There are three accused in this case. As per the charge sheet, the petitioner in Crl.R.C.No.609 of 2011 and Crl.O.P.No.19152 of 2010 has been arrayed as A1 and the petitioners in Crl.R.C.Nos.636 of 2011 and 667 of 2011 have been arrayed as A2 and A3 respectively. A1 has been implicated for the offence under Section 11 and A2 and A3 have been implicated for the offence under Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

1A. The petitioners preferred discharge petitions under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) and as against the dismissal of their discharge petitions, they have preferred the above revisions before this Court. As far as A1 is concerned, apart from preferring discharge petition before the trial court, she has also preferred a petition before this Court under Section 482 of the Code in Crl.O.P.No.19152 of 2010 seeking for the relief of quashing the proceedings mainly on the ground of delay in registering the First Information Report and filing the charge sheet on the basis of the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay and others V. R.S.Nayak reported in 1992 (1) SCC 225 to the effect that an objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account should first be addressed to the High Court.

2.0. The factual matrix of the case right from registering the First Information Report culminating into filing of the final report in this case is to be stated hereunder :

6. Mr.S.Ashok Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner/A2 in Crl.R.C.No.636 of 2011 submitted that he is adopting the arguments of Mr.B.Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for A1 in respect of delay in completing the investigation and filing the final report and thereby infringing the fundamental right of the accused to speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is further submitted that as per the charge sheet, the prosecution has come forward with two versions, one version is on the basis of the statements given by the income tax officers particularly L.W.117 to the effect that DDs presented to A1 cannot be considered as gifts, but would be treated as income in the hands of the assessee and another version is on the basis of the statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code to the effect that DDs were presented to A1 by the persons who are having business transaction or to be transacted with the Government and thereby A1 committed the offence under Section 11 of the Act and A2 and A3 under Section 12 of the Act. Therefore, it is contended that the prosecution itself has not come forward with a clear and consistent version even as per the final report filed in this case. It is further contended that there is absolutely no material available on record to show that A2 had directly presented the DDs to A1. It is contended that even assuming that A2 had given the DD in person to A1, A2 had already assumed office as a Minster and as such, he is not going to gain anything and therefore, it cannot be stated that A2 abetted A1 to accept the valuable things i.e., DDs without consideration in order to attract the ingredients of the provisions of Section 12 of the Act. The learned Senior Counsel would submit that all these important factors have been overlooked by the learned trial Judge while passing the impugned order of rejecting the discharge petition and as such, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

7. Mr.V.Gopinath, learned Senior Counsel for A3 also adopted the arguments advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for A1 in respect of delay in completing the investigation and thereby infringing the fundamental right of speedy trial enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. It is further contended that four witnesses have been examined during the course of investigation, viz., L.Ws.24, 38, 39 and 42 implicating A3. It is the prosecution version that the amount was given to them by L.W.44, who is the brother of A3 and there is no allegation of A3 giving money to them for taking DDs. L.W.44, on the other hand, in his statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. that he had no political dealing with his brother A3 and he had never carried any DD from anyone either to A3 or to anyone at any point of time. Therefore, there is absolutely no material available on record as to how the DDs have been taken on behalf of A3 and A3 was the Minister at the time of the alleged transaction. It is pointed out that the DD was taken in the personal name of A1 and not as the Chief Minister and as such, the DDs were not given to A1 as the Chief Minister and only as the leader of the party for giving her as birthday gift and as such, the ingredients of the offence under Section 12 of the Act are not attracted against A3.

8. Per contra, Mr.N.Chandrasekaran, learned Special Public Prosecutor for CBI, would contend that a prima facie case is made out to implicate the petitioners, namely, A1 for the offence under Section 11 and A2 and A3 for the offence under Section 12 of the Act. It is contended that there are enough materials available on record through the statements recorded from the witnesses under Section 161 of the Code to attract the ingredients of the offence under Sections 11 and 12 of the Act and the probative value of such statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code cannot be gone into at the stage of discharge petition or quashing the proceedings. It is contended that detailed counters are also filed in this matter highlighting the materials available on record implicating each one of the petitioners. He would also place reliance on the provision under Section 20 of the Act and contended that in view of the materials available on record attracting the provisions under Sections 11 and 12 of the Act, the presumption contemplated under Section 20 of the Act is necessarily to be drawn against the petitioners/A1 to A3. The learned Special Public Prosecutor for CBI would submit that though there is a delay on the part of the respondent in conducting investigation, no malafide intention could be attributed on the part of the investigating agency and such delay is caused only due to administrative and procedural reasons. It is contended that merely because there is a delay, there is no prerogative right conferred on the petitioners to seek the relief of quashing and discharge.

