Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J 1 This batch of appeals arises from a judgment and order dated 8 January 2019 of a Single Judge of the High Court of Gujarat. The High Court quashed an FIR 1 which was registered against the private respondents under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 2, except for the allegations against the fourth and fifth respondents under Section 385 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 3, in respect of which the investigation has been permitted to continue. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Sanjay Kumar Date: 2021.11.12 17:36:00 IST Reason: 1 FIR No I-124 of 2016 2 “ CrPC ” 3 “ IPC ” 1 2 On 13 April 2016, an FIR 4 was registered against the private respondents under Sections 465 , 467 , 468 and 120B of the IPC by the Gandhigram Police Station, Rajkot on a complaint made by the appellant. The contents of the FIR are elucidated below.

3 A property located in Village Veja at Rajkot is alleged to have been allotted to Shamjibhai Jesabhai Koli by the government on account of his service in the Army. The appellant has alleged that he and his brother purchased the property for a consideration of Rs 7,75,000 and an agreement to sell was executed in their favour by Shamjibhai before a notary. An irrevocable power of attorney was allegedly executed in favour of the appellant and his brother for clearing the title to the land and for obtaining the sanction of the government. The appellant alleged that in 1999, he paid an amount of Rs 4,00,000 by a demand draft and Rs 4,00,000 in cash to the vendor. Shamjibhai is alleged to have registered a sale deed on 19 May 1999 in favour of the appellant, his father and his brothers. Shamjibhai is alleged to have also executed a power of attorney in favour of the appellant and his father-in-law on the same date. The power of attorney mentioned that Shamjibhai had accepted the consideration for the land and had handed over possession to the appellant and his family. Shamjibhai is alleged to have executed another agreement mentioning that an amount of Rs 2,00,000 was due to be paid to him. On 9 January 2006, the Government of Gujarat granted permission for the sale of the land and a premium of Rs 13,76,000 was allegedly paid by the appellant and his family. As the power of attorney holder, the appellant’s father-in-law sold the land to Om Prakash Kotecha, Mukul 4 FIR No I-124 of 2016 2 Kotecha, Ketan Kotecha and his wife Deepaben and registered a sale deed in this regard. The appellant claims that he has been in possession of the property since 1999.

4 The appellant has alleged that the second and third respondents, who are daughters of Shamjibhai, instituted a suit 5 in 2011 for cancellation of the sale deed executed by Shamjibhai in favour of the appellant. The civil court by its order dated 8 February 2013 granted an interim injunction restraining the appellant from alienating, transferring or assigning the property during the pendency of the suit.

5 It is alleged that the second and third respondents executed a power of attorney in favour of the seventh respondent in relation to the property, for a consideration of Rs 5,51,000. A Memorandum of Understanding 6 was also executed stipulating that the land is to be sold for Rs 2 crores. The second and third respondents are alleged to have executed another power of attorney and MoU with the sixth respondent, against a payment of Rs 5,00,000. 6 On 20 March 2015, prior to the FIR which was registered at the behest of the appellant, an FIR 7 was registered against the appellant and the members of his family on a complaint lodged by the second respondent for offences punishable under Sections 406 , 409 , 420 , 465 , 467 , 471 , 447 , 34 , 114 and 120B of the IPC at DCB Police Station, Rajkot alleging that the property had been obtained by the appellant without payment of the entire consideration. The appellant has contended that the second respondent did not disclose that a 5 Civil Suit No 157 of 2011 6 “MoU” 7 FIR No I-11 of 2015 3 payment of Rs 4,00,000 was made by the appellant by a demand draft which was deposited in the account of Shamjibhai.

7 The appellant has further alleged that the fourth respondent who is the spouse of the second respondent called him to the office of an advocate to pressurize him to enter into a compromise. A sum of money running into crores of rupees is alleged to have been demanded from the appellant, stating that the lands had been sold to land mafias. The fifth respondent, the spouse of the third respondent, is also alleged to have demanded money from the appellant to arrive at a compromise. The fourth and fifth respondents are alleged to have acted as witnesses to the powers of attorney and deeds executed by the second and third respondents with third parties.

