Ashutosh Mohunta, Acting Chief Justice.

The Petitioners pray for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari seeking quashing of notification dated 5th March 2011 (P1) issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dated 13th September 2013 (P4) and the Award no. 551 dated 31st December 2013 (P8) with SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 2 ] subsequent proceedings.

While expressing grievance to the acquisition of their land measuring about 7.3875 acres falling in village Raipur Kalan, Tehsil and District Mohali, described in the revenue record as Gair Mumkin Rasta, with ownership shown as Jumla Mushtarka Malkan the petitioners who are 24 in number claim to be Khewatdars and state that the revenue Rastas sought to be acquired are the only passages, which provide approach to their respective fields.

The facts as disclosed from pleadings show that on 5th of March 2013 a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued by the Government of Punjab (P1) stating therein that it appears to the Government that the land of the revenue Rastas is likely to be needed by the State Government at the expense of the company, for a public purpose, that is, the planned harmonious and compact urban development of the area in accordance with the duly notified Master Plan of S.A.S. Nagar and more specifically for the planned harmonious and compact development of Mega Township Project of respondent number 5 in sectors 99, 105, 106, 108, 109 and 110.

The petitioners filed objections to the proposed acquisition of land on 28th of March 2013 (P3). According to the petitioners, without following the procedure prescribed by law and against the spirit of the mandate given under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 a declaration under Section 6 of the said Act was issued on 15th of September 2013 (P4) and an area measuring 7.3375 acres belonging to them, was declared as acquired.

Thereafter, notices under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dated 6th December 2013 inviting claims for compensation were also issued and the petitioners filed their claims on 27th of December SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 3 ] 2013 (P5). Pursuant to the filing of claims, Award number 551 dated 31st December 2013 was announced (P8).

It is the contention of the petitioners that Respondent Number 5 is a private company, which entered into an agreement with the Government, containing a condition that the expenses for acquisition are to be borne by the company. Hence the acquisition is for the company and not for a public purpose.

On the aforesaid assertions, the petitioners have contended that the acquisition of revenue Rastas is against law.

It may be noticed that when the matter came up for hearing on 6th of March 2014 the contention of the petitioners was noticed as follows:

After notice, a written statement on behalf of the State of Punjab through its Secretary Housing and Urban Development has been filed. Refuting the assertions made by the petitioners, the official respondents raised preliminary objections stating therein that the petitioners have already filed reference petitions under Sections 18 and 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The acquisition process has already been finalised and possession of the acquired land has been handed over to Respondent Number 5 for executing development works as per the Layout Plan approved in terms of the Statutory Master Plan. As Preliminary Submissions, it has been brought out that the project being implemented by Respondent Number 5 is as per the SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 4 ] Industrial Policy, 2003 (R5) whose objective, apart from promoting industrialisation in the State, is also to attract investment in the housing infrastructure sector so that overall socio - economic development can take place.

Acquisition of 9.35 acres of land falling in various villages including the land belonging to the petitioners has been made keeping in view the policy of the State with regard to acquisition of revenue Rastas falling within colonies. According to this policy dated 24th of January 2011, (R2) it had come to the attention of the State Government that while planning layouts of colonies, revenue Rastas falling in these colonies cause hindrance to proper and ideal planning of urban settlements and therefore, with a view to facilitate planned urban development and also to promote development in the villages, the Government decided to acquire revenue Rastas falling within colonies subject to the condition that the developers will provide alternative passages to the villagers before possession of the Rastas is handed over to them.

In this context, it is specifically asserted by the State that the acquisition is restricted to only revenue Rastas passing through the project and the said acquisition is necessary for the planned, compact and harmonious development of the project as per the Master Plan, hence the acquisition is for public purpose.

Furthermore, the revenue Rastas that have been acquired vested with the Gram Panchayat and the Gram Panchayat has already been duly compensated to carry out development works. At the same time the residents of the village have been provided alternative access in the form of developed roads.

Regarding the acquisition being made for the company, it is SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 5 ] contended that the acquisition is in terms of fulfilment and discharge of social obligations of the State in providing housing to the people including those persons belonging to the economically weaker sections of society and this purpose is being satisfied by the Company that is making payment of compensation for the revenue Rastas. Specific reference has been made to paragraph 4.15, Annexure VII of the industrial policy which stresses upon the need to provide affordable residential infrastructure in the State and the agreement dated 16th of November 2006 (R4) entered into between the State and respondent number 5 wherein the said respondent has agreed to make available affordable residential infrastructure in the State which is in the larger public interest and the pressing need of the people. The private respondent has agreed to shoulder the social obligation of the State in providing housing for economic weaker sections of society at a price to be determined by the Government. Thus, although the State is not directly contributing towards the compensation, it is being benefited from the infrastructure development that will take place in the entire locality apart from, provision being made for housing for economically weaker sections of society. The entire expenditure towards this would ordinarily have been borne by the State however, it is the private respondent which would not only carry out the entire development at its own cost and handover the developed area to the State but would also pay compensation for the acquisition of the revenue Rastas. It has been asserted that the private respondent entered into an agreement on 22nd November 2011 (R7) for acquisition of the revenue Rastas for which the entire cost of acquisition was to be paid for by the private respondent apart from providing alternate passage to the residents of the village with the right of easement over these new passages. SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 6 ] Insofar as the objections filed under Section 5-A by the Petitioners, it has been stated that personal hearing was afforded to all those persons who filed objections on 30th April, 2013 and thereafter, the Land Acquisition Collector, Urban Development SAS Nagar made a report to the Government which after considering the same decided to reject the objections vide its memorandum 1430 dated 19th June 2013 and it is thereafter that the declaration under Section 6 was made.

