African military systems ( 1800 – 1900 ) African military systems ( 1800 – 1900 ) refers to the evolution of military systems on the African continent after 1800 , with emphasis on the role of indigenous states and peoples within the African continent . Only major military systems or innovations and their development after 1800 are covered here . For events prior to 1800 , see African military systems to 1800 . Coverage of the 20th century and beyond is provided in African military systems after 1900 . For an overall view of the military history of Africa by region , see Military History of Africa . See individual battles , empires and leaders for details on activities after 1800 . African military systems and the 19th century . Significant influences . The beginning of the 19th century saw several factors that had significant bearing on the evolution of military systems . Such factors are referenced in standard histories on Africa that identify the 19th century as a period of intense transformation on the continent . Some of these are : All these factors in part continued earlier trends but the 19th century was to see an acceleration in the pace of military evolution on the continent . The environmental variables of past centuries also continued in many areas . Some of these include : These variables impacted the development of military systems . Low population densities for example meant that large forces could not be raised and maintained in being for a long time . The Zulu as one instance , could field an estimated 50 , 000 warriors , impressive by regional standards . But this was the nation ' s entire armed strength , whereas more populous European nations during the Napoleonic Wars of the 19th century could routinely put this amount of men into a " single " battle . Political fragmentation also hindered the growth of large armies , and African tribes could be divided and defeated separately by foreign invaders , just as Rome did with numerous tribal opponents in antiquity . Nevertheless , despite such limits , the internal consolidation and growth of African states played an important part in military transformation . The Zulu system for example did not rely on foreign horses , guns or ships . The evolution of African military systems is thus not a simple tale of outside influences but a complex web of indigenous development that adapted , shaped and sometimes rejected outside technology . The influence of the gun and other technology . The introduction of firearms was important , but guns on African battlefields were often of indifferent quality , and traditional weapons and tactics sometimes compared favorably with them . Indeed Africans were well aware of the deficiencies of trade muskets and often demanded better quality than that offered . Most guns imported from Europe had not been test fired by the manufacturer to check for imperfections in bore and breach , although this was essential in the era of hand - forged barrels . Proven guns had proof - marks , and counterfeits flourished in the Africa trade . Firearms were thus a mixed bag on the ground , and the success of consolidating native powers like the Merina in Madagascar or the Zulu were due more to changes in indigenous organization , leadership and tactics , than to firearms . As the decades rolled on however , improvements to firearms , and other technology such as disease control ( the cinchona bark to suppress malaria for example ) , and steamships were to give Europeans a decisive military edge on the continent . Naval developments . Naval warfare patterns showed continuity with that of the 18th century . Foreign - derived designs like " dhows " plied East African waters , pirates operated off the Barbary coast , and canoes also were used in ocean trading and fishing . Indigenous fighting vessels however , generally stayed inland or very close to home . Armament continued to be relatively weak , despite persistent attempts to " up - gun " war vessels . Small swivel cannon were reportedly first introduced late in the 18th century on the West Coast by one Antonio Vaz Coelho , a free Negro from Brazil . This practice accelerated in the 19th century . The city - state of Lagos for example , deployed medium sized canoes carrying up to 25 men , armed with swivel - cannon . Soldiers on board attempted to force landings , using both muskets and swivel guns for covering fire . Naval tactics with these weapons sometimes followed a " fire and withdraw " pattern . The canoes maneuvered close inshore for firepower to be delivered , then backed out quickly to the open water to reload , before repeating the cycle . Generally cannons were placed in the bow or stern , with the boat absorbing the guns ' recoil . The whole vessel had to be turned to deliver salvoes . Compared to European use of naval cannon , such artillery saw limited use in ship to ship engagements , or shore bombardments . As stand - off weapons covering troop landings or raiding missions however , they had serviceable anti - personnel value , particularly when combined with muskets . In Nigeria , large war canoes are reported , some mounting up to twenty pairs of swivel - guns on cross - beams at intervals of five or six feet . In 1841 , the ruler of Abo was reported to muster some 300 canoes , many armed with muskets and bow / stern cannons . Some canoe fleets however relied on traditional weapons . On Lake Chad in the early 19th century the piratical Buduna fielded a fleet of some 1 , 000 reed canoes , using spears and shields for armament , and in East Africa , native kingdoms sometimes vied for supremacy with large numbers of canoes on the region ' s great lakes . In the Niger Delta , the bigger Itsekiri war canoes mounted multiple cannon and swivels , and carried 40 rowers and 100 warriors , with slaves doing most of the rowing duties . Slaves were also tasked with providing food for the canoe men . Commerce sometimes operated closely with war - making . Itsekiri traders operated their own fleets of fighting vessels , and the British navy was often unable to stop these fast - moving warrior - merchants as they flitted between the streams , lagoons and waterways of the Delta . On several occasions they fended off British warships by blockading narrow creeks and waterways , and in disputes with the colonial regime or European merchants , shut down trade on the Benin river for several months . Pirates also made use of fast canoes to plague commerce and local citizenry alike . War - canoe ports were often fortified with extensive stockades , and multiple trench lines , behind which teams of gunmen and other fighters were marshalled for defense . Some European slave - traders and their allies also made use of big canoes in their operations , plying the waterways in heavy vessels backed with musketeers and armed with small cannon , as they collected their human cargo for transport to the Americas . Naval developments mirror those on land . New technology like firearms was adapted and shaped to existing indigenous politics , technology and forms of organization . The landscape also played its part - limiting major , long - term water movement by rivers that were unnavigable for long stretches , contrary currents , and lack of good coastal harbors . Few " native " powers attempted any significant upgrades involving intensive sailing technology , or took to the oceans with long - distance ships in the European , Polynesian or Chinese manner . No African equivalent of the famous , ocean - spanning Chinese fleet admiral Cheng Ho was to emerge , although a number of inland captains rose to prominence . The days of Carthage long gone , African naval power remained primarily a localized phenomenon . Land warfare in the 19th century . The post 1800 period saw a quickening of European expansion and conquest in Africa . This expansion did not go unopposed , nor was such activity the only significant military development on the continent . Indigenous states in all regions were developing new forms of political organization and military structure independently of , and before the major European interlude . Cavalry and infantry in West Africa . Traditional weapons saw substantial use well into the century , and weapons systems such as cavalry , archers , and spearmen clashed in many areas . The Mandingo horsemen of the Liberian hinterland for example were said to call out to fearful or fleeing infantry opponents with two options : " " Stand and you