Supreme Court of India

Dinesh Seth vs State Of N.C.T. Of Delhi on 18 August, 2008

Author:
G.S. Singhvi

Bench:
G.S. Singhvi
,
Altamas Kabir

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1239 OF 2003

Dinesh Seth ........Appellant

Versus

State of N.C.T. of Delhi ........Respondent

JUDGMENT

G.S. Singhvi, J.

1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of Delhi High Court

whereby the appellant was acquitted of the charge under
Section 304B

Indian Penal Code (for short `
IPC
') but was convicted under
Section 498A

IPC and sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment.

2. The facts

(i) The appellant was married to Rama on 2.12.1984. She died on

22.11.1986. On receipt of an anonymous call/information that son of

Kuldeep Seth (the appellant herein) has murdered his wife in his

house situated at Gali No.8, Multani Dhanda, Paharganj. Shri C.L.

Jatav, Sub-Inspector of Police visited the spot and found the dead
body of Rama in a room on the second floor of the house. He also

found one piece of printed cloth (chunni) near the dead body and

another piece which was tied with the ceiling fan. Shri Naresh

Tandon, brother-in-law of the deceased who was present at the site

told Shri Jatav that the deceased had been subjected to harassment

and torture by her husband and in-laws. The Sub-Divisional

Magistrate recorded the statement of Smt. Raj Rani Mehra (mother of

the deceased), who had also reached the house of the appellant and on

that basis a case was registered under
Sections 304B
/
/
498A
read

with
Section 34
IPC. On the next day, Dr. Bharat Singh (PW-21)

conducted post mortem. He found the following injuries on the body

of the deceased:-

1. One ligature mark around the neck placed above the
thyroid cartilage which was present all around the neck.

The width of the ligature was >" all along except near
the right side of the ear where it was irregular and was
wider upto 1". Base was depressed. Skin was abraded.
Colour was light brown.

2. One lenier abrasion was present on the right knee joint
size two and half inches x two and ten inches.

Dr. Bharat Singh opined that the cause of death was asphyxia

caused due to hanging.
(ii) The police submitted challan under
Sections 304B
/
/
498A
read

with
Section 34
IPC against the appellant, his brothers Suresh Seth

and Naresh Seth and mother Janak Seth. The learned Additional

Sessions Judge framed charge under
Section 304B
read with
Section
IPC. The prosecution examined as many as 26 witnesses

including the mother of the deceased, Smt. Raj Rani Mehra (PW-7),

her sisters and brother, Smt. Radha Mehra (PW-1), Ms. Chitra Mehra

(PW-6) and Chaman Mehra (PW-26), two neighbours, namely Rajesh

(PW-19) and Amit Grover (PW-24), Investigating Officer C.L. Jatav

(PW-20) and Dr. Bharat Singh (PW-21). In their statements under

Section 313
Code of Criminal Procedure (for short `the Code'), all the

accused denied their involvement in the death of Rama. They also

denied the allegation of having subjected the deceased to harassment

and torture for dowry.

(iii) The trial court convicted all the accused under
Section 304B
read

with
Section 34
IPC and sentenced them to seven years' rigorous

imprisonment. On appeal, the High Court held that charge under

Section 304B
IPC is not made out and acquitted all the accused.

However, the appellant was found guilty under
Section 498A
IPC and

sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment.
3. Shri K.T.S. Tulsi, senior counsel appearing for the appellant, assailed

the impugned judgment on two counts. He argued that the appellant's

conviction under
Section 498A
IPC is liable to be set aside because he was

tried for an offence under
Section 304B
read with 34
IPC
and not under

Section 498A
IPC. Learned senior counsel submitted that in the absence of

a specific charge under
Section 498A
IPC, the High Court could not have

convicted the appellant under that section because he did not get

opportunity to defend himself. Shri Tulsi further argued that after having

discarded the testimony of PW-1, PW-6 and PW-7 on the issue of

harassment, cruelty and demand of dowry and acquitted the appellant of the

charge under
Section 304B
IPC, the High Court could not have relied upon

the same evidence for the purpose of convicting him under
Section 498A

IPC.
In support of his arguments, Shri Tulsi referred to the judgments of this

Court in
State of West Bengal vs. Orilal Jaiswal & Another
[1994 (1)

SCC 73],Himachal Pradesh Admn.
vs. Shri Om Prakash [1972 (2) SCR

765], Ramakant Rai vs. Madan Rai & Others [JT 2003 (Supp.2) SC

344], Gokaraju Venkatanarasa Raju vs. State of A.P. [1993 Supp.
(
4)

SCC 191] and Shivanand Mallappa Koti vs. State of Karnataka
[2007

(8) Scale 408].

