Japanese military strategies in 1942 Immediately after the fall of Singapore in 1942 certain Army circles argued that Japan should exploit her advantage and seek peace with Great Britain . The heart of this reasoning was the fact that Japan could not knock out both the United States and England , judging from such factors as national strength and geographical location . The Soviet Army had recovered from its initial setbacks in the war with Japan ' s ally Germany , and had regained its feet . Under the circumstances , Japan should plan to conclude a so - called compromise peace , seizing the opportunity after attainment of her war objectives . This sentiment was held by very few people , however , and most of the military paid scant attention to it . Planning for and prosecution of war then followed . Expected counterattacks . Between February and March 1942 , Imperial General Headquarters was anxious about the next steps which were to follow the close of the first - phase operations . In planning second - phase operations , the Army Operations Bureau estimated that counter - offensives could be expected starting in 1943 . Two basic elements went into the formulation of this judgment . As for the scale of counterattack , the operations people could make no definitive estimate , because they had no basis for forecasting . Some of the staff officers thought that the counteroffensive might center around a force of several Marine Corps divisions . The estimates proved overly optimistic . The American counter - assault began in the latter half of 1942 . This mental relaxation could be observed not only in Tokyo but in the Southern Army as well - which was perhaps only natural . The Southern Army , for example , united its headquarters Intelligence Section with the Operations Section after the close of the first phase of the war , alleging that the intelligence staff had lost its raison d ' etre at that stage . This action of the Southern Army , ignoring the intelligence function , was taken without the approval of IGHQ and typified contempt for the combat strength of the Allies . There was consequently an inability to forecast the large - scale counteroffensives launched by the Americans and the British in the near future . Indeed , the Southern Army ' s Intelligence Section was not re - activated until February 6 , 1944 . Redeployment in China . The principles of the redeployment were as follows : July mobilizations . On July 4 , 1942 , IGHQ ordered the following units activated : To win the war , IGHQ needed stability in vital portions of the southern regions , and the establishment of self - sufficient , impregnable foundations . Operations , moreover , was to be prepared in conformity with all possible eventualities . In conjunction with the Navy , the Army Commander should endeavor to stabilize important regions in the south , and to prepare Outer Perimeter operations based upon the below - cited precepts : IGHQ also directed the Southern Army to undertake a number of measures : Sumatra , Java , and the Philippines . Singapore will be the hub . Planned operations in Outer Perimeter . One of the operations , The Port Moresby Operation or Operation Mo , had the objective of taking possession of strategic island points to intensify a cutoff in the contact between the United States and Australia , while squelching the Americans ' and Australians ' plans of counterattack from the same areas . Action was slated to begin about the beginning of July 1942 , using the following forces : Seventeenth Army and Guadalcanal operations . Fighting had meanwhile erupted on Guadalcanal Island . On August 13 , the Seventeenth Army ( with the Ichiki Detachment in support ) was ordered to continue the Eastern New Guinea Operation , while simultaneously recapturing Guadalcanal in concert with the Navy . Implications of loss at Midway . The failure of the Midway Operation was caused by slight negligence , but the effects were so tremendous that Japanese Army operations in the Pacific were shaken to their very roots . Because of the failure , the Japanese Navy also lost its mastery forever , since a quick recovery from the smashing blow to the carrier fleet was impossible . It was difficult for Japan either to build large aircraft carriers or to train skilled airmen overnight . Aleutian Islands . June landings . On June 7 , 1942 , the North Seas Detachment landed on Kiska , and the next day upon Attu , without meeting resistance . No landings were made , in Adak and the mission of occupying that island was canceled on June 25 . IGHQ ( on October 24 ) reinforced the North Seas Detachment and also changed its name to the North Seas Garrison Unit . Commanded by Major General Juichiro Mineki , the force was primarily composed of three infantry battalions and was under the operational control of the Commander - in - Chief of the Fifth Fleet . The American Army constructed air bases at both Adak ( about the end of August 1942 ) and at Amchitka , near Kiska ( around February 1943 ) . On March 26 , 1943 , a naval battle occurred near the Komandorski Islands , within Soviet territorial waters , but neither side suffered serious losses .