are a slave ; run and you are a corpse . " " Mounted troops however were far from invincible . Bowmen made up the bulk of infantry strength in many areas , and the use of poisoned arrows and a rapid volume of fire partially offset weaknesses in bow strength and unfletched arrows . Against determined combinations of archers and spearmen , properly positioned and deployed , cavalry could be beaten . Just such a scenario unfolded in 1804 , when Fulani groups proclaimed a jihad against the cavalry heavy state of Gobir , in what is today ' s Northern Nigeria . The Fulani , under Usman Dan Fodio , a religious reformer and teacher , suffered a number of initial setbacks against the fast - moving Gobir cavalry , most notably at the Battle of Tsuntua where some 2 , 000 men were lost . Fulani innovations in infantry tactics . The cavalrymen of Gobir , under their leader Yunfa , initially mocked the inability of the Fulani to use horses effectively , but the Fulani replied with their own trump card , massed arrow fire , at the Battle of " Tabkin Kwotto " . Ordinarily , such fire would have been delivered by scattered bowmen in loose formation , vulnerable to quick charges by the Gobir chevaliers . In this particular battle however , the Fulani anchored their formation in a fairly wooded area , with one flank of their army resting on a lake . Although the cavalry of Gobir outflanked their opponents , the center of the Fulani formation held this strong position . Rather than deploy in the usual open skirmishing order , the Fulani bowmen adopted a square , grouping their archers in a compact block , and concentrating the firepower of their poisoned arrows . This broke the back of the Gobir formations , despite their armor . The tactics of the Fulani were continually refined over time , as they gained more victories and themselves began to acquire numbers of horses for their own cavalry arm . Dan Fodio wrote on tactics employed by his forces as the jihad campaign unfolded : The infantry armed themselves with large shields ( " diraq " ) and carried long lances and javelin . Grouped into ranks , a spearman knelt on the left knee , holding his round shield before him . Behind the ranks of spearmen the archers stood ready . They were ordered to shoot at the enemy horse and men in chain mail ( " duru " ) . As the enemy cavalry approached the infantry would launch its javelins and the archers would keep shooting . If the enemy wavered , the infantry formation would then part left and right , so that their own cavalry was unleashed in pursuit . The writings of Dan Fodio on tactics echo a sentiment that would be approved by many a military commander : " " Concentration is the first thing in victory : the beginning of defeat is dispersion . " " Continued relevance of the cavalry - infantry combination . Cavalry still continued to be relevant in the 19th century . The Caliphate of Sokoto , was West Africa ' s largest single state during this period , and had its genesis in the many Muslim jihads across the region . Sokoto ' s core strike force was cavalry , although the bulk of its armies consisted of archers and spearmen . On the flat terrain of the savannahs , this combination did relatively well against indigenous opponents , although deployment in forested regions , and operations against fortifications suffered from the problems of earlier eras . Infantry , and their muskets , became increasing more important and dominant in some savannah areas as the decades progressed . Sokoto and several other cavalry - elite empires like Gobir however , continued to place their trust in the traditional weapons and fighting styles . This " old ways " approach of Sokoto can be seen in such battles as the 1826 clash with the state of Gobir , where some elite units of armored Sokoto cavalry had to be lifted on to their horses , like the medieval knights of Europe . It should be noted however that the cavalry - elites depended heavily for their successes on cooperation with lesser esteemed infantry , who were critical in opening opportunities for attack , fixing an enemy into an unfavorable position , or in suppressing deadly counterfire by poisoned arrows . This conservatism in methods was to continue on into the 20th century , when the Sokoto hosts clashed with the modern weaponry of the British Empire . The Ashanti military system . Organization , equipment and tactics . Mobilization , recruitment and logistics . From about 1700 to 1820 , no nation on the Gold Coast of West Africa ( region of modern - day Ghana ) excelled the Ashanti in the scale of their military organization and activity . Wars of conquest made them the major power in the area , and they fought and won several major clashes against the British , before going down to defeat in the latter part of the 19th century . A small core of professional warriors was supplemented by peasant levies , volunteers and contingents from allied or tributary tribes . Grouped together under competent commanders such as Osei Tutu and Opoku Ware , such hosts began to expand the Ashanti empire in the 18th century on into the 19th , moving from deep inland to the edges of the Atlantic . One British source in 1820 estimated that the Ashanti could field a potential 80 , 000 troops , and of these , 40 , 000 could in theory , be outfitted with muskets or blunder - busses . Arms and equipment . The Ashanti became familiar with firearms in the 18th century , and by the 19th century , the bulk of their best troops were armed with a variety of guns , such as the standard European trade muskets , 6 feet in length , so - called " Long Dane " . The Long Dane , and other improved Africa - trade models that came into service over the years , were serviceable weapons in local context , but obsolete compared to first - rank European firearms . This was to cause problems against strong British forces in later wars . General Nkwanta , head of the Ashanti army ' s general council is reported to have done a detailed assessment of new breech - loading European firearms in 1872 – 73 and was troubled by the obsolescence of Ashanti muskets in comparison . Some of the muskets burst after a few firings , and good quality powder and shot were in short supply . Most of the tribal gunmen in addition , did not use wadding to compact the powder down into the barrels but simply dumped in it , then added a variety of lead slugs , nails , bits of metal or even stones . This made an impressive pyrotechnic display , but unless opponents were at very close range , the muskets were ineffective . The huge explosion and kick of the muskets also meant that men preferred to fire from the hip , causing them to aim high , with inaccurate results . Available guns were valued however , and carefully protected with leather or leopard skin covers , as were the pouches of ammunition each fighter carried . Soldiers carried thirty to forty gunpowder charges within reach , individually packed in small wooden boxes for quick reloading . Good bullets were scarce , and gunners were forced to use such substitutes as stones , metal pieces , and bits of lead . Compared to the European enemies they were to face in their later history , the weapons of the Ashanti were poor . The Ashanti fighting man also wore a buckskin belt , carrying several knives of various lengths . The belt also held a machete for cutting through bush , or hand - to - hand combat . Organization of the Ashanti armies . The Ashanti national army was elaborately organized into 6 parts , each with various sub - divisions , and muskets gradually replaced bows and arrows as the main weapons . Such organization was based primarily on structures already in place locally , rather than being copies of European forms , and can be seen in the history of Akwamu , one of the earliest of all the centralized Akan forest kingdoms . Guns were added to and adapted to this six part breakdown as follows : On the move the army used this general breakdown - advance guard , main body , rearguard , and right and left wings . This detailed organization had several advantages , enabling the Ashanti generals to maneuver their forces with flexibility . The scouts performed recon and carried out pursuit operations . The advance guard could serve as initial storm troops or bait troops - getting an enemy to reveal his position and strength . The main body applied the bulk of the army ' s striking power . The personal bodyguard protected the king or high ranking nobles