Japanese Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group The Japanese Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group or also known as the refers to a battalion - sized , largely humanitarian contingent of the Japan Self - Defense Forces that was sent to Samawah , Southern Iraq in early January 2004 and withdrawn by late July 2006 . Their duties had included tasks such as water purification , reconstruction and reestablishment of public facilities for the Iraqi people . Background . The Koizumi administration originally ordered the controversial formation and deployment of the JIRSG at the request of the United States . This marks a significant turning point in Japan ' s history , as it represents the first foreign deployment of Japanese troops since the end of World War II , excluding those deployments conducted under United Nations auspices . Public opinion regarding the deployment was sharply divided , especially given that Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan prohibits the use of military forces unless for self - defence purposes ( operating in Iraq seemed , at best , tenuously connected to that mission ) . In order to legalize the deployment of Japanese forces in Samawah , the Koizumi administration legislated the Humanitarian Relief and Iraqi Reconstruction Special Measures Law on December 9 , 2003 in the Diet , even though the opposition firmly opposed it . Two Japanese diplomats were shot and killed near Tikrit , Iraq on November 29 , 2003 while preparations for the deployment were in their final stages . In early April 2004 , three Japanese - a journalist and two aid workers - were kidnapped , but they were released several days later on April 15 . The following day , another two Japanese - an aid worker and a journalist - were kidnapped and released within 24 hours . The kidnappers of the original three had threatened to burn the hostages alive if Japanese troops were not removed from Iraq within three days . A spokeswoman for the Islamic Clerics Committee , which negotiated their release , said that growing public calls in Japan for the SDF troops to be withdrawn from Iraq led to the release of three Japanese . In a statement released on July 20 , 2004 , Al Zarqawi warned Japan , Poland and Bulgaria to withdraw their troops , demanding that the Japanese government : ' . . . do what the Philippines has done . . . ' , and threatening that : ' Lines of cars laden with explosives are awaiting you . . . ' if the demands were not met . The body of a Japanese backpacker , Shosei Koda , was found in Baghdad on October 30 , 2004 , several days after he had been kidnapped . His captors had promised to execute him unless Japanese troops were withdrawn . According to Channel NewsAsia , the killing renewed domestic pressure on Prime Minister Koizumi to bring the contingent home . One Japanese private security guard , Akihiko Saito , was killed in an ambush on his convoy on May 25 , 2005 . Significance . Analysts differ as to the political ramifications of the deployment . One view is that it represents the emergence of Japan as a close military ally of the United States , strategically positioned as a counterweight to China ' s growing regional power . This position asserts that the Iraq deployment offers a constitutional model for future overseas deployment in circumvention of Article 9 . Another interpretation is that the deployment is entirely symbolic as it comes at little financial or human cost to the Koizumi administration , has a negligible effect on the strategic situation in Iraq , and is simply aimed at maintaining positive relations with the U . S . so as to perpetuate a favorable economic relationship . At the height of the deployment , on September 19 , 2005 , a senior Defense Agency official succinctly gave his opinion on the future prospects for overseas Japanese military deployments , drawing on his opinion of the Iraq mission : " It isn ’ t worth it " . Analysts said that the restrictive rules of engagement and reliance on the constant protection of others effectively renders meaningful Japanese participation in international operations impossible for the foreseeable future . One opposition member had said that the JIRSG deployment " wouldn ' t be a problem if it really were for humanitarian reasons . But it is first and foremost a show of support to the U . S . The U . S . invaded Iraq without a U . N . resolution , and Japan is now aiding in that act . " Deployment . Since the beginning of the war in Iraq , the city of Samawah has continuously been a relatively stable city , in what is probably the most peaceful and sparsely populated province of non - Kurdish Iraq . The first elements of the contingent arrived in Kuwait on January 9 and January 17 , 2004 , after an advance team from the Japanese Air Self - Defense Forces ( JASDF ) assessed the security situation in Samawah in late December 2003 and to Kuwait for the arrival of other JSDF forces to Iraq . The first JGSDF troops arrived at the Dutch military base in Samawah on January 19 . Prime Minister Koizumi decided on December 8 , 2005 to renew the contingent ' s mandate for another year , despite a poll by the Asahi newspaper which found that 69 % of respondents were against renewing the mandate , up from 55 % in January . A total of nine JIRSG scheduled rotations took place between 2004 to 2006 . Protection for the unit was provided primarily by Australian troops , as the Japanese soldiers were prohibited from engaging Iraqi guerrillas unless they came under fire . However , a small number of Japanese Special Forces Group , Western Infantry Army Regiment , and 1st Airborne Brigade personnel were deployed to provide protection . Mortars and rockets were lobbed at the Japanese camp several times , causing no damage or injuries . Withdrawal . Although Defense Agency officials initially denied a report that the JSDF would be withdrawing from Iraq , they eventually confirmed that the contingent would leave Iraq by March 2006 . Officials , however , subsequently insisted that any withdrawal would hinge on the ability of the Iraqis to form a new government by the end of 2006 . A united Iraqi government was established in May 2006 , and Koizumi subsequently announced that forces could be withdrawn as early as the end of July given the completion of the mission . Koizumi announced on June 20 , 2006 that the Japanese contingent would be withdrawn within ' several dozen days ' , however he suggested expanding airborne logistical support from southern parts of the country to Baghdad in place of the ground force . On June 25 , the first batch of the 600 - member contingent began to withdraw from Samawah to Kuwait . The last 220 troops left Iraq by July 18 . And the JIRSG base in Samawah was planned to be the new headquarters of the 2nd Brigade , 10th Division of the Iraqi Army . Although all Japanese soldiers have left Iraq , JASDF forces continue to play a minor support role . As of November 2006 , JASDF transport aircraft were assisting coalition forces by airlifting materials and personnel between Iraq and Kuwait . The airlift mission was extended until July 31 , 2007 , at which point it was extended again for another two years . As of November 26 , 2008 , 671 . 1 tons of supplies have been transported since March 2004 . On April 17 , 2008 , Nagoya High Court ruled that dispatch of troops was partly unconstitutional . Due to rising anti - Iraq war sentiment from the opposition , the Japanese government announced it JASDF forces in Kuwait would withdraw soon , though it was announced that the withdrawal was due to the improving security situation and the nearing expiration of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1790 , which allows multinational forces to stay in Iraq until December 2008 . The last JASDF forces left Kuwait on December 18 , 2008 .