2025:HHC:28474-DB IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No 297 of 2023.

Reserved on: 06.08.2025 Date of Decision: 22.08.2025.

Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr. N.S. Chandel, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Sidharth, Advocate.

For the Respondent : Mr. Janesh Mahajan, Advocate.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of charge sheet dated 19.12.2014 arising out of FIR bearing RC No. 0962012A0010 dated 18.10.2012, registered with CBI, Shimla for the commission of offences punishable under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act (PC Act) 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

2025:HHC:28474-DB (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that an FIR was registered with CBI, Shimla against Brigadier J.K. Narang, stating that Brigadier J.K. Narang joined the Indian Army as a Lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers on 14.03.1981. He served at various places. He acquired huge movable and immovable assets in his name and in the name of his family members, between 01.01.2007 and 23.02.2012. He was in possession of assets worth ₹2,13,42,801/-. He was paid a salary of ₹42,14,191/-. He earned a profit of ₹50,00,000/- from the sale of Plot No. C-1545 situated in Sushant Lok, Phase-I, Gurgaon, vide sale agreement and general power of attorney. The income of Brigadier J.K. Narang and his family members under all the heads was ₹1,37,36,473/-. Their likely savings were ₹16,16,007/-. He was found in possession of assets worth ₹1,84,79,943/-, and he possessed ₹1,68,63,936/- disproportionate to his known sources of income. The CBI registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. CBI filed a charge sheet against Brigadier J.K. Narang, his family members and the present petitioner. It was asserted that the petitioner/accused Kulbir Singh Dhaliwal is ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:21 :::CIS 3 2025:HHC:28474-DB practising as an Advocate in the High Court at Chandigarh. His daughter, Ms. Loveleen Dhaliwal, is married to Amit Singla, an .

approved contractor of Border Road Organisation (BRO) who had worked under the supervision of the accused J.K. Narang.

Petitioner/ accused Kulbir Singh Dhaliwal entered into a criminal conspiracy with the accused, Sh. Sumant Narang & J.K. Narang.

They entered into an agreement dated 15.04.2011 with Sh. Sumant Narang for the purchase of his plot No. A-403, Sector-6, Dwarka, New Delhi for ₹75,00,000/-. It was mentioned in the agreement that ₹15,00,000/- was paid in cash as an earnest money to Sumant Narang on 15.04.2011. The agreement was executed on the stamp paper No. S387853, which was released to Ms. Madhu, stamp vendor, on 13.02.2012. Kulbir Singh Dhaliwal is shown to have given ₹15,00,000/- in cash to Sumant Narang on 15.04.2011 and ₹10,00,000/- in cash to Sumant Narang on 11.10.2011 as an advance payment to purchase the flat. He had entered into a criminal conspiracy with Sumant Narang and J.K. Narang to commit forgery by preparing a false agreement dated 15.04.2011 and used this document as genuine to conceal the disproportionate assets of Brigadier J.K. Narang and his family members; hence, it was prayed that action be taken against the accused.

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3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and the filing of the charge sheet, the petitioner has filed the present .

petition for quashing of the FIR and the consequential proceedings.

It was asserted that no party to the agreement claimed that it was forged. Only the CBI is claiming that the document is forged. No sale deed was executed pursuant to the agreement, and the parties entered into an agreement stipulating that the agreement to sell would not be acted upon. ₹25,00,000/- would be returned by Sumant Narang to the petitioner/accused with interest. As a result, ₹27,00,000/- was transferred by the petitioner to Sumant Narang through a cheque. The basic ingredients of Sections 463 , 464 and 467 of IPC are not satisfied. The petitioner is not a maker of the document, and he cannot be held liable for its forgery. The ingredients of the conspiracy were not satisfied. The petitioner is being harassed because his son-in-law is a registered contractor with the Border Security Organisation. He never worked with the accused J.K. Narang. The petitioner cannot be held liable because his son-in-law was associated with BRO. The allegations in the charge sheet do not constitute the commission of any cognizable offence; therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed, the charge sheet and the FIR be ordered to be quashed.

