Cognitive traps for intelligence analysis Intelligence analysis is plagued by many of the cognitive traps also encountered in other disciplines . The first systematic study of the specific pitfalls lying between an intelligence analyst and clear thinking was carried out by Dick Heuer . According to Heuer , these traps may be rooted either in the analyst ' s organizational culture or his or her own personality . Types . The most common personality trap , known as " mirror - imaging " is the analysts ' assumption that the people being studied think like the analysts themselves . An important variation is to confuse actual subjects with one ' s information or images about them , as the sort of apple one eats and the ideas and issues it may raise . It poses a dilemma for the scientific method in general , since science uses information and theory to represent complex natural systems as if theoretical constructs might be in control of indefinable natural processes . An inability to distinguish subjects from what one is thinking about them is also studied under the subject of functional fixedness , first studied in Gestalt psychology and in relation to the subject - object problem . Experienced analysts may recognize that they have fallen prey to mirror - imaging if they discover that they are unwilling to examine variants of what they consider most reasonable in light of their personal frame of reference . Less - perceptive analysts affected by this trap may regard legitimate objections as a personal attack , rather than looking beyond ego to the merits of the question . Peer review ( especially by people from a different background ) can be a wise safeguard . Organizational culture can also create traps which render individual analysts unwilling to challenge acknowledged experts in the group . Another trap , " target fixation " , has an analogy in aviation : it occurs when pilots become so intent on delivering their ordnance that they lose sight of the big picture and crash into the target . This is a more basic human tendency than many realize . Analysts may fixate on one hypothesis , looking only at evidence that is consistent with their preconceptions and ignoring other relevant views . The desire for rapid closure is another form of idea fixation . " Familiarity with terrorist methods , repeated attacks against U . S . facilities overseas , combined with indications that the continental United States was at the top of the terrorist target list might have alerted us that we were in peril of a significant attack . And yet , for reasons those who study intelligence failure will find familiar , 9 / 11 fits very much into the norm of surprise caused by a breakdown of intelligence warning . " The breakdown happened , in part , because there was poor information - sharing among analysts ( in different FBI offices , for example ) . At a conceptual level , US intelligence knew that al - Qaida actions almost always involve multiple , near - simultaneous attacks ; however , the FBI did not assimilate piecemeal information on oddly behaving foreign flight - training students into this context . On the day of the hijackings ( under tremendous time pressure ) , no analyst associated the multiple hijackings with the multiple - attack signature of al - Qaeda . The failure to conceive that a major attack could occur within the US left the country unprepared . For example , irregularities detected by the Federal Aviation Administration and North American Air Defense Command did not flow into a center where analysts could consolidate this information and ( ideally ) collate it with earlier reports of odd behavior among certain pilot trainees , or the possibility of hijacked airliners being used as weapons . Inappropriate analogies are yet another cognitive trap . Though analogies may be extremely useful they can become dangerous when forced , or when they are based on assumptions of cultural or contextual equivalence . Avoiding such analogies is difficult when analysts are merely unconscious of differences between their own context and that of others ; it becomes extremely difficult when they are unaware that important knowledge is missing . Difficulties associated with admitting one ' s ignorance are an additional barrier to avoiding such traps . Such ignorance can take the form of insufficient study : a lack of factual information or understanding ; an inability to mesh new facts with old ; or a simple denial of conflicting facts . Organizational culture . Even extremely creative thinkers may find it difficult to gain support within their organization . Often more concerned with appearances , managers may suppress conflict born of creativity in favor of the status quo . A special case of stereotyping is stovepiping , whereby a group heavily invested in a particular collection technology ignores valid information from other sources ( " functional specialization " ) . It was a Soviet tendency to value HUMINT ( " HUMan INTelligence " ) , gathered from espionage , above all other sources ; the Soviet OSINT was forced to go outside the state intelligence organization in developing the USA ( later USA - Canada ) Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences . Another specialization problem may come as a result of security compartmentalization . An analytic team with unique access to a source may overemphasize that source ' s significance . This can be a major problem with long - term HUMINT relationships , in which partners develop personal bonds . Groups ( like individual analysts ) can also reject evidence which contradicts prior conclusions . When this happens it is often difficult to assess whether the inclusion of certain analysts in the group was the thoughtful application of deliberately contrarian " red teams " , or the politicized insertion of ideologues to militate for a certain policy . Monopolization of the information flow ( as caused by the latter ) has also been termed " stovepiping " , by analogy with intelligence - collection disciplines . The " other culture " . There are many levels at which one can misunderstand another culture , be it that of an organization or a country . One frequently encountered trap is the " rational - actor hypothesis " , which ascribes rational behavior to the other side — according to a definition of rationality from one ' s own culture . The social anthropologist Edward T . Hall illustrated one such conflict with an example from the American Southwest . " Anglo " drivers became infuriated when " Hispanic " traffic police would cite them for going one mile an hour over the speed limit , although a Hispanic judge would later dismiss the charge . " Hispanic " drivers , on the other hand , were convinced that " Anglo " judges were unfair because they would not dismiss charges due to extenuating circumstances . Both cultures were rational with regard to law enforcement and the adjudication of charges ; indeed , both believed that one of the two had to be flexible and the other had to be formal . However , in the Anglo culture it was the police who had discretion with regard to issuing speeding tickets , while the court was expected to stay within the letter of the law . In the Hispanic culture the police were expected to be strict , but the courts would balance the situation . There was a fundamental misunderstanding ; both sides were ethnocentric , and both incorrectly assumed the other culture was a mirror image of itself . In this example denial of rationality was the result in both cultures , yet each was acting rationally within its own value set . In a subsequent interview , Hall spoke widely about intercultural communication . He summed up years of study with the statement , " I spent years trying to figure out how to select people to go overseas . This is the secret . You have to know how to make a friend . And that is it ! " To make a friend , one has to understand the culture of the potential friend , one ' s own culture , and how things which are rational in one may not translate to the other . Key questions are : Hall asserted : " Proportionality bias " assumes that small things in one culture are small in every culture . In reality , cultures prioritize differently . In Western ( especially northern European ) culture , time schedules are important ; being late can be a major discourtesy . Waiting one ' s turn is the cultural norm , and failing to stand in line is a cultural failing . " Honor killing " seems bizarre in some cultures , but is an accepted part of others . Even within a culture , however , individuals remain individual . " Presumption of unitary action by organizations " is another trap . In Japanese culture the lines of authority are very clear , but the senior individual will also seek consensus . American negotiators may push for quick decisions , but the Japanese need to build consensus first ; once it exists , they may execute faster than Americans . The " other side " is different . The analyst ' s country ( or organization ) is not identical to that of their opponent . One error is to mirror - image the opposition , assuming it will act the same as your country and culture would under the same circumstances . " It seemed inconceivable to the U . S . planners in 1941 that the Japanese would be so foolish to attack a power whose resources so exceeded those of Japan , thus virtually guaranteeing defeat " . In like manner , no analyst in US Navy force protection conceived of an Arleigh Burke class destroyer destroyer such as the being attacked with a small suicide boat — a boat much like those the Japanese planned to use extensively against invasion forces during World War II . The " other side " makes different technological assumptions . An opponent ' s cultural framework affects its approach to technology . This complicates the task of one ' s own analysts in assessing the opponent ' s resources , how they may be used and defining intelligence targets accordingly . Mirror - imaging — committing to a set of common assumptions rather than challenging those assumptions — has figured in numerous intelligence failures . In the Pacific Theater of World War II , the Japanese seemed to believe that their language was so complex that even if their cryptosystems such as PURPLE were broken , outsiders would not really understand the content . That was not strictly true , but it was sufficiently so that there were cases where even the intended recipients did not clearly understand the writer ' s intent . On the other side , the US Navy assumed that ships anchored in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor were safe from torpedo attack , even though the British had demonstrated the feasibility of shallow - water torpedo attacks in the 1940 Battle of Taranto . Even if intelligence services had credited the 9 / 11 conspirators with the organizational capacity necessary to hijack four airliners simultaneously , no one would have suspected that the hijackers ' weapon of choice would be the box - cutter . Likewise , the US Navy underestimated the danger of suicide boats in harbor , and set rules of engagement that allowed an unidentified boat to sail into the USS " Cole " without being warned off or taken under fire . An Arleigh Burke class destroyer is one of the most powerful warships ever built , yet US security policies did not protect the docked USS " Cole " . The " other side " does not make decisions as you do . Mirror - imaging can be a major problem for policymakers , as well as analysts . During the Vietnam War , Johnson and McNamara assumed that Ho Chi Minh would react to situations in the same manner as they themselves . Similarly , in the run - up to the Gulf War , there was a serious misapprehension — independent of politically motivated intelligence manipulation — that Saddam Hussein would view the situation " vis - à - vis " Kuwait as the State Department and White House viewed it . Opposing countries are not monolithic , even within their governments . There can be bureaucratic competition , which becomes associated with different ideas . Some dictators ( such as Hitler and Stalin ) were known for creating internal dissension , so that only the leader was in complete control . A current issue , which analysts understand but politicians may not ( or may want to exploit by playing on domestic fears ) , is the actual political and power structure of Iran ; one must not equate the power of Iran ' s president with that of the president of the United States . Opponents are not always rational . They may have a greater risk tolerance than one ' s own country . Maintaining the illusion of a WMD threat appears to have been one of Saddam Hussein ' s survival strategies . Returning again to the Iranian example , an apparently irrational statement from President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would not carry the weight of a similar statement by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei . Analysts sometimes assume that the opponent is all - wise and knows all of your side ' s weaknesses . Despite this danger , opponents are unlikely to act according to one ' s best - case scenario ; they may take the worst - case approach , to which one is most vulnerable . The " other side " may be trying to confuse you . The analysts ' job is to form hypotheses ; however , they should also be prepared to reexamine them repeatedly in light of new information instead of searching for evidence buttressing one favored theory . They must remember that the enemy may be deliberately deceiving them with information which seems plausible " to the enemy " . Donald Bacon observed that " the most successful deception stories were apparently as reasonable as the truth . Allied strategic deception , as well as Soviet deception in support of the operations at Stalingrad , Kursk , and the 1944 summer offensive , all exploited German leadership ’ s preexisting beliefs and were , therefore , incredibly effective . " Theories that Hitler thought implausible were not accepted . Western deception staffs alternated " ambiguous " and " misleading " deceptions ; the former intended simply to confuse analysts , and the latter to make one false alternative especially likely . Of all modern militaries , the Russians treat strategic deception ( or , in their word , " maskirovka " ; this goes beyond our phrase to include deception , operational security and concealment ) as an integral part of all planning . The highest levels of command are involved . Bacon wrote further that The counterattack by the Steppe Front stunned the Germans . The opponent may try to overload one ' s analytical capabilities as a gambit for those preparing the intelligence budget , and for those agencies where the fast track to promotion is in data collection ; one ' s own side may produce so much raw data that the analyst is overwhelmed , even without enemy assistance .