Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati

The State Of A.P vs Budagala Nageswara Rao on 11 December, 2025
APHC010404442009
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3369]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)

THURSDAY, THE ELEVENTH DAY OF DECEMBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1675/2009

Between:

1. THE STATE OF A.P.,
A.P. REP. BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH
COURT OF A.P., HYDERABAD.

...AP
...APPELLANT

AND

1. BUDAGALA NAGESWARA RAO, S/o. Krishna Murthy R/o. 4th line, 4th
cross road, Kakumanvarithota D.No.7-9-18,
D.No.7

...RESPODENT

Appeal under
Section 372
/
374(2)
/
378(4)
of Cr.P.C praying that the High
Court may be pleased to present this Memorandum of Criminal Appeal
against the order of acquittal against the accused/respondents in S.C.No.423

S
of 2004 on the file of the Hon'ble II Additional Senior Civil Judge-cum-Asst.,
Guntur dated 21stday of April 2008 and prays that this
Sessions Judge (FTC), Guntur,
Hon'ble Court may be pleased to set aside the order of acquittal and convict
the accused/(Respondents) for the offence with which he was charged.

IA
A NO: 1 OF 2009(CRLAMP 609 OF 2009

Petition under
Section 151
CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased
To condone the delay of "203 days" in presenting appeal against the order of
acquittal of the accused/respondent in S S.C.No.423
C.No.423 of 2004 on the file of the
Hon'ble II Additional Senior Civil JudgeJudge-cum-Asst., Session Judge (FTC),
Guntur.

Counsel for the Appellant:

pellant:
1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP)

Counsel for the Respondent:

1. A PRABHAKAR RAO

The Court made the following JUDGMENT:

1. This appeal is preferred by the Appellant / State against the judgment of
acquittal rendered by the Trial Court in Sessions Case No.423 of 2004 on the
file of II Additional Senior Civil Judge-cum-Assistant Sessions Judge, Fast
Track Court, Guntur (for short, 'the Trial Court') by its judgment dated
29.04.2008, acquitted the accused for the offences punishable under
sections
of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, '
IPC
').

2. Perused the impugned judgment of acquittal rendered by the Trial
Court, which is now under challenge in this appeal. The record consists of the
evidence of PWs.1 to 9, and the documents marked as Exs.P.1 to P.13 on
behalf of the prosecution. On behalf of the defence, no witnesses were
examined, and the accused filed 29 documents at the time of his examination
under
section 313
of Cr.P.C.

3. The facts in a nutshell, which give rise to the present appeal, are as
follows:

The deceased, Venkata Lakshmi, was the daughter of Eluri
Venkatamma (PW.1). She married Nallapati Chinnabbayi of
Narasaraopet in 1985 and had two children: a son, Venkata Naga
Bala Krishna (PW.2), and a daughter, Durga Bhavani (LW.3). After
her divorce, the deceased lived with her mother along with her
children. She mortgaged her house at Kakumanuvarithota, Guntur,
and borrowed money from the accused for family needs. The
accused also rented two shops belonging to her and her mother for
his business. He later developed an attraction to her and repeatedly
pressured her to marry him, but she refused. Without her consent,
he sold the house she had mortgaged as security. He also failed to
pay rent despite repeated requests. He frequently came to her home
in a drunken state, demanded money by misusing documents
fraudulently obtained from her, and attempted to coerce her into
marriage. He further threatened to ruin the lives of her and her
children if she did not comply. On 29.03.2004 at about 11:00 AM,
she poured kerosene on her body behind the house, in the absence
of her mother and children, and set her clothes on fire. Her mother
and daughter returned home, heard her cries, extinguished the
flames, and took her to the Government General Hospital, Guntur.
She died on 03.04.2004 at 3:10 PM due to burn injuries. The
government doctor (LW.9), who conducted the autopsy, opined that
she died from complications caused by burns. In the dying
declaration recorded by the Judicial Magistrate of First Class
(LW.10), she stated that the accused pressured her to marry him,
and she could not bear the harassment. She therefore poured
kerosene on herself and set her clothes on fire to end her life. Thus,
the accused abetted her suicide and is liable for the offence under

Section 306
IPC.

4. The V Additional Junior Civil Judge-cum-Judicial Magistrate of First
Class, Guntur, vide orders in P.R.C.No.6 of 2004, has committed the accused
to the Court of Sessions, Guntur Division, to take up the trial for the offences
punishable under
Section 306
of the IPC.

