United States biological defense program The United States biological defense program began as a small defensive effort that paralleled the country ' s offensive biological weapons development and production program , active between 1943 and 1969 . Organizationally , the medical defense research effort was pursued first ( 1956 - 1969 ) by the U . S . Army Medical Unit ( USAMU ) and later , after the discontinuation of the offensive program , by the U . S . Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases ( USAMRIID ) . Both of these units were located at Fort Detrick , Maryland , where the U . S . Army Biological Warfare Laboratories were headquartered . The current mission is multi - agency , not exclusively military , and is purely to develop defensive measures against bio - agents , as opposed to the former bio - weapons development program . However , these U . S . biodefense programs — military and civilian — have long raised concerns that the U . S . may be pursuing research that is outlawed by the Biological Weapons Convention ( BWC ) of 1972 . Since the 2001 anthrax attacks , and the consequent expansion of federal bio - defense expenditures , USAMRIID has been joined at Fort Detrick by sister bio - defense agencies of the U . S . Department of Health and Human Services ( NIAID ’ s Integrated Research Facility ) and the U . S . Department of Homeland Security ( the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center and the National Bioforensic Analysis Center ) . These — along with the much older Foreign Disease Weed Science Research Unit of the U . S . Department of Agriculture — now constitute the National Interagency Confederation for Biological Research ( NICBR ) . Overview . Biological agent s have been used in warfare for centuries to produce death or disease in humans , animals , or plants . The United States , however , did not begin a biological warfare offensive program until 1941 . During the next 28 years , the U . S . initiative evolved into an effective , military - driven research and acquisition program , shrouded in secrecy and , later , controversy . Most research and development was done at Fort Detrick , Maryland , while production and testing of bio - weapons occurred at Pine Bluff , Arkansas , and Dugway Proving Ground ( DPG ) , Utah . Field testing was done secretly and successfully with simulants and actual agents disseminated over wide areas . A small defensive effort always paralleled the weapons development and production program . With the presidential decision in 1969 to halt offensive biological weapons production — and the agreement in 1972 at the international BWC never to develop , produce , stockpile , or retain biological agents or toxins — the program became entirely defensive , with medical and nonmedical components . The U . S . biological defense research program exists today , conducting research to develop physical and medical countermeasures to protect service members and civilians from the threat of modern biological warfare . Both the U . S . bio - weapons ban and the BWC restricted any work in the area of biological warfare to defensive in nature . In reality , this gives BWC member - states wide latitude to conduct biological weapons research because the BWC contains no provisions for monitoring of enforcement . The treaty , essentially , is a gentlemen ' s agreement amongst members backed by the long - prevailing thought that biological warfare should not be used in battle . In recent years certain critics have claimed the U . S . stance on biological warfare and the use of biological agents has differed from historical interpretations of the BWC . For example , it is said that the U . S . now maintains that the Article I of the BWC ( which explicitly bans bio - weapons ) , does not apply to " non - lethal " biological agents . Previous interpretation was stated to be in line with a definition laid out in Public Law 101 - 298 , the Biological Weapons Anti - Terrorism Act of 1989 . That law defined a biological agent as : any micro - organism , virus , infectious substance , or biological product that may be engineered as a result of biotechnology , or any naturally occurring or bioengineered component of any such microorganism , virus , infectious substance , or biological product , capable of causing death , disease , or other biological malfunction in a human , an animal , a plant , or another living organism ; deterioration of food , water , equipment , supplies , or material of any kind . . . According to the Federation of American Scientists , U . S . work on non - lethal agents exceeds limitations in the BWC . History . 