Military career of Hugo Chávez The military career of Hugo Chávez spans the seventeen years ( 1975 – 1992 ) that ex President of Venezuela spent in the Venezuelan army . Leader of the " Bolivarian Revolution " , Chávez is known for his professed and self - proclaimed democratic socialist governance , his promotion of Latin American integration , and his radical critique of neoliberal globalization and United States foreign policy . Born 28 July 1954 in rural Sabaneta , Chávez entered military service upon his graduation from the Military academy of Venezuela in 1975 , as a military officer . Chávez thereafter held a variety of post , command , and staff positions . At the time , he was increasingly drawn into leftist political movements ; he eventually engaged in electioneering and political conspiracy . Chávez led a violent 1992 civilian - military coup which sought to overthrow a democratically elected government that he saw as a corrupt oligarchy . Although the coup ultimately failed — ending Chávez ' s military career — it also brought Chávez into the national spotlight and set the stage for his future rise to political power . Early military career ( 1975 – 1982 ) . After his undergraduate studies concluded in 1975 , Chávez entered active - duty military service . Chávez ' s first assignment was as commander of a communications platoon attached to a counter - insurgency force — the Manuel Cedeño Mountain Infantry Battalion , headquartered in Barinas and Cumaná . In 1976 , it was tasked with suppressing a guerilla insurgency staged by the Hoxhaist Partido Bandera Roja ( Red Flag Party ) . Despite this , Chávez saw little actual combat ; this was due to a low density of insurgent activity in the Cumaná region . Later , in 1977 , Chávez was appointed as a communications officer at the Center of Tactical Operations in San Mateo ; it was here that Chávez first received first - hand and hands - on experience in counter - insurgency tactics . Chávez later recalled that , during these years , he experienced growing sympathy for the waning guerilla movements — the very groups he was tasked with countering . He harbored a growing dislike of what he viewed as corruption among the military hierarchy . He perceived such problems as a direct result of political corruption . At the age of 23 , Chávez married Nancy Colmenares . Colmenares , like Chávez , was also from Barinas and had roots in Venezuela ' s plains culture . Colmenares ' friends gossiped that she was already pregnant with their first daughter before they were married in 1977 . Thereafter , Chávez began to lead a " double life " : while feigning disciplined obedience amidst his military superiors and miming political neutrality around his family , Chávez engaged in secret trysts with known socialists , communists , and other leftists . From 1978 through 1979 , Chávez was commander and squad leader of the 414th Apure Braves AMX - 30 armored battalion in Maracay . ( The unit ' s anthem , Fatherland Beloved by Venezuelan composer Heriberto Maluenga , was the one song he sung during his Deccember 8 , 2012 final TV address to the nation . ) Chávez received promotions in rapid succession , and was eventually appointed company commander and head of the Department of Physical Education at the Military Academy of Venezuela , remaining in that position from 1980 to 1981 . He then headed the Department of Culture at the Academy in 1982 . Chávez was also a founding commander of the José Antonio Páez Company at the Academy from 1983 to 1984 . At the time , Chávez gained recognition for his lectures at Caracas ' s war college , in which he spoke for hours in a " folksy " manner that captivated supporters in his audiences . Chávez ' s interest in Venezuelan politics only grew throughout his career in the military . Chávez received several decorations : the Star of Carabobo ( " Estrella de Carabobo " ) ; the Land Forces Cross ( " Cruz de las Fuerzas Terrestres " ) ; and was awarded the Military Order of Francisco de Miranda , the Order of Rafael Urdaneta , and the Order of the Liberator , 5th Class ( Military Division ) . Chávez continued playing baseball and softball : he went to the 1976 National Baseball Championships , held in Barinas ; and he played in military baseball tournaments , among the most important of which were those held in Cumaná in 1977 and the Dominican Republic in 1980 . Apart from his writing , Chávez sculpted , producing such works as the 1980 " Sombra de Guerra en el Golfo " ( " Shadows of War in the Gulf " ) . Premonitions of a military - civilian coup ( 1982 – 1989 ) . Chávez ' s first attempt at launching a political movement came in 1977 , when he formed the " Ejército de Liberación del Pueblo de Venezuela " , or " ELPV " — the " Liberation Army of the Venezuelan People " . Years later , he recalled that the " ELPV " ' s purpose was to " prepare ourselves in case something should happen " and that it was " an important pointer to the future " . In 1978 , dressed in his army fatigues , Chávez met then - presidential candidate José Vicente Rangel — who later became Chávez ' s vice - president — and subsequently aided him in affixing election materials in Maracay . Chávez risked expulsion from the military had his superiors found out about such leftist political activities . Under Venezuelan law at the time , military officers and other personnel were forbidden from involving themselves in political affairs