AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.

Leave granted.

2. The question for consideration in the instant appeal is as to whether in the absence of a Trust being made an accused in a complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘ NI Act ’), when a Cheque has been issued on behalf of a Trust, the said complaint would be maintainable against the Chairman/a Trustee of Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SAPNA BISHT Date: 2025.10.09 the said Trust?

17:17:05 IST Reason:

3. The instant appeal arises from the Final Judgment and Order dated 21.11.2022 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Impugned Judgment’) [2022 SCC OnLine Megh 624 | (2023) 1 GLT 344], passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Meghalaya, Shillong (hereinafter referred to as the ‘High Court’) in Criminal Petition No.31/2019, wherein the High Court quashed and set aside the proceedings in Criminal Case No.44(S)/2019 pending before the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Shillong (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’) and the Summoning Order dated 11.02.2019 passed against the Respondent.

4. The William Carey University (hereinafter referred to as the ‘University’), a recognized Private University, owned and sponsored by the Agriculture Crafts Trades and Studies Group of Institutions (hereinafter referred to as the ‘ACTS Group’), was facing a severe financial crisis. The ACTS Group entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with Orion Education Trust (hereinafter referred to as ‘Orion’) on 12.10.2017 to hand over the management and administration of the University to Orion. The Respondent is the Chairman of Orion. As CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2025 [@ SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CRIMINAL) NO.4459/2023] 3 Chairman of Orion, the Respondent issued authorization letters to all concerned, duly entrusting the Appellant with the task of liaisoning with governmental authorities and to undertake such activities to facilitate the effective transition of all administrative control of the University from the hands of the ACTS Group to Orion.

5. The Appellant alleged that pursuant to the above, upon such transition being effected, the Respondent issued a Cheque dated 13.10.2018, bearing number 000013 for Rs.5,00,00,000/- (Rupees Five Crores Only), drawn on Kotak Mahindra Bank, Vadodara Branch in his favour for the services rendered by him under the signature of the Respondent as authorized signatory of Orion. When presented by the Appellant at his ICICI Bank Branch at Laitumkhrah, Shillong, East Khasi Hills on 07.12.2018, the Cheque was dishonoured with the endorsement ‘insufficient funds’.

6. Notice under Section 138 of the NI Act was addressed by the Appellant to the Respondent on 19.12.2018, which was received by the Respondent on 27.12.2018. Response thereto was sent by the Respondent vide Letter dated 28.12.2018. Subsequently, the Appellant filed a complaint case No.44(S)/2019 before the Trial Court against the CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2025 [@ SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CRIMINAL) NO.4459/2023] 4 Respondent for offences under Sections 138 and 142 of the NI Act as well as under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. On receipt of summons, as per the Trial Court’s Order dated 11.02.2019, the Respondent entered appearance and challenged the complaint case on the issue of maintainability for non-joinder of necessary parties.

7. The Respondent, thereafter, preferred Criminal Petition No.31/2019 under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’) before the High Court seeking to quash the complaint case and the proceedings before the Trial Court, on the ground, inter alia, that Orion - a juristic entity and a necessary party being a Trust - not having been added as a party, the complaint case was non-maintainable, and consequently, no vicarious liability could be placed on the Respondent.

8. Allowing the Criminal Petition in the Respondent’s favour, the High Court has, by way of the Impugned Judgment, quashed the complaint case and the Summoning Order dated 11.02.2019 passed by the Trial Court. Assailing the same, the present appeal has been preferred by the Appellant.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2025 [@ SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CRIMINAL) NO.4459/2023] 5 APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS:

9. The arguments put forth by the learned counsel for the Appellant were basically two-fold – (i) the ineligibility of a Trust to be sued, and; (ii) no mandate to make specific averments with regard to the accused’s responsibility in conducting the day-to-day business of the Trust. For the first proposition, learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Pratibha Pratisthan v Manager, Canara Bank , (2017) 3 SCC 712, where, in the context of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘ Consumer Protection Act ’), it was held that a Trust is not a person and therefore, could not be a consumer.

10. Next, in support of his argument that a Trust is not capable of being sued or suing in a court of law, learned counsel drew the attention of this Court to the decision of the Kerala High Court in K P Shibu v State of Kerala , 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 7585, holding that in the context of the NI Act , it is the Trustees who can maintain and defend a suit to protect the Trust property, and the Trust itself cannot sue or be sued in a court of law, therefore, a Trust is not a juristic person or a legal entity, as a juristic person has a legal existence of its own and hence is capable of suing and being sued in a court of law. It was further held that a Trust would not fall within the term ‘association of individuals’ as used in the NI CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2025 [@ SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CRIMINAL) NO.4459/2023] 6 Act. The High Court held that since Trustees do not join together for a common action to achieve some common benefit for themselves as Trustees, a Trust cannot be said to be an ‘association of persons/body of individuals’.

11. Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that a Trust, as defined under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘ Trusts Act ’), is an obligation and not a legal entity. Learned counsel for the Appellant placed reliance on the decision of the Kerala High Court in K R Rajan v Cherian K Cherian , 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 4699; the decision of the Delhi High Court in Duli Chand v M/s M P T C Charitable Trust, 1983 SCC OnLine Del 270; decisions by the Madras High Court in V Chandrasekaran v Venkatanaicker Trust, 2016 SCC OnLine Mad 33745 and Narayana Iyer v Anandammal Adheena Trust, (2021) 3 CTC 776; decision of the Gujarat High Court in Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin v Trustees of the Maniar Jamat Ahmedabad , AIR 1968 Guj 184 and; the decision by the Calcutta High Court in Vijay Sports Club v State of Bengal , 2019 SCC OnLine Cal 2331.

12. With regard to the second limb of his argument, learned counsel submitted that in the case at hand, the Respondent, being the CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2025 [@ SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CRIMINAL) NO.4459/2023] 7 Chairman/Authorized Representative of Orion, had signed the cheque in question and thus, it was prima facie evident that he was responsible for the day-to-day business of the Trust. To support his contention, learned counsel relied upon the decision of this Court in SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v Neeta Bhalla , (2005) 8 SCC 89 [3-Judge Bench], wherein it was held that a position of a Managing Director would suggest responsibility of the person holding the said position, in the day-to-day affairs of the Company, which in the present case, urged learned counsel, is akin to the position of the Chairman/Authorized Representative of the Trust viz. Orion. The relevant portion from SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra) is quoted below:

Without this averment being made in a complaint, the requirements of Section 141 cannot be said to be satisfied.

(b)The answer to the question posed in sub-para (b) has to be in the negative. Merely being a director of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable under Section 141 of the Act. A director in a company cannot be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. The requirement of Section 141 is that the person sought to be made liable should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2025 [@ SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CRIMINAL) NO.4459/2023] 8 relevant time. This has to be averred as a fact as there is no deemed liability of a director in such cases.

(c) The answer to Question (c) has to be in the affirmative. The question notes that the managing director or joint managing director would be admittedly in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. When that is so, holders of such positions in a company become liable under Section 141 of the Act. By virtue of the office they hold as managing director or joint managing director, these persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. Therefore, they get covered under Section 141 . So far as the signatory of a cheque which is dishonoured is concerned, he is clearly responsible for the incriminating act and will be covered under sub-section (2) of Section 141 .’ (emphasis supplied)

13. To further support his contentions, learned counsel for the Appellant placed reliance on the decision of this Court in K K Ahuja v V K Vora , (2009) 10 SCC 48; Sunita Palita v Panchami Stone Quarry , (2022) 10 SCC 152; D Purushotama Reddy v K Sateesh , (2008) 8 SCC 505 and the decision of the Gauhati High Court in Pranab Jyoti Dutta v Chief Branch Manager, SBI , 2023 SCC OnLine Gau 243. It was urged that the appeal deserved to be allowed. RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS:

14. Au contraire, learned senior counsel for the Respondent submitted that a Trust is a juristic person, capable of suing and being sued in a CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2025 [@ SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CRIMINAL) NO.4459/2023] 9 court of law. He placed reliance on the decision of the High Court of Kerala in Prana Educational and Charitable Trust v State of Kerala , 2023 SCC OnLine Ker 8449, where it was held that the expression ‘company’ used in sub-clause (a) of the Explanation to Section 141 of the NI Act includes ‘any body corporate’ or ‘other association of individuals’, and the said term, by applying the principle of ejusdem generis would include a club, a Trust (emphasised by learned senior counsel), and a Hindu Undivided Family within the expression ‘company’ or ‘firm’. The High Court further held that a Trust, either private or public/charitable is a juristic person liable to prosecute or be prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. In this regard, reliance was also placed on the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Dadasaheb Rawal Co-op. Bank of Dondaicha Ltd. v Ramesh s/o Jawrilal Jain, 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 794 and Mukund s/o Manohar Wazalwar v Eknath s/o Bajirao Hatwar (Dead) through his L.R. Durwas Eknath Hatwar, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 3015 and the decision by the Orissa High Court in Bijaya Manjari Satpathy v State of Orissa , 2022 SCC OnLine Ori 4092. Attention was also drawn to a decision of the High Court of Madras in Abraham Memorial Educational Trust v Suresh Babu , 2012 SCC OnLine Mad 2986, where that High Court held that a CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2025 [@ SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CRIMINAL) NO.4459/2023] 10 Trust is a juristic person which can sue or be sued for offence punishable under the NI Act .

