Joseph Stilwell General Joseph Warren Stilwell ( March 19 , 1883 – October 12 , 1946 ) was a United States Army four - star General known for service in the China Burma India Theater . His caustic personality was reflected in the nickname " Vinegar Joe " . Although distrustful of his allies Stilwell showed himself to be a capable and daring tactician in the field but a lack of resources meant he was continually forced to improvise . He famously differed as to strategy , ground troops versus air power , with his subordinate , Claire Chennault , who had the ear of Generalissimo Chiang Kai - shek . George Marshall acknowledged he had given Stilwell " one of the most difficult " assignments of any theater commander . Early life . Stilwell was born on March 19 , 1883 , in Palatka , Florida of patrician Yankee stock . His parents were Doctor Benjamin Stilwell and Mary A . Peene . Stilwell was an eighth generation descendant of an English colonist who arrived in America in 1638 , whose descendants remained in New York up through the birth of Stilwell ' s father . Named for a family friend , as well as the doctor who delivered him , Joseph Stilwell , known as Warren by his family , grew up in New York , under a strict regimen from his father that included an emphasis on religion . Stilwell later admitted to his daughter that he picked up criminal instincts due to , " . . . being forced to go to Church and Sunday School , and seeing how little real good religion does anybody , I advise passing them all up and using common sense instead . " Stilwell ' s rebellious attitude led him to a record of unruly behavior once he reached a post - graduate level at Yonkers High School . Prior to this last year , Stilwell had performed meticulously in his classes , and had participated actively in football ( as quarterback ) and track . Under the discretion of his father , Stilwell was placed into a post - graduate course following graduation , and immediately formed a group of friends whose activities ranged from card playing to stealing the desserts from the senior dance in 1900 . This last event , in which an administrator was punched , led to the expulsions and suspensions for Stilwell ' s friends . Stilwell , meanwhile , having already graduated , was once again by his father ' s guidance sent to attend the United States Military Academy at West Point , rather than to proceed to Yale University as originally planned . Despite missing the deadline to apply for Congressional appointment to the military academy , Stilwell gained entry through the use of family connections who knew President William McKinley . In his first year , Stilwell underwent hazing as a plebe that he referred to as " hell . " While at West Point , Stilwell showed an aptitude for languages , such as French , in which he ranked first in his class during his second year . In the field of sports , Stilwell is credited with introducing basketball to the Academy , and participating in cross - country running ( as Captain ) , as well as playing on the varsity football team . At West Point he had two demerits for laughing during drill . Ultimately , Stilwell graduated from the academy , class of 1904 , ranked 32nd in a class of 124 cadets . His son , Brigadier General Joseph , Jr . , { West Point 1933 } served in World War II , Korean War , and Vietnam . Military career . Stilwell later taught at West Point , and attended the Infantry Advanced Course and the Command and General Staff College . During World War I , he was the U . S . Fourth Corps intelligence officer and helped plan the St . Mihiel offensive . He was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal for his service in France . Stilwell is often remembered by his sobriquet , " Vinegar Joe " , which he acquired while a commander at Fort Benning , Georgia . Stilwell often gave harsh critiques of performance in field exercises , and a subordinate – stung by Joe ' s caustic remarks – drew a caricature of Stilwell rising out of a vinegar bottle . After discovering the caricature , Stilwell pinned it to a board and had the drawing photographed and distributed to friends . Yet another indication of his view of life was the motto he kept on his desk : " Illegitimi non carborundum " , a form of fractured Latin that translates as " Don ' t let the bastards grind you down . " Between the wars , Stilwell served three tours in China , where he mastered spoken and written Chinese , and was the military attaché at the U . S . Legation in Beijing from 1935 to 1939 . In 1939 and 1940 he was assistant commander of the 2nd Infantry Division and from 1940 to 1941 organized and trained the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord , California . It was there that his leadership style – which emphasized concern for the average soldier and minimized ceremonies and officious discipline – earned him the nickname of “ Uncle Joe . ” Just prior to World War II , Stilwell was recognized as the top corps commander in the Army and was initially selected to plan and command the Allied invasion of North Africa . However , when it became necessary to send a senior officer to China to keep that country in the War , Stilwell was selected , over his personal objections , by President Franklin Roosevelt and his old friend , Army Chief of Staff George C . Marshall . He became the Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai - Shek , served as the commander of the China Burma India Theater responsible for all Lend - Lease supplies going to China , and later was Deputy Commander of the South East Asia Command . Unfortunately , despite his status and position in China , he soon became embroiled in conflicts over U . S . Lend - Lease aid and Chinese political sectarianism . Political and Personal Views . Tuchman records that Stilwell was a lifelong Republican : " . . . he retained the family Republicanism and joined naturally in the exhilarating exercise of Roosevelt - hating " and later ( at the time of his meeting with Roosevelt ) " At home Stilwell was a conventional Republican who shared the sentiments and adopted the tone of the Roosevelt - haters , in which he was influenced by his brother John , an extremist of the species . " . Elsewhere she notes that , in the view of an ( unnamed ) close friend , “ Stilwell was liberal and sympathetic by instinct . But he was conservative in thought and politics . ” Tuchman also notes his use in his letters and diaries of a catalogue of now insulting words which she says " he used easily and seemingly without pejorative content " : these included " limeys for the English , frogs for the French ( " met a frog and his wife on shipboard " ) , huns and squareheads for Germans , wops for Italians , chinks or chinos for Chinese , googs for Filipinos , niggers or coons for Negroes " . , while at the end of the war Tuchman says he took " a harsh pleasure in touring the gutted and burned - out districts of Yokohama and staring at the once arrogant [ Japanese ] now living in shanties of scrap lumber and tin and scratching in the dirt to plant onions " . His diary entry for 1 September 1945 ( in Yokohama ) reads in part : " What a kick to stare at the arrogant , ugly , moon - faced , buck - toothed , bowlegged bastards , and realize where this puts them . Many newly demobilized soldiers around . Most police salute . People generally just apathetic . We gloated over the destruction & came in at 3 : 00 feeling fine . " Burma . Stilwell ' s assignment in the China - Burma - India Theater was a geographical administrative command on