Battle of Sangju ( 1950 ) The Battle of Sangju ( ) was an engagement between the United Nations and North Korean forces , occurring on July 20 – 31 , 1950 , in the village of Sangju in southern South Korea , early in the Korean War . It ended in a victory for the North Korean forces after they were able to push troops of the United States and South Korea out of the area . Republic of Korea Army units had been unsuccessfully resisting advances by the North Korean People ' s Army in the region when they were reinforced by the United States Army ' s 25th Infantry Division , newly arrived in the country . In the subsequent fight , the 25th Infantry Division was able to inflict substantial casualties on the advancing NK 15th Division but was not able to hold its positions . In 11 days of fighting , the UN forces performed poorly and were forced to withdraw from Yechon County , the city of Sangju , and the surrounding areas . The US 24th Infantry Regiment of the 25th Division was ineffective in its first showing . The regiment , composed mostly of black troops , was criticized by the Army for being quick to panic and retreat . Some historians have described the Army ' s statements as biased , downplaying the regiment ' s successes and overstating its failures . Background . Outbreak of war . Following the invasion of the Republic of Korea ( South Korea ) by its northern neighbor , the Democratic People ' s Republic of Korea ( North Korea ) , the United Nations decided to commit troops to the conflict in support of South Korea . The United States subsequently sent ground forces to the Korean peninsula with the goal of fighting back the North Korean invasion and to prevent South Korea from collapsing . However , US forces in the Far East had been steadily decreasing since the end of World War II in 1945 , and at the time the closest forces were the 24th Infantry Division of the Eighth United States Army , which was headquartered in Japan . The division was understrength , and most of its equipment was antiquated due to reductions in military spending . Regardless , the 24th Infantry Division was ordered into South Korea . The 24th Infantry Division was the first US unit sent into Korea with the mission to take the initial " shock " of North Korean advances , fighting alone and outnumbered for several weeks . They delayed much larger North Korean units while additional UN forces arrived and moved into position : the 7th Infantry Division , 25th Infantry Division , 1st Cavalry Division , and other Eighth Army supporting units . South Korean forces in the meantime were systematically defeated and forced south along Korea ' s east coast , with entire divisions being overrun by the North Koreans ' superior firepower and equipment . Advance elements of the 24th Infantry Division were badly defeated in the Battle of Osan on July 5 , during the first battle between American and North Korean forces . For the first month after the defeat at Osan , 24th Infantry Division soldiers were repeatedly defeated and forced south by the North Korean force ' s superior numbers and equipment . The regiments of the 24th Infantry Division were systematically pushed south in battles around Chochiwon , Chonan , and Pyongtaek . The 24th Infantry Division made a final stand in the Battle of Taejon , being almost completely destroyed but delaying North Korean forces from advancing until July 20 . By that time , the Eighth Army ' s force of combat troops were roughly equal to North Korean forces attacking the region at around 70 , 000 for each side , with new UN units arriving every day . US 25th Infantry Division arrives . At the same time , on the east coast , the NK 12th Division was resting from its heavy battles north of the town of Sangju , a crossroads center for all the mountain roads in that part of Korea . Situated south of the Mun ' gyong plateau and the dividing watershed between the Han River and the Naktong River , Sangju had a commanding position in the valley of the Naktong , northeast of Taegu . There was a large amount of confused activity around Sangju during the end of July , as refugees and stragglers from the defeated ROK Army poured south through the town . Many ROK units were retreating to Sangju and some had passed south through it . Isolated fighting had already begun between North Koreans and Republic of Korea ( ROK ) forces for control of the Mun ' gyong plateau when the US 25th Infantry Division under Major General William B . Kean , newly arrived in Korea on July 10 – 15 , received orders from General Walker to concentrate there to bolster ROK defenses of the central mountain corridors . Eighth Army Commander Lieutenant General Walton Walker looked to the 25th Division to help the ROK forces in central Korea prevent a major North Korean movement into the valley of the upper Naktong . The division stood at a strength of 13 , 059 as of July 19 . Battle . Capture of Yechon . The first action between elements of the 25th Division and North Korean forces took place at Yechon on July 20 . Company K , 3rd Battalion , US 24th Infantry Regiment , led by First Lieutenant Jasper R . Johnson , entered the town during the afternoon . When other units of the 3rd Battalion failed to take a ridge overlooking the town on the left , he requested and received permission to withdraw from the town for the night . Meeting at the battalion command post , the commanders of the US units planned a renewed assault for 05 : 00 the next morning . Artillery and mortars fired on the town ahead of the infantry advance , and soon the town was on fire from the shells . By this time , however , Yechon had likely been abandoned by the North Koreans . At Hamch ' ang , Colonel Henry G . Fisher , commanding the US 35th Infantry Regiment , received an erroneous message early that morning stating that the North Koreans had driven the 24th Infantry from Yechon . He immediately left for Yechon . He found the battalion commander about west of the town , but was dissatisfied with the information that he received from him . Fisher and a small party then drove on into Yechon , which was still burning . He encountered no North Korean troops or South Korean civilians . The 3rd Platoon , 77th Engineer Combat Company , attached to Company K , entered the town with the infantrymen and attempted to halt the spread of flames but were unable to do so because of high , shifting winds . The 24th Infantry then met light resistance from North Korean troops counterattacking the town , but drove them off , securing the town after several hours of fighting at a cost of 2 killed and 12 wounded . North Korean casualties at the fight could not be estimated . However , the US Army , preoccupied by the Battle of Taejon , took little notice and credited the victory to the South Koreans . News of the capture was picked up by the US media as the first fight won by black soldiers of the mostly black unit . By 13 : 00 Yechon was secured , and 3rd Battalion turned over control of the town to the ROK 18th Regiment of the ROK Capital Division . The Capital Division then concentrated the bulk of its forces there , and opposed the NK 8th Division in that vicinity the remainder of the month . Drawing battle lines . Major General Kean and his 25th Division had to guard two main approaches to Sangju to keep the town from falling to the North Koreans . The main road crossed the Mun ' gyong plateau and passed through Hamch ' ang at the base of the plateau about north of Sangju . Next , there was a secondary mountain road that crossed the plateau farther west and , once through the mountains , turned east toward Sangju . On the main road , the 2nd Battalion , 35th Infantry , held a blocking position northwest of Hamch ' ang , supported by a platoon of tanks from A Company , 78th Tank Battalion , and A Battery , 90th Field Artillery Battalion . The 1st Battalion was emplaced with the 2nd Battalion but stayed less than 24 hours before it was sent to reinforce the US 27th Infantry Regiment on the next north - south line of communications westward . Thus , in effect , one battalion of US troops stood behind ROK units on the Hamch ' ang approach . On the second road , that leading into Sangju from the west , the 24th Infantry Regiment assembled two , and later all three , of its battalions . The 2nd Battalion of the 35th Infantry took up a hill position northwest of Hamch ' ang and south of Mun ' gyong on the south side of a stream that flowed past Sangju to the Naktong . On the north side of the stream an ROK battalion held the front line . Brigadier General Vennard Wilson , the 25th ' s Assistant Division Commander , ordered F Company of the battalion to be inserted in the center of the ROK line north of the stream , and this was done over the strong protests of the battalion commander , Lieutenant Colonel John L . Wilkins . Wilson thought the American troops would strengthen the ROK defense but Wilkins did not want the untried company to be dependent on ROK stability in its first engagement . Behind the ROK and F Company positions the ground rose to another hill within small arms range . Heavy rains had swollen the stream behind the ROK and F Company positions to a torrent that was rolling large boulders along its channel . In the meantime , the ROK 2nd Battalion , 17th Regiment , ambushed a battalion of North Korean troops near Tongkwanri , forcing it to withdraw . North Korean attack on Sangju . On July 22 the North Koreans attacked . The ROK troops resisted briefly , but withdrew from their positions on either side of F Company without communicating their intentions . The withdrawal had been a part of the plan for reorganizing the line to