Battle of San Francisco The Battle of San Francisco , also known as " Battle of Dolores " , fought on November 19 , 1879 , was the third battle of the " Tarapacá Campaign " in the War of the Pacific , after Pisagua and Germania . A Chilean army commanded by Colonel Emilio Sotomayor successfully held off and dispersed the bulk of the Peruvian army led by General Juan Buendía at San Francisco hill , near the town of Dolores . The Allies lost a huge amount of war materiel such as cannons , ammunition and weapons . The catastrophe for the Allies was the result of poor logistics , inefficient leadership and the unexpected desertion of the Bolivian Army under the half - hearted command of President Hilarión Daza , known as the " Camarones betrayal " . Prelude . The lost of Pisagua takes away the only escape route from the Tarapacá department for the Allies , so Buendía marches to Agua Santa , but Dávila doesn ’ t concur to the rendezvouz point and stays at Pozo Almonte . Meanwhile , two war councils take place on the Allied headquarters in Perú , the first one on November 6 when it ' s decided that Bolivian President General Daza would take command of the army and lead it to Tana , where he will join with Buendía . The very next day , the Bolivian Chiefs of Staff prepare two gunned trains to transport the army and supplies to Arica . Daza departs at 8 pm to Tacna in a special train from where will march to Tana . From this point to Tacna has to march about 150 kilometres across the desert . On the Chilean side , on November 3 Gen . Erasmo Escala reinforces the position at Hospicio with a division , attending the rumour of Buendía has regrouped and taken position between Dolores and San Roberto . Lt . Col . José Francisco Vergara proposes to make a reconnaissance , and leaves on November 5 following the railroad to Dolores , finding the water machines working soundly , which Vergara informs to headquarters . The next day , the detachment resumes its exploring mission , finding and annihilating an Allied cavalry squadron at Germania . The commander of the Peruvian Southern Army sees himself in an unfavourable position . If not rejecting the Chileans to the sea , Pisagua ’ s taking will put him in a trap . The geography of the Tarapacá department engulfs a 5 , 400 square kilometres area between the Andes , the Pacific Ocean and the high plateaus of the Altiplano , and the only way out of there are the ports of Pisagua and Iquique , and the first one has been taken by the Chileans and the latter is under blockade . Besides , having his army scattered weaken him even more . Division chiefs Cáceres and Bustamante are at Iquique , while Villegas is at Puerto Patillo ; Dávila is at Pozo Almonte , and Bolognesi is between Pozo Almonte and Iquique ; whilst Villamil , after losing Pisagua , has retreated to Agua Santa . The Aroma Battalion is at Mejillones , and the Vengadores Battalion coming from Agua Santa , arrives Alto Hospicio on the afternoon of November 2 , withdrawing to San Roberto , and later returning to Agua Santa . Buendía , departs from Iquique on November 5 leaving Colonel De los Ríos there , with the Lima , Arequipa , Ayacucho battalions ; and by November 9 he ’ s at Pozo Almonte , guarded by Dávila , where Bolognesi reunites with them ; and on the 16 reaches Agua Santa , finding Villamil . With his army regrouped , Buendía marches from Agua Santa and arrives to Negreiros on the 17 , after 16 hours of march across the Pampa del Tamarugal . From this point , the Allies march to Porvenir and at 3 pm of November 19 encounters the Chilean army at Santa Catalina . Meanwhile , after marching stubbornly across the desert on daylight , Daza wears down his army beyond any possibility to fight , and after reaching Camarones , retreats to Tacna without meeting with Buendía . On November 10 , under Col . José Domingo Amunátegui , 3 , 500 men followed by another 2 , 500 under Col . Martiniano Urriola move over Dolores seizing control of the water installations . Here War Minister Sotomayor concentrates there all the materiel arrived from Pisagua , plus anything that could be found at Dolores , and sends scouts to Tana and Tiviliche fearing Daza ' s incoming army . The frictions between General Escala and his staff make these two convoys to depart separately , seeing each other without recognizing and reporting that