Learned senior counsel then submitted that the judgments of

this Court in
Pyare Lal vs. State of Haryana
[1997 (11) SCC 552] and
Satpal vs. State of Haryana [1998 (5) SCC 687] on which reliance has

been placed by the High Court for convicting the appellant under
Section

498A
IPC are clearly distinguishable because in neither of those cases

question similar to the one arising in this appeal was considered.

4. Shri P.P. Malhotra, senior counsel representing the State relied upon

the provisions of
Sections 221
,
and
of the Code and argued that

omission to frame specific charge under
Section 498A
IPC cannot be made

a ground for acquittal of the appellant because absence of charge under that

section did not prejudice his defence and no failure of justice was

occasioned. Shri Malhotra submitted that the evidence produced by the

prosecution was sufficient to prove that the appellant had subjected the

deceased to cruelty and the High Court did not commit any error by

convicting him under
Section 498A
IPC.

5. We have considered the respective submissions. For deciding whether

the High Court committed an illegality by convicting the appellant under

Section 498A
IPC, it will be useful to notice the provisions of
Sections 221
,
and
of the Code. The same read as under:-

221. Where it is doubtful what offence has been committed.

(1) If a single act or series of acts is of such a nature that
it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which
can be proved will constitute, the accused may be
charged with having committed all or any of such
offences, and any number of such charges may be tried at
once; or he may be charged in the alternative with having
committed some one of the said offences.

(2) If in such a case the accused is charged with one
offence, and it appears in evidence that he committed a
different offence for which he might have been charged
under the provisions of sub-section (1), he may be
convicted of the offence which he is shown to have
committed, although he was not charged with it.

Illustrations (a) A is accused of an act which may
amount to theft, or receiving stolen property, or criminal
breach of trust or cheating. He may be charged with
theft, receiving stolen property, criminal breach of trust
and cheating, or he may be charged with having
committed theft, or receiving stolen property, or criminal
breach of trust or cheating.

(b) In the case mentioned, A is only charged with theft. It
appears that he committed the offence of criminal breach
of trust, or that of receiving stolen goods. He may be
convicted of criminal breach of trust or of receiving
stolen goods (as the case may be), though he was not
charged with such offence.
(c) A states on oath before the Magistrate that he saw B
hit C with a club. Before the Sessions Court A states on
oath that B never hit C. A may be charged in the
alternative and convicted of intentionally giving false
evidence, although it cannot to be proved which of these
contradictory statements was false.

222. When offence proved included in offence charged.

(1) When a person is charged with an offence consisting
of several particulars, a combination of some only of
which constitutes a complete minor offence, and such
combination is proved, but the remaining particulars are
not proved, he may be convicted of the minor offence
though he was not charged with it.

(2) When a person is charged with an offence and facts
are proved which reduce it to a minor offence, he may be
convicted of the minor offence, although he is not
charged with it.

(3) When a person is charged with an offence, he may
be convicted of an attempt to commit such offence
although the attempt is not separately charged.

(4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to authorise
a conviction of any minor offence where the conditions
requisite for the initiation of proceedings in respect of
that minor offence have not been satisfied.
Illustrations (a) A is charged, under
section 407
of the
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) with criminal breach of
trust in respect of property entrusted to him as a carrier.
It appears, that he did commit criminal breach of trust
under
section 406
of that Code in respect of the property,
but that it was not entrusted to him as a carrier. He may
be convicted of criminal breach of trust under the said

section 406
.

(b) A is charged under
section 325
of the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860), with causing grievous hurt. He
proves that he acted on grave and sudden provocation.
He may be convicted under
section 335
of that Code.

