Harold Brown ( Secretary of Defense ) Harold Brown ( born September 19 , 1927 ) , American scientist , was U . S . Secretary of Defense from 1977 to 1981 in the cabinet of President Jimmy Carter . He had previously served in the Lyndon Johnson administration as Director of Defense Research and Engineering and Secretary of the Air Force . While Secretary of Defense , he insisted in laying the groundwork for the Camp David accords . He took part in the strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union and supported ( unsuccessfully ) , ratification of the SALT II treaty . He advocated détente with the Soviet Union , an issue over which he conflicted with National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski . Early life and career . Brown was born in New York City , to Gertrude ( Cohen ) and Abraham Harold Brown . He graduated from the Bronx High School of Science ; Brown took three degrees at Columbia University , including , at age 21 in 1949 , a Ph . D . in physics . After a short period of teaching and postdoctoral research , Brown became a research scientist at the Radiation Laboratory at the University of California , Berkeley . In 1952 he joined the staff of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Livermore , California , and became its director in 1960 . During the 1950s he served as a member of or consultant to several federal scientific bodies and as senior science adviser at the 1958 - 59 Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests . Brown worked under Robert McNamara as director of defense research and engineering from 1961 to 1965 , and then as Secretary of the Air Force from October 1965 to February 1969 . Between 1969 and 1977 , he was president of the California Institute of Technology . Secretary of Defense . Appointment and initial agenda . With almost eight years of prior service in the Pentagon , Brown was the first scientist to become secretary of defense . Brown involved himself in practically all areas of departmental activity . Consistent with the Carter administration ' s objective to reorganize the federal government , Brown launched a comprehensive review of defense organization that eventually brought significant change . But he understood the limits to effective reform . In one of his first speeches after leaving office , " ' Managing ' the Defense Department - Why It Can ' t Be Done , " at the University of Michigan in March 1981 , he observed : With regard to strategic planning , Brown shared much the same concerns as his Republican predecessors — the need to upgrade U . S . military forces and improve collective security arrangements — but with a stronger commitment to arms control . Brown adhered to the principle of " essential equivalence " in the nuclear competition with the Soviet Union . This meant that " Soviet strategic nuclear forces do not become usable instruments of political leverage , diplomatic coercion , or military advantage ; nuclear stability , especially in a crisis , is maintained ; any advantages in force characteristics enjoyed by the Soviets are offset by U . S . advantages in other characteristics ; and the U . S . posture is not in fact , and is not seen as , inferior in performance to the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union . " Nuclear missiles . Brown considered it essential to maintain the triad of ICBMs , SLBMs , and strategic bombers ; some of the administration ' s most important decisions on weapon systems reflected this commitment . Although he decided not to produce the B - 1 bomber , he did recommend upgrading existing B - 52s and equipping them with air - launched cruise missile s , and gave the go - ahead for development of a " stealth " technology , fostered by William J . Perry , under - secretary of defense for research and engineering , that would make it possible to produce planes ( bombers as well as other aircraft ) with very low radar profiles , presumably able to elude enemy defenses and deliver weapons on targets . The administration backed development of the MX missile , intended to replace in the 1980s the increasingly vulnerable Minuteman and Titan intercontinental missiles . To insure MX survivability , Brown recommended deploying the missiles in " multiple protective shelters " ; 200 MX missiles would be placed in Utah and Nevada , with each missile to be shuttled among 23 different shelters of its own located along roadways - meaning a total of 4 , 600 such shelters . Although this plan was expensive and environmentally controversial , Brown argued that it was the most viable scheme to protect the missiles from enemy attack . For the sea leg of the triad , Brown accelerated development of the larger Trident nuclear submarine and carried forward the conversion of Poseidon submarine s to a fully MIRVed missile capability . By early 1979 Brown and his staff had developed a " countervailing strategy " , an approach to nuclear targeting that both McNamara and Schlesinger earlier had found attractive but never formally codified . As Brown put it , " we must have forces and plans for the use of our strategic nuclear forces such that in considering aggression against our interests , our adversary would recognize that no plausible outcome would represent a success - on any rational definition of success . The prospect of such a failure would then deter an adversary ' s attack on the United States or our vital interests . " Although Brown did not rule out the assured destruction approach , which stressed attacks on urban and industrial targets , he believed that " such destruction must not be automatic , our only choice , or independent of any enemy ' s attack . Indeed , it is at least conceivable that the mission of assured destruction would not have to be executed at all in the event that deterrence failed . " Official adoption of the countervailing strategy