Whether the High Court of Judicature, Madras, can issue a writ in the nature of Declaration and set at naught the proceedings initiated on a private complaint under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 , before the criminal court outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Madras High Court is the moot question raised in this writ petition.

2. At the foremost, it has to be taken note of that the petitioner has already raised a similar question before the Bombay High Court in Criminal Writ Petition No.409 of 2010 and vide order dated 08.02.2010, the Bombay High Court, has directed the petitioner to raise the dispute before the concerned criminal court and the same has been raised by the petitioner and answered in Criminal Revision Application No.56 of 2010 on 15.04.2010. Despite the same, the petitioner has urged the same contentions in this writ petition by way of a writ of declaration, hence the adjudication.

3. The petitioner, Managing Director of M/s.Galaxy Amaze Kingdom Ltd., Chennai, has filed the present writ petition for a declaration, declaring that when the jurisdiction with regard to the settlement of dispute is restricted between the parties by an agreement at Chennai, proceedings launched by the third respondent outside the agreed jurisdiction at Mumbai in Case No.23196/SS/2009 before Learned 62nd Metropolitan Magistrate Court is not valid and binding insofar as the petitioner is concerned.

4. M/s.Galaxy Amaze Kingdom Ltd., Chennai, is a company manufacturing Nutrivita health drink and other products. According to the Managing Director, it has fixed assets of more than 100 Crores. There are 4 brand values worth Rs.175 Crores. It has a manufacturing factory and other machineries worth several Crores. The products of the company have been received well by the public. It is an indigenous company. The company used to advertise its products through various advertising companies and one among them was Precept-H PTV Ltd., a Multi National Advertising Agency, Madras, 4th respondent herein. According to the petitioner, prior to the filing of the writ petition, the petitioner company has given more than 40 lakhs worth advertisements to Precept-H PTV Ltd., Mumbai and paid the said sum regularly by way of Demand Drafts, cheques, payable at Chennai only. The petitioner has further submitted that for the purpose of settlement or any litigation, the contracts executed by the company confer territorial jurisdiction only to the Courts at Madras.

5. Whiles, there was a dispute between the petitioner and the said advertising company, in respect of one particular advertisement, payment for the said advertisement was disputed. The Advertisement company seemed to have deposited the advance security cheques for a sum of Rs.6,66,961/- and got it dishonoured. According to the petitioner, a sum of Rs.4,10,705/- has already been paid to the advertising company. It is the case of the petitioner that suppressing the same, the advertising company has filed a criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, on the file of Learned 62nd Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Dada, Mumbai, against the Company and the Directors of the company.

6. The petitioner has further submitted that in the bill raised by the 4th respondent advertisement company, a condition has been imposed that payment due under the invoice would be made only at Chennai, subject to the jurisdiction of Madras Courts, and as per the agreement entered into between the parties, M/s.Galaxy Amaze Kingdom Ltd., Chennai, has stipulated a condition that all the disputes arising out of a contracts can be made only within the territorial jurisdiction of Chennai Courts. Therefore, when a complaint was filed by the 4th respondent before the Learned 62nd Metropolitan Magistrate, Dada, Mumbai, an objection was raised regarding the territorial jurisdiction and considering the objection raised, an oral order was passed on 29.04.2009 postponing the issuance of process. Lateron, on 30.06.2009, summons were issued ignoring the objections, on the sole ground that cheque was dishonoured at Mumbai.

7. The petitioner has further submitted that no part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Mumbai Courts and that the entire transactions have taken place only in Chennai, where the agreement was entered into between the parties. According to the petitioner, the cheque was issued in Chennai, notice to the petitioner was issued at Chennai. The 4th respondent is also having office at Chennai and therefore, the petitioner has submitted that the place of dishonour of cheque alone would not confer jurisdiction on the payee to institute a criminal complaint against him at Mumbai, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. It is also the case of the petitioner that in all the invoices of the 4th respondent, it has been clearly mentioned that if any dispute arises between the parties, Courts in Chennai alone will have jurisdiction. According to Mr.R.N.Amarnath, learned counsel for the petitioner, the above facts have been suppressed by the complainant in the notice issued under Section 138 of the Act and that therefore the complaint lodged before the Learned 62nd Metropolitan Magistrate, Dada, Mumbai, lacks bona fides. He has further contended that being aggrieved by the issuance of summons, a Criminal Revision Application was filed before the Learned Sessions Court, Sewree, Mumbai, on 15.04.2010 and the Learned Judge has rejected the plea to transfer or to quash the summons.

8. The petitioner has further submitted that since number of prosecutions were levelled against the company and its Directors, he was constrained to file W.P.No.28645 of 2006, seeking for a declaration, declaring that in a case where jurisdiction is restricted between the parties by an agreement in business transactions, at a particular place, any proceeding launched outside the agreed jurisdiction, even under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, is not valid and binding and in the said writ petition, this Court was pleased to grant interim stay. At this juncture, though the learned counsel for the petitioner requested for tagging of both the writ petitions, the request was rejected on the ground as the prayer in both writ petitions are one and the same, any orders to be passed in the writ petition, would be made applicable to the other case, if pleadings are one and the same.

9. In support of the above pleadings, and inviting the attention of this Court to a decision in Oil and Natural Gas Commission Vs. Uptake Kaman Bass and others, reported in 1994 (4) SCC 711, R.N.Amaranath, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that for instituting a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the entire cause of action has to be taken and mere receipt of an intimation from the bank situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of Chennai courts, does not confer any right to the payee to prefer a complaint in a place of his choice. According to the learned counsel, an agreement entered into between the parties confer jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction for preferring a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, depends upon various factors such as, location of both the companies with their registered offices or branches, the conditions in the invoice, conferring jurisdiction on any specific Court/s, in the case of any dispute between the parties, the place of issuance of cheques and mere dishonour of cheque at Mumbai alone does not decide the place of institution of the complaint. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the overall conduct of the parties has to be taken into consideration, while considering the issue relating to territorial jurisdiction and that there should be any harassment by the payee, by choosing a place of his choice. In this context, he referred to a decision in Oligarch Muslim University Vs. Vinery Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd. , reported in 1994 (4) SCC 710, relied on in Oil and Natural Gas Commission Vs. Uptake Kaman Bass and others, reported in 1994 (4) SCC 711, where the Supreme Court, after considering several decisions and on the facts and circumstances of that case, and particularly, the averments made in the petition that it did not disclose that even a part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court, held that the criminal complaint ought not to have been entertained.

