Battle of Dak To The Battle of Đắk Tô was a series of major engagements of the Vietnam War that took place between 3 – 22 November 1967 , in Kontum Province , in the Central Highlands of the Republic of Vietnam ( South Vietnam ) . The action at Đắk Tô was one of a series of People ' s Army of Vietnam ( PAVN ) offensive initiatives that began during the second half of the year . North Vietnamese attacks at Lộc Ninh ( in Bình Long Province ) , Song Be ( in Phước Long Province ) , and at Con Thien and Khe Sanh , ( in Quảng Trị Province ) , were other actions which , combined with Đắk Tô , became known as " the border battles . " During the summer of 1967 , heavy contact with PAVN forces in the area prompted the launching of Operation " Greeley " , a combined search and destroy effort by elements of the U . S . Army ' s 4th Infantry Division and 173rd Airborne Brigade , along with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam ' s 42nd Infantry Regiment and Airborne units . The fighting was intense and lasted into the fall , when the North Vietnamese seemingly withdrew . By late October , however , U . S . intelligence indicated that local communist units had been reinforced and combined into the 1st PAVN Division , which was tasked with the capture of Đắk Tô and the destruction of a brigade - size U . S . unit . Information provided by a PAVN defector provided the allies a good indication of the locations and intentions of North Vietnamese forces . This intelligence prompted the launching of Operation " MacArthur " , and brought the units back to the area along with more reinforcements from the ARVN Airborne Division . The battles that erupted on the hill masses south and southeast of Đắk Tô became some of the hardest - fought and bloodiest battles of the Vietnam War . Background . Border outpost . During the early stages of the U . S . involvement in the Vietnam War , several U . S . Special Forces Civilian Irregular Defense Group ( CIDG ) camps were established along the borders of South Vietnam in order to both maintain surveillance of PAVN and National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam ( NLF or " Viet Cong " ) infiltration and to provide support and training to isolated Montagnard villagers , who bore the brunt of the fighting in the isolated area . One of these camps was built near the village and airstrip at Đắk Tô . After 1965 , Đắk Tô was also utilized as a Forward Operations Base by the highly classified U . S . Studies and Observations Group ( SOG ) , which launched reconnaissance teams from there to gather intelligence on the Ho Chi Minh Trail across the border in Laos . Đắk Tô lies on a flat valley floor , surrounded by waves of ridgelines that rise into peaks ( some as high as 4 , 000 feet ) that stretch westward and southwestward towards the tri - border region where South Vietnam , Laos , and Cambodia meet . Western Kontum Province is covered by double and triple - canopy rainforests , and the only open areas were filled in by bamboo groves whose stalks sometimes reached eight inches in diameter . Landing Zones ( LZs ) large enough for helicopters were few and far between , which meant that most troop movements could only be carried out on foot . Temperatures in the highlands could reach 95° Fahrenheit ( 35° Celsius ) during the day and could drop to as low as 55° Fahrenheit ( 12 . 78° Celsius ) in the evenings . Operation " Greeley " . In January 1967 , Major - General ( later LTG ) William R . Peers had taken command of the 4th Infantry Division , which had responsibility for the defense of western Kontum Province . Prior to the onset of the summer monsoon , Peers set up blocking positions from the 4th Infantry Division ' s 1st Brigade base camp at Jackson Hole , west of Pleiku , and launched Operation " Francis Marion " on 17 May . The 4th had on hand its 1st and 2nd Brigades while its 3rd Brigade operated with the 25th Infantry Division northwest of Saigon . Throughout the middle of 1967 , however , western Kontum Province became a magnet for several PAVN spoiling attacks and it appeared that the North Vietnamese were paying an increasing amount of attention to the area . Immediately after taking command , Peers instituted guidelines for his units in order to prevent them from being isolated and overrun in the rugged terrain , which also did much to negate the U . S . superiority in firepower . Battalions were to act as single units instead of breaking down into individual companies in order to search for their enemy . If rifle companies had to act independently , they were not to operate more than one kilometer or one hour ' s march from one another . If contact with the enemy was made , the unit was to be immediately reinforced . These measures went far in reducing the 4th Infantry ' s casualties . These heavy enemy contacts prompted Peers to request reinforcement and , as a result , on 17 June , two battalions of Brigadier General John R . Deane ' s 173rd Airborne Brigade were moved into the Đắk Tô area to begin sweeping the jungle - covered mountains in Operation " Greeley " . The 173rd had been operating near Bien Hoa Air Base