Marc Mitscher Admiral Marc Andrew " Pete " Mitscher ( January 26 , 1887 – February 3 , 1947 ) was a pioneer in naval aviation who became an admiral in the United States Navy , and served as commander of the Fast Carrier Task Force in the Pacific during the latter half of World War II . Early life and career . Mitscher was born in Hillsboro , Wisconsin on January 26 , 1887 , the son of Oscar and Myrta ( Shear ) Mitscher . Mitscher ' s grandfather , Andreas Mitscher ( 1821 – 1905 ) , was a German immigrant from Traben - Trarbach . During the western land boom of 1889 , when Marc was two years old , his family resettled in Oklahoma City , Oklahoma , where his father , a federal Indian agent , later became that city ' s second mayor . Mitscher attended elementary and secondary schools in Washington , D . C . and received an appointment to the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis , Maryland in 1904 through Bird Segle McGuire , then U . S . Representative from Oklahoma . An indifferent student with a lackluster sense of military deportment , Mitscher ' s career at the naval academy did not portend the accomplishments he would achieve later in life . Nicknamed after Annapolis ' s first midshipman from Oklahoma , Peter Cassius Marcellus Cade , who had " bilged - out " in 1903 , upperclassmen compelled young Mitscher to recite the entire name as a hazing . Soon he was referred to as " Oklahoma Pete " , with the nickname shortened to just " Pete " by the winter of his youngster year . Having amassed 159 demerits and showing poorly in his class work , Mitscher was saddled with a forced resignation at the end of his sophomore year . At the insistence of his father , Mitscher re - applied and was granted reappointment , though he had to re - enter the academy as a first year plebe . This time the stoic Mitscher worked straight through , and on June 3 , 1910 , he graduated 113th out of a class of 131 . Following graduation he served two years at sea aboard " USS Colorado " , and was commissioned ensign on March 7 , 1912 . In August 1913 , he served aboard the " USS California " on the West Coast . During that time Mexico was experiencing a political disturbance , and the " California " was sent to protect U . S . interests and citizens . Mitscher took an early interest in aviation , requesting a transfer to aeronautics while aboard the " Colorado " in his last year as a midshipman , but his request was not granted . After graduating he continued to make requests for transfer to aviation while serving on the destroyers " USS Whipple " and " USS Stewart " . Mitscher was in charge of the engine room on the " USS Stewart " when orders to transfer to the Naval Aeronautic Station in Pensacola , Florida came in . He was assigned to the armored cruiser " USS North Carolina " , which was being used to experiment as a launching platform for aircraft . The ship had been fitted with a catapult over her fantail . Mitscher trained as a pilot , earning his wings and the designation Naval Aviator . Mitscher was one of the first naval aviators , receiving No . 33 on June 2 , 1916 . Almost a year later , on April 6 , 1917 , he reported to the renamed armored cruiser " USS Huntington " for duty in connection with aircraft catapult experiments . At this early date the Navy was interested in using aircraft for scouting purposes and as spotters for direction of their gunnery . Lieutenant Mitscher was placed in command of NAS Dinner Key in Coconut Grove , Florida . Dinner Key was the second largest naval air facility in the U . S . and was used to train seaplane pilots . On July 18 , 1918 , he was promoted to lieutenant commander . In February 1919 , he transferred from NAS Dinner Key to the Aviation Section in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations , before reporting to Seaplane Division 1 . Interwar assignments . On May 10 , 1919 , Mitscher was among a group of naval aviators attempting the first transatlantic crossing by air . Among the men involved was future admiral Jack Towers . Mitscher piloted NC - 1 , one of three Curtiss NC flying boat s that attempted the flight . Taking off from Newfoundland , he nearly reached the Azores before heavy fog caused loss of the horizon , making flying in the early aircraft extremely dangerous . What appeared to be fairly calm seas at altitude turned out to be a heavy chop , and a control cable snapped while setting the aircraft down . Mitscher and his five crewmen were left to sit atop the upper wing of their " Nancy " while they waited to be rescued . Of the three aircraft making the attempt , only NC - 4 successfully completed the crossing . For his part in the effort Mitscher received the Navy Cross , the citation reading : " " For distinguished service in the line of his profession as a member of the crew of the Seaplane NC - 1 , which made a long overseas