First Battle of Mount Hermon The First Battle of Mount Hermon was fought at the outset of the Yom Kippur War between the Syrian Army and the Israel Defense Forces ( IDF ) . On Yom Kippur , October 6 , 1973 , Syrian commandos attacked and captured the IDF outpost on Mount Hermon . Two days later , the Syrians repelled an Israeli counterattack in the Second Battle of Mount Hermon . It was eventually recaptured by Israel on October 21 in the Third battle . Background . At a height of about 6 , 600 feet , Mount Hermon has a commanding view of the Galilee . After Israel ' s capture of it in the Six - Day War , it was used as a radar outpost , housing some of the IDF ' s most sensitive and secret electronic equipment . Israel also constructed an approach road and a ski lift . The troops manning the Hermon outpost could view the entire Syrian plain bordering on the Purple Line , there were observation posts on the outpost itself and at the upper level of the ski lift . The outpost was constructed with much help from the Druze living in the Golan . In April 1970 , Colonel Hikmat Shahabi , chief of Syrian Military Intelligence , sent a letter with Sergeant - Major Nozi tewfik Abu Saleh , a Syrian Druze , to Kemal Kanj , a Golan Heights Druze leader and former member of the Syrian parliament whose brother was a general in the Syrian Army . Saleh , who was also related to Kanj , crossed the border on foot and delivered the letter , which asked Kanj to provide details regarding Israeli positions . Kanj agreed and carried out his mission . He was caught by the Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate ( AMAN ) in May 1971 . He was pardoned in June 1973 . The Hermon outpost was considered strategically important for several reasons , such as : gathering early warning information , real - time Intelligence collection , conducting electronic warfare ( EW ) against ground or air attack , artillery spotting on the Damascus Plain , using the Hermon ridge and its western slopes for a strategic flanking move toward Syria , conducting operations in Syria and Lebanon and commanding Israel ' s main water sources . The outpost was isolated in its sector with only a narrow access road connecting it to the Golan Heights and Har Dov . It was made up of three levels : an underground section of bunkers for quarters , ammunition , food and water , ( which were connected by tunnels to the guard and observation posts ) and two above - ground storeys which contained the work rooms , laboratories , infirmary , mess , generators , and observation and guard posts . When the war broke out , the outpost was still under construction and fighting positions , communication trenches and a command position were not yet built . The outpost was situated in the 13th Battalion ' s sector , but was commanded by Lieutenant Gadi Zidover from the 820th regional brigade , whose operational subordination was not properly classified . On Yom Kippur there were sixty soldiers in the outpost : Thirteen of them were 13th Battalion infantrymen , the rest were men from support units , artillerymen , non - commissioned officers from the Israeli Northern Command ( NC ) and regional brigade Intelligence , and maintenance soldiers from the 820th Brigade . Some of the officers and soldiers had only arrived between October 4 and October 6 with just their personal weapons , others were unarmed . Most of them were not familiar with the layout of the outpost or with the sector in general . In the days before the war , the artillery forward observation officer reported a growth in the number of Syrian artillery batteries and other forces . A section of troops were assigned to defend it . On Yom Kippur , October 6 , 1973 , fifty - five men were in the outpost , including the defense section from the Golani Brigade , men from the Israeli Air Force and intelligence personnel manning the electronic equipment . NC estimated that the Hermon was not a major axis of advance , and would therefore not be subject to a major attack , only routine raids . The fortifications were built to withstand artillery fire and air bombardments , but the trench system was incomplete . A week before the war , an antiaircraft battery was moved down to the Golan . Prelude . On Friday , October 5 , the outpost reported a vast concentration of Syrian forces on the plain below . The Israeli soldiers were ordered to be on the alert , they shut themselves in the main bunker . The next morning , the observation posts were manned as usual and routine reconnaissance along the approach routes took place . An alert was ordered , but for some reason the Hermon outpost was not reinforced by the required fourteen - man infantry section . The security routine was maintained and included a foot patrol to secure the access road from the outpost to the lower level of the ski lift . It was