Battle of Wadi Al - Batin The Battle of Wadi Al - Batin or Battle of Ruqi Pocket took place before the beginning of the Desert Storm operations on 16 February 1991 . This is not to be confused with the " Battle of Wadi Al - Batin " which was fought later in the four - day ground war between elements of the U . S . 3rd Armored Division and the Iraqi Republican Guard . Iraqis thought that Coalition forces were prepping the Wadi Al - Batin for the main attack . The desired effect was that the Iraqis would think that the main coalition ground attack would come up the Wadi Al Batin , a natural invasion route , and they would therefore reinforce their forces there , at the expense of the Western flank , where VII Corps would conduct the main attack . Deception movements . As American forces secretly redeployed from the southern Kuwaiti border to the northwest , " deception cells " were left in the south . This units built a computer - generated electronic network which simulated an intense VHF - UHF wireless traffic . When the Iraqi intelligence caught these " radio calls " - some of them only static hiss - they immediately concluded that the bulk of American forces were still entrenched south of the border . Another master piece of military dupery was the building of fake bunkers and the shuttling of bogus vehicle convoys , only intended to churn up great clouds of dust . Decoy tanks added to the deception of the unsuspecting Iraqi army . The Feint . By mid February , General Franks ordered U . S . 1st Cavalry Division to conduct a thrust along the border between Iraq and Kuwait . This misdirection would allow the coalition forces to perform the famous " Hail Mary " to the West as the Iraqis focused on the Wadi . Operation Berm Buster . On 15 February , TF 1 - 32 , supported by the divisions 8th Engineers , breached the defensive berm built by the Iraqis on the frontier . The 155 mm howitzer s of the Division ' s 3 - 82nd Field Artillery Regiment kept the Iraqi positions under fire in the course of this operation , pounding seven pre established targets . The Iraqis retaliated with sporadic mortar fire . Operation Red Storm . The first phase of the feint was a night attack . Fire support from the 82nd Field Artillery Regiment was required again . The artillery was temporarily reduced to 50 % percent when a howitzer was stuck in an antitank ditch , preventing the rest of the convoy from moving ahead . Two soldiers were injured in the accident . Undeterred , the Regiment carried out a precision shelling on an Iraqi radar facility just before 1 : 00 AM of 16 February . The 82nd immediately moved out of the area after the mission was completed , and a raid by Apache helicopters hit selected targets deep behind the Iraqi lines . Operation Knight Strike . On the evening of 19 February , the 1st Cavalry followed up the artillery attack with a Reconnaissance in Force by Task Force 1 - 5 CAV ( Black Knights ) of the 2nd Black Jack Brigade , 1st Cavalry Division . The Task Force consisted two M1A1 Abrams Tank Companies , two M2A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Companies , an M901 Anti Tank Company , Command and Control elements from the Headquarters of 2nd Brigade , elements of 1st ADA ( Stinger and Vulcan Anti Aircraft Systems ) and in a combat trains location , elements of the forward support battalion ( C Co medical evac ) . One of the first reaction of the Iraqis , besides firing sporadic mortar rounds , was to set oil trenches on fire . On 20 February , 1 - 5 CAV broke the border berm in two different points , and after evading a minefield they crossed to the west bank of the wadi . Then the troops of the 2nd Brigade maneuvered northwards for six miles . Their orders were " Do not become decisively engaged , and do not attrit your force . " At midday , a scout platoon reported that they were exchanging fire with the enemy . Seven Iraqi soldiers laid down their weapons . As reinforcements were pushing forward , the column was ambushed by Iraqi troops using mortars and T - 12 anti - tank guns hidden on the reverse slope of a low ridge . Intense direct and indirect fire erupted . The Brigade commander , Col . Randolph House , was forced to retreat rearguards after his M113 vehicle was nearly hit by several shells . Before a skirmish line could be formed , an M163 Vulcan was destroyed by a 100 mm round . The gunner died instantly . A Bradley IFV spraying 25 mm fire on Iraqi trenches was also hit ; Sergeant Ronald Randazzo the BFV Gunner was killed and two other men were wounded as result . Another Bradley , commanded by Staff Sergeant Christopher Chichon , came forward to evacuate these casualties . The armored vehicle was struck in the turret by a round which shattered its TOW launcher . While rescuing wounded personnel from the first Bradley , Private First Class Ardon Cooper received several shrapnel injuries , and died later from heavy loss of blood . He was posthumously awarded the Silver Star . Sergeant Chichon ' s Bradley was still operational , and its crew managed to withdraw it from the line of fire , after picking up the wounded . The battle raged for about an hour ; after pounding the Iraqi positions with heavy artillery and A - 10 air strikes , 1 - 5 fell back to the berm . During the pull - out , an Abrams tank tank hit a mine and was heavily damaged . The Iraqi defenders lost five tanks and 20 artillery pieces . American casualties amounted to three dead and nine wounded . The wisdom of a full - daylight operation was the subject of some criticism , but the Iraqi army remained convinced that the Coalition invasion would take place from the south .