Supreme Court of India

Amalendu Pal @ Jhantu vs State Of West Bengal on 11 November, 2009

Equivalent citations: AIR 2010 SUPREME COURT 512, 2010 (1) SCC 707, 2009 AIR SCW 7070, (2010) 1 ALLCRILR 644, (2010) 2 MAD LJ(CRI) 109, 2010 (1) SCC(CRI) 896, (2009) 84 ALLINDCAS 122 (SC), 2010 CALCRILR 1 217, (2010) 1 CRILR(RAJ) 25, (2010) 2 MADLW(CRI) 764, (2010) 1 JCR 82 (SC), (2010) 45 OCR 536, (2010) 1 DMC 23, (2010) 1 UC 359, (2009) 3 ALLCRIR 3436, (2009) 4 DLT(CRL) 624, (2009) 4 CAL HN 176, 2009 ALLMR(CRI) 3755, (2009) 67 ALLCRIC 932, (2009) 4 CURCRIR 492, (2009) 3 UC 1753, (2009) 4 CRIMES 190, (2010) 1 RECCRIR 643, 2009 (13) SCALE 663, 2010 CRILR(SC MAH GUJ) 25, (2009) 13 SCALE 663, (2010) 1 CHANDCRIC 1, (2010) 1 ALD(CRL) 459

Author:
Mukundakam Sharma

Bench:
R.M. Lodha
,
Mukundakam Sharma

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2091 OF 2009
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 9483 of 2008)

Amalendu Pal @ Jhantu .... Appellant

Versus

State of West Bengal .... Respondent

JUDGMENT

Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. In the present appeal, the appellant has challenged the

legality of the judgment and order dated 24.07.2008 passed

by the Calcutta High Court. The appellant is aggrieved by

the aforesaid judgment and order as by the said judgment,

the High Court has upheld the order of conviction and

sentence passed by the trial Court whereby the appellant

was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three

years for the offence punishable under
Section 498-A
of

the Indian Penal Code (in short "the
IPC
") and for eight

years together with a fine of Rs 1000/- for the offence

punishable under
Section 306
of the IPC with a default

stipulation. The sentences awarded to the appellant were

directed to run concurrently.
3. The facts necessary for the disposal of the present appeal

and as presented by the prosecution may be set out at this

stage. The appellant - Amalendu Pal @ Jhantu and the

deceased - Dipika were married in the year 1977. Out of

the said wedlock, two sons were born. The appellant was

residing in Calcutta in connection with his work and

earning. During his stay in Calcutta, the appellant

developed an extra-marital relationship with one Jyotsna @

Anita. The relationship between the appellant and said

Anita became known to the deceased and the deceased

objected to such illegal relationship. The appellant

sought permission of the deceased to marry said Anita,

which was also refused by the deceased. Consequently, the

appellant started torturing the deceased both physically

and mentally.

4. After a few days, the appellant again tried to take the

consent of the deceased for marrying said Anita and on

refusal of the deceased, physical and mental torture was

perpetrated on the deceased. It was alleged that the

deceased was provoked by the appellant to end her life by

consuming poison or by hanging herself. It was also the

case that three months prior to the date of death of the

deceased, the appellant brought said Anita to his house.

Anita was sporting a vermillion mark on her forehead and

was wearing conch bangles on her wrist to indicate that
she is married to the accused. It was also stated that in

the evening prior to the date of the death of the

deceased, the deceased was assaulted by Anita, the

appellant and his family members. On the morning of

27.09.1991, the deceased was found hanging from the

ceiling of the house of the appellant.

5. Ashoka Kumar Maity (PW-7) intimated Supriyo Das, brother

of the deceased (PW-2) about the death of the deceased.

Upon receipt of the aforesaid information, PW-2 arrived at

the house of the appellant where he learnt about the

entire incident from the villagers who had assembled at

the scene of occurrence. Thereafter, PW-2 proceeded to the

Contai Police Station and got a complaint registered. On

the strength of the complaint, First Information Report

(in short "the FIR") under
Sections 498-A
and
IPC was

lodged on 28.09.1991 at 20.30 hrs.

6. After completion of the investigation, the police filed a

charge sheet against the appellant and seven other accused

persons. On the basis of the aforesaid charge sheet, the

trial Court framed charges under
Section 498A
read with

Section 34
IPC and
Section 306
read with
Section 34
IPC

against the appellant and seven other accused persons to

which all of them pleaded not guilty and claimed to be

tried.

