(per Hon'ble Sri Justice A.V.Sesha Sai) The only issue that falls for consideration and resolution in this batch of Writ Petitions is ----

2. Petitioners as well as the unofficial respondents are presently working as Agricultural Extension Officers Grade-II in the Department of Horticulture, Government of Andhra Pradesh. Petitioners entered into service with Diploma qualification, whereas the unofficial respondents entered into service with Degree qualification. The next higher category is Agriculture Officer and is governed by the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Service Rules.

3. The present issue cropped up pursuant to an order passed by the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal 2 (hereinafter called 'the Tribunal') in O.A. No.1222 of 2017 filed by certain Agricultural Extension Officers who entered into the service with Degree qualification in agriculture. The Tribunal, by way of an order dated 03.05.2017, disposed of the said O.A. with a direction to consider their representation.

Pursuant to the said order, the Government issued Memo bearing No.2438/Agrl.I(2) /2017 dated 12.05.2017, which reads as follows:

6. Accordingly, after careful examination keeping in view the orders of the Hon'ble A.P. Administrative Tribunal and also the orders of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, Government hereby clarified that the A.E.Os., who were appointed with in-service candidates, are eligible for promotion to the next category, i.e., Agricultural Officer from the date of their acquiring the requisite qualification i.e., B.Sc. (Agrl.) Degree and their seniority for the purpose of promotion shall be counted from the date of their acquiring the B.Sc. (Agrl.) qualification.

7. The Special Commissioner of Agriculture, A.P., Guntur is, therefore, requested to revise the seniority list of the A.E.Os. and after finalization of the seniority list, based on the above clarification, effect the promotions to the category of Agricultural Officers."

4. Certain Agricultural Extension Officers, who got initially appointed with Diploma and who secured Degree qualification at a later point of time, invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal by way of filing Original Applications under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

Applicants in O.A. Nos.2886 of 2018, 546 of 2019, 550 of 2019 and 128 of 2018 are the petitioners in W.P. Nos.1648 of 2019, 8106 of 2019, 8062 of 2019 and 3775 of 2019 6 respectively. The Tribunal, by way of the orders impugned in the above said Writ Petitions, except O.A. No.128 of 2018 (against which W.P. No.3775 of 2019 is filed), dismissed the said Original Applications on the ground that the applicants should respond to the provisional seniority list with their objections and on the ground of availability of alternative remedy.

5. Though the petitioners in W.P. Nos.1311 of 2019 and 3879 of 2019 are also aggrieved by the same impugned action, they did not approach the Tribunal before filing the said Writ Petitions before this Court. This Court does not propose to reject those Writ Petitions on the ground of availability of alternative remedy under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, as it is not in dispute that the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal is not functioning as on date.

6. Heard Sri K.G. Krishna Murthy, learned senior counsel, representing Sri K.Rammohan, learned counsel for the writ petitioners in W.P. Nos.1648 of 2019, 8062 of 2019 and 8106 of 2019, Sri D.Y.Karunakar Dayanidhi, learned counsel for the writ petitioners in W.P. No.1311 of 2019, and Sri G.Jayaprakash Babu, learned counsel for the petitioners 7 in W.P. Nos.3775 of 2019 and 3879 of 2019, the learned Government Pleader for the official respondents in all the Writ Petitions and Sri J.Sudheer and Smt. T.V.Sridevi, for the unofficial respondents-Graduate (Degree) holders right from the inception, apart from perusing the material available on record.

7. It is contended by Sri K.G. Krishna Murthy that the Tribunal grossly erred in dismissing the Original Applications on the ground of failure of the applicants to avail the alternative remedy, by totally ignoring the fact that the applicants assailed not only the provisional seniority list dated 19.11.2018 issued by the Commissioner of Agriculture but also the Memo dated 12.5.2017 issued by the State Government which is the basis for the Commissioner to issue the impugned provisional seniority list. It is further contended that having regard to the provisions of Rules 4 & 6 of the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Service Rules, 1997 notified vide G.O.Ms.No.16, Agriculture and Co-operation (FP-

I) Department, dated 21.1.2000 and Rule 33 of the Andhra Pradesh State and Subordinate Service Rules, the impugned action cannot be sustained; that the official respondents erred in taking a view that the seniority of Agriculture Extension Officers for promotion as Agriculture Officer is 8 required to be reckoned from the date of acquisition of the qualification of degree in agriculture; that the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K.K. Dixit & others v. Rajasthan Housing Board & another1, cannot be applied as the contingencies which arose in the said judgment are not present in the cases on hand, and in view of the other judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which are both anterior and posterior to the same.