flight from New Foundland to the vicinity of the Azores , in May 1919 " . " On October 14 , 1919 , Mitscher reported for duty aboard the " Aroostook " , a minelayer refitted as an " aircraft tender " that had been used as a support ship for the " Nancys " transatlantic flight . He served under Captain Henry C . Mustin . " Aroostook " was assigned temporary duties as flagship for the Air Detachment , Pacific Fleet . Mitscher was promoted to commander on July 1 , 1921 . In May 1922 , he was detached from Air Squadrons , Pacific Fleet ( San Diego CA ) to command Naval Air Station Anacostia , D . C . After six months there he was assigned to a newly formed department , the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics . Here as a young aviator he assisted Rear Admiral William Moffett in defending the Navy ' s interest in air assets . General Billy Mitchell was advancing the idea that the nation was best defended by an independent service which would control all military aircraft . Though Mitscher was not a vocal member of the Navy ' s representatives , his knowledge of aircraft capabilities and limitations was instrumental in the Navy being able to answer Mitchell ' s challenge and retain their own airgroups . The debate culminated in the hearings of the Morrow Board , convened to study the best means of applying aviation to national defense . Mitscher testified before the board on October 6 , 1925 . When General Mitchell took his case to the press he was summoned for a court - martial . Mitscher was called as one of the witnesses for the prosecution . The end result was the Navy was left to develop its own , independent aviation branch . Over the next two decades Mitscher continued to work in naval aviation , serving on the aircraft carrier s " Langley " and " Saratoga " , the seaplane tender " Wright " , and taking command of Patrol Wing 1 , in addition to a number of assignments ashore . The " Langley " was the navy ' s first aircraft carrier . A converted collier , she could only make 14 knots , thus limiting her ability to generate wind over her flight deck and lift under the wings of her aircraft for launching and recovery . Nevertheless it was here aboard " Langley " that Mitscher helped develop many of the methods by which aircraft are handled aboard US Navy aircraft carriers . Following this Mitscher was assigned command of the air group for the newly launched aircraft carrier " Saratoga " . As air group commander Mitscher was the first person to land an airplane onto her flight deck . In 1938 , Mitscher was promoted to captain . World War II . Between June 1939 and July 1941 , Mitscher served as assistant chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics . Carrier commander . Mitscher ' s next assignment was as captain of the Yorktown class aircraft carrier USS " Hornet " , being fitted out in Newport News , Virginia . Upon her commissioning in October 1941 he assumed command , taking " Hornet " to the Naval Station Norfolk for her training out period . She was there in Virginia when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor . Newest of the Navy ' s fleet carriers , Mitscher worked hard to get ship and crew ready for combat . Following her shake down cruise in the caribbean , Mitscher was consulted on the possibility of launching long range bombers off the deck of a carrier . After affirming it could be done , the sixteen B - 25 bombers of the Doolittle Raid were loaded on deck aboard " Hornet " for a transpacific voyage while " Hornet ' s " own flight group was stored below deck in her hangar . " Hornet " rendezvoused with the " Enterprise " and Task Force 16 in the mid - Pacific just north of Hawaii . Under the command of Admiral Halsey , the task force proceeded in radio silence to a launch point 650 miles from Japan . Enterprise provided the air cover for both aircraft carriers while the " Hornet ' s " flight deck was taken up ferrying the B - 25s . " Hornet " , then , was the real life " Shangri - la " that president Roosevelt referred to in his announcement of the bombing attack on Tokyo . Battle of Midway . During the Battle of Midway " Hornet " and " Enterprise " carried the air groups that made up the strike force of Task Force 16 , while " Yorktown " carried the aircraft of Task Force 17 . Mitscher had command of the newest carrier in the battle and had the least experienced air groups . As the battle unfolded the Japanese carrier force was sighted early on June 4 at 234 degrees and about 140 miles from Task Force 16 , sailing on a northwest heading . In plotting their attack there was strong disagreement among the air group commanders aboard " Hornet " as to the best intercept course . Lieutenant Commander Stanhope C . Ring , in overall command of " Hornet " s air groups , chose a course of 263 degrees , nearly true west , as the most likely solution