Battle of Hamburger Hill The Battle of Hamburger Hill was a battle of the Vietnam War that was fought by the United States and South Vietnam against North Vietnamese forces from May 10 – 20 , 1969 . Although the heavily fortified Hill 937 was of little strategic value , U . S . command ordered its capture by a frontal assault , only to abandon it soon thereafter . The action caused an outrage both in the American military and public . The battle was primarily an infantry engagement , with the U . S . Airborne troops moving up the steeply - sloped hill against well entrenched troops . Attacks were repeatedly repelled by North Vietnamese Army ( NVA ) defenses , weather , friendly fire , and accidents . Nevertheless the Airborne troops took the hill through direct assault , causing extensive casualties to the NVA forces . Background . Terrain . The battle took place on Dong Ap Bia ( Ap Bia Mountain , ) in the rugged , jungle - shrouded mountains of South Vietnam , from the Laotian border . Rising from the floor of the western A Shau Valley , Ap Bia Mountain is a looming , solitary massif , unconnected to the ridges of the surrounding Annamite range . It dominates the northern valley , towering some above sea level . Snaking down from its highest peak are a series of ridges and fingers , one of the largest extending southeast to a height of , another reaching south to a peak . The entire mountain is a rugged , uninviting wilderness blanketed in double - and triple - canopy jungle , dense thickets of bamboo , and waist - high elephant grass that in some cases was taller than an M113 Armored Personnel Carrier . Local Montagnard tribesmen called Ap Bia " the mountain of the crouching beast " . Official histories of the engagement refer to it as Hill 937 after the elevation displayed on U . S . Army maps , but the American soldiers who fought there dubbed it " Hamburger Hill " , suggesting that those who fought on the hill were " chewed up like a hamburger " in joking reference to the Battle of Pork Chop Hill during the Korean War . Order of battle . The battle on Hamburger Hill occurred in May 1969 , during Operation Apache Snow , the second part of a three - phased campaign intended to destroy North Vietnam Army ( NVA ) Base Areas in the remote A Shau Valley . This campaign was a series of operations intended to neutralize the A Shau , which had been an infiltration route into South Vietnam prior to 1966 , when the North Vietnamese seized the Special Forces camp in the valley during the Battle of A Shau and established a permanent presence . Subsequent U . S . efforts to clear the valley had been consistently unsuccessful . Lieutenant General Richard G . Stilwell , commander of XXIV Corps , amassed the equivalent of two divisions supported by substantial artillery and air support to accomplish the task . The North Vietnamese had moved their 6th , 9th , and 29th Regiments into the area to recover from losses sustained during a previous U . S . Marine operation ( Operation Dewey Canyon ) in February . Assigned to Apache Snow were three airborne infantry battalions of the 101st Airborne Division , commanded by Major General Melvin Zais . These units of the division ' s 3rd Brigade ( commanded by Colonel Joseph Conmy ) were the 3rd Battalion , 187th Infantry Regiment ( Lt . Col . Weldon Honeycutt ) ; 2nd Battalion , 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment ( Lt . Col . Robert German ) ; and the 1st Battalion , 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment ( Lt . Col . John Bowers ) . Two battalions of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam ' s ( ARVN ) 1st Division ( the 2 / 1st and 4 / 1st ) had been temporarily assigned to the 3rd Brigade in support . Other major units participating in Apache Snow included the 9th Marine Regiment ; and 3rd Squadron , 5th Cavalry Regiment and the 3rd ARVN Regiment . Planning . Colonel Conmy characterized the operation as a reconnaissance in force . His plan called for the five battalions to " combat assault " into the valley by helicopter on May 10 , 1969 , and to search their assigned sectors for PAVN troops and supplies . The overall plan of attack called for the Marines and the 3 / 5th Cavalry to reconnaissance in force toward the Laotian border while the ARVN units cut the highway through the base of the valley . The 501st and the 506th were to destroy the enemy in their own operating areas and block escape routes into Laos . If a battalion made heavy contact with the North Vietnamese , Conmy would reinforce it by helicopter with one of