Battle of the Denmark Strait The Battle of the Denmark Strait was a Second World War naval battle between ships of the Royal Navy and the German " Kriegsmarine " , fought on 24 May 1941 . The British battleship and the battlecruiser fought the German battleship and the heavy cruiser , both of which were attempting to break out into the North Atlantic to attack Allied merchant shipping . Less than 10 minutes after the British opened fire , a shell from " Bismarck " struck " Hood " near her aft ammunition magazines . Soon afterward , " Hood " exploded , and sank within three minutes with the loss of all but three of her crew . " Prince of Wales " continued to exchange fire with " Bismarck " but suffered serious malfunctions in her main armament as the British battleship had not fully worked up after only being completed in late March 1941 and soon broke off the engagement . The battle was considered a tactical victory for the Germans ; however , " Bismarck " was forced to abort her Atlantic mission due to damage suffered to her forward fuel tanks , and was eventually sunk herself three days later . Background . The two ships were expected to try to break westward through the Greenland - Iceland - UK ( GIUK ) gap . While passing neutral Sweden in the Baltic Sea , they were first spotted by the Swedish cruiser and patrol planes from the neutral country ; these reports were intercepted by the British embassy , allowing Royal Navy ships to watch their probable route . Due to cloud and rain , aircraft scheduled to assist in the search , could not do so when the German ships attempted their breakout . On the evening of 23 May , despite the advantage of foul weather to cloak their presence , the Germans were spotted , steaming at , by the British heavy cruiser s and . These cruisers - each carrying eight 8 - inch guns - were patrolling the Denmark Strait under the command of Rear - Admiral Frederic Wake - Walker . With the help of " Suffolk " s newly installed radar , the cruisers shadowed the German ships through the night , reporting on their movements . The next morning , the German ships were intercepted in the Strait between Iceland and Greenland by a force of British ships . These were the battleship " Prince of Wales " , the battlecruiser and a screen of six destroyer s , under the command of Vice - Admiral Lancelot Holland in " Hood " . " Prince of Wales " was a newly commissioned " King George V " - class battleship , of much the same size and power as " Bismarck " . She had not yet been properly " shaken down " , and her crew was green . She still had mechanical problems , especially with her main armament , and had sailed with shipyard workers still aboard working on her . " Hood " , following her commissioning in 1918 , had been the largest warship afloat for 20 years . Between the wars , more than any other ship , she had represented British naval power in the eyes of Britain and the world . But her armour was less comprehensive than a battleship ' s and her lower armoured deck was too light to stand up to long - range plunging fire . The outbreak of World War II prevented her from undergoing the required modernisation , specifically a planned increase in the thickness of the lower deck from to . Even so , " Hood " s firepower , eight guns , was the equal of any German ship afloat . Far away to the southeast , Admiral Holland ' s superior , Admiral Sir John Tovey debated whether to order Admiral Holland to allow " Prince of Wales " ahead of " Hood " . In this position , the better - protected " Prince of Wales " would draw the enemy ' s fire . He decided not to give this order , later claiming , " I did not feel such interference with such a senior officer justified . " Plan gone awry . Holland ' s battle plan was to have " Hood " and " Prince of Wales " engage " Bismarck " while " Suffolk " and " Norfolk " engaged " Prinz Eugen " ( which , Holland assumed , still steamed behind " Bismarck " and not ahead of her ) . He signalled this to Captain John C . Leach of " Prince of Wales " but did not radio Rear Admiral Wake - Walker , who as Commander of the 1st Cruiser Squadron directed " Suffolk " and " Norfolk " , for fear of disclosing his location . Instead , he observed radio silence . Holland hoped to meet the enemy at approximately 02 : 00 . Sunset in this latitude was at 01 : 51 ( ship ' s clocks were four hours ahead of local time ) . " Bismarck " and " Prinz Eugen " would be silhouetted against the sun ' s afterglow while " Hood " and " Prince of Wales " could approach rapidly , unseen in the darkness , to a range close enough not to endanger " Hood " with plunging fire from " Bismarck " . The Germans would not expect an attack from this quarter , giving the British the advantage of surprise . The plan ' s success depended on " Suffolk " s continually unbroken contact with the German ships . However , " Suffolk " lost contact from 00 : 28 . For 90 minutes , Holland neither sighted the German ships nor received any further news from " Norfolk " or " Suffolk " . Reluctantly , he ordered " Hood " and " Prince of Wales " to turn south - southwest while the destroyers continued searching to the north . Before contact was re - established , the two squadrons missed each other by a hairsbreadth . Had the German ships not altered course to the west at 01 : 41 to follow the line of the Greenland icepack , the British would have intercepted them much earlier than they did . The British destroyers were just to the southeast when the Germans made this course change . If the visibility had not been reduced to , the German vessels would probably have been spotted . Just before 03 : 00 , " Suffolk " regained contact with " Bismarck " . " Hood " and " Prince of Wales " were away , slightly ahead of the Germans . Holland signalled to steer toward the Germans and increased speed to . " Suffolk " s loss of contact had placed the British at a disadvantage . Instead of the swiftly closing head - on approach Holland had envisioned , he would have to converge at a wider angle , much more slowly . This would leave " Hood " vulnerable to " Bismarck " s plunging shells for a much longer period . The situation worsened further when , at 03 : 20 , " Suffolk " reported that the Germans had made a further course alteration to the west , placing the German and British squadrons almost abeam of each other . At 05 : 35 , lookouts on " Prince of Wales " spotted the German ships away . The Germans , already alerted to the British presence through their hydrophonic equipment , picked up the smoke and masts of the British ships 10 minutes later . At this point , Holland had the option of joining " Suffolk " in shadowing " Bismarck " and waiting for Tovey to arrive with " King George V " and other ships to attack or to order his squadron into action . He chose the latter at 05 : 37 . The rough seas in the Strait kept the destroyers ' role to a minimum and the cruisers " Norfolk " and " Suffolk " would be too far behind the German force to reach the battle . The battle begins . " Hood " opened fire at 05 : 52 at a distance of approximately . Holland had ordered firing on the leading ship , " Prinz Eugen " , believing from her position that she was " Bismarck " . Holland soon amended his order and directed both ships to engage the rear ship , " Bismarck " . " Prince of Wales " had already correctly identified and targeted " Bismarck " , whereas " Hood " is believed to have continued to fire at " Prinz Eugen " for some time . Holland , himself a gunnery expert , was well aware of the danger posed by " Hood " s weak horizontal protection . Therefore , he wanted to reduce the range as quickly as possible . At a shorter range , the trajectory of " Bismarck " s shells would be flatter and they would be more likely to hit the sides of the ship rather than the decking , or to glance off the top deck . However , he closed the range at an angle that placed the German ships too far forward of the beam . This meant he could use only 10 of his capital ships ' 18 heavy guns while presenting the Germans more at which to aim than necessary . Those 10 guns became nine when a defect in one of " Prince of Wales " forward guns rendered it inoperative after the first salvo . Both " Suffolk " and " Norfolk " attempted to engage " Bismarck " during the action , but both were out of range and neither cruiser had a sufficient speed advantage over " Bismarck " to rapidly close the range during the brief engagement . The Germans also had the weather gauge , meaning that the British ships were steaming into the wind , spray drenching the lenses of " Prince of Wales " " A " turret ' Barr and Stroud coincidence rangefinder and both British ships ' " B " turret rangefinders . This necessitated using the shorter based ( ) ones in the director towers instead . In addition , Admiral Holland had " Prince of Wales " stay close to " Hood " , conforming to " Hood " s movements instead of varying course and speed . This made it easier for the Germans to find the range to both British