Allahabad High Court

Pramod And Another vs The State Of Up And Another on 23 February, 2021

Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2021 ALL 187

Author:
Manju Rani Chauhan

Bench:
Manju Rani Chauhan

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

A.F.R.

Reserved on 7th January, 2021

Delivered on 23rd February, 2021

Court No. - 81

Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 12174 of 2020

Applicant :- Pramod And Another

Opposite Party :- The State Of Up And Another

Counsel for Applicant :- Raj Kumar Kesari

Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Ashutosh Mishra

Hon'ble Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan,J.

1. Brief facts giving rise to the questions invovled in this case, are that a first information report was lodged by the opposite party no. 2 against the applicant no.1, Pramod and two others, which was registered as Case Crime No. 93/2012, under
Sections 498-A
,
,
of the Indian Penal Code (for short "
I.P.C
.") as also under
Sections 3
/
of the Dowry Prohibition Act (fort short "
D.P. Act
"), Police Thana, District Ghaziabad. After investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the applicant and two others co-accused namely Lalit and Rinku, under
Sections 498-A
,
,
,
I.P.C. and
Sections 3
/
D.P. Act, on the basis of which, charges were framed under the aforesaid sections. On the basis of the statements of opposite party no. 2, learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 8, Ghaziabad vide order dated 02.12.2017 convicted the applicants under
Sections 498-A
and
IPC and
Section 4
Dowry Prohibition Act.

2. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 02.12.2017, the applicants filed Criminal Appeal No. 164/2017 (
Pramod and another vs. State of U.P.
, assailing the judgment and order dated 02.12.2017, the applicants have been released on bail in criminal appeal.

3. During the pendency of the criminal appeal, the parties have entered into compromise and they decided to live happily as husband and wife under one roof with their minor son Shiva, aged about 18 years. Since arriving at a compromise between the parties, they are residing under one roof as husband and wife alongwith their minor son, the applicants filed an application before the Appellate Court, alleging therein, that criminal proceeding against them may be quashed, as the continuation of criminal proceeding against them would be abuse of process of the law.

4. Heard Mr. Raj Kumar Kesari, learned counsel for the applicants, Mr. Ashutosh Mishra, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 and Mr. Pankaj Srivastava, learned A.G.A. for the State of U.P.

5. This application under
Section 482
Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing the criminal proceeding in Case Crime No. 93/2012, under
Sections 498-A
,
,
IPC and under
Section 3
/
Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station Mahila Thana, District Ghaziabad and consequential conviction order dated 02.12.2017 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 8, Ghaziabad in Criminal Case No. 10/2013, "
State vs. Pramod
" as well as the proceeding in Criminal Appeal No. 164/2017, "
Pramod and another vs. State of U.P.
", pending in the Court of District and Session Judge, Ghaziabad in terms of the compromise arrived at between the applicants and the opposite party no. 2.

6. On the matter being taken up, learned counsel for the applicants submitted that applicant no. 1 is the husband and applicant no.2 is mother-in-law of opposite party no. 2 and opposite party no. 2 is legally wedded wife of applicant no. 1. Without disputing the facts of the case, counsel for the applicants submits that during the pendency of appeal, compromise has been arrived at between the parties, therefore, criminal proceeding against the applicants may be quashed in the light of the compromise entered into between the parties.

7. A joint affidavit has also been filed by the learned counsel for the applicants which is part of the record. On the basis of joint affidavit, the Court on 07.09.2020 passed the following order :

"1. Heard Mr. Raj Kumar Kesari, learned counsel for the applicants, Mr. Ashutosh Mishra, learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 and learned A.G.A. for the State.

2. The present 482
Cr.P.C
. application has been filed to quash the entire proceedings of Case Crime No. 93 of 2012, under
Section 498-A
,
,
IPC and 3/4
D.P. Act
, P.S.-Mahila Thana, District-Ghaziabad and the consequential conviction order dated 2.12.2017 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.8, Ghaziabad in Criminal Case No. 10/2013 (
State vs. Pramod and another
) as well as the proceeding in Criminal Appeal No. 164/2017, (
Pramod and another vs. State
of u.p.), pending in the court of District and Session Judge, Ghaziabad.

3. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that there is a matrimonial dispute between the parties. However, during pendency of appeal against conviction the parties have entered into compromise. It has further been submitted that now, the husband and wife are staying together. A compromise has been entered between them which has been reduced in writing, copy of compromise deed has been annexed as Annexure no.4 to this affidavit in support of bail application.

4. Learned counsel appearing for the opposite party no. 2 does not dispute the correctness of the submissions so advanced by learned counsel for the applicants. He will filing counter affidavit in the registry today itself after serving copy of the same to the learned A.G.A., wherein he has accepted that the parties have amicably settled their dispute.

5. Accordingly, it is provided that the parties shall appear before the court below along with a certified copy of this order on the next date fixed and be permitted to file an application for verification of the original compromise document, which is annexed as Annexure no.4 to this application. It is expected that the trial court may fix a date for the verification of the compromise entered into between the parties and pass an appropriate order with respect to the verification within a period of one month from today. Upon due verification, the court below may pass appropriate order in that regard and send a report to this Court.

6. Put up on 2nd November, 2020 as fresh.

7. Till then, no coercive measure shall be taken against the applicants in the aforesaid case. "

8. By the order dated 07.09.2020, it was provided that the parties shall appear before the Court below alongwith certified copy of the order and were permitted to file an application for verification of the original compromise document. After which the trial Court was expected to fix a date for verification of the compromise entered into between the parties and pass an appropriate order with respect to the same.

9. In compliance of the aforesaid order dated 07.09.2020, a report has been received from Additional Sessions Judge, Ghaziabad wherein, it has been stated that since the matter relates to non compoundable offence, therefore, the parties have been directed to appear before this Court.

10. It appears that realizing the fact that conviction order was passed and during the pendency of appeal against conviction, the parties have entered into compromise, therefore, the parties have been directed by the concerned court below to be present before this Court.

11. At this juncture, the issue before this Court, which is to be decided, is whether this Court can quash the criminal proceeding under
Section 482
Cr.P.C., after conviction, and during the pendency of the appeal.

12. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that the offences under
Section 498-A
I.P.C. as also under
Section 4
of the Dowry Prohibition Act is not compoundable offence, as is clear from the perusal of the table referred to under
Section 320
Cr.P.C. However, this Hon'ble Court having inherent power under
Section 482
Cr.P.C. can quash the proceeding in cases of non compoundable offence.

13. Learned counsel for the applicants has further submitted that though the offence under
Sections 498-A
IPC is non compoundable offence, but, in the present case, when the parties have entered into compromise and both are living as husband and wife under one roof alongwith their minor son, continuation of criminal proceeding against them may be quashed as the continuous of criminal proceeding against them would be abuse of process of the law and this Court will vitiate the purpose of compromise and cordial relationship between the husband and wife.