8 The appellant lodged a complaint with the Gandhigram Police Station against the respondents and a FIR 8 was registered on 13 April 2016 for offences punishable under Sections 465 , 467 , 468 and 120B of the IPC. The second to seventh respondents filed petitions 9 before the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash the FIR 10 registered at the behest of the appellant against them. By an interim order dated 2 May 2016, the High Court directed that the investigation may continue but the charge-sheet be filed only with its permission. 9 The eighth and ninth respondents were not named in the FIR. Apprehending arrest, they sought and were granted anticipatory bail by the 8 FIR No I-124 of 2016 9 Crl. M.A. No 9885 of 2016, Crl. M.A. No 10534 of 2016, Crl. M.A. 10612 of 2016 and Crl. M.A. No 10651 of 2016 10 FIR No I-124 of 2016 4 Sessions Court, Rajkot. Thereafter, they also filed petitions 11 for quashing of the FIR under Section 482 of the CrPC.

10 A draft charge-sheet was placed before the High Court for offences punishable under Sections 385 , 389 , 418 , 477 , 506 (2) , 120B and 34 of the IPC. The draft charge-sheet also contains allegations against the eighth and ninth respondents. It is alleged that the eight respondent who is an advocate, helped the other accused in drafting false documents – the powers of attorney and MoUs. The ninth respondent is alleged to have entered into a settlement with the second respondent on 25 February 2015 against a payment of Rs 41,51,000. 11 The petitions for quashing the FIR were allowed by the High Court by its impugned judgement dated 8 January 2019 save in respect of the investigation for offences punishable under Section 385 of the IPC against the fourth and fifth respondents. The conclusion of the High Court is extracted below:

12 On behalf of the appellant, it has been urged by Mr Nikhil Goel learned counsel that:

SLP (Crl) No 5734 and 5735 of 2019 8

(ii) The investigation conducted by the DCB police station has revealed that:

13 On the other hand, Mr Karan Bharihoke and Mr Khilan Chandrani appearing for the sixth to ninth respondents submitted that:

Thereafter, they filed the quashing petitions before the High Court; 11

(xi) The civil court had allowed the application for interlocutory injunction filed by the second and third respondents. This order was challenged by the appellant before the Sessions Court, 13 under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 but this was rejected on 22 November 2016. The appellant has moved the High Court 14 in appeal, before which proceedings are pending;

(xii) The appellant has misled the Court by claiming that Shamjibhai had registered a sale deed in his favour in 1999. The document is not registered. The power of attorney and sale deeds are forged documents and were a subject matter of a prior FIR;

(xiii) The dispute between the parties is essentially of a civil nature which has been given a criminal colour;

(xiv) The appellant has entered into a settlement with the fourth and fifth respondents, who were the only persons accused of extortion. An attempt is being made to pressurize the sixth to ninth respondents to enter into a compromise with the help of the police machinery;

(xv) The FIR was registered after a lapse of 3 years and 6 months; and (xvi) There are no allegations against the answering respondents which constitute an offence.

14 The rival contentions will now be considered.

15 Insofar as the sixth to ninth respondents are concerned, their position 13 Civil Appeal No 32 of 2013 14 SCA No 5558 of 2017 12 before this Court in SLP (Crl) Nos 5736-5739 of 2019 is as follows:

16 Before we examine whether the High Court transgressed the limitations on the exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, it will be useful to give an overview of how the proceedings have evolved.

