USS Lagarto ( SS - 371 ) USS " Lagarto " ( SS - 371 ) , a " Balao " - class submarine , was the only ship of the United States Navy to be named for the lagarto , a lizard fish . Her keel was laid down on 12 January 1944 by the Manitowoc Shipbuilding Company of Manitowoc , Wisconsin . She was launched on 28 May 1944 sponsored by Emily Taft Douglas , Congresswoman from Illinois , and later United States Senator from Illinois , and commissioned on 14 October 1944 with Commander Frank D . Latta in command . Latta was a veteran of nine war patrols and holder of the Navy Cross , earned while commanding officer of . Floated high and dry in a floating drydock down the Mississippi River , among the islands and channels of which her captain had first “ felt the call of the sea ” as “ a mere youth , ” " Lagarto " departed New Orleans , Louisiana , on 12 November 1944 , for Panama , escorted by the submarine chaser . Releasing her escort on 15 November , " Lagarto " reported to Commander , Panama Sea Frontier , to begin her shakedown two days later . Captain John G . Johns supervised the boat ’ s training during the period between 20 November and 5 December 1944 . Sadly , during that period , on 3 December , Chief Machinist ’ s Mate Pat Cole died of coronary thrombosis while " Lagarto " lay at Saboya Anchorage , off Perlas Island , Panama . Clearing Balboa , Canal Zone , on 9 December 1944 , " Lagarto " reached Pearl Harbor on Christmas Day 1944 . The following day , she commenced a period of training ( supervised by Captain Jesse L . Hull for its duration ) and a special availability . The latter saw the installation of a second gun and replacement of the 20 - millimeter with two 40 - millimeter mounts , installation of additional topside ready - use lockers , eight topside mounts for . 50 - caliber machine guns , in addition to other internal work , including the alteration of the small arms magazine to accommodate additional ammunition stowage , bringing the boat ’ s total capacity to 220 rounds . Additionally , a Panama Bay sound test having revealed a “ singing ” port propeller , that was replaced . The special training and availability period concluded on 23 January 1945 . January – March 1945 . " Lagarto " , accompanied by , departed Pearl Harbor on 24 January 1945 , escorted initially by . Releasing their escort four and a half hours out , the two boats proceeded in company , conducting dives and drills daily and acting as targets for each other on alternate days . Ultimately , the pair reached the Marianas on 4 February , exchanging recognition signals with friendly planes as they neared Saipan . Escorted in by the infantry landing craft on 5 February , " Lagarto " moored in a nest alongside as she lay alongside in Tanapag Harbor . " Haddock " moored outboard . Tragedy struck the next day , however , when an automobile accident on Saipan resulted in serious injuries to two of " Lagarto " ’ s more experienced officers : Lieutenant Walter R . Shaw , a “ mustang ” ( commissioned from the enlisted ranks ) veteran of three war patrols , and Ensign Allen G . Brewington , who , like Shaw , was a mustang but a veteran of nine patrols , including one in " Haddock " for which he had earned the Silver Star . In addition , the mishap incapacitated three of " Haddock " ’ s officers , including Commander John P . “ Beetle ” Roach , her skipper and a Naval Academy classmate of " Lagarto " ’ s commanding officer . Consequently , Lieutenant Robert J . Williams ( five war patrols ) and Lieutenant , junior grade Walter B . Phelps ( four war patrols ) arrived by air from Guam , reporting on board " Lagarto " late in the forenoon watch on 7 February to replace Shaw and Brewington . Underway during the first dog watch on 7 February 1945 , escorted by the motor minesweeper , “ Latta ’ s Lancers ” ( Task Group 17 . 13 ) formed column — " Lagarto " , " Haddock " , and — and headed for the Bonin Islands to destroy “ picket boats ” in advance of the carrier strikes planned to be launched by Task Force 38 in mid - month . Releasing " YMS - 426 " at midnight , " Lagarto " decoded a dispatch a little over two hours into the mid watch on 8 February , however , communicating the sad tidings that Lieutenant Shaw had died ( “ His loss was a serious blow to the " Lagarto " , ” wrote Captain Willard J . Suits , Commander , Submarine Squadron 22 , “ and the submarine service . ” ) of the injuries suffered in the automobile accident on the 6th . At noon the same day ( 8 February ) , while " Lagarto " mourned her loss , Commander Latta informed the “ wolfpack ” that its being behind schedule would not permit coordinated practice firing . 