Fireforce Fireforce is a variant of the tactic of vertical envelopment of a target by helicopter - borne and parachute infantry developed by the Rhodesian Security Forces during the Rhodesian Bush War . Fireforce counter - insurgency missions were designed to trap and eliminate ZANLA and ZIPRA insurgents before they could flee . Fireforce reacted to enemy ambushes , farm attacks , or OP sightings , and could also be called in by trackers or patrols who had made contact with the enemy and then called for reinforcements . Fireforce was first deployed in January 1974 , and saw its first action a month later on 24 February 1974 . Fireforce was an operational assault or response usually composed of a first wave of 32 soldiers carried to the scene by three helicopters ( G - Cars ) and one Dakota ( Paradaks ) , with a command / gunship helicopter ( K - Car ) and a light attack aircraft in support ( Lynx ) . One of the advantages of the Fireforce was its flexibility , as all that was needed was a reasonable airstrip . Four - man stick . Unlike conventional military units , Fireforce troops were broken down into ' sticks ' of 4 men instead of the usual 8 or 9 - man sections . The reason for the 4 - man stick was because the Rhodesian Air Force Alouette III helicopters could only carry 4 men . Of the 4 men , one was the Stick Leader , with an A63 or A76 VHF radio , a FN FAL , 100 rounds ( 7 . 62 × 51 mm NATO ) and several types of grenade s . One was the machine gunner , with a FN MAG machine - gun and carrying 400 rounds . The other two were riflemen with a FN FAL and 100 rounds , grenades and rifle grenades . Grenades carried were usually one M962 HE grenade , one M970 white phosphorus grenade , a smoke grenade , one or two rifle grenade s and an Icarus rocket flare each . One of the riflemen was a fully trained combat medic and carried a medical pack . Every man also carried a saline drip . Rifles were zeroed for 100m , and sights were set to the same range . Every third or fourth round loaded into the rifle magazine was a tracer . During 1979 one of these two men was issued a radio . Pistols were optional and all paratroopers were entitled to carry a FN Hi - Power or Star 9mm pistol . Each solder also carried a lightweight sleeping bag in a mat pack on his back . A single Stick made up the stop groups ( stops ) , patrols , ambushes and often sweep lines , although larger sweep lines could be made up from para - sticks or by combining the sticks positioned by the G - Cars , or from those sticks transported by the " Landtail " . In all formations the MAG gunner was next in position to the Stick Leader . Aircraft . A Fireforce would be based at an airfield with usually four helicopters , one Dakota and a light attack aircraft ( known as the " Lynx " ) . The helicopters were Alouette III s ( in 1979 a few Agusta - Bell 205As ' Cheetahs ' were used ) of which one was equipped with a MG 151 / 20 20mm cannon and flown by the senior pilot . The cannons were equipped with trays , which took 200 or 400 of high explosive incendiary ( HEI ) rounds . This helicopter was called the ' K - Car ' ( Killer Car ) and had a crew of three ( pilot , gunner / technician ( gunner - tech ) , and Fireforce commander ) . The Fireforce Commander directed ground operations from an orbit of , high enough over the contact area to see everything that was happening . Some K - cars ( known as Dalmatian K - Cars ) were armed with four Browning . 303 machine - guns ( instead of the 20mm cannon ) but were not popular with the troops , as they were less effective . The numbers of enemy personnel killed by the K - Car in a scene varied from zero to all . The K - Car would carry a spare FN FAL to replace any malfunctioning rifle and two A63 / A76 VHF radios , a spare for the ground troops and one for the commander in case he had to disembark the K - Car . With him in the K - Car , he would carry the radio codes and in particular the daily Shackle code . All would don flak jacket s to protect them from ground fire . The other three helicopters were known as ' G - Cars ' and were armed with machine guns ( originally one FN MAG replaced with twin Browning . 303 machine guns each ) with 500 rounds per gun and carried the 4 - man Sticks along with its pilot and technician ( called a ' tech ' ) who also operated its machine guns . The G - Cars had headsets for the stick leaders to keep them abreast of developments while in the air . The G - cars were also used for casualty evacuation and resupplying the fireforce troops with ammunition and equipment . The Dakota carried five Sticks . Two on the port side , three on the starboard . Apart from the parachutes the equipment was identical to the heli - sticks . The gunner had to jump with his machine - gun strapped to his side and carrying 400 rounds . The Reims - Cessna FTB 337G ' Lynx ' was the main light attack aircraft used on Fireforce missions . The Lynx ' s were armed with twin Browning . 