Patna High Court

Upendra Rai vs State Of Bihar & Anr on 12 January, 2017

Author:
Aditya Kumar Trivedi

Bench:
Aditya Kumar Trivedi

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA

Criminal Miscellaneous No.12180 of 2014
Arising Out of PS.Case No. -1607 Year- 2012 Thana -VAISALI COMPLAINT CASE District- VAISHALI
(HAJIPUR)
===========================================================
UPENDRA RAI S/O LATE BRAHMDEO RAI RESIDENT OF VILLAGE -
RAHAR - DIYARA, P.S. SONEPUR, DISTT. - SARAN AT CHHAPARA.
.... .... PETITIONER/S
VERSUS
1. THE STATE OF BIHAR.
2. MEENA DEVI W/O UPENDRA RAI PRESENTLY RESIDING AT
VILLAGE AND POST - HILALPUR, P.S. INDUSTRIAL AREA, DISTT. -
VAISHALI.
.... .... OPPOSITE PARTY/S
===========================================================
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/s : MR. MAHENDRA THAKUR, ADV.
For the Opposite Party/s : MR. SANJAY KUMAR, APP
===========================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ADITYA KUMAR TRIVEDI
CAV ORDER
Date: 12-01-2017

1. Sole petitioner Upendra Rai has challenged the order dated

16.11.2012
passed by the SDJM, Vaishali at Hajipur in Complaint Case

No.C1-1607 of 2012, "Meena Devi vs. Upendra Rai & Ors." whereby and

whereunder petitioner along with others has been summoned to face trial

for an offence punishable under
Section 498A
IPC, 4 of
Dowry Prohibition

Act
.

2. Because of the fact that basically it relates with marital

discord on account thereof, this Court had given so many adjournments

even after referring the matter to High Court Mediation and Conciliation

Centre, unfortunately, by the action of the parties the desirability in getting

revival of conjugal life could not restored. Lastly, the matter has been

heard on merit.

3. The O.P. No.2, Meena Devi filed complaint petition

narrating the event that she was married with Upendra Rai about six years

ago. At the time of marriage her parents had given cash appertaining to
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 2

Rs.51,000/-, ornaments, furniture, household articles appertaining to

rupees one lac. After marriage, she came to her Sasural where she

stayed. One month after the stay, the accused persons began to harass

her on the score that at the time of marriage her parents had not fulfilled

their desire and so, they coerce to bring one T.V., motorcycle and cash

appertaining to rupees one lac to do business. As, complainant protested,

she was being regularly assaulted. Sometimes foods were not supplied.

She conveyed her miseries to her parents whereupon her father rushed,

convened panchayati wherein the accused persons undertook to keep the

complainant in congenial, peaceful, pleasant atmosphere but at each

occasion, after due interval, she was treated in same manner and lastly,

after snatching all her belongings, she was kicked out from her Sasural.

After her arrival at Naihar, she had disclosed her woe to her parents,

brother who took her to police station but as the police declined to register

a case instructing to file complaint case, on account thereof, the same has

been filed.

4. The aforesaid complaint was sent to the court of SDJM

under Section 192 of the Cr.P.C. by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,

Vaishali at Hajipur for holding an inquiry under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C.

and after concluding the same, the learned lower court by the order

impugned summoned the petitioner and others on account thereof,

challenged the same under instant petition.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner challenge the order

impugned on sole ground of lack of jurisdiction. To substantiate such plea,

it has been submitted that from narration of the complaint petition as well

as statement of the witnesses, it is evident that whatever allegation has

been attributed by the complainant which she faced during her stay at her

Sasural which lies within the original jurisdiction of Saran district and so,
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 3

the court of Saran at Chapra is only competent enough to entertain and

proceed with the trial. Therefore, the Vaishali court lacks jurisdiction and

on account thereof, the order impugned is fit to be set aside. Furthermore,

the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon
Y. Abraham Ajith and

others v. Inspector of Police, Chennai and another
reported in AIR

2004 SC 4286, Ramesh Kumar Srivastava & Anr. v. State of Bihar &

Anr. reported in 2009(2) East.
Cr.C 419, Mumtaz Bano Arzoo & Ors. v.

State of Bihar & Anr. reported in 2010(1) East. Cr.C 243, Santokh

Singh v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. reported in 2010(1) East. Cr.C 154,

Amarendu Jyoti & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. reported in

2015(1) East. Cr.C 231 (SC), Avinash Kumar Singh @ Avinash Kumar

& Ors. v. The State of Bihar & Anr. reported in 2015(4) East.
Cr.C 738

(Pat), Manoj Yadav @ Manoj Kumar Yadav & Ors. with
Raj Kumar

Yadav @ Raj Kumar-1 & Ors. v. The State of Jharkhand & Anr
.

reported in 2015(4) East. Cr.C 741 (Jhr), and submitted that consistent

view happens to be that the offence of 498A
IPC
is not a continuing

offence therefore, the prosecution should be launched at the place within

which area the offence has been alleged. As, the offence has been

alleged to have taken place at the matrimonial place lying within original

jurisdiction of Saran at Chapra, on account thereof, prosecution having

launched at Vaishali at Hajipur appears to be misconceived as well as

non-maintainable, consequent thereupon the order impugned is fit to be

set aside.

6. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor along with learned

counsel for the O.P. No.2 have submitted that no infirmity is found in the

order impugned, on account thereof did not require any sort of inference.

Furthermore, it has been submitted that the learned lower court after due

inquiry, found a prima facie case whereupon took cognizance of an
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 4

offence and summoned the petitioner along with others and so, for the

present, it should not be nullified on the factum of lack of jurisdiction.

Furthermore, also submitted that the offence being continuing one, hence

court of Vaishali at Hajipur has got jurisdiction to entertain the complaint

and in likewise manner has jurisdiction to conduct trial.

7. Before coming to the jurisdictional avenue trial having been

conducted at different place by a competent court would not nullify the

finding as is evident from the spirit of
Section 462
of the Cr.P.C. and for

better appreciation, the same is quoted below:

"462. Proceedings in wrong place.- No finding,
sentence or order of any Criminal Court shall be set
aside merely on the ground that the inquiry, trial or
other proceedings in the course of which it was
arrived at or passed, took place in a wrong sessions
division, district, sub-division or other local area,
unless it appears that such error has in fact
occasioned a failure of justice."

8. Apart from this in
Krishna Kumar Variar v. Share Shoppe

reported in 2010 Cr.L.J. 3848, it has been held:

"5. In our opinion, in such cases where the accused
or any other person raises an objection that the Trial
Court has no jurisdiction in the matter, the said
person should file an application before the Trial
Court making this averment and giving the relevant
facts. Whether a Court has jurisdiction to try/entertain
a case will, at least in part, depend upon the facts of
the case. Hence, instead of rushing to the higher‟
Court against the summoning order, the concerned
person should approach the Trial Court with a
suitable application for this purpose and the Trial
Court should after hearing both the sides and
recording evidence, if necessary, decide the question
of jurisdiction before proceeding further with the
case."

