Battle of the Chinese Farm The Battle of the Chinese Farm took place during October 15 to October 17 , 1973 between the Egyptian Army and the Israel Defense Forces ( IDF ) , as part of the Yom Kippur War . It was fought in the Sinai Peninsula , north of the Great Bitter Lake ( GBL ) and just east of the Suez Canal , near an Egyptian agricultural research station . The farm featured specialised , Japan ese - made machinery ; Israeli soldiers mistook Japanese characters on this equipment for Chinese , leading to the area being labeled ' Chinese Farm ' on Israeli military maps . The battle began when the IDF launched Operation Abiray - Lev ( " Stouthearted Men " ) , attempting to establish a corridor to the canal and allow bridges to be laid for a crossing . Accordingly , the Israelis attacked Egyptian forces in and around the Chinese Farm . Determined Egyptian resistance made progress extremely slow for the Israelis , who suffered heavy losses . The Israelis were repeatedly reinforced with armor but were unable to make much headway , only managing to seize an important crossroad on the second day . Suffering from a lack of infantry the Israelis brought up paratroopers during the night of October 16 / 17 , tasked with clearing anti - tank defenses for the armor , but these became pinned down by heavy Egyptian fire . The paratroopers drew Egyptian attention long enough for the Israelis to move bridging equipment to the canal undetected . Armored forces later extricated the paratroopers from battle . The Egyptians attempted to restore their defenses to their initial dispositions with an armored attack on October 17 . It initially succeeded but was pushed back by Israeli counterattacks , the armored battle lasting for the entire day . Seriously depleted by the continuous fighting the Egyptians relinquished control of the routes to the canal , opening them up to the Israelis . The battle is remembered as one of the most costly and brutal battles of the war . Background . On October 6 , 1973 Egypt launched Operation Badr intending to cross the Suez Canal and establish bridgeheads on the opposite bank of the Sinai Peninsula , occupied by Israel since 1967 . Coordinated with a Syrian assault on the Golan Heights , the crossing achieved tactical surprise and was a success . Thereafter , counterattacks by Israeli reserves were unsuccessful . By October 10 fighting along the front had come to a lull . The Egyptians dug in and hoped to wear down the Israelis by means of attrition while remaining within range of their ground surface - to - air missiles , providing air cover from the west bank of the canal , while the Israelis focused on directing their main efforts against the Syrians in the Golan and reorganized their battered forces . Israeli failures led to the replacement of the chief of the Israeli Southern Command , Major General Shmuel Gonen , with Chaim Bar - Lev , although Gonen was retained as his aide . The situation changed when Sadat , in the face of protests from his senior commanders , ordered an offensive to seize the strategic Sinai mountain passes , hoping to relieve Israeli pressure off the Syrians . The resulting offensive was ill - planned and ill - executed , culminating in heavy Egyptian losses without achieving any objectives . This allowed the Israelis the initiative to launch a counteroffensive . On October 14 , immediately following the Egyptian offensive , Israeli Chief of Staff David Elazar presented the general outlines of a crossing operation , of the Suez Canal to the west bank , to the Israeli cabinet in a meeting in Tel Aviv . Elazar emphasized the military and political gains of the operation , and the expected collapse that would occur in the Egyptian forces on the east bank when their supply routes were threatened . Elazar received unanimous support from the cabinet . Later that day Bar - Lev headed a meeting attended by the senior and main division commanders in the Sinai theatre : Major Generals Abraham Adan , Ariel Sharon and Kalman Magen . Bar - Lev informed the Israeli officers of the decision to begin the crossing operation on the night of October 15 / 16 , and assigned duties and responsibilities to the division commanders . Operation Abiray - Lev . According to the plan set for the Israeli crossing , Operation " Abiray - Lev " ( Hebrew for " Stouthearted Men " ) , the designated crossing point lay near to Deversoir , at the northern end of the GBL on the Suez Canal . The Israelis had to open the principal route to Deversoir and secure a corridor stretching north of the crossing site ( known as " The Yard " ) . Paratroopers and armor would then cross the canal to establish a after which the bridges would be laid , with at least one to be operational by the morning of October 16 . The Israelis would then cross to the west bank and attack south and west , with the end goal of reaching Suez , thus encircling and cutting off two Egyptian divisions on the east bank . Southern Command allotted 24 hours for the setting up of the bridgehead and 24 