The Hardest Day The Hardest Day was the name of a Second World War air battle fought during the Battle of Britain on 18 August 1940 between the German " Luftwaffe " and British Royal Air Force ( RAF ) . By June 1940 the Allies had been defeated in Western Europe and Scandinavia . Rather than come to terms with Germany , Britain rejected all overtures for a negotiated peace resulting in Adolf Hitler issuing the German armed forces ( " Wehrmacht " ) Directive No . 16 ordering the invasion of the United Kingdom . The invasion of the United Kingdom was codenamed Operation Sea Lion ( " Unternehmen Seelöwe " ) however before this could be carried out , air superiority or air supremacy was required . The " Luftwaffe " was to destroy the RAF in order to prevent it from attacking the invasion fleet or providing protection to the Royal Navy ' s Home Fleet that might attempt to intercept a landing by sea . Hitler ordered the " Luftwaffe ' s " commander - in - chief , " Reichsmarschall " ( Empire ' s Marshal ) Hermann Göring and the " Oberkommando der Luftwaffe " ( High Command of the Air Force ) to prepare for the assault . The primary target was RAF Fighter Command : the destruction of which , would deny the British their air superiority asset . In July 1940 , the Luftwaffe began military operations to destroy the RAF . Throughout July and early August the Germans targeted convoys in the English Channel and occasionally RAF airfields . On 13 August a major German effort , known as " Adlertag " ( Eagle Day ) , was made against RAF airfields but failed . The failure did not deter the Germans from persisting with air raids against the RAF or its infrastructure . On 18 August 1940 the Luftwaffe made an all - out effort to severely damage Fighter Command . The air battles that took place on this date were amongst the largest aerial engagements in history at that time . Both sides suffered very heavy losses . The British outperformed the Luftwaffe in the air , achieving a favourable ratio of 2 : 1 . However , a number of RAF aircraft , including around six to eight fighters , were caught and destroyed on the ground , equalling the total losses of both sides . Further large aerial battles would take place , with heavy casualties being suffered , but both sides lost more aircraft combined on this day than at any other point during the campaign , including Battle of Britain Day , generally considered the climax of the campaign . For this reason , the air battles of the 18 August 1940 became known as " The Hardest Day " . Background . The " Luftwaffe " was detailed to destroy Fighter Command before the planned invasion of Britain could take place . The " OKL " hoped that by destroying the British fighter force the British could be brought to terms by air power alone and the very risky Operation " Sea Lion " would not be needed . The enormous numerical superiority of British sea forces over their German opponents made a crossing of the Channel very dangerous , even under conditions of air superiority . Furthermore , the aircraft losses of the spring campaign had weakened the " Luftwaffe " before the Battle of Britain and it could not begin its campaign against Fighter Command immediately . The service was forced to wait until it had reached acceptable levels before a main assault against the RAF could be made in August 1940 . Until the " Luftwaffe " was ready to begin operations over the mainland , the first phase of the German air offensive targeted British shipping in the Channel . The raids rarely involved attacks against RAF airfields inland , but encouraged RAF units to engage in battle by attacking British Channel convoys . These operations would last from 10 July to 8 August 1940 . The attacks against shipping were not very successful , and only 24 , 500 Grt was sunk . Mine laying from aircraft had proved more profitable , sinking 38 , 000 tons . The impact on Fighter Command was minimal . It had lost 74 fighter pilots killed or missing and 48 wounded in July but British strength rose to 1 , 429 by 3 August . By that date , it was only short of 124 pilots . Still , the attacks succeeded in forcing the British to abandon the Channel convoy route and to redirect shipping to ports in north - eastern Britain . With this achieved the " Luftwaffe " began the second phase of its air offensive , attacking RAF airfields and supporting structures on the British mainland . The first major raid inland and against RAF airfields came on 12 August and the Luftwaffe quickly escalated its offensive . The Germans did not achieve a degree of success commensurate with their exertions on this date . Nevertheless , in the belief they were having considerable effect on Fighter Command , they prepared to launch their all - out assault on the RAF the following day . By 13 August , German air strength had reached acceptable levels . After bringing its serviceable rates up , the " Luftwaffe " carried out heavy attacks under the codename " Adlertag " ( or Eagle Day ) with 71 per cent of its bomber force , 85 per cent of its Bf 109 units , and 83 per cent of its Bf 110 units operational . The day went badly for the Germans , who failed to impair Fighter Command and its bases or command and control system . The failure was due in large part to poor intelligence which failed to identify Fighter Command airfields and distinguish them from Bomber and Coastal Commands . Still , the Germans pursued their strategy against Fighter Command on 15 August , suffering 76 losses . Undeterred , they prepared to make another large - scale attack on RAF bases on 18 August . The month of August would witness an escalation in air combat as the Germans made a concentrated effort against Fighter Command . Luftwaffe plan . Rationale . German intelligence suggested that the RAF was down to just 300 serviceable fighters on 17 August 1940 , taking into consideration German pilots ' claims and their estimates of British production capabilities . In fact there were 855 machines serviceable with 289 at storage units and another 84 at training units . This gave a total of 1 , 438 fighters , twice as many as at the beginning of July 1940 . Expecting weakening opposition , the " Luftwaffe " prepared for a major action against RAF Sector Stations on the 18 August . The " Luftwaffes " plan of attack was simple . German bombers were to strike at the RAF airfields situated in the south - east corner of England . The most important airfields in this region , under the command of AOC ( Air Officer Commanding ) Keith Park and his No . 11 Group RAF , were the Sector Stations at RAF Kenley , Biggin Hill , Hornchurch , North Weald , Northolt , Tangmere and Debden . The first five were on the periphery of Greater London . Tangmere was in the south near the coast at Chichester ; Debden was in the north near Saffron Walden . Each of these airfields housed two to three squadrons and had its own sector operations room . From there its fighters were directed from its satellite airfields into combat . There were six satellite airfields at Westhampnett , Croydon , Gravesend , Manston , Rochford and RAF Martlesham Heath ; Manston and Martlesham Heath each housed two squadrons , the remainder each housed one . Finally , there was RAF Hawkinge , just inland from Folkestone . Not all of these airfields were targeted on 18 August . Despite the failure of " Adlertag " and considerable loss rates on the 15 , 16 and 17 August , Kesselring convinced Göring that the only sound strategy was to continue to send heavily escorted bombers to destroy British airfields . Kesselring also advocated the use of " Jagdgeschwader " ( Fighter Wings ) in free - chase tactics . Messerschmitt Bf 109 single - engine fighters were to be sent out in advance of the main raids to force the British fighter forces into large - scale air battles which , in theory , would destroy RAF aircraft in combat and deplete British defences . However , this time , Kesselring changed his operational methods . In consultation with Hugo Sperrle , commanding " Luftflotte 3 " ( Air Fleet 3 ) , he chose not to scatter his effort against a large amount of targets . Instead , he narrowed down the targets into a short list in order to concentrate his strength and strike power against worthy targets . Sector stations RAF Kenley , North Weald , Hornchurch and Biggin Hill were the prime targets . Targets . The following targets were chosen for attack on 18 August 1940 : RAF defences . Initial strategy and tactics . Up to the late Spring of 1940 , Fighter Command had been preparing to meet a possible air attack on the British Isles coming only from due east , from Germany itself ; prior to the German victory in Western Europe . The possibility that France might fall and Britain would continue to fight on had not been considered . An air attack from Germany meant the " Luftwaffes " bombers would operate beyond the range of their fighters and be vulnerable to attack . If twin - engine fighters , such as the Messerschmitt Bf 110 s were used , they would be fighting at the limits of their range . It was also doubted that fast fighter aircraft could engage in dogfight s . The g - force effect on the human body also seemed to suggest the prospect of air - to - air combat between fighters was impractical anyway . The threat they saw related only to the return - fire of the bomber ' s gunners . Before the war the effectiveness of return , or cross - fire , from bombers had been exaggerated by the Air Staff and Air Ministry . This short - sighted belief had a detrimental impact on the tactical