In this batch of LPAs and Writ Petitions, common questions of law arise and so they are being disposed off by this common order. A brief overview of the facts The respondents in the LPAs (except LPA-558-2019), the appellants in LPA-558-2019 and the petitioners in the Writ Petitions are land owners whose lands had been acquired under the National Highway Act, 1956 by the National Highway Authority of India (for short 'the NHAI') for the purpose of widening/four-laning of certain National Highways.

Thereafter, matters were referred to the concerned District Revenue Officer-cum- Land Acquisition Officer (the Revenue Authority of the State) (hereinafter referred to as the 'competent authority') and he passed awards and awarded compensation, but while doing so, he did not grant benefits akin to those under Section 23, Section 28 and Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

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[2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 6 of 45 Writ Petitions were filed in this Court challenging the award of the competent authority by landowners without approaching the arbitrator under section 3G (5) of the National Highway Act, 1956.

They were partly allowed by a learned Single Judge of this Court which judgments are challenged by the NHAI in the Letters Patent Appeals being LPAs-4965-2018, 428-2019, 475-2019, 224-2019, 4968-2018, 280- 2019, 52-2019.

In LPA-324-2019, the landowners did approach the Arbitrator and he passed an award under section 3G(5) , but the said award was not challenged by them under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Instead the land owners filed Writ Petition in this Court which was allowed by the learned Single Judge. The said order is challenged by the NHAI in the said LPA.

In LPA-558-2019, the landowners had filed a writ petition challenging the arbitral award passed on 04.05.2016 by the arbitrator confirming the order dt.30.04.2012 passed by the competent authority, but the same was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on the ground that they have a remedy to challenge the same under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. This judgment is challenged by them in the said LPA.

In CWP-18775-2019, CWP-25229-2019, CWP-14487-2019 and CWP-18799-2019, the landowners had not approached the statutory Arbitrator for enhancement of compensation granted by the competent authority under the National highways Act,1956 and had straight away approached this Court seeking the benefits akin to those granted under Section 23 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

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[2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 7 of 45 Contentions of the land owners The landowners place reliance on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in M/s Golden Iron and Steel Forgings vs. Union of India and Ors.1 In M/s Golden Iron and Steel Forgings (1 supra), a Division Bench of this Court held that in acquisitions of land under the National Highway Act, 1956 , solatium and interest in terms of Section 23(2) and Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 should be granted to landowners and Section 3-J and Section 3-G of the said Act, which did not provide for payment of solatium and interest and other statutory benefits similar to the provisions contained in section 23 (1-A), section 23(2) and section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, were struck down.

This judgment was approved by the Supreme Court in Union of India and another vs. Tarsem Singh and others2.

The Supreme Court in Tarsem Singh (2 supra) noted that solatium and interest were awarded to landowners for compulsory acquisition of their lands for the purpose of National Highways until the National Highways Laws (Amendment) Act, 1997 was enacted; after the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was repealed and the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Act 30 of 2013) came into force, under section 105 of the said Act, a notification dt.28.08.2015 was issued directing that provisions of the 2013 Act relating to determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule would be extended to cases of land acquisition under the enactments 1 2011(4) R.C.R. (Civil) 375 (DB) dt.28.03.2008 2 2019(9) SCC 304 SURESH KUMAR 2023.04.18 09:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 8 of 45 specified in the Fourth Schedule; that the National Highways Act, 1956 was also mentioned in the Fourth Schedule to the 2013 Act; since the Government itself is of the view that solatium and interest should be granted even in cases that arise between 1997 and 2015, it cannot contend that landowners, who were not granted solatium and interest in arbitral awards, should avail the remedy under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 challenging the awards passed under the National Highways Act, 1956 . It therefore declared that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 relating to solatium and interest contained in section 23 (1-A), section 23(2) and interest payable in terms of section 28 proviso will apply to acquisitions made under the National Highways Act, 1956 , and section 3-J of the National Highways Act, 1956 was declared unconstitutional to the extent it did not grant the said benefits to land owners.

