Tullahoma Campaign The Tullahoma Campaign or Middle Tennessee Campaign was fought between June 24 and July 3 , 1863 , during the American Civil War . The Union Army of the Cumberland , commanded by Maj . Gen . William Rosecrans , outmaneuvered the Confederate Army of Tennessee , commanded by General Braxton Bragg , from a strong defensive position , driving the Confederates from Middle Tennessee and threatening Chattanooga . The Tullahoma Campaign was arguably Rosecrans ' s most significant achievement of the war , described by historians as a " brilliant " campaign that achieved significant goals with very few casualties on either side . However , it was overshadowed by contemporaneous Union victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg and it left his opponent ' s army essentially intact , which led to Rosecrans ' s disastrous defeat at the Battle of Chickamauga in September . Background . Following the costly but tactically inconclusive Battle of Stones River ( December 31 , 1862 – January 2 , 1863 ) between Rosecrans and Bragg at Murfreesboro , Tennessee , Bragg withdrew his army about 30 miles to the south , along the Duck River and behind the ridge known as the Highland Rim , which encircles the Nashville Basin . Small groups of pickets protected the passes through the Highland Rim and cavalry protected each flank , a front of almost 70 miles . Bragg , headquartered in Tullahoma , was concerned that Rosecrans would advance to seize the strategic city of Chattanooga , a vital rail junction and the gateway to northern Georgia . His cavalry was spread over such a wide front because he was also concerned at a tactical level that Rosecrans might be able to turn his position , forcing him to retreat or to fight at a disadvantage . Bragg assumed that any attack would be made against his left flank through the easy - to - cross Guy ' s Gap in the direction of Shelbyville ; he placed his larger infantry corps commanded by Lt . Gen . Leonidas Polk in strong entrenchments at Shelbyville . Eight miles to his right , the corps of Lt . Gen . William J . Hardee was fortified in Wartrace , protecting the main road to Chattanooga and positioned to reinforce the other three passes through the Highland Rim — ( from west to east ) Bell Buckle Gap , Liberty Gap , and Hoover ' s Gap . Hoover ' s Gap was almost undefended ; it was a four - mile - long pass between the 1100 - foot ridges separating the Stones and Duck Rivers . The pass was so narrow that two wagons could barely pass side by side and was commanded by the surrounding ridges . Strong entrenchments were constructed , but they were manned by only a single cavalry regiment . After the campaign , Bragg was criticized for the inadequate nature of his Tullahoma position . Hardee told him that it was subject to both frontal and flanking attacks . Rosecrans kept his army in place occupying Murfreesboro for almost six months , spending the time resupplying , building a logistical base ( Fortress Rosecrans ) , and training , but also because he was reluctant to advance on the muddy winter roads . He received numerous entreaties from President Abraham Lincoln , Secretary of War Edwin M . Stanton , and General - in - Chief Henry W . Halleck to resume campaigning against Bragg , but rebuffed them through the winter and spring . A primary concern of the government was that if Rosecrans continued to sit idly , the Confederates might move units from Bragg ' s army in an attempt to relieve the pressure that Union Maj . Gen . Ulysses S . Grant was applying to Vicksburg , Mississippi . Lincoln wrote to Rosecrans , " I would not push you to any rashness , but I am very anxious that you do your utmost , short of rashness , to keep Bragg from getting lost to help Johnston against Grant . " Rosecrans offered an excuse that if he started to move against Bragg , Bragg would likely relocate his entire army to Mississippi and threaten Grant ' s Vicksburg Campaign even more ; thus , by not attacking Bragg , he was helping Grant . Frustration with Rosecrans ' s excuses led Halleck to threaten to relieve him if he did not move , but in the end he merely protested " against the expense to which [ Rosecrans ] put the government for telegrams . " Bragg ' s Army suffered from the delays . The area his troops occupied , known as the Barrens , was a zone of poor farmland that made it difficult for him to subsist his army while he waited for Rosecrans to attack him . Ironically , as they were stationed to protect agricultural supplies of the South moving by rail through Chattanooga , they