Sri K.G.Krishna Murthy, in support of his submissions and contentions, places reliance on the following judgments;

(i) In M.Dakshayani v. State of Karnataka & another2;

(ii) In Anil Kumar Gupta & others v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & others3;

(iii) In M.B.Joshi & others v. Satish Kumar Pandey & others4;

(iv) In State of Andhra Pradesh v. B.Prashanth & others5;

(v) In G.Shravan Kumar Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh & others6;

(vi) In State of Orissa & others v. Prasana Kumar Sahoo7 ;

(2015) 1 SCC 474 2 (2018) 16 SCC 172 3 (2000) 1 SCC 128 4 1993 Supp (2) SCC 419 5 2001 (5) ALD 473 6 2005 (3) ALD 732 9

(vii) In Siddabloina Laxminarayana v. Government of Andhra Pradesh8 ;

(viii) In P.S.Ghalaut v. State of Haryana & others9;

(ix) In Bimlesh Tanwark v. State of Haryana & others10;

(x) In Suresh Chandra Jha v. State of Bihar & others11;

(xi) In Government of Andhra Pradesh v. A.P.Jaiswal & others12;

(xii) In B.Premchand & others v. Mohan Koikal & others13 ;

8. Sri Dayanidhi and Sri G Jayaprakash Babu, Advocates, also vehemently attacked the view taken by the official respondents and totally supported the version of the learned senior counsel, Sri K.G.Krishna Murthy.

9. Per contra, Sri J.Sudheer, learned counsel for unofficial respondents, who are the degree holders right from the inception, contends that the contentions advanced on behalf of the writ petitioners are neither sustainable nor tenable in the eye of law; that the stand of the authorities that the seniority of the Agriculture Extension Officers for 7 AIR 2007 SC 2588 8 2014 (5) ALD 114 9 (1995) 5 SCC 625 10 (2003) 5 SCC 604 11 (2007) 1 SCC 405 12 (2001) 1 SCC 748 13 AIR 2011 SC 1925 10 promotion to the category of Agricultural Officer is required to be reckoned only from the date of acquisition of degree qualification and the service rendered prior to the same cannot be counted for the seniority; that the official respondents are perfectly justified in relying upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.K. Dixit 's case (1 supra) as the same was rendered on the basis of the Larger Bench judgments rendered earlier.

To bolster his submissions and contentions, the learned counsel relies on the following judgments;

(i) In K.K. Dixit & others v. Rajasthan Housing Board & another (1 supra);

(ii) In Shailendra Dania & others v. S.P. Dubey & others14;

(iii) In Challa Jaya Bhaskar & others v. Thungathurthi Surender & others15;

(iv) In Chandravathi P.K. & others v. C.K. Saji & others16;

(v) In Indian Airlines Limited & others v. S.Gopala Krishnan17;

(2007) 5 SCC 535 15 (2010) 13 SCC 348 16 (2004) 3 SCC 734 17 (2001) 2 SCC 362 11

(vi) In Vijay Singh Deora & others v. State of Rajasthan & another 18;

(vii) In N.Sureshnathan & another v. Union of India & others19;

(viii) In Roop Chand Adlakha & others v. Delhi Development Authority & others20;

(ix) In Union of India & others v. Deo Narain & others21;

10. Smt. T.V.Sridevi, learned counsel, while totally supporting and adopting the arguments of Sri J.Sudheer, contends that the post of Agriculture Officer is a post which needs to be filled up by way of transfer from the category of Agricultural Extension Officers, and seniority is not the sole criteria and the post of the Agriculture Officer is a selection post and is to be filled up by way of merit and ability as such Rule 33 of the Andhra Pradesh State and Subordinate Service Rules cannot be applied. In support of her submissions and contentions, she relied on the following decisions.

(i) In State of Gujarat & others v. Arvindkumar T.Tiwari & another 22;

(ii) In State of Karnataka v. M/s.Hansa Corporation 23;

(1997) 3 SCC 118 19 1992 Supp (1) SCC 584 20 1989 Supp (1) SCC 116 21 Judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.8017 of 2003, dated 15.09.2008 22 Judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.6468 of 2012, dated 14.09.2012 12

11. In order to consider and resolve the issue on hand, it would be highly essential and imperative to refer to the Rules which govern the subject posts. The posts of Agriculture Officers are governed by the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Service Rules, 1997 notified vide G.O.Ms.No.16, Agriculture and Co-operation (FP-I) Department, dated 21.1.2000. The relevant provisions are Rules 4 and 6 of the said Rules, which read as under:

1980 (0) SCJ Online (SC) 426 13

b) No person shall be eligible for appointment to the post of Agril. Officer by transfer or promotion unless he possesses a degree of Bachelor of Science in Agriculture of a recognized University in the State or any other University recognized by Indian Council of Agricultural Research."