10. He also submitted that in Navinchandra N.Majithia Vs. State of Maharashtra , reported in AIR 2000 SC 2966, the Supreme Court, after considering the expression "cause of action" with reference to the jurisdictional aspect of the courts, held that merely because an FIR was registered at a particular state, the police cannot contend that no part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction limits of another state and if a writ petition is filed before the High Court, seeking for transfer or quashing of the complaint, a direction can always be issued to transfer the investigation to other state. Contending inter aila that since the entire cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts in Chennai, i.e., execution of contract, issuance of cheque, raising of invoice bills, issuance of notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and the place of business, location of the registered offices of the disputing parties etc., learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that when in the above judgment, the Supreme Court has made it clear that even FIR registered in one state, can be transferred to another state, the proceedings initiated under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, on the file of the Learned 62nd Metropolitan Magistrate, Dada, Mumbai, has to be declared as not valid and binding insofar as the petitioner is concerned.

11. Placing reliance on a decision of the Division Bench Judgment of the Kerla High Court in Krishnakumar Melon Vs. Neoteric Informative (P) Ltd. , reported in I (2002) BC 512 (DB), learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that in the abovesaid decision, an important question of law came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Division Bench of the Kerla High Court, as to whether the Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, can quash a criminal complaint pending in a Court outside the Kerla State and inviting the attention of this Court to paragraph 7 of the judgment of the Kerla High Court, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the reported case, even if the Court at Mumbai does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Kerla High Court for the purpose of Article 227 or Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, yet the Division Bench of the Kerla High Court held that the power of the Court can be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for compelling reasons in rare occasions, and therefore prayed to invoke the powers and declare the proceedings launched by the third respondent outside the agreed jurisdiction at Mumbai in Case No.23196/SS/2009 before the learned 62nd Metropolitan Magistrate Court as not valid. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, when the only exception in the bundle of facts being the place of dishonour of cheque and all other events, forming part of cause of action, as stated supra, have taken place at Chennai, within the territorial jurisdiction of Chennai Courts, the criminal proceedings initiated by the 4th respondent before the Learned 62nd Metropolitan Magistrate, Dada, Mumbai, has to be declared as not valid.

12. Placing reliance on a decision made in Musaraf Hussein Khan Vs. Bhagheeratha Engineering Ltd., and others , reported in II (2006) BC 515, learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that when the 4th respondent was aware of all the transactions which had taken place, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts in Chennai, preferring a complaint at Mumbai, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, outside the territorial jurisdiction of Chennai Courts, is nothing but quorum juries, to harass the petitioner and to bring pressure on him to settle the amount, contrary to the terms and conditions of the contract entered into between the parties.

13. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Harman Electronics (P) LTD and another Vs. National Panasonic India Ltd. , reported in I (2009) BC 649 (SC), learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that in the above reported case, parties were carrying on business at Chandigarh. The head office of the complainant was situated at Chandigarh. The transaction was carried on in Chandigarh. cheque was issued and presented at Chandigarh. But the complaint was made at Delhi, on the sole ground that notice was sent from Delhi. In the abovesaid circumstances, the Supreme Court, by observing that it is necessary to strike a balance between the right of the complainant and the right of the accused, vis-a-vis the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code , and quashed the criminal complaint registered at Delhi and held that mere sending of notice from Delhi alone would not give rise to a cause of action to file a complaint at Delhi. Applying the said judgment to the facts of the present case, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is similarity in the facts, that all the transactions, except the presentation of the cheque and dishonour at Mumbai, and therefore, the relief sought for should be ordered.

14. Per contra, on the basis of the orders passed in the Criminal Writ Petition No.409 of 2010 dated 08.02.2010 by the High Court of Bombay and Criminal Revision Application No.56 of 2010 dated 15.04.2010 and learned counsel for the 4th respondent submitted that the present writ petition is devoid of merits, and it is nothing but an attempt to stall the criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner on the file of the Learned 62nd Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Dada, Mumbai. He further submitted that all the contentions which are now raised before this Court, for a writ of declaration have already been considered by the Learned Sessions Judge, Sewree, Mumbai, in Criminal Revision Application No.56 of 2010 dated 15.04.2010 and when the petitioner has filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court, challenging the orders summoning the petitioner, the High Court, by order dated 08.02.2010, has already rejected his submissions, on the ground that it is always open to the petitioner to urge the question of territorial jurisdiction before the Learned 62nd Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Dada, Mumbai. In the abovesaid circumstances, learned counsel for the 4th respondent submitted that instead of facing trial before the Criminal Court at Mumbai, the petitioner, in order to protract the proceedings, has approached this Court, with the prayer of declaration. For the abovesaid reasons, he prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.

15. Before adverting to the facts of this case, this Court deems it fit to have a cursory look at some of the relevant provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the Code.

Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

138. dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid. either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honor the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offense and shall, without prejudice. to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless-

Section 142 of The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

142. Cognizance of offences. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure , 1973 (2 of 1974),-

16. At the outset, this Court also deems it fit to consider the decision made in Crl.W.P.No.409 of 2010, dated 08.02.2010 by the Bombay High Court and the Criminal Revision Application No.56 of 2010 dated 15.04.2010 passed by the Learned Sessions Judge, Sewree, Mumbai.

17. Criminal Revision Application No.56 of 2010 has been filed by Managing Director, the petitioner herein, and Directors of M/s.Galaxy Amaze Kingdom Ltd., Chennai, against the State of Maharashtra and Precept-H PTV Ltd., Mumbai, testing the correctness of an order dated 30.06.2009, by which, the Learned 62nd Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Dada, Mumbai, in C.C.No.23196/SS/2009 issued process against the petitioners therein for the offenses punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

18. According to the complainant, there was an invoice of balance of Rs.13,22,241/- due and payable by the company, Managing Director and other Directors. A cheque bearing No.757203 dated 25.09.2008 for Rs.6,66,961/- has been drawn on ICICI Bank, Branch Chennai, payable to the complainant at Mumbai. The complainant relying on the assurance and instructions given by the revision applicants therein, deposited the aforesaid cheque with their bankers, HDFC Bank, Mumbai, for realization, but it was returned unpaid by their bankers with a bank memo dated 03.03.2009, with the endorsement, "insufficient funds". Intimation of dishonour of cheque has been received at Mumbai. Thereafter, a notice dated 14.03.2009, by registered post, has been issued to the revision applicants, (Company, Managing Director and Directors), calling upon them to make payment. Despite acknowledgment of notice, there was failure on their part to pay the amount. The Learned 62nd Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Dada, Mumbai, after recording the statement of the complainant and considering the documents attached thereto, made an inquiry under Section 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code and finding that there was a prima facie case, passed an order dated 30.06.2002, issuing process. The arguments of the revision applicants therein, were that the office of the complainant Viz., Advertising company was situated at Chennai. The complainant rendered services only at Chennai. The cheque was issued at Chennai and the contents of the foot notes of invoice dated 31.05.2008 contained a special clause, that payment under the invoice would be made at Chennai and therefore, the Courts in Chennai alone have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and not the Court at Dada, Mumbai.

