Battle of Basra ( 2008 ) The Battle of Basra began on March 25 , 2008 , when the Iraqi Army launched an operation ( code - named " Saulat al - Fursan " , meaning Operation " Charge of the Knights " in Arabic ) to drive the Mahdi Army militia out of the southern Iraqi city of Basra . The operation was the first major operation to be planned and carried out by the Iraqi Army since the invasion of 2003 . Coalition and Iraqi aircraft patrolled the skies above Basra providing intelligence and carrying out air strikes in support of Iraqi forces on the ground . Coalition forces provided embedded military transition team s ( MiTTs ) in Iraqi Army units and American special forces also conducted joint operations with ISOF units . Iraqi forces faced heavy resistance from Mahdi Army militia inside the city and the offensive stalled , requiring American and British air and artillery support , eventually resulting in a stand - off . More than 1 , 000 casualties resulted in six days of heavy fighting . Following a ceasefire negotiated in Iran on March 31 , Muqtada al - Sadr withdrew his fighters from the streets , but had gained a major political victory . However , the Iraqi Army , reinforced with brigades from other parts of Iraq , including the 1st Division from al - Anbar , continued to carry out slower , more deliberate clearing operations in militia strongholds . The Hillah Special Weapons and Tactics Unit , as well as Iraqi Special Operations Forces ( ISOF ) , carried out a number of targeted raids on militia leaders . By April 20 , the Iraqi army had taken control of the last major district controlled by the Mahdi Army and by April 24 , Iraqi forces claimed to be in full control of the city centre . Background . During the invasion of Iraq , Basra was the first city to fall to Coalition forces , following two weeks of fighting between the British and Iraqi forces . Following the collapse of the Iraqi government , a number of Shi ' ite Islamist groups , including the Sadrist Trend led by Muqtada al - Sadr , the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and Fadhila , were able to expand their influence in Basra , solidifying their standing following the January 2005 elections . Basra became a center of smuggling activity in Iraq , including cigarette smuggling , opium from Afghanistan which transits Iran , oil and gas smuggling , illegal weapons , and other criminal rackets . Violence steadily increased as the three parties vied for control of Basra ' s resources , continuing through 2005 and 2006 . At the same time , attacks on British forces increased . The increased use of explosively formed penetrators ( EFPs ) restricted the British to their bases , which militia targeted with rocket and mortar fire on a regular basis . The Mahdi Army also enforced strict Islamic rule in Basra , threatening women for wearing makeup and punishing individuals for playing secular Western and Arabic music . In late September 2006 , British forces launched Operation Sinbad , a six month operation originally intended to purge militia from the Iraqi police but eventually targeted the militias directly . However , British forces did not have sufficient numbers and despite a temporary decrease in violence , British troops were again under attack and withdrew to their positions at the palace and the airport . The UK military returned control of Basra to the Iraqi forces in December 2007 and concentrated its forces at the city airport . In February 2008 , Muqtada al - Sadr ' s followers renewed a ceasefire which had been declared in August 2007 , under which they pledged not to attack rival armed groups or American forces in Iraq . General Qassem Suleimani of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps ( IRGC ) ordered this truce . The truce , however , came under strain in the weeks before the battle as Iraqi forces detained " rogue " militia members . Preparations . In 2007 , the Iraqi Army moved 4 brigades , including one of its two tank brigades from the 9th Division , and a special forces battalion to Basra . The existing brigade was transferred to Wasit province to break its ties to militia groups in Basra . The Iraqi National Police also moved two battalions to Basra . In August 2007 , the Iraqi Army established the Basra Operational Command , a Corps - level command in charge of 2 Iraqi Army divisions ( the 10th and the 14th ) , under the command of Lt General Mohan al - Furayji . The Vice Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Joint Staff said " We do not have enough forces there . That is why we are having a new division , the 14th Division , to be built in Basrah , especially with the possibility that the British might be leaving us in time . " . The formation of this new division was not scheduled to be completed before June 2008 and was accelerated to deal with the upcoming operation . The 3rd brigade of the division graduated from the Besmaya Combat Training Center Program on February 13 , 2008 , five weeks before