the other units . In theory , the 101st could reposition its forces quickly enough to keep the PAVN from massing against any one unit , while a U . S . battalion discovering a North Vietnamese unit would fix it in place until a reinforcing battalion could lift in to cut off its retreat and destroy it . The U . S . and ARVN units participating in Apache Snow knew , based on existing intelligence information and previous experience in the A Shau , that the operation was likely to encounter serious resistance from PAVN . Beyond that , however , they had little intelligence as to the actual strength and dispositions of PAVN units . Masters of camouflage , the North Vietnamese completely concealed their bases from aerial surveillance . When PAVN forces moved , they did so at night along trails under triple - canopy jungle . They effected their command and control mainly by runner and wire , leaving no electronic signature to monitor or trace . U . S . battalion commanders had to generate their own tactical intelligence by combat patrols , capturing equipment , installations , documents , and occasionally prisoners of war to provide the raw data from which to draw their assessment of the North Vietnamese order of battle and dispositions . It was this time - consuming and hit - or - miss task force which characterized the main efforts of Colonel Honeycutt ' s 3 / 187th Infantry during the first four days of the operation . SGT F D Blandori and his unit held the south side of the slop as the NVA tried several time to flank the 3 / 187 , but sgt Blandori and his men held the line . Initially , the operation went routinely for the 101st Airborne Division . Its units experienced only light contact on the first day , but documents captured by 3 / 187th indicated that the 29th PAVN Regiment , nicknamed the " Pride of Ho Chi Minh " and a veteran of the 1968 Tet Offensive assault on Hue , was somewhere in the valley . Past experience in many of the larger encounters with PAVN indicated the North Vietnamese would resist violently for a short time and then withdraw before the Americans brought overwhelming firepower to bear against them . Prolonged combat , such as at Dak To and Ia Drang , had been relatively rare . Honeycutt anticipated his battalion had sufficient capability to carry out a reconnaissance on Hill 937 without further reinforcement , although he did request that the brigade reserve , his own Bravo Company , be released to his control . Honeycutt was a protégé of General William C . Westmoreland , the former commander of U . S . forces in Vietnam . He had been assigned command of the 3 / 187th in January and had by replacement of many of its officers given it a personality to match his own aggressiveness . His stated intention was to locate the PAVN force in his area of responsibility and engage it before it could escape into Laos . Battle . Reinforcing the assault on Hill 937 . They had made no significant contacts in its area of operations , and at midday on May 13 , the brigade commander , Colonel Conmy , decided it would move to cut off North Vietnamese reinforcement from Laos and to assist Honeycutt by attacking Hill 937 from the south . Its Bravo company was heli - lifted to Hill 916 , but the remainder of the battalion made the movement on foot , from an area from Hill 937 , and both Conmy and Honeycutt expected the 1 / 506th to be ready to provide support no later than the morning of May 15 . Although Bravo Company seized Hill 916 on May 15 , it was not until May 19 that the battalion as a whole was in position to conduct a final assault , primarily because of nearly impenetrable jungle . The 3 / 187 conducted multi - company assaults on May 14 and May 15 , incurring heavy casualties , to the 1 / 506th , made probing attacks on the south slopes of the mountain on May 16 and May 17 . The difficult terrain and well organized North Vietnamese forces continually disrupted the tempo of U . S . tactical operations on Hills 916 , 900 , and 937 . Steep gradients and dense vegetation provided few natural LZs in the vicinity of the mountain and made helicopter redeployments impractical . The terrain also masked the positions of the NVA " 29th Regiment " , making it nearly impossible to suppress anti - aircraft fire , while the jungle covered the movement of North Vietnamese units so completely that it created a nonlinear battlefield . NVA soldiers , able to maneuver freely around the LZs , shot down or damaged numerous helicopters with small arms fire , rocket - propelled grenades , and crew - served weapons . The