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4. The petition is opposed by filing a reply by the CBI denying the contents of the petition and reproducing the contents .

of the charge sheet. It was asserted that the agreement was executed on 15.04.2011 on the stamp paper No. S387853. An addendum was executed on 11.10.2011. The stamp paper No. S387853 was not in existence before 13.02.2012. It was issued to Ms. Madhu on 13.02.2012 and was taken on record by her on the same day. Ms. Madhu also denied that the entry mentioned in the stamp paper pertained to her. She stated that the licence No. 169 belongs to Raj Kumar, another stamp vendor. Raj Kumar revealed that the stamp paper was not issued to him, and it was not sold by him. The witnesses to the agreement, Sh. Kashmir Singh and Sh. Dinesh Prashad, were also interrogated. Kashmir Singh revealed that the agreement already had the signatures of the petitioner and Sumant Narang. No person had signed the document in his presence. He put the signatures on the document on the petitioner's request. Dinesh Parshad was also not present in the office. Dinesh Prashad stated that he had put the signatures on the request of Smt. Loveleen Kaur Dhaliwal, the petitioner's daughter. No transaction of money took place in the presence of the witnesses. Petitioner's son-in-law, Amit Singla and daughter Loveleen Dhaliwal Singla were the ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:21 :::CIS 6 2025:HHC:28474-DB owners of LSR Logistics, Private Limited, which was engaged in transportation and road work with BRO. Kamal Singh, Director of .

LSR Logistics, stated that he and Ravinder went to the petitioner's office and put their signatures on the agreement as per the directions of Ms. Loveleen Dhaliwal. No money was paid in his presence. The petitioner actively participated in the creation of the documents. The original sale agreement and the addendum were never produced, even though the notices were served under Section 91 of the CrPC. The agreement and addendum were prepared with the intention of screening the ill-got money of Brigadier J.K. Narang. The income tax return for the year 2011-2012 and 2012- 2013 shows that Sumant Narang had filed 'Nil' ITR, which shows that no money was paid to him. The agreement to sell and addendum were prepared after the registration of the FIR against Brigadier J.K. Narang. The statement of account of the petitioner does not show any funds flow. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

5. I have heard Mr. N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Sidharth, learned counsel for the petitioner/ accused and Mr. Janesh Mahajan, learned counsel for the respondent/ CBI.

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6. Mr. N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner/ accused, submitted that the allegations against the .

petitioner are false. The petitioner did not prepare any forged document. The transaction between the parties was genuine. The money was repaid to Sumant through cheques, which show the bona fide nature of the transaction. Even if the plea of the CBI is accepted as correct that the stamp paper was released in the year 2012, writing an agreement bearing the date of 2011 does not constitute any forgery. There was no intention to cheat any person.

Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of the same be quashed.

7. Mr. Janesh Mahajan, learned counsel for the respondent/ CBI, submitted that the statement of stamp paper vendors shows that the stamp paper was not sold to the petitioner/ accused in the year 2012. The agreement came into existence in the year 2011, whereas the stamp paper was released in the year 2012.

The agreement was executed to inflate the income of co-accused J.K. Narang. The contents of the agreement are false. No sale deed was executed between the parties, which shows that the agreement was a sham and was executed to avoid the inquiry pending against ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:21 :::CIS 8 2025:HHC:28474-DB the co-accused. This Court should not enquire into the factual aspects while exercising its inherent jurisdiction. Hence, he prayed .

that the present petition be dismissed.

8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully.

9. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

r to explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P. , "7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal , 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:

report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

r (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

2025:HHC:28474-DB (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and .

with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge." (emphasis added)

8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.

In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed."

10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

11. It was held in Raghunath Sharma v. State of Haryana , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1148, that the exercise of inherent jurisdiction is the exception and not the rule. It was observed:

nataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699; Sunder Babu v. State of Tamil Nadu (2009) 14 SCC 244; Vineet Kumar v. State of U.P. (2017) 13 SCC 369; Ahmad Ali Quraishi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2020) 13 SCC 435.] The observations made in State of Kar-

nataka v. M. Devendrappa (2002) 3 SCC 89 by a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges encapsulate the purpose of this power most aptly in the following terms:

12. It was held in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699: 1977 SCC (Cri) 404 that the High Court can quash the criminal proceedings if they amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed on page 703:

13. The term abuse of the process was explained in Chandran Ratnaswami v. K.C. Palanisamy , (2013) 6 SCC 740: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 447: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 450 at page 761:

which bar the trial when there appears to be an abuse of the process of the court.

34. Lord Morris in Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145 : (1964) 2 All ER 401 (HL)], observed: (AC pp. 1301-02) "There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction. ... A court must enjoy such powers in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its process.

*** The power (which is inherent in a court's jurisdiction) to prevent abuses of its process and to control its procedure must in a criminal court include a power to safeguard an accused person from oppression or prejudice."

