Subject: Creation of the posts of officers and support staff of the Armed Forces Tribunal.

Sanction of the President is hereby accorded under Section 13 of the Armed Forces Act, 2007 (No. 55 of 2007), for creation of the posts as per Annexures I and II, respectively, for the Principal Bench at New Delhi and Regional Branches at Chandigarh; Lucknow; Kolkata; Guwahati: Mumbai; Kochi; Chennai & Jaipur of the Armed Forces Tribunal.

2. The expenditure incurred shall be debitable to Major Head 2014 Administration of Justice 00800 Other Expenditure WP(C) 5245/2020 Page 15 of 56 (Minor Head) 14 Armed Forces Tribunal, 01 Establishment, 01.01 Salaries under Grant No. 19 Ministry of Defence (Civil) for the Year 2008-09.

3. This issue with the concurrence of Ministry of Defence (Finance) vide their ID Note No. 456-AG/PA dated 14.08.2008.

(Suman K Sharma) Under Secretary to the Government of India‖

29. Para 2 of the order clearly reflects that the expenditure for creation of the posts was debitable to major and minor heads mentioned therein and the salaries were to be paid from Grant No.19, Ministry of Defence (Civil) for the years 2008-2009. The order further shows that it was issued with the concurrence of Ministry of Defence (Finance) vide their ID Note dated 14.08.2008. The proposal relating to filling up the unfilled posts was considered and agreed to by the Ministry of Defence, in consultation with DOPT, vide I.D. Note dated 10.07.2009, which was a precursor to the selection of the Petitioner against the post of Assistant in the year 2011.

30. The offer letter of appointment of the Petitioner, in para 2(i) under the head „terms and conditions of appointment‟ stipulated that the appointment was governed by Ministry of Defence I.D. Note dated 10.07.2009. Learned counsel for Respondent No.1 during the course of arguments had highlighted that the Central Government had notified the Armed Forces Tribunal (Financial and Administrative Power) Rules, 2008 in exercise of power conferred by Section 41 read with Section 12 WP(C) 5245/2020 Page 16 of 56 of the AFT Act . Rule 4 of the said Rules is as under :-

Albeit when the Petitioner was appointed, the Recruitment Rules had not been notified, however, if the relief sought by the Petitioner is to be granted, the Recruitment Rules will govern his re-engagement and continuance. The Recruitment Rules have been made by the Central Government in exercise of powers conferred by Section 13(2) read with Section 41(2)(e) of the AFT Act and are notified in the Official Gazette on 23.04.2018. Rule 5 thereof, gives the power to the Central Government to relax any of the provision of the Rule, if it is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient to do so.

33. Leaned counsel for Respondent No.1 had pointed out that the Recruitment Rules for the various posts in AFT have been notified, as referred above. This Court while researching has come across a recent WP(C) 5245/2020 Page 17 of 56 Circular issued by Ministry of Defence, Government of India, inviting applications for filling up various posts in AFT Principal Bench and Regional Benches, which includes post of Section Officer. It is clear from a reading of the above that the post of Section Officer is a „General Central Services Group „B‟ Gazetted Non-Ministerial‟ post. Relevant part of the Circular is as under:-

209200) Note-1: The period of deputation including period of deputation in another ex-

cadre post held immediately preceding this appointment in the same or other organization or Department of the Central Govt. shall not ordinarily exceed five years.

34. Classification of Civil Posts is only to be found under Rule 6 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Rule 6 is as follows:-

35. Rule 7 of the said Rules defines "General Central Service", and is as follows:-

36. Conjoint reading of the aforesaid Circular and the Rules aforesaid clearly shows that the post of Section officer is a Civil Post. Additionally, it is apparent from the documents placed on record by the parties that the Rules of the Central Government and Instructions thereunder governed the service conditions of the Petitioner. In matters of discipline, Petitioner was governed by the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and this was so prescribed even in the offer letter of appointment. Para 2(viii) of the letter dated 14.11.2011 is as under :-

37. Letter dated 27.01.2014 shows that the pay fixation of the Petitioner was in accordance with para 4 (b)(i) of CCS (Fixation of Pay of Re-employed Pensioners) Order, 1986, as amended from time to time. In fact the note dated 02.03.2020 placed on record by the Petitioner indicates that the recommendations of the Committee, constituted by the Chairperson of AFT to look into the grievances of the Petitioner, was forwarded to Ministry of Defence for consideration and approval. When WP(C) 5245/2020 Page 23 of 56 all the above factors are considered singularly and cumulatively, it is clear that Petitioner is a holder of „civil post‟. Ministry of Defence comes under the „Union‟ as prescribed under Section 14(1) of AT Act. There is no dispute that the subject matter of the present petition falls under „service matters‟ as defined in Section 3(q) of the AT Act. Therefore, Petitioner is amenable to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal as a Court of first instance.

