Allahabad High Court

Vipin Kumar Jaiswal & Anr. vs State Of U.P. & Anr. on 15 October, 2020

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH

Court No. - 8

Case :- U/S 482/378/407 No. - 2137 of 2020

Applicant :- Vipin Kumar Jaiswal & Anr.

Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. & Anr.

Counsel for Applicant :- Naved Mumtaz Ali,Sandeep Yadav

Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Pawan Bhaskar

Hon'ble Virendra Kumar-II,J.

1. Heard Shri Naved Mumtaz Ali, learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri Pawan Bhaskar, learned counsel for complainant and learned A.G.A. participated through video conferencing.

2. Both the parties have compromised the matter and filed compromise application in compliance of the order dated 30.09.2020. The Senior Registrar of this Court has verified compromise application and submitted his report on 08.10.2020.

3. The present petition has been instituted for quashing the summoning order dated 27.06.2014 passed by the Court of Addition Civil Judge (J.D.), District- Pratapgarh in Crime No. 20 of 2014 after taking cognizance in Case No. 764 of 2019 (
State Vs. Vipin Jaiswal & another
) for offences punishable under
Sections 323
,
,
,
,
IPC, Police Station Kahdaur, District Pratapgarh.

4. As per prosecution version, the complainant, Sripal Yadav, Lekhpal went for measurement of land of Shailendra Kumar in Village Madafarpur. Brother of Shailendra Kumar and his sons Vipin Kumar Jaiswal and Ankit Jaiswal came at motorcycle agency and assaulted the victim, abused him and threatened him for his life. They also tried to tear government documents, which was in his possession. Lekhpal Shiv Shankar Singh and Ramjas Sarodh witnessed this incident and saved the victim from the accused persons.

5. The Investigating Officer after conducting investigation found involvement of Vipin Kumar Jaiswal and Ankit Jaiswal only.

6. Now, victim Sripal Yadav has compromised the matter with the petitioners/accused persons.

7. On the point of compromise in criminal case, regarding non bailable offences, the following exposition of law is relevant for invoking powers under
Section 482
Cr.P.C.:-

"A Full Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Parbatbhai Aahir Vs. State of Gujarat
, (2017) 9 SCC 641 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 1 : 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1189 at page 649 in following paras has held as under:

11.
Section 482
is prefaced with an overriding provision. The statute saves the inherent power of the High Court, as a superior court, to make such orders as are necessary (i) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court; or (ii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
In
Gian Singh [Gian Singh v. State of Punjab
, (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1188 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 988] a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court adverted to the body of precedent on the subject and laid down guiding principles which the High Court should consider in determining as to whether to quash an FIR or complaint in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction. The considerations which must weigh with the High Court are: (SCC pp. 342-43, para 61)

"61. ... the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under
Section 320
of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the
Prevention of Corruption Act
or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."

12.
In
Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab
, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54], Dr Justice A.K. Sikri, speaking for a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court observed that in respect of offences against society, it is the duty of the State to punish the offender. In consequence, deterrence provides a rationale for punishing the offender. Hence, even when there is a settlement, the view of the offender and victim will not prevail since it is in the interest of society that the offender should be punished to deter others from committing a similar crime. On the other hand, there may be offences falling in the category where the correctional objective of criminal law would have to be given more weightage than the theory of deterrence. In such a case, the court may be of the opinion that a settlement between the parties would lead to better relations between them and would resolve a festering private dispute. The court observed that the timing of a settlement is of significance in determining whether the jurisdiction under Section 482 should be exercised: (SCC p. 484, para 29.7)

"29.7. ... Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits...."

This Court held, while dealing with an offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code that the following circumstances had weighed with it in quashing the first information report: (SCC p. 485, para 33)

"33. We have gone through the FIR as well which was recorded on the basis of statement of the complainant/victim. It gives an indication that the complainant was attacked allegedly by the accused persons because of some previous dispute between the parties, though nature of dispute, etc. is not stated in detail. However, a very pertinent statement appears on record viz. "respectable persons have been trying for a compromise uptil now, which could not be finalised". This becomes an important aspect. It appears that there have been some disputes which led to the aforesaid purported attack by the accused on the complainant. In this context when we find that the elders of the village, including Sarpanch, intervened in the matter and the parties have not only buried their hatchet but have decided to live peacefully in future, this becomes an important consideration. The evidence is yet to be led in the Court. It has not even started. In view of compromise between parties, there is a minimal chance of the witnesses coming forward in support of the prosecution case. Even though nature of injuries can still be established by producing the doctor as witness who conducted medical examination, it may become difficult to prove as to who caused these injuries. The chances of conviction, therefore, appear to be remote. It would, therefore, be unnecessary to drag these proceedings. ..."

