Supreme Court of India

Yogendra Pal Singh vs Raghvendra Singh Alias Prince on 28 November, 2025
2025 INSC 1367 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 8075 of 2025)

YOGENDRA PAL SINGH …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

RAGHVENDRA SINGH ALIAS PRINCE
AND ANOTHER … RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

R. MAHADEVAN, J.

Leave granted.

2. The challenge in the present appeal is to the judgment and order dated

09.01.20251 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad 2 in Criminal

Misc. Bail Application No. 7768 of 2024, whereby the High Court granted bail

to Respondent No. l / accused, in connection with Case Crime No. 415 of 2023

registered at Police Station Kotwali, District Fatehpur, Uttar Pradesh, for

Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by

BORRA LM VALLI

Date: 2025.11.28

17:48:56 IST

Reason:
Hereinafter referred to as “the impugned order”
Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
offences punishable under
Sections 498A
,
304B
, and
of the Indian Penal

Code, 18603 read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 19614.

3. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant, who is the father of the

deceased Aastha @ Saarika, seeking cancellation of bail granted to Respondent

No. 1/ Accused – Husband, Raghvendra Singh @ Prince. The appellant’s

daughter died on 05.06.2023, i.e., within four months of her marriage, in highly

suspicious circumstances by allegedly consuming poison.

4. The facts, as projected by the appellant, are as follows:

4.1. The appellant's daughter Aastha @ Saarika was married to Respondent

No.1 – Raghvendra Singh @ Prince, on 22.02.2023 according to Hindu rites

and rituals. At the time of marriage, the appellant spent approximately Rs. 22

lakhs in cash, gave articles worth Rs. 10 lakhs and jewellery worth Rs. 15 lakhs

to the first respondent’s family.

4.2. Soon after marriage, the deceased was subjected to cruelty and

harassment by Respondent No. 1 and his family members on the pretext that the

dowry given was insufficient. The accused persons persistently demanded a

Fortuner car as additional dowry and subjected the deceased to mental and

physical torture.

4.3. When the deceased came to her parental home during the chhathi ritual,

she informed the appellant about the cruelty and demand for a Fortuner car. Ten
For short, “
IPC
”
For short, “
D.P. Act
”
days before her death, on 02.06.2023, she was again sent back to her

matrimonial home only after assurance by Respondent No. 1 that such

harassment would not be repeated.

4.4. On 04.06.2023, during a family function at Kaushambi, there was a

quarrel between Respondent No. 1 and the deceased. Later that night, around

01.30 am, the deceased telephoned her elder sister Diksha in a distressed state,

crying and seeking urgent help. At that time, she disclosed that Respondent No.

1 along with his relatives had forcibly administered some foul-smelling

substance to her, due to which she was feeling uneasy.

4.5. The deceased was immediately taken to Sadar Hospital, Fatehpur, where

she was found with froth emanating from her mouth. Despite medical

intervention, her condition deteriorated and she expired while being shifted to

Kanpur.

4.6. A post-mortem examination was conducted on 05.06.2023, but the cause

of death was not initially ascertained. Thereafter, the viscera was sent to a

forensic science laboratory for examination, and the FSL report confirmed the

presence of aluminium phosphide poison.

4.7. Despite serious allegations, the police did not arrest the accused

immediately. After investigation, charge sheet no.557 of 2023 dated 30.10.2023

was filed, implicating only Respondent No. 1/ husband, and excluding other

named in-laws.
4.8. Respondent No. 1 approached the Sessions Court seeking bail, which was

dismissed by order dated 20.10.2023. However, the High Court, by the

impugned order, allowed his bail application.

4.9. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant is before this Court with the present

appeal.

5. Learned senior counsel for the appellant assailed the impugned order

granting bail to Respondent No. 1 on multiple grounds. It was submitted that the

High Court failed to consider the gravity of the offence, the nature of evidence

available against the accused, as well as the statutory presumption under
Section

113B
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which squarely applies in cases of

dowry death occurring within seven years of marriage.

5.1. It was contended that the present case involves the most serious

allegations where the deceased was continuously harassed for dowry by

Respondent No. 1 / husband, and in the course of such harassment, was

poisoned to death on 05.06.2023, i.e., within four months of her marriage.

According to the learned senior counsel, the post-mortem report records an

ante-mortem injury – an abrasion on the left forearm – and the Forensic Science

Laboratory report categorically confirmed the presence of aluminium phosphide

poison, thereby corroborating the prosecution’s case of homicidal poisoning.
5.2. Learned senior counsel placing reliance on the chargesheet, which

records that the accused’s uncle, Tej Bahadur Singh alias Ram Bahadur, is

politically active, having contested the 2017 Assembly Elections, and owns

several plots, agricultural lands, brick kilns, and multiple vehicles, submitted

that the family of the accused is highly influential and wields considerable clout

in the area. It is to be noted that though the uncle was initially arraigned as an

accused along with his wife, Vijay Shri, their names were later dropped from the

chargesheet, which according to the learned senior counsel, suggests that there

could be serious doubts regarding the fairness of the investigation.

