1967 USS Forrestal fire The 1967 USS " Forrestal " fire was a devastating fire and series of chain - reaction explosions on 29 July 1967 that killed 134 sailors and injured 161 on the aircraft carrier USS " Forrestal " ( CVA - 59 ) , after an electrical anomaly discharged a Zuni rocket on the flight deck . " Forrestal " was engaged in combat operations in the Gulf of Tonkin during the Vietnam War at the time , and the damage exceeded US $ 72 million ( equivalent to $ million today ) not including damage to aircraft . Future United States Senator John McCain was among the survivors . Background . " Forrestal " had departed Norfolk in early June 1967 . Upon completion of the required inspections for the upcoming WESTPAC Cruise , she then went on to Brazil for a show of force . She then set sail around the horn of Africa , and went on to dock for a short while at Leyte Pier at N . A . S . Cubi Point in the Philippine Islands before sailing to " Yankee Station " in the Gulf of Tonkin on July 25 . For four days in the gulf , aircraft of Attack Carrier Air Wing 17 flew about 150 missions against targets in North Vietnam . By 1967 , the ongoing naval bombing campaign from Yankee Station represented by far the most intense and sustained air attack operation in the navy ' s history , with monthly demand for general purpose bomb s ( " iron bombs " ) greatly exceeding new production . The on - hand supply of bombs had dwindled throughout 1966 and become critically low by 1967 , particularly the new 1000 - lb . Mark 83 , which the navy greatly favored for its power - to - size ratio : a carrier - launched A4 Skyhawk , the navy ' s standard ground attack aircraft of the period , could carry either a single 2000 - lb . bomb , or two 1000 - lb . bombs , with the ability to strike two separate hardened targets in a single sortie being seen as more desirable in most circumstances . Until 1971 , the US Air Force ' s primary ground attack aircraft in Vietnam was the much heavier land - based F - 105 Thunderchief which could carry 2 2 , 000 - lb . M118 bombs and 4 750 - lb . M117 bombs ( both of which had large stockpiles available ) simultaneously on a single sortie , and thus did not need to rely as heavily on the limited supply of 1000 - lb . bombs the way the navy did . In training , the damage control team specializing in on - deck firefighting for " Forrestal " ( Damage Control Team # 8 , led by Chief Petty Officer Gerald Farrier ) had been shown films of navy ordnance tests demonstrating how a 1000 - lb bomb could be directly exposed to a jet fuel fire for full 10 minutes and still be extinguished and cooled without an explosive cook off . However , these tests were conducted using the new Mark 83 1000 lb bombs which featured relatively stable Composition H6 explosive filler and thicker , heat - resistant cases compared to their predecessors ; H6 , which is still used in many types of naval ordnance due to its relative insensitivity to heat , shock and electricity , is also designed to deflagrate instead of detonate when it reaches its ignition point in a fire , either melting the case and producing no explosion at all or at most a subsonic low order detonation at a fraction of its normal power . The day before the accident ( 28 July ) , the " Forrestal " was resupplied with ordnance from the ammunition ship USS " Diamond Head " . The load included 16 1000 - lb . AN - M65A1 " fat boy " bombs ( so nicknamed because of their short , rotund shape ) , which the " Diamond Head " had picked up from the Subic Bay Naval Base and were intended for the next day ' s second bombing sortie . The batch of AN - M65A1 " fat boys " the " Forrestal " received were surplus from World War II , having spent roughly three decades exposed to the heat and humidity of the Philippine jungles while improperly stored in open - air Quonset hut s at a disused ammunition dump on the periphery of Subic Bay Naval Base . Unlike the thick - cased Mark 83 bombs filled with Composition H6 , the AN - M65A1 bombs were thin - skinned and filled with Composition B , an older explosive with greater shock and heat sensitivity ; Composition B also had the dangerous tendency to become more powerful ( up to 50 % by weight ) and more sensitive if it was old or improperly stored . The " Forrestal ' s " ordnance handlers had never even seen an AN - M65A1 before , and to their shock the bombs delivered from the " Diamond Head " were in terrible condition ; coated with " decades of accumulated rust and grime " and still in their original packing crates ( now moldy and rotten ) , some were stamped with production dates as early as 1935 . Most worryingly of all , several bombs were seen to be leaking liquid paraffin phlegmatizing agent from their seams , an unmistakably dangerous sign the bomb ' s explosive filler had degenerated