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1. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the inquiry report, order passed by respondent No.1 and the order passed by respondent No.2, the present petition is filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the following prayers:-

2. Brief facts of the present case is that the petitioner was serving as Assistant with the respondent - Bank at Bhachau Branch, Kachchh with utmost honesty and sincerity and, Page 2 of 48 Downloaded on : Wed Feb 07 20:48:05 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/4369/2008 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/02/2024 undefined thereafter, he was transferred to Amreli Branch. During his service tenure at Bhachau Branch, a number of victims of the earthquake, which was occurred in January 2001 at Kachchh), had opened their Savings Bank Accounts at Bhachau Branch, District: Kachchh in order to receive the Government extended relief for reconstruction of their houses and disbursement of initial installments was made by Bhachau Branch at the concerned villages on 11.08.2003, 12.08.2002 and 23.08.2002 and final disbursement was released on 02.09.2003 at the branch itself.

2.1 That upon the reports of recovery of levy from constituents by the employees of the bank published in daily newspapers "Kachchh Mitra" and "Gujarat Samachar", the matter got probed into by the Bank and departmental actions were initiated against the number of employees. So far as the petitioner is concerned, he is innocent person and has no role to play whatsoever in the aforesaid incident.

2.2 The petitioner was asked to receive a charge-sheet alleging that he had committed serious misconducts when he was Page 3 of 48 Downloaded on : Wed Feb 07 20:48:05 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/4369/2008 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/02/2024 undefined working as Assistant at Bhachau Branch while making payments to the beneficiaries and certain irregularities were observed in his Leave Fare Concession. The representative of the petitioner gave defence statement and petitioner had given reply to the charge-sheet.

2.3 The departmental inquiry was initiated and pursuant to which the inquiry officer had submitted his report and upon inquiry report, the disciplinary authority - respondent No.1 had terminated / dismissed the petitioner from the service with superannuation benefits. The petitioner had preferred an appeal against the order passed by respondent No.1 and the appeal came to be dismissed by respondent No.2 and hence, the present petition.

3. Heard Mr.Shakti Jadeja, learned counsel for Mr.S. P. Majmudar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Ms.Dharmishta Raval, learned counsel appearing for respondents.

4. Mr.Jadeja, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted the same facts which are narrated in the memo of petition and Page 4 of 48 Downloaded on : Wed Feb 07 20:48:05 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/4369/2008 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/02/2024 undefined has submitted that the impugned orders are contrary to law and evidence on record. He has submitted that the petitioner was serving as Assistant with respondent - Bank and he had not committed any misconducts as alleged in the charge-sheet.

According to Mr.Jadeja, learned counsel, during the course of the inquiry, no one confirmed that the recovery operation was held under the leadership of the petitioner and even the petitioner did not know about the recovery. He has submitted that the allegations made against the petitioner were concocted and got up as Shri K. K. Parmar, Cash Officer of the Branch has personal grudge against the petitioner and even during the inquiry, none of the cashiers stated that the petitioner had asked them for recovery or any excess cash was handed over to him. It is submitted by Mr.Jadeja, learned counsel that neither payment cashier nor the branch manager had stated that the petitioner intervened or advised to destroy the list and the credit voucher was not in the handwriting of the petitioner. He has submitted that the inquiry was conducted against the principles of natural justice as he was not given proper opportunity of hearing.

According to Mr.Jadeja, learned counsel that the charges leveled Page 5 of 48 Downloaded on : Wed Feb 07 20:48:05 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/4369/2008 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/02/2024 undefined against the petitioner are merely based on assumptions and presumptions and the appellate authority has not applied its mind to arrive at justifiable conclusion. He has submitted that none of the Branch Manager, Armed Guards or any management witnesses confirmed that the petitioner is guilty in the alleged misconduct, except Shri K. K. Parmar, whose statement is self-

contradictory and Mr.Parmar's deposition having several contradictions. He has submitted that the Branch Manager has confirmed that the petitioner was performing his duty on 02.09.2003 and he was also allotted the duty list. He has submitted that the impugned orders are against the principles of law and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside and the petition deserves to be allowed.