15. Learned senior counsel supported the Impugned Judgment, submitted that the appeal merited dismissal and advanced that the High Court had not erred.

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:

16. We have heard respective learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record. The question for consideration, as indicated in Paragraph 2 supra, is as to whether in the absence of a Trust being made an accused in a complaint under the NI Act , when a cheque has been issued on behalf of the Trust, the said complaint would be maintainable against the Chairman/a Trustee of the said Trust?

17. On the issue that it is not mandatory to make substantive averments pertaining to the responsibility of the Respondent in the conduct of the day-to-day business of the Trust, reliance was rightly placed on the decision of a 3-Judge Bench of this Court in SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra) by learned counsel for the Appellant. CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2025 [@ SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CRIMINAL) NO.4459/2023] 11

18. We need only reiterate the view espoused by this Court in SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra) and K K Ahuja (supra). As such, a person designated as ‘Managing Director’ or ‘Joint Managing Director’, by virtue of the office held, would be in charge of and responsible for the daily conduct or business of the company, and thus, be covered under Section 141 of the NI Act. Further, as far as the signatory of a cheque which is dishonoured be concerned, he is responsible for the incriminating act and will be covered under Section 141 of the NI Act. Support for the above from K K Ahuja (supra) can be traced as under:

27. The position under Section 141 of the Act can be summarised thus:

Referring to the said provision from the Consumer Protection Act , in Pratibha Pratisthan (supra), the Court opined:

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2025 [@ SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CRIMINAL) NO.4459/2023] 16

(iv) every other association of persons whether registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860) or not;”

5. On a plain and simple reading of all the above provisions of the Act it is clear that a trust is not a person and therefore not a consumer. Consequently, it cannot be a complainant and cannot file a consumer dispute under the provisions of the Act.’ (emphasis supplied)

22. Sections 3 and 13 of the Trusts Act read thus:

property and the assertion or protection of the title thereto.’ (emphasis supplied)

23. To our mind, the above-extracted Sections of the Trusts Act would also favour the view we are taking, as the obligation to ‘maintain and defend’ suits is placed on the shoulders of a Trustee and not the Trust itself. It is clear that only a Trustee has the obligation to file, maintain and defend any suit on behalf of the Trust. Meaning thereby, that a Trust does not have a separate legal existence of its own, making it incapable of suing or being sued. A learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court, relying on Pratibha Pratisthan (supra), in K P Shibu (supra), noted:

24. The same proposition has been reiterated by the Delhi High Court in Duli Chand (supra), the Madras High Court in V Chandrasekaran (supra) and Narayana Iyer (supra), the Gujarat High Court in Kansara Abdulrehman Sadruddin (supra), the Calcutta High Court in Vijay Sports Club (supra) and the Karnataka High Court in Chikkamuniyappa Memorial Trust v State, ILR 1997 Kar 2460.

25. We find substance in the reasoning assigned by the High Courts of Kerala, Delhi, Madras, Gujarat, Calcutta and Karnataka that a Trust is not a ‘legal entity’ or ‘juristic person’. A Trust is also not like a corporation which has a legal existence of its own and therefore can appoint an agent. A Trust operates through its Trustees, who are legal entities. We may gainfully refer to the decision of the Kerala High Court in K R Rajan (supra), where the said Court has rightly held:

26. Ergo, it is clear that though a Trust may act or even be treated as an entity for certain legal purposes and not all legal purposes, a Trust is an obligation imposed on the ostensible owner of the property to use the same for a particular object - for the benefit of a named beneficiary or charity, and it is the Trustee(s) who are bound to maintain and defend all suits and to take such other steps with regard to the nature, land or the value of the Trust property, that may be reasonably required for the preservation of the Trust property, and the assertion of protection of title thereto, subject to the provisions of the instructions of Trust to take such other steps.

