Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.

Leave granted.

These appeals project a challenge to the judgment and order dated
11.5.2015 rendered by the High Court of Karnatka in the appeals preferred
by the respondents herein, thereby acquitting them of the charge under Sections 120B and 109 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short “ IPC ”) read
with Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
(for short “1988 Act”) as framed against them and also resultantly setting-
aside the order of the Trial Court for confiscation of properties, both
movable and immovable, of the concerned firms, as mentioned therein. In
the meantime, after the conclusion of the arguments, the respondent No.1
expired and, thus in law, the appeals against her have abated.
Nevertheless, in view of the gamut of the imputations and the frame-work of
the charges as well as the nature of the evidence, oral and documentary,
available on records, reference to her role and involvement, based thereon
in collaboration with other respondents would have to be essentially
examined. The respondents-accused would hereinafter be referred to as
respondents/accused/A1/A2/A3/ A4, as the case may be, contingent on the
context.

Charges were framed against A1 – former Chief Minister of the State of
Tamil Nadu and the co-accused viz. A2, A3 and A4 (respondents herein), for
commission of the alleged offences punishable under Section 13(1)(e) read
with Section 13(2) of the 1988 Act and further under Section 120-B and Section 109 of IPC. It is the case of the prosecution that A1 (since
deceased) was the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu from 24th June, 1991 till
13th May, 1996. Prior to this, she was a member of the Rajya Sabha from
April, 1984 till 27th January, 1989 and further she was a member of Tamil
Nadu Legislative Assembly from 27th January, 1989 till 30th January, 1991.
She also acted in the films during 1964-1972. Facts reveal that she was the
daughter of late Smt. N.R. Sandhya, who also acted in films during 1960’s.
Smt. N.R. Sandhya died in the year 1971 and by virtue of her mother’s Will
dated 01.11.1971, A1 became the owner of the following properties viz.,

Land and building at No.36, Poes Garden, Chennai-86;

House at Plot No.36, Door No.8/3/1099 in Sri Nagar Officer’s Colony at
Hyderabad City;

Lands totally measuring 10.20 acres in Sy.No.52 and Sy.No.50 of Jeedimetla
village and Sy. No.93/1 of Pet Basheerabad Village in Metchal Taluk in
Ranga Reddy Dist. of Andhra Pradesh with Grape Garden, Farm House and
Servants quarters;

Land in Sy.No.93/2 to the extent of 3.15 acres in Pet Basheerabad village
in Andhra Pradesh;

In addition to the above properties, A1 was also in possession of –

Agricultural land measuring 3.43 acres in Cheyyur Taluk now in Anna Dist.
(as per Doc. No.4564/81, dt.16.12.1981 of SRO North Madras);

An old Ambassador car and an old Contessa car;

A new Maruti car bearing registration No.TMA-2466 worth Rs.60,435/- and

Company shares.

Thus, the assets which were in the possession of A1 up to 1987 were found
to be worth only Rs.7.5 lakhs. Besides, she also claimed to have possessed
balance in her bank accounts to the extent of Rs.1 lakh and certain items
of jewellery.

A2 – Tmt. Sasikala Natarajan is the wife of one Mr. M. Natarajan who had
joined Government service as a Publicity Assistant in the Department of
Information and Public Relation, Government of Tamil Nadu, in the year 1970
and thereafter promoted in succession eventually as Deputy Director in the
year 1986 in the same department. He tendered his resignation from
Government service on 1st November, 1988 which was accepted by the
Government of Tamil Nadu with retrospective effect on 3rd April, 1991.

A2, as it appears from the facts, is the daughter one C. Vivekanandan, a
Medical Compounder, and her marriage with said Natarajan was held in the
early 1970’s. A2 was initially an occasional visitor to the residence of
A1 at No.36, Poes Garden, Chennai-86, and started permanently living there
with A1 from 1988 onwards and was acknowledged and declared by A1 as her
friend-cum-sister. A2 continued to live with A1 since then.

A3 – Tr. V.N. Sudhakaran is the son of A2’s elder sister Smt. Vanithamani
and T.T. Vivekanandan. He started residing at No.36, Poes Garden, Chennai-
86 in the year 1992 while pursuing his studies at New College, Chennai. A1
had acknowledged and proclaimed A3 as her “foster son” and had conducted
his marriage with one Sathiyalakshmi at Chennai on 7.9.1995, in a lavish
celebrations.

A4, Tmt. J. Elavarasi is the wife of late V. Jayaraman, the elder brother
of A2. The said V. Jayaraman was a Government servant and he died in
December, 1991 due to electrocution while attending to works in the Grape
Garden of A1 at Hyderabad. Following her husband’s death, A4 came to live
at No.36, Poes Garden, Chennai-86, from the beginning of 1992.

The case of the prosecution is that, as on 1.7.1991, A1 was found in
possession of properties and pecuniary resources in her name and in the
name of A2 Smt. N. Sasikala, who was living with A1 at No. 36, Poes Garden,
Chennai to the extent of Rs.2,01,83,957/- including the properties acquired
in the name of M/s. Jaya Publications, M/s. Sasi Enterprises and Namadhu
MGR, which had been floated by A1 and A2 with themselves as partners. But,
after 1.7.1991, there was sudden spurt in the acquisition of assets and
during this period, A1 and A2 floated several firms in the names of A2, A3
and A4 viz.,

M/s. J. Farm Houses;

M/s. J.S. Housing Development;

M/s. Jay Real Estate;

M/s. Jaya Contractors and Builders;

M/s. J.S. Leasing and Maintenance;

M/s. Green Farm Houses;

M/s. Metal King;

M/s. Super Duper TV (P) Ltd.,

M/s. Anjaneya Printers Pvt. Ltd.,

M/s. Ramraj Agro Mills Ltd.,

M/s. Signora Business Enterprises Pvt., Ltd.,

M/s. Lex Property Development Pvt., Ltd.,

M/s. Riverway Agro Products Pvt., Ltd.,

M/s. Meadow Agro Farms Pvt., Ltd.,

M/s. Indo Doha Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Ltd.,

M/s. A.P. Advertising Services;

M/s. Vigneswara Builders;

M/s. Lakshmi Constructions;

M/s. Gopal Promoters;

M/s. Sakthi Constructions;

M/s. Namasivaya Housing Development;

M/s. Ayyappa Property Developments;

M/s. Sea Enclave;

M/s. Navasakthi Contractors and Builders;

M/s. Oceanic Constructions;

M/s. Green Garden Apartments;

M/s. Marble Marvels;

Vinod Video Vision;

Fax Universal;

Fresh Mushrooms;

M/s. Super Duper TV., and

M/s. Kodanadu Tea Estate;

The further case of the prosecution is that during the check period i.e.
from 1.7.1991 to 30.4.1996, there were no business activities at all in
respect of many of the above firms, and in respect of others, the
activities were more in the nature of acquiring assets like lands,
machinery, building etc., which were not production oriented. No income-tax
returns were filed by these firms. No assessment for commercial tax has
also been done with respect to the business of these firms. A1 also did not
file her Income-tax returns for the assessment years 1987-88 to 1992-93
till November, 1992 and when this issue was sought to be raised in
Parliament, A1 filed the income-tax returns for the above period in
November, 1992. Subsequent to 1.7.1991, assets in the form of movable and
immovable properties and pecuniary resources like bank deposits etc., were
found acquired not only in the name of A1, but also in the names of A2, A3
and A4 and the firms floated in their names. Scrutiny of various bank
accounts maintained in the names of A1 to A4 and in the names of the above
firms disclosed that huge credits in cash had been frequently made into
various accounts which were not commensurate with the income of the
individuals and of the firms concerned. There were frequent transfers of
amounts between one account to the others to facilitate illegal acquisition
of assets. The huge quantum of such assets, when viewed in the context that
A1 was holding the office of the Chief Minister and that A2, A3 and A4 were
living under the same roof with A1 and not having sufficient means to
acquire the assets in their names, established that the assets were
actually acquired by A1.

It is further alleged that, pursuant to the criminal conspiracy between A1,
a public servant and her associates viz., A2, A3 and A4, to acquire and
possess properties and pecuniary resources by A1 in her name and in the
names of A2, A3 and A4 and in the names of various firms floated by them,
they amassed properties and pecuniary resources to the tune of
Rs.66,64,73,573/- (later corrected as Rs.66,65,20,395/-), which was grossly
disproportionate to the known sources of income of A1 and A2 to A4 during
the check period from 1.7.1991 to 30.4.1996. According to the prosecution,
the income from the known sources of A1 during this period, such as rental
income, interest derived from various bank deposits and other deposits held
by her in her name and in the names of A2, A3 and A4, agricultural income,
loans and the salary received by her as Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu,
worked out to a total of Rs.9,34,26,054/-, whereas during this period the
expenditure incurred by A1 including repayment of principal amounts and
interest on loan, and other outgoings were assessed at Rs.11,56,56,833/-.
Thus, as on 30.4.1996, A1 being a public servant was found to have acquired
and possessed pecuniary resources and properties in her name and in the
names of A2, A3 and A4 and the firms floated by them, which were
overwhelmingly disproportionate to her known sources of income to the
extent of Rs.66,65,20,395/- (Rupees Sixty Six Crores Sixty Five Lakhs
Twenty Thousand Three hundred and Ninety Five only) which is an offence of
criminal misconduct within the definition of Sec.13(1)(e) punishable under Section 13(2) of 1988 Act and A2, A3, and A4 conspired with A1 and abetted
the commission of the above offence.

On 14.6.1996, Dr. Subramanian Swamy (PW-232), the then President of Janata
Dal lodged a complaint against A1 before the Principal Sessions/Special
Judge, Madras, under Section 200 of Cr.P.C., alleging that A1, after
assuming the public office as Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, had acquired
properties and earned income disproportionate to her known sources of
income. The said complaint was registered as Crl.M.P. No.3238 of 1996 and
by order dated 21.06.1996, the Principal Sessions Judge/Special Judge
directed investigation under Section 17 of 1988 Act and Section 202 of
Cr.P.C. and further directed to collect necessary materials and submit a
report before the Court within a period of two months. Pursuant to the
said order, PW-240 - Smt. Letika Saran, a senior IPS Officer, took up the
investigation, collected records and documents from various sources.

During the investigation, the said order passed by the Principal Sessions
Judge/Special Judge was challenged before the High Court of Madras. The
investigation was stayed for a brief period and thereafter the High Court
was pleased to direct the Director of Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Madras
(hereinafter also referred to as “DVAC”) to take appropriate steps to
investigate into the allegations made in the complaint and ultimately, an
FIR was filed against A1 on 18.9.1996 as per Ext.P-2266.

During investigation, after conducting search of the residential premises
of A1 and various other locations, the Investigating Officer found several
incriminating materials and voluminous documents were seized and statements
of a large number of witnesses were recorded. The incriminating evidence
collected during such investigation disclosed the complicity of A2 to A4 in
the alleged offence. Hence, an application was filed before the Special
Judge on 22.01.1997 for addition of A2, A3 and A4 as co-accused and for
incorporation of additional offences under Section 120-B of IPC read with Sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of 1988 Act and Section 109 of IPC. On
completion of such investigation, PW-259 (Shri Nallamma Naidu) laid the
charges against all the accused on 4.6.1997 which was duly registered as
Spl. C.C. No.7/97 on the file of the IX Additional Sessions Judge (Special
Court, I), Chennai.

The ball was set into motion and following charges were framed by the
Special Judge, Chennai:

r/w 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and within the
cognizance of this Court.

Secondly:- That you A1 in pursuance of the said criminal conspiracy, during
the said period and the said places, being a public servant to wit the
Chief Minister of the State of Tamil Nadu, acquired and possessed in your
name and in the names of A2 to A4 and in the names of the business
enterprises floated in the names of A2 to A4, pecuniary resources and
property disproportionate to your known sources of income to the extent of
Rs.66,65,20,395/- for which you could not satisfactorily account, and
thereby you A1 committed an offence punishable u/Sec. 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and within the cognizance of this Court.

Thirdly:- That you A2 to A4 in pursuance of the said criminal conspiracy
during the said period and the said places abetted A1 who was a public
servant, by intentionally aiding her in the possession of pecuniary
resources and property disproportionate to her known sources of income and
for which she could not satisfactorily account, by holding a substantial
portion of the said pecuniary resources and property in your names and in
the names of the business enterprises floated in your names, and thereby
you A2 to A4 committed an offence punishable u/Sec. 109 I.P.C . r/w 13(2)
r/w 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and within the
cognizance of this Court.

The charges were denied by the accused persons. During the pendency of the
trial, the D.V. & A.C. was permitted further investigation under Section
173(8) of Cr.P.C. and was granted letters rogatory by the Designated Court
for collecting evidence and materials relating to the alleged accumulation
of disproportionate assets/wealth by A1 in conspiracy with A2 outside the
country. On the basis of the evidence collected during further
investigation, a separate FIR in Crime No.2/AC/2000 was filed by the
prosecution on 2.9.2000 against A1 and A2 which culminated into a charge-
sheet dated 23.3.2001 registered as Spl.C.C. No.2/2001.

Subsequent thereto evidence was recorded from time to time. Thereafter,
steps were taken under Section 313 Cr.P.C. So far as A1 was concerned, she
was permitted to answer a questionnaire which was delivered to her with a
direction to answer it on 25.2.2003, which was adhered to by A1. A2 to A4
were also questioned as per Section 313 Cr.P.C. which was duly concluded on
26.2.2003. Thereafter, defence witnesses were examined. Thereafter, by its
judgment dated 18.11.2003 in Transfer Petition (Criminal) Nos.77-78/2003,
the Supreme Court transferred the said matter to the State of Karnataka and
in terms of the said judgment, the Government of Karnataka by its order
dated 27.12.2003 duly accorded sanction for establishment of the Special
Curt at Bangalore and by Notification dated 19.02.2005, duly appointed Shri
B.V. Acharya, Senior Advocate and former Advocate General of Karnataka as
Public Prosecutor to conduct the said matter.

Thereafter, the said matter bearing Spl.C.C. No.7/1997 was renumbered as
Spl.C.C. No.208/2004 and Spl.C.C. No.2/2001 was renumbered as Spl.C.C.
No.209/2004 on the file of the Special Judge (i.e. 36th Addl. City Civil &
Sessions Judge at Bangalore. Subsequent thereto certain steps were taken on
behalf of the accused and the matter travelled up to this Court/Supreme
Court whereafter the trial was resumed before the Special Judge. The
accused were called upon to examine their witnesses and subsequently 99
witnesses were produced before the Court and concluded their evidence.
Narration of all eventful factual interventions has been avoided being not
decisively essential for the adjudication.

It appears that the Trial Court after hearing the parties culled out the
following points for determination:

Whether the prosecution further proves beyond reasonable doubt that A1 to 4
were parties to a criminal conspiracy with the object of acquiring and
possessing pecuniary resources and assets to the extent of Rs.66,65,20,395/-
in the names of A1 and in the names of A2 to 4 and the 32 business
enterprises floated in the names of A2 to 4 and thereby committed the
offence punishable u/Sec. 120-B of Indian Penal Code R/w. Sec.13 (2) R/w. Sec. 13 (1) (e) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988?

Whether the prosecution further proves beyond all reasonable doubt that A2
to A4 abetted the commission of the above offence by intentionally aiding
A1 in the acquisition and possession of pecuniary resources and properties
disproportionate to her known source of income by holding substantial
portion thereof in their names and in the names of 32 business enterprises
floated in the names of A2 to A4, rendering them liable for conviction for
the offence punishable u/Sec. 109 Indian Penal Code R/w. Sec. 13(2) R/w. Sec.13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988?

What order ?

The Trial Court appraised the evidence adduced in respect of the points
formulated by it and duly dealt with the charges framed against the
accused. The Trial Court elaborately dealt with the matter after
considering the evidence, facts as well as the judgments cited before it,
the contentions raised and after dealing with all aspects of the matter,
inter alia held that:

Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that A2 to A4 abetted the
commission of the above
offence by intentionally aiding A1 in the acquisition
and possession of pecuniary resources and properties disproportionate to
her known source of income as above. Hence, A2, A3 and A4 are hereby
convicted for the offence punishable u/ Sec.109 of I.P.C. R/w. Sec. 13 (1)

(e) R/w. Sec. 13 (2) of 1988 Act.”

The Trial Court after hearing the learned counsel appearing for the accused
and the learned Public Prosecutor on sentence, awarded the following
sentence against the accused:

Out of the fine amount recovered as above, a sum of Rs.5 crores shall be
made over to the State of Karnataka towards reimbursement of the cost of
trial conducted in the State of Karnataka.

Furnish a free copy of the full judgment to the accused forthwith.”

Being aggrieved, appeals were filed by the accused before the High Court of
Karnataka at Bangalore challenging the order passed by the Court of 36th
Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge at Bangalore. The High Court on its
analysis came to the conclusion that the value of assets at the end of the
check period in respect of accused Nos.1, 2, 3 & 4 together along with the
firms/companies involved was Rs.66,44,73,537/- and accepted the value of
the assets as indicated by the prosecution. The High Court, thereafter
applying the principles laid down in Krishnanand Agnihotri Vs. The State of
Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1977 SC 769 = (1977) 1 SCC 816, on a calculation of
total assets, income & expenditure of accused Nos.1 to 4, their firms and
companies, arrived at the percentage of disproportionate assets as under:

Income of Accused Nos.1 to 4, firms and companies:

Rs.37,59,02,466 - Rs.34,76,65,654 = Rs.2,82,36,812

Percentage = Disproportionate assets x 100
Income

= Rs.2,82,36,812 x 100
_____________________
Rs.34,76,65,654

= 8.12%

The High Court, following the principles laid down in Krishnanand
Agnihotri (supra), held that when there is disproportionate asset to the
extent of 10% or below, the accused are entitled to acquittal and
accordingly the High Court passed the following order acquitting the
accused:

[i] Order of the Trial Court relating to confiscation of the properties
both movable and immovable, is hereby set aside.”

Assailing the judgment and order dated 11.05.2015, passed by the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru, appeals, by special leave, have been filed
before this Court by the State of Karnataka and Mr. K. Anbazhagan.
Although the State of Tamil Nadu was arrayed as the sole respondent in the
appeals before the High Court, these appeals have been filed by the State
of Karnataka, in view of the decisions of this Court in K. Anbazhagan Vs.
State of Karnataka and Ors. , reported in (2015) 6 SCC 86 and (2015) 6 SCC
158, wherein it was held that it is only the State of Karnataka (being the
Transferee State) which is the sole Prosecuting Agency and was competent to
appoint the Public Prosecutor.

We have given a patient hearing to all the parties, including the
intervenor, in the matter. We have been taken through various documents and
the evidence of the parties.

Mr. Dushyant Dave and Mr. B.V. Acharya, learned senior counsel appearing in
support of the appeals first contended that the High Court has calculated
the disproportionate assets by adopting an incorrect method with wrong
particulars and our attention was drawn to Page 997 of the SLP Paper Book,
where in the table consisting of assets and expenditure, the High Court has
reduced the values therein but has inflated the income and thus
inaccurately assessed the disproportionate assets to be Rs.2,82,36, 812/-.
It is pointed out before us that there are concurrent findings of the two
Courts in respect of the fact that the accused did own disproportionate
assets during the check period and the difference between the two Courts is
only with regard to the quantum. While the Trial Court held that it is
Rs.53,60,49,954/-, the High Court held it as Rs.2,83,36,812/-. It is also
submitted that in calculating the disproportionate assets, value of assets,
expenditure and income of all the accused has been taken jointly along with
that of firms and companies (34 in number). Both the Courts, High Court as
well as Trial Court, have recorded concurrent findings and have taken all
the assets, income and expenditure of all the accused together. It is
further pointed out that the sole source of inflow is of A1, although
assets were standing in the names of other accused or the firms/companies
owned by them. It is further submitted, as appears from the records, that
both the Courts did not accept the claim to consider the case of A1 and A2
to A4 separately. Hence, it is submitted that now they cannot claim such a
course to be adopted at this stage before this Court.

It is also submitted that both the Courts have rejected the claim of
Namadhu MGR scheme which according to the accused worked out to more than
Rs.14 crores during the check period and that the finding of the Courts
that all properties purchased by the 6 companies actually belonged to
accused has not been challenged by anybody and therefore it stands.

