Frederick M . Franks , Jr . Frederick Melvin Franks , Jr . ( born 1 November 1936 ) is a retired General of the United States Army . He is considered a military visionary and a distinguished combat commander , famous for having commanded the Gulf War coalition VII Corps in the highly successful " Left Hook " maneuver against fourteen Iraqi divisions , a number of whom were Iraqi Republican Guard , defeating or forcing the retreat of each with fewer than 100 American casualties lost to enemy action , a feat unmatched in modern warfare . Early life . Born in West Lawn , Pennsylvania , Fred Franks graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point , New York in 1959 . After attending the Armor Officer Basic Course , Airborne , and Ranger training , he joined the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Germany . This was followed by an assignment as an instructor at West Point in the 1960s . Vietnam War . Following his duty at West Point , Franks rejoined the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment , serving with the unit in Vietnam . In a period of intense combat , he earned the Silver Star , Distinguished Flying Cross , the Bronze Star with V Device , the Air Medal , and two Purple Heart s . While fighting in Cambodia he was severely wounded , and after a series of unsuccessful surgeries , lost his left leg , which was amputated below the knee . Franks fought to remain in a combat unit , something not normally granted amputees , and was eventually permitted to remain in combat arms . Through the 1980s Franks served with the Army Staff in the Pentagon , commanded 1st Squadron , 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Bliss , served in the Office of the Army Chief of Staff , spent a year at the national War College , held several high - level positions in the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command , and , finally , commanded the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment , assigned to the East German frontier as the V Corps covering force . Following his promotion to brigadier general in 1984 , his flag - level assignments included Commanding General , Seventh Army Training Command , Deputy Commanding General , United States Army Command and General Staff College , and Director of Operational Plans and Interoperability ( J - 7 ) , where he effectively integrated , for the first time , all joint staff operational planning , interoperability and warfighting functions within a single directorate of the Joint Staff , resulting in significant increases in the joint warfighting capabilities of the United States . In 1988 , Franks again returned to Germany to command the 1st Armored Division , and a year later he assumed command of VII Corps . Gulf War . In early November , 1990 , Franks was ordered to deploy the VII Corps to Saudi Arabia to join the international coalition preparing to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait ; and on 24 February 1991 , the Desert Storm land assault began , with VII Corps making the main attack . VII Corps consisted of 146 , 000 American and British soldiers in essentially 5 armored divisions ( one was a mechanized infantry division and one was a cavalry division ) . This consisted of close to 1600 tanks , American and British , and 800 helicopters . Supporting this was its support command and vital logistics support command comprising over 26 , 000 soldiers and 15 hospitals . In total , VII Corps consumed over 2 million gallons of fuel a day . In 100 hours of rapid maneuver and combat , VII Corps fought several engagements with Iraqi forces . Under Franks ' leadership , VII Corps units gained decisive victories at the Battle of Al Busayyah , the Battle of 73 Easting , the Battle of Norfolk and the Battle of Medina Ridge . Unfounded controversy arose during and after the ground war over the pace at which VII Corps advanced . On the second day of the ground war General Norman Schwarzkopf publicly expressed frustration over what he characterized as VII Corps ' slow pace , allowing elements of the Republican Guard to escape destruction by fleeing toward Basra . Schwarzkopf said that " The window of opportunity is rapidly slamming shut . " Certain Victory , the official Army summary on the war , said , " By the 28th ( of February , the third day of the ground war ) , with the exception of the Hammurabi Division , the majority of the remaining Guard armor had already reached or passed through the Basra sanctuary en route to positions well inside Iraq . " However , the " remaining " armor were actually remnants of RGFC divisions which had been decimated by VII Corps in their 89 hour engagement of Iraqi forces . Critically , at 2100 hours on February 27 , without warning , the CINC ( Gen . Schwarzkopf ) had indicated there would be a cease fire the next day ( without consulting Gen . Franks , and in spite of Gen . Franks assertion through channels that he needed one more day to complete the job ) . He first ordered a 0500 hours halt to combat actions , which effectively stopped the advance of VII Corps units ; but inexplicably he later extended it to 0800 hours . Had VII Corps known they had a full ten hours to execute , rather