Human Terrain System The Human Terrain System ( HTS ) is a United States Army , military intelligence support program employing personnel from the social science disciplines – such as anthropology , sociology , political science , regional studies and linguistics – to provide military commanders and staff with an understanding of the local population ( i . e . the " human terrain " ) in the regions in which they are deployed . The concept of HTS was first developed in a paper by Montgomery McFate and Andrea Jackson in 2005 , which proposed a pilot version of the project as a response to " identified gaps in [ US military ] commanders ' and staffs ' understanding of the local population and culture " , such as became particularly visible during the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan . HTS was subsequently launched as a proof - of - concept program , run by the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command ( TRADOC ) , in February 2007 , with five HTS teams deployed between Iraq and Afghanistan . Since 2007 , HTS has grown from a program with five deployed teams and a $ 20 million two - year budget to one with 31 deployed teams and a $ 150 million annual budget . HTS became a permanent US Army program in 2010 . Ever since its launch , HTS has been surrounded by controversy . While the program initially received a lot of positive coverage in the US media , it quickly became the subject of heavy criticism – particularly from anthropologists , but also from journalists , military officials and HTS personnel and former personnel . Most notably , on 31 October 2007 , the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association ( AAA ) published a statement opposing HTS as an " unacceptable application of anthropological expertise " that conflicted with the AAA ' s Code of Ethics . Following the publication of a report on HTS by the Commission on Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Services ( CEAUSSIC ) in 2009 , the AAA released a further statement of disapproval , which they re - iterated in 2012 after rumours that the controversy had died down . The public debate surrounding HTS has received widespread coverage in the media , and has been the topic of numerous articles in academic journals . Background . In the most immediate sense , HTS was developed as a response to concerns about mismanagement of US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan , and , in particular , to the negative effects of recognized " deficiencies " in US military " cultural understanding " of these countries . However , military analysts and academics have also suggested earlier historical contexts for the program ' s development . CORDS : a US military precedent . A number of military officials have invoked Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support ( CORDS ) – a counterinsurgency program developed by the US military during the Vietnam war – as a precedent for HTS . In a foundational article on HTS , a group of military analysts , Kipp " et al " , described the program as " a CORDS for the 21st Century " . Their article appraised CORDS as a successful and effective program that was " premised on a belief that the war would ultimately be won or lost not on the battlefield , but in the struggle for the loyalty of the people " . Kipp " et al " contended that the only major problems with the CORDS program were that it lacked adequate reachback facilities , and " was started too late and ended too soon " . As such they argued that it provided " many important lessons " to " guide " the development of HTS as an " effective cultural intelligence program " that could " support tactical and operational - level commanders today " . By contrast , critics of HTS have drawn attention to the fact that , in Vietnam , CORDS was run in conjunction with the Phoenix Program , which used information gathered through CORDS in its effort to " neutralize " ( by means of assassination , infiltration and capture ) supporters of the Viet Cong . History of the concept of " human terrain " . The concept of " human terrain " has been defined in military documents pertaining to HTS as " the human population in the operational environment . . . as defined and characterized by sociocultural , anthropologic and ethnographic data and other non - geographical information " . According to Roberto J . Gonzalez ( Associate Professor of Anthropology at San Jose State University , and one of the most vocal critics of HTS ) , this concept can be traced back to a 1968 report by the House of Un - American Activities Committee ( HUAC ) about " the perceived threat of the Black Panthers and other militant groups " . He argues that the concept gradually gained in popularity and usage , in the military and elsewhere , through the writing of military officials , such as Ralph Peters , and pundits , such as Max Boot . History of anthropological engagement