Bombardment of Cherbourg The Bombardment of Cherbourg was a naval attack by ships of the United States Navy and Royal Navy on June 25 , 1944 , in support of United States Army units engaged in the Battle of Cherbourg . The Allied force attacked German fortifications near and in the city . They engaged in a series of duels with coastal batteries , and provided close infantry support . Allied reports agreed that the most effective naval gunnery was small ship direct fire support of infantry . While the bombardment force ' s heavy guns neutralized twenty - two of twenty - four assigned navy targets , none were destroyed ; German batteries were eliminated as a threat when the infantry captured them . Rapid infantry assaults ensured the guns could not be reactivated . When the city fell , the neutralized casemated guns , which the Germans could have turned inland towards advancing Allied troops , still pointed out to sea . Combined Task Force . Following the initial beachhead lodgment in Europe on D - Day , as the Allied push east stalled around at Caen , the 1st U . S . Army , VII U . S . Army Corps , was to turn west to capture Cherbourg , the major port facility in Normandy that was both defensible and within protected access of Allied bases in the British Isles . To support their advance over the Cotentin Peninsula and their planned assault on the German fortifications , on Jun 25 , 1944 , a bombarding force ( CTF 129 ) was organized under the command of Rear - Admiral Morton Deyo , USN . It was to suppress coastal batteries that the Germans might turn on advancing infantry , and support infantry calls for fire . The navy was additionally tasked to coordinate with the army air force bombers to interdict ammunition resupply and , as infantry closed , follow direction from AAF spotter planes . COMBINED TASK FORCE 129 , Rear Admiral Deyo , Commanding . " Group 1 " . Rear Admiral Morton Deyo , heavy cruiser " Tuscaloosa " ( flag ) , heavy cruiser " Quincy " , battleship " Nevada " , HMS light cruiser " Glasgow " and light cruiser " Enterprise " , six destroyers : " Ellyson " , " Rodman " , " Gherardi " , " Hambleton " , " Emmons " , and British 9th Minesweeping Flotilla . " Group 2 " . Rear Admiral C . F Bryant , battleship " Texas " ( flag ) , battleship " Arkansas " , five destroyers : " Barton " , " O ’ Brien " , " Laffey " , " Hobson " , " Plunkett " , and . U . S . Mine Squadron 7 . General Pete Quesada of IX Army Air Force flew Liberators and Avengers to supplement an additional British six - destroyer anti - submarine screen : " Onslow " , " Offa " , " Onslaught " , " Oribi " , " Melbreak " , " Brissenden " and British 159th Minesweeping Flotilla . Infantry fire - coordination was provided in the air and on the ground . P - 38s of the IX AAF flew from southern England for combat air patrol for the navy , in addition to fighter - bomber strikes and on - call close support of the infantry coordinated with artillery . General Collins , commanding VII Corps , arranged for shore fire control parties in infantry units as they approached German fortified objectives . Background . Once the Allied assault at Normandy was assessed as the primary invasion , German commanders sought to limit the lodgment preparatory to a counter offensive . To preserve naval assets , the Cherbourg - based German E - boats were transferred to Saint - Malo . Four destroyers out of Brest tried to make for Cherbourg to follow the E - boats , but they were sunk or disabled . The next German step was to deny the Allies use of the major port facility on the Cotentin Peninsula . By 14 June the Germans had begun to block , mine and demolish Cherbourg ’ s harbor . The violent English Channel storm that thrashed apart the artificial port Mulberry A raged until June 22 . While logistic movement ashore was temporarily crippled , their sustainability was in doubt . Cherbourg was the nearest major port , the Allies desperately needed it in their possession . From 18 June , the Cotentin Peninsula was sealed off by Allied infantry but the German line engaging the Americans was stabilized and the American advance stalled . Cherbourg held an additional 40 , 000 garrison under command of Generalleutnant Karl von Schlieben . Hitler believed that without Cherbourg , the Allied invasion would fail . He ordered Cherbourg made impregnable , awarding it “ fortress ” status . The American ground forces would lose over 2800 dead and 13 , 500 wounded to conquer it . Rear Admiral Morton Deyo began putting together a naval bombardment plan on 15 June . In ten days , he orchestrated a “ Sunday punch ” of notably ferocious naval gunnery . The Germans had armed the objective in and around Cherbourg with coastal guns in twenty casemate d batteries — fifteen were 150 - mm or greater , and three were 280 - mm . There were many 75 - mm and the feared 88 - mm guns , some of which could be trained inland towards advancing infantry . While planning went forward , a late June storm raged into the English Channel , scattering Deyo ’ s task force out to open sea and into British ports , causing them to reassemble in Portland , England . On the Cotentin Peninsula , the U . S . Army VII Corps advance , after some progress , was again stalled by entrenched German resistance . The proposed naval bombardment was complicated , because the advance of the 9th , 79th and 4th Divisions had brought them within a mile of the city . An army liaison officer was assigned as General " Lightning Joe " Collins ' ( VII Corps ) representative aboard the Tuscaloosa to expedite communications between different services and commands . The navy - only operation with a three - hour bombardment was shortened to ninety minutes . The targets to fire were limited to those chosen by the army . Battle groups , 1 and 2 . The task force was divided into two divisions , Deyo ’ s Group one was assigned Cherbourg , inner harbor forts and west towards the Atlantic . Group 1 was " Tuscaloosa " , " Quincy " , " Nevada " , HMS " Glasgow " and five destroyers : " Ellyson " ( flag ) , " Hambleton " , " Rodman " , " Emmons " , " Murphy " , and " Gherardi " . Admiral C . F . Bryant ' s smaller Group 2 was to take " Target 2 " , the " Battery Hamburg " . It was located near Fermanville , inland from Cape Levi , six miles east of Cherbourg . " Nevada " in Group 1 was to use its major battery to silence " the most powerful German strongpoint on the Cotentin Peninsula " . Then Group 2 would complete the destruction , and pass westward to join Deyo ’ s group . Bryant ' s Group 2 was composed of the aging " Texas " , " Arkansas " , and five destroyers . These were " Barton " ( flag ) , " O ' Brien " , " Laffey " , " Hobson " ( pennant ) , and " Plunket " . Minesweeping Squadron 7 and British 9th Minesweeping Flotilla were to swept lanes ahead of them . General " Pete " Quesada of IX Army Air Force provided fighter cover . Additional aircraft provided antisubmarine and combat air patrols . All planned long - range shots on seaward batteries were cancelled and only call fires were to be delivered . Inter - service negotiations made three batteries dedicated navy targets and added any batteries firing on the ships . The ships were to have spotter planes over Cherbourg targets . During ship approaches from 09 : 40 until 12 : 00 they were to fire only if fired on . NEPTUNE standard operating procedure for " Shore Fire Control Parties " ( SFCP ) called for nine per infantry division . A naval gunfire liaison officer was attached to each regimental fire control center . A naval gunfire officer was attached to each divisional headquarters in charge of all shore parties in his division . Every firing ship was provided with an army artillery officer to maintain current information about the position of Allied troops , and to determine whether to fire at any given target at the time . The army liaison officer decided the safety of firing at each target . " The ship itself controlled the fire . " The SFCP observed the fall of shot and corrected fire with a clock code . “ In all cases , it was the responsibility of the ship to determine whether any given shoot would endanger allied personnel or positions . ” This was possible because each bombarding ship was provided with an army officer who tracked positions of Allied forces ashore . Air spotters operated in pairs , one as a spotter , one as an escort , each capable of both missions . Each pair could communicate with one another and with the same ships . Every bombarding ship was provided radio capability to communicate with all varieties of aircraft radios . The third method of fire control involved a combination of air to ground to sea communication . " Army Air Observation " planes spotted for a control party on the ground . They relayed the information to the ships taking fire missions . Fire support areas . At 09 : 40 , Group 1 made landfall , about fifteen miles north of Cherbourg . Leading minesweepers cleared approach channels for both battle groups with Group 2 ’ s column steaming parallel several miles to the east . They arrived into the seaward fire support areas without being fired on or receiving any calls for fire . As noon passed at eight bells , the task force plodded towards the in - shore fire support areas at the sweepers ’ five - knot speed . German salvos from a village three miles west of Cherbourg at Querqueville began falling among the deployed minesweeper flotillas . Four British Fairmile C motor gun boat s began making a smoke screen for the approaching minesweepers . HMS " Glasgow " and HMS " Enterprise " with Spitfire spotters began returning fire on the German batteries firing on the minesweepers . In just thirty minutes , every minesweeper had been straddled with battery fire , though none were hit . Deyo recalled them , and they would lay - to out of range for the rest of the action . At 09 : 55 , Bryant ’ s Group 2 entered Fire Support Area 2 . Spotter planes for " Texas " and " Arkansas " were on target , ready to open fire , and operation plans called for " Nevada " to begin firing on Target 2 , " Battery Hamburg " . Deyo ’ s flash message surprised Bryant cancelling " Nevada " ’ s long - range bombardment , postponing his open - firing until noon at shore