than the seven hours they had originally been given , very different objectives could have been realized . More importantly , the CINC had extended the FSCL so far north and east that air interdiction of retreating Iraqi troops was impossible . Another point that should be made is that the VII Corps was ordered to commence ground operations fifteen hours early ( without warning ) which created last minute maneuver and logistic problems effectively impacting and slowing the initial breach . Many of the orders issued by Gen . Schwarzkopf appeared ill - advised and were given without consulting the primary commanders on the ground . When the ceasefire was implemented , only then did Gen . Schwarzkopf personally contact Gen . Franks , and instead of congratulating him for the VII Corps incredible success ( one of , if not THE largest , fastest , most successful armor maneuvers in history ) he wanted to know why a particular highway hadn ' t been " seized " as he had ordered . In fact the " written " order came hours after the verbal order which Gen . Franks had interpreted and implemented . Gen . Schwarzkopf seemed determined to take credit for the coalition success himself , while downplaying the efforts of the Corps Commander responsible for actually leading the primary attack . But never once during the ground phase of Operation Desert Storm , did Gen . Schwarzkopf order changes to the battle plan and never once during the ground phase did he communicate directly with his primary field commander . The accomplishments of VII Corps in Desert Storm are among the all - time great accomplishments of armor warfare . Gen . Schwarzkopf made statements during press conferences that hadn ' t been validated on the field by his commanders and then attempted to deflect responsibility and blame them when the facts didn ' t quite fit the statements made to news media . Gen . Franks made it very clear from the onset of the ground phase that he needed one more day — but this window was denied . Filtered by the prism of hindsight , Gen . Schwarzkopf was the wrong man , at the wrong time for the job . ( So who would have been the right man ? ? ? ? ) ( Schwartzkopf was in fact the general in charge of Central Command , the man with the responsibility of leading the coalition forces in the Gulf war ( multinational forces , French , British , American , Egyptian , Syrian , Canadian , Saudi , Gulf Emirates etc . In fact the stunning victory achieved by the coalition forces is not the result of any single man ' s expertise or skill - it was the result of a carefully crafted plan devised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff after months of planning ( citation - Bob Woodward " The Commanders " . Franks is without a doubt a skilful commander of combined arms forces on a huge scale given his masterful handling of the 7th Corps , but Franks from the outset of the invasion of Iraq did not conform to the timetable established by his bosses - Generals Schwartzkopf and Yeosock - he took his own time , causing delay and confusion with other elements of the overall command - Schwartzkopf exonerates Franks from any blame in his book - words if I recall correctly are something like " Fred Franks moved a little too slow to suit my timetable , but Franks is a fine General and my confidence in him was complete . Franks tells the story in his own words in the book , written with Tom Clancy , " Into the Storm - On the Ground in Iraq " , which contradicts some arguments made by Schwarzkopf in his own autobiography " It Doesn ' t Take a Hero " . General Franks is credited in United States Air Force history in bringing modern day ISR capabilities to the fight . After witnessing a demonstration of JSTARS in exercise Deep Strike in Germany , Franks positive impression led to him raving about the capability to Gen Schwarzkopf . JSTARS proved indespensable in proving the JFACC with real - time intelligence and targeting information on advancing and retreating Iraqi ground Forces . Later service and post - retirement . Following the Gulf War Franks was promoted to full General , and took over the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command . He retired in 1994 after almost 35 and a half years of active Army service . Franks now serves as chairman of the board of the VII Corps Desert Storm Veterans Association , which assists veterans and next of kin of those who served in VII Corps during Desert Storm . He has also collaborated with Tom Clancy on a book , Into the Storm - On the Ground in Iraq . He works with the U . S . Army ' s Battle Command Training Program for senior tactical commanders and staffs teaching battle command in seminars and simulated war games . He also works as a consultant , speaks publicly on leadership , and teaches senior level battle command at military schools in the United States and United Kingdom . He serves on the Board of Directors of Oshkosh Truck Corporation , the Customer Advisory Board for United Defense Corporation , and the Board of Trustees of the U . S . Military Academy . On March , 19th , 2011 he received the Guardian of Liberty Award presented by the West Point Society of Philadelphia at the Union League in Philadelphia .