or generals in the field . The rear guard might function for pursuit , or as a reserve echelon . The two wings might attempt to carry out encirclement of the opposing force , or even strike at the rear . Individualized acts of daring were encouraged , such as rushing out into the open to chop off the heads of wounded or dead enemies . A tally of these trophies was presented to the commanding general after the end of the engagement . Severe discipline prevailed in the Ashanti armies . Soldiers who faltered were whipped or slaswed with heavy swords carried by special contingents of " enforcer " troops – the " sword - bearers . " . Ashanti soldiers had to memorize the following saying : " " If I go forward , I die ; if I flee , I die . Better to go forward and die in the mouth of battle . " " Generally the " enforcers " were deployed forward , between the scouts and the main force . They eased back as the battle started to better observe and intimidate the weary and faltering . In a feature seldom seen among African armies , the Ashanti also deployed units of medical personnel behind the main forces , who were tasked with caring for the wounded and removing the dead . Ashanti tactics . The flexibility of the Ashanti tactical system called for a large measure of decentralization , important in the thick forest terrain of Western Africa . This heavy jungle growth often hindered large scale clashes in the open involving thousands of men , as was seen among peoples like the Zulu or the Ndebele . Ashanti methods thus involved smaller tactical sub - units , ambushes , constant movement , and more dispersed strikes and counter - strikes . In one unusual incident in 1741 however , the armies of Asante and Akkem agreed to " schedule " a battle , and jointly assigned some 10 , 000 men to cut down trees to make space for a full scale clash . The Asante won this encounter . One 1844 British commentary on Ashanti tactics claims that they commenced operations by cutting a number of footpaths in the brush to approach and encircle the enemy force . Once reaching the initial jump - off point , Ashanti troops formed in line and attacked . Other accounts compared the Ashanti marching order to that of ants , with the use of several parallel columns that joined into one general striking force maneuvering before combat . Such a " converging columns " approach was ironically used by the British themselves in fighting the Ashanti , and is a tactic that appeared on the battlefields of Europe under Napoleon , as ' march divided , fight together ' was the original raison d ' etre of the division . These standardized tactics had often yielded the Ashanti victory . Scouts screened the army as it marched in its columns , then withdrew as the enemy became close . Upon the beginning of combat , the advance guard moved up in 2 or 3 lines , discharged its muskets and paused to reload . The second line would then advance to fire and reload , A third rear line would then repeat the advance – fire - reload cycle . This " rolling fire " tactic was repeated until the advance halted . Flanking units would be dispatched as part of the fire and maneuver model . The Ashanti versus the British . In facing the British , the Ashanti did not change their traditional tactics appreciably . They had initially advanced across the Prah River in a regional campaign before being confronted by an English invasion force . Beset by severe logistics problems , smallpox and dysentery they had pulled back across the river . Nevertheless their battle plan was one that had worked earlier . The Ashanti sought to draw the British deep into their territory , against a strong defensive anvil centered at the town of " Amoaful " . Here the British would be tied down , while maneuvering wing elements circled to the rear , trapping and cutting them off . Some historians ( Farwell 2001 ) note that this was " hammer and anvil " approach was a traditional Ashanti battle strategy , and was common in other African armies as well . It had served the Ashanti well against other African forces , and had beaten the British under Governor Charles McCarthy of Sierra Leone once before . In 1824 M ' Carthy had advanced with a small force of African and colonial militia , and encountered 10 , 000 Ashanti at the village of " Essamako " . Perhaps hoping to sustain internal morale and / or overawe the opposing natives , McCarthy ordered the band of the Royal African Corps to play " God Save The King " . The Ashanti moved up drums and horns and in turn struck up their own music , before launching an encircling attack . The British were quickly routed and M ' Carthy was captured and beheaded , with his skull later serving as a drinking cup . At the village of Amoaful , the Ashantis succeeded in luring their opponents forward according to plan , and threatened them several times by flanking movements . Ashanti weaponry however , was poor compared to the modern weapons deployed by the redcoats , a point noted in the British accounts , and such superior arms served the British well in repulsing the Ashanti encirclements : " " The Ashantees stood admirably , and kept up one of the heaviest fires I ever was under . While opposing our attack with immediately superior numbers , they kept enveloping our left with a constant series of well - directed flank attacks . " " Enemy commander General Garnet Wolesey had anticipated Ashanti tactics and had strengthened the British flanks with the best units and stronger firepower . The earlier successes of the African kingdom were thus not repeated . Another tactic of the Ashanti during later wars against the British was to create powerful log stockades at key points to block British advances . Some of these fortifications were over a hundred yard long , with heavy parallel tree trunks sometimes impervious to destruction by artillery fire . Behind these stockades numerous warriors were mobilized to check enemy movement . While formidable in construction , many of these strongpoints failed because Ashanti guns , gunpowder and bullets were poor , and provided little sustained killing power in defense . Time and time again British troops overcame or bypassed the stockades by mounting old - fashioned bayonet charges , after laying down some covering fire . The Ashanti had given up effective use of traditional weapons like spears , and had little effective reply to the cold steel of an infantry charge except the weak volleys of their obsolete or malfunctioning muskets . Supplementary weapons like bush knives made an indifferent showing in these tactical situations against the European soldiers . The presence of African enemies also fighting alongside the British with their customary tribal arms also added to Ashanti woes . Supposed advanced technology in this case , the gun , became ironically , a handicap for the indigenous forces . By contrast , the Zulu retained the effective use of their traditional spears , generally forcing the British to remain in packed defensive formations or entrenched strongpoints , protected by guns and artillery . Effectiveness of the Ashanti . Some British commentary draws a sharp contrast between Ashanti fighting qualities and the shakiness and unreliability of the coastal tribes , ostensible allies of the invaders . At Amoaful , one combat post - mortem pays tribute to the Ashanti commander : " " The great Chief Amanquatia was among the killed . Admirable skill was shown in the position selected by Amanquatia , and the determination and generalship he displayed in the defence fully bore out his great reputation as an able tactician and gallant soldier . " " While the numbers fielded and weaponry compared unfavorably to the mass armies and industrial output of contemporary Europe , the Ashanti were a strong regional power , that did relatively well until confronted by the most advanced technology of a major world power in the latter half of the 19th century . As one Western historian observes : Resistance to colonial expansion : Samori and Abd el - Kader . The policies of Samori Ture of Mali and Guinea and Abd el - Kader of Algeria illustrate how African states were expanding internally , while fighting foreign invasions . Both adapted to modern arms in performing these tasks . Abd - el Kader in Algeria . Unlike many parts of the continent , the operations of Abd el - Kader in Algeria represent a different pattern of warfare in opposition to colonial rule . While small scale raids , skirmishes