Valley of Tears The Valley of Tears ( sometimes called Vale of Tears Battle , , " Emek HaBakha " ) is the name given to an area in the Golan Heights after it became the site of a major battle in the Yom Kippur War . On 6 October 1973 the Syrian 7th Infantry Division attacked the Israeli 7th Armored Brigade in the area between Mount Hermonit and a southern ridge known as " Booster " in Israel , or Tel el Mekhafi in Arabic . The Syrians started the offensive with an artillery barrage , but failed to move tanks across the anti - tank ditch . They penetrated the Israeli defenses at night with the help of night vision equipment — equipment that the Israelis lacked . The next day , the Syrians mounted a second attack , and at one point in the engagement less than forty Israeli tanks were facing approximately 500 Syrian tanks . On the fourth day , the 7th Brigade received a small reinforcement force when it was down to about a dozen tanks and almost out of ammunition . The Syrians retreated for reasons that are still debated . Background . On Rosh Hashana eve , the Israeli 7th Brigade was ordered to move one battalion to the Golan Heights to strengthen the Barak Armored Brigade , under the command of Yitzhak Ben Shoham . The brigade commander Avigdor Ben - Gal concluded that something would happen on Yom Kippur . He ordered his artillery troops to survey the area and prepare targets and firing tables . He held a meeting with his battalion commanders to go over the main points of the operational plans that were previously implemented in the Israeli Northern Command . Without notifying his superiors , he took them on a tour of the front line . By 12 : 00 on Yom Kippur , 6 October , the brigade was concentrated in the Nafakh area . Israeli Intelligence estimated that Syria had more than 900 tanks and 140 batteries of artillery immediately behind the Syrian line . The Syrian 7th Division was one of the units ready to attack . The actual number of Syrian tanks was about 1 , 260 . Each Syrian infantry division had one infantry brigade , one mechanized infantry brigade , and one armored brigade . The infantry and mechanized infantry brigades each had three infantry battalions , a battalion of forty tanks , an AA artillery battalion and a field artillery battalion . The armored brigade had three battalions of forty tanks each . The division also had a regiment of division field artillery , a divisional AA field artillery regiment , a reconnaissance regiment with a company attached to each brigade and a chemical company with a section attached to each brigade . The total force of the division was about 10 , 000 men , 200 tanks , 72 artillery pieces and 72 antiaircraft guns and SAMs . The 7th Division , under the command of Brigadier - General Omar Abrash , had about 80 % of its tanks and APCs . There were also independent armored brigades with about 2 , 000 men and 120 tanks each . One of the independent brigades attached to Abrash ' s division was a Moroccan brigade . In the rear were the 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions , with 250 tanks each . The Syrian attack force was backed by at least 1 , 000 artillery pieces . The Syrian plan was for the 7th Division to break through near Ahmadiyeh in the north while the 5th Division did the same near Rafid in the south . This would lead to the double envelopment of most of the Israeli forces in the Golan . Each division was to advance in two echelons , the 7th Division to strike westward through El Rom and Wassett while the 5th Division advanced to the Arik Bridge north of the Kinneret . If the 5th Division broke through , or if both the 5th and 7th did , the 1st Division would drive between the 5th and 9th for Nafakh to attack the Israeli forces caught between the pincers of the 5th and 7th . The Israeli forces in the Golan were 170 tanks and 60 artillery pieces divided between the 7th and the Barak brigades . Prelude . At 10 : 00 on Yom Kippur , Ben - Gal and other brigade commanders convened with General Yitzhak Hofi in Nafakh , where Hofi told them that Intelligence was estimating the Syrians would attack that day , at around 18 : 00 . The 7th Brigade was assigned as a reserve force around Nafakh and was to prepare for a counter attack in either the north or south sector , or to split and support both . Ben - Gal then drove to meet one battalion in Sindiana and address the officers . He called an orders group at Nafakh for 14 : 00 , assuming it would give his second Battalion enough time to organize . As they gathered to wait for him , the Syrian artillery and planes began to attack . Ben - gal ' s men ran back to their battalions while Ben - Gal moved the headquarters out of the camp . After an hour , he was ordered to move to the northern sector in the Kuneitra area and to transfer the 2nd battalion to the southern sector , under command of the Barak Brigade . The 7th Brigade was left in charge of the northern sector from Kuneitra northwards with two battalions . As part of his usual strategy , Ben - Gal decided to maintain a reserve force , and began building a third battalion . He transferred a company from one battalion and placed it under the command of his armored infantry battalion , thus creating a third battalion framework with tanks . With reinforcements , the new battalion gradually became a proper one : Ben - Gal now had three battalions available for maneuvering purposes . He received Lieutenant - Colonel Yair Nafshi ' s 74th Battalion , which was in the line with the fortifications in the northern sector . With Nafshi ' s battalion , the brigade had about 100 tanks . The first battalion was stationed on the Purple Line . The line began at the fortification A1 , directly east of Mas ' ade on the foothills of Mount Hermon , and ran south four miles to Mount Hermonit . Battle . First day . At 13 : 55 , while Nafshi ' s sector came under a heavy artillery barrage , several soldiers along the Purple Line reported that the Syrians were removing the camouflage nets from their tanks and artillery . Ben Shoham ordered his battalion commanders , Nafshi and Oded Erez , to deploy their nearly seventy Centurion tanks in prepared battle positions . Nafshi was at Kuneitra when the order came to deploy his platoons and move his headquarters somewhere safer . He immediately ordered his troops to leave the town , and the tanks to advance while the soft vehicles fell back . Erez ' s 53rd Battalion was moved to the southern Golan . One of Nafshi ' s platoons of three tanks was near the Wassett crossroads when Syrian jets attacked Tel Abu Nida . When the jets departed , the crews began moving to the bunker line . After one kilometer , they came under large - caliber artillery fire . Before 14 : 00 , Nafshi reported to his brigade headquarters that his battalion was ready for combat and was manning the Booster ridge . The Syrian 85th Infantry Brigade assault column reached the Israeli anti - tank ditch before its officers noticed that the engineers were not in the vanguard . They decided to dismount tank crewmen and mechanized infantrymen and rush them on foot to improvise crossings . This halted the attack in full Israeli view and exposed the men to Israeli fire . Nafshi ordered his men to destroy the bridging tanks . During the afternoon the Israelis destroyed most of the Syrian bridging tanks within sight , putting them out of action with shots fired at a range of 2 , 000 yards . Only two of the bridging tanks managed to reach the anti - tank ditch north of A3 . The Syrians threw two bridges and a company of ten tanks crossed the ditch . The Israeli Air Force ( IAF ) was called into action , but many planes were shot down . The first close combat commenced in the 74th Battalion ' s northernmost sector , against the Moroccan Brigade of thirty tanks . One Israeli Centurion was hit , and an Israeli platoon that was sent northward to guard the Dan Road was caught between the Moroccans moving against Tel Shaeta and a Syrian battalion closing in from the west . Avner Landau ' s company , now with seven Centurions , was also threatened and could not help . Nafshi delegated the area north of Hermonit to his deputy , Major Yosef Nissim , and reinforced the sector with Captain Eyal Shaham ' s company , leaving a company from the Armor School Tank Battalion as a tactical reserve . In forty minutes , every Barak Brigade Centurion in the northern Golan was committed . Nissim ordered Shaham to reinforce the trapped platoon around Tel Shaeta , and ordered his deputy , Lieutenant Asaf Sela , to cover the area south of Tel Shaeta , which could provide easy access to Hermonit , with one platoon . The Moroccans continued to fire at Tel Shaeta , but did not advance , and the Syrian battalion was stopped when its leading vehicles were destroyed on the roadway . The Syrian battalion commander decided to move southward and try to penetrate between the Dan Road and Hermonit . He was unaware that he was moving between the forces of Shaham and Sela , who prepared a trap . They opened fire just before 15 : 00 , using superior positions . After a little more than two hours , the Syrians withdrew , leaving behind their bridging tanks , a bulldozer tank , two BRDM s and six main battle tanks . Shaham ' s company lost two Centurions . Just before nightfall , Shaham noticed three SU - 100 gun carriers and a truck close to Nissim ' s position , from which Nissim could not engage them . Shaham directed Sela , who could not see the Syrians , to intercept them . Sela , accompanied by one other Centurion , opened fire at the rear of the Syrian force and destroyed them at a range of 200 to 300 meters . Two Syrian tanks to cross the open ground to the anti - tank ditch in the unguarded area south of Nissim ' s sector . The Syrian companies began moving toward that area , hoping to cross just before nightfall . As darkness fell , Nafshi ordered one company to move forward towards the Syrian bridges across the ditch to