Andrei Pervozvanny - class battleship The " Andrey Pervozvanny " class were a pair of predreadnought battleship s built in the mid - 1900s for the Baltic Fleet of the Imperial Russian Navy . They were conceived by the Naval Technical Committee in 1903 as an incremental development of the s with increased displacement and heavier secondary armament . Work on the lead ship , " Andrey Pervozvanny ( Saint Andrew ) " , commenced at the New Admiralty , Saint Petersburg in March 1904 ; " Imperator Pavel I " trailed by six months . The disastrous experiences of the Russo - Japanese War led to countless redesigns , change orders and delays in construction . After the completion of " Andrey Pervozvanny " its builders identified seventeen distinct stages of her design . " Andrey Pervozvanny " was launched in October 1906 but subsequent alterations delayed completion until 1911 . Almost all of her hull was armored , albeit thinly ; redesign and refinement of protective armor continued until 1912 . The ship ' s artillery mixed novel quick - firing long range 8 - inch guns with obsolescent 12 - inch 40 caliber main guns . The " Andrey Pervozvanny " - class battleships became the only battleships of the Old World fitted with lattice mast s , which were replaced with conventional masts at the beginning of World War I . The imposing ships , the largest in the Russian Navy until the completion of the dreadnoughts , were obsolete from the start : by the time of their sea trials the Royal Navy had already launched the super - dreadnought s . In the first year of World War I " Andrey Pervozvanny " and " Imperator Pavel I " comprised the battle core of the Baltic Fleet . For most of the war they remained moored in the safety of Sveaborg and Helsingfors . Idle , demoralized enlisted men subscribed to Bolshevik ideology and on took control of the ships in a violent mutiny . The battleships survived the Ice Cruise of 1918 , and " Andrey Pervozvanny " later ruthlessly gunned down the Krasnaya Gorka fort mutiny of 1919 . After the Kronstadt rebellion the Bolshevik government lost interest in maintaining the battleships , and they were laid up in November – December 1923 . Design . Choice of strategy . Construction of the five " Borodino " - class battleships marked the end of the 1881 shipbuilding program of the Imperial Navy . In 1902 the Naval Technical Committee ( NTC ) chaired by Vice Admiral Fyodor Dubasov opened preliminary hearings on the new 20 - year shipbuilding program . Numerical part of the program , drafted by Nikolai Essen , was accepted without much discussion . Nicholas II approved financing , but the NTC had no design proposals for the new ships , and no firm ideas about their combat tactics and performance targets . In January 1903 the NTC reviewed three possible strategies for the new battleships . The first relied on building more s , which were perceived as the state of the art in naval architecture . The second strategy called for enlarging the " Borodino " , improving its protection and stability , and replacing 6 - inch secondary armament with 8 - inch quick - firing guns . The third strategy proposed development of a radically new battleship type , superior to any foreign adversary . This proposal could potentially evolve into an all - big - gun battleship , but the NTC ruled it out from the start . The Navy tacticians saw no need in increasing the number of 12 - inch guns : they were perceived as a coup de grâce weapon that should be engaged " after " the quick - firing secondary artillery had reduced the enemy to a floating bonfire . As - is copying of the " Borodino " class was deemed unsafe : " Borodino " and her sister ships , then nearing completion , turned out overloaded by at least six hundred tons . The NTC conservatively chose the middle road : enlarging the " Borodino " . Dubasov parted with ambitions and approved construction of a perfectly conventional battleship displacing 16 , 500 tonnes , armed with four 12 - inch main guns and 8 - inch secondary guns . Nicholas II , determined to expand the Navy , endorsed Dubasov ' s choice without reviewing it in depth of which he was not capable anyway . Displacement of 16 , 500 tonnes effectively became a law , a universal constraint that ruled over any engineering and tactical considerations and that was never met in practice owing to poor design and project management . Objections and compromise . After obtaining the tsar ' s signature Dubasov and Pavel Tyrtov discussed the configuration with chief executives of state - owned shipyards . The conference agreed to arm the new ships with proven but already obsolescent 12 - inch / 40 - calibre main guns and 8 - inch / 50 - calibre secondary guns that had yet to be designed and built . Upgrade of the main guns to 50 - calibre barrel length was not even considered : Tyrtov made it clear that the matters of armament are clearly subordinate to keeping displacement within the limit . In March 1903 Tyrtov agreed to remove the forecastle and lower the freeboard , sacrificing seagoing to the displacement constraint . Gun placement was simplified , and became inferior to the " Borodino " class . In March – April 1903 the NTC ' s consultants reviewed the drafts of the hull