Absolute war The concept of absolute war was a philosophical construct developed by the military theorist General Carl von Clausewitz . This concept was featured in the first half of the first chapter of his most famous book , " On War " . In it , Clausewitz explained that absolute war is a philosophical abstraction — a " logical fantasy " — that is impossible in practice because it is not directed or constrained by political motives or concerns , nor limited by the practical constraints of time or space . He called warfare constrained by these moderating real - world influences " real war . " In his explanation of absolute war , Clausewitz defined war as " an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will " . However , war itself does not contain inherent moral or political aspects . These conditions ( for instance , the laws of armed conflict ) are placed on war by those who fight it , and exist because the intelligence of the civilized nations involved exercises greater influence on their methods of fighting war than does their instinctive hostility . Absolute war can be seen to be an act of violence without compromise , in which states fight to war ' s natural extremes ; it is a war without the ' grafted ' political and moral moderations . In On War , Clausewitz explains what makes up absolute war : The three Reciprocal Actions . An utmost use of force . Clausewitz states that " . . . it follows that he who uses force unsparingly , without reference to bloodshed involved , must obtain a superiority if his adversary uses less vigour in [ the ] application [ of force ] " . Therefore , war in its most natural manner would involve each state continually reciprocating each other ' s use of force ( plus some ) to maintain a superiority , until both were using violence to its utmost extent . This is the first reciprocal action , and leads to the first extreme of war . The aim is to disarm the enemy . Clausewitz stated that the purpose of war is to make the opponent comply with the will of the nation or state . However , an opponent will obviously not do that unless complying to that will becomes the least oppressive of its available options . Therefore , in order to make the enemy comply with the will of the nation , a state must place its adversary in a position that is more oppressive to it than compliance . Furthermore , that position cannot be temporary , or appear to be temporary . This is because it will be more likely that an enemy will simply ' ride out the storm ' in the prospect of being in a better position at a later stage . Any change in this position would be a change for the worse , and so in order to best achieve this position a state must disarm its enemy ( forcing it into a position from which it cannot resist ) . Furthermore , as war involves two ( or more ) hostile states , this principle applies to both , and so it becomes the second reciprocal action , whereby both try to impose such a position on the other . An utmost exertion of powers . Here Clausewitz states that if a state wishes to defeat its enemy it must annihilate them . According to Clausewitz , the use of power involves two factors . The first is the " strength of available means " , which may be measured somewhat by numbers ( although not entirely ) . The second factor is the " strength of the will " which can not be specifically measured ( only estimated ) as it is intangible . Once a state has gained an approximation of the enemy ' s strength of resistance it can review its own means and adjust them upwards accordingly in an effort to gain the advantage . As the enemy will also be doing this , it too becomes reciprocal ( the third reciprocal action ) , creating a third push towards an extreme . Confusion with Total War . The recognition of total war since World War I has created a degree of confusion for many , who fail to understand the differences between it and the concept of absolute war , often using the terms interchangeably and blaming Germany ' s conduct of " total war " on the writings of Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz . In reality , however , Clausewitz neither coined nor used the term " total war , " and " absolute ( or ideal ) war " is quite a different concept . Total war is essentially a war in which the home front ( that is , a state ' s political system , society and economy ) is mobilised to a massive degree for the continuation and expansion of the war effort — it implies the subordination of politics ( internal and external ) to the goal of purely military victory . It is characterised by civilian infrastructure and civilians themselves becoming highly involved in war as part of the military ' s logistical support system . Absolute war on the other hand , is war that reaches its logical extremes ( as mentioned above ) when it is free from the moderating effects that are imposed on it by politics and society , not to mention the practical constraints of time and space . As wars cannot run themselves , and require politics and society to exist , Clausewitz held absolute war to be impossible , as it could not avoid these influences . Although most of the confusion over " absolute war " is the result of sloppy reading ( or no reading ) of Clausewitz ' s actual discussion in Book One of " On War " ( the only part of Clausewitz ' s unfinished draft that he considered to be in finished form ) , some careful readers point out that there are several references in later sections of the book ( which , somewhat confusingly , are derived from earlier drafts ) to " absolute war " that reflect an earlier conception of such war as simply the more extreme reaches of the forms that Napoleonic warfare had actually achieved . This conception , however , was clearly rejected by the mature Clausewitz .