with the military . Commentators on HTS have also drawn attention to the long history of anthropological involvement in military operations , in the US and Europe , though for different reasons . In a 2005 article , Montgomery McFate ( HTS ' s Senior Social Scientist from 2007 to 2010 , and an anthropologist by training ) argued that anthropology was born as a " warfighting discipline " , having served – in its early history – as " the handmaiden of colonialism " . She suggested that anthropology had retreated " into the Ivory Tower " following the Vietnam war , and contended that anthropologists should become involved in developing " military applications of cultural knowledge " . David Price ( Professor of anthropology and sociology at Saint Martin ' s University ) also noted that anthropology and warfare have " merged " many times before , but argued that the difference with HTS was that the program had been " clearly identified " as involving activities that betrayed " basic ethical standards for protecting the interests and well - being of studied populations " . Neil L Whitehead ( Professor of anthropology at the University of Wisconsin - Madison ) likewise argued that the " collaboration " between anthropological theory and colonial practice was " nothing new " , but went on to suggest that this history – and particularly recent developments such as HTS and the Minerva Initiative – should prompt a critical re - assessment and transformation of anthropological methodology . The " cultural turn " in the US Army . A number of commentators on HTS have described the program as part of a " cultural turn " in US military policy , particularly pertaining to the War on Terror . According to commentators , this " cultural turn " has been characterized by an increasing strategic emphasis on the use of " cultural knowledge " ; the promotion and funding of a growing number of " cultural knowledge " projects in the US Army and National Security services , such as HTS , the Minerva Initiative and the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program ; and the preference of " gentler " approaches to counterinsurgency that prioritize efforts directed towards " winning hearts and minds " over " kinetic " actions ( i . e . the use of military force ) . History and recent developments . Chronological history of developments in HTS . The beginnings of HTS can be traced to a Montgomery McFate and Andrea Jackson ' s pilot proposal for a " Pentagon Office of Operational Cultural Knowledge " , which was published in 2005 . Shortly afterwards , in July 2005 , the Foreign Military Studies Office ( FMSO ) initiated an HTS pilot project ( named Cultural Operations Research – Human Terrain System , or COR - HTS ) , which was headed up by Captain Don Smith , and housed at the Training and Doctrine Command in Fort Leavenworth . The pilot lasted until August 2006 . In July 2006 , Colonel Steve Fondacaro ( retired ) was hired by TRADOC to transition the pilot into an active program . In October 2006 , Jacob Kipp and colleagues outlined the Human Terrain System in an official FMSO public press release . HTS began recruiting in early 2007 . In February 2007 , the first team was deployed to Afghanistan ; and further teams were deployed to Iraq in the summer of that year . Originally , HTS project leaders McFate and Fondacaro had planned for the program to run at a small scale ( five teams : two in Afghanistan , three in Iraq ) for two years . However , in response to a Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement ( JUONS ) from Central Command issued in April 2007 , calling for an HTS Team in every Army Brigade and Marine Corps Regiment in Iraq and Afghanistan , the US Defense Secretary , Robert M . Gates , authorized a $ 40 million expansion of the program in September 2007 . The JUONS demanded a 420 per cent expansion of HTS , from the existing five teams to twenty - six teams divided between Iraq and Afghanistan . McFate and Fondacaro referred to this as a " catastrophic success " , meaning that " while the boost from the DOD ( Department of Defense ) was gratifying , fulfilling the mandate would stretch a new organization to the limit " Following the public statement of disapproval from the AAA , and significant media coverage of the controversy surrounding HTS , the United States Congress issued an order for an independent assessment of HTS project to be undertaken by the Center for Naval Analyses ( CNA ) in September 2009 . In May 2010 , the House Armed Services Committee ( HASC ) temporarily limited the army ' s funding obligation towards the program while this assessment was completed . The CNA report – which contained the results of interviews with 19 out of 71 commanders supported by HTS – was completed in October 2010 . It was subsequently published on the Defense Technical Information Center ( DTIC ) website in February 2011 , but withdrawn from