Clear and hold Clear and hold is a counter - insurgency strategy in which military personnel clear an area of guerrillas or other insurgents , then keep the area clear of insurgents while winning the support of the populace for the government and its policies . As defined by the United States Army , " clear and hold " contains three elements : Civil - military operations , combat operations , and information warfare . Only highly strategic areas are initially chosen for " clear and hold " operations ; once these are secure , the operation gradually spreads to less strategic areas until the desired geographic unit ( county , province , nation ) is under control . Once an area has been cleared , local police ( rather than military ) authority is re - established and government authority re - asserted . Development and critical elements . The clear and hold strategy was first developed by Sir Robert Thompson and the British Army during the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 . It was also widely employed by the British during the Mau Mau Uprising of 1952 – 1960 . The strategy was also implemented by General Creighton Abrams as part of the " pacification " effort conducted by the Republic of Vietnam and the U . S . Army during the Vietnam War ( at which time the strategy became widely known ) . Clear and hold has also been used as a counter - insurgency tactic in Algeria , Greece , the Philippines , and South Korea . The strategy was used extensively by the United States and its allies in the Iraq War . Several critical elements of the clear and hold strategy have been identified . One element is to secure support for the strategy at all levels of the traditional military forces . Experience in Vietnam has shown that traditional military forces dislike the limited role they play in the clear and hold strategy , and may successfully advocate for a more traditional war - making role . Another challenge is that the strategy takes time , which a government may not ( for various reasons ) have . The strategy also requires significant numbers of on - the - ground " clearing " combat and " holding " police forces . Thompson and others have also argued that clear and hold operations can only be successful by isolating the population from insurgents , but some strategists point out that this can have deleterious effects on public support for the government and its policies . Assessment of the strategy . The success of clear and hold as a counter - insurgency strategy is hotly debated . Military historian Lewis Sorley has argued that clear and hold tactics were markedly successful in the Vietnam War , despite being implemented after a decade of conflict and under less than ideal conditions . His view is supported by others , who see the strategy as still viable in the 21st century . While combat operations against insurgents are often successful , some authors conclude that combat operations themselves make it very difficult to win support for the government , that " hold " operations are rarely successful , and that guerrillas easily adapt . Others argue that the initial limited goals of clear and hold operations enable guerrilla forces to regroup militarily , limiting the combat effectiveness of the strategy . Some analysts have also voiced the concern that the strategy relies too heavily on physical security issues , and ignores the role that ideology , nationalism , and other belief systems play in fomenting insurgency in the first place . More recently , American military strategists in Iraq and Afghanistan have proposed modifications to the strategy . Sometimes defined as " clear , hold and build " as well as " shape , clear , hold , and build " , this strategy relies more heavily on using native forces to identify the nature and strength of the enemy threat in a given area ( shape ) , using foreign and native forces to defeat the enemy threat ( clear ) , using foreign and native forces to keep the area clear of enemies ( hold ) , and establishing native democratic institutions which draw their legitimacy from the local people ( build ) . Journalist Fred Kaplan has argued that the revised doctrine is ethnocentric , capitalist , and materialistic , ignoring such important beliefs as religion and cultural norms and institutions . Kaplan also concludes that too little discussion is given to local versus national government ( especially regarding corruption and trustworthiness ) and situations where a majority of the population is on the side of the insurgents .