Clandestine cell system A clandestine cell structure is a method for organizing a group of people in such a way that it can more effectively resist penetration by an opposing organization . Depending on the group ' s philosophy , its operational area , the communications technologies available , and the nature of the mission , it can range from a strict hierarchy to an extremely distributed organization . It is also a method used by criminal organizations , undercover operatives , and unconventional warfare ( UW ) led by special forces . Historically , clandestine organizations have avoided electronic communications , because signals intelligence is a strength of conventional militaries and counterintelligence organizations . In the context of tradecraft , covert and clandestine are not synonymous . The adversary is aware that a covert activity is happening , but does not know who is doing it , and certainly not their sponsorship . Clandestine activities , however , if successful , are completely unknown to the adversary , and their function , such as espionage , would be neutralized if there was any awareness of the activity . Saying a " covert cell structure " is tantamount to tautology , because the point of the cell structure is that its details are completely hidden from the opposition . A sleeper cell refers to a cell , or isolated grouping of sleeper agent s that lies dormant until it receives orders or decides to act . History . Provisional Irish Republican Army . As opposed to the French Resistance , the modern Provisional Irish Republican Army ( PIRA ) has a history going back to Irish revolutionary forces in the early 20th century , but has little external control . Its doctrine and organization have changed over time , given factors such as the independence of 26 of Ireland ' s 32 counties , the continued British control of Northern Ireland and the simple passage of time and changes in contemporary thinking and technology . Officially , the PIRA is hierarchical , but , especially as British security forces became more effective , changed to a semiautonomous model for its operational and certain of its support cells ( e . g . , transportation , intelligence , cover and security ) . Its leadership sees itself as guiding and consensus - building . The lowest - level cells , typically of 2 - 5 people , tend to be built by people with an existing personal relationship . British counterinsurgents could fairly easily understand the command structure , but not the workings of the operational cells . The IRA has an extensive network of inactive or sleeper cells , so new " ad hoc " organizations may appear for any specific operation . World War II French Resistance . In World War II , Operation Jedburgh teams parachuted into occupied France to lead unconventional warfare units . They would be composed of two officers , one American or British , and the other French , the latter preferably from the area into which they landed . The third member of the team was a radio operator . Especially through the French member , they would contact trusted individuals in the area of operation , and ask them to recruit a team of trusted subordinates ( i . e . , a subcell ) . If the team mission were sabotage , reconnaissance , or espionage , there was no need to meet in large units . If the team was to carry out direct action , often an unwise mission unless an appreciable number of the locals had military experience , it would be necessary to assemble into units for combat . Even then , the hideouts of the leadership were known only to subcell leaders . The legitimacy of the Jedburgh team came from its known affiliation with Allied powers , and it was a structure more appropriate for UW than for truly clandestine operations . National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam . Also known as the Viet Cong , this organization grew from earlier anticolonial groups fighting the French , as well as anti - Japanese guerillas during World War II . Its command , control , and communication techniques derived from the experiences of these earlier insurgent groups . The group had extensive support from North Vietnam , and , indirectly , from the Soviet Union . It had parallel political and military structures , often overlapping . See Viet Cong and PAVN strategy and tactics . The lowest level consisted of three - person cells who operated quite closely , and engaging in the sort of self - criticism common , as a bonding method , to Communist organizations . Parallel organizations . The NLF and PIRA , as well as other movements , have chosen to have parallel political and military organizations . In the case of the NLF , other than some individuals with sanctuary in North Vietnam , the political organization could not be overt during the Vietnam War . After the war ended , surviving NLF officials held high office . In the case of the PIRA , its political wing , Sinn Féin , became increasingly overt , and then a full participant in politics . Hamas and Hezbollah also have variants of overt political / social service and covert military wings . The overt political - covert military split avoided the inflexibility of a completely secret organization . Once an active insurgency began , the secrecy could limited freedom of action , distort information about goals and ideals , and restrict communication within the