5. The Court of Sessions, Guntur Division, has taken up the case on file
under
Section 306
of the IPC against the accused and has referred it to the
Court of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Guntur, for disposal
in accordance with law. Subsequently, the case in Sessions Case No.423 of
2004 has been numbered. After hearing the Public Prosecutor and the
defence counsel, the Trial Court framed a charge against the accused under

Section 306
of the IPC, which was read over and explained to him in Telugu,
as required under
Section 228
of the Cr.P.C. The accused did not plead guilty
and claimed to be tried.

6. The learned Sessions Judge examined the accused as required under

Section 313
of the Cr.P.C., to enable him to consider the evidence led on
behalf of the prosecution and also against him. However, the accused denied
the evidence adduced by the prosecution. He filed 29 documents in his
defence, and his counsel submitted a memorandum of arguments on his
behalf.

7. After considering the available material on record, the learned Sessions
Judge found the accused not guilty of the offences punishable under
Section
of the IPC and acquitted him.

8. Sir K. Sandeep, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for the
State, contends that the prosecution has clearly established all the essential
ingredients constituting an offence punishable under
Section 306
IPC against
the accused; the learned Judge failed to properly appreciate the cogent and
reliable evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses; it is evident from the
dying declaration of the deceased, as well as from the testimony of the
supporting prosecution witnesses, that the accused was solely responsible for
abetting the deceased's suicide; despite the prosecution having proved the
guilt of the accused, the learned Judge, without assigning adequate weight to
the prosecution's case, proceeded to acquit him; the additional reasons given
by the learned Judge for the acquittal are also asserted to be unsustainable.

9. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the accused
supported the findings and conclusions recorded by the Trial Court.

10. I have heard the learned counsel on both sides and perused the
material on record, including the oral and documentary evidence produced by
the prosecution before the Trial Court.

11. The point for determination is:
Was the Trial Court justified in acquitting the accused?

P O I N T:

12. Before re-appreciation of the evidence on record, it is necessary here to
mention the power of the Appellate Court regarding interference. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court, in the case of
A. Shankar V. State of Karnataka
1 , at
paragraph 26 of the judgment, has held as follows:

"26. It is settled legal proposition that in exceptional circumstances the
appellate court, under compelling circumstances, should reverse the
judgment of acquittal of the court below if the findings so recorded by the
court below are found to be perverse i.e. the conclusions of the court
below are contrary to the evidence on record or its entire approach in
dealing with the evidence is found to be patently illegal leading to
miscarriage of justice or its judgment is unreasonable based on erroneous
law and facts on the record of the case. While dealing so, the appellate
court must bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and
further that acquittal by the court below bolsters the presumption of his
innocence."

13.
In
State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran & Anr.
2, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, while considering the power of the Appellate Court to interfere in an
appeal against acquittal, after adverting to various earlier decisions on this
point, has concluded as under:

"16.....while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal
the court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal
unless the approach of the lower court is vitiated by some manifest
illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any
reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as
perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the court of appeal
would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the
court below. However, the appellate court has a power to review the
evidence if it is of the view that the view arrived at by the court below is
perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored
the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate court, in
such circumstances, to reappreciate the evidence to arrive at a just
decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any
of the accused is connected with commission of the crime he is charged
with."
(2011) 6 SCC 279
(2007) 3 SCC 755
14. With the above principles in mind, this Court analyze the reasoning and
ultimate conclusion of the Trial Court in interfering with the order of acquittal.

15. Reading the
section 306
of IPC would indicate that there must be either
instigation, or an engagement or intentional aid to doing of a thing.
In

S.S.Chheena V. Vijay Kumar Mahajan
3 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court
explained the concept of abetment along with necessary ingredient for offence
under
Section 306
of IPC as under:

"25. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or
intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on
the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction
cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the
cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under

Section 306
IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It
also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit
suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the
deceased into such a position that he committed suicide."

16.
In
Amalendu Pal V. State of W.B.
4 , the Hon'ble Supreme court
explained the parameters of
Section 306
in following words:

"12. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that before holding an
accused guilty of an offence under
Section 306
IPC, the court must
scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also
assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the
cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no
other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be borne in mind
that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or
indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the
allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate
to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or
compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of
Section 306

IPC is not sustainable.

