1. Present petitions have been filed by the Petitioners seeking multifarious reliefs embracing several causes of action, including a challenge to the termination orders of the employees working in the Food and Beverages department of Delhi Golf Club (hereinafter referred to as WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 3 of 83 „DGC‟) and issuance of various directions to DGC, Government of India, Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi and other Authorities under different labour welfare legislations. The reliefs sought are set out in later part of the judgment.

2. At the outset, a preliminary objection was taken for and on behalf of DGC, the main contesting Respondent, questioning the maintainability of the petitions and thus, the parties were called upon to address arguments on maintainability. As maintainability is a common thread that runs in all the petitions and goes to the root of the matter, the objection is taken up and decided at the threshold, by a common judgment. WP(C) 3403/2020

3. Petitioner is a Union of the Employees of DGC and petition has been filed on behalf of 59 members, who are permanent employees of the Food and Beverages Department of DGC, essentially seeking quashing of the decision of DGC terminating their services and a mandamus directing the Official Respondents to take action against DGC for removing the Petitioners from permanent employment during Pandemic Covid-19 as well as to direct DGC to permit them to join their permanent employment, amongst other reliefs as follows :-

11011/08/2020/Media issued by the Respondent No.1 and 2 respectively prohibiting the illegal termination of the employees amid the Pandemic COVID-19 by the Respondent No.6 as the WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 5 of 83 Respondent No.6 is using the Government Charity of free land of Respondent No.5 (of Rs.55,779 Crores).

6. Writ, order or direction in the nature of MANDAMUS or any other appropriate writ, order or direction thereby directing the Respondent No.1, 2, 3 and 4 to prosecute and take stern action against the Respondent No.6 i.e. Board of Management of ‗The Delhi Golf Club' under Section 58 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005;

7. Writ, order or direction in the nature of MANDAMUS or any other appropriate writ, order or direction thereby ordering for the prosecution of the Board of Management of Respondent No.6 for willful non compliance of the Orders/directions and advisory issued by the Respondent No.1 to 4 during the outbreak of the pandemic COVID-19.

8. Writ, order or direction in the nature of MANDAMUS or any other appropriate writ, order or direction thereby directing the Respondent No.1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 to act upon the representations made by Petitioner from ANNEXURE P-10 to ANNEXURE P-14 of the present Writ petition.

9. Any other Writ, Order or direction in the nature of MANDAMUS or any other appropriate writ, order or direction the Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper may also be granted in the facts and circumstances of the present case and in the interest of Justice.‖ W.P.(C) 3941/2020

4. This writ petition is filed by five Petitioners, who were appointed against permanent posts in DGC on the posts of Waiter, Assistant Waiter, Assistant Supervisor, Senior Supervisor, respectively in the Food and Beverages Department of DGC and were subsequently promoted. Petitioners seek a writ in the nature of mandamus to the Official Respondents to take stern action against the Board of Management of WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 6 of 83 DGC for allegedly taking away the right of livelihood of the Petitioners as well as for quashing the decision dated 29.05.2020, whereby the Petitioners were terminated from permanent employment, amongst other reliefs, which are as under:-

11011/08/2020/Media issued by the Respondent No.1 and 2 respectively prohibiting the illegal termination of the employees amid the Pandemic COVID-19 by the Respondent No.6 as the Respondent No.6 is using the Government Charity of free land of Respondent No.5 (of Rs.55,779 Crores).

6. Writ, order or direction in the nature of MANDAMUS or any other appropriate writ, order or direction thereby directing the Respondent No.1, 2, 3 and 4 to prosecute and take stern action against the Respondent No.6 i.e. Board of Management of ‗The Delhi Golf Club' under Section 58 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005;

7. Writ, order or direction in the nature of MANDAMUS or any other appropriate writ, order or direction thereby ordering for the prosecution of the Board of Management of Respondent No.6 for willful non compliance of the Orders/directions and advisory issued by the Respondent No.1 to 4 during the outbreak of the pandemic COVID-19.

8. Writ, order or direction in the nature of MANDAMUS or any other appropriate writ, order or direction thereby directing the Respondent No.1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 to act upon the representations made by Petitioners from ANNEXURE P-30 to ANNEXURE P-59 of the present Writ petition.

9. Writ, order or direction in the nature of MANDAMUS or any other appropriate writ, order or direction thereby directing the Respondent No.6 not to act upon the WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 8 of 83 advertisement i.e. ANNEXURE P-63 given in News Papers for privatization/outsourcing the Food & Beverages Department of the Delhi Golf Club.

10. Writ, order or direction in the nature of MANDAMUS or any other appropriate writ, order or direction thereby directing the Respondent No.6 not to create any third party interest by privatization/outsourcing the Food & Beverages Department of the Delhi Golf Club at the cost of livelihood of the Petitioners.

11. Any other Writ, Order or direction in the nature of MANDAMUS or any other appropriate writ, order or direction the Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper may also be granted in the facts and circumstances of the present case and in the interest of Justice.‖ W.P.(C) 5440/2020

5. Multiple directions are sought in the petition against Union of India, Special/Additional/Joint Labour Commissioners, Delhi Advisory Contract Labour Board and other concerned Departments including DGC to prohibit deployment of contract labour by DGC and to forward the application of the Petitioners under Section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 to the State Advisory Contract Labour Board for prohibition of deployment of contract labour in the Food and Beverages Department of DGC under Section 4 of the said Act. Directions are also sought to Respondent Nos. 7 and 8 to initiate action against the concerned Labour Commissioners for contravening their statutory duties and a direction to Respondent No.4 not to grant Principal Employer Registration Certificate to the Management of DGC and to WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 9 of 83 cancel the same, if already granted. The prayers in the writ petition are as follows :-

6. Mr. Sandeep Sethi, learned Senior Counsel arguing for DGC raised manifold grounds contesting the maintainability of the writ petitions, inter alia (a) DGC is a private club constituted by its members for their personal recreation and is neither a „State‟ nor instrumentality of a State or „other authority‟ under Article 12 of the Constitution of India (b) DGC is neither funded (directly or indirectly) nor owned or controlled by the Government (c) it is a private body constituted under the Companies Act governed by its Memorandum and Articles of Association; (d) it discharges no public duty and performs no public function; (e) DGC is a Company under Section 8 of the Companies Act, 2013 limited by WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 12 of 83 Guarantee; (f) it is an autonomous and private body run by its own Governing Board, namely, the General Committee comprising of a President, Captain, three nominees of the Government of India, immediate past Captain and twelve members elected as per Article 43 of the Articles of Association of DGC; (g) presence of 3 nominees in the Board, appointed by the Government, does not alter the status of DGC as a private body and Government has no financial or even administrative control over its functioning; (h) it is run solely for the use of its members or permitted persons, membership being restricted and facilities are not open to public at large and (j) funds are generated purely through membership fee, membership subscriptions and revenues earned from Golf.

