Battle of the North Cape The Battle of the North Cape was a Second World War naval battle which occurred on 26 December 1943 , as part of the Arctic Campaign . The German battlecruiser , on an operation to attack Arctic Convoys of war matériel from the Western Allies to the USSR , was brought to battle and sunk by superior Royal Navy forces — the battleship plus several cruisers and destroyers — off Norway ' s North Cape . The battle was the last battle between big gun capital ships in the war between Britain and Germany . The British victory confirmed the massive strategic advantage held by the British , at least in surface units . Background . Operation " Ostfront " was an attempt by the German Kriegsmarine to intercept the expected Arctic convoy s . In late December 1943 , these would be the Russia - bound convoy JW 55B and the Home - bound convoy RA 55A . On 22 December 1943 , a " Luftwaffe " aircraft sighted JW 55B and commenced shadowing . Three days later , on 25 December , " Scharnhorst " ( Captain Fritz Hintze ) with the " Narvik " - class destroyer s , , , , and left Norway ' s Alta Fjord under the overall command of " Konteradmiral " Erich Bey . JW 55B consisted of 19 cargo vessels under the command of the Commodore , retired Rear - Admiral Maitland Boucher , accompanied by a close escort of two destroyers and three other vessels , and an ocean escort of eight Home Fleet destroyers led by the destroyer . Also in the area was convoy RA 55A , returning to the United Kingdom from Russia . RA 55A consisted of 22 cargo ships , accompanied by a close escort of two destroyers and four other vessels , and an ocean escort of six Home Fleet destroyers led by the destroyer . Escorting the convoys to Russia was the responsibility of the Home Fleet and its Commander - in - Chief , Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser . Fraser wished to neutralise " Scharnhorst " , a major threat to the convoys , and planned a confrontation over Christmas 1943 in which convoy JW 55B would be used to draw the enemy out . The previous convoy , JW 55A , had arrived safely at Murmansk with its normal escorts and additional protection from Force 1 commanded by Vice Admiral Robert Burnett in his flagship light cruiser with the cruisers and . Fraser expected and hoped that " Scharnhorst " would attempt to attack JW 55B . At a conference of the captains of the ships in his force Fraser described his plan to intercept " Scharnhorst " at a position between the convoy and the enemy ' s Norwegian base before approaching the enemy within in the Arctic night , illuminating with star - shell , and opening fire using fire - control radar . Convoy JW 55B had left Loch Ewe on December 20 , and by December 23 it was clear from intelligence reports that it had been sighted and was being shadowed by enemy aircraft . Fraser then put to sea with Force 2 consisting of his flagship the battleship , the cruiser and S - class destroyer s , , , and HNoMS " Stord " of the Royal Norwegian Navy . Fraser was anxious not to discourage " Scharnhorst " from leaving its base , so did not approach before it was necessary to do so . As JW 55B and its escorts approached the area of greatest danger on the same day , the 23rd , travelling slowly eastward off the coast of North Norway , Burnett and Force 1 set out westward from Murmansk while Fraser with Force 2 approached at moderate speed from the west . " Scharnhorst " sailed from its base at Altenfjord on the evening of 25 December and set course for the convoy ' s reported position as a south - westerly gale developed . Battle . The following day , in poor weather and heavy seas and with only minimal " Luftwaffe " reconnaissance to aid him , Rear Admiral Bey was unable to locate the convoy . Thinking he had overshot the enemy , he detached his destroyers and sent them southward to increase the search area . Admiral Fraser , preparing for a German attack , had diverted the returning empty convoy RA 55A northward , out of the area in which it was expected , and ordered JW 55B to reverse course , to allow him to close . He later ordered four of the destroyers with RA 55A ; , , and , to detach and join him . The now unescorted " Scharnhorst " encountered Burnett ' s Force 1 shortly after 09 : 00 . At a distance of nearly , the British cruisers opened fire and " Scharnhorst " responded with her own salvoes . While no hits were scored on the cruisers , the German battlecruiser was struck twice , with one shell destroying the radar controls and leaving " Scharnhorst " virtually blind in a mounting snowstorm . Without radar , gunners aboard the battlecruiser were forced to aim at the enemy ' s muzzle flashes . This was made more difficult because two of the British cruisers were using a new flashless propellant , leaving " Norfolk " the relatively easier target . Bey , believing he had engaged a battleship , turned south in an attempt to distance himself from the pursuers and perhaps draw them away from the convoy . Once he had shaken off his pursuers , Bey turned northeast in an attempt to circle round them . Burnett , instead of giving chase in sea conditions that were limiting his cruisers ' speed to , positioned Force 1 so as to protect the convoy . It was a decision that he had some personal doubts about and which was criticised in some quarters but supported by Fraser , but to Burnett ' s relief , shortly after noon " Scharnhorst " approached the cruisers once more . As fire was again exchanged , " Scharnhorst " scored hits on " Norfolk " , disabling a turret and her radar . Following this exchange , Bey decided to return to port , while he ordered the destroyers to attack the convoy at a position reported by a U - Boat . The reported position was out of date and the destroyers missed the convoy . " Scharnhorst " ran south for several hours . Burnett pursued , but both " Sheffield " and " Norfolk " suffered engine problems and dropped back , leaving " Belfast " dangerously exposed for a while . The lack of working radar aboard " Scharnhorst " prevented the Germans from taking advantage of the situation , allowing " Belfast " to reacquire the German ship on her radar set . Meanwhile , the battleship " Duke of York " , with her four escorting destroyers already pressing ahead to try to get into torpedo launching positions , had been informed of " Belfast " s contact and they themselves soon picked up " Scharnhorst " on radar at 16 : 15 and were manoeuvring to bring a full broadside to bear . At 16 : 17 " Scharnhorst " was detected by " Duke of York " s Type 273 radar at a range of 45 , 500 yards ( 41 , 500m ) and by 16 : 32 " Duke of Yorks " Type 284 radar indicated that the range had closed to 29 , 700 yards ( 27 , 700m ) . At 16 : 48 , " Belfast " fired star shell s to illuminate " Scharnhorst " . " Scharnhorst " , unprepared with her turrets trained fore and aft , was clearly visible from " Duke of York " . " Duke of York " opened fire at a range of and scored a hit on the first salvo disabling " Scharnhorst " s foremost turrets ( " Anton " and " Bruno " ) while another salvo destroyed the ship ' s aeroplane hangar . Bey turned north , but was engaged by the cruisers " Norfolk " and " Belfast " , and turned east at a high speed of . Bey was able to put some more distance between " Scharnhorst " and the British ships to increase his prospects of success . " Scharnhorst " also put two shells through " Duke of York " s masts severing a vital radar cable , but these hits could not have been known to Bey , and his ship ' s fortunes took a dramatic turn for the worse at 18 : 20 when a shell fired by " Duke of York " at extreme range pierced her armour belt and destroyed the No . 1 boiler room . " Scharnhorst " s speed dropped to only , and though immediate repair work allowed it to regain to , " Scharnhorst " was now vulnerable to torpedo attacks by the destroyers . Five minutes later , Bey sent his final radio message to the German naval command : " We will fight on until the last shell is fired . " At 18 : 50 " Scharnhorst " turned to starboard to engage the destroyers " Savage " and " Saumarez " , but this allowed " Scorpion " and the Norwegian destroyer " Stord " to attack with torpedo es , scoring one hit on the starboard side . As " Scharnhorst " continued to turn to avoid the torpedoes , " Savage " and " Saumarez " scored three hits on her port side . " Saumarez " was hit several times by " Scharnhorst " s secondary armament and suffered eleven killed and eleven wounded . Due to the torpedo hits , " Scharnhorst " ' s speed again fell to , allowing " Duke of York " to rapidly close the range . With " Scharnhorst " illuminated by starshells " hanging over her like a chandelier " , " Duke of York " and " Jamaica " resumed fire , at a range of only . At 19 : 15 , " Belfast " joined in from the north . The British vessels subjected the German ship to a deluge of shells , and the cruisers " Jamaica " and " Belfast " fired their remaining torpedoes at the slowing target . " Scharnhorst " s end came when the British destroyers " Opportune " , " Virago " , " Musketeer " and " Matchless " fired a further 19 torpedoes at her . Wracked with hits and unable to flee , " Scharnhorst " finally capsized and sank at 19 : 45 on 26 December , her propellers still turning , at an estimated position of . She was later identified and filmed at . Of her total complement of 1 , 968 , only 36 were pulled from the frigid waters , 30 by " Scorpion " and six by " Matchless " . Neither Rear Admiral Bey nor Captain Hintze were among those rescued , although both were reported seen in the water after the ship sank , nor were any other officers . " Scorpion " tried to rescue Bey but he foundered . Fraser ordered the force to proceed to Murmansk , making a signal to the Admiralty : " Scharnhorst sunk " , to which the reply came : " Grand , well done " . Aftermath . Later in the evening of 26 December , Admiral Fraser briefed his officers on board " Duke of York " : " Gentlemen , the battle against " Scharnhorst " has ended in victory for us . I hope that if any of you are ever called upon to lead a ship into action against an opponent many times superior , you will command your ship as gallantly as " Scharnhorst " was commanded today " . The loss of " Scharnhorst " demonstrated the vital importance of radar in modern naval warfare . While the battlecruiser should have been able to outgun all of her opponents save the battleship " Duke of York " , the early loss of radar - assisted fire control combined with the problem of inclement weather left her at a significant disadvantage . " Scharnhorst " was straddled by 31 of the 52 radar - fire - controlled salvos fired by " Duke of York " . In the aftermath of the battle , the " Kriegsmarine " commander , " Großadmiral " Karl Dönitz remarked , " Surface ships are no longer able to fight without effective radar equipment . " " Stord " and " Scorpion " fired their torpedoes from an easterly direction . " Stord " fired her eight torpedoes as she was about from " Scharnhorst " , while also firing her guns . After the battle Admiral Fraser sent the following message to the Admiralty : " . . . Please convey to the C - in - C Norwegian Navy . " Stord " played a very daring role in the fight and I am very proud of her . . . " . In an interview in The " Evening News " on 5 February 1944 the commanding officer of HMS " Duke of York " , Captain Guy Russell , said : " . . . the Norwegian destroyer " Stord " carried out the most daring attack of the whole action . . . " .