destroy the tanks that had crossed . The Syrian company that crossed was hit by Landau ' s tanks and destroyed after half an hour . The bridgehead was sealed . In late afternoon , Hofi decided that the Barak Brigade ' s 65 tanks could not contain the Syrian attack alone , and committed the 7th Brigade ' s 105 Centurions . Believing that the northern sector was more crucial than the southern sector because of the Kuneitra Gap , he ordered Ben Gal to assume command of the area from Bunker 107 northward . The Barak Brigade was now put in charge of the southern sector , already occupied by Erez ' s 53rd Battalion . The 74th Battalion was transferred to the 7th Brigade , while the newly arrived 82nd Battalion , under the command of Captain Meir " Tiger " Zamir , and two companies from the newly arrived 75th Armored Infantry Battalion from the 7th Brigade to the Barak Brigade . Avigdor Kahalani ' s 77th Battalion , which was familiar with the terrain after having worked there for a week , was returned to the 7th Brigade . Ben Gal decided to create a personal reserve by attaching one company of the 82nd Battalion to the 7th Brigade ' s headquarters . After an hour , the 82nd Battalion was transferred to the Barak Brigade . By nighttime , Nafshi was placed under the command of the 7th Brigade . The Syrians kept advancing in columns , using colored lights and flags to distinguish units . Some of them struck Israeli minefields . The Israeli forces did not have adequate optical equipment for night fighting , and had to gauge the position of the Syrian forces by their noise and artillery flares . Nafshi ' s battalion kept changing positions to avoid tank hunters . The fortifications were under heavy attack by tanks and infantry and were calling for help . Nafshi told them to go underground and provided them with supporting artillery fire . Abrash committed his division ' s 78th Armored Brigade in the northern sector at 22 : 00 . He was behind schedule , but expected to make up for it if the 78th Brigade could reach and secure the Kuneitra - Mas ' ade Road , four and a half kilometers west of its starting line . It was believed that achieving this mission would cause the Israeli defenses to collapse . Each of the 82nd Brigade ' s ninety - five T - 55 ' s tanks was equipped with a specially designed infrared nightscope . The night was brightly moonlit . The 82nd Brigade moved up the valley just two and a half kilometers from the Kuneitra - Masada Road . Ben Gal used his artillery for illumination , and ordered his men to remain silent until the Syrians were well within range . By 22 : 00 , the Syrian tanks were within 800 meters of the Israeli positions . Both sides lost tanks to the terrain . Captain Yair Sweet , a 77th Battalion company commander , was ordered to move to Booster and lost two tanks as a result . One crew managed to extricate its tank and use it to pull the other , but the delay distracted the battalion . Lieutenant - Colonel Yosef Eldar , commander of the 75th Armored infantry Battalion and responsible for the area penetrated by the 78th Brigade , was wounded , and Ben Gal ordered Kahalani to assume responsibility . At this point , Kahalani ' s companies were scattered across seventeen kilometers between Hermonit and Bunker 109 . One Syrian tank was discovered only after Kahalani ordered one of the companies to turn off their lights . A Syrian anti - tank unit tried to advance down the Bnot Yaakov Road , in front of Bunker 107 , not knowing it was occupied . The Israelis opened fire and after a brief battle the Syrians retreated . The 78th Brigade and its supporting units hunkered down . Some may surmise this was due to the swift reaction time of the Israeli crews compared to the Syrian tank crews . As the Israeli ' s were often firing at least two or more shells to the Syrians one , this would prove a major factor in offsetting the disparity of the forces . Second day . On the dawn of 7 October , the area between Hermonit and Booster was named " Valley of Tears " because of the great number of burning tanks lying across it . At 07 : 00 , Israeli Skyhawk s began flying over the southern Golan . The first four came down from the southwest and within seconds , they were hit by Syrian surface - to - air missile s ( SAM ) . Several minutes later , another foursome approached and two were shot down . At 08 : 00 , the 78th Tank Brigade of the 7th Division launched a second attack . It advanced along a 2 . 