Gujarat High Court

Jayshreeben Krishnalal Somani vs Central Bank Of India & 2 on 7 November, 2016

Author:
J.B.Pardiwala

Bench:
J.B.Pardiwala

C/SCA/10854/2003 CAV JUDGMENT

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10854 of 2003

With
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10855 of 2003
With
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10856 of 2003
With
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10857 of 2003
With
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10860 of 2003
With
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8934 of 2013
With
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4958 of 2003

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:

HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA

==========================================================

1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed YES
to see the judgment ?

2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? YES

3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of NO
the judgment ?

4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of NO
law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of
India or any order made thereunder ?

==========================================================
JAYSHREEBEN KRISHNALAL SOMANI....Petitioner(s)
Versus
CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA & 2....Respondent(s)

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==========================================================
Appearance:

MR ANAND B GOGIA, ADVOCATE for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR BB GOGIA, ADVOCATE for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR RB GOGIA, ADVOCATE for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR KIRIT J MACWAN, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 1

RULE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 2 - 3

==========================================================

CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA

Date : 07/11/2016
COMMON CAV JUDGMENT

1. Since the issues raised in all the captioned writ­applications are
more   or   less   the   same,   those   were   heard   analogously   and   are   being
disposed of by this common judgment and order.

2. The   writ­applicants   before   me   are   all   former   employees   of   the
respective   Nationalized   Banks.   The   issue   raised   in   all   the   writ­
applications is one relating to the claim to receive pension. The case of
the   writ­applicants   is   that   since   they   all   had   put   in   the   minimum
qualifying years of service, they are entitled to receive pension, whereas,
the case of the respective banks is that the writ­applicants had resigned
from   service   and   therefore,   are   not   entitled   to   receive   pension   in
accordance with the Pension Regulations.

3. The learned counsel appearing for the respective writ­applicants
have provided the necessary details and information as regards each of
the writ­applicants for the convenience of this Court.

4. So far as the Special Civil Applications Nos.10855 of 2003; 10857
of 2003 and 8934 of 2013 are concerned, the details are as under:­

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SCA   No.  SCA   No.  SCA   No.  SCA   No.

10855/2003 10855/2003 10857/2003 8934/2013

Mr. H.S. Chhapia Mr. K.I. Oza Mr. C.L. Bhimani Mr. S.M. Dave
Dena Bank Dena Bank IOB Central Bank
Date of Birth 06/10/50 07/06/40 03/01/44 01/12/46
Appointed on 11/03/70 15/06/1959 21/08/1968 11/10/71
Applied   for  29/02/1992 19/06/1986 15/06/1989 12/10/1991 &
Retirement/  28/02/1992
Resignation
Relieved   on  28/05/1992 19/06/1986 15/09/1989 01/03/92
Completed
service of 22 years 27 years 21 years 20 years
Applied   for  03/05/94 18/07/1994 15/02/1994
Pension
Denied   the  20/06/1996 & 23/01/2001 08/04/1995 & 02/08/1994
Pension on 26/02/1997 28/07/2000 30/03/1995
ADDITIONAL  ➢ Conditio Bank   had   sent  Frequently
INFORMATION nal   Resignation  Required   Forms  Requested   the

- For Benefits of  for Exercising the  Bank   to   send
Retirement. Option   for  forms   for
➢ Bank  Pension  pension
Sent   for   Medical  (28.07.1994)  Opetion.

Examination
Required   for
Retired Officers

5. The details as regards the Special Civil Application No.10854 of
2003 is concerned, the same are as under:­

1 Name & Address Miss Jayshreeben Krishnalal Somani
Parekh Building,
B/h. Telegraph Office
Near Jubli Garden
Rajkot - 360 001
2 Date of Birth 01/10/49
3 Date of Joining Service in  25.11.1969
Bank & Designation At Central Bank of India, Rajkot
Main Branch at Typist­Clerk
4 Date of Resignation  13.08.1993 from Central Bank of India,
Rajkot Main Branch as Typist­Clerk
5 Notice Period Given One month Salary deducted by the Bank
in lieu of Notice.

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6 Stood Relieved from Bank  13.08.1993 as Typist - Clerk
Service

7 Total No. of Years of Service 23 Years 8 Months

8 Date of Appl. For pensionary  11/07/94
Benefit
9 Date of Denial of pensionary  18.08.1994 vide Central Bank of India,
Benefit Rajkot Branch Letter No.BR/PRS/94­
95/440 dated18.08.1994
10 Reason for Denial of  As per reason(s) given in Aexure - 'A' at
pensionary Benefit Page 21­ Page 27, 30 - Reply
11 Relevant Rules  Regulation 3(1)(a) covers the case of
petition read with Para 4.2 of Reply filed
by the Bank of Page 27(30)

6. The details as regards the Special Civil Application No.10856 of
2003 is concerned, the same are as under:­

Name of the  Date of  Date of  Date of  Date of  Years of
Petitioner Appointment Resignation Option Rejection  Service
Hasmukh R.  06/11/54 30/09/1989 ­ 27/11/1995 34
Pavagadhi
Adityakumar  25/05/1974 30/01/1995 25/06/1996 03/07/96 20
Jain
Harshadri N.  05/07/54 23/05/1989 27/11/1995 34
Trivedi

7. The details as regards the Special Civil Application No.10860 of
2003 is concerned, the same are as under:­

Name of the  Date of  Date of  Date of  Date of  Years of
Petitioner Appointment Resignation Option Rejection  Service
Bhupatrai D.  15/05/1961 15/01/1988 18/07/1994 26/10/1994 26
Shah

8. The learned counsel appearing for the respective writ­applicants
vehemently   submitted   that   the   Regulation   No.22   of   the   Pension
Regulations,   1995   stipulates   that   the   "resignation   or   dismissal   or
removal or termination of an employee from service of the Bank shall

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entail   forfeiture   of   his   entire   past  service   and  consequently,   shall   not
qualify for pensionary benefits." It is submitted that the same is violative
of
Articles 14
and
of the Constitution of India.

9. It is submitted that the causes and effect of the resignation are
totally different from the causes and effect of the dismissal, removal or
termination.   The   resignation   is   entirely  a  voluntary  act,  for   which   an
employee   is   not   punished   or   penalised.   The   resignation   becomes
effective   after   a   notice   period   and/or   after   the   employer   had   duly
accepted it. The Regulation No.22 seeks to create a parity between two
unequals.  In   no  circumstances,   the   resignation   can   be   treated   on   par
with the dismissal, removal or termination.

10. It is submitted that an employee who resigns from the service of
the respondents­ Nationalized Banks is granted all the terminal benefits
such as gratuity, provident fund, etc., in accordance with the Rules and
Regulations.   In   such   circumstances,   ignoring   more   than   20   years   of
service   on   account   of   resignation   for   the   purpose   of   pension   is
unreasonable.

11. It   is   submitted   that   the   Regulation   No.22   of   the   Pension
Regulations, 1995 to the extent that it entails forfeiture of the entire past
service   and   consequently,   disentitlement   to   pension   in   case   of
employees, who have resigned from service of the bank deserves to be
quashed and set aside.

12. On   the   other­hand,   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the
respective   banks   have   raised   a   preliminary   objection   as   regards   the
maintainability of the writ­applications on the ground of gross delay and
laches  in  filing  the  writ­applications.  It is  submitted  that all  the  writ­

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applicants had resigned from service years back. The writ­applications
have been filed almost after a period of two decades. It is submitted that
on this ground alone the writ­applications deserve to be rejected.

13. Mr.   Pranav   Desai,   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   State
Bank of India in the Special Civil Application No.10856 of 2003 in his
written submissions has stated as under:­

2. So far as petitioner no.1 is concerned, he joined services on
6.11.1954   and   had   resigned   on   medical   grounds   with   benefit   of
compassionate   appointment   to   one   of   his   dependents.   He   was
informed   by   letter   dated   27.11.1995   that   he   was   not   eligible   for
pension as per the provisions of the Pension Scheme. His case was
further   rejected   vide   letter   dated   24.6.2002   in   which   reference   is
made to the letter of the Indian Banks Association dated 4.10.2001,
wherein it was specifically verified that employees who retired on
medical   grounds   with   simultaneous   benefits   of   appointment   on
compassionate grounds to one of his dependents under the bank's
specific scheme formed a separate class and thus cannot be extended
the   benefit   of   exercising   option   for   pension.   All   these   letters   are
annexed with the affidavit in reply.

3. So far as petitioner no.2 is concerned, he joined on 28.5.1974
and   resigned  on  31.1.1995.  He   also   resigned  on   medical  grounds
with   benefits   of   compassionate   appointments   to   one   of   its
appointments and therefore was not eligible for pension as per the
scheme.  He   was  informed   by   letter   dated   3.7.1996.  His  case   was
further   rejected  by   letter   dated   30.5.2002,  wherein  reference  was
made  to  Govt.  Of    India  letter   dated  19.2.2002  which  specifically
states that under no circumstances the request for fresh option for
pension can be considered except in special circumstances.

4. So far as petitioner no.3 is concerned he joined services on
5.7.1954 and resigned on 31.5.1989. He also resigned on medical
ground   with   benefit   of   appointment   of   his   son   on   compassionate
ground   and   therefore   was   not   eligible   for   pension   as   per   the
provisions of the pension scheme. He was informed by letter dated
27.11.1995 that he was not eligible. In view of the letter of the Indian
Banks Association dated 4.10.2001 and Govt. of India letter dated
30.5.2002.

5. So far as the reference is made by the petitioners to Annexure
'C'   Indian   Banks   Association   notice   dated   20.3.1994   it   does   not
pertain to the employees who resigned under banks specific scheme

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which is the case of all the present petitioners.

Petitioners have resigned under respondent bank's specific scheme of
resignation   on   medical   grounds   with   benefit   of   appointment   of
dependents   on   compassionate   ground.   Therefore,   the   said   notice
dated 20.3.1994 is not applicable to the petitioner.

6. As   per   regulation   no.22   of   the   Pension   Regulations,   1995
which has been framed pursuant to bi­partite settloement which has
been made effective from 1.1.1986 i.e. all the bank employees who
were in service of the bank on the 1st day of January, 1986 and have
retired thereafter are made eligible provided they opt for the scheme
and refund the entire amount of the banks contribution to provident
fund including interest accrued thereon together with further simple
interest @6%. The said regulation restrict the class of employees to
whom it shall apply. Regulation no.22 prescribes as under:­

"22(1)   resignation   or   dismissal   or   removal   or   termination   of   an
employee from the service of the bank including that of an employee
deemed to have voluntarily retired from the bank service in terms of
the provisions for voluntary cessation of employment contained in
bipartite settlement shall entail forfeiture of his entire  past service
and consequently shall not qualify for pensionary benefits.

In view of the above all the three petitioners admittedly resigned on
30.09.1989,   31.1.1995   and   23.5.1989   on   medical   grounds   with
benefit of compassionate appointments  to one  of their dependents
under banks specific schemes are not qualified for any pensionary
benefit under the pension scheme and also in view of the regulation
22 above.

7. Further, as per regulation 29 of the pension regulations, the
benefit   of   pension   or   family   pension   or   for   employees   who   have
voluntarily retired in accordance with the provisions of the pension
scheme and not in case of the employees who have resigned. In the
case of the petitioners there is a cessation from service on medical
ground with benefit of compassionate appointment and the same has
been treated as resignation only and not voluntary retirement and
thus they are not eligible for pension. The petitioners had no right to
pension either on the date when they entered the service or on the
date on which they resigned. The petitioners have resigned under the
special scheme. Resignation and Voluntary Retirement have different
connotation   in   service   jurisprudence.   Once   petitioners   received
terminal   benefits   due   to   resignation   as   well   as   compassionate
appointments given to their dependents this being a special scheme
now   petitioners   cannot   claim   that   they   resignation   be   treated   as
voluntary retirement.

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14. Mr. Varun K. Patel, the learned counsel appearing for the Dena
Bank,   Indian   Overseas   Bank   and   Union   Bank   of   India   in   his   written
submissions has stated as under:­

(1) With respect to (2014) 16 SCC 260  - Shashikala  Devi V/s.
Central Bank of India & Ors. It is submitted that the present cases are
covered   by   the   decision   of   Hon'ble   Apex   Court   in   case   of
M.R.
Prabhakar   Vs.   Canara   Bank
(supra)   and   not   by   the   decision   of

Shashikala Devi Vs. Central Bank
(supra) as ­

(a)   The   pension   regulations   came   into   force   from   the   date   of
publication being 29­9­1995 and it covered all employees who were
in service on 1­11­1993 and continued in service as on the date of
notification as also those who were in service as on 1­11­1993 but
had retired/died before date of notification. The date of resignation
of employee in case of
Shashikala Devi
(supra) was 19­10­2007 (i.e.
after the pension regulations came into force) whereas the date of
resignation of all employees in case of M.R. Prabhakar & Ors. (supra)
was prior to 29­9­1995 and/or 1­11­1993. In the present cases, as
stated hereinabove, all petitioners had resigned prior to 29­9­1995 or
1­11­1993, which is identical to the facts of M.R. Prabhakar's case.

(b)   Prior   to   29­9­1995   (i.e.   date   of   enforcement   of   pension
regulations),   the   employees   of   the   bank   were   entitle   to   avail
voluntary retirement in terms of Regulation 19 of The Bank (Officers)
Service Regulations, which provides for at least three month's prior
notice and condition of completing 30 years of service or attaining 55
years   of   age   at   the   time   of   seeking   voluntary   retirement.   In   the
present case, admittedly, the petitioner did not completed 30 years of
service with the bank nor had reached the age of 55 years at the time
of   tendering   their   resignation   nor   had   given   three   month's   prior
notice.   Thus,   the   petitioners   were   not   eligible   to   avail   voluntary
retirement in terms of Regulation 19. Further, it is clearly evident
that they had sole intention to resigning from the services of the bank
as   per   the   provisions   of   regulation   20(2)   of   the   said   service
regulations of the bank and not for seeking voluntary retirement in
terms of Regulation 19.

(c)  The  Hon'ble  Apex  Court  in  case  of   Shashikala  Devi's  case   has
examined the issue as to whether the letter of employee was a letter
of   resignation   or   it   would   as   well   be   treated   as   letter   seeking
voluntary retirement. The Hon'ble Apex Court after detailed scrutiny
came to the conclusion that in the facts and circumstances of the
case, the real intention of employee was to avail voluntary retirement
for   which   he   was   otherwise   eligible   as   per   regulation   22   of   the
Pension Regulations, which was in force as on date of his letter of
resignation (Paragraph 8, 9, 16.1, 16.2, 17 & 18 of Shashikala Devi's

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case). However, in the present cases as stated herein above, it is a
clear case of resignation. There is no averment in the petition to the
effect that though the employees had resigned, the real intention of
the employees was to avail voluntary retirement. In fact, as stated
hereinabove,   at   the   time   of   tendering   resignation,   the   petitioners
were not qualified to avail voluntary retirement under the prevailing
provision   for   voluntary   retirement   i.e.   Regulation­   19   of   service
regulations. Therefore, there was no possibility that intention of the
petitioners was to avail voluntary retirement instead of resignation at
the time of tendering their resignation. Thus, only possibility in the
facts and circumstances of the present cases was that the employees
had resigned from the service of the bank and their intention too was
to resign from the service of the bank.

(d) The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shashikala Devi's case has
not referred to the decision of M.R. Prabhakar's case.

(2) The main challenge in the petition is against the Regulation 22
of the pension regulations, which is no more res integra in view of the
decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court in cases of
UCO Bank
(supra) and
M.R. Prabhakar's case (supra).

(3) In paragraph 17 of the petition, the petitioners have referred
the identical case being SCA No.13418/2000 filed by Bank of India
Retired   Officers'   Association   which   was   admitted   by   this   Hon'ble
Court earlier on 27­12­2000. It is submitted that this Hon'ble Court
by order dated 23.8.2010 has dismissed the said identical petition on
the   ground   of   delay   and   laches.   In   the   present   case,   the   above
mentioned petitions were filed with more gross delay and laches, the
same therefore deserve to be dismissed only on the identical ground
of delay and laches.

15. The learned counsel appearing for the respective banks submitted
that no case worth the name is made out by any of the writ­applicants
for the pensionary benefits. It is submitted that the issue is more or less
squarely covered by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court. Reliance
is placed on the following decisions.

(
1) (2011) 12 SCC 197
Sheelkumar Jain Vs. New India Assurance Company Limited & Ors

(2) AIR 2015 SC 2434
Shashikala Devi Vs. Central Bank of India & Ors.

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(3) (2012) 9 SCC 671
M.R. Prabhakar & Ors. Vs. Canara Bank & Ors.

(4) (2001) 9 SCC 318
Bank of India Vs. Indu Rajagopalan & Ors.

(5) Civil Appeal No.10251 of 2014 decided on 12/10/2015 by the
Division Bench of the Supreme Court.

Asger Ibrahim Amin Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India

(6) Letters Patent Appeal No.299 of 2013; decided by the Division
Bench of this Court on 08/05/2014.

Vijaya Bank Vs. Chandrakant Devjibhai Patel

(7) Letters Patent Appeal (Stamp) No.536 of 2004; decided by the
Division Bench of this Court on 17/10/2005.

Kamlesh Natwarlal Bhatt Vs. Union Bank of India & Ors.

(
8) (2004) 4 SCC 412
UCO Bank And Ors. Vs. Sanwar Mal

(
9) (2004) 9 SCC 461
Reserve Bank of India And Anr.  Vs. Cecil Dennis Solomon & Anr
.

16. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls
for my consideration is whether the writ­applicants are entitled to the
pensionary   benefits   having   resigned   from   their   service   with   the
respective banks.

17. Since a preliminary objection has been raised on behalf the banks
as regards the maintainability of these writ­applications on the ground of
gross and inordinate delay in approaching this Court, I deem it proper to
deal with the same first.

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18.
In the case of
Union of India & Ors. Vs. Tarsem Singh
reported in
(2008) 8 SCC 648, the Supreme Court considered the question whether
the High Court was justified in directing payment of arrears towards the
pension for a period of 16 years.  While considering the said question the
Supreme Court explained the principles underlying continuing wrongs
and recurring/ successive wrongs which are normally applied to service
law   disputes.   The   observation   of   the   Supreme   Court   as   contained   in
Paragraphs­4 and 5 are relevant. The same are elicited as under:­

4.     The   principles   underlying   continuing   wrongs   and   recurring/
successive   wrongs   have   been   applied   to   service   law   disputes.   A
`continuing   wrong'   refers   to   a   single   wrongful   act   which   causes   a
continuing injury.`Recurring/successive wrongs' are those which occur
periodically, each wrong giving rise to a distinct and separate cause of
action.   This   Court   in   Balakrishna   S.P.   Waghmare   vs.   Shree
Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan ­ [AIR 1959 SC 798], explained the
concept of continuing wrong (in the context of section 23 of Limitation
Act, 1908 corresponding to
section 22
of Limitation Act, 1963) :

"It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which
creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act
responsible  and  liable  for  the  continuance  of the  said  injury.  If the
wrongful   act   causes   an   injury   which   is   complete,   there   is   no
continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may
continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the
injury   caused   by   it   itself   continues,   then   the   act   constitutes   a
continuing   wrong.   In   this   connection,   it   is   necessary   to   draw   a
distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what
may be described as the effect of the said injury."