27. There exists no ambiguity about there being no legal requirement for a Trust to be made a party in a proceeding before a Court of Law since it is only a/the Trustee(s) who are liable and answerable for acts CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2025 [@ SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CRIMINAL) NO.4459/2023] 20 done or alleged to have been done for and on behalf of the said Trust. From a perusal of Orion’s Deed of Trust, of which the Respondent is the Chairman/Authorized Signatory, it emerges clearly that the relevant clauses deal with the Trustee insofar as administering and holding the funds and properties of the Trust are concerned. Which is to say that the Trust (i.e., Orion) operates only through the Trustee(s) and that the objects thereof were for charitable purposes. The Deed of Trust also provides for permitting one or more Trustees to operate a bank account. It becomes all the more apparent that it is the Trustees alone, through whom the Trust funds/property(ies) are managed and dealt with. The Trust itself is without any independent legal status.

28. Though we have delved into the issue of whether a Trust can sue or be sued on its own, we would make it amply clear (and as would also become evident from what follows infra) on this point, that our view is confined to examination of the subject in the context of the NI Act alone, in praesenti. We were called upon to consider only as to whether without making a Trust an accused, a complaint would be maintainable against a Trustee in the eye of law under the NI Act .

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29. Hence, the question posed is answered in the affirmative. When a cause of action arises due to an alleged dishonour of cheque and a complaint is initiated under the NI Act , the same is maintainable against the Trustee who has signed the cheque, without the requirement to array the Trust also as an accused.

30. As far as the judgments pressed into service by the Respondent be concerned, we have bestowed thoughtful consideration thereto. We are unable to concur with the propositions they purport to propound.

31. In Prana Educational and Charitable Trust (supra), a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court held:

While applying this principle, (1) the general words must follow the specific words and the specific words must necessarily constitute, a genus/class (2) the legislative intention of the statute to be born in mind for restricting the general word to the genus/class of the specified words if follows and (3) this principle has to be used by the Courts properly and apply where it is necessary and not use this principle where it is not necessary so as to defeat the purpose of the statute and to cause miscarriage of justice are the conditions to be satisfied. Thus, it appears that the High Courts of Madras, Bombay and Gujarat correctly interpreted the various provisions and the law emerges from the said judgments are as under: (i) The expression “company” used in sub-clause (a) of explanation appended to Section 141 of the N.I. Act includes any body corporate or other “association of individuals” and the term “association of individuals” to be interpreted by applying the principle of ejusdem generis. To be construed so, the term “association of individuals” will include club, trust and Hindu undivided family business along with the expression “company” or “firm”. (ii) A Trust, either private or public/charitable or otherwise, is a juristic person who is liable for punishment for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. (iii) A Trust, either private or public/charitable or otherwise, having either a single trustee or two or more trustees, is a company in terms of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. (iv) For the offence under Section 138 of The Negotiable Instruments Act, committed by the Trust, every trustee, who was in-charge of the day-to-day affairs of the Trust shall also be liable for punishment besides the Trust.

22. Therefore, following the legal principles set forth above, it has to be held that the challenge raised by the accused on the ground that no prosecution under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the N.I. Act against the Trust would lie, cannot be sustained and the same stands repelled.’ CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2025 [@ SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CRIMINAL) NO.4459/2023] 23 (emphasis supplied)

32. We do not approve of the manner in which the learned Single Judge in Prana Educational and Charitable Trust (supra) decided to ignore binding precedent in K P Shibu (supra), which was a judgment rendered by another learned Single Judge of the same Court, earlier in point of time, merely by noting ‘it is discernible that the said decision is not so elaborative and the interpretation of the term “association of individuals” not done by applying the ratio of ejusdem generis.’ It was not open to the learned Judge in Prana Educational and Charitable Trust (supra) to prefer the view expressed by other High Courts in preference to the view of a Bench of the own High Court of equal strength expressed previously. At the most, recording his disagreement with the view in K P Shibu (supra), the learned Judge in Prana Educational and Charitable Trust (supra) ought to have referred the matter to the learned Chief Justice of the High Court seeking constitution of a larger Bench. The only other way Prana Educational and Charitable Trust (supra) could have gotten over K P Shibu (supra) despite being a co-equal Bench would have been by undertaking an analysis via the principles of per incuriam and/or sub-silentio, as undertaken by a 3-Judge Bench recently in A Raja v D Kumar , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1033. We say this illustratively. Not CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2025 [@ SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CRIMINAL) NO.4459/2023] 24 as a matter of routine can a later Bench of equal strength refuse to follow an earlier decision of a Bench of equal strength. The law hereon was stated in National Insurance Company Limited v Pranay Sethi , ( 2017) 16 SCC 680 and Union Territory of Ladakh v Jammu and Kashmir National Conference , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1140. Therefore, while not disturbing Prana Educational and Charitable Trust (supra) inter- parties, we declare the statement of law therein incorrect to the extent it rules on the issue before us, on account of failure to adhere to binding precedent.