Mr. B.V. Acharya, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the State
of Karnataka contended that if the final figures arrived by the High Court
(appearing at Pages 997-998 of its judgment) are accepted and apparent
errors therein including calculation and arithmetical errors as also error
apparent on the face of the record are corrected, the disproportionate
assets will be more than Rs.35 crores and this alone is sufficient to
sustain the conviction, according to him. Mr. Acharya has placed before us
a Chart which is as follows:

|1. |CALCULATION ERROR |The method of calculating D.A. is wrong. If |
| | |all the findings of the high court is |
| | |accepted in toto then the amount of D.A. is |
| | |Rs.14,38,93,645 i.e. 41.3% & not |
| | |Rs.2,82,36,36,812 i.e. 8.12% as held by the |
| | |High Court – (The previous two charts have |
| | |details of the same) |
|2. |ARITHMETIC ERROR |While totalling loans as income at (Pg.939 |
| | |Vol IV), the High Court has committed an |
| | |arithmetic error to the tune of 13.50 |
| | |Crores. If this arithmetic error is alone |
| | |corrected then the Disproportionate Asset |
| | |come to Rs.16,32,36,812/- i.e. 76.7% |
| | |This is fully covered in Pg 1028-1030 – SLP |
| | |Vol.IV |
|3. |ADMISION OF ACCUSED|Under Expenditure: |
| | |Cost of Construction : The accused have |
| | |admitted that the cost of construction |
| | |incurred is Rs.8,60,59,261 – Pg 2350 Vol IX.|
| | |However the High Court values the same at |
| | |Rs.5,10,55,060 – Pg 979 Vol IV, which is |
| | |Rs.3,50,05,210 lesser than the admitted |
| | |amount. |
| | |Under income: |
| | |Business income of Jaya Publication: The |
| | |accused have admitted that the income of |
| | |Jaya Publication was Rs.1,15,94,849/- (As |
| | |per written submission of A-2 –Extracted in |
| | |Pg 1034 SLP Vol IV). The High Court |
| | |calculated this at Rs.4 Crores – Pg 946-960 |
| | |Vol IV, which is Rs.2,84,05,151/- more than |
| | |the admitted amount. |
|4. |GIFTS AS INCOME |Gifts as income is subject matter of SLP |
| | |Nos.1163-1167 of 2012 – Pg 1032-1033 Present|
| | |SLP Vol IV. Therefore although Trial Court |
| | |has held that gifts received cannot be held |
| | |to be a lawful source of income – Pg |
| | |1283-1296 Vol V, the High Court has added |
| | |1.5 Crores as income under this head, which |
| | |is liable to be reduced. |

Therefore if the above corrections are carried out, the disproportionate
assets will be :

Regarding the loan of Rs.50,00,000/- J. Farm House which is shown as item
No.2 in Annexure-III Ext.-P 2329, Page 1224 of Vol. V, (Income list) and
Item No.3 in Annexure-IV Exh.P-2330 Page 1397 of Vol. VI (Expenditure
list), it is submitted by the learned counsel that this loan has been
deposed to by PW-182 and marked as Exh.P-1211-1212 through him. He
submitted that although the Bank had sanctioned Rs.50 lakhs, it had
released only a sum of Rs.28 lakhs and the principal amount and interest
has not been paid back by the firm. The Trial Court has discussed this loan
at Page 1234 of Vol. V while dealing with income and at Page 1416 of Vol.VI
while dealing with expenditure. Therefore, Mr. Acharya submitted, this
income has been duly considered and the High Court could not have taken the
amount of Rs.50 lakhs under this head.

Regarding the loan of Rs.25,00,000/- by Sasikala which is shown as item
No.1 in Annexure-III Ext.-P 2329, Page 1224 of Vol. V, (Income list) and
Item No.2 in Annexure-IV Exh.P-2330 Page 1397 of Vol. VI (Expenditure
list), it is submitted by the learned counsel that this amount has been
deposed to by PW-182 and marked as Exh.P-1260 through him. He submitted
that the principal amount due under this account was Rs.13,55,023 and the
Trial Court has discussed this loan at Page 1234 of Vol. V while dealing
with income and at Page 1416 of Vol.VI while dealing with expenditure.
Therefore, Mr. Acharya submitted that this income has been duly considered
and the High Court could not have taken the amount of Rs.25 lakhs under
this head.

Regarding the loan of Rs.1,57,00,000/- by Sudhakaran (A3) which is shown as
item No.7 in Annexure-III Ext.-P 2329, Page 1224 of Vol. V, (Income list)
and Item No.8 in Annexure-IV Exh.P-2330 Page 1397 of Vol. VI (Expenditure
list), it is submitted by Mr. Acharya that this loan has been taken by Lex
Property Development Ltd. and not by Sudhakaran. It has been deposed to by
PW-182 and marked as Exh.P-1330 through him. He submitted that the
principal amount due under this account was Rs.83,00,000 and the Trial
Court’s discussion on this loan is at Page 1234 of Vol. V while dealing
with income and at Page 1418 of Vol.VI while dealing with expenditure.
Therefore, Mr. Acharya submitted, this income has been duly considered and
the High Court could not have taken a sum of Rs.1.57 lakhs under this head.

Regarding the loan of Rs.1,65,00,000/- by Ramraj Agro Mills Ltd. it is
submitted by the learned counsel that this loan is not shown as an item in
Annexure-III Ext.-P 2329, Page 1224 of Vol. V, (Income list) or as an item
in Annexure-IV Exh.P-2330 Page 1397 of Vol. VI (Expenditure list). It has
been deposed to by PW-182 and marked as Exh.P-1349-1354 through him.
Exh.1354 is a statement of account of OCC-19 of Ramraj Agro Mills Ltd. PW-
235 at 145 of Vol. 11 has stated of his knowledge about Rs.1.65 crores
being sanctioned. However, there is no evidence of disbursement of this
loan amount. Mr. Acharya submitted that the amount due to the Bank on this
account was Rs.39,10,781/-, hence, the High Court could not have taken a
sum of Rs.1.65 crores under this head.

Regarding the loan of Rs.17,85,274/- by Mahalakshmi Kalyanamandapa, which
is shown as item No.6 in Annexure-III Ext.-P 2329, Page 1224 of Vol. V,
(Income list) and Item No.7 in Annexure-IV Exh.P-2330 Page 1397 of Vol. VI
(Expenditure list), it is submitted by Mr. Acharya that this has been
deposed to by PW-182 and marked as Exh.P-1357 through him. He submitted
that the amount due in this account was Rs.19,81,802 and the Trial Court’s
discussion on this loan is at Page 1234 of Vol. V while dealing with income
and at Page 1417 of Vol.VI while dealing with expenditure. Therefore, Mr.
Acharya submitted that this income has been duly considered and the High
Court could not have taken a sum of Rs.17.85 lakhs under this head.

Mr. Acharya thus submitted that the detailed discussion in the preceding
paragraphs will clearly disclose that that the High Court considered these
10 items against the weight of the evidence on record and the entire amount
of Rs.24,17,31,274/- which after deduction of Rs.5,99,85,274/- comes to
Rs.18,17,46,000/- is liable to be set aside. He further contended that the
accused have nowhere in their written statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.,
their Memorandum of Appeal or their written arguments before the Trial
Court and the High Court, taken any plea of any loan from nationalized
banks being left out of consideration while calculating the income and
expenditure and then arrived at the value of Rs.9,34,26,054/- (Page 1224,
Vo. V) and Rs.11,56,56,833/- (Page 1397, Vol. VI), respectively. Therefore,
he contended that 10 items valued at Rs.24,17,31,274/- taken by the High
Court at Page 939, has to be totally excluded since the same amounts to
nothing but double credit. If this error is corrected, than the income has
to be reduced by, according to him, Rs.18,17,46,000/-. Therefore, from the
finding of the total income of Rs.34,76,65,654/- of the High Court, an
amount of Rs.18,17,46,000/- is liable to be deducted and the total income
would be only Rs.16,59,19,654/- and not Rs.34,76,65,654/-. He further
contended that from this amount, if we deduct the income on the basis of
admission and gift treating it as income, then the income will be
Rs.16,59,19,654/- - Rs.2,84,05,151/- (admitted amount) + Rs.1,50,00,000/-
(gifts) = Rs.12,25,14,503/-.

Mr. Acharya further contended that significantly the accused are not
pressing for remand of the case to the appellate Court (High Court).
Consequently, the accused accept all the findings of the High Court. Of
course, this Court will have to correct the calculation mistakes or
arithmetic errors and also errors apparent on the face of the record.
Reacting to the ingenious endeavour on the part of the respondents to
maintain their acquittal by only assailing the errors committed by the
Trial Court, while abstaining from questioning any finding of the High
Court, the learned Public Prosecutor urged that the choice before the
respondents was two-fold:-

It is the case of the appellants that when A2 to A4 had jointed the
household of A1, they did not have any worthwhile property/asset in their
names. They did not have any independent source of income. Properties were
acquired in the names of newly formed or acquired thirty two
firms/companies and two existing firms, i.e., Jaya Publications and Sasi
Enterprises in which A1 and A2 were partners. Among these entities, only
few were registered as a company under the Companies Act, 1956 and all
others are firms. In the said firms or companies, A2 or A3 or A4 or all of
them are partners or directors. It is not in dispute that the said
properties were acquired during the check period. It is further submitted
that it is on record that six firms were registered on a single day, i.e.,
on 25.01.1994, where partners were A2, A3 and A4 and ten other firms were
registered on another single day, i.e., on 06.02.1995, where A2, A3 and A4
were the partners and further in Lex Proeprty Development (P) Ltd., A3 and
A4 were the directors, which would be evident from the deposition of PW3
(D. Thangavalu in Vol.2, Pg. 11-23). It was further pointed out that about
50 bank accounts were opened in Indian Bank, Abiramapuram Branch and Canara
Bank, Mylapore in the names of accused and the firms/companies, which would
be evident from the deposition of PW-182 (A.R. Arunachalam in Vol.8 – Pages
90-182) and PW-201 (C.K.R.K. Vidyasagar in Vol.9 – Pages 80-231). It is
also submitted that the accused shared common auditors, architects and
accountants.

On the question of abetment and conspiracy, Mr. Acharya has duly taken us
through the Paragraph Nos. 88 to 99 of the judgment and order of the Trial
Court appearing at Page Nos. 1838-2028 in Vol. 7 & 8 and submitted that
there was no source of income of A2 to A4 and further A2 to A4 were not
related to A1. Moreover, A2 to A4 resided with A1.

It is submitted that the properties standing in the name of A3; formation
of large number of firms in the names of A2 to A4; opening of 50 bank
accounts and transfer of funds from one account to another and cash credits
into the banks shows that the origin of the resources is from A1. According
to the prosecution, the other circumstances which disclose the conspiracy
and abetment would appear from the following facts :-

To support his contention, he submitted that:

But having regard to the fact that in valuing the constructions, there are
several imponderables and taking note of the possibility of marginal error,
the Trial Court has given a discount of 20% which in the circumstances, is
reasonable. Having regard to the superior quality of marble and granite
used as described in the valuation reports and having regard to the value
of various special items, the ultimate finding of the Trial Court is
justified, he urged.

He further submitted that even the accused have admitted valuation of
buildings at Rs.8,60,59,261/- excluding one building of Anjaneya Printers.
If the value of this construction of Rs.2,13,63,457/- is added to this sum,
the total will be Rs.10,74,22,718/-. As can be seen from Chart 10 as
reproduced above, under other items of assets IV to XII, the Trial Court
has totally excluded the value of Sarees and footwear. Regarding Gold and
Diamond jewellary also after detailed discussion at Pages 1756 to 1785,
Trial Court has reduced the value from Rs.5,53,02,334/- to Rs.2,51,59,144/-
and Silverwares from Rs.48,80,800/- to Rs.20,80,000/-. Regarding other
items such as Fixed Deposits and cash balance in bank account, there can be
no dispute. Therefore, the conclusion of the Trial Court regarding value of
other assets is fully justified as per the evidence on record, he
contended.

So far expenditure is concerned, the High Court has accepted the amount of
expenditure fixed by DVAC in respect of all items except the marriage. The
High Court has reduced the marriage expenditure from Rs.6,45,04,222/- (as
per prosecution) to Rs.28,68,000/-, i.e., a reduction of Rs.6,16,36,222.
According to the prosecution, the total expenditure is Rs.11,56,56,833/-.

He submitted that the main dispute under caption expenditure is regarding
marriage. In support of the prosecution case as many as 21 witnesses have
been examined as detailed in the chart. Though according to prosecution
expenditure incurred for marriage is Rs.6,45,04,222/-, the Trial Court on
detailed consideration has fixed the same at Rs.3 Crores. It is thus
totally erroneous to contend that the Trial Court has rejected the evidence
of prosecution witnesses, he pleaded. In fact the Trial Court on a
consideration, not only of the prosecution evidence but also defence
evidence of 23 witnesses, has rightly fixed the amount of expenditure to
the tune of Rs.3 Crores. It is even conceded that a total expenditure of
Rs.2 to 3 Crores has been spent for the marriage. According to him, the
Trial Court has rightly disbelieved the evidence of DW’s who claimed that
the party workers have collected funds and have spent for expenses such as
façade, decoration, food etc. It is unbelievable that a person of the
stature of A1, would allow her party workers to spend on the marriage of
her foster son. He elaborated that though A1 has, in her reply to the
notice to the Income Tax Department, claimed that A2 has spent amounts
under different heads, A2 has failed to account for the same.

Mr. Acharya submitted that according to the prosecution the total income of
the accused is Rs.9,34,26,054/- and according to the Trial Court, the
total income is Rs.9,91,05,094.75/-. However, according to the High Court,
the total income is Rs.34,76,65,654/-. In coming to this conclusion, the
High Court added to the income seven items such as :

According to Mr. Acharya, there is no lawful source so far as the Gift is
concerned. He further submitted that the Trial Court has rightly disallowed
the claim. The High Court has erroneously fixed it at Rs.4 crores based on
belatedly filed Income Tax returns, which even if accepted, amounts to only
Rs.1.15 Crores.

Therefore, he submitted that if the above is the correct position, the
conclusion of the Trial Court is fully justified. According to him, the
Trial Court has considered every contention raised by the accused and if
some of the contentions are not urged before the Trial Court, then the
respondent cannot complain before this Court about non-consideration
thereof.

He further contended that if the contention of the appellants that in
calculating Disproportionate Assets, the value of the Assets, Expenditure
and Income of all the Accused have to be taken jointly along with that of
firms and companies (34 in number), as done by both the courts below, then
the explanation offered in the individual chart of A1 and the combined
chart given by A2 to A4 will be of no effect and the same do not deserve to
be taken note of. The accused have deliberately given their explanations
separately as they cannot give any satisfactory explanation if the assets
are taken jointly.

In refutation, learned senior counsel appearing for A1 submitted that the
Trial Court wrongly excluded from consideration the Income Tax Assessment
Orders in favour of the accused by relying upon the judgment of High Court
of Patna in State of Bihar Vs. Lalu Prasad & Anr. , (2008) Crl.L.J. 2433,
which, according to him, is clearly inapplicable since the order passed by
the Patna High Court was in the nature of an interlocutory order. He
further stated that while dealing with the assets of A1 under the head
“Additional Construction”, the Trial Court by an arbitrary method deducted
20% from the overall cost of construction. Similarly, in relation to
marriage expenditure, the Trial Court erroneously estimated the cost of
construction of a thatched pandal and arbitrarily came to the conclusion
that the marriage expenditure was to the tune of Rs.3 crores, for which no
basis has been given, according to him. He further contended that with
regard to the possession of gold and jewellery, although the Trial Court
accepted that A1 had 7040 gms. in 1987-1988, as reflected in the Wealth Tax
Assessment order, it overlooked the other Wealth Tax Assessment orders for
the subsequent years whereby there was an addition of Rs.2,51,59,144/- in
the holdings of A1, which is also contrary to the evidence on record. He
further submitted that the Trial Court and the prosecution have failed to
take into account the income from Grape Garden, interest income, rental
advance, rental income, wealth tax refund, income from gifts, Partner’s
drawings of A1 from Jaya Publications and income from Namadhu MGR scheme,
etc.

Learned senior counsel submitted that the Trial Court, contrary to the
settled law, has required the public servant to offer an explanation to the
properties held by A2 to A4 and the companies, without any foundational
basis or any evidence to show that those properties in the names of A2 to
A4 or companies were acquired out of the resources of A1 or that there was
any flow of fund from A1 to A2 to A4. The Trial Court has sought to
attribute criminal conspiracy between A1 and A2 to A4 on the sole ground
that A1 to A4 were living in the same house under a common roof.

He further contended that in a disproportionate assets case, the
prosecution has to discharge the initial burden to prove that the assets of
the accused were disproportionate to the known sources of income. The
prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt, the value of the assets
possessed by the accused and it has a further burden to show that the
properties which were standing in the name of third parties, like A2 to A4
and the companies, were being held benami for the public servant. Once the
prosecution discharges this initial burden beyond reasonable doubt, the
onus then shifts to the accused to satisfactorily account for the source of
such income. He further contended that for the accused, the standard of
proof is one based on preponderance of probabilities and it is sufficient
for the accused to provide a plausible explanation that is satisfactory to
the Court. In support of his contention, the learned senior counsel relied
upon the following decisions:

The learned senior counsel, next dwelt upon the purport of “income received
from any lawful source” and drew our attention to Section 13(1)(e) of the
1988 Act, which reads as follows:

Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, “known sources of income”
means income received from any lawful source and such receipt has been
intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for
the time being applicable to a public servant.”

He further contended that the term “income” which has been used in Section
13(1)(e) , would include all earnings, sources whereof are not prohibited by
law and it is always open to the accused to prove those other sources of
income which have not been taken into account or brought into evidence by
the prosecution. The term “income”, according to him, would also include
receipts in the form of “gifts” and “loans” which have been disclosed to
and accepted by the income tax authorities. He further pointed out that the
concept of ‘known sources of income’ is not confined only to the source
known to the prosecution but every other source of income which the
accused is able to establish during the course of trial. In support of the
said contention, he relied upon the following decisions of this Court:

Learned senior counsel further submitted that the Court cannot set up a
third case which is not the basis of prosecution case or that of the
accused. He further contended that without making a company an accused, its
property cannot be forfeited. He further contended that A1’s income and
expenditure have been accepted by the Income Tax authorities for all the
five years of the check period. In none of the assessment years any income
is assessed as from an unexplained source. Same is the position as regards
Jaya Publication and for A2 also, and those orders have been exhibited in
evidence. He further submitted that A1 had no disproportionate assets but
her likely savings were to the extent of Rs.67,72,128.54. The prosecution
has valued all the assets belonging to A1 to A4 and the 32 firms/companies,
in a sum of Rs.66,65,20,395/-. The value of the assets held by them before
the check period was assessed at Rs.2,01,83,957/-. The assets acquired
during the check period is Rs.64,42,89,616/-. The value of the assets
acquired by A1 alone as per DVAC is Rs.24,29,40,490/-.

However, it is A1’s case that the assets acquired (including construction)
by A1 during check period amounted to Rs.6,52,34,410.00 for which she had
satisfactorily explained out of her known sources of income. The major
heads of assets and the errors committed by the Trial Court were
highlighted as hereunder:

Vis-à-vis new and additional constructions, Mr. L. Nageswara Rao, learned
senior counsel (as he then was) submitted that according to the prosecution
the total cost was Rs.13,65,31,901/- and according to the accused as
determined by the Income Tax authorities it is Rs.3,62,47,700/-. Hence, he
submitted that deduction of Rs.10,02,84,201/- is required. He further
pointed out that there are fundamental defects in the prosecution evidence
in relation to the valuation of all the construction because measurement is
not verifiable, age of the building is not given, there is no basis for
calculating the price of non-scheduled items. As per prosecution’s
calculation the cost under the head new/additional construction in Grape
Garden Farm House is Rs.6,40,33,901/- while as per A1 this cost is
Rs.1,39,62,300/-. Therefore, he submitted that an amount of Rs.5,00,71,601/-
should be deducted.

According to the learned senior counsel, the prosecution has examined PW-98
M. Velayudam, PWD Engineer (Vol.4 Page 148-179) and marked his Report Exh.P-
645 (Vol.33 Page 86-112). He submitted that the evidence of PW-98 should
be rejected since there are three major defects in his evidence. He further
pointed out that his report is unreasoned and cannot be relied upon. The
entire evaluation of electrical appliances by Mr. Udaya Suriyan, Asstt.
Electrical Engineer, amounting to Rs.41,53,653/- (Exh.P-645) is
inadmissible in evidence as this expert has not been examined as a witness.
He further submitted that the defence evidence has not been taken into
account by the Trial Court. He further contended that the calculation of
the prosecution under the head ‘New/Additional Construction at residential
buildings at 31-A and 36 Poes Garden’ is Rs.7,24,98,000/- (Trial Court
Judgment – Page 1709 of Vol.VII), whereas the valuation as per A1 is
Rs.2,14,35,4000/-. Accordingly, he submitted that an amount of
Rs.5,10,62,600/- is to be deducted from the said amount.

He submitted that the prosecution has relied mainly on the evidence of PW-
116 Jayapal, PWD Executive Engineer (appear at Vol.5 Page 41) and the
report prepared by him i.e. Exh.P-671 (Vol. 35 Page 16-47) to arrive at an
erroneous calculation of Rs.7,24,98,000/-. According to the learned
counsel, there are several infirmities in the report Exh.P-671 as well as
deposition of PW-116. He also raised dispute with regard to the valuation
of electrical lay outs being Exh.P-2152 submitted by PW-220. He also relied
on the evidence of DW-78 – R. Raviraj, Executive Engineer (Vol.91 Page

212). He further contended that the total expenditure incurred by A1
towards construction was accepted by the Income Tax authorities after deep
and pervasive scrutiny. He also submitted that the total expenditure
incurred by A1 in the entire three constructions amount to only as under:

He further pointed out that A1 had succeeded in all the proceedings before
the Income Tax authorities and her case that the gold jewellery was already
possessed by her earlier to the check period had been accepted by the
authorities. Hence, he submitted that the total jewellery to the extent of
26,558.250 gms. has been accounted for and what remains is only a balance
of around 343.830 gms. which is meager difference.

The learned senior counsel next pointed out that 416 Kgs. of silver was
seized from A1 during the check period. The value of this silver has been
taken as Rs.20,80,000/- at the rate of Rs.5,000/- per Kg as described in
Item No.291 of the DVAC Annexre-II (Vol.1 Page 112). The Trial Court’s
finding is that 416 Kgs of silver is the illegal acquisition of A1 during
the check period and the value of this at the rate of Rs.5,000/- per kg, is
assessed at Rs.20,80,000/-.

The High Court has also accepted the said valuation. The Trial Court, in
respect of costly watches, has duly accepted and allowed the case of the
prosecution while accepting the valuation report and oral evidence of PW-
129 and PW-130. According to the learned senior counsel, PW-130 had been
examined to value 91 watches. His report is Exh.740. He had given the total
value of 91 watches at Rs.6,87,350/-. However, it would be evident from the
testimony of these witnesses that they are not experts as they have no
special proficiency on valuation of watches nor do they have experience in
evaluating watches. He further submitted that A1 was not required to
disclose personal effects as it is exempted under Section 2(14) of the
Income Tax Act. Hence, the amount of Rs.15,90,350/- is liable to be
excluded from the computation of the assets of A1. He also submitted that
the entire amount with regard to footwear and sarees has to be excluded
from the assets of A1 since the Trial Court has disbelieved the version of
the prosecution.