effectiveness of RAF Fighter Command until the summer , 1940 . With German bombers perceived as the only prey , AOC Fighter Command Hugh Dowding and his planners devised a system and tactics which used unwieldy and tight fighter formations to bring the RAF fighters into combat with bombers , followed by set - piece tactics for the engagement . Because the bomber ' s return fire was considered so dangerous , fighter pilots were trained to open fire at long range , 300 to 400 yards , then break away without closing to short - range . These tactics , practised so thoroughly over the years , proved totally useless to the battle situation facing them over Britain in 1940 . The tactics were unsuitable for fighter - versus - fighter combat . Packed in tight formation , the RAF pilots were more concerned with keeping their position and not colliding with each other than they were keeping watch for the enemy . It made them vulnerable to surprise attacks by Bf 109s and Bf 110s . Even if the British fighters reached the bombers without interception , the chaos of modern aerial combat made it impossible to concentrate attacks with large , rigid formations . Pilots were also forced into paying far too much respect to the bomber ' s defensive capabilities . Attacks were broken off far too early and caused little damage to bombers . These tactical failures were evident during the battles in Belgium and France . Moreover , rushed training with pilots who were barely able to use the old tactical methods meant that airmen could not cope with much needed radical changes . The V formation was developed in June , which made a greater emphasis on each pilot looking for the enemy , search capability and avoiding being taken by surprise . Still , it was inferior to German fighter tactics . German fighter tactics were more flexible . In the Spanish Civil War , Werner Mölders developed a new system of fighter tactics . The primary deployment was to use large numbers of Bf 109s on free - hunting missions , or sweeps , over the battle area . Instead of flying the standard V formation , used by many air forces , the Germans paired their fighters into " Rotte " . It consisted of two fighters ; a pilot and his wingman 200 yards abreast . Flying this way meant each could cover the others blind spots . If an enemy made an attack , the other could move in behind it to protect the other " Rotte " member . The " Rotte " could be expanded into a " Schwarm " ( Swarm or Flight ) . The formation was eventually given the name " Finger - four " . It offered maximum protection and all members of a " Schwarm " were on the lookout for threats and targets . C3 : Command , communication and control . At the operational level the British fighter defences proved to be far more sophisticated . The RAF defences were not just based on the combat power of Fighter Command . Just as important as the " teeth " of the defence was the " eyes and ears " - its nervous system which carried intelligence and information between them to position the " teeth " to strike . By the summer , 1940 , the Chain Home radar stations along the English and Scottish coasts was able to track incoming aircraft from continental Europe at all but the lowest altitudes . The best detection altitude was 20 , 000 feet . Aircraft at this height could be detected over 100 miles away . To assess their identity , IFF ( Identification Friend or Foe ) could , by means of a distinctive blip on radar screens , distinguish German and British aircraft . The radar technology was not flawless . It struggled to gauge heights of incoming formations above 25 , 000 feet and could not measure their numerical strength . It could also take several minutes to assess the line of advance for aircraft on a zigzag course . Moreover , the radar looked out to sea and was unable to track aircraft overland . That was the job of the Royal Observer Corps . Tens of thousands of volunteers , the length and breadth of Britain tracked the German formations over land . They were connected to Sector airfields by landline and could communicate intelligence in real time . The detection and interception of incoming raids was as follows : Anti - aircraft defences . A number of unusual defence mechanisms were used at RAF bases on 18 August 1940 . Among the more conventional was the anti - aircraft artillery piece . The three main types in service were the 4 . 5 inch , 3 . 7 inch and 3 inch batteries . The first two were modern and effective over 26 , 000 feet . The last was a First World War vintage weapon and was effective only to 14 , 000 feet . Usually batteries were sited in fours , with a range - finder and predictor which measured the speed and height of the aircraft while taking into account the time the shell took to reach that patch of sky , thus calculating when to detonate the fuse in the shell . As with most artillery , when firing at aircraft , the higher the shell travelled the less effective it became . A shell fired to 5 , 000 feet would only be half as effective at 10 , 000 feet and a quarter as accurate at 15 , 000 feet . The German bombers usually tried to fly around heavy concentrations and if forced to fly through them , chose to fly at heights of around 15 , 000 feet . Most of the heavy artillery defences were located around London and the Thames Estuary . Others concentrated around Dover , Folkestone , Harwich , Ipswich , Portsmouth and Southampton docks . For low - level defence the Bofors 40 mm was used which had a rate of fire around 120 rounds a minute . The two pound shells were highly effective against low flying aircraft , capable of blowing a hole big enough for a man to fit through . However , there were only a few to go around . More than twice as many were needed to protect RAF Kenley and Biggin Hill . To make up the difference 3 inch guns , firing over open sights from 1918 were used . They could fire only 15 rounds per minute . However there was an unusual defence weapon that had been designed for use at Kenley on 18 August ; the parachute - and - cable . On the north side of the airfield at 60 - foot intervals they were fired vertically upwards by a rocket in salvoes of nine or more . As enemy aircraft came in at low - altitude the parachute device deployed and held a 480 - foot long steel cable from an altitude of 600 feet . An enemy aircraft would hopefully fly through it . If it struck , the second parachute deployed and the unfortunate victim was left towing away the contraption . If the cable was picked up on the wing , there was a good chance that the aircraft would go down out of control . This device had not been used before 18 August 1940 . To support them , Barrage balloon s with cutting cables capable of tearing off bombers ' wings were also used . Lunchtime engagement . German build - up . The morning weather was clear and sunny making ideal flying conditions . At his Headquarters in Brussels , Albert Kesselring commanding " Luftflotte 2 " ( Air Fleet 2 ) directed the " Geschwader " ( Wings ) under his command to carry out attacks on targets Nos . 1017 and 10118 in the Luftwaffe catalogue ; Biggin Hill and Kenley . Biggin Hill was handed over to KG 1 which was to send 60 Heinkel He 111 s from its base in Amiens to conduct a high - level attack . RAF Kenley was the responsibility of KG 76 based in airfields to the north of Paris . The " Kampfgeschwader " ( Bomber Wing ) consisted of a mixed formation of 48 Dornier Do 17 s and Junkers Ju 88 s . The force attacking Kenley was smaller numerically than the one hitting Biggin Hill and the Ju 88 and Do 17 carried only two - thirds the bomb - load of a He 111 . The planners reasoned a more accurate low - level strike carried out by a " staffel " from KG 76 would compensate for the weaker firepower of KG 76s main formations . Fighter escort was provided by " Jagdgeschwader 3 " ( JG 3 ) , " Jagdgeschwader 26 " ( JG 26 ) , " Jagdgeschwader 51 " ( JG 51 ) , " Jagdgeschwader 52 " ( JG 52 ) , " Jagdgeschwader 54 " ( JG 54 ) and " Zerstörergeschwader 26 " ( ZG 26 ) . The " Jagdgeschwader " would carry out free - hunting and close escort from bases in the Pas - de - Calais . Both of these airfields contained Sector Operations rooms from which the British fighters were directed into action . These airfields were selected by the Luftwaffe because they were the largest ones known to be operating RAF fighters . The German intelligence had no knowledge of the Sector Operations rooms there . The rooms were above ground and had little protection . If those poorly protected buildings could be hit , and those inside killed or wounded , it would be a serious blow to the control system in the region . At their airfield at Cormeilles - en - Vexin , " 9 Staffel " ( Squadron ) KG 76 were briefed by their commander " Hauptmann " ( Captain ) Joachim Roth . The " Staffel " was to conduct a low - level attack against Kenley with Roth flying as a navigator in the lead aircraft . The unit had specialised in low - level attacks in France with great success . The nine Do 17s were to head across the Channel and make landfall at Beachy Head . From there they were to follow the Brighton - London rail line north - east to the target area . The crews were ordered to concentrate their attacks against buildings and hangars on the southern end of the airfield . The Dorniers were to carry twenty 110 - lb bombs each fitted with a fuse that would allow for function if released from 50 feet or higher ; the type of bomb previously used by the " Staffel " had to release from twice this height , making the unit ' s Do 17s