14. Learned counsel for the applicants has lastly submitted that the Bombay High Court as well as Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in the cases of Kiran Tulsiram Ingle vs. Anupama P. Gayakwad reported in 2006 0 Supreme (Bom) 1151 and Vinay Kumar Vs. State of U.P. and another; reported in 2016 0 Supreme (P & H) 243, even after conviction, Hon'ble Courts have been pleased to quash the criminal proceeding during the pendency of the appeal, exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

15. To further bolster the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the applicants has
placed reliance upon
the following judgments the Punjab and Haryana High Court, Bombay High Court and the Apex Court:

i. Vinay Kumar (Supra);

ii. Kiran Tulsiram Ingle (Supra);

iii.
Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab
reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303.

16. In view of aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the applicants submitted that the proceedings of the above mentioned criminal case are liable to be quashed by this Court as also the consequences thereof, i.e., conviction of the applicants is also liable to be set aside.

17. Mr. Ashutosh Mishra, learned counsel for the opposite party no.2, on instruction received, states that opposite party no.2 has no objection, if the proceedings arising out of the aforesaid case are quashed as well as the judgment and order of the conviction passed against the applicants, is set aside. He does not dispute the correctness of the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the applicants or the correctness of the documents relied upon by him.

18. However, on the other hand, Mr. Pankaj Srivastava, learned A.G.A. for the State has opposed the prayer made by the learned counsel for the applicants by contending that when the appeal against the conviction of the applicants is pending, wherein, they have been enlarged on bail and they have been convicted for offences under
Sections 323
,
498-A
I.P.C. as also under
Section 4
D.P. Act, which are non-compoundable, this Court, in exercise of inherent powers under
Section 482
Cr.P.C. cannot quash the aforesaid criminal proceedings and the judgment and order of the conviction passed against the applicants.
In support his case, the learned A.G.A. has
placed reliance upon
the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
Arun Singh & Others Vs. State of U.P.
through its Secretary & Another reported in 2020 (3) SCC 736.

19. On the cumulative strength of the aforesaid submissions, learned A.G.A. states that the present application is liable to be rejected.

20. This Court has considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records of the present application.

21. The question, as to whether non compoundable offences should be quashed by this Court or not, has come up for consideration before the Apex court, time and again, and there is no need to go into the same at great length.

22. The issues before this Court are whether (i) this Court can convert non-compoundable offences into compoundable one (
Section 498-A
I.P.C. and
Section 4
D.P. Act in the facts of the present case), (ii) quash the aforesaid criminal proceedings of the case and lastly (iii) set aside the judgment and order of conviction passed against the applicants while exercising its inherent power under
Section 482
Cr.P.C. to arrive at the ends of justice and in view of compromised arrived at between the parties, who are none other than the husband, wife and in-law's, when there is no equally efficacious course is open for the parties to get the relief prayed for herein.

23. There are authoritative judicial precedents where the Apex Court has approved the quashing of the proceedings when it found that they emanated from mutual marital discord, even though the proceedings included some offences, which were not compoundable (
Section 498-A
I.P.C. and
Section 4
D.P. Act in the facts of the present case). The dockets of the pending cases are already bursting on there seams. If this court can clearly see that the continuation of some criminal proceeding in the lower court is going to result into nothing fruitful and the same will be a sheer wastage of public time and money then it shall not be loath to put an end to that fruitless exercise. In the present case, the dispute is matrimonial in nature, i.e., between the husband and wife in which the husband and mother-in-law of the wife have been convicted by the court below and they filed an appeal against the order of conviction. In the appeal, they have been enlarged on bail and for happy and peaceful life of the husband and wife as also the life of their son, they have settled their disputes during the pendency of the appeal and both husband and wife arrived at a compromise. After compromise, they are living together happily along with their son. This Court, therefore, deems it appropriate and expedient both to quash the entire criminal proceedings initiated by opposite party no.2 during the pendency of appeal filed against the judmgent and order of conviction, as they will result into a fruitless exercise in vain in the peaceful life of husband and wife as also their son.

24. But, as the advisability to exercise the powers of this Court to quash the non compoundable offences has been questioned, thus, it may be useful to give a brief reference to the law in this regard. Therefore, firstly it would be worth while to reproduce the relevant paragraphs of the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel the applicant and the learned A.G.A. for the State to examine the applicability of the aforesaid judgments in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Paragraph nos. 11 to 14 of the case of Vinay Kumar (Supra) reads as follows:

"11. This Court in the case of Sube Singh and another Versus State of Haryana and another 2013(4) RCR (Criminal) 102 has considered the compounding of offences at the appellate stage and ANJAL GUPTA 2016.02.12 17:32 I attest to the accuracy and authenticity of this document high court chandigarh has observed that even when appeal against the conviction is pending before the Sessions Court and parties entered into a compromise, the High Court is vested unparallel power under
Section 482
Cr.PC to quash criminal proceedings at any stage so as to secure the ends of justice and has observed as under:-

"15. The refusal to invoke power under
Section 320
CrPC, however, does not debar the High Court from resorting to its inherent power under
Section 482
Criminal Procedure Code and pass an appropriate order so as to secure the ends of justice.

16. As regards the doubt expressed by the learned Single Judge whether the inherent power under
Section 482
Criminal Procedure Code to quash the criminal proceedings on the basis of compromise entered into between the parties can be invoked even if the accused has been held guilty and convicted by the trial Court, we find that in Dr. Arvind Barsaul etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., 2008(2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 910 : (2008)5 SCC 794, the unfortunate matrimonial dispute was settled after the appellant (husband) had been convicted under
Section 498A
Indian Penal Code and sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment and his appeal was pending before the first appellate court. The Apex Court quashed the criminal proceedings keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice observing that "continuation of criminal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law" and also by invoking its power under
Article 142
of the Constitution. Since the High Court does not possess any power akin to the one under
Article 142
of the Constitution, the cited decision cannot be construed to have vested the High Court with such like unparallel power.

17. The magnitude of inherent jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court under
Section 482
Criminal Procedure Code with a view to prevent the abuse of law or to secure the ends of justice, however, is wide enough to include its power to quash the proceedings in relation to not only the non- compoundable offences notwithstanding the bar under
Section 320
Criminal Procedure Code but such a power, in our considered view, is exercisable at any stage save that there is no express bar and invoking of such power is fully justified on facts and circumstances of the case.