464. Effect of omission to frame, or absence of, or error in,
charge. (1) No finding, sentence or order by a Court of
competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid merely on
the ground that no charge was framed or on the ground
of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge
including any misjoinder of charges, unless, in the
opinion of the Court of appeal, confirmation or revision,
a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.

(2) If the Court of appeal, confirmation or revision is of
opinion that a failure of justice has in fact been
occasioned, it may- (a) in the case of an omission to
frame a charge, order that a charge be framed and that
the trial be recommended from the point immediately
after the framing of the charge.
(b) in the case of an error, omission or irregularity in the
charge, direct a new trial to be had upon a charge framed
in whatever manner it thinks fit:

Provided that if the Court is of opinion that the
facts of the case are such that no valid charge could be
preferred against the accused in respect of the facts
proved, it shall quash the conviction.

6. A reading of the plain language of
Section 221(1)
and (2) shows that

if a single act or series of acts constitute several offences and the

prosecution is not certain about the particular offence then the accused can

be charged with the allegation of having committed all, some or any of the

offences. In such a case the accused can be convicted of the offence with

which he may not have been specifically charged but evidence produced by

the prosecution proves that such an offence has, in fact, been committed.

Section 222(1)
lays down that when a person is charged with an offence

consisting of several particulars and combination of only some of the

particulars constituting a minor offence is proved then he can be convicted

of the minor offence with which he may not have been charged.
Section

222(2)
lays down that when a person is charged with an offence but the

facts proved constitute a minor offence then he can be convicted of the

minor offence despite the fact that he may not have been charged with that

offence. Sub-section (3) of
Section 222
lays down that a person charged
with an offence, can be convicted of an attempt to commit such offence

even though a separate charge may not have been framed on that account.

Section 464
lays down that any error, omission or irregularity in the framing

of charge including any misjoinder of charges, will not invalidate a finding,

sentence or order by a court of competent jurisdiction unless the higher

court comes to a conclusion that failure of justice has been occasioned.

Sub-section (2) of
Section 464
specifies the modes which can be adopted by

the Court of appeal, confirmation or revision, if such court is of the opinion

that a failure of the justice has been occasioned on account of non framing

of charge or any error, omission or irregularity in the framing of charge.

7. The question whether omission to frame a charge or any error or

irregularity in the charge, is by itself, sufficient for quashing the conviction

of the accused was considered in
Willie (William) Slaney vs. State of M.P.

[AIR 1956 SC 116]. After examining the issue in detail, the Constitution

Bench of this Court observed:-

"Before we proceed to set out our answer and examine the
provisions of the Code, we will pause to observe that the Code
is a code of procedure and, like all procedural laws, is designed
to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate them by the
introduction of endless technicalities. The object of the Code is
to ensure that an accused person gets a full and fair trial along
certain well-established and well-understood lines that accord
with our notions of natural justice.

If he does, if he is tried by a competent court, if he is told
and clearly understands the nature of the offence for which he
is being tried, if the case against him is fully and fairly
explained to him and he is afforded a full and fair opportunity
of defending himself, then, provided there is `substantial'
compliance with the outward forms of the law, mere mistakes
in procedure, mere inconsequential errors and omissions in the
trial are regarded as venal by the Code and the trial is not
vitiated unless the accused can show substantial prejudice.
That, broadly speaking, is the basic principle on which the
Code is based.

Now here, as in all procedural laws, certain things are
regarded as vital. Disregard of a provision of that nature is fatal
to the trial and at once invalidates the conviction. Others are
not vital and whatever the irregularity they can be cured; and in
that event the conviction must stand unless the Court is
satisfied that there was prejudice. Some of these matters are
dealt with by the Code and wherever that is the case full effect
must be given to its provisions."

8. The Constitution Bench then referred to the provisions of
Sections
,
,
and
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, which are

analogous to
Section 215
,
and
of the Code and held:

"Now, as we have said,
Sections 225
,
, 535 and 537(a)
between them, cover every conceivable type of error and
irregularity referable to a charge that can possibly arise,
ranging from cases in which there is a conviction with no
charge at all from start to finish down to cases in which there is
a charge but with errors, irregularities and omissions in it. The
Code is emphatic that `whatever' the irregularity it is not to be
regarded as fatal unless there is prejudice.

