Supreme Court of India

Shabeen Ahmad vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh on 3 March, 2025

Author:
Vikram Nath

Bench:
Vikram Nath

2025 INSC 307

Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(@ SLP (Crl.) No.15156 OF 2024)

SHABEEN AHMAD …APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
& ANR. …RESPONDENTS

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(@ SLP (Crl.) No.15157 OF 2024)

AND

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(@ SLP (CRL.) NO.11355 OF 2024)

AND

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(@ SLP (Crl.) No.15158 OF 2024)

JUDGMENT

VIKRAM NATH, J.

Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by

POOJA SHARMA

1. Leave granted.

Date: 2025.03.03
18:09:09 IST
Reason:

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2. These four criminal appeals have been preferred
by the common Appellant (original complainant)
against four separate orders of the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad (Lucknow Bench),
granting bail to the respective Respondent No.2
in each of the following Special Leave Petitions:

• SLP (Crl.) No. 015156/2024 (Respondent No.2:

Original Accused No.3, Smt. Tara Bano, mother-
in-law of the deceased),

• SLP (Crl.) No. 11355/2024 (Respondent No.2:

Original Accused No.2, Mukhtar Ahmad, father-
in-law of the deceased),

• SLP (Crl.) No. 015157/2024 (Respondent No.2:

Original Accused No.5, Ayasha Khan, sister-in-
law of the deceased),

• SLP (Crl.) No. 015158/2024 (Respondent No.2:

Original Accused No.4, Saba, sister-in-law of the
deceased).

Since the factual matrix is the same for all of
these cases, these appeals are being considered
together for disposal.

3. The Appellant’s case arises from FIR
No. 0032/2024 registered at Police Station
Kotwali Nagar, District Sultanpur, Uttar

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Pradesh, for alleged offences punishable under

Sections 498A
and
304B
of the Indian Penal
Code1, along with
Sections 3
and
of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961. This FIR was lodged on
23.01.2024 by the Appellant (the brother of the
deceased, Ms. Shahida Bano). It states that
Shahida was married on 07.02.2022 to Accused
No.1, Sami Khan (husband of the deceased).
Shortly after the marriage, the family members of
her matrimonial home- namely, Accused No.2
(Mukhtar Ahmad, father-in-law), Accused No.3
(Tara Bano, mother-in-law), Accused No.4 (Saba,
sister-in-law), and Accused No.5 (Ayasha, sister-
in-law), began demanding additional dowry.

4. According to the FIR, the in-laws first demanded
a “Bullet” motorcycle, which the Appellant
ultimately provided in the name of the deceased.
Thereafter, they allegedly demanded a car, but
the Appellant, due to financial constraints,
sought additional time. It is alleged that because
these dowry demands were not completely met,
the deceased was subjected to continuous
In short, “
IPC
”

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harassment and cruelty by Accused Nos.2, 3, 4,
and 5, as well as by her husband (Accused No.1),
who resided abroad at the relevant time.

5. The FIR further recounts that on 22.01.2024,
around 6:15 p.m., the father of the Appellant
received a phone call from Accused No.2
(Mukhtar Ahmad/father-in-law) asking him to
come immediately. When the Appellant, his
father, mother, and other relatives reached the
matrimonial home, they allegedly found the
deceased’s body with a dupatta around her neck,
tied to the ceiling fan, and her knees still resting
on the bed. On being informed, the local police
arrived, took photographs, and recorded the
occurrence in the General Diary.

6. A Post Mortem was conducted on 23.01.2024 by
a panel of doctors. The report documented
multiple ante-mortem injuries, including
traumatic contusions on the head and neck, as
well as a prominent ligature mark around the
neck. Crucially, the cause of death was recorded
as “Asphyxia due to ante-mortem strangulation,”
suggesting forced strangulation and ruling out
suicide.

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7. In the course of investigation statements under

Section 161
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
were recorded, of the Appellant, the deceased’s
father, and various witnesses. They consistently
alleged that Accused Nos.2, 3, 4, and 5, in concert
with Accused No.1, collectively harassed, beat,
and eventually killed the deceased for dowry.
Based on these statements and the medical
evidence, the learned Sessions Judge noted the
gravity of the offence, the unnatural death within
seven years of marriage, and the specific
allegations of dowry-related cruelty, and
therefore rejected the bail applications filed by
the Respondent-accused.

8. Aggrieved by the Sessions Court’s denial of bail,
Accused Nos.2, 3, 4, and 5 approached the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Lucknow
Bench). By separate orders dated 07.05.2024,
21.05.2024, 19.04.2024, and 04.04.2024,
respectively, the High Court granted bail to the
aforementioned respondents, primarily citing
factors such as the accused having no prior
criminal history, some of them being women, and

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the fact that certain co-accused had already been
granted bail.

9. Challenging the said bail orders, the Appellant
has approached this Court through the present
Special Leave Petitions, contending that the High
Court erred in overlooking substantial material
indicating the involvement of Accused Nos.2, 3, 4,
and 5 in the alleged offence.

