Contras The contras ( some references use the capitalized form , " Contras " ) is a label given to the various rebel groups opposing the Sandinista Junta of National Reconstruction government in Nicaragua that were active from 1979 through to the early 1990s . Among the separate contra groups , the Nicaraguan Democratic Force ( FDN ) emerged as the largest by far . In 1987 , virtually all contra organizations were united , at least nominally , into the Nicaraguan Resistance . From an early stage , the rebels received financial and military support from the U . S . government , and their military significance decisively depended on it . After U . S . support was banned by Congress , the Reagan administration covertly continued it . These covert activities culminated in the Iran – Contra affair . The term " contra " comes from the Spanish " contra " , which means " against " but in this case is short for , in English " the counter - revolution " . Some rebels disliked being called contras , feeling that it defined their cause only in negative terms , or implied a desire to restore the old order . Rebel fighters usually referred to themselves as ( " commandos " ) ; peasant sympathizers also called the rebels ( " the cousins " ) . From the mid - 1980s , as the Reagan administration and the rebels sought to portray the movement as the " democratic resistance " , members started describing themselves as . During the war against the Sandinista government , the contras carried out many human rights violations , and evidence suggests that these were systematically committed as an element of warfare strategy . Contra supporters often tried to downplay these violations , or countered that the Sandinista government carried out much more . In particular , the Reagan administration engaged in a campaign to alter public opinion on the contras which has been denoted as " white propaganda " . History . Origins . The Contras were not a monolithic group , but a combination of three distinct elements of Nicaraguan society : Main groups . The CIA and Argentine intelligence , seeking to unify the anti - Sandinista cause before initiating large - scale aid , persuaded 15 September Legion , the UDN and several former smaller groups to merge in September 1981 as the Nicaraguan Democratic Force ( " Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense " , FDN ) . Although the FDN had its roots in two groups made up of former National Guardsmen ( of the Somoza regime ) , its joint political directorate was led by businessman and former anti - Somoza activist Adolfo Calero Portocarrero . Edgar Chamorro later stated that there was strong opposition within the UDN against working with the Guardsmen and that the merging only took place because of insistence by the CIA . Based in Honduras , Nicaragua ' s northern neighbor , under the command of former National Guard Colonel Enrique Bermúdez , the new FDN commenced to draw in other smaller insurgent forces in the north . Largely financed , trained , equipped , armed and organized by the U . S . , it emerged as the largest and most active contra group . In April 1982 , Edén Pastora ( " Comandante Cero " ) , one of the heroes in the fight against Somoza , organized the Sandinista Revolutionary Front ( FRS ) – embedded in the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance ( ARDE ) – and declared war on the Sandinista government . Himself a former Sandinista who had held several high posts in the government , he had resigned abruptly in 1981 and defected , believing that the newly found power had corrupted the Sandinista ' s original ideas . A popular and charismatic leader , Pastora initially saw his group develop quickly . He confined himself to operate in the southern part of Nicaragua ; after a press conference he was holding on 30 May 1984 was bombed , he " voluntarily withdrew " from the contra struggle . A third force , Misurasata , appeared among the Miskito , Sumo and Rama Amerindian peoples of Nicaragua ' s Atlantic coast , who in December 1981 found themselves in conflict with the authorities following the government ' s efforts to nationalize Indian land . In the course of this conflict , forced removal of at least 10 , 000 Indians to relocation centers in the interior of the country and subsequent burning of some villages took place . The Misurasata movement split in 1983 , with the breakaway Misura group of Stedman Fagoth Muller allying itself more closely with the FDN , and the rest accommodating themselves with the Sandinistas : On 8 December 1984 a ceasefire agreement known as the Bogota Accord was signed by Misurasata and the Nicaraguan government . A subsequent autonomy statute in September 1987 largely defused Miskito resistance . Unity efforts . U . S . officials were active in attempting to unite the Contra groups . In June 1985 most of the groups reorganized as the United Nicaraguan Opposition ( UNO ) , under the leadership of Adolfo Calero , Arturo Cruz and Alfonso Robelo , all originally supporters of the anti - Somoza revolution . After UNO ' s dissolution early in 1987 , the Nicaraguan Resistance ( RN ) was organized along similar lines in May . U . S . military and financial assistance . In front of the International Court of Justice , Nicaragua claimed that the contras were altogether a creation of the U . S . This claim was rejected . However , the evidence of a very close relationship between the contras and the United States was considered overwhelming and incontrovertible . The U . S . played a very large role in financing , training , arming , and advising the contras over a long period , and the contras only became capable of carrying out significant military