USS Cole bombing The USS " Cole " bombing was a suicide attack against the United States Navy guided - missile destroyer on 12 October 2000 , while it was harbored and being refueled in the Yemen port of Aden . 17 American sailors were killed , and 39 were injured . This event was the deadliest attack against a United States Naval vessel since 1987 . The terrorist organization al - Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attack . A U . S . judge has held Sudan liable for the attack , while another has released over $ 13 million in Sudanese frozen assets to the relatives of those killed . The American Navy has reconsidered their rules of engagement in response to this attack . Attack . On the morning of Thursday , 12 October 2000 , USS " Cole " , under the command of Commander Kirk Lippold , docked in Aden harbor for a routine fuel stop . " Cole " completed mooring at 09 : 30 . Refueling started at 10 : 30 . Around 11 : 18 local time ( 08 : 18 UTC ) , a small craft approached the port side of the destroyer , and an explosion occurred , creating a 40 - by - 40 - foot gash in the ship ' s port side , according to the memorial plate to those who lost their lives . According to former CIA intelligence officer Robert Finke , the blast appeared to be caused by explosives molded into a shaped charge against the hull of the boat . Around 400 to 700 pounds ( 200 – 300 kg ) of explosive were used . The blast hit the ship ' s galley , where crew were lining up for lunch . The crew fought flooding in the engineering spaces and had the damage under control after 3 days . Divers inspected the hull and determined that the keel was not damaged . 17 sailors were killed and 39 were injured in the blast . The injured sailors were taken to the United States Army ' s Landstuhl Regional Medical Center near Ramstein , Germany , and later , back to the United States . The attack was the deadliest against a U . S . naval vessel since the Iraqi attack on the USS " Stark " on 17 May 1987 . The asymmetric warfare attack was organized and directed by the terrorist organization al - Qaeda . In June 2001 , an al - Qaeda recruitment video featuring Osama bin Laden boasted about the attack and encouraged similar attacks . Al - Qaeda had previously attempted a similar but less publicized attack on the U . S . Navy destroyer while in port at Aden on 3 January 2000 , as a part of the 2000 millennium attack plots . The plan was to load a boat full of explosives and explode it near " The Sullivans " . However the boat was so overladen that it sank , forcing the attack to be abandoned . Planning for the attack was discussed at the Kuala Lumpur al - Qaeda Summit shortly after the attempt , which was held from 5 to 8 January 2000 . Along with other plotters , it was attended by future 11 September hijacker Khalid al - Mihdhar , who then traveled to San Diego where he established a close relationship with " 9 / 11 imam " Anwar al - Awlaki , who was later linked to numerous plots and attacks , including the Fort Hood shootings and the " underwear bomber " of 2009 and put on a targeted killing list by President Obama as a terrorist threat . On 10 June 2000 , Mihdhar left San Diego to visit his wife in Yemen at a house also used as a communications hub for al - Qaeda . After the bombing , Yemeni Prime Minister Abdul Karim al - Iryani reported that Mihdhar had been one of the key planners of the attack and had been in the country at the time of the attacks . He would later return to the US to participate in 9 / 11 on American Airlines Flight 77 , which flew into the Pentagon , killing 184 people . Rescue . The first naval ship on the scene to assist the stricken " Cole " was the Royal Navy Type 23 frigate , , under the command of Capt Anthony Rix , RN . She was on passage to the UK after a six - month deployment in the Gulf . " Marlborough " had full medical and damage control teams on board and when her offer of assistance was accepted she immediately diverted to Aden . Eleven of the most badly injured sailors were sent via MEDEVAC to a French military hospital in Djibouti and underwent surgery before being sent to Germany . The first U . S . military support to arrive was a Quick Response Force from the United States Air Force Security Forces , transported by C - 130 . They were followed by another small group of United States Marines from the Interim Marine Corps Security Force Company , Bahrain flown in by P - 3 . Both forces landed within a few hours after the ship was struck and were reinforced by a U . S Marine platoon with the 1st Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team Company ( FAST ) , based out of Norfolk , Virginia . The Marines from 4th Platoon , 1st FAST arrived on the 13th from a security mission in Bahrain . The FAST platoon secured the USS Cole and a nearby hotel that was housing the U . S . Ambassador to Yemen . Investigation . In a form of transport pioneered in 1988 by the aboard the " Mighty Servant 2 " , " Cole " was hauled from Aden aboard the Norwegian semi - submersible