5th Naval Infantry Battalion ( Argentina ) The 5th Marine Infantry Battalion ( Spanish " Batallón de Infantería de Marina 5 " , abbreviated to BIM - 5 ) is a battalion of the Argentine Marine Corps . Current . Today BIM - 5 , together with the 4th Marine Infantry Battalion ( BIM - 4 ) , is based at Río Grande , Tierra del Fuego Province as part of the Argentine Navy ' s " Fuerza de Infantería de Marina Austral " ( Southern Marine Corps Force , FAIA ) , formerly " Fuerza de Infantería de Marina N°1 " ( First Marine Force , FIM1 ) . They started the " Black Beret " tradition from a design made by Marine Sub - Lieutenant ( naval rank equivalent to army captain ) Abelardo " Tigre " ( Tiger ) Terré at the beginning of 1977 , with then Marine Commander Manuel Tomé as its CO . After a gruelling Mountain and Cold Weather commando fighting course , they were dubbed the " Aguilas Australes " ( Southern Eagles ) and wore a black beret with a silver flash . Later on , the flash was changed to the unit ' s crest , and the use of the beret spread throughout FIM1 and FAIA . The Original " Aguilas Australes " flash is currently the semi - official logo of the Rio Grande Marine Garrison ( Agrupación IM Río Grande ) . History . Operation Soberanía . At 20 : 00 on 22 December 1978 a task force of the Argentine Navy and the Argentine Marines ( Batallón N° 5 ) under the command of Humberto José Barbuzzi would seize the islands Horn , Freycinet , Hershell , Deceit and Wollaston . On D - day , a severe storm impeded Argentine operations in the disputed area . Falklands War and Battle of Mount Tumbledown . Commanded by Marine Commander Carlos H . Robacio , BIM - 5 took part in the defence of Mount Tumbledown in the 1982 Falklands War . Although made up by conscripts , the unit ' s core of highly - professional NCOs and commissioned officers , along with a well - developed training and logistics system , rendered BIM - 5 a tough unit that fought well in defense during the Battle of Mount Tumbledown . Different Argentine authorities have repeatedly decorated BIM - 5 ' s colors , while Marine Admiral Robacio is a holder of the French Légion d ' Honneur and he was awarded the Argentine Nation to the Valour in Combat Medal . Mount Tumbledown , Mount William , and Sapper Hill lie west of Stanley . They were held by BIM - 5 , a reinforced , cold weather trained and equipped , marine battalion . During preparations for movement to the Falklands , the Marine battalion was brought up to full strength of a light brigade with a company of the amphibious engineer company and a battery of the 1st Marine Artillery Regiment . The 5th Marines were further strengthened by three Tigercat SAM batteries of the 1st Marine Anti - Aircraft Regiment , deployed along Stanley harbor , and a heavy machine - gun company of Headquarters Battalion . The BIM - 5 positions around Port Stanley were bombarded , both from the sea by naval gunfire and from the air by the Royal Air Force Harrier s . At 4 . 30 p . m . , on 7 June 1982 , a British Harrier bombing positions held by the 5th Marine Battalion was hit by concentrated fire from M Company ( under Marine Sub - Lieutenant Rodolfo Cionchi ) on Sapper Hill . 12 June proved to be the toughest day for the Argentine Marines . From the moment the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards had finally been moved to Goat Ridge by helicopter , 1 , 500 rounds of artillery , descended upon the Marines , in preparation for the coming infantry assault . On 13 June a diversionary action was fought to the northeast in order to raid the Cortley Ridge fuel dump . The 101st Anti - Aircraft Artillery Group ' s B Battery ( B / GADA101 ) was assigned to defend the Fresinet Peninsula , a long , narrow piece of land running from Moody Brook to form the northern arm of Stanley , when their troops came under attack at 11 p . m . The incursion was carried out by the SAS and SBS in rigid raiders . They were engaged by the Marines with automatic weapons , resulting in four wounded occupants . ( Tony Geraghty , Who Dares Wins : The Special Air Service 1950 to the Gulf War , p . 