4.1 In support of his submissions, Mr.Jadeja, learned counsel has relied upon the following decisions:-

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5. Ms.Raval, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that both the authorities have not committed any error of facts and law in passing the orders. She has submitted that when the petitioner was performing his duty as Assistant on 02.09.2003, the Branch Manager asked him to find out account number and other inquiries of illiterate customers and, therefore, he was feeding earlier day's vouchers. She has submitted that with regard to Leave Fare Concession, the petitioner himself had accepted that he had claimed Second Class A/c. fare for his wife and himself without travelling in train. According to Ms.Raval, learned counsel, the petitioner went to his Home Town in his own car and so the petitioner has committed grave misconduct by claiming such fare and, therefore, the present petition deserves to be dismissed.

5.1 In support of her submissions, Ms.Raval, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has relied upon the following decisions:-

NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/4369/2008 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/02/2024 undefined ( 2) Union of India and others Vs. P. Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610;

(3) Bank Of India Versus T.Jogram reported in AIR 2007 SC 2793;

6. It is worthwhile referred to the decisions relied upon by learned counsel appearing for the respective parties.

6.1 In the case of H. C. Goel (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para - 20 as under:-

6.2 In the case of Sat Narayan Kaushik (supra), the Hon'ble Page 9 of 48 Downloaded on : Wed Feb 07 20:48:05 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/4369/2008 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/02/2024 undefined Supreme Court has held and observed in para - 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 and 21 as under:-

6.3 In the case of Janardan Jaishankar Jokharkar and another (supra), this Court (Coram: Hon'ble Mr.Justice K. M. Thaker) has held and observed in para-15 as under:-

NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/4369/2008 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/02/2024 undefined 6.4 In the case of S. Murugadhas (supra), the High Court of Madras has held and observed as under:-

6.5 In the case of Vijaykuamr Muljibhia Jasani (supra), this Court (Coram: Hon'ble Ms.Justice Abhilasha Kumari) has held and observed in paras - 10 11, 12, 13 and 19 as under:-

NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/4369/2008 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/02/2024 undefined 6.6 In the case of Anil Kumar (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed as under:-

6.7 In the case of Lalita (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed as under:-

6.8 In the case of Biswanath Bhattacharjee (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras - 17, 20 as under:-

18. Other decisions have ruled that being a proceeding before a domestic tribunal, strict rules of evidence, or adherence to the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872 are inessential. However, the procedure has to be fair and reasonable, and the charged employee has to be given reasonable opportunity to defend himself (ref: Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana , (1999) 5 SCC 762. a decision followed later in Punjab & Sind Bank v. Daya Singh , (2010) 11 SCC 233.). In Moni Shankar v. Union of India , (2008) 3 SCC 484. this court outlined what judicial review entails in respect of orders made by disciplinary authorities:

This court struck a similar note, in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya , (2011) 4 SCC 584 where it was observed that:

19. The bank is correct, when it contends that an appellate review of the materials and findings cannot ordinarily be undertaken, in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Yet, from H.C. Goel onwards, this court has consistently ruled that where the findings of the disciplinary authority are not based on evidence, or based on a consideration of irrelevant material, or ignoring relevant material, are mala fide, or where the findings are perverse or such that they could not have been rendered by any reasonable person placed in like circumstances, the remedies under Article 226 of the Constitution are available, and intervention, warranted. For any court to ascertain if any findings were beyond the record (i.e., no evidence) or based on any irrelevant or extraneous factors, or by ignoring material evidence, necessarily some amount of scrutiny is necessary. A finding of "no evidence" or perversity, cannot be rendered sans such basic scrutiny of the materials, and the findings of the disciplinary authority. However, the margin of appreciation of the court under Article 226 of the Constitution would be different; it is not appellate in character.

20. In the present case, the impugned judgment discloses scrutiny of the record. The same level of scrutiny is absent in the decision of the learned single judge. That the division bench conducted the kind of scrutiny that it did, cannot be a factor to hold its decision erroneous. In this context, it would be worth recollecting Bernard Schwartz that judicial review- of administrative decisions:

6.10 In the case of T. Jogram (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras - 13, 14 and 15 as under:-

14. In the case of Regional Manager, U.P.SRTC, V/s. Hoti Lal, 2003 3 SCC 605, this Court observed at p.614 scc as under:-

