First Battle of Bud Dajo The First Battle of Bud Dajo , also known as the Battle of Mt . Dajo , was a counter insurgency action fought by the United States Army against native Moros in March 1906 , during the Moro Rebellion phase of the Philippine – American War . While fighting was limited to ground action on Jolo Island in the Sulu Archipelago , use of naval gunfire contributed significantly to the overwhelming firepower brought to bear against the Muslim insurgent s , who were mostly armed with melee weapons . The description of the engagement as a battle is disputed because of both the overwhelming firepower of the attackers and the lopsided casualties . The conflict , especially the final phase of the battle , is also known as the Moro Crater Massacre . During this battle , 790 men and officers , under the command of Colonel J . W . Duncan , assaulted the volcanic crater of Bud Dajo ( Tausūg : " Būd Dahu " ) , which was populated by 800 to 1000 Moro villagers , including women and children . According to Herman Hagedorn ( who was writing prior to World War II ) , the position held by the Moros was " the strongest which hostiles in the Philippines have ever defended against American assault . " ( pg . 64 ) Although the battle was a victory for the American forces , it was also an unmitigated public relations disaster . It was the bloodiest of any engagement of the Moro Rebellion , with only six of the hundreds of Moro coming out of the battle alive . Estimates of American casualties range from fifteen killed to twenty - one killed and seventy - five wounded . Background . The first battle at Bud Dajo happened during the final days of General Leonard Wood ' s term as governor of the Moro Province . Wood ' s term was a time of great reform . Some of these reforms , including the abolition of slavery and the imposition of the " cedula " - a registration poll tax - were less than popular with his Moro subjects . The " cedula " < nowiki > was especially unpopular , since the Moros interpreted it as a form of tribute , and according to Vic Hurley , Moro participation in the cedula was very low even after 30 years of American occupation . < / nowiki > These reforms , coupled with the general resentment of foreign Christian occupiers , created a tense and hostile atmosphere during Wood ' s tenure , and the heaviest and bloodiest fighting during the American occupation of Mindanao and Sulu took place under his watch . Although Moro hostilities died down during the latter days of Wood ' s governorship ( the tenure of Wood ' s replacement , General Tasker H . Bliss , was a period of relative peace ) , it was in this tense atmosphere of Moro resentment that the events leading to the Battle of Bud Dajo played out . According to Hermann Hagedorn , the Moro rebels of Bud Dajo were " the rag - tag - and - bobtail remnants of two or three revolts , the black sheep of a dozen folds , rebels against the poll tax , die - hards against the American occupation , outlaws recognizing no datto and condemned by the stable elements among the Moros themselves . " ( pg . 64 ) Vic Hurley , author of " Swish of the Kris " , adds that “ the causes contributing to the battle of Bud Dajo were resentment over the curtailing of slave - trading , cattle - raiding , and women - stealing privileges of the Moros of Sulu . ” Road to Bud Dajo . The chain of events leading to Bud Dajo began when a Moro named Pala ran amok in British - held Borneo . ( The Moros differentiate between the religious rite of the juramentado and the strictly secular violence of the amoks , Pala ' s rampage was of the latter . ) Pala then went to ground at his home cotta near the city of Jolo ( the seat of the Sultan of Sulu ) , on the island of Jolo . Colonel Hugh L . Scott , the governor of the District of Sulu , attempted to arrest Pala , but Pala ' s datu opposed this move . During the resulting fight , Pala escaped . He avoided capture for several months , setting up his own cotta and becoming a datu in his own right . Wood led an expedition against Pala but was ambushed by Moros from the Bud Dajo area with the help of Pala . Wood beat off the ambushers , and many of them found refuge in the crater of Bud Dajo . Wood determined that the Moros held too strong of a position to assault with the forces at hand , and so he withdrew . ( Lane , pg . 