12 February – 13 February . Entering the assigned patrol area on 11 February 1945 , “ Latta ’ s Lancers ” commenced searching for their quarry . A quarter of an hour into the first dog watch on 12 February , " Lagarto " sighted four B - 29 s ; contacting two over her VHF ( very high frequency ) radio equipment , she “ received [ the ] dope on [ the ] picket vessels ” they sought . likewise obtained contact data from the Superfortresses . Thus forewarned , " Haddock " obtained the first radar contact an hour before the end of the first watch on 12 February ; opening the range , she commenced tracking what proved to be the “ guardboats ” ( converted trawlers ) " No . 8 Kotoshiro Maru " ( 109 tons ) and " No . 3 Showa Maru " ( 76 tons ) , neither vessel underway . “ With excellent SCR communication , ” Commander Latta “ outlined [ the ] plan to [ the ] other skippers as easily as if we were in the same wardroom . ” He ordered " Sennet " to westward , maintaining contact with her SJ radar , while " Lagarto " kept in touch with " Haddock " in like fashion . With the coming of the mid watch on 13 February 1945 , the Japanese craft still lay - to , “ apparently not alerted . ” Consequently , Latta ordered " Haddock " to break contact and his boat formed a line of bearing on " Sennet " . " Lagarto " began opening to westward at 04 : 15 , and at 05 : 40 began heading in on the surface toward the last known position of " No . 8 Kotoshiro Maru " and " No . 3 Showa Maru " . With " Sennet " on the left flank and " Haddock " on the right , and " Lagarto " as guide in the center , the boats some apart , Latta planned to close to , then turn right about 50 degrees , to put the seas and wind in a most favorable position and still close the range , allocating " Sennet " the picket to the north , " Haddock " the one to the south ; " Lagarto " , meanwhile , would direct the fire to whichever vessel “ appeared to be offering the most opposition . ” At 06 : 20 on 13 February 1945 , " Lagarto " manned her battle surface stations , and opened fire with her number one gun 12 minutes later on the clearly unsuspecting enemy that lay “ nicely outlined against [ the ] red eastern sky ” distant . “ Japs began jabbering in high gear at 4 , 475 KCS ! ” Latta reported subsequently , as one of the guardboats managed to transmit a dispatch as chaos descended suddenly upon her : “ Gun attack by submarines in position 30 - 00N , 136 - 30E . . . ” " Lagarto " ’ s photographer seemed elated ( in a “ happy daze , ” the commanding officer reported ) at the apparently photogenic aspect of the action he was recording , repeating “ Oh boy , Oh boy ! ” No such elation seized the enemy , however , who determinedly fought back against his heavier adversaries , as the action progressed , with whatever caliber weapon lay at hand . " No . 8 Kotoshiro Maru " and " No . 3 Showa Maru " began turning to the northward , returning fire with what appeared to be approximately “ 40 - millimeter size ” weapons . " Lagarto " recorded “ numerous splashes within twenty yards ( 18 m ) of ship . . . ” " Lagarto " , followed by " Sennet " and " Haddock " , concentrated her fire upon " No . 8 Kotoshiro Maru " , the leading and northerly vessel as she appeared to be laying a smoke screen to obscure her smaller sister ; " Haddock " silenced the lead boat ’ s forward gun . Inside of ten minutes , the Americans ’ fire began to tell , as the first quarry began to burn ; smoke began obscuring her from view . " Haddock " , meanwhile , shifted fire to " No . 3 Showa Maru " , noting one particularly defiant Japanese sailor firing back with a rifle , while " Sennet " , being blanked out by " Lagarto " , swung left in a full circle and fell in astern of the pack commander ’ s boat , shifting her fire to " Haddock " ’ s target as well . As " No . 3 Showa Maru " began to burn , however , the smoke cleared away from the larger guardboat , revealing her still underway and full of fight . Sennet “ commenced hot pursuit ” of " No . 