outside Saigon and had been in combat only against NLF guerrillas . Prior to its deployment to the highlands , Peer ' s operations officer , Colonel William J . Livsey , attempted to warn the Airborne officers of the hazards of campaigning in the highlands . He also advised them that PAVN regulars were a much better equipped and motivated force than the NLF . These warnings , however , made little impression on the paratroopers , who were about to become victims of their own overconfidence . On 20 June , Charlie Company , 2nd battalion , 503rd Airborne Infantry ( C / 2 / 503 ) discovered the bodies of a Special Forces CIDG unit that had been missing for four days on Hill 1338 , the dominant hill mass south of Dak To . Supported by Alpha Company , the Americans moved up the hill and set up for the night . At 06 : 58 the following morning , Alpha Company began moving alone up a ridge finger and triggered an ambush by the 6th Battalion of the 24th PAVN Regiment . Charlie Company was ordered to go to support , but heavy vegetation and difficult terrain made movement extremely difficult . Artillery support was rendered ineffective by the limited range of visibility and the " belt - grabbing " - or " hugging " - tactics of the North Vietnamese . Close air support was impossible for the same reasons . Alpha Company managed to survive repeated attacks throughout the day and night , but the cost was heavy . Of the 137 men that comprised the unit , 76 had been killed and another 23 wounded . A search of the battlefield revealed only 15 dead North Vietnamese . U . S . headquarters press releases , made four days after the conclusion of what came to be called " The Battle of the Slopes " , claimed that 475 North Vietnamese had been killed while the 173rd ' s combat after action report claimed 513 enemy dead . The men of Alpha Company estimated that only 50 – 75 PAVN troops had been killed during the entire action . Such losses among American troops could not go unpunished . The operations officer of the 4th Infantry went so far as to recommend that General Deane be relieved of command . Such a drastic measure , however , would only provide more grist for what was becoming a public relations fiasco . In the end , the commander and junior officers of Charlie Company ( whose only crime was that of caution ) were transferred to other units . In response to the destruction of Alpha Company , MACV ordered additional forces into the area . On 23 June , the 1st Battalion , 1st Brigade , 1st Air Cavalry Division arrived to bolster the 173rd . The following day , the elite ARVN 1st Airborne Task Force ( the 5th and 8th Battalions ) and the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Air Cavalry Division arrived to conduct search and destroy operations north and northeast of Kontum . General Deane sent his forces 20 kilometers west and southwest of Dak To in search of the 24th PAVN Regiment . After establishing Fire Support Base 4 on Hill 664 , approximately 11 kilometers southwest of Đắk Tô , the 4th Battalion , 503rd Airborne Infantry found the North Vietnamese K - 101D Battalion of the " Doc Lap " Regiment on 10 July . As the four companies of the battalion neared the crest of Hill 830 they were struck by a wall of small arms and machine gun fire and blasted by B - 40 rocket - propelled grenades and mortar fire . Any advance was impossible , so the paratroopers remained in place for the night . The following morning , the North Vietnamese were gone . The 4th of the 503rd suffered 22 dead and 62 wounded . The bodies of three PAVN soldiers were found on the site . North Vietnamese pressure against CIDG outposts at Dak Seang and Dak Pek , 20 and 45 kilometers north of Đắk Tô respectively , was the impetus for dispatching the 42nd ARVN Infantry Regiment into the area while the ARVN Airborne battalion moved to Dak Seang . On 4 August , the 1st of the 42nd encountered the North Vietnamese on a hilltop west of Dak Seang , setting off a three - day battle that drew in the South Vietnamese paratroopers . The 8th Airborne , along with U . S . Army advisers , was airlifted into a small unimproved air field next to the Special Forces camp at Dak Seang . The camp was under sporadic fire and probing ground attack by PAVN forces . This occurred when its Special Forces commander and a patrol failed to return and the camp received what appeared to be preparatory fire for a full scale ground attack by PAVN . The terrain was high mountains with triple canopy jungle . The importance of the Dak Seang camp was that it lay astride the Ho Chi Minh Trail , the main infiltration route of the PAVN into the South . About a kilometer from the camp , the Army advisers and the 8th Airborne came upon the bodies of the lost Special Forces patrol , all dead , including the camp commander . As the 8th Airborne moved up the mountain , the lead elements were taking small arms fire . Before long , it was obvious that the PAVN troops had filtered down on all sides . By noon of 4 August , the 8th Airborne with its advisers were in a fight that lasted several days . When the unit finally overwhelmed the PAVN forces because of superior