Bomber Mafia The Bomber Mafia were a close - knit group of American military men who believed that long - range heavy bomber aircraft in large numbers were able to win a war . The derogatory term ' Bomber Mafia ' was used before and after World War II by those in the military who did not share their belief , and who were frustrated by the insistence of the men that the heavy bomber should take a primary position in planning and funding . After World War II , the 20 years of foundational work by the bomber mafia resulted in the separation of the United States Air Force from the Army to become an independent military arm . The bomber mafia ' s strategic doctrine , changed by war and experience , helped shape the mission of the new Air Force and its Strategic Air Command . Many years later a related term " Fighter Mafia " described those within the Air Force that favoured light weight fighters good at dog - fighting instead of heavy missile - firing fighters . Origins . Developed over the years 1926 – 1929 at Air Corps Tactical School ( ACTS ) at Langley Field in Virginia , a forward - looking doctrine of daylight precision bombing was promulgated by four instructors who argued that an enemy ' s army and navy could be defeated intact due to the destruction of industrial and military targets deep within enemy - held territory . This theory was first espoused by Italian General Giulio Douhet , though his ideas included the terror bombing of population centers that the American theorists eschewed . In contrast , American theorists devised a strategy of pin - point bombing that targeted the enemy economy and the production of weapons . Though unproven , the major attraction of this sort of strategic bombing doctrine was that a war was expected to be won relatively quickly , with minimal casualties , and that grinding , static trench warfare as seen in World War I could be avoided . In November 1932 when British Lord President of the Council Stanley Baldwin said " the bomber will always get through " , he was talking about the terror bombing of cities . The US Bomber Mafia agreed with Baldwin only in that the bomber would prevail in its mission . They intended the mission to be against military and industrial targets , not populations . To effect this doctrine , the United States Army Air Corps would be required to expend the majority of its resources in amassing a fleet of self - defending heavy bombers , and in the training and maintenance of a great number of airmen to fill aircrew and ground crew positions . The ACTS officers who believed in the heavy bomber doctrine realized that any other Air Corps expenditures such as for tactical bomber s and fighter aircraft would take away from the proposed large fleet of heavy bombers . Moreover , the men realized that the United States government would have to reduce funding to naval and ground forces in order to establish a great air fleet . To implement these changes , the ACTS instructors began to instill a sense in their students that a separate and independent air arm of the type described earlier by Brigadier General William " Billy " Mitchell , to be called the United States Air Force , was the way forward . As a compromise first step , the General Headquarters ( GHQ ) Air Force was established within the Army Air Corps in 1935 , commanded by General Frank M . Andrews , a strategic bombing advocate . Andrews staffed the command with like - minded officers such as Henry H . " Hap " Arnold . Although flawed and tested only under optimal conditions , the doctrine ( originally known as the " industrial web theory " ) became the primary airpower strategy of the United States in the planning for World War II . Four former instructors of the school , the core of the " Bomber Mafia " , produced the two airpower war plans ( AWPD - 1 and AWPD - 42 ) that guided the wartime expansion and deployment of the Army Air Forces . Opposition . The term ' bomber mafia ' came from the sometimes bitter debates between United States Army staff and Air Corps men who observed , and argued with , the insistence by instructors and students of the ACTS that heavy bombers were the new primary weapon of war , and that a separate air arm was required to command them . For the first few years , the strongest voice at ACTS against the bomber doctrine was Captain ( later General ) George C . Kenney who called for the use of air power to attack enemy fighting units on the ground . He advocated the close coordination of air and ground forces , with an emphasis on medium bomber s and fighter bomber s . Kenney left ACTS in 1929 , and heavy bomber doctrinarians filled the vacancy . The doctrine also ran counter to the theories of Billy Mitchell himself , who espoused that pursuit support was essential for daylight bombing operations . Lewis H . Brereton served as instructor at ACTS for one year 1924 – 1925 , then took command of Second Bombardment Group . During his short tenure at ACTS , he spoke in favor of an eclectic air force composed of many different tactical and strategic units . Brereton continued in this stance as instructor at Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth , Kansas during 1935 – 1939 . As an expert in the use of air units to aid artillery and infantry , Gordon P . Saville held to the concept of tactical air power through his time as ACTS instructor from 1934 to 1936 . Later , Saville successfully implemented his ideas in the Mediterranean Theater . Captain Claire Lee Chennault , senior instructor in fighter tactics at ACTS , was a vocal Air Corps officer who challenged the bomber mafia for more than a decade ; he was forced into early retirement in 1937 , leaving the precision bombing advocates unopposed . The teaching of fighter ( " pursuit " ) tactics declined , though Earle E . Partridge and Hoyt S . Vandenberg continued to discuss the role of the fighter . Other opposition was more subtle . USAAC Fighter Projects officer Lieutenant Benjamin S . Kelsey appreciated that a large bomber fleet would be able to perform many military tasks , not just strategic bombing , and felt that the force ' s doctrine should remain flexible to meet any demand . Because of his lower rank , he was in no position to challenge the bomber mafia , and instead strove to work around their restrictions on pursuit aircraft . Kelsey formulated a new " interceptor " class of aircraft in order to sustain his idea that a well - armed fighter aircraft could successfully attack enemy bombers , and that , given drop tanks for long range , it could defend friendly bombers all the way to the target and back . The bomber mafia , through a " failure of imagination " in not expanding the doctrine to include establishing air superiority as a prerequisite for success , would not accept either of these concepts — they believed the heavy bomber fleet could protect itself , and thus they contributed to the delay in the development of a long - range escort fighter until two years into the war . However , the doctrine nonetheless became the foundation for the separation of the Air Force from the Army , and the basis for modern airpower theory . ACTS graduate , instructor , and " Bomber Mafia " member Haywood S . Hansell concurred that both the theorists and the authors of the AWPD - 1 war plan ( of which he was both ) made a serious mistake in neglecting long - range fighter escort in their ideas . Hansell wrote : It was recognized that fighter escort was inherently desirable , but no one could quite conceive how a small fighter could have the range of the bomber yet retain its combat maneuverability . Failure to see this issue through proved one of the Air Corps Tactical School ' s major shortcomings . Legacy . In World War II , the bomber mafia ' s theory of the primacy of unescorted daylight strategic bombing was proved wrong . Fleets of heavy bombers were not able to achieve victory without the cooperation of the Army and Navy , and required the protection of long - range fighters for deep penetration missions . Overall casualties in the war were not minimal , and victory did not come significantly quicker . Precision in bombing was not achieved until long - range fighter escorts became available and air superiority was achieved , as opponents had warned . The strategic bombing concept , however , was a major factor in the eventual victory and became the first core doctrine of the independent United States Air Force . Its proponents continued to promote the doctrine into the nuclear age , forming the Strategic Air Command to carry out a vision modified to fit the needs of the Cold War and the threat of nuclear warfare . The bomber mafia was gradually replaced in the 1950s and 1960s by advocates of intercontinental ballistic missile warfare .