18. xxx xxx

19. xxx xxx

20. xxx xxx

21. In the light of these peculiar facts and circumstances where not only the parties but their close relatives (including daughter and son-in-law of respondent No.2) have also supported the amicable settlement, we are of the considered view that the negation of the compromise would disharmonize the relationship and cause a permanent rift amongst the family members who are living together as a joint family. Non-acceptance of the compromise would also lead to denial of complete justice which is the very essence of our justice delivery system. Since there is no statutory embargo against invoking of power under
Section 482
Criminal Procedure Code after conviction of an accused by the trial Court and during pendency of appeal against such conviction, it appears to be a fit case to invoke the inherent jurisdiction and strike down the proceedings subject to certain safeguards.

22. Consequently and for the reasons afore-stated, we allow this petition and set aside the judgement and order dated 16.03.2009 passed in Criminal Case No. 425-1 of 2000 of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hisar, on the basis of compromise dated 08.08.2011 arrived at between them and their step-mother respondent No.2 (Smt. Reshma Devi) w/o late Rajmal qua the petitioners only. As a necessary corollary, the criminal complaint filed by respondent No.2 is dismissed qua the petitioners on the basis of above-stated compromise. Resultantly, the appeal preferred by the petitioners against the above- mentioned order dated 16.03.2009 would be rendered infructuous and shall be so declared by the first Appellate Court at Hisar."

12. Similarly, in the case of Baghel Singh Versus State of Punjab 2014(3) RCR (Criminal) 578, whereby the accused was convicted under
Section 326
IPC and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years, the parties entered into compromise during the pendency of the appeal. This Court while relying upon the judgment of Lal Chand Versus State of Haryana, 2009 (5) RCR (Criminal) 838 and Chhota Singh Versus State of Punjab 1997(2) RCR (Criminal) 392 allowed the compounding of offence in respect of offence under
Section 326
IPC at the appellate stage with the observation that it will be a starting point in maintaining peace between the parties, such offence can be compounded.

13. Accordingly, while relying upon the aforesaid judgments and coupled with the fact that the parties have entered into a compromise and learned Sessions Judge, Sangrur has submitted his report in support of genuineness of the compromise, the present petition is allowed and FIR No.17, dated 21.05.2010, under
Sections 304-A
,
,
,
and
IPC, registered at Police Station Cheema, District-Sunam, and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom, qua the accused-petitioner, are quashed, on the basis of compromise and affidavits dated 07.08.2012(Annexures P-2 to P-4).

14. Consequently, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 12.11.2014 passed by the trial Court, are set aside. The appeal preferred by the accused-petitioner against the aforesaid judgment and order is rendered infructuous and shall be declared so by the first Appellate Court."

Paragraph nos. 1,9,10,11,12,13,14 and 15 of Kiran Tulshiram Ingle (Supra) read as follows:

"1. Heard advocates for the petitioner and Respondent No. 1. Petitioner is the husband and Respondent No. 1 is the wife. A case was instituted against the petitioner under
Section 498Aof
the Indian Penal Code. He came to be convicted by the trial Court. The matter went in appeal. Before the appellate Court, the matter was settled between the parties. The petitioner and respondent No. 1 obtained divorce by mutvial consent. Respondent No. 1 agreed not to press for the petitioners conviction. The appellate Court maintained the conviction of the petitioner and gave him benefit of provisions of
Probation of Offenders' Act
.

9. In this background, the advocate for the petitioner contended that the criminal case should have been quashed by the Sessions Judge, but admittedly, the Sessions Judge had no power to do so, nor any power to compound the offence and, therefore, he has moved this Court. He prayed that either the criminal case be quashed or offence under
Section 498A
of the Indian Penal Code be allowed to be compounded.

10. Justice Khanwilkar in the Criminal Revision, arising out of the conviction of petitioner, as referred to above, did not agree with the view of the single Judge taken in the case of
State of Maharashtra v. Madhu Bhisham Bhatia and Ors.
reported in 2004 All MR (Crl) 1849 : 2004 Cri LJ 5072.
According to Justice Khanwilkar, the single Judge misread the judgment of the Apex Court In B.S. Joshi's Case and, therefore, he thought it fit to refer the Issue to the Division Bench. He framed following two Issues:

(1) The decision of the Apex Court, in B.S. Joshi's case is not an authority to hold that offence underSection 498A of the
Indian Penal Code
is a compoundable offence, which can be compounded with the permission of the Court.

(2) Whether it is open for the High Court to quash the criminal action in exercise of Inherent powers even in a case which has ended with an order of conviction after trial.

11. In our opinion, the main issue before the Supreme Court was, whether to allow the matrimonial disputes to continue indefinitely causing hardship to both the parties; or whether in case parties come to a settlement, that settlement should be given approval and sanctity. In para 2 of B.S. Joshi's Case AIR 2003 SC 1386 the Supreme Court observed as under:

The matrimonial disputes of the kind in the present case have been on considerable increase in recent times resulting in filing of complaints by the wife under
Sections 498A
and
, IPC not only against the husband but his other family members also. When such matters are resolved either by wife agreeing to rejoin the matrimonial home or mutual separation of husband and wife and also mutual settlement of other pending disputes as a result whereof both sides approach the High Court and jointly pray for quashing of the criminal proceedings of the First Information Report or complaint filed by the wife under
Sections 498A
and
, IPC can the prayer be declined on the ground that since the offences are non-com-poundable under Section 320 of the Code and, therefore, it is not permissible for the Court to quash the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint.

Thereafter the Supreme Court considered 7 Judgments upon which the parties relied and then, after considering its own Judgment in
G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad
, and found that the observations made in that Judgment were apt and which were reproduced, are as under:

It was said that there has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly extend which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about re-approachment are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a Court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their "young" days in chasing their "cases" in different Courts.

Then para 14 the Supreme Court observed as:

The hyper-technical view would be counter productive and would act against interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XXA of
Indian Penal Code
.

These observations of the Supreme Court are very broad. In para 2, reproduced above by us, the Issue before the Supreme Court was, for quashing of criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint.

12. The single Judge felt that the powers of quashing cannot be exercised if the criminal proceedings have resulted in conviction, as in the present case. We are not in agreement with these observations. If the prime object of the Judgment of Supreme Court in B.S. Joshi's case is to allow the parties to settle their matrimonial disputes either way, then conviction, in our opinion, cannot and should not come in the way. It is a fact on record that the trial Court convicted the accused. The parties thereafter mutually obtained divorce. This fact was taken into consideration by the learned Sessions Judge. But he expressed his inability to compound the offence under
Section 498A
of the Indian Penal Code because he had no powers to do so. He further granted benefit of
Probation of Offenders Act
to the petitioner.

13. Therefore, it is clear that firstly in this case the parties have compromised even after conviction and, the object of compromise to live happily, peacefully though separately after divorce. The Sessions Court has taken cognizance of this compromise and has reduced the conviction and altered it to a bond under the
Probation of Offenders Act
. Secondly, conviction by the first Court is not end of the matter and appeal therefrom is continuation of proceeding and if a revision is filed, in case conviction is maintained, altered, reduced, then the High Court in revision does get power to pass effective orders in consonance with the judgment of the Supreme Court. Conviction does not attain finality if the appeal is filed and, If the revision is filed against conviction by appellate Court, there also all issues become opened before the High Court.

