Effects - based operations Effects - Based Operations ( EBO ) is a United States military concept that emerged during the Persian Gulf War for the planning and conduct of operations combining military and non - military methods to achieve a particular effect . The doctrine was developed to take advantage of advancements in weaponry and tactics , from an emerging understanding that attacking a second - order target may have first order consequences for a variety of objectives , wherein the Commander ' s intent can be satisfied with a minimum of collateral damage or risk to his own forces . EBO has been an emerging concept , with multiple views on what it meant and how it could be implemented . Most notably , military scientists at the Air Force Research Lab , the Army Research Lab and DARPA engaged in research to develop automated tools to annotate options and recommend courses of action . This is hard science and tools are slow to be implemented . For air forces , it supported the ability for a single aircraft to attack multiple targets , unlike tactics of previous wars , which used multiple aircraft to attack single targets , usually to create destruction without thought of later re - use by allied forces or friendly civilians . EBO concepts emphasise the importance of technological sophistication in the Information Age , arguing that casualties can be avoided on both sides by taking advantage of the technological advances made since the end of the Cold War - for example , by utilising precision munitions and UAV attack drones . EBO concepts traditionally take a " systemic approach " to the enemy , arguing that the enemy ' s centre of gravity can be disrupted by attacking the command and control " mainframe " and the " support nodes " surrounding this central mainframe . In 2008 , Joint Forces Command stopped using the term " effects - based " after failure of the Army - led TEBO JCTD . The concept remains valid in the US Air Force . Definition . As defined by the United States Joint Forces Command ( USJFCOM ) , effects - based operations are " a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or effect on the enemy through the synergistic and cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at all levels of conflict . " The intent and desired outcome of an effects - based approach is to employ forces that paralyze the enemy forces and minimize its ability to engage friendly forces in close combat . Rather than focusing specifically on causing casualties and physical destruction resulting in the attrition or annihilation of enemy forces , effects - based operations emphasizes end - state goals first , and then focuses on the means available to achieve those goals . For instance , psychological operations , electronic warfare , logisitical disruptions and other non - lethal means can be used to achieve the demoralization or defeat of an enemy force while minimizing civilian casualties or avoiding the destruction of infrastructure . While effects - based operations does not rule out lethal operations , it places them as options in a series of operational choices for military commanders . Batschelet ' s Seven attributes of EBO . JFCOM ' s description of the doctrine is quoted by LTC ( now MG ) Allen Batschelet , author of the April 2002 study " Effects - based operations : A New Operational Model ? " He was later appointed in 2004 as commander of the Fires Brigade , the newly - reorganized 4th Infantry Division Artillery Brigade which deployed to Iraq to implement such theories in practice . According to Batschelet ' s paper , seven elements comprise and differentiate EBO : Center of gravity . The core of the doctrine , to support superior decision - making and to understand the enemy ' s systems , lies in determining and calculating the philosophical ( not physical ) center of gravity ( COG ) of the combatants . " COGs are those characteristics , capabilities , or localities from which a military derives its freedom of action , physical strength , or will to fight " ( such as leadership , system essentials , infrastructure , population , and field military ) . A similar modeling scheme refers to these as National Elements of Value ( NEV ) . A relative weighting is made as to which of the elements are most critical to be targeted by operations . Effects - based thinking . EBO is less of a thing and more of a mindset . Except in cases where this developer or that has sought to use the term for their software application , EBO does not replace existing systems or core concepts . EBO is instead : EBO seeks to understand the causal linkages between events , actions and results . EBO is most useful in understanding secondary and tertiary consequences to actions . For example , the effect of feeding a hungry child could be accomplished by handing the child a meal , directing the child and / or guardian to a soup kitchen or food pantry , or by providing the child or the guardian a job as a means to earn sufficient ongoing income to afford daily meals . EBO in practice . Although it was not called EBO at the time , the strategic bombing of Nazi rail lines from the manufacturing centers in Normandy to the interior of Germany disrupted critical resupply channels , weakening Germany ' s ability to maintain an effective war effort . Removing a few key bridges had the same effect as large - scale bombing . The first examples of consciously using effects - based approach of limited military actions to create strategic effects with little collateral damage occurred when the US dropped CBU - 94B anti - electrical cluster bombs filled with 147 reels of fine conductive fiber . These were employed on high - voltage electrical transmission lines leading to Serbia to short them and " knock the lights out . " On the first attack , these knocked out 70 % of the electrical power supply , crippling the enemy ' s command and control and air defense networks . During the first Gulf War in 1990 and 91 , USAF LtCol ( now Ret LtGen ) Dave Deptula argued against the dominant view of targeting for destruction , instead opting for alternate and unconventional means to achieve desired effects . For example , as chief air power planner , he chose to target the Iraqi air defenses first , removing opposition that would have kept subsequent missions from creating effective precision attacks . This allowed him to achieve desired effects with far fewer munitions , reserving those critical assets for future missions . The January – February 2004 issue of " Field Artillery " magazine featured a report on the implementation of Effects - Based Operations in Afghanistan " to help shape an environment that enables the reconstruction of the country as a whole . " United States policy objectives are to create a " government of Afghanistan committed to and capable of preventing the re - emergence of terrorism on Afghan soil . " All mission efforts are undertaken with that end - state goal in mind . To coordinate endeavors , the US military maintains a Joint Effects Coordination Board ( JECB ) chaired by the Director of the Combined / Joint Staff ( DCJS ) which serves to select and synchronize targets and determine desired effects across branches and operational units . Besides representatives from combat maneuver organizations , staff also is drawn from the Staff Judge Advocate ( SJA ) , Psychological Operations ( PSYOP ) and Public Affairs ( PA ) . Weekly Joint Effects Working Group ( JEWG ) targeting team meetings provide recommendations and updates to the JECB based on three priorities : The result is a three - week - ahead planning window , or battle rhythm , to produce the desired effects of the commanders , as defined in operations order s ( OPORDs ) every three weeks and fragmentary orders ( FRAGOs ) each week to update the standing OPORDs . Activities include both lethal and non - lethal missions , including civil - military , public affairs , reconstruction , intelligence and psychological operations and feedback as well as conventional combat and fire support missions . An FA lieutenant , as an “ Effects Support Team ” ( EST ) leader , must understand how to employ lethal and non - lethal assets to realize the maneuver company commander ’ s vision of future operations . He must be able to work with civil affairs teams , special operations , coalition and host - nation forces , as well as NGOs and OGA s . This requires a shift away from " hot steel " ( artillery fire ) as a solution to all problems , and a focus on integration of multiple dimensions and methods to achieve desired results . A recent study concluded that a contributing factor to the Israeli Defense Force ' s defeat in the Israeli - Hezbollah Conflict in the Summer of 2006 was due in large part to an over reliance on EBO concepts . EBO In and Out of Favor . In 2008 , Joint Forces Command , the caretaker of US Military Joint Warfighting doctrine , noted the failure of US Army ' s Theater EBO software development and issued memorandum and a guidance documents from then commander , Marine General James Mattis , on Effects Based Operations . In these documents dated 14 August 2008 Mattis said , " Effective immediately , USJFCOM will no longer use , sponsor or export the terms and concepts related to EBO . . . in our training , doctrine development and support of JPME ( Joint Professional Military Education ) . " Mattis went on to say , " . . . we must recognize that the term " effects - based " is fundamentally flawed , has far too many interpretations and is at odds with the very nature of war to the point it expands confusion and inflates a sense of predictability far beyond that which it can be expected to deliver . " The US Air Force , however , not only has not abandoned EBO , but has increased mention of ' effects - based ' thinking in official doctrine and has codified it in AF Doctrine Document 2 . It is also mentioned 124 times in Joint Pub 5 - 0 . Colonels Carpenter and Andrews , writing in " Small Wars Journal " noted " When EBO has been misunderstood , overextended , or misapplied in exercises , it has primarily been through misapplication or over - engineering , not because of EBO principles themselves . Specifically , the bundling of ONA and SoSA with EBO weighed down a useful concept with an unworkable software engineering approach to war . " Further reading . Smith , Edward A . ' Effects - Based Operations ' Command & Control Research Publications ( CCRP ) , 2003 ,