1. Rule. With the consent of learned Advocates for the parties, heard forthwith.

2. In this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the petitioners seek quashing of and setting aside First Information Report and consequently, proceedings in Criminal Case No. 589 of 1999 pending before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nagpur. The case of the petitioners is that their marriage was solemnized on 24.12.1998 and due to the misunderstanding between the petitioners and family members of the petitioners, several cases were filed. According to the petitioners, since the matter is compromised and as the offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code is not compoundable, the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court is invoked to secure the ends of justice. In Criminal Case No. 589 of 1999 complaint was filed by respondent No. 1 who is brother of petitioner No. 2 for offence under Sections 323 , 395 , 498A, 506 and 147 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code as also under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Case No. 797 of 99 was filed by respondent No. 2 who is father of petitioner No. 1 for offences under Sections 323, 427, 506 and 147 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. Besides these criminal cases, the petitioner No. 2 has filed a petition for decree of nullity of marriage which is pending before the Family Court and the matter was compromised and both parties agreed to withdraw the allegations against each other and further agreed to file joint petition under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act for divorce by mutual consent. The petitioner No. 1 agreed to deposit Rs. 2,50,000/- towards past, present and future maintenance as permanent settlement and has deposited a sum of Rs. 2,21,000/-. The consent terms have been filed by the parties before the Family Court in Petition No. 88 of 1999. It is further alleged that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had given undertaking that they will extend co-operation to withdraw the criminal complaint. The offences under Sections 498A and 395 of the Indian Penal Code are not compoundable. Therefore, according to the parties, the matter cannot be finally settled and as such inherent powers should be exercised by this Court, to avoid harassment as also for the good of the society at large. According to them, this would also save valuable and precious time of this Honourable Court.

3. This petition is opposed by the State (respondent No. 3) on the ground that the offence under Sections 498A and 395 of the Indian Penal Code are not compoundable and the petition is liable to be rejected.

4. Learned Advocate for the petitioners, after placing reliance upon number of authorities, submitted that in the circumstances of the case, since the offences under Sections 498A and 395 of the Indian Penal Code are not compoundable and in the absence of compromise the entire settlement between the parties cannot take place, this Court in its inherent jurisdiction should quash the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 598 of 1999 pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nagpur. Learned Advocates for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have adopted the arguments advanced by the learned Advocate for the petitioners. Learned A.P.P. while opposing the petition, has also placed reliance on number of rulings and has urged that the offences being non-compoundable. The question of quashing the proceedings would not arise.

5. The short question for decision is, whether writ jurisdiction or inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code should be pressed into service for quashing the proceedings in cases where the offences are non-compoundable and the parties wish to settle the disputes between them by compromising the same. There is divergence of opinion amongst High Courts on this issue. The High Courts of Punjab and Haryana, Delhi High Court, Orissa High Court and Himachal Pradesh have taken a view that offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, though not compoundable, under Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code, can be allowed to be compounded by exercising inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. On the other hand, the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court; Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court; Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court; High Court of Karnataka and learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, have taken the view that in the case of an offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code which is non-compoundable under Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code, inherent powers cannot be exercised either to permit compromise or to quash proceedings on that count. Learned Advocate for the petitioners has taken the former view and the learned A.P.P. has pressed before me the later view.

6. I shall first deal with the view which is pressed into service by learned Advocate for the petitioners. Though the learned Advocate for the petitioners had placed reliance on the Division Bench judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Smt. Daggupati Jayalakshmi v. State 1993 Cri.L.J. 3162 : 1993 (3) All Cri.L.R. 317, yet the view taken therein has been held by the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Annaamdevula Srinivasa Rao and Anr. v. State of A.P. and Ors. 1995 Cri.L.J. 3964, as view taken per incuriam. Subsequently, the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Smt. Ghousia Sultana @ Ghousia Begum and etc. etc. v. Mohd. Ghouse Baig and Ors. 1996 Cri.L.J. 2973, has overruled the view taken by the Division Bench and has endorsed the view taken by the learned Single Judge. I shall discuss these authorities while discussing the other view put up before me by the learned A.P.P.