heavy lift salvage ship . She arrived in Pascagoula , Mississippi , on 24 December 2000 , where she was rebuilt . U . S . FBI agents sent to Yemen to investigate the bombing in the days following the blast worked in an extremely hostile environment . They were met at the airport by Yemen special forces , " each soldier pointing an AK - 47 at the plane . " Speakers in the Yemeni parliament " calling for jihad against America , " were broadcast on local television each night . After some delay , Yemenis produced a CCTV video from a harborside security camera , but with the crucial moment of the explosion deleted . " There were so many perceived threats that the agents often slept in their clothes and with their weapons at their sides . " At one point , the hotel where the agents stayed " was surrounded with men in traditional dress , some in jeeps , all carrying guns . " Finally the agents abandoned their hotel to stay at a Navy vessel in the Bay of Aden , but even that was not safe . After being granted " permission from the Yemeni government to fly back to shore , " their helicopter " was painted by an SA - 7 missile " and " had to take evasive maneuvers " . Responsibility . On 14 March 2007 , a federal judge in the United States , Robert G . Doumar , ruled that the Sudanese government was liable for the bombing . The ruling was issued in response to a lawsuit filed against the Sudanese government by relatives of the victims , who claim that al - Qaeda could not have carried out the attacks without the support of Sudanese officials . The judge stated " There is substantial evidence in this case presented by the expert testimony that the government of Sudan induced the particular bombing of the " Cole " by virtue of prior actions of the government of Sudan . " On 25 July 2007 , Doumar ordered the Sudanese government to pay $ 8 million to the families of the 17 sailors who died . He calculated the amount they should receive by multiplying the salary of the sailors by the number of years they would have continued to work . Sudan ' s Justice Minister Mohammed al - Mard has stated that Sudan intends to appeal the ruling . By May 2008 , all defendants convicted in the attack had escaped from prison or been freed by Yemeni officials . However , on 30 June 2008 , Brig . Gen . Thomas W . Hartmann , legal advisor to the U . S . Military tribunal system , announced charges are being sworn against Abd al - Rahim al - Nashiri , a Saudi Arabian citizen of Yemeni descent , who has been held at the military prison in Guantanamo Bay , Cuba , since 2006 . According to the Pentagon , the charges have been defined as " organizing and directing " the bombing of the USS " Cole " . The charges still must be approved by a Department of Defense official who oversees military commissions set up for terrorism suspects . The Pentagon will seek the death penalty . Alleged mastermind . Several individuals have been described as the USS Cole bombing mastermind . Among the allegations leveled by a Guantanamo Military Commission against Abd al - Rahim al - Nashiri , captured in late 2002 , was that he was the mastermind of the USS " Cole " bombing . Al - Nashiri was one of the three " high - value detainees " the George W . Bush Presidency was to acknowledge had been subjected to waterboarding and other " extended interrogation techniques " . Abu Ali al - Harithi was one of the first suspected terrorists to be targeted by a missile armed predator drone . He too was described as the mastermind of the USS " Cole " bombing . In 2003 , the US Justice Department indicted two people who were believed to been the last main co - conspirators who were still at large , Jamal Mohammad Ahmad Al Badawi and Fahd al - Quso . Jamal Mohammad Ahmad Al Badawi was convicted in Yemen , and sentenced to death . Fox News called Al - Badawi a " mastermind " of the " Cole " bombing . Al - Badawi was one of seventeen captives who escaped through a tunnel from a Yemeni jail in 2006 . According to CNN , Tawfiq bin Attash , who was captured in Pakistan 2003 and is currently being held in US custody at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp , was " considered the mastermind " of the bombing . An Al Qaeda commander in Yemen also confirmed that another co - conspirator in the bombing , Abdul Mun ' im Salim al - Fatahani , was killed in a US drone strike on 31 January 2012 . On 6 May 2012 , officials from the Yemen government reported that al - Quso was killed in an airstrike earlier in the day in southern Yemen . The report was later confirmed by US officials and Al Qaeda ' s media network As - Sahab . Aftermath . Rules of engagement . The destroyer ' s rules of engagement , as approved by the Pentagon , kept its guards from firing upon the small boat ( which was not known to be loaded with explosives ) as it neared them without first obtaining permission from the " Cole " s captain or another officer . Petty Officer John Washak said that right after the blast , a senior chief petty officer ordered him to turn an M - 60 machine gun