Battle of Callantsoog The Battle of Callantsoog ( sometimes also called Battle of Groote Keeten ) ( 27 August 1799 ) followed the amphibious landing by a British invasion force under lieutenant - general Sir Ralph Abercromby near Callantsoog in the course of the Anglo - Russian Invasion of Holland of 1799 . Despite strong opposition by troops of the Batavian Republic under lieutenant - general Herman Willem Daendels the British troops established a bridgehead and the Dutch were forced to retreat . Background . The British government had long deliberated about the best place for the landing of the Anglo - Russian expedition on the Dutch coast . Possible locations taken into consideration were the Scheldt estuary ( where in 1809 the Walcheren Campaign was aimed at ) and the area around Scheveningen ( near The Hague ) where the planners expected support from partisans of the former stadtholder , William V , Prince of Orange . Eventually , it was decided however , to select the extreme northern part of the North Holland peninsula , because its shore was more easily accessible than other parts of the Dutch coast , that were encumbered with dangerous shoals and sandbanks ; because it was only lightly defended , with only a few shore batteries at Den Helder ; and because it offered the hope of capturing the northern squadron of the Batavian fleet , a most important strategic objective . Also , the British planners thought that the great city of Amsterdam could easily be approached and captured from this direction . The project of the expedition was of course known to the Batavian and French governments and military commanders , but they were of necessity uncertain of the exact location of the landing . This compelled them to spread their forces thinly over a large area , from the Scheldt in the South to Groningen . One of the two divisions of the new Batavian army , under Daendels , was indeed positioned in North Holland . He had about 7 , 000 men in the northern part of the peninsula , around Alkmaar , while a reserve force under general Van Zuylen van Nijevelt was located at the narrowest part of the province of Holland , near Beverwijk . The second Batavian division , under lieutenant - general Jean - Baptiste Dumonceau ( who was a Belgian , later naturalized to Dutch nationality ) , was guarding the northern provinces , Friesland and Groningen , and therefore separated from the North - Holland peninsula by the Zuiderzee , which abutted its eastern shore . This implied that Dumonceau was several day marches away and could in the event not reach Daendels in time to support him . The same applied to the French forces under the command of general Guillaume Marie Anne Brune , the supreme commander of the Franco - Batavian forces in this theater of war . As the arrival of the Russian troops that would eventually take part in the expedition was delayed , it was decided to wait no longer , but to embark Abercromby ' s division of about 12 , 000 men on August 13 . The division consisted of The division was accompanied by companies from the 3rd and 4th battalions Royal Artillery ( Lt . Col . Whitwhorth ) and Royal Engineers ( Lt . Col . Hay ) . Second - in - command and Chief - of - Staff was Lieutenant - General Sir James Pulteney . The invasion fleet of about 200 vessels in total was commanded by Vice - Admiral Mitchell . Shortly after the departure of this fleet the weather turned stormy and the gale forced the invasion fleet to stand off of the Dutch coast until it finally calmed down , allowing the fleet to approach Den Helder on August 22 . By then , Admiral Duncan had joined the fleet . This Admiral then sent two parlimentaire s to the Batavian Squadron of Rear - Admiral Samuel Story , that was anchored in the roadstead of Den Helder , to demand its surrender , and that of the shore batteries at Den Helder . Story indignantly rejected this demand . The next few days the British invasion fleet was again buffeted by inclement weather , but by the evening of the 26th this had sufficiently died down to consider starting the landing the next day . Meanwhile , the Batavian forces had had time to make their preparations for the coming event . To understand these , it is useful to consider the terrain at the proposed landing site , as it was in 1799 . ( The situation has considerably changed since then ) . Den Helder then was just a hamlet with two shore batteries ( no more than sconce s ) , called " Unie " and " Revolutie " , nearby . It was located at the extreme northern point of a spit of sand that jutted out from the North - Holland peninsula , north of Callantsoog . The spit consisted of three rows of dune s behind the North Sea beach , with a road ( the " Zanddijk " ) , bordered by a canal , behind them . Behind the canal was a marsh , called the " Koegras " ( that has since been embanked , but was then open to the sea and inundated at every high tide ) . The sand spit was bordered in the north by the Marsdiep and to the east by the Wadden Sea . It was no more than half a mile wide . Daendels figured that it would be impossible to sufficiently deploy his division in such a narrow space while fronting the shore . Instead he proposed to have only light forces of skirmisher s ( ) in the dunes along the likely disembarkation front , but to attack a landing from both the north and the south in a double flank attack , as soon as they had landed . He therefore positioned the 5th and 7th Demi - brigades of the Batavian army under Maj . Gen . Van Guericke in Den Helder , together with the 2nd Jagers and several squadrons of light cavalry and horse artillery ( about 5 , 000 men in total ) . He himself took up position near Callantsoog with the remainder of the 1st Batavian Division , under Maj . Gen . Van Zuylen van Nijevelt . This command consisted of the 1st , 3rd , 4th and 6th Demi - brigades , the 1st Jagers and the 1st Grenadiers ( total about 5 , 200 men ) . Of course , the implication was that he violated the taboo against dividing his forces , but it seemed the best solution in the circumstances . Battle . At 3 AM of the morning of August 23 the British vanguard under gen . Pulteney embarked in the boats of the British invasion fleet . ( There were not enough boats to accommodate all troops so the landing had to be performed in stages ) . These 2500 men of the 3rd Brigade and Reserve landed without mishap ; the first to put foot ashore was Lt . Macdonald of the Grenadier company of the 25th . The fleet had meanwhile swept the beach clear with a vigorous cannonade that displaced a lot of sand , but did no damage to the defenders as those were positioned behind the first row of dunes . The British had landed at the location that was locally known as " Kleine Keeten " ( after a cluster of sheds , ; further to the south existed a similar cluster , known as " Groote Keeten " ) . On top of the dune near this location