9. The learned Special Public Prosecutor placed reliance on a decision of this Court in V.Thiagarajan V. State reported in 2008 (2) MLJ (Cri.) 731 and contended that in the said decision this Court considered the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions regarding the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code as well as the scope and power of this Court regarding the discharge of an accused.

10. This Court has given its careful and anxious consideration to the rival contentions put forward by either side and thoroughly scrutinised the entire materials available on record and perused the petitions filed by the petitioners and the counters filed by the respondent and also perused the impugned orders passed by the learned trial Judge.

11. As already pointed out by this Court, A1 to A3 have invoked the provision under Section 239 of the Code by filing discharge petitions and A1 during the pendency of such discharge petition also preferred a petition before this Court invoking the provision under Section 482 of the Code for quashing the proceedings. Therefore, it is relevant to refer the above said two provisions of the Code in order to highlight the scope and ambit of the powers conferred under the said provisions.

12. Section 239 of the Code reads as hereunder :

Section 428 of the Code reads as hereunder :

13. A reading of the above said provision makes it crystal clear that the obligation to discharge the accused under Section 239 of the Code arises when the learned trial Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless on the basis of the examination of the materials produced along with the final report under Section 173 of the Code.

14. It is worthwhile to refer the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a landmark case in R.S.Nayak V. A.R.Antulay (AIR 1986 SC 2045) has held as follows :

(emphasis supplied by this Court)

15. The Hon'ble Apex Court in yet another decision in State of Maharashtra V. Som Nath Thapa (AIR 1996 SC 1744) held that, "If there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence, a Court can justifiably say that a prima facie case against him exists, and so, frame charge against him for committing that offence. In Black's Law Dictionary word 'presume' has been defined to mean "to believe or accept upon probable evidence". Legal Dictionary has quoted in this context a certain judgment according to which "A presumption is a probable consequence drawn from facts (either certain, or proved by direct testimony) as to the truth of a fact alleged." The aforesaid shows that if on the basis of materials on record, a Court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the Court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into ; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage."

16. In yet another decision in State of Delhi V. Gyan Devi (2000 (8) SCC 239) the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as follows :

(emphasis supplied by this Court)

17. The Hon'ble Apex Court in a landmark case in Pepsi Foods Ltd., Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate reported in 1998 SCC (Cri.) 1400 considered the scope and power of the High Court under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India as well as the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. The Hon'ble Apex Court in that decision has held as hereunder :

18. At the outset, it is to be stated that A1 apart from raising grounds in respect of merits of the case also raised the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay in registering the FIR, completing the investigation and filing the final report in the discharge petition. However, considering the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in A.R.Anulay V. R.S.Nayak reported in (1992) 1 SCC 225, wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that "an objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court", A1 thought it fit to prefer the above said Criminal Original Petition before this Court for quashing the proceedings on the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay in completing the investigation during the pendency of the discharge petition before the trial court.

19. It is also relevant to refer the scope and ambit of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Pankaj Kumar V. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 2008 SC 3077. In the said decision , the Hon'ble Apex Court, referring and relying the earlier decisions in Janata Dal Vs. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors. ( 1992 4 SCC 305), Kurukshetra University & Anr. Vs. State of Haryana & Anr. [( 1977) 4 SCC 451] and State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors. (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335), held as hereunder :

20. Bearing in mind the above legal position in respect of scope and ambit of powers of this Court under Section 239 of the Code and under Section 482 of the Code, let me now consider the two fold submissions made by Mr.B.Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner/A1 regarding the merits of the case and the delay in completing the investigation.

21. Let me now consider the first submission regarding the merits of the case.

At the outset, it is to be stated that the entire allegations against A1 are founded on the basis of her voluntary disclosure in respect of gifts including DDs and cash received by her on the occasion of her birthday in her income tax returns and also the receipt of a foreign DD to the tune of US $ 3 lakhs on her birthday in the year 1992. In the final report, it is stated that no offence is made out on the basis of the receipt of US $ 3 lakhs by way of DD. Though it is alleged that she had accepted 89 DDs worth about Rs.2,00,00,012/- from 57 persons, ultimately in the charge sheet, it was confined to only 21 persons, who have gifted the DDs to A1 including A2 and A3 and other AIADMK party leaders, who have been subsequently appointed as Chairman of Government Corporations and other government bodies and as such, it is alleged that they were concerned in official business transaction or to be transacted with A1 in her capacity of the Chief Minister and as such, A1 said to have committed the offence under Section 11 of the Act.

