Battle of Longewala The Battle of Longewala ( 4 – 7 December 1971 ) was one of the first major engagements in the Western Sector during the Indo - Pakistani War of 1971 , fought between assaulting Pakistani forces and Indian defenders at the Indian border post of Longewala , in the Thar Desert of the Rajasthan state in India . The " A " company ( reinforced ) of the 23rd Battalion , Punjab Regiment , under the Indian Army ' s 30th Infantry , commanded by Brigadier E . N . Ramadoss , was left with the choice of either attempting to hold out until reinforced , or fleeing on foot from a mechanised infantry Pakistani force . Choosing the former , Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri ( the commanding officer ) ensured that all his assets were correctly employed , and made the most use of his strong defensive position , and weaknesses created by errors in enemy tactics . He was also fortunate in that an Indian Air Force forward air controller was able to secure and direct aircraft in support of the post ' s defence until reinforcements arrived six hours later . The Pakistani commanders made several bad decisions , including a failure of strategic intelligence to foresee availability of Indian strike aircraft in the Longewala area , exercising operational mobility with little or no route reconnaissance , and conducting a tactical frontal assault with no engineer reconnaissance . This led to the Pakistani brigade group being left extremely vulnerable to air attack , vehicles becoming bogged in terrain not suitable for the movement of armoured vehicles as they tried to deploy off a single track , these being more susceptible to enemy fire by using external fuel storage in tactical combat , attempting to execute a night attack over unfamiliar terrain , and infantry being surprised by obstacles to troop movement causing confusion and stalling the attack during the crucial hours of darkness , when the assaulting infantry still had a measure of concealment from Indian small arms and infantry support weapon fire . Background . The main thrust of the Indian Army during the 1971 war was directed towards the eastern theatre , with the western sector envisaged as a holding operation to prevent the Pakistan Army from achieving any success that would allow the President of Pakistan , Yahya Khan , any bargaining tool to trade against the captured territories in the east . By the last week of November 1971 , the Indian Army had launched offensive manoeuvres at Atgram against Pakistani border posts and communications centres along the eastern border . The Mukti Bahini also launched an offensive on Jessore at this time . It was clear to Islamabad by this time that open conflict was inevitable , and that East Pakistan was indefensible in the long run . Yahya Khan chose at this point to try to protect Pakistan ' s integrity and to hold India by Ayub Khan ' s strategy – " " The defence of East Pakistan lies in the West " " . Prelude . The Western sector . Khan ' s policy made the assumption that an open conflict with India would not last long due to International pressure , and that since East Pakistan was undefendable , the war - effort should be concentrated on occupying as large an area of Indian territory as possible as a bargaining tool at the negotiating table . To this end , Gen Tikka Khan had proposed an offensive into India , and the PAF ' s " overriding priority was to give maximum support to this offensive " . The initial plans for the offensive called for at least a temporary cover of air dominance by the PAF under which Khan ' s troops could conduct a lightning campaign deep into Western India before digging in and consolidating their positions . To support Khan ' s troops , the PAF had launched pre - emptive strikes on the evening of 3 December that led to the formal commencement of hostilities . In the western theatre , the town of Rahim Yar Khan , close to the international border , formed a critical communication centre for Khan ' s forces and , situated on the Sindh - Punjab railway , remained a vulnerable link on Khan ' s logistics . The fall of Rahim Yar Khan to Indian forces would cut off the rail as well as road link between Sindh and Punjab , starving Khan ' s forces of fuel and ammunitions delivered to Karachi . Indian battle plans called for a strike across the international border with the 12th Indian division towards Islamgarh through Sarkari Tala , subsequently advancing through Baghla to secure Rahim Yar Khan , which would not only destabilise the Pakistani defences in the Punjab , but also in the Jammu & Kashmir Sector , allowing the planned Indian offensive in the Shakargarh sector to sweep