1st Fighter Corps ( Germany ) I . Jagdkorps ( I . JK ) ( 1st Fighter Corps ) was formed 15 September 1943 in Zeist from the XII . Fliegerkorps and the " Luftwaffenbefehlshaber Mitte " , and later subordinated to the " Luftflotte Reich " . The " Stab " relocated to Brunswick - Querum in March 1944 and to Treuenbrietzen in October 1944 . The unit was disbanded on 26 January 1945 and its obligations were taken over by IX . ( J ) Fliegerkorps . Role . " I . Jagdkorps " controlled the units based in Germany for the Defense of the Reich campaign . The Corps was an operational command . Its powers were exercised in supervision and planning and less in actual control during combat missions . The Corps attempted to control the deployment of units in its area . Its functions included running analysis for all divisions under its command with the intend of figuring out enemy intentions . This was attempted by studying the weather forecasts , listining in on enemy radio transmissions and monitoring the radar services . It received the divisions readiness reports and dictated broad lines of strategic fighter employment . The two " Jagdkorps " , I . JK and II . JK , were responsible for all day fighter forces after the formation of " Luftflotte Reich " . However , the forces in southern Germany and Austria were subordinated to " Fliegerdivision 7 " . In frustration , its commanding officer Joseph Schmid , wrote to the " Reichsluftfahrtministerium " ( RLM — Reich Air Ministry ) to increase his own powerbase and role of I . JK in the defence of Germany . On 24 January 1944 Schmid argued for one central agency should be given the responsibility of intelligence . All other agencies ( radio , radar and ground observer ) should report to this single agency and should be put under its command . Schmid also added that a central commanding unit should be set up to direct day and night fighter defences . After the war Schmid complained that this was not done until 31 March 1944 , and that he had officially requested this on 11 December 1943 . Operational history . Combat operations in 1943 . Among the thousands of aerial engagements and aerial battles over Europe in 1943 , 1944 and 1945 , I . JK fought several notable actions . On 9 October 1943 the United States Army Air Force Eighth Air Force bombed the Focke - Wulf plant at Marienburg inflicting much damage . Although the Germans failed to intercept them on the way to the target , the staff of I . JK guessed correctly the return route of the bomber stream . Every day and night fighter made contact and , aided by perfect weather , shot down 28 bombers and damaged two so badly they were scrapped . German losses were limited . The Messerschmitt Bf 109 s and Focke - Wulf Fw 190 s had not intercepted , but all the day and night fighter forces equipped with Messerschmitt Bf 110 s did , and their units lost only 10 fighters , with 11 aircrew killed in action or missing in action and one wounded in action . Combat operations in 1944 . On 11 January 1944 the Eighth Air Force again was engaged by I . JK ' s tactical units . I . JK contributed 289 sorties , 207 with enemy contact . USAAF fighter units reported heavy resistance . The attacks of its fighter shot down 60 USAAF bombers and five more were scrapped . USAAF fighters , 592 in number , claimed 31 German fighters destroyed , 12 probable and 16 damaged for a loss of five destroyed three beyond repair and six damaged . Losses of German fighters were severe . 53 German fighters were destroyed and 31 damaged . 38 aircrew were killed and 22 wounded . Schmid reported that all fighter units had failed to master the successful head on attack properly in a report on 24 January 1944 . Schmid complained that reinforcements had not been received despite a request in December 1943 . Schmid stated that " Wilde Sau " units had suffered high losses which damaged combat effectiveness of the day fighter force . The replacements of lost fighters were satisfactory for the moment . The striking power of I . JK was better than in late 1943 , according to Schimd . Schmid reported the confidence that the 11 January interception had given the fighter units had improved morale , although he warned , " the tactical and numerical superiority of the American fighter units had not been demonstrated fully " . Schmid confirmed that the average strength for January was 400 single - engine fighters , 80 twin - engine fighters and 100 night fighters for day use . I . JK had committed 2 , 306 sorties to the defence and lost 122 aircraft , or 5 . 3 percent of the force . The USAAF had flown 7 , 158 sorties and lost 179 aircraft , or 2 . 5 percent . Schmid ' s requests for reinforcements were denied . On 4 February 1944 the Eighth Air Force bombed Wilhelmshaven and Emden . German controllers failed to intercept or locate the stream . Only I . and II . " Jagdgeschwader 26 " made contact , losing four Fw 190s , one pilot killed and one wounded for five bombers . Schmid was blamed and summoned to Berlin . Schmid blamed " Fliegerdivision 7 " . On 23 February 1944 Schmid reorganized his forces in I . JK to contain : During Big Week - part of the Allied strategy to force the Luftwaffe to commit aircraft it could not afford to lose - on 24 February 1944 , I . JK and II . JK intercepted the Eighth Air Force and between them shot down 33 B - 24 Liberator s plus another damaged . Another 16 B - 17 Flying Fortress es and one damaged were lost along with 10 USAAF fighters 11 . 3 percent of the force . For this exchange the Jagdkorps lost 46 aircraft , 9 . 