came with President Carter ' s approval of Presidential Directive 59 ( PD 59 ) on July 25 , 1980 . In explaining PD 59 Brown argued that it was not a new strategic doctrine , but rather a refinement , a codification of previous explanations of our strategic policy . The heart of PD 59 , as Brown described it , was as follows : Because the almost simultaneous disclosures of PD 59 and the stealth technology came in the midst of the 1980 presidential campaign , some critics asserted that the Carter administration leaked them to counter charges of weakness and boost its re - election chances . Others charged that PD 59 made it more likely that the United States would initiate a nuclear conflict , based on the assumption that a nuclear war could somehow be limited . Brown insisted that the countervailing strategy was not a first strike strategy . As he put it , " Nothing in the policy contemplates that nuclear war can be a deliberate instrument of achieving our national security goals . . . . But we cannot afford the risk that the Soviet leadership might entertain the illusion that nuclear war could be an option - - or its threat a means of coercion - - for them . " NATO . Brown regarded the strengthening of NATO as a key national security objective and worked hard to invigorate the alliance . With the assistance of Robert W . Komer , at first his special adviser on NATO affairs and subsequently under - secretary of defense for policy , Brown launched a series of NATO initiatives shortly after taking office . In May 1978 the NATO heads of government endorsed a Long Term Defense Program that included 10 priority categories : enhanced readiness ; rapid reinforcement ; stronger European reserve forces ; improvements in maritime capabilities ; integrated air defenses ; effective command , control , and communications ; electronic warfare ; rationalized procedures for armaments collaboration ; logistics co - ordination and increased war reserves ; and theater nuclear modernization . To implement the last item , NATO defense and foreign ministers decided in December 1979 to respond to the Soviet deployment of new theater nuclear weapons — the SS - 20 missile and the Backfire bomber — by placing 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 ground - launched cruise missile s ( GLCMs ) in several Western European countries beginning in December 1983 . The NATO leaders indicated that the new missile deployment would be scaled down if satisfactory progress occurred in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union . At Brown ' s urging , NATO members pledged in 1977 to increase their individual defense spending three percent per year in real terms for the 1979 - 86 period . The objective , Brown explained , was to ensure that alliance resources and capabilities - both conventional and nuclear - would balance those of the Soviet bloc . Although some NATO members hesitated to confirm the agreement to accept new missiles and did not always attain the three percent target , Brown was pleased with NATO ' s progress . Midway in his term he told an interviewer that he thought his most important achievement thus far had been the revitalization of NATO . Brown also tried to strengthen the defense contributions of U . S . allies outside of NATO , particularly Japan and Korea . He repeatedly urged the Japanese government to increase its defense budget so that it could shoulder a larger share of the Western allies ' Pacific security burden . Although the Carter administration decided in 1977 on a phased withdrawal of United States ground forces from the Republic of Korea , it pledged to continue military and other assistance to that country . Later , because of a substantial buildup of North Korean military forces and opposition to the troop withdrawal in the United States , the president shelved the plan , leaving approximately 40 , 000 U . S . troops in Korea . In establishing diplomatic relations with the People ' s Republic of China ( PRC ) on January 1 , 1979 , the United States formally recognized the PRC almost 30 years after its establishment . A year later Brown visited the PRC , talked with its political and military leaders , and helped lay the groundwork for limited collaboration on security issues . Arms control . Arms control formed an integral part of Brown ' s national security policy . He staunchly supported the June 1979 SALT II treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union and was the administration ' s leading spokesman in urging the Senate to approve it . SALT II limited both sides to 2 , 250 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles ( bombers , ICBMs , SLBMs , and air - to - surface ballistic missiles ) , including a sublimit of 1 , 200 launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles , of which only 820 could be launchers of MIRVed ICBMs . It also placed restrictions on the number of warheads on each missile and on deployment of new land - based ballistic missile systems , except for one new type of light ICBM for each side . There was also a provision for verification by each side using its own national technical means . Brown explained that SALT II would reduce the Soviet Union ' s strategic forces , bring enhanced predictability and stability to Soviet - U . S . nuclear relationships , reduce the cost of maintaining a strategic balance , help the United States to monitor Soviet forces , and reduce the risk of nuclear war . He rebutted charges by SALT II critics that the United States had underestimated the Soviet military buildup , that the treaty would weaken the Western alliance , that the Soviet Union could not be trusted to obey the treaty , and that its terms could not really be verified . Partly to placate Senate opponents of the treaty , the Carter administration agreed in the fall of 1979 to support higher increases in the