1. Shri Ashish Raman Mishra, Advocate, has put in appearance on behalf of opposite party no.2 by way of filing his Vakalatnama, which is taken on record.

2. Heard Shri Purnendu Chakravarty who appeared along with Shri Himanshu Suryavanshi, learned counsel for the revisionist, Shri Ashish Raman Mishra, learned counsel for opposite party no.2, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the material brought on record.

3. By means of the present revision, the revisionist has assailed the order dated 24.07.2025 passed by Sessions Judge, Barabanki in Sessions Trial No.32263 of 2023, arising out of FIR No.454 of 2023, under Sections 323 , 504 , 307 I.P.C., P.S.- Kotwali Nagar, District- Barabanki.

4. Brief facts of the case are as under.

2. In pursuance of earlier order, Dr Sanjeev Kumar, the then Emergency Medical Officer, District Hospital Barabanki and Sri Ram Pratap Singh, Pharmacist, who is maintaining the record in the office of Chief Medical Officer, Barabanki are present along with relevant record.

3. A specific question was asked from Sri Ram Pratap Singh that as to why he came from the Hospital, then he replied that no ministerial staff was available and at present he is maintaining the record in the office of Chief Medical Officer, Barabanki, therefore, he came to the Court.

4. Counter affidavit filed by Sri Arun Sinha, learned counsel for complainant is taken on record.

5. Ten days' time is granted to learned counsel for applicants to file rejoinder affidavit.

6. List immediately thereafter.

7. The Chief Medical Officer, Barabanki shall also file counter affidavit explaining that how many Pharmacist are working in his office.

8. Original record produced before this Court is returned to the officer concerned.

9. The Officer present today need not appear again unless called for.

10. Interim order granted earlier shall continue to operate till the next date of listing."

(vi) Before proceeding further, it is to be mentioned at this stage that based upon the pendency of the Application u/s 482 No.9699 of 2024 and the order passed therein, it has been argued that the injury reports are manipulated and ought not to have relied upon while dealing with the application seeking discharge.

(vii) In response, this Court put a query to the learned counsel for the revisionists that as to whether this Court in the Application u/s 482 No.9699 of 2024 has passed any order based upon which the trial court was under obligation to ignore the injury reports on record.

(viii) Learned counsel for the revisionist, in response to above, fairly submitted that no such order has been passed by this Court in Application u/s 482 No.9699 of 2024 and the said application is still pending.

(ix) The Magistrate taking note of the fact that the case is triable by court of Sessions, committed the matter to the Sessions Court and before the Sessions Court the case was registered as Session Case No.1915 of 2024 ( State Vs. Prachi Verma & others ).

(x) Before the Sessions Court, the applicants, who according to the learned counsel for the revisionists are on bail, preferred an application seeking discharge in terms of Section 250 B.N.S.S. (akin to Section 227 Cr.P.C.). This application is on record as Annexure No.1. The prayer of this application is relevant and being so the same is extracted hereinunder.

(xi) From the aforesaid prayer sought, it is apparent that the discharge application was moved only with regard to the offence under Section 307 I.P.C. and not for the other offences.

(xii) A perusal of the para 5 of the affidavit of this application as also the submissions of learned counsel for the revisionists indicates that the application seeking discharge for the offence under Section 307 I.P.C. was moved on the basis of the fact(s)/grounds which are as under.

(a) Injuries sustained by the injured persons, who were examined by Dr. Sanjay Kumar, were simple in nature.

(b) There was overwriting/manipulation in the Medical Register of Emergency Room of District Hospital, Barabanki.

(c) As per Medical Register of Emergency Room of District Hospital, Barabanki, entry at Serial No.12 regarding I.D. No.21167, 3:15 P.M. indicates that Ram Vilas Verma was discharged after taking note of the fact that he sustained simple injuries and the name of this very injured finds place at serial no.16, I.D. No.21168 4:00 P.M. which indicates that he was unconscious and referred to RML/KGMU, Lucknow.