5 mile wide front in the valley in the direction of Wassett . The 75th Battalion was fighting a Syrian brigade , at ranges varying from 10 to 2 , 300 yards . Meanwhile , the 74th Battalion in the north was attacked by two Syrian battalions , supported by an armored infantry force in APCs , most of which were destroyed . The Syrian objective in this attack was a wadi running in the direction of Wassett along the base of Hermonit . Shaham was killed just before 13 : 00 , a short time before the Syrians withdrew . The 77th Battalion was moved from south of Kuneitra to the central sector at Hermonit . He was ordered to leave a small force to the south to protect the brigade flank . The 74th Battalion , having lost about ten tanks , remained in the north . The company Kahalani left behind was attacked in the afternoon , but the attacking Syrian force of about twenty tanks was destroyed . The 7th Brigade lost three company commanders in the morning fighting , and over a dozen tanks were damaged or destroyed , none of which were replaced . Late in the day , Ben Gal met with Kahalani and Eldar , who was wounded , on the southern slope of Booster to review the events . Meanwhile , Khalani ' s deputy , Major Eitan Kauli , supported the forces fighting in that sector . With troops from the 75th Battalion , he began rearming , refueling , and salvaging tanks and APCs . Three Centurions at a time were withdrawn from the front - line positions and worked over at Wassett . This gave the crewmen a chance to eat , drink , and rest , and improved the brigade ' s morale . The Syrians attacked the central sector again at 22 : 00 with artillery . The 7th Division was joined by the 64th and 66th Field Artillery Regiments with the 81st Brigade , led by T - 62 tanks , which were turned over from the General Headquarters to allow Abrash to mount a new offensive around the Tapline - Wassett crossroads in the north - central Golan . The 81st Brigade arrived five hours after it was ordered out of the Kiswe , Syria Military Base . With 400 artillery pieces , the 85th Infantry Brigade was to commit a company each of tanks and infantry to its divisional northern sector . The 78th and 81st Brigades were to commit over a hundred infantry - supported tanks in the divisional central sector , and the 121st Mechanized Brigade was to press some of its assault on Kuneitra with the help of BRDM - mounted Sagger anti - tank missiles . All units were to be equipped with anti - tank weapons , mostly RPGs . In total , about 500 tanks were to attack at 22 : 00 . Nafshi ' s force of five tanks at Bunker 107 was the first to report the new Syrian attack . Nafshi ' s position was vulnerable to massive attacks , and his tank ' s turret was damaged . He decided to allow the T - 62s to close in in order to reduce the Syrian advantages of numbers and night - vision . Close to 22 : 00 , the Syrians approached within 450 meters of the bunker . He hit two tanks and whispered commands through his microphone . After four minutes , 25 Syrian tanks were destroyed and their attack disturbed . Nafshi ' s force suffered no casualties . Most of the Syrian artillery fire fell on the Israeli units in the north . Kahalani warned his men to remain on the lookout for antitank squads . The Israeli brigade , with less than 40 tanks , was facing approximately 500 Syrian tanks . Due to the Israelis ' lack of night - fighting equipment , the Syrians reached within close range , and a battle commenced at ranges of 30 to 60 yards . The Syrian tanks and commandos bypassed the Israelis and destroyed many tanks with RPG s . At 01 : 00 , the Syrians retreated , trying to evacuate damaged tanks and wounded . Ben - Gal struck the area with artillery and used the interval to refuel and reload . At 04 : 00 , the Syrians renewed their attacks . This time , they attacked mainly with artillery and did not renew any major tank assaults . Only in the 7th Brigade ' s southern sector , the 7th Syrian Division 121st Mechanized Brigade was able to hold on . At dawn , 130 Syrian tanks and many APCs were lying in the valley , many of them behind or between the Israeli positions . During the night , two Syrian infantry battalions attacked the position on Hermonit and were fought off by less than twenty Israeli infantry troops from the Golani Brigade , and dozens of bodies were left lying on the battlefield . Third day . On 8 October , the 7th Brigade fought against elements of the 7th Infantry Division , the 3rd Armored Division and independent units , including the Assad Republican Guard . On the brigade ' s southern flank , Zamir ' s company fought an armored force that had entered the area during the night . Zamir ' s force of seven tanks held the attack and eliminated about thirty Syrian tanks , two APC companies and twenty vehicles . In the afternoon , three individual Syrian tank battalion concentrations with armored infantry tried to break through in the Hermonit area . The Syrian artillery identified the Israeli positions and inflicted most of its casualties . The 7th Brigade lost about 50 dead and many wounded , and less than 45 working tanks . Ben - Gal decided to create a reserve of five tanks under the command of his operations officer , whom he ordered to move back half a mile and prepare to block a Syrian breakthrough . At dusk , Abrash ' s tank was hit just as he was getting his tank ready for a new attack , and he was killed . At night , the Syrians attacked the central sector towards Booster . Ben - Gal