Stanislav Petrov Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov ( ; born c . 1939 ) is a retired lieutenant colonel of the Soviet Air Defence Forces . On September 26 , 1983 , he was the duty officer at the command center for the Oko nuclear early - warning system when the system reported that a missile was being launched from the United States . Petrov judged the report to be a false alarm , and his decision is credited with having prevented an erroneous retaliatory nuclear attack on the United States and its NATO allies that could have resulted in large - scale nuclear war . Investigation later confirmed that the satellite warning system had indeed malfunctioned . The incident . There are questions about the part Petrov ' s decision played in preventing nuclear war , because , according to the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation , nuclear retaliation requires that multiple sources confirm an attack . In any case , the incident exposed a serious flaw in the Soviet early warning system . Petrov asserts that he was neither rewarded nor punished for his actions . Had Petrov reported incoming American missiles , his superiors might have launched an assault against the United States , precipitating a corresponding nuclear response from the United States . Petrov declared the system ' s indication a false alarm . Later , it was apparent that he was right : no missiles were approaching and the computer detection system was malfunctioning . It was subsequently determined that the false alarm had been created by a rare alignment of sunlight on high - altitude clouds and the satellites ' Molniya orbits , an error later corrected by cross - referencing a geostationary satellite . Petrov later indicated that the influences on his decision included : that he was informed a U . S . strike would be all - out , so five missiles seemed an illogical start ; that the launch detection system was new and , in his view , not yet wholly trustworthy ; and that ground radar failed to pick up corroborative evidence , even after minutes of delay . However in a 2013 interview , Petrov said at the time he was never sure that the alarm was erroneous . He felt that his civilian training helped him make the right decision . His colleagues were all professional soldiers with purely military training and , following instructions , would have reported a missile strike if they had been on his shift . Petrov underwent intense questioning by his superiors about his judgment . Initially , he was praised for his decision . General Yury Votintsev , then commander of the Soviet Air Defense ' s Missile Defense Units , who was the first to hear Petrov ' s report of the incident ( and the first to reveal it to the public in the 1990s ) , states that Petrov ' s " correct actions " were " duly noted . " Petrov himself states he was initially praised by Votintsev and promised a reward , but recalls that he was also reprimanded for improper filing of paperwork under the pretext that he had not described the incident in the military diary . He received no reward . According to Petrov , this was because the incident and other bugs found in the missile detection system embarrassed his superiors and the influential scientists who were responsible for it , so that if he had been officially rewarded , they would have had to be punished . He was reassigned to a less sensitive post , took early retirement ( although he emphasizes that he was not " forced out " of the army , as is sometimes claimed by Western sources ) , and suffered a nervous breakdown . In a later interview , Petrov stated that the famous red button has never worked , as military psychologists did not want to put the decision about a war into the hands of one single person . The incident became known publicly in the 1990s upon the publication of Votintsev ' s memoirs . Widespread media reports since then have increased public awareness of Petrov ' s actions . There is some confusion as to precisely what Petrov ' s military role was in this incident . Petrov , as an individual , was not in a position where he could single - handedly have launched any of the Soviet missile arsenal . His sole duty was to monitor satellite surveillance equipment and report missile attack warnings up the chain of command ; top Soviet leadership would have decided whether to launch a retaliatory attack against the West . But Petrov ' s role was crucial in providing information to make that decision . According to Bruce Blair , a Cold War nuclear strategies expert and nuclear disarmament advocate , formerly with the Center for Defense Information , " The top leadership , given only a couple of minutes to decide , told that an attack had been launched , would make a decision to retaliate . " Petrov later said “ I had obviously never dreamt that I would ever face that situation . It was the first and , as far as I know , also the last time that such a thing had happened , except for simulated practice scenarios . ” Awards and commendations . For his actions in averting a potential nuclear war in 1983 , Petrov was awarded the " Dresden Preis 2013 " ( Dresden Prize ) in Dresden , Germany , on February 17 , 2013 . The award included €25 , 000 ( $ 32 , 000 ; £21 , 000 ) . On February 24 , 2012 , he was honored with the 2011 German Media Award , presented to him at a ceremony in Baden Baden , Germany . On May 21 , 2004 , the San Francisco - based Association of World Citizens gave Petrov its World Citizen Award along with a trophy and $ 1000 " in recognition of the part he played in averting a catastrophe . " In January 2006 , Petrov traveled to the United States where he was honored in a meeting at the United Nations in New York City . There the Association of World Citizens presented Petrov with a second special World Citizen Award . The next day , Petrov met with American journalist Walter Cronkite at his CBS office in New York City . That interview , in addition to other highlights of Petrov ' s trip to the United States , is included in the documentary film " The Man Who Saved the World " . On the same day that Petrov was honored at the United Nations in New York City , the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations issued a press release contending that a single person could not have started or prevented a nuclear war , stating in part : " Under no circumstances a decision to use nuclear weapons could be made or even considered in the Soviet Union ( Russia ) or in the United States on the basis of data from a single source or a system . For this to happen , a confirmation is necessary from several systems : ground - based radars , early warning satellites , intelligence reports , etc . " But Bruce Blair has said that at that time the U . S . – Soviet relationship " had deteriorated to the point where the Soviet Union as a system — not just the Kremlin , not just Andropov , not just the KGB — but as a system , was geared to expect an attack and to retaliate very quickly to it . It was on hair - trigger alert . It was very nervous and prone to mistakes and accidents . . . The false alarm that happened on Petrov ’ s watch could not have come at a more dangerous , intense phase in U . S . – Soviet relations . " At that time , according to Oleg D . Kalugin , a former KGB chief of foreign counterintelligence , “ The danger was in the Soviet leadership thinking , ‘ The Americans may attack , so we better attack first . ’ ” Petrov has said he does not know that he should regard himself as a hero for what he did that day . In an interview for the documentary film " The Red Button and the Man Who Saved the World " , Petrov says , " All that happened didn ' t matter to me — it was my job . I was simply doing my job , and I was the right person at the right time , that ' s all . My late wife for 10 years knew nothing about it . ' So what did you do ? ' she asked me . ' I did nothing . ' "