17 An FIR 15 was registered at the behest of the appellant on 13 April 2016 for offences punishable under Sections 465 , 467 , 468 and 120B of the IPC. Eight persons were named as accused:

18 Upon the registration of the FIR, petitions under Section 482 of the CrPC were instituted before the Gujarat High Court. By an order dated 2 May 2016, a Single Judge permitted the investigation to continue but directed that no final report (under Section 173 of the CrPC) shall be submitted without the permission of the High Court. The interim order of the High Court records that it is based on two considerations:

19 The FIR lodged by the appellant was investigated, upon which an application was moved on 9 August 2017 by the Police Inspector, DCB Police Station, Rajkot city to the Registrar General of the High Court seeking permission to file a charge-sheet. In the course of the proceedings before the High Court, 16 Regular Civil Suit No 157 of 2011 15 submissions were advanced by the APP, alluding to the contents of the FIR and the charge-sheet. The charge-sheet has been described as a “draft charge- sheet” since in view of the interim order of the High Court, there was a restraint on the submission of the charge-sheet before the competent court without the permission of the High Court. At this stage, it becomes necessary to advert to the submissions which were urged before the High Court by the APP, setting out the material which had emerged during the course of the investigation, following the registration of the FIR. The submissions have been summarized in the judgment of the High Court and read thus:

The advocate informed him that in order to compromise, a huge money has to be paid to Karanbhai, Maganbhai etc, and when he asked about the amount, advocate Babubhai informed him that they are demanding Rs.5,00,00,000/- (Rupees Five Crores Only) in order to enter into compromise otherwise he will enter into settlement agreement with head strong persons.

6.4 Learned APP has also placed reliance on the statement of Mr. Jenish Premjibhai Motivaras recorded by the Investigating Officer on 20. 05. 2016 in which he has stated that he was contacted by one Shri Kapilbhai Kotecha, who had taken him to one shop, wherein one person was sitting and was talking about the dealing to be done in some land, and thereafter, he informed him that, if he would like to invest in the said land, he can sign on the 16 documents brought by him. The said persons informed him that the land belongs to two ladies and accordingly, he has prepared the compromise in his name on the stamp paper of Rs.100/-. It is submitted by Mr.Jenish Premji that thereafter, he signed the said documents pertaining to the compromise and accordingly, the said person had asked him to pay Rs.25,000/- and further Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lacs Only) to be paid within a period of three months. It is further stated by Mr.Jenish Premji that he did not take any receipt from that unknown persons about the amount and only received business card in which his name and address was given. It is lastly submitted by him that that unknown person had committed fraud of Rs.25,000/- (Rs.Twenty Five Thousand Only), however, he has not lodged any police complaint in that regard.

6.5 Learned APP has also placed reliance on the statement dated 21.05.2016 taken by the Investigating Officer of one Prakash Kishorbhai Jariya, who has stated that he had given Rs.90,000/-(Rupees Ninety thousand Only) to one Ashwinbhai Parshottambhai Lila on 12.04.2016, but he did not take any receipt to that effect. It is submitted by him he read in the news-paper about the incident. When he tried to contact Ashwinbhai, his mobile phone was switch off, and thereafter, he contacted Jetul Kotecha and went with him at DCB Police Station for giving statements. It is submitted by him that Ashwinbhai had given him one compromise on the stamp paper of Rs.100/- as well as copy of power of attorney.

6.6 Learned APP has also relied upon one statement of Narendrabhai Chaganbhai Nasit recorded by the Investigating Officer on 21.05.2016 in which he has stated that he was approached by one Mr.Ashwinbhai to invest in the said land and also demanded Rs.2,50,000/-

(Rupees Two Lacs and Fifty Thousand Only) for investment and accordingly, he had paid cheque of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lac Only) on 18.11.2012 which was in the name of his brother Ramesh Chagan Nasit, and thereafter, he paid cash of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees One Lac Fifty Thousand only), and thereafter, he was called on 20.11.2012 at Rajkot Court to execute a compromise deed where Geetaben and Savitaben were present with their husbands. It is stated by him that Ashwinbhai thereafter was talking to the said farmers that Jitulbhai Kotecha is a Businessman and if we forced him, he would pay Rs.50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lacs Only) or Rs.1,00,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore Only), at that time, he told Ashwinbhai that he would not like to do such, and thereafter, went from there with his younger brother. He has submitted that he has not signed anywhere on the compromise deed and had put a cross on the name of his younger brother and the said compromise was written by the Ashwinbhai after one and half months. He has further submitted that he had not filed any police complaint in relation to Rs 2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lacs and Fifty Thousand) taken by Ashwinbhai.

