12th Chief Directorate The 12th Chief ( or " Main " ) Directorate of the Ministry of Defense ( 12 GU MO ) of the former USSR and of the modern Russian Federation ( Russian : 12 Главное Управление Министерства Обороны СССР / РФ ( Ядерно - техническое обеспечение и Безопасность ) is a department within the Russian ( ex - Soviet ) Ministry of Defense responsible for safe - keeping , technical maintenance , transportation , delivery , issuance , disposal , etc . of the nuclear arsenal of the state . The agency is also responsible for testing of nuclear charges , for ecological safety of such testing , and for maintenance of Soviet / Russian testing grounds , known in Russian as “ polygons ” – in Semipalatinsk ( Semipalatinsk Test Site , now Kazakhstan ) and on Novaya Zemlya Archipelago . Unlike the GRU ( Chief Directorate of Intelligence ) , the 12th GU MO is not a chief directorate of the General Staff , but a chief directorate of the Ministry of Defense . As such it is not subordinated to the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet / Russian Armed Forces , but directly to the Minister of Defense , which makes it higher in status compared to the GRU . Position of the Chief of the 12th GU MO is equal to that of the commander of a military district , and supposed to be occupied by a 4 - star General or by a Marshal of Artillery . However , in practice , out of seven chiefs of this Organization , only one ( E . V . Boichuk ) has held such a high rank – the other six were only three - star Generals . Officers . Officers , or cadres , for the 12th GU MO are supplied mainly by a special nuclear weapons faculty of the Military College of Rocket Forces ( ) situated in Serpukhov , near Moscow , and by a special faculty of the Dzerzhinsky Military Academy . The 12th GU MO maintains also its own training facility for commissioned officers and for warrant - officers at Sharapovo village , near a city of Sergiev Posad , where commissioned officers possessing other military specialties could be educated in nuclear arsenal maintenance skills in 6 - month - long courses . Non - essential specialists ( those commissioned and non - commissioned officers and soldiers who perform general tasks unrelated to nuclear weapons ) could be supplied by other military colleges and academies , but these people can not obtain positions in the 12th GU MO or in either of its subordinated units unless they ( as well as their family ) could get a special security clearance . In the USSR only members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union could be appointed to serve in the 12th GU MO or in any of its subordinated units , including its Special Control Service ( even young conscripts who served there only two years without actually knowing anything about nuclear weapons must obtain special security clearance and must necessarily be members of the Communist Union of Youth , aka “ Komsomol ” ) . Main structure and tasks . In its main part the 12th GU MO consists of the headquarters , or the “ directorate of the Chief of the 12 Chief Directorate ” , located in central Moscow – Znamenskiy Pereulok 19 , unit number 31600 . There was also a central archive , popularly known as “ the nuclear registrar , ” where any and every piece of the Soviet or Russian nuclear munitions is registered . Besides , it consists of a network of nuclear arsenal bases both central and “ dedicated ” where nuclear warheads / munitions are actually being kept . These bases are called “ Special - Technical Formations ” , but their whole is called “ Special Troops of Supreme Command Reserve ” . Each base is typically the size of a regiment , sometimes the size of a brigade , but it is usually commanded by a Major - General or sometimes by a Rear Admiral rather than by a Colonel because their importance and elevated status makes them technically equal to that of a regular infantry or other division . Many of commanding officers serving at its Moscow headquarters bear General ’ s and Admiral ’ s ranks , since almost all of them are being promoted from among remote arsenal base commanders . That is why percentage of Generals and Admirals among commissioned officers in the 12th GU MO is considerably higher than in any other military organization of the Russian Armed Forces or the Russian Navy . Such nuclear arsenal bases are usually located far enough from big cities ( at least 50 kilometres ) , but close enough to the military units that would use these nuclear warheads in case of war ( primarily it is Intercontinental Ballistic Missile batteries , but also missile batteries with shorter range , theatre and tactical missile units , navy and aviation units armed with nuclear weapons , units of military saboteurs and engineers that were supposed to use portable nuclear munitions , anti - aircraft and anti - ballistic missile defences that use nuclear - tipped missiles , etc . ) . So the main purpose of the 12th Chief Directorate ’ s existence is to securely separate “ end - users ” of nuclear weapons from their actual nuclear weapons during times of peace . Only in case of real necessity those who are supposed to have nuclear weapons would get them and it could only happen when authorized by the top political leadership . Presently only some small number of nuclear warheads are always issued to end - users , such as warheads attached to ballistic missiles currently at service , but most of the Russian nuclear arsenal is being securely kept by the 12th Chief Directorate units and could only be issued to others in case of emergency . Moreover , this organization is tasked to collect currently issued nuclear warheads back from their end - users for a reason of replacement or upgrading , and to conduct technical maintenance on nuclear weapons currently issued to end - users at their territories . For this reason each military unit that armed with nuclear warheads currently in service also has some permanently attached representatives of the 12th GU MO nearest arsenal bases whose main duty is to supervise prescribed handling and to conduct required technical maintenance of these issued nuclear warheads . The 12th GU MO nuclear arsenal bases ’ staff is additionally trained for being able to attach nuclear warheads to their carriers , ballistic and other missiles , to strategic bombers and to other kind of aircraft , a task which usually assigned to special units of end - users . Such additional training is conducted for a reason that 12th GU MO specialists could replace specialists of the end - users in this capacity in case of emergency . Another task of the 12th GU MO is to prevent so - called " nuclear terrorism , " but this is a relatively modern task , which did not exist formerly . Besides these nuclear arsenal bases , the 12th Chief Directorate maintains several nuclear weapons research institutes in Moscow and in Sergiev Posad , near Moscow , with their subsidiaries located at nuclear testing grounds in Semipalatinsk - 21 and on Novaya Zemlya Archipelago , and in several other cities ( Saint Petersburg , for example ) . It also maintains a separate research institute tasked with developing nuclear explosions detection technology . Another function of the 12th GU MO is to serve as a link between the Armed Forces and those branches of Soviet / Russian industry and science related to nuclear weapons developing and manufacturing . It is actually the 12th Chief Directorate that develops detailed plans for required nuclear armament and its improvements and places orders for nuclear weapons production before civilian manufacturers . Secrecy . The 12th GU MO is probably the most secretive organization of the Soviet / Russian Armed Forces , even more than the GRU or the Strategic Rocket Forces . Even though today Russia has become more open and even some articles appear in its mass - media openly describing the “ Nuclear Technical Service ” Directorate , this organization remains off - limits . However , during Soviet times the most of commissioned officers , even though highly educated ones , had little or no knowledge that the 12th Chief Directorate existed . In the Soviet times it was considered taboo to talk about it outside of secured premises . When talking to strangers , even to other commissioned officers of the Armed Forces , one could only refer to their unit by its coded number . For example , you could say that “ I serve as a tank platoon commander at the military unit 31600 , ” but nothing more than that . Most of officials of the 12th GU MO headquarters wear gunnery uniforms and bear military ranks typical to Artillery , since this organization is considered being primarily an “ arsenal . ” However , when it comes to its personnel serving in its remote nuclear arsenal bases , it could wear various military uniforms , ranging from aviation and navy to even tank - crews and marines , because it is a long - time policy of the 12th GU MO to disguise its remote units . All service personnel of the 12th GU MO are explicitly forbidden to reveal to anyone , even to their spouses , that they serve in the Nuclear Technical Service , in the 12th Chief Directorate , or that they have anything to do with nuclear weapons . Moreover , a majority of non - essential staff of nuclear arsenal bases do not know that they actually maintain nuclear weapons . Every unit of this organization has its own cover story based on its location and its currently worn uniform and all its personnel must strictly adhere to this story when dealing with strangers . Some bases also use “ civilian legends . ” For example , nuclear arsenal base unit number 62047 in Krasnokamianka , Kizil - Tash , Crimea , was masquerading as a “ wine - making enterprise ” . Active disinformation measures to this effect are meticulously planned and are regularly conducted not only in order to create a wrong impression among local population and neighbouring military units , but even to misinform conscripts and other unrelated staff