38. The next issue that arises is whether the present petition can be entertained, when the remedy available to the Petitioner lies before the Tribunal under Section 14(1) of the Act. Counsel for the Petitioner strenuously argued that the power of judicial review of a High Court is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution and as held by the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar (supra), cannot be ousted, being integral to the Constitutional scheme and thus this Court has jurisdiction even if an alternative remedy exists.

39. To examine the said contention, I may first refer to the judgement by the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar (supra). The questions of law that were framed by the Supreme Court for consideration are as under:

40. The Supreme Court thereafter set out the legal and historical background to the case and referred to Articles 323-A and 323-B in Part XIV-A of the Constitution, inserted through Section 46 of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 with effect from 01.03.1977. Article 323-A with which the present petition concerns provides for constitution of the Administrative Tribunals with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to Public Services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union etc. and is as under:

41. Thereafter the Supreme Court noted the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the AT Act as follows:

42. In para 9 the Supreme Court referred to the judgement of the five- Judge Constitution Bench in S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India (1985) 4 SCC 458, wherein the Supreme Court had, in a challenge to the Constitutional validity of Article 323-A , taken a view that though judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution, the vesting of the said power in an alternative Institutional mechanism would not do violence to the basic structure, so long as it is ensured that the mechanism is effective and will be an effective and a real substitute for the High Court. Relevant para is as follows:

43. The Supreme Court after examining the provisions of the Act applied itself to analyzing one of the decisions impugned before it rendered by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sakinala Hari Nath v. State of A.P. , 1993 SCC OnLine AP 195, wherein Article 323-A (2)(d) was held to be unconstitutional to the extent it empowers the Parliament to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that under the Constitutional scheme, Supreme Court and High Courts are the sole repositories of the power of judicial review. Such a power, including the power to pronounce on the validity of Statutes, actions taken by individuals and State has only been entrusted to the Constitutional Courts. The High Court analyzing the decision in Sampath Kumar (supra) observed that the theory of Alternative Institutional Mechanism was in defiance of the proposition laid down in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (supra) that Constitutional Courts alone are competent to exercise power of judicial review to pronounce upon Constitutional validity, statutory provisions and Rules. In this background, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that service matters involving constitutionality of Rules or provisions should not be left to be decided by statutorily created adjudicatory bodies.

44. The Supreme Court while examining the said observations, observed as follows:

45. The Supreme Court thereafter addressed itself to the question as to what constitutes the basic structure of the Constitution, in order to express its opinion on the issue whether the power of judicial review vested in the High Courts and in the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 respectively, is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution of India. Relying on the observations of the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati (supra), wherein the doctrine of basic structure was evolved and on the case of Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain , (1975) Supp SCC 1 the Supreme Court observed as follows:

46. Having so held, what followed as an observation of the Supreme Court is significant and crucial to the present case. The Supreme Court thereafter held that though the subordinate Judiciary or the Tribunals created under ordinary Legislations, cannot exercise the power of judicial review of Legislative action to the exclusion of the Supreme Court and High Courts, there is no Constitutional prohibition against their performing a supplemental, as opposed to substitutional role in this respect. That such a situation is contemplated within the Constitutional scheme becomes evident by reading Clause (3) of Article 32 of the Constitution. The Court further went on to hold that if the power under Article 32 of the Constitution which has been described as the „heart‟ and „soul‟ of the Constitution can be additionally conferred upon any other Court, there is no reason why the same situation cannot subsist in respect of jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court. Importantly it was held that so long as the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226/227 is retained, there is no reason why the power to test the validity of Legislations cannot be conferred upon Administrative Tribunals, WP(C) 5245/2020 Page 32 of 56 created under the Act or those under Article 323-B of the Constitution. Relevant paras are as under:

B of the Constitution. It is to be remembered that, apart from the authorisation that flows from Articles 323-A and 323-B , both Parliament and the State Legislatures possess legislative competence to effect changes in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. This power is available to Parliament under Entries 77, 78, 79 and 95 of List I and to the State Legislatures under Entry 65 of List II; Entry 46 of List III can also be availed of both by Parliament and the State Legislatures for this purpose.‖ (emphasis supplied)