7. During the trial, a number of prosecution witnesses were
examined. The defence produced two witnesses in support

of its case. On conclusion of the trial, the trial Court

by its judgment and order dated 25.11.1997 convicted the

appellant under
Sections 498A
and
IPC and sentenced

the appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three

years and for eight years together with a fine of Rs

1000/- respectively. All the other seven accused persons

were acquitted of the above stated charges framed against

them.

8. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of conviction and

sentence passed by the trial Court, the appellant herein

preferred an appeal before the High Court. The State,

however, did not prefer any appeal before the High Court

against the order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court

with regard to the seven accused persons who were also

charged with the appellant for the aforesaid offences. The

High Court entertained the said appeal and heard the

counsel appearing for the parties. On conclusion of the

arguments, the High Court passed a judgment and order

upholding the order of conviction and affirming the

sentence awarded to the appellant by the trial Court. The

said order of conviction upheld by the High Court is under

challenge in this appeal.

9. Mr. Pradip K. Ghosh, learned senior counsel appearing on

behalf of the appellant, very painstakingly argued the
appeal before us. He submitted that in the absence of

cogent and reliable evidence to establish abetment of

suicide by the appellant, the conviction of the appellant

under
Section 306
could not be sustained and was bad in

law. He further submitted that the High Court erred in

convicting the appellant under
Section 306
IPC as the High

Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence on

record. He further strenuously submitted before us that

there was no evidence of infliction of torture upon the

deceased by the appellant immediately prior to the

incident of suicide by the deceased and as such it could

not be said that the appellant had incited the deceased to

commit suicide.

10.On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the respondent State supported the judgments of

the courts below.

11.We have carefully considered the submissions made before

us by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and

perused the evidence available on record before us. On a

close and careful scrutiny of the oral evidence of the

prosecution witnesses namely, PW-2, PW-4, PW-6, PW-7 and

PW-9, we find that the appellant and the deceased had got

married in the year 1977 and they had enjoyed a happy

married life for 5-6 years from the date of their

marriage. The aforesaid prosecution witnesses have also
categorically stated in their testimony before the trial

Court that the problems between the appellant and the

deceased cropped up and their matrimonial life got

strained only after the appellant developed an extra-

marital relationship with one Jyotsna @ Anita during his

stay in Calcutta and the said liaison between the

appellant and the said Anita became known to the deceased.

It was only when the appellant was denied permission by

the deceased to marry said Anita that the appellant

started torturing the deceased both mentally as well as

physically.

12.At the outset, we intend to address the issue regarding

the applicability of
Section 306
IPC in the facts of the

present case.
Section 306
deals with abetment of suicide

and
Section 107
deals with abetment of a thing. They read

as follows:

"306. Abetment of suicide.--If any person commits
suicide, whoever abets the commission of such
suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to
ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

* * *
107. Abetment of a thing.--A person abets the
doing of a thing, who--

First.--Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly.--Engages with one or more other person
or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of
that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes
place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in
order to the doing of that thing; or
Thirdly.--Intentionally aids, by any act or
illegal omission, the doing of that thing.

Explanation 1.--A person who, by wilful
misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a
material fact which he is bound to disclose,
voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to
cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to
instigate the doing of that thing.

* * *
Explanation 2.--Whoever, either prior to or at the
time of the commission of an act, does anything
in order to facilitate the commission of that
act, and thereby facilitates the commission
thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act."

13. The legal position as regards
Sections 306
IPC which is

long settled was recently reiterated by this Court in the case

of
Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab
(2004) 13 SCC 129 as

follows in paras 12 and 13:

"12. Abetment involves a mental process of
instigating a person or intentionally aiding that
person in doing of a thing. In cases of conspiracy
also it would involve that mental process of
entering into conspiracy for the doing of that
thing. More active role which can be described as
instigating or aiding the doing of a thing is
required before a person can be said to be
abetting the commission of offence under
Section
IPC.

13.
In
State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal
this Court
has observed that the courts should be extremely
careful in assessing the facts and circumstances
of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial
for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty
meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to
end the life by committing suicide. If it
transpires to the court that a victim committing
suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance,
discord and differences in domestic life quite
common to the society to which the victim belonged
and such petulance, discord and differences were
not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced
individual in a given society to commit suicide,
the conscience of the court should not be
satisfied for basing a finding that the accused
charged of abetting the offence of suicide should
be found guilty."

