Samu Incident The Samu incident or Samua incident refers to a large cross - border assault on November 13 , 1966 by Israeli military on the Jordanian - controlled West Bank village of Samu in response to an al - Fatah land mine incident two days earlier near the West Bank border , purported originating from Jordanian territory . It was the largest Israeli military operation since the 1956 Suez Crisis and is considered to have been a contributing factor to the outbreak of the Six - Day War in 1967 . Since 1965 Jordan had an active campaign to curb Fatah sabotage activities . Background . For three years King Hussein of Jordan had been meeting clandestinely with Israeli Foreign Minister , Golda Meir , and Prime Minister ' s deputy , Abba Eban , concerning peace and mutually secure borders . On the night of November 11 , an Israeli border patrol vehicle carrying policemen drove over a mine near the Israeli - Jordanian border , killing three and wounding six ; the mine was reportedly planted by al - Fatah men . On November 12 , King Hussein sent a letter of condolence to Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol , via the U . S . embassy in Amman . From there it was sent to U . S . ambassador Walworth Barbour at the embassy in Tel - Aviv ; instead of forwarding it to the prime minister , he left the letter on his desk - assuming it was not important and there was no rush . According to another version of the story , the letter reached Barbour on the 11th ( a Friday ) , but he delayed passing it on due to the coming Sabbath . Early on the morning of November 13 , King Hussein received an unsolicited message from his Israeli contacts stating that Israel had no intention of attacking Jordan . Early the same day also , the Israeli military mobilized 3000 - 4000 troops , and sent about 600 of these , with 60 half - tracks and 11 tanks , across the border into the Jordanian - controlled West Bank . Israel ' s goal . According to Tom Segev , Israel ' s rationale for the cross - border assault was to avenge the three Israeli deaths in the recent land mine incident . A further goal in the operation was to demolish houses in Palestinian villages located south of Hebron as a show of force to preempt future Palestinian violence . Israel hoped that the residents of those villages would appeal to King Hussein to tame al - Fatah and other Palestinian militant groups . Additionally , Israel aimed to warn Jordan as well as Syria of its military strength and tactics , without actually confronting the Jordanian Armed Forces . The Israeli rationale for the attack on Samu has often been questioned . For example , Colonel ( ret . ) Jan Mühren , a Dutch UN observer in the West Bank who patrolled Samu during this period , gave an interview to Dutch current affairs program Nova on the 40th anniversary of the Six Day War where he denied the Israeli charges regarding Samu . He said " " Had the people from this village anything to do with the attack on Israel - Well no . Not just from this village but also not from the entire West Bank . . . . only western officers operated here and we did patrols . The situation was completely calm . " " That , despite the attack against the Israeli patrol two days earlier , although the purported Jordanian origin of the perpetrators was never independently investigated Jordan immediately lodged a formal complaint with the UN Security Council . Although the Israeli goal was retribution for the Fatah land mine incident , purportedly having originated from Jordanian - controlled territory , Israel ' s first act was to cross the 1949 Armistice line and to destroy a Jordanian police post at Rujm El Madfa . < ref name = S / 7593 > UN report by the Secretary General concerning incident of 13 Nov 1966 in Jordan . Retrieved 1 Oct 07 . < / ref > In addition to the large - scale destruction in Samu village , the Israeli forces also damaged other small settlements . In a report by the Arab League , it was assumed that the main goal of this attack was to test the efficiency of what was called the United Arab Command , and see if any other Arab country such as Egypt or Syria would come to the aid of Jordan . It also assumes that this battle was in preparation for the Six - Day War . Operation " Shredder " . Israel mobilised a force of around 3 , 000 - 4 , 000 soldiers , backed by tanks and aircraft , in the attack code - named Operation " Shredder " . The force was divided into a large reserve force , which remained on the Israeli side of the border , and two attack forces , which crossed into the Jordanian - controlled West Bank . In what was justified as a retaliatory attack against Fatah , ground troops moved into the village of Rujm al - Madfa located just southwest of Hebron and destroyed its police station . From there , the larger force of eight Centurion tank s followed by 400 paratroopers mounted in 40 open - topped half - tracks and 60 engineers in 10 more half - tracks headed for Samu . Meanwhile , the smaller force of three tanks and 100 paratroopers and engineers in 10 half - tracks headed toward two smaller villages , Khirbet el - Markas and Khirbet Jimba . When the larger force entered Samu , most