6 percent of the forces committed . It also lost 31 aircrew killed and 14 wounded . On 25 February 1944 , I . JK was duped by a diversionary raid into withholding " Jagdgeschwader 11 " on standby in order to counter a suspected target in eastern Germany . Before the mistake was realised , the B - 24s of the USAAF turned back and it was too late to get JG 11 involved in the fighting . The defensive effort of the " Fliegerdivision 7 " and I . JK hampered the interception . The days score was 31 USAAF heavy bombers destroyed and three damaged plus three USAAF fighters destroyed and two damaged . The German casualties , including I . JK stood at 48 fighters , 19 killed and 20 wounded . At the end of February 1944 , Schimd stated in I Jagdkorps War Diary that the raids of Big Week had disrupted the flow of aircraft plants to the extent that supply to their defences were impossible . Schmid stated that the multiple raids on the same day effectively dissipated the air defences . Schmid complained decentralized command was impossible , as units were subject to different division , air fleet or Korps headquarters . Hermann Göring gave I . JK the responsibility of defending the coastal , Berlin and central areas of Germany . Schmid complained his forces were inadequate to meet this challenged . Schmid also stated that technically and numerically American fighter units were superior to the RLV units . Schmid described it as a hapless battle for which victory was unlikely . Schmid recorded that the average daily strength was 350 single - engine fighters , 100 twin - engine fighters , and 50 night fighters available for day use . February sorties by I . JK equalled 2 , 861 in which they lost 299 aircraft or 10 . 3 percent . The USSAF flew 10 , 452 sorties and lost just 310 aircraft , 2 . 5 percent . On 6 March 1944 the Eighth Air Force struck Berlin . I . JK committed the cream of their units to the battle . It was the largest concentrated attack in the history of the RLV , and the Defence of the Reich Campaign . Some 20 bombers were shot down by 12 : 25 hours . Along with other Korps and Flieger and Jagddisivions , the USAAF Eighth Air Force lost 69 bombers and a further six damaged - its highest of the war . Another 11 USAAF fighters were shot down and three damaged . The bomber loss rate was 10 . 2 percent of the force . The RLV lost 64 fighters , eight aircrew killed , 36 missing and 23 wounded . Nearly all the missing were dead . The loss rate of aircraft was 19 . 2 percent of the force . The USAAF returned on 9 March to Berlin . Schmid moved his Headquarters from Zeist , Netherlands to Brunswick , reflecting I . JK abandonment of forward defence . I . JK and other Luftwaffe units did not respond . The dwindling industrial value of Berlin ' s shattered industry and the fact the propaganda value of defending their capital had been lost , the Luftwaffe decided not to risk its shrinking fighter force further . The 3rd Bomb Division of the USAAF Eighth Air Force was intercepted by elements of I . JK which committed " Fliegerdivisions " 1 , 2 and 3 on its way to Brunswick and Munster . Strong head winds meant it flew ahead of schedule and missed its escort . It lost 16 B - 17s and one damaged to " Jagdgeschwader 3 " . Overall 28 bombers were destroyed and one damaged plus four USAAF fighters and one damaged was achieved . The RLV , among it I . JK , lost 31 fighters with six killed , 12 missing and six wounded . Schmid claimed that on 1 April 1944 , the Jagddivision 7 and Jafu Ostmark was now placed under the command of I . JK and Schmid had his way , the defence was now under a single command in western and central Germany . Schmid calculated that I Jagdkorps flew 2 , 226 sorties in March 1944 and lost 240 aircraft , or 10 . 9 percent . The USAAF flew 16 , 612 missions and lost 302 aircraft or 1 . 8 percent . On 2 April the Fifteenth Air Force flew missions against Steyr , Austria which housed aircraft assembly plants and ball - bearings factories . All the RLV units responded . Some 312 single engine German fighters made an interception plus another 64 Messerschmitt Bf 110s . The 110s claimed five B - 17s , three B - 24s and one P - 38 for eight losses , mostly to the 14th Fighter Group . Other units , such as " Jagddivision 7 " claimed 11 B - 17s and 31 B - 24s , plus three P - 38s and one P - 47 ( all claims were not confirmed ) for seven Bf 109s . Actual US losses were eight B - 17s and 20 B - 24s . No P - 47s or P - 38s were lost . Some I . JK fighters were involved in the battles . On 8 April 1944 the Eighth Air Force attacked aviation industry targets around Brunswick . The Germans could not match the estimated 600 USAAF fighters dispatched to cover the bombers . JD 1 , 2 and 3 were ordered to engage . Only the 2d Bomb Wing reached Brunswick . 250 Fw 190s and Bf 109s attacked the unescorted sections of B - 24s . The fighters of JG 1 and JG 11 made head on attacks . Attacking the bombers furthest away from the P - 51 escort , the Fw 190s made repeated passes knowing the P - 51s above would not dive through the bombers to engage . On one pass , the German fighters mistakenly turned into the side of the Mustangs , climbing , after making an attack . The 357th Fighter Group shot down six . Among the casualties was " Staffelkaptan " " Oberleutnant " Josef Zwernemann . He had managed to claim a P - 51 shot down , but in turn was shot down , but bailed out . Several of his " staffel " say they saw a P - 51 in red and yellow markings shoot him in his parachute . Further east , over the north sea , B - 24s from the 14th Combat Wing were heading to Brunswick , planning to head further east and approach the city from its eastern side to avoid spending much time over the target . One of the four formations turned back , but a shadowing Me 410 " Fuhlungshalter " reported the other three formations position . 1 D ' s JG 3 attacked supported by 14 " Sturmstaffel 1 " Fw 190 heavy fighters . Some 11 B - 24s were shot down before P - 51s were quickly on the scene . The day was costly for both sides . 30 B - 24s were destroyed and two damaged . Four B - 17s were lost to flak and 23 USAAF fighters were lost and two damaged . Most fighter losses were caused by flak . German casualties are not clear , but at least 40 pilots were dead and 70 fighters lost . I . JK war diary indicated most of the 72 fighters claimed lost in were a result of strafing attacks . Another 45 were stated as damaged .