19. By way of reply, in the revision application, the complainant has contended that under the instructions of the revision applicants, (Company, Managing Director and Directors), the complainant presented the cheque for realization at Mumbai and after dishonour of the said cheque, issued notice. The advertising company and the complainant has further submitted that payment was intended to be paid at Mumbai and therefore, when an intimation was given by their bankers, a complaint was lodged with the Learned 62nd Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Dada, Mumbai, who has territorial jurisdiction.

20. Placing reliance on the decision made in Crl.W.P.No.409 of 2010, dated 08.02.2010, a submission has also been advanced by the complainant that the point of territorial jurisdiction and the role of the revision applicants in the company affairs had already been considered by the Bombay High Court and therefore, the Managing Director and other Directors have no right to raise the same objections before the Learned Sessions Judge. As regards the invoice dated 31.05.2008 annexed as document, by the revision applicants therein, the Learned Sessions Judge Sewree, Mumbai, by observing that when the same had not been produced before the concerned Magistrate, no new material or evidence of defence can be let in at the reversional stage.

21. Let me now consider some of the decisions dealing with the territorial jurisdiction, on the aspect of taking cognizance of complaint preferred under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

2. The brief facts, according to complaint, are that M/s. Saraswati Industrial Syndicate is a Company which has its registered office at Yamuna Nagar (Haryana). The Company has a Steel Mill situated at village Nara in district Muzaffar Nagar (U.P.). The accused is also a Private Limited Company known as Essmay Special Steels Private Limited which has its regis-tered office at New Delhi. The accused purchased some steel ingots from the complainant company and a cheque for Rs. 67,872/- bearing No. 732097 dated 11th February, 1994 drawn on Oriental Bank of Commerce, Barola (NOIDA), Ghaziabad was given by the accused to the complainant. The complainant gave this cheque to its Bank (State Bank of Patiala) and the cheque was forwarded by the State Bank of Patiala to Oriental Bank of Commerce, Barola (NOIDA), Ghaziabad but its payment was refused on the ground that there are not sufficient funds in the account of drawer of the cheque. When the cheque was dishonoured the complainant sent a notice by post on 11th July, 1994 and the accused was called upon to make the payment within fifteen days. In spite of receipt of notice the payment was not made by the accused and therefore, a complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act was filed by the complainant at Muzaffar Nagar on 23rd January, 1995.

3. The accused raised an objection that the Court at Muzaffar Nagar lacks the territorial jurisdiction to try the case. This objection was upheld by the learned. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Muzaffar Nagar who came to the conclusion that the cause of action did not arise within the jurisdiction of Court at Muzaffar Nagar. In this view of the matter the Court set aside the summoning order and dropped the proceedings against the accused by its order dated 29-5-1996.

4. Being aggrieved against the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, the complainant filed a revision before the Court of Sessions and the revision was decided on 23rd July, 1998 by Vllth Addl. Sessions Judge, Muzaffar Nagar, who came to the conclusion that the goods were sold at Muzaffar Nagar, the cheque was issued at Muzaffar Nagar and by the notice issued on behalf of the complainant the payment was demanded at Muzaffar Nagar and therefore, the cause of action arose at Muzaffar Nagar. In this view of the matter the learned Addl. Sessions Judge reversed the order of the C.J.M. and directed the parties to appear before C.J.M., Muzaffar Nagar. Being aggrieved against the order dated 23rd July, 1998 passed by Vllth Addl. Sessions Judge, Muzaffar Nagar the present revisions have been filed by the accused persons.

After considering the decisions in Abhay Lalan Vs. Yogendra Madhavlal , reported in 1981 Crl.L.J 1667 (Kerala), P.K.Muraleedharan Vs. C.K.Pareed, reported in 1993 (1) Crimes 46 = 1992 Crl.L.J 1965, on the basis of Lachhman Dass Vs. Chuhra Mal, reported in AIR 1952 Pepsu 5 and Horsburg Vs. Chandroji, reported in AIR 1957 Madhya Bharat 90, Indmark Finance and Investment Co. Pvt Ltd, Vs. The Learned Metropolitan Magistrate 28th Court, reported in 1992 ( 1) Crimes 973 (Cal), and Sadanandan Bhadran Vs. Madhavan Sunil Kumar , reported in (1998) 6 JT (SC) = AIR 1998 SC 3043, at paragraph 14, the court held as follows:-

(iii) In Agro Oil Traders and another Vs. South India Viscose Ltd. , reported in 1999 Company Cases 798, the facts are as follows:-

In a situation, where the offence is partly committed in one local area and partly in another, one has to recourse to the statutory provisions available in section 178 of the Code, which prescribes, "(a) when it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or

(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or

(c) where an offence is a continuing one and continues to be committed in more local areas than one (or)

(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas."

Section 179 of the Code deals with a situation, where one act is done in one place and the consequence ensuing' in another place. It provides, "When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued."

In the case on hand, as earlier stated, the act of issuance of cheques and consequent dishonour of those cheques happened in one and the same place, namely, Madras. According to the provisions adumbrated under section 179 of the Code, the case on hand can very well be instituted at Madras. The question is whether the case may be instituted at any place, other than Madras, and if so, the case, as instituted at Coimbatore, is maintainable, as having been instituted in a court having territorial jurisdiction.

In answering a question of such a nature, one has to take into account, the offence part of dishonour of the cheques, as contemplated by section 138 of the Act, which has not become complete by the mere factum of dishonour of the cheque. For such an offence to become complete, so many acts are required to be done and complied with. The various acts are :

As such, it is crystal clear that various acts are to be committed by different parties, for an offence to become complete, before even a prosecution is launched. Those acts, as contemplated for the completion of an offence take place within various territorial jurisdictions. Therefore, any court having territorial jurisdiction, in which one of several of the acts, as contemplated under section 138 for an offence to become complete, takes place, will be having jurisdiction, for taking cognizance of an offence under section 138 of the Act.

In the case on hand, it cannot be stated that part of an offence had not at all happened at Coimbatore. The registered and corporate office of the complainant-company is located, as seen from the complaint, only at Coimbatore. Admittedly, compliance with the demand so made had not been made. The fact that compliance had not been made, by effecting payment will not by itself be sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of a competent court situate at Coimbatore.