firepower in air and artillery , it reached the top of the mountain and found a fully operational PAVN Headquarters , complete with hospital facilities and anti - aircraft emplacements . During the three - day battle , the 8th Airborne Battalion alone withstood six separate ground attacks and casualties among all the South Vietnamese units were heavy . By mid - August , contact with communist forces decreased , leading the Americans to conclude that the North Vietnamese had withdrawn across the border . The bulk of the ARVN Airborne units were then returned to their bases around Saigon for rest and refitting . On 23 August , General Deane turned over command of the 173rd to Brigadier General Leo H . Schweiter . On 17 September , two battalions of the 173rd departed the area to protect the rice harvest in Phu Yen Province . The 2nd of the 503rd remained at Đắk Tô along with the 3rd ARVN Airborne Battalion to carry out a sweep of the Toumarong Valley north of Đắk Tô and the suspected location of a PAVN regimental headquarters . After three weeks of fruitless searching , however , the operation was halted on 11 October . Operation " Greeley " was over . Prelude . By early October , U . S . intelligence reported that the North Vietnamese were withdrawing regiments from the Pleiku area to join those in Kontum Province , thereby dramatically increasing the strength of local forces to that of a full division . In response , the 4th Infantry began moving the 3rd Battalion , 12th Infantry and the 3rd Battalion , 8th Infantry into Đắk Tô to launch Operation " MacArthur " . On 29 October , the 4 / 503 of the 173rd Airborne Brigade was returned to the area as a reinforcement . The battalion was moved west of Đắk Tô to the CIDG camp at Ben Het to protect the construction of Fire Support Base 12 on 2 November . On 3 November , Sergeant Vu Hong , an artillery specialist with the 6th PAVN Regiment , defected to the South Vietnamese and was able to provide U . S . forces with detailed information on the disposition of PAVN forces and their objectives , both at Đắk Tô and at Ben Het , 18 kilometers to the west . The North Vietnamese had fed approximately 6 , 000 troops into the area , most of which made up the 1st PAVN Division . The 66th PAVN Regiment was southwest of Đắk Tô preparing to launch the main attack while the 32nd PAVN Regiment was moved south to prevent any counterattacks against the 66th . The independent 24th PAVN Regiment held positions northeast of Đắk Tô to prevent reinforcement of the base from that direction . The 174th PAVN Regiment was northwest of Đắk Tô , acting as a reserve or an offensive force as the situation dictated . In addition , the 1st PAVN Division was supported by the 40th PAVN Artillery Regiment . The goal of these units was the taking of Đắk Tô and the destruction of a brigade - size American unit . The communist actions around Đắk Tô were part of an overall strategy devised by the Hanoi leadership , primarily that of General Nguyen Chi Thanh . The goal of operations in the area , according to a captured document from the B - 3 Front Command , was " to annihilate a major U . S . element in order to force the enemy to deploy as many additional troops to the Central Highlands as possible . " As the Americans quickly discovered , the area had been well prepared by the North Vietnamese . The number and elaborateness of defensive preparations found by U . S . and ARVN troops indicated that some had been prepared as much as six months in advance . As General Peers noted : Nearly every key terrain feature was heavily fortified with elaborate bunker and trench complexes . He had moved quantities of supplies and ammunition into the area . He was prepared to stay . After contact with the PAVN forces on the 4th and 5th of the month , General Schweiter received orders to move the rest of his brigade back to Đắk Tô . The immediate goal of the paratroopers was first to establish a base of operations and bolster the defenses at Ben Het . They would then begin to search for the headquarters of the 66th PAVN Regiment , which U . S . intelligence believed to be in the valley stretching south of FSB 12 . Simultaneously , most of the remaining elements of the 4th Infantry Division moved into the area around Đắk Tô . They were joined by two First Air Cavalry battalions ( the 1 / 12 and 2 / 8th Cavalry ) and ARVN forces consisting of the four battalions of the 42nd Regiment and the 2nd and 3rd Airborne Battalions . By this time , the village and airstrip had become a major logistical base , supporting an entire U . S . division and airborne brigade and six ARVN battalions . The stage was set for a major pitched battle . Battle . Operation " MacArthur " . The first fighting of the new operation erupted on 3 November and 4 November when companies of the 4th Infantry came across PAVN defensive positions . The next day the same thing occurred to elements of the 173rd . The American and ARVN troops soon applied a methodical approach to combat in the highlands . They combed the hills on foot , ran into fixed PAVN hill - top defensive positions , applied massive firepower , and then