Battle of Rennell Island The Battle of Rennell Island ( Japanese : レンネル島沖海戦 ) took place on 29 – 30 January 1943 . It was the last major naval engagement between the United States Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy during the Guadalcanal campaign of World War II . It occurred in the South Pacific between Rennell Island and Guadalcanal in the southern Solomon Islands . In the battle , Japanese naval land - based torpedo bomber s , seeking to provide protection for the impending evacuation of Japanese forces from Guadalcanal , made several attacks over two days on US warships operating as a task force south of this island . In addition to approaching Guadalcanal with the objective of engaging any Japanese ships that might come into range , the U . S . task force was protecting an Allied transport ship convoy carrying replacement troops there . As a result of the Japanese air attacks on the task force , one U . S . heavy cruiser was sunk , a destroyer was heavily damaged , and the rest of the U . S . task force was forced to retreat from the southern Solomons area . Partly because they turned back the U . S . task force in this battle , the Japanese successfully evacuated their remaining troops from Guadalcanal by 7 February 1943 , leaving it in the hands of the Allies and ending the battle for the island . Background . On 7 August 1942 , Allied forces ( primarily U . S . ) landed on Guadalcanal , Tulagi , and Florida Islands in the Solomon Islands . The landings on the islands were meant to deny their use by the Japanese as bases for threatening the supply routes between the U . S . and Australia , and to secure the islands as starting points for a campaign with the eventual goal of isolating the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign . The landings initiated the six - month - long Guadalcanal campaign . The last major attempt by the Japanese to drive Allied forces from Guadalcanal and Tulagi was defeated during the decisive Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in early November 1942 . Thereafter , the Japanese Navy was only able to deliver subsistence supplies and a few replacement troops to Japanese Army forces on Guadalcanal . Because of the threat from Allied aircraft based at Henderson Field on Guadalcanal , plus nearby U . S . aircraft carriers , the Japanese delivered these supplies at night , usually by destroyer or submarine , in operations the Allies called the " Tokyo Express . " However , these supplies and replacements were not enough to sustain Japanese troops on the island , who by 7 December 1942 , were losing about 50 men each day from malnutrition , disease , and Allied ground or air attacks . On 12 December 1942 , the Japanese Navy proposed that Guadalcanal be abandoned . Despite initial opposition from Army leaders , who still hoped that Guadalcanal could eventually be retaken from the Allies , on 31 December 1942 the Imperial General Headquarters , with approval from the Emperor , agreed to evacuate of all Japanese forces from the island and establish a new line of defense for the Solomons on New Georgia . The evacuation was code - named " Operation Ke " ( ケ号作戦 ) , and was scheduled to begin on 14 January 1943 . An important element in the plan was an air superiority campaign starting 28 January 1943 , to inhibit Allied aircraft or warships from disrupting the final stage of the " Ke " operation , which was the actual evacuation of all Japanese troops from Guadalcanal . Allied forces misinterpreted the " Ke " preparations as the beginning of another Japanese offensive to try to retake Guadalcanal . At the same time , Admiral William Halsey , Jr . , the Allied theatre commander , was under pressure from his superiors to complete the replacement of the 2nd Marine Regiment , which had been in combat on Guadalcanal since August , with fresh Army troops . Halsey hoped to take advantage of what he believed was an impending Japanese offensive to draw Japanese naval forces into a battle , while at the same time delivering the replacement Army troops to Guadalcanal . On 29 January 1943 , Halsey sent five task force s toward the southern Solomons area to cover the relief convoy and to engage any Japanese naval forces that came into range . These five task forces included two fleet carriers , two escort carrier s , three battleship s , 12 cruisers , and 25 destroyers . In front of this array of task forces was Task Group 62 . 