Battlefield Airborne Communications Node The Battlefield Airborne Communications Node ( BACN ) is an airborne communications relay and gateway system hosted on a variety of aircraft that provides flexible radio connectivity across the battlespace for airborne and surface operators . BACN enables real - time information flow between similar and dissimilar tactical data link and voice systems through relay , bridging , and data translation in line of sight and beyond line of sight situations . By acting as a translation proxy between dissimilar communications systems , it allows interoperability without modification to the individual platforms ' systems . While many of the interoperability problems were due to aging systems , there has been a special problem with stealth aircraft such as the F - 22 Raptor , which , in the interest of security , could only communicate with other aircraft of its type . Because of its flexible deployment options and ability to operate at high altitudes , BACN can enable air and surface forces to overcome communications difficulties caused by complex mountainous terrain and range while performing as a key node for tactical networks . BACN provides decision - makers at all operational echelons with critical information and increases situational awareness by correlating tactical and operational air and ground pictures . For example , an Army unit on the ground currently sees a different picture than an aircrew , but with BACN , both can see the same picture . On 22 February 2010 , the Air Force and Northrop Grumman BACN Team received the 2010 Network Centric Warfare Award from the Institute for Defense and Government Advancement . Tactical data links . Individual tactical data links are just a part of the larger tactical data link network , encompassing tactical data links , common data links , and weapon data links . BACN provides a communications relay and gateway . Flying at extremely high altitudes allows real - time information exchanges between different tactical data link systems . An example would be an A - 10 pilot communicating via BACN with special operations forces allowing them to call directly to the cockpit for targeting information in beyond line of sight range situations . This is a tremendous gain in mission effectiveness when troops are operating in mountainous , or other areas where line - of - sight is difficult or makes the mission more risky . Background . Interoperability between airborne networking waveforms has been a persistent challenge . The solution was a ' universal translator ' to move data from one network to another . The first concepts used lessons learned from ROBE , a pallet of equipment on a transport aircraft . ( ROBE is Roll - On Beyond line of sight Equipment ) In 2005 , the USAF ' s AFC2ISRC and ESC created BACN as a technology demonstrator to provide interlink between aircraft in a single battle area . The four key principles were BACN was successfully demonstrated in Joint Expeditionary Force eXperiment ( JEFX ) 2006 and JEFX 2008 and selected for field deployment . Joint support . Getting critical air support to troops in contact with the enemy supports our troops on the ground , as well as in the air . This project is not just limited to combat operations . We provided the World Food convoy commander with “ comms - on - the - move . ” This capability allows convoys to stay in continuous contact with air support and around command channels in the complex , adverse terrain , mitigating exposure to attacks - they no longer needed to halt to establish communications . Platforms . The BACN prototype was originally developed and tested in 2005 - 2008 on the NASA WB - 57 high altitude test aircraft during Joint Expeditionary Force Experiments and other experimentation venues . These last two flying B - 57s continue to be used for this mission in Afghanistan . BACN was deployed on a test platform Bombardier BD - 700 and originally designated as the RC - 700A under the reconnaissance classification . The aircraft was later re - designated as the E - 11A under the special electronics installation category . The BD - 700 was selected due to its high altitude , flight duration . These flight characteristics are critical in providing unified datalink and voice networks in the mountainous terrain encountered in the current theater of operations . Additional E - 11As have been deployed to increase availability and flexibility . BACN payloads have also been developed , installed , and operated on special variant EQ - 4B Global Hawk aircraft to provide unmanned long endurance high altitude communications coverage . The combination of BACN payloads on E - 11A and EQ - 4 aircraft gives planners and operators flexibility to adapt to mission needs and increase coverage in the battlespace to near 24 / 7 operations . Northrop Grumman is also developing BACN pods that can be temporarily mounted to various other aircraft . Other High Altitude Long Endurance ( HALE ) platforms are also being considered for use with BACN . Problems emerge . The QDR ' s effects on the DoD were widespread . In retrospect , the performance of the Armed Services in Enduring and Iraqi Freedom tend to prove that the QDR got it right . The rapid liquidation of the Taliban and Iraqi forces during Blitzkrieg like advances shows that though significantly leaner than the force that fought in Desert Storm , the American military still retains a