47. The Supreme Court then referred to the reasons, which according to the Court, were pressing reasons to preserve the conferment of powers on the Tribunals and these are discernible from paras 82 to 84 of the judgement, which are extracted herein under, for ready reference:

We are conscious of the fact that when a Constitution Bench WP(C) 5245/2020 Page 34 of 56 of this Court in Sampath Kumar case [(1987) 1 SCC 124 :

83. We must, at this stage, focus upon the factual position which occasioned the adoption of the theory of alternative institutional mechanisms in Sampath Kumar case [(1987) 1 SCC 124 : (1987) 2 ATC 82] . In his leading judgment, Ranganath Misra, J. refers to the fact that since Independence, the population explosion and the increase in litigation had greatly increased the burden of pendency in the High Courts. Reference was made to studies conducted towards relieving the High Courts of their increased load. In this regard, the recommendations of the Shah Committee for setting up independent Tribunals as also the suggestion of the Administrative Reforms Commission that Civil Service Tribunals be set up, were noted. Reference was also made to the decision in Kamal Kanti Dutta v. Union of India [(1980) 4 SCC 38 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 485] where this Court had, while emphasising the need for speedy resolution of service disputes, proposed the establishment of Service Tribunals.

84. The problem of clearing the backlogs of High Courts, which has reached colossal proportions in our times is, nevertheless, one that has been the focus of study for close to half a century. Over time, several Expert Committees and Commissions have analysed the intricacies involved and have made suggestions, not all of which have been WP(C) 5245/2020 Page 35 of 56 consistent. Of the several studies that have been conducted in this regard, as many as twelve have been undertaken by the Law Commission of India (hereinafter referred to as ―the LCI‖) or similar high-level committees appointed by the Central Government, and are particularly noteworthy. [ Report of the High Court Arrears Committee 1949; LCI, 14th Report on Reform of Judicial Administration (1958); LCI, 27th Report on Code of Civil Procedure , 1908 (1964); LCI, 41st Report on Code of Criminal Procedure , 1898 (1969); LCI, 54th Report of Code of Civil Procedure , 1908 (1973); LCI, 57th Report on Structure and Jurisdiction of the Higher Judiciary (1974); Report of High Court Arrears Committee, 1972; LCI, 79th Report on Delay and Arrears in High Courts and other Appellate Courts (1979); LCI, 99th Report on Oral Arguments and Written Arguments in the Higher Courts (1984); Satish Chandra Committee Report 1986; LCI, 124th Report on the High Court Arrears -- A Fresh Look (1988); Report of the Arrears Committee (1989-

48. Having reflected on the powers of judicial review of the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution as well as the need to have Administrative Tribunals for adjudication of service matters as an alternative mechanism, the Supreme Court further went on to elaborate what I may state directly concerns and touches upon the issue of maintainability of this petition in the context of overlooking the remedy of approaching the Tribunal. Suffice would it be in this context to quote paras 90 to 94 of the judgement, which are as follows :

However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional set-up, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the High Court concerned may be approached directly. All other decisions of these Tribunals, rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Courts. We may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that it will not be open for WP(C) 5245/2020 Page 39 of 56 litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned.

94. The directions issued by us in respect of making the decisions of Tribunals amenable to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts will, however, come into effect prospectively i.e. will apply to decisions rendered hereafter. To maintain the sanctity of judicial proceedings, we have invoked the doctrine of prospective overruling so as not to disturb the procedure in relation to decisions already rendered.‖

49. The Supreme Court finally held that Clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and Clause 3(d) of Article 323-B , to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court, are unconstitutional. In para 99, the Court reaffirmed that the said jurisdiction is a part of the inviolable basic structure of the Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other Courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and Article 32 of the Constitution. It is significant to note that the Supreme Court, in no uncertain terms held that the Tribunals will nevertheless continue to act as Courts of first instance and more importantly, it will not be open to the litigants to directly approach the High Courts, overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Para 99 is as follows:

The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323-A and Article 323-B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated."

50. The principles that can be broadly culled out from a reading of these passages are :

51. Having perused the above judgement of the Constitutional Bench, the inexplorable and inevitable conclusion that can be drawn is that where the person is covered under the provisions of Section 14 of the AT Act, Tribunal is the Court of first instance, with respect to service matters. The Supreme Court clearly ruled that power of the High Court WP(C) 5245/2020 Page 42 of 56 is a part of the inviolable basic structure of the Constitution, but having so observed, the Supreme Court has qualified it by observing that for the areas for which the Tribunals are created, High Court cannot be approached directly and Division Bench of the High Court would exercise power of judicial review over the decisions of the jurisdictional Tribunal.

