Action of 23 August 1967 The Action of 23 August 1967 was a major air battle which involved elements of the Vietnam People ' s Air Force ( VPAF ) and the United States Air Force ( USAF ) . The air battle took place over the skies of North Vietnam as part of Operation Rolling Thunder , during the Vietnam War . On 2 January 1967 , the United States Air Force launched Operation Bolo with the aim of luring North Vietnamese MiG fighters into an air battle , where they could be destroyed in an ambush . The operation , led by Colonel Robin Olds , turned out to be a major success after five North Vietnamese MiG - 21 fighters of the VPAF 921st Fighter Regiment were shot down . Stung by that devastating defeat , the North Vietnamese Air Force grounded their fighter force several times between June and August 1967 , in order to work on their training and tactics . On 23 August 1967 , the North Vietnamese Air Force employed their newly devised tactic against a U . S . strike formation , while it was conducting raids against a rail yard . The air battle concluded with the USAF losing three F - 4D fighters . Background . On 2 March 1965 , the United States Government launched Operation Rolling Thunder , a major bombing campaign , with several objectives . Firstly , the operation was supposed to retaliate against North Vietnam for their military activities inside South Vietnam , thereby raising the morale of the South Vietnamese people , especially the Army of the Republic of Vietnam ( ARVN ) . Secondly , it aimed to impede North Vietnam ’ s ability to wage war by reducing , if not stopping , the flow of men and material into South Vietnam . Thirdly , the overall objective was to persuade the North Vietnamese Government to find a compromise through negotiations . Originally the U . S . Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a list of 94 targets to be hit over a period of 16 days , but U . S . President Lyndon Johnson decided to include military targets in order to gradually apply pressure on the North Vietnamese Government , so the list of targets grew to 427 by the end of the campaign . In the first phase of the operation , which lasted from spring to summer of 1965 , American airpower mainly targeted the North Vietnamese capital of Hanoi and its limited industrial base . However , by the end of the year , the United States had failed to achieve the objectives of Rolling Thunder , because North Vietnam continued to send its troops and military supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail , which demonstrated that the North Vietnamese Government was not ready to quit the war . In response to domestic political pressure to do more , President Johnson shifted priority of the campaign to interdiction . From summer 1965 to the winter period of 1966 – 67 , the campaign was aimed at degrading North Vietnam ’ s capability to infiltrate and send men into South Vietnam . Again , America ’ s shift towards interdiction also failed , and the Johnson administration was forced to change the priority of the bombing campaign . For the third phase of Rolling Thunder , which occurred from spring 1967 to early 1968 , bombing operations were focused on industrial and transportation targets in and around Hanoi , Hai Phong and the buffer zone near the Chinese border . The third phase of the campaign was heavily favored by U . S . commanders , because it allowed them to destroy rather than just threaten Hanoi ’ s nascent industrial infrastructures . Furthermore , the new targets approved by the Johnson administration enabled U . S . airpower to be used against the primary war - making capabilities of North Vietnam , by striking at military targets that were previously denied to the fighter - bombers of the U . S . Navy and Air Force . Thus , in 1967 the United States also introduced more aircraft into the operation equipped with new technology , which gave American air units the assets to make a significant difference . However , as American bombers moved closer to Hanoi and Hai Phong , they were aggressively challenged by North Vietnamese MiG fighters . Prelude . The year of 1967 started badly for the Vietnam People ' s Air Force ( VPAF ) . During the early years of the war , the rules of engagement prevented U . S . fighter - bombers from hitting North Vietnamese air bases , and that allowed North Vietnamese fighter pilots to attack American bomber formations as they were approaching their targets , thereby forcing U . S . pilots to jettison their bomb loads before they even reached their target . Then , instead of dueling with U . S . strike aircraft , North Vietnamese pilots would normally