(d) The injury report does not support the contents of the FIR as it was lodged promptly at 14:50 hours and the incident was of 12 noon, and the injury report indicates that the injury could be sustained before 12 hours. The prayer is to interfere in the matter.

5. Shri Ashish Raman Mishra, learned counsel for opposite party no.2 and learned A.G.A. opposed the present application. It is stated that to attract the offence under Section 307 I.P.C. even injury is not required what to say about the nature of injury and only intention has to be gathered. To ascertain the intention, the evidence is required and the trial court could conclude in the manner after taking note of the evidence adduced by the parties during trial before the trial court which includes the evidence of the accused applicants/revisionists herein and accordingly, no interference is required in the matter.

6. It is further submitted that the manipulation if any in Medical Register is also required to be considered during trial and at this stage, i.e. the stage of seeking discharge, no observation or finding on this aspect of the case is required to be given by the trial court.

7. It is further submitted that the injured persons, namely, Ram Vilas Verma and Smt. Sushila Verma and also the victim/Priya Verma supported the story of the prosecution and it is settled proposition that the statement/testimony of the injured witness/victim has greater evidential value and the same could be ignored in exceptional circumstances by the trial court after assessing the evidence of parties at the stage of pronouncement of judgment. In this regard reference is to the judgment passed in the case of State of M.P. vs. Mansingh , (2003) 10 SCC 414; Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab , (2009) 9 SCC 719; Balraje @ Trimbak v. State of Maharashtra , (2010) 6 SCC 673; Abdul Sayeed vs. State of M.P. , (2010) 10 SCC 259; State of U.P. vs. Naresh , (2011) 4 SCC 324; Laxman Singh vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand ) (2021) 9 SCC 191; Balu Sudam Khalde and another vs. State of Maharashtra , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 355.

8. It is also submitted that from a perusal of statement of Dr. Alankar Kumar Gupta, Gastro Surgeon, Chandan Hospital, Lucknow (Annexure No.6), would indicate that injured/Ram Vilas Verma sustained serious/grievous injury as this injured was operated for treating the damage caused to his small intestine by the accused and this aspect of the case is also evident from Annexure No.8 to the instant application, which is copy of case summary of injured/Ram Vilas Verma.

9. It is also stated that FIR is not encyclopedia and only placing reliance on the same conclusion should not be drawn on issue related to offence under Section 307 I.P.C.

10. In rebuttal, Shri Chakravarty, learned counsel for the revisionists stated as under.

(i) The injuries/nature of injuries ought to have been considered while dealing with the application seeking discharge after taking note of various provisions of Indian Penal Code , i.e. Section 319 to Section 338 and other sections which include Section(s) 307 and 308 I.P.C .

(ii) It is also stated that without ultrasound of abdomen, how the Doctor could conclude that small intestine has been damaged and no findings with regard to the grievous injuries have been recorded by the concerned Doctor.

(iii) The trial court erred in law and fact both in not considering the statement(s) of the injured witnesses in its true spirit.

11. Considered the aforesaid and perused the record.

12. The present case relates to Section 307 I.P.C. and for coming to the conclusion as to whether the trial court has rightly rejected the application seeking discharge only with regard to offence under Section 307 I.P.C. it would be appropriate to refer Section 307 IPC as also the some pronouncements on the issue.