and revolts always existed , the Algerian anti - French war of the 19th century persisted for decades as a major conflict , with indigenous armies using modern arms to prosecute it . The French conquest of Algeria began in 1834 with the seizure of Algiers , ousting the Ottoman regime . The tribes of the region rose in revolt and a brutal war ensued . In 1832 , a new leader of the native forces gained prominence , the Emir Abd - El Kader , who managed to bring the fractious resistance into a common front against the enemy . El - Kader used guerilla tactics , drawing on rifle - armed mounted troops that relied on quick raids and ambushes . A series of treaties brought only temporary peace and the struggle continued . Ed - kader formed a core force of some 10 , 000 riflemen , supplemented by ad hoc tribal irregulars . Artillery was comparatively weak , with only a small number of cannon available for effective use . Instructors from Morocco , Tunisia and Europe were invited to help train and organize the main force . Support from the Sultan of Morocco was crucial to financing and equipping this central army . Shortages of weapons was always a pressing problem - and financing methods ranged from extraordinary taxes , state monopolies and the booty from raids on hostile tribes . The resistance army also build a number of fortresses throughout its operational area . French investments to crush the resistance were massive . By 1839 they had concentrated some 70 , 000 men in Algeria . By 1844 , a third of the French Army was fighting in Algeria – some 108 , 000 troops – a stark and extraordinary contrast to the typically small European or European - led forces that conquered most of Africa . French tactics changed to counter the swift guerrilla attacks of the native resistance . Heavy formations were broken down into mobile columns , and a ruthless " scorched earth " policy of devastation , plunder and destruction was enacted - seeking to break the native resistance by destruction of its resource base . Wells were poisoned , livestock shot , fields , houses and villages burned , and inhabitants driven into the countryside or exterminated . The ruinous devastation of the countryside severely hurt the Emir ' s war - making efforts , as did the seizure of his strongholds by the mobile columns . By 1844 , El - Kader was forced to withdraw from Algeria to Morocco . Subsequent developments saw his capture and imprisonment by the French , who confiscated massive quantities of native land for settlement of French " colons " or settlers . This set the stage for an equally bloody resistance war , a century later . While unsuccessful , the case of Abd el - Kader illustrates a significant pattern in African warfare that was an alternative to massed " human wave " attacks against small European or European - led forces armed with modern rifles , artillery , and in later years , machine guns ( Gatlings and Maxims ) . El - Kader ' s forces fought a mobile guerrilla war , rather than gathering conveniently in one place where they could be decimated by European firepower . His troops were also relatively well armed with good rifles , although dependent on imports . El - Kader ' s inability to continue arming and supplying his forces also led to his eventual defeat , and his manpower base was relatively limited . Nevertheless it took massive numbers of French troops , outnumbering his main force by 10 to 1 , and their harsh " scorched earth " policy to prevail . Samori in Guinea and Ivory Coast . Internal conquests of Samori . The armies and operations of African leader Samori Ture offer another illustration of the diversity , strengths and weaknesses of indigenous African military systems , both prior to and after clashes with expanding European colonial powers . Samori ' s resistance campaign is similar to that of the tribes of Algeria , both in the enemy he fought , and chronic shortages of modern weapons . There is however contrast with Abd el - Kader . Samori ' s main forces were infantry as compared to horsemen , and he pursued a " scorched earth " approach before the French to deny them resources , the reverse of the pattern under El - Kader . Samori was also a conqueror in his own right even before the coming of the French . He first rose to prominence in 1867 , when he began carving out his own state in the Guinea Highlands bordering the Niger River . He understood the power of firearms early on and built up a disciplined force of musketeers . His search for reliable sources of supply was constant . Years of conquest continued and by 1878 , he proclaimed himself " faama " ( military leader ) of his own Wassoulou Empire , that at its height was to include parts of today ' s Guinea , Mali , Sierra Leone and the northern Côte d ' Ivoire . Alliances were struck with a number of African polities in this area , particularly the Fulbe ( Fula ) jihad state of Fouta Djallon , who were facing pressure from the expanding French to submit to a protectorate . The aggressive expansion of the French brought them into conflict with Samori ' s empire . The Samorian army was also constantly on the move , fighting on multiple fronts . Faced with French pressure in the west , Samori moved east , conquering areas in the Ivory Coast and Liberia as he maneuvered for combat and logistics space . A large number of civilians moved with the army . The discussion below is drawn from studies such as Legassick ' s " Firearms , Horses and Samorian Army Organization ( 1966 ) . Structure of the Samorian army . Primarily infantry with cavalry as a smaller arm , the army structure consisted of 4 parts : the regulars ( primarily slaves and captives ) , a mixed , less standardized conscripted reserve , detachments sent by allied or tributary chiefs , and a cavalry force . The basic rank of a regular infantryman was the " sofa . " The basic unit was a squad of ten , progressing to a company sized unit of 200 – 300 men , and thence to larger groupings , typically of approximately 1 , 000 men . Squad and company leaders were generally mounted . Estimated numbers of fighting men are a source of debate , but the highest places an operational army at around 20 , 000 men . Of these about 5 , 000 were " regular " forces . This small permanent army of " sofa - kun " , directed and stiffened a larger mass of reservists . In the late years of Samoir ' s empire , more emphasis was placed on smaller detachments . Weapons and logistics . The Samorian army did manage to acquire a large number of repeating rifles . Replacement and resupply however including ammunition , was a continuing problem . Freetown , under British rule in Sierra Leone , was an important source of supply . The French tried incessantly to cut this pipeline , and finally did in collaboration with the British . An attempt was made to manufacture guns indigenously , but quality was poor , although the African gunsmiths did succeed in rendering a workable breech mechanism , and in various repairs . Ammunition was also manufactured , and was so precious that after each battle , empty cartridge cases and even bullets were collected . Tactics of the Samorian army . Samorian armies showed the capability of maneuvering against both indigenous and foreign forces . In one of his earliest clashes with the French for example , he executed a sweeping pincer movement to recapture the gold - producing center of " Bure " , a gambit that threatened to cut off the French rear , and forced them to withdraw . Additional victories were won at Nfadji and Dadadugu . Flexibility was also seen in Samori ' s organization , from the use of Konya warrior bands , to the traditional militia call - ups centered on a force of regulars , to his later use of riflemen organized in smaller European - style units . However , although Samori inflicted heavy casualties on the French in several encounters during the 1890s , growing French resources , mobility and firepower placed his regime in ultimate jeopardy . Lacking good firearms and ammunition , major battles against the French were fought by means of carefully arranged fixed lines , to maximize available firepower . Once these were disrupted however , they were difficult to reconstitute . The main forces however turned in excellent performances based on the accounts of French opponents , who were amazed at the marksmanship , discipline and maneuverability of Samori ' s forces . Acquisition of new breech - loading guns , enabling a soldier to