on the " Cole " s fantail away from a second small boat approaching . " With blood still on my face , " he said , he was told : " That ' s the rules of engagement : no shooting unless we ' re shot at . " He added , " In the military , it ' s like we ' re trained to hesitate now . If somebody had seen something wrong and shot , he probably would have been court - martialed . " Petty Officer Jennifer Kudrick said that if the sentries had fired on the suicide craft " we would have gotten in more trouble for shooting two foreigners than losing seventeen American sailors . " Consequences . President Bill Clinton declared , " If , as it now appears , this was an act of terrorism , it was a despicable and cowardly act . We will find out who was responsible and hold them accountable " . Some critics have pointed out that , under U . S . law , an attack against a military target does not meet the legal definition of terrorism ( see : 22 USC § 2656f ( d ) ( 2 ) ) . On 19 January 2001 , the U . S . Navy completed and released its Judge Advocate General Manual ( JAGMAN ) investigation of the incident , concluding that " Cole " s commanding officer Commander Kirk Lippold " acted reasonably in adjusting his force protection posture based on his assessment of the situation that presented itself " when " Cole " arrived in Aden to refuel . The JAGMAN also concluded that " the commanding officer of " Cole " did not have the specific intelligence , focused training , appropriate equipment or on - scene security support to effectively prevent or deter such a determined , preplanned assault on his ship " and recommended significant changes in Navy procedures . In spite of this finding , Lippold was subsequently denied promotion and retired at the same rank of commander in 2007 . In Afghanistan the bombing was a " great victory for bin Laden . Al - Qaeda camps . . . filled with new recruits , and contributors from the Gulf States arrived . . . with petrodollar s . " Both the Clinton Administration and the Bush Administration have been criticized for failing to respond militarily to the attack on the USS " Cole " before 11 September 2001 . The 9 / 11 Commission Report cites one source who said in February 2001 , " [ bin Laden ] complained frequently that the United States had not yet attacked [ in response to the Cole ] . . . Bin Laden wanted the United States to attack , and if it did not he would launch something bigger . " Evidence of al - Qaeda ' s involvement was inconclusive for months after the attack . The staff of the 9 / 11 Commission found that al - Qaeda ' s direction of the bombing was under investigation but " increasingly clear " on 11 November 2000 . It was an " unproven assumption " in late November . By 21 December the CIA had made a " preliminary judgment " that " al Qaeda appeared to have supported the attack , " with no " definitive conclusion . " Accounts thereafter are varied and somewhat contradictory . Then - National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice told the Commission that when the administration took office on 20 January 2001 , " We knew that there was speculation that the 2000 Cole attack was al Qaeda . . . We received , I think , on January 25 the same assessment [ of al - Qaeda responsibility ] . It was preliminary . It was not clear . " The Washington Post reported that , on 9 February , Vice President Dick Cheney was briefed on bin Laden ' s responsibility " without hedge . " Newsweek reported that on the following day , " six days after Bush took office , " the FBI " believed they had clear evidence tying the bombers to Al Qaeda . " These conclusions are contrasted by testimony of key figures before the 9 / 11 Commission , summarized in the 9 / 11 Commission Report . Former CIA Director George Tenet testified ( page 196 ) that he " believed he laid out what was knowable early in the investigation , and that this evidence never really changed until after 9 / 11 . " The report suggests ( pages 201 – 202 ) that the official assessment was similarly vague until at least March 2001 : On January 25 , Tenet briefed the President on the Cole investigation . The written briefing repeated for top officials of the new administration what the CIA had told the Clinton White House in November . This included the " preliminary judgment " that al Qaeda was responsible , with the caveat that no evidence had yet been found that Bin Ladin himself ordered the attack . . . in March 2001 , the CIA ' s briefing slides for Rice were still describing the CIA ' s " preliminary judgment " that a " strong circumstantial case " could be made against al Qaeda but noting that the CIA continued to lack " conclusive information on external command and control " of the attack . According to Rice , the decision not to respond militarily to the Cole bombing was President Bush ' s . She said he " made clear to us that he did not want to respond to al Qaeda one attack at a time . He told me he was ' tired of swatting flies . ' " The administration instead began work on a new strategy