incorporate the US troops , but F Company expected them to send a message before doing so , and did not adjust their defenses to compensate . North Korean troops quickly flanked F Company and began attacking it from the rear . This precipitated an unorganized withdrawal . The swollen stream prevented F Company from crossing to the south side and the 2nd Battalion positions . Walking wounded crowded along the stream where an effort to get them across failed . Two officers and two noncommissioned officer s tied a pair of twisted telephone wires about their bodies and tried to swim to the other bank and fasten a line , but each in turn was swept downstream where they floundered ashore on the same bank where they had started . Some men drowned trying to cross the swollen river . The covering fire of a platoon of tanks on the south side held off the North Koreans and allowed most of the survivors to eventually escape . F Company lost 37 men : 6 killed , 10 wounded , and 21 missing . The next morning five North Korean T - 34 tanks crossed the river and moved toward Hamch ' ang . Artillery fire from A Battery of the 90th Field Artillery Battalion knocked out four of the tanks immediately . The fifth moved back across the river , where an air strike later destroyed it . UN consolidates around Sangju . The 2nd Battalion , 35th Infantry , was still in its position when it received orders to withdraw to a point north of Sangju on July 23 . On July 28 the battalion fell back further , and the next day it moved to a position south of Sangju . On the last day of July , the 35th Infantry was ordered to a blocking position on a line of hills south of Sangju on the Kumch ' on road . In 11 days it had fallen back about on the Sangju front without encountering strong resistance , only North Korean patrols . During the battle , the 35th Infantry merely executed a series of withdrawals on division orders as the front around it collapsed , and was not heavily involved in the fighting . The ROK 6th Division continued its hard - fought action on the road through the mountains from Mun ' gyong , but gradually it fell back from in front of the NK 1st Division . In the mountains above Hamch ' ang the ROK 6th Division on July 24 destroyed seven North Korean T - 34 tanks . Three days later the ROK 1st Division , now relieved northwest of Sangju by the US 24th Infantry and redeployed on the Hamch ' ang front , destroyed four more tanks there with 2 . 36 - inch bazookas and captured one tank intact . The remnants of the ROK 2nd Division , relieved by the 27th Infantry Regiment on the Hwanggan – Poun road , were incorporated into the ROK 1st Division . Thus , by July 24 the US 25th Division had taken over from the ROK 1st and 2nd Divisions the sector from Sangju westward to the Seoul – Taegu highway , and these ROK troops were moving into the line eastward and northward from Sangju on the Hamch ' ang front . By July 27 all the Mun ' gyong divide was in North Korean possession and their units were moving into the valley of the upper Naktong in the vicinity of Hamch ' ang . Prisoners taken at the time and others captured later said that the NK 1st Division suffered 5 , 000 casualties in the struggle for control of the divide , including the division commander who was wounded and replaced . The NK 13th Division , following the 1st , suffered about 500 casualties below Mun ' gyong , but otherwise it was not engaged during this period . The NK 15th Division , one of North Korea ' s weaker divisions which consisted mostly of inexperienced youth , moved on Sangju . It was part of a concentrated attack by North Korean troops aiming to push the UN forces south before they had time to organize an effective defensive line . Simultaneously with their appearance on the Hamch ' ang road at the southern base of the Mun ' gyong plateau north of Sangju , the North Koreans approached on the secondary mountain road to the west . On July 22 , F Company of the 35th Infantry was also attacked north of Hamch ' ang , when it was confronted with a North Korean battalion three times its size . The company fought effectively and inflicted heavy casualties , though the next day rains caused flooding of a river to the unit ' s rear and cut off its route of supply . Assisted by artillery , it was able to disengage . The 24th Infantry falters . Elements of the US 24th Infantry Regiment had a similar experience west of Sangju . On that day , the 2nd Battalion , 24th Infantry , and elements of the ROK 17th Regiment were advancing into the mountains northwest of the town . There , they came into contact with the NK 48th Regiment , 15th Division , the leading element of the North Korean troops . With E Company leading , 2nd Battalion moved along the dirt road into a gorge with precipitous mountain walls . Suddenly , a North Korean light mortar