History of the School of Advanced Military Studies The history of the United States Army School of Advanced Military Studies has its beginning in the early 1980s . It began as an additional year of study for selected graduates of the United States Army ' s Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth , Kansas . Although there was some disagreement as to the course purpose , it settled into providing its students a " broad , deep military education in the science and art of war . " Colonel Wass de Czege provided the vision and impetus for the school , and coordinated the shaping of the curriculum and the school before and during its early years . The early years were marked with uncertainty about how its graduates would be accepted and how they would perform , but the initial results from the field were positive . Its growing popularity and reputation attracted students from other U . S . uniformed services , and eventually international military students . U . S . interagency students from the Defense Intelligence Agency , Department of State , and the United States Agency for International Development , among others followed . The first major combat test for SAMS graduates was Operation Just Cause , where the school further built its reputation . However , it wasn ' t until Operation Desert Storm that SAMS graduates earned the moniker of " Jedi Knight " , due partly to their efforts in planning the invasion . Since then , SAMS graduates have participated in nearly every U . S . military operation as well as military operations other than war , such as relief efforts following Hurricane Katrina . Today , the school produces " leaders with the flexibility of mind to solve complex operational and strategic problems in peace , conflict , and war " . Early years . The impetus for the SAMS course manifested in various forms . Colonel Richard Sennrich , SAMS ' s second director , pointed to a post - Vietnam War " hole " in U . S . military education between the CGSC focus on tactics and the war colleges ' focus on " ' grand strategy ' and national security policy " . In the period after the Vietnam War , the commandant of the United States Army ' s Command and General Staff College ( CGSC ) , lieutenant general ( LTG ) William Richardson , " ordered the directors of CGSC to find ways to ' improve the tactical judgment ' of CGSC graduates . " Colonel Huba Wass de Czege , an officer stationed at Fort Leavenworth , was the primary driver for the creation of the school . According Wass de Czege , the solutions generated were inadequate , and he readied a new proposal — starting a new school — which he briefed to LTG Richardson during a trip to China on the Yangtze River in the spring of 1981 . In 1982 – 1983 , Wass de Czege ' s purpose was to " develop a curriculum for a course focused on large unit operations and specifically the operational art " . After approval on 28 December 1982 by General Glen Otis ( the commander of the U . S . Army ' s Training and Doctrine Command — TRADOC ) , a pilot program began in June 1983 — a " 1 - year extension of the Command and General Staff College . . . for specially selected officers . " As a further indication of the need for extended schooling , Wass de Czege compared the length of the U . S . Army ' s staff college ( 42 weeks ) to that of other " first rate " armies such as Canada , Germany , Russia , and the United Kingdom , with lengths between 65 and 150 weeks for selected officers . He also pointed to periods in the past when the Command and General Staff School was two years in duration . Course purpose . There were a number of considerations regarding the purpose and concept for the school . Wass de Czege thought that certain officers should receive a " broad , deep military education in the science and art of war . " Graduates would not be a " privileged elite " , but would " create a multiplier effect in all areas of Army competence . " But there were varying ideas about what product the course should generate . For example , the commandant of the Command and General Staff School , Lieutenant General Jack N . Merritt " wanted sort of a junior Henry Kissinger kind of course , " whereas the deputy commandant , Major General Crosbie Saint Jr . envisioned a " super dooper tacticians course . " What was developed , and eventually approved , by both officers was " a broad - based curriculum that began with military theory and ended with courses on preparing for war — a logical progression through the complexities of warfare " . Although Army senior leaders had accepted the need for the school , an additional challenge was finding the right students to attend . According to John S . Brown , " A fraction of SAMS ' s popularity was its exploitation of a time - honored technique : Seduce talented officers into staff work by promising to make them line officers in due course . Course development . Two officers became the " curriculum carpenters " to mold the course with Wass de Czege : Lieutenant Colonel Hal Winton , and Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Johnson . They developed the course from March to June 1983 in accordance with U . S . Army TRADOC requirements . Lieutenant Colonel L . Don Holder later also joined the team . They planned travel into the course , including observation of Regular Army and National Guard training , as well as visits to U . S . military headquarters and a trip to Europe for a NATO exercise . In June 1983 , students reported for the first SAMS class . Although the curriculum was ready , the school faced a number of challenges at the outset . For example , there was no separate academic building for the school . Classrooms in Fort Leavenworth ' s Bell Hall ( image right ) were reserved " on a daily basis . " During the first year , Winton observed that , " It was a little bit on the fly and everybody put up with that and understood it . " Difficulties aside , the 13 students of the first class completed their studies and graduated in May 1984 . By then , SAMS had become " the symbol for intellectual renaissance in the officer corps " . As planned at the outset , enrollment steadily increased in following years ; the second class comprised 24 students , which rose to 52 by 1991 — the year SAMS graduates would be tested in Operation Desert Storm . The school saw a number of other changes as well in the early years . Due to challenges with the Army Personnel Management Division in supplying high - quality officers to serve as instructors for three years , Wass de Czege made some adjustments . In 1984 , he hired the first two civilian faculty members , both with PhDs in history . Additionally , in 1985 , the Advanced Operational Studies Fellowship ( AOSF ) began , which put selected officers through the course and made them instructors in the following year . By the time Wass de Czege relinquished the reins as director of the school to Colonel Richard Sennreich in 1985 , the school was beginning to produce results : " The Army as a whole and the College in particular came to view SAMS as a useful experiment . " But the school was not done developing . In 1986 , Sennreich changed the name from the Department of Advanced Military Studies to the School of Advanced Military Studies . This action " ensured a large degree of freedom for future directors " by establishing it as a separate school within CGSC . By the time Colonel L . Don Holder became the third Director of the school , the effect of SAMS on the force was still unclear . Attendance " was still regarded as ' a slightly chancy thing to sign up for ' " . Yet , there were positive signs . Other uniformed services became interested in benefitting from the course . During Holder ' s tenure , there were Air Force officers in each of the four AMSP seminars . The program was also " growing in popularity " , applications for entry into SAMS soon more than doubled the available 48 seats , and the result of the admissions process " was a very select , bright group of officers who were eager for the SAMS experience . Holder instituted further changes . As a masters - degree program , the requirement to write a single master ' s thesis was changed to two monographs . Holder also split the SAMS Fellows ( AOSF ) into a separate seminar with their own curriculum . But the changes did not stop there . Holder saw the first international officer assigned as a SAMS faculty member — a British Colonel who eventually led a seminar due to various faculty members ' departure to command U . S . Army brigades in 1987 . By 1990 , SAMS was called to help develop U . S . Army doctrine . Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E . Mitchell , the fifth SAMS director , Colonel James McDonough , and various other members of the SAMS team played a significant part in revising the U . S . Army Doctrinal Manual 100 - 5 " Operations " in 1990 – 1993 . Curriculum development . In the early years , the course " was defined largely by historical studies of modern , and usually armored , campaigns and analyzed in terms of Clausewitzian concepts , particularly " centers of gravity " and " culmination " " . This , according to the school ' s second director , separated the course from the Jomini an focus — adherence to a recipe of rules and principles — of the Command and General Staff College . The school ' s founders also stressed the importance of theory , and this became an integral part of the course . Clausewitz , Jomini , Mao Zedong , Sun Tzu , and Tuchachevskii found homes in SAMS ' theory courses . Critical thinking , as part of the course , was reinforced by guest speakers , who also " challenged conventional wisdom " . Operation Just Cause and beyond . In its early years , the value of the school had not yet been clearly established . The " first test of battle " for SAMS graduates came during Operation