operations as a result of this support . Political background . The US government viewed the leftist Sandinistas as undemocratic and opposed its ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union . Ronald Reagan , who had assumed the American presidency in January 1981 , accused the Sandinistas of importing Cuban - style socialism and aiding leftist guerrillas in El Salvador . The Reagan administration continued to view the Sandinistas as undemocratic despite the 1984 Nicaraguan elections being generally declared fair by foreign observers . However throughout the 1980s the Sandinista government was regarded as " Partly Free " by Freedom House . Apart from that , there were concerns that Nicaragua would inspire and strengthen leftist revolutionary movements throughout Central America . On the one hand , US officials warned that Nicaragua could " actively " export leftist ideology by training radical union and peasant leaders of its neighboring countries . On the other hand , Chomsky - citing reports from Oxfam - suspected that Nicaragua posed " the threat of a good example " , as social and economic reforms undertaken by the Sandinistas in the early eighties ( which had already received praise not just by Oxfam , but also by the World Bank and Inter - American Development Bank ) started to succeed . Anyway , the US government explicitly planned to back the contras as a means to force the Sandinista government to divert scarce resources to the military and away from social and economic programs . On 4 January 1982 , Reagan signed the top secret National Security Decision Directive 17 ( NSDD - 17 ) , giving the CIA the authority to recruit and support the contras with $ 19 million in military aid . The effort to support the contras was one component of the Reagan Doctrine , which called for providing military support to movements opposing Soviet - supported , communist governments . By December 1981 , however , the United States had already begun to support armed opponents of the Sandinista regime . From the beginning , the CIA was in charge . The arming , clothing , feeding and supervision of the contras became the most ambitious paramilitary and political action operation mounted by the agency in nearly a decade . One of the purposes the CIA hoped to achieve by these operations was an aggressive and violent response from the Sandinista government which in turn could be used as a pretext for proper military actions . In the fiscal year 1984 , the U . S . Congress approved $ 24 million in contra aid . However , since the contras failed to win widespread popular support or military victories within Nicaragua , since opinion polls indicated that a majority of the U . S . public was not supportive of the contras , since the Reagan administration lost much of its support regarding its contra policy within Congress after disclosure of CIA mining of Nicaraguan ports , and since a report of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research commissioned by the State Department found Reagan ' s allegations about Soviet influence in Nicaragua " exaggerated " , Congress cut off all funds for the contras in 1985 by the third Boland Amendment . The Boland Amendment had first been passed by Congress in December 1982 . At this time , it only outlawed U . S . assistance to the contras " for the purpose of overthrowing the Nicaraguan government " , while allowing assistance for other purposes . In October 1984 , it was amended to forbid action by not only the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency but all U . S . government agencies . Nevertheless , the case for support of the contras continued to be made in Washington , D . C . , by both the Reagan administration and the Heritage Foundation , which argued that support for the contras would counter Soviet influence in Nicaragua . On 1 May 1985 President Reagan announced that his administration perceived Nicaragua to be " an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States " , and declared a " national emergency " and a trade embargo against Nicaragua to " deal with that threat " . After the U . S . enforced the embargo , Nicaragua was isolated from the West , forcing the Sandinistas to rely more on Eastern bloc military and economic assistance even though Moscow declined to offer the quantity of aid it provided to close communist allies . Illegal covert operations . With Congress blocking further contra aid , the Reagan administration sought to arrange funding and military supplies by means of third countries and private sources . Between 1984 and 1986 , $ 34 million from third countries and $ 2 . 7 million from private sources were raised this way . The secret contra assistance was run by the National Security Council , with officer Lt . Col . Oliver North in charge . With the third - party funds , North created an organization called " The Enterprise " which served as the secret arm of the NSC staff and had its own airplanes , pilots , airfield , ship , operatives and secret Swiss bank accounts . It also received assistance from personnel from other government agencies , especially from CIA personnel in Central America . This operation functioned , however , without any of the accountability required of U . S . government activities . The Enterprise ' s efforts culminated in the Iran - Contra Affair of 1986 – 1987 , which facilitated contra funding through the proceeds of arms sales to Iran . According to the National Security Archive , Oliver North had been in contact with Manuel Noriega , the military leader of Panama later convicted on drug charges , whom he personally met . The issue of drug money and its importance in funding the