Uttarakhand High Court

Pan Singh Rana vs State Of Uttarakhand & Another on 28 September, 2018

Author:
Sharad Kumar Sharma

Bench:
Sharad Kumar Sharma

IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL

Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 1538 of 2018
(under
Section 482
of Cr.P.C.)
With
Compounding application No. 10867 of 2018

Pan Singh Rana ...Applicant

Vs.

State of Uttarakhand & another ...Respondents

Mr. Sandeep Kothari, Advocate for the applicant.

Mr. V.K. Gemini, Deputy Advocate General assisted by Mr. Lalit Miglani, Brief Holder for
the State of Uttarakhand/respondent no. 1.

Mr. Ravi Babulkar, Advocate for respondent no. 2.

Dated: 28th September, 2018

1. A vexed question which arises for consideration before this
Court is with regard to the extent of exercising the powers by this Court
under
Section 482
of the Cr.P.C. so far it relates to the composition of
offences punishable under
Section 307
I.P.C. as well as the offences
under
Sections 147
,
,
,
,
and
of Indian Penal Code,
1860 (henceforth to be called as '
I.P.C
.') Though they have been
answered by the various judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court
from both the prospective but, they have to be considered together in
harmony to arrive at a rationale balance in its applicability. To elucidate
its applicability and to the manner, in which, it has to be applied
depending upon the circumstances of the each case and the
circumstances and factors leading to the commission of offence sought
to be compounded. The present C482 Application would be dealing
with the offences under
Sections 307
and
I.P.C. The factual
backdrop of this particular case is as under :

2. Initially, an F.I.R. was registered for offences under

Sections 285
and
I.P.C., read with under
Section 27
and
u/s 30
of
the Arms Act. During the course of investigation, it was found by the
Investigating Officer that the offence under
Section 285
I.P.C. as alleged
in F.I.R. is not made out and
Section 307
I.P.C. was added to it. Thus,
ultimately charge sheet was submitted for the offences under
Sections
and
I.P.C. This C482 Application was called for from the
Registry, on a mention being made by the counsel for the parties. The
applicant and respondent No. 2 are present in person and they have been
duly identified by their respective counsel. The offences which are being
sought to be compounded in the present C482 Application emanates
from Case Crime No. 111/2016, registered under
Sections 307
&
of
I.P.C. at Police Station Raipur, District Dehradun, which was ultimately
on submission of the charge sheet, being Charge Sheet No. 69A/16
dated 03.09.2016, was registered as Criminal Case No. 3577/2016
'State
vs. Pan Singh Rana
', on which, after submission of charge-sheet, the
summoning order was issued on 15.09.2016. Consequently, the present
C482 Application has been preferred questioning the summoning order
dated 15.09.2016, Charge-Sheet No. 69A/16 dated 03.09.2016 as well as
the entire criminal proceedings, pending before IInd Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate. The applicant has sought the following relief :

"It is, therefore, Most Respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble
Court may graciously be pleased to quash / set-aside charge-sheet
dated 29.08.2016 as well as the summoning order dated
05.09.2016 passed by the learned IInd Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Dehradun in Criminal Case No. 3577 / 2016 (
State
Vs. Pan Singh Rana
) (Case Crime No. 111/2016), under
Sections
,
of I.P.C. registered at Police Station - Raipur, District -
Dehradun and further to quash the entire proceedings of the
aforesaid Criminal Case No. 3577 / 2016 (
State Vs. Pan Singh
Rana
) (Case Crime No.111/2016), under
sections 307
,
of
I.P.C. registered at Police Station - Raipur, District-Dehradun
pending in the court of learned IInd Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Dehradun, and / or to pass such other and further
order which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the
facts and circumstances of the case."

3. The Compounding Application, which has been preferred
jointly by the parties to the present 482 Application by invoking
Section
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicants submit that the
parties to the C-482 Application had settled their dispute outside the
Court and the complainant/respondent no. 2, herein, who is present apart
from filing affidavit has categorically stated before this Court that he
does not want to prosecute the applicant any further for the offences
under
Sections 307
and
of I.P.C. as has been registered against the
present applicant by way of criminal case.

4. The argument of the applicant's counsel is that though
there had been an accidental fire without there being any deliberate and
motivated intention to harm or cause injury, and rather in fact no injury
was caused on respondent no. 2 and, as such, as a matter of fact, there
are no ingredients available which are required for prosecution under

Section 307
of I.P.C., which could be said to have been made out. In the
Compounding Application, particularly in paragraph-3, it has been
submitted by complainant/respondent no. 2 that he does not want to
further prosecute the applicant and a written compromise has been
entered into between the parties on 09.09.2018, which is on record duly
signed by both the parties, where the terms of the compromise has been
settled between them. The relevant part of settlement is quoted
hereunder:

"le>kSrkukek
Jh fd"ku flag pkSgku iq= Jh ch0,l0 pkSgku mi vkcdkjh fujh{kd
eq[;ky; nsgjknwu gky irk ch&307 f}rh;ry lgL=/kkjk jslhMsUlh lgL=/kkjk
jksM] nsgjknwuA

-----------iz

-----------izFkei{k
,oa
Jh iku flag jk.kk iq= Jh vkye flag jk.kk vkcdkjh flikgh Mk.Mk
y[kkS.M lSDVj izFke] nsgjknwu gky irk& 131 lkSa/kksokyh iks-vks- d.Mksyh ftyk
nsgjknwu

-------------f}rh;i{k

-------------f}rh;i{k
fofnr gks fd izFkei{k ,oa f}rh;i{k ,d gh foHkkx esa dk;Zjr gSAa
;g fd fnukad 23-07-2016 dks i{kdkjksa dh vkil esa dgklquh gks xbZ Fkh
ftlds pyrs izFkei{k us xyrQgeh@vkos"ko"k eqdnek vijk/k la[;k&111@16
Fkkuk jk;iqj esa iathd`r djk fn;k Fkk ftldk okn ekuuh; U;k;ky; eq[;
U;kf;d eSftLVªsV nsgjknwu ds U;k;ky; esa fopkjk/khu gSA mijksDr ?kVuk fnukad
23-07-2016 ds laca/k esa f}rh;i{k }kjk Hkh xyrQgeh@vkos"ko"k ,d izFke lwpuk
fjiksVZ eqdnek vijk/k la[;k&116@17 Fkkuk jk;iqj esa iathd`r djk j[kh gSA
;g fd orZeku esa vkilh tku igpku@fe=x.kksa }kjk i{kdkjksa ds e/;
vkilh le>kSrk djk fn;k gS rFkk leLr xyrQgfe;ka nwj djk nh xbZ gSaA
orZeku esa i{kdkjksa ds e/; ,d nwljs ds izfr dksbZ fxyk f"kdok ugha jg x;k gSA
;g fd vc nksuksa i{kdkj gq, le>kSrs ds Øe esa vius vius okn ij dksbZ
cy ugha nsuk pkgrs gSa rFkk mls lekIr djkuk pkgrs gSa o eqdneksa dh lekfIr gsrq
tks Hkh vko";d dk;Zokgh@izkFkZuki=@"kiFki=@O;fDrxr mifLFkfr tgka
Hkh@ftl Hkh U;k;ky; esa vko";d gksxh ogka mifLFkr gksus ds fy, ikcUn gS vkSj
jgsaxsA"

5. Considering the fact that they belong to the same
Department and the fact that it was an accidental fire at spur of moment
due to heated reaction in fact there was no intention as such to inflict
injury on respondent no. 2, and also considering the fact that both the
parties unanimously agree that the C482 Application may be allowed.