14. Since the Supreme Court had approached this issue with a broader perspective and the Issue was whether it is permissible to quash criminal proceedings (Stress Added, or complaint or FIR and in our opinion, even the criminal proceedings can be quashed irrespective of whether there is conviction or otherwise. We, therefore, answer both the Issues as under:

Ans. to Issue No. 1 :- The decision of the Supreme Court gives powers to the High Court to permit compounding of matrimonial offences and the High Court has powers to quash the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint.

Ans. to Issue No. 2 : Even in case of conviction, inherent powers can be exercised and criminal proceedings can be quashed.

15. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, we hold that the High Court, by exercising inherent powers, can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal procedure Code. In view of this clear judgment of the Supreme Court we pass the following order:-

ORDER:

Reference stands answered accordingly.

The criminal proceedings against the petitioner so also his conviction by both the Courts below is hereby quashed in view of the mutual understanding, divorce and compromise between the husband and wife.

All the matters, therefore, stand disposed of accordingly."

Paragraph nos. 61 and 62 of the case of
Gian Singh
(Supra) read as follows:

"61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like
Prevention of Corruption Act
or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.

62. In view of the above, it cannot be said that B.S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant and Manoj Sharma were not correctly decided. We answer the reference accordingly. Let these matters be now listed before the concerned Bench(es)."

(Emphasis added)

25. Apart from the above judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the applicants, this Court is also required to notice some judgments of the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court has held that if the parties have settled their disputes and arrived at a compromise for their safe and peaceful life, the High Court, in exercise of its inherent power, can quash the criminal proceedings initiated under the compoundable and non-compoundable sections if the same relate to offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry etc., or family disputes, as it would be unfair or contrary to interest of justice to continue with criminal proceeding or continuation of criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law and to secure ends of justice.

26. The Apex Court in the case of
B.S. Joshi & Others VS. State of Haryana & Another
reported in (2003) 4 SCC 675 has opined that while exercising power of quashing under
Section 482
Cr.P.C., it is for the High Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. Where, in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may, while taking into consideration the special facts of a case, also quash the proceedings. The special features in such matrimonial matters are evident. It becomes the duty of the Court to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes. Paragraph nos. 2, 13 to 15 of
the said judgment
, which are relevant, read as follows:

"2.The question that falls for determination in the instant case is about the ambit of the inherent powers of the High Courts under
Section 482
, Code of Criminal Procedure (Code) read with
Articles 226
and
of the Constitution of India to quash criminal proceedings. The scope and ambit of power under Section 482 has been examined by this Court in catena of earlier decisions but in the present case that is required to be considered in relation to matrimonial disputes. The matrimonial disputes of the kind in the present case have been on considerable increase in recent times resulting in filing of complaints by the wife under
Sections 498A
and
, IPC not only against the husband but his other family members also. When such matters are resolved either by wife agreeing to rejoin the matrimonial home or mutual separation of husband and wife and also mutual settlement of other pending disputes as a result whereof both sides approach the High Court and jointly pray for quashing of the criminal proceedings or the First Information Report or complaint filed by the wife under
Sections 498A
and
, IPC, can the prayer be declined on the ground that since the offences are non-compoundable under Section 320 of the Code and, therefore, it is not permissible for the Court to quash the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint.

...

13. The observations made by this Court, though in a slightly different context, in
G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad & Ors.
[(2000) 3 SCC 693] are very apt for determining the approach required to be kept in view in matrimonial dispute by the courts, it was said that there has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their "young" days in chasing their "cases" in different courts.

14. There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section 498A in the
Indian Penal Code
was to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hyper-technical view would be counter productive and would act against interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XXA of
Indian Penal Code
.

15. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code."

(Emphasis added)

27. The Apex Court in the case of
Nikhil Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr.
reported in (2008) 9 SCC 677, keeping in mind the decision of the Apex Court in the case of
B.S. Joshi
(Supra) has held that this is a fit case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way in quashing of the criminal proceedings, since, in our view, the continuance of the same after compromise arrived at between the parties would be a futile exercise. For ready reference, Paragraph nos. 29, 30, 31 which are relevant, read as follows:

"29. Despite the ingredients and the factual content of an offence of cheating punishable under
Section 420
IPC, the same has been made compoundable under Sub-section (2) of
Section 320
Cr.P.C. with the leave of the Court. Of course, forgery has not been included as one of the compoundable offences, but it is in such cases that the principle enunciated in
B.S. Joshi
's case (supra) becomes relevant.

30. In the instant case, the disputes between the Company and the Bank have been set at rest on the basis of the compromise arrived at by them whereunder the dues of the Bank have been cleared and the Bank does not appear to have any further claim against the Company. What, however, remains is the fact that certain documents were alleged to have been created by the appellant herein in order to avail of credit facilities beyond the limit to which the Company was entitled. The dispute involved herein has overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal facets. The question which is required to be answered in this case is whether the power which independently lies with this Court to quash the criminal proceedings pursuant to the compromise arrived at, should at all be exercised?

31. On an overall view of the facts as indicated hereinabove and keeping in mind the decision of this Court in
B.S. Joshi
's case (supra) and the compromise arrived at between the Company and the Bank as also clause 11 of the consent terms filed in the suit filed by the Bank, we are satisfied that this is a fit case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way in the quashing of the criminal proceedings, since, in our view, the continuance of the same after the compromise arrived at between the parties would be a futile exercise."

28. The Apex Court in the case of
Manoj Sharma Vs. State of U.P. & Others
reported in (2008) 16 SCC 1, has held that the ultimate exercise of discretion under
Section 482
Cr.P.C. or under
Article 226
of the Constitution of India is with the Court, which has to exercise such jurisdiction in the facts of each case. Said power in no way is limited by the provisions of
Section 320
Cr.P.C. It is further held that exercise of power under
Section 482
Cr.P.C. or
Article 226
of the Constitution of India for quashing of FIR/complaint/criminal proceedings relating to offences not compoundable under
Section 320
Cr.P.C. is discretionary. For ready reference, paragraph nos. 22, 23, 26 and 27, which are relevant, read as follows:

"22. Since
Section 320
Cr.P.C. has clearly stated which offences are compoundable and which are not, the High Court or even this Court would not ordinarily be justified in doing something indirectly which could not be done directly. Even otherwise, it ordinarily would not be a legitimate exercise of judicial power under
Article 22
of the Constitution or under
Section 482
Cr.P.C. to direct doing something which the
Cr.P.C
. has expressly prohibited.
Section 320(9)
Cr.P.C. expressly states that no offence shall be compounded except as provided by that Section. Hence, in my opinion, it would ordinarily not be a legitimate exercise of judicial power to direct compounding of a non-compoundable offence.

