Aerial reconnaissance in World War II A transformational growth in air reconnaissance occurred in the years 1939 - 45 , especially in Britain and then in the United States . It was an expansion determined mostly by trial and error , represented mostly by new tactics , new procedures , and new technology , though rarely by specialized aircraft types . The mission type branched out into many sub - types , including new electronic forms of reconnaissance . In sharp contrast with the case during the pre - war years , by 1945 air reconnaissance was widely recognized as a vital , indispensable component of air power . Pre - war situation . In the interwar years , reconnaissance languished as a mission type and tended to be overshadowed by routine aerial mapping . This was despite the growth ( in the United States and Britain ) of a doctrine of strategic bombardment as the decisive weapon of war . Experience would soon prove that bombing was completely ineffective unless accompanied by intensive aerial reconnaissance . In the 1930s , gradual technical progress in the leading air nations led to advances particularly in photogrammetry and cartography , but failed to be translated into a capable operational reconnaissance capability . The various parties went into the new war with mostly the same cameras and procedures they had used when exiting the last one . Stereoscopic imaging using overlapping exposures was refined and standardized for mapping . Color photography from the air was introduced in 1935 in the United States , but did not find widespread application . Experiments with flash bomb photography at night were carried out pre - war , but did not lead to an operational capability until later in the war . In the United States , apart from the case of small army - cooperation observation planes , the emphasis was almost completely on aerial mapping conducted by long - range bombers . In Germany , the Army Chief , Werner Freiherr von Fritsch , noted that in the next war , whoever had the best air reconnaissance would win – and thereby won himself a perfunctory mention in almost all subsequent works on the topic . Yet in all countries , initial doctrines were focused on battlefield observation , which assumed a relatively static front , as it had been in the previous war . Strategic reconnaissance in its embryonic form began with the flights carried out over Germany by Australian businessman Sidney Cotton just before the outbreak of war in Europe . On behalf of first French and then British intelligence , Cotton outfitted civilian Lockheed Electras with hidden cameras and was able to snap useful footage during business trips . Cotton pioneered ( for the British ) the trimetrogon mount and the important innovation of heated cameras , fogging being the bane of high - altitude photography . However , a multi - lens trimetrogon had been used in the 1919 U . S . Bagley mapping camera , and Germany had heated optics during the Great War . Early Western reconnaissance . Sidney Cotton ’ s work found only grudging approval with the Royal Air Force , but eventually his work was incorporated into 1 Photographic Development Unit ( PDU ) at RAF Heston and then RAF Benson , a unit from which most later British air reconnaissance developed . ( It soon was renamed 1 PRU , R for reconnaissance . ) Key to the RAF ’ s intellectual ascendancy in reconnaissance was the establishment of the Central Interpretation Unit ( CIU ) at RAF Medmenham . Priority tasks of this unit were to prepare target folders and to chart Axis air defenses . In short order , it began to evaluate the effectiveness of bombing . See Photo interpretation . At first Britain used a handful of hastily modified Spitfire s ( PR 1 ) and some medium twins ( Bristol Blenheim s ) for photographic reconnaissance , supplemented by in - action footage shot from regular bombing aircraft . At this time the RAF still used the vintage F8 and F24 cameras , later adding the larger F52 . The F24 became especially useful in night photography . Thanks to bomb damage assessment ( BDA ) the complete failure of precision daylight bombing soon became apparent , the vast majority of bombers not even coming close to their targets . This resulted in heavier demands on reconnaissance for before - and - after photography ; and the documented poor results ( as well as heavy losses ) led to a shift to night - time area bombing . Britain was far behind Germany in optics , and at one time 1 PRU took two Zeiss Ikon cameras with 60 cm lenses from a lost Ju - 88 and used them for high - altitude photography . By 1941 , the RAF had a capable reconnaissance arm ( 1 PRU ) centered at RAF Benson , supported by a nascent infrastructure in interpretation and analysis . The Combined / Joint Intelligence Committee ( CIC ) ensured centralized tasking for critical objectives . The RAF led this field by far , and in 1941 several American observers from both the U . S . Army Air Corps ( USAAC ) and the U . S . Navy were sent to England to investigate RAF reconnaissance methods . Unlike the case in the previous war , French reconnaissance was now comparatively ineffective on all levels , and entirely lacked