13. In order to bring a case within the purview of
Section 306
IPC there
must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the
person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have
played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to
facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the
(2010) 12 SCC 190
(2010) 1 SCC 707
person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by
the prosecution before he could be convicted under
Section 306
IPC."

17.
In
Ramesh Kumar V. State of Chhattisgarh
5 , while explaining the
meaning of Instigation, the Hon'ble Supreme Court stated that:

"20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do
"an act". To satisfy the requirement of "instigation", though it is not
necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes
"instigation" must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the
consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must
be capable of being spelt out. Where the accused had, by his acts or
omission or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances
that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, in
which case, an "instigation" may have to be inferred. A word uttered in a fit
of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow,
cannot be said to be instigation."

18. These principles and necessary ingredients of
Section 306
and
of
Indian Penal Code were reiterated and summarized by the Hon'ble Supreme
court in the case of
Gurucharan Singh V. State of Punjab6
.

19. PW.1 is the mother, PW.2 is the son, and PW.3 is the sister of the
deceased, Venkata Lakshmi. PW.4 is the husband of PW.3. PWs.3 and 4 did
not support the prosecution's case and have been treated as hostile
witnesses. Their evidence indicates that they are unaware of the reasons
behind the deceased's suicide. However, PW.3 stated that the police did not
examine her and that her testimony did not consistent with the statement
recorded in Ex.P1. PW.4 also did not support the prosecution's case regarding
the observation of the scene of the offence by the police and the seizure of
material objects in his presence. He did, however, state that he signed the
observation report at the Government General Hospital, Guntur, at the request
of the police.

20. PW.7 is the Head Constable of Arundelpet L & O Police Station, who
recorded the statement of the deceased at the Government General Hospital,
(2001) 9 SCC 618
(2020) 10 SCC 200
Guntur, upon receiving information. PW.8 is the Judicial Magistrate of First
Class, who recorded the dying declaration of the deceased, Venkata Lakshmi,
after receiving intimation from the hospital. It is not seriously disputed that the
deceased, Venkata Lakshmi, was married in 1985 to one Nallapati
Chinnabbai, and the couple was blessed with a son, Venkata Naga Bala
Krishna (PW.2), and a daughter, Durga Bhavani, during their marriage.
Subsequently, the deceased obtained a divorce from her husband and was
living with her mother, along with her son and daughter.

21. The evidence of PWs.1 and 2 reveals that the deceased had borrowed
Rs.2,00,000/- from the accused to meet her family necessities and had
mortgaged her house as security for the said loan. PW.1 and her deceased
daughter, Venkata Lakshmi, had also leased out their shops to the accused
for his business, on payment of rent. However, the accused repeatedly
insisted that the deceased should marry him. On her refusal, he sold the
mortgaged house without her consent or knowledge, and further failed to pay
rent despite repeated requests made by the deceased and her mother. It was
further stated that the accused used to visit her house in a drunken condition,
demand money, and take advantage of the documents obtained from her, with
the intention of forcing her to marry him. On 29.03.2004, at about 11:00 AM, in
the absence of her mother and children, the deceased poured kerosene over
her body at the rear portion of the house and set herself on fire; when her
mother and daughter returned home, they heard her cries, immediately
extinguished the flames, and admitted her to the Government General
Hospital, Guntur, for treatment. Upon receiving information, PW.7 went to the
hospital, recorded her statement, registered the case, and sent a copy of the
FIR to the concerned authorities. PW.8, the Judicial Magistrate of First Class,
also received intimation, visited the hospital, identified the victim, Venkata
Lakshmi, with the aid of the medical officer, and recorded her statement.

22. The evidence of the Investigating Officer, PW.9, shows that he visited
the scene of the offence and, in the presence of mediators PWs.4 and 5,
found a partially burnt saree and blouse, along with a plastic bottle. He seized
the semi-burnt saree, blouse and plastic bottle (MOs.1 and 2) in the presence
of the mediators. The prosecution examined PW.6, the doctor who conducted
the autopsy on the dead body of the deceased, and issued the certificate
marked as Ex.P5. His undisputed evidence shows that, upon receiving a
requisition from the S.H.O., Arundelpet Police Station in Crime No.153 of 2004
on 04.04.2004, he conducted the post-mortem examination on the body of
Eluri Venkata Lakshmi between 12.00 PM and 1.00 PM. On examination, he
found burn injuries on the body and opined that the cause of death was
complications arising from burns.