7. Succinctly put the argument was that DGC is a private body, not performing public functions and is not financially or functionally or administratively controlled by the Government of India and merely having senior officials of the Government, as nominee Directors, appointed by Ministry of Urban Development, as part of the General Committee (Board), does not make DGC a State or its instrumentality or „other authority‟ to bring it in the sweep of Article 12 of the Constitution. Accentuating on the role of the three nominee Directors, it was submitted that they are at par with other Directors in the Board in all respects and do not enjoy any extra or special powers. It was contended that reading of the petitions shows that Petitioners have been unable to make out a case that DGC is in any manner funded or controlled by Government of India or that its functions fall in the realm of public functions.

8. It was next submitted that no doubt DGC has been granted land measuring 179 acres by Government of India, through a registered lease deed, however, this is only a lessor-lessee relationship, governed by terms of the lease deed. Merely because the lease deed is executed by the Government as a lessor is not enough to bring DGC within the definition of State or public authority. Under the lease, the possession and user of the land subsists exclusively with DGC, to the exclusion of all others and statutory dues and taxes are paid in accordance with law.

9. In support of his arguments, Mr. Sethi relied on the judgment in Air Vice Marshall J.S. Kumar vs. Governing Council of Air Force Sports Complex and Anr. , 2006 (86) DRJ 711 (DB), wherein the Division Bench of this Court held that a writ petition cannot lie against a private body not performing any public function and since Air Force Sports Complex was only providing recreation to serving and retired Air Force personnel and not performing a public function, it was not a State under Article 12 of the Constitution. Reliance was also placed on the judgment in the Praga Tools Corporation vs. C.A. Imanual & Ors. , 1969 (1) SCC 585, where the Supreme Court held that a Company being a non-statutory body and incorporated under the Companies Act , was not performing a statutory or public duty and hence no mandamus would lie against a Company, for enforcement of any legal right by its workmen. For the same proposition, reliance was also placed on K.K. Saksena vs. International Commission on Irrigation & Drainage & Ors., 2015 (4) SCC 670 and Shri Sohan Lal vs. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1957 SC

529. WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 14 of 83

10. Mr. Sethi additionally contested the maintainability of the petitions on the ground that Petitioners have already approached the Conciliation Officer under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as „ I.D. Act ‟) and filed complaints alleging illegal removal of the Petitioners and raising other grievances and proceedings are pending. DGC had received notice and reply has been filed. Though, it was disputed that the employees are „workman‟ under Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act, however, without prejudice to the said position, the argument was that once Petitioners have resorted to the dispute resolution mechanism, they are estopped from approaching this Court invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction and seeking prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution. For the proposition that once an alternate remedy is available under the I.D. Act and other labour legislations, writ petition will not lie, reliance is placed by Mr. Sethi on the judgments in Chairman, Coal Authority of India & Anr. vs. Madan Prasad Sinha and Ors., (2000) 10 SCC 597; Transport and Dock Workers Union & Ors. vs. Mumbai Port Trust and Anr. , (2011) 2 SCC 575 and a recent judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in PTI Employees Union vs. PTI, W.P.(C) No.1596/2018 and W.P.(C) No.10605/2018.

11. Without prejudice to the objection to the maintainability of the petitions, Mr. Sethi contended that DGC, which is a private body, has taken a decision not to undertake in-house food and beverages services. The cost and expenses involved do not justify, at present, to undertake the services in-house as they are impacting the finances and resources. Accordingly, management decided to engage a specialized agency to provide the entire gamut of food and beverage services, with no exposure WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 15 of 83 or outgo to DGC. In fact, by handing over the operations and outsourcing them, DGC shall benefit in as much as the agency shall pay to cover the cost of infrastructure like space, air-conditioning and other incidental provisions. This is purely an economic and commercial decision as a matter of policy and is not open to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

12. It was pointed out that DGC is registered under the Shops and Establishments Act, 1954 and in accordance with Section 30 of the said Act, only one month‟s notice or salary in lieu thereof is payable while terminating the services of an employee and the said provision has been complied with. Albeit none of the provisions of the I.D.Act apply to DGC, however, retrenchment compensation to the tune of Rs.10,05,20,034.00 was paid to all the 59 employees on 28.05.2020 and a sum of Rs.73,36,865/- has been paid on 29.05.2020 to the 7 Executives.

