USS Borie ( DD - 215 ) USS " Borie " ( DD - 215 ) was a " Clemson " - class destroyer in the United States Navy during World War II . She was the first ship named for Ulysses S . Grant ' s Secretary of the Navy , Adolph E . Borie . She served in the Black Sea , the Asiatic Fleet and the Caribbean between the wars , and in the Battle of the Atlantic , the long campaign to protect Allied shipping from German U - boat s during World War II . As part of the antisubmarine Hunter - killer Group unit Task Group 21 . 14 , the crew earned a Presidential Unit Citation for its " extraordinary performance . " " Borie " also earned distinction in her final battle with in November 1943 , and was sunk by friendly forces due to damage sustained by ramming the U - boat and engaging her crew with small arms fire . Construction . " Borie " was launched on 4 October 1919 , by William Cramp and Sons ; sponsored by Miss Patty Borie , great - grandniece of Secretary Borie ; and commissioned 24 March 1920 , Lieutenant Commander E . F . Clement in command . As a typical " flush decker , " " Borie " was armed with four 4 inch ( 102 mm ) deck guns , one 3 inch ( 76 mm ) antiaircraft ( AA ) gun , six . 30 - cal . ( 7 . 62 mm ) machine gun s , and twelve 21 " ( 533 mm ) torpedo tubes in four triple mounts , two mounts on each side . She was also fitted with depth charge s and sonar for use against submarines . Her top speed was 35 knots ( 65 km / h ) . Due to the heat in the tropics , it was customary for crewmen to sleep on the open decks of their ships , to be cooled by the breeze . The " flush deckers " often sported canvas awning s over their decks for this purpose . Service history . In April 1920 , " Borie " joined the United States Naval Detachment in Turkish Waters for service in the Black Sea . The following year , she reported to Destroyer Division 38 , Asiatic Fleet , and for the next four years alternated between the Philippine Islands , during the winter and Chefoo and Shanghai , China during the summer . She then returned home and patrolled in the Caribbean until the spring of 1927 , when she made a cruise to Europe . " Borie " remained with the Atlantic Fleet until 1929 , when she began a three - year tour with the Asiatic Fleet . Following conversion to a Squadron Leader at San Diego ( 1932 – 33 ) , " Borie " joined Destroyer Squadron 2 , Battle Force . She remained in the Pacific on normal destroyer duty until late 1939 , when she transited the Panama Canal to join the Neutrality Patrol . After the breakout of hostilities between the US and the Axis powers , she served first on the Inshore Patrol , 15th Naval District , in Panama Bay . In December 1941 , in the face of the growing U - boat campaign in the Caribbean , she replaced USS " Goff " ( DD - 247 ) as flagship of Destroyer Division 67 , which also included USS " Tattnall " ( DD - 125 ) and USS " Barry " ( DD - 248 ) . On 15 June 1942 , she rescued survivors of USAT " Merrimac , " which had been torpedoed . After returning to Philadelphia in November 1942 , " Borie " went to New Orleans for an overhaul and then was reassigned to the Caribbean . During her refit , she had surface search radar installed ; four of her . 30 - cal . ( 7 . 62 mm ) machine gun s were removed , and replaced with two single - mount Oerlikon 20 mm AA guns . For three months beginning in February 1943 , " Borie , " " Barry " and " Goff " were attached to Escort Unit 23 . 2 . 4 with gunboats " Courage " ( PG - 70 ) and " Tenacity " ( PG - 71 ) and patrol craft " PC - 575 " and " PC - 592 , " which operated between Trinidad and Recife , Brazil with Admiral Jonas Ingram ' s South Atlantic Fleet ( later Fourth Fleet ) . The escort unit accompanied convoys from Trinidad to Recife , where it was relieved by Brazilian Navy units who took the convoys to Bahia . Patrols with Task Group 21 . 14 . Returning to Norfolk in May , the three destroyers escorted convoy UGS - 13 to Casablanca , French Morocco and on their return were assigned to hunter killer Task Group 21 . 14 , escorting escort carrier under her Capt . Arnold J . Isbell . On 26 June 1943 , under the command of Lt . Cdr . Charles H . Hutchins , at the time the youngest destroyer commander in the Navy , the destroyer departed the Caribbean and on 30 July put to sea in the North Atlantic as a member of the antisubmarine group built around the " Card . Borie " completed three patrols with " Card ' s " group , providing valuable support for sister ships in the pursuit and sinking of German U - boat s . The Presidential Unit Citation was awarded to Task Group 21 . 