23. PW.5 acted as a mediator during the inquest held over the dead body of
the deceased, and was also present at the time of observation of the scene of
offence and the seizure of the saree, blouse, and plastic bottle (MOs.1 and 2)
from the spot. According to the prosecution, the deceased stated before
PWs.7 and 8 that she was unable to bear the harassment and torture inflicted
by the accused, and therefore poured kerosene over her body and set her
clothes on fire to end her life.

24. Although PWs.1 and 2 testified that the deceased had borrowed
Rs.2,00,000/- from the accused and mortgaged her house as security, and
that the accused subsequently sold the said house, during cross-examination,
both witnesses admitted that they had no personal knowledge of those
transactions and that they were only informed about the mortgage by the
deceased. However, PW.2, the son of the deceased, categorically admitted in
cross-examination that he had perused the document executed by his mother,
and that the said deed was in fact a Sale-cum-General Power of Attorney. The
accused produced a certified copy of an Agreement of Sale, along with a
General Power of Attorney dated 03.11.1999, for a consideration of
Rs.3,70,000/-. The document shows that the deceased sold her house to the
accused on 03.11.1999 for Rs.3,70,000/-, executed a registered agreement of
sale, and that her father, the husband of PW.1, attested the agreement. Once
this document establishes the execution of a registered sale agreement
coupled with a General Power of Attorney in favour of the accused by the
deceased, and in the absence of any supporting documentary evidence, the
version of PWs.1 and 2 that the deceased borrowed Rs.2,00,000/- from the
accused and mortgaged her house towards security cannot be accepted. A
plain reading of the document, as rightly observed by the Trial Court, clearly
indicates that the accused had the right to sell the house property in terms of
the agreement of sale and the accompanying General Power of Attorney
executed by the deceased.

25. The defence produced documents, namely receipts issued by
Ushodaya Publications of Eenadu dated 30.05.2001, 19.10.2001, and
09.06.2002, along with a certified copy of the registered sale deed dated
06.03.2003. These documents show that the accused sold the house, which
he had purchased from the deceased, to one Bathini Sreenivasa Rao for
Rs.3,70,000/- on 06.03.2003, under a registered sale deed executed in
accordance with the terms of the original agreement. It was further elicited
during the cross-examination of PWs.1 and 2 that the deceased, Venkata
Lakshmi, did not file any suit against the accused either in relation to the sale
agreement executed by her or the subsequent sale deed executed by the
accused pursuant to that agreement. These circumstances clearly show that
the deceased had no grievance regarding the sale transaction effected by the
accused; otherwise, she could have questioned the transaction in accordance
with the law.

26. The evidence on record establishes that the deceased, Venkata
Lakshmi, did not choose to question the transactions entered into between
herself and the accused, nor the subsequent transactions made by the
accused. Accordingly, the Trial Court rightly observed that, as the accused
executed the sale deed pursuant to the General Power of Attorney granted by
her, and in accordance with the terms of the agreement of sale, such conduct
would not amount to provoking or forcing the deceased to take the extreme
step of committing suicide, particularly on 29.03.2004. The Trial Court further
noted that the sale transaction had evidently taken place on 06.03.2003,
leaving a time gap of more than one year between the two events.

27. The Trial Court extensively referred to the inconsistencies between the
statements of PWs.1 and 2 and the dying declarations made by the deceased,
Venkata Lakshmi, to PWs.7 and 8. In her statement recorded by PW.7, the
deceased stated that she had borrowed money from the accused and
mortgaged her properties, and that the accused had obtained promissory
notes from her for amounts exceeding those actually borrowed. She further
stated that he attempted to deprive her of her properties, and, unable to bear
the humiliation caused by him, she committed suicide to end her life. It is
pertinent to note that she did not mention to the Investigating Officer the
execution of the registered agreement of sale, or the sale of the property by
the accused pursuant to that agreement, nor did she refer to the newspaper
publications made prior to the sale in the Eenadu daily. In contrast, in the
dying declaration given to PW.8, the deceased stated that the accused had
sold her house without her consent or knowledge, compelled her to pay
money as demanded, came to her home in a drunken condition, insisted that
she should marry him, threatened to ruin the lives of her and her children, and
continued to persecute her to marry him even though she had lodged a case
against him.

28. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that the Trial Court observed that
neither the evidence of PW.1 nor PW.2 disclosed any consistent instance of
the accused harassing or torturing the deceased to marry him, either at the
time of the incident or proximate to the date of her suicide. Furthermore, the
statement given by the deceased to PW.7 did not contain any allegation that
the accused demanded her to marry him. Consequently, the Trial Court rightly
entertained doubt regarding the credibility of the version put forth by the
deceased in her statement to PW.8 on this aspect.
29. Another inconsistency noted by the Trial Court is that, in her statement
to PW.7, the deceased alleged that the accused had taken promissory notes
from her for amounts exceeding the sums actually borrowed, with the intention
of depriving her of her property. In contrast, in her statement before PW.8,
Judicial Magistrate of First Class, the deceased stated that the accused
demanded repayment of the amounts claimed by him towards the discharge
of debts. PWs.1 and 2, however, did not depose that the accused had
obtained promissory notes from the deceased for amounts more than those
actually borrowed, or that he pressurized her to pay such amounts. Although
PW.1 stated during cross-examination that the accused had obtained her
thumb impressions on ten blank promissory notes, her evidence did not
establish that the accused had obtained any promissory notes from the
deceased.

30. The accused produced a certified copy of a promissory note dated
31.12.1999, along with the certified copy of the award passed before the Lok
Adalat in O.S.No.1117 of 2002 on the file of the I Additional Junior Civil Judge,
Guntur. These documents reveal that the deceased borrowed Rs.50,000/-
from the accused on 31.12.1999 for her family needs and executed a
promissory note in his favour, agreeing to repay the said amount with interest
at 24% per annum. As she failed to discharge the debt, the accused filed
O.S.No.1117 of 2002, and subsequently, the matter was compromised before
the Lok Adalat, where the deceased paid Rs.50,000/- to the accused towards
full and final settlement of the claim, and an award was passed in terms of the
compromise. In view of the settlement reached before the Lok Adalat, it
cannot be said that the claim made by the accused was unsupported by
consideration. Had PW.1 not borrowed any amount from the accused, there
would have been no occasion for her to repay any amount before the Lok
Adalat.

31. As already observed, the evidence of PWs.1 and 2 does not establish
that the accused obtained promissory notes from the deceased. In these
circumstances, the Trial Court rightly held that it is not justifiable to conclude
that the conduct of the accused in relation to the money transactions
referred
to above
amounted to instigation or abetment to commit suicide.

32. PWs.1 and 2 testified that the accused took two shop rooms from the
deceased on lease but failed to pay rent regularly and harassed her. However,
PW.1 admitted during cross-examination that the accused had paid
Rs.60,000/- as advance rent and that she and her daughter, the deceased,
had executed a lease agreement in his favour for a period of ten years. She
further confirmed that the shops were leased out for business purposes and
that the accused had paid a total of Rs.1,00,000/- towards rent.

33. In support of his defence, the accused produced a certified copy of the
registered lease deed dated 09.05.2001 and a copy of the agreement dated
15.05.2001. These documents show that the deceased, Venkata Lakshmi,
and her mother had leased out their shops to the accused upon receiving a
sum of Rs.1,00,000/- as rent. In view of the admissions made during the
cross-examination of PWs.1 and 2, coupled with the registered lease deed
and the agreement
referred to above
, the allegation of PWs.1 and 2 that the
accused failed to pay rent regularly and harassed or abetted the deceased to
commit suicide is rendered untenable. On the contrary, as rightly observed by
the Trial Court, the statement of the deceased recorded by PWs.7 and 8 does
not indicate that the accused failed to pay rent regularly or caused her any
trouble leading to her suicide. Had there been any truth in the version put
forward by PWs.1 and 2, the deceased would not have omitted to mention
such facts before PW.7 or PW.8.

34. As already noted, in her statement before PW.7, the deceased did not
state that the accused had asked her to marry him, that she refused, or that
he thereafter harassed, tortured, or threatened to ruin the lives of her children.
Instead, she stated that she had borrowed money from the accused,
mortgaged her properties, and that the accused had taken promissory notes
for amounts exceeding the sums actually lent. She further stated that, being
unable to bear the hardship caused by his actions, she attempted to commit
suicide. Whereas, in the dying declaration made before PW.8, the deceased is
said to have stated that the accused sold her house without her consent or
knowledge, compelled her to pay the amounts he demanded, came to her
home in a drunken state, asked her to marry him, and threatened to ruin her
children's lives. Taking these inconsistent versions into account, the Trial
Court expressed doubt that the dying declarations were the result of tutoring
or prompting, or the product of imagination.