15. By now it is well-settled principle of law that judicial review is not against the decision. It is against the decision making process. In the instant case, there are no allegations of procedural irregularities/illegality and also there is no allegation of violation of principles of natural justice. Counsel for the respondent tried to sustain the allegation of malafide. He tried to assert that the respondent filed a case against the Chief Manager of Secunderabad Branch in 1996 and the enquiry initiated against the respondent is the fall out of malafide. We are unable to accept the bald allegations. The allegation of malafide was not substantiated. It is well settled law that the allegation of malafide cannot be based on surmises and conjectures. It should be based on factual matrix. Counsel also tried to assert the violation of principles of natural justice on the ground that the documents required by the respondent were not supplied to him. From the averment it is seen that the documents, which were sought to be required by the respondent, were all those bills submitted by the respondent himself before the authority. In these circumstances, no prejudice whatsoever was caused to the respondent."

6.11 In the case of P. Gunasekaran (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para - 12 to 17 as under:-

14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of Andhra Pradesh and others V/s. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC Page 21 of 48 Downloaded on : Wed Feb 07 20:48:05 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/4369/2008 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/02/2024 undefined 1723, many of the above principles have been discussed and it has been concluded thus:

15. In State of Andhra Pradesh and others V/s. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557, the principles have been further discussed at paragraph-21 to 24, which read as follows:

16. These principles have been succinctly summed-up by the living legend and centenarian Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in State of Haryana and another V/s. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491. To quote the unparalled and inimitable expressions:

17. In all the subsequent decisions of this Court upto the latest in Chennai Water Supply and Sewarage Board V/s. T. T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, these principles have been consistently followed adding practically nothing more or altering anything."

6.12 In the case of N. Gangaraj (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras - 13, 14 and 15 as under:-

14. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent relies upon the judgment reported as Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari , 2017 2 SCC 308 wherein this Court held that if the disciplinary authority records a finding that is not supported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which is unreasonably arrived at, the Writ Court could interfere with the finding of the disciplinary proceedings. We do not find that even on touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High Court could interfere with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. It is not the case of no evidence or that the findings are perverse. The finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct has been interfered with only on the ground that there are discrepancies in the evidence of the Department. The discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no evidence. The Inquiry Officer has appreciated the evidence and returned a finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct.

15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and had passed an order of punishment. An appeal before the State Government was also dismissed. Once the evidence has been accepted by the Page 26 of 48 Downloaded on : Wed Feb 07 20:48:05 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/4369/2008 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/02/2024 undefined departmental authority, in exercise of power of judicial review, the Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere with the findings of facts recorded by reappreciating evidence as if the Courts are the Appellate Authority. We may notice that the said judgment has not noticed larger bench judgments in S. Sree Rama Rao and B.C. Chaturvedi as mentioned above. Therefore, the orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court suffer from patent illegality and thus cannot be sustained in law. "

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9. It is worthwhile to refer to the decision of the State Bank Of India Versus Bela Bagchi reported in (2005) 7 SCC 435, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para-15 as under:-

10. It is also worthwhile to refer to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court dated 06.01.2014 rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No.915 of 2013 wherein the Division Bench has observed in para-7 as under:-

(a) When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities;

(b) The Courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary / departmental authorities and to decide nature of function the quantum penalty is to be of punishment awarded, exclusively as within and this the jurisdiction of the competent authority;

(c) Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the Court;"

11. It is also worthwhile to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of C S. Amin Vs. Assistant General Manager SBI, Region III & 2 reported in 2016 LawSuit (Guj) 1916 and Bhikhubhai Kamabhai Dabhi Vs. Surat Municipal Corporation and 2 reported in 2017 LawSuit (Guj) 9 where in this Court has decided similar issue as involved in the present petition.

12. In the case of C. S. Amin (supra), this Court has held and observed in paras - 29, 30 and 31 as under:-

(1) To judge the validity of any administrative order or statutory discretion normally the Wednesbury test is to be applied to find out if the decision was illegal or suffered from procedural improprieties or was one which no sensible decision-maker could, on the material before him and within the framework of the law, have arrived at. The Court would consider whether relevant matters had not been taken into account or whether irrelevant matters had been taken into account or whether the action was not bonafide. The Court would also consider whether the decision was absurd or perverse. The Court would not however go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator amongst the various alternatives open to him. Nor could the Court substitute its decision to that of the administrator. This is the Wednesbury test.