127 ) Bud Dajo lies 6 miles ( 10 km ) from the city of Jolo and is an extinct volcano , 2 , 100 feet ( 640 m ) above sea level , steep , conical , and has thickly forested slopes . Only three major paths lead up the mountain , and the thick growth kept the Americans from cutting new paths . However , there were many minor paths , known only to the Moros , which would allow them to resupply even if the main paths were blocked . The crater at the summit is 1 , 800 yards in circumference and easily defended . The mountain itself is eleven miles ( 18 km ) in circumference , making a siege difficult . Over the months that followed , the Bud Dajo rebels were joined by various outlaws , bringing the population of the crater up to several hundred . Water was plentiful , and the rebels began farming rice and potatoes . Scott sent the Sultan of Sulu and other high ranking datus to ask the rebels to return to their homes , but the rebels refused . Wood ordered an attack in February 1906 , but Scott convinced him to rescind the order , arguing that the opposition of the surrounding datus would keep the rebels isolated . ( Lane , 128 ) Scott was worried that an attack on Bud Dajo would reveal just how easily defended it was , encouraging repeats of the standoff in the future . ( Smythe , 169 ) Unfortunately , the Bud Dajo rebels were emboldened by the American inaction , and began raiding nearby Moro settlements for women and cattle . Although the datus of Jolo continued to condemn the rebels , there began to develop popular support of a general uprising among the Moro commoners of Jolo . ( Hagedorn , 64 ) The crisis at Bud Dajo occurred during a period of transition in the leadership of the Moro Province . On February 1 , 1906 , Wood was promoted to the position of Commander of the Philippine Division , and was relieved as commander of the Department of Mindanao - Jolo by General Tasker H . Bliss . However , Wood retained his position as civil governor of the Moro Province until sometime after the Battle of Bud Dajo . Colonel Scott was absent during part of the crisis , and Captain Reeves , the deputy governor of the Sulu District , served as his substitute . ( Hagedorn , pg . 63 ) Battle . On March 2 , 1906 , Wood ordered Colonel J . W . Duncan of the 6th Infantry Regiment ( stationed at Zamboanga , the provincial capital ) to lead an expedition against Bud Dajo . Duncan and Companies K and M took the transport " Wright " to Jolo . Governor Scott sent three friendly datus up the mountain to ask the Bud Dajo Moros to disarm and disband , or at least send their women and children to the valley . ( Hagedorn , pg . 64 ) They denied these requests , and Scott ordered Duncan to begin the assault . The assault force consisted of “ 272 men of the 6th Infantry , 211 [ dismounted ] men of the 4th Cavalry , 68 men of the 28th Artillery Battery , 51 Sulu Constabulary , 110 men of the 19th Infantry and 6 sailors from the gunboat " Pampanga " . ” The battle began on March 5 , as mountain gun s fired 40 rounds of shrapnel into the crater . On March 6 , Wood and Bliss arrived , but left Duncan in direct command . Captain Reeves , the acting governor of the District of Sulu , made one last attempt to negotiate with the rebels . ( Hagedorn , pg . 64 - 65 ) He failed , and the Americans drew up into three columns and proceeded up the three main mountain paths . The columns were under the command of Major Bundy , Captain Rivers , and Captain Lawton . The going was tough , with the troops ascending a 60 % slope , using machetes to clear the path . ( Hagedorn , pg . 65 ) At 0700 , March 7 , Major Bundy ' s detachment encountered a barricade blocking the path , 500 feet ( 150 m ) below the summit . Sniper s picked off Moro defenders , and the barricade was shelled with rifle grenade s . The barricade was then assaulted in a bayonet charge . The Moros staged a strong defense , then charged with kris ( the traditional wavy - edged sword of the Moros ) and spear . 200 Moros died in this engagement , and Major Bundy ' s detachment suffered heavy casualties . Captain Rivers ' detachment also encountered a barricade , and took it after several hours of fighting , during which Rivers himself was severely wounded by a spear . Captain Lawton ' s detachment advanced up a poor path , so steep in places that the Americans proceeded on hands and knees . They were harassed by Moros hurling boulders and occasionally rushing to attack hand - to - hand with krises . Lawton finally took the defensive trenches on the crater rim by storm . The Moros retreated into the crater , and fighting continued until nightfall . During the night , the Americans hauled mountain guns to the crater ' s edge with block and tackle . At daybreak , the American guns ( both the mountain guns and the guns of the " Pampanga " ) opened up on the Moros ' fortifications in the crater . The Moros , armed with krises and spears , refused to surrender and held their positions . Some of the defenders rushed the Americans and were cut down . The Americans charged the surviving Moros with fixed bayonets , and the Moros fought back with their kalis , barung , improvised grenade s made with black powder and seashells . The defenders were wiped out . Out of the estimated 800 to 1 , 000 Moros at Bud Dajo , only 6 survived . Corpses were piled five deep , and many of the bodies were wounded multiple times . According to Hurley , American casualties were 21 killed , 75 wounded . Lane lists them at 18 killed , 52 wounded . ( pg . 