It is the substance that we must seek. Courts have to
administer justice and justice includes the punishment of guilt
just as much as the protection of innocence. Neither can be
done if the shadow is mistaken for the substance and the goal is
lost in a labyrinth of unsubstantial technicalities. Broad vision
is required, a nice balancing of the rights of the State and the
protection of society in general against protection from
harassment to the individual and the risks of unjust conviction.

Every reasonable presumption must be made in favour of
an accused person; he must be given the benefit of every
reasonable doubt. The same broad principles of justice and fair
play must be brought to bear when determining a matter of
prejudice as in adjudging guilt. But when all is said and done
what we are concerned to see is whether the accused had a fair
trial, whether he knew what he was being tried for, whether the
main facts sought to be established against him were explained
to him fairly and clearly and whether he was given a full and
fair chance to defend himself.

If all these elements are there and no prejudice is shown
the conviction must stand whatever the irregularities whether
traceable to the charge or to a want of one."
9.
In
Gurbachan Singh vs. State of Punjab
[AIR 1957 SC 623], a

three Judges' Bench considered the question of prejudice and observed:

"In judging a question of prejudice, as of guilt, courts must act
with a broad vision and look to the substance and not to
technicalities, and their main concern should be to see whether
the accused had a fair trial, whether he knew what he was being
tried for, whether the main facts sought to be established
against him were explained to him fairly and clearly and
whether he was given a full and fair chance to defend himself."

10.
In
Lakhjit Singh vs. State of Punjab
[1994 Supp. (1) SCC 173], the

accused were charged and convicted of offence under
Section 302
IPC. The

High Court upheld their conviction. A two Judges' Bench of this Court

held that charge under
Section 302
IPC is not established but convicted the

appellants under
Section 306
IPC. While rejecting the argument that in the

absence of a specific charge under
Section 306
IPC, the appellants cannot

be convicted under that section, the Court observed:-

"The learned counsel, however, submits that since the charge
was for the offence punishable under
Section 302
Indian Penal
Code, the accused were not put to notice to meet a charge also
made against them under
Section 306
IPC and, therefore, they
are prejudiced by not framing a charge under
Section 306

Indian Penal Code and; therefore, presumption under
Section
113-A
of Indian Evidence Act cannot be drawn and
consequently a conviction under Section 306 cannot be
awarded. We are unable to agree. The facts and circumstances
of the case have been put forward against the accused under

Section 313
CrPC and when there was a demand for dowry it
cannot be said that the accused are prejudiced because the
cross-examination of the witnesses, as well as the answers
given under
Section 313
CrPC would show that they had
enough of notice of the allegations which attract
Section 306

Indian Penal Code also."

11.
In
Sangaraboina Sreenu vs. State of A.P.
[1997 (5) SCC 348],

another Bench of two Judges' expressed a contrary view. The facts of that

case were that the accused was convicted by the trial court under
Section
IPC. The High Court converted the conviction to one under
Section
IPC. While reversing the judgment of the High Court, this Court held:

"This appeal must succeed for the simple reason that having
acquitted the appellant of the charge under
Section 302
IPC --
which was the only charge framed against him -- the High
Court could not have convicted him of the offence under

Section 306
IPC. It is true that
Section 222
CrPC entitles a
court to convict a person of an offence which is minor in
comparison to the one for which he is tried but
Section 306
IPC
cannot be said to be a minor offence in relation to an offence
under
Section 302
IPC within the meaning of
Section 222

CrPC for the two offences are of distinct and different
categories. While the basic constituent of an offence under

Section 302
IPC is homicidal death, those of
Section 306
IPC
are suicidal death and abetment thereof."
12. In view of the apparently conflicting judgments of the coordinate

Benches, the issue was referred to a larger Bench.
In
Dalbir Singh vs.