22. The sheet-anchor of the contentions of the learned Senior Counsel for A1 is that the statements recorded from 19 persons disclosed that they have taken DDs out of the funds mobilised from the contributions of Rs.5/- or Rs.10/- etc. by the party workers, sympathisers, admirers and well-wishers of A1 to present the DDs to her on her birthday and as such, it cannot be stated that the said 19 persons have given their own money for taking DDs, and on the other hand, they have acted only as a conduit between the large number of persons who had paid the money and the petitioner (A1) and therefore, those 19 persons having alleged business transaction or to be transacted with the Government has no relevance as they did not pay any money on their own attracting the ingredients of Section 11 of the Act.

23. It is also contended by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner (A1) that in view of the above said factor to the effect that the trivial amounts have been contributed by the party workers and others for taking DDs and as such, the provision under Section 20(3) of the Act is attracted and accordingly, the presumption cannot be raised against the petitioner (A1). It is also contended that the petitioner/A1 was not only the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, but she had the dual capacity as she was also the General Secretary of the AIADMK party and as such, it cannot be stated that the said DDs were received by her only in her capacity as the Chief Minister, viz., as a public servant, on the other hand, she had received the said DDs from her party workers, sympathisers only as the leader of the political party on the occasion of her birthday. Though learned Senior Counsel raised substantial contentions, as stated above, this Court is of the considered view that the above said contentions cannot be considered at the stage of framing the charge and the same would amount to appreciation of evidence and such exercise cannot be undertaken while dealing with the petition for discharge or the petition for quashing. It is well-settled that at the stage of framing the charge the Court has to find out whether a prima facie case is made out against the accused only on the basis of the materials available on record. The court cannot conduct a roving enquiry or to consider the probative value of the materials available on record.

24. The learned Senior Counsel for A1 placed reliance on the presumption clause under Section 20(3) of the Act.

It is relevant to refer the provisions under Sections 11 , 12 and 20 of the Act as hereunder :

25. A reading of the provision under Section 11 of the Act would make it clear that the said provision is corresponding to the provision under Section 165 IPC which was repealed subsequently by the Act (49 of 1988 Section 31 ).

26. The Hon'ble Apex Court in R.S.Nayak V. A.R.Antulay reported in 1986 (2) SCC 716 dealt with the essential ingredients of the provisions under Section 165 IPC and the said provision is verbatim the same as that of the provision under Section 11 of the Act and the Hon'ble Act has held that the following are the essential ingredients to attract Section 165 IPC:

The Hon'ble Apex Court in that decision further held that indisputably the field under Section 165 is wider. Therefore, it is needless to state that the provision under Section 11 of the Act is also wider.

27. It is pertinent to note that as per Sub-Section (1) & (2) of Section 20 of the Act, there is a presumption clause in respect of offence under Sections 11 and 12 of the Act. As far as the case on hand is concerned, as it is already pointed out that A1 had admitted the receipt of demand drafts and termed them as gifts as disclosed in her income tax returns and as such, the presumption contemplated under Section 20(1) of the Act is to be raised against A1 and as far as A2 and A3 are concerned, the presumption contemplated under sub-section (2) to Section 20 has to be raised. It is well-settled that such presumption is a rebuttable one and it is for the accused to rebut the presumption only during the course of trial and not at the stage of framing of charge. Merely because 19 persons have stated in their statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code to the effect that the DDs were taken from the contribution of Rs.5/-, Rs.10/- etc. (trivial amounts) from the party workers, sympathisers and admirers, the petitioners/A1, A2 and A3 cannot invoke the provision under Section 20 (3) of the Act. It is relevant to note that as per Section 20 (3) of the Act, the Court may decline to draw the presumption under sub-section (1) or (2), if the amount is so trivial. However, the provision under Section 20 (3) of the Act could be considered only at the time of trial by testing and analyzing the evidence of the above said 19 persons by way of appreciation of the evidence and such exercise cannot be undertaken at the pre-trial stage, namely, at the time of framing the charge.