The learned senior counsel next turned to the expenditure. Annexure-III of
DVAC shows that the valuation of expenditure attributable to A1 to A4 and
the companies during the check period is Rs.11,56,56,833/- and as per the
prosecution the expenditure attributable to A1 is Rs.8,98,69,833/-. A1’s
case was that the expenditure incurred by her during the check period was
Rs.2,49,28,815/. As per the Trial Court’s judgment its value is
Rs.8,49,06,833/- (Page 1542 Vol.VI) and the findings of the High Court
which has been placed before us is at Pages 889-831.

He drew the attention of this Court specifically to the following
particulars with regard to the Marriage of Tr. V.N. Sudhakaran:

The claim of A1 is that the amount of gifts received by her on the occasion
of her 44th birthday was Rs.2,15,00,012/-(cash and drafts) and
Rs.77,52,059/- (foreign remittance) and this entire amount is to be allowed
as income. He has submitted that the prosecution has admitted the receipt
of the gift, it having been contemporaneously banked, but the amounts were
not taken into account as income or lawful resource available to A1. The
Trial Court has disallowed it in entirety. However, the High Court accepted
the case of A1 and reduced the amount of Rs.1,50,00,000/- received from
gift. It is submitted that the said income ought to have been taken into
consideration by the Trial Court.

Learned senior counsel further submitted that gift has been recognized as
valid source of income by this Court in its judicial pronouncements and he
relied upon the case of M. Krishna Reddy (supra) and Kedari Lal (supra).
It is further pointed out that A1 had received an amount of Rs.6,28,569.00
from Sasi Enterprises in her capacity as partner during the check period
which was not repaid by A1 to M/s. Sasi Enterprises, thereby treating it as
her drawings as a partner of the said firm.

It is further pointed out that A1 had received a loan of Rs.1,53,03,000.00
from A2 and her proprietary firms. Jaya Publication was started in the
year 1988. At the relevant time, A1 and A2 were the only partners. It was
carrying on business of printing and was running a daily newspaper called
Namadhu MGR. This daily newspaper used to carry all the announcements of
the General Secretary as also all the AIADMK Party’s news. Jaya
Publication apart from its regular business income had also received money
through subscribers deposit schemes. It is submitted that with a view to
boost the circulation and the readership of the newspaper, the subscribers
scheme was started one year earlier to the check period. Under the scheme
any person could make a deposit of Rs.12,000/-, 15,000/- or 18,000/- and
the subscribers would receive 4, 5, or 6 copies daily free of cost,
according to the deposit he made. The deposit was refundable on 15 days
notice of demand.

To establish the receipt under the said deposit scheme, A1 produced Income
Tax returns and independent evidence from subscribers to probabilise and
prove receipt of money. The money received under the scheme from 1990 to
1996 was deposited in the bank account of Namadhu MGR or in the account of
Jaya Publication. It is submitted that the Income Tax authorities accepted
the said scheme of deposit. According to the learned senior counsel, there
was a scrutiny of the account of Jaya Publication and Namadhu MGR by an
internal auditor of the prosecution department and a report was filed. Yet
the auditor was not examined nor his report was marked in evidence. It is
submitted that an adverse inference ought to be drawn against the
prosecution evidence on account of suppression of the material evidence.
It is submitted that the Trial Court committed glaring errors while dealing
with the scheme deposit claim of Jaya Publication. The learned counsel
submitted that the accused had produced the order of the Income Tax
authorities relating to the scheme deposit covering the entire check period
of 5 years which was overlooked by the Trial Court. According to him, the
drawing of A1 from Jaya Publication in her capacity as partner of Jaya
Publication, to the extent of Rs.34,92,000/- is proper and lawful. It is
further submitted that A1 received from Jaya Publication Rs.24,75,000/- and
further amount spent by Jaya Publication on behalf of A1 for construction
of residence at 36, Poes Garden, Chennai, at Rs.76,74,900/-. The evidence
was placed before the Court, being Exh.D-226 and the deposition of DW-88.
Therefore, the total of the above two items in aggregate comes to
Rs.1,01,49,900/-. It is further submitted that the loan from Can Fin Homes
is about Rs.75,00,000/- which was availed as loan from Can Fin Homes on
29.9.1992. The loan was also repaid by Jaya Publication on behalf of A1 on
27.3.1995 and the same was not repaid by A1 to Jaya Publication, thereby
treating it as her drawings as a partner of Jaya Publication. It is
submitted that the entire amount of Rs.13,89,19,475.00 is also the resource
available to A1 and A2 for offering an explanation under the 1988 Act.

Referring to the attribution of assets of A2 to A4, six companies and other
firms to A1, the learned senior counsel contended that the prosecution has
included the properties acquired by the following companies to the account
of A1 and the value of all the properties has been included in the total
assets.

The properties held by all the above companies have been computed in
Annexure-II by the prosecution in a sum of Rs.4,70,24,439/-.

According to the learned senior counsel, the companies assets required to
be excluded. He urged that A1 was neither a shareholder nor a director or
associate of these six companies. Therefore, it is submitted that there is
no justification to attribute the properties of the companies to A1. For
these reasons, he submitted that the property of the company cannot be
included in the holding of A1 requiring her to give an explanation. Hence,
it is submitted that all the properties acquired by and constructed by the
said companies are liable to be excluded totally from consideration and
thus a total amount of Rs.4,70,24,439/- is liable to be excluded.

The learned senior counsel submitted that conspiracy, though can be
inferred from circumstances, in this case, the mere fact that A1 to A4 were
residing in the house belonging to A1 cannot be a circumstance to prove
conspiracy. According to him, A1 and A2 were partners in two partnership
firms and such partnership connection cannot be an incriminating
circumstance. According to him, A1 to A4 have purchased properties with
their own efforts, with the money earned or mobilized by them. Accordingly,
it is submitted that the prosecution has not established any circumstance
from which an inference of conspiracy can be drawn. There is no
circumstance proved in this case by the prosecution from which a conclusion
can be drawn that there was meeting of minds of A1 to A4 with a view to
enable A1 to commit an offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act. He
further submitted that during the check period, starting of a firm by a non-
public servant could never be a circumstance by itself to infer conspiracy.
Hence, it is submitted that there is no direct or indirect evidence in the
form of proved circumstance to infer conspiracy. Hence, it is submitted
that the judgment of the High Court should be affirmed.

Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
respondent Nos.2 to 4 submitted that the abstract of Annexures-I to VII are
assets relating to A2 to A4, firms & companies and he drew our attention to
the said Annexures. According to him, the properties acquired by A2 to A4,
firms & companies prior to the check period as per DVAC, would appear from
the following chart:

|ANNEXURE -I |
|Properties acquired by Accused No.2, Jaya Publications and Sasi Enterprises |
|prior to check period |
|according to DVAC which is not disputed |
|TMT. N. SASIKALA |
|Description of the |Reference |Stands in the |Value of |Annexure|Item No |
|Property |of |Name |the |No. |in |
| |Document –|of |property | |Annexure I|
| |Sale | |Rs. | | |
| |deeds | | | | |
|Land and flat No.7, | |Tmt.N.Sasikala |3,13,530 |1 |6 |
|R.R. Flats, 3/4 Antu|17.04.1989| | | | |
|Street, Santhome, |Sale deed | | | | |
|Chennai-4 of | | | | | |
|Tmt.N.Sasikala | | | | | |
|Land and Building at|30-12-1988|Tmt. N. Sasikala|5,85,420 |I |15 |
| | | | | | |
|Abishekapuram |Sale Deed | | | | |
|Village, Ponnagar, | | | | | |
|Trichy in Plot | | | | | |
|No.102, 3rd Cross | | | | | |
|Road, New Ward, | | | | | |
|No.K, Block | | | | | |
|No.30, T.S.No.107, | | | | | |
|totally | | | | | |
|measuring 3525 Sq Ft| | | | | |
|purchased from | | | | | |
|MIRASI of 22A, | | | | | |
|William Road, | | | | | |
|contonment Trichy, | | | | | |
|Cash Balance as on |30-12-1988|Tmt. N. Sasikala|13,601 |I |24 |
|1-7-1991 in Canara | | | | | |
|Bank Kellys Branch | | | | | |
|SB 38746 Opened on | | | | | |
|30/12/1988 in the | | | | | |
|Name of Tmt. N. | | | | | |
|Sasikala | | | | | |
|Cash Balance as on |07-01-1991|Tmt. N. Sasikala|1,40,198 |1 |27 |
|1-7-1991 in Canara | | | | | |
|Bank Mylapore SB | | | | | |
|23218 Opened on | | | | | |
|23/5/1990 in the | | | | | |
|Name of Tmt. N. | | | | | |
|Sasikala | | | | | |
|62 items of Jewels |As per |Tmt. N. Sasikala|9,38,460 |1 |45 |
|claimed to be of |evaluation| | | | |
|Tmt. N. Sasikala as | | | | | |
|evaluated by M/s. |report of | | | | |
|VBC Trust |M/s.VBC | | | | |
| |Trust | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | |TOTAL |19,91,209 | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
|JAYA PUBLICATION |
|Description of the |Reference |Stands in the |Value of |Annexure|Item No |
|Property |of |Name |the |No. |in |
| |Document –|of |property | |Annexure 1|
| |Sale deeds| |Rs. | | |
| | | | | | |
|Building at Door |18.06.1989|M/s Jaya |5,70,039 |I |7 |
|No.19, Pattammal | |Publications | | | |
|Street, Chennai Plot|Sale deed |( Selvi | | | |
|No.83, | |J.Jayalalitha | | | |
|R.S.No.4087 Extent | |and Tmt. N. | | | |
|1897 Sq ft | |Sasikala) | | | |
|purchased from V.H. | | | | | |
|Ssubramanian | | | | | |
|S/o.H.Venkatesubban,| | | | | |
|15 Venkatraman | | | | | |
|Street, Srinivasa | | | | | |
|Avenue, Chennai-28. | | | | | |
|Land and Building |08.12, |M/s Jaya |5,28,039 |I |17 |
|Thiru Vi KA |1990 |Publications | | | |
|Industrial Estate |Sale deed |( Selvi | | | |
|Guindy in | |J.Jayalalitha | | | |
|S.No,55, 56 Block | |and Tmt. N. | | | |
|No.V1 extent | |Sasikala) | | | |
|5658 sq.ft shed | |, | | | |
|No.C-8 Adyar | | | | | |
|village | | | | | |
|Cash balance as on |Account |Namadhu MGR |5,51,826 |I |26 |
|1.7.91 CA No 1952 |opened | | | | |
|Canara Bank , |on | | | | |
|Mylapore |23.10.89 | | | | |
|Cash Balance as on |07-01-1991|M/s Jaya |7,83,861 |1 |28 |
|1-7-1991 in Canara | |Publications | | | |
|Bank Mylapore CA | |( Selvi | | | |
|2047 opened on | |J.Jayalalitha | | | |
|26-9-90 on transfer | |and Tmt. N. | | | |
|from Kellys Branch | |Sasikala) | | | |
|in the Name of Selvi| | | | | |
|J. Jayalitha and | | | | | |
|Tmt.N.Sasikala | | | | | |
|Fixed Deposit |FDR dt |M/s Jaya |64,520 |1 |29 |
|No,451/90 dated |19.06.1990|Publications | | | |
|19,6,1990 with | |( Selvi | | | |
|Canara Bank, | |J.Jayalalitha | | | |
|Mylapore | |and Tmt. N. | | | |
| | |Sasikala) | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | |TOTAL |24,98,285 | | |
|SASI ENTERPRISES |
|Description of the |Reference |Stands in the |Value of |Annexu |Item No |
|Property |of |Name |the |re No. |in |
| |Document -|of |property | |Annexu |
| |Sale deeds| |Rs. | |re I |
| | | | | | |
|Shop No.14 Ground |07-05-1989|M/s. Sasi |98,904 |I |8 |
|Floor at 602, Anna | |Enterprises - | | | |
|Salai Chennai - 6 |Sale deed |Partners Selvi | | | |
| | |Jayalaitha and | | | |
| | |Tmt. N. | | | |
| | |Sasikala | | | |
|Undivided share of |21-9-1989 |M/s, Sasi |2,10,919 |I | |
|Land only at |Sale deed |Enterprises - | | | |
|Door No. 14 Khadar | |Partners Selvi | | | |
|Navaz Khan road, | |Jayalaitha and | | |9 |
|Nungambakkam at | |Tmt. N. | | | |
|R.S.No.58/51 to the | |Sasikala | | | |
|extent of | | | | | |
|68/12000 undivided | | | | | |
|share in 11 | | | | | |
|grounds and 736 | | | | | |
|sq.ft. of land | | | | | |
|Land and building at|19-04-1990|M/s. Sasi |1,57,125 |I |12 |
|Tanjore S.No 1091 | |Enterprises - | | | |
|extent of 2400 |Sale deed |Partners Selvi | | | |
|sq.ft. | |Jayalaitha and | | | |
| | |Tmt, N. | | | |
| | |Sasikala | | | |
|Vacant site at Blake|19-04-1990|M/s. Sasi |1,15,315 |I |13 |
|H D Road | |Enterprises - | | | |
|Tanjore Town 3rd |Sale deed |Partners Selvi | | | |
|division 6th | |Jayalaitha and | | | |
|Ward Mahar Nombu | |Tmt. N. | | | |
|chavadi extent 5100 | |Sasikala | | | |
|sq.ft. in T,S.No. | | | | | |
|1091 | | | | | |
|Vacant site at Ward |19-04-1990|M/s. Sasi |2,02,778 |I |14 |
|No.6 in Manar Nombu | |Enterprises - | | | |
|Chavadi extent 8970 |Sale deed |Partners Selvi | | | |
|sq. ft. in T.S. No. | |Jayalaitha and | | | |
|1091 Tanjore Town | |Tmt. N. | | | |
| | |Sasikala | | | |
|Dry Land to the |07-12-1990|M/s. Sasi |75,210 |1 |16 |
|extent of 3.23 Acres| |Enterprises - | | | |
|in S,No.402-2 of |Sale deed |Partners Selvi | | | |
|Sundarakottai | |Jayalaitha and | | | |
|Village, Mannargudi | |Tmt. N. | | | |
|Taluk Tanjore distr.| |Sasikala | | | |
|TSR 333 (Swaraj |01-12-1989|M/s. Sasi |2,99,845 |1 |22 |
|Mazda Van) | |Enterprises - | | | |
| |Date of |Partners Selvi | | | |
| |registrati|Jayalaitha and | | | |
| |on |Tmt. N. Sasikala| | | |
|Cash Balance as on |07-01-1991|M/s. Sasi |2,29,578 |I |33 |
|01/7/1991 in | |Enterprises- | | | |
|Canara Bank, | |Partners Selvi | | | |
|Mylapore CA 2061 | |Jayalaitha and | | | |
|Opened on 21/3/1991 | |Tmt. N. | | | |
|in the name of Sasi | |Sasikala | | | |
|Enterprises in which| | | | | |
|Both Selvi | | | | | |
|J.Jayalalitha and | | | | | |
|Tmt. N Sasikara are | | | | | |
|partners | | | | | |
|Amount paid of |28-7-1993 |M/s. Sasi |50,000 |1 |50 |
|72/12000 on share | |Enterprises - | | | |
|of land in 11 and | |Partners Selvi | | | |
|1736 sq.ft in b/s | |Jayalaitha and | | | |
|at 14, gems court | |Tmt. N. | | | |
|Khadhar Navaz | |Sasikala | | | |
|Con Road, | | | | | |
|Nungambakkam paid by| | | | | |
|Ch, dated 23.4.90 of| | | | | |
|CB which was | | | | | |
|registered as | | | | | |
|document No.641/93 | | | | | |
|of S R Thousand | | | | | |
|Lights, Dated | | | | | |
|28/7/1993 | | | | | |
| | |TOTAL |14,39,674 | | |
| |GRAND |Rs. |59,29,168 | | |
| |TOTAL | | | | |

He further submitted that properties acquired by A2 to A4, firms &
companies prior to the check period were not taken into account by DVAC and
he filed a chart in respect thereof, which is hereunder:-

Thus in the above revealing perspective, it is not considered essential
to scrutinise the evidence on the assets pertaining to all items thereof
and it would be adequate enough to limit the audit only qua item number 3
i.e. new or additional construction of buildings, more particularly because
of its decisive bearing on the adjudication.

In the above premise, being of crucial relevance, evidence with regard to
the item number three namely; new or additional construction of buildings
in the list of assets demands scrutiny. As mentioned hereinabove, though
the High Court had altered the value of five out of twelve items, in the
ultimate quantification, it did focus only on the item of new or additional
construction of buildings and computed the worth thereof to be
Rs.5,10,54,060/- against Rs.22,53,92,344/- adjudged by the Trial Court.
According to the prosecution, however, the investment on this count had
been Rs.28,17,40,430/-. Significantly, the respondents had valued this
item of their assets at Rs.8,60,59,261/- which is about Rs.3.5 crores
above the valuation made by the High Court.

Be that as it may, whereas the prosecution had listed out twenty one
items under the head new or additional construction of buildings, the Trial
Court took note of eighteen items and the High Court of seventeen items as
would be adverted to in details hereafter. The total construction area of
these twenty one items, according to the prosecution is 23,076.84 sq.
meters which is equivalent to 2483.97 squares. The area of four items left
out by the High Court when deducted from the total area of 2483.97 squares
calculate to 2174.69 squares. However, the High Court computed the value by
adopting the area of the 17 items selected by it to be 1668.39 squares
instead of 2174.69 squares and thus reduced the actual area under
consideration by 506.3 squares. Ergo, according to the prosecution, not
only did the High Court exclude four out of twenty one items in assessing
the value of the assets under examination, it erred as well on the
resultant area corresponding to the seventeen items chosen by it. This did
also impact upon the value eventually arrived at.

In course of the arguments before this Court, emphasis has been laid on
item numbers 179, 180 and 181 of annexure II i.e. buildings/construction
on which investments had been made to sum up the total to the figure of
Rs.29,35,68,982/- according to the prosecution. According to the
respondent No. 1, as against the figure of Rs.24,29,40,490/- being the
value of her assets during the check period, as computed by the
prosecution, her assertion is of Rs.6,52,34,410/-. It has been urged on
her behalf that she had acquired only one property during the entire check
period i.e. the item at serial number 18 in anneuxre II worth Rs.10 lakhs
and in addition thereto, she had made two constructions i.e. of a farm
house at Jeedimetla Village near Hyderabad and at 31-A, Poes Garden,
besides renovating her residential building at 36, Poes Garden. Against
item numbers 179 and 181 referred to hereinabove, it has been asserted
that as against Rs.13,65,31,901/- assessed by the prosecution, the value of
her assets corresponding thereto and as accepted by the income tax
authorities is Rs.3,62,47,700/- and thus an amount of Rs.10,02,84,201/-
needs to be deducted. The break up of expenditure on the relevant counts
towards these items has been provided as hereinbelow:

While endeavouring to authenticate the above figure, the deficiencies in
the evidence of the prosecution relating to the valuation of the
constructions have been highlighted in quite some details. Broadly, the
denunciation qua the process related thereto, refers to the non-verifiable
measurements in absence of essential datas and want of supporting
particulars in the reports rendering them sterile and worthless being of
no probative worth, absence of any scientific or laboratory tests
convincingly demonstrating the age of the buildings to correctly appreciate
the value thereof, absence of any basis for calculating the price of non-
scheduled items etc. Vis-a-vis the price of non-scheduled items in
particular, it has been asseverated that though the valuers had deposed
that with regard thereto, market enquires had been made and the inputs had
been recorded in a paper or a note book, the same had not been retained but
destroyed and were not enclosed with the corresponding reports. The
assessment of the price of the non-scheduled items has thus been dismissed
to be not only as being bereft of any foundation but also as mere hearsay.

The oral evidence of the prosecution witnesses namely; PW-98, PW-116 and
PW-220, amongst others, has been referred to and analysed apart from the
reports submitted by the inspection team which as adverted to hereinabove,
have been repudiated to be lacking in indispensable datas. Other
documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution has also been dealt with.
Evidence of defence witnesses, amongst others of DW-64, S. Shanmugham,
Chartered Accountant of R1/A1, DW-76 who was a part of the inspection team
and DW-78 who was one of the signatories to the report Ex. P-671 has been
highlighted. Considerable emphasis has also been laid on the orders of the
income tax authorities by way of corroboration of the quantum of
expenditure cited by the defence. This is more particularly as the income
tax authorities had accepted the figure cited by the respondent No.1/A1 on
the basis of independent enquiries conducted by the department specifically
in respect of the market rates/price of the marbles/granites during the
relevant period i.e. 1994-95 to 1996-97. The corresponding invoices have
also been referred to in the course of arguments. According to the
defence, the expenditure as shown by respondent No.1/A1 was supported by
bank documents, bills, contemporaneous vouchers proved through defence
witnesses, which inter alia, establish that the price of the marble per
square meter at the relevant time was between Rs.100 to Rs.180 per sq.
meter as against Rs.5000 per sq. meter to Rs.21000 per sq. meter cited by
the prosecution. While dismissing the valuation offered by the prosecution
to be arbitrarily exaggerated and inflated, it has been asserted that
though the Trial Court was right in observing that the prosecution had
not been able to establish the cost of construction in respect of special
items like marble, it erred in accepting the valuation made by it after
granting only 20% deduction in the overall quantum. It was pointed out as
well that the Trial Court's rejection of the documents i.e.. D-210 series
pertaining to the price of marbles prevailing during 1995-96 by construing
the same erroneously to be of subsequent years, was patently flawed. It has
been urged that the prosecution had failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt, the expenditure towards the construction of the items under the
head, new or additional construction of buildings and thus no burden lay on
the defence to explain the amount spent towards the same. According to
the defence, the valuation made by the High Court of the expenditure on
such construction is correct and does not merit any interference.