In
M. R. Gupta vs. Union of India
[1995 (5) SCC 628], the appellant
approached the High Court in 1989 with a grievance in regard to his
initial pay fixation with effect from 1.8.1978. The claim was rejected
as it was raised after 11 years. This Court applied the principles  of
continuing   wrong   and   recurring   wrongs   and   reversed   the   decision.
This Court held :

"The appellant's grievance that his pay fixation was not in accordance
with the rules, was the assertion of a continuing wrong against him
which gave rise to a recurring cause of action each time he was paid a
salary which was not computed in accordance with the rules. So long
as   the   appellant   is   in   service,   a   fresh   cause   of   action   arises   every

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month when he is paid his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong
computation  made  contrary to rules. It is no doubt  true that if the
appellant's claim is found correct on merits, he would be entitled to be
paid according  to the properly fixed pay scale in the future and the
question of limitation would arise for recovery of the arrears for the
past period. In other words, the appellant's claim, if any, for recovery
of arrears calculated on the basis of difference in the pay which has
become time barred would not be recoverable, but he would be entitled
to proper fixation of his pay in accordance with rules and to cessation
of a continuing wrong if on merits his claim is justified. Similarly, any
other   consequential   relief   claimed   by   him,   such   as,   promotion   etc.,
would also be subject to the defence of laches etc. to disentitle him to
those reliefs. The pay fixation can be made only on the basis of the
situation existing on 1.8.1978 without taking into account any other
consequential relief which may be barred by his laches and the bar of
limitation.   It   is   to   this   limited   extent   of   proper   pay   fixation,   the
application cannot be treated as time barred........."

In
Shiv Dass vs. Union of India
­ 2007 (9) SCC 274, this Court held:

"The  High  Court  does  not  ordinarily  permit  a belated  resort  to the
extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public
inconvenience   and   bring   in   its   train   new   injustices,   and   if   writ
jurisdiction   is   exercised   after   unreasonable   delay,   it   may   have   the
effect   of   inflicting   not   only   hardship   and   inconvenience   but   also
injustice   on   third   parties.   It   was   pointed   out   that   when   writ
jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of
third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also
weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such
jurisdiction.

In   the   case   of   pension   the   cause   of   action   actually   continues   from
month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay
in   filing   the   petition..........   If   petition   is   filed   beyond   a   reasonable
period say three years normally the Court  would reject  the same or
restrict   the   relief  which   could   be  granted   to  a  reasonable  period   of
about three years."

5.       To summarize, normally, a belated service related claim will be
rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by
filing  a writ  petition)  or  limitation  (where  remedy  is sought  by an
application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to
the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service
related  claim is based on a continuing  wrong,  relief can be granted
even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the
date on which the continuing  wrong  commenced,  if such continuing
wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception
to   the   exception.   If   the   grievance   is   in   respect   of   any   order   or
administrative decision which related to or affected several others also,
and if the re­opening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third

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parties,   then  the   claim   will  not   be   entertained.   For   example,   if  the
issue relates to payment or re­fixation of pay or pension, relief may be
granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties.
But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion etc.,
affecting  others,  delay  would  render  the claim  stale  and  doctrine  of
laches/limitation will be applied. In so far as the consequential relief of
recovery   of   arrears   for   a   past   period,   the   principles   relating   to
recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, High Courts
will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a
period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.

19. I   am   conscious   of   the   well­settled   principle   that   delay   defeats
equity. However, the rule which says that the Court may not inquire into
belated and stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based
on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable
rule that whenever there is a delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to
entertain   the   petition.  Each   case   must   depend   on   its   own   facts.   The
question of delay is one of discretion of the court to follow from case to
case.   There   is   no   lower   limit   and   there   is   no   upper   limit.   It   will   all
depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy
claimed   are   and   how   the   delay   arose.   (See
Ramchandra   Shankar
Deodhar and others v. The State of Maharashtra and others
, reported in
AIR 1974 SC 259)

20. I am dealing with a very important issue as regards the claim of
pensionary benefits. I am of the view that only on the ground of delay
and laches, the writ­applications should not be rejected.

21.
In the aforesaid context, I may refer to a  pronouncement of the
Supreme   Court   in   the   case   of
Tukaram   Kana   Joshi   and   others   v.
M.I.D.C.   and   others
,   reported   in  AIR   2013   SC   565.   His   Lordship
Dr.B.S.Chauhan, J. reiterated the position of law on the issue of delay.
What   was   assailed   before   the   Supreme   Court   was   the   judgment   and

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order passed by the High Court of Bombay by way of which the High
Court had rejected the claim of the appellants for compensation due to
them for the land taken by the respondent authorities, without resorting
to any procedure prescribed by law. It was contended before the Court
that the delay and laches on the part of the appellants had extinguished
the right to put forth a claim. In such circumstances, His Lordship made
the following observations in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12, which, in my
opinion, are very apt and helps the writ­applicants:

"10. The State, especially a welfare State which is governed by the Rule
of Law, cannot arrogate itself to a status beyond one that is provided
by the Constitution. Our Constitution is an organic and flexible one.
Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise
of   jurisdiction   to   grant   relief.   There   is   another   facet.   The   Court   is
required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent
on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the
facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment.
There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause of action, etc. That
apart,   if whole   thing  shocks  the   judicial  conscience,  then  the   Court
should exercise the discretion more so, when no third party interest is
involved. Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrine of delay
and laches as the same is not a constitutional imitation, the cause of
action is continuous and further the situation certainly shocks judicial
conscience.

11. The question of condonation of delay is one of the discretion and
has to be decided on the basis of the facts of the case at hand, as the
same vary from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of
fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the
delay  arose.  It  is  not   that  there  is  any  period   of  limitation   for  the
Courts to exercise their powers under
Article 226
, nor is it that there
can  never  be a case where  the Courts  cannot  interfere  in a matter,
after  the   passage  of  a certain   length   of  time.  There   may  be  a case
where  the  demand  for  justice  is so compelling,  that the High Court
would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay. Ultimately, it would be
a matter within the discretion of the Court and such discretion, must
be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat
it.  The   validity  of  the  party's   defence  must  be  tried   upon   principles
substantially equitable. (Vide:
P.S.Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N.
AIR
1974 SC 2271;
State of M.P. and Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and Ors.
,
AIR 1987 SC 251; and
Tridip Kumar Dingal and Ors. v. State of West
Bengal and Ors.
, (2009) 1 SCC 768: (AIR 2008 SC (Suppl) 824);)

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12.  No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court
should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves
it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion
must  be  exercised  judiciously  and   reasonably.  In  the  event   that  the
claim   made  by  the  applicant   is legally   sustainable,  delay  should  be
condoned. In other words, where circumstances justifying the conduct
exist, the illegality which is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole
ground   of   laches.   When   substantial   justice   and   technical
considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial
justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have
a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non­deliberate
delay. The court should not harm innocent parties if their rights have
infact emerged,  by delay on the part of the petitioners. (Vide:
Durga
Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports and Ors.
AIR 1970
SC 769;
Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. V. Mst
.

Katiji
and Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1353;
Delhi Rohtas Light Railway Company
Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur and Ors.
, AIR 1993 SC 802: (1992 AIR
SCW 3181);
Dayal Singh  and  Ors.  v. Union  of India and  Ors.
AIR
2003 SC 1140: (2003 AIR SCW 685); and Shankara Co­op.
Housing
Society Ltd. v. M.Prabhakar and Ors.
AIR 2011 SC 2161 : (2011 AIR
SCW 3033))"

22. Applying   the   aforesaid   proposition   of   law
laid   down   by
the
Supreme Court, I hold that the preliminary objection raised on behalf of
the banks as regards the delay and laches deserves to be overruled and is
accordingly overruled.

23. I   propose   to   examine   the   issue   raised   on   behalf   of   the   writ­
applicants on merits.

24. Let me first look into the relevant regulations:­

1.   Dena Bank (Employees') Pension Regulations, 1995,
Indian Overseas Bank (Employees') Regulations, 1995
Union Bank of India (Employees') Regulations, 1995

Regulation­2(k):­ "date of retirement" means the last date of the
month in which an employee attains the age of superannuation or the
date on which he is retired by the Bank or the date on which the

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employee   voluntarily   retires;   or   the   date   on   which   the   officer   is
deemed to have retired;

Regulation­2(l):­ "deemed to have retired" means cessation from
service   of   the   Bank   on   appointment   by   Central   Government   as   a
whole­time Director or Managing Director or Chairman in the Bank
or in any other Bank specified in column 2 of the
FIRST SCHEDULE
of   the   Act
or
Banking   Companies   (Acquisition   and   Transfer   of
Undertakings)   Act,   1970
(5   of   1970)   or   in   any   public   financial
institution  or State  Bank of  India  established under
State  Bank of
India Act, 1955
(23 of 1955);

Regulation­2(y):­ "retirement" means cessation from Bank's service

-

(a)   On   attaining   the   age   of   superannuation   specified   in   Service
Regulations or Settlements;

(b) On voluntary retirement in accordance with provisions contained
in regulation 29 of these regulations;

(c) On premature retirement by the Bank before attaining the age of
superannuation specified in Service Regulations or Settlement;

Regulation­(za):­   "service   regulations"  means   DENA   BANK
(Officers') Service Regulations, 1979 made under
section 19
of the
Act;

Regulation­3:­   Application   -  These   regulations   shall   apply   to
employees who ­

(i) (a) were in the service of the Bank on or after 1st day of January,
1986 but had retired before the 1st day of November, 1993; and

(b) exercise an option in writing within one hundred and twenty
days from the notified date to become member of the Fund; and

(c) refund within sixty days after expiry of the said period of one
hundred   and   twenty   days   specified   in   clause   (b)   the   entire
amount   of   the   Bank's   contribution   to   the   Provident   Fund
including interest accrued thereon together with a further simple
interest at the rate of six percent per annum on the said amount
from the date of settlement of the Provident Fund account till the
date of refund of the aforesaid amount to the Bank; or

(2) (a) have retired on or after the 1st  day of November, 1993 but
before the notified date; and

(b) exercise an option in writing within one hundred and twenty
days from the notified date to become member of the Fund; and

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(c) refund within sixty days after the expiry of the said period of
one hundred and twenty days specified in clause (b) the entire
amount  of   the   Bank's   contribution  to   the   Provident  Fund   and
interest accrued thereon together with a further simple interest at
rate of six per cent per annum on the said amount from the date
of settlement of the Provident Fund account till the date of refund
of the aforesaid amount to the Bank; or

(3) (a) are in the service of the Bank before the notified date and
continue to be in the service of the Bank on or after the notified
date; and

(b) exercise an option in writing within one hundred and twenty
days from the notified date to become member of the Fund; and

(c)   authorise   the   trust   of   the   Provident   Fund   of   the   Bank
alongwith the interest accrued thereon to the credit of the Fund
constituted for the purpose under regulation 5; or

(4) join the service of the Bank on or after the notified date; or

(5) were in the service of the Bank during any time on or after the 1st
day of November. 1993 and had died after retirement but before
the notified date, their family shall be entitled for the amount of
pension payable to them from the date on which they would have
been entitled to pension under these regulations, had they been
alive   till   the   date   on   which   they   died,   if   the   family   of   the
deceased ­

(a) exercise an option in writing within one hundred and twenty
days from the notified date to become member of the Fund; and

(b) refund within sixty days after the expiry of the said period of
one hundred and twenty days specified in clause (a) above the
entire amount of the Bank's contribution to the Provident Fund
and   interest   accrued   thereon   together   with   a   further   simple
interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of
settlement of the Provident Fund account till the date of refund of
the aforesaid amount to the Bank; or

(6) joined the service of the Bank on or after the 1st day of November,
1993 but who have died while in the service of the Bank before
the   notified   date,   their   family   shall   be   entitled   to   the   family
pension under these regulations;

Provided that the family of such a deceased employee refunds
within one hundred and eighty days from the notified date the

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entire amount of the Bank's contribution to the Provident Fund, if
any, and interest accrued thereon together with further simple
interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of
settlement of the Provident Fund account till the date of refund of
the aforesaid amount to the Bank;

Provided  further  that  the  family  of   such  a   deceased  employee
shall apply in writing for grant of family pension; or

(7) were in the service of the Bank during any time on or after the 1st
day of January, 1986 and had died while in service on or before
the 31st day of October, 1993 or had retired on or before the 31st
day of October, 1993 but died before the notified date in which
case their family shall be entitled to the pension or the family
pension as the case may be under these regulations, if the family
of the deceased ­

(a) exercise an option in writing within one hundred and twenty
days from the notified date to become member of the Fund; and

(b) refund within sixty days of the expiry of the said period of
one hundred and twenty days specified in clause (a) above the
entire amount of the Bank's contribution to the Provident Fund
and   interest   accrued   thereon   together   with   a   further   simple
interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum from the date of
settlement of the Provident Fund account till the date of refund of
the aforesaid amount to the Bank; or

(8)   joined   the   service   of   the   Bank   on   or   before   the   31st  day   of
October, 1993 and who died while in service on or after the 1st
day of November, 1993 but before the notified date in which case
their   families   shall   be   entitled   to   family   pension   under   these
regulations if the family of the deceased employee -

(a) exercise an option in writing within one hundred and twenty
days from the notified date to become member of the Fund; and

(b)   refund within sixty days of the expiry of the said period of
one hundred and twenty days specified in clause (a) above the
entire amount of the Bank's contribution to the Provident Fund,
including interest accrued thereon together with a further simple
interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum from the date of
settlement of the Provident Fund account of the employee till the
date of refund of the aforesaid amount to the Bank;

(9) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub­regulations (1), (2),
(3), (5) and (6) an option exercised before the notified date by
an employee or the family of a deceased employee in pursuance
of the settlement shall be deemed to be an option for the purpose

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of this Chapter if such an employee or the family of deceased
employee  refund  within  sixty  days  from  the  notified  date,  the
amount   of   the   Bank's   contribution   to   the   Provident   Fund
including interest accrued thereon together with a further simple
interest in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter and in
case   employer's   contribution   of   Provident   Fund   has   not   been
received from Provident Fund Trush has authorised or authorises
within   sixty   days   from   the   notified   date   of   trustees   of   the
Provident Fund of the Bank to transfer the entire contributions of
the   Bank   to   the   Provident   Fund   including   interest   accrued
thereon in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter to the
credit of the Fund constituted for this purpose under regulation 5.

Regulation­14:­   Qualifying   Service   -  Subject   to   the   other
conditions   contained   in   these   regulations,   an   employee   who   has
rendered a minimum of ten years of service in the Bank on the date
of his retirement or the date on which he is deemed to have retired
shall qualify for pension.

Regulation­22 ­ Forfeiture of service.

(i) Resignation   or   dismissal   or   removal   or   termination   of   an
employee from the service of the Bank shall entail forfeiture of
his   entire   past   service   and   consequently   shall   not   qualify   for
pensionary benefits:

(2) An   interruption   in   the   service   of   a   Bank   employee   entails
forfeiture   of   his   past   service,   except   in   the   following   cases,
namely:

(a) authorized leave of absence;

(b)   suspension,   where   it   is   immediately   followed   by
reinstatement, whether in the same or a different post, or where
the bank employee dies or is permitted to retire or is retired on
attaining   the   age   of   compulsory   retirement   while   under
suspension;

(c) transfer to non­qualifying service in an establishment under
the control of the Government or Bank if such transfer has been
ordered by a competent authority in the public interest;

(d) joining time while on transfer from one post to another.

(3)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  sub­regulation  (2),  the
appointing authority may, by order, commute retrospectively the
periods of absence without leave as extraordinary leave.

(4) (a) In the absence of a specific indication to the contrary in the
service   record,   an   interruption,   between   two   spells   of   service
rendered by a bank employee shall be treated as automatically
condoned and the pre­interruption service treated as qualifying

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service;

(b) Nothing in clause (a) shall apply to interruption caused by
resignation, dismissal or removal from service or for participation
in a strike;

Provided that before making an entry in the service record of the
Bank employee regarding forfeiture of past service because of his
participation in strike, an opportunity of representation may be
given to such bank employees."

Regulation­29:­ Pension on voluntary Retirement ­ (i) On or after
the 1st  day of November, 1993, at any time after an employee has
completed twenty years of qualifying service he may, by giving notice
of not less than three months in writing to the appointing authority,
retire from service;

Provided that this sub­regulation shall not apply to an employee who
is on deputation or on study leave abroad unless after having been
transferred or having returned to India he has resumed charge of the
post in India and has served for a period of not less than one year:

Provided   further   that   this   sub­regulation   shall   not   apply   to   an
employee   who   seeks   retirement   from   service   for   being   absorbed
permanently in an autonomous body or a public section undertaking
or company or institution or body, whether incorporated or not to
which   he   is   on   deputation   at   the   time   of   seeking   voluntary
retirement:

Provided that this sub­regulations shall not apply to an employee who
is deemed to have retired in accordance with clause (1) of regulation

2.

(2) The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub­regulation
(1) shall require acceptance by the appointing authority:

Provided that where the appointing authority does not refuse to grant
the permission for retirement before the expiry of the period specified
in the said notice, the retirement shall become effective from the date
of expiry of the said period.

(3) (a) An employee referred to in sub­regulation (1) may make a
request in writing to the appointing authority to accept notice or
voluntary   retirement  of   less   than  three   months  giving   reasons
therefore;

(b)   On   receipt   of   a   request   under   clause   (a),   the   appointing

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authority  may,   subject  to   the   provisions  of   sub­regulation  (2),
consider such request for the curtailment of the period of notice
of three months on merits and if it is satisfied that the curtailment
of   the   period   of   notice   will   not   cause   any   administrative
inconvenience,   the   appointing   authority   may   relax   the
requirement of notice of three months on the condition that the
employee shall not apply for commutation of a part of his pension
before the expiry of the notice of three months.

(4) An employee, who has elected to retire under this regulation
and   has   given   necessary   notice   to   that   effect   to   the   appointing
authority, shall be precluded from withdrawing his notice except with
the specific approval of such authority:

Provided that the request for such withdrawal shall be made before
the intended date of his retirement.

(5) The   qualifying   service   of   an   employee   retiring   voluntarily
under this regulation shall be increased by a period not exceeding
five years, subject to the condition that the total qualifying service
rendered by such employee shall not in any case exceed thirty­three
years and it does not take him beyond the date of superannuation.

(6) The   pension   of   an   employee   retiring   under   this   regulation
shall be based on the average emoluments as defined under clause

(d)   of   regulation   2   of   these   regulations   and   the   increase,   not
exceeding five years in his qualifying service, shall not entitle him to
any   notional   fixation   of   pay   for   the   purpose   of   calculating   his
pension.

2.   Dena/ IOB /UBI Bank (Officers') Service Regulations, 1979

Regulation­19 Age of Retirement:­
(1) The   age   of   retirement   of   an   Officer   employee   shall   be   as
determined by the Board in accordance with the guidelines issued by
the Government from time to time.

Provided that the Bank may, at its discretion on review by the Special
Committee/   Special   Committees   as   provided   hereinafter   in   Sub­
Regulation (2) retire, if it is of the opinion that it is in the public
interest, an Officer employee on or at any time after the completion
of 55 years of age or on or at any time after the completion of 30
years of total service as an Officer employee or otherwise, whichever
is earlier.

Provided  further  that  before  retiring  an  Officer  employee,  at  least
three   months'  notice  in  writing  or   an  amount  equivalent  to   three

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months' substantive salary/pay and allowances, shall be given to such
Officer employee.

Provided   also   that   nothing   in   the   Regulation   shall   be   deemed   to
preclude an Officer employee from retiring earlier pursuant to the
option exercised by him in accordance with the rules in the Bank.

Explanation:  An Officer employee will retire on the last day of the
month in which he completes his age of retirement.

Provided that an Officer employee whose date of birth is on the first
day of a month shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last
day of preceding month on attaining the age of retirement.

(2) The   Bank   shall   constitute   a   Special   Committee/   Special
Committees  consisting  of  not  less  than  three  members,  to   review,
whether an Officer employee should be retired in accordance with the
first proviso to this regulation. Such Committee/ Committees shall,
from time to time, review the case of each Officer employee, and no
order   of   retirement   shall   be   made   unless   the   Special   Committee/
Special   Committees   recommends   in   writing   to   the   Competent
Authority the retirement of the Officer employee.