8 Kotoshiro Maru " . " Lagarto " likewise closed the range with the larger patrol vessel , opening up with her 40 - millimeter guns at ; by 06 : 45 , " No . 8 Kotoshiro Maru " ’ s guns had fallen silent and she wallowed in the sea , burning fiercely , while " No . 3 Showa Maru " likewise lay in extremis . " Haddock " , having expended the last of her ammunition , headed for the latter , lying riddled and burning , to finish her off , but " No . 3 Showa Maru " sank before the submariners could man her 40 - millimeter guns . " Haddock " circled the wreckage several times “ to see if we could pick up any Japs or material but neither could be found . ” " Sennet " neared " No . 8 Kotoshiro Maru " ’ s side “ to see if anything worth salvaging was left , ” but apparently found it “ too hot ” and pulled clear . Latta ordered her to sink the wreck . " Sennet " hastened " No . 8 Kotoshiro Maru " ’ s demise with “ a couple rounds of 5 " from close range . ” “ Latta ’ s Lancers ” having summarily disposed of the two guardboats ( there were no survivors from either Japanese vessel ) with no loss to themselves , " Lagarto " , " Haddock " , and " Sennet " formed a scouting line and continued their search . A little less than four hours later , a lookout in " Lagarto " spotted a patrolling " Betty " ( Mitsubishi G4M Type 0 land attack plane ) crossing astern , heading for " Haddock " ; " Lagarto " submerged ; " Haddock " spotted the Betty and did likewise ; both boats logged the presence of explosions that , fortunately , caused no damage . During the first dog watch on 13 February 1945 , a lookout in " Haddock " , despite poor visibility conditions , spotted two more guardboats lying - to about distant . Sending a contact report to her two pack - mates , Haddock maintained contact as the day went on . " Lagarto " exchanged calls with on the SJ , and ordered that boat to close " Haddock " . “ Our choice of direction is biased , ” Latta later explained , “ neither boat [ " Lagarto " nor " Sennet " ] having a sight in two days . ” At 22 : 49 " Lagarto " contacted " Haddock " by the SJ . “ When within range of good SCR communication [ such as had facilitated the destruction of " No . 8 Kotoshiro Maru " and " No . 3 Showa Maru " ] [ Latta ] outlined to both skippers a plan previously proposed by Commander [ George E . ] Porter [ Jr . , " Sennet " ’ s commanding officer . ] ” Since " Haddock " had expended the last of her ammunition in the engagement with the two pickets that morning , Latta ordered her to maintain contact while " Lagarto " and " Sennet " opened to the westward as before . Those two boats would strike at dawn with gunfire and " Haddock " would make a close range submerged torpedo attack . Ironically , " Haddock " ’ s skipper , Commander William H . Brockman , Jr . , had arrived at the same solution independently . 14 February . " Lagarto " began her easterly approach for the attack at 05 : 50 on 14 February 1945 . “ No likelihood of bright eastern sky today , ” her commanding officer later recounted , “ all heavy gray overcast and seas less favorable to gun firing . ” Going to “ battle surface ” 15 minutes later , " Lagarto " opened fire on the right - hand vessel at , swinging to the right to bring both of her mounts to bear , “ cold seas washing over [ the ] gun crews . ” The Japanese fought back more spiritedly than the day before . “ Return fire heavier than yesterday , ” Latta noted in his patrol report , “ but targets slower getting underway . ” " Sennet " reported numerous holes in her superstructure and one man wounded from the “ extremely accurate ” fire , but " Lagarto " emerged from the encounter unscathed . " Haddock " fired one torpedo at at one of the guardboats , but missed . " Lagarto " and " Sennet " , having expended the last of their ammunition , broke off the action by 07 : 00 and stood away from the scene of the action , leaving behind one guardboat , " No . 3 Kanno Maru " ( 98 tons ) , damaged . 