hours for Israeli forces to reach Suez , with the latter expected to be under Israeli control by October 18 at the latest . It would soon be shown that the execution of Operation Stouthearted Men would deviate from planning and schedules , and that the realization of the time - frame had been highly optimistic and extremely unrealistic . Order of Battle . Major General Ariel Sharon ' s 143rd Armored Division was charged with completing the critical tasks of opening the corridors and laying the bridges . His division included Tuvia Raviv ' s 600th Armored Brigade , Colonel Amnon Reshef ' s 14th Armored Brigade , and the ' Haim ' Brigade commanded by Colonel Haim Erez . Major General Abraham Adan ' s 162nd Armored Division was tasked with crossing the canal and achieving an encirclement with its 300 tanks . The division included the Colonel Natke Nir ' s 217th Armored Brigade , Colonel Gabi Amir ' s 460th Armored Brigade and Aryeh Keren ' s 500th Armored Brigade . A paratrooper brigade would be transferred to Adan ' s division during the course of battle . Kalman Magen ' s 252nd Armored Division would initially launch diversionary attacks elsewhere along Egyptian lines to draw attention from Sharon ' s operations at Deversoir . Thereafter the division would hold and secure the corridor and bridgehead . Egyptian forces in the area formed the southern flank of the Second Field Army . These units were the 21st Armored Division commanded by Brigadier General Ibrahim Oraby and the 16th Infantry Division commanded by Brigadier General Abd Rab el - Nabi Hafez . In addition to being division commander Hafez also commanded forces within his division ' s bridgehead , which included the 21st Division . Oraby ' s unit included the 1st Armored Brigade commanded by Colonel Sayed Saleh , the 14th Armored Brigade commanded by Colonel Othman Kamel , and the 18th Mechanized Brigade commanded by Colonel Talaat Muslim . Hafez ' s 16th Division included the 16th Infantry Brigade , commanded by Colonel Abd el - Hamid Abd el - Sami ' , as well as the 116th Infantry and the 3rd Mechanized Brigades . Location of battle and deployment of forces . Two main roads led to Deversoir . The first was the Tasa - Tel Salam Road , codenamed " Akavish " by Israelis . This road connected Artillery Road ( running north to south east of the canal ) to Lexicon Road ( running north to south directly east of the canal ) . The Lexicon - Akavish junction fell on Tel Salaam , near the GBL and south of Deveroir , where Fort Lakekan ( part of the Bar Lev Line ) was located . The second road , codenamed " Tirtur " , ran north of Akavish . It too connected Artillery Road to Lexicon , but provided a direct route to " the Yard " . The Lexicon - Tirtur junction fell on Fort Matzmed . This fortification , which consisted of two strongpoints apart , had been captured on October 9 by a small assault force while Fort Lakekan had been evacuated without any combat on October 8 . The importance of both fortifications lay in their control of the Lexicon - Akavish and Lexicon - Tirtur junctions . Both forts fell in the designated buffer zone however , long , between the Second and Third Armies . It was believed this area would not need defending as it was both adjacent to the GBL , a natural obstacle , and most of it lay outside the range of the Egyptian SAMs . Thus they were left unoccupied by the local Egyptian commander who chose not to extend his defenses southwards . The Egyptian negligence to occupy and defend both forts would greatly assist the Israelis in Operation Stouthearted Men . Just north of the Lexicon - Tirtur junction was the village of al - Galaa . Prior to the 1967 Six Day War the village had been the site of an agricultural project . This agricultural station incorporated several irrigation ditches and specialist Japanese - made machinery . When the Sinai came under Israeli occupation Israeli soldiers unwittingly mistook the Japanese characters for Chinese ones , leading to the location being labeled ' Chinese Farm ' on military maps . Just north and north - west of Chinese Farm was a hill mass known by its Israeli codename ' Missouri ' . During Operation Badr , al - Galaa and the Chinese Farm fell within the designated bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division . Abd el - Hamid ' s 16th Infantry Brigade occupied and defended these locations . After partaking in the initial canal - crossing the brigade , along with the rest of the division , faced an attack by Raviv ' s brigade on October 9 . The Israelis achieved some initial gains , but were repelled by the end of the day . Also located within 16th Division ' s bridgehead , as of October 13 , was the 21st Armored Division . Its units were positioned in the center and the north of the bridgehead . The 14th Brigade had been involved in the crossing and , along with the 1st Brigade , participated in the Egyptian offensive on October 14 ; as a result it lost half of its operational tank strength . In the aftermath Oraby ' s efforts , to reorganize