Regulation­20 Termination of Service:­
(2) An  Officer  shall   not  leave   or   discontinue  his  service  in  the
Bank without first giving a notice in writing of his intention to leave
or discontinue  his service or  resign. The period of notice required
shall be 3 months and shall be submitted to the Competent Authority
as prescribed in these regulations.

Provided further that the Competent Authority may reduce the period
of three months or remit the requirement of notice.

25. Let me now look into the decisions of the Supreme Court on the
subject.

26.
In the case of
UCO Bank
(Supra), the Supreme Court explained
the   distinction   between   the   "resignation"   and   "retirement".   The
observation of the Supreme Court as contained in Paragraph­4 to 9 are
as under:­

4. Now   coming   to   the   said   regulations,   it   may   be   stated   that
regulations  2(j) defines  "contribution"  to mean  any sum credited  by
the bank on behalf of the employee to the Pension Fund. Under clause

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(k)   of   regulation   (2),   the   "date   of   retirement"   has   been   defined   to
mean the last date of the month in which an employee tains the age of
superannuation or the date on which he stood retired by the bank or
the   date   on   which   the   employee   voluntarily   retires   or   the   date   on
which the officer is deemed to have retired.
Regulation 2(q)
defines the
word   "Fund"   to   mean   UCO   Bank   (Employees)   Pension   Fund
constituted   under   regulation   5.
Regulation   2(s)
defines   "pay"   to
include the basic pay and all allowances counted for the purposes of
contribution   to   the   provident   fund   and   for   payment   of   dearness
allowance, in relation to an employee who has either retired or died on
or   after   1.1.1986   but   before   1.11.1993.
Regulation   3(1)
inter   alia
states that the said regulations shall apply to employees who were in
service   of   the   bank   on   or   after   1.1.1986   but   who   retired   prior   to
1.11.1993 and who exercised option to join the pension scheme within
120 days from the notified date i.e. 29.9.1995. Suffice it to state that
the  entire  regulation  3 refers  to retirees  only and  not  to those  who
have resigned or dismissed/removed from the bank.
Regulation 5
deals
with the constitution of a pension fund. It states that the bank shall
constitute a Fund under an irrevocable trust within the specified period
to provide for payment of pension/family pension in accordance with
regulations. It further provides that the bank shall be a contributor to
the said fund to ensure that the trustees make due payments to the
beneficiaries under these regulations. A bare reading of regulation 5
indicates   that   the   fund   will   be   managed   by   the   trustees   and   the
beneficiaries are the employees covered by the regulations.
Regulation
inter alia states that on constitution of the said fund, the Provident
Fund Trust shall transfer to the pension fund the accumulated balance
of the contribution of the bank to the Provident Fund along with the
interest accrued thereon up to the date of transfer.
Regulation 7
deals
with   composition   of   the   pension   fund.   It   states   that   pension   shall
consist of the contribution by the bank at the rate of 10% per month of
the pay of the employee; the accumulated contributions of the bank to
the   Provident   Fund   along"   with   interest   accrued   up   to   the   date   of
transfer;  the  amount  consist  ing  of contributions  of the  bank  along
with interest refunded by the employees who retired before the notified
date but who opt for pension in accordance with the regulations; the
investment in annuities / securities purchased out of the moneys of the
Fund; annual contribution by the bank and income from investments.

Regulation   7
,   therefore,   indicates   that   the   scheme   is   self­financing
scheme to be run on the basis of contributions from the employees and
the  bank.  It further  shows  that it is a funded  scheme,  which is not
dependent   upon   budgetary   support.
Regulation   14
inter   alia   states
inter alia that an employee who has rendered a minimum of 10­years
of service in the bank on the date of his retirement shall qualify for
pension.
Regulation 22
deals with forfeiture of service and it reads as
follows :

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"Forfeiture   of   service.   (1)   Resignation   or   dismissal   or   removal   or
termination  of  an employee  from  the  service  of  the  Bank  shall  entail
forfeiture of his entire past service and consequently shall not qualify for
pensionary   benefits:   (2)   An   interruption   in   the   service   of   a   Bank
employee   entails  forfeiture   of  his  past   service,  except   in  the   following
cases, namely : (a) authorized leave of absence; (b) suspension, where it
is   immediately   followed   by   reinstatement,   whether   in   the   same   or   a
different post, or where the bank employee dies or is permitted to retire
or is retired on attaining the age of compulsory retirement while under
suspension;   (c)   transfer   to   non­qualifying   service   in   an   establishment
under the control of the Government or Bank if such transfer has been
ordered by a competent authority in the public interest; (d) joining time
while   on   transfer   from   one   post   to   another.   (3)   Notwithstanding
anything contained in sub­regulation (2), the appointing authority may,
by order, commute retrospectively the periods of absence without leave
as extraordinary leave. (4) (a) In the absence of a specific indication to
the contrary in the service record, an interruption, between two spells of
service rendered by a bank employee shall be treated as automatically
condoned and the pre­interruption service treated as qualifying service;

(b)   Nothing   in   clause   (a)   shall   apply   to   interruption   caused   by
resignation, dismissal or removal from service or for participation in a
strike; Provided that before making an entry in the service record of the
Bank   employee   regarding   forfeiture   of   past   service   because   of   his
participation in strike, an opportunity of representation may be given to
such bank employees."

5. Chapter   V   refers   to   Classes   of   pension   and   it   covers
superannuation   pension;   pension   on   voluntary   retirement;   invalid
pension; compassionate allowance, pre­mature retirement pension and
compulsory retirement pension. Regulation 34 which also falls within
chapter V deals with payment of pension/family pension in respect of
employees   who   retired   or   died   between   1.1.1986   to   31.10.1993.   It
states that such retirees shall be eligible for pension from 1.11.1993.
Further, different formulas are laid down for computation of pension
having   co­relationship   with   the   classes   of   pension.   Accordingly,
computation   of   pension   on   voluntary   retirement   is   different   from
computation of pension in the case of invalid pension or pre­mature
retirement pension or compulsory retirement pension.

6. To sum up, the pension scheme embodied in the regulation is a
self­supporting scheme. It is a code by itself. The bank is a contributor
to the pension fund. The bank ensures availability of funds with the
trustees   to   make   due   payments   to   the   beneficiaries   under   the
regulations. The beneficiaries are employees covered by the regulation

3.  It is  in this  light  that  one  has  to construe  regulation  22  quoted
above.
Regulation 22
deals with forfeiture of service.
Regulation 22(1)

states   that   resignation,   dismissal,   removal   or   termination   of   an
employee   from   the   service   of   the   bank   shall   entail   forfeiture   of   his
entire past service and consequently shall not qualify for pensionary

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benefits. In other words, the pension scheme disqualifies such dismissed
employees and employees who have resigned from membership of the
fund.   The   reason   is   not   far   to   seek.   In   a   self­financing   scheme,   a
separate fund is earmarked as the scheme is not based on budgetary
support.   It   is   essentially   based   on   adequate   contributions   from   the
members of the fund. It is for this reason that under regulation 11,
every   bank  is  required  to  cause  an  investigation  to  be   made  by  an
actuary into the financial condition of the fund from time to time and
depending   on   the   deficits,   the   bank   is   required   to   make   annual
contributions to the fund.
Regulation 12
deals with investment of the
fund whereas regulation 13 deals with payment out of the fund. In the
case of retirement, voluntary or on superannuation, there is a nexus
between retirement and retiral benefits under the provident fund rules.
Retirement is allowed only on completion of qualifying service which is
not there in the case of resignation. When such a retire opts for self­
financing   pension   scheme,   he   brings   in   accumulated   contribution
earned by him after completion qualifying number of years of service
under   provident   fund   rules   whereas   a   person   who   resigns   may   not
have adequate credit balance to his provident fund account (i.e. banks
contribution) and, therefore, the regulation 3 does not cover employees
who   have   resigned.   Similarly,   in   the   case   of   a   dismissed   employee,
there   may   be   forfeiture   of   his   retiral   benefits   and   consequently   the
framers of the scheme have kept out the retirees as well as dismissed
employees   vide   regulation   22.   Further,   the   pension   payable   to   the
beneficiaries under the scheme would depend on income accruing on
investments and unless there is adequate corpus, the scheme may not
be workable and, therefore, clause 22 prescribes a disqualification to
dismissed   employees   and   employees   who   have   resigned.   Lastly,   as
stated  above,  the scheme  contemplated  pension as the second  retiral
benefit   in   lieu   of   employers'   contribution   to   contributory   provident
fund. Therefore, the said scheme was not a continuation of the earlier
scheme of provident fund. As a new scheme, it was entitled to keep out
dismissed employees and employees who have resigned.

7. In the light of our above analysis of the scheme, we now proceed
to deal with the arguments advanced by both the sides. It was inter
alia urged on behalf of the appellant bank that under regulation 22,
category  of employees  who  have  resigned   from  the  service  and   who
have been dismissed  or removed from the service  are not entitled  to
pension,   that   the   pension   scheme   constituted   a  separate   fund   to  be
regulated on self­financing principles, that prior to the introduction of
the pension  scheme,  there  was in existence  a provident  fund  scheme
and  the present  scheme  conferred  a second  retiral  benefit to certain
classes   of   employees   who   were   entitled   to   become   the   members/
beneficiaries   of  the   fund,  that  the   membership  of  the  fund  was  not
dependent  on   the  qualifying  service  under   the  pension   scheme,  that
looking   to   the   financial   implications,   the   scheme   framed   mainly

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covered retirees because retirement presupposed larger number of years
of service, that in the case of resignation, an employee can resign on
the next day of his appointment whereas in the case of retirement, the
employee is required to put in certain number of years of service and
consequently, the scheme was a separate code by itself, that the High
Court   has   committed   manifest   error   in   decreeing   the   suit   of   the
respondent   inasmuch   as   it   has   not   considered   the   relevant   factors
contemplated   by  the   said   scheme  and   that   the   pension   scheme  was
introduced in terms of the settlement dated 29.10.1993  between the
IBA and All India Bank Employees' Association, which settlement also
categorically rules out employees who have resigned or who have been
dismissed/removed from the service.

8. Shri R.P. Bhatt, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1506 of 2003 inter alia urged that
regulation   22   to   the   extent   it   provides   for   forfeiture   of   service   and
disqualifying   those   who   have  resigned  for   pensionary   benefits   is   an
arbitrary and unreasonable classification and repugnant to
Art. 14
of
the Constitution, that regulation 22 was contrary to the objects of the
pension scheme embodied in the regulations, that employees who have
resigned after completing qualifying service contemplated by regulation
14 were entitled to opt for pension as they were in a position to bring
in   their   contribution   of   retiral   benefits   to   their   credit   for   having
worked for a minimum service of 10­ years in the bank and that the
respondent had worked for more than 10­years after which he resigned
and,   therefore,   be   fulfilled   the   qualifying   service   contemplated   by
regulation   14   and   consequently,   he   was   entitled   to   benefit   of   the
pension scheme.

9. We  find   merit   in  these  appeals.   The  words  "resignation"  and
"retirement"   carry   different   meanings   in   common   parlance.   An
employee can resign at any point of time, even on the second day of his
appointment   but   in   the   case   of   retirement   he   retires   only   after
attaining   the   age   of   superannuation   or   in   the   case   of   voluntary
retirement on completion of qualifying service. The effect of resignation
and retirement to the extent that there is severance of employment but
in   service   jurisprudence   both   the   expressions   are   understood
differently.  Under  the  Regulations,  the  expressions  "resignation"  and
"retirement"   have   been   employed   for   different   purpose   and   carry
different meanings. The pension scheme herein is based on actuarial
calculation; it is a self­financing scheme, which does not depend upon
budgetary support and consequently it constitutes a complete code by
itself.  The  scheme  essentially  covers  retirees  as the  credit  balance  to
their provident fund account is larger as compared to employees who
resigned   from   service.   Moreover,   resignation   brings   about   complete
cessation   of   master   and   servant   relationship   whereas   voluntary
retirement   maintains   the   relationship   for   the   purposes   of   grant   of

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retiral  benefits,  in  view   of  the   past  service.  Similarly,   acceptance  of
resignation   is   dependent   upon   discretion   of   the   employer   whereas
retirement   is   completion   of   service   in   terms   of   regulations/   rules
framed  by the bank.  Resignation  can be tendered  irrespective  of the
length   of   service   whereas   in   the   case   of   voluntary   retirement,   the
employee   has   to   complete   qualifying   service   for   retiral   benefits.
Further,   there   are   different   yardsticks   and   criteria   for   submitting
resignation   vis­a­vis   voluntary   retirement   and   acceptance   thereof.

Since   the   pension   regulations   disqualify   an   employee,   who   has
resigned,   from   claiming   pension   the   respondent   cannot   claim
membership   of   the   fund.   In   our   view,   regulation   22   provides   for
disqualification of employees who have resigned from service and for
those who have been dismissed or removed from service. Hence, we do
not   find   any   merit   in   the   arguments   advanced   on   behalf   of   the
respondent that regulation 22 makes an arbitrary and unreasonable
classification repugnant to
Art. 14
of the Constitution by keeping out
such class of employees. The view we have taken is supported by the
Judgement of this Court in the case of
Reserve Bank of India & Anr. v.
Cecil   Dennis   Solomon   &   Anr.
reported   in   [2003   (10)   Scale   449].
Before concluding we may state that clause 22 is not in the nature of
penalty as alleged.  It only disentitles  an employee  who has resigned
from service  from becoming  a member  of the Fund. Such employees
have   received   their   retiral   benefits   earlier.   The   pension   scheme,   as
stated above, only provides for a second retiral benefit. Hence there is
no question  of penalty being  imposed  on such employees  as alleged.
The   pension   scheme   only   provides   for   an   avenue   for   investment   to
retirees.
They  are provided  avenue  to put in their  savings  and  as a
term or condition which is more in the nature of an eligibility criteria
the scheme disentitles such category of employees out of it.

27.
In   the   case   of
Reserve Bank of India
(Supra),  the  respondents
were   employees   of   the   Reserve   Bank   of   India.   In   1988,   during   the
operation of the Reserve Bank of India   (Staff) Regulations, 1948 they
tendered   their   resignation.   They   were   getting   the   superannuation
benefits   under   the   contributory   provision   and   gratuity   schemes.
Subsequently,   the   Reserve   Bank   of   India   Pension   Regulations,   1990
framed under
Section 58(2)(j)
of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934
came into effect.
Regulation 2(12)
of the Pension Regulations defined
"retirement" and
Regulation 18
provided that on resignation, the past
service   would   be   forfeited   and   would   not   qualify   for   entitlement   for

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pension.   The   Staff   Regulations   enabled   an   employee   attaining   the
specified age to voluntarily retire after giving the requisite notice. At the
instance   of   the   respondents,   the   Bombay   High   Court   held   that   the
Pension
Regulation 18
had no retrospective operation and therefore, the
employer RBI was legally bound to grant pension to the respondents.
The Supreme Court while allowing the appeal filed by the RBI held as
under:­

4. The   Respondents   were   working   in   various   capacities   in   the
employer organization. The employees tendered resignation sometimes
in   1988.   Subsequent   to   their   resignation,   the   Pension   Regulations
came   to  be   operative.   The   said   Regulation   was   made  in  exercise   of
powers conferred by clause (j) of sub­section (2) of
Section 58
of the
Reserve   Bank   of   India   Act,   1934   (for   short   the   'Act').   The   Central
Board of the employer­bank with the previous sanction of the Central
government   made   the   Regulations.   The   Reserve   Bank  of   India   Staff
Regulations,   1948   (in   short   'Staff   Regulations')   which   were
subsequently   amended   w.e.f.   7.2.1992   were   in   operation   at   the
relevant  time  governing  the service  conditions.
Regulation  26
of the
1948   Regulations   dealt   with   the   age   of   retirement.   Sub­rule   (3)
thereof which has some relevance to the present disputes provides that
an employee  who has attained  the age of 50 years may voluntarily
retire after giving to the competent authority three months' notice in
writing.   Though   several   other   provisions   were   incorporated   in   the
Regulation  w.e.f.  7.2.1992,  this  provision  in sub­rule  (3)  continued
unamended.   By   Pension   Regulations   prescriptions   were   made   for
granting pension to certain categories of employees. Regulations 2(12)
and 18 thereof read as follows:

"2(12): 'Retirement' means retirement in terms of Staff
Regulation 26

and other instructions issued by the Bank under settlements/awards;

18.  Forfeiture  of service  on resignation  or dismissal or termination:

Resignation   or   dismissal   or   termination   of   an   employee   from   the
service shall entail forfeiture of his entire past service and consequently
shall not qualify for pension payment."

Some of the provisions of Staff Regulations need to be noted. They read
as follows:

"
Regulation 26
. (Unamended­ prior to 7.2.1992)­
(1) an employee, other than an employee in Class IV shall retire at 58

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years of age and an employee in Class IV at 60 years of age;

Provided that in the case of an employee in Class IV who has reached
the age of 55 years the Bank may, in its discretion, retire him after
giving two months' notice in writing if in the opinion of the competent
authority his efficiency is found to have been impaired.

Provided   further   that   the   Bank   may,   in   its   discretion,   retire   an
employee,   other   than   an   employee   in   Class   IV,   at   any   time   after
completion of 50 years of age;

Provided further in the case of an employee, other than an employee in
Class  IV, who has attained  the age of 55 years,, his continuance  in
service up to the age of 58 years shall be subject to his being found
suitable to be retained in service.

(2) The power conferred by the provisos to sub­regulation (1) shall be
exercised   by   the   Governor,   with   the   prior   approval   of   the   Central
Board   in   the   case   of   officers   and   by   the   Manager,   subject   to   such
general or special instructions as may be issued by the Governor, in the
case of other employees.

(3) An employee who has attained the age of 50 years may voluntarily
retire after giving to the competent authority three months' notice in
writing.

Regulation 26
(Amended with effect from 7.2.1992):

(1) An employee shall retire at 60 years of age but no extension shall
be given to any employee beyond 60 years of age;

Provided that an employee who attains the age of superannuation on
any day other than the first during a calendar month, shall retire on
the last day of that month;

Provided further that in the case of an employee in Class IV who has
reached the age of 55 years the Bank may, in its discretion, retire him
after   giving   two   months'   notice   in   writing   if   in   the   opinion   of   the
competent authority his efficiency is found to have been impaired;

Provided further that the Bank may, in its discretion, retire in public
interest an employee, other than an employee in Class IV, at any time
after completion of 50 years of age;

Provided further in the case of an employee in Class III and Class I,

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who has attained the age of 55 years, his continuance in service upto
the age of 60 years shall be subject to his being found suitable to be
retained in service.

(2) The power conferred by the provisions to sub­regulation (1) shall
be exercised by the Governor, with the prior approval of the Central
Board   in   the   case   of   officers   and   by   the   Manager,   subject   to   such
general or special instructions as may be issued by the Governor, in the
case of other employees.

(3) An employee who has attained the age of 50 years may voluntarily
retire after giving to the competent authority three months' notice in
writing.

(3­A)   Without   prejudice   to   sub­regulation   (3),   an   employee   may
voluntarily retire after giving to the competent authority three months
notice in writing provided he has completed 20 years of service if he is
not governed by the Reserve Bank of India Pension Regulations, 1990
and 20 years of qualifying service as defined in the Reserve Bank of
India Pension Regulations, 1990, if he is governed by the Reserve Bank
of India Pension Regulations, 1990.

Provided that this sub­Regulation shall not apply to an employee who
is   on   deputation   or   study   leave   abroad,   unless,   after   having   been
transferred or having returned to India he has resumed the charge of
the post in India and served for a period of not less than one year. The
requirement of this proviso may, however, be waived at the discretion
of the Governor.

Provided   further   that   this   sub­Regulation   shall   not   apply   to   an
employee   who   seeks   retirement   from   service   for   being   absorbed
permanently in an autonomous body or a public sector undertaking to
which he is on deputation at the time of seeking voluntary retirement.