a strategic perspective . Most aircraft allocated to the mission type were obsolete . Large numbers of open - cockpit Mureaux 115 / 117 and light twin Potez 630 series were assigned to Army cooperation according to observation doctrines from the previous war . However , the new and scarce Bloch 174 twin distinguished itself by its high performance . Noted writer and reconnaissance pilot Antoine de Saint - Exupery flew this aircraft before the fall of France . German reconnaissance capabilities . Despite a considerable technological and numerical head start , Germany gradually neglected aerial reconnaissance , at least relative to Britain . The reason , grounded in history and geography , was that Germany had no strategic bombing doctrine and viewed air power as an auxiliary of land armies . Numerous Aufklaerungs ( up - clearing , i . e . reconnaissance ) units were established for marine and ground support purposes , but while this was effective in the tactical sense , the intellectual investment in interpretation , analysis , and strategic estimation lagged . From the German perspective , this was defensible considering that about 90 % of the action lay in large land - battles in the East , and an expensive long - range air capability would have been unlikely to effectively change the outcome . Leading up to the war , the United States developed an indigenous high - quality optics capability led by Bausch & Lomb of Rochester , N . Y . ; however this company had been allied to Germany ’ s Zeiss - Jena . Nonetheless , the American reconnaissance expert , then - captain George William Goddard , said that he much coveted German technical leadership , specifically as represented by Carl Zeiss Jena optical works , and he was pleased to briefly occupy that facility at the end of the war . But the German Air Force ( GAF ) , expecting a quick victory , did not build an integrated reconnaissance and interpretation capability as a core national security asset like the Anglo Allies did . Before 22 June 1941 , German reconnaissance was far predominant in frequency with many daily sorties throughout the region . Leading up to the invasion of France , concentration was on ports , forts , railways and airports , using mostly Do - 17 Ps and He - 111 Hs , already vulnerable types , and rapid conversion to Ju - 88 D , later - H followed . Losses were on the order of 5 - 10 % . A regular daily weather reconnaissance was kept up over the North Sea . Maritime reconnaissance from France and Norway reached well west of Ireland to the coast of Greenland using Focke Wulf Fw - 200 and various multi - engine seaplanes . Germany used the LZ - 130 Graf Zeppelin airship for sigint sorties targeting RAF radar stations in 1939 . German units were divided into Fernaufklaerer ( long - distance ) , Nahaufklaerer ( tactical , subordinate to Army command ) , Nachtaufklaerer ( night photography ) , and maritime and special units . Command structure and unit designations changed incessantly . Each staffel ( squadron , roughly ) had a Bildgruppe of interpreters , who would telephone urgent intelligence to nearby headquarters . Film and analyses would go to Fliegerkorps ( higher - level ) staff later ; eventually top - level staff at Oberkommando der Wehrmacht ( OKW ) headquarters at Zossen near Berlin would receive the products for filing and possibly strategic integration . Germany emphasized tactical reconnaissance and invested considerably in both modified aircraft – primarily Ju - 88 s and Ju - 188s – and in dedicated types such as the asymmetric Blohm & Voss BV 141 ( 20 built ) and the twin - boom Fw - 189 Uhu ( nearly 900 produced ) . This Nahaufklaerung was primarily successful on the Eastern Front where immediate results were desired , and these units were directly under Army field command . For special demanding tasks , a high - altitude photographic aircraft , the pressurized Ju - 86 P , was available in very small numbers , but it could not survive after 1943 ; the pressurized Ju - 388 tried to fill the vacancy , reaching 45 , 000 feet . Fighters , often with dual oblique cameras in the rear fuselage , were pressed into service for reconnaissance where their speed was necessary , and performed well in this role . Still , German reconnaissance against well - defended England was relatively ineffective . Prior to Operation Barbarossa , the German attack on the USSR , the German Air Force did carry out an extensive pre - strike aerial observation of European Russia . This was possible partly because Soviet air opposition was weak , and because of the Soviet leadership ’ s conviction that Germany would not attack . The GAF maintained air superiority in the East until late in the war , but simply could not bring enough resources to bear for air power to be decisive . Axis partners Italy and Japan successfully performed long - distance reconnaissance prior to meeting stiffening opposition in 1942 . Japanese aircraft reconnoitered the Philippines prior to 7 December 1941 . Other countries . The Soviet Union had no advanced reconnaissance resources , but emphasized visual observation and reporting over the battle space . Open - cockpit