1950s . After World War II , and with the onset of Cold War tensions , the US continued its clandestine wartime bio - weapons program . The Korean War ( 1950 – 53 ) added justification for continuing the program , when the possible entry of the Soviet Union into the war was feared . Concerns over the Soviet Union were justified , for the Soviet Union would pronounce in 1956 that chemical and biological weapons would , indeed , be used for mass destruction in future wars . In October 1950 , the US Secretary of Defense approved continuation of the program , based largely on the Soviet threat and a belief that the North Korean and Chinese communists would use biological weapons . With expansion of the biological warfare retaliatory program , the scope of the defensive program was nearly doubled . Data were obtained on personnel protection , decontamination , and immunization . Early detection research produced prototype alarms for use on the battlefield , but progress was slow , apparently limited by technology . The U . S . Army Medical Unit , under the direction of The U . S . Army Surgeon General , began formal operations in 1956 . One of the Unit ’ s first missions was to manage all aspects of Project CD - 22 , the exposure of volunteers to aerosols containing a pathogenic strain of " Coxiella burnetii " , the etiologic agent of Q fever . The volunteers were closely monitored and antibiotic therapy was administered when appropriate . All volunteers recovered from Q fever with no adverse aftereffects . One year later , the Unit submitted to the U . S . Food and Drug Administration an Investigational New Drug application for a Q fever vaccine . 1960s . In the following decade , the US accumulated significant data on personnel protection , decontamination , and immunization ; and , in the offensive program , on the potential for mosquitoes to be used as biological vectors . A new Department of Defense ( DoD ) Biological and Chemical Defense Planning Board was created in 1960 to establish program priorities and objectives . Preventive approaches toward infections of all kinds were funded under the auspices of biological warfare . As concern increased over the biological warfare threat during the Cold War , so did the budget for the program : to $ 38 million by fiscal year 1966 . The U . S . Army Chemical Corps was given the responsibility to conduct biological warfare research for all of the services . In 1962 , the responsibility for the testing of promising biological warfare agents was given to a separate Testing and Evaluation Command ( TEC ) . Depending on the particular program , different test centers were used , such as the Deseret Test Center at Fort Douglas , Utah , the headquarters for the new biological and chemical warfare testing organization . In response to increasing concerns over public safety and the environment , the TEC implemented a complex system of approval of its research programs that included the U . S . Army Chief of Staff , the Joint Chiefs of Staff , the Secretary of Defense , and the President of the United States . During the last 10 years of the offensive research and development program ( 1959 – 69 ) , many scientific advances were made that proved that biological warfare was clearly feasible , although dependent on careful planning , especially with regard to meteorological conditions . Large - scale fermentation , purification , concentration , stabilization , drying , and weaponization of pathogenic microorganisms could be done safely . Furthermore , modern principles of biosafety and containment were established at the Fort Detrick laboratories which have greatly facilitated biomedical research in general ; still today , these are followed throughout the world . Arnold G . Wedum , M . D . , Ph . D . , a civilian scientist who was Director of Industrial Health and Safety at Fort Detrick , was the leader in the development of containment facilities . During the 1960s , the US program underwent a philosophical change , and attention was now directed more towards biological agents that could incapacitate , but not kill . In 1964 , research programs involved staphylococcal enterotoxin s capable of causing food poisoning . Research initiatives also included new therapy and prophylaxis . Pathogens studied included the agents causing anthrax , glanders , brucellosis , melioidosis , plague , psittacosis , Venezuelan equine encephalitis , Q fever , coccidioidomycosis , and a variety of plant and animal pathogens Particular attention was directed at chemical and biological detectors during the 1960s . The first devices were primitive field alarms to detect chemicals . Although the development of sensitive biological warfare agent detectors was at a standstill , two systems were , nonetheless , investigated . The first was a monitor that detected increases in the number of particles sized 1 to 5 µm in diameter , based on the assumption that a biological agent attack would include airborne particles of this size . The second system involved the selective staining of particles collected from the air . Both systems lacked enough specificity and sensitivity to be of any practical use . But in 1966 , a research effort directed at detecting the presence of adenosine triphosphate ( a chemical found only in living organisms ) was begun . By using a fluorescent material found in fireflies , preliminary studies indicated that it was possible to detect the presence of a biological agent in the atmosphere . The important effort to find a satisfactory detection system continues today , for timely detection of a biological attack would allow the attacked force to use its protective masks effectively , and identification of the agent would allow any pre - treatment regimens to be instituted . The US Army also experimented with and developed highly effective barrier protective measures against both chemical and biological agents . Special impervious tents and personal protective equipment were developed , including individual gas masks even for military dogs . During the late 1960s , funding for the biological warfare program decreased temporarily , to accommodate the accelerating costs of the Vietnam War . The budget for fiscal year 1969 was $ 31 million , decreasing to $ 11 . 