The Abandonment of the Jews The Abandonment of the Jews : America and the Holocaust 1941 – 1945 , published in 1984 , is an influential book by David S . Wyman , former Josiah DuBois professor of history at the University of Massachusetts Amherst . Wyman is currently the chairman of the David S . Wyman Institute for Holocaust Studies . " The Abandonment of the Jews " has been well received by most ( though not all — see below ) historians , and has won numerous prizes and widespread recognition , including " the National Jewish Book Award , the Anisfield - Wolf Award , the Present Tense Literary Award , the Stuart Bernath Prize from the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations , and the Theodore Saloutos Award of the Immigration History Society , and was nominated for the National Book Critics Circle Award . " Wyman ' s Argument . In response to Nazi determination and concerted action to remove Jews from Europe — by any means necessary — the non - Axis world closed many possibilities for immigration to other countries . For example , legal immigration to the refuge in Palestine — an area that had been assigned by the League of Nations as a Jewish Homeland for Jews who were not safe in their original countries — was severely limited by the British in 1939 , and many nations simply refused to allow European Jews entry to their countries . As Nazi Germany gained power and inherited larger Jewish populations in conquered territories ( e . g . Poland ) the policies in most nations were either to completely eliminate the Jewish presence ( in the case of Axis countries ) or to predominantly discourage Jewish immigration ( in the case of non - Axis countries . ) The closing of these immigration possibilities in America is covered by Wyman in his 1968 book " Paper Walls : America and the Refugee Crisis , 1938 - 1941 " . Wyman continues to document this aspect of World War II history in " The Abandonment of the Jews " , which covers the period of 1941 - 1945 , when America and the Allies fought against Germany and the Final Solution Holocaust progressed to its most lethal stages . Wyman summarizes his principal findings in the Preface ( presented below in edited precis ) : " The Abandonment of the Jews " argues that American ( and British ) political leaders during the Holocaust , including President Roosevelt , turned down proposals that could have saved hundreds of thousands of European Jews from death in German concentration camp s . Wyman documents , for example , how Roosevelt repeatedly refused asylum to Jewish refugees and failed to order the bombing of railway lines leading to Auschwitz In the same time , most Jewish leaders in America and in Palestine did little to pressure these governments to change their policy . Some American newspapers , including the New York Times , are said to have under - reported or buried reports off their front pages , and not just for reasons of anti - Semitism , as the Times was owned by Jews , who may have wanted to not appear as Jewish advocates in their coverage . Wyman examines the documents suggesting that the U . S . and British governments turned down numerous proposals to accept European Jews . The issue was raised at a White House conference on March 27 , 1943 of top American and British wartime leaders , including President Roosevelt , U . S . Secretary of State Cordell Hull , British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden , presidential advisor Harry Hopkins , and the British Ambassador to Washington , Lord Halifax . Hull raised the question of having the Allies offer to accept 60 , 000 to 70 , 000 Jews from Bulgaria , a German ally . Eden reportedly objected , citing the risk that Hitler may take up similar offers for the Jews of Germany and Poland , and said " . . . and there simply are not enough ships and means of transportation to handle them . " Wyman writes that , because of a combination of nativism , anti - Semitism and an unwillingness to act on any proposal not of direct strategic value , thousands and possibly million of Jews died who might otherwise have been saved . He documents numerous cases where the Allies found resources ( such as shipping ) to give air and rescue to tens of thousands of non - Jewish refugees , while at the same time denying similar aid or rescue efforts for Jews . For instance , he documents how the British turned back endangered Jews from Mandatory Palestine , while at the same time they generously took between 9 , 000 and 12 , 000 non - Jewish Greek and 1 , 800 non - Jewish Polish refugees into Palestine . He cites many cases where US and British authorities turned down offers by Nazis to exchange Jews for resources , often with documentation on how the Allies appeared to fear that there would be so many Jews that it could strain the Allies ' war effort , He also documents the efforts of the US State Dept . to