ships , although it would have aided Holland ' s gunners if they had both fired upon " Bismarck " as originally planned , since they could then precisely time each other ' s salvos to avoid mistaking one ship ' s fire for the other . They could also use " Concentration Fire " , where both ships ' main armament salvos would be controlled by one ship ' s fire control computer - probably " Prince of Wales " ' modern Admiralty Fire Control Table . " Prince of Wales " struck her target first . She would ultimately hit " Bismarck " three times . One shell struck the commander ' s boat and put the seaplane catapult amidships out of action ( the latter damage not being discovered until much later , during an attempt to fly off the ship ' s War Diary on the eve of her final battle ) . The second shell passed through the bow from one side to the other without exploding . The third struck the hull underwater and burst inside the ship , flooding a generator room and damaging the bulkhead to an adjoining boiler room , partially flooding it . These last two hits caused damage to " Bismarck " s machinery and medium flooding . < ref name = " Garzke and Dulin , Bismarck ' s Final Battle , part 1 . " > Garzke and Dulin , Bismarck ' s Final Battle , part 1 . < / ref > More importantly , the damage to the bow cut access to of fuel oil in the forward fuel tanks . It also caused " Bismarck " to leave a visible oil slick and reduced her speed by . " Bismarck " was soon listing 9° to port and lost of freeboard at her bow . < ref name = " Garzke and Dulin , Bismarck ' s Final Battle , part 1 . " / > The Germans held their fire until 05 : 55 , when both German ships targeted " Hood " . " Admiral " Lutjens , the German fleet chief and task force commander , did not immediately give the order to commence firing . Not until he had made multiple inquiries did " Bismarck " s first gunnery officer " Korvettenkapitän " Adalbert Schneider , " " ? ( Permission to open fire ? ) ; the commander of " Bismarck , " " Kapitän zur See " Ernst Lindemann , impatiently responded : " " ( I ' m not letting my ship get shot out from under my arse . Open fire ! ) A shell hit " Hood " s boat deck , starting a sizable fire in the ready - use ammunition stored there , but this fire did not spread to other areas of the ship or cause the later explosion . Although unconfirmed , it is possible that " Hood " was struck again at the base of her bridge and in her foretop radar director . There has been some contention over which German vessel struck " Hood " at this time . " Prinz Eugen " , under the command of " Kapitän zur See " Helmuth Brinkmann , was targeting " Prince of Wales " by this stage , following an order from the fleet commander . However , " Prinz Eugen " s Gunnery Officer , Paul Schmalenbach is quoted as confirming that " Prinz Eugen " ' s target was " Hood " . Sinking of " Hood " . At 06 : 00 , Holland ordered his force to turn once again to port to ensure that the aft main guns on both " Hood " and " Prince of Wales " could bear on the German ships . During the execution of that turn , a salvo from " Bismarck " , fired at a range of about , was seen by men aboard " Prince of Wales " to straddle " Hood " abreast her mainmast . It is likely that one shell struck somewhere between " Hood " s mainmast and " X " turret aft of the mast . This was immediately followed by a huge pillar of flame that shot upward like a giant blowtorch , in the vicinity of the mainmast . This was followed by an explosion that destroyed a large portion of the ship from amidships clear to the rear of " Y " turret . The ship broke in two . The stern fell away and sank . The bow , pointed upward and pivoting about , followed shortly thereafter . The forward turret did manage to fire one last salvo while upward , possibly from the doomed gun crew , just before the bow section sank . Splinters rained down on " Prince of Wales " away . " Hood " sank in about three minutes , taking 1 , 415 men , including Vice - Admiral Holland , with her . Only three of her crew ( Ted Briggs , Bob Tilburn and Bill Dundas ) , survived to be rescued two hours later by the destroyer HMS " Electra " . The British Admiralty later concluded that the most likely explanation for the loss of " Hood " was a penetration of her magazines by a single shell from " Bismarck " , causing the subsequent catastrophic explosion . Recent research by submersible craft suggests that the initial explosion was in the aft magazine and that it spread to the magazines via