request or in self - defense , and Group 2 was to join Group 1 by noon American troops had overrun two smaller targets , spotters described them as “ surrounded by dead Germans ” . The strong currents off Normandy slowed the battleships behind minesweepers drifting off course in the current . " Arkansas " established radio contact with its shore fire control party , closed range to 18 , 000 yards and opened fire on Battery Hamburg with her antiquated fire control system . " Texas " could not connect with her shore party and so stayed in line with the minesweepers . " Arkansas " ' s salvos did no damage , so as Group 2 steamed well into the battery arc of fire , the German guns were able to let fly . The minesweepers were all bracketed . Destroyer " Barton " was holed with a ricochet dud from another battery that landed in her aft diesel room . She returned fire on the disclosed battery without air or shore spotting . All minesweepers were splashed with near misses . Destroyer " Laffey " took a dud in her port bow by the anchor . The damage control party pried it loose and tossed it overboard . Group 2 now began firing generally at " Battery Hamburg " , which was obscured by smoke . " Texas " was straddled by three rounds at her bow , swung starboard with full right rudder , and missed three shells over her stern . Maneuvering , she was straddled at intervals of twenty to thirty seconds by a newly uncovered battery just northeast of " Battery Hamburg " . The large battery itself was focusing on minesweepers and destroyers . Destroyer " O ’ Brien " was hit at her bridge , knocking out her radar , and so sailed out to sea through a smoke screen blind . Minesweepers and the three damaged destroyers were recalled , the destroyers firing their five - inch guns as harassing fire until out of range . At 12 : 20 , Group 1 destroyers laid smoke to protect the heavy ships in Fire Support Area 3 , then closed nearer to the shore to gain more effective fire on the Querqueville battery . German fire concentrated on HMS " Glasgow " and " Enterprise " , hitting " Glasgow " twice , but she was able to rejoin . After two hours of dueling , all four German guns were temporarily neutralized . Air spot followed the operations at the landing beaches . Pairs of Spitfires , including pilots off the heavy ships , were to loiter 45 minutes over their target . Only half were able to reach the area , the others were driven off by flak , turned away with engine trouble , or could not navigate to the target assignment . At 12 : 12 , the first call for fire came in from VII Corps shore fire control parties . Following their corrections , " Nevada " and " Quincy " took out the fortified target in 25 minutes . They continued with targets of opportunity for about three hours . " Tuscaloosa " was distributing its fire among targeted strong points directed by shore fire control , when flak hit its two Spitfires and they were forced to retire . In the first hour , " Ellyson " identified coastal battery fire nearby the town of Gruchy . " Glasgow " and her air spot silenced it with 54 rounds . Destroyer " Emmons " answered the fire on Fort De l ' Est on one of the harbor breakwaters , but by the time the target was silenced , a well camouflaged battery began walking fire closer to the ship operating from a range of 15 , 000 yards . " Rodman " dropped smoke , and " Emmons " withdrew . Bombardment extension . At 13 : 20 , ten minutes before the agreed to ending of the bombardment , Admiral Deyo , seeing that the mission was not accomplished , signaled VII Corps , ” Do you wish more gunfire ? Several enemy batteries still active . ” The Querqueville battery had come to life again and taken the " Murphy " under fire , straddling it four times in twenty minutes . " Tuscaloosa " came to her aid , scoring a direct hit bringing flames . With her deck covered with splinters and splashes from near misses , " Murphy " dodged behind a smoke screen . " Ellyson " and " Gherardi " joined in . " Quincy " fired for half an hour , then the " Nevada " silenced the battery again . Later , as the task force withdrew , the battery opened fire again . More than its endurance , the task force upper decks noted its long day of near - misses . The battery near Gruchy came to life again . HMS " Glasgow " and " Rodman " returned fire . The batteries in and around Cherbourg seemed able to fire accurately at any ship within 15 , 000 yards . " Rodman " pulled out of range . Navy men had been assigned to army units as shore party spotters to direct all fire more than 2 , 000 yard inland . The infantry support fires could then safely reach along roads far inland , blowing German tanks into “ scrap ” . Pillboxes were “ powdered ” and gun emplacements “ tossed skyhigh ” . German shore batteries were in turn laying well placed fire , churning the seas with near misses bracketing Deyo ’ s ships . In Group 2 , making westward to join Group 1 , " Texas " was radically steering to dodge near - misses and straddles when one of the German 280 - mm shells struck the hull and lodged alongside a sailor ' s bunk , but it too was a dud . At 13 : 35 , one of the large caliber guns in Battery Hamburg was knocked out by " Texas " , and she and " Arkansas " continued through the afternoon firing at " Battery Hamburg " and another nearby battery . When they strayed back into the arc of fire , " Battery Hamburg " ’ s three remaining guns made " Texas " a target , and a nearby 105 - mm battery acquired " Arkansas " . Both ships maneuvered , the two remaining destroyers made smoke , and all escaped with no damage . At 14 : 02 VII Corps replied to Deyo , “ Thanks very much — we should be grateful if you would continue until 15 : 00 . ” VII Corps was on the verge of breaking into Cherbourg ’ s city streets . Fort des Flamand at the eastern end of the inner breakwater , had eight dual - purpose 88 - mm guns holding up a regiment of the 4th Division . Shore fire control called for naval support , and " Hambleton " began firing , but large - caliber rounds from Battery Hamburg began to drop around her at 14 , 250 yards . She retired , then " Quincy " was able to silence the target fort . " Nevada " turned from Battery Hamburg and joined in the attack on targets on the west side of Cherbourg that might have turned landward on advancing infantry . For over twenty minutes she was repeatedly straddled , including two that holed her superstructure and another that missed as close as 25 feet . An hour later , following General Collin ’ s new deadline of 15 : 00 , Admiral Deyo ordered cease fire and began withdrawing from the bombardment area . Group 2 headed back to Portland , England , at 15 : 01 . Flagship " Tuscaloosa " took another call for fire . The target was 75 - mm field guns in casemates , on the dock at the entrance to Cherbourg ' s naval arsenal . " Tuscaloosa " continued firing as she maneuvered out to sea , at 25 , 000 yards and again out a further mile and a half with accuracy . Outcomes . General Collins wrote to Admiral Deyo on 29 June , “ Naval bombardment of the coastal batteries and the covering strong points around Cherbourg . . . results were excellent , and did much to engage the enemy ’ s fire while our troops stormed into Cherbourg from the rear . ” The army liaison officer reported after inspection of the port defenses that guns after bombardment could not be reactivated , and those that could have been turned landward were still pointed out to sea when the city fell . While prisoner reports speak of terror from naval gunnery , “ there is no evidence that naval gun fire caused great destruction to enemy guns . Naval gunfire neutralized rather than destroyed enemy batteries . ” Long periods of silence from German gun positions was considered the result of the morale impact on their gunners , not destructive effect on the guns . Infantry capturing German batteries is what eliminates their threat . “ All Navy and Army reports on the subject agree that the most effective naval gunnery is small ship direct fire support of infantry . The volume of fire was notable and of consequence . Supreme Commander Eisenhower wrote , “ The final assault was materially assisted by heavy and accurate naval gunfire . ” Commander of Cherbourg , General von Schlieben reported to Feldmarschall Rommel , that further resistance had been useless due in part to “ heavy fire from the sea . ” Admiral Krancke recorded for his war diary , that one contributing cause to Cherbourg ’ s fall was “ naval bombardment of a hitherto unequalled fierceness . ” German reports of the effect of naval bombardment was broadcast over the German telegraph service in the “ German Military Journal ” . The Allied naval fire curtain was one of their trump cards . In a crisis , it was better aimed and it could be sustained on target . The functions of the artillery arm are provided by the combined fleet . Even “ smaller vessels ” have firepower that cannot be underestimated : “ a torpedo boat . . . had the firepower of a howitzer battery , a destroyer that of a Battery of Artillery . ” A cruiser is compared to a regiment of artillery . Battleships of 38 - 40 - cm guns have no equal in land warfare , possible only “ by an unusual concentration of very heavy batteries . ” The German report said that Allied troops had a “ particular advantage ” from ship formations that provided the mobility to concentrate artillery on any point on the battlefield , and then change their placement to whatever the fighting required . The Anglo - American naval forces made “ . . . the best possible use of this opportunity . ” A single coastal battery could come repeatedly under “ . . . quite extraordinary superior fire - power . ” A multiple type formation of warships would concentrate fire at batteries when they were the focal point of combat , creating an “ umbrella of fire ( Feuerglocke ) . ” Field - Marshal von Rundstedt assessed Allied naval gun fire support as “ The flexible and well directed support of the land troops . . . ranging from battleship to gun boat . . . as quickly mobile , constantly available artillery , at points . . . as defense against our [ German ] attacks or as support for [ Allied ] attacks . ” They are skillfully directed by air