Statement on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs The " Statement on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs " was a speech delivered on November 25 , 1969 , by U . S . President Richard Nixon . In the speech , Nixon announced the end of the U . S . offensive biological weapons program and reaffirmed a no - first - use policy for chemical weapons . The statement excluded toxin s , herbicide s and riot - control agent s , though herbicides and toxins were both later banned . The decision to ban biological weapons was influenced by a number of domestic and international issues . Push for a U . S . ban . When Richard Nixon selected Melvin Laird as his Secretary of Defense in early 1969 , Laird directed the Department of Defense to undertake a comprehensive review of U . S . biological warfare ( BW ) programs . Laird ' s push for a review of both the chemical and biological programs arose when Congress attempted to push the Pentagon for open , joint Congressional hearings on chemical - biological warfare ( CBW ) . The Pentagon balked and the result was Laird ' s memo to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger urging a review of those weapons programs . Laird hoped to eliminate the U . S . BW program . He saw two reasons to kill the BW program . The first was political — eliminating the program could deflect growing protests over Vietnam . The second was budgetary : As a U . S . Representative , Laird had watched Pentagon BW budgets balloon during the Kennedy and Johnson years . With Laird ' s impetus , and the concurrence of the National Security Council staff , in late May 1969 Kissinger directed key administration officials to begin a review of CBW " policies , programs and operational concepts " with a report to be issued no later than September . Surprisingly , Laird found the Joint Chiefs of Staff receptive to BW elimination as well . In twice weekly meetings with the Joint Chiefs during 1969 Laird found none of the officers opposed to ending the U . S . BW program . They found the weapons ineffective and militarily useless , especially when compared to the U . S . nuclear arsenal . The Joint Chiefs made two demands , one was to continue defensive germ warfare research and the other was that they be allowed to maintain the U . S . chemical arsenal as a deterrent to the Soviet Union . In June 1969 Kissinger asked a former Harvard colleague , Matthew Meselson to prepare a position paper on U . S . chemical and biological weapons programs . Meselson and Paul Doty then organized a private conference to discuss policy issues . The result was a September 1969 paper that not only urged U . S . ratification of the Geneva Protocol but an end to U . S . BW programs . Meselson and his colleagues argued that a biological attack would likely inflict a great toll on civilian populations while remaining largely militarily ineffective . Executive action on BW was followed by congressional action on chemical warfare ( CW ) . In August 1969 the Senate passed an amendment to the Military Procurement Bill which unilaterally renounced first - use of chemical weapons . The Senate action also issued a moratorium on the acquisition of new chemical weapons as well as de - emphasizing the need for CW readiness . The bill passed 91 - 0 , although some senators expressed reservations about the CW provisions . Statement . Nixon issued his " Statement on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs " on November 25 , 1969 in a speech from Fort Detrick . The same day he gave a speech from the Roosevelt Room at the White House further outlining his earlier statement . The statement ended , unconditionally , all U . S . offensive biological weapons programs . Nixon noted that biological weapons were unreliable and stated : The United States shall renounce the use of lethal biological agents and weapons , and all other methods of biological warfare . The United States will confine its biological research to defensive measures such as immunization and safety measures . In his speech Nixon called his move " unprecedented " ; and it was in fact the first review of the U . S . BW program since 1954 . Despite the lack of review , the BW program had increased in cost and size since 1961 ; when Nixon ended the program the budget was $ 300 million annually . Nixon ' s statement confined all biological weapons research to defensive - only and ordered the destruction of the existing U . S . biological arsenal . The Nixon statement also addressed the topics of chemical warfare and U . S . ratification of the Geneva Protocol , which , at the time , the nation had yet to ratify . On chemical warfare Nixon reaffirmed no - first - use of chemical weapons by the United States . He also announced that the United States would reconsider ratification of the Geneva Protocol , which Nixon recommended to the Senate that year . Omissions . The presidential statement purposely omitted certain agents , while others were simply overlooked . In an exception to the no - first - use policy , which his statement reaffirmed , Nixon made a deference for riot - control agent s and herbicide s . Both were in use in Vietnam and both had been lightning rods for criticism . Nixon promised later memorandums concerning abolition of both types of agents ; herbicide use