the Pakistani forces trapped there . Pakistan , which envisaged the Punjab as an operational centre , had a strong intelligence network in the area and planned to counter its own comparatively weak strength on the ground with a pre - emptive strike through Kishangarh towards the divisional headquarters south of Ramgarh Pakistani intelligence did a very good job infiltrating the operations area posing as local people and passing on information . However , these sources failed to pass on information on the Longewala post which , originally a BSF post , was now held by a company of the Punjab Regiment . Longewala formed a strategic point en route to capturing vast tracts of land and also a pivotal theatre of war in engaging India on the western front . Tactical plan . Pakistan ' s tactical plan was based on the assumption that an attack in the area would help Pakistan ’ s 1st Armoured Divisions task in the Sri Ganganagar area . Pakistan High command also felt that it was important to protect the North - South road link which they felt was vulnerable as it was close to the border . A Combined Operations Plan was decided upon . This involved two Infantry Brigades and two Armoured Regiments . A separate division , the 18 Division , was formed for this purpose . 18 Division Operation Orders required one Infantry Brigade ( 206 ) with an Armoured Regiment ( 38 Cavalry ) to capture and establish a firm base at Longewala , a junction on the Indian road system and 51st Infantry Brigade and the 22nd Cavalry ( Pakistan Army Armoured Corps ) to operate beyond Longewala to capture Jaisalmer . The Pakistani plan was to reach Longewala , Ramgarh and Jaisalmer " . The plan was far - fetched from the start , if only because it called for a night attack to be conducted over terrain that was not preceded by route or engineer reconnaissance , and the armoured troops were therefore unaware of the ground surface that could not support rapid movement towards the objective . As the day unfolded , Longewala would stand out as one of the biggest losses in a battle for Pakistan despite overwhelming superiority before commencement of the battle , largely due to the vehicles becoming bogged down in soft sand . Indian defensive planning . On the Indian side , the Longewala post was held by the A company of the 23rd Battalion , Punjab Regiment , led by Major K S Chandpuri , the defences occupying a high sand dune which dominated the area that was largely intractable to vehicles . The post was surrounded by a barbed wire fence of three stands . The rest of the battalion was located at Sadhewala , 17 km north - east of the Longewala post . Chandpuri commanded an infantry company reinforced by a section each of MMG s and L16 81mm Mortar , and one Jeep - mounted RCL . His two other recoilless rifle teams of the anti - tank section were under training at the battalion headquarters . Major Chandpuri also had under his command a four - man team of the camel Border Security Force division . The Longewala post had no armoured vehicles , but artillery support was available from a battery of 170 Field Regiment ( Veer Rajput ) tasked in direct support to the battalion , and 168 Field Regiment which had been deployed to the area in secrecy just a day earlier . The direct support battery was attached to the 168 Field Regiment and served as its " Sierra " Battery . Immediately after PAF strikes on Indian airfields on 3 December , Chandpuri dispatched a 20 - man strong patrol under Lieutenant Dharam Veer to Boundary Pillar ( BP ) 638 , on the international border . This patrol was to play an important part in detecting the Pakistani forces . Battle . During the night of the 4th , Lt . Veer ' s platoon conducting a patrol detected noises across the border that suggested a large number of armoured vehicles approaching . These were soon confirmed by reports - from the Army ' s Air Observation Post aircraft flown by Maj . Atma Singh - in the area of a 20 km long armoured column on the track leading to the post advancing in the general direction of the Longewala post . Directing Lt Veer ' s patrol to trail the advancing armoured column , Chandpuri got in touch with the battalion headquarters requesting urgent reinforcements and armour and artillery support . Battalion HQ gave him the choice of staying put , and containing the attack as much as possible , or carrying out a tactical retreat of the company to Ramgarh , as reinforcements would not be available for at least six hours . Considering that Chandpuri ' s command had no transportation , and was facing a mobile enemy , he decided to maintain the defensive position of the post where his troops at least had the