Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati

State Of Andhra Pradesh vs Pellakuru Krishna Mohan Reddy on 19 November, 2025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH: AMARAVATI
****
Criminal Petition Nos.9363, 9364 and 9365 of 2025

Criminal Petition No.9363 of 2025

Between:

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH THE STATION HOUSE
OFFICER, GANNAVARAM POLICE STATION, KRISHNA DISTRICT,
ADDL. S.P. CID, CID HEADQUARTERS, MANGALAGIRI
REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH, AT AMARAVATI.

...PETITIONER / COMPLAINANT / STATE

AND

BALAJI GOVINDAPPA, S/O.MUNEGOWDA GOVINDAPPA, AGE
ABOUT 61 YEARS FLAT NO.101, H.NO.MCH 8-2-624/A/B/3/1, BURRI
RESIDENCY, ROAD NO.11, CITY CENTER, BANJARA HILLS,
HYDERABAD

...RESPONDENT / ACCUSED No.33

Criminal Petition No.9364 of 2025

Between:

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH THE STATION HOUSE
OFFICER, GANNAVARAM POLICE STATION, KRISHNA DISTRICT,
ADDL. S.P. CID, CID HEADQUARTERS, MANGALAGIRI
REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH, AT AMARAVATI.

...PETITIONER / COMPLAINANT / STATE

AND

PELLAKURU KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY, S/O. RAMA SUBBA REDDY,
AGE ABOUT 67 YEARS, VILLA NO. 9A, SUNRISE VALLEY,
UPPERALLY, ATTAPUR, RANGAREDDY, TELANGANA.

...RESPONDENT / ACCUSED No.32
Criminal Petition No.9365 of 2025

Between:

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH THE STATION HOUSE
OFFICER, GANNAVARAM POLICE STATION, KRISHNA DISTRICT,
ADDL. S.P. CID, CID HEADQUARTERS, MANGALAGIRI
REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH, AT AMARAVATI.

...PETITIONER / COMPLAINANT / STATE

AND

K DHANUNJAYA REDDY, S/o. K. REDDENNA, AGE ABOUT 61 YEARS,
I.A.S (RETIRED), R/O. FLAT NO. 1004, C BLOCK FORTUNE ONE,
ROAD NO. 12, BANJARA HILLS, HYDERABAD, TELANGANA.

...RESPONDENT / ACCUSED No.31

DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED: 19.11.2025

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:

HON'BLE DR.JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA
1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments ? Yes / No

2. Whether copies of Judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals ? Yes / No

3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the
fair copy of the Judgment ? Yes / No

_________________________________________
DR.JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA
* HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA
+ Criminal Petition Nos.9363, 9364 and 9365 of 2025

% 19.11.2025

# Criminal Petition No.9363 of 2025

Between:

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH THE STATION HOUSE
OFFICER, GANNAVARAM POLICE STATION, KRISHNA DISTRICT,
ADDL. S.P. CID, CID HEADQUARTERS, MANGALAGIRI
REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH, AT AMARAVATI.
...PETITIONER / COMPLAINANT / STATE

AND

BALAJI GOVINDAPPA, S/O.MUNEGOWDA GOVINDAPPA, AGE
ABOUT 61 YEARS, FLAT NO.101, H.NO.MCH 8-2-624/A/B/3/1, BURRI
RESIDENCY, ROAD NO.11, CITY CENTER, BANJARA HILLS,
HYDERABAD.
...RESPONDENT / ACCUSED No.33

Criminal Petition No.9364 of 2025

Between:

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH THE STATION HOUSE
OFFICER, GANNAVARAM POLICE STATION, KRISHNA DISTRICT,
ADDL.S.P. CID, CID HEADQUARTERS, MANGALAGIRI
REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH, AT AMARAVATI.

...PETITIONER / COMPLAINANT / STATE

AND

PELLAKURU KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY, S/O. RAMA SUBBA REDDY,
AGE ABOUT 67 YEARS, VILLA NO. 9A, SUNRISE VALLEY,
UPPERALLY, ATTAPUR, RANGAREDDY, TELANGANA.

...RESPONDENT / ACCUSED No.32
Criminal Petition No.9365 of 2025

Between:

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH THE STATION HOUSE
OFFICER, GANNAVARAM POLICE STATION, KRISHNA DISTRICT,
ADDL. S.P. CID, CID HEADQUARTERS, MANGALAGIRI
REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH, AT AMARAVATI.

...PETITIONER / COMPLAINANT / STATE

AND

K DHANUNJAYA REDDY, S/o. K.REDDENNA, AGE ABOUT 61 YEARS,
I.A.S (RETIRED), R/O. FLAT NO.1004, C BLOCK FORTUNE ONE,
ROAD NO.12, BANJARA HILLS, HYDERABAD, TELANGANA.

...RESPONDENT / ACCUSED No.31

! Counsel for the Petitioner :

Sri Sidharth Luthra, Learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner
assisted by Sri M.Lakshmi Narayana, learned Public Prosecutor, learned
counsels Sri A.Ramdheeraj, Sri P.Rustonkhar and Sri P.Arora.

^ Counsel for the Respondent :

Sri T.Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Inakollu
Venkateswarlu and Sri Siddharth Sharma, learned counsel for Respondent /
Accused No. 33 in Crl.P.No.9363 of 2025;

Sri Siddhartha Dave, Learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri T.Nagarjuna
Reddy, learned counsel (assisted by Sri K.Sri Sai Sanjay, Sri Paragati
Nagendra Babu and Sri V.Sai Likhith) appearing for respondent /Accused No.
32 in Crl.P.No.9364 of 2025;

Sri S.Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri S.Dushyanth
Reddy (assisted by Sri Pradyuman Kaistha, Sri S.Uday Bhanu, Sri
P.M.Mithileswara Reddy and Sri K.Mokshitha Ramakrishna,) learned counsel
for Respondent / Accused No.31 in Crl.P.No.9365 of 2025.

< Gist :

> Head Note:
? Cases Referred:

1. (2023) SCC OnLine SC 502
2. Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.5724/2023, dated 12.05.2023
= 2023 SCC OnLine SC 751
3. (2021) 16 SCC 376
4. (2006) 6 SCC 277
5. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 726
6. (1991) 3 SCC 655
7. (2014) 16 SCC 543
8. (2023) 17 SCC 48
9. (2024) 3 SCC 734
10. (2024) 6 SCC 758
11. (2023) 15 SCC 311
12. (2002) 5 SCC 582
13. (2001) 7 SCC 536
14. (2023) 16 SCC 779
15. (1985) 2 SCC 537
16. (2007) 8 SCC 770
17. (1994) 5 SCC 410
18. (2013) 3 SCC 77
19. 2000 SCC OnLine Del 1336
20. 2000 SCC OnLine Del 911
21. 1993 SCC OnLine AP 260
22. 2009 SCC OnLine AP 264
23. 2020 SCC OnLine AP 1464
24. (2024) 11 SCC 733
25. (1994) 4 SCC 602
26. (2017) 15 SCC 67
27. (2013) 5 SCC 762
28. 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3124
29. (2016) 1 SCC 507
30. (2019) 14 SCC 599
31. (1995) 1 SCC 42
32. (2009) 6 SCC 346
33. (2021) 20 SCC 636
34. 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2946
35. 1993 SCC OnLine AP 66
36. 2024 SCC OnLine Del 1631
37. 2007 SCC OnLine Del 450
38. 1974 SCC OnLine Del 98
39. 2003 SCC OnLine Mad 1165
40. 1996 SCC OnLine Ker 112
41. 1978 SCC OnLine P&H 117
42. (2010) 12 SCC 254
43. (1992) 4 SCC 272
44. (2004) 8 SCC 579
45. (2008) 1 SCC 494
46. (2013) 5SCC 762
47. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 553
48. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 726
49. (2021) 2 SCC 485
50. 1975 SCC OnLine AP 71
51. AIR 1966 AP 377
52. 2022 SCC OnLine TS 1075
53. (2024) 3 SCC 51
54. 1955 SCR (1)1150
55. 2020 SCC OnLine SC 824
56. (2001) 5 SCC 453
57. (1996) 1 SCC 722
58. (2022) 10 SCC 51
59. (2002) 5 SCC 82
60. 2025 INSC 776
61. 1951 Supreme Court Cases 903
62. 2022 SCC OnLine AP 2166
63. 2006 SCC OnLine Ker 482
64. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 537
65. (2016) 4 SCC 160
66. (2004) 5 SCC 347
67. 2025 SCC OnLine Del 5684
68. AIR 1951 SC 207
69. AIR 1967 SC 1480
70. 1991CRILJ 3329
71. (1995) 1 SCC 42
APHC010436982022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3396]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)

WEDNESDAY,THE NINETEENTH DAY OF NOVEMBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA

Criminal Petition Nos.9363, 9364 and 9365 of 2025

Criminal Petition No.9363 of 2025

Between:

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH THE STATION HOUSE
OFFICER, GANNAVARAM POLICE STATION, KRISHNA DISTRICT,
ADDL. S.P. CID, CID HEADQUARTERS, MANGALAGIRI
REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH, AT AMARAVATI.

...PETITIONER / COMPLAINANT / STATE

AND

BALAJI GOVINDAPPA, S/O.MUNEGOWDA GOVINDAPPA, AGE
ABOUT 61 YEARS FLAT NO.101, H.NO.MCH 8-2-624/A/B/3/1, BURRI
RESIDENCY, ROAD NO.11, CITY CENTER, BANJARA HILLS,
HYDERABAD

...RESPONDENT / ACCUSED No.33

Criminal Petition No.9364 of 2025

Between:

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH THE STATION HOUSE
OFFICER, GANNAVARAM POLICE STATION, KRISHNA DISTRICT,
ADDL. S.P. CID, CID HEADQUARTERS, MANGALAGIRI
REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH, AT AMARAVATI.

...PETITIONER / COMPLAINANT / STATE

AND

PELLAKURU KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY, S/O. RAMA SUBBA REDDY,
AGE ABOUT 67 YEARS, VILLA NO. 9A, SUNRISE VALLEY,
UPPERALLY, ATTAPUR, RANGAREDDY, TELANGANA.

...RESPONDENT / ACCUSED No.32

Criminal Petition No.9365 of 2025

Between:

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH THE STATION HOUSE
OFFICER, GANNAVARAM POLICE STATION, KRISHNA DISTRICT,
ADDL. S.P. CID, CID HEADQUARTERS, MANGALAGIRI
REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH, AT AMARAVATI.

...PETITIONER / COMPLAINANT / STATE

AND

K DHANUNJAYA REDDY, S/o. K. REDDENNA, AGE ABOUT 61 YEARS,
I.A.S (RETIRED), R/O. FLAT NO. 1004, C BLOCK FORTUNE ONE,
ROAD NO. 12, BANJARA HILLS, HYDERABAD, TELANGANA.

...RESPONDENT / ACCUSED No.31

DATE OF RESERVING OF ORDER : 26.09.2025

DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER: 19.11.2025

DATE OF UPLOADING THE ORDER: 19.11.2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH: AMARAVATI
****
Criminal Petition Nos.9363, 9364 and 9365 of 2025

Criminal Petition No.9363 of 2025

Between:

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH THE STATION HOUSE
OFFICER, GANNAVARAM POLICE STATION, KRISHNA DISTRICT,
ADDL. S.P. CID, CID HEADQUARTERS, MANGALAGIRI
REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH, AT AMARAVATI.

...PETITIONER / COMPLAINANT / STATE

AND

BALAJI GOVINDAPPA, S/O.MUNEGOWDA GOVINDAPPA, AGE
ABOUT 61 YEARS FLAT NO.101, H.NO.MCH 8-2-624/A/B/3/1, BURRI
RESIDENCY, ROAD NO.11, CITY CENTER, BANJARA HILLS,
HYDERABAD

...RESPONDENT / ACCUSED No.33

Criminal Petition No.9364 of 2025

Between:

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH THE STATION HOUSE
OFFICER, GANNAVARAM POLICE STATION, KRISHNA DISTRICT,
ADDL. S.P. CID, CID HEADQUARTERS, MANGALAGIRI
REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH, AT AMARAVATI.

...PETITIONER / COMPLAINANT / STATE

AND

PELLAKURU KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY, S/O. RAMA SUBBA REDDY,
AGE ABOUT 67 YEARS, VILLA NO. 9A, SUNRISE VALLEY,
UPPERALLY, ATTAPUR, RANGAREDDY, TELANGANA.

...RESPONDENT / ACCUSED No.32
Criminal Petition No.9365 of 2025

Between:

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH THE STATION HOUSE
OFFICER, GANNAVARAM POLICE STATION, KRISHNA DISTRICT,
ADDL. S.P. CID, CID HEADQUARTERS, MANGALAGIRI
REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH, AT AMARAVATI.

...PETITIONER / COMPLAINANT / STATE

AND

K DHANUNJAYA REDDY, S/o. K. REDDENNA, AGE ABOUT 61 YEARS,
I.A.S (RETIRED), R/O. FLAT NO. 1004, C BLOCK FORTUNE ONE,
ROAD NO. 12, BANJARA HILLS, HYDERABAD, TELANGANA.

...RESPONDENT / ACCUSED No.31

DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED: 19.11.2025

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:

HON'BLE DR.JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA
1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments ? Yes / No

2. Whether copies of Judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals ? Yes / No

3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the
fair copy of the Judgment ? Yes / No

_________________________________________
DR.JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA
* HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA
+ Criminal Petition Nos.9363, 9364 and 9365 of 2025

% 19.11.2025

# Criminal Petition No.9363 of 2025

Between:

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH THE STATION HOUSE
OFFICER, GANNAVARAM POLICE STATION, KRISHNA DISTRICT,
ADDL. S.P. CID, CID HEADQUARTERS, MANGALAGIRI
REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH, AT AMARAVATI.
...PETITIONER / COMPLAINANT / STATE

AND

BALAJI GOVINDAPPA, S/O.MUNEGOWDA GOVINDAPPA, AGE
ABOUT 61 YEARS, FLAT NO.101, H.NO.MCH 8-2-624/A/B/3/1, BURRI
RESIDENCY, ROAD NO.11, CITY CENTER, BANJARA HILLS,
HYDERABAD.
...RESPONDENT / ACCUSED No.33

Criminal Petition No.9364 of 2025

Between:

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH THE STATION HOUSE
OFFICER, GANNAVARAM POLICE STATION, KRISHNA DISTRICT,
ADDL.S.P. CID, CID HEADQUARTERS, MANGALAGIRI
REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH, AT AMARAVATI.

...PETITIONER / COMPLAINANT / STATE

AND

PELLAKURU KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY, S/O. RAMA SUBBA REDDY,
AGE ABOUT 67 YEARS, VILLA NO. 9A, SUNRISE VALLEY,
UPPERALLY, ATTAPUR, RANGAREDDY, TELANGANA.

...RESPONDENT / ACCUSED No.32
Criminal Petition No.9365 of 2025

Between:

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH THE STATION HOUSE
OFFICER, GANNAVARAM POLICE STATION, KRISHNA DISTRICT,
ADDL. S.P. CID, CID HEADQUARTERS, MANGALAGIRI
REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH, AT AMARAVATI.

...PETITIONER / COMPLAINANT / STATE

AND

K DHANUNJAYA REDDY, S/o. K.REDDENNA, AGE ABOUT 61 YEARS,
I.A.S (RETIRED), R/O. FLAT NO.1004, C BLOCK FORTUNE ONE,
ROAD NO.12, BANJARA HILLS, HYDERABAD, TELANGANA.

...RESPONDENT / ACCUSED No.31

! Counsel for the Petitioner :

Sri Sidharth Luthra, Learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner
assisted by Sri M.Lakshmi Narayana, learned Public Prosecutor, learned
counsels Sri A.Ramdheeraj, Sri P.Rustonkhar and Sri P.Arora.

^ Counsel for the Respondent :

Sri T.Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Inakollu
Venkateswarlu and Sri Siddharth Sharma, learned counsel for Respondent /
Accused No. 33 in Crl.P.No.9363 of 2025;

Sri Siddhartha Dave, Learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri T.Nagarjuna
Reddy, learned counsel (assisted by Sri K.Sri Sai Sanjay, Sri Paragati
Nagendra Babu and Sri V.Sai Likhith) appearing for respondent /Accused No.
32 in Crl.P.No.9364 of 2025;

Sri S.Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri S.Dushyanth
Reddy (assisted by Sri Pradyuman Kaistha, Sri S.Uday Bhanu, Sri
P.M.Mithileswara Reddy and Sri K.Mokshitha Ramakrishna,) learned counsel
for Respondent / Accused No.31 in Crl.P.No.9365 of 2025.

< Gist :

> Head Note:
? Cases Referred:

1. (2023) SCC OnLine SC 502
2. Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.5724/2023, dated 12.05.2023
= 2023 SCC OnLine SC 751
3. (2021) 16 SCC 376
4. (2006) 6 SCC 277
5. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 726
6. (1991) 3 SCC 655
7. (2014) 16 SCC 543
8. (2023) 17 SCC 48
9. (2024) 3 SCC 734
10. (2024) 6 SCC 758
11. (2023) 15 SCC 311
12. (2002) 5 SCC 582
13. (2001) 7 SCC 536
14. (2023) 16 SCC 779
15. (1985) 2 SCC 537
16. (2007) 8 SCC 770
17. (1994) 5 SCC 410
18. (2013) 3 SCC 77
19. 2000 SCC OnLine Del 1336
20. 2000 SCC OnLine Del 911
21. 1993 SCC OnLine AP 260
22. 2009 SCC OnLine AP 264
23. 2020 SCC OnLine AP 1464
24. (2024) 11 SCC 733
25. (1994) 4 SCC 602
26. (2017) 15 SCC 67
27. (2013) 5 SCC 762
28. 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3124
29. (2016) 1 SCC 507
30. (2019) 14 SCC 599
31. (1995) 1 SCC 42
32. (2009) 6 SCC 346
33. (2021) 20 SCC 636
34. 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2946
35. 1993 SCC OnLine AP 66
36. 2024 SCC OnLine Del 1631
37. 2007 SCC OnLine Del 450
38. 1974 SCC OnLine Del 98
39. 2003 SCC OnLine Mad 1165
40. 1996 SCC OnLine Ker 112
41. 1978 SCC OnLine P&H 117
42. (2010) 12 SCC 254
43. (1992) 4 SCC 272
44. (2004) 8 SCC 579
45. (2008) 1 SCC 494
46. (2013) 5SCC 762
47. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 553
48. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 726
49. (2021) 2 SCC 485
50. 1975 SCC OnLine AP 71
51. AIR 1966 AP 377
52. 2022 SCC OnLine TS 1075
53. (2024) 3 SCC 51
54. 1955 SCR (1)1150
55. 2020 SCC OnLine SC 824
56. (2001) 5 SCC 453
57. (1996) 1 SCC 722
58. (2022) 10 SCC 51
59. (2002) 5 SCC 82
60. 2025 INSC 776
61. 1951 Supreme Court Cases 903
62. 2022 SCC OnLine AP 2166
63. 2006 SCC OnLine Ker 482
64. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 537
65. (2016) 4 SCC 160
66. (2004) 5 SCC 347
67. 2025 SCC OnLine Del 5684
68. AIR 1951 SC 207
69. AIR 1967 SC 1480
70. 1991CRILJ 3329
71. (1995) 1 SCC 42
APHC010436982022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3396]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)

MONDAY,THE SEVENTEENTH DAY OF NOVEMBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA

Criminal Petition Nos.9363, 9364 and 9365 of 2025

Criminal Petition No.9363 of 2025

Between:

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH THE STATION HOUSE
OFFICER, GANNAVARAM POLICE STATION, KRISHNA DISTRICT,
ADDL. S.P. CID, CID HEADQUARTERS, MANGALAGIRI
REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH, AT AMARAVATI.

...PETITIONER / COMPLAINANT / STATE

AND

BALAJI GOVINDAPPA, S/O.MUNEGOWDA GOVINDAPPA, AGE
ABOUT 61 YEARS FLAT NO.101, H.NO.MCH 8-2-624/A/B/3/1, BURRI
RESIDENCY, ROAD NO.11, CITY CENTER, BANJARA HILLS,
HYDERABAD

...RESPONDENT / ACCUSED No.33

Criminal Petition No.9364 of 2025

Between:

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH THE STATION HOUSE
OFFICER, GANNAVARAM POLICE STATION, KRISHNA DISTRICT,
ADDL. S.P. CID, CID HEADQUARTERS, MANGALAGIRI
REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH, AT AMARAVATI.

...PETITIONER / COMPLAINANT / STATE

AND

PELLAKURU KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY, S/O. RAMA SUBBA REDDY,
AGE ABOUT 67 YEARS, VILLA NO. 9A, SUNRISE VALLEY,
UPPERALLY, ATTAPUR, RANGAREDDY, TELANGANA.

...RESPONDENT / ACCUSED No.32

Criminal Petition No.9365 of 2025

Between:

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH THE STATION HOUSE
OFFICER, GANNAVARAM POLICE STATION, KRISHNA DISTRICT,
ADDL. S.P. CID, CID HEADQUARTERS, MANGALAGIRI
REPRESENTED BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH, AT AMARAVATI.

...PETITIONER / COMPLAINANT / STATE

AND

K DHANUNJAYA REDDY, S/o. K. REDDENNA, AGE ABOUT 61 YEARS,
I.A.S (RETIRED), R/O. FLAT NO. 1004, C BLOCK FORTUNE ONE,
ROAD NO. 12, BANJARA HILLS, HYDERABAD, TELANGANA.

...RESPONDENT / ACCUSED No.31

DATE OF RESERVING OF ORDER : 26.09.2025

DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER: 19.11.2025

DATE OF UPLOADING THE ORDER: 19.11.2025
PARA WISE INDEX

Heading Paragraph Nos.,
within the judgment
FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE CRIME 3-4

BACKGROUND FOR FILING THESE PETITIONS 5

SUBSTANCE OF THE PLEADINGS

• Version of the Petitioner/State 6

• Version of the Accused No.31 7

• Version of Accused No.32 8

• Version of Accused No.33 9

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED AT THE BAR

• On behalf of Petitioner/State 11-23

• On behalf of Accused No.31 24-31

• On behalf of Accused No.32 32-36

• On behalf of Accused No.33 37-43

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION 44

DETERMINATION BY THE COURT

• Legislative History of relevant Provisions 46-62

• Key Precedents on Statutory Bail 63-74

• Key Precedents on Constituents of a Chargesheet 75-83

• Brief Overview on Contents of Police Reports 84-93

• Basis for the Impugned Orders 94

A. Some defects not cured 96-117
B. Incomplete Investigation as Further Investigation 118-127

Sought

C. Investigation pending qua other Accused 128-154

D. Inability to show custody as cognizance not taken 155-162

CONCLUSION 163-166

RESULT 167-169
This Court made the following:

COMMON ORDER

1. The State filed these petitions seeking to quash the impugned orders

dated 06.09.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge for SPE and ACB Cases

- cum - III Additional District Judge, Vijayawada1 in Crl.M.P.Nos.,1446, 1447

and 1467 of 2025 emanating out of Crime No.21 of 2024 of CID Police Station,

Mangalagiri, whereby the Respondents/ Accused Nos.,31 to 33 were enlarged

on default bail under Section 187(3)(ii) of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,

20232 and to quash and set aside the Official Memorandums dated 23.08.2025

therein.

