Shifta War The Shifta War ( 1963 – 1967 ) was a secessionist conflict in which ethnic Somalis in the Northern Frontier District ( NFD ) of Kenya ( a region that is and has historically been almost exclusively inhabited by ethnic Somalis ) attempted to join with their fellow Somalis in a Greater Somalia . The Kenyan government named the conflict " shifta " , after the Somali word for " bandit " , as part of a propaganda effort . The Kenyan counter - insurgency General Service Unit s forced civilians into " protected villages " ( essentially concentration camps ) as well as killing a large number of livestock kept by the pastoralist Somalis . The war ended in the late summer of 1967 when Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal , Prime Minister of the Somali Republic , signed a ceasefire with Kenya . However , the violence in Kenya deteriorated into disorganised banditry , with occasional episodes of secessionist agitation , for the next several decades . The war and violent clampdowns by the Kenyan government caused large - scale disruption to the way of life in the district , resulting in a slight shift from pastoralist and transhumant lifestyles to sedentary , urban lifestyles . Background . The Northern Frontier District ( NFD ) came into being in 1925 , when it was carved out of the Jubaland region in present - day southern Somalia . At the time under British colonial administration , the northern half of Jubaland was ceded to Italy as a reward for the Italians ' support of the Allies during World War I . Britain retained control of the southern half of the territory , which was later called the Northern Frontier District . From 1926 to 1934 , the NFD , comprising the current North Eastern Province and the districts of Marsabit , Moyale and Isiolo , was closed by British colonial authorities . Movement in and out of the district was possible only through the use of " passes " . Despite these restrictions , pastoralism was well - suited to the arid conditions and the non - Somali residents — who represented a tiny fraction of the region ' s population – were relatively prosperous , whereas the Somali owners of the land were calculated in underdevelopment . Anthropologist John Baxter noted in 1953 that : The Boran and the Sakuye were well - nourished and well - clothed and , though a pastoral life is always physically demanding , people led dignified and satisfying life . . . They had clearly been prospering for some years . In 1940 , the District Commissioner commented in his Handing Over Report : " The Ewaso Boran have degenerated through wealth and soft living into an idle and cowardly set " . . . On 26 June 1960 , four days before granting British Somaliland independence , the British government declared that all Somali areas should be unified in one administrative region . However , after the dissolution of the former British colonies in East Africa , Britain granted administration of the Northern Frontier District to Kenya despite a ) an informal plebiscite demonstrating the overwhelming desire of the region ' s population to join the newly formed Somali Republic , and b ) the fact that the NFD was and still is almost exclusively inhabited by ethnic Somalis . On the eve of Kenyan independence in August 1963 , British officials belatedly realised that the new Kenyan administration were not willing to give up the historically Somali - inhabited areas they had just been granted administration of . Somali officials responded with the following statement : It was evident that the British Government has not only deliberately misled the Somali Government during the course of the last eighteen months , but has also deceitfully encouraged the people of North Eastern Province to believe that their right to self - determination could be granted by the British Government through peaceful and legal means . Led by the Northern Province People ' s Progressive Party ( NPPPP ) , Somalis in the NFD vigorously sought union with the Somali Republic to the north . In response , the Kenyan government enacted a number of repressive measures designed to frustrate their efforts : Somali leaders were routinely placed in preventive detention , where they remained well into the late 1970s . The North Eastern Province was closed to general access ( along with other parts of Kenya ) as a " scheduled " area ( ostensibly closed to all outsiders , including members of parliament , as a means of protecting the nomadic inhabitants ) , and news from it was very difficult to obtain . A number of reports , however , accused the Kenyans of mass slaughters of entire villages of Somali citizens and of setting up large " protected villages " – in effect concentration camp s . The government refused to acknowledge the ethnically based irredentist motives of the Somalis , making constant reference in official statements to the " shifta " ( bandit ) problem in the area . Conflict . The province thus entered a period of running skirmishes between the Kenyan Army and Somali - backed Northern Frontier District Liberation Movement ( NFDLM ) insurgents . One immediate consequence was the signing in 1964 of a Mutual Defense Treaty between Jomo Kenyatta ' s administration and the government of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie . The start of the Bale revolt in Ethiopia in 1963 indicated to both Kenya and Ethiopia the need for cooperation in checking Somali irredentism . However , the treaty had little effect as the Kenyan army was not able to stem the cross - border flow of materiel from Somalia to the guerrilla s . At the outset of the war , the government declared a State of Emergency . This consisted of allowing security forces to detain people up to 56 days without trial , confiscating the property of communities allegedly in retaliation for acts of violence , and restricting the right to assembly and movement . A ' prohibited zone ' was created along the Somali border , and the death penalty was made mandatory for unauthorised possession of firearms . " Special courts " without guarantee of due process were also created . The