and recoup armored losses , were hampered by frequent artillery barrages and air strikes . On October 15 there was a total of 136 tanks in the Egyptian bridgehead , unevenly split among Oraby ' s brigades : 66 tanks with the 1st Armored Brigade ; 39 tanks with the 14th Armored Brigade ; and 31 tanks in the 18th Mechanized Brigade . Despite their heavy losses the Egyptian forces in the bridgehead outnumbered Reshef ' s force . Early on the morning of October 15 Adan moved his division from its positions in the north to a concentration area west of Tasa , in preparation for a crossing to the west bank . Sharon ' s division was located in the central sector since its arrival to the Sinai Front , along with the crossing equipment and bridges since October 13 . Sharon had his headquarters in Tasa , east of the canal . Israeli plan and initial maneuvers . After receiving his orders late on October 14 from Bar - Lev , Sharon headed to his headquarters to prepare for the operation . His division incorporated Raviv ' s Brigade , Colonel Amnon Reshef ' s 14th Armored Brigade , and the ' Haim ' Brigade commanded by Colonel Haim Erez . Attached to his division was the 243rd Paratrooper Brigade commanded by Colonel Dani Matt . Sharon planned for Raviv ' s brigade to attack from the east , diverting Egyptian attention away from Deversoir . Erez was tasked with transporting a preconstructed roller bridge to the crossing area at Deversoir , while one of his tank battalions would be attached to the paratroopers . Colonel Reshef was given the most critical tasks of all . Accordingly his brigade was heavily reinforced to incorporate four armored and three mechanized infantry battalions , in addition to the division ' s reconnaissance battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Yaov Brom . His brigade would conduct a turning maneuver at 6 : 00 AM on October 15 south of Akavish Road , move through the sand dunes to reach Fort Lakekan , before moving north to occupy Fort Matzmed . Reshef ' s brigade would then split to clear the Akavish and Titur Roads and seize the Chinese Farm , while occupying the crossing area in wait for Matt ' s brigade . Matt ' s paratrooper brigade , containing an additional tank company and the armored battalion , would move south - west via Akavish to reach Fort Matzmed . From here it would continue on to the Yard and cross the canal at 11 : 00 PM using rubber dinghies and rafts for the tanks . Matt ' s brigade began moving to Tasa at 4 : 30 PM on October 15 , before turning eastwards on Akavish . Congestion on the roads was heavy and the brigade moved very slowly . A little after midnight the brigade left Akavish and moved westward to the Yard , an area 700 meters long and 150 meters wide surrounded by protective sand walls . The site had been made long before the war . Reshef maneuvered his brigade as planned , entering into the previously discovered gap without any opposition . Leaving a combined recon and paratrooper force at the canal , he sent his tanks north and west to secure the flank of the projected crossing site and clear the Akavish and Tirtur roads from behind for the follow - on bridging equipment . He seized the Lakekan and Matzmed fortifications without encountering resistance . Reshef informed Sharon that the forts were under control and that Akavish was clear . Sharon in turn informed Southern Command of these successes sending a wave of jubilation through the Israeli commanders , delighted that the operation had begun so smoothly . Battle . Matt had been informed that the crossing area and its environs were clear of Egyptian forces but , out of caution , ordered his tank company to deploy at the Lexicon - Tirtur junction to confront any Egyptian movements towards the crossing site , just south of the crossroads . The entire company was destroyed after it was ambushed by Egyptian infantry of the 16th Brigade . The company commander was killed and most of his men were casualties , unbeknown to Matt . Meanwhile , Israeli artillery batteries opened fire on the landing site on the west bank , landing around 70 tons of shells and ordnance . In fact , the opposite bank was completely clear of Egyptian troops . The crossing finally got underway at 1 : 35 AM , over five hours behind schedule . By 9 : 00 AM there were 2 , 000 paratroopers across , along with a battalion of thirty tanks . The Israelis sent raiding parties attacking Egyptian SAMs on the west bank , while securing a without facing resistance . Tuvia Raviv ' s armored brigade began its diversionary attack against the 16th Division ' s bridgehead at 5 : 00 PM on October 15 , striking at the bridgehead ' s center from the east , after a fire preparation . It was repulsed by the Egyptians , as had been expected , but succeeded in its purpose . When the 16th Division ' s southern flank came under increasing Israeli attack it was assumed that the Israeli objective was to roll up the Egyptian Second Army ' s right flank , not to open a corridor to the west bank for Israeli forces to cross