2. As the issues raised in these Petitions are common and challenge is to

analogous impugned orders, they were heard together and are now disposed of,

by this common order. The challenge in these petitions, unfold a series of legal

questions concerning the scope and interpretation of BNSS provisions, in

relation to default bail and completeness of a police report.

Factual Background of the Crime:

3. The instant crime arises out of allegations concerning large-scale

irregularities in the implementation of the excise policy and functioning of the

Andhra Pradesh State Beverages Corporation Limited3 during 2019 to 2024.

The matter came to light upon a representation made to the Principal Secretary

to the Government of Andhra Pradesh, on 26.08.2024 by one Venkateswara

1 For short, the learned Special Judge
2 For short, BNSS
3 For short, APSBCL
Rao Srinivas, alleging irregularities in the excise policy from 2019 to 2024. The

report highlighted issues such as unfair discrimination in the allocation of

Orders for Supply (OFS) of liquor, leading to the suppression of established

brands and preferential treatment for new brands, in violation of existing

norms. It also raised concerns about the shift from an automated to a manual

OFS system, which could allow for manipulations. After an enquiry, Principal

Secretary referred the complaint to CID Police, Mangalagiri, which registered a

case in Crime No.21 of 2024 against unknown persons on 23.09.2024, alleging

offences under
Sections 409
,
, and
120-B
of the Indian Penal Code, 18604.

On 05.02.2025, the Government constituted a Special Investigation Team5,

vide G.O.Rt.No.262 to investigate the alleged irregularities in the excise policy

and related crimes. Following this, on 05.05.2025, Accused Nos. 31 to 33 were

formally arraigned as accused in the ongoing investigation into the case.

4. Accused No. 31, the former Secretary to the Chief Minister, is alleged to

have played a key role in suppressing popular liquor brands as part of a

syndicate involving high-ranking officers, political authorities, and close

associates of Accused No. 1. Accused No. 32, a retired Special Deputy Collector,

worked as Office on Special Duty in the Chief Minister's Office during the

relevant period. Accused No. 33 is alleged of being involved in a kickback

scheme, collecting ill-gotten money as part of the conspiracy.

4 For short '
IPC
'
5 For short, 'SIT'
Background for filing these Petitions:

5. Succinctly put, the Respondents/Accused Nos., 31,32 and 33 were

arrested and remanded to judicial custody, which was periodically extended

from time to time. The Investigating Agency filed charge sheets dated

19.07.2025 and 11.08.2025 within the statutory period of 90 days. The learned

Special Judge treated the charge sheets as incomplete, and enlarged the

Accused Nos., 31, 32 and 33 on default bail, vide impugned orders dated

06.09.2025. Aggrieved thereby, the State preferred these Petitions.

Substance of the Pleadings before this Court:

For a proper appreciation of the matter, the brief contents of the pleadings are

segregated as under;

6. Version of the Petitioner/State:

a. Preliminary report dated 19.07.2025 and supplementary report dated

11.08.2025 along with material documents and statements recorded during

investigation are filed by the Investigating Agency within the statutory period.

Accused Nos.,31 to 33 were remanded to judicial custody, the same was

extended from time to time till 09.09.2025. In such a case, the Court cannot

review its order of remand and grant default bail, even after filing of preliminary

and final reports holding them to be incomplete. When a valid report under

Section 193(3)
of BNSS is filed before the Court, the right of the Accused for

default bail automatically extinguishes irrespective of taking cognizance.

b. Non filing of sanction order and FSL reports can never be a ground for

granting default bail as they are not falling under the category of the compliance

under
Section 193 (6)
of BNSS [corresponding to
Section 173 (5)
of Cr.P.C.].
c. The finding of the learned trial Judge that the charge sheet was

'piecemeal' or 'incomplete' to beat the statutory time frame is erroneous;

labeling a report as 'supplementary' does not change its legal validity, if it fulfills

Section 193(3)
of BNSS and is supported by voluminous material that was

placed on record.

d. Non-filing of additional copies of the charge sheet for supply to the

Accused does not render it incomplete.

e. The material placed on record had reflected completeness under
Sections

193(3)
and
193(6)
of BNSS and default bail under
Section 187(3)
of BNSS is an

exception triggered, only where no report is filed on time. When the main report

under
Section 193(3)
of BNSS contains the prescribed particulars, annexural

gaps, which are curable, do not revive default bail. Statutory compliance is

achieved when the report includes all required details and accompanies

documents and witness statements under
Section 172
Cr.P.C.

f. Police remand period under
Section 167
Cr.P.C. (15 days) has been

extended to 40/60 days under
Section 187
BNSS.

g. Under
Section 193(9)
BNSS, no Court permission is required for further

investigation.

h. The objections taken by the learned trial Judge in the Official

Memorandum dated 23.08.2025, are untenable, contrary to law and the same

cannot be a ground to grant default bail to the Accused.

7. Version of the Respondent / Accused No.31

a. Accused No.31 is entitled to statutory bail under
Section 187 (3) (ii)
of

BNSS (corresponding to
Section 167 (2)
Cr.P.C.) as the Prosecution did not
choose to file a valid final report, within the statutory period. The claim made

by the Investigating Agency in the supplementary report would itself indicate

that the investigation is incomplete, triggering the right of the Accused to seek

default bail.

b. The objections raised by the learned trial Judge with regard to the non-

compliance of the statutory requirements confirm that the final report is

incomplete and is filed without completing the investigation within the

statutory period only to defeat the indefeasible right of Accused No.31 to seek

statutory bail conferred under
Section 187(3)
of BNSS.

c. Non-compliance of the requirement of the valid charge sheet in terms of

Section 193
of BNS would renders the charge sheet incomplete as the

investigation is incomplete.

d. The trial Judge's decision to grant statutory bail to the Accused No.31

aligns with legal principles. The report filed by the Investigating Agency lacks

the essentials of
Section 193
of BNSS and it does not fit into the sphere of valid

report and cannot substantiate the claim of a completed investigation.

e. The deficiencies pointed out by the learned trial Judge in the form of

office objections cannot be construed as minor technical lapses and annexural

gaps, since the issue concerns the status of the investigation and its

completeness in culminating into filing of valid charge sheet.

f. The extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Section 528 of BNSS is

available only in cases of gross miscarriage or perversity, which are absent here.

This petition, which is a disguised version of appeal for overturning the

statutory bail is not maintainable.
g. Mere filing of a charge sheet, even if voluminous, does not equate

completion of investigation. Incomplete or piecemeal charge sheets submitted

to delay default bail are impermissible.

h. The absence of a detailed tabular form for the siphoned amount, as

mentioned in the Official Memorandum, demonstrates that the Police had not

fully traced the proceeds of the crime. The fact that substantial amounts

siphoned remain untraced and unrecovered supports the conclusion that the

investigation is pending and the statutory bail has not been granted on this

ground alone.

i. The learned trial Judge has rightly observed the difference between the

legal requirements under Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 20026 and

prosecution under
IPC
/
The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
.7

j. The power to conduct "further investigation" under Section 193(9) of

BNSS (173(8)
Cr.P.C
) is meant for collecting additional evidence after

completion of the investigation and filing of a charge sheet. It cannot justify an

initially incomplete investigation. The Court's remand powers under
Section

309(2)
Cr.P.C. apply only after cognizance; if the charge sheet is incomplete, the

case remains pre-cognizance.

8. Version of Respondent / Accused No.32:

a. On 19.07.2025, the very date on which Accused Nos. 41 to 48 were added

to the present case, the preliminary charge sheet was filed against sixteen

Accused. Subsequently, a supplementary charge sheet was filed against Accused

6 For short 'PMLA'
7 For short '
PC Act
'
Nos.,31 to 33, which also listed the same sixteen Accused. The learned trial Judge

rightly concluded that even this supplementary charge sheet was defective and

could not be treated as final.

b. The charge sheets have been filed solely to defeat the constitutional rights

of Accused No. 32. Even after the supplementary charge sheet, remand of

Accused No. 32 was repeatedly obtained, solely on the pretext that the

investigation remained incomplete.

c. The State sought and obtained custody extensions strictly under
Section
Cr.P.C., applicable only during investigation prior to its completion. Had the

investigation been truly complete, recourse would have been under
Section 309

Cr.P.C., governing custody after cognizance or commencement of trial. The

State's failure to invoke
Section 309
Cr.P.C. confirms that the investigation was

far from complete.

d. The present petition seeking quashment of the order dated 23.08.2025 is

not maintainable, as the order relates only to the administrative side of the

learned trial Judge. Section 528 of BNSS applies solely to judicial orders, not to

administrative actions such as marking defects in a charge sheet.

e. In the absence of proper investigation on material aspects, neither charge

sheet complies with Section 193(5) of BNSS (corresponding to
Section 173(3)
of

Cr.P.C.). Both are also defective because, out of 48 nominated Accused, the first

charge sheet was filed against only 16, and the second against only three. Critical

documents, including the FSL report and sanction to prosecute under
Sections

17-A
or 19 of the
PC Act
, remain unproduced.
f. The Investigating Agency cannot, under the pretext of further

investigation, file charge sheets in a staggered manner. This undermines the right

to default bail under
Section 167(2)
Cr.P.C., which hinges on the completion of

investigation within the prescribed period, unlike
Section 190
Cr.P.C.

g. Filing preliminary and supplementary charge sheets in this manner

constitutes a fraud on power, designed to defeat the statutory right under
Section
Cr.P.C. for extraneous reasons.

h. Formal permission of the Court is required to be obtained by the Police

before conducting further investigation. Once the police report is filed, it should

be capable of examination for the purpose of judicial determination to take

cognizance of the offence and to proceed further into Chapter XVI
Cr.P.C
. and

any act short of that, cannot be construed as 'taking cognizance'.

i. Accused No. 32, aged approximately 67, suffers from serious respiratory

ailments, including bronchiectasis, fibro-atelectatic changes, emphysematous

changes with large subpleural bullae, and a history of pulmonary tuberculosis.

He has been medically advised to avoid environmental triggers to prevent

aggravation of his condition. Any delay in providing such safeguards could result

in pneumonia, severe hypoxia, or respiratory failure, causing irreversible

damage.

j. As many as five preliminary reports were filed, nominating new Accused

and adding fresh offences. There was no justification to arraign Accused No. 32

in the supplementary final report, as the same material was already available in

the first charge sheet. A charge sheet returned for defects cannot be considered

valid in law.
9. Version of Respondent /Accused No.33:

a. This petition itself is not maintainable since it seeks to challenge an

administrative order.

b. It is the case of the Prosecuting Agency that the investigation was

incomplete on the date of filing of the first charge sheet. As many as five

preliminary reports were filed nominating new Accused persons and

incorporating fresh offences. The supplementary final report dated 11.08.2025

was filed only after acknowledging that the investigation was incomplete.

c. The main charge sheet does not satisfy the conditions of
Section 173 (2)

Cr.P.C. as it consists of only 16 Accused persons and the investigation on the

material offences had not been undertaken.

d. The learned trial Judge did not find the investigation to be incomplete

merely because documents were not annexed to the charge sheet; rather, it was

held that the investigation itself was wholly defective in material particulars.

e. The formal filing of a charge sheet under Section 193(3) of BNSS is not

determinative. It is settled law that repeated filing of preliminary reports to

circumvent statutory bail rights cannot be countenanced.

f. The need for further investigation arises only upon the discovery of fresh

material. There was no justification for arraigning Accused No. 33 in the

supplementary final report, as the same material was already available in the

first charge sheet.

g. The Petitioner cannot challenge an administrative act using standards

applicable to judicial functions. A charge sheet returned for defects cannot be

regarded as valid in law.
h.
Section 309
of Cr.P.C. is applicable to a stage after cognizance is taken.

The learned trial Judge has only declared that it is not open to the Prosecuting

Agency to extend the custody of an Accused on the basis of an incomplete charge

sheet.

i. Filing of piecemeal and incomplete charge sheets cannot be considered

as final report. Where the investigation is admittedly incomplete and

cognizance has not been taken due to substantial defects, any so-called filing of

charge sheets cannot be relied upon to defeat the accrued right to default bail.

j. Accused No. 33 was not included in the initial charge sheet, and no leave

of the Special Court for further investigation was obtained. The subsequent

filing without such permission cannot justify curtailing the liberty of default

bail.

k. An investigation cannot be artificially splintered to allow filing of

staggered reports before a Court of competent jurisdiction. Both BNSS and

Cr.P.C
. mandate completion of investigation, not the mere filing of a charge

sheet.

l. Investigation cannot be split to file piecemeal reports before the Court.

Section 173
Cr.P.C. does not contemplate partial investigations or filing

incomplete charge sheets. It requires that a charge or final report be filed only

after completion of the entire investigation, formation of an opinion regarding

all alleged offences, and in cases involving multiple offences, after the

investigation into all offences is complete.
Arguments advanced at the Bar:

10. Heard Sri Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the

Petitioner assisted by Sri M.Lakshmi Narayana, learned Public Prosecutor and

also Sri A. Ram Dheeraj, Sri Rustonkhan and Sri P. Arora ; Sri T. Niranjan

Reddy, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Inakollu Venkateswarlu and Sri

Siddharth Sharma, learned counsel for Respondent/Accused No.33 in Crl.P.

No.9363 of 2025; Sri Siddhartha Dave, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri

T. Nagarjuna Reddy, learned counsel and also Sri K.Sri Sai Sanjay, Sri Paragati

Nagendra Babu and Sri V. Sai Likhith appearing for Respondent/Accused

No.32 in Crl.P.No.9364 of 2025 and Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior

Counsel assisted by Sri S. Dushyanth Reddy and also Sri Pradyuman Kaistha,

Sri S.Uday Bhanu, Sri P.M. Mithileswara Reddy and Sri K.Mokshitha

Ramakrishna, learned counsel for Respondent/Accused No.31 in Crl.P.No.

9365 of 2025.

On behalf of Petitioner/State:

11. Sri Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel representing the State

in elaboration to the contentions raised in the Petitions would submit that the

impugned orders of the learned Special Judge enlarging the Respondents

(Accused Nos.,31, 32 and 33) on default bail under Section 187 (3) (ii) of BNSS

on the ground that the Investigating Agency allegedly filed incomplete charge

sheets in connection with Crime No.21 of 2024 are perverse, unjustified and

contrary to the settled principles of criminal law.

12. Learned Senior Counsel urged that the investigating agency filed

charge sheets against the Accused named therein, which are complete and in
compliance of Section 193 (3) of BNSS and the Andhra Pradesh Police Manual.

He further pointed out that the titles of the charge sheets dated 19.07.2025 and

11.08.2025 clearly state "Final Report," thereby dispelling any doubt regarding

the nature of the police report. According to the learned Senior Counsel, upon

verification of the charge sheets, the learned Special Judge issued two official

memoranda dated 23.08.2025 to the Investigating Officer, pointing out twenty-

one omissions or defects, which were identical in nature. The Investigating

Officer duly complied with these observations through a memo dated

26.08.2025 and also filed Memos of Evidence 1 and 2, containing a revised,

detailed, and descriptive list of witness statements recorded under Section 180

of BNSS (corresponding to
Section 161
of Cr.P.C.) up to L.W.292, as well as

statements under Section 183 of BNSS (corresponding to
Section 164
of

Cr.P.C.), along with a list of documents extending up to Volume 57, before the

Special Court. It was further argued that the BNSS does not prescribe any

nomenclature such as "preliminary" or "final" charge sheet. The learned Special

Judge erroneously referred to the charge sheet dated 19.07.2025 as a

preliminary charge sheet. When the Investigating Agency files a charge sheet in

compliance with the statutory requirements under Section 193(3) of BNSS

(corresponding to
Section 173(2)
of Cr.P.C.), it constitutes a complete charge

sheet. In fact, the report was accompanied by all requisite documents and

witness statements as mandated under
Section 173(5)
of the Cr.P.C.

13. It was further contended by learned Senior Counsel that the

learned Special Judge erred in holding that the non-filing of certain FSL reports

and the absence of a sanction order to prosecute Accused No. 1, a public servant,
amounted to the filing of an incomplete charge sheet. The absence of some FSL

reports, which may be attributable to systemic delays, does not render the

charge sheet incomplete. Even if such deficiencies exist, they constitute curable

irregularities rather than illegalities that vitiate the charge sheet. Furthermore,

once a charge sheet is filed within the prescribed period of ninety days, its return

for compliance with certain procedural objections, such as obtaining a scientific

expert's opinion amounts to due compliance under
Section 173(2)
of the Cr.P.C.

However, such procedural compliance does not confer upon the accused any

right to claim statutory (default) bail.

14. Another line of argument advanced by the learned Senior Counsel

is that the learned Special Judge erred in holding that the charge sheet was

incomplete, merely because the Investigating Agency sought permission to

place additional documents and technical evidence on record. He submitted

that even after filing the final report, the Investigating Agency is empowered to

produce further documents and evidence before the Court in accordance with

Section 193(9) of BNSS (corresponding to
Section 173(8)
of Cr.P.C.).

15. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that all particulars

required under Section 193(3) of the BNSS were duly incorporated in the charge

sheet, and therefore, it cannot be termed as 'incomplete'. The objections raised

in the Official Memorandum dated 23.08.2025 reflect non-application of mind,

as they are untenable, contrary to law, and based on fallacious reasoning. The

corrections made in compliance with the said Official Memorandum relate back

to the date of filing of the original charge sheet.
16. Furthermore, learned Senior Counsel submitted that while

examining the charge sheet for the purpose of taking cognizance under Section

210 of the BNSS, three courses of action are available to the learned Special

Judge and the learned Special Judge failed to exercise these options viz., accept

the report, reject the report or direct further investigation, available while

issuing the Official Memoranda dated 23.08.2025 and acted de hors the law.

Although the said memoranda purported to be administrative in nature, they

were issued under the signature of the learned Special Judge, clearly indicating

that the learned Judge overlooked the existence of Form 69 and Rule 480-1 of

the Andhra Pradesh Police Manual, as well as the relevant provisions of BNSS.

The learned Special Judge, therefore, could not have granted default bail to the

accused on the basis of the objections raised through the Official Memoranda

dated 23.08.2025.

17. Learned Senior Counsel also pointed out that pendency of further

investigation qua other Accused is not a ground for grant of default bail. Merely

because the remand extension memos filed after filing of the charge sheet

contained the grounds pertaining to further investigation on certain aspects

related to the larger conspiracy, does not indicate that the investigation qua the

Respondents (Accused Nos.,31, 32 and 33) is still pending or that the charge

sheet is incomplete. In addition, he also submitted that further investigation

can be continued even after filing of the charge sheet and taking of cognizance

is not material, since filing of the charge sheet is sufficient to extinguish Section

187 (3) of BNSS (corresponding to
Section 167 (2)
Cr.P.C). He would thus point

out that the learned Special Judge in the impugned order erred in observing
that, without taking cognizance of the case, remand of the Accused cannot be

extended under
Section 309 (2)
of Cr.P.C., beyond 90 days.

18. Learned Senior Counsel further brought to the notice of the Court

that even after filing of the charge sheets dated 19.07.2025 and 11.08.2025, the

learned Special Judge extended the remand of the Accused, observing that since

two charge sheets had already been filed by the SIT, the remand was being

continued. The said charge sheets were under scrutiny and pending compliance

of certain office objections, and in the meantime, the Accused were remanded

to judicial custody till 09.09.2025. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the

extension of remand after filing of the charge sheets clearly establishes that the

reports were filed within the statutory period of 90 days. Once the charge sheet

is filed, the remand of the Accused can only be under Section 346 of BNSS

(corresponding to
Section 309
of Cr.P.C.). Therefore, when the Accused were

remanded under Section 346 of BNSS, the question of claiming default bail

under Section 187(3) of the BNSS does not arise. The moment a charge sheet is

filed within the prescribed 90 days, the right of the Accused to seek default bail

stands extinguished.

19. Learned Senior Counsel further also submitted that the learned

Special Judge erroneously addressed only the liberty of the accused by

completely overlooking the rights of the prosecution and the victim. He would

state that right to free and fair investigation and trial includes maintenance of a

balance between accused and prosecution rights. He also submitted that the

investigating agency has every authority to produce additional documents and

evidence as it may gather during further investigation. He urged that the word
'shall' used in
Section 173 (5)
Cr.P.C. is not mandatory but only directory and

the Prosecution can file relevant documents even after filing the final report.

20. Learned Senior Counsel also pointed out the new proviso

introduced under Section 193(9) of BNSS, which mandates the Police Officer to

take permission of the Magistrate to carry out further investigation during trial.

It is the argument of the learned Senior Counsel that the Investigating Agency

is not required to take permission of the Court for carrying out further

investigation as long as the trial has not commenced. He would submit that in

the present case, the Investigating Agency, as a matter of transparency, apprised

the Special Judge of the ongoing further investigation, even though the trial had

not yet commenced.

21. Learned Senior Counsel also pointed out that the learned Special

Judge took 34 days to issue the Official Memorandum in response to the final

report dated 19.07.2025 and 11 days for the supplementary charge sheet dated

11.08.2025, yet permitted only three days to comply with the raised objections.

He stated that although the Investigating Officer duly filed the necessary

compliances on 26.08.2025, which were reflected before the Special Court on

01.09.2025, the Special Court, without properly scrutinizing these submissions,

hastily proceeded to hear the Respondents' applications and granted default

bail. Furthermore, he submitted that the impugned order dated 06.09.2025

fails to refer to or consider the compliances filed by the Investigating Agency on

26.08.2025. The learned Special Judge could have exercised any of the three

legally available options after the filing of the charge sheet but chose not to do

so and instead granted default bail. It is well settled that the Court's inability to
take cognizance is not a valid ground to grant default bail, as the filing of the

charge sheet and continued judicial remand extinguish the accused's right to

claim such bail, irrespective of cognizance status.

22. Learned Senior Counsel would finally submit that the impugned

order stating that the Investigating Agency has not complied with the defects,

by placing heavy reliance on the decision in
Ritu Chhabaria v. Union of

India
and others8, is incorrect.

Learned Senior Counsel brought it to the

notice of the Court that, a three Judge Bench in
Directorate of Enforcement

v. Manpreet Singh Talwar9
clarified that a trial Court or High Court, as the

case may be shall not precluded from considering an application for the grant

of default bail under
Section 167
of Cr.P.C., independent of and without relying

on the judgment dated 26.04.2023 in Writ Petition (Crl.)

No.60 of 2023 i.e.

Ritu Chhabaria
(supra). Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that

the order passed by the Three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court

referred to supra, is in force, though the review petition preferred by CBI was

dismissed in Ritu Chhabaria.

23.
In support of his contentions, learned Senior Counsel Sri Sidharth

Luthra placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Venkatesan Balasubramaniyan v. Intelligence Officer
, Directorate

of Revenue Intelligence,10 Bhupinder Singh v. Jarnail Singh11,
Sharif

Ahmad and another v. State of U.P.12
,
K.Veeraswami v. Union
of

8 (2023) SCC OnLine SC 502
9 Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.)

No.5724/2023, dated 12.05.2023; 2023 SCC OnLine SC 751
10 (2021) 16 SCC 376
11 (2006) 6 SCC 277
12 2024 SCC OnLine SC 726
India13, Abdul Azeez P.V and others v. National Investigation

Agency14,
Judgebir (Jasbir) Singh v. NIA15
, CBI v. Kapilwadhwan16,

Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand17
,
Serious Fraud Investigation

Office v. Rahul Modi18
,
CBI v. R.S.Pai
and another19,
Hemanth

Dhasmana v. CBI20
, CBI v. Hemendhra Reddy and another21,

Bhagwanth Singh v. Commissioner of Police
and another22,
Dinesh

Dalmia v. CBI23
,
Sanjay Dutt v. State24
,
Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand

Jain v. State of Maharashtra25
, High Court of Delhi in
Java Singh v.