Just Cause . A core planning cell of seven SAMS graduates " crafted a well rehearsed and well executed plan that simultaneously struck some roughly 50 objectives in a single coordinated blow " . According to Kevin Benson , " The Army and SAMS faced a test of battle and the new group of highly - educated planners appeared to have passed the test with flying colors . " The results of Operation Just Cause reverberated within the school . An end - of - course survey in 1990 suggested that — considering the operation — " ' LIC [ low intensity conflict ] needed more emphasis ' , and that the course needed ' more joint participation ' " . The school and faculty knew that there would be further tests for SAMS graduates ahead . They were not wrong : " The next test . . . would take place in the deserts of the Persian Gulf . " Shortly after General Norman Schwarzkopf arrived in Riyadh , Saudi Arabia in 1990 , U . S . Army Chief of Staff , General Carl Vuono offered him the use of some SAMS graduates . Schwarzkopf accepted . These SAMS planners became known as " Schwarzkopf ' s famous ' Jedi Knights ' " . This " small Jedi Knight team . . . would dramatically shape the outlines of Operation Desert Storm " . But the efforts of SAMS graduates were not limited to the initial planning effort . 82 graduates were participating in " a wide array of command and planning tasks " , in the theater by February 1991 . These efforts " established SAMS in the minds of the leadership of the Army as a place to turn to for superb planners " . After Desert Storm , the school again looked ahead . The Army was " grappling with a range of new problems : military operations other than war , peacekeeping , and peace enforcement operations " . The school and its graduates examined the situations in Bosnia , Haiti , and Somalia , and SAMS Jedi Knights engaged in operations worldwide , as well as domestic contingencies such as those in Los Angeles and Miami ( after Hurricane Katrina ) . But SAMS graduates had not completely turned away from large - scale operational planning . Lieutenant General Guy C . Swan noted that SAMS graduates were indispensable in Europe after the fall of the Berlin wall and the dissolution of the WARSAW Pact . They were expected to " re - engineer the decades of planning that had gone into the GDP [ General Defense Plan ] almost overnight " . Swan stated that this was " the first true test of SAMS on a large scale " . The course itself continued to change in the waning hours of the twentieth century . Under Colonel Robin P . Swan , the school moved from Fort Leavenworth ' s Flint Hall to Eisenhower Hall ( image right ) in October 1994 . Swan also decided to add an additional two seminars . The civilian faculty also expanded . The drawdown in forces after Operation Desert Storm affected SAMS as well . By 1998 , the school ' s ennrollment began to shrink based on timing concerns by eligible students in a shrinking force . This was in spite of favorable comparisons between SAMS attendees and non - attendees on promotion and command selection boards in 1995 – 1998 . The 21st century . Although the first class comprised only 13 students , " subsequent classes over the next 16 years averaged 48 . " By the twentieth century , demand for SAMS graduates increased . By the year 2000 , there were 57 students in the program ; this would increase to 95 in the next four years . This was within the range of 36 to 120 that Wass de Czege predicted in 1983 would " assure quality " in the course . SAMS ' s " Jedi Knights " played a significant role in the Global War on Terror as well . The United States Central Command requested SAMS graduates along with its " sister schools " , the United States Air Force ' s School of Advanced Air and Aerospace Studies ( SAAAS ) , as well as the United States Marine Corps ' s School of Advanced Warfighting ( SAW ) . These planners participated in the preparations for the invasion of Iraq , as well as a " post - hostility plan for the occupation of Iraq " . Again , SAMS graduates ' efforts were not limited to major combat operations during the Global War on Terror . Its officers also deployed to Baton Rouge , Louisiana , to assist the military ' s Joint Task Force and the Federal Emergency Management Agency after Hurricane Katrina . The school continued to morph to meet the demands of a changing world . An additional faculty expansion occurred in 2005 – 2006 , and the Fellows ' curriculum shifted further away from that of the AMSP program ' s . To meet an increasing demand , the 11th Director , Colonel Steve Banach , began a winter - start SAMS course in 2007 . During this period , SAMS also " continued to serve the Army at war as a ' reach ' asset " , helping deployed headquarters plan operations and contingencies . On 30 August 2011 the school ' s offices and most of its seminars moved from Eisenhower Hall to the newly renovated Muir Hall at Fort Leavenworth .