Loot system A Loot System is any method to distribute items amongst a group of players . Whenever two or more players share some reward , they participate in a loot system , even if it ' s only the default roll system from Blizzard . Frequently , the terms DKP and " loot system " are used interchangeably , because DKP based systems are the most widely used type of formal loot systems . Loot System Categories . There are two basic methods to earn DKP income : standard and zero - sum . There are also two basic methods to determine loot order ( who gets items first ) : bidding and non - bidding . Each income method can in theory be combined with each loot order determination method ( although a combination of zero - sum with bidding would be highly unusual ) . A third grand variety of loot systems use no DKP at all . Loot System Discussion . Loot systems are frequently the subject of heated debate , adherents advocating their own preferred system with something approaching religious fervor . Players sometimes choose to leave or to join a guild primarily on the basis of its loot system . This debate is so wide - spread and returns so consistently in forums that it deserves a deeper look . The following section is based on the massive thread " I will tear apart your Guild loot system " by Angelie ( human priest from US Ner ' zhul ) in the official forums . The original thread has vanished , but returned as a sticky . Unfortunately that new version lacks a few of the finer points . The quintessence remains the same : " No loot system is perfect " . Why use a formal Loot System at all ? When not using a formal system , loot distribution is basically random , which sooner or later leads to regular players getting unhappy . Players like to plan their gear , and want to be compensated for not getting an item . Formal loot systems can help to solve this problem . Their basic function is to provide a memory for past achievements and rewards gained . They give some compensation for raid members who didn ' t get some item by increasing their chance to receive future loot . The grand goal is to provide an automatism which leads to " fair " loot distribution over a longer timespan . Two fundamental system - inherent issues pester any formal loot system : the DKP Gap and Collusion . Characteristics . The following is a list of fundamental desirable characteristics which all loot systems strive to achieve : Standard . The most widely spread loot system uses standard DKP on the income side , and a bidding system when it comes to loot distribution . This offers the maximum flexibility for both sides - guild and raid leaders may reward whatever they feel appropriate , and raid members pay exactly what they think the item is worth . In an ideal world , such a system would fulfill all of the above requirement perfectly . The DKP Gap . This effect is also known as " Inflation " , which is not quite appropriate . Inflation in a real economy means rising prices and devaluation of income , while in a DKP system , the effect means that new members have too low DKP scores to buy good items . A whole genre of DKP systems was invented to counter this effect , the Zero - sum DKP . They guarantee that inflation in the real world meaning cannot occur . Unfortunately , as Anglie pointed out in her article , the actual problem in loot systems has nothing to do with real - world inflation , but deserves a different name - the DKP Gap exists in Zero - sum systems too . Assume that in a zero - sum , fixed - price system some veteran has ( after maybe 30 MC runs ) luckily won his full Tier 1 set , and now a current score of - 100 . The 8 pieces had a value of 460 points . A newbie ( equipped in Dungeon Set 1 ) enters the system at 0 points . Although the visible difference in DKP between the two is - 100 , and the newbie seems to have a point lead over the veteran , the real gap is actually 360 points . The newbie has to equip himself , paying the fixed prices for his gear , while the veteran accumulates points , and only rarely takes an item . When the newbie finally acquires his 8 pieces of Tier 1 , the veteran meanwhile either has some Tier 2 items , or a very obvious point lead . This game of hare and hedgehog can continue indefinitely - on top - of - the - line drops , the veteran will always have priority over the former newbie , even after both players contributed the same for several months . In effect , the zero - sum , fixed price system fails to acheive its set goal , it is by no means " fairer " to the new raid member as a traditional system , where the veteran has an obvious point lead . In a bidding system , after a few runs the newbie acutally has a chance to win an item by bidding , and can gradually close the gap by getting items cheaper than the veterans . The DKP Gap is probably the single biggest problem which loot distribution systems use to have . Many people have objections against all formalized loot systems because they fear to find themselves in this very situation - being behind in the priority list , with no possibility to do anything about it . In a zero - sum fixed price environment , it may even be the best possible course for a newbie to run with his initial group until his chance to get meaningful drops becomes very low , and then simply look for another guild where he can enter the system at zero , and his chances for good loot are better . This problem is by no means accidential , it ' s rather a case of a job too well done . Loot systems are meant to provide a memory . A fixed and unattainable DKP gap means that the memory is too good . Some people actually feel that such a situation is just , and doesn ' t really need a solution - the veterans did contribute more to the guilds progress after all . Collusion . In real world economics , collusion means price fixing . This very effect can easily happen in a bidding system . There ' s quite a large number of drops which is interesting only for a certain combination of class and build ( e . g . plate items with int are useful only to holy paladins ) , while there are other items which are wanted by a large number of raid members ( e . g . a necklace with int and spellpower may be wanted by any healer ) . Now assume the raid has only two holy paladins . It would be natural for the paladins to agree on the plate items to simply take turns - whenever they ' re both in the same raid , one bids the minimum amount , and the other passes . This saves them a lot of points , which they can use to bid on the cross - class items , therefore gaining an advantage over the other healers which may have more competition for class specific items . Another example for collusion is if some high - profile raid member ( e . g . an officer ) bids , and all others interested in the item pass out of courtesy . These two cases are explicit collusion , people willingly agree to a lower - than - appropriate price . There ' s also implicit collusion , for example if by chance some item drops many times , or if one class is all alone ( e . g . tree or moonkin druid ) . Items are too cheap in these cases by accident , the players paying these too - low prices gain an advantage over other members of the system nontheless . Non - bidding systems make collusion systematically impossible , usually at the price of disenchants . By setting a pre - defined price for each item , it ' s simply impossible to manipulate . Unfortunately , this leads to situations where an item which is only a minor upgrade , sidegrade or situationally useful is disenchanted , because the fixed price is considered to be too high . Disenchanting is always bad , because even a fractional increase in efficiency sums up over time , and some players happiness is greatly increased if they have a nice collection of off - spec epics sitting in the bank . Some raids offer such items at a discount , but this immediately brings back the collusion problem ( and / or lengthy discussions whether some item really is an upgrade or not ) . Discounts may even lead to the perverse situation that in the long run players have better gear for their off - spec than for their main spec ( because they are reluctant to pay high prices for main items , and get offspec items cheap ) . A second big problem of fixed price systems is to find and maintain an appropriate price for hundreds of items ( although this can be solved rather elegantly by using one standard price for all items ) . Taxes . The DKP gap can be traced back to the system having too good a memory . Collusion is caused by peoples wish to save their points for some later time . Both of these reasons can be solved by introducing a DKP decay over time . A good starting point would be to deduce 5 % from all raid members DKP score every week . By this , the memory of past achievements slowly fades away , and after a few months of consistent raiding , new members are able to compete for top items . At the same time , the willingness to spend DKP is increased , thus collusion is less interesting . Additionally , any advantage gained by collusion also fades away sooner or later . The problem with taxes is that DKP rich longterm members may feel treated unfairly when they wait for a certain item which by bad luck simply doesn ' t drop , and feel punished when their hard earned points just melt away for nothing . In practise though , most DKP systems are reset regularly ( frequently when entering a new instance ) . This DKP reset is actually a rather crude form of tax , and also leads to longterm members losing their points . External links . for a more general MMORPG based description , but not very detailed or up - to - date . , the first well - known system of MMO loot distribution