33. Dadasaheb Rawal Co-op. Bank of Dondaicha Ltd. (supra) and Abraham Memorial Educational Trust (supra) were decided by the Bombay and Madras High Courts respectively, prior to Pratibha Pratisthan (supra) and need not detain us further. Mukund (supra) was decided by a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, Bench at Nagpur, where the learned Judge held:

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2025 [@ SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CRIMINAL) NO.4459/2023] 26

13. In this background, it would be necessary to consider the settled position on the important point as to the effects and consequences of not arraigning the Trust as a principal accused or the effects and consequences of deletion of the name of Trust from the complaint during the pendency of the complaint. In my view, this situation would be required to be addressed in the backdrop of the law laid down in the cases of Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd. , (2012) 5 SCC 661: (2012) 4 Mah LJ (SC) 527:

(c) The Orissa High Court altogether omitted to consider the relevant provisions of the Trusts Act .

38. The views expressed by the respective High Courts in Prana Educational and Charitable Trust (supra); Dadasaheb Rawal Co-op. Bank of Dondaicha Ltd. (supra); Abraham Memorial Educational Trust (supra); Mukund (supra), and; Bijaya Manjari Satpathy (supra) run counter to what we have held above. The same do not commend themselves to us and are overruled in law, without disturbing their effect(s) inter-parties.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2025 [@ SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CRIMINAL) NO.4459/2023] 30

39. The Impugned Judgment accorded reliance to SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra) and Pawan Kumar Goel (supra) while acceding to the Respondent’s prayer(s) before it. Again, Pawan Kumar Goel (supra) was in the context of a company and the principles laid down could not be made applicable straightaway to a Trust, moreso in light of the reasoning by us hereinabove. The extracts from SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra) cited in the Impugned Judgment are distinguishable as they related to the averments necessary in a complaint to invoke vicarious liability and not the factum of impleadment or lack thereof, specifically, a Trust in a complaint. Concededly, neither party urged submissions based on the Trusts Act before the High Court.

40. Accordingly, for reasons aforesaid, taking a holistic view in the entirety of the extant facts and circumstances as also the submissions canvassed by the learned counsel for the parties, we find the Impugned Judgment to be unsustainable. We have no hesitation in quashing and setting aside the Impugned Judgment. Resultantly, the subject- proceeding in Criminal Case No.44(S)/2019 stands restored to its original file and number, to be proceeded with by the Court concerned in accordance with law. As the matter traces its origin to the year 2019, we expect the Court concerned to take steps with due expedition. CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2025 [@ SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CRIMINAL) NO.4459/2023] 31

41. The appeal stands allowed. This Judgment shall not affect any other contentions of law and fact, which may be raised before the Trial Court, at the appropriate stage.

THE PENDING REFERENCE AND ITS EFFECT IN LAW:

42. We are conscious that Pratibha Pratisthan (supra) has been doubted and referred to a Larger Bench vide Order dated 04.10.2019 in Tara Bai Desai Charitable Opthalmic Trust Hospital v Supreme Elevators India (P) Ltd., Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.18636/2019 [since reported as (2025) 3 SCC 80]. In fact, one of us (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.) was nominated by Hon’ble the then Chief Justice of India to be part of the 3-Judge Bench constituted to hear the afore-noted reference. As the learned Judge presiding over that 3-Judge Bench has since demitted office, it would entail nomination of a new coram. However, till the reference is decided one way or the other, the law as declared in Pratibha Pratisthan (supra) continues to hold the field as no order has been passed in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.18636/2019 requesting other Benches to await the outcome thereof. There is no doubt on this, given the clear dicta in Union Territory of Ladakh (supra) [2-Judge Bench], which after surveying the law, held:

43. We have noticed a judgment by a Coordinate Bench in A P Electrical Equipment Corporation v Tahsildar , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 447 stating:

MISCELLANEOUS:

We clarify that the instant appeal is disposed of and not tagged with the reference.

..…………………..................…..J. [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH] ..…………………..................…..J. [PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA] NEW DELHI OCTOBER 09, 2025 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2025 [@ SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CRIMINAL) NO.4459/2023]