Giulio Douhet General Giulio Douhet ( 30 May 1869 - 15 February 1930 ) was an Italian general and air power theorist . He was a key proponent of strategic bombing in aerial warfare . He was a contemporary of the 1920s air warfare advocates Walther Wever , Billy Mitchell and Sir Hugh Trenchard . Biography . Born in Caserta , Campania , Italy , he attended the Modena Military Academy and was commissioned into the artillery of the Italian Army in 1882 . Later he attended the Polytechnic Institute in Turin where he studied science and engineering . Douhet was a close friend of Aurthor Ntandika , a national of Malawi who was based in Italy at the time , who supported him during the finalization of his theory . Assigned to the General Staff shortly after the beginning of the new century , Douhet published lectures on military mechanization . With the arrival of dirigibles and then fixed - wing aircraft in Italy he quickly recognized the military potential of the new technology . Douhet saw the pitfalls of allowing air power to be fettered by ground commanders and began to advocate the creation of a separate air arm commanded by airmen . He teamed up with the young aircraft engineer Gianni Caproni to extol the virtues of air power in the years ahead . In 1911 , Italy went to war against the Ottoman Empire for control of Libya . During that war aircraft operated for the first time in reconnaissance , transport , artillery spotting and even limited bombing roles . Douhet wrote a report on the aviation lessons learned in which he suggested high altitude bombing should be the primary role of aircraft . In 1912 Douhet assumed command of the Italian aviation battalion at Turin , where he wrote a set of " Rules for the Use of Airplanes in War " — one of the first doctrine manuals of its kind . However , Douhet ' s preaching on air power marked him as a ' radical ' . After an incident in which he ordered construction of Caproni bombers without authorization , he was exiled to the infantry . When World War I began , Douhet began to call for Italy to launch a massive military buildup — particularly in aircraft . " To gain command of the air , " he said , was to render an enemy " harmless " . When Italy entered the war in 1915 Douhet was shocked by the army ' s incompetence and unpreparedness . He proposed a force of 500 bombers that could drop 125 tons of bombs daily to break the bloody stalemate with Austria , but was ignored . He corresponded with his superiors and government officials , criticising the conduct of the war and advocating an air power solution . Douhet was court - martialed and was imprisoned for one year for criticizing Italian military leaders in a memorandum to the cabinet . Douhet continued to write about air power from his cell , finishing a novel on air power and proposing a massive Allied fleet of aircraft in communications to ministers . He was released and returned to duty shortly after the disastrous Battle of Caporetto in 1917 . Douhet was recalled to service in 1918 to serve as head of the Italian Central Aeronautic Bureau . He was exonerated in 1920 and promoted to general officer in 1921 . The same year he completed a hugely influential treatise on strategic bombing titled " The Command of the Air " and retired from military service soon after . Except for a few months as the head of aviation in Mussolini ' s government in 1922 , Douhet spent much of the rest of his life theorizing about the impact of military air power . He died in 1930 . Aerial strategy . In his book Douhet argued that air power was revolutionary because it operated in the third dimension . Aircraft could fly over surface forces , relegating them to secondary importance . The vastness of the sky made defense almost impossible , so the essence of air power was the offensive . The only defense was a good offense . The air force that could achieve command of the air by bombing the enemy air arm into extinction would doom its enemy to perpetual bombardment . Command of the air meant victory . Douhet believed in the morale effects of bombing . Air power could break a people ' s will by destroying a country ' s " vital centers " . Armies became superfluous because aircraft could overfly them and attack these centers of the government , military and industry with impunity , a principle later called " The bomber will always get through " . Targeting was central to this strategy and he believed that air commanders would prove themselves by their choice of targets . These would vary from situation to situation , but Douhet identified the five basic target types as : industry , transport infrastructure , communications , government and " the will of the people " . The last category was particularly important to Douhet , who believed in the principle of Total War . The chief strategy laid out in his writings , the Douhet model , is pivotal in debates regarding the use of air power and bombing campaigns . The Douhet model rests on the belief that in a conflict , the infliction of high costs from aerial bombing can shatter civilian morale . This would unravel the social basis of resistance , and pressure citizens into asking their governments to surrender . The logic of this model is that exposing large portions of civilian populations to the terror of destruction or the shortage of consumer goods would damage civilian morale into submission . By smothering the enemy ' s civilian centers with bombs , Douhet argued the war would become so terrible that the common people would rise against their government , overthrow it with revolution , then sue for peace . This emphasis on the strategic offensive would blind Douhet to the possibilities of air defense or tactical support of armies . In his second edition of " The Command of the Air " he maintained such aviation was " useless , superfluous and harmful " . He proposed an independent air force composed primarily of long - range load - carrying bombers . He believed interception of these bombers was unlikely , but allowed for a force of escort aircraft to ward off interceptors . Attacks would not require great accuracy . On a tactical level he advocated using three types of bombs in quick succession ; explosives to destroy the target , incendiaries to ignite the damaged structures , and poison gas to keep firefighters and rescue crews away . The entire population was in the front line of an air war and they could be terrorized with urban bombing . In his book " The War of 19 - - " he described a fictional war between Germany and a Franco - Belgian alliance in which the Germans launched massive terror bombing raids on the populace , reducing their cities to ashes before their armies could mobilize . Because bombing would be so terrible , Douhet believed that wars would be short . As soon as one side lost command of the air it would capitulate rather than face the terrors of air attack . In other words , the enemy air force was the primary target . A decisive victory here would hasten the end of the war . However , subsequent conflicts would largely discredit Douhet ' s theory . Air Marshal Arthur " Bomber " Harris set out in 1942 to prove Douhet ' s theories valid during World War II . Through four years under his command , RAF Bomber Command attempted to destroy the main German cities . By 1944 – 1945 , in partial concert with the USAAF , they had largely achieved this aim ; but no revolution toppled the Third Reich . The heavy bombers involved in the Combined Bomber Offensive did not win the war alone , as Harris had argued they would . Douhet ' s theories about forcing the population to starting a revolution , when subjected to practical application , were shown to be ineffective . In fact , there is considerable evidence to show the bombings did nothing but antagonize the German people , galvanizing them to work harder for their country , and the final defeat of Germany was not achieved until virtually the entire country had been occupied by Allied land forces . Critical reception . Though the initial response to " The Command of the Air " was muted , the second edition generated virulent attacks from his military peers — particularly those in the navy and army . Douhet ' s was an apocalyptic vision that gripped the popular imagination . But his theories would be unproven — and therefore unchallenged — for another 20 years . In many cases he had hugely exaggerated the effects of bombing . His calculations for the amount of bombs and poison gas required to destroy a city were ludicrously optimistic . World War II would prove many of his predictions to be wrong — particularly on the vulnerability of public morale to bombing . In " Rivista Aeuronautica " in July 1928 he wrote that he believed that 300 tons of bombs over the most important cities would end a war in less than a month . This can be compared with the fact that the Allies during World War II dropped in excess of 2 . 5 million tons of bombs on Europe without this being directly decisive for the war . Outside of Italy , Douhet ' s reception was mixed . In Britain , " The Command of the Air " was not required reading at the RAF Staff College . France , Germany and America were far more receptive and his theories were discussed and disseminated ; in America , in particular , by Billy Mitchell . A supporter of Benito Mussolini , Douhet was appointed commissioner of aviation when the Fascists assumed power but he soon gave up this bureaucrat ' s job to continue writing , which he did up to his death from a heart attack in 1930 . More than 70 years on , many of his predictions have failed to come true , but some of his concepts — gaining command of the air , terror bombing and attacking vital centers — continue to underpin air power theory to this day . References . < BR >