5.3. It was further submitted that the investigation in this case has been carried

out in an impartial manner since the inception. Respondent No. 1/ husband was

arrested only after three months of the FIR, while the other named accused were

never arrested. The chargesheet filed on 30.10.2023 did not fairly reflect the

involvement of all accused. In fact, the Assistant Prosecution Officer, Fatehpur,

vide letter dated 16.11.2023, pointed out several deficiencies in the investigation

and requested the Joint Director, Prosecution, Fatehpur to seek a fresh legal

opinion after collecting the material evidence which had been ignored by the

investigating officer. This eventually led to the transfer of the investigation to

the CB-CID itself indicative of the gravity of the offence and the shortcomings

in the earlier investigation.
5.4. Learned senior counsel argued that in such circumstances, any leniency

shown towards the accused would severely prejudice the trial, as there exists a

strong likelihood of tampering with the evidence and influencing the

prosecution witnesses and the High Court, while granting bail, failed to

appreciate this real and imminent threat.

5.5. It was also contended that the High Court committed an error in relying

upon the judgments in
Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI5
and
Manish Sisodia v.

Directorate of Enforcement6
, since both these cases are clearly distinguishable

based on the facts, nature of offence, period of incarceration, and the materials

available against the accused. The settled principles governing bail in cases of

dowry death under
Section 304B
IPC and the presumption under
Section 113B

of the Evidence Act were altogether ignored by the High Court.

5.6. On the basis of these submissions, learned senior counsel for the

appellant prayed for cancellation of bail granted to Respondent No. 1, so as to

ensure a fair and effective trial.

6. Per contra, the learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 / accused, at the

outset, submitted that the present appeal is not maintainable, as there is no

perversity, arbitrariness, or illegality in the well-reasoned order of the High

Court granting bail. Once the discretionary relief of bail has been exercised
2022 INSC 690
2024 INSC 595
judiciously on appreciation of material, it ought not to be interfered with by this

Court in the absence of gross illegality or miscarriage of justice.

6.1. It was contended that the incident dated 05.06.2023 was first reported by

the complainant vide G.D. Entry No. 019, which merely mentions the death of

the deceased under suspicious circumstances, without any reference to dowry

demand or cruelty. The FIR was lodged belatedly on 15.06.2023, after ten days

and after the last rites, raising doubts about its genuineness.

6.1.1. During the investigation, statements of the deceased’s family members

introduced allegations of dowry demand her a Fortuner car and cruelty by

Respondent No. 1 and his relatives. However, these allegations were absent in

the initial report. Similarly, the allegation that the deceased made a distress call

to her sister in the intervening night of 04/05.06.2023 complaining of being

administered some “smelly substance” remains uncorroborated, as no call

records substantiate the same.

6.1.2. The chargesheet dated 30.10.2023 was filed against Respondent No. 1

under
Sections 498A
,
304B
, and
IPC read with
Sections 3
and
of the D.P.

Act. Notably, co-accused Tej Bahadur Singh and Vijay Shri, initially named in

the FIR, were exonerated as their presence at the relevant point of time was

established elsewhere, and they had no motive. Further investigation culminated

in a final report dated 30.04.2025, which reaffirmed their innocence. The

exoneration of these relatives significantly weakens the prosecution’s version,
making it improbable that the alleged offence was committed by Respondent

No.1 alone.

6.2. It was argued that the prosecution has relied solely on statements of

interested witnesses – the father, mother, and sisters of the deceased, which

according to the learned counsel, are not corroborated by independent or

documentary evidence, and thus cannot be treated as conclusive proof of dowry

harassment.

6.3. Learned counsel further submitted that the deceased was allegedly

unwilling to marry Respondent No. 1 as she was in love with one Abhay Singh

(brother-in-law of her elder sister).

6.4. It was submitted that the post-mortem report dated 05.06.2023 records a

single abrasion of 1 cm x 1 cm on the left forearm, and the FSL report indicates

aluminium phosphide ingestion as the cause of death. However, neither

document establishes that the poison was administered by Respondent No. 1.

The issue of whether poison was self-ingested or administered, and the

significance of the forearm injury, are matters of trial.

6.5. Lastly, it was highlighted that Respondent No. 1 has already undergone

more than 15 months of incarceration (from 22.09.2023 to 09.10.2025) and is

willing to cooperate with the trial.

