United States Marine Air - Ground Task Force Reconnaissance The reconnaissance mission within the United States Marine Corps is divided into two distinct but complementary aspects ; Marine Division Recon and Force Reconnaissance . The United States Marine Corps Reconnaissance Battalions ( or commonly called Marine Division Recon ) are the reconnaissance assets of Marine Air - Ground Task Force that provide division - level ground and amphibious reconnaissance to the Ground Combat Element within the United States Marine Corps . Division reconnaissance teams are employed to observe and report on enemy activity and other information of military significance in close operations . Their capabilities are similar to those of Force Recon , but do not normally insert by parachute , and provide limited direct action , whereas Force Reconnaissance companies perform both deep reconnaissance and direct action operations . Some of these missions are shared by Marine Special Operations Teams , a subordinate part of Marine Special Operations Command ( MARSOC ) . History of MAGTF Reconnaissance . The Formation of a Doctrine . At the turn of the 20th Century , amphibious reconnaissance as we know it today in the United States Fleet Marine Force ( FMF ) , was first conceived by a Marine officer , " then " - Major Dion Williams , who formulated the first official ( maritime ) naval doctrine concerning intelligence gathering for planning of operations ; in theaters of amphibious warfare . Williams ' doctrine outlined a wide spectrum of reconnaissance , which consisted of : He specified in his thesis that these Marines particularly needed to be competent in surveying , cartography , and recording observations , as well as reading previous maps and surveys of various types . Although there was very little effect in creating a formidable unit because the outset of World War I and the Gallipoli Operations due to the lack of Marine Corps personnel by the Isolationism of 1920 - 1930s . Also drawbacks concurred while most of the Marine forces were engaged in conflicts of China and Nicaragua . After World War I , three significant aspects of the second edition of Williams ' " Naval Reconnaissance " included : It was this latter emphasis on obtaining information long before hostilities that was perhaps of greatest significance . Rather than obtaining information solely for military operations in progress , Williams now enunciated a more comprehensive mission . The earliest activities in amphibious reconnaissance was largely limited in surveying of ports , uncharted islands and adjacent beaches or coastlines . Most of these duties were billeted by senior Naval Intelligence Officers that were prerequisites in topography , hydrography , impermanent construction of fortification with the means of rapid encampment and mobilization of troops to operate in their area . However , another Marine intel officer and amphibious reconnaissance war prophet , Earl H . Ellis , put most of William ' s concept to effect years later . After fighting in the trenches in WWI , in 1921 , Ellis submitted a request to Headquarters Marine Corps ( HQMC ) for special intelligence duty in South America and the Pacific , in which he foresaw the built - up of Japanese naval forces that eventually led to the events of World War II ; the Director of Naval Intelligence diligently accepted . It was during his special duty that introduced the most profound accounts of Ellis ' s intelligence reports . He submitted a 30 , 000 page Top Secret document concerning his detail discussion of local sea , air and the climate , various land terrain types , the native population and economic conditions . He discussed his reports on strategically seizing key islands as forward - operating bases for project naval forces effectively into the area . His time - tables , mobilization projections , and predictions of manpower necessary to seize certain targets . His maritime intelligence reports became paramount years later for the United States maritime forces , during the Pacific campaigns of World War II . Testing the Doctrine . In the 1920s and 1930s , the Fleet Marine Force ( FMF ) first tested Williams conceptual methods of reconnaissance in the fourth series of the Fleet Landing Exercises ( FLEX ) in the Caribbean ; for evaluation in establishing a naval reconnaissance doctrine for the Marine Corps . By 7 December 1933 , the Fleet Marine Force was formed at HQMC in Quantico , VA , combining the roles of the Navy and Marine Corps into an integrated maritime ( naval ) assault force . Shortly after , a new naval doctrine , the " Fleet Training Publication 167 " was created to ensure long - term purposes . Although the subsequent tests encompassed more broadly in combined amphibious / ground reconnaissance efforts , its aerial reconnaissance elements cannot be overlooked since aircraft were both tested for direct combat support and reconnaissance . The aviation reconnaissance assets did not see further scrutiny until the outset of the Korean War . Before World War II , the first radars were developed for anti - aircraft purposes . Subsequently , these were soon followed