13.
In
State of Maharashtra v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi [State of Maharashtra
v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, (2014) 15 SCC 29 : (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 563] , a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court explained the earlier decisions and the principles which must govern in deciding whether a criminal proceeding involving a non-compoundable offence should be quashed. In that case, the respondents were alleged to have obtained letters of credit from a bank in favour of fictitious entities. The charge-sheet involved the offences under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code. Bogus beneficiary companies were alleged to have got them discounted by attaching fabricated bills. Mr Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) emphasised that the case involved an allegation of forgery; hence the Court was not dealing with a simple case where "the accused had borrowed money from a bank, to divert it elsewhere". The Court held that the manner in which letters of credit were issued and funds were siphoned off had a foundation in criminal law: (SCC p. 42, para 26)

"26. ... availing of money from a nationalised bank in the manner, as alleged by the investigating agency, vividly exposits fiscal impurity and, in a way, financial fraud. The modus operandi as narrated in the charge-sheet cannot be put in the compartment of an individual or personal wrong. It is a social wrong and it has immense societal impact. It is an accepted principle of handling of finance that whenever there is manipulation and cleverly conceived contrivance to avail of these kind of benefits it cannot be regarded as a case having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil character. The ultimate victim is the collective. It creates a hazard in the financial interest of the society. The gravity of the offence creates a dent in the economic spine of the nation."

The judgment of the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings was hence set aside by this Court.

14. The same principle was followed in
CBI v. Maninder Singh [CBI
v.Maninder Singh, (2016) 1 SCC 389 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 292] by a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court. In that case, the High Court had, in the exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 quashed proceedings under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code. While allowing the appeal filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation Mr Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed that the case involved allegations of forgery of documents to embezzle the funds of the bank. In such a situation, the fact that the dispute had been settled with the bank would not justify a recourse to the power under Section 482: (SCC p. 394, para 17)

"17. ... In economic offences the Court must not only keep in view that money has been paid to the bank which has been defrauded but also the society at large. It is not a case of simple assault or a theft of a trivial amount; but the offence with which we are concerned was well planned and was committed with a deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of consequence to the society at large. To quash the proceeding merely on the ground that the accused has settled the amount with the bank would be a misplaced sympathy. If the prosecution against the economic offenders are not allowed to continue, the entire community is aggrieved."

15.
In a subsequent decision in
State of T.N. v. R. Vasanthi Stanley [State of T.N.
v. R. Vasanthi Stanley, (2016) 1 SCC 376 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 282] , the Court rejected the submission that the first respondent was a woman "who was following the command of her husband" and had signed certain documents without being aware of the nature of the fraud which was being perpetrated on the bank. Rejecting the submission, this Court held that: (SCC p. 387, paras 14-15)

"14. ... Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent is neither to be considered nor accepted in economic offences. The submission assiduously presented on gender leaves us unimpressed. An offence under the criminal law is an offence and it does not depend upon the gender of an accused. True it is, there are certain provisions in
CrPC
relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 437, etc. therein but that altogether pertains to a different sphere. A person committing a murder or getting involved in a financial scam or forgery of documents, cannot claim discharge or acquittal on the ground of her gender as that is neither constitutionally nor statutorily a valid argument. The offence is gender neutral in this case. We say no more on this score.

15. ... A grave criminal offence or serious economic offence or for that matter the offence that has the potentiality to create a dent in the financial health of the institutions, is not to be quashed on the ground that there is delay in trial or the principle that when the matter has been settled it should be quashed to avoid the load on the system. ..."

16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:

16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.

16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of
Section 320
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.

16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.

16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.

16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.

16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.

16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.

16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.

