Axe murder incident The axe murder incident ( ) was the killing of two United States Army officers by North Korean soldiers on August 18 , 1976 , in the Joint Security Area ( JSA ) located in the Korean Demilitarized Zone ( DMZ ) . The U . S . officers had been part of a work party cutting down a tree in the JSA . Three days later , the U . S . and South Korea launched Operation Paul Bunyan , an operation that combined a return to cut down the tree with a show of force to intimidate North Korea into backing down . North Korea then accepted responsibility for the earlier killings . The incident is also known as the hatchet incident and the poplar tree incident and " The Tree Trimming Incident " because the object of the conflict was a poplar tree standing in the JSA . Background . In the JSA , near the Bridge of No Return , a poplar tree blocked the line of sight between a United Nations Command ( UNC ) checkpoint ( CP # 3 ) and an observation post ( OP # 5 ) . CP # 3 , situated next to the Bridge of No Return , was the northernmost UNC checkpoint and only visible from OP # 5 during the winter months . During the summer months , only the top of CP # 3 was visible from one other UNC checkpoint ( CP # 2 ) . Running across the middle of the bridge was the Military Demarcation Line between North Korean and South Korean territories . The Korean People ' s Army ( KPA , North Korea ' s army ) had made numerous attempts to grab UNC personnel from CP # 3 and drag them across the bridge into North Korean territory . The proximity to North Korean territory and the North Korean checkpoints on all access routes , along with the repeated attempts to kidnap the UNC personnel working there , led to CP # 3 being referred to as “ The Loneliest Outpost in the World ” . On one occasion before the incident , North Korean soldiers had held a group of U . S . troops at gunpoint , so Joint Security Force ( JSF ) Company Commander Captain Arthur Bonifas was sent to force the North Koreans to stand down and bring the Americans back to safety , which he did successfully . Bonifas would later be one of the two killed in the axe murder . The incident . Initial trimming . On August 18 , 1976 , a group of five Korean Service Corps ( KSC ) personnel escorted by a UNC security team consisting of Bonifas , his South Korean ( ROK ) Army counterpart , Captain Kim , the platoon leader of the current platoon in the area ( 1LT Mark Barrett ) , and 11 enlisted personnel , both American and South Korean , went into the JSA to trim the tree as previously scheduled with the KPA delegation . The two captains did not wear side arm s , as members of the Joint Security Area were limited to only five armed officers and 30 armed enlisted personnel at a time . However , there were mattock s in the back of the 2½ ton truck . The KSC workers had the axes they brought to prune the tree branches . The tree had been scheduled to be trimmed seven days earlier , but rain had forced the work to be rescheduled . After trimming began , about 15 North Korean soldiers appeared , commanded by Senior Lt . Pak Chul , whom the UNC soldiers had previously nicknamed " Lt . Bulldog " due to a history of confrontations . Pak and his subordinates appeared to observe the trimming without concern for approximately 15 minutes , until he abruptly told the UNC to cease the activity stating the tree could not be trimmed " because Kim Il Sung personally planted it and nourished it and it ' s growing under his supervision . " Capt . Bonifas ordered the detail to continue , and turned his back on Lt . Pak Chul . Attack . After being ignored by Capt . Bonifas , Pak sent a runner across the Bridge of No Return . Within minutes a North Korean guard truck crossed the bridge and approximately 20 more North Korean guards disembarked carrying crowbar s and club s . Pak again demanded that the tree trimming stop , and when Capt . Bonifas again turned his back on him , Pak removed his watch , carefully wrapped it in a handkerchief , placed it in his pocket , and then shouted " Kill the bastards ! " . Using axes dropped by the tree - trimmers , the KPA forces attacked the two U . S . soldiers , Capt . Bonifas and Lt . Barrett , and wounded all but one of the UNC guards . While Capt . Bonifas was knocked to the ground by Pak and then bludgeoned to death by at least five North Koreans , Lt . Barrett jumped a low wall which led into a deep tree - filled depression , just across the road from the tree . The depression was not visible from the road because of the dense grass and small trees . The entire fight lasted for only about 20 – 30 seconds before the UNC Force managed to disperse the North Korean guards and place Capt . Bonifas ' body in their truck . However , there was no sign of Lt . Barrett and the two UNC guards at OP # 5 could not see . They did , however , observe the North Korean guards grab ( by the heels ) approximately five members of their own force and drag them back across the bridge . They also observed the North Korean guards at KPA # 8 ( along the UNC emergency egress road ) exhibiting strange behavior , in that one guard would take an axe and go down into the depression for a couple of minutes and then come back up and hand the axe to another guard who would repeat the process . This went on for approximately 90 minutes until the UNC guards at OP # 5 were informed that Lt . Barrett was missing , at which time they informed their superiors about the KPA activity in the depression . A search and rescue squad was quickly dispatched and found Lt . Barrett had been attacked with the axe by the North Koreans . Lt . Barrett was recovered and transferred to a hospital in Seoul via an aid station at Camp Greaves , but died during the journey . Captain Shirron ( Bonifas ' replacement ) , Captain Shaddix , the Joint Duty Officer ' s driver , the Joint Duty Officer , and the OP # 5 guard witnessed the attack from OP # 5 and recorded the incident with both a black and white camera , which ran out of film , and Shaddix ' s 35 mm camera with a telephoto lens . The UNC Guard at CP # 3 ( Bridge of No Return ) recorded the incident with a movie camera . Reaction . Shortly after the incident , North Korean media began airing reports of the fight . The North Korean version stated : " Around 10 : 45 a . m . today , the American imperialist aggressors sent in 14 hoodlums with axes into the Joint Security Area to cut the trees on their own accord , although such a work should be mutually consented beforehand . Four persons from our side went to the spot to warn them not to continue the work without our consent . Against our persuasion , they attacked our guards en masse and committed a serious provocative act of beating our men , wielding murderous weapons and depending on the fact that they outnumbered us . Our guards could not but resort to self - defense measures under the circumstances of this reckless provocation . " Within four hours of the attack , Kim Jong - il ( son of the North Korean leader Kim Il - sung ) addressed the Conference of Non - Aligned Nations in Colombo , Sri Lanka , where he presented a prepared document describing the incident as an unprovoked attack on North Korean guards , led by American officers . He then introduced a resolution asking the conference to condemn that day ' s grave U . S . provocation and called on participants to endorse both the withdrawal of U . S . forces from Korea and the dissolution of the United Nations Command , which was seconded by Cuba . The members of the conference passed the resolution . The CIA considered that the attack had been pre - planned by the North Korean government . A variety of responses were evaluated . Readiness levels for American forces in Korea were increased to DEFCON 3 early on August 19 . Rocket and artillery attacks in the area were considered , but discounted due to an unfavorable 4 : 1 ratio of artillery pieces and because President Park Chung - hee did not want military action taken . Operation Paul Bunyan . In response to the " axe murder incident " , the UN Command determined that instead of trimming the branches that obscured visibility , they would cut down the tree with the aid of overwhelming force . The parameters of the operation were decided in the White House , where President Gerald Ford had held crisis talks . Ford and his advisors were concerned about making a show of strength to chasten North Korea , but without causing further escalation . The operation , named after mythical lumberjack Paul Bunyan , was conceived as a US / South Korean show of force , but was also carefully managed to prevent further escalation . It was planned over two days by General Richard G . Stilwell and his staff at the UNC headquarters in Seoul . Forces . Operation Paul Bunyan was carried out on August 21 at 7 AM , three days after the killings . A convoy of 23 American and South Korean vehicles ( " Task Force Vierra " , named after Lieutenant Colonel Victor S . Vierra , commander of the United States Army Support Group ) drove into the JSA without warning to the North Koreans , who had one observation post manned at that hour . In the vehicles were two eight - man teams of military engineers ( from the 2nd Engineer Battalion , 2nd Infantry Division ) equipped with chain - saw s to cut down the tree . These teams were accompanied by two 30 - man security platoons from the Joint Security Force , who were armed with pistols and axe handles . The 2nd Platoon would secure the northern entrance to the JSA via the Bridge of No Return , while the 3rd Platoon would secure the southern edge of the area . Concurrently , a team from B Company , commanded by Captain Walter Seifried , had activated the detonation systems for the charges on Freedom Bridge and had the 165mm main gun of the M728 Combat Engineer Vehicle aimed mid - span to ensure that the bridge would fall should the order be given for its destruction . Also B Company , supporting E Company ( Bridge ) , were building M4T6 rafts on the Imjin River should the situation require emergency evacuation by that route . In addition , a 64 - man South Korean special forces company accompanied them , armed with clubs and trained in Tae Kwon Do , supposedly without firearms . However , once they parked their trucks near the Bridge of No Return , they started throwing out the sandbags that lined the truck bottoms , and handing out M - 16 rifle s and M - 79 grenade launcher s that had been concealed below . Several of the special forces men also had Claymore mine s strapped to their chests with the firing mechanism in their hands , and were shouting at the North Koreans to cross the bridge . A U . S . infantry company in 20 utility helicopters and 7 Cobra attack helicopters circled behind them . Behind these helicopters , B - 52 Stratofortress es escorted by U . S . F - 4 Phantom II s from Kunsan Air Base and South Korean F - 5 Freedom Fighter s were visible flying across the sky at high altitude . At Taegu Air Base , F - 111 bombers of the 366th Tactical Fighter Squadron out of Mountain Home Air Force Base , were stationed . The aircraft carrier " Midway " task force had also been moved to a station just offshore . In addition , near the edges of the DMZ , many more heavily armed U . S . and South Korean infantry , artillery including the Second Battalion , 71st Air Defense Regiment armed with HAWK missile s , and armor were waiting to back up the special operations team . Bases near the DMZ were prepared for demolition in the case of a military