6.6. On these grounds, it was urged that the order granting bail to Respondent

No. 1 calls for no interference by this Court.
7. Learned counsel for the State supported the case of the complainant,

submitting as follows:

(i) Based on the complaint given by the appellant alleging that his daughter

was killed by her in-laws on account of unmet dowry demands, FIR

No.415/2023 dated 15.06.2023 was registered at P.S. Kotwali, District Fatehpur

under
Sections 498A
,
304B
,
120B
and
IPC and
Sections 3
and
of the D.P.

Act against Respondent No. 1 and his family members.

(ii) The delay of ten days in lodging the FIR was explained by the appellant’s

mental condition, as he was in deep shock and grief after the sudden death of his

daughter.

(iii) The post-mortem conducted on 05.06.2023 revealed an abrasion on the

forearm, and the FSL report confirmed aluminium phosphide poisoning as the

cause of death.

(iv) Statements of key witnesses – Abhay Singh (brother-in-law), the

appellant (father), Premlata Singh (mother), and sisters (Sameeksha Singh and

Diksha Singh) – recorded under
Section 161
of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

19737 corroborated the allegations of dowry demand and cruelty mentioned in

the FIR.

(v) Upon the appellant’s representation, the investigation was transferred to

CB-CID, which reaffirmed the findings of the local police.
For short, “
Cr.P.C
”
(vi) Chargesheet No. 557 of 2023 dated 30.10.2023 was filed only against

Respondent No. 1, on which cognizance was duly taken by the Sessions Court.

(vii) The High Court failed to appreciate the seriousness of the offence – the

unnatural death of a young woman within four months of marriage, amid

specific allegations of dowry demands and poisoning. The High Court’s order

overlooked the gravity of the allegations and the societal menace of dowry

deaths.

7.1. It was therefore submitted that the bail granted to Respondent No. 1

ought to be cancelled in the interests of justice.

8. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for

the parties and perused the materials available on record.

9. Apparently, criminal proceedings were initiated against Respondent No. 1

/ Husband pursuant to a complaint lodged by the appellant / father in connection

with the unnatural death of his daughter on 05.06.2023. FIR No. 415 of 2023

dated 15.06.2023 was registered against Respondent No. 1 and the in-laws of

the deceased for offences punishable under
Sections 498A
,
304B
,
120B
and
IPC and
Sections 3
and
of the D.P. Act. Upon completion of investigation, the

chargesheet was filed only against Respondent No. 1 for offences under
Section

498A
,
304B
and
IPC and
Sections 3
and
of the D.P. Act. Respondent No.

1 was arrested on 22.09.2023. His Bail Application (No. 2225 of 2023) was

rejected by the Sessions Court on 20.10.2023, following which he filed
Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 7768 of 2024 before the High Court, which

allowed the same, by the order impugned herein.

10. The appellant, being the father of the deceased, is undoubtedly an

aggrieved person and thus possesses the requisite locus standi to maintain the

present appeal seeking cancellation of the bail granted to Respondent No. 1. The

unnatural death of his daughter within four months of marriage, allegedly on

account of dowry harassment, directly affects his rights as a complainant.

10.1.
In
R. Rathinam v. State by DSP8
, this Court has categorically held that

the power under
Section 439(2)
Cr.P.C. to cancel bail may be invoked not only

at the instance of the State but also by any aggrieved party.

10.2.

Similarly, in
Brij Nandan Jaiswal v. Munna @ Munna Jaiswal
and

another9, this Court observed:

“7. It is now a settled law that complainant can always question the order
granting bail if the said bail is not validly passed. It is not as if once a bail is
granted by any court, the only way is to get it cancelled on account of its misuse.
The bail order can be tested on merits also. In our opinion, therefore, the
complainant could question the merits of the order granting bail.”

10.3. Applying the above legal position to the present case, the appellant, being

the complainant and father of the deceased, has a direct and substantial interest

in seeking cancellation of bail. Accordingly, the present case is clearly

maintainable before this Court.
(2000) 2 SCC 391
Criminal Appeal No. 2087 of 2008 decided on 19.12.2008
11. The law relating to cancellation of bail is well settled. Recently, in State

of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, etc.10, this Court comprehensively reviewed the

principles governing annulment and cancellation of bail. The Court

distinguished between annulment of bail due to legal infirmity in the order, and

cancellation of bail arising from post-bail misconduct or supervening

circumstances. It is well established that bail granted without due application of

mind to relevant factors – such as the gravity of the offence, prima facie

evidence, or the antecedents of the accused – may be annulled. Courts must

consider the totality of circumstances, balancing the presumption of innocence

against the seriousness of the crime, societal interest, and risk of the misuse of

liberty. For ready reference, the relevant paragraphs are extracted below:

“15. The statutory framework governing cancellation of bail is well-settled.

