David Kilcullen David John Kilcullen FRGS ( born 1967 ) is an Australian author , strategist and counterinsurgency expert and is currently the CEO of Caerus Associates , a strategy and design consulting firm that he founded . From 2005 to 2006 , he was Chief Strategist in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the U . S . State Department . Kilcullen was a senior counter - insurgency advisor to General David Petraeus in 2007 and 2008 , where he helped design and monitor the Iraq War troop surge . He was then a special advisor for counter - insurgency to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice . Kilcullen has been a Senior Fellow of the Center for a New American Security and an Adjunct Professor at the Paul H . Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University . He has written three books : " The Accidental Guerrilla " , " Counterinsurgency , " and " Out of the Mountains " . Education . Kilcullen graduated from St Pius X College in 1984 . He then attended the Australian Defence Force Academy and completed a Bachelor of Arts with Honours in Military Art and Science through the University of New South Wales and graduated as a Distinguished Graduate and was awarded the Chief of Defence Force Army Prize in 1989 . He took his army officer training at the Royal Military College , Duntroon . After twelve months training in Indonesia , Kilcullen graduated from the Australian Defence Force School of Languages in 1993 with an Advanced Diploma in Applied Linguistics . He is fluent in Indonesian and partially fluent in Arabic and French . Kilcullen received a PhD in politics from the Australian Defence Force Academy at the University of New South Wales in 2000 . His thesis , entitled " The Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia 1945 - 99 : A Fieldwork Analysis of the Political Power - Diffusion Effects of Guerrilla Conflict , " focused on the effects of guerrilla warfare on non - state political systems in traditional societies . He drew on ethnographic methods to research traditional systems of governance in East Timor and West Papua . His research centered on investigating power diffusion in Indonesia during the Darul Islam Era of 1948 to 1962 and the Indonesian Occupation of East Timor of 1974 to 1999 . Kilcullen argues that counter - insurgency operations , whether successful or not , cause the diffusion of political power from central to local leaders and that populations are the major actors in insurgency and counter - insurgency dynamics . Australian military career . Kilcullen was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the Australian Army and served in a number of operational , strategic , command , and staff positions in the Royal Australian Infantry Corps and Australian Defence Force . He served in several counter - insurgency and peacekeeping operations in East Timor , Bougainville , and the Middle East . Kilcullen attained the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Australian Army and served as a Staff Officer in the Australian Defence Force Headquarters . In 2004 , he became a Senior Analyst in the Australian Office of National Assessments , where he served on the writing team for the Australian Government ' s 2004 Terrorism White Paper , " Transnational Terrorism : The Threat to Australia " . He left active duty in 2005 and is commissioned as a Lieutenant Colonel in the Australian Army Reserve . Career in the United States . Kilcullen was seconded to the United States Department of Defense in 2004 , where he wrote the counter - terrorism strategy for the Quadrennial Defense Review that appeared in 2006 . After going to reserve status in the Australian Army , Kilcullen worked for the United States Department of State in 2005 and 2006 , serving as the Chief Strategist in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism . He worked in the field in Pakistan , Afghanistan , Iraq , the Horn of Africa and Southeast Asia . He helped design and implement the Regional Strategic Initiative . Kilcullen helped write the United States Army ' s Field Manual 3 - 24 , " Counterinsurgency " , published in December 2006 . He also wrote an appendix , entitled " A Guide to Action . " In early 2007 , Kilcullen became a member of a small group of civilian and military experts , including Colonel H . R . McMaster , who worked on the personal staff of General David Petraeus , the Commander of the Multi - National Force – Iraq . There , Kilcullen served as the Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor until 2008 and was responsible for planning and executing counterinsurgency strategy and operations . He was a principal architect of the Joint Campaign Plan which guided the Iraq War 2007 Troop Surge . He has also served as the Special Advisor for Counterinsurgency to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2007 and 2008 . Kilcullen was a Member of the White House 2008 Review of Afghanistan and Pakistan Strategy . From 2009 to 2010 , he was the Counterinsurgency Adviser to NATO and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan . Kilcullen has also been an adviser to the British Government , the Australian Government , the North Atlantic Treaty Organization , the International Security Assistance Force and to several private sector institutions and companies . He was a Senior Fellow and a member of the Advisory Board of the Center for a New American Security . He was a Partner at the Crumpton Group , but left due to moral and principled differences . He has also been an Adjunct Professor of Security Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies . Kilcullen founded Caerus Associates , LLC in 2010 . Caerus is a Washington , DC - based strategic and design consultancy firm that specializes in working in complex and frontier environments . Contributions to counter - insurgency . " Complex Warfighting " . In 2004 , Kilcullen wrote " Complex Warfighting " , which became the basis of the Australian Army ' s Future Land Operating Concept , approved the next year . It identifies an operating environment heavily influenced by globalization and the United States ' conventional military dominance . The concept claims that future conflicts will feature asymmetric threats requiring land forces to be flexible , able to deploy quickly and operate in urban terrain . The paper calls for " modular , highly educated and skilled forces with a capacity for network - enabled operations , optimised for close combat in combined arms teams . These teams will be small , semi - autonomous and highly networked , incorporating traditional elements of the combined arms team as well as non - traditional elements such as civil affairs , intelligence and psychological warfare capabilities . They will have a capacity for protracted independent operations within a joint interagency framework . " While not strictly limited to counter - insurgency , it stated that counter - insurgency and other non - traditional actions were going to compose a greater part of warfare in the 21st Century . " Countering Global Insurgency " . " Countering Global Insurgency " proposed a new strategic approach to the War on Terrorism . It was first published in Small Wars Journal in 2004 and then a shorter version appeared in the Journal of Strategic Studies in 2005 . The paper argues that al - Qaeda is best understood as a " global Islamic insurgency " that seeks to promote its takfiri version of Islam and increase its role in the world order . Thus , counter - insurgency strategies and tactics need updating to deal with a globalized movement like al - Qaeda , especially increasing participation and cooperation of many states ' intelligence and police agencies . " Counterinsurgency " Redux " " . Kilcullen ' s 2006 paper " Counterinsurgency " Redux " " questions the relevance of classical counterinsurgency theory to modern conflict . It argues from field evidence gathered in Iraq , Afghanistan , Pakistan and the Horn of Africa that : " Twenty - Eight Articles " . Kilcullen ' s paper " Twenty - Eight Articles " is a practical guide for junior officers and non - commissioned officer s engaged in counter - insurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq . The paper ' s publication history is an illustration of new methods of knowledge propagation in the military - professional community . It first appeared as an e - mail that was widely circulated informally among U . S . Army and Marine officers in April 2006 , and was subsequently published in " Military Review " in May 2006 . Later versions of it were published in " IoSphere " and the " Marine Corps Gazette " , and it has been translated into Arabic , Russian , Pashtu and Spanish . It was later formalized as Appendix A to FM 3 - 24 , the US military ' s counterinsurgency doctrine , and is in use by the US , Australian , British , Canadian , Dutch , Iraqi and Afghan armies as a training document . Conflict ethnography . Kilcullen has argued in most of his works for a deeper cultural understanding of the conflict environment , an approach he has called conflict ethnography : " a deep , situation - specific understanding of the human , social and cultural dimensions of a conflict , understood not by analogy with some other conflict , but in its own terms . " In the same essay , " Religion and Insurgency " , published in May 2007 on the Small Wars Journal , he expanded this view : " Counterinsurgency " . In 2010 , Kilcullen brought together his writings in " Counterinsurgency " and developed his understanding of counterinsurgency to address the globalized threat of radical Islam . He argues that successful counterinsurgency is about out - governing the enemy and winning the adaptation battle to provide integrated measures to defeat insurgent tactics through political , administrative , military , economic , psychological and informational means . Positions on American policy . Iraq War . In an interview with Spencer Ackerman of the " Washington Independent " in 2008 , Kilcullen called the decision to invade Iraq " fucking stupid " and suggested that if policy - makers apply his manual ' s lessons , similar wars can be avoided in the future . " The biggest stupid idea , " Kilcullen said , " was to invade Iraq in the first place . " Kilcullen didn ' t deny saying it , but rather that " I can categorically state that the word ‘ fucking ’ was said off the record " . Kilcullen explained his comment the next day : Criticizing American policy . On 6 March 2009 , Kilcullen published a piece on Small Wars Journal titled " Accidental Guerrilla : Read Before Burning . " The piece responded to Andrew Bacevich ' s review of Kilcullen ' s book , " The Accidental Guerilla : Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One " , and also addressed his criticisms of American administrations . Kilcullen wrote : Drone use . Kilcullen argues that targeted killings with drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan is a mistake . " These strikes are totally counter - productive . It is a strategic error to personalize the conflict in this way , it ’ ll strengthen the enemy and weaken our friends . How can one expect the civilian population to support us if we kill their families and destroy their homes . "