8 , the troop convoy of four transports and four destroyers . Ahead of the troop convoy , between Rennell Island and Guadalcanal , was Task Force 18 ( TF 18 ) Rear Admiral Robert C . Giffen , a close support group of heavy cruisers , , and , light cruisers , , and ; escort carriers and ; and eight destroyers . Admiral Giffen commanded TF 18 from " Wichita " . A fleet carrier task force — centered on the carrier — steamed about behind TG 62 . 8 and TF 18 . The other fleet carrier and battleship task forces were about farther back . Admiral Giffen , with " Wichita " and the two escort carriers , had just arrived in the Pacific after participating in Operation Torch in the North African Campaign . Also , " Chicago " had just arrived back in the South Pacific , after completing repairs from damage suffered during the Battle of Savo Island almost six months before . Battle . Prelude . In addition to protecting the troop convoy , TF 18 was charged with rendezvousing with a force of four U . S . destroyers , stationed at Tulagi , at 21 : 00 on 29 January in order to conduct a sweep up " The Slot " north of Guadalcanal the next day to screen the unloading of the troop transports at Guadalcanal . However , the escort carriers , under Commodore Ben Wyatt , were too slow ( ) to allow Giffen ' s force to make the scheduled rendezvous , so Giffen left the carriers behind with two destroyers at 14 : 00 and pushed on ahead at . Wary of the threat from Japanese submarines , which Allied intelligence indicated were likely in the area , Giffen arranged his cruisers and destroyers for anti - submarine defense , not expecting an air attack . The cruisers were aligned in two columns , spaced apart . " Wichita " , " Chicago " , and " Louisville " , in that order , were to starboard , and " Montpelier " , " Cleveland " , and " Columbia " were to port . The six destroyers were in a semicircle ahead of the cruiser columns . Giffen ' s force was tracked by Japanese submarines , who reported its location and movement . Around mid - afternoon , based on the submarine reports , 16 Mitsubishi G4M Type 1 bomber s from the 705 Air Group ( 705AG ) and 16 Mitsubishi G3M Type 96 bombers from the 701 Air Group ( 701AG ) took off from Rabaul carrying torpedoes to attack Giffen ' s force . One Type 96 turned back with engine trouble , leaving 31 bombers in the attack force . The leader of the 705AG aircraft was Lieutenant Tomō Nakamura and Lieutenant Commander Joji Hagai commanded the 701AG planes . Action on 29 January . At sunset , as TF 18 headed northwest north of Rennell Island and south of Guadalcanal , several of Giffen ' s ships detected unidentified aircraft on radar west of their formation . Having previously insisted on absolute radio silence , Giffen gave no orders about what to do about the unidentified contacts , or any orders at all , for that matter . With the setting of the sun , TF 18 ' s combat air patrol ( CAP ) from the two escort carriers returned to their ships for the night , leaving Giffen ' s ships without air cover . The radar contacts were , in fact , the approaching 31 Japanese torpedo bombers , who circled around to the south of TF 18 so that they could attack from the east , with the black backdrop of the eastern sky behind them . From this direction , the Japanese bombers were hidden by the night sky , but Giffen ' s ships were silhouetted against the twilight of the western horizon . The 705AG aircraft attacked first , beginning at 19 : 19 . Nakamura ' s aircraft missed with all of their torpedoes and one was shot down by anti - aircraft fire from Giffen ' s ships . Believing the attack was over , Giffen ordered his ships to cease zigzagging and continue towards Guadalcanal on the same course and at the same speed . Meanwhile , a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft began dropping flares and floatlights to mark the course and speed of TF 18 for the impending attack by Hagai ' s bombers . At 19 : 38 , 701AG attacked , planting two torpedoes in " Chicago " , causing heavy damage and bringing the cruiser to a dead stop . Another torpedo hit " Wichita " but did not explode . Two bombers were shot down by anti - aircraft fire , including Hagai ' s ; he was killed . At 20 : 08 , Giffen ordered his ships to reverse direction , to slow to , and to cease firing their anti - aircraft guns . The absence of muzzle flashes concealed the ships from the Japanese aircraft , who all departed the area by 23 : 35 . In pitch darkness , " Louisville " managed to take the crippled " Chicago " under tow and slowly headed south , away from the battle area , escorted by the rest of TF 18 . Action on 30 January . Halsey immediately took steps to try to protect " Chicago " , notifying the escort carriers to make sure they had a CAP in place at first light , ordering the " Enterprise " task force to approach and augment the escort carrier CAP , and sending the fleet tug to take over the tow from " Louisville " , which was accomplished at 08 : 00 . Between daybreak and 14 : 00 , numerous Japanese scout aircraft approached TF 18 . Although they were all chased away by the CAP , they observed and reported the position of " Chicago " . At 12 : 15 , a force of 11 Type 1 torpedo bombers from the 751 Air Group ( 751AG ) , based at Kavieng and staging through Buka , launched to attack the damaged U . S . cruiser . An Australian coastwatcher in the Solomon Islands warned the U . S . forces of the bombers , and estimated their arrival time as 16 : 00 . However , Halsey ordered the other cruisers to leave " Chicago " behind and head for Efate in the New Hebrides . They departed at 15 : 00 , leaving behind six destroyers to protect " Chicago " and " Navajo " . At 15 : 40 , " Enterprise " was away from " Chicago " , with ten of her fighters forming a CAP over the damaged cruiser . At this time , four of the CAP fighters chased and shot down a scout Type 1 bomber . At 15 : 54 , " Enterprise " s radar detected the incoming bomber flight , and launched 10 more fighters . The escort carriers , however , had difficulties in getting their aircraft launched , and their aircraft did not attack the bombers until the engagement was over . At first , the Japanese bombers appeared to be trying to approach and attack " Enterprise " but turned toward " Chicago " after six " Enterprise " CAP fighters began to engage them . Four other CAP fighters chased the 751AG aircraft as they entered the anti - aircraft fire from " Chicago " s escorting destroyers . Two of the bombers were shot down before they could release their ordnance . Six more were shot down moments later , but not before they dropped their torpedoes . One torpedo hit the destroyer in her forward engine room , killing 22 of her crew and causing heavy damage . " Chicago " was hit by four torpedoes , one forward of the bridge and three others in her engineering spaces . Captain Ralph O . Davis of " Chicago " ordered the ship to be abandoned , and she sank , stern first , 20 minutes later . " Navajo " and the escorting destroyers rescued 1 , 049 survivors from " Chicago " , but 62 of her crew died . A final attack force of Japanese torpedo bombers failed to find the remaining U . S . ships . " Navajo " took " La Vallette " under tow , and all of the remaining ships of TF 18 made port at Espiritu Santo without further incident . Aftermath . The Japanese widely publicized the results of the engagement , claiming to have sunk a battleship and three cruisers . The U . S . on the other hand , tried to conceal the loss of " Chicago " from the public for some time , with Admiral Chester Nimitz threatening to " shoot " any of his staff who leaked the loss of " Chicago " to the press . Halsey and Nimitz blamed Giffen for the defeat and so stated in Giffen ' s official performance report for the period . The defeat and resulting recriminations did not affect Giffen ' s career ; he continued to lead Allied battleship and cruiser task forces in the Pacific until 1944 and was later promoted to Vice Admiral . With Japanese aircraft engaged with TF 18 , the Allied transports completed their mission of replacing the remaining Marines on Guadalcanal over the last two days in January 1943 . During this time , the other Allied task forces , including the two fleet carrier task forces , took station in the Coral Sea , in anticipation of an expected Japanese offensive in the southern Solomons . In reality , however , the Japanese completed the secret evacuation of their remaining forces from Guadalcanal ( Operation Ke ) over three nights between 2 and 7 February 1943 . With TF 18 forced to retreat , very few Allied naval forces were left in the immediate Guadalcanal area , allowing the Japanese to retrieve most of their remaining ground forces . The Allies did not realize the evacuation was happening until it was over . Building on their success in securing Guadalcanal , the Allies continued their campaign in the Solomon Islands to its successful conclusion .