Battle of El Guettar The Battle of El Guettar was a World War II battle that took place during the Tunisia Campaign , fought between elements of the Army Group Africa under General Hans - Jürgen von Arnim and U . S . II Corps under Lieutenant General George S . Patton in south - central Tunisia . It was the first battle in which U . S . forces were able to defeat the experienced German tank units , but the followup to the battle was inconclusive . Background . The U . S . II Corps had been badly mauled in their first encounter with the German - Italian forces in Tunisia in a series of battles that culminated in the disastrous Battle of the Kasserine Pass in late February 1943 . Erwin Rommel — poised on the threshold of a complete tactical victory — turned from the battle to return to his eastward - facing defenses at the Mareth Line when he heard of the approach of Bernard Montgomery ′ s British 8th Army . Thus the battle concluded with the U . S . forces still in the field , but having lost ground and men , and with little confidence in some key commanders . The American command reacted to their failure against the German forces with a prompt and sweeping series of changes in command , discipline , and tactics . A major change was the adoption of more flexible artillery communications , allowing all batteries within range of a target to respond to a single call for fire . Previously each battery could fire only on the direct command of its dedicated observers , spread out over the lines and using different frequencies to communicate back to the battery . Also , large units were kept massed rather than being broken up into smaller , unsupported elements as had been done under Fredendall . Coordination with air support was improved but did not reach satisfactory levels until later in the war . On 6 March 1943 , George Patton took command of the U . S . II Corps from Lloyd Fredendall , who had been in command before and during the Kasserine engagement . His first move was to organize his U . S . II Corps for an offensive back toward the Eastern Dorsal chain of the Atlas Mountains . If successful , this would threaten the right rear of the Axis forces defending the Mareth Line facing Montgomery ′ s 8th Army and ultimately make their position untenable . His style of leadership was very different to his predecessor : he is reported to have issued an order in connection with an attack on a hill position ending " I expect to see such casualties among officers , particularly staff officers , as will convince me that a serious effort has been made to capture this objective " . On 17 March , the U . S . 1st Infantry Division moved forward into the almost abandoned plains , taking the town of Gafsa and starting to set it up as a forward supply base for further operations . On the 18th , the 1st Ranger Battalion — led by Colonel William O . Darby — pushed ahead , and occupied the oasis of El Guettar , again meeting with little opposition . The Italian defenders instead retreated and took up positions in the hills overlooking the town , thereby blocking the mountain pass ( of the same name ) leading south out of the interior plains to the coastal plain . Another operation by the Rangers raided an Italian position and took 700 prisoners on the night of 20 March , scaling a sheer cliff and passing ammunition and equipment up hand - over - hand . II Corps was now in an excellent position for an offensive . Battle . The Axis army commanders had become aware of the U . S . movements and decided that the 10th Panzer Division should stop them . Rommel had flown to Germany before the battle , leaving von Arnim in control of the newly named Army Group Africa . Von Arnim held Rommel ′ s opinion on the low quality of the U . S . forces and felt that a spoiling attack would be enough to clear them from the Eastern Dorsals again . At 06 : 00 on 23 March , 50 tanks of Broich ′ s 10th Panzer emerged from the pass into the El Guettar valley at . Elite German motorised units in halftracks and motorised bikes broke off from formation and charged the infantry on the top of the hill . The halftracks would move up the hill as far they could and release their infantry while powerful German guns provided cover . The Germans were maneuvering to hit American artillery anchored on the hill . They quickly overran front - line infantry and artillery positions . Major General Terry de la Mesa Allen , Sr . — commanding the U . S . 1st Infantry Division — was threatened when two tanks came near his headquarters , but he shrugged off suggestions of moving , " I will like hell pull out , and I ' ll shoot the first bastard who does . " German efforts took a turn for the worse when they ran into a minefield . When they slowed to clear the field , U . S . artillery and anti - tank guns opened up on them , including 31 potent M10 tank destroyer s which had recently arrived . Over the next hour , 30 of the 10th Panzer ′ s tanks were destroyed , and by 09 : 00 they retreated from the valley . A second attempt was made starting at 16 : 45 , after waiting for the infantry to form up . Once again the U . S . artillery was able to disrupt the attack , eventually breaking the charge and inflicting heavy losses . Realizing that further attacks were hopeless , the rest of the 10th dug in on hills to the east or retreated back to German HQ at Gabès . Patton attacks . On 19 March , the British 8th Army launched their attack on the Mareth Line , at first with little success . However , on 26 March , a force sent via an outflanking inland route arrived to the north of the line , and the Mareth defenses became untenable . A full retreat started to a new line set up at Wadi Akarit , north of Gabès at . This made the U . S . position even more valuable , since the road through El Guettar led directly into Gabès . Over the next week , the U . S . forces slowly moved forward to take the rest of the interior plains and set up lines across the entire Eastern Dorsals . German defenses were heavy , and the progress was both slow and costly . However , by 30 March they were in position for an offensive south from El Guettar . In order to start a breakout , the two original Italian strongpoints on Hill 369 and Hill 772 had to be taken , one after the other . The U . S . plan involved the U . S . 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions , and one " Combat Command " ( 1 / 3 ) of the U . S . 1st Armored Division , collectively known as " Benson Force " . This force attacked Hill 369 on the afternoon of 30 March but ran into mines and anti - tank fire , losing five tanks . The tanks were removed , and the 1st and 9th attacked again the next day at 06 : 00 , moving up and taking several hundred prisoners . However , an Italian counterattack drove them back from their newly gained positions , and by 12 : 45 they were back where they started with the loss of nine tanks and two tank destroyers . A further attempt the next day on 1 April also failed , after barely getting started . At this point Patton received orders to start the attempt on Hill 772 , even though Hill 369 was still under Italian control . The 9th was moved to Hill 772 , leaving the 1st on Hill 369 . By 3 April , the 1st had finally cleared Hill 369 , but the battle on Hill 772 continued . The Italian commander — General Messe then called in support from the German 21st Panzer Division , further slowing progress . The tempo of the operations then slowed , and the lines remained largely static . Aftermath . On 6 April , the British 8th Army once again overran the German lines , and a full retreat started . On the morning of 7 April , Benson Force moved through the positions held by the 1st and 9th , and raced down the abandoned El Guettar - Gabès road , where it met the lead elements of the 8th Army at 17 : 00 . With the last Axis line of defense in the south of Tunisia broken , they made a run to join the other Axis forces in the north . Tunis fell to the Allies in early May . The results of the El Guettar operations were mixed . The U . S . showed they were able to fight the Germans successfully in a defensive operation during the opening stages but also demonstrated a lack of power when starting offensive operations of their own .