28. As far as A2 and A3 are concerned, it is to be stated that they have been implicated for the offence under Section 12 of the Act on the allegation of abetting A1 to commit the offence under Section 11 of the Act. It is pertinent to note that it is alleged against A2 and A3 in the charge sheet that A2 has provided an amount of Rs.22,53,700/- and A3 has provided Rs.25,50,000/- for the purchase of DDs in favour of A1 and presented the same to her on her birthday in the year 1992 and during the said relevant period, they were Ministers in the Cabinet of A1. It is pointed out by the learned Special Public Prosecutor as per the counter that L.Ws.8, 63, 64 and 67 have implicated A2. In respect of A3, it is pointed out by the learned Special Public Prosecutor that the prosecution placed reliance on the statements of L.Ws.24, 38, 39 and 42 and among them L.W.42 has stated in his 161 statement that the amount for purchase of DDs was provided by A3 and the DD was purchased as instructed by him and as such, it cannot be stated that there is no material available on record to link A3 with the alleged transactions. It is already pointed out that he was also a Minister in the Cabinet of A1. Added to the above said factors, it is also pointed out earlier that even in respect of the offence under Section 12 of the Act, there is a presumption clause contemplated as per Section 20 (2) of the Act and as A1 accepted and admitted the receipt of DDs, the prosecution is entitled to place reliance on the presumption clause under Section 20(2) of the Act in respect of A2 and A3 and as such, it is for A2 and A3 to rebut the presumption only at the time of trial. In view of the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the considered view that the contentions raised in respect of the merits of the case are untenable.

29. In respect of the second limb of the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for A1 seeking the relief of quashing the proceedings on the ground of inordinate delay in completing the investigation and filing the final report, it is to be borne in mind of this Court about the factual scenario of the sequence of events right from registering the FIR to filing the final report coupled with broad features of the nature of allegation levelled against A1.

30. The FIR in this case was originally registered on 24.06.1996 for the offences under Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the Act by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.B.C.I.D., on the basis a D.O. Letter sent by the Director General of Income Tax (Investigation), Chennai, furnishing details of gifts received by A1 on the occasion of her birthday as disclosed in her income tax returns. Thereafter, the case was entrusted to CBI and the CBI registered the FIR in R.C.No.50(A)/1996 for the offences under Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the Act and the said FIR was also registered on the basis of the communication of the Director General of Income Tax (Investigation), Chennai, on the basis of the disclosure of the gifts received by A1 on her birthdays in her income tax returns. Again after commencement of investigation, it is stated in the charge sheet that the allegations attracted the provisions under Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Act and accordingly, the said provision was substituted in the First Information Report registered in Crime R.C.No.50(A)/1996 and proceeded with the investigation and ultimately, as already pointed out, the final report was filed only for the offence under Section 11 of the Act as against A1 and for the offence under Section 12 of the Act as against A2 and A3. It is to be reiterated that the whole allegation is founded on the basis of disclosure of the gifts received by A1 in her income tax returns and the above said FIRs were not registered on the basis of any complaint preferred by any aggrieved persons or from any other source of information. Therefore, it is crystal clear that A1 has not suppressed any material factor and there is absolutely no clandestine dealings alleged against her. Further it is also relevant to state that the FIR was registered on the allegation of receipt of 89 DDs from 57 persons including a foreign DD for US $ 3 lakhs, but ultimately at the time of filing the final report, the allegation was confined to only 21 persons including A2 and A3. Therefore, the value of the DDs comes to Rs.1,48,00,000/- and in respect of the foreign DD for an amount of US $ 3 lakhs, it is stated in the final report that no offence is made out.

31. It is pertinent to note that the alleged transactions took place between 1990 and 1993 as per the FIR registered in Crime No.15 of 1996 dated 24.06.1996 by the C.B.C.I.D.. The second FIR was registered on 02.10.1996 in R.C.No.50(A)/1996 by the CBI. Therefore, there is a delay of four years in registering the FIR in this case. The investigation was completed and the final report was filed only on 31.07.2006 and as such, there is a delay of 10 years in filing the final report from the date of registration of the FIR and nearly about 14 years in filing the final report from the date of alleged transactions as it is stated in the final report that the alleged transactions took place in the year 1992.