14 for actions during these three patrols : In late October 1943 , TG 21 . 14 went out for a fourth patrol , searching for a reported refueling concentration of U - boats around a " Milchkuhe " ( Milk Cow ) tanker sub in the North Atlantic . The report was the result of the triangulation of bearings taken with high frequency radio direction finder s ( HFDF , nicknamed " huff - duff " ) . Final battle with " U - 405 " . During her fourth patrol , " Borie " got a radar contact on " U - 256 " shortly after 1943 hours , 31 October and closed in . The sub promptly crash dived . Two depth charge attacks forced her back to the surface , but she again submerged ; after a third attack , a large oil slick was observed . Though " U - 256 " made it home badly damaged , Hutchins believed the target to be sunk , and signalled the " Card : " " Scratch one pig boat ; am searching for more . " " Borie " then got another radar contact about 26 miles ( 42 km ) from the first , at 0153 hours on 1 November 1943 , range 8000 yds . ( 7200 m ) and charged in to engage . At 2800 yd ( 2500 m ) radar contact was lost , but sonar picked up the enemy sub at about the same time . " Borie " engaged ( a Type VIIC U - boat ) hours before dawn , at 49°00 ' N . , 31°14 ' W . There were 15 - foot seas , with high winds and poor visibility . The destroyer initially launched depth charges , after which the submarine came ( or was probably forced ) to the surface . " Borie " then came about for another attack , engaging with 4 inch ( 102 mm ) and 20 mm gunfire at a range of 400 yd ( 360 m ) The sub ' s machine gun s scored hits in the forward engine room and several scattered and harmless hits near the bridge , and her deck gun crew traversed their 88 mm ( 3 . 5 inch ) gun and took aim for their first shot at " Borie ' s " waterline ; but " Borie ' s " 20 mm gunfire wiped out every exposed member of the sub ' s crew topside , and a salvo of three 4 inch shells then blew off the sub ' s deck gun before it fired a round . " Borie " then closed in and rammed " U - 405 , " but at the last moment , the submarine turned hard left and a huge wave lifted the " Borie ' s " bow onto the foredeck of the U - boat . After the ramming , " Borie " was high - centered on top of " U - 405 , " and until they separated , exchanges of small arms fire took place . This was a unique battle : unlike most other modern naval battles , it was decided by ramming and small arms fire at extremely close range . " Borie ' s " 24 - inch spotlight kept the submarine illuminated throughout the following battle , except for brief periods when it was turned off for tactical reasons . The two ships were initially almost perpendicular to one another ; as the battle progressed , wave action and the efforts of both crews to dislodge from the enemy ship resulted in the two vessels becoming locked in a " V " for an extended fight , with the U - Boat along " Borie ' s " port side . The two ships were locked together only 25 – 30° from parallel . The action of the seas began to open seams in " Borie ' s " hull forward and flood her forward engine room . The submarine ' s hull , made of thicker steel and sturdier beams to withstand deep diving , was better able to handle the stress . Hutchins reported later , " We were impressed by the ruggedness and toughness of these boats . " Normally , in a surface engagement the superior armament , speed and reserve buoyancy of the destroyer would have been decisive . But in this unusual case , the destroyer was unable to depress her 4 inch ( 102 mm ) and 3 inch ( 76 mm ) deck guns enough to hit the sub , while all of the submarine ' s machine gun s could be brought to bear . One or two 4 inch gun crews attempted to fire , but their shells passed harmlessly over the target . " Borie ' s " crew had a limited number of small arms , however , and the German deck mounts were completely open and had no protection . The executive officer had presented a virtually identical situation during drills on 27 October — a theoretical ramming by a U - boat on the port side — and as a result , after the ramming the " Borie ' s " crew took immediate action without orders . In the extended and bitter fighting that ensued , dozens of German sailors were killed in desperate attempts to keep their machine guns manned . As each man emerged from the hatch and ran toward the guns , he was illuminated by " Borie ' s " spotlight and met by a hail of gunfire . " Borie ' s " resourceful crew engaged the enemy with whatever was at hand : Tommy gun s , rifles , pistols , shotguns intended for riot control , and even a Very pistol . " Borie ' s " executive officer and a signalman fired effectively from the bridge with Tommy guns throughout the fight . One German sailor was hit in the chest with a Very flare . One of the Oerlikon 20 mm cannon was also able to continue firing , with devastating effect . " Borie ' s " crewmen could clearly see a polar bear insignia painted on the conning tower of the sub , and three numerals that had been obliterated by 20 mm gunfire . The bow of the sub had been badly damaged by the depth charges and she was probably unable to submerge . " U - 405 ' s " deck armament was extensive : in addition to the 88 mm gun , she also had six MG 42 machine guns , in one quadruple and two single mounts . These weapons would have been devastating if the sub ' s crewmen had been able to keep them manned . Occasionally , one of them would reach one of the MG 42 mounts , and open fire briefly before he was killed . Other German sailors kept up a sporadic small arms fire of their own from open hatchways . At a key moment in the fight , as " Borie ' s " port side crewmen were running out of 20 mm and small arms ammunition , two Germans broke from their protected position behind the bridge and approached the quad mount gun . A thrown sheath knife pierced a German crewman ' s abdomen and he fell overboard . Unable to bring his gun to bear , one of the 4 inch gun captains threw an empty 4 inch shell casing at the other German sailor , and successfully knocked him overboard as well . Sinking of the " U - 405 " . Finally , " U - 405 " and " Borie " separated and the two crews attempted to engage each other with torpedoes , to no effect . At this point , about 35 of the German crew of 49 had been killed or lost overboard . " Borie " had been badly damaged and was moving at a reduced speed , while the sub was still capable of maneuvering at a similar speed . The " U - 405 ' s " tighter turning radius effectively prevented the " Borie " from bringing her superior broadside firepower to bear , and her skipper , " Korvettenkapitän " Rolf - Heinrich Hopmann , did a masterful job of maneuvering his badly - damaged boat with his remaining crew . " Borie " shut off her searchlight , with her crew hoping that " U - 405 " would attempt to escape and provide a better target for gunfire . The submarine did attempt to speed away , and " Borie " switched her searchlight back on and turned to bring her broadside guns and a depth charge thrower to bear . The sub was bracketed by shallow - set depth charges and struck by a 4 inch shell , and came to a stop . " Borie ' s " crew observed about 14 sailors signalling their surrender and abandoning ship in yellow rubber rafts , and Hutchins gave the order to cease fire ; several of them were apparently wounded , being loaded into the rafts in stretchers by their shipmates . The last to leave the stricken ship was wearing an officer ' s cap . " U - 405 " sank slowly by the stern at 0257 . She was seen to explode underwater , probably from scuttling charges set by the last officer to leave . Hutchins reported later , The survivors were observed firing Very star shell s : " Borie ' s " crew believed this to be a distress signal , and maneuvered in an attempt to recover them from their rubber rafts , as they approached 50 - 60 yards off the port bow . But as it turned out , the Germans were signalling another surfaced U - boat , which answered with a star shell of her own . A " Borie " lookout reported a torpedo passing close by from that U - boat , and " Borie " had no choice but to protect herself by sailing away . The " Borie " was forced to sail through the " U - 405 " survivors ' rafts as she turned away from the other U - boat , but the men on the rafts were observed firing another Very flare as the " Borie " steamed away in a radical zigzag pattern . No German survivors were ever recovered by either side ; all 49 crewmen were lost . A jubilant radio report of the sinking of the " U - 405 " was sent to " Card " after the engagement , before the extent of the ship ' s damage was fully realized . Then her radio fell silent . " Borie " attempted to reach her scheduled rendezvous with the rest of the " Card " Task Group , planned for shortly after sunrise . Sinking of the " Borie " . Because of the loss of electric power , the crew had to wait until daylight to fully assess the damage to their ship . First light brought a thick fog . " Borie " was too badly damaged by the collision to reach the rendezvous in time , or even be towed to port by her