Counsel for the land owners contended:

c) Prior to 1997, benefits under Sections 23 (1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were granted to all land losers whose lands were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for purpose of National Highways; the State itself had taken a decision that solatium and interest should be granted even in cases that arise between 1997 when the amendment was made to the NHAI Act, 1956 and 2015 (as recorded in Tarsem Singh (2 Supra)); and so the land owners are entitled to the said 4 2021(1) SCC 804 SURESH KUMAR 2023.04.18 09:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 10 of 45 benefits even if they did not challenge the awards of the competent authority before the arbitrator under Section 3J(5) of the NHAI Act, 1956 or even if they did not challenge any arbitrator's award passed under the said provision under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and they had directly filed Writ Petitions in this Court. It is contended that the NHAI cannot discriminate among the landowners and grant the said benefit to some of them and deny it to others similarly placed.

d) That Supreme Court in Tarsem Singh (2 Supra) (at para 52 of the SCC) had declined to interfere even in cases where applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 had not been filed challenging the awards of the competent authority under the National Highways Act,1956 when the land owners had approached the High Courts directly under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as in M/s Golden Iron and Steel Forging (1 Supra) ; that remedy under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is not an effective alternative remedy because the Court cannot modify an erroneous arbitral award as was held in NHAI Vs. M. Hakeem5 and in other cases and so the writ petitions filed by them are maintainable.

Contentions of counsel for the NHAI Shri Chetan Mittal, Senior Counsel for NHAI contends that in LPAs-4965-2018, 4976-2018, 52-2019, 324-2019, there is more than 10 years delay on the part of the landowners in challenging the awards passed by the competent authority; that in LPA-204-2020, 205-2020, there is more than 7 years delay on the part of the landowners in challenging the awards passed by 5 2021 (9) SCC 1 SURESH KUMAR 2023.04.18 09:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 11 of 45 the competent authority; that in LPAs-1536-2019, 1537-2019, 1539-2019, and 1550-2019,there is more than 3 years delay on the part of the landowners in challenging the awards passed by the competent authority; and on the ground of laches and delay in seeking relief before this Court, the landowners should be denied relief and orders of the learned Single Judge granting such relief should be set aside.

The following is the table submitted by the counsel for the NHAI:-

2023 (2) RCR (Civil) 86 = Civil Appeal No.1278 of 2023 dt. 24.02.2023; 7 2023 (1) ALT 54 : 2023 ALL SCR 429;

2022 (4) DNJ 1428 : 2023 ALL SCR 88.

2022 (4) DNJ 1299 : Civil Appeal 7516-7521 of 2022 dt. 20.10.2022 10 2020 (3) SCC 255 11 CWP-16168-2021 dt. 13.09.2021 SURESH KUMAR 2023.04.18 09:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 13 of 45

b) In cases where the Arbitrator had passed an award but the aggrieved land owner did not avail the remedy under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, in view of the decision of the Mumbai High Court in Sureshchandra Vs. The Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Road Transport and Highway Transport12 , relief should be denied under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to the land owners. He also relied on M/s. SBP and Co. Vs. M/s Patel Engineering Ltd. and Another 13.

c) Even if any relief is to be given to the land owners, still the benefit under Section 23 (1- A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 should be denied to them because the judgment in Tarsem Singh (2 Supra) was modified subsequently on 30.07.2021 in Civil Appeal No.7086 of 2019, and the benefit under Section 23 (1- A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 , which had been granted in that judgment to land owners whose land was acquired under the National Highways Act,1956 , was withdrawn on the ground that Section 23 (1-A) benefit was not present before any authority or the Supreme Court on the facts of the cases which were decided in Tarsem Singh (2 Supra).

He therefore contended that none of the land owners should have been granted the said relief by the learned Single Judge in the judgments which are in challenge in the LPAs and they are not entitled to grant of relief in that regard also in the Writ Petitions filed by them.

12 Order dt.07.12.2021 in WP-1597-2020 (DB) 13 2005 (8) SCC 618 SURESH KUMAR 2023.04.18 09:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 14 of 45 Points for consideration From the rival contentions of the parties, the following points for consideration arise:

2019 and who had invoked arbitration under section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act,1956, but had not filed objections under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and had approached this Court directly under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should be denied relief on the said ground?

d) Whether the landowners should be denied relief on the ground of laches and if not, to what relief they are entitled?

e) To what relief?

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[2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 15 of 45 Consideration by the Court We shall first consider point (a) which is as under:

Sections 23 (1-A), section 23(2) and section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 state as under:

first, the market-value of the land at the date of the publication of the 1[notification under Section 4 , sub-section (1)]; secondly, the damage sustained by the person interested, by reason of the taking of any standing crops or trees which may be on the land at the time of the Collector's taking possession thereof;

thirdly, the damage (if any) sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of severing such land from his other land;

fourthly, the damage (if any) sustained by the person interested, at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other property, movable or immovable, in any other manner, or his earnings;

fifthly, if, in consequence of the acquisition of the land by the Collector, the person interested is compelled to change his residence or place of business, the reasonable expenses (if any) incidental to such change; and sixthly, the damage (if any) bona fide resulting from diminution of the profits of the land between the time of the publication of the declaration under Section 6 and the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land.