303 machine guns mounted above the wing and 63mm SNEB rockets , locally made 450 lb blast and shrapnel bombs and napalm . The Percival Provost Mk 52 was originally used in the light attack role before the Lynx came into service . Hunter ground - attack fighter jets , Canberra light bombers and more rarely , Vampire fighter - bombers were on 24 - hour stand - by should a Fireforce encounter stiff resistance . In 1979 the ' Jumbo ' Fireforce came into being . The Jumbo Fireforce was created by bringing two Fireforces together , giving it two K - Cars , eight G - Cars , a Dakota and a Lynx , often with the support of Hunters ground - attack fighter jets . Tactics . The following paragraphs are for the standard Fireforce assault of one K - car , three G - cars , a Dakota and the Lynx . Often there was no Dakota involved , or more G - cars . When in 1979 Cheetahs ( the Bell Hueys ) were introduced , a Fireforce might go into action with two or three of these , each carrying two ( sometimes three ) stops . There were many times when no Lynx was used . The Fireforce ( of which there were only three main ones most of the time ) had responsibility for huge swathes of Rhodesia ( many thousands of square miles each ) . A commando of the Rhodesian Light Infantry or an infantry company of the Rhodesian African Rifles would be designated as a Fireforce at a forward airfield for six weeks , or sometimes , several months . By 1977 , all Rhodesian regular infantry were trained paratroops and would in turn be deployed by helicopter or parachute or brought in as reinforcements from the vehicles of the ‘ land - tail ’ . Any sightings of the enemy within the Fireforce zone was reported and a siren sounded in the base . Eight sticks ( 32 men ) were deemed the " First Wave " . The First Wave troops rushed to their helicopters ( after donning their webbing ) . The Paratroopers went first to the tent where their equipment and parachutes were held and the dispatchers and off - duty comrades would help them kit out . Normally the Second Wave ( or Landtail ) rushed to the trucks , although if " jousting " or if the contact area was nearby they would wait at the airfield to be picked up by the G - cars after the First Wave had been dropped off . Troops alternated as Heliborne , Paratroopers , Landtail and Off - duty throughout a Bush Trip . The Landtail was often an important factor in refuelling of helicopters and recovering of deceased persons ( enemy and civilian ) , parachutes and enemy weapons and equipment . Sometimes there was a small third wave if numbers permitted . Quite often only the First Wave was involved in the action . In general , most soldiers preferred to be in the Heliborne First Wave . Arrival on target . The K - car was always the first to arrive at the scene . The K - car Commander had to first attempt to confirm the precise area where the enemy had been spotted by the OP . Usually the terrain was extremely broken and covered in vegetation , which made this task particularly difficult . The K - car Commander then had to make a plan — where to position the first stops , where to make the main sweep , and in what direction . The first troops to arrive were always transported in by the G - cars , which followed the K - car in column ( sometimes a long way behind , for they were a little slower than the K - car ) . Sometimes the sticks were dropped immediately , but on many occasions the G - cars would circle the scene several times ( to the delight of the troops ) before the commander made his final decisions . Very often the K - car occupants would see the enemy ( or any perceived enemy ) , and then the Helicopter Gunner / Technician would attack them with his 20 mm cannon , using bursts of two to four shells ( but no more than five ) . The accuracy of this firing was extraordinary , due to the machine flying in tight anticlockwise circles just a few hundred feet above the ground . The 20 mm cannon poked out of the port side , thus there was no " lead in " , and the exploding high velocity shells would impact right next to and often on their intended targets . Very few persons caught by this fire were ever found alive by the troops . Usually the G - car sticks were positioned in areas where the enemy would most likely run through ( often a riverbed or dry " donga " ) , where there was more vegetation , therefore attempting to surround or cut off enemy movement . If there was a hill or ridge that gave outstanding observation , then more than one stick might be placed there . Sometimes G - car sticks would form the main sweep line immediately they were deployed instead of the Paras , depending on the circumstances at hand . The G - Cars would make dummy landings to confuse the enemy , while placing men in cut - off or stop positions . Whilst the K - car was looking for , or engaging the enemy , the commander also had to decide on where to drop the Para - sticks and direct any strikes by the Lynx . The Lynx usually initiated the attack . The Drop Zone ( DZ ) position was of course dictated by the enemy ' s own position , and the terrain , but often there would be no clear DZ nearby , in which case the Para - sticks would be dropped a mile or so away to be picked up and repositioned by the G - cars . Usually the Para - sticks were dropped as close as possible , which resulted on numerous occasions with the Paras being fired at whilst floating down for a few seconds ( drop heights normally varied from about to 600 feet ) . This firing was always ineffective , as no troops were ever hit . There was also a