Thomas S . Gates , Jr . Thomas Sovereign Gates Jr . ( April 10 , 1906 – March 25 , 1983 ) was United States Secretary of Defense from 1959 to 1961 under President Eisenhower . He was promoted from deputy secretary of defense . During his tenure , he established a task force to set nuclear target priorities . He also authorized U - 2 reconnaissance flights , including the flight of Francis Gary Powers . Early life and career . Born in Germantown , Pennsylvania , Gates was the son of Thomas S . Gates Sr . , an investment banker and lawyer who was president of the University of Pennsylvania from 1930 to 1944 , and Marie ( née Rogers ) Gates . Gates graduated from Chestnut Hill Academy , an all - male private preparatory school in Philadelphia , Pennsylvania , in 1924 . He was then accepted into the University of Pennsylvania , where his father was serving on the university ' s board of trustees . At Penn , Gates managed the Penn Quakers football team and was a member of the school ' s basketball team , where in March 1928 , he was arrested along with 17 others students with charges of inciting a riot after Penn defeated Princeton to become Intercollegiate League champions . A member of the Phi Beta Kappa Society , Gates graduated with his Bachelor of Arts in English in 1928 . After graduating , he joined his father ' s Philadelphia - based investment banking firm , Drexel and Company . In the early to mid - 1930 ' s he worked as a bond salesman at Drexel , and later moved to New York City for two years where has was an apprentice for J . P . Morgan Chase & Company . Gates became a full partner at Drexel and Company in 1940 . During World War II he served in the Navy , rose to the rank of lieutenant commander , and participated in campaigns in the Pacific and Mediterranean areas . He was released from active duty in October 1945 . Political career . President Eisenhower appointed Gates Under Secretary of the Navy in October 1953 and Secretary on 1 April 1957 , positions in which he earned the president ' s approval . It was a foregone conclusion when Gates became Defense Secretary Neil McElroy ' s deputy on 8 June 1959 that he would succeed him . He entered office with an impressive background of active military experience and more than six years in the Department of Defense . As a top - level DoD official since 1953 , Gates was familiar with the 1953 and 1958 Defense Department reorganizations . Believing that the Secretary of Defense had all the authority he needed and that time should be allowed for evaluation of the long range effects of the 1958 amendments , he discouraged efforts to further revamp the department . As a former Secretary of the Navy who had observed the gradual downgrading of service secretary positions , he felt that the service secretaries should play a more important role , and he encouraged them to do so . Relationship with the Joint Chiefs . Gates cultivated a good working relationship with the Joint Chiefs of Staff . Less than a month after becoming secretary , he reminded the chiefs of their responsibility to apprise him of disputes and proposed to meet with them in order to expedite settlement or bring the issue to the president ' s attention for final resolution . Soon Gates and the JCS met on a regular basis , not just in instances when the Chiefs disagreed . Congressional and other sources applauded Gates for taking the initiative in improving both the JCS organization and the secretary ' s relations with it . Another important Gates initiative was the creation in August 1960 of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff ( JSTPS ) . Previously , inadequate coordination of targeting plans between the Strategic Air Command and the Navy led to redundancy and disputed priorities . These differences became especially significant with the advent of the Navy ' s sea - based Polaris ballistic missiles . Acting on a proposal by SAC Commander in Chief General Thomas S . Power that SAC control strategic weapon s targeting , Gates set up the JSTPS . The SAC commander , supported by an integrated joint staff , assumed separate duties as director of strategic target planning , to be , as Gates indicated , " the planning agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in developing and keeping up to date the detailed plans which are necessary . " When Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A . Burke objected to the new arrangement , Gates encouraged him to argue his case with President Eisenhower , who ultimately upheld Gates ' s decision . Thereafter Burke supported the JSTPS and assigned to it highly qualified naval officers . By December 1960 the JSTPS had prepared the first Single Integrated Operational Plan ( SIOP ) , which specified for various attack options the timing , weapons , delivery systems , and targets to be used by U . S . strategic forces . Role in defense policy . Gates devoted more time than his predecessors Charles E . Wilson and Neil H . McElroy to the development of basic defense policy , a sphere in which the president remained dominant . While he instituted no radical departure from the New Look