Daza was incoming . This wrong information makes General Villagrán to transfer 4 , 500 men from Antofagasta to Pisagua . Whilst Amunátegui has advanced to Santa Catalina , following the railroad ; finding himself 12 kilometres south of Dolores and at 10 kilometres from the saltpetre office at Porvenir . Warned of Buendía ’ s presence at 8 am of November 18 , Colonel Sotomayor notifies General Escala . With the newly arrived artillery and reinforced by the 3rd Line Regiment – 1 , 800 men in total – foresees to organize a defensive position starting at dawn at Dolores , where some vanguard elements will spent the night , without lighting any fires to reveal its positions . Preliminary situation . Chilean preliminary situation . On November 7 , the " Buin " 1st Line and the 4th Line regiments , along with the Atacama and Coquimbo battalions plus an artillery battery are dispatched from Hospicio to Dolores . The next day follow the same route the 3rd Line Regiment with the Navales and Valparaíso battalions and another artillery battery . These two columns reunite at Dolores on November 10 . The Chilean forces , under the command of Colonel Emilio Sotomayor , have a strength of 6 , 500 men . Peruvian preliminary situation . On November 5 , the Allies march to Pozo Almonte , increasing its numbers with stray soldiers . On the 13th , Buendia leaves Pozo Almonte and moved towards Agua Santa , reaching his destination four days later . During the march , the soldiers are haunted by the lack of food and water . The troops march to Negritos , and then to Dolores . On the night of the 18th , Gen . Buendia decides to advance to Dolores and engage the Chilean troops posted there Armies layout . Chilean battle plan and disposition . When a scout group of the Cazadores a Caballo Cav . Regt . encounters the marching Allied forces , Sotomayor first decides to present battle over Santa Catalina´s plain , making a huge tactical mistake . However , bitter discussions with Vergara makes him to decline that option and to change his battleplan . Now he orders to fortify the position on the surrounding hills , where the Allies larger numbers represent no advantage whatsoever . Also , the artillery is divided in groups guarded with infantry . The Chilean defence centres on the twin hills of San Francisco , where the northernmost of them elevates about 300 metres , dominating the extension surrounding Santa Catalina , and to the east the space where runs the railroad from Pisagua to Agua Santa . These hills are accessible only from the south and the east , forming a natural bastion before the water well and the installations of Dolores . Col . Amunátegui sets there with the 4th Line Regt . and the Atacama and Coquimbo battalions , disposing Salvo ’ s 63 artillerymen and their eight cannons , covering south and west , according to the battle evolution , plus another six piece battery and 2 Gatling machine guns of Sgt . Major Benjamin Montoya pointing east . The Valparaíso and Navales battalions and the “ Buin ” 1st Line Regiment , under Urriola support a six cannon battery directed by Capt . Roberto Wood and another six mountain cannons led by Capt . Eulogio Villareal . In consequence , the artillery can attack the plain over the west , south or southwest , depending on the needs of the army , with no obstacles thanks to its elevation . The rough mountain zone over the railroad prevents any infantry incursion between San Francisco and La Encañada , so the Chilean camp over the double hill doesn ’ t fear of being attacked from its rearguard . The station , the wind generators and the buildings of the mining company of Dolores are in the centre of the defence dispositive , since the Tres Clavos hill , although less elevated than San Francisco hill , covers it with four cannons , while 400 cavalry men under Soto Aguilar are as a reserve at west of La Encañada . The San Bartolo hill is defended by the 3rd Line Regiment , on the Chilean right wing . Peruvian battle plan and disposition . Buendía ’ s plan consists on breaking the Chilean defence at Dolores , seizing the water wells and cutting the enemy ’ s escape route . He would direct the offensive over Dolores with his right wing , while Cáceres and Suárez would onset the southwest face of San Francisco hill with three divisions . On the left wing , the Bolivians under Pedro