were close to starving while large portions of those agricultural supplies were shipped east to Gen . Robert E . Lee ' s Army of Northern Virginia . Bragg ' s subordinate generals were near mutinous with their dissatisfaction of Bragg ' s command during his Kentucky campaign ( Battle of Perryville ) and Stones River . Confederate President Jefferson Davis responded to the complaints by dispatching Gen . Joseph E . Johnston to investigate the condition of the army . Davis assumed that Johnston , Bragg ' s superior , would find the situation wanting and take command of the army in the field , easing Bragg aside . However , Johnston arrived on the scene and found the men of the Army of Tennessee in relatively good condition . He told Bragg that he had " the best organized , armed , equipped , and disciplined army in the Confederacy . " Johnston explicitly refused any suggestion that he take command , concerned that people would think he had taken advantage of the situation for his own personal gain . When Davis ordered Johnston to send Bragg to Richmond , Johnston delayed because of Mrs . Elise Bragg ' s illness ; when her health improved Johnston was unable to assume command because of lingering medical problems from his wound at the Battle of Seven Pines in 1862 . During the winter and spring , both sides occupied themselves with their favorite — and generally profitless — practice of sending cavalry on raids . Almost a third of Bragg ' s army consisted of cavalry — 16 , 000 effectives versus about 9 , 000 Union . In a February raid against Fort Donelson ( the Battle of Dover ) Confederate Maj . Gen . Joseph Wheeler , commanding two brigades of cavalry , failed to capture the garrison in Dover , Tennessee , or disrupt Union shipping on the Cumberland River . In March , Rosecrans sent a detachment to cut Bragg ' s communications , but it was forced to surrender in the Battle of Thompson ' s Station . Also in March , Confederate Brig . Gen . Nathan Bedford Forrest raided Rosecrans ' s communications at Brentwood , a station on the Nashville & Decatur Railroad , in the Battle of Brentwood . Confederate Brig . Gen . John Hunt Morgan made his famous raid into Ohio and Pennsylvania , an operation that cavalry historian Stephen Z . Starr called " militarily insane " , ending in Morgan ' s capture . Confederate Maj . Gen . Earl Van Dorn who was brought into the Army of Tennessee ' s area of operation by Johnston , was unsure of his mission , where he was supposed to take position , and who would serve under him . He was unsuccessful in cutting Rosecrans ' s communications between February and May , with raids that included two minor cavalry fights north of Spring Hill in March and Forrest ' s pursuit and capture of Col . Abel Streight in Streight ' s Raid in Alabama in April . In May , Van Dorn was murdered and Forrest assumed command of the cavalry on Bragg ' s left flank ; most of Van Dorn ' s Mississippi troopers were transferred back to their home state in May . The Confederates lost 4 , 000 cavalrymen during this period but did cause Rosecrans some concern over his supply lines . The Union lost 3 , 300 men and received little in return . On June 2 , Halleck telegraphed that if Rosecrans was unwilling to move , some of his troops would be sent to Mississippi to reinforce Grant , who by then was besieging Vicksburg , but was potentially threatened by the army of Joseph E . Johnston to his rear . Rosecrans sent a questionnaire to his corps and division commanders in the hopes of documenting support for his position — that Bragg had so far detached no significant forces to Johnston in Mississippi , that advancing the Army of the Cumberland would do nothing to prevent any such transfer , and that any immediate advance was not a good idea . Fifteen of the seventeen senior generals supported most of Rosecrans ' s positions and the counsel against advancing was unanimous . The only dissenter was the newly assigned chief of staff , Brig . Gen . James A . Garfield , who recommended an immediate advance . On June 16 , Halleck wired a blunt message : " Is it your intention to make an immediate movement forward ? A definite answer , yes or no , is required . " Rosecrans responded to this ultimatum : " If immediate means tonight or tomorrow , no . If it means as soon as all things are ready , say five days , yes . " Seven days later , early in the morning of June 24 , Rosecrans reported that the Army of the Cumberland began to move against Bragg . Opposing forces . The Union Army of the Cumberland , commanded by Rosecrans , began