Battle of Tarapacá The Battle of Tarapacá occurred on November 27 , 1879 , during the Tarapacá Campaign of the War of the Pacific . A Chilean column of 2 , 300 soldiers led by General Luis Arteaga recklessly attacked an outnumbering Peruvian contingent of 4 , 500 troops at Tarapacá commanded by Gen Juan Buendía , resulting in a harsh defeat . The Chilean 2nd Line Regiment was the most damaged unit , losing almost half of its force , along with its commander Col . Eleuterio Ramírez and his second in command , Lt . Col . Bartolomé Vivar . Also , the unit lost its banner , which was recovered six months later after the battle of Tacna . Despite the victory , the Allies could not contest for the domination of the Tarapacá department , abandoning it to Chilean control . Background . Following a significant defeat at Dolores dwell inflicted by an outnumbered Chilean contingent ; which cost the Allies all their artillery , the remnants of the Peruvian army were scattered all across the desert , demoralized and almost leaderless . Suárez ’ s soldiers marched to Tarapacá , the former administrative Peruvian capital of the department , to join Buendía . Buendía ’ s army gathers at Tarapacá once reunited by Suárez , after marching across the inclement dessert . When Buendía arrived to Tarapacá , dispatched emissaries to gather more fugitives , so , a few days later , his troops grew up to 2 , 000 men , and on the 26 , Rios ’ division arrived from Iquique with supplies , apart from the food and water already existing at Tarapacá . In the end , 4 , 500 soldiers were stationed at Tarapacá . Meanwhile all of this events occurred , and acknowledging that a column of exhausted Peruvians under Buendía had stopped near the town of Tarapacá to rest and regain strength , Lt . Col . José Francisco Vergara asked Gen . Arteaga to dispatch a reconnaissance force to find out enemy ' s condition and to inspect the route . Hence , Arteaga dispatched under Vergara ’ s command a party of 270 men of the Zapadores Regiment , 2 artillery pieces , 115 riders of the Cazadores a Caballo Cavalry Regiment on November 24 . Vergara ’ s column took the road to Dibujo , camping at about from Tarapacá . Later , Arteaga was informed that the Peruvian numbers were greater than expected , so he sent another column made up of the 2nd Line and Artillería de Marina regiments , the Chacabuco Battalion , 30 more Cazadores a Caballo riders and another artillery battery . Next day , Chilean sentries of the vanguard division captured an Argentinean muleteer , who reports only 1 , 500 men at the town , and Vergara asks Arteaga for instructions creating great anxiety among Chilean High Command and troops . However , the latter soundly underestimated the battle capabilities of the Allies , and did not prepare properly , carrying an insufficient amount of food , water and ammunition , with serious consequences later on . Vergara , as the same as Arteaga did , gave no importance to supply his troops properly , even more , instead of waiting for the reinforcements to arrive advances over Tarapacá . Both divisions reunited on the noon of the 26 at Isluga , after Vergara made a reconnaissance of the Peruvian troops . When he did so , saw the arrival of Rios ’ division , which were in poor condition , giving him the wrong idea of the Allies were demoralized and weary , besides believing there were only 2 , 500 soldiers . After both divisions gathered , Arteaga assumed the command . His forces added up 2 , 281 men , only half of Buendía ’ s final contingent . His soldiers were like he thought the Allies were , extremely exhausted and thirsty . Only that day , the Chileans marched for nine hours , totalizing 30 hours of marches across burning sands with no food or water , leading to diminishing the soldiers fighting capabilities leaving them no condition of presenting battle at all . But since they were at from the nearest font of supplies at Dolores , Arteaga realized that their only salvation was to attack . Battlefield . The Tarapaca oasis was from San Francisco . This commercial town was founded by the Spanish in 16th century over one of the Inca roads that link up the mountains with the sea . A little creek formed by the Andes snow melting , runs through the town allowing small plantations downstream . The Peruvian administration buildings are next to rock walls , with the market and the church at the very centre , that for an army it is a dead end due to its geography . Chilean battle plan . The attack was poorly planned , since despite being heavily outnumbered Arteaga divided his force into three columns anyway as it follows , weakening even more any chance of victory : Col . Ricardo Santa Cruz with his Zapadores Regiment , one company of the 2nd Line Regiment , and the Krupp cannons were to advance over Quillahuasa to cut off Buendía ' s escape route . Col . Eleuterio Ramírez with 7 companies of his 2nd Line Regiment , one Cazadores a Caballo company and some artillery was ordered to enter Tarapacá from Huariciña , pushing the Peruvians from the south . Finally , Gen . Arteaga with the rest of his forces would directly attack on the centre of the Chilean lines , over Tarapacá . Allied battle plan . Buendía was well aware of the Chilean presence , notified by Caceres and Bolognesi that one column was advancing over the plateau , and another