52. Contention of the Petitioner that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is a part of inviolable basic structure and framework of our Constitution is a proposition which cannot be disputed. However, in view of the binding dictum of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar (supra) in the context of remedy before the Central Administrative Tribunal, the present writ petition cannot be entertained. The presumption on which the arguments of the Petitioner are premised is that approaching the Tribunal is an alternative remedy and therefore if the remedy is not efficacious, a writ can be filed.This argument cannot be sustained in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar (supra) that the remedy to approach the Tribunal in service disputes with respect to employees who are amenable to its jurisdiction is not an alternative remedy but is the only remedy, the Tribunal being a Court of first instance. Employees aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal can certainly approach the respective High Court having territorial jurisdiction over the matter in its power of judicial review over the decisions of the Tribunal. It is fundamental that if the remedy before the Tribunal is not alternative, the arguments of the remedy being efficacious cannot be accepted.

53. Very recently, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Rajesh Goyal v. Defence Research and Development Organisation & Ors. , 2021 SCC OnLine Del 964, was called upon to adjudicate on a controversy related to treating special pay in lieu of separate pay-scale as a part of basic pay in respect of the Petitioner who had retired as Scientist-G from DRDO under the Government of India. The Court relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar (supra) and agreeing with the view taken by this Court in Akshay Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., WP(C ) 8316/2020, decided on 24.11.2020 declined to entertain the writ petition filed directly in this Court, bypassing the remedy before the Tribunal.

54. Insofar as the Petitioner has sought to question the independence of the Tribunals in the light of the Tribunal Rules, 2020, suffice would it be to state that the argument is based on mere assumptions and conjectures of the Petitioner. Respondents have rightly pointed out that the Supreme Court in the case of Madras Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr. , 2020 SCC OnLine SC 962 has directed that recommendations of Search-cum-Selection Committee in matters of disciplinary action shall be final and the same shall be implemented by the Central Government, which in any event dispels whatever apprehension the Petitioner may have.

55. Reliance of the Petitioner on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Maharashtra Chess Association (supra) can be of no avail. In the said case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether by private agreement between the parties, it was open to confer exclusive jurisdiction on a particular High Court to the exclusion of the other High WP(C) 5245/2020 Page 44 of 56 Court, where cause of action otherwise arises. It is in this context that the Supreme Court held that the decision by the High Court, to entertain or not to entertain a petition in its writ jurisdiction is fundamentally discretionary and the limitations placed on the Court‟s discretion are self-imposed. The Supreme Court also observed that mere existence of alternative Forums, where the aggrieved party may secure relief, does not create a legal bar on a High Court to exercise its writ jurisdiction. It is a factor to be taken into consideration amongst several factors. Relevant para of the judgment is as follows :-

56. It may bear repetition that the remedy before the Tribunal is not an alternative remedy and the Tribunal is the Court of first instance for service matters and in view of the judgment in L. Chandra Kumar (supra), the aforesaid judgment will not apply to the present case. For the same reason, the judgments in Savita Kapila (supra) and Balakrishna Ram (supra) wherein the Supreme Court had held that existence of alternative efficacious remedy will not be a bar for the High Court to exercise its writ jurisdiction, would be inapplicable.

57. Mr. A.K. Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the Petitioner has very eloquently articulated yet another argument that the Tribunal has jurisdiction qua the employees who are working in connection with the WP(C) 5245/2020 Page 45 of 56 affairs of the Union under Article 77 of the Constitution of India and additionally that Section 2 of the AT Act bars the jurisdiction of the Tribunal qua the employees working in Courts subordinate to the Supreme Court or High Courts. Relevant part of Section 2 of the AT Act is as under :-

58. That the post of Section Officer in AFT is a civil post, has been answered in the earlier part of the judgement and comes under the purview of Section 14(1) of AT Act. In this view of the matter, the argument with respect to Article 77 of Constitution of India, is misconceived. The exclusion of applicability of AT Act is provided under Section 2(c) and a plain reading of the provision indicates that the AT Act shall not apply to an officer or servant of the Supreme Court or of any High Court or Courts subordinate thereto. The Petitioner was admittedly appointed as an Assistant initially with the AFT and subsequently as a Section Officer. He is thus not an officer or servant of the Supreme Court or the High Court. Insofar as the expression „Courts subordinate thereto‟ is concerned, owing to Article 227(4) of the Constitution of India, the powers of superintendence vested in this Court under Article 227 do not extend to the Armed Forces Tribunal and the AFT is not a Court subordinate to the High Court. Therefore, the contention that the Petitioner being an employee of AFT, is outside the WP(C) 5245/2020 Page 46 of 56 purview of the AT Act is misplaced.