156 ) Further south , action was initiated shortly after 8 p . m . , as the 2nd Scots Guards ' Reconnaissance Platoon carried out a diversionary attack , advancing with four Blues and Royals Scorpion light tanks . As the British tanks came into range of the 5th Marine Battalion ' s O Coy ( O / BIM5 ) , one of the Scorpion tanks was incapacitated by a booby - trap . In a firefight that lasted two hours , three Marines were killed ( Marine Conscripts Omar Iniguez , Omar Patrone , and Juan Rava ) . The Guards decided to fall back towards the south but entered a minefield and were caught in a crossfire from the Mortar Platoon on Mount William and the Marines ' artillery . BIM - 5 coordinated fire support from Bravo Battery of the 1st Marine Field Artillery Battalion ( B / BIAC and also guns of the Argentine Army ' s 3rd and 4th ( Airborne ) Artillery Groups ( G . A . 3 / G . A . Aerot . 4 ) . The Guards sustained twelve casualties . At about 1 . 30 a . m . on 14 June , the commander of the 5th Marines ordered O Company of the Marines , to withdraw in order to stand in reserve . O Coy ' s rest in reserve wasshort lived and in the early hours of 14 June the platoon commanders were instructed to put the platoons on one hour ' s notice to move . Meanwhile , to the north of Mount William , Marine Sub - Lieutenant Eduardo Villarraza ' s N Company of the 5th Marines ( N / BIM5 ) occupied Mount Tumbledown . At 10 . 30 p . m . , they were attacked from Goat Ridge by 2nd Scots Guards . About 300 metres from the first Argentine position , the Marines opened fire with MAG machine - guns and FAL rifles . Both British forward platoons started to take casualties and the Scots Guards retreated to the western rocks and reorganized themeselves . Argentine shells began landing among the Guards but by 2 . 30 a . m . , part of the high ground was in British hands and the situation of the Argentine forces became uncertain . In the centre of the mountain , one Scots Guards platoon managed to secure a small piece of high ground , where they were able to set up a fire base that pinned down several Marine positions for the remaining five hours of the battle . Commander Robacio ordered Marine Sub - Lieutenant Eduardo Villarraza to send a fighting patrol to deal with the fire base . Marine Sub - Lieutenant Hector Miño with 5th Platoon accompanied by Second Lieutenant Augusto La Madrid ( Argentine Army ) with 3rd Platoon . Meanwhile members of the Marine N Company ( N / BIM5 ) were ordered to remain under cover during a bombardment by Argentine artillery . However , using the cover of British artillery , the Scots Guards advanced upon the Argentine positions . Marine Private Jorge Sanchez , in the book " 5th Infantry Brigade in the Falklands " ( Leo Cooper , 2003 ) , recalled : The fighting was sporadic , but at times fierce , as we tried to maintain our position . By this time we had ten or twelve dead including one officer [ Second Lieutenant Oscar Silva , Argentine Army ] . I hadn ' t fired directly at a British soldier , as they had been too hard to get a clear shot at . I can remember lying there with all this firing going over my head . They were everywhere . The platoon commander [ Marine Sub - Lieutenant Carlos Daniel Vazquez ] then called Private Ramon Rotela manning the 60 millimetre mortar and Rotela fired it straight up into the air so that the bombs landed on ourselves . At this point I had been up and in actual combat for over six hours . It was snowing and we were tired . Some of the guys had surrendered , but I didn ' t want to do this . I had only twenty rounds left and I decided to continue the fight from Mount William . I popped up , fired a rifle grenade in the direction of 8 to 10 British soldiers to keep their heads down , and then ran for the 2nd Platoon . I can remember saying some type of prayer hoping the British wouldn ' t shoot me in the back . Two Argentine platoons ( Second Lieutenant La Madrid and Marine Sub - Lieutenant Miño ) on the eastern of Tumbledown counter - attacked but were outmanoeuvred by the Scots Guards . During this action Miño was wounded but refused medical assistance until all the wounded men received medical attention . The fall of Wireless Ridge and the heavy expenditure of artillery , mortar and machine - gun ammunition in support of