stood a semaphore station ( ) , which ( as the nearest " strategic object " ) was immediately attacked by the British . The Batavian jagers tried to prevent its capture but were driven back on " Kleine Keeten " ( as anticipated , as they were just a skirmishing line ) . However , the inexperienced Line battalion that stood in reserve at this location , instead of letting them into their line in an orderly fashion , panicked and were routed . ( Their commander , Lt . Col . Luck , died in action during this melee ) . Another Batavian battalion , the 2nd of the 5th Demi - brigade counter - attacked with the bayonet , but the British numerical superiority was too great and this battalion was also driven back , again with the loss of its commander , Lt . Col . Herbig . General Guericke then decided to intervene on his own initiative and marched south from his command on the Batavian right wing with the 2nd battalion of the 7th Demi - brigade ( 2 / VII ) and two squadrons of cavalry and horse artillery , on the way rallying the 2 / 5th . Unfortunately , he deployed in the swamp area of the " Koegras " , behind the canal bordering the " Zanddijk " . This effectively cut him off from communications with not only his own command , but also the divisional command on the Batavian right wing . As a consequence , not only was his intervention ineffective ( the canal was too much of an obstacle to attack the British around the semaphore ) , but also the remainder of the 7th Demi - brigade under Col . Gilquin ( that was supposed to attack the British left flank ) remained motionless during the entire battle for lack of orders to proceed . In effect , all Batavian activity during the main phase of the battle was therefore on the British right flank , by the Batavian left wing . Here Daendels deployed his forces in three lines , as the front was too narrow to deploy more than two battalions in line at a time . He first had Col . Crass attack with the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 5th Demi - brigade , supported by cavalry and two pieces of horse artillery under capt . d ' Anguerand . He was opposed by the British 3rd Brigade ( now under command of Gen . Coote , as Gen . Pulteney had received a wound in the arm and been forced to leave the field ) . The British had only enough room to deploy one battalion in line and there was a threat that they would be outflanked near " Groote Keeten " ( where the main action was fought ) . However , the Batavians were severely hampered by the terrain . The horses sometimes sank to their bellies into the dune sand and the artillery also constantly was immobilized by the loose sand . Besides , the British gunboats were able to get very close to the beach and supported the British infantry vigorously , whenever they got sight of the enemy though gaps in the dunes . This British naval - gun fire wrought havoc on the Batavian troops . While Col . Crass ' troops were mauled by the British and slowly being driven back , Daendels piecemeal fed reinforcements into the battle . Elements of the 1st , 3rd and 6th Demi - brigades were so used up without much positive effect . Meanwhile , the British disembarkation progressed almost without mishap ( only one boat overturned with the loss of its crew of 20 drowned ) and the British numerical superiority on their right wing kept growing , while they were able to bring up field artillery through the loose sand ( manhandled by British seamen ) . Around 6 PM Daendels therefore saw the futility of further fighting , and withdrew to his starting position . ( The British did not pursue ) . He was joined there by Guericke with his detachment . This left only the troops of Col . Gilquin north of the British position near the batteries at Den Helder . Daendels decided to withdraw these troops also , as they were too few in number to withstand an assault by the far - superior British forces . Besides , the Helder batteries of course had their guns trained to seaward , and they therefore could not defend against an attack from the land side . ( In the opinion of admiral Story , they would have been unable to prevent an advance of the British fleet through the Marsdiep , anyway ) . After having spiked the 86 guns in the batteries they therefore left Den Helder by a roundabout route through the " Koegras " and arrived safely at the Batavian main force . The consequence was that the roadstead of " Nieuwe Diep " fell into British hands without a fight , providing the British and Russian invasion forces in later phases of the invasion with a more convenient disembarkation location . Also , a number of inactive Batavian ships of the line were an easy prey for the British , as were the contents of the naval arsenal in Den Helder . The squadron of admiral Story was forced to move away to the roadstead of " De Vlieter " further east . The British losses during the battle were 74 killed ( including the 20 men that drowned ) , 376 wounded , and 20 missing . Among the dead were only three officers , but two of them were field officers : Lt . Cols . Hay , RE , and Smollett , 1st Foot . The Dutch lost 137 dead and 950 wounded . Aftermath . On the night of the battle Daendels fell back on the nearby " Zijpe " polder where he occupied a defensive line . In the next few days he withdrew even further south , as he feared another amphibious landing near Petten in his rear , that would have placed him between two British forces . Such a landing would have exposed Alkmaar and points South to an easy British advance , too . At first he seems to have considered retreating all the way to the line Purmerend - Monnikendam , but in the event he took up a defensive position in the Schermer polder near Alkmaar . Later historians have held this retreat against him ( as they did the abandonment of the " fortress " of Den Helder ) . General Krayenhoff points out , however , that the abandonment of Den Helder , though deplorable in its effects , was probably unavoidable . The formidable fortress of " Kijkduin " , that Napoleon Bonaparte had built after 1810 , and that was so tenaciously defended against the Dutch by admiral Carel Hendrik Ver Huell in 1814 , did not exist as yet . Daendels abandonment of the " Zijpe " seems more questionable , but only because the British in the event did not perform the obvious landing at Petten , of which they should have been fully capable . An important consideration was also , that the Batavians had exhausted their ammunition during the battle . They were for the moment unable to engage in a new battle for that reason . While Daendels arrived in his new position near Alkmaar on August 30 , dramatic developments took place on the Batavian fleet . The crews and some officers mutinied during the notorious Vlieter Incident of that day , and the squadron of admiral Story ignominiously surrendered to admiral Mitchell without firing a shot .