13. Section 307 I.P.C. reads as under:

14. In State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil [State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil, (1983) 2 SCC 28 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 320], Hon'ble Apex Court held that it is not necessary that a bodily injury sufficient under normal circumstances to cause death should have been inflicted :

15. In State of M.P. v. Saleem [State of M.P. v. Saleem, (2005) 5 SCC 554 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1329], Hon'ble Apex Court held thus :

16. In Jage Ram v. State of Haryana [Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366 : (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 425], Hon'ble Apex Court held that to establish the commission of an offence under Section 307 , it is not essential that a fatal injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted :

17. In State of Maharashtra v. Kashirao , (2003) 10 SCC 434, the Hon'ble Apex Court identified the essential ingredients for the applicability of the section. The relevant extract is as below:

18. Hon'ble Apex Court in Om Prakash v. State of Punjab , 1961 SCC OnLine SC 72, as far back as 1961, observed the constituents of the Section, having referred to various judgments of the Privy Council, as under:

(Emphasis supplied)

19. In Hari Mohan Mandal v. State of Jharkhand , (2004) 12 SCC 220, the Hon'ble Apex Court holds that the nature or extent of injury suffered, are irrelevant factors for the conviction under this section, so long as the injury is inflicted with animus. It has been held:

20. In the case of State of M.P. vs. Kashiram & Ors. (2009 4 SCC 26), the scope of intention for attracting conviction under Section 307 IPC was elaborated and it was held as under:-

21. In Surinder Singh v. State (UT of Chandigarh ), (2021) 20 SCC 24 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1135, the Hon'ble Apex Court holds as under:

(emphasis supplied)

20. These very ingredients have been accentuated in some of the later decisions, including in State of M.P. v. Kashiram [State of M.P. v. Kashiram, (2009) 4 SCC 26 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 40] , Jage Ram v. State of Haryana [Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366 : (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 425] and State of M.P. v. Kanha [State of M.P. v. Kanha, (2019) 3 SCC 605 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 247] .

21. It is by now a lucid dictum that for the purpose of constituting an offence under Section 307 IPC, there are two ingredients that a court must consider, first, whether there was any intention or knowledge on the part of the accused to cause death of the victim, and, second, such intent or knowledge was followed by some overt actus rea in execution thereof, irrespective of the consequential result as to whether or not any injury is inflicted upon the victim. The courts may deduce such intent from the conduct of the accused and surrounding circumstances of the offence, including the nature of weapon used or the nature of injury, if any. The manner in which occurrence took place may enlighten more than the prudential escape of a victim. It is thus not necessary that a victim shall have to suffer an injury dangerous to his life, for attracting Section 307 IPC.

22. It would also be fruitful at this stage, to appraise whether the requirement of "motive" is indispensable for proving the charge of attempt to murder under Section 307 IPC.

23. It is significant to note that "motive" is distinct from "object and means" which innervates or provokes an action. Unlike "intention", "motive" is not the yardstick of a crime. A lawful act with an ill motive would not constitute an offence but it may not be true when an unlawful act is committed with best of the motive. Unearthing "motive" is akin to an exercise of manual brain-mapping. At times, it becomes Herculean task to ascertain the traces of a "motive".

24. This Court has time and again ruled : (Bipin Kumar Mondal case [ Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B. , (2010) 12 SCC 91 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 150] , SCC p. 97, para 23) "23. ... that in case the prosecution is not able to discover an impelling motive, that could not reflect upon the credibility of a witness proved to be a reliable eyewitness. Evidence as to motive would, no doubt, go a long way in cases wholly dependent on circumstantial evidence. Such evidence would form one of the links in the chain of circumstantial evidence in such a case. But that would not be so in cases where there are eyewitnesses of credibility, though even in such cases if a motive is properly proved, such proof would strengthen the prosecution case and fortify the court in its ultimate conclusion. But that does not mean that if motive is not established, the evidence of an eyewitness is rendered untrustworthy."

(emphasis supplied) [See : Shivaji Genu Mohite v. State of Maharashtra [Shivaji Genu Mohite v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 3 SCC 219 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 214] and Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B. [Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B., (2010) 12 SCC 91 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 150] ]

25. We are thus of the considered opinion that whilst motive is infallibly a crucial factor, and is a substantial aid for evincing the commission of an offence but the absence thereof is, however, not such a quintessential component which can be construed as fatal to the case of the prosecution, especially when all other factors point towards the guilt of the accused and testaments of eyewitnesses to the occurrence of a malfeasance are on record."