128 ) Hagedorn says simply that “ one - fourth of the troops actively engaged have been killed or wounded . ” ( pg . 65 ) By any estimate , Bud Dajo was the bloodiest engagement of the Moro Rebellion . Aftermath . Following the American victory , President Theodore Roosevelt sent Wood a congratulatory cablegram , but reporters stationed at Manila had cabled their own account to the press . The March 11 , 1906 " New York Times " headlines read , “ WOMEN AND CHILDREN KILLED IN MORO BATTLE ; Mingled with Warriors and Fell in Hail of Shot . FOUR DAYS OF FIGHTING Nine Hundred Persons Killed or Wounded — President Wires Congratulations to the Troops . ” The press ' account of the " Moro Crater Massacre " fell on receptive ears . There were still deep misgivings among the American public about America ' s role during the Spanish - American War and the stories of atrocities carried out during the Philippine - American War . The public had also been largely unaware of the continuing violence in the Moro Province , and were shocked to learn that killing continued . ( Lane , pg . 129 ) Under pressure from Congress , Secretary of War William Howard Taft cabled Wood for explanation of the “ wanton slaughter ” of woman and children . Despite not being in command of the assault ( although he was the senior officer present ) , Wood accepted full responsibility . By the time the scandal died down , Wood had assumed his post as Commander of the Philippine Division , and General Tasker H . Bliss had replaced him as governor of the Moro Province . In response to criticism , Wood ' s explanation of the high number of women and children killed stated that the women of Bud Dajo dressed as men and joined in the combat , and that the men used children as living shields . ( Lane , pg . 129 ) Hagedorn supports this explanation , by giving an account of a Lt . Gordon Johnston , who was severely wounded by a woman warrior . ( pg . 65 ) A second explanation was given by the Governor - General of the Philippines , Henry Clay Ide , who reported that the women and children were collateral damage , having been killed during the artillery barrages . ( Lane , pg . 129 ) These conflicting explanations of the high number of women and child casualties brought accusations of a cover - up , adding to the criticism . ( Lane , pg . 129 ) Some of Wood ' s critics accused him of seeking glory by storming the crater rather than besieging the rebels . Wood did show some signs of being a glory - hound earlier in his tenure as the governor of the Moro Province , taking the Provincial Army on punitive raids against cottas over minor offenses that would have been better left to the district governors . This heavy - handedness jeopardized relations with friendly datus , who viewed the encroachment of the army as a challenge . ( Lane , pg . 125 ) Wood badly needed military laurels , since he had gone through an uphill United States Senate battle over his appointment to the rank of Major General , which was finally confirmed in March 1904 . Although Wood had served as an administrator in Cuba , he had seen only a hundred days of field service during the Spanish - American War . ( Lane , pg . 126 ) Wood had been promoted over the heads of many more senior officers , bringing charges of favoritism against President and fellow Rough Rider Teddy Roosevelt . Even though his promotion had been confirmed , Wood ' s reputation still suffered . Wood ' s willingness to take responsibility for Bud Dajo did much to improve his reputation within the army . Wood argued that besieging Bud Dajo would have been impossible , given the ample supplies of the rebels , the 11 - mile circumference of the mountain , the thickly forested terrain , and the existence of hidden paths up the mountainside . During the Second Battle of Bud Dajo , in December 1911 , General “ Black Jack ” Pershing ( the third and final military governor of the Moro Province ) did succeed in besieging Bud Dajo , by cutting a lateral trail which encircled the mountain , 300 yards downhill from the crater rim . This cut off the Moros in the crater from the hidden mountainside paths . ( Smythe , pg . 170 ) However , the tactical situation facing Pershing in 1911 was far different from that facing Wood in 1906 .