59. The submission of learned counsel for the Petitioner that the Supreme Court in Lt. Col. Prithi Pal Singh Bedi (supra) had held that absence of even one appeal with power to review evidence, legal formulation, conclusion and adequacy or otherwise of punishment in matters of Court Martial was a distressing and glaring lacuna, cannot be disputed. Indeed the Supreme Court had urged the Government to take steps to provide atleast one independent and truly judicial review Forum for Defence personnel with the right to seek judicial review in service matters or file appeals against the verdicts of Court Martials, comprising a body composed of non-military personnel or civil personnel. The Estimates Committee of the Parliament in their 19th Report presented to the Lok Sabha on 20.08.1992 recommended constitution of an independent Statutory Board or Tribunal in that behalf. Thereafter, the Armed Forces Tribunal Bill received the assent of the President on 20.12.2007 and the AFT Act came on the Statute Book, having force w.e.f. 15.06.2008. The AFT Act provides for redressal of service disputes before the AFT by personnel subject to the Army / Navy / Air Force Acts and also appeal against the verdict of Court Martial. This, however, cannot lead to a conclusion that employees of AFT are not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal as is sought to be contended by the Petitioner.

60. The contention of the Petitioner that being employed on re- employment on contract basis, he is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, only merits rejection. This issue is no longer res integra and it would be apposite in this regard to quote a few passages from the WP(C) 5245/2020 Page 47 of 56 judgment of a Full Bench of this Court in Suman Lata v. Govt. of NCT Delhi & Ors. , 2015 SCC Online 7927. In the said case, Suman Lata had applied against an advertisement inviting applications to appoint honorary Anganwadi Helpers. She had originally predicated her claim before the Tribunal but the Original Application was rejected in view of the law declared by the Supreme Court in Ameerbi and Ors. (supra) holding that Anganwadi workers were not holders of a civil post. Suman Lata then filed a writ petition in this Court, which was listed before the learned Single Judge, who made a reference to the Larger Bench in view of the judgment in L. Chandra Kumar (supra) and Ameerbi and Ors. (supra) and the reference was as under :-

61. Analyzing Section 14(1) and Section 3(q) of the AT Act as also considering the judgments in Ameerbi and Ors. (supra) and Union of India and Ors. v. Deep Chand Pandey and Ors. (1992) 4 SCC 432 as well as State of Assam v. Kanak Chandra Dutta (supra), the Full Bench held that the real test to determine would be to see the nature of duties WP(C) 5245/2020 Page 48 of 56 performed and also the nature of reliefs prayed for, overlooking whether the appointment is temporary or casual and what is important is that the employment must relate to matters connected with the affairs of the State. In that context, the Full Bench had distinguished the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India and Anr. v. Chhote Lal & ors. (supra), which is also relied upon by the Petitioner before this Court. Relevant passages from the judgment of the Full Bench are as under :-

on the question whether the employees were Government servants, in para 27 observed as under:-

62. In the case of Yogesh Mahajan vs. Professor R.C. Deka, Director, All India Institute of Medical Sciences , (2018) 3 SCC 218, the Petitioner was engaged as a contractual employee in AIIMS. Aggrieved by the non-renewal of the contract, he approached the Tribunal, where his application was entertained, but relief of renewal of contract/ regularization was declined on merits. The judgment was upheld by the WP(C) 5245/2020 Page 55 of 56 Division Bench of this Court and finally approved by the Supreme Court. Therefore, it is not correct for the Petitioner to contend that being a contract employee, the Petitioner is precluded from approaching the Tribunal. In fact counsel for Respondent No.1 rightly relied on several judgements, where service matters of the employees of the Tribunal are adjudicated by the Tribunal and have been alluded to in earlier part of the judgement and are not being repeated in order to avoid prolixity. Respondent No.1 is right in his submission that Section 13 of AFT Act and AT Act are pari materia.

63. For all the aforesaid reasons and the binding dictum and authoritative pronouncement of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar (supra), the present petition cannot be entertained.

64. The writ petition alongwith accompanying application is hereby dismissed as not maintainable, granting liberty to the Petitioner to approach the Central Administrative Tribunal, in accordance with law, if so advised.

65. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case.

JYOTI SINGH, J MAY 25, 2021/yg WP(C) 5245/2020 Page 56 of 56