by fire control radars for ships and coastal artillery batteries . However , it wasn ' t until decades later that improvements to technology proved that radar systems were capable of locating artillery guns . Patrons of the Doctrine . From ' sea - to - shore ' . The Marine Corps established its first specialized ground / amphibious reconnaissance unit , the " Observer Group " , in 1941 , which was formed for the upcoming secretive mission in North Africa ( in preparation for " Operation Torch " ) — under the command of Captain James L . Jones , Sr . The unit was composed of skilled and highly proficient swimmers from the Army , Navy , and the Marine Corps . Momentarily , the Observer Group was ordered to be decommissioned , but not completely dissolved ; the Marine unit was re - institutionalized as the Amphibious Reconnaissance Company . The remaining Army and Navy counterparts formed the " Scouts and Raiders " and continued its deployment to North Africa as planned . The Scouts and Raiders are the predecessor to the Navy Combat Demolition Unit s ( NCDU ) , which subsequently became the Underwater Demolition Teams — the patrons of the prestigious Navy SEALs . Preliminary — Ground operations . The Amphibious Reconnaissance Company ( still under command of Capt . James Jones ) was directed to report to the joint - Navy and Army ' s Amphibious Corps , Pacific Fleet ( ACPF ) . The United States Navy controlled many joint units of the Army and the Marine Corps . These units represented the sum total of the amphibious forces of the United States , with the exception of small units of the Fleet Marine Force , which had been trained for amphibious raids . The Amphib Recon Company was tasked to provide preliminary reconnaissance for the force commander of the ACPF . By 1943 , the Army ceded their role of amphibious assaults to the Navy and Marine Corps . Subsequently , the Marine subordinate units of the ACPF were re - designated under the full command of the Marine Corps ' s V Amphibious Corps ( VAC ) — and the Amphibious Reconnaissance Company shifted alongside under its new command . In the next following years , the Company increased in manpower and the brevity of upcoming missions , forcing it to be re - designated to full battalion - strength with two active reconnaissance companies ; becoming the " Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion " . To include , VAC shifted its command under the Fleet Marine Force . Prior to the arrival of Marines in this area of the Pacific War , the Australians had already established a network of deep reconnaissance agents known as the Australian Coastwatchers . They operated not only on coasts , but deep in jungles as well . Initially , some Marines became part of the unit . Although , the force commanders of the VAC weren ' t the only ones to see the true value of ground and amphibious reconnaissance . The subordinate units of the Marine division and regiments resorted to their own avenues of reconnaissance methods . The I Marine Amphibious Corps ( I MAC ) and III Marine Amphibious Corps ( III MAC ) approached its reconnaissance assets more differently than the V Amphibious Corps ' s ( VAC ) Reconnaissance platoons . The amphibious reconnaissance platoons of VAC were more associated to preliminary and amphibious reconnaissance , whereas the division and regimental commanders equated their decision - making process using terrestrial reconnaissance . Reconnaissance - in - force operations . In 1941 , Lieutenant Colonel William " Wild Bill " Whaling , the executive officer of 5th Marine Regiment , 1st Marine Division , established visualized and perceived the use for specialized missions encompassing reconnaissance at the division - level , which would be conducted above the normal infantry battalion - level in scouting and patrolling . He recommended to General Alexander Vandegrift the need of a special " Scout and Sniper unit " for the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal . Soon after , each of the three rifle companies that were used during the Guadalcanal campaign were tasked in sending one their best field craft Marines to devise the scout - sniper unit , with each regiment containing a Scout and Sniper Platoon , within the regimental headquarters and service company . Momentarily , the regiments requested their scouts to be heavily reinforced with tanks for rapid mobility and increased firepower , to allow their scouting parties to determine a hasty , yet accurate account of their enemies potential and strengths — using a technique known as reconnaissance - in - force ( RIF ) . RIF elicits determination of strength by offensively provoking the enemy for a reaction . The close of World War II discontinued the use of amphibious reconnaissance , and momentarily the Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion dismantled ; all amphibious reconnaissance subsidiaries were under the direct control of the " only " - remaining division - level reconnaissance assets — ending force - level reconnaissance . Close - distant operations . The " Scout ( Tank ) and Sniper " companies later formed the Division Recon Battalions