6. Mr. Lalit Miglani, Brief Holder for the State, vehemently
opposes the application for compounding on the ground that the offence
under
Section 307
of the I.P.C. is not such an offence which could be
compounded under
Section 320
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As
it is a serious offence having grave implications and social impact and if
it is permitted to be compounded, it will give a wrong message to
society and may result in augmenting the crime.

7. Principally, there is no dispute with regard to the legal
preposition, which has been argued by Mr. Lalit Miglani, learned Brief
Holder for the State but, this Court cannot be oblivious of the fact that
when there happens to be a joint affidavit filed by the parties, wherein,
the complainant himself has submitted that he does not want to
prosecute the applicant and, therefore, even then, if the parties to the
dispute are forced to face the trial apart from the fact that it will cause
uncalled hardship and embarrassment, it will not attain any fruitful
conclusion. Besides increasing the apathy on the litigating parties
unnecessary imposing a litigation on them, involving fruitless
investment of time and money on the parties resulting to futility. This
Court is of the view that this Court while exercising its powers under

Section 482
of Cr.P.C., it can compound the offences by imposing
conditions as
laid down by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in various
judgments, even those which are not compoundable under
Section 320

Cr.P.C. The rationale behind the above philosophy is as under :

8. Principally, for the purposes of scrutinizing the ambit of
power of the Courts seized with the jurisdiction under
Section 482

Cr.P.C. or under
Articles 226

/ 227
of the Constitution of India, the
prime consideration is that as to how the equitable balance in exercise of
said powers could be struck down for the purposes of exercising the
powers under
Section 320
Cr.P.C. which deals with the composition of
offences. The classification which has been held out by the Hon'ble
Apex Court is that a distinction has to be drawn between the ground of
settlement of disputes by the offenders amongst themselves in the terms
acceptable by them as compared to the ambit and extent of the power,
which has been given to the Court under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C.

9. As a matter of fact, on its precise reading, both the
situations, i.e. when a criminal offence is being sought to be settled
based on the compromise or where the criminal offences are being
sought to be settled by the invocation of
Section 320
Cr.P.C., they are
definitely not interchangeable with one another because both are
materially different as they deal with different parameters and grounds,
to be considered, as in the first situation, the Court has to exercise its
inherent power under C-482 or under
Articles 226
and
of
Constitution of India which cannot be circumscribed and limited by the
stipulations contained under
Section 320
of the Cr.P.C. which deals with
second concept.
Code of Criminal Procedure
, so far as it relates to the
provisions contained under
Section 320
Cr.P.C., it could very well be
said, it only guides the consideration to be borne in mind by the Courts
when the Court exercises a power for composition of an offence in an
absence of settlement under
Section 320
Cr.P.C.. In such a situation,
where the Court exercise the power, obviously, the implication of Sub-
section (2) of Section 320 and Sub-section (9) of
Section 320
of the
Cr.P.C. has to be taken into consideration which limits the scope of
exercise of powers by the Courts. But, a situation where the criminal
disputes, irrespective of its nature of offences, its seriousness is being
settled by the terms arrives at, the provisions contained under
Section
of the Cr.P.C. is not to be strictly made applicable to athwart the
settlement between the parties. Only rider which has been attached
thereto which requires caution when the Courts are settling the disputes
in relation to the offences which are of serious in nature, for example

Sections 302
,
,
and
I.P.C., and such other sexual offences,
the Court's will have to consider to attract its inherent power depending
upon the material and the nature of the offences which is under
consideration to be settled in terms of the compromise. There cannot be
any strait jacketed formula for deciding the criminal controversy
between the parties based on the settlement as each settlement has its
own facts and nature of offence and the circumstances in which it has
been committed which will call upon the court to consider pondering on
the issue of exercising inherent powers of compounding the offence, and
the controversy which is to be decided is based on the attraction of

Section 320
Cr.P.C., is altogether different ingredients.

10. The basic ratio and the extent of power which the
constitutional Courts have, they are much distinct to the powers which
could be exercised by the criminal Courts for the purpose of
compounding the offences. The inherent powers of the Courts,
particularly, when seized with the powers under
Section 482
Cr.P.C. and

Articles 226

/ 227
of the Constitution of India, it has got a wide
plentitude and the same cannot be circumscribed or limited to be
exercised so as to meet the ends of justice instead of strictly considering
the inherent powers in relation to the powers under
Section 320
Cr.P.C.
What is necessary to be considered by the Constitutional Courts, while
deciding the matter based on the settlement, which is distinct to the
composition of scope under
Section 320
Cr.P.C. These are the
following wider parameters for compounding offences based on the
settlement :

1. Whether such a settlement which has been arrived at between
the parties for settling the criminal offence would secure the
ends of justice.

2. As to whether it would prevent the abuse of process of Court
unnecessarily forcing the litigants who has otherwise settled
the disputes to undergo the criminal trial.

3. It has to consider its social impact and its affect on the society
in an event if offence is compounded.

Hence, the prime consideration for the Court is not only the
nature of offence which is being sought to be settled but it also depends
upon the considerations to be made by the Court having regard to the
nature of dispute between the offender and the victim and the terms of
its settlement, as to whether it is not ill motivated. The ratio which has
also been laid down that the Constitutional Courts while exercising the
inherent powers would also have to take into consideration that whether
by adopting a strict principle for declining to settle the criminal disputes
between the offender and victim on the premise of the offence being of
heinous nature, will it ultimately on the conclusion of the trial would
have an effective adjudication in a situation where the victim has settled
the dispute with the offenders does not derive his prosecution. Thus, the
basic intention for settling the heinous offences, which includes the
offences under
Sections 307
,
and
I.P.C., it should not be forced
upon to be continued by denial of settlement on a technical ground of
implications of Sub-section (9) of Section 320 and Sub-section (2) of

Section 320
of the Cr.P.C. so that ultimately on the culmination of the
proceedings of the trial, it may not result to be a proceeding of futility.
11. There is another aspect to be taken care of, as already
observed, the High Courts when it exercises the power under Section C-
Cr.P.C
. and under
Articles 226

/ 227
of the Constitution of India,
the High Courts have to apply the rationale approach which is not to be
restricted in a concise manner because apart from the fact that it has to
ensure that it meets the ends of justice, rather also that High Court has to
ensure that such concised interpretation does not lead to the abuse of
process. The Court (in particular High Court) will also have to consider
that if such type of settlement voluntarily entered between the parties,
expressing their unrestricted opinion in terms of the compromise settled
down, it has to consider that if the comprise is sacredly entered into,
whether it would result into an establishment of harmony and
understanding between the offenders and the victim. The only
stipulation which has to be borne in mind while the High Court either
under Section 482 Cr.P.C., or under Article 226 and 227 of Constitution
of India decides a criminal dispute, apart from the fact that it has not be
influenced by the restriction of Section 320 Cr.P.C. It would depend
upon the nature of offence, the terms of settlement, wider object it aims
to achieve and the period at which the settlement is arrived at.

12. The aforesaid ratio as discussed, came up for consideration
in the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Gian Singh Vs.
State of Punjab and another
reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303, wherein,
in its para 57, 58 and 61, the Court has held as under :-

"57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the
ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the
same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not
interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of
offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different
from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences,
power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions
contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and
squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of
opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or
criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the
material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify
such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be
acquittal or dismissal of indictment.