Per contra, it has been insisted on behalf of the prosecution that though
its computation of the expenditure against twenty one items comprising the
investments in new or additional construction of buildings did sum up to
Rs.29,35,68,982/-, the Trial Court taking note of eighteen such items, did
quantify the expenditure at Rs.22,53,92,344/-. As sample instances, the
prosecution highlighted the expenditure towards item numbers 179,180 and
181 of annexure II i.e. the list of items of assets acquired during the
check period and referring to the oral testimony of PW-98,107 and 166 as
well as the reports prepared and submitted by the inspection team i.e. Ex.
P-645, P-661 and P-671 maintained that the sum total of expenditure on the
basis thereof was Rs.19,05,84,199/-. Understandably, this figure was
included in the total expenditure of Rs.29,35,68,982/- and had been
highlighted as these three items accounted for the major portion of the
investments.

According to the prosecution, the High Court not only limited its analysis
to seventeen out of twenty one items, it also erred in the measurement of
the built up area of these items so much so that instead of 2174.69
squares, it proceeded to make the computation on the basis of an area of
1668.39 squares i.e. yielding a short fall of 506.30 squares. In addition
thereto, it has been urged on behalf of the prosecution that the High Court
appraised the expenditure towards new and additional construction by taking
only the cost expended for a sentry shed by totally overlooking the
additional and highly expensive enhancements and fixtures of the main
buildings. According to the prosecution, whereas as per the evidence
adduced by it, the cost of construction of the new/additional buildings was
Rs.4037 per sq. feet, the High Court on the basis of the cost of
construction of the sentry shed III adopted the rate of Rs.680 per sq.
feet, as a result whereof the actual cost of construction of the
new/additional building stood reduced by 83%. The prosecution has thus
insisted that in quantifying the expenditure towards the construction of
the new/additional building, the High Court thus patently erred not only
on the actual built up area but also on the basic rate of cost by drawing
an analogy of a sentry shed with the new/additional buildings, though
these two classes of structures with the inherent characteristics thereof
were not comparable by any means.

As referred to hereinabove, the Trial Court scrutinized the oral and
documentary evidence of both sides relating to 18 items of new/additional
constructions out of 21 cited by the prosecution. It exhaustively
evaluated the evidence item wise and weighed the merits and demerits
thereof in details. It took note of the reports submitted by the
inspection team qua every new/additional building involved and also took
cognizance of the denunciation by the defence thereof primarily on the
ground that those lacked in details and further were not accompanied by
supporting documents. The Trial Court appreciated the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses who were participants in the exercise of the
valuation of the buildings, the ancillary structures, accessories, fixtures
and furnishings. The members of the inspection team, who were Civil
Engineers drawn from the Public Works Department, in addition to Electrical
Engineers from Electricity Department, as their evidence noticed by the
Trial Court, would demonstrate did take into account all the essential
aspects of the subject matter of survey including the make and age of the
structures and also duly discounted the value thereof on depreciation. A
common feature of the evidence is that the price of the electrical
appliances mostly was assessed on the basis of their age and the expertise
of the officers undertaking the inspection. Qua the non-scheduled items,
according to the prosecution witnesses, the price was ascertained from the
market. The demur of the defence that such evaluation was not decisive in
absence of the notes of the relevant inputs was however noticed by the
Trial Court. For the general items, the contemporaneous PWD schedule of
rates prevailing in the districts involved were applied. The defence
witnesses who mostly were the members of the same team did not radically
differ from the substance of the version of the prosecution witnesses. A
marked attribute of the prosecution witnesses, as noted by the Trial Court,
was that when examined on their first recall, they seemed to vacillate in
their disclosures in the examination-in-chief but reaffirmed the same
narration on their second recall. The defence however noticing this
demeanour has endeavoured to discredit them as prevaricating and unfaithful
witnesses.

As had been elaborately appraised by the Trial Court, the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses disclose that the members of the inspection team did
minutely notice all the salient characteristics of the new/additional
buildings under surveillance together with their exquisite and expensive
structural attachments, trappings, fineries and adornments having
formidable potential of enhancing their overall worth.

The Trial Court while taking note of the income tax returns disclosing
the expenditure statements and the orders accepting the same after the
departmental inquiries however accepted the expenditure towards the
new/additional buildings to be Rs.22,53,92,344/- by discounting the figure
furnished by the prosecution by 20% as according to it, the prosecution had
not produced convincing evidence in support of the value fixed by the
Public Works Department engineers in respect of price of the special items
and as there was some dispute regarding the payments of the architects’
fees. In arriving at this conclusion, the Trial Court did take note of
every objection of the defence to the evaluation of the new/additional
buildings and rejected the same. In particular, the defence plea that the
valuation on plinth rate area ought not to have been adopted, was also
dismissed. It took note of the evidence of DW-78 that building valuation
could be done on the basis of plinth area of the building or the detailed
method. It was of the firm view that the engineers involved in the process
of the evaluation of the new/additional buildings were competent for the
assignment entrusted and that the defence had not disputed the measurement
of the buildings and the nature of the constructions as well as the quality
of the materials used. It however observed that the prosecution could not
produce any direct evidence in proof of the cost of the special items used
and had relied on the oral testimony of its witnesses who had stated that
they had ascertained the price of marbles and other special items from the
market.

The defence has tried to demonstrate that the rejection by the Trial Court
of the invoices Ex.D210 series pertaining to marbles as proved by DW96
construing the same to be the year 1999 was patently erroneous as the said
document disclosed that those related to the period between 1994 and 1996.
Be that as it may, the Trial Court however while rejecting the objections
of the defence on the valuation of the new/additional buildings, effected a
reduction of 20% of the total estimate furnished by the prosecution
witnesses for want of persuasive evidence in support of the recorded value
fixed by the PWD Engineers in respect of the special items and the dispute
regarding payments of architects fees and quantified the amount of
expenditure to be Rs.22,53,92,344/-.

Noticeably, the exercise undertaken by the inspection team was a massive
one chancing minor shortcomings and from the Trial Court’s comprehensive
narrative of the evidence on record, in our view, its estimate on the basis
thereof cannot be said to be perverse. As it is, having regard to the
nature and size of the survey, insistence on proof beyond reasonable doubt
with mathematical exactitude would be both unwarranted, inexpedient and un-
pragmatic.

In our comprehension, the appreciation made by the Trial Court of the
evidence on record and the final determination of the extent of expenditure
incurred cannot be discarded as absurd or implausible.

The High Court on the other hand noted the reservations expressed by the
defence to the valuation made by the prosecution. It noted the
denouncement that the valuation made was highly inflated and that the cost
of marbles and granites have been assessed on a very exorbitant measure.
The remonstrance that neither any sample of marble or granite had been
taken nor tenders had been called for to ascertain the rates thereof was
recorded. The objection that forests officers have not been examined to
price the cost of the wood and that nobody had certified that the teakwood
had been used, was accounted for. The High Court did take cognizance of
the reference to the inquiries made by the Income Tax Department to
ascertain the prevailing rates of marble and marble slabs during the
relevant period. Defence evidence to that effect was also marked.

The High Court in the ultimate analysis adopted the “per square foot
method” in evaluating the value of the new/additional buildings. According
to it, the Public Works Department rates were supposedly higher, taking
into consideration the delayed payment and other miscellaneous expenses.
The High Court accepted the cost of construction of the new/additional
buildings to be Rs.28,000/- per square basing on the rate of construction
of the Sentry Shed-III. Referring to the estimate for construction of such
sentry shed, the High Court deduced that, it was valued for one square at
Rs.31,580/- and therefrom as a measure of cost of construction for
new/additional building, it applied Rs.28,000/- per square for the said
purpose. It accounted for the other investments towards super structures,
windows, doors, internal painting, electrification, flooring, water supply
etc. The total constructed area, according to the High Court, was
1,66,839.68 sq.ft. i.e. 1668.39 squares. It accepted an area of 25662.22
sq.ft. i.e. 256.62 squares as area on which granites had been used. It
added an amount of Rs.9,65,060/- towards expenditure for sanction of plan
and architect fees.

Qua the prosecution evidence, the High Court observed that though reports
had been prepared by the inspection team for the new/additional buildings
involved, all the members of inspection team did not subscribe their
signatures thereto. Further in course of the testimony, they did not speak
anything about the measurement of the floor area where marbles and granites
had been used. It held the view that the valuation reports by themselves
did not prove the estimate of granites and marble stones and that the
appreciation thereof was more or less on guess work. By adopting the
valuation on square feet method and by applying the rate of Rs.28,000/- per
square, the High Court computed the value of new/additional building with
all its accessories and furnishings to be Rs.5,10,54,060/-.

Prima facie thus the plea of the prosecution that in assessing the
expenditure of new/additional buildings, the High Court had not only taken
a reduced constructed area of 1668.39 sqs. instead of 2174.69 sqs. (for the
17 items considered by it), thereby introducing a shortfall of 506.3 sqs.,
it also applied the rate of Rs.28,000/- per square based on the
construction cost of a sentry shed, as the base value to work out the
amount of investments made towards the new/additional
buildings/constructions is borne out by the records.

The approach of the High Court on both counts in the face of the evidence
on record does not commend for acceptance. By no means, in our estimate,
the High Court could have applied the base value of Rs.28,000/- per square
for quantifying the expenditure incurred towards the new/additional
buildings/ constructions involved. The adoption of Rs.28,000/- per square
as the base value, which is the cost of construction of a sentry shed, per
se is erroneous, having regard to the fact that a sentry shed and the
new/additional constructions/buildings are incomparable on many counts.
Even if it is assumed, as has been pleaded by the defence that the base
value so applied was only for appreciating the expenditure towards the
skeletal framework of the constructions, the method adopted by the High
Court in the final computation of the investments by making lump sum
additions towards cost of marbles, granites/interior decorations,
staircase, overhead tank and other furnishings, having regard to the
description of the constructions/buildings does not appear to be either
realistic or rational and does not merit affirmation.

In any case however even assuming that the arithmetic undertaken by the
High Court is correct, it having accepted the value of assets to be
Rs.66,44,73,573/-, the remainder would still value at Rs.43,75,38,688/-. In
other words, in calculating the disproportionate assets, the amount of
Rs.43,75,38,688/- has to be applied even if there is a reduction in value
of assets by Rs.22,69,34,885/ i.e. (Rs.29,82,71,254.32 – Rs.5,10,54,060).

According to A2 to A4, the valuation of their assets at the beginning of
the check period as per the prosecution was Rs.59,29,168/- and according to
them Rs.63,64,790.60. At the end of the check period, the figure swelled,
as per the prosecution to Rs.37,55,10,354.38, which in their computation
became Rs.25,03,36,963.40/-. Thus, whereas the prosecution case is that
the valuation of their assets acquired by A2 to A4 during the check period
was Rs.36,95,81,186.38, it had been only Rs.24,39,72,172.80 as per the
estimate of these respondents.

A2 to A4 have not disputed the prosecution's figure of Rs.59,29,168/- and
in fact had added Rs.4,35,622/- being the cash balance available with A2
at that point of time making the tally according to the respondents at
Rs.63,64,790.60. While commenting on the prosecution's valuation of their
assets at the end of the check period at Rs.37,55,10,354.38, A2 to A4 have
asserted that the properties of six companies; Signora Business Enterprises
(Private) Limited, Meadow Agro Farms (Private) Limited, Ram Raj Agro Mills
(Private) Limited, Riverway Agro Products (Private) Limited, Lex Property
Development (P) Limited and Indo Doha Chemicals and Pharmaceutical Limited
being separate legal entities and not arraigned as accused in the case
ought to have been excluded from the corpus of assets, more particularly
in absence of any evidence that their acquisitions had been made with the
funds provided by the respondents.

In course of the arguments on their behalf, several disputed items of
assets have been highlighted, accompanied by emphatic assertion that either
the value attached thereto ought to be excluded wholly or to the extent
reduced on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence relied upon by
them.

A plain perusal of the compilation to this effect reveals that broadly
these disputed items can be categorized as “land and building, shares,
acquisition of Indo Doha Chemicals and Pharmaceutical Ltd., new/additional
constructions, renovation, vehicles, fixed deposits, jewellery and
machinery.

As has been hinted hereinabove, these assets had been classified under 12
components. The High Court, though had altered the valuations in five of
these items, it did ultimately limit its consideration to item No. III
(i.e. new/additional construction of buildings) and reduced the cost
thereof by Rs.22,69,34,885. As a corollary, for the purpose of the
eventual quantification of the disproportionate assets, the High Court did
not consider it essential to invoke its findings vis-a-vis the remaining
four items on which it had differed from the Trial Court. As would be
evident from the chart adduced by the defence, out of Part-B containing the
disputed items in Annexure-II appended to the charge-sheet, ten items
thereof i.e. item numbers 6,7,8,9,12,13,14,15,16,17 are claimed to have
been acquired prior to the check period. Vis-a-vis the other disputed
items, to reiterate, referring to the oral and documentary evidence, it has
been urged that either the full value as cited by the prosecution or to
the extent, highlighted by them, ought to have been excluded. Qua the
items pertaining to “new/additional constructions”, the eventual plea is
that the Trial Court though had concluded that the prosecution had failed
to prove the cost of construction, as cited by it, it erroneously accepted
the valuation by granting 20% reduction in the overall cost. According to
A2 to A4, in view of the failure of the prosecution to prove the cost of
construction, the entire valuation made by it to this effect ought to have
been discarded and the evidence adduced by it should have been rejected in
its entirety.

In course of the elaboration of this salient feature of the disputation,
it has been underlined that there has been non-application of mind by the
Trial Court to the evidence on record in arriving at its findings. Apart
from referring to the oral and documentary evidence adduced by both the
parties, reliance has also been placed amongst others on the income tax
returns and the orders passed in connection therewith. The valuation
reports of the buildings submitted by the inspection team, comprised of
civil engineers of the Public Works Department and others, have been
seriously repudiated on the ground of being laconical, incredible,
inchoate and deficient in material particulars. The respondents have
been particularly critical about the valuation of electrical installations
and other items as in their perception, those were wholly unfounded in
absence of standard rates and corroborative proof based on market survey.
Even the expertise and competence of the members of the inspection team
offered by the prosecution as witnesses of valuation has been questioned.
The respondents have sought to buttress this plea by examining as defence
witnesses, members of the same inspection team. It has been urged as well
that the prosecution could not prove that all new/additional constructions
had been built during the check period. It has been contended that the
valuation of the special items i.e. marbles, granites, sanitary ware,
decorative tiles, teakwood etc. in absence of any schedule of rates had
been highly inflated without any contemporaneous documents or authenticated
proof in support thereof. According to the respondents, the defence
witnesses who were members of the inspection team did not support the
conclusions recorded in the reports rendering those wholly unacceptable.
On smaller items, like vehicles, fixed deposits, jewellery and machinery,
the respondents have dismissed the valuations made by the prosecution
either on the ground that those had been wrongly exaggerated or had been
acquired before the check period.

Apropos the above impeachment, the prosecution has reiterated its
valuation of the assets and has reconciled to the quantification made by
the Trial Court. It has reiterated that the valuation of the constructions
had been made by the qualified PWD engineers and that the findings are
elaborately contained in the valuation reports, based on exhaustive
inspection of all necessary components of the buildings surveyed. It has
stoutly refuted the defence plea that the Trial Court had rejected the
evidence adduced and has maintained that the discount of 20% accorded by
the Trial Court had been due to the several imponderables attendant on the
massive exercise undertaken. It has insisted that in view of the superior
quality of marbles and granite used in the buildings as well as the
prevalent price of the various special items availed by way of ornate
enhancements, the cost appreciation made by the Trial Court was justified.
That the High Court had wrongly assessed the cost of new/additional
buildings at Rs.5,10,54,060 compared to the admitted computation by the
respondents at Rs.8,60,59,261 has been underscored as well.

Qua the other segments of the assets, the prosecution has underlined that
the Trial Court had totally excluded the valuation of sarees and footwear
and that had effected considerable reduction in the value of the jewellery
and silverwares. In all, according to the prosecution, though it had cited
higher value of the assets, it has accepted the determination thereof as
made by the Trial Court.

The prosecution has jettisoned the disclosures in the income tax returns
and the orders/opinions expressed thereon by the departmental authorities
as wholly inconsequential. It has been insisted that enquiries made by the
income tax authorities even if conducted, those had been ex-parte in which
the investigating agency had not been associated. In any view of the
matter, according to the prosecution, the findings of the income tax or
wealth tax authorities on the valuation of the assets, neither bind the
prosecution nor is of any conclusive relevance for the case and is far less
final for the criminal court trying the same. The cavil of the respondents
that the civil engineers of the inspection team were incompetent to
undertake the valuation work has been emphatically refuted by the
prosecution. That the High Court in adopting the plinth area of the
new/additional buildings had erroneously reduced the same by 50,630 sq.
feet, has been reiterated. It has been asserted as well that the High
Court had erred in taking into account only five special items by excluding
the other expensive furnishings/attachments in computing the cost of
construction. In specific terms, the prosecution has been critical of the
valuation of the Otis lift at Rs.15,000/- and the cost of construction of
staircase, pump and overhead tanks at Rs.40,000/- to be much on the lower
side. That the untenable attempt of the defence to represent that ordinary
marble and granite had been issued against expensive versions thereof, has
been highlighted as well.

As indicated hereinabove, the only item apart from the new or additional
construction of buildings forming a major component of assets is immovable
properties which the prosecution valued at Rs.19,77,18,164.70 whereas the
Trial Court assessed the same Rs.20,07,80,246/-. According to the High
Court, it computed the value to be Rs.6,24,09,120/-. Noticeably the
respondents had indicated the value of this item as Rs.16,19,03,301/-.
Significantly though in all, 146 sale deeds were involved qua the immovable
properties figuring therein, the High Court limited its attention only to
97 such deeds and thus left out from its consideration, the remaining 49
sale deeds, while arriving at its quantification of this item of the asset
to be Rs.6,24,09,120/-.

To reiterate however the High Court though did accept the valuation of the
assets for the purpose of computation to be Rs.66,44,73,573/- as valued by
the prosecution, for the purpose of ascertaining the disproportionate
assets, it took into account only the cost of new or additional
construction of buildings as assessed by it at Rs. 5,10,54,060/- thus
reducing the value thereof as made by the prosecution by a sum of
Rs.22,69,34,885/-. The omission on the part of the High Court to exclude
the other four items of assets, on which as well it had scaled down the
value, in working out the extent of disproportionate assets however had not
been questioned by the respondents before this Court. The judgment of the
Trial Court does not demonstrate as well, the alleged total non-
consideration of the evidence adduced on behalf of the respondents. On an
overall appraisal of the materials on record, the reduction of the cost of
new or additional construction of buildings to Rs.5,10,54,060/- as effected
by the High Court has to be held as patently erroneous. Consequently the
quantification of the disproportionate assets is also visibly wrong.

Expenditure

Annexure IV to the charge-sheet enumerates 244 items of expenditure cited
by the prosecution. This sums up to Rs.11,56,56,833.41 out of which the
major segment being Rs.6,45,04,222/- is towards the expenditure incurred in
connection with the marriage of Tr. V.N. Sudhakaran, (A3) on 07.09.1995.
Incidentally, the High Court did accept the expenditure assessed by the
prosecution in respect of all items except item nos. 2 to 6 i.e. the
marriage of A3 and reduced the sum of Rs.6,45,04,222/- as fixed by the DVAC
to Rs.28,68,000/-, thus occasioning a drop of Rs.6,16,36,222/-. The Trial
Court however had also lessened the amount cited by the prosecution by
Rs.7,50,000/- against item No. 235 and also the marriage item by
Rs.3,45,04,222/-, thereby reducing the total expenditure incurred to
Rs.8,49,06,833/-. The Trial Court had assessed Rs.3,00,00,000/- towards
marriage expenses.

In this factual premise, it would thus be enough, for the present
adjudication vis-à-vis this facet of the debate, to confine the appraisal
of the evidence, oral and documentary pertaining only to the expenditure
towards the marriage of A3. As the Trial Court’s appreciation of the
materials on record would reveal, it analyzed the evidence under the
following heads:

2 b) Expenditure incurred towards the cost of food, mineral
water and tamboolam.

c) Cost of 34 Titan watches - Rs.1,34,565/-

d) Cost of stitching charges of wedding dress - Rs.1,26,000/-

e) Cost of 100 silver plates - Rs.4,00,000/-

f) Postal Expenses - Rs.2,24,000/-

In re the erection of marriage pandals, the Trial Court did assess the
oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties. It took note,
amongst others, of the testimony of PW-181 Shri Thangarajan, who was the
Assistant Engineer, PWD at the relevant point of time and to whom,
according to the witness, the work of estimating the expenses incurred
towards the pandals, both at the marriage and reception venues was
entrusted. He referred to the measurements of these pandals including
amongst others those for VIPs with iron-sheet roof in his report Ex. P-1019
mentioning the estimated cost towards the same and also with regard to the
incidental decorative trappings and furnishings. He mentioned as well
about the air conditioners used and the chairs with the dining tables
arranged at the two venues and assessed the expenditure towards all these
at Rs.5,91,00,000/-. The Trial Court did take note of the cross-
examination of this witness, branding him to be partisan and without any
personal knowledge or information about the event or the expenses in
connection therewith and alleged to have been set up by the prosecution
with a view to inflate the expenditure by creating the document Ex P-1019.
The said document in any case was denounced as not being contemporaneous,
having been prepared after 2 ½ years of the marriage without any acceptable
foundation therefor.