deny asylum to endangered Jews , and the failure of the American Jewish establishment to put sufficient pressure on US politicians ( e . g . President Roosevelt ) to engage in effective rescue operations . Breckinridge Long , one of the four assistant secretaries of state , and a clique of other State Department executives , figure prominently in many episodes in this history . Wyman documents how Long and his colleagues repeatedly obstructed measures that would have effectively rescued Jews . Wyman cites the several organizations as comparatively effective in rescue efforts , particularly some Orthodox Jewish organizations , the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee , and the Revisionist Zionist faction called the ' Bergsonites , ' which took their name from their leader , the so - called ' Peter H . Bergson , ' which was actually the English nom - de - guerre of Hillel Kook , a Palestinian Jew associated with the radical armed underground group Irgun Zvai Leumi . Bergson came to the United States to form the ' American Friends of a Jewish Palestine , ' the ' Committee for a Jewish Army , ' and other efforts to rescue European Jewry . Wyman is particularly critical of the mainstream American Jewish and Zionist leadership , who were ineffective in their rescue efforts and often prioritized the fight against American anti - Semitism and strengthening the Zionist position for a post - war Jewish commonwealth in Palestine ( Israel ) above the priority to rescue Jews from Nazi persecution . In the chapter on ' Responsibility ' Wyman has a sub - section titled ' What Might Have Been Done ' in which he acknowledges that the possibilities for rescue were " narrowed by the Nazis ' determination to wipe out the Jews " and that " War conditions themselves made rescue difficult . . . most likely it would not have been possible to rescue millions . " He contends , however , that " without impeding the war effort , additional tens of thousands - - probably hundreds of thousands - - could have been saved . " He then presents a selection of twelve programs that were proposed ( among others ) during the Holocaust that could have been effective if only they had been tried . His selection included ( in edited precis ) : ( 1 ) Most important , the War Refugee Board should have been established in 1942 . And it should have received adequate government funding and much broader powers . < br > ( 2 ) The U . S . government , working through neutral governments or the Vatican , could have pressed Germany to release the Jews . . . < br > ( 3 ) The United States could have applied constant pressure on Axis satellites to release their Jews . . . < br > ( 4 ) . . . Strong pressure needed to be applied to neutral countries near the Axis . . . to take Jews in . . . havens of refuge outside of Europe were essential . . . Thus the routes would have remained open and a continuing flow of refugees could have left Axis territory . < br > ( 5 ) Locating enough outside havens . . . presented difficulties . . . a camp existence . . . was still preferable to . . . death . . . other countries used American stinginess as an excuse for not accepting Jews . For instance , in Jerusalem on his 1942 trip around the world , Wendell Wilkie confronted the British leadership with the need to admit large numbers of Jews into Palestine . The British High Commissioner replied that since the United States was not taking Jews in even up to the quota limits , Americans were hardly in a position to criticize . < br > ( 6 ) Shipping was needed to transport Jews from neutral countries to outside havens . . . Early in 1943 the United States turned its back on a Romanian proposal to release 70 , 000 Jews . It was a pivotal failure . . . < br > ( 7 ) A campaign to stimulate and assist escape would have led to a sizable outflow of Jews . . . < br > ( 8 ) Much larger amounts of money should have been transferred to Europe . . . facilitating escapes , . . . hiding Jews . . . . supplying food . . . strengthening Jewish undergrounds , and . . . non - Jewish forces . < br > ( 9 ) Much more effort should have gone into finding ways to send in food and medical supplies . . . < br > ( 10 ) . . . the United States could have applied much more pressure . . . on neutral governments , the Vatican , and the International Red Cross to induce them to take earlier and more vigorous action . . . < br > ( 11 ) Some military assistance was possible . . . < br > ( 12 ) Much more publicity about the extermination of the Jews should have been disseminated throughout Europe . . . Counter - arguments . The overwhelming majority of professional historians who specialize in World War II and / or the Holocaust have generally endorsed , supported or have been influenced by Wyman ' s arguments . The primary criticisms of " The Abandonment of the Jews " target Wyman ' s criticisms of President