of any sort . Moreover , engaging in such illicit activities while dressed in fatigues or in uniform was punishable by even harsher penalties . It was not until the period 1982 – 1983 that Chávez seriously began to plot the overthrow of Venezuela ' s elected civilian leaders . On 17 December 1982 , Chávez and his co - conspirators gathered under a large tree at Samán de Güere . There , they solemnly witnessed each other ' s repetition of a revised version of the oath Simon Bolivar undertook while upon Italy ' s Monte Sacro , this time adding Ezequiel Zamora ' s slogan during the Federal War : On 24 July 1983 , Chávez — along with peers from his days at the military academy — launched the " Ejército Revolucionario Bolivariano " ( " EBR - 200 " — " Revolutionary Bolivarian Army " ) . The " " 200 " " in " EBR - 200 " ' s name derives from the movement ' s founding on the 200th anniversary of Simón Bolívar ' s birth . The movement established as its political goal the realization of " Bolivarianism " by means of a " Bolivarian Revolution " . Chávez continued to play baseball in the military leagues . Indeed , he progressed with his team to the University League Championships , which were held in Caracas between 1984 and 1985 . Chávez wrote collections of stories and poems , including " Vuelvan Caras " , " Mauricio " and " El Genio y el Centauro " ( " The Genius and the Centaur " ) . " El Genio y el Centauro " garnered him 3rd prize at a 1987 competition held in the " Teatro Histórico Nacional " ( " National Historical Theater " ) in Cañafístola . One of his poems honored the late Felipe Acosta Carles , a co - founder of the " EBR - 200 " . In March 1986 , the " EBR - 200 " held its third congress in San Cristobal , close to Venezuela ' s frontier with war - torn Colombia . The " EBR - 200 " ' s inner circle came together for the secret meeting . Nine people attended , including six military personnel ( including Chávez ) and three civilians . Chávez ' s then - collaborator , Francisco Arias Cardenas ( who , twelve years later , would lose the 2000 presidential election to Chávez ) attended . Also in attendance was one of Chávez ' s uncles . Only one woman attended : Herma Marksman , who by then had become Chávez ' s mistress . Chávez ' s own wife and children remained alone in Sabaneta during these years . The attendees sought ways to attain power through a civilian - military power grab , a common method of power seizure in much of South and Latin America ' s history . Marksman played a crucial role in both Chávez ' s political and personal lives . Upfront , Chávez told Marksman that he would never marry her . Chávez stated that this stemmed from his mother ' s refusal to allow him to divorce Nancy . Nevertheless , he told Marksman that she was needed in his life . Thus , for nine years , Marksman would aid Chávez ' s plans by ferrying and delivering messages for him across the country . She performed various other tasks : placing phone calls and taking notes at meetings . Leaders of the extreme left movement " La Causa R " — such as founder Alfredo Maneira ( just prior to his 1983 death ) and leader Pablo Medina — held meetings with Chávez . Medina recounts that during their meetings Chávez always came across as a jovial person . This was despite recollections of his taciturn demeanor . Medina recalled that Chávez did not articulate his own opinions . Rather , he appeared as a " sponge " via his absorption of vast amounts of information . In this regard , Chávez always reportedly requested a hard copy of all documents he was shown . Nothing of substance came of these initial contacts . Chávez , then a lieutenant , was stationed as commander of a motorized army division — the Francisco Farfán Cavalry Unit — in remote Elorza , Apure between 1985 and 1986 . Elorza itself was situated twelve hours due south ( by local bus ) from Barinas and towards the vast Venezuelan interior . The distance from his previous acquaintances ( including his brother Adán and numerous leftist associates ) meant that Chávez had much less opportunity to plan for his desired insurrection . By 1987 , Chávez and Arias were seen by associates as the clear leaders of the " EBR - 200 " . They together determined that it would be most opportune to launch their coup attempt half - way through the next president ' s term ( they were not concerned about who won the presidential election ) . They reasoned that it was typically at mid - term that the President and his administration polled their lowest popularity levels . Later , Chávez commanded the Civilian - Military Development Nucleus at the Arauca - Meta border between 1986 and 1988 . There , Chávez took advantage of his authority by implementing experimental civilian - military programs . In these programs , he organized such military aid efforts directed at the surrounding population as socioeconomic development initiatives , historical re - enactments and pageants , and oral history documentation efforts . Chávez was also in charge of all patron saints ' feasts held in Elorza , Apure between 1987 and 1988 . Chávez realized that such projects would be essential in order to effectively allow Latin America to regain an autonomous cultural identity independent of U . S . " cultural imperialism " . Yet , in 1988 , Chávez was seconded to the Miraflores presidential palace ; there , he was appointed assistant head of the National Security and Defense