Battle of Pharsalus The Battle of Pharsalus was a decisive battle of Caesar ' s Civil War . On 9 August 48 BC at Pharsalus in central Greece , Gaius Julius Caesar and his allies formed up opposite the army of the republic under the command of Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus ( " Pompey the Great " ) . Pompey had the backing of a majority of the senators , of whom many were optimate s , and his army significantly outnumbered the veteran Caesarian legions . The two armies confronted each other over several months of uncertainty , Caesar being in a much weaker position than Pompey . The former found himself isolated in a hostile country with only 22 , 000 men and short of provisions , while on the other side of the river he was faced by Pompey with an army at least three times as great in strength . Pompey wanted to delay , knowing the enemy would eventually surrender from hunger and exhaustion . Pressured by the Senators present and by his officers , he reluctantly engaged in battle and suffered an overwhelming defeat , ultimately fleeing the camp and his men disguised as an ordinary citizen . Prelude . A dispute between Caesar and the Senate of Rome culminated in Caesar marching his army on Rome and forcing Pompey , accompanied by much of the Roman Senate , to flee from Italy to Greece in 49 BC where he could better conscript an army to face his former ally . Caesar , lacking a fleet to immediately give chase , solidified his control over the western Mediterranean – Spain specifically – before assembling ships to follow Pompey . Bibulus , whom Pompey had appointed to command his 600 - ship fleet , set up a massive blockade to prevent Caesar from crossing to Greece and to prevent any aid to Italy . Caesar , defying convention , chose to cross the Adriatic during the winter , with only half his fleet at a time . This move surprised Bibulus and the first wave of ships managed to run the blockade easily . Now prepared , Bibulus managed to prevent any further ships from crossing , but died soon afterwards . Caesar was now in a precarious position , holding a beachhead at Epirus with only half his army , no ability to supply his troops by sea , and limited local support , as the Greek cities were mostly loyal to Pompey . Caesar ' s only choice was to fortify his position , forage what supplies he could , and wait on his remaining army to attempt another crossing . Pompey by now had a massive international army ; however , his troops were mostly untested raw recruits , while Caesar ' s troops were hardened veterans . Realizing Caesar ' s difficulty in keeping his troops supplied , Pompey decided to simply mirror Caesar ' s forces and let hunger do the fighting for him . Caesar began to despair and used every channel he could think of to pursue peace with Pompey . When this was rebuffed he made an attempt to cross back to Italy to collect his missing troops but was turned back by a storm . Finally , Marc Antony rallied the remaining forces in Italy , fought through the blockade and made the crossing , reinforcing Caesar ' s forces in both men and spirit . Now at full strength Caesar felt confident to take the fight to Pompey . Pompey was camped in a strong position just south of Dyrrhachium with the sea to his back and surrounded by hills , making a direct assault impossible . Caesar ordered a wall to be built around Pompey ' s position in order to cut off water and pasture land for his horses . Pompey built a parallel wall and in between a kind of no man ' s land was created , with fighting comparable to the trench warfare of World War I . Finally the standoff was broken by a traitor in Caesar ' s army , who informed Pompey of a weakness in Caesar ' s wall . Pompey immediately exploited this information and forced Caesar ' s army into a full rout , but ordered his army not to pursue , fearing Caesar ' s reputation for setting elaborate traps . This caused Caesar to remark , " The day was theirs had there been anyone among them to take it . " Pompey continued his strategy of mirroring Caesar ' s forces and avoiding any direct engagements . After trapping Caesar in Thessaly , the prominent Senators in Pompey ' s camp began to argue loudly for a more decisive victory . Although Pompey was strongly against it - he wanted to surround and starve Caesar ' s army instead - he eventually gave in and accepted battle from Caesar on a field near Pharsalus . Caesar had the following legions with him : However , all of these legions were ' short ' , and did not have the requisite numbers of troops . Some only had about a thousand men at the time of Pharsalus , due partly