Battle of Ap Gu The Battle of Ap Gu occurred during 31 March and 1 April 1967 during Operation Junction City , a search and destroy mission by American military forces in Tay Ninh Province of South Vietnam , to the west of the capital Saigon . The battle near the border with Cambodia left 609 Viet Cong killed , 5 captured , and over 50 weapons of all types , while the Americans lost only 17 killed and 102 wounded . Two American infantry battalions were scheduled to make an airborne assault into an area near the border with Cambodia to secure some roads and US bases , and to search and destroy communists in the surrounding area . The assault was scheduled for 30 March , but poor weather meant that one of the battalions did not land until the day after . In the early afternoon of 31 March , the Americans began reconnaissance missions , and one platoon was put into difficulty by a communist attack that killed their commanding officer . A few hours later , an American company was attacked by a battalion - sized communist force , and were in difficulty until supporting artillery allowed them to withdraw . The communists tried to exploit their advantage but were driven off by American firepower . Before dawn the next day , the communists launched their main attacks on an American landing zone and fire support base with mortar - fire and infantry charged . They managed to overrun a few bunkers and capture 0 . 4 ha of territory before the Americans called in air strikes and cluster bomb s . This wore down the communists and they forced the Viet Cong to withdraw by early morning with heavy casualties . Preparations . On 26 March the 1st Battalion , 26th Infantry Regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander M . Haig , was told to prepare for an airborne assault deeper into War Zone C and nearer to the Cambodian border . At that time , the Battalion was attached to the 2d Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division and was located at Fire Support Patrol Base C at Sroc Con Trang , where they were engaged in perimeter defense , road security , and occasional search and destroy operations . The plan was to make the landing on the morning of 30 March into what would be Landing Zone George , some to the west . They would secure the zone for a follow - up landing by the 1st Battalion , 2nd Infantry Regiment , and then conduct operations together in an area where Viet Cong were expected to be positioned . On the scheduled day of the assault , poor weather delayed the preparatory air strikes around and on the Landing Zone ( LZ ) , resulting in a two - hour delay . Thus , the assault of the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Infantry was postponed until 31 March , and the 1st Battalion , 26th Infantry landed in the afternoon of 30 March at LZ George . The LZ consisted of open fields covered with tall , meadow - like grass and the area was surrounded by medium to heavy jungle . The remainder of the Battalion landed within an hour . Upon landing the Battalion dispatched cloverleaf patrols to try to intercept the Viet Cong . The patrols uncovered fortified positions in and around the LZ but made no contact . That evening the unit organized its night defensive position in the vicinity of the LZ . Fighting positions were dug with full overhead cover and interlocking fires all around , as was the standard practice . Listening post s were established and ambush patrols sent out . No significant contact with the Viet Cong occurred overnight . The next morning , 31 March , the 1st Battalion , 2nd Infantry led by Lieutenant Colonel William C . Simpson landed at LZ George without incident . After this , they moved to southwest . The 1st Battalion , 26th Infantry began search and destroy operations in the surrounding area . Company A went south and C Company east . B Company remained in reserve , manning and patrolling the Battalion perimeter at the LZ . The Battalion ' s reconnaissance platoon was searching the woods northwest of the perimeter . The Viet Cong were expecting the Americans and had hung small signs written in English on the trees , warning that Americans who went beyond the signs would not return . Initial skirmishes . At 13 : 00 the platoon moved further north into a wooded area , approximately south of the Cambodian border . There , first contact was made . The platoon ' s point man was hit by enemy fire , and First Lieutenant Richard A . Hill went forward to check the situation , only to be mortally wounded . Only Hill ' s radio operator was left in contact with the Battalion headquarters . Hill had advised the Battalion that his platoon was heavily engaged with automatic weapons , small arms , and grenades . Haig called for artillery support and after being advised that Hill was incapacitated , taking action to co - ordinate the artillery fire and air strikes in