7. In Mohindeer Singh Khosla and Ors. v. State of Union Territory of Chandigarh and Ors. 1996 Cri.L.J. 1247 : 1992 All. L.J. 464, while dealing with the criminal case wherein offences under Sections 365, 384, 342 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code were disclosed, it was found that the offences mentioned in the First Information Report were not compoundable, but the parties amicably settled their disputes and differences and in the interest of justice, exercising powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the First Information Report was quashed. In this case it was pointed out that in Y. Suresh Babu v. State of A.P. 1987 (2) J.T. 361, an offence under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code, which is non-compoundable, was allowed to be compounded by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court and similarly, in Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1988 SC 2111 : 1989 (1) J.T. 618 : 1989 Cr.L.J. 121. Their Lordships permitted the parties to compound the offence under Section 397 of the Indian Penal Code. However, it may be pointed out that the Apex Court in Ram Lal and Anr. v. State of J. & K. , has held that the judgments in Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan ( supra) and Suresh Babu v. State of A.P. (supra) were decisions rendered per incuriam. It was pointed out by the Apex Court that Section 320 provides two tables, one compoundable and the other compoundable with the permission of the Court and only such offences as are included in the two Tables can be compounded and none else. The Apex Court also pointed out that Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 imposes a legislative ban in the following terms:

The judgment of the Apex Court in Ram Lal and Anr. v. State of J. & K. (supra) was followed in Surendranath Mohanty and Anr. v. State of Orissa , wherein it was held that an offence under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code is non-compoundable and compounding of the same is not permissible. Therefore, the basis of the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, wherein reliance was placed on the judgments in the case of Suresh Babu v. State of A.P. (supra) and Mahesh Chand v. State (supra) which have been held to be per incuriam in Ram Lal and Anr. v. State of J. & K. (supra) is shaken.

8. Learned Advocate for the petitioners has then placed reliance on the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Chain Sukh and Ors. v. State and Ors. (1999) C.C.R. 265, wherein the Delhi High Court was dealing with a criminal case under Sections 452, 323 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Relying upon Smt. Daggupati Jayalakshmi v. The State (supra) and Mahesh Chand and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan (supra), the First Information Report was quashed in exercise of the power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Judgment in Smt. Daggupati Jayalakshmi v. State (supra) as I have already pointed out has been held to be rendered per incuriam by the learned Single Judge of the same High Court in Annamdevula Srinivasa Rao and Anr. v. State of A.P. (supra), and subsequent thereto, the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has overruled the view taken in Daggupati Jayalakshmi v. State (supra) and the Full Bench has endorsed the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Annamdevula Srinivasa Rao and Anr. v. State of A.P. Therefore, even this ruling of the Delhi High Court cannot help the petitioners. The ruling in Mahesh Chand and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan (supra) has been held to be rendered per incuriam by the Apex Court in Randal v. State of J. & K. (supra).

9. Reliance was placed on another judgment of Delhi High Court in Saleemuddin and Ors. v. State and Ors. (2000) 1 D.M.C. 693. In this case, the Court was dealing with the criminal complaint under Sections 498A and 406 of the Indian Penal Code. It was held that to ensure larger happiness by allowing settlement between the parties specially where the parties have started living together or the divorce has taken place to enable them to settle down in life all-out effort has to be made by each one of us to contain this ever spreading fear psychosis leading to tension and consequential strange relations. In this case the judgment of the Apex Court in Ramlal and Anr. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (supra) as also Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code has been considered besides rulings on the point of exercise of inherent power in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana , V.C. Shukla v. State , and Krishnan and Anr. v. Krishnaveni and Anr. ; Nevertheless, some of the other judgments of the Apex Court on the point of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, have not been considered in this judgment, to which I shall make reference at a later stage and I am not able to subscribe to the view taken by learned Judge.

10. The last judgment on which reliance is placed by the learned Advocate for the petitioners is, Subhash Chandra Mishra v. Republic of India and Anr. 2001 Cri.L.J. 876, wherein the Court was dealing with the criminal offences under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. In this case, divorce petition was pending before the Family Court and affidavit was filed that there was no chance of reunion and parties wanted to live separately without proceeding with the criminal case and the parties had settled their differences and had arrived at compromise. The proceedings in this case were quashed in order to achieve social justice and harmony. However, the matter has not been dealt with threadbare with reference to the law and rulings on this subject.