the website shortly after . The US Army also conducted its own internal investigation of HTS , but the results were not released . In 2010 , HTS was approved by the US Army and became a permanent Army program . In June 2010 , Maxie McFarland , the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence at TRADOC , terminated Fondacaro ' s temporary position as HTS Program Manager in June 2010 . Colonel Sharon Hamilton was appointed as his replacement . McFate also left HTS in 2010 . On 8 March 2011 , the Center for Complex Operations at the National Defense University hosted a conference titled Inter - agency Human Terrain Program and Requirements . The Center stated that the aims of the conference were to " improve understanding of human terrain information and analysis and of how it is currently being used " ; to discuss the " effectiveness " of HTS ; and to discuss ethical and legal issues associated with the program . In June 2011 , AFRICOM requested and launched a pilot HTS program . In December 2011 , Colonel Hamilton reported that the US Central Command had issued a requirement for an increase of 9 HTS teams in Afghanistan by summer 2012 , to bring the total number of teams in Afghanistan up to 31 . In 2012 , HTS officials began prioritizing HTS involvement in " Phase Zero " or , in other words , the earliest , " prevention of conflict " stage of a military campaign . In April 2012 , " Defense News " reported that the Director of HTS , Colonel Sharon Hamilton , had been " working on a plan " to expand the use of HTS into other regions such as Africa and Latin America , and was considering whether HTS personnel could be deployed in Mexico to support military counter - narcotic work . In June 2012 , Hamilton retired from HTS and from the U . S . Army , and was replaced as Director by Colonel Steve Bentley . Notable operations . Operation Khyber . During a 15 - day operation in the late summer of 2007 , 500 Afghan and 500 US soldiers were deployed to clear an estimated 200 to 250 Taliban insurgents out of Paktia Province , secure southeastern Afghanistan ’ s most important road , and halt a string of suicide attacks on US troops and local governors . During the operation , an HTS anthropologist , Tracy St . Benoit , identified an unusually high concentration of widows in poverty , creating pressure on their sons to join the well - paid insurgents . Citing St . Benoit ’ s advice , US officers developed a job training program for the widows . She also interpreted the beheading of a local tribal elder as an effort to divide and weaken the Zadran , rather than as a more general attempt at intimidation . As a result , Afghan and US officials focused on uniting the Zadran , one of southeastern Afghanistan ’ s most powerful tribe s , as a way of hindering the Taliban ' s operations in the area . Operation Maiwand . 800 Afghan soldiers , 400 US soldiers and 200 Afghan policemen took part in the operation , in which Afghan soldiers raided houses of suspected militants . " Stars and Stripes " reported that in one Pashtun village , Kuz Khadokhe l , the HTT made it possible for negotiator Captain Aaron White to understand body language in the context of the culture , to identify leaders during negotiations , and to reinforce a perception of leadership by not conferring with fellow officers and by demonstrating good faith through projects facilitated by the Ghazni Provincial Reconstruction Team ( PRT ) , including roads , a visit by the PRT ’ s mobile medical clinic , the construction of a deep well for irrigation , and the beginnings of a road to Afghanistan ’ s main Highway 1 . Deaths . Michael V . Bhatia , a member of HTT AF1 , was killed along with two other soldiers by an IED ( Improvised Explosive Device ) while riding in a Humvee in Khost , Afghanistan in May 2008 . Nicole Suveges , a member of HTT IZ3 , was killed on 24 June 2008 , along with 11 other soldiers , Iraqi government officials and United States Embassy personnel when a bomb exploded at the District Council building in Sadr City . On 4 November 2008 , HTS member Paula Loyd was fatally injured whilst surveying the village of Chehel Gazi with a US Army platoon . She was doused with gasoline disguised in a jar of cooking oil and lit on fire by Abdul Salam , an Afghan national . Loyd was severely burned over 60 percent of her body . Salam was captured by Don . M Ayala ( another member of HTS ) and other US Army personnel almost immediately after the attack , as he tried to escape . About ten minutes later , after learning of the severity of Loyd ' s injuries , Ayala shot Salam in the head , killing him instantly . Loyd , 36 , died at Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio on 7 January 2009 . Ayala pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter in federal court in Alexandria , Virginia in February 2009 . On 8 May 2009 , he was sentenced to five years probation and a $ 12 , 