to losses at Dyrrhachium and partly to Caesar ' s wish to rapidly advance with a picked body as opposed to a ponderous movement with a large army . Battle . Deployment . Pompey had every tactical advantage an army could hope for ; he held the higher ground , had superiority of numbers , and was better supplied from his many allies in Greece . This caused the great general to be conservative , careful , and dangerously predictable . Pompey deployed his army in the traditional formation of three lines with a depth of ten men . Again according to convention he posted his most experienced legions on the flanks ( the first and the third legion on his left with Pompey himself commanding , the Syrian legions in the center with Scipio , the Cilician legion and the Spanish cohorts on the right with Afranius ) , dispersing his new recruits along the center . In total , Caesar counted 110 complete cohorts in the Pompeian army , 11 legions consisting of about 45 , 000 men . Pompey ' s right was protected by the River Enipeus , therefore he amassed all his cavalry on Caesar ' s right . He had given command of the cavalry to Labienus , the former commander of Caesar ' s favourite X legion . He deployed the rest of the army on his left together with his auxiliary troops . Pompey ' s plan was to allow Caesar ' s infantry to advance , have his cavalry attack and push back the numerically inferior Julian horses , and then attack Caesar ' s infantry from behind . Caesar knew this would be his last stand as they had run out of supplies and with no lines of retreat they would be at Pompey ' s mercy and likely to be slaughtered if they lost the battle . This " nothing to lose " mentality was played up by Caesar to his men as he explained that defeat meant nothing less than death . Caesar also deployed in three lines but could only set them to six men deep if he was to match the length of Pompey ' s line . Like Pompey he was protected by the river on his left allowing him to position all his cavalry to the right as a counter . As was typical of Caesar he gambled and began discreetly thinning his already depleted ranks of men then repositioned them as a fourth line to support his cavalry against the inevitable assault by the much larger Pompeian cavalry . Caesar himself commanded the cavalry , he posted the notorious tenth legion on his right under Sulla , with the undermanned eighth and possibly the ninth on his left under Marc Antony . In the center he designated Domitius as the commanding officer . According to his accounts , he had 80 cohorts on the battlefield , about 22 , 000 men . Conflict . There was significant distance between the two armies , according to Caesar . Pompey ordered his men not to charge , but to wait until Caesar ' s legions came into close quarters . Pompey ' s adviser Caius Triarius believed that Caesar ' s infantry would be fatigued and fall into disorder if they were forced to cover twice the expected distance . But seeing that Pompey ' s army was not advancing , Caesar ' s men , without orders , stopped to rest and regroup before continuing the charge . Caesar , in his history of the war , would praise his own men ' s discipline and experience , and questioned Pompey ' s decision not to charge . When the lines joined , Labienus ordered the cavalry to attack ; as expected they successfully pushed back Caesar ' s cavalry until his hidden fourth line joined in , using their pila to thrust at Pompey ' s cavalry and turn them to flight . After this , Caesar ordered his six cohorts from his left flank to attack the flank of Pompey ' s army — a move which at this point meant that the battle was more or less decided . Pompey could see this . After observing his cavalry routed , Pompey retreated to his camp and left his troops to their own devices . He ordered the garrison to defend it as he gathered his family , loaded up as much gold as he could , threw off his general ' s cloak and fled . Caesar urged his men to end the day by capturing the enemy camp . They complied with his wishes , furiously attacking the walls . The Thracians and the other auxiliaries who were left in the camp , in total seven cohorts , defended bravely , but were not able to fend off the assault . Caesar had won his greatest victory , having lost only about 1 , 200 soldiers and 30 centurions . Aftermath . Pompey fled from Pharsalus to Egypt , where he was assassinated on the order of Pharaoh Ptolemy XIII . Interestingly enough , Ptolemy XIII sent Pompey ' s head to Caesar in an effort to win his favor , but instead secured him as a furious enemy . Ptolemy , advised by his regent , the eunuch Pothinus , and his rhetoric tutor Theodotus of Chios , had failed to take into account that Caesar was granting amnesty to a great number of those of the senatorial faction in their defeat . Even men who had been bitter enemies were allowed to not only return to Rome but assume their previous positions in Roman society . Pompey ' s assassination had deprived Caesar of his ultimate public relations moment — pardoning his most ardent rival . The Battle of Pharsalus ended the wars of the First Triumvirate . The Roman Civil War , however , was not ended . Pompey ' s two sons , Gnaeus and Sextus , and the Pompeian faction , led now by Metellus Scipio and Cato , survived and fought for their cause in the name of Pompey the Great . Caesar spent the next few years ' mopping up ' remnants of the senatorial faction . After seemingly destroying all his enemies and bringing peace to Rome he was assassinated by friends in a conspiracy organized by Marcus Junius Brutus and Gaius Cassius Longinus . Importance . Paul K . Davis wrote that " Caesar ' s victory took him to the pinnacle of power , effectively ending the Republic . " The battle itself did not end the civil war but it was decisive and gave Caesar a much needed boost in legitimacy . Until then much of the Roman world outside of Italy supported Pompey and his allies due to the extensive list of clients he held in all corners of the Republic . After Pompey ' s defeat former allies began to align themselves with Caesar as some came to believe the gods favored him , while for others it was simple self - preservation . This mentality is possibly difficult to understand in our modern age , but the ancients took great stock in success as a sign of favoritism by the gods . This is especially true of success in the face of almost certain defeat — as Caesar experienced at Pharsalus . This allowed Caesar to parlay this single victory into a huge network of willing clients to better secure his hold over power and force the Optimates into near exile in search for allies to continue the fight against Caesar . Battle date . The date of the battle is given as 9 August 48 BC according to the republican calendar . According to the Julian calendar however , the date was either 29 June ( according to Le Verrier ' s chronological reconstruction ) or possibly 7 June ( according to Drumann / Groebe ) . Pompey was assassinated on 3 September 48 BC . Thus , had the battle actually taken place in the true month of August , when the harvest was becoming ripe , Pompey ' s strategy of starving Caesar would not be plausible . Location . The location of the battlefield was for long a subject of controversy among scholars . Caesar himself , in his Commentarii de Bello Civili , mentions few place - names ; and although the battle is called after Pharsalos , four ancient writers – the author of the " Bellum Alexandrinum " ( 48 . 1 ) , Frontinus ( " Strategemata " 2 . 3 . 22 ) , Eutropius ( 20 ) , and Orosius ( 6 . 15 . 27 ) – place it specifically at " Palae " pharsalos . Strabo in his " Geographica " ( " Γεωγραφικά " ) mentions both old and new Pharsaloi , and notes that the Thetideion , the temple to Thetis south of Scotoussa , was near both . In 198 B . C . in the Second Macedonian War Philip V of Macedon sacked Palaepharsalos ( Livy , " Ab urbe condita " 32 . 13 . 9 ) , but left new Pharsalos untouched . These two details perhaps imply that the two cities were not close neighbours . Until the early 20th century , unsure of the site of Palaepharsalos , scholars followed Appian ( 2 . 75 ) and located the battle of 48 B . C . south of the Enipeus or close to Pharsalos ( today ' s Pharsala ) . The “ north - bank ” thesis of F . L . Lucas , based on his 1921 solo field - trip to Thessaly , is now , however , broadly accepted by historians . “ A visit to the ground has only confirmed me , ” Lucas wrote in 1921 ; “ and it was interesting to find that Mr . Apostolides , son of the large local landowner , the hospitality of whose farm at Tekés I enjoyed , was convinced too that the [ battle - ] site was by Driskole [ now Krini ] , for the very sound reason that neither the hills nor the river further east suit Caesar ’ s description . ” John D . Morgan in his definitive “ Palae - pharsalus – the Battle and the Town ” , arguing for a site closer still to Krini , where he places Palaepharsalos , writes : “ My reconstruction is similar to Lucas ’ s , and in fact I borrow one of his alternatives for the line of the Pompeian retreat . Lucas ’ s theory has been subjected to many criticisms , but has remained essentially unshaken . ” Named after battle . The battle gives its name to