13. Per contra, Ms. Sunita Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the Petitioners controverted the stand taken by DGC and urged that the writ petitions are maintainable as DGC is „other authority‟ under Article 12 and alternatively, as it discharges public functions it is an „authority‟ under Article 226 , amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court. The term „authority‟ used in Article 226 , must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term „authority‟ in Article 12. The words "any person or authority" used in Article 226 are not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State and cover any other person or body performing public duty. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non- fundamental rights. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Full WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 16 of 83 Bench of Allahabad High Court in Roychan Ibraham vs. State of U.P. & Ors. , AIR 2019 ALL 96, relevant paras of which as relied upon are as follows :-

14. It was argued that DGC has been established for the purpose of facilitating and promoting Golf, a sport and thus clearly subserves public purpose and for this reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Baljeet Singh vs. Delhi Golf Club & Ors. , (1998) 4 SCC 524 and the relevant para, as relied, reads as follows :-

15. To fortify the submission that DGC, even if it is not a State, is „other authority‟ under Article 12 and any argument to the contrary by DGC is untenable in the eyes of law, reliance was placed on the judgment WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 20 of 83 of the Supreme Court in Board of Control for Cricket in India vs. Cricket Association of Bihar , (2015) 3 SCC 251 and support was also drawn from ratio decidendi of the judgment in Indian Olympic Association vs. Veeresh Malik, W.P.(C ) 876/2007, wherein this Court held that the Indian Olympic Association is a Public Authority under Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, as follows :-

16. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Central Information Commission in Amardeep Walia vs. Chandigarh Lawn WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 21 of 83 Tennis Association (File No.CIC/LS/C/2009/900377), wherein it was held as follows :-

17. Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee & Ors. vs. Jathedar Kuldip Singh Bhogal , in LPA 606/2010, was cited, wherein the Court held as follows :-

18. Order passed by Central Information Commission in Pradeep Bhanot vs. Chandigarh Club, Chandigarh (File No.CIC/LS/A/2010/ 001184) is cited, wherein it is held that Chandigarh Club is a Public Authority, based on somewhat similar facts, where the plot of land is leased to the Club, by the Chandigarh Administration.

19. It was next contended that DGC is directly under the control of the Central Government as the Ministry of Urban Development has leased land measuring 179 acres for promotion of Golf at a prime location on nominal ground rent. This apart, Ministry exercises direct control over the affairs and in the administration of DGC by nominating three serving IAS officers as Directors, with full voting rights and control in the Managing Committee. Ms. Bhardwaj submitted that DGC has taken an incorrect stand that it is a private entity with no control of the Government and places reliance on provisions of the lease deed, which was signed by the President of India as Lessor and DGC as the Lessee, more particularly Clause 21, which according to her, clearly evidences control of the Government in management and administration of DGC. According to her the said Clause casts a responsibility on DGC to inform the Ministry, from time to time, of the expiry of the terms of the members of the WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 23 of 83 Management Committee and other aspects relating thereto and also provides for regulating memberships of Government servants in the club.

20. Concisely and pithily put, the argument is that though DGC is not State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, but it certainly falls under the expression „other authority‟, as judicially interpreted, on account of the deep and pervasive administrative control of the Government of India, over its functioning. Alternatively, it performs „public functions‟ and is an „authority‟ under Article 226 , which has a wider scope and ambit and thus this Court ought to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to redress the grievances raised by the Petitioners.

21. On merits, Ms. Bhardwaj contended that DGC has illegally terminated permanent services of the Petitioners, which is impermissible in law and that too amidst Pandemic Covid-19, without any disciplinary proceedings, without giving any opportunity of hearing and without prior permission of the appropriate Government to terminate, which is a mandate under Sections 25(N)(7) and Section 25(O)(6) of the I.D.Act. Petitioners have been dedicatedly serving the Club for the past 3-4 decades, with an unblemished and exemplary record of service. Impugned action of termination is in violation of the express directions in the Notification dated 29.03.2020, issued by the Central Government under Section 10(L) of the Disaster Management Act, 2005 and the letter and spirit behind it, which is to protect employees against wage reduction and termination etc. in the wake of Pandemic COVID-19.

22. It was argued that it is a settled law that termination of service without following due process of law is liable to be quashed, more WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 24 of 83 particularly, when it is in violation of the principles of natural justice. It is submitted that in Satwati Deswal vs. State of Haryana and Ors. , 2010 (1) SCC 126, the Supreme Court held that if an employee is terminated and there are violations of principles of natural justice in the procedure followed to terminate, then, despite the existence of an alternate remedy, Court can interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution.

23. In support of the argument that existence of an alternative efficacious remedy does not as matter of rule, bar a writ remedy, support is drawn from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Harbanslal Sahnia vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. , (2003) 2 SCC 107, para nos.7 and 8 of which are as follows :-

2000, terminating dealership of the appellants, is hereby quashed and set aside. No order as to the costs.‖

24. It is contended that the action of DGC in deploying contract labour in place of the Petitioners is in clear violation of provisions of Section 10 of Contract Labour (Abolition & Regulation) Act, 1970. Legislative intent underlying the enactment is to enable an aggrieved person to make an application to the concerned Authority to prohibit deployment of contract labour by a Notification. Petitioners are certainly „aggrieved‟ as their permanent employment in the F&B Department has been abruptly terminated under the false pretext of closure and contemporaneously DGC has deployed contract labour, replacing them. Despite the complaints of the Petitioners no action is being taken by the concerned Authorities and a direction ought to be issued to them to enforce the statutory mandate.

25. Adverting to the provisions of I.D.Act, Ms. Bhardwaj, resolutely and forcefully argued that Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 have failed to carry out their statutory duties and obligations by not taking action against DGC, despite violation of several statutory provisions of the Act. Respondent Nos.1 to 5 are under statutory obligations to take action for violation of provisions of Section 25 (N) of the I.D.Act, terminating services of 66 Petitioners, without prior approval of the appropriate Government; violation of Section 25(O) of the I.D.Act, taking a false plea of closure of the F&B Department, without prior approval and operating the same WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 26 of 83 through a contractor; violation of Section 25(O)(6) of the I.D.Act by not allowing those employees who are deemed to be in employment in the absence of permission of closure, to work; violation of Section 25(U) and unfair labour practice by taking away the livelihood of the Petitioners at a time when there was a Pandemic and in the natural course, wage revision was due.

26. Responding to the submissions of Ms. Bhardwaj, learned Senior Counsel Mr. Sethi, eloquently articulated that there is no violation of the Notification dated 29.03.2020, issued under the Disaster Management Act, 2005 , as the same stands withdrawn by the Government with effect from 18.05.2020, which fact has been concealed by the Petitioners. The Judgment of the Supreme Court in Ficus Pax Private Ltd. and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors. , 2020(4) SSC 810 is a complete answer to the Petitioners‟ contentions where the Court observed as follows :-

2020, in between there has been only 50 days during which period, the statutory obligation was imposed. Thus, the wages of workers and employees which were required to be paid as per the Order dated 29-3-2020 and other consequential notification was during these 50 days.