biplanes such as the Po - 2 Mule were very useful for this , especially at night . The Soviets had virtually no interest in long - range air power or strategic reconnaissance , and had no advanced optics capabilities . However , they learned a lot about the discipline from the Americans when the U . S . Army Air Forces operated from three Ukrainian bases in 1944 ( Operation Frantic ) . This operation included a photo - reconnaissance detachment which shared all results with the USSR . At the same time , Americans learned that Soviet photoreconnaissance capabilities were embryonic . Japanese reconnaissance was characterized by institutional rivalry between the Army and the Navy . The latter standardized on the Yokosuka Suisei ( Judy ) and Nakajima C6N ( Myrt ) multi - seat aircraft . The Army , which encountered little air opposition in China , used a variety of aircraft types and cameras . Italy entered the war in 1940 with a very large number of obsolete observation aircraft , mostly open - cockpit biplanes assigned directly to Army commands . Initially , some strategic surveillance was carried out by three - engined bombers , and Italian aircraft ranged from Nigeria to Abyssinia to Bahrein ( one flew to Japan and back ) . Italian reconnaissance could not survive in contested airspace . Neutral countries seemingly remained in the World War I mindset of trench observation . While aerial photography was allocated to tactically inferior aircraft , and aerial mapping advanced considerably , there was no concept of strategic reconnaissance and little thought given to analysis and interpretation . Surprisingly , this was even the case in the United States , where the Air Corps had staked its future on the doctrine of strategic bombing . Up to 1940 , the USAAC ’ s interest in reconnaissance was centered in one small office at Wright Field , Ohio , headed by the controversial Captain George William Goddard . He was responsible for most of the technical advantages adopted by the USAAC during the early war years . The extensive O - series of aircraft , such as the Douglas O - 38 and its descendants , were typically low and slow and used for direct Army liaison , artillery spotting , and observation . The OA series of observation amphibians were mostly Army variants of better known Navy types , such as the PBY Catalina . These were in practice more utility aircraft than dedicated reconnaissance platforms . In December 1941 , complacency and inadequate leadership led to the failure to detect the Japanese task force north of Hawaii from the air . Also , the Americans labored under the handicap that much equipment was assigned to Britain as fast as it could be produced . The United States contribution . By 1941 , prompted by the British experience , Americans began to understand the need for a much expanded air reconnaissance concept . The F - series , which denoted photographic reconnaissance , was then led by the F - 3A , a modified A - 20 Havoc . Thanks in large part to the advocacy of the Director of Photographic Intelligence , the also very controversial Colonel Minton Kaye , a run of 100 Lockheed P - 38 s were set aside for modification to F - 4 standard , incorporating the trigonometric mount that both Kaye and Cotton had pioneered prior to the war . Despite the promising performance of the F - 4 , there were so many technical problems with the early versions that the model was largely rejected by its crews when it did reach combat zones . The RAF rejected the P - 38 , as well . The first U . S . operational reconnaissance experience was gained in the Australian theater . The top name to emerge was that of Colonel Karl Polifka , an extremely aggressive pilot who developed many of the tactics that would later become standard . Operating from Port Moresby to Rabaul , his F - 4 - equipped 8th PR squadron encountered serious problems reducing it at one time to one aircraft , but the valuable experience gained was shared by Polifka when he returned to the U . S . in 1943 . When the United States and Britain invaded French North Africa in November 1942 , the hastily improvised reconnaissance capability was quickly checked by reality . President Franklin D . Roosevelt ’ s son , Colonel Elliott Roosevelt , led the American reconnaissance assets and in February joined with RAF units in the multinational Northwest African Photographic Reconnaissance Wing ( NAPRW ) . At that point the Wing had found the F - 4 unsatisfactory , the F - 7 or B - 17 Fortress unable to survive over enemy territory , and the new British de Havilland Mosquito to be the most promising reconnaissance platform . British squadrons in the Mediterranean took over the slack left by the Americans . Numerous other technical and tactical problems virtually brought American reconnaissance to a halt ; but it rebounded swiftly , and by the time of the invasion of Sicily in July ( Operation Husky ) , a very credible joint capability existed , the NAPRW comprising South African , Free French , and New Zealand units as well as RAF and USAAC units . By that time , new F - 5 models of the Lightning were becoming available , and they were found to be far more reliable