insurgency . In a split organization the public issues can be addressed overtly , while military actions were kept covert and intelligence functions stay clandestine . External support . Many cell systems still receive , with due attention to security , support from the outside . This can range from leaders , trainers and supplies ( e . g . , the Jedburgh assistance to the French Resistance ) , or a safe haven for overt activities ( e . g . , NLF spokesmen in Hanoi ) . External support need not be overt . Certain Shi ' a groups in Iraq , for example , do receive assistance from Iran , but this is not a public position of the government of Iran , and may even be limited to factions of that government . Early US support to the Afghan Northern Alliance against the Taliban used clandestine operators from both the CIA and United States Army Special Forces . As the latter conflict escalated , the US participation became overt . Note that both unconventional warfare ( UW ) ( i . e . , guerilla operations ) and foreign internal defense ( FID ) ( i . e . , counterinsurgency ) may be covert and use cellular organization . In a covert FID mission , only selected host nation ( HN ) leaders are aware of the foreign support organization . Under Operation White Star , US personnel gave covert FID assistance to the Royal Lao Army starting in 1959 , became overt in 1961 , and ceased operations in 1962 . Models of insurgency and associated cell characteristics . While different kinds of insurgency differ in where they place clandestine or covert cells , when certain types of insurgency grow in power , the cell system is deemphasized . Cells still may be used for leadership security , but , if overt violence by organized units becomes significant , cells are less important . In Mao ' s three - stage doctrine , cells are still useful in Phase II to give cover to part - time guerillas , but , as the insurgency creates full - time military units in Phase III , the main units are the focus , not the cells . The Eighth Route Army did not run on a cell model . When considering where cells exist with respect to the existing government , the type of insurgency needs to be considered . One US Army reference was Field Manual 100 - 20 , which has been superseded by FM3 - 07 . Drawing on this work , Nyberg ( a United States Marine Corps officer ) extended the ideas to describe four types of cell system , although his descriptions also encompass types of insurgencies that the cell system supports . At present , there is a new type associated with transnational terrorist insurgencies . Classic models for cell system operations . Different kinds of cell organizations have been used for different purposes . This section focuses on clandestine cells , as would be used for espionage , sabotage , or the organization for unconventional warfare . When unconventional warfare starts using overt units , the cell system tends to be used only for sensitive leadership and intelligence roles . The examples here will use CIA cryptonym s as a naming convention used to identify members of the cell system . Cryptonyms begin with a two - letter country or subject name ( e . g . , AL ) , followed with an arbitrary word . It is considered elegant to have the code merge with the other letters to form a pronounceable word . Operations under official cover . Station BERRY operates , for country B , in target country BE . It has three case officers and several support officers . Espionage operation run by case officers under diplomatic cover , they would have to with the basic recruiting methods described in this article . Case officer BETTY runs the local agents BEN and BEATLE . Case officer BESSIE runs BENSON and BEAGLE . Some recruits , due to the sensitivity of their position or their personalities not being appropriate for cell leadership , might not enter cells but be run as singletons , perhaps by other than the recruiting case officer . Asset BARD is a different sort of highly sensitive singleton , who is a joint asset of the country B , and the country identified by prefix AR . ARNOLD is a case officer from the country AR embassy , who knows only the case officer BERTRAM and the security officer BEST . ARNOLD does not know the station chief of BERRY or any of its other personnel . Other than BELL and BEST , the Station personnel only know BERTRAM as someone authorized to be in the Station , and who is known for his piano playing at embassy parties . He is covered as Cultural Attache , in a country that has very few pianos . Only the personnel involved with BARD know that ARNOLD is other than another friendly diplomat . In contrast , BESSIE and BETTY know one another , and procedures exist for their taking over each other ' s assets in the event one of the two is disabled . Some recruits , however , would be qualified to recruit their own subcell , as BEATLE has done . BESSIE knows the identity of BEATLE - 1 and BEATLE - 2 , since he had them checked by headquarters counterintelligence before they were recruited . Note that a cryptonym does not imply anything about its designee , such as gender . Clandestine presence . The diagram of " initial team presence " shows that two teams , ALAN and ALICE , have successfully entered an area of operation , the country coded AL , but are only aware of a pool of potential recruits , and have not yet actually recruited