Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States , also called the Rumsfeld Commission , was an independent commission formed by the US Congress to evaluate the ballistic missile threat posed to the United States . The group began work in January 1998 and issued their unanimous final report on July 15 , 1998 , within the six - month mandate . The report warned of a growing threat of ballistic missiles and the inability for US intelligence to keep track of developments . This contrasted with the views of previous US intelligence estimates , which stated that the threat of ballistic missiles was still 10 to 20 years away . The commission further fueled the debate over a national missile defense system , and may have contributed to the coining of the phrase axis of evil . Background . The argument for a national missile defense system in the United States was traditionally to protect the country from a Soviet missile attack . With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 , proponents of a missile defense shield began instead to focus on the risk posed by rogue state s developing ballistic missiles capable of eventually reaching the US . This case was blunted by a 1995 National Intelligence Estimate ( NIE ) , which stated that no country besides the five major nuclear powers was capable of acquiring missiles that could reach Canada or the contiguous United States within the ensuing 15 years . Republican lawmakers intent on funding a defensive shield criticized the report and the Clinton administration for inaccurate assessments and distorted intelligence . Republican Congressman Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania walked out of a CIA briefing on the NIE , and later said that it was " the most outrageous politicisation of an intelligence document that I ' ve seen in the 10 years I ' ve been in Washington . " From February to May 1996 , the House National Security Committee held hearings on the ballistic missile threat , and in a final report recommended that two reviews be created : one to investigate the NIE itself , and another to complete a new investigation of the ballistic missile threat . This process was also highly politicized , and the ranking Democrat on the committee , California Congressman Ronald Dellums , accused it of relying far too heavily on outside experts . Many of the witnesses called before the committee were in fact strong proponents of missile defense . The first review was conducted by former Director of Central Intelligence ( DCI ) and future Defense Secretary Robert Gates . He concluded that while there was evidence of faulty methodology in the NIE , there was no political bias in its conclusions . This conclusion again angered the missile defense supporters who had counted on this review to further their arguments . Commission history . The second review was to be conducted by an outside commission , although it took lawmakers until 1997 to agree upon the commission ' s membership . The commission eventually began to meet in mid - January 1998 in the Old Executive Office Building and under the chairmanship of former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld . Although the commission was not formed to investigate the feasibility of a national missile defense shield , the reality that their conclusions would influence that debate led many in Washington to doubt that a unanimous conclusion was possible . Rumsfeld still wished to reach a consensus , and instituted a policy whereby any noted objection in the report needed to have the support of at least two commissioners . The first weeks of deliberations and testimonies gleaned little new information on the threat being investigated , so in mid - February , with their mandate supposedly giving them access to all necessary information from the executive branch , the commission complained in person to then DCI George Tenet . From that point on , the commission gained much greater access to the information and personnel of the US intelligence community . The commission continued briefings until mid - July 1998 . During that time they were frustrated by the compartmentalization of intelligence , the refusal of analysts to speculate or hypothesize on given information , and what they considered general inexperience in the intelligence personnel . The group did not limit their interviews to members of the government , but also spoke with employees of Boeing and Lockheed Martin , especially about how Scud missile designs could be used as the basis for a long - range ballistic missile program . Conclusions . There were two final reports of the commission : a 300 - page classified report for Congress and a 27 - page unclassified report . In the unclassified version , the group came to four unanimous conclusions : Aftermath . Immediate . The findings of the commission generated mixed reactions among lawmakers , intelligence officers , and experts . The intelligence community was privately angered by the harsh language the report used to describe their own assessments of the threat , although CIA Director George Tenet did not openly criticize it in public . Congressional proponents of a national missile shield , especially Republicans , used the findings to further push their case that such a shield was necessary . However , some experts in and out of government questioned the usefulness of the report , saying that it made general speculations without reaching any definite conclusions . Whereas the intelligence estimate focused on what was actually occurring , the commission focused on what might occur . This was labeled in one article " ' hypothesis - based ' threat assessment " . Many observers took a moderate tone in their reaction , acknowledging that funding should be provided for further national missile defense tests , but also saying that the US should not rush into developing technology that might prove ineffective and too costly . Within months of the final report several events occurred which to some supporters reinforced the commission ' s conclusions . In late July , Iran tested for the first time its new Shahab - 3 missile , which traveled before exploding . Its basic design was modeled on the North Korean Rodong - 1 . North Korea launched what it described as a three - stage satellite launch on August 31 of that year , a surprise for US intelligence , which had expected a test of the two - stage Taepodong - 1 ( partially based on the Scud ) . While the third stage failed , it was nonetheless a major development in that introduced stage separation and solid fuel in North Korean rocketry . Bush Administration . The commission reentered the public consciousness in 2000 when the former chairman of the commission , Donald Rumsfeld , was named by newly elected President George W . Bush to be Secretary of Defense , his second time in that office . On December 30 , 2000 , Richard Garwin , a former commissioner , praised Rumsfeld for his commission work in a " New York Times " op - ed piece , although he reiterated that the commission never suggested whether or not the US should build a missile defense system . Other staffers and members of the commission were also appointed by the new Bush administration : Paul Wolfowitz was named Deputy Secretary of Defense , William Schneider , Jr . was appointed by Rumsfeld to the Defense Science Board , and in March 2003 Stephen Cambone was selected by Rumsfeld to fill the newly created Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence position . Robert Gates , the man who conducted the first review of the ballistic missile threat , was appointed Secretary of Defense after Rumsfeld ' s November 2006 resignation . The commission is thought by some foreign policy analysts to be the basis for President George W . Bush ' s axis of evil line in his 2002 State of the Union Address , in which he accused Iraq , Iran , and North Korea of being state sponsors of terrorism and of pursuing weapons of mass destruction . The Rumsfeld Commission grouped the three countries together because they all were believed to be pursuing ballistic missile programs based on the Scud missile . In the pre - 9 / 11 days of the Bush presidency , the administration had focused heavily on developing a national missile defense system to counter such threats . A month after the address , former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich , who appointed Rumsfeld as head of the commission , mentioned the importance of the commission ' s findings in relation to the US ability to predict the threat posed by the axis members . Participants . The commission was chaired by former Secretary of Defense and Republican Donald Rumsfeld , and included the following members :