12. It would be very much evident from a reading of the said Rules that on completion of three years' service in the category of Agriculture Extension Officer, one gets the eligibility to hold the post of Agriculture Officer as per Rule 4.

Apart from the said three years' service as Agriculture Extension Officer, they should also hold a degree in agriculture. The said qualification and eligibility are mandatory as per the 1997 Rules. While referring to the said provisions of law, it is the case of the applicants that the Agriculture Extension Officers, in order to claim the post of Agriculture Officer, are required to have 3 years' service in the category of Agriculture Extension Officer and should also possess the Degree in Agriculture, and their seniority needs to be reckoned from the date of initial appointment as Agriculture Extension Officers but not from the date posterior to acquiring the degree qualification. It is the further case of the applicants that as per Rule 33 of the A.P. State and 14 Subordinate Service Rules also, they are entitled to have their seniority reckoned from the date of initial appointment.

13. On the contrary, vehemently opposing the said stance of the applicants, the case of the individuals who entered into the service as Agriculture Extension Officers initially with degree qualification is that the seniority of Agriculture Extension Officers needs to be reckoned from the date of acquiring the degree qualification.

14. For the purpose of having a just conclusion, it would be necessary to refer to the judgments cited by either side. First this Court proposes to refer to the judgments cited on behalf of the applicants who were initially appointed with diploma and thereafter acquired degree.

15. Judgments cited on behalf of the applicants/writ petitioners ---

In M.Dakshayani 's case (2 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 10 to 13, held as under:

8. Applying the definition to the eligibility criteria it is clear that it requires the prescribed educational qualification and 6 years' experience as well. Given the plain meaning of the phrase, the Court would not be justified in reading a qualification into the conjunctive word and imply the word "subsequent" after the word "with".

12. The High Court was right in relying upon the judgment in A.K. Raghumani 's case (supra) to hold that the Rule in the instant case does not require three years teaching experience after acquisition of Post-Graduate Degree. The eligibility criteria for promotion as Assistant Professor are Degree in Medicine, Post-Graduation qualification in Ophthalmology and three years teaching experience as Lecturer. A plain reading of the qualification prescribed for promotion as Assistant Professor would make it clear that three years teaching experience as Lecturer along with a Post-Graduation Degree is sufficient. There is no requirement of three years experience after a person acquires Post- Graduation Degree.

13. There is yet another reason for our conclusion that three years experience as Lecturer for promotion to the post of Assistant Professor need not be after completion of the Post-Graduate Degree. The Recruitment Rules prescribe qualifications for appointment to the posts of Lecturer, Assistant Professor and Associate Professor. The qualifications for appointment to the posts of Assistant Professor and Associate Professor are different. The teaching experience that is required for promotion to the post of Associate Professor and Reader is three years after acquiring Post-Graduate qualification. Whereas, the qualification for promotion to the post of Assistant Professor is teaching experience of not less than three years as a Lecturer. A comparison of the qualifications prescribed for promotion to the posts of Associate Professor and Assistant Professor would make it clear that the prescription of experience 17 after acquisition of Post-Graduate qualification required for promotion to the post of Associate Professor is not part of the qualifications required for promotion as Assistant Professor. A conscious omission of the condition of experience after acquiring Post-Graduate Degree in the qualifications for Assistant Professor supports our view that three years experience as a Lecturer is sufficient. It need not be after completion of Post-Graduation."

In Anil Kumar Gupta 's case (3 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 16 to 33, held as under:

3960/99) and therefore, for both reasons, it will be open to them to attack the said finding in the appeals of the appellants or as appellants in their own Civil appeal arising out of SLP (CC. 3960/99). Point 1 is decided accordingly.

22. This Court based its decision initially on the practice obtaining in the department over a long number of years when the rules were understood as requiring full service of three years after obtaining the degree. On that basis it was held that service was not to include service while holding a diploma. Suresh Nathan 's case was, however, distinguished in M.B. Joshi 's case. In the latter case the relevant rule referred to (i) Diploma holder Sub Engineers completing 12 years of service 35% (ii) Draftsman & Head Draftsman completing 12 years of service (iii) Graduate Sub-Engineers completing 8 years of service 10%. The Court was concerned with category

(iii). It was pointed out that the Rule did not contemplate any equivalence between a degree with particular number of years of service as in N. Suresh Nathan 's case. It was observed that the Rules in M.B. Joshi 's case:

The judgment in M.B. Joshi 's case supports the case of the respondents.