(2) The Court would not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illegal or suffered from procedural impropriety or was irrational in the sense that it was in outrageous defiance of logic or moral standards. The possibility of other tests, including proportionality being brought into English Administrative Law in future is not ruled out. These are the CCSU principles.

(3)(a) As per Bugdaycay, Brind and Smith, as long as the European Human Rights Convention (Contention) is not incorporated into English Law, the English Courts merely exercise a secondary judgement to find out if the decision maker could have, on the material before him, arrived at the primary judgment in the manner he has done. (3)(b) If the Convention is incorporated in England making available the principle of proportionality, then the English Courts will render primary judgement on the validity of the administrative action and find out if the restriction is disproportionate or excessive or is not based upon a fair balancing of the fundamental freedom and the need for the restriction thereupon.

NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/4369/2008 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/02/2024 undefined (4)(a) The position in our country in administrative law, where no fundamental freedoms are involved, is that the Courts/Tribunals will only play a secondary role while the primary judgement as to reasonableness will remain with the executive or administrative authority. The secondary judgement of the Court is to be based on Wednesbury the CCSU principles as stated by Lord Greene and Lord Diplock respectively to find if the executive or administrative authority has reasonably arrived at his decision as the primary authority.

(4)(b) Whether in the case of administrative or executive action affecting fundamental freedoms, the Courts in our country will apply the principle of 'proportionality' and assume a primary role, is left open, to be decided in an appropriate case where such action is alleged to offend fundamental freedoms."

In Apparel Export Promotion Council Vs. A.K. Chopra - (1999) 1 SCC 759, the Supreme Court reiterated the otherwise well settled principles of law on the scope of judicial review of disciplinary action taken by the employer and laid down the following propositions:-

In Om Kumar Vs. Union of India - AIR 2000 SC 3689, the Supreme Court traced the history of the principle of proportionality, referred to the propositions culled out in Ganayutham 's case (supra), noticed the decision of the House of Lords in R. Vs. Chief Constable of Sussesc ex.p. International Trader's Ferry Ltd. (1999) 1 All ER 129, wherein the principles of Wednesbury and proportionality were almost equated and held that where the decision of an administrative authority is attacked being arbitrary, the principle of secondary review will have to be kept in mind. Paragraphs 28, 29 66 to 71 of this judgement which theortises the law on the subject are reproduced below:

NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/4369/2008 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/02/2024 undefined In Regional Manager U.P. SRTC V. Hoti Lal (2003) 3 SCC 605, the Supreme Court outlined the mode to be adopted for determining whether the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is shockingly disproportionate and observed as under:

NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/4369/2008 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/02/2024 undefined 30 The above noted decision of this Court gives a clear idea of the limited scope of judicial review of the discretion exercised by the employer to impose the particular penalty on the delinquent employee. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that the High Courts cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction in such matters and substitute their opinion for the one formed by the disciplinary authority. It has also been held that the punishment imposed by the competent authority cannot be modified/substituted with a lesser penalty unless the Court is satisfied that the same is grossly or shockingly disproportionate or is so unreasonable that no person of reasonable prudence would have imposed such punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case.

31. For determination of the question whether the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is grossly or shockingly disproportionate, the Court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors including the nature of charges proved, the past conduct of the employee, the punishment if any imposed earlier, the nature of duties assigned to the employee having due regard to their sensitiveness, performance norms if any laid down by the employer and above all the paramount requirement of maintaining discipline in the service."

13. In the case of Bhikhubhai Kamabhai Dabhi (supra), this Court has held and observed in paras - 17, 18 and 21 as under:-

15 In State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra Venkata Rao [(1975) 2 SCC 557], the principles have been further discussed at paragraphs 21 to 24, which read as follows:

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23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan (AIR 1964 SC 477).

24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do."

16 These principles have been succinctly summedup by the living legend and centenarian Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in State of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh [(1977) 2 SCC 491]. To quote the unparalled and inimitable expressions:

17 In all the subsequent decisions of this Court up to the latest in Chennai Water Supply and Sewarage Board v. T. T. Murali Babu (2014) 4 SCC 108 : (AIR 2014 SC 1141), these principles have been consistently followed adding practically nothing more or altering anything.