39. In most of the industries, factories and establishments, the workers are represented by trade unions or other employees associations. The State is also under obligation to ensure that there is smooth running of industrial establishment and the disputes between the employers and employees may be conciliated and sorted out.

40. It cannot be disputed that both industry and labourers need each other. No industry or establishment can survive without employees/labourers and vice versa. We are thus of the opinion that efforts should be made to sort out the differences and disputes between the workers and the employers regarding payment of wages of above 50 days and if any settlement or negotiation can be entered into between them without regard to the Order dated 29-3-2020, the said steps may restore congenial work atmosphere.

41. We thus direct the following interim measures which can be availed by all the private establishments, industries, WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 28 of 83 factories and workers trade unions/employees associations, etc. which may be facilitated by the State authorities:

31. In W.P.(C) No. 5440/2020, a short affidavit has been filed by the Government of NCT of Delhi in which it is stated that Petitioners filed complaints on 09.06.2020, 11.06.2020 and 02.07.2020 seeking prosecution against management of DGC for violation of provisions of I.D.Act and non-payment of wages for April and May, 2020, before the Joint Labour Commissioner. Notice was issued to the management of DGC and on 23.06.2020, both parties appeared and the management sought copies of the complaints for filing detailed reply. DGC filed its reply on 02.07.2020 and on an objection to jurisdiction of Labour Officer (District South), matter was transferred to New Delhi District for further proceedings. Thereafter, on 16.07.2020 hearing took place before the Labour Officer who prepared a detailed report and forwarded the same to the Joint Labour Commissioner. However, subsequently, matter was again placed before the Labour Officer and he attempted some settlement but no further proceedings could take place as it was informed that the matter is sub-judice before this Court.

32. Insofar as the issue of prohibition of deployment of contract labour is concerned, the stand in the affidavit is that the application has been WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 32 of 83 considered by the Joint Labour Commissioner and recommended for forwarding to the State Advisory Board for consideration as the Chairman of the Board is the final Authority. As and when the meeting of the Board is convened, the agenda item shall be placed before it for consideration. With respect to the application for grant of registration of establishment employing contract labour under Section 7 of the CLRA, filed by DGC, before the Registering Office, it is stated in the affidavit that previously a certificate was granted to DGC on 08.08.2006 and until the same is surrendered, no new certificate can be issued. Therefore, the application will be considered only once the said certificate is surrendered.

33. I have heard learned Senior Counsel for DGC and counsel for the Petitioners as well as counsels for the other Respondents in all the petitions.

34. In view of the preliminary objection raised by DGC, the foremost issue that arises for consideration is the maintainability of the present petitions before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

35. Article 226 of the Constitution of India deals with powers of High Courts to issue writs, orders or directions to any person or authority and to enforce rights conferred by Part-III thereof and for any other purpose. It has been observed by the Supreme Court in several judgements that the expansive and extraordinary power of the High Court under Article 226 of Constitution is as wide as the amplitude of the language used therein, but at the same time Supreme Court and other Courts have been laying down the clear restraints and constraints on exercise of that power. In Air Vice Marshall J.S. Kumar (supra), the Division Bench held that the language of Article 226 cannot be interpreted and understood literally. If WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 33 of 83 literally interpreted, it will follow that the words „for any other purpose‟ would mean that writ can be issued even for deciding private party disputes such as disputes relating to property, divorce, succession certificate etc. Similarly, if the words „to any person‟ are literally interpreted, it would mean that writ can be issued to private persons. This, however, would not be correct interpretation in view of various pronouncements of the Supreme Court. A writ will ordinarily lie against the State or instrumentality of the State but may lie against a person or any other authority, if it performs public functions or discharges statutory or public duties. Relevant paras of the judgment are as under:-

36. In order to decide the strenuous challenge to the maintainability of the petitions, the first question that this Court is called upon to answer is whether DGC is a State or an instrumentality of the State or falls under „other authorities‟ under Article 12 of the Constitution, so as to be WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 35 of 83 amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Article 12 of the Constitution is as follows:-

37. Plain reading of Article 12 indicates that „State‟ includes Government of India, Parliament of India, Government and Legislatures of the States and all local or „other authorities‟. Petitioners did not dispute the position that DGC is not a State and thus this is not a conundrum that arises in the present case. The unequivocal contention of the Petitioners is that DGC comes in the sweep of „other authorities‟ under the said Article. Literally seen, the scope of „other authorities‟ is narrow under Article 12. However, the term has been given a broader interpretation and its scope has been expanded over a period of time through judicial interpretations. Article 12 in the Constitution was introduced in the Draft Constitution as Article 7. The reason why the Article was placed in a Chapter concerning Fundamental Rights is discernible from the Constituent Assembly Debate by Dr. Ambedkar and I may allude to the same as follows:-

38. While referring to the Assembly Debate, the Supreme Court in Zee Telefilms Ltd & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. , (2005) 4 SCC 649, observed as under:-

39. Although till late 1960s, the view taken by the Courts was that even bodies like the Universities etc. were not „other authorities‟ under Article 12. In Rajasthan State Electricity Board vs. Mohan Lal , (1967) 3 WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 37 of 83 SCR 377, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the expression is wide enough to include every statutory authority on which powers are conferred to carry out Government or quasi-Government functions and functioning within the territory of India or under the control of Government of India. The ethos of this judgment was followed a decade later when in Sukhdev Singh vs. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi , (1975) 1 SCC 421, another Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court ruled that bodies which are created by Statutes, would come within the expression „other authorities‟ because of the nature of their activities despite their constitution being for commercial purposes. Accordingly, Corporations such as Life Insurance Corporation, Industrial Finance Corporation were brought within the purview of Article 12 and the reasoning to so hold is evident from the following observations in the judgment:-

40. The Supreme Court in Zee Telefilms Ltd. (supra), after noticing the observations of the Constitution Bench, as above, observed that because of the change in socio-economic policies of the Government, by a judicial interpretation, wider meaning was given to the expression „other authorities‟ and this was primarily with a view to prevent the Government from by-passing its Constitutional obligations by creating Companies, Corporations, etc. to perform its duties.