23. The above ruling in M.B. Joshi was followed in D. Stephen's case. In that case, this Court again distinguished N. Suresh Nathan 's case. This Court however cautioned that any practice which was de hors a Rule could be no justification for the department to rely upon. Such past practice must relate to the interpretation of a rule in a particular manner. This Court then followed M.B. Joshi 's case as being one where the language of the rule was specific that "if a particular length of services in the feeder post together with educational qualification enables a candidate to be considered for promotions, it will not be proper to count the experience only from the date of acquisition of superior educational qualification because such interpretation will violate the very purpose to give incentive to the employee to acquire higher education".

This decision in D. Stephen's case also supports the case of the respondents.

24. Therefore, on the language of the notification dated 30.6.89, we are of the view that the 2 years professional experience need not entirely be experience gained after obtaining the degree.

25. It is true that in one of the counter- affidavits in CWP 606/1985, the MCD took the view that the experience ought to be after acquiring degree. But the clarification of the UPSC dated 22 13.9.85 addressed to the MCD made it clear that the entire service including the service rendered before obtaining degree was to be taken into consideration. This letter has, in fact, been relied upon by the learned Single Judge of the High Court for holding that service rendered before acquiring the degree was to be counted.

26. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the service rendered by the Diploma holders before obtaining degree can also to be counted.

Point 3 and 4:

27. The dispute regarding ineligibility centers round 18 candidates before us. Here, there are two categories. In regard to some of them, Justice Jain held that they were beyond 30 years by the cut off date while in regard to others he held that they did not have the required professional experience of two years.

28. So far as the first category is concerned, they were all MCD employees earlier and age was relaxable as per the advertisement. Further, in view of the 'consent' between parties in the High Court and before us, those who were selected by the MCD in spite of exceeding 30 years and who otherwise were held by Justice Jain as having secured the necessary marks, are to be retained. There is no difficulty so far as these persons are concerned.

29. Coming to the second category, so far as Dalip Ramnani was concerned, rejection of his case by Justice Jain was based mainly upon the 23 suspicion regarding the genuineness of two certificates of ICMCP Ltd., Gurgaon as regards his experience. Now, the High Court has held that Justice Jain was wrong in suspecting these certificates. On that finding of the High Court, the position will be that he will have to be treated as having more than two years experience, for the entire period often months from 1.4.86 to 31.1.87 in ICMCP will have to be counted rather than only two months and 14 days in ICMCP as done by Justice Jain. According to Justice Jain, his experience otherwise came down to 1 year, 7 months, 1 day. If, therefore, the entire ten months and not merely 2 months, 14 days period is taken into consideration, that will add up 7 months, 16 days, more making the experience 2 years, 2 months, 17 days.

30. Coming to Sri R.K. Ailawadi, Justice Jain held that he got his degree on 29.7.87, the marks sheet is dated 24.7.87. Justice Jain considered his experience in Bhasin Construction Co. for the period 17.87 to 22.8.88 as 1 year, 1 month, 22 days and as JE in MCD from 23.8.88 to 31.7.89 as 11 months, 9 days, in all 2 years, 1 month, 1 day. Justice Jain excluded the experience prior to 24.7.87. Similarly, in the case of Naresh Gupta, the marks certificate is dated 24.7.87 and the service in Aggarwal & Co. is from 15.6.87 to 30.11.88 (1 year, 5 months, 16 days) and as JE in MCD is from 1.12.88 to 31.7.89 (8 months). If the service from 15.6.87 to 23.7.87 is not to be considered, the candidate will be ineligible.

31. The issue relating to Mr. Ailwadi and Mr. Naresh Gupta is a common issue. In the case before 24 us, the words used in the rules and notification are 'professional experience' of two years. The narrow question is whether the experience gained after the examination and before the publication of results, can be taken into account. We may point out that this issue does not concern itself with a question sometimes raised in relation to cases where the result of the examination is not declared before the date of advertisement or last date of receipt of application and is announced after such date. Such cases may stand on a different footing. We are aware that, in regard to those cases, there are various rulings of this Court as to which is the crucial date. Here we are not concerned with such an issue because the advertisement is of 1989 and long before that in all the cases, the degree results were announced and degree certificates/marks sheets were also obtained. We are here concerned with a limited question as to whether the experience gained after campus selection, i.e., after final examination in BE was over and before publication of result of BE examination/or marks certificate, could be treated as 'professional experience'.

32. In the context of the advertisement in this case and the facts - including the rival pleas as to 'consent' in the High Court, we are disinclined to hold that the experience rendered before actual announcement of results is to be excluded. We are dealing with a case in which no argument as the one raised before us was advanced in the High Court on this issue. Added to this, the rival claims as to 'consent' of parties in the High Court remain. We are, therefore, not inclined to disturb the conclusion 25 of the High Court so far as these two officers are concerned.