and found it to be superior to " Navarin " and " Poltava " but inferior to the original " Borodino " . Dmitry Skvortsov ( 1859 – 1910 ) , the builder of " Borodino " , warned about unacceptable drag of the proposed shape . Alexey Krylov , then chief of the Navy ' s ship model basin , performed towed scale model test and came to the same conclusion . Krylov , who was preparing for a sea voyage to Port Arthur to pursue his own academic interests , did not blow the whistle . After the October Revolution Krylov wrote that the hull of " Andrey Pervozvanny " was so poorly shaped that it required twice as much engine power as more efficient hulls , but in 1903 he kept this conclusion to himself and submitted a critical but very carefully written report . Krylov ' s planned departure forced the NTC to hasten official approval of the drafts . Their presentation on ended in an embarrassment : the NTC intended to award the contract for one of two new ships to Baltic Shipyard , but did not even inform its master builder Sergey Ratnik about the project ' s existence . Ratnik , the builder of " Alexander III " and " Suvorov " , was confident that the new design was inferior to its predecessors . It had no displacement reserve compared to 246 tonnes of " Borodino " class and the British standard of at least 4 % of standard displacement . The NTC overruled his objections and approved the draft for construction . In the end of July Ratnik appealed to the NTC again , arguing that the mechanisms and systems overlooked by the designers will add five to six hundred tons to the ship ' s weight . The NTC dismissed his complaint and proceeded with the flawed design . In line with Russian practice of the period , it was a collective work signed off by a ring of designers and bureaucrats . No one dared to take the lead and assume full responsibility . Construction . Commencement . In August 1903 the NTC finalized its drafts with only marginal improvements . On the Ministry of the Navy awarded construction contracts to the New Admiralty of the Port of Saint Petersburg ( " Andrey Pervozvanny " ) and Baltic Shipyard ( " Imperator Pavel I " ) . The new projects were officially christened on August 22 . " Andrey " automatically assumed the role of the lead ship , Baltic Shipyard was instructed to trail behind the New Admiralty . Admiral Rodionov , chief of the Department of Construction , estimated that the lead ship could be launched in the spring of 1906 and be ready for a shooting practice in the spring of 1907 . By the end of 1903 this schedule was already broken by a confusion over working drawings . Both master builders ( Skvortsov for the New Admiraly and Ratnik for Baltic Shipyard ) complained about poorly executed drafts . Ratnik noticed that the bilge keels added by the NTC did not fit into existing drydocks of his yard . He again alerted the admirals of the inevitable overload and demanded redesign of belt armor to match the expected rise in waterline level . According to Skvortsov , the proposed technology called for unnecessary breaks in construction schedule because deck armor could only be ordered and made to measure " after " completion of underlying structure . He proposed replacement of armor deck with softer steel which could be cut on site , saving a whole year of idle time , but the NTC insisted on following the original plan . Actual work on " Andrey Pervozvanny " commenced on March 2 , 1904 ; work in " Imperator Pavel I " commenced on October 14 , 1904 . Contracts for steel were awarded to Putilov ( structural steel ) and Izhorsky Plant ( armor plates ) . Coal - firing boilers and steam engines were ordered from the Franco - Russian Plant of St . Petersburg . In an inexplicable twist of the NTC bureaucracy , engines for two sister ships were ordered to different specifications . They turned out extremely inefficient compared to the French engines of " Tsesarevich " . By this time all active admirals who could intervene and call the NTC to answer were either killed in the opening stages of the Russo - Japanese War or heading to the Battle of Tsushima . Skvortsov continued to fight the NTC chaos alone . In October – December 1904 he persuaded the NTC to replace practically useless hand - cranked firefighting pumps with Worthington steam pumps He argued that the arrangement of bilge pump s of different capacities , favored by the NTC , was inadequate to the purpose , and persuaded the designers to use standard 500 tonne - per - hour pumps . These small improvements did not change the already obsolete design , and construction proceeded at a slow pace , frequently interrupted by redesign proposals , change order s , rework and inevitable delays . After the completion of " Andrey Pervozvanny " its builders identified seventeen distinct stages of its design . In line with Russian tradition " Andrey Pervozvanny " was formally laid down in May 1905 , after more than a year of construction work . The ceremony coincided with the beginning of a six - month hiatus ( May – October 1905 ) caused by the 1905 Russian Revolution . It became the last of its kind for a whole generation of naval bureaucracy : none of the admirals present ever laid down or launched another ship . Dubasov became