.2020 till 28.2.2022, including that prescribed under Section 138 of the proviso (b) and (c) in Cognisance for Extension of Limitation, in re, (2022) 3 SCC 117: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 27, wherein it was observed at page 119: -

9-2021 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 947], it is directed that the period from 15-3-2020 till 28-2-2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.

5.2. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 3-10-2021, if any, shall become available with effect from 1-3-2022.

5.3. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15-3-2020 and 28-2-2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 1-3-2022. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 1-3- 2022, is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply.

5.4. It is further clarified that the period from 15-3-2020 till 28-2-2022 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23(4) and 29-A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and

(c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:22 :::CIS 20 2025:HHC:28472 limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings."

20. Therefore, the limitation period w.e.f. 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, is to be excluded. The complaint was filed before the expiry of the extended period of limitation, and the same cannot be said to be barred by limitation.

21. It was submitted that the petitioner was not residing in India; she left India on 11th June, 2019 and is a permanent resident of Portugal. Therefore, the proceedings against her are not maintainable. Reference was made to Annexure P-3 to Annexure P-5. These are the photocopies, and their authenticity has not been established. Further, the complete copy of the passport has not been filed, and no reliance can be placed upon a part of the passport. It is impermissible to exercise the inherent jurisdiction by relying upon the documents, which do not form part of the record of the learned Trial Court, especially when the authenticity of the documents is yet to be established. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi , (1983) 1 SCC 1: 1983 SCC (Cri) 115 that the proceedings can be quashed on the face of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same, no offence is ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:22 :::CIS 21 2025:HHC:28472 constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed:

22. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram , 1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. It was observed:

23. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K. Strips Private Limited and another , 2004 STPL 43 AP, and held:

judging the correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the documents, which were not filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court from looking into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another , 2002 (1) Supreme 192. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:

24. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka , (2022) 2 SCC 129: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401, wherein it was observed on page 142:

25. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana , (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765, wherein it was held:

26. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya , (2024) 2 SCC 86: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 512: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein it was observed:

27. Therefore, it is impermissible to look into the documents and to hold that the petitioner was not present in India on the day when the endorsement for refusal was made.

28. It was submitted that the notice was not served upon the accused, and the essential part of the cause of action is not established. This submission is not acceptable. The notice was sent to House No. 1703, Iqbal Nagar, Tibba Road, Near Samrala Chowk, Ludhiana, Punjab, which is the same address mentioned in ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:22 :::CIS 25 2025:HHC:28472 the present petition. Therefore, the notice was sent to the correct address. Whether the petitioner was available in India at that time .

or not is a disputed question of fact. The notice was returned with the endorsement refused and is deemed to be served. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in D. Vinod Shivappa v. Nanda Belliappa , (2006) 6 SCC 456: (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 114: (2006) 131 Comp Cas 663: 2006 SCC OnLine SC 629 that a complaint cannot be quashed when rthe notice is returned unserved with an endorsement. It was observed at page 460:

According to him, therefore, it must be established on .

record that the notice issued by the payee was in fact received by him. He conceded that if the drawer of the cheque refuses to accept the notice, the court may presume service of notice, but in a case where the notice is not served for any other reason, it cannot be said to be deemed service of notice giving rise to a cause of action. He submitted that apart from the seven notices in these seven cases, several other notices were issued to the appellant on the same address, which he accepted, and where due, paid the amount also. He, therefore, submitted that the appellant has settled all those disputes where the claim of the respondent was justified, but he is not willing to pay the amount claimed by the respondent unjustifiably. It is a queer coincidence that the appellant received all those notices where the demand was justified, and all the notices which could not be served upon him on account of his absence from his residence are those where the demand of the respondent is, according to the appellant, not justified. We need not make any further comment on this aspect of the matter.

14. If a notice is issued and served upon the drawer of the cheque, no controversy arises. Similarly, if the notice is refused by the addressee, it may be presumed to have been served. This is also not disputed. This leaves us with the third situation where the notice could not be served on the addressee for one or the other reason, such as his non-availability at the time of delivery, or premises remaining locked on account of his having gone elsewhere, etc. etc. If in each such case the law is understood to mean that there has been no service of notice, it would completely defeat the very ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:22 :::CIS 28 2025:HHC:28472 purpose of the Act. It would then be very easy for an unscrupulous and dishonest drawer of a cheque to make himself scarce for some time after issuing the cheque so .

that the requisite statutory notice can never be served upon him, and consequently, he can never be prosecuted. There is good authority to support the proposition that once the complainant, the payee of the cheque, issues notice to the drawer of the cheque, the cause of action to file a complaint arises on the expiry of the period prescribed for payment by the drawer of the cheque. If he does not file a complaint within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act, his complaint gets barred by time. Thus, a person who can dodge the postman for about a month or two, or a person who can get a fake endorsement made regarding his non-availability can successfully avoid his prosecution because the payee is bound to issue notice to him within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of information from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. He is, therefore, bound to issue the legal notice, which may be returned with an endorsement that the addressee is not available on the given address.

15. We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the drawer may, by dubious means, manage to get an incorrect endorsement made on the envelope that the premises has been found locked or that the addressee was not available at the time when the postman went for delivery of the letter. It may be that the address is correct and even the addressee is available, but a wrong endorsement is manipulated by the addressee. In such a case, if the facts are proved, it may amount to a refusal of the notice. If the complainant is able to prove that the drawer of the cheque knew about the notice and deliberately evaded service and got a false endorsement ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:22 :::CIS 29 2025:HHC:28472 made only to defeat the process of law, the court shall presume service of notice. This, however, is a matter of evidence and proof. Thus even in a case where the notice .

is returned with the endorsement that the premises has always been found locked or the addressee was not available at the time of postal delivery, it will be open to the complainant to prove at the trial by evidence that the endorsement is not correct and that the addressee, namely, the drawer of the cheque, with knowledge of the notice had deliberately avoided to receive notice.

Therefore, it would be premature at the stage of issuance of process to move the High Court for quashing of the proceeding under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The question as to whether the service of notice has been fraudulently refused by unscrupulous means is a question of fact to be decided on the basis of evidence. In such a case, the High Court ought not to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."

29. Thus, it is impermissible to quash the complaint because the notice was returned with an endorsement of refusal.

30. In any case, it was laid down in C.C. Allavi Haji vs. Pala Pelly Mohd. 2007(6) SCC 555, that the person who claims that he had not received the notice has to pay the amount within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the summons from the Court and in case of failure to do so, he cannot take the advantage of the fact that notice was not received by him. It was observed:

31. Therefore, the submission that the essential ingredients of Section 138 of the NI Act are not satisfied cannot be accepted.

32. In R.L. Varma & Sons (supra), the Delhi High Court found that there was no service of the statutory notice. The address mentioned on the letter was different from the address of the accused, which is not the case here. In Jugesh Sehgal (supra), the ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:22 :::CIS 31 2025:HHC:28472 Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the cheque was issued from an account which was not maintained by the accused. In the present .

case, the cheque was issued from the account maintained by the accused, and this judgment also does not apply to the present case.

33. No other point was urged.

34. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed.

35. to The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 22 August, 2025 (Pramod) ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:22 :::CIS