33. Justice Jain has found Sri Dinesh Yadav, Sunil Kumar, Saminder Negi, Ramesh Kumar, A.K. Mittal and S.K. Mehta eligible by counting their experience while they held Diploma. These officers passed BE or AMIE later but long before the advertisement. Our decision on Point 2 holds good and Justice Jain was right in counting their pre- degree service."

In M.B.Joshi 's case (4 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 12 to 16 held as under:

In B.Prashanth 's case (5 supra), a Division Bench of this Court at paragraph No.4 held as under:

In our considered opinion, clause (i) of Rule 11 of Annexure IV is quite precise, clean, plain and unambiguous and it does not admit more than one meaning. In the instant case, there is no controversy on facts. The admitted facts are that the 1st respondent in each of these writ petitions claims to have been appointed as Probationary Revenue Inspector against the substantive vacancies arising in the permanent cadre of the category of Senior Assistants in the Revenue Department on completion of the prescribed period of probation. In view of these admitted facts and by force of the phrase "with effect from the date on which the vacancy arose" occurring in Rule 11(i), it becomes quite clear that the 1st respondent in each of these writ petitions should be deemed to have been appointed as Probationary Revenue Inspector from the date on which the respective vacancies against which the petitioners were appointed arose. It is true that Rule 11(i) as such does not deal with seniority at all. It is also not the argument of Sri J. Manohar Rao, that Rule 11(i) deals with seniority and seniority has to be determined in terms of that rule. The learned Government Pleader is quite right in 30 saying that the appropriate rule to determine seniority is Rule 33 of the A.P. State and Subordinate Service Rules only. The language employed in Rule 33 of the A.P. State and Subordinate Service Rules, is also quite clear and unambiguous. The seniority of a person in a service, class, category or grade has to be determined with reference to the date of his first appointment. The crucial phrase in clause (a) of Rule 33 of the A.P. State and Subordinate Service Rules is "the date of his first appointment". The question is how this phrase should be understood and interpreted. The question to be considered is as regards the 1st respondents who are appointed as Probationary Revenue Inspectors under Rule 11(i), what is the date of their first appointment within the meaning and purport of Rule 33(a)? Can it be said that the actual date on which the office orders are issued appointing the respondents as Probationary Revenue Inspectors is "the date of their first appointment"

The above rule is not brought into force with retrospective effect. Therefore, it cannot be applied in the case of the 1st respondent-employees."

In G.Shravan Kumar Reddy 's case (6 supra), a Division Bench of this Court at paragraphs 19 and 20 held as under:

Rule 33 of the A.P. State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1962 deals with seniority and Rules 33(b) reads:

In the light of the Special Rules issued in G.O.Ms. No. 215, dated 13-5-1970 referred to supra, the services of the writ petitioner and others had been regularized in accordance with the said Rules and the General Rules, in their respective Units of appointment by the concerned appointing authorities. It is also not in serious controversy that the seniority in the category of Inspector of Mines had been settled long prior to 12 years and after such long lapse of time a representation is made by 3rd respondent to disturb the said seniority on the ground of his merit obtained in A.P. Public Service Commission. It is pertinent to note that the effect of the representation and the impugned show-cause notice is to alter the dates of regularisation after a lapse of 12 years after the writ petitioner had been 35 promoted to two higher categories i.e., Technical Assistant and also Royalty Inspector. The regularisation orders had been issued in the light of Rule 5 of the Rules under G.O.Ms. No. 215, dated 13-5-1970 and also in accordance with the General Rule 23(a) of A.P. State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1962 as the said Rules were operative during the said period. The A.P. State and Subordinate Services Rules of 1996 came into force long subsequent thereto and on the strength of the amended Rules also, the present representation had been made by the 3rd respondent to disturb the seniority already fixed which would result in unsettling the seniority fixed long back. No doubt, submissions at length were made to the effect that it is only at the stage of show cause notice and hence at this stage inasmuch as opportunity had been given to file objections, all the objections if any can be raised before the 2nd respondent and hence it would not be appropriate to interfere with the Memo issued by the 2nd respondent at this stage.