22. Paras 8 and 9 of the judgment in the case Sivamani and another Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, Vellore Taluk Police Station, Vellore District, reported in [2023] 14 S.C.R. 849 referred by Shri Chakravarty, are as under.

23. Relevant paras of the judgment passed in the case of Shoyeb Raja Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others , reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2624 , referred by Shri Chakravarty are as under.

In respect of the other allegations and alleged crimes, it was observed:--

x x x x x x

11. Let us at this stage, consider the law as laid down by this Court in respect of this section, as also that of Section 34 IPC, given that there are a total of eight respondents (accused) before the court.

11.1 In State of Maharashtra v. Kashirao , the Court identified the essential ingredients for the applicability of the section. The relevant extract is as below:

11.2 This Court in Om Prakash v. State of Punjab , as far back as 1961, observed the constituents of the Section, having referred to various judgments of the Privy Council, as under:

(Emphasis supplied) 11.3 Hari Mohan Mandal v. State of Jharkhand holds that the nature or extent of injury suffered, are irrelevant factors for the conviction under this section, so long as the injury is inflicted with animus. It has been held:

(Emphasis supplied) 11.4 The principle governing the application of Section 34 has been captured thus in Chhota Ahirwar v. State of M.P. "24. Section 34 is only attracted when a specific criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, in which case all the offenders are liable for that criminal act in the same manner as the principal offender as if the act were done by all the offenders. This section does not whittle down the liability of the principal offender committing the principal act but additionally makes all other offenders liable. The essence of liability under Section 34 is simultaneous consensus of the minds of persons participating in the criminal act to bring about a particular result, which consensus can even be developed at the spot as held in Lallan Rai v. State of Bihar [Lallan Rai v. State of Bihar, (2003) 1 SCC 268 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 301]. There must be a common intention to commit the particular offence. To constitute common intention, it is absolutely necessary that the intention of each one of the accused should be known to the rest of the accused."

11.5 Sanjiv Khanna J., writing for the Court in Krishnamurthy v. State of Karnataka , encapsulated, succinctly its field of operation as under:

(Emphasis supplied) x x x x

13. It is well recognized that intention may not always be proved by hard evidence and instead may be required to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. If the doctor who conducted the examination posits the possibility of throttling, then under what circumstances, without rigorous cross-examination, could it be concluded that the injuries sustained were simple? That apart, even if the injuries were taken as simple, the extent of the injuries, as observed supra in Hari Mohan Mondal, are not relevant, if the intent is present. We are not in agreement with the learned Courts below that intent was absent, as the Doctor's report itself records throttling to be reasonably suspected.

14. The third criterion as in Kashirao (supra) could also arguably be met. Whether or not it is met, is a matter of determination at trial. The question of intention to kill or the knowledge of death in terms of Section 307 , IPC is a question of fact and not one of law.

15. This Court's scope of interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is well established. Reference made be made to Mathura Prashad v. State of M.P. It was held as below:

In recognition of these self-imposed, long-standing, and justified limitations, interference is to be made, more so, when a Court, in arriving at its findings has acted perversely or otherwise improperly. [See : State of Madras v. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer] This has been the consistently adopted position till date. [See : Shahaja alias Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra ]

16. In view of the above discussion, given that the minor nature of injuries is not sufficient reason to not frame a charge under Section 307 IPC, as per the law laid down by this Court, the judgment impugned, passed in Criminal Revision No. 3125 of 2021 dated 23rd November, 2023, is set aside. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The concerned Trial Court is directed to have the Respondents stand trial for all the offences for which charges have been framed, as also Section 307 . The trial shall proceed on its own merits, as per law, uninfluenced by the observations hereinabove which were for the limited purpose of testing the propriety of the impugned order. The same shall be expedited.