correspondingly more vulnerable to ground fire . The attack was to be part of a coordinated pincer movement against the airfields . Ju 88s from II . / KG 76 were to dive - bomb buildings and hangars from high - altitude first . Five minutes later , 27 Do 17s from I . and II . / KG 76 would level - bomb from high altitude to crater the runways and landing grounds while knocking out its defences . " 9 Staffel " KG 76 , the specialist low - level strike unit , would go in and finish off any buildings still standing . It was a bold and imaginative plan . If it worked , it would wreck Kenley from end - to - end . The high - flying bombers would have full fighter escort but the low - flying bombers would have to use stealth to avoid interception to and from the target area . The operation began at 09 : 00 but was postponed because of heavy haze reducing visibility up to 4 , 000 feet . In the intermediate time , a few skirmishes took place between RAF fighters and German reconnaissance aircraft . A " Lehrgeschwader 2 " ( LG 2 ) Bf 110 was shot down in the morning . At 11 : 00 KG 1 ' s formations took off and the main formations headed out to sea . The form - up was more difficult for KG 76 and its Do 17s and Ju 88s . Their bases in and around Calais were covered in 8 / 10ths cloud cover with a base of 6 , 500 feet which reached to 10 , 000 feet . As the bombers climbed through the haze the formation soon lost cohesion . Valuable time was lost as they reformed . Unfortunately the Do 17s of I . and III . / KG 76 had overtaken the III . / KG 76 Ju 88s which should have been ahead of them by five minutes . These delay would have serious consequences for " 9 Staffel " KG 76 . Meanwhile Gerhard Schöpfel , leading III . / JG 26 and Bf 109s from JG 3 , 40 in total , were already crossing the Dover straights to sweep the skies clear of the main raid . Some 25 miles behind him were the 27 Do 17s of I . and III . / KG 76 escorted by 20 Bf 110s that were to strike Kenley . Close by the Dorniers were the Ju 88s of III . / KG 76 escorted by Bf 109s from JG 51 . This formation should have been 15 miles in front . Some 15 miles to the rear of the Ju88s , KG 1 ' s He 111s were bound for Biggin Hill , escorted by 40 Bf 109s from JG 54 . The formations were moving at around three miles per minute , at 12 , 000 feet . Around 50 miles to the south - west , the nine Do 17s of " 9 Staffel " were at wave - top height , half way between Dieppe , Seine - Maritime and Beachy Head , intent on sneaking under British radar beams unobserved . Altogether , the raiding force contained 108 bombers and 150 fighters . British scramble . The British followed the main raids and were aware of all the approaching aircraft , save for the low - altitude " 9 Staffel " . The radar station near Dover began reporting a build - up over the Pas - de - Calais area . This activity increased until 12 : 45 when six separate concentrations were reported . The plotters estimated the strength of the force as 350 aircraft , one - third more than the actual size . At RAF Uxbridge , AOC No . 11 Group RAF Keith Park and his controllers directed No . 501 Squadron RAF and its 12 Hawker Hurricane s , already in the air , to Canterbury at 20 , 000 feet . They had been on their way back to RAF Gravesend having spent most of the morning on patrol operating from RAF Hawkinge near Folkestone . Within minutes eight more Squadrons were dispatched to meet them ; two from Kenley , two from Biggin Hill and one each from North Weald , Martlesham , Heath , Manston and Rochford . Within a short time the fighters assigned to engage were all airborne . Five Squadrons ; No . 17 , No . 54 , No . 56 , No . 65 , and 501 with 17 Supermarine Spitfire s and 36 Hurricanes were moving to patrol the Canterbury - Margate line to block any attack on the Thames Estuary ports of the airfields to the north of it . Four Squadrons ; No . 32 , No . 64 , No . 601 , and No . 615 , with 23 Spitfires and 27 Hurricanes went into position above Kenley and Biggin Hill . A total of 97 RAF fighters were to meet the attack . Park did not send all of his forces aloft , and he held a reserve . Three Squadrons at RAF Tangmere were kept and made ready to meet more attacks from the south . Six more were in reserve to meet a possible follow - up to the coming raid . " 9 Staffel " KG 76 attacks Kenley . As the advance led by Gerhard Schöpfel made their way past the coast it spotted the vic - formation of RAF fighters . They were Hurricanes of 501 Squadron which were conducting wide spirals to gain height . Schöpfel bounced them and shot down four in two minutes killing one pilot and wounding three others . As he departed other members of his " Geschwader " ( Wing ) dived on the Squadron and an inconclusive dogfight ensued . Schöpfel ' s victims were Donald McKay and Pilot Officer s J . W Bland , Kenneth Lee and F . Kozlowski . Bland was the only one killed . Both the Do 17s and Ju 88s of the III . / KG 76 were engaged by AAA defences as they crossed Dover . The Do 17s were escorted by ZG 26 while III . / JG 51 led by Hannes Trautloft escorted the Ju 88s . Trautloft remarked on the impressive numerical strength of the German formations . Fortunately the German bombers had flown too far east of Canterbury and thus avoided the main concentration of fighters on the Canterbury - Margate line . At 13 : 01 they passed over Ashford and had a clear 40 mile run before they reached Biggin Hill and its four defending Squadrons . As " 9 Staffel " crossed the coast they were fired at by Royal Navy patrol boats . The machine gun fire was ineffective . However , the Royal Observer Corps Post K3 , situated on top of Beach Head , spotted the Dorniers . They immediately telephoned a warning to Observer Group Headquarters at Horsham and fighter sector stations in the area , including RAF Kenley . Wing Commander Thomas Prickman , the station commander at Kenley , noticed the low - flying Dornier plot appear on his situation map . They appeared to be heading away towards the west , and was unsure of their target . His controllers were organising Nos . 64 and 615 Squadrons to meet the high - altitude raid . Roth headed past Lewes until he picked up the rail line , Brighton - London . He then turned north - west . With the Observer Corps passing a steady stream of reports regarding approaching German formations they soon realised a coordinated attack was underway . The two Squadrons approaching the high - altitude attack could not be diverted and no fighters had been asked to engage the " 9 Staffel " . The only Squadron on the ground in the area was No . 111 Squadron RAF that had 12 Hurricanes at RAF Croydon . Although usually the responsibility of Park , the controllers took the matter into their own hands and ordered all aircraft into the air . Even those that were not in combat condition were flown north - east , to avoid them being caught on the ground . No . 111 Squadron managed to get into position above Kenley at 3 , 000 feet . With luck they could intercept " 9 Staffel " . Biggin Hill soon took the same precaution of ordering all fighters into the air by order of Group Captain Richard Grice . At 13 : 10 the German bombers were within 40 miles of the BBC high - power transmitter at Hatfield , Hertfordshire . In accordance with policy , it was shut down to deny the Germans the opportunity to use it as direction - finding beacon and the BBC Home Service was kicked off air in the process . Using the railway lines , Roth , in the lead Do 17 , homed in on Kenley from the south . They were now just six miles away . Joachim Roth ' s low - level navigation had been extremely accurate . He had navigated his unit to within two minutes flying time from the target without interception , over unfamiliar enemy territory , on time and exactly on the planned route . But as the Dorniers neared the airfield they noticed that there was no smoke , or signs of damage . They expected to be polishing off a damaged fighter station . As the Germans burst over the airfield the air was suddenly filled with tracer rounds as the Dornier ' s gunners engaged the Bofors and British AAA defences . Some of No . 111 Squadron dived onto the Dorniers , but one Hurricane was shot down , either by the Dorniers or British ground fire . Pilot Flight Lieutenant Stanley Connors was killed . The rest pulled up and away to avoid friendly fire . They flew to the northern edge of the airfield to catch the raiders as they emerged . Two Hurricanes from No . 615 were taking off under the attack . Within minutes all the Dorniers had been hit . " Feldwebel " Johannes Petersen ' s Do 17 was flying higher than the others . It was hit , and caught fire , but carried on . Günter Unger lined up his Do 17 in order to attack a hangar and released his 20 110 - lb bombs before his starboard engine was knocked out . " Unteroffizier " ( Junior Officer or NCO ) Schumacher watched as three hangars were destroyed by Unger ’ s bombs . Unger ’ s Dornier was then was hit by something . It bled black smoke and lost speed . Unger was engaged by No . 