February 26 Incident The ( also known as the 2 - 26 Incident ) was an attempted coup d ' état in Japan on 26 February 1936 . It was organized by a group of young Imperial Japanese Army ( IJA ) officers with the goal of purging the government and military leadership of their factional rivals and ideological opponents . Although the rebels succeeded in assassinating several leading officials ( including two former Prime Ministers ) and in occupying the government center of Tokyo , they failed to assassinate the current Prime Minister Keisuke Okada or secure control of the Imperial Palace . Their supporters in the army made attempts to capitalize on their actions , but divisions within the military , combined with Imperial anger at the coup , meant they were unable to achieve a change of government . Facing overwhelming opposition as the army moved against them , the rebels surrendered on 29 February . Unlike earlier examples of political violence by young officers , the coup attempt had severe consequences . After a series of closed trials , 19 of the uprising ' s leaders were executed for mutiny and another 40 imprisoned . The radical Kōdō - ha faction lost its influence within the army , the period of " government by assassination " came to a close , and the military increased its control over the civilian government . Background . IJA Factional Rivalry . The Imperial Japanese Army had a long history of factionalism among its high - ranking officers , originally stemming from domainal rivalries in the Meiji period . By the early 1930s , officers in the high command had become split into two main informal groups : the Kōdō - ha " Imperial Way " faction led by Gen . Araki Sadao and his ally Gen . Jinzaburō Mazaki and the Tōsei - ha " Control " faction identified with Gen . Tetsuzan Nagata . The Kōdō - ha emphasized the importance of Japanese culture , spiritual purity over material quality , and the need to attack the Soviet Union while the Tōsei - ha officers , who were strongly influenced by the ideas of the contemporary German general staff , supported central economic and military planning ( total war theory ) , technological modernization , mechanization , and expansion within China . The Kōdō - ha was dominant in the army during Araki ' s tenure as Minister of War from 1931 to 1934 , occupying most significant staff positions , but many of its members were replaced by Tōsei - ha officers following Araki ' s resignation . The Young Officers . Army officers were divided between those whose education had ended at the Army Academy ( a secondary school ) and those who had advanced on to the prestigious Army War College . The latter group formed the elite of the officer corps , while officers of the former group were effectively barred by tradition from advancement to staff positions . A number of these lesser - privileged officers formed the army ' s contribution to the young , highly politicized group often referred to as the . The young officers believed that the problems facing the nation were the result of Japan straying from the ( an amorphous term often translated as " national polity " , it roughly signifies the relationship between the Emperor and the state ) . The " privileged classes " exploited the people , leading to widespread poverty in rural areas , and deceived the Emperor , usurping his power and weakening Japan . The solution , they believed , was a " Shōwa Restoration " modeled on the Meiji Restoration of 70 years earlier . By rising up and destroying the " evil advisers around the Throne " , the officers would enable the Emperor to re - establish his authority . The Emperor would then purge Western ideas and those who exploited the people , restoring prosperity to the nation . These beliefs were strongly influenced by contemporary nationalist thought , especially the political philosophy of the former socialist Ikki Kita . The loose - knit group varied in size , but is estimated to have had roughly a hundred regular members , mostly officers in Tokyo area . Its informal leader was Mitsugi ( Zei ) Nishida . Nishida , a former army lieutenant and disciple of Kita , had become a prominent member of the civilian nationalist societies that proliferated from the late 1920s . Nishida referred to the army group as the faction . Involved to at least some extent in most of the political violence of the period , following the March and October Incidents of 1931 , the army and navy members of the group split and largely ended their association with civilian nationalists . Despite its relatively small size , the faction was influential , due in no small part to the threat it posed . It had sympathizers among the general staff and imperial family ( most notably Prince Chichibu , the Emperor ' s brother ( and , until 1933 , heir ) , who was friends with Nishida and other Kokutai Genri - ha leaders ) . Despite being fiercely anti - capitalist , it had also managed to secure irregular funding from zaibatsu leaders who hoped to shield themselves . The exact nature of the relationship between the Kōdō - ha and the Kokutai Genri - ha is complicated . The two factions are often treated as the same or as two groups forming a larger whole . Contemporary accounts and the writings of members of the two groups make clear they were actually distinct groups in a mutually beneficial alliance , however . The Kōdō - ha shielded the Kokutai Genri - ha and provided it with access while they in exchange benefited from their perceived ability to restrain the radical officers . Political Violence . The years leading up to the February 26 Incident were marked by a series of outbursts of violence by the young officers and their fellow nationalists against their political opponents . Most notably , in the May 15 Incident of 1932 young naval officers assassinated Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi . This incident is significant because it convinced the young army officers ( who were aware of , but not involved in the attack ) of the need to