24. The above judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court leads to the conclusion that proof of grievous or life-threatening hurt is not a sine qua non for the offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code. The intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances. Among other things, the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent.

25. The Apex Court has held that for conviction under Section 307 IPC the intention to cause death is also required to be proved along with the injuries inflicted.

26. For the purpose of conviction under Section 307 IPC, prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder and (ii) the act done by the accused. The burden is on the prosecution that accused had attempted to commit the murder of the prosecution witness. Whether the accused person intended to commit murder of another person would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that fatal injury capable of causing death should have been caused. Although the nature of injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be adduced from other circumstances. The intention of the accused is to be gathered from the circumstances like the nature of the weapon used, words used by the accused at the time of the incident, motive of the accused, parts of the body where the injury was caused and the nature of injury and severity of the blows given etc.

27. For the conviction under Section 307 IPC more importance has been given to mens rea or the intention than the actus reus or the actual act itself. The attempt should arise out of a specific intention or desire to murder the victim. The nature of the weapon used, the manner in which it is used, motive for the crime, severity of the blow, the part of the body where the injury is inflicted is all taken into consideration to determine the intention.

28. From the aforesaid above referred judgments, it is apparent that the injury is not required. It is the intention which is required and intention would be gathered by the trial court only after adducing the evidence by the counsel for the parties and not at the stage of discharge. With regard to the principles settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with the discharge application, this Court also finds appropriate to take note of the principles settled in the various pronouncements.

29. The Hon'ble Apex in the case of Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander , (2012) 9 SCC 460 has observed as under:-

30. Subsequently, the ambit and scope of Section 227 Cr.P.C. as well as parameters regarding exercise of jurisdiction under Section 227 Cr.P.C. came to be considered by a three Judges Bench of Supreme Court in Tarun Jit Tejpal Vs. State of Goa and Another , 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1053, wherein Court concluded as under in paragraphs 8 and 9:-

31.1. Under Section 227 of the Code, the trial court is required to discharge the accused if it 'considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused'. However, discharge under Section 239 can be ordered when 'the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless'. The power to discharge is exercisable under Section 245(1) when, 'the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction'.

31.2. Sections 227 and 239 provide for discharge before the recording of evidence on the basis of the police report, the documents sent along with it and examination of the accused after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard. However, the stage of discharge under Section 245 , on the other hand, is reached only after the evidence referred in Section 244 has been taken.

31.3. Thus, there is difference in the language employed in these provisions. But, in our opinion, notwithstanding these differences, and whichever provision may be applicable, the court is required at this stage to see that there is a prima facie case for proceeding against the accused. Reference in this connection can be made to a judgment of this Court in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay [R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, (1986) 2 SCC 716 : 1986 SCC (Cri) 256] . The same reads as follows : (SCC pp. 755-56, para 43) '43. ... Notwithstanding this difference in the position there is no scope for doubt that the stage at which the Magistrate is required to consider the question of framing of charge under Section 245(1) is a preliminary one and the test of "prima facie" case has to be applied. In spite of the difference in the language of the three sections, the legal position is that if the trial court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, charge has to be framed.' "

8.3. In Mauvin Godinho [Mauvin Godinho v. State of Goa , (2018) 3 SCC 358 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 63 : (2018) 1 SCC (L&S) 591] this Court had an occasion to consider how to determine prima facie case while framing the charge under Sections 227 / 228 CrPC. In the same decision this Court observed and held that while considering the prima facie case at the stage of framing of the charge under Section 227 CrPC there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

8.4. At this stage the decision of this Court in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad [Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia , (1989) 1 SCC 715 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 285] is also required to be referred to. In that aforesaid decision this Court had an occasion to consider the scope of enquiry at the stage of deciding the matter under Sections 227 / 228 CrPC. In paras 11 to 14 observations of this Court in the aforesaid decision are as under : (SCC pp. 719-21) "11. Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure having bearing on the contentions urged for the parties, provides:

12. Section 228 requires the Judge to frame charge if he considers that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence. The interaction of these two sections has already been the subject-matter of consideration by this Court. In State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh [State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 533] , Untwalia, J., while explaining the scope of the said sections observed : [SCC pp. 41-42, para 4 : SCC (Cri) pp. 535-36 : SCR p. 259] '4. ... Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.'