the canal . For the next 24 hours this remained the general impression among Egyptian commanders , actions henceforth were driven according to that impression . Had they discovered Israeli intentions earlier the Egyptians would almost certainly have been able to defeat the Israeli operation , in light of the greater strength of their forces and reserves near the Deversoir area , on the east and west banks of the Suez Canal . Lexicon - Tirtur junction . While the paratroopers prepared to cross Reshef was informed that Akavish had been closed again by Egyptian infantry units soon after his passing . He sent one armored battalion to clear the road and committed his remaining three armored and three mechanized battalions to push northwards and secure Tirtur and the Chinese Farm . An infantry battalion , forming the right flank of Abd el - Hamid ' s 16th Brigade , was in position to defend the Lexicon - Tirtur crossroads . Initially Reshef sent two armored battalions northward on Lexicon . As the Israeli tanks neared the infantry battalion they opened heavy fire with anti - tank weapons . They destroyed 27 tanks during this engagement , although seven Israeli tanks managed to break through the battalion ' s westernmost position on Lexicon and advance northwards to al - Galaa ' . Thereafter ' Abd el - Hamid ordered tank - hunting squads – groups of ten equipped with RPG - 7 rockets and RPG - 43 grenades – to deploy around al - Galaa ' and destroy those tanks that penetrated , he also sent a tank company to reinforce the infantry battalion . At night Reshef moved with his remaining forces north along the canal bank . Bypassing the 16th Brigade ' s positions , the Israelis soon found themselves in the center of a huge administrative area and vehicle park . Reshef ' s brigade had stumbled into the command and supply bases of the Egyptian 16th and 21st Divisions . The base was located near the canal on the assumption that it was the safest location from Israeli attacks , which was expected to come from the east where the defenses were strongest , not from the south where defenses and security measures were weakest . Both sides immediately opened fire on each other , inadvertently leading to the destruction of supply trucks and SAM launchers . The Egyptians managed to organize a counterattack by units of the 21st Division ; a battalion of the 14th Brigade and a battalion ( less one company ) of the 18th Brigade . The tanks repelled the Israelis , who sustained significant losses from vastly overwhelming opposing forces . Brig . Gen . Hafez , commanding the 16th Infantry Division , planned to contain the Israeli attack from the south by having the 18th Mechanized Brigade occupy defenses north of the Chinese Farm , directly behind the 16th Infantry Brigade , but without its organic tank battalion which was designated as part of the division ' s reserve . The 1st Armored Brigade was moved from its positions southward to occupy positions between Lateral Road and the canal , on the right flank of the 18th Brigade . Upon the brigade ' s arrival it engaged Israeli armor from Reshef ' s brigade in al - Galaa ' , Egyptian armor destroyed around 15 tanks and several half - tracks . At around 1 : 00 PM sorties of Egyptian Su - 7 s destroyed many Israeli tanks in ground - attack missions over al - Galaa ' village . The 1st Brigade countered a flanking attempt on its left at 2 : 00 PM by a tank battalion , thwarting the attack and destroying ten tanks . During its engagements on October 16 the 21st Division managed to destroy over 50 Israeli tanks and APCs , while subject to frequent Israeli air strikes and artillery barrages . The 1st Brigade accounted for most of the kills , while suffering fewer losses . Meanwhile one of Reshef ' s mechanized battalions , commanded by Major Nathan Shunari , was reinforced with company - sized remnants of the 40th Tank Battalion now commanded by Captain Gideon Giladi after the previous battalion commander had been wounded . Shunari was ordered to seize the Lexicon - Tirtur junction . He sent the tank company ahead first , which initially reported no Egyptian units , and Shunari dispatched an infantry unit in six half - track s to the junction . Upon reaching it they discovered that the tank company had already been destroyed and Giladi killed . Soon the vehicles began receiving heavy fire stopping their advance . The unit commander reported casualties and Shunari ordered the remainder of his battalion to aid the pinned - down Israelis . Attempts to rescue the infantry failed and the Egyptian battalion , defending the junction , directed heavy firepower against the area aided by the brigade ' s artillery . The Egyptian defenders had managed to catch the Israelis in a prepared killing zone . Shunari , whose troops lacked cover and were threatened with destruction , regrouped some of his forces and managed to escape the area in vehicles but the infantry - half - track unit , first sent to the crossroads , remained pinned down . Reshef sent another tank company