Respondents have pointed out dis-similarity between the present petition and CWP 25843 of 2013 and claim that the two petitions challenge distinct acquisitions and the reference made to Civil Writ Petition 25843 of 2013 is misleading. While Civil Writ Petition 25843 of 2013 pertains to challenge to acquisition of land falling in critical gaps of the Mega Project and is based on a different set of notifications, the present case lays challenge to revenue Rastas as per Government policy. In this context, it has specifically been mentioned that there is no similarity inasmuch as, the present acquisition is on the basis of the declared State Government policy to acquire revenue Rastas which fall within a project on the specific condition that an alternative and developed road be provided for access. The allegation that the present acquisition raises identical questions to those raised in CWP 25843 2013, is therefore denied.

Respondent number 2, Greater Mohali Area Development Authority (GMADA) has filed a reply on lines similar to that of the State. It is contended that the acquisition of the land is pursuant to the agreements entered into between the State Government and respondent number 5. The benefit to the State Government by respondent number 5 is in providing housing to economically weaker sections of society equivalent to 10% of the total developed project SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 7 ] which is to be transferred free of cost to the Government which will then allot this at concessional rates, as well as, the providing of all amenities in the area including sewage treatment plant, electricity transmission lines, developed sites for police station, post office, health centres, schools, parks etc. again at its own cost. Thereafter, the handing over of the entire project to the State Government at a later stage and these are all acts that discharge the social and welfare obligations of the State Government.

It has been asserted that the revenue Rastas have been acquired in terms of the policy dated 24th January 2011 and that apart from the fact that the Gram Panchayats have been compensated for the same through costs paid which increased their funds to carry out development works, the villagers have been provided alternative access in the form of developed roads.

Based on these contentions, it has been claimed that the acquisition is in accordance with law, helps fulfill the social and welfare obligations of the State and the acquisition cannot be taken to be an acquisition for a company attracting the provisions of Chapter VII of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 .

Respondent Number 5 the Company has also filed a written statement contending therein that the grievance of the petitioners is limited to denial of access to their lands and this grievance has been addressed by providing fully developed roads. In addition, it is stated that the private respondent is discharging the social and welfare obligations of the State by reserving and providing low cost housing apart from overall development as a part of the inclusive growth objective. Reliance has been placed upon the Industrial Policy of the State as well as in the policy to acquire revenue Rasta's. SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 8 ] It has been contended that the acquisition of only critical gaps has been requested for while setting up a project for which 625.35 acres of land have been directly purchased. The request for acquisition of land is for an area which is well below the permissible limit of 10% of the total area and in any case, the 9.35 acres of land which is being acquired is strictly in consonance with the policy which stipulates the provision of developed roads giving access to the land which is approached through these revenue Rasta's.

In addition, it has been claimed that pursuant to the agreement that was entered into between the State and the respondent in the year 2006, based upon the approved layout for 625.35 acres of land, the respondent has already offered possession of plots to a number of persons however, there has been a great deal of delay on the part of the State in providing land to make up for the critical gaps as well as the now redundant revenue Rastas, most of which now stand developed into roads which even the petitioners are using.

It is contended that out of 625.25 acres of land an approximate area of 267.48 acres of land shall revert to the Government immediately, free of cost whereas the remaining would be allotted. The land which would revert free of cost would include an area of 4.3 acres for sewage treatment, 42.83 acres for green space, 38.79 acres for public utility buildings, 29.41 acres reserved for economically weaker section of society and 156.45 acres of land on the public road. While claiming that the respondent is assisting the State in the discharge of its obligation to provide housing accommodation within the economic means of weaker sections of society, reliance has been placed upon the case of Yamuna Expressway Project and it has been claimed that that the acquisition of revenue Rastas in order to provide developed roads is SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 9 ] a public purpose and not for a company. Further, especially considering the fact, that the State would be provided, free of cost, 267.48 acres of land after it is fully developed, the entire development is for the benefit of the public.

It is also to be noticed that an application seeking vacation of the interim stay was moved by Respondent no. 5 alongwith its written statement. It was asserted that in fact the present petition ought to be dismissed on account of delay, latches and concealment of fact since the petitioners were aware of the declaration made under Section 6 dated 13th September 2013 when they filed CWP 25843 of 2013 and yet the present petition has been filed after passing of the Award on 31st December 2013. Yet, no challenge was made to the same.