the battle and the 4th brigade is still forming . In mid - March , the deputy prime minister , Barham Salih , called for a " very strong military presence in Basra to eradicate the militia " . He also indicated possible Coalition force involvement in the plan . On Thursday , March 20 , Lt General Mohan al - Furayji warned his troops to prepare for a " final battle " in Basra to defeat Shia militia before provincial elections in October later that year . On March 22 , the Iraqi prime minister Nouri al - Maliki met with the commander of US forces in Iraq , General David Petraeus . During the meeting , al - Maliki explained that the impending operation would be an " entirely Iraqi affair . . . to take on criminals and gang leaders " in Basra . General Petraeus advised al - Maliki not to rush in to a fight and that the large scale movement of Iraqi forces would put strains on the Iraqi logistical and command and control networks , as well as " putting at risk " a lot of the gains made since the start of the US " Surge " in 2007 by threatening the ceasefire imposed on the Mahdi Army by Muqtada al - Sadr . The Mahdi Army had long been well - entrenched in their districts with sniper positions , ambush sites , roadside bombs and booby trapped buildings . During the reign of Saddam Hussein over 202 , 000 refugees fled Iraq to refugee camps in Iran . Many of the young men and children who lived in these camps were recruited by Iran ' s Revolutionary Guard Corps in anticipation of repatriation back into Iraq . These young men were indoctrinated into so - called Special Groups under command of the Quds force . They were trained in sabotage and told to infiltrate the Mahdi Army . The Special Groups also organized criminal rackets to support their illicit activities and make it easier to smuggle weapons from Iran . Timeline of the battle . Note that not very much is actually known about the tactical operations . Because so few Coalition forces were involved in the operation there were no embeds in Basra and most broadcasts and print reports originated from Baghdad . Field reports from Basra have generally been filed by news agency " stringers " , sometimes of dubious credibility . March 24 . The Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al - Maliki and the commander in charge of all Iraqi ground forces , Lt General Ali Ghaidan Majid , arrived in Basra to oversee the operation , taking over from the Basra police chief , Maj . Gen . Abdul - Jalil Khalaf , and the head of the Basra Operational Command , Lt . Gen . Mohan al - Furayji . An indefinite nightly curfew was announced in Basra , as well as in al - Kut and Nasiriyah . Routes into Basra were sealed off , according to reports , and vehicles were also prohibited from entering the city . Sadr ' s organization promised violent retaliation in Basra if members of his Mahdi Army were targeted . March 25 . In the early morning , security forces entered the neighbourhood of al - Tamiya , a Mahdi Army stronghold . Shortly after , fighting erupted and the clashes later spread to five other neighbourhoods , including al - Jumhuriya , Five Miles and al - Hayania , the Mahdi Army ' s main stronghold in Basra . Nassar al - Rubaie , an official in al - Sadr ' s political movement , accused the Iraqi government of trying to weaken the Sadr trend ahead of provincial elections . In response to the fighting the political movement of powerful Shiite cleric Muqtada al - Sadr launched a nationwide civil disobedience campaign across Iraq to protest the raids and detentions against the Mahdi Army . March 26 . By late in the evening the assault on the port city stalled as Shiite militiamen in the Mahdi Army fought day - long hit - and - run battles and refused to withdraw from their positions . The Mahdi Army fighters also managed to overrun a number of police stations and checkpoints . The Iraqi Prime Minister set a 72 - hour deadline for militia in Basra to surrender their arms . A statement from the Basra Operational Command quoted Maliki : " We are not going to chase those who hand over their weapons within 72 hours . If they do not surrender their arms , the law will follow its course . " March 27 . By March 27 , residents in the city were beginning to run out of food and water . They said Iraqi army deserters broke into shops , took food and water , then set fire to shops and cars on the street . An oil pipeline near Basra , which carries oil for export , was damaged by a bomb . Mahdi Army fighters paraded around the wreckages of two Iraqi Army AMZ Dzik armored vehicles and a BMP infantry fighting vehicle which were seen destroyed on the streets . A captured Iraqi Army Humvee along with 20 Iraqi soldiers that were said to have surrendered voluntarily to the militants were also presented . At this point , reports were circulating that Iraqi policemen and soldiers were refusing to fight or deserting their posts and abandoning their uniforms . Overnight , the chief of the police force escaped a roadside