Operation Savannah ( Angola ) Operation Savannah was the name given to the South African Defence Force ' s 1975 – 1976 covert intervention in the Angolan Civil War . Background . After a struggle of 14 years , aided by the so - called " Carnation Revolution " of 25 April 1974 which ended Portugal ' s dictatorial colonial government , Angola ' s three main liberation forces , FNLA , UNITA and the leftist MPLA began competing for dominance in the country . Fighting began in November 1974 , starting in the capital city , Luanda , and spreading quickly across all of Angola , which was soon divided among the combatants . The FNLA occupied northern Angola and UNITA the central south , while The MPLA mostly occupied the coastline , the far south - east and , after capturing it in November 1974 , Cabinda . Negotiations for independence resulted in the Treaty of Alvor being signed on 15 January 1975 , naming the date of official independence as 11 November 1975 . The agreement ended the war for independence but marked the escalation of the civil war . Two dissenting groups , the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda and the Eastern Revolt , never signed the accords , as they were excluded from negotiations . The coalition government established by the Treaty of Alvor soon ended as nationalist factions , doubting one another ' s intentions , tried to control the country by force . Fighting between the three forces resumed in Luanda hardly a day after the transitional government assumed office on 15 January 1975 . . The liberation forces sought to seize strategic points , most importantly the capital , by the official day of independence . By March 1975 , the FNLA was driving towards Luanda from the north , joined by units of the Zairian army which the United States had encouraged Zaire ' s dictator , Mobutu Sese Seko , to provide . Between 28 April and early May , 1 , 200 Zairian troops crossed into northern Angola to assist the FNL . The FNLA eliminated all remaining MPLA presence in the northern provinces and assumed positions east of Kifangondo at the eastern outskirts of Luanda , from where it continued to encroach on the capital . The situation for the MPLA in Luanda became increasingly precarious . The MPLA received supplies from the Soviet Union and repeatedly requested 100 officers for military training from Cuba . Until late August , Cuba had a few technical advisors in Angola , which the CIA noted . By 9 July , the MPLA gained control of the capital , Luanda . Starting 21 August , Cuba established four training facilities ( CIR ) with almost 500 men , which were to form about 4 , 800 FAPLA recruits in three to six months . The mission was expected to be short - term and to endure about 6 months . The CIR in Cabinda accounted for almost half of the total , 191 men , while the ones at Benguela , Saurimo ( formerly Henrique de Carvalho ) and at N ' Dalatando ( formerly Salazar ) had 66 or 67 each . Some were posted in headquarters in Luanda or in other places throughout the country . The training centres were operational on 18 – 20 October . Military intervention . South African involvement in Angola , part of what it termed the Border War , started in 1966 when SWAPO , a liberation force of Southwest Africa , began killing South Africans in that district . At that time SWAPO had its bases in Ovamboland and Zambia . With the loss of the Portuguese as an ally and the possibility of communist pro - SWAPO governments in the two former colonies ( Angola and Mozambique ) , the Pretoria government would lose the remaining sections of its valued " cordon sanitaire " ( buffer zone ) between itself and hostile pro - communist Africa . SWAPO would have a safe haven from which to operate in Angola , and South Africa was confronted not only with the issue of another hostile government in the region but also of having to cross another border in pursuit of SWAPO . The Angolan Civil War became a major Cold War conflict . The South Africans continued to aid UNITA , operate in and occupy parts of Southern Angola and Cubans remained stationed in the country . The USSR supplied weapons to Angola . The United States officially ended direct assistance to UNITA by the Clark Amendment but it was continued secretly and later again officially during the Reagan administration . The PRC withdrew its military advisers from Zaire , ending assistance for the FNLA . Support for UNITA and FNLA . Consequently , with the covert assistance of the United States through the CIA , it began assisting UNITA and the FNLA in a bid to ensure that a neutral or friendly government in Luanda prevailed . On 14 July 1975 , South African Prime Minister Balthazar Vorster approved weapons worth US $ 14 million to be bought secretly for FNLA and UNITA . of which the first shipments from South Africa arrived in August 1975 . Ruacana - Calueque occupation . On 9 August 1975 a 30 - man patrol of the South African Defence Force ( SADF ) moved some 50 km into southern Angola and occupied the Ruacana - Calueque hydro - electric complex and other installations on the Cunene River . The scheme was an important strategic asset for Ovamboland , which relied on it for its water supply . The facility had been completed earlier in the year with South African funding . Several hostile incidences with UNITA and SWAPO frightening foreign workers had provided a rationale for the occupation . The defence of the facility in southern Angola also was South Africa ' s justification for the first permanent deployment of regular SADF units inside Angola . On 22 August 1975 the SADF initiated operation " Sausage II " , a major raid against SWAPO in southern Angola and on 4 September 1975 , Vorster authorized the provision of limited military training , advice