8 million by fiscal year 1973 . Although the offensive program had been stopped in 1969 , both offensive and defensive programs continued to be defended . John S . Foster , Jr , Director of Defense Research and Engineering , responded to a query by Congressman Richard D . McCarthy : It is the policy of the U . S . to develop and maintain a defensive chemical - biological ( CB ) capability so that our military forces could operate for some period of time in a toxic environment , if necessary ; to develop and maintain a limited offensive capability in order to deter all use of CB weapons by the threat of retaliation in kind ; and to continue a program of research and development in this area to minimize the possibility of technological surprise . On 25 November 1969 , President Richard Nixon visited Fort Detrick to announce a new policy on biological warfare . In two National Security Memoranda , the U . S . government renounced all development , production , and stockpiling of biological weapons and declared its intent to maintain only small research quantities of biological agents , such as are necessary for the development of vaccines , drugs , and diagnostics . Ground was broken in 1967 for construction of a new , modern laboratory building at Fort Detrick . The building would open in phases during 1971 and 1972 . With the disestablishment of the biological warfare laboratories , the name of the U . S . Army Medical Unit , which was to have been housed in the new laboratories , was formally changed to U . S . Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases ( USAMRIID ) in 1969 . The institute ’ s new mission was stated in General Order 137 , 10 November 1971 ( since superseded ) : Conducts studies related to medical defensive aspects of biological agents of military importance and develops appropriate biological protective measures , diagnostic procedures and therapeutic methods . The emphasis now shifted away from offensive weapons to development of vaccines , diagnostic systems , personal protection , chemoprophylaxis , and rapid detection systems . 1970s . After Nixon declared an end to the U . S . bio - weapons program , debate in the Army centered around whether or not toxin weapons were included in the president ' s declaration . Following Nixon ' s November 1969 order , scientists at Fort Detrick worked on one toxin , " Staphylococcus " enterotoxin type B ( SEB ) , for several more months . Nixon ended the debate when he added toxins to the bio - weapons ban in February 1970 In response to Nixon ’ s 1969 decision , all antipersonnel biological warfare stocks were destroyed between 10 May 1971 and 1 May 1972 . The laboratory at Pine Bluff Arsenal , Arkansas , was converted to a toxicological research laboratory , and was no longer under the direction or control of the DoD . Biological anticrop agents were destroyed by February 1973 . Biological warfare demilitarization continued through the 1970s , with input provided by the U . S . Department of Health , Education and Welfare ; U . S . Department of the Interior ; U . S . Department of Agriculture ; and the Environmental Protection Agency . Fort Detrick and other installations involved in the biological warfare program took on new identities , and their missions were changed to biological defense and the development of medical countermeasures . The necessary containment capability , Biosafety Level s 3 and 4 ( BSL - 3 and BSL - 4 ) continued to be maintained at USAMRIID . 1980s . In 1984 , the DoD requested funds for the construction of another biological aerosol test facility in Utah . The proposal submitted by the army called for BSL - 4 containment , although maintaining that the BSL - 4 inclusion was based on a possible need in the future and not on a current research effort . The proposal was not well received in Utah , where many citizens and government officials still recalled the secretive projects of the military : the areas on DPG still contaminated with anthrax spores , and the well - publicized accidental chemical poisoning of a flock of sheep in Skull Valley , Utah , in March 1968 . Questions arose over the safety of the employees and the surrounding communities , and a suggestion was even made to shift all biological defense research to a civilian agency , such as the National Institutes of Health . The plan for a new facility was revised to utilize a BSL - 3 facility , but not before the US Congress had instituted more surveillance , reporting , and control measures on the army to ensure compliance with the BWC . 