2[(1-A) In addition to the market-value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum of such market-value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4 , sub-section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the SURESH KUMAR 2023.04.18 09:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 16 of 45 award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier.

Explanation.--In computing the period referred to in this sub-section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any court shall be excluded.] (2) In addition to the market-value of the land, as above provided, the Court shall in every case award a sum of 3[thirty per centum] on such market-value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition.

28. Collector may be directed to pay interest on excess compensation.-- If the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as compensation is in excess of the sum which the Collector did award as compensation, the award of the Court may direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of nine per centum per annum from the date on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into Court.

Provided that the award of the Court may also direct that where such excess or any part thereof is paid into Court after the date of expiry of a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of' fifteen per centum per annum, shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of such excess or part thereof which has not been paid into Court before the date of such expiry."

Section 23 (1-A) deals with additional market value. Section 23(2) deals with solatium, and Section 28 deals with payment of interest on excess compensation.

It is not in dispute that additional market value, solatium and interest under the above provisions were being awarded to landowners for compulsory acquisition of their lands for the purpose of national highways because such acquisitions till 1997 were under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 .

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[2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 17 of 45 A National Highways Laws (Amendment) Ordnance, 1997 was promulgated by the President of India on 24.01.1997 amending the National Highways Act, 1956 introducing Section 3A empowering the Central Government to acquire land for the building, maintenance, management or operation of a national highway or part thereof.

Sections 3B, 3C, 3D, 3E, 3F, 3G, 3H, 3I and 3J were also added in the National Highways Act, 1956 and Section 3J stated that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 would not apply to acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956 .

Determination of compensation under the National Highways Act, 1956 is to be made by the competent authority under section 3G(1) of the said Act which, if not accepted by either party, is then to be determined by an Arbitrator to be appointed by the Central Government under Section 3G(5) of the said Act. Such arbitrator's award can be challenged under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 . Thus, delays in references made to District Judges and Appeals therefrom to the High Court and the Supreme Court have been obviated.

But there was no provision for grant of solatium and section 3H (5) awarded interest only @9% on the excess amount determined by the Arbitrator under section 3G(5) over what is determined by the competent authority under section 3G(1) unlike section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and it's proviso.

The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was repealed by the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 by Section 114 thereof.

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[2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 18 of 45 Under First Schedule to the 2013 Act, market value is to be determined under section 26 ; in case of rural areas, it must be multiplied by a factor of 1 to 2 based on the distance of project from urban area as may be notified by the appropriate Government; in the case of urban areas, it must be multiplied by a factor of 1; solatium under section 69(3) equivalent to 100% of the market value of the land multiplied by various factors is payable depending on whether the land is situated in a rural or urban area (akin to section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894); additional compensation under section 69(2) calculated @12% p.a. (akin to section 23 (1- A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ); as also interest on excess compensation @9% p.a. if paid within 1 year and at 15% p.a. if paid beyond 1 year (akin to section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894) is payable to the landlosers.

Importantly, section 105 of the 2013 Act inter alia enabled the Central Government to direct that any of the provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule shall apply to the cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule. At serial No.7 in the Fourth Schedule is the National Highways Act, 1956 .

Initially amendment Ordnance 9 of 2014 was promulgated amending the 2013 Act and section 10 thereof made applicable provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule applicable to enactments relating to land acquisitions specified in the Fourth Schedule (including the National Highways Act, 1956 ) w.e.f 01.01.2015.

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[2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 19 of 45 After the lapsing of the said Ordnance, a notification dt.28.08.2015 was issued under section 113 of the 2013 Act reiterating the same. It contains recital that the Central Government considers it necessary to extend the benefits available to the landowners under the 2013 Act to similarly placed landowners whose lands are acquired under the 13 enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule (including the National Highways Act, 1956 ).

Thus, both before the 1997 Amendment Act to the National Highways Act,1956 and also after coming into force of the 2013 Act, additional market value, solatium and interest are payable to landowners whose property is compulsorily acquired for purposes of national highways.

So the Government itself accepted that it is not possible to discriminate between landowners covered by the 2013 Act and landowners covered by the National Highways Act, 1956 when it comes to compensation to be paid for lands acquired under either of the enactments.

Taking note of this, the Supreme Court in Tarsem Singh (2 supra) held as under:

(emphasis supplied) Thus the Supreme Court held that that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act relating to solatium and interest contained in Sections 23 (1-A) and (2) and interest payable in terms of Section 28 proviso will apply to acquisitions made under the National Highways Act,1956 and classification based on public purpose is impermissible.