benefit of prepared defensive works , rather than conducting a withdrawal at night that was a far riskier option . The Pakistani forces began their attack at 12 : 30 am . As the offensive approached the lone outpost , Pakistani artillery opened up across the border with medium artillery guns , killing five of the ten camels from the BSF detachment . As the column of 65 tanks neared the post , Indian defences , lacking the time to lay a prepared minefield , laid a hasty anti - tank minefield as the enemy advanced , one infantryman being killed in the process . The Indian infantry held fire until the leading Pakistani tanks had approached to 15 – 30 metres before firing their PIAT s . They accounted for the first two tanks on the track with their Jeep - mounted 106 mm M40 recoilless rifle , with one of its crew being killed during the combat . This weapon proved quite effective because it was able to engage the thinner top armour of the Pakistani tank s from its elevated position , firing at often stationary bogged down vehicles . In all the post defenders claimed 12 tanks destroyed or damaged . The initial Pakistani attack stalled almost immediately when the infantry discovered the barbed wire which was unseen in the night , and interpreted it to signify a minefield . Firing for the Indian RCL crews was made easier by the flames of fires when the spare fuel tanks on the Pakistani tanks , intended to supplement their internal capacity for the advance to Jaisalmer , exploded , at once providing ample light for Indians located on higher ground , and creating a dense acrid smoke screen at ground level for the Pakistani infantry , adding to the confusion . Two hours were lost as Pakistani sappers were brought up , only to discover there was no minefield . However , at this time Pakistani infantry were required to make another attack , from a different direction , but in the dawn light . The Pakistani advance then attempted to surround the post two hours later by vehicles getting off the road , but many vehicles , particularly armoured personnel carriers and tanks , in trying to soften up the Indian defenders before attacking , became bogged in the soft sand of the area surrounding the post . Throughout the engagement Major Chandpuri continued to direct the supporting artillery fire . Although massively outnumbering the Indian defenders , and having surrounded them , the Pakistani troops were unable to advance over open terrain on a full - moon night , under small arms and mortar fire from the outpost . This encouraged the Indians not to give up their strong defensive position , frustrating the Pakistani commanders . As dawn arrived , the Pakistan forces had still not taken the post , and were now having to do so in full daylight . In the morning the Indian Air Force was finally able to direct some HF - 24 Maruts and Hawker Hunter aircraft to assist the post ; they were not outfitted with night vision equipment , and so were delayed from conducting combat missions until dawn . With daylight , however , the IAF was able to operate effectively , with the strike aircraft being guided to the targets by the airborne Forward Air Controller ( FAC ) Major Atma Singh in a HAL Krishak . The Indian aircraft attacked the Pakistani ground troops with the 16 Matra T - 10 rockets and 30 mm cannon fire on each aircraft . Without support from the Pakistan Air Force , which was busy elsewhere , the tanks and other armoured vehicles were easy targets for the IAF ' s Hunters . The range of the 12 . 7 mm anti - aircraft heavy machine gun s mounted on the tanks was limited and therefore ineffective against the Indian jets . Indian air attacks were made easier by the nature of the barren terrain . Many IAF officers later described the attack as a ' Turkey Shoot ' signifying the lopsidedness . By noon the next day , the assault ended completely , having cost Pakistan 22 tanks claimed destroyed by aircraft fire , 12 by ground anti - tank fire , and some captured after being abandoned , with a total of 100 vehicles claimed to have been destroyed or damaged in the desert around the post . The Pakistani attack was first halted , and then Pakistani forces were forced to withdraw when AMX - 13 Indian tanks from division ' s cavalry regiment the 20 Lancers , Commanded by Col Bawa Guruvachan Singh , and the 17th Rajputana Rifles launched their counter - offensive to end the six - hour combat ; Longewala had proved to be one of the defining moments in the war . Aftermath . The battle of Longewala saw heavy Pakistani losses and low Indian losses . Since the Indians were able to use the defenders advantage , they managed to inflict heavy losses on the