23. However, it has to be pointed out that
Section 320
Cr.P.C. cannot be read in isolation. It has to be read along with the other provisions in the
Cr.P.C
. One such other provision is
Section 482
Cr.P.C. which reads:

" Saving of inherent power of High Court. - Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."

The words "Nothing in this Code" used in Section 482 is a non obstante clause, and gives it overriding effect over other provisions in the Cr.P.C. The words "or otherwise to secure the ends of justice" in Section 482 implies that to secure the interest of justice sometimes (though only in very rare cases) the High Court can pass an order in violation of a provision in the Cr.P.C.

26. While in the present case I respectfully agree with my learned brother Hon'ble Kabir J. that the criminal proceedings deserve to be quashed, the question may have to be decided in some subsequent decision or decisions (preferably by a larger Bench) as to which non-compoundable cases can be quashed under
Section 482
Cr.P.C. or
Article 226
of the Constitution on the basis that the parties have entered into a compromise.

27. There can be no doubt that a case under
Section 302
IPC or other serious offences like those under Sections 395, 307 or 304B cannot be compounded and hence proceedings in those provisions cannot be quashed by the High Court in exercise of its power under
Section 482
Cr.P.C. or in writ jurisdiction on the basis of compromise. However, in some other cases, (like those akin to a civil nature) the proceedings can be quashed by the High Court if the parties have come to an amicable settlement even though the provisions are not compoundable. Where a line is to be drawn will have to be decided in some later decisions of this Court, preferably by a larger bench (so as to make it more authoritative). Some guidelines will have to be evolved in this connection and the matter cannot be left at the sole unguided discretion of Judges, otherwise there may be conflicting decisions and judicial anarchy. A judicial discretion has to be exercised on some objective guiding principles and criteria, and not on the whims and fancies of individual Judges. Discretion, after all, cannot be the Chancellor's foot."

29. The Apex Court in the case of
Narinder Singh & Others Vs. State of Punjab & Others
reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466 has observed that the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320. The scope of inherent power is of wide platitude with no statutory limitation, but, it has to be exercised in accordance with the guidelines engrafted in such power viz.: (I) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. For ready reference, relevant paragraph nos. 15, 16, 17, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29 & 33, which are relevant, are quoted herein below:

"15. Whereas in various countries, sentencing guidelines are provided, statutorily or otherwise, which may guide Judges for awarding specific sentence, in India we do not have any such sentencing policy till date. The prevalence of such guidelines may not only aim at achieving consistencies in awarding sentences in different cases, such guidelines normally prescribe the sentencing policy as well namely whether the purpose of awarding punishment in a particular case is more of a deterrence or retribution or rehabilitation etc. In the absence of such guidelines in India, Courts go by their own perception about the philosophy behind the prescription of certain specified penal consequences for particular nature of crime. For some deterrence and/or vengeance becomes more important whereas another Judge may be more influenced by rehabilitation or restoration as the goal of sentencing. Sometimes, it would be a combination of both which would weigh in the mind of the Court in awarding a particular sentence. However, that may be question of quantum.

16. What follows from the discussion behind the purpose of sentencing is that if a particular crime is to be treated as crime against the society and/or heinous crime, then the deterrence theory as a rationale for punishing the offender becomes more relevant, to be applied in such cases. Therefore, in respect of such offences which are treated against the society, it becomes the duty of the State to punish the offender. Thus, even when there is a settlement between the offender and the victim, their will would not prevail as in such cases the matter is in public domain. Society demands that the individual offender should be punished in order to deter other effectively as it amounts to greatest good of the greatest number of persons in a society. It is in this context that we have to understand the scheme/philosophy behind Section 307 of the Code.

17. We would like to expand this principle in some more detail. We find, in practice and in reality, after recording the conviction and while awarding the sentence/punishment the Court is generally governed by any or all or combination of the aforesaid factors. Sometimes, it is the deterrence theory which prevails in the minds of the Court, particularly in those cases where the crimes committed are heinous in nature or depicts depravity, or lack morality. At times it is to satisfy the element of "emotion" in law and retribution/vengeance becomes the guiding factor. In any case, it cannot be denied that the purpose of punishment by law is deterrence, constrained by considerations of justice. What, then, is the role of mercy, forgiveness and compassion in law? These are by no means comfortable questions and even the answers may not be comforting. There may be certain cases which are too obvious namely cases involving heinous crime with element of criminality against the society and not parties inter-se. In such cases, the deterrence as purpose of punishment becomes paramount and even if the victim or his relatives have shown the virtue and gentility, agreeing to forgive the culprit, compassion of that private party would not move the court in accepting the same as larger and more important public policy of showing the iron hand of law to the wrongdoers, to reduce the commission of such offences, is more important. Cases of murder, rape, or other sexual offences etc. would clearly fall in this category. After all, justice requires long term vision. On the other hand, there may be, offences falling in the category where "correctional" objective of criminal law would have to be given more weightage in contrast with "deterrence" philosophy. Punishment, whatever else may be, must be fair and conducive to good rather than further evil. If in a particular case the Court is of the opinion that the settlement between the parties would lead to more good; better relations between them; would prevent further occurrence of such encounters between the parties, it may hold settlement to be on a better pedestal. It is a delicate balance between the two inflicting interests which is to be achieved by the Court after examining all these parameters and then deciding as to which course of action it should take in a particular case.

22. Thus, we find that in certain circumstances, this Court has approved the quashing of proceedings under
section 307
,IPC whereas in some other cases, it is held that as the offence is of serious nature such proceedings cannot be quashed. Though in each of the aforesaid cases the view taken by this Court may be justified on its own facts, at the same time this Court owes an explanation as to why two different approaches are adopted in various cases. The law declared by this Court in the form of judgments becomes binding precedent for the High Courts and the subordinate courts, to follow under
Article 141
of the Constitution of India. Stare Decisis is the fundamental principle of judicial decision making which requires ''certainty' too in law so that in a given set of facts the course of action which law shall take is discernable and predictable. Unless that is achieved, the very doctrine of stare decisis will lose its significance. The related objective of the doctrine of stare decisis is to put a curb on the personal preferences and priors of individual Judges. In a way, it achieves equality of treatment as well, inasmuch as two different persons faced with similar circumstances would be given identical treatment at the hands of law. It has, therefore, support from the human sense of justice as well. The force of precedent in the law is heightened, in the words of Karl Llewellyn, by "that curious, almost universal sense of justice which urges that all men are to be treated alike in like circumstances".