However, NHAI filed a clarification application Miscellaneous Application diary no.2572 of 2020 to clarify the judgment in Tarsem Singh ( 2 supra); and the Supreme Court, on 30.07.2021, modified its order in the Tarsem Singh case (2 supra) and deleted section 23 (1-A) observing that issue regarding entitlement to benefit under the said provision was not present before any authority or court in the said batch of cases.

Therefore, by virtue of the decision in Tarsem Singh (2 supra) as SURESH KUMAR modified on 30.07.2021, all landowners whose lands are acquired by invoking 2023.04.18 09:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 21 of 45 the National Highways Act, 1956 , are entitled to solatium and interest under section 23(2) and section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 but not to additional market value under section 23 (1-A) of the said Act.

The said decision being binding on this Court, we follow the same and hold that landholders whose lands were acquired by invoking the National Highways Act, 1956 are only entitled to solatium and interest akin to that under section 23(2) and section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and not to additional market value under section 23 (1-A) of the said Act.

This point is answered accordingly in favour of the landowners to the above extent.

In the context of contractual disputes between parties of whom one of them is a State or a State instrumentality, in spite of the contract containing an arbitration clause, the Supreme Court had held that such a clause is not a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by High Courts.

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[2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 22 of 45 In Harbanslal Sahnia and another v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and others14, the petitioner's dealership was terminated by the respondent-Corporation for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. The Supreme Court held that they should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of being driven by the High Court to arbitration proceedings. The Court held that the rule of exclusion of Writ jurisdiction because of availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion; and in an appropriate case, in spite of availability of alternative remedy the High Court can still exercise its Writ jurisdiction, i.e., where the Writ petition seeks enforcement of fundamental rights or where there is a failure of principles of natural justice or where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.

This was reiterated in Ram Barai Singh and Co. v. State of Bihar and others15 wherein the Supreme Court declared that a constitutional remedy by way of a Writ Petition is always available to an aggrieved party and an arbitration clause in an agreement between the parties cannot ipso facto render a Writ Petition "not maintainable".

Recently, in Unitech Ltd. vs. Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure Corporation and others16 the Supreme Court held that recourse to jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not excluded altogether in a contractual matter; and a public law remedy is available for enforcing legal rights subject to well settled parameters. It relied on the decision in ABL International Ltd. vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation 14 2003 (2) SCC 107 15 2015 (13) SCC 592 16 Civil Appeal No.317 of 2021 dt.17.02.2021 SURESH KUMAR 2023.04.18 09:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 23 of 45 of India17and held that jurisdiction under Article 226 is not excluded in contractual matters and the presence of an arbitration clause within a contract between a State instrumentality and a private party has not acted as an absolute bar to availing the remedies under Article 226. It declared that if the State instrumentality violates the constitutional mandate under Article 14 to act fairly and reasonably, relief under the plenary powers of the Article 226 of the Constitution can be granted. It quoted the following passage in ABL International (17 supra):

(emphasis supplied) In the instant case, the NHAI contends that in view of the remedy of arbitration contained in section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 to challenge the award of compensation made by the competent authority under section 3G(1) of the said Act, this Court ought not to have entertained 17 2004 (3) SCC 553 18 1998 (8) SCC 1 SURESH KUMAR 2023.04.18 09:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 24 of 45 the writ petitions filed by the landowners whose lands were acquired under the said Act.

We have already noted that a Division Bench of this Court in a judgment delivered on 28.03.2008 in M/s Golden Iron and Steel Forgings (1 supra) held that landowners, whose lands are acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956 , are entitled to solatium and interest in terms similar to those contained in section 23(2) and section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

This was challenged by the NHAI before the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court, in Civil Appeal No.10695 of 2011, did not grant any stay of the said judgment .

Only on 03.08.2017, Civil appeal No.10695 of 2011 filed against the decision of this Court in M/s Golden Iron and Steel Forgings (1 supra) was disposed of in terms of a settlement entered into between the parties.

Thus, the decision of this Court in M/s Golden Iron and Steel Forgings (1 supra) was holding the field between 28.03.2008 and 03.08.2017.

The decision in M/s Golden Iron and Steel Forgings (1 supra) was later specifically upheld by the Supreme Court in Tarsem Singh (2 supra) on 19.09.2019 (at para 48).