approach , the changing nature of nuclear weapons and delivery systems , the related assumed need for continental defense systems , and the pressing question of how to respond to local or " limited " wars , dictated a gradual shift in defense policy . As Gates pointed out at a congressional hearing in January 1960 , the two principal U . S . defense objectives were " to deter the outbreak of general war by maintaining and improving our present capability to retaliate with devastating effectiveness in case of a major attack upon us or our allies " and " to maintain , together with our allies , a capability to apply to local situations the degree of force necessary to deter local wars , or to win or contain them promptly if they do break out . " Gates saw no clear distinction between general war and limited war forces . As he put it , " All forces are a deterrent to and would be employed in a general war . Most of our forces could be employed in a limited war , if required . " He noted as an example that aircraft carrier s " are probably the country ' s best limited war capability initially because they are deployed in the world ' s trouble zones and they have on - the - spot ability to react " ; yet , he added , they could contribute to the strategic offensive forces during general war . Views on strategic weapons . During Gates ' s tenure , two missile elements — the ICBM and the submarine - launched ballistic missile ( SLBM ) - - joined the manned bomber to form a " triad " of strategic nuclear delivery systems . Also during this period , there occurred movement toward greater emphasis on counterforce targeting a potential enemy ' s military installations and forces . Not only was the United States developing or beginning to deploy a variety of missile systems during this period - Atlas , Titan , Minuteman , and Polaris - but so was the Soviet Union . The USSR ' s emphasis on the land - based ICBM rather than the manned bomber as its primary strategic delivery system presaged a threat of such magnitude to the United States that , together with the Sputnik shock , it forced an acceleration in the pace of U . S . missile development . Gates , like McElroy , had to contend with the " missile gap " controversy . He regarded it as a false issue , based on the failure of missile gap believers to distinguish between space and military programs . When the U . S . long - range ballistic missile program began in the early 1950s , Gates observed , the development of small , lightweight nuclear warheads by American scientists made it possible for smaller ballistic missiles to carry them . The Russians , on the other hand , concentrated on very large boosters that they used to launch space satellites earlier than the United States . Gates told a House committee , " We are not behind the Russians in our military effort overall . . . . It is one thing to admit you are behind in the ability to put big payloads in space for which we have at the moment no military requirement , and another thing to admit that we are behind in our total military posture . " Gates conceded that the Soviets might have more strategic missiles than the United States for a few years , perhaps peaking in 1962 , but he denied that there was a real missile or deterrent gap ; the Soviets would not " gain a strategic posture which might tempt them to initiate a surprise attack . " Gates based his thinking in part on a debatable approach to intelligence estimates , which took account of Soviet intentions as well as capabilities , leading to the conclusion that the disparity between the number of Soviet and U . S . missiles by 1962 or 1963 would not be as great as estimated during the McElroy period . Views on collective security . Like all of his predecessors , Gates supported U . S . participation in collective security pacts and military assistance programs . He identified NATO as the nucleus of the U . S . " forward strategy . " As he put it , " Should we ever abandon our forward strategy in favor of the so - called ' Fortress America ' concept , we would retreat forever . " He urged Congress to continue adequate funding for military assistance , which had brought very high returns for the money spent . The U - 2 controversy . Perhaps the most spectacular event of Gates ' s administration occurred on 1 May 1960 when the Soviet Union shot down over its territory a U - 2 reconnaissance aircraft piloted by Francis Gary Powers . When Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev announced the incident four days later and accused the United States of spying , the Eisenhower administration initially suggested that the plane might have strayed into Soviet airspace . On the recommendation of representatives from the State and Defense departments , including Gates , President Eisenhower later admitted that the U - 2 was on an intelligence - gathering mission ( actually under CIA control ) and assumed responsibility for the flight . In mid - May Gates accompanied Eisenhower to Paris for a summit meeting that had been scheduled prior to the U - 2 affair . There Khrushchev demanded termination of all U . S . flights