58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding
having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and
the victim has been settled although the offences are not
compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of
criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in
the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an
end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the
ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have
harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that
seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society
and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the
victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has
been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made
compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court.
In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or
other offences of mental depravity under
IPC
or offences of moral
turpitude under special statutes, like the
Prevention of Corruption
Act
or the offences committed by public servants while working
in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the
victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain
offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil
flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial,
financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences
arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or
the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and
the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them
amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been
made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework
of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal
complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such
settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being
convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice
shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above
list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its
own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.

61. The position that emerges from the above discussion
can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing
a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its
inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given
to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section
320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no
statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the
guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of
justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In
what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint
or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have
settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances
of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before
exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to
the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences
of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.
cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's
family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences
are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society.
Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in
relation to the offences under special statutes like the
Prevention
of Corruption Act
or the offences committed by public servants
while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis
for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But
the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly
civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of
quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial,
financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or
the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or
the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or
personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire
dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the
criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise
between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction
is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would
put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme
injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal
case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with
the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether
it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue
with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal
proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite
settlement and compromise between the victim and the
wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is
appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the
answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High
Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal
proceeding."

13. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that settlement of
criminal disputes by way of a compromise has to be distinctly treated
from different prospective and has not to be camouflaged and eclipsed
by the provision of
Section 320
Cr.P.C. but only rider imposed are the
guidelines as framed by the Hon'ble Apex Court. It has to consider as
to whether despite the offences being of a serious nature, what was its
gravity, whether it was of private nature and such other factors which
has been
laid down in

the said judgment
.

14. The intention and purpose of
Section 320
of the Cr.P.C. is
rather spirited to attain a public policy with regard to the composition of
an offence and that is why, it enlists the offences which are
compoundable and the manner in which its composition could be made
by the courts. But, it does not limit the power of High Courts while
exercising its inherent powers.
Section 482
of the Cr.P.C. reads as
under :

"482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.--
Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the
inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be
necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to
prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice."

Even on a simplicitor reading of provisions contained under

Section 482
Cr.P.C., which is quoted hereinabove, on its simple reading
of its language and analyzing the legislative instant, it suggests that by
virtue of the said provision, the power which has been vested with the
Superior Courts, apart from the fact that it intends to prevent the abuse
of process, it also aims to achieve the ends of justice and that is why the
provision of
Section 482
Cr.P.C. has been given an overriding effect to
any other provisions contained in the Code because it precedes with the
word "nothing in this code". Obviously, it would over ride under

Section 320
Cr.P.C. too.

15. Under normal law of interpretation, by the use of aforesaid
words, "nothing in this code", the provision of
Section 482
Cr.P.C.
would have an effect of being an overriding provision and there is no
doubt about the fact that the other provisions of the
Criminal Procedure
Code
will not limit or restrict the inherent powers to be exercised by the
High Court. Rather, it could also be said that the powers vested with the
High Courts while exercising powers under Section C-482
Cr.P.C
. is not
an addition to the power but rather it is the power which intends to
safeguards the abuse which may occur on account of enforceability of
other provisions under the Code, and is spirited to meet the ends of
justice in its wider social implication. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of
Gian Singh
(Supra), in its para 53 and 54 has held as under :-

"53. Section 482 of the Code, as its very language suggests,
saves the inherent power of the High Court which it has by virtue
of it being a superior court to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It begins with the
words, "nothing in this Code" which means that the provision is
an overriding provision. These words leave no manner of doubt
that none of the provisions of the Code limits or restricts the
inherent power. The guideline for exercise of such power is
provided in Section 482 itself i.e. to prevent abuse of the process
of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. As has
been repeatedly stated that Section 482 confers no new powers on
the High Court; it merely safeguards existing inherent powers
possessed by the High Court necessary to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. It is equally
well settled that the power is not to be resorted to if there is
specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of
an aggrieved party. It should be exercised very sparingly and it
should not be exercised as against the express bar of law
engrafted in any other provision of the Code.

54. In different situations, the inherent power may be
exercised in different ways to achieve its ultimate objective.
Formation of opinion by the High Court before it exercises
inherent power under Section 482 on either of the twin objectives,

(i) to prevent abuse of the process of any court, or (ii) to secure
the ends of justice, is a sine qua non."
16. The aforesaid preposition is guided on a principle factor
that it is judicial obligation on the constitutional Courts which has to be
unfettered as aimed by section 482 Cr. P.C. to prevent a public wrong
which is a duty casted by implication of law, in the course of
administration of justice, so as to prevent unnecessary judicial process
dispensation of justice amongst litigating parties. It also constitutes to be
having an inherent element of the administration of justice, which
becomes an integral part of courts function.

The aforesaid principle is based upon a maxim, called as "quando
lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non
protest."

The aforesaid maxim infers that whenever a particular action is to
be taken as a matter in the course of discharge of duty, which is required
to be done to attain impossible, it attains to perform a real, complete and
substantial justice for the purposes for which the Courts are created and
possessed with its plenary powers conferred under Section C-482
Cr.P.C.

17. The Five-Judge Bench of Haryana High Court, in the case
of
Kulwinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab
, reported in (2007) 4 CTC
769, was identically called upon to answer the powers of High Court
which it can exercise under
Section 482
of the Cr.P.C. while considering
the composition of offence under
Section 320
Cr.P.C. and settling of a
dispute on the basis of the compromise arrived between offender and the
victim. Apart from laying down the wide ratio pertaining to the nature
of offence involved in the said case, it has laid down a broader
guidelines to the effect that any offence in relation to a human body,
other than murder and culpable homicide, they can be permitted to be
compounded when the Courts on the basis of material on record, forms
an opinion in terms of the settlement between the parties that such a
settlement, when it is fair not ill motivated and voluntary, it could be
compounded. In addition to it, there is another test which has to be
considered is that such type of terms of settlement for a heinous offence,
resulting to bodily injury, each terms of settlement has to satisfy the
conscious of the Courts and it has to be seen that it has been fairly
arrived at without any duress or oppression being made by the offenders
on the victim taking advantage of its autocratic capacity on the victim
and also it has to be seen that as to whether the weak victim have not
been made vulnerable to the powers of the superiors. This judgment,
too, has provided that the only factors to be considered by the High
Court under C-482
Cr.P.C
. is to prevent the abuse of the process of any
Court and to secure the ends of justice, uphold law its intentions, under a
given set of circumstances amongst the parties.

18. An issue which crops up for consideration before this Court
at this stage to be considered is as to what would be the impact of Sub-
section (9) of
Section 320
of the Cr.P.C. which absolutely creates a bar
that the offences other than the offences referred under
Section 320

Cr.P.C. cannot be compounded. What has been dealt with and the ratio
as
laid down by
the Apex Court in the case of
Gian Singh
(Supra),
since having held that the plenary power conferred on the High Court
under C-482 is not circumscribed and restricted by the power under

Section 320
of the Cr.P.C. and it would not in any way create an
embargo or curtail the powers, as there is no statutory bar in exercise of
powers under
Section 482
Cr.P.C. The relevant part of the Five-Judges
Bench judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of

Kulwinder Singh
(Supra), in its para 23 and 25 has laid down as
under:

"23. No embargo, be in the shape of
Section 320(9)
CrPC,
or any other such curtailment, can whittle down the power under

Section 482
CrPC.

