Collins - class submarine replacement project Planning to replace the Royal Australian Navy ' s ( RAN ' s ) " Collins " - class submarines began in 2007 with the commencement of defence acquisition project SEA 1000 . The six " Collins " - class boats are due to leave service from 2025 onwards , and are to be replaced by a class of twelve submarines . The project is looking at four options to replace the submarines : buy a Military - Off - The - Shelf ( MOTS ) design , modify a MOTS design for Australian conditions , design an evolution of an existing submarine , or design a new submarine from scratch . The resulting vessel is tentatively identified displacing around 4 , 000 tons , will be equipped with land - attack cruise missiles in addition to torpedoes and anti - ship missiles , and need to be capable of performing surveillance and intelligence - gathering operations ( both directly and through the delivery and recovery of covert operatives ) . Nuclear propulsion has been ruled out by the Australian government . Construction will occur at the ASC shipyard in South Australia , although other companies will be invited to tender against ASC to build the submarines . The project is predicted to cost A $ 36 billion : the largest acquisition undertaken by the Australian Defence Force . The original plans called for concept work to start in 2009 , the establishment of preliminary designs between 2011 and 2013 , detailed design work from 2013 to 2016 , and construction to start that year . This timeline would have had the new submarines entering service before the " Collins " began phasing out . However , the preliminary design phase did not begin until May 2012 , and entry - into - service for the first new submarine is optimistically predicted as 2030 . Project history . Built during the 1990s and 2000s , the " Collins " - class submarines have a predicted operational life of around 30 years , with lead boat due to decommission around 2025 . The Submarine Institute of Australia released a report in July 2007 arguing that planning for the next generation of Australian submarines had to begin soon . In December 2007 , a month after coming into office following the 2007 federal election , Minister for Defence Joel Fitzgibbon announced that planning for the " Collins " class replacement ( designated SEA 1000 ) had commenced . The SEA 1000 project office was established within the Defence Materiel Organisation in October 2008 , and is being jointly administered with Defence ' s Capability Development Group . In February 2009 , Rear Admiral Rowan Moffitt was appointed as project head . The 2009 " " white paper confirmed the replacement project , and announced that the submarine fleet would be increased to twelve vessels . Reasons for the increase presented in the white paper included the growing quantity and sophistication of Asian - Pacific naval forces ( particularly submarine forces ) , the need to sustain submarine operations in any conflict , and the greater deterrent an increased submarine force would provide . Originally , the planned timeline called for concept work to start in 2009 , preliminary designs to be established between 2011 and 2013 , then detailed design work completed in time for construction to start in 2016 . This was to ensure that the new class would be in service before the " Collins " class began decommissioning in 2025 . However , meetings between Moffitt and the National Security Committee to clarify concept details and intended capabilities , scheduled for November 2009 , did not go ahead until March 2012 . On 3 May 2012 , the Australian government announced funding for the initial design phase . The initial phase will encompass studies to select the new submarines ' design , Defence Science and Technology Organisation projects to establish parameters for propulsion , combat system , and stealth capabilities , along with initiating programs to develop the required industry skills for the actual construction . Under the revised timeline , the preliminary phase will conclude in 2013 , with ' first pass approval ' to be done by early 2014 , and ' second pass approval ' in 2017 , after which construction will start . With the project ' s early delays , the best case scenario for seeing the first new submarine enter service will be after 2030 . Possible designs and planned capabilities . In the 2009 Defence white paper , the replacement submarine had been outlined as a 4 , 000 - ton vessel fitted with land - attack cruise missiles in addition to torpedoes and anti - ship missiles , capable of launching and recovering covert operatives while submerged , and carrying surveillance and intelligence - gathering equipment . It is likely that the submarines will be fitted with the United States AN / BYG - 1 combat system . There are four possible routes for the SEA 1000 project to take , in order of increasing complexity and risk : Designs considered for the two MOTS routes include the Spanish S - 80 class , the French - Spanish designed " Scorpène " class , the German - designed Type 214 , and Japan ' s " Sōryū " class . Scaled - up proposals of the S - 80 and " Scorpène " classes , as well as the Type 216 ( an enlarged version of the Type 214 ) have been offered by the respective designs ' parent companies as possibilities for modification . An updated version of the " Collins " class design is also being looked at : the original submarine was designed for the RAN ' s unique operating environment , and replacing or fixing the issues that affected the original submarines while updating equipment and systems would result in a design that meets the white paper requirements . SEA 1000 will most likely follow the ' modified MOTS ' or ' evolution ' path . No existing MOTS submarine design meets the RAN ' s desired capabilities , or would successfully operate in the warm seas and huge transit distances of Australian service . MOTS submarines were initially ruled out by the project in March 2011 , but were put back on the table in December 2011 . At the other end of the scale , designing a submarine from first principles is considered incredibly risky . The Australian government has rejected nuclear propulsion . Reasons for the rejection include the lack of a nuclear power industry and the related infrastructure and regulatory guidelines ( Australia would be the only non - nuclear nation to operate nuclear submarines ) , as well as public opposition to nuclear technology . Defence commentators have suggested that the United States Navy ' s " Virginia " class nuclear - powered submarines would fit the outline given in the white paper . But instead the recent defense technology deal could see Australia adapt the AIP technology of the " Sōryū " class submarine s . Even though the Australian government had decided to use diesel power instead of nuclear propulsion for the replacement submarine , the University College London International Energy Policy Institute in Adelaide published a paper on its feasibility on 12 August 2013 . The paper argues it is entirely feasible for Australia to replace its submarines with nuclear - powered craft at the same cost of conventional designs . The paper does not directly advocate a nuclear fleet and doesn ' t address strategic , tactical , or political questions in detail . It is intended to spark debate in Australia about what sort of submarines could be selected . The UCL paper says a nuclear craft fits the requirements of increased range , endurance , and strike capability compared the " Collins " class , and that a domestic nuclear industry is not needed to obtain a nuclear fleet . Its authors argue that a nuclear sub would have a significant impact on the pacific region by providing a deterrent advantage because they can remain submerged indefinitely , have high speed , and deploy quickly . Nuclear submarine costs are concluded to be competitive , with overall costs at US $ 1 . 8 billion to US $ 2 . 7 billion . Suppliers of nuclear boats would likely be close allies , with the U . S . having surplus ships , utilizing the military cooperation agreement with Britain , or using France as a source , though with less advanced technology . Construction . Initially , the Australian government promised that the government - owned ASC , the company responsible for building the " Collins " class , would build the new submarines . However , it announced in May 2009 that a request for tender would be released for the construction work . The submarines will be built at ASC ' s shipyard in Osborne , South Australia ; if a company other than ASC is the successful tenderer , they will be granted access to the site . Construction is predicted to occur over a 25 year period , with the new submarines operating until the 2070s . In December 2010 , an update to the 2009 Defence Capability Plan forecast the cost of the project as over A $ 10 billion . However , the Australian Strategic Policy Institute has predicted that the new submarines will cost over A $ 36 billion to design and build , with construction of each submarine valued between A $ 1 . 4 and A $ 3 . 04 billion . The " Collins " replacement project has been identified as the most expensive ever undertaken by the Australian Defence Force . Instead of building all twelve submarines to the same design , building them in ' batches ' is under consideration . Doing so would allow new technologies and improved equipment to be added to the latter submarines through evolving design and research work , but would likely come at an increased cost .