retreat to the safety of their bases . To preempt further attacks on U . S . bomber formations by the North Vietnamese Air Force , the United States Air Force became interested in luring North Vietnamese MiG fighters up against a decoy target , and shoot them down in the air using missile - armed fighter aircraft . By 1967 , the North Vietnamese Air Force had become more aggressive towards U . S . strike formations , and it indicated to U . S . commanders that it was the right time to launch a decoy operation . In what became known as Operation Bolo , the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing ( 8th TFW ) — under the command of Colonel Robin Olds — based at Ubon in Thailand , was entrusted with the task of leading an operation which aimed to lure the North Vietnamese Air Force into an ambush . Accordingly the F - 4 Phantoms of the 8th TFW would fly in the same profile as an F - 105 strike formation , by flying at the same time , altitudes , speed and routes . For the first time , the F - 4 Phantoms would be equipped with the QRC - 160 jamming pods so they would appear on North Vietnamese radars as F - 105 bombers . To prepare for the operation , U . S . aircrews spent several days studying weapons envelopes , pod operation , and all aspects of air - to - air tactics . On 2 January 1967 , a total of 56 F - 4C Phantom II from the 8th , 355th , 366th and 388th Tactical Fighter Wing s flew in a formation which resembled an F - 105 strike force , towards the VPAF ’ s Phuc Yen Air Base . There were four flights of F - 104 fighters flying in escort , to simulate the F - 4s . When the U . S . fighter formations were detected by North Vietnamese radar , MiG - 21 fighters of the VPAF 921st Fighter Regiment based at Noi Bai and Kep were immediately placed on category one red alert , which was the highest state of alert . However , unknown to the U . S . pilots at the time , the VPAF High Command forbade their pilots from taking off until U . S . fighters were away from Noi Bai . Apart from the late reaction of the VPAF High Command , weather conditions over North Vietnam also favored U . S . aircrews ; North Vietnamese bases at Noi Bai and Kep were covered by 10 / 10th cloud , which started at a height of and cleared at . By the time the first wave of North Vietnamese MiG fighters had taken off , two additional flights of F - 4C fighters from the 8th TFW had already flown into the area undetected . Due to their lack of radar equipment , North Vietnamese MiG - 17 fighters were restricted to flying at cloud base , so they failed to detect the presence of U . S . fighters that were flying at a higher altitude . From above U . S . F - 4 fighters had a greater energy level over North Vietnamese MiG - 17 and MiG - 21 fighters , and U . S . pilots had no trouble seeing or identifying North Vietnamese fighters flying up from below . Furthermore , weather conditions on the day allowed radar and missile systems on the F - 4 fighters to perform at their maximum level , an advantage which U . S . pilots fully exploited as North Vietnamese MiG fighters flew up to engage them . Just after 3 : 00 pm North Vietnamese MiG - 21 fighters appeared through the clouds and began attacking U . S . fighters circling above . One by one the MiG - 21 fighters were picked off by AIM - 7 and AIM - 9 missiles launched by U . S . pilots . The USAF suffered no losses and they claimed to have shot down seven MiG - 21 fighters , but only five were confirmed by the North Vietnamese . All North Vietnamese pilots who were hit ejected safely , while the survivors managed to return to the safety of their home bases . Engagement . On 8 January 1967 , the VPAF High Command convened a meeting to examine what had gone wrong . The actions of 2 January had exposed the flawed tactics employed by MiG - 21 pilots ; they broke through the clouds too quickly , and they did not join up with each other before they attacked the U . S . fighters waiting above them . The VPAF High Command then devised a new tactic which required the deployment of between two or four aircraft for each attack , with a maximum of ten aircraft for each mission to perform guerrilla - style attacks on U . S . bomber formations . Furthermore , after they had examined U . S . air tactics , North Vietnamese commanders decided that MiG - 17 pilots should attack U . S . formations from either side , while MiG - 21 pilots would strike from above . Before the North Vietnamese Air Force could implement their new tactics , however , the VPAF 921st Fighter Regiment was withdrawn from combat for several months to recover from the bloody defeat it had suffered