20 February . Detaching to proceed to her assigned patrol area and to hers , " Lagarto " proceeded to carry out the remainder of her patrol . Outside of aircraft sightings on 17 , 19 February and 20 February , it seemed devoid of contacts until the forenoon watch on 24 February 1945 off Okino Shima . Identifying a “ RO - class submarine ” at 10 : 58 , " Lagarto " maneuvered into position and launched four torpedoes at 11 : 18 ; she logged the sound of what appeared to be an explosion on the target , and a second explosion that seemed to reflect the impact of the torpedo with an underwater cliff . Her quarry got off a report : “ Torpedo attack in position 32 - 41N . , 132 - 36E . Damage sustained . . . ” The target ’ s screws appeared to stop shortly after the explosion , followed less than ten minutes later by a “ heavy underwater explosion like [ a ] collapsed hull . . . ” The identity of " Lagarto " ’ s victim appears to have been the Japanese submarine " I - 371 " ( Lieutenant Kamijukoku Yasuo ) , that had departed Truk for Yokosuka on 31 January 1945 . However , the credit of the 880 - ton merchantman " Tatsumomo Maru " to " Lagarto " seems questionable in view of " Lagarto " ’ s only carrying out one attack on one target , reported as a submarine , in excellent visibility conditions . Sweeping the area with her periscope soon thereafter , " Lagarto " saw only empty ocean . Later that day , she heard “ distant , heavy depth charge explosions , ” prompting Latta to write : “ Hope " Haddock " is not paying for our attack . . . ” " Lagarto " submerged to conduct a patrol of Van Diemen Strait the following day , 25 February 1945 , and the heavy seas encountered rendered control difficult ; she encountered 8 – 10 degree rolls at depths of between periscope observations . She conducted a submerged patrol off Bungo Suido the next day , sighting a veritable parade of guardboats similar to those encountered and destroyed less than a fortnight before . She photographed the nearest one ( 2 , 500 yards ) and later , “ nothing following these lads , ” secured from battle stations . On the 27th , she encountered what she reported as a midget submarine without success . Ultimately , a few more fruitless days passed , after which she exchanged patrol areas with " Haddock " on 7 March . 13 March . Ultimately departing her patrol area on 13 March 1945 , bound for Subic Bay and a refit , " Lagarto " shaped course for a rendezvous with " Haddock " the following morning . At 06 : 12 on 14 March , " Lagarto " sighted a submarine through her high periscope , and began calling " Haddock " on the SCR . At 06 : 48 , however , " Lagarto " sighted another submarine on an opposite bearing . “ One of them , ” Latta later recounted , “ is probably enemy — but which ? ” Establishing voice communication with " Haddock " at 07 : 03 identified her as the first contact , so " Lagarto " advised her sister boat of the second — obviously enemy — contact . Hobbled by her number two main engine being temporarily out of commission , " Lagarto " ( “ " Haddock " has four engines to our three , ” Latta lamented ) directed " Haddock " to make an end - around and then attack once she had achieved a favorable position to do so . Tracking the enemy all morning allowed " Lagarto " to improve the bearing , identifying her as an “ I - class submarine . ” Decreasing the range , both American boats gained on the enemy , but “ " Haddock " found a few more turns and began to pull ahead rapidly . ” Latta wished Commander Brockman luck . Ultimately , however , the Japanese boat frustrated the Americans ’ designs , submerging and escaping both . “ After [ a ] final talk with Comdr . Brockman and mutual well - wishing , ” Latta wrote subsequently , “ [ " Lagarto " ] took departure and set course for previously assigned route to Subic Bay . ” " Lagarto " joined her escort , ( DE - 422 ) an hour into the morning watch on 20 March 1945 , and after anchoring for a sound test in Subic Bay , moored alongside the submarine tender ( AS - 16 ) to commence a refit . She returned from patrol “ clean and shipshape with a minimum number of material defects . ” April – May 1945 . " Lagarto " departed Subic Bay on 12 April 1945 , bound for the South China Sea , and received orders on 27 April to patrol the outer waters of the Gulf of Siam . A little under an hour into the forenoon watch on 2 May , ( SS - 318 ) exchanged calls with " Lagarto " by SJ radar . Later , an hour into the afternoon watch on 2 May , " Baya " sighted a Consolidated PB4Y - 2 Privateer and contacted him by VHF . While “ he had no dope for us , ” " Baya " ’ s skipper wrote later , the submarine informed the aviators of the proximity of " Lagarto " and ( SS - 323 ) . At 20 : 55 , " Baya " again exchanged calls with " Lagarto " ; less than an hour later , she slowed to take soundings , recording seven fathoms . She changed course to parallel the coast . 