to bring them to the Japanese carrier group . He had not anticipated the Japanese turning east into the wind while they recovered their aircraft . Lieutenant Commander John C . Waldron , in command of Torpedo Eight , strongly disagreed with Ring ' s flight plan . An aggressive aviator , he assured Mitscher he would get his group into combat and deliver their ordinance , no matter the cost . Thirty minutes after the " Hornet " airgroups set out , Waldron broke away from the higher flying fighters and divebombers , coming to a course of 240 degrees . This proved to be an excellent heading , as his Torpedo Eight squadron flew directly to the enemy carrier group ' s location " as though on a plumb line " . They did so with no supporting fighter aircraft . On their way Waldron ' s Torpedo Eight happened to get picked up by " Enterprise ' s " VF - 6 fighter squadron flying several thousand feet above them . This group had launched " last " off " Enterprise " and had not been able to catch up with or locate the " Enterprise " dive bombers , but when Waldron dropped his group down to the deck to prepare for their attack the " Enterprise " fighters lost sight of them . Torpedo Eight was on its own . The first of the carrier squadrons to locate the Japanese carriers , Waldron bore down upon the enemy . He brought his group in low , slowing for their torpedo drops . With no fighter escort and no other attackers on hand to split the defenders , his group was decimated by defending Japanese Zeros flying combat air patrol . All fifteen TBD Devastator s of VT - 8 were shot down . Though not known at the time , the valiant efforts of Torpedo Eight failed to deliver a hit on the Japanese carriers . Of the Torpedo Eight aircrews , only Ensign George H . Gay , Jr . survived . About twenty minutes later " Enterprise ' s " Torpedo Six made their own attack , and was met with a similar hot reception . Again , no torpedo hits were made , but five of the aircraft managed to survive the engagement . Though failing to inflict any damage , the torpedo attacks did pull the Japanese CAP down and northeast of the carrier force , leaving the approach from other angles unhindered . SBD dive bombers from " Enterprise " arriving from the south flew over the Japanese carrier force to reach their tipping points almost unopposed . They delivered a devastating blow to " Kaga " and managed to put a bomb into " Akagi " as well , while SBDs coming from the east from " Yorktown " dove down upon the " Soryu " and shattered her flight deck . All three ships were set ablaze , knocked out of the battle to sink later that day . While all this raged Ring continued his search on a course of 260 degrees , flying to the north of the battle . Unable to find the enemy and running low on fuel , " Hornet ' s " strike groups eventually turned back , either toward " Hornet " or to Midway Island itself . All ten fighters in the formation ran out of fuel and had to ditch at sea . Several of her SDBs heading to Midway also ran out of fuel and had to ditch on their approach to the Midway base . Other SBDs attempting to return to the " Hornet " were unable to locate her , and disappeared into the vast Pacific . All these aircraft were lost , though a number of the pilots were later rescued . Of " Hornet ' s " air groups , only Torpedo Eight ended up making it to the enemy that morning . " Hornet ' s " air groups suffered a 50 percent loss rate without achieving any combat results . The battle was a great victory and Mitscher congratulated his crew for their efforts , but the " Hornet ' s " performance had not lived up to his expectations and he felt he had failed to deliver . In addition , he had great regret for the loss of John Waldron and Torpedo Eight . For the next three years he would try to get the entire unit awarded the Medal of Honor , but without success . The pilots of Torpedo Eight were eventually awarded the Navy Cross . The loss of Torpedo Eight caused Mitscher great personal grief . Commander Air Solomon Islands . Prior to the Midway operation Mitscher had been promoted to Admiral in preparation for his next assignment , the command of Patrol Wing 2 . Though Mitscher preferred to be at sea , he held this command until December when he was sent to the South Pacific as Commander Fleet Air , Nouméa . Four months later Halsey moved Mitscher up to Guadalcanal in April 1943 , assigning him to the thick of the fight as Commander Air , Solomon Islands ( COMAIRSOLS ) . Here Mitscher directed an assortment of Army , Navy , Marine and New Zealand aircraft in the air war over Guadalcanal and up the Solomon chain . Said Halsey : " I knew we ' d probably catch hell from the Japs in the air . That ' s why I sent Pete Mitscher up there . Pete was a fighting fool and I knew it . " Short on aircraft , fuel and ammunition , the atmosphere on Guadalcanal was one