Small power There is considerable literature on the foreign policy challenges of states that are not great power s , termed variously as middle powers , small states , regional powers , secondary powers and the like . The formalization of the division between small and great powers came about with the signing of the Treaty of Chaumont in 1814 . Before that the assumption had been that all independent states were in theory equal regardless of physical strength and responsibilities . From the second half of the twentieth century , the bipolar power blocs decreased the strategic room for manoeuvre for smaller actors . The late 1960s and early 1970s briefly saw strategic studies orienting towards smaller actors . The problem with bundling all small actors together is that the members of the group have so little in common that little can be learned from seeing them together . A more fine - masked classification is therefore required . In his seminal study of great and small powers in international law , Karol Wolfke notes that ‘ the existence of great and small powers side by side has always been a source of particular difficulties and international conflicts ’ . There are several possible ways of defining a small power . Most attempts at definitions have been in reference to quantifiable entities . An obvious contemporary yardstick could be weapons technologies – or prestige . Different point of entry is in reference to resources . Asle Toje takes a view where great powers and small powers distinguish themselves through patterns of behaviour . Small powers are not down scaled great powers – or oversized small states . The International System is for the most part made up by small powers ( and small states ) . This is easily forgotten by the single minded focus of academia on the great powers . Over time the impact of a small power in the international system may never equal or surpass the impact of greater powers . Nevertheless small powers can influence the workings of the international system together with other states causing reactions from other nations . Small powers are instruments of great powers and they are actors ; they may act to strengthen stability or they may promote chaos . They may at times be dominated ; but they cannot be ignored . Powers great and small . Almost all studies of power in international relations focus on great power politics and it will for this reason not be discussed here . For , as László Réczei noted , power status hinges on the capacity for violence : " If the notion of war were unknown in international relations , the definition of ‘ small power ’ would have no significance ; just as in the domestic life of a nation it has no significance whether a man is less tall or has a weaker physique than his fellow citizen . Most of the small - state studies that make up the backbone of the small power research tradition were carried out in the heyday of non - alignment by scholars such as David Vital , Robert Rothstein , Maurice East and Robert Keohane . The weakening of the non - alignment movement during the 1970s coincided with a gradual decline in small - state studies , culminating in Peter Baehr ’ s critical appraisal of the research tradition in which he questioned smallness as a useful framework for analysis . The small - power category was first taken into serious account with David Mitrany ’ s study on world government ( pax oecumenica ) in 1933 . 12 Mitrany argued that the international community consisted only of two tiers of state powers : great and small . Characteristics of small powers . Though a single definition has proved elusive due to the number of potential variables and their particular interpretation under given conditions , Asle Toje claims that to have found recurring traits in the research literature regarding the behavioural patterns of small powers on the international stage : 1 . The strategic behaviour of small powers is characterized by dependence . A small power recognizes that it cannot obtain security by relying solely on its own capabilities . They cannot affect the international system alone but with some concerted effort they can have an impact on the way the system works . A small power plays a dispensable and non - decisive part in a great power ’ s array of political and military resources . Small powers therefore tend towards a policy of either strict neutrality or alliance . Those ‘ located in geopolitical regions critical to maintaining a great power ’ s position in the international system [ tend ] to opt for alliance ’ . In an alliance , small powers tend to follow the alliance leader closely , lend it what support they can and avoid antagonizing it . Under regional hegemony with a low probability of punishment , small powers tend to adopt neutrality . 2 . Small powers display variable geometry . In terms of military capabilities there is no ability to project power on a global scale . They are forced by their limited resources , their location and by the international system itself to establish clear priorities . To this end , they identify a hierarchy of risks and attempt to internationalize those considered to be most serious . Small power policies , argues David Vital , are aimed at altering the external environment by ‘ reducing an unfavourable discrepancy in strength , broadening the field of manoeuvre and choice , and increasing the total resources on which the state can count in times of stress ’ . Small powers are therefore status quo oriented . They work within the established order rather than attempting to revise the order itself . 3 . Small powers are the primary beneficiaries of international institutions and are , by necessity , lovers of the law . A small power will often seek to minimize the costs of conducting foreign policy and will increase the weight behind its policies by engaging in concerted efforts with other actors . Generally , this leads to a high degree of participation in and support for international organizations , which leads to a tendency to adopt ‘ moral ’ or ‘ normative ’ policy positions . Formal rules are actively encouraged in order to curb the great powers and strengthen their own position . Cooper et al . identify small powers by ‘ [ t ] heir tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems , their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes , and their tendency to embrace notions of “ good international citizenship ” to guide their diplomacy ’ . 4 . Small powers are risk averse . They see more dangers than opportunities in international politics , which leads them both to shun system - upholding tasks and to display a penchant for token participation in such endeavours . Zaki Laidi defines a risk averse power as an international actor that ‘ defines and responds to the political states of a given identified risk in terms of a will to reduce its uncertainties and uncontrollable effects ’ . Due to the risks of extermination when challenging more powerful states , their ambitions are generally ‘ defensive ’ . They have a narrow range of interests and little freedom of activity . Annette Fox sees small powers as being geographically bound in the sense that their demands are restricted to their own and immediately adjacent areas , while great powers exert their influence on a global scale . Subsequently , small power strategic behaviour is characterized by a general reluctance to coerce and a tendency to promote multilateral , non - military solutions to security challenges . ”