13. In Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] , Fazal Ali, J., summarised some of the principles : [SCC p. 9, para 10 : SCC (Cri) pp. 613-14 : SCR pp. 234-35] '(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused had been made out.

(2) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused.

(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.'

14. These two decisions do not lay down different principles. Prafulla Kumar case [ Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal , (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] has only reiterated what has been stated in Ramesh Singh case [ State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh , (1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 533] . In fact, Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of enquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It provides that 'the Judge shall discharge when he considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused'. The "ground" in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate enquiry in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is whether the evidentiary material on record if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime. No more need be enquired into."

8.5. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions and considering the scope of enquiry at the stage of framing of the charge under Sections 227 / 228 CrPC, we are of the opinion that the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant on merits, at this stage, are not required to be considered. Whatever submissions are made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant are on merits are required to be dealt with and considered at an appropriate stage during the course of the trial. Some of the submissions may be considered to be the defence of the accused. Some of the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant on the conduct of the victim/prosecutrix are required to be dealt with and considered at an appropriate stage during the trial. The same are not required to be considered at this stage of framing of the charge. On considering the material on record, we are of the opinion that there is more than a prima facie case against the accused for which he is required to be tried. There is sufficient ample material against the accused and therefore the learned trial court has rightly framed the charge against the accused and the same is rightly confirmed by the High Court. No interference of this Court is called for.

9. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeal fails and as a result the appeal stands dismissed. Considering the fact that the allegations against the appellant of sexual abuse are very serious and affecting the dignity of a woman and is the most morally and physically reprehensible crime in a society, an assault on the mind and privacy of the victim and the trial for such offences is required to be decided and disposed of at the earliest and considering the fact that in the present case the learned trial court has framed the charge against the accused and the incident is of 2013 and there is already a delay in concluding the trial because of the pending proceedings, we direct the learned trial court to conclude the trial at the earliest within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the order of this Court. All concerned are directed to cooperate with the trial court in the earlier disposal of the trial and within the stipulated time observed hereinabove."

31. In the case of State of Gujarat vs. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under:-

11. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged. The expression "the record of the case" used in Section 227 Cr.P.C. is to be understood as the documents and articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. The submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the investigating agency.

12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of existence of a prima-facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra Vs. Som Nath Thapa (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of MP Vs. Mohan Lal Soni (2000) 6 SCC 338 has held the nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the 14 charge is to test the existence of prima-facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into probative value of the material on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial.

13. The power and jurisdiction of Higher Court under Section 397 Cr.P.C. which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this court in Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh 15 Chandra (2012) 9 SCC 460 where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under:

14. This Court in the aforesaid judgement has also laid down principles to be considered for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in the context of prayer for quashing of charge framed under Section 228 Cr.P.C. is sought for as under:

15. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate court and start appreciating the evidence by finding out inconsistency in the statement of witnesses and it is not legally permissible. The High Courts ought to be cognizant of the fact that trial court was dealing with an application for discharge."

32. In the case of Vishnu Kumar Shukla v. State of U.P. , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1582, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under:-

22. In the warrant trial instituted otherwise than the police report, the complainant gets two opportunities to lead evidence, firstly, before the charge is framed and secondly, after the framing of the charge. Of course, under Section 245(2) CrPC, a Magistrate can discharge the accused at any previous stage of the case, if he finds the charge to be groundless.