111s Harry Newton . Newton was shot down by accurate return fire and bailed out . However , Newton fired a burst of machine gun fire at the Dornier in frustration before leaving the Hurricane . He damaged the Dornier , but Unger flew on . " Oberleutnant " ( First Lieutenant ) Hermann Magin was lining up a hangar when he was hit and slumped over . The quick reactions of the navigator , 28 year old Wilhelm - Friedrich Illg , saved the crew . He took control and climbed out of the defensive fire before ordering the crew to abandon the aircraft . As the bombers worked over the airfield , Aircraftman D . Roberts waited for them on the northern boundary with his Parachute - and - cable launchers . Three Do 17s were heading towards him , climbing slowly . When they were in range he fired the cables . Nine rockets flew upwards . Wilhelm Raab saw the rockets go up . Although he did not understand what they were , he banked the Do 17 to avoid the lines of smoke that may or may not have concealed something . Because the Dornier banked , one of the cables that hit his bomber slid off the wing before the lower parachute had time to deploy . Pilot Petersen ' s Dornier was not that lucky . Already on fire it ran into the cable which dragged it out of the sky . The Do 17 crashed killing all five crewmen . " Oberleutnant " Rudolf Lamberty ( carrying Joachim Roth ) also managed to avoid a collision , but before he could do so fire hit his Dornier destroying the fuel tanks . The bomber caught fire and he was barely able to keep control . Eventually it crash - landed at Leaves Green in Kent after being shot down by No . 111 Squadron Hurricanes . Roth was killed , but Lamberty survived with burns . Of the bombers that evaded the defences and No . 111 Squadron , two ditched into the sea and two more crash - landed in France . The German crew was picked up by " Kriegsmarine " ships . Out of the nine Do 17s , four were lost , two damaged in crash landings and all were at least damaged . Wilhelm - Friedrich Illg was awarded the Knight ' s Cross of the Iron Cross for helping the wounded pilot Hermann Magin guide his Do 17 back home . Magin died of wounds soon after . For their efforts , " 9 Staffel " destroyed at least three hangars , hit several other buildings and destroyed eight Hurricanes on the ground . According to other sources , 10 hangars were destroyed , six damaged , the operations room put out of action , and many buildings were destroyed . It would have been worse had the bombs been released higher . A lot of bombs landed horizontally and did not explode on impact . To achieve this level of damage , KG 76 dropped nine tons of bombs . At the end of the day just one hangar was left operational at Kenley . The low - level raid put the airfield out of commission for two hours . In combat , two Hurricanes were shot down by the Dornier ' s return fire . In return " 9 Staffel " lost four Do 17s , three slightly damaged and two seriously damaged . Low - level attacks were abandoned after " The Hardest Day " . KG 1 and KG 76 hit Kenley , Biggin Hill and West Malling . Nos . 610 , 615 and 32 Squadrons were guarding the air space near Biggin Hill . Operating at about 25 , 000 feet they were waiting for the high - altitude force to reach the area . Unfortunately , the German escort fighters had climbed much higher and they were taken by surprise . JG 3 ' s Bf 109s had been flying extended cover for the 12 Ju 88s and 27 Do 17s of KG 76 . They spotted No . 615 below them and bounced the RAF fighters . " Oberleutnant " Lothar Keller and " Leutnants " Helmut Meckel and Helmut Landry each destroyed a Hurricane . While 615 had taken grievous losses , it had served an important purpose by keeping the escorting German fighters busy . While they engaged JG 3 , Squadron Leader Michael Crossley led No . 32 Squadron against I . and III . / KG 76 bombers without having to worry about enemy fighter aircraft . ZG 26 ' s Bf 110s were flying near the formation , and tried to offer JG 3 support by intercepting Crossley ' s fighters but failed . Crossley led a head - on attack and downed one Do 17 while his squadron damaged several others . So close had the RAF fighters pressed home their attacks that the bombers had to move and jink to avoid their fire . It put the bomb - aimers off their aim . The Dorniers were already too close to their targets and the pilots could not realign before the formation was over and passed the aiming point . Having been thwarted from bombing their official targets they aimed for rail tracks to the north and east of the airfield . Some of the unit targeted RAF Croydon , three miles north - west of Biggin Hill . Others turned around without releasing their bombs . The crews that bombed the rail lines found they were a difficult target to hit at 15 , 000 feet . Some released their bombs at intervals in the hope of hitting their targets , however some bombs fell on residential property . Crossley attempted a second pass on the bombers soon after . This time , the Bf 110s succeeded in getting in between the bombers and 32 Squadron . One Bf 110 was damaged while their gunners shot down and wounded Flight Lieutenant ' Humph ' Russell . Seconds later , No . 64 Squadron ' s eight Spitfires turned up , led by Squadron Leader Donald MacDonell . They dived on the Dorniers from high - altitude . Some of the Squadron , including Squadron Leader MacDonell , attacked the Bf 110s , believing them to be Dorniers . MacDonell damaged a Bf 110 flown by Ruediger . Proske crash - landed and was taken prisoner . Several confusing dogfights broke out and lasted for some time . The Ju 88s arrived over the target at Kenley to find a smoke pall hanging over the target . It was impossible to begin dive - bombing attacks under those conditions . Given the amount of damage to Kenley , it also seemed unnecessary to the bomber crews . As they were deciding what action to take , they were attacked . The Bf 109s led by Hannes Trautloft had a difficult job of defending the Ju 88s . After passing Biggin Hill on their way to RAF West Malling British AAA fire began targeting the formation . One Ju 88 was hit , and Trautloft gave it special protection . As he manoeuvred himself into position , the formation was jumped by Spitfires and Hurricanes . One Ju 88 was lost to 32 Squadron ' s Pilot Officer Bolesław Własnowolski . As they attack began , the Ju 88s turned to West Malling , and began dive - bombing attacks as an alternate target . KG 1 , meanwhile , had a clear run to its target . The battles with KG 76 had drawn in four of the five RAF Squadrons . Still , the British sent No . 615 Squadron and its 15 Spitfires to deal with KG 1 . They were confronted with a large number of Bf 109s from JG 54 , escorting the He 111s . The German fighters successfully defended their charges and the RAF fighters could not break through to the bombers , which were flying in stepped - up waves from 12 to 15 , 000 feet . Most of the German bomber crews noted the absence of fighter opposition and speculated that the RAF might be at the end of its tether . Most of the personnel at Biggin Hill had time to take cover before the bombers arrived . KG 1 lost only one He 111 and one another damaged but failed to damage Biggin Hill . It is likely the losses sustained by KG 1 were inflicted by Spitfires from No . 65 Squadron RAF which stumbled across of their He 111s while 615 and JG 54 were locked in combat . Thus far , the German fighters had performed well , but now it came to the most difficult part of the operation : withdrawing under attack . The German fighters were low on fuel and could only do so much to protect the bombers . Damaged stragglers lagged behind the main bomber streams and were easy prey for RAF fighters if they could be found . The four German raiding formations were all heading in different directions by 13 : 30 : " 9 Staffel " were well clear to the south , heading back over Beachy Head ; KG 1 were completing their bomb run while the Spitfires of 610 were being held at arms length by JG 54 Bf 109s ; the Ju 88s of KG 76 had attacked West Malling and their escorts were battling Nos . 32 , 64 , 501 and 615 Squadrons . The Dorniers were heading home under attack by elements of 32 , 64 and 615 Squadrons . However , further to the east , Nos . 1 , 17 , 54 , 56 and 266 Squadrons totalling 23 Spitfires and 36 Hurricanes were moving in to meet the main formations during their withdrawal . RAF controllers faced difficulties of their own . Thickening haze made it impossible for the Observer Corps to plot the route of German formations . A concentrated force of RAF fighters , should it be able to engage the main formations , might be able to inflict serious damage . However , the thickening haze might enable the Germans to slip by and leave the concentrated force of RAF fighters near Canterbury striking at thin air . Instead of adopting an " all or nothing " approach , Park ordered the fighters to spread out and engage singly if needed . Park ' s plan paid dividends . Bf 110s from ZG 26 were soon discovered by No . 56 Squadron and quickly found themselves under attack . In the short and sharp engagement , ZG 26 lost five Bf 110s and another damaged to No . 56 Squadron . Worse was follow when No . 54 and 501 engaged the Messerschmitts . ZG 26 lost a further two shot down and two damaged to No . 54 Squadron . None of the RAF Squadrons reported any losses in these engagements . The " Geschwader " would lose other machines to No . 151 and No . 46 Squadrons who arrived to join the battle . According to one source , the total losses of ZG 26 amounted to 12 destroyed and seven damaged throughout the entire day . Another source gives a list of 15 Bf 110s written off ; 13 destroyed , two written off and six damaged on 18 August 1940 . Whatever the actual losses , " The Hardest Day " marked the start of a decline in Bf 110 operations . Production was not keeping pace with losses , and there simply were not enough aircraft to go around . No . 