In this view of the matter, it cannot be stated that Judicial Magistrate No. 5, Coimbatore is not having territorial jurisdiction to deal with the complaint on hand. Consequently, the petition deserves to be dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed.

(iv) In Krishnakumar Menon Vs. Neoteric Informatique (P) Ltd. , reported in I (2002) BC 512 (DB), a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court had an occasion to consider a case as to whether the High Court can quash a complaint pending in a Court outside the Kerala State. The petitioner therein was a partner of the firm named "Online Instruments" functioning in Kochi. Various complaints were filed before the Learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai, under Section 138 read with Sections 141 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, against the petitioner firm and some of the partners of the firm. The petitioner therein prayed to quash the criminal cases, contending inter alia that the Learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Mumbai, has no jurisdiction to deal with the cases, as no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Mumbai Court. All the accused were living in Kerala. On the merits of the case, it was also contended that even if the allegations made in the complaint were correct, no case was made out. Execution of the cheques were denied. Acknowledgment of notice was denied. A learned Judge referred the matter for consideration, by a Division Bench. The order of reference is as follows:-

After elaborate consideration, as to the exercise of powers of the High Court under Articles 226 , 227 and 482 of Criminal Procedure Code , the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, at paragraph 6, held that after the introduction of Clause 2 to Article 226 of the Constitution of India (15th amendment) Act, 1978, if the whole or part of the cause of action, arose in a State, High Court of that State alone would have jurisdiction. Reference has been made to a decisions of the Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu and others , reported in 1994 (4) SCC 711 and other cases. After considering M/s.Pepsi Foods Ltd., Vs Special Judicial Magistrate , reported in AIR 1998 SC 128, at paragraph 7, the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court held as follows:-

Initially, interim stay was granted. The respondents/accused contended that the cheques have not been issued from the registered offices of the respondents company. According to them, a part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of Kerala High Court. Reliance was also placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Navinchandra N.Majithia Vs. State of Maharashtra , reported in AIR 2000 SC 2966 and a decision of the learned single Judge in Augustine Vs. Omprakash Nanakram , reported in 2001 (2) KLT 638. The reasons for invoking the Kerala High Court, as summarised in Musaraf Hossain Khan 's case are as follows:-

Considering the issue relating to territorial jurisdiction, the Apex Court at paragraphs 25 to 28, held as follows:-

26. In Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr., Ill (2004) SLT 565=111 (2004) BC 56 (SC)=III (2004) DLT 480 (SC)=(2004) 6 SCC 254, a three-Judge Bench of this Court clearly held that with a view to determine the jurisdiction of one High Court viz-a-viz the other the facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer can be made and the facts which have nothing to do therewith cannot give rise to a cause of action to invoke the jurisdiction of a Court. In that case it was clearly held that only because the High Court within whose jurisdiction a legislation is passed, it would not have the sole territorial jurisdiction but all the High Courts where cause of action arises, will have jurisdiction. Distinguishing, however, between passing of a legislation by a Legislature of the State and an order passed by the Tribunal or Executive Authority, it was held:

27. In Union of India and Others v. Adani Exports Ltd. & Another (supra), this Court observed:

28. We have referred to the scope of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution only to highlight that the High Courts should not ordinarily interfere with an order taking cognizance passed by a competent Court of Law except in a proper case. Furthermore only such High Court within whose a jurisdiction the order of subordinate Court has been passed, would have the jurisdiction to entertain an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India unless it is established that the earlier cause of action arose within the jurisdiction thereof.

In Musaraf Hossain Khan 's case, according to the complainant therein, the entire cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the District Court at Birbhum. It was not the contention that the complainant had suppressed the material fact and which if not disclosed would have demonstrated that the offence was committed outside the jurisdiction of the said Court. On the facts of that case, the Supreme Court held that even Section 138 of the Act is attracted, the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Birbhm, will alone have jurisdiction in the matter. At paragraphs 36 and 37, the Supreme Court held as follows:-

(vi) In Harman Electronics (P) Ltd and another Vs. National Panasonic India Ltd. , reported in I (2009) BC 649 (SC), territorial jurisdiction of the Court to try an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was in question. Facts leading to filing of the complaint are as follows:-

The reason for preferring the complaint was that the complainant carried on his business at Delhi. The statutory notice dated 11.01.2001 was issued from Delhi and the amount of cheque was payable at Delhi. Cognizance of the offence was taken by the Learned Magistrate. When issuance of summons was challenged, it was disposed of by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi, in terms of an order dated 03.02.2003 stating:-

Thereafter, a criminal miscellaneous petition was filed by the complainant and that the same also dismissed. In the above reported case, the parties had been carrying on business at Chandigarh. The Head office of the complainant was at Delhi. The branch office was at Chandigarh. There was no dispute that the transactions were carried on only from Chandigarh. There was also no dispute that the cheque was issued at Chandigarh. But the complaint petition did not make any specific averments that the cheque was presented at Chandigarh or Delhi. It was absolutely silent in that regard. In that context, the Supreme Court by observing that when the facility for collection of the cheque admittedly was available at Chandigarh and when the same had also been availed of, mere issuance of notice from Delhi alone does not give rise to a cause of action to prefer a complaint before the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi. Even in the abovesaid judgment, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the place where offence had been committed, plays an important role. The Supreme Court, taking into consideration the right of an accused vis-a-vis the procedure of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the likelihood of harassment to the accused, that if complaints were to be instituted in different places, on the basis of mere issuance of notice from a particular place, at paragraph 25, held as follows:-

(vii) In Murali Dhar Vs. Ishwar Dayal Girdhani, reported in 2010 (3) Crimes 791 (M.P), the Madhya Pradesh High Court was called upon to adjudicate the correctness of an order, dismissing a petition filed by the accused taking cognizance on the ground of territorial jurisdiction. The cheque was drawn at Rajasthan (Kota). The payee presented the cheque at Datia, where he was having account. The cheque stood dishonoured at Datia. Notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, was issued from Datia. After considering Harnam Electronics Pvt Ltd., and another Vs. National Panasonic India Pvt Ltd., reported in 2009 ( 1) SCC 720, K.Bhaskaran Vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and another , reported in 2000 ( 1) MPLJ 1, Smt.Shamshad Begum Vs. B.Mohammed , reported in 2008 (13) SCC 77, the Madya Pradesh High Court held as follows:-

The above reported case pertains to issuance of notice and therefore, it is apposite to the facts of this case.