both reload and fire from a concealed position , improved performance . Samori thus reduced his striking forces in the field as the war against the French progressed , cutting them into smaller detachments armed with better firearms . Infantry snipers and cavalry skirmishers began to be used more extensively and European deserters and renegades were hired to conduct troop training . Guerrilla tactics and harassment of French detachments and lines of supply received more emphasis . Infantry engagements became staggered . Rather than one fighting line persisting throughout a day , Samori ' s troops used multiple lines , withdrawing in more systematic fashion to form another for defense . The old call - up system was replaced by a more permanent force . Samori ' s army used larger formations as it fought against indigenous opponents in its southward drive towards the Ivory Coast and Guinea . Smaller numbers were deployed against the French . Samori ' s armies had to remain mobile , conquering new territory on one front , harassing the French on another , and doubling back to reoccupy old areas . The south - eastern front into Ivory Coast and Guinea took up most of Samori ' s attention after 1891 , while his " burn and retire " tactics held off the Europeans in the West . In 1898 Samori began an epic march towards Boribana , moving an estimated 120 , 000 civilians along with the army . The French commander Lartigue comments on this move as being carried out successfully with credible precision and speed . French pressure continued relentlessly however , and Samori ’ s force grew more constricted . He was captured by a small French striking force that burst into his camp from an unexpected direction in September 1898 . His long struggle and disciplined organization however illustrates the capacity of indigenous systems to create new forms of organization , modify existing tribal ones , and adapt to new or improved technology . From innovation to conservatism : the Zulu military system . Military reforms of Shaka . The Zulu are a significant case in African military innovation and change . Their system of war transformed large portions of the continent and their methods spanned both the pre - gunpowder and gunpowder eras . Tribal warfare among the Zulu area clans was heavily ritualistic and ceremonial until the ascent of the ruthless chieftain Shaka , who adapted and innovated a number of tribal practices that transformed the Zulu from a small , obscure tribe to a major regional power in Southern Africa . Many of the innovations of Shaka were not simply created out of thin air , nor can they be dubiously credited to the influence of European troops drilling several hundred miles to the south , nor can they merely be dismissed as the product of vague environmental forces like drought or overpopulation . Age - grade groupings , the advantages of an aggressive charge or encircling an enemy , etc . , are all known in tribal warfare of the period . Elements of the regimental system for example had been put in place under his predecessor Dingiswayo . What was different was a much more ruthless combination and systematic use of all these elements to produce the distinctive Zulu system . Shaka sought to bring combat to a swift and bloody decision , as opposed to duels of individual champions , scattered raids , or light skirmishes where casualties were comparatively light . Such a brutal focus demanded changes in weapons , organization and tactics . New weapons and new organisation . " New spear and shield . " Shaka is credited with introducing a new variant of the traditional weapon , discarding the long , spindly throwing weapon and instituting a heavy , shorter stabbing spear . He is also said to have introduced a larger , heavier cowhide shield , and trained his forces to thus close with the enemy in more effective hand - to - hand combat . The throwing spear was not discarded , but standardised like the stabbing implement and carried as a missile weapon , typically discharged at the foe , before close contact . None of these weapons changes are largely important in the local context , but mated to an aggressive mobility and tactical organisation , they were to make a devastating impact . " Logistics . " The fast moving host , like all military formations , needed supplies . These were provided by young boys , who were attached to a force and carried rations , cooking pots , sleeping mats , extra weapons and other material . Cattle were sometimes driven on the hoof as a moveable larder . Again , such arrangements in the local context were probably nothing unusual . What was different was the systematisation and organisation , a pattern yielding major benefits when the Zulu were dispatched on military missions . " Age - grade regimental system . " Age - grade groupings of various sorts were common in the Bantu tribal culture of the day . Shaka manipulated this system , transferring the loyalty of the traditional clan groupings to himself , thus strengthening his personal hegemony . Such groupings on the basis of age , did not constitute a permanent , paid military in the modern Western sense , nevertheless they did provide a stable basis for sustained armed mobilisation , much more so than ad hoc tribal levies or war parties . Shaka organised the various age grades into regiments , and quartered them in special military kraals , with each regiment having its own distinctive names and insignia . " Mobility and training . " Shaka discarded sandals to enable his warriors to run faster . Initially the move was unpopular , but those who objected were simply killed , a practice that quickly concentrated the minds of available personnel . Shaka drilled his troops frequently , implementing forced marches that could cover more than fifty miles a day . He also drilled the troops to carry out encirclement tactics ( see below ) . Such mobility gave the Zulu a significant impact in their local region and beyond . " Encirclement tactics . " The Zulu typically took the offensive , deploying in the well known " buffalo horns " formation . The attack layout was composed of three elements : " Organisation of the Zulu forces . " The Zulu forces were generally grouped into 3 levels : regiments , corps of several regiments , and " armies " or bigger formations , although the Zulu did not use these terms in the modern sense . Size distinctions were taken account of , any grouping of men on a mission could collectively be called an impi , whether a raiding party of 100 or horde of 10 , 000 . Numbers were not uniform , but dependent on a variety of factors including assignments by the king , or the manpower mustered by various clan chiefs or localities . A regiment might be 400 or 4000 men . These were grouped into Corps that took their name from the military kraals where they were mustered , or sometimes the dominant regiment of that locality . " Higher command and unit leadership . " An inDuna guided each regiment , and he in turn answered to senior izinduna who controlled the corps grouping . Overall guidance of the host was furnished by elder izinduna usually with many years of experience . One or more of these elder chiefs might accompany a big force on an important mission . Coordination of tactical movements was supplied by the indunas who used hand signals and messengers . Generally before deploying for battle , the regiments were made to squat in a semicircle while these commanders made final assignments and adjustments . Lower level regimental izinduna , like the NCOs of today ' s armies , and yesterday ' s Roman centurions , were extremely important to morale and discipline . Prior to the clash at Isandhlwana for example , they imposed order on the frenzied rush of warriors eager to get at the British , and steadied those faltering under withering enemy fire during the battle . The Zulu in the gunpowder era . Victories . The Zulu system spanned both the spear and gunpowder eras and exemplified the typical outcome in Africa when native armies were confronted by European forces armed with modern weapons . Unlike many other native armies however , the Zulu scored one of the biggest African victories over colonial forces , annihilating a British column at Isandhlawana and almost over - running a detachment at Rorke ' s Drift . Proceeding at a more leisurely pace than their reputed 50 miles per day , a large " impi " , some 12 regiments strong , approached the British camp almost undetected . It split into 2 massive columns and made a long parallel march before settling into a deep ravine near the enemy position , waiting until the omens were good for an assault . Discovered by a British cavalry patrol , the entire " impi " sprang up as one man , and launched their attack from some 4 miles away , in their classic " buffalo horns " formation . Morris ( 1965 ) holds that in the fluid situation , the commanding Zulu generals struggled to shape the battle and position their forces in the proper order as the warriors streamed forward , but only succeeded in holding back one corps ( the " Undi " ) , and one regiment ( the " uDloko " ) which had been located a mile behind the main body . McBride ( 1976 ) maintains that the Zulu commanders were already well informed by their scouts ( " izinhloli " ) of British dispositions and only needed quick final directions to send the troops on their way – left horn to trap the British against the mountain , right horn to serve as blocking force and cut off the rear , chest to deliver main blow , and " loins " to drop deep , seal escape routes , and await further developments . These " tail end " reserves , who had been held in check by their unit commanders , were to later pursue fugitives and clash with the stalwart British defenders of Rorke ' s Drift . Whatever the final adjustments made , both writers show that the Zulu force , for all its eagerness , was no wild horde , but a disciplined formation , purposefully moving into combat according to its training and general battle plan . The attack was met by withering British rifle , rocket and artillery fire that made part of the advance falter . The British however had divided their forces - part of it being away on a search for the main Zulu Army . That army materialized behind their backs at Isandlwana , and moved quickly to exploit the situation . Poor logistics and positioning of troops ( scattered deployments , delayed ammunition resupply ) also contributed to fatal weaknesses in the British defences , and the fiery exhortations of the regimental indunas encouraged the host of warriors to continue attacking . When British fire slackened , the Zulu prongs surged forward , smashing into the camp and annihilating its defenders . The liquidation of almost 1 , 000 European troops with modern arms by the tribal spearmen sparked disbelief and uproar in Britain . Aside from the losses of British regulars , and the supporting native levies , the Zulu " impi " killed more British officers at Isandhlawana , than Napoleon killed at Waterloo . Defeat . Long term Zulu success against a major world power however was a questionable proposition . In his earlier encounters with European visitors to his kingdom , the Zulu King Chaka had dismissed firearms as ineffective against the massed charge of the regiments . At Isandhlawana , the monarch ' s boast held true . But as the Zulu War went on , massed rifle and artillery fire repeatedly broke the back of Zulu attacks , as they persisted in assaulting heavily fortified positions and failed to use captured firearms effectively . Despite earlier defeats by the Boers using guns , 4 decades earlier , the Zulu had not sufficiently adapted to the realities of firepower on the battlefield . They also failed to effectively cut the vulnerable supply lines of their enemies - leaving the Natal rear area virtually untouched for example . Contrary to popular belief many African armies did not have vast supplies of fighting personnel ( see " Significant Influences " above ) . The war put tremendous pressure on the Zulus relatively limited manpower resources , a pattern repeated throughout Africa where comparatively small kingdoms clashed with European states like Britain or France . At Isandhlwana for example , the Zulu main force had marched for three days straight , without eating on the last two . As the regiments deployed for attack they had a four mile run to reach the British camp , before entering into the immediate battle . The reserve force of the impi , the " uDokolo " regiment , had another twelve mile run to make immediately after , where they attacked the fortified British position for ten hours straight . Such intensity could not be sustained with available manpower and logistics . At the final Battle of Ulundi , the depleted Zulu formations showed little of their previous ferocity , and made a relatively token half - hour attack before being scattered . Influence of the Zulu system . The Zulu military system was to transform large swathes of the continent , from south east Africa , into parts of East and Central Africa through the disruptive warfare that broke out during the reign of Zulu king Shaka . The disruption , known as the " Mfecane " had several causes , but it was to create several powerful nations in its wake , such as the Swazi , the Nebebele , the Shangaan and others . Many of these new powers copied Zulu methods , weapons and tactics , and saw a measure of success against both indigenous and foreign opponents . The Shangaan for example , founded by war - leader Soshangane , were to migrate into what is now Mozambique and force the Portuguese into paying them tribute . Horses , guns and indigenous adaptation in Southern Africa . The powerful horse and gun system of the Boers . While not indigenous to the continent , the horse and gun system of the Boers , and their defensive wagon " laager " , was to have profound effects on military developments in the southern portion of Africa . Mounted warfare enabled them to beat or fight a wide variety of African enemies to a standstill , although they suffered their share of defeats over the decades . Skilled horsemen , and excellent shots , the Boers acquitted themselves well in a variety of tactical situations , against both African enemies and imperial forces . Several groups arose that emulated the horse and gun system . Prominent among these were the " outcasts " , the half - caste or mixed race product of Dutch and African interaction , and / or alliances with other dispossessed tribal elements - peoples like the Griqua , Bergnaars , Koranna and Basters . Acquiring weapons and mounts over the course of time , they too began to carve out their own sphere of influence in the region , alternately battling Boer , Bantu and Briton at various times in their history . Rise of the Basotho system . Several tribal kingdoms such as the Tlokoa , Pedi and Basotho took up horse and gun , despite collaboration between the Boers and the British to prevent such transfers , particularly of firearms . The Basotho , a small tribal grouping threatened by the Zulu , Ndebele , as well as the Europeans , adapted to both weapons systems , and carried out a complex mix of warfare and diplomacy to fend off their enemies . They became avid horsemen , and in time , developed the tough , durable breed , that was to be known as the Basuto pony . The Basotho equipped their mounted fighters with guns , although the traditional spear , battle - axe , and knobkerrie ( club ) continued in use . Most of the firearms were low quality flintlocks , and ammunition and gunpowder were usually in short supply . Marksmanship according to contemporary European observers was not as good as that of the Boers . The tribal warriors also relied heavily on fortifications in their mountainous country , the most famous of which was Thaba Boisu , fortress capital of their king Moshoeshoe . Battles against English and Boer forces . The Basotho clashed with several enemies to maintain their fragile independence . In the 1840s they fought against the Tlokwa , who were also mounted , and against the Zulu - influenced Nedebele , who were primarily infantry . In 1851 , a British colonial force invaded Sotho country and was soundly defeated at the battle of Kononyaba ( or Viervoet ) . Against the British , who deployed an artillery piece , the spear and battle - axe proved more useful than guns when the Sotho hemmed in the invaders on a mountaintop . Victory was gained by close hand - to - hand fighting . This incident provided a significant check to British power in the area . The following year another British force tried its luck , and was also defeated . This encounter saw the widespread deployment of Sotho cavalry . At one point in the battle , some 6 , 000 Basotho horsemen mounted a charge against the British formation . They were repulsed by rifle and artillery fire . Nevertheless , the tribal regiments controlled the