9. Now coming to desirability of the prosecution under
Section

498A
of the IPC,
Section 198A
of the Cr.P.C. deals with the same and

prescribes a non-ostensible clause in following:

"198A. Prosecution of offences under
section
498A
of the Indian Penal Code
No Court shall take cognizance of an offence
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 5

punishable under
section 498A
of the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860) except upon a police report of facts
which constitute such offence or upon a complaint
made by the person aggrieved by the offence or by
her father, mother, brother, sister or by her father's or
mother's brother or sister or, with the leave of the
Court, by any other person related to her by blood,
marriage or adoption."

10.
Section 14
of the Cr.P.C. marks jurisdiction of the Judicial

Magistrate in following manner:

"14. Local Jurisdiction of Judicial
Magistrates. - (1) Subject to the control of the High
Court, the Chief Judicial Magistrate may, from time to
time, define the local limits of the areas within which
the Magistrates appointed under section 11 or under
section 13 may exercise all or any of the powers with
which they may respectively be invested under this
Code:

[Provided that the Court of a Special Judicial
Magistrate may hold its sitting at any place within the
local area for which it is established.]
(2) Except as otherwise provided by such
definition, the jurisdiction and powers of every such
Magistrate shall extend throughout the district
(3) Where the local jurisdiction of a Magistrate,
appointed under section 11 or section 13 or section
18, extends to an area beyond the district, or the
metropolitan area, as the case may be, in which he
ordinarily holds Court, any reference in this Code to
the Court of Session, Chief Judicial Magistrate or the
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate shall, in relation to such
Magistrate, throughout the area within his local
jurisdiction, be construed, unless the context
otherwise requires, as a reference to the Court of
Session, Chief Judicial Magistrate, or Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be,
exercising jurisdiction in relation to the said district or
metropolitan area."

11. Chapter XIII of
Cr.P.C
. in clear tone identify the place of

inquiry or trial to be conducted by the Magistrate or Court of Sessions,

which in ordinary course should be by a court within whose local

jurisdiction offence is committed, however has got certain exceptions so

prescribed thereafter.

12. The aforesaid provisions stood since before, never been

before considered even after introduction of 498A
IPC
did not speak with
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 6

regard to territorial jurisdiction nor there happens to be any specific

provision persisting identifying
Section 498A
IPC not to be a continuing

one. Basically it relates with own perception and that has to be adjudged

in the background of facts of each case, as narrated and placed before

the court.

13. Whenever there happens to be controversy with regard to

mode of construction of particular statute in connection with its

appreciation regarding its application, the same has been taken into

consideration in
Pawan Kumar and others v. State of Haryana
reported

in AIR 1998 SC 958 and for better appreciation, the relevant paras are

quoted below:

"13. When words in statute are referable to more
than one meaning, the established rule of construction
is found in Heydon‟s case case (1584) 76 ER 637
also approved by this Court in
Bengal Immunity Co.
Ltd. v. State of Bihar
, AIR 1955 SC 661 (674). The
rule is to consider four aspects while construing an
Act:

[a] what was the law prior to the law which is
sought to be interpreted:

[b] what was the mischief or defect for which new
law is made:

[c] what is the remedy the law now provides; and
[d] what is the reason of the remedy.

14. The Court must adopt that construction which,
"suppresses the mischief and advances the remedy."

14. Because of the fact that during stay of bride at the place of

groom, her marital place an unfortunate event is faced when she is

subjected to harassment as well as cruelty for the purpose of procurement

of the dowry or other article from her parental place on account thereof, to

put safeguard upon her interest,
Section 498A
IPC has been introduced
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 7

by way of an amendment under the
IPC
. So, introduction of Section 498A

happens to be benevolent one for the protection of the bride.
The Hindu

Marriage Act
did not prescribe any provision nor recognizes shifting of

bride to the place of groom, that means to say at her Sasural but is

governed by a precedent, custom, rituals which is universally

acknowledged and could be taken under judicial notice thereof unless and

until contrary is proved identifying place of groom to be the place of

residence after marriage and the reason behind is that after marriage, a

bride became part and parcel of groom‟s family, her welfare is found

infused with the welfare of the groom‟s family, she is to bear a child

paving a way of inheritance. Thus, the bride is expected in normal

phenomenon to stay at her matrimonial place unless and until some other

circumstance so visualize and for that, so many contingency are

responsible one of it being ousted thereof on account of cruelty or

harassment for procurement of dowry. Therefore, depriving the bride her

legal, social, religious, customary right by not allowing her to stay at her

matrimonial place, would compel the bride to face mental agony, and such

event would not warrant continuing offence appears to be pivotal

question, to be empowered. Therefore, proper recognition to her at the

place of her Sasural where she is to live with full dignity and honour and

further, should not fell victim of an evil of the society on the score of

demand of dowry or unrecognized lust of Sasuralwala,
Section 498A
of

the IPC has been introduced. It is also found that considering the gradual

rise in causing death of a female at her Sasural on that very score within

seven years from the date of marriage has been viewed seriously and for

that necessary amendments have been brought up under the
Indian

Evidence Act
as well as Penal Code subsequently. Therefore, the aim and

ambit of introduction of
Section 498A
IPC as it reveals, happens to be in
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 8

favour of bride in order to protect herself and so interpretation of
Section

498A
of the IPC should be viewed accordingly.

15. If the bride did not accede with the demand for which she is

forced to physical as well as mental torture, harassment at her Sasural,

she is being thrown from her Sasural forcing her to stay away therefrom,

sometimes at her Maika and sometimes may be at different place and

whether this event could be perceived an outcome of continuing offence,

whereunder bride is found illegally denied to exercise her legal, customary

right by having her stay at her Sasural and more recently, under Domestic

Violence Act the aforesaid theme has been perceived whereunder right of

residence has duly been acknowledged apart from others and in likewise

manner, asking for maintenance for which there happens to be absence

of any condition for drawing any kind of legal proceeding at the place

where she at present resides.

16.
In
Gananath Pattnaik vs. State of Orissa
reported in

2002(2) PLJR 83(SC), cruelty in terms of
Section 498A
IPC has been

explained in following way:

"6. We do not agree with the argument of the
learned counsel for the appellant that even on
proof of the aforesaid circumstances, as noticed
by the trial court, no case was made out against
the appellant as, according to him, those facts
even proved do not constitute cruelty for the
purposes of attracting the provisions of
Section
498A
of the Indian Penal Code. Cruelty for the
purposes of aforesaid section has been defined
under the Explanation of the Section to mean:

"(a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature
as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide
or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or
health (whether mental or physical) of the woman;
or

(b) harassment of the woman where such
harassment is with a view to coercing her or any
person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security or is
on account of failure by her or any person related
to her to meet such demand."