The Supreme Court in Sunita Mehra vs. Union of India19 had taken the view that solatium and interest should be granted to landowners whose land is acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956 whose proceedings are pending on 28.03.2008 when this High Court pronounced the judgment in M/s Golden Iron and Steel Forgings (1 supra). 19

2016 SCC online SC 1128=2019 (17) SCC 672 SURESH KUMAR 2023.04.18 09:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 25 of 45 Though the NHAI was a party to the said decisions and the principle of law laid down in M/s Golden Iron and Steel Forgings (1 supra) was binding on it, yet in all the awards passed by the competent authority under section 3G(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 in respect of the landowners in the instant batch of cases, which awards were passed after 28.03.2008 (the date of the decision in M/s Golden Iron and Steel Forgings (1 supra)) ( from April 2008 to 2014), the competent authority did not follow the said principle and denied solatium and interest in terms akin to that under section 23(2) and section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to them.

The competent authority cannot ignore binding precedents and decide contrary to it. This is patently arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 and 300-A of the Constitution of India. This also results in discrimination among the landowners whose lands are acquired under the National Highways Act,1956 .

Therefore, we hold that since NHAI, a State instrumentality, has violated the constitutional mandate under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, it is open to the landowners to invoke the plenary power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking appropriate relief.

Therefore, this point is answered against the NHAI and in favour of the landowners.

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[2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 26 of 45 Point (c):

2019 who had invoked arbitration under section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act,1956 but had not filed objection under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and had approached this Court directly under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should be denied relief on the said ground?

In LPA-324-2019, order of the learned Single Judge in CWP-20024-2018 is challenged.

In that case, land was acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956 through a notification issued on 24.12.2004 under section 3A of the said Act and an award was passed by the competent authority under section 3G(1) of the said Act on 14.12.2007.

The landowners approached the arbitrator under section 3G(5) of the Act for enhancement on 03.12.2009 seeking benefit of solatium @30% and interest @12%.

The Arbitrator passed award on 17.02.2011 refusing solatium and interest.

The landowners did not avail the remedy under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 but filed the said CWP in 2018, after more than 7 years from the date when the award was pronounced by the Arbitrator.

The learned Single Judge partly allowed the said Writ Petition on 14.11.2018 holding that delay by itself would not come in the way and the alternative remedy issue also would not be a bar for entertaining the Writ SURESH KUMAR 2023.04.18 09:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 27 of 45 Petition. He held that the Supreme Court in Sunita Mehra (19 supra) had taken the view that solatium and interest should be granted to landowners whose land is acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956 whose proceedings are pending on 28.03.2008 when this High Court pronounced the judgment in M/s Golden Iron and Steel Forgings (1 supra).

He held that issue of delay raised by the NHAI is not tenable in view of the principle of eminent domain where the landowners have lost their land on account of which they have no right as such to contest for the land which is being acquired for the purpose of building of national infrastructure; and interest of the NHAI can be protected by denying the benefit of interest on the amount of solatium and interest for the period of delay in approaching the Writ Court.

He held that once the matter is settled by the Supreme Court by holding that benefit of solatium and interest would accrue to landowners where the proceedings are pending as on 28.03.2008, the landowners would also be entitled to the same till February, 2011 when the award dt.17.02.2011 was passed; and interest thereafter is denied. He directed the NHAI to deposit the enhanced amount of solatium and interest on the amount of compensation awarded to the landowners along with solatium and interest within 3 months. He denied interest for the delayed period.

Challenging the same, LPA-324-2019 is filed by the NHAI. Counsel for the NHAI sought to contend that the landowners had not challenged the award of the arbitrator under section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, SURESH KUMAR 2023.04.18 09:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 28 of 45 1996 and so the learned Single Judge ought not to have entertained the Writ Petition and granted relief to the landowners.

We do not find any force in the said contention for the following reasons.

The Supreme Court in Tarsem Singh (2 Supra) (at para 52 of the SCC) had declined to interfere even in cases where applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 had not been filed challenging the awards of the competent authority under the National Highways Act,1956 when the land owners had approached the High Courts directly under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking benefits akin to those under sec.23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act,1894.

Ordinarily it is true that the court has imposed a restraint in its own wisdom on its exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 where the party invoking the jurisdiction has an effective, adequate alternative remedy. More often, it has been expressly stated that the rule which requires the exhaustion of alternative remedies is a rule of convenience and discretion rather than rule of law.

At any rate it does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court if the alternative remedy provided in a statute is not effective, then its mere existence is no bar to entertaining of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by a High Court.

The Supreme Court had held in M. Hakeem (5 Supra) and in NHAI vs. P. Nagaraju and others20 that it was not permissible for a Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation 20 MANU/SC/0850/2022 SURESH KUMAR 2023.04.18 09:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 29 of 45 Act, 1996 to modify an Award passed by an Arbitrator, and the Court, even it found the challenge to the substantial, would have to set aside the Award and remit the matter to the learned Arbitrator for de novo consideration.