500 fine . On 1 September 2010 , the " Times - Picayune " of Louisiana posted a documentary video of friends and family speaking in support of Ayala at sentencing . Design and organizational structure . Role of HTS in the US Army . HTS is defined as an " intelligence enabling capability " , and is categorized as " Intelligence support activity " . According to the HTS website , the aim of the program is to " provide sociocultural teams to commanders and staff " in the US Army in order to " improve the understanding of the local population " , and to " apply this understanding to the Military Decision Making Process ( MDMP ) " . The website also argues that the program was designed to address an identified " operational need " in the US army for " sociocultural support " . HTS components . HTS has two main components : an institutional component referred to as the " Army Enduring Base " , and an operational component referred to as " Deployed Teams " . Both components include numerous sub - divisions . Army Enduring Base . Project Office . The Project Office is based in Newport News and is composed of the Director , the Deputy Director , and Project staff ( including human resources , social scientists , knowledge management and information technology ( IT ) teams ) . Reachback Research Center ( RRC ) . The RRC is a Continental United States ( CONUS ) based research and analysis program that provides support to deployed HTTs , HTATs and TCEs . It is made up of a combination of social scientists , military analysts and civilian analysts who are organized into teams that specialize in research in a particular geographical region . RRC personnel are responsible for supplying information from open source and classified sources to deployed HTS teams , and for continuously updating HTS databases . HTS training . HTS training is based at Fort Leavenworth in Kansas . Training focuses on field research methods , staff planning and procedures , and equipment training . Deployed teams . Human Terrain Teams ( HTT ) . Human Terrain Teams ( HTT ) work at the brigade or regimental level of the US army . They undertake research among the local population , and represent that population ( referred to as the ' human terrain ' ) in the various stages of military operations : planning , preparation , execution and assessment . Human Terrain Teams contain 5 – 6 members , and consist of : a Team Leader , who is the a principal adviser and is responsible for the entire team ; one or two Social Scientists , who are responsible for conducting and managing ethnographic and social - science research for the brigade staff ' s area of operations ; one Research Manager , who is responsible for integrating the HTT ' s research their military unit ' s intelligence collection effort and interacting with other agencies and organizations ; and one or two Human Terrain Analysts , who have specific local knowledge and act as the primary human terrain data researcher . HTTs are responsible for : providing a constantly updated , user - friendly ethnographic and socio - cultural database of the area of operations that comprises data maps showing specific ethnographic or cultural features ; raising points on cultural or ethnographic issues of specific concern to the unit commander ; and sustaining a connection with RRC . Human Terrain Analysis Teams ( HTAT ) . Human Terrain and Analysis Teams provide support to echelons of the US army that are above brigade or regimental level ( e . g . , division or regional command ) . They form a part of the Commander ' s staff and are responsible for analysing the information provided by HTTs in order to support the Commander ' s Military Decision Making Process ( MDMP ) . HTATs are made up of one Team Leader , one or two Social Scientists , one or two Research Managers and one or two Human Terrain Analysts . Theater Coordination Elements ( TCE ) . TCEs are made up of a mixture of military and civilian staff . They are responsible for providing socio - cultural support to the military staff and commanders of a particular operational region or ' theater ' . A TCE comprises one Team Leader , three Social Scientists , one or two Research Managers , and one or two Human Terrain Analysts . Theater Support Office ( TSE ) . TSEs are responsible for providing administrative and logistics support to HHTs in a particular operational region or ' theater ' . They are made up on one Theater Support Officer , and a variably - sized support team . Social Science Research and Analysis ( SSRA ) . SSRA is responsible for liaising with indigenous polling organizations , and small or medium - sized enterprises ( SMEs ) in order to gather data and information from the local population . This information is then passed on to the TCE . Methods . The HTS program focuses on mapping the " human terrain " ( i . e . the local population in an area in which military are deployed ) . In order