response . The defense condition ( DEFCON ) was elevated on order of Gen . Stillwell , as recounted in Colonel De LaTeur ' s research paper later . In addition , 12 , 000 additional troops were ordered to Korea , including 1 , 800 Marines from Okinawa . During the operation , nuclear - capable strategic bombers circled over the JSA . According to an intelligence analyst monitoring the North Korea tactical radio net , the accumulation of force " blew their . . . minds " . Altogether , Task Force Vierra consisted of 813 men : almost all of the men of the United States Army Support Group , of which the Joint Security Force was a part ; a South Korean reconnaissance company ; a South Korean Special Forces company which had infiltrated the river area by the bridge the night before ; and members of a reinforced composite rifle company from the 9th Infantry Regiment . In addition to this force , every UNC force in the rest of South Korea was on battle alert . Actual operation . The engineers in the convoy — two teams from B Company and C Company , 2d Engineer Battalion , led by First Lieutenant Patrick Ono , who had , two days before , conducted a recon of the tree disguised as a Korean corporal — disembarked from their vehicles once the convoy arrived , and immediately started cutting down the tree while standing on the roof of their truck , while the 2nd Platoon truck was positioned to block the Bridge of No Return . The remainder of the task force dispersed to their assigned areas around the tree and assumed their roles of guarding the engineers . North Korea quickly responded with about 150 – 200 troops , armed with machine guns and assault rifles . The North Korean troops arrived mostly in buses , but did not leave them at first , watching the events unfold . Upon seeing their arrival , Lieutenant Colonel Vierra relayed a radio communication , whereupon the helicopters and air force jets became visible over the horizon . At the Yokota Air Force Base in Japan , the base was on alert . The flight - line runway was " nose to tail " with a dozen C - 130 ready to support the incident . The North Koreans quickly disembarked from their buses and began setting up two - man machine gun positions , where they watched in silence as the tree was felled in 42 minutes ( three minutes fewer than Stilwell ' s estimate ) , avoiding a violent confrontation . Also removed were two road barriers installed by the North Koreans , while the South Korean troops also vandalized two North Korean guard posts . The stump of the tree , almost tall , was deliberately left standing . Five minutes into the operation , the UNC notified their North Korean counterparts at the JSA that a UN work party had entered the JSA " in order to peacefully finish the work left unfinished " on August 18 . Aftermath . Although the operation was carried out peacefully , there was concern that it could spark a wider conflict . The incident led to increased tensions along the Korean Demilitarized Zone , but did not develop into full - scale war . Some shots were fired at the US helicopter which , carrying Major General Morris Brady , circled Panmunjom later that day , but nobody was injured . The United Nations Command had demanded that the North Koreans " punish those involved and make adequate reparations to the families of those killed and injured " . Later on the day of Operation Paul Bunyan , they received a message from Kim Il - sung expressing regret at the incident without accepting responsibility . The message was relayed by the senior member of the North Korean MAC team ( Major General Han Ju Kyong ) to the senior UNC MAC member ( Rear Admiral Mark Frudden ) . It read : " It was a good thing that no big incident occurred at Panmunjom for a long period . However , it is regretful that an incident occurred in the Joint Security Area , Panmunjom this time . An effort must be made so that such incidents may not recur in the future . For this purpose both sides should make efforts . We urge your side to prevent the provocation . Our side will never provoke first , but take self - defensive measures only when provocation occurs . This is our consistent stand . " While not going far enough to satisfy a previously discussed ' acceptable ' Northern response , the US administration decided to emphasize this as a step in the right direction . Indeed , it was the first time since the armistice that the North had accepted responsibility for violence along the DMZ . The Joint Security Area ' s Advance Camp ( Camp Kitty Hawk ) was later renamed Camp Bonifas in honor of the slain company commander . The site of the tree , the stump of which was cut down in 1987 , became the location of a stone monument with a brass plate inscribed in the memory of both men . The UN command has held commemorative ceremonies at the monument on anniversaries . The close - by UNC checkpoint ( CP # 3 , situated next to the Bridge of No Return ) was no longer used after the mid - 1980s , when concrete - filled bollard s were placed in the road to make vehicle passage impossible . The incident also prompted the separation of personnel from the two sides within the JSA as a way to avoid further incidents . The axe supposedly used in the incident is on display in the North Korea Peace Museum ( the axe was not on display in May 2012 , but had been returned to a display case by March 2013 ) . General William J . Livsey , who was the Commanding General of the Eighth United States Army in South Korea from 1984 to 1987 , publicly carried a swagger stick that was carved from wood collected at the Korean Demilitarized Zone Axe Murder Incident poplar tree . The swagger stick was ceremoniously passed on to General Louis C . Menetrey when General Livsey retired from his command .