(3B)  The  notice  of voluntary  retirement  given  under  sub­Regulation
(3A)   shall   not   be   valid   unless   it   is   accepted   by   the   competent
authority;

Provided that where the competent authority does not communicate its
decision not to accept such notice before the expiry of period specified
in the notice,  the  retirement  shall become  effective  from  the date  of
expiry of such period.

(3C) The  competent authority may,  if so requested  by the employee
retiring pursuant to sub­Regulation (3) or (3A), waive the notice of

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voluntary retirement with respect to its full period or part thereof if the
competent  authority is satisfied that such waiver  will not cause any
administrative inconvenience.

(3D) An employee  who has elected  to voluntarily retire pursuant  to
sub­Regulation   (3A)   and   has   given   notice   shall   not   be   entitled   to
withdraw   the   notice   except   with   the   permission   of   the   competent
authority, provided that the request for such withdrawal shall be made
before the intended date of his retirement".

5. Since   the   respondents­employees   had   tendered   resignation,
making them ineligible / writ applications were filed before the High
Court  questioning  legality  of
Regulation  18
.  The  High Court  by the
impugned   judgment   held   that   Regulation   did   not   have   any
retrospective operation and, therefore, the employer was legally bound
to grant pension.

8.
In
Reserve   Bank   and   Another   Vs.   S.   Jayarajan
the   view
expressed in
V.T. Khanzode and Ors. Vs. Reserve  Bank of India and
Anr.
was  reiterated  that the  Staff  Regulations  are  administrative  in
nature. The Central Board is authorized to take such administrative
decisions and Central government's approval/decision is not necessary.
Therefore,  if changes  were  to be introduced  in the Staff Regulations
and   the   Central   Board   takes   a   decision,   there   would   not   be   any
necessity   for   taking   approval   of   the   Central   government.   But   the
position is different so far as the Pension Regulations are concerned.
The  said  Regulations   were   framed   with   the   sanction   of  the   Central
government   and   are   framed   in   exercise   of   the   powers   conferred   by
clause   (i)   of   sub­sec.   (2)   of
section   58
.   If   the   Central   Board
recommended for changes in the Pension Regulations, sanction of the
Central government is mandatory. This aspect seems to have been lost
sight   by   the   High   Court   and   the   respondents   cannot   derive   any
advantage from the mere recommendations made by the Central Board
suggesting   changes   to   the   Regulations.   The  Central   government  has
specifically   dealt   with   the   recommendations   and   has   turned   them
down. Unless the recommendations for the amendment are approved,
they have no binding force or application to make any claim thereon.
Further, the respondents who claim that they were not claiming the
benefit under the Pension Regulations could not point out any other
source   to   which   their   claims   could   be   linked.   The   respondents­
employees   were   getting   superannuation   benefits   accruing   to   them
under   the   contributory   provisions   and   gratuity   schemes.   The   High
Court   was   also   in   error   in   equating   the   case   of   resignation   to
voluntary retirement. The two are conceptually different in the service
jurisprudence and different consequences would flow depending upon
one or the other of the courses.

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9. Under
Regulation   26
of   the   Staff   Regulations,   four   types   of
retirements   were   contemplated   as   on   1st   November,   1990   i.e.   (a)
Retirement   on   superannuation,   (b)   Compulsory   retirement   on
invalidation, (c) Compulsory retirement and (d) Voluntary retirement.
Resignation does not fit into any one of the said categories.

10. In   service   jurisprudence,   the   expressions   superannuation,
voluntary   retirement,  compulsory  retirement  and  resignation   convey
different  connotations.  Voluntary  retirement  and  resignation  involve
voluntary  acts on the part of the employee  to leave  service.  Though
both involve voluntary acts, they operate differently. One of the basic
distinctions  is that  in case  of resignation  it can  be tendered  at any
time; but in the case of voluntary retirement, it can only be sought for
after   rendering   prescribed   period   of   qualifying   service.   Other
fundamental distinction is that in case of the former, normally retiral
benefits are denied but in case of the latter, same is not denied. In case
of the former, permission or notice is not mandated, while in case of
the   latter,   permission   of   the   concerned   employer   is   a   requisite
condition.   Though   resignation   is   a   bilateral   concept,   and   becomes
effective on acceptance by the competent authority, yet the general rule
can   be   displaced   by   express   provisions   to   the   contrary.   In   Punjab
National Bank V/s. P.K. Mittal, on interpretation of
Regulation 20(2)

of the Punjab National Bank Regulations, it was held that resignation
would automatically take effect from the date specified in the notice as
there   was   no   provision   for   any   acceptance   or   rejection   of   the
resignation  by the employer.  In Union  of India V/s. Gopal Chandra
Misra, it was held  in the  case of a judge  of the  High Court having
regard  to
Article  217
of the  Constitution  that  he   has  an  unilateral
right   or   privilege   to   resign   his   office   and   his   resignation   becomes
effective   from   the   date   which   he,   of   his   own   volition,   chooses.   But
where there is a provision empowering the employer not to accept the
resignation,   on   certain   circumstances   e.g.   pendency   of   disciplinary
proceedings, the employer can exercise the power.

11. On   the   contrary,   as   noted   by   this   Court   in
Dinesh   Chandra
Sangma Vs. State of Assam
, while the government reserves its right to
compulsorily retire a government servant, even against his wish, there
is a corresponding right of the government servant to voluntarily retire
from service. Voluntary retirement is a condition of service created by
statutory   provision   whereas   resignation   is   an   implied   term   of   any
employer employee relationship.

12. Looking from any angle the High Court judgment is indefensible
and   is   set   aside   and   the   writ   petitions   filed   by   the   respondents­
employees   stand   dismissed.   Appeals   are   allowed.   There   shall   be   no

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orders as to costs.

28.
In the case of
M.R. Prabhakar
(Supra)  almost an identical issue
like the one in hand was considered by the Supreme Court. The relevant
observations are as under:­

2. We   are,   in   these   appeals,   concerned   with   the   legality   of   the
claim  for  pension  in lieu of Contributory  Provident  Fund  (for  short
'CPF') of some officers of the Canara Bank who had resigned and stood
relieved   from   their   respective   posts   prior   to   3.6.1993,   i.e.   prior   to
signing   of   the   Statutory   Settlement   dated   29.10.1993   under   the

Industrial   Disputes   Act,   1947
,   the   Joint   Note   dated   29.10.1993,
followed  by   the   Canara   Bank   Pension  Regulations,   1995  (for   short
'Regulations   1995'),   which   was   notified   in   the   Gazette   of   India   on
29.9.1995.   The   learned   single   Judge   of   the   High   Court   held   {
K.V.
Venkatesh Vs. Syndicate Bank, WP No.21608
of 1997, order dated 20­
12­2001 (KAR)} in favour of the appellants but the Division Bench of
the High Court held {Canara Bank Vs. M.R. Prabhakar, WA No.1037
of   2002,   order   dated   18/11/2006   (KAR)}   otherwise.   Hence,   these
appeals.

3. We may, as already indicated, refer to the facts of the case in
civil appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 30983­30986 of 2008. The
appellants' date of appointment and their resignation are as under:

Position of the petitioner as per  Date of appointment Date of
cause­list resignation
1 M.R. Prabhakar 27/05/1970 04/06/91
2 S. Ananda Rao  09/09/70 22/09/1990
3 N. Anand 17/12/1969 19/04/1993
4 S. K. Mehta 15/12/1965 01/05/91
5 N.V. Rangaswamy 24­07­1968 09/01/91
6 S. Sathyanarayan  07­0701970 03/06/93
7 K. S. Seshadri  18­02­1970 20­07­1992
(since deceased)
8 K. Suresh Rao  02/05/70 30­06­1990
9 P. Govinda Pai  03/04/68 30­03­1988
10 K. V. Puranik  01/02/63 24­07­1986

14. The appellants, in our view, did not retire from the service, but
resigned from the service. Appellants tried to build up a case that in

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the   absence   of   a   legal   definition   of   'voluntary   retirement'   or   in   the
absence of legally prescribed consequences of 'resignation', it must be
understood in the sense of voluntary relinquishment of service. It was
pointed   out   that   there   can   be   no   distinction   between   'voluntary
retirement'   and   'resignation'   and   those   expressions   are   to   be
understood in their ordinary literal sense.

17. We may  indicate  that in
Sanwar  Mal
(supra),  the employee,
who was working on Class III post, resigned from the service of UCO
Bank on 25.2.1988 after giving one month's notice and also accepted
his   provident   fund   without   protest.   On   coming   into   force   of   the
Regulations   1995,   Sanwar   Mal   opted   for   pension   scheme.   Since
Sanwar  Mal had resigned  in the year 1988,  UCO Bank declined  its
option   for   admitting   him  as   a  member  of   the  fund.  This   Court,   as
already   indicated,   after   referring   to   the   various   provisions   of   the
Regulations 1995 and after examining the meaning of the expressions
'resignation' and 'retirement', held that since
Regulation 22
provided
for   disqualification   of   employees   who   had   resigned,   such   employees
could not claim membership of the fund.

18. The  learned  counsel appearing  for the appellants  have placed
heavy reliance on
Sheelkumar Jain
(supra) and submitted that in the
light of that judgment, the decision rendered in
Sanwar Mal
(supra)
requires reconsideration. We find it difficult to accept the contention
raised by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants.

19. We may point out in
Sheelkumar Jain
(supra) that this Court
was dealing  with an insurance  scheme  and not the pension  scheme,
which is applicable in the banking sector. The provisions of both the
scheme and the Regulation are not pari materia.

In
Sheelkumar Jain

case   (supra),   while   referring   to   Para   5,   this   Court   came   to   the
conclusion   that   the   same   does   not   make   distinction   between
'resignation'  and  'voluntary  retirement'  and  it only provides  that an
employee  who  wants  to leave  or  discontinue  his  service  amounts  to
'resignation'  or 'voluntary  retirement'.  Whereas,
Regulation  20(2)
of
the   Canara   Bank   (Officers)   Service   Regulations   1979   applicable   to
banks, had specifically referred to the words 'resignation', unlike Para
5 of the Insurance Rules. Further, it is also to be noted that, in that
judgment,   this   Court   in   Para   30   held   that   the   Court   will   have   to
construe the statutory provisions in each case to find out whether the
termination  of service  of an employee  was a termination  by way of
resignation or a termination by way of voluntary retirement.

20. The appellants, when tendered their letters of resignation, were
governed  by the  Regulations  1979.
Regulation  20(2)
of Regulations
1979   dealt   with   resignation   from   service   and   they   tendered   their

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resignation in the light of that provision. We are of the view that the
appellants have failed to show any pre­existing rights in their favour
either   in   the   Statutory   Settlement/Joint   Note   dated   29.10.1993   or
under the Regulations 1995. The appellants had resigned from service
prior to 1.11.1993 and, therefore, were not covered by the statutory
settlement,  Joint Note  dated  29.10.1993  and  the  Regulations  1995.

They   could   not   establish   any   pre­   existing   legal,   statutory   or
fundamental rights in their favour to claim the benefit of Regulations
1995.  Consequently,  the  reliance  placed  by the  appellants  either  on

Regulation 29
or
Regulation 22
in support of their contentions, cannot
be   accepted,   since   they   are   not   covered   by   the   scheme   of   pension
introduced by the banks with effect from 1.11.1993.

29.
In the case of
Chandrakant Devji Patel Vs. Vijya Bank
; Special
Civil   Court   No.11135   of   2001,   decided   on   03/11/2012,   I   had   the
occasion  to  consider  almost  identical  submissions  i.e.   the   submissions
canvassed   herein   on   behalf   of   the   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the
respective writ­applicants. This Court in the facts of the case took the
view that on the date when the employee tendered his resignation, if he
was otherwise entitled to voluntary retirement under the Scheme, then
such an employee would be entitled to receive pension even though he
could   be   said   to   have   resigned   from   the   service.   However,   the   view
expressed by this Court did not find favour with the Division Bench of
this Court and the judgment of this Court was set aside vide order dated
08/05/2014 passed in the Letters Patent Appeal No.299 of 2013. The
observations of the Division Bench are as under:­

3. It cannot be said that he had prematurely retired. Though the
word  is mentioned  as prematurely  retired,  we  are afraid  we cannot
exceed   to   the   submission   made   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the
respondent that he was entitled to the pension. We are in agreement
with the submission made by the appellant's counsel that the petitioner
resigned from duty vide letter dated 10.09.1992.

4. We concur with this submission and therefore on this count also
the learned Single Judge has committed error in allowing the petition.

5. The   Pension   Scheme,   1995   was   framed   and   notified   only   in

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1995 and yet the Pension Scheme, 1995 was made applicable also to
employees   who   had   left   the   services   of   the   respondent­bank   before
1995. Clauses 14 and 22 of the Pension Scheme, 1995 quoted above
were  not in existence  when  the  petitioner  submitted  his letter  dated
10th September 1992 to the Chairman and Managing Director of the
bank. Hence, when the petitioner served his letter dated 10 September
1992 to the Chairman and th Managing Director of the bank, he had
no knowledge of the difference between 'resignation' under
Regulation
and   'voluntary   retirement'   or   'premature   retirement'   because   as
such there was no provision of any voluntary retirement or premature
retirement.

6. When there was no provision of voluntary retirement or premature
retirement  and  therefore  resignation  is a resignation  and  cannot  be
converted into voluntary retirement in absence of specific stipulation.

Therefore   Sheelkumar   Jain
's   case   cannot   be   made  applicable   in   the
facts of this case.

7. For   the  following  reasons  resignation  from  the  service  of   the
petitioner  would not amount to voluntary retirement as provided  in
Clause 29 of the Vijaya Bank (Employees) Pension Regulations, 1995:

1. Petitioner had not completed the minimum qualifying service of 20
years   for   Voluntary   Retirement,   as   stipulated   in   Clause   29   of   the
Vijaya Bank (Employees') Pension Regulations, 1995;

2. Petitioner in his resignation letter dated 10th September 1992 had
given only one month's notice;

3. Resignation letter was not submitted to the Appointing Authority;

4. Resignation letter was not accepted by the Appointing  Authority
but   was   accepted   by   the   Administrative   Office   i.e.   Divisional
Manager, Ahmedabad.

On  10th  September  1992  i.e. the  date  on  which  the  petitioner  had
tendered his resignation letter, the petitioner was governed by Vijaya
Bank   (Officers')   Service   Regulations,   1982,   as   amended   upto   31   st
March 1991.
Regulation 20
of the Service Regulation reads as under:­

"20. [1] Subject to sub­regulation (3) of
Regulation 16
, the Bank may
terminate the services of any officer by giving him three month's notice
in writing or by paying him three month's emoluments in lieu thereof
(2) An officer  shall not leave or discontinue  his service  in the Bank
without first ciivinci (sic) a notice in writing of his intention to leave

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or discontinue the service or resign. The period of notice required shall
be three months and shall be submitted to the competent authority as
prescribed in these regulations.

Provided that the Competent Authority may reduce the period of three
months or remit the requirement of notice."

8. The Apex Court in case of  M.R.Prabhakar and ors. vs. Canara
Bank and ors reported in (2012) 9 SCC 671 the Court has given the
difference   between   the   resignation   and   retirement/voluntary
retirement which reads as follows:

"14. The appellants, in our view, did not retire from the service, but
resigned from the service. Appellants tried to build up a case that in
the absence  of a legal definition of 'voluntary retirement'  or in the
absence of legally prescribed consequences of 'resignation', it must be
understood in the sense of voluntary relinquishment of service. It was
pointed   out   that   there   can   be   no   distinction   between   'voluntary
retirement'   and   'resignation'   and   those   expressions   are   to   be
understood in their ordinary literal sense.

15.   We   find   it   difficult   to   accept   the   contentions   raised   by   the
appellants.   There   is   no   ambiguity   in   the   definition   clause   under

Regulation   2(y)
which   has   statutorily   brought   in   the   'voluntarily
retirement' as 'retirement'. Though the concept of 'resignation' is well
known   in   Service   Jurisprudence,   the   same   has   not   been   brought
within the definition of 'retirement' under
Regulation 2(y)
. Further,
the  words  'retired'  and 'retirement'  have  some  resemblance  in their
meanings, but not 'resignation'.
Regulation 3(1)(a)
specifically used
the   expression   'retirement'   and   the   expression   'resignation'   has   not
been   incorporated   either   in   the   definition   clause   or   in
Regulation
3(1) (a)
. We need not labour much on this issue, since the difference
between   these   two   concepts   'resignation'   and   'retirement',   in   the
context   of   the   same   Banking   Regulations   1995,   came   up   for
consideration before this Court in
Sanwar Mal
(supra), wherein this
Court has distinguished the words 'resignation' and 'retirement' and
held as follows

"9.   .........   The   words   "resignation"   and   "retirement"   carry   different
meanings in common parlance. An employee can resign at any point
of time, even on the second day of his appointment but in the case of
retirement he retires only after attaining the age of superannuation
or in the  case  of voluntary  retirement  on completion   of qualifying
service.  The  effect  of resignation  and  retirement  to the  extent   that
there is severance of employment but in service jurisprudence both the
expressions   are   understood   differently.   Under   the   Regulations,   the
expressions   "resignation"   and   "retirement"   have   been   employed   for
different purpose and carry different meanings. The pension scheme
herein is based on actuarial calculation; it is a self­financing scheme,
which does not depend upon budgetary support and consequently it

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constitutes   a complete   code   by  itself.  The   scheme  essentially   covers
retirees as the credit balance to their provident fund account is larger
as   compared   to   employees   who   resigned   from   service.   Moreover,
resignation   brings   about   complete   cessation   of   master   and   servant
relationship whereas voluntary retirement maintains the relationship
for the purposes of grant of retiral benefits, in view of the past service.
Similarly, acceptance of resignation is dependent upon discretion of
the employer whereas retirement is completion of service in terms of
regulations/rules  framed  by the bank.  Resignation  can be tendered
irrespective of the length of service whereas in the case of voluntary
retirement, the employee has to complete qualifying service for retiral
benefits. ............"

(emphasis added)
In the above mentioned judgment, this Court has also held that there
are different  yardsticks  and criteria  for  submitting  the resignation,
visÃ ­ vis voluntary retirement and exceptions thereof. In that context,
the scope of
Regulation 22
of Regulations 1995 was also considered
and the Court held as follows:

9. ................In our view,
Regulation 22
provides for disqualification
of employees who have resigned from service and for those who have
been dismissed or removed from service. Hence, we do not find any
merit  in the arguments  advanced  on behalf of the  respondent  that

Regulation   22
makes   an   arbitrary   and   unreasonable   classification
repugnant to
Article 14
of the Constitution by keeping out such class
of employees. The view we have taken is supported by the judgment of
this   Court   in   the   case   of
Reserve   Bank   of   India   v.   Cecil   Dennis
Solomon
(2004)  9 SCC  461.  Before  concluding  we may  state that
Clause 22 is not in the nature of penalty as alleged. It only disentitles
an employee who has resigned from service from becoming a member
of   the   Fund.   Such   employees   have   received   their   retiral   benefits
earlier.   The   pension   scheme,   as   stated   above,   only   provides   for   a
second   retiral   benefit.   Hence   there   is   no   question   of   penalty   being
imposed   on   such   employees   as   alleged.   The   pension   scheme   only
provides for an avenue for investment to retirees. They are provided
avenue to put in their savings and as a term or condition which is
more in the nature of an eligibility criteria the scheme disentitles such
category of employees out of it."

9. The   Apex   Court   after   considering   the   decision   in   case   of

Sheelkumar Jain vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.
reported in (2011)
12 SCC 197 came to the conclusion that the decision in case of
UCO
Bank   vs.   Sanwar   Mal
reported   in   (2004)   4   SCC   412   requires
reconsideration. Relevant portion of the judgement reads as thus:

"18. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants have placed heavy
reliance on
Sheelkumar Jain
(supra) and submitted that in the light
of   that   judgment,   the   decision   rendered   in
Sanwar   Mal
(supra)
requires reconsideration. We find it difficult to accept the contention
raised by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants.