32. It is seen that in the final report there is absolutely no explanation whatsoever for such an inordinate delay of more than a decade for completing the investigation and filing the final report. Equally there is no explanation for the delay of four years in registering the FIR in the above said two FIRs. Only for the first time, in the counter filed before the trial court in the discharge petition and before this Court in the Criminal Original Petition for quashing the proceedings in Crl.O.P.No.19152 of 2010, the respondent has come forward with the explanation to the effect that the investigation was to be conducted in USA, UK and UAE and as such, the time to complete the same took a very long time. I am unable to accept such a strange and curious explanation for the simple reason that even as per the allegations contained in the FIR and the charge sheet only one DD is in relation to a foreign country for an amount of US $ 3 lakhs and in respect of the same, it is stated that no offence is made out and as such, there is no question of conducting the investigation in various countries. It is also pertinent to note that in respect of the said foreign DD of US $ 3 lakhs, it is stated that in the month of May 2000 itself the documents have been collected and further it is mentioned in the annexure attached to the charge sheet that on 21.12.2001 itself, recommendation was made for prosecuting A1 for the offence under Section 11 and A2 and A3 for the offence under Section 12 of the Act and as such, there is no explanation for further delay of six years in filing the final report.

33. Yet another explanation given by the respondent is that after completion of investigation in the year 2000 itself, it took time for getting legal opinion from the Attorney General of India in respect of obtaining sanction for prosecuting A1 for the offence under the Act. It is to be stated that A1 was the Chief Minister only upto May 1996 and thereafter, she was only an M.L.A.

34. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Habibulla Khan Vs. State of Orissa reported in (1995) 2 SCC 437 held that sanction for prosecution under Section 19 of the Act against persons alleged to have committed the offences during their tenure as Ministers after they ceased to be the Ministers not required, though they continued to be MLAs and even assuming that MLAs are public servants. The said decision was rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court as early as in the year 1995.

35. Again, in P.V.Narasimha Rao V. State (CBI/SPE ) reported in 1998 (4) SCC 626 the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that in respect of a Member of Parliament, who is a public servant, the sanction shall be obtained from the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha or the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, as the case may be and as such, in respect of an M.L.A., the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly is the competent authority to accord sanction and accordingly, in the instant case, it is stated in the charge sheet that the sanction was obtained from the Speaker of the Tamil Nadu Assembly as sanction was accorded as per the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in P.V.Narasimha Rao 's case.

36. It is pertinent to note that the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered the said decision in P.V.Narasimha Rao 's case as early as in the year 1998 and even in the said case, the CBI is the respondent and as such, on the face of it, the explanation offered by the respondent for the inordinate delay is unacceptable. On the other hand, it is relevant to note that there is absolutely no allegation made against the petitioners in respect of causing hindrance and thereby stalling or hampering the investigation either in the counter filed in the Criminal Original Petition or in the counter filed in Criminal Revision Petitions and the petitioners are not at all responsible for such inordinate delay in completing the investigation and filing the final report. The sword of Damocles due to prolonged investigation over a period of 10 years in this case is perilously hanging over the heads of the petitioners. It is imperative at the very threshold to state that in all criminal prosecutions right to a speedy trial is now an inalienable fundamental right of the citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Such right cannot be allowed to be whittled down on the ground of flimsy and untenable excuse for the inordinate delay in completion of the investigation.

37. At this juncture, it relevant to refer the following decisions:

38. The said Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court got the seal of approval from the Hon'ble Apex Court in A.R.Antulay V. R.S.Nayak reported in 1992 (1) SCC 324. In the said decision , the Hon'ble Apex Court incorporated the said Full Bench decision as hereunder :

80. The learned Chief Justice then examined the facts of the case before him in the light of the principles evolved and held that it is a clear case where the petitioner's right to speedy trial has been violated. He found that the petitioner was not guilty of obstructive tactics and that the delay was entirely of the prosecution's doing. Accordingly, the investigation and the trial against the petitioner was quashed. Another Full Bench presided over by the same learned Chief Justice held in State v. Maksudan Singh that in case of serious offences like murder, delay of 10 years or more occasioned entirely by the default of prosecution must be deemed to be per se prejudicial to the accused."

39. The Hon'ble Apex Court in A.R.Antulay 's case further held that right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial.

40.0. It is relevant to refer two of the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in which the proceedings have been quashed in respect of the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act apart from other offences.

40.1. In Pankaj Kumar 's case (cited supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held as hereunder:

40.2. In yet another decision Vakil Prasad Singh V. State of Bihar reported in AIR 2009 SC 1822 the Hon'ble Apex Court has taken a similar view as in the earlier decision cited supra ( Pankaj Kumar 's case).