1990s . In the 1990s , the US medical biological defense research effort ( part of the U . S . Army ’ s Biological Defense Research Program [ BDRP ] ) was concentrated at USAMRIID at Fort Detrick . The army maintained state - of - the - art containment laboratory facilities there , with more than 10 , 000 ft2 of BSL - 4 and 50 , 000 ft2 of BSL - 3 laboratory space . BSL - 4 , the highest containment level , included laboratory suites that are isolated by internal walls and protected by rigorous entry restrictions , air - locks , negative - pressure air - handling systems , and filtration of all out - flow air through high - efficiency particulate air ( HEPA ) filters . Workers in BSL - 4 laboratories also wore filtered positive - pressure total body suits , which isolated the workers from the internal air of the laboratory . BSL - 3 laboratories had a similar design , but do not require that personnel wear positive - pressure suits . Workers in BSL - 3 suites were protected immunologically by vaccines . U . S . governmental standards provided guidance as to which organisms might be handled under various containment levels in laboratories such as USAMRIID . The unique facilities available at USAMRIID also included a 16 - bed clinical research ward capable of BSL - 3 containment , and a 2 - bed patient care isolation suite — the Medical Containment Suite ( MCS ) , known as “ The Slammer ” — where ICU - level care could be provided under BSL - 4 containment . Here , healthcare personnel wore the same positive - pressure suits as are worn in BSL - 4 research laboratories . The level of patient isolation required depended on the infecting organism and the risk to healthcare providers . Patient care can be provided at BSL - 4 . There were no patient - care category analogous to BSL - 3 ; humans who are ill as a result of exposure to BSL - 3 agents were to be cared for in an ordinary hospital room with barrier nursing procedures . USAMRIID guidelines were prepared to determine which level of containment would be employed for individual patients who required BSL - 4 isolation or barrier nursing care . Staff augmentation for BSL - 4 critical care expertise cames from the Walter Reed Army Medical Center ( WRAMC ) , Washington , D . C . , in accordance with a memorandum of agreement between the two institutions . Patients could be brought directly into the BSL - 4 suite from the outside through specialized ports with unique patient - isolation equipment . ( The MCS was decommissioned and discontinued in December 2010 . ) Additionally , starting in the 1970s USAMRIID maintained a unique evacuation capability known as the Aeromedical Isolation Team ( AIT ) . Led by a physician and a registered nurse , each of the two teams consisted of eight volunteers who trained intensively to provide an evacuation capability for casualties suspected of being infected with highly transmissible , life - threatening BSL - 4 infectious diseases ( e . g . , hemorrhagic fever viruses ) . The unit used special adult - sized Vickers isolation units ( Vickers Medical Containment Stretcher Transit Isolator ) . These units were aircraft transportable and isolated a patient placed inside from the external environment . The AIT could transport two patients simultaneously ; obviously , this was not designed for a mass casualty situation . During the 1995 outbreak of Ebola fever in Zaire , the AIT remained on alert to evacuate any US citizens who might have become ill while working to control the disease in that country . During this period , some biological defense research also continued at the U . S . Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense , Edgewood Arsenal , Maryland , and the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research ( WRAIR ) , Washington , D . C . USAMRIID and these sister laboratories conducted basic research in support of the medical component of the US biological defense research program , which developed strategies , products , information , procedures , and training for medical defense against biological warfare agents . The products included diagnostic reagents and procedures , drugs , vaccines , toxoids , and antitoxins . Emphasis is placed on protecting personnel before any potential exposure to the biological agent occurs . In 1997 , United States law formally defined weaponizable bio - agents as " Biological Select Agents or Toxins " ( BSATs ) — or simply Select Agents for short — which fall under the oversight of either the U . S . Department of Health and Human Services or the U . S . Department of Agriculture ( or both ) and which have the " potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety " . In 1998 , several DoD organizations consolidated to create the Defense Threat Reduction Agency ( DTRA ) , headquartered in Fort Belvoir , Virginia . This agency is DOD ' s official Combat Support Agency for countering weapons of mass destruction , including bio - agents . DTRA ' s main functions are threat reduction , threat control , combat support , and technology development . In the US national interest , DTRA supports projects at more than 14 locations around the world , including Russia , Kazakhstan , Azerbaijan , Uzbekistan , Georgia , and Ukraine . In 1999 , a " National Pharmaceutical Stockpile " — renamed Strategic National Stockpile in 2002 — was created under the oversight of DHHS . In the same year , the Laboratory Response Network — a collaborative effort within the US federal government involving the Association of Public Health Laboratories and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention — was established to facilitate the confirmatory diagnosis and typing of possible bio - agents . 