CBI26
,
Rajneesh Kumar Singhal v. The State (NCT of Delhi
)27, High

Court of Andhra Pradesh in Velinedipurnam v. State of A.P.28, Venkata

Ramayakota Krishnappa Raghavendra Bhuvanahalli Muniappa

Nagesh Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh29 and Akula Raviteja v. State

of Andhra Pradesh.30

On behalf of Accused No.31:

24. Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for Respondent /

Accused No.31, submitted that, as evident from the evolution of law from the

13 (1991) 3 SCC 655
14 (2014) 16 SCC 543
15 (2023) 17 SCC 48
16 (2024) 3 SCC 734
17 (2024) 6 SCC 758
18 (2023) 15 SCC 311
19 (2002) 5 SCC 582
20 (2001) 7 SCC 536
21 (2023) 16 SCC 779
22 (1985) 2 SCC 537
23 (2007) 8 SCC 770
24 (1994) 5 SCC 410
25 (2013) 3 SCC 77
26 2000 SCC OnLine Del 1336
27 2000 SCC OnLine Del 911
28 1993 SCC OnLine AP 260
29 2009 SCC OnLine AP 264
30 2020 SCC OnLine AP 1464
Cr.P.C
., 1898, through the recommendations of the Law Commission, to the

enactment of the
Cr.P.C
., 1973, and now the BNSS, 2023, the legislature has

consistently accorded paramount importance to the personal liberty of an

individual. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that there is no prohibition to

continue the investigation after the statutory period of 60 / 90 days and the

right under Section 187 of BNSS is triggered upon failure to complete the

investigation. He argued that the question as to whether the Investigating

Officer filed charge sheet to defeat the right of an Accused to default bail would

be a question of fact.

25. Learned Senior Counsel contended that the judgment relied upon

by the State in Kapil Wadhwan (supra) cannot be construed to mean that the

Court is bound to mechanically accept the filing of a charge sheet as conclusive

proof of completion of investigation, without exercising its judicial discretion.

In the present case, the Investigating Agency is alleged to have misled the Court

by filing the charge sheet on 19.07.2025, despite the fact that Accused Nos. 31

to 33 had been in custody and available for investigation for nearly two months

prior to that date, yet no charge sheet was filed against them during that period.

It is evident that the Investigating Officer was fully aware that further

investigation was being undertaken and that, in such circumstances, permission

of the Court was required to proceed, thereby indicating procedural impropriety

on the part of the Investigating Agency.

26. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the test for default

bail is not whether charge sheet has been filed, rather, it is whether the

investigation is completed within the prescribed time. He would submit that the
learned Special Judge applied this test and on facts held that, investigation is

not completed. Learned Senior Counsel elaborated further that the charge sheet

must be valid in the eye of law to continue the custody of the Respondent beyond

the statutory period. It is further represented that supplementary report based

on a material which is already available fails to satisfy Section 193 (9) of BNSS

as it has to be in relation to fresh information after filing the final report. He

also submitted that if any doubt arises regarding the nature of the charge sheet,

Court has to lean towards the Accused.

27. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that, when charge sheet

is filed only for certain offences, the charge sheet is considered to be incomplete

and piece-meal. He would submit that an in-depth review of charge sheets

cannot be conducted by the High Court. He would point out that the remand

extension memos filed subsequent to the submission of the supplementary

charge sheet clearly indicate that the investigation is still at a nascent stage, as

they emphasize need for continued custodial interrogation and confrontation of

the Accused with the recovered material. This according to learned Senior

Counsel demonstrates that the investigation remains incomplete, even with

respect to Accused No. 31, thereby undermining the contention of Investigating

Agency that the investigation had reached its conclusion at the time of filing the

charge sheet.

28. Learned Senior Counsel contended that the manner in which the

investigation has been conducted clearly reflects that it is politically motivated

and tainted with mala fides. He submitted that the State must justify the filing

of multiple charge sheets against different accused persons, as such splitting
and piecemeal filing appear to be deliberate attempts to frustrate the accused's

statutory right to default bail. The supplementary charge sheet filed against

Respondent / Accused No. 31 is based on material allegedly gathered after the

first charge sheet, yet the pattern indicates an intention to prolong custody

rather than a genuine progression of investigation. Learned Senior Counsel

submitted that, once cognizance is taken, Court cannot undo it and as per the

memo filed by the Prosecution dated 13.08.2025 investigation qua Accused

No.31 is continuing, when it is a case of conspiracy, the case cannot be

separated.

29. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that the Investigating

Officer failed to comply with Form 69 of the A.P. Police Rules, as there is no

clarity regarding persons not charge-sheeted. According to the A.P. Police

Manual, an incomplete charge sheet cannot be filed merely to keep the accused

in custody. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that Section 193(9) BNSS

cannot substitute for an original, complete charge sheet; only genuinely new

material discovered later justifies further investigation. He would also contend

that even for further investigation, permission of the Court is essential. He

further stated that under Section 346 BNSS, the Court cannot remand an

accused until cognizance of the offence is taken. It is also argued that if the

official memorandum dated 23.08.2025 is treated as a judicial order, the failure

to challenge it before the grant of default bail would imply that no valid charge

sheet existed in law. Since the Magistrate had returned the charge sheet before

the expiry of the statutory period, at the time of the default bail application,
there was effectively no charge sheet or material under Section 173 BNSS before

the Court for consideration.

30. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the order passed by a

three Judge Bench in
Manpreet Singh Talwar
(supra), directing the trial

Courts and High Courts to take independent decision on the point of default bail

without reference to the decision in
Ritu Chhabaria
(supra) is purely a

temporary arrangement.

31.
In support of his contentions, learned Senior Counsel Sri S.

Niranjan Reddy has placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in
Mariam Fasihuddin and another v. State of Karnataka31
,

Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and others v. State of Maharashtra
and

others32, Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam33, Dinesh Dalmia

(supra), Kapil Wadhwan (supra),
Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali
and

others34, High Court of Delhi in
Chitra Rama Krishna vs. CBI35
.

On behalf of Accused No.32:

32. Sri Siddhartha Dave, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Accused No.

32, submitted that this Court possesses inherent powers under Section 528 of

the BNSS to act ex debito justitiae and to secure the ends of justice and the

judgments relied upon by the State cannot restrict or predetermine the Court's

independent assessment of the matter. He stated that the Respondent / Accused

No. 32, a retired Special Deputy Collector who served as Officer on Special Duty

31 (2024) 11 SCC 733
32 (1994) 4 SCC 602
33 (2017) 15 SCC 67
34 (2013) 5 SCC 762
35 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3124
(OSD) in the Chief Minister's Office, was arrested on 16.05.2025 and remanded

to judicial custody on 17.05.2025.

33. Learned Senior Counsel stated that the investigating agency filed a

preliminary charge sheet on 19.07.2025 against sixteen persons and

supplementary charge sheet on 11.08.2025 against three persons including

Accused No.32 and the period of 90 days in case of Accused No.32 expired on

17.08.2025. He contended that the supplementary charge sheet was filed

without completing the investigation, only to defeat an indefeasible right of

default bail of the Accused.

34. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that the right to default bail

exhausts only when the investigation is completed i.e., when it is brought to an

end. In the present case, the investigation remains incomplete, and therefore

the embargo under Section 187 of BNSS (corresponding to
Section 167
Cr.P.C.)

continues to apply. While
Section 167
Cr.P.C. prescribes limits on police and

judicial custody i.e., 15 days for police and 60/90 days for judicial custody, it

does not fix a maximum period for completion of investigation; if the

investigation is not completed within the prescribed period, the Magistrate has

no option but to release the accused on bail if they are willing.

35. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that filing a report under

Section 193 of BNSS is not a mere formality; it is meant to enable the Magistrate

to take cognizance under Section 210 of BNSS. Filing an incomplete charge

sheet to defeat the accused's statutory right to default bail is contrary to law. He

contended that in the present case, the learned Special Judge identified serious

defects in the charge sheet filed by the State and, after providing opportunity
for compliance, rightly granted default bail to Respondent/Accused No. 32.

Authority to conduct further investigation cannot be used as a tool to deny

default bail. Further investigation refers to the discovery of fresh material after

filing the initial report; a preliminary charge sheet cannot be treated as evidence

of a completed investigation under Sections 190 and 193 BNSS. The judgments

relating to UAPA, NDPS and TADA Acts are not applicable to the facts of the

present case. Learned counsel finally submitted that the learned Special Judge

clearly observed in the order that the charge sheet is incomplete and it is filed

only to defeat the rights of the Accused for default bail.

36.
In support of his contentions, learned Senior Counsel Sri Siddhartha

Dave, placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Judgebir Singh
(supra),
CBI v. Rathin Dandapat36
, Achpal v. State of

Rajasthan37 Kapil Wadhwan (supra),
K.Veeraswami
(supra),
Ritu

Chhabaria
(supra),
State of Maharashtra v. Sharadchandra Vinayak

Dongre38
,
Rama Chaudhary v. State of Bihar39
,
Dinesh Dalmi
supra,

M.Ravindran (supra), Fakhrey Alam v. State of Uttar Pradesh40 High

Court of Delhi in
Avinash Jain v. CBI41, High
Court of Andhra Pradesh in

Akula Ravi Teja (supra),
M.China Venkatareddy & Ors. v. State of

A.P.42, High
Court for the State of Telangana in C. Parthasarthy (supra),

High Court of Delhi in
Chitra Ramakrishna
(supra), Ram Kishore Arora

36 (2016) 1 SCC 507
37 (2019) 14 SCC 599
38 (1995) 1 SCC 42
39 (2009) 6 SCC 346
40 (2021) 20 SCC 636
41 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2946
42 1993 SCC OnLine AP 66
v. Directorate of Enforcement and Anr.,43 Tunde Gbaja v. CBI44, Hari

Chand v. State of Delhi45 High Court of Madras in
Nagarajan and Anr. v.

State of Tamilnadu,46 High
Court of Kerala in
S.M. Furtado v. CBI &

Ors.47, High
Court of Punjab & Haryana in
State of Haryana v. Mehal

Singh and Anr.48

On
behalf of Accused No.33

37. Sri T. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for Respondent/

Accused No.33 would submit that, Accused No.33 is not a public servant. The

purpose of filing a charge sheet after completion of investigation is to enable the

Court to inquire into the matter. Respondent/Accused No.33 was remanded to

judicial custody on 14.05.2025. The learned Special Judge cannot extend the

judicial custody beyond the 90th day unless, he can inquire into the matter on

the basis of a charge sheet which is filed. It is further submitted that, the 90th

day of such judicial custody of Accused No.33 expired on 11.08.2025. The said

report filed by the Investigating Agency was not in accordance with Section 193

(3) of BNSS, and thereby, the learned Special Judge could not inquire into the

matter. The investigating agency filed its report in complete form only on

01.09.2025. However, on 26.08.2025 the Respondent / Accused No.33 filed an

application for default bail. The learned Special Judge has rightly not

considered such compliance in the impugned order. The judgment in the case

43 2024 SCC OnLine Del 1631
44 2007 SCC OnLine Del 450
45 1974 SCC OnLine Del 98
46 2003 SCC OnLine Mad 1165
47 1996 SCC OnLine Ker 112
48 1978 SCC OnLine P&H 117
of Kapil Wadhwan (supra) is not helpful to the case of the Prosecution. In

the said case, the Court took cognizance of the offence and investigation was

pending for some other Accused and the default bail was granted on the ground

that the investigation was pending against the remaining Accused. Hence, the

judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case, as the learned Special

Judge could not take cognizance in this matter.

38. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that an indefeasible

right to be enlarged on default bail had accrued in favour of Accused No.33,

which cannot be defeated by a subsequent filing of final report by the

Investigating Agency. The right to be released on default bail on the failure of

the Investigating Agency to complete the investigation within 90 days is a

fundamental right enshrined in
Article 21
of the Constitution of India. The 90th

day is expired on 12.08.2025. The right which had accrued to the Accused by

filing a petition on 26.08.2025 sought to be defeated by relying upon the

compliance on 01.09.2025 which is impermissible in law. The Constitutional

Courts have consistently taken a view that, when two views are possible, one in

favour of the liberty of the Accused and the other which ensures continued

incarceration of the Accused, the Courts are required to take the view that

favours the liberty of the Accused. The Investigating Agency has filed a charge

sheet only to defeat a valuable right of Accused No.33. The investigation has

been person-centric but not offence-centric as it failed to disclose full

particulars of the offence.

39. Learned Senior Counsel further stated that Accused Nos.1 to 29

were brought on record by a memo dated 22.04.2025 and Accused Nos.31 to 33
on 05.05.2025. Yet, the initial charge sheet is filed against sixteen Accused and

the second charge sheet is filed on 11.08.2025 named against Accused Nos.31 to

33. Neither charge sheet satisfies the requirement of completion of investigation

under Section 190 and 193(2) of BNSS. The tenor of filing piece-meal charge

sheets against particular Accused is only to deprive them of their statutory right.

He further stated that the Investigating Agency filed remand extension memos

before the Court from time to time, which would establish that continued

detention of the Accused was sought to facilitate investigation. The remand

extension memos filed either prior or subsequent to the filing of the incomplete

charge sheets, explicitly show that the investigation into the offences is still in

progress. Further investigation presupposes that the primary investigation has

concluded with a final report and that the Court can take cognizance.

40. Learned Senior Counsel further argued that the Investigating

Agency never stated that the investigation qua the offences alleged against

Accused No.33 had concluded to enable the Special Court to take cognizance.

As the investigation remains on going, it cannot be said as further investigation

but it is a continuing investigation. The remand of an Accused under Section

346 of BNSS (corresponding to
Section 309
Cr.P.C.) arises only after taking

cognizance. Learned Special Judge has noted in the proceedings dated

26.08.2025 that the learned Special Public Prosecutor sought extension of

remand stating that, some more witnesses have to be examined and material

witness evidence i.e., documentary and technical was yet to be collected from

various sources.
41. Learned Senior Counsel sternly argued that the contention of the

State that the Accused were remanded to judicial custody under Section 346 of

BNSS (corresponding to
Section 309
Cr.P.C) is misconceived and is liable to be

rejected. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the Investigating Officer

himself mentioned in the remand extension memos that the investigation is still

in progress. As such, the charge sheets dated 19.07.2025 and 11.08.2025 cannot

be considered as final reports within the meaning of Section 190 of BNSS and

they are incomplete or piece-meal reports. It is submitted that the judgments

are precedents for what they actually decided and not for what logically follows

from them and a judgment has to be understood in the context of its facts.

42. Learned Senior counsel also stated that filing of FSL report along

with charge sheet is mandatory for compliance of Section 193 (3) BNSS and the

matter is now referred to a larger Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Learned

counsel finally submitted that, they are not relying on
Ritu Chhabaria

(supra), since a three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed order

not to rely on
the said judgment
. He finally submitted that it is a settled law that

the indefeasible right under Section 187 of BNSS accrues to an accused, when

incomplete charge sheet filed only to scuttle the right of an Accused for default

bail.

43.
In support of his contentions, learned Senior Counsel Sri T.

Niranjan Reddy placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in
Babubhai v. State of Gujarat
and others49,
Aslam Babalal

49 (2010) 12 SCC 254
Desai v. State of Maharashtra50
,
Bharath Petroleum Corporation v.

N.R.Vairamani
and another51,
Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV) v.

State of Maharashtra52
,
Vijay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali @ Deepak
and

others,53
Peethambaran v. State of Kerala
and another,54
Sharif

Ahmed and another v. State of U.P
and another55,
M. Ravindran v.

Intelligence Officer, Director of Revenue Intelligence56, Suresh

Kumar Bikamchand
(supra), High Court of Andhra Pradesh in
T.V. Sarma

v. Smt.Turgakamala Devi
and others57, Bandi Kotayya v. State58,

Akula Ravi Teja (supra), and High Court for the State of Telangana in C.

Parthasarthy v. State.59

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION :

44. This Court has given anxious consideration to the submissions

made and perused the material on record. On such exercise, the issues falling

for consideration before this Court, are as follows;

a. Whether an Accused is entitled to default bail under proviso to Section

187 (3)(ii) of BNSS when the chargesheet, though filed within the

statutory period, is returned on certain defects, which are subsequently

complied?

50 (1992) 4 SCC 272
51 (2004) 8 SCC 579
52 (2008) 1 SCC 494
53 (2013) 5SCC 762
54 2023 SCC OnLine SC 553
55 2024 SCC OnLine SC 726
56 (2021) 2 SCC 485
57 1975 SCC OnLine AP 71
58 AIR 1966 AP 377
59 2022 SCC OnLine TS 1075
b. Whether mere permission seeking further investigation would make

the investigation incomplete and consequently the chargesheet

incomplete for the purposes of default bail under proviso to Section

187(3)(ii) of the BNSS?

c. Whether taking cognizance of the case is precondition for extending

remand of an Accused after the filing of the charge sheet within the

statutory period, and whether the Court's inability to take cognizance

can be a ground for default bail?

d. Whether the impugned orders dated 06.09.2025 and the official

memorandum dated 23.08.2025 are liable to be quashed?

DETERMINATION BY THE COURT:

45. A perusal of Sec. 528 BNSS (corresponding to Sec. 482 Cr. P.C.)

makes it clear that BNSS envisages that inherent powers of the High Court are

not limited or affected so as to make orders as may be necessary; (i) to give effect

to any order under the Sanhita or, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any

Court or, otherwise (iii) to secure ends of justice. A court while sitting in

inherent jurisdiction must exercise its powers to do real and substantial justice,

depending on the facts and circumstances of the case for compelling reasons of

abuse of process of law or glaring injustice, which are against sound principles

of criminal jurisprudence.

Legislative History of the relevant Provisions

46. The concept of 'default bail', enabled in the criminal procedural

jurisprudence, reflects an equilibrium between investigative efficiency and
individual liberty. Before going forward with the analysis on the present cases,

it is essential to refer to the historical background of the legal provisions.

47. Section 58 of BNSS (corresponding to
Section 57
of Cr.P.C.)

clarifies that no Police Officer shall detain any arrested person in custody more

than 24 hours exclusive of the time necessary for journey from the place of

arrest to the Magistrate Court, irrespective of jurisdiction. If the Investigating

Officer failed to complete the investigation within 24 hours of the said arrest,

he shall produce the person before the Court seeking some time to complete the

investigation, Section 187 of BNSS (corresponding to
Section 167
of Cr.P.C.)

takes care of such a situation. The Sections are tabulated hereinunder;

Cr.P.C
. BNSS

57. Person arrested not to be 58. Person arrested not to be
detained more than twenty-four detained more than twenty-four
hours.-- hours.--
No police officer shall detain in No police officer shall detain in
custody a person arrested without custody a person arrested without
warrant for a longer period than warrant for a longer period than
under all the circumstances of the under all the circumstances of the
case is reasonable, and such period case is reasonable, and such period
shall not, in the absence of a special shall not, in the absence of a special
order of a Magistrate under Section order of a Magistrate under Section
167, exceed twenty-four hours 187, exceed twenty-four hours

exclusive of the time necessary for the exclusive of the time necessary for the
journey from the place of arrest to the journey from the place of arrest to the
Magistrate's Court. Magistrate's Court, whether having
jurisdiction or not.

48. The historical background of Section 187 BNSS as it stands now starts

from the 1898
Code of Criminal Procedure
.
Section 167
of Cr.P.C, 1898 provided

for conclusion of investigations within twenty-four hours or within 15 days at
the maximum, regardless of the nature of the offence or the punishment. The

provision reads as follows;

"Section 167 -Procedure when investigation cannot
be completed in twenty-four hours
*****
(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is
forwarded under this section may, whether he has
or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to
time authorise the detention of the accused in such
custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not
exceeding fifteen days in the whole. If he has not
jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and
considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the
accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such
jurisdiction...."

49. In relation to the above provision in
Cr.P.C
, 1898, the Law

Commission of India, in its 41st Report, noted that complex investigations are

often not completed within 15 days. In such cases, the police seek custody by

filing a preliminary or incomplete report, and the Magistrate then uses Section

344 to extend custody, even though the Law Commission, in its 14th Report,

had stated that Section 344 should apply only after a final report under Section

173 is filed. It was observed that using Section 344 to bypass the limits of Section

167 would lead to misuse allowing prolonged detention while investigation goes

slow. Therefore, as in the earlier Law Commission (14th Report), the maximum

period under Section 167 at 60 days was proposed in the 41st Report also.

50. The recommendations of the Law Commission of India were

carefully examined and accepted, as reflected in the Statement of Objects and

Reasons dated 07.11.1970 for introducing the new
Cr.P.C
, 1973. The

Government considered, among other factors, that an accused person should
receive a fair trial based on the principles of natural justice, that delays in

investigation and trial should be avoided as they harm both individuals and

society, and that the procedure should remain simple and ensure fairness,

particularly for the poorer sections of the community. Consequently,
Section
of the Cr.P.C., 1973, was enacted with the recommended time limit,

applicable irrespective of the nature of the offence or the punishment, which

reads thus;

"Section 167 -Procedure when investigation cannot
be completed in twenty-four hours
*****
(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded
under this section may, whether he has or has not
jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time authorise the
detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate
thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole:

and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for
trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may
order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having
such jurisdiction:

Provided that

(a) the Magistrate may authorise detention of the
accused person, otherwise than in custody of the
police, beyond the period of fifteen days if he is
satisfied that adequate grounds exists for doing so,
but no Magistrate shall authorise the
detention of the accused person in custody
under this section for a total period
exceeding sixty days, and on the expiry of
the said period of sixty days, the accused
person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to
and does furnish bail; and every person released on
bail under this section shall be deemed to be so
released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII
for the purposes of that Chapter;"
51. Thereafter in 1978, it was felt that
Section 167
of the Cr.P.C., required

amendment, not only to extend the period for completing investigations but

also to link the same to the seriousness of the alleged offence. As a result, it was

proposed that an aggregate period of 90 days be allowed for investigations in

cases involving offences punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or

imprisonment for not less than ten years, and up to 60 days in all other cases.

52. Section 187 of BNSS corresponds to
Section 167
of Cr.P.C. and is on

similar footing so far as the instant issue of statutory bail stands. Section 187 (3)

corresponds to
Section 167(2)
of the CrPC, and forms the crux of the present

case.

53. It is pertinent to mention that, a two Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex

Court in
V. Senthil Balaji v. State,60
directed the Registry to place the matter

before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India to decide whether the police can seek

police custody only during the first 15 days after the accused is remanded, or

whether that 15-day period can be used at any time during the entire

investigation period of 60 or 90 days. The BNSS resolves this ambiguity by

Section 187(2). It clearly states that the Magistrate may authorize police custody

"for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole, or in parts, at any time

during the initial forty days or sixty days" (depending on whether the total

remand period is 60 or 90 days).

