Defense of Schwedt Bridgehead The defense of the Schwedt bridgehead was a German 3rd Panzer Army operation on the Eastern Front during the final months of World War II . German forces , commanded by Otto Skorzeny , were ordered to prepare to conduct a counter - offensive . However they were forced to hold a bridgehead against expected numerically superior forces of the Soviet 2nd Belorussian Front ( Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky ) for 31 days . Their position was largely ignored during the Red Army ' s Cottbus - Potsdam Offensive Operation which breached German defences at Gartz to the north of Schwedt . This was unexpected because it required the Red Army to cross the " Randowbruch " Swamp that lay between the Oder and Randow rivers . Background . The Germans feared that the advancing Red Army would cross the frozen Oder at Schwedt , about 60 miles north - east of Berlin . The Commander - in - chief of Army Group Vistula , Heinrich Himmler , was planning a counter - offensive from Schwedt . On January 30 , 1945 he ordered " SS - Standartenführer " Otto Skorzeny to prepare for the offensive . Preparations . The rapid advance of the Red Army meant that when Skorzeny set up his command post on the right bank of the Oder in Niederkrönig ( some three kilometers south - east of Schwedt ) , rather than preparing for a counter - offensive , he was forced to order that the first week be spent by troops of the newly created 11th Army preparing fortified positions while others were concentrated for the offensive . The position was prepared according to typical Wehrmacht doctrine some 20 km forward of the river , and strengthened with machine gun nests and reinforced trenches . Despite ostensibly preparing for an offensive , the 3rd Panzer Army troops , including the X SS Corps , were short of supplies and weapons , lacking heavy machine guns and artillery . Makeshift artillery was produced by mounting anti - aircraft guns on trucks . It proved useful in harassing the Red Army ' s 61st Army by giving them the impression that the Germans had large artillery units . After the ice on the Oder was blown up by pioneers to make crossing more difficult for the advancing Red Army tanks , a similar strategy was employed using guns mounted on river barge s . Skorzeny later credited this use of mobile artillery with gaining enough time to sufficiently fortify the bridgehead . The initial troops began to arrive early in February from the Courland Pocket , they included the 4th Panzer Division , the 32nd and 227th Infantry divisions , elements of the XVI SS Corps , and other SS units . Battle at the bridgehead . The first encounter battles were between the screening German infantry , and the 2nd Guards Tank Army on 28 January , which " was pouring now like a torrent north of [ the ] Notec River towards Küstrin " , when elements of the 9th Guards Tank Corps probed the positions of " Kampfgruppe Voigt " ( " Generalmajor " Adolf Voigt ) east of Pyritz and 18 km east of Schwedt . As the 2nd Guards Tank Army turned towards Küstrin , the encounters between patrols from the German 56th Jäger Regiment ( CI Army Corps ) and the Red Army ' s 89th Rifle Corps on February 1 intensified . As of February 5 the number of Red and Polish Armies ' forces had grown so much that German probes behind enemy lines were no longer possible . Once the 2nd Belorussian Front troops had captured the railway in Bad Schönfliess , they received a steady flow of reinforcements by train . However , unbeknown to Skorzeny , the Red Army reinforcements were those belonging to the 61st Army and the 1st Polish Army of the 1st Belorussian Front ' s northern flank . They had orders to bypass Schwedt and attack in the direction of Eberswalde . They also masked the movement of the 2nd Belorussian Front ' s 49th Army which would attack north of Schwedt . Extensive deception operations , and the rapid tempo of advance meant that the German command was largely unaware of the switch in forces , or the true direction of the impending assaults . For much of the time they were under the impression they were facing a major armored thrust while the 2nd Guards Tank Army was replaced in line by the 5th Shock Army , including the preparation of 136 T - 34 mock - ups . These deceptive measures were hampered by the previous deception conducted by Zhukov in the final stage of the Vistula - Oder Strategic Offensive Operation . After fighting to the north of their position , the 9th Army , which had replaced the 3rd Panzer Army , had to fall back from its forward defenses and on February 7 the evacuation of all villages outside the bridgehead began . Two Red Army battalions supported by T - 34 tanks conducted a daily reconnaissance in force as this evacuation took place . On March 3 9th German Army forces abandoned the Schwedt bridgehead , having fruitlessly awaited the orders for a counter - offensive and not having witnessed the expected Soviet attack on their positions for over a month , had assumed new positions on the western banks of the Oder . Aftermath . The Soviets captured Schwedt on 26 April after German troops had withdrawn to avoid encirclement following the commencement of the Cottbus - Potsdam Offensive Operation on the 19 April ; by then the city was severely damaged . The commander of the " XI SS Panzer " Corps later stated that there was no strategic purpose in the defense of the bridgehead , but that it served a tactical defensive role and misled the advancing Soviet armies into believing that the Germans were preparing a counter - offensive . 9th Army order of battle ( 15 April ) . The order of battle was largely the same as that of the forces being assembled for the expected offensive although the Army subordinations were changed several times . They come from " Zhukov at the Oder : The Decisive Battle " for Berlin by Tony Le Tissier .