Technical intelligence In a pure military context , Technical Intelligence ( TECHINT ) is intelligence about weapon s and equipment used by the armed forces of foreign nations ( often referred to as foreign material ) . The related term , scientific and technical intelligence , addresses information collected at the strategic ( i . e . , national ) level . Technical intelligence is intended primarily to allow the armed forces to avoid technological surprise . Knowledge of the characteristics and capabilities of enemy weapons allows nations to develop effective countermeasures for them . Occasionally , armed forces adopt technology developed by foreign nations . The jerrycan of World War II is an example of foreign equipment adopted by the US Army . Technical intelligence should not be confused with intelligence obtained " by technical means " . That is a term of art used in discussion of disarmament to mean information gathered by various sorts of cameras , sensors , or other devices . Technical intelligence is the product : " technical intelligence — Intelligence derived from the collection , processing , analysis , and exploitation of data and information pertaining to foreign equipment and materiel for the purposes of preventing technological surprise , assessing foreign scientific and technical capabilities , and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an adversary ' s technological advantages . " Scientific and technical intelligence ( S & TI ) reveals more than the foreign equipment itself . It is the product resulting from the collection , evaluation , analysis , and interpretation of foreign scientific and technical information that covers : It covers not just the equipment , but the process by which it was developed and produced , the production rate of the country or organization making it , and possibly the economic and other priorities given to the project . Given that scientific and technical information is an important part of a nation ' s competitive position in world markets , S & TI blurs into economic intelligence , which is defined by the U . S . government as " government - sponsored or coordinated intelligence activity designed to unlawfully and covertly obtain classified data and / or sensitive policy or proprietary information from a U . S . Government agency or company , potentially having the effect of enhancing a foreign country ' s economic competitiveness and damaging U . S . economic security . " Convicted CIA spy Aldrich Ames collected $ 4 . 6 million for selling classified information , on CIA activities , to the USSR and Russia . In contrast to the sale of government information , " Ronald Hoffman , a project manager for a company called Science Applications , Inc . , made $ 750 , 000 by selling complex software programs that were developed under secret contract for the Strategic Defense Initiative ( SDI ) . The CONTAM software tracks the plumes that rockets and missiles leave in their wake and , therefore , has both military and civilian applications . Hoffman sold his wares to Japanese multinationals - Nissan Motor Company , Mitsubishi Electric , Mitsubishi Heavy Industries , and Ishikawajima - Harima Heavy Industries - that wanted the information for civilian aerospace programs . He was arrested in 1992 . " Porteous identifies two kinds of economic intelligence that are distinct from S & TI : The technical intelligence process . The production of technical intelligence is a specialized sort of bureaucratic scholarship harnessed to the needs of the armed forces . A multiservice manual describes U . S . military doctrine for TECHINT . Typically the technical intelligence process is divided into : Collection of materiel and related documents . Chance plays an important part in the collection of foreign weapons and equipment . The collection phase typically begins when a soldier finds something interesting on a battlefield or a defecting pilot flies an aircraft to a friendly country . In a famous case , Viktor Ivanovich Belenko flew a Soviet Mig 25 " Foxbat " to Hakodate , Japan on 6 September 1976 . The United States granted Belenko asylum and assisted in the dismantling of the aircraft so that it could be crated for return to the Soviet Union . Bureaucratic procedures have been established for development of requirements , " i . e . " wish lists , to guide systematic collection efforts . Materiel required may be obtained through any number of channels . For example , materiel may be obtained through commercial channels . An attache might ask a foreign official for information about a piece of foreign equipment . Clandestine operations have been mounted to obtain critical enemy materiel . Probably the most expensive and most ambitious was construction of Hughes Glomar Explorer by the Central Intelligence Agency to obtain the wreckage of Soviet submarine that sunk in the Pacific . Exploitation ( testing and analysis ) . The exploitation phase includes various types of technical and operational tests . The services have well developed procedures for testing various types of materiel . Testing often includes operating the item and non - destructive testing . The Air Force Historical Studies Office Web Production of finished intelligence . The production of technical intelligence includes preparation of a variety of reports and documents . TECHINT documents include a wide range of materials from brief messages and reports prepared in the field to extensive formal studies prepared by teams of researchers . During World War II the Army prepared technical manuals on certain items of enemy equipment ; included information about enemy equipment in catalogs of enemy equipment and in handbooks about foreign forces ; and published technical intelligence in various reports . Tactical agencies . United States . The primary technical intelligence agencies of the United States government are : Department of Defense units . Defense Intelligence Agency , is the primary intelligence agency of the Department of Defense . It is charged with providing military intelligence to policymakers , war - fighters , and defense planners in the Department as well as to national - level consumers and the United States Intelligence Community . Historical examples of field technical intelligence . See Operation Biting for information on a British raid to capture German radar for technical evaluation . R . V . Jones was the leading World War II British expert on electronic warfare . He was one of the primary analysts of the Oslo Report . US programs at the end of World War Two included Historical technical intelligence programs include Operation Paperclip , the general program directed at German scientists and engineers at the end of World War II . It is most often associated with rocket science . Other contemporary efforts included Operation Alsos , focusing on nuclear science and engineering and Operation Lusty , devoted to aerodynamics . Use of enemy material in the field . Troops involved in technical intelligence operations have used knowledge of foreign material to put enemy equipment to use . For example , Army troops used German military telephone wire and medical supplies to aid civilians in France during World War II . Similarly , Joseph E . Smith , who wrote " Small Arms of the World " in the 1960s , reported that the U . S . Army captured a large supply of German mortar ammunition in France during World War II . It was discovered that the German ammunition could be fired from US mortars . Troops in the field prepared a firing table for the American mortar firing German ammunition by test firing the German ammunition . National - level policy . The US Economic Espionage Act of 1996 criminalizes two kinds of activity , which may be done either by foreign powers for ( 18 U . S . C . § 1831 – 1839 ) makes the theft or misappropriation of a trade secret a federal crime . To some extent , the Act addresses an international problem , but not all countries regard unauthorized technology transfer as illegal , when done for commercial purposes . Technology transfer that involves militarily critical technologies are more commonly a matter This law contains two provisions criminalizing two sorts of activity : Categorizing an individual act can be complex , as some national intelligence services have provided scientific and technical intelligence to private firms based in their countries . It becomes even more complex when the information is provided to an organization partially or fully owned by that government , and that organization competes in commercial markets . Other complexities arise when the information is not actually stolen , but where the foreign intelligence service ( or business ) buys one copy of a high - technology product , and then reverse engineers its technology to use in its own products . End user license agreement s forbidding reverse engineering are common in software , but less so in other business areas . Violation of export controls may overlap with information acquisition , or the exported equipment or materials may themselves be things difficult for the offending country to produce . According to the US National Counterintelligence Executive ( NCIX ) , 108 countries tried to obtain US technology in fiscal year 2005 . Most of the effort , however , centered around a small number of countries . NCIX named China and Russia among this small number , " just as they have since the CI Community first began systematically tracking foreign technology collection efforts in 1997 . " By no means , however , is the US the only target , nor are China and Russia the only countries trying to obtain such information . In 2003 , Sweden expelled two Russian diplomats over accusations of spying at Ericsson , a major electronics manufacturer whose products include avionics for Swedish Gripen fighter aircraft . Even more sensitive , however , is scientific and technical information - gathering by allies , such as Japan , France , and Israel . Collection techniques at the national level . In contrast with tactical technical intelligence , national level science and technology information tends to come less from capture of foreign equipment , and more from HUMINT or creative business relationships . There are some national - level attempts to salvage foreign equipment , such as Project Jennifer , a complex and clandestine attempt to recover a sunken Soviet submarine . Issues in national policy . Porteous raises the question : is commercially oriented , economic / scientific / technical espionage efficient ? He observes that some claim intelligence obtained through economic espionage would be " tactically useless " for a number of reasons . Typically , the barriers to potential efficiency are related to an intelligence agency ' s lack of knowledge of the subject area and to problems associated with the dissemination of intelligence once acquired . These arguments tend to come from individuals who at the same time argue for or accept the need for government to defend