utilize troops in any potential coup attempt . The ringleaders of the incident , as in the previous March and October incidents , received relatively light punishments . The direct prelude to the coup , however , was the 1934 Military Academy Incident ( November Incident ) and its consequences . In this incident Capt . Takaji Muranaka and Capt . Asaichi Isobe , prominent members of the Kokutai Genri - ha , were arrested for planning a coup with a group of military cadets . Muranaka and Isobe admitted discussing such a coup , but denied having any plans to actually carry it out . The military court investigating the incident found there was insufficient evidence to indict , but Muranaka and Isobe were suspended by the army . The two were convinced that the incident was a Tōsei - ha attack on the young officers and began circulating a pamphlet calling for a " housecleaning " of the army and naming Nagata as the " chief villain " . They were then expelled from the army . It was at this time that the last Kōdō - ha officer in a prominent position , Gen . Mazaki , was forced from office . The young officers were enraged by Mazaki ' s removal because , having become disillusioned with Araki for his failures to overcome resistance in the cabinet during his time as War Minister , Mazaki had become the focus of their hopes . Muranaka and Isobe released a new pamphlet attacking Nagata for the dismissal , as did Nishida . On 12 August 1935 , in the " Aizawa Incident " , Lt . Colonel Saburō Aizawa , a member of the Kokutai Genri - ha and a friend of Mazaki , murdered Nagata in his office in retaliation . Aizawa ' s public trial ( which began in late January 1936 ) became a media sensation as Aizawa and the Kokutai Genri - ha leadership , in collusion with the judges , turned it into a soapbox from which their ideology could be broadcast . Aizawa ' s supporters in the mass media praised Aizawa ' s " morality and patriotism " , and Aizawa himself came to be seen as " a simple soldier who sought only to reform the army and the nation according to the true National Principle . " Preparations . Deciding to Act . The Kokutai Genri - ha had long supported a violent uprising against the government . The decision to finally act in February 1936 was caused by two factors . The first was the decision announced in December 1935 to transfer the 1st Division , to which most of the Kokutai Genri - ha ' s officers belonged , to Manchuria in the spring . This meant that if the officers did not strike before then , any possible action would be delayed by years . The second was Aizawa ' s trial . The impact of Aizawa ' s actions had impressed the officers , and they believed that by acting while his trial was still going on , they could take advantage of the favorable public opinion it was causing . The decision to act was initially opposed by Nishida and Kita when they learned of it . The two men ' s relationship with most of the officers had become relatively distant in the years leading up to the uprising , and they were against direct action . However , once it was clear that the officers were determined to act anyway , they moved to support them . Another barrier to be overcome was opposition to the involvement of troops from Teruzō Andō , who had sworn an oath to his commander not to involve his men in any direct action . Andō ' s position in the 3rd Infantry Regiment ( the largest source of troops ) was essential to the plot , so Muranaka and Nonaka spoke with him repeatedly , ultimately wearing down his resistance . The date February 26 was chosen because the officers had been able to arrange to have themselves and their allies serve as duty officers on that date , facilitating their access to arms and ammunition . The date also allowed Mazaki to testify at Aizawa ' s trial as scheduled on the 25th . Planning and Manifesto . The uprising was planned in a series of meetings held between the 18 and 22 February by Mitsugi Nishida , Yasuhide Kurihara , Teruzō Andō , Hisashi Kōno , Takaji Muranaka , and Asaichi Isobe . The plan decided upon was relatively simple . The officers would assassinate the most prominent enemies of the kokutai , secure control of the administrative center of the capital and the Imperial Palace , and then submit their demands ( the dismissal of certain officers and the appointment of a new cabinet led by Mazaki ) . They had no longer term goals , believing that those should be left to the Emperor . It is believed that they were prepared to replace Hirohito with Prince Chichibu if necessary , however . The young officers believed they had at least tacit approval for their uprising from a number of important army officers after making a number of informal approaches . These including Minister of War Yoshiyuki Kawashima , Araki , Mazaki , Tomoyuki Yamashita , Kanji Ishiwara , Shigeru Honjō , and their own immediate commanders , Kohei Kashii and Takeo Hori . Kawashima ' s successor as Minister of War later remarked that if all the officers who had supported the rebels had been forced to resign , there wouldn ' t have been enough high - ranking officers left to replace them . They prepared an explanation of their intentions and grievances in a document , entitled , which they wanted to be handed to the Emperor . The document was prepared by Muranaka , but written in Shirō Nonaka ' s name as he was the highest - ranking officer involved in the plot . The document was entirely in line with Kokutai Genri - ha ideals , blaming the genrō , political leaders , military factions , zaibatsu , bureaucrats , and political parties for endangering the kokutai through their selfishness and disrespect for the Emperor and asserting the need for direct action : < br > Seven targets were chosen for assassination for " threatening the kokutai " : The first four mentioned in the above list survived the attempted coup . Saionji , Saitō , Suzuki , and Makino were targeted because they were the most influential Imperial advisers . Okada and Takahashi were moderate