Signals intelligence by alliances , nations and industries Multilateral SIGINT . Many organizations , national or not , are responsible for communications security as well as SIGINT ; the organization makes codes and ciphers that it hopes opponents cannot break . There is a synergy between the two components ; there is a saying among cryptologists that no one is qualified to create a cipher unless they have successfully cryptanalyzed a cipher of equivalent complexity . Many US and allied SIGINT activities are considered Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence , and carry the special security marking , " HANDLE THROUGH COMINT CHANNELS ONLY " , which is abbreviated as a suffix to the security classification . SECRET SIGINT material would be marked ( S - CCO ) . For exceptionally sensitive TOP SECRET material , there might be an additional codeword , such as ( TS - CCO - RABID ) . UKUSA Agreement . SIGINT and security procedures are closely coordinated under what is called the UKUSA Community , which includes Australia , Canada , New Zealand , the United Kingdom , and the United States . It is widely rumored that those five nations cooperate in a major SIGINT activity codenamed ECHELON . Of the UKUSA partners , NSA is the US element , Britain ' s is the Government Communications Headquarters ( GCHQ ) . Canada has the Communications Security Establishment and a few other small groups . Australia puts these activities in the Defence Signals Directorate . New Zealand has the Government Communications Security Bureau . ECHELON . It is fair to say that there is " something " called ECHELON , and it is very large . There is no unclassified definition of what it really does , and there are conflicting unofficial reports on its capabilities and operations . Duncan Campbell is the source of much information , but many of his claims have been challenged by independent sources . It is a 2000 report , and his claims that NSA has published no details of its operations is not the case in 2007 . Another extensive report is that of the European Parliament in 2001 . Campbell himself refined his definitions a year later . His " strict " definition of ECHELON is that it is a satellite interception component of the partners of the UKUSA Agreement . Even among the UKUSA members , according to Campbell , there may be other satellite interception stations not called ECHELON , probably in Australia and possibly in Great Britain . It is generally accepted that ECHELON is a cooperative system , principally among the UKUSA Agreement partners , to intercept satellite , microwave , and other communications around the world , searching for information of interest to its members . The geographic distribution of the members allows much more effective worldwide coverage . This article does not replace the separate ECHELON Wikipedia article , but will complement it . Campbell cites Jeffrey Richelson as defining , in the 4th edition of " The American Intelligence Establishment " , an " official " list of " third party " participants in ECHELON ( or perhaps the UKUSA SIGINT alliance ) as Norway , Denmark , Germany , Italy , Greece , Turkey , Austria , Japan , South Korea , and Thailand . Campbell further indicated that US payments to Norway and Denmark were stopped in 1992 , and those countries intended to do their own satellite interception . There are also conflicting reports about the relationship , if any , between ECHELON and US government warrantless monitoring wanted by the George W . Bush administration . Many reports focus on ECHELON ' s capability to intercept signals transmitted through free space , such as microwave and communications satellites . Given that much of the world ' s communications have moved to optical fiber cables , which are difficult but not impossible to intercept . Much ECHELON specification is based on clues , such as noting the geographic location of various large satellite receiving antennas , then plotting the vertical and horizontal coordinates of the parabolic " dish " of the antenna . These can be correlated with the known positions of communications satellites to project that the antenna is intended to receive the signals of a particular satellite . Other countries may be cooperating with the UKUSA countries , including Ireland and Switzerland , although Switzerland has an independent capability . There are also conflicting reports about France cooperating with ECHELON , but also operating an independent capability . NATO . Communications and data exchange electronics are intended to be interoperable among NATO members , although not all countries will share sensitive data . Tactical information usually will be shared . ASEAN and related groups . The Association of Southeast Asian Nations ( ASEAN ) consists of ten countries of the region : Indonesia , Malaysia , Thailand , Singapore , the Philippines , Cambodia , Vietnam , Myanmar , Brunei and Laos . Five of the ten countries have concerns with Islamic terrorism , and most are also concerned with piracy . Formed