northeast — declared a " special district " – was subject to nearly unfettered government control , including the authority to detain , arrest or forcibly move individuals or groups , as well as confiscate possessions and land . However , as part of its effort to reassure the public , the Voice of Kenya was warned not to refer to the conflict as a " border dispute " , while a special government committee decided to refer to the rebels as " shiftas " to minimise the political nature of the war . Over the course of the war , the new Kenyan government became increasingly concerned by the growing strength of the Somali military . At independence , Somalia had a weak army of 5 , 000 troops that was incapable of exerting itself beyond its borders . However , in 1963 , the Somali government appealed for assistance from the Soviet Union , which responded by lending it about $ 32 million . By 1969 , 800 Somali officers had received Soviet training , while the army had expanded to over 23 , 000 well - equipped troops . The Kenyan fear that the insurgency might escalate into an all - out war with phalanxes of well - equipped Somali troops was coupled with a concern about the new insurgent tactic of planting land mine s . In a 29 July 1966 letter , Kenyan Defence Permanent Secretary Danson Mlamba warned Information and Broadcasting PS Peter Gachathi of : Mounting casualties to the army and police . . . and the last incident , which we are keeping quiet about , when a police Land Rover was blown up by a mine which killed two officers and wrecked the vehicle is a very serious development . The Kenyan government response may have been inspired by the counter - insurgency efforts taken by the British during the Mau Mau Uprising , which had been spearheaded by the Kikuyu , who now ironically dominated the Kenya African National Union - led government . Gachathi mused that they should perhaps " take a leaf from the ( British ) operations carried out during the emergency against the Mau Mau movement which , I am sure you will agree , were considerably effective . " In 1967 , Kenyan fears reached a fever pitch , and a special government committee was created to prepare for a full - scale war with Somalia . The government also adopted a policy of compulsory villagization in the war - affected area . In 1967 , the populace was moved into 14 " Manyattas " , villages that were guarded by troops ( some referred to them as concentration camps ) . East Africa scholar Alex de Waal described the result as " a military assault upon the entire pastoral way of life , " as enormous numbers of livestock were confiscated or killed , partly to deny their use by the guerrillas and partly to force the populace to abandon their flocks and move to a " Manyatta " . Thus , made destitute , many nomads became an urban underclass , while educated Somalis in Kenya fled the country . The government also removed the dynastic Sultans , who were the traditional leaders , with low - ranking government - appointed chiefs . In 1967 , Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda mediated peace talks between Somali Prime Minister Mohamed Egal and Kenyatta . These bore fruit in October 1967 , when the governments of Kenya and Somalia signed a Memorandum of Understanding ( the Arusha Memorandum ) that resulted in an official ceasefire , though regional security did not prevail until 1969 . After a 1969 coup in Somalia , the new military leader Mohamed Siad Barre , abolished this MoU as he claimed it was corrupt and unsatisfactory . The " Manyatta " strategy is seen as playing a key role in ending the insurgency , though the Somali government may have also decided that the potential benefits of a war simply was not worth the cost and risk . However , Somalia did not renounce its claim to Greater Somalia . Effects . With Somali support for their movement for self - determination temporarily halted , many former rebels returned to the traditional activity of pastoralism . The forced internment of the Northern Frontier District ' s inhabitants also resulted in an economic bifurcation of its other minority residents . Those with means diversified into trade and sedentary farming . Those without became wage labourers , while the poorest were reduced to dependence on outside relief aid . Anthropologist John Baxter returned to the village in Isiolo District that he had researched in 1953 , and had this to say about the few non - Somali minority tribes that lived at the time alongside the Somali majority : In 1982 , only a few fortunate ones still maintained themselves through stock pastoralism . Some 40 percent of the Boran and Sakuye of the District had been driven to peri - urban shanty villages in the new administrative townships . There , they eked out a bare subsistence , hanging around the petrol stations for odd jobs , hawking for " miraa " , making illicit alcohol , engaging in prostitution and the like . The war thus marked the beginning of decades of violent crackdowns and repressive measures by the police in the NFD coupled with trumped - up allegations and unsubtle innuendo on the part of the Kenyan media charging the region ' s almost exclusively Somali inhabitants with " banditry " and other vice . A particularly violent incident referred to as the Wagalla Massacre took place in 1984 , when the Kenyan provincial commissioner ordered security forces to gather 5 , 000 men of the Somali Degodia clan onto the airstrip at Wagalla , Wajir , open fire on them , and then attempt to hide their bodies . In the year 2000 , the government admitted to having killed 380 people , though independent estimates put the toll at over 2 , 000 . Not until late 2000 and the administration of Provincial Commissioner Mohammoud Saleh – a Somali — was there a serious drop in violent activities , partially attributable to Saleh ' s zero tolerance policy towards abuse by security forces . Ironically , Saleh himself was the target of the local police , having been arrested and booked several times . Wearing plain clothes , Saleh was apparently mistaken for an ordinary inhabitant of the NFD .