the Governor - General of Moscow , and de facto retired after an assassination attempt in April 1906 . Admiral Kuzmich , the newly appointed Chief of the Port of Saint Petersburg , was killed by terrorists in May 1906 . General Admiral Grand Duke Alexey , Chief of the Ministry of the Navy Fyodor Avelan and Chief Inspector of the NTC Nikolay Kuteinikov , blamed for the losses of the Russo - Japanese War , retired in the summer of 1905 . Baltic Shipyard cancelled the laying - down ceremony of " Imperator Pavel I " altogether : officially , " Pavel " was laid down and launched on the same date , . Influence of the Russo - Japanese War . The sinking of " Petropavlovsk " in April 1904 , which was blamed on a detonation of its naval mine magazines , compelled the NTC to reconsider the use of mines . Russian battleships carried their own stock of naval mines to protect themselves at anchorage , even when accompanied by minelayers and destroyers ( as was the case with " Petropavlovsk " ) . The NTC hastily stopped the practice , banning mines from new ships and demanding " safe handling " from the rest of the Navy . Later the NTC banned mines from the battleships altogether ; the function was delegated to cruisers and destroyers . In December 1904 the NTC also agreed to strip the new battleships of their stern torpedo tubes , but kept the bow and side - firing tubes . In the summer of 1905 torpedo armament was reduced to only two side - firing tubes . In 1905 the NTC flooded Skvortsov with a chain of conflicting and poorly formulated change orders influenced by war - time experience . The war demonstrated the uselessness of keeping small - calibre guns on capital ships ; in May 1905 the NTC removed the 47 - mm guns but instead added equally useless 75 - mm guns in an upper deck casemate . The 75 - mm guns were replaced with 120 - mm guns in another round of redesign . Concentration of larger guns in the central citadel compelled the NTC to redesign the middle 8 - inch guns , moving them one deck above their original placement . Another war reality , loss of control after direct hits against the bridge or the conning tower , caused the addition of a second conning tower . All hull porthole s were replaced with solid armor , making " Andrey Pervozvanny " and " Imperator Pavel I " the least comfortable even for commissioned officers . These changes inevitably added more steel to an already overloaded ship ; the NTC compensated overload with " optimization " of turret armor , further delaying completion . By September 1905 all involved parties realized that the project had no chances of meeting the 16 , 500 maximum displacement , worse , the overload increased hull draft above the maximum depth of the Suez Canal . The NTC urgently commissioned Krylov to redesign the hull , making it wider but shallower . This theoretical work was still in progress when the NTC received the specifications for the new British s and the . The NTC considered arming " Andrey Pervozvanny " with 10 - inch secondary artillery along the lines of " Lord Nelson " but eventually shelved the proposal . Armor . In June 1905 the NTC finally approved Skvortsov ' s proposal to decrease deck armor , saving 130 tonnes of gross weight . This was only a prelude to a major redesign of the ships ' s protection scheme . In August 1905 Krylov and Skvortsov independently raised concerns about the ship ' s stability in combat . Skvortsov wrote that although the maximum roll angle was set at a respectable 30° , combat damage would reduce it to an unacceptably low 15° . The only solution , he wrote , was to extend belt armor upward , effectively armoring the whole freeboard surface . Skvortsov compensated the added weight with the removal of two 8 - inch gun turrets and yet another redesign of the remaining turrets . The NTC , scared by the losses at Tsushima , approved the proposal . They were not yet aware of the effectiveness of counter - flooding system of the " Borodino " - class battleships . Counter - flooding enabled survival of " Oryol " but her crewmen were still held prisoners in Japan . Their experience materialized in a counter - flooding system designed by Skvortsov in the summer of 1906 . In October 1905 Krylov compiled a report on the Tsushima experience and recommended a sunstantial redesign of hull armor and counter - flooding system . He advised to increase upper hull armor to 6 in ( 152 mm ) but the NTC discarded the proposal as too radical . The NTC formulated their own proposal in November 1906 , when the hulls were already launched . It required virtual demolition of the hull above the waterline and rebuilding it anew . Skvortsov fiercely objected and the NTC reluctantly shelved their plans . The accepted changes were limited to reinforcement of casemate decks and boiler compartments , which were not complete until January 1908 . The engines were installed in the summer of 1908 , armor plates deliveries continued until March 1910 . The central citadel remained incomplete and unarmored until the installation of the 8 - inch guns , which were delivered in the spring of 1910 . Masts . The original 1903 design provided each ship with two conventional hollow cylinder masts . During the war , the NTC incorrectly