7. The concept of cruelty and its effect varies from
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 9

individual to individual also depending upon the
social and economic status to which such person
belongs. "Cruelty" for the purposes of constituting
the offence under the aforesaid section need not
be physical. Even mental torture or abnormal
behaviour may amount to cruelty and harassment
in a given case."

17.
In
Arun Khanna vs. The State of Bihar and another

reported in 1994(1) PLJR 513, it has been held:

"7.
Section 498A
Indian Penal Code provides for
punishment to husband or relative of husband of a
woman subjected to cruelty. Explanation appended to
the section defines „cruelty‟ to mean:

"(a) any willful conduct which is of such a
nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit
suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life,
limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the
woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such
harassment is with a view to coercing her or any
person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security or is
on account of failure by her or any person related
to her to meet such demand."

A bare perusal of the provision would indicate that
if a person is found guilty of any willful conduct which
is of such nature as is likely to drive the woman to
commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to
life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the
woman or guilty of an act of harassment relating to
demand for any property under Section 498A.
Reading of the complaint leaves no room for doubt
that the allegations made therein do prima facie,
constitute the ingredients of the said office. The only
question is regarding territorial jurisdiction or the
place of enquiry or trial.

8. In the instant case, the complainant has alleged
that by reason of the conduct of the accused persons,
she was forced to leave her matrimonial home. If the
act of cruelty had not been committed and there was
no danger to her life and health, there perhaps would
have been no occasion for her to leave the house.
She has also alleged that as a consequence of the
acts of the accused persons she is suffering mental
agony at Dhanbad. In other words, the wrong or the
offence is still continuing. In my opinion, the term
„cruelty‟ in Section 498A has to be given an extended
meaning. If the woman continues to suffer the mental
agony or torture as a result of the acts done to her by
the husband or his relatives forcing her to leave the
matrimonial home, it must be said that the cruelty is
continuing. While construing the question of
jurisdiction with respect to offence under section
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 10

498A one should not forget the social background
and the object for which the said offence has been
created. This new penal provision is intended to
provide benefit and relief to the females who
constitute the weaker section of the society, the
destitutes who have been turned out of the husband‟s
home. If they are to be compelled to file the complaint
only at the place where the act was committed, that
is, at the place where the husband/in-laws reside, she
may not be able to prosecute the complaint property
which will not serve the desired object. A learned
Single Judge of this Court in the case of Sardar
Harpal Singh reported in 1991 Eastern India Criminal
Cases 756, relied upon by Mr. M.M. Benerjee on
behalf of the opposite party, has taken the same view
and I find myself in respectful agreement with the
same."

18.
In
Jagdish and others vs. State of Rajasthan and

another
reported in 1998 CRI.L.J. 554, it has been held:

"7. If repeated demand for dowry is made and
harassment is meted out to a woman which may be
physical or mental is an act of cruelty. It is not
necessary that the husband or his relatives must be
present at the time when the house wife is subjected
to cruelty. If their act or conduct, omission or
commission is of such a nature which results in
mental and physical harassment it will amount to an
act of cruelty to a woman and it is immaterial that the
woman is living at that relevant time at her
matrimonial home or at her parents house. The
offence under Section 498A is a continuing office and
if the act of cruelty continues even while, the woman
is living at her parents house, the offence is triable by
both the Courts in whose territorial jurisdiction the act
of continuing offence of cruelty has been committed
at matrimonial home or the parents house. In the
instant case prima facie it has been shown that
Narayani was subjected to cruelty at her matrimonial
home Binjbayala and she was compelled to leave the
matrimonial home due to the threats given by the
petitioners. It has been further stated that when she
was living at her parents house the petitioners
insisted on their demand for Rs. one lac failing which
she will have to remain at her parents house. This
prima facie at this stage shows that the petitioners
continued to cause harassment to Narayani with a
view to coerce her to satisfy their unlawful demand
i.e. to compel her to live at her parents house.
Therefore, prima facie it appears that she has been
subjected to cruelty at Manak Khedi within the
definition of „cruelty‟ given in the explanation of

Section 498A
I.P.C. On taking into consideration the
F.I.R. and the papers under investigation i.e. the
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 11

statements of witnesses, it appears that act of
maltreatment and humiliation by the petitioners
continued even while Narayani was residing with her
parents. Therefore, I am of the view that Clause (c) of

Section 178
, Criminal Procedure Code is clearly
attracted and the learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Suratgarh has also territorial jurisdiction
to try the case against the petitioners under
Section
498A
, I.P.C. which is a continuing offence.

10. There is one more important aspect of the
case that when complainant wife was maltreated and
subjected to cruelty so much so that she feared for
her life due to the threats given by the petitioners, the
consequences of all the above acts of the petitioners
ensued at Manak Khedi that she was compelled to
leave her matrimonial home and to reside with her
parents at Manak Khedi. She was not being called
back to force her and parents to fulfil the unlawful
demand of dowry.
Section 179
, Cr.P.C. says that
where an act is an offence by reason of anything
which has been done and all the consequences
which have ensued, the offence may be enquired by
a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has
been done or such consequence has ensued. I am of
the view that
Section 179
, Cr.P.C. is also attracted to
the facts and circumstances of this case and the
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Suratgarh has
clearly territorial jurisdiction to try the offences."

19.
In
Bimlesh Kumar Saraf & Ors. vs. Smt. Chetna Saraf &

Anr.
reported in 1997(2) PLJR 266, it has been held:

"7. Apparently in the complaint petition, allegation
was levelled that the complainant was assaulted and
tortured in various ways so that her relation may be
compelled to fulfil the unlawful demand of dowry as
alleged in the complaint petition and the complainant
was also driven out of the matrimonial house on
17.7.90 and she was forced to live at Katras in the
house of her brother. No doubt
u/s 177
Cr.P.C. which
is the jurisdiction chapter of the criminal trial, every
offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by
a court within whose local jurisdiction it was
committed. But
Section 179
Cr.P.C. which is a
special provision, only to meet such contingency, and
to mitigate the hardship of the weaker sections, a
provision has been made that where an act is an
offence by reason of anything which has been done
and the consequence which has ensured, the
offence may be enquired into or tried by a court
within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been
done or such consequence has ensued. So the true
test will be that the consequence must be an
essential ingredient of the offence and something
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 12

which forms part and parcel of it or completes the
offence; meaning thereby that the consequence must
be so iner-linked that the consequence is the direct
result of the act and if the wife is compelled due to
torture and harassment to leave the matrimonial
house, then it is the direct result of the alleged action
of the petitioners.

