Strategic Rocket Forces ( North Korea ) The Strategic Rocket Forces ( Chosŏn ' gŭl : 조선인민군 전략로케트군 , Hanja : 朝鮮人民軍 戰略로케트軍 ) , also known as Missile Guidance Bureau ( Chosŏn ' gŭl : 미사일지도국 ; Hanja : 미사일指導局 ) is the strategic missile forces of North Korea . The SMF is a major division of the Korean People ' s Army that controls North Korea ' s nuclear and conventional strategic missiles . It is mainly equipped with surface - to - surface missile s of Soviet and Chinese design , as well as locally developed long - range missiles . History . Shortly after Kim Il - Sung ' s October 5 , 1966 , instructions to develop the military and economy jointly , the Second Machine Industry Ministry , under the Korean Workers Party secretary in charge of military industries , was established to manage the procurement and production of weapons . Some sources assert that North Korea had begun the production of multiple rocket launchers in the early 1960s , but by 1965 Kim Il - sŏng had probably made the political decision to establish an indigenous missile production capability after the Soviets rebuffed his request for ballistic missiles . Nevertheless , during the 1960s the Soviet Union began to provide free rockets over ground ( FROG s ) , surface - to - air missiles ( SAMs ) , and coastal defense antiship missiles , which exposed North Korean engineers to basic technologies for rocket propulsion , guidance , and related missile systems . And in 1965 , North Korea founded the Hamhŭng Military Academy , which began to train North Korean personnel in rocket and missile development . By 1970 , North Korea had received surface - to - ship missiles and surface - to - air missiles from China , but Pyongyang was also seeking assistance to establish its own missile development program . In September 1971 , North Korea signed an agreement with China to acquire , develop , and produce ballistic missiles , but significant bilateral cooperation did not begin until about 1977 when North Korean engineers participated in a joint development program for the DF - 61 , which was supposed to be a liquid - fueled ballistic missile with a range of about 600 km and a 1 , 000 kg warhead . The program was cancelled in 1978 because of Chinese domestic political reasons . Around this same time , Pyongyang was also seeking Soviet missiles and technology . The DPRK did receive Soviet - made Scud - B ballistic missiles , but the timing of the acquisition is unclear . One North Korean defector has asserted that the Soviet Union provided about 20 Scud - Bs in 1972 , but this claim has not been substantiated and is probably not credible . By 1984 , the DPRK had produced and flight - tested its Hwasong - 5 , which reportedly has a range of 320 km compared to the Scud - B ’ s 300 km ; the extra 20 km is attributed to improvements in the missile ’ s propulsion system and not a reduction in the mass of the warhead . Just as North Korea was beginning to manufacture the Hwasŏng - 5 , Tehran approached Pyongyang in 1985 to purchase the missile for use in the “ war of the cities ” with Iraq . North Korea began to construct missile bases for the Hwasŏng - 5 around 1985 - 86 , just before the missile went into serial production around 1987 . North Korea ’ s ballistic missile development then accelerated at a fast pace ; as soon as mass production of the Hwasŏng - 5 began , North Korea began developing the Hwasŏng - 6 ( 火星 - 6 or Scud - C ) , the Rodong ( commonly known as Nodong - 1 ) , the Paektusan - 1 ( 白頭山 - 1 ; commonly known as the Taepodong - 1 ) , the Paektusan - 2 ( 白頭山 - 2 ; commonly known as the Taepodong - 2 ) , and the Musudan . Despite the difficulties of missile development and the fact that other countries had tried and failed to develop medium - and intermediate - range missiles , North Korea began to produce Rodong prototypes around the same time it was beginning mass production of the Hwasŏng - 6 ( Scud - C ) . The first Rodong deployments were in February 1995 , even though the system only had two flight tests — one catastrophic failure and one successful flight at a reduced range . In 1999 different missile units , which were subordinate to the KPA Ground Force Artillery Command , were re - organized into a single missile force - the Missile Guidance Bureau . Organization . The Strategic Rocket Forces is a branch of the KPA , and is directly subordinate to the supreme commander . Facilities . There are other numerous smaller sites , scattered around the country , serving for mobile launcher pads . Some larger sites are under construction . Active Missiles . Detailed listings of the equipment holdings of the Korean People ' s Army [ KPA ] are rather scarce in unclassified literature . North Korea operates the FROG - 7 , Hwasong - 5 ( NK built Scud - B ) , Hwasong - 6 ( NK built Scud - C ) , Rodong - 1 , SCUD - ER . Rather speculative estimates are given in the following table : Additionally , there are two space booster variants : North Korea test - fired a short - range missile off its eastern coast toward Japan on 1 May 2005 . The missile , fired into the Sea of Japan ( East Sea of Korea ) , appeared to have a range of between 100 to 120 kilometers . It is called by the North the KN - 02 Toksa ( " Viper " ) , an upgraded version of the Russian SS - 21 , with a longer range . The KN - 02 nomenclature was disclosed by Kim Sung - il Kim Seong - il , chief information officer at Seoul ’ s Joint Chiefs of Staff , in a closed - door parliamentary session . The DPRK test - fired the same type of missile in April 2004 , but the test failed . Another multiple test has taken place in 2006 , and it was a success . According to most reports , the missile was deployed in 2007 , and was seen on military parades . Warheads . North Korean missiles can serve to deliver various types of warheads , including WMD . It is possible that up to three Rodong - 1 missiles are fitted with nuclear warheads . In a similar manner to the initial Chinese nuclear doctrine , nuclear weapons are being stored separately , and would only be mounted on missiles after an order of the supreme commander ( Kim Jong - un ) . Despite the claims by numerous media that North Korea has not yet created nuclear warheads small enough to be fit in a missile , reports surfaced in April 2009 , according to which North Korea has miniaturized warheads , capable of being mounted on its missiles . The most suitable nuclear weapons delivery system is the Rodong - 1 , which has been successfully tested many times . Additionally , the DPRK possesses a large chemical weapons stockpile , including powerful agents such as tabun , sarin , soman , VX gas and others . Little is known about the biological weapons stockpiles . They are probably limited , as North Koreans consider them much more dangerous to handle , therefore posing a threat to their own soldiers apart from the enemy . North Korea has yet to demonstrate the ability to produce a re - entry vehicle , without which North Korea cannot deliver a weapon from an ICBM . Doubts about the missiles . United Nations and independent experts say that North Korea does not operate missiles beyond the intermediate range , and that the long - range missiles shown at parades are mock - ups . There are doubts about the authenticity of the KN - 08 missiles displayed on 16 - wheel carrier trucks during a 2012 military parade , and Musudan missiles shown in 2010 were probably mock - ups . The experts who studied the most doubted KN - 08 pictures have pointed out multiple problems . For example : Exports . Several countries , including Pakistan and Libya , have bought North Korean ballistic missiles or received assistance from North Korea to establish local missile production . See also . National strategic missile forces :