* * *

25. The only inevitable conclusion from the above discussion
is that there is no statutory bar under
CrPC
which can affect the
inherent power of this Court under Section 482. Further, the same
cannot be limited to matrimonial cases alone and the court has the
wide power to quash the proceedings even in non-compoundable
offences notwithstanding the bar under
Section 320
CrPC, in
order to prevent the abuse of law and to secure the ends of justice.
The power under
Section 482
CrPC is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae to prevent an abuse of process of court. There can neither
be an exhaustive list nor the defined parameters to enable a High
Court to invoke or exercise its inherent powers. It will always
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The power
under
Section 482
CrPC has no limits. However, the High Court
will exercise it sparingly and with utmost care and caution. The
exercise of power has to be with circumspection and restraint.
The court is a vital and an extraordinary effective instrument to
maintain and control social order. The courts play role of
paramount importance in achieving peace, harmony and
everlasting congeniality in society. Resolution of a dispute by
way of a compromise between two warring groups, therefore,
should attract the immediate and prompt attention of a court
which should endeavour to give full effect to the same unless
such compromise is abhorrent to lawful composition of the
society or would promote savagery."

19. In view of what has been discussed, it could be said that the
power of compounding on one hand under
Section 320
Cr.P.C., and
quashing of the criminal proceedings, charge sheets, summoning orders
or compounding of offence based on settlement in exercise of inherent
powers are not to be treated as synonymous to one other but only has to
be restricted by the condition precedent to satisfy the criteria of these
two different and distinct aspects of law for compounding of an offence
so as to render substantial justice. What is to be seen is also important,
as to the communality, its harmony of the offence which is to be settled
in the exercise of powers in favour of the accused persons. This Court is
of the view that if there are sufficient element available that the
settlement was fairly entered into without any oppression being
exercised as against the victim, and it ultimately results into resolving
this discord amongst the parties to a lis, the bar of Sub-section (9) of

Section 320
Cr.P.C. for composition of an offence would not come into
play when the Court exercises its inherent powers under C-482, which
also legislatively has administratively purpose of enforcing justice.

20. The aspect pertaining to the composition of offence and its
ambit and amplitude came up for consideration in the case of
Nikhil
Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and another
reported
in (2008) 9 SCC 677. Although it was in relation to the offence under

Sections 420
,
,
and
of the I.P.C. read with
Section 5 (2)
and

5 (1) (d)
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, but it has widely laid
down the principles of compounding and settlement under
Section 320

of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Para 6 of
the said judgment
reads as
under:

"6. Before the High Court, it was urged that since the
subject-matter of the dispute had been settled between the
appellant and the Bank, it would be unreasonable to continue with
the criminal proceedings which had been commenced on a
complaint filed on behalf of the Bank having particular regard to
Clause 11 of the consent terms by which the parties had
withdrawn all claims against each other. It was submitted that the
learned Special Judge had erred in rejecting the appellant's prayer
for discharge from the criminal case."

21. It has been held in principle to the effect that once subject
matter of the dispute, it has been voluntarily settled between the parties,
it would be absolutely unreasonable to continue with the criminal
proceedings which has commenced on a complaint, though, despite the
fact that the offences alleged may prime facie have been made out.
The
Judgment of Nikhil Merchant
(Supra) in its para 8 had more or less
reiterated the ratio as
laid down by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
judgment of
State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal
reported in 1992 Supp.

(1) SCC 335, which too, has provided the determination of powers of
the High Courts under Section C-482
Cr.P.C
.. Para 8 of the judgment
of
Nikhil Merchant
(Supra) reads as under :-

"8. Apart from
the said decision
, reliance was also placed
on another decision of this Court in
B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana

wherein while dealing with the proceedings under Sections 498-A
and 406 of the Penal Code involving matrimonial disputes and
offences, this Court held that even though the provisions of

Section 320
of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not apply
to such offences which are not compoundable, it did not limit or
affect the powers under
Section 482
CrPC and the powers
conferred on the High Courts and the Supreme Court under

Articles 226
and
of the Constitution of India.

Referring to the
decision of this Court in
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
this
Court observed that the categories indicated in the said case
which warranted exercise of power under
Section 482
CrPC were
only illustrative and not exhaustive. This Court ultimately held
that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash
criminal proceedings or an FIR or complaint and
Section 320

CrPC does not limit or affect the power of the High Court under
Section 482 of the Code."

22. The High Court in the exercise of its power under Section
482 quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact of each case
that dispute between the offender and victim stood settled. It does so, as
in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise
in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the
parties is put to an end and peace amongst parties is restored; securing
the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor for administration of
justice. It is an inevitable conclusion that crimes committed between
parties, do have a social effect as it is a crime against a society and it
defeats the very fabric of reformatic concept of criminal law of our
country, at time composition of offence based on settlement, may not
be safe so as to leave crime doer. But still there are exceptions which
have been carved out by judicial precedents where wrong is against a
private individual. The High Court may within the framework of its
inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or
F.I.R if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly
any likelihood of offender being convicted and by not quashing the
criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall
be defeated.

23. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid case of
Gian
Singh
(Supra) has also dealt with the judgment in the cases of
B.S.
Joshi and others Vs. State of Haryana and another
reported in (2003)
SCC 675 and Nikhil Merchant
(Supra).

24. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
B.S. Joshi
(Supra),
has held as follows:

"6.
In
Pepsi Food Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate &
Ors.
[(1998) 5 SCC 749], this Court with reference to
Bhajan
Lal
's case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the
court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code
could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by
the courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts
and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no
limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes
necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking
such powers.

8. It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye's case does not lay
down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the
criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482
of the Code or extra ordinary power under
Article 226
of the
Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the
purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes
necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of
power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending
upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise
or not such a power.

10.
In
State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy & Ors.
[(1977) 2
SCC 699], considering the scope of inherent power of quashing
under Section 482, this Court held that in the exercise of this
wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash
proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that ends of justice so
require. It was observed that in a criminal case, the veiled object
behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on
which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would
justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest
of justice and that the ends of justice are higher than the ends of
mere law though justice had got to be administered according to
laws made by the legislature. This Court said that the compelling
necessity for making these observations is that without a proper
realization of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks
to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice
between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to
appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction. On
facts, it was also noticed that there was no reasonable likelihood
of the accused being convicted of the offence. What would
happen to the trial of the case where the wife does not support the
imputations made in the FIR of the type in question. As earlier
noticed, now she has filed an affidavit that the FIR was registered
at her instance due to temperamental differences and implied
imputations. There may be many reasons for not supporting the
imputations. It may be either for the reason that she has resolved
disputes with her husband and his other family members and as a
result thereof she has again started living with her husband with
whom she earlier had differences or she has willingly parted
company and is living happily on her own or has married
someone else on earlier marriage having been dissolved by
divorce on consent of parties or fails to support the prosecution on
some other similar grounds. In such eventuality, there would
almost be no chance of conviction. Would it then be proper to
decline to exercise power of quashing on the ground that it would
be permitting the parties to compound non-compoundable
offences. Answer clearly has to be in 'negative'. It would,
however, be a different matter if the High Court on facts declines
the prayer for quashing for any valid reasons including lack of
bona fides.

11.
In
Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Ors. v. Sambhajirao
Chandrojirao Angre & Ors.
[(1988) 1 SCC 692], it was held that
while exercising inherent power of quashing under Section 482, it
is for the High Court to take into consideration any special
features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is
expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to
continue. Where, in the opinion of the Court, chances of an
ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is
likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue,
the court may, while taking into consideration the special facts of
a case, also quash the proceedings.

15. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High
Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal
proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code
does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the
Code."

25. The issue regarding the composition of an offence based on
settlement under
Section 307
of the I.P.C. was considered by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dimpey Gujral and others Vs.
Union Territory through Administrator, UT, Chandigarh and
others reported in (2013) 11 SCC 497. This was a case where the
offence which was considered to be compounded was at a stage when
after submission of the report under
Section 173
of the Cr.P.C., the
charges were already framed in relation to the offences as involved
therein, being the offences covered by
Sections 147
,
,
,
,
,
and
I.P.C. Widely it involved the offences with which we are
concerned partially in the present matter and other connected cases.

Primarily, the said judgment which was dealing with the powers
for compounding the offence under
Section 307
I.P.C. has derived the
ratio and distinction which has been laid down in the case of
Gian
Singh
(Supra) regarding the inherent powers and powers given under
statute under
Section 320
Cr.P.C. and has held out that even the offences
as narrated therein whichever is inclusive of offence under
Section 307

IPC, would be compoundable though not covered by
Section 320
of the
Cr.P.C. Para 8 of the judgment of Dimpey Gujral (Supra) reads as
under :-

"8. In the light of the above observations of this Court in
Gian Singh, we feel that this is a case where the continuation of
criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of
law because the alleged offences are not heinous offences
showing extreme depravity nor are they against the society. They
are offences of a personal nature and burying them would bring
about peace and amity between the two sides. In the
circumstances of the case, FIR No. 163 dated 26-10-2006
registered under
Sections 147
,
,
,
,
,
and
IPC at Police Station Sector 3, Chandigarh and all consequential
proceedings arising therefrom including the final report presented
under Section 173 of the Code and charges framed by the trial
court are hereby quashed."

26. It was arising out of the judgment rendered by the Punjab
and Haryana High Court, wherein, while exercising the jurisdiction
under Section C-482
Cr.P.C
., the High Court has declined to quash the
F.I.R. under
Sections 307
,
and
/
I.P.C., based on the
compromise entered between the victim and the offender and the reason
for refusal which has been recorded by the Punjab and Haryana High
Court was that the offence being heinous in nature would fall to be an
offence not compoundable under
Section 320
of the Cr.P.C and bar of
Sub-section (9) of
Section 320
of the Cr.P.C. come into play as it has an
element of being a social offence and also the stage at which, the
settlement for the offences aforesaid was under consideration, was an
issue before the High Court was the stage when the investigation stood
completed, challan has been presented in the Court and the accused
were charged and the matter was pending before the Trial Court. It was
at that stage that in C-482 proceedings by way of criminal petition, a
prayer was made for quashing of the F.I.R.. In the said case, settlement
thus arrived, following assertions were made :-

1. Complainant has specially made a statement that he has no
intention to prosecute the offender.

2. The situation where the complainant agrees that he has got no
objection for quashing of the proceedings.

3. Where the offenders and the victim have undertaken in writing
that in writing or by way of affidavit that they do not intent to
undertake and indulge in any criminal offences against one
another.

4. Based on the criminal offences alleged, they do not want to
litigate any further.

5. As a consequence of such settlement in writing or by way of
affidavit, when it results into futile exercise on culmination of
the criminal proceedings and,

6. Lastly, when in an event of declining to accept such settlement
covering the aforesaid condition would result into unnecessary
wastage of time of the Court as well as the Investigating
Agency and would cause unnecessary hardship and wastage of
time to the parties to the dispute.

27. These are the wider governing factors, which have to be
borne in mind by the High Court when even serious offence like that of
IPC
, which happens to be in the instant case, is sought to be
compounded. The High Courts before whom such an application for
composition of offence comes for consideration, based on the
settlement, the High Court is not denuded of its powers to consider its
propriety while exercising its inherent powers under
Section 482

Cr.P.C., which will not be eclipsed and overridden by the restriction of
Sub-section (9) of
Section 320
of the Cr.P.C. because Section 320 itself
as already observed above, it will not in view of language used under

Section 482
Cr.P.C. which has an overriding effect, derived power of
the Court to decide application for heinous offences also as inherent
power is independent to the circumstances for compounding under

Section 320
Cr.P.C. Because the experience do not rule out a situation
where on most of the occasions, the criminal act is taken on account of a
spur of moment, on account of verbal fighting, and on account of a
heated discussion and moment, which are to be considered while
considering the application for composition.
28. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Narendra Singh

(Supra), has laid down the wider principles and circumstances as to
how the power to compromise an offence should be exercised as there
happens to be a subtle distinction between the composition of offence
exercising inherent power and the power which is given to the Court
under
Section 320
of the Cr.P.C. Para 9 of the judgment of
Narendra
Singh
(Supra) reads as under :-

"9. At the same time, one has to keep in mind the subtle
distinction between the power of compounding of offences given
to the court under Section 320 of the Code and quashing of
criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction conferred upon it under Section 482 of the Code.
Once it is found that compounding is permissible only if a
particular offence is covered by the provisions of Section 320 of
the Code and the court in such cases is guided solitarily and
squarely by the compromise between the parties, insofar as power
of quashing under Section 482 of the Code is concerned, it is
guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice
would justify such exercise of power, although the ultimate
consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment."

29. The normal philosophy and the psychology with courts
which persists when an offence of such nature comes into consideration
before the Court of law pertaining to a bodily harm being inflicted,
whereas, in the instant case which happens to be contended to be an
attempt to take life of another person under
Section 307
of I.P.C. It
becomes imperative no doubt that heinous crimes too have to be treated
as a crime against the society and not against any individual. But, there
is a distinction while giving an offence a flavor of a social crime as in
relation to the personal crime covered under
Section 307
I.P.C. For
such type of offences, the basic underlining principle for classifying it to
be a public crime is to act as a deterrent for the people at large and
hence, in para 17 of the
Narendra Singh
Case (Supra), it has been
dealt with as under :-

"17. We would like to expand this principle in some more
detail. We find, in practice and in reality, after recording the
conviction and while awarding the sentence/punishment the court
is generally governed by any or all or combination of the
aforesaid factors. Sometimes, it is the deterrence theory which
prevails in the minds of the court, particularly in those cases
where the crimes committed are heinous in nature or depict
depravity, or lack morality. At times it is to satisfy the element of
"emotion" in law and retribution/vengeance becomes the guiding
factor. In any case, it cannot be denied that the purpose of
punishment by law is deterrence, constrained by considerations of
justice. What, then, is the role of mercy, forgiveness and
compassion in law? These are by no means comfortable questions
and even the answers may not be comforting. There may be
certain cases which are too obvious, namely, cases involving
heinous crime with element of criminality against the society and
not parties inter se. In such cases, the deterrence as purpose of
punishment becomes paramount and even if the victim or his
relatives have shown the virtue and gentility, agreeing to forgive
the culprit, compassion of that private party would not move the
court in accepting the same as larger and more important public
policy of showing the iron hand of law to the wrongdoers, to
reduce the commission of such offences, is more important. Cases
of murder, rape, or other sexual offences, etc. would clearly fall in
this category. After all, justice requires long-term vision. On the
other hand, there may be offences falling in the category where
the "correctional" objective of criminal law would have to be
given more weightage in contrast with "deterrence" philosophy.
Punishment, whatever else may be, must be fair and conducive to
good rather than further evil. If in a particular case the court is of
the opinion that the settlement between the parties would lead to
more good; better relations between them; would prevent further
occurrence of such encounters between the parties, it may hold
settlement to be on a better pedestal. It is a delicate balance
between the two conflicting interests which is to be achieved by
the court after examining all these parameters and then deciding
as to which course of action it should take in a particular case."

