Charles B . DeBellevue Colonel Charles Barbin “ Chuck ” DeBellevue ( born August 15 , 1945 ) is a retired officer in the United States Air Force . In 1972 , while serving in the Vietnam War , DeBellevue became the first Air Force Weapon Systems Officer ( WSO ) to become a flying ace . He was credited with a total of six MiG kills , the most earned by any U . S . aviator during the Vietnam War and is a recipient of the Air Force Cross . Background . DeBellevue was born in New Orleans on August 15 , 1945 and grew up in Louisiana . After applying unsuccessfully to the United States Air Force Academy , he attended and graduated from the University of Louisiana at Lafayette ( then named the University of Southwestern Louisiana ) , in 1968 . Upon graduation , he was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant through the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps ( AFROTC ) program at the university . Accepted into undergraduate pilot training ( UPT ) , he failed to complete the course , but subsequently applied for and was accepted into undergraduate navigator training ( UNT ) at Mather Air Force Base , California in July 1969 . He completed F - 4 combat crew training at Davis - Monthan AFB , Arizona and was assigned to the 335th Tactical Fighter Squadron at Seymour Johnson AFB , North Carolina , as a McDonnell Douglas F - 4D Weapon Systems Officer ( WSO ) . Vietnam War . In October 1971 , DeBellevue was sent to the famed 555th Tactical Fighter Squadron ( “ Triple Nickel ” ) , of the 432nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing , at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base , Thailand . Flying in a F - 4D as the WSO with pilot Capt Steve Ritchie on May 10 , 1972 , he and Ritchie scored the first of four Mikoyan - Gurevich MiG - 21 kills they would achieve together . Both DeBellevue and Ritchie , along with Capt Jeffrey Feinstein of the 13th Tactical Fighter Squadron , 432nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing , would become the only USAF " aces " during the Vietnam War . An advantage that the " Triple Nickel Squadron " pilots and WSOs had over other U . S . aircrews was that eight of their F - 4D Phantoms had the top - secret APX - 80 electronic set installed , known by its code - name " Combat Tree " . Combat Tree could read the IFF signals of the transponders built into the MiGs so that North Vietnamese GCI radar could discriminate its aircraft from that of the Americans . Displayed on a scope in the WSO ' s cockpit , Combat Tree gave the Phantoms the ability to identify and locate MiGs when they were still beyond visual range ( BVR ) . May 10 , 1972 , MiG Kill 1 . Ritchie and DeBellevue ' s assignment on May 10 , 1972 , the first major day of air combat in Operation Linebacker , was as element leader ( Oyster 03 ) of one of two flights of the F - 4D MiGCap for the morning strike force . Oyster flight had three of its Phantoms equipped with Combat Tree IFF interrogators , and two days previously its flight lead , Major Robert Lodge , and his WSO 1st Lt Roger Locher had scored their third MiG kill to lead all USAF crews then flying in Southeast Asia . At 0942 , forewarned 19 minutes earlier by the EC - 121 " Disco " over Laos and then by " Red Crown " , the US Navy radar picket ship , Oyster flight engaged an equal number of MiG - 21s head - on , scattering them . Oyster flight shot down three and nearly got the fourth , but fell victim to a MiG tactic dubbed " Kuban tactics " after those of the Soviet WWII ace Pokryshkin , in which a GCI - controlled flight of MiG - 19 s trailed so that they could be steered behind the American fighters maneuvering to attack the MiG - 21s . Maj Lodge was shot down and killed . Lt Locher ejected and was recovered three weeks later . Almost simultaneously Ritchie and DeBellevue rolled into a firing position behind the remaining MiG - 21 of the original four with a radar lock , launched two Sparrows and scored a kill with the second . July 8 , 1972 , MiG Kills 2 and 3 . USAF strike and chaff forces suffered a severe series of losses to MiGs between June 24 and July 5 ( seven F - 4s ) without killing a MiG in return . As a counter - measure , 7th Air Force added a second Disco EC - 121 to its airborne radar coverage , positioning it over the Gulf of Tonkin . On July 8 , 1972 , Ritchie and DeBellevue were leading Paula flight , in gun - equipped F - 4Es