In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the same case observed that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial.

35. In Hui Chi-ming v. R. [(1992) 1 AC 34 : (1991) 3 WLR 495 :

36. In the leading case of R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex p Bennett [(1994) 1 AC 42 : (1993) 3 WLR 90 : (1993) 3 All ER 138 (HL)], on the application of the abuse of process, the court confirms that an abuse of process justifying the ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:21 :::CIS 15 2025:HHC:28474-DB stay of prosecution could arise in the following circumstances:

(ii) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of the process because it offends the court's sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the circumstances of the particular case.

37. In R. v. Derby Crown Court, ex p Brooks [(1984) 80 Cr App R 164 (DC)], Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated:

38. Neill, L.J. in R. v. Beckford (Anthony ) [(1996) 1 Cr App R 94:

What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to determine on the individual facts of each case.

14. It was held in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P. , (2023) 15 SCC 488: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950 that where the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious, the Court owes a duty to quash them.

However, the Court cannot appreciate the material while exercising ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:21 :::CIS 16 2025:HHC:28474-DB jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. It was observed at page 498:

The Court drew a fine distinction between the consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and the appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held : ( Golconda Linga Swamy case [ State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy , (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], SCC p. 527, paras 5-7) "5. ... Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent the promotion of justice. In the exercise of its powers court would be justified in quashing any ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:21 :::CIS 17 2025:HHC:28474-DB proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of the court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the .

court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out, even if the allegations are accepted in toto.

6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1960 SC 866], this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (SCC OnLine SC para 6)

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance, e.g. want of sanction;

(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;

(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.

7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether, on a reasonable appreciation of it, the accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. The judicial process, no doubt, should not be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The court should be circumspect ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:21 :::CIS 18 2025:HHC:28474-DB and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing the process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta .

to harass any person needlessly. At the same time, the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death." (emphasis supplied)

15. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

16. The statement of Madhu reads that each stamp vendor is required to enter the date, serial number of the register, serial number of the stamp paper sold, denominations of the stamp paper, address of the purchaser and signatures of the purchaser in the register. The entry number is to be endorsed on the back of the stamp paper with date, name and address of the purchaser and the purpose of purchase. Stamp paper bearing the serial No. S387853 was issued to her on 13.02.2012 and was taken on record in the register on 13.02.2012. Serial No. 398 dated 01.04.2011 was recorded on behalf of Raj Kumar, stamp vendor, and the licence No. 169 did not pertain to her. The sale of stamp paper was not possible on 01.04.2011.

17. This statement clearly shows that the stamp paper used for writing the document was issued on 13.02.2012, and no ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:21 :::CIS 19 2025:HHC:28474-DB agreement could have been executed on it on 01.04.2011. Hence, the agreement was ante-dated.

18. Statement of Raj Kumar, stamp vendor, reads that he has not sold stamp paper No. S387853. The entry on the back of the photocopy of the stamp paper was not in his hand, and serial No. 398 was entered in the register on 04.04.2011. The stamp available on the back of the photocopy of the stamp paper did not bear his stamp. The license number was distorted, and the entry no. 398 was not made by him.

19. The statement of this witness shows that the entry on the back of the stamp paper was not made by him, and he had not put his stamp. Therefore, prima facie, a false entry was made on the back of the stamp paper showing the sale of the stamp paper on 01.04.2011 vide entry No. 398 pertaining to this witness. This witness specifically denied that he had made the entry and put the stamp; hence, his statement prima facie shows a forgery of the entry made on the reverse of the stamp paper.

20. There is no explanation for executing the document on 01.04.2011 on a stamp paper issued on 13.02.2012. The ante dating of the agreement to sell prima facie supports the version of the CBI ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:21 :::CIS 20 2025:HHC:28474-DB that this was done to help the co-accused by providing the source of income when no source of income existed.

21. The CBI mentioned in the charge sheet that no funds were transferred from the account of the petitioner. The income tax return filed by Sumant Narang was also 'Nil', suggesting that no money was received by him. Therefore, the recitals in the agreement to sell that the amount of ₹15,00,000/- was paid by the petitioner and was received by Sumant Narang are prima facie incorrect.