anyone . They communicate with one another only through headquarters , so compromise of one team will not affect the other . Assume that in team ALAN , ALISTAIR is one of the officers with local contacts , might recruit two cell leaders , ALPINE and ALTITUDE . The other local officer in the team , ALBERT , recruits ALLOVER . When ALPINE recruited two subcell members , they would be referred to as ALPINE - 1 and ALPINE - 2 . ALPINE and ALTITUDE only know how to reach ALISTAIR , but they are aware of at least some of other team members ' identity should ALISTAIR be unavailable , and they would accept a message from ALBERT . Most often , the identity ( and location ) of the radio operator may not be shared . ALPINE and ALTITUDE , however , do not know one another . They do not know any of the members of team ALICE . The legitimacy of the subcell structure came from the recruitment process , originally by the case officer and then by the cell leaders . Sometimes , the cell leader would propose subcell member names to the case officer , so the case officer could have a headquarters name check run before bringing the individual into the subcell . In principle , however , the subcell members would know ALPINE , and sometimes the other members of the ALPINE cell if they needed to work together ; if ALPINE - 1 and ALPINE - 2 had independent assignments , they might not know each other . ALPINE - 1 and ALPINE - 2 certainly would not know ALISTAIR or anyone in the ALTITUDE or ALLOVER cells . As the networks grow , a subcell leader might create his own cell , so ALPINE - 2 might become the leader of the ALIMONY cell . Fault - tolerant cellular structures . Modern communications theory has introduced methods to increase fault tolerance in cell organizations . In the past , if cell members only knew the cell leader , and the leader was neutralized , the cell was cut off from the rest of the organization . Game theory and graph theory have been applied to the study of optimal covert network design ( see Lindelauf , R . H . A . et al . 2009 . The influence of secrecy on the communication structure of covert networks . Social Networks 31 : 126 - 137 ) . If a traditional cell had independent communications with the foreign support organization , headquarters might be able to arrange its reconnection . Another method is to have impersonal communications " side links " between cells , such as a pair of dead drop s , one for Team ALAN to leave " lost contact " messages to be retrieved by Team ALICE , and another dead drop for Team ALICE to leave messages for Team ALAN . These links , to be used only on losing contact , do not guarantee a contact . When a team finds a message in its emergency drop , it might do no more than send an alert message to headquarters . Headquarters might determine , through SIGINT or other sources , that the enemy had captured the leadership and the entire team , and order the other team not to attempt contact . If headquarters can have reasonable confidence that there is a communications failure or partial compromise , it might send a new contact to the survivors . When the cut - off team has electronic communications , such as the Internet , it has a much better chance of eluding surveillance and getting emergency instructions than by using a dead drop that can be under physical surveillance . Non - traditional models , exemplified by al - Qaeda . Due to cultural differences , assuming the " al - Qaeda Training Manual " is authentic , Islamist cell structures may differ from the Western mode . " Al - Qaida ' s minimal core group , only accounting for the leadership , can also be viewed topologically as a ring or chain network , with each leader / node heading their own particular hierarchy . " Such networks function by having their sub - networks provide information and other forms of support ( the ‘ many - to - one ’ model ) , while the core group supplies ‘ truth ’ and decisions / directions ( the ‘ one - to - many ’ model ) . Trust and personal relationships are an essential part of the Al - Qaida network ( a limiting factor , even while it provides enhanced security ) . Even while cell members are trained as ‘ replaceable ’ units , ‘ vetting ’ of members occurs during the invited training period under the observation of the core group . Cells of this structure are built outwards , from an internal leadership core . Superficially , this might be likened to a Western cell structure that emanates from a headquarters , but the Western centrality is bureaucratic , while structures in other non - western cultures builds on close personal relationships , often built over years , perhaps involving family or other in - group linkages . Such in - groups are thus extremely hard to infiltrate ; infiltration has a serious chance only outside the in - group . Still , it may be possible for an in - group to be compromised through COMINT or , in rare cases , by compromising a member . The core group is logically a ring , but is superimposed on an inner hub - and - spoke structure of ideological authority . Each member of the core forms another hub and spoke system ( see infrastructure cells , the spokes leading to infrastructure cells under the supervision of the core group member , and possibly to operational groups which the headquarters support . Note that in this organization , there is a point at which the