assumed that a ship with only one mast would be less conspicuous in combat . The proposal has already been tested on the " Novik " , launched in 1900 . " Novik " s experience was negative : a single mast severely limited its ability to communicate flag signals . Her successors , the s , were built with " three " masts but in 1905 the NTC returned to the old idea and ordered " Admiral Makarov " with a " single " mast . Plans to fit " Andrey Pervozvanny " with a single mast did not materialize although the NTC regularly raised this proposal until the outbreak of World War I . Assessment of the damage incurred in the Battle of the Yellow Sea led the NTC to another incorrect conclusion . The NTC tacticians noted that a single artillery hit in the mast of " Tsesarevich " nearly knocked it down ; a fallen mast would , most likely , disable the secondary artillery turrets of its central citadel . Lattice masts , introduced with the American s , seemed to be a robust solution . However , they required substantial deck area to fit their wide bases . Instead of clearing deck space , the NTC designed the masts too narrow to be stable . Instead of Shukhov ' s hyperboloid profile , their structural beams were arranged in a weaker conical shape . Their deficiency was evident from the start , but the Navy needed " something new " to dispel the curse of Tsushima , and eagerly accepted the flawed novelty . " Andrey Pervozvanny " and " Imperator Pavel I " became the only Russian battleships built with lattice masts . These masts , installed in 1910 , turned out unstable and prone to vibration . They took up precious upper deck space , forcing the sailors to crouch under the beams ; they were regularly overheated by exhaust fumes , making the signaller s work unbearable . Despite those drawbacks , the captain of " Andrey Pervozvanny " fiercely defended them and objected to all alternatives proposed by the NTC . On the day when Austria - Hungary declared war against Russia , the captain of " Imperator Pavel I " , who held an opposite opinion , volunteered to replace the masts in three days . Fleet commander Nikolai Essen concurred , and by the middle of August 1914 the old lattice masts were largely gone . Both ships retained the lower baskets of their masts , cut at different heights . Operational history . Trials and completion . In June 1910 both ships , still missing their 8 - inch artillery , were commissioned into the Armed Reserve of the Baltic Fleet . The decision permitted the Navy to bring their crews to full strength . In the end of July " Andrey Pervozvanny " sailed to its sea trials with 583 men on board , " Imperator Pavel I " sailed to her trials in September – October with even fewer men . As predicted by theory , they turned out very " wet " ships even in calm seas . At bow wave s swept over " all " open decks and flooded the lookout cupolas and optical sights of main gun turrets , effectively prohibiting fire at high speed . Ivan Bubnov recommended fitting " Andrey " ' s protruding bow ram with a scoop - shaped fairing , which would decrease bow wave height from 22 to and eliminate flooding , but the NTC shelved the proposal . The powerplants of both ships performed well at the speed trials , but post - trial examination of " Imperator Pavel I " revealed unacceptable defects of its Belleville boilers , engine cylinders and crankshaft bearings . The NTC had no funds to replace defective boilers and postponed the repairs until the next year . The ships returned into the drydocks of Kronstadt . Their captains hoped to install all missing guns and equipment in time for the 1911 navigation . This did not happen : the Navy committed all available financing to the dreadnought program ; " Andrey Pervozvanny " and " Imperaror Pavel I " were not properly completed until the autumn of 1912 . Mutinies . " Andrey Pervozvanny " and " Imperator Pavel I " saw very limited seagoing service in the summer seasons on 1910 , 1911 and 1912 ; the few voyages within the Russian Baltic waters were trials , rather than active duty . Their combat readiness was crippled by shortage of personnel . Absence of proper porthole s and limited capacity of electrical fans made living conditions unbearable , thus commissioned officers evaded transfer to the " ugly sisters " at all costs . The NTC seriously considered cutting portholes through the armor , but found it too expensive to be done . The enlisted men sabotaged the system by jamming the fan switches in " on " position , which caused frequent electrical failures . The Navy " fixed the problem " by building steel lockers around the switches but could not contain the discontent of the sailors . On officers of " Imperator Pavel I " received first warnings of a mounting conspiracy among enlisted men , who allegedly planned an open mutiny on the night of July 24 – 25 . In the few days preceding the strike the sailors openly disobeyed and taunted their officers but refrained from violence . Only a minority of the enlisted men ( around 160 ) subscribed to the mutiny ; the majority remained loyal and kept the officers informed . On July 24 the ringleaders were arrested , more arrests followed throughout July and August . 