18 On Article I, the disciplinary authority, while imposing the punishment of compulsory retirement in the impugned order dated 28.02.2000, had arrived at the following findings:

19 The disciplinary authority, on scanning the inquiry report and having accepted it, after discussing the available and admissible evidence on the charge, and the Central Page 44 of 48 Downloaded on : Wed Feb 07 20:48:05 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/4369/2008 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/02/2024 undefined Administrative Tribunal having endorsed the view of the disciplinary authority, it was not at all open to the High Court to re appreciate the evidence in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 20 Equally, it was not open to the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, to go into the proportionality of punishment so long as the punishment does not shock the conscience of the court. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority has come to the conclusion that the respondent lacked integrity. No doubt, there are no measurable standards as to what is integrity in service jurisprudence but certainly there are indicators for such assessment. Integrity according to Oxford dictionary is "moral uprightness; honesty". It takes in its sweep, probity, innocence, trustfulness, openness, sincerity, blamelessness, immaculacy, rectitude, uprightness, virtuousness, righteousness, goodness, cleanness, decency, honour, reputation, nobility, irreproachability, purity, respectability, genuineness, moral excellence etc. In short, it depicts sterling character with firm adherence to a code of moral values."

14. In view of the above decisions and on perusal of the charge which apparently clears that the intention of the present petitioner is mala fide though he has not travelled in train and despite of that, he had produced such documents to encash of Leave Fare Concession and, therefore, he has committed grave misconducts. So far as the allegation that the respondent - bank has initiated departmental inquiry without there being any complaint/s on the part of the beneficiaries is concerned, it is relevant to note that the bank has initiated departmental inquiry on the basis of the press report published in the local Page 45 of 48 Downloaded on : Wed Feb 07 20:48:05 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/4369/2008 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/02/2024 undefined newspapers and on that basis the respondent - bank has initiated inquiry and after finding sufficient materials, it has issued show-

cause notice to the petitioner. Therefore, after considering all relevant materials and seriousness of the charge, the impugned order came to be passed by the disciplinary authority and subsequently, thereafter confirmed by the appellate authority and, while exercising the powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court has very limited scope to interfere with the findings recorded by the inquiry officer and after appreciating the documentary evidence and inquiry report, the punishment order was passed by the disciplinary authority and confirmed by the appellate authority.

15. The above-mentioned decisions of this Court gives a clear idea of the limited scope of judicial review of the discretion exercised by the employer to impose the particular penalty on the delinquent employee. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that the High Courts cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction in such matters and substitute their opinion for the one formed by the disciplinary authority. It has been held that the punishment imposed by the competent authority cannot be Page 46 of 48 Downloaded on : Wed Feb 07 20:48:05 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/4369/2008 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/02/2024 undefined modified / substituted with a lesser penalty unless the Court is satisfied that the same is grossly or shockingly disproprtionate or is so unreasonable that no person of reasonable prudence would have imposed such punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case.

16. On perusal of the inquiry report of the inquiry officer and the order of the disciplinary authority, I am of the opinion that the punishment of dismissal inflicted on the petitioner vis-a-vis the proven misconduct is not so disproportionate as would shock the conscience of this Court warranting interference.

17. Considering the totality of facts, I am of opinion that the authority has rightly arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of misconduct, which was sufficient to remove him from the service. This Court finds no reasons to interfere with the same either.

18. Considering overall facts and circumstances of the case and the decisions of this Court as well as Hon'ble Supreme Court, I am of the opinion that the appellate authority has recorded its findings after perusing and going through the materials on Page 47 of 48 Downloaded on : Wed Feb 07 20:48:05 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/4369/2008 JUDGMENT DATED: 07/02/2024 undefined record and, therefore, both the authorities have not committed any error in passing the impugned orders and hence, the present petition is devoid of merits and the same deserves to be dismissed.

19. For the foregoing reasons, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged. Interim relief, if any, shall stand vacated forthwith.

(HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J) FURTHER ORDERS Mr.Jadeja, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner requests this Court that as per the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority, the petitioner was removed from the service with all retiral and consequential benefits. In case, if the petitioner is entitled for the said benefits, the bank will consider the same and it will be paid to the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the order.

(HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J) V.R. PANCHAL Page 48 of 48 Downloaded on : Wed Feb 07 20:48:05 IST 2024