Section 439(2)
of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 empowers the High Court
or the Court of Sessions to direct the re-arrest of an accused who has been
released on bail, if such direction is deemed “necessary”. Similarly, Section 437
(5) enables a Magistrate to cancel bail granted under Section 437(1) or (2).

These provisions underscore the legislative intent that the power to grant bail is
not absolute but is always subject to judicial reconsideration in light of
emerging facts or legal infirmities in the original order.

16. It is equally well established that the considerations for grant of bail and for
its cancellation are not identical. While the grant of bail involves a preventive
evaluation of the likelihood of misuse of liberty, the cancellation of bail entails a
review of the prior decision – either on account of supervening circumstances or
because the original order was legally flawed. As laid down in
State (Delhi
Administration) v. Sanjay Gandhi11, “Rejection
of bail when bail is applied for,
is one thing; cancellation of bail already granted is quite another”. This
principle reflects a recognition of the sanctity of liberty once granted, and the
requirement of compelling justification for its withdrawal.
2025 INSC 979
(1978) 2 SCC 411
17. However, it is equally well recognized that bail granted without due
application of mind to relevant factors – such as the gravity of the offence, the
strength of the evidence, or the conduct and antecedents of the accused – may be
cancelled. Even in the absence of subsequent misconduct, a bail order that is
perverse, unjustified, or legally untenable is vulnerable to interference.
In
Dolat
Ram v State of Haryana12
, this Court held that “where a bail order is passed in
disregard of material facts or in an arbitrary manner, it can be set aside”.

18. Let us now examine the jurisprudence on when bail may be annulled or
cancelled. Two distinct categories have emerged in this regard:

(A) Annulment of Bail due to legal infirmity in the order; and
(B) Cancellation of Bail, i.e., revocation of bail due to post-grant misconduct or
supervening circumstances.

(A) Annulment of bail orders
18.1. This refers to the appellate or revisional power to set aside a bail order
that is perverse, unjustified, or passed in violation of settled legal principles. It
is concerned with defects existing at the time the bail was granted, without
reference to subsequent conduct.

18.2.
In
Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT of Delhi
13, this court laid down guiding
principles:

“(a) While granting bail the court has to keep in mind not only the nature of the
accusations, but the severity of the punishment, if the accusation entails
conviction and the nature of evidence in support of the accusations.

(b) Reasonable apprehensions of the witnesses being tampered with or the
apprehension of there being a threat for the complainant should also weigh with
the court in the matter of grant of bail.

(c) While it is not expected to have the entire evidence establishing the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt but there ought always to be a prima facie
satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.

(d) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered and it is only the
element of genuineness that shall have to be considered in the matter of grant of
bail, and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the
prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to an order
of bail.”

18.3.
In
Puran v. Rambilas
and another14, it was held that a bail order can be
set aside even in the absence of post-bail misconduct if it is found to be
unjustified, illegal, or perverse.
(1995) 1 SCC 349
(2001) 4 SCC 280
(2001) 6 SCC 338
18.4. Similarly, in
Dr. Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat and another
15, a
three-Judge Bench held that consideration of irrelevant materials renders the
bail order vulnerable and liable to be set aside.

18.5.
In
Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee16
, this Court held that
where the High Court grants bail mechanically and without application of mind
to material factors such as the gravity of the offence or antecedents of the
accused, such an order must be set aside.

18.6.
In
Prakash Kadam and others v. Ramprasad Viswanath Gupta
and
another17, this Court distinguished between cancellation of bail by the same
court and annulment by an appellate / revisional court. It observed:

“18. In considering whether to cancel the bail the court has also to
consider the gravity and nature of the offence, prima facie case against
the accused, the position and standing of the accused, etc. If there are
very serious allegations against the accused his bail may be cancelled
even if he has not misused the bail granted to him. Moreover, the above
principle applies when the same court which granted bail is approached
for cancelling the bail. It will not apply when the order granting bail is
appealed against before an appellate/Revisional Court.

19. ….. There are several other factors also which may be seen while
deciding to cancel the bail.”

18.7.
In
Neeru Yadav v. State of UP18
, this court annulled a bail order where the
High Court had ignored the criminal antecedents of the accused and relied
mechanically on parity. It held that consideration of irrelevant factors and
omission of relevant considerations renders the order perverse. As the court
noted:

“15. …. It is clear as a cloudless sky that the High Court has totally
ignored the criminal antecedents of the accused. What has weighed with
the High Court is the doctrine of parity. A history-sheeter involved in the
nature of crimes which we have reproduced hereinabove, are not minor
offences so that he is not to be retained in custody, but the crimes are of
heinous nature and such crimes, by no stretch of imagination, can be
regarded as jejune. Such cases do create a thunder and lightning having
the effect potentiality of torrential rain in an analytical mind. The law
expects the judiciary to be alert while admitting these kind of accused
persons to be at large and, therefore, the emphasis is on exercise of
discretion judiciously and not in a whimsical manner.”
2008 (6) SCALE 415
(2010) 14 SCC 496
(2011) 6 SCC 189
(2014) 16 SCC 508
It further clarified:

“18. Before parting with the case, we may repeat with profit that it is not
an appeal for cancellation of bail as the cancellation is not sought
because of supervening circumstances. The annulment of the order
passed by the High Court is sought as many relevant factors have not
been taken into consideration which includes the criminal antecedents of
the accused and that makes the order a deviant one. Therefore, the
inevitable result is the lancination of the impugned order.”