field at the end of the day , and the British withdrew . Facing a British ban against arms sales to Africans in the 1850s , the Basotho desperately tried to manufacture their own cartridges and gunpowder with assistance from European deserters . The results were poor and of little value when a Boer invasion from the Orange Free State threatened in 1858 . The Boer force was armed with modern breech - loading rifles and several pieces of artillery , and their firepower took a heavy toll against the tribal warriors . The Basotho however withdrew to their mountain strongholds , particularly Thaba Boisiu , and a siege commenced . Counterattacks from the fortress saw some success , with one foray killing 30 enemy troops , and the siege became a stalemate . Eventually the Boers were forced to withdraw when the Basotho dispatched horsemen to raid homesteads and fields behind their lines . Another Boer invasion in 1867 was more dangerous for the Basotho . The Europeans had upgraded their rifles , obtained more powerful artillery , and augmented their numbers with white volunteers from across South Africa . Once again they converged on Thaba Boisu , liquidating local strongholds on the way . A first assault against the fortress ended in failure . A second drove the Basotho back from their advanced defence lines , but also became bogged down . A third also stalled when a Boer leader was shot dead . The conflict dragged on for 6 months as the Boers ravaged Basotho territory , seizing cattle , people and burning crops to bring their opponents to heel . In early 1868 however Moshoeshoe persuaded the British to intervene and placed his kingdom under crown protection . This ended the Boer siege although a subsequent treaty transferred yet more Basotho land to their enemies . The ' gun war ' – defeat of colonial forces . The Basotho continued to use their horse - gun system under the new colonial regime to maintain their independence . In the 1880s , their territory was annexed by Cape Colony and a punitive expedition of 800 white troops and 1500 African allies was dispatched to crush the opposition of one Moorosi , a dissenting Sotho chieftain . Moorosi gathered some 300 gunmen in a strong mountaintop position and fought off the colonial forces for over 8 months . After three major assaults , and continuous shelling by artillery , the position was overrun , Moroosi was killed and his lands seized . As the struggle with Moorosi raged , colonial authorities reserved part of Basutoland for white settlement and demanded that all natives surrender their firearms . This demand was rejected and another British expedition was dispatched to liquidate resistance , sparking the so - called " Gun War . " The Sotho horsemen however used a flexible mix of tactics : defensive positions on fortified hills , attacks against administrative centers of the colonial regime , and frequent use of guerrilla strikes and ambushes against lumbering colonial columns , most notably a column of British lancers at Qalabani . The combination of mobility , firepower , ambushes , and hit and run strikes was sufficient to stalemate or defeat the Basotho ' s enemies for almost a year . Stymied , the colonial army , and the disarmanent demand was withdrawn . End of the regional balance of power . While other African groups adapted to horses and guns , the Basotho state successfully maintained a measure of independence from the many enemies that sought to destroy it . The Basotho case again demonstrates the complexity of African military systems , often conceived mainly in terms of hordes of attacking , spear - wielding infantry . A fuller picture must include the cavalry tradition , both in the south and in western Africa , and must take into account the alternative , tactical defensive style of peoples like the Shona and Basotho . The case of the Basotho , Zulu , Xhosa and others also shows that indigenous militaries could learn and adapt , and could achieve credible performances even in the 19th century . Some historians note that a rough balance of power prevailed in the region , with native military systems generally holding their own against settler forces and local colonial levies . The heavier intervention of British power however choked off the free market in firearms , and / or deployed regular imperial troops with modern repeating rifles , artillery and machine guns . Such imperial troops in turn , were also to crush Boer power during the Boer War , circa 1899 – 1902 . Adapting to modern arms : the Ethiopians at Adowa . The Ethiopian victory at Adowa demonstrates the increasing ability of African forces to handle modern arms as gunpowder weapons began to dominate the field . Painful lessons in the killing efficiency of rifled firepower had been dealt the Ethiopian forces in earlier encounters with European armies . At the battle of Aroge for example , British volleys from breechloading rifles crushed the Emperor Tewodros ' troops , and the British campaign was to end in his death and the destruction of his capital . Adaptations to modern arms . Others learned however . Tewodros ' s successor , Yohannes IV had been backed by the British and received 500 , 000 pounds ( sterling ) worth of military equipment . This was put to good use against a variety of other enemies , including the Mahdi ' s dervish forces from the Sudan , and in inflicting a crushing defeat on an Italian force at the Battle of Dogali in 1887 . In 1875 and 1876 , Yohannes ' troops also defeated substantial Egyptian armies trained and officered by European mercenaries and US Civil War veterans . The Egyptians had been equipped with Remington rifles , Krupp artillery , Gatling guns and rocket tubes . This hardware was transferred to the victorious Ethiopian forces , and captured Egyptian gunners were pressed into service , training the Ethiopians to use the big guns . Yohannes ' successor Menelik continued the armed buildup , and by the 1890s the Ethiopians were a tough fighting force on their own ground , capable of mobilizing massive numbers of infantry . Military and diplomatic links with other nations such as Imperial Russia ( chief military mission in the war - time Nikolay Leontiev ) were also established . AN assortment of foreign military personnel advised the Ethiopians during their modernization and build up phases . Special role for this purpose was played by the Russian military advisers and volunteers of Menylik ' s army . So Little Leontiev ' s command of the Russian volunteers and advisers could be the direct participants of battle near Adwa in composition the Ethiopian army ( less than fifty ) . In accordance with the order of emperor of Ethiopia , Directly Nikolay Leontiev organized the first battalion of the regular Ethiopian army , it was represented to Menelik II , in February , 1899 . Leontiev formed an first regular battalion , the kernel of which became the company of volunteers from the former Senegal shooters ( disappointed or unreliable for colonial authorities ) , which he chose and invited from Western Africa , with training of the Russian and French officers . The first Ethiopian military orchestra was organized at the same time . Historian Bruce Vandervort in " Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa , 1830 – 1914 , " notes that around 100 , 000 Ethiopian soldiers fought at Adowa , with about 70 , 000 of them carrying modern repeating rifles . The bulk of these were infantry . The remaining 30 , 000 men fought with traditional weapons - spear , sword and buffalo - hide shield . The Ethiopians also deployed a number of machine guns , and were the only Africans to employ artillery to any extent during the colonial wars . Some of their gunners were foreign , but many were indigenous artillerymen , who took over the batteries captured from the Egyptians . The performance of the artillery arm proved a key factor in the Ethiopian victory . Their " " quick - firing Hotchkiss artillery forced the surrender of an Italian fort in the run - up to the battle of Adowa , and actually outgunned an Italian battery at a crucial point during the battle itself . " " . In many ways the Ethiopian army at Adowa was a traditional one that lacked the industrial base and elaborated military establishment of the typical European force . Proficiency however had been gained through long years of campaigning , as the various emperors consolidated power over internal and external foes . Such proficiency however masked many