266 Squadron was the last unit to trade shots with German formations . During the battles five Bf 109s were destroyed ; two from JG 26 and three from JG 3 . A further three Bf 109s were 60 , 70 and 80 percent damaged . Four German pilots were killed , one wounded , one captured and one missing . One made it back to base where the crippled fighter crash - landed . One JG 3 and one JG 26 Bf 109s fell to Spitfires of 266 Squadron . Three fell to Spitfires of No . 54 Squadron . Bomber losses amounted to eight destroyed and ten damaged ; including five Do 17s and two Ju 88s destroyed from KG 76 and one KG 1 He 111 lost . The British suffered casualties as well . No . 17 Squadron lost one Hurricane and one pilot killed . No . 32 Squadron suffered the loss of one Hurricane destroyed ; No . 65 Squadron lost one Hurricane shot down and one pilot missing . No . 111 Squadron lost one Hurricane destroyed on the ground and one damaged on the ground and three shot down in aerial combat , but all pilots survived . No . 501 Squadron suffered heavy losses amounting to five Hurricanes destroyed , two pilots killed , one seriously wounded . No . 601 lost two Hurricanes and both pilots killed while No . 602 Squadron lost three Spitfires and one damaged with one pilot wounded . No . 615 Squadron also took crippling casualties . It lost three Hurricanes with one pilot killed and another wounded . However , a further six of their Hurricanes were destroyed in the Kenley raid by " 9 Staffel " . / KG 76 . The casualties of 615 have been challenged by another source which indicates 615 Squadron lost only three on the ground at Kenley ( P3158 , P3487 , R4186 ) . The main battle was over , but more combats took place as Kesselring sent in even more Bf 109s to support the withdrawing bombers . " Jagdgeschwader 2 " ( JG 2 ) and " Jagdgeschwader 27 " ( JG 27 ) engaged RAF fighters near the Isle of Wight as the bombers left British air space . II . / JG 2 lost one Bf 109 destroyed and another damaged in battle with Hurricanes from No . 601 Squadron , suffering one pilot missing and the other wounded . JG 27 lost six Bf 109s ( three each from I . and II . / JG 27 ) in action against No . 85 Squadron RAF . Three pilots were killed , two were posted missing presumed dead and the other was picked up in the Channel by a Heinkel He 59 air - sea rescue aircraft . Large - scale Ju 87 operations . German build up . Hugo Sperrle ' s " Luftflotte 3 " ordered his dive bomber units to begin operations against the radar stations and airfields on the southern coast of Britain . The targets on the afternoon of 18 August were RAF Ford , RAF Thorney Island and Gosport , all belonging to the Fleet Air Arm or Coastal Command . Included in the target selection was the radar station at Poling , West Sussex , near Littlehampton . Reconnaissance by Junkers Ju 86 aircraft had identified the airfields as fighter bases . The high altitude and poor resolution of the photographs meant the aircraft on the ground could not be identified properly and the Germans mistakenly believed them to be fighter fields . In fact , none of the airfields belonged to Fighter Command . Gosport housed a torpedo development unit , Thorney Island housed No . 59 Squadron RAF and No . 235 Squadron RAF with Bristol Blenheim ' s assigned to RAF Coastal Command . Ford was a naval air station and housed No . 829 Squadron Fleet Air Arm which was working up with Fairey Albacore aircraft at the time . These targets were given to " Sturzkampfgeschwader 77 " ( StG 77 or Dive Bombing Wing 77 ) . The " Geschwader " committed 109 Junkers Ju 87 " Stuka " dive - bombers to the raid . It was the largest concentration of Ju 87s to operate over Britain to date . I . / StG 77 were to strike at Thorney Island with 28 Ju 87s ; 28 II . / StG 77 were assigned to Ford ; and 31 III . / StG 77 Ju 87s were to destroy Poling radar station . A fourth unit , " Sturzkampfgeschwader 3 " ( StG 3 or Dive Bombing Wing 3 ) , sent 22 Ju 87s to attack Gosport . The dive - bombers were supported by 157 Bf 109s ; 70 from JG 27 ; 32 from JG 53 acting as close escort ; and 55 from JG 2 which was to sweep the Portsmouth area in advance of the main raid independently . The Ju 87s were based around Caen , too far away for the attacks . So in the morning the " Stukas " were moved into closer airfields around Cherbourg , right on the Channel coast . There , fuel tanks were filled , bombs loaded , and crews given a final briefing . At 13 : 29 the first Ju 87s took off . By 13 : 45 all were in formation and beginning the 85 - mile trip . " Major " Helmut Bode led III . / StG 77 to Poling . He knew nothing of the technicalities of his target . Behind him was " Hauptmann " Alfons Orthofer ' s II . / StG 77 bound for Ford . After them , " Hauptmann " Herbert Meisel ' s III " Gruppe " was heading on the left of the formation for Thorney Island . " Hauptmann " Walter Seigel ' s I . / StG 3 headed for Gosport on the extreme left . Each Ju 87 was loaded with 550 - lb bombs under the main fuselage and four 11 - lb bombs and two under each wing . The Bf 109s would not take off for some time . The long trip and low speed of the Ju 87s meant there was plenty of time to catch up without burning fuel keeping close contact with the " Stukas " . British scramble . At 13 : 59 , Poling radar station picked up the German formations and reported them as 80 - strong . Smaller forces ranging from 9 to 20 - plus represented the German fighters moving up behind it . The British estimated the Luftwaffe attack force to be 150 - aircraft strong . It was an underestimation by half . No . 10 Group RAF and No . 11 Group alerted their units from their operations rooms at Uxbridge and Box in Wiltshire . No . 10 and 11 Groups dispatched more Squadrons to support the already airborne 11 Hurricanes from No . 601 Squadron . 10 Group dispatched one Squadron each from RAF Middle Wallop , RAF Exeter and RAF Warmwell , and one each from No . 11 ' s RAF Tangmere and RAF Westhampnett . The RAF order of battle included ; nine Hurricanes of No . 43 Squadron RAF , led by Squadron Leader Frank Reginald Carey patrolling Thorney Island ; No . 602 Squadron RAF protected Westhampnett with 12 Spitfires ; No . 152 Squadron RAF and 11 Spitfires patrolled Portsmouth air space ; No . 234 Squadron RAF with 11 Spitfires over the Isles of Wight to engage the attackers ; No . 213 Squadron RAF with 12 Hurricanes which were to move 80 miles eastward from Exeterand patrol St . Catherine ' s Point . Finally , No . 609 Squadron RAF and 12 Spitfires remained in reserve around Middle Wallop to meet any unexpected German moves . Having lost all of its Bristol Blenheim night fighters in the raid of 16 August , Tangmere dispatched two Hurricanes from the Fighter Interception Unit ( FIU ) fitted with FIU airborne radar to test the device in action . RAF Coastal Command also joined in , and committed No . 235 Squadron RAF and its Bristol Blenheim ' s . The defence was reliant on the 68 Spitfires and Hurricanes . The numerical standing meant a ratio of one RAF fighter to every four German fighters and bombers , or in other words , one British aircraft to every two German fighters . Even had the fighter controllers realised the strength of the raid , there was little that could be done . Other fighters were refuelling and rearming after the attacks on Kenley and Biggin Hill and would not be available . During the British scramble , Bf 109s from JG 52 which were part of a pre - raid sweep , chanced upon RAF fighters out in the open at RAF Manston . Twelve Bf 109s from " 2 Staffel " II . / JG 52 , led by " Hauptmann " Wolfgang Ewald attacked while the British fighters were refuelling . After two passes , the Germans claimed 10 fighters and three Blenheims destroyed . In fact , just two No . 266 Squadron RAF Spitfires were destroyed with another six Hurricanes damaged but repairable . A single Hurricane was also destroyed . Ju 87s attack unopposed . As the Ju 87s reached the coast , the respective groups split off and headed for their assigned targets . By this time , some 15 miles off the Isle of Wight , the Bf 109s had caught up and were now zigzagging around the dive - bombers . Bode led III . / StG 77 to attack from the North West , dead into wind in order to bomb accurately . Usually the Ju 87s attacked in line astern , but Bode chose to attack in groups of three to split the AAA fire . To keep the enemy ' s heads down , he fired his machine guns in an 80 - degree dive . He soon left an altitude of 13 , 000 feet , releasing his bombs and pulling out at 2 , 275 feet . The rest of his unit followed . Poling took severe punishment from very accurate bombing . Since Ventnor radar station had been knocked out already , this attack demonstrated that an attack on Fighter Command ' s command , communication and control system was possible . Emergency equipment had been installed on the site in case of a breakdown , but the information and reading of the radar was significantly less reliable . In fact , Poling was so badly damaged it was out of action for the rest of August . Fortunately , the CH chain had a mobile radar station at the Isle of Wight to fill in for it . Another was due to be set up near Poling anyway , so the chain remained unaffected . The damage done to Kenley and Poling were no more than major inconveniences to Park and Dowding . Only one WAAF member was studying the plots at Poling up until the attack . Avis Parsons was awarded the Military Medal for her actions on 5 September 1940 . As Bode was in action at Poling , Alfons Orthofer ' s unit attacked Ford . There were only six Lewis machine guns manned at Ford and the Ju 87s were able to attack with complete confidence . Bombs rained down on huts , hangars , building and amongst aircraft drawn up together for maintenance . Early on bombs struck the field ' s oil tanks and storage compounds causing an enormous blaze which contributed to the crippling damage on the airfield . Gosport also came under attack soon after . Siegel ' s Ju 87s , with no air opposition , swooped onto their targets causing large - scale damage . As the Ju 87s began their attack , Spitfires from No . 