and ground spotters . Their naval gunnery has a high rapid - fire capacity at range . Nevertheless , World War II U . S . naval doctrine was modified . More attention was paid to the requirement of long range effective fire . Had not so many of the German shells been duds , Admiral Bertram Ramsay , Naval Commander in Chief of the Allied Naval Expeditionary Force observed , “ they might well have inflicted heavy damage to our ships at the relatively close range . . . ” Before June 1944 , the United States Navy had experience in both the Mediterranean and the Pacific . It pointed to a conclusion that the upgraded modern fire control systems on U . S . ships allowed for them to close with and defeat coastal batteries at will . But in the Mediterranean the shore batteries had not been “ well and resolutely ” served . Japanese coast defense gunners were inadequately trained . Morison ’ s conclusion was that , even with modern directors for naval gunnery , a casemated gun is “ exceedingly difficult for a rapidly maneuvering warship to destroy with a direct hit , although a shower of salvos around the coast defense position will silence the guns temporarily . ” Admiral Deyo ’ s after action report recommended that long - range bombardment with plane spot would be required to silence casemated batteries . Either good air spot or shore parties are required for effective naval bombardment , especially when strong currents add to the navigational problems of a task force under accurate shore battery fire . The destroyers . Task Force 129 had ten destroyer s listed in its assigned ships from five divisions , DESDIV 19 , 20 , 34 , 119 , 13 , out of four squadrons , DESRON 10 , 17 , 60 , 7 . Additional destroyers noted below were among those that rendered supporting fire to the VII Corps in their drive up the Cotentin Peninsula . They also bombarded coastal batteries nearby Cherbourg in the three days prior to Task Force 129 . An accounting of where the other ships in a division were and why they could not be there , can show a glimpse of the chaos and loss of war , even amidst a “ success ” . The discussion in this section is based on the squadron organization , destroyer class descriptions , and ships histories found at the Destroyer History Foundation webpage and the Navy ’ s “ Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships ” online . In the World War II U . S . Navy destroyer organization , a captain commanded a destroyer squadron ( DESRON ) composed of two divisions . Destroyer division ( DESDIV ) composition could change rapidly and divisions did not always operate together . Ships composing divisions are listed in hull - number order . Other sources may order ships in a division by the seniority of their commanders . The “ commodore ” of a squadron flies his “ flag ” from his flagship . The division commander flies his “ pennant ” . The commanders carried their flags with them when they moved from ship to ship . If the flag in a division is unknown for 25 June 1944 , it is left attached to the lowest hull number . Ships with one asterisk have recently seen extraordinary service , machinery breaks down , men need rest in port ; they are given alternative screen and escort duty . Ships with two asterisks are lost or under repair , see notes . Task Force 129 included the ten destroyers noted in bold . Ships with ( flag ) or ( pennant ) in the task force would have had an additional senior officer with seamanship , command and combat experience on the bridge during action . DESRON 10 ( I ) . After Bristol , the nine low - numbered 1 , 630 - tonners ( Bristol class ) . This was the first squadron of fiscal year 1941 ships commissioned . Another citation records that 1 , 630 - ton Gleaves - class ships were assigned to squadrons 10 – 19 . This is not to be confused with the late - war re - establishment of DESRON 10 ( II ) of 2 , 200 - ton destroyers , which was made up of either of the short hull ( Sumner - class ) or long hull ( Gearing - class ) destroyers . DESRON 17 . 1 , 630 - ton Gleaves - class ships were assigned to squadrons 10 – 19 . DESRON 60 The first five Sumner class 2 , 200 - tonners from Bath and the first four from Federal , beginning with Squadron 60 , each with two divisions . DESRON 7 made up of the eight ships authorized in fiscal year 1938 plus Plunkett . The squadron had a history from September 1920 , composed of 15 flush - deckers of 1 , 200 tons in Charleson , SC , reactivated in April 1939 at San Diego . 1940 , Gleaves and Benson class 1 , 630 ton destroyers replaced the old to form an 11 ship squadron . See also . Task Force 129 , Group One ( incomplete ) < br > , Adm . Deyo flag , commanding , , " Baltimore " - class cruiser , , " Nevada " - class battleship < br > , " Southampton " - class light cruiser , , " Emerald - class " light cruiser < br > Task Force 129 , Group Two ( incomplete ) < br > , " New York " - class battleship , Adm . Bryant flag , , " Wyoming " class battleship < br > Anti - submarine screen < br > , " O " - class destroyer , , , , , " Hunt " - class destroyer , Type III , , " Hunt " - class destroyer Type IV