as a result of Operation Bolo . In April , North Vietnamese MiG fighters were back in the air to challenge U . S . Navy and Air Force fighter - bombers again , but they only experienced mixed results with heavy losses . As a result , between late June and early August 1967 , North Vietnamese Air Force fighters were grounded several times , so their pilots could work on their training and new tactics . While the North Vietnamese pilots were undergoing training , American airpower was concentrated on striking at Hanoi ’ s line of communications , especially the rail lines running north - east and north - west into China , and the transportation network which linked North Vietnam ’ s capital with Hai Phong . To minimize the effects of U . S . strikes , North Vietnamese authorities constructed several alternate rail yards on the north - eastern train line , including the Yen Vien rail yard which located north of Hanoi and ran through Thai Nguyen , and linked up with the main line at Kep close to China . In response , the Seventh Air Force launched repeated strikes on the Yen Vien rail yard and other infrastructures which linked Hanoi with the China buffer zone . On 21 August 1967 , a formation of twenty F - 105 Thunderchiefs and eight F - 4 Phantoms raided Yen Vien , which contained about 150 boxcar s . The Americans claimed to have damaged more than half of the boxcars and trapped the remainder in the rail yard , so they returned two days later to destroy the rest . On the afternoon of 23 August 1967 , a flight of sixteen F - 4s from the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing escorted a formation of thirty - six F - 105 strike aircraft from the 355th and 388th Tactical Fighter Wings based in Thailand , for the second attack on Yen Vien . The 555th Tactical Fighter Squadron provided two flights of F - 4 Phantoms , ‘ Ford ’ flight and ‘ Falcon ’ flight . The mission was led by Colonel Nicholas J . Donelson with Olds , who spearheaded Operation Bolo back in January , as the leader of the escort formation . At 1 : 45 pm on 23 August , North Vietnamese radars detected a flight of 40 U . S aircraft approaching Hanoi from Sam Neua , in neighboring Laos . The VPAF High Command immediately scrambled two flights of four MiG - 17 fighters from the VPAF 923rd Fighter Regiment , followed by two MiG - 21 fighters from the VPAF 921st Fighter Regiment at 2 : 51 pm . The MiG - 21 force was led by Nguyen Nhat Chieu with Nguyen Van Coc , who had participated in the VPAF ' s disastrous mission during Operation Bolo , as the wingman . The first and second MiG - 17 flights were commanded by Cao Thanh Tinh and Nguyen Van Tho respectively . Once airborne , North Vietnamese pilots maneuvered their aircraft into positions to deploy their new tactic which required the MiG - 17 fighters to act as bait , while the MiG - 21 fighters attacked from the rear . After Chieu and Coc had departed from Phuc Yen Air Base , they flew at low level and stayed in the ground clutter to avoid detection by airborne radars employed by U . S aircraft . However , the MiG - 21 ’ s transponders were detected by an orbiting EC - 121 airborne early warning radar surveillance aircraft , and their positions were relayed to the F - 4 fighters that were escorting the strike formation , but they did not respond . Initially the first MiG - 17 flight fell behind the U . S . strike formation , so Tinh and his formation climbed with full afterburner and they immediately played their part in the attack , by attacking the F - 105 formation with their cannons . Meanwhile , as North Vietnamese ground controllers saw their fighter aircraft abeam the strike flight and outside the radar range of the F - 4 formation , they ordered the MiG - 21 fighters to climb up to . Chieu and Coc then dived out from an overcast and swept down on ‘ Ford ’ flight and the strike formation ; Chieu fired a missile at an F - 105 and Coc fired an R - 3S Atoll missile which successfully destroyed ‘ Ford 4 ’ ( 66 - 0238 , 8th TFW ) , piloted by Major Charles R . Tyler . Shortly afterwards , Chieu turned his aircraft around and fired a missile at another F - 4 , but it missed . Coc also tried to score another kill , but he strayed into Chieu ’ s line of fire as the latter was diving down from above firing his 20mm cannon . As a result Coc ’ s MiG - 21 was damaged but the controls were still working properly , so he requested to carry on with the mission . However , ground controllers ordered him to return to base , and the MiG - 21 could only fly at a speed of due to the damage . After the U . S . strike formation had fallen into the ambush , MiG - 17 pilots