The Trial Court to start with did not endorse this criticism of the
witness and instead proceeded to evaluate the merit of his testimony by co-
relating the same with the version of the other witnesses. In doing so, the
Trial Court traversed the evidence of PW-200 Shri, K.P. Muthuswami, Chief
Engineer, PWD, Tamil Nadu, who, as stated by this witness, had been
entrusted to complete the pandals' work by A2 in a proper manner. This
witness testified to have consulted a plan given to him by the architect
involved whereafter he amongst others levelled the land and put up the
pandals as specified. This witness affirmed that several pandals had been
erected amongst others for serving food to the VIPs, kitchen and cooking
sheds together with marriage platform, bathroom, rooms for the bride and
bridegroom. He further stated that the expenses towards this construction
work were made on behalf of A1. This witness clarified that the pandal
work at the reception venue was undertaken by Kumarason Nader which too he
had to oversee on the instructions of the Assistant Secretary of the
secretariat of A1. According to this witness, an amount of Rs.14 lakhs in
four installments was also paid by the bride’s father Mr. Narayan Swamy.
Incidentally PW-181 had also referred to the same architect and the
contractors as named by PW-200 in his evidence.

The Trial Court after taking note of the cross-examination of this
witness, accepted his version being satisfied that he had a first-hand
information about the arrangements made at the marriage venue and
concluded that the same corroborated the testimony of PW-181 sufficiently.

The Trial Court assessed the evidence of PW-183 Mr. Ramesh, Managing
Director, Moulis Advertising Services (P) Ltd., who deposed to have
printed 65,000 cards for marriage invitation as instructed by Tr. Jawahar,
Assistant Secretary to A1. This witness also claimed to have printed 5000
car passes for which on the basis of his bill submitted, he had received
payment of Rs.11 lakhs through cheque issued by A1. Though this witness
resiled from these statements in his cross-examination, when recalled and
was confronted with this inconsistency, he affirmed his version in the
examination-in-chief to be correct.

PW-184 Mr. Vincent claimed to have lent out ten cars on hire and had
received Rs.27,502/- through cheque signed by A1. This witness too
recoiled from this statement in his cross-examination but reverted thereto
in his re-examination.

PW-185 Prem Kumar did state to have, on the requisition of the Tamil Nadu
Guest House lent six cars for rent for four days against which he was paid
Rs.19,211/- through cheque 23.09.1995 issued by A1.

The Trial Court next also took note of the evidence of PW-186 Chalapathy
Rao who had supplied chairs, tables, cooking wares, vessels etc. for the
event as ordered by A3 and Sachitnanandam, PRO of A1 and received payment
of Rs 1,30,000/- by cheque as advance. He also received a further amount
of Rs.57,250/- by cheque issued by A1 and according to him, Rs.2,65,000/-
was still outstanding. This witness too vacillated in his cross-
examination only to affirm the correctness of the statement in his
examination-in-chief after he was recalled for re-examination.

The endeavour on the part of the defence that the payment received by this
witness by way of cheque of Rs.1,30,000/- was in fact towards supply made
to the AIADMK Party was dismissed by the Trial Court in absence of any
evidence to that effect.

The Trial Court also examined the evidence of PW-188, Sundareshan, who was
the Senior Advertisement Manager of a local daily in which a thanks giving
message of A1 had been published in its issue dated 10.09.1995. According
to this witness, such an advertisement was published in all other editions
of the daily on 11.09.1995 as well and that he had raised a bill of Rs.
2,47,660/- therefor.

The evidence of PW-199 A.G. Krishnamurti of A.G.K. Travels, Chennai is
that he had arranged two Ambassador AC cars from 06.09.1995 to
08.09.1995 on rent, raised bills in the name of A1 and received payment of
Rs.15,814/- through cheque issued by her.

PW228 Shri Rajasekharan, Chartered Accountant claimed to have filed Income
Tax and Property Tax returns of A1 for year 1984-85 to 1996-97 and stated
about seizures amongst others of a file Ex. P-2218 containing the
expenditure bills, receipts etc. in connection with the marriage. This
witness was not cross-examined at the first instance on behalf of the
respondents and thereafter he failed to appear in spite of issuance of
summons. Though the defence raised a plea that in absence of cross-
examination of this witness, his untested testimony ought to be eschewed,
the Trial Court noted that neither the respondents-accused had cross-
examined this witness when the opportunity was available nor had
thereafter, when as many as 145 witnesses have been recalled for cross-
examination, did they seek the assistance of the court to secure his
presence, if necessary by applying coercive legal process. Even otherwise,
according to the Trial Court the testimony of this witness pertained mainly
to the seizure of the documents from his office which included amongst
others, the file containing vouchers, receipts etc. relating to the
expenditure incurred in the marriage of A3. This is more so as some of
these documents had also been relied upon by the respondents-accused.

Vis-a-vis the expenditure incurred towards cost of food, mineral water and
thamboolam, the Trial Court did assess the evidence of PW-237, Jawahar,
who at the relevant time, was working as Assistant Secretary to A1 and his
office functioned amongst others from her house at No.36, Poes Garden.
This witness stated about musical concerts presented by Mr. Srinivas and
Mr. A.R. Rahman whom he had met for such arrangement on the direction of
A1. He deposed about the printing of invitation cards for the VIPs. He
also stated generally about the other features of the marriage including
the supervision of the pandal works by Mr. K.P. Muthuswamy, a retired
Engineer. This witness too had resiled from the above, in his cross-
examination but reiterated, in his re-examination, his testimony in his
examination-in-chief.

The defence plea that the afore-mentioned witnesses in view of their
contradictory orientations ought to be discarded as a whole did not meet
the approval of the Trial Court. It recorded that not only the evidence of
such witnesses does not deserve to be discredited as a whole and instead
can be acted upon on the same analogy as of a hostile witness, the
circumstances under which 76 prosecution witnesses were recalled by the
respondents/accused after A1 had assumed the office of the Chief Minister
of the State and the way, 64 of them had casually resiled from their
earlier version, could not be lightly brushed aside. The Trial Court
observed that as most of these witnesses who were in service in the
Government Departments, were likely to be influenced by the status of A1,
it being one of the considerations for which the trial of the case had
been transferred out of Tamil Nadu to Karnataka, it concluded that the
temporary retraction of these witnesses in cross-examination from their
testimony in their examination-in-chief ipso facto did not warrant
rejection of their version in toto.

The Trial Court noted the evidence of PW-192 Mr. Sanjay Jain, Proprietor
of Titan Show Room, Chennai to the effect that he had delivered 34 watches
amounting to Rs.1,34,565/- for which he was paid the amount in cash.

PW-196 Mr. Sayad Bawker, claimed to have done the stitching work of suits,
shirts, sherwanis etc. for the bridegroom-A3 for which he received
Rs.1,41,025/- as the charges therefor. The witness conceded that the
payment was made by Ram Kumar, the maternal uncle of the bride. The Trial
Court however disbelieved the statement that the uncle of the bride had
made the payment.

On the expenditure of 100 silver plates, the prosecution had examined PW-
191, Mr. Srinivas and PW-214 Mr. A.R. Rehman who had conducted music
concerts. Both of them stated to have made the performances on the request
made on behalf of A1 and that they had not charged therefor. They however
admitted to have been offered silver plate, silk saree and a small kumkum
box at the time of their invitation for the event. They deposed that on
being requisitioned by the investigating agency, those items had been
handed over to the concerned officers.

Acting on the evidence of these witnesses, the Trial Court concluded that
on the occasion of the marriage, silver plates, silk saree/dhoti and kumkum
box were presented to the VIPs.

Regarding postal expenses, the prosecution relied on the evidence of PW-
189 Office Administrator, Head Office of AIADMK who confirmed to have sent
56,000 invitations, expending therefor, Rs.2,24,000/-. He stated to have
received the said amount from Mr. Jawahar, Assistant/Joint Secretary of A1.

In response, the respondents had examined several witnesses with documents
to butress and consolidate the oral testimony. DW1 Ram Kumar, the maternal
uncle of the bride in his deposition claimed to have met the entire
expenses of the marriage and for that purpose, had opened an account in
State Bank of India being Account No. 95071 in Gopal Puram Branch, State
Bank of India and had remitted a sum of Rs.92 lakhs which was spent on the
occasion. He also proved Ex. D15, the photocopy of the pass book of the
said account and stated that the deposit had been arranged through the
brides' family. In cross-examination, he disclosed that the account was
opened on 14.8.1995 but did not disclose the details of the expenditure
therefrom. He also did not produce the counter-foils of the cheques
issued in that account. His statement in cross-examination also revealed
that he had not produced a copy of the passbook earlier in course of the
investigation. He however affirmed that the total expenditure in the
marriage did sum up to Rs.92 lakhs only.

Apart from this witness, the respondents examined a host of party workers
who, at the relevant time, held various positions at the district level and
elsewhere. These witnesses, as the tenor of their testimony demonstrates,
in essence asserted that they had collected various sums of money from the
party workers and others and had utilized the same for various purposes
relating to the marriage like decorating the pandals erected by the bride
party, crackers, music, food for the party workers, chairs in the
pandals, reception on the visit of A1 to areas in connection with the event
etc. All these witnesses, however, did admit that there was no
instruction from the party to raise such fund and incur the expenditure but
insisted that they had given their statements before the income tax
department in course of the enquiry made in this regard. The witnesses
also did concede that accounts/receipts in connection with the collection
and expenditures had not been retained/maintained.

In addition to the above, the respondents examined DW64 S. Shanmugam,
Chartered Accountant who claimed to be the auditor of A1 from 1996 to 2000
and had dealt with her accounts/assessment for the assessment years 1991-
92 to 1997-98. He referred to the query made by the income tax department
in the year 1995 about the amounts spent by her in the marriage and also
the reply given by A1 in response thereto. He also deposed that on
necessary enquries being made, the income tax authorities eventually did
write off the expenditure of Rs.94 lakhs, which earlier, it had observed,
had been spent by A1 on the event. Reference was also made to the
assessment made by the income tax authorities with regard to food expenses
to the tune of Rs.3 lakhs which also stood deleted in appeal.

DW24 T. Tharani, who was a painter and also Art Director of the films, was
examined to affirm that in connection with the marriage, people from AIADMK
party had approached him for designing the facade of the entrance of the
marriage hall and that he had entrusted the work to one of his assistants
Mr. Ramesh. He also added that he did not charge any remuneration for the
work.

DW54 Gopi Kant, at the relevant time, was working as Cine Art Director and
stated that on being requested by the bride's family, he met DW1 Ram Kumar,
maternal uncle of the bride who introduced him to PW 200, Muthu Swamy.
This witness stated that PW 200 asked him to prepare a pandal at the place
of reception/public procession of the bride and the bridegroom and to erect
two arches and sets at the designated locations. According to him, the
cost of the work was Rs.12,98,000/- which was paid by cheque in the name
of G.K. Arts by DW1 Ram Kumar. That a further cheque of Rs.4 lakhs was
also issued by DW1 towards some items of additional work, was also stated
by this witness. The witness confirmed that he was the proprietor of G.K.
Arts.

The respondents also examined DW80, B. Vasudevan who, at the relevant
time, was working as Junior Engineer, PWD, Madras. The witness deposed
that the investigating officer of the case on 17.4.1997 had orally
instructed him to value the marriage pandal and other works. This witness
identified his signature in the report Ex. P1019 but maintained that the
drawings pertaining to the pandals and the stage had not been given by
Vijay Shankar, Architect and that he did not know where the said panals had
been put up. He stated that the measurements mentioned in the report were
based on the instructions of the I.O. and that the said report had been
prepared in the office without carrying out any inspection. He also
disputed the measurements mentioned in the report.

In cross-examination, however, this witness admitted that he along with PW
181 Thangrajan were the members of the valuation team and also conceded
that the report contained the signatures of the Architect, Vijay Shankar.

DW-85, as offered by the respondents, was the Manager (Administration &
Accounts) in Super Duper TV Private Limited, who conducted the TV coverage
of the wedding for which, according to this witness, a sum of Rs.2 lakhs
was paid by DW1. In cross-examination, this witness admitted that at that
time, the bridegroom- A3- Sudhakaran and A2- Sasikala were the directors of
Super Duper T.V. Pvt. Limited and that A3 was its Managing Director.

DW-97 A. Vijay Kumar, Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central
Circle-II, Chennai produced documents containing 10 volumes and exhibited
Ex. D325 to D364, referred to by the other witnesses for the defence. This
witness however admitted that the assessment for the year 1993-94
pertaining to the concerned respondents was sub judice before the High
Court in appeal and that the assessment orders relating to them had not
been finalised and were pending before various authorities.

It has been emphatically urged that the evidence of PW181 ought to have
been summarily rejected being hearsay and besides speculative, arbitrary
and based on no verifiable data and that this witness is wholly
untrustworthy even otherwise. It was insisted on behalf of the respondents
that the learned Trial Court had also rejected the evidence of PW181 to be
hearsay in character and thus in absence of any other admissible evidence,
its computation of the expenditure at Rs.3 crores is also without any
tangible basis and is wholly inferential. The testimony of PW181 being
clearly hearsay in nature, in terms of Section 60 of the Evidence Act, the
same could not have been accepted as substantive evidence and thus the
Trial Court's approach of seeking corroboration thereto had also been
flawed. According to the respondents, the version of PW200 supports the
case of the accused in view of his admission that Rs.16 lakhs was paid by
the bride’s father towards the expenses for the construction of the
pandals. It has been urged that his evidence as well is rejectable as
hearsay in nature, as this witness did not personally know about the
expenses, if any made by A1 and that he had only been informed of the
contribution of A1 by some unnamed pandal contractors. In absence of any
evidence to show that A1 had incurred the expenditure, as claimed by the
prosecution, towards the construction of the marriage pandal or towards the
actual cost thereof, the entire amount of Rs.5.21 crores, as cited by the
prosecution, ought to be deducted. Qua the expenses on the other heads
including food, mineral water, presentations, stitching charges, etc., it
has been argued that not only the Trial Court had wrongly accepted the
evidence forthcoming from the prosecution that the expenditure on Titan
watches and stitching charges had been incurred by the respondents, it
grossly erred in holding that on a rough estimate, an amount of Rs.3
crores had been spent by the respondents on the event. It has been
canvassed that in doing so, the Trial Court left out of consideration
amongst others, the evidence adduced by the defence through DW1 Ram Kumar,
the maternal uncle of the bride, the party workers and most importantly the
income tax proceedings, which after thorough enquiries and scrutiny at
different levels did finally record that only an amount of Rs.29,66,552/-,
as mentioned by A1 in her reply dated 19.09.2005, had been spent and that
too by cheques except for a sum of Rs.3 lakhs. In all, having regard to
the entire gamut of the evidence, it has been argued that considering the
different segments of expenditures incurred by the bride’s family and the
party workers, the same is Rs.1,85,17,000/-, to which Rs.29,66,552/- only
could be added on account of A1. In this premise, the respondents have
maintained that the High Court’s computation of the expenses of
Rs.28,68,000/- only by A1 by way of expenditure incurred by the respondents
is unassailably correct being based on a logical analysis of the materials
on record.

The High Court however readily discarded the testimony of PW181 and the
report Ex.P1019 primarily on the ground that this witness had no personal
knowledge or idea of the structures raised at the venue of the marriage and
of the reception and that his version with regard thereto was on the basis
of derived inputs though it mentioned that the witness, as attested by him,
did consult the architect, the Art Director, the electrician etc. who
accompanied him to the site and that he had been given as well a drawing
of the wedding choultry and the measurements of the pandal along with the
sketch of the decorative arches etc. It held the view that the witness had
prepared the report on the basis of what the witness had heard and seen
from the drawings and the sketches and was not personally aware of the
authenticity thereof and that he did not ask for quotations or confirm the
sketches. That his report Ex.P1019 was deficient and scanty in essential
particulars to inspire confidence for its acceptance was recorded. On this
aspect, the High Court also referred to the evidence of PW200 K.P.
Muthuswamy, who claimed to have been entrusted to oversee the works related
to the pandals by A2. This witness, to reiterate had confirmed that he
visited both the venues and that a plan for the pandals as well as stage
arrangements, as prepared by architect Vijay Shankar had been handed over
to him. He narrated in details about the specifications of the structures
and the payments therefor. He also admitted to have received a sum of
Rs.16 lakhs from the father of the bride in this regard. The High Court,
however observed that this witness, amongst others, did neither tell the
police about the expenses of leveling nor disclose the particulars about
the number of air conditioner machines used. The High Court further
commented that he did not supervise the work of Art Director Gopi Nath and
that this witness could not remember as to how much money was spent for the
marriage. The High Court touched upon the evidence of other witnesses and
in particular elaborated on the testimony of PW228 R. Rajshekheran from
whom the file containing the original vouchers, bills, invoices in
connection with the marriage i.e. Ex. P2218 had been seized. It also
analyzed the queries made by the Income Tax Department and the reply given
thereto by A1 by her letter dated 19.09.1995 wherein, she provided the
breakup of the expenditure incurred by her. The testimony of DW1 Ram
Kumar, the maternal uncle of the bride, more specifically to the effect
that the entire expenses had been borne by the bride’s family to the tune
of Rs.92 lakhs by remittances through the bank account opened on 14.08.1995
was taken note of. The evidence of the party workers claiming their
contribution in the expenditure through collection was also recorded and
eventually the High Court accepted the statement of A1 furnished to the
Income Tax Department disclosing the expenditure by her of Rs.28,67,520/-
towards marriage and rounded up the said figure to Rs.28,68,000/- to be her
share of expenses.

In reaching this conclusion, apart from rejecting the testimony of PW181
being second hand in nature, the High Court seemingly accepted in
substance the version of the defence witnesses observing that at the
relevant time A1 was the Chief Minister of the State and was incidentally
then the General Secretary of AIADMK party as well. It recorded further
that the bride was none else than the grand-daughter of famous cine actor
Shivaji Ganeshan. It observed that the prosecution for no reason
forthcoming, had omitted to examine the bride’s father who would have been
the best person to state about the actual expenses on the marriage. The
High Court as well seem to have accepted that it was the customary practice
for the bride’s family to bear the expenses of the marriage normally and
though it was of the view that such expenditure was comprised of verifiable
and non-verifiable components, it was difficult to ascertain the non-
verifiable segment while verifiable expenditure could be assessed through
investigation. Et al, the High Court eventually accepted the figure of
Rs.28,67,520/-, as cited by the A1 to be the amount expended by her in the
marriage and limited the liability of the respondent- accused, as stated
above, to Rs.28,68,000/-. Thereby the High Court reduced the expenditure
of Rs.6,45,04,222/- towards marriage expenditure by the R1/A1, as mentioned
by the prosecution, to Rs.28,68,000/-.

A2 to A4 also have positioned themselves to question the expenditure of
Rs.2,38,89,609/- attributed to them by the prosecution. This amount, as is
apparent from annexure IV to the charge sheet, includes sums expended not
only by A2, A3 and A4 but also by nine companies/firms as named therein.
In the compilation referred to in course of the arguments, the break up of
the expenditures incurred by A2, A3, A4 and the firms aforementioned have
been provided. It is however the contention of A2 to A4 that an amount of
Rs.1,63,06,897.16 is liable to be deducted on the grounds as enumerated in
the compilation so much so that the total admitted expenditure by them and
their firms as named by the prosecution was Rs.75,82,712.17. Qua the
disputed items, it has been urged on behalf of these respondents that the
Trial Court had overlooked the defence evidence and instead had received
the version of the prosecution witnesses though on the face of the records,
the corresponding expenditures had not been proved. According to the
respondents, apart from these infirmities, the Trial Court also ignored,
amongst others, the aspect that on several items of expenditure by way of
payment of interest, these respondents had been subjected to double
jeopardy inasmuch as though these sums had been accounted for in computing
their net profits, these amounts were shown separately again as
expenditures. Not only sums not expended in fact had been deliberately
shown to be so, the attempt on the part of the prosecution to make double
and inflated additions in respect of purchase of machineries in some items
has been overlooked. It has been argued as well that the Trial Court
erroneously also relied on the evidence of prevaricating prosecution
witnesses against the respondents.

Per contra, the prosecution has insisted that the challenge to the so
called flaws in the assessment of the evidence by Trial Court on items
other than the one pertaining to marriage expenditure is wholly misplaced
and unmerited as the High Court had also endorsed the amounts corresponding
thereto. This is more so in absence of any challenge to the conclusions of
the High court in this regard by the respondents. According to the
prosecution, the High Court scaled down the marriage expenditure from
Rs.6,45,04,222/-, as quantified by the prosecution to Rs.28,68,000/-,
though the Trial Court had computed the same to be Rs.3 crores.
Arithmetically thus, the High Court endorsed the total expenditure to be
Rs.5,40,20,611/- instead of Rs.11,56,56,833.41 quoted by the prosecution.
It has been argued that the analysis of the evidence on record as a whole
by the Trial Court and its computation of the marriage expenditure of Rs.3
crores is correct and did not call for any interference. According to the
prosecution, the Trial Court did not reject the evidence adduced by it, but
on a rational appraisal thereof, had moderated the marriage expenditure to
be Rs.3 crores. It has been urged as well that the Trial Court had rightly
disbelieved the evidence of the defence witnesses and more particularly the
party workers who claimed to have collected funds to spend the same on the
event. That A2 had failed to account for the expenditures, referred to by
A1 in her reply to the notice to the Income Tax Department had been
underlined too.

The break-up of expenditure of Rs.6,45,04,222/- on the marriage has been
furnished by the prosecution as hereunder.