over the Soviet Union , an apology , and punishment of those responsible . Eisenhower indicated that the flights would not be resumed but rejected the other demands , whereupon Khrushchev refused to proceed with the summit meeting . Gates suggested later that the Russian leader used the U - 2 crisis to abort a meeting that he had determined in advance would not result in gains for the Soviet Union . On the eve of the summit conference , Gates ordered a worldwide alert of U . S . military communications facilities a decision criticized by some as provocative . Stoutly defending his action , Gates later explained that he decided , with the concurrence of Eisenhower and Secretary of State Christian A . Herter , to call the alert when he became aware of the belligerent position Khrushchev intended to take when the summit convened the next day . " Under the circumstances , " Gates said , " it seemed most prudent to me to increase the awareness of our unified commanders . Moreover , since the command and individuals concerned in the decision process , including the President , the Secretary of State , and myself , were overseas , it was important to check out our military communications . " Although Gates adhered to the usual budget posture and strategy of the Eisenhower administration , there was 8 . 2 percent real growth in DoD ' s fiscal year 1961 budget after Congress completed its work . Total obligational authority amounted to $ 44 . 6 billion , almost $ 4 . 4 billion over the previous year . The bulk of the increase went to the Navy and the Air Force . Gates pressed for an appropriation of $ 2 billion for military assistance , most of which Congress provided . To criticism of the Eisenhower administration ' s continuing efforts to hold down the DoD budget , Gates replied that the department was spending enough money to meet the nation ' s vital security needs . Summary of Gates ' tenure as defense secretary . In a lengthy statement entitled " Department of Defense , 1953 - 1960 , " prepared at the close of Gates ' s tenure , the Department of Defense summarized its accomplishments during the Eisenhower years , concluding that " today our armed forces have the greatest striking power in our history , many times greater than in 1953 . " Among other accomplishments , it cited development of medium - and long - range bombers ( including the B - 52 s put into service during the 1950s ) and ICBMs ; installation of a continental defense system the Distant Early Warning Line ( DEW ) Line , the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System ( BMEWS ) , and Nike surface - to - air missile systems ; production of several nuclear submarines , beginning with the Nautilus in 1954 , and " Forrestal " - type carriers ; and creation of the Defense Communications Agency . Gates retired from office on 20 January 1961 . There were those who regarded him as the first of a new breed of secretaries of defense who would take a more active management approach evidenced by his regular meetings with the JCS and establishment of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff . Gates , of course , had the advantages of long prior service in DoD and the expanded authority of the office resulting from the 1953 and 1958 reorganizations . Although President Eisenhower continued to be , as during the Wilson and McElroy periods , the chief author of defense policy and the ultimate decision - maker , Gates appeared to operate with more authority and independence than his immediate predecessors , especially in areas such as strategic policy and planning . It is notable that after John F . Kennedy ' s election to the presidency in 1960 the press speculated that he might include a Republican in his cabinet and that if so , Gates would be high on the list of possible appointees . Later career and honors . On January 18 , 1961 , Gates was presented with the Medal of Freedom by President Eisenhower . After he left The Pentagon , Gates joined Morgan and Company in New York , later the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company , which eventually became the J . P Morgan Bank , becoming president in 1962 and chairman and chief executive officer in 1965 . President Richard M . Nixon appointed him chairman of the Advisory Commission on an All - Volunteer Force , which presented its influential report in November 1969 . In 1976 – 77 he served , with the rank of ambassador , as chief of the United States Liaison Office in the People ' s Republic of China . Gates died in Philadelphia at age 76 on 25 March 1983 . Gates served as a Trustee of the University of Pennsylvania , from 1948 to 1983 and received an honorary degree of an LL . D . from Penn , his alma mater , in 1956 . He was also a member of the Board of Trustees of the College of the Atlantic during the periods 1972 – 1976 and 1978 – 1983 . The community center at College of the Atlantic is named in his honor . Namesake . The " Ticonderoga " - class guided missile cruiser USS " Thomas S . Gates " ( CG - 51 ) is named after the late Secretary of Defense . It is the only such cruiser named after a person . External links .