Nicaraguan conflict was the subject of various reports and publications . The contras were funded by drug trafficking , of which the United States was aware . Senator John Kerry ' s 1988 Committee on Foreign Relations report on Contra drug links concluded that " senior U . S . policy makers were not immune to the idea that drug money was a perfect solution to the Contras ' funding problems " . The Reagan administration ' s support for the Contras continued to stir controversy well into the 1990s . In August 1996 , " San Jose Mercury News " reporter Gary Webb published a series titled " Dark Alliance " , alleging that the contras contributed to the rise of crack cocaine in California . Propaganda . During the time the US Congress blocked funding for the contras , the Reagan government engaged in a campaign to alter public opinion and change the vote in Congress on contra aid . For this purpose , the NSC established an interagency working group which in turn coordinated the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean ( managed by Otto Reich ) , which conducted the campaign . The S / LPD produced and widely disseminated a variety of pro - contra publications , arranged speeches and press conferences . It also disseminated " white propaganda " — pro - contra newspaper articles by paid consultants who did not disclose their connection to the Reagan administration . On top of that , Oliver North helped Carl Channell ' s tax - exempt organization , the " National Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty " , to raise $ 10 million , by arranging numerous briefings for groups of potential contributors at the premises of the White House and by facilitating private visits and photo sessions with President Reagan for major contributors . Channell , in turn , used part of that money to run a series of television advertisements directed at home districts of Congressmen considered to be swing votes on contra aid . Out of the $ 10 million raised , more than $ 1 million was spent on pro - contra publicity . " If you look at it as a whole " , a senior S / LPD official said , " the Office of Public Diplomacy was carrying out a huge psychological operation of the kind the military conducts to influence a population in denied or enemy territory " . International Court of Justice ruling . In 1984 the Sandinista government filed a suit in the International Court of Justice ( ICJ ) against the United States ( " Nicaragua v . United States " ) , which resulted in a 1986 judgment against the United States . The ICJ held that the U . S . had violated international law by supporting the contras in their rebellion against the Nicaraguan government and by mining Nicaragua ' s harbors . Regarding the alleged human rights violations by the contras , however , the ICJ took the view that the United States could only be held accountable for them if it would have been proven that the U . S . had effective control of the contra operations resulting in these alleged violations . Nevertheless , the ICJ found that the U . S . encouraged acts contrary to general principles of humanitarian law by producing the manual " Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare ( Operaciones sicológicas en guerra de guerrillas " ) and disseminating it to the contras . The manual , amongst other things , advised on how to rationalize killings of civilians and recommended to hire professional killers for specific selective tasks . The United States , which did not participate in the merits phase of the proceedings , maintained that the ICJ ' s power did not supersede the Constitution of the United States and argued that the court did not seriously consider the Nicaraguan role in El Salvador , while it accused Nicaragua of actively supporting armed groups there , specifically in the form of supply of arms . The ICJ had found that evidence of a responsibility of the Nicaraguan government in this matter was insufficient . The U . S . argument was affirmed , however , by the dissenting opinion of ICJ member U . S . Judge Schwebel , who concluded that in supporting the contras , the United States acted lawfully in collective self - defence in El Salvador ' s support . The U . S . blocked enforcement of the ICJ judgment by the United Nations Security Council and thereby prevented Nicaragua from obtaining any actual compensation . The Nicaraguan government finally withdrew the complaint from the court in September 1992 ( under the later , post - FSLN , government of Violeta Chamorro ) , following a repeal of the law requiring the country to seek compensation . Human rights violations . Edgar Chamorro , a former Contra and member of the FDN ' s political directorate who later became a critic of the Contras , stated that during his time with the Contras , he frequently received reports about atrocities committed by Contra troops against civilians and against Sandinista prisoners : " As time went on , I became more and more troubled by the frequent reports I received of atrocities committed by our troops against civilians and against Sandinista prisoners . The atrocities I had heard about were not isolated incidents , but reflected a consistent pattern of behaviour by our troops . There were unit commanders who openly bragged about their murders , mutilations , etc . " A Sandinista militiaman interviewed by " The Guardian " stated that Contra rebels committed these atrocities against Sandinista prisoners after a battle at a Sandinista rural outpost : " Rosa had her breasts cut off . Then they cut into her chest and took out her heart . The men had their arms broken , their testicles cut off . They were killed by slitting their throats and pulling the