In our comprehension, though PW181 had neither visited the venues on the
dates of the event nor was then in-charge of the construction of pandals
and other arrangements auxiliary thereto, his evidence is not liable to be
excluded as a whole. On being entrusted with the responsibility of making
an estimate of the expenses incurred in the construction of the pandals and
other arrangements, it is discernible from his testimony that he did
consult the Architect Vijay Shankar, the Art Director Thotha Theerani and
others, who were in fact actually involved in the said works at the
relevant point of time. This witness visited the venues and stated on oath
that the Architect Vijay Shankar had given him the drawing of the choultry
and the measurements of the pandals on the basis of which those had been
constructed. He also referred to the plans and sketches provided to him
by the Art Director, based whereupon, the fixtures and ancillary
structures were raised. In the report Ex.P1019 prepared by PW181, he did
mention, inter alia, the areas of the various pandals together with the
decorative attachments and after accounting for the cost thereof and the
price of the furniture used and the amenities provided, estimated the
expenditure to be Rs.5,91,00,000/- towards the pandals and other
arrangements to secure the intended facilities for the couple, guests and
other participants. True it is, that PW181 was not an eye-witness to the
marriage arrangements and had not personally undertaken the works
pertaining to the pandals and other associated arrangements, yet as has
been observed by the Trial Court, his findings as recorded in the report
Ex. P1019 could be construed to be of an expert witness and further could
be used as corroboration for the testimony of PW200 who indeed had
supervised the same works himself and as claimed by the prosecution on the
instructions/advise of A2. The evidence of PW181, that the Architect
Vijayshankar and the Art Director Thotha Tharani had provided him with the
plan and the sketch map on which the pandals and other structures at the
venues had been constructed, cannot be discarded as hearsay. In this view
of the matter, the approach of the Trial Court to weigh the probative worth
of the testimony of PW181 in conjunction with PW200 cannot be repudiated
to be impermissible in law or outrageously fallacious.

PW200 K.P. Muttuswamy, Chief Engineer, Public Works Department, Tamil Nadu
did assert on oath that he was instructed by A2 to complete the pandal
works as early as possible. He also referred to a plan to that effect
furnished by the Architect Vijay Shankar in presence of the contractors
entrusted for the execution thereof. The witness claimed to have arranged
land at the identified sites to be levelled and also provided in details of
the number, size and specification of the pandals together with the
purposes thereof. The witness was candid to state that the father of the
bride had paid Rs.14 lakhs towards the expenditure and that therefrom, he
disbursed payments. He deposed as well that A1 and A2 had inspected the
work by visiting the site about a week prior to the marriage. He claimed
to have signed the applications for securing temporary electric connections
for the pandals for which payments were made by cheques on behalf of A1.
In this patent premise, the conclusion of the Trial Court that the evidence
of PW200 was direct and of first hand in nature with regard to the
arrangements at the pandals cannot be faulted with. Its finding that his
testimony thus lent sufficient corroboration to that of PW181 also cannot
be dismissed as preposterous.

The testimony of DW-80, who was also a signatory to the report Ex. P-1019,
to the effect that the same had been prepared without any inspection and
that the measurements mentioned therein were not real had not been rightly
preferred to the otherwise consistent versions of PW181 and PW200. The
evaluation of the evidence of the other witnesses touching upon the
remaining aspects of the expenditure incurred on the marriage, as conducted
by the Trial Court, also does not merit rejection in toto. Noticeably, the
Trial Court did not accept the expenditure quoted by the prosecution on
the cost of Titan watches as the evidence to that effect was construed to
be inadequate to lay the same in the account of the respondents. The
rejection of the evidence of the party workers claiming collection of
various amounts from its cadres and utilization thereof towards the
purposes and arrangements mentioned by them also in absence of any
persuasive corroborative evidence does not merit any repudiation. In the
face of the evidence in particular of the elaborate arrangements at the
venues and the expenses incurred on other items associated with the event,
we are of the opinion that the Trial Court did not err in not accepting the
figure of Rs.28,68,000/-, as the expenditure incurred by A1 on the basis of
her reply to the queries made by the Income Tax Department. Though it has
been urged on behalf of the defence that this figure had been finally
accepted after the necessary enquiries undertaken by the income tax
authorities, the result of such enquiries even if made, being not
binding on the Trial Court, it was not obliged to accept the same by
ignoring the evidence adduced before it. The treatment of the evidence by
the High Court, on the other hand, in our assessment, had been summary and
sketchy and it in a way promptly accepted the expenditure mentioned by A1
in her reply to the notice of the income tax department without
independently appraising the evidence adduced by the parties at the trial.

Though it is not unknown, that very often the bride's family shares or
bears the expenditure of marriage, dependent on the practice prevalent, it
is not an invariable phenomenon and permits of exception in varying fact
situations and therefore no rigid assumption either way is tenable. In any
case, necessary deductions would have to be drawn on the basis of the
evidence adduced. As the investigation into the expenditure on the
marriage had to be conducted more than two years after the event, it is
logical that the exercise involved was expected to be informed with some
assumptions, which if realistic and logical, would not as such vitiate the
assessment as incurably infirm or non-est.

On an overall consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties, we are
inclined to hold that the computation of the expenditure incurred by A1 in
the marriage as made by the High Court is unacceptable in the teeth of the
materials on record to the contrary. There being concurrent findings of
the two forums on the rest of the items of expenditure, we construe it to
be inessential to undertake a fresh exercise with regard thereto in the
present proceedings.

CONSPIRACY AND ABETEMENT

The prosecution asserts that the respondents i.e. A1 to A4 had entered
into a conspiracy and in furtherance thereof, A1 who was a public servant,
had come to possess assets to the tune of Rs.66.65 crores, disproportionate
to her known sources of income, during the period 1991 to 1996 when she
held the office of the Chief Minister of the State of Tamil Nadu. The
prosecution has alleged as well that A2 to A4 had abetted her i.e. A1 in
the commission of offence. To reiterate, the check period is from 1.7.1991
to 30.4.1996. To buttress this imputation, the prosecution has relied on
the fact that A1, who was the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu from 24.6.1991
to 13.5.1996 and A2 who was her close friend and associate, were amongst
others partners together in Jaya Publications and Sasi Enterprises from
before the check period. A2, who was the wife of Tr. M. Natarajan, a
government servant with the Information and Public Relations Department,
initially was a occasional visitor to the residence of A1 till 1988
whereafter she was permanently assimilated in the household. The
prosecution case as well is that A3 who is proclaimed to be the foster
son of A1 is the biological son of A2's elder sister Tmt. Vanamani and T.
Vivekanandan. He too had come to reside in the residence of A1 during the
year 1992 while pursuing studies at Chennai and remained there till 1997.
It is in evidence that A1 had solemnized his marriage on 7.9.1995, claiming
him to be her foster son with noticeable pamp and grandeur. A4, according
to the prosecution, is the wife of the elder brother of A2 and had been
residing in the house of A1 from the beginning of 1992.

The above noticeable integration of A1 to A4 and their joint residence has
been highlighted by the prosecution as a formindable indicator to attest
the imputation of conspiracy and abetment. Apart from maintaining that A2,
A3 and A4 at the time of joining the household of A1 were not possessed of
properties significant enough in their names nor did have any independent
source of income as such, it has insisted that the properties acquired
during the check period in the names of the 34 firms and companies were
with the unaccounted funds and resources of A1. It has been underlined that
only few of the companies/firms which were formed with A2, A3 and A4 and
Lex Property Development (Pvt). Ltd. in different combinations were
registered under the Companies Act . Noticeably, the properties of these
companies/firms had been acquired during the check period and significantly
about 50 bank accounts were opened with the Indian Bank, Abhirampuram and
Canara Bank, Mylapore in the names of the respondents and their
firms/companies during that time. The prosecution has also brought on
record the fact that out of these firms/companies, six firms namely; Jay
Farm House, J. Real Estate, Jaya Contractors and Builders, Green Farm
House, J.J. Leasing and Maintenance and J.S. Housing Development had been
registered on the same day ie. 25.1.1994 and ten other firms namely;
Vigneshwara Builders, Lakshmi Constructions, Gopal Promoters, Namasivaya
Housing Developments, Ayyappa Property Developments, Sea Enclave,
Navasakthi Contractors and Builders, Oceanic Constructions, Green Garden
Apartments and A.P. Advertising Services on 15.2.1995. According to the
prosecution, all the respondents availed of the services of common
auditors, architects and accountants. It has referred to numerous inter-
account transfers involving the respondents and the above firms/companies
so much so to unequivocally project that those represented cash flow from
their accounts inter se for common purposes. Referring to the evidence of
PW198 in particular, it has been contended on behalf of the prosecution
that huge unaccounted cash deposits had been made in the two accounts,
maintained in Canara Bank, Mylapore and Indian Bank, Abhirampuram
originating from 36, Poes Garden, Chennai, the residence/secretariat of A1
with A2 monitoring the account(s) in which such deposits were to be made.
Vis-a-vis the purchase of immovable properties, it has been alleged that
about 3000 acres of fertile lands, of which 900 acres comprised a tea
estate, had been acquired in the names of individuals/companies through
various transactions evidenced by 146 sale deeds. It has been underlined
that qua most of the sales, A2 had suggested the names of the
firms/individuals to figure in the deals. It has been imputed as well that
in connection with such transactions, the vendors/owners were kept away
from the purchasers and and the conveyances were made through attorneys
foisted upon them. The vendors were also subjected to duress to part with
the property and the officials entrusted with the duty of registration of
such transactions, were subjected to instructions from higher authorities
to oblige the purchasers and that the registrations did take place at the
residence of A1 on many occasions. The consideration price of such sale
transactions very often had been below the guidelines prescribed and the
amounts were paid from various accounts of the respondents as well as their
firms/companies and also by cash. According to the prosecution, all these
circumstances are borne out unmistakably by the evidence on record, oral
and documentary do prove the charge of conspiracy and abetment and that in
furtherance of these criminal activities, each one of them had acted on
behalf of each other in capacities either as individuals, partners,
directors, of their firms/companies and also collaborators.

In refutation on behalf of A1, it has been broadly urged that though
conspiracy can be inferred from circumstances, the same has to be
essentially proved and that the mere fact that A2 to A4 had been residing
in the house of A1, per se cannot be a decisive circumstance to prove
conspiracy. It has been argued that from much prior to the check period,
A1 and A2 had been partners in the firms namely; M/s Jaya Publication and
Sasi Enterprises and their business connection ipso fact also cannot be
construed to be an incriminating circumstance. It has been maintained that
A2 to A4 have purchased properties with their own resources and efforts and
that the prosecution has failed to establish even a single instance to
demonstrate that the funds for such acquisitions had been doled out by A1.
Contending that starting of a firm by a non-public servant by itself
cannot be an irrefutable determinant to assume conspiracy with a public
servant more particularly when A1 had never been a partner in any of the
firms started during the check period, it has been pleaded that the finding
of the Trial Court that the evidence available did prove issuance of
cheques by A1 in favour of the co-accused and the applications by her for
availing loan for the firms involved is factually incorrect. It has been
argued that the prosecution has failed to cite even one instance where A1
had transferred any fund to A3 and A4 and for that matter to any of the six
companies in particular which allegedly have acquired properties therewith.
It has been underlined as well that A1 had neither received any dividend
from these companies nor been either a shareholder or a director thereof.
In this context, the finding of the Trial Court that A2 to A4 had acquired
defunct companies with a sinister motive has been dismissed as unfounded
and patently erroneous. It has been maintained that a circumstance to admit
any inference of an illegal act must be one incapable of any other
reasonable explanation and the prosecution having failed to offer any, by
furnishing either direct or indirect evidence, the charge of conspiracy
has remained unproved.

Elaborating further the refutation of the imputation that the six
companies namely; Meadow Agro Farms Pvt. Limited, Riverway Agro Products
Limited, Lex Property Development (Pvt.) Limited, Signora Business
Enterprises, Ramraj Agro Products Limited and Indo Doha Chemical and
Pharmaceutical Pvt. Limited had no resources of their own and that with
the induction of A2, A3 and A4 in particular, a tide of funds had flowed
into their accounts generated from the coffers of A1, it has been urged
with reference to the testimony of DW86 Vaidyanathan and DW87 Srikant as
well as the income tax returns for the period ending 31.3.1996 and 1996-97
as well as the balance sheets of the companies that so far as Meadow Agro
Farm Pvt. Limited, and Riverway Agro Products Limited are concerned, at the
relevant time, the respondents were not the shareholders thereof and their
share capital was formed of the contribution of the shareholders of these
entities. According to the respondents, all these companies had sufficient
funds of their own where from acquisition of properties and expenditures
were made. That huge amount of loans were also advanced by these companies,
to name in particular, Meadow Agro Farms Pvt. Limited, Riverway Agro
Products Limited and Lex Property Development (Pvt.) Limited have been
highlighted. The loans, noticeable were more prominently to A2, A3 and the
firms/companies formed by them in different combinations including Sasi
Enterprises and Jaya Publications. The amount of loans range from Rs.2
lakhs to Rs.62,52,000/-. Vis-a-vis Lex Property Development (Pvt.) Limited,
it has been contended that from its balance sheet for the assessment year
1996-97, it was patent that it had received share application money to the
tune of Rs.46,00,000 and that it had borrowed a sum of Rs.84,07,172 from
the Indian Bank. Further, it had a receipt of Rs.2,04,98,350 from sundry
creditors. In addition to the above, it has been pleaded that the company
also received an inter-corporate deposit (ICD) from Kalyani Constructions
Pvt. Ltd. of an amount of Rs. 1,56,67,000 during the year ending
31.3.1996 and Rs. 45,00,000 from Altaf Constructions Private Ltd. That this
company did make an investment of Rs.2,63,49,857/- in immovable property
apart from granting loans to A3 and three other firms including Sasi
Enterprises, has been mentioned. According to the respondents, thus the
total expenditure of this company including advances did sum up to
Rs.3,03,48,357/- which was met from its own corpus, as had been accepted
by the income tax authorities.

It has been insisted in particular that the properties acquired by Signora
Business Enterprises Private Limited were prior to A3 and A4 becoming the
additional directors of the company and therefore the finding to the
contrary as recorded by the Trial Court was apparently erroneous.

With regard to Ram Raj Agro Products Limited, it has been argued that the
balance sheet of the company for the year 1994-95 disclosed that it had
made investment of Rs.14,39,446/- in the purchase of land. Referring to
the balance-sheet of this company for the assessment year 1995-96, it has
been maintained that it had secured loans from banks to the tune of
Rs.1,43,87,336 and unsecured loans of Rs.75,30,561. It has been urged as
well that during the said period, this company had received a sum of
Rs.1 crore also from Mangutta Investment Pvt. Limited. That the company
had received back from the government a refund of Rs.40,00,000 has also
been urged to contend that it thus had funds to the tune of Rs.2,59,17,897
wherefrom it spent Rs.62,57,000 towards constructions at Thanjavour during
1994-95 and 1995-96.

Vis-a-vis, Indo Doha Chemicals and Pharmaceutical Pvt. Limited, it has
been asserted that on 31.3.1995, it had paid up share capital of
Rs.97,00,000/- as disclosed by its balance-sheet. Referring to the order
passed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) in ITA No. 144/1999-
2000, it is submitted that 9,69,400 shares of face value of Rs.10 each
had been purchased by A2 at Rs.6 per share and the remaining 600 shares had
been purchased by six other persons. That the price of the 9,69,400 shares
@ Rs.6 per share amounting to Rs.58,16,400/- and registered in the name of
A2 had been paid by A3 is however admitted. Contending thus that the
prosecution version that Indo Doha Chemicals and Pharmaceutical Pvt.
Limited during the check period had a total income of Rs.30,40,000 to be
wrong, it has been urged that after the purchase of the shares, the whole
factory was leased out to Southern Petrochemical Company Limited (SPIC), in
return whereof the company received an amount of Rs.1,39,08,584/-. It has
however been admitted that out of such receipt, Rs.25,00,000/- had been
lent to Meadow Agro Farm (Private) Limited. Further, an amount of
Rs.20,00,000/- had been paid to James Frederic and Rs.72,00,000/- to
S IPC OT by way of repayment of loan availed earlier leaving a balance of
Rs.57,08,584/- in deposit. This is to contradict the prosecution's claim
that the income of Indo Doha Chemicals and Pharmaceutical Private Limited
during the check period was Rs.30,40,000/-. It has thus been urged that all
the properties acquired and constructions raised by the six companies
have been from their own funds and therefore, the amount of
Rs.4,70,24,439/- towards the same is not liable to be integrated while
adjudging the assets of A1 to A4.

In consolidation of the above, it has been urged on behalf of A2 to A4
that they along with the six companies whose assets, income and expenditure
have been combined by the prosecution to lay the charge, being not public
servants, cannot, in law, be called upon to explain their source of income
or the manner of acquisition of their assets or the mode and extent of
their expenditures.

Referring to Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act, it has been asserted that
the same does not cast any obligation on a non-public servant even if
arraigned as a co-accused with the public servant, to furnish explanation
as otherwise contemplated therein. It has been maintained that though the
clear mandate of this legal provision is that for the charge to succeed,
the prosecution must establish that the public servant, had been during the
term of his/her office holding his/her assets through some other person or
to put it differently, some other person had been holding the assets on
behalf of the public servant, the Trial Court had grossly erred in absence
of any evidence to that effect, to proceed on the basis of surmises and
conjectures to return a finding against A2 to A4 and the above referred
six companies. The prosecution having utterly failed to adduce any
evidence to demonstrate that A2 to A4 or these companies had received any
money from A1, her financial involvement in their affairs remained
unproved, more particularly as she was neither a director nor a shareholder
of these companies. Underlining the fact that no charge of benami
transaction had been framed against the respondents, it has been insisted
that even otherwise the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden to
prove this fact. It has been argued that it having been established that A2
to A4 and the six companies at all relevant times, had their independent
sources of income and individual business, the 1988 Act did not cast any
burden on them to prove that they did not hold any assets on behalf of A1.
Elaborating on this aspect, it has been contended that from much before
the commencement of the check period, A2 had been carrying on business in
her own right as the proprietor of Vinod Vision and she had been filing her
income tax returns in connection therewith. Reference of the income tax
returns and wealth tax returns of A2 for the assessment years 1985-86 to
1992-93 have been referred to. All these returns as the dates thereof
would indicate had been submitted much belatedly and noticeably on same
dates i.e. 23.2.1993 and 25.2.1993 for income tax and wealth tax returns
respectively. No explanation for such delayed submission of returns had
been furnished.

Though A2 had been a partner in Jaya Publications and Sasi Enterprises
which did exist as well from before the check period, it has been pleaded
that the Trial Court completely disregarded the evidence with regard to her
income and assets of these firms as disclosed more particularly in the
income tax returns and accepted by the income tax authorities, in holding
that the transactions involved were really of A1 catalysed by her
finances. Similarly the income tax returns of A3, A4 and the six companies
had also been left out of consideration by the Trial Court.

Reiterating that there is no evidence on record even to indicate that A1
had been the director or a shareholder of any of the six companies, it has
been emphasized that these companies had been floated prior to the check
period. Apart form contending that there is no evidence to suggest that A1
had either given loan to the six companies or had made any investment
therein, it has been urged as well that these companies not having been
arraigned as accused, their income and assets could not have been
attributed to any of the respondents, being impermissible in law. In a
way, thus it has been argued that the assimilation of the assets of these
companies with those of the respondents and the eventual confiscation
thereof amounts to condemning these entities unheard. The prosecution as
well has been severely criticized to be unfair in withholding the audit
report prepared by Mr. Chokkalingam in respect of Jaya Publications and
Namadhu MGR. That several other documents seized in course of the
investigation were also endeavoured to be withheld and that it was on the
intervention of this Court that the respondents could secure an opportunity
to traverse the same, has also been mentioned. In reiteration of their
plea made with regard to the deficiencies in the assessment of the
valuation of the construction made by the engineers deputed by the
prosecution, it has been insisted that they could by no means be accepted
as experts, the appraisals and the reports based thereon being wholly
incomplete, faulty and conjectural in absence of any contemporaneous
document in support thereof. The approach of the Trial Court in accepting
the valuation furnished by the prosecution through such witnesses by
allowing a discount of 20% has also been castigated as absurd and perverse.
According to the respondents, the Trial Court readily accepted the evidence
of the prosecution on many issues without analysing the same in the
correct perspective which patently exhibits its non application of mind.

Aside impeaching the failure of the Trial Court in omitting to lay before
the A2, all the incriminating circumstances under Section 313 Cr.P.C., its
acceptance of the charge of conspiracy and abetment on the consideration
of the joint residence of A1 to A4, execution of general power of attorney
by A1 in favour of A2, constitution of various firms and companies during
the check period and inference of cash flow from one account to another
has been branded as visibly flawed. It has been argued on behalf of the
respondents that the deed of power of attorney was executed by A 1 in
favour of A2 only for the purpose of bank transactions of Indian Bank and
not for all purposes as assumed by the Trial Court. Further, as A1 was
neither a partner in any of the firms/companies constituted during the
check period and as the six companies, the properties whereof had been
confiscated, had been incorporated prior to the check period with third
party promoters/directors, this factor also did not merit acceptance to
reinforce the charge of conspiracy.

It has been assiduously pleaded that having regard to the fact that A1 is
a spinster and that she and A2 were partners in M/s Jaya Publications and
M/s Sasi Enterprises from before the check period and thus did share a
close relationship, A2's accommodation with A1 per se cannot suggest
conspiracy as alleged. Similarly, A3 being the nephew of A2 and A4, the
widowed sister-in-law of A2, their residence with A1 also ipso facto was
not an unmistakable circumstance to deduce conspiracy, in absence of any
evidence direct or indirect or a single instance evidencing flow of cash or
finance either from any source of A1 or her account to that of the other
accused persons or the six companies. Such a factor was really non est but
presumed and acted upon by the Trial Court to infer conspiracy and
abetment. It has been emphatically contended that the Trial Court ignored
as well the fact that M/s Jaya Publications and M/s Sasi Enterprises along
with A2 to A4 and six companies had secured substantial amounts of loan
from banks and other private sources which they rolled in their respective
business to assume their inter dependence and sustenance through
circulation of unaccounted reserves of A1 in their accounts.

