US / Saudi AWACS Sale The sale of AWACS ( Airborne Warning and Control System ) surveillance planes to Saudi Arabia by the United States administration of President Ronald Reagan was a controversial part of what was then the largest foreign arms sale in US history . ( See Arms Industry ) The sale saw objections from a majority of Americans , prominent US Senators , the State of Israel and the Israel lobby . The sale included the five E - 3 Sentry AWACS aircraft and eight KE - 3 refueling aircraft , with spare parts and support , delivered between June 1986 and September 1987 . AWACS . The United States Air Force began using the E - 3 Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft in 1977 following ten years of prototype design , development , and testing . The U . S . currently has a fleet of 33 AWACS , the largest in the world . NATO possesses 17 , the United Kingdom has seven , Saudi Arabia has five , and France has four . The AWACS plane is a modified Boeing 707 commercial jetliner characterized by the strikingly large thirty - foot rotating antenna mounted on its roof . This antenna can detect and track other aircraft within an area of , flying at any altitude or over any terrain , allowing the AWACS to detect aircraft that remain hidden from ground radar . < ref name = " Boston Globe 9 / 22 / 81 " > Boston Globe 9 / 22 / 81 < / ref > The planes ’ mobility is a crucial feature , providing for the use of this sophisticated detection equipment whenever and wherever needed ; AWACS can be deployed quickly into military conflict “ regardless of intensity ” according to Boeing , who claims AWACS are the “ world ’ s standard for airborne early warning systems . ” The Saudi AWACS bear Arabic writing on their exterior with a translation below , “ Royal Saudi Air Force ” . The roof - mounted antenna is an AWACS plane ’ s dominant feature ; it is a smooth black disk with a white stripe down the center , and it rotates constantly . The antenna is about a fifth of the length of the plane and it sits higher above the roof than the plane ’ s roof sits above the ground . Another noticeable difference from a commercial 707 is the lack of passenger windows . Colonel Walt Kowalik said about the lack of windows , " We don ' t want ' em . . . we don ' t want our people looking out of windows . We want them concentrating on what ' s in front of them . " An Associated Press writer described blue carpet and “ subdued ” lighting , “ as in a movie theatre . ” Reaction in the United States . Only months old , the Reagan Administration announced its plans to sell five of the U . S . - made AWACS to Saudi Arabia . The proposal , part of the largest foreign arms sale ever was not received warmly on Capitol Hill where Congressional consent was required . The AWACS proposal was also harshly rejected by Israel and disapproved of by a majority of Americans . Upon formal introduction of the AWACS proposal to Congress in the fall of 1981 , many Senators reacted coldly . “ This is one of the worst and most dangerous arms sales ever , ” proclaimed Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy . Senator Donald Riegle said , “ We are being asked to submit to a kind of blackmail ; the price gouging of oil . ” < ref name = " Boston Globe 9 / 18 / 81 " > Boston Globe 9 / 18 / 81 < / ref > These Senators feared that the AWACS sale was not designed to promote stability , as would be claimed by the Administration , but to secure U . S . oil resources . Such a deal would mean technology for oil access , and as Kennedy said , a potentially dangerous deal at that . Senator Bob Packwood , who as a Republican was a member of Reagan ’ s party , was also a leader of opposition to the AWACS deal in the Senate . Packwood spelled out the danger he saw in arming Saudi Arabia : “ They have displayed a hostility that must be interpreted as their deliberate intentions to promote continued instability in the Middle East . ” Packwood questioned the choice of Saudi Arabia as an arbiter of peace saying , “ Let ’ s think about which nations have been seriously committed to negotiating peace in the Middle East and which have not shared that commitment . ” With the recently ended American hostage crisis in Iran fresh in mind , Americans were reluctant to sell military equipment to anyone . In fact , a May 1981 poll showed that 52 % of those surveyed opposed arms sales to any country , and only 19 % wanted the U . S . to sell AWACS to Saudi Arabia . Considering Israel . Israel , feeling its security directly threatened , was the most strongly opposed to the AWACS deal of anyone involved . Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin expressed “ profound regret and unreserved opposition ” to the Saudi AWACS proposal . < ref name = " Boston Globe 4 / 22 / 81 " > Boston Globe 4 / 22 / 81 < / ref > Experts on Israeli defense said that AWACS could track every move of Israel ’ s air force , denying it the chance to launch a “ surprise first strike , the basis of Israeli defense doctrine . ” While Israel ’ s “ unreserved opposition ” was based on the real security threat it faced , its “ profound regret ” could have been rooted in perceived betrayal by the United States . A protector of Israel since the Six - Day War , the U . S . was planning to sell military surveillance planes to Saudi Arabia , a country hostile towards Israel . A Boston Globe editorial from May 4 , 1981 recognized this contradiction as well as other threats posed by the AWACS sale , noting , “ the intention to sell AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia constitutes not only a manifest contradiction of Reagan ’ s campaign promise to enhance Israel ' s security , but also serves to further destabilize the Mideast , a region whose stability was supposed to be a strategic priority of the Reagan foreign policy . ” The sensitivity of Congress to the threats against peace and stability , was matched by its sensitivity to Israel ’ s concerns . The Reagan Administration actively sought to diminish Israel ’ s voice and influence over the deal . In public speeches , Administration officials admonished Israel for getting involved in a U . S . foreign policy matter . Secretary of State Alexander Haig said the President must be “ free of the restraints of overriding external vetoes , ” and went on to say that were the AWACS deal blocked by Israeli influence , there would be “ serious implications on all American policies in the Middle East . . . I ’ ll just leave it there . ” Reagan himself declared , “ It is not the business of other nations to make American foreign policy . ” < ref name = " Boston Globe 10 / 1 / 81 " > Boston Globe 10 / 1 / 81 < / ref > Winning support . In order to gain support for the AWACS deal in Congress and in the country , the Administration lobbied strongly on behalf of it . Though it continually stated the AWACS deal would benefit U . S . “ interests ” in the Middle East , the Administration also gave promises of the AWACS planes ’ importance in securing peace . In a speech to Congress , Alexander Haig said that if the AWACS sale was blocked , “ our security , the security of Israel and peace itself ( might ) be endangered , ” Reagan himself promoted the AWACS sale saying , “ By contributing to the stability of the area , it improves Israeli security . ” The Administration even commissioned former government officials to speak about AWACS as part of the peace cause . Richard Nixon ’ s Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said “ it is essential for the peace process in the Middle East . ” Congress approved the AWACS sale , and as part of the then largest arms export ever , the planes were a symbolic commitment to the U . S . / Saudi relationship . US Arms Sale to Saudi Arabia , 2010 . On October 20 , 2010 , the U . S . State Department notified Congress of its intention to make the biggest arms sale in American history - an estimated $ 60 . 5 billion purchase by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia . Trumping the former US / Saudi AWACS Sale that took place during the Reagan administration . The package represents a considerable improvement in the offensive capability of the Saudi armed forces . Israel did not raise objections to the sale , except to say that it was " not thrilled about it . " At the time , a senior administration official stressed : " This is a big development , because it ' s part of a larger regional strategy and the maintenance of a strong U . S . presence in the region . We ' re paying attention to the needs of our allies and what everyone in the region believes is a flexing of muscles by a more aggressive Iran . One way to deal with that is to make our allies and friends strong . "