This in our opinion shows that the remedy under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to challenge an award passed by an Arbitrator under section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 is not an effective alternative remedy in the context of claims for compensation under the said law as the landowners cannot get quick relief by invoking the said remedy.

In Ram & Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana21 , the Supreme Court held that if the alternative remedy is not effective, then a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be entertained. It held:

(emphasis supplied) Again in CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal24 , the Supreme Court declared as under:

(emphasis supplied) When the statutory authority/State instrumentality like NHAI acts arbitrarily and unreasonably and does not follow a binding precedent of this Court in M/s Golden Iron and Steel Forgings (1 Supra) and that of the Supreme Court in Sunita Mehra (19 supra) and denies to land owners relief of solatium and interest akin to those under Section 23(2) and section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act,1894, there is a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and this Court is entitled to invoke its plenary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and grant relief to the landowners.

For the above reasons, we do not agree with the reasoning of the Bombay High Court in Suresh Chandra case (9 supra) that existence of SURESH KUMAR 2023.04.18 09:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 32 of 45 remedy under the Statute bars exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Therefore, point (c) is answered in favour of the landowners and against the NHAI.

The aspect of laches and delay in filing the Writ Petition in 2018 before this Court, though the award of the Arbitrator was passed on 17.02.2011, and what relief the landowners should be granted, if at all, will however be considered under the points (d) and (e). Point (d):

Much emphasis has been made by the counsel for the NHAI on the aspect of laches on the part of the landowners in approaching this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking relief of solatium and interest akin to that granted under section 23(2) and section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

In State of Himachal Pradesh and others (6 supra) cited by him, a writ petition was filed in 2016 in the Himachal Pradesh High Court challenging acquisition of the respondents' land for construction of a road in 1996 and contending that no compensation was paid to the landowners. It was contested by the State on the ground that the respondents had agreed not to claim compensation for loss of their land. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and directed the appellants to initiate the process for SURESH KUMAR 2023.04.18 09:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 33 of 45 acquisition of the land in accordance with law. LPA filed against the said order was dismissed on the ground of delay in filing it. The Supreme Court directed that though, the notification dt.17.05.1996 under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had lapsed, and though there was a delay of 20 years in approaching the High Court, in exercise of its power under Article 136 and 142 of the Constitution of India, the said date should be taken as date of deemed acquisition of the land of the respondents by the appellants; and market rate as on that date should be given to them along with all other statutory benefits excluding interest from 17.05.1996 till the writ petition was filed in the High Court. Thus the landowners were granted relief by the Supreme Court to some extent in spite of their laches for more than 20 years.

In Omvir Singh (7 supra) cited by the counsel for the NHAI, an appeal was filed in the High Court in 2014/2015, 16 years after rejection of review applications by a reference Court refusing to review its order passed in 1998 refusing to enhance compensation to landowners under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 . The High Court condoned the delay in filing the appeal, enhanced the compensation, but denied interest for the period of delay. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the order of the High Court condoning the delay in preferring the appeal but decided the SLP on merits holding that the landholders will not be entitled to statutory benefits excluding interest on the enhanced amount of compensation for the delayed period in preferring appeal before the High Court.

Similar view was taken in Rameshwar (8 supra) where the appeal in the High Court was entertained 22 years from the date of the judgment of the reference Court.

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[2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 34 of 45 In Jaspal Singh and others (9 supra) also, landowners who had delayed filing of appeals in the High Court, were denied interest on enhanced amount of compensation for the period of delay.

In Executive Engineer, Nimna Dudhna Project (10 supra) also the Supreme Court held that landowners should be denied interest for the period of delay in filing first appeals in the High Court challenging award of the reference Court.

Thus, none of the above decisions supports the plea of the NHAI that mere delay or laches in seeking remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is sufficient to refuse relief to a litigant.

