Direct action ( military ) In the context of special operations , direct action ( DA ) consists of : " Short - duration strikes and other small - scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile , denied , or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize , destroy , capture , exploit , recover , or damage designated targets . Direct action differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk , operational techniques , and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives . " The United States and many allied countries consider DA one of the basic special operations missions . Some units specialize in it , such as Rangers of the 75th Ranger Regiment , while other units , such as US Army Special Forces , have DA capabilities but focus more on other operations . Unconventional warfare , special reconnaissance and direct action roles have merged through the decades and are typically performed primarily by the same units . For instance , while American special operations forces were originally created for the unconventional warfare ( UW ) mission and gradually added other capabilities , the United States Navy SEALs teams , and the UK Special Air Service ( SAS ) and Special Boat Service ( SBS ) continue to perform a primary DA role with special reconnaissance ( SR ) as original missions . SEALs , SAS , and SBS added additional capabilities over time , responding to the needs of modern conflict . Russia n Spetsnaz are DA and SR units . Some countries may have standing units for deniable DA operations , and others may put together " ad hoc " volunteer groups for such missions . Under the US Central Intelligence Agency ' s National Clandestine Service , there is a Special Activities Division that operates without apparent national identification . It is possible that units of the Joint Special Operations Command or the frequently - renamed Intelligence Support Activity may do " ad hoc " operations . Risk factors . DA , conducted by special operations forces , uses a small ground team , possibly with air and naval support , which maintains a high degree of secrecy about the intended action . It relies on surprise and skill , rather than mass , and has a " hit - and - run " approach : If the political situation so requires , the DA team may operate completely or partially out of proper uniform . In some cases , which international law accepts as a legitimate ruse of war , a direct action force may infiltrate to the target area in disguise , but must make some distinguishing insignia visible before taking any combat action s . While the entire mission was not completed due to a lack of helicopters , the DA force , in Operation Eagle Claw , which was to make the actual attack on the occupied American Embassy in Tehran , would wear nondescript clothing until they reached the assembly point for the attack . At that time , before using any weapons , they would remove black coverings over American flags , putting them in compliance with having a proper insignia or uniform . In practice , any military force that operates at least partially out of proper uniform may be considered unlawful combatants . Formally , being out of proper uniform while approaching the target is considered a legitimate ruse of war , rather than spying , according to the language of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 . This continues the language of the Hague Convention of 1907 . Countries do not always honor this legal protection , as with the Nazi Commando Order of WWII , which was held illegal at the Nuremberg Trials . The status of guerrillas acting under a distinct chain of command , wearing at least a distinctive armband or other insignia , carrying arms openly while in combat , and complying with the laws and customs of war is that they technically are legal combatants , but this , historically , is respected even less than for regular military personnel making a clandestine approach to the target . Operational techniques . Techniques that minimize the chance of detection during infiltration , attack , and exfiltration are preferred . There is a blurry line between Special Reconnaissance units that never directly attack a target with their own weapons , instead directing air and missile strikes onto a target , and Direct Action , where the soldiers will physically attack the target with their own resources , and possibly with other support . Some special operations forces have doctrine that allowed them to attack targets of opportunity ; Soviet Spetsnaz , while on SR during a war , were expected to attack any tactical nuclear delivery systems , such as surface - to - surface missiles , that they encountered . Infiltration . Direct action teams , depending on training and resources , may enter the area of operations in many ways : Attack . To reduce their chance of detection , if the target could be destroyed by demolition charges , set on a delayed fuse so the team can exfiltrate before the explosion , this would be far preferable to having to fight their way to the target , place demolition charges , and fight their way out of the now - alerted target area . Skill with explosives and demolition , therefore , is a critical skill for DA units . They also may employ long - range sniper fire . Properly uniformed forces that kill other properly uniformed soldiers , firing from cover and never revealing themselves to enemy troops , are in compliance with the laws of war , but , especially if at least part of that operation was conducted out of proper uniform or insignia ( e . g . , by guerillas ) , the force is likely to be treated as unlawful combatants . Exfiltration . The team will leave the attack area using any of the means they used to infiltrate , although they will have to deal with the problem of an alerted enemy . Rather than going immediately to the means of exfiltration , they may have prepared a safe house or some other hiding place near the target , and make a delayed exfiltration . Examples of direct action missions . Norwegian and SOE attacks on