18.8.
In
Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi
) 19, this Court reiterated that
while no exhaustive list can be laid down, courts must always consider the
totality of circumstances, including the seriousness of the offence, prima facie
evidence, and potential for interference with the trial.

18.9.
In
State of Kerala v. Mahesh20
, it was observed that even under
Article
, where interference with bail orders is rare, this Court will exercise its
powers if the bail order is found to be lacking application of mind or based on
irrelevant considerations.

….

18.15. Thus, it is clear that while cancellation of bail is a serious matter
involving deprivation of personal liberty, the law does permit annulment of a
bail order that is unjustified, legally untenable, or passed without due regard to
material considerations. The distinction between annulment of bail orders due
to perversity and cancellation for post-bail misconduct must be clearly
understood and applied, ensuring a careful, calibrated, and constitutionally
sound approach to the administration of criminal justice.

19. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer to the decision of this Bench in
Pinki
v. State of Uttar Pradesh
and another21, wherein, the bail granted to the
accused therein was cancelled, after a detailed consideration of the facts and
the gravity of the offence, namely, child trafficking as well as the legal
principles. The Court underscored that while personal liberty is a cherished
constitutional value, it is not absolute. Liberty must yield where it poses a threat
to the collective interest of society. No individual can claim a liberty that
endangers the life or liberty of others, as the rational collective cannot tolerate
anti-social or anti-collective conduct. Emphasizing that bail jurisprudence is
inherently fact-specific, the Court reiterated that each bail application must be
decided on its own merits, in light of the well settled on its own merits, in light
of the well-settled parameters governing grant or denial of bail….”
(2018) 12 SCC 129
AIR 2021 SC 2071
2025 INSC 482
12. In the present case, Respondent No. 1 /accused was subjected to criminal

prosecution for offences punishable under
Sections 498A
,
304B
and
IPC

read with
Sections 3
and
of the D.P. Act, in connection with the unnatural

death of his wife, who is the daughter of the appellant. The appellant alleges

that his daughter was subjected to persistent torture and harassment for failure

to provide a Fortuner car as additional dowry.

13. The post-mortem report reveals an abrasion on the left forearm of the

deceased, approximately 8 cm above the wrist joint. The subsequent Forensic

Laboratory Report on the chemical analysis of the viscera may indicate

ingestion of a poisonous or unnatural substance. Therefore, the cause of death

cannot be conclusively ascertained at this stage and is to be determined by the

trial Court during the course of the trial.

14. The statements of witnesses recorded under
Section 161
Cr.P.C. prima

facie indicate that the deceased was subjected to persistent dowry demands and

cruelty at the hands of the accused. Abhay Singh, the brother-in-law of the

appellant’s elder daughter, stated that the deceased repeatedly complained of

harassment and abuse by her husband and in-laws on account of dowry

demands, including the demand for a vehicle. The appellant further deposed that

shortly before her death, the deceased disclosed to him that her husband and in-

laws had forcibly made her consume a “smelly substance”, after which she
collapsed and succumbed while being taken to Kanpur. This disclosure

constitutes a dying declaration of high evidentiary value, corroborated by other

witnesses.

14.1. The mother of the deceased, Premlata Singh, corroborated the appellant’s

statement, adding that she was in regular telephonic contact with her daughter,

who narrated continuous torture for dowry. The younger sister, Sameeksha

Singh, gave a concurrent statement, testifying that Respondent No. 1 used to

threaten the deceased not to disclose the abuse, and frequently used abusive

language. The elder sister, Diksha Singh, narrated the facts of the fateful night.

She testified that the deceased had called her repeatedly around 1.30 am, crying

and begging to be rescued. She further deposed that when her father asked the

deceased at the hospital about what had happened, the deceased again said that

her husband, uncle, and aunt had forcibly administered a “smelly substance” to

her.