14. Further in the case of
Kishori Lal v. State of M.P.
(2007) 10 SCC 797, this Court gave a clear exposition of

Section 107
IPC when it observed as follows in para 6:

"6.
Section 107
IPC defines abetment of a thing.
The offence of abetment is a separate and distinct
offence provided in
IPC
. A person, abets the doing
of a thing when (1) he instigates any person to do
that thing; or (2) engages with one or more other
persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that
thing; or (3) intentionally aids, by act or
illegal omission, the doing of that thing. These
things are essential to complete abetment as a
crime. The word "instigate" literally means to
provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by
persuasion to do any thing. The abetment may be by
instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, as
provided in the three clauses of
Section 107
.

Section 109
provides that if the act abetted is
committed in consequence of abetment and there is
no provision for the punishment of such abetment,
then the offender is to be punished with the
punishment provided for the original offence.
"Abetted" in
Section 109
means the specific
offence abetted. Therefore, the offence for the
abetment of which a person is charged with the
abetment is normally linked with the proved
offence."

[See also
Kishangiri Mangalgiri Swami v. State of Gujarat

(2009) 4 SCC 52]

15. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that

before holding an accused guilty of an offence under
Section
IPC, the Court must scrupulously examine the facts and

circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced

before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and

harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no

other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to

be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide
there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to

the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of

harassment without their being any positive action proximate to

the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or

compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of

Section 306
IPC is not sustainable.

16. In order to bring a case within the purview of
Section
of IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the

commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have

abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active

role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to

facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of

abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be

proved and established by the prosecution before he could be

convicted under
Section 306
IPC.

17. The expression `abetment' has been defined under

Section 107
IPC which we have already extracted above. A

person is said to abet the commission of suicide when a person

instigates any person to do that thing as stated in clause

firstly or to do anything as stated in clauses secondly or

thirdly of
Section 107
IPC.
Section 109
IPC provides that if

the act abetted is committed pursuant to and in consequence of

abetment then the offender is to be punished with the

punishment provided for the original offence.

18. Learned counsel for the respondent-State, however,
clearly stated before us that it would be a case where clause

`thirdly' of
Section 107
IPC only would be attracted. According

to him, a case of abetment of suicide is made out as provided

for under
Section 107
IPC.

19. In view of the aforesaid situation and position, we

have examined the provision of clause thirdly which provides

that a person would be held to have abetted the doing of a

thing when he intentionally does or omits to do anything in

order to aid the commission of that thing. The Act further

gives an idea as to who would be intentionally aiding by any

act of doing of that thing when in Explanation 2 it is provided

as follows:

"

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

"Explanation 2.- Whoever, either prior to or at
the time of the commission of an act, does
anything in order to facilitate the commission of
that act, and thereby facilitate the commission
thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act."

20. Therefore, the issue that arises for our consideration

is whether any of the aforesaid clauses namely firstly

alongwith explanation 1 or more particularly thirdly with

Explanation 2 to
Section 107
is attracted in the facts and

circumstances of the present case so as to bring the present

case within the purview of
Section 306
IPC.

21. We have already considered a number of decisions of

this Court on the aforesaid aspect and having done so we revert
back to the factual position of the present case. The

prosecution has specifically alleged that on 26.09.1991, the

day prior to the date of commission of suicide by the deceased,

the deceased was tortured by the appellant, Anita and the other

accused persons present in the house of the appellant, as a

result of which the deceased committed suicide on the next day.

On a perusal of the record of the present case, we find that

both the trial Court as well as the High Court have disbelieved

the said incident as, according to them, the statement of the

witnesses to establish the said fact are not reliable and

trustworthy. Those findings recorded by the trial Court and the

High Court have not been challenged before us. It is not the

case of the prosecution that the case in hand would fall within

the ambit of clause firstly of or Explanation 1 to
Section 107

IPC.

22. The prosecution, however, heavily relies on the clause

thirdly of
Section 107
IPC because, according to the

prosecution, the appellant by way of harassment and torturing

the deceased at various point of time and by marrying said

Anita for the second time without the permission and against

the will of the deceased, intentionally aided the commission of

suicide by the deceased.

23. In support of the aforesaid contention, learned counsel

for the prosecution relied upon Explanation 2 to
Section 107
.

He submitted that prior to the commission of suicide by the
deceased, the appellant had, by bringing said Anita as his

second wife to his house facilitated the commission of suicide

by the deceased and thus, the appellant intentionally aided the

commission of suicide by the deceased. The evidence on record,

however, does not support such a case. It is pertinent to note

that the appellant had brought Anita to stay with him at his

house three months prior to the date of the death of the

deceased. If the deceased had been so perturbed by the act of

the appellant in marrying the said Anita and in bringing her to

his house that she felt impelled to commit suicide then she

could have done so on the very day when Anita had come to stay

with the appellant in his house as naturally at that point of

time her annoyance or dismay with life would have been at its

pinnacle. From the period of three months which elapsed in

between the incidents of the appellant bringing Anita to his

house and the deceased committing suicide, it can be clearly

inferred that it was not the act of the appellant which

instigated or provoked the deceased to commit suicide.