22. It was submitted that, as per the FIR, the check period was between 01.01.2007 and 23.02.2012, and the execution of the agreement on 11.04.2012 was beyond the check period, which would not have helped the co-accused. This submission overlooks the fact that the advance payment of ₹25,00,000/- in cash was shown to have been made on 15.04.2011 and 10.11.2011 to Sumant Narang, within the check period. This prima facie corroborates the version of the CBI that the payment of ₹25,00,000/- was shown to have been made within the check period to inflate the income of Sumant Narang, a family member of J.K. Narang.

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23. A heavy reliance was placed upon the fact that the petitioner returned ₹27,00,000/- to Sumant Narang when it was .

found that execution of the sale deed was not possible, which shows the bona fide nature of the transaction. This submission is not acceptable. The CBI registered the FIR on 18.10.2012. The agreement between the petitioner and Sumant Narang to cancel the agreement to sell was executed on 10.10.2013 after the registration of the FIR. Hence, it was a post-litem transaction and does not show any bona fide.

24. It was submitted that there is a distinction between a false document as understood in law and a document whose contents are false. A document is not a false document because it contains false recitals. There can be no dispute with this preposition of law. However, in the present case, the falsity of the contents was with a view to help the co-accused regarding the money received by him during the check period, and prima facie shows that it was done pursuant to a conspiracy entered with the petitioner.

25. The statements of the attesting witnesses to the agreement to sell and the addendum also show that the documents ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:21 :::CIS 22 2025:HHC:28474-DB were not executed in their presence, and money was also not exchanged in their presence. They were presented with a document .

and were asked to sign it. Kamal Singh stated that he and Ravinder went to the petitioner's office and signed an agreement between Sumant Narang and the petitioner as per the directions of Loveleen Dhaliwal, the daughter of the petitioner. Kashmir Singh also stated that the petitioner asked him to sign some papers as a witness.

Dinesh Prashad, another witness, was also not present. No persons had put their signatures in his presence. The agreement was duly signed by K.S. Dhaliwal and Sumant Narang. Dinesh Prashad also stated that he was asked by the daughter of the petitioner to put his signatures on the agreement. Kashmir Singh, another witness, was not present in the office.

26. These statements prima facie show that the documents were not executed in the presence of the attesting witnesses. There is no requirement that the signatures should be put in the presence of attesting witnesses because as per Section 3 of Transfer of Property Act an acknowledgement of the signature is sufficient but in the present case the fact that the attesting witnesses were asked by the petitioner and his daughter and not by the petitioner and Sumant to put the signatures prima facie show that the petitioner ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:21 :::CIS 23 2025:HHC:28474-DB and his daughter were responsible for the preparation of the document. Hence, the submission that the petitioner is not the .

maker of the document and cannot be held liable is not acceptable.

27. It was submitted that no person had made any complaint regarding the falsity of the documents. Only the CBI has come up with a plea that the document contained false recitals.

This submission will not help the petitioner. As per the CBI, the documents were brought into existence to help the co-accused J.K. Narang and mislead the CBI. It was a consensual transaction between the petitioner and Sumant Narang; therefore, no person would have complained about the same, and only CBI, which was intended to be misled by the execution of the agreement, would have made the complaint.

28. Reference was made to the various documents annexed to the petition. However, it is impermissible for the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to look into the documents forming part of the charge sheet, especially when the authenticity of the documents is not established. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi , (1983) 1 SCC 1: 1983 SCC (Cri) 115 that the proceedings can be quashed on the face ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:21 :::CIS 24 2025:HHC:28474-DB of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract .

anything. It was observed:

29. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram , 1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceeding under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. It was observed:

30. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K. Strips Private Limited and another , 2004 STPL 43 AP, and held:

documents, which were not filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court from looking into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another , 2002 (1) Supreme 192. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:

31. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka , (2022) 2 SCC 129: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401, wherein it was observed on page 142:

32. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of .

Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765, wherein it was held:

33. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya , (2024) 2 SCC 86: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 512: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein it was observed:

34. It was submitted that the allegations in the F.I.R. are false. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P. , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed:-

35. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand , (2025) 1 SCC 392:

made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)

6. ... As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. ...

7. ... At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider 'whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not'."

36. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi ), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising the inherent jurisdiction should treat the contents of the FIR as correct. It was observed: -

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37. This position was reiterated in Vinod Bihari Lal v. State of U.P. , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1216, wherein it was observed:

40. No other point was urged.

dismissed. to Consequently, the present petition fails, and the same is

42. The present petition stands disposed of, and so are the miscellaneous applications, if any.

43. The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 22nd August 2025 (Anurag) ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2025 02:28:21 :::CIS