to eliminate al - Qaeda . As a result of the USS " Cole " bombing , the U . S . Navy began to reassess its anti - terrorism and force protection methods , both at home and abroad . The Navy stepped up Random Anti - Terrorism Measures ( RAM ) , which are meant to complicate the planning of a terrorist contemplating an attack by making it difficult to discern a predictable pattern to security posture . In November 2001 , the Navy opened an Anti - Terrorism and Force Protection Warfare Center at Naval Amphibious Base ( NAB ) Little Creek , in Virginia Beach , Virginia , with the objective of developing tactics , equipment and training to combat terrorists . On 3 November 2002 , the CIA fired an AGM - 114 Hellfire missile from a Predator UAV at a vehicle in Yemen carrying Abu Ali al - Harithi , a suspected planner of the bombing plot . Also in the vehicle was Ahmed Hijazi , a U . S . citizen . Both were killed . On 29 September 2004 , a Yemeni judge sentenced Abd al - Rahim al - Nashiri and Jamal al - Badawi to death for their roles in the bombing . Al - Nashiri , believed to be the operation ' s mastermind , was detained by the U . S . at Guantanamo Bay detention camp . Al - Badawi , in Yemeni custody , denounced the verdict as " an American one . " Four others were sentenced to prison terms of five to 10 years for their involvement , including one Yemeni who had videotaped the attack . In October 2004 the Navy consolidated the forces it deploys for anti - terrorism and force protection under a single command at NAB Little Creek . The new Maritime Force Protection Command ( MARFPCOM ) was activated to oversee the administration and training of the expeditionary units the Navy deploys overseas to protect ships , aircraft and bases from terrorist attack . MARFPCOM aligned four existing components : the Mobile Security Forces , Naval Coastal Warfare , Explosive Ordnance Disposal ( EOD ) , and Expeditionary Mobile Diving and Salvage Forces . On 3 February 2006 , 23 suspected or convicted Al - Qaeda members escaped from jail in Yemen . This number included 13 who were convicted of the bombings of USS " Cole " and the French tanker " Limburg " in 2002 . Among those who reportedly escaped was Al - Badawi . Al - Qaeda ' s Yemeni number two Abu Assem al - Ahdal may also have escaped . On 17 October 2007 , al - Badawi surrendered to Yemeni authorities as part of an agreement with al - Qaeda militants . Following his surrender , Yemeni authorities released him in return for a pledge not to engage in any violent or al - Qaeda - related activity , despite a US $ 5 million reward for his capture . Two other escapees remained at large . In June 2008 the United States charged Abd al - Rahim al - Nashiri with planning and conducting the attack . The US planned to seek the death penalty in his case . On 5 February 2009 , the United States dropped all charges against al - Nashiri " without prejudice " to comply with President Obama ' s order to shut down the military prison at Guantanamo Bay , but reserved the right to file charges at a later date . Charges were reinstated in 2011 . In 2009 U . S . federal judge Kimba Wood released $ 13 . 4 million in frozen assets belonging to Sudan to be awarded to 33 spouses , parents , and children of the sailors killed in the attack . The money was awarded based on the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 . Previously , the court had found Sudan culpable in facilitating the attack on the destroyer . Said John Clodfelter , father of Kenneth Clodfelter who was killed in the bombing , " It ' s about time something was done . It ' s taken so much more time than we thought it should take . " The USS " Cole " bombing plays a highly visible role in Navy damage - control training , which begins in boot camp with a pre - graduation Battle Stations event . " The Cole Scenario " launched in 2007 takes place aboard a realistic destroyer mock - up housed at Naval Station Great Lakes , Ill . The training focuses on preparing recruits for damage control challenges they may face in the fleet . Memorial . A memorial to the victims of the attack was dedicated at Norfolk Naval Station in Virginia on 12 October 2001 . It was erected along the shore of the Elizabeth River near the , and overlooks the berth of the USS " Cole " . Seventeen low - level markers stand for the youthfulness of the sailors , whose lives were cut short . Three tall granite monoliths , each bearing brass plaques , stand for the three colors of the American flag . A set of brown markers encircling the memorial symbolize the darkness and despair that overcame the ship . In addition , 28 black pine trees were planted to represent the 17 sailors and the 11 children they left behind . The memorial was funded by contributions from thousands of private individuals and businesses to the Navy - Marine Corps Relief Society , which gave the memorial to the Navy . Its design originated as a vision of USS " Cole " crew members , who then teamed with Navy architects and the Society to finalize the project .