decisive and lethal force . However , it is now clear that the services need to re - think their approach to net centric warfare and command , control , communications for the future . This will likely include any necessary changes to force structure to support the full spectrum of operations expected . The September 11 Terrorist Attacks , the Katrina Hurricane disaster , and the ongoing counter insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan show where many communications seams exist both in the DoD and in other governmental functions to include intelligence , law enforcement , and emergency response . This became apparent soon after the September 11 , 2001 , attacks , when President Bush became irritated with Air Force One ' s inability to provide a live video feed to news organizations in the hours after the hijackings and subsequent atrocities committed by the terrorists . BACN as a concept . BACN has been a controversial program within the DoD . This is caused by a number of issues including the personality clashes between the service people who conceived the project back in late 2004 and the traditional acquisition bureaucracy . This was particularly true between requirements developers at the former Air Force Command and Control Intelligence , Surveillance , Reconnaissance Center at Langley AFB , Virginia and their acquisition partners at the Electronic Systems Center ( ESC ) at Hanscom AFB , Massachusetts , part of Air Force Materiel Command . BACN divides military planners and acquisition bureaucrats on two main fronts . First , how will an " Airborne Network " evolve beyond the existing tactical data links on today ' s platforms . Second , the BACN effort presupposes that the capability will initially be " outsourced " to commercial companies that will provide an " airborne network " as a service to the DOD for the foreseeable future . The evolution of airborne networking . With few exceptions , today ' s military aircraft , in any service , are not networked . While many platforms have implemented tactical data links that allow some measure of collaboration between flights of aircraft , very little information is passed between command and control elements and attack aircraft at the tactical edge . Since 2001 , the DoD has made significant progress in " linking " platforms together . This would include some degree of cross service interoperability but within common groupings like ground attack aircraft and fighters . USAF F - 15 s and US Navy F / A - 18s can link together using Link 16 and share some limited information between flights like target data , fuel and weapons status . On the other hand , USAF bombers like the B - 52 and B - 1 are not equipped with data links and cannot interoperate with either F - 15s and F / A - 18s . Furthermore , half the USAF fighter force based in the Air National Guard ( ANG ) are equipped with Situational Awareness Data Link ( SADL ) gear that cannot interoperate with Link 16 unless there is a " gateway " which has radios for both data links , and a computer system that can interconnect them and translate the data . While the deployment of data links to fighter aircraft has aided flights of aircraft to coordinate their attacks locally , these systems are constrained by line of sight and cannot reach command and control centers that are often hundreds , if not thousands , of miles distant from where the fighting is taking place . While the USAF has taken the lead to field " gateways " that can handle both connecting dissimilar links and relaying data over satellite back and forth to connect command and control to the tactical edge , the platform that carries the gateway is more often than not dedicated to another mission ( like air refueling ) that consumes limited resources and sub - optimizes some other critical theater activity . There are unfortunately bigger problems with linking aircraft together with data links . While ground attack aircraft are increasingly linked , they cannot interoperate with attack helicopters or ground forces with any service . In an age where there is zero tolerance for even a single " friendly fire " death , attack aircraft from either the Navy or the Air Force use the same sensors to prevent fratricide that were used in World War I — their eyeballs . Late in the last decade of the Twentieth Century , defense planners began to think beyond simply " linking " forces to " networking " them and fundamentally changing the information model at the tactical edge from one that required a priori knowledge of required information to employ forces , or " push " model , to one in which the information required was globally available and could be " pulled " as required by warfighters engaged in combat . This new model came to be known as " Network Centric Warfare ( NCW ) . " The drive towards NCW began in earnest with the arrival of the Bush Administration . Former Defense Secretary , Donald Rumsfeld , drove a transformation of the DoD so that it would be capable of meeting the needs of the 21st century . This DoD - sanctioned technology push became the perfect incubator for pursuing a networked force . On Rumsfeld ' s recommendation , President Bush appointed a number of industry leaders to key positions within the DoD that brought with them their experience in the technology revolution that exploded in the 1990s . The concept is expected to evolve into the Joint Aerial Layer Network .