60 (2024) 3 SCC 51
54. Relevant extracts of the provision from
Cr.P.C
. and BNSS for the present

issue are tabulated hereinunder;

Cr. P. C. BNSS
Section 167: Section 187:
Procedure when investigation Procedure when investigation
cannot be completed in twenty- cannot be completed in twenty-
four hours. four hours
(2) The Magistrate to whom (3) The Magistrate may
an accused person is forwarded authorise the detention of the
under this section may, whether he accused person, beyond the period
has or has not jurisdiction to try of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that
the case, from time to time, adequate grounds exist for doing
authorise the detention of the so, but no Magistrate shall
accused in such custody as such authorise the detention of the
Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not accused person in custody under
exceeding fifteen days in the this sub-section for a total period
whole; and if he has no jurisdiction exceeding--
to try the case or commit it for trial, (i) ninety days, where the
and considers further detention investigation relates to an
unnecessary, he may order the offence punishable with death,
accused to be forwarded to a imprisonment for life or
Magistrate having such imprisonment for a term of ten
jurisdiction: years or more;
Provided that-- (ii) sixty days, where the
(a) the Magistrate may investigation relates to any
authorise the detention of the other offence,
accused person, otherwise than in and, on the expiry of the said period
custody of the police, beyond the of ninety days, or sixty days, as the
period of fifteen days, if he is case may be, the accused person
satisfied that adequate grounds shall be released on bail if he is
exist for doing so, but no prepared to and does furnish bail,
Magistrate shall authorise the and every person released on bail
detention of the accused person in under this sub-section shall be
custody under this paragraph for a deemed to be so released under the
total period exceeding provisions of Chapter XXXV for the
(i) ninety days, where the purposes of that Chapter.
investigation relates to an
offence punishable with death,
imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for a term of not
less than ten years;
(ii) sixty days, where the
investigation relates to any
other offence,
and, on the expiry of the said
period of ninety days, or sixty days,
as the case may be, the accused
person shall be released on bail if
he is prepared to and does furnish
bail, and every person released on
bail under this sub-section shall be
deemed to be so released under the
provisions of Chapter XXXIII for
the purposes of that Chapter;
.....

55. Therefore, on a whole, the legislative intent has consistently been

to ensure that investigations are completed within 24 hours, and if not, then

within 15 days under the 1898
Cr.P.C
. This limit was later extended to 60 days

under
Cr.P.C
., 1973 and eventually to 90 days for offences punishable with

death, life imprisonment, or imprisonment of at least 10 years, while the 60-day

limit continued for all other offences, as is brought in by the 1978 Amendment

and followed in the BNSS. The importance of these 60- and 90-day periods is

that if the investigation is not completed and no charge sheet is filed within the

applicable time, the accused in custody becomes entitled to 'default' bail,

provided he is prepared to and does furnish bail.

56. It must be emphasized that the paramount consideration of the

legislature while enacting
Section 167(2)
of Cr.P.C. and the proviso thereto/

Section 187 BNSS was that the investigation must be completed expeditiously,
and that the accused should not be detained for an unreasonably long period as

was the situation prevailing under the 1898 Code. This would be in consonance

with the obligation cast upon the State under
Article 21
to follow a fair, just and

reasonable procedure prior to depriving any person of his personal liberty.

57. "Investigation" as defined in
Section 2(l)
of the BNSS includes all

the proceedings under BNSS for the collection of evidence conducted by a police

officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorised by a

Magistrate in this behalf. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
H. N. Rishbud and

Anr. v. State of Delhi61
categorized the steps involved in an investigation as

follows;

"....investigation consists generally of the following steps:(1)
Proceeding to the spot, (2) Ascertainment of the facts and
circumstances of the case, (3) Discovery and arrest of the
suspected offender, (4) Collection of evidence relating to the
commission of the offence which may consist of (a) the
examination of various persons (including the accused) and
the reduction of their statements into writing, if the officer
thinks fit, (b) the search of places of seizure of things
considered necessary for the investigation and to be
produced at the trial, and (5) Formation of the opinion
as to whether on the material collected there is a
case to place the accused before a Magistrate for
trial and if so taking the necessary steps for the
same by the filing of a charge-sheet under section

173."

(emphasis supplied)

58. Sec.193 (1) BNSS (corresponding to
Sec.173 (1)
Cr.P.C.) enjoins

that the investigation must be completed without 'unreasonable delay'.

61 1955 SCR (1)1150
Relevant extracts of these two provisions for the instant case are tabulated

hereunder; (Emphasized portion indicates change)

Cr. P. C. BNSS
Section 173 Section 193
Report of police officer on Report of police officer on
completion of investigation completion of investigation
(1) Every investigation under this (1) Every investigation under this
Chapter shall be completed without Chapter shall be completed without
unnecessary delay. unnecessary delay.

(2) (i) As soon as it is completed, the (3) (i) As soon as the investigation is
officer in charge of the police station completed, the officer in charge of the
shall forward to a Magistrate police station shall forward,
empowered to take cognizance of the including through electronic
offence on a police report, a report in communication to a Magistrate
the form prescribed by the State empowered to take cognizance of the
Government, stating-- offence on a police report, a report in
the form as the State Government

(a) the names of the parties;

may, by rules provide, stating--

(b) the nature of the information; (a) the names of the parties;

(c) the names of the persons who (b) the nature of the information;
appear to be acquainted with the (c) the names of the persons who
circumstances of the case; appear to be acquainted with the

(d) whether any offence appears circumstances of the case;

to have been committed and, if (d) whether any offence appears to
so, by whom; have been committed and, if so, by
(e) whether the accused has been whom;
arrested; (e) whether the accused has been
arrested;
(f) whether he has been released
(f) whether the accused has been
on his bond and, if so, whether
with or without sureties; released on his bond or bail bond;
(g) whether the accused has been
(g) whether he has been
forwarded in custody under
forwarded in custody under
Section 170; Section 190;
(h) whether the report of medical
(h) whether the report of examination of the woman has
medical examination of the
been attached where investigation
woman has been attached where
investigation relates to an offence relates to an offence under Sections
under Sections 376, Section 376- 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70 or Section 71
A, Section 376-AB, Section 376-
B, Section 376-C, Section 376-D, of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,
Section 376-DA, Section 376-DB 2023;
or Section 376-E of the Indian (i) the sequence of custody in
Penal Code. case of electronic device;
(ii) The officer shall also (ii) the police officer shall, within
communicate, in such manner as a period of ninety days, inform
may be prescribed by the State the progress of the investigation
Government, the action taken by him by any means including through
to the person, if any, by whom the electronic communication to the
information relating to the informant or the victim;
commission of the offence was first (iii) the officer shall also
given. communicate, in such manner as the
State Government may, by rules,
provide, the action taken by him, to the
person, if any, by whom the
information relating to the
commission of the offence was first
given.
(5) When such report is in respect (6) When such report is in respect
of a case to which Section 170 applies, of a case to which Section 190 applies,
the police officer shall forward to the the police officer shall forward to the
Magistrate along with the report-- Magistrate along with the report--
(a) all documents or relevant
(a) all documents or relevant
extracts thereof on which the
extracts thereof on which the
prosecution proposes to rely other
prosecution proposes to rely
than those already sent to the
other than those already sent to
Magistrate during investigation;
the Magistrate during
(b) the statements recorded under
investigation;
Section 180 of all the persons
(b) the statements recorded whom the prosecution proposes to
under Section 161 of all the examine as its witnesses.
persons whom the prosecution
proposes to examine as its
witnesses.
(8) Nothing in this section shall be (9) Nothing in this section shall be
deemed to preclude further deemed to preclude further
investigation in respect of an offence investigation in respect of an offence
after a report under sub-section (2) after a report under sub-section (3)
has been forwarded to the Magistrate has been forwarded to the Magistrate
and, where upon such investigation, and, where upon such investigation,
the officer in charge of the police the officer in charge of the police
station obtains further evidence, oral station obtains further evidence, oral
or documentary, he shall forward to or documentary, he shall forward to
the Magistrate a further report or the Magistrate a further report or
reports regarding such evidence in reports regarding such evidence in the
the form prescribed; and the form as the State Government may, by
provisions of sub-sections (2) to (6) rules, provide; and the provisions of
shall, as far as may be, apply in sub-sections (3) to (8) shall, as far as
relation to such report or reports as may be, apply in relation to such
they apply in relation to a report report or reports as they apply in
forwarded under sub-section (2). relation to a report forwarded under
sub-section (3):
Provided that further
investigation during the
trial may be conducted with
the permission of the Court
trying the case and the same
shall be completed within a
period of ninety days which
may be extended with the
permission of the Court.

59. Section 193(3) of BNSS (corresponding to
Section 173(2)
Cr.P.C.)

mandates that once investigation is completed, the Officer in charge of the

Police Station shall forward, a report to the Magistrate empowered to take

cognizance of the offence, including electronically (inserted by BNSS). The

report must be in the format prescribed by the State Government and must state

the required details as contained in the sub-clauses (a) to (i) of Section 193

(3)(i). In addition to the requirements as provided in Section 173 (2), the BNSS

introduced the sequence of custody in case of electronic device, vide sub-clause

(i). Further, vide the newly inserted Section 193 (3)(ii), the police officer must

inform the informant or the victim about the progress of the investigation

within 90 days, using any means, including electronic communication.
60. Section 193 (6) of BNSS mandates when such report is in respect

of a case to which Section 190 of BNSS applies, the Police Officer shall forward

to the Magistrate along with the report, all documents or relevant extracts

thereof on which the Prosecution proposes to rely other than those already sent

to the Magistrate during investigation and the statements recorded under

Section 180 of BNSS of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to

examine as its witnesses. Subsection (8) of 193
Cr.P.C
. is newly inserted, which

mandates the police officer investigating the case to submit such number of

copies of police report for supply to the accused, including by electronic

communication.

61. Section 193(9) of BNSS, like
Section 173(8)
of Cr.P.C., allows the

police to conduct further investigation even after submitting the initial report

to the Magistrate and requires that any new oral or documentary evidence be

forwarded through a supplementary report to which the same procedural rules

apply. However, the BNSS adds a new proviso stating that further investigation

during trial may be carried out only with the Court's permission and must be

completed within ninety days, thereafter extendable with the Court's approval.

62. So far as to identify the trend of application of legal provisions

supra, it is essential to primarily deal with few judicial pronouncements.

Key Precedents on Statutory Bail

63. The Hon'ble Supreme Court and various High Courts, in a line of

precedents categorically held that an indefeasible right accrues to an accused

when the prosecution fails to file a charge-sheet within the period prescribed

under the proviso to
Section 167(2)
of the CrPC, provided that the accused is
ready to and does, in fact, furnishes bail. Right to default bail is not merely a

statutory entitlement under the proviso to
Section 167(2)
of CrPC, but forms an

integral part of the "procedure established by law" as under
Article 21
of the

Constitution of India, thereby elevating it to the status of a fundamental right of

an accused, provided that the conditions stipulated are fulfilled. Explaining this

principle of law, a three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab62
held as follows:

"36. ...A conspectus of the aforesaid decisions would show
that so long as an application for grant of default bail is made
on expiry of the period of 90 days (which application need not
even be in writing) before a charge sheet is filed, the right to
default bail becomes complete. It is of no moment that the
Criminal Court in question either does not dispose of such
application before the charge sheet is filed or disposes of such
application wrongly before such charge sheet is filed. So long
as an application has been made for default bail on
expiry of the stated period before time is further
extended to the maximum period of 180 days, default
bail, being an indefeasible right of the accused under
the first proviso to Section 167(2), kicks in and must be
granted.

37. ..... The right to default bail, as has been correctly
held by the judgments of this Court, are not mere
statutory rights under the first proviso to Section
167(2) of the Code, but is part of the procedure
established by law under
Article 21
of the Constitution
of India, which is, therefore, a fundamental right
granted to an accused person to be released on bail
once the conditions of the first proviso to Section 167(2)
are fulfilled. ..."

(emphasis supplied)

64. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Sanjay

Dutt
(supra) answered questions concerning the proper construction of Section

62 2020 SCC OnLine SC 824
20 (4) (bb) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 198763

indicating the nature of right of an accused to be released on bail thereunder.

Under TADA, the normal 90-day or 60-day limit as in
Section 167
CrPC is

modified to the extent that the investigation must be finished within 180 days

for the offences under the said Act. If the police cannot finish in 180 days, the

Designated Court may extend the time up to 1 year, but only if the Public

Prosecutor submits a report explaining the progress of the investigation and

giving specific reasons why the accused must remain in custody longer. This

gives rise to the right of the accused to be released on default bail on expiry of

180 days or the extended period on default to complete the investigation within

the time allowed. At para 48, the Hon'ble Supreme Court answered the

reference as follows;

"53...

(2)(b) The "indefeasible right" of the accused to be
released on bail in accordance with
Section
20(4)(bb)
of the TADA Act read with
Section 167(2)

of the Code of Criminal Procedure in default of
completion of the investigation and filing of the
challan within the time allowed, as held
in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur is a right which enures
to, and is enforceable by the accused only from the
time of default till the filing of the challan and it
does not survive or remain enforceable on the
challan being filed. If the accused applies for bail under
this provision on expiry of the period of 180 days or the
extended period, as the case may be, then he has to be
released on bail forthwith. The accused, so released on bail
may be arrested and committed to custody according to the
provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure
. The right of
the accused to be released on bail after filing of the challan,

63 For short, TADA
notwithstanding the default in filing it within the time
allowed, is governed from the time of filing of the challan
only by the provisions relating to the grant of bail applicable
at that stage."

(emphasis supplied)

65.
In
Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra
64, the

accused, booked under Sections 406 and 420 IPC and the Maharashtra

Protection of Interest of Depositors (In Financial Establishment) Act, 1999,65

surrendered on 17.6.2000 and the 60 day period for filing chargesheet expired

on 16.8.2000. He applied for default bail on 17.8.2000, but the Magistrate

rejected it on the ground that Section 167(2) did not apply to
MPID Act
offences.

The High Court later held that Section 167(2) does apply, but refused bail

because the chargesheet had been filed on 30.8.2000, a day before the matter

was heard on 31.8.2000.

Relying on
Sanjay Dutt
(supra), the High Court held

that the right to default bail does not survive once a charge-sheet is filed before

the bail claim is decided. In this context, a three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court observed that Sections 57 and proviso to
Section 167 (2)
of the

Cr.P.C. are in consonance with the constitutional mandate of
Article 22 (2)
and

that the statutory bail under Section 167 (2) proviso is a beneficial provision for

curing the mischief of indefinitely prolonging the investigation which affects the

liberty of a citizen. The following conclusions were culled out;

"1. Under sub-section (2) of Section 167, a Magistrate
before whom an accused is produced while the police is
investigating into the offence can authorise detention of the
accused in such custody as the Magistrate thinks fit for a
term not exceeding 15 days on the whole.

64 (2001) 5 SCC 453
65 For short, MPID Act
2. Under the proviso to the aforesaid sub-

section (2) of Section 167, the Magistrate may authorise
detention of the accused otherwise than in the custody of
police for a total period not exceeding 90 days where the
investigation relates to offence punishable with death,
imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less
than 10 years, and 60 days where the investigation relates to
any other offence.

3. On the expiry of the said period of 90 days
or 60 days, as the case may be, an indefeasible right
accrues in favour of the accused for being released
on bail on account of default by the investigating
agency in the completion of the investigation within
the period prescribed and the accused is entitled to
be released on bail, if he is prepared to and
furnishes the bail as directed by the Magistrate.

4. When an application for bail is filed by an accused
for enforcement of his indefeasible right alleged to have
been accrued in his favour on account of default on the part
of the investigating agency in completion of the
investigation within the specified period, the Magistrate/
court must dispose of it forthwith, on being satisfied that in
fact the accused has been in custody for the period of 90
days or 60 days, as specified and no charge-sheet has been
filed by the investigating agency. Such prompt action on the
part of the Magistrate/court will not enable the prosecution
to frustrate the object of the Act and the legislative mandate
of an accused being released on bail on account of the
default on the part of the investigating agency in completing
the investigation within the period stipulated.

5. If the accused is unable to furnish the bail as
directed by the Magistrate, then on a conjoint reading of
Explanation I and the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section
167, the continued custody of the accused even beyond the
specified period in para (a) will not be unauthorised, and
therefore, if during that period the investigation is complete
and the charge-sheet is filed then the so-called indefeasible
right of the accused would stand extinguished.

6. The expression "if not already availed of" used by
this Court in
Sanjay Dutt
case [(1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994 SCC
(Cri) 1433] must be understood to mean when the accused
files an application and is prepared to offer bail on being
directed. In other words, on expiry of the period specified in
para (a) of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 if the
accused files an application for bail and offers also to furnish
the bail on being directed, then it has to be held that the
accused has availed of his indefeasible right even though the
court has not considered the said application and has not
indicated the terms and conditions of bail, and the accused
has not furnished the same"

(emphasis supplied)

66. The appeal preferred was allowed as according to the majority in
Uday

Mohanlal Acharya
(supra), the accused's right to default bail had already

been availed of on 17.8.2000, when he filed an application offering to furnish

bail after the statutory period expired and the Magistrate wrongly rejected the

plea. It was ruled that although the charge-sheet was later filed during

proceedings in the High Court, it did not extinguish the right.

However, by way

of minority judgment in
Uday Mohanlal Acharya
(supra), view was taken

that the right is availed only after the accused actually furnishes the bail bond,

not merely on filing the application.

67.
In
M.Ravindran
(supra), the issue that arose was whether the

indefeasible right accruing to the appellant under
Section 167(2)
, CrPC gets

extinguished by subsequent filing of an additional complaint by the

investigating agency. It was decided that the filing of an additional complaint

after the accused has availed his right to be released on default bail, should not

deter the courts from enforcing this indefeasible right, if the charge-sheet was

not filed before the expiry of the statutory period. The following guidelines were

culled out;
"18.1 Once the accused files an application for bail under
the Proviso to Section 167(2) he is deemed to have 'availed
of' or enforced his right to be released on default bail,
accruing after expiry of the stipulated time limit for
investigation. Thus, if the accused applies for bail under

Section 167(2)
, CrPC read with
Section 36A (4)
, NDPS Act
upon expiry of 180 days or the extended period, as the case
may be, the Court must release him on bail forthwith
without any unnecessary delay after getting necessary
information from the public prosecutor, as mentioned
supra. Such prompt action will restrict the prosecution from
frustrating the legislative mandate to release the accused on
bail in case of default by the investigative agency.
18.2 The right to be released on default bail continues to
remain enforceable if the accused has applied for such bail,
notwithstanding pendency of the bail application; or
subsequent filing of the chargesheet or a report seeking
extension of time by the prosecution before the Court; or
filing of the chargesheet during the interregnum when
challenge to the rejection of the bail application is pending
before a higher Court.

18.3 However, where the accused fails to apply for default
bail when the right accrues to him, and subsequently a
chargesheet, additional complaint or a report seeking
extension of time is preferred before the Magistrate, the
right to default bail would be extinguished. The Magistrate
would be at liberty to take cognizance of the case or grant
further time for completion of the investigation, as the case
may be, though the accused may still be released on bail
under other provisions of the
CrPC
.

18.4 Notwithstanding the order of default bail passed by the
Court, by virtue of Explanation I to Section 167(2), the
actual release of the accused from custody is contingent on
the directions passed by the competent Court granting bail.
If the accused fails to furnish bail and/or comply with the
terms and conditions of the bail order within the time
stipulated by the Court, his continued detention in custody
is valid."
68. In Achpal (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the settled

principal concerning statutory bail as follows;

"12. The principles laid down in Uday Mohanlal
Acharya have been consistently followed by this Court,
namely, in
State of W.B. v. Dinesh Dalmia
;
Sanjay
Kumar Kedia v. Narcotics Control Bureau
;
Union of
India v. Nirala Yadav
and in
Rambeer Shokeen v. State
(NCT of Delhi) [Rambeer Shokeen
v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2018) 4 SCC 405 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 498] . It must
therefore be taken to be well settled that in terms
of 3rd conclusion as recorded in Uday Mohanlal
Acharya, on the expiry of the period stipulated, an
indefeasible right accrues in favour of the accused
for being released on bail on account of default by
the investigating agency in the completion of the
investigation within the period stipulated and the
accused is entitled to be released on bail, if he is
prepared to and furnishes the bail as directed by
the Magistrate."

(emphasis supplied)

69.
In
Mohd. Iqbal Madar Sheikh v. State of Maharashtra,66

a three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court right held that the right to

statutory bail under proviso to Section 167 (2) cannot be defeated by any court,

if the accused concerned is prepared and does furnish bail bonds to the

satisfaction of the court concerned. The relevant extract reads;

"If an accused charged with any kind of offence becomes
entitled to be released on bail under proviso (a) to Section
167(2), that statutory right should not be defeated by
keeping the applications pending till the charge-sheets are
submitted so that the right which had accrued is
extinguished and defeated."

66 (1996) 1 SCC 722
70. In Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra), a three Judge Bench of Hon'ble

Supreme Court, dealt with the interpretation of the phrase "punishable with

imprisonment for not less than 10 years" which occurs in Section 167(2) for

determining whether the permissible period of custody is 60 days or 90 days in

relation to the offence punishable under
Section 13 (1)
of the PC Act. While

emphasizing on the duty of the courts in matters concerning personal liberty

and penal statutes, observed thus;

"44.....Strong words indeed. That being so we are of the
clear opinion that adapting this principle, it would
equally be the duty and responsibility of a court on
coming to know that the accused person before it is
entitled to "default bail", to at least apprise him or
her of the indefeasible right. A contrary view would
diminish the respect for personal liberty, on which so much
emphasis has been laid by this Court as is evidenced by the
decisions mentioned above, and also adverted to in Nirala
Yadav."

(emphasis supplied)

71.
In
Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI
, terming the indefeasible right to
statutory bail under Section 167 (2) as an integral part of the right to personal

liberty under Art 21, it was observed thus;

"41. As a consequence of the right flowing from the said
provision, courts will have to give due effect to it, and thus
any detention beyond this period would certainly be illegal,
being an affront to the liberty of the person concerned.
Therefore, it is not only the duty of the investigating
agency but also the courts to see to it that an
accused gets the benefit of Section 167(2)."

(emphasis supplied)

67 (2022) 10 SCC 51
72.
In
Dinesh Dalmia
(supra), interpretation of
Section 167 (2)
of Cr.P.C.

vis-à-vis
Section 309 (2)
of Cr.P.C. fell for consideration. With regard to the

scope of statutory bail, it was observed as follows;

"25. Such a right of bail although is a valuable right
but the same is a conditional one; the condition
precedent being pendency of the investigation.
Whether an investigation in fact has remained pending
and the investigating officer has submitted the charge-
sheet only with a view to curtail the right of the accused
would essentially be a question of fact..... "

(emphasis supplied)

73. In light of the provisions of the BNSS, along with the precedents

discussed above, it is clear that when an accused is arrested, during the course

of an investigation, the accused must be produced before the Magistrate if the

investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours of the arrest, so that the

Magistrate may authorise custody. At this stage, under Section 187 of the BNSS,

the Magistrate is empowered to remand the accused to police or judicial custody

for up to 15 days, subject to a maximum of 60 or 90 days, depending on the

nature of the case. If the investigating agency fails to file the charge sheet within

the prescribed period, the accused becomes entitled to statutory bail. In other

words, if the investigation is not completed and the police report is not filed

within the statutory period, the consequence is that the accused must be

released on default bail, provided he is willing to furnish bail to the satisfaction

of the Magistrate.

74. The underlying object of Section 187(3)(i) BNSS thus appears to be to

caution investigating officers to complete investigations promptly, failing which
the accused must be released on default bail. At the same time, this provision

protects the fundamental right under
Article 21
of the Constitution by

preventing indefinite incarceration, whether at the pre-cognizance or post-

cognizance stage, before the accused's guilt is established.

Key Precedents on Constituents of a Chargesheet

75. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
K.