the ammunition trunks . It has been suggested from examination of the wreckage , found in 2001 , that the magazine explosion in the armament near the mainmast caused the vertical blast of flame seen there , and this in turn ignited the magazines of the aft guns that caused the explosion that wrecked the stern . This explosion might have travelled through the starboard fuel tanks , igniting the fuel oil there , setting off the forward magazines and completing the destruction of the ship . < br > The wreck of " Hood " revealed the bow section bereft of any structure and a huge section of her side is missing , from the ' A ' barbette to the foredeck . The midship section had its plates curled outward . Moreover , the main parts of the forward structure , including the conning tower , were found about away from the main wreckage . This has sparked theories that the forward magazines exploded as a result of the force , flames and pressure , caused by the detonation of the aft magazines . However , a team of marine forensic scientists has found that implosion damage to the forward hull due to the rapid sinking of the " Hood " , is the most likely cause of the state of the forward hull , and they do not support any theory that the forward magazines exploded . " Prince of Wales " alone . " Prince of Wales " found herself steering towards the sinking " Hood " . Her commanding officer , Captain Leach , ordered an emergency avoidance turn away from " Hood " s wreckage . This violent change of course disrupted her aim and put her in a position that made it easier for the Germans to target her . She resumed her previous course , but was now under the concentrated fire of both German ships . " Prince of Wales " was struck four times by " Bismarck " and three times by " Prinz Eugen " . One shell passed through her upper superstructure , killing or wounding several crewmen in the Compass Platform and Air Defence Platform . Pieces of another shell struck her radar office aft , killing the crewmen within . An shell from " Prinz Eugen " found its way to the propelling charge / round manipulation chamber below the aft gun turrets , and a shell from " Bismarck " hit underwater below the armour belt , penetrating about into the ship ' s hull , about below the waterline , but was stopped by the anti - torpedo bulkhead . Fortunately for " Prince of Wales " , neither shell exploded , but she still suffered minor flooding and the loss of some fuel oil . Contrary to some mistaken opinion , the shell that struck " Prince of Wales " below the waterline did not endanger her magazines , as it came to rest abreast an auxiliary machinery room . By this time , serious gunnery malfunctions had caused intermittent problems with the main armament , leading to a 26 % reduction in output . Captain Leach realised that continuing the action would risk losing " Prince of Wales " without inflicting further damage on the enemy . He therefore ordered the ship to make smoke and withdraw , ' pending a more favourable opportunity ' . " Prince of Wales " turned away just after 06 : 04 , firing from her rear turret under local control until the turret suffered a jammed shell ring , cutting off the ammunition supply and making the guns inoperable . Despite efforts by crew members and civilian technicians to repair the shell ring , all four guns were not back in service until 08 : 25 , although two of the four guns were serviceable by 07 : 20 . This temporarily left only five guns operational , but nine of the ten were operational in five hours . The final salvos fired were ragged and are believed to have fallen short . The ship retired from the battle around 06 : 10 . Thirteen of her crew had been killed , nine were wounded . The timing of " Prince of Wales " withdrawal was fortunate for her , as she had come into torpedo range of " Prinz Eugen " and turned away as the German cruiser was about to fire . Breaking off the action . On " Bismarck " , there was tremendous elation at the sinking of " Hood " . There was also a keen expectation that they would close on " Prince of Wales " and possibly finish her off . " Bismarck " s captain , Ernst Lindemann , requested that Admiral Lütjens allow " Bismarck " to do just that . Captain Lindemann was a master naval gunner and knew he had " Prince of Wales " at his mercy . Even if British Admiral John Tovey ' s squadron had left Scapa Flow the previous day , he would still be more than away from " Bismarck " even after diverting to sink " Prince of Wales " — a chase