in 1967 , the countries also shared several decades of concern over Communist threats . Their cooperation improved over time , although there still was support from outside powers . Given Singapore ' s small but potent military , it made basing arrangements in Singapore , in Malaysia and the Philippines . Thailand and Malaysia have a good record working together against the Communist Party of Malaysia . For some years , the ASEAN countries have held annual intelligence summits . It is unclear , however , if intelligence ties preceded or followed the development of military relationships . The author poses the challenge , " Do arrangements such as ECHELON exist outside the relationships between " great " powers ? Literature shows that broad relationships exist among regional powers for various reasons . In the case of ASEAN , states brought together to fight communist insurgency find that they can maximize security by cooperating in covert operations and intelligence sharing . " Technology has accelerated ASEAN intelligence cooperation . For example , Malaysia and Singapore jointly monitor the South China Sea electronically . It is reasonable to assume that the less sensitive aspects of SIGINT , such as Direction finding are part of that surveillance . Other sources include the Five Power Defence Arrangements ( FPDA ) of Australia , Great Britain , New Zealand , Singapore and Malaysia , which includes three members of the UKUSA alliance with strong national SIGINT organizations . Spurred by terrorism concerns , the ASEAN states , in May 2002 , agreed on an Action Plan that provided for enhanced cooperation in intelligence sharing and coordination of anti - terror laws . In August 2002 , ASEAN and the United States issued a “ Joint Declaration . . . to Combat International Terrorism , " which was followed by an ASEAN Regional Forum ( ARF ) meeting on terrorism , to be jointly sponsored by Malaysia in the US . The US proposed that a regional counterterrorism training center be established in Malaysia . Accompanying the Anti - Terrorism Center is an intelligence - sharing agreement among Indonesia , the Philippines , Malaysia , Cambodia , and Thailand , a first meeting of which was held in Manila in January 2003 . An obvious question , without a simple answer , is how much SIGINT capabilities these countries have . Some of these countries are reluctant to get too close to the US , involving nationalist issues in the Philippines and Islamic parties in Malaysia and Indonesia . Singapore , among the regional nations , seems most comfortable in exchanging intelligence information with the US , especially receiving SIGINT in return for HUMINT . Singapore has established sharing between the US PACOM Joint Intelligence Center and Singapore ’ s Joint Counterterrorism Center , and Singapore also is leading in accepting US goals for maritime security , with a Strategic Goods Control law in January 2003 . That law made Singapore the first major port to meet US homeland security rules for cargo . Singapore wants more US X - ray equipment , and possibly MASINT sensors . US relations to an ASEAN or other group may be more domestically acceptable , in countries suspicious of the US , than bilateral arrangements . There are obvious reasons for regional nations wanting US intelligence support , including SIGINT . Nevertheless , the eagerness of the US to help against Islamic groups strikes at local sensitivities . Other coalitions . UN and other , often " ad hoc " international coalitions have no predefined SIGINT interoperability ; establishing even basic communications interoperabilities is one of the first and most urgent tasks of any coalition . National SIGINT . Australia . Australia ' s main organization is in the Defence Signals Directorate . It operates collection stations for multilateral and national use . Australia has systems interoperable with UKUSA , and ECHELON . Canada . Canada has the Communications Security Establishment and several other groups , especially military tactical groups . Canada has systems interoperable with NATO nations , UKUSA , and ECHELON . China . China ' s main SIGINT effort is in the Technical Department , or Third Department of the General Staff Department of the Central Military Commission , with additional capabilities , primarily domestic , in the Ministry of State Security ( MSS ) . SIGINT stations , therefore , are scattered through the country , for domestic as well as international interception . Prof . Desmond Ball , of the Australian National University , described the largest stations as Some Western analyses of the third Department claim it maintains a staff of more than 130 , 000 , though this figure cannot be independently confirmed . As opposed to other major powers , China focuses its SIGINT activities on its region rather than the world . Ball wrote , in the 1980s , that China has several dozen SIGINT stations aimed at Russia , Japan , Taiwan , Southeast Asia and India , as well as internal communications . . . " Of the stations apparently targeting Russia , there are sites at Jilemutu and Jixi in the northeast , and at Erlian and Hami near the Mongolian border . Two Russian - facing sites in Xinjiang ( Sinkiang ) , at Qitai and Korla may be operated jointly with resources from the US CIA ' s Office of SIGINT Operations , probably focused on missile and space activity . Other stations aimed at South and Southeast Asia are on a net controlled by Chengdu , the capital of Szechuan . There is a large facility at Dayi , and , according to Ball , " numerous " small posts along the Indian border . Other significant facilities are located near Shenyang , near Jinan and in Nanjing and Shanghai . Additional stations are in the Fujian and Guangdong military districts opposite Taiwan . On Hainan Island , near Vietnam , there is a naval SIGINT facility that monitors the South China sea , and a ground station targeting US and Russian satellites . China also has ship and aircraft platforms in this area , under the South Sea Fleet headquarters at Zhanjiang immediately north of the island . Targeting here seems to have an ELINT as well as COMINT flavor . There are also truck - mounted mobile ground systems , as well as ship , aircraft , and limited satellite capability . There are at least 10 intelligence - gathering auxiliary vessels . As of the late 1990s , the Chinese did not appear to be trying to monitor the US Pacific Command to the same extent as does Russia . Whether they will attempt to do so depends , in part , on the status of Taiwan . Cuba . While Cuba had traditionally been a Soviet client , it both has been developing indigenous capabilities , including equipment design and manufacture , as well as having Chinese - operated stations on its soil . Within the Cuban intelligence ministry , a Counter - Electronic Warfare Department was established in 1997 , at the same level as the Technical Department and the Foreign Intelligence ) Department . In 1992 , a tactically oriented Counter - Electronic Warfare Department was created . The national intelligence organization also runs electronic warfare and SIGINT for the Air Force and Navy . Russia and China , at various times , have operated or are operating intercept stations in Cuba , as well as Cuban - operated facilities . The largest and best - known , Lourdes SIGINT Station , was shut down by Russia in 2001 , along with the Russian station at Cam Ranh Bay , Vietnam . Four ground stations ( q . v . ) are in Cuba , two of which are operated by China . Denmark . Denmark is a NATO member and thus has access to a wide range of SIGINT equipment and techniques . A journal article ( information from abstract on Ingentaconnect ) from 2001 states that all four countries of Scandinavia , including NATO members Denmark and Norway , and neutral Sweden and Finland , cooperated in collecting SIGINT on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe . Norway and Denmark did not allow American personnel in their intercept centers , but did receive American financial and technical help . The author suggests Sweden , while neutral , cooperated with US and UK intelligence in the early stages , and possibly later , in the Cold War . The Danish Sigint service , Forsvarets Central Radio , was also active at the same time , and fed the U . S . data from 8 stations located from Greenland to Bornholm . He states that US funds from the 1950 agreement were cut off , to Norway and Denmark , in 1992 , and those two countries planned to do their own satellite interception . It should be noted that the Pusher HF / DF system used by Denmark is not designed for satellite but for terrestrial interception ; it is not clear what , if any , effect that the reported US funds cutoff had on the Pusher system output . The Danish periodical , " Ekstra Bladet " , on September 18 , 1999 , published an article titled " WHERE THE SPIES ARE LISTENING — Take a walk with us through the most secretive secrets of the FE ( the Intelligence Agency of the Danish Armed Forces ) . The authors describe a visit to an apparent SIGINT collection facility , called Sandagergård , at Aflandshage south of Copenhagen . Sandagergård is operated by the Danish intelligence agency . According to the article , Denmark has participated , since 1947 , in ECHELON . Denmark participates in the global surveillance system known today as UKUSA , and known in the press as Echelon . The agreement was reached with Cdr . P . A . Mørch , then second in command of FE , with the American Office of Strategic Services ( OSS ) , predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency ( CIA ) . The CIA was formed by the National Security Act of 1947 , and , by 1947 , the OSS had been dissolved although there were interim agencies that might have negotiated an agreement . The agreement was that the Americans were to supply the equipment free of charge . Denmark ' s payment was to allow a large American ear to listen in on everything that was intercepted by Denmark ' s FE agents . In 1950 , the agreement was formalized by Commander Finn Haugsted and Minister of Defense Rasmus ' Jetfighter ' Hansen . The article cites Cdr . Mørch ' s memoirs as the source , and says he refers to the Danish SIGINT organization as ' the Social Democrat ' s Child ' . Under the agreement , the US was to supply the technical equipment , while Denmark would supply the land and staff . In 1999 , however , the Social Democratic Minister of Justice , Minister of Defense former Minister of Research ( responsible for Denmark ' s telecommunications ) denied knowledge of ECHELON . When the journalists visited the Sandagergård facility , they saw a Pusher HF / DF system , which is a smaller version of the Wullenweber intercept & direction - finding antenna , and two radomes . Discarded paper and packing materials identified shipments of products from IBM , Digital Equipment Corporation , Microsoft and Unisys . They also identified a SIGINT post at Skibsbylejren near Hjørring . This report clearly shows that Denmark operates SIGINT equipment . It cannot be determined , from this information alone , if the operation is for Danish use only , in support of NATO , or indeed part of ECHELON . Denmark hosts the regional NATO command for the Baltic Approaches ( BALTAP ) from a base at Karup . In September 1999 , Minister for Defense Hans Hækkerup said Denmark cooperates with other countries on surveillance , but would not identify the countries or agencies . According to the authors , the US 650th MI Group is the sole point of contact to NATO . Denmark . Finland . During the Soviet era , Finland , while neutral , was reported to be cooperating with the other Scandinavian countries in obtaining SIGINT on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe . France . The French intelligence agency DGSE has responsibility for national - level SIGINT , including a and the . There are multiple . A French Army publications mentions Emeraude as an apparently tactical SIGINT " listening module " . Press reports suggest there is another system , nicknamed Frenchelon in the press , run by DGSE and possibly providing economic intelligence to French industry . Germany . After the end of the Cold War , Germany treated military - related SIGINT differently than other nations , making it a part of the defense - wide electronic warfare organization rather than an intelligence organization . The first unit was set up in Osnabruck in 1957 . In 1959 , German and Dutch SIGINT personnel met to establish a long - standing , especially close cooperation . Today Germany operates many different . Greece . Greece ' s main SIGINT organization is Branch E of the national ( civilian ) intelligence service , " Ethniki ypiresia pliroforion " ( EYP ) . Branch E reports to the Deputy Director General A , who reports to the Director General The military has limited tactical capabilities , interoperable with NATO . A 12 - day major exercise in Greece , Trial Spartan Hammer ( TSH ) ‘ 06 , involved 2 , 000 personnel from 14 NATO countries and 15 NATO agencies , including the SIGINT & ESM working group ( SEWG ) under the NATO Joint Intelligence , Surveillance , and Reconnaissance Capability Group . It was the second NATO joint Signal Intelligence / Electronic Warfare ( SIGINT / EW ) demonstration . Canadian Forces involved included the Electronic Warfare Centre ( CFEWC ) , HMCS Iroquois , 772 EW Squadron , the Joint Intelligence Fusion Capability and the Directorate of Space Development . Ireland . An Irish magazine suggests that Ireland is abandoning some of its neutrality and becoming more allied with ECHELON . One motivation may be that " C3 ( Garda Intelligence and Security ) will get a few crumbs of information about Irish druggies in Amsterdam " . India . India is implementing AWACS and SIGINT using the Israeli Aircraft Industries Phalcon , which will be installed in Russian Ilyushin - 76 aircraft , the same aircraft used for Russia ' s own A - 50 AWACS India ' s main SIGINT directorate is under the Ministry of Defense . Japan . In 1996 , Japan created its first post - WWII major intelligence organization , the Defense Intelligence Headquarters ( DIH ) . Its SIGINT Division is the largest in the organization , with a Ground Self Defense Force unit in Ichigawa , targeting North Korea . The Division also has two Wullenweber intercept and direction finding , as well as offices in Kobunato ( in Niigata Prefecture ) , Oi ( in Saitama Prefecture ) , Tachiarai ( in Fukushima Prefecture ) , and Kikaijima ( in Kagoshima Prefecture ) . Jordan . Beginning in the 1990s , and according to with a declaration of Jordan as a combat zone for U . S . personnel on September 19 , 2001 , there has been increasing intelligence cooperation between the US and Jordan . Arkin states there are permanent US SIGINT ground stations now in Jordan . New Zealand . The Government Communications Security Bureau ( GCSB ) is responsible for signals intelligence was established in 1977 , with responsibility for Communications and Technical Security as well as SIGINT . Computer security responsibilities were added later . Predecessor organizations included the New Zealand Communications Security Committee ( NZCSC ) , created after WWII , from the Prime Minister ' s Department , and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence . While New Zealand had SIGINT functions before WWII , in 1955 , the function was organized into the New Zealand Combined Signals Organisation ( NZCSO ) , under the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff . The TECSEC function of the Government , which essentially involves the provision of protection from eavesdropping or " bugging " , was undertaken by the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service and the Ministry of Defence , prior to the formation of the GCSB . Those capabilities were however limited , and the role was passed to GCSB upon its formation . During the mid - 1970s ( 74 - 76 ) two separate reviews were conducted into the SIGINT and COMSEC activities of the New Zealand Government . One of the aims of the COMSEC study was to investigate the possibility of establishing vital operating standards and a capability to produce national cryptographic key material . Formally established on 1 September 1977 , the GCSB was located within the Ministry of Defence for reasons of cover . " The fact of " GCSB was disclosed , in 1980 , to the Cabinet and Opposition Leader , but with SIGINT functions excluded . Only in 1984 was the SIGINT function of GCSB announced by the Prime Minister . In 1982 , the HF radio interception and Direction finding station at Tangimoana was opened . After a number of reviews in the late 1980s , GCSB was separated from the Defence Ministry , reporting directly to the Prime Minister in 1989 . This act coincided with the creation of the satellite communications interception station at Waihopai , near Blenheim . According to Nicky Hagar , New Zealand is part of ECHELON via the UKUSA Agreement . Norway . Norway , a NATO member , was reported to be cooperating with the other Scandinavian countries in obtaining SIGINT on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe . According to Campbell , there were two bilateral agreements for a SIGINT alliance between Norway in the US , one in 1954 and the next in 1979 . US funding , however , ceased in 1992 , and Campbell said that the Norwegians planned to begin their own satellite interception . Russia . Russia ' s approximate counterpart to NSA is FAPSI , with additional capability in the GRU Sixth Directorate . * * * Russia with the FAPSI - GRU surveillance facility at the People ’ s Democratic Republic of Yemen ’ s Ras Karma Military Airbase , near QaDub on Socotra Island which lies opposite the coast of Somalia at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden in the Indian Ocean . This facility allows intercept of signals from Afghanistan and Diego Garcia . Tupolev Tu - 142M - Z ‘ Bear ’ – the Beriev A - 50 ‘ Mainstay ’ and the IL - 38 ‘ May ’ surveillance planes operate from bases in Syria , South Yemen , and Cuba . Ports also support Russian SIGINT " trawlers " , or , more correctly , small intelligence collection vessels . Russia had operated large SIGINT stations in Cuba and Vietnam until 2001 , but the chief of the General Staff , Anatoly Kvashnin , while the station in Lourdes , Cuba had been vital during the cold war " Now , the military - political situation has changed and there has been a qualitative leap in military equipment . With that money we can buy and launch 20 communication , intelligence and information satellites , and buy up to 100 sophisticated radars , " Given US SIGINT satellite launches typically are quoted in the billion - dollar range , this seems an odd calculation . Vietnam found the Cam Ranh Bay station useful for information on Chinese movements in the South China Sea . While Russia took some equipment back with them , it is not known how much capability the Vietnamese still have . There have been a number of reports that the US helped , using SIGINT satellites , Russian fighters to target and shoot down the Chechen leader , Dzhokhar Dudayev in April 1996 . Spain . Spain operates both a SIGINT ship and a SIGINT aircraft in an apparently strategic function . Its submarines have SIGINT , at least for targeting . The air component is a 707 variant , modified by Israel and equipped with Israeli and Spanish electronics . As well as an Elta EL / L - 8300 SIGINT system , the aircraft has a Tamam Stabilised Long Range Observation System ( SLOS ) high - resolution TV camera and recording systems . The SLOS is reported to have a range of at least 62 miles ( 100 km ) . The aircraft has been reported around the western edge of North Africa , the Western Sahara and the Mediterranean . Spain has been reported to have acquired an ex - East German AGI , which it may operate in cooperation with its SIGINT aircraft . The vessel concerned is the 1 , 900 ton renamed " Alerta " . In East German service , she had extensive antennas and a large radome . Based in Cartagena , the SIGINT work is reportedly by two Israeli companies and a Spanish firm . A different source says that the SIGINT equipment is Russian . A Saturn 35 satellite antenna has been , according to Spanish sources , added . Its submarines have at least tactical SIGINT . Spanish boats have the domestically produced Indra BLQ - 355 , which may have been exported . With its participation in the EADS consortium , Spain obtains access to new technologies . Spain appears to be developing a coordinated SIGINT approach using submarine , ship , and aircraft platforms . Sweden . In 1942 , Swedish SIGINT successes were such that it was split out from the General Staff ' s intelligence branch and made autonomous . At the end of WWII , it was suggested that of European nations , Sweden ' s SIGINT was second only to Great Britain ' s . Sweden ' s Defence Radio Institute , while neutral , was reported to be cooperating with the other Scandinavian countries in obtaining SIGINT on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Switzerland . A number of reports suggest Switzerland both has its own SIGINT but may cooperate with ECHELON . In the spring of 2000 , Swisscom announced that it was selling its satellite earth stations , in Leuk , Geneva , Basel and Zurich , to a US firm , Verestar . Swisscom announced in spring 2000 that it would withdraw from the satellite industry to " concentrate on its core activities . . . The Swiss military sees the purchase of the satellite stations by the US as a potential threat to national security , arguing that the infrastructure could be used for spying . " Verestar is a major European provider of Internet Exchange Point s . The article suggested Switzerland has independent capability . " Switzerland has been conducting its own satellite project since 1993 , dubbed Satos 3 . Initiated by security chief Peter Regli , it is similar to the Echelon project , but on a much smaller scale . Regli ' s successor , Dino Belasi , continues to develop the project with the objective of developing a network capable of dealing with " threats from technology , terrorism and nuclear weapons " . United Kingdom . The major SIGINT organization of Great Britain is the Government Communications Headquarters ( GCHQ ) . The various military components have tactical SIGINT elements . MI - 5 , the counterespionage organization , also has specialized SIGINT capability for detecting receivers as well as illegal transmitters . Britain is trying to find a balance between the very real " special relationship " with the US and the UKUSA partners , and still having a significant European role . Transnational terrorism , as well as multinational organized crime , have led to increased sharing among domestic security organizations . In the case of Britain , this is the Security Service MI5 with France ' s DST , Germany ' s BFV and the other domestic agencies in the so - called Club of Berne . Britain and France . Cooperation with France , by any other government , because the multiple intelligence agencies do not coordinate well with each other . There is no equivalent of the British Joint Intelligence Committee ( JIC ) or US Intelligence Board ( USIB ) . While priorities do come from a national Comité Interministériel du Renseignement , there is no central information and analysis coordination . The particular structure of the French government hurts centralization , because the President and Prime Minister both would want control . Nevertheless , British and French intelligence , perhaps more on the foreign side , sometimes work closely , as an extension of the relationship formed when the British Special Operations Executive ( SOE ) helped the French Resistance . The relationship was strengthened when the French President , Mitterrand , ordered the French intelligence services to assist Britain in the Falklands conflict . France helped track an Argentine ship that was thought to be attempting to obtain additional French - made Exocet missiles . The most important ELINT and radar MASINT cooperation between Britain and France was detailed radar information on the French Exocet anti - shipping missile , which had already sunk " HMS Sheffield " and threatened other ships . While the Argentines had only five Exocets , each could kill a ship , and they were trying to get more . Mitterrand ' s analyst disclosed several comments from Mitterrand during the Falklands war , specifically dealing with the British request for detailed information on the Exocet , so electronic countermeasures ( ECM ) could be planned to misdirect it . Mitterrand , according to his analyst , said , " I had a difference of opinion to settle with the Iron Lady . What an impossible woman , that Thatcher ! “ With her four nuclear submarines on mission in the southern Atlantic , she threatens to launch the atomic weapon against Argentina — unless I supply her with the secret codes that render deaf and blind the missiles we have sold to the Argentineans . Margaret has given me very precise instructions on the telephone . " Thatcher had already been surprised by an offer of French assistance . Again according to the analyst , Jacques Attali , his former aide , said that Mitterrand called her on the day after the Argentine invasion and told her : " I am with you . " Mitterrand told his analyst " She is furious . She blames me personally for this new Trafalgar . . . I have been forced to yield . She has them now , the [ Exocet radar ] codes . If our customers find out that the French wreck the weapons they sell , it ’ s not going to reflect well on our exports . " While the highest levels of government may cooperate , and there is a good working relationship with the French domestic service , DST , there is less mutual aid between GCHQ and the French SIGINT organization in the DGSE . Part of this is that French and British targeting is different , with France focused on the Francophone countries of the world . The French also are suspicious of the British ties to NSA . During the Falklands war and in counterterrorism , there has been effective SIGINT cooperation . It is not known if Britain will receive information from the French experimental Essaim . Britain and Germany . There is HUMINT cooperation between German and British intelligence services . United States . The National Security Agency ( NSA ) is the major SIGINT organization of the US , with other SIGINT activities in other parts of the intelligence community . There is SIGINT capability in several other agencies , often concerned with just one aspect , such as collection or tactical use . US military forces all have tactical SIGINT and COMSEC ( Communications Security ) units . The director of NSA wears a " second hat " as the director of the Central Security Service , which coordinates the military operations , which may both make use of national resources ( i . e . , TENCAP , or Tactical Exploitation of National Intelligence Capabilities ) or provide data to the strategic analysts elsewhere in the intelligence community . There is a limited cryptanalytic capability , principally aimed at domestic criminals , in the Federal Bureau of Investigation ( FBI ) . CIA has some joint activities with NSA , which may include the covert or clandestine placement of SIGINT sensors . US doctrine includes a flexible interface between the strategic and tactical , in military operations . Under the TENCAP program , warfighters can benefit from systems intended for the national intelligence level . Under the complementary Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities ( TIARA ) programs , tactical units acquiring information of interest to the national level can feed it up the chain to the appropriate organizations . The interaction of the US intelligence community , especially COMINT , for domestic law enforcement and counterterrorism is extremely complex , balancing civil liberties versus security needs . There is no consensus on this balance and the matter is very controversial . The SIGINT industry . A variety of firms build SIGINT equipment , and the various government agencies typically have strong in - house prototyping . In the US , the major manufacturers are easy enough to find at trade shows such as that of the Armed Forces Communications - Electronics Association ( AFCEA ) , but details are often scanty until there is a meeting at which classified information can be exchanged . Several firms , however , do have a much higher profile . One challenge , especially in the US where there are many mergers and acquisitions , and in Europe where a consortium model is more common , is keeping track of the names of manufacturers . As one example , the microwave surveillance systems business of Watkins - Johnson , a SIGINT electronics vendor with a long history , was acquired in 1995 by Condor Systems . Watkins - Johnson refocused to make its core business the manufacture of components . Condor Systems , in turn , was acquired by EDO Reconnaissance and Surveillance Systems Inc . ( EDO RSS ) . An actual piece of equipment , however , might still have a Watkins - Johnson label . Boeing . A very large aerospace industry and defense industry vendor , Boeing makes many systems , including the 707 platform on which the US E - 3 AWACS is built , and the 767 platform for Japan ' s AWACS . It is building the P - 8 replacement for the P - 3 maritime patrol aircraft , and has proposed a SIGINT variant . See discussion of this aircraft under SIGINT EADS Consortium . European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company EADS N . V . ( EADS ) is a large European aerospace corporation , formed by the merger on 10 July 2000 of Aérospatiale - Matra of France , Construcciones Aeronáuticas SA ( CASA ) of Spain , and DaimlerChrysler Aerospace AG ( DASA ) of Germany . The combined organizations , especially the French and German components , have extensive military electronics experience . Elbit Systems . This Israeli firm , with worldwide strategic partners , owns all of the former Israeli military electronics manufacturer , Tadiran . It has US manufacturing operations , which sometimes create US export control restrictions . Elbit is teamed with Thales Group to produce the UK ' s standard UAV . General Dynamics . A diversified US military contractor , it divested itself of aviation lines of business and now concentrates on land and naval systems . General Dynamics C4 Systems , in Scottsdale , AZ , makes SIGINT products including the Army ' s Prophet ground SIGINT system . GTE . GTE Government Systems is now part of General Dynamics . GTE merged its communications operations with Verizon HARVESTER . A British firm that makes the " HARVESTER family of SIGINT database applications provide unique and cost - effective solutions to a wide range of collection requirements " has a website that can serve as a basic tutorial on the technical aspects of what SIGINT systems collect . Israel Aerospace Industries . Israel Aerospace Industries ( IAI ) ( formerly Israel Aircraft Industries ) , is the largest defense contractor in Israel . It sells worldwide , although the United States has , on occasion , blocked a sale , which included US technology , to a nation the US considered unfriendly . Within the context of SIGINT and related ISTAR product is the airborne Phalcon system , often described as an AWACS radar and battle management system , but having significant ELINT capabilities . Based on an Active Electronically Scanned Array ( AESA ) radar and antenna , the Phalcon fuses data from the radar , but also IFF , COMINT and ELINT sensors . When the supplemental sensors detect an item of interest , the system control computer begins an active search for more information from other on - board and ground - based sensors . First exhibited in 1993 , full Phalcon , other than one on an Israeli 707 , has been sold to Chile and India ( Ilyushin Il - 76 platform ) , although a sale to the PRC was blocked by the US . A subset was sold to South Africa , and a miniaturized version will be installed in Israeli Gulfstream G550 SIGINT aircraft . This will include S - and L - band radars , as well as passive sensors . Narus . Another firm is Narus , which started as a security vendor for very large telecommunications and Internet service providers , has a product called the " NarusInsight Intercept Suite ( NIS ) enables capture of packet - level , flow - level , and application - level usage information along with complete session packets for forensic analysis , surveillance , or for satisfying regulatory compliance . " Narus ' CEO was interviewed about the general subject of cyberwarfare , perhaps an even broader problem than SIGINT . Oslan , when asked to describe cyberwarfare , said " This is my opinion only , but I think that what would constitute an act of war over the Internet would be something that maliciously , directly cripples a country ’ s ability to function . If somebody brought down our electrical infrastructure and crippled our economy , I think that would be an act of war . How we could treat that , government to government , is a policy question . You are not using guns and bullets anymore . What is the appropriate response as your armies move from physical entities to virtual entities ? " If one continued the military metaphor here , the armies , whether physical or virtual , need intelligence . Large Internet Service Providers ( ISPs ) increasingly believe that " deep packet inspection " is required to protect their internal infrastructure , as well as their customers , from malicious hacking and computer crime . The same type of tools with legitimate ISP security applications also have COMINT interception and analysis capability . See " 2000s " for a discussion of the surveillance capabilities of such software . Northrop Grumman . A major US defense industry player , Northrop Grumman makes a variety of sensors , as well as the Global Hawk UAV , which uses Raytheon SIGINT electronics . The EuroHawk variant of this UAV has SIGINT electronics from EADS . Racal . A British company founded in 1950 , Racal is now part of Thales Group . Raytheon . A major US defense contractor , Raytheon ' s own materials identify it as the SIGINT contractor for the Global Hawk Unmanned aerial vehicle ( UAV ) . See further discussion of this product under Aircraft Platforms . Swedish - South African - EADS . A consortium of Swedish CelsiusTech ( formerly Saab Technologies ) and Grintek Ewation , the latter a South African partnership with the European EADS consortium . Through their common international trademark Monitoring , Reconnaissance , Counter Measures ( MRCM ) they field a full range of SIGINT technologies . Thales . Thales Group is a French electronics company involved in , among others , defense and security markets . It was earlier called Thomson - CSF , but changed its name after acquiring Racal . Its ownership is split among the Government of France , Alcatel - Lucent , and Dassault Group . Its joint venture to build the British Watchkeeper WK450 UAV , UAV Tactical Systems , is 51 % majority owned by Israeli company Elbit Systems and Thales UK . US participation in Elbit imposes some US export controls .