political leaders who had worked to restrain the military . Finally , Watanabe was targeted as a member of the Tōsei - ha and because he had been involved with Mazaki ' s removal . Saionji ' s name was ultimately removed from the list , though the reasons why are disputed . Some of the officers ' allies argued that he should be left alive to be used to help convince the Emperor to appoint Mazaki as Prime Minister , and this is commonly given as the reason . However , Isobe testified later that he had rejected these suggestions and continued to make arrangements for the attack on Saionji . According to his account , the attack was only canceled after the officers assigned to carry it out ( teachers at a military school in Toyohashi ) could not agree over the use of cadets in the operation . The Righteous Army . From the 22nd on , the 7 leaders managed to convince 18 other officers to join the uprising with varying degrees of enthusiasm . Non - commissioned officers ( NCO ) were informed on the night of the 25th , hours before the attacks started . Although the officers insisted that all NCOs participated voluntarily and any orders given were merely " pro forma " , many of the NCOs argued later that they had been in no real position to refuse to participate . The soldiers themselves , 70 % of whom were less than a month out of basic training , were not told anything before the coup began , though many were ( according to the offiers ) enthusiastic once the uprising began . The bulk of the army was made up of men from the 1st Division ' s 1st Infantry Regiment ( 11th and MG companies ; 456 men ) and 3rd Infantry Regiment ( 1st , 3rd , 6th , 7th , 10th , and MG companies ; 937 men ) . The only other significant contribution was 138 men from the 3rd Imperial Guard Regiment . Including officers , civilians , and men from other units , the total size of the Righteous Army was 1 , 558 men . An official count of 1 , 483 was given at the time ; this number excludes the 75 men who participated in Nakahashi ' s attempt to secure the Palace ; see below ) . The leadership adopted the name for this force and the password , adopted from the Meiji Restoration - era slogan , " Revere the Emperor , Destroy the Shogunate " . Allies were also to display a 3 sen postage stamp when approaching the army ' s lines . Uprising . It snowed heavily on the night of the 25th , covering Tokyo . This heartened the rebel officers because it reminded them of the 1860 Sakuradamon Incident in which shishi assassinated Ii Naosuke , the chief adviser to the Shogun , in the name of the Emperor . The rebel troops , divided up into 6 groups , assembled their troops and left their barracks between 03 : 30 and 04 : 00 . The attacks on Okada , Takahashi , Suzuki , Saito , the Ministry of War , and police headquarters occurred approximately simultaneously at 05 : 00 . 1st Infantry Regiment . Keisuke Okada . The attack on Okada consisted of 280 men from the 1st Infantry Regiment led by 1st Lt . Yasuhide Kurihara . The troops surrounded the Prime Minister ' s residence and forced its guards to open the gates . Upon entering the compound and attempting the find the Prime Minister , however , they were fired upon by four policemen . All four were killed after wounding six of the rebel soldiers , but the gunfire succeeded in warning Okada of the danger . He was spirited into hiding by his brother - in - law , Col . Denzō Matsuo . Matsuo , who was said to have resembled Okada , was then discovered and killed by the troops . The soldiers compared Matuso ' s wounded face to a picture of the Prime Minister and concluded that they had succeeded in their mission . Okada would escape the next day , but this fact was kept a secret and he played no further role in the incident . After Matsuo ' s death , Kurihara ' s men assumed guard positions around the compound . They were joined by 60 men from the 3rd Imperial Guard ( see below ) . Seizure of the Ministry of War . Kiyosada Kōda , accompanied by Muranaka , Isobe , and others , led 160 men to seize control of the Minister of War ' s residence , the Minister of War itself , and the General Staff Office . Once this had been accomplished , they entered the residence and asked to see Minister of War Yoshiyuki Kawashima . When they were admitted to see him at 06 : 30 , they read their manifesto aloud and handed him a document in which they made numerous demands of the army , including : As Minister of War ( 1924 – 27 , 1929 – 31 ) , Ugaki had overseen a reduction in size and modernization of the army . He had also failed to back the March Incident plotters ( who had hoped to make him Prime Minister ) . Minami , Muto , Nemoto , and Katakura were all prominent members of the Tōsei - ha faction . Katakura was also partly responsible for reporting the Military Academy Incident . When Isobe encountered him outside the Ministry of War later that morning , he shot him ( non - fatally ) in the head . During this period , a number of officers sympathetic to the rebels were admitted , including generals Mazaki , Tomoyuki Yamashita , Ryū Saitō , and the Vice - Minister of War , Motoo Furushō . Saitō praised the young officers ' spirit and urged Kawashima to accept their demands . Shortly before 09 : 00 , Kawashima stated that he needed to speak with the Emperor and left for the palace . Makino Nobuaki . Capt . Hisashi Kōno commanded a team consisting of 7 members , including 6 civilians to attack Makino , who was staying at Kōfūsō , part of the ryokan Itōya in Yugawara with his family . Arriving at 05 : 45 , they stationed 2 men outside , then entered the inn with weapons drawn , at which point policemen stationed inside opened fire , beginning a lengthy gunfight . A policeman notified Makino and his party of the attack , and led them to a rear entrance . The assassins fired upon the group as they left , but did not realize that Makino had managed to escape . Kōno was wounded in the chest during the gunfire , and one policeman , Yoshitaka Minagawa , was killed . As