Furthermore the complainant though living at
Katras within the jurisdiction of the Dhanbad court,
she is under the constant agony and mental torture is
also there and as she was forced to leave the
matrimonial house, the harassment is continung to
compel her relation to fulfil the dowry demand. In that
view of the matter, even though the complainant is in
Katras, still she is constantly under mental agony and
also under constant harassment and cruelty, so that
the illegal demand of the petitioners can be fulfilled
by her relation. In that view of the matter, for the
illegal action done at Muzaffarpur, a direct
consequence has ensued even at Katras and such
offence is also a continuing offence because the
complainant is continuously feeling harassment and
torture though the mental harassment is also there.

8. A Bench of this Court in
Arun Khanna vs.
State of Bihar
reported in 1994 Vol.
1 PLJR 513
also took a similar view and in that case also the
allegation of torture and harassment and also cruelty
was levelled for the period when the wife was in
Amritsar in her matrimonial house and she was
forced to leave the matrimonial house and to live at
Dhanbad in the house of her parents and from there
she filed a case u/s. 498 and 406 IPC and it was held
by a Bench of this Court that the complaint case is
maintainable before the Dhanbad court also in view
of the provision of Section 179 Cr.P.C.

9. Furthermore the Calcutta High Court in the
case of Motahar Hussain reported in 1995 C Cr.L.R.
(Cal) 43 also held that the offence
u/s. 498
IPC is a
continuing offence and the court where the
complainant resides had the jurisdiction to proceed
with the case. So far the case of Andhra Pradesh
High Court, that is, Rajaram case (supra) as relied
upon by the learned lawyer for the petitioner, is not
applicable for the reason that in that case it was held
that the allegation that her husband and sister in-law
visited the place where the wife was residing, had not
been substantiated. Moreover, the provision of

Section 179
Cr.P.C. as discussed above had not at
all been considered in that case."

20. In Pabitra Chaudhary & others vs. The State of Bihar &

others reported in 2007 (Suppl) PLJR 57 it has been held:

"8. On behalf of the petitioners reliance has been
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 13

placed in a case of
Y. Abraham Ajith and Ors. vs.
Inspector of Police, Chennai and Anr.
[2004(8)
SCC 100]. In thisdecision from the facts it would
appear that all the alleged offences had taken place
at Nagercoil and none at Chennai. It was further held
that normally the general rule is that ordinarily every
offence should be enquired into and tried by a court
within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. This
rule is, however, subject to several exceptions and
one of them is contained in Section 178(c) of the
Code which provides that where the offence is a
continuous one it must be continued to be committed
in more local areas than one, then courts of all those
areas will have jurisdiction to try any such offence. In
this case, however, no offence was committed at
Chennai and, therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has held that this is not a case of continuing offence
so as to attract the provision of Section 178(c) of the
Code.

9.
In this connection a reference may also be made
to the case of
Sujata Mukherjee (Smt.) vs.
Prashant Kumar Mukherjee
[(1997)5 SCC 30]. In
this case the offence was continued to be committed
at the place of her parents where she came away
from her Sasural. It was held that since the offence
was a continuing one the courts at her father's place
will also have jurisdiction to try the offence by virtue
of Section 178(c) of the Code.

10. The question what could constitute a continuing
offence had come up for consideration before the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
State of Bihar
vs. Deokaran Nenshi and Anr.*
[(1972)2 SCC 890].
It's paragraph no. 5 runs as follows:--

"5. A continuing offence is one which is
susceptible of continuance and is
distinguishable from the one which is
committed once and for all. It is one of those
offences which arises out of a failure to obey
or comply with a rule or its requirement and
which involves a penalty, the liability for which
continues until the rule or its requirement is
obeyed or complied with. On every occasion
that such disobediance or non-compliance
occurs and reoccurs, there is the offence
committed. The distinction between the two
kinds of offences is between an act or
omission which constitutes an offence once
and for all and a act or omission which
continues and, therefore, constitutes a fresh
offence every time or occasion on which it
continues. In the case of a continuing offence,
there is thus the ingredient of continuance of
the offence which is absent in the case of an
offence which takes place when an act or
omission is committed once and for all."

11. This definition of a continuing offence has been
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 14

quoted with the approval by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of
Manish Ratan and Ors. vs.
State of M.P. and Anr
. [(2007)1 SCC 262)].

12.
In this connection a reference may also be made
to the case of
Abdul Nazar Madani vs. State of T.N.
and Anr.
[(2000)6 SCC 204]. It was held by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in this case that the purpose
of criminal trial is fair and impartial justice
uninfluenced by anything. If it appears that was not
possible impartially at any place dispensation of
justice the appropriate court may transfer the case to
another court where it feels that the trial would fair
conducive to justice.

13.
In the case of
Mohan Baitha & Ors. vs. State of
Bihar & Ors.
(2001(2) PLJR (SC)83) from the facts it
would appear that F.I.R. was lodged at Bhagalpur
under
Sections 304B
and
/
of the Indian Penal
Code on receiving a telephone call by the father for
the victim that she died at Jahanaganj in U.P. while
preparing milk for the child. It was held that in a given
case indicating proximity of time, unity or proximity of
place, continuity of action and continuity of purpose
or design are the factors for deciding whether certain
acts form parts of the same transactions or not.
Section 221 will be decided on these factors and
Section 177 is, therefore, not peremptory in nature
nor a complete imbargo.

14.
In a recent decision in the case
Kunti Devi &
Ors. vs. The State of Bihar
(2007(2) PLJR 43) the
learned Single Judge (Navin Sinha, J.) has decided
what is meant "ordinary courts in Section 171" which
according to him need not be limited to the special
provision provided for by law."

21.
In
Shankar Prasad Das & Ors. Vs. The State of Bihar &

Anr.
reported in 2003(3) PLJR 813, it has been held:

"6. I do not find any substance in this submission of
Mr. Roy. True it is that in column of place of
occurrence the informant has stated that the same
had taken place at Deoghar but in the same column
she had further stated that occurrence had taken
place subsequent thereto. For ascertaining the
jurisdiction the allegation made in the first
information report has to be seen. In the first
information report the informant has clearly stated
that on failure of her father to fulfil the illegal
demand of dowry, her husband and other family
members, who are opposite party nos. 2 to 9 before
this Court, after retaining all her ornaments, driven
her out from her matrimonial home and since then
she is living with her father.
Thus the cruelty meted
out to the informant still continues at Gaya where
she is living with her father. In my opinion, the
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 15

allegation made in the first information report
reveals continued offence of maltreatment to the
complainant at Gaya and as such Gaya court shall
have jurisdiction to try the offence. Reference in
this connection can be made to a decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of
Sujata Mukherjee vs
Prashant Kumar Mukherjee
[(1997) 5 SCC 30]. In
the said case in paragraph 7 the Supreme Court
has held as follows :

"Despite service being effected on the private
respondents, no one has appeared for any of
the accused respondents. We have taken into
consideration the complaint filed by the
appellant and it appears to us that the
complaint reveals a continuing offence of
maltreatment and humiliation meted out to the
appellant in the hands of all the accused
respondents and in such continuing offence,
on some occasions all the respondents had
taken part. Therefore, clause (c) of
Section
of the Code of Criminal Procedure is
clearly attracted. We, therefore, set aside the
impugned order of the High Court and directed
the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur to
proceed with the criminal case. Since the
matter is pending for long, steps should be
taken to expedite the hearing. The appeals are
accordingly allowed."