operational cell becomes autonomous of the core . Members surviving the operation may rejoin at various points . Osama , in this model , has the main responsibility of commanding the organization and being the spokesman on propaganda video and audio messages distributed by the propaganda cell . The other members of the core each command one or more infrastructure cells . While the tight coupling enhances security , it can limit flexibility and the ability to scale the organization . This in - group , while sharing tight cultural and ideological values , is not committed to a bureaucratic process . " Members of the core group are under what could be termed ‘ positive control ’ — long relationships and similar mindsets make ‘ control ’ not so much of an issue , but there are distinct roles , and position ( structural , financial , spiritual in the sense of having the ‘ correct ’ interpretation of Islam ) determines authority , thus making the core group a hierarchy topologically . In the first example of the core , each member knows how to reach two other members , and also knows the member ( s ) he considers his ideological superior . Solid lines show basic communication , dotted red arrows show the first level of ideological respect , and dotted blue arrows show a second level of ideological respect . If Osama , the most respected , died , the core would reconstitute itself . While different members have an individual ideological guide , and these are not the same for all members , the core would reconstitute itself with Richard as most respected . Assume there are no losses , and Osama can be reached directly only by members of the core group . Members of outer cells and support systems might know him only as " the Commander " , or , as in the actual case of al - Qaeda , Osama bin Laden ' s face is recognizable worldwide , but only a very few people know where he is or even how to contact it . Infrastructure cells . Any clandestine or covert service , especially a non - national one , needs a variety of technical and administrative functions . Some of these services include : Other functions include psychological operations , training , and finance . A national intelligence service has a support organization to deal with services such as finance , logistics , facilities ( e . g . , safehouses ) , information technology , communications , training , weapons and explosives , medical services , etc . Transportation alone is a huge function , including the need to buy tickets without drawing suspicion , and , where appropriate , using private vehicles . Finance includes the need to transfer money without coming under the suspicion of financial security organizations . Some of these functions , such as finance , are far harder to operate in remote areas such as the FATA of Pakistan , than in cities with large numbers of official and unofficial financial institutions , and the communications to support them . If the financial office is distant from the remote headquarters , there is a need for couriers , who must be trusted to some extent , although they may not know the contents of their messages , or the actual identity of sender and / or receiver . The couriers , depending on the balance among type and size of message , security , and technology available , may memorize messages , carry audio or video recordings , or hand - carry computer media . " These cells are socially embedded ( less so than the core group , however ) , structurally embedded , functionally embedded ( they are specialized into a domain ) , and knowledge base - specific ( there does not seem to be a great deal of cross - training , or lateral mobility in the organization ) . Such cells are probably subjected to a mixture of positive and negative control ( " do this , do these sorts of things , don ’ t do that " ) . " The leaders of military cells are responsible for training them , and , when an operation is scheduled , selecting the operational commander , giving him the basic objective and arranging whatever support is needed , and then release him from tight control to execute the meeting . Depending on the specific case , the military leaders might have direct , possibly one - way , communications with their cells , or they might have to give Kim the messages to be transmitted , by means that Anton and Hassan have no need to know . Note that Anton does not have a direct connection to Kim . Under normal circumstances , he sacrifices efficiency for security , by passing communications requests through Hassan . The security structure also means that Hassan does not know the members of Anton ' s cells , and Kim may only know ways to communicate with them , but not their identity . Kim operates two systems of cells , one for secure communications and one for propaganda . To send out a propaganda message , Osama must pass it to Kim . If Kim were compromised , the core group might have significant problems with any sort of outside communications . Terrorist networks do not match cleanly to other cell systems that regularly report to a headquarters . The apparent al - Qaeda methodology of letting operational cells decide on their final dates and means of attack exhibit an operational pattern , but not a periodicity that could easily be used for an indications checklist appropriate for a warning center . Such lists depend on seeing a local