with excessive age and exposure to heat and moisture . According to A - 4 Skyhawk pilot Lieutenant Rocky Pratt , the concern and objection induced in the " Forrestal ' s " ordnance handlers was striking , with many afraid to even handle the bombs ; one officer wondered out loud if they would even survive the shock of a catapult assisted launch without spontaneously detonating , and others suggested they immediately jettison them into the sea . Since no one wanted to be responsible for scrubbing the next day ' s missions , the decision was made by the " Forrestal ' s " ordnance officers to report the situation up the chain of command to Captain John Beling and inform him the bombs were , in their assessment , an imminent danger to the ship and should not be kept on board . Faced with this , but still needing 1000 - lb . bombs for the next day ' s missions , Beling demanded the " Diamond Head " take the AN - M65A1s back in exchange for new Mark 83s , but was told by the " Diamond Head " that they had none available to give him . The AN - M65A1 bombs had been returned to service specifically because there were not enough Mark 83s to go around . According to one crew - member on the " Diamond Head " , when they had arrived at Subic Bay to pick up their load of ordnance for the carriers , the base personnel who had prepared the AN - M65A1 bombs for transfer assumed the " Diamond Head " had been ordered to dump them at sea on the way back to Yankee Station ; when notified that the bombs were actually destined for active service in the carrier fleet , the commanding officer of the naval ordnance detachment at Subic Bay was so shocked he initially refused the transfer , believing a paperwork mistake must have been made . At risk of delaying the " Diamond Head ' s " departure , he refused to sign the transfer forms until receiving written orders from CINCPAC on the teletype explicitly absolving his detachment of responsibility for their terrible condition . With orders to conduct strike missions over North Vietnam the next day and no replacement bombs available , Captain Beling reluctantly concluded he had no choice but to accept the AN - M65A1 bombs in their current condition . In one concession to the demands of the ordnance handlers , Beling did agree to store all 16 bombs alone on deck in the " bomb farm " area between the port rail and the carrier ' s island until they were loaded for the next day ' s missions ; standard procedure would have been to store them in the ship ' s magazine with the other bombs ( where an accidental detonation could easily destroy the entire ship ) . Fire . At about 10 : 50 ( local time ) on 29 July , while preparations for the second strike of the day were being made , an unguided Mk - 32 " Zuni " rocket , one of four contained in a LAU - 10 underwing rocket pod mounted on an F - 4B Phantom II , was accidentally fired due to an electrical power surge during the switch from external power to internal power . The surge originated from the fact that high winds had blown free the safety pin , which would have prevented the fail surge , as well as a decision to plug in the " pigtail " system early to increase the number of takeoffs from the carrier ( see below ) . The rocket flew across the flight deck , striking a wing - mounted external fuel tank on an A - 4E Skyhawk awaiting launch , aircraft No . 405 , piloted by Lieutenant Commander Fred D . White . The Zuni Rocket ' s warhead safety mechanism prevented it from detonating , but the impact tore the tank off the wing and ignited the resulting spray of escaping JP - 5 fuel , causing an instantaneous conflagration . Within seconds , other external fuel tanks on White ' s aircraft overheated and ruptured , releasing more jet fuel to feed the flames , which began spreading along the flight deck . The impact of the Zuni had also dislodged two of the 1000 - lb AN - M65 bombs , which fell to the deck and lay in the pool of burning fuel between White and McCain ' s aircraft . Damage Control Team # 8 swung into action immediately , and Chief Gerald Farrier , recognizing the risk and without benefit of protective clothing , immediately smothered the bombs with a PKP fire extinguisher in an effort to knock down the fuel fire long enough to allow the pilots to escape . The pilots , still strapped into their aircraft , were immediately aware that a disaster was unfolding , but only some were able to escape in time . Lieutenant Commander John McCain , pilot of A - 4 Skyhawk side No . 