German heavy water production . A series of DA missions during WWII involved Allied sabotage of German heavy water production in Norway . Operation Grouse successfully delivered , by parachute , four SOE - trained Norwegian soldiers . They were intended to act as an advanced reconnaissance and guide party for the next group of British personnel , who would actually carry out the demolitions at the Rjukan in the Telemark area of Norway . Operation Freshman , the next phase , was a disastrous failure . Two teams of Royal Engineers , carried in towed Airspeed Horsa gliders , either were killed in crashes , or captured , tortured , and executed under the German Commando Order . A followup , Operation Gunnerside , successfully parachuted in another six Norwegian soldiers . The combined teams were able to place demolition charges in the plant and make their escape . As is not uncommon for DA , a follow - up bombing mission completed the destruction of the plant . Prisoner of war rescue raids in the Philippines . The US command had become increasingly concerned that the Japanese intended to kill all prisoners , and already had been alerted to several killings . They executed multiple rescue raids . Documents and prisoner interrogation subsequently proved that the concern was fully justified . A combination of Filipino guerillas , Alamo scouts ( 6th US Army Special Reconnaissance force ) and US 6th Ranger Battalion paratrooper s carried out a successful DA raid on the Cabanatuan prison camp , destroying the Japanese guard force and freeing the prisoners . As is frequently done in DA , the infiltration was in phases : the guerillas were already in the area , but the Alamo Scouts came in early , and were guided to the target area by the local fighters . Reconnaissance of the camp provided information to finalize the final raid , which was deferred a day due to a larger enemy presence . The Rangers parachuted to a landing zone a distance from the camp , aware they would need to crawl to their final jump - off points . Another method often used in DA was to provide a distraction to the defenders , in this case with a low - level pass by a fighter aircraft . The guards were looking to the sky when the Rangers rushed the camp . After the guards were neutralized , the rescue force ran into another problem common in prisoner rescues : many prisoners were confused or so terribly afraid that they needed to be forcibly removed . Others were sick and unable to walk . Nevertheless , the rescue was successful . The Raid at Los Baños was also a success . Prior to the attack , Filipino guerillas had established clandestine communications with prisoners , and had precise information about the camp . This was a considerably larger operation for a larger number of prisoners , with a much stronger Japanese presence in the area . Operations began , as is often typical , with reconnaissance . 11th Airborne ’ s Provisional Reconnaissance Platoon jumped in and linked up with guerillas . Two days later , they marked the drop and landing zone s , and then killed the gate guards , as a guerilla regiment encircled the camp and attacked Japanese they could see . Next , a paratrooper company jumped into a marked drop zone , linked up with additional guerillas , killed the remaining guards , and secured the prisoners . The remainder of the paratroop battalion moved , by water using amphibious tractors , to a point 2 miles from the camp . They would land and then move to the camp , and take the prisoners onto the vehicles . A fourth phase protected the actual escape , diverting the remaining Japanese troops with a strong force including artillery and tank destroyers . Additional guerilla units formed ambushes to stop Japanese reinforcements from moving into the area . 2 , 147 former Allied POWs and internees were rescued . Two guerillas and two paratroopers were killed , and a small number wounded . Afterwards , the Japanese retaliated by killing 1 , 500 Filipinos , who were not involved in the raid and rescue . The Japanese commander was later convicted of war crimes and hanged . Israeli raid on Soviet radar used by Egypt . In 1969 , Israel became aware that Egypt was using an advanced Soviet radar . Originally , an air attack was planned to destroy it . The air attack was cancelled , however , and the mission assigned to helicopter - carried Sayeret Matkal special operations troops , who believed they could capture the radar , and return at least significant pieces . In Operation Rooster 53 , the raiders quickly suppressed the local security , and then began taking apart the radar to return critical components for technical intelligence analysis . After consultation between the ground special operations soldiers and the helicopter pilots , they packaged the entire radar and successfully carried it as external loads on their CH - 53 helicopters , operating at the edge of the helicopters ' lift capability Attempted prisoner of war rescue in North Vietnam . Operation Ivory Coast was a long - range US raid , in 1970 , to rescue POWs believed to be held in the Son Tay prison camp . The rescue force , of 56 Army Special Forces personnel plus Air Force special operations personnel , flew clandestinely from Thailand into North Vietnam , while Naval aircraft conducted diversionary activities . Although the ground force fought a sharp engagement with North Vietnamese and a never - identified , probably foreign unit , near the camp , they took no casualties ( other than a broken ankle from a hard landing ) . The prisoners had been moved to other camps , but the raiders successfully exfiltrated . Even though the raid failed in its specific purpose , its tactical execution was near perfect . It did have a significant strategic effect on the North Vietnamese , who became concerned about other raids behind their own lines and reallocated significant resources to internal security US prisoner in Panama rescued by Delta Force . During the 1989 invasion of Panama , one of the many objectives was to free Kurt Muse , an American