Battle of Campo Grande The Battle of Campo Grande was a major engagement which took place during the Chaco War , in the southern region of the Chaco Boreal . During this battle , the Paraguayan Army successfully encircled two Bolivian regiments defending two of the three flanks of Fort Alihuatá , forcing them to surrender . The encirclement . The battle of Gondra had forced the Bolivian high command to remove troops from the front of the 9th Division that defended Alihuatá , leaving the advanced area of the stronghold with only three scattered units . 700 men of the " Chacaltaya " regiment remained entrenched near Arce , riding the road coming from Alihuatá , while the " Ballivián " regiment was deployed five kilometres to the left , in Campo Grande . The Bolivian command deployed a company of the " Junín " regiment in Pozo Favorito , four kilometers from the " Chacaltaya " , on the right side of the screen . The Paraguayan command was aware of the weakness of the Bolivian deployment . Reconnaissance patrols learned of the shortage of personnel and the isolation of the three outposts . They surrounded the Bolivian troops through three simultaneous operations . On 30 August , the Paraguayan artillery pounded the trenches of the " Chacaltaya " regiment , while infantry forces assaulted the flanks . A small Bolivian detachment left Alihuatá to bring relief to the " Chacaltaya " but failed to clear the way . Another strong detachment , consisting of the regiment 18th , managed to evict the Paraguayans , cleaning up the rearguard of the " Chacaltaya " . The Paraguayan command , however , was ready to repeat this diversional maneuver . The Gral . Kundt , who was in the sector Bullo controlling the operation which was at that point , leaving their barracks of Muñoz had left specific instructions that the " Loa " regiment should not be used without his permission . The Lieutenant Cnel . Toro , which was nominally as Chief of operations of the high command , but had no more authority that relay the news received from various fronts , to Kundt Muñoz received a distress message from the 9th Division which said that the " Chacaltaya " was being surrounded again and that the " Ballivián " regiment also was in danger . As Toro was trying to contact Kundt to obtain authorization to deploy the " Loa " regiment , the situation of the " Ballivián " and the " Chacaltaya " was deteriorating . Break - out attempt . Lieutenant Colonel Toro decided to move on his own " Loa " regiment from Gondra to Campo Grande to support the " Ballivián " regiment . Upon learning of this Kundt scolded his Chief of operations and traveled to Alihuatá to meet himself with the situation . General Kundt and Colonel Banzer , Commander of the 9th Division , assumed that the centre of gravity of the Paraguayan offensive was the attack against the " Chacaltaya " regiment , in the path Alihuatá - Arce . The truth was that the Paraguayan command acted there with very little strength . On the other hand , in Campo Grande , the Paraguyan army deployed an entire Division , the 7th . The " Loa " regiment tried to prolong the " Ballivián " line to avoid overflow enemy flanks , but the Paraguayan troops extended their deployment including the " Loa " , threatening to encircle the two units . A baffled Colonel Banzer went to Campo Grande and issued emergency measures on his return to Alihuatá , not before being uncovered and tracked by Paraguayan patrols which had also closed that pathway . A Paraguayan account states : We saw a passing truck carrying a blond high official of uncertain age , we assumed that he was a senior officer , but we abstained from ambush them to keep the surprise . On September 12 , 1933 , the route Charata - Campo Grande was occupied by the Paraguayans , who consequently cornered the Bolivian regiments " Ballivián " and " Loa " . The Paraguayan pressure became more intense on both the North and East . Intending to quickly decide the battle , " Ballivián " ' s line was broken by a Paraguayan attack and even kitchen and courier staff had to be sent to close the gap . During the night the pressure enemy remained constant . Colonel Rafael Gonzalez Quint , head of the Ballivián suggested ask for reinforcements but the Colonel José Capriles , Commander of the Loa , who had assumed the leadership of the detachment consisting of these two regiments , was opposed . The reason was that Colonel Banzer , on the last visit to his command , had notified him that the 9th Division no longer had any reserves and that all available men were going to be used to help the " Chacaltaya " regiment that was supposedly defending the road to Arce