launched ground attacks to force the North Vietnamese off . In all of these instances , PAVN troops fought stubbornly , inflicted casualties on the Americans , and then withdrew . To expand the coverage of supporting artillery fires , the 4th Battalion of the 173rd was ordered to occupy Hill 823 , south of Ben Het , for the construction of Fire Support Base 15 . Since the rest of the battalion ' s companies were already deployed elsewhere , the 120 men of Bravo Company would combat assault onto the hilltop by helicopter alone . After several attempts to denude the hilltop with airstrikes and artillery fire , Bravo company landed unopposed that afternoon , but the hill was not unoccupied . Fifteen minutes later , contact was made with the North Vietnamese . The battle that ensued raged at close quarters until early the following morning when elements of the 66th PAVN Regiment withdrew , leaving behind more than 100 bodies . Nine Americans of Bravo Company , 4 / 503 also lay dead and another 28 were wounded . The following morning Bravo Company was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel David J . Schumacher ' s 1 / 503 , which ( against the admonitions of Colonel Livsey ) was divided into two small Task Forces . Task Force Black consisted of Charlie Company supported by two platoons of Dog Company and Task Force Blue which was composed of Alpha Company and the remaining platoon of Dog . Task Force Black left Hill 823 to find the North Vietnamese who had attacked B / 4 / 403 . At 08 : 28 on 11 November , after leaving their overnight laager and following a PAVN communications wire , the force was ambushed by the 8th and 9th Battalions of the 66th PAVN Regiment and had to fight for its life . Task Force Blue and Charlie Company 4 / 503 drew the job of going to the relief of the beleaguered task force . They encountered fire from all sides during the relief attempt , but they made it , reaching the trapped men at 15 : 37 . U . S . losses were 20 killed , 154 wounded , and two missing . The commanding officer of Task Force Black , Captain Thomas McElwain , reported an enemy body count of 80 but was commanded by Schumacher ( whose conduct of the action later came under severe criticism ) to go out and count again . He then reported back that 175 PAVN soldiers had been killed . He later stated that " If you lost so many people killed and wounded , you had to have something to show for it . " McElwain and Schumacher later clashed over McElwain ' s recommendation for a decoration for Private First Class John Andrew Barnes , III , who had leapt on a grenade and sacrificed his life to save wounded comrades during the action . Schumacher refused to endorse the recommendation , stating that he did not think medals were for " men who committed suicide . " Barnes was later awarded the Medal of Honor . Simultaneous with this action was a North Vietnamese attack on the three companies of the 3 / 8th Infantry of the 4th Infantry Division on Hill 724 . Beginning at 13 : 07 and lasting for thirty minutes , a mortar barrage rained onto the battalion ' s laager site . North Vietnamese troops then charged out of the jungle to the attack . By the time the action ended at 19 : 03 , 18 Americans were dead and another 118 were wounded . The 4th Infantry claimed that 92 North Vietnamese had died in the clash . On the night of 12 November , the North Vietnamese launched the first of many rocket attacks against the airstrip at Đắk Tô , firing 44 missiles . By 08 : 00 on 15 November , three C - 130 Hercules transport aircraft were in the turnaround area as a PAVN mortar barrage landed squarely on the aircraft , destroying two of them . The resulting fires and additional incoming mortar fire caught the ammunition dump and fuel storage areas a blaze with explosions continued all day and into the night . During that night ' s incoming shelling , a lone mortar round landed on two steel containers of C - 4 plastic explosive . Both detonated simultaneously , sending a fireball and mushroom cloud high above the valley and leaving two craters 40 feet deep . This was said to be the largest explosion to occur in the Vietnam War , knocking men off their feet over a mile away . The explosion destroyed the entire 15th Light Equipment Company compound next to the ammunition dump but miraculously no one was killed . Engineer Lieutenant Fred Dyerson thought " it looked like Charlie had gotten hold of some nuclear weapons . " Although more than 1 , 100 tons of ordnance were destroyed during the explosions and fires , this was as close as the North Vietnamese would get to taking Dak To . The rapid deployment of allied forces had upset the North Vietnamese offensive and had thrown them onto the defensive . Previous actions had battered the 66th and 33rd PAVN Regiments , and they began a southwesterly retreat , covered by the 174th Regiment . The Americans and the ARVN then began to run into tenacious rearguard actions . To prevent a repetition of the artillery attack against its base camp , the 4th Division ' s 3rd Battalion , 12th Infantry Regiment was ordered to take Hill 1338 , which had an excellent overview of