22.
In
Raja Ram Chaudhary @ Raja Ram & others vs. The

State of Bihar & another
reported in 2005 (4) PLJR 741 which was filed

by petitioners/accused for transfer of the proceeding wherein it has been

held:

"5.
Section 179
of the Cr.P.C. reads as follows:--

179. Offence triable where act is done or
consequence ensues: -- "When an act is an
offence by reason of anything which has been
done and of a consequence which has ensued,
the offence may be inquired into or tried by a
Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing
has been done or such consequence has
ensued."

6.
Section 179
Cr.P.C. is in the nature of
exception to general rule that every offence shall
be inquired into and tried by the court within
whose jurisdiction it was committed. This section
provides that an act is an offence by reason of
section which has ensued, the offence may be
enquired into and tried by the court within whose
local jurisdiction the act was committed or where
the act has ensued where the wife has been
forced to leave her husband or the in-laws house
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 16

due to torture. Leaving of the house is direct
result or consequence of conduct and are integral
part of the act done. The complainant was
tortured by the accused persons at Patna. She
was assaulted and threatened by the accused
persons due to which she was compelled to leave
her matrimonial house. She was forced to meet
unlawful demand of accused persons or to leave
her matrimonial house. Lastly the accused
persons forced the complainant to leave her
matrimonial house. She was driven out of her
matrimonial house with her children. All her
belongings were taken away by the accused
persons. Her father brought her to Bhabhua
where she was treated for her mental and
physical ailment.

7. Counsel for the opposite party submits that the
opposite party no. 2 is residing at Bhabhua and
that gives jurisdiction to the Bhabhua court to try
such nature of offence as provided under section
179 Cr. P.C. Counsel for
the opposite parties has placed reliance on
decisions in the case of
Girdhari Lal Jatana and
Ors. vs. The State of Bihar and Anr.
, [1997(1)
P.L.J.R. 513] and in the case of
Dr. Animesh
Gupta and Anr. vs. The State of Bihar and Ors.

[2004(2) P.L.J.R. 483].

In 1997(1) P.L.J.R. 513
(
Arun Khanna vs. The State of Bihar and Anr.
)
it has been held as follows:--

"In the instant case, the complainant has alleged
that by reason of the conduct of the accused
persons she was forced to leave her matrimonial
home. If the act of cruelty had not been
committed and there was no danger to her life
and health, there perhaps would have been no
occasion for her to leave the house. She has also
alleged that as a consequence of the acts of the
accused persons she is suffering mental agony at
Dhanbad. In other words, the wrong or the
offence is still continuing. In my opinion, the term
"cruelty" in Section 498A has to be given an
extended meaning. If the woman continues to
suffer the mental agony or torture as a result of
the acts done to her by the husband or his
relatives forcing her to leave the matrimonial
home, it must be said that the cruelty is
continuing. While construing the question of
jurisdiction with respect to offence under section
498A one should not forget the social background
and the object for which the said offence has
been created. This new penal provision is
intended to provide benefit and relief to the
females who constitute the weaker section of the
society, the destitute who have been turned out of
the husband's home. If they are to be compelled
to file the complaint only at the place where the
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 17

act was committed, that is, at the place where the
husband/in-laws reside, she may not be able to
prosecute the complaint properly which will not
serve the desired object."

23.
In
Surendra Nath Choubey & Others vs. The State of

Bihar & Another
reported in 2007(2) PLJR (HC) 47, it has been held:

"6. So far the second submission is concerned,
the facts alleged in complaint petition would go to
show that this case falls under
section 179

Cr.P.C. and not under sections 177 or 178

Cr.P.C
.
Section 179
Cr.P.C. runs as follows:

"179. Offence triable where act is done or
consequence ensues .--When an act is an
offence by reason of anything which has been
done and of a consequence which has ensued,
the offence may be inquired into or tried by a
Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing
has been done, or such consequence has
ensued."

7. According to paragraph-13 of the fardbeyan-
cum-complaint petition, the victim after assault
was driven out of the petitioners' house situated in
Buxar district. Thereafter, she was compelled to
take shelter in her parents house at Chapra.
Therefore, consequences of torture ensued at
Chapra where the victim was compelled to take
shelter after eviction from her Sasural. Therefore
court of Chapra had also jurisdiction to entertain
the case.

8. The above cited apex court decision in this
case is not applicable which is apparent from the
facts mentioned in paragraph-11 of the judgment.
In that very case, the victim voluntarily left her
Sasural and was not driven out by her in-laws."

24.
In
Vagish Kumar vs. State of Bihar
reported in 2004(4)

PLJR 688, it has been held:

"4. So far question whether the offence under

section 498A
, I.P.C. was time barred, it has to be
examined whether an offence under
Section
498A
, I.P.C. refers to physical tortures only. The
wordings in
Section 498A
, I.P.C. refers to cruelty
to a woman by her husband or his relatives. This
cruelty has been explained thus-

"(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature
as is likely to drive woman to commit suicide or to
cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health
(whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b)
harassment of the woman
where such harassment is with a view to coercing
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 18

her or any person related to her to meet any
unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security or is on account of failure by her or any
person related to her to meet such demand."