support of the platoon . At the same time , B Company was closing on the perimeter after a sweep of the Battalion ' s defensive zone . When advised of the reconnaissance platoon ' s desperate position and that Hill had been hit , the commander of B Company took his men to the north to the assistance of the embattled platoon without the knowledge of Haig . Colonel Haig boarded his helicopter , and it was not until he was airborne that he learned of B Company ' s move . As Haig pointed out later , while Company B ' s move was necessary , the lack of accurate control of artillery and air support complicated the problem . As a result , B Company had entered the battle without sufficient preparation and found itself heavily engaged along with the reconnaissance platoon . The B Company commander reported that he was confronting a Viet Cong force of at least Battalion - size , and his optimism gradually faded ; his men were pinned down by heavy machine gun fire , rockets , mortars , and recoilless rifles , and was running low on ammunition . Haig realized that reinforcements and relief was necessary . Company A was alerted and ordered to move forward to relieve B Company . Haig landed near the battle and had his Battalion operations officer take to the air to control fire direction . Haig found Hill ' s body and the B Company commander wounded . Haig stayed and was joined by the A Company commander , who had moved his unit through and gained fire superiority over the enemy force . The American artillery and air strikes increased , permitting all units , except initially two platoons of A Company still in contact , to be withdrawn under fire cover . As the Americans moved back , the Viet Cong left their bunkers and moved forward to try to keep the pressure on the Americans , but they were forced to stop because of the American bombardment , and the fighting stopped at 17 : 05 . Seven Americans were killed and 38 wounded in the initial skirmish , while the Viet Cong casualties were unknown at that time . Meanwhile the Division commander , General John H . Hay , had ordered reinforcements . At 1555 the first element of the 1st Battalion , 16th Infantry Regiment , except C Company , touched down at LZ George under Viet Cong sniper fire and occupied positions to the west and northwest of the 1st Battalion of the 26th Infantry . The Battalion , led by Colonel Rufus C . Lazzell , established night defensive positions . The two Battalions co - ordinated defensive plans to improve their fighting positions , established listening posts , and sent out ambush patrols . During the night , American harassment and interdiction artillery and mortar fires were placed in the area around the perimeter . From midnight until 04 : 00 on 1 April , listening posts to the north , east , and south reported movement to their front ; however , their contact was insignificant contact . Mortar fire was directed into areas of suspected Viet Cong activity . Main Viet Cong attack . At 04 : 55 a single Viet Cong mortar round exploded to the front of the perimeter of the 1st Battalion , 26th Infantry . Haig heard and correctly interpreted it to be a registration round for a mortar attack . He immediately ordered all of his companies to be on full alert posture and directed them to take cover and be prepared for an attack . He also recommended that the 1st Battalion , 16th Infantry do the same , and Lazzell ' s unit complied . Haig immediately requested Capt . Dave Ernest lay down artillery cover fire . Five minutes after the Viet Cong registration round landed , the first of several hundred rounds of 60 - mm . , 82 - mm . , and 120 - mm . mortar fire were directed into the northern portions of the American areas . The Americans estimated the source of fire to be northeast of the defensive perimeter . They could hear the rounds being fired and concluded that the Viet Cong were nearby , and that so many mortars were firing that they " sounded like loud , heavy machine guns . " Due to the early warning and thus the rapid response , only 12 men were wounded . At the same time the mortar attack opened on the units in LZ George , a coordinated attack was launched against Fire Support Patrol Base C , where much of the artillery for the 1st Battalion , 26th Infantry and the 1st Battalion , 16th Infantry was dug in . The incoming mortar and 75 - mm . pack howitzer rounds hit the artillery base and made it more inefficient . However , the artillery that had moved into Fire Support Patrol Base Thrust on 29 March was not under incoming mortar attack and could provide support unhindered . The Americans were surprised that the Viet Cong did not attack this base to try to hinder their artillery fire . Haig felt that the Viet Cong had wanted to press on after the previous day ' s attack , and that he would have taken the initiative if his opponents had