Air Armament Center The Air Armament Center ( AAC ) was an Air Force Material Command ( AFMC ) center at Eglin Air Force Base , Florida , responsible for development , acquisition , testing , and deployment of all air - delivered weapons for the U . S . Air Force . Weapon systems maintained by the center included the Advanced Medium Range Air - to - Air Missile , High - speed anti - radiation missile , HARM Targeting System , Joint Air - to - Surface Standoff Missile , Joint Direct Attack Munition , Miniature Air - Launched Decoy , Sensor Fuzed Weapon , and the Small Diameter Bomb . The Air Armament Center was inactivated as an AFMC center on July 18 , 2012 and its functions merged into the former 96th Air Base Wing at Eglin AFB . The new organization was renamed as the 96th Test Wing ( 96 TW ) the same day as a subordinate command of the Air Force Test Center at Edwards Air Force Base , California . History . On 27 October 1942 the United States Army Air Forces established the Army Air Forces School of Applied Tactics at Orlando Army Air Base , Florida . The next year , it was redesignated as the Army Air Forces Tactical Center , on 16 October 1943 . In the last days of the war , it was redesignated the Army Air Forces Center , and documentation of the period appears to indicate that the AAF Proving Ground Command at Eglin Field , Florida and the Army Air Forces Center at Orlando AAB were merged as Army Air Forces Center on 1 June 1945 . It was again redesignated , and raised to major command status , on 8 March 1946 as the Army Air Forces Proving Ground Command , and was redesignated the Air Proving Ground Command ( APGC ) on 10 July 1946 . The APGC was moved to the now renamed Eglin Air Force Base , Florida , on 1 July 1948 . APGC conducted realistic testing of new weapons as an independent organization , reporting directly to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and advocating a " fly - before - buy " approach to acquiring new systems . Such a shift , however , remained a challenge , for the Air Force continued the " buy - fly - fix " process that had grown from the demands of the Second World War and undervalued the importance of timely independent operational test and evaluation . APGC attempted to simulate combat conditions during its tests . It also grew in size as it acquired the systems it tested . By 1956 , Air Force regulations outlined an eight - phase test and evaluation process that did not include the APGC until phase seven . By that point in the acquisition cycle , the Air Force had often already fielded units with new systems that APGC had not yet tested . Not surprisingly , operators often experienced serious problems with these new , untested systems . This led to a misperception about the value of operational test and evaluation ( OT & E ) and APGC . Had OT & E taken place before production decisions and fielding new systems , there likely would not have been any question about the added value of independent OT & E . As a result of the doubts about the value of APGC and cuts to the defense budget , in 1957 the Air Force stripped APGC of its major command status , reduced its budget and authorized personnel , and redesignated the Command the Air Proving Ground Center , and assigned it to the Air Research and Development Command . This action meant the Air Force no longer had an independent organization that specialized in impartial operational test and evaluation . Decentralized operational testing at the major commands occurred from 1958 to 1973 . Major command emphasis was often on quick deployment rather than thorough testing and impartial evaluations . Although the Air Force streamlined OT & E from eight to three phases during this period , OT & E still came at the end of the acquisition process . In addition , as systems became more complex , and the Air Force moved to acquire systems quickly , the " fly - before - buy " approach fell by the wayside . The consequences became clear when a Department of Defense study found that 21 of 22 major weapons systems used in the Vietnam War from 1965 - 1970 suffered severe operational deficiencies . These results strongly stated the case for independent OT & E in the Air Force . The AAC was a focal point for the acquisition of advanced weapons systems . The center carried out scientific research , system management , production , operational performance , business management , requirements definition , customer and engineering support , technology planning , materiel identification , and field support activities . While " fly - before - buy " has repeatedly proven its worth in thorough testing of systems and avoidance of later problems , the Air Force even in the twenty - first century remains severely hampered by a " buy - fly - fix " approach . Literally billions of dollars have been spent in making weapons systems operational after they have entered squadron service . For example , the Rockwell B - 1B Lancer suffered repeated such problems . When declared operational , apart from nuclear weapons , the only conventional weapon the B - 1 could use were free - fall bombs . Structure . To accomplish its mission the Air Armament Center commanded three wings through 2010 .