of dogged defense . Mitscher brought a fresh outlook , and instilled an offensive mindset to his assorted air commands . Mitscher later said this assignment managing the constant air combat over Guadalcanal was his toughest duty of the war . Battles for the Central Pacific . Returning to the Central Pacific as Commander , Carrier Division 3 , Mitscher soon was given operational control of the newly formed Fast Carrier Task Force , at that time operating as Task Force 58 as part of Admiral Raymond Spruance ' s Fifth Fleet . To that point in the conflict carriers had been able to bring enough airpower to bear to inflict significant damage on opposing naval forces , but they always acted as a raiding group . They would approach their objective , inflict damage and then escape away into the vast reaches of the Pacific . Even the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor , devastating though it was , was a carrier raid . Naval airpower was not thought to have the capacity to challenge land based airpower over any length of time . Mitscher was about to change that , leading US naval airpower into a new realm of operations . The fleet had recently completed operations in the Gilbert Islands , taking Tarawa in a bloody and costly invasion in the process . This mission was done for the purpose of providing a land base for aircraft to support naval operations against the next objective , the Marshall Islands . The idea that land based air support was necessary to successfully conduct an amphibious operation was traditional doctrine . The Marshalls would be the first key step for the Navy ' s march across the Pacific to reach Japan . Mitscher ' s objective was to weaken Japanese air defenses in the Marshalls and limit their capability of flying in reinforcements , in preparation for a U . S . invasion of the Marshalls , code named Operation Flintlock . Intelligence estimates of the Japanese defenders of the Marshall Islands believed they had approximately 150 aircraft at their disposal . Two days before the intended landings Mitscher ' s task force groups approached to within 150 miles of the Marshalls and launched their airstrike groups , fighters first to soften up the defenders , followed by bombers to destroy supplies and crater the defender ' s airfields . It was thought it would take two days to attain air superiority . Though the Japanese battled briskley , they lost control of the skies over the Marshall Islands by noon of the first day . What came next was an aerial bombardment of the Japanese defenses , followed by a naval bombardment from the big guns of Spruance ' s surface force . The two days of destruction saved a great many of the lives of the marines that were landed . The Japanese are estimated to have lost 155 aircraft . Mitscher ' s task force lost 57 aircraft , from which 31 pilots and 32 crewmen were lost . The manner in which the fast carrier task force operated established a pattern for future Pacific operations . In his summary report for the month of January , Admiral Nimitz commented it was " typical of what may be expected in the future . " Next Mitscher led Task Force 58 through a series of attacks against Japanese air bases , first in the Mariana and Palau Islands , followed by a raid against Japanese bases in the Hollandia area . Lastly came the raid against Truk , Satawan and Ponape ( February 17 – 18 ) . This was a big step up . The idea of purposely sailing into the range of a major Japanese naval and air base brought great unease to Mitscher ' s airmen . Said one : " They announced our destination over the loudspeaker once we were underway . It was Truk . I nearly jumped overboard . " But Mitscher felt confident they could succeed . As tactical commander of the striking force , he developed techniques that would help give his airmen the edge of surprise . In Operation Hailstone , Mitscher ' s forces approached Truk from behind a weather front to launch a daybreak raid that caught many of the defenders off guard . The airmen brought devastation to the heavily defended base , destroying 72 aircraft on the ground and another 56 in the air , while a great number of auxiliary vessels and three warships were sunk in the lagoon . Chuckling over the pre - raid fears , Mitscher commented " All I knew about Truk was what I ' d read in the National Geographic . " Through the spring of 1944 Task Force 58 conducted a series of raids on Japanese air bases across the Western Pacific . These raids demonstrated that the air power of Task Force 58 was powerful enough to overwhelm the air defenses of not just a single island airbase , or several bases on an island , but the airbases of several island groups at one time . The long held naval rule that fleet operations could not be conducted in the face of land based air power was brushed aside . In the ensuing year Mitscher ' s aviators