In the reply filed to the application seeking vacation of stay, it has been admitted by the Petitioners that alternate developed roads have been provided to them however, the main objection that has been taken by the petitioners appears to be that the provision of developed roads has increased the distance between the land which is being cultivated and the place of residence of the petitioners and further, the public roads which have been provided are not free for use as guards employed by the private company restrict the movement of the petitioners.

In the aforesaid pleaded case, Ld. Counsel for the Petitioners has primarily raised two grounds of challenge to the acquisition proceedings. The first challenge has been raised on the ground that with the acquisition of the revenue Rasta's, access by the petitioners to their fields has been denied and this aspect was no considered while deciding the objections filed under Section 5-A. The second ground is a challenge claiming that the provisions of Chapter VII ought to have SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 10 ] been followed while acquiring the land, which is for a company.

The Petitioners urged that the Government ought to have considered the fact that agricultural land of the petitioners was being cut-off from being accessed since the only approach to it was by the revenue Rastas that were being acquired. Hence dismissal of the objections taken by the petitioners under Section 5-A clearly speaks of non-application of mind.

Learned Counsel for the State has drawn attention to the un- rebutted assertion of the State that all land owners who had filed objections were afforded a hearing and the report of the Land Acquisition Collector was accepted by the Government. Thereafter, the price to be paid for the land was determined by the District Price Fixation Committee in its meeting dated 26th November 2013 in which the Sarpanch of Village Raipur Kalan was present. A sum of Rs.1.36 Crore per acre was fixed and this is apart from other statutory benefits based upon which a sum of Rs.18.70 Crores was paid for the land.

With regard to the first ground of challenge, Counsel for the Respondent contended that a perusal of the objections filed by the petitioners under Section 5-A to the notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 disclose that the petitioner land owners had complained that with the acquisition of the revenue Rasta's, access to their fields for the purpose of cultivation would be denied. In fact, the petitioners had claimed that till the landowners do not sell the left out land, land of the revenue Rastas should not be acquired. The Government has already considered this aspect while framing policy dated 24th January 2011 and acquisition of revenue Rastas is permissible only on the condition that incase the revenue Rastas pass through a project, alternate passage has to be provided SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 11 ] before possession of the revenue Rastas is handed over. Thus, it is not correct for the petitioners to suggest that their objections were not considered.

Further, Counsel for the respondents also pointed out that there is no denial of the fact that developed roads have in fact been provided for use to the public including the petitioners. In fact the acquisition of revenue Rastas has proceeded on the express condition imposed by the Government for acquiring the same and therefore, developed roads were a pre-requisite. As a matter of fact, developed roads have been provided.

Learned Counsel for the petitioner in context of the second aspect then contended that the acquisition is for a company and that it is not for a public purpose. He has placed reliance upon the decision in the case of Devinder Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab (2008) 1 SCC 728 to contend that the procedure prescribed in Part II is distinguishable from the procedure prescribed in Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and that the basis for adopting or choosing an appropriate procedure does not depend upon the existence or nonexistence of a public purpose but on the source of funds to cover the cost of acquisition. Learned counsel has contended that the entire cost of acquisition has been paid for by a company and therefore, the acquisition cannot be considered to be for a public purpose.

While referring to the aforesaid judgement Ld. Counsel sought to argue that once the Government had not contributed any amount towards the cost of acquisition, it could not have proceeded under Part II rather, compliance of Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 ought to have been made and had it been so, it would be obvious that the procedure to be adopted in the present case would fall SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 12 ] under Part VII. This is so, because the acquisition is being made entirely at the cost of the company.

Mr. Sanjeev Sharma Ld. Senior Counsel appearing for respondent number 5 on the other hand contended that the situation in the present case is completely distinct from the facts in the case of Devinder Singh. According to learned Senior Counsel, in the case of Devinder Singh, a company made a request to the Government to acquire land adjoining its land for the purpose of expansion. The State contributed an amount of Rs.100 towards the acquisition and that too only after a writ petition had been filed challenging the acquisition. In the present case, the acquisition is of revenue Rastas, which cause hindrance to the planned development. Furthermore, acquisition of these revenue Rastas is conditional upon alternate access being provided through developed roads. Additionally, the acquired land will not vest in or remain with Respondent number 5 but will form a part of the developed road network and other infrastructure which will be used by the general public. Consequently, no similarity can be drawn with the case of Devinder Singh.

Further, he referred to the objection taken by the respondents that the petitioners had earlier filed CWP 25843 of 2013 in which the present declaration made under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dated 13th of September 2013 had been placed on record. This notification was thereafter substituted by a different notification by filing civil miscellaneous 16952 of 2013. Yet, no challenge was made to this acquisition, allowing the Award to be passed on 31.12.2013 pursuant to which reference applications under Sections 18 and 30 have been filed by the petitioners. Thus, it has been claimed that the present petition ought not to be entertained.

2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 13 ] While placing reliance on Nand Kishore Gupta v. State of U.P. , (2010) 10 SCC 282 Ld. Sr. Counsel also contended that there has been a paradigm shift in the concept of contribution made by the State towards acquisition of land for a public purpose with the coming into force the concept of private sector participation in delivery of public benefits.

