Minimal deterrence In nuclear strategy , minimal deterrence ( also called minimum deterrence ) is an application of deterrence theory in which a state possesses no more nuclear weapons than is necessary to deter an adversary from attacking . Pure minimal deterrence is a doctrine of no first use , holding that the only mission of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear adversary by making the cost of a first strike unacceptably high . To present a credible deterrent , there must be the assurance that any attack would trigger a retaliatory strike . In other words , minimal deterrence requires rejecting a counterforce strategy in favor of pursuing survivable force that can be used in a countervalue second strike . While the United States and the Soviet Union each developed robust first - and second - strike capabilities during the Cold War , the People ' s Republic of China pursued a doctrine of minimal nuclear deterrence . Assuming that decision - makers make cost - benefit analyses when deciding to use force , China ' s doctrine calls for acquiring a nuclear arsenal only large enough to destroy an adversary ’ s " strategic points " in such a way that the expected costs of a first strike outweigh the anticipated benefits . Both India and Pakistan have also adopted this strategy , which they term Minimum Credible Deterrence . Minimal deterrence represents one way of solving the security dilemma and avoiding an arms race . Decision - makers often feel pressured to expand their arsenals when they perceive them to be vulnerable to an adversary ’ s first strike , especially when both sides seek to achieve the advantage . Eliminating this perceived vulnerability reduces the incentive to produce more and advanced weapons . For example , the United States ’ nuclear force exceeds the requirements of minimal deterrence , and is structured to strike numerous targets in multiple countries and to have the ability to conduct successful counterforce strikes with high confidence . In response to this , China continues to modernize its nuclear forces because its leaders are concerned about the survivability of their arsenal in the face of the United States ’ advances in strategic reconnaissance , precision strike , and missile defense . One disadvantage of minimal deterrence is that it requires an accurate understanding of the level of damage an adversary finds unacceptable , especially if that understanding changes over time so that a previously credible deterrent is no longer credible . A minimal deterrence strategy must also account for the nuclear firepower that would be " lost " or " neutralized " during an adversary ’ s counterforce strike . Additionally , a minimal deterrence capability may embolden a state when it confronts a superior nuclear power , as has been observed in the relationship between China and the United States . Finally , while pursuing minimal deterrence during arms negotiations allows states to make reductions without becoming vulnerable , further reductions may be undesirable once minimal deterrence is reached because they will increase a state ’ s vulnerability and provide an incentive for an adversary to secretly expand its nuclear arsenal .