one was moving towards Tarapacá ’ s den . Buendía ordered his vanguard to return from Pachica , north of this position , and concentrates his division on the town , setting skirmishers in every building to fire from a safe position . Also disposed his infantry in a manner that formed a cross fire field . Castañon ’ s artillery men were set on Visagra hill , to defend the den entrance , supported by the Arequipa Battalion . Battle . At 03 : 30 Santa Cruz departed from Isluga while a dense fog covered the surroundings , and an hour later Ramírez and Arteaga began their movement . Disoriented by the mist , Santa Cruz marched almost three hours in circles , losing precious time . When the sunrise showed that he was at Ramírez ’ rearguard , resolved to move over his objective , meanwhile the latter marched to his own . Closing to his destination , Santa Cruz sent his grenadiers to take Quillahuasa , but they were sighted by the Peruvians advanced posts which sounded the alarm . Strangely , Santa Cruz refused to use his artillery , losing the chance to overwhelm his enemy . Suárez , realizing his army could be vanquished by the Chilean artillery shooting at the from a higher ground , rapidly evacuated the town , putting his soldiers over the surrounding hills . Immediately Cáceres climbed the northern hill as Bolognesi did the same on the southern end of Tarapacá . At 10 : 00 , the fog vanished and Cáceres division could easily climb Visagra hill and attack Santa Cruz ’ column from his rearguard , isolating him from Ramírez and Arteaga . Cáceres division was formed by the Zepita and 2 de Mayo regiments , and later strengthened by the Ayacucho and Provisional Nº 1 of Lima battalions of Colonel Bedoya . His 1 , 500 men outnumbered the 400 men strength force of Santa Cruz . Thus , after 30 minutes almost one third of the Chilean column was out of combat , and lost its artillery , but managed to maintain cohesion and inflict several casualties as well . On the brink of annihilation , Arteaga came in Santa Cruz help , charging an astonished Caceres and forcing him to stop his attack . Facing a defeat , the Chilean officers prepared the retreat , deploying the infantry guarding the remains of the artillery . But before even moving , the grenadiers sent by Santa Cruz to Quillahuasa returned and charged the Allies again , followed by the infantry . Meanwhile , Ramirez ’ column was spotted by Bolognesi ’ s division , who deployed over the hills on the east , whilst Buendía garrisoned himself in the town . Ramirez ’ progressed without inconvenience passing through Huaraciña and San Lorenzo along the river , but when reaching a small mount at Tarapacá ’ s entrance , was received by a dense fire . Incredibly , despite capturing Buendía ’ s intention to outflank him , maintained his order and resumed his march as planned . The Chileans came back for their surprise and charged into the town only to be shot at point blank range from every house and building , suffering heavy damage . When Ramírez orders the retreat , simultaneously the grenadiers charge forced Caceres to refold at Visagra . More than 50 % of his 2nd Line Regiment was disabled , counting only with two companies disposed on the den high borders . After being reinforced by these troops , the Peruvians withdrew to Tarapacá and the battle stopped for a while . Believing the battle was over , the Chilean officers let their extenuated and thirsty men to abandon all order and moved over the river . Almost without any ammunition , were waiting for the night fall to return to Dibujo . But the Peruvian High command was planning a second attack , dividing its army into three columns , as equal as the Chileans did , but with the big difference that their greater numbers allowed to divide the forces without weakening them . Dávila ’ s men appeared suddenly over Huariciña ; Herrera ’ s and Bolognesi ’ s divisions attacked the troops at the river , the eastern and western heights , surprising the Chileans again . After the first impact , the Chileans gathered up and made a run from the heights trying to evacuate the town . The second in command officer of the Artillería de Marina Regiment formed 50 shooters along with two cannons and held the attack for an hour , until Arteaga realized the battle was lost and ordered the retreat . This was carried out with no order whatsoever , with soldiers moving to Dibujo and others to Isluga . The lack of cavalry prevented the Peruvians to inflict more severe casualties , saving the rest of Arteaga ’ s division . The battle was over and the Allied victory was total . Aftermath and consequences . The Chilean army lost at Tarapacá 691 men between dead and wounded , representing 23 . 6 % of the contingent presented to battle . Also , Col . Eleuterio Ramírez and Bartolomé Vivar , first and second commanders of the 2nd Line Regiment were killed in action , and the unit lost its banner . The defeat and poor planning cost Arteaga ’ s command , and strengthened War Minister Sotomayor ’ s prestige , since this was the only action so far planned without him , resulted in a disaster . On the Allies side , this victory had no effect on the course of actions , leaving Tarapacá and marching to Arica , losing almost half of their troops . Despite the defeat , Chile secured the Tarapacá province . See The New York Times Article