Operation Ten - Go In April 1945 , the Japanese battleship ( the largest battleship in the world ) — along with nine other Japanese warships — embarked from Japan on a deliberate suicide attack upon Allied forces engaged in the Battle of Okinawa . The Japanese force was attacked , stopped , and almost completely destroyed by United States carrier - borne aircraft before reaching Okinawa . " Yamato " and five other Japanese warships were sunk . The battle demonstrated U . S . air supremacy in the Pacific theater by this stage in the war and the vulnerability of surface ship s without air cover to aerial attack . The battle also exhibited Japan ' s willingness to sacrifice large numbers of its people in desperate " kamikaze " attacks aimed at slowing the Allied advance on the Japanese home islands . Background . By early 1945 , following the Solomon Islands campaign , the Battle of the Philippine Sea and the Battle of Leyte Gulf , the once formidable Imperial Japanese Navy ' s Combined Fleet was reduced to just a handful of operational warships and a few remaining aircraft and aircrew . Most of the remaining Japanese warships in the Combined Fleet were stationed at ports in Japan , with most of the large ships at Kure , Hiroshima . With the invasions of Saipan and Iwo Jima , Allied forces began their campaign against the Japanese homeland . As the next step before a planned invasion of the Japanese mainland , Allied forces invaded Okinawa on 1 April 1945 . In March , in briefing Emperor Hirohito on Japan ' s response to the expected Okinawan invasion , Japanese military leaders explained that the Japanese Imperial Army was planning extensive air attacks , including the use of " kamikaze " . The emperor then reportedly asked , " But what about the Navy ? What are they doing to assist in defending Okinawa ? Have we no more ships ? " Now feeling pressured by the emperor to mount some kind of attack also , Japan ' s Navy commanders conceived a " kamikaze " - type mission for their remaining operational large ships , which included the battleship " Yamato " . The resulting plan — drafted under the direction of the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet , Admiral Toyoda Soemu — called for " Yamato " and her escorts to attack the U . S . fleet supporting the U . S . troops landing on the west of the island . " Yamato " and her escorts were to fight their way to Okinawa and then beach themselves between Higashi and Yomitan and fight as shore batteries until they were destroyed . Once destroyed , the ship ' s surviving crewmembers were supposed to abandon the ships and fight U . S . forces on land . Very little , if any , air cover could be provided for the ships , which would render them almost helpless to concentrated attacks from US carrier - based aircraft . In preparation for executing the plan , the assigned ships left Kure for Tokuyama , Yamaguchi , off Mitajiri , Japan , on 29 March . However , despite obeying orders to prepare for the mission , Vice - Admiral Seiichi Itō — commander of the " Ten - Go " force — still refused to actually order his ships to carry it out , believing the plan to be futile and wasteful . Other commanders of the Imperial Japanese Navy also had very negative feelings about the operation , believing that it was a waste of human life and fuel . Captain Atsushi Ōi — who commanded escort fleets — was critical as fuel and resources were diverted from his operation . As he was told that the aim of this operation was " the tradition and the glory of Navy , " he shouted : This war is of our nation and why should the honor of our " surface fleet " be more respected ? Who cares about their glory ? Damn fools ! Vice Admiral Ryūnosuke Kusaka flew from Tokyo on 5 April to Tokuyama in a final attempt to convince the assembled commanders of the Combined Fleet — including Admiral Itō — to accept the plan . Upon first hearing of the proposed operation ( it had been kept secret from most of them ) , the Combined Fleet commanders and captains unanimously joined Admiral Itō in rejecting it for the same reasons that he had expressed . Admiral Kusaka then explained that the Navy ' s attack would help divert U . S . aircraft away from the Army ' s planned kamikaze attacks on the U . S . fleet at Okinawa . He also explained that Japan ' s national leadership , including the emperor , were expecting the Navy to make their best effort to support the defense of Okinawa . Upon hearing this , the Combined Fleet commanders relented and accepted the proposed plan . The ship ' s crews were briefed on the nature of the mission and given the opportunity to stay behind if desired — none did . However , approximately 80 crew members who were new , sick , or infirm , were ordered off the ships . The ships ' crews now engaged in some last - minute intense drills to prepare for the mission , mostly practicing damage - control procedures . At midnight , the ships were fueled . Reportedly , in secret defiance of orders to provide the ships with only just enough fuel to reach Okinawa , the Tokuyama personnel actually gave " Yamato " and the other ships almost all of the remaining fuel in the port , although this probably still was not enough to allow the force to return to Japan from Okinawa . Battle . At 16 : 00 on 6 April , " Yamato " , with Admiral Ito on board , the light cruiser and eight destroyer s departed Tokuyama to begin the mission . Two submarine s — and — sighted the Japanese force as it proceeded south through Bungo Suido . Although they