Veeraswami
(supra), dealt with a question whether a Judge of the Supreme

Court or a Judge of a High Court is a public servant within the meaning of

Section 2
of the PC Act, 1947 and can be bought within the purview of
Section

6(1) (c)
of the Act or not. As the legality of the chargesheet was also challenged,

the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus;

"76. The charge-sheet is nothing but a final report of police
officer under
Section 173(2)
of the CrPC. The Section 173(2)
provides that on completion of the investigation the police
officer investigating into a cognizable offence shall submit a
report. The report must be in the form prescribed by
the State Government and stating therein (a) the
names of the parties; (b) the nature of the
information; (c) the names of the persons who
appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of
the case; (d) whether any offence appears to have
been committed and, if so, by whom (e) whether the
accused has been arrested; (f) whether he had been
released on his bond and, if so, whether with or
without sureties; and (g) whether he has been
forwarded in custody under Section 170. As observed
by this Court in
Satya Narain Musadi v. State of
Bihar
, that the statutory requirement of the report under
Section 173(2) would be complied with if the various details
prescribed therein are included in the report. This report is
an intimation to the magistrate that upon investigation into
a cognizable offence the Investigating Officer has been able
to procure sufficient evidence for the court to inquire into
the offence and the necessary information is being sent to
the court. In fact, the report under Section 173(2)
purports to be an opinion of the Investigating
Officer that as far as he is concerned he has been
able to procure sufficient material for the trial of
the accused by the court. The report is complete if
it is accompanied with all the documents and
statements of witnesses as required by Section
175(5). Nothing more need be stated in the report of
the Investigating Officer. It is also not necessary
that all the details of the offence must be stated. The
details of the offence are required to be proved to
bring home the guilt to the accused at a later stage
i.e. in the course of the trial of the case by adducing
acceptable evidence."

(emphasis supplied)

76.
In the context of the facts in
K. Veeraswami
(supra), it was observed

by the Constitution Bench that the charge sheet met all the requirements of

Section 173(2)
CrPC as it clearly stated that, during the relevant period, the

appellant possessed assets both in his own name and in the names of his family

members disproportionate to his known income by ₹6,41,416.36 and could not

account for them. The details of these assets were fully set out, and nothing

more was required under the law.

77.
In
Dablu Kujur
(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court having examined

the importance of a complete police report under
Section 173(2)
of the CrPC,

emphasized that the investigating officer must strictly comply with the statutory

requirements while submitting a chargesheet, noting the variant practices and

defaults in states.

"6. The police report submitted by the police under
Section
173(2)
CrPC being very important piece of document from the
viewpoint of the prosecution, the defence and the court, we
deem it necessary to elaborately deal with the various aspects
involved in the said provision. For the reasons stated
hereinafter, we are of the opinion that it is incumbent on the
part of the investigating officer to strictly comply with the
requirements of the said provisions, as non-compliance
thereof gives rise to many legal issues in the court of law.

*****

13. We are more concerned with Section 173(2) as we have
found that the investigating officers while submitting the
charge-sheet/police report do not comply with the
requirements of the said provision. Though it is true that
the form of the report to be submitted under Section
173(2) has to be prescribed by the State Government
and each State Government has its own Police Manual
to be followed by the police officers while discharging
their duty, the mandatory requirements required to
be complied with by such officers in the police
report/charge-sheet are
laid down in
Section 173,
more particularly sub-section (2) thereof.

14. It may be noted that though there are various reports
required to be submitted by the police in charge of the police
station before, during and after the investigation as
contemplated in Chapter XII
CrPC
, it is only the report
forwarded by the police officer to the Magistrate under sub-
section (2) of Section 173CrPC that can form the basis for the
competent court for taking cognizance thereupon. A charge-
sheet is nothing but a final report of the police officer
under
Section 173(2)
CrPC. It is an opinion or intimation
of the investigating officer to the court concerned that on the
material collected during the course of investigation, an
offence appears to have been committed by the particular
person or persons, or that no offence appears to have been
committed.

15. When such a police report concludes that an
offence appears to have been committed by a
particular person or persons, the Magistrate has
three options:

(i) he may accept the report and take cognizance of
the offence and issue process,
(ii) he may direct further investigation under sub-

section (3) of Section 156 and require the police to
make a further report, or

(iii) he may disagree with the report and discharge
the accused or drop the proceedings.

If such police report concludes that no offence appears to have
been committed, the Magistrate again has three options:

(i) he may accept the report and drop the proceedings, or

(ii) he may disagree with the report and taking the view that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding further, take
cognizance of the offence and issue process, or

(iii) he may direct further investigation to be made by the
police under sub-section (3) of Section 156 [Bhagwant
Singh v. CBI, (1985) 2 SCC 537 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 267] .

****

20. Ergo, having regard to the provisions contained
in Section 173 it is hereby directed that the report of
police officer on the completion of investigation shall
contain the following:

20.1. A report in the form prescribed by the State
Government stating--

(a) The names of the parties;

(b) The nature of the information;

(c) The names of the persons who appear to be acquainted
with the circumstances of the case;

(d) Whether any offence appears to have been committed
and, if so, by whom;

(e) Whether the accused has been arrested;

(f) Whether he has been released on his bond and, if so,
whether with or without sureties;

(g) Whether he has been forwarded in custody under
Section 170.

(h) Whether the report of medical examination of the
woman has been attached where investigation relates to an
offence under [Sections 376, 376-A, 376-AB, 376-B, 376-C,
376-D, 376-DA, 376-DB or Section 376-E of the Penal Code (45
of 1860)]
20.2. If upon the completion of investigation, there is no
sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify
the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, the police officer
in charge shall clearly state in the report about the compliance
of Section 169CrPC.

20.3. When the report in respect of a case to which Section
170 applies, the police officer shall forward to the Magistrate
along with the report, all the documents or relevant extracts
thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely other than
those already sent to the Magistrate during investigation; and
the statements recorded under Section 161 of all the persons
whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses.
20.4. In case of further investigation, the police officer in
charge shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or
reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed and
shall also comply with the details mentioned in the above sub-
paras 20.1 to 20.3."

(emphasis supplied)

78.
In
Sharif Ahmed
(supra), a two Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme

Court, while dealing with an appeal arising out of quashment of chargesheet had

observed as follows by placing reliance on the decision of the Constitution bench

in
K. Veeraswami
(supra);

"13. The question of the required details being complete
must be understood in a way which gives effect to the true
intent of the charge-sheet under Section 173(2) of the Code.
The requirement of "further evidence" or a "supplementary
charge-sheet" as referred to under Section 173(8) of the
Code, is to make additions to a complete charge-sheet,
[
State v. Hemendhra Reddy
, (2023) 16 SCC 779] and not to
make up or reparate for a charge-sheet which does not fulfil
requirements of Section 173(2) of the Code. The charge-
sheet is complete when it refers to material and evidence
sufficient to take cognizance and for the trial. The nature
and standard of evidence to be elucidated in a charge-sheet
should prima facie show that an offence is established if the
material and evidence is proven. The charge-sheet is
complete where a case is not exclusively dependent on
further evidence. The trial can proceed on the basis of
evidence and material placed on record with the charge-
sheet. This standard is not overly technical or foolproof, but
a pragmatic balance to protect the innocent from
harassment due to delay as well as prolonged incarceration,
and yet not curtail the right of the prosecution to forward
further evidence in support of the charges [See also, para 22
below on the power of the police to investigate under Section
173(8) of the Code.] .

****

25. It is the police report which would enable the
Magistrate to decide a course of action from the options
available to him. The details of the offence and
investigation are not supposed to be a
comprehensive thesis of the prosecution case, but
at the same time, must reflect a thorough
investigation into the alleged offence. It is on the
basis of this record that the court can take effective
cognizance of the offence and proceed to issue
process in terms of Section 190(1)(b) and Section
204 of the Code. In case of doubt or debate, or if no
offence is made out, it is open to the Magistrate to
exercise other options which are available to him.

****

29. The final report has to be prepared with these aspects
in mind and should show with sufficient particularity and
clarity, the contravention of the law which is alleged. When
the report complies with the said requirements, the court
concerned should apply its mind whether or not to take
cognizance and also proceed by issuing summons to the
accused. While doing so, the court will take into account
the statement of witnesses recorded under Section 161 of
the Code and the documents placed on record by the
investigating officer.

30. In case of any doubts or ambiguity arising in
ascertaining the facts and evidence, the Magistrate can,
before taking cognizance, call upon the investigating
officer to clarify and give better particulars, order further
investigation, or even record statements in terms of
Section 202 of the Code."

(emphasis supplied)
79.
In
Central Bureau of Investigation v. R.S. Pai,68
the

question that arose before a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges was whether the

prosecution can produce additional documents which are gathered during

investigation, after submitting the charge-sheet under
Section 173
of the Code

of Criminal Procedure, 1973. At para 7, it was answered as follows;

"7. From the aforesaid sub-sections, it is apparent that
normally, the investigating officer is required to produce all
the relevant documents at the time of submitting the
chargesheet. At the same time, as there is no specific
prohibition, it cannot be held that the additional documents
cannot be produced subsequently. If some mistake is
committed in not producing the relevant documents at the
time of submitting the report or the charge-sheet, it is
always open to the investigating officer to produce the same
with the permission of the court. In our view,
considering the preliminary stage of prosecution
and the context in which the police officer is
required to forward to the Magistrate all the
documents or the relevant extracts thereof on
which the prosecution proposes to rely, the word
"shall" used in sub-section (5) cannot be
interpreted as mandatory, but as directory.
Normally, the documents gathered during the investigation
upon which the prosecution wants to rely are required to be
forwarded to the Magistrate, but if there is some omission,
it would not mean that the remaining documents cannot be
produced subsequently. Analogous provision under
Section
173(4)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was
considered by this Court in
Narayan Rao v. State of A.P.

and it was held that the word "shall" occurring in sub-
section (4) of Section 173 and sub-section (3) of Section 207-
A is not mandatory but only directory. Further, the
scheme of sub-section (8) of Section 173 also makes
it abundantly clear that even after the charge-sheet
is submitted, further investigation, if called for, is

68 (2002) 5 SCC 82
not precluded. If further investigation is not
precluded then there is no question of not
permitting the prosecution to produce additional
documents which were gathered prior to or
subsequent to the investigation. In such cases, there
cannot be any prejudice to the accused. Hence, the
impugned order passed by the Special Court cannot be
sustained."

(emphasis supplied)

80. A two-Judge Bench in
Sameer Sandhir v. CBI
69 reiterated the

position of law
laid down in

R.S. Pai
(supra).

81. In Velinedipurnam (supra), a Division Bench of the then

Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, dealt with a reference in context of

Section 173(2) and (5) as to whether filing of incomplete charge-sheet within

60/90 days would enable the accused to seek for his release from custody. It

was observed as follows;

"5. If all the necessary details as contemplated under
S.
173(2)
, Cr.P.C. are not disclosed in the police report in the
first instance, but they are furnished at a later date, perhaps
it is for the Court to consider the probative value of those
details furnished later during the trial of the case, but to say
that the police report filed with certain omissions or gaps is
not a valid report contemplated under S. 173(2) is reading
something more into the section. Consequently we hold
that non-filing of all the enclosures under S. 173(5)
along with the report filed under S. 173(2) is not a
ground to release the accused on the premise that
full charge-sheet is not filed within the stipulated
time."

(emphasis supplied)

82. It is thus clear that, the purpose of the submission of the Police

report in terms of the precedents referred above i.e., in compliance with Section

69 2025 INSC 776
193(3) BNSS/
Section 173(2)
Cr.P.C., is to enable the Magistrate to satisfy

himself, whether on the basis of the report and the material filed along with the

Police report, a case for taking cognizance has been made out or not. After

applying his mind to the Police report and the material submitted therewith, if

the Magistrate is satisfied that cognizance of the offence is required to be taken,

he shall proceed further in accordance with the
Cr.P.C
.

83. With regard to the options left to a Magistrate, in case of filing of a

report by the Investigating Officer, for consideration, a Three Judge Bench of

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhagwant Singh (supra) observed that, on filing

such report, the Magistrate may do one of the three things i.e.,

(1) he may accept the report, take cognizance of the offence and

issue process or,

(2) he may disagree with the report and drop the proceeding or,

(3) he may direct further investigation under Section 156(3) and

require the police to make a further report.

Brief Overview on the Contents of Police Reports

84. As the law laid down by various precedents has been discussed, it

is desirable to look into the Police report filed on 19.07.2025 and the

supplementary report on 11.08.2025, strictly for the purpose of assessing

whether the reports filed are in compliance of Section 193(3) BNSS or not. This

Court has called for the attested copies of the relevant material in this matter

for the above purpose.
85. Before going further, a short snapshot of the relevant dates in the

crime, are as follows;

23.09.2024 FIR No.21/2024 registered against unknown person
22.04.2025 1st Memo filed and names of 29 accused persons were added
to the FIR.

01.05.2025 2nd Memo filed adding name of A.30 to the FIR
05.05.2025 3rd Memo filed adding names to A.31 toA.33 (three
Respondents before the High Court) to the FIR
17.06.2025 4th Memo filed adding names of A.34 to A.39 as accused
04.07.2025 5th Memo filed adding name of A.40 as accused
19.07.2025 6th Memo filed adding names of A.41 to A.48as accused
19.07.2025 Chargesheet filed against 16 persons
11.08.2025 1st Supplementary Chargesheet filed against the 16 persons
and three respondents
15.09.2025 2nd Supplementary Chargesheet filed against A.34 to A.38

86. The relevant dates relating to Accused Nos., 31 to 33, necessary for

the purpose of these matters, are mentioned in the tabular form as follows:

Date of 90th day of Date of Date of Date of
Date of Date of Date of Date of filing of the judicial issuance compli- filing of
adding as Arrest remand filing of supplemen custody of of Memo ance of default
Accused Charge -tary Accused of the bail
Sheet charge Defects defects petition
sheet
26.8.25
A.31 16.5.25 17.5.25 14.8.25 (As per 28.8.25
A.32 5.5.25 16.5.25 17.5.25 19.7.25 11.8.25 14.8.25 23.8.25 CFR 26.8.25
A.33 13.5.25 14.5.25 11.8.25 entry 26.8.25
1.9.25)

Police report dated 19.07.2025

87. The Police report filed on 19.07.2025 would show the following details;

i. It contains the initial of the Officer dated 19.07.2025. It was noted

in the CF No.2490 with the date 19.07.2025.

ii. The over leaf of the Charge sheet would show that it was filed under

Section 193 BNSS, Chapter 28 and Chapter 29 Order No. 480-1,
480-2, 481, 482, 487 and 609-5 in Form-69 of Andhra Pradesh

State Police Manual.

iii. It contains the following information;

a) Names of the Parties in Crime No.21 of 2024

b) Date of Registration of Crime

c) The offences alleged in the case

d) Name of the Investigating Officer

e) Name of the Complainant

f) Particulars of the Accused persons charge sheeted, Separate

sheet is used for each accused

g) Details regarding the date of arrest, date on which the person

was forwarded to the Court. Offences alleged against the

individuals, status of the accused, acknowledged copy of the

Notice to the complainant about the progress of the case.

h) The Police report filed for sixteen Accused, separate sheets

attached mentioning the particulars of each accused with the

details of their address, offences alleged, date of arrest, status of

the Accused regarding the custody.

i) The index of the Police Report would show, it broadly contains

the particulars of accused persons charge sheeted:

i. Brief overview of the Crime,
ii. Legislative Backdrop for Procurement of
Liquor through APSBCLL
iii. Invitation of offers for supply of IMFL-E-
Procurement Notification dt.15.10.2015.
iv. Procedure of OFS issue and indenting in the
State of Andhra Pradesh Prior to 2019
v. Brief Facts of the Present Crime
vi. Execution of the Conspiracy
vii. Transaction through Shell companies
viii. How the kickbacks received are disposed
during general elections- 2024 and other
specific cash disposal methods utilized by
Accused.
ix. Results of Investigation.
x. Conclusion.

88. An Official Memorandum was issued by the office of the Special

Judge dated 23.08.2025, informing the Investigating Officer about the

omissions and 21 defects pointed out by the Office in the police report filed by

him on 19.07.2025, requiring the Investigating Officer to comply with the same

within three days to take up further action in the matter. This Official

Memorandum was shown in the dispatch register as Dis.No.658 dated

23.08.2025. The Investigating Officer received the said Official Memorandum

on 25.08.2025. The Investigating Officer filed compliance regarding omissions,

showing the date as 26.08.2025 with his signature. But as per the endorsement

of the Special Judge directing the Office to 'check and put up' with his initials

dated 01.09.2025, it contains the stamp of the Court dated 01.09.2025. The

same was recorded with reference to CF-3516 dated 01.09.2025. Along with the

Charge sheet, on 19.07.2025, list of witnesses as L.W.1 to L.W.270 and list of

documents Volume No.1 to Volume No.43 and other documentary evidences
are also filed separately. It contains the initial of the learned Special Judge dated

19.07.2025 along with the Court Stamp with the same date.

89. For the purpose of the present determination, it is apt to extract

paragraphs - 341, 342, 343, 344 of the Police Report dated 19.07.2025

"341. It is also prayed to permit the submission of
additional statements and documents as and when required.

342. It is necessary to state that considering huge
magnitude and complexity of the offence having involved
large amounts of money coupled with the non-availability of
the absconding accused and deliberate action of transferring
the ill-gotten money to several other countries and illegally
concealing it in covert financial operations, further
investigation is necessary. Due to the deliberate design
adopted by the accused to conceal the evidence and abscond
from investigation, the investigation into it the present crime
needs to be carried on in the interests of justice. As such,
further investigation in order to elicit the remaining accused
who are at large, unearth and attach ill-gotten crime
proceeds, examine several key witnesses, seize and analyze
documents, discover the role played by the identified as well
as unidentified accused individuals that have aided in
manipulation of the excise policy and were the ultimate
beneficiary of crime is necessary and required.

343. It is further prayed that permission may be granted
for continuing further investigation in this case against other
accused arrayed and the role of several other individuals to
complete the investigation. It is further prayed that further
reports u/s.193(9) BNSS [173(8)
CrPC
] will also be filed in
this Hon'ble Court.

344. It is therefore, prayed that the Charge sheet be taken on
file and issue process against the absconding accused and the
accused persons be tried and punished in accordance with
law."
Supplementary Police Report dated 11.08.2025

90. Coming to the supplementary charge sheet dated 11.08.2025, the

overleaf contains the final report under Section 193 BNSS in Crime No.21 of

2024 of CID Police Station, Mangalagiri, Guntur District. It is filed against 19

persons including the present respondents/A.31 toA.33. Particulars of Accused

persons are mentioned in a separate sheet for each Accused. The very first

sentence in the Charge Sheet would show that it is filed in addition to the Charge

Sheet submitted on 19.07.2025 and in accordance with Section 193(9) BNSS.

The details of each accused regarding the offences alleged, date of arrest, their

current status, passport number, house address are mentioned.

91. The contents of the supplementary charge sheet dated 11.08.2025

broadly would show the following:

i. Conspiracy and Crime.

ii. Details of financial investigation

iii. Details of the technical analysis and forensic analysis
iv. Details of further investigation

92. It is pertinent to extract Paras-197, 198, 199 and 200 of the

supplementary chargesheet dated 11.08.2025 for the present case;

"197. It is also prayed to permit the submission of
additional statements and documents as and when
required.

198. It is necessary to state that considering huge
magnitude and complexity of the offence having involved
large amounts of money coupled with the non-availability of
the absconding accused and deliberate action of
transferring the ill-gotten money to several other countries
and illegally concealing it in covert financial operations,
further investigation is necessary. Due to the deliberate
design adopted by the accused to conceal the evidence and
abscond from investigation, the investigation into it the
present crime needs to be carried on in the interests of
justice. As such, further investigation in order to elicit the
remaining accused who are at large, unearth and attach ill-
gotten crime proceeds, examine several key witnesses, seize
and analyze documents, discover the role played by the
identified as well as unidentified accused individuals that
have aided in manipulation of the excise policy and were the
ultimate beneficiary of crime is necessary and required.

199. It is further prayed that permission may be granted
for continuing further investigation in this case against
other accused arrayed and the role of several other
individuals to complete the investigation. It is further
prayed that further reports u/s.193(9) BNSS [173(8)
CrPC
]
will also be filed in this Hon'ble Court.

200. It is therefore, prayed that the Charge sheet be
taken on file and issue process against the absconding
accused and the accused persons be tried and punished in
accordance with law."

93. Along with the Supplementary Charge sheet, Investigating Officer

filed Memo of evidence received in the Office of the Special Judge on the same

dated i.e. 11.08.2025. It shows L.Ws.20,34,35,76, 243, 246 and 261 were further

examined.L.W.272 to 292 were the witnesses examined. List of witnesses

examined under Section 183 BNSS, which is corresponding to
Section 164

Cr.P.C. mentioned as L.Ws.277, 282, 283. List of documents Volume 44 to 57

are placed before the Court along with mediators' report. It is apt to mention

that the 21 defects pointed out by the Office of the Learned Special Judge in the

supplementary report are the very same defects pointed out in the Police report

filed on 19.07.2025.
Basis for the Impugned Orders

94. The impugned orders were passed placing reliance mainly on the

decisions rendered in by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Ritu Chhabbaria

(supra),
Dinesh Dalmia
(supra), Fakhrey Alam (supra), Satender

Kumar Antil, this Court in Akula Raviteja (supra), Bombay High Court in

Sarath Chandra Vinayak Dongre and others v. State of

Maharashtra, Delhi High Court in
Avinash Jain
(supra) and
Chitra

Ramkrishna
(supra) and High Court for the State of Telangana in C.

Parthasarathy (supra). Further, the reasons taken into consideration by the

learned Special Judge in passing impugned orders dated 06.09.2025 can be

classified as follows;

A. Some Defects not cured: To this, learned Special Judge gave examples

of FSL reports missing, sanctions under the
Prevention of Corruption Act
not

filed, tabular format of proceeds, siphoned amount only small portion traced.

B. Incomplete Investigation as Further Investigation Sought: The

real legal test for grant of statutory bail is not whether a chargesheet is filed, it

is whether the investigation is complete. Both the preliminary and

supplementary charge sheets were incomplete because investigation was

admittedly still pending. The Charge sheet itself says further investigation and

more accused/evidence to be found. As the investigation is incomplete, the right

to default bail under Section 187(3) BNSS is triggered.

C. Investigation pending qua other Accused: Police were splitting the

charge sheets for different accused and filing them before completing the full
investigation, which is termed as clever contrivance. Applying the ratio of
Ritu

Chhabbaria
(supra), a charge sheet filed without completing investigation

cannot defeat default bail, a fundamental right under
Article 21.

The decision in

Kapil Wadhwan (supra), is not binding precedent since it has not taken note

of
Ritu Chhabaria
(supra).

D. Inability to show custody as cognizance not taken: Since the

chargesheet was incomplete, the court could not take cognizance and therefore

custody could not be extended using
Section 309
Cr.P.C. which applies post-

cognizance. No statutory power exists as in other Special Acts to extend remand

beyond 90 days in this case and therefore, there is no option except to grant

statutory bail.

95. This Court would now deal with each of these considerations on the

touchstone of settled criminal jurisprudence as has been discussed in the

previous portion.

A. Some defects not cured

96. Undisputably, police report, i.e., charge sheet and supplementary

charge sheet in the present case, were filed within the statutory period of ninety

days from the date of judicial remand of Respondents/ Accused Nos. 31 to 33.

The Respondents admittedly filed their default bail petitions only two weeks

after the submission of these reports. The core issue is that, although the charge

sheets were filed, the Respondents contended that they were "incomplete" due

to defects pointed out by the Special Court, and therefore, for the purposes of

Section 187(3)(ii), should be treated as if no charge sheet was filed. The State,

on the other hand, argued that once a charge sheet is filed within the statutory
period, the accused's right to default bail automatically ceases. The Learned

Special Judge, however, accepted the reasoning advanced by the Accused.

97. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents/Accused Nos., 31 to

33 in one voice submitted that the very prayer regarding quashment of Official

Memoranda dated 23.08.2025 on the Charge Sheets filed by the Investigating

Agency dated 19.07.2025 and 11.08.2025 is not maintainable since the Official

Memoranda issued to the Investigating Officer is only an administrative act and

not a judicial order. Learned Senior Counsel for the State would submit that

Official Memoranda issued by the Court dated 23.08.2025 are contrary to law

and reflect non-application of mind. The State seeks the quashment of such

Memoranda since they were issued by the Learned Special Judge, which contain

his signature. Refuting the same, Sri T. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel

submits that if such an argument is to be accepted, the State should have

challenged the Official Memoranda dated 23.08.2025 immediately, but not

after sufferance of an adverse order from the Court.

98. This Court concurs with the submissions of the Respondents that

the issuance of Official Memoranda by the Learned Special Judge to

Investigating Officer for rectifying defects is essentially an administrative act.

The issuance of such memoranda does not involve hearing the parties or

adjudicating any matter. Although the memoranda bear the signature of the

learned Special Judge, in practice, it is the Clerk on the Criminal Side, along

with the Property Clerk, who compiles the original FIR, documents, and any

property received, and presents them to Superintendent of the Court. The

Superintendent verifies the charge sheet and prepares an office note for the
Judge to take cognizance. If the Superintendent identifies defects, they are

pointed out in the office note, which the Judge merely reviews and signs. This

signature does not convert the memoranda into a judicial order, it only remains

an administrative action signed after verification of office objections, not a

decision on the judicial side.

99. The defects pointed out by the Court in the Official Memoranda

dated 23.08.2025 formed one of the primary grounds relied upon by the

Learned Special Judge while granting default bail to the Respondents.

Consequently, State has also challenged these very Official Memorandums. This

Court is of the considered opinion that for a proper and comprehensive

appreciation of the legal issues arising in the present case, it is appropriate to

examine the contents of the Official Memorandums dated 23.08.2025. As

rightly contended by Sri T. Niranjan Reddy, the Official Memoranda per se,

being administrative in nature, are not liable to be quashed and may be referred

to only for contextual understanding of the matter.

100. It is apt to refer the observations made by a two-Judge Bench of

Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Sharif Ahmed
(supra), while dealing with the issue

of the complete charge sheet to the effect that in case of any doubts or ambiguity

arising in ascertaining the facts and evidence, the Learned Magistrate can, call

upon the Investigating Officer to clarify and give better particulars, order

further investigation, or even record statements in terms of Section 202 of the

Code before taking cognizance. Therefore, it is the bounden duty of the

Investigating Officer to make clear and complete entries of all columns in the

Chargesheet so that the Court can clearly understand which crime has been
committed by which accused and what is the material evidence available on the

file. Now let us examine, the defects pointed by the Learned Special Judge and

rectification of such defects by the Investigating Officer. For this Purpose,

Annexure-II enclosed to the Written Arguments submitted by the Petitioner/

State, is extracted as under:

Defect Response
Accused copies of charge The proviso to S.193(8) BNSS permits the
1 sheet along with investigating agency to submit copies of the
documents for all the police report along with other documents
accused who are arrayed duly indexed to the Magistrate for supply to
as accused in the charge the accused as required/S.230 through
sheet to be filed. electronic communication. Thus, the
investigating agency has provided the
charge sheets along with all the documents
to the Court in the form of soft copies in
open drives.
(Compliance shown)
To state how the charge There is no bar to initiate criminal
sheet is maintainable proceedings and to file a chargesheet
2 against Al without against a Public Servant without obtaining
obtaining the previous a sanction for prosecution. Sanction is
sanction for prosecution required only to enable the Court to take
from the competent cognizance of the offence. [Refer to
authority U/s.19 of the PC Judgebir Singh V.NIA,(2023) 17 SCC 48].

Act 1988. Steps to obtain a sanction
u/S.19
PC Act
for a.1 has been undertaken on 18.07.2025.

[This omission/defect is perverse in law]
To state how the Old PC The provisions of the Prevention of
3 Act 1988 is attracts
Corruption Act, 1988
(amended vide Act
against the accused in this No.16 of 2018) are invoked in the case.

case for the offences (Compliance shown)
U/s.7, 7A, 8, 9, 12, 13 (1)
(b) and 13 (2) of
PC Act

1988.
How many witnesses were The number of witnesses examined
4 examined U/s.161
Cr.P.C
., u/S.180 BNSS have been mentioned in
(180 BNSS) to be Para.363 of the Chargesheet dated
mentioned in list of 19.07.2025 and in Para.191 of the
documents as well as Supplementary chargehset dated
charge sheet. 11.08.2025.
In addition to the same, the IO has filed a
Memo of Evidence 1 & Memo of Evidence
2 to place on record detailed List
Witnesses and Documents.
[Compliance shown].
How many witnesses were The number of witnesses examined S.183
examined U/s.164
Cr.P.C
. BNSS have been mentioned in Para.364 of
5 (183 BNSS) to be the Chargesheet dated 19.07.2025 and in
mentioned in list of Para.193 of the Supplementary Charge
documents as well as sheet dated 11.08.2025.
charge sheet. In addition to the same, the IO has filed a
Memo of Evidence 1 &Memo of Evidence 2
to place on record detailed List of
witnesses and documents.
Description of documents The detailed description of documents in
6 to be mentioned correctly the List of Documents have been provided
in list of documents. in the Memo of Evidence 1 & Memo of
Evidence 2 filed by the IO.
(Compliance shown).

All the mediators reports The same has been complied vide Memo of
and seizure reports to be Evidence 1 and Memo of Evidence 2 filed
7 mentioned list of by the IO.

documents. (Compliance Shown).
All the documents filed The same has been complied vide Memo of
along with FIR, Remand Evidence 1 and Memo of Evidence 2 filed by
8 Report as well as Charge the IO.
Sheet to be mentioned in (Compliance Shown)
list of documents with full
descriptive particulars.

List of witnesses and List The same has been complied vide Memo
9 of documents to be filed in of Evidence 1 and Memo of Evidence 2
proper format. filed by the IO.

(Compliance shown).

List of M.O.s to be A detailed table stating the same has been
mentioned in charge mentioned in Para.367 of the Chargesheet
10 sheet and their CP dated 19.07.2025 and in Para.188 of the
numbers to be mentioned Chargesheet dated 11.08.2025.
against the said material (Compliance shown).

objects.

Investigation Officer to be The same has been complied vide Memo of
signed on conclusion Evidence 1 and Memo of Evidence 2 filed
11 pages of the List of by the IO.

witnesses and List of (Compliance shown)
documents.

The Serial Number of the The Accused Number against each
12 accused in the charge Accused has been specifically mentioned
sheet is not tallied with in brackets next to the name
the crime record. (Compliance shown)
As per contents of the The title of the Chargesheet dated
charge sheet the19.07.2025 clearly indicates that it is a Final
13 Investigation is still
Report u/S.193 BNSS. Although, the IO has
pending but nowhere in inadvertently used the term 'Preliminary
the charge sheet is Chargesheet' in the Compliances
mentioned that the charge dt.26.08.2025, there is no concept of filing
sheet preliminary or final of a 'Preliminary Chargesheet' either under
the Andhra Pradesh Police Manual or
under the BNSS. A Rectification Petition
[CF No.3820 of 2025] to that effect has
been filed before the Spl.Judge on
08.09.2025.The final Report dated
19.07.2025 ought to be considered as a
Chargesheet in accordance with S.193(3)
BNSS.

(Compliance shown).

How the charge sheet is The issue of whether filing of chargesheet
maintainable without without FSL Reports entitles the Accused to
14 filing the some of the FSL Default Bail is still pending before the
reports. larger bench of the Supreme Court and that
there is no definite decision holding that the
absence of FSL Reports due to systemic
delays makes the Chargesheet incomplete.

Alternatively, if at all it could be said to be a
curable irregularity and is not an illegality
which renders the Chargesheet to be
incomplete.

In any case, 47 FSL Reports have already
been submitted to the Trial Court and the
same are annexed along with Volume 43A
of the Preliminary Chargesheet dated
11.08.2025.

[This Omission/defect is not tenable and
contrary to the Division Bench decision of
this Hon'ble Court in Venkatarayanakota
Krishnappa Raghavendra Buvanahalli
Muniyappa Nagesh babu V. State of AP
2009 SCC Online AP 264 [Paras.8-10, 20-
22]
It is mentioned in charge Details with respect to the same have been
15 sheet that an amount of mentioned in paragraphs 110 to 113 of
Rs.3500 Crores was Charge sheet dated 19.07.2025.

siphoned details of the [Compliance shown]
amount should be filed in
a tabular form matching
the figure.
The representatives and The reason for their non-arrest has been
16 their designations of the stated in compliance dated 26.08.2025.
accused No.7 to 15 to be Learned Special Judge has misconstrued
mentioned properly, and the serial numbers as Accused numbers in
reasons for their non- the proforma of the Charge sheet.
arrest to be assigned. Learned Special Judge is referring A.11 to
A.17 and A.25 toA.26and has inadvertently
stated A.7toA.15.
A.11 is a shell company represented by a
person named Prem Prakash Yadav.
A.12 toA.15 are shell companies
represented by a person named Anil
Chokra.
Shell Companies such as A.16 and A.17 are
represented by A.9 who is absconding.
NBW has been issued against him on
28.07.2025.

17 The role of the Accused Learned Special Judge has misconstrued

Nos. 7 to 15 in charge sheet Serial Numbers as accused Numbers in the
to be mentioned in charge proforma charge sheet.

sheet specifically. Learned Special Judge is referring A.11 to
A.17 and A.25 toA.26and has inadvertently
stated A.7toA.15.

The specific roles attributed to the Accused
have been stated in para 370 of the Charge
sheet dated 19.07.2025. The said
companies are shell companies.

{Compliance Shown}
18 The punishable sections The defect is complied, vide Compliance
to be mentioned against dated 26.08.2025 filed by the IO.

for each and every (Compliance shown)
accused who are
described in charge sheet,
separately.
19 Under what provision The Section under which further
this court as competent investigation has been sought has been
to grant permission for stated in the charge sheet dated 19.07.2025
continuing further and 11.08.2025.

investigation in this case The State of Tamil Nadu V. Hemendra
against the other Reddy (2023) 16 SCC 79 has held that the
accused to be police is permitted to carry out further
mentioned. investigation
u/s.173(8)
of Cr.P.C. dehores
any direction from the Court.

It is pertinent to note that the proviso to
Section 193(9) BNSS Mandates the Police
Officer to take permission of the
Magistrate to carry out further
investigation only once the trial has
commenced.
How many accused are The details of arrest are provided in para
20 arrested and from when - 365 of the Charge Sheet dated
they are in judicial 19.07.2025 as well as paragraph-194 of

custody to be mentioned supplementary charge sheet dated
in charge sheet. 11.08.2025.

Prayer portion of the The same has been shown to be complied
21 charge sheet to be vide Compliances dated 26.08.2025.

mentioned correctly.

101. A careful perusal of the impugned orders dated 06.09.2025 reveal

that the Learned Special Judge noted that, although copies of the charge sheet

and the list of documents were filed through electronic means, several

significant objections remained unrectified. These included the non-filing of the

FSL report, the absence of sanction orders required to prosecute public

servants, lack of detailed particulars showing the extent of misappropriation or

siphoning of crime proceeds by each accused in a tabular form, and the omission

of details concerning the recovery of such crime proceeds. It is beneficial to

identify the legality of each of these objections.

I. Non filing of Sanction orders to prosecute the Accused, who

are Public Servants

102. In the case of hand, specifically, with respect to obtaining sanction

under
Section 19
of the PC Act for Accused No. 1, compliance report reflects that

a requisition was sent on 18.07.2025, and the sanction order was awaited. It is

important to emphasize that it is the statutory duty of the Investigating Officer

to submit all material collected during the course of investigation against a

public servant to the competent appointing authority while seeking such
sanction. In the present case, since the police report was filed before the Special

Court on 19.07.2025, Investigating Officer had appropriately initiated the

process by submitting the requisition for sanction a day earlier, on 18.07.2025.

One of the objections raised by the learned trial Judge for return of the charge

sheet is that the same was filed without obtaining previous sanction under

Section 19
of the P.C Act for Accused No.1.

103. With regard to the necessity to obtain sanction for filing of charge

sheet, it is essential to refer to the decision of a three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in
Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain
(supra), wherein it

was categorically held that the sanction and investigation are on separate

footings as sanction is an enabling provision to prosecute, which is totally

separate from the concept of investigation which is concluded by the filing of

the charge-sheet. Failure of the prosecution in obtaining and filing of the

sanction along with the charge sheet, does not automatically give right to the

Accused to seek statutory bail, when the charge-sheet is filed well within the

period contemplated under
Section 167(2)(a)(ii)
CrPC.

104. Later, a Two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in

Judgebir Singh
(supra) while reaffirming the principles
laid down in

Suresh

Kumar Bhikamchand Jain
(supra), categorically held that the issuance of

a sanction order to prosecute an accused who is a Government employee is the

exclusive responsibility of competent sanctioning authority, which functions

independently and is not connected with the investigation process.

105. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Judgebir Singh
(supra) further

clarified that any delay in according such sanction does not invalidate or vitiate
the final report filed by the Investigating Agency before the Court. It was further

held that
Section 173
Cr.P.C. does not make any reference to the filing of a

sanction order, and
Section 167
Cr.P.C. pertains solely to the investigation

process, not to the stage of cognizance by the Magistrate. Therefore, once a final

report is filed within the prescribed period, signifying completion of

investigation, the accused cannot claim a right to default bail merely because

the sanction order has not yet been filed.

106. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Judgebir Singh
(supra) further

clarified that a sanction order issued by the competent authority can be

produced and placed on record even after the filing of the charge sheet.

However, if there is undue delay in producing the sanction order, the accused

may seek regular bail on the ground of delay in trial but it was categorically held

that such delay cannot form the basis for claiming default bail under
Section

167(2)
Cr.P.C.

107. In the instant case, admittedly, the objection raised by the learned

Special Judge is with regard to non-filing of sanction for Accused No.1. As was

discussed in the precedents referred supra, non-filing of sanction order along

with the charge sheet, is a curable defect, which can be rectified at the

subsequent time and the same cannot entitle the Accused to seek default bail

under
Section 167(2)
Cr.P.C. Therefore, the argument advanced by the learned

Senior Counsel for Accused No.32 and the objection raised by the learned

Special Judge on this aspect, is not tenable.
II. Charge Sheet filed without FSL Reports

108. Sri Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on

Tara Singh v. State,70
to buttress his contention that a chargesheet merely

sans FSL report is not incomplete.

109.
In
Tara Singh
(supra), the issue for consideration was whether

the challan submitted by police could be regarded as complete so as to enable

the Court to take cognizance under
Section 190(1)(b)
of the Cr.P.C. 1898. A four

Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the challan
in that case

was indeed complete, notwithstanding the absence of the Imperial Serologist's

report and the sketch map of the scene of occurrence. Referring to
Section 173(1)

of the Cr.P.C.1898, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that a police report or

challan is complete, if it sets forth the essential particulars, i.e., the names of the

parties, the nature of the information, and the names of persons acquainted

with the circumstances of the case. Accordingly, it was held that the cognizance

taken by the Court on such a report was proper and valid in law.

110. Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, contended that the

decision in
Tara Singh
(supra) must be distinguished from the present case,

as the FSL reports here pertain to data extracted from mobile phones, whereas

the report in
Tara Singh
(supra) was that of a Serologist. He argued that the

information emerging from such data could potentially reveal crucial

circumstances requiring further investigation. This contention, however, is far-

70 1951 Supreme Court Cases 903
fetched and contingent on uncertain possibilities, and therefore does not

support his version at this stage for consideration under Section 187 BNSS.

111. It is necessary to refer to the decision rendered by a Division Bench

of the Composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Venkatarayanakota

Krishnappa (supra), which dealt with a reference on the point whether the

charge sheet which was filed within ninety days, but was returned for

compliance of certain technical objections of not filing the scientific experts

report is a proper compliance under
section 173
Cr.P.C. and whether the same

confer any right on the accused to seek bail as a matter of right as required under

Section 167
Cr.P.C. It was observed by the Division Bench that reports which

are pending with the Science Laboratory are not within the control of the

Investigating Agency and the chargesheet filed therein having satisfied the

requirements under Section 173(2) is sufficient compliance to extinguish the

indefeasible right of statutory bail. It was also observed that a chargesheet filed

containing the particulars mentioned in Section 173 (2) is valid, irrespective of

the fact that it did not contain some of the documents as required under Section

173 (5) as they can be produced at a later stage by supplying copies to the

Accused, with the permission of the Court.

112. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in
Anantha Satya Udaya

Bhaskara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh71
, dealt with a case wherein

the petitioner sought default bail in a case under
Sections 302
,
, and
of

the IPC, along with
Sections 3(1)(r)
,
3(1)(s)
, and
3(2)(v)
of the Scheduled Castes

71 2022 SCC OnLine AP 2166
and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989
. His plea for default

bail was rejected by trial Court on the ground that the police had filed

chargesheet within the statutory period in compliance with
Section 173(2)

Cr.P.C., and the mere non-filing of the scientific expert's report did not entitle

the petitioner to default bail under
Section 167(2)
Cr.P.C. This Court upheld this

view, holding that the charge sheet filed was complete in substance, being

sufficient for the concerned Court to take cognizance of the offences.

113. A learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in
Kamalaksha

v. Sub Inspector of Police and Another,72
observed that when a Police

Report or Charge Sheet contains necessary details so as to enable the Magistrate

to take cognizance of the offence and proceed further, it cannot be said that

there is failure of compliance of
Section 173(5)
Cr.P.C. just because the scientific

reports have not been produced along with the Charge Sheet filed by the Police

Officer. It was also observed that the question as to whether the prosecution has

adduced sufficient evidence to establish its case will be a matter to be decided

at the close of the trial and not when cognizance is taken of the offence alleged.

114. It is also essential to refer to the decision of the High Court of Delhi

in Ram Kishore Arora (supra), wherein it was observed that the preparation

of the FSL report lies beyond the control of the investigating agency, even

though it may take steps to expedite the process. The Court noted that the

investigating agency had already submitted the necessary documents to the FSL

for expert analysis and had categorically stated that the investigation against

72 2006 SCC OnLine Ker 482
the petitioner was complete. It was further held that the mere issuance of

summons to another individual or a request to place additional evidence on

record does not, by itself, render the investigation incomplete or entitle the

accused to claim default bail in the absence of any substantial grounds

challenging the completeness of the investigation.

115. It is also relevant to note that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Hanif

Ansari v. State (NCT of Delhi
)73, was posed with an issue as to whether a

chargesheet filed without the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report is

"incomplete," thereby entitling an accused to default bail under
Section 167(2)

CrPC read with
Section 36A
of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances

Act, 1985.74 In
Hanif Ansari
(supra), the petitioner was accused of possessing

2 kg of heroin, contended that since the FSL report confirming the substance as

heroin was filed months after the chargesheet, he is entitled to statutory right

to bail. The State opposed this, arguing that a spot test had already identified

the contraband and that validity of the chargesheet was unaffected by absence

of the FSL report. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its order dated 19.03.2024

noted the divergent judicial opinions on this issue, wherein some benches

holding that the FSL report is essential to complete a chargesheet, others ruling

it is not.
Referring to Kapil Wadhawan (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court

emphasized that the non-filing of all documents does not automatically vitiate

a chargesheet or create a right to default bail, but since the question remains

legally unsettled.
In that light, the Hon'ble Supreme Court directed that the case

73 2024 SCC OnLine SC 537
74 For short,
NDPS Act
be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for tagging with the lead

matter i.e.,
Directorate of Enforcement v. Manpreet Singh Talwar

(SLP (Crl
.) No. 5724/2023), which is pending before a larger Bench, for an

authoritative decision on whether omission of the FSL report pertaining to the

seized contraband article(s) along with the chargesheet, within the time

specified in Section 167(2) of the Code read with
Section 36A
of the NDPS Act,

would entitle the accused to default bail or not.

116. In the instant case, while complying with the defect regarding the

FSL reports, total forty-seven(47) FSL reports which were annexed with the

final report dated 19.07.2025 were already filed and seizures which were also

carried out after 19.07.2025 were also mentioned in the supplementary charge

sheet dated 11.08.2025.
In such circumstances, contention of the learned Senior

Counsel for Accused No.33 that filing of FSL report along with charge sheet is

mandatory for compliance of Section 193 (3) BNSS (corresponding to
Section

173(2)
Cr.P.C), is not sustainable since the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in
Tara Singh
(supra) (Four-Judges Bench) holds the field as on today.

Therefore, on the strength of the authorities presently subsisting in
Tara

Singh
(supra), Venkatarayanakota Krishnappa (supra),
Kamalaksha

(supra),
Anantha Satya Udaya Bhaskara Rao
(supra) and Ram

Kishore Arora (supra), this Court is unable to reach a finding that the

chargesheet sans FSL Report makes it incomplete. Therefore, such a ground

cannot be one of the reasons for grant of default bail terming the police report

as "incomplete".
III. Details of Misappropriated funds

117. Further, the learned Special Judge's reliance on the "details of

misappropriation of siphoning of crime proceeds by each accused in a tabular

form", "recovery of the proceeds of the crime" or "untraced siphoned money" to

conclude that investigation was incomplete is unsustainable in the view of this

Court, because recovery is an evidentiary matter that belongs exclusively to the

domain of trial and has no bearing on default bail under Section 187(3) BNSS.

Non-recovery may perhaps impact proof at trial as it is an aspect concerning the

merit of the allegations, but it cannot revive or create a right to default bail.

B. Incomplete Investigation as Further Investigation Sought

118. The Learned Judge observed that in the Memo filed before the

Court, the Investigating Officer sought extension of remand on the ground that

investigation is pending and in the Charge sheet also it is mentioned that further

investigation is pending against other Accused and also the present Accused.

119. On this point, it is the contention of Sri S.Niranjan Reddy, learned

Senior Counsel for Accused No.31 that the Investigating Officer has to obtain

prior permission of the Court for conducting further investigation. Sri

Siddhartha Dave, learned Senior Counsel for Accused No.32 also contended

that a formal permission of the Court is required to be obtained by the Police

before conducting further investigation. However, it is the contention of Sri

Siddharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner / State, there is no

mention in
Section 173(8)
Cr.P.C about the permission to be taken from the

Court for conducting further investigation and so far as Section 193 (9) is
concerned, the Investigating Agency is not required to take permission of the

Court for carrying out further investigation as long as the trial has not

commenced and that as a courtesy, it was informed to Special Judge about the

pendency of further investigation.

120. Under the Code of 1898, there was no express provision enabling

the Police to make further investigation after a final report under Sec.173(1) had

been submitted. Though a report under Sec.173 (2) can be submitted only after

completion of the investigation, new sub-Section (8) to Sec.173 enabled the

Police to carry on further investigation, as recommended by the Law

Commission, on the ground that it would be unfair both to the prosecution or

to the accused if the investigating officer, after submitting his report under

Sec.173 (2), comes upon evidence bearing on the guilt or innocence of the

accused and that is shut out from the Court.