2000s . Three secret DoD projects involving countermeasures against anthrax — code named Project Bacchus , Project Clear Vision and Project Jefferson — were publicly disclosed by the " New York Times " in 2001 . ( The projects were undertaken between 1997 and 2000 and focused on the concern that the old Soviet BW program was secretly continuing and had developed a genetically - modified anthrax weapon . ) Since the September 11 attacks and the 2001 anthrax attacks , the US government has allocated nearly $ 50 billion to address the threat of biological weapons . Funding for bioweapons - related activities focuses primarily on research for and acquisition of medicines for defense . Biodefense funding also goes toward stockpiling protective equipment , increased surveillance and detection of bio - agents , and improving state and hospital preparedness . Significant funding goes to BARDA ( Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority ) , part of DHHS . Funding for activities aimed at prevention has more than doubled since 2007 and is distributed among 11 federal agencies . Efforts toward cooperative international action are part of the project . A " Select Agent Program " ( SAP ) was established to satisfy requirements of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 . The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention administers the SAP , which regulates the laboratories that may possess , use , or transfer Select Agents within the United States . The Project Bioshield Act was passed by Congress in 2004 calling for $ 5 billion for purchasing vaccines that would be used in the event of a bioterrorist attack . According to President George W . Bush : Project BioShield will transform our ability to defend the nation in three essential ways . First , Project BioShield authorizes $ 5 . 6 billion over 10 years for the government to purchase and stockpile vaccines and drugs to fight anthrax , smallpox and other potential agents of bioterror . The DHHS has already taken steps to purchase 75 million doses of an improved anthrax vaccine for the Strategic National Stockpile . Under Project BioShield , HHS is moving forward with plans to acquire a safer , second generation smallpox vaccine , an antidote to botulinum toxin , and better treatments for exposure to chemical and radiological weapons . Since 2007 , USAMRIID has been joined at Fort Detrick by sister bio - defense agencies of the U . S . Department of Health and Human Services ( NIAID ’ s Integrated Research Facility ) and the U . S . Department of Homeland Security ( the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center and the National Bioforensic Analysis Center ) . These — along with the much older Foreign Disease Weed Science Research Unit of the U . S . Department of Agriculture — now constitute the National Interagency Confederation for Biological Research ( NICBR ) . Current status . Since biological warfare agents are often etiologic agents for naturally occurring diseases , the current military bio - defense research effort provides substantive benefits for civilian populations as well . Products currently being produced or under development through military research include : Some vaccines also have applicability for diseases of domestic animals ( e . g . , Rift Valley fever and Venezuelan equine encephalitis ) . In addition , vaccines are provided to persons who may be occupationally exposed to such agents ( e . g . , laboratory workers , entomologists , and veterinary personnel ) throughout government , industry , and academe . USAMRIID also provides diagnostic and epidemiological support to federal , state , and local agencies and foreign governments . Examples of assistance rendered to civilian health efforts by the U . S . Army Medical Research and Materiel Command ( USAMRMC ) include : The current research effort combines new technological advances , such as genetic engineering and molecular modeling , applying them toward development of prevention and treatment of diseases of military significance . The program is conducted in compliance with requirements set forth by the U . S . Food and Drug Administration , U . S . Public Health Service , Nuclear Regulatory Commission , U . S . Department of Agriculture , Occupational Safety and Health Administration , and Biological Weapons Convention . Even though the US stopped all offensive biological warfare research in 1969 , US officials have continued to believe that its biological defense research program must remain strong in view of : While some of the military ’ s biological defense programs remain classified , based on worldwide threats and uncertainties , the medical biological defense research program is unclassified and is widely considered to be an invaluable resource for the country .