and Scout Sniper Platoon s of today . By early - 1980s , the Light Armored Reconnaissance units were formed to provided mechanized reconnaissance - in - force for infantry regiments . The responsibilities of the LAR battalions resemble those of the Scout ( Tank ) companies of World War II . It wasn ' t until the highlight of the Korean War that foresaw the re - establishment of force - level reconnaissance ; however , only 2nd Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion was created ( 1st Amphib Recon Bn remained inactive - only to be used as for training new amphibious reconnaissance candidates ) in support of the Marine task force commanders ' effort in pushing the Socialist Chinese forces north , from South Korea . Deep operations . The Korean War introduced the new concept of using rotary - wing aircraft to the Marine Corps in combat employment for logistics and rapid troop transport . During the mid - 1950s , a recon test platoon from the Marine Corps Test Unit # 1 experimented in various parachute insertions for deeper reconnaissance and pathfinding . In 1957 , the command staff of the Recon Platoon , MCTU # 1 relinquished the command of 1st Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion and formed the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company . When the Force Recon companies were established , they allowed the Fleet Marine Force commanders to obtain information quicker than the slower , processed intelligence that was provided by the division recon platoons , which went through each of the battalion ' s , regiment ' s , and division ' s intelligence sections before reaching the force level . However , like the fate of the Marine Raiders and the Paramarines of World War II , 1st and 2nd Force Reconnaissance companies were disbanded , albeit temporarily , to make way for the Fleet Marine Force ' s ' first ' unconventional asset that was created within the new Marine Special Operations Command ( MARSOC ) . The force reconnaissance companies were replaced under the command of the Marine Division ' s reconnaissance battalions while maintaining deep reconnaissance and force - oriented reconnaissance under the Fleet Marine Force . MARSOC absorbs much of the unconventional operations in which Force Recon was previously was responsible , allowing the force recon platoons to fully exercise their initial role of providing " deep " and " preliminary reconnaissance " to the Command Element of MAGTF without interference . Signals intelligence operations . By 1986 , new counter - battery radars were introduced . These radars were able to locate many artillery batteries simultaneously . In latter , the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan requested for a small , counter - mortar radar , given 360 degree coverage and requiring a minimal crew , for use in forward operating base s . In another back to the future step it has also proved possible to add counter - battery software to battlefield airspace surveillance radars . MAGTF Security Operations . Security operations reduces risk to operating Marine forces from unknown avenues that may conflict in any tactical situation ; it encompasses surprise attacks from the enemy , counter - intelligence , and deception in the friendly forces ' capabilities and intentions . In relation , reconnaissance operations support security operations by providing information on enemy forces , capabilities and intentions , and by denying the enemy information of friendly activities through counter - reconnaissance . Through succession , security operations are usually integrated with its reconnaissance operations ; in which force commanders acquire during offensive , defensive and other tactical operations . It greatly improves their decision - making process due to the collected information that is much needed to develop situational awareness and commander critical information requirements ( CCIR ) . The CCIR are designed to feed important , time - sensitive information to the commander so he can make a decision that should dramatically affect the battlespace . The CCIR is collectively , a comprehensive list of high - prioritized information in which a force commander identifies as " critical " . It is much required to influence and facilitate timely information management and the decision - making process that may help dictate successful mission accomplishment . CCIR is divided into two key sub - components : " critical friendly force information " and " priority intelligence requirements " . Reconnaissance Planning . Reconnaissance supports the MAGTF commander ’ s intent and his CCIRs . While contributing to the commander ’ s broad situational awareness and development , reconnaissance assets tailor their efforts to support the specific CCIRs indicated by the commander ’ s intent and subsequent unit intelligence and operations planning . Simultaneously , reconnaissance forces must remain alert to any developments that may cause the commander to reassess that intent . MAGTF reconnaissance assets are best employed early to support the CCIRs and friendly course of action development and selection . When