and capable . However , this period marked the beginning of a year - long struggle by the USAAF , led especially by Colonel Roosevelt , to acquire the Mosquito and to also develop a brand new reconnaissance aircraft – a quest that would result in the ill - fated and scandal - ridden Hughes F - 11 . The RAF continued to display leadership in the field , and now took on the role of on - the - job mentor to the Americans . Spitfires and Mosquitos were found to be the best reconnaissance platforms , as everyone now realized that speed , range , and altitude were essential to survival and good photographs . Second - line photographic aircraft ( such as Bostons , Blenheims , Marylands ) were relegated to less contested skies . The RAF turned Medmenham into the Allied Central Interpretation Unit ( ACIU ) , inviting the Americans to participate on a joint basis , and continued to spin off new squadrons with high - performance reconnaissance aircraft based both in the British Isles and in the Mediterranean . Other RAF units operated in the Far East , often with slightly less capable aircraft such as Hawker Hurricane s and B - 25 s . A very large fraction of RAF reconnaissance was consumed in tracking German capital ships . This endeavor even included stationing photo detachments at Vaenga on the Kola Peninsula . When the British returned home , their reconnaissance aircraft were given to the Soviets . During this period Wing Commander Adrian Warburton built a reputation as a daring and productive reconnaissance pilot ; and Wing Commander D . W . Steventon undertook many important missions , inc . some of the first overflights of the German experimental site of Peenemunde on the Baltic coast . The interpreters at ACIU gained recognition for their expertise , F / O Constance Babington Smith , MBE and Sarah ( Churchill ) Oliver being among the noted names . A scientific approach to reconnaissance developed , topped by the involvement of the Prime Minister when particularly notable results were discussed , such as the discovery of German jet fighters in test . The RAF also early developed the standard three - phase interpretation procedure : first phase required immediate response ( such as advancing columns of armor sighted ) ; second phase required 24 - hour handling ( such as concentrations of landing crafts in ports ) ; and third phase was for long - term analysis ( such as industrial targets like coal gasification plants ) . Also , the distinction between strategic and tactical reconnaissance became clear , and sub - specialties like weather reconnaissance , radar photography , and bomb - damage assessment ( BDA ) became current . Both sides developed programs of regular weather reconnaissance in the Atlantic . In addition , the technique widely known as “ dicing ” – extreme low - altitude photography at high speed – came to be adopted by the Allies for special work . Colonel Roosevelt pioneered night photography over Sicily . Flash bombs had to set off at very precise timing in order to capture the image , and in time the Edgerton D - 2 Flash System came into wide use , this involving capacitor discharge at precise intervals . Also , infrared film began to be used at the end of the war . It was generally agreed that the Mosquito , designated F - 8 by the Americans , was the best platform – apart from its performance , it offered the use of an another operator in the glazed nose , which made both navigation and the very delicate selection of camera controls to match speed and altitude easier than in the single - seat F - 5 Lightnings . Nonetheless , the Americans began to standardize on F - 5s and F - 6 Mustang s in order to promote an indigenous capability and break away from the RAF ’ s tutelage . The Endgame . By D - day , the U . S . 8th and 9th Air Force s had an immense reconnaissance wing in Colonel Roosevelt ’ s 325th Reconnaissance Wing . It commanded two groups , the 25th Bombardment Group at RAF Watton and the 7th PRG at RAF Mount Farm ( other units supported tactical reconnaissance for the 9th Air Force ) . The seven squadrons of the 325th provided routine weather recon , pathfinder - services , BDA , chaff and other electronic services , radar photography and night missions , as well as special operations in support of inserted agents . In Italy , the Mediterranean Allied Photographic Reconnaissance Wing under Colonel Polifka provided similar services , and using staging bases in the Ukraine these units together could provide full , regular coverage of the shrinking Axis territory . The RAF maintained a similar large number of reconnaissance squadrons , dominated by Spitfires and Mosquitos ; however , in the Far East and the Middle East , less capable types tended to be allocated to reconnaissance and army cooperation . For example , in Iraq during the 1941 Nazi coup , the RAF relied on Hawker Audax biplanes . What had begun with one PRU in 1940 eventually amounted to several dozen squadrons worldwide . Because of a singular devotion to victory through strategic bombing , the USAAF placed extraordinary emphasis on reconnaissance . As an example , the need to destroy German petroleum , oil and