bomb attack on his convoy just outside the city which killed three of his bodyguards . The deputy police chief was also attacked in central Basra . Late in the evening an Iraqi Army helicopter was shot down by militants . March 28 . On Friday , Major Tom Holloway , spokesman for the British Armed Forces , reported two air strikes were made in support of Iraqi forces in Basra overnight . The air strikes , which occurred at 21 : 00 on Thursday and shortly after midnight involved US Navy or Marine F / A - 18 fighters firing cannon rounds at a militia stronghold and on a mortar team in Basra . Major Holloway reported coalition aircraft had been flying surveillance operations over Basra since the beginning of the fighting in support of the Iraqi offensive . March 29 . In the early hours of the morning a US air strike on the city killed eight Iraqi civilians , including 2 women and a child , according to Iraqi police . The Coalition spokesman , Major Brad Leighton , denied this report , saying an AC - 130 gunship strafed heavily armed militants on the rooftops of three buildings , killing 16 militants . Major Leighton also reported the targets were identified by special operations forces before the attack . According to a US military statement , the strike occurred during an Iraqi special forces operation in western Basra to " disrupt criminal activities and capture criminal leaders " in a " known criminal stronghold " . In addition , 6 Insurgents were killed by the Iraqi special forces after being engaged by small arms fire and RPGs at the target building . 2 Iraqi soldiers were wounded and a vehicle damaged during the operation . UK artillery based at Basra airport fired 155mm shells into the city at a militia mortar position which had been firing at Iraqi security forces . By this point the Iraqi military offensive against the city was faltering in the face of stiff resistance as the 72 - hour ultimatum by the government passed and the militants refused to surrender . Reports of defecting and deserting soldiers and policemen were circulating and the Mahdi Army confirmed that seven American - made Humvee s were given to them by sympathisers within the Iraqi army . An Iraqi Army battalion commander and two other Iraqi soldiers were killed during the night by a roadside bomb in central Basra . Iraq ’ s defense minister , Qadir Obeidi , stated that “ We were surprised by a very strong resistance that made us change our plans . ” March 30 . On March 30 , militia fighters stormed a state TV facility in Basra forcing Iraqi military guards surrounding the building to flee and setting armored vehicles on fire . A mortar attack against the palace that houses the military operations center killed one of al - Maliki ' s top security officials . Later in the day , after running low on ammunition , al - Sadr ordered his followers to cease fighting . In a statement to the media , Sadr said : " Because of the religious responsibility , and to stop Iraqi blood being shed , and to maintain the unity of Iraq and to put an end to this sedition that the occupiers and their followers want to spread among the Iraqi people , we call for an end to armed appearances in Basra and all other provinces , " The New York Times reported that as of March 30 , Shiite militiamen still controlled large parts of Basra and were continuing to stage raids on Iraqi government forces . USA Today reports that after the Mahdi Army requested a ceasefire , a negotiating team was sent by the Iraqi Government to Iran where an agreement for ceasefire was negotiated . McClatchy Newspapers reports that the Iraqi Central Government sent representatives of five Iraqi political parties to Qom , Iran to negotiate with Moqtada al - Sadr and Brig . Gen . Qassem Suleimani , the Commander of Iran ' s Quds Force . " Ali al Adeeb , a member of Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki ' s Dawa party , and Hadi al Ameri , the head of the Badr Organization , the military wing of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq , had two aims , lawmakers said : to ask Sadr to stand down his militia and to ask Iranian officials to stop supplying weapons to Shiite militants in Iraq . " General Suleimani was instrumental in the negotiations that put Maliki in power . Suleimani traveled into the Baghdad Green Zone to negotiate with the relevant parties . The IRGC has been a player in Iraqi politics for some time . March 31 . Following the ceasefire , armed Mahdi Army militiamen no longer openly appeared on the streets and Basra appeared to be returning to normal with shops and schools starting to reopen . The commander of the 14th Division , Major - General Mohammed Jawan Huweidi , said his forces had control of the towns around Basra , as well as inside the city . He reported that his troops were now beginning to clear roadside bombs in the city . According to a spokesman for Nouri Al Maliki , Iraqi troops and police were in control of much of Basra , and local security forces were