Strategic reset Strategic reset was a policy framework designed to stop counterproductive U . S . engagement in a fragmenting Iraq and to strengthen the United States ' stance throughout the Middle East . In military terms , " reset " refers to " a series of actions to restore units to a desired level of combat capability commensurate with future mission requirements . " The proposal advocates harnessing U . S . military , economic , and diplomatic power to protect critical national security interests rather than expending this power in efforts to accommodate political progress amid multiple internal and external conflicts in Iraq . The plan for strategic reset entails four key measures : The framework was set forth in a 2007 report by the Center for American Progress , a progressive think tank based in Washington , D . C . Background . The Center for American Progress developed the framework for strategic reset on the premise that " with the Iraq war well into its fifth year , the still lacks a realistic plan for the Middle East and Iraq . " Senior Fellows Brian Katulis and Lawrence J . Korb , together with Peter Juul , laid out the plan in the form of a 64 - page report released June 25 , 2007 . In 2007 , when retired U . S . Marine Corps Gen . John J . Sheehan published a newspaper editorial explaining his decision not to accept the position of " War Czar " or White House implementation manager for the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan , he wrote : Citing Gen . Sheehan , the report gives examples from what are described as seven years of relative progress in the Middle East ( 1994 – 2000 ) followed by seven years of setbacks ( 2001 – 2007 ) , such as : Current U . S . strategy in Iraq relies on Iraqi political progress , increased numbers of U . S . troops in the country , and diversification of tactics for political and economic support . While proponents of strategic reset support diversification , particularly as it regards " situat < nowiki > [ ing ] < / nowiki > the strategy in a regional approach , " they strongly oppose sending more U . S . troops to Iraq , and they maintain that the " fundamental premise of Bush ’ s surge strategy — that Iraq ’ s leaders will make key decisions to advance their country ’ s political transition and national reconciliation — is at best misguided and clearly unworkable . " In 2006 , the bipartisan Iraq Study Group released a report stressing the need for troop withdrawal and for redoubled diplomatic efforts , including efforts to address the Arab – Israeli conflict . The report also said that the Iraqi government " should accelerate assuming responsibility for Iraqi security , " and that the " primary mission of U . S . forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army , which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations . " Supporters of the strategic reset framework disagree with the latter terms , claiming that " the ISG was examining an Iraq that simply does not exist anymore , " and that embedding U . S . forces to support Iraqi ones " would create unmanageable force protection problems for U . S . troops . " Strategic reset emphasizes making counterterrorism the primary role of U . S . troops , rather than engaging them in sectarian conflict . It also emphasizes the necessity of recognizing Iraq ' s failed national reconciliation and adapting U . S . policy to the inevitable decentralization of Iraqi politics . In 2007 , the " Washington Post " described as " strategic reset " a proposal by U . S . Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that took the form of " an unusually detailed public explanation of the new American effort to create a de facto alliance between Israel and moderate Arab states against Iranian extremism . " Principles of the strategic reset framework . Advocates of strategic reset maintain that the current administration ' s misjudgments regarding Iraq policy have jeopardized the United States ' national security interests and that it must act now in order to prevent further attrition of its military and to effectively confront a growing global terrorist threat . The strategy requires that U . S . troops rapidly be withdrawn from Iraq and enlisted in efforts to counter this threat , while available political resources are deployed throughout the Middle East in order to minimize conflict in Iraq and to ensure stability in the region at large . It also requires the U . S . to take action on several fronts , especially the Arab – Israeli conflict , in order to build international support and promote regional commitment to this stability . A further requirement is that the international community cooperate to promote rule of law and to encourage legitimate , non - aggressive governments in the Middle East , preventing the formation of " security vacuums " exploited by Al Qaeda . Adapting to Iraq ' s fragmentation . Since 2005 , Iraq ' s major sectarian conflicts have continued to generate violence at high levels , and Iraq has failed to engineer a political solution to the problems that fuel them . In northern Iraq , Turkmen , Kurds , and Arabs are fighting over the jurisdiction of the Kurdistan Regional Government , and Turkey is conducting raids on the Kurdistan Workers Party . In the south and west , respectively , there is intra - Shi ' a violence and violence between Iraqi Sunnis and Sunnis linked to Al - Qaeda ; Baghdad and surrounding areas host the deadliest violence in the form of civil war between Sunni and Shi ' a . Proponents of strategic reset point out that no significant progress has been made on " benchmarks " established by U . S . Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice such as constitutional reform or laws regulating provincial elections , distribution of oil revenue , or treatment of citizens subject to de - Baathification ; they argue that no realistic policy can predicate the resolution of Iraq ' s sectarian conflicts on the rule of a unified Iraqi governing authority . On June 26 , 2007 , for example , Iraqi commando s raided the house of Culture Minister Asad Kamal al - Hashimi , who is believed to have ordered an assassination attempt fatal to both sons of Mithal al - Alusi , a member of Iraq ' s parliament . According to the CAP , " Iraq ' s leaders fundamentally disagree on what kind of country Iraq is and should be , and Iraq ' s political transition has not succeeded in bridging these divides . This lack of political consensus among Iraq ' s leaders has resulted in a violent struggle for power . " Stopping unconditional arming of security forces . Under the strategic reset framework , one immediate response to the political stalemate is cessation of the ongoing provision of weapons to Iraqi security forces , whose number now exceeds 500 , 000 . According to the CAP , these security forces — who continue to receive considerable U . S . support — exhibit divided loyalties that stem directly from divisions in the political structure ; they have been implicated in corruption , militia membership , death squads , and killing American troops sent to train them . " The fundamental problem with Iraq ' s security forces is that they lack the allegiance and in many cases the motivation to defend their country . The United States has poured more than $ 20 billion into building a national army and police force that does not have the unity and support of its own leaders . " Supporters of the strategic reset see two dangers in allowing the current policy of arming and training these security forces to continue : the first danger is that the U . S . is providing weaponry to opposing sides of a civil war . For example , Matthew Yglesias , writing for " The Atlantic " , has said , The second danger arises from the fact that the majority of Iraq ' s security forces are Shi ' a who constitute " some of the closest allies of America ' s greatest rival in the Middle East — Iran . " Decentralization . A second response to fragmentation in Iraqi politics is decentralization of U . S . policy and power structure in Iraq . The strategic reset framework calls for reassignment of personnel from the U . S . Embassy in Baghdad into " provincial outposts " established throughout Iraq . It also calls for the U . S . to forgo building a new Baghdad embassy , one projected to be the world ' s largest . According to the report , the adoption of this pragmatic , localized approach to placing diplomats and intelligence employees would represent progress on three fronts : It would provide bases for intelligence operations to counter terrorism , allow U . S . officials to give consular support to Iraq ' s estimated 2 million internally displaced persons , and bring U . S . personnel into closer working relationships with local Iraqi institutions . Phased military redeployment . Phased redeployment is the strategic reset framework ' s second mainstay . The plan calls for the U . S . immediately to announce " that it does not intend to maintain permanent military bases or forces in Iraq " and to initiate a new deployment structure allowing forces currently serving in Iraq to rotate home , while incoming troops conduct counterterrorism missions from locations such as Turkey , Afghanistan , and Kuwait . A temporary force of 8 – 10 , 000 should remain in northern Iraq until 2009 , but virtually all other troops are to leave Iraq by September 2008 . Redeployment is crucial to the reset strategy chiefly because of its potential to undermine terrorism : proponents argue that U . S military presence in Iraq gives Al - Qaeda a powerful recruiting tool , as well as ideological justification for continued violence . The most damaging blow the U . S . can deal to such organizations in Iraq , they argue , is to withdraw . Ayman al - Zawahri said on May 5 , 2007 that a proposed U . S . redeployment would " deprive us of the opportunity to destroy the American forces which we have caught in a historic trap . " The reset would remove U . S . troops from Iraq while preserving the ability to strike terrorist targets there and elsewhere . The " post - redeployment U . S . force structure in the Middle East would include : an Army brigade and a tactical air squadron stationed in Kuwait ; two light , mobile Army brigades stationed in the northern Kurdish areas < nowiki > [ of Iraq ] < / nowiki > ; a Marine Expeditionary unit afloat in the Persian Gulf ; and four to five Army combat brigades stationed in Afghanistan to complete the unaccomplished mission of eradicating Al Qaeda there . Security and diplomacy . The plan combines redeployment with initiatives to promote security and diplomacy in the Middle East . These include : Arab – Israeli conflict . Strategic reset requires that U . S . diplomatic efforts to resolve the Arab – Israeli conflict be significantly upgraded . The first major reason for this requirement is that the conflict is considered to have deep destabilizing effects on the entire region ; the second is that , since the conflict is seen as a driving force behind anti - American sentiment , enhanced American participation in the peace process would leave the U . S . in a stronger political position regionally . The strategy calls for President Bush to appoint a Middle East envoy and two senior ambassadors as an initial step in this direction . Further key steps would include : Criticisms . David Gooden , writing for the " Des Moines Register " , has criticized the proposal as " imperial liberalism , " claiming that " [ F ] oreign military occupations are the root cause of Islamic terrorism " and that " [ t ] he Center for American Progress ’ plan for a ' strategic reset ' will not achieve a lasting or a just peace . "