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19. We may point out in
Sheelkumar Jain
(supra) that this Court
was dealing with an insurance scheme and not the pension scheme,
which is applicable in the banking sector. The provisions of both the
scheme and the Regulation are not pari materia.

In
Sheelkumar Jain

case   (supra),   while   referring   to   Para   5,   this   Court   came   to   the
conclusion   that   the   same   does   not   make   distinction   between
'resignation' and 'voluntary retirement' and it only provides that an
employee who wants to leave or discontinue his service amounts to
'resignation' or 'voluntary retirement'. Whereas,
Regulation 20(2)
of
the  Canara  Bank  (Officers)  Service  Regulations  1979  applicable  to
banks, had specifically referred to the words 'resignation', unlike Para
5 of the Insurance Rules. Further, it is also to be noted that, in that
judgment,  this   Court   in  Para   30   held  that   the   Court   will   have  to
construe the statutory provisions in each case to find out whether the
termination of service of an employee was a termination by way of
resignation or a termination by way of voluntary retirement.

20. The appellants, when tendered their letters of resignation, were
governed by the Regulations 1979.
Regulation 20(2)
of Regulations
1979   dealt   with   resignation   from   service   and   they   tendered   their
resignation in the light of that provision. We are of the view that the
appellants have failed to show any pre­ existing rights in their favour
either  in the  Statutory  Settlement/Joint  Note  dated  29.10.1993  or
under   the   Regulations   1995.   Appellants   had   resigned   from   service
prior to 1.11.1993 and, therefore, were not covered by the statutory
settlement, Joint Note dated 29.10.1993 and the Regulations 1995.
They   could   not   establish   any   pre­existing   legal,   statutory   or
fundamental rights in their favour to claim the benefit of Regulations
1995. Consequently, the reliance placed by the appellants either on

Regulation   29
or
Regulation   22
in   support   of   their   contentions,
cannot   be   accepted,   since   they   are   not   covered   by   the   scheme   of
pension introduced by the banks with effect from 1.11.1993."

Since   the   law   has  been   settled   by  the   Apex   Court,   it  has   held   that
resignation  and voluntary retirement  are two different  concepts  and
they cannot be equated as the learned Single Judge has relied on case
of
Sheelkumar Jain
(supra) which has been distinguished by the Apex
Court   in   case   of   M.R.Prabhakar   and   ors   (supra)   Petitioner's
resignation would be treated to be a resignation only and it cannot be
treated   to   be   voluntary   retirement   and   therefore,   no   relief   can   be
granted to the petitioner for payment of pension.

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30. It appears that the matter went up to the Supreme Court and the
Supreme   Court  dismissed   the   Special  Leave  Petition   vide  order   dated
08/09/2014.

31. Let   me   now   look   into
Shashikala   Devi
's   case   (Supra).   The
question   that   fell   for   consideration   before   the   Supreme   Court   was
whether   the   letter   sent   by   the   late   husband   of   the   appellant   was  in
essence  a letter seeking premature retirement on medical grounds or a
letter of resignation from the service of the respondent­bank. The bank
treated the letter of the employee as a letter of resignation from service
and   relieved   him   because   the   expression   used   in   the   letter   was
resignation. The Supreme Court considered the  Central Bank of India
(Employees) Pension Regulations, 1995 and held as under:­

5. Grant or refusal of pension to the employees of the respondent­
bank   is   regulated   by   Central   Bank   of   India   (Employees)   Pension
Regulation,   1995.   Chapter   IV   of   the   said   Regulations   deals   with
qualifying service.
Regulation 14
of the Regulations appearing in that
chapter postulates that an employee who has rendered a minimum of
ten years of service in the bank on the date of his retirement or on the
date on which he is deemed to have retired shall qualify for pension.

Regulation 22
deals with forfeiture of service and, inter alia, stipulates
that   resignation,   dismissal,   removal   or   termination   of   an   employee
from the service of the Bank shall entail forfeiture of his entire past
service.  Chapter  V of the  Regulations  deals  with Classes  of Pension.
While
Regulation 28
envisages superannuation pension,
Regulation 29

deals with pension on voluntary retirement and read as under:

"29. Pension on Voluntary Retirement:­
(1) On or after the 1st day of November, 1993, at any time after an
employee has completed twenty years of qualifying service he may, by
giving   notice   of   not   less   than   three   months   in   writing   to   the
appointing authority retire from service".

Provided that this sub­regulation shall not apply to an employee who
is on deputation or on study leave abroad unless after having been
transferred or having returned to India he has resumed charge of the
post in India and has served for a period of not less than one year;

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Provided   further   that   this   sub­regulation   shall   not   apply   to   an
employee   who   seeks   retirement   from   service   for   being   absorbed
permanently   in   an   autonomous   body   or   a   public   sector
understanding   or   company   or   institution   or   body,   whether
incorporated   or   not   to   which   he   is   on   deputation   at   the   time   of
seeking voluntary retirement.

Provided that this sub­section shall not apply to an employee who is
deemed to have retired in accordance with clause (1) of regulation 2.

2. The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub­regulation (1)
shall require acceptance by the appointing authority:

Provided that where the appointing authority does not refuse to grant
the permission for retirement before the expiry of the period specified
in the said notice, the retirement shall become effective from the date
of expiry of the said period.

(3) (a) An employee referred to in sub­regulation
(1) may make a request to the appointing authority retirement of less
than three months giving reasons therefor :

(b) On receipt of a request under clause (a), the appointing authority
may,  subject  to the  provisions  of sub­regulation   (2),   consider   such
request for the curtailment of the period of notice of three months on
merits and if it is satisfied that the curtailment of the period of notice
will   not   cause   any   administrative   inconvenience,   the   appointing
authority may relax the requirement of notice of three months on the
condition   that   the   employee   shall  not   apply  for   commutation   of  a
part of his pension before the expiry of the notice of three months.

(4) An employee, who has elected to retire under this regulation and
has given necessary notice to that effect to the appointing authority,
shall   be   precluded   from   withdrawing   his   notice   except   with   the
specific approval of such authority:

Provided that the request for such withdrawal shall be made before
the intended date of his retirement.

(5) The qualifying service of an employee retiring voluntarily under
this regulation shall be increased by a period not exceeding five years,
subject to the condition that the total qualifying service rendered by
such employee shall not in any case exceed thirty­three years and it
does not take him beyond the date of superannuation.

(6) The pension of an employee retiring under this regulation shall be
based   on   the   average   emoluments   as   defined   under   clause   (d)   of
regulation (2) of these regulations and the increase not exceeding five
years in his qualifying service, shall not entitle him to any notional

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fixation of pay for the purpose of calculating his pension."

6. From a reading of the above, it is evident that an employee who
has   completed   twenty   years   of   qualifying   service   is   entitled   to   seek
voluntary   retirement   from   service   of   the   bank   provided   he   gives   a
notice   of   not   less   than   three   months   in   writing   to   the   appointing
authority in that regard. What is important is that in terms of proviso
to
Regulation   29(2)
,   if  the   appointing   authority   does   not   refuse   to
grant permission for retirement before the expiry of the period specified
in the said notice, the retirement becomes effective from the date of the
expiry   of   the   said   period.   It   is   also   noteworthy   that   in   terms   of

Regulation 29(3)(a)
the appointing authority is competent to curtail
the period of notice of three months in appropriate cases subject to the
condition  that  the employee  shall not apply  for  commutation  of his
pension before the expiry of the notice period.

7. In   the   case   at   hand,   Mauzi   Ram­the   deceased   employee   had
rendered nearly 34 years of service in the respondent­bank. He was,
therefore,   qualified   to   receive   pension   in   terms   of   the   Regulations
applicable to him. It is also evident from a reading of
Regulation 29

that the deceased­employee was entitled to seek voluntary retirement
in   terms   of
Regulation   29
for   he   had   completed  more   than   twenty
years of service by the 8th October, 2007. As on 8th October, 2007 the
deceased­employee was entitled either to resign from service or to seek
premature retirement in terms of
Regulation 29 (supra)
. The question
in that backdrop is whether letter dated 8th October, 2007 was a letter
of   resignation   simpliciter   or   could   as   well   be   treated   to   be   a   letter
seeking   voluntary   retirement.   The   High   Court,   as   seen   earlier,   has
taken the view that the letter was one of resignation that resulted in
the forfeiture of past service under
Regulation 22
of the Regulations.
The High Court appears to have been impressed by the use of the word
"resignation" in the employee s letter dated 8th October, 2007. The use
of   the   expression   "resignation",   however,   is   not,   in   our   opinion,
conclusive. That is, in our opinion, so even when this Court has always
maintained  a  clear  distinction   between  "resignation"  and  "voluntary
retirement".   Whether   or   not   a   given   communication   is   a   letter   of
resignation  simpliciter  or can  as well be treated  to be a request  for
voluntary   retirement   will   always   depend   upon   the   facts   and
circumstances of each case and the provisions of the Rules applicable.

The  distinction  between  the  expressions  "resignation"  and  "voluntary
retirement" was elaborately discussed by this Court in
UCO Bank and
Ors.   v.   Sanwar   Mal
(2004)   4   SCC   412   where   this   Court   was
examining   the   provisions   of   UCO   Bank   (Employees   )   Pension
Regulations   1995   applicable   to   a   bank   employee   who  had   resigned
from   service   after   giving   an   advance   notice   to   the   appointing
authority. So also in
Reserve Bank of India and Anr. v. CECIL Dennis
Solomon and Anr.
(2004) 9 SCC 461 this Court was considering the

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provisions   of   the   Reserve   Bank   of   India   Pension   Regulations,   1990
while  it made  a distinction  between  what  is resignation  on the  one
hand and voluntary retirement on the other.

At the same time a long
line of decisions have recognised that pension is neither a bounty nor a
matter   of   grace   but   is  a   payment  for   past  services  rendered   by  the
employee. Decisions of this Court in
D.S. Nakara and Ors. v. Union of
India
(
1983) 1 SCC 305, and Chairman Railway Board and Ors. v.
C.R.   Rangadhamaiah   and   Ors.
(1997)   6   SCC   623,   are   clear
pronouncements on the subject.

Reference may also be made to
Sudhir
Chandra Sarkar v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. and Ors.
(1984)  3
SCC 369 where this Court observed:

"18. For centuries the courts swung in favour of the view that pension
is either a bounty or a gratuitous payment for loyal service rendered
depending upon the sweet will or grace of the employer not claimable
as a right and therefore, no right to pension can be enforced through
court. This view held the field and a suit to recover pension was held
not   maintainable.   With   the   modern   notions   of   social   justice   and
social security, concept of pension underwent a radical change and it
is now well­settled that pension is a right and payment of it does not
depend upon the discretion of the employer, nor can it be denied at
the sweet will or fancy of the employer.
Deokinandan Prasad v. State
of Bihar
(
1971) 2 SCC 330 , State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh
(
1976) 2
SCC   1  and   D.S.   Nakara   v.   Union   of   India
(1983)   1  SCC   305.   If
pension which is the retiral benefit as a measure of social security can
be   recovered   through   civil   suit,   we   see   no   justification   in   treating
gratuity on a different footing. Pension and gratuity in the matter of
retiral benefits and for recovering the same must be put on par."

(emphasis supplied)

8 It is also well settled by several decisions  of this Court that while
interpreting a statute the Court ought to keep the legislative intent in
mind   and   eschew   an   interpretation   which   tends   to   restrict,   narrow
down or defeat its beneficial provisions. In
S. Appukuttan v. Thundiyil
Janaki Amma and Anr.
(1988) 2 SCC 372 this Court observed:

"16.   After   the   arguments   were   concluded,   learned   counsel   for   the
respondents have circulated a copy of the judgment of this Court in
CA No. 165 of 1974 etc.
K.M. Mathew v. Hamsa Haji
(1987) 3 SCC
326 delivered on 29­4­1987 wherein
Section 7
­
D of the Kerala Land
Reforms   Act,   1963
as   amended   by   the
Kerala   Land   Reforms
(Amendment)  Act,  1969
has  been interpreted  as conferring  benefit
thereunder only on persons whose occupation of the private forests or
unsurveyed lands had a lawful origin and not on persons in unlawful
occupation based on trespass or forcible and unlawful entry. We have
carefully considered the judgment and find that the pronouncement
therein does not in any way lend support to the contentions of the
respondents herein. The scheme of
Sections 7
­A, 7­B, 7­C, 7­D, 8 and
9 of the
Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963
is entirely different and this
position   is   succinctly   brought   out   by   the   following   passage   in   the

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decision
referred to above
. The court had summed up the scheme of
the Act in the following words: (SCC p. 330, para 5): (Para 5 of AIR)

On   a   careful   scrutiny   of   the   aforesaid   provisions,   it   becomes
abundantly   clear   that   the   intention   of   the   legislature   was   to   grant
protection only to persons whose possession had a lawful origin in the
sense   that   they   had   either   bona   fide   believed   the   lands   to   be
government s land of which they could later seek assignment or had
taken the lands on lease from persons whom they bona fide believed to
be competent to grant such leases or had come into possession with the
intention   of   attorning   to   the   lawful   owners   or   on   the   basis   of
arrangements like varam etc. which were only in the nature of licences
and fell short of a leasehold right. It was not within the contemplation
of the legislature to confer the benefit of protection on persons who had
wilfully   trespassed   upon   lands   belonging   to   others   and   whose
occupation was unlawful in its origin. The expression "in occupation"

occurring   in
Section   7
­D   must   be   construed   as   meaning   "in   lawful
occupation".

9. Again  in
Vatan  Mal  v.  Kailash  Nath
(1989)  3  SCC  79,  this
Court observed:

"9. .......The intention of the legislature to confer the benefit of
Section
­A  to  all   tenants,   provided   actual   eviction   had   not   taken   place,
could further be seen by the terms of sub­clause (c). Under sub­clause

(c)   the   provisions   of   sub­clauses   (a)   and   (b)   have   been   made
applicable   mutatis   mutandis   to   all   appeals   or   applications   for
revision preferred or made after the commencement of the amending
Ordinance   and   the   only   stipulation   contained   is   that   the   tenant
preferring an appeal or an application for revision should apply to
the court within a period of thirty days from the date of presentation
of   the   memorandum   of   appeal   or   the   application   for   revision   for
giving him the benefit of
Section 13
­A....."

10. Reference   may   also   be   made   to
Employees   State   Insurance
Corporation v. R.K. Swamy and Ors
. (1994) 1 SCC 445 where this
Court observed:

"14. There is no doubt at all that the said Act is beneficent legislation.
If, therefore, it is reasonably possible so to construe the word "shop"

as   to   include   the   activity   of   an   advertising   agency   within   it,   that
construction must be preferred."

11. To the same effect is a later decision of this Court in
Union of
India and Anr. v. Pradeep Kumari and Ors.
(1995) 2 SCC 736 where
this Court declared:

"8. We may, at the outset, state that having regard to the Statement
of Objects and Reasons, referred to earlier, the object underlying the
enactment of
Section 28
­A is to remove inequality in the payment of

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compensation for same or similar quality of land arising on account
of inarticulate and poor people not being able to take advantage of
the right of reference to the civil court under
Section 18
of the Act.
This   is   sought   to   be   achieved   by   providing   an   opportunity   to   all
aggrieved parties whose land is covered by the same notification to
seek   redetermination   once   any   of   them   has   obtained   orders   for
payment   of   higher   compensation   from   the   reference   court   under

Section 18
of the Act.
Section 28
­A is, therefore, in the nature of a
beneficent provision intended to remove inequality and to give relief
to   the   inarticulate   and   poor   people   who   are   not   able   to   take
advantage of right of reference to the civil court under
Section 18
of
the  Act.  In relation to beneficent  legislation,  the  law is well­settled
that while construing  the provisions  of such a legislation the court
should   adopt   a   construction   which   advances   the   policy   of   the
legislation to extend the benefit rather than a construction which has
the effect of curtailing the benefit conferred by it. The provisions of

Section   28
­A   should,   therefore,   be   construed   keeping   in   view   the
object underlying the said provision."

(emphasis supplied)

12. Let us now examine the true purport of the letter submitted by
the deceased­employee in the light of the above principles. Two distinct
aspects   stand   out   from   the   record.   The   first   is   that   the   deceased­
employee  had served  for more  than 34  years  in the bank  and  was,
therefore,   entitled   to   seek   voluntary   retirement   if   he   chose   to   leave
prematurely. The second aspect which is equally important is that the
employee   had   chosen   to   leave   the   employment   not   because   of   any
disciplinary   or   other   action   proposed   against   him   or   any   order   of
transfer   or   posting   with   which   he   was   unhappy   or   because   any
proceedings had been started that could have visited him with any civil
consequence if he had continued in service, but because of his physical
inability to continue in service on account of diseases with which he
was stricken. This is evident from the fact that not only in the letter,
but also in documents enclosed therewith the employee has laid great
stress   on   the   reasons   for   leaving   the   service   prematurely.   No   such
reasons were necessary if the employee actually intended to resign in
the   true   sense   of   that   term.   Reasons   why   he   was   quitting   were
obviously meant to support his case that he was doing so under the
compulsion of the circumstances. This is evident from letter dated 23rd
November, 2007 from the Regional Manager which has recognised the
poor  health  condition  of the  deceased­employee  and  sanctioned  165
days   without   pay   leave   in   his   favour.   It   is   also   evident   from   letter
dated 29th November, 2007 by which the acceptance of the request of
the employee was communicated to him that the employer had taken
note of his failing health, expressed the management s sympathy with
him   and   wishing   him   early   recovery   from   his   illness.   The   letter
recognises   the   commitment   of   the   employee   to   his   duties   and   the
contribution made by him in the growth of the organisation. To that

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extent there is thus no communication gap between the employee and
the   employer.   The   employee   s   case,   however,   is   that   all   that   he
intended   to   do   was   to   seek   premature/voluntary   retirement   from
service.   This   is,   accordingly   to   the   employee,   evident   also   from   his
letter dated 18th December, 2007 addressed within three weeks of the
acceptance of the request by the bank. In the said letter the deceased­
employee, inter alia, said:

"As   such,   as   per   the   said   representation   I   requested   to   accept   my
resignation from the service. The whole reason and purpose, which I
have submitted and stated through my said representation and my
left over service  of one and half year have forced my conscience  to
seek voluntary retirement from the service and not resignation from
the service in its literal meaning."

13. The letter once again enclosed with it medical certificates and
prescriptions  in support of his request that the letter  written  earlier
and the expression used therein may be understood in the right spirit
and   terminal   benefits   released   in   his   favour.   The   refusal   of   the
management of the bank to treat letter dated 8th October, 2007 as a
request   for   premature   retirement   was   conveyed   to   the   employee   on
24th June, 2008 in which the respondent­bank made reference to the
decision of this Court in UCO Bank s case (supra) whereby
Regulation
of the Pension Regulations was upheld by this Court.