instead of the Combat Tree F - 4Ds they usually flew , on a MiGCAP to cover the exit of the strike force . While they were west of Phu Tho and south of Yen Bai , the EC - 121 vectored them to intercept MiG - 21s returning to base after damaging one of the US chaff escorts . The MiGs were still approximately 4 miles away and Ritchie turned the flight south to cross the Black River . As they closed , Disco gave them warning that the MiG return had " merged " with the Paula flight ' s return on his screen . Ritchie reversed course , observed the first MiG at his 10 o ' clock position and turned left to meet it head - on . When Ritchie passed the first MiG - 21 , he recalled the engagement of May 10 and waited to see if there was a trailing MiG . When he observed the second MiG , which he also passed head - on , he reversed hard left to engage . The MiG turned to its right to evade the attack , an unusual maneuver , and Ritchie used a vertical separation move to gain position on its rear quarter . DeBellevue obtained a solid boresight ( dogfighting ) radar lock on it while at the MiG ' s 5 o ' clock , although fired from the edge of their flight envelope s , both AIM - 7 s struck home . The first MiG had also turned back and was attacking the last F - 4 in Ritchie ' s flight from behind , an often fatal consequence to US aircraft employing the then - standard " fluid four " tactical formation . Ritchie made a hard turn across the curving intercept of the MiG , again coming out at its 5 o ' clock , and the MiG , apparently perceiving the threat , broke hard right and dove away . Ritchie fired an AIM - 7 from inside its minimum range and at the limit of its capability to turn . Expecting the Sparrow to miss , he was trying to switch to a gun attack in the relatively unfamiliar F - 4E he was flying that day when the missile exploded the MiG , 1 minute and 29 seconds after the first kill . A competition to become the Air Force ' s first Vietnam " ace " developed between Ritchie and Captain Jeffrey S . Feinstein , a WSO in another one of the 432nd ' s squadrons , the 13th TFS , who scored his 3rd and 4th kills on July 18 and July 29 . Each had a claim denied by Seventh Air Force ' s Enemy Aircraft Claims Evaluation Board , Ritchie and DeBellevue for a claim of a MiG - 21 on June 13 , and Feinstein for a claim June 9 . August 28 , 1972 , MiG Kill 4 . Ritchie ' s final victory ( his 5th making him an " Ace " ) with DeBellevue ( his 4th ) came on August 28 , 1972 , while leading Buick flight , a MiGCAP for a strike north of Hanoi . During the preceding month , 7th Air Force had instituted daily centralized mission debriefings of leaders and planners from all fighter wings called " Linebacker Conferences " . Ritchie had just started his flight of Combat Tree Phantoms on its return to base ( Ritchie and DeBellevue were flying F - 4D AF Serial No . 64 - 7463 , in which they had scored their first kill ) . Red Crown , now the USS " Long Beach " , alerted the strike force to " Blue Bandits " ( MiG - 21s ) 30 miles southwest of Hanoi , along the route back to Thailand . Approaching the area of the reported contact at 15 , 000 feet , Ritchie recalled recent Linebacker Conference information that MiGs had returned to using high altitude tactics and suspected the MiGs were high . Buick and Vega flights , both of the MiGCAP , flew toward the reported location . DeBellevue picked up the MiGs on the Phantom ' s onboard radar and using Combat Tree , discovered that the MiGs were ten miles behind Olds flight , another flight of MiGCAP fighters returning to base . Ritchie called in the contact to warn Olds flight . Ritchie , concerned that MiGs might be at an altitude above them , made continuous requests for altitude readings to both Disco and Red Crown . He received location , heading , and speed data on the MiGs ( now determined to be returning north at high speed to their base ) but not altitude as Buick flight closed to within 15 miles of the MiGs . DeBellevue ' s radar then painted the MiGs dead ahead at 25 , 000 feet , and Ritchie ordered the flight to light afterburners . DeBellevue warned Ritchie they were closing fast and were in range . About the same time Ritchie saw the MiGs himself headed in the opposite direction . Attacking in a climbing curve behind the MiG - 21 ' s with his AIM - 7 guidance radar locked on , Ritchie was given continuous range updates by DeBellevue . With his Phantom barely making enough speed to overtake the targets , Ritchie launched two Sparrows from over four miles away . The firing parameters of the two shots were out of the missiles ' performance envelope , an attempt to influence the MiGs to turn and thus shorten the range . Both shots not only missed but failed to influence the opponents . Moments later , tracking one MiG visually by the contrail it was making , Ritchie fired his remaining two Sparrows , also at long range . The first missed , but the MiG made a hard turn and actually shortened the range , and was destroyed by the second . Short on fuel , Ritchie elected not to try to pursue the second MiG - 21 . September 9 , 1972 , " Ace Day " , MiG Kills 5 and 6 . During Linebacker strikes on September 9 , 1972 , a flight of four F - 4Ds on MiGCAP west of Hanoi shot down three MiGs . Two were MiG - 19s downed by Capt John A . Madden , Jr . and his WSO Capt DeBellevue . For Madden , the victories constituted his first and second MiG kills , but for DeBellevue they were numbers five and six , moving him up as the leading MiG destroyer of the war and elevating him to " Ace " status . When DeBellevue acquired the MiGs on radar , the flight maneuvered to attack . Madden and DeBellevue made the first move . They got a visual on the MiG about 5 miles out on final approach with his gear and flaps down . Getting a lock on him , they fired missiles but they missed . They were coming in from the side - rear and slipped up next to that MiG no more than 500 feet apart . " He got a visual on us , snatched up his flaps and hit afterburner , accelerating out . It became obvious we weren ' t going to get another shot at the MiG " , says DeBellevue . DeBellevue describes the next two engagements as follows : " We acquired the MiG ' s on radar and positioned as we picked them up visually . We used a slicing low - speed yo - yo to position behind the MiG - 19 ' s and started turning hard with them . We fired one AIM - 9 missile which detonated 25 feet from one of the MiG - 19 ' s . We switched the attack to the other MiG - 19 and one turn later we fired an AIM - 9 at him . I observed the missile impact the tail of the MiG . The MiG continued normally for the next few seconds , then began a slow roll and spiraled downward , impacting the ground with a large fireball . " Madden and DeBellevue returned to their base thinking they had destroyed only the second MiG - 19 . Only later did investigation reveal that they were the only aircrew to shoot at a MiG - 19 which crashed and burned on the runway at Phuc Yen that day . That gave them two MiG - 19 kills for the day and brought DeBellevue ' s total to six MiG kills , the most earned during the war . During his combat tour , DeBellevue logged 550 combat hours while flying 220 combat missions , 96 of which were over North Vietnam . His skill as a weapon systems officer was recognized when he and the other two Air Force " Aces " , Ritchie and Feinstein , received the 1972 Mackay Trophy . He also received the Veterans of Foreign Wars ' Armed Forces Award and the Eugene M . Zuckert Achievement Award . MiG credits . The six MiG kills credited to DeBellevue in 1972 are : Disposition of aircraft . The aircraft in which DeBellevue flew when he achieved his six MiG kills : Post - Vietnam War . Removed from active combat following his fifth and sixth kills , DeBellevue re - applied for and re - entered pilot training at Williams AFB , Arizona , in November 1972 . After pinning on his new pilot wings , he returned to the F - 4 as a pilot assigned to the 49th Tactical Fighter Wing at Holloman AFB , New Mexico . In 1975 , he moved to Elmendorf AFB , Alaska , where he served as the assistant operations officer in the 43d Tactical Fighter Squadron . He went on to serve as the 5th Air Force deputy chief of staff at Yokota AB , Japan and the Commander of the 432d Combat Support Group at Misawa AB , Japan . He was then assigned as the commander of the 95th Air Base Wing at Edwards AFB , California , until 1995 . The 95 ABW is the host wing at Edwards AFB , which is the second largest base , area - wise , in the U . S . Air Force . DeBellevue retired from active duty as a full Colonel while serving as commander of Air Force ROTC Detachment 440 at the University of Missouri in January 1998 after 30 years of military service . He was the last American fighter ace on active duty .