23. Essentially, the applicable sections are Sections 244 and 245 CrPC since this is a warrant trial instituted otherwise than on police report. There had to be an opportunity for the prosecution to lead evidence under Section 244(1) CrPC or to summon its witnesses under Section 244(2) CrPC. This did not happen and instead, the accused proceeded to file an application under Section 245(2) CrPC on the ground that the charge was groundless.

24. Now, there is a clear difference in Sections 245(1) and 245(2) of CrPC. Under Section 245(1) , the Magistrate has the advantage of the evidence led by the prosecution before him under Section 244 and he has to consider whether if the evidence remains unrebutted, the conviction of the accused would be warranted. If there is no discernible incriminating material in the evidence, then the Magistrate proceeds to discharge the accused under Section 245(1) CrPC.

25. The situation under Section 245(2) CrPC is, however, different. There, under subsection (2), the Magistrate has the power of discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case i.e. even before such evidence is led. However, for discharging an accused under Section 245(2) CrPC, the Magistrate has to come to a finding that the charge is groundless. There is no question of any consideration of evidence at that stage, because there is none. The Magistrate can take this decision before the accused appears or is brought before the court or the evidence is led under Section 244 CrPC. The words appearing in Section 245(2) CrPC "at any previous stage of the case", clearly bring out this position.

36. The Magistrate has the power to discharge the accused under Section 245(2) CrPC at any previous stage i.e. before the evidence is recorded under Section 244(1) CrPC, which seems to be the established law, particularly in view of the decision in Cricket Assn. of Bengal v. State of W.B. [(1971) 3 SCC 239 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 446], as also the subsequent decision of the Bombay High Court in Luis de Piedade Lobo v. Mahadev Vishwanath Parulekar [1984 Cri LJ 513 (Bom)]. The same decision was followed by Kerala High Court in Manmohan Malhotra v. P.M. Abdul Salam [1994 Cri LJ 1555 (Ker)] and Hon'ble Justice K.T. Thomas, as the learned Judge then was, accepted the proposition that the Magistrate has the power under Section 245(2) CrPC to discharge the accused at any previous stage. The Hon'ble Judge relied on a decision of the Madras High Court in Mohd. Sheriff Sahib v. Abdul Karim Sahib [AIR 1928 Mad 129 (1)], as also the judgment of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Gopal Chauhan v. Satya [1979 Cri LJ 446 (HP)].

37. We are convinced that under Section 245(2) CrPC the Magistrate can discharge the accused at any previous stage i.e. even before any evidence is recorded under Section 244(1) CrPC. In that view, the accused could have made the application. It is obvious that the application has been rejected by the Magistrate. So far, there is no difficulty.' (emphasis supplied)

17. Turning to Sections 239-240 , CrPC, this Court held as under in Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar , (1994) 4 SCC 142:

18. With great respect, we express our reservations in fully acceding to what has been stated above. If Paragraph 8 of Minakshi Bala (supra) is accepted as it is, the necessary concomitant would be that despite examining the matter in detail, a Court would find its wings clipped to intercede. This would amount to forcing a person to stand trial, even when the overwhelming material points to his/her innocence. Obviously, the hands of a Court ought not to be tied down, and especially not by a higher Court, and moreso not against liberty. Paragraph 7 of Minakshi Bala (supra) does enable examining unimpeachable documents. We are conscious that Minakshi Bala (supra) has been followed in later decisions by the Court. However, we have chosen to survey the precedents further, and then decide on the road we wish to take13.

19. In Rumi Dhar v. State of West Bengal , (2009) 6 SCC 364, this Court held that the Judge concerned with an application under Section 239 , CrPC has to '... go into the details of the allegations made against each of the accused persons so as to form an opinion as to whether any case at all has been made out or not as a strong suspicion in regard thereto shall subserve the requirements of law.'