Lindemann calculated would take only two or three hours . Lütjens refused to allow Lindemann to give chase , giving no explanation . Lindemann repeated his request , this time more assertively . Lütjens held firm to orders from the German Naval Commander , " Groß Admiral " Erich Raeder , to avoid unnecessary combat with the Royal Navy , especially when it could lead to further damage that could hasten delivering " Bismarck " toward the waiting hands of the British . He broke off combat instead of pursuing " Prince of Wales " and ordered a course of 270° , due west . " Bismarck " had fired 93 of her 353 base - fused Armour Piercing ( AP ) shells during the engagement . This clash between the two senior German officers reflected their disparate and distinct command functions . As commander of " Bismarck " , Lindemann operated first and foremost as a tactician . As such , he had no doubt about his ship ' s immediate objective to destroy " Prince of Wales " , and he had pressed his case as far and hard as he should . Lütjens , as fleet chief and task force commander , operated at the strategic and operational levels . To some degree , his orders were clear – attacking convoys was his priority , not risking " a major engagement for limited , and perhaps uncertain , goals " . Nevertheless , Raeder had also ordered Lütjens to be bold and imaginative , to accept battle if unavoidable and conduct it vigorously to the finish . The reality was that Lütjens ' orders did not cover a spectacular success like the one just achieved . His priority therefore was to stick to his instructions , focus on sinking merchant shipping and avoid encounters with enemy warships whenever possible . Moreover , before leaving Germany , Lütjens had told Admirals Conrad Patzig and Wilhelm Marschall , that he would adhere to Raeder ' s directives . This meant he did not intend to become the third fleet chief to be relieved for contradicting Raeder ' s orders ; Marschall , one of his two predecessors , had been relieved of command for not following his orders to the letter despite the fact that Marschall ' s analysis of the changes in the tactical situation since the orders were issued resulted in the sinking of the British aircraft carrier and its two escorting destroyers . Nor was he predisposed to discuss his command decisions with a subordinate officer . Even if he had known it was the untried " Prince of Wales " he was fighting and not " King George V " , Lütjens would probably have stuck to his decision . Following her would have meant exposing the squadron to further gunfire as well as to torpedo attacks from " Norfolk " and " Suffolk " . He would have risked his ships and crews on an expressly forbidden opportunity . Between 06 : 19 and 06 : 25 , " Suffolk " fired six salvoes in the direction of " Bismarck " , having mistaken a radar contact with an aircraft for " Bismarck " . " Suffolk " was actually out of gun range of both " Bismarck " and " Prinz Eugen " at the time . Aftermath . With Vice - Admiral Holland ' s death , command of " Prince of Wales " as well as " Norfolk " and " Suffolk " fell to British Rear - Admiral Frederic Wake - Walker . With this command came the responsibility of coping with " Bismarck " until enough British warships could concentrate and destroy her . His choice was either to renew the action with the " Bismarck " or ensure that she be intercepted and brought to action by Admiral Tovey . Wake - Walker chose the latter course , continuing to shadow the German ships . Further action , he concluded , would cause more damage to " Prince of Wales " than to " Bismarck " and endanger his cruisers , plus he knew Tovey was on his way . He ordered " Prince of Wales " to follow " Norfolk " at her best speed , so that " Norfolk " could fall back on her if attacked . At 07 : 57 " Suffolk " reported that the " Bismarck " had reduced speed and appeared damaged . Since " Bismarck " s receiving the first hit in the forecastle , all six of the ship ' s 26 - man damage control teams had worked ceaselessly to repair the damage . When it was reported that the tips of the starboard propeller could be seen above water , Lindemann had ordered counterflooding two compartments aft to restore the ship ' s trim . He then sent divers into the forecastle to connect the forward fuel tanks , containing a much - needed of fuel , first to the tanks near the forward boiler then to the rear fuel tank by way of a provisional line running over the upper deck . Both these manoeuvres failed . Lindemann then requested permission to slow " Bismarck " and heel the ship first to one side then the other to weld patches from the inside to the holes in the forward hull . Lütjens refused , again without comment . Eventually , the admiral had to agree to slow the ship to to allow hammocks and collision matting to be stuffed in the holes of the No . 