20. As can be seen from the respective pleadings of the parties and also the material available on record and the impugned order of the Tribunal, several of the facts are not in controversy. Seniority was fixed in the respective District Units and the fact that the writ petitioner and the 3rd respondent are in different District Units also is not in serious controversy. Subsequent thereto some promotions also had been given and ultimately for the reason that for further promotions his chances would be affected, at this point of time, the 3rd respondent thought of making the present 36 representation. In P. Mohan Reddy v. E.A.A. Charles, MANU/SC/0108/2001 : [2001]1SCR1068 while deciding the aspect of seniority, the Apex Court held that the right to get seniority determined as per rules in force at the time of his recruitment vests in an employee and redetermination of seniority on the basis of amended seniority rule can be done only if amended rule is given retrospective effect and seniority not to be changed over and over again as and when there are changes of criteria. Reliance also was placed on Dasari Satyanarayana v. Bapayya and Anr., MANU/AP/0100/1963 : AIR1963AP148 to show that a writ of certiorari of this nature can be issued in view of the fact that the 2nd respondent lacks jurisdiction to issued show-cause notice impugned in the O.A. In B.S. Bajwa and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors. 1998 (1) Supreme 217 it was held that in service matters the question of seniority not to be reopened after lapse of a reasonable period because that results in disturbing the settled position which is not justifiable. No doubt an attempt was made to distinguish these decisions on facts. In Narravula Kotam Raju v. Regional Deputy Director of Fisheries, Kakinda and Ors., MANU/AP/0372/2001 : 2001(3)ALD649 the Division Bench held that inter se seniority of employees would be governed by Rules existing at the relevant point of time and the inter se seniority of respective candidates fixed after due notice and after considering the objections raised and as per the Rules then existing cannot be reopened after a long lapse of time by reason of subsequent amendment of relevant Rule or insertion of new Rule particularly when candidates were promoted to more than one 37 post meanwhile. Reliance also was placed on M. Shyam Sunder and Ors. v. Government of A.P. and Ors., MANU/AP/0630/2001 : 2001(6)ALD87 (D.B.) wherein it was held that altering the date of regularisaton as well as seniority of promotee engineers contrary to the earlier G.Os.259 and 260 which have been sustained earlier by the High Court as well as Supreme Court is illegal and the Government cannot exercise powers of review for the second time under paragraph 13 of the Presidential Order and the impugned order is violative of the principles of natural justice. Reliance also was placed on Union of India and Ors. v. Upendra Singh 9 SC SR 542."

In Prasana Kumar Sahoo 's case (7 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph No.13 held as under:

In Siddabloina Laxminarayana 's case (8 supra), a Division Bench of this Court at paragraphs 15 and 16 held as under:

In P.S.Ghalaut 's case (9 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph No.5 held as under:

In Bimlesh Tanwark 's case (10 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph No.52 held as under:

In Suresh Chandra Jha 's case (11 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph No.8 held as under:

In A.P.Jaiswal 's case (12 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph No.24 held as under:

In B.Premchand 's case (13 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 15, 16, 19 and 33 held as under:

This would be destructive of judicial discipline, and also the basic principle in a democracy that it is not for the Judge to legislate as that is the task of the elected representatives of the people. Even if the literal interpretation results in hardship or inconvenience, it has to be followed (see G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretations, 9th Edn. pp 45-49). Hence departure from the literal rule should only be done in very rare cases, and ordinarily there should be judicial restraint in this connection.

33. We may mention here that the literal rule of interpretation is not only followed by Judges and lawyers, but it is also followed by the lay man in his ordinary life. To give an illustration, if a person says "this is a pencil", then he means that it is a pencil; and it is not that when he says that the object is a pencil, he means that it is a horse, donkey or an elephant. In other words, the literal rule of interpretation simply means that we mean what we say and we say what we mean. If we do not follow the literal rule of interpretation, social life will become impossible, and we will not understand each other. If we say that a certain object is a book, then we mean it is a book. If we say it is a book, but we mean it is a horse, table or an elephant, then we will 47 not be able to communicate with each other. Life will become impossible. Hence, the meaning of the literal rule of interpretation is simply that we mean what we say and we say what we mean."

14. Judgments cited by the learned counsel for the unofficial respondents----

In K.K.Dixit 's case (1 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph No.34 held as under:

In Shailendra Dania 's case (14 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 43 to 45 held as under:

In Challa Jaya Bhaskar 's case (15 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph No.29 held as under:

In Chandravathi P.K. 's case (16 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 31, 32, 41 and 43 held as under:

In S.Gopala Krishnan's case (17 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 3 to 5 held as under:

OR 2.2 S.S.C. with I.T.I, certificate or equivalent in Associated Trades of Mechanical/ Electrical/Automobile courses and having five years' 57 experience in equipment operating or driving and possessing current heavy vehicle driving licence.