and logistical assistance . In turn FNLA and UNITA would help the South Africans fight SWAPO . Meanwhile , the MPLA had gained against UNITA in Southern Angola and by mid - October was in control of 12 of Angola ' s provinces and most cities . UNITA ' s territory had been shrinking to parts of central Angola , and it became apparent that UNITA did not have any chance of capturing Luanda by independence day , which neither the United States nor South Africa were willing to accept . The SADF established a training camp near Silva Porto ( Kuito ) and prepared the defences of Nova Lisboa ( Huambo ) . They assembled the mobile attack unit " Foxbat " to stop approaching FAPLA - units with which it clashed on 5 October , thus saving Nova Lisboa for UNITA . Task Force Zulu . On 14 October , the South Africans secretly initiated Operation Savannah when Task Force Zulu , the first of several South African columns , crossed from Namibia into Cuando Cubango . The operation provided for elimination of the MPLA from the southern border area , then from south western Angola , from the central region , and finally for the capture of Luanda . According to John Stockwell , a former CIA officer , " there was close liaison between the CIA and the South Africans " and " ’ high officials ’ in Pretoria claimed that their intervention in Angola had been based on an ‘ understanding ’ with the United States " . With the liberation forces busy fighting each other , the SADF advanced very quickly . Task Force Foxbat joined the invasion in mid - October . The territory the MPLA had just gained in the south was quickly lost to the South African advances . After South African advisors and antitank weapons helped to stop an MPLA advance on Nova Lisboa ( Huambo ) in early October , Zulu captured Rocadas ( Xangongo ) by 20 , Sa da Bandeira ( Lubango ) by 24 and Mocamedes by 28 October . With the South Africans moving quickly toward Luanda , the Cubans had to terminate the CIR at Salazar only 3 days after it started operating and deployed most of the instructors and Angolan recruits in Luanda . On 2 – 3 November , 51 Cubans from the CIR Benguela and South Africans had their first direct encounter near Catengue , where FAPLA unsuccessfully tried to stop the Zulu advance . This encounter led Zulu - Commander Breytenbach to conclude that his troops had faced the best organized FAPLA opposition to date . Cuban Intervention . After the MPLA debacle at Catengue , the Cubans became very aware of the South African intervention . On 4 November Castro decided to begin an intervention on an unprecedented scale : " Operation Carlota " . The same day , a first airplane with 100 heavy weapon specialists , which the MPLA had requested in September , left for Brazzaville , arriving in Luanda on 7 November . On November 9 the first 100 men of a contingent of a 652 - strong battalion of elite Special Forces were flown in . The 100 specialists and 88 men of the special forces were dispatched immediately to the nearby front at Kifangondo . They assisted 850 FAPLA , 200 Katangans and one Soviet advisor . With the help of the Cubans and the Soviet advisor , FAPLA decisively repelled an FNLA - Zairian assault in the Battle of Kifangondo on 8 November . The South African contingent , 52 men commanded by General Ben de Wet Roos , that had provided for the artillery on the northern front , had to be evacuated by ship on 28 November . MPLA - leader Agostinho Neto proclaimed independence and the formation of the People ' s Republic of Angola on 11 November and became its first President . South African Reinforcements . On 6 and 7 November 1975 Zulu captured the harbour cities of Benguela ( terminal of the Benguela railroad ) and Lobito . The towns and cities captured by the SADF were given to UNITA . In central Angola , at the same time , combat unit Foxbat had moved 800 km north toward Luanda . By then , the South Africans realised that Luanda could not be captured by independence day on 11 November and the South Africans considered to end the advance and retreat . But on 10 November 1975 Vorster relented to UNITA ' s urgent request to maintain the military pressure with the objective of capturing as much territory as possible before the impending meeting of the OAU . Thus , Zulu and Foxbat continued north with two new battle groups formed further inland ( X - Ray and Orange ) and " there was little reason to think the FAPLA would be able to stop this expanded force from capturing Luanda within a week . " Through November and December 1975 , the SADF presence in Angola numbered 2 , 900 to 3 , 000 personnel . After Luanda was secured against the north and with enforcements from Cuba arriving , Zulu faced stronger resistance advancing on Novo Redondo ( Sumbe ) . First Cuban reinforcements arrived in Porto Amboim , only a few km north of Novo Redondo , quickly destroying three bridges crossing the Queve river , effectively stopping the South African advance along the coast on 13 November 1975 . Despite concerted efforts to advance north to Novo Redondo , the SADF was unable to break through FAPLA defences . In a last successful advance a South African task force and UNITA troops captured Luso on the Benguela railway on 11 December which they held until 27 December . End of South African Advance . By mid - December South Africa extended military service and brought in reserves . " An indication of the seriousness of the situation … is that one of the most extensive military call - ups in South African history is now taking place " . By late December , the Cubans had deployed 3 , 500 to 4 , 000 troops in Angola , of which 1 , 000 were securing Cabinda , and eventually the struggle began to favour of the MPLA . Apart from being " bogged down " on the southern front , the South African advance halted , “ as all attempts by Battle - Groups Orange and X - Ray to extend the war into the interior had been forced to turn back by destroyed bridges ” . In addition , South Africa had to deal with two other major setbacks : the international press criticism of the operation and the associated change of US policies . Major battles and incidents . Battle of Quifangondo . On 10 November 1975 , the day before Angolan independence , the FNLA attempted against advice to capture Luanda from the MPLA . South African gunners and aircraft assisted the offensive which went horribly wrong for the attackers ; they were routed by the FAPLA assisted by Cubans manning superior weaponry that had arrived recently in the country . The South African artillery , antiquated due to the UN embargo , was not any match for the longer - ranged Cuban BM - 21 rocket launchers , and therefore could not influence the result of the battle . Battle of Ebo . The Cuban military , anticipating a South African advance ( under the direction of Lieutenant Christopher du Raan ) towards the town of Ebo , established positions there at a river crossing to thwart any assault . The defending artillery force , equipped with a BM - 21 battery , a 76mm field gun , and several anti - tank units , subsequently destroyed five to six Eland armoured cars , whilst they were bogged down with RPG - 7s , on November 25 , killing 5 and wounding 11 South African soldiers . A Cessna spotter aircraft was shot down over Ebo the following day . This was the first tangible South African defeat of Operation Savannah . " Bridge 14 " . The Battle of " Bridge 14 " was fought on the 9 December at the Nhia River at . An important bridge structure located there had been demolished by withdrawing Cuban forces in an ultimately futile attempt to stall the South African Defence Force as it marched on Quibala . The South African forces were known as Battle Group Foxbat under the command of Commandant George Kruys . The South Africans managed to place a handful of observers on a nearby hill dubbed " Top Hat " , from which they were able to direct 5 . 5 inch artillery fire effectively against the enemy positions . South African sapper s successfully rebuilt the bridge despite heavy Cuban opposition , allowing an infantry and armoured car column to breach the river . A number of Sagger missile crews had expected to ambush the advancing vehicles , but the South Africans carefully skirted the road , routing the Cuban - MPLA troops on the opposite bank . During the fighting , Danny Roxo claimed to have single - handedly killed twelve Cuban and MPLA soldiers while conducting a reconnaissance of the bridge , an action for which he was awarded the Honoris Crux . Several other South African military personnel were decorated with the medal for bravery during this battle , some posthumously . It is estimated 400 Cuban and MPLA soldiers died in the attack while the South Africans lost four SADF soldiers . In 1976 , the SADF created a brief film depicting the victory , entitled Brug 14 ( Afrikaans for ' Bridge 14 ' ) . This film was screened across national television when the South African Broadcasting Corporation began television broadcasts later that year . Battle of Luso . On December 11 , the South African Task Force X - Ray followed the Bengueala railway line from Silva Porto ( Kuito ) east to Luso , which they overran on the 11th December 1975 . The South African contingent included an armoured squadron , supporting infantry units , some atillery , engineers , and UNITA irregulars . Their main objective was to seize the Luso airport , which later went on to serve as a supply point until the South Africans finally departed Angola in early January 1976 . Battles Involving Battlegroup Zulu in the West . There were numerous unrecorded clashes fought in the southwest between Colonel Jan Breytenbach ' s SADF battlegroup and scattered MPLA positions during Operation Savannah . Eventually , Breytenbach ' s men were able to advance three thousand kilometers over Angolan soil in thirty - three days . On a related note , Battlegroup Zulu later formed the basis of South Africa ' s famous 32 Battalion . Ambrizete Incident . The South African Navy was not planned to be involved in the hereunto land operation , but after the Battle of Quifangondo , nevertheless had to hastily extract a number of army personnel by sea from far behind enemy lines in Angola , as well as abandoned guns . Ambrizete north of Luanda at was chosen as the pick - up point for the gunners involved in the action at Quifangondo . The frigate s SAS " President Kruger " and SAS " President Steyn " went to the area , where the latter used inflatable boats and its Westland Wasp helicopter to extract 26 personnel successfully from the beach on 28 November 1975 . The replenishment oiler SAS " Tafelberg " provided logistical support to the frigates , and picked up the guns in Ambriz after they were towed to Zaire , and took them to Walvis Bay . General Constand Viljoen , who had grave concerns at the time about the safety of both his soldiers and abandoned field guns , called it " the most difficult night ever in my operational career " . The success of this operation was exceptionally fortuitous , given that the South African Navy had been penetrated by the spy Dieter Gerhardt . Aftermath . South Africa continued to assist UNITA in order to ensure that SWAPO did not establish any bases in southern Angola . The 49 South African casualties during the conflict were never acknowledged by the SADF , who were operating covertly in the country . These soldiers were listed simply as ' missing ' rather than ' killed in action ' , resulting in a number of Supreme Court cases afterwards to change their status .