234 Squadron engaged the 25 - strong Bf 109 escort commanded by " Hauptmann " Karl - Wolfgang Redlich . I . / JG 27s commander , " Gruppenkommandeur " ( Group Commander ) Eduard Neumann heard the battle developing , but communications were poor and he decided to let Redlich , one of his most experienced " Staffelkapitän " ( Squadron Leaders ) fight alone . In the resulting combat , three Bf 109s were shot down . Disaster for StG 77 . While three of the four Ju 87 groups reached and bombed their targets without interception , the 28 " Stukas " of I . / StG 77 were attacked by No . 43 and 601 Squadron sporting a force of 18 Hurricanes . The escorting Bf 109s from II . / JG 27 were flying too far away and could not stop the Hurricanes making an attack before the Ju 87s made their dives . Three Ju 87s were shot down in exchange for a damaged Hurricane , hit by return fire . The Bf 109s soon came under attack themselves and could not assist the dive - bombers effectively . Still , some Ju 87s made attacks . While they were doing so , some of the German crews saw No . 235 Blenheims taking off to defend their base . Some hangars were hit by the Ju 87s and much damage done . As the Bf 109 escorts turned to meet the two engaging RAF Squadrons , around 300 aircraft filled a patch of sky 25 miles long , from Gosport to Bognor Regis . No . 152 , 235 Squadrons engaged the Germans over Thorney Island . No . 602 engaged the Ju 87s that attacked Ford but III . / JG 27 bounced No . 602 Squadron , claiming four Spitfires destroyed . Spitfires from No . 234 and Hurricanes from 213 Squadron each destroyed one Bf 109 . The running air battles had cost the Ju 87 units heavily . The lack of protection for I . / StG 77 had cost it 10 Ju 87s with one damaged beyond repair . Total manpower losses for the unit amounted to 17 killed or mortally wounded , six wounded and five captured out of 56 men . II . / StG 77 lost three Ju 87s to fighter attack and one damaged beyond repair , five crewmen dead and one captured . III . / StG 77 also lost two Ju 87s and two damaged with four men killed . StG 77s casualties amounted to 26 killed , six taken prisoner , and six wounded . The battles brought the number of Ju 87s lost thus far in the campaign to 59 with a further 33 damaged . The price was too high and with the exception of sporadic attacks on convoys later in the year , the Ju 87 played no further part in the Battle of Britain . Among the dead was " Gruppenkommandeur " " Hauptmann " Herbert Meisel . The Bf 109s of JG 27 lost six fighters . Two pilots were saved . Another source gives eight Bf 109s destroyed . JG 27 claimed 14 victories , but it is likely this was an exaggeration . Only seven were allowed to stand by the Luftwaffe . RAF casualties in the air battles amounted to five fighters destroyed and four damaged . No . 43 Squadron suffered one damaged Hurricane ; 152 Squadron two damaged Spitfires ; No . 601 Squadron lost two Hurricanes ; No . 602 Squadron lost three Spitfires and one damaged . Aftermath . The damage done to Ford was great . The local fire brigades helped put out the numerous fires and clear up the dead in and around the station . Mostly foam was used as the main water pipe had burst . Other fire units used water from static water tanks and a ditch which had filled from the fractured pipe . Ford had received less warning than the other targets and suffered heavier casualties : 28 killed and 75 wounded . Some 14 aircraft were destroyed : five Blackburn Shark s , five Fairey Swordfish , and two Fairey Albacore . A further 26 aircraft were damaged but repairable . As well as petrol and oil installations , two hangars , the motor transport hangar , two stores buildings , the ratings ' and petty officers ' canteens and numerous accommodation buildings were destroyed . At Gosport , five aircraft were lost and five damaged . Several buildings were wrecked and two hangars damaged . But there were no casualties . The Ju 87 attack had been accurate , and no bombs fell outside the military compounds . In the Gosport area , 10 barrage balloon s were shot down and two damaged . The attacks of No . 43 and 601 Squadron disrupted the raid against Thorney Island and damage was not concentrated . Two hangars and two buildings were wrecked . Three aircraft were destroyed : a Blenheim , an Avro Anson and a Magister . One Vickers Wellington was also damaged . The only casualties were five civilian workers , injured when a 110 - lb bomb landed on their shelter . The loss of long - range radar station at Poling caused few problems . The Chain Home Low radar there was working and could see almost as far out to sea . Along the surrounding coastline , for 70 miles , another six radar stations gave interlocking stations which provided cover , so there was no hole in the system . Within a few days , mobile units were moved into wooded areas nearby to provide cover until Poling was repaired . Weather intervention . RAF over France . After the second attack there followed several hours of quiet as Nos . 10 and 11 Groups and " Luftflotte 2 " and 3 , tired after considerable exertions , stopped to draw breath . On both sides of the Channel , unit commanders now phoned round frantically , trying to establish whether missing crews and aircraft were safely down elsewhere . It was time to move the dead , wounded and refuel and rearm the aircraft before the next potential mission . In the interim , two Bristol Blenheim of No . 114 Squadron RAF made an attack on Frecamp and Dieppe . It passed over at high altitude , and dropped its bombs . The Germans recorded no damage at Frecamp , and the attack on Dieppe seems to have gone unnoticed . As the bombers headed home , they passed two Spitfires of the Photographic Reconnaissance Unit ( PRU ) . These aircraft had their armament removed , stripped of radios and everything not essential for their mission . They were fitted with extra fuel tanks and cameras to carry out their work . To achieve greater speed , the machines were polished to reduce drag . The Spitfires were the fastest aircraft either the RAF or Luftwaffe at that time , achieving a speed of just under 400 mph . Flying at 34 , 000 feet they usually came and went undetected . They photographed ports and airfields and then returned . Fresh German operations . By 17 : 00 , the Luftwaffe was ready to strike again . Radar stations were not plotting more German formations off the Kent coast and over the Pas - de - Calais area . Having attacked Biggin Hill and Kenley , " Luftflotte 2 " was not going after the Sector Station RAF North Weald and RAF Hornchurch . Some 58 Do 17s of KG 2 were sent to bomb Hornchurch and 51 He 111s of KG 53 were directed to attack North Weald . The two raiding formations were to pass over the coast at the same time ; so the He 111s attacking North Weald , with further to go , left 15 minutes earlier . The He 111s were to cross over at Foulness , the Dorniers at Deal . Fighter escort was provided by 140 Bf 109s and Bf 110s from JG 3 , JG 26 , JG 51 , JG 54 and ZG 26 . The British correctly estimated the German strength as 250 aircraft . To meet the threat the Fighter Controllers at 11 Group ' s Uxbridge centre scrambled 13 Squadrons ; No . 12 Group at Watnall passed on ordered to four more . Soon , a combined total of 47 Spitfires and 97 Hurricanes were in the air . Ten of the RAF fighters in the air ( nine Spitfires from No . 19 Squadron and one Hurricane from No . 151 Squadron ) were armed with 20 mm cannon . No . 11 Group moved No . 32 , 54 , 56 , and 501 Squadrons , totalling 11 Spitfires and 33 Hurricanes , to the Margate - Canterbury line to engage the enemy formations first . The remaining units were to climb to altitude and wait over or near the threatened fighter airfields , until a clearer picture emerged of enemy intentions . KG 53 raid . KG 53 approached North Weald from the east between Maldon , Essex and Rochford . No . 56 Squadron ' s 12 Hurricanes engaged the bombers , while No . 54 Squadron ’ s 11 Spitfires engaged the escorting Bf 109s and Bf 110s . In the engagement , at least one Bf 110 was shot down . The line of advance was now clear to the British ground controllers . Five Squadrons : No . 46 , 85 , 151 , 257 , and 310 with 61 Hurricanes , were scrambled to intercept the bombers in front of , or over the target . By 17 : 00 the airfield was covered in 5 / 10ths stratocumulus at 5 , 000 feet . Within thirty minutes the base fell to just 3 , 500 feet . The German formation leaders soon realised that there was no hope of hitting a target from 12 , 000 feet , particularly when they could not see it . At 17 : 40 , KG 53 turned away and headed for base . They had lost a single bomber to 56 Squadron . Things were about to change . As they turned around , 28 Hurricanes from Nos . 46 , 85 , and 151 Squadron prepared for a head - on attack . Meanwhile , 12 Hurricanes from 256 Squadron closed on the Germans from behind . No . 151 ' s Pilot Officer Richard Milne shot down " Gruppenkommandeur " of II . / KG 53 , Major Reinhold Tamm . The He 111 blew up , killing all aboard . The escorting Bf 109s counter - attacked , shooting down two No . 