23. As there is a close relation between the equality and justice, it should be clearly discernible as to how the two prosecutions under
Section 307
IPC are different in nature and therefore are given different treatment. With this ideal objective in mind, we are proceeding to discuss the subject at length. It is for this reason we deem it appropriate to lay down some distinct, definite and clear guidelines which can be kept in mind by the High Courts to take a view as to under what circumstances it should accept the settlement between the parties and quash the proceedings and under what circumstances it should refrain from doing so. We make it clear that though there would be a general discussion in this behalf as well, the matter is examined in the context of offences under Section 30 7IPC.

24. The two rival parties have amicably settled the disputes between themselves and buried the hatchet. Not only this, they say that since they are neighbours, they want to live like good neighbours and that was the reason for restoring friendly ties. In such a scenario, should the court give its imprimatur to such a settlement. The answer depends on various incidental aspects which need serious discourse. The Legislators has categorically recognized that those offences which are covered by the provisions ofsection 320 of the Code are concededly those not only do not fall within the category of heinous crime but also which are personal between the parties. Therefore, this provision recognizes whereas there is a compromise between the parties the Court is to act at the said compromise and quash the proceedings. However, even in respect of such offences not covered within the four corners of Section 320 of the Code, High Court is given power under Section 482 of the Code to accept the compromise between the parties and quash the proceedings. The guiding factor is as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power, both the ultimate consequences may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. This is so recognized in various judgments taken note of above.

27. At this juncture, we would like also to add that the timing of settlement would also play a crucial role. If the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence when the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be somewhat liberal in accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings/investigation. Of course, it would be after looking into the attendant circumstances as narrated in the previous para. Likewise, when challan is submitted but the charge has not been framed, the High Court may exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. However, at this stage, as mentioned above, since the report of the I.O. under
Section 173
,Cr.P.C. is also placed before the Court it would become the bounding duty of the Court to go into the said report and the evidence collected, particularly the medical evidence relating to injury etc. sustained by the victim. This aspect, however, would be examined along with another important consideration, namely, in view of settlement between the parties, whether it would be unfair or contrary to interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings and whether possibility of conviction is remote and bleak. If the Court finds the answer to this question in affirmative, then also such a case would be a fit case for the High Court to give its stamp of approval to the compromise arrived at between the parties, inasmuch as in such cases no useful purpose would be served in carrying out the criminal proceedings which in all likelihood would end in acquittal, in any case.

28. We have found that in certain cases, the High Courts have accepted the compromise between the parties when the matter in appeal was pending before the High Court against the conviction recorded by the trial court. Obviously, such cases are those where the accused persons have been found guilty by the trial court, which means the serious charge of
Section 307
IPC has been proved beyond reasonable doubt at the level of the trial court. There would not be any question of accepting compromise and acquitting the accused persons simply because the private parties have buried the hatchet.

29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the
Prevention of Corruption Act
or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under
Section 307
IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of
Section 307
IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under
Section 307
IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under
Section 307
IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.

..

33.We have gone through the FIR as well which was recorded on the basis of statement of the complainant/victim. It gives an indication that the complainant was attacked allegedly by the accused persons because of some previous dispute between the parties, though nature of dispute etc. is not stated in detail. However, a very pertinent statement appears on record viz., "respectable persons have been trying for a compromise up till now, which could not be finalized". This becomes an important aspect. It appears that there have been some disputes which led to the aforesaid purported attack by the accused on the complainant. In this context when we find that the elders of the village, including Sarpanch, intervened in the matter and the parties have not only buried their hatchet but have decided to live peacefully in future, this becomes an important consideration. The evidence is yet to be led in the Court. It has not even started. In view of compromise between parties, there is a minimal chance of the witnesses coming forward in support of the prosecution case. Even though nature of injuries can still be established by producing the doctor as witness who conducted medical examination, it may become difficult to prove as to who caused these injuries. The chances of conviction, therefore, appear to be remote. It would, therefore, be unnecessary to drag these proceedings. We, taking all these factors into consideration cumulatively, are of the opinion that the compromise between the parties be accepted and the criminal proceedings arising out of FIR No.121 dated 14.7.2010 registered with Police Station LOPOKE, District Amritsar Rural be quashed. We order accordingly."

30. The Apex Court in the case of the
State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan & Others
reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688, has held that mere compromise between the parties would not be ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender, who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under
Section 307
IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.

But the Apex Court in
the said judgment
, taking into consideration the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
Gian Singh
(Supra), has opined that while exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice causing extreme injustice to him by not quashing the criminal cases. The Apex Court has also held that mere mention of Section 307 cannot be sole basis of decision for not quashing of the criminal proceedings. Relevant paragraph nos. 15 to 18 read as follows:

"15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:

15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;

15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;

15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like
Prevention of Corruption Act
or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender;

15.4. offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under
Section 307
IPC and/or the
Arms Act
etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of
Section 307
IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of
Section 307
IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under
Section 307
IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of
Narinder Singh
(supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;

15.5. while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.

16. Insofar as the present case is concerned, the High Court has quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences under
Sections 307
and
IPC mechanically and even when the investigation was under progress. Somehow, the accused managed to enter into a compromise with the complainant and sought quashing of the FIR on the basis of a settlement. The allegations are serious in nature. He used the fire arm also in commission of the offence. Therefore, the gravity of the offence and the conduct of the accused is not at all considered by the High Court and solely on the basis of a settlement between the accused and the complainant, the High Court has mechanically quashed the FIR, in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code, which is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The High Court has also failed to note the antecedents of the accused.

17. In view of the above and for the reasons stated, the present appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 07.10.2013 passed by the High Court in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 8000 of 2013 is hereby quashed and set aside, and the FIR/investigation/criminal proceedings be proceeded against the accused, and they shall be dealt with, in accordance with law. Criminal Appeal No.350 of 2019

18. So far as Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP 10324/2018 is concerned, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences punishable under
Sections 323
,
,
&
of the IPC, solely on the ground that the accused and the complainant have settled the matter and in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji(supra), there may not be any possibility of recording a conviction against the accused. Offence under
Section 308
IPC is a non-compoundable offence. While committing the offence, the accused has used the fire arm. They are also absconding, and in the meantime, they have managed to enter into a compromise with the complainant. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, this appeal is also allowed, the impugned judgment and order dated 28.05.2018 passed by the High Court in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 19309/2018 is hereby quashed and set aside, and the FIR/investigation/criminal proceedings be proceeded against the accused, and they shall be dealt with, in accordance with law."