41. If the factual scenario in the instant case coupled with the sequence of events, as stated above, resulting in inordinate and unexplained delay of 10 years in completing the investigation is tested on the touch stone of the principles enumerated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decisions cited supra, this Court has no hesitation to hold that in the case on hand, the petitioner's constitutional right to speedy trial enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India stands flagrantly violated.

42. At the risk of repetition, it is to be reiterated that there is not only delay of four years in registering the FIR as the alleged transactions are said to have taken place in the year 1992 and the first FIR was registered only on 24.06.1996 there is a further inordinate delay of 10 years in completing the investigation and filing the final report and there is absolutely no acceptable and reasonable explanation forthcoming from the prosecution and on the other hand, the petitioners are in no way responsible for such an inordinate delay, as pointed out earlier. The prosecution has miserably failed to show any exceptional circumstances which would possibly be taken into consideration for condoning the callous and inordinate delay of more than a decade in completing the investigation. It is needless to state that the delay would not only amount to denial of justice, but also would result in serious miscarriage of justice apart from causing grave prejudice to the petitioners.

43. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision cited supra in Pankaj Kumar 's case (cited supra) has held that inordinately long delay would be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. It is also held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decisions cited supra that the right to speedy trial is not only applicable to the actual proceedings in Court, but also includes within its sweep the preceding investigation as well and the speedy trial extends equally to all criminal prosecution and not to any particular category of cases. This Court is of the considered view that the prolonged investigation by the respondent could have very well caused extreme mental stress and strain to the petitioners. The sword of Damocles is hanging perilously over their heads for over 10 years.

44. In the decisions cited supra, the Hon'ble Apex Court highlighted the principle laid down in a landmark case in State of Haryana & Ors. V. Bhajan Lal & Ors. (1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335) formulating as many as seven category of cases by way of illustration, wherein the extraordinary power under Section 482 of the Code could be exercised by the High Court to prevent abuse of process of Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

45. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the decisions held that the power possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is undoubtedly very wide, but it has to be exercised in appropriate cases to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the Courts exist.

46. In Vakil Prasad Singh (cited supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has ultimately held as hereunder :

47. The above said principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court is squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case in view of the reasons assigned earlier. There is absolutely no justification for subjecting the petitioner (A1) to undergo the ordeal of trial after the inordinate and unexplained delay and further continuance of the criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner (A1) would certainly amount to abuse of process of Court. In the case on hand, as the petitioner (A1) rightly invoked the inherent power of this Court under Section 482 of the Code by filing the above said Crl.O.P.No.19152 of 2010 on the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay in conducting the investigation and filing the final report and more particularly, on the basis of the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in A.R.Antulay case (cited supra) that such an objection based on denial of right to speedy right should first be addressed before the High Court, this Court has no hesitation to invoke and exercise the extraordinary inherent power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the entire proceedings as the fundamental right to speedy trial of A1 enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been flagrantly violated in view of the reasons assigned earlier.

48. Consequently, the impugned order passed by the learned trial Judge dismissing the petition for discharge filed by the petitioner (A1) is liable to be set aside and accordingly, the said order of the learned XIII Additional Special Court for CBI Cases, City Civil Court, Chennai, made in Crl.M.P.No.760 of 2009 in C.C.No.26 of 2006 dated 12.04.2011 is hereby set aside and the proceedings initiated against the petitioner (A1) in in C.C.No.26 of 2006 stands quashed.

49. As far as A2 and A3 are concerned, though they have raised the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay of 10 years in filing the final report in their discharge petitions, they have not preferred any petition under Section 482 of the Code seeking the relief of quashing the proceedings. However, as this Court quashed the entire proceedings in respect of A1, the proceedings initiated against A2 and A3, who have been implicated on the allegation of abetment under Section 12 of the Act would necessarily fall into the ground and as such, the impugned orders of dismissal of their discharge petitions are also liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the said orders of the learned XIII Additional Special Court for CBI Cases, City Civil Court, Chennai, made in Crl.M.P.Nos.723 and 887 of 2009 in C.C.No.26 of 2006 dated 12.04.2011 are also hereby set aside.

These petitions are allowed accordingly. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition in M.P.No.1 of 2010 in Crl.O.P.No.19152 of 2010 is closed.

1. The XIII Additional Special Court for CBI Cases, City Civil Court, Chennai.

2. The Superintendent, ACB, Central Bureau of Investigation, Chennai.

3. The Special Public Prosecutor for CBI Cases, Madras High Court, Chennai