of the town ' s residents responded to orders by the IDF to gather in the town square . Sappers from the 35th paratrooper brigades then dynamited numerous buildings within and near the village ; reports of the total number of houses destroyed range from 40 to 125 ( IDF and United Nations estimates , respectively ) . In addition the UN reported the destruction of the village medical clinic , a 6 - classroom school and a workshop , plus damage to one mosque and 28 houses . The 48th Infantry Battalion of the Jordanian Army , commanded by Major Asad Ghanma , encountered the Israeli forces north - west of Samu . Two companies of the Hitteen Infantry Brigade ( لواء المشاة حطين ) also approached from the north - east ; these were composed of roughly 100 men and 20 convoy vehicles , and commanded by Brig . Gen . Bahjat al - Muhaisen ( العميد الركن بهجت المحيسن ) . Apparently , al - Muhaisen was leading his troops to Yattah , another village south of Hebron , but the road there passed though Samu . The Jordanians were subsequently ambushed by Israeli forces . According to then - Colonel al - Muhaisen , in an interview with the Jordanian Armed Forces ' Al Aqsa Magazine , Jordanian intelligence had informed him that the target of the Israeli attack was Samu village . He ordered his troops to move toward Samu from two directions , one through Thaheria Village and the other through Yatta , which he led , in an attempt to reach Samu before the Israelis did . The Israelis reached higher ground first . Eight Jordanian Hawker Hunter jets scrambled at Mafraq Airbase and attacked Israeli forces to relieve pressure on their own troops , but were met by a force of four Israeli Mirage 3 jets . In the air battle that followed , a Jordanian plane was shot down and the pilot was killed , and an Israeli plane was damaged and forced to land . Another platoon of Jordanians armed with two 106 mm recoilless rifles entered Samu , engaging the IDF . In the ensuing battle fifteen Jordanian soldiers were killed , and fifty - four other soldiers were wounded , including Colonel al - Muhaisen . The commander of the Israeli paratroop battalion , Colonel Yoav Shaham , was killed and ten other Israeli soldiers were wounded . Three civilians were also killed and 96 wounded during the battle . Aftermath . In Jordan , King Hussein was faced with a storm of criticism for failing to protect Samu , emanating from Jordanians , as well as from Palestinians and neighboring Arab countries . Riots spread throughout the West Bank demanding the king be overthrown . Four Palestinians were killed by Jordanian police as a result of the riots . On 20 November , Hussein ordered nation - wide military service . Egypt ian and Syrian radio also verbally attacked Jordan accusing King Hussein of collaborating with the CIA to plot an overthrow of the Ba ' ath Party in Syria . Following the Palestinian demonstrations against him , King Hussein accused Nasser of using the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force on Egypt ' s border with Israel , as an excuse for failing to take action against Israel . As Palestinians rioted in Hebron , Nablus , Jerusalem on the West Bank and Irbid in Jordan , the Palestine Liberation Organization warned all Jordanian ministers to resign by noon on 26 November . In Israel , angered opposition parties demanded to know why Israel attacked Jordan rather than Syria , which was the guerrilla home base . In a special parliamentary debate , Prime Minister Eshkol listed 14 major acts of sabotage carried out from Jordan in the past year , climaxed by the land - mine explosion that killed three Israeli troops on 12 November . Eshkol said : " It is regrettable that this particular act of aggression came from Jordan . " But since it did , he had picked Jordan as his target . " No country where the saboteurs find shelter and through whose territory they pass on their way to Israel can be exempt from responsibility . " What Eshkol left unsaid was his certainty that , with the so - called Arab unity being what it was , Jordan would find itself with far less Arab support than Syria , which was much closer to Egypt ' s Gamal Abdel Nasser . Jordan ' s Arab partners did wait until the Israelis had withdrawn before making indignant vows of support . Two days after the attack , in a memo to President Johnson , his Special Assistant Walt Rostow wrote " I ' m not suggesting our usual admonition against retaliation . We ' ll maintain that posture . . . but retaliation is not the point in this case . This 3000 - man raid with tanks and planes was out of all proportion to the provocation and was aimed at the wrong target . In hitting Jordan so hard , the Israelis have done a great deal of damage to our interests and to their own : They ' ve wrecked a good system of tacit cooperation between Hussein and the Israelis . . . They ' ve undercut Hussein . We ' ve spent $ 500 million to shore him up as a stabilizing factor on Israel ' s longest border and vis - à - vis Syria and Iraq . Israel ' s attack increases the pressure on him to counterattack not only from the more radical Arab governments and from the Palestinians in Jordan but also from the Army , which