On the aspects of abetment and conspiracy, the High Court dwelt upon the
evidence in general without undertaking any minute analysis of the
testimony of the individual witnesses or the documents/ transactions
related thereto. It in particular, while dealing with the charge of
accumulation of unaccounted wealth by A1 and diversion thereof to A2 to A4
to acquire immovable properties and administer the firms/companies
involved, noted that the respondents along with the firms and companies had
borrowed loans of Rs.24,17,31,274/- from banks. The High Court therefore
concluded that this amount having been utilised for the purchase of
immovable properties and administration of the firms and companies
involved, there was no foundation for the charge of abetment. Qua the
imputation of conspiracy, the High Court ruled that the joint residence of
A2 to A4 did not warrant an inference thereof and though as this offence
contemplates an agreement between two or more persons to commit an unlawful
act, a court to be satisfied with regard thereto ought to have at its
disposal prima facie evidence. It observed that where evidence is only
circumstantial, it must be complete, continuous and unimpeachable to be
consistent with the guilt of the accused so much so to exclude any possible
hypothesis of his innocence. The High Court concluded that the evidence
disclosed that A2 to A4 had borrowed huge amounts from the banks and other
sources and had therefrom acquired the immovable properties and the six
companies. It thus ruled, that not only the source of income was lawful,
the object was also legal. The charges of abetment and conspiracy against
the respondents have thus been dismissed by the High Court on these
considerations.

The Trial Court, while examining these charges, did address at the outset
the imputation of the prosecution that the pecuniary resources and the
properties of A2 to A4 as well as the six afore-named companies were
really held for and on behalf of A1, thus attracting the offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. The Trial Court recounted in this context,
the plea of A2 to A4 that the cash deposits in their accounts and their
assets had been acquired out of their own funds and that A1 had no
association therewith or contribution therefor in any manner whatsoever.
This, is in the face of the accusation of the prosecution that the
financial resources as well as the assets of A2 to A4 and the six companies
were in fact those of A1, as A2 to A4 and the said companies did not have,
at all relevant times, any income, or wherewithal to acquire the same. The
Trial Court was thus alive to the assertion of the prosecution that the
pecuniary resources and the properties of A2 to A4 and of the six companies
as endeavoured to have been acquired from their funds were held in benami
for and on behalf of A1. It proceeded to analyse the evidence adduced by
the prosecution on the touchstone of the accepted legal formulation that
benami transactions admitted of direct or circumstantial evidence leading
to such inference and embarked on the process of scrutinizing the facts and
circumstances attendant on the various transactions pertaining to
acquisition of properties of the six companies of which A2 to A4, in
different combinations, were the directors, as well as the cash flow inter
se in their bank accounts.

As the narration outlined by the Trial Court would reveal, it dealt with
in minutest details the oral and documentary evidence available on record.
Without resorting to a dialectical appraisal of the evidence of the
individual witnesses and the documents brought on record, it would be
suffice in our comprehension to notice the salient features discernible
therefrom and strikingly common to the transactions.

The evidence on record demonstrates that these companies though were in
existence from before the commencement of the check period and of which A3
and A4 were not the directors then, did neither have any significant
business activity nor transaction nor any profit earning pursuit to their
credit. This the Trial Court rightly noticed was apparent from the
relevant returns and balance sheets. The contemporaneous evidence also
evinced that these companies were not possessed of sufficient resources to
acquire properties to the extent amassed during the check period. Neither
did these companies have fixed assets nor did they avail or give loans to
evince financial soundness or stability permitting acquisition of the
assets and properties as made during the check period. In all, in these
six companies, A3 and A4 were nominated as additional directors/directors
in the year 1994 and soon thereafter their registered office stood
shifted to Shop No. 21, First Floor, Wellington Plaza No. 19, Annasalai,
Madras. The original directors resigned leaving the reins of the companies
wholly with A3 and A4 in particular. Noticeably, soon after A3 and A4 were
inducted as additional directors/directors, bank accounts were opened.
Simultaneously A2 to A4 formed several partnership firms with the principal
place of business thereof also at the above address. Co-incidentally the
dates of registration of most of these firms were common in batches and
the duration of their existence were mentioned to be at will.
Significantly, A3 and A4 resigned from the above six companies markedly on
the eve of the expiry of the check period.

The Trial Court, in details, took notice of the testimony of the witnesses
examined as well as the documents on the aspect of acquisition of
properties by these six companies. The witnesses included erstwhile
directors of these companies, bank officials who stated about the opening
of their accounts as well as advancement of loans, the concerned sub-
registrars, who registered the sale deeds of lands purchased by these
companies, officials from the office of the Company Registrar and Mr.
Shiva, Real Estate Agent, who acted as the agent/attorney of the vendors,
whose lands were purchased by these companies. The materials examined by
the Trial Court evidenced heavy deposits/withdrawals of cash and transfers
thereof hitherto absent before A3, A4 had taken over the companies. The
amounts varied very often in the range of Rs.10 lakhs and above. The pay-
in-slips for the deposits amongst others showed address of 36 Poes Garden,
Chennai. Transfers of heavy amounts to and from other accounts of A2 to A4
and their firms also surfaced. The income-tax returns/balance sheets
belatedly filed also demonstrated exchanges of deposits inter se the
accounts of A2 to A4 and their firms as well as these companies.

In respect of the acquisition of the immovable properties, the evidence
attested that soon after A3 and A4 had become directors of these companies,
they got involved in the negotiations and survey of lands intended to be
purchased. The sales were got executed through the attorneys of the owners
of the lands for which deeds of power of attorney were obtained from such
owners. Not only uneven bargains but also inadequate consideration/price
by undervaluing the properties was noticeable in the transactions.
Evidence on record disclosed that instructions were issued from the higher
authorities to the Registrars/Sub-Registrars to respond to the directions
issued from the office of A1 for documentation and registration of the
deeds involving such purchases and as a matter of fact, on various
occasions, such precepts did come and were readily complied with. Several
registrations were executed in the house of the vendors and at times, also
in the concerned office of the Registrar/Sub-Registrar. The sale deeds
executed, which are not disputed so far as those relate to these companies,
did not indicate that the purchases had been made from their assets
existing prior thereto. The evidence of the witnesses did suggest as well
that the registration norms were flexed and that resultant irregularities
in the process were ignored and cast aside to oblige the respondents.
Evidence of direct involvement of A3 and A4 in the purchase of shares and
properties on behalf of Ramraj Agro Mills (Private) Limited and that of A3
in the purchase of property for Meadow Agro Farms (Private) Limited is
discernible from the evidence adduced. In some cases, A2 was also present
at the time of negotiations for such purchases. The active role of Mr.
Shiva, the attorney of the owners, is apparent on the face of the records.

The Trial Court also noticed the evidence that the companies had been
transferred to A3 and A4 at paltry sums. On a totality of the scrutiny of
the evidence on record which significantly is adequately exhaustive, the
Trial Court held that at the relevant time of acquisition of the
properties, as above, all the six companies were exclusively in the control
and management of A2 to A4. The statement of the erstwhile
directors/promoters of the companies that they did not purchase any
property in their names either before or after the formation of such
companies was also taken note of. The Trial Court noted as well that A2 to
A4 had taken over the management of the companies even without buying the
requisite shares and concluded that these entities in fact did not have
the trappings of a company. It was determined as well that none of these
companies had any account in their names before A3 and A4 had taken over
the charge thereof and that there was no evidence to demonstrate that the
funds of these companies had been utilised to purchase properties in their
names. It recorded as well, that the funds were transferred to the
accounts of these companies either from the accounts held in the names of
Namadhu MGR, M/s Jaya Publications or other firms of the respondents which
unassailably proved that the resources for the acquisition of the
properties of these companies had in fact been availed from A1 or the
accounts maintained in the joint accounts of A1 and A2. That admittedly
none of the companies had filed returns either before the Registrar of the
Companies or before the income tax authorities declaring the funds for the
purchase of properties or acquisitions made in the names of the companies
was noted. The Trial Court also recorded the non-compliance of the various
provisions namely, i.e. Sections 209 , 210 , 211 , 215 and 220 of the
Companies Act in particular to conclude that as required by these
provisions, no proper books of accounts had been maintained, no returns had
been filed by these companies from the date of incorporation till the date
of attachment of their properties pursuant to the notifications issued by
the Government of Tamil Nadu under the provisions of Section 3 of the
Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance 1944 as per GOMS No. 120 dated 29.1.1997
and GOMS No. 1183 dated 25.9.1997. That the balance sheet and profit and
loss account of the companies were not maintained and processed as mandated
by Sections 213 and 220 of the Companies Act was also underlined. It was of
the view as well that there was nothing on record to show that A2 to A4 had
convened any general meeting of the companies during the relevant time or
that regular returns were filed before the Registrar as required under the
law. It also noted that the companies did not have their own auditors
appointed under Section 234 of the Companies Act and that the auditors of
A1 to A4 themselves submitted the returns after the properties of the
companies were attached. The Trial Court thus deduced that all the
circumstances conjointly substantiated that the acquisition of these
companies were never intended to be the assets thereof and were also not
treated to be their properties at any point of time. According to the
Trial Court, it was only after the attachment of the properties that the
respondents raised the contention that the ownership thereof did vest in
the companies and thus could not be said to have been held benami for A1.
The Trial Court also, with reference to the certified copies of the
orders in Misc. Petition No. 768/2014 dated 18.6.2014 and Misc. Petition
289/2014 dated 26.6.2004 passed under Section 5(3) of the Criminal Law
Amendment Ordinance recorded that after the resignation of A3 and A4, there
was no appointment of directors and that seemingly for that reason, the
order of attachment passed in 1997 was not assailed for nearly two years.
It thus rejected on a comprehensive analysis of the evidence on record, the
contention of the respondents that the properties acquired in the name of
the companies did belong to these entities and could not have been
assimilated in the assets of A1.

Qua 'the respondents’ plea that the companies incorporated under the Companies Act cannot hold property benami for another person, it entered a
finding that none of the documents of title registered in the names of the
companies did bear the seal thereof. That in 90% of the registered deeds,
the companies were not represented by their secretary or director and that
the address of the companies were not recorded in such deeds, was noted.
The Trial Court concluded that the registrar who registered these
properties and PW 181 who negotiated with the purchasers, distorted the
rules to help A1 and they went out of his way to oblige her. That in some
of the deeds, the names of the purchasers were not included and that the
properties were undervalued was reiterated. The admission of the District
Registrar that he proceeded with the registration solely because the
properties were purchased by A1 was taken cognizance of. It was thus of
the view that the intention of the respondents in taking over the
companies was for acquiring large number of properties in their names for
diverting the funds unlawfully amassed by A1 during her tenure as Chief
Minister of the State. It thus concluded that the properties registered
in the names of these companies and which formed the subject matter of GOMs
No. 1183 dated 25.9.1997 and GOMs No. 120 dated 12.1.1997 issued by the
State of Tamil Nadu were really the properties acquired and held by A2 to
A4 for and on behalf of A1.

The evidence on record thus propel several conspicuous and singular
features as noted comprehensively by the Trial Court. Apart from the fact
that the properties aforementioned had been acquired during the check
period, the general phenomenon decipherable is that the acquisitions had
been made in the names of the newly formed or acquired firms/companies with
their directorial composition, as noticed hereinabove and the two existing
firms i.e. M.s. Jaya Publications and Sasi Enterprises of which A1 and A2
were partners.

Evidently about 50 banks accounts were opened with the Indian Bank,
Abhaypuram and Carana Bank, Mylapore in the names of accused persons and
the firms/companies as has been stated by PW182 and PW201, details of
which are as under:

The Trial Court noted that at the commencement of the check period, there
were hardly 10 to 12 bank accounts standing in the names of A1 and A2 but
thereafter 50 accounts mushroomed during the check period as deposed by PWs
182, 201, 207,209 and 239. The particulars of the bank accounts, the names
of the banks, the dates of opening thereof, and the corresponding exhibits
along with the names of the account holders were marked in details.

Referring to the evidence of PW-201 in particular, the remittances inter
se the accounts of A1 to A4 and their firms also were set out which
would demonstrate that the exchanges during the check period were not
only noticeably frequent and numerous but also did sum up to figures
fluctuating from Rs.12000/- to Rs.25,00,000/- as would be evident from
the particulars of such transfers involving the accounts of A1, A2, A3, A4,
Namadhu MGR, Fax Universal, Anjaneya Printers, Green Farm House and Meadow
Agro Farm.

Oral evidence in the form of testimony of M. Jayaraman (PW-198), Mani,
Ram Vijayan & Balakrishnan and the documents adduced by the prosecution
through the witnesses prove that an amount of Rs.13,55,28,685.50 in all,
had been deposited by cash through pay-in-slips in the current accounts of
A2 to A4 and the firms by these witnesses and others. These deposits
significantly had been made during the check period and apart from heavy
amounts on every occasion, varying from above Rs.50,000/- to
Rs.33,70,000/-, there is a noticeable frequency thereof in close proximity
with each other. The pay-in-slips proved in support of such cash deposits
and exhibited by the witnesses concerned even disclose deposits of various
amounts in different accounts on the very same date. As many as 184
deposits between 17.9.1992 and 8.3.1996 have been made in current account
No. 1952 of Namadhu MGR. As many as 267 deposits have been made by Ram
Vijayan himself only, totalling Rs.8,96,52,623.30 out of the total amount
of Rs.13,55,28,685/- indicated hereinabove, apart from M. Jayaraman (PW-

198), Mani, Ram Vijayan & Balakrishnan through whom deposits had been
made. A2 and A3 as well have through pay-in-slips made such deposits of a
sum of Rs.28,74,000/-. The noteworthy feature of these deposits is that
the same had not been in the account of A1. Not only the cash deposits of
such a huge amount is out of the ordinary, the mode thereof i.e. by pay-in-
slips through a selected few and the frequency thereof render an
overwhelming phenomenon, highly redolent and admitting of a logical and
persuasive inference of laundering of gigantic unaccounted cash. The
absence of deposits in the account of A1 in the multitude of such
operations admits of reasonable and unimpeachable conclusion that the
wealth in circulation had its origin in her coffers. On a rational analysis
of such mammoth inflow of cash in the accounts of A2 to A4 and the
firms/companies involved during the check period, the conclusion of the
Trial Court that these resources were at all relevant times held by A2 to
A4 and their firms/companies on behalf of A1 in order to veil her otherwise
unexplained disproportionate assets is unassailable.

The Trial Court next probed into the credit entries of the relevant bank
accounts of the respondents to seek the trail of the fund flow and thus
examined the deposits of cash into their bank accounts and also in those of
the firms/companies floated by them spanning from Rs.10,000/- to
Rs.33,70,000/. On an audit of the current and saving bank accounts of
the respondents and the firms involved, the Trial Court identified
unexplained cash credits of huge sums therein varying from Rs.2684.90 to
Rs.1,26,00,000/- involving the respondents, Namadhu MGR, Sasi Enterprises,
Vinod Video Vision, Jaya Publications, J. Farm House, Maha Subalaxmi
Kalayana Mandapam, Anjaneya Printers Private Limited, Fresh Mushroom, Metal
King, Super Duper T.V. Private Limited, Lex Property Development Pvt.Ltd.,
Riverway Agro Production Private Limited, Fax Universal, Meadow Agro Farm
Pvt. Limited, Namay Shivaya Housing Development, Vigneshwara Builders,
Laxmi Constructions, Sea Enclave, Ayyappa Property Development Private
Limited, Ocean Construction, Gopal Promoters, Green Garden Apartments,
Shakti Constructions, J. S. Housing Development, Ramraj Agro Mills Private
Limited. Noticeably except Jaya Publications and Sasi Enterprises, A2 to
A4 and Lex Property Development Private Limited were the partners of the
other firms named above.

In this context, the Trial Court inter alia referred to the decision of
this Court in Kale Khan Mohammad Hanif Vs. C.I.T. , (1963) 50 ITR 1 (SC),
wherein it was expounded that the onus was on the assessee to explain the
nature and source of cash credits as to whether those stood in the
assessee's account or in the account of a third party and that the assessee
had a legal obligation to explain the nature and source of such credit by
proving prima facie the transaction(s) that had yielded such accruals in
his books of account.

The Trial Court held the view that the respondents in the case in hand had
failed to offer any satisfactory explanation with regard to the enormous
unexplained credit/accumulations in their bank accounts. It rejected the
confirmatory letter offered by the respondents as false and bogus and
further held that the identity of the person who disclosed the source, had
also not been proved. Further the transactions which generated such cash
credits were also not established. It rejected as well the balance sheet
and the profit and loss statement claimed to have been filed before the
income tax authorities and on which the respondents primarily relied as
their defence, as not proved in accordance with law besides being not in
conformity with the statutory prescriptions. It discarded as well the
evidence of the auditors examined by the respondents who, as the evidence
on record testified, were not conversant with the true facts and had not
handled their accounts during the check period. The Trial Court returned
the finding that the evidence on record cumulatively substantiated that the
returns, the balance sheet and the profit and loss accounts were framed
and fashioned to offer an explanation to the otherwise titanic unexplained
credits in their respective bank accounts. The Trial Court thus held that
the respondents had failed to prove their defence, when tested on the
evidence adduced even by the standard of preponderance of probability.

While observing that mere declaration of property in the income tax
returns does not ipso facto connote that the same had been acquired from
the known lawful sources of income, the Trial Court held the view that the
prosecution could successfully establish that the respondents and their
firms/companies, who posed to be income tax assessees, had no independent
or real source of income and that it was the finance of A1 that was
really in circulation and thus it could prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the only source of money the acquisition of large assets was that of
hers.

The evidence of PW198 M. Jayaraman, a member of staff with A1 in her house
at Poes Garden, at the relevant point of time, admitting remittances into
various bank accounts through Mr. Vijayan on the instructions of A2 was
referred to in particular. That this witness had stated that A2 used to
instruct him about the details of the bank to which the deposit ought to
be credited and that the amounts used to be dispatched in suit cases and
bags through domestic servants was taken note of. The Trial Court took
into consideration his testimony that he used to fill the challans as
directed by A2 which he identified in the course of his examination. He
identified too, the signatures of Mr. Vijayan on the challans. The Trial
Court also took note of the evidence of PW 182 and PW 201, the bank
officers who identified/proved large numbers of pay-in-slips and also
affirmed that those bore the name of Mr. Vijayan as the person remitting
the amounts mentioned. These witnesses had stated further, as noted by
the Trial Court, that the pay orders and the demand drafts issued by them
for the purpose of acquisition of the assets as involved were at the
instance of the respondents. That these demand drafts or the pay orders
could be directly related to the cheques or pay orders mentioned in the
various sales deeds was recorded as well. This too, as held by the Trial
Court, did establish the nexus of the funds of A1 with the investments made
for the acquisition of such assets. The Trial Court thus sustained the
charge levelled by the prosecution that all the assets and pecuniary
resources found to be possessed by A2 to A4 and in the names of various
firms/companies actually belonged to A1 and thus she in fact possessed
the assets and pecuniary resources of the total value of Rs.55,02,48,215
in her name and in the names of A2 to A4 and of the firms/companies, thus
establishing the ingredients of the offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the
P. C. Act. It held the view that A2 to A4 as the evidence substantiated
had conspired with A1 and had actively abetted in collaboration with each
other with the sole object of acquiring and holding properties and assets
disproportionate to the known sources of income of A1.

This according to the Trial Court stood corroborated by the large
number of accounts opened in the names of the respondents or of
firms/companies and the disbursements to these accounts only by the staff
of A1 on the instructions of A2 who was in-charge of her financial affairs.
The Trial Court also took cognizance of the fact that the evidence on
record established that except Super Duper T.V. Private Limited, neither
the respondents nor their firms did credit any amount to the various
accounts standing in their names. Rather, all these firms had gained
deposits transferred to their accounts either from that of Namadhu MGR or
Jaya Publications. Reiterating the rejection of the plea of the
respondents, that large deposits collected from various subscribers of
Namadhu MGR totalling Rs.15 crores had been credited in the accounts of
Namadhu MGR and Jaya Publications, the Trial Court reaffirmed that these
deposits in fact represented the un-explained wealth accumulated by A1.

The Trial Court in the ultimate analysis summed up the circumstances
gleaned from the evidence on record to conclusively hold that the
prosecution could prove beyond reasonable doubt, the charges levelled
against the respondents as framed. While enumerating finally the facets
substantiating this determination, the Trial Court took note of the fact
that A1 had executed a general power of attorney (Ex. P-995) in favour of
A2 in respect of Jaya Publications as A1, at all relevant time, was the
partner of the said firm. That such a power of attorney was otherwise not
necessary and that this authority was thus endowed on A2 so as to lend her
a free hand in the management of Jaya Publications so as to facilitate the
defence of A1 that she used to be a dormant partner and was unaware of the
transactions carried on by A2 was recorded. The Trial Court however held
the view that by the execution of such power of attorney, in law, A1
rendered herself liable for all acts and deeds of A2 pursuant to the powers
so conferred. It correlated the flow of funds accumulated by A1 to the
account of Jaya Publications and thereafter to branch out the same to other
accounts to be eventually appropriated for the acquisition of huge assets.
The Trial Court thus rejected the stand of A1 that she was unaware of the
activities of A2, her agent with regard to the transfer of the funds and
the mode of utilization thereof.