41. In Sabhajit Tewary vs. Union of India , (1975) 1 SCC 485, the same Constitution Bench rejected the contention of the Petitioner therein that Council for Scientific and Industrial Research would be included in the term „other authority‟, on the ground that it was registered under the Societies Registration Act and that it was neither performing a State function nor was under the pervasive control of the Government to be a State under Article 12.

42. Thereafter, in Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International Airport Authority of India , (1979) 3 SCC 489, a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court laid down certain Guidelines for determining whether a WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 39 of 83 body falls within „other authorities‟, while holding that the International Airport Authority, which was a creature of a Statute was instrumentality of the State. The Guidelines are as under:-

43. In Ajay Hasia and Ors. vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Ors. , (1981) 1 SCC 722, the above tests were accepted by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court for determining when a Corporation can be WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 40 of 83 said to be an instrumentality or agency of the Government. Relevant para is as under :-

Therefore assuming there is violation of any fundamental right by the Board that will not make the Board a ―State‖ for the purpose of Article 12.‖

48. In Federal Bank Ltd. vs. Sagar Thomas & Co. (2003) 10 SCC 733, the question before the Supreme Court was, whether the bank, being a private bank, is a State or its instrumentality under Article 12 of the Constitution to be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. An employee of the Bank had challenged his dismissal order in a writ petition, which was entertained by the learned Single Judge, overruling WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 45 of 83 the objection of maintainability. Appeal before the Division Bench was dismissed. In the appeal filed by the Bank before the Supreme Court, eight categories of bodies/persons against whom writ may be maintainable were carved out by the Supreme Court and it was held as under :-

49. Thus, what emerges is that ordinarily no writ shall lie against a private person except writ of Habeas Corpus or against a private body unless it is performing a public function or discharging public duty. In Binny Ltd. and Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with a writ petition arising from a contract between an employer and an employee and the Supreme Court while analyzing the expression „public function‟ held :-

matter of judicial review. In the following two situations judicial review will not normally be appropriate even though the body may be performing a public function:

In such a case the express or implied terms of the agreement should normally govern the matter. This reflects the normal approach of English law, namely, that the terms of a contract will normally govern the transaction, or other relationship between the parties, rather than the general law.

Thus, where a special method of resolving disputes (such as arbitration or resolution by private or domestic tribunals) has been agreed upon by the parties (expressly or by necessary implication), WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 50 of 83 that regime, and not judicial review, will normally govern the dispute.‖

23. The counsel for the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1976 of 1998 and for the appellant in the civil appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 6016 of 2002 strongly contended that irrespective of the nature of the body, the writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable provided such body is discharging a public function or statutory function and that the decision itself has the flavour of public law element and they relied on the decision of this Court in Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani [(1989) 2 SCC 691] . In this case, the appellant was a Trust running a science college affiliated to the Gujarat University under the Gujarat University Act, 1949 . The teachers working in that college were paid in the pay scales recommended by the University Grants Commission and the college was an aided institution. There was some dispute between the University Teachers Association and the University regarding the fixation of their pay scales. Ultimately, the Chancellor passed an award and this award was accepted by the State Government as well as the University and the University directed to pay the teachers as per the award. The appellants refused to implement the award and the respondents filed a writ petition seeking a writ of mandamus and in the writ petition the appellants contended that the college managed by the Trust was not an ―authority‖ coming within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution and therefore the writ petition was not maintainable. This plea was rejected and this Court held that the writ of mandamus would lie against a private individual and the words ―any person or authority‖ used in Article 226 are not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State and they may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 51 of 83 or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists, mandamus cannot be denied.

29. Thus, it can be seen that a writ of mandamus or the remedy under Article 226 is pre-eminently a public law remedy and is not generally available as a remedy against private wrongs. It is used for enforcement of various rights of the public or to compel public/statutory authorities to discharge their duties and to act within their bounds. It may be used to do justice when there is wrongful exercise of power or a refusal to perform duties. This writ is admirably equipped to serve as a judicial control over administrative actions. This writ could also be issued against any private body or person, specially in view of the words used in Article 226 of the Constitution. However, the scope of mandamus is limited to enforcement of public duty. The scope of mandamus is determined by the nature of the duty to be enforced, rather than the identity of the authority against whom it is sought. If the private body is discharging a public function and the denial of any right is in connection with the public duty imposed on such body, the public law remedy can be enforced. The duty cast on the public body may be either statutory or otherwise and the source of such power is immaterial, but, nevertheless, there must be the public law element in such action. Sometimes, it is difficult to distinguish between public law and private law remedies. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 30, p. 682, ―1317. A public authority is a body, not necessarily a county council, municipal corporation or other local authority, which has public or statutory duties to perform and which perform those duties and carries out its transactions for the benefit of the public and not for private profit.‖ There cannot be any general definition of public authority or public action. The facts of each case decide the point.