28. In NEPC Micon Ltd., v. Magma Leasing Ltd. , reported in 1999 (4) Crimes 119 = 2000 (1) MWN (Cri) DCC 56 (Cal.), a revision petition was filed under section 402 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against an order dated 10.12.1997 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 9th Court, Calcutta, in a complaint case No.C-494 of 1997 under section 138 read with section 141 of the Negotiable instruments Act, 1881, whereby, the prayer of the petitioners-accused persons was to discharge them, under section 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and it was rejected on contest. The complainant-O.P. being a limited company under the Companies Act, 1956 had its registered office at 24, Part Street, Calcutta-700 016 (i.e. within the jurisdiction of Calcutta, West Bengal) and had also a Branch Office at Haddous Road, Nungambakkam. Chennai-600034. The complainant-O.P. was a financial institution, inter alia, providing fund for Hire purchase of machineries and other assets for business concerns. The complaint in the case was filed by the Assistant Manager (Legal and Administration) as an authorised representative of the O.P. Company. It was alleged in the complaint that the petitioner-accused Nos. 2 to 8 were incharge of management of the day-to-day affairs of the NEPC Micon Limited and controlling the affairs of the said company. it was alleged that in discharge of its existing liability, the O.P.-company tendered as many as five cheques dated 1.1.97 for various amount, the total being Rs.58,25,980/- to the petitioner-company (accused No. 1) drawn on Canara Bank, Broadway Branch, Madras-600108 in favour of the O.P.-company (the complainant). Those cheques were duly tendered by the O.P.-company to their banker, Punjab National Bank, Park Street Branch. Calcutta for encashment but those cheques were returned by the banker of the accused persons i.e. Canara Bank, Broadway Branch, Madras, with the remark as "account closed". The O.P.-company, thereafter. issued notices upon the accused persons on 14.1.97 through their advocate demanding payment of the total sum of the dishonoured cheques within 15 days from the receipt of the notice. The accused-company as well as their Directors (i.e. the petitioners therein) received the notice on 17.1.97, but, on expiry of the statutory period of 15 days, they neglected and failed to pay the amount of the dishonoured cheques. Hence the necessity to prosecute the petitioners-accused persons for the offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable instrument Act, 1881. The petitioners-accused persons after having entered into appearance in the proceeding before the Court below filed a petition for discharge under section 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Upon hearing both the parties, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate passed an order by rejecting the prayer and hence the petitioners therein filed a revision petition. The first and foremost point of challenge on behalf of the petitioners, was want of jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding-in-question by the Learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta and, in this context, it was contended that the underlying agreements of hire purchase between the parties with regard to which the relevant cheques had been drawn and handed over to the O.P.-Company, had been made at Chennal (Madras) and not in Calcutta (West Bengal). It was further pointed out that the relevant cheques were drawn on Canara Bank, Broadway Branch. Madras and, it was thus contended that the alleged dishonour (bouncing), if at all any such was there, was at Chennai (Madras) and not in Calcutta (West Bengal). Yet another point, highlighted was that with respect to some other such cheques having been dishonoured, the O.P.-Company had instituted criminal cases being C.C. No. 6339 of 1996 of and C.C. No. 6341 of 1996 in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Saldapet, Chennal, and that being as such, the O.P./Complainant should have chosen the forum at Chennal and not in Calcutta. Having regard to the above submission, the Calcutta High Court held as follows:

29. In Ruchi Soya Industries Ltd., Mumbai v. State of Maharastra reported in 2010 (2) Bankmann 228 (Bom.) = 2010 (2) Bom.CR (Cri) 782, the writ petitioner therein was the complainant. The respondents Nos.2 to 4 were accused Nos.1, 2 and 3. Accused No.1 was a company situated at Alwar in Rajasthan. Accused Nos.2 and 3 were the directors of accused No.1 and both of them were residing at Delhi. The complainant used to purchase mustard oil and packing material and to hand over the same to the accused at Alwar for the purpose of packing the same. The accused company used to charge packing charges from the complainant and hand over packed material to the complainant. However, some oil was not packed and the oil and packing material were not returned to the complainant. Therefore, the accused were liable to pay the price of the remaining oil and packing material. To discharge that liability, the accused persons issued a cheque No.712059, dated 27.1.2004, for Rs.15,63,381/- drawn on State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur, Lawrence Road, Delhi Branch in favour of the complainant company. The cheque was signed by accused No.2. The complainant deposited the said cheque with its Bank at Mumbai for presentation to State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur, Delhi Branch, for encashment. However, the drawee Bank returned the cheque on 11.5.2004 with the endorsement "funds insufficient". After getting an intimation of the same, on 27.5.2007, the complainant issued a notice to the accused and asked to make payment of the amount of the cheque. However, they failed to make payment. Therefore, the complainant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against all the three accused in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai. It was registered as a Criminal Case No.2575/SS/2005. Process was issued. Plea was recorded and the matter proceeded for trial. After the prosecution evidence was over and even the defence evidence was led by the accused persons, on the date when the case was fixed for arguments, the accused persons filed an application, Exhibit 57 before the trial Court contending that the Metropolitan Magistrate in Mumbai had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint because no part of transaction had taken place in Mumbai and merely because the notice was issued from Mumbai and that cheque was deposited with the complainant's banker at Mumbai is not sufficient to give jurisdiction to the Metropolitan Magistrate at Mumbai. That application was opposed. After hearing the parties, the learned Special Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai, by impugned order dated 8.2.2008 allowed that application holding that the Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai had no jurisdiction. He directed the complaint to be returned to the complainant for presentation to the proper Court. That order was challenged in the Writ Petition. The Bombay High Court, held as follows:

The same view was taken in number of cases,including a recent Judgment in Criminal Application No. 2674 of 2008 ( Hemlata Raghunath Pendharkar vs. Jaswantsingh Rajaram Sonawane & Anr .)

7. In Mrs.Preetha S.Babu vs. Voltas Ltd. & Anr. 2010 AlL MR (Cri) 1025, a contract for supply of air-conditioners had taken place between the accused company situated at Ernakulam in Kerala. Towards payment and discharge of their liability, the accused had issued a cheque on Syndicate Bank, Angamaly Branch, Ernakulam, Kerala. The head office of the complainant was siuated in Mumbai. The cheque was deposited with Citibank, Fort Branch, Mumbai, which was duly presented to the drawee Bank and was dishonoured. The complainant issued a notice to the accused from Mumbai demanding payment. Inspite of notice, payment was not made and the complaint was filed in the Court of Metropolitan magistrate at Mumbai. After referring to several authorities, the Division Bench of this Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the accused challenging the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Magistrate. Holding that admittedly the complainant's registered office is situated at Mumbaiand the notice was issued from Mumbai and accused was called upon to make payment in Mumbai and therefore Metropolitan Magistrate Mumbai has jurisdiction. In the present case, the registered office of the complainant is at Mumbai and after the cheque was dishonoured, the notice was issued from Mumbai for making payment. Naturally, the payment was expected to be made to the complaiant at Mumbai. In view of these two facts which took place at Mumbai, the Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai would get jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in view of the law settled in above referred authorities which are based on K.Bhaskaran.

