Aerial reconnaissance in World War I During 1914 - 18 , driven primarily by the introduction of heavier - than - air aircraft , aerial reconnaissance developed from an almost zero baseline to a vast , complex science . Equipment , tactics , procedures and terminology that would survive with modifications to this day had their origins in this period . Beginnings . The first use of an airplane in combat , a reconnaissance flight , was performed by Cap . Carlo Maria Piazza in a Bleriot XI on 23 October 1911 , during the Italo - Turkish War in Tripolitania . There , aerial photography with a Zeiss Bebe camera began in December . The experience in World War I would begin on very similar terms , with French Bleriot and German Taube monoplanes . Reconnaissance was widely perceived as the only practical use of airplanes . Fighter s developed later to bring down opposing reconnaissance aircraft , and then to protect friendly ones . While most combatant countries possessed a few military aircraft by August 1914 , they were almost exclusively devoted to observation ( especially artillery spotting ) , thereby supplementing well - tried and familiar platforms like balloons and kite s . Tethered balloons would ascend to as high as a mile , but were easy to shoot down . Furthermore , they were unstable observation platforms in any wind , leading to attempts to stabilize them with kite - tails or wind anchors attached to the gondola . Dirigibles like the huge new German Zeppelin s were considered the best reconnaissance platforms and they served effectively in maritime patrol . Vertical camera installations were used from the beginning of the war , but they were too heavy and bulky for light airplanes , and most early reconnaissance from airplanes consisted of visual observation and written reports . Handheld cameras were widely used but with disappointing results . Good imagery required both pilot skill and an operator who could devote time to handle the camera and the unwieldy and heavy glass plates it required . In time , longer focal lengths were used , cameras and gear grew lighter and bigger , and for survival , operating altitudes increased up to the 12 - 18 , 000 foot level . Driven high , aircrews began to use oxygen and heated clothing items . The critical discipline of communicating results led to rampant improvisation . At first it was not uncommon for aircraft to land next to command posts so the pilot could personally recount urgent information . For artillery spotting , time was of the essence , and the French tried air - dropped messaging , colored flares , and pre - arranged aircraft maneuvers to convey information . France was reportedly the first to try airborne radios , often transmitters alone due to the weight penalty ; others maintain that Britain preceded with the light - weight Sterling radio set in aircraft by 1915 . Germany had a scientific head start and adopted the first aerial camera , a Görz , in 1913 . Austria - Hungary followed that lead . Just two weeks into the war , reporters noted of aeroplanes : “ They have ranged constantly over the enemy ’ s positions , so that the French have always known what the Germans have been doing . This has so disconcerted the latter that they are now making efforts to frighten the French air scouts away . ” By 17 August 1914 and repeatedly thereafter , Belgian “ air scouts ” reported on German troop movements . France was by far the aeronautical leader at the time , and French Military Aviation incorporated cameras in airplanes from the beginning . France began the war with several squadrons of Bleriot observation planes . The French Army developed procedures for getting prints into the hands of field commanders in record time . In Britain , then lagging far behind in aviation , the reconnaissance pioneer F . C . V . Laws established the first heavier - than - air photography unit at Farnborough in 1913 , using a Farman with a Watson camera . In stark contrast with the French , early British reconnaissance was essentially conducted on an amateur basis , lacking in official backing . The United States played an important role in the last months of the war , using French aircraft and modified cameras . Some techniques and equipment used in civilian surveying and mapping were developed by the US Army Corps of Engineers when the topographic engineer , James W . Bagley , transferred from the US Geological Survey to the army . Major Bagley brought his recently invented tri - lens camera to France , where it was used to make one vertical and two oblique images from airplanes . These images were used to overprint enemy trenches and gun emplacements over existing maps for precision targeting . An example of this camera is held at the Smithsonian Institution : " This object is on display in the Boeing Aviation Hangar at the Steven F . Udvar - Hazy Center in Chantilly , VA . Fairchild Aerial Camera Corporation built the production model of the T - 2 and T - 2A four - lens camera , which improved upon the T - 1 tri - lens mapping camera developed by Maj . James Bagley of the U . S . Army Signal Corps . The T - 2A had one vertical lens and three oblique lenses set at 35 degrees , which provided a 120 - degree field of view at right angles to the direction of flight . Four lens caps are also displayed . " Italy and Russia had prominent roles as well , with Italy deploying some of the best performing aircraft . The small Ottoman air forces were mostly an extension of German air power . The failure of the Schlieffen Plan offensive in 1914 is attributed in part to French air superiority blinding German reconnaissance , but the German victory at Tannenberg is thought to derive from prompt action on air intelligence about Russian advances . Despite the improvised start , all sides quickly learned the importance of aerial photography , and by 1916 heavier - than - air reconnaissance was a regular practice along the front . This in turn necessitated fighter escorts , and thus drove much of the rapid aeronautical progress of the four years of war . Support of ground forces was almost the sole role of reconnaissance ; strategic air war concepts were as yet embryonic . At sea , lighter - than - air photography still dominated ; but Zeppelins turned out to be very vulnerable over settled areas . Flying boat s and seaplane s ( " Hydro - aeroplanes " ) came into their own for coastal patrol duties . By the end of the war both sides maintained detailed mosaics of the front derived from aerial photography . Germany alone reportedly generated 4 , 000 images a day in 1918 . Equipment . All major combatants maintained traditional units of kite - balloons and airships for point surveillance and reconnaissance . These were vulnerable and tethered balloon observers were the first to use parachutes . Lighter - than - air platforms would soon be eclipsed , though not replaced , by fixed - wing aircraft . At the beginning , France had a significant corps of Bleriot type observation aircraft , soon replaced by a profusion of more capable types . The Royal Flying Corps entered the war with the spindly but stable and reliable B . E . 2 reconnaissance aircraft . It served acceptably in the role until new German fighters drove it from the skies in 1915 - 16 . B . E . 2 variants typically mounted a vertical camera outside the pilot ’ s ( rear ) cockpit . The more capable but similar R . E . 8 replaced the B . E . 2 as the standard RAF reconnaissance aircraft and remained in that role despite requiring escort for survival . British aircraft used the Watson Air Camera , the Type A camera , and later the C , E , L and finally L / B cameras ( L for Laws and B for Brabazon ) developed specifically for aircraft . The early C - type used the available 12 inch lenses on a 4×5 inch plate . The Allies began to standardize on 18×24 cm plates and 25 , 50 and 120 cm focal lengths , 50 being the most common . The Central Powers used many different aircraft but especially Rumpler and Albatros types mounting Görz and ICA cameras . The Germans used also a standard 70 cm focal length and 13×18 cm plates . The radio - equipped unarmed photoship Rumpler C . VII ( Rubild ) distinguished itself for long - range and high - altitude , reaching 21 , 000 feet . Unusual recon aircraft included the armored Junkers J . 1 for low - level flights , the gigantic long - range Ilya Muromets from Russia , and the high - performing Italian Ansaldo SVA , considered nearly uninterceptable . Italy standardized on the simple 24 - plate Lamperti camera . German optics was overwhelmingly superior , as exemplified by Carl Zeiss lenses and optical glass . The Allies had to quickly learn to make lenses especially for long foci . In the meantime they had to make do with such short - focus lenses as could be found . When the U . S . entered the war , the Army urgently requested that American civilians turn in their lenses and optics , including telescopes and binoculars , for aerial use , specifically naming several sought - after German manufactures . Cameras quickly became large and mechanically very complex . German and Italian cameras generally used 13×18 cm plates . France standardized on the advanced deMaria cameras of various configurations . For the last two years of the war , Britain used almost exclusively the 35 - pound , semi - automatic , prop - driven L camera . As was the case for airplanes , the U . S . made use of French and British cameras . As an example , the semi - automatic American deRam ( from the French ) weighed 45 kg , had a focal length of 50 cm ( standard ) , and took 18×24 cm plates . The U . S . flew Curtiss Jenny s with Folmer - Schwing ( Graflex ) handheld