416 next to White ' s was among the first to notice the flames and escaped by scrambling down the nose of his A - 4 and jumping off the refueling probe shortly before the explosions began . Damage Control Team # 8 had been assured of a 10 - minute window in which to extinguish the fire and prevent the bombs from detonating , but the Composition B bombs proved to be just as unstable as the ordnance crews had initially feared ; after only slightly more than 1 minute , despite Chief Farrier ' s constant efforts to cool the bombs , the casing of one suddenly split open and began to glow cherry red . The chief , recognizing a lethal cook - off was imminent , shouted for his team to withdraw , but the bomb detonated seconds later – a mere one minute and 36 seconds after the start of the fire . The detonation destroyed White and McCain ' s aircraft ( along with their remaining fuel and armament ) , blew a crater in the armored flight deck , and sprayed the deck and crew with bomb fragments and burning fuel . Damage Control Team # 8 took the brunt of the initial blast ; Chief Farrier and all but three of his men were killed instantly ; the survivors were critically injured . Lieutenant Commander White had managed to escape his burning aircraft but was unable to get far enough away in time ; White was killed along with the firefighters in the first bomb explosion . In the tightly packed formation on the deck , the two nearest A - 4s to White and McCain ' s ( both fully fueled and bomb - laden ) were heavily damaged and began to burn , causing the fire to spread and more bombs to quickly cook off . Lieutenant Commander Herbert A . Hope of VA - 46 ( and operations officer of CVW - 17 ) was far enough away to survive the first explosion , and managed to escape by jumping out of the cockpit of his Skyhawk and rolling off the flight deck and into the starboard man - overboard net . Making his way down below to the hangar deck , he took command of a firefighting team . " The port quarter of the flight deck where I was " , he recalled , " is no longer there . " Two other pilots ( Lieutenant Dennis M . Barton and Lieutenant Commander Gerry L . Stark ) were also killed by explosions during this period , while the rest were able to escape their aircraft and get below . Nine bomb explosions eventually occurred on the flight deck , eight caused by the AN - M56 Composition B bombs cooking off under the heat of the fuel fires and the ninth occurring as a sympathetic detonation between an AN - M56 and a newer 500 lb M117 H6 bomb that it was lying next to on the deck . The other Composition H6 - based bombs performed as designed and either burned on the deck or were jettisoned , but did not detonate under the heat of the fires . The explosions ( several of which were estimated to up to 50 % more powerful than a standard 1000 lb bomb due to the unintentionally - enhanced power of the badly degraded Composition B ) tore large holes in the armored flight deck , causing flaming jet fuel to drain into the interior of the ship , including the living quarters directly underneath the flight deck , and the below - decks aircraft hangar . Sailors and marines controlled the flight deck fires by 1215 , and continued to clear smoke and to cool hot steel on the 02 and 03 levels until all fires were under control by 1342 . The fire was not declared defeated until 0400 the next morning , due to additional flare - ups . Throughout the day the ship ’ s medical staff worked in dangerous conditions to assist their comrades . HM2 Paul Streetman , one of 38 corpsmen assigned to the carrier , spent over 11 hours on the mangled flight deck tending to his shipmates . The large number of casualties quickly overwhelmed the ship ’ s sick bay staff , and the " Forrestal " was escorted by to rendezvous with hospital ship at 2054 , allowing the crew to begin transferring the dead and wounded at 2253 . Aftermath . The fire left 134 crewmen dead and 161 more injured . Many planes and armament were jettisoned to prevent them from catching fire or exploding . Twenty - one aircraft also sustained enough damage from fire , explosions and salt water to be stricken from naval inventory , including seven F - 4B Phantom IIs ( BuNos 153046 , 153054 , 153060 , 153061 , 153066 , 153069 and 153912 ) ; eleven A - 4E Skyhawks ( 149996 , 150064 , 150068 , 150084 , 150115 , 150118 , 150129 , 152018 , 152024 , 152036 and 152040 ) ; and three RA - 5C Vigilantes ( 148932 , 149284 and 149305 ) . The fire also revealed that " Forrestal " required a heavy duty , armored forklift for use in the emergency jettisoning of aircraft ( particularly heavier types such as the RA - 5C Vigilante ) as well as heavy or damaged ordnance . Sailors had been forced to manually jettison numerous 250 and 500 lb bombs by rolling them along the deck and off the side . From 31 July – 11 August 1967 , " Forrestal " was moored at Leyte Pier at Naval Air Station Cubi Point in the Philippines for temporary repairs . On 12 – 13 September , " Forrestal " arrived at Naval Station Mayport and unloaded aircraft and the crews of squadrons based in Florida . On 14 September , the ship returned