Edwin T . Layton Edwin Thomas Layton ( 7 April 1903 in Nauvoo , Illinois - 12 April 1984 in Carmel , California ) was a Rear Admiral in the United States Navy , who is most noted for his work as cryptanalyst during World War II . Career . Edwin Thomas Layton was born on April 7 , 1903 in Nauvoo , Illinois as a son of George E . Layton and his wife Mary C . Layton . Layton attended the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis , Maryland and graduated in 1924 . Layton spent next five years with the Pacific Fleet aboard the cruiser USS West Virginia and destroyer USS Chase . In 1929 , Layton was one of a small number of naval officers selected to go to Japan for language training . Significantly , on his voyage to Japan he met another young naval officer , Joseph J . Rochefort , assigned to the same duty . Both became intelligence officers , Rochefort specializing in decryption efforts , Layton in using intelligence information in war planning . Layton and Rochefort , both of whom were in Pearl Harbor , worked closely together in the months before the attack , largely trying to figure out what information was being denied them by Washington , and even more closely after the war began , especially in the month before the Battle of Midway . They both made signal contributions to that victory . Layton was assigned to the American Embassy in Tokyo as a naval attaché where he remained for three years . While in Japan , he met Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto on several occasions . The last four months he spent in Peiping , China , as assistant naval attaché at the American Legation . His linguistic ability and fluency in Japanese proved to be assets as his career progressed , even more so as World War II began in Europe . During the 1930s , Layton served two tours of duty in the Navy Department ’ s Office of Naval Intelligence , in 1933 and again in 1936 – 1937 , but he also saw sea duty . He had a three - year stint in the battleship Pennsylvania where he received commendations for gunnery excellence . In 1937 , he returned to Tokyo for two years as assistant naval attaché at the American Embassy . This was followed by a one - year tour of duty as Commanding Officer of USS Boggs ( AG - 19 ) . Exactly one year to the day before the attack on Pearl Harbor , Layton became Combat Intelligence Officer on the staff of Admiral Husband E . Kimmel , Commander - in - Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet , which had recently been moved from its base in San Pedro , California to Pearl Harbor – over the objections of Admiral James O . Richardson , whom Kimmel replaced . Layton was in charge of all intelligence in the Pacific Ocean area . Pearl Harbor , Coral Sea , Midway . Layton was a champion of using code - breaking information in war planning operations and had strong supporters in both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Nimitz . Layton ’ s book describes how Kimmel and his army counterpart at Pearl , General Walter C . Short , the commanders there , were scapegoats for failures by higher - ups in Washington . Layton blames Admiral Richmond K . Turner in particular for monopolizing naval intelligence in Washington that would have alerted Kimmel and his staff to the imminence of attack and to the fact that Pearl could be a target of that attack . Layton ’ s argument is detailed and comprehensive , but in general , he maintains that although Washington was reading the highest level Japanese diplomatic code , Purple , little of this was ever made available to the field commanders ( other than to MacArthur in the Philippines , who failed to act , not only on the Purple data but even after he knew that Pearl had been attacked ) . The diplomatic information that they were denied not only contained data about the imminence of war , but also included messages sent from Honolulu to Tokyo by Takeo Yoshikawa , the spy sent to observe and report daily on the exact positions of ships in the harbor , using a grid system that was obviously designed for the purpose of targeting torpedoes and bombs . Those above Turner , including his boss , the Chief of Naval Operations , Admiral Stark , and even General Marshall also come in for blame , though some details are still missing from the official record . Forrest Biard , another naval linguist , one who was in the last group to be sent to Japan for language studies , worked for the Rochefort Hypo team as soon as he left Japan in 1941 . Hypo was located in a basement , called by team members “ The Dungeon . ” In a speech to the National Cryptologic Museum Foundation , Biard describes Layton as the sixth member of the five - member team ( Joseph J . Rochefort , Joe Finnegan , Alva B . Lasswell , Wesley A . Wright , Thomas Dyer ) who produced the information that was vital to winning the Battle of Midway , following Coral Sea . He also characterizes Layton : During May 1942 , in particular , Layton and the Rochefort team were battling Washington as much as the Japanese – both as to where the next attack would occur and as to when it would occur . Washington said Port Moresby or the Aleutians in mid - June ; Rochefort / Layton said Midway , first week in June . The story of how Rochefort ’ s team prevailed is told in the Rochefort article , and in much greater detail in Layton ’ s book . Nimitz deserves the highest praise for realizing that their analysis was sounder , something for which Layton deserves a very great deal of credit , and for risking the wrath of his boss in Washington , Admiral King , something for which Nimitz alone deserves a very great deal of credit . ( Selecting Admiral Raymond Spruance to replace the hospitalized Admiral Halsey was also the right move , as was the earlier decision to retain Kimmel ’ s intelligence officers ) . Layton remained on the staff of the Pacific Fleet until February 1945 , followed by a three - year tour of duty as Commander of the U . S . Naval Net Depot at Tiburon , California . During this time , Admiral Nimitz , as a mark of his recognition of Layton ’ s contributions , invited him to Tokyo Bay when the Japanese formally surrendered on September 2 , 1945 . Intelligence work occupied Layton again , in the form of a two - year assignment as the first Director of the Naval Intelligence School in Washington D . C . Korean War . Starting in 1950 , Layton spent six months as Intelligence Officer on the staff of the Commandant , Fourteenth Naval District in Hawaii . His evaluative skills and keen interpretation of events were vital during the early stages of the conflict . In 1951 , for a two - year period , he assumed his old position of Fleet Intelligence Officer on the staff of the Commander - in - Chief , Pacific Fleet . In 1953 , with the war over , he was assigned to the staff of the Joint Chiefs where he was Assistant Director for Intelligence , then Deputy Director . His last duty before retirement was Director of the Naval Intelligence School at the Naval Receiving Station , Washington , D . C . Layton retired in 1959 . He went to work for the Northrup Corporation as Director of Far East Operations in Tokyo , Japan , 1959 – 1963 . He retired from Northrup in 1964 and moved to Carmel , California . Not until the 1980s were many of the documents about Pearl Harbor and Midway declassified . His book , " And I Was There : Pearl Harbor and Midway — Breaking the Secrets " was written with co - authors Roger Pineau and John Costello and was published in 1985 , the year after Layton died . Decorations and Honors . Here is the ribbon bar of Rear Admiral Edwin T . Layton : The Naval War College in Newport , Rhode Island , honored Layton in the 1960s by naming the Chair of Naval Intelligence after him . Works . Edwin T . Layton , Roger Pineau , and John Costello ( 1985 ) , " And I Was There : Pearl Harbor and Midway — Breaking the Secrets " , New York : William Morrow .