31. The decision of the employer in these two cases to terminate the services of their employees cannot be said to have any element of public policy. Their cases were purely governed by the contract of employment entered into between the employees and the employer. It is not appropriate to construe those contracts as opposed to the principles of public policy and thus void and illegal under Section 23 of the Contract Act. In contractual matters even in respect of public bodies, the principles of judicial review have got limited application. This was expressly stated by this Court in State of U.P. v. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd. [(1996) 6 SCC 22] and also in Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil [(2000) 6 SCC 293] . In the latter case, this Court reiterated that the interpretation and implementation of a clause in a contract cannot be the subject-matter of a writ petition. Whether the contract envisages actual payment or not is a question of construction of contract. If a term of a contract is violated, ordinarily, the remedy is not a writ petition under Article 226.‖

50. In G. Bassi Reddy vs. International Crops Research Institute , (2003) 4 SCC 225, the Supreme Court was examining the grievances raised by employees of International Crops Research Institute, who had filed a writ petition before the High Court of Karnataka on their services being terminated. Analysing the expressions, „public functions‟ or „public duties‟ the Supreme Court held that the terms are not easy to define, but reasonably speaking these would closely relate to functions akin to sovereign functions of the State and in that context observed that the primary activity of the Institute was to conduct Research and Training Programmes on voluntary basis and a voluntary service cannot be a public duty. Supreme Court relied upon the judgment in Praga Tools Corporation (supra), where the Supreme Court had construed Article 226 WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 53 of 83 to hold that High Court could issue a writ to secure performance of a duty or a statutory duty but mandamus will not lie for an order of reinstatement to an office, which is essentially of a private character or to resolve private disputes. Relevant passage is as follows:-

51. In Chander Mohan Khanna vs. NCERT, (1991) 4 SCC 578, the Supreme Court after examining the Memorandum of Association and the applicable Rules, concluded that NCERT was an autonomous body whose functions were not related to Government functions. In the said case, to some extent, funding was by the Government and proper utilization of the grants was monitored by the Government. It was set up as a Society with seven Government officers subscribing to the Memorandum of Association, with the object of assisting and advising Ministry of Education and Social Welfare, in field of education. The Supreme Court after examining all the salient features held that NCERT is not a State under Article 12.

52. In General Manager, Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Limited, Sultanpur, Uttar Pradesh vs. Satrughan Nishad & Ors. , (2003) 8 SCC 639, the Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the issue again in the context WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 55 of 83 of „other authority‟ under Article 12. The Appellant was a cooperative society registered under the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act . Respondents had filed writ petitions before the High Court challenging the discontinuation of their long services, spanning over 5 to 12 years, without notice and retrenchment compensation. High Court overruled the objection of the Mill that writ was not maintainable as the Respondent/Mill was not an instrumentality of the State. Supreme Court held that the Mill was not a State, despite the fact that 50% Shares of the Society were held with the State Government and out of 15 members in the Management Committee, 5 were nominated by the State Government. Relevant paras are as under:-

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, on the other hand, submitted that mandamus can be issued against a private person or body only if the infraction alleged is in performance of public duty. Reference in this connection may be made to the decisions of this Court in Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Samarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani [(1989) 2 SCC 691] in which this Court examined the various aspects and distinction between an authority and a person and after analysis of the decisions referred in that regard came to the conclusion that it is only in the circumstances when the authority or the person performs a public function or discharges a public duty that Article 226 of the Constitution can be invoked. In the cases of K. Krishnamacharyulu v. Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engg. [(1997) 3 SCC 571 :

53. At this stage, it would be useful to allude to the judgment of the Supreme Court in K.K. Saksena (supra). The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was right in holding that the writ petition filed against International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (ICID) was not maintainable as it is not a State under Article 12 and nor were its actions amenable to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. Relying on several earlier judgments of the Supreme Court on this aspect and examining elaborately the nature of functions of ICID as well as its constitution, bye-laws, etc., the Supreme Court observed as under :-

In Praga Tools Corpn. v. C.A. Imanual [(1969) 1 SCC 585] , as already discussed above, this Court held that the action challenged did not have public element and writ of mandamus could not be issued as the action was essentially of a private character. That was a case where the employee concerned was seeking reinstatement to an office.‖

54. On a finding that ICID was neither funded by the Government nor discharging any function under any Statute, the question posed and answered by the Supreme Court was :-

The activities undertaken by the respondent Society, a non-governmental organisation, do not actually partake the nature of public duty or State actions. There is absence of public element as has been stated in V.R. Rudani [Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani , ( 1989) 2 SCC 691] and Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engg. [K. Krishnamacharyulu v. Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engg. , (1997) 3 SCC 571 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 841] It also does not discharge duties having a positive application of public nature. It carries on voluntary activities which many a non-governmental organisations perform. The said activities cannot be stated to be remotely connected with the activities of the State. On a scrutiny of the Constitution and bye- laws, it is difficult to hold that the respondent Society has obligation to discharge certain activities which are statutory or of public character. The concept of public duty cannot be construed in a vacuum. A private society, in certain cases, may be amenable to the writ jurisdiction if the writ court is satisfied that it is necessary to compel such society or association to enforce any statutory obligation or such obligations of public nature casting positive public obligation upon it.

36. As we perceive, the only object of ICID is for promoting the development and application of certain aspects, which have been voluntarily undertaken but the said activities cannot be said that ICID carries on public duties to make itself amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.‖ xxx xxx xxx

53. In the present case, though we have held that ICID is not discharging any public duty, even otherwise, it is clear that the impugned action does not involve public law element and no ―public law rights‖ have accrued in favour of the appellant which are infringed. The service conditions of the appellant are not governed in the same manner as was the position in Andi Mukta Sadguru [Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak trust v. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691].‖

55. In the same judgment the Supreme Court also held that even if a body performing public duty is amenable to writ jurisdiction, all its decisions are not subject to judicial review and only those decisions which have public element therein, can be judicially reviewed.

56. Public law is a term of art with definite legal consequences as observed in O‟Reilly vs. Mackman, (1982) 3 WLR 604. In Dwarka Prasad Agarwal vs. B.D. Agarwal , (2003) 6 SCC 230, the Supreme Court held that the power of judicial review of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution can be exercised only where the dispute involves a public law element as contradistinguished from a private law dispute. A. J. Harding in his book „Public Duties and Public Law‟ defined the terms as follows:-