While relying upon Smt. Somavanti and others v. State of Punjab and others AIR 1963 SC 151 he sought to contend that the declaration by the State as to the acquisition being for a public purpose is not to be lightly interfered with and such declaration should be considered to be conclusive evidence of the fact that it is so needed. He further submitted that the very definition of the expression 'Public purpose' is an inclusive definition and not a compendious one, therefore, it would include a purpose in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned. Therefore, according to Ld. Sr. Counsel source of funding by itself would not be the determining factor. In the instant case, from the very beginning, the Government has been consistent, clear and satisfied that acquisition of revenue Rastas which hinder planned development can be acquired on the condition that alternative access has to be provided and that to, by means of developed roads. In such a case, the acquisition is for the benefit of the public, clearly demonstrating the fulfilment of a public purpose and therefore, this conclusive satisfaction of the Government that the acquisition is for a public purpose ought not to be questioned. Considering that, in the instant case, the declaration of the Government is related to a public purpose as distinct from a purely private purpose, the exercise of power by the Government in acquiring the land cannot be faulted and SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 14 ] would be protected under Section 6 (3) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Further, Ld. Sr. Counsel contended that it is in the discharge of its public duty that the State was providing housing, although through the private developer. He submitted that it is the duty of State to provide housing accommodation within the economic means of weaker sections of the society and the State has justifiably joined hands or collaborated with Respondent number 5 for this purpose. It was contended that the State Government is being benefitted from the revenue collected, the public at large is getting planned infrastructure especially, in the form of roads network, the weaker section of the society is getting low cost housing and most importantly the land owners/farmers are getting compensation at market rate. The land falling in the revenue Rastas is required for roads connectivity and other development works and once development process is complete the entire roads network shall vest in the State Government or Municipal Corporation. Thus, in addition to other factors, the fact that the land will not remain with or vest in the company clearly shows that the acquisition is not for the company and is for public purpose as declared.

It was thus, urged that the acquisition is for benefit of the public and in any case the petitioners have failed to demonstrate as to how they are prejudiced if the State Government has not contributed towards cost of acquisition. The submission being that without burdening the State exchequer, the Government gets developed land in the form of roads, sewage plant, electricity supply system, water supply system etc. and low cost housing all at the cost of respondent number 5. Once more reliance has been placed upon Nand Kishore Gupta & Ors. Versus State of U.P. , (Supra) wherein it has been held that SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 15 ] where the acquisition is by the State for the company in discharge of the Policy of the State then such acquisition shall be considered as acquisition for Public Purpose even though ostensibly the State is not contributing towards compensation.

Learned counsel for the State while reiterating the submissions made by learned Senior Counsel, submitted that in the instant case, the petitioners are being benefitted from developed roads, which admittedly, they are utilising. At the same time, the Gram Panchayats have been benefitted with the money received from the acquisition of revenue Rastas leaving it open to it to utilise the said money for development and benefit of those persons residing in the villages. Furthermore, the fact that the State will draw direct benefit from the development, but not limited to low-cost housing for the economically weaker section of society, clearly demonstrates the public purpose for which acquisition of the revenue Rastas is necessary. The fact that the cost of acquisition has been paid by the company is not the sole factor to determine public purpose considering the huge benefit, both monetary and otherwise, that the Government has received through the development that is being carried out by the company. This money would ordinarily have been spent by the State.

In light of the above, it would be appropriate to examine the arguments advanced by Ld. Counsel as to whether in fact there was any lapse in considering the objections filed by the Petitioners or that the acquisition is in fact a colourable exercise of power by the State.

Having heard learned counsel, we now proceed to examine the issues raised, which are:

Onus to satisfy the Court of a bonafide exercise of statutory power lies upon the State in such matter, we are therefore obliged to examine the matter with a view to determine whether there was in fact, some other purpose sought to be achieved while claiming public purpose.

An examination of the pleaded case and arguments advanced by Ld. Counsel for the parties however demonstrate no plausible reason to suggest that there was any motive or failure on the part of the State in carrying out the acquisition. In the first place, while rejecting the objections filed by the Petitioners under Section 5-A it was to be seen whether the petitioners complain regarding denial of access to their fields if the revenue Rastas are acquired is correct. This specific objection stood answered through the Policy of the State dated 24th January 2011, which requires the developer to provide alternate access, which admittedly has been done through developed roads which, the petitioners are now using. The development has taken place as per the duly sanctioned Master Plan to which no objection was raised.