were unable to attack ( due to the ships ' speed ) , they did spend several hours shadowing the Japanese sortie and sending updates of its course to the U . S . fleet . The submarines ' messages , which were reportedly sent uncoded , were also picked up by radio operators on the Japanese ships . At dawn on 7 April , the Japanese force passed the Ōsumi Peninsula into the open ocean heading south from Kyūshū toward Okinawa . They shifted into a defensive formation , with " Yahagi " leading " Yamato " and the eight destroyers deployed in a ring around the two larger ships , with each ship from each other and proceeding at . One of the Japanese destroyers — — developed engine trouble and turned back . U . S . reconnaissance aircraft began to shadow the main force of ships . At 10 : 00 , the Japanese force turned west to make it look like they were withdrawing , but at 11 : 30 , after being detected by two American PBM Mariner flying boat s ( the " Yamato " fired a salvo with her bow guns using special " beehive shells " ( but could not prevent the two planes from shadowing the Japanese force ) , they turned back towards Okinawa . Upon receiving contact reports early on 7 April , U . S . 5th Fleet commander Admiral Raymond Spruance ordered Task Force 54 , which consisted of veteran battleships under the command of Admiral Morton Deyo ( which were engaged in shore bombardment ) , to intercept and destroy the Japanese sortie . Deyo moved to execute his orders , but Vice Admiral Marc A . Mitscher , who commanded Task Force 58 ( TF 58 ) , preempted Spruance and Deyo by launching a massive air strike from his carriers , without informing Spruance until after the launches were completed . Around 10 : 00 on 7 April , Task Groups 58 . 1 and 58 . 3 ( TG 58 . 1 and 58 . 3 ) began launching almost 400 aircraft in several waves from eight carriers ( TG 58 . 1 : , , , ; TG 58 . 3 , , and ) that were located just east of Okinawa . The aircraft consisted of F6F Hellcat and F4U Corsair fighter s , SB2C Helldiver dive bomber s , and TBF Avenger torpedo bomber s . After being informed of Mitscher ' s launches , Spruance agreed that the airstrikes could go ahead as planned . As a contingency , Spruance ordered Admiral Deyo to assemble a force of six battleships ( , , , , , and ) , together with seven cruisers ( including the battlecruisers and ) and 21 destroyers , and to prepare for a surface engagement with " Yamato " should the airstrikes prove unsuccessful . Around 12 : 00 , the first American aircraft arrived over the " Yamato " ; these were F6F Hellcat and F4U Corsair fighters , which were under orders to deal with any Japanese aircraft that might appear to defend the ships below . None did . Since it soon became obvious that the Japanese force had no air cover , the U . S . aircraft were able to set up for their attacks without fear of opposition from Japanese aircraft . U . S . bomber and torpedo aircraft arriving over the " Yamato " group — after their two - hour flight from Okinawa — were thus able to circle the Japanese ship formation just out of anti - aircraft range in order to methodically set up their attacks on the warships below . The first wave of U . S . carrier planes were spotted by a Japanese lookout on the bridge at 5 degrees to port , elevation 8 , range 4 , 375 yards , moving to port at 12 : 32 . Two minutes later , Yamato opened fire with her 460mm main batteries . The Japanese ships stopped zigzagging and increased speed to , beginning evasive maneuvers , and opened fire with their anti - aircraft guns . " Yamato " carried almost 150 anti - aircraft guns , including her massive 460 mm guns which could fire special " Common Type 3 " anti - aircraft shells , known to the Japanese as " Sanshiki " . The U . S . torpedo airplanes mainly attacked from the port side so that if the torpedoes mainly hit from that side , it would increase the likelihood of the target ship capsizing . At 12 : 46 , a torpedo hit directly in her engine room , killing the entire engineering room crew and bringing her to a complete stop . " Yahagi " was hit by at least six more torpedoes and 12 bombs by succeeding waves of air attacks . The Japanese destroyer attempted to come to " Yahagi " s aid but was attacked , heavily damaged , and sank sometime later . " Yahagi " capsized and sank at 14 : 05 . During the first attack wave , despite intensive evasive maneuvers that caused most of the bombs and torpedoes aimed at her to miss , " Yamato " was hit by two armor - piercing bombs and one torpedo . Her speed was not affected , but one of the bombs started a fire aft of the superstructure that was not extinguished . Also , during the first attack wave , Japanese destroyers and were heavily damaged and taken out of the battle . " Hamakaze " sank later . At 13 : 00 exact , Yamato changed course to 180 degrees heading south . Between 13 : 20 and 14 : 15 , the second and third waves of U . S . aircraft attacked , heavily concentrating on " Yamato " . During this time , " Yamato " was hit by at least eight torpedoes and up to 15 bombs . The bombs did extensive damage to the topside of the ship , including knocking out power to the gun director s and forcing the anti - aircraft guns to be individually and manually aimed and fired , greatly reducing their effectiveness . The torpedo hits — almost all on the port side — caused " Yamato " to list enough that capsizing was now an imminent danger . The water damage - control station had been destroyed by a bomb hit making it impossible to counter - flood the specially designed spaces within the ship ' s hull to counteract hull damage . At 13 : 33 , in a desperate attempt to keep the ship from capsizing , " Yamato " s damage control team counter - flooded both starboard engine and boiler rooms . This mitigated the danger but also drowned the several hundred crewmen manning those stations , who were given no notice that their compartments were about to fill with water . The loss of the starboard engines — plus the weight of the water — caused " Yamato " to slow to about . At that same moment , the Americans launch another 110 aircraft from Task Group 58 . Twenty Avengers make a new torpedo run from 60 degrees to port . Yamato starts a sharp turn to port but three torpedoes rip into her port side amidships . Her auxiliary rudder is jammed in position hard port . With " Yamato " proceeding more slowly and therefore easier to target , U . S . torpedo aircraft concentrated on hitting her rudder and stern with torpedoes in order to affect her steering ability , which they succeeded in doing . At 14 : 02 , after being informed that the ship could no longer steer and was unavoidably sinking , Admiral Ito ordered the mission canceled , the crew to abandon ship , and for the remaining ships to begin rescuing survivors . " Yamato " communicated this message to the other surviving ships by signal flag because her radios had been destroyed . At 14 : 05 , " Yamato " was stopped dead in the water and began to capsize . Admiral Ito and Captain Aruga refused to abandon her with the rest of the survivors . At 14 : 20 , " Yamato " capsized completely and began to sink ( ) . At 14 : 23 , she suddenly blew up with an explosion so large that it was reportedly heard and seen away in Kagoshima and sent up a mushroom - shaped cloud almost into the air . It is claimed that her large explosion downed several U . S planes observing her end . The explosion is believed to have occurred when the fires ignited by bomb hits reached the main magazines . Attempting to make it back to port , Japanese destroyer was bombed and sunk with all hands by U . S . aircraft . The Japanese destroyer was also crippled by U . S . carrier aircraft attack during the battle and had to be scuttled by other , relatively undamaged Japanese destroyers . " Suzutsuki " — despite her bow being blown off — was able to make it to Sasebo , Japan , by steaming in reverse the entire way . The remaining three less - damaged Japanese destroyers ( , , and ) were able to rescue 280 survivors from " Yamato " ( sources differ on the size of " Yamato " s crew , giving it as between 2 , 750 and 3 , 300 men ) , plus 555 survivors from " Yahagi " ( out of a crew of 1 , 000 ) and just over 800 survivors from " Isokaze " , " Hamakaze " , and " Kasumi " . Between 3 , 700 and 4 , 250 Japanese naval personnel perished in the battle . The ships took the survivors to Sasebo . A total of 10 U . S . aircraft were shot down by anti - aircraft fire from the Japanese ships ; some of the aircrews were rescued by seaplane or submarine . In total , the U . S . lost 12 men . Some of the Japanese survivors reported that U . S . fighter aircraft machine - gunned Japanese survivors floating in the water . Japanese survivors also reported that U . S . aircraft temporarily halted their attacks on the Japanese destroyers during the time that the destroyers were busy picking up survivors from the water . During the battle , the Japanese Army conducted an air attack on the U . S . naval fleet at Okinawa as promised , but they failed to sink any ships . Around 115 aircraft — many of them " kamikaze " — attacked the U . S . ships throughout the day of 7 April . " Kamikaze " aircraft hit , battleship , and destroyer , causing moderate damage to " Hancock " and " Maryland " and heavy damage to " Bennett " . About 100 of the Japanese aircraft were lost in the attack . Aftermath . " Ten - Go " was the last major Japanese naval operation of the war , and the remaining Japanese warships had little involvement in combat operations for the rest of the conflict . " Suzutsuki " was never repaired . " Fuyuzuki " was repaired but hit a U . S . air - dropped mine at Moji , Japan , on 20 August 1945 , and was not subsequently repaired . " Yukikaze " survived the war almost undamaged . " Hatsushimo " hit a U . S . air - dropped mine on 30 July 1945 , near Maizuru , Japan , and was the 129th , and last , Japanese destroyer sunk in the war . " Maryland " was kept out of the war following the " kamikaze " attacks . Okinawa was declared secure by Allied forces on 21 June 1945 , after an intense and costly battle . Japan surrendered in August 1945 , after being bombed twice with atomic weapons . The apparent willingness of Japan to sacrifice so many of its people using suicidal tactics such as Operation " Ten - Go " and in the Battle of Okinawa , which began since the Battle of Leyte Gulf reportedly was a factor in the American decision to employ atomic weapons against Japan . The story of Operation " Ten - Go " is revered to some degree in modern Japan as evidenced by appearances of the story in popular Japanese culture which usually portray the event as a brave , selfless , but futile , symbolic effort by the participating Japanese sailors to defend their homeland . One of the reasons the event may have such significance in Japanese culture is that the word " Yamato " was often used as a poetic name for Japan . Thus , the end of battleship " Yamato " could serve as a metaphor for the end of the Japanese empire .