2 boiler room and the auxiliary boiler room to stop the growing ingress of seawater . This attempt also failed . Boiler Room No . 2 was shut down , with a loss of speed to . As well as taking - on seawater , " Bismarck " was leaking fuel oil . Lütjens ordered " Prinz Eugen " to drop back and see how much of a trail she was leaving astern . The carpet of oil was broad enough to cover both sides of the ship ' s wake , was all colours of the rainbow and gave off a strong smell – all of which helped disclose " Bismarck " s location . The damage to " Bismarck " s forward fuel tanks , combined with a missed opportunity to refuel at Bergen earlier in the voyage , left less than of fuel remaining , not enough to operate effectively against the Atlantic convoys . Also , the element of surprise – which was considered essential for the operation ' s success – had most definitely been lost ; the squadron also continued to be shadowed by " Suffolk " , " Norfolk " and eventually also " Prince of Wales " . Lütjens concluded that he needed to abort " Bismarck " s mission and head toward a convenient dockyard for repairs . The question was which dockyard to head for . The nearest friendly ports were Bergen and Trondheim in Norway , a little over away . Steaming in that direction meant a return passage north or south of Iceland , with the enemy ' s air forces now fully alerted to their presence and the possibility of other heavy units between them and Scapa Flow . Lütjens also knew his intelligence was unreliable . " Hood " had been reported by Group North to be off West Africa and there had been no reports of a " King George V " - class battleship in the vicinity . Disregarding Lindemann ' s recommendation to return to Bergen , Lütjens ordered " Bismarck " to head for the French port of Saint - Nazaire . Although the French coast was further away than Bergen , Saint - Nazaire held the potential of longer nights and wider seas in which to shake off " Bismarck " s shadowers , plus the possibility of luring them across a line of U - boats . It would also leave " Bismarck " poised on the edge of the British trade routes once the damage were repaired ; it also meant the potential support of the battleship s and , as well . Both ships had been stationed at Brest in France , since the end of Operation Berlin earlier that year but had been kept in port for repairs and overhaul . While Brest was closer than Saint - Nazaire , it was also within range of Royal Air Force bombers . Lütjens detached the undamaged " Prinz Eugen " to continue raiding on her own . The cruiser went further south into the Atlantic , where she refueled from a tanker at sea . She suffered engine trouble , abandoned her commerce raiding mission without having sunk any merchant ships , and returned to Brest . Reaction . German . News of Lütjens ' decision hit Berlin , Wilhelmshaven and Paris like a bolt from the blue . A blizzard of urgent telephone calls raced across German - occupied Europe . While the Berlin Admiralty was satisfied with Lütjens ' success , it was tempered by news of " Bismarck " s damage and the decision to head for France . Grand Admiral Raeder was not clear whether Lütjens intended to steam for St . Nazaire immediately or after shaking off his pursuers and oiling in mid - Atlantic . Raeder immediately conferred with his chief of staff , " Admiral " Otto Schniewind , who in turn telephoned " Admiral " Rolf Carls , who commanded Group North in Wilhelmshaven . Carls had already drafted a message recalling Lütjens to Germany , but had not yet sent it . Schniewind pointed out that at noon Lütjens had crossed the demarcation line between the Northern Hebrides and Southern Greenland , thus passing from Group North ' s operational control to Group West ; therefore , the decision to recall Lütjens was no longer Carls ' to make . A subsequent call to Group West ' s commander , " Admiral " Alfred Saalwächter , revealed that he did not plan to recall Lütjens and that he felt such a decision should be discussed between Schniewind and Raeder . Raeder was against issuing a recall himself , telling Schniewind they did not know enough about the situation at hand and