sister ships . She had sustained severe underwater damage along her entire port side , including both engine rooms , as the two ships were pounded together by the sea before separating . The stress of the wave action from the 15 - foot waves , as " Borie " was pinned against the U - boat ' s hull , had caused damage to key operating systems throughout the ship . The forward engine room and generators were completely flooded , and only the starboard engine was operating in the partially flooded aft engine room . Auxiliary power had been lost and speed was reduced . The most critical damage was the compromised hull ; but steam and water lines had separated , and most of the fresh water for the boilers had been lost , compounding the drive system problems . As a result , Hutchins was forced to use salt water in the boilers : the reduction in steam pressure forcing him to further reduce speed to 10 knots , making her an easy target for U - boats . At about 1100 , the communications officer restarted the Kohler emergency radio generator with a mixture of " Zippo " lighter fluid and alcohol from a torpedo ; a distress call was sent , a homing beacon was set up and , after some delays due to poor visibility , " Borie " was spotted by a TBF Avenger from the " Card . " Valiant efforts were made to save the ship . Kerosene battle lanterns had to be used for all work below decks . The crew formed a bucket brigade , and all available topweight was jettisoned , even the gun director . All remaining torpedoes were fired . The lifeboat , torpedo tubes , 20 mm guns and machine guns were removed and thrown over the side , along with the small arms used against the U - boat crew , tons of tools and equipment , and over 100 mattresses . Only enough 4 inch ammunition was kept for a final defensive action : 10 rounds per gun . But the ship continued to slowly settle into the water with all pumps running ; trailing fuel oil from all portside fuel tanks , and an approaching storm front had been reported . It would have been necessary to bring out a tugboat to tow her into port ; due to the poor visibility prevalent in the North Atlantic , Hutchins believed the chances of a tugboat finding the " Borie " were slim . The nearest port , Horta , was about 690 miles away ; Iceland , Ireland and Newfoundland were all about 900 miles away , and the task group was at the approximate center of five reported U - boat wolfpacks . By now there were 20 - foot waves . As nightfall approached at 1630 , Hutchins reluctantly ordered his exhausted crew to abandon ship . The " Card " task force had taken a substantial risk by leaving the escort carrier unprotected in sub - infested waters . " Card " was 10 miles away , but and were close by as the crew abandoned " Borie ; " on orders from the Task Group commander , the ship was not scuttled at that time . Despite the sporadic machine gun and small arms fire from " U - 405 , " none of " Borie ' s " crewmen had been killed during the engagement , although several were wounded . But due to 44 °F . ( 6 °C . ) water , 20 - foot waves , high winds and severe exhaustion , three officers and 24 enlisted men were lost during the rescue operation . Hutchins reported , " Many of the lost were just unable to get over the side " of the two rescuing destroyers . Still , the ship remained afloat through the night ; " Goff " and " Barry " attempted to sink the wreck at first light , but torpedoes went astray in the heavy seas . One 4 inch shell from the " Barry " struck the bridge and started a small fire , but she still refused to sink . The " coup de grace " was delivered on the morning of 2 November by a 500 lb ( 227 kg ) bomb dropped by a TBF Avenger from the " Card , " piloted by Lt . ( jg ) Melvin H . Connley of VC - 9 . " Borie " finally sank at 0955 on 2 November . The survivors were transferred to the more spacious accommodations of the " Card " for the journey home . Awards . " Borie " received three battle star s for her World War II service as well as the Presidential Unit Citation for her actions in the " Card " group . Hutchins was awarded the Navy Cross in a ceremony aboard the USS " Card " by the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet , Adm . Royal E . Ingersoll . Namesake ship : USS " Borie " ( DD - 704 ) . A second USS " Borie , Allen M . Sumner " - class was launched 4 July 1944 , commissioned 21 September , and served with distinction at Iwo Jima and Okinawa before being hit by a " kamikaze " suicide aircraft off Japan , 9 August 1945 , one of the last destroyers damaged in World War II .