Soviet support for Iraq during the Iran – Iraq war During the Iran – Iraq War from 1980 to 1988 , the Soviet Union ( USSR ) sold or gave more military equipment and supplies to Iraq than did any other country , as well as providing military advisers . The public position of the Soviet Union was officially neutral , especially early in the war . They clandestinely provided a smaller amount of support to Iran . Later in the war they more visibly supported Iraq , but still maintained official neutrality . At the start of the Iran – Iraq War , while Iraq was on the offensive , the Soviet Union stopped all overt and most covert arms shipments to Iraq for 18 months . Rather than wanting to help Iran , the Soviet Union was probably annoyed with Iraq ' s president Saddam Hussein , who had refused the Soviets more access to Iraqi ports in exchange for arms . Soviet prestige was at stake if its arms were defeated , so the Soviets began to provide spare parts and ammunition . They later replaced complete vehicles and weapons in one - to - one exchanges . France supported Iraq as the second greatest military supplier , and tended to supply higher - technology equipment than the Soviets . Motives for policy towards Iraq . When the Iran – Iraq war began , the United Nations ( UN ) responded with Security Council resolution s calling for a ceasefire and for all member states to refrain from actions contributing to continuing conflict . A key resolution in 1987 was Resolution 598 . The Soviet Union opposed the war and cut off arms exports to both Iran and Iraq , the latter being an ally under a 1972 treaty . Despite strong policy disagreements with Iraq , the Soviet Union was concerned about the reputation of its weapons and arms deliveries resumed in 1982 . The Iraqi Communist Party , driven from Iraq by the Ba ' athist regime , was allowed to broadcast calls for the end of the war from the Soviet Union . This may have been more due to Soviet irritation at the war than a serious attempt to harm Iraq : Iran was not seen as pro - Soviet . Competition with other countries . France supported Iraq as the second greatest military supplier , and tended to supply higher - technology equipment than the Soviets . Iraqi leaders were inclined to blame their Soviet - supplied equipment for failings rather than admit their own organizational and training problems . While Soviet equipment may have been inferior to others , it was effective when handled properly , but the Iraqis supplemented or replaced it with French equipment . The competition between France and the Soviet Union as an arms supplier was a continuing issue for Iraq . Iraq approached the French in late 1980 with requests to buy Crotale and Roland surface - to - air missile systems ( SAMs ) to augment their depleted Soviet SAM arsenal . Many other nations provided materials or encouraged client states to do so , and private arms traders also sold arms to both sides . Support for Iran . Timmerman quotes " World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers " , United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency , Washington , DC , 1985 , as conservatively estimating Iran ' s arms imports over the 1979 – 83 period at $ 975 million from the Soviet Union . Soviet training . Iraqi pilots were less aggressive because of their more conservative Soviet training . Yet , French , Indian and Egyptian trainers indicated that Iraqi pilots could be extremely effective after Western - style training that put the initiative in the air in the pilot ' s cockpit and with his flight leader . Movement away from Soviet doctrine was also seen in land warfare , where the Iraqis also learned to place greater emphasis on training and preparation for complex combined arms operations . This was seen in the training provided to new recruits and the use of large - scale battle rehearsals . Intelligence support . Iraq improvised an AWACS using a British Thompson CSF Tiger radar on a Soviet Il - 76 airframe , the combination called the Baghdad 1 . Cordesman cites " Jane ' s Defense Weekly " as reporting that the Soviet Union had to reschedule its satellite coverage during the more intense periods of tension between Iran and the West . In November and December 1987 , the Soviet Union lowered its Kosmos 1983 photo - reconnaissance IMINT satellite to monitor the battlefield between Iraq and Iran . Similarly , it altered the orbit of Kosmos 1985 in a way that implied it either had night coverage of the battlefield or was covering U . S . activity at Diego Garcia . There have been numerous reports that Iraq received intelligence from third countries , especially satellite imagery from the U . S . The " Jane ' s " article suggests that the Soviets also might have provided imagery . Air warfare . At the start of the war , the Iranian air arm had superior equipment to what was largely Soviet equipment in Iraqi hands . The Iraqis used the Soviet air defense model , which gave pilots relatively little initiative . The Iraqis and Soviets had different priorities for waging air warfare , shown by how each assigned their best pilots to different aircraft types . This conflicted with Saddam Hussein ' s strict control of the Iraqi military , but over the course of the war some