8. In M/s.Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. v. National panasonic India Ltd. 2009 (1) ALL MR (Cri) 280 (S.C.), the cheque was issued at Chandigarh. The complainant also had a branch office at Chandigarh, though its head office was at Delhi. The cheque was presented at Chandigarh and was also dishonoured at Chandigarh. However, the complainant issued a notice upon the accused asking to make payment from New Delhi. The notice was served upon the accused at Chandigarh. Thereafter, the complaint was filed at Delhi. The trial Court held that it had jurisdiction since the payment was to be made to the complainant at Delhi and the accused had failed to make payment. The Supreme Court held that mere issuance of notice from Delhi would not by itself give rise to the cause of action but communication of the notice would. The Supreme Court observed in para 25 thus :-

In fact, it would appear that in Harman Electronics, whole of the transaction had taken place at Chandigarh and the complainant had also its branch office at Chandigarh but only to cause harassment to the accused, the notice was issued from Delhi and complaint was filed in Delhi. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that merely issuance of notice from Delhi would not give jurisdiction to the Delhi Court. Therefore, on facts, the authority in Harman Electronics would not be applicable to the facts of the present case.

9. In view of the above facts and the legal position, I find that the Metropolitan Magistrate at Mumbai has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the trial Court at the stage of final arguments of the case to return the complaint to the complainant was not correct and needs to be set aside.

30. In Mohammed Haneef v. Sankarraj reported in 2011 (2) Bankmann 243 = 2011 (3) MWN (Cri.) DCC 39 = 2012 Crl.L.J 99, respondent therein initiated proceedings under Sec.138 and 142 of Negotiable Instruments before the learned Judicial Magistrate Court, Ambattur against the petitioner therein. In the complaint, it was alleged that the petitioner therein has taken a sum of Rs.35,00,000/- assuring an admission for a post graduate course in M.S.Ortho for the respondent's son Dr.S.Manivannan. The petitioner therein executed promissory note, dated 8.3.2009 and also issued four cheques, dated 26.3.2009, each for Rs.7,50,000/-. He also assured the complainant that he would repay the amount within sixty days. Since the amount was not paid, the cheques were presented by the complainant in his bank on 5.9.2009 and the cheques were dishonoured by the petitioner's banker on 7.9.2009. The complainant issued a statutory notice on 23.9.2009 demanding repayment within fifteen days, which was received by the petitioner, who also sent a reply on 30.9.2009. Since the demand made in the notice was not complied with, the respondent initiated the abovesaid proceedings. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence. Challenging taking cognizance of the offence by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ambattur, the petitioner has filed a petition, on the sole ground that the learned Judicial Magistrate has no jurisdiction to take cognizance. It was the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner therein that the entire transaction took place only at Bangalore and the cheque was drawn on Central Bank of India, Indira Nagar Branch, Bangalore and that the same has been returned dishonoured only by the drawee bank, the notice has been received by the petitioner therein only at Bangalore and therefore, the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ambattur had no jurisdiction. On the above facts, this Court has considered the issue relating to territorial jurisdiction at length. The submissions, discussion and the decision are reproduced hereunder:-

16. However, in the case of Shri Ishar Alloy Steels Ltd., v. Jayaswals Neco Ltd. , reported in (2001) 3 SCC 609, the following questions were raised.

17. The three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Bank referred to in proviso (a) to Sec.138 of the Act would mean the drawee bank on which the cheque is drawn and not all banks where the cheque is presented for collection including the bank of the payee in whose favour the cheque is issued.

18. By this judgment the five different acts were reduced to four local areas which can become the place for trial. The place where the bank of the payee is situated is excluded from having jurisdiction.

19. Further, in the case of Harman's Electronics, the Apex Court categorically held that issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to cause of action but communication of notice would. Therefore, five different acts referred by the Apex court in Bhaskaran 's case have been reduced into three different acts viz., a) where the cheque has been issued b) where the cheque has been returned by the drawee bank and (c ) where the notice has been served or communicated to the accused. The place of presentation of cheque of the holders bank and the place of issuance of notice by the complainant would no more have jurisdiction.

20. In similar circumstances, referring to all the above case laws, this court in Crl.O.P.(MD)No.14835 of 2010 has held that the courts which has jurisdiction to the offence under Sec.138 of the Act shall be, "1) the place where the cheque has been drawn;

2) the place where the cheque returned unpaid by the drawee bank;

3) the place where the statutory notice demanding payment of the cheque was served on the drawer.

23. On the contrary, Mr.A.Laxmi Raj Rathnam, learned counsel for the respondent relied on an unreported judgment of Bombay High Court in Criminal Writ Petition No.615 of 2008 , wherein, it has been observed as follows:

26. The learned counsel also relied on an unreported judgment of Bombay High Court in Crl.Appln.No.2674 of 2008 wherein it is held as follows:

27. As stated earlier, in Bhaskaran 's case, the Apex Court has referred five local areas which can become the place for trial for an offence under Sec.138 of NI Act. However, the three judges Bench of the Apex Court in Shir Ishar Alloy Steels Ltd., v. Jayaswals Neco Ltd. , reported in (2001) 3 SCC 609 has clarified the bank referred to in proviso a to Sec.138 of the Act would mean that the drawee bank on which the cheque is drawn and not all banks where the cheque is presented for collection including the bank of the payee or holder.

28. In Harman 's case it is held that the issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action but the communication of the notice would.

29. However, I am unable to agree with the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner, who would insist that the place where the statutory notice demanding payment of cheque was received or served on the accused alone can have jurisdiction.

30. Issuing of cheque per-se is not an offence. Presentation of the cheque and the dishonour of the cheque by the drawee bank may be referred to as commencement of the offence, which is followed by issuing of a statutory notice demanding payment and giving an opportunity to the drawee to avoid criminal prosecution.

31. On receipt of such notice and on failure to make payment, the offence is completed and therefore, the cumulative effect of all the above acts has to be taken into consideration to decide the jurisdiction of the Court.

32. Therefore, this court has already held that the jurisdiction for a trial of the offence shall be the place where a) the cheque has been issued b) the place where the cheque has been returned unpaid by the drawee bank and c) the place where the statutory notice demanding payment of the cheque was served or received.