to do this , HTTs create databases of information about local leaders , tribes or social groups , political disputes , economic issues and social problems . This information is then analysed by HTATs and used to advise military staff and commanders , and to inform the Military Decision Making Process ( MDMP ) . Collected data is compiled and stored in a larger archive , in order to be accessible for the military and other government agencies . Equipment . HTS has developed the MAP - HT Toolkit , an integrated software suite provided to HTTs for data visualization and reporting . This includes software for mapping ( of the spatial distribution of social groups , for example ) , and for producing link charts ( of power structures and social networks in informal economies , for example ) and timelines . Components in the toolkit include : ANTHROPAC , UCINET , Axis PRO , i2 Analyst ' s Notebook , and TerraExplorer – a 3D earth visualization application provided by Skyline Software Systems . Funding . The initial funding for the Human Terrain System came from the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization ( JIEDDO ) . The JIEDDO funding of $ 20 million , granted in the summer 2006 , supported the pilot HTS project from mid - 2006 to 2007 . Following the Central Command JUONS request for the major and rapid expansion of HTS in April 2007 , the Defense Secretary approved a $ 40 million expansion of HTS to be funded by the Department of Defense ( DOD ) . DOD provided HTS funding until 2009 when funding responsibilities were assumed by Army G2 ( i . e . , the army ' s Military Intelligence budget ) . In 2009 it was reported that the annual budget for the program was $ 143 million . In May 2010 the HASC temporarily limited the funding obligation to HTS until the Army submitted an assessment of the program that addressed concerns that had been raised . In 2011 , McFate stated that HTS had a $ 150 million annual budget . Public debate : praise , criticism and controversy . Praise and support . US government officials . In a speech in 2008 , Robert Gates ( US Defense Secretary ) praised HTS , saying that although the program had experienced early " teething problems " the " net effect " of HTS efforts was often " less violence across the board , with fewer hardships and casualties among civilians as a result " . Military officials and HTS personnel . In a 2007 article on HTS in the " New York Times " , David Rohde – an American journalist who has twice won the Pulitzer Prize – reported that one of the first HTT to be deployed in Afghanistan had received " lavish " praise from officers for " helping them see the situation from an Afghan perspective and allowing them to cut back on combat operations " . He wrote that HTS had also been praised by Afghan and Western civilian officials in the area , although they had been " cautious about predicting long term success " . Rohde also cited Colonel David Woods ( Commander of the 4th Squadran of the 73rd Cavalry Regiment ) as having remarked : " Call it what you want , it works . . . It works in helping you define the problems , not just the symptoms . " In a statement to the United States House of Representatives in 2008 , Colonel Martin Schweitzer – Commander of the 4th Brigade Combat Team , of the 82nd Airborne Division – claimed that HTS capabilities had reduced his unit ’ s " kinetic operations " in Afghanistan by 60 – 70 per cent within a year . His statement of praise for HTS was subsequently reported in the " New York Times " and " Harper ' s Magazine " as well as other press media . It was also cited by Robert Gates when he praised the program in 2010 . Schweitzer ' s statistics , however , were later disputed by David Price . The US media has also reported a number of positive review from HTS employees . In 2008 , " World Politics Review " ran a feature article on David Matsuda ( a former professor of anthropology at California State University ) who described HTS as " the chance to change the nature of warfare , the chance to anthropologize the military – and not the other way around – the chance to lessen casualties , avoid conflict , take people through the post - conflict to peace " . Matsuda also described the disapproval of anthropologists as a " knee - jerk reaction " and stated : " I came here to save lives , to make friends out of enemies " . Michael Bhatia , an embedded anthropologist who was killed whilst serving in Afghanistan , contended that " some academics have created a polemical enemy image rather than actually learning what HTS does " . Audrey Roberts – an HTS social scientist who worked with a US Army Brigade at Forward Operating Base Salerno , near Khost in Afghanistan – expressed her support of the HTS approach in an interview from 2009 . In the media . In 2006 , George Packer , author of " The Assassin ' s Gate : America in Iraq " and " New Yorker " magazine staff writer , wrote