In the case of
Arun Singh v. State of U.P.
, (2020) 3 SCC 736 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 217 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 164 at page 740 Division bench of Hon'ble Apex court In para 13 reterited again the aforementioned principal :-

And has held as follows:-

11. Though the offences in question are non-compoundable but the power of the High Court under
Section 482
CrPC of the Court to quash the proceedings in such offences is well recognised by various decisions of this Court and the issue is no longer res integra. Reference may be made to the observations of the three-Judge Bench of this Court in
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab [Gian Singh
v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1188 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 988] : (SCC p. 340, para 57)

"57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of the offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceeding by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceedings or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment."

12.
B.S. Joshi [B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana
, (2003) 4 SCC 675 : 2003
SCC (Cri) 848] ,Nikhil Merchant [Nikhil Merchant v. CBI
, (2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] ,Manoj Sharma [Manoj Sharma v. State, (2008) 16 SCC 1 : (
2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] andShiji [Shiji v. Radhika
, (2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101] to illustrate the principle that the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and Section 320 does not limit or effect the powers of the High Court under Section 482.

Can it be said that by quashing criminal proceedings in
B.S. Joshi [B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana
, (2003) 4 SCC 675 : 2003
SCC (Cri) 848], Nikhil Merchant [Nikhil Merchant v. CBI
, (2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858], Manoj Sharma [Manoj Sharma v. State, (2008) 16 SCC 1 : (
2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and Shiji [Shiji v. Radhika
, (2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101] this Court has compounded the non-compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so. There does exist the distinction between compounding of an offence under Section 320 and quashing of a criminal case by a High Court in exercise of inherent power under Section 482. The two powers are distinct and different although the ultimate consequence may be the same viz. acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the indictment.

14.
In another decision in
Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Narinder Singh
v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] it has been observed that in respect of offence against the society it is the duty to punish the offender. Hence, even where there is a settlement between the offender and victim the same shall not prevail since it is in interests of the society that offender should be punished which acts as deterrent for others from committing similar crime. On the other hand, there may be offences falling in the category where the correctional objective of criminal law would have to be given more weightage than the theory of deterrent punishment.
In such cases, the court may be of the opinion that a settlement between the parties would lead to better relations between them and would resolve a festering private dispute and thus may exercise power under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the proceedings or the complaint or the FIR as the case may be.

15. Bearing in mind the above principles which have been laid down, we are of the view that offences for which the appellants have been charged are in fact offences against society and not private in nature. Such offences have serious impact upon society and continuance of trial of such cases is founded on the overriding effect of public interests in punishing persons for such serious offences. It is neither an offence arising out of commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or such similar transactions or has any element of civil dispute thus it stands on a distinct footing. In such cases, settlement even if arrived at between the complainant and the accused, the same cannot constitute a valid ground to quash the FIR or the charge-sheet.

The Three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab
, (2012) 10 SCC 303 has held as under:

"57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.

58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under
IPC
or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the
Prevention of Corruption Act
or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.

59.B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 848] , Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] ,Manoj Sharma[(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and Shiji [(2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101] do illustrate the principle that the High Court may quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and Section 320 does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court under Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing criminal proceedings in B.S. Joshi[(2003) 4 SCC 675 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 848] , Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] , Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and Shiji [(2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101] this Court has compounded the non-compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so. There does exist the distinction between compounding of an offence under Section 320 and quashing of a criminal case by the High Court in exercise of inherent power under Section 482. The two powers are distinct and different although the ultimate consequence may be the same viz. acquittal of the accused or dismissal of indictment.