devastated Japanese carrier forces in the Battle of the Philippine Sea — also known as the " Great Marianas Turkey Shoot " — during June 1944 . Notably , when a follow - up strike was forced to return to his carriers in darkness , Mitscher turned on the flight decks ' running lights , risking submarine attack to give his aviators the best chance of being recovered . Facing the kamikaze threat . During the next year , his carriers spearheaded the thrust against the heart of the Japanese Empire , covering successively the invasion of the Palaus , the liberation of the Philippines , and the conquest of Iwo Jima and Okinawa . During the later operation there was a delay in the Army preparing serviceable air bases to support their operations . Mitscher was obliged to keep Task Force 58 sailing in a box on station some 60 miles off the coast of Okinawa for the next two months . During this time they were subject to air attack around the clock , and the psychological pressures of warding off these attacks was enormous . There was rarely a night that would go by that the crews would not be called to quarters , and the days were worse . " Bunker Hill " was struck by kamikazes , knocking her out of the operation and causing much loss of life . Half of Mitscher ' s staff officers were killed or wounded , and Mitscher was forced to shift his command to the " Enterprise " . The " Enterprise " at that time was functioning as a " night carrier " , launching and recovering her aircraft in the dark to protect the fleet against bomber and torpedo aircraft slipping in to attack the fleet in the relative safety of night . When " Enterprise " was struck by kamikaze attack as well Mitscher had to transfer once more , this time to the USS " Randolph " , the Essex - class carrier that had been damaged by a long range kamikaze attack at Ulithi . Throughout this period Mitscher repeatedly led the fast carriers northward to attack airbases on the Japanese home islands . Commenting on Admiral Mitscher upon his return from the Okinawa campaign , said Admiral Nimitz " He is the most experienced and most able officer in the handling of fast carrier task forces who has yet been developed . It is doubtful if any officer has made more important contributions than he toward extinction of the enemy fleet . " Post - war . At the conclusion of the war and in the face of markedly reduced military spending , a political battle ensued over the need for a military , with advocates from the Army Air Corps insisting that with the development of the atomic bomb the nation could be defended by the devastating power that strategic bombers could now deliver , doing away with the need for Army or Navy forces . In their view , air assets in the Navy should be brought under the control of the soon to be formed Air Force . In the face of such proposals Mitscher remained a staunch advocate for Naval aviation , and went so far as to release the following statement to the press : Japan is beaten , and carrier supremacy defeated her . Carrier supremacy destroyed her army and navy air forces . Carrier supremacy destroyed her fleet . Carrier supremacy gave us bases adjacent to her home islands , and carrier supremacy finally left her exposed to the most devastating sky attack - the atomic fission bomb - that man has suffered . When I say carrier supremacy defeated Japan , I do not mean air power in itself won the Battle of the Pacific . We exercised our carrier supremacy as part of a balanced , integrated air - surface - ground team , in which all hands may be proud of the roles assigned them and the way in which their duties were discharged . This could not have been done by a separate air force , exclusively based ashore , or by one not under Navy control . By July 1946 , when he returned to the United States to serve as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations ( Air ) , Mitscher received , among other awards , two Gold Stars in lieu of a second and third Navy Cross and the Distinguished Service Medal with two Gold Stars . He served briefly as commander 8th Fleet and on March 1 , 1946 became Commander - in - Chief , U . S . Atlantic Fleet , with the rank of admiral . While serving in that capacity , Mitscher died at Norfolk , Virginia at the age of 60 . He was buried in Arlington National Cemetery . Mitscher ' s style as military commander . Though reserved and quiet , Mitscher possessed a natural authority . He could check a man with a single question . He was intolerant of incompetence and would relieve officers that were not making the grade , but was lenient with what he would consider honest mistakes . Harsh discipline he believed ruined more men than it made . He was not forgetful of the abuse he took at the Naval Academy . He believed pilots could not be successfully handled with rigid discipline , as what made for a good pilot