Kōno was carried from the fighting , the assassins set fire to the building . Hearing a single shot , Kōno believed Makino had shot himself inside the burning building . The men took Kōno to a nearby military hospital where all were arrested by the military police . Attack on the Asahi Shimbun . At approximately 10 : 00 , Kurihara and Nakahashi boarded 3 trucks with 60 men and traveled from the Prime Minister ' s Residence to the offices of the " Tokyo Asahi Shimbun " , a prominent liberal newspaper . Charging into the building , the officers forced the newspaper employees to evacuate while yelling that the attack was " divine retribution for being an un - Japanese newspaper " . They then overturned and scattered the newspaper ' s type trays ( containing 4 , 000 different characters ) on the floor , temporarily preventing the newspaper from publishing . Following the attack , the men distributed copies of the uprising ' s manifesto to nearby newspapers and then returned to the Prime Minister ' s Residence . 3rd Imperial Guard . Takahashi Korekiyo . 1st Lt . Motoaki Nakahashi of the 3rd Imperial Guard assembled 120 men and , telling his commanders that they were going to pay their respects at Yasukuni Shrine ( or Meiji Jingu , sources differ ) , marched to Takahashi ' s personal residence . There he split his men in half and took one group to attack the residence while having the other stand guard outside . After the men smashed their way into the compound , confused servants led Nakahashi and Lt . Kanji Nakajima to Takahashi ' s bedroom . There Nakahashi shot the sleeping Takahashi with his pistol while Nakajima slashed him with his sword . Takahashi died without waking . Once Takahashi was dead , Nakahashi sent the group that had participated in the attack to join the troops already at the Prime Minister ' s residence . He then accompanied the remaining group of men onward to the Palace . Attempt to secure the Imperial Palace . Nakahashi and his 75 men entered the palace grounds using the western Hanzō Gate at 06 : 00 . Nakahashi ' s unit was the scheduled and he told the commander of the palace guard , Maj . Kentarō Honma , that he had been dispatched to reinforce the gates because of the attacks earlier that morning . Honma had been informed of the attacks , so he found Nakahashi ' s arrival unsurprising . Nakahashi was assigned to help secure the Sakashita Gate , the main entrance to the grounds directly in front of the Kyūden ( the Emperor ' s residence ) . Nakahashi ' s plan had been to secure the Sakashita Gate , then use flashlights to signal the nearby rebel troops at police headquarters to join him . Having gained control over access to the Emperor , the rebels would then be able to prevent anyone but Honjō and others they approved of from seeing him . Nakahashi had difficulty contacting his allies , however , and by 08 : 00 Honma had learned of his involvement in the uprising . Nakahashi was ordered at gunpoint to leave the palace grounds . He did so , joining Kurihara at the Prime Minister ' s residence . His soldiers remained at the gate until they were relieved at 13 : 00 , at which point they returned to their barracks . For this reason , these 75 soldiers were not included in the government ' s official tally of rebel forces . 3rd Infantry Regiment . Saitō Makoto . 120 men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment were led by 1st Lt . Naoshi Sakai to Saitō ' s private residence in Yotsuya . A group of the soldiers surrounded the policemen on guard and they surrendered . Five men including Sakai entered the residence and found Saitō and his wife Haruko on the second floor in their bedroom . They fired upon Saitō , who fell to the ground dead . His wife covered him with her body and told the soldiers to " Please kill me instead ! " They pulled her off and continued to fire at Saitō . Haruko was wounded by a stray bullet . Following Saitō ' s death , two officers led a group of men to attack Gen . Watanabe . The rest left to assume a position northeast of the Ministry of War . Suzuki Kantarō . Capt . Teruzō Andō led 200 men of the 3rd Infantry Regiment to Suzuki ' s private residence just across from the Imperial Palace in Kōjimachi . They surrounded and disarmed the police on guard , then a group entered the building . After Suzuki was discovered in his bedroom , he was shot twice ( sources differ as to who fired the shots ) . Andō then moved to deliver a " coup de grace " with his sword , when Suzuki ' s wife pleaded to be allowed to do it herself . Believing Suzuki to be mortally wounded , Andō agreed . He apologized to her , explaining that it was done for the sake of the nation . He then ordered his men to salute Suzuki and they left to guard the Miyakezaka junction north of the Ministry of War . Suzuki , although seriously wounded , would survive . Andō had visited Suzuki at his home in 1934 to suggest that Araki be appointed Prime Minister following Saitō ' s resignation . Suzuki had rejected the suggestion , but Andō had come away with a favorable impression of Suzuki . Jōtarō Watanabe . Following the attack on Saitō , 20 men led by 2nd Lt . Tarō Takahashi and 2nd Lt . Yutaka Yasuda boarded two trucks and headed to Watanabe ' s residence in Ogikubo on the outskirts of Tokyo , arriving shortly after 07 : 00 . Despite the two hours that had passed since the other attacks , no attempt had been made to warn Watanabe . As the men attempted to enter the front of the residence , they were fired upon by military policemen stationed inside . Yasuda and another soldier were wounded . The soldiers then forced their way in through the rear entrance , where they encountered Watanabe ' s wife standing outside their bedroom on the second floor . Shoving her aside , they found Watanabe using a futon for cover . Watanabe opened fire with his pistol , whereupon one of the soldiers fired a burst at him with a light machine gun . Takahashi then rushed forward and stabbed Watanabe with his sword . His 9 year - old daughter