The State has in paragraphs 10 onwards of its written statement highlighted the public purpose, the benefit to the public at large and the redressal of the grievance made by the petitioners with regard to access and contended that all these aspects have been adequately dealt with. The policy of the State does not provide to acquire the entire land for the project being set up by the respondent number 5 but it is restricted to revenue Rastas passing through the project. This acquisition is necessary for the planned, compact and harmonious SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 17 ] development of the project as per the Master Plan and at the same time, the concerned Gram Panchayat has been duly compensated for its land to carry out development works. More importantly it stated that the villagers have been provided alternative access in the form of developed roads. It has specifically been stated that the acquisition is by the State in the discharge of its policy and even though the State is not directly contributing towards the compensation, the benefit that directly accrues from providing this land is in the form of direct assistance to the State as per its Industrial Policy, 2003, as well as the discharge of its social obligation for providing housing to the people of the State and to the economically weaker sections of society. The entire purpose of permitting megaprojects is to bring infrastructural development and increase the per capita income. In context of the present acquisition, the acquisition of revenue Rastas which are passing through the project facilitate planned urban development without causing inconvenience to the villagers and at the same time provide much-needed revenue to the village to carry out development works. Apart from the fact that the development of the project will result in provision of affordable residential infrastructure for economical weaker section and also attract private realtors to build residential facilities. It is also stated that the social obligation of the State would be shouldered through this private participation.

Therefore it is evident that the rejection of objections was based upon the policy and sound reason in as much as, the very objection raised by the petitioners stood resolved once developed road access was given to them.

After taking into consideration the facts and the arguments addressed, we find no reason to hold that there was any illegality in SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 18 ] disposal of the objections filed by the petitioners by the State leaving e any illegality that can lead to a successful challenge to the acquisition itself. While doing so we are not unmindful of the fact that the right granted to the land owners under Section 5-A cannot be lightly brushed aside but in the instant case, we find no reason to hold that the decision taken on the objections is in any manner vitiated. This is evident from the fact that the acquisition of the revenue Rastas was based on the policy of the State which clearly provides for acquisition of revenue Rastas and provision for alternate developed roads in lieu thereof. The main objection of denial of access, made by the petitioners was therefore correctly rejected.

Now to address the second issue. A perusal of the notification issued under Section 4 dated 5th of March 2013 discloses that the State was of the view that the land falling under the revenue Rastas was likely to be needed for a public purpose. The stated public purpose was planned, harmonious and compact urban development in accordance with the duly notified Master Plan.

The following land was proposed to be acquired:-

The declaration issued under Section 6 for acquisition for land measuring 7.3875 acres falling in Village Raipur Kalan for the public purpose as a result land declared necessary for acquisition was:-

The policy dated 24th January 2011 lays a pre-condition on a developer to provide alternative passage to the villagers before SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 20 ] possession of revenue Rastas is handed over. The policy reads as:

While it is evident as to why the State wishes to acquire revenue Rastas but as to what would become of these revenue Rastas after acquisition is indicated in the written statement filed by Respondent Number 5 which discloses that a large chunk of land developed by it is reserved for public use. This is:

Post development, this entire area will vest with the concerned Municipal Corporation/Council and the balance would be allotted to the public. At first, about 267.48 acres will revert to the Government. At a later stage the entire area would vest with the Municipal Corporation/Council. Benefit to the State is in terms of low cost housing for economically weaker section over an area measuring 29.41 acres of the developed land, which has been reserved for this purpose. This is much more than the land of revenue Rastas that has been acquired by the State Government. Thus, the acquired land will not remain with the company but would be used as a part of the infrastructure development including roads and would thus, be put to public use.

The Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. District Collector Ranga Reddy District (2008) 9 SCC 552 held that the expression Public purpose is incapable of precise and SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 22 ] comprehensive definition. In fact it is used in a generic sense to include any purpose in which even a fraction of the community may be interested or by which it may be benefited. Such a purpose is therefore, much wider than a public necessity. In this context, it would be useful to refer to paragraphs 79 to 82 of the judgement, which read as under:

Purpose is more pervasive than urgency. That which one sets before him to accomplish, an end, intention, aim, object, plan or project, is purpose. A need or necessity, on the other hand, is urgent, unavoidable, compulsive. "Public purpose should be liberally construed, not whittled down by logomachy."

80. In State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy [(1977) 4 SCC 471] Krishna Iyer, J. stated: (SCC p. 502, para 57) "57. ... There may be many processes of satisfying a public purpose. A wide range of choices may exist. The State may walk into the open market and buy the items, movable and immovable, to fulfil the public purpose; or it may compulsorily acquire from some private person's possession and ownership the articles needed to meet the public purpose; it may requisition, instead of resorting to acquisition; it may take on loan or on hire or itself manufacture or produce. All these steps are various alternative means to meet the public purpose. The State may need chalk or cheese, pins, pens or planes, boats, buses or buildings, carts, cars, or eating houses or any other of the innumerable items to run a welfare-oriented administration or a public corporation or answer a community requirement. If the purpose is for servicing the SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 23 ] public, as Governmental purposes ordinarily are, then everything desiderated for subserving such public purpose falls under the broad and expanding rubric. The nexus between the taking of property and the public purpose springs necessarily into existence if the former is capable of answering the latter. On the other hand, if the purpose is a private or non-public one, the mere fact that the hand that acquires or requires is Government or a public corporation, does not make the purpose automatically a public purpose. Let us illustrate. If a fleet of cars is desired for conveyance of public officers, the purpose is a public one. If the same fleet of cars is sought for fulfilling the tourist appetite of friends and relations of the same public officers, it is a private purpose. If bread is 'seized' for feeding a starving section of the community, it is a public purpose that is met but, if the same bread is desired for the private dinner of a political maharajah who may pro tem fill a public office, it is a private purpose. Of course, the thing taken must be capable of serving the object of the taking. If you want to run bus transport you cannot take buffaloes."