flexibility did emerge . The Iraqis considered ground attack to be the most important and put their best pilots into their French Mirage F - 1s rather than Soviet air - superiority fighters and interceptors such as the MiG - 25 and MiG - 29 . Aircraft . In early 1987 , the Soviet Union delivered a squadron of twenty - four MiG - 29 Fulcrums to Baghdad . Considered to be the most advanced Soviet fighter , the MiG - 29 had previously only been provided to Syria and India . The MiG - 29 export deal to Iraq gave a more advantageous payment schedule than any offered by the West : Iraq was caught in a financial crisis and needed the low - interest loans provided by the Soviet Union . Ground support . In the ground support role , the IQAF provided aircraft for close air support and strike roles and , to a limited extent , for air superiority over the immediate battlefield . In 1980 , the Iraqi air force had 12 ground attack squadrons - 4 equipped with MiG - 23 Bs , 2 with Su - 7 ( NATO reporting name FITTER ) , 4 with Su - 20s ( i . e . , the export version of the Su - 17 FITTER C ) , and 1 with British Hawker Hunter s . They also had some Su - 22 ' s , the final upgrade of the Su - 17 with Russian / French avionics . Also , the IQAF had two bomber squadrons equipped with Tu - 22 s ( NATO reporting name BLINDER ) and Il - 28 s ( NATO reporting name BEAGLE ) respectively , though the latter were probably inoperable . Transport . Iraq had two transport squadrons whose primary aircraft were Soviet Il - 76 s ( NATO reporting name CANDID ) and An - 12 s ( NATO reporting name CUB ) . Helicopters . The 11 helicopter squadrons included Soviet Mi - 8 s ( NATO reporting name HIP ) and Mi - 24 s ( NATO reporting name HIND ) , as well as European - designed models . Soviet helicopters had troop transport capability rather than being attack - only . Air defense . Iranian pilots avoided Iraqi S - 75 Dvina ( NATO reporting name SA - 2 GUIDELINE ) and S - 125 ( NATO reporting name SA - 3 GOA ) anti - aircraft missiles using American tactics developed in Vietnam , though they were less successful against Iraqi SA - 6 s optimized for low and medium altitude engagements . " Iran ' s Western - made air defense system seemed more effective than Iraq ' s Soviet - made counterpart . " Surface - to - air missiles . Iraq ' s ground - based air defense suffered from poor leadership as well as both a lack of understanding of the Soviet operational doctrine and technical characteristics of their Soviet SA - 2 , SA - 3 , and SA - 6 surface - to - air missile s . Iraq adopted Soviet deployment and fire techniques , and relied on standard Soviet tactics without adapting to Iraqi needs . The SA - 2 , and SA - 3 were designed for a medium - to high - altitude threat , tactics which the Iranian Air Force rarely if ever used . By the time of the 1988 ceasefire , Iraq had obtained from the Soviet Union approximately 120 SA - 2 launchers , 150 SA - 3 launchers , 25 – 60 SA - 6 launchers . The Soviet weapons depended on a low - altitude system of anti - aircraft artillery with SA - 7 , SA - 8 , and SA - 9 missiles , and eventually the SA - 14 . Some Israeli experts came to regard Iraqi ability to manage the command and control and electronic warfare aspects of their Soviet - supplied surface - to - air missile systems as far inferior to those of Syria , even considering the poor Syrian performance in 1982 . Interceptors and air - to - air missiles . Each interceptor squadron was deployed at a separate base for defense of a specific target . Their five interceptor squadrons had limited all - weather capability and were all equipped with MiG - 21 s ( NATO reporting name FISHBED ) . The Iraqis were displeased with Soviet air - to - air missiles . Pakistani technicians were reported to have helped the Iraqis modify some MiG - 21s to carry the French - made R550 Magic air - to - air missile . The Iraqis claimed to have used a MiG - 21 so equipped to down an F - 14 . Land warfare . The Soviet Union initially cut off supplies in response to being caught by surprise , but this position was later reversed . Iraq was not prepared for effective infantry combat when the war began . In accordance with Soviet doctrine , the Iraqis placed great stress on the use of tanks and mechanized units during the first stages of the war . Tanks and armored fighting vehicles . Soviet doctrine emphasized tanks , and Iraq followed its example . It consistently improved its skills with tanks , both Soviet - made and Chinese copies . It also used its attack helicopters with some of the Soviet " flying tank " methods . Most Iraqi tanks were Soviet , or Chinese copies of Soviet tanks , with more and more acquired during the war . They started in 1979 with 2 , 500 older T - 55 and T - 62 model Soviet tanks , and a few more advanced T - 72 tanks , probably less than 100 . Iraq had roughly 2 , 750 tanks in late 1980 . In early 1988 , it had more than 4 , 500 Soviet T - 54s , 55s , 62s , and 72s , some 1 , 500 Chinese Type 59 and Type 69 - II main battle tanks ( copies / derivatives of the Soviet T - 54A ) , 60 Romanian M - 77s , and some captured Iranian British - made ( 30 ? ) Chieftain s . It is believed that France sold also about 100 AMX - 30 to Iraq . Iraq had about 