31.
In the case of
Arun Singh & Others Vs. State of U.P. Through Its Secretary
, reported in (2020) 3 SCC 736 which has heavily been relied upon by Mr. Pankaj Srivastava, learned A.G.A. for the State, the Apex Court has observed that in respect of offence against the society, it is the duty of court to punish the offender. On the other hand, there may be offences falling in the category, where the correctional objective of criminal law would have to be given more weightage than the theory of deterrent punishment. In such cases, court may be of the opinion that a settlement between the parties would lead to better relations between them and thus, may exercise power under
Section 482
Cr.P.C. for quashing the criminal proceedings. Offences under
Section 493
I.P.C. and under
Section 3
read with
Section 4
of the D.P. Act are in fact offences against society and not private in nature. Such offences have serious impact upon the society and continuance of trial of such cases is founded on the overriding effect of public interests in punishing persons for such serious offences. In such cases, settlement even if arrived at between the parties, the same cannot constitute a valid ground to quash the FIR or the charge-sheet.

32. This Court has an occasion to have a glance on the opinion and observations made by the Apex Court in paragraph nos. 54 to 60 in the famous case of
Gian Singh
(Supra), after referring various judgments of the Apex Court on the same issue involved herein also, which read as follows:

"54. In different situations, the inherent power may be exercised in different ways to achieve its ultimate objective. Formation of opinion by the High Court before it exercises inherent power under Section 482 on either of the twin objectives, (i) to prevent abuse of the process of any court or (ii) to secure the ends of justice, is a sine qua non.

55. In the very nature of its constitution, it is the judicial obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice or to prevent continuation of unnecessary judicial process. This is founded on the legal maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id sine qua res ipsa esse non potest. The full import of which is whenever anything is authorised, and especially if, as a matter of duty, required to be done by law, it is found impossible to do that thing unless something else not authorised in express terms be also done, may also be done, then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to do real, complete and substantial justice for which it exists. The power possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is of wide amplitude but requires exercise with great caution and circumspection.

56. It needs no emphasis that exercise of inherent power by the High Court would entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is neither permissible nor proper for the court to provide a straitjacket formula regulating the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482. No precise and inflexible guidelines can also be provided.

57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.

58. Where High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that dispute between the offender and victim has been settled although offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrong doing that seriously endangers and threatens well-being of society and it is not safe to leave the crime- doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without permission of the Court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc; or other offences of mental depravity under
IPC
or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like
Prevention of Corruption Act
or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between offender and victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to victim and the offender and victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or F.I.R if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard and fast category can be prescribed.

59. B.S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji alias Pappu do illustrate the principle that High Court may quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and Section 320 does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court under Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing criminal proceedings in B.S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji alias Pappu, this Court has compounded the non-compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so. There does exist the distinction between compounding of an offence under Section 320 and quashing of a criminal case by the High Court in exercise of inherent power under Section 482. The two powers are distinct and different although ultimate consequence may be same viz., acquittal of the accused or dismissal of indictment.

60. We find no incongruity in the above principle of law and the decisions of this Court in Simrikhia, Dharampal, Arun Shankar Shukla, Ishwar Singh, Rumi Dhar (Smt.). and Ashok Sadarangani. The principle propounded in Simrikhia that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override express bar provided in law is by now well settled. In Dharampal15, the Court observed the same thing that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilized for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. Similar statement of law is made in Arun Shankar Shukla. In Ishwar Singh, the accused was alleged to have committed an offence punishable under
Section 307
, IPC and with reference to Section 320 of the Code, it was held that the offence punishable under
Section 307
IPC was not compoundable offence and there was express bar in Section 320 that no offence shall be compounded if it is not compoundable under the Code. In Rumi Dhar (Smt.) although the accused had paid the entire due amount as per the settlement with the bank in the matter of recovery before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the accused was being proceeded with for commission of offences under
Section 120-B
/
/
/
/
of the IPC along with the bank officers who were being prosecuted under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of
Prevention of Corruption Act
. The Court refused to quash the charge against the accused by holding that the Court would not quash a case involving a crime against the society when a prima facie case has been made out against the accused for framing the charge. Ashok Sadarangani was again a case where the accused persons were charged of having committed offences under
Sections 120-B
,
,
,
and
, IPC and the allegations were that the accused secured the credit facilities by submitting forged property documents as collaterals and utilized such facilities in a dishonest and fraudulent manner by opening letters of credit in respect of foreign supplies of goods, without actually bringing any goods but inducing the bank to negotiate the letters of credit in favour of foreign suppliers and also by misusing the cash-credit facility. The Court was alive to the reference made in one of the present matters and also the decisions in B.S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant and Manoj Sharma and it was held that B.S. Joshi, and Nikhil Merchant dealt with different factual situation as the dispute involved had overtures of a civil dispute but the case under consideration in Ashok Sadarangani was more on the criminal intent than on a civil aspect. The decision in Ashok Sadarangani supports the view that the criminal matters involving overtures of a civil dispute stand on a different footing."

33. From perusal of the judgments of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh and High Court of Bombay, relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant in the cases of Vinay Kumar and Kiran Tulshiram Ingale (Supras), it is apparently clear that both the High Court has held that since
Section 320
Cr.P.C. does not affect the powers of the High Court under
Section 482
Cr.P.C., High Court can quash the criminal proceedings, FIR or complaint and even conviction in exercise of its inherent powers. Though, the aforesaid Division Bench's judgment of the Bombay High Court, in the case of Kiran Tulshiram Ingale (Supra), on the issue framed that in a prosecution which has culminated in a conviction, whether the power under
Section 482
Cr.P.C. ought to be exercised for quashing the prosecution/conviction altogether, (instead of maintaining it and considering the issue of modification of the sentence) upon a settlement between the convict and the victim/complainant?, has been accepted by the Three Judges' Full Bench of the Bombay High Court of Nagpur Bench in the case of Sau.
Maya Sanjay Khandare & Another Vs. State of Maharashtra, Police Station Officer
, vide judgment and order dated 5th January, 2021 passed in Criminal Application (Apl) No. 709 of 2020, reported in 2021 0 Supreme (Bom) 7. However, the Full Bench has also The relevant portion whereof reads as follows:

"We find no difficulty in recognizing such power as held in Kiran T. Ingale (supra), subject to the limitations as expressed while answering Question (A)."

34. This Court is of the opinion that from perusal of the judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of B.S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma (Supras), which are two
Judges' Division Bench and Gian Singh
(Supra), which is Three Judges' Full Bench, it is clear that in all the cases, the Apex Court has held that since
Section 320
Cr.P.C. does not limit or affect the powers under
Sections 482
Cr.P.C. or under
Articles 226
and
of the Constitutions of India, the High Court can quash the criminal proceedings/FIR/complaint.

In the case of
B.S. Joshi
(Supra), Two Judges' Bench of the Apex Court has specifically held that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A in
I.P.C
. was to prevent torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498-A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife or coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. A hyper technical view would be counterproductive and would act against the interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women for settling earlier.
This is not the objective of Chapter-XX-A of I.P.C.