cameras during the Mexican excursion in 1916 . These became the K - 1 , first in a long line of U . S . aerial cameras . The attempts at Allied interoperability was thus described at the time : “ The task of harmonizing the photographic practice as taught in America , following English lines , with French practice as followed in the theater of war , and of adapting planes built on English designs so that they could carry French apparatus , was a formidable one , not likely to be soon forgotten by any who had a part in it . ” Overlapping stereoscopic photos began to be taken , requiring carefully timed exposures . Fully automatic cameras and film cameras came into use . Germany began using electrically heated cameras and devised engine - driven generator power . Wind - driven generators , both venturi s and small props , came into use for automation . Suction was used to keep film flat on the plate . Despite the weight penalty , radiotelegraphy gradually replaced earlier “ message - in - a - bottle ” airdrops . Simple codes for artillery spotting were worked out . Despite some experiments , night photography was unsuccessful due to insufficient flash power and film speed , and inability to precisely time the exposure to the illumination . At the end of the war , aerial photography was an enormous ongoing project . The number of exposed images numbered in the millions , with many more prints . Large photo - mosaics covering the entire Western Front at scales as low as 1 : 8000 were created and continuously updated . It is estimated that about one third of sorties were devoted to reconnaissance . Results . From an essentially zero base , armies had to create and train interpretation units , since the aerial view and stereoscopic view was quite alien to what ground - based reconnaissance would see . Interpreters had to have extensive knowledge of military hardware on both sides . They had to learn how to use shadows for size estimation , and to detect the increasing use of camouflage and decoys . Equally importantly , interpreters learned to standardize annotations and present comprehensive marked - up imagery to commanders . The static fronts and fixed fortifications in Europe were especially suitable for turning the art of interpretation into a science , while the far - ranging operations in the desert and at sea put a great premium on serendipitous discovery and resourcefulness . Maritime reconnaissance tended to generate its own separate technology and procedures , aided by the customary sharp separation of the fleet from the armies . In the air , however , the two services overlapped , which began to cause friction in assigning responsibilities , especially for sea powers like the U . K . and the U . S . The use of ship - based observation aircraft ( though not true carriers ) was already well advanced by the end of the war . This quickly became a force multiplier for the fleet . It complicated offensive sea power ; for example , Zeppelin surveillance of the North Sea made it difficult for the Royal Navy to exploit its naval superiority . In four years , commanders learned that reconnaissance innately favors the defensive , as it reduces surprises and makes it difficult for the opponent to mass forces for attack . Inability to conduct reconnaissance , such as due to weather or enemy air domination , conversely leaves one highly vulnerable , as occurred repeatedly during the War . Commanders learned that in aircraft , there is no substitute for performance , and in cameras , no substitute for focal length . They learned to regularly surveil and monitor the opponent in order to detect any changes ; and they learned the absolute necessity of maintaining libraries and institutional knowledge of targets and of the visual “ signatures ” of not only equipment , but the subtle effects thereof – tracks , marks , etc . – on the environment . Experts agree that most of this had to be relearned the hard way two decades later . Perennial problems included the shortage of trained and experienced photo - interpreters , the difficulty in distributing timely and interpreted prints to exactly the commanders needing them , a lack of overall coordination of effort and centralized interpretation ( a " common air picture " ) , and the tendency of field commanders to demand risky , repeated flights for objectives only for the photos to languish in files somewhere along the process . Finally , the recurrent pattern of reconnaissance not gaining recognition commensurate with its importance developed during these years . There were no “ reconnaissance aces ” and recon pilots were not household names . Air combat gained immense publicity , but – apart from reconnaissance – air operations had negligible military effect . This imbalance in perception would have consequences for preparedness in later years .