Massive retaliation Massive retaliation , also known as a massive response or massive deterrence , is a military doctrine and nuclear strategy in which a state commits itself to retaliate in much greater force in the event of an attack . Strategy . In the event of an attack from an aggressor , a state would massively retaliate by using a force disproportionate to the size of the attack . The aim of massive retaliation is to deter an adversary from initially attacking . For such a strategy to work , it must be made public knowledge to all possible aggressors . The adversary also must believe that the state announcing the policy has the ability to maintain second - strike capability in the event of an attack . It must also believe that the defending state is willing to go through with the deterrent threat , which would likely involve the use of nuclear weapon s on a massive scale . Massive retaliation works on the same principles as mutually assured destruction , with the important caveat that even a minor conventional attack on a nuclear state could conceivably result in all - out nuclear retaliation . History . In August 1945 , the United States ended World War II with the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan . Four years later , on August 9 , 1949 , the Soviet Union developed its own nuclear weapons . At the time , both sides lacked the means to effectively use nuclear devices against each other . Eventually with nuclear triad s being established , both countries were quickly increasing their ability to deliver nuclear weapons into the interior of the opposing country . The term " massive retaliation " was coined by Eisenhower administration Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in a speech on January 12 , 1954 . Dulles stated : Dulles also said that the U . S . would respond to military provocation " at places and with means of our own choosing . " This speech and quotes appear to form the basis for the term massive retaliation , which would back up any conventional defense against conventional attacks with a possible massive retaliatory attack involving nuclear weapons . The doctrine of massive retaliation was based on the West ' s increasing fear at the perceived imbalance of power in conventional forces , a corresponding inability to defend itself or prevail in conventional conflicts . By relying on a large nuclear arsenal for deterrence , President Eisenhower believed that conventional forces could be reduced while still maintaining military prestige and power and the capability to defend the western bloc . Upon a conventional attack on Berlin , for instance , the United States would undertake a massive retaliation on the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons . The massive response doctrine was thus an extension of mutually assured destruction to conventional attacks , conceivably deterring the Soviet Union from attacking any part of the United States ' sphere of influence even with conventional weapons . Effects . In theory , as the U . S . S . R . had no desire to provoke an all - out nuclear attack , the policy of massive response likely deterred any ambitions it would have had on Western Europe . Although the United States and NATO bloc would be hard - pressed in a conventional conflict with the Warsaw Pact forces if a conventional war were to occur , the massive response doctrine prevented the Soviets from advancing for fear that a nuclear attack would have been made upon the Soviet Union in response to a conventional attack . It can be argued , however , that aside from raising tensions in an already strained relationship with the Soviet bloc , massive retaliation had few practical effects . A threat of massive retaliation is hard to make credible , and is inflexible in response to foreign policy issues . Everyday challenges of foreign policy could not be dealt with using a massive nuclear strike . In fact , the Soviet Union took many minor military actions that would have necessitated the use of nuclear weapons under a strict reading of the massive retaliation doctrine . A massive retaliation doctrine , as with any nuclear strategy based on the principle of mutually assured destruction and as an extension the second - strike capability needed to form a retaliatory attack , encourages the opponent to perform a massive counterforce first strike . This , if successful , would cripple the defending state ' s retaliatory capacity and render a massive retaliation strategy useless . Also , if both sides of a conflict adopt the same stance of massive response , it may result in unlimited escalation ( a " nuclear spasm " ) , each believing that the other will back down after the first round of retaliation . Both problems are not unique to massive retaliation , but to nuclear deterrence as a whole . Policy shift . President John F . Kennedy abandoned the policy of massive retaliation during the Cuban Missile Crisis in favor of flexible response . Under the Kennedy Administration , the U . S . adopted a more flexible policy in an attempt to avert nuclear war if the Soviets did not cooperate with American demands . If the United States ' only announced military reaction to any Soviet incursion ( no matter how small ) were a massive nuclear strike , and the U . S . didn ' t follow through , then the Soviets would assume that the United States would never attack . This would have made the Soviet Union far more bold in its military ventures against U . S . allies and would probably have resulted in a full - scale nuclear war . By having other , more flexible policies to deal with aggressive Soviet actions , the U . S . could opt out of a nuclear strike and take less damaging actions to rectify the problem without losing face in the international community .