North Vietnamese also assaulted nearby logistical support LZs and command posts at least four times , forcing deployment of units for security that might otherwise have been employed in assaults . Attacking companies had to provide for 360 - degree security as they maneuvered , since the terrain largely prevented them from mutually supporting one another . NVA platoon - and company - sized elements repeatedly struck maneuvering U . S . forces from the flanks and rear . Tactical difficulties . The effectiveness of U . S . maneuver forces was limited by narrow trails that funneled attacking companies into squad or platoon points of attack , where they encountered PAVN platoons and companies with prepared fields of fire . With most small arms engagements thus conducted at close range , U . S . fire support was also severely restricted . Units frequently pulled back and called in artillery fire , close air support , and ARA , but the North Vietnamese bunkers were well - sited and constructed with overhead cover to withstand bombardment . During the course of the battle the foliage was eventually stripped away and the bunkers exposed , but they were so numerous and well constructed that many could not be destroyed by indirect fire . Napalm , recoilless rifle fire , and dogged squad and platoon - level actions eventually accounted for the reduction of most fortifications , though at a pace and price thoroughly unanticipated by American forces . U . S . battle command of small units was essentially decentralized . Though Honeycutt constantly prodded his company commanders to push on , he could do little to coordinate mutual support until the final assaults , when the companies maneuvered in close proximity over the barren mountain top . Fire support for units in contact was also decentralized . Supporting fires , including those controlled by airborne forward air controller s , were often directed at the platoon level . Eventually human error led to five attacks by supporting aircraft on the 3 / 187th , killing seven and wounding 53 . Four of the incidents involved Cobra gunship helicopters , which in one case were more than away from their intended target . Hamburger Hill . On May 16 , Associated Press correspondent Jay Sharbutt learned of the ongoing battle on Hill 937 , traveled to the area and interviewed Zais , in particular asking why infantry , rather than firepower , was used as the primary offensive tool on Hill 937 . More reporters followed to cover the battle , and the term " Hamburger Hill " became widely used . The U . S . brigade commander ordered a coordinated two - battalion assault for May 18 , 1 / 506th attacking from the south and 3 / 187th attacking from the north , trying to keep the 29th NVA Regiment from concentrating on either battalion . Fighting to within of the summit , Delta Company 3 / 187th nearly carried the hill but experienced severe casualties , including all of its officers . The battle was one of close combat , with the two sides exchanging small arms and grenade fire within of one another . From a light observation helicopter , the battalion commander attempted to coordinate the movements of the other companies into a final assault , but an exceptionally intense thunderstorm reduced visibility to zero and ended the fighting . Unable to advance , 3 / 187 again withdrew down the mountain . The three converging companies of 1 / 506th struggled to take Hill 900 , the southern crest of the mountain , encountering heavy opposition for the first time in the battle . Because of the heavy casualties already sustained by his units and under pressure from the unwanted attention of the press , Zais seriously considered discontinuing the attack but decided otherwise . Both the corps commander and the MACV commander , General Creighton W . Abrams , publicly supported the decision . Zais decided to commit three fresh battalions to the battle and to have one of them relieve the 3 / 187th in place . The 3 / 187th ' s losses had been severe , with approximately 320 killed and wounded , including more than sixty percent of the 450 experienced troops who had assaulted into the valley . Two of its four company commanders and eight of twelve platoon leaders had become casualties . The battalion commander of the 2 / 506th , Lt . Col . Gene Sherron , arrived at Honeycutt ' s CP on the afternoon of May 18 to coordinate the relief . 