Lesley J . McNair General Lesley James McNair ( May 25 , 1883 – July 25 , 1944 ) was an American Army officer who served during World War I and World War II . He was killed by friendly fire when a USAAF Eighth Air Force bomb landed in his foxhole near Saint - Lô during Operation Cobra as part of the Battle of Normandy . McNair , Frank Maxwell Andrews , Simon Bolivar Buckner , Jr . and Millard Harmon , all lieutenant generals at the time of their deaths , were the highest - ranking Americans to be killed in World War II ; McNair and Buckner were both promoted posthumously to general , on July 19 , 1954 , by Act of Congress . Early life and career . He was born in Verndale , Minnesota , the son of James and Clara Manz McNair . He graduated eleventh in a class of 124 from the United States Military Academy and was commissioned a 2nd lieutenant of Artillery ( 1904 ) . He then served in a series of ordnance and artillery appointments in Utah , Massachusetts , New Jersey and Washington , D . C . ( 1904 – 1909 ) . He was promoted to 1st lieutenant ( June 1905 ) and captain ( May 1907 ) and was then assigned to the 4th Artillery Regiment in the west ( 1909 – 1914 ) . While attached to the regiment he was sent to France to observe French artillery training for a period of seven months ( 1913 ) and upon return took part in Major General Frederick Funston ' s expedition to Vera Cruz ( April 30 - November 23 , 1914 ) . He then saw service under General John J . Pershing , in the Pancho Villa Expedition , and was promoted to major ( May 1917 ) . World War I . When the United States of America entered the First World War , McNair went to France , where he served with the 1st Infantry Division . For his outstanding service , he was awarded both the Army Distinguished Service Medal and the French Légion d ' honneur . He was also promoted in due succession to lieutenant colonel ( August 1917 ) , colonel ( June 1918 ) , and brigadier ( one - star ) general ( October 1918 ) thus becoming the youngest general officer in the United States Army at the time at the age of 35 . Between wars . Following the end of the First World War in November 1918 , he left his position as senior artillery officer in the General Staff ' s Training Section and reverted to his permanent rank of major ( 1919 ) , returning to the United States to teach , first , at the General Service School ( 1919 – 1921 ) , then doing a stint as a staff officer in Hawaii ( 1921 – 1924 ) , then as a professor of military science and tactics at Purdue University from 1924 to 1928 . He was promoted to permanent lieutenant colonel ( 1928 ) and graduated from the Army War College in 1929 . Following this , he served as assistant commander of the U . S . Army Field Artillery School ( 1929 – 1933 ) then in the Civilian Conservation Corps during the first Franklin Roosevelt Administration ( 1933 – 1935 ) . He was promoted to colonel ( May 1935 ) and received command of 2d Field Artillery Brigade in Texas following his promotion to Brigadier General in March 1937 , and commanded from March 1937 to April 1939 . As Commandant of the Command and General Staff College from April 1939 to July 1940 , McNair initiated changes that prepared the College ' s graduates to meet the upcoming challenges of World War II . World War II . McNair was Chief of Staff of GHQ , U . S . Army from July 1940 to March 1942 . He was promoted to Major General in September 1940 , and temporary Lieutenant General in June 1941 . In March 1942 , General McNair became Commanding General , Army Ground Forces . As such , he was responsible for the organization , training and preparation of the U . S . Army for overseas service . He was instrumental in preparing large - scale divisional and corps exercises to provide Army commanders with some experience in controlling large forces in simulated combat . However , McNair ' s emphasis on abbreviated basic combat training schedules for inductees , as well as his programs for the training and supply of individual replacements to combat units would later face widespread criticism after the U . S . Army invasion of North Africa in 1942 , criticism that continued until the end of the war in Europe . McNair , who had already received a Purple Heart for being wounded in the North African Campaign , was killed in his foxhole July 25 , 1944 near Saint - Lô during Operation Cobra , by an errant aerial bomb dropped during a pre - attack bombardment by heavy strategic bombers of the Eighth Air Force . General Omar Bradley , his ground forces stymied , had decided to use carpet bombing to break the German lines . Carpet bombing enemy lines was used as breakthrough artillery at the start of many operations by the Americans and the British instead of the Soviet method of concentrated conventional artillery . 1 , 500 heavies , 380 medium bombers and 550 fighter bombers dropped 4 , 000 tons of high explosives and napalm . Bradley was horrified when 77 planes bombed short : McNair is buried at the Normandy American Cemetery and Memorial in Normandy , France . His tombstone originally listed him as a lieutenant general , the rank he held at death . Although he was posthumously promoted to the rank of general by the US Congress in 1954 , the American Battle Monuments Commission was initially unaware of the change . His gravestone was not changed to reflect his final rank of general until 11 November 2010 , making him the highest - ranking military officer buried at that cemetery . His son , Colonel Douglas McNair , chief of staff of the 77th Infantry Division , was killed two weeks later by a sniper on Guam and is buried at the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific in Hawaii . Washington Barracks in Washington , D . C . was renamed Fort Lesley J . McNair in his honor in 1948 . McNair Barracks in Berlin , Germany & McNair Kaserne in Höchst ( Frankfurt am Main ) , Germany were also both named in his honor . McNair Kaserne was closed and turned over to the German government when the 17th Signal Battalion moved to Kitzingen , Germany in 1992 . Evaluation . Initial training issues . During the early months of the war , Lieutenant General McNair received largely favorable treatment for his training programs and