Words of estimative probability Words of estimative probability ( WEP or WEPs ) are terms used by intelligence analysts in the production of analytic reports to convey the likelihood of a future event occurring . They express the extent of their confidence in the finding . A well - chosen WEP provides a decision maker with an unambiguous estimate upon which to base a decision . WEP usage is not standard across the U . S . Intelligence Community ( IC ) . Some intelligence and policy failures appear to be related to an imprecise use of estimative words . A well - chosen WEP gives a decision maker a clear and unambiguous estimate upon which to base a decision . Ineffective WEPs are vague or misleading about the likelihood of an event . An ineffective WEP places the decision maker in the role of the analyst . The decision maker has to infer the prediction alone , thus increasing the likelihood of poor decision making or snap decision making . History . Intelligence . In 1964 Sherman Kent , one of the first contributors to a formal discipline of intelligence analysis , addressed the problem of misleading expressions of odds in National Intelligence Estimate s ( NIE ) . In " Words of Estimative Probability " Kent distinguished between ‘ poets ’ ( those preferring wordy probabilistic statements ) from ‘ mathematicians ’ ( those preferring quantitative odds ) . To bridge the gap between them and decision makers , Kent developed a paradigm relating estimative terms to odds . His goal was to " . . . set forth the community ' s findings in such a way as to make clear to the reader what is certain knowledge and what is reasoned judgment , and within this large realm of judgment what varying degrees of certitude lie behind each key judgment . " Kent ’ s initiative was not adopted although the idea was well received and remains compelling today . Policy and intelligence failures related to WEPs . An example of the damage that missing or vague WEPs can do is to be found in the President ' s Daily Brief ( PDB ) , entitled " Bin Laden Determined to Strike in US " . The President ’ s Daily Brief is arguably the pinnacle of concise , relevant , actionable analytic writing in the IC . The PDB is intended to keep the President informed on a wide range of issues , the best analysts write it and senior leaders review it . This , the " “ August 6 PDB , ” " is at the center of much controversy for the USIC . The August 6 PDB began with not only a vague warning in the title , but also continued with vague warnings : The PDB described Bin Laden ’ s previous activities . It did not present the President with a critically important clear estimate of Bin Laden ’ s likely activities in the coming months : Bush had specifically asked for an intelligence analysis of possible al Qaeda attacks within the United States , because most of the information presented to him over the summer about al Qaeda focused on threats against U . S . targets overseas , sources said . But one source said the White House was disappointed because the analysis lacked focus and did not present fresh intelligence . The lack of appropriate WEPs would lead to confusion about the likelihood of an attack and to guessing about the time period in which it was likely to occur . The language used in the memo lacks words of estimative probability ( WEP ) that reduce uncertainty , thus preventing the President and his decisionmakers from implementing measures directed at stopping al Qaeda ’ s actions The consequences of the 9 / 11 and the Iraq / WMD intelligence failures , the 9 / 11 Commission and the Iraq Intelligence Commission , were the movers of structural reform of the Intelligence Community . Although these reforms intended to improve the functioning of the IC , particularly with respect to inter - agency cooperation and information sharing , " they paid scant attention to improving the quality of analyses and intelligence writing " . There is a pervasive feeling that this improvement is needed . However , there seems to be resistance in the IC , due in part to habit and in part to the reality of politics and the understandable preference for the ‘ plausible deniability ’ that less precise jargon offers . Medicine . Physicians and clinical scientists face a very similar problem in obtaining informed consent for patients , where words such as " rare " or " infrequent " do have actual probabilities defined . Numerical information of this type , however , is rarely presented to patients . A representative guide for obtaining informed consent from people participating in social science or behavioral research , or of the potential risks of a medical procedure , suggests giving typical numerical chances of an adverse event , when words of estimative probability first are used . The guideline continues , For studies involving investigational agents , or experimental doses or combinations of drugs and / or treatments , subjects should be warned that there may be as yet unknown risks associated with the drug / treatment but that they will be advised if any new information becomes available that may affect their desire to participate in the study . Reforms to methodology . Estimative statements can be improved in four ways ; either by : Quantification of source reliability and analytic confidence . Michael Schrage , an advisor to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology ’ s ( MIT ) Security Studies Program , wrote , in a Washington Post editorial that requiring analysts to produce and include quantitative measures of source reliability and confidence along with their findings would reduce ambiguity . Yet Schrage also reported that former Interim Director of Central Intelligence John E . McLaughlin ’ s attempted to enact this at the CIA , but , like Kent ’ s initiative , it was not adopted . Former acting CIA director and longtime analyst John McLaughlin tried to promote greater internal efforts at assigning probabilities to intelligence assessments during the 1990s , but they never took . Intelligence analysts " would rather use words than numbers to describe how confident we are in our analysis , " a senior CIA officer who ' s served for more than 20 years told me . Moreover , " most consumers of intelligence aren ' t particularly sophisticated when it comes to probabilistic analysis . They like words and pictures , too . My experience is that [ they ] prefer briefings that don ' t center on numerical calculation . That ' s not to say we can ' t do it , but there ' s really not that much demand for it . " Stochastic analysis . Since combining quantitative , probabilistic information with estimates is a successful in business forecasting , marketing , medicine , and epidemiology it should be implemented by the intelligence community as well . These fields have used probability theory and Bayesian analysis as forecasting tools . Using probability theory and other stochastic methods are appealing because they rely on rationality and mathematical rigor , are less subject to analytical bias , and such findings appear to be unambiguous . As an opposing argument it is indisputable that few analysts or intelligence consumers have the stomach for numerical calculation . Additionally , Bruce Blair , Director of the Center for Defense Information , a proponent of quantitative methods for the IC , points out ; intelligence information from secret sources is often murky , and the application of advanced math is not sufficient to make it more reliable . However , he sees a place for stochastic analyses over a very long period , it “ points to a fairly slow learning curve that also challenges the wisdom of making preemption a cornerstone of U . S . security strategy . ” The reservations stated are significant : Mathematical and statistical analyses require a lot of work without rapid and necessarily commensurate gains in accuracy , speed or comprehension . Standardization . The National Intelligence Council ’ s recommendations described the use of a WEP paradigm ( Table 2 ) in combination with an assessment of confidence levels ( “ High , moderate , low ” ) based on the scope and quality supporting information : However , the NIC ’ s own discussion of this paradigm seems to undercut its chances of being effective : Intelligence judgments pertaining to likelihood are intended to reflect the Community ’ s sense of the probability of a development or event . [ . . . ] We do not intend the term “ unlikely ” to imply an event will not happen . We use “ probably ” and “ likely ” to indicate there is a greater than even chance . We use words such as “ we cannot dismiss , ” “ we cannot rule out , ” and “ we cannot discount ” to reflect an unlikely — or even remote — event whose consequences are such it warrants mentioning . Words such as “ may be ” and “ suggest ” are used to reflect situations in which we are unable to assess the likelihood generally because relevant information is nonexistent , sketchy , or fragmented . < br > This explanation is ‘ a half - step forward , half - step backward . ’ An agency - sponsored WEP paradigm " is " progress . However — an estimative statement that uses “ maybe ” , “ suggest ” , or other weasel word s is vague and symptomatic of the problem at hand — not its solution . In 1964 Kent railed against the “ restort to expressions of avoidance . . . which convey a definite meaning but at the same time either absolves us completely of the responsibility or makes the estimate enough removed . . . as not to implicate ourselves . ” Mercyhurst experience with standardized WEPs . The Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies conducted several experiments investigating the IC ’ s interpretation of WEPs ( results varied ) their use of WEPs in NIEs over the past three decades ] to determine the significant changes in the ways the NIC has been articulating its intelligence judgments over time . See Analysis of Competing Hypotheses Mercyhurst ’ s WEP paradigm reduces Kent ’ s schema to its least ambiguous words : Analytic Confidence and Source Reliability are expressed on a 1 to 10 scale , with 10 high . Weasel words . Table 4 contains a non - exhaustive list of common terms that are especially vague , known pejoratively as Weasel Words . Their use in estimative statements is almost certain to cause confusion ; they should be avoided at all costs .