81. As observed by Bhagwati, J. (as His Lordship then was) in National Textile Workers' Union v. P.R. Ramakrishnan [(1983) 1 SCC 228 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 72 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 2] the law must adapt itself with the changing socio-economic context. His Lordship said: (SCC p. 255, para 9) "9. ... We cannot allow the dead hand of the past to stifle the growth of the living present. Law cannot stand still; it must change with the changing social concepts and values. SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 24 ] If the bark that protects the tree fails to grow and expand along with the tree, it will either choke the tree or if it is a living tree, it will shed that bark and grow a new living bark for itself. Similarly, if the law fails to respond to the needs of changing society, then either it will stifle the growth of the society and choke its progress or if the society is vigorous enough, it will cast away the law which stands in the way of its growth. Law must therefore constantly be on the move adapting itself to the fast changing society and not lag behind."

82. Finally, we may refer to the Tenth Report of the Law Commission of India on "The Law of Acquisition and Requisitioning of Land" wherein the Law Commission considering the meaning of "public purpose" under the Act, stated:

In the instant case, the changed economic scenario noticed in the Industrial Policy, 2003 shows a departure from the earlier method adopted by the States towards development. The emphasis now is upon attracting investment by calling upon private companies to create infrastructure within the State to attract investment as well as to provide better amenities within the financial resources of a State by utilizing the financial inputs through private funding. It is through these means that the object of fulfilling its social and welfare obligation by the State are met. Towards this public purpose, the facility of acquiring land through compulsory acquisition, limited in both extent as well as contingent upon fulfilment of conditions is made. Revenue Rastas are acquired only upon alternate developed roads being provided and the revenue Rastas so acquired are only those which cause impediment to SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 26 ] planned development.

As noticed earlier, there exists a policy to acquire revenue Rastas that terminate in colonies or pass through the same. These are to be acquired subject to alternative passages being provided by means of developed roads. On a plain understanding of these conditions, it is evident that the provision of developed roads is to the benefit of the public at large and it cannot be taken as a benefit for only a few. Such acquisition cannot be considered to be opposed to public purpose or held to be for a private purpose. In context of how a policy of the Government ought to be viewed, we once more draw strength from paragraph 90 of the judgement in case of Sooraram Pratap Reddy (Supra):

It is, therefore, a settled proposition of law that in absence of illegality or violation of law, a court of law will not interfere in policy matters.' Thus, once the acquisition is based upon a policy that has been framed by the State, this Court would not venture upon an examination as to its correctness much less in a situation where the policy is not challenged.

We find that the case of Devinder Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab and others (Supra) on which Ld. Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance in context of acquisition for a private company vis-a-vis public purpose was noticed in Sooraram (Supra) as follows:

119. In our judgment, in deciding whether acquisition is for "public purpose" or not, prima facie, the Government is the best judge. Normally, in such matters, a writ court will not interfere by substituting its judgment for the judgment of the Government.

120. In Hamabai [(1914-15) 42 IA 44: AIR 1914 PC 20 : (1911) SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 29 ] 13 Bom LR 1097] the Judicial Committee of Privy Council stated:

That exception is that if there is a colourable exercise of power the declaration will be open to challenge at the instance of the aggrieved party. The power committed to the Government by the Act is a limited power in the sense that it can be exercised only where there is a public purpose, leaving aside for a moment the purpose of a company. If it appears that what the Government is satisfied about is not a public purpose but a private purpose or no purpose at all the action of the Government would be colourable as not being relatable to the power conferred upon it by the Act and its declaration will be a nullity." The majority concluded: (Somawanti case [AIR 1963 SC 151 :

123. In Srinivasa Coop. House Building Society Ltd. v. Madam Gurumurthy Sastry [(1994) 4 SCC 675] this Court held that a token contribution from public revenue cannot ipso facto be treated as colourable exercise of power by the State in acquisition of land. Each case must furnish its backdrop whether the action is for public purpose or for a private purpose.

124. In Bajirao T. Kote v. State of Maharashtra [(1995) 2 SCC 442] this Court held that satisfaction of the State Government regarding existence of public purpose is not open to judicial scrutiny unless there is mala fide or colourable exercise of power. The Court stated: (SCC p. 449, para 10) "10. ... It is primarily for the State Government to decide whether there exists public purpose or not, and it is not for this Court or the High Courts to evaluate the evidence and come to its own conclusion whether or not there is public purpose unless it comes to the conclusion that it is a mala fide or colourable exercise of the power. In other words the exercise of the power serves no public purpose or it serves a private purpose."

125. In Laxmanrao Bapurao Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 32 ] [(1997) 3 SCC 493] this Court held that it is for the State Government to decide whether the land is needed or is likely to be needed for a public purpose and whether it is suitable or adaptable for the purpose for which the acquisition was sought. The mere fact of empowering the authorised officer to inspect and find out whether the land would be adaptable for the public purpose does not take away the power of the Government to take a decision ultimately.

126. We may, however, recall Daulat Singh [(2007) 1 SCC 641] once again at this stage. There, referring to all leading cases and dealing with the ambit and scope of judicial review on the satisfaction by the State Government on "public purpose", this Court stated: (SCC pp. 656-57, para 44) "44. Public purpose is bound to vary with times and prevailing conditions in the community or locality and, therefore, the legislature has left it to the State (Government) to decide what is public purpose and also to declare the need of a given land for the purpose. The legislature has left the discretion to the Government regarding public purpose. The Government has the sole and absolute discretion in the matter."

It was contended that the italicised portion quoted above (the Government has the sole and absolute discretion in the matter) is not in consonance with settled legal position or in accord with earlier decisions of this Court including decisions rendered by various Constitution Benches. We have already referred to R.S. Nanji [AIR 1956 SC 294: 1956 SCR 18] wherein before more than half a century, the Constitution Bench of this SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 33 ] Court held that prima facie, the Government is the best judge to decide public purpose but it is not the sole judge. That was the view of the Privy Council in Hamabai [(1914-15) 42 IA 44:

Conclusions

128. Applying the aforesaid principles to the case on hand, in our considered opinion, it cannot be said that the proceedings initiated by the State for acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are illegal, unlawful, unwarranted, mala fide, fraud on statute or have been taken in colourable exercise of power.

What is understood from the aforesaid observations is that SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 34 ] ordinarily, the satisfaction of the Government as to the existence of public purpose will not be interfered with, unless it can be shown that the satisfaction is a colourable excerise based on fraud, it is tainted by malafide, unwarranted or illegal. We find that in the instant case there is no reason to doubt the action of the Government and in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Government correctly arrived at its decision as to public purpose for carrying out the acquisition. The acquisition of revenue Rastas as per the Policy of the State, to enable proper planning and at the same time ensuring that alternate developed roads are provided is a public purpose.

Further, we also find that while noticing Devinder Singh in Nand Kishore (Supra) in paragraphs 80 to 83 the Supreme Court observed as:

State of Punjab [(2008) 1 SCC 728] was also referred to. It was urged that there was a conflict in this decision and the decision in Pratibha Nema case [(2003) 10 SCC 626] . This was a case where the petitioners who were the owners of the agricultural lands, had challenged the acquisition of lands for M/s International Tractors Ltd. It was claimed that the land was being acquired for public purpose i.e. setting up Ganesha Project of M/s International Tractors Ltd. at various villages. The High Court had held that the land acquisition was for public purpose. This Court explained the "public purpose" as defined in Section 3(f) of the Act and noted that the aforementioned Ganesha Project was not a project of the State, but the one undertaken by the Company M/s International Tractors Ltd. The Court then went on to consider Sections 40 and 41 of the Act along with SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 35 ] Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 and came to the conclusion that the same could not be a public purpose as the whole compensation was coming from the coffers of the Company. In that view, the Court further came to the conclusion that the State not having followed the provisions of Sections 40 and 41 of the Act, the whole process had suffered illegality.

81. The Court also considered the decision in Pratibha Nema case [(2003) 10 SCC 626] and distinguished the same by making a comment to the following effect: ( Devinder Singh case [(2008) 1 SCC 728] , SCC p. 738, para 22) "22. ... But we must hasten to add that the Bench did not have any occasion to consider the question as to whether the State is entitled to take recourse to the provisions of both Part II and Part VII of the Act simultaneously." The Court, however, refused to go into the nicety of the question and observed that in a case of acquisition for a public company, public purpose is not to be assumed and the point of distinction between acquisition of lands under Part II and Part VII of the Act would be the source of funds to cover the cost of acquisition. The Court also considered the judgment of this Court in Somawanti v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 SC 151] , Jage Ram v. State of Haryana [(1971) 1 SCC 671] and Shyam Behari v. State of M.P. [AIR 1965 SC 427] Ultimately, the Court came to the conclusion that the necessary provisions not having been found, the view of the High Court was not correct, whereby it had upheld the land acquisition, holding it to be for the public purpose. SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document

Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 36 ]

82. We have closely seen the judgment in Devinder Singh [(2008) 1 SCC 728] however, the factual situation in the judgment is quite different. In our opinion, the judgment will not help the appellants to contend that the present land acquisition is not for public purpose. We also do not think that there is any serious conflict between the decision in Pratibha Nema case [(2003) 10 SCC 626] and the decision in Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab [(2008) 1 SCC 728], so as to require a reference to the larger Bench. In our opinion, the decision in Pratibha Nema case [(2003) 10 SCC 626] applies to the fact situation in this case.

83. Therefore, considering the overall factual situation, we are of the opinion that the High Court was right in holding that the acquisition was made for the public purpose. We find from the order of the High Court that the High Court has considered the question of public purpose keeping in mind the correct principles of law. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants that this acquisition was not for the public purpose for various reasons which we have discussed, is not correct.

In context of the above observation, a brief look at the case of Pratibha Nema v. State of M.P. , (2003) 10 SCC 626 shows thatSupreme Court has observed that "public purpose is involved in the acquisition of land for setting up an industry in the private sector as it would ultimately benefit the people. However, we would like to add that any and every industry need not necessarily promote public purpose and there could be exceptions which negate the public purpose. But, it must be borne in mind that the satisfaction of the Government as to the existence of public purpose cannot be lightly faulted and it must remain SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 37 ] uppermost in the mind of the court."

As already noticed above, providing developed roads for the benefit of public along with complete infrastructure development in the area cannot be considered as being not a public purpose. We find no material available on record to substantiate such a challenge. No motive had been alleged by the petitioners to say that the acquisition of land was initiated by mala fide or colourable exercise of power, neither is there a total transfer of ownership of the land to a company. It is well settled that the conclusiveness of Section 6 declaration is open to challenge only on the ground of colourable exercise of power. In order to establish the allegation of mala fides and/or colourable exercise of power, the burden is on the petitioner. In the present case, we find no such grounds made out. Consequently, we have no hesitation to hold that the acquisition is not a colourable exercise of power therefore there is no justification to interfere with the same.

It further also needs to be noticed that the present petition has been filed after passing of the Award on 31.12.2013. This by itself would be a disqualification to lay challenge to the acquisition more so when it is also not denied that the petitioners have filed reference petitions under section 18 and 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which have been sent to the reference court on 19th June 2014. Thus, the petition must fail on the ground of acquiescence, delay and latches. Reference in this regard may be made to Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig , (2000) 2 SCC 48, paragraphs 17 and 18 thereof which lay down the legal position.

17. In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder. This has been the consistent view SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 38 ] taken by this Court and in one of the recent cases ( C. Padma v. Dy. Secy. to the Govt. of T.N. [(1997) 2 SCC 627] ) this Court observed as below: (SCC p. 628, para 4) "4. The admitted position is that pursuant to the notification published under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the Act') in GOR No. 1392 Industries dated 17-10-1962, total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in Madhavaram Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpattu District in Tamil Nadu was acquired under Chapter VII of the Act for the manufacture of Synthetic Rasina by Tvl. Reichold Chemicals India Ltd., Madras. The acquisition proceedings had become final and possession of the land was taken on 30-4-1964. Pursuant to the agreement executed by the company, it was handed over to Tvl. Simpson and General Finance Co. which is a subsidiary of Reichold Chemicals India Ltd. It would appear that at a request made by the said company, 66 cents of land out of one acre 37 cents in respect of which the appellants originally had ownership, was transferred in GOMs No. 816 Industries dated 24-3-1971 in favour of another subsidiary company. Shri Rama Vilas Service Ltd., the 5th respondent which is also another subsidiary of the Company had requested for two acres 75 cents of land; the same came to be assigned on leasehold basis by the Government after resumption in terms of the agreement in GOMs No. 439 Industries dated 10-5-1985. In GOMs No. 546 Industries dated 30-3-1986, the same came to be approved of. Then the appellants challenged the original SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 39 ] GOMs No. 1392 Industries dated 17-10-1962 contending that since the original purpose for which the land was acquired had ceased to be in operation, the appellants are entitled to restitution of the possession taken from them. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have held that the acquired land having already vested in the State, after receipt of the compensation by the predecessor-in- title of the appellants, they have no right to challenge the notification. Thus the writ petition and the writ appeal came to be dismissed."

18. Similar is the view in an earlier decision of this Court in the case of Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. (P) Ltd. [(1996) 11 SCC 501] Incidentally, the decision last noted was also on land acquisition and requisition under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 and in para 29 of the Report this Court observed: (SCC p. 520) "29. It is thus well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 . But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Civil Writ Petition No. 4212 of 2014 (O&M) [ 40 ] consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third-party rights were created in the case is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches." It is also admitted that the development in the area will result in the provision of housing, including, low-cost housing and provision of fully developed infrastructure and that the entire development is being carried out in accordance with the approved Master Plan."

As already noticed that the Petitioners had earlier filed CWP 25843 of 2013 in which the declaration dated 13th September 2013 was placed on the record, yet no challenge was made to this acquisition at that point in time and rather the petitioners chose to wait till the passing of the Award on 31.12.2013 and then laid challenge to the same. Admittedly, in the meanwhile, they also filed references under sections 18 and 30 of the land Acquisition Act, 1894 . This petition appears to be a gamble, which cannot be permitted.

For the aforementioned reasons we find no reason to interference, this petition is dismissed.

( ASHUTOSH MOHUNTA ) ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE ( HARINDER SINGH SIDHU ) 1.10.2014 JUDGE rupi SANDHU RUPINDER KAUR 2014.10.06 15:10 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document