5. From the aforesaid wordings used in the
aforesaid section regarding cruelty meted out to a
wife, it is apparent that it is not only the physical
tortures, assaults etc. which amount to cruelty.
The demand of any property including money
persistently will also be included in the mental
torture or cruelty being committed upon the wife
by the husband or by his family members. The
persistent demands, so long as wife remains at
the house of her husband or even at the house of
her father, will be a continuing cruelty to the wife.
In the instance case, the alleged complaint case
was filed on 03.07.1996, as stated at paragraph-li
of the quashing application. The alleged divorce
suit ended in a judgment on 23.08.1996, as
stated in paragraph-9 of the quashing application
so apparently divorce suit ended in a decree in
favour of the petitioners of this quashing
application. The complaint was filed on
03.07.1996 itself and on that date the
complainant's daughter was still the wife of her
husband Vagish Kumar. The demand of rupees
four to five lacs was continuing upto the date
when the complaint was filed, as has been stated
by the complainant in his complaint petition, and it
was under these circumstances that the husband
had refused to take back his wife unless his
demands were fulfilled, that the complainant was
compelled to file his complaint petition so the
demand of rupees four to five lacs was a
continuing demand and in this view of the matter,
when the complaint was filed, the offence of
cruelty, as defined under
Section 498A
, I.P.C.,
was not yet time barred. So far the allegation that
it was the wife herself who had deserted her
husband and for which there was a matrimonial
suit which ended in a decree in favour of the
husband, it is to be noted that, during the course
of submission, it was admitted that the divorce
decree was still pending in appeal so there was
no finality to the judgment of divorce and, hence,
the allegation of the husband that he was
deserted by his wife, the complainant's daughter,
cannot be accepted as the final truth. So the
desertion of the complainant's daughter by her
husband or the allegation of the husband
regarding his desertion by the wife are all
disputed facts which can be decided only by the
trial Court. This court cannot take into
consideration the divorce decree in order to come
to a definite conclusion."

Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 19

25.
In
Mohan Baitha & others vs. State of Bihar & Anr
.

reported in 2001 PLJR 83 (SC) it has been held:

"4. Mr. P.S. Mishra, the learned senior counsel,
appearing for the accused persons contended that
under
Section 177
of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, an offence could be inquired and tried by
the Court in whose local jurisdiction, it was
committed and consequently on the basis of
allegations made in the F.I.R. as well as the
complaint filed, the incident constituting the alleged
offence under Section 304B being at Jahanaganj
(Azamgarh) in the State of Uttar Pradesh, the
Magistrate at Bhagalpur in the State of Bihar will not
have territorial jurisdiction to try the offence. Mr.
Mishra also further contended that on the basis of
allegations made, no offence under
Section 406
IPC
can be said to have been constituted. On examining
the assertions in the F.I.R. and the complaint as well
as on scrutinizing the judgment of the learned Single
Judge of Patna High Court, which is the subject
matter of challenge, we do not find any substance in
either of the contentions raised by Mr. Mishra. So far
as the contention relating to the constitution of
offence under Section 406 is concerned, we are not
required to examine the same, since the accused
never assailed the criminal proceedings itself on the
ground that no offence under
Section 406
IPC can be
said to have been committed. The accused merely
assailed the territorial jurisdiction of the criminal court
at Bhagalpur in relation to offence under Section
304B on the ground that the said offence stood
committed in Uttar Pradesh.
Section 177
of the Code
of Criminal Procedure on which Mr. Mishra relies,
uses the expression "ordinarily". The use of the word
"ordinarily" indicates that the provision is a general
one and must be read subject to the special
provisions contained in the
Criminal Procedure Code
.
That apart, this Court has taken the view that the
exceptions implied by the word "ordinarily" need not
be limited to those specially provided for by the law
and exceptions may be provided by law on
considerations of convenience or may be implied
from other provisions of law permitting joint trial of
offences by the same court (See
Purshottamdas
Dalmia vs. The State of West Bengal
, 1962(
2) SCR
101, L. N. Mukherjee vs. The State of Madras
,
1962(
2) SCR 116 and Banwari Lal Jhunjhunwala and
Ors. vs. Union of India
and anr., 1963 Supp.
(2) SCR

338). Even the Law Commission in its 41st Report
had observed that the general rule
laid down in

Section 177 is neither exclusive nor peremptory. The
learned Single Judge while dismissing the contention
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 20

raised by the accused has relied upon
Section 220
of
the Code of Criminal Procedure and considering the
narration of events culminating in the death of
Kalpana, which constitutes offence under
Section
304B
of the IPC, the learned Single Judge has come
to a conclusion that there appears to exist a
continuity of action to attract sub-section (1) of
section 220, and therefore, it cannot be said that the
jurisdiction of the Magistrate at Bhagalpur is ousted
to try the offence under Section 304B. The High
Court also has casually observed that the assertions
made prima facie constitute an offence under Section
498A and since the accused has approached the
Court even before the Magistrate has applied his
mind to the result of the investigation on the basis of
the allegations made by the informant/complainant, it
would not be appropriate to express any definite
opinion on the same. According to Mr. Mishra, from
the tenor of the impugned judgment, it can be well
imagined that the judgment is rather strained one
and has been passed in view of the earlier directions
and by no stretch of imagination, the incident
constituting the offence under Section 304B can be
held to be one falling under
Section 220
of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, so as to be tried along with
the offence under Section 406 at Bhagalpur. It may
be noticed that under
Section 220
of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, offences more than one
committed by the same persons could be tried at one
trial, if they can be held to be in one series of acts, so
as to form the same transaction. The expression
"same transaction" from its very nature is incapable
of an exact definition. It is not intended to be
interpreted in any artificial or technical sense.

Common sense and the ordinary use of language
must decide whether on the facts of a particular
case, it can be held to be in one transaction. It is not
possible to enunciate any comprehensive formula of
universal application for the purpose of determining
whether two or more acts constitute the same
transaction. But the circumstances of a given case
indicating proximity of time, unity or proximity of
place continuity of action and community of purpose
or design are the factors for deciding whether certain
acts form parts of the same transaction or not.
Therefore a series of acts whether are so connected
together as to form the same transaction is purely a
question of fact to be decided on the aforesaid
criteria. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles and
on scrutiny of the narration of events in the F.I.R. as
well as the complaint, we do not find any infirmity
with the conclusion of the High Court in applying

Section 220
of the Criminal Procedure Code to the
case in hand and in coming to the conclusion that the
jurisdiction of the Magistrate at Bhagalpur cannot be
held to have been ousted for the offence under
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 21

Section 304B
IPC. In the aforesaid premises, we see
no merits in this appeal, which accordingly stands
dismissed. The interim order of stay stands vacated
and the Magistrate is directed to proceed with the
matter expeditiously, in accordance with law."

26.
In
Sunita Kumari Kashyap vs. State of Bihar Anr
.

reported in (2011) 11 SCC 301, it has been held:

"8. Chapter XIII of the
Code of Criminal
Procedure
, 1973 (in short "the Code") deals with
jurisdiction of the criminal courts in inquiries and
trials. Sections 177-179 are relevant which are as
follows:

"177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial.--
Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and
tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it
was committed.

178. Place of inquiry or trial.--(a) When it is
uncertain in which of several local areas an
offence was committed, or

(b) where an offence is committed partly in one
local area and partly in another, or

(c) where an offence is continuing one, and
continues to be committed in more local areas
than one, or

(d) where it consists of several acts done in
different local areas,
it may be inquired into or tried by a court having
jurisdiction over any of such local areas.