serving at actual arsenal bases . For example , tanks and artillery pieces that are maintained as a part of the cover story could be seen by neighbours on daily “ routine ” exercises in corresponding bogus “ tank “ or “ artillery “ regiments . In order to minimize spreading of information about these bases , their commissioned staff was encouraged to serve at one location for as long as possible and not to seek promotions outside their bases ( while it was typical for Soviet military in general to move officers every 3 – 5 years to various places and to promote them exclusively outside of their former military units ) . Nuclear arsenal base typical structure . Each nuclear arsenal base typically consists of the following main services and units : Nuclear arsenal bases functioning and training . The main arsenal service , its ETS , and all attached to it transportation and communication detachments , guards , and sappers are subdivided into several so - called Special Tactical Groups ( STGs ) . These were highly mobile units trained to deliver nuclear warheads to designated end - users in various circumstances , including those during ongoing battles and even during unfolding nuclear war . These STGs are mostly based on various automobile transport , but also on rail - way transport , and sometimes , on helicopter transport . Even those auxiliary tanks that are designed to serve as a cover for the arsenal base could be used to reinforce these STGs on their full march . The 12th Chief Directorate maintains its own secure communication system , independent of others , that links its peace - time and war - time headquarters with all its bases and with other subordinated units . Additional local communication systems of each arsenal base securely link its main command post with its multiple mobile STGs . The main communication system of the 12th GU MO has its own unique coded commands that could be used to instantly transmit orders to elevate readiness and to begin loading , delivering , and issuing nuclear warheads and other nuclear munitions to their end - users . Such commands must be transmitted via at least three different communication channels simultaneously to guarantee their delivery . Delivery of such commands must be practiced at least once a day . More extended exercises that include execution of alerts of a “ higher readiness ” and “ combat readiness , ” with actual loading of warheads into transport and dispatching the STGs towards the end - users , must be conducted at least several times per year . All nuclear arsenal bases are linked by their own railways to the vast Russian railways system ( nuclear warheads / munitions are being moved from production plants to the 12th Chief Directorate units and between these units usually by railway ) . Security . Each base is heavily guarded . The guards belong to two independent organizations : some to the KGB , and some to the 12th Chief Directorate itself . This arrangement is made so that guards could not make any sinister agreements among themselves . Moreover , guards from the 12th GU MO are organized into a separate battalion which makes them independent from those dealing with nuclear weapons inside . Each arsenal base is encircled by barbed wire carrying current , by various electronic and laser movement detection devices , by border furrow , and sometimes even by mine fields in between . Guard dogs are also used in some cases . In addition to an outer guarding perimeter there is also an inner guarding perimeter , which encircles the nuclear depot ( its “ technical zone ” ) , where only authorized officers could have access . Even when it is needed to bring in some truck to load or to unload , the truck ’ s driver has to get out and then some authorized officer would replace the driver to drive the truck into the technical zone . The technical zone itself is also separated into several restricted zones of various levels of access in accordance with actual levels of security clearance of staff admitted there . Inside such an inner perimeter all technical premises where nuclear warheads are being kept and maintained , are normally buried deep underground and usually equipped with full anti - atomic protection ; for example , typical weight of steel safe - like hermetic doors to the inner premises is over 40 tons . These premises , as well as command posts , could likely survive a thermo - nuclear explosion and the officers there could still be able to deliver their warheads in such conditions . History . The 12th Chief Directorate was formerly known as the “ Special Department of the General Staff ” , and later – as the “ 6th Directorate of the Ministry of Defense ” . It has been created on September 4 , 1947 , based on “ KB - 11 ” ( in Russian : “ КБ - 11 ” - “ Design Bureau 11 ” , also known in Russia as off - limits town “ Arzamas - 16 ” , later " Sarov " ) ; its first chief was Major - General - Engineer ( later – full General ) Viktor A . Boliatko . The first