14. When viewed in the backdrop of the above facts, it is difficult to
reject the contention urged on behalf of the appellant that what the
deceased­employee   intended   to   do   by   his   letter   dated   8th   October,
2007 was to seek voluntary retirement and not resignation from his
employment. We say so in the light of several attendant circumstances.
In the first place,  the employee  at the time  of his writing  the  letter
dated th October, 2007 was left with just about one and a half years of
service.  It will  be  too  imprudent  for  anyone  to suggest  that  a bank
employee who has worked with such commitment as earned him the
appreciation of the management would have so thoughtlessly given up
the retiral benefits in the form of pension etc. which he had earned on
account   of   his   continued   dedication   to   his   job.   If   pension   is   not   a
bounty, but a right which the employee acquires on account of long
years of sincere and good work done by him, the Court will be slow in
presuming  that  the  employee   intended   to  waive  or   abandon  such  a
valuable right without any cogent reason. At any rate there ought to
be   some   compelling   circumstance   to   suggest   that   the   employee   had
consciously given up the right and benefit, which he had acquired so
assiduously.   Far   from   the   material   on   record   suggesting   any   such
conscious   surrender   abandonment   or   waiver   of   the   right   to   retiral
benefit including pension, we find that the material placed on record
clearly   suggests   that   the   employee   had   no   source   of   income   or
sustenance   except   the   benefit   that   he   had   earned   for   long   years   of

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service. This is evident from a reading of the letter dated 8th October,
2007 in which the employee seeks release of his retiral benefits at the
earliest to enable him to undergo medical treatment that he requires.
The   letter,   as   seen   earlier,   lays   emphasise   on   the   fact   that   for   his
sustenance the employee is dependent entirely on such benefits. It is in
that view difficult for us to attribute to the employee the intention to
give up what was rightfully his in terms of retiral benefits, when such
benefits   were   the   only   source   not   only   for   his   survival   but   for   his
medical   treatment   that   he   so   urgently   required.   For   a   waiver   of   a
legally enforceable right earned by an employee, it is necessary that the
same is clear and unequivocal, conscious and with full knowledge of
the consequences. No such intention can be gathered from the facts and
circumstances  of the instant case. The  employee  s subsequent  letters
and communication which are placed on record cannot be said to be
an   afterthought.   Being   proximate   in   point   of   time   letter   dated   8th
October,   2007   must   be   treated   to   be   a   part   of   the   subsequent
communication  making  the  employee  s intentions  clear,  at least for
purposes of determining the true intention underlying the act of the
employee.

15. It   is,   in   our   opinion,   abundantly   clear   that   the   beneficial
provisions   of   a   Pension   Scheme   or   Pension   Regulations   have   been
interpreted rather liberally so as to promote the object underlying the
same   rather   than   denying   benefits   due   to   beneficiaries   under   such
provisions.   In   cases   where   an   employee   has   the   requisite   years   of
qualifying service for grant of pension, and where he could under the
service conditions applicable seek voluntary retirement, the benefit of
pension has been allowed by treating the purported resignation to be a
request   for   voluntary   retirement.   We   see   no   compelling   reasons   for
doing so even in the present case, which in our opinion is in essence a
case of the deceased employee seeking voluntary retirement rather than
resigning.

16 We may at this stage refer to a few decisions of this Court in
which somewhat similar questions have been examined and answered
by   this   Court.
In
Sudhir   Chandra   Sarkar   v.   Tata   Iron   and   Steel
Company   Ltd.   and   Ors.
(1984)   3   SCC   369,   a   permanent
uncovenanted   employee   of   the   company   had   served   for   29   years
whereafter  he  tendered  his  resignation  which  the  employer  accepted
unconditionally.   The   Company   s   Retiring   Gratuity   Rules   did   not
provide   for   payment   of   gratuity   to   employees   who   resigned   from
service. This Court while reversing the view taken by the High Court
held   that   termination   of   service   by   resignation   was   tantamount   to
retirement by resignation entitling the employee to retiral benefits. The
following passage is apposite in this regard:

"7. The contention of the respondent is that the plaintiff did not retire
from service but he left the service of the Company by resigning his

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post. This aspect to some extent agitated the mind of the High Court.
It may  be  dealt  with  first.  It is  not  only  in dispute,  but is  in  fact
conceded   that   the   plaintiff   did   render   continuous   service   from
December 31, 1929 till August 31, 1959. On exact computation, the
plaintiff rendered service for 29 years and 8 months. Rule 6(a) which
prescribed   the   eligibility   criterion   for   payment   of   gratuity   provides
that   every   permanent   uncovenanted   employee   of   the   Company
whether paid on monthly,  weekly or daily basis will be eligible for
retiring  gratuity  which  shall  be  equal  to half a month  s salary  or
wages   for   every   completed   year   of   continuous   service   subject   to   a
maximum of 20 years salary or wages in all provided that when an
employee dies, retires or is discharged under Rule 11(2)(ii) and (iii)
before he has served the Company for a continuous period of 15 years
he   shall   be   paid   a   gratuity   at   the   rate   therein   mentioned.   The
expression "retirement" has been defined in Rule 1(g) to mean "the
termination of service by reason of any cause other than removal by
discharge due to misconduct". It is admitted that the plaintiff was a
permanent uncovenanted employee of the Company paid on monthly
basis and he rendered service for over 29 years and his service came
to   an   end   by   reason   of   his   tendering   resignation   which   was
unconditionally accepted. It is not suggested that he was removed by
discharge due to misconduct. Unquestionably, therefore, the plaintiff
retired from service  because  by the letter Annexure  B dated August
26, 1959, the resignation tendered by the plaintiff as per his letter
dated   July   27,   1959   was   accepted   and   he   was   released   from   his
service with effect from September 1, 1959. The termination of service
was thus on account of resignation of the plaintiff being accepted by
the   respondent.   The   plaintiff   has,   within   the   meaning   of   the
expression,   thus   retired   from   service   of   the   respondent   and   he   is
qualified for payment of gratuity in terms of Rule 6."

17.
In
Union of India and Ors. v. Lt. Col. P.S. Bhargava
(1997) 2
SCC 28, this Court was dealing with a case where the respondent was
denied   pension   on   the   ground   that   he   had  voluntarily   retired   from
service. Dismissing the appeal filed by the Union of India, this Court
held that
Regulation 16
of the Pension Regulations applicable to the
respondent   did  not  deal   with   voluntary  resignations   and  could  not,
therefore,  be pressed  into service  to deny pension  to the respondent.
This Court said:

"19.
Regulation  16
does  not cover  a case of voluntary resignation.

Regulation 16(b)
does refer to a case where an officer who has to his
credit the minimum period of qualifying service being called upon to
resign whose pension can be reduced. Had the Regulations intended
to take  away  the right  of a person to the terminal  benefits  on his
voluntary  resigning,  then a specific  provision  similar  to
Regulation
16(b)
would have been incorporated in the Regulations but this has
not been done. Once an officer has to his credit the minimum period
of   qualifying   service,   he   earns   a   right   to   get   pension   and   as   the
Regulations stand, that right can be taken away only if an order is
passed under
Regulation 3
or 16. The cases of voluntary resignations

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of officers, who have to their credit the minimum period of qualifying
service are not covered by these two Regulations and, therefore, such
officers, who voluntarily resign, cannot be automatically deprived of
the terminal benefits."

18. In Sheel Kumar Jain v. New India Assurance Company Limited
and Ors. (2011) 12 SCC 197, the facts were somewhat similar to the
case   at   hand.   The   appellant   in   that   case   was   an   employee   of   an
Insurance Company governed by a Pension Scheme which provided, as
in   the   case   at  hand,   forfeiture   of   the   entire   service   of  an  employee
should   he   resign   from   his   employment.   The   appellant   submitted   a
letter   of   resignation   which   resulted   in   denial   of   his   service   benefits
under the scheme aforementioned. This Court, however, held that since
the employee had completed the qualifying service and was entitled to
seek voluntary retirement  under  the scheme  he could  not be said to
have resigned so as to lose his pension. This Court said:

"25. Para 22 of the 1995 Pension Scheme states that the resignation
of an employee from the service of the corporation or a company shall
entail forfeiture of his entire past service and consequently he shall
not   qualify   for   pensionary   benefits,   but   does   not   define   the   term
"resignation".  Under  sub­para  (1) of Para  30 of the  1995  Pension
Scheme,   an   employee,   who   has   completed   20   years   of   qualifying
service, may by giving notice of not less than 90 days in writing to the
appointing authority retire from service and under sub­para (2) of
Para   30   of   the   1995   Pension   Scheme,   the   notice   of   voluntary
retirement shall require acceptance by the appointing authority. Since
"voluntary retirement" unlike "resignation" does not entail forfeiture
of   past   services   and   instead   qualifies   for   pension,   an   employee   to
whom Para 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme applies cannot be said to
have "resigned" from service.

26. In the facts of the present case, we find that the appellant had
completed 20 years of qualifying service and had given notice of not
less   than   90   days   in   writing   to   the   appointing   authority   of   his
intention   to   leave   the   service   and   the   appointing   authority   had
accepted notice of the appellant and relieved him from service. Hence,
Para 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme applied to the appellant even
though   in   his   letter   dated   16­9­1991   to   the   General   Manager   of
Respondent 1 Company he had used the word "resign"."

19. In the result this appeal succeeds  and  is hereby  allowed.  The
impugned order passed by the High Court is, hereby, set aside and the
writ petition filed by the deceased­employee allowed with a direction to
the respondent­bank to treat letter dated 8th October, 2007 as a notice
for voluntary retirement of the employee and for curtailment for three
months   notice   period.   Depending   upon   the   view   the   competent
authority may take on the question of curtailment of the notice period
and/or   deduction   of   three   months   salary   from   out   of   the   retiral

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benefits  of the deceased­employee,  the deceased­employee  s claim for
payment   of   retiral   benefits   due   under   the   relevant   rules   including
pension   shall   be   processed   and   released   in   favour   of   the   appellant­
widow as expeditiously as possible but not later than six months from
the date a copy of this order is served upon the bank. In the event of
the bank s failure to comply with the directions within six months as
indicated  above,  the  amount  payable  to the  employee  and  after   his
death his widow, shall start earning interest @ 10% p.a. from the date
the period of six months expires. The parties are left to bear their own
costs.

32.
In   the   case   of
Asger Ibrahim Amin
(Supra),  the   appellant  had
joined the services of the Life Insurance Corporation on 30/06/1967 on
the post of Assistant Administrative Officer. He worked for 23 years and
07 months in the Corporation before tendering the resignation, owing to
the "family circumstances and indifferent health". He had also crossed
fifty years in age. The appellant was allowed to resign from the post of
the Deputy General Manager (Accounts), which he was holding at that
time.   The   request   of   the   appellant   for   waiver   of   the   stipulated   three
months notice was also favourably considered by the Corporation. The
Central Government in exercise of its power conferred under Section­48
of the
Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956
had notified the LIC of India
(Staff) Regulations, 1960 and thereafter, the Life Insurance Corporation
of India (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995. The Pension Rules provide,
interalia, that the resignation from service would lead to forfeiture of the
benefits of the entire service including the eligibility for pension.

33. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the termination
of   service   of   the   appellant   remained   unalterably   in   the   nature   of
resignation, with the consequence of disentitling him from availing of
the Pension Scheme or whether it could have been viewed as a voluntary
retirement. The Supreme Court while allowing the appeal filed by the
Asger Ibrahim Amin held as under:­

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5. The second issue which confronts us is whether the termination
of   service   of   the   Appellant   remains   unalterably   in   the   nature   of
resignation, with the consequence of disentitling him from availing of
or migrating/mutating  the  pension  scheme  or whether  it instead  be
viewed as a voluntary retirement or whether it requires to be regarded
so in order to bestow this benefit on the Appellant; who had resigned
after reaching the age of fifty and after serving the LIC for over twenty
three years. The Appellant resigned from service under
Regulation 18

of LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, which along with the other
provisions of relevance is reproduced for facility of reference ­

SECTION 3 TERMINATION
Determination of Service:

18.  (1) An employee,  other  than an employee  on probation  or an
employee   appointed   on   a   temporary   basis,   shall   not   leave   or
discontinue his service in the Corporation without first giving notice
in   writing   to   the   competent   authority   of   his   intention   to   leave   or
discontinue the service. The period of notice required shall be­

(a) three months in the case of an employee belonging to Class I;

(b) one month in the case of other employees.

Provided  that such  notice  may be waived  in part  or in full by the
competent   authority   at   its   discretion.   In   case   of   breach   by   an
employee of the provisions of the sub­regulation, he shall be liable to
pay the Corporation as compensation a sum equal to his salary for
the  period   of  notice   required  of  him,  which   sum   may   be  deducted
from any moneys due to him.

Superannuation and Retirement:

19(1) xx
(2)  An  employee  belonging  to Class  I or  Class  II  appointed  to the
service of the Corporation on or after 1st September,1956, shall retire
on completion of 60 years of age, but the competent authority may, if
it is of the opinion that it is in the interest of the Corporation to do
so, direct such employee to retire on completion of 50 years of age or
at any time thereafter on giving him three months notice or salary in
lieu thereof.

The  following  Regulations,  on which  learned  Senior  Counsel  for  the
LIC has placed reliance, came to be introduced on 16.2.1996, that is
after the Appellant had resigned from service. We have called for and
perused this Notification, and as we expected, these provisions apply
retrospectively with effect from 1.11.1993. These Regulations ordain,
inter   alia,   that   an   employee   may   be   permitted   to   retire   (a)   on
completion   of   the   age   of   55   and   (b)   after   completing   25   years   in
service. In other words, the Corporation has the power to compulsory
retire   an   employee   who   has   attained   the   age   of   50   years   if   in   its
opinion such decision is in the interests of the Corporation; and the

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employee may seek permission to retire upon completion of 55 years of
age and after rendering  25 years of service. This very position finds
reiteration in Rule 31 of the Pension Rules under the epithet voluntary
retirement  , which pandect appears  to have been available  from the
inception i.e. 1.11.1993.

(2A)  (a) Notwithstanding  what  is  stated  in sub­rules  (1)  and  (2)
above,   an   employee   may   be   permitted   to   retire   at   any   time   on
completion of the age 55 after giving three months notice in writing
to the appointing authority of his intention to retire.

(b)  (i)  Notwithstanding  the  provisions  of Clause  (a),  an employee
governed   by   the   Life   Insurance   Corporation   of   India   (Employees)
Pension Rules 1995 may be permitted to retire at any time after he
has completed twenty years of qualifying service, by giving notice of
not less than ninety days in writing to the appointing authority.

Provided that this sub­clause shall not apply to an employee who is
on   deputation   unless   after   having   been   transferred   or   having
returned to India, he has resumed charge on the post in India and
has served for a period of not less than one year.

Provided further that this sub­clause shall not apply to an employee
who seeks retirement from service for being absorbed permanently in
an autonomous body or a public sector undertaking to which he is on
deputation at the time of seeking voluntary retirement.

(ii) The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub­clause (i) of
clause (b) shall require acceptance by the appointing authority.

Provided that where the appointing authority does not refuse to grant
the permission for retirement before the expiry of the period specified
in the said notice, the retirement shall become effective from the date
of expiry of the said period."

6. As we have already recounted, the Appellant received a waiver
of the requirement of giving three months prior notice of his resolve to
"discontinue  his service  in the Corporation",  bestowing  legitimacy to
the reasons that compelled him to do so. It also brings to the fore that
the 1960 Staff Regulations did not provide for voluntary retirement or
VRS as has become commonplace today. This Court has clarified and
highlighted   that   resignation   and   retirement   have   disparate
connotations;   that   an   employee   can   resign   at   any   time   but,   in
contradistinction,   can   retire   only   on   completion   of   the   prescribed
period of qualifying service and in consonance with extant Rules and
Regulations.

7. We  shall  now  consider  the  Pension  Rules  of 1995.  Rule  3 of

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Chapter II thereof, provides that the Rules are applicable to employees
(1) who were in the service of the Corporation on or after 1.1.1986
and had retired before 1.11. 1993 i.e. the notified date, or (2) who
retired   after   1.11.1993;   or   (3)who   were   in   the   service   before   the
notified  date  and  continued  to be in service  on or after  the notified
date;  or (4)  who  were  in the  service  on  or after  1.1.1986  but had
retired  on or after  1.11.1993  and  before  the  notified  date.  What  is
discernible  from  these  dates  is that  the Pension  Rules  of 1995  have
included two classes of beneficiaries into one homogenous class, to wit,
the employees who had retired before the notified date and those who
were to retire after the notified date. In our opinion, the advantage of
these beneficent Rules should be extended even to the Appellant who
was similarly placed as the retirees mentioned  in Rule 3 but for the
fact   that   he   had   resigned   rather   than   retired.   The   two   provisions
caught in the crossfire are Rule 2(s), which defines "retirement"  and
Rule 23, which deals with the "forfeiture of service":

2(s)   "retirement"   means,­   (i)   retirement   in   accordance   with   the
provisions contained in sub­regulation (1) or sub­regulation (2) or
sub­regulation (3) of regulation 19 of the Life Insurance Corporation
of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 and rule 14 of the Life Insurance
Corporation  of India  Class  III and Class IV Employees  (Revision  of
Terms and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1985 made under the Act;

(ii) voluntary retirement in accordance with the provisions contained
in rule 31 of these rules. (emphasis added)

23.   Forfeiture   of   service   ­   Resignation   or   dismissal   or   removal   or
termination   or   compulsory   retirement   of   an   employee   from   the
service   of   the   Corporation   shall   entail   forfeiture   of   his   entire   past
service and consequently shall not qualify for pensionary benefits.

Voluntary retirement, noted in the sub­Rule (ii) of Rule 2(s), has been
defined in Rule 31, and it reads as follows:

31. Pension on voluntary retirement ­
(1)  At  any   time   after   an  employee   has  completed   twenty  years   of
qualifying  service  he  may,  by giving  notice  of not  less  than  ninety
days, in writing, to the appointing authority, retire from service:

Provided that this sub­rule shall not apply to an employee who is on
deputation unless after having been transferred or having returned to
India he has resumed charge of the post in India and has served for a
period of not less than one year:

Provided  further   that  this  sub­rule  shall not   apply to an employee
who seeks retirement from service for being absorbed permanently in
an autonomous body or a public sector undertaking to which he is on
deputation at the time of seeking voluntary retirement.

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(2) The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub­rule (1) shall
require acceptance by the appointing authority:

Provided that where the appointing authority does not refuse to grant
the permission for retirement before the expiry of the period specified
in the said notice, the retirement shall become effective from the date
of expiry of the said period.

(3) (a) An employee referred to in sub­rule (1) may make a request
in writing to the appointing authority to accept notice of voluntary
retirement of less than ninety days giving reasons therefor;

(b) on receipt of a request under clause(a), the appointing authority
may, subject to the provisions of sub­rule (2), consider such request
for the curtailment of the period of notice of ninety days on merits
and if it is satisfied that the curtailment of the period of notice will
not cause any administrative inconvenience, the appointing authority
may relax the requirement of notice of ninety days on the condition
that the employee shall not apply for commutation of a part of his
pension before the expiry of the notice of ninety days.

(4) An employee, who has elected to retire under this rule and has
given necessary notice to that effect to the appointing authority, shall
be   precluded   from   withdrawing   his   notice   except   with   the   specific
approval of such authority:

Provided that the request for such withdrawal shall be made before
the intended date of his retirement.

(5) The qualifying service of an employee retiring voluntarily under
this   rule   shall   be   increased   by   a   period   not   exceeding   five   years,
subject to the condition that the total qualifying service rendered by
such employee shall not in any case exceed thirty­three years and it
does not take him beyond the date of retirement.

(6) The pension of an employee retiring under this rule shall be based
on the average emoluments as defined under clause(d) of rule 2 of
these rules and the increase, not exceeding five years in his qualifying
service, shall not entitle him to any notional fixation of pay for the
purpose of calculating his pension.

It seems obvious to us that the Appellant s case does not fall within the
postulation of Rule 23 as the last four categories or genres or types of
cessation of services are in character punitive; and the first envisages
those resignations where the right to pension has not been earned by
that time or where it is without the permission of the Corporation.

