Battle of Lang Vei The Battle of Lang Vei ( Vietnamese : " Trận Làng Vây " ) began on the evening of February 6 and concluded during the early hours of 7 February 1968 , in Quảng Trị Province , South Vietnam . Towards the end of 1967 the 198th Tank Battalion , Vietnam People ' s Army ( VPA ) 203rd Armored Regiment , received instructions from the North Vietnamese Ministry of Defense to reinforce the 304th Division as part of the " Route 9 - Khe Sanh Campaign " . After an arduous journey down the Ho Chi Minh trail in January 1968 , the 198th Tank Battalion linked up with the 304th Division for a major offensive along Highway 9 , which stretched from the Laotian border through to Quảng Trị Province . On 23 January , the VPA 24th Regiment attacked the small Laotian outpost at Bane Houei Sane , under the control of the Royal Laos Army BV - 33 ‘ Elephant ’ Battalion . In that battle the 198th Tank Battalion failed to reach the battle on time because its tank crews struggled to navigate their tank equipment through the rough local terrain . However , as soon as the PT - 76 tanks of the 198th Tank Battalion turned up at Bane Houei Sane , the Laotian soldiers and their families panicked and retreated into South Vietnam . After Bane Houei Sane was captured , the 24th Regiment prepared for another attack which targeted the U . S . Special Forces Camp at Lang Vei , manned by Detachment A - 101 of the 5th Special Forces Group . On 6 February , the North Vietnamese 24th Regiment , again supported by the 198th Tank Battalion , launched their assault on Lang Vei . Despite fighting with air and artillery support , the U . S . - led forces conceded ground and the North Vietnamese quickly dominated their positions . By the early hours of 7 February the command bunker was the only position still held by allied forces , but they were besieged by North Vietnamese soldiers above ground . During the entire ordeal , U . S . and indigenous Civilian Irregular Defense Group ( CIDG ) forces trapped inside the command bunker had to endure North Vietnamese harassment , which came in the form of fragmentation and tear gas grenades . To rescue the American survivors inside the Lang Vei Camp , a counter - attack was mounted , but the Laotian soldiers , who formed the bulk of the attack formation , refused to fight the North Vietnamese . Later on , U . S . Special Forces personnel were able to escape from the camp , and were rescued by a U . S . Marine task force . Background . North Vietnam . The task of capturing Lang Vei was entrusted to the 24th Regiment , Vietnam People ' s Army 304th Division , led by Colonel Le Cong Phe . The regiment was to be supported by the 2nd Battalion ( part of the 101D Regiment , 325th Division ) , the 2nd Artillery Battalion ( part of the 675th Artillery Regiment ) , one tank company ( part of the 198th Tank Battalion , 203rd Armored Regiment ) , two sapper companies , one anti - aircraft gun company , and one flamethrower platoon . One of the most important features of the North Vietnamese formation were the elements of the 203rd Armoured Regiment ; the " Route 9 - Khe Sanh Campaign " marked the first time the Vietnam People ’ s Army deployed its armored forces on the battlefield . In 1964 , soldiers of North Vietnam ’ s first armored unit — the 202nd Armored Regiment — was sent into South Vietnam without their T - 34 main battle tanks , because their prime mission was to learn enemy armor tactics in order to prepare for future missions . On 22 June 1965 , the North Vietnamese Ministry of Defense passed Resolution 100 / QD - QP , to establish the 203rd Armored Regiment , and Resolution 101 / QD - QP to create an Armored Force Command . For North Vietnamese commanders , the creation of an independent armored force command represented a significant milestone in the development of their army , because it enabled them to respond to the circumstances on the battlefield with a modern armored force . To prepare for their upcoming mission , the 203rd Armored Regiment undertook a series of combined - arms training with infantry and artillery units in different types of terrain , in order to operate in Vietnam ’ s rough mountainous and jungle conditions . On 5 August 1967 , the Ministry of Defense ordered the 203rd Armored Regiment to form a sub - unit , namely the 198th Tank Battalion equipped with 22 PT - 76 amphibious tanks , to bolster the strength of the 304th Division in South Vietnam . From their base in Luong Son , Hòa Bình Province , the 198th Tank Battalion began their arduous journey down the Ho Chi Minh trail under constant U . S . air - strikes . In January 1968 , the 198th Tank Battalion arrived on the field where it joined the 304th Division for an attack on the Laotian outpost of Ban Houe Sane . United States . The Lang Vei Special Forces Camp was placed under the control of the United States Army ' s