Kazuko witnessed his death as she hid behind a table nearby . The soldiers then boarded their trucks and left , taking their two wounded to a hospital , then assuming a position in northern Nagatachō . Tokyo Metropolitan Police Headquarters . Capt . Shirō Nonaka took nearly a third of all the rebels ' troops , 450 men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment , to attack police headquarters , located directly south of the Imperial Palace , with the goal of securing its communication equipment and preventing the dispatch of the police ' s . They met no resistance and soon secured the building , possibly due to a police decision to leave the situation in the hands of the army . The large number of troops involved was because of the intended move on to the palace itself . After the occupation of police headquarters , 2nd Lt . Kinjirō Suzuki led a small group to attack the nearby residence of Fumio Gotō , the Home Minister . Gotō was not home , however , and escaped the attack . This attack appears to have been the result of an independent decision by Suzuki rather than part of the officers ' overall plan , however . Government Response and Suppression of the Uprising . Opposition of the Court Faction and Emperor . The Palace learned of the uprising when Capt . Ichitarō Yamaguchi , a supporter of rebel officers and duty officer for the 1st Infantry Regiment , informed his father - in - law Gen . Shigeru Honjō , the Emperor ' s chief aide - de - camp and member of the Kōdō - ha , at about 05 : 00 . Honjō then contacted his subordinates and the chief of the military police and headed to the Palace . The Emperor himself learned of the incident at 05 : 40 and met with Honjō shortly after 06 : 00 . He told Honjō to end the incident , although he was not specific as to how . With Saitō dead and Suzuki gravely wounded , the Emperor ' s chief remaining advisors were Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper Kōichi Kido , Minister of the Imperial Household Kurahei Yuasa , and Vice - Grand Chamberlain Tadataka Hirohata . These officials met after learning of the attacks from Suzuki ' s secretary . They took a hard line , advising the Emperor that he should demand that efforts be concentrated on suppressing the uprising and that he must not accept the resignation of the current government , as doing so would " effectively be granting victory to the rebel army " . It was after hearing this advice that Hirohito hardened his position . Kawashima met with the Emperor at 09 : 30 after his meeting with the rebel officers at the Ministry of War . He read the officers ' manifesto and demands aloud and then recommended the Emperor form a new cabinet to " clarify the kokutai , stabilize national life , and fulfill national defense . " The Emperor refused and demanded that Kawashima suppress the uprising . When the remaining members of Okada ' s government , unaware that he was alive , attempted to resign that afternoon , Hirohito told them he would not allow it until the uprising had been suppressed . The Minister of War ' s Proclamation and de facto Recognition . The Supreme Military Council ( SMC ) held an unofficial meeting in the afternoon . The meeting was joined by a number of other officers , including Kashii , Yamashita , Kawashima , and Hajime Sugiyama , Vice Chief of Staff . The SMC , while a prestigious part of the army , had little function in peacetime and had therefore become a body to which high - ranking officers could be appointed without actually granting them power . For this reason , by 1936 a number of Kōdō - ha generals , including Araki and Mazaki , had been made members . The authority of this meeting was disputed ; it had not been convened by the Emperor , and Sugiyama argued that it had no authority . Araki countered that the " elders of the army " had a moral obligation to resolve the situation . The Kōdō - ha members and their supporters controlled a clear majority of the council . Despite the Emperor ' s order to Kawashima that the uprising be suppressed , Araki proposed that a message be drafted to the rebels . This message , which came to known as the " Minister of War ' s Proclamation " has become a point of controversy ( it was issued in Kawashima ' s name because of the unofficial nature of the SMC meeting ) . Araki and other participants argued later that it had been intended to persuade the officers to surrender . Others interpreted it as an endorsement of the uprising . The Proclamation read : Once approved , Yamashita brought the message to the rebels in the Ministry of War , who were pleased but somewhat confused by its vagueness . Some of the officers later testified that Yamashita claimed that the Emperor had approved the message , but Yamashita denied this . Another point of controversy was the proclamation ' s wording . Although the above text notes that the rebels ' " motives " were recognized , another version of the text was distributed by Kashii ( possibly at Kawashima ' s instructions ) shortly after 15 : 30 to military units in Tokyo . This version recognized the rebels ' " actions " rather than their " motives " . This difference has been attributed to Kōdō - ha manipulation of the text after - the - fact . Araki , Yamashita , and others claimed that what Kashii distributed was an earlier , unfinished draft of the proclamation . Two other developments deepened the rebel officers ' impression that their uprising had succeeded . At 15 : 00 , shortly before the Minister of War ' s message was released , Kashii , acting as commander of the Tokyo garrison , ordered a state of in the 1st Division ' s operational area ( which included the area being occupied by the rebel troops ) . This had the effect of formally placing the rebel troops within the chain of command under Lt . Gen . Takeo Hori ' s 3rd Infantry Regiment . Hori placed them under Col . Satoshi Kofuji and charged them with maintaining law and order in their area . Thus , the rebel officers were no longer acting illegally by occupying