8. The  Respondent   Corporation  has   vehemently  argued   that   the
termination   of   services   is   under
Regulation   18   (supra)
of   the   LIC
(Staff) Regulations, 1960 and is not covered by the Pension Rules of
1995.   Respondent   Corporation   has   controverted   the   plea   of   the
Appellant that at the relevant date and time, viz. 28.1.1991 there was

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no alternative  for him except to tender his resignation, pointing out
that he could not have sought voluntary retirement under
Regulation
19(2A)
of LIC of India (Staff) Regulations,  1960.  If that be so, the
Respondent being a model employer could and should have extended
the   advantage   of   these   Regulations   to   the   Appellant   thereby
safeguarding his pension entitlement. However, we find no substance
in the argument  of the Respondent since
Regulation 19(2A)
was, in
fact, notified in the Gazette of India on 16.2.1996,  that is after the
pension   scheme   came   into   existence   with   effect   from   1.11.1993.
Otherwise   there   would   have   been   no   conceivable   reason   for   the
Appellant not to have taken advantage of this provision which would
have protected his pensionary rights.

9. We also record that the provisions covered by the definition of
"retirement",   which   do   not   entail   forfeiture   of   service,   are   sub­
regulation   (1),   sub­regulation   (2),   and   sub­regulation   (3)   of

Regulation   19
of   the   Life   Insurance   Corporation   of   India   (Staff)
Regulations, 1960  and Rule 14 of the Life Insurance  Corporation of
India   Class   III   and   Class   IV   Employees   (Revision   of   Terms   and
Conditions of Service) Rules, 1985. None of these provisions provides
for voluntary retirement like Rule 31 of the Pension Rules nor does the
definition   of   "retirement"   make   any   mention   of   aforementioned

Regulation 19(2A)
.

10. The facts of the case disclose that the Appellant has worked for
over twenty years and had tendered his resignation in accordance with
the   provision   of
Regulation   18
of   LIC   of   India   (Staff)   Regulations,
1960,  which,   as   is   apparent   from   its  reading,   does   not   dissimulate
between the termination of service by way of resignation on the one
hand and voluntary retirement on the other, or distinguish one from
the   other.   Significantly,   there   was   no   provision   for   voluntary
retirement  at the  relevant  time,  and  it was  for  this reason  that the
Pension Rules of 1995 specifically provided for it under Rule 31.
In this
backdrop of facts, we need not dwell much on the issue because the
case of
Sheelkumar Jain v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.
, (2011) 12
SCC 197 is on all fours of this case.

11. In Sheelkumar, the Appellant resigned from the services of the
Respondent Company after serving for over 20 years on 16.12.1991.
His  resignation  was  offered  and  granted  under  Clause  5  of General
Insurance   (Termination,   Superannuation  and   Retirement  of  Officers
and   Development   Staff)   Scheme,   1976.   Thereafter,   the   Central
Government   formulated   General   Insurance   (Employees')   Pension
Scheme,  1995  with retrospective  effect from  1.11.1993.  Sheelkumar
applied   for   pension   under   this   Scheme,   which   was   declined   on   the
ground that resignation from service would entail forfeiture of service

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under   Clause   22   of   the   General   Insurance   (Employees')   Pension
Scheme, 1995.  The Appellant moved the High Court challenging  the
rejection of his claim. His writ petition as well as the writ appeal was
dismissed  by the  High Court.  The  Appellant  then moved  this Court,
whereby   we   noted   that   Clause   5   of   the   Scheme   of   1976   did   not
mention   resignation   nor   was   the   Appellant   made   aware   of   the
distinction   between   resignation   and   voluntary   retirement;   that   this
distinction   was   a   product   of   the   General   Insurance   (Employees   )
Pension Scheme of 1995. This Court observed:

20. Sub­para (1) of Para  5 does not state that the termination of
service pursuant to the notice given by an officer or a person of the
Development   Staff   to   leave   or   discontinue   his   service   amounts   to
"resignation" nor does it state that such termination of service of an
officer or a person of the Development Staff on his serving notice in
writing   to   leave   or   discontinue   in   service   amounts   to   "voluntary
retirement". Sub­para (1) of Para 5 does not also make a distinction
between "resignation" and "voluntary retirement" and it only provides
that an employee who wants to leave or discontinue his service has to
serve a notice of three months to the appointing authority.

21.We also notice that sub­para (1) of Para 5 does not require that
the appointing authority must accept the request of an officer or a
person of the Development Staff to leave or discontinue his service but
in the facts of the present case, the request of the appellant to relieve
him from his service after three months notice was accepted by the
competent authority and such acceptance was conveyed by the letter
dated 28­10­1991 of the Assistant Administrative Officer, Indore.

xxxxx

23. The 1995 Pension Scheme was framed and notified only in 1995
and   yet   the   1995   Pension   Scheme   was   made   applicable   also   to
employees who had left the services of Respondent 1 Company before
1995. Paras 22 and 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme quoted above
were not in existence when the appellant submitted his letter dated
16­9­1991   to   the   General   Manager   of   Respondent   1   Company.
Hence, when the appellant served his letter dated 16­9­1991 to the
General Manager of Respondent 1 Company, he had no knowledge of
the  difference  between  "resignation"  under   Para  22  and  "voluntary
retirement"  under Para 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme.  Similarly,
Respondent 1 Company employer had no knowledge of the difference
between "resignation" and "voluntary retirement" under Paras 22 and
30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme, respectively.

24. Both the appellant and Respondent 1 have acted in accordance
with the provisions of sub­para (1) of Para 5 of the 1976 Scheme at
the time of termination of service of the appellant in the year 1991. It
is   in   this   background   that   we   have   now   to   decide   whether   the
termination of service of the appellant under sub­para (1) of Para 5

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of the 1976 Scheme amounts to resignation in terms of Para 22 of
the   1995   Pension   Scheme   or   amounts   to   voluntary   retirement   in
terms of Para 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme.

25. Para 22 of the 1995 Pension Scheme states that the resignation
of an employee from the service of the corporation or a company shall
entail forfeiture of his entire past service and consequently he shall
not   qualify   for   pensionary   benefits,   but   does   not   define   the   term
"resignation".  Under  sub­para  (1) of Para  30 of the  1995  Pension
Scheme,   an   employee,   who   has   completed   20   years   of   qualifying
service, may by giving notice of not less than 90 days in writing to the
appointing authority retire from service and under sub­para (2) of
Para   30   of   the   1995   Pension   Scheme,   the   notice   of   voluntary
retirement shall require acceptance by the appointing authority. Since
"voluntary retirement" unlike "resignation" does not entail forfeiture
of   past   services   and   instead   qualifies   for   pension,   an   employee   to
whom Para 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme applies cannot be said to
have "resigned" from service.

26. In the facts of the present case, we find that the appellant had
completed 20 years of qualifying service and had given notice of not
less   than   90   days   in   writing   to   the   appointing   authority   of   his
intention   to   leave   the   service   and   the   appointing   authority   had
accepted notice of the appellant and relieved him from service. Hence,
Para 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme applied to the appellant even
though   in   his   letter   dated   16­9­1991   to   the   General   Manager   of
Respondent 1 Company he had used the word "resign".

12. What is unmistakably evident in the case at hand is that the
Appellant had worked continuously for over 20 years, that he sought
to discontinue his services and requested waiver of three months notice
in writing, and that the said notice was accepted by the Respondent
Corporation and the Appellant was thereby allowed to discontinue his
services. If one would examine Rule 31 of the Pension Rules juxtaposed
with   the   aforementioned   facts,   it   would   at   once   be   obvious   and
perceptible   that   the   essential   components   of   that   Rule   stand
substantially  fulfilled  in the  present  case.  In Sheelkumar,  this Court
was alive to the factum  that each case calls  for scrutiny on its own
merits, but that such scrutiny should not be detached from the purpose
and objective of the concerned statute. It thus observed:

30. The aforesaid authorities would show that the court will have to
construe the statutory provisions in each case to find out whether the
termination of service of an employee was a termination by way of
resignation   or   a   termination   by   way   of   voluntary   retirement   and
while construing the statutory provisions, the court will have to keep
in mind the purposes of the statutory provisions.

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31.   The   general   purpose   of   the   1995   Pension   Scheme,   read   as   a
whole,   is   to   grant   pensionary   benefits   to   employees,   who   had
rendered   service   in   the   insurance   companies   and   had   retired   after
putting in the qualifying service in the insurance companies. Paras 22
and 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme cannot be so construed so as to
deprive   of   an   employee   of   an   insurance   company,   such   as   the
appellant, who had put in the qualifying service for pension and who
had voluntarily given up his service after serving 90 days notice in
accordance with sub­para (1) of Para 5 of the 1976 Scheme and after
his notice was accepted by the appointing authority.

13. The   Appellant   ought   not   to   be   deprived   of   pension   benefits
merely because he styled his termination of services as "resignation" or
because there was no provision to retire voluntarily at that time. The
commendable objective of the Pension Rule is to extend benefits to a
class of people to tide over the crisis and vicissitudes of old age, and if
there are some inconsistencies between the statutory provisions and the
avowed   objective   of   the   statute   so   as   to   discriminate   between   the
beneficiaries within the class, the end of justice obligates us to palliate
the differences between the two and reconcile them as far as possible.
We would be failing in our duty, if we go by the letter and not by the
laudatory   spirit   of   statutory   provisions   and   the   fundamental   rights
guaranteed under
Article 14
of the Constitution of India.

14.
Reserve Bank of India v. Cecil Dennis Solomon
, (2004) 9 SCC
461 relied upon by the Respondent, although distinguishable on facts,
has ventured to distinguish "voluntary retirement" from "resignation"
in the following terms:

10. In   service   jurisprudence,   the   expressions   "superannuation",
"voluntary   retirement",   "compulsory   retirement"   and   "resignation"

convey different connotations. Voluntary retirement and resignation
involve voluntary acts on the part of the employee to leave service.
Though both involve voluntary acts, they operate differently. One of
the basic distinctions is that in case of resignation it can be tendered
at any time, but in the case of voluntary retirement, it can only be
sought   for   after   rendering   prescribed   period   of   qualifying   service.
Other fundamental distinction is that in case of the former, normally
retiral benefits are denied but in case of the latter, the same is not
denied. In case of the former, permission or notice is not mandated,
while in case of the latter, permission of the employer concerned is a
requisite   condition.   Though   resignation   is   a   bilateral   concept,   and
becomes effective on acceptance by the competent authority, yet the
general rule can be displaced by express provisions to the contrary.
In

Punjab National Bank v. P.K. Mittal
(1989 Supp (2) SCC 175) on
interpretation   of
Regulation   20(2)
of   the   Punjab   National   Bank
Regulations,  it was held that resignation would automatically take
effect from the date specified in the notice as there was no provision
for any acceptance or rejection of the resignation by the employer.

In

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Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra
((1978) 2 SCC 301) it was
held in the case of a judge of the High Court having regard to
Article
of the Constitution that he has a unilateral right or privilege to
resign his office and his resignation becomes effective from the date
which he, of his own volition, chooses. But where there is a provision
empowering  the employer  not to accept  the resignation,  on certain
circumstances e.g. pendency of disciplinary proceedings, the employer
can exercise the power.

(emphasis is ours)
The   legal   position   deducible   from   the   above   observations   further
amplifies that the so­called resignation tendered by the Appellant was
after satisfactorily serving the period of 20 years ordinarily qualifying
or   enabling   voluntary   retirement.   Furthermore,   while   there   was   no
compulsion to do so, a waiver of the three months notice period was
granted   by   the   Respondent   Corporation.   The   State   being   a   model
employer should construe the provisions of a beneficial legislation in a
way that extends the benefit to its employees, instead of curtailing it.

15. The cases of
Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India
, (1994) 2
SCC 521;
State of M.P. v. Yogendra Shrivastava
, (2010) 12 SCC 538;

M.R.   Prabhakar   v.   Canara   Bank
,   (2012)   9   SCC   671;
National
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kirpal Singh
, (2014) 5 SCC 189;
UCO Bank v.
Sanwar   Mal
,   (2004)   4   SCC   412   relied   upon   by   the   parties   are
distinguishable on facts from the present case.

16. We thus hold that the termination of services of the Appellant,
in essence, was voluntary retirement within the ambit of Rule 31 of the
Pension Rules of 1995. The Appellant is entitled for pension, provided
he   fulfils   the   condition   of   refunding   of   the   entire   amount   of   the
Corporation s contribution to the Provident Fund along with interest
accrued thereon as provided in the Pension Rules of 1995. Considering
the   huge   delay,   not   explained   by   proper   reasons,   on   part   of   the
Appellant in approaching the Court, we limit the benefits of arrears of
pension payable to the Appellant to three years preceding the date of
the   petition   filed   before   the   High   Court.   These   arrears   of   pension
should be paid to the Appellant in one instalment within four weeks
from the date of refund of the entire amount payable by the Appellant
in  accordance  of  the  Pension  Rules  of  1995.   In  the  alternative,  the
Appellant may opt to get the amount of refund adjusted against the
arrears of pension. In the latter case, if the amount of arrear is more
than the amount of refund required, then the remaining amount shall
be paid within two weeks from the date of such request made by the
Appellant. However, if the amount of arrears is less than the amount
of refund required, then the pension shall be payable on monthly basis
after the date on which the amount of refund is entirely adjusted.

17. The impugned Judgments of the High Court are set aside and

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the Appeal stands allowed in the terms above. However, parties shall
bear their respective costs.

34. In the case of Kamlesh Natvarlal Bhatt (Supra), a Division Bench
of this Court considered an almost identical issue. After an exhaustive
review   of   the   various   decisions   of   the   Supreme   Court   and   also,
considering   the
Regulation   22
of   the   Pension   Regulations,   it   held   as
under:­

We   have  thoughtfully  considered   the   respective  arguments.  An
employee who resigns from service ceases to have any relation with the
employer with effect from the date of acceptance  of resignation. The
position   of   such   an   employee   is  not   synonymous   with   the   one   who
retires  on  attaining  the  age  of  superannuation  or  who  is retired  in
accordance   with   the   rules   regulating   the   conditions   of   service.   The
relationship between an employee who retires on attaining the age of
superannuation or otherwise subsists with the employer for the limited
purpose   of   grant   of   pension   and   other   retiral   benefits.   In   an
appropriate case the employer can also take disciplinary action against
a   retired   person.   As   against   this,   no   semblance   of   relation   subsists
between the employer and the employee who has resigned from service.
Such  an employee  cannot  be  subjected  to any  disciplinary  action  in
relation   to   the   misconduct   which   may   have   been   committed   in   the
course   of   employment.   Therefore,   appellant   has   no   right   to   claim
pension and other retiral benefits.

In
UCO Bank vs. Sanwar Mal
(2004)4 SCC 412, the  Supreme  Court
highlighted   the   distinction   between   the   words   ?resignation?   and   ?
retirement? in the following words:

"The words resignation" and "retirement" carry different meanings in
common parlance. An employee can resign at any point of time, even
on the second day of his appointment but in the case of retirement he
retires only after attaining the age of superannuation or in the case of
voluntary retirement on completion of qualifying service. The effect of
resignation  and  retirement  to the  extent  that  there  is  severance  of
employment   but   in   service   jurisprudence   both   the   expressions   are
understood   differently.   Under   the   Regulations   the   expressions
"resignation"   and   "retirement"   have   been   employed   for   different
purpose and carry different meanings. The pension scheme herein is
based on actuarial  calculation,  it is a self­financing  scheme,  which
does   not   depend   upon   budgetary   support   and   consequently   it
constitutes   a complete   code   by  itself.  The   scheme  essentially   covers
retirees as the credit balance to their provident fund account is larger

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as   compared   to   employees   who   resigned   from   service.   Moreover,
resignation   brings   about   complete   cessation   of   master   and   servant
relationship whereas voluntary retirement maintains the relationship
for the purposes of grant of retiral benefits, in view of the past service.
Similarly, acceptance of resignation is dependent upon discretion of
the employer whereas retirement is completion of service in terms of
regulations/rules  framed  by the bank.  Resignation  can be tendered
irrespective of the length of service whereas in the case of voluntary
retirement, the employee has to complete qualifying service for retiral
benefits.   Further,   there   are   different   yardsticks   and   criteria   for
submitting resignation vis­a­vis voluntary retirement and acceptance
thereof."

In
Reserve
Bank   of   India
Vs.   Cecil   Dennis   Solomon   and   another
,
(2004) 9 SCC 461, the Supreme Court reiterated the views expressed
in Sanwar Mal's case (supra) and observed:

"The   expressions   "superannuation",   "voluntary   retirement",
"compulsory   retirement"   and   "resignation"   convey   different
connotations. Voluntary retirement and resignation involve voluntary
acts on the part of the employee to leave service. Though both involve
voluntary acts, they operate differently. Resignation can be tendered
at  any time  but voluntary  retirement  can  be  sought  for  only after
rendering   the   requisite   period   of   qualifying   service.   In   case   of   the
former, normally retiral benefits are denied but in case of the latter,
the same is not denied. In case of the former, permission or notice is
not mandated, while in case of the latter, permission of the employer
concerned is a requisite condition. Though resignation is a bilateral
concept,   and   becomes   effective   on   acceptance   by   the   competent
authority, yet the general rule can be displaced by express provisions
to the contrary."

In our opinion, the ratio of the law
laid down in
the afore mentioned
decisions   is  squarely  applicable  to   the   appellant's  case.

In
Premji
Khanji Masani  v. Regional Manager, United India Insurance  Co.Ltd
.

(supra)   and   Letters   Patent   Appeal   No.23   of   1997,   Hina   A.Desai   v.
Government of Gujarat and others decided on 28.9.2005, two Division
Benches   of   this   Court   have   expressed   similar   view   and   held   that   a
person who has resigned from service can not claim pensionary benefit.

We  are  further  of the view that the  appellant  can not take  benefit  of
the option exercised by him for pension scheme. Rule 22 of the Pension
Regulations, which provides for forfeiture of service reads as under:

"22. Forfeiture of service:­ 1) Resignation or dismissal or removal or
termination of an employee from the service of the Bank shall entail
forfeiture of his entire past service and consequently shall not qualify
for pensionary benefits;

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(2)   An   interruption   in   the   service   of   a   Bank  employee  entails
forfeiture of his past service, except in the following cases, namely:­

(a) authorised leave of absence;

(b)  suspension, where  it  is  immediately  followed  by  reinstatement,
whether in the same or a different post, or where the Bank employee
dies  or   is   permitted  to  retire  or   is   retired   on   attaining   the  age  of
compulsory retirement while under suspension;

(c) transfer to non­qualifying service in an  establishment  under  the
control of the Government or Bank if such transfer has been ordered
by a competent authority in the public interest;

(d) joining time while on transfer from one post to another.

(3) Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in sub­regulation (2),  the
appointing   authority  may,   by   order,   commute   retrospectively   the
periods of absence without leave as extraordinary leave.

(4) (a) In the absence of a specific indication to the contrary in the
service record, an interruption between two spells of service  rendered
by a bank employee shall be  treated as automatically condoned and
the pre­interruption service treated as qualifying service;

(b)   Nothing   in   clause   (a)   shall   apply   to  interruption  caused   by
resignation, dismissal or removal from service or for participation in
a strike:

Provided   that   before   making   an   entry   in   the   service   record   of   the
Bank   employee   regarding   forfeiture   of   past   service   because   of   his
participation in strike, an opportunity of representation may be given
to such bank employees."

A  reading  of   the   above  reproduced  regulation   makes   it   clear   that
resignation or dismissal or  removal  or  termination  of service  entails
forfeiture   of   the   past   service.   In   view   of  the   plain  language   of   this
Regulation,   the   appellant   will   be   deemed   to   have   forfeited   his   past
service because he had  voluntarily  resigned from  service and in that
view of the matter he can not claim pension on the basis of the service
rendered till the date of acceptance of resignation.