On the other hand, counsel for the landowners cited Tukaram Kana Joshi and others (3 supra). In that case, the Supreme Court held that that delay and laches is only one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion but it is not an absolute impediment. If the whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise its discretion to entertain the writ petition, when no third-party interest is involved. In that case, land was notified under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on 06.06.1964 for a project but no subsequent proceedings were taken up and the acquisition proceedings lapsed. Possession of the land was taken in 1964 but no compensation was paid to the landowners/petitioners though others similarly situated were paid compensation in 1966. In 2009, the landowners approached the High Court which dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches but the Supreme Court reversed its decision by giving the above reasons. The Supreme Court declared:

In Vetindia Pharmaceuticals Limited (4 supra) the Supreme Court reiterated the said principle and held that jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is equitable in nature, and it is not a mandatory requirement that every delayed petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must be dismissed on the ground of delay. It observed:

(emphasis supplied) In Sukh Dutt Ratra v. State of H.P.25 recently the Supreme Court declared in a case where the State deprived a person of property without following due process of law and sought to contest his case on ground of laches as under:

But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defenc defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy' remedy'."

19. The facts of the present case reveal that the State has, in a clandestine and arbitrary manner, actively tried to limit disbursal of compensation as required by law, only nly to those for which it was specifically prodded by the courts, rather than to all those who are entitled. This arbitrary action, which is also violative of the appellants' prevailing Article 31 right (at the time of cause of action), undoubtedly warranted warranted consideration, and intervention by the High Court, under its Article 226 jurisdiction."

The action of the competent authority under Section 3G (1) of the National Highways Act,1956 in denying the solatium and interest akin to that granted under Sections 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act,1894 inspite of binding precedents such as M/s Golden lden Iron and Steel Forgings (1 1 supra) and Sunita Mehra (19 supra) shocks our judicial conscience, and it seems ms that it is actively trying to limit the quantum of compensation as required by law being paid to only those for which it is specifically prodde prodded d by the Courts, rather than to all those who are entitled, and act arbitrarily. S So o notwithstanding the delay in approaching this Court, we hold that such relief may not be denied to them in toto..

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[2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 39 of 45 It would be useful to refer the decision of the Supreme Court in Popatrao Vyankatrao Patil v. State of Maharashtra27 , where it decreed that Governments and statutory authorities should be model or ideal litigants and should not put forth false, frivolous, vexatious, technical (but unjust) contentions to obstruct the path of justice.

The conduct of the NHAI in the instant cases is quite contrary to what is expected of it as it had raised several technical pleas unfairly to deny just relief to the landowners.

The learned single Judge had held that once the matter is settled by the Supreme Court by holding that benefit of solatium and interest would accrue to landowners where the proceedings are pending as on 28.03.2008, the landowners would also be entitled to the same till February, 2011 when the award dt.17.02.2011 was passed; and interest thereafter is denied. He directed the NHAI to deposit the enhanced amount of solatium and interest on the amount of compensation awarded to the landowners along with solatium and interest within 3 months. He denied interest for the delayed period.

We have held under point (c) that when the statutory authority/State instrumentality like NHAI acts arbitrarily and unreasonably and does not follow a binding precedent of this Court in M/s Golden Iron and Steel Forgings (1 Supra) and that of the Supreme Court in Sunita Mehra (19 supra) and denies to land owners relief of solatium and interest akin to those under Section 23(2) and section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act,1894, there is a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and this Court is entitled to invoke its plenary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and grant relief to the landowners.

Therefore we find no merit in the LPA and the same is dismissed and hold that the landowners are held entitled to interest and solatium as per the order of the learned single Judge. In addition they are also entitled to interest from the date of filing of the Writ Petition till the date of payment and the NHAI shall also pay the landowners costs of 10,000/- within 4 weeks. SURESH KUMAR 2023.04.18 09:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

[2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 41 of 45 LPA-4965-2018, LPA-475-2019, LPA-428-2019, LPA-224-2019, LPA-4968-2018, LPA-52-2019, LPA-118-2020, LPA-280-2019, LPA-4976-2018 In the judgments impugned in these LPAs, the learned Single Judge, while holding that the landowners would be entitled to solatium and interest in terms of the provisions of sections 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 took care to ensure that the said benefit would be payable till the date when the payments were disbursed on the main amount of compensation. Thus he denied them benefit of interest on the amount of solatium and interest for the period of delay for approaching the Writ Court.

The learned Single Judge held that delay as such would not be a factor for denying relief to the landowners because on account of ignorance, poverty and similar handicaps they could not seek relief immediately and the existence of alternative remedy is also not a bar for granting relief to them; that once the matter stands settled by the Supreme Court in Sunita Mehra (19 supra) [that where the proceedings are pending on the date of the order pronounced by the Division Bench in M/s Golden Iron and Steel Forgings (1 supra), they should be entitled to benefit of solatium and interest on the amount awarded till the date when the payments were disbursed on the main amount], the NHAI cannot contend otherwise. We are in complete agreement with the learned single Judge's views.