4. The respondent has obtained the ITI certificate in June 1994 and he had about five years of experience after obtaining the certificate and diploma in Mechanical Engineering was obtained in April 1996. In any event, it is clear that the experience obtained by him falls short of the requisite qualification. This Court in N. Suresh Nathan and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. MANU/SC/0101/1992 : AIR1992SC564 ; Gurdial Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab MANU/SC/0494/1995 : 1995CriLJ4171 and Anil Kumar Gupta and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors. MANU/SC/0674/1995 :

5. When in addition to qualification, experience is prescribed, it would only mean acquiring experience after obtaining the necessary qualification and not before obtaining such qualification. In the case of the respondent, he obtained the ITI certificate in the year 1994 and, therefore, did not possess five years of experience as required under the relevant rule. If his qualification as a diploma holder in Mechanical Engineering is taken note of, he has not completed three years of experience as he got the same in April, 1996 and on relevant date he did not possess such qualification. Indeed in prescribing qualification and experience, it is also made clear in the general information 58 instruction at Item No. 6 that "experience will be computed after the date of acquiring the necessary qualifications". Therefore, when this requirement was made very clear that he should have experience only after acquiring the qualification, the view taken by the High Court to the contrary either by the learned Single Judge or the Division Bench, does not stand to reason."

In Vijay Singh Deora 's case (18 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph No.9 held as under:

In N.Sureshnathan's case (19 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 4 and 5 held as under:

In Roop Chand Adlakha 's case (20 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 10, 11, 18, 21 and 29 held as under:

In the present case, eligibility-determination was made by a cumulative-criterion of a certain educational qualification plus a particular quantum of service experience. It cannot, in our opinion, be said, as postulated by the High Court, that the choice of the State was either to recognise Diploma- Holders as "eligible" for promotion or wholly exclude 67 them as "not-eligible". If the educational qualification by itself was recognised as conferring eligibility for promotion, then, the super-imposition of further conditions such as a particular period of service, selectively, on the Diploma-Holders alone to their disadvantage might become discriminatory. This does not prevent the State from formulating a policy which prescribes as an essential part of the conditions for the very eligibility that the candidate must have a particular qualification plus a stipulated quantum of service-experience. It is stated that on the basis of the "Vaish Committee" report, the authorities considered the infusion of higher academic and technical quality in the personnel requirements in the relevant cadres of Engineering Services necessary. These are essentially matters of policy. Unless the provision is shown to be arbitrary, capricious, or to bring about grossly unfair results, judicial policy should be one of judicial-restraint. The prescriptions may be somewhat cumbersome or produce some hardship in their application in some individual cases; but they cannot be struck down as unreasonable, capricious or arbitrary. The High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in striking down the Rules as violative of Articles 14 and 16."

In Deo Narain 's case (21 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph No.29 held as under:

15. Judgments cited by Smt. T.V.Sridevi, learned counsel for the unofficial respondents---

In Arvindkumar T. Tiwari 's case (22 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held at paragraphs 5 to 13 as under:

Dharam Bir MANU/SC/0397/1998 : (1998) 6 SCC 165, this Court while dealing with a similar issue 71 rejected the plea of humanitarian grounds and held as under:

Lacking eligibility for the post cannot be cured at any stage and appointing such a person would amount to serious illegibility and not mere irregularity.

Such a person cannot approach the court for any relief for the reason that he does not have a right which can be enforced through court. (See: Prit Singh v. S.K. Mangal and Ors .

MANU/SC/0640/1993 : 1993 (Supp.) (1) SCC 714; and Pramod Kumar v. U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission and Ors .

MANU/SC/7404/2008 : AIR 2008 SC 1817).

12. The claim of the Respondent was earlier rejected on the ground that, the family had adequate financial status and the amount of pension being given was actually over and above the limit fixed by the Appellant issuing the guidelines. Subsequently, when the case was reconsidered upon the direction of the court, it was found that the Respondent did not meet the requisite eligibility criteria i.e., 10th standard certificate. Admittedly, the Respondent is 8th standard fail, and thus, he can be considered only as 7th standard pass and we must therefore consider, whether he could have been offered appointment to a Class IV post.

13. Clause 9 thereof, provides that no relaxation in educational qualification(s) for the purpose of giving compassionate appointment to the dependent(s) of a deceased employee, would be permissible. However, such relaxation can be granted if there exists some requirement of minimum qualification(s) with respect to the said post.

Clause 11 thereof, provides that a dependent can, in fact, be given appointment on compassionate ground, on the basis of the pass marks obtained by him in the new Secondary School Certificate and in view thereof, as Respondent No. 1 is admittedly only 8th standard (fail), he is therefore, ineligible for the post.

Even otherwise, if the direction of the High Court is complied with and the case is considered as per the un-amended provisions in existence prior to 2005, the financial limits fixed therein, would 74 automatically be applicable. His application dated 11.5.1999 reveals that his date of birth is 1.3.1976, and further that he has studied only upto the 8th standard (fail)."

