Beit Hanoun wedge The Beit Hanoun wedge ( , " Triz Beit Hanun " ) was a sliver of land around Beit Hanoun ( today in the Gaza Strip ) that the Israel Defense Forces captured during Operation Yoav in the final stage of the 1948 Arab – Israeli War . With this and other wedges , the Israelis hoped to divide various units in the Egyptian army ' s expeditionary force in Palestine as part of Operation Yoav ' s plan . The battles around the wedge were fought on October 15 – 22 , 1948 . Creating the wedge involved the capture of a series of positions overlooking Beit Hanoun ( October 15 – 19 ) , and eventually taking the village itself ( October 20 – 22 ) . The Israelis deployed a reinforced battalion from the Yiftach Brigade for the operation , with another battalion in the reserve . On the first day , eight outlying positions were captured with little resistance , and bridges surrounding Beit Hanoun were blown up . The Egyptians created a bypass to the west of the road and managed to evacuate their staff . The Israelis captured Beit Hanoun on October 19 – 20 and more outlying positions , which forced Egypt to move their forces through the sands between the road and the Mediterranean Sea . The Beit Hanoun wedge as a tactic was unsuccessful , because the objective of dividing the Egyptian expeditionary force was not achieved , but it accomplished other strategic goals in Operation Yoav . Background . The second truce of the 1948 Arab – Israeli War started on July 18 , 1948 , with an Israeli enclave in the Negev disconnected from the rest of the country . Military operations , including An - Far , Death to the Invader and GYS , to create a corridor between the two areas , failed . The United Nations mediator Folke Bernadotte ' s second plan for Palestine became known on September 20 , days after Bernadotte was assassinated by the Lehi . This plan envisioned the Israeli Negev enclave to be handed over to the Arab side . Israel ' s military options were pondered by its leadership during the second truce , and the Bernadotte Plan prompted the government and army to decide to concentrate the next effort on the southern front . The Operation , codenamed The Ten Plagues , was meant to open a permanent ground connection to the Negev , and gradually encircle the Egyptian forces in the Majdal – Bayt Jibrin corridor by creating wedges that would deny the Egyptians free movements between their main troop concentrations . This was the approach favored by Yigal Allon , head of the Southern Command , which mostly won over the General Staff ' s proposals to directly assault the large Egyptian concentrations . The Yiftach Brigade , which previously had participated in Operation GYS but was not native to the Negev theater , was an integral part of the operation , and already infiltrated the area in Operation Avak during the second truce . Forces from the 8th and 9th brigades ( the IDF ' s operational reserve ) were also brought in to assist . Beit Hanoun was an Arab village in southwestern Palestine , just northeast of Gaza , located on the coastal road . Its vicinity was selected as one of the three main wedge locations , the others being Khirbet Masara , southeast of Iraq al - Manshiyya , and Kawkaba . Creating the wedge . On the night of October 15 , 1948 , Israel sent a convoy to the Negev , hoping that the Egyptians would shoot at it and give the Israeli forces an excuse to start the operation . The forces for creating the two wedges set out . The Yiftach force consisted of three companies from the 3rd Battalion , two platoons from the 8th Battalion ( Negev Brigade ) , two 65 mm cannon batteries , one 75 mm cannon battery , one mortar platoon , one machine gun platoon , two mobile 20 mm cannons . Another reinforced battalion was placed in the operational reserve . Most of the forces moved to the northwest from Nir Am to a line about 600 m east of Beit Hanoun . On the first night , eight positions were captured with only light resistance : Hill 113 . 9 just north of Nir Am , where they set up the mission ' s headquarters , and Hills 81 . 2 , 75 . 6 , 79 . 6 , 78 . 7 , 84 . 4 , 80 . 1 and 110 . 7 . Meanwhile , a small contingent moved to the north and south of Beit Hanoun and blew up the road bridges around the village — above Wadi al - Halib to the south and Wadi al - Hesi . The railway bridge was rendered unusable . The Egyptians attempted a counterattack on Hill 81 . 2 ( the northernmost one held by Israel ) in the same night , but were repelled . An Egyptian armored force that attempted to reinforce Beit Hanoun from the south met with heavy fire from the Israeli forces at the southern bridge and retreated . At 15 : 00 on October 16 , the Israelis staged a raid on Dimra , but failed to take the village . They also took heavy aircraft and artillery fire from the Egyptians , who were able to inflict significant damage because the Israelis were not properly dug in and the engineers had not yet finished creating proper cover . On October 17 , the Egyptians sent troops to Hill 60 . 3 ( " The Tree " ) , just north of 81 . 2 . An Egyptian convoy going south from Majdal at 08 : 00 was fired at by Yiftach , and started moving west of the main road . Some vehicles were hit , but the majority successfully avoiding the Israeli guns . At night , Yiftach took Hill 81 , slightly closer to the road . On October 18 , the Egyptians staged another attack on Israeli - held positions , this time 75 . 6 and 81 . The day after that , they evacuated their divisional staff from Majdal , under a smoke screen and heavy air and artillery barrage , using the alternative path created by the previous convoys . Seeing that their wedge was ineffective , the Israelis sought to deepen it . On the night of October 19 – 20 , the Yiftach forces took over Beit Hanoun itself in the west , and Hill 60 . 3 and Dimra in the north . On the following night , Hills 57 and 70 , overlooking Beit Hanoun , were captured to strengthen the hold on the wedge . Egyptian forces were thus unable to use their alternative road and created yet another bypass , this time in the sands further to the west . This involved significant engineering work , and a makeshift road of wood and wire netting was laid on the shoreline , which trucks and armored vehicles were able to move through . Aftermath and impact . The Beit Hanoun wedge was largely ineffective in cutting off the Egyptian headquarters , in part because the Egyptians saw the situation as extremely grave , and fought desperately to get their units through . On the other hand , it achieved a strategic goal — a significant number of Egyptian forces were allocated to fighting the Israelis in the wedge , which eased the other battles of Operation Yoav for Israel . Some scholars are of the opinion however , that completely cutting off the Egyptian headquarters was never an objective of the wedge . They believe that the Israelis foresaw a situation like the one of the Fallujah Pocket , where a large stationary Egyptian force was indeed surrounded , eventually leading to heavy Israeli casualties and a failure to take the pocket . The Beit Hanoun wedge , however , created just enough of a panic for Egypt to start evacuating major forces , but prevented a situation where they would dig in and pose a significant obstacle . The forces that would later be trapped in the Fallujah Pocket were indeed part of the Egyptian division headquarters ' withdrawal request . As part of the 1949 Armistice Agreements between Israel and Egypt , Israel agreed to hand over territories around Rafah and Beit Hanoun , including the wedge , in exchange for the Egyptian evacuation of the Fallujah Pocket .