33. In the present case, though the cheque was issued at Bangalore and the notice was also served at Bangalore, the place where the cheque has been returned unpaid by the drawee bank is only at Chennai.

34. In the additional common set of typed set of papers filed by the respondent, the return memo of Central Bank of India having office at Montieth Road, Chennai has been furnished. The respondent has presented the cheque to his bank viz., Indian Bank, Padi Branch, Chennai and the same has been forwarded to Central Bank of India, Montieth Road, Chennai where it is returned with an endorsement stating 'exceeds arrangement'. Though the cheque was drawn on the Central Bank of India, Indira Nagar, Bangalore Branch, it has been returned by the Central Bank of India, Montieth Road, Egmore Branch, Chennai.

35. Therefore, the court which has jurisdiction is neither the Magistrate's court at Bangalure nor the Judicial Magistrate court, Ambattur, Chennai, but the Metropolitan Magistrate's Court at Egmore, Chennai.

36. Therefore, initiation of proceedings and taking cognizance by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ambattur, Chennai is not proper but it is only a curable defect which can be rectified by giving an opportunity to the respondent to withdraw the complaint and present the same before the jurisdiction court at Egmore, Chennai."

31. In Haya Systems India Pvt. Ltd., v. Don Construction Chemicals India Ltd , reported in 2011 (2) MWN (Cri.) DCC 34, the respondent therein has filed a case in C.C.No.7888 of 2007, on the file of the learned XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate Court at Saidapet against the petitioners therein alleging that they have committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In the said complaint, the respondent alleged that the second petitioner therein had purchased construction chemicals from the respondent and issued four cheques, dated 20.04.2007, 05.05.2007, 20.05.2007 and 05.06.2007 on behalf of the first petitioner for a total sum of Rs.9,50,000/- drawn on Citi Bank N.A., Bangalore. It was also alleged that when the cheques were presented for encashment through their bankers, namely Canara Bank, Teynampet Branch, Chennai on 07.06.2007, they were bounced back on 08.06.2007 with an endorsement 'Refer to Drawer'. This fact was intimated to the respondent by his banker. Hence, the respondent therein issued a legal notice to the petitioners therein on 26.06.2007, which was received by them on 28.06.2007. It was also alleged that since the petitioners had failed to pay the cheque amount within the stipulated period, the above said complaint was filed. It was contended that the learned XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate Court at Saidapet has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The disputed cheques were drawn on M/s.Citi Bank N.A., Bangalore. Therefore, it was contended that neither issuance of notice from a place nor the location of the collecting bank can create jurisdiction in respect of a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Further, the first petitioner therein was a firm based in Bangalore at Karnataka and the respondent therein was also a firm having branch in Bangalore and there was no transaction in Chennai between the petitioners and the respondent and equally, there was no outstanding due to the respondent therein as alleged and that the cheques have not been dishonoured due to the insufficiency of funds. The petitioner therein further contended that none of the ingredients to constitute the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act occurred within the legal jurisdiction of the learned XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate Court at Saidapet. On the above pleadings and submissions, this Court held that, "15. ........For the completion of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the following five components are sine qua non (1) Drawing of the cheque, (2) Presentation of the cheque to the drawee bank, (3) Returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank (4) Giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount (5) Failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. It is not necessary that all the five acts should have been perpetrated at the same locality. It is possible that each of those five acts could be done at five different localities. But concatenation of all the above five components are very much essential to constitute the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. As discussed in earlier paragraphs, referring Section 178 (d) of Code it is clear that if the five different acts were done in five different localities any one of the Courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five localities can become the place of trial for the offence under Section 138 of the Act.

19. With very great respect to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, this Court considered that the above cited decision in M/s.Harman Electronics (P) Ltd., and Anr. v. M/s.National Panasonic India Ltd., reported in AIR 2009 SC 1168 is not made applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case on hand. Because, the above cited case hinges around the center point of issuance of notice and that was why the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to cause of action. But communication of notice would. In the given case on hand as discussed in the foregoing paragraph, the above specified four cheques were presented by the respondent for collection in their bank namely Canara Bank, Teynampet Branch, at Chennai-600 018. Those cheques were returned dishonoured by the banker on 08.06.2007 with and endorsement of 'Refer to Drawer'. Thereafter, the respondent had issued a statutory notice to the petitioners, which is required under the proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Hence, it is clearly established that not only the notice, but the other ingredients viz. presentation of the cheques, dishonour of cheques and issuance of legal notice were all taken place within the local jurisdiction of the learned XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate Court at Saidapet.

20. For the foregoing reasons, the respondent being the complainant can choose any one of the local areas within the territorial limits of which all those five acts were done."

32. In Narendramal v. State of Maharashtra reported in 2011 (2) Bankmann 45 = 2011 All.MR(Cri.) 2297, the petitioner therein (accused) questioned the order of issuance of process dated 15.03.2008 passed by the learned Magistrate, Wardha in a Summary Criminal Case No.213 of 2008, as also the order dated 06.03.2010 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Wardha in a Criminal Revision No.6 of 2010, on ground that the learned trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the complaint and besides erroneous findings were recorded on the question of territorial jurisdiction by the learned Magistrate. The Court therein, after perusing the original copy of the Criminal Complaint Case No.213/2008, recorded that the title itself indicates that the complainant was resident of Wardha, Taluka & District - Wardha, while accused are resident of Nagpur. The Court also recorded as follows:-

5. The issue was also dealt with by Division Bench of this Court in Preetha S. Babu, Ernakulum V/s. Voltas Ltd., Chochin and another [2010 (3) Mh.L.J. 234] in para 31, it is observed thus:

In view of these observations, the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class at Wardha where the collecting bank is situated and where the cheque in question was presented and dishonoured has territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try the complaint. That being so, petition is meritless and stands dismissed."