60. When these reasons are placed on the canvas in the background and facts of the present case, as carved out above, are compared, the inescapable and inexorable conclusion is that DGC cannot be brought under the purview of Article 12 , as it is neither a State nor its instrumentality nor „other authority‟. As stated categorically in the counter-affidavit by DGC, it is governed by its own Memorandum and Articles of Association and its management and other affairs are regulated by the General Committee. There is no funding from the WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 69 of 83 Government and nor does the Government have any administrative dominance or control over the affairs of DGC. The funds are generated through membership and subscription fee and revenue earned from golf and thus there is no financial control of the Government. While it is not disputed that the General Committee has three nominee members appointed by the Ministry of Urban Development, but as stated by DGC in the counter-affidavit, these Directors do not enjoy any extra or dominant powers compared to the other Directors. There is nothing brought on record by the Petitioners which shows any control of the Government over the affairs of DGC, leave alone deep and pervasive control. In so far as the contention of the Petitioners with respect to the land leased to DGC by the Government i.e. the Ministry of Urban Development at a nominal ground rent for promotion of Golf is concerned, suffice would it be to note that mere execution of a lease deed by the Government with respect to the land is not enough to confer the status of a State or instrumentality of the State or a public authority. As rightly argued by Mr. Sethi, the lease is governed by the terms of the lease deed executed between two parties as lessor and lessee, with rights and obligations flowing from and governed by the terms and conditions therein. In fact, a similar contention was rejected by the Division Bench in Air Vice Marshall J.S. Kumar (supra) and the relevant paras have already been quoted in the earlier part of the judgment.

61. At this stage, I may also take note of an affidavit filed on behalf of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs wherein it is categorically stated that the lease of land in possession of DGC was executed in 1963 and was renewed from time to time, however, the Ministry does not have WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 70 of 83 any control or any role in the day-to-day functioning of DGC and nor does it exercise any administrative control. Thus, examining on the anvil of the principles enunciated in the various judgements , referred to above , this Court cannot agree with the contention of the Petitioners that DGC falls under „other authority‟ as envisaged under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and the question is answered against the Petitioners.

62. No doubt Courts have held that writs may lie against a private body but a caveat has been astutely lodged that only if it performs public functions, it would be amenable to writ jurisdiction. This was the dicta and ethos of the judgement of the Constitution Bench in Unni Krishnan J.P. & Ors. vs. State of A.P. & Ors. , (1993) 4 SCC 111. Taking the benchmarks and yardsticks laid down by the Supreme Court, the next question whether DGC is performing „public function‟ or „public duty‟, in my opinion, can only be answered against the Petitioners. It is uncontrovertibly obvious that DGC is providing recreational facility of golf to its members or permitted members and this cannot be termed as a function akin to sovereign functions of the State. Division Bench in Air Vice Marshall J.S. Kumar (supra), relying on various judgements of the Supreme Court including Praga Tools Corporation (supra), addressing a similar issue held that the Air Force Sports Complex is a private body which provides recreation to Air Force Officers, serving or retired and it cannot be said that it is carrying out sovereign functions of the State.

63. In General Manager, Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills (supra), as noted above, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the expression „other authority‟. It was held that the form in which the body is constituted i.e. Society or Company etc. is not decisive and the real status WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 71 of 83 with respect to the control of the Government is to be looked into and there cannot be a hard and fast formula. In the said case the ratio of the nominees of the State Government in the Management Committee was one-third and the State Government held 50% shares in the Mill, which was an untraversed position. However, the Supreme Court held that the Mill was not an Authority or State or its instrumentality under Article 12 of the Constitution, as none of the indicia existed to categorize it so and the factors that led the Supreme Court to reach this conclusion, discernable from reading of the judgment were; (a) Mill operated on self generated finances; (b) bye-laws of the Mill reflected that its membership was open to canegrowers, other societies, Gram Sabha, State Government etc.; (c) State Government could not issue any direction to the Mill nor determine its policy as the Mill is an autonomous body; (d) role of the Federation, which is the apex body whose ex-officio CMD is the Secretary, Department of Sugar Industry and Cane, Government of Uttar Pradesh; is only advisory. Significantly, the second contention raised by the Respondents was that even if the Mill is not an Authority under Article 12 , the writ can be entertained as mandamus can be issued under Article 226 against any person or authority which would include a private person or body. Supreme Court, referred to the decision in Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust vs. V.R. Rudani , (1989) 2 SCC 691, in which the Court had examined the distinction between an authority and a person and concluded that only when the authority or the person performs a public function or discharges a public duty that Article 226 can be invoked. Supreme Court also relied on its earlier decisions in K. WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 72 of 83 Krishnamacharyulu vs. Sri Venkateswara Hindu College of Engg. , ( 1997) 3 SCC 571 and VST Industries Ltd. vs. Workers' Union , (2001) 1 SCC 298, where the same principle was reaffirmed. Having examined the facts of the case before it, the Supreme Court held that as the Mill was engaged in manufacture and sale of sugar, it is not performing any public function and analogy was drawn from the judgment in VST Industries Ltd. (supra), where the Court had held that manufacture and sale of cigarettes by private persons will not involve any public function. On this analogy, I may safely hold that DGC only provides recreational facility in the nature of a sport activity restricted to its members and permissive users and it would be too far-fetched to term it as a public function akin to a sovereign function of State, which is the touchstone from which the expression has to take its colour. Thus, without any hesitation and equivocation, this Court holds that DGC is neither „other authority‟ under Article 12 of the Constitution of India nor it performs public function or discharges public duty, to be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

64. Since this Court is not entertaining the writ petitions on ground of maintainability, challenge to the alleged illegal termination of the services of the Petitioners is not being adjudicated. Thus, at this stage no directions can be issued to the official Respondents for taking action against DGC for discontinuing the services, as sought by the Petitioners.

65. Petitioners have relied on an order of the Information Commission wherein Chandigarh Golf Club has been held to be a Public Authority. It was pointed out by learned Senior Counsel for DGC that the said order has been stayed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in WP(C) WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 73 of 83 No.21967/2012 and similar orders qua DGC have been stayed by this Court in W.P.(C) 6768/2013 and the petitions are pending. Thus, reliance on the said orders cannot be placed by the Petitioners at this stage, quite apart from the fact that a „public authority‟ under the Right to Information Act, 2005 , has a different connotation in law, from an Authority under Article 12 of the Constitution. In this context, I may refer to and quote from a judgment of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P. (C) 4596/2007 entitled „IFCI Limited vs. Ravinder Balwani‟ , decided on 17th August 2010, which is as under:-

66. The judgment in Satwati Deswal (supra), relied upon by the Petitioners, is also of no avail as this was a service matter pertaining to termination of the Petitioner by the Manager of the School and dealt with an employment with the State of Haryana, which was amenable to writ jurisdiction as a State under Article 12. In Roychan Abraham (supra), the issue was with regard to a private educational Institution and the Allahabad High Court held that private Institutions imparting education to students perform a „public duty‟, which at the cost of repetition is quite apart from the activities undertaken by DGC.