conducted by the Golani troops and commanded by the platoon commander , Second - Lieutenant Hagai Funk . Only two infantrymen were left to guard the outpost . After the patrol , the infantrymen returned to the outpost , except for three men who took up positions in an under - construction observation post on a hill north of the upper ski lift . One observation point and two guard positions were manned in the outpost itself . Three watches were deployed at dawn between Har Dov and the lower ski lift , manned by members of the same company , but were subordinated throughout the day to the 902nd Nahal Battalion in Har Dov . Shortly before 14 : 00 , an EW blocking company from the 374th Communications unit , under the command of Lieutenant Moshe Sapir , arrived at the " tank curve " and located its equipment according to NC command . Due to coordination problems , its arrival was unknown to the outpost commander and the Hermon company commander at the employment camp in Masada . The Syrians had put the Hermon at the top of their target list . The 82nd Paratroop Battalion , the elite combat unit of the Syrian army , under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Rifai al - Joju , was given its final briefing on the morning of the attack . Al - Joju ' s company was to be landed by helicopter half a mile from the Israeli structure and take - up positions covering the Israeli outpost and the road leading toward it from the Golan . The rest of the battalion , about 200 men , were to set out on foot from the Syrian Hermon . This force was to attack the outpost while al - Joju ' s troops would provide them with covering fire . The plan used data collected through Kanj . Battle . Syrian attack . At around 13 : 00 , four Soviet - built MI - 8 helicopters lifted off near Damascus and flew west into Lebanon , where they circled until forty - five minutes into the Syrian shelling of the Golan . They then headed southeast toward the Israeli outpost . The Israelis detected the helicopters at about 15 : 00 , when the team at the upper ski lift reported the sighting and fired at them until they flew out of sight . At 13 : 45 , the artillery officer , along with other officers , noticed that the Syrian artillery units in the plain below were taking the camouflage nets from their guns . The Syrians began shelling the outpost at 14 : 00 . All the Israeli soldiers in the outpost concentrated in the central hall of the bunker . The platoon officer and the mortar sergeant climbed up to the observation point but had to come back down due to the heavy shelling . An observation officer , a technical assistant and a driver from the 334th Artillery Battalion left the outpost in a half - track for their planned position in the " tank curve " to help pinpoint the artillery in the northern Golan . Six Syrian MiG - 17 aircraft attacked the outpost . Three of the helicopters arrived from the west . Two of them landed about thirty paratroopers on Hill 2072 , south of the lower ski lift . Most of the Syrian force deployed above the curve south of the upper ski lift to block access to the outpost . A few of them advanced toward the outpost to provide cover . A third helicopter with sixteen paratroopers , who were supposed to block the " tank curve " , crashed ( a rotor - blade hit the slope ) . Only three paratroopers survived and joined their comrades at the upper ski lift . They opened fire on the Israeli half - track , which kept driving . The company commander of the EW unit and his driver , who were riding in a jeep on their way to the outpost , saw the Syrians landing and turned back to their unit at the " tank curve " , under fire . Three Golani soldiers at the upper ski lift observation post saw the Syrian landing but failed to fire at them due to a machine gun malfunction . After a few minutes , they abandoned their post , which was equipped with a radio , and went down to the lower ski lift to join a platoon positioned there without informing the outpost of the Syrian landing . While Joju ' s troops were taking - up positions , the rest of the 82nd Battalion , two companies under the command of Captains Jassam al Salah and Mahmoud Ma ' aleh , advanced on foot from the Syrian Hermon position to the Israeli outpost . They were organized in eight platoon - sized forces . At around 15 : 15 , when the first two forces arrived near the outpost , Syrian artillery opened fire and the covering force directed small - arms fire at the outpost . Meanwhile , the fourth helicopter approached and landed sixteen more commandos . Some of them joined the charge at the outpost while the rest formed a second covering force . When the shelling subsided small - arms fire could be heard from the central hall , Zidover , Funk and four other Golani soldiers came out to the fighting platform through the upper western opening . They saw