tongue out through the slit . " Americas Watch – which subsequently became part of Human Rights Watch – accused the Contras of : Human Rights Watch released a report on the situation in 1989 , which stated : " [ The ] contras were major and systematic violators of the most basic standards of the laws of armed conflict , including by launching indiscriminate attacks on civilians , selectively murdering non - combatants , and mistreating prisoners . " Similarly , the Catholic Institute for International Relations ( CIIR , now known as " Progressio " ) , a human rights organization which identifies itself with liberation theology , had summarized Contra operating procedures in their 1987 human rights report : " The record of the contras in the field , as opposed to their official professions of democratic faith , is one of consistent and bloody abuse of human rights , of murder , torture , mutilation , rape , arson , destruction and kidnapping . " Earlier , in December 1984 , the Council on Hemispheric Affairs had issued a report condemning the Contras and the United States government as being among the worst human rights violators in Latin America : " The CIA directed forces are among the worst human rights violators in Latin America , responsible for systematic brutality against a civilian population . For its critical role in facilitating the Contra violence , the [ United States ] Administration must share responsibility as a hemispheric violator of human rights . The Contras have killed , tortured , raped , mutilated and abducted hundreds of civilians they suspect of sympathizing with the Sandinistas . Victims have included peasants , teachers , doctors and agricultural workers . " Human rights violations as a strategy . – sponsored by the International Human Rights Law Group and the Washington Office on Latin America , and carried out independently of any Nicaraguan government interference or direction - found that the contras with some frequency deliberately targeted Nicaraguan citizens in acts of terroristic violence . An influential report on Contra atrocities was issued by lawyer Reed Brody shortly before the 1985 U . S . Congressional vote on Contra aid . It disclosed a " distinct pattern " of abuses by the contras , including : " attacks on purely civilian targets resulting in the killing of unarmed men , woman , children and the elderly — premeditated acts of brutality including rapes , beatings , mutilations and torture — and individual and mass kidnappings of civilians for the purpose of forced recruitment into the Contra forces and the creation of a hostage refugee population in Honduras ; – assaults on economic and social targets such as farms , cooperatives and on vehicles carrying volunteer coffee harvesters ; – intimidation of civilians who participate or cooperate in government or community programs such as distribution of subsidized food products , education and local self - defense militias ; – and kidnapping , intimidation , and even murder of religious leaders who support the government , including priests and clergy - trained lay pastors . " Similarly , Human Rights Watch pointed out that " the Contras systematically engage in violent abuses . . . so prevalent that these may be said to be their principal means of waging war " in a 1989 report . In his affidavit to the World Court , former contra Edgar Chamorro testified that " The CIA did not discourage such tactics . To the contrary , the Agency severely criticized me when I admitted to the press that the FDN had regularly kidnapped and executed agrarian reform workers and civilians . We were told that the only way to defeat the Sandinistas was to . . . kill , kidnap , rob and torture . . . " These deliberate acts of violence against civilians were acknowledged by the CIA as early as late 1983 , when Duane Clarridge , Latin America division chief of the CIA ’ s Directorate for Operations , reported in a secret briefing to the Senate subcommittee that his contras had murdered " civilians and Sandinista officials in the provinces , as well as heads of cooperatives , nurses , doctors and judges " . But that didn ' t contradict the presidential directive , Dewey said . " These events don ’ t constitute assassinations because as far as we are concerned assassinations are only those of heads of state . I leave definitions to the politicians . After all , this is a war — a paramilitary operation " . Furthermore , the contras attacked and sabotaged economic and social targets such as lumber yards , coffee processing plants , electrical generating stations , farms , cooperatives , food storage facilities , health centers , including a particular effort to dusrupt the coffee harvests through attacks on coffee cooperatives and on vehicles carrying volunteer coffee harvesters . They also attacked and intimidated civilians deemed to be contributors to the country ' s economy such as telephone workers , coffee pickers , teachers , and technicians as well as civilians who participated or cooperated in government or community programs such as distribution of subsidized food products , rural cooperatives , and education . " Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare " . The CIA manual , ( " Operaciones sicológicas en guerra de guerrillas " ) , had been written in 1983 to be used by the contras . The manual talks about killing civilians who try to leave an occupied town and to rationalize their killing , hiring professional assassins , blackmailing citizens into working for the contras , and inciting violence during demonstrations . The International Court of Justice ruled on 27 June 1986 that by disseminating the manual to the contras , the United