11. At this stage, I shall also refer to three unreported judgments of this Court upon which reliance was placed by learned Advocate for the petitioner. The said judgments are Sudhir Dattatraya Kulkarni and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. Criminal Application No. 386 of 2000; Sanjay Shantaram Awade v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. Criminal Application No. 628 of 2000, and Suresh Kashinath Dhadhod and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. Criminal No. 1365 of 2000, wherein the offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code was allowed to be compounded in view of the settlement between the parties, but in none of these cases, there has been discussion on law or on the question of exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In fact, in Suresh Kashinath Dhadhod and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra), learned A.P.P. had stated that the State had no objection if the matter is allowed to be compounded. As against these rulings, there is judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Smt. Neeta Sanjay Tadage v. Smt. Vimal Sadashiv Tadage and Ors. 1997 Cri.L.J. 3263, wherein all relevant aspects have been considered and the view taken by the learned Single Judge is that offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code is non-compoundable; Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code clearly provides that no offence shall be compounded except as provided by that section; compounding of offence which is non-compoundable cannot be accomplished by invoking writ jurisdiction of the High Court on inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In this case, judgment in Nathmal Rathi v. State of Maharashtra 1992 Cri.L.J. 2106, of this Court has been held to be per incuriam in the light of the view which I am going to take, the judgments of the learned Single Judges in Suresh Kashinath Dhadhod and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr.; Sanjay Shantaram Awade v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. and Sudhir Dattatraya Kulkarni and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (supra) are per incuriam. The learned Single Judge of this Court in Smt. Neeta Sanjay Tadage v. Smt. Vimal Sadashiv Tadage and Ors. (supra) relied upon the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Annamdevula Srinivasa Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra) which has been approved by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Smt. Ghousia Sultana alias Ghousia Begum and. etc. etc. v. Mohd. Ghouse Baig and Ors. etc. (supra) and which has overruled the Division Bench judgment of the said High Court in Smt. Daggupati Jayalakshmi v. State (supra). The learned Single Judge of this Court has, after placing reliance on Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra , and concurring fully with the view taken by the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Annamdevula Srinivasa Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra), as also the expression "any other purpose" occurring in Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, thereby meaning "enforcement of any legal right and performance of any legal duty" has come to the conclusion that offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code being non-compoundable, compounding of the same cannot be permitted either by invoking writ jurisdiction of the High Court or in exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. What cannot be done directly, cannot be obviously be permitted to be done indirectly and if the offences are not compoundable and the parties wish to compound the same, the desired result cannot be allowed to be achieved by seeking quashing of proceedings on that ground.

12. Be that as it may, I shall now proceed to discuss the other judgments which take the latter view. I shall first deal with the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In Smt. Daggupati Jayalakshmi v. State (supra), the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court had laid down that the High Court in exceptional circumstances can permit compounding of non-compoundable offences under its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It was pointed out that sympathy cannot be a ground for applying the inherent powers vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and sympathy has no place to outweigh the powers given under a particular statute. This judgment of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court came up before the learned Single Judge of the same High Court in Annamdevula Srinivasa Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra). In this matter, directions were sought from the Court in various matters relating to non-compoundable offences such as, Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, Sections 307 and 452 of the Indian Penal Code. After elaborate discussion and taking into consideration the rulings of the Apex Court on the question of exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as also the provisions of Section 320(9) of the Criminal Procedure Code as also the judgments of the other High Courts and the Division Bench judgment in Smt. Daggupati Jayaiakshrni v. State (supra), it was held that the said judgment of the Division Bench even with regard to its applicability to the offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code is given per incuriam. In this judgment, the learned Single Judge has referred to two Tables under Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the question of exercise of inherent powers. Reliance is placed on the judgment of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (supra) wherein the Apex Court has held:

Then reference is made to Mosst. Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee , and Sooraj Devi v. Pyarelal , and the following observations from there have been quoted:

13. The learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has quoted Constitutional Bench decision of the Apex Court in Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India , on which reliance was placed by the learned Senior Counsel therein and it was submitted that the matter is now authoritatively decided by the Supreme Court that the Court, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction cannot direct compounding of offences which are otherwise non-compoundable under the Code and it was pointed out that the compounding would run in the teeth of the statutory prohibition contained in Section 320(9) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Apex Court while dealing with this submission, held that the order terminating the pending criminal proceedings is not supportable on the strict terms of Sections 320 or 321 or 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code . However, the case was decided under the plenary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India by the Apex Court. The learned Single Judge then referred to the judgments of the Apex Court in Dharampal v. Ramshri , and Ganesh Narayan Hegde v. S. Bangarappa (1995) 2 All Cri.L.R. 211, and has quoted the following observations therefrom:

14. The learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court then dealt with the Division Bench judgment in Smt. Daggupati Jayalakshmi v. State (supra), and quoted the following paragraph from the Division Bench judgment:

15. The Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Smt. Ghousia Sultana alias Ghousia Begum and etc. etc. v. Mohd. Ghouse Baig and Ors. etc. (supra), subsequently overruled the Division Bench judgment in Smt. Daggupati Jayalakshmi v. State (supra) and followed the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Annamdevula Srinivasa Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra). The Full Bench noticed the law laid down in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (supra) by the Apex Court in relation to the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as also other judgments and came to the conclusion that the compounding of non-compoundable offences cannot be allowed or directed to be compounded by the High Court in the exercise of its inherent powers. However, it was pointed out that in appropriate cases steps may be taken for withdrawal of prosecution in accordance with Section 321 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

16. The Full Bench of the Rajas than High Court in Mohan Singh and Ors. v. State 1993 Cri.L.J. 3193 : 1993 (3) All Cr.L.R. 197 : 1993 (1) Cur. Cr.R. 608, has also exhaustively dealt with the issue in question with reference to the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code after relying upon a number of judgments of the Apex Court on the scope of exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, including Palaniappa Gounder v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1977 SC 1332 : 1977 (3) S.C.R. 132 : 1977 (2) SCC 632 : 1977 U.J. 339 : 1977 Cr.L.J. 1992, wherein it is laid down as under:

Applying the aforesaid principles, the Rajasthan High Court held that in view of the express bar contained in Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court cannot, in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, permit composition of offence which is not compoundable under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

17. The Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Deepak Dawar and Ors. v. State of M.P. and Ors. 2000 Cri.L.J. 2874, while dealing with the criminal case under Sections 406 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code and after noticing the divergence of views on the subject, held that compounding a non-compoundable offence or quashing a criminal prosecution as a result of compromise between the parties by the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not permissible since such a compromise is expressly barred under Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

18. The learned Advocate for the applicants relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Krishnan and Anr. v. Krishnaveni and Anr. (supra). In this case, after considering Sub-section (3) of Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as also suo motu. powers under Section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code has laid down that in spite of bar contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, inherent power of the High Court is still available under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The question before the Apex Court was, whether the High Court has power to entertain revision under Section 397(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code in respect of which the Sessions Judge had already exercised revisional power and whether under the circumstances of the case, it could be considered to be one under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Apex Court has laid down the object of Section 397(3) is to put a bar on simultaneous revisional applications to the High Court and the Court of Sessions so as to prevent unnecessary delay and multiplicity of proceedings. However, it was pointed out that by implication, the State stands excluded from the purview of the word "person" for the purpose of limiting its rights to avail the revisional power of the High Court under Section 397(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code for the reason that the State, being the prosecutor of the offenders, is enjoined to conduct prosecution and to take such remedy and steps as it deems proper. Accordingly, it was held that the prohibition under Section 397(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code on revisional power given to the High Court would not apply when the State seeks revision under Section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, the State is not prohibited to avail the revisional power of the High Court under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Apex Court then laid down that ordinarily when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, a person/accused/complainant cannot be allowed to take recourse to revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code or under inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code or Section 397(2) of the Code. Nevertheless, the Apex Court has pointed out that Section 397 of the Code gives power to the High Court to call for records as also suo motu power under Section 401 to exercise the revisional power on the grounds mentioned therein. It has been further laid down that the revisional power of the High Court merely conserves the power of the High Court to see that justice is done in accordance with the recognized rules of criminal jurisprudence and that Its subordinate Courts do not exceed the jurisdiction or abuse, the power vested in them under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of the inferior Criminal Courts or to prevent miscarriage of justice. Therefore, the conclusion arrived at by the Apex Court in this judgment is based upon the reasoning that even in spite of the bar under Section 397(3) of the Code, the State can approach the High Court for revision under Section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

18-A. At this stage, a reference may be made to another judgment of the Apex Court which was cited by the learned Advocate for the applicant, which is, Mary Angel and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu . In this case, the Apex Court, after referring to the judgments in Pamapathy v. State of Mysore , and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar , has laid down that if there is an express provision governing the particular subject-matter, then there is no scope for invoking or exercising the inherent powers of the Court because the Court is required to apply, in the manner and mode prescribed, the provisions of the statute which are made to govern the particular subject-matter, but the highest Court in the State could exercise inherent powers for doing justice according to law where no express power is available to do a particular thing and express powers do not negative the existence of such power. The following observations from Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar (supra) were quoted, with approval, by the Apex Court:

19. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the view that inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be pressed into service either for permitting a non-compoundable offence to be compounded or for quashing of prosecution on the ground that the parties wish to compound the offence which is otherwise non-compoundable. I therefore, do not find any merit in this application and the petition is liable to be rejected. Petition is rejected' and rule is accordingly discharged.