Europe first Europe first , also known as Germany first , was the key element of the grand strategy agreed upon by the United States and the United Kingdom during World War II . According to this policy , the United States and the United Kingdom would use the preponderance of their resources to subdue Nazi Germany in Europe first . Simultaneously , they would fight a holding action against Japan in the Pacific , using fewer resources . After the defeat of Germany — considered the greatest threat to Great Britain — all Allied forces could be concentrated against Japan . Official U . S . statistics indicate that the United States devoted more resources in the early part of the war to stopping the advance of Japan , and not until 1944 was a clear preponderance of U . S . resources allocated toward the defeat of Germany . Grand Strategy . Germany was the United Kingdom ' s primary threat , especially after the Fall of France in 1940 , which saw Germany overrun most of the countries of Western Europe , leaving the United Kingdom alone to combat Germany . Germany ' s planned invasion of the UK , Operation Sea Lion , was averted by its failure to establish air superiority in the Battle of Britain . At the same time , war with Japan in East Asia seemed increasingly likely . Although the U . S . was not yet at war with either Germany or Japan , it met with the UK on several occasions to formulate joint strategies . In the March 29 , 1941 report of the ABC - 1 conference , the Americans and British agreed that their strategic objectives were : ( 1 ) " The early defeat of Germany as the predominant member of the Axis with the principal military effort of the United States being exerted in the Atlantic and European area ; " and ( 2 ) A strategic defensive in the Far East . " Thus , the Americans concurred with the British in the grand strategy of " Europe first " ( or " Germany first " ) in carrying out military operations in World War II . The UK feared that , if the United States was diverted from its main focus in Europe to the Pacific ( Japan ) , Hitler might crush both the Soviet Union and Britain , and would then become an unconquerable fortress in Europe . The wound inflicted on the United States by Japan at Pearl Harbor on December 7 , 1941 did not result in a change in U . S . policy . Prime Minister Winston Churchill hastened to Washington shortly after Pearl Harbor for the Arcadia Conference to ensure that the Americans didn ' t have second thoughts about Europe First . The two countries reaffirmed that , " notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the War , our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy . and her defeat is the key to victory . Once Germany is defeated the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow . " United States . When Germany declared war on the United States on December 11 , 1941 , the United States faced a decision about how to allocate resources between these two separate theaters of war . On the one hand , Japan had attacked the United States directly at Pearl Harbor , and the Japanese Navy threatened United States territory in a way that Germany , with a limited surface fleet , was not in a position to do . On the other hand , Germany was universally considered the stronger and more dangerous threat to Europe because only Great Britain and the Soviet Union remained un - occupied by Nazi Germany , Germany ' s geographical proximity to the UK and the Soviet Union was therefore a greater threat to their survival Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor , American planners foresaw the possibility of a two - front war . Chief of Naval Operations Harold Rainsford Stark authored the Plan Dog memo , which advocated concentrating on victory in Europe while staying on the defensive in the Pacific . However , the U . S . reassurance to the UK notwithstanding the U . S . ' s immediate concern was with Japan . As Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall later said , " we had a fair understanding of what we had best do rather than the necessity of engaging in prolonged conversations . . . . This understanding , which included a recognition that Germany was the main enemy and that the major effort would be made initially in Europe , was obviously not applicable in the present situation . Of first importance now was the necessity to check the Japanese . " Thus , the U . S . adherence to the Europe First was , in the early part of the war , more of reassurance to the British ally than it was a policy put into practice . Opposition . The " Europe First " strategy did not go along well with factions of the US military , driving a wedge between the Navy and the Army . While USN Fleet Admiral Ernest King was a strong believer in " Europe First " , contrary to British perceptions , his natural aggression did not permit him to leave resources idle in the Atlantic that could be utilized in the Pacific , especially when " it was doubtful when — if ever — the British would consent to a cross - Channel operation " . King once complained that the Pacific deserved 30 % of Allied resources but was getting only 15 % . In spite of ( or perhaps partly because of ) the fact that the two men did not get along , the combined influence of King and General Douglas MacArthur increased the allocation of resources to the Pacific War . General Hastings Ismay , chief of staff to Winston Churchill , described King as : tough as nails and carried himself as stiffly as a poker . He was blunt and stand - offish , almost to the point of rudeness . At the start , he was intolerant and suspicious of all things British , especially the Royal Navy ; but he was almost equally intolerant and suspicious of the American Army . War against Japan was the problem to which he had devoted the study of a lifetime , and he resented the idea of American resources being used for any other purpose than to destroy Japanese . He mistrusted Churchill ' s powers of advocacy , and was apprehensive that he would wheedle President Roosevelt into neglecting the war in the Pacific . At the Casablanca Conference , King was accused by Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke of favoring the Pacific war , and the argument became heated . The combative General Joseph Stilwell wrote : " Brooke got nasty , and King got good and sore . King almost climbed over the table at Brooke . God , he was mad . I wished he had socked him . " The American people favored early action against Japan , In one of the few public opinion polls taken during the war , in February 1943 , 53 percent of Americans said that Japan was the " chief enemy " compared to 34 percent choosing Germany . A later poll showed that 82 percent of Americans believed that the Japanese were more " cruel at heart " than Germans . As a consequence , American resources allocated to the defeat of Japan initially exceeded those allocated to Europe . In the first six months the U . S . was in the war , the U . S . army deployed more than 300 , 000 soldiers overseas to the Pacific while less than 100 , 000 were sent to Europe . The U . S . ' s first major offensive during World War II was in the Pacific : Guadalcanal in August 1942 . Concurrently , Australian forces attacked and pushed back the Japanese in the Kokoda Track Campaign in New Guinea . Analysis . The inability of the two allies to mount an invasion of German - controlled northern Europe in 1943 permitted the U . S . to maintain more military forces arrayed against Japan than Germany during the first two years the U . S . was in the war . As late as December 1943 , the balance was nearly even . Against Japan , the U . S . had deployed 1 , 873 , 023 men , 7 , 857 aircraft , and 713 warships . Against Germany the totals were 1 , 810 , 367 men , 8 , 807 airplanes , and 515 warships . In early 1944 , the military buildup of American forces for the invasion of France shifted the balance of American resources toward the European theater and made Europe First a reality . However , despite the majority of American resources going into Europe in 1944 , the U . S . still had sufficient resources to mount several major military operations in the Pacific that year : Saipan ( June 1944 ) ; Guam ( July 1944 ) ; Peleliu ( September 1944 ) ; and the invasion of the Philippines at Leyte in October 1944 . In 1944 and 1945 the balance of U . S . resources shifted heavily toward Europe as the Europe First strategy became a reality rather than just a stated objective . At war ' s end in Europe , the U . S . Army had 47 divisions in Europe and 21 divisions , plus 6 Marine Corps divisions , in the Pacific . Seventy - eight percent of Army and Army airforce manpower was deployed against Germany versus 22 percent deployed in the Paficic . The plan to invade Japan envisioned that 15 of the European divisions would be transferred to the Pacific . The uncritical view that " Europe First " dictated the allocation of resources throughout the war has caused many scholars to underestimate the resources required to defeat Japan . For example , historian H . P . Willmott stated that the United States " allocated little more than one - quarter of her total war effort to the struggle against Japan . " That may be an underestimate which does not take into account that , according to official U . S . statistics , 70 percent of the U . S . Navy and all the Marine Corps were deployed in the Pacific as well as the 22 percent of the Army deployed to the Pacific at the time of Germany ' s surrender in May 1945 .