the 7th Infantry Regiment ( RI7 ) on the ridgeline overlooking Moody Brook rendered the situation of the Marines tenuous . Using armour - infantry - co - operation the 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment had advanced through the RI7 companies . O Company , BIM - 5 ( O / BIM5 ) had been sent up to the Moody Brook area and moved into blocking positions to the south and east of Moody Brook . In due course firing broke out in the direction of Battalion HQ at Moody Brook , indicating that the British had outflanked their position . At 7 a . m . , the Commanding Officer of the 5th Marines reported his command post near Moody Brook had come under enemy fire from Wireless Ridge . By dawn the approach of the Gurkhas , advancing to secure Mount William was detected . As the Marine commanders on Tumbledown and Mount William awaited reinforcements , they received orders to withdraw . Ignoring these orders , the Marines continued to resist . By 9 a . m . , the Marines had again been ordered to withdraw . Around eight RI 6 personnel were killed and eighteen captured , many of them wounded but the 5th Marine Battalion ' s N Coy ( N / BIM5 ) carried out an orderly withdrawal to Sapper Hill . The 6th Regiment ' s B Coy ( B / RI6 ) successfully withdrew with its portable weapons to set up defensive positions around Sapper Hill . Five of the Marine platoon positions now fell to the British . About 9 a . m . Gurkhas , supported by artillery fire , launched the final assault against Mount William . . The Argentine propaganda now backfired . Stories had been bandied about portraying Gurkhas as semi - human cannibals who never took prisoners and went into battle crazed with drugs . The Argentines on Mount William were already feeling insecure after the fall of Tumbledown and Wireless Ridge . When they realised they were about to be attacked by the Gurkhas , it became too much for them . Almost an entire battalion of Argentines fled Mount William as D Company advanced towards the Hill . Lt . - Col . Morgan ' s men took Mount William unopposed and his men were bitterly disappointed . By 10 . a . m . the 5th Marine Battalion ' s position had stabilized . The Argentine commanding officer , Marine Commander Robacio and the RI 6 Officer , Major Jaimet were determined to continue fighting . In the battle report Marine Commander Robacio wrote : " I was convinced that we could still resist , and that is why I ordered the O Company - which was ready - to begin a counter - attack together with the M Company . I planned to direct this attack myself personally . " ( Marine Rear Admiral Carlos Büsser , El BIM 5 en las Malvinas , Boletin del Centro Naval , pp . 318 – 319 ) . Generals Mario Benjamin Menendez ( the commander of the Argentine garrison ) and Oscar Jofre ( commander of the 10th Brigade , responsible for the defence of Stanley ) , following a quick conference , agreed that to continue resistance would entail senseless loss of life . By 1 p . m . , the 5th Marines had initiated their withdrawal , after destroying their vehicles and heavy equipment . Minutes later Marine Midshipman ( naval rank equivalent to second lieutenant ) Alejandro Koch ' s 3rd Platoon , M Coy ( M / BIM5 ) covering the withdrawal of the Marine battalion were attacked by C Company of 40 Commando ( C / 40 Cdo . ) landing from eight Sea King helicopters . ( Hugh Bicheno " Razor ' s Edge " pg . 314 ) Three Argentine Marines ( Marine Conscripts Roberto Leyes , Eleodoro Monzon and Sergio Robledo ) were killed covering the last withdrawal . Four Royal Marine Commandos were shot in the action ( two more , including Lt . Cooper , later trod on mines ) . Marine Commander Robacio , commanding the Marine battalion , spoke to British journalists after the war and said , " At about seven o ' clock I received the order to withdraw prior to a surrender . Our military code states that for an Argentine military unit to surrender it must have spent all its ammunition or lost at least two - thirds of its men . It was awful to have to ask the units which were still fighting to withdraw . " ( Michael Bilton & Peter Kosminsky , Speaking Out : Untold Stories from the Falklands War , p . 213 , Andre Deutsch , 1989 )