to Norfolk and was welcomed home by over 3 , 000 family members and friends gathered on Pier 12 and onboard , " Forrestal " s host ship . From 19 September 1967 – 8 April 1968 , " Forrestal " underwent repairs in Norfolk Naval Shipyard beginning with removal of the starboard deck - edge elevator which was stuck in place . It had to be cut from the ship while being supported by shipyard ' s hammerhead crane . The carrier occupied drydock number 8 from 21 September 1967 until 10 February 1968 , displacing USS John King ( DDG - 3 ) , an oil tanker , and a mine sweeper that were occupying the drydock . During the post - fire refit , the ship ' s four aft 5 " / 54 caliber Mark 42 gun s were removed . The forward four guns were removed prior to 1962 . From 8 – 15 April 1968 , Captain Robert B . Baldwin sailed the ship down the Elizabeth River and out into the waters off the Virginia capes for her post - repair trials , the ship ' s first time at sea in 207 days . While accomplishing trials the ship also recorded her first arrested landing since the fire when Commander Robert E . Ferguson , Commander , CVW - 17 , landed on board . Lessons learned . Even today the navy commonly refers to the fire aboard " Forrestal " , and the lessons learned , when teaching damage control and ammunition safety . The navy circulated the lessons which the men of " Forrestal " re - learned at such cost throughout the fleet , and the flight deck film of the flight operations , subsequently entitled Learn Or Burn , became mandatory viewing for fire fighting trainees for years . All new navy recruits are required to view a training video titled " Trial by Fire : A Carrier Fights for Life " , produced from footage of the fire and damage control efforts , both successful and unsuccessful . On the one hand there were damage control teams spraying fire fighting foam on the deck to contain the flames , which was the correct procedure , while on the other hand crewmen on the other side of the deck sprayed seawater , washing away the foam and worsening the situation by washing burning fuel through the hole in the flight deck into the decks below ; burning fuel is not easily extinguished and can in fact be spread by water . Due to the first bomb blast which killed nearly all of the specially trained firefighters on the ship , the remaining crew , who had no formal firefighting training , were forced to improvise . In response , a " wash down " system was incorporated into all carriers , which floods the flight deck with foam or water . Many other fire safety improvements stemmed from this incident . The Farrier Fire Fighting School Learning Site in Norfolk is named for Chief Aviation Boatswain ' s Mate Gerald W . Farrier , the sailor who died in the initial explosion in an attempt to extinguish the fire with a single PKP extinguisher . Eighteen crewmen were buried at Arlington National Cemetery . Names of the dead are also listed on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial . The incident was featured on an episode of Discovery Channel ' s " Destroyed In Seconds " . Investigation . Although investigators could not identify the exact chain of events behind the carnage , they revealed potential maintenance issues including concerns in circuitry ( stray voltage ) associated with LAU - 10 rocket launchers and Zunis , as well as the age of the " fat bombs " loaded for the strike , shards from one of which dated it originally to the Korean War in 1953 . Safety regulations should have prevented the Zuni rocket from firing . A triple ejector rack ( TER ) electrical safety pin prevented any electrical signal from reaching the rockets but it was known that high winds could sometimes catch the attached tags and blow them free . The backup was the “ pigtail ” connection of the electrical wiring to the rockets pod . Regulations required they be connected only when the aircraft was attached to the catapult ready to launch . The navy investigation found that four weeks before the fire , " Forrestal " s Weapons Coordination Board had a meeting to discuss the possible problem of a faulty pigtail delaying a mission while the aircraft was removed from the launcher . The board ruled that in the future the crew could ignore protocol and connect the pigtails while the aircraft were still queued . Though never made official , the crew immediately acted on the ruling . The inquiry found that the TER pin was likely blown free while the pigtail was connected and that the missile fired due to a power surge when the pilot transferred his systems from external to internal power . This incident also led the U . S . Navy to implement safety reviews for weapons systems going on board ships ( whether for use or for shipping ) . Today , this evaluation still exists as the Weapon System Explosives Safety Review Board .