151 Squadron Hurricanes , killing one pilot and wounding the other . No . 257 Squadron also engaged and lost one pilot killed in a crash landing after combat with Bf 110s . No . 46 Squadron — the only 12 Group unit to take part — also engaged . Shortly hence , the 13 Hurricanes from No . 85 Squadron , led by Peter Townsend , struck at the bombers but was blocked by ZG 26 Bf 110s . Bf 109s was also present and inconclusive engagements began . It was likely the Bf 109s belonged to III . / JG 51 providing top cover . There were intense combats around the bombers . No . 1 Squadron ' s leader , David Pemperton , accounted for one JG 3 Bf 109 . No . 85 Squadron accounted for one He 111 , but lost a Hurricane to the Bf 110s , the pilot , Pilot Officer Paddy Hemmingway , bailed out into the Channel and survived . Another pilot , Flight Lieutenant Dick Lee , a veteran of the Battle of France and a flying ace with nine victories was reported missing in action . He was last seen chasing three Bf 109s out to sea . His body was never found . Among the few British squadrons left in the fight ( owing to fuel and ammunition running low ) was No . 54 Squadron . Its commander , Colin Falkland Gray , destroyed a Bf 110 . As KG 53 retreated out to sea , the German bombers dumped their bombs . Around 32 German bombs fell on the town of Shoeburyness . Two houses were destroyed and 20 damaged . One bomb landed on an Anderson Air Raid Shelter , killing a man and his wife . Another landed on the railway signal box , killing the signalman . Several bombs fell on a War Department gunnery range , causing no damage . Some 200 German bombs fell on the mud flats and sandbanks off Shoeburyness . Many were delayed - action bombs , and would go off at irregular intervals . KG 53 had lost only four He 111s destroyed and one damaged . Its personnel losses amounted to 12 dead , two wounded and four prisoners of war . A further five were rescued by British ships , bringing the total number captured to nine . The low losses of the group in the face of fighter attacks were down to the determination of ZG 26 . It cost the unit seven Bf 110s and a further six damaged . KG 2 raid . Squadron Leader Michael Crossley was back in action with No . 32 Squadron . With No . 501 , Crossley ' s units attempted to engage KG 2 while over Herne Bay . The 15 - strong Hurricanes were blocked by escorting Bf 109s . No . 501 came under attack from II . / JG 51 . One was shot down and its pilot , George E . B . Stoney was killed . His victor was " Hauptmann " Josef Foezoe , an Austrian pilot . No . 501 quickly counter - attacked , destroying two Bf 109s . One of them was flown by Horst Tietzen , an ace with 20 victories and the fourth highest claimant in the Luftwaffe at that time . The other victim was Hans - Otto Lessing . Both German pilots were killed . Another Bf 109 fell to Peter Brothers . The Bf 109s 22 - year old pilot , Gerhard Mueller was killed . Meanwhile Crossley , Karol Pniak and Alan Ackford shared in the destruction of another Bf 109 . The pilot , Walter Blume was severely injured and taken prisoner . Within a short time , the Germans turned the tables , and three Hurricanes ( Crossley , Pilot Officer de Grunne and Pilot Officer Pearce ) were shot down . All three survived , though Pearce and de Grunne suffered burns . But while the RAF fighters were kept busy by the escort , the Dorniers continued without interception . As the Dorniers passed Sheerness , the anti - aircraft defences opened fire to protect the naval yard at Chatham , Kent . Along the south bank of the Thames Estuary 15 gun positions fired six 4 . 5in of 3 . 7in heavy shells . The German bombers opened up a little , to spread out . The cloud over the target ruined the German bomb run , and some bombers began the return trip with their loads still on board . While crossing the coast over Deal , Kent , three attacked the Royal Marines barracks there . They continued back across the Channel , having made no contact with enemy fighters . Night raids . German . At 18 : 18 night began to fall . The Luftwaffe sent bombers from KG 1 , 2 , 3 , 27 and 53 to bomb targets at Sheffield , Leeds , Hull , Colchester , Canvey Island , Manningtree and Sealand . British records mentioned damage only at Sealand . Most bombs were scattered over rural districts . In one incident , a KG 27 He 111 , shortly before midnight , attacked the flying and training school at Windrush , in Gloucestershire , where night flying was in progress . The bomber , piloted by Alfred Dreher , crashed into an Avro Anson piloted by Sergeant Bruce Hancock . Both aircraft crashed , killing all five men involved . British . While the Luftwaffe was attacking Britain , 36 Bristol Blenheim ' s from RAF Bomber Command took off in ones and twos to attack a score of German airfields in the Netherlands and France . Its sole success was at Vlissingen , Netherlands , where it damaged two " Jagdgeschwader 54 " ( JG 54 ) Bf 109s . At the same time four Armstrong Whitworth Whitley s were attacking the Fiat works in Turin , Italy and 20 more were heading for the aluminium works at Rheinfelden in southern Germany . The 18 August 1940 would end before either force reached its target . Aftermath . Overclaiming and Propaganda . Overclaiming of aerial victories was not uncommon , and both sides claimed more aircraft shot down than was the case . For the 18 August action , British propaganda claimed 144 German aircraft destroyed , which was over twice the actual figure . In response , the Germans claimed they had only lost 36 , a figure which has since been proven to be half the actual figure ( 69 to 71 ) . The German propaganda elements claimed to have destroyed 147 British aircraft , which was over twice the actual figure . Again , the British admitted to losing only 23 , when the actual figure was around 68 . Other sources between them insist the RAF ' s losses were 27 – 34 fighters destroyed , and 29 aircraft destroyed on the ground , including only eight fighters . One German fighter pilot stated that losses were always under reported . Siegfried Bethke pointed out that the German High Command always misled the public about losses . According to him , German aircraft that crashed into the Channel were not counted in the official figures although the loss of the aircraft was total . One aircraft in his unit that was damaged by 88 hits and had to be broken up and taken back to Germany . Bethke intimates it was not added to the loss record . Sorties and losses . During the 18 August 1940 , Luftwaffe units flew a total of 970 sorties over Britain : some 495 by medium bomber s , 460 by fighters and 15 by reconnaissance units . Of this total , about 170 of the bomber sorties were flown on the night of 17 / 18 August ; the remainder were flown during the daylight hours on the 18 August . Less than half of the available ( or serviceable ) aircraft on the " Luftflotte 2 " and " Luftflotte 3 " order of battle were involved in the action that day , so it was clear that the Luftwaffe was not greatly extended in providing forces for the offensive . " Luftflotte 5 " did not take any part in the fighting , although its reconnaissance aircraft were active over England and Scotland . Altogether , the Luftwaffe lost between 69 and 71 aircraft destroyed or damaged beyond repair as a result of its operations over Britain on 18 August 1940 . Of this total , 59 were lost to certain or probable action by fighters while two fell to ground fire , four to a combination of both and one collided with a British training aircraft . The remaining three crashed in German - held territory owing to technical failures . Altogether , the losses represented seven per cent of the force committed . Around 29 aircraft crashed in England . Personnel losses were 94 German crews killed , 40 captured and 25 returned with wounds . Some 27 to 31 German aircraft returned with damage . The gross underestimation of Fighter Command ' s strength issued to Luftwaffe units meant the British reaction was much stronger than expected . During the 24 - hour period , Fighter Command flew 927 sorties , slightly fewer than the Germans . Only 41 of these sorties were flown by night , 28 on 17 / 18 August and 13 on 18 / 19 August . The remaining 886 sorties were flown by day , a number almost exactly equal to the 861 serviceable Spitfire , Hurricane , Defiant and Gladiator day fighters available to squadrons . The average operational sortie rate of one per serviceable fighter was not spread evenly throughout the command , however . Nos 12 and 13 Groups in the Midlands and north of Britain , with a third of the serviceable fighters between them , put up 129 ( or only 15 per cent ) of the day sorties , and of these only three made contact with the enemy . No . 11 Group put up one - third of the serviceable fighters in 600 sorties , or more than two - thirds of the total ; on average . Each of the serviceable Spitfires and Hurricanes flew 1 . 7 operational sorties . No . 