ordered Zamir ' s company to counterattack from the flank and the rear of the enemy . Zamir ' s seven tanks managed to break the attack . Fourth day . The Northern Command was trying to put together a command reserve , but could only assemble the survivors of the 53rd Battalion . The Barak Brigade had almost ceased to exist : Its commander and key staff officers were dead , and almost all of its troops and equipment were absorbed into other brigades . Lieutenant - Colonel Yossi Ben Hanan arrived the night before to take command of what was left of it . He had been the commander of the 53rd Battalion until two weeks earlier , and was on his honeymoon when the war started . He was sent to reorganize the brigade . He teamed with Erez , who had escaped from Tel Faris on Monday morning , and Shmuel Askarov , the 53rd Battalion ' s deputy commander , to start repairing tanks . At 1800 , he reported to his division commander , General Rafael Eitan that he was ready to bring forward the thirteen Centurions he had repaired thus far , and was ordered to head for Nafakh . He was on his way when the IAF confirmed that about 100 Syrian tanks were headed toward the 7th Brigade ' s sector . One air photo depicted a complete Syrian battalion of thirty - eight T - 62s and four BMPs . At dawn on 9 October , the Syrians launched the heaviest artillery barrage thus far , using Katyusha rockets and MiG - 17 s . Seven Syrian helicopters flew over the Israeli positions to Buq ' ata , where four of them discharged commando forces . At 08 : 00 , a Syrian force of 100 tanks and a large number of APCs began to advance . The Israelis opened fire at maximum range but the Syrian advance continued . The Israeli commanders were exposed in their turrets and the artillery caused the number of casualties among them to grow significantly . Ben - Gal ordered his force to leave the high ramps and withdraw some 400 yards to escape the artillery concentrations . Nafshi was ordered to join the 7th Brigade ' s area . He entered the battle with six tanks and was hit . He joined another tank and left A3 . He ordered all the men under cover and requested Israeli artillery shelling of the position for protection . Later that day , he organized a supply convoy to A3 . His tank was hit by a Syrian bazooka near Kuneitra and the tank behind him reported him dead . Nafshi continued with three APCs past Booster and entered A3 with the supplies . When the 7th Brigade withdrew from the hill , the artillery stopped and Syrian tanks mounted the hill to fire at them . Ben - Gal ' s 7th Battalion had only six tanks and was acting as a brigade reserve , Nafshi had six tanks , and the operations officer was patrolling Buq ' ata for the commandos . Zamir was fighting on Tel Git and was running out of ammunition , so he asked for permission to withdraw and reload . Ben - Gal refused at first , but relented when he was told there was only one shell per tank . Ben - Gal consulted Eitan and decided to counterattack . The 7th Battalion began to move up the hill and saw the Syrian tanks . Kahalani called the other Israeli tanks behind the ramp and got little response , since they were from different units and were operating on different frequencies . The brigade communications officer cut into every company ' s net , but they still did not respond to Kahalani . Kahalani ' s gunner knocked out the Syrian tank at the top of the hill , and another one was hit by an Israeli tank from the rear of the ramp . In the north , the 74th Battalion was fighting with less than half its tanks . Ben - Gal feared that it might not be able to hold out , and ordered it to leave three tanks in the sector and move to the northern flank of the battle to face the Assad Republican Guard , which was trying to use the dead ground to move towards El Rom . The battalion commander was killed in this battle . Ben - Gal ordered the 77th Battalion to take command of the 74th Battalion . The 77th Battalion then fought two battalions of T62 tanks that got by the 7th Brigade and were about 500 yards behind it . The 77th Battalion moved to the high ground around the valley and destroyed the Assad Republican Guard force . All the forces in the central sector , about fifteen tanks , were at this point under Kahalani ' s command , fighting at ranges of 250 to 500 yards from their original positions on the ramps . The Syrians passed them and fired on them from behind . The 7th Brigade was fighting in all directions . Tanks from both sides got mixed up with the other side and struck by friendly artillery fire . Several Syrian Mi - 8 helicopters flew over the valley toward El Rom . At this point , Eitan heard that Syrian infantry was approaching Buq ' ata , north of El Rom . If the 7th Division were to break through , it could join the infantry force and proceed to Dan and Kiryat Shmona . Ben - Gal described the battle to Eitan and told him he was not sure he could hold on . Eitan asked him to hold on for another half hour . At this point , the remaining eleven tanks of the Barak Brigade arrived , and Eitan directed them to Ben - Gal . Eitan told Ben - Gal of Ben - Hanan ' s force . Kahalani called Captain Emi Palant , the senior officer behind the ramps , to use a signal flag to get the tank commanders ' attention and direct them to the ramp , but waving the flag got no response . Palant fired his machine gun at the side of the nearest tank to get the commander to look out , and the message was passed . He ran from tank to tank and rapped on their turrets to get their attention before returning to his own tank and starting to move forward . No tank followed . Kahalani heard a sergeant from the 74th Battalion and ordered him to take his position and guard the wadi . The sergeant replied he did not have any shells left . Zamir , who was flanking his position to the south , reported a massive Syrian attack and asked for permission to move the remaining tanks to Zamir ' s company to a better position slightly to the south . Ben - Gal refused . Kahalani reported that he was unable to control the tanks , which kept drifting to the rear . Ben - Gal said he would try and get him more tanks . Kahalani ordered the sergeant to take his place , saying the Syrians would not try to attack if they saw his tank . Kahalani moved towards the tanks behind the rampart and told their commanders to raise their flags if they heard him . He saw ten tanks , and most raised their flags . Two Israeli planes accidentally bombed them , but none of the tanks were hit . On the southern sector , Zamir reported that he was out of ammunition and could no longer hold out on Booster . His force was left with two shells per tank . He radioed Ben - Gal that he could no longer hold on . Ben - Gal asked him for ten more minutes . Zamir ' s tank ran out of shells , and he began to fill his pockets with grenades and withdraw . Kahalani reached the tanks behind the ramps and told them they were going to retake the ramp . He started moving and a few other tanks slowly followed . Two Syrian tanks were knocked out , but the tanks behind him began to pull back . Ben - Gal informed him on the radio that several tanks , under the command of Eli Geva , were on their way . Kahalani managed to convince the other tanks to follow him . The tank next to him hit a Syrian tank that came over the ramp . The tanks ' hatches were open , and eventually they could see the valley . Syrian tanks were moving forward , fifty to 1000 yards away . The Israeli tanks opened fire . Kahalani ordered them to shoot only at moving tanks . Geva ' s force reached the ramp and joined the battle . The Syrians fired a heavy artillery barrage . When it subsided , Kahalani could see no Syrian tanks moving ahead . Zamir had two tanks left and requested permission to withdraw , but Ben - Gal turned him down . He began to withdraw just as a force from the south , under the command of Ben Hanan , was arriving . Askarov took a position near Ben Hanan and the rest of the unit formed a battle line . Ben Hanan ' s face was wounded and he passed command to Askarov to get treatment . The force destroyed about thirty Syrian tanks . The 7th Brigade was left with seven tanks , and Ben - Gal told Eitan he could no longer hold on . Then A3 , surrounded by Syrian forces , reported that the Syrian supply trains were turning around and withdrawing . Dennie Agmon , Eitan ' s intelligence officer , told him that the Syrian General Staff had decided to retreat . The Syrian forces began to withdraw . Aftermath . The 7th Brigade , including reinforcements , totaled some twenty tanks . It began to pursue the Syrians but stopped at the anti - tank ditch . About 260 tanks were lying in the valley . The Syrians lost over 500 tanks and APCs and the Israelis lost 60 to 80 armored vehicles . One brigade from the 7th Division was taken out of action for three days and then reorganized as a battalion . Eitan told the 7th Brigade over the radio : " You have saved the people of Israel " . Ben Gal told Kahalani : " You are the true savior of the people of Israel " . In the afternoon , the brigade ' s tanks pulled back a few at a time for ammunition and fuel . Ben Gal told Kahalani that the brigade has been ordered to counterattack into Syria . Eitan asked him to attack the next day , so as not to allow the Syrians time to reorganize , but Ben Gal asked for a day to allow his men to rest and refill the ranks . Kahalani was later awarded the Medal of Valor for his performance in the battle . Patrick Seale argued that the reason why the Syrians were stopped was the superiority of the IAF , which was free to devote all of its attention to the Syrian front . Kenneth Pollack wrote that the Syrian forces did not look for an alternative axis of advance and rolled forward without defending their flanks . Martin Van Creveld suggested the explanation that on October 8 , when Israel felt that the battle was being lost , it threatened Syria with a nuclear strike .