defense budget . However , the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 ensured that the Senate would not accept the treaty at that time , forcing the president to withdraw it from consideration . When his term ended in 1981 , Brown said that failure to secure ratification of SALT II was his greatest regret . Regional matters . Panama Canal . Besides broad national security policy matters , Brown had to deal with several more immediate questions , among them the Panama Canal issue . Control of the canal zone had been a source of contention ever since Panama achieved its independence from Colombia in 1903 and granted the United States a concession " in perpetuity . " In the mid - 1960s , after serious disturbances in the zone , the United States and Panama began negotiations that went on intermittently until September 7 , 1977 , when the countries signed two treaties , one providing for full Panamanian control of the canal by the year 2000 and the other guaranteeing the canal ' s neutrality . The Defense Department played a major role in the Panama negotiations . Brown championed the treaties through a difficult fight to gain Senate approval ( secured in March and April 1978 ) , insisting that they were both advantageous to the United States and essential to the canal ' s future operation and security . Middle East . In Middle East affairs , Brown supported President Carter ' s efforts as an intermediary in the Egypt ian - Israeli negotiations leading to the Camp David Accords of September 1978 and the signing by the two nations of a peace treaty in March 1979 . Elsewhere , the fall of the Shah from power in Iran in January 1979 eliminated a major U . S . ally and triggered a chain of events that played havoc with American policy in the region . In November 1979 , Iranian revolutionaries occupied the U . S . embassy in Tehran and took more than 50 hostages . Brown participated closely in planning for a rescue operation that ended in failure and the loss of eight U . S . servicemen on 24 – 25 April 1980 . Not until the last day of his administration , on 20 January 1981 , could President Carter make final arrangements for the release of the hostages . Soviet invasion of Afghanistan . The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 to bolster a pro - Soviet Communist government further complicated the role of the United States in the Middle East and Southwest Asia . In response to the events in Iran and Afghanistan and in anticipation of others , Brown activated the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force ( RDJTF ) at MacDill Air Force Base , Florida on March 1 , 1980 . Although normally a planning headquarters without operational units , the RDJTF could obtain such forces from the several services and command them in crisis situations . Brown explained that the RDJTF was responsible for developing plans for contingency operations , particularly in Southwest Asia , and maintaining adequate capabilities and readiness for such missions . Budget . As with all of his predecessors , budget matters occupied a major portion of Brown ' s time . During the 1976 campaign , Carter criticized Defense spending levels of the Ford administration and promised cuts in the range of $ 5 billion to $ 7 billion . Shortly after he became secretary , Brown suggested a series of amendments to Ford ' s proposed FY 1978 budget , having the effect of cutting it by almost $ 3 billion , but still allowing a TOA increase of more than $ 8 billion over the FY 1977 budget . Subsequent budgets under Brown moved generally upward , reflecting high prevailing rates of inflation , the need to strengthen and modernize conventional forces neglected somewhat since the end of the Vietnam War , and serious challenges in the Middle East , Iran , Afghanistan , and elsewhere . The Brown Defense budgets by fiscal year , in TOA , were as follows : 1978 , $ 116 . 1 billion ; 1979 , $ 124 . 7 billion ; 1980 , $ 141 . 9 billion ; and 1981 , $ 175 . 5 billion . In terms of real growth , there were slight negative percentages in 1978 and 1979 , and increases in 1980 and 1981 . Part of the increase for FY 1981 resulted from supplemental appropriations obtained by the Reagan administration ; but the Carter administration by this time had departed substantially from its early emphasis on curtailing the DoD budget . Its proposals for FY 1982 , submitted in January 1981 , called for significant real growth over the TOA for FY 1981 . Departure . Brown left office on January 20 , 1981 following President Carter ' s unsuccessful bid for re - election . During the 1980 campaign Brown actively defended the Carter administration ' s policies , speaking frequently on national issues in public . He received the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1981 . He received the Enrico Fermi Award in 1992 . Later life . After leaving the Pentagon , Brown remained in Washington , D . C . , joining the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies as a visiting professor and later the university ' s Foreign Policy Institute as chairman . He continued to speak and write widely on national security issues , and in 1983 published Thinking About National Security : Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World . In later years , Brown was affiliated with research organizations and served on the boards of a number of corporations , like Altria ( previously Philip Morris ) . On January 5 , 2006 , he participated in a meeting at the White House of former Secretaries of Defense and State to discuss United States foreign policy with Bush administration officials . In July 2011 , Brown became a member of the United States Energy Security Council , which seeks to diminish oil ' s monopoly over the US transportation sector and is sponsored by the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security ( IAGS ) .