35. The Trial Court noted that PW.1 testified in cross-examination that the
accused had harassed the deceased only two or three years prior to her
death. Similarly, PW.2 stated that the accused had harassed his mother under
the influence of alcohol, and that she had lodged a complaint with the police,
with PW.2 accompanying her to the police station. He further stated that this
incident occurred about one year before her death. Thus, the evidence of
PWs.1 and 2 does not indicate that the accused harassed or tortured the
deceased immediately before her suicide or within a period proximate to its
occurrence.

36.
In
Rajesh V. State of Haryana
7 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court after
referring to
Sections 306
and
of the IPC held as follows:

9. Conviction under
Section 306
IPC is not sustainable on the allegation
of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time
of occurrence on the part of the accused, which led or compelled the
person to commit suicide. In order to bring a case within the purview of

Section 306
IPC, there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of
the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of
suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing
certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of
abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and
established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under
Section
IPC.
(2020) 15 SCC 359
37. The Trial Court also took into consideration the fact that the evidence of
PWs.1 and 2 does not corroborate each other and is contrary to both the
statement of the deceased recorded by PW.7 and the dying declaration
recorded by PW.8. The testimony of PWs.1 and 2 indicates that the alleged
harassment by the accused occurred either two to three years prior to the
deceased's death, as stated by PW.1, or one year prior to her death, as stated
by PW.2. Further, the statement recorded by PW.7 does not disclose that the
accused demanded the deceased to marry him. These inconsistencies create
doubt as to whether the deceased committed suicide due to instigation or
abetment by the accused. Consequently, the Trial Court extended the benefit
of doubt to the accused.

38. Upon appreciation of the evidence on record, the Trial Court rightly
concluded that the alleged acts of the accused were not the proximate cause
of the death of Venkata Lakshmi. Even if the version put forth by PWs.1 and 2
is assumed to be accurate and correct, this Court is of the view that the
quarrels that occurred between the accused and the deceased one to three
years prior to the suicide of the deceased cannot be taken into consideration
to conclude that the suicide was a direct result of those quarrels.

39. The Trial Court further observed that there is no indication in the
testimony of material witnesses implicating the accused in the offence. It
further observed that the conduct of the accused towards the deceased prior
to her death was not of such a nature as to drive her to commit suicide on
29.03.2004. Thus, the evidence on record does not conclusively establish the
circumstances that led the deceased to take the extreme step of ending her
life. Taking these facts into consideration, the Trial Court concluded that their
evidence lacked rationality.

40. Upon a careful consideration of the facts and evidence recorded by the
Trial Court, as well as the legal principles established through statutory
provisions and judicial precedents, this Court is of the view that no proximate
link has been established between the accused and the commission of suicide
by the deceased. The prosecution has failed to produce any evidence
substantiating the allegations against the accused. The material on record
does not demonstrate any act of goading, solicitation, or insinuation by the
accused that could have prompted the deceased to take the extreme step.
There is nothing to suggest that the accused played an active role or
committed any positive or direct act amounting to instigation, aiding, or
abetment of suicide. The Trial Court also observed inconsistencies in the
prosecution's evidence, further undermining the reliability of the version
presented. In these circumstances, and upon a comprehensive evaluation of
the entire evidentiary record, the Trial Court correctly concluded that the
prosecution had failed to prove the charge of abetment of suicide under

Section 306
of the IPC. Consequently, the Trial Court acquitted the accused of
the said charge.

41. In a criminal case, the degree of proof is the standard that is required in
civil proceedings, and if there is the slightest doubt in the mind of the Court
regarding the involvement of the accused person, then the Court should not
convict the accused person with such a doubt. Rather, it would be proper for
the Court to pass a judgment of acquittal in favour of the accused. When Trial
Court after adequate appreciation of the evidence of witnesses passed a
judgment of the acquittal, it would not be appropriate for the Appellate Court to
disturb
the said judgment
, unless
the said judgment
of acquittal is
unreasonable, even if two views are possible, then also, the Appellate Court
should not disturb
the said judgment
, instead, the Court should upheld the
view favoured the accused.

42. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that in an acquittal
appeal, if another view is possible, then also the Appellate Court cannot
substitute its view by reversing the acquittal into a conviction unless the
findings of the Trial Court are perverse, contrary to the material on record,
palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable.
43.
In
Mohan @ Srinivas @ Seena @ Tailor Seena V. State of
Karnataka8
, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed the scope of
section
of the Code as under:

"
Section 378
Cr.P.C. enables the State to prefer an appeal against an order
of acquittal.
Section 384
Cr.P.C., speaks of the powers that can be
exercised by the appellate court. When the trial court renders its decision by
acquitting the accused, the presumption of innocence gathers strength
before the appellate court. Consequently, the onus on the prosecution
becomes more burdensome as there is a double presumption of innocence.
Certainly, the court of the first instance has its advantages in delivering its
verdict, which is to see the witnesses in person while they depose. The
appellate court is expected to involve itself in a deeper, studied scrutiny of
not only the evidence before it. Still, it is duty bound to satisfy itself whether
the decision of the trial court is both a possible and plausible view. When
two views are possible, the one taken by the trial court in a case of acquittal
is to be followed on the touchstone of liberty and the advantage of having
seen the witnesses.

44. So far as the main issue is concerned, that scope of acquittal appeal is
well defined by now by series of decisions and the same is not to be repeated
time and again, however, one of the recent decision in case of
Harbeer Singh
V. Sheeshpal
9 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down that mere fact that
another view could also have been possible that cannot be a ground to
reverse the acquittal. The powers of High Court are wide enough to turtle the
acquittal order, however, some parameters are well defined by series of
decisions in which this Court is of the considered opinion that State has not
made out any case which would permit this Court to exercise such wide
powers. Neither any material irregularity is pointed out nor any perversity is
reflecting on the contrary it is reflecting that there is an application of mind on
the part of learned Judge as the entire material on record has been dealt with
specifically and the principle of appreciation of evidence appears to have been
rightly undertaken by the Court below and therefore when such eventuality is
reflecting sitting in a jurisdiction dealing with an order of acquittal Court is of
the opinion not to interfere with such exercise. The relevant observations of
2021 (15) SCALE Pg. 184
(2017) CriLJ 169
the aforesaid decision in paras:10 and 11 (Cri.L.J.) are reproduced herein
after:

"10. The above principle has been reiterated by this court in a number of
judicial decisions and the position of law that emerges from a
comprehensive survey of these cases is that in an appeal under
Article 136

of the Constitution of India, this court will not interfere with the judgment of
the High Court unless the same is clearly unreasonable or perverse or
mainfestly illegal or grossly unjust. The mere fact that another view could
also have been taken on the evidence on record is not a ground for
reversing an order of acquittal.

11. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the guilt of the
accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. The burden of
proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt lies with the prosecution, and
it never shifts. Another golden thread that runs through the web of
administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible
on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the
accused and the other to his innocence, the view that is favourable to the
accused should be adopted.

45. Considering the aforesaid set of circumstances and in view of the
conjoint reading of the conclusion arrived at in co-relation with the evidence on
record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution makes out
no case to establish a definite guilt of the respondent / accused.

46. It is a settled principle of law that if the Trial Court takes the view, it
should not be reversed, even if another view is possible. The view taken by
the Trial Court is a plausible one. Therefore, considering the facts and
circumstances of the case, this Court is not inclined to reverse the Trial
Court's finding.

47. The Trial Court rightly reached its conclusion, providing sound and
justifiable reasons. Therefore, the appellant's request for interference lacks
merit. A re-appreciation of the evidence reveals no misdirection or
misinterpretation by the Trial Court. Upon careful reconsideration, there is no
flaw in the findings of fact by the Trial Court. Therefore, the acquittal of the
respondent/accused cannot be interfered with. Accordingly, the appeal against
the acquittal is dismissed, and the judgment of acquittal is confirmed, and
there is no reason to interfere with the judgment of the Trial Court.
Accordingly, the point is answered.

48. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present
Criminal Appeal No.1675 of 2009 fails and the same deserves to be dismissed
and is dismissed, accordingly. The judgment and order of acquittal passed by
the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge-cum-Assistant Sessions Judge,
Fast Track Court, Guntur, in Sessions Case No.423 of 2004, dated
29.04.2008, stands confirmed.

Interim orders, if any, granted earlier shall stand vacated, and all
pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.

_____________________________
JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO

Date: 11.12.2025
SAK
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1675/2009

Date: 11.12.2025

SAK