17 6.7 Learned APP has further placed reliance on the statement of one Punit S/o. Narsibhai Udesa recorded by the Investigating Officer on 09.06.2016 and he has specifically stated there was a dispute going on between Karanbhai Solanki and Jetulbhai and one half prior, his uncle Karanbhai met Jitulbhai Kotecha at Europine Hotel for entering into compromise, at that time, Jetulbhai had made an offer of Rs.2,50,000/ (Rupees Two Lacs and Fifty Thousand) for compromise and on hearing that, his uncle Karan Solanki left the hotel. It is further stated that when he met his uncle Karanbhai outside the hotel, at that time, his uncle informed that he would not accept Rs.2,50,000/ (Rupees Two Lacs Fifty Thousand) for compromise with Jitulbhai.

6.8 In view of the aforesaid statement, learned APP has submitted that prima facie, case of extortion is made out against the present applicants and hence, FIR may not be quashed at this stage.” The above extract from the judgment of the High Court would make it abundantly clear that the Single Judge was duly apprised of the statements which were recorded by the Investigating Officer during the course of the investigation on 20 May 2016, 21 May 2016 and 9 June 2016. When the High Court took up the petitions under Section 482 , the Investigating Officer upon the completion of the investigation, sought permission to submit the final report under Section 173 before the competent court. This was noted by the High Court in paragraph 9 of its impugned order which reads as follows:

21 We would like to clarify that a distinct position arises when the charge- sheet has been filed before a Magistrate and proceedings under Section 482 are pending before the High Court. In such cases, the High Court must take into consideration the material collected during the investigation, as has been held by a two-judge Bench of this Court in Kaptan Singh v. The State of Uttar 21 Pradesh 20, of which one of us (Justice DY Chandrachud) was a part. However, the High Court cannot place reliance on a “draft charge-sheet” which is yet to be placed before the Magistrate to quash the criminal proceedings under Section

482. 22 Recently, in Mahendra KC v. State of Karnataka 21 this Court has reiterated the well settled test to be applied by the High Court for exercise of its powers under Section 482 for quashing an FIR:

23 In the present case, the FIR clearly mentions the role played by the sixth and seventh respondents in the following extract:

24 During the course of its impugned judgment, the High Court noted that certain persons (the eighth and ninth respondents) who were named as accused in the draft charge-sheet had instituted quashing petitions, evidently before the draft charge-sheet was placed before the High Court. In this backdrop, there is substance in the submission which has been urged on behalf of the appellant that the proceedings before the High Court have followed an unusual, if not extra- ordinary course. The High Court proceeded to entertain petitions for quashing under Section 482 at the behest of persons who were not named in the FIR purely on the basis of their names appearing in the draft charge-sheet. A draft charge-sheet was placed before the High Court by the investigating officer only in order to seek its permission, pursuant to the interim order, for submitting the charge-sheet to the competent court. Knowledge in regard to what has transpired during the course of the investigation is obtained by the accused once a copy of the charge-sheet is made available under Section 207 of the CrPC 22.Evidently, the persons whose names were mentioned in the draft charge-sheet had already moved the High Court in proceedings under Section 482 at a point of time 22 “207. Supply to the accused of copy of police report and other documents. In any case where the proceeding has been instituted on a police report, the Magistrate shall without delay furnish to the accused, free of cost, a copy of each of the following:-