from where came the main attack of the enemy . Colonel Capriles didn ' t encouraged them to try an offensive on their own since he knew that a retreat was the most reasonable course of action before the effects of the encirclement made it impossible . In the evening of the second day of siege , were heard loud noises of fighting on the side of Alihuatá : it was the Zambrana company of the " Loa " regiment , who was in another sector and that came in relief of the besieged . After half an hour the noise died down ; Captain Julio Zambrana Bayá and many of his colleagues had succumbed in the rescue bid . The " Ayacucho " regiment was taken out of Nanawa for another release attempt . He also achieved success . Colonel Ortiz , head of the Paraguayan Division seventh , had established three lines in this sector , looking towards Alihuatá to stop Bolivian forces of relief that they could come from the Fort , another harassing the besieged and third , in the middle , to come and go in support of one or the other wall . Desperate Situation . Some aircraft were able to throw bags of coca into the fencing . On September 15 , the third day of the siege , a hellishly sun increased the thirst of the Bolivian troops . Four trucks had brought water shortly before the encirclement was completed . The liquid is carefully share out to half a litre per day per person . Thirst prevented the soldiers to eat the pieces of meat that was feed them . Their dry throats simply don ' t allowed them to swallow the food . According to 2nd Lieutenant Benigno Guzmán : Day 15 . 17 Hours : they bring some water , the supply to the troops caused us several casualties , because all are desperate . They do not want the coca that dropped our aircraft , or the cigarretes … some soldiers don ' t recognize me , others just cry . 10 Hours : I talk with mayor Cárdenas . The exhausted soldiers only can shout out " water ! water ! water ! " . . . and the Paraguayans are offering us water , threatening in addition to cut our throats … at noon , the Paraguayans stormed the pen ' s sector … they carried out another assault , on the entire front this time … Three men get out from the trench , one of them wounded . Another survivor is a Sergeant , who tells me : " the Paraguayans have entered and caught them all " . . . the few of us still standing attempted to run away towards the headquarters … I was dragged out of the bushes , and they asked me to surrender … everything was lost by then . | " Diary " 2nd Lieutenant Benigno Guzmán ( Querejazu Calvo , 1981 , pág . 227 ) Surrender . On the western side a Paraguayan official formally raised the surrender of Bolivian units , giving an hour of term for the response . The Paraguayan pressure was felt everywhere and many soldiers were delivering . After consulting his officers , Colonel Capriles agreed to meet with a parliamentary enemy . The veteran Lieutenant Colonel Eugenio Garay joined the Bolivian command post on behalf of the Commander of the Paraguayan Division , Lieutenant Colonel José A . Ortiz , to enter into the terms of the surrender . And while the Bolivian aircraft threw cans and Paraguayan soldiers offered some water to the Bolivian troops , the Act of surrender was signed . A total of 509 troops capitulated , among them two Colonels , 11 officers , three surgeons and ten non - commissioned officers . Five hours earlier , ten kilometres to the right , the shrinking company of the " Junín " regiment , defending Pozo Favorito had also been forced to capitulate . In the Centre , the " Chacaltaya " regiment broke through a second overrun attempt with the help of two units , the " Campos " regiment , launched the assault three times in a row , and the " Lanza " cavalry regiment , who managed to open a safe path on a flank . Assessment . This battle , despite the small units engaged in it , is important because it marks a change of strategy for the Paraguayan army . Commander Estigarribia was unable to assess the State that was the operational capacity of the enemy army . It was easy to observe the reactions slow and hesitant of the Bolivian command , returning to the tactic of sending reinforcements in small quantities and where the situation was almost hopeless . It was also observed , in the prisoners captured , tiredness and the growing demoralization that widespread in officers and soldiers Bolivians who distrusted more and more orders received from their senior commanders . The Paraguayan Commander Ortiz , which directly addressed the entire operation , could maintain in secret the main direction of his attack until the last minute , denying the enemy time for regrouping their forces .