In M/s. Hansa Corporation 's case (23 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph No.15 held as under:

This view was re-affirmed in Norman v. Norman ."

16. The judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.K.Dixit 's case ( 1 supra), Shailendra Dania 's case (14 supra), N.Sureshnathan's case (19 supra) and Chandravathi P.K.'s case (16 supra), dealt with the situation where the relevant Rules prescribed different ratios for different sets of employees, and in the said factual situation, the Hon'ble Apex Court took a view that the date of acquisition of qualification needs to be taken into account for deciding the seniority of the employees for quotas earmarked for different categories.

Therefore, the said judgments would not render any assistance to the case of the respondents herein who are graduates right from the inception. It is absolutely not in dispute that the Rules in the present case i.e. the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Service Rules notified vide G.O.Ms.No.16, Agriculture and Co-operation (FP-I) Department, dated 21.1.2000, do not provide for such 77 situation and there are no such ratios earmarked in the Rules, governing the case on hand. Therefore, the said judgments would not render any assistance to the unofficial respondents.

17. As referred to supra, in identical situation in the case of Anil Kumar Gupta (3 supra), a three (3) Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and in M.Dakshayani 's case (2 supra), a two Judge Bench, held that the seniority should be reckoned from the date of initial appointment in the feeder category and not from the date of acquisition of qualification.

In fact, in M.Dakshayani 's case (2 supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court also considered all the earlier judgments now cited on behalf of the unofficial respondents at paragraph No.7, and having regard to the scheme of the relevant Rules, took the view that the earlier service put in prior to acquiring the qualification should also be taken into consideration.

Therefore, this court is bound by the principles laid down in the Three Judge Bench decision of the Apex Court in Anil Kumar Gupta (3 supra), and in M.Dakshayani 's case (2 supra). Having regard to the said judgments and the other judgments cited by the learned counsel for the applicants, it is to be necessarily held that the service put in by the Agricultural Extension Officers from the date of initial 78 appointment as Agricultural Extension Officers is required to be taken into consideration but not the service put in by them from the date of acquisition of qualification of degree.

18. The contention of the learned counsel Smt. T.V.Sridevi that since the instant post is a selection post, merit alone is the criteria, as rightly pointed out by the learned senior counsel Sri K.G.Krishna Murthy, is premature, and the said aspect needs no consideration at this stage for the purpose of adjudicating the issue on hand. The judgments cited by Smt. T.V.Sridevi, learned counsel have no relevance to the case on hand.

19. It is also significant to note that the Rules, governing the subject post, Agriculture Officer, do not make any distinction for consideration of the cases of Agricultural Extension Officers for promotion as Agriculture Officers on the basis of date of acquisition of qualification of degree in agriculture. When the language employed in the relevant Rules is unambiguous and clear, there is no scope for interpreting the same in the manner suggested by the learned counsel, representing the unofficial respondents, who are the Agricultural Extension Officers with degree qualification right from the inception.

20. The Tribunal, instead of putting a quietus for the problem by deciding the issue, as the government issued the Memo directing the Commissioner to act in a particular manner, asked the applicants to avail all the alternative remedies. The said course of action suggested by the Tribunal is highly erroneous and obviously a futile exercise.

The above factual and legal situation drives this Court towards an irresistible conclusion that the action impugned in the Original Applications and the orders of the Tribunal impugned in these Writ Petitions cannot be sustained in the eye of law.

21. For the aforesaid reasons, the Writ Petitions are allowed, setting aside the Memo bearing No.2438/Agrl.I(2) /2017 dated 12.05.2017 issued by the State Government and consequently, the respondents are directed to reckon the seniority of the petitioners (Diploma Holders initially) from the initial date of appointment and to proceed further.

Miscellaneous applications, if any pending in these Writ Petitions, shall stand closed.

____________________ A.V.SESHA SAI, J ___________________________ M.VENKATA RAMANA, J Date: 25.10.2019 LR copy to be marked.

BO Siva 80 THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M.VENKATA RAMANA WRIT PETITION Nos. 1648 OF 2019, 8062 OF 2019, 8106 OF 2019, 1311 OF 2019, 3775 OF 2019 AND 3879 OF 2019 Date: 25.10.2019 siva 81 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI **** WRIT PETITION Nos. 1648 OF 2019, 8062 OF 2019, 8106 OF 2019, 1311 OF 2019, 3775 OF 2019 AND 3879 OF 2019 Between:

* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M.VENKATA RAMANA + WRIT PETITION Nos. 1648 OF 2019, 8062 OF 2019, 8106 OF 2019, 1311 OF 2019, 3775 OF 2019 AND 3879 OF 2019 % 28.10.2019 # Between: