"That to palm off a young woman as belonging to a caste different to the one to which she really belongs, with the object of obtaining money, amounts to the offence of cheating by personation as defined in Section 416 of the Penal Code, 1860, which must be read in the light of the preceding Section 415."

27. A similar view was taken in Delhi Race Club (supra) wherein it was observed:

37. Further, in both the aforesaid sections, mens rea, i.e. intention to defraud or dishonest intention, must be present, and in the case of cheating, it must be there from the very beginning or inception.

28. Therefore, it is to be determined whether these ingredients are satisfied by the allegations contained in the FIR or not.

2025:HHC:16349

29. It was held in Bharateesh Reddy v. Ramesh Ranganathan , (2022) 16 SCC 210: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1061 that a breach of contract will not amount to fraud. It was observed on page 215:

30. This position was reiterated in Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab , (2023) 5 SCC 360: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 210 wherein it was observed on page 363:

31. The gist of the allegations made in the FIR is that the petitioners developed a P&G Connect + Develop Programme promising to collaborate with the innovators for mutual value.

2025:HHC:16349 The informant submitted his innovation as per the terms and conditions of the programme. The petitioners showed their disinclination to pursue the partnership and thereafter used the technology/process submitted by the informant. Prima facie, these allegations show that the petitioners had invited the informant to collaborate with the promise to enter into a partnership. They refused to proceed further with the partnership but used the process submitted by the informant.

These allegations show that a false promise of collaboration was made to the informant. The informant was induced to deliver the innovation which he would not have done but for the promise of collaboration made to him, and in this manner, the petitioners gained knowledge of the process developed by the informant while the informant lost the money promised to him by way of collaboration. These facts satisfy the ingredients of cheating.

32. It was submitted that the petitioners never used the technology/process submitted by the informant, the process used by the petitioners is entirely different from the process patented by the informant. These are the questions of fact which require investigation. It was laid down by the Hon'ble 39 2025:HHC:16349 Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand , (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed on page 397:

33. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false. The petitioners never used the process of the informant.

This submission will not help the petitioners. This Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has to take the allegations in the FIR as correct. This position was laid down 40 2025:HHC:16349 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi ), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, wherein it was observed: -

34. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P. , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: -

35. Therefore, this Court refrains from conducting any inquiry into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations and leaves the matter to the Investigating Officer to do so.

2025:HHC:16349

36. It was submitted that the dispute between the parties was civil, and the registration of the FIR was impermissible.

There can be no dispute with the proposition of law that the civil dispute cannot be turned into criminal proceedings1, however, it does not mean that no civil action can give rise to a criminal action. Professor Glanville Williams explained in his celebrated book Learning the Law (Tenth Edition, Stevens and Sons) that the facts by themselves cannot determine civil or criminal liability.

The same set of facts may give rise to criminal or civil liability.

The distinction between the two is not the nature of the act but the nature of the proceedings that are taken to seek redressal. It was observed:

37. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also held in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P. , (2021) 14 SCC 626: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 942, that a given set of facts may make out a civil wrong, as well as, 44 2025:HHC:16349 the criminal offence and mere availability of civil remedies is no ground to quash the criminal proceedings. It was observed:

38. A similar view was taken in V.R. Dalal v. Yougendra Naranji Thakkar , (2008) 15 SCC 625, wherein it was observed: -

39. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Puneet Beriwala Vs. State 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983 that simply because a remedy is provided under the civil law cannot lead to an inference that resort cannot be had to the criminal law or that the civil law remedy is the only remedy available to the parties. It was observed:

40. Hence, the mere fact that the informant has a remedy under the Patent Act to sue for the breach of the patent will not take away the remedy available under the criminal law.

41. It was submitted that there is a delay in reporting the matter to the police and the F.I.R. is liable to be quashed due to the delay. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala (supra), that the F.I.R.

cannot be quashed on the ground of delay. It was observed:

42. It was submitted that the Courts at Kandaghat had no jurisdiction to hear and entertain the application. The police at Kandaghat also do not have the territorial jurisdiction to investigate the matter. Hence, the FIR is liable to be quashed.

This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi ), (1999) 8 SCC 728 that SHO has a statutory authority to investigate any cognizable offence and the investigation cannot be quashed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. It was observed:-

9. This would be clear from the following discussion. Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers the police officer to investigate any cognizable offence. It reads as under:

2025:HHC:16349 (3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above-

mentioned."

10. It is true that territorial jurisdiction is also prescribed under sub-section (1) to the extent that the officer can investigate any cognizable case in which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such police station would have the power to enquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. However, sub- section (2) makes the position clear by providing that no proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called into question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered to investigate. After the investigation is completed, the result of such investigation is required to be submitted as provided under Sections 168, 169 and 170. Section 170 specifically provides that if, upon an investigation, it appears to the officer in charge of the police station that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, such officer shall forward the accused under custody to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a police report and to try the accused or commit for trial. Further, if the investigating officer arrives at the conclusion that the crime was not committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the police station, then the FIR can be forwarded to the police station having jurisdiction over the area in which the crime was committed. But this would not mean that in a case which requires investigation, the police officer can refuse to record the FIR and/or investigate it.

11. Chapter XIII of the Code provides for "jurisdiction of the criminal courts in enquiries and trials". It is to be stated that under the said chapter, there are various provisions which empower the court for enquiry or trial of a criminal case and that there is no absolute prohibition that the offence committed beyond the local territorial jurisdiction cannot be investigated, enquired 49 2025:HHC:16349 or tried. This would be clear by referring to Sections 177 to 188. For our purpose, it would suffice to refer only to Sections 177 and 178, which are as under:

12. A reading of the aforesaid sections would make it clear that Section 177 provides for an "ordinary" place of enquiry or trial. Section 178, inter alia, provides for place of enquiry or trial when it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed or where the offence was committed partly in one local area and partly in another and where it consisted of several acts done in different local areas, it could be enquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Hence, at the stage of investigation, it cannot be held that the SHO does not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the crime.

13. This Court in State of W.B. v. S.N. Basak [AIR 1963 SC 447 : (1963) 2 SCR 52] dealt with a similar contention wherein the High Court had held that the statutory powers of investigation given to the police under Chapter XIV were not available in respect of an offence triable 50 2025:HHC:16349 under the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949 and hence the investigation was without jurisdiction. Reversing the said finding, it was held thus:

14. Further, the legal position is well settled that if an offence is disclosed, the court will not normally interfere with an investigation into the case and will permit an investigation into the offence alleged to be completed. If the FIR, prima facie, discloses the commission of an offence, the court does not normally stop the investigation, for, to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences. [ State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha , (1982) 1 SCC 561: 1982 SCC (Cri) 283] It is also settled by a long course of decisions of this Court that for the purpose of exercising its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash an FIR or a complaint, the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint or the documents accompanying the same per se; it has no jurisdiction to examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations. [ Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar , (1985) 2 SCC 370, 395 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 180]

15. Hence, in the present case, the High Court committed a grave error in accepting the contention of the 52 2025:HHC:16349 respondent that the investigating officer had no jurisdiction to investigate the matters on the alleged ground that no part of the offence was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the police station at Delhi. The appreciation of the evidence is the function of the courts when seized of the matter. At the stage of the investigation, the material collected by an investigating officer cannot be judicially scrutinised for arriving at a conclusion that the police station officer of a particular police station would not have territorial jurisdiction. In any case, it has to be stated that in view of Section 178(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code, when it is uncertain in which of the several local areas an offence was committed, or where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, the said offence can be enquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Therefore, to say at the stage of the investigation that the SHO, Police Station Paschim Vihar, New Delhi, was not having territorial jurisdiction is, on the face of it, illegal and erroneous. That apart, Section 156(2) contains an embargo that no proceeding of a police officer shall be challenged on the ground that he has no territorial power to investigate. The High Court has completely overlooked the said embargo when it entertained the petition of Respondent 2 on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction.

43. It was held in Rasiklal Dalpatram Thakkar v. State of Gujarat , (2010) 1 SCC 1, that once an investigation is commenced under Section 156(1), it cannot be interrupted on the ground that the Police Officer was not empowered. It was observed:-

2025:HHC:16349 section (2) of Section 156 ensures that once an investigation is commenced under sub-section (1), the same is not interrupted on the ground that the police officer was not empowered under the section to investigate. It is in the nature of a "savings clause" in respect of investigations undertaken in respect of cognizable offences. In addition to the powers vested in a Magistrate empowered under Section 190 CrPC to order an investigation under sub-section (1) of Section 202 CrPC, sub-section (3) of Section 156 also empowers such Magistrate to order an investigation on a complaint filed before him.

26. In the instant case, the stage contemplated under Section 181(4) CrPC has not yet been reached. Prior to taking cognizance on the complaint filed by the Bank, the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad had directed an inquiry under Section 156(3) CrPC and as it appears, a final report was submitted by the investigating agency entrusted with the investigation stating that since the alleged transactions had taken place within the territorial limits of the city of Mumbai, no cause of action had arisen in the State of Gujarat and therefore, the investigation should be transferred to the police agency in Mumbai. There seems to be little doubt that the Economic Offences Wing, State CID (Crime), which had been entrusted with the investigation, had, upon initial inquiries, recommended that the investigation be transferred to the police agency of Mumbai.

27. In our view, both the trial court as well as the Bombay High Court had correctly interpreted the provisions of Section 156 CrPC to hold that it was not within the jurisdiction of the investigating agency to refrain itself from holding a proper and complete investigation merely upon arriving at a conclusion that the offences had been committed beyond its territorial jurisdiction.

28. A glance at the material before the Magistrate would indicate that the major part of the loan transaction had, in fact, taken place in the State of Gujarat and that having regard to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 156 CrPC, the proceedings of the investigation could not be 54 2025:HHC:16349 questioned on the ground of jurisdiction of the officer to conduct such investigation. It was open to the learned Magistrate to direct an investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC without taking cognizance on the complaint and where an investigation is undertaken at the instance of the Magistrate, a police officer empowered under sub-section (1) of Section 156 is bound, except in specific and specially exceptional cases, to conduct such an investigation even if he was of the view that he did not have jurisdiction to investigate the matter.

29. Having regard to the law in existence today, we are unable to accept Mr Syed's submissions that the High Court had erred in upholding the order of the learned trial Judge when the entire cause of action in respect of the offence had allegedly arisen outside the State of Gujarat. We are also unable to accept the submission that it was for the investigating officer in the course of the investigation to decide whether a particular court had jurisdiction to entertain a complaint or not.

30. It is the settled law that the complaint made in a criminal case follows the place where the cause arises, but the distinguishing feature in the instant case is that the stage of taking cognisance was yet to arrive. The investigating agency was required to place the facts elicited during the investigation before the court in order to enable the court to come to a conclusion as to whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint or not. Without conducting such an investigation, it was improper on the part of the investigating agency to forward its report with the observation that since the entire cause of action for the alleged offence had purportedly arisen in the city of Mumbai within the State of Maharashtra, the investigation should be transferred to the police station concerned in Mumbai.

31. Section 156(3) CrPC contemplates a stage where the learned Magistrate is not convinced as to whether the process should be based on the facts disclosed in the complaint. Once the facts are received, it is for the Magistrate to decide his next course of action. In this case, 55 2025:HHC:16349 there are materials to show that the appellant had filed his application for a loan with the Head Office of the Bank at Ahmedabad and that the processing and the sanction of the loan was also done in Ahmedabad which clearly indicates that the major part of the cause of action for the complaints arose within the jurisdiction of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad. It was not, therefore, desirable on the part of the investigating agency to make an observation that it did not have territorial jurisdiction to proceed with the investigation, which was required to be transferred to the police station having jurisdiction to do so.

32. On the materials before him, the learned Magistrate was fully justified in rejecting the final report submitted by the Economic Offences Wing, State CID (Crime), and to order a fresh investigation into the allegations made on behalf of the Bank. The High Court, therefore, did not commit any error in upholding the views expressed by the trial court. As mentioned hereinbefore, Section 181(4) CrPC deals with the court's powers to inquire into or try an offence of criminal misappropriation or a criminal breach of trust if the same has been committed or any part of the property, which is the subject of the offence, is received or retained within the local jurisdiction of the said court.

33. The various decisions cited by Mr Syed, and in particular the decision in Satvinder Kaur case [(1999) 8 SCC 728: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1503] provide an insight into the views held by the Supreme Court on the accepted position that the investigating officer was entitled to transfer an investigation to a police station having jurisdiction to conduct the same. The said question is not in issue before us and as indicated hereinbefore, we are only required to consider whether the investigating officer in respect of an investigation undertaken under Section 156(3) CrPC can file a report stating that he had no jurisdiction to investigate into the complaint as the entire cause of action had arisen outside his jurisdiction despite there being material available to the contrary. The answer, in our view, is in negative and we are of the firm view that the powers vested in the investigating authorities, under Section 156(1) CrPC, did not restrict the jurisdiction of the investigating agency 56 2025:HHC:16349 to investigate into a complaint even if it did not have territorial jurisdiction to do so. Unlike in other cases, it was for the court to decide whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint as and when the entire facts were placed before it."

44. Therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed on the ground that the Police at Kandaghat have no territorial jurisdiction over the matter.

45. No other point was urged.

46. The allegations in the FIR, if believed to be correct, prima facie show the offence of cheating, and it is impermissible to quash the same. Therefore, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed.

47. The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.

( Rakesh Kainthla ) 28 May 2025 th Judge (Rupsi)