15. Despite such grave allegations, the police remained inactive for an

inordinate period. Respondent No. 1 was arrested only on 22.09.2023, after a

delay of 104 days from lodging the FIR, and the appellant addressed a

representation to the Home Secretary seeking transfer to CB-CID. Such a delay

reflects serious lapses in the investigation and undue benefit to the accused.
16. Without considering these aspects, the High Court erroneously granted

bail to Respondent No. 1/ accused by observing that at the stage of bail only

prima facie satisfaction is required, and that an elaborate evaluation of the

merits of the case should be avoided. It invoked
Article 21
of the Constitution,

holding that bail is the rule and jail is the exception, and noted that there was no

material to suggest that the accused was likely to abscond or tamper with

witnesses.

17. The statutory framework embodied in
Sections 304B
and
498A
IPC and

Section 113B
of the Evidence Act further highlights the need for careful and

cautious consideration in such cases.
Section 304B
IPC classifies the death of a

married woman occurring within seven years of marriage, preceded by dowry-

related cruelty or harassment, as a “dowry death”, punishable with

imprisonment that may extend to life.
Section 498A
IPC criminalises cruelty by

the husband or his relatives, including harassment for unlawful demands of

dowry. In addition,
Section 113B
of the Evidence Act mandates a presumption

of dowry death once such foundational facts are established. Collectively, these

provisions reflect the legislature’s firm resolve to combat the social evil of

dowry and to safeguard married women from cruelty and harassment within

their matrimonial homes.

17.1. In the present case, the marriage took place on 22.02.2023, and the death

occurred on 05.06.2023 i.e. within four months of marriage. The dying
declarations to the father and elder sister, coupled with consistent testimony of

relatives and post-mortem noting of an abrasion suggestive of restraint, satisfy

the foundational requirements of
Section 304B
IPC. Consequently, the

presumption under
Section 113B
of the Evidence Act arises inexorably against

Respondent No. 1.

17.2. The High Court, however, failed to take this statutory presumption into

account, and instead relied solely on general bail principles. This approach

contradicts the law
laid down in
State of U.P. through CBI v. Amarmani

Tripathi22, which requires courts to evaluate the gravity of the offence, the

nature of accusations and the prima facie evidence while considering bail.

18.
In
Kans Raj v. State of Punjab
23, this Court elaborated upon the

presumption under
Section 113B
of the Evidence Act. It held that once the

prosecution establishes that the death of a woman occurred otherwise than

under normal circumstances within seven years of marriage, and that she was

subjected to cruelty or harassment “soon before her death” in connection with a

demand for dowry, a statutory presumption arises that the husband or his

relatives caused the dowry death. The burden then shifts to the accused to rebut

this presumption by showing the absence of dowry-related cruelty or lack of a

causal link between such cruelty and the death. The Court emphasised that once

the ingredients of
Section 304B
IPC are established, the presumption under
(2005) 8 SCC 21
(2000) 5 SCC 207
Section 113B
of the Evidence Act becomes mandatory, and the proximity

between harassment and death is a decisive factor in its application. The

following paragraph is pertinent in this context:

“9. The law as it exists now provides that where the death of a woman is caused
by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal
circumstances within 7 years of marriage and it is shown that soon before her
death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative
for or in connection with any demand of dowry such death shall be punishable
under Section 304B. In order to seek a conviction against a person for the
offence of dowry death, the prosecution is obliged to prove that:

(a) the death of a woman was caused by burns or bodily injury or had occurred
otherwise than under normal circumstances;

(b) such death should have occurred within 7 years of her marriage;

(c) the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or by
any relative of her husband;

(d) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with the demand
of dowry; and

(e) to such cruelty or harassment the deceased should have been subjected to
soon before her death.

10. As and when the aforesaid circumstances are established, a presumption of
dowry death shall be drawn against the accused under
Section 113B
of the
Evidence Act. It has to be kept in mind that presumption under Section 113B is a
presumption of law. …”

15. ….. “Soon before” is a relative term which is required to be considered
under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be

laid down by
fixing any time-limit. This expression is pregnant with the idea of
proximity test. The term “soon before” is not synonymous with the term
“immediately before” and is opposite of the expression “soon after” as used
and understood in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the
Evidence Act
. These words
would imply that the interval should not be too long between the time of making
the statement and the death. It contemplates the reasonable time which, as
earlier noticed, has to be understood and determined under the peculiar
circumstances of each case. In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances
showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted
to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct
may be spread over a period of time. If the cruelty or harassment or demand for
dowry is shown to have persisted, it shall be deemed to be “soon before death”
if any other intervening circumstance showing the non-existence of such
treatment is not brought on record, before such alleged treatment and the date of
death. It does not, however, mean that such time can be stretched to any period.
Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand
and the consequential death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The
demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date
of death should not be too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be
treated as having become stale enough.”