States of America had " encouraged . . . acts contrary to general principles of humanitarian law . " Americas Watch had come to a similar conclusion in 1985 . U . S . justification . " New Republic " editor Michael Kinsley argued that critics should not simply dismiss State Department justifications for contra attacks on " soft targets " : " The State Department has defended bloody contra attacks on government - sponsored farm cooperatives , saying that these civilian facilities have military aspects . And , of course , that ' s true . In a Marxist society geared up for war , there are no clear lines separating officials , soldiers and civilians . A guerrilla struggle can ' t be won by attacking only card - carrying Sandinistas . The goal is to undermine morale and confidence in the government : a perfectly legitimate goal if you believe in the cause , but impossible to achieve without vast civilian suffering . Any sensible policy must meet the test of cost - benefit analysis . The amount of blood and misery that will be poured in , and the likelihood that democracy will emerge at the other end . " In line with this , contra leader Adolfo Calero denied that his forces deliberately targeted civilians : " What they call a cooperative is also a troop concentration full of armed people . We are not killing civilians . We are fighting armed people and returning fire when fire is directed at us . " Controversy . U . S . news media published several articles accusing Americas Watch and other bodies of ideological bias and unreliable reporting . It alleged that Americas Watch gave too much credence to alleged Contra abuses and systematically tried to discredit Nicaraguan human rights groups such as the Permanent Commission on Human Rights , which blamed the major human rights abuses on the Sandinistas . In 1985 , the " Wall Street Journal " reported : Human Rights Watch , the umbrella organization of Americas Watch , replied to these allegations : " Almost invariably , U . S . pronouncements on human rights exaggerated and distorted the real human rights violations of the Sandinista regime , and exculpated those of the U . S . - supported insurgents , known as the contras . . . The Bush administration is responsible for these abuses , not only because the contras are , for all practical purposes , a U . S . force , but also because the Bush administration has continued to minimize and deny these violations , and has refused to investigate them seriously . " U . S . political scientist Rudolph Rummel estimated that by 1987 , the contras had murdered about 500 people while the Sandinistas had murdered 4 , 000 to 7 , 000 people in democide . In contrast , Witness for Peace and the Sandinista government claimed at least 736 civilians were murdered by the contras between March 1987 and October 1988 alone . Military successes and election of Violeta Chamorro . By 1986 the contras were besieged by charges of corruption , human - rights abuses , and military ineptitude . A much - vaunted early 1986 offensive never materialized , and Contra forces were largely reduced to isolated acts of terrorism . In October 1987 , however , the contras staged a successful attack in southern Nicaragua . Then on 21 December 1987 , the FDN launched attacks at La Bonanza , La Siuna , and La Rosita in Zelaya province , resulting in heavy fighting . ARDE Frente Sur attacked at El Almendro and along the Rama road . These large - scale raids mainly became possible as the contras were able to use U . S . - provided Redeye missiles against Sandinista Mi - 24 helicopter gunships , which had been supplied by the Soviets . Nevertheless , the Contras remained tenuously encamped within Honduras and weren ' t able to hold Nicaraguan territory . There were isolated protests among the population against the draft implemented by the Sandinista government , which even resulted in full - blown street clashes in Masaya in 1988 . However , polls showed the Sandinista government still enjoyed strong support from Nicaraguans . Political opposition groups were splintered and the Contras began to experience defections , although United States aid maintained them as a viable military force . After a cutoff in U . S . military support and with both sides facing international pressure to bring an end to the conflict , the contras agreed to negotiations with the FSLN . With the help of five Central American Presidents , including Ortega , it was agreed that a voluntary demobilization of the contras should start in early December 1989 , in order to facilitate free and fair elections in Nicaragua in February 1990 ( even though the Reagan administration had pushed for a delay of contra disbandment ) . In the resulting February 1990 elections , Violeta Chamorro and her party the UNO won an upset victory of 55 % to 41 % over Daniel Ortega , even though polls leading up to the election had clearly indicated an FSLN victory . Possible explanations include that the Nicaraguan people were disenchanted with the Ortega regime as well as the fact that already in November 1989 , the White House had announced that the economic embargo against Nicaragua would continue unless Violeta Chamorro won . Also , there had been reports of intimidation from the side of the contras , with a Canadian observer mission confirming 42 people killed by the contras in " election violence " in October 1989 . This led many commentators to assume that Nicaraguans voted against the Sandinistas out of fear of a continuation of the contra war and economic deprivation . Both by critics and supporters of the Reagan administration , this was seen as a direct result of the administration ' s efforts concerning the contras .