Therefore we find no merit in the LPAs and the same are dismissed and hold that the landowners are held entitled to interest and solatium as per the order of the learned single Judge. In addition they are also entitled to interest from the date of filing of the Writ Petition till the date of SURESH KUMAR 2023.04.18 09:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 42 of 45 payment and the NHAI shall also pay the landowners costs of 10,000/- within 4 weeks.

LPA-1550-2019, LPA-1539-2019, LPA-1537-2019, LPA-1536-2019 In the judgments impugned in these LPAs, the learned Single Judge had allowed the writ petitions filed by the landowners and had directed the competent authority appointed by the Central Government under section 3G(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 to pass a supplementary award pertaining to solatium and interest within 2 months by following the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sunita Mehra (19 supra) and M/s Golden Iron and Steel Forgings (1 supra) and had rejected the plea of availability of alternative remedy on the ground that the landowners had averred that they do not wish to seek enhancement of rate of compensation before the Arbitrator.

We find no error in the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge warranting our interference in exercise of Letters Patent Jurisdiction.

Therefore we find no merit in the LPAs and the same are dismissed and hold that the landowners are held entitled to interest and solatium as per the order of the learned single Judge. In addition they are also entitled to interest from the date of filing of the Writ Petition till the date of payment and the NHAI shall also pay the landowners costs of 10,000/- within 4 weeks.

LPA-558-2019 This is an Appeal by landowners challenging the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing his writ petition filed by them on 18.12.2018. In the said writ petition, they questioned order dt.04.05.2016 passed by the arbitrator appointed under section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 SURESH KUMAR 2023.04.18 09:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 43 of 45 confirming the order of the respondent No.3 passed on 30.04.2012 whereunder the latter had denied benefit of solatium and interest under sections 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to them.

The learned Single Judge had held that the landowners have a remedy to approach the Civil Court of original jurisdiction against the award passed by the arbitrator for redressal of their grievances under Section 34 of the Arbitration and conciliation Act,1996 and relegated the landowners to the said remedy.

In this case, we hold that the plea of laches is not available to the NHAI since within a reasonable time from the date of the order of the arbitrator, the writ petition has been filed before this Court by the landowners.

In view of our finding under point (c) that existence of alternative remedy of challenge to the arbitral award of the respondent No.4 under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is no bar to filing the writ petition since the said alternative remedy is not effective because the Court cannot modify the award, we set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and grant to the appellants solatium and interest under section 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

LPA-558-2019 is therefore allowed hold that the landowners are held entitled to interest and solatium. In addition we hold that they are also entitled to interest from the date of filing of the Writ Petition till the date of payment and the NHAI shall also pay the landowners costs of 10,000/- within 4 weeks.

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[2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 44 of 45 CWP-18775-2019, CWP-25229-2019, CWP-14487-2019 and CWP-18799-2019 In CWP-18775-2019 and in CWP-18799-2019, award was passed by the competent authority under section 3G(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 on 23.04.2008 and amounts were received on 29.05.2009.

In CWP-25229-2019 and CWP-14487-2019, award was passed by the competent authority under section 3G(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 on 24.12.2009 and 21.12.2009 respectively.

Without approaching the arbitrator under section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956, the landowners have filed writ petitions in 2019 seeking relief of solatium and interest under section 23(2) and section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 apart from additional market value under section 23 (1-A) of the said Act.

For the reasons given by us under point (a), the landowners are not entitled to additional market value under section 23 (1-A) of the said Act and are only entitled to solatium and interest under sections 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

But they are not entitled to interest for the period of delay in approaching this Court i.e. in CWP-18775-2019 and in CWP-18799-2019 from 29.05.2009 till the date of filing of the writ petitions and in CWP-14487- 2019 and CWP-25229-2019, from the date of passing of the award by the competent authority till the date of filing of the said writ petitions.

However we hold that they are also entitled to interest from the date of filing of the Writ Petition till the date of payment and the NHAI shall also pay the landowners costs of 10,000/- within 4 weeks.

Accordingly, these Writ Petitions are partly allowed as above. SURESH KUMAR 2023.04.18 09:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

[2023:PHHC:053158-DB] LPA-4965-2018 and connected cases Page 45 of 45 CWP-28334-2018 However we hold that they are also entitled to interest from the date of filing of the Writ Petition till the date of payment and the NHAI shall also pay the landowners costs of 10,000/- within 4 weeks.

(M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO) JUDGE (SUKHVINDER KAUR) JUDGE April 12, 2023.

Ess Kay/Mohit Goyal

1. Whether speaking/reasoned? Yes

2. Whether reportable? Yes SURESH KUMAR 2023.04.18 09:41 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document