lubricants facilities required careful monitoring to decide not only what to hit , but when and how much – and then when to hit them again . This led to an emphasis on long - term surveillance , and also to centralized analysis correlating photography with other sources ( such as agents on the ground ) . Although the RAF usually preferred area bombing , it promoted a similar reconnaissance emphasis , for example in the celebrated discovery , coverage , and analysis of the Peenemunde rocket range which culminated in an important August 1943 raid . The Axis had no comparable strategic capability and most Axis air resources were consumed in support of massive ground battles . In general , Western recon aircraft were unarmed , not only to maximize performance , but to emphasize the objective of bringing back pictures , not engaging the enemy . They also usually flew singly or in widely spread pairs . In special circumstances it was necessary to bring along fighter escorts ; this phenomenon arose again in the last months when the hitherto sovereign Mosquito began to be picked off by Me - 262 jets . Selected heavy bombers carried film cameras and cameramen . The 8th Air Force ’ s 8th Combat Camera Unit thus documented much of the air war , and these films are much more frequently shown today than are the static images of regular reconnaissance . D - Day constituted the single biggest photo - recon job in history . One who was there reported that at the ACIU , 1 , 700 officers and enlistees studied 85 , 000 images daily . There were 12 , 000 Allied aircraft in the air over the region that day . If the invasion was counted as a major reconnaissance success , the Ardennes offensive ( known in America as the Battle of the Bulge ) in December was a major failure . Post - battle investigation maintained that the problem lay not in obtaining airborne evidence , but in integrating the numerous disparate data points into a coherent picture . Also , by then the Germans had learned to move by night and under cover of seasonal bad weather when possible . These countermeasures , also including going underground and exploiting snow cover , came to represent some of the limitations of overhead reconnaissance even in conditions of overwhelming air superiority . German reconnaissance languished in the west because radar - aided air defenses there made survival unlikely . Apart from the ubiquitous Ju - 88s , the Heinkel He - 177 s proved valuable as a reconnaissance platform , but that type was extremely troubled mechanically . In effect , the GAF was unable to carry out regular surveillance of critical targets like the British Isles prior to the invasion of June 1944 ; indeed , one German aircraft was “ allowed ” to overfly Dover in order to report on a fake invasion build - up there . ( However , Brugioni maintains that Germany did conduct sufficient flights to estimate the time and place of the invasion . ) After this , a few jets became available : Arado Ar - 234 allocated to Sonderkommandos , but although they were uninterceptable the results brought back seems to have added little value to the German war effort . A version of the very advanced Dornier Pfeil was assigned to recon duties . Reconnaissance was more successful in the East , and the Germans did carry out large - scale photographic mapping , some of which would later benefit the western Allies . The GAF also successfully deployed night photography with flash bombs , as amply documented by the BDA of the annihilating German attack on the USAAF in the Ukrainian SSR in June 1944 . At sea , Germany had a considerable early lead in long - range aircraft , chiefly represented by the FW - 200 Condor . This was a converted airliner unsuitable for the rigors of combat . As a Fernaufklaerer , the large Ju - 290 had the necessary range , but it was produced in low numbers and was very vulnerable . Seeaufklaerer and Kustenflieger groups used seaplanes of many different types with considerable success in coastal areas , especially from Norway . By 1942 - 3 the Condor menace was subsiding , and German long - range aircraft had great difficulty surviving in the Atlantic . They were much more effective in Northern Norway against the Arctic convoys . Germany adopted armed reconnaissance as an expediency at these long ranges . Finally , the industrial centers arrayed against the Axis – in the United States and the Urals and Siberia – were simply out of reach of strategic reconnaissance . As always it was at the tactical level that the Germans excelled , and short - range aircraft were able to hold their own in the East until fuel , pilots , and even aircraft became depleted . Experts generally hold that the top German leadership failed to understand air power , and Hitler has been especially blamed for lacking the strategic perspective that the West Allies adopted . But since the industrial mismatch was insurmountable , it is doubtful what difference a greater German emphasis on strategic reconnaissance and commensurate bombardment would have made . The Allies were slow to allocate very long ranged aircraft to maritime duties . They needed long - range maritime surveillance to hunt