to rescue the infantrymen . The tanks advanced towards the Chinese Farm from the south . As they neared the farm , and the village , a downpour of anti - tank and artillery fire forced the company to retreat . Nathan kept pleading with Rehsef to send additional support , unaware he was facing superior Egyptian forces after entering the administrative bases of the Egyptian 16th and 21st Divisions . With no help coming the unit commander had his men carry the wounded and attempted to leave the battlefield , tasking two sections of heavy machine guns with providing cover to the force . As the Israelis slowly made their way back to their lines a group of Egyptian tanks intercepted , wiping out the Israeli force . Despite the debacle Reshef remained determined to seize the junction , giving the task to the division ' s reconnaissance battalion attached to his brigade . To achieve surprise the battalion maneuvered to attack at 3 : 00 AM from the west , as the Egyptians were preparing for further attacks from the south and east . As the Israelis attacked Lt . Col . Brom was killed , barely thirty meters from Egyptian positions , disrupting his battalion ' s assault . The Israelis sustained losses but managed to retreat . Soon after a tank company attacked the crossroads at 4 : 00 AM on October 16 but also withdrew after losing three tanks . By 4 : 00 AM on October 16 Reshef ' s brigade , which began the operation with 97 tanks , had lost 56 tanks in just twelve hours of fighting with only 41 tanks remaining . Although seizing the crossing site had been accomplished easily stiff resistance had prevented Reshef from completing his remaining objectives , namely opening the routes to the canal and securing a corridor . Reshef ' s force would further drop to just 27 tanks by noon . As a whole , Sharon ' s division had lost some 300 killed and 1 , 000 wounded that night . To help Reshef secure the corridor Sharon supplied him with two tank battalions by 6 : 00 PM , propping his numbers up to 81 tanks . Hearing reports of the heavy fighting taking place between the junction and the Chinese Farm , Dayan suggested withdrawing Matt ' s brigade and canceling the operation . He voiced concerns that the paratroopers were threatened with annihilation and noted that all attempts to open a corridor for the bridges to be laid had failed . Gonen rejected the suggestion stating that , " If we knew in advance this was going to happen we would not have started the crossing operation , but now that we have crossed then let us follow through to the bitter end . " Bar - Lev concurred with Gonen and Dayan decided not to press his suggestion . At around 6 : 00 AM Golda Meir telephoned Dayan to inquire of the situation . Dayan informed her that the bridges had not yet been laid and that the Egyptians had closed the routes leading to Deveroir . He also stated there were high hopes that Egyptian resistance would be overcome and that the bridges would be laid during the morning . Dayan also told her that Matt ' s paratrooper brigade had crossed to the west bank without encountering resistance and that Southern Command , as yet , had no intentions of withdrawing the brigade even if the bridge - laying was delayed . In the morning , shortly after dawn , Reshef conducted a reconnaissance of the battlefield from a hilltop . He saw that the Egyptians had set up a strong blocking position defending the junction , composed of Egyptian tanks situated in hull - down positions and infantrymen in foxholes and the now - dry irrigation ditches of the Chinese Farm . The infantry were from the 16th Brigade ' s right - flank battalion and had the support of recoilless rifles , RPG - 7 s and some manually guided AT - 3 Sagger missiles . Reshef discovered that the Egyptians had mined both sides of Lexicon Road , to which he had lost several of his tanks . Reshef decided to change fighting tactics . He personally commanded the 40th Armored Battalions , after reinforcing it with tanks salvaged and repaired from the previous night ' s fighting , and maneuvered to attack from the west – i . e . : from the direction of the canal – hitting Egyptian positions in the flank while a tank company and an infantry company attacked from south to north . Reshef ' s forces engaged the Egyptians from long range , picking off defensive positions from afar , while using alternate fire and movement to advance to the crossroads . The infantry battalion , exhausted by continuous fighting and suffering from a severe lack of ammunition , soon withdrew allowing the Israelis to at last seize the junction . In the meantime other difficulties were surfacing . Sharon reported to Southern Command that the roller bridge , being towed by Erez ' s brigade , had been damaged in one of its sections and that the engineers needed a few hours to repair it . He also requested additional forces to help secure the corridor , noting the stiff resistance facing Reshef ' s brigade . Sharon ' s report prompted Bar - Lev to alert Adan to prepare to open the corridor with his division . Sharon argued for Adan ' s division to cross the canal on rafts and to proceed with Operation Abiray - Lev without waiting for the bridges . Both Gonen and Bar - Lev rejected Sharon ' s suggestion since , without a secure corridor to the canal , Israeli forces on the west bank would be threatened with encirclement . Subsequently Bar - Lev ordered that no more Israeli forces or equipment would cross to the west bank until the bridges had been laid . After receiving reinforcements Reshef focused on clearing the Tirtur Road . He left a battalion of around thirty tanks between the junction and the western part of the Chinese Farm , and prepared to attack with two armored battalions provided by Sharon . He concentrated on the section of the Tirtur Road defended by an Egyptian battalion forming the left flank of the 16th Infantry Brigade . One of Reshef ' s battalions attacked from the north - east , the other from the west . The Egyptian battalion managed to halt the advance aided by fire from tanks and anti - tank weapons on the slopes of Missouri , a hill north - west of the Chinese Farm , causing Reshef to break off his attack . This last attempt left Reshef ' s brigade in a desperate situation . He had 27 tanks remaining and was running short on ammunition and supplies . Reshef requested authorization from Sharon to withdraw his brigade to Fort Lakekan , to regroup his forces and allow them to regain combat effectiveness . Israeli reinforcement . The unexpected Egyptian resistance forced Israeli Southern Command to change its plans . Visiting Adan ' s advance command post Gonen noted that " Sharon has disappointed us " and handed Adan the task of moving the pontoon bridge to the canal . Adan was to prepare to clear the Akavish and Tirtur Roads to deploy the bridges . Gonen informed Sharon of Adan ' s new orders and tasked Sharon with capturing the Chinese Farm and Egyptian positions near the farm and the canal . In need of regrouping his forces Sharon suggested that he capture the farm , once Adan had cleared the routes to the canal , and Gonen consented . In a later meeting with Dayan and Bar - Lev , Gonen reiterated the latter ' s statement that no more forces would cross until the bridges were laid , and added that should the situation worsen the paratroopers may be withdrawn . The 162nd Division , concentrated south of Tasa , had been standing - by to cross the canal since dawn on October 16 . The division advanced towards the canal but movement was hampered by the massive traffic jams on the roads leading to the canal . When Adan realized that Akavish was closed , he ordered a tank battalion to make a turning maneuver through the desert to reach Deversoir . When it arrived Sharon contacted Adan , explaining Reshef ' s difficult situation , and requested that the battalion be placed under his command . Adan accepted and Sharon in turn authorized Reshef ' s request to pull back and regroup , replacing his brigade with the tank battalion . After receiving his new orders Adan moved his division to occupy a series of positions opposite ' Abd el - Hamid ' s 16th Brigade . One of Adan ' s armored brigades had been placed as a reserve force under Southern Command . ' Abd el - Hamid ' s left - flank infantry battalion , blocking Tirtur , repelled Israeli tanks attacking westwards and thwarted Adan ' s efforts to clear the road . Adan realized that , without infantry support , breaking through the Egyptian positions would prove costly . However at 2 : 00 PM Southern Command notified Adan that he was soon to be supplied with the 35th Paratrooper Brigade , which had been transported by helicopters from Ras Sudar on the Gulf of Suez to Refidem east of the canal . The brigade made its way to the canal in buses and was greatly delayed by the traffic on Akavish road . Adan had expected the unit to arrive well before dusk but the brigade commander Colonel Uzi Ya ' iri only arrived at 10 : 00 PM , closer to midnight . The rest of his brigade soon arrived , transported by helicopters after the buses had come to a complete standstill . Paratrooper effort . Adan met Ya ' iri at Adan ' s former command post . Adan briefly explained the situation and , in a short discussion , Ya ' iri laid out his plan . He was tasked with clearing Akavish and Tirtur . At 11 : 30 the paratroopers began moving , with a battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Yitzhak Mordechai spearheading the advance . Ya ' iri , acting with a sense of urgency , had decided to go into action without awaiting sufficient intelligence , or performing adequate reconnaissance on Egyptian defenses . His unit lacked artillery observer s and , rather than wait for one to arrive , it was agreed the paratroopers would request fire support of the 162nd Division ' s command net . The brigade was acting without armor support . After some time time Mordechai ' s battalion had reached an area where Tirtur and Akavish were closest , the distance between them no wider than . At around 2 : 45 AM , they came into contact with Abd el - Hamid ' s left - flank battalion , positioned around Tirtur . The battalion directed effective artillery fire against the paratroopers , who were also receiving heavy machine gun and small arms fire from entrenched Egyptian infantry . The paratroopers attempted to assault the machine gun positions , in places advancing to within a few meters of Egyptian lines . The paratrooper companies spread out , but repeatedly failed to reach the defenses . Israeli artillery fire was ineffective . Egyptian infantry were able to suppress the paratroopers ' movement and thwart flanking attempts . Most company and platoon commanders were killed or wounded . Adan ordered Ya ' iri to narrow his brigade ' s front and focus on clearing Akavish instead , but the lead paratrooper battalion was under such heavy fire that it was impossible to maneuver . With dawn nearing Adan realized that if the pontoon bridge could not be brought to the canal during the few remaining hours of dark , an entire day would pass without a bridge being laid across the canal and in daylight the paratroopers would sustain more casualties . He sent a half - track company to reconnoiter Akavish at 3 : 00 . Half an hour later the company reported it had reached the crossing site without encountering any resistance . The Egyptian battalion fighting the paratroopers had focused all their attention on the Israelis at Tirtur , ignoring activity on Akavish . Adan took a risky decision , sending the irreplaceable pontoons down Akavish to the canal . IDF Bulldozer s cleared the road of wreckage and debris and the Israelis reached Fort Lakekan before turning northwards , finally reaching the crossing site . Bridge construction was started immediately by military engineer s of the 143rd Division . At dawn Ya ' iri requested approval from Adan to withdraw his brigade , the paratroopers having thus far been unsuccessful in reaching Egyptian lines . Gonen denied the request , approving only medevac for the wounded . This was countermanded after Bar - Lev visited Adan at his command post and realized the gravity of the paratroopers ' situation . An armored battalion was tasked with covering the paratroopers but was unable to locate them . The paratroopers released red smoke to pinpoint their position but this backfired as the Egyptians also spotted the smoke , directing accurate artillery fire against them and inflicting further paratrooper casualties . The tanks assaulted the defenses but suffered losses and fell back . It became evident that withdrawal could not be accomplished in the open , APCs and half - tracks were brought up to extract the paratroopers and the wounded — all the while under fire . The Israelis finally withdrew under cover of friendly tanks . In 14 hours of almost uninterrupted combat the paratroopers suffered heavy casualties with some 40 – 70 killed and 100 wounded . Ya ' iri would state that " We had suffered seventy casualties because we went into action too hastily , without proper intelligence on the enemy ' s defenses . " Armored losses sustained during the withdrawal were also heavy . Egyptian withdrawal . The Israeli armored brigades , principally those of Nir , Amir and Raviv , continued engaging and attacking the 16th Brigade after the paratroopers were withdrawn . The Israelis concentrated air and artillery attacks against 21st Division ' s units from 5 : 00 AM . The Egyptians estimated there were upwards of 80 Israeli tanks attacking their positions . At around 7 : 00 AM on October 17 the 21st Division received orders to evict Israeli armor from the vicinity of al - Galaa ' village and capture Fort Matzmed , as part of a larger Egyptian effort to seal the Israeli penetration and destroy the bridgehead on the west bank . Since Oraby had the 18th Mechanized Brigade in defensive positions and stripped of its tank battalion , and the 14th Brigade defending other parts of the Egyptian bridgehead , he tasked the 1st Brigade to execute the attack with its remaining 53 tanks . At 8 : 00 AM the Egyptians conducted an air and artillery strike on the area for some fifteen minutes , after which the attack commenced . Egyptian tanks managed to destroy Israeli armor near the village and reached the northern strongpoint of Fort Matzmed just after 9 : 00 AM , in the face of heavy resistance . However they were soon repelled by Israeli ground fire supported by air strikes . Israeli tanks then counterattacked and managed to advance significantly . The armored battle continued in a see - saw fashion until 9 : 00 PM , by which time the 1st Brigade had restored its original lines . Meanwhile an attack by one of the 18th Brigade ' s mechanized infantry battalions on al - Galaa ' , at 5 : 00 PM , failed with heavy losses and ten tanks were then allocated to the brigade . Israeli armor had occupied irrigation ditches around the farm and were entrenched in them , which significantly enhanced their defensive position against Egyptian counterattacks . Egyptian attacks directed against the Israeli corridor , or the bridgehead , failed with heavy losses . The 1st Brigade had just 33 tanks remaining in its inventory after losing 20 tanks . This prompted Second Army command to transfer a battalion of 21 tanks on October 18 from the 2nd Infantry Division to the north to reinforce the dwindling tank numbers in 16th Division ' s bridgehead . As the battalion moved south a large number of Israeli aircraft attacked the formation . The battalion undertook evasive maneuvers , turning eastwards and fanning out in the desert terrain , thereby avoiding losses . The battalion was then attached to the 21st Division . Abd el - Hamid meanwhile reported the dire situation of his forces at 5 : 30 PM on October 17 . The 16th Brigade had been in heavy combat for three consecutive days – ammunition was running scarce and the brigade was heavily outnumbered and outgunned due to losses , including the destruction of its artillery units . Abd el - Hamid received orders from 16th Division Headquarters to retreat , his brigade abandoned its Chinese Farms positions and reinforced the lines of the 18th Mechanized Brigade to the north during the night of October 17 / 18 . This finally opened the Tirtur and Akavish roads to Israeli forces , ensuring Operation Abiray - Lev would proceed . Missouri remained in Egyptian hands though , posing a threat to the Israeli corridor to the canal . Aftermath . At around 4 : 00 PM on October 17 the pontoon bridge had been fully assembled , opening the first Israeli bridge across the canal . The roller bridge was laid soon after at dawn on October 18 and , by the afternoon , Adan ' s division crossed to the west bank followed by Kalman Magen ' s division . Adan , supported by Magen , would go on to reach Suez after the failure of a United Nations ceasefire , thereby cutting off two infantry divisions of the Egyptian Third Field Army . Sharon also crossed with part of his division , simultaneously trying to defend and expand the Israeli corridor to the Suez Canal — as well attacking northwards on the west bank to Ismailia , in an attempt to similarly cut off Second Army . His efforts bogged down and he was unable to reach Ismailia ( see Battle of Ismailia ) , while attempts to seize critical positions and expand the Israeli corridor on the east bank saw little to no success . While ultimately an Israeli victory , the Battle of the Chinese Farm has an especially infamous legacy among Israeli participants , and it is remembered for as one of the most brutal battles of the war — and for the heavy losses it incurred on both Egyptians and Israelis . After the battle had ended , Dayan visited the area of the battlefield and Reshef , who accompanied him , said " Look at this valley of death . " The minister , taken aback by the great destruction before him , muttered in an undertone " What you people have done here ! " Later Dayan would recount that : " I am no novice at war or battle scenes , but I have never seen such a sight , not in reality , or in paintings , or in the worst war movies . Here was a vast field of slaughter stretching as far as the eye could see . " Sharon would also provide his own poignant account of the aftermath : " It was as if a hand - to - hand battle of armor had taken place . . . Coming close you could see the Egyptian and Jewish dead lying side - by - side , soldiers who had jumped from their burning tanks and died together . No picture could capture the horror of the scene , none could encompass what had happened there . " The losses suffered by both the Egyptians and the Israelis in the battle were severe . Israeli units suffered heavy casualties in men and equipment ; Reshef ' s armored losses during the first night of the battle alone were comparable to Egyptian armored losses on the disastrous October 14 offensive . For their part , the numbers of Egyptian armored forces within 16th Division ' s bridgehead severely dwindled . As of 18 October the 21st Armored Division had no more than 40 tanks remaining , of an original 136 tanks available at the start of the battle ( not counting 21 tanks received as reinforcements ) , while the 16th Infantry Division had just 20 tanks remaining in its organic tank battalion . This attrition served Egypt ' s war strategy of inflicting maximum casualties on the Israelis even though , from another perspective , the initiative had passed to the Israelis during the battle . Notable participants . Among the participants of the battle were Mohamed Hussein Tantawi and Ehud Barak , then Lieutenant - Colonels . Tantawi commanded an infantry battalion under the 16th Infantry Brigade . He engaged Reshef ' s armor during October 16 and later Mordechai ' s paratroopers during the night of October 16 / 17 , and was decorated for valor during the battle . Ehud Barak commanded an armored battalion during the battle , and personally led the armored effort to extricate the Israeli paratroopers . Both men would later serve as Ministers of Defense in their respective nations and encounter each other again in that capacity .