Detachment A - 101 , Company C , 5th Special Forces Group , to train and equip locally - recruited Vietnamese through the Civilian Irregular Defense Group ( CIDG ) program . Detachment A - 101 had originally been established in July 1962 at Khe Sanh . In 1966 , Detachment A - 101 moved to its first site at an area near the village of Lang Vei , when the United States Marines took control of Khe Sanh as part of an American military build - up in South Vietnam ’ s northern provinces . However , the first camp at Lang Vei proved to be only temporary , when the North Vietnamese army attacked the camp on May 4 , 1967 . Even though the North Vietnamese attack had been repelled , damage to the camp was extensive . Since the original camp site had lacked good observation and fields of fire beyond the barbed - wire perimeter , the 5th Special Forces Group commander decided to move the camp to a more suitable area , about 1 , 000 meters to the west . The new camp , situation on Highway 9 and located about to the west of Khe Sanh , was completed in 1967 . In 1967 , Captain Franklin C . Willoughby assumed command of Detachment A - 101 at Lang Vei , which had a tactical area of responsibility of , and was one of nine operational CIDG camps in I Corps Tactical Zone . From Lang Vei , U . S Special Forces personnel worked jointly with a 14 - man South Vietnamese special forces contingent and six interpreters ; they were responsible for border surveillance , interdiction of enemy infiltration and assistance in the Revolutionary Development Program . To accomplish those tasks Willoughby had one Montagnard company , three South Vietnamese rifle companies and three combat reconnaissance platoons at his disposal . Early in January 1968 , Detachment A - 101 received reinforcements in the form of a Mobile Strike Force Company , consisting of 161 Hre tribesmen , along with six U . S . Special Forces advisors . Elements of this Mobile Strike Force Company operated from a fortified bunker about 800 meters west of the camp , which served as an observation post . During the day the Hre tribesmen of the Mobile Strike Force conducted patrols ; at night they took up ambush positions in the vicinity of the camp . Prior to the battle , Willoughby placed Company 101 of 82 Bru Montagnard tribesmen , on the northeastern flank of the camp , with the 3rd Combat Reconnaissance Platoon positioned just behind it . Company 104 was placed in the southern end of the camp ; Company 102 , consisting of 42 men , was positioned at the opposite end about 450 meters to the west , while the 43 - man Company 103 was positioned further south . The 1st and 2nd Combat Reconnaissance Platoons were placed at the northern and southern perimeters respectively , about 200 meters apart . Individually , the CIDG personnel carried M1 and M2 carbines with nearly 250 , 000 rounds of ammunition , and each company was also equipped with one 81mm mortar . Among heavy weapons , there were two 106mm recoilless rifles , two 4 . 2 - inch mortars and nineteen 60mm mortars positioned around the camp . For close - in support , the CIDG personnel were furnished with 100 disposable M - 72 anti - tank weapons . If necessary , Willoughby could also request support from at least two rifle companies from the United States 24th Marines Regiment based at Khe Sanh , along with artillery support from other locations within range . Prelude . Following the construction of the new camp site west of Lang Vei , Willoughby and his CIDG soldiers concentrated their efforts on strengthening the camp ’ s defenses , and they made relatively few contacts with the North Vietnamese . However , unbeknown to Willoughby , the North Vietnamese 304th Division had assembled on the battlefield , reinforced by the 198th Tank Battalion , with the following orders : the 66th Regiment was given the task of capturing Khe Sanh village , part of Huong Hoa District , to begin their " Route 9 - Khe Sanh Campaign " ; the 24th Regiment was ordered to destroy the enemy strongholds of Ban Houei Sane and Lang Vei ; while the 9th Regiment was ordered to destroy any reinforcements that may try to relieve those bases areas . From December 1967 , CIDG soldiers operating from Lang Vei began to report more frequent contacts with the North Vietnamese . By mid - January , U . S . military intelligence also reported movements of North Vietnamese formations across the Xe Pone River from Laos into South Vietnam . At the same time , the North Vietnamese began to harass the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp with mortar and artillery fire at least two or three times a week , and North Vietnamese patrols even probed the camp ’ s perimeters . On January 21 , 1968 , the North Vietnamese 66th Regiment began their attack on Khe Sanh village , seat of the local Huong Hoa government . At that time , Khe Sanh village was defended by the