campaigning with 50 – 60 , 000 men , composed of the following major organizations : The Confederate Army of Tennessee , commanded by Bragg , with about 45 , 000 men , was composed of the following major organizations : Campaign . The first movements of the campaign had actually begun on June 23 when elements of the Reserve Corps under Granger , with a cavalry division under Mitchell , moved due west from Murfreesboro to Triune to begin an elaborate feint . This was designed to play into Bragg ' s assumption that the main attack would come on his left flank in the direction of Shelbyville . At the same time , the XXI Corps division of John Palmer moved to Bradyville , well beyond the Confederate right flank , where he could push back Confederate cavalry and move in the direction of Manchester , getting into the Confederate rear . It was only after these movements were under way that Rosecrans brought his corps commanders together to hear the detailed orders for the upcoming campaign . Rosecrans ' s elaborate plan , which would test the extensive training program he had spent the six months conducting , was to slide Granger ' s corps to the left , covering the Shelbyville approaches , and perform a giant right wheel of the army . While Bragg ' s attention was focused on the strongly fortified Shelbyville , Thomas ' s corps would march southeast on the Manchester Pike , headed for Hoover ' s Gap on Hardee ' s right flank . Since the gap was lightly manned , speed was of the essence to Rosecrans ' s plan . During the spring , Rosecrans had repeatedly asked for more cavalry resources , which were denied by Washington , but he did receive permission to outfit an infantry brigade as a mounted unit . Col . John T . Wilder ' s brigade of Reynolds ' s division — 1 , 500 men of the 17th and 72nd Indiana regiments and the 98th and 123rd Illinois — found horses and mules in the countryside and armed themselves with long handled hatchets for hand - to - hand combat , which caused their unit to be derisively nicknamed the " Hatchet Brigade " . Their more lethal armament were the seven - shot Spencer repeating rifle s carried by all the men . Wilder ' s brigade had the mobility and firepower , but also the high unit morale , necessary to lead the surprise advance on Hoover ' s Gap before it could be reinforced . Wilder ' s brigade was successful in racing toward Hoover ' s Gap and capturing it on the first day of battle , which led to his unit ' s subsequent nickname , the Lightning Brigade . Their opponents , the 1st Kentucky Cavalry , skirmished briefly and withdrew under pressure , but were unable to reach the gap before the better - fed horses of the Lightning Brigade . The Kentuckians fell apart as a unit and , unluckily for the Confederates , failed in their cavalry mission to provide intelligence of the Union movement to their higher headquarters . Although Wilder ' s main infantry support was well behind his mounted brigade , he determined to continue pushing through the Gap and hold it before the Confederate reinforcements could arrive . The Confederate brigade of Brig . Gen . William B . Bate , supported by Brig . Gen . Bushrod Johnson ' s brigade and some artillery , assaulted Wilder ' s position , but was driven back by the concentrated fire of the Spencers , losing 146 killed and wounded ( almost a quarter of his force ) to Wilder ' s 61 . Wilder ' s brigade held the Gap until the main infantry units of the XIV Corps arrived to secure the position against any further assaults . The corps commander , General Thomas , shook Wilder ' s hand and told him , " You have saved the lives of a thousand men by your gallant conduct today . I didn ' t expect to get to this gap for three days . " At Liberty Gap , 6 miles to the west , a similar battle occurred . The leading elements of McCook ' s advance was the 39th Indiana , commanded by Col . Thomas J . Harrison , which was also mounted and armed with Spencer rifles . Taking a few prisoners of the Confederate pickets that opposed them , they found that there were only two Confederate regiments in the Gap . Not waiting for the main infantry support to arrive , McCook ordered the brigade of Brig . Gen . August Willich to move forward as quickly as possible . Deploying a regiment on each side of the road , Willich ' s men drove up the slope . A frontal assault against the breastworks was not feasible , so a fierce battle of flanking maneuvers resulted against the Confederate brigades of Brig . Gens . St . John R . Liddell and Patrick R . Cleburne . As a second Union brigade