State of U.P.
[2004 (5) SCC 334], a three Judges' Bench considered the

provisions of Section 222 and 464 of the Code and observed:-

"Sub-section (1) of Section 222 lays down that when a person
is charged with an offence consisting of several particulars, a
combination of some only of which constitutes a complete
minor offence, and such combination is proved, but the
remaining particulars are not proved, he may be convicted of
the minor offence, though he was not charged with it. Sub-
section (2) of the same section lays down that when a person is
charged with an offence and facts are proved which reduce it to
a minor offence, he may be convicted of the minor offence,
although he is not charged with it.
Section 222
CrPC is in the
nature of a general provision which empowers the court to
convict for a minor offence even though charge has been
framed for a major offence. Illustrations (a) and (b) to the said
section also make the position clear. However, there is a
separate chapter in the
Code of Criminal Procedure
, namely,
Chapter XXXV which deals with irregular proceedings and
their effect. This chapter enumerates various kinds of
irregularities which have the effect of either vitiating or not
vitiating the proceedings. Section 464 of the Code deals with
the effect of omission to frame, or absence of, or error in,
charge. Sub-section (1) of this section provides that no finding,
sentence or order by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be
deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was
framed or on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity
in the charge including any misjoinder of charges, unless, in
the opinion of the court of appeal, confirmation or revision, a
failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. This
clearly shows that any error, omission or irregularity in the
charge including any misjoinder of charges shall not result in
invalidating the conviction or order of a competent court unless
the appellate or revisional court comes to the conclusion that a
failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby."

13. The three Judges' Bench then referred to the earlier judgments in

Willie (William) Slaney vs. State of M.P.
(supra), Gurbachan Singh vs.

State of Punjab (supra) and observed:-

"There is a catena of decisions of this Court on the same lines
and it is not necessary to burden this judgment by making
reference to each one of them. Therefore, in view of
Section
CrPC, it is possible for the appellate or revisional court to
convict an accused for an offence for which no charge was
framed unless the court is of the opinion that a failure of justice
would in fact occasion. In order to judge whether a failure of
justice has been occasioned, it will be relevant to examine
whether the accused was aware of the basic ingredients of the
offence for which he is being convicted and whether the main
facts sought to be established against him were explained to
him clearly and whether he got a fair chance to defend himself.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that Sangaraboina Sreenu
was not correctly decided as it purports to lay down as a
principle of law that where the accused is charged under

Section 302
IPC, he cannot be convicted for the offence under

Section 306
IPC."

14. The ratio of the above noted judgments is that in certain situations an

accused can be convicted of an offence with which he may not have been

specifically charged and that an error, omission or irregularity in the

framing of charge is, by itself not sufficient for upsetting the conviction.

The appellate, confirming or revisional Court can interfere in such matters

only if it is shown that error, omission or irregularity in the framing of

charge has caused prejudice to the accused and failure of justice has been

occasioned.

15. Reverting to the facts of this case, we find that the appellant and his

co-accused were charged under
Section 304B
IPC. The specific allegation

levelled against them was that they had subjected the deceased to cruelty for

or in connection with demand for dowry and she had died unnatural death

within seven years of her marriage. Thus, the appellant knew that he was to

defend himself against the allegation of cruelty. The cross-examination of

prosecution witnesses unmistakably shows that the defense had made

concerted effort to discredit the testimony of mother, sisters and brother of
the deceased in the context of allegation of cruelty. Not only this in his

statement under Section 313 of the Code, the appellant denied the allegation

that he had subjected his wife to cruelty. It is thus evident that the appellant

was not only aware of the charge of cruelty but he got and availed the

opportunity to defend himself with reference to that charge. Therefore, it is

not possible to accept the submission of Shri Tulsi that omission of the trial

court to frame specific charge under
Section 498A
IPC had prejudiced the

cause of his client or that failure of justice had been occasioned on that

count.

16. The next point which requires consideration is whether after

discarding the testimony of PW-1, PW-6 and PW-7 and acquitting the

appellant of the charge under
Section 304B
IPC, the High Court could

convict him under
Section 498A
IPC.

17. Section 498A was added to the
IPC
by amending Act No.46 of 1983

in the backdrop of growing menace of dowry related cases in which the

women were subjected to cruelty and harassment and were forced to commit

suicide. This section lays down that if the husband or his relative subjects a

woman to cruelty, then he/she is liable to be punished with imprisonment

for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation appended to this section defines the term `cruelty' to mean any
willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to

commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health

(whether mental or physical) of the woman; or harassment of the woman

where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related

to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or

is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such

demand.