section (5) of section 173 : Provided that the Magistrate may, after perusing any such part of a statement as is referred to in clause (iii) and considering the reasons given by the police officer for the request, direct that a copy of that part of the statement or of such portion thereof as the Magistrate thinks proper, shall be furnished to the accused: Provided further that if the Magistrate is satisfied that any document referred to in clause (v) is voluminous, he shall, instead of furnishing the accused with a copy thereof, direct that he will only be allowed to inspect it either personally or through pleader in Court.” 24 anterior to the investigating officer submitting the charge-sheet to the High Court for seeking its permission to submit it before the competent court in accordance with law. As a matter of fact, the draft charge-sheet records the filing of the petitions for quashing in the High Court which would indicate that even before the charge-sheet was brought to the notice of the High Court, petitions for quashing had already been filed. The High Court ought to have taken note of these developments. The appellant has submitted both in the course of the oral and written submissions that these developments indicate that the accused were complicit with the police. The High Court should have been alive to the abuse of its process.

25 On behalf of the respondents, it has been submitted that during the course of the investigation, the sixth to ninth respondents, who were apprehending arrest, moved an application for anticipatory bail, which was allowed by the Sessions Judge, Rajkot. Hence, it has been urged that it was thereafter that the petitions for quashing came to be instituted. While the apprehension of arrest may have led to the filing of an application for anticipatory bail before the Sessions Judge, this could not furnish the basis of a petition for quashing under Section 482 at the behest of persons who were not named in the FIR and who, as stated earlier, had instituted proceedings for quashing even before the draft charge-sheet came to be submitted before the High Court. The judgment of the High Court indicates that while analyzing the case set up before it by the applicants in various quashing petitions, it has proceeded to quash the FIR and the draft charge-sheet in respect of applicants who were not even arraigned as accused in the FIR. The interference by the High Court in the investigation 25 against the eighth and ninth respondents was at a premature stage and was not warranted.

26 During the course of oral arguments, it was urged on behalf of the respondents by learned counsel that a prior complaint had been registered against the appellant which had resulted into the submission of a charge-sheet. The respondents ought to have drawn the attention of this Court to the fact that on 8 July 2021, the High Court in Criminal Misc. Application No 10523 of 2021 had quashed the prior complaint as well as the charge-sheet and all consequential proceedings at the behest of the appellant, a fact which emerged out of the written submissions filed on behalf of the appellant. Another submission which was urged on behalf of the respondents is that the appellant had arrived at a compromise in respect of some of the accused and the entire FIR was quashed. On this aspect, the appellant in the written submissions has recorded that the memo of Criminal Misc. Application No 10529 of 2021 was filed by two persons (the fourth and fifth respondents) in respect of whom proceedings were directed to be continued. It is in this backdrop that the order dated 9 July 2021 records that the entire FIR stands quashed. The FIR against all the accused except the aforesaid two persons stood quashed as a result of the impugned order of the High Court dated 8 January 2019. Hence, the order dated 9 July 2021 only quashed the FIR against the remaining two accused with whom there was a subsequent compromise. The compromise has been annexed as Annexure R-1 to the counter affidavit filed by the sixth respondent. In this backdrop, the appellant stated that SLP (Crl) Nos 5734 and 5735 of 2019 are not being pressed. The respondents to the above SLPs are the legal heirs of the 26 seller of the land from whom the appellant and his family members purchased the land and their spouses. The other accused are allegedly the persons who had executed champertous agreements or aided in their execution (eighth respondent) and who are alleged to have been party to the extortion of money from the appellant.

27 For the above reasons we have come to the conclusion that the High Court transgressed the limitations on the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC in quashing the FIR and all consequential proceedings. There has been a clear abuse of the process before the High Court. We accordingly set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 8 January 2019 and allow the Criminal Appeals arising out of SLP (Crl) Nos 5736-39 of 2019 in terms of the above judgment. However, Criminal Appeals arising out of SLP (Crl) Nos 5734 and 5735 of 2019 shall stand dismissed.

28 Pending application(s), if any stand disposed of.

…..….…………………………...............................J. [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud] …..….…………………………...............................J. [B V Nagarathna] New Delhi;

November 12, 2021.