Battle of Medina de Rioseco The Battle of Medina de Rioseco , also known as the Battle of Moclín , was fought during the Peninsular War on 14 July 1808 when a combined body of Spanish militia and regulars moved to rupture the French line of communications to Madrid . General Joaquín Blake ' s Army of Galicia , under joint command with General Gregorio de la Cuesta , was routed by Marshal Bessières after a badly coordinated but stubborn fight against the French corps north of Valladolid . Bessières exploited the poor coordination between Blake and Cuesta to defeat the Spaniards in detail , with Blake being ejected from a low ridge while Cuesta sat to the rear , and Cuesta failing to recapture the ridge with his own troops . The Army of Galicia was the only formation capable of threatening the French advance into Old Castile — Cuesta ' s command having been destroyed earlier at Cabezón — and its destruction marked a serious blow to Spain ' s national uprising . But in the event , Medina de Rioseco proved to be the solitary French triumph in an invasion of Spain that ultimately failed to seize the country ' s major cities or to pacify its rebellious provinces , and which met outright disaster at Bailén , forcing French forces — Bessières ' victorious corps included — to fly over the Ebro in retreat . A fresh campaign , conducted by Napoleon himself with the bulk of the Grande Armée , would be needed to redress the situation . Situation in northern Spain . Recent French operations in the region had come far short of Napoleon ' s expectations . The Galician and Biscayan provinces were ideally suited as a base for resistance against France : remote and mountainous ; out of the French Army ' s immediate reach yet flanking its long communications to occupied Madrid ; its coastline largely secured by the allied Royal Navy , which disgorged supplies and materiel . In June , Marshal Bessières ' flying column , marching on Santander in an attempt to secure French communications in Galicia and guard the coast against a possible British landing , had been forced back by popular resistance . Stung by these and other reverses , Napoleon committed more troops and formulated a new strategy . In July he ordered Bessières to renew his western offensive . Snaking toward the French were the columns of the Army of Galicia under General Joaquín Blake who supplemented his force with Cuesta ' s motley levy of militia and regulars from isolated provincial garrisons — debris from Cuesta ' s destroyed Army of Old Castile . Spanish preparations . Cuesta , quite undeterred by his defeat the previous month , proposed a rapid coup de main toward Valladolid , astride the French communications ( and incidentally his old seat of command as Captain General of Old Castile , from which he had been ejected after his rout at Cabezón . ) Cuesta mustered some 350 horse — a precious , if token , force , considering Galicia and Asturias combined could not furnish as many — and several infantry battalions , but not a single cannon . The northern Juntas received Cuesta ' s proposals coolly ; Asturias refused to be drawn into what it considered a foolhardy scheme but committed several battalions in a show of goodwill ; Galicia , however , dispatched General Blake to liaison with Cuesta . A professional officer of considerable talent ( albeit new to command ) , Blake questioned the wisdom of facing the Grande Armée in open country , preferring the broken ground and hills of the north to neutralize the superiority of French arms . Of particular concern to Blake was the dilapidated Spanish cavalry , with which a descent into the plains of Castile seemed a sorry prospect . The Galician commander advocated holding and fortifying the rugged terrain of Léon and Galicia , but deferred to Cuesta . Between them the two Spanish generals raised about 25 , 000 men , many of them dispirited and in poor condition . In May British ships had disembarked some 5 , 000 former Spanish prisoners of war ( largely captured in attacks on the Spanish colonial empire during the recent Anglo - Spanish War ) with arms and munitions , notably Cuesta ' s 800 colonial regulars — the " Colorados " battalion — taken prisoner in Montevideo and , for lack of Spanish uniforms , bedecked in full redcoat s . Cuesta , citing his seniority , claimed supreme command and set his columns marching July 12 , against Blake ' s objections ( although the Castilian was persuaded to detach a reserve at Benavente ) . Cuesta , for lack of cavalry , advanced blind to French movements , expecting to find Bessières concentrating near Valladolid . By July 14 Cuesta had drawn up the Spanish force near Medina de Rio Seco , with Blake commanding the forward position on a small elevation and Cuesta hovering about a mile to the rear ( near the village proper ) , with many of the best troops . Their meagre cavalry detachment stood by the road between the two corps . French response . Bessières , well - informed of the Spanish plans by virtue of an enterprising double - agent , advanced from Burgos July 9 in the aim of preventing Blake ' s junction with Cuesta , resolving to concentrate his effectives en route . Receiving part of a division at Palencia July 10 , Bessières rapidly assembled 14 , 000 with 40 guns and marched to meet Blake and Cuesta , approaching the Spanish positions along the cultivated plains of Medina de Rio Seco at dawn on the 14th . The French army contained elements of three divisions , decidedly mixed in quality : a reserve division ( with which French commanders in Spain often had to make do ) , a division of veterans expedited from France , and Imperial Guard units dispatched from Madrid . The battle . Blake , separated from Cuesta by a glaring gap , faced off against the French with his flanks uncovered and his line of retreat far from secure . Bessières immediately understood his enemies ' weakness and moved to seize the central position , allowing him to dispatch the two Spanish wings in detail by keeping Cuesta at bay with a screening force ( Major - General Mouton ) while elements of two divisions stormed the ridge under his supervision . The Imperial artillery , with twenty pieces arrayed on the Monclin Mound opposite Blake , blasted terrible holes in the Spanish ranks . Major - General Merle led the attack against Blake on the left , reaching west toward the Spanish flank , while Mouton , on the right , put up a noisy demonstration against Cuesta . Blake reacted promptly to the menace to his position , stretching his line right to ward off encirclement and replying to the devastating French cannonades with his own batteries . Bessières ' cavalry reserves then charged into the gap kept open by Mouton and tore into Blake ' s right flank , cracking his fragile force and driving it off the ridge in a panicked rout . Blake was saved from complete annihilation by the self - sacrifice of a lone battalion of regular troops from Navarre which stood its ground against the swarming cavalry , keeping the French at bay while Blake ' s half of the army made good its escape over the Sequillo river . Before Bessières could turn on Cuesta , the Spanish general , quite unwilling to follow Blake in retreat , formed his troops into columns and hurled them uphill at the Imperial army , now drawn up on the ridge . The tirailleur s screening Mouton ' s division were abruptly charged by 300 carabinier s and Spanish Guards and thrown into the ravine , with Spanish infantry columns advancing up the ridge behind the cavalry . The Imperial Guard horse managed temporarily to blunt the advance , flattening the weaker Spanish cavalry against its own supporting infantry columns . The Spanish foot , however , continued to gain ground , capturing two guns from the Artillery of the Guard and threatening the entire French position on the ridge . Merle , however , continuing his march along its original axis , was now drawing his division upon the right flank of the second Spanish line ; sensing this opportunity , Bessières ordered Merle to wheel right and plunge into the Spanish flank " à la baïonnette . " Mouton ' s chasseurs appeared on the Spanish left , and under the combined pressure the Spanish line , overlapped and plunged into disorder , ruptured . The leading Spanish grenadier battalions struck their last determined blows against the French centre before being caught in this crossfire and brusquely forced off the ridge , convincing Cuesta to sound the retreat . As with Blake ' s retreat , a rearguard of regular battalions held off the French while the other formations flew north to Medina . Aftermath . While Cuesta and Blake both escaped the battlefield , in all other respects the rout was complete : the Army of Galicia , while numerically intact , all but ceased to exist as an army . Blake suffered most , losing 13 guns and as many as 3 , 000 casualties . Many veteran Spanish battalions were badly mauled in the fight for the ridge ; the " Colorados " , for instance , were destroyed as a unit . Fearing pursuit , Cuesta channeled his infantry north to Asturias and rode off with a small cavalry corps to Salamanca , while Blake returned to Galicia . Following Medina de Rioseco Bessières seized Benavente , León and Zamora , but dallied in the area while his beaten foes made good their retreat . The French were guilty of savage reprisals against both the Spanish prisoners and the populace of the neighboring cities – which , ironically , had been among the very few not carried by popular uprisings . Bessières was informed that Blake and Cuesta had separated , the former to Manzanal and the latter into Léon ; both were allowed to retire unmolested when General Lasalle was uncharacteristically recalled to headquarters . Bessières ' victory marked a great improvement to the strategic position of the French army in northern Spain , formerly the cause of much anxiety . A delighted Napoleon asserted , " if Marshal Bessières has been able to beat the Army of Galicia with few casualties and small effort , General Dupont will be able to overthrow everybody he meets . " A few days later , Dupont ' s entire corps was broken in battle at Bailén and captured by General Castaños . With 20 , 000 French troops erased from the map , the French command panicked and ordered a general retreat to the Ebro , undoing Bessières ' hard - fought gains . News of the disaster reached Bessières July 22 , forcing him to fall back towards Madrid . Assessment . Medina de Rioseco was a sorely contested battle , with the Spanish infantry attack upon the ridge — conducted with " precision and audacity " — coming close to victory . The latter action especially was lauded by contemporaries ; in Britain , Hamilton applauded the Spanish troops ' bitter fight against the much more seasoned French Imperial Army . Cuesta ' s divisions ( though not the commander himself ) received special praise for nearly securing a dramatic victory even after Blake ' s rout : Another contemporary , General Maximilien Sebastien Foy , described the Spanish force at Medina de Rioseco as : " A splinter of the ancient Spanish army which demonstrated what such an army could do : for an army new to the field , facing for the first time an experienced foe , it was a lot . " In contrast , the Blake – Cuesta partnership has been widely criticized and the tactical deployment arranged by Cuesta found wanting . One historian of Spanish military history in the Napoleonic period attributed the outcome to the fact that the Spanish generals acted at cross - purposes : " To have any hope of success , the Spaniards needed to strike fast with all their forces , but the unwilling Blake in fact moved very slowly , whilst leaving two of his four infantry divisions behind him to cover his retreat . " British military historian David G . Chandler pinned the blame for the defeat squarely on Cuesta , who for reasons not quite clear to him refused to deploy his portion of the army against the enemy and planted his divisions far to the rear . Likewise , according to General Foy , the Spanish deployment did not offer much prospect for success : approaching a prepared enemy frontally along the defile , with both flanks open to attack , and with such a gap between the two lines , all but guaranteed defeat . Foy , however , does not fault Blake with agreeing to a pitched battle : denuded of cavalry , the Spanish general faced the grim prospect of traversing an open countryside hounded by 1 , 500 French sabres under possibly the greatest cavalry commander of all time , General Lasalle .