Submarine incident off Kildin Island The Submarine Incident off Kildin Island was a collision between the US Navy nuclear submarine and the Russian Navy nuclear submarine B - 276 " Kostroma " near the Russia n naval base of Severomorsk , on 11 February 1992 . The incident took place when the US unit was engaged in a covert mission , apparently aimed at intercepting Russian military communications . Although a majority of sources claim that the American submarine was trailing her Russian counterpart , some authors believe that neither the " Kostroma " nor the " Baton Rouge " were able to locate each other before the collision . Background . Right after the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union , uncertainty prevailed among the US intelligence community about the attitude of the former Soviet forces , especially those strategic assets that remained under Russian control . The US government tasked the US Navy to continue to keep a close watch on the main bases of Russian nuclear submarines to monitor developments . During the cold war , this kind of submarine surveillance was known as " Operation Holy Stone " ; submariners nicknamed the program " Operation Pinnacle " or " Bollard " . Author Jeffrey T . Richelson maintains that " Holy Stone " continued unabated , and that the 1992 incident was part of the operation . This intelligence gathering included the tapping of Soviet submarine communication cables , the recording of the pattern of noises from Soviet submarines , and the observation of submarine - launched ballistic missile tests . Collision . Blind encounter . The ramming occurred at 8 : 16 pm local time , at a point slightly over 12 miles from the shoreline , in waters the United States regarded as international , and by Russia as five miles inside the Russian territorial sea ( due to the Russian use of a straight baseline . ) The mission of " Baton Rouge " off Severomorsk was reportedly the recovery or delivery of intelligence - monitoring devices on the seabed . The American press claimed that the submarine was checking wireless traffic between Russian bases , but the Russian counterpart asserted that the two boats were engaged in a ‘ cat - and - mouse game ’ , an opinion supported also by a number of Western sources . According to naval analyst Eugene Miasnikov , the amount of antisubmarine surveillance deployed by the Russians along their shores makes the first possibility implausible . The second argument also seems to be weak , he asserts , given the circumstances , and the collision itself seems to have happened by chance . The breaking waves and the shallow waters of that area of the Barents sea prevented early detection of the other by either submarine , which at the time of the incident were using only their passive sonar s , by creating too much ‘ noise ’ around . Miasnikov maintains that the submarines of the " Los Angeles " class are unable to detect acoustic signals from targets located within a cone of 60 degree astern , thus the most probable scenario was that " Kostroma " approached " Baton Rouge " from behind . Indeed , the collision took place when the " Kostroma " was surfacing , hitting the US submarine underneath on her aft section . The Sierra class sonar is also ‘ deaf ’ to the aft direction ; her usual pattern of acoustic search is moving along a loop course . The incident , however , implied that Russian attack submarines are capable of avoiding passive acoustic detection , at least under certain conditions . Damage . Both submarines sustained damage , but there were no casualties reported . Russian reports and American aerial surveillance agree that the " Kostroma " s sail was dented on its front section . Russian navy sources reportedly found pieces of composite material from " Baton Rouge " s anti - sonar tiles . The US Navy claimed that besides some scratches , dents , and two minor cuts on her port ballast tank , the " Baton Rouge " didn ’ t suffer major damage , but it was necessarily serious in any case , as any rupture on the single hull of " Baton Rouge " would have compromised her pressure resistance . The deactivation of " Baton Rouge " was announced on 17 September 1993 , although some sources claim that the American submarine had been already taken out of service less than a year after the incident , in January 1993 . According to Gregory Stitz , curator of Arkansas Inland Maritime Museum , and some European sources the costs of repairing the damaged pressure hull , along with a programmed refueling , were well beyond the planned budget ; therefore the US Navy chose to decommission the submarine . Russian naval officers alleged that the US submarine became a constructive total loss right after the collision . As for " Kostroma " , it was laid up on 28 March 1992 , and by 29 June had been fully repaired at Nerpa shipyards in Snezhnogorsk . The Russian submarine was temporarily renamed " Krab " , before recovering her original name on November 1996 . After a huge overhaul , again at Nerpa , she returned to service in 2005 . Political consequences . The incident produced intense embarrassment in Washington . Russian complained via diplomatic channels , and the Pentagon quickly acknowledged that a collision had happened , contrary to the official policy until then . A meeting between Secretary of State James Baker and Russian president Boris Yeltsin was arranged immediately . The Russian navy accused the United States of continuing intelligence operations around Russia ' s home waters , despite the end of the cold war . All this prompted the US Navy to stop some specific submarine activities off Russian bases , such as tapping underwater cables or intercepting wireless communications . This measure , however , did not prevent a later incident in March 1993 , when the Sturgeon - class submarine collided with a Delta class submarine , K - 407 " Novomoskovsk " off Kola peninsula .