SANJAY KAROL, J.

1. Assailed before us, at the insistence of the complainant, is a judgment and order dated 23rd November, 2023 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Principal Bench at Jabalpur), passed in Criminal Revision No.3125 of 2021, whereby the judgment/order dated 11th November, 2021 in Sessions Trial No.52/2019 of the Signature Not Verified learned IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Seoni, acquitting the accused- Digitally signed by VARSHA MENDIRATTA Date: 2024.09.25 15:56:16 IST Reason: 1|SLP(CRL.16333/2023 Respondents (Nos.2 to 9) of the charges under Sections 294, 323, 506, 353, 352 read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code1 was confirmed. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

2. The complainant-appellant was appointed as the Chairman of the District Waqf Board, Seoni, thereby being charged with the supervision of Masjid Committees. As a result of the dispute between the newly appointed committee of which he was the Chairman and the previous committee, the claimant was abused and beaten to the point of unconsciousness.

3. He was taken to the district hospital wherefrom he was referred to the Asian Hospital, Nagpur and upon discharge therefrom, FIR No.133 of 2018 dated 9th March, 2018 under Sections 294 , 323 , 506 read with 34 IPC came to be lodged.

4. Vide order dated 18th March, 2019 of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Seoni, the case was committed to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Seoni. In this order, it was noted that the accused were on bail, but they were taken into custody under Section 307 IPC on that date itself.

5. The Additional Sessions Judge, Seoni, framed charges under Sections 294 , 332 / 34 and 307 / 34 IPC. Such framing of charge by order dated 17th September, 2019 was challenged before the High Court in Criminal Revision No.4805 of 1 For short, ‘ IPC ’ 2|SLP(CRL.16333/2023 2019, whereby vide order dated 21st January, 2020 the same was set aside on the ground that the documents made part of the record were not supplied to the accused. The matter was remanded for framing of charge afresh.

6. It is in this backdrop, that the order impugned before the High Court came to be passed. Regarding Section 307 , the order records:-

7. Aggrieved by the said order, the complainant-appellant preferred the instant criminal revision. The impugned order records that the medical officer of the District Hospital, Seoni, gave his opinion about the nature of the injury sustained by the complainant, also observing that the throttling could have 3|SLP(CRL.16333/2023 resulted in respiratory arrest. There are observations with respect to bruises and abrasions, however, details as to their size and location were missing. Such assessment was termed as general and superficial.

8. As such, it was held that no case under Section 307 IPC was made out and the Criminal Revision was, thus, dismissed.

CONSIDERATION BY THIS COURT

9. By way of the special leave petition, it is submitted primarily that :

Gyan Devi & Ors.2 to state that at the time of framing of charge, the Court is not to undertake a detailed assessment of the material placed on record.

e) The predecessor in office of the Additional Sessions Judge took a contrary view on the same set of facts and circumstances and had framed the charge under the said section.

2 (2000) 8 SSCC 239 4|SLP(CRL.16333/2023

10. Section 307 IPC is the charge that the Courts below have concurrently, refused to frame. It reads as under:-

11. Let us at this stage, consider the law as laid down by this Court in respect of this section, as also that of Section 34 IPC, given that there are a total of eight respondents (accused) before the court.

11.1 In State of Maharashtra v. Kashirao3 , the Court identified the essential ingredients for the applicability of the section. The relevant extract is as below:

11. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. If the injury inflicted has been with the avowed object or intention to cause death, the ritual nature, extent or character of the injury or whether such injury is sufficient to actually causing death are really factors which are wholly irrelevant for adjudging the culpability under Section 307 IPC. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, it is not correct to acquit an accused of the charge under Section 307 IPC merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.” (Emphasis supplied) 11.4 The principle governing the application of Section 34 has been captured thus in Chhota Ahirwar v. State of M.P.6 :

12. In the light of the decisions considered supra, let us now turn our attention to the facts of the present case. The statement of the doctor, relied upon by the Trial Court to observe that there are minor injuries is placed as Annexure P-5. It is extracted as under:

Though, other injuries were simple but Death of patient might be possible if throttling had been done (as suspected by the bruise marks over upper lip, nose and throat ) which may result in respiratory arrest.

--sd— Dr. Praveen Thakur MBBS Reg No. MP 10316 Medical Officer District Hospital Seoni”

13. It is well recognized that intention may not always be proved by hard evidence and instead may be required to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. If the doctor who conducted the examination posits the possibility of throttling, then under what circumstances, without rigorous cross-examination, could it be concluded that the injuries sustained were simple? That apart, even if the injuries were taken as simple, the extent of the injuries, as observed supra in Hari Mohan Mondal, are not relevant, if the intent is present. We are not in agreement with the learned Courts below that intent was absent, as the Doctor’s report itself records throttling to be reasonably suspected.

14. The third criterion as in Kashirao (supra) could also arguably be met. Whether or not it is met, is a matter of determination at trial. The question of intention to kill or the knowledge of death in terms of Section 307 , IPC is a question of fact and not one of law.

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15. This Court’s scope of interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is well established. Reference made be made to Mathura Prashad v. State of M.P.7 . It was held as below:

16. In view of the above discussion, given that the minor nature of injuries is not sufficient reason to not frame a charge under Section 307 IPC, as per the law laid down by this Court, the judgment impugned, passed in Criminal Revision 7 1992 Supp (1) SCC 406 8 AIR 1958 SC 61 9 2022 SCC OnLine SC 883 10|SLP(CRL.16333/2023 No. 3125 of 2021 dated 23rd November, 2023, is set aside. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The concerned Trial Court is directed to have the Respondents stand trial for all the offences for which charges have been framed, as also Section

307. The trial shall proceed on its own merits, as per law, uninfluenced by the observations hereinabove which were for the limited purpose of testing the propriety of the impugned order. The same shall be expedited.

17. Registry to transmit a copy of this judgment to the Registrar General, High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Principal Bench at Jabalpur) who will then transmit it to the Concerned Court.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

…………………………….J. (C.T. RAVIKUMAR) ………………………………J. (SANJAY KAROL) New Delhi;

September 25, 2024.

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