curator of this organization was Lavrentiy Beria , the then mighty chief of the Soviet NKVD . It is widely believed until today that if not for Beria ’ s personal efforts , neither the Nuclear Technical Service , nor actual nuclear weapons would ever be created in the Soviet Union . In fact , it was Beria who spearheaded the campaign for creating the USSR ' s own nuclear weapons program and who contributed to it , including supplying some nuclear technology stolen by his intelligence service from the United States researchers . For this reason , Beria is considered to the god - father of this organization . Even though for the rest of the Soviet Union Beria was declared an “ enemy of the people ” , relegated to “ unperson ” status and excluded from the 30 - volumed Great Soviet Encyclopedia , he remains a highly revered figure within the off - limits structure of the 12th GU MO , and especially within its scientific research institutions . Beria ’ s portraits and statues are still maintained in some premises and flowers are laid to his statures on his birthdays and on some other occasions . Even in the post - Soviet times when the entire communist past was declared criminal , the alleged “ top of the top communist criminal ” Lavrentiy Beria continued to enjoy similar reverence among nuclear weapons specialists . For example , the 6 - volumes collective work named “ Nuclear Testing in the USSR ” published few years after the USSR disappearance still features seditious Beria ’ s portrait first in this book , before any other photos . The 12th Chief Directorate in its current capacity was formed in February 1959 . Three years later the Organization managed to effectively and secretly delivered numerous combat - ready nuclear warheads of six different types to Cuba during an infamous strategic Operation Anadyr , a move that resulted in the most dangerous nuclear stand - off between the United States and the Soviet Union . On the next stage of its development the Nuclear Technical Service was headed by General N . P . Egorov . The next and the most well - known chief was Marshal of Artillery E . V . Boichuk , who held this position from February 1974 until November 1985 and was credited with transforming the organization into the most effective nuclear weapons protection , delivery , and maintenance system . During his command the 12th GU MO lost its initial “ warehouse image ” and became a real effective branch of the Soviet Armed Forces , in some respects surpassing by its effectiveness of well - known Soviet special purpose forces such as “ Spetsnaz ” and the “ VDV ” ( Russian Airborne Troops ) . The last chief of this organization during the Soviet Union was General V . I . Gerasimov . The 12th Chief Directorate was re - created as a part of Russian Armed Forces on September 2 , 1993 , by a special order No . 68 of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation . The first post - soviet chief of the 12th GU MO was General E . P . Maslin . In September 1997 he was replaced by General I . N . Valynkin . The current chief ( from December 2005 ) of the 12th Chief Directorate is V . N . Verkhovcev . Special Control Service ( SSK ) . There is a smaller autonomous organization within the main 12th GU MO structure – known as “ military unit 46179 ” , “ the Special Control Service of the Defense Ministry , ” “ atomic intelligence , ” or “ nuclear intelligence ” of the former Soviet Union . The Special Control Service is tasked with gathering intelligence on nuclear weapons and particularly on nuclear testing of various adversaries of the former USSR by all means – ranging from six technical control methods to analyzing radio - intercepts and periodicals . The Special Control Service was not a part of the 12th GU MO from very beginning , but was formerly a part of the GRU , its 6th Directorate ’ s department of special observation . However , it was later detached from the GRU and made an independent Special Observation Service of the Defense Ministry . Then it was renamed into a Special Control Service and re - subordinated first to the Directorate of the Commander of the Chemical Troops ( the analogue of a standard ABC service in the Soviet Army ) , and then again re - subordinated to the 12th GU MO . The Special Control Service has its own network of military units , named “ detection laboratories ” , each headed by a Colonel , which are situated in many spots inside and outside of the Soviet Union and are all linked to the Service headquarters and to its computation centres by its own secure communication network which is totally independent from the communication network of the 12th GU MO itself . Structure of the 12th GU MO . The 12th Chief Directorate consists of : Note : v / ch here mean ' Military Unit Number . ' Objects « C » . In the former USSR there were 102 Special Objects to keep nuclear munitions : Tactical nuclear munitions . As of 1989 year in all USSR republics there were tactical nuclear munitions :