33. This Court has no territorial jurisdiction over the Courts at Mumbai. Therefore, this Court exercising power under Articles 226 and 227 , cannot entertain a writ petition to quash any proceeding instituted outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. The prayer sought for in this writ petition would virtually set at naught, the proceedings instituted on the file of the Learned 62nd Metropolitan Magistrate, Dadar, Mumbai. The jurisdiction to issue a writ is co-extensive with the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, within whose jurisdiction, the subordinate court takes cognizance of a complaint. The proceedings instituted within the jurisdiction of one High Court cannot be stayed by another High Court. The remedy available to the aggrieved, can be invoked only in that High Court, within whose jurisdiction, the subordinate Court has taken cognizance and not in any other High Court, otherwise, it would amount to territorial transgression. In the case on hand, the petitioner has questioned the jurisdiction and the Bombay High Court has declined to adjudge the question, leaving it open to the petitioner to raise it before the court which took cognizance. Subsequently, the petitioner has also raised a preliminary objection regarding the territorial jurisdiction in Criminal Revision Application No.56 of 2010 before the Learned Sessions Judge, Sewree, and failed. In the present writ petition, he has sought for a declaration, to declare the proceedings initiated by M/s.Percept-H Pvt Ltd., Mumbai, third respondent herein, outside the agreed jurisdiction at Mumbai in Case No.23196/SS/2009 before Learned 62nd Metropolitan Magistrate Court as not valid, and this Court, while adjudicating the issue, has to necessarily answer the same, in the negative against the petitioner, in the light of the various decisions stated supra.

34. Reading of the judgments stated supra makes it abundantly clear that no Writ of Certiorari or declaration under Article 226 can be issued against a judicial officer and only in the High Court within whose jurisdiction an order of the subordinate court is questioned, it would confer jurisdiction on that High Court to entertain an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot indirectly question the order of the Learned 62nd Metropolitan Magistrate, Dadar, Mumbai, whose jurisdiction is outside this Court. The power of this Court cannot be exercised beyond its territorial jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of a complaint has to be decided on the basis of the place of occurrence of the crime. The place of presentation of cheque and dishonour certainly is one of the places conferring jurisdiction on the criminal court, to take cognizance of the complaint as it is covered in K.Bhaskaran Vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and another , reported in AIR 1999 SC 3762. In Upasana Finance Limited Vs. S.N.Bagla & Company and others , reported in 2006 (1) Crl.L.J 833, the FIR was lodged in the State of Tamil Nadu on the basis of an order passed by a Learned Magistrate at Chennai under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the Calcutta High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition for quashing an FIR, as the cause of action had arisen wholly within the jurisdiction of Madras High Court. The Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Mrs.Meenakshi Sathish Vs. M/s.Southern Petrochemical Industries and others, reported in 2007 (2) Crl.L.J. 2250, held that if the complaint of dishonour of cheque was pending in subordinate Court in another State, even if the cause of action for the said complaint arose at High Court 'A', the High Court at 'B' has no jurisdiction to quash the complaint. Cognizance of the Court under Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 , is on a private complaint. Even taking it for granted that a part of the cause of action for preferring a complaint has taken place within the jurisdiction of the Chennai Courts, this Court cannot issue any writ in the nature of declaration and interfere with any proceedings before a criminal court, outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and on the facts of this case, it is only for the Bombay High Court to interfere, on the question of territorial jurisdiction, for the reason that the Learned 62nd Metropolitan Magistrate, Dadar, Mumbai, would not come under the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. Transgression of territorial jurisdiction cannot be permitted, whatever be the nomenclature of the prayer made in the writ petition. In M.Balakrishna Reddy Vs. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation, Hyderabad, and another , reported in 2001 (3) ALD 611 (DB) = 2002 (1) AnWR 578, a criminal case was registered against the petitioner at Bhopal. The petitioner therein filed a petition to quash the complaint in Andhra Pradesh. It was held that only the Court at Bhopal has the jurisdiction to quash the complaint and not the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The cause of action for preferring a complaint under Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 , depends upon (1) drawing of the cheque; (2) presentation of the cheque to the Bank; (3) returning the unpaid cheque by the drawee bank; (4) giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount; (5) failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. The complainant may chose any one of the places, where the offence has been committed. The offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, is said to be committed only when the cheque was dishonoured. Therefore, as per the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure , a complaint can be preferred at the place where the offence is committed. Consent conferring jurisdiction for redressal of any dispute arising out of the contractual obligations will not take away the jurisdiction of the courts to take cognizance of an offence committed within its jurisdiction.

35. Having regard to the legal pronouncements of the Supreme Court as well as various High Courts, on the aspect of territorial jurisdiction of the criminal courts in taking cognizance of a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and on the facts of this case, inasmuch as the payment on the cheque issued by M/s.Galaxy Amaze Kingdom Ltd., Chennai, was intended to be honoured at Mumbai and that the cheque, was presented and dishonoured by the payee's bankers at Mumbai, it cannot be said that the Court at Mumbai within whose jurisdiction, the offence has been committed, lacks territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance.

36. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the 4th respondent/complainant, having chosen to challenge the issuance of summons by the Learned 62nd Metropolitan Magistrate, Dadar, Mumbai, and became unsuccessful in the Criminal Writ Petition before the High Court of Bombay, and in the Criminal Revision Application before the Learned Sessions Judge, Sewree, the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition, which if allowed, would set at naught the orders passed by the Bombay High Court in Crl.W.P.No.409 of 2010, dated 08.02.2010. No courts in India in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can issue any writ in the nature of declaration or certiorari, which would have effect of setting aside an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by another High Court. The exercise of jurisdiction by a High Court over the subject matter under Article 227 of the Constitution of India could be confined only, if any proceeding is instituted before the subordinate court falls within whose territorial jurisdiction of that High Court. The constitutional limitations in exercise of the powers by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are circumscribed. The Constitution of India is supreme and every court in India, cannot transgress its limitations, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the contract executed between the parties, place of issuance of cheque, the place of registered offices of the payer and payee are all within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts in Chennai, yet, as stated supra, conduct of the parties cannot take away the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of an offence committed, where the cheque was presented and dishonoured. In the cases relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, interference has been with the cognizance of the criminal courts, on the basis of place of issuance of notice, and in such circumstances, the Supreme Court as well as other High Courts, considering the balance between the payer and payee, decided the case in favour of the petitioners therein, regarding the place of institution of the complaint.

37. This Court in its humble opinion is of the view, the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, may not in strict sense be applicable to the facts of this case. Indisputably, the invoice raised by the payee was not placed before the Learned 62nd Metropolitan Magistrate, Dadar, Mumbai. The decision rendered in Criminal Revision Application No.56 of 2010 dated 15.04.2010 passed by the Learned Sessions Judge, Sewree, and the decision made in Crl.W.P.No.409 of 2010, dated 08.02.2010, operate as res judicata and binding on the parties.

38. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is dismissed. M.P.No.1 of 2010 is ordered. No costs.

1) Union of India Rep. by Secretary to Government, Law Department, New Delhi.

2) The Secretary to Government Law Department, Government of Tamil Nadu, Secretariat. Fort St.George, Chennai-600 009.

3) The Learned Metropolitan Magistrate-62, Dadar, Mumbai