dozens of Syrian soldiers advancing on the road toward the outpost gate and a covering force lying on the embankment outside the outpost fence . Of the three machine guns , two were out of action after the shelling . Lacking fighting positions , the outpost commander and the infantrymen opened fire with a machine gun and their personal weapons . The Syrians were surprised by the fire and halted . The machine gunner was killed and the outpost sergeant took the weapon over . The outpost commander realized that ammunition was low and went down to the central hall to contact the 820th Brigade commander , Colonel Zvi Barazani . He explained the situation and asked him to " fire on our outposts " . Barazani approved and the 334th Battalion commander , Lieutenant - Colonel Aryeh Schwartz , accepted the mission . The Golani soldiers kept firing at the Syrians and prevented them from entering the outpost until approximately 15 : 45 , when the Israeli shelling began . At this point Barazani ordered the outpost commander to shut his men in the outpost until the shelling was over and break out only on his command . Due to a misunderstanding , the soldiers did not leave the outpost and continued defending its openings from within . The Syrians charged into the outpost courtyard and some managed to penetrate the upper western opening into the top storey , throwing fragmentation and stun grenades and firing into the work rooms . Their entrance was hesitant and slow , and included calls in Hebrew and Arabic to the Israeli soldiers to surrender . Some went down the staircase leading to the central hall and threw grenades into it . They reached the hall but did not enter the rooms or the connecting tunnels . They may have used a smoke generator operated by a small engine . The hall filled with smoke dust and the sounds of explosions , which induceded panic among the Israeli non - combatant soldiers . Many of them were choking and believed the Syrians were using gas . The room was full of dust , they had to cover their noses with flannelette soaked in urine to breathe . They tried to take cover in the tunnels , some were in a state of shock and remained frozen in the rooms near the central hall . Between 16 : 00 and 17 : 00 , some of the soldiers returned fire from various corners of the central hall in the direction of the staircase and prevented the Syrians from coming down . The outpost commander tried to concentrate the men from the different tunnels and rooms into a single tunnel . At this point , the outpost lost its connection with the outside world . At about 17 : 30 , the outpost commander and several infantry soldiers tried to break out through one of the tunnels in order to get out and reach the upper ski lift , but they encountered some Syrians and had to return . Most of the men were now concentrated in the same tunnel , except for the doctor and two Golani soldiers , one of whom was dead and the other wounded . Five others hid in two bunkers in the bottom storey . Since some of the men did not know their way around the outpost , they split - up in the dark into two groups , which remained close to each other . At around 19 : 00 , the Syrians stopped clearing the interior of the Israeli position and it became relatively quiet . Wadi Si ' on . At around 16 : 50 , the men in the " Hedva " observation post , located near the Lebanese village of Shebaa , were ordered to move back to Masada through the lower ski lift with their armored personnel carrier ( APC ) . At about 17 : 00 , the APC , along with a 81mm mortar half - track approached Wadi Si ' on , ( where the " Tali " observation point was located ) ; both positions came under heavy fire from the ridge above them . The APC was hit by an RPG and stopped in the middle of the road . Three Israeli soldiers were killed instantly , the rest were wounded and took cover . The " Tali " commander , exposed in his half - track , was hit by a bullet in the back , but the driver started the vehicle and sped off toward the lower ski lift . The attacking Syrians were probably the blocking force from the 87th Reconnaissance Battalion , which was supposed to take - up positions in the " tank curve " that night , but strayed into the area above the road from the lower ski lift and Har Dov . The Syrians maintained a constant fire and left without coming down to the road . At nightfall , at around 17 : 35 , after the Syrians left , the " Hedva " observation post reported the encounter to the 902nd Battalion company headquarters at Har Dov and asked for assistance . Company headquarters reported to the 820th Brigade headquarters at Nafakh . Putting together a rescue force which included a doctor , a paramedic and five infantrymen , took an hour . The force , advancing in two APCs , moved slowly and carefully with its lights off . At about 18 : 30 , it arrived at the