10. We have heard learned counsel for the Appellant
and the Respondents at length. The issue for
consideration before us is whether the impugned
orders granting bail to the Respondent Nos.2
(Accused Nos.2, 3, 4, and 5) in these matters
deserve to be sustained or set aside in light of the
gravity of the offence alleged and the material
available on record.

11. At the outset, it is crucial to underscore the
seriousness of an alleged dowry death under

Sections 498A
and
304B
of the IPC, read with

Sections 3
and
of the Dowry Prohibition Act. In
the present case, the deceased had married
accused no. 1 on 07.02.2022 and had died under
highly suspicious circumstances on 22.01.2024,
well within the seven-year window that invokes

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Section 304B
of IPC. Her body was bearing
multiple ante-mortem injuries and a pronounced
ligature mark signifying strangulation. A closer
look at the post-mortem details reveals traumatic
contusions on the head and neck, indicating
severe physical violence prior to her demise.
When such brutality is combined with a clear
pattern of dowry demands, including a “Bullet”
motorcycle initially and later a car, the possibility
of a dowry-related killing becomes alarmingly
evident. Stricter judicial scrutiny is necessary in
matters where a young woman loses her life in
her matrimonial home so soon after marriage,
particularly where the record points to persistent
harassment over unmet dowry demands.

12. A further appraisal of the material on record
suggests that Accused No.2 (father-in-law) and
Accused No.3 (mother-in-law) had a principal
role in pressurising the deceased with repeated
demands for expensive items and subjecting her
to relentless cruelty. It emerges that the
deceased’s family did provide a motorcycle in her
name, yet the demands continued to escalate,
culminating in a demand for a car. Equally

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alarming is the fact that the deceased’s final
moments appear to have involved intense
violence, evidenced by multiple contusions and
injuries that are inconsistent with a mere case of
suicide. The father-in-law’s subsequent phone
call to the deceased’s parental home, urging
them to rush over, does not by itself exonerate
him; rather, when considered alongside the
forensic and testimonial evidence, it casts further
doubt on the entire chain of events leading to the
victim’s death. In dowry-death cases, courts
must be mindful of the broader societal impact,
given that the offence strikes at the very root of
social justice and equality. Allowing alleged
prime perpetrators of such heinous acts to
remain on bail, where the evidence indicates they
actively inflicted physical, as well as mental,
torment, could undermine not only the fairness
of the trial but also public confidence in the
criminal justice system.

13. In light of these concerns, we find that Accused
No.2 and Accused No.3 do not deserve the
continued protection of bail. The gravity of the
allegations, ranging from demands for costly gifts

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to the infliction of brutal injuries, demonstrates
a strong prima facie case against them. Moreover,

Section 304B
IPC (dowry death) prescribes a
stringent standard because of the grave nature of
the offence and the systemic harm it perpetuates.
Where the facts clearly indicate direct
involvement in the fatal events, courts must act
with an abundance of caution. Thus, permitting
the father-in-law and mother-in-law to remain at
large would run counter to the ends of justice,
especially when the evidence reflects a probable
nexus between their persistent dowry demands,
physical cruelty, and the deceased’s death.
Consequently, their bail warrants cancellation so
that a fair and unimpeded trial may take place,
in keeping with the legislative intent behind anti-
dowry laws.

14. As regards Accused No.4 (Saba) and Accused
No.5 (Ayasha) both sisters-in-law of the
deceased, the material on record does implicate
them, but their role appears relatively less direct.
One of them (Accused No.4) has recently got
married (in November 2024) and begun her new
life, while the other (Accused No.5) is quite

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young, pursuing her education in Bachelor of
Arts degree and simultaneously employed as a
teacher in a private school. Although we do not
exonerate them from the allegations at this stage,
we find it appropriate to extend a measure of
leniency towards them by not interfering with the
bail granted. This consideration stems solely
from their personal and educational
circumstances and should not be construed as a
reflection on the merits of the allegations against
them.

15. We also find it necessary to express our concern
over the seemingly mechanical approach adopted
by the High Court in granting bail to the
Respondent accused. While the Court did note
the absence of prior criminal records, it failed to
fully consider the stark realities of the
allegations. It is unfortunate that in today’s
society, dowry deaths remain a grave social
concern, and in our opinion, the courts are duty-
bound to undertake deeper scrutiny of the
circumstances under which bail is granted in
these cases. The social message emanating from
judicial orders in such cases cannot be

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overstated: when a young bride dies under
suspicious circumstances within barely two
years of marriage, the judiciary must reflect
heightened vigilance and seriousness. A
superficial application of bail parameters not
only undermines the gravity of the offence itself
but also risks weakening public faith in the
judiciary’s resolve to combat the menace of dowry
deaths. It is this very perception of justice, both
within and outside the courtroom, that courts
must safeguard, lest we risk normalizing a crime
that continues to claim numerous innocent lives.
These observations regarding grant of bail in
grievous crimes were thoroughly dealt with by
this Court in
Ajwar v. Waseem2
in the following
paras:

“ 26. While considering as to whether
bail ought to be granted in a matter
involving a serious criminal offence, the
Court must consider relevant factors
like the nature of the accusations made
against the accused, the manner in
which the crime is alleged to have been
committed, the gravity of the offence,
the role attributed to the accused, the
criminal antecedents of the accused,
(2024) 10 SCC 768

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the probability of tampering of the
witnesses and repeating the offence, if
the accused are released on bail, the
likelihood of the accused being
unavailable in the event bail is granted,
the possibility of obstructing the
proceedings and evading the courts of
justice and the overall desirability of
releasing the accused on bail. [Refer :

Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman
Lal
v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525 :
2004 SCC (Cri) 1974] ;
Kalyan Chandra
Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan
Chandra Sarkar
v. Rajesh Ranjan,
(2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri)
1977] ; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor
v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 :
(2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368] ;
Prasanta
Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee
[Prasanta Kumar Sarkar
v. Ashis
Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011)
3 SCC (Cri) 765] ; Neeru Yadav v. State
of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P.,
(2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri)
527] ;
Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT
of Delhi) [Anil Kumar Yadav
v. State
(NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 :

(2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425] ; Mahipal v.

Rajesh Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh
Kumar
, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1
SCC (Cri) 558] .]

27. It is equally well settled that bail
once granted, ought not to be cancelled
in a mechanical manner. However, an

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unreasoned or perverse order of bail is
always open to interference by the
superior court. If there are serious
allegations against the accused, even if
he has not misused the bail granted to
him, such an order can be cancelled by
the same Court that has granted the
bail. Bail can also be revoked by a
superior court if it transpires that the
courts below have ignored the relevant
material available on record or not
looked into the gravity of the offence or
the impact on the society resulting in
such an order.
In
P v. State of M.P. [P
v.
State of M.P., (2022) 15 SCC 211]
decided by a three-Judge Bench of this
Court [authored by one of us (Hima
Kohli, J.)] has spelt out the
considerations that must weigh with
the Court for interfering in an order
granting bail to an accused under

Section 439(1)
CrPC in the following
words : (SCC p. 224, para 24)

“24.

As can be discerned from the
above decisions, for cancelling bail
once granted, the court must
consider whether any
supervening circumstances have
arisen or the conduct of the
accused post grant of bail
demonstrates that it is no longer
conducive to a fair trial to permit
him to retain his freedom by
enjoying the concession of bail

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during trial [
Dolat Ram v. State of
Haryana
, (1995) 1 SCC 349 : 1995
SCC (Cri) 237] . To put it
differently, in ordinary
circumstances, this Court would
be loathe to interfere with an order
passed by the court below
granting bail but if such an order
is found to be illegal or perverse or
premised on material that is
irrelevant, then such an order is
susceptible to scrutiny and
interference by the appellate
court.”

Considerations for setting aside bail
orders

28. The considerations that weigh with
the appellate court for setting aside the
bail order on an application being
moved by the aggrieved party include
any supervening circumstances that
may have occurred after granting relief
to the accused, the conduct of the
accused while on bail, any attempt on
the part of the accused to procrastinate,
resulting in delaying the trial, any
instance of threats being extended to
the witnesses while on bail, any
attempt on the part of the accused to
tamper with the evidence in any
manner. We may add that this list is
only illustrative and not exhaustive.
However, the court must be cautious
that at the stage of granting bail, only a

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prima facie case needs to be examined
and detailed reasons relating to the
merits of the case that may cause
prejudice to the accused, ought to be
avoided. Suffice it is to state that the
bail order should reveal the factors that
have been considered by the Court for
granting relief to the accused.”

16. We clarify that our present observations are
limited to deciding whether the bail of each
Accused is liable to be cancelled. The trial court
shall proceed on its own assessment of evidence,
uninfluenced by any of the remarks made herein.

17. In view of the discussion above, we direct that the
bail granted to Accused No.2 (father-in-law) and
Accused No.3 (mother-in-law) is hereby
cancelled. They shall surrender before the
concerned trial court/authority forthwith, failing
which the authorities shall take steps to take
them into custody.

18. The bail granted to Accused No.4 (Saba) and
Accused No.5 (Ayasha) is upheld. All conditions
imposed upon them by the High Court shall
continue to operate, and they shall strictly abide
by any further directions that the trial court may
impose to ensure the integrity of the proceedings.

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19. The appeals against the bail granted to Accused
No.2 (father-in-law) and Accused No.3 (mother-
in-law) are allowed, and the appeals against the
bail granted to Accused No.4 (Saba) and Accused
No.5 (Ayasha) are dismissed.

20. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed
of.

21. We direct the Trial Court to make endeavours to
conclude the trial expeditiously, without being
influenced by any of the observations contained
in this judgment.

…………………..……J
(VIKRAM NATH)

…………………..……J
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI
MARCH 03, 2025

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