Villamil would attack the north - western edge of the hill , turning right to join at La Encañada with Buendía , who wants to engulf the Chilean positions to take possession of Dolores . A little later , the Allied command knows that Daza has retreated to Tacna from Camarones . General Buendía divided his 9 , 000 troops in three columns . In this plan , Buendía counted on Hilarión Daza ' s Bolivian troops , but the latter decided to return to Arica after a long and extenuating march . The three columns were placed under the command of Belisario Suárez , Andrés Cáceres and Buendía himself . Suárez ' column was formed by the Villamil , Bolognesi and Velarde divisions . These units were composed of the Cazadores de Cuzco Nº5 , Cazadores de la Guardia Nº7 , Ayacucho , Guardia de Arequipa , Aroma , Vengadores , Victoria and Colquechaca battalions . Buendía had under his command the Villegas , Bustamante and Davila divisions , formed by the Ayacucho Nº3 , Provisional de Lima Nº3 , Cerro de Pasco , Puno Nº6 , Lima Nº8 , Illimani , Olañeta , Paucarpata , Dalance battalions , besides two cavalry squadrons and a six cannon battery . The battle . At 1 pm , the Chilean command has established its positions . The Chilean army counts now with 6 , 500 men and 34 cannons , thanks to Castro and Velázquez which joined in time and set between San Bartolo and Tres Clavos hills , behind the train station and the railroad in a way that could limit the access to Dolores from the plain . The Atacama and Coquimbo battalions reinforce the position at San Francisco . Buendía , notified of these reinforcements doesn ’ t want to wait the next day and gives the order to attack immediately . The units get ready to fight but after Suárez claims for delaying the attack , Buendía agrees again and issues a countermand , making his men to return to previous positions . All this movement confuses the Chileans , so when Salvo sees the incoming scout mission sent earlier , fires a warning shot over them . Some units from Cáceres and Suárez divisions rush to aid their companions , believing this is the battle signal ; and assault Salvo ’ s position in disarray . Under Gen . Villegas , the Illimani , Olañeta , Zepita and Ayacucho battalions impelled over the enemy , and Col . Lavadenz with the Dalance Battalion manages to reach the bottom hillside entering into artillery dead angle , where is reinforced by the Lima and Puno battalions . From here , Lavadenz climbs the slope and reaches the artillerymen , which barely contain the assault with their bayonets and the butts of their rifles . Coming in Salvo ’ s aid , half of the Atacama Battalion along with a company of the Coquimbo Battalion reject the Allies and kept guarding the cannons , palliating the lack of protection and checked another effort on the hill by a reinforced column . Meanwhile , Buendía has advanced over Dolores describing a semicircle to take the emplacement at Tres Clavos , only to be overwhelmed by Castro and Velázquez cross fire , being stopped as his units begin to dissolve . Back on the centre of the battle , the refolding units attack Salvo ’ s position again with no support at all . When the assault is resumed , the Allied reserve and artillery fire without abandoning their position , shooting their own companions from behind and decimating the troops massed at the bottom of the hill slope and at its bottom . Hence , the entire Allied left wing is forced to fall back without achieving its objective . Right after this , the Coquimbo and Atacama battalions counterattack emerging from their stronghold , destroying some companies of the Olañeta and Illimani battalions and bayoneting off the Allies from the hill definitively . The three Allied colonels on the second line disband to Porvenir , and the Allied cavalry flees from the battlefield without covering the general retreat . In less than an hour , the Allied army disarticulates and retreats , abandoning the headquarters , the mules and supplies . The Chileans didn ’ t chase the enemy , waiting for a second massive attack . Aftermath . The Chileans lost 208 men between dead and wounded . The Allies had 296 casualties , plus over 3 . 000 missing troops . This defeat was a very rough blow for the Peruvian Army Southern Command . The remaining troops marched to Tarapacá . References . < div class = " references - small " >