and one or two automatic weapons fired on E Company . It stopped and the men dispersed along the sides of the road . Soon North Korean rifle fire came in on the dispersed men and E and F Companies immediately began withdrawing in a disorderly manner . Troops began shying from the front and retreating without orders , ignoring officers ' commands to stay in position . Colonel Horton V . White , the regimental commander , heard of the difficulty and drove hurriedly to the scene . He found the battalion coming back down the road in disorder and most of the men in a state of panic . Historians blame the retreat as much on officers ' ineptitude as individual soldiers panicking . He mustered the men and ordered a retreat but by then many soldiers were withdrawing on their own . The next day the ROK 17th Regiment enveloped the North Korean position that had launched the attack and captured two light machine guns , one mortar , and about 30 North Koreans who appeared to be guerrillas . The ROK 17th Regiment fought in the hills for the next two days , making some limited gains , and then it moved back to Sangju to join other units as part of the ROK Army reorganization in progress around Pusan . This left only the US 24th Infantry Regiment guarding the west approach to Sangju from the Mun ' gyong plateau . The tendency to panic continued in nearly all the 24th Infantry operations west of Sangju . Men left their positions and straggled to the rear . They abandoned weapons on positions . On many occasions units lost most of their equipment while on the move , even when not under fire , causing logistical shortages . In other cases the majority of a unit would desert its position at the first sign of North Korean fire . By July 26 all three battalions of the 24th Infantry were concentrated in remote battle positions that were difficult to resupply , astride the road west of Sangju . The shortage of UN troops forced the regiment to devote most of its troops to the front , leaving very few reserves to respond to attacks . Elements of the NK 15th Division advancing on this road had cleared the mountain passes and were closing with the regiment . From July 26 to the end of the month the North Koreans had almost constant contact with the 24th Infantry , which was supported by the 159th and 64th Field Artillery Battalions and one battery of the 90th Field Artillery Battalion . The North Koreans relied heavily on massed charges to close rapidly on the US lines . This caused heavy casualties for the North Koreans , but their mortars and artillery inflicted significant casualties on the American lines in turn . During the last days of July , the 24th Infantry generally tried to hold positions during the day , and then withdrew at night . Their performance was mixed ; during the first few North Korean attacks , most units held positions until they ran out of ammunition . Higher officers attempted to move the units back in position but were unsuccessful in the face of mounting North Korean resistance . Notably , L Company fought until surrounded by North Korean attackers ; the rest of the regiment was able to drive them off . On July 29 the 1st Battalion suffered about 60 casualties from North Korean mortar fire . As the men were preparing their perimeter defense for the night , a general panic arose , for reasons that are still unclear . Most of them deserted their positions in a state of alarm . Colonel White found himself , the 77th Combat Engineer Company , and a battery of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion all that was left in the front line . He had to personally reorganize the battalion as many of his officers were unable to get the men to listen to them . As White tried to rally his men , the field artillery maintained a sustained barrage of fire to slow the North Koreans advance . That night alone the artillery fired 3 , 000 rounds in holding back the North Koreans . US withdrawal . In the final days of the fight , to the west of Sangju , Major John R . Woolridge , one of the regiment ' s senior officers , set up a check point west of the town and stopped every vehicle coming from the west , taking off stragglers attempting to retreat . Many jeeps were filled with six or seven men claiming they were retreating after their position was overrun . He averaged about 75 stragglers a day , and 150 on the last day of the battle . A contingent of military police were dispatched specifically to collect men abandoning their positions and to return them to the front . By July 30 , the 24th Infantry had withdrawn to the last defensible high ground west of Sangju , from the town . The North Korean troops hit the regiment with heavy attacks beginning at 05 : 00 that morning , targeting the 3rd Battalion ' s forward positions . Overstretched , lacking reserves and plagued by stragglers , the regiment began to come apart and senior commanders had to personally move into the front lines to help resist the Korean advance with their sidearms . The regiment had deteriorated so badly by this time that General Kean recalled the 1st Battalion , 35th Infantry , and placed it in defensive positions behind the 24th Infantry , to hold the line when the 24th withdrew . The next day North Koreans again pressed against the regiment ' s forward line of resistance . First Lieutenant Leon A . Gilbert , commanding A Company , and about 15 men then quit the forward line . White and other ranking officers ordered Gilbert back into position , but he refused to go , saying that he was scared . The senior noncommissioned officer returned to the forward position with the men . After regimental commanders pleaded unsuccessfully with Gilbert to return to his position , he was arrested and tried for desertion under fire , a capital offense , and sentenced to death . His sentence was later reduced to 17 years in prison , but he served only five of them . Finally , during the night of July 31 the 24th Infantry Regiment withdrew through Sangju . The 1st Battalion , 35th Infantry , covered the withdrawal . The NK 15th Division set up a new defensive line at Sangju the next day as the 25th Infantry Division was moved to deal with a growing attack on Masan to the south . Aftermath . In 11 days of action in the Sangju area the 24th Regiment had suffered 323 battle casualties , 27 killed , 293 wounded , and 3 missing . The light casualty count was partially credited to effective use of fortifications and North Korean caution in advancing during the fight , but the fact that 24th Infantry troops were quick to withdraw was also blamed . The regiment , a mostly black unit left over from the US military ' s recently abolished segregated system , was blasted for its poor performance during the fight . Walker , seeing the 24th Infantry as an ineffective unit , resolved to use it only as a " trip wire force " on the front lines , requiring it to be reinforced by another regiment in reserve to conduct serious resistance when the 24th broke . Other leaders saw the poor performance as a reason to demand further integration of the armed forces , which had not been easy to do before the war . The 24th Infantry was fully desegregated on October 1 , 1951 . In reaching the upper Naktong valley at the end of July , the North Korean divisions engaged in this part of the drive southward had suffered heavy casualties . The NK 1st Division in battling across the Mun ' gyong plateau against the ROK 6th Division not only suffered great losses in the ground battle but also took serious losses from UN aerial attack . Prisoners reported that by the time it reached Hamch ' ang at the end of July it was down to 3 , 000 men from the 5 , 500 it had before the push . The NK 15th Division , according to prisoners , also lost heavily to artillery and mortar fire in its drive on Sangju against ROK troops and the US 24th Infantry Regiment , and was down to about 5 , 000 men at the end of July , from 7 , 500 before the fight . In contrast , the NK 13th Division had bypassed Hamch ' ang on the west and , save for minor skirmishes with ROK troops and the 2nd Battalion , 35th Infantry , it had not been engaged and consequently had suffered relatively few casualties . In the years since the war , the battle has been investigated as an example of the prevalence of racism in the US Army during the Korean War . The 24th Infantry , though officially desegregated , was still made up overwhelmingly of African - American soldiers . Historians contend its accomplishments , particularly at Yechon , were ignored while shortcomings were seized upon to depict the 24th as a sub - par unit and African - Americans as inferior soldiers to whites . Historians have also pointed out that although the performance of the 24th Infantry was indeed poor , these failings were exaggerated due to racism . " Black Soldier , White Army " , a 1988 book by William T . Bowers , William M . Hammond and George L . MacGarrigle , concluded that a combination of an overextended line and inexperienced white officers who were not firm or effective in asserting their authority were the primary factors in the performance of the 24th . Others contend that the untested regiment performed similarly to units of the 24th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division in their first engagements . With training , many of the same troops became effective fighters in a matter of weeks . Lieutenant Colonel Charles M . Bussey , a member of the 24th Infantry that participated in the battle , claimed in his memoir " " that the 24th Infantry ' s good performances , particularly at Yechon , were ignored , and soldiers denied medals for their actions because of racism .