Đắk Tô , only six kilometers away . For two days , the Americans fought their way up the steep slope of the hill and into the most elaborate bunker complex yet discovered , all of the fortifications of which were connected by field telephones . After scouring the area of the North Vietnamese who attacked Task Force Black , the three companies of 1 / 503 moved southwest to occupy Hill 882 . The force was accompanied by approximately a dozen civilian news correspondents . On the morning of 15 November , the lead company crested the hill and discovered bunkers connected by telephone wire . They were then attacked , and the rest of the Americans rushed to the hilltop to take defensive positions . PAVN troops poured small arms , machine gun , and mortar fire on the Americans and launched several ground attacks . The U . S . commander requested helicopter evacuation for the most seriously wounded , but this request was denied by Colonel Schumacher , who demanded that the civilians be evacuated first . When the fighting ceased on 19 November the U . S . battalion had suffered seven killed and 34 wounded . The North Vietnamese 66th Regiment left behind 51 dead . While the action on Hill 882 was underway , tragedy struck Dog Company , 4 / 503 . The unit was conducting road clearing operations around Ben Het while being accompanied by a CIDG Mike Force . While calling in an artillery fire mission , an error caused two rounds to fall on the company ' s position . Six Americans and three CIDG were killed outright and 15 paratroopers and 13 CIDG troops were wounded in the friendly fire incident . South Vietnamese units had also found plenty of action in the Đắk Tô area . On 18 November , on Hill 1416 northeast of Tan Canh , the ARVN 3 / 42nd Infantry found the PAVN 24th Infantry Regiment in well - fortified defensive positions . The elite , all - volunteer ARVN 3rd and 9th Airborne Battalions joined the action , attacking the hill from another direction . The ARVN forces took the hill on 20 November after vicious close - quarters fighting that claimed 66 South Vietnamese dead and another 290 wounded . The North Vietnamese left behind 248 of their own . U . S intelligence indicated that the fresh 174th PAVN Regiment had slipped westward past Ben Het and had taken up positions on an 875 meter - high hill just six kilometers from the border . The 174th had done so in order to cover the withdrawal of the 66th and 32nd Regiments , which were moving toward their sanctuaries across the Cambodian frontier . On 19 November , General Schweiter was informed that a Special Forces Mobile Strike Force company had run into heavy resistance while reconning the area . He then ordered his 2nd Battalion to take the hill . Hill 875 . At 09 : 43 on 19 November , the three companies ( 330 men ) of 2 / 503 moved into jumpoff positions from which to assault Hill 875 . Charlie and Delta companies moved up the slope followed by two platoons of Alpha Company in the classic " two up one back " formation utilized since World War I . The Weapons Platoon of Alpha remained behind at the bottom of the hill to cut out a landing zone . Instead of a frontal assault with massed troops , the unit would have been better served by advancing small teams to develop possible North Vietnamese positions and then calling in air and artillery support . At 10 : 30 , as the Americans moved to within 300 meters of the crest , PAVN machine gunners opened fire on the advancing paratroopers . Then B - 40 rockets and 57mm recoilless rifle fire were unleashed upon them . The paratroopers attempted to continue the advance , but the North Vietnamese , well concealed in interconnected bunkers and trenches , opened fire with small arms and grenades . The American advance was halted and the men went to ground , finding whatever cover they could . At 14 : 30 PAVN troops hidden at the bottom of the hill launched a massed assault on Alpha Company . Unknown to the Americans , they had walked into a carefully prepared ambush by the 2nd Battalion of the 174th PAVN Regiment . The men of Alpha Company retreated up the slope , lest they be cut off from their comrades and annihilated . They were closely followed by the North Vietnamese . All that prevented the company - strength North Vietnamese onslaught from overrunning the entire battalion was the heroic efforts of American paratroopers who stood their ground and died to buy time for their comrades . Soon , U . S . air strikes and artillery fire were being called in , but they had little effect on the battle because of the dense foliage on the hillside . Resupply became a necessity because of high ammunition expenditures and lack of water , but it was also an impossibility . Six UH - 1 helicopters were shot down or badly damaged that afternoon trying to get to 2 / 503 . At 18 : 58 one of the worst friendly fire incidents of the Vietnam War occurred when a Marine Corps fighter - bomber dropped two 500 - pound bombs into 2 / 503 ' s perimeter . One of the bombs exploded , a tree burst above the center of the position , where the combined command groups , the wounded , and the medics were all located . It killed 42 men outright and wounded 45 more , including the overall on - scene commander , Captain Harold Kaufman . 