pattern to give a specific warning . Note that Hassan has two subordinates that have not yet established operational cells . These subordinates can be considered sleepers , but not necessarily with a sleeper cell . Operational cells . For each mission are created one or more operational cells . If the al - Qaeda signature of multiple concurrent attacks is used , there may be an operational cell for each target location . It will depend on the operation if they will need any support cells in the operational area . For example , it may be more secure to have a local cell build bombs , which will be delivered by cells coming from outside the area . " Operational cells are not created , but instead ‘ seeded ’ utilizing individuals spotted or that request assistance ( both groups are ‘ vetted ’ by being trained under the observation of the core group , which dramatically restricts the opportunity for passing off walk - ins under false flag ) . Categorization of operational cells appears to be by capabilities , region , and then task / operation . Operational cells are composed of members whose worldview has been firmly tested — necessary to front - load , because such cells are dispersed back to their own local control ( or negative control — proscribed behavior — with positive control only coming in the form of contact for synchronization or support ) . " If operational cells routinely are " released " " curved dotted lines on link to military cells " to select their final operational parameters , they use a different paradigm than governmental clandestine or covert operations . On a number of cases , US special operations forces had to wait for Presidential authorization to make an attack , or even move to staging areas . Admittedly , a country would have to face the consequences of an inappropriate attack , so it may tend to be overcautious , where a terror network would merely shrug at the world being upset . Assuming that the al - Qaeda operational technique is not to use positive control , their operations may be more random , but also more unpredictable for counterterror forces . If their cells truly need constant control , there are communications links that might be detected by SIGINT , and if their command can be disrupted , the field units could not function . Since there is fairly little downside for terrorists to attack out of synchronization with other activities , the lack of positive control becomes a strength of their approach to cell organization . The operational cells need to have continuous internal communication ; there is a commander , who may be in touch with infrastructure cells or , less likely from a security standpoint with the core group . Al - Qaeda ' s approach , which even differs from that of earlier terrorist organizations , may be very viable for their goals : Indirect support networks . In the above graphic , note the indirect support network controlled by Richard ' s subcell . " While Al - Qaida has elements of the organization designed to support the structure , but such elements are insufficient in meeting the needs of such an organization , and for security reasons there would be redundant and secondary - / tertiary - networks that are unaware of their connection to Al - Qaida . These networks , primarily related to fundraising and financial activities , as well as technology providers , are in a ‘ use ’ relationship with Al - Qaida — managed through cut - outs or individuals that do not inform them of the nature of activities , and that may have a cover pretext sufficient to deflect questions or inquiry . " A possible countermeasure . In 2002 , " U . S . News & World Report " said that American intelligence is beginning to acquire a sufficiently critical mass of intelligence on al - Qaida indicating " Once thought nearly impossible to penetrate , al Qaeda is proving no tougher a target than the KGB or the Mafia - - closed societies that took the U . S . government years to get inside . " We ' re getting names , the different camps they trained at , the hierarchy , the infighting " , says an intelligence official . " It ' s very promising . " The report also said that the collected data has allowed the recruiting of informants . Writing in the U . S . Army journal " Military Review " , David W . Pendall suggested that a " catch - and - release program for suspected operatives might create reluctance or distrust in such suspects and prevent them from further acts or , perhaps more important , create distrust in the cell leaders of these individuals in the future . " The author noted the press release describing Ramzi Binalshib ' s cooperation with the United States " are sure to prevent reentry into a terrorist cell as a trusted member and most likely limits the further trust and assignments of close cell associates still at large . The captor would determine when to name names and when to remain silent . " Indeed , once intelligence learns the name and characteristics of an at - large adversary , as well as some sensitive information that would plausibly be known to him , a news release could be issued to talk about his cooperation . Such a method could not be used too often , but , used carefully , could disturb the critical trust networks . The greatest uncertainty might be associated with throwing doubt onto a key member of an operational cell that has gone autonomous .