their positions . As with the earlier Minister of War ' s Proclamation , this order was later justified as an attempt to convince the rebel officers to end their occupation . The officers were , however , encouraged by the act and convinced that they were on the verge of success . The second positive development was the declaration of martial law . The cabinet initially opposed this measure as it feared that it would be used to impose military rule ( just as the young officers hoped ) , but they had no choice but to approve it after Kawashima insisted it was necessary to resolve the uprising . The Privy Council concurred , and the edict was signed by the Emperor at 01 : 20 on the 27th . Kashii was made chief of Martial Law Headquarters . In his first order , issued later that morning , he placed ordered the rebel troops to enforce martial law in the Kōjimachi area ( which they were occupying . ) Opposition within the Military . Despite the above developments , the position of the rebel officers was less secure than it seemed . Most significantly , as noted above , the Emperor and his court officials had taken a hard line towards the uprising . But the rebels also faced important opposition within the military as well , especially from the Army General Staff and navy . Many within the army were pleased by the assassinations because they had removed a number of the army ' s opponents within the government . However , they could not accept the more radical social ideas included within a " Shōwa Restoration " and were not disposed to accept a Kōdō - ha dominated cabinet . Others , such as Kanji Ishiwara , were infuriated at the rebel officers ' use of troops without authorization . The General Staff was effectively ruled by a triumvirate made up of the Chief of Staff , Vice Chief of Staff , and Inspector General of Military Education . With Watanabe assassinated and the Chief of Staff ( Prince Kan ' in ) ill and away from the capital , Vice Chief of Staff Sugiyama had full control . Sugiyama , a member of the Tōsei - ha , had from the beginning favored the forcible removal of the rebel occupation of the capital . His unwillingness to accept a new cabinet and present a united front with the SMC to the Emperor would ultimately be a major factor in the uprising ' s collapse . Initially concerned about the uncertainty of the situation , however , he only called in reinforcements from outside Tokyo . The Naval Staff had taken a similarly dim view of the uprising , at least partly due to the attacks on three admirals ( Okada , Saitō , and Suzuki ) . It summoned the 1st Fleet to Tokyo on the 26th . By the afternoon of the 27th , 40 warships were stationed in Tokyo Bay and IJN marines had been dispatched to defend naval installations in the city . Negotiations and Stalemate . Thus , by the evening of the 26th , the uprising had resulted in a stalemate . The Emperor and Sugiyama ' s opposition had prevented the achievement of its primary goal : the appointment of a military - centered cabinet centered around Mazaki . Although they had managed to achieve a degree of official recognition for their actions , it was obvious that they could not occupy their positions indefinitely . Their presence was their strongest bargaining chip , but even their supporters felt that it needed to end . It was for this reason that Araki , Mazaki , and most of the other members of the SMC met with Muranaka and Kurihara at the Ministry of War on the night of the 26th . There they congratulated the officers again , but asked that they return to their units and leave the rest to the SMC . The rebel officers , however , convinced of their success , again spoke of the need to promote the Showa Restoration and form a " strong cabinet centered around the military " . No agreement was reached . This approach was followed by late - night negotiations at the Imperial Hotel between Ishiwara and Lt . Col . Sakichi Mitsui , a supporter of the uprising . They reached a compromise : a new cabinet under Adm . Eisuke Yamamoto would be appointed and the rebel troops would return to their units . This compromise was rejected by both Sugiyama ( who insisted the Emperor would not approve a new cabinet ) and the rebel officers ( who would only accept a Mazaki cabinet ) . Finally a settlement seemed to have been reached when the rebel officers asked to Mazaki on the 27th . Mazaki , accompanied by two other members of the SMC ( Nobuyuki Abe and Yoshikazu Nishi ) arrived at the Ministry of War at 16 : 00 . Gathered there were all of the rebel officers except Andō and Kurihara , who were in charge of the troops outside , and Kōno , who was still hospitalized . The rebels told Mazaki that they were entrusting everything to him . Mazaki thanked them , but explained that he could do nothing until they returned to their units . He also stated that he would fight them himself if they went against the Emperor ' s wishes . The rebels replied that if they received a formal order to return , they would of course obey it . Following the meeting , both Mazaki and the rebel officers were relieved . Mazaki believed the rebel officers would leave without violence and the rebels were apparently convinced that a Mazaki cabinet would be formed shortly after they did so . Kashii issued orders for the troops to stay the night in the buildings they had occupied and reported to the Emperor that the situation would be resolved by the morning . The Imperial Command . However , unknown to Kashii , Mazaki , and the rebel officers , Sugiyama had already asked the Emperor at 08 : 20 to issue an imperial command authorizing the use of force against the rebel troops . This was immediately granted and issued to Sugiyama , to be released at his discretion . Addressed to Kashii , the command ordered him to quickly evict " the officers and men occupying the Miyakezaka area " . The Emperor had , by the end of the 27th , become increasingly impatient with the failure of the military to suppress the uprising as he had ordered on