location , treated the wounded and evacuated them . From that moment until the end of the war , no IDF troops entered the territory between Har Dov and the Hermon mountainside . At around 19 : 30 , Barazani ordered the commander of the Hermon Company , Lieutenant Yiftah Sagiv , to head from Masada to the lower ski lift with an APC and a tank platoon from the attached 71st Battalion , to check on the outpost and evacuate the wounded that had arrived in the afternoon . The force reached the lower ski lift at around 21 : 00 . Saqiv saw that everything was in order and reported that fact to the battalion commander . Barazani ordered him to leave the tank platoon to defend the place . The company commander left on his own accord to evacuate the wounded to Nafakh . When he arrived near midnight , he reported to the NC chief and the others about the incidents at the Hermon . At around 21 : 00 , the outpost commander decided to try to escape to the lower ski lift . Due to a lack of communication with the other men , only he , five officers and eleven soldiers got out . They crossed a minefield , went down the Bul ' an valley and headed west toward the upper ski lift . Just before 23 : 00 , as they began to head down a rocky slope from the upper ski lift , the Syrian blocking force saw them and opened fire . The platoon commander and five of his men charged down the hill . Three were killed , including the platoon commander , two were taken prisoner the next day . Other officers and soldiers took cover and returned fire . The observation officer was badly wounded and later died . The other eleven , some of whom were wounded , escaped the encounter and scattered . The escapees ran down the road and encountered three Israeli tanks heading their way . One of the tanks fired at them before they could identify themselves . During the night and the next day , ten of them made their way back to the Israeli lines . A soldier from the Air Force unit in the outpost accidentally entered a 183rd Syrian Battalion position , deployed on high point 1614 . He was caught and executed the next day . Counterattack . At 18 : 07 , NC accepted the suggestion raised by the Golani Brigade commander , Colonel Amir Drori , to try to reach the outpost . While the eleven Israeli soldiers were trying to make their escape , a Golani force – made up of Drori ' s command half - track , the 51st Battalion command post with companies A and B in fifteen more half - tracks , the 69th Reconnaissance Company in eight other half - tracks and the brigade ' s battalion collecting station in an ambulance – was on its way to the Hermon . The force left Rosh Pina at 07 : 01 and reached Neve Ativ at 04 : 01 , but NC ordered Drori to stop , fearing a Syrian breakthrough in the Hadar - Masada sector and ordered him to deploy for a block around bunkers 103 , 104 and 105 , with the 13th Battalion subordinated to the brigade . Unaware of the situation throughout the Golan , Drori objected , assuming it was best to strike as early as possible and deny the Syrians time to organize . He was denied , and the force started moving back via the Sa ' ar Bridge toward Masada . At 04 : 21 , Drori was ordered to organize for a block , and at 05 : 19 his troops were deployed in their sector . While the reduced 51st Battalion and the 69th Company were deployed around Masada at around 07 : 00 , a convoy came down from the lower ski lift , having been ordered to do so by the 13th Battalion commander , Lieutenant - Colonel Ze ' ev Oren . It included a tank platoon from the 71st Battalion , the infantry platoon from the 13th Battalion manning the lower ski lift in two BTR - 152 APCs , the observation officer ' s half - track and the communications company from the 374th unit in its three vehicles . It also included the five survivors from the outpost . The three tanks remained attached to the Golani Brigade . Thirty - six soldiers were still trapped in the outpost . Two Israeli soldiers wounded in the encounter on the ridge were captured by the Syrians . Six of the soldiers who escaped made their way down the mountain , along with three observation soldiers who escaped from the upper ski lift . Capture . At around 06 : 00 on October 7 , the two wounded soldiers that were captured were questioned and taken to a ravine outside the outpost . At around 09 : 00 , the Israeli soldiers in the northeastern tunnels heard shots in the courtyard . The Syrians may have fired Israeli weapons captured at the upper ski lift , and some of the Israeli soldiers thought it was their rescuers firing . Four soldiers hiding in the communication bunker heard the shots and came out through a position blown up by the Syrians that morning . Noticing soldiers with olive - colored uniforms , Uzi s and an IDF helmet , a radio technician came out and yelled " Golani , Golani , don ' t shoot ! " , before his eyes had adapted to the sunlight when he noticed they were Syrians . He and the others ran back in and the Syrians chased them , throwing smoke grenades . Not knowing where the other Israelis were hiding , the Syrians called on them to surrender through the generator gratings and pointed flashlights inside , saying that whoever did not come out would be killed . The Israelis contemplated surrender , but the Golani platoon sergeant refused , opting instead to try to break out through the northeastern position . At around 11 : 00 , he led them through the tunnel connecting the generators to the position . He came out onto the roof first , followed by a Golani soldier , an AMAN soldier and a radio operator . They were spotted on the roof , near the main entrance of the anti - aircraft hill north of the outpost . Perhaps as a response to the Syrian calls to surrender , the sergeant opened fire and threw two grenades at the Syrians . The three Israelis were killed soon after . The others who got out lay in a trench , the Syrians firing at them but missing . When they concluded they had no chance , they surrendered . The radio technician , who waved a piece of white cloth , was killed . The Syrians held their fire , ordered the Israelis down to the courtyard and told them to lay down their weapons and helmets . At about 11 : 30 , two Syrians entered the doctor ' s room on the top storey and captured him along with two Golani soldiers who were with him , one of them badly wounded . In the late afternoon , the twenty - six captured Israelis were disarmed and their hands tied with telephone wire ; they were then led , tied in pairs , toward the Syrian outpost . They were escorted by about thirty Syrian soldiers from the 82nd Battalion . A badly wounded Golani soldier who fell behind was killed , his body left behind . From the Syrian outpost , the prisoners were transferred by trucks to a special forces training base at Qabun , near Damascus , where they stayed for four days . Five Israeli soldiers were left in the outpost : a quartermaster hiding in the emergency bunker and four soldiers hiding in the war room bunker . They found some rations in the nearby maintenance bunker and a plastic water tank , which sustained them until October 12 . Using a transistor radio , they heard that the kibbutzim members in the Golan had returned to their homes and so decided to keep hiding until the IDF recaptured the outpost . In the first three days , the Syrians raked the outpost with gunfire and grenades each morning and each night . When the outpost became relatively quiet , the Israelis tried on more than one occasion to get out , but returned after hearing the Syrian guards in the central hall . At around 11 : 00 on Friday , October 12 , Syrian soldiers entered the tunnels to look for food and caught the Israelis , including the quartermaster , by accident . The prisoners were transferred through the Syrian outpost to Qabun . On October 15 , all thirty - one prisoners were taken to an olive grove and photographed by journalists ; they were transferred to a prison the next day . Aftermath . In the battles fought in the outpost itself , near the upper ski lift and in Wadi Si ' on , sixteen Israelis were killed and twelve wounded . Seven were killed and four wounded in the outpost , four were killed and three wounded near the upper ski lift , three were killed and four wounded in the Si ' on encounter . Two were executed by the Syrians after their capture , thirty - one were taken prisoner . Syrian casualties were fifteen killed ( twelve commandos and three helicopter crewmen ) and three officers wounded trying to penetrate the outpost . The Syrians captured the outpost , the lower ski lift and the entire Hermon mountainside . Soviet advisers arrived at the outpost a few days later to dismantle the electronic equipment , they were pleased to find most of it intact . Syrian interrogators were also able to extract valuable information from the captured Israelis . The electronic equipment was sent to the Soviet Union for analysis , the documents captured compromised Israeli military codes . With the fall of the Hermon , AMAN lost its " eyes on the Golan " , the loss of the antennas on the listening posts damaged its ability to collect information . Author Abraham Rabinovich wrote that " the fall of the Hermon was for Israel the single most humiliating episode of the Yom Kippur War " . Author Walter J . Boyne commented that this was the first time in Israel ' s history that a commander had abandoned a position while his troops were still fighting . Funk was believed by many Israelis to be at fault for the defeat , as summarized by one soldier : " The officers ran away " . The Israelis made a failed attempt to recapture the Hermon on October 8 , but finally succeeded on October 21 , in Operation Dessert .