43 squadron flew the most sorties : 63 operations including five each from the 13 serviceable at the beginning of the day . Only 403 ( 45 percent ) of the total number of sorties flown by Fighter Command were directed at the three major German raids . A further 56 ( or just over 6 per cent ) were standing patrols to protect shipping off the coast . Most of the remaining 427 sorties ( nearly 50 per cent ) were made to engage the reconnaissance aircraft . Usually several half - squadrons were committed . This was not excessive . But by sending more units to counter the flights , German aircraft were forced to fly higher and were denied the opportunity to drop to low altitude to take higher resolution photographs . This contributed to a lack of German intelligence which often failed to distinguish fighter , bomber and naval airfields from each other . Much of the time their strength was directed at non - fighter airfields on this date . Of the 403 sorties put up by Fighter Command to meet the major German attacks , 320 of those made contact with the enemy , meaning 80 percent of the fighters sent to intercept the bombers did so . The percentage would have been higher , had the bombers on the afternoon raid not turned around short of their targets . Between 27 and 34 RAF fighters were destroyed . A specialist source of the battle indicated the figure to be 31 destroyed or beyond repair . Of these , 25 fell to German fighters , two to return fire from the bombers . One was shot down by British ground fire in error and the loss of the remainder cannot be established . Some 26 of the fighters lost were Hurricanes , and five were Spitfires . Personnel losses for the RAF amounted to 10 British fighter pilots killed on the day , and another who died of wounds . Around 19 pilots were wounded , 11 so seriously that they did not take part in the rest of the battle . Losses on the ground amounted to eight fighters ( two Spitfires ) . Around 28 aircraft of other types were destroyed on the ground . The total destroyed or damaged beyond repair amounted to 68 aircraft , although 17 of these were trainers or non - operational types . Göring , Mölders and Galland . Göring spent " The Hardest Day " at Karinhall with two of his top fighter pilots , Werner Mölders and Adolf Galland . He was decorating them with the Combined Pilots - Observation Badge in Gold with Diamonds after they had achieved much success in recent weeks . However , Göring took the opportunity to berate them over bomber losses and in particular , what he saw , as a lack of aggression in the " Jagdwaffe " . This did not go down well with the two men . Göring moved to quickly reconcile with them by ordering their promotion to " Geschwaderkommodore " ( Wing Commander ) in command of their respective " Geschwader " ( Wings ) . Göring felt a younger generation of combat leaders would help motivate the force . They were dismissed . On the 19 August , Göring read the reports on the losses of the 18 August , and unhappy with the extent of the losses , recalled both pilots . Hitler ' s Directive 17 had ordered the Luftwaffe to achieve air superiority , but remain strong enough for when , or rather if , " Sea Lion " was launched . Moreover , Göring recognised that the Luftwaffe was his power base . A failure would be bad , but a severe weakening of the Luftwaffe would be far worse . He emphasised to his commanders the need to preserve the Luftwaffe ' s strength . Essentially , the core theme of the conference was fighter protection . The fighter leaders advocated sweeps to clear the skies in advance of attacks . Other commanders present thought a combination of sweeps and close escort would be more effective in reducing losses . Göring agreed and listed a number of forms that the sweeps may take . The most important tactical change he made was instituting a wholesale purge of older " Geschwaderkommodore " in favour of younger men . From now on , leaders were to be drawn from the ranks , given responsibility based on skill and experience rather than rank , while allowing them to have a free rein in tactical engagements ( a form of aerial " Auftragstaktik " ) . Göring also placed emphasis on correct rendezvous with the bombers , which had been lacking in recent operations ( see " Adlertag " ) . The longer - range bombers were ordered directly to fighter airfields to pick up their escorts on the way to the target . He determined that as many fighters as possible should remain on sweeps while a smaller number maintained close contact with the bombers . For now , this would be the main tactical arrangement of fighter - bomber cooperation . Outcome . German target selection was sound on " The Hardest Day " . There were four means open to the Luftwaffe for destroying Fighter Command ; bombing airfields ; destroying the command , control system and radar stations ; and attacking aircraft factories producing fighter aircraft . " Luftflotte 2 " was well used in this way . Operations against Kenley , Biggin Hill , North Weald and Hornchurch had the potential to destroy 11 Group ' s major sector stations and impair its defences . It would also draw the defending fighters into battle . The attempt to attack Kenley , however , failed and " 9 Staffel " KG 76 paid a high price . The weather put paid to any chance of the raids on Hornchurch and North Weald being successful . On the other hand , " Luftflotte 3 " had poor intelligence , and its raids on the radar stations were ineffective . Radar elimination would enable the Luftwaffe to destroy the command and control system of Fighter Command , but despite the severe damage done to the Poling station , the existence of other stations nearby gave the system plenty of cover . The airfields the Air Fleet attacked at Ford , Gosport and Thorney Island had nothing to do with the main battle as they belonged to Coastal Command and the FAA . Sperrle and his command remained unaware of their errors in intelligence . The tactical handling of " Luftflotte 3 " was not good either . The escorting fighters of StG 77 were stretched too far across a 30 - mile front . By chance half of the defending fighters went into action against one of the attacking Ju 87 groups with disastrous results for the group concerned . The German fighters , which outnumbered the RAF units by 2 : 1 , were unable to protect the " Stuka " units . Had the targets been closer together , the concentration of fighters would have allowed the Germans to destroy more RAF fighters in the air , while protecting their charges . Considering the weight of attack against airfields , hardly any fighters were destroyed on the ground . Figures indicated just two Spitfires and six Hurricanes were lost in this manner . The main reason for this was the high state of readiness of RAF units during daylight . The command depended on radar and the Observer Corps warning them in advance , giving them plenty of time to get airborne . The successful strafing attack by Bf 109s of JG 52 on Manston depended on a combination of circumstances and chance which would not occur often during the battle . The attacks on airfields , on this day and throughout the battle , did not cause any real danger to RAF Fighter Command . Biggin Hill was never out of service during the Battle of Britain , and Kenley was out of action for only two hours on 18 August . German medium bombers , usually sent in waves of 50 , could carry between 60 and 85 tons of bombs . But this was not enough to destroy an airfield . If the airfield ' s hangars and buildings were destroyed , work on aircraft could be done in the open in summer periods . Should the craters become too troublesome , RAF units could move to another field , not necessarily an airfield , and operate fighters of it , provided it was 700 yards long and 100 yards wide to allow for operations . The vulnerable operations buildings on some airfields were hidden underground . One flaw was the vulnerability of operations rooms . At Kenley and Biggin the sector operations buildings were above ground , but they were difficult to hit even had the Luftwaffe known their location . Vital communications ( telephone cables ) were buried underground , making them vulnerable only to an accidental direct hit . Attacking and destroying the radar chain was also difficult . The stations were indeed vulnerable to dive bombers and low flying aircraft , however the British had mobile units which could be moved around to cover any gaps . Rapid repair services were also quick . Rarely were radar stations out of action for more than a few days . A last option was to attack fighter factories , which was not attempted on 18 August . Only the Spitfire factory at Southampton and the Hawker factory in Surrey were within range of escorted bombers . Without the Bf 109s , the bombers would suffer heavy casualties attempting to attack factories further north in daylight . Still , the attacks on the southern factories would require large concentrations of bombers and fighters which would be powerful enough to destroy them without sustaining heavy losses . Overall , each side suffered more losses on this date than on any other day during the Battle of Britain . In terms of the outcome , the battle does not appear to have been strategically favourable to either side . The loss rates were in the British favour , but the both air forces had sustained a level of attrition they could not support for long . Historian Alfred Price : The laurels for the day ’ s action went to the defenders . The aim of the Luftwaffe was to wear down the Fighter Command without suffering excessive losses in the process , and in this it had failed . It cost the attackers five aircrew killed , wounded , or taken prisoner , for each British pilot casualty . In terms of aircraft , it had cost the Luftwaffe five bombers and fighters for every three Spitfires and Hurricanes destroyed in the air or on the ground . If the battle continued at this rate the Luftwaffe would wreck Fighter Command , but it would come close to wrecking itself in the process .