179. Offence triable where act is done or
consequence ensues.--When an act is an
offence by reason of anything which has been
done and of a consequence which has ensued,
the offence may be inquired into or tried by a court
within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been
done or such consequence has ensued."

From the above provisions, it is clear that the normal
rule is that the offence shall ordinarily be inquired into
and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it
was committed. However, when it is uncertain in
which of several local areas an offence was
committed or where an offence is committed partly in
one local area and partly in another or where an
offence is a continuing one, and continues to be
committed in more than one local area and takes
place in different local areas as per Section 178, the
court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas
is competent to inquire into and try the offence.
Section 179 makes it clear that if anything happened
as a consequence of the offence, the same may be
inquired into or tried by a court within whose local
jurisdiction such thing has been done or such
consequence has ensued.

Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 22

9. Keeping the above provisions in mind, let us
consider the allegations made in the complaint. On
17-10-2007, Sunita Kumari Kashyap, the appellant
herein made a complaint to the Inspector-in-Charge,
Magadh Medical College Police Station, Gaya. In the
complaint, the appellant, after narrating her marriage
with Sanjay Kumar Saini, Respondent 2 herein on 16-
4-2000 stated what had happened immediately after
the marriage at the instance of her husband and his
family members‟ ill-treatment, torture and finally
complained that she was taken out of the matrimonial
home at Ranchi and sent to her parental home at
Gaya with the threat that unless she gets her father‟s
house in the name of her husband, she has to stay at
her parental house forever. In the said complaint, she
also asserted that her husband pressurised her to get
her father‟s house in his name and when she denied
she was beaten by her husband. It was also asserted
that after keeping her entire jewellery and articles, on
24-12-2006, her husband brought her at Gaya and
left her there warning that till his demands are met,
she has to stay at Gaya and if she tries to come back
without meeting those demands she will be killed. It
was also stated that from that date till the date of
complaint, her in-laws never enquired about her.
Even then she called them but they never talked to
her.

10. A perusal of the entire complaint, which was
registered as an FIR, clearly shows that there was ill-
treatment and cruelty at the hands of her husband
and his family members at the matrimonial home at
Ranchi and because of their actions and threat she
was forcibly taken to her parental home at Gaya
where she initiated the criminal proceedings against
them for the offences punishable under
Sections 498-
A
and
/
IPC and
Sections 3
and
of the DP
Act. Among the offences, the offence under
Section
498-A
IPC is the main offence relating to cruelty by
husband and his relatives. It is useful to extract the
same which is as under:

"498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a
woman subjecting her to cruelty.--Whoever,
being the husband or the relative of the husband
of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall
be punished with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to three years and shall also be liable
to fine.

Explanation.--For the purposes of this section,
„cruelty‟ means--

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a
nature as is likely to drive the woman to
commit suicide or to cause grave injury or
danger to life, limb or health (whether mental
or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 23

harassment is with a view to coercing her or
any person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security
or is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand."

11. Similar allegations as found in the complaint in
the case on hand with reference to the offences
punishable under
Sections 498-A
,
/
IPC were
considered by this Court in the following decisions.

12.
In
Sujata Mukherjee v. Prashant Kumar
Mukherjee
(1997)5 SCC 30 a similar issue was
considered by this Court and found that clause (c) of
Section 178 of the Code is attracted and the
Magistrate at wife‟s parents‟ place has also
jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. In
the said
decision
, wife was the appellant before this Court and
the respondents were the husband, parents-in-law
and two sisters-in-law of the appellant Sujata
Mukherjee. The gist of the allegation of the appellant
Sujata Mukherjee was that on account of dowry
demands, she had been maltreated and humiliated
not only in the house of her in-laws at Raigarh but as
a consequence of such events, the husband of the
appellant had also come to the house of her parents
at Raipur and assaulted her. On behalf of the
respondents therein, it was contended before the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur that the
criminal case was not maintainable before the said
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate because the cause
of action took place only at Raigarh which was
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the learned
Magistrate at Raipur. A prayer was also made to
quash the summons issued by the learned Chief
Judicial Magistrate by entertaining the said complaint
of Smt Mukherjee. As the Chief Judicial Magistrate
was not inclined either to quash the summons or to
transfer the criminal case to the competent court at
Raigarh, the criminal revision petitions were filed
before the High Court, one by all the five respondents
and another by four of the respondents excluding the
husband presumably because there was specific
allegation against the husband that the husband had
also gone to Raipur and had assaulted the appellant
and as such the husband could not plead want of
territorial jurisdiction. Both the said criminal revision
cases were disposed of by a common order dated 31-
8-1989 by the High Court holding that the case
against the husband of the appellant alone is
maintainable and in respect of other respondents
related to the incidents taking place at Raigarh,
hence, the criminal case on the basis of complaint
made by the appellant is not maintainable at Raipur.
The said order of the High Court was challenged by
the appellant Sujata Mukherjee in this Court. It was
submitted that it will be evident from the complaint
that the appellant has alleged that she had been
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 24

subjected to cruel treatment persistently at Raigarh
and also at Raipur and the incident taking place at
Raipur is not an isolated event, but consequential to
the series of incidents taking place at Raigarh.
Therefore, it was contended that the High Court was
wrong in appreciating the scope of the complaint and
proceeding on the footing that several isolated events
had taken place at Raigarh and one isolated incident
had taken place at Raipur. This Court basing reliance
on Section 178 of the Code, in particular clauses (b)
and (c), found that in view of allegations in the
complaint that the offence was a continuing one
having been committed in more local areas and one
of the local areas being Raipur, the learned
Magistrate at Raipur had jurisdiction to proceed with
the criminal case instituted in such court.

13. Ultimately, accepting the stand of the
appellant, this Court held as under: (
Sujata
Mukherjee
case(1997)5 SCC 30, SCC p. 32, para 7)
"7. ... We have taken into consideration the
complaint filed by the appellant and it appears to
us that the complaint reveals a continuing offence
of maltreatment and humiliation meted out to the
appellant in the hands of all the respondent-
accused and in such continuing offence, on some
occasions all the respondents had taken part and
on other occasion, one of the respondents had
taken part. Therefore, clause (c) of
Section 178
of
the Code of Criminal Procedure is clearly
attracted."

14.
In
State of M.P. v. Suresh Kaushal
(2003)11
SCC 126, again in a similar circumstance,
considering the provisions of Section 179 with
reference to the complaint relating to the offences
under Section 498-A read with
Section 34
IPC, this
Court held as under: (SCC p. 128, para 6)
"6. The above section contemplates two courts
having jurisdiction and the trial is permitted to take
place in any one of those two courts. One is the
court within whose local jurisdiction the act has
been done and the other is the court within whose
local jurisdiction the consequence has ensued.
When the allegation is that the miscarriage took
place at Jabalpur it cannot be contended that the
court at Jabalpur could not have acquired
jurisdiction as the acts alleged against the
accused took place at Indore."