60. We find no incongruity in the above principle of law and the decisions of this Court in Simrikhia [(1990) 2 SCC 437 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 327] , Dharampal [(1993) 1 SCC 435 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 333 : 1993 Cri LJ 1049] , Arun Shankar Shukla [(1999) 6 SCC 146 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076 : AIR 1999 SC 2554] , Ishwar Singh [(2008) 15 SCC 667 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1153] , Rumi Dhar [(2009) 6 SCC 364 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1074] and Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] . The principle propounded in Simrikhia [(1990) 2 SCC 437 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 327] that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override express bar provided in law is by now well settled. In Dharampal [(1993) 1 SCC 435 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 333 : 1993 Cri LJ 1049] the Court observed the same thing that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. Similar statement of law is made in Arun Shankar Shukla [(1999) 6 SCC 146 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076 : AIR 1999 SC 2554] . In Ishwar Singh [(2008) 15 SCC 667 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1153] the accused was alleged to have committed an offence punishable under
Section 307
IPC and with reference to Section 320 of the Code, it was held that the offence punishable under
Section 307
IPC was not compoundable offence and there was express bar in Section 320 that no offence shall be compounded if it is not compoundable under the Code. In Rumi Dhar [(2009) 6 SCC 364 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1074] although the accused had paid the entire due amount as per the settlement with the bank in the matter of recovery before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the accused was being proceeded with for the commission of the offences under
Sections 120-B
/
/
/
/
IPC along with the bank officers who were being prosecuted under
Section 13(2)
read with 13(1)(d) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act
. The Court refused to quash the charge against the accused by holding that the Court would not quash a case involving a crime against the society when a prima facie case has been made out against the accused for framing the charge. Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] was again a case where the accused persons were charged of having committed the offences under
Sections 120-B
,
,
,
and
IPC and the allegations were that the accused secured the credit facilities by submitting forged property documents as collaterals and utilised such facilities in a dishonest and fraudulent manner by opening letters of credit in respect of foreign supplies of goods, without actually bringing any goods but inducing the bank to negotiate the letters of credit in favour of foreign suppliers and also by misusing the cash-credit facility. The Court was alive to the reference made in one of the present matters and also the decisions in B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 848] , Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] and Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] and it was held that B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 848] andNikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] dealt with different factual situation as the dispute involved had overtures of a civil dispute but the case under consideration in Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] was more on the criminal intent than on a civil aspect. The decision in Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] supports the view that the criminal matters involving overtures of a civil dispute stand on a different footing.

61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the
Prevention of Corruption Act
or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."

62. In view of the above, it cannot be said that B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 848] , Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] and Manoj Sharma[(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 145] were not correctly decided. We answer the reference accordingly. Let these matters be now listed before the Bench(es) concerned.

In the case of
Anita Maria Dias Vs. State of Maharashtra
, reported in (2018) 3 SCC 290, a Division Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:

"7. In a case like this, where the proceedings are still at initial and nascent stage, the High Court should have exercised its discretion in quashing the proceedings. Law in this behalf is well settled by a catena of judgments of this Court including Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat [Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 1] and Gian Singh v. State of Punjab[Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1188 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 988].
We may also quote the following passage from
Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Narinder Singh
v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] : (SCC pp. 482-84, para 29)

"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the
Prevention of Corruption Act
or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under
Section 307
IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of
Section 307
IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of
Section 307
IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under
Section 307
IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under
Section 307
IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under
Section 307
IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime."

8. As a result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed and proceedings arising out of FIR bearing Crime No. 267 of 2012 lodged with Chatushrungi Police Station, Pune, Maharashtra are hereby quashed."

In the case of "
State of M.P. v. Kalyan Singh
, (2019) 4 SCC 268 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 57 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 7 at page 269" a Division Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:

5. It is required to be noted that the original accused was facing the criminal proceedings under Sections 307, 294 read with
Section 34
IPC. It is not in dispute that as per
Section 320
CrPC offences under Sections 307, 294 read with
Section 34
IPC are non-compoundable. It is also required to be noted that the allegations in the complaint for the offences under Sections 307, 294 read with
Section 34
IPC are, as such, very serious. It is alleged that the accused fired twice on the complainant by a countrymade pistol. From the material on record, it appears that one of the accused persons was reported to be a hardcore criminal having criminal antecedents. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the accused was facing the criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 307, 294 read with
Section 34
IPC and that the offences under these sections are non-compoundable offences and, looking to the serious allegations against the accused, we are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a grave error in quashing the criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 307, 294 read with
Section 34
IPC solely on the ground that the original complainant and the accused have settled the dispute.

6. At this stage, the decision of this Court in Gulab Das v. State of M.P. [Gulab Das v.State of M.P., (2011) 10 SCC 765 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 421] is required to be referred to. In the said decision, this Court has specifically observed and held that, despite any settlement between the complainant on the one hand and the accused on the other, the criminal proceedings for the offences under
Section 307
IPC cannot be quashed, as the offence under Section 307 is a non-compoundable offence. Under the circumstance, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings against the original accused for the offences under Sections 307, 294 read with
Section 34
IPC cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside.

7. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court in
Kalyan Singh v. State of M.P. [Kalyan Singh
v. State of M.P., MCRC No. 6075 of 2013, decided on 29-7-2013 (MP)] is hereby quashed and set aside. Consequently, the criminal proceedings being Crime No. 23 of 2013 under Sections 307, 294 read with
Section 34
IPC registered at Police Station Maharajpur, District Gwalior be proceeded further in accordance with law and on its own merits.

In the case of "
Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab
, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54 " a Division Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:

"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the
Prevention of Corruption Act
or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under
Section 307
IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of
Section 307
IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of
Section 307
IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under
Section 307
IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under
Section 307
IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under
Section 307
IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime."

A Single judge of High Court Of Punjab And Haryana in the case of "
Yadwinder Singh @ Yada Vs. State of Punjab & Others
" Criminal Miscelleanous No. 43607 of 2015, 15606 of 2016 and 981 of 2018 | decided on 14-02-2018, in following paras held as under:-

On 28.9.2015, a compromise was effected between the parties, which was duly signed by the complainant and injured on one side and also by father of the petitioner, namely, Baldev Singh and witnesses, namely, Gurcharan Singh, Hakumat Rai and Jaspal Singh. Complainant Kulwant Kaur and injured Satnam Singh also executed their affidavits dated 29.9.2015 in token of the compromise.

Petitioner was declared to be proclaimed offender on 27.3.2014 and thereafter, arrested in the present case. In respect of status of the petitioner being proclaimed offender, separate FIR bearing No.285 dated 27.10.2014 under
Section 174-A
IPC at Police Station Patti District Taran Taran came to be registered. Petitioner was attributed a lalkara, whereas, co- accused Rasal Singh opened fire at the husband of the complainant. Now the parties have compromised.

The most common case where inherent jurisdiction is generally exercised is where criminal proceedings are required to be quashed because they are initiated illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction. Most of the cases set out herein above fall in this category. It must be remembered that the inherent power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code or any other enactment for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. This power should not be exercised against an express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the
Criminal Procedure Code
. This power cannot be exercised as against an express bar in some other enactment."

In exercise of inherent powers under
Section 482
Cr.P.C., criminal proceedings are not to be quashed where the offence is heinous in nature. Proceedings can only be quashed where the issue is overwhelmingly and predominantly of civil profile arising out of commercial, financial, mercantile and civil or matrimonial nature. In a way dispute may involve wrong which is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have redressed the same by entering into compromise.

In
Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and another
2012(4) RCR (Crl.) 543, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered necessary imports of all previous precedents and observed in the following manner:-

"57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute.

Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like
Prevention of Corruption Act
or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."

The quashing of criminal proceedings in an offence under
Section 307
IPC came up for detailed discussion before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Narinder Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and another
, 2014(2) RCR (Crl.) 482. After due consideration the Hon'ble Apex Court formalised the issue of compounding of offences under
Section 307
IPC to say that it is an offence against society and is non-compoundable, but in certain cases the High Court would be guided to give adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties in exercise of inherent powers under
Section 482
Cr.P.C. Following principles were
laid down in
para 31 of the judgment:-

"31. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

(I) Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even inthose cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

(II) When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

(III) Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the
Prevention of Corruption Act
or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

(IV) On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

(V) While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

(VI) Offences under
Section 307
IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of
Section 307
IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation ofSection 307
IPC
is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under
Section 307
IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

(VII) While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under
Section 307
IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime."

8. On the basis of the aforesaid exposition of law, I have examined the present matter that the victim/complainant, Sripal Yadav went for measurement of land of Shailendra Kumar, where the petitioners assaulted and abused him at the place of occurrence on 23.02.2014 at 03.00 pm in Village Madafarpur. Therefore, the offences committed by the petitioners were in nature of private dispute. They are not affecting the public at large. In compromise application, the complainant, Sripal Yadav has accepted that he lodged FIR by name of the petitioners on the basis of the fact that the persons gathered on the place of occurrence, apprised him about the name of the petitioners. The petitioners were not known to him. The petitioners could not torn the official documents.

9. On the basis of the aforesaid discussions and expositions of law quoted above, entire proceedings, summoning order dated 27.06.2014 and charge sheet No.23 of 2014 are hereby quashed.

10. The petition is accordingly allowed.

Order Date :- 15.10.2020

SK/-