the previous day . He summoned Honjō throughout the day demanding to know if the rebels had been suppressed . When Honjō spoke in defense of the officers ' motives , the Emperor accused them of " trying to pull a silk rope around my neck " . At one point , Hirohito became so angry that he threatened to assume personal command of the Imperial Guard and order them to attack the rebels himself . The General Staff and Martial Law HQ decided to release the imperial command at 05 : 00 on the 28th . From this point on formal documents , which had previously used " uprising " , the word chosen by the rebel officers themselves , began to use the word instead . At 08 : 00 , the rebel officers ' nominal superior Maj . Kofuji was told to inform the officers of the imperial command and order them to return to their units . However , Muranaka and Kōda had already heard of the command from Nakahashi . Believing the order to be a mistake , they went to see him . When they met Kofuji , he only told them to come to 1st Division Headquarters . There they met Gen . Hori , who lied to them , telling them that no command had been issued . The relieved but skeptical officers left . A meeting of the heads of the army including Kawashima , Kashii , and Sugiyama had been held from the early morning onward ( Araki and Mazaki had attempted to attend but had been told to leave as the SMC had no authority ) . Kawashima and Kashii attempted to convince the group to avoid violence , but when 10 : 00 passed without any word of movement by the rebel officers , they approved the use of force . However , when Hori and Kofuji came to see Kashii at 10 : 40 , the three agreed that it was too early to enact the imperial command . It has also been suggested that a lack of preparedness on the part of the government forces was another factor . Either way , the action was delayed . Yamashita visited the Ministry of War at 12 : 00 and told the rebel officers that the issuance of the imperial command was merely a matter of time and that they should " take responsibility " . Hori joined the group at 12 : 30 and confirmed Yamashita ' s words . Shortly after , Kurihara , speaking for the group , asked that an Imperial messenger be sent . He said that the officers would commit suicide and the NCOs would take the soldiers back to their barracks . Yamashita , joined by Kawashima , immediately went to the Palace , where he informed Honjō of the request . Honjō asked that the request be granted , but the Emperor refused , saying that they could do it on their own . Not all the rebels had been prepared to commit suicide . Andō had been infuriated at the idea , yelling that " the generals want to use us as footstools and have us kill ourselves " . Andō ' s rejection of the idea and the Emperor ' s refusal led to a change of heart among the officers . By 13 : 30 , they had decided to fight . Kofuji learned this at 14 : 00 when he finally attempted to gather the officers to read them the imperial command and order them to return to their units and they refused ( the orders had to be formally given in order to be valid ) . Soon after , at 16 : 00 , Martial Law HQ announced that force would be used , and the rebel troops were removed from Kofuji ' s command at 18 : 00 . At 23 : 00 , orders went out to begin preparations at 05 : 00 on the 29th for a general attack . Final Hours . By the morning of the 29th , the rebel army of less than 1 , 500 was surrounded by more than 20 , 000 government troops and 22 tanks . The general attack was planned for 09 : 00 . By 05 : 30 all civilians in the surrounding areas had been evacuated . From 08 : 00 the army began a major propaganda push towards the rebel troops . Three planes scattered leaflets from the air , a giant ad balloon adorned with the words " The Imperial Command has been issued , do not resist the Army colors ! " was suspended nearby , and a series of radio broadcasts were made over NHK . The broadcasts and leaflets assured soldiers it was not too late to return to their units and informed them of the imperial command ( the broadcasts would cause later problems , for they had promised all crimes would be forgiven ) . These efforts , together with the hopeless odds , had a devastating effect . Desertions began shortly after midnight ; by 10 : 00 , many were gone . Realizing the hopelessness , by noon all the officers except for Andō had released their soldiers . Finally , at 13 : 00 Andō ordered his men to leave and unsuccessfully attempted suicide by shooting himself in the head . The rest assembled at the Ministry of War . There they met Yamashita and Ishiwara , who suggested that they commit suicide . They allowed the men to keep their sidearms and left . Col . Nobutoki Ide , a member of the General Staff and Nonaka ' s former commander , came to the building and called for Nonaka to come outside . Shortly afterwards , Nonaka shot himself . Isobe claimed that Nonaka was forced to commit suicide in an attempt to pressure the rest of the officers to do the same . The final rebel officer to commit suicide was Kōno , still hospitalized from the failed attack on Makino , who stabbed himself with a knife a week later . The remaining officers were arrested by the military police at 18 : 00 . They were all stripped of their ranks . Aftermath . Trials . The Emperor signed an ordinance on March 4 establishing a to try those involved in the uprising . All 1 , 483 members of the Righteous Army were interrogated , but ultimately only 124 were prosecuted : 19 officers , 73 NCOs , 19 soldiers , and 10 civilians . Of these , all of the officers , 43 NCOs , 3 soldiers , and all of the civilians were found guilty . The trials related to the uprising took nearly 18 months to complete . The main trial of the ringleaders of the rebellion ( the 19 surviving officers , Isobe , Muranaka , and 2 other civilians ) began on April 28 . The trial was held in secret , and the defendants did not have rights to legal representation , call witnesses , or appeal . The judges were