Golden Comb ( tactic ) The Golden Comb ( Ger . " die Goldene Zange " ) was an anti - ship tactic developed by the German air force ( " Luftwaffe " ) during World War II for use against Allied convoys taking supplies to the Soviet Union by the Arctic route . It was first employed against convoy PQ 18 in September 1942 . Background . Before 1942 the German armed forces ( " Wehrmacht " ) lacked a means to attack ships at sea due to the inter - service rivalry between the " Luftwaffe " , which regarded all air operations as its domain , and the " Kriegsmarine " , which saw the development , production and use of torpedo es as its own . Consequently Germany had no torpedo bomber force , in contrast to the forces of other world powers , even the other Axis nations like Italy with the land - based " Aerosiluranti " , or the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service which used the excellent Type 91 torpedo in the Attack on Pearl Harbor . In early 1942 , when the Allied Arctic convoy cycle was becoming well established , the " Luftwaffe " was ordered to form a torpedo bomber force , and was allotted the resources to do so . In response , two groups ( " Gruppe " ) , III / KG 26 and III / KG 30 , were assigned to train and equip as anti - ship / anti - convoy units . These units were equipped with He 111 and Ju 88 aircraft , modified to carry two air - dropped torpedoes externally under the wings . In order to attack a target like a convoy , a formation of 20 to 30 ships sailing in close formation at relatively slow speed , KG 26 commander " Generalmajor " Harlinghausen and his men developed the " Goldene Zange " ( the “ Golden Comb ” ) , a new anti - ship ( specifically an anti - convoy ) tactic . The Golden Comb involved the full group , which , having found its target , would form into a line abreast , some 40 aircraft flying approximately 30 metres apart . These would approach the convoy , from a forward quarter , and simultaneously launch their torpedoes at a distance of 1000 metres . The line would then overfly the convoy and escape . The resulting pattern of up to 80 torpedoes , all travelling in parallel towards the target , was likened to the teeth of a comb ; hence the name . The attack was planned for use in the half light period of dawn or dusk , and would be in conjunction with a simultaneous dive bombing attack to divide the opposing AA fire . In action . The first use of the tactics occurred on 13 September 1942 against the Allied convoy PQ 18 , a collection of 35 merchant ships , with a strong escort of 18 warships including the escort carrier " Avenger " . After a dive - bombing attack by I / KG 30 , the convoy was approached by I / KG 26 , the torpedo - bombers , in a formation of 42 aircraft . The sight was described by one observer as “ a huge flight of nightmare locusts ” . Despite anti aircraft fire from the ships and their escorts , the group continued on course , dropping their torpedoes as planned . In response the convoy commodore ordered a turn to starboard in order to sail parallel to the torpedo tracks . In the confusion the signal was misread by the ships of the starboard columns , which continued ahead . The torpedoes struck and eight ships , six in the outermost starboard column , and two further in , were sunk . This occasion was the most successful use of the Golden Comb . The German aircraft made repeated attacks on PQ 18 thereafter , and two more ships were sunk by them , but no successes similar to the first day were achieved . Conversely , aircraft losses mounted after the first attack , and by the end of the air offensive against PQ 18 , 40 aircraft from the two groups had been lost . Following PQ 18 the Allied convoy cycle was paused until December 1942 when the next series of convoys was able to travel under cover of the Arctic night . Thus the " Luftwaffe " had no further opportunity to use the Golden Comb . Assessment . Impressive as it was , and devastating as its first use had been , the Golden Comb was , in the end , an ineffective tactic . The Allies quickly found counter - measures which reduced its effectiveness and inflicted crippling losses on the attackers . The approaching formation was unable to take any evasive action on its approach , and was vulnerable to AA fire from the ships and escorts . The formation was also vulnerable to attacks by fighter aircraft from the carrier , and the combination of gun and fighter attack , aided by the bold and aggressive handling of the carrier , " Avenger " , and the AA ship , " Ulster Queen " , caused the bombers to release and break formation earlier and earlier in their approach runs as the battle progressed . Finally the standard response to torpedo attack , to turn into the track to present a smaller target ( coincidentally referred to as “ combing the tracks ” ) was made more effective against torpedoes running on the same vector . The confusion over signals that contributed to PQ 18 ’ s first day losses was not repeated . Other air forces had found torpedo attacks were more effective against ships when delivered from different directions simultaneously . Whilst hitting 8 ships in one attack was a huge success , the bombers had launched over 80 torpedoes in that one attack ; a ratio of 10 torpedoes to one ship hit . This was a less successful ratio than other occasions by other air forces , such as the RN ' s attack on " Bismarck " ( May 1941 ) , the IJN ' s attack on " Prince of Wales " and " Repulse " , ( December 1941 ) and the USN ' s attack on " Yamato " , ( April 1945 ) .