was an independence that inflexible discipline destroyed . At the same time he was insistent on rigid " air discipline " and he would break a man who violated it . Naval aviation tactics . Before most other officers in the high command of the U . S . Navy , Mitscher had a grasp of the potential sudden , destructive power that airgroups represented . The change in the operation of carriers from single or paired carriers with support vessels to task groups of three or four carriers was a Mistcher concept , which he implemented for the purpose of concentrating the fighter aircraft available for a better air defense of the carriers . Offensively , Mitscher trained his airgroups to engage in air attacks which delivered a maximum destructive force upon the enemy with the least amount of loss to his aviators . He sought well coordinated attacks . In a typical Mitscher style air attack fighter aircraft would come at the targets first , strafing the enemy ships to suppress their defensive anti - aircraft fire . In plain terms he intended his fighter pilots to wound or kill the target ship ' s anti - aircraft gun crews . Following the fighter runs the ordinance carrying aircraft would execute bombing and torpedo runs , preferable simultaneously to overburden the ship ' s defenses and negate evasive maneuvers . The attack would be completed in a few minutes . Once the attack was delivered the airgroups would leave , as suddenly as they had arrived . Leadership . Mitscher ' s command style was one of few words . His small frame belied the authority he carried . A raised eyebrow was all he needed to indicate he was not pleased with the effort of one of his officers . He was not patient with incompetent personnel , yet he was forgiving of what he considered " honest " mistakes , and would allow airmen a second chance when other officers would have washed them out . He placed tremendous value on his pilots and had great respect for the risks they were willing to accept in attacking the enemy . Following the completion of their missions his practice was for the flight leaders to come up to the flag bridge to report . He valued greatly the information he received from the men who had been on the scene . He was devoted to them , and made a great effort to recover as many downed aircrew as possible . He hated to lose a man , either adrift at sea , or worse , captured by the Japanese . Even though recovery rates were high , he was always deeply distressed that the numbers of rescued airmen were not higher . Personality . Mitscher was a quiet man . He rarely spoke , never engaged in small talk , and he would never discuss mission details at the mess table . On the rare occasions when he would enter into conversation it would be about fishing , a love of which he picked up in his middle years . Mitscher relaxed by reading inexpensive murder mysteries , and when at sea he would always have one with him . Though he appeared distant and severe to those that did not know him , in truth he held a deep affection for his men and was the possessor of a dry sense of humor . Captain Arleigh Burke had come to Mitscher from destroyers , and it was no secret that he preferred a fighting command over his new role as chief - of - staff . At one point a destroyer came alongside to refuel off the bunkers of the carrier . The Admiral advised a marine sentry nearby : " Secure Captain Burke , till that destroyer casts off . " Relations toward superior officers . Mitscher had tactical control of Task Force 58 , and operated the task groups . Strategic control was held by Spruance or Halsey . Once a decision was made by either of his superiors Mitscher would not question it , but implemented the decision without complaint , even though he may have disagreed . This is best examplified by the last two major naval battles of the war : the Battle of the Philippine Sea and the Battle of Leyte Gulf . In each case he recommended a course of action that differed from that of his commanding officer , but he executed the decision made without protest or debate . Legacy . Two ships of the Navy have been named USS " Mitscher " in his honor : the post - World War II frigate , USS " Mitscher " , later re - designated as the guided - missile destroyer ( DDG - 35 ) , and the currently serving " Arleigh Burke " - class guided - missile destroyer , USS " Mitscher " . The airfield and a street at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar ( Naval Air Station Miramar ) have also been named in his honor ( Mitscher Field and Mitscher Way ) . Mitscher Hall at the United States Naval Academy houses chaplain offices , meetings rooms , and an auditorium . The words of Admiral Arleigh Burke , his wartime chief - of - staff , provide the greatest tribute and recognition of his leadership : Awards and decorations . Here is admiral Marc Mitscher ' s ribbon bar :