53 sailors of " Imperator Pavel I " were sentenced to terms ranging from six months to sixteen years . Attempts to spread the mutiny to " Andrey Pervozvanny " were foiled at the very beginning . By August 1913 the battleships were deemed safe , in all senses , for their farthest voyage ever , to England and France . Yet the ships again harbored active Bolshevik militants – the future Red Army commander Pavel Dybenko , the future chief of the Red Black Sea Fleet and naval historian Nikolay Izmaylov and the future chief of the whole Red Navy Ivan Sladkov . In October 1916 the crew of " Imperator Pavel I " , demoralized by boredom and Bolshevik propaganda , refused to obey orders and demanded better rations and easing of service . The Navy preferred to appease the sailors , and the ringleaders escaped punishment . Fifteen years later Leonid Sobolev , former officer of " Imperator Pavel I " , described the explosive environment and Bolshevik propaganda on board of his ship in " The Big Refit " ; in an act of self - censorship he changed the name of his " lead character " to " Generalissimus Suvorov " . World War I . In June – July 1914 both ships represented the Empire in joint naval reviews with friendly British , French and Dutch forces in the Gulf of Finland . Sweden had not yet declared its neutrality , and on " Imperator Pavel I " , " Rurick " , " Slava " and " Tsesarevich " sailed out to Stockholm to intimidate the Swedes . The diplomats called the fleet back , and " Imperator Pavel I " missed her chance to score her first kill against a weak German scouting flotilla operating in the same area . In August – September the battleships actively sailed north of the Gulf of Riga but failed to intercept " Augsburg " and " Blücher " . The sinking of " Pallada " on effectively put both " Andrey Pervozvanny " - class ships out of action for the rest of the war . All battleships were ordered to return to safety of Finnish bases and stay there until the Navy could cope with the submarine threat . " Slava " and " Tsesarevich " returned to action in the Battle of the Gulf of Riga but " Imperator Pavel I " remained moored in Helsingfors . " Andrey Pervozvanny " was called out for active operations twice , in April and November 1916 . The first operation , a raid on a German convoy near the Swedish coast , was a moderate success ; the second ended in a humiliating retreat after " Rurick " struck a naval mine laid by UC 27 . Revolution . During the outbreak of the February Revolution both battleships were moored in Helsinki . The enlisted men , demoralized by idle life and revolutionary propaganda , have already been organized for a mutiny by a well - entrenched core of conspirators . Exact history of the fleet revolt has been sanitized by Soviet historiography in the wake of the Kronstadt rebellion . It is known that the revolt of was coordinated from " Imperator Pavel I " . Sailors of " Imperator Pavel I " took control of the ship , killed the officers who stood in their way and signalled instructions to other ships . The two battleships accounted for the majority of casualties of this day . The captain of " Imperator Pavel I " did not even try to subdue the sailors and save his officers ; he survived the mutiny and was killed by the Cheka in 1921 . Captain of " Andrey Pervozvanny " , on the contrary , opposed the revolt ; he survived in emigration until 1952 . The commander of the battleship squadron refused to confront the sailors and was killed on shore . The enlisted men almost completely subscribed to communism : by the end of April 520 sailors of " Imperator Pavel I " were carrying Bolshevik party cards . On " Imperator Pavel I " was renamed " Respublika " . The ship provided quarters to civilian Bolshevik functionaries who felt unsafe among the ethnic Finns of Helsinki . The disorganized crew demonstrated formal allegiance to the Russian Provisional Government and even sailed out for a gunnery practice on orders from Alexander Kerensky . In August 1917 " Respublika " escorted " Slava " to her last station at Moon Sound . " Slava " perished during Operation Albion , but neither " Respublika " nor " Andrey Pervozvanny " dared to rescue her . In April 1918 the two battleships fled from hostile Helsinki , the Ice Cruise to Kronstadt became their last voyage . " Respublika " was hulked in September 1918 and saw no action ever . " Andrey Pervozvanny " , although neglected by its revolutionary crew , remained in active service . In June 1919 " Andrey " , captained by Lev Galler , and " Petropavlovsk " gunned downed the rebels of the Krasnaya Gorka fort . The British fleet , which was cruising nearby , did not do anything to support the anti - Bolshevik mutiny . Two months later , August 16 , 1919 , the British raided the harbor of Kronstadt with a joint air and torpedo boat strike . One torpedo hit " Andrey Pervozvanny " armor belt , killing one sailor and flooding an isolated watertight compartment . Repairs continued slowly until the Kronstadt rebellion of 1921 and completely stopped after its suppression . The Bolshevik government had no interest in resurrecting the troublesome capital ships . Both " Andrey Pervozvanny " - class battleships were sent to the breaker ' s yard in November – December 1923 .