30. About the nature of offence as contemplated under
Section
I.P.C. which is normally dealt with as to be a public offence, this
aspect was considered in Dimpey Gujral Case (Supra), which, in turn,
while considering the ratio rendered in
Gian Singh
case (Supra), has
held that if the three ratio are read harmoniously, it has been provided
that the interpretation given to the offence under
Section 307
IPC may
be that they are social offence and it ought to be made punishable so as
to made deterrent for offenders at large but simultaneously while
referring to
the said judgment
of Dimpey Gujral (Supra), as well as

Narinder Singh
(Supra) has thus held that even at times, looking to the
circumstances, which led to commission of offence the nature of injury
inflicted, the circumstances of commission of offence, they do at times
make an important consideration for compounding offence based on
settlement the offences under
Section 307
IPC also as to be a personal
offence and not an offence against the society.

That is why in

Narinder Singh
(Supra) case, the Hon'ble Apex Court while drawing a
distinction as against the
ratio
laid down in
the case of
Rajendra
Harakchand Bhandari Vs. State of Maharashtra
reported in (2011)
13 SCC 311 and in the case of
Shiji Alias Pappu and others Vs.
Radhika and another
, reported in (2011) 10 SCC 705 and in the case
of
State of Rajasthan Vs. Shambhu Kewat and another
reported in
(2014) 4 SCC 149, where these judgments have invariably held that the
offence under
Section 307
I.P.C. since being non-compoundable offence
covered by the Sub-section (9) of
Section 320
Cr.P.C would not be
compoundable.

Considering the ratio of making the offence as not
compoundable, irrespective of the settlement arrived at between the
parties, the Hon'ble Apex Court in
Narinder Singh
(Supra) has drawn
a distinction from the aforesaid judgment and has deviated to lay down
the ratio that even the offence under
Section 307
I.P.C., though heinous
in nature, though at times it may be a social offence, but, the same
would still be dependent upon its own facts and circumstances which is
the prerogative of the Court to consider in each case when the same is
being decided on the basis of the settlement while exercising its plenary
powers under
Section 482
Cr.P.C. or under
Article 226
/227 of the
Constitution of India.

It would be apt to refer to para 22 and 23 of the
judgment of
Narendra Singh
(Supra) case.

"22. Thus, we find that in certain circumstances, this Court
has approved the quashing of proceedings under
Section 307
IPC
whereas in some other cases, it is held that as the offence is of
serious nature such proceedings cannot be quashed. Though in
each of the aforesaid cases the view taken by this Court may be
justified on its own facts, at the same time this Court owes an
explanation as to why two different approaches are adopted in
various cases. The law declared by this Court in the form of
judgments becomes binding precedent for the High Courts and
the subordinate courts, to follow under
Article 141
of the
Constitution of India. Stare decisis is the fundamental principle of
judicial decision-making which requires "certainty" too in law so
that in a given set of facts the course of action which law shall
take is discernible and predictable. Unless that is achieved, the
very doctrine of stare decisis will lose its significance. The related
objective of the doctrine of stare decisis is to put a curb on the
personal preferences and priors of individual Judges. In a way, it
achieves equality of treatment as well, inasmuch as two different
persons faced with similar circumstances would be given identical
treatment at the hands of law. It has, therefore, support from the
human sense of justice as well. The force of precedent in the law
is heightened, in the words of Karl Llewellyn, by "that curious,
almost universal sense of justice which urges that all men are to
be treated alike in like circumstances".

23. As there is a close relation between equality and justice,
it should be clearly discernible as to how the two prosecutions
under
Section 307
IPC are different in nature and therefore are
given different treatment. With this ideal objective in mind, we
are proceeding to discuss the subject at length. It is for this reason
we deem it appropriate to lay down some distinct, definite and
clear guidelines which can be kept in mind by the High Courts to
take a view as to under what circumstances it should accept the
settlement between the parties and quash the proceedings and
under what circumstances it should refrain from doing so. We
make it clear that though there would be a general discussion in
this behalf as well, the matter is examined in the context of the
offences under
Section 307
IPC."

31. On a wider principle, the aspects which are to be
considered while dealing with the composition of offence is to be based
on the terms of settlement, its spirit of amicable settlement and also the
intention of the parties to bury their hatchet to live in harmony. This
has also to be considered with regard to the advantageous or
disadvantageous situation of the parties, their social status, their mental
status, to understand their well being, the circumstance under which the
offence has been committed and basically the intention of such
settlement to establish harmony and restoring friendly ties between the
offenders and it does not intent to defeat the process of law and the
victim. The issue which crops as to when the party is in such a
situation when they inspires to settle their score, whether the law and the
Court should create a hurdle by giving its immature opinion to the
settlement?
Thus, Narinder Singh
case (Supra), in para 26 has laid
down the circumstances for deciding the dispute, based on the
settlement in relation to the heinous crime. Para 26 reads as under :
"26. Having said so, we would hasten to add that though it
is a serious offence as the accused person(s) attempted to take the
life of another person/victim, at the same time the court cannot be
oblivious to hard realities that many times whenever there is a
quarrel between the parties leading to physical commotion and
sustaining of injury by either or both the parties, there is a
tendency to give it a slant of an offence under
Section 307
IPC as
well. Therefore, only because FIR/charge-sheet incorporates the
provision of
Section 307
IPC would not, by itself, be a ground to
reject the petition under Section 482 of the Code and refuse to
accept the settlement between the parties. We are, therefore, of
the opinion that while taking a call as to whether compromise in
such cases should be effected or not, the High Court should go by
the nature of injury sustained, the portion of the bodies where the
injuries were inflicted (namely, whether injuries are caused at the
vital/delicate parts of the body) and the nature of weapons used,
etc. On that basis, if it is found that there is a strong possibility of
proving the charge under
Section 307
IPC, once the evidence to
that effect is led and injuries proved, the Court should not accept
settlement between the parties. On the other hand, on the
basis of prima facie assessment of the aforesaid circumstances, if
the High Court forms an opinion that provisions of
Section 307

IPC were unnecessarily included in the charge-sheet, the Court
can accept the plea of compounding of the offence based on
settlement between the parties."

32. However
,
the said judgment
has created a specific bar that
when such an agreement for settling the dispute of a heinous crime is
based on the compromise which is being sought to be arrived at, at an
appellate stage, when the accused has already been held guilty, no such
power of composition of offence at the appellate stage could be made.

Hence, while concluding, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of

Narinder Singh
(Supra), in its para 29 has laid down the certain
guiding factors to be adhered to for dealing with the composition based
on settlement.