Council by " Accion Democratica " President Jaime Lusinchi . The post would see Chávez sent off briefly to Central America on official business ; he would remain at the post until 1989 . Reaction to the " Caracazo " ( 1989 ) . Throughout Chávez ' s early life , Venezuela had enjoyed a period of economic and democratic stability that was remarkable in South America at the time . This stability was partly based on Venezuela ' s massive foreign exchange earnings gained from petroleum exports . Venezuelans referred to their society as " Venezuela Saudíta " ( " Saudi Venezuela " — a parody of Saudi Arabia ' s heavily modernized and oil - based economy ) . When Saudi Arabia itself and other United States - aligned oil producers significantly raised their production output — in an attempt to bring about economic implosion in the heavily oil - dependent Soviet Union — a global oil glut ensued . Oil prices collapsed to historic lows , and Venezuelan oil earnings , and economic and social stability in general , were suddenly imperiled : in the 1980s , per - capita gross domestic product ( GDP ) fell by more than 20 % , and by 1989 real wages fell to a third of their previous levels . The nation also faced a dire balance of payments crisis . Responding to this , in 1989 the Carlos Andrés Pérez administration enacted sweeping and ambitious IMF - inspired neoliberal structural adjustment programs . Nevertheless , these reforms were widely unpopular among poor and working class Venezuelans . Such measures involved the removal of state - managed development and industrialization , the implementation of market liberalization measures , enactment of export subsidies and incentives , extensive privatization of state - owned holdings , curtailed social spending , the release of longstanding price controls on many goods , as well as liberalization of capital and liquidity flows into and out of Venezuela . The programs ' international backers — including renowned Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs — as well as domestic business groups such as " Grupo Roraima " thereby sought to restore fiscal stability and responsibility to Venezuela ' s ailing economy . These policies yielded mixed social and economic results . In 1991 and 1992 , Venezuela experienced GDP growth rates of 10 . 3 % and 7 % , respectively . Such remarkable results resulted mainly from Pérez ' s drive to increase investments in the oil industry . Yet , other indicators suffered . Sharp declines in measures of human well - being exacerbated a growing social crisis . Much hardship was thus generated among Venezuela ' s poor majority . Incidences of hunger , prostitution , murder , and other ills rose sharply , while continuing surges in Venezuela ' s national debt and flagging foreign direct investment inflows continued to hammer the Venezuelan economy . Further , the neoliberal reforms failed to lower high poverty rates of the 1990s . This continuing poverty complimented Latin American economies ' general skewing towards satiating elite consumptive interests while simultaneously relieving upper classes from substantial taxes that would subsidize the poor . Discontent with the general socioeconomic decline erupted in the violent 27 February 1989 Caracazo riots ; they were the most destructive and deadly such disturbances in Venezuelan history . Officially , 372 deaths occurred — although some critics of the government claim that the actual total is well in excess of two thousand . Outraged mobs engaged in mass arson against whole city blocks . Several days passed before troops restored full order . At the time , Chávez was ill . Thus , he was not ordered to help suppress the riots that were breaking out in primarily poor neighborhoods . Yet , Chávez recalls observing the unfolding events — and realizing that he had missed his " strategic minute " to launch his coup . Thus unable for the moment to capitalize on the popular anger and unrest , Chávez refined his critique of what he saw as an irredeemably corrupt traditional two - party " puntofijismo " system . Subsequently , Chávez ' s political rhetoric would dramatically mature ; after these " Caracazo " riots , Chávez always chose to refer to the type of neoliberalism practiced by Pérez as so - called " savage " neoliberalism . He saw such economic reform packages — including the ten - point " Washington Consensus " reform program advanced by former International Monetary Fund advisor John Williamson — as forcibly imposed upon the unwilling populations of Latin America by the U . S . government and allied leaders . In response , Chávez intensified preparations for the Bolivarian military - civilian coup . Final coup preparations ( 1989 – 1992 ) . Weeks after the " Caracazo " , Chávez returned to work at Miraflores . Chávez recalled that the presidential palace ' s guards stopped and questioned him . They reportedly asked him : " [ l ] ook here , major , is it true about the Bolivarian Movement ? We ' d like to hear more about it ; we ' re not prepared to go on killing people " . Chávez took this as a sign that his plan to overthrow the government was gaining momentum . By late 1989 , the first civilians joined the EBR - 200 ' s ranks . The EBR - 200 thus changed its name to the " Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario - 200 " ( MBR - 200 — the " Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement - 200 " ) . The supplanting of the