against economic espionage engaged in by other governments . It is difficult to support these points simultaneously : if economic espionage is " tactically useless " , it is similarly useless to foreign governments that practice it , and thus need not be defended against . He counters the argument that " lack of direct knowledge of a certain business or its technology has been cited as a significant obstacle to intelligence services engaging in economic espionage . Yet during the Cold War , intelligence services spent significant amounts of time and energy , with some success , trying to obtain intelligence on various complex military technologies of which the case officers would not have had a profound knowledge . If intelligence services were trusted to obtain such information , a shift of focus to complex commercial technologies and intelligence would not be unthinkable . The same techniques used to obtain military secrets could be turned to complex commercial technologies or strategies without too much difficulty . " Another efficiency argument deals with the security of dissemination to industry . National characteristics will be different here ; industry - government partnerships , for example , are far more routine in Japan than in the United States . US consortia have been open to foreign firms , and many have shut down , such as the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation and the Corporation for Open Systems ( in OSI and ISDN ) networking . Some , such as the Open Software Foundation merged with other groups and wound up being international . Porteous observed " the existence of means to reduce dissemination difficulties will not erase them . Problems will inevitably arise . Those countries considering engaging in or expanding their practice of economic espionage would be well - advised to consider the alleged experience of France in this area . It has recently been suggested that the embarrassing release of information indicating French intelligence service targeting of American companies , which triggered an American boycott of the Paris Airshow , was the work of disgruntled French firms . The companies responsible for releasing the material to the press apparently were unhappy with what they saw as the tendency of the French intelligence service , Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure ( DGSE ) , to favour some French firms over others in distributing material obtained through economic espionage . The incident reportedly cooled relations between the DGSE and certain elements of French industry . Collection techniques . Perhaps most common are operations that exploit business relationships , including the marketing and sales phase . There are also efforts targeted at individuals with sensitive knowledge . The NCIX said the easiest techniques can be straightforward , including : Another category starts with agreements of which the hosting government is fully aware , but that may be enforced more or less stringently in specific cases : " Since the mid - 1980s , development , production , and marketing of weapon systems has been increasingly internationalized through government - sponsored cooperative development programs and various kinds of industrial linkages , including international subcontracting and teaming arrangements , joint ventures , and cross - border mergers and acquisitions . Foreign companies have acquired many U . S . defense companies and have legitimate business interests in them . The U . S . government allows such foreign investment as long as it is consistent with U . S . national security interests . " Multinational programs may be even more common in Europe , such as Panavia ( UK - Germany - Italy ) and Airbus ( Germany - France - Spain , but operating under Dutch law ) . There are also enterprises owned by a combination of industry and government , such as the French Thales Group . Foreign intelligence services , or foreign companies , may still try to recruit individuals . Allegations of intelligence collection at the national level . Nations often claim that each is trying to get economically significant scientific and technical information to file counterclaims of each spying on the other . One conflict comes from the fact that some normal business practices in other countries are considered illegal by the United States . Nations have different views of what constitutes offensive and defensive economic intelligence : " Decisions informed by the provision of economic intelligence range from determining whether to raise interest rates to the proper stance to take in contentious trade negotiations . This type of intelligence support to government decision - makers is generally accepted as a legitimate function of state intelligence services . Related intelligence services that go beyond the mere collection of information and aim to influence events directly , either at a macro - economic or firm level , are understandably more controversial . Citing a US example , Porteous describes a useful distinction : " . . . the CIA recently distinguished between to differentiate their economic intelligence activities in France from the direct industry - support activities in which French intelligence had engaged in the USA . " He cites the former category , intending to inform government officials , as where the CIA was allegedly supporting the formulation of American trade policy with regard to negotiations concerning audio - visual matters at the GATT . This was reportedly done through