radioed their control center and requested to continue with their air patrol . Over the skies of Yen Vien , ‘ Ford 1 ’ piloted by Captain Larry E . Carrigan ( 66 - 0247 , 8th TFW ) was shot down by a MiG - 17 fighter from Tho ’ s formation . Meanwhile , ‘ Falcon 3 ’ ( 65 - 0726 , 8th TFW ) piloted by Major Robert R . Sawhill was shot down by anti - aircraft artillery . Against those losses , F - 105 pilot First Lieutenant David B . Waldrop , ‘ Crossbow 3 ’ , claimed that he had destroyed one MiG - 17 in the air battle . On the return trip , ‘ Ford 3 ’ piloted by Major C . B . Demarque ( 66 - 0260 ) ran out of fuel as the aircraft tried to reach a tanker , but the pilot and his Weapons Systems Officer was forced to eject from the aircraft as it malfunctioned over Thailand . Aftermath . The battle concluded as the worst day for the United States Air Force in Vietnam since 2 December 1966 , when they had lost five aircraft over the skies of North Vietnam in a single day . Consequently , the actions of 23 August became known as ‘ Black Wednesday ’ amongst U . S . pilots who participated in air operations over Hanoi on that particular day . The USAF officially confirmed the loss of three F - 4D fighters during the raid against the Yen Vien rail yard , which resulted in the deaths of Weapon Systems Officers Captain Ronald N . Sittner ( 66 - 0238 , 8th TFW ) and First Lieutenant Charles Lane ( 66 - 00247 , 8th TFW ) . Major Charles R . Tyler , Captain Larry E . Carrigan , Major Robert R . Sawhill and First Lieutenant Gerald L . Gerndt ejected safely from their aircraft , but they were captured alive and became prisoners of war . Major C . B . Demarque and his Weapons System Officer , First Lieutenant J . M . Piet were rescued shortly after they ejected from their malfunctioned aircraft over Thai airspace . In contrast to the misery suffered by their opponents , the action of 23 August gave the North Vietnamese Air Force their first major victory since Operation Bolo . The USAF ’ s confirmation of the loss of ‘ Ford 4 ’ to a MiG aircraft gave Nguyen Van Coc his second air - to - air victory , and he eventually became the leading ace pilot of the war with nine kills . Earlier in the engagement , flight leader Nguyen Nhat Chieu claimed to have destroyed an F - 105 with a missile , but the USAF have not confirmed that claim . Nonetheless , Chieu also became a ranking ace pilot with six kills attributed to his name . The USAF also claimed one victory against a MiG - 17 fighter , attributed to First Lieutenant David B . Waldrop , but the claim was not confirmed by the North Vietnamese because all their MiG fighters returned to base safely . Following their defeat at the hands of the North Vietnamese Air Force , Colonel Robin Olds learned that Seventh Air Force intelligence had watched North Vietnamese MiG fighters practicing their new tactics for ten days prior to the battle of 23 August , but had not passed that information on to the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing and other units . Thus , it soon became clear to U . S commanders that the reason the North Vietnamese repeatedly stood down their fighter force was because they were working on their new tactic . In the first half of 1967 , the North Vietnamese had realized they could not directly confront U . S . fighters in air - to - air combat , so they changed their procedures for the deployment of their numerically inferior MiG units . To take advantage of the MiG - 21 ’ s speed and small size , pilots flying the type were instructed to intercept targets only at high speed behind or above U . S . strike formations . Then , as they approached their target , the MiG - 21 pilots would make a supersonic diving pass against trailing or isolated flights , so they could position themselves for a missile kill . The action of 23 August demonstrated that the North Vietnamese Air Force had successfully executed their new procedure , which was helped by more skilful ground controllers who directed the MiG fighter towards their targets . Indeed , the new procedure gave North Vietnamese MiG pilots the ingredient they needed to achieve a kill over their U . S . opponents ; between August 1967 and February 1968 , the North Vietnamese Air Force achieved a kill ratio of 1 . 1 : 1 against the USAF , with the loss of 20 aircraft for 22 victories . In the same period of time , Operation Rolling Thunder had cost the United States approximately $ 900 million ( $ 5 , 640 million at 2010 prices ) with the loss of more than 700 aircraft . The bombing campaign continued until 31 October 1968 , when it was abandoned by the U . S . Government .