"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay
down the following principles by which the High Court would be
guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the
parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code
while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or
refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with
the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to
be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to
compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt,
under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power
to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are
not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter
between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised
sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on
that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed,
the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an
opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those
prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of
mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such
offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on
society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been
committed under special statute like the
Prevention of Corruption
Act
or the offences committed by public servants while working
in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of
compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly
those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of
matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed
when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among
themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to
examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and
bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to
great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be
caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under
Section 307
IPC would fall in the
category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be
generally treated as crime against the society and not against the
individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its
decision merely because there is a mention of
Section 307
IPC in
the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be
open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of

Section 307
IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to
proving the charge under
Section 307
IPC. For this purpose, it
would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury
sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate
parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in
respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the
guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High
Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of
conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In
the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash
the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be
permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding
the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At
this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the
settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony
between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under
Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a
crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at
immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the
matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal
in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal
proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this
stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has
not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed
but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy
stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its
powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the
circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand,
where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the
conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument,
normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power
under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court
would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to
come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under
Section 307

IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the
conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is
at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise
between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same
resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been
convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under
Section
IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime
and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found
guilty of such a crime."
On considering the aforesaid judgment and the ratio as
propounded by his Lordships as a matter of fact even the Hon'ble Apex
Court has laid down that it would not be safe to hold that there is an
absolute bar of compounding the heinous offence, but, only precautions
are the guidelines which have been
laid down by
the Hon'ble Apex
Court in para 29 of the
Narinder Singh
(Supra) case.

33. Often, whenever the question comes as to whether an
offence is compoundable or not and whether the High Courts, which
exercising its powers under Section C-482
Cr.P.C
. or under
Articles 226

/ 227
of the Constitution of India, is seized with the settlement, what
would be the extent of its power, it has to consider it from the view
point with regard to nature of offence, which is being sought to be
compounded, if it happens to be of personal nature, for example, that of
matrimonial dispute, financial transactions, company matters or matter
pertaining to the
Negotiable Instruments Act
, the composition under

Section 320
Cr.P.C. or based on a settlement, has to be entered into
keeping in mind the personal nature of dispute as the settlement will not
at all affect a public policy, rather it would result into the settlement of
personal dispute. This is the broader ratio as
laid down by
the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of
Madan Mohan Abbot Vs. State of Punjab

reported in (2008) 4 SCC 582. Para 5 of
the said judgment
has dealt
with the aforesaid ratio, the same is quoted hereunder :

"5. It is on the basis of this compromise that the application
was filed in the High Court for quashing of proceedings which
has been dismissed by the impugned order. We notice from a
reading of the FIR and the other documents on record that the
dispute was purely a personal one between two contesting parties
and that it arose out of extensive business dealings between them
and that there was absolutely no public policy involved in the
nature of the allegations made against the accused. We are,
therefore, of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served
in continuing with the proceedings in the light of the compromise
and also in the light of the fact that the complainant has on 11-1-
2004 passed away and the possibility of a conviction being
recorded has thus to be ruled out."

It is rather postulated that whenever the Court comes to the
conclusion that the offence has the private element, it has to liberally
exercise its power while settling the dispute based on the compromise.

34. A similar preposition pertaining to the composition of an
offence under
Section 482
Cr.P.C. and
Article 226

/ 227
of the
Constitution of India, has been
laid down by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in
the case of
Gold Quest International Private Limited Vs. State of
Tamil Nadu and others
reported in (2014) 15 SCC 235. Para 8 of
the
said judgment
reads as under :-

"8.
In view of the principle
laid down by
this Court in the
aforesaid cases, we are of the view that in the disputes which are
substantially matrimonial in nature, or the civil property disputes
with criminal facets, if the parties have entered into settlement,
and it has become clear that there are no chances of conviction,
there is no illegality in quashing the proceedings under
Section
CrPC read with
Article 226
of the Constitution. However, the
same would not apply where the nature of offence is very serious
like rape, murder, robbery, dacoity, cases under the
Prevention of
Corruption Act
, cases under the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act
and other similar kind of offences in which
punishment of life imprisonment or death can be awarded. After
considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, we
are of the view that the learned Single Judge did not commit any
error of law in quashing the FIR after not only the complainant
and the appellant settled their money dispute but also the other
alleged sufferers entered into an agreement with the appellant,
and as such, they too settled their claims."

The aforesaid judgment of
Gold Quest International
(Supra)
has been rendered considering the principle
laid down by
the Hon'ble
Apex Court in Gian Singh as well as in
Nikhil Merchant
(Supra)
cases.

35. The wider amplitude of powers which the High Courts
have held are not circumscribed to limit its plenary powers. The Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of
State of Haryana and others Vs. Bhajan
Lal and others
reported in 1992, Supl (1) SCC 335, while considering
the contention in its para 102 has classified the situation where and the
circumstances under which the constitutional Courts can exercise its
powers, has held in para 102 as under :-

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the
principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions
relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under
Article
or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power
could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not
be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid
formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases
wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or
the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do
not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence,
no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order
of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala
fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a
view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

36. An altogether a new aspect has been considered and
propounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of
Pepsi Foods
Ltd. and another Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and others
reported
in (1998) 5 SCC 749. The Apex Court, while dealing with the powers
of the High Court in the matters of compounding the offences, has laid
down that the exercise of powers of judicial review conferred to the
High Courts is not only to ensure administration of justice, but it is also
of a judicial nature, which intends to prevent the abuse of the process by
the inferior courts and also to see that stream of justice remains clean
and pure and attains the social objective. To attain the wider principle
as considered by the Apex Court, it has been held that the powers of the
High Court is not limited but only thing is that while exercising the
same, the Court has to be extremely cautious and due care has to be
taken and that is why it has been laid down that the powers under

Section 482
Cr.P.C. which has been given an overriding power to the
provision of the
Code of Criminal Procedure
would be an inflexible
power and could be exercised depending upon the facts and
circumstances of each case.

In the aforesaid judgment, it has been observed that the guidelines
in terms therein, where the Court while exercising the powers under

Section 482
Cr.P.C. is inflexible and not laying down the rigid formula
to be followed while exercising its jurisdiction. Para 22, 26 and 28 of
the judgment of
Pepsi Foods Ltd.
(Supra) read as under :-

"22. It is settled that the High Court can exercise its power
of judicial review in criminal matters.
In
State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal
this Court examined the extraordinary power under

Article 226
of the Constitution and also the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which it said could be exercised by the
High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice. While laying down certain
guidelines where the court will exercise jurisdiction under these
provisions, it was also stated that these guidelines could not be
inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the courts.
Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice. One of such guidelines is where the allegations made in
the first information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not
prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the
accused. Under
Article 227
the power of superintendence by the
High Court is not only of administrative nature but is also of
judicial nature. This article confers vast powers on the High Court
to prevent the abuse of the process of law by the inferior courts
and to see that the stream of administration of justice remains
clean and pure. The power conferred on the High Court under

Articles 226
and
of the Constitution and under Section 482 of
the Code have no limits but more the power more due care and
caution is to be exercised while invoking these powers. When the
exercise of powers could be under
Article 227
or Section 482 of
the Code it may not always be necessary to invoke the provisions
of
Article 226.
Some of the decisions of this Court laying down
principles for the exercise of powers by the High Court under
Articles 226 and 227 may be referred to.

26. Nomenclature under which petition is filed is not quite
relevant and that does not debar the court from exercising its
jurisdiction which otherwise it possesses unless there is special
procedure prescribed which procedure is mandatory. If in a case
like the present one the court finds that the appellants could not
invoke its jurisdiction under
Article 226
, the court can certainly
treat the petition as one under
Article 227
or Section 482 of the
Code. It may not however, be lost sight of that provisions exist in
the Code of revision and appeal but some time for immediate
relief Section 482 of the Code or
Article 227
may have to be
resorted to for correcting some grave errors that might be
committed by the subordinate courts. The present petition though
filed in the High Court as one under
Articles 226
and
could
well be treated under
Article 227
of the Constitution.