Pakistanis . Indian casualties in the battle were 2 soldiers . In addition , one Indian jeep mounted Recoilless rifle was knocked out . Pakistani losses were 200 soldiers killed . The Pakistanis also suffered the loss of 34 tanks destroyed or abandoned , and lost 500 additional vehicles . The judicial commission set up at the end of war recommended the commander of 18 division Major General Mustafa to be tried for negligence during the war . Notwithstanding the Indian victory , there were intelligence and strategic failures on both sides . India ' s intelligence failed to provide warning of such a large armoured force in the western sector . Moreover the defending post was not heavily armed to neutralise the enemy . Finally , they did not push home the advantage by finishing more tanks when the IAF had the Pakistan tanks on the run . They did , however destroy or capture some 36 tanks , remaining one of the largest disproportionate tank casualties for one side in a single battle after World War II . Invading Pakistan troops meanwhile , had overestimated the Longewala post ' s defensive capability due to the difficulty of approach over sand , conducting the attack at night and in full - moon light , against stiff resistance encountered there from a well prepared defensive position located on a dominant height . Attacking with virtually no air cover , they took too long to close for an assault on the position , and failed to anticipate availability of Indian close air support . Given that Pakistan ' s Sherman tank s and T - 59 / Type 59 Chinese tanks were slow on the sandy Thar desert , some military analysts have opined that the attack may have been a poorly planned and executed given the terrain . Some Pakistan tanks had suffered engine failures due to overheating in trying to extricate themselves , and were abandoned . The open desert battleground provided little to no cover for the tanks and infantry from air attacks . The plan to capture Longewala may have been good in conception , but failed due to lack of air cover . As a result , two tank regiments failed to take Longewala . For his part , the Indian company commander Major ( later Brigadier ) Kuldip Singh Chandpuri was decorated with India ' s second highest gallantry award , the Maha Vir Chakra . Several other awards were earned by members of the defending company , and the battalion ' s commander . On the other hand , the Pakistani divisional commander was dismissed from service . However , the commander of the Pakistani 51 Brigade who mounted the daring attack and crossed into Indian territory was later awarded Pakistan ' s high award of the Sitara - e - Imtiaz . The British media significantly exploited the defence of Longewala . James Hatter compared the Battle of Longewala as to Battle of Thermopylae in his article " Taking on the enemy at Longewala " describing it as the deciding moment of the 1971 war . Similarly , Field Marshal R . M . Carver , the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff , visited Longewala a few weeks after the war to learn the details of the battle from Major Chandpuri . In 2008 , there was some controversy surrounding the role of the army and the air force in the battle . Maj - Gen Atma Singh ( who was awarded Vir Chakra for his actions during the battle ) , Air Marshal Mohinder Singh Bawa and eight others claimed that there was no ground battle fought at Longewala and the Indian air power was responsible for Pakistan ' s defeat . Kuldip Singh Chandpuri sued the air force officers disputing the official version of the battle for one rupee , and stated that the limelight given to him had caused them " heartburn " . In popular culture . The Battle of Longewala was depicted in the 1997 Bollywood Hindi film " Border " , which was directed by J . P . Dutta and starred Sunny Deol as the Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri , Jackie Shroff as the Wing Commander M . S . Bawa , Sunil Shetty as the Rajput Border Security Force Captain Bhairon Singh , and then the teen idol Akshaye Khanna as Lt . Dharam Veer Bhan . The main criticism of the movie was that it showed Indian forces being in a terrible position before any sort of help came from the Indian Air Force . The movie also exaggerates the casualties of Indian soldiers for dramatic purposes . This was not the case in the real incident as Indian forces had defended a position on a height that commanded the area , and were able to defend it effectively due to tactical mistakes made by the Pakistani commanders . This resulted in only 2 jawan casualties before combat ceased . Indian troops were later able to capture damaged or abandoned Pakistani tanks .