submarines just as the GAF needed it to hunt convoys . Stung by catastrophic losses , in April 1943 the United States finally allocated sufficient numbers of VLR ( very long range ) aircraft to suppress submarines . This was an important factor in defeating the U - boat offensive that spring . Maritime versions of the B - 24 served effectively in this maritime patrol role . The Soviet Union had virtually no in - depth reconnaissance capability and relied overwhelmingly on human intelligence ( humint ) . By the time of the brief U . S . - Soviet shuttle bombing program in the summer of 1944 , the Americans noted that Soviet reconnaissance did not venture far past the front , and that photographic technology was far inferior . At Poltava , the U . S . reconnaissance detachment shared all imagery as well as tactics and technology with their Soviet counterparts , enabling the latter to comprehend American operations and develop an indigenous capability . Besides , for strategic intelligence the Soviets had thoroughly infiltrated both Allied and Axis governments at the most sensitive levels . In the Pacific , long range was at a premium , and both fleet and army aircraft soon reflected an overwhelming American advantage . The U . S . Navy , prompted by the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor , invested in long - range patrol aircraft like the ubiquitous PBY Catalina . However , from early on the Allies had a tremendous unseen advantage in signals intelligence and cryptography , being able to read Axis codes . This led to economies in reconnaissance . Perhaps surprising considering her small industrial base , Japan may have built the finest and most beautiful reconnaissance aircraft of the war . These included several superb platforms such as “ the Japanese Mosquito ” , the unarmed Mitsubishi Ki - 46 Dinah ; and the extreme - long - range Kawanishi H8K Emily , widely considered the best flying boat of the war . These aircraft reached as far as Ceylon . The Navy ’ s standard C6N Myrt was also an extremely capable reconnaissance platform from 1944 on . But it does not appear that Japan had the overall industrial capability nor made the intellectual investment necessary to run a competitive reconnaissance branch . From 1943 , the Japanese were virtually always on the defensive , while new long - range , high - altitude U . S . aircraft climaxing with the B - 29 ( F - 13 in the recon role ) provided overwhelming American coverage of the Home Islands from mid - 1944 . Cameras . Aircraft usually carried several different camera configurations in one bay . A common installation was the trimetrogon : one vertical , and one oblique to each side . Often one aircraft carried several different camera - lens configurations for special purposes . The British found that a rear - wards facing camera could overcome some of the jitter from sideways movement , and that very low - level photography ( called dicing ) benefitted from an almost side - ways camera view . Most surveillance was conducted from extremely high altitudes , requiring long - focus optics , as reflected in “ Goddard ’ s Law ” : In photo - reconnaissance there is no substitute for focal length . In the United States , the primary aerial cameras were the K - series and naval F - series produced by Fairchild . Inventor Sherman Fairchild had developed the K - 3 in 1919 based on experience from the Great War . His work would dominate the field for decades , including in the form of foreign copies . Initially many cameras still used German Zeiss and Schneider optics . The U . S . K - 17 ( 9x9 inch image ) with several different lenses was especially ubiquitous . For mapping , a six - inch lens was standard . The less common K - 18 ( 9x18 ) was used for high altitude . K - 19s were used at night , and the small K - 20s ( 4x5 ) for low - level obliques . Although standardized on 9X9 inch plates , several similar camera types came into use . The period saw a rapid development of longer focal lengths in order to enable high - resolution high - altitude photography . 12 , 24 , 36 and ultimately 60 inch lenses came into use . The Americans also produced and used British cameras ( F24 as K24 ) . The old James Bagley T - 1 mapping camera and its multi - lens descendants were still used strictly for aerial mapping . The Navy used variants of the Fairchild series . In Britain , the small F24 ( 5x5 image ) and the derivative but much larger F52 ( 8 . 