19. The above principle was reaffirmed in
Rajinder Singh v. State of

Punjab24
, to the effect that once the prosecution establishes the ingredients of

Section 304-B
IPC, the presumption under
Section 113B
of the Evidence Act

must be drawn. The words “soon before her death” have to be understood in a

practical manner, and the proximity of the cruelty to the death must be

established to invoke the presumption. The following paragraphs are apposite:

“24… Days or months are not what is to be seen. What must be borne in mind is
that the word "soon" does not mean "immediate". A fair and pragmatic
construction keeping in mind the great social evil that has led to the enactment
of Section 304B would make it clear that the expression is a relative expression.
Time-lags may differ from case to case. All that is necessary is that the demand
for dowry should not be stale but should be the continuing cause for the death of
the married woman under Section 304-B.

25…
We hasten to add that this is not a correct reflection of the law. "Soon before" is
not synonymous with "immediately before".”

20. This Court in
Baijnath v. State of M.P.25
, clarified the scope and

operation of the presumption under
Section 113B
of the Evidence Act in

conjunction with
Section 304B
IPC. The relevant paragraphs are usefully

extracted below:
(2015) 6 SCC 477
(2017) 1 SCC 101
“24. …As the prosecution is on the charge of the offences envisaged in Sections
304B and 498A of the Code, the provisions for reference are extracted
hereunder:

“304B. Dowry death.-(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any
burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal
circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that
soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her
husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any
demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such
husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation.-. For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have
the same meaning as in
section 2
of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28
of 1961).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment
for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend
to imprisonment for life.

…

498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to
cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a
woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also
be liable to fine.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” means—

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the
woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb
or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to
coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand
for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or
any person related to her to meet such demand.”

25. Whereas in the offence of dowry death defined by Section 304B of the Code,
the ingredients thereof are:

(i) death of the woman concerned is by any burns or bodily injury or by
any cause other than in normal circumstances, and

(ii) is within seven years of her marriage, and

(iii) that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or any relative of the husband for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry.

The offence under Section 498A of the Code is attracted qua the husband or his
relative if she is subjected to cruelty. The Explanation to this Section exposits
“cruelty” as:
(i) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the
woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb
or health (whether mental or physical) or

(ii) harassment of the woman, where such harassment is with a view to
coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand
for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or
any person related to her to meet such demand.

26. Patently thus, cruelty or harassment of the lady by her husband or his
relative for or in connection with any demand for any property or valuable
security as a demand for dowry or in connection therewith is the common
constituent of both the offences.

27. The expression “dowry” is ordained to have the same meaning as in
Section
of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The expression “cruelty”, as explained,
contains in its expanse, apart from the conduct of the tormentor, the
consequences precipitated thereby qua the lady subjected thereto. Be that as it
may, cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative of his for or in
connection with any demand of dowry, to reiterate, is the gravamen of the two
offences.

28.
Section 113B
of the Act enjoins a statutory presumption as to dowry death in
the following terms:

“113B. Presumption as to dowry death.-. When the question is whether
a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that
soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to
cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry,
the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.

Explanation.-. For the purpose of this section, “dowry death” shall have
the same meaning as in
section 304B
of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860)”

29. Noticeably this presumption as well is founded on the proof of cruelty or
harassment of the woman dead for or in connection with any demand for dowry
by the person charged with the offence. The presumption as to dowry death thus
would get activated only upon the proof of the fact that the deceased lady had
been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand
for dowry by the accused and that too in the reasonable contiguity of death.
Such a proof is thus the legislatively mandated prerequisite to invoke the
otherwise statutorily ordained presumption of commission of the offence of
dowry death by the person charged therewith.
30. A conjoint reading of these three provisions, thus predicate the burden of the
prosecution to unassailably substantiate the ingredients of the two offences by
direct and convincing evidence so as to avail the presumption engrafted in

Section 113B
of the Act against the accused. Proof of cruelty or harassment by
the husband or her relative or the person charged is thus the sine qua non to
inspirit the statutory presumption, to draw the person charged within the coils
thereof. If the prosecution fails to demonstrate by cogent coherent and
persuasive evidence to prove such fact, the person accused of either of the above
referred offences cannot be held guilty by taking refuge only of the presumption
to cover up the shortfall in proof.

31. The legislative primature of relieving the prosecution of the rigour of the
proof of the often practically inaccessible recesses of life within the guarded
confines of a matrimonial home and of replenishing the consequential void, by
according a presumption against the person charged, cannot be overeased to
gloss-over and condone its failure to prove credibly, the basic facts enumerated
in the Sections involved, lest justice is the casualty.