word " Army " ( " Ejército " ) with " Movement " ( " Movimiento " ) was intended to punctuate this shift . However , on 6 December 1989 , Chávez along with other senior officers were abruptly arrested . They were brought before army command on charges of plotting a coup that was suspected by the government as planned for Christmas Day . They were accused of planning the assassination of high government officials , including President Pérez . Yet the officers were eventually released — due to lack of evidence . The government was reluctant to prosecute officers who were recognized in the military as among the best in their respective armed services . Nevertheless , all — including Chávez — were thereafter sent to posts far from the federal government in Caracas . Chávez was sent in 1990 to Maturín , where he was appointed the official in charge of civilian matters with the Ranger Brigade headquartered in the area . Chávez was later allowed to matriculate at the Universidad Simón Bolívar ( " Simón Bolívar University " ) in Caracas , where he did graduate work in political science . He left without a degree . Chávez took courses until August 1991 . Chávez re - entered military service with an initial re - posting to Cumaná , where a desk job awaited him . Chávez recalled feeling that such a seemingly dull and minor posting was beneath him . Thereafter , from 1991 to 4 February 1992 , Chávez was again given his own command — the Maracay - based Colonel Antonio Nicolas Briceño 421st Airborne Battalion , 42nd Airborne Brigade , of the Venezuelan Army ' s 4th Armored Division ( then the 4th Infantry Division ) . Such troops proved key in facilitating Chávez ' s violent political ambitions . Chávez received the job when the battalion ' s former commander retired from the army ; Chávez was his replacement as commanding offivcer . With a posting in Maracay , a city that is relatively near the national power structures in Caracas , Chávez ' s coup plans were no longer hindered by his own geographic isolation . Later , reports emerged of a dossier detailing all of Chávez ' s subversive activities . It had been produced just prior to Chávez ' s new Maracay posting — yet , the document was ignored by military intelligence . The major who had compiled it was ordered to undergo psychiatric evaluation . By 1991 , Chávez and other MBR - 200 leaders activated the coup plan codenamed after one of Chávez ' s heroes , Ezequiel Zamora — " Plan Zamora " . Yet despite planning " for " the coup ' s execution , Chávez and other MBR - 200 leaders made precious little plans about what their putative future rebel government would do " after " the rebellion . Their future governing structure thus remained vague until the end of 1991 , when Chávez and others decided to delineate an initial legal framework for their government ' s operation . Several assorted coup dates were proposed by Chávez ' s associates . Indeed many junior captains threatened to launch their own early coup , which would be independent of that waged by their higher ranked commanders . They threatened this action if Chávez refused to pick a date that they considered soon enough . Yet Chávez refused to budge on a December 1991 attempt . He stated that nothing was to be attempted without his involvement . The captains thus waited for Chávez ' s chosen date . Yet one aspect of the planned coup remained clear throughout : Chávez ' s demand that it maintain a primarily military focus and character . The leftist ex - guerrilla leader Douglas Bravo — who fought in the 1960s and 1970s — also regularly met Chávez . These meetings took place during the years leading up to the coup and without the knowledge of other key MBR - 200 officers . Bravo recounted that Chávez did not trust civilians enough to afford them a role in his bloody intrigue . According to him , it was for this reason that what was initially planned as a civilian - military rebellion was pared down by Chávez to one fought solely by soldiers ; Bravo and his leftist civilian cohorts were turfed out of logistical considerations , preparations , and planning just days before the coup . Yet , towards the end of January 1992 , Chávez realized that the Movement ' s window of opportunity was to close . Chávez received notification that he faced imminent transferral on 14 February — to a small village on the frontier with war - ravaged Colombia . Chávez realized that this posting would jeopardize his participation in the MBR - 200 coup , as the town was far from the major cities and power centers of Venezuela ' s northern coastal strip . Alarmed at this prospect , Chávez and other Movement members held one final meeting . There , they determined to act before Chávez ' s transfer . They would quicken preparations and wait until President Pérez — who was just then abroad on a trip to the 1992 World Economic Forum , held in Switzerland — returned to Venezuela . All the while , MBR - 200 rebel forces built up their numbers . Eventually , 5 lieutenant colonels , 14 majors , 54 captains , 67 first and second lieutenants , 65 warrant officers and technical non - commissioned personnel , 101 sergeants and senior non - commissioned officers and 2 , 056 corporals and enlisted servicemen were involved in the conspiracy ; thus Chávez and other rebel commanders had 2 , 367 military personnel from 10 army battalions to rely upon . They set a final date for their coup : Tuesday , 4 February 1992 .