the provision of clandestinely obtained intelligence on the French bargaining position . The Americans argued that this support to government decision - makers was well within the bounds of tolerable espionage behaviour . . . " The Americans contrasted this with : alleged French intelligence activities in support of French commercial actors through directly transmitting clandestinely obtained proprietary information from American companies was not . In 1994 , Porteous suggested that there may be a shift in the countries most eager to engage in this sort of intelligence gathering . " Early on , the French and the Russians were presented in most North American analyses as the primary practitioners of economic espionage . Now , in a realignment perhaps more attuned to today ' s geopolitical realities , this dubious status is being transferred to the Japanese and emerging Asian economies . In a recent article in the Far Eastern Economic Review , FBI officials stated 57 countries are running operations to obtain information out of Silicon Valley . These same officials were quoted as labelling Asian governments and multinationals , particularly Japan , Taiwan and South Korea , as the chief culprits . " There are differences in economic culture between Europe and Asia . Where European industry - government partnerships tend to be very formally defined , the Asian ones are more fluid . " The prospect of huge Asian multinational corporations , with their definite but elusive relationship with government , engaging in industrial or economic espionage , may open new debates on when and how intelligence services should intervene in these cases . For while European states move towards privatization ( albeit retaining a " golden share " ) in many cases there is little sign of a lessening of links between business and government in the high growth communitarian societies of Asia . The imminent emergence of powerful Chinese multinationals out of the so - called " socialist market economy " of China will only increase this trend . " It can reasonably be surmised that there is a degree of economic intelligence gathering among most or all industrialized nations . Merely because a country , in the list below , complains of intelligence gathering against it should not be interpreted as meaning that country ' s intelligence service does not collect information from other countries . Canada . Porteous mentions that in Montreal , two members of the Stasi , the former East German secret police , explained how they used phony work records from " sympathetic companies " to gain employment at targeted Canadian companies . He speculated , in 1993 , " In the near future , it is conceivable that the UK would share more economic intelligence with fellow EC members than it would with Canada or the United States . On the other hand , the USA would be more likely to share its economic intelligence with its fellow FTA and NAFTA members . " While there has been no official Canadian statement about targeting scientific , technical and economic intelligence , the Communications Security Establishment ( CSE ) , the Canadian SIGINT agency , advertised for " university graduates for analyst positions noting that " graduation in fields such as economics , international business , commerce . . . would be an asset " . " China . " China has also warned its people about foreigners seeking economic intelligence . ( In this instance the Chinese government felt 1000 - year - old remedies and ancient healing techniques required protection . ) " France . France and the US have accused one another of economic , scientific and technical espionage at the national level . A US senator , William Cohen , accused the French of hiding listening devices on Air France flights in order to pick up useful economic information from business travelers . " In 1993 , the CIA warned U . S . aircraft manufacturers to be on the lookout for French spies at the Paris Air Show , and intelligence officials have claimed that France regularly sponsors the theft of information from U . S . companies . " . France declared several US intelligence officers " persona non grata " for alleged US economic intelligence - gathering , although Knight stated the US denied the charges . France , according to Russell , also is a target . The French former intelligence official , Alexandre de Marenches described the Japanese as experts in economic espionage ; that the Japanese government and industry have close ties with each other . The French intelligence agency , Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure ( DGSE ) , studies Japanese intelligence operations abroad , trying to determine Japan ' s next technology target . According to de Marenches , Japan examines the global production situation , determines which country can satisfy their high - technology requirement , and then dispatches a collection delegation . Germany . " German articles talk of American or French use of signals intelligence ( SIGINT ) capacity to eavesdrop on sensitive commercial transactions . " Israel . Several sources describe Israel as having energetic programs in economic and S & TI . According to a Command and General Staff College thesis , Israeli Air Force intelligence tried to steal 14 boxes of corporate data from Recon / Optical , Inc . , a company that develops optics and semiconductors used in reconnaissance satellites . " Data the agents removed successfully , before their arrest , went to the laboratories of the Israeli company