XIX Tactical Air Command The XIX Tactical Air Command ( XIX TAC ) is an inactive United States Air Force unit . The unit ' s last assignment was with the Ninth Air Force based at Biggs Field , Texas . It was inactivated on 31 March 1946 . During World War II , the mission of the XIX TAC was to support General Patton ' s United States Third Army with tactical air support throughout during the army ' s advance from formation in France on 1 August 1944 until VE - Day . History . Formed in England in early 1944 , XIX TAC was a command and control organization , designed to provide air support to Army ground forces , primarily with P - 47 Thunderbolt and P - 51 Mustang aircraft . XIX TAC supported all of Third Army ' s operations and more . Its roles included a bewildering number of missions : close air support , battlefield air interdiction , deep interdiction , dive bombing , counterair , reconnaissance , and even leaflet dropping . XIX TAC ' s close air support mission took its most concerted , extended , and spectacular form in supporting Patton ' s armored and motorized infantry columns as they sped across France . The Third Army ' s tank crews and their accompanying air support officers pointed out enemy concentrations , and divisional artillery at times gave further assistance by marking targets with smoke . In return , the P - 47 and P - 51 pilots of XIX TAC provided cover for the tanks in one - hour shifts with four aircraft per flight , and four more on ground alert could be called in if necessary . As little as three minutes after being contacted , they could strike the designated target , thereby freeing the armored forces to continue their advance . Another of XIX TAC ' s missions , dive bombing , is normally thought of as a tactic , but XIX TAC considered it a separate mission . It resembled deep interdiction , for both types of missions made use of various aerial bombing techniques and normally attacked similar , prearranged targets . But while deep interdiction was designed to cut off enemy movements either in or out of the combat zone , dive - bombing missions were most often used for static warfare . They were employed , for example , during the unsuccessful September attempt to seize Metz , and their most extensive use was during the siege at Brest . The results of Brest were not particularly impressive . It was soon obvious that the defenders – – as part of Hitler ' s " hold on to the ports " strategy – – had ample provisions and were determined to hold out . It also became evident that XIX TAC fighters and fighter - bombers assigned to the operation were insufficient to perform effectively all of the tasks they were expected to carry out , particularly in terms of dive bombing . XIX TAC ' s P - 47s and P - 51s simply did not have the bombing power to bring about the desired results . Thus the American commander called on other air formations to assist . Eighth Air Force responded between 11 August and 5 September with four missions in which 983 B - 17s dropped 2520 tons of bombs . British Bomber Command made two raids with approximately 220 Lancasters taking part . U . S . IX Bomber Command ' s B - 26s and new A - 26s undertook six missions . IX TAC loaned some of its squadrons to XIX TAC – – squadrons that flew 839 sorties between 5 and 11 September , when Brest ' s capture was accorded a high priority . By the time the last of Germany ' s beleaguered troops capitulated on the 19th , the Allies had flown more than 3500 Brest - related sorties . The city was in shambles . Its port facilities , for which the operation originally had been undertaken , were so badly damaged ( by German demolitions along with Allied bombing and artillery shelling ) that the Americans never used it as a major supply port . Obviously , air power had had an impact on the outcome of the battle but not in the way that had been hoped for . XIX TAC was also involved in counterair operations , although , because of the Luftwaffe ' s relative weakness , to a lesser extent than it might have been . Only in critical situations or when they had a numerical advantage did Jagdkorps II ' s Bf - 109s and FW - 190s venture out and pose a threat . During the early August Mortain counteroffensive , German fighters and some bombers did support the attack , but they were overwhelmed by the Allies ' superior numbers , better aircraft , and experienced pilots . While IX TAC led the counterair response , the RAF and XIX TAC ' s 354th Fighter - Bomber Group of P - 51s also lent a hand . At Falaise , the German Air Force again was active , and XIX TAC ' s fighters performed a variety of defensive and offensive counterair tasks – – intercepts , sweeps , combat air patrols , and escorts , including bomber escorts – – along with other support missions . Near Paris , U . S . pilots also encountered opposition ; but at times several of Weyland ' s groups reported seeing no enemy aircraft for days at a time . Although the Allies remained aware that the situation might change , Allied aircraft now reigned supreme . XIX TAC further undertook reconnaissance duties . Most of the sorties were confined to visual reconnaissance , but they included day and night photo missions as well , especially from 10th Photo Group , whose P - 51s were stationed in the area . Overall , during the two months , aircraft under Weyland ' s command flew 2011 reconnaissance sorties , or slightly more than 9 percent of the 22 , 233 total sorties flown . One final mission was that XIX TAC pilots performed several special air operations in the form of leaflet - dropping sorties . During August and September , XIX TAC was involved in seven different missions – – close air support , battlefield and deep interdiction , dive bombing , counterair , aerial reconnaissance , and special operations .