not . The heavy mortar attack ended at 05 : 15 , but continued for a further hour at Fire Support Patrol Base C . During this time flareships , a light helicopter fire team , and forward air controllers were furnished by the 2d Brigade tactical headquarters on request . Seven minutes later the Viet Cong started their ground attack against the northeast edge of the perimeter . The attack mainly hit B and C Companies of the 1st Battalion , 26th Infantry , and A Company and the reconnaissance platoon of the 1st Battalion , 16th Infantry . As the soldiers manning the friendly listening posts withdrew to the perimeter , the Viet Cong followed them in . The withdrawing Americans had accidentally set off flares , allowing the Viet Cong to see them and open fire will small arms and machine guns , backed by mortars . The surprise attack caught the Americans off guard and resulted in the capture of three bunkers and the capture of territory roughly 40 m by 100 m wide in the C Company sector and close - quarters hand - to - hand fighting occurred . Haig later admitted that the night defensive position he selected , with a natural wood line - leading into the northeast portion of the perimeter made this the most vulnerable portion of his perimeter , and that the Viet Cong were clever in attacking at this point . The Americans had to fall back 75 m to consolidate . The commander of Company C , Captain Brian H . Cundiff , defying the intense fire , moved among his men and organized an effective response to the Viet Cong penetration . At 06 : 30 the reserve of the 1st Battalion , 26th Infantry , the reconnaissance platoon , moved into a blocking position behind C Company and , along with B Company , fought to re - establish the original perimeter . Meanwhile the Viet Cong launched diversionary attacks from the east and west . By this time , flights for air strikes were coming over the target area four times an hour , providing continuous air cover . Initially , there was some difficulty in getting the flights loaded with cluster bombs ; these were seen as essential and the most effective ordnance for the situation , as the Viet Cong were in the open , in close range to the Americans , and as the pilot can release the cluster bombs from a low level within 30 m of the Americans without harming them . The main Viet Cong attack was beginning to be worn down by the American firepower . Light and heavy helicopter fire teams were aiming rockets and miniguns on the wood line to the northeast ; artillery was massing along the east flank and in depth to the east . As the flights arrived with cluster bombs and attacked within thirty meters of the American positions , large groups of Viet Cong bodies formed . As the ordnance began taking its toll , the Viet Cong started to run , many throwing down their weapons . In the meantime , Captain Cundiff led elements of C Company , reinforced by the 1st Platoon of B Company , in a massive counter - attack that pushed the remaining Viet Cong back into the American artillery barrages and air strikes and by 08 : 00 the perimeter was restored . As the Viet Cong began withdrawing , the 1st Battalion , 2nd Infantry and the 1st Battalion , 16th Infantry passed through the 1st Battalion , 26th Infantry to pursue the Viet Cong to the east and northeast . However , they could not make substantial contact . Artillery and air strikes were ordered on suspected withdrawal routes and camps . Aftermath . After the battle was over , the Americans found 491 Viet Cong bodies in their base area , but concluded that there were many more deaths . The Americans concluded that they had confronted three battalions of the 271st Viet Cong Regiment of the 9th Viet Cong Division and elements of the 70th Guard Regiment , and that they had killed 609 and captured 5 , and recovered over 50 weapons of all types . The Americans reported 17 killed and 102 wounded . During the mortar attack on Fire Support Patrol Base C , where the 2d Brigade command post was located , Colonel Grimsley was wounded and evacuated , and General James F . Hollingsworth took command . Later that day , Colonel Haig took over . During the battle , artillery from Alpha Battery , 1st Battalion 7th Field Artillery , under Captain David Ernest , had fired around 15 , 000 rounds , while United States Air Force jet fighter - bombers recorded 103 sorties amounting to over 100 tons of ordnance dropped . Haig felt that the air power , particularly cluster bombs , were the main factor in the US success , although he also acknowledged the artillery and mortar in grinding down the Viet Cong . However , he also claimed that without all of the components used in the American effort , it would have failed . Haig claimed that Ap Gu and Operation Attleboro showed the Viet Cong were tactically and strategically naive and inflexible at large - unit open combat .