great variation on the dropping patterns of these sticks , as sometimes they were all dropped at once , sometimes individually , or any combination thereof . Positioning the main sweep . Whilst all this was taking place , one of the commanders main concerns was where the main sweep would occur . In a perfect scenario , the Para - sticks would form the main sweep , and the G - car sticks would carry out blocking actions . In reality , there was vast variation , so that there was little difference in being Para , or in the First Wave Helicopter assault . First Wave strikes in the G - cars however were generally the best stops to be in for those wishing action . The most important factors ( apart from the reaction of the enemy and the terrain ) in a Fireforce operation were firstly the reliability of the sighting of the enemy and secondly the skill of the Fireforce commander . In the former case the majority of successful contacts were due to the skills of the Selous Scouts ( many of which were former enemy ) . They had the capacity to insert observation posts ( OPs ) into the bush without being noticed by the inhabitants . In the latter case the difficulty of commanding the scene was extreme and good Fireforce commanders were highly prized by the troops . How soon the enemy heard the approaching helicopters and his reaction to it was of course decisive . Wind direction and speed , the presence of a tree covered ridge line or a multitude of other factors would make the difference of life or death . Where he was caught in unfavourable terrain for him ( like a village surrounded by open ground ) he had no chance and normally none escaped ( unless it was near nightfall ) . Although the number of operational parachute jumps was remarkable , the majority of troops were carried into action by helicopter . There were many times when the exiting from G - cars was dangerous , due ( for example ) to them unable to descend close enough because of trees and troops had to clamber out and hold on to the steps and drop from too great a height , with mass leaves and twigs whirling about the inside of the machine and great stress of pilot and tech . The Alouettes were much more capable of dropping off stops in rough terrain than the Bells , though they had less carrying capacity and range and speed . The Alouettes were extremely reliable ( they had a tendency to sway a little as the troops jumped ) . The twin - Browning . 303 machine guns of the G - cars were never indiscriminately fired by the tech . The K - car Gunners had to be careful , for there was always a shortage of 20mm rounds and there were many times when friendly troops were only meters away from the target . Tracers , smoke or phosphorus grenade , or miniflare ( pencil flare ) were used as the " Fireball " to mark a target for strike aircraft . A 37mm SNEB shoulder launched marker rocket was locally developed and used by the Selous Scouts to identify an enemy position . Up to the second quarter of 1979 , troops were required to collect and remove all deceased persons from the scene . This rule was very strictly adhered to , even if it reduced in the short term the effectiveness of the Fireforce ( due to the immense effort of it ) . The plight of the civilians was most profoundly realised by the troops . Sweep . Each stick made a sweep every time it moved to a new location . This meant ( usually ) all four soldiers moving in a sweepline ( extended line ) formation , spaced apart according to the terrain . In flat open land this may mean as much as twenty five metres or so . In heavy vegetation this dropped to several metres . Even then it was common to lose sight of comrades , pushing alone through the denseness . It was more effective to be spaced as far apart as possible . Whether in the main sweep ( which might be composed of any number of sticks available ) or in a sticks sweep , the tactics were the same and very simple , to sweep ahead observing your line of sight ahead through the bush and undergrowth . The speed of this movement varied . Where it was thought ( usually deemed by the commander ) the enemy lurked , the sweep would slow very much . When the troops sensed enemy ahead the sweep became even more slow , edging forward inch by inch , rifles held at chest level , pointed ahead with the safety catch off . MAG gunners would bear the gun at the hip , held by a sling from their shoulders . Usually encounters with the enemy were resolved with great speed ( a typical Fireforce action could take hours , whilst a fire fight might take just a few seconds ) . In the great majority of cases , the enemy were killed outright by swift shooting ( sometimes hand grenades were used ) . In responding to sudden incoming fire , a sweep or patrol would immediately return fire from either the prone position or from down on one knee , depending on the nature of the surrounding bush . A deliberate attacking movement called a " Skirmish " was carried out , ending in a run through of the enemy position . Three basic skirmishing techniques were employed , usually by Sweep lines containing a few Sticks . The first method of skirmishing involved splitting the Sweep line into two equal sections , called flanks , with one flank moving forward while the second flank