an article about the increasing use of social science in US military operations and the early trials of the HTS program . He reflected : " At a moment when the Bush Administration has run out of ideas and lost control , it could turn away from its “ war on terror ” and follow a different path – one that is right under its nose . " In a ( mainly critical ) book about HTS entitled " David Petraeus ' s Favourite Mushroom : Inside the US Army ' s Human Terrain System " ( 2009 ) , John Stanton ( an independent journalist ) claimed that HTS had been successful in advising a US military unit in Iraq on proper mealtime etiquette , i . e . , not only how to properly eat , but also the gestures during the meal , and especially how to observe the Ramadan feast . Criticism and controversy . American Anthropological Association . On 31 October 2007 , the American Anthropological Association ( AAA ) published a statement opposing HTS as an " unacceptable application of anthropological expertise " . The statement argued that HTS personnel would have responsibilities to the U . S military working in war zones that would conflict with anthropologists ' duty , as outlined in the AAA Code of Ethics ( Section III , A , 1 ) , to " do no harm to those they study " . It further maintained that , working in a war zone , HTS personnel would be unable to ensure the " voluntary informed consent ( without coercion ) " of those that they communicate with , as is also required by the AAA Code of Ethics ( Section III , A , 4 ) . In December 2008 , the AAA Executive Board followed up their initial statement of disapproval by asking the Commission on Engagement of Anthropology with the US Security and Intelligence Services ( CEAUSSIC ) to thoroughly review the HTS program . CEASSUIC ' s " Final Report on the Army ' s Human Terrain Proof - of - Concept System " was released in December 2009 . CEAUSSIC ' s 74 - page report argued that the " goals " and " basic identity " of HTS were characterized by " confusion " , and that the program was designed to simultaneously perform multiple tasks that were , in fact , " potentially irreconcilable " i . e . serving as research function whilst also operating as " a source of intelligence " and a " tactical function in counterinsurgency warfare . It added that this " confusion " would make it unclear to anthropologists whether they could follow the Code of Ethics or not . The commission further maintained that HTS personnel would be unable to " maintain reliable control " over the information they collected , and that there was a " significant likelihood " that HTS data would be used " as part of military intelligence " , which would place " researchers and their counterparts in the field in harm ' s way " . It also noted that if HTS were a research organization , " it would be required to comply with federal law for subject protection " and suggested that the fact that the program had avoided oversight by an Institutional Review Board ( IRB ) was " unusual " . In conclusion , the report stated : " When ethnographic investigation is determined by military missions , not subject to external review , where data collection occurs in the context of war , integrated into the goals of counterinsurgency , and in a potentially coercive environment – all characteristic features of the HTS concept and its application – it can no longer be considered a legitimate professional exercise of anthropology " ; and it recommended that the AAA emphasize the incompatibility of HTS with [ anthropological ] disciplinary ethics and practice " . In April 2012 , the AAA restated their disapproval of the HTS program after a cover story article in " C4ISR " ( a " Defense News " publication ) claimed that " the controversy ha [ d ] cooled " and that HTS would have a recruiter at the annual AAA meeting in November that year . The AAA denied both claims . Anthropologists . In 2007 , the Network of Concerned Anthropologists ( NCA ) was founded by a group of anthropologists , largely in response to the HTS program . In 2010 , the Network wrote an " Anthropologists ' Statement on the Human Terrain System Program " to the United States House of Representatives , which was signed by over 700 anthropologists . The statement called for Congress to halt governmental support to HTS and cancel plans for its expansion , giving the following reasons : " There is no evidence that HTS is effective " ; " HTS is dangerous and reckless " ; " HTS wastes taxpayers money " ; " HTS is unethical for anthropologists and other social scientists " . Roberto J . Gonzalez ( Associate Professor of anthropology at San Jose State University ) , Hugh Gusterson ( Professor of anthropology and Sociology at George Mason University ) and David Price ( Professor of Anthropology and Sociology at Saint Martin ' s University ) – three of the founding members of NCA – have all written numerous articles criticizing HTS