arrived in the evening to support Willich , the Union troops had pushed a half mile beyond the southern entrance to the Gap . The first day of the campaign had been conducted in heavy rain , a weather pattern that would persist for 17 days . ( Union soldiers spread the humorous rumor during the campaign that the name Tullahoma was a combination of the Greek words " tulla " , meaning " mud " , and " homa " , meaning " more mud " . ) This slowed the Union advances , but the day was marked by the Army of the Cumberland ' s " absolutely flawless execution of Rosecrans ' s plan . " The Union army possessed two key passes in the Highland Rim and was in position to turn Bragg ' s right flank . On June 25 , Bate and Johnson renewed their attempts to drive the Union men out of Hoover ' s Gap , while Cleburne did the same at Liberty Gap . Both were unsuccessful , although Cleburne pushed back Willich for a time , causing 20 % casualties in the 77th Pennsylvania , until reinforcements arrived . Rosecrans brought the forward movement of the Army of the Cumberland to a halt as the roads had become quagmires . But during this lull , Bragg took no effective action to counter Rosecrans because his cavalry commanders were not relaying intelligence to him reliably — Forrest was not informing of the weak nature of the Union right flank attack and Wheeler failed to report the movement of Crittenden ' s corps through Bradyville and toward Bragg ' s rear . Bragg became aware on June 26 of the significant fighting on his right flank and that the actions on his left were a feint . He ordered Polk to take his corps on a night march toward Murfreesboro through Guy ' s Gap and attack the Union force at Liberty Gap from the rear , while Hardee pressed them in front . Polk objected to the difficulty of the assignment and Bragg eventually called off the attack as he came to realize the threat from Thomas . Meanwhile , Rosecrans ordered McCook to withdraw from Liberty Gap to the north , skirt around the upper reaches of the Highland Rim , and exploit Thomas ' s breakout at Hoover ' s Gap . Hardee also contributed to Bragg ' s difficulties . The mistrust among the general officers of the Army of Tennessee for the past months led to little direct communication about strategy and neither Polk nor Hardee had a firm understanding of Bragg ' s plans . Hardee complained about the unsuitability of the Tullahoma position , but rather than assuming that Bragg and Joseph E . Johnston understood the strategic situation and that he had insufficient knowledge of their plans , as historian Steven E . Woodworth described it , " He simply took the situation as further proof of his long - held notion that Bragg was an idiot " and pursued the course " he deemed best for saving an army whose commander was an idiot . " That course was to order his force under Maj . Gen Alexander P . Stewart at Hoover ' s Gap to retreat towards Wartrace . If he had withdrawn in the direction of Manchester , he might have used the successive defensive positions along that route to delay Rosecrans enough for Bragg to implement a successful counterattack , but he simply made Thomas ' s breakout more effective , leaving Bragg with no alternatives than to order Polk and Hardee to withdraw to Tullahoma on June 27 . Wilder ' s Brigade reached Manchester at 8 a . m . on June 27 and his division occupied the town by noon . Rousseau and Brannon pushed their divisions toward Wartrace as Stewart withdrew . In the west , Granger and Stanley , still demonstrating before Guy ' s Gap , received orders to attempt to move forward . Stanley ' s cavalry easily pushed aside their Confederate counterparts and approached the breastworks at Shelbyville , now mostly abandoned after Polk ' s withdrawal . Some resistance remained and Col . Robert H . G . Minty personally led his " Saber Brigade " of Michigan cavalrymen in a mounted charge over the breastworks after the retreating Confederates . On June 28 , Wilder ' s brigade left on a raid to damage the railroad infrastructure in Bragg ' s rear , heading south toward Decherd , a small town on the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad . The rainswollen Elk River proved a significant obstacle , but they disassembled a nearby mill and constructed a raft to float their howitzer s across . They defeated a small garrison of Confederates in Decherd , tore up 300 yards of track and a burned the railroad depot filled with Confederate rations . The next morning they rode into the foothills of the Cumberland Mountains , reaching the town of Sewanee , the place Leonidas Polk had selected a few years before as the future site of the University of the South , where they destroyed a branch rail line . Although pursued by a larger Confederate force , the Lightning Brigade was back in Manchester by noon , June 30 . They had not lost a single man on their raid . Bragg was not overly concerned by the raid in his rear area and the damage to the railroad was repaired quickly . His men waited in their Tullahoma fortifications for a frontal assault that Rosecrans planned for July 1 . However , Polk was overly concerned about the fate of the army with its communications cut off — even temporarily — and counseled Bragg to retreat . Hardee , who had no faith in Bragg , refused to specifically recommend a retreat , but offered no encouragement to stay and fight . A day later , at 3 p . m . on June 30 , Bragg issued orders for a nighttime withdrawal across the Elk . By leaving before the Union assault , Bragg gave up an opportunity to inflict potentially serious damage on the Army of the Cumberland . The Army of Tennessee took up positions below the Elk River , but Hardee and Polk convinced Bragg to move farther south , to the town of Cowan . Steven Woodworth wrote that " The resolute and well - conceived Union advance and the constant carping and noncooperation of his generals seemed to have broken Bragg down physically and emotionally " and he suffered from a collection of physical ailments , including a painful case of boil s that prevented him from mounting his horse to survey the battle lines . The Cowan position was not well defensible and the army remained there only until the evening of July 2 . Without consulting his corps commanders , on July 3 Bragg ordered a retreat to Chattanooga . The army crossed the Tennessee River on July 4 ; a cavalry pursuit under Phil Sheridan was not successful in trapping the rear guard of Bragg ' s army before they crossed the river . All the Confederate units had encamped near Lookout Mountain by July 7 . Aftermath . Tullahoma is considered a " brilliant " campaign by many historians . Abraham Lincoln wrote , " The flanking of Bragg at Shelbyville , Tullahoma and Chattanooga is the most splendid piece of strategy I know of . " Union Cavalry Corps commander David Stanley wrote , " If any student of the military art desires to make a study of a model campaign , let him take his maps and General Rosecrans ' s orders for the daily movements of his campaign . No better example of successful strategy was carried out during the war than in the Tullahoma campaign . " The Union Army had driven the Confederates out of Middle Tennessee with minimal losses . Union casualties were reported as 569 ( 83 killed , 473 wounded , and 13 captured or missing ) . Bragg made no casualty report ; his losses , he said , were " trifling . " But the Union army captured 1 , 634 Confederates , primarily from Hardee ' s Corps . As Bragg rode into the Tennessee mountains he told Bishop Charles Quintard , the chaplain of the 1st Tennessee , that he was " utterly broken down " and that the campaign was " a great disaster " . Rosecrans did not receive all of the public acclaim his campaign might have under different circumstances . The day it ended was the day Robert E . Lee launched Pickett ' s Charge and lost the Battle of Gettysburg . The following day , Vicksburg surrendered to Grant . Secretary Of War Stanton telegraphed Rosecrans , " Lee ' s Army overthrown ; Grant victorious . You and your noble army now have a chance to give the finishing blow to the rebellion . Will you neglect the chance ? " Rosecrans was infuriated by this attitude and responded , " Just received your cheering telegram announcing the fall of Vicksburg and confirming the defeat of Lee . You do not appear to observe the fact that this noble army has driven the rebels from middle Tennessee . . . . I beg in behalf of this army that the War Department may not overlook so great an event because it is not written in letters of blood . " Rosecrans did not immediately pursue Bragg and " give the finishing blow to the rebellion " as Stanton urged . He paused to regroup and study the difficult choices of pursuit into mountainous regions . When the campaigning resumed , Bragg ' s army proved to be only temporarily defeated . Reinforced with additional troops from Lee ' s Virginia army , Bragg attacked Rosecrans at the Battle of Chickamauga in September and won the only significant Confederate victory in the Western Theater of the war , driving Rosecrans back to Chattanooga and besieging him there .