35.
In the case of
Gian Singh
(Supra), the Three Judges' Full Bench of the Apex Court has specifically observed that where High Court quashes a criminal proceeding, having regard to the fact that dispute between the offender and victim has been settled, although offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrong doing that seriously endangers and threatens well-being of society and it is not safe to leave the crime- doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without permission of the Court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc; or other offences of mental depravity under
IPC
or offences of moral turpitude, under special statutes, like
Prevention of Corruption Act
or the offences committed by public servants, while working in that capacity, the settlement between offender and victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to victim and the offender and victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may, within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or F.I.R, if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard and fast category can be prescribed.

36.
In
Narinder Singh
(Supra), the two Judges' Bench of the Apex Court, while framing guidelines for quashing the proceedings in cases where the offenses involved are non-compoundable, has quashed the criminal proceedings of FIR after accepting the compromise entered into between the parties. It is pertinent to mention here that in the said case, Offence under
Section 307
I.P.C. was alleged against the accused for attacking the victim, who sustained injuries also, i.e. non-compoundable offence was involved.

37. Similarly, in the case of
State of Madhya Pradesh
(Supra), offence under Section 307 was alleged against the accused for attacking the victim, who sustained gun shot injuries. Seeing the nature of such heinous crime, which has harmful effect on the public and consist in wrong doing that seriously endangers and threatens well-being of society and it is not safe to leave the crime- doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, the Three Judges' of Apex Court has refused to quash the criminal proceedings on the basis of settlement/agreement/compromise entered into between the parties.

38.
In the case of
Arun Singh
(Supra), which has heavily been relied upon by the learned A.G.A. for the State, the Two Judges' Bench of the Apex Court has also refused to quash the criminal proceedings of a case, wherein offence punishable under
Sections 3
/
D.P. Act was involved, on the basis of a compromise/settlement/agreement entered into between the parties.

However, this judgment of two Judges' of the Apex Court shall not prevail over the law
laid down by
the Three Judges' Full Bench of the Apex Court in the case of
Gian Singh
(Supra).

39. Apart from the above, the facts of the case of
State of Madhya Pradesh
(Supra) is clearly distinguishable in the facts of the present case.

40. The law
laid down by
the three Judges Full Bench of the Apex Court in the case of
Gian Singh
(Supra) leaves the matter concluded and it remains res-integra no more, which has not been overruled by any court of law i.e. more number of judges of the Apex Court and as such, still holds the field.

41. The objections raised by learned AGA could not have been more convincingly answered than by the ratio of the above noted pronouncement by the Apex Court in
Gian Singh
's case.

42. This Court is of the considered opinion that the aim and object of law is not only to punish the culprit, but, the objective of the law is also to maintain peace, tranquility, prosperity and harmony in society as well as in the country. If there is a compromise between husband and wife and they are living to live together and to lead happy family life, then it will also be ideal in building our society. Marriage is a sacred ceremony of our society, the main objective of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions, resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their "young" days in chasing their "cases" in different courts.

43. In the facts of the present case, the marriage of the applicant no.1 was solemnized with opposite party no.2 but after some time of their marriage, the relations between the two became strained and incompatible resulting in initiation of present criminal proceedings by opposite party no.2 against the applicants, under
Sections 498-A
,
,
I.P.C., as also under
Sections 3
/
D.P. Act. Thereafter, the applicants have been convicted for an offence under
Sections 498-A
,
I.P.C. as also under
Section 4
D.P. Act by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 8, Ghaziabad vide order dated 02.12.2017. Against the said order of conviction, applicants filed an appeal in which they have been enlarged on bail. During the pendency of the appeal, after settling their all the disputes, they have arrived at a compromise and now they are living happily as husband and wife under the same roof, and enjoying their happy family life with their son. If this Court, in exercise of its inherent power under
Section 482
Cr.P.C., does not quash the criminal proceedings as well as the order of conviction, then the happy life of husband i.e. applicant no.1 and wife (opposite party no.2) will be ruined, especially the happy future life of son of applicant no.1 and opposite party no.2, who has not seen anything yet and whose golden future remains yet to commence and who will suffer a lot.

44. Thus, with regard to third issue, whether this Court can quash the criminal proceedings during the pendency of appeal filed against the judgment and order of conviction, this Court is in respectful agreement with the finding recorded by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Kiran Tulshiram Ingale (Supra), wherein it has been observed that firstly in this case the parties have compromised even after conviction and, the object of compromise is to live happily, peacefully, though separately after divorce. The Sessions Court has taken cognizance of this compromise and has reduced the conviction and altered it to a bond under the
Probation of Offenders Act
. Secondly, conviction by the first court is not end of the matter and appeal therefrom is continuation of proceeding and, if a revision is filed, in case conviction is maintained, altered, reduced, then the High Court in revision does have the power to pass effective orders in consonance with the judgment of the Supreme Court. Conviction does not attain finality if the appeal is filed and, if the revision is filed against conviction by appellate court, there also all issues become open before the High Court. On the basis of said observations, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has held that the criminal proceedings against the petitioner so also conviction by both the Courts below hereby stood quashed, in view of the mutual understanding, divorce and compromise between the husband and wife.
The Three Judges' Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of
Maya Sanjay Khandare
(Supra), has affirmed
the said decision
of the Division Bench by observing that the ratio of the decision in Kiran T. Ingale (supra) has to be understood in the context that inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code can be exercised for quashing criminal proceedings at any stage especially those arising out of a matrimonial disputes. (Emphasis added)

45. Accordingly, while relying upon the law laid down by the Three Judges' Full Bench of the Apex Court in the case of
Gian Singh
(Supra) and the Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Kiran Tulshiram Ingale (Supra) and considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court, in exercise of its inherent power under
Section 482
Cr.P.C., allows the present application and quashes the criminal case arising out of Case Crime No. 93/2012, under
Sections 498-A
,
,
I.P.C. as also under
Sections 3
/
D.P. Act, Police Thana, District Ghaziabad, on the basis of compromise so entered into between the parties.

46. Consequently, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 2nd December, 2017 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 8, Ghaziabad, convicting the applicants under
Sections 323
,
498-A
I.P.C. as also under
Section 4
D.P. Act, is set aside. The appeal preferred by the accused-applicants against the aforesaid judgment and order is rendered infructuous and shall be declared so by the appellate Court.

47. There shall be no order as to costs.

48. It is also clarified that the joint affidavit filed on behalf of the applicants and opposite party no.2 has been misplaced during the course of dictation. Therefore, a copy of the same has been called for from the learned counsel for the applicants and the same has also been got verified from the learned counsel for opposite party no.2 and the learned A.G.A. for the State to be kept on record. The same shall be treated as original.

Date:-23.02.2021 (M.R. Chauhan, J.)

Sushil/-