as an effort to " weaponize anthropology " . In a 2010 article , Gusterson wrote of the program : The Pentagon seems to have decided that anthropology is to the war on terror what physics was to the cold war " . He criticized HTS for performing " drive - by research " as well as violating disciplinary ethics , arguing that the AAA Code of Ethics is comparable to the Hippocratic oath : " Asking an anthropologist to gather intelligence that may lead to someone ' s death or imprisonment [ . . . ] is like asking an army doctor to kill a wounded insurgent " . David Price has described HTS as part of a " neocolonial " mission . " Human Terrain System " , he maintained " is not some neutral humanitarian project , it is an arm of the US military and it is part of the military ' s mission to occupy and destroy opposition to US goals and objectives . . . HTS ' s goal is a gentler form of domination " . In an article in " Counterpunch " in April 2009 , Price disputed Colonel Schweitzer ' s claims that HTS had reduced kinetic action by 60 – 70 % , reporting that his efforts to track the studies on which these statistics were based through the Freedom of Information Act resulted in Schweitzer ' s admission that there were no such studies and the statistics were a " loose estimate " . In the same article , Price also criticized the coverage of HTS in the US media and published a list of ten fundamental issues that reporters needed to address . In a paper from 2009 , Neil L Whitehead ( Professor of Anthropology at the University of Wisconsin - Madison ) questioned whether HTS can even work in the way that it is promoted to do . Drawing on anthropological studies of warfare that demonstrate the socially transformative effects of warfare and military action , Whitehead argued that the practice of anthropology becomes " highly problematic " in a situation where anthropology is being deployed to report on " the very phenomenon it is a part of changing , whether consciously or not " . He therefore suggested that ethical objections to HTS are not limited to the anthropologist ' s potential violation of their duty of confidentiality and responsibility to their informants , but also include the questionable " ethical responsibility " of those anthropologists and military planners " erroneously " promoting HTS as being able to work in ways that " in all likelihood " it cannot actually work , and thereby " endangering anthropologists and soldiers alike " . Other anthropologists who have criticized HTS include Marshall Sahlins , who describes HTS as " manipulating local culture , imposing [ our government ' s objectives ] on them , transforming anthropologists into spies , and putting people you work with [ in the locale ] at risk " ; and Maximillian Forte , who has published numerous articles on HTS in academic journals and on internet websites . Military officials and former HTS personnel . In 2009 , Major Ben Connable ( Marine Corps ) published an article in " Military Review " which argued that HTS was " undermining " the US Army ' s " cultural competence " . A number of former HTS personnel have also criticized the program . In 2007 , social scientist Zenia Helbig was fired from HTS after raising concerns that the program was disorganized and provided insufficient region specific training . In the same year , Matt Tompkins , an HTT Leader , remarked that defense contractors supporting HTS were not providing sufficient training or staffing , and that the social scientists on his team lacked region - specific expertise . After resigning from the program in 2010 , John Allison criticized HTS for its doctrinal inflexibility and lack of openness to anthropological perspectives and suggestions for improvement . In the media . John Stanton ( independent journalist ) has published numerous reports on the HTS program and its history . In 2009 he published a book about the program entitled " General David Petraeus ' Favorite Mushroom : Inside the US Army ' s Human Terrain System " . According to Stanton , much of the information in his reports came from sources within HTS . Ann Marlowe wrote a piece about HTS for the " Weekly Standard " in November 2007 stating that " there are some things the Army needs in Afghanistan , but more academics are not at the top of the list . " Cultural references . In 2010 , James Der Derian , David Udris and Michael Udris released a documentary film about HTS entitled " " . The film has been described as having two main narrative components : the first is an inquiry into the HTS program and its history ; the second is a narrative of the " tragic " story of Michael Bhatia ' s involvement in HTS . The film features interviews with numerous individuals who have played an important role in the history of HTS and the public debate surrounding the program , including : Michael Bhatia , Steve Fondacaro , Roberto Gonzalez , Hugh Gusterson and Montgomery McFate .