2 May . " Baya " ’ s SJ picked up four contacts at at 21 : 55 on 2 May 1945 ; her battle stations tracking party took their places . At 22 : 10 , " Baya " sent a contact report to " Lagarto " . Latta responded at 22 : 45 that his boat was in contact with a convoy , tracking it on a base course of 310° ( T ) , speed nine knots ( 17 km / h ) , running along the 5 to 7 fathom curve ( 10 m ) . There was one large ship , one medium , and two escorts , both of which appeared to be equipped with 10 - centimeter radar . Beneath a clear , dark , sky , " Baya " began her attack at through the flat sea , from off the convoy ’ s starboard bow , setting her torpedoes to run at four feet . Soon she began encountering SJ and 10 - centimeter radar interference “ all around the dial . ” Two additional contacts materialized — one turned out to be a large three - masted junk , the other proved to be " Lagarto " . " Baya " , however , soon had her hands full ; as her commanding officer later reported : “ Jap gunnery poor but plenty of it . Tracer s passing down both sides of the periscope shears and overhead . . . ” Both escort vessels — one of which " Baya " identified as a “ " Shiretaka " - type minelayer ” — gave a good account of themselves ; at 23 : 33 , " Baya " informed " Lagarto " “ that we had been driven off by gunfire . ” " Baya " ’ s skipper later ruminated : “ It is nothing short of a miracle that we came through so much gun fire without a single hit . ” “ We were in a continuous hail of lead , fire , and steel and sustained not a scratch . ” 3 May . The dogged defenders , who skillfully utilized searchlights and withering gunfire of calibers from to 25 - millimeter , elicited grudging admiration of the American submariners . During the mid watch on 3 May 1945 , " Baya " rendezvoused with " Lagarto " and their captains discussed plans . The latter ’ s proposed to dive on the convoy ’ s track to make contact at 14 : 00 , in the middle of the afternoon watch ; " Baya " would be 10 to further along the track , “ if no contact was made we [ " Baya " ] were to intercept at 20 : 00 at convoy ’ s possible 21 : 30 position . ” That having been arranged , the boats set course for their arranged stations . At 15 : 00 on 3 May 1945 , " Baya " sent the first “ of numerous contact reports to " Lagarto " . ” By 23 : 47 , “ having sent " Lagarto " contact reports almost half hourly with no receipt , ” " Baya " decided to go it alone . Again , however , the Japanese escorts drove off " Baya " when she attacked during the mid watch on 4 May , again saving their charges from destruction . Post - war examination of Japanese records revealed the most likely reason for " Lagarto " ’ s silence . One of the two escorts , the minelayer " Hatsutaka " , made an attack on 3 May against a submerged submarine in 30 fathoms of water at . Announced as “ overdue from patrol and presumed lost ” on 10 August 1945 , " Lagarto " was stricken from the Naval Vessel Register on 1 September 1945 . Discovery , 2005 – 2006 . In May 2005 , a group of private deep - sea divers , led by British wreck diver Jamie MacLeod , discovered the wreck in of water in the Gulf of Thailand . The wreck is mostly intact and sitting upright on the ocean floor . During the dive , a large rupture was discovered on the port bow area , suggesting a depth charge as the catalyst to her sinking . Also observed during the dive was an open torpedo tube door , with an empty torpedo tube behind it , suggesting the possibility that " Lagarto " fired off a torpedo shortly before her sinking . In June 2006 , Navy divers from the surveyed and photographed the wreck for 6 days . More evidence was seen that this is the " Lagarto " . Twin 5 " - gun mounts were seen on the forward and rear parts of the ship . " Manitowoc " was seen on the propellers providing a connection to the Manitowoc , Wisconsin shipyard . The pictures were sent back to naval archeologists for further review . After viewing the evidence provided by the " Salvor " divers , it was confirmed that this was indeed the " Lagarto " . Awards . " Lagarto " received one battle star for World War II service .