20. In State of Tamil Nadu v. N Suresh Rajan , (2014) 11 SCC 709, it was observed notwithstanding the difference in language of Sections 227 and 239 , CrPC, the approach of the Court concerned is to be common under both provisions. The principles holding the field under Sections 227 and 228 , CrPC are well-settled, courtesy, inter alia, State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh , (1977) 4 SCC 39; Union of India v. Prafulla K Samal , (1979) 3 SCC 4; Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip N Chordia , (1989) 1 SCC 715; Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra B Bijjaya, (1990) 4 SCC 76; Dilawar B Kurane v. State of Maharashtra , (2002) 2 SCC 135; Chitresh K Chopra v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2009) 16 SCC 605; Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander , (2012) 9 SCC 460; Dinesh Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh , (2014) 13 SCC 137; Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat , (2019) 16 SCC 547; and State (NCT of Delhi) v. Shiv Charan Bansal , (2020) 2 SCC 290. We need only refer to some, starting with Prafulla K Samal (supra), where, after considering Ramesh Singh (supra), K P Raghavan v. M H Abbas , AIR 1967 SC 740 and Almohan Das v. State of West Bengal, (1969) 2 SCR 520, it was laid down as under:

21. In Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi (supra), this Court was alive to reality, stating that '... it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.' If a view gives rise to suspicion, as opposed to grave suspicion, the Court concerned is empowered to discharge the accused, as pointed out in Sajjan Kumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation , (2010) 9 SCC 368. The Court, in Dinesh Tiwari (supra) had reasoned that if the Court concerned opines that there is ground to presume the accused has committed an offence, it is competent to frame a charge even if such offence is not mentioned in the Charge Sheet. As to what is 'strong suspicion', reference to Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel (supra) is warranted, where it was explained that it is '... the suspicion which is premised on some material which commends itself to the court as sufficient to entertain the prima facie view that the accused has committed the offence.'

22. In a recent judgment viz. State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao , 2023 INSC 894, this Court held:

11. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged. The expression "the record of the case" used in Section 227 Cr. P.C. is to be understood as the documents and articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. The submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the investigating agency.

12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of existence of a prima-facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa , (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 has held the nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of prima-facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into probative value of the material on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial.' (emphasis supplied)

23. On a careful conspectus of the legal spectrum, juxtaposed with our view on the facts and merits expressed hereinbefore, we are satisfied that there is no suspicion, much less strong or grave suspicion that the appellants are guilty of the offence alleged. It would be unjustified to make the appellants face a full-fledged criminal trial in this backdrop. In an appeal dealing with the refusal of the High Court to quash an FIR under Section 482 , CrPC albeit, this Court, while setting aside the judgment impugned therein and quashing that FIR, took the view that '...the Appellants are to be protected against vexatious and unwarranted criminal prosecution, and from unnecessarily being put through the rigours of an eventual trial. The protection against vexatious and unwanted prosecution and from being unnecessarily dragged through a trial by melting a criminal proceeding into oblivion, either through quashing a FIR/Complaint or by allowing an appeal against an order rejecting discharge or by any other legally permissible route, as the circumstances may be, in the deserving case, is a duty cast on the High Courts. The High Court should have intervened and discharged the appellants. But this Court will intervene, being the sentinel on the qui vive."

33. Taking note of the aforesaid facts of the case including statement(s) on record of injured person, namely, Ram Vilas Verma and Smt. Sushila Verma as also the pronouncements related to dealing with the statement of an injured as also with the application seeking discharge, referred above, and also the statement of Dr. Alankar Kumar Gupta and also the case summary of injured/Ram Vilas Verma, at this stage, it cannot be said that offence under Section 307 I.P.C. against the revisionist is not made out and therefore this Court is of the view that while passing the order dated 24.07.2025 the court dealing with case has not committed any illegality as the same has been passed after taking note of the facts and evidence collected during investigation and being so no interference is required in this order.

34. For the reasons aforesaid, this revision has no force. Accordingly, the present revision is dismissed. Cost made easy.

Order date: - 19.08.2025 Anand/-