32. This Court while often dwelling on the scope and purport of Section 304B of
the Code and
Section 113B
of the Act have propounded that the presumption is
contingent on the fact that the prosecution first spell out the ingredients of the
offence of Section 304B as in
Shindo Alias Sawinder Kaur and another v. State
of Punjab26
and echoed in
Rajeev Kumar v. State of Haryana
27. In the latter
pronouncement, this Court propounded that one of the essential ingredients of
dowry death under Section 304B of the Code is that the accused must have
subjected the woman to cruelty in connection with demand for dowry soon
before her death and that this ingredient has to be proved by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt and only then the Court will presume that the accused
has committed the offence of dowry death under
Section 113B
of the Act.

It
referred to with approval, the earlier decision of this Court in
K. Prema S. Rao
v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao28
to the effect that to attract the provision of Section 304B
of the Code, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be
established is that “soon before her death” she was subjected to cruelty and
harassment “in connection with the demand for dowry”.
(2011) 11 SCC 517
(2013) 16 SCC 640
(2003) 1 SCC 217
21.
In
Shabeen Ahmad v. State of U.P.29
, this Court cautioned that the grant

of bail in dowry death cases, despite strong incriminating material, undermines

public confidence in the justice delivery system. The Court observed that in

cases of dowry death, courts must remain alive to the broader societal

ramifications, as such offences strike at the very root of social justice and

gender equality. Permitting alleged prime perpetrators of such heinous crimes to

remain at liberty on bail, when evidence indicates active infliction of physical as

well as mental cruelty, may not only jeopardize the fairness of the trial but also

erode public faith in the administration of criminal justice.

22. Thus, the present case squarely falls within the category of annulment of

bail. The High Court’s omission to consider the gravity of the offence, the

corroborated dying declarations and the post-mortem evidence renders the

impugned order perverse and unsustainable. As held in
Puran v. Rambilas
, bail

orders passed in disregard of material evidence or settled principles are liable to

be set aside.

This Court in
Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. and another
30, clearly

observed:

“11. Though a conclusive finding in regard to the points urged by the parties is
not expected of the court considering the bail application, yet giving reasons is
different from discussing merits or demerits. As noted above, at the stage of
granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation
of the merits of the case is not to be undertaken. But that does not mean that
while granting bail some reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being
granted is not required to be indicated.”
(2025) 4 SCC 172
(2004) 7 SCC 525
23. Dowry death is not merely an offence against an individual but a crime

against society at large. As emphasized in Social Action Forum for
Manav

Adhikar v. Union of India31
, the alarming rise in such cases necessitates strict

judicial scrutiny. Permitting the accused to remain at large in the face of such

material would erode the deterrent object of
Sections 304B
and
498A
IPC.

24. In view of the foregoing, the impugned order of the High Court is liable

to be set aside, and the bail granted to Respondent No. 1 deserves to be

annulled.

25. This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that marriage, in its true essence,

is a sacred and noble institution founded on mutual trust, companionship, and

respect. However, in recent times, this pious bond has regrettably been reduced

to a mere commercial transaction. The evil of dowry, though often sought to be

camouflaged as gifts or voluntary offerings, has in reality become a means to

display social status and to satiate material greed.

25.1. The social evil of dowry not only corrodes the sanctity of marriage but

also perpetuates systemic oppression and subjugation of women. When such

demands transgress the bounds of reason and culminate in cruelty – or worse, in

the untimely death of a young bride – the offence transcends the private sphere

of the family and assumes the character of a grave social crime. It ceases to
(2018) 10 SCC 443
remain a mere personal tragedy and becomes an affront to the collective

conscience of society.

25.2. The phenomenon of dowry deaths represents one of the most abhorrent

manifestations of this social malaise, where the life of a young woman is

extinguished within her matrimonial home – not for any fault of her own, but

solely to satisfy the insatiable greed of others. Such heinous offences strike at

the very root of human dignity and violate the constitutional guarantees of

equality and life with dignity under
Articles 14
and
of the Constitution of

India. They corrode the moral fibre of the community, normalize violence

against women, and erode the foundations of a civilized society.

25.3. In this backdrop, this Court is constrained to observe that judicial

passivity or misplaced leniency in the face of such atrocities would only

embolden perpetrators and undermine public confidence in the administration of

justice. A firm and deterrent judicial response is, therefore, imperative – not

only to uphold the majesty of law and do justice in the present case, but also to

send an unequivocal message that neither law nor society will countenance

barbarities born out of the evil of dowry.

26. With the above observations, this Criminal Appeal is allowed and the

impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The bail granted to Respondent

No. 1 is hereby cancelled, and he is directed to surrender to custody forthwith,

failing which, the concerned authorities shall take him into custody
immediately. It is, however, clarified that this judgment is confined to the issue

of cancellation of bail, and the trial shall proceed independently, on its own

merits, and strictly in accordance with law.

27. Connected Miscellaneous Application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

…………………………J.
[B.V. NAGARATHNA]

…………………………J.
[R. MAHADEVAN]

NEW DELHI;

NOVEMBER 28, 2025