going house - to - house in some districts to confiscate weapons . Time magazine reported that there had been " a large - scale retreat of the Mahdi Army in the oil - rich Iraqi port city because of low morale and because ammunition was low due to the closure of the Iranian border . " A US military officer confirmed that assessment to the " Long War Journal " , saying " In short [ the Mahdi Army ] had no ability to sustain the effort " . Nouri al - Maliki said security operations against " criminals and terrorist activities " would continue in Basra . The Iraqi defense spokesman said that reinforcements were being sent to Basra and preparations for fresh military operations to clear the city were being made . According to a US military statement , Iraqi special forces raided a school being used by " criminals " to store weapons , ammunition and explosives . The special forces , supported by US special forces and Coalition aircraft , killed 14 of the criminals and released six Iraqi soldiers being held at the school . Aftermath . Before the battle , Basra had become a lawless place with widespread violence , kidnappings , sectarian attacks against Sunnis and Christians and attacks on alcohol and music shops and women not wearing head scarves . By contrast , after the army had regained control of the city , it was described by a foreign visitor as a " very safe " city with only the presence of troops as a sign of abnormality . The outcome of the battle has been a subject of much public debate . Militarily , the battle ended indecisively with the Iraqi security forces clearing some districts but facing ferocious resistance in others . Although Mahdi Army fighters withdrew from the streets , clashes between Iraqi Security Forces and militia continued . The battle triggered a nationwide political debate on the role of militias in the future Iraq . It seemed as if most political parties were leaning towards Maliki ' s position , which was basically that militias have no place in the future of Iraq . Iran ' s actions in Iraq were described by Ryan Crocker , US Ambassador to Iraq , as a proxy war and evidence of Iran ' s negative role in Iraq . Administration officials have long accused Iran of supporting Shiite militias in attacks on American forces in Iraq . The difference now is that administration officials are trying to convince the Iraqi government that Iran may not be the ally it thought , and is behind attacks against Iraqi government forces . That is a harder sell , given that Iran has supported Iraq ’ s government . After the battle , the Iraqi government dismissed 1 , 300 soldiers and policemen who deserted or refused to fight during the operation . " War Stories " Coverage . Oliver North , host of the Fox News program " War Stories " , contacted some of the Coalition personnel with whom their team was embedded with in December 2007 during the show ' s ninth trip to Iraq . The following is a selection of what American troops had to say about their Iraqi allies and their adversaries : The Iraqis planned and executed the operation with little U . S . involvement and managed to commit more than 40 , 000 troops in high - intensity combat against well - armed , militia - terrorists in six cities — a feat that would have been impossible just six months prior . Conventional Iraqi Army and police units operated effectively together in multiple large - scale , simultaneous urban combat for the first time . Though there were inevitable " SNAFUs , " most of the problems were logistical , not operational . All commended the courage and tenacity of the Iraqi soldiers . The Iraqi Special Operations Forces ( ISOF ) and Hillah SWAT units , with which we were embedded in December , killed or captured more than 200 " high profile criminals " for which they had arrest warrants . Most of those apprehended or killed were renegade members of Muqtada al - Sadr ' s Jaish al Mahdi — the Mahdi Army . Intelligence collected during the operation confirms that Iranian Quds Force fighters have heavily infiltrated southern Iraq and that Iranian weapons , explosives and equipment continue to be delivered to areas previously controlled by the Mahdi Army . Though the ISF lacks the sophisticated casualty evacuation and medical treatment available to U . S . troops , their compassion toward wounded and injured non - combatants rallied civilians to the side of the Iraqi government . Casualties . Police and health workers said at least 236 people were killed and 600 wounded in the fighting in districts of central and northern Basra , with at least 50 civilians among the dead . These claims are questionable though , since Al Sadr followers are known to be prominent in the health organization . Among the dead were at least 30 members of the security forces , including 15 soldiers and 15 policemen . The Iraqi interior ministry chief , Maj . General Abdul - Kareem Khalaf , claimed 210 militiamen killed , 600 wounded and 155 captured since the beginning of the operation .