Even   otherwise,   the  appellant's  case   does   not   fall   in   any   of   the
provisions  contained  in Chapter  V of the Pension  Regulations  which
specifies  different   kinds   of   pension   i.e.   Superannuation
Pension(
Regulation 28
), Pension on voluntary retirement (Regulation

29),   Invalid   Pension   (
Regulation   30
),   Compassionate   Allowance
(
Regulation  31
),   Premature   Retirement   Pension   (
Regulation   32
),
Compulsory Retirement  Pension (
Regulation 33
) and Family Pension
(
Regulation 34
). None of the provisions contained in the  Regulations
provide for grant of pension to a person who has resigned from service.
Therefore,   the  appellant's  prayer   for  grant  of   pension   can   not   be

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entertained.

No other point has been argued.

For the reasons mentioned above, the appeal is dismissed.

35. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls
for my consideration is whether the writ­applicants are entitled to the
pensionary benefits under the Regulations.

36. It is well settled law that the pension is neither a bounty nor a
matter of grace depending upon the sweet will of the employer, nor an
ex­gratia payment. It is a payment for the past service rendered. It is a
social   welfare   measure   rendering   the   socio­economic   justice   to   those
who in the hey­day of their life ceaselessly toiled for the employer or an
assurance   that   in   their   old   age   they   would   not   be   left   in   lurch.  The
Constitution Bench in
Deokinandan Prasad vs. State of Bihar & Ors
:

AIR 1971 SC 1409 held that the grant of pension does not depend upon
an order being passed by the authorities to that effect. It may be that for
the purposes of quantifying the amount having regard to the period of
service and other allied matters, it may be necessary for the authorities
to pass an order to that effect, but the right to receive pension flows to
the officer employee not because of the said order but by virtue of the
Rules. Pension is not a bounty payable on the sweet will and pleasure of
the Government and that on the other hand, the right to pension is a
valuable   right   vesting   in   a   Government   servant.   The   right   to   receive
pension is property under Article 300­A and by a mere executive order
the State has no power to withhold the same. Similarly, the said claim is
also property under
Article 19 (1) (f)
and it is not saved by sub­article
(5)   of
Article   19.
The   Constitution   Bench   in
D.S.  Nakara  &   Ors   vs.
Union of India & Ors
: (1983) 1 SCC 305 held that:­

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"29. Summing­up it can be said with confidence  that pension is not
only compensation for loyal service rendered in the past, but pension
also   has   a   broader   significance,   in   that   it   is   a   measure   of   socio­
economic   justice   which   inheres   economic   security   in   the   fall   of   life
when physical and mental prowess  is ebbing  corresponding  to aging
process and therefore, one is required to fall back on savings. One such
saving in kind is when you gave your best in the hey­day of life to your
employer, in days of invalidity, economic security by way of periodical
payment is assured. The term has been judicially defined as a stated
allowance   or   stipend   made   in   consideration   of   past   service   or   a
surrender of rights or emoluments to one retired from service. Thus the
pension   payable   to   a   Government   employee   is   earned   by   rendering
long  and efficient service and therefore can be said to be a deferred
portion of the compensation or for service rendered. In one sentence
one  can  say that the  most  practical  raison  d'etre  for  pension  is the
inability to provide for oneself due to old age. One may live and avoid
unemployment but not senility and penury if there is nothing to fall
back upon."

37. A person cannot be deprived of his pension without the authority
of law, which is the constitutional mandate and enshrined in Article 300­
A of the Constitution. An employee earns these benefits by dint of his
long,   continuous,   faithful   and   unblemished   service.   It   is   thus   a   hard
earned benefit  which  accrues  to an employee and is  in  the  nature of
property.   The   Apex   Court   in
State  of  Jharkhand &  Ors vs. Jitendra
Kumar Srivastava & Anr
: (2013) 12 SCC 210 held (Paras 8, 15, 16 &
17 of the SCC in Jitendra Kumar Srivastava's case (Supra)) that:

8.   It   is   an   accepted   position   that   gratuity   and   pension   are   not
bounties.   An   employee   earns   these   benefits   by   dint   of   his   long,
continuous,   faithful   and   unblemished   service.   Conceptually   it   is   so
lucidly described in
D.S. Nakara v. Union of India
: (1983) 1 SCC 305
: 1983 SCC (L&S) 145  by D.A. Desai, J. who spoke for the Bench, in
his inimitable style, in the following words: (SCC pp.319­20, paras 18­

20).

"18. The approach of the respondents raises a vital and none too easy
of   answer,   question   as   to   why   pension   is   paid.   And   why   was   it
required   to   be   liberalized?   Is   the   employer,   which   expression   will
include even the State, bound to pay pension? Is there any obligation

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on the employer to provide for the erstwhile employee even after the
contract  of employment has come to an end and the employee has
ceased to render service?

19. What is a pension? What are the goals of pension? What public
interest or purpose, if any, it seeks to serve? If it does seek to serve
some   public   purpose,   is   it   thwarted   by   such   artificial   division   or
retirement pre and post a certain date? We need seek answer to these
and incidental questions so as to render just justice between parties to
this petition.

20. The antiquated notion of pension being a bounty of gratuitous
payment depending upon the sweet will or grace of the employer not
claimable   as   a   right   and,   therefore,   no   right   to   pension   can   be
enforced   through   court   has   been   swept   under   the   carpet   by   the
decision of the Constitution Bench in
Deokinandan Prasad v. State of
Bihar
: (1971) 2 SCC 330 : 1971 Supp SCR 634 wherein this Court
authoritatively ruled that pension is a right  and the payment of it
does   not   depend   upon   the   discretion   of   the   Government   but   is
governed   by   rules   and   a   government   servant   coming   within   those
rules is entitled to claim pension. It was further held that the grant of
pension does not depend upon anyone‟s discretion. It is only for the
purpose of quantifying the amount having regard to service and other
allied matters that it may be necessary for the authority to pass an
order to that effect but the right to receive pension flows to the officer
not because of any such order but by virtue of the rules.

This view
was reaffirmed in
State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh
:(1976) 2 SCC 1 :
1976 SCC (L&S) 172 : (1976) 2 LLJ 377

It is thus a hard earned benefit which accrues to an employee and is
in the nature of "property". This right to property cannot be taken
away without the due process of law as per the provisions of Article
300­A of the Constitution of India.

15. In
State of W.B v. Haresh C. Banerjee
: (2006) 7 SCC 651 : 2006
SCC   (L&S)   1719   this   Court   recognized   that   even   when,   after   the
repeal of
Article 19 (1) (f)
and
Article 31 (1)
of the Constitution vide
Constitution  (Forty­fourth
Amendment)  Act,  1978
w.e.f. 20­6­1979,
the right to property no longer remained a fundamental right, it was
still   a   constitutional   right,   as   provided   in   Article   300­A   of   the
Constitution. Right to receive pension was treated as right to property.
Otherwise, challenge
in that case
was to the vires of Rule 10(1) of the
West   Bengal   Services   (Death­cum­Retirement   Benefit)   Rules,   1971
which conferred the right upon the Governor to withhold or withdraw
a pension or any part thereof under certain circumstances and the said
challenge was repelled by this Court.

16.   That   fact   remains   that   there   is   an   imprimatur   to   the   legal

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principle that the right to receive pension is recognized as a right in
"property". Article 300­A of the Constitution of India reads as under:­

"300­A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of
law. - No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority
of law." Once we proceed on that premise, the answer to the question
posed by us in the beginning of this judgment becomes too obvious. A
person cannot be deprived of this pension without  the authority of
law, which is the constitutional mandate enshrined in Article 300­A
of the Constitution. It follows that attempt of the appellant to take
away a part of pension or gratuity or even leave encashment without
any   statutory   provision   and   under   the   umbrage   of   administrative
instruction cannot be countenanced.

17. It is hardly needs to be emphasized that the executive instructions
are not have statutory character and, therefore, cannot be termed as
"law" within the meaning of the aforesaid Article 300­A. On the basis
of   such   a   circular,   which   is   not   having   force   of   law,   the   appellant
cannot   withhold   even   a   part   of   pension   or   gratuity.   As   we   notices
above, so far as statutory Rules are concerned, there is no provision for
withholding pension or gratuity in the given situation. Had there been
any   such   provision   in   these   Rules,   the   position   would   have   been
different."

38. There   need   not   be   any   more   debate   on   the   proposition   that
pension is not the bounty of the employee, it is a benefit earned by dint
of   his   long,   continuous,   faithful   and   unblemished   service   under   the
service Rules or under the relevant Rules or under the pension rules.
Pension   is   in   the   nature   of   property   and   that   this   right   to   property
cannot   be   taken   away   without   due   process   of   law.   The   word   "Law"
under Article 300­A of the Constitution would mean a validly enacted
law meaning thereby a just and reasonable law.

39. I   hasten   to   add   that   although   pension   is   not   a   bounty   but   is
claimable   as   a   matter   of   right,   yet   the   right   is   not   absolute   or
unconditional.   The   person   claiming   pension   must   establish   his
entitlement to such pension in law. The entitlement might be dependent
upon various considerations or conditions. In a given case, the retired

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employee   is   entitled  to   pension   or  not  depend  on   the   provisions   and
interpretation of Rules and Regulations.

40. Indisputably   all   the   writ­applicants   before   me   had   tendered
resignation from service of the respective banks and thereby had put an
end to their service. Each of the writ­applicants resigned from service
before the Pension Regulations, 1995 came into force. It is for the first
time   in   the   Pension   Regulations,   1995   that   voluntary   retirement   was
introduced.
Regulation 29
provides for Pension on voluntary Retirement.
The respondents have resisted the claim of the writ­applicants on the
ground that the 1995 Pension Scheme will not apply as
Regulation 22
of
the   1995   Pension   Scheme   provides   that   when   a   person   has   resigned
from   service,   he   would   not   be   entitled   to   pension,   thereby,   drawing
distinction from having voluntarily retired.

41. Various judgments of the Supreme Court have been relied upon as

referred to above
, but the reliance is more strong on the judgments in
the case of
Sheelkumar Jain
(Supra) and
M.R. Prabhakar
(Supra).

42. The ratio of the judgment in the case of Sheel Kumar Jain is that if
an   employee   is   not   expected   to   know   that   inspite   of   serving   the
qualifying service period, he would not be entitled to grant of pension
under a subsequent implemented Pension Scheme (which operates from
a   retrospective   dates)   his   resignation   will   lead   to   forfeiture   of   the
services, then, once an employee has otherwise completed the requisite
period   of   qualifying   service   for   grant   of   pension   under   the
retrospectively operating pension scheme, the language of a resignation
letter   should   not   be   treated   as   one   seeking   a   resignation   by   the
employee,   but   that   the   letter   should   be   treated   as   an   application   for
voluntary retirement.

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43. Thus,   in
Sheelkumar   Jain
(supra),   the   Supreme   Court   took   an
equitable view considering  that a person is not expected to know the
adverse  consequences   against  him   unless  so   provided   by  the   relevant
Rules and especially when the benefits of the Pension Scheme is given
retrospectively   whereby   the   qualifying   service   completes   many   years
earlier/prior   to   the   introduction   of   the   Pension   Scheme   (i.e.in   the
retrospective period) and in which period there would be persons who
would had "resigned" but who on the date of resignation had otherwise
completed the qualifying service period for the grant of the pension.

44. I have  an honest  confession  to make  that my heart really is   in
accordance with the ratio in the case of  Sheelkumar Jain's Case. What I
have just said is reflected in my judgment and order dated 03/11/2012
passed  in   the  case  of  Chandrakant  Devji  Patel  Vs. Vijya Bank (Supra).
However, as pointed out above, the view taken by me did not find favour
with the Division Bench of this Court and the judgment was set aside.
One more reason to say so is that in none of the counter affidavits filed
by the  Banks, there is no reference to the  earlier service rules of the
banks   that   prior   to   the   application   of   the   1995   Pension   Scheme   the
distinction  was in fact drawn between the 'resignation' and 'voluntary
retirement'.

45. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
M.R. Prabhakar

(supra) makes all the difference. In
M.R. Prabhakar
(supra), the Supreme
Court distinguished Sheelkumar Jain's case (supra) on the ground that the
same dealt with the pension scheme of the Insurance Companies and not
the Pension Scheme of the Banks, and that according to the
Regulation
of the 1995 Pension Scheme of the Banks, if a person had resigned,
the same would result in forfeiture of his services and such a person is

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not entitled to the benefits of 1995 Pension Scheme.

46.
In the aforesaid context, I may quote the observations made by a
learned   Single   Judge   of   the   Delhi   High   Court   in   the   case   of
Anand
Parkash Batra Vs. Central Bank of India
; Writ Petition (Civil) No. 5698
of 1998; decided on 30/09/2013.

6(i)   I   must   state   that   it   is   a   moot   point   for   consideration   at   an
appropriate   time   by   the   Supreme   Court   that   if   a   scheme   operates
retrospectively i.e it commences at a date for its implementation many
years   prior   to   the   same   being   introduced,   then   surely   an   adverse
consequence   of   denial   of   benefits   of   such   retrospectively   operating
scheme should not be denied to an employee whose services come to an
end in the retrospective period unless such employee was made aware
of the adverse consequences. In this regard it bears note that it is held
by the Supreme Court in a catena of judgments that terminal benefits
are not a bounty but are natural entitlements which become due to an
employee for the services rendered by the employee with the employer­
organization.  Therefore,  once  the  necessary  qualifying  service  period
has   been   completed   by   the   employee,   terminal   benefits   should   be
granted  as a matter  of course  because  they flow  from  the  aspect  of
rendering continuous service with the bank for the qualifying period
and they be not denied on the technical ground that the employee had
"resigned‟.

(ii) A most important aspect for giving benefit of pension scheme  is
noted and stated by the Supreme Court in the case of
UCO Bank Vs.
Sanwar   Mal
(2004)   4   SCC   412,   as   "The   pension   scheme   herein   is
based on actuarial calculation; it is a self financing scheme, which does
not   depend   budgetary   support   and   consequently   it   constitutes   a
complete   code   by   itself.   The   scheme   essentially   covers   retires   as   the
credit balance to their provident fund account is larger as compared to
employees  who resigned  from service."  Thus,  clearly there  is a valid
reason   to   treat   resignation   as   retirement   qua   those   employees   who
have at the time of resignation rendered the requisite qualifying service
for grant of pension and they ought to be treated differently for being
entitled to grant of pension under the scheme than those persons who
on   resignation   have   not   completed   the   period   of   qualifying   service
inasmuch as the employee who renders the qualifying service has that
much credit to his provident fund by which no budgetary support is
required for payment of pension.

I am of the very same view as expressed by the learned Single

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Judge of the Delhi High Court
referred to above
.

47. I am not impressed by the submission canvassed on behalf of the
writ­applicants that
Regulation 22
of the Pension Regulations, 1995 is
arbitrary and unreasonable, and therefore violative of Article­14 of the
Constitution of India. I need not to go into this issue because the same
has been answered by the  Supreme Court in the case of
Sanwar Mal

(supra). The relevant observations are as under:­

Resignation   can   be   tendered   irrespective   of   the   length   of   service
whereas   in   the   case   of   voluntary   retirement,   the   employee   has   to
complete   qualifying   service   for   retiral   benefits.   Further,   there   are
different   yardsticks   and   criteria   for   submitting   resignation   vis­a­vis
voluntary   retirement   and   acceptance   thereof.   Since   the   Pension
Regulations disqualify an employee, who has resigned, from claiming
pension, the respondent cannot claim membership of the fund. In our
view,   regulation   22   provides   for   disqualification   of   employees   who
have resigned from service and for those who have been dismissed or
removed   from   service.   Hence,   we   do   not   find   any   merit   in   the
arguments  advanced  on behalf of the respondent that regulation  22
makes   an   arbitrary   and   unreasonable   classification   repugnant   to

Article 14
of the Constitution by keeping out such class of employees.

The view we have taken is supported by the Judgment of this Court in
the case of
Reserve Bank of India & Anr. v. Cecil Dennis Solomon &
Anr.
reported  in [2003  (10) Scale  449].  Before  concluding  we may
state that
Regulation 22
is not in the nature of penalty as alleged. It
only   disentitles   an   employee   who   has   resigned   from   service   from
becoming a member of the Fund. Such employees have received their
retiral   benefits   earlier.   The   pension   scheme,   as   stated   above,   only
provides   for   a   second   retiral   benefit.   Hence   there   is   no   question   of
penalty   being   imposed   on   such   employees   as   alleged.   The   Pension
Scheme  only provides for an avenue for investment to retirees.
They
are provided avenue to put in their savings and as a term or condition
which   is   more   in   the   nature   of   an   eligibility   criteria   the   scheme
disentitles such category of employees out of it.

48. So far as the facts of each of the writ­applications are concerned,
as stated above, they all had resigned from service. Ultimately it comes
to this that the Court will have to construe the statutory provisions in
each case to find out whether the termination of service of an employee

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was   a   termination  by   way   of   resignation   or   a   termination   by  way   of
voluntary retirement and while construing the statutory provisions, the
Court should keep in mind the purpose of the statutory provisions.

49. When the writ­applicants submitted their resignations, there was
no   provision   for   retirement   and   there   was   only   a   provision   for
resignation. The decision in the case of
Shashikala Devi
(Supra)  would
also not save the situation for the writ­applicants. In the said case, the
question was whether the letter of the employee was one of resignation
or   for   voluntary   retirement.   The   Court   took   the   view   that   it   would
depend   on   the   circumstances   in   which   the   letter   was   written   by   the
employee. It was held that mere expression used in the letter would not
be   determinative.   The   Supreme   Court   on   a   reference   to   the   letter,
wherein, the employee had spelt out the reasons for resigning based on
his medical condition  and attendant circumstances concluded that the
employee had, in fact, sought voluntary retirement and never intended
to   resign   from   service.   Mauzi   Ram   ­   the   deceased   employee   had
rendered more than 34 years of service in the respondent­bank. He was,
therefore,   qualified   to   receive   pension   in   terms   of   the   Regulations
applicable   to   him.   The   Supreme   Court   considered   the
Regulation   29

which provides for the voluntary retirement.  Mauzi Ram had completed
more   than   twenty   years   of   service   by   8th  October,   2007.   As   on   8th
October, 2007 the deceased­employee was entitled either to resign from
service or to seek premature retirement in terms of
Regulation 29
.

50. So far as the cases in hand are concerned, I need not undertake
the   exercise   to   ascertain   whether   or   not   the   communications   at   the
relevant  point  of   time   were   letters   of   resignation  simpliciter   or  could
well have been treated to be a request for voluntary retirement because
prior   to   29/09/1995   i.e.   the   date   of   enforcement   of   the   Pension

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Regulations, the employees of the Banks were entitled to avail voluntary
retirement in terms of the
Regulation 19
of the Bank (Officers') Service
Regulations   which   provided   for   three   months   prior   notice   and
completion   of   30   years   of   service   or   attaining   55   years   of   age.
Indisputably, none of the above referred conditions  were fulfilled and
therefore,   the   writ­applicants   could   not   have   availed   the   benefits   of
voluntary retirement in terms of the
Regulation 19
.

51. At the time, when the writ­applicants tendered their resignations,
they   knew   very   well   that   they   were   not   fulfilling   the   conditions   as
provided in
Regulation 19
of the Bank (Officers') Service Regulations to
seek   voluntary   retirement.   If   they   were   entitled   to   seek   voluntary
retirement, obviously they would have applied for the same rather than
resigning from service. None of the writ­applicants completed 30 years
of service with the respective banks nor had reached the age of 55 years
at the time of tendering their resignations nor had given three months
prior notice. For one reason or the other they had put to an end the
service voluntarily and they did so by tendering resignations. So far as
the writ­applicants of the Special Civil Application No.10856 of 2003 are
concerned, they resigned on medical grounds and also, took the benefit
of compassionate appointment which was given to the Son.

52. I also take notice of the fact that in the judgment of
Shashikala
Devi
(Supra), there is no reference to the decision of the
M.R. Prabhakar

(Supra).

53. For   the   forgoing   reasons,   all   the   writ­applications   fail   and   are
hereby rejected. Rule is discharged.

(J.B.PARDIWALA, J.)
aruna

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