suspected , by the Panamanians , of working for the CIA . Operation Acid Gambit was one of the few acknowledged operations by the US Delta Force . The DA force landed on Modelo prison at night , carried by light MH - 6 special operations helicopters . AH - 6 helicopter gunships suppressed potential snipers on nearby building , while AC - 130 fixed - wing gunships put heavy fire into other military buildings of the complex . The Delta operators secured the roof , and a team fought to Muse ' s cell , where they blew down the door and rescued him . During the exfiltration , one of the MH - 6 helicopters crashed , wounding everyone besides Muse . Taking cover , they signalled to one of the gunships , and were soon retrieved by an armored personnel carrier from the 5th Infantry Division extracted Muse and the retrieval team . Killing of Osama bin Laden . On 1 May 2011 , Red Squadron from the United States Navy ' s elite Naval Special Warfare Development Group , also known as DEVGRU , undertook a covert mission to capture al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden , acting on intelligence suggesting that he was located at a compound in Abottabad , deep inside Pakistan . Launching the mission from neighbouring Afghanistan , US helicopters flew across Pakistani airspace at very low altitude to avoid radar detection , and the DEVGRU operators were delivered to the courtyard of the compound , descending from ropes . After a brief firefight , bin Laden was located and killed by the US forces . The forces then retreated , taking bin Laden ' s remains with them , and they were back in Afghan airspace before the Pakistani forces could respond to the unknown disturbance . Bin Laden ' s body was immediately taken to a US Navy ship and buried at sea , to guard against the possibility that his grave could become a shrine or a focal point for unrest . The whole operation inside Pakistan was monitored from Washington in real time by the Obama administration , and lasted for 40 minutes in total . Subsequent revelations of the success of this bold and daring operation were to draw praise from across the political spectrum and from around the world . Physical destruction of propaganda facilities . Direct action has been used , or planned and not authorized , against radio and television facilities used for propaganda , or even for tactical coordination , in several operations . During the 1989 US invasion of Panama , special operations teams removed critical components from a television station , doing minimum damage . They did so , however , a day into the operation ; greater speed would have had greater effect In 1994 , during the Rwandan Genocide , part of the requests to UN military headquarters from the on - scene commander , MG Roméo Dallaire , included seizing a broadcast facility , which he considered the chief inciter of violence . He was told such action was outside his authority . Another multinational operation , NATO SFOR in Bosnia was operating under peace enforcement , not peacekeeping rules of engagement . It was cleared , in 1997 , to neutralize Serb radio - television facilities . It should be noted that taking control of television falls under the mission of information operations as well as direct action . In the section " Physical Destruction Operations in Task Force Eagle : The Seizure of Bosnian - Serb Radio / Television Towers , " a Center for Army Lessons Learned ( CALL ) analyst observed that after the Bosnian civil war , few broadcast media remained , but were extremely influential . " In May 1997 , the North Atlantic Council granted authority to SFOR to take actions against any media undermining the peace accords . " " During the early summer of 1997 , a power struggle erupted between the rival factions of the Bosnian Serb leadership . . . The struggle caused a split within state television , with journalists and editors from the Banja Luka studio deciding to split away from [ one faction ] direction after [ its leader ] manipulated a broadcast on SFOR searches in police stations . SFOR and OHR tried to exploit these developments to their advantage . . . " offering to keep the stations open if the faction reduced its inflammatory propaganda , but continuing to do so would result in military action . The propaganda continued , such as accusing SFOR of using " low - intensity nuclear weapons , " during the 1995 attacks on VRS positions around Sarajevo , Gorazde , and Majevica in 1995 . In another propaganda piece , Serbian Radio Television ( SRT ) showed alternating images of WWII German Army and present - day NATO forces while the commentator drew the comparison , likening SFOR soldiers to a Nazi occupation force . NATO officials have expressed concerns that such " venomous propaganda " threatens the safety of the NATO - led peace operations force . " Eventually , " under the authority of the GFAP and orders from the NATO Council and the Office of the High Representative , SFOR seized four SRT transmission towers , considerably reducing the footprint of SRT . The seizure of these towers was a physical destruction mission in that SFOR targeted the TV transmitter towers for neutralization , which is a condition achieved by physical destruction operations . . . On October 1 , 1997 , TFE units executed the physical destruction operation , securing the Bosnian - Serb television / radio transmitter complexes on Hill 619 in Duga Njiva , Hill 562 near Ugljevik , Trebevica ( near Sarajevo ) and Leotar . In pre - dawn raids , SFOR French , Polish , Scandinavian and American soldiers secured the sites and immediately fortified them against anticipated resistance . " " At Hill 619 , US Engineers operating Armored Combat Excavators ( M - 9 ACE ) constructed protective berms for the troops , and cleared fields of fire , while other engineers emplaced a triple - standard concertina barrier around the site . At Hill 562 , 200 Bosnian - Serb protesters staged a 15 - hour confrontation in which the protesters hurled rocks and attacked with clubs , damaging several vehicles .