5x7 ) aerial cameras dominated , the former being used mostly for night photography with the aid of flash bombs . Up to 40 inch lenses were fitted . These cameras had shutter - in - focal - plane , whereas U . S . cameras standardized on shutter - between - lenses , claiming this reduced distortion . Exposures typically required the use of a cockpit - mounted intervalometer , set by reference to speed , altitude , and interval so that the pilot or observer could obtain the correct exposures by keying a switch . Great flight precision was needed especially for exposures for stereography and cartography in general . While German optics was superior , experts noted that standard German reconnaissance cameras , though excellent , were heavy and not optimized for aerial use . Leica seemed to be the main camera manufacturer while optics production was concentrated at ISCO Gottingen ( Schneider ) and Zeiss . The bulky Rb30 ( Reihenbild ) and its variants were in common use . This required at least two men for handling and produced 12x12 ( 32 cm ) images . It was supplemented by smaller hand - held cameras , Hk13 ( Handkamera ) and Hk19 , which also could be fitted into the rear fuselage of single - engine fighters . In general , the focal length in cm was indicated by the first number and the plate size by the second , thus Rb50 / 30 . As an example , the Do - 17P carried Rb 20 / 30 + Rb 50 / 30 or Rb 20 / 18 + Rb 50 / 18 cameras as well as defensive guns . The cameras were controlled remotely by the crew from the cockpit . Other configurations arose as needed . Japanese cameras were a mixture of domestic and imported / copied types . The Navy often used copies of the American Fairchild K - 8 and K - 20 , and also a copy of the U . S . Navy ’ s F - 8 . The Army used small , usually handheld Type 96 , 99 ( K - 20 ) , and 100 . Konica and Nikon were the main manufactures . Some German cameras were also used . As Japanese reconnaissance aircraft were multi - seat , the rear observer usually operated the cameras . Japan trained only a relative handful of officers as photo interpreters . Legacy . Because of their initial disregard for reconnaissance , all belligerents shared in the failure to develop and field a dedicated , survivable air reconnaissance platform , although they belatedly recognized the need therefore . As a result , nearly all recon aircraft were converted combat aircraft , and the proposed dedicated U . S . types ( F - 11 and F - 13 ) were canceled after the peace . Soon after the war , the CIA did develop such a dedicated aircraft , the U - 2 . From 1945 aerial reconnaissance became a critical , high - priority component of national security in both the U . S . and Britain . The results obtained from reconnaissance were controversial . Bomb Damage Assessment ( BDA ) generally revealed less damage than bombers estimated , and even the BDA was found to be inflated after ground truth could be established . The tendency to overestimate both threat and damage was endemic to the field . Questions arose over why German reconnaissance had been ineffective . Babington Smith noted that the Zossen image library was soon discovered in a barn in Bad Reichenhall near Berchtesgaden , and that the square - foot sized photographs were impressive . But interrogations revealed that the interpreters were poorly trained , didn ’ t use stereoscopes , and “ it was a horrible warning as to what photographic intelligence can become if it is based on the wrong concepts , and staffed almost entirely by uninspired plodders . ” The failure of the Axis to measure up in reconnaissance cannot be ascribed to technical deficiency or indifference . Despite many efforts in this direction , it also cannot be wholly ascribed to top - level stupidity , since the Axis had no monopoly on this either . As in many other aspects of the war , it instead highlighted that reconnaissance must be viewed and developed wholistically , as a national ( or multinational ) capability integrating many advanced resources , scientific , industrial , and intellectual ; it also requires a centralized management tying it in with other intelligence specialties and related disciplines like targeting . In these matters , once aroused , the Anglo powers together had the required heft and persistence ; the opposition simply was not nearly as strong or as mentally adjusted to a protracted global conflict . One of the top objectives of Allied occupation was the center of optical excellence in Jena ; Colonel Goddard said that U . S . bombers had orders to spare Jena . In June 1945 the Americans under Goddard evacuated most of the top scientific staff to the West ; however , Soviet troops moved the physical plant to the USSR , enslaving the remaining high - value workers there . As soon as the war ended , the USAAF in Europe used existing resources in an all - out effort to map Europe from the air before diplomatic considerations would make it difficult . Similar efforts were made elsewhere . The United States got access to a limited amount of German coverage of the European part of the Soviet Union , and soon began a costly and technically ambitious program to obtain pictures of the rest . From 1946 , the focus was no longer just on photography , but on signals intelligence and especially on new air sampling methods to detect and analyze nuclear fall - out . The extremely close operating relationship between the RAF and the USAAF ( USAF from 1947 ) would survive the war , and the tactics , technology , terminology and in general the shared intellectual infrastructure in aerial surveillance and analysis would transition into the Cold War , becoming embodied in the National Reconnaissance Office by 1960 . By then , no other country , including the Soviet Union , had national technical means for reconnaissance remotely rivaling those the RAF - USAF founded during the war .