24. The perpetration of physical torture on the deceased on

the day prior to the date of the incident which led the

deceased to commit suicide is the prosecution case all

throughout. It is nowhere the case of the prosecution that the

appellant had played any active role either in instigating or

aiding the commission of suicide by the deceased for denying to

accept Anita as the wife of the appellant. Anita, the second

wife of the appellant was brought by the appellant to his house
about three months prior to the date of the incident of suicide

by the deceased and therefore, bringing of the second wife to

the house by the appellant cannot be said to have either

incited or facilitated the commission of suicide by the

deceased. It is also not the case of the prosecution as

disclosed from the evidence led which we have scrutinised very

minutely. The aforesaid contention, in our considered opinion,

is far fetched and is not established by the facts of the

present case. After carefully assessing the evidence on record

we find that there is no direct evidence to show that the

appellant had by his acts instigated or provoked the deceased

to commit suicide and has not done any act which could be said

to have facilitated the commission of suicide by the deceased.

25. We now intend to proceed to find out whether a case

under
Section 498A
IPC is made out against the appellant or

not.
In the case of
Girdhar Shankar Tawade v. State of

Maharashtra
(2002) 5 SCC 177, this Court gave a succinct

enumeration of the object and ingredients of
Section 498A
IPC,

when it observed as follows in paras 3 and 17:

"3. The basic purport of the statutory provision
is to avoid "cruelty" which stands defined by
attributing a specific statutory meaning attached
thereto as noticed hereinbefore. Two specific
instances have been taken note of in order to
ascribe a meaning to the word "cruelty" as is
expressed by the legislatures: whereas Explanation

(a) involves three specific situations viz. (i) to
drive the woman to commit suicide or (ii) to cause
grave injury or (iii) danger to life, limb or
health, both mental and physical, and thus
involving a physical torture or atrocity, in
Explanation (b) there is absence of physical
injury but the legislature thought it fit to
include only coercive harassment which obviously
as the legislative intent expressed is equally
heinous to match the physical injury: whereas one
is patent, the other one is latent but equally
serious in terms of the provisions of the statute
since the same would also embrace the attributes
of "cruelty" in terms of
Section 498-A
.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

17. As regards the core issue as to whether
charges under
Sections 306
and
498-A
of the Indian
Penal Code are independent of each other and
acquittal of one does not lead to acquittal on the
other, as noticed earlier, there appears to be a
long catena of cases in affirmation thereto and as
such further dilation is not necessary neither are
we inclined to do so, but in order to justify a
conviction under the later provision there must be
available on record some material and cogent
evidence. Presently, we have on record two
inconsistent versions of the brother and the
cousin, as such no credence can be attributed
thereon -- the documentary evidence (namely, those
three letters), in our view, falls short of the
requirement of the statute: even on an assumption
of the fact that there is no contradiction in the
oral testimony available on record, the cousin
goes to the unfortunate girl's in-laws' place and
requests the husband to treat her well -- at best
some torture and a request to treat her well. This
by itself would not bring home the charge under

Section 498-A
. Demand for dowry has not seen the
light of day."

26. From the evidence of record available before us, we

find that the prosecution witnesses have in their testimonies

stated that the deceased was tortured both physically and

mentally by the appellant for the first time after his marriage

with the deceased when he was refused permission for marriage

with said Anita by the deceased. On having been refused the

permission for his second marriage with Anita, the appellant
again, after a few days requested the deceased to accede to his

request for marriage with Anita, which request was again

refused by the deceased. Consequent to the said position and

due to the adamant position taken by the deceased, cruelty was

meted out to her by the accused which fact is sufficiently

proved from the evidence on record. Therefore, we find no

reason to take a different view than what has been taken by the

trial Court and the High Court as far as
Section 498A
IPC is

concerned.

27. Accordingly, the present appeal is hereby partly

allowed. We hereby set aside the conviction of the appellant

under
Section 306
but uphold the conviction of the appellant

under
section 498A
. As the appellant is on bail, his bail

bonds stand cancelled. The appellant is directed to surrender

himself before the jail authorities within 15 days from today

to serve out the remaining sentence under
Section 498A
, failing

which the concerned authority shall proceed against the

appellant in accordance with law.

.....................J.
[Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]

.....................J.
[R.M. Lodha]
New Delhi
November 11, 2009