121.
In
Vinay Tyagi
(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the

context of Section 173 (8) observed as follows;

"49. Now, we may examine another significant aspect which
is how the provisions of Section 173(8) have been
understood and applied by the courts and investigating
agencies. It is true that though there is no specific
requirement in the provisions of Section 173(8) of
the Code to conduct "further investigation" or file
supplementary report with the leave of the court,
the investigating agencies have not only understood
but also adopted it as a legal practice to seek
permission of the courts to conduct "further
investigation" and file "supplementary report"
with the leave of the court. The courts, in some of the
decisions, have also taken a similar view. The requirement
of seeking prior leave of the court to conduct "further
investigation" and/or to file a "supplementary report" will
have to be read into, and is a necessary implication of the
provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code. The doctrine of
contemporanea expositio will fully come to the aid of such
interpretation as the matters which are understood and
implemented for a long time, and such practice that is
supported by law should be accepted as part of the
interpretative process."

(emphasis supplied)

122.
In
Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana,75
the Hon'ble Supreme

Court provided that the permission of the Magistrate under Section 173 (8) is

though not specifically provided, but is in practice followed. Relevant extract

reads thus;

"21. In this context, we may notice the statutory scheme
pertaining to investigation.
Section 173
CrPC empowers the
police officer conducting investigation to file a report on
completion of the investigation with the Magistrate
empowered to take cognizance of the offence.
Section 173(8)

CrPC empowers the officer-in-charge to conduct further
investigation even after filing of a report under
Section
173(2)
CrPC if he obtains further evidence, oral or
documentary. Thus, the power of the police officer under

Section 173(8)
CrPC is unrestricted. Needless to say, the
Magistrate has no power to interfere but it would be
appropriate on the part of the investigating officer

75 (2016) 4 SCC 160
to inform the Court. It has been so stated in
Rama
Chaudhary v. State of Bihar
."

(emphasis supplied)

123. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Hasanbhai

Valibhai Qureshi v. State of Gujarat,76
which is relied on by the High

Court of Delhi in
Java Singh
(supra), categorically held that further

investigation is permissible, however, reinvestigation is prohibited. The law

does not mandate taking of prior permission from the Magistrate for further

investigation. Carrying out a further investigation even after filing of the charge-

sheet is a statutory right of the police. It was further held that even after

submission of police report under Section 173 (2) on completion of

investigation, the police has a right to "further" investigation under Section

173(8) but not "fresh investigation" or "reinvestigation". The meaning of

"Further" is additional; more; or supplemental. "Further" investigation,

therefore, is the continuation of the earlier investigation and not a fresh

investigation or reinvestigation to be started ab initio wiping out the earlier

investigation altogether.

124. At this juncture, it is useful to refer to the decision rendered by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Dinesh Dalmia
(supra), wherein the chargesheet

has mentioned that further investigation would be necessary on certain vital

points including "end use of funds".

Relying on the decision of the Constitution

Bench in
K. Veeraswami
(supra), it was observed thus;

76 (2004) 5 SCC 347
"20. Indisputably, the power of the investigating
officer to make a prayer for making further
investigation in terms of sub-section (8) of Section
173 is not taken away only because a charge-sheet
under sub-section (2) thereof has been filed. A
further investigation is permissible even if order of
cognizance of offence has been taken by the
Magistrate.

***

24. Concededly, the investigating agency is required to
complete investigation within a reasonable time. The ideal
period therefor would be 24 hours, but, in some cases, it
may not be practically possible to do so. Parliament,
therefore, thought it fit that remand of the accused can be
sought for in the event investigation is not completed within
60 or 90 days, as the case may be. But, if the same is not
done within the stipulated period, the same would not be
detrimental to the accused and, thus, he, on the expiry
thereof would be entitled to apply for bail, subject to
fulfilling the conditions prescribed therefor.

25. Such a right of bail although is a valuable right but the
same is a conditional one; the condition precedent being
pendency of the investigation. Whether an investigation
in fact has remained pending and the investigating
officer has submitted the charge-sheet only with a
view to curtail the right of the accused would
essentially be a question of fact. Such a question
strictly does not arise in this case inasmuch as, according to
CBI, sufficient materials are already available for
prosecution of the appellant. According to it, further
investigation would be inter alia necessary on certain vital
points including end use of the funds.

***

39. The statutory scheme does not lead to a conclusion in
regard to an investigation leading to filing of final form
under sub-section (2) of Section 173 and further
investigation contemplated under sub-section (8) thereof.
Whereas only when a charge-sheet is not filed and
investigation is kept pending, benefit of proviso
appended to sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the
Code would be available to an offender; once,
however, a charge-sheet is filed, the said right
ceases. Such a right does not revive only because a
further investigation remains pending within the
meaning of sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the
Code."

(emphasis supplied)

125. As already discussed, Sec.193 BNSS corresponds to
Sec.173

Cr.P.C.1973 with some additions. Under Sec.173 (8), the Investigating officer

would be competent to examine such further evidence and send a

supplementary report to the Magistrate, complying with the requirements of

Sec.173 (2) to (6). "Fresh" investigation or "re-investigation" is not

contemplated by Sec.173 (8), as rightly pointed by the learned Counsel for the

Accused. What Sec.173 (8) provides for is further investigation by the same

agency. For holding fresh investigation or reinvestigation, fresh permission of

the Magistrate is required. Moreover, it is also settled that further investigation

is to be undertaken from the same offence, not into further investigation in the

separate offence.

126. Section 193(9) of BNSS is a corresponding version of
Section 173

(8)
of Cr.P.C., but with a newly added proviso that stipulates that the further

investigation during the trial may be conducted with the permission of the Court

trying the case and it shall be completed within a period of 90 days, extendable

with the permission of the Court. However, there is no mention about seeking

of such permission at the pre-trial stage. Recently, in
Yash Mishra v. State

of NCT of Delhi and Others,77
a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court

77 2025 SCC OnLine Del 5684
declined to rule Section 193 (9) read with Section 187 (3) as arbitrary and ultra

vires. In this light, the following observation was made;

"14. So far as the submission that provision of 'further
investigation' as contained in Section 193(9) is camouflage
to defeat the right of the accused person to seek 'default bail'
under Section 187(3) of BNSS 2023, we may only
observe that the provision contained in Section
193(9) and those of Section 187(3), operate in
different fields and further that Section 193(9) does
not in any manner acts as a camouflage to such
right."

(emphasis supplied)

127. So far as the instant case concerns, admittedly trial has not been

commenced. In the charge sheet itself at para 343 of the police report dated

19.07.2025 and para 199 of the supplementary report dated 11.08.2025 are clear

to that effect, that permission is sought to conduct further investigation and file

additional material, if any, found during investigation. Thus, in view of the

judgments referred to supra, terming the chargesheet as incomplete on the

ground that further investigation was sought cannot be countenanced.

C. Investigation pending qua other Accused:

128. At cost of repetition, in this case, final report and supplementary

charge sheet have been originally filed within a period of 90 days. After two

weeks of filing such charge sheets, Accused Nos.31 to 33 filed petitions before

Special Court seeking default bail. The learned counsel for respondents argued

in one voice that the charge sheet is incomplete since investigation is pending
against the other Accused. It is the contention of learned Senior Counsel

representing Accused Nos.,31 to 33 that splitting up of charge sheets and filing

of piece-meal charge sheets is only for the purpose of scuttling the right of the

Accused to be released on default bail. It is a settled principle of law that filing

of piecemeal and incomplete charge sheets cannot be considered as final report

as they are impermissible. Per contra, it is the contention of the learned Senior

Counsel for State that merely because the remand extension memos filed after

filing of the charge sheet contained the grounds pertaining to further

investigation on certain aspects related to the larger conspiracy, it does not

indicate that the investigation against Accused Nos.,31 to 33 is still pending or

that the charge sheet is incomplete.

129. On this point, it is essential to refer to the decision rendered by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kapil Wadhawan (supra), wherein the question

for consideration was whether the respondents were entitled to the benefit of

the statutory bail under the proviso to
Section 167(2)
CrPC, on the ground that

the investigation qua some of the accused named in the FIR was pending,

though the charge-sheet against the respondents along with the other accused

was filed within the prescribed time-limit and though the cognizance of the

offence was taken by the special court before the consideration default bail.

130. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kapil Wadhawan (supra), while

reiterating the settled legal position that the right of default bail under Section

167 (2) is not only a statutory right but a right flowing from
Article 21
, had

referred to the decision of the Constitution Bench in
Sanjay Dutt
(supra), to

emphasise that the custody of the accused after the challan has been filed is not
governed by Section 167 but different provisions of the
Cr.P.C
. The Hon'ble

Supreme Court further noted that there remains no doubt that if the statutory

requirements under Section 173 (2) stand complied, when the particulars

indicated therein are included in the reported. At para 23, the Hon'ble Supreme

Court answered the question of law as follows;

"23. The benefit of proviso appended to sub-section (2) of
Section 167 of the Code would be available to the offender only
when a charge-sheet is not filed and the investigation is kept
pending against him. Once however, a charge-sheet is filed, the
said right ceases. It may be noted that the right of the
investigating officer to pray for further investigation in terms of
sub-section (8) of Section 173 is not taken away only because a
charge-sheet is filed under sub-section (2) thereof against the
accused. Though ordinarily all documents relied upon by the
prosecution should accompany the charge-sheet, nonetheless for
some reasons, if all the documents are not filed along with the
charge-sheet, that reason by itself would not invalidate or vitiate
the charge-sheet. It is also well settled that the court takes
cognizance of the offence and not the offender. Once from the
material produced along with the charge-sheet, the
court is satisfied about the commission of an offence
and takes cognizance of the offence allegedly committed
by the accused, it is immaterial whether the further
investigation in terms of Section 173(8) is pending or
not. The pendency of the further investigation qua the
other accused or for production of some documents not
available at the time of filing of charge-sheet would
neither vitiate the charge-sheet, nor would it entitle the
accused to claim right to get default bail on the ground
that the charge-sheet was an incomplete charge-sheet
or that the charge-sheet was not filed in terms of
Section
173(2)
CrPC."

(emphasis supplied)

131.
In
Dablu Kujur
(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court having

examined the importance of a complete police report under
Section 173(2)
of

the CrPC, emphasized that the investigating officer must strictly comply with

the statutory requirements while submitting a chargesheet.
The decision in

Kapil Wadhawan (supra) was reiterated in the following manner;

"18. Such issues often arise when the accused would
make his claim for default bail under
Section
167(2)
CrPC and contend that all the documents
having not been submitted as required under Section
173(5), or the investigation qua some of the persons
having been kept open while submitting police report
under Section 173(2), the requirements under
Section 173(2) could not be said to have been
complied with.
In this regard, this Court recently held
in
CBI v. Kapil Wadhawan [CBI
v. Kapil Wadhawan, (2024) 3
SCC 734 : (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 300] that : (SCC p. 748, para 23)
"23. ... Once from the material produced along
with the charge-sheet, the court is satisfied about the
commission of an offence and takes cognizance of the
offence allegedly committed by the accused, it is
immaterial whether the further investigation in terms
of Section 173(8) is pending or not. The pendency
of the further investigation qua the other
accused or for production of some documents
not available at the time of filing of charge-
sheet would neither vitiate the charge-sheet,
nor would it entitle the accused to claim right
to get default bail on the ground that the
charge-sheet was an incomplete charge-sheet
or that the charge-sheet was not filed in terms
of
Section 173(2)
CrPC."

(emphasis supplied)

132. Sri S.Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for

respondents would submit that the purported charge sheets filed by the
Investigating Officer are not in accordance with the Andhra Pradesh Police

Manual. Learned Senior Counsel brought to the notice of this Court that Form-

69 of A.P. Police Rules, Column-12, which stipulates mentioning "particulars of

accused persons not charge sheeted". Moreover, Section 193(3) BNSS stipulates

"a report in the form as the State Government may, by rules provide". Learned

Senior Counsel also made special emphasis on Paragraphs 478(9), 478(10),

479(5), 479(6) of Andhra Pradesh Police Manual. Sri Sidharth Luthra,

vehemently opposed this argument and submitted that the Investigating Officer

followed the Manual and Charge sheets were filed as per Rule 480-1, in Form-

69 by mentioning all the details required to the Court to proceed for inquiry.

133. A bare perusal of the impugned orders dated 06.09.2025 would

reveal that the learned Special Judge had placed heavy reliance on the decision

rendered in
Ritu Chhabaria
(supra) and considered
Kapil Wadhawan

(supra) as not binding as the latter did not take note of the former.

Factual

position in
Ritu Chhabaria
(supra) was that FIR was initially registered for

offences under IPC and the PC Act, without naming the petitioner's husband.

Subsequent supplementary charge-sheets were filed, one of which showed him

as a prosecution witness, and later ones did not name him at all. After the

investigation was transferred, he was arrested by the CBI on 28.4.2022, and

further supplementary charge-sheets described him as a suspect, leading to

repeated extensions of his remand under
Section 309(2)
CrPC without granting

default bail. The writ petition ultimately challenged the continued custody and

alleged that the repeated filing of supplementary charge-sheets was a deliberate

attempt to deny the accused his statutory right to default bail. In this context,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that first investigation is to be completed, and

only then can a chargesheet be filed within the stipulated period, and failure to

do so would trigger the statutory right of default bail under
Section 167(2)
CrPC.

Relevant portion is as follows;

"25. This right of statutory bail, however, is extinguished, if
the charge-sheet is filed within the stipulated period. The
question of resorting to a supplementary charge-sheet under

Section 173(8)
CrPC only arises after the main charge-sheet has
been filed, and as such, a supplementary charge-sheet,
wherein it is explicitly stated that the investigation is still
pending, cannot under any circumstance, be used to scuttle the
right of default bail, for then, the entire purpose of default bail
is defeated, and the filing of a charge-sheet or a supplementary
charge-sheet becomes a mere formality, and a tool, to ensue
that the right of default bail is scuttled."

134. It is indeed true that the review preferred by the CBI on the

decision in
Ritu Chhabaria
(supra) was dismissed, vide order dated

31.07.2025 in R.P. (Crl.) No.124/2025.

It is brought to the notice of this Court

by learned Senior Counsel Sri Sidharth Luthra that a three-Judge Bench of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Manpreet Singh Talwar
(supra), had expressly

clarified that trial courts and High Courts must consider applications for default

bail independent of and without relying on
Ritu Chhabbaria
(supra) in

following terms;

""In continuation of the interim order of this Court dated 1
May 2023, we clarify that the order shall not preclude any
trial court or, as the case may be, High Court from
considering an application for the grant of default bail under

Section 167
of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973
independent of and without relying on the judgment dated
26 April 2023 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No 60 of 2023."
135. Learned Senior Counsel for Accused No.33, during the course of

arguments, fairly conceded that, in the light of the interim order passed by the

three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which is in force, they are not

relying on
Ritu Chhabaria
(supra).

Learned Senior Counsel for Accused

No.31 would submit that, even in absence of
Ritu Chhabaria
(supra),

Accused No.31 got a good case to succeed in the light of settled principles of law

by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

Learned Special Judge went on discussing the

judgment in
Ritu Chhabaria
(supra), and held that
the said judgment
holds

the field and is binding.

In the light of the submissions referred to supra, this

Court is of the humble view that, as on the date of passing the impugned order,

the interim order passed by the three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in
Manpreet Singh Talwar
(supra) was in force.

It is also pertinent

to mention that Hon'ble Supreme Court directed the Registry to list the batch

of matters on the same issue regarding the
Ritu Chhabaria
(supra), before

the Three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

136.
In addition to relying on
Ritu Chhabaria
(supra), the impugned

order is also based on the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Fakhrey Alam (supra), this Court in Akula Ravi Teja (supra) and the Delhi

High Court in
Avinash Jain
(supra) and
Chitra Ramkrishna
(supra).

These decisions along with Tunde Gbaja (supra), were relied on by the

learned counsel for the Accused also, to submit that statutory bail was granted

finding the chargesheets to be incomplete.
137. The reliance on Fakhrey Alam(supra) is misplaced as it pertains

to filing of chargesheet is filed after the filing of default bail application, after

expiry of statutory period.

138. Coming to Akula Ravi Teja (supra), against the petitioner/

Accused No.3 therein a case was registered under Sections 143, 148, 188, 269,

324, 307 and 302 read with
Section 149
IPC, and he was remanded to judicial

custody on 05.06.2020. The police filed a preliminary charge sheet in Crime

No.453 of 2020 on 28.08.2020. The Learned Magistrate returned the same with

certain objections. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a petition seeking default bail

on the ground that the police failed to complete the investigation within the

statutory period of ninety days. The Learned Magistrate dismissed the petition

on the ground that the charge sheet had been filed within time and that it had

only been returned for compliance with some objections. Aggrieved thereby, the

petitioner approached the High Court. It was contended on behalf of the State

that the Investigating Officer could not examine some witnesses because they

were in judicial custody, and some crucial witnesses in the counter case were

absconding; hence, there was no lapse on the part of the Investigating Officer.

While dealing with the plea for default bail, Learned Single Judge categorically

held that there was no legal flaw in the Magistrate's finding and held that if a

charge sheet is filed within the statutory period, the fact that it is returned for

compliance with technical objections does not confer a right on the accused to

claim default bail.

139. Thereafter, Learned Single Judge in Akula Ravi Teja (supra), at

para 15, referred to the judgment of the Division Bench of the composite High
Court of Andhra Pradesh in Venkatarayanakota Krishnappa (supra), and

held that the Magistrate's finding could not be considered erroneous. With

respect to the second ground, the Learned Single Judge noted that in that case,

the charge sheet filed was admittedly only a preliminary charge sheet, which

itself indicated that it was not possible for the Investigating Officer to specify

the overt acts of each accused until recording the statements of twenty two (22)

crucial witnesses who were lodged as remand prisoners in the Central Prison,

Rajahmundry, in a counter case, as well as eight other crucial witnesses who

were absconding. Thus, the contents of the charge sheet clearly indicated that

the investigation had not been completed and that the charge sheet was only

preliminary. In that context, the Court held that mere filing of a preliminary

charge sheet without completing the investigation would not defeat the

indefeasible statutory right of an accused to claim default bail.

140.
In
Chitra Ramkrishna
(supra), it was held that a chargesheet

can be filed only after the entire investigation covering "all" offences in the FIR

is completed. Filing an incomplete or "piece-meal" chargesheet for only some

offences while leaving the others under investigation violates Section 167(2),

since it allows the investigating agency to improperly extend the accused's

custody.

141. Similarly, in
Avinash Jain
(supra), a learned Single Judge,

granted default bail to the applicant after finding that the CBI had filed an

incomplete and piecemeal chargesheet that did not cover all offences mentioned

in the FIR, particularly the offences under the
PC Act
for which investigation

was still pending and sanction under
Section 17A
was yet to be obtained. The
High Court held that a chargesheet under
Section 173(2)
CrPC must reflect

completion of the entire investigation for all offences, and filing a partial report

solely to defeat the accused's statutory right under Section 167(2) is

impermissible and violates
Article 21.
Since the investigation into
PC Act

offences remained open on the expiry of 60 days from arrest, the chargesheet

was not held to be a valid final report.

142. In Tunde Gbaja (supra), the Delhi High Court dealt with a

situation where the FIR contained several
IPC
offences requiring a 90-day

investigation period, but the police filed a chargesheet only under
Section 14
of

the Foreigners Act, which carried a 60-day limit. Although the agency could

later file a supplementary chargesheet under
Section 173(8)
CrPC, the learned

Single Judge held that an incomplete or part chargesheet cannot defeat an

accused's right to default bail. Since the chargesheet did not cover the
IPC

offences listed in the FIR, the filing could not be treated as a valid chargesheet

for purposes of Section 167(2), the accused was held entitled to default bail.

143. Turning to the present case, the State contends that the charge

sheet filed on 19.07.2025 is a complete charge sheet covering all offences. The

State further asserts that the charge sheet filed on 11.08.2025 against A.31 to

A.33 is also complete in all respects and in accordance with Section 193(3) of

the BNSS. It is also submitted that there is no bar to filing further reports as per

Section 193(9) BNSS by following the procedure prescribed under sub-sections

(3) to (8) of Section 193. A cursory examination of the charge sheets filed in the

present case in the previous portion, prima facie supports this version. Viewed

thus, the above referred decisions are distinguishable on facts to the present
case. In the case on hand, admittedly, chargesheet has not been filed against the

remaining Accused. However, pendency of the further investigation against the

other accused or for production of some more documents which were not

available at the time of filing of chargesheet would neither vitiate the

chargesheet filed against the present Accused, nor would it entitle them to be

released on default bail on the ground that the chargesheet was an incomplete

chargesheet for the purposes of Section 187 (3).

144. Sri T.Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel had placed reliance

on
T.V. Sharma
(supra) and Bandi Kotaiah (supra), both of which are also

distinguishable from the facts of the present case.

145.
In
T.V. Sharma
(supra), Accused Nos.1 to 4 faced charges under

Sections 302 and 201 read with 34
IPC
. They remained in judicial custody from

05.03.1975 to 03.05.1975, which is 60 days in total. As under the proviso to

Section 167(2)
Cr.P.C., the accused were entitled to be released after sixty days

if they were prepared to furnish bail, the Learned Magistrate released them on

bail on 03.05.1975. Aggrieved, the State and the deceased's father approached

the High Court seeking cancellation of the said bail order. The Magistrate had

opined that the preliminary charge sheet filed by the police was merely a

remand report aimed at securing further remand under
Section 309
Cr.P.C. and

that
Section 309
Cr.P.C. applies only after cognizance is taken, and not at the

investigation stage. The Learned Single Judge upheld this reasoning, holding

that a preliminary charge sheet is not a 'police report' under
Section 173(2)

Cr.P.C. and that cognizance could not be taken on such a report.
The Court

relied on the Division Bench judgment in Bandi Kotaiah (supra), which
concerned Section 207(A) of the old
Cr.P.C
. 1898. The Learned Single Judge

further noted the significant distinction between
Section 344
Cr.P.C. 1898 and

Section 309
Cr.P.C. 1973. Ultimately, the petitions were dismissed, and the

Magistrate's grant of statutory bail was confirmed. As to the present case, the

State contends that all objections raised by the office of the Learned Special

Judge on 26.08.2025 (recorded on CFR on 01.09.2025) have been duly

complied with. In light of Velidipuram (supra), delivered by the Division

Bench of the then composite High Court, such compliance relates back to the

date of filing of the charge sheet. In the present case, the charge sheet was filed

within the statutory period.
Moreover, the case is distinguishable from
T.V.

Sharma
, (supra) where the so-called charge sheet which was merely a "remand

report".

146. In Bandi Kotaiah (supra), the Hon'ble Division Bench of the

then Composite High Court considered the procedure under
Section 207(A)

Cr.P.C. 1898 governing enquiries in cases triable by a Sessions Court on a police

report. Under that regime, the Magistrate recorded the testimony of witnesses

during the enquiry, allowed cross-examination by the accused, and, depending

on the evidence, either discharged the accused or committed the case to the

Sessions Court. In that case, the Police had filed a preliminary charge sheet

stating that the final charge sheet with complete witness lists would be filed

later. The Magistrate numbered the case (PRC No.1/1964), remanded the

accused, and adjourned the matter periodically for completion of the

investigation. The final charge sheet was later filed only against A.1 to A.15. The

challenge by a prosecution witness (Bandi Kotaiah) was that the Magistrate had
acted illegally by not proceeding against A.16 to A.18.
The Division Bench,

relying on
R.R. Chari v. State of U.P.78
, held that mere numbering of a

preliminary charge sheet and remanding the accused for the purpose of

facilitating investigation does not amount to taking cognizance. Cognizance is

taken only upon filing of the final report under
Section 173
Cr.P.C. Accordingly,

the reference was answered holding that cognizance had been taken only after

the filing of the final report.
Needless to say, Bandi Kotaiah (supra) renders

no assistance to the respondents herein. The reason is that the procedure under

the
Cr.P.C
. 1898 was entirely different. Under that regime, Police commonly

filed a preliminary report within 15 days, and Magistrates frequently extended

remand to facilitate completion of investigation. There was no clear provision

regarding release of the accused if the charge sheet was not filed within fifteen

days. The issue in Bandi Kotaiah (supra) concerned the stage of cognizance,

not the grant of default bail. In contrast,
Section 167
of Cr.P.C. 1973 explicitly

confers an indefeasible right to default bail if the police fail to file the report

within the statutory period. This distinction is fundamental.