internal weaknesses , including poor logistics , and lack of advanced standardization in organization . Before the battle for example , the Emperor was considering leaving the field because of low supplies . Such deficiencies would count heavily against the indigenous forces in later years when faced with a new Italian invasion under Mussolini in the 1930s . Nevertheless on the day of Adowa , the Ethiopians were supremely ready for the struggle before them . The battle . At Adowa , the Italian force , estimated at 18 , 000 were heavily outnumbered , but had good rifles and some 56 pieces of artillery , and was also stiffened by high quality , elite " bersaglieri " and " alpini " units that marched with some 15 , 000 European soldiers supported by a smaller number of 3 , 000 African " askari " . Prior to the encounter , their commander Bartieri dug into a strong fortified position , hoping to lure the Ethiopians into attacking him . They did not oblige , and a stalemate ensued . Urgings from Rome prompted Bartieri to advance against the Ethiopian concentration at Adowa . The Emperor was considering retreat as supplies ran low , but also hoped that by maneuver , he would draw out his opponents . The Italian advance set the stage for battle . Their forward movement on Adowa was a confused affair and their columns became separated . Ethiopians troops positioned themselves to intercept , and covered by accurate artillery fire , launched a fierce attack that took advantage of this vulnerability , rolling up the Italian line with continuous pressure . They killed over 3 , 000 Italians and wounded hundreds . A smaller number of African soldiers in Italian service , about 2 , 000 , were also killed , and over 1 , 000 wounded . A further 954 Italian troops were missing in action , and the army lost some 11 , 000 rifles , all of its 56 artillery pieces , and had to endure guerrilla attacks as it pulled back from the killing zone . Ethiopian losses were about 7 , 000 dead and 10 , 000 wounded . Thousands of European captives were taken , and the Italian government paid some 10 million lire in reparation money for the survivors after the defeat . Some 800 Tigrean " askari " troops who fought for the Italians met a more brutal fate . Considered traitors , they had their right hands and left feet cut off . Although the Ethiopians were to be less successful or prepared some 40 years later against Mussolini ' s troops , the victory at Adowa , which repeated the smaller triumph at Dogali some 9 years earlier , was to become a landmark in African military history . Significance of the Adowa victory . News of the disaster caused the fall of the Crispi government in Italy and riots in urban areas . The shock of Adowa exceeded the British shock at Isandhlwana , with both disasters magnified by the realization that indigenous forces had beaten modern European regulars in the open field . As one Italian historian notes : While Adowa has attracted much attention in a political and African nationalist sense , one Western military historian notes that the battle was a relatively costly affair for a European army in terms of force - ratio casualties - indeed one of the most proportionately costly major battles of the 19th century . Summary of African military systems : 1800 – 1900 . Military systems on the continent during the 19th century illustrate the complexity of previous eras , to which was added the growing pace and weight of European colonialism . These systems defy the easy categorization and depictions of popular media and imagination - often stereotyped in terms of wildly charging hordes on foot , while ignoring the continent ' s long established archery and cavalry traditions . As noted by one Western historian for example , the notion of countless attacking spearmen is a myth . Manpower resources were often limited . In the 19th century , European nations like Prussia could put some 300 , 000 men into a single campaign . Only the Ethiopians at Adowa with their 100 , 000 effectives approached this level of mobilization – " " the savage hordes of popular lore seldom materialized on African battlefields . " " At times however , local troop concentrations for battle could be quite substantial , comparing favorably with the numbers available in smaller European states , or on some European battlefields . For example , combat forces of some 12 , 000 to 13 , 000 cavalry are documented for one kingdom in pre - colonial West Africa , comparable to the numbers Napoleon would deploy at Waterloo . Indigenous military organization also encompasses Africa ’ s substantial cavalry or mounted tradition , from the armored chevaliers of Western Africa , to the desert horsemen of North Africa , to the mounted fighters of the Basotho in their southern redoubts . On the waters of the continent , naval activities must be accounted for , not simply canoe transport , but fighting vessels , ports , and troop landings covered by poisoned arrows , bullets and cannonballs . Different styles of warfare and modes of organization are also demonstrated by indigenous systems , from the patient tactical defensive of the Basotho , the elaborate armies of Ashanti , the sweeping offensive horns of the Zulu impi , and the protracted guerrilla styles and archery of forest peoples like the Lobi , or the San ( Bushmen ) further south . As regards styles of organization , different approaches over different eras can be seen . Among the Kongo kingdoms of the 18th century for example , a mixture of unit types was deployed – heavy infantry with strong shields for example , backed by lighter contingents armed with bows and spears . Special units of elite troops and bodyguards were also maintained . Like the reorganized Roman legions of old however , the later Zulu system dispensed with such distinctions in favor of one streamlined combat organization and method . Such standardized methods were to be copied by other tribes , and were to dominate or influence large parts of southern Africa and beyond during the 19th century . Such complexity again illustrates that African military systems cannot be conceived of in static , one - dimensional terms . The introduction of firearms does not tell the whole story of the 19th century due to their mixed impact and use in many regions . Indeed , some historians argue that mere advanced technology was not the single most decisive factor in the outcome of many colonial conquests . More important , was the divided , fragmented nature of many small African polities that enabled them to be defeated separately by their enemies . Such fragmentation is not unique to Africa . Germany for example in 1815 , was split into over 30 separate states . Despite these weaknesses , until well into the second part of the century , many native forces held their own until the coming of modern artillery , machine guns and rifles . The 19th century also cannot be seen simply in terms of European plans or schemes , some historians maintain . Instead , African states were executing their own agendas , based on whatever internal factors they thought relevant . Such internal factors and actors ( Shaka for example ) sparked a number of significant conflicts on the continent . The European powers sometimes had to react to these internal developments rather than implement neat , pre - planned schemes . Thus Britain initially had little interest in the Sudan , but the sweeping conquests of the Mahdi forced it to take action to safeguard in part , its position in Egypt and the strategic Red Sea route to other parts of the empire . In the case of the Zulu War , some historians call it " an unauthorized aggression conducted for reasons of geopolitical strategy " and argue that Britain ' s main interest was safeguarding the Cape of Good Hope as a strategic base and route to India . This meant control of the region ' s ports – Cape Town , Simonstown , and Durban – and the liquidation of potential threats from further inland like the Zulu kingdom . This strategy backfired in part when the Zulu chose to fight rather than submit to British coercion . In short , rather than being mere passive actors awaiting colonization , controllers of indigenous military systems were evolving new forms of organization , refining existing ones , or adapting old ones to fit changing opportunities and advanced technology . Their successes , failures , methods , and styles form part of the complex pattern of the military arts on the continent .