1Lt . Bartholomew O ' Leary , Delta Company Commander , was seriously wounded . ( Alpha company ' s commander had been killed in the retreat up the slope ) . The next morning , the three companies of 4 / 503 were chosen to set out and relieve the men on Hill 875 . Because of intense PAVN sniper and mortar fire ( and the terrain ) it took until nightfall for the relief force to reach the beleaguered battalion . On the afternoon of 21 November , both battalions moved out to take the crest . During fierce , close - quarters fighting , some of the paratroopers made it into the PAVN trenchline but were ordered to pull back as darkness fell . At approximately 23 : 00 , the 4th Division ' s 1 / 12th Infantry was ordered to withdraw from an offensive operations in the southern Central Highlands and redeploy to Đắk Tô . In an almost flawless night - time air redeployment , the entire battalion redeployed and took up positions around the main fire support base at Đắk Tô in less than 12 hours . The following day was spent in launching airstrikes and a heavy artillery bombardment against the hilltop , totally denuding it of cover . On 23 November , the 2nd and 4th Battalions of the 503rd were ordered to renew their assault while the 1st Battalion of the 12th Infantry assaulted 875 from the south . This time the Americans gained the crest , but the North Vietnamese had already abandoned their positions , leaving only a few dozen charred bodies and weapons . The battle of Hill 875 had cost 2 / 503 87 killed , 130 wounded , and three missing . 4 / 503 suffered 28 killed 123 wounded , and four missing . Combined with noncombatant losses , this represented one - fifth of the 173rd Airborne Brigade ' s total strength . For its combined actions during operations around Đắk Tô , the 173rd Airborne Brigade was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation . Aftermath . By the end of November , the North Vietnamese were forced to withdraw from the area and back into their sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos . Failing to wipe out a major American unit , yet the PAVN had forced the U . S . Army to pay a high price . 376 U . S . troops had been killed or listed as missing - presumed dead and another 1 , 441 were wounded , in the fighting around Đắk Tô . The fighting had also taken a toll on South Vietnamese troops . 73 ARVN soldiers were killed in the fighting . U . S . munitions expenditures attested to the ferocity of the fighting : 151 , 000 artillery rounds , 2 , 096 tactical air sorties , 257 B - 52 strikes , and 40 lost helicopters . The U . S . Army claimed that 1 , 644 PAVN troops had been killed by body count , but this figure quickly became a source of contention . In his memoirs , General William C . Westmoreland , U . S . commander in Vietnam , mentioned 1 , 400 North Vietnamese casualties , while Major General William B . Rossen , the MACV deputy commander , estimated that the North Vietnamese lost between 1 , 000 to 1 , 400 men . Not all American commanders were happy with the friendly to enemy loss ratio . U . S . Marine Corps General John Chaisson questioned " Is it a victory when you lose 362 friendlies in three weeks and by your own spurious body count you only get 1 , 200 ? " Three of the four North Vietnamese regiments that participated in the fighting had been so battered that they played no part in the next phase of their winter - spring offensive . Only the 24th PAVN Regiment took the field during the Tet Offensive of January 1968 . The 173rd Airborne Brigade and two battalions of the 4th Infantry Division were in no better shape . General Westmoreland claimed that " we had soundly defeated the enemy without unduly sacrificing operations in other areas . The enemy ' s return was nil . " But Westmoreland ' s claim may have missed the point . The border battles fought that fall and winter had indeed cost the North Vietnamese dearly , but they had achieved their objective . By January 1968 , one - half of all U . S . maneuver battalions in South Vietnam had been drawn away from the cities and lowlands and into the border areas . Several members of Westmoreland ' s staff began to see an eerie resemblance to the Viet Minh campaign of 1953 , when seemingly peripheral actions had led up to the climactic Battle of Dien Bien Phu . General Giap even laid claim to such a strategy in an announcement in September , but , to the Americans , it all seemed a bit too contrived . Yet , no understandable analysis seemed to explain Hanoi ' s almost suicidal military actions . They could only be explained if a situation akin to Dien Bien Phu came into being . Then , almost overnight , one emerged . In the western corner of Quang Tri Province , an isolated Marine outpost at Khe Sanh came under siege by PAVN forces that would eventually number three divisions . Three members of the 173rd Airborne Brigade ( Maj . Charles J . Watters , Pfc . John A . Barnes III and Pfc . Carlos Lozada ) all posthumously received the Medal of Honor for their actions during the battle .