28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a
serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter
of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two
witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the
criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate
summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind
to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to
examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the
evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would
that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing
charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent
spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before
summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully
scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself
put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit
answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise
and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all
or any of the accused."

37.
In the matter of
Madhu Limaye Vs. State of
Maharashtra
reported in (1977) 4 SCC 551, the Court has laid down
that
Section 320
Cr.P.C. would not create a bar for the exercise of
powers by the High Courts for quashing of a proceedings, summoning
order or the charge sheet without being affected by the powers under

Section 320
Cr.P.C. and it would exclusively be governed by the factors
depending upon the circumstances of each case.

38. A harmonious interpretation can also be discerned from the
ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the judgment of B.S. Joshi and
others Vs. State of Haryana and another reported in (2003) 4 SCC

675. Para 5, 6, 8 and 15 of
the said judgment
reads as under

"5. After reproducing the seven categories of cases as
given in para 102 of
Bhajan Lal
case the High Court has held that
the parameters, principles and guidelines for quashing of
complaints, first information report and criminal proceedings
have been settled in terms thereof and has concluded therefrom
that the instant case does not fall in any of the said categories. It is
quite clear that the High Court has lost sight of the earlier part of
para 102 which made it abundantly clear that the said categories
of cases were being given by way of illustration.

Neither were the
categories of cases given exhaustive nor could it be so. Before
giving those categories, it was said in
Bhajan Lal
case that: (SCC
p. 378, para 102)
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the
principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of
decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power
under
Article 226
or the inherent powers under Section 482 of
the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we
give the following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse
of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise,
clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of
myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised."

6.
In
Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate
this
Court with reference to
Bhajan Lal
case observed that the
guidelines laid therein as to where the court will exercise
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible
or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the courts. Exercise of
such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of
each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It
is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where
there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care
and caution while invoking such powers.
8. It is, thus, clear that
Madhu Limaye
case does not lay
down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the
criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482
of the Code or extraordinary power under
Article 226
of the
Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the
purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes
necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of
power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending
upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise
or not such a power.

15. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High
Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal
proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code
does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the
Code."

Hence, on considering the aforesaid prepositions, it can be safely
concluded that in view of the language used in the provisions contained
under
Section 482
Cr.P.C., which confers the inherent power to the High
Courts, cannot be limited by the provisions contained under
Section 320

Cr.P.C. as they being the plenary power and independent to
Section 320

Cr.P.C and will not be eclipsed by the restrictions of sub-Section (9) of

Section 320
of the Cr.P.C. Hence, the composition for the heinous
offence and, in particularly, the case at hand in relation to the offence
under
Section 307
I.P.C., it would depend upon the factors as
determined by para 29 of the
Naarinder Singh
(Supra) case.

39. The Coordinate Bench of this Court had also in the case of
Criminal Misc.
Application 1253 of 2012, Dilbagh Singh Vs. State of
Uttarakhand
has also held that the offences under
Sections 147
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
and
I.P.C. would be
compoundable.
An identical view has been expressed by the Coordinate
Bench of Allahabad High Court in a judgment rendered in Application
under Section C482 No. 31751 of 2015, Rajendra Sharma and 18
others Vs. State of U.P. and another, wherein, the Court has held as
under :-

"A perusal of the aforesaid would indicate that this Court is
competent to quash a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, which is distinct and different
from the power to compound an offence under Section 320 of the
Code. The Apex Court went on to hold that the inherent powers
are of wide amplitude with the no statutory limitations, but the
same is to be exercised either to secure the ends of justice or to
prevent the abuse of the process of any court. Thus where the
offender and the victim have settled their dispute in respect of an
offence, which is neither heinous and serious, nor involved any
mental depravity relating to an offence like murder, rape, dacoity
etc, such proceedings can be quashed on the basis of settlement,
but the offence should be private in nature and should not have
any societal impact, such as an offence under the
Prevention of
Corruption Act
or an offence involving public servants in
discharge of duties etc. But criminal cases having a
predominantly civil flavour, such as commercial, financial
mercantile civil partnership etc. or family disputes are such
instances, where prosecution could be quashed subject to a
settlement."

40. Even recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Parbatbhai Aahir Alias Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and
others Vs. Sate of Gujrat and another reported in (2017) 9 SCC 641
was dealing with the powers of the Superior Courts under
Section 482

Cr.P.C.. The said judgment too places reliance on the ratio as
propounded in
Gian Singh
(Supra).
The judgment of Parbatbhai
Aahir (Supra) could widely be summarized as under :-

(1)
Section 482
Cr.PC preserves the inherent powers of the High
Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to
secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new
powers. It only recognizes and preserves powers which
inhere in the High Court.

(2) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a
first information report or a criminal proceeding on the
ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the
offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of
jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence.

While compounding an offence, the power of the court is
governed by the provisions of
Section 320
Cr.P.C. The power
to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is
non-compoundable.

(3) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or
complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction
under
Section 482
Cr.P.C., the High Court must evaluate
whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the
inherent power.

(4) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit
and plentitude, it has to be exercised to secure the ends of
justice and to prevent an abuse of the process of any Court.
(5) The decision as to whether a complaint or F.I.R. should be
quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have
settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of
principles can be formulated.

(6) In the exercise of power under
Section 482
Cr.P.C. and while
dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High
Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the
offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental
depravity or fences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot
be appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of
the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are not
private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The
decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on
the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons
for serious offences.

(7) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar
transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in
appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have
settled the dispute.

(8) The High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view
of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a
conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal
proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice. Economic
offences involving the financial and economic well-being of
the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a
mere dispute between the private disputants. The High Court
would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is
involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud
or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of
upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the
balance.

41. In view of discussions and reasons enumerated, the
conclusion which could be safely deduced is that the powers under

Section 320
Cr.P.C. of compounding of offences within its ambit will
have to read distinct to the powers vested with superior Courts under

Section 482
Cr.P.C. and Writ Courts under
Articles 226
and
of the
Constitution of India and they cannot be limited and circumscribed, as
they carry a distinct and wide powers of exercising the inherent powers
to eradicate the abuse of process of law. Thus, even heinous offences
which are not compoundable under
Section 320
Cr.P.C., which includes
offences under
Sections 147
,
and
I.P.C. and so forth can be
compounded but with the frame work of guidelines laid down by the
Hon'ble Apex Court and, in particular, testing each case based on its
own factual merits. It could also be concluded by saying that concept of
compounding also achieves wider social objectives to bring peace
amongst people, increasing tranquility and saving the litigants from
facing long drawn judicial proceedings, which would otherwise on its
conclusion will not have any legal conclusion.

42.
In view of ratio as laid by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
catena of decisions cited hereinabove, Compounding Application No.
10867 of 2018, filed by the parties will stand allowed and the entire
proceedings of Criminal Case
No. 3577 of 2016 'State Vs. Pan Singh
Rana
' arising out of Case Crime No. 111 of 2016 under
Sections 307

and
of I.P.C. at Police Station Kotwali Raipur, District Dehradun,
which is presently pending before the IInd Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Dehradun stands quashed.

43. Consequently, this C-482 Application under
Section 482
of
Cr.P.C. would also stand allowed. There would be no order as to costs.

(Sharad Kumar Sharma, J.)
28.09.2018
Shiv