Dicta Boelcke The Dicta Boelcke is a list of fundamental aerial maneuvers of aerial combat formulated by the first great German flying ace of the First World War , Oswald Boelcke . Boelcke ' s list of tactics . The Dicta Boelcke consists of the following 8 rules : 1 . Try to secure the upper hand before attacking . If possible , keep the sun behind you . Advantages for World War I aircraft included speed , altitude , surprise , performance and numerical superiority . A documented example of Boelcke ' securing advantages ' took place on 17 September 1916 . Boelcke and his pilots intercepted a flight of bombers and fighters crossing the lines . He chose not to attack right away , but had his Jasta climb higher above the bombers , keeping themselves between the bombers and the sun . There they circled and waited . When the bomber pilots , observers and fighter escort pilots were preoccupied with the destruction they were causing on the ground , Boelcke signaled for his pilots to attack . Several enemy aircraft went down and Jasta 2 lost no one . 2 . Always continue with an attack you have begun . Rookie pilots would start a fight , but instinct ( fear ) would convince them to break it off and run . This inevitably presented the rookie ' s tail to his opponent ' s guns , making the rookie an easy victory for his enemy . Boelcke learned that it was far better to stay and continue mixing it up — waiting for his opponent to make mistakes or flee — than to break and run . To turn tail and run was to surrender most , if not all , of the advantages a pilot might have had . As an example , when Manfred von Richthofen met British ace Lanoe Hawker in November 1916 , each persisted in trying to get on the other ' s tail . Both stuck to Boelcke ' s second dictum . When their endless circling had brought them down near the ground behind German lines , Hawker had to choose between landing and capture or fleeing . He chose to flee . Richthofen was then able to get behind him and shoot him down . 3 . Open fire only at close range , and then only when the opponent is squarely in your sights . A common rookie ' s urge was to start blasting away upon sighting his first enemy machine . Shots taken at ranges of 1000 m ( 3280 ft ) stood little chance of hitting their mark . The rattle of machine gun fire would alert the intended target and gave them time to react . The machine guns available for aircraft during the First World War were not highly accurate at longer ranges . Add to that the difficulty of aiming from a moving , bouncing gun platform at a fast moving target and it is a marvel that anyone ever hit anything . Boelcke preferred to fly to within 100 m ( 330 ft ) or less before firing , to ensure hitting what he aimed at with his opening burst . Once the rattle of his guns was heard , the advantage of surprise was gone , so it was best to make that first shot most effective . Another aspect of making each shot count was the limited supply of ammunition carried in World War I aircraft — usually only a few hundred rounds . This could amount to less than 60 seconds of sustained fire . Reloading in the air varied from dangerous to impossible . Spraying the sky with lead in hopes of hitting something , eventually , was not an option . Shots had to be chosen carefully . Early in the war , when a sense of chivalry still held sway , some men allowed their opponents to depart if they were out of ammunition or had jammed guns . Total war did not allow such courtesies to last for long . 4 . You should always try to keep your eye on your opponent , and never let yourself be deceived by ruses . The first part , ' keeping your eye on your opponent , ' sounds obvious enough , but it needed to be stated . In the hustle and bustle of an air fight it was easy to lose sight of your adversary . A restatement of this rule might be : never assume you know where your opponent is or will be . If a pilot ' lost ' his foe , the advantage shifted to the foe . A successful pilot did not allow himself to be distracted from his opponent . As far as ruses go , it was not an uncommon practice for a pilot to feign being hit , going into a supposedly uncontrolled spin or dive , in order to exit a fight that was not going well . This practice traded on the chivalry of their opponents . To continue hammering a man who was already going down , was thought unsportsmanlike . Boelcke recognized that too many enemies were being allowed to escape and return to fight another day . War for national survival was not sport . He taught against the accepted notion that once a machine began to spin down , that one could move on . If it were a ruse , the enemy pilot would pull out at the last moment and either escape or return to attack , perhaps now having gained the advantage of surprise . Boelcke wanted his pupils to follow their opponent down , and make sure they were out of the fight or resume the fight if necessary . 5 . In any type of attack , it is essential to assail your opponent from behind . Firing at a machine flying across one ' s path required ' leading ' the shot — aiming ahead of a moving target to compensate for its speed . While a few pilots were adept at the mental calculations necessary and good aerial marksmen , most were much less adept . The velocity of a moving gun platform , the speed of bullets plus the speed and direction of a moving target could be a lot to consider in the heat of battle . Furthermore , in deflection firing , the target could cross the stream of fire whose bullets were 50 m ( 165 ft ) or more apart . Such crossing gave less exposure to the bullets . Head - on attacks or head - to - tail attacks required little or no calculated deflection in aim . A head - on attack , however , exposed one directly to the enemy ' s guns . It was far safer and more effective to have one ' s target and bullet stream all traveling in more or less the same direction . This required little or no ' leading , ' and exposed the target to a greater concentration of fire . Because of the prevalence of attacks from the rear , aircraft design adapted to allow for rear firing guns in two - seaters and larger bombers . 6 . If your opponent dives on you , do not try to get around his attack , but fly to meet it . This rule is related to dictum # 5 above . The instinctive reaction of many rookies was to turn and flee from an approaching attacker — especially a diving one . This simply presented their tail to the attacker , usually with disastrous results . Boelcke taught that a pilot had to conquer that instinct . Turning to face the attack could force the attacker onto the defensive , or at least keep the situation unsettled , which was far better than presenting your tail . Even though climbing to meet an attack would reduce speed , it was better to try to bring one ' s own guns to bear than to flee , and approaching the enemy still increases the relative velocity between the two fighters and thus reduces the time during which the enemy can fire . Furthermore , if both fighters miss , the diving attacker must now pull out of his dive , while the defender is now in position to circle around and counter - attack with his own dive . 7 . When over the enemy ' s lines , always remember your own line of retreat . If a pilot chose to flee a superior force , or was coming down with a damaged machine , it was critical to spend what little time he might have going in the right direction . This rule sounds as though it is stating the obvious , but Boelcke found it necessary to include it . More than a few pilots came down behind enemy lines because they got confused and lost their way . In World War I , aerial navigation was done mostly by sight . Taking regular note of landmarks helped a pilot get his bearings quickly , perhaps making the difference between safety and captivity . 8 . Tip for Squadrons : In principle , it is better to attack in groups of four or six . Avoid two aircraft attacking the same opponent . In the first year or so of World War I , air combat was more of a one - on - one affair . The early aces , like Pegoud , Garros , Boelcke and Immelmann , hunted the skies alone . As the war progressed , the sheer number of machines in the sky increased . Several reconnaissance machines traveled together for mutual protection , further protected by escorting fighters . Boelcke recognized that the days of the lone hunter were over . Many young pilots , however , still came to the front expecting to dash valiantly into battle as an errant knight , alone , but in reality they would be quickly overwhelmed by multiple enemies . Boelcke tirelessly lectured his pupils on the need for teamwork — sometimes scolding them for acting too independently . Attacking in a group allowed the leader to concentrate his attention exclusively on his target , while his wingmen protected his tail . Air battles later in the war could involve dozens of aircraft from each side at the same time . The sky could become a swirling tangle of machines . When your side was at a numerical disadvantage , it was especially important not to double up on one opponent . The concentrated fire was of dubious value , since you were just as likely to get in each other ' s way as to hit the enemy . Doubling up also left an enemy machine somewhere unbothered and free to tail one of your side ' s machines . Later in the war , teamwork became the primary key to success and survival .