policies . McNair was frequently quoted for his pronouncements that no army could be fully effective unless it is properly organized , correctly equipped , adequately led , and completely trained . In a 1943 wartime profile for " The Saturday Evening Post " written just before the rout of U . S . Army forces at Kasserine Pass , reporter John T . Whitaker effusively wrote of McNair : " If you have a son or husband in uniform , you may owe his welfare or even his survival to ' Whitey ' McNair . " . Under pressure to quickly produce huge numbers of soldiers , McNair resorted to cutting back basic and advanced combat training , particularly in the areas of combat initiative ( small - unit leadership exercises for enlisted troops , where all NCOs and officers have been ruled killed or wounded ) , combat acclimatization , weapons proficiency , and small unit tactics . With the exception of elite combat units such as airborne forces , who received intense physical training as well as realistic weapon and unit combat instruction , McNair used the bulk of the training cycle to train Army inductees in their particular specialty or classification . The faults in this system were soon exposed after the battle of Kasserine Pass and other critical initial encounters with the battle - seasoned German forces , in which U . S . infantry , service , and supporting arms troops lost unit cohesion and retreated in disorder after being overrun . While U . S . forces in continual operations against enemy forces soon acquired combat experience of their own , the cost of ' on the job training ' proved extremely expensive in terms of casualties and loss of morale . Though McNair and his successors later implemented more realistic training based on modern battle experiences , widespread reports of insufficiently - trained soldiers and combat specialists would continue to occur for the duration of the war . In this respect , McNair was not helped by the practice of assigning generals who had done poorly in combat assignments , such as Lloyd Fredendall and John P . Lucas , to head stateside training commands . Individual replacement system . Another problem surfaced with the individual replacement system ( IRS ) , a concept devised by General George C . Marshall and implemented by McNair . Instead of learning from combat veterans in the same unit ( via transfer to an existing battalion or regiment temporarily rotated out of the combat zone for retraining ) , replacements were first trained at a variety of facilities , then sent to replacement depots ( " repple - depple s " ) . Shipped without unit organization or strong command , they were passed from one temporary duty station to another , often spending months between leaving their original organizations and assignment to a unit . During this time they became physically soft , their discipline slackened , and their acquired basic infantry or combat skills tended to be forgotten . It was at this point that the individual army replacement was transferred to an active duty unit , frequently a fighting arm such as armor or infantry that was ' on the line ' ( currently engaged in combat operations ) . In addition to this , U . S . commanders frequently encountered replacement soldiers that had received no training on their individual rifle or assigned weapons system at all . As the IRS plan began to break down completely in late 1944 , other men , including older individuals and those physically incapable of rigorous physical duty were taken from other army specialties ( clerk - typist , cook etc . ) or training programs and hurriedly given six weeks ' infantry training , upon which they were reassigned as combat infantry replacements . In consequence , casualty rates skyrocketed ; in many frontline units , replacement soldiers lasted an average just three to four days before being killed or wounded . At the same time , veteran soldiers were retained on the line until they were killed , wounded , or became incapacitated by battle fatigue or physical illness . Tactical doctrine controversies . McNair also espoused controversial theories on armored support of infantry forces , theories which were later found to be inadequate . He particularly came in for criticism over the tank destroyer doctrine . As an artillery officer , McNair favored towed anti - tank artillery over self - propelled tank destroyers , even after it had become apparent that German forces were converting their anti - tank forces into self - propelled guns as soon as such vehicles could be produced . Due to inherent delays in deploying such towed guns , combined with greatly increased crew exposure to German small arms and mortar fire , American towed anti - tank artillery was never really effective during the war in Europe ; instead , some units were tasked as substitute howitzers firing conventional artillery missions . When used in their original role as towed anti - tank guns against German tanks and defensive emplacements , the towed battalions suffered disproportionate casualties compared to the self - propelled tank destroyer battalions . As a result of his belief in the tank destroyer doctrine , McNair was instrumental in obstructing the production of the M26 Pershing . McNair saw no need for a heavy tank and believed that tank versus tank duels were " unsound and unnecessary " . McNair would agree only to the production of the 76mm M4 Sherman which he believed were capable of handling the Tiger I tank that had appeared in late 1942 . Gen . Jacob Devers , the main proponent for the M26 , had to go over McNair ' s head to Gen . Marshall to begin production of the M26 . Command ability . McNair was not always successful in selecting subordinate commanders with genuine military leadership abilities . He had a natural affinity and very high regard for General Lloyd Fredendall , considered one of the most incompetent U . S . senior battlefield commanders of World War II . McNair included Fredendall on a list of three senior generals he thought capable of commanding all American forces in England . As part of Operation Torch , Fredendall was later sent to North Africa , where he was relieved of command by General Eisenhower after the debacle at Kasserine Pass .