covered the first . When the first flank went prone and restarted shooting , the second flank would then run forward until some meters passed the line of the first , and so on . This method is the least likely to result in a friendly fire incident , but it is also the easiest to counter . The second skirmish option had every second member of the sweep line designated as one of the flanks , with each member of that flank passing between and through members of the other . The covering flankers stopped shooting as those moving forward passed them . The third option was called a Pepper Pot . This involved individuals of the Sweep line or Stick , randomly getting up and moving forward , or going prone and covering , and so on . It is more difficult to implement when in larger numbers , but is also the hardest to counter because prone troops rise from their positions in a very random and seemingly uncoordinated fashion . Sticks of four always used something resembling the Pepper Pot when on the assault , or split pairs if a serious attempt at out - flanking the enemy position was intended . Prisoners were taken on occasion . Although they were requested to take prisoners wherever possible , in a close - quarter fire fight and in thick bush , it was sometimes difficult to determine an enemy ' s intentions . Prisoners were usually extremely valuable as they might reveal important intelligence to Special Branch or Selous Scouts . Captured guerrillas were frequently turned to work for the Rhodesian Security Forces , sometimes as Auxiliary Forces ( Pfumo Re Vanhu ) from 1979 . Stop position . The other main experience was for an individual stick to sweep to a position thought most likely to intercept a fleeing enemy , and stay there , sometimes for up to several hours ( perhaps being moved around and maybe later on joining the main sweep ) . More often than not nothing happened but on many occasions one or more of the enemy came down the ( usual ) stream bed , or nearby . If there was a clear view then it was easy , once again just a few seconds shooting . Sometimes the process was repeated in the same spot , with fire being opened a bit earlier . Sometimes the enemy were seen behind in which case the stick immediately pursued . There were many occasions where the action was not so tidy due to terrain / vegetation , or even the sunlight blinding them . Communication . Radios were reasonably light and reliable . Most importantly they were easy to use . Headsets were not used normally just a telehand tied to a shoulder strap . An extremely efficient form of radio speech known as Voice Procedure was used . Troops were expected to have a high degree of self - initiative and reliance . For example , if a stick leader desired , the two riflemen would be detached to perform a mini - sweep ( or stop position ) of their own ( and perhaps even an individual go off on his own ) . The introduction of the second radio in 1979 merely confirmed this practice . Each heli - bourne stick was giving the call - sign ' Stop ' suffix by a number . Stop - 1 was assigned to the first G - car , stop - 2 to the second , stop - 3 to the third . Para sticks call - signs were ' Banana ' suffix by a number . Banana - 1 to Banana - 5 were in the Dakota . Colour codes suffix by a number were selected for aircraft , e . g . : G - Car One might become Yellow - 1 . The Firforce commander ' s call - sign was usually a two digit number ending in nine , e . g . : 39 ( pronounced three - nine ) . To mark a target for air strike , a commanded would be sent to " Send Fireball " . The most important hand - signals were : Thumb up , meaning " friend " , Thumb down to indicate " enemy " and Palm down on head to say " come to me " . Importance of air power . Fireforce without air power is inconceivable . As the enemy did not have air power and was unable to shoot down significant numbers of aircraft ( remarkably few helicopters , and no Dakotas were shot down in this conflict , though at least one Dakota was damaged by enemy fire in flight ) , Fireforce operations were invincible as long as the infantry performed correctly . The movement of the circling helicopters was enough to drown out the sound of the dropped attackers ( there was no shouting or talking in the sweeps ) so that often they surprised the hiding defenders , in effect ambushing them . The terrain varied wildly , from villages surrounded by open fields on flat plains , to dense vegetation amongst huge boulders on mountain slopes . Usually there was plenty of cover . Where the enemy ran and a stick had been placed by the Fireforce commander in the right place the hunt was usually easy . The difficult thing was to walk up to the enemy hiding in a house or cave or behind a boulder and kill or capture him . Though the event was shocking ( and often results in one or more civilians being killed ) , it is far more efficient than firing or dropping ordnance from air and overall reduces civilian casualties . As contact was made typically with 6 to 12 insurgents , this force level of 32 gave the Fireforce a 3 – 1 ratio of superiority on the ground . The Fireforce quickly yielded an 80 – 1 kill rate by trapping the enemy gangs and eliminating them by air and ground fire . See also . General :