Electro - Optics Industries . The Government of Israel continues efforts to field a reconnaissance satellite with the services of a prime contractor - - Electro - OpticsIndustries . " Japan . " In the early 1980s , the companies Hitachi and Fujitsu , and the government agency the Ministry for International Trade and Industry ( MITI ) were caught stealing corporate secrets from IBM , Cray , and Fairchild Semiconductors . A 1987 Central Intelligence Agency ( CIA ) report " concluded that 80 percent of all Japanese government intelligence assets were directed toward the United States and Western Europe and concentrated on acquiring secrets about . . . technological developments . " As of 1994 , " Japan operates its economic collection bureaucracy in a manner different from France . The Japanese government itself does not provide large amounts of intelligence to its corporations . Companies maintain their own extensive intelligence gathering assets . Instead , the Japanese government provides direction and money ; it also collates the information provided to it by companies . Government agencies , the Ministry for International Trade and Industry ( MITI ) and the Japanese External Trade Organization ( JETRO ) , coordinate national economic collection priorities , provide access to foreign countries ( through trade offices ) , and channel the intelligence they do collect to the appropriate industry . JETRO operates 77 offices in 59 countries ; its agents collect economic and technical information and forward it to MITI . According to Japan : 2000 , a report commissioned by the CIA , " Japan ' s elaborate system for political and economic intelligence is conducted through the various trading companies down to the office leve1 . " " Republic of Korea ( South Korea ) . " South Korea ' s equivalent of the CIA , the National Security Planning Agency , places operatives in Korean companies like Hyundai , Samsung , and the Lucky Group . The companies then post the agents to foreign countries to forge close contacts with their industrial counterparts to gather technical and financial information . " Former Soviet Union and Russia . " To address the lag in technology , Soviet authorities in 1970 reconstituted and invigorated the USSR ' s intelligence collection for science and technology . The Council of Ministers and the Central Committee established a new unit , Directorate T of the KGB ' s First Chief Directorate , to plumb the R & D programs of Western economies . The State Committee on Science and Technology and the Military - Industrial Commission were to provide Directorate T and its operating arm , called Line X , with collection requirements . Military Intelligence ( GRU ) , the Soviet Academy of Sciences , and the State Committee for External Relations completed the list of participants . The bulk of collection was to be done by the KGB and the GRU , with extensive support from the East European intelligence services e . g . in Poland Departament I MSW - Wydział Naukowo - Techniczny . A formidable apparatus was set up for scientific espionage ; the scale of this structure testified to its importance . The coming of détente provided access for Line X and opened new avenues for exploitation . " " In June of 1994 , Russian presidential aide Yuriy Baturin accused Asian countries , particularly China and North Korea , of economic espionage . " United Kingdom . Reuter ' s stories from Britain make similar claims involving a middle - eastern power and a multi - billion dollar arms deal the UK was bidding on . " The concept of " economic well - being " used above is also found in the British Intelligence Services Act , 1994 . The act discloses for the first time the functions of the British Secret Intelligence Service ( SIS ) and Government Communications Headquarters ( GCHQ ) with regard to the economic and commercial interests of the state . According to the Act , under the authority of the Secretary of State , the functions of SIS include obtaining and providing information as well as performing " other tasks " relating to the actions or intentions of " persons outside the British Isles " . These functions of SIS , like those of GCHQ , are to be exercised only in the interests of national security , prevention or detection of serious crime and , most importantly from the point of view of this article , " in the interests of the economic well - being of the UK " . " United States . The United States suffers from a degree of conflict , in that it is sensitive to economic espionage against US companies , but it also objects to those companies using business practices , routine in other countries , that are considered corrupt domestically . " The United States is the only member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ( OECD ) to pass legislation — the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act — criminalizing the payment of a bribe to a foreign official . The legislation arose out of the American bribery scandals of the 1970s . These restraints , which are extraterritorial in scope , have proven a constant irritant to Americans doing business abroad . According to Secretary of State Warren Christopher , the legislation costs American companies " hundreds of millions of dollars in contracts every year " . Not surprisingly , the USA is particularly upset about the practice engaged in by some countries of not only turning a blind eye to bribery by their own nationals but recognizing these same bribes as tax - deductible business expenses . The Clinton administration has not been encouraged by progress in lobbying fellow OECD members to pass domestic legislation mirroring America ' s , or to agree to an enforceable international code condemning the practice . In the absence of any international support for these initiatives , American commercial interests have been pressuring their government either to change the international regime or to rescind the legislation . " Unwilling to rescind , the Clinton administration turned to the CIA . " Former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey distinguished between what is licit for the US government and illicit for companies : " I . . . reserve the term industrial espionage to mean espionage for the direct benefit of an industry . . . . I don ' t call it industrial espionage if the United States spies on a European corporation to find out if it is bribing its way to contracts in Asia or Latin America that it can ' t win honestly . " " Statements of current and past US officials about economic intelligence collection . " Former United States Central Intelligence Agency director James Woolsey confirmed in Washington . . . that the US steals economic secrets " with espionage , with communications [ intelligence ] , with reconnaissance satellites " , and that there was now " some increased emphasis " on economic intelligence . He claimed that economic spying was justified because European companies had a " national culture " of bribery and were the " principle offenders from the point of view of paying bribes in major international contracts in the world " . Responding to the European Parliament report on interception capabilities and the Echelon satellite surveillance system , Woolsey said that the " Interception Capabilities 2000 " report which had been presented to the parliament ' s Citizens ' Rights Committee on 23 February , was " intellectually honest " . In two cases cited in the report , " the fact [ is ] that the subject of American intelligence collection was bribery . " " That ' s correct " , he told a packed audience of foreign press journalists . . . We have spied on that in the past . I hope . . . that the United States government continues to spy on bribery . " Woolsey continued , " Whether economic or military , most US intelligence data came from open sources , he said . But " five percent is essentially secrets that we steal . We steal secrets with espionage , with communications , with reconnaissance satellites . " Explaining his view that Europe was the main centre of world industrial bribery , he asked " Why . . . have we in the past from time to time targeted foreign corporations and government assistance to them ? . . . Some of our oldest friends and allies have a national culture and a national practice such that bribery is an important part of the way they try to do business in international commerce . . . The part of the world that where this culture of getting contracts through bribery , that actually has a great deal of money , and is active in international contracting is to a first approximation Europe " . " [ . . . ] The principal offenders , from the point of view of paying bribes in major international contracts in the world , are Europe . And indeed , they are some of the very same companies - - the companies are in some of the very same countries where the most recent flap has arisen about alleged American industrial espionage . " Woolsey , when newly Director of Central Intelligence in 1993 , publicly announced that economic intelligence was now a CIA program . French intelligence had been aggressively going after information from American executives . Woolsey said " No more Mr . Nice Guy . " In a statement in 1995 entitled " A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement " , President Bill Clinton detailed just what his administration expected from American intelligence with regard to protecting or pursuing American economic interests To adequately forecast dangers to democracy and to U . S . economic well - being , the intelligence community must track political , economic , social and military developments in those parts of the world where U . S . interests are most heavily engaged and where overt collection of information from open sources is inadequate . Economic intelligence will play an increasingly important role in helping policy - makers understand economic trends . Economic intelligence can support U . S . trade negotiators and help level the economic playing field by identifying threats to U . S . companies from foreign intelligence services and unfair trading practices . Expert inference about economic intelligence collection by the US . According to Porteous , [ Clinton ' s ] statement clearly envisages the use of clandestine methods to obtain this intelligence where " overt collection . . . from open sources is inadequate " . Russell observes " France and Japan provide illustrative examples of foreign governments ' actions . " It is this direct link between government and business that some individuals propose to establish between the U . S . Government and U . S . businesses . Anticipated rewards of such a relationship include : reduced product research and development ( R & D ) timelines , reduced R & D costs , accelerated time from R & D to product marketing , and the receipt of lucrative contracts by undercutting a competitor using inside knowledge of his bid and terms . In sum , any benefit gained in these areas has the potential to increase profits . "