reconnaissance is initiated early in the planning cycle , planning and execution are driven by the flow of solid , timely information and intelligence . If reconnaissance is delayed , situation development will generally be more uncertain . In this case , planning and execution can either take place in an information vacuum or be driven by the search for such information . Reconnaissance assets are best employed in general support . Because of the nature of warfare , MAGTF reconnaissance units will most likely be employed in rapidly developing and fluid situations . The main effort may shift quickly from one subordinate element to another . Such situations often require modifications or complete changes in reconnaissance elements ’ missions . The MAGTF commander and his staff are usually the most capable of determining the best use of MAGTF reconnaissance assets at any given time , to provide the necessary support , and to integrate the results of reconnaissance information with other intelligence sources . Although placing reconnaissance assets in direct support of some subordinate element or even attaching them to specific units is occasionally appropriate , in general , such support relationships make for inefficient use of specialized reconnaissance forces . Proper planning ; the institution of flexible , responsive command and control and intelligence reporting procedures and networks ; and clear intelligence reporting and dissemination priorities will ensure that the products of reconnaissance are shared to the maximum benefit of all potential users . Reconnaissance requires adequate time for detailed planning and preparation . Most reconnaissance focuses on the enemy ’ s activities and intentions to satisfy the commander ’ s need to exploit the enemy ’ s vulnerabilities or to attack his center of gravity . This frequently necessitates operating in and around the enemy ' s most critical and best defended areas . This normally requires that reconnaissance be conducted over long distances and well in advance of commencement of the operations it will support . These conditions usually dictate specialized methods of transportation , communications and information systems support , combat service support , equipment , and coordination . MAGTF Reconnaissance Assets . All Marine Air - Ground Task Force ( MAGTF ) elements uses its own unique reconnaissance capabilities ; the Aviation Combat Element ( ACE ) utilizes aerial reconnaissance , but the Command Element ( CE ) and the Ground Combat Element ( GCE ) operate in combined amphibious / ground reconnaissance . Command Element . Force Reconnaissance . The Force Reconnaissance companies report to the Command Element of the MAGTF . They are used for retaining any information that are held in deep operations under conventional warfare . They are very proficient in various entry and recovery methods in heliborne and waterborne techniques to insert behind enemy lines either by High - Altitude / Low ( or High ) Opening parachute landings ; or combatant diving in submarine surface and subsurface methods . This ensures they achieve and maintain stealth in order to avoid compromising their mission . The Fleet Marine Force ' s detachable force reconnaissance platoons can operate independently from the support Marine Expeditionary Unit s if needed , making them special operations " " capable " " in forward - operated areas . Because the division reconnaissance assets are heavily tasked in providing regiment commanders vital information ; the force commander ' s intelligence staff are able to make the necessary preparations or changes in the future , shaping the battlespace . It is mainly due because the division - " level " intelligence may not be retrieved at a fast pace for adjusting the needs of the force commander . Also , force - " level " reconnaissance is retained under the direct control of the force commander , enabling him to send his force recon assets at his will . This may include non - reconnaissance avenues , such as direct action operations under the commander ' s proposal ; the same methods performed by the " more - " ' unconventional ' special operations forces of USSOCOM . NOTE : Both 1st and 2nd Force Reconnaissance companies have been deactivated since c . 2006 . However the Marine Corps is in the process of standing up these units in the near future . ' Force Recon ' companies were re - established , starting on December 19 , 2008 , within the 1st and 2nd Marine Division ' s reconnaissance battalions to maintain expedient " deep recon " capabilities within the II Marine Expeditionary Force . Radio Battalion . The Radio Reconnaissance Platoons provides ground - based signals intelligence , electronic warfare , communications security monitoring , and special intelligence communications capability to support MAGTF operations . It plans and coordinates the employment of its subordinate elements , to include radio reconnaissance elements beyond the Forward Edge of Battle Area and mobile electronic warfare support system in light armored vehicle s . It is the focal point for MAGTF ground - based signals intelligence operations . They are also used to augment the Force Recon platoons in proving communications relay , when the Force Recon assets are unavailable . Remote Sensors and Imagery Interpretation . The intelligence battalion provides remote sensor , imagery interpretation , and geospatial [ topographic ] intelligence ( GEOINT ) support to MAGTF operations . In addition to the sensor control and management platoon ( SCAMP ) , the force imagery interpretation unit , and the topographic platoon , the intelligence company establishes and mans the MAGTF ’ s surveillance and reconnaissance center . It plans , executes , and monitors MAGTF reconnaissance operations . Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence . The intelligence battalion provides human intelligence ( HUMINT ) , counterintelligence ( CI ) , and interrogator - translator support to MAGTF operations . This support can include screening and interrogation / debriefing of prisoners of war and persons of intelligence interest ; conduct of CI force protection source operations ; conduct of CI surveys and investigations ; preparation of CI estimates and plans ; translation of documents ; and limited exploitation of captured material . In addition to the specialized CI and interrogator - translator platoons , the company employs task - organized HUMINT Exploitation Teams ( HET ) in direct support of MAGTF subordinate elements . The HET combine CI specialists and interrogator - translators in one element , thereby providing a unique and comprehensive range of CI / HUMINT services . Ground Combat Element . The Ground Combat Element ( GCE ) has substantial organic reconnaissance support assets . Any units in contact with the enemy , especially patrols , are among the most reliable sources of information . Division Reconnaissance . The Marine Corps ' s Division Reconnaissance conduct reconnaissance in close operations to gather enemy intelligence at the division staff - " level " . The mission of division reconnaissance is to provide immediate tactical reconnaissance and surveillance ( R & S ) to the GCE of MAGTF , whether it be amphibious or ground reconnaissance . Division recon , like force reconnaissance , is employed to observe and report on enemy activity and other information of military significance . In current theaters of operation they rely mostly on rapid mobilization via motor transport , traversing ahead of major Marine forces for intelligence contingency for division , regimental , or battalion commanders . Division reconnaissance mainly do not operate in deep operations , they support the Marine ( infantry ) regiments by providing and ground reconnaissance to Marine division [ or regimental and battalion ] commanders within the MAGTF ' s subordinate MEU ; in contrast to force recon who supports the force commanders of the Fleet Marine Force and its subordinate MEF in deep reconnaissance and direct action missions . Counterbattery Radar . Counterbattery Radar ( CBR ) platoons are located within the headquarters battery of the artillery regiment . The CBR Platoon ' s primary mission is to locate enemy rocket , mortar , and artillery weapons and process all acquired enemy locations in a timely manner for counter - fire and intelligence purposes . Secondary missions that can be assigned by the supported artillery unit are adjusting or registering artillery . They are normally employed as a unit and controlled by the regimental artillery commander . The CBR platoon commander coordinates the employment of radars operating under regimental control . Information on enemy order of battle and locations derived from counter - battery radar detections are reported to the Ground Combat Element and the Command Element of MAGTF . Light Armored Reconnaissance . The division Light Armored Reconnaissance battalions provides the Ground Combat Element with its light armored reconnaissance capability by operating in forward areas or along the flanks of Marine ground forces . Initially , they are usually used to provide early warning of contact by hostile forces , acting as the ' mechanized ' reconnaissance - in - force , but they are capable of a wide variety of missions due to their inherent mobility and organic firepower ; such as quick reaction force s , and counter - insurgency support . Scout - Sniper and Surveillance , Target , and Acquisition . Scout Sniper Platoons are organic collection support assets to each infantry battalion . They are highly skilled in marksmanship , reconnaissance and surveillance , and target acquisition . Every Marine Scout Sniper can deliver long - range precision fire on selected targets from concealed positions . Although the platoon can be employed in support of a myriad of tactical missions in defensive and offensive operations , they are primarily employed to provide timely surveillance and tactical data and coordinate supporting arms and close air support . The Scout Sniper Platoon provides the infantry battalion with extended area observation . The Scout Sniper may be attached to the division and FMF reconnaissance companies . Aviation Combat Element . The capability of the ACE to observe the battlefield and report