Roosevelt , defend the actions of establishment Jewish organizations , and / or challenge his contention that the Allies could have effectively mitigated the slaughter of Jews by bombing the Auschwitz extermination facilities , a topic often referred to as the Auschwitz bombing debate . Dr James H . Kitchens III , an Archivist of the United States Air Force Historical Research Center , has composed the strongest academic arguments in defense of the Allied forces ' failure to attempt disrupting the systematic extermination of Jews by bombing the Auschwitz facilities . Kitchens ' two principal points are 1 ) the Allies did not have sufficiently detailed intelligence about the location of these facilities to reasonably target them , and 2 ) the logistics of bombing would have been too difficult to reasonably expect a successful result . Richard Levy is one of the few historians who support Kitchens ' position . Kitchens ' work has been strongly criticized and contested by many other historians , however . It has been pointed out 1 ) there were opportunities for the Allies to acquire sufficient military intelligence on potential Auschwitz targets , though it appears that no concerted effort was made gather such information . and 2 ) there were many successful Allied bombing missions which were just as difficult and which ware supported by comparably incomplete intelligence . The notion that the Auschwitz mission would have been particularly difficult is strongly challenged , and the literature includes speculations that Kitchens may have been influenced by a natural desire to defend the reputation of his employer , the US Air Force . There are very few historians who disagree with Wyman ' s position that more could have been done by the Allies and Neutrals to rescue endangered European Jews . One rare exception is William D . Rubinstein , whose " The Myth of Rescue : Why the Democracies Could Not Have Saved More Jews from the Nazis " is explicitly a critical response to " The Abandonment of the Jews " and a host of other works that support Wyman ' s positions . Rubinstein argues that the Western powers had a creditable record of accepting immigrants , that Palestine was not a potential refuge , and that effective allied action against the Extermination Camps was not possible . Even Wyman ' s most strident critics , however , acknowledge that many of Wyman ' s contentions are valid . Rubinstein , for instance , appears to largely agree with Wyman ( and many other historians ) that the influence of Palestinian Arab political leadership , led by Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin al - Husseini , and the 1936 – 1939 Arab revolt in Palestine were factors in causing the British government to abandon the League of Nations ' British Mandate for Palestine ( legal instrument ) , which was primarily a mandate to establish a Homeland for the Jewish people that would be available to facilitate rescue of endangered Jews in their time of need . Both Wyman and his critics agree that Britain ' s abandonment of their mandatory responsibilities was embodied in the White Paper of 1939 which reduced Jewish immigration to Palestine to a yearly quota of only 10 , 000 , with a maximum of 75 , 000 immigrants , and after a five - year period relegated all Jewish immigration to the approval of the Palestinian Arab polity . The devastating consequences to the Jews of Europe during the Holocaust of this British abandonment of their internationally - recognized Mandate is generally recognized by Wyman ' s critics , though Wyman details the detrimental effects in greater detail than many of his detractors . For instance , the differences of opinion between Rubinstein and Wyman on this issue rests principally on Rubinstein ' s argument that the Zionist Jews in Palestine ( e . g . Ben Gurion ) are primarily to blame for not giving refuge to European Jews in Palestine , rather than putting the responsibility on British policy - makers or the Palestinian Arabs who violently opposed such rescue efforts . Some historians have taken Rubinstein and other Wyman critics to task for such assertions , and have directly attacked these criticisms of Wyman ' s positions as unscholarly " polemic . " Examples where Jews were rescued from the Axis countries . Many historians , including Dr . David Kranzler , who specialized in documenting those who rescued Jews , note that large number of Jews were saved and argue that even more could have been saved , often using the same historical examples that are covered by Wyman . In most cases the rescue efforts were not initiated by the Allied governments nor by institution like the Vatican nor the Red Cross . Most successful rescue operations were the result of work by non - establishment Jewish organizations and non - Jews who largely acted outside their own umbrella groups . Examples include : References . also