2 , 500 other armored vehicles in late 1980 . By late 1985 , Iraq had about 3 , 000 AFVs . It had about 5 , 100 such systems in early 1988 , including roughly 1 , 000 models of the Soviet BMP - 1 and BMP - 2 armored fighting vehicle . Even during the opening stages of the war , Saddam Hussein was aware that Soviet tank types were individually inferior to those used by the Iranians . In October 1980 , he said : " Their [ Iran ’ s ] cannons are greater in number , their tanks more advanced , their navy can reach long distance targets , and they have better arms . " The Iraqis were unprepared for urban warfare , even using Soviet methods that cost the Soviets heavily in the 1956 Hungarian Revolution . Iraq ' s tanks were more effective against Iranian helicopter gunships . The Soviet 12 . 5mm anti - aircraft machine guns on the Iraqi tanks were of adequate range and lethality to hold Iranian helicopters out of the range of their most lethal anti - tank guided missiles . Helicopters . Iraq still kept most of its helicopters in its air force at the beginning of the war , which created major problems because of a lack of effective coordination between the air force and forward deployed army units . In mid - 1980 , it had 35 Mi - 4s , 15 Mi - 6s , 78 Mi - 8s , 18 - 34 Mi - 24s , 47 Alloutte IIIs , 10 Super Frelons , 40 Gazelles , 3 Pumas , and 7 Wessex Mk - 52s . By early 1988 , it had a strong Army Aviation Corps with 150 – 200 armed helicopters , including 40 – 80 Soviet Mi - 24s with the 3M11 Falanga ( NATO reporting name AT - 2 SWATTER ) , and the rest French , and 86 U . S . designs ( either U . S . made or built under license ) lightly armed helicopters : 26 Hughes 530F , 30 Hughes 500D , and 30 Hughes 300C . Army aviation had 10 Mi - 6 ( NATO reporting name HOOK ) heavy transport helicopters , and 100 Mi - 8 ( NATO name HIP ) , 20 Mi - 4 ( NATO name HOUND ) , and an additional 10 French Puma medium transport helicopters . Logistics . The Iraqis made logistic oversupply a key operational principle . They operated on the Soviet system of " supply push " , rather than the U . S . system of " demand pull " . Iraqi forces at the front were given massive ammunition stocks and war reserves . This was necessary given their Soviet - style extremely heavy artillery bombardments . " By the end of 1982 , Iraq had been resupplied with new Soviet materiel , and the ground war entered a new phase . Iraq used newly acquired T - 55 tanks and T - 62 tanks , BM - 21 Stalin Organ rocket launchers , and Mi - 24 helicopter gunships to prepare a Soviet - type three - line defense , replete with obstacles , minefields , and fortified positions . " The Iraqi Army had about 200 , 000 men under arms in September 1980 , with another 250 , 000 in the reserves . It was equipped with almost 3 , 000 Soviet - built tanks , including about 100 T - 72s , 2 , 500 armored fighting vehicles ( AFVs ) , and about 1 , 000 tubes of artillery . The tank force was a mixture of T - 34 / 55 / 62s and PT - 76s of Soviet origin and some 100 French AMX - 30 ' s , of which more were on order . Mechanized forces included Soviet BTR 50 / 60 / 152s , and BMPs , French Panhards and British Ferrets . Naval warfare . The Iraqi Navy was largely ineffective due to a poor state of training and inadequate Soviet weaponry . Most of the Osa class missile boat s were at the lowest level of training and readiness for operations . The Iraqi Navy numbered about 4 , 000 men and consisted of submarine chaser s , patrol boats , missile boats , torpedo boat s and minesweeper s of Soviet , British and Yugoslavian origin . Missile technology . While the Soviet Union assisted Iraq with long - range missiles like the SCUD , there is little evidence that they helped the Iraqi development of nuclear , chemical or biological weapons . Chemical warfare . A raw , redacted CIA report suggested that the Iraqis used Soviet chemical defense equipment . All units in the Iraqi army had some chemical defense capability , using principally Soviet equipment . The basic vehicle - mounted system was composed of : " BBAR " and " RCH 469 " chemical attack detectors ; " GSP12 " chemical concentration measuring device ; a small chemical laboratory ; night flares and flags to signal the direction of attack . Iraqi army units of approximately 3 , 000 men had a 20 - man chemical defense unit assigned . This unit was equipped with two " R469 " chemical attack detectors ; one RS - 19 , RS - 12 , or RS - 14 vehicle for decontaminating weapons , buildings and roads ; and two " DDA " vehicles for decontaminating soldiers . Smaller - units had one - man chemical defense units with a Soviet chemical attack detector and a German Kärcher pressure washer for decontaminating soldiers . Individual soldiers had Soviet gas masks , and one of three types of chemical defense suits . " Number one " suits , which gave the greatest protection , were used only by chemical units . " Number two " suits covered the torso , hands and legs ( in addition to the gas masks ) , and the " Number three " suits issued to troops consisted of long gloves . All received Yugoslav first - aid packets with two atropine injectors , " tablets for nuclear radiation " , and two bottles for spot - cleaning unknown chemicals .