3 / 187th was flying out its latest casualties , and its commander had not yet been informed of the relief . Before any arrangements were made , Zais landed and was confronted by Honeycutt , who argued that his battalion was still combat effective . After a sharp confrontation , Zais relented , although he assigned one of Sherron ' s companies to Honeycutt as reinforcement for the assault . Final assault . Two fresh battalions — the 2 / 501st Infantry and ARVN 2 / 3d Infantry — were airlifted into LZs northeast and southeast of the base of the mountain on May 19 . Both battalions immediately moved onto the mountain to positions from which they would attack the following morning . Meanwhile the 1 / 506 for the third consecutive day struggled to secure Hill 900 . The 3rd Brigade launched its four - battalion attack at 10 : 00 on May 20 , including two companies of the 3 / 187 reinforced by Alpha Company 1 / 506 . The attack was preceded by two hours of close air support and ninety minutes of artillery prep fires . The battalions attacked simultaneously , and by 12 : 00 elements of the 3 / 187 reached the crest , beginning a reduction of bunkers that continued through most of the afternoon . Some PAVN units were able to withdraw into Laos , and Hill 937 was secured by 17 : 00 . ARVN participation . The 2nd Battalion , 3rd Regiment of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam ' s 1st Division participated in the battle . Recent research , particularly the admission by General Creighton W . Abrams in " The Abrams Tapes " , says its role in the final assault was as follows . The unit was positioned on a stretch of the NVA defense line that was lightly defended , and sent a scout party to test the forward enemy lines earlier than the proposed assault time ; this party was quickly able to discern the minimal enemy strength . The 2 / 3 ARVN commanding officer decided to exploit the situation , and attack in advance of the other units . The 2 / 3 ARVN reached the crest of Hamburger Hill around 10 : 00 , ahead of the 3 / 187th , but was ordered to withdraw from the summit , allied artillery was to be directed on to the top of the hill . The opportunity to threaten the NVA lines facing the 3 / 187th was lost . Shortly after the 2 / 3 ARVN completed their withdrawal , the 3 / 187th was able to break through the NVA defenses and occupy the summit . Casualties . U . S . losses during the ten - day battle totaled 72 KIA and 372 WIA . To take the position , the 101st Airborne Division eventually committed five infantry battalions and ten batteries of artillery . In addition , the U . S . Air Force flew 272 missions and expended more than 500 tons of ordnance . U . S . claimed the 7th and 8th Battalions of the 29th NVA Regiment suffered 630 dead ( discovered on and around the battlefield ) ; including many found in makeshift mortuaries within the tunnel complex . Aftermath . Major General John M . Wright quietly abandoned the hill on June 5 . The debate over Hamburger Hill reached the United States Congress , with particularly severe criticism of military leadership by Senators Edward Kennedy , George McGovern , and Stephen M . Young . In its June 27 issue , Life Magazine published the photographs of 241 Americans killed in one week in Vietnam ; considered a watershed event of negative public opinion toward the Vietnam War . While only five of the 241 featured photos were of those killed in the battle , many Americans had the perception that all of the photos featured in the magazine were casualties of the battle . The controversy of the conduct of the Battle of Hamburger Hill led to a reappraisal of U . S . strategy in South Vietnam . As a direct result , to hold down casualties , General Abrams discontinued a policy of " maximum pressure " against the North Vietnamese to one of " protective reaction " for troops threatened with combat action , while simultaneously President Richard Nixon announced the first troop withdrawal from South Vietnam . In popular culture . John Irvin ' s 1987 film , " Hamburger Hill " , is a fictionalized account of the battle ( while the film ' s plot is based on real events , it features fictional characters ) . The American documentary television miniseries , " Vietnam in HD " ( which aired on the History Channel ) , features The Battle of Hamburger Hill . In particular , the Battle of Hamburger Hill is related by featured veterans Karl Marlantes and Arthur Wiknik . The videogame " " features a multiplayer map named Hill 137 ( rather than 937 ) , which includes heavily fortified positions similar to those seen on Hill 937 . Additionally , if the US side loses a round , a newsreel - style voiceover states that the US Army nicknamed the hill " Hamburger Hill " .