15. Mr S.B. Sanyal, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the respondents fairly stated that there
is no dispute about the jurisdiction of the Court at
Gaya insofar as against the husband, however, in
respect of other relatives of the husband in the
absence of any act at Gaya, the said court has no
jurisdiction and if at all, the wife has to pursue her
remedy only at Ranchi. In support of his contention,
he relied on a decision of this Court in Y. Abraham
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 25

Ajith v. Inspector of Police
(2004)8 SCC 100 in
particular, SCC para 12 of
the said decision
which
reads as under: (SCC p. 105)
"12. The crucial question is whether any part of
the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of
the court concerned. In terms of Section 177 of
the Code, it is the place where the offence was
committed. In essence it is the cause of action for
initiation of the proceedings against the accused."

16. It is true that Section 177 of the Code refers to
the local jurisdiction where the offence is committed.
Though the expression "cause of action" is not a
stranger to criminal cases, in view of Sections 178
and 179 of the Code and in the light of the specific
averment in the complaint of the appellant herein, we
are of the view that
the said decision
is not applicable
to the case on hand.

17. Mr Sanyal also relied on a decision of this
Court in
Bhura Ram v. State of Rajasthan
(2008)11
SCC 103 wherein following the decision in Y.
Abraham Ajith (2004)8 SCC 100 this Court held that
"cause of action" having arisen within the jurisdiction
of the court where the offence was committed, could
not be tried by the court where no part of offence was
committed. For the same reasons, as mentioned in
the earlier paragraph, while there is no dispute as to
the proposition in view of the fact that in the case on
hand, the offence was a continuing one and the
episode at Gaya was only a consequence of the
continuing offence of harassment and ill-treatment
meted out to the complainant, clause (c) of Section
178 is attracted. In view of the above reason, both the
decisions are not applicable to the facts of this case
and we are unable to accept the stand taken by Mr
Sanyal.

18. We have already adverted to the details made by
the appellant in the complaint. In view of the specific
assertion by the appellant wife about the ill-treatment
and cruelty at the hands of the husband and his
relatives at Ranchi and of the fact that because of
their action, she was taken to her parental home at
Gaya by her husband with a threat of dire
consequences for not fulfilling their demand of dowry,
we hold that in view of Sections 178 and 179 of the
Code, the offence in this case was a continuing one
having been committed in more local areas and one
of the local areas being Gaya, the learned Magistrate
at Gaya has jurisdiction to proceed with the criminal
case instituted therein. In other words, as the offence
was a continuing one and the episode at Gaya was
only a consequence of continuing offence of
harassment and ill-treatment meted out to the
complainant, clause (c) of Section 178 is attracted.
Further, from the allegations in the complaint, it
appears to us that it is a continuing offence of ill-
treatment and humiliation meted out to the appellant
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 26

at the hands of all the accused persons and in such
continuing offence, on some occasions all had taken
part and on other occasions one of the accused,
namely, the husband had taken part, therefore,
undoubtedly clause (c) of Section 178 of the Code is
clearly attracted."

27. Now coming to facts of the case, it is evident that

complainant has asserted in specific tone that after assault she was

ousted from her matrimonial home, whereupon she took shelter at her

maika. Therefore, departure from her Sasural was not voluntarily, rather

she was ousted by the accused persons, and on account thereof, staying

at her Sasural happens to be not in normal phenomenon rather, on

account of deprivation whereupon till her stay at Naihar will consistrue

continuing offence . The relevant judicial pronouncement as referred

above consistently held so.

28. Now coming to the judicial pronouncement having referred

by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is evident that in the facts and

circumstances of the case, none is applicable.
In
Y. Abraham Ajith and

others v. Inspector of Police, Chennai and another
reported in AIR

2004 SC 4286 complainant herself deserted her matrimonial house hence

the principle decided
in that case
, happens to be to based upon aforesaid

facts.

Similar situation prevails with
Amarendu Jyoti & Ors. v. State of

Chhattisgarh & Ors.
reported in 2015(1) East. Cr.C 231 (SC).

29. In Avinash Kumar Singh @ Avinash Kumar & Ors. v.

The State of Bihar & Anr. reported in 2015(4) East. Cr.C 738 (Pat)

though the facts of the case resembles, but after going through the

same, it is evident that neither the earlier decisions as
referred above

were considered nor the consequence of ousting from matrimonial house

has been considered, as is evident from para-7.

"However, here, under the facts and
circumstances of the case, the occurrence
alleged to have taken place either at Delhi or at
Patna High Court Cr.Misc. No.12180 of 2014 dt.12-01-2017 27

Purnia, as per the allegation made, hence, as per

Section 177
of the Criminal Procedure Code the
local area in which the occurrence took place has
jurisdiction as well as the exception as under

Section 178
of the Criminal Procedure Code that
the area where the part of the occurrence,
alleged, occurred. Hence it can well be said that
Court at Delhi and Purnia has got jurisdiction as
per
Section 177
and
of the Criminal
Procedure Code. However, the allegation is that
the demands were made at Delhi first then the
victim was taken to Purnia where further demand
was made and even the victim was assaulted and
abused, her belongings were seized at her
sasural in Purnia and, then, she was driven out of
the sasural and, then, she came to naiher at
Katihar. However, no act alleged either of any
omission and commission at Katihar has been
mentioned in the entire complaint. There is no
allegation whatsoever alleged at her naiher in
Katihar."

30. Likewise is the statues of Manoj Yadav @ Manoj Kumar

Yadav & Ors. with
Raj Kumar Yadav @ Raj Kumar-1 & Ors. v. The

State of Jharkhand & Anr.
reported in 2015(4) East. Cr.C 741 (Jhr).

31.
Ramesh Kumar Srivastava & Anr. v. State of Bihar &

Anr.
reported in 2009(2) East.
Cr.C 419, Mumtaz Bano Arzoo & Ors. v.

State of Bihar & Anr. reported in 2010(1) East. Cr.C 243, Santokh

Singh v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. reported in 2010(1) East. Cr.C 154

are distinguishable on the facts of the case.

32. Considering the factual as well as legal aspect, so involved,

it is apparent that petitioner is not entitled to seek the relief as claimed for

consequent thereupon, instant petition is dismissed.

(Aditya Kumar Trivedi, J.)

Prakash Narayan

AFR/NAFR AFR
CAV DATE 19.11.2016
Uploading Date 13.01.2017
Transmission 13.01.2017
Date