The constitution of various firms during the check period was cited as
well to be another circumstance to prove the conspiracy amongst the
respondents. The Trial Court re-counted that at the commencement of the
check period, A1 and A2 were involved in the two concerns namely M/s Jaya
Publication and M/s Sasi Enterprises but during the check period as many as
18/21 firms did come into existence. The Trial Court reiterated that the
evidence on record however proved that none of these firms either carried
on business during the check period or contributed any share capital to or
receive any profit from these firms. The fact that in a single day, ten of
such firms have been constituted with identical features was reiterated.
The Trial Court did recall as well that not only A2 and A3 did start
independent concerns in their names, even defunct companies were
purchased/taken over by the respondents. However, none of these firms or
companies did actually carry on any business except acquiring huge
properties. Referring to the fact that at the time of opening of the bank
accounts of these firms/companies, none of these entities had any
independent resources, the Trial Court deduced that these firms/companies
were nothing but extensions of Namadhu MGR and Jaya Publications and owed
their existence to the benevolence of A1 and A2 for continued sustenance.
It reiterated that the proved fact that large amount of funds were diverted
to these accounts was a clear attestation of the fact that these firms were
constituted to only siphon off the unlawful resources amassed by A1. The
fact that these firms/companies did operate from the residence of A1 belied
the feigned ignorance of A1 about their activities, was noted. The joint
residence of all the accused persons also could not be ignored as a factor
contributing to the charge of conspiracy and abetment when assessed
together with the attendant facts and circumstances reinforcing the said
imputations. This also belied, according to the Trial Court, the specious
plea of A2 to A4 that each one of them had independent business and own
source of income. The fact that A2 to A4 did combine to constitute the
firms to acquire huge tracts of land out of the funds provided by A1 also
was a clear index that their assemblage in the house of A1 was not
engendered by any philanthropic urge for friends and their relations in
need, rather to frame and further the criminal conspiracy to hold the
assets of A1. The fact that the materials on record did evince that A1 had
not only advanced Rs.1 crore to Shasi Enterprises as a contribution to its
share capital for which she availed loan, but also that she did issue
several cheques in favour of other accused persons and filed application
for availing loan for the benefit of the firms involved, did buttress the
charge that she was wholly aware of the dealings of the co-accused and the
firms in their minutest details. The free flow of money from one account
to the other of the respondents, the firms/companies also proved beyond
reasonable doubt that all the accused persons had actively participated in
the conspiracy to launder the ill-gotten wealth of A1 for purchasing
properties in their names. The fact that the assets and properties of the
six companies were attached pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Law
Amendment Ordinance and that the applications for vacating the attachments
were not filed for more than two years therefrom did make it apparent that
no other person except the accused were interested therein. The Trial
Court rightly did mark as well, referring in particular to the evidence of
PW159 Sub-Registrar, North Beach, Sub Registrar’s Office and PW71 Radha
Krishnan, Horticulture Officer that they were called to Poes Garden and on
the instructions of higher officers, they did oblige A1 even by relaxing
the rules in the registration of large number of documents by taking
personal interest and even overlooking that the properties were undervalued
to hold a deep seated involvement of A1 in these transactions. That the
registering authorities had gone to the extent of permitting registration
of six documents even without incorporating the names of the purchasers,
was referred to. The Trial Court in its conclusion, on an exhaustive
analysis of the evidence as a whole, held the following facts to have been
proved by the prosecution beyond all reasonable doubt.

In view of this, the Trial Court convicted A1 for the offences under Section 13(1)(e) r/w Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Further A1 to A4 were
convicted under Section 120-B IPC r/w Section 13(1)(e) r/w Section 13(2) of
the PC Act as well. A2 to A4 were additionally convicted under Sections
109 IPC r/w 13(1)(e) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act and sentenced them
accordingly as heretobefore mentioned.

The Trial Court further ordered that necessary directions be issued to the
concerned banks to remit the proceeds of the fixed deposits and the cash
balance standing to the credit of the respective accused persons in their
bank accounts to be appropriated and adjusted towards the fine amounts.
It was directed as well that if even after such adjustment, the amount fell
short of the quantum of fine, the gold and diamond ornaments, seized and
produced before the court (after setting apart 7040 gms. of gold with
proportionate diamond jewellery) be sold to RBI or SBI or by public auction
so as to meet the deficit. The rest of the gold and diamond jewellery was
directed to be confiscated to the Government.

It further ordered that all immovable properties registered in the names
of Lex Property Developments Pvt. Ltd., Meadow Agro Firms Pvt. Ltd., Rama
Raj Agro Mills (P) Ltd., Signora Business Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., Riverway
Agro Production (P) Ltd. and Indo Doha Chemicals and Pharmaceutical Ltd.
which were under attachment pursuant to GO Nos. MS 120 and 1183, above
referred to be confiscated to the State Government. It ordered as well
that out of the fine amount recovered, a sum of Rs.5 crores be made over
to the State of Karnataka towards reimbursement of expenses for the trial
conducted thereat.

As many as 34 companies/firms fell for scrutiny in the course of
adjudication. Out of these Jaya Publications, Sasi Enterprises, Signora
Business Enterprises Private Limited, Lex Property Development Pvt.
Limited, Riverway Agro Production Private Limited, Meadow Agro Firm Pvt.
Limited, Indo Doha Chemical and Pharmaceutical Limited, Ram Raj Agro Mills
Limited did exist from before the check period. The others were
registered during the check period and notably, the date of registration of
six of these had been 25.1.1994 and three bank accounts of five of them
had been opened on the same date i.e. 27.1.1994. Further ten of such firms
had been registered on 15.2.1995 and their bank accounts had been opened
on 23.3.1995. To say the least, in the context of the charge levelled,
this co-incidence also is conspicuously abnormal and irreconcilable.
Another note worthy feature is that in most of these firms, A2, A3 and A4
are the partners with Lex Property Development Pvt. Limited, joining them
in some. There are firms as well where either A2 or A3 is the proprietor
and others are with the combination of A2, A3 and A4. As the evidence
with regard to the affairs of the six firms in whose names large tracts of
properties had been purchased and deposits made, has been dilated upon
hereto before, the same does not warrant further elaboration.

The unimpeded, frequent and spontaneous inflow of funds from the account
of A1 to those of the other co-accused and the firms/companies involved,
overwhelmingly demonstrate the collective culpable involvement of the
respondents in the transactions in the face of their overall orientations
so as to render the same to be masked banking exchanges though involving
several accounts but mostly of the same bank. No other view is possible.

Apart from the above, the demurral of unfairness in investigation and
trial also cannot be sustained in the overall factual conspectus. True
that in course of the investigation, some documents had been seized which
were not adduced in evidence being construed to be irrelevant for
substantiating the charge, but it did not certainly tantamount to
suppression thereof so as to afflict the trial with the vice of unfairness
and non-transparency as alleged. Additionally, the courts did intervene as
permissible in law wherever merited to ensure against any prejudice qua the
parties. The fact that the documents seized but not brought on evidence
by the prosecution had not been destroyed and were available to the
respondents for their inspection, at all relevant times, is, per se, an
index of fair and impartial trial. The defence as a matter of record did
at some point of time close its side of evidence by examining only two
witnesses, whereafter following the inspection of the documents, as desired
by the respondents, after A1 had returned to power, examined as many as 99
witnesses. Prior thereto, 76 prosecution witnesses were permitted to be
recalled for further cross-examination. The remonstrance that the Trial
Court did not take into consideration the defence evidence is also not
borne out by the records. As would be evident from its judgment, the
testimony of several witnesses examined by the respondents received in-
depth appreciation by the Trial Court wherever relevant. The contention
that the Trial Court had conducted the trial in a manner prejudicial to the
respondents in the overall context, both factual and legal, thus cannot be
sustained.

That the Trial Court was meticulous, sensitive, vigilant and judicious in
appraisal, stands authenticated by the fact that in valuing the assets, as
warranted, it excluded a sum of Rs.32 lakhs towards the price of sarees
and further reduced the value of gold and diamond to the extent of Rs.2
crores. It also allowed reduction in the marriage expenses by more than 50%
and further discounted the value of constructions by permitting a
depreciation of 20%.

Apropos the off repeated grievance, of the defence that the Trial Court
had left out of consideration material pieces of evidence adduced by it,
suffice it to state that the decision rendered by it proclaim to the
contrary. In all the aspects amongst others income, expenditure and
assets, the judgment of the Trial Court reveals on a plain reading that
the evidence adduced by the defence as construed to be relevant had not
only been taken note of but also analysed and applied for arriving at
the conclusions on the issues pertaining to the adjudication. Whereas
qua income, reference of the testimony of the defence witnesses is
decipherable amongst others pertaining to the scrutiny involving
Namadhu MGR, Super Duper T.V., gifts offered to A1, rental income and
income tax returns, the Trial Court did also assess the defence evidence
while judging the case on the issues of marriage of A3, expenditure and
as well as valuation of buildings. The cavil to the contrary thus cannot
be entertained. Further this plea though elaborated in details in course
of the arguments in the present proceedings was not taken very
specifically before the High Court by the respondents while challenging
their conviction. Significantly, such a grievance has also not been made
by them by laying a formal challenge to such purported omissions on the
part of the Trial Court, before this Court, as contemplated in law. In
this persuasive backdrop, we are thus disinclined to sustain this
contention. This is more so as in view of the appraisal of the relevant
evidence as a whole, we are of the unhesitant opinion that the impugned
judgment and order of the High Court suffers from manifest errors on the
face of the record, both on facts and in law and is liable to be set-aside.

The Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 (referred to as the “Ordinance”
as well), which was enforced w.e.f. 23.8.1944 is an yield of the exercise
of powers under Section 72 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and is
directed to prevent the disposal or concealment of property procured by
means of the offences enlisted in the Schedule thereto. To iterate, for
the instant adjudication, paragraphs 4A and 5 of the Schedule are extracted
hereinbelow for immediate reference:

Clause 3 of the Ordinance provides that where the State Government or as
the case may be, the Central Government has reason to believe that any
person has committed, whether after the commencement of the Ordinance or
not, any scheduled offence and whether or not any court has taken
cognizance thereof, it may authorise the making of an application to the
District Judge within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, the said
person ordinarily resides or carries on business, for attachment of any
money or other property, believed to have been procured by means of such
offence. It also permits that if such money or property cannot for any
reason be attached, the prayer in the application may be extended to
other property of the said person of the value as nearly as may be
equivalent thereto. The provisions did make applicable Order XXVII of
the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure , 1908 to the proceedings
for an order of attachment under the Ordinance as they did apply to the
suits by the Government.

Section 4 contemplates ad interim attachment by the jurisdictional
District Judge, in the eventualities as mentioned therein and while doing
so, he is required to issue to the person whose money or other property was
being attached, a notice accompanied by copies of the order, the
application and affidavits and of the evidence, if recorded, asking him to
show cause on a date to be specified in the notice as to why the order of
attachment should not be made absolute. Clause 5 empowers the District
Judge to make the ad interim order of attachment absolute, if either no
objection is filed by the person affected or not varied after necessary
enquiry on a consideration of the objection if filed, and the evidence is
adduced. In terms of clause 10 of the Ordinance, an order of attachment
of property made shall unless it is withdrawn, continue to be in force, in
a contingency where a court has taken cognizance of the alleged schedule
offence whether, before or after the time when the order was applied for,
until orders are passed by the District Judge in accordance with the
provisions of the Ordinance after the termination of the criminal
proceedings. Clause 11 provides for appeals against the order(s) of the
District Judge, in the matter of attachment before the jurisdictional High
Court. Whereas clause 12 makes it incumbent on the court trying a
scheduled offence, when apprised of an order of attachment of the property
involved under the Ordinance, to record a finding, in case of conviction,
as to the amount of money or value of other property procured by the
accused by means of the offence, Clause 13 mandates the manner of disposal
of such attached property upon termination of the criminal proceedings.
Thereunder, when the final judgment or order of the criminal court is one
of conviction, the District Judge shall order that from the property of
the convicted person attached under the Ordinance or out of the security
given in lieu of such attachment, there shall be forfeited to Government
such amount or value as is found in the final judgment or order of the
criminal court, to have been procured by the convicted person, by means of
the offence together with the costs of attachment as determined by the
District Judge. Sub-clause 4 deals with a situation where the amounts
ordered to be forfeited or recovered exceed the value of the property of
the convicted person attached, thus permitting in that eventuality, the
steps to follow. Sub-clause (6) ordains that every sum ordered to be
forfeited in connection with any scheduled offence other than one
specified in item 1 of the schedule, would after deduction of the cost of
attachment as determined by the District Judge, be credited to the
Government or the local authority to which the offence has caused loss or
where there is more than one such government or local authority, to be
distributed amongst them in the proportion to the loss sustained by each.

Noticeably “termination of criminal proceedings”, as per clause 2(2), as
relevant for our present purpose, would be where this Court would pass its
final order in the present appeals.

In the appeals, filed by the State of Karnataka pertaining to the release
of the properties recorded in the name of the six companies involved,
consequent upon the acquittal of the respondents, the parties are
essentially at issue on the applicability or otherwise of Section 452 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 invoked by the Trial Court to order
confiscation/forfeiture of the properties otherwise attached under the
Ordinance. The other facets of the competing assertions being largely
common and already addressed, are inessential for a fresh scrutiny.

Whereas it is urged on behalf of the State that having regard to the
scheme of the Act and the mode of attachment of the property involved in a
scheduled offence, the operation of Section 452 of the Code is not
excluded, the plea on behalf of the respondents is that the Ordinance being
a complete code by itself, the Trial Court was patently wrong in
assuming to itself the power of disposal of the property under attachment
by invoking the said provision of the Code. It has been urged in essence
on behalf of the respondents that at the most, the Trial Court could have
valued the property under attachment following its conclusion of guilt
against them, leaving it thereafter to the forum under the Ordinance to
comply with the procedure prescribed therein and further the process to its
logical end. This is more so, as has been urged for the respondents, that
the appeals against the orders making the ad interim attachment absolute
are pending before the High Court as permissible under the Ordinance.
Principally, reliance, amongst others has been placed by the respondents
on the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in State of West
Bengal Vs. S.K. Ghosh , AIR 1963 SC 255.

In our comprehension, the course adopted by the Trial Court cannot be
faulted with. To reiterate, in terms of Section 5(6) of the Act, it was
authorised to exercise all powers and functions exercisable by a District
Judge under the Ordinance. The offences at the trial were under Sections
13(1)(e) , 13(2) of the Act, Sections 109 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code
encompassed within paragraphs 4A and 5 of the Schedule to the Ordinance.
These offences were unimpeachably within the contours of the Act and
triable by a special Judge thereunder. Having regard to the frame and
content of the Act and the limited modifications to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure , in their applicability as occasioned thereby
and the authorisation of the special Judge trying the offences thereunder
to exercise all the powers and functions invocable by a District Judge
under the Ordinance, we are of the opinion that the order of
confiscation/forfeiture of the properties standing in the name of six
companies, as involved, made by the Trial Court is unexceptionable. In any
view of the matter, with the peremptory termination of the criminal
proceedings resultant on this pronouncement, the direction of the Trial
Court towards confiscation/forfeiture of the attached property, as
mentioned therein, is hereby restored and would be construed to be an order
by this court as well. The decisions cited on behalf of the respondents
on this issue, are distinguishable on facts and are of no avail to them.

In Mirza Iqbal Hussain through Askari Begum Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh,
(1982) 3 SCC 516, two fixed deposit receipts and the cash amount of
Rs.5200/- seized from the house of the appellant and proved to be the
subject-matter of charge under Section 5(1)(e) of the 1947 ACt, were
ordered to be confiscated to the State. Responding to the plea of want
of jurisdiction of the Special Court to order confiscation, this Court
referring to Section 4(2) of Cr.P.C., held that in terms thereof, all
offences under any law other than the Indian Penal Code have to be
investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to
the provisions contained in the Code but subject to any enactment for the
time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigation,
enquiry, trial or otherwise dealing with such offences. It was observed
that none of the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act provided
for confiscation or prescribed the mode by which an order of confiscation
could be passed and thus, it was ruled that the order of confiscation in
the facts of the case could not be held to be de hors jurisdiction. The
invocation of Section 452 of the Code, in absence of any provision in the Prevention of Corruption Act , excluding its operations to effect
confiscation of the property involved in any offence thereunder, was thus
affirmed.

After analyzing the facts and circumstances of this case and after taking
into consideration all the evidence placed before us and the arguments put
forward by all the parties, we are of the unhesitant opinion that the
impugned judgment and order rendered by the High Court is untenable and is
thus set aside. We have considered the facts of this case and in our
opinion, the percentage of disproportionate assets as 8.12% as computed by
the High Court is based on completely wrong reading of the evidence on
record compounded by incorrect arithmetical calculations, as referred to
herinabove. In view of the regnant evidence on record, unassailably proving
the disproportionateness of the assets, as contemplated in Section 13(1)(e) of 1988 Act, it is inessential as well to resort to any arithmetic to
compute the percentage thereof. In any view of this matter, the decision of
this Court in Krishnanand Agnihotri (supra) has no application in the facts
of this case and therefore, the respondents cannot avail any benefit
therefrom.

Both the Courts have construed all the assets, income and expenditure of
all the accused collectively. We see no convincing reason to adopt a
different course which even otherwise, having regard to the charge, is not
warranted.

Noticeably, the respondents accused accepted all the findings of the High
Court. We have analyzed the evidence adduced by the parties and we come to
the conclusion that A1 to A4 have entered into a conspiracy and in
furtherance of the same, A1 who was a public servant at the relevant time
had come into possession of assets disproportionate to the known sources of
her income during the check period and had got the same dispersed in the
names of A2 to A4 and the firms & companies involved to hold these on her
behalf with a masked front. Furthermore, the the charge of abetment laid
against A2 to A4 in the commission of the offence by A1 also stands proved.

We have noticed that:

Furthermore, the reasoning given by the Trial Court in respect of criminal
conspiracy and abetment, after scrutinizing the evidence of this case, is
correct in the face of the overwhelming evidence indicating the
circumstances of active abetment and conspiracy by A2 to A4 in the
commission of the above offences under Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act.
This would be evident from the following circumstances:-

aggrandizement by the unscrupulous, taking unfair advantage of their power
and authority and those in public office also, in breach of the
institutional norms, mostly backed by minatory loyalists. Both the corrupt
and the corrupter are indictable and answerable to the society and the
country as a whole. This is more particularly in re the peoples’
representatives in public life committed by the oath of the office to
dedicate oneself to the unqualified welfare of the laity, by faithfully and
conscientiously discharging their duties attached thereto in accordance
with the Constitution, free from fear or favour or affection or ill-will.
A self-serving conduct in defiance of such solemn undertaking in
infringement of the community’s confidence reposed in them is therefore a
betrayal of the promise of allegiance to the Constitution and a condemnable
sacrilege. Not only such a character is an anathema to the preambulor
promise of justice, liberty, equality, fraternal dignity, unity and
integrity of the country, which expectantly ought to animate the life and
spirit of every citizen of this country, but also is an unpardonable
onslaught on the constitutional religion that forms the bedrock of our
democratic polity.

6. This pernicious menace stemming from moral debasement of the
culpables, apart from destroying the sinews of the nation’s structural and
moral set-up, forges an unfair advantage of the dishonest over the
principled, widening as well the divide between the haves and have nots.
Not only this has a demoralising bearing on those who are ethical, honest,
upright and enterprising, it is visibly antithetical to the quintessential
spirit of the fundamental duty of every citizen to strive towards
excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity to raise
the nation to higher levels of endeavour and achievement. This virulent
affliction triggers an imbalance in the society’s existential stratas and
stalls constructive progress in the overall well-being of the nation,
besides disrupting its dynamics of fiscal governance. It encourages
defiance of the rule of law and the propensities for easy materialistic
harvests, whereby the society’s soul stands defiled, devalued and
denigrated.

7. Such is the militant dominance of this sprawling evil, that
majority of the sensible, rational and discreet constituents of the society
imbued with moral values and groomed with disciplinal ethos find themselves
in minority, besides estranged and resigned by practical compulsions and
are left dejected and disillusioned. A collective, committed and
courageous turnaround is thus the present day imperative to free the civil
order from the suffocative throttle of this deadly affliction.

8. Every citizen has to be a partner in this sacrosanct mission,
if we aspire for a stable, just and ideal social order as envisioned by our
forefathers and fondly cherished by the numerous self-effacing crusaders of
a free and independent Bharat, pledging their countless sacrifices and
selfless commitments for such cause.

............................................J.
(AMITAVA ROY)

NEW DELHI;

FEBRUARY 14, 2017

-----------------------

|PROPERTIES ACQUIRED BY ACCUSED NO.2 PRIOR TO CHECK PERIOD NOT |
|TAKEN |
|INTO ACCOUNT BY DVAC |
|S|Description of property |Value |Exhibits and |
|.| | |Evidence relied by|
|N| | | |
|o| | |Accused |
|.| | | |
|1|As per Balance Sheet for the |4,35,622|DW 88 (Vol No.92, |
| |Assessment year 1991- 1992 ending | |Page 105-176) |
| |on 31.3.1991 the Cash Balance | |Ex-D-287 |
| |Available with Accused No.2 | |(VolNo.157, Page |
| | | |1-5) |
| | |
| | |
|The properties value of A2, Jaya | |
|Publication, Sasi Enterprises in Annexure — | |
|I, According to DVAC was | |
|Cash balance available on hand as on | |
|1.7.1991 and the advances paid lying pending| |
|adjustment as on 1.7.1991 As per Ex.P-2191 | |
|the amount available as on 31.3.1991 by A2 | |
|is Rs.4,35,622/- which was not taken into | |
|Account by DVAC | |
|Hence the balance available on hand as on | |
|1.7.1991 has to be treated as a | |
|Source/Income available to A2 during check | |
|period and considered in Annexure III | |
| | |
|Hence the Assets value of A2 prior to check | |
|period should be taken into Account as | |
| | |
| |Rs. 59,29,168.00 |
| | |
| |Rs. 4,35,622.60 |
| | |
| | |
| |Rs.4,35,622.60 |
| | |
| |Rs.63,64,790.60 |
| | |

Grand Total 37,55,10,354