not interested in hearing about the defendants ' motives and intentions , and forced them to concentrate on their actions in their testimony . The trial was therefore far different from the ordinary court martial that Aizawa had faced a few months earlier . Charged with , the rebel officers argued that their actions had been approved by the Minister of War ' s Proclamation and their incorporation into the martial law forces , and that they had never been formally presented with the imperial command . The verdicts were handed down on June 4 and the sentences on July 5 : all were found guilty and 17 were sentenced to death . Four more trials took place for those directly involved in the attacks : one for those NCOs involved in the attacks on Saitō , Watanabe , and police headquarters ; one for those NCOs involved in the attacks on Okada , Takahashi , Suzuki , and the Ministry of War ; one for the soldiers involved in those attacks ; one for the NCO and 6 civilians involved in the attack on Makino . A series of trials were also held for 37 men charged with indirectly supporting the rebellion . 24 were found guilty , with punishments ranging from life imprisonment to a fine of 45 yen . The most noteworthy of these were Ichitarō Yamaguchi ( life imprisonment ) , Ryu Saitō ( 5 years ) , and Sakichi Mitsui ( 3 years ) . Ikki Kita and Mitsugi Nishida were also charged as ringleaders of the rebellion and tried in a separate trial . Their actions during the uprising had only been indirect ( primarily providing support over the telephone ) and as such , they did not actually meet the requirements of the charge . The chief judge , Maj . Gen . Isao Yoshida , protested to the Ministry of War that the charges were improper . However , the Tōsei - ha generals now dominant in the army had decided that the two ' s influence had to be eliminated ; Yoshida later wrote another judge to tell him that regardless of the lack of evidence , it had been decided that the two must die . They were sentenced to death on August 14 , 1937 . The only significant military figure to be tried for their involvement in the uprising was Mazaki , charged with collaborating with the rebel officers . Although his own testimony showed him to be guilty of the charge , Mazaki was found not guilty on September 25 , 1937 . This result has been attributed to the influence of Fumimaro Konoe , who had become prime minister in June . 15 of the officers were executed by firing squad on July 15 at a military prison in Shibuya . The execution of Muranaka and Isobe was delayed so that they could testify at Kita and Nishida ' s trial . Muranaka , Isobe , Kita , and Nishida were executed by firing squad at the same location on August 14 , 1937 . Change of Government . Despite the failure of the coup , the February 26th Incident had the effect of significantly increasing the military ' s influence over the civilian government . The Okada cabinet resigned on March 9 and a new cabinet was formed by Kōki Hirota , Okada ' s foreign minister . This transition was not without its problems , however . When the selection of Hirota was made clear and efforts began to assemble a cabinet , Gen . Hisaichi Terauchi , the new cabinet ' s Minister of War , made his displeasure with some of the selections clear . Hirota gave into Terauchi ' s demands and changed his selections , choosing Hachirō Arita over Shigeru Yoshida as Minister of Foreign Affairs , for example . This interference with cabinet selection was followed by a demand that only active - duty officers be allowed to serve as Minister of War and Minister of the Navy . Until this point , reserve and retired officers had been allowed to serve in these positions . This demand was accepted and authorized by imperial commands on May 18 . This change would have far - reaching implications for the Japanese government , as it effectively gave veto power over government policies to the military services . By asking a minister to resign and refusing to appoint a new officer to serve as his replacement , the services could cause a government to fall at their pleasure . This fate would , in fact , meet Hirota less than a year later when Terauchi resigned over Hirota ' s refusal to dissolve the Diet . Personnel Changes within the Army . Although only Mazaki faced criminal charges , this didn ' t mean that the Kōdō - ha didn ' t suffer any consequences from the incident . Under Terauchi ' s auspices , , most notably Ishiwara and Akira Mutō , began a purge of the military . Of the 12 full generals in the Army , 9 were removed from active service by the end of April , including Kōdō - ha members Araki , Mazaki , Kawashima , and Honjō . At the same time , other Kōdō - ha officers and their supporters were either removed from active service or sent to positions away from the capital where they would be less able to influence policy . Among these were Yamashita , Kashii , Kofuji , Hori , Hashimoto , and Yanagawa . Although other , non - Kōdō - ha officers were also targeted to a limited extent , the focus of the actions was clearly on eliminating Kōdō - ha influence . Almost every high - ranking officer who had helped support the rebels during the uprising was therefore affected . Commemoration . The parents , widows , and children of the executed men , who were prevented by the government from commemorating them until the end of the war , formed the . They have established two sites in Tokyo commemorating the officers of the February 26th Incident . In 1952 , shortly after the end of the Allied occupation of Japan , they placed a gravestone entitled in Kensōji , a temple in Azabu - Jūban , where the ashes of the executed men had been placed . The " twenty - two " signifies the nineteen men executed , the two who committed suicide ( Nonaka and Kōno ) , and Aizawa . Then , in 1965 , they placed a statue of Kannon , the Buddhist goddess of mercy , dedicated to the memories of the rebel officers and their victims at the former location of the Shibuya execution grounds .