67. Much emphasis was placed by learned counsel for the Petitioners on the judgment in Board of Control for Cricket in India (supra), wherein the Supreme Court has held that functions of the Board were public functions, no matter discharged by a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and is amenable to the writ jurisdiction. In order to analyze this argument, I may only refer to the judgment in the said case and the circumstances in which the Supreme Court came to the above conclusion. The Supreme Court first considered the judgment in Zee Telefilms Ltd. (supra), where, by a majority, the Supreme Court had held that BCCI was not State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, based on its creation, share capital, financial control of the Government and its autonomy. Having said that, the Supreme Court had examined whether the Board was discharging public duties in the nature of State functions. The contention that the Board was discharging public WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 75 of 83 duties in the nature of State functions was rejected by the Supreme Court and it was held as under:-

68. Having so observed, the Supreme Court found that as a matter of fact the Board was discharging some duties like selection of the Indian cricket team, controlling the activities of the players, which activities were akin to public duties and in case of any breach of statutory obligations or rights of citizens, the aggrieved party could seek redress by a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and in that context held as under:-

69. The Supreme Court thereafter in Board of Control for Cricket in India (supra) observed that the majority view in Zee Telefilms Ltd. (supra) was that BCCI is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 even though it is not a State under Article 12.

Analyzing the rationale, the Supreme Court in Board of Control for Cricket in India (supra) delved in detail into the functions of the Board, which is reflected from para 33 of the judgment and on the basis of the functions performed by the Board, came to a conclusion that BCCI was performing public functions and, therefore, answerable in judicial review of State action. Para 33 is as under:-

70. In stark contrast to the functions carried out by the BCCI, in my view, the functions carried out by DGC cannot even remotely be termed as public functions. Providing recreation as a Club to its restricted members cannot be compared to the functions of the BCCI on any pedestal. The said judgment, therefore, does not help the Petitioners.

71. Since this Court has held that writ petitions are not maintainable as no writ would lie against a private body not performing public functions, it would be unnecessary to decide the other issues raised by the parties including the existence or otherwise of an alternate remedy. It is left open to the Petitioners to resort to appropriate remedies available to them in accordance with law for ventilating the grievances raised in the present petitions. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the issues raised.

72. Before parting with these petitions, I may, however, take note of the fact that in W.P.(C) 5440/2020, Respondents / Government of NCT of Delhi has filed a short affidavit stating therein that the application made by the Petitioners for prohibition of deployment of contract labour in the WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 79 of 83 departments of DGC was forwarded to the Joint Labour Commissioner (District South) who has recommended forwarding the application to consider the matter to the State Advisory Board. The Chairman of the Board is the final approving authority and as and when the meeting of the Board is convened the agenda items shall be placed before it. This Court is sanguine and confident that the needful shall be done as expeditiously as possible by the concerned authorities, in accordance with law.

73. The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed, along with all pending applications.

74. The present writ petition has been filed seeking the following reliefs:-

Section 25 U; Section 25 N; Section 25 FFA; Section 25 H; Section 30 A, Section 31 A; Section 32 & Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

3. Writ, order or direction in the nature of MANDAMUS or any other appropriate writ, order or direction thereby directing the respondent No.10 to immediately initiate & sent prosecution to the concerned Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate against the Respondent No.11, 12, 13 & 14 for contravention of Section 2 (m) of the Factories Act, 1948 for not obtaining license for food processing in the Kitchen of the Food Beverages Department of the Delhi Golf Club.

4. Writ, order or direction in the nature of MANDAMUS or any other appropriate writ, order or direction thereby directing the respondent No.6 to immediately initiate & sent prosecution to the concerned Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate against the Respondent No.11, 12, 13 & 14 under Section 58 for contravention of Section 10 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005.

5. Writ, order or direction in the nature of MANDAMUS or any other appropriate writ, order or direction thereby directing the respondent No.6 to immediately initiate & sent prosecution under Section 23 ; Section 24 & Section 25 of the of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 to the concerned Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate against the Respondent no.11, 12, 13 & 14 for contravention of Section 9 of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970.

6. Any other Writ, Order or direction in the nature of MANDAMUS or any other appropriate writ, order or direction the Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper may WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 81 of 83 also be granted in the facts and circumstances of the present case and in the interest of Justice.‖

75. As is evident from the reliefs sought, Petitioners seek prosecution of the office bearers of DGC, alleging violation of the various provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 , Factories Act, 1948 , Disaster Management Act, 2005 and Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 . In my view, the reliefs sought cannot be granted by this Court as it is the prerogative of the State Government to initiate prosecution, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case before it. A writ of mandamus cannot be issued for directing prosecution or institution of legal proceedings to any party and there is a complete mechanism available to the Petitioners under the relevant statutes for the said purpose. In Nagpur Glass Works Ltd., Nagpur & Anr. vs State of Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur & Ors. , 1954 SCC OnLine MP 74, a petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for a writ of mandamus to the State of Madhya Pradesh seeking prosecution under the Minimum Wages Act . The Supreme Court held that a writ of mandamus cannot lie to compel a person to institute legal proceedings. Paras 19 to 21 being relevant are quoted hereunder:-

This argument cannot be accepted in view of the following statement of the law in Halsbury's Daws of England, Hailsham Edition, Volume IX, paragraph 1270, pp. 744- 746:

76. In view of the above, no directions can be issued in the present petition and the same is accordingly dismissed along with all pending applications.

JYOTI SINGH, J APRIL 19, 2021 yg WP(C) 3403/2020 & conn. Page 83 of 83