in Vietnam was discontinued in 1970 but riot - control agent use continued . The other major omission from Nixon ' s statement were toxin s . His statement did not specifically address toxins , such as ricin , which tend to blur the line between chemical and biological weapons . As debate within the Army raged over whether toxins were considered chemical or biological weapons concerning the president ' s order , work on them continued at Fort Detrick , the " hub " of U . S . biological weapons programs . For several months following the November order , the Army continued working on staphylococcus enterotoxin type B ( SEB ) . On February 20 , 1970 Nixon added toxins , regardless of their means of production - be it chemical or biological , to the U . S . ban on biological weapons . Results and legacy . The statement immediately led to National Security Decision Memorandum 35 from Nixon , which was also dated November 25 , 1969 . The memorandum also stated that the U . S . government renounced all " lethal methods " and " all other methods " of biological warfare , it also stated that the U . S . would only conduct BW research and development for defensive purposes . U . S . biological weapons stocks were destroyed over the next few years . A $ 12 million disposal plan was undertaken at Pine Bluff Arsenal , where all U . S . anti - personnel biological agent s were stored . That plan was completed in May 1972 and included decontamination of facilities at Pine Bluff . Other agents , including anti - crop agents such as wheat stem rust , were stored at Beale Air Force Base and Rocky Mountain Arsenal . These anti - crop agents , along with agents at Fort Detrick used for research purposes were destroyed in March 1973 . Nixon closed his statement , " Mankind already carries in its own hands too many of the seeds of its own destruction . By the examples we set today , we hope to contribute to an atmosphere of peace and understanding between nations and among men . " Shortly after Nixon ' s statement the United States and the Soviet Union began the SALT arms control talks , which eventually resulted in nuclear arms control s as well as the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty . The U . S . commitment to end BW programs helped provide the lead for ongoing talks led by the United Kingdom in Geneva . The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee was discussing a British draft of a biological weapons treaty which the United Nations General Assembly approved in 1968 and that NATO supported . These arms control talks would eventually lead to the Biological Weapons Convention , an international treaty outlawing biological warfare . Nixon ' s renunciation is often overlooked in discussions about his presidency and his presidential legacy . Books about Nixon devote little space to the act and those centered on the topic of arms - control , even less . The abandonment of an entire class of weapons remains unrepeated in U . S . history . In addition , Melvin Laird ' s role in the elimination of offensive U . S . biological capabilities has been largely overlooked . Nixon ' s motivation . Scholars and critics have argued that Nixon ' s decision to ban biological weapons was purely politically motivated . This move was seen as a way to placate national , Congressional , and international concerns . It was also seen as a way to progress arms - control talks , additionally it could have stymied the outcry over the use of non - lethal chemical agents in Vietnam . In reality , the issue was much more complex than even those reasons suggest . Meselson and others had argued that biological weapons amounted to little more than a cheap version of a nuclear weapon , and were easily attainable . Biological weapons represented a significant threat in the hands of less - well - armed , poorer nations , and Nixon surely recognized this " asymmetrical " threat . The administration eventually came to the conclusion that any biological threat could be easily countered with the U . S . nuclear arsenal . Nixon recognized that the BW program was unpopular and decided that there was no real reason to continue these programs . While there were some political considerations involved in Nixon ' s decision , the end result brought the topic into international forums for years following his declaration . The media characterized Nixon ' s decision as a sudden awareness of the horrific nature of chemical - biological warfare . Nixon hoped that the move would bolster both the image of his administration and the United States as a whole . He also wanted to score points with the Democratic majority in Congress and he had chosen to do this through various arms control measures . Nixon knew Democrats could not afford to oppose his renunciation of BW programs in light of rising opposition to the use of non - lethal chemicals in Vietnam and other events such as the Skull Valley sheep kill in Utah . Thus , the idealistic language Nixon used in his November statement was only part of the story . Besides the issue of proliferation raised by Meselson , the specter of growing dissent over Vietnam loomed large , as did the fact that the U . S . had never ratified the Geneva Protocol . In the end , Nixon was motivated to ban biological weapons in the United States by a host of issues .