that the person who would best know would be Lütjens . He then telephoned Adolf Hitler , who was at the Obersalzberg in the Bavarian Alps . Hitler received the news of " Hood " s sinking stoically , exhibiting neither joy nor any other triumphant behavior . After hearing Raeder ' s report , he turned to those who were with him and expressed his personal thoughts : News of " Hood " s destruction was seized upon more enthusiastically by Dr . Joseph Goebbels ' Propaganda Ministry . That evening it was broadcast to the nation , accompanied by " " We march against England " " and other martial airs . The German public , already enjoying the news of " Luftwaffe " victories over the Royal Navy off Crete , took " Hood " s sinking euphorically . British . The British public were shocked that their most emblematic warship and more than 1 , 400 of her crew had been destroyed so suddenly . The Admiralty mobilised every available warship in the Atlantic to hunt down and destroy " Bismarck " . The Royal Navy forces pursued and brought " Bismarck " to battle ; the German battleship was sunk on the morning of 27 May . Moves were subsequently made to court - martial Wake - Walker and Captain John Leach of " Prince of Wales " . The view was taken that they were wrong not to have continued the battle with " Bismarck " after " Hood " had been sunk . John Tovey , Commander - in - Chief of the Home Fleet , was appalled at this criticism . A row ensued between Tovey and his superior , Admiral Sir Dudley Pound . Tovey stated that the two officers had acted correctly , ensuring that the German ships were tracked and not endangering their ships needlessly . Furthermore , " Prince of Wales " s main guns had repeatedly malfunctioned and she could not have matched " Bismarck " . Tovey threatened to resign his position and appear at any court - martial as ' defendant ' s friend ' and defence witness . No more was heard of the proposal . A British board of enquiry quickly investigated the cause of " Hood " s explosion and produced a report . After criticism that the initial enquiry did not record all the available evidence , a second board of enquiry more extensively investigated " Hood " s loss , and examined the vulnerabilities of other large British warships still in service in light of the probable causes of the explosion . It , like the first enquiry , concluded that a shell from " Bismarck " caused the explosion of " Hood " s aft ammunition magazines . This led to refitting some older British warships with increased protection for their ammunition magazines and some other related improvements . Many naval historians and writers have analyzed the " Bismarck " engagement and weighed the participants ' decisions . One of the most debated is " Admiral " Lütjens ' decision to proceed into the Atlantic rather than continue the battle . Parallels to Jutland . A number of parallels could be drawn from Vice - Admiral Holland ' s actions in this battle and those of Admiral David Beatty in the opening stages of the Battle of Jutland . From his actions , it seems clear that Holland felt he had to engage " Bismarck " immediately , rather than support Wake - Walker in shadowing until Force ' H ' could arrive . Beatty , likewise , felt he needed to engage German Admiral Franz Hipper ' s battlecruisers with his own forces instead of drawing the Germans toward Admiral John Jellicoe and the British Grand Fleet . Holland , like Beatty , possessed superiority in the number of heavy ships he possessed , yet he was encumbered by inferiority in fighting effectiveness of those units . Moreover , Holland ' s deployment of his units compared to Beatty ' s deployment at Jutland . Beatty and Holland both attacked while German units were well before the beam . As a result , the midships and after turrets of Beatty ' s ships could barely fire on the enemy ; Holland ' s ships could not use their after turrets until the final turn to port just before " Hood " was sunk . Beatty placed his lighter - armoured battlecruisers at the head of his line , leaving the more powerful and better - armoured " Queen Elizabeth " s in the rear . Likewise , Holland placed the old and vulnerable " Hood " ahead of the strongly armoured ( albeit new and untested ) " Prince of Wales " . Both admirals exercised tight tactical control over their units from their flagships . This prevented Captain Leach from manoeuvering " Prince of Wales " independently and possibly taking a different line of approach that could have confused the Germans .