South Vietnamese Regional Force 915th Company and the U . S . Marines Combined Action Company Oscar . Throughout the night , the combined U . S and South Vietnamese forces held their position , but at the first daylight U . S . soldiers on the ground called in air strikes and artillery support from the Khe Sanh Combat Base . Fighting in and around Khe Sanh village continued throughout the day and into the following night , and was finally captured at 09 : 30 on 22 January . At 11 : 00am Colonel David Lownds ordered Delta Company , of 1 / 26th Marines Regiment , to relieve the defenders inside Khe Sanh village , but reversed his orders after second thoughts about North Vietnamese ambushes . Later , the South Vietnamese Regional Force 256th Company was destroyed by the enemies ’ 9th Regiment as they marched towards Khe Sanh village . The North Vietnamese 66th Regiment paid a heavy price for their victory with 154 killed and 496 wounded . On the evening of 23 January , one day after the fall of Khe Sanh village , the North Vietnamese 304th Division moved against their next target , the small Laotian outpost at Ban Houei Sane . Prior to 1968 , Laotian forces at Ban Houei Sane had played an important role in the war , watching North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam from a section of the Ho Chi Minh Trail running through Laos . The outpost was manned by 700 Laotian soldiers of BV - 33 ‘ Elephant ’ Battalion , Royal Laos Army , led by Lieutenant Colonel Soulang Phetsampou . As night fell , the North Vietnamese 3rd Battalion of the 24th Regiment began attacking the outpost . The 198th Tank Battalion , which was tasked with supporting the 24th Regiment , was delayed as their tank crews tried to navigate their PT - 76 amphibious tanks through the rough local terrain . However , confusion quickly descended on the Laotian defenders as North Vietnamese PT - 76 tanks turned up outside their outpost . After three hours of fighting , Soulang decided to abandon his outpost , so he radioed the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp and requested helicopters to evacuate his men and their families . However , as helicopters were unavailable , the Laotians decided to move eastward by foot along Highway 9 , in an attempt to reach Lang Vei just across the border in South Vietnam . Following the collapse of both Khe Sanh village and Ban Houei Sane , thousands of civilian refugees made their way towards Lang Vei village and the Special Forces Camp . With an estimated 8 , 000 non - combatants within a thousand meters of his camp , Willoughby radioed Da Nang for assistance . This arrived on January 25 in the form of food and medical supplies , along with a six - man Special Forces augmentation team . The Laotian soldiers of BV - 33 , with assistance from the new Special Forces team , were given materials to restore the old Lang Vei Camp , where they would remain until further orders were issued from Da Nang . The Laotian soldiers and their families brought with them stories of a North Vietnamese attack supported by tanks , which was a cause for concern for Willoughby , because Ban Houei Sane was only away across the border . On January 30 , Willoughby ' s fears were confirmed when a North Vietnamese deserter , Private Luong Dinh Du , surrendered himself to the U . S . Special Forces in Lang Vei . Under interrogation , Private Du revealed that tracked vehicles had positioned near his unit , but a planned attack was canceled twice for unknown reasons . Battle . In response to the threat posed by the North Vietnamese , Willoughby stepped up daytime patrols and night ambushes around his camp . On the afternoon of February 6 , Lieutenant Colonel Daniel F . Shungel — commander of Company C , 5th Special Forces — flew into Lang Vei from Da Nang as a diplomatic gesture towards the Laotian commander Phetsampou . At 23 : 30 , North Vietnamese artillery started pounding the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp , which covered the movement of the 24th Regiment and the 3rd Battalion , 101D Regiment . From an observation post above the tactical operations centre , Sergeant Nickolas Fragos saw the first North Vietnamese tanks moving along Lang Troai road , attempting to breach the barbed - wires just in front of Company 104 . He immediately went down to the tactical operations center and described what he had witnessed to Willoughby ; Shungel then advised Willoughby to concentrate all available artillery and air support on the North Vietnamese formation just in front of Company 104 . Soon afterwards , three North Vietnamese PT - 76 tanks were knocked out by a 106mm recoilless rifle manned by Sergeant First Class James W . Holt , but the barbed wire in front of Company 104 was quickly overcome by the combined North Vietnamese tank - infantry attack . Meanwhile , from inside the tactical operations center , Willoughby was busy calling in air and artillery support . He also radioed the 26th Marines Regiment at Khe Sanh to request the deployment of two rifle companies as part of the reinforcement plan , but his request was denied . Believing that the attack on Company 104 was the enemy ’ s main effort , Willoughby concentrated his artillery support there during the early stages of the battle . About 10 minutes after the artillery had begun firing , a U . S . Air Force forward air - controller arrived over Lang Vei along with a flareship and an AC - 119 Shadow gunship . Willoughby then requested air strikes on the ravines located north of the camp , on Lang Troai road , and the areas west of the early warning outpost manned by the Hre soldiers of the Mobile Strike Force . Despite the ferocity of the air strikes and artillery fire , the North Vietnamese managed to break through the Company 104 area , forcing the defenders to retreat into the 2nd and 3rd Combat Reconnaissance Platoon positions behind them . By 01 : 15 , the North Vietnamese had captured the entire eastern end of the Special Forces Camp and , from the Company 104 area , began pouring fire on Company 101 . At the opposite end of the camp , three North Vietnamese PT - 76 tanks rolled through the barbed - wire barrier in front of Company 102 and 103 . From point blank , North Vietnamese tank crews destroyed several bunkers with their guns , forcing the soldiers of Company 102 and 103 to abandon their positions . Those who survived the onslaught either retreated to the reconnaissance positions , or along Highway 9 , toward Khe Sanh in the east . About 800 meters to the west , Sergeant First Class Charles W . Lindewald , an adviser to the Mobile Strike Force , also reported back to Willoughby that the early warning outpost was in danger of being overrun . To save it , Lindewald directed artillery strikes on the North Vietnamese troops moving up towards his outpost , but he later died from a gunshot wound to the stomach as the North Vietnamese overran the outpost . At about 01 : 30 , Shungel and his hastily - organized tank - killer teams were busy engaging the North Vietnamese tanks that were roaming the Company 104 area ; on many occasions the M - 72 rockets fired by the Americans either missed completely , jammed , misfired , or simply failed to knock out the enemy tanks . By 02 : 30 , the North Vietnamese had broken through the inner perimeter of the camp , and began harassing the soldiers trapped inside the tactical operations center , which included Willoughby along with seven other Americans , three South Vietnamese special forces , and 26 CIDG soldiers . Above ground , American and Vietnamese soldiers who had escaped death or capture tried to escape from the North Vietnamese . From the team house , a group of four Americans and about 50 CIDG soldiers held a quick conference and decided that they would leave the camp through the northern perimeter , where there was no visible sign of the North Vietnamese . Without much difficulty , the Americans and the CIDG soldiers were able to make it through the barbed - wire barrier , but North Vietnamese soldiers on the eastern side of the camp had detected their movement and began firing on the group . Ultimately , only two Americans and about 10 Vietnamese soldiers managed to escape from the camp , taking refuge in a dry creek bed that offered some cover and concealment . At around 3 : 30 am , Willoughby made another request for the Marines at Khe Sanh to send reinforcements , but again his request was turned down . In an attempt to save the defenders at Lang Vei , Company C Headquarters in Da Nang tried to call for reinforcements from the Marines at Khe Sanh , but its request was also turned down . Finally , Company C Headquarters placed another Mobile Strike Force Company and a company - sized unit on standby alert in Da Nang , to be airlifted into battle as soon as helicopters were available . Back in Lang Vei , the North Vietnamese continued to harass the small force of soldiers still trapped in the command bunker with hand grenades , explosives and bursts of gunfire down the stairwell that led into the bunker . Shortly after 6 : 00 am , the North Vietnamese threw several fragmentation grenades and tear gas grenades down the stairwell , causing panic amongst the defenders . Then , a voice called down the stairwell in Vietnamese , demanding the American - led forces give up at once . Following a quick discussion with his CIDG soldiers , the South Vietnamese special forces commander led his troops up the stairwell to surrender but were killed by North Vietnamese soldiers , leaving behind their American counterparts . After the South Vietnamese had gone up , there was another short verbal exchange between the Americans in the bunker and the North Vietnamese in English , which was followed by another fire - fight when the Americans refused surrender . At 6 : 30 am , the North Vietnamese successfully blasted a hole on the northern wall , gaining direct access into the command bunker . However , instead of launching a direct attack on the last American stronghold , the North Vietnamese continued to throw grenades through the wall . At dawn , Sergeant First Class Eugene Ashley assembled about 100 Laotian soldiers of BV - 33 at the old Lang Vei Camp in order to launch a rescue operation and , if possible , recapture the Special Forces Camp from the North Vietnamese . Even though Phetsampou had initially refused to take part in the operation , the Americans held him to his earlier promise of providing them with troops . After Ashley had formed the Laotian soldiers into a skirmish line , he radioed the forward air - controllers overhead to direct strafing runs on the Special Forces Camp to soften up the enemy . Meanwhile , as General William C . Westmoreland learned of the North Vietnamese attack on Lang Vei and Lownd ’ s refusal to send a relief force , he ordered the U . S . Marines to supply enough helicopters to airlift a 50 - man strike force with the aim of rescuing the survivors . Subsequently , Colonel Jonathan F . Ladd — commanding officer of the 5th Special Forces Group — and Major General Norman J . Anderson , commander of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing — were directed to formulate a rescue plan . While Willoughby and his men waited for help in the command bunker , Ashley and his Laotian contingent cautiously entered the Special Forces Camp . The Laotian soldiers were evidently reluctant to advance on the enemy , and only inched forward when the Americans ordered them to do so . In their first attempt to break through North Vietnamese lines , Ashley and his men were beaten back . Undeterred , the American - led forces tried to penetrate North Vietnamese positions several times , and only stopped after Ashley was shot in the chest and later killed by an exploding artillery round . The Laotians , who feared the North Vietnamese , disengaged from the fight and fled . After Ashley ' s final attack had failed , Willoughby and his men made the decision to abandon their position . However , after Specialist Four James L . Moreland was mortally wounded , Captain Willoughby decided to leave him in the bunker , because the remaining Americans were in no physical condition to carry out the wounded man . Under the cover of U . S . air strikes , Willoughby and other American survivors ran towards the old Lang Vei Camp , where they were evacuated by U . S . Marines UH - 1 Hueys under the protection of a 50 - man reaction force . By 17 : 30 on 7 February , all known survivors had been evacuated to Khe Sanh . Aftermath . The fight for Lang Vei , though short in duration , was a costly endeavor for both sides . In their efforts to hold the camp , the combined Montagnard and South Vietnamese CIDG soldiers suffered 309 killed , 64 wounded , and 122 captured . Of the original 24 Americans who took part in the battle , seven were killed in action , 11 sustained injuries , and three were captured . Nearly all of the camp ’ s weaponry and equipment were either destroyed or captured by enemy forces . In contrast , for North Vietnam , the battle for Lang Vei marked the first successful use of armor in the war . In terms of human casualties , the North Vietnamese claimed to have lost 90 soldiers killed in action , and 220 wounded . On the evening of February 7 , though the fight was over for the military forces , the ordeal continued for the civilians who were caught in the fighting . An estimated 6 , 000 survivors from the old Lang Vei Camp that included South Vietnamese soldiers and their families , Montagnard tribesmen and the Laotians , followed the Americans and descended on the Khe Sanh Combat Base . However , when they reached the American compound , Lownds refused to give them entry because he feared that North Vietnamese soldiers may have mingled with the crowd . Instead , Lownds ordered his soldiers to herd the civilians into bomb craters , disarmed the local soldiers , and kept them under guard even though North Vietnamese artillery shells continued to rain down on the base . No food or medical aid was given to the civilians as they were kept outside the wires of the American compound . Frustrated by the lack of support and poor treatment by the Americans , Phetsampou complained that his people were being treated more like an enemy . On 10 February , Laotian civilian refugees started walking back to Laos along Highway 9 , because they feared for their lives and preferred to die in their own country . On February 15 , through arrangements made by the Laotian embassy in Saigon , the Laotian commander and his soldiers were flown back to their country on a Royal Laotian Air Force C - 47 transport aircraft .