in near - real time gives the MAGTF commander a multidimensional capability that should be used at every opportunity . Aviation combat units can view the entire AO in depth , providing early indications and warning and reconnaissance information that can be essential to the success of the MAGTF . Each ACE aircraft ( rotary - or fixed - wing ) , can conduct visual observation of terrain and enemy forces that it may fly over . Given the combined arms capability of the MAGTF , these aircraft can engage enemy targets immediately or direct other supporting arms against the enemy forces . The ACE manages the following reconnaissance systems . Unmanned Aerial Vehicles . UAVs provide day - night , real - time imagery reconnaissance , surveillance , and target acquisition . Its unique capabilities can also be used to support real - time target engagement , assisting in the control of fires / supporting arms and maneuver . The UAV provides high quality video imagery for artillery or naval gunfire adjustment , battle damage assessment , and reconnaissance over land or sea . It is capable of both day and night operations using TV or forward - looking infrared cameras . UAV squadrons are under the ADCON of the ACE . The MAGTF commander retains OPCON because of the limited number of UAV assets and the critical reconnaissance capabilities they provide to the entire force . Mission tasking is exercised through the surveillance and reconnaissance center . Advanced Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System . The F / A - 18D can be equipped with the advanced tactical airborne reconnaissance system and the Radar Upgrade Phase II with synthetic aperture radar ( SAR ) . The advanced tactical airborne reconnaissance system is a real - time digital package providing day / night , all - weather imagery capability . The imagery collected provides sufficient detail and accuracy to permit delivery of appropriate air and ground weapons , assist with battle damage assessment , and provide tactical commanders with detailed information about the enemy ’ s weapons , units , and disposition . Imagery resulting from collection can be digitally disseminated to the force imagery interpretation unit tactical exploitation group for exploitation , printing , and dissemination . Electronic Reconnaissance and Warfare . Aerial electronic reconnaissance and electronic warfare is conducted using EA - 6B aircraft . EA - 6B aircraft also process and disseminate information from digital tape recordings obtained during electronic warfare missions to update and maintain enemy electronic order of battle information . The sensors are passive systems that require threat emitters to be active to collect . Combat Service Support Element . As the CSSE is often in more direct contact with the indigenous population , it can collect HUMINT unavailable to the other MAGTF elements . For example , medical battalion personnel can often provide information on health conditions and their potential impact on operations . The CSSE is limited in its reconnaissance capabilities , having no dedicated reconnaissance capabilities . However , it can conduct road and route reconnaissance with its convoys , and military police . Combat engineers are excellent sources of information . These engineer units often conduct Engineer reconnaissance of an area and can provide detailed reporting on lines of communications ; i . e . , roads , rivers , railroad lines , bridges , and obstacles to maneuver . Amphibious Reconnaissance Corpsman . The Amphibious Reconnaissance Corpsmen are Navy combat medic s , active members of a division or force recon platoons , that are trained in every aspect in the Marine Corps reconnaissance community . They provide advanced life support skills to casualties that are associated in underwater diving and parachute injuries , and hazards of the maritime and amphibious environments . The independent duty corpsmen ( IDC ) are assigned to the independently operated FMF Reconnaissance ( Force Recon ) companies , as the " Special " Amphibious Reconnaissance Corpsmen ( " SARCs " ) . National and Theater Assets . The MAGTF can draw on the full range of national , theater , joint , other service , and allied reconnaissance assets . When made available , these capabilities will be fully integrated into MAGTF reconnaissance operations ; e . g . , Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System ( JSTARS ) , Navy SEALS or Army signals intelligence aircraft . During forcible entry operations , the MAGTF integrates its amphibious reconnaissance capabilities with national , theater , and special operating forces . The Marine Corps component will support the MAGTF by monitoring the status of MAGTF reconnaissance requests to national and theater entities . The component coordinates the provision of Marine intelligence liaison to the joint task force and other component intelligence elements to satisfy the MAGTF ’ s requirements . Some MAGTF reconnaissance assets , such as the radio battalion and the CI / HUMINT company , will usually have direct connectivity with appropriate external agencies to coordinate tasking or support .