147. Further, an interesting argument has been taken by Sri Siddharth

Dave, learned Senior Counsel for Accused No.32 relying on Achpal (supra)

that, as on the date of filing of default bail petition, the State had not complied

with the objections pointed out by the learned trial Judge, as such, Accused

No.32 got indefeasible right of default bail as it should be considered as if there

is no chargesheet. In Achpal (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing

78 AIR 1951 SC 207
with a situation wherein, FIR was lodged for serious offences, and the

appellants (Accused 1 and 2) were arrested on 8.4.2018. While they remained

in custody, the High Court on 3.7.2018 ordered that a higher-ranked officer (not

below ASP) must complete the investigation within two months. The statutory

90-day period for filing a charge-sheet was set to end on 7.7.2018. Although a

charge-sheet was filed on 5.7.2018, it was filed by an officer below the required

rank and was therefore returned by the Magistrate. Thus, on 7.7.2018 no valid

charge-sheet was on record, and the accused applied for default bail. The

Magistrate rejected the application, calling the defect "technical" and treating

the High Court's order as extending time. The High Court upheld this view,

holding that a charge-sheet had been presented before 90 days, even though it

was returned for not complying with its earlier order.

148. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Achpal (supra) noted that even

though a charge-sheet was filed on 5.7.2018, it had been submitted by an officer

below the rank promised before the High Court, which had directed that the

investigation be done by a Gazetted Officer. As this requirement was not

followed, the Magistrate returned the papers even before the 90-day period

expired. The Hon'ble Supreme Court framed two key questions: (1) whether

such an improper and non-compliant filing could be treated as "completion of

investigation" under
Section 167(2)
CrPC to deny default bail, and (2) whether

the High Court's earlier order could be interpreted as extending the statutory

time for investigation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when the 90-day

period expired, no valid Section 173 report was before the Magistrate because

the charge-sheet filed on 5.7.2018 had been returned for non-compliance with
the High Court's direction that a Gazetted Officer conducts the investigation. As

a result, the Magistrate had no material to assess whether further custody was

justified, thereby depriving the accused of the statutory protection under

Section 167(2).

149. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the accused could not be

remanded without such judicial consideration and accepted the argument that

default bail had accrued. With respect to the second issue in Achpal (supra),

the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the High Court had no power to extend

the statutory 60/90-day period for completing investigation under
Section

167(2)
CrPC, because the Code provides no mechanism for extension, except in

special laws like TADA or MCOCA which expressly modify Section 167. In this

case, the High Court's order dated 3.7.2018 merely recorded the Public

Prosecutor's submission that a Gazetted Officer would complete the

investigation within two months; it was held to not be an order of extension,

especially since the High Court was not informed that the 90-day period was

about to expire.

150. In the opinion of this Court, the reliance on Achpal (supra) is

misplaced because the ratio in Achpal (supra) operates on an entirely different

factual foundation. Achpal (supra) was a case where no charge sheet was

before the Magistrate on the 90th day, because the report filed earlier was

returned by the Magistrate for not being in conformity with the High Court's

specific order directing investigation by a higher-ranked officer. Thus, on the

crucial 90th day, zero papers were on the Magistrate's record, triggering the

statutory right to default bail. To address this opinion better, it is relevant to
take note of the argument of Sri T. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for

Accused No.33 who submitted that, had the State has complied with such

objections by the date of filing of their petition, the things would have been in a

different way and in written arguments it was stated that the chargesheet was

complete in all aspects only on 01.09.2025.

151. On the other hand, Sri Siddhartha Luthra would submit that the

State have complied with the objections on 26.08.2025 itself and the same is

mentioned in CFR on 01.09.2025, and therefore, though they have complied

with the objections, the learned trial Judge has not referred the compliance in

the order.

152. In Velinedipurnam (supra) before a Division Bench of the then

Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh, the factual position was that the

Accused was arrested on 15.06.1993, and the chargesheet was filed on

28.08.1993, within 90days. As it contained defects, the Magistrate returned it,

and the corrected chargesheet was finally re-submitted only on 17.09.1993, the

95th day. The petitioner argued that since a complete and proper charge-sheet

was not filed within 90 days, he was entitled to default bail under
Section 167(2)

CrPC. The Magistrate rejected his plea. Aggrieved thereby, petitioner

approached High Court. In this context, it was observed as follows;

"8. It is indisputable that the amendments or corrections
relate back to the date of filing of the original document. In
this view the rectification of defects or compliance
with the objections will relate back to the date of
filing as if the corrections are made at the time of
filing the charge-sheet in the first instance and it
cannot be said that presentation was made on the
date when the defects are rectified and
represented."

(emphasis supplied)

153. The same view was also expressed by a Coordinate Bench of this

Court in Akula Ravi Teja (supra). More so, a cursory look at the impugned

orders dated 06.09.2025 would go to show that the learned Special Judge is

aware of the compliance of the objections and also the law on the point that such

compliance dates back to the filing of the charge sheet. If a mistake is

committed in not producing the relevant documents at the time of submitting

the report or the charge sheet, it is always open to the investigating officer to

produce the same with the permission of the Court. Return of charge sheet for

compliance of certain defects, implies permission to cure the defects. In the

present case, the charge sheet was returned on 23.08.2025 raising certain

objections. By compliance with the said objections, the defects are rectified.

Admittedly, the charge sheet was filed within the prescribed period of 90 days.

Therefore, though the charge sheet is represented after curing the defects

pointed out, beyond the period mentioned in the proviso to
S.167(2)
CrPC, it

does not entitle the Accused to get default bail, when the charge sheet was

originally filed within time. Even in the impugned order, as referred to supra,

the learned trial Judge has clearly mentioned that some of the objections have

been complied with. In that view, the argument of the learned Senior Counsel

for Accused Nos.32 and 33 falls to ground.

154. It is not out of place to mention that a judgment can operate as a

precedent only when the facts and circumstances of that case are in pari
materia i.e., identical in material respects to those of the case at hand. It is

therefore not correct to rely mechanically on decisions without examining

whether the factual matrix therein. Each case must be decided on its own facts,

and the facts of cited cases cannot be blindly treated as applicable. In simple

words, a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. Moreover, it is

also settled principle of law as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
B.

Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry,79
that a decision is

binding not on its conclusion but in regard to its ratio and the principle laid

down therein.

D. Inability to show custody as cognizance not taken:

155. The Learned Special Judge opined that because of the defects

pointed out viz., filing of chargesheet against a few, waiting for FSL reports,

non-receipt of sanction and raids still being conducted, cognizance is not

possible. At the same time, he cannot extend the remand of the accused beyond

the statutory period of ninety days as in the case of the other special Acts and

without taking cognizance custody under
Section 309 (2)
Cr.P.C. cannot be

permitted.

156.
In
Suresh Bhikamchand Jain
(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme

Court had categorically held that the cognizance is immaterial so far as Section

167 (2) is concerned and the accused continues to remain in the custody of the

Magistrate till such time as cognizance is taken by the court trying the offence.

Relevant extracts from the decision are;

79 AIR 1967 SC 1480
"16. At this juncture, we may refer to certain dates which
are relevant to the facts of this case, namely:

(a) 11-3-2012 -- The petitioner arrested and remanded to
police custody;

(b) 25-4-2012 -- First charge-sheet filed against the four
accused;

(c) 1-6-2012 -- Supplementary charge-sheet filed in which
the petitioner is named;

(d) 30-7-2012 -- The trial court rejected the petitioner's
prayer for grant of bail;

(e) 13-9-2012 [
Suresh v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal
Application No.
3568 of 2012, order dated 13-9-2012
(Bom)] -- The High Court confirmed the order of the trial
court;

(f) 2-10-2012 -- Application filed under
Section 167(2)
CrPC
before the trial court;

(g) 5-10-2012 -- The trial court rejected the application
under
Section 167(2)
CrPC.

From the above dates, it would be evident that both the
charge-sheet as also the supplementary charge-sheet were
filed within 90 days from the date of the petitioner's arrest
and remand to police custody. It is true that cognizance was
not taken by the Special Court on account of failure of the
prosecution to obtain sanction to prosecute the accused
under the provisions of the
PC Act
, but does such failure
amount to non-compliance with the provisions of
Section
167(2)
CrPC is the question with which we are confronted.

17. In our view, grant of sanction is nowhere contemplated
under
Section 167
CrPC. What the said section contemplates
is the completion of investigation in respect of different
types of cases within a stipulated period and the right of an
accused to be released on bail on the failure of the
investigating authorities to do so. The scheme of the
provisions relating to remand of an accused, first during the
stage of investigation and, thereafter, after cognizance is
taken, indicates that the legislature intended investigation
of certain crimes to be completed within 60 days and
offences punishable with death, imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, within 90
days. In the event, the investigation is not completed by the
investigating authorities, the accused acquires an
indefeasible right to be granted bail, if he offers to furnish
bail. Accordingly, if on either the 61st day or the 91st day, an
accused makes an application for being released on bail in
default of charge-sheet having been filed, the court has no
option but to release the accused on bail. The said provision
has been considered and interpreted in various cases, such
as the ones referred to hereinbefore. Both the decisions
in Natabar Parida case [(1975) 2 SCC 220 : 1975 SCC (Cri)
484] and in
Sanjay Dutt
case [(1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994 SCC
(Cri) 1433] were instances where the charge-sheet was not
filed within the period stipulated in
Section 167(2)
CrPC and
an application having been made for grant of bail prior to
the filing of the charge-sheet, this Court held that the
accused enjoyed an indefeasible right to grant of bail, if such
an application was made before the filing of the charge-
sheet, but once the charge-sheet was filed, such right came
to an end and the accused would be entitled to pray for
regular bail on merits.

18. None of the said cases detract from the position
that once a charge-sheet is filed within the
stipulated time, the question of grant of default bail
or statutory bail does not arise. As indicated
hereinabove, in our view, the filing of charge-sheet is
sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section
167(2)(a)(ii) in this case. Whether cognizance is taken
or not is not material as far as
Section 167
CrPC is
concerned. The right which may have accrued to the
petitioner, had charge-sheet not been filed, is not attracted
to the facts of this case. Merely because sanction had not
been obtained to prosecute the accused and to proceed to
the stage of
Section 309
CrPC, it cannot be said that the
accused is entitled to grant of statutory bail, as envisaged in

Section 167
CrPC. The scheme of
CrPC
is such that
once the investigation stage is completed, the court
proceeds to the next stage, which is the taking of
cognizance and trial. An accused has to remain in
custody of some court. During the period of
investigation, the accused is under the custody of
the Magistrate before whom he or she is first
produced. During that stage, under
Section 167(2)

CrPC, the Magistrate is vested with authority to
remand the accused to custody, both police custody
and/or judicial custody, for 15 days at a time, up to
a maximum period of 60 days in cases of offences
punishable for less than 10 years and 90 days where
the offences are punishable for over 10 years or
even death sentence. In the event, an investigating
authority fails to file the charge-sheet within the
stipulated period, the accused is entitled to be
released on statutory bail. In such a situation, the
accused continues to remain in the custody of the
Magistrate till such time as cognizance is taken by
the court trying the offence, when the said court
assumes custody of the accused for purposes of
remand during the trial in terms of
Section 309

CrPC. The two stages are different, but one follows
the other so as to maintain a continuity of the
custody of the accused with a court."

(emphasis supplied)

157.
In
Rahul Modi
(supra), before a two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court, the issue whether an accused is entitled for statutory bail under

Section 167(2)
CrPC on the ground that cognizance has not been taken before

the expiry of 60 days or 90 days, as the case may be, from the date of remand,

arose for consideration.

"15. A close scrutiny of the judgments in
Sanjay Dutt

(supra),
Madar Sheikh
(supra) and
M. Ravindran

(supra) would show that there is nothing contrary to what
has been decided in
Bhikamchand Jain
(supra). In all
the above judgments which are relied upon by either side,
this Court had categorically laid down that the indefeasible
right of an accused to seek statutory bail under
Section
167(2)
, CrPC arises only if the charge-sheet has not been
filed before the expiry of the statutory period.

Reference to
cognizance in
Madar Sheikh
(supra) is in view of the fact
situation where the application was filed after the charge-

sheet was submitted and cognizance had been taken by the
trial court. Such reference cannot be construed as
this Court introducing an additional requirement
of cognizance having to be taken within the period
prescribed under proviso (a) to
Section 167(2)
,
CrPC, failing which the accused would be entitled to
default bail, even after filing of the charge-sheet
within the statutory period. It is not necessary to repeat
that in both
Madar Sheikh
(supra) and
M. Ravindran

(supra), this Court expressed its view that non-filing of the
charge-sheet within the statutory period is the ground for
availing the indefeasible right to claim bail under
Section
167(2)
, CrPC.

The conundrum relating to the custody
of the accused after the expiry of 60 days has also
been dealt with by this Court in
Bhikamchand Jain

(supra). It was made clear that the accused remains
in custody of the Magistrate till cognizance is taken
by the relevant court.

As the issue that arises for
consideration in this case is squarely covered by the
judgment in
Bhikamchand Jain
(supra), the order
passed by the High Court on 31.05.2019 is hereby set aside."

(emphasis supplied)

158. The above position of law is again reiterated by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the decision of
Judgebir
(supra), as follows;

"58. ....The scheme of
CrPC
is such that once the stage of
investigation is completed, the court proceeds to the next
stage, which is the taking of cognizance and trial. During the
period of investigation, the accused is under the custody of
the Magistrate before whom he or she is first produced, with
such Magistrate being vested with the power to remand the
accused to police custody and/or judicial custody, up to a
maximum period as prescribed under
Section 167(2)
CrPC.
Acknowledging the fact that an accused has to
remain in custody of some court, this Court
concluded that on filing of the charge-sheet within
the stipulated period, the accused continues to
remain in the custody of the Magistrate till such time
as cognizance is taken by the court trying the
offence, when the said court assumes custody of the
accused for purposes of remand during the trial in
terms of Section 309CrPC. This Court clarified that
the two stages are different, with one following the
other so as to maintain continuity of the custody of
the accused with a court."

(emphasis supplied)

159. The learned Special Judge appears to have relied on the decision

rendered by the Bombay High Court in Sarath Chandra Vinayak Dongre

and others v. State of Maharashtra,80 which held that incomplete

charge-sheets of the Code would not entitle the Magistrate to take cognizance

of the offences. In that matter, the prosecution filed five chargesheets along with

applications seeking condonation of delay and permission to conduct further

investigation and file an additional chargesheet within 6 months. Magistrate

took cognizance and issued process and had also allowed the condonation of

delay application without recording reasons and without hearing the accused.

The High Court held that cognizance on an incomplete police report which

cannot be treated as a "police report" at all as contemplated under Section

173(2), was without jurisdiction and therefore quashed the entire proceedings,

including the issuance of process.

80 1991CRILJ 3329
160. Thereafter, in appeal before a three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court titled as
State of Maharashtra v. Sarath Chandra

Vinayak Dongre
and others,81 the decision of the Bombay High Cour to

the extent of quashing the condonation of delay without notice was upheld,

whereas the quashing of cognizance and issuing of process was overturned

calling it patently erroneous. The Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that the

police report with the details as required under
Section 173 (2)
Cr.P.C. is to

enable the Magistrate to satisfy himself whether a case for taking cognizance is

made out or not by applying his mind. It was categorically held that the prayer

of the investigating agency seeking permission to further investigate and submit

a "supplementary chargesheet" could not vitiate the cognizance taken by the

Magistrate nor denude him of his jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence.

Relevant portion from the decision is as follows;

"7. The purpose of the submission of the police report with
the details as mentioned above, is to enable the Magistrate
to satisfy himself, whether on the basis of the report and the
material filed along with the police report, a case for taking
cognizance has been made out or not. After applying his
mind to the police report and the material submitted
therewith, if the Magistrate is satisfied that cognizance of
the offence is required to be taken, he shall proceed further
in accordance with the provisions of the
Code of Criminal
Procedure
.
Section 190(1)(b)
CrPC provides that a
Magistrate has the power to take cognizance upon a police
report of such facts as are provided therein on being
satisfied that the case is a fit one for taking cognizance of the

81 (1995) 1 SCC 42
offence. Therefore, if the police report and the
material filed therewith is sufficient to satisfy the
Magistrate that he should take cognizance, his
power is not fettered by the label which the
investigating agency chooses to give to the report
submitted by it under
Section 173(2)
CrPC. Merely,
because the prosecution had filed an application, after
submission of the charge-sheet, seeking permission to file
"supplementary charge-sheet", it could not affect the
jurisdiction of the Magistrate to take cognizance, if he was
otherwise satisfied from the material placed before him
along with the charge-sheet that cognizance of the offence
was required to be taken. It is the jurisdiction of the
Magistrate and Magistrate alone to decide whether the
material placed by the prosecution with the report (charge-
sheet) was sufficient to take cognizance or not. The power
of the Magistrate to take cognizance cannot be
controlled by the investigating agency, whose duty
is only to investigate and place the facts and the
evidence before the Magistrate."

(emphasis supplied)

161. Therefore, the reliance of the learned Special Judge on the decision

of the Bombay High Court which is overturned on that point by a three Judge

Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is legally flawed. Instead of taking recourse

to the steps provided in Bhagwant Singh (supra), the learned Special Judge's

insistence that there is no other option than to grant default bail because

cognizance was not taken and he cannot show custody under
Section 309(2)
of

Cr.P.C. At this juncture, it is also pertinent to state that the argument advanced

by Sri Sidharth Luthra that automatically after the expiry of 90 days, Section
309 comes into play holds no water. It is not uncommon to see that though the

prosecution files Charge sheet within time, it may take some time for the Court

to take cognizance. This exercise sometimes may take time. It does not

automatically entitle any accused to sought for default bail.

162. The view of the learned Special Judge is also directly contrary to

the clear and categorical holding of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Rahul

Modi
,(supra) after examining
Sanjay Dutt
(supra),
Madar Sheikh

(supra),
M. Ravindran
(supra) and
Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain
,

(supra), it was held that "filing of a charge-sheet is sufficient compliance with

Section 167(2)
, CrPC and an accused cannot demand default bail on the

ground that cognizance has not been taken"

CONCLUSION

163. In view of the discussion made supra, the conclusions to each

question are tabulated below;

a. Whether an Accused is i. The indefeasible right of an accused
entitled to default bail under to seek statutory bail under proviso
proviso to Section 187 (3)(ii) of to Section Section 187 (3)(ii) of
BNSS when the chargesheet, BNSS, exhausts the moment a
though filed within the statutory chargesheet in compliance to
period, is returned on certain Section 193 (3) is filed within the
defects, which are subsequently statutory period.

complied? ii. The word "shall" used in Section
193(6) of BNSS is directory and not
mandatory.

iii. Nature and gravity of these defects
are to be seen case to case basis.
Rectification of defects/compliance
with objections will relate back to
the date of filing as if the corrections
are made at the time of filing the
charge-sheet in the first instance.

b. Whether mere seeking of i. Even after submission of police report
permission for further under Section 193(3) on completion of
investigation would make the investigation, the police has right for
investigation incomplete and "further" investigation under Section
consequently the chargesheet 193(9) but not "fresh investigation" or
incomplete for the purposes of "reinvestigation".
default bail under proviso to ii. Mere seeking of permission for further
Section 187(3)(ii) of the BNSS? investigation would not lead to the
right to statutory bail under proviso to
Section 187(3)(ii) of the BNSS.

c. Whether taking cognizance When a chargesheet is filed within the
of the case is precondition for statutory period and in compliance to
extending remand of an Accused Section 193 (3) of the BNSS, merely
after the filing of the charge sheet because cognizance of the offence is not
within the statutory period, and taken would not be a ground to grant
whether the Court's inability to statutory bail. Accused remains in
take cognizance can be a ground custody of the Magistrate till cognizance
for default bail? is taken.

164. A Three Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Aslam

Babalal Desai
(supra), observed that when two views or interpretations are

possible, in the field of criminal justice involving the liberty of an individual, the

one in favour of the Accused should be adopted.
165. A close scrutiny of the decisions in
Sanjay Dutt
(supra),
Madar

Sheikh
(supra),
Suresh Kumar Bikamchand Jain
(supra),
Rahul Modi

(supra),
Bhagavanth Singh
(supra),
Dinesh Dalmia
(supra),
Kapil

Wadhawan
(supra),
Judgebir Singh
(supra),
Dablu Kujur
(supra), and

Sharif Ahmed
(supra) which were relied on by either side, show that the

Hon'ble Supreme Court had categorically laid down that the indefeasible right

of an accused to seek statutory bail under
Section 167(2)
Cr.P.C.,(corresponding

to Section 187 (3) BNSS) which is a fundamental right under
Article 21
, exists

only when the Police fails to file the chargesheet within the statutory period of

60/90 days, as the case maybe. In the present case, the police report filed on

19.07.2025 and the supplementary report filed on 11.08.2025 were both

submitted before the expiry of the statutory period in respect of all the Accused

herein.

The Constitution Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
K.

Veeraswami
(supra), clearly held that the statutory requirement of the report

under Section 173(2) would be complied with if the various details prescribed

therein are included in the report. The reports herein also contain all necessary

particulars as required under Section 193(3) BNSS (corresponding to
Section

173 (2)
Cr.P.C.) to enable the learned Special Judge to proceed with the matter.

Furthermore, if any further investigation is required in respect of Respondents/

Accused Nos. 31 to 33, it would only be in addition to what had already been

gathered by the Investigating Officer as of the date of filing the supplementary

report, as contemplated under
Section 193(9)
Cr.P.C. In that view, this Court

has no hesitation to say that the questions of law falling for consideration before

this Court do not give any scope to entertain two views.
166. In the light of the above legal analysis, this Court is of the view that

the impugned orders dated 06.09.2025 warrant interference of this Court as

they are unsustainable on the touchstone of settled principles of law. However,

as already enunciated, this Court is not inclined to go into the question of

quashing the official Memoranda, as they are essentially an administrative act.

RESULT:

167. In that view of the matter, the Criminal Petitions are allowed in

part, quashing the impugned orders dated 06.09.2025 passed by the learned

Special Judge for SPE and ACB Cases-cum- III Additional District Judge,

Vijayawada in Crl.M.P. Nos., 1446, 1447 and 1467 of 2025 pertaining to Crime

No.21/2024 (CID Police Station,Mangalagiri). Consequently, the Respondents/

Accused Nos., 31, 32 and 33 are directed to surrender before the Learned Special

Judge for SPE and ACB Cases-cum-III Additional District Judge, Vijayawada

on or before 26.11.2025.

168. Needless to state, Accused Nos., 31 32 and 33 may seek regular bail

and the learned Special Judge may deal with the same on their own merits.

169. It is clarified that observations made in this judgment are on the

question of law arising on default bail and cannot be construed as an opinion

on merits relating to Crime No.21/2024 of CID Police Station, Mangalagiri.

Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, shall also stand closed.

DR. JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA
19.11.2025
Mjl/*
Dinesh

LR copy to be marked