18. After three years, Section 304B was inserted by amending Act No.43

of 1986 to deal with cases involving dowry deaths occurring within seven

years of marriage. Sub-section (1) of
Section 304B
IPC lays down that

where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or

occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her

marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to

cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or

in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called

`dowry death', and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused

her death. By virtue of explanation appearing below sub-section (1), the

word `dowry' used therein carries the same meaning as is contained in

Section 2
of The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
19. The ingredient of cruelty is common to
Sections 304B
and
498A
IPC,

but the width and scope of two sections is different, inasmuch as Section

304B deals with cases of death as a result of cruelty or harassment within

seven years of marriage, Section 498A has a wider spectrum and it covers

all cases in which the wife is subjected to cruelty by her husband or relative

of the husband which may result in death by way of suicide or cause grave

injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) or even

harassment caused with a view to coerce the woman or any person related to

her to meet unlawful demand for property or valuable security.

20. In order to bring home charge under
Section 304B
IPC, the

prosecution is required to establish that the death of the woman has been

caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal

circumstances within seven years of her marriage and soon before her death,

the woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his

relative. However, for the purpose of conviction under
Section 498A
IPC, it

is sufficient to prove that the woman was subjected to cruelty, as elucidated

in the explanation appearing below substantive part of the section, by her

husband or his relative.

21. A reading of the impugned judgment shows that after recording a

finding that there was no evidence to prove that the deceased was treated
with cruelty or harassment in connection with demand of dowry soon before

her death, the High Court referred to the judgments of this Court in
Pyare

Lal vs. State of Haryana
(supra) and Satpal vs. State of Haryana (supra)

and held that evidence on record clearly makes out an offence under
Section

498A
IPC against the appellant.

22. Although the judgment under challenge does not contain an elaborate

discussion with reference to the ingredients of
Section 498A
IPC, having

carefully gone through the statements of PW-1, PW-6, PW-7, PW-14 and

PW-26, we are convinced that the prosecution succeeded in proving that the

appellant had subjected the deceased to cruelty within the meaning of clause

(a) of explanation appearing below
Section 498A
IPC and the mere fact that

the statements of three of them were not found convincing by the High

Court for sustaining the conviction of the appellant and his other co-accused

on the premise that all the ingredients of
Section 304B
IPC have not been

established is not sufficient to discard the prosecution case as a whole. PW-

1, PW-6 (both sisters), PW-7 (mother) and PW-26 (brother) have

categorically deposed that immediately after marriage the deceased was

given beating by the appellant, his brothers and was subjected to harassment

and taunting by mother-in-law and sister-in-law for being dark
complexioned and illiterate/not fluent in English. Their statements also

show that the appellant had hit the deceased with a brick resulting in wound

on her head which had to be stitched. On the date of death also, the

deceased was subjected to physical torture and harassment. Both the sisters

narrated that when they met the deceased, she was weeping and her eyes

were swollen. Their testimony has been substantially supported by PW-14

Rakesh Malhotra. He too stated that the deceased was subjected to beating

by her husband and she had suffered injury on her head. This part of the

prosecution case has not been disbelieved by the High Court which found

discrepancy only on the issue of demand of dowry. The beating given to the

deceased and harassment to which she was subjected had direct bearing on

her committing suicide. Therefore, we are convinced that the High Court

did not commit any error in convicting the appellant under
Section 498A

IPC.

23. The judgments on which Shri Tulsi has placed reliance do not support

the cause of the appellant. Rather, the judgment in
State of West Bengal

vs. Orilal Jaiswal & Another
(supra) supports the conclusion that an

offence under
Section 498A
IPC is made out if the woman is subjected to

physical assault, humiliation, harassment and mental torture.

In
Satpal vs.

State of Haryana
(supra), this Court held that even though the prosecution

evidence was not sufficient to establish charge under Section 304 or 306
IPC
, conviction under
Section 498A
IPC can be upheld because the

deceased was treated with cruelty by the appellant.

24. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The appellant who is on bail,

shall be arrested for serving out the remaining sentence.

......................... J.

(Altamas Kabir)

.........................J.
(G.S. Singhvi)
New Delhi
August 18, 2008