is his main source of support and may now press for a chance to recoup its Sunday losses . . . They ' ve set back progress toward a long term accommodation with the Arabs . . . They may have persuaded the Syrians that Israel didn ' t dare attack Soviet - protected Syria but could attack US - backed Jordan with impunity . It ' s important that we strengthen the hand of those within the Israeli Government who feel this is not the proper way to handle the problem . Even members of the Israeli military now doubt that retaliation will stop the cross - border raids , though they see no better solution . " On 16 November 1966 the UN Security Council convened to hear the Jordanian complaint and invited an Israeli response . After hearing both sides the UK representative responded : " . . . my delegation can find no justification whatsoever for the calculated , admitted and wholly disproportionate act of military reprisal committed by Israel against Jordan on 13 November . Mr . President , reference has been made , in the letter of the representative of Israel to you of 12 November [ S / 7584 ] , to a mining incident on that day which cost the lives of three occupants of an Israel army vehicle and injured six others . Certainly , my delegation deplores that incident and regrets the loss of life . But even if it could be demonstrated to us that Jordan had any direct responsibility for this and other incidents , we could not possibly condone the Israel attack . It was a fully planned attack , mounted by infantry and armored forces and supported by aircraft , and attack on Jordanian villages in the area of Hebron . This action constituted a flagrant violation of our Charter and of the Israel - Jordan Armistice Agreement . It has done nothing to enhance the security of Israel citizens or the reputation of Israel . " The United States representative followed with : " Immediately after learning of the incident now before the Council , on Sunday morning , I issued a statement on behalf of my Government expressing our strong disapproval of the large - scale Israel military action on Jordanian territory on 13 November . . . . The United States then condemned this raid and condemns it now , deeming it in clear violation of solemn obligations undertaken by Israel in the General Armistice Agreements . And what is , of course , most deplorable is ( the ) tragic toll in human lives of this inexcusable action . . . . the Government of Israel carried out , with support of tanks , armored vehicles , heavy weapons and aircraft , a raid into Jordan the nature of which , and the consequences of which in human lives and destruction , far surpassed the cumulative total of the various acts of terrorism conducted against the frontiers of Israel . . . . this large - scale military action cannot be justified , explained away or excused by the incidents which preceded it and in which the Government of Jordan has not been implicated . " On 18 November , the Security Council requested that the existing United Nations Military Observers prepare a report of their findings regarding the incident ; by the Secretary General concerning incident of 13 Nov 1966 in Jordan . This was presented to the Security Council a few days later . In a rare agreement , Russia joined the U . S . , France and Great Britain and condemned the Israeli attack . U . S . Ambassador Arthur Goldberg termed the raid " inexcusable " and pushed for a formal U . N . resolution censuring Israel . On 25 November the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 228 unanimously deploring " the loss of life and heavy damage to property resulting from the action of the Government of Israel on 13 November 1966 " ; censuring " Israel for this large - scale military action in violation of the United Nations Charter and of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan " ; and emphasising " to Israel that actions of military reprisal cannot be tolerated and that , if they are repeated , the Security Council will have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against the repetition of such acts . " Some months later and just weeks before the Six - Day War , the U . S . ambassador in Amman , Findley Burns , reported in a telegram to the State Department that Hussein had expressed the opinion in a conversation the day before that , if Israel launched another Samu - scale attack against Jordan he would have no alternative but to retaliate or face an internal revolt . If Jordan retaliates , asked Hussein , would not this give Israel a pretext to occupy and hold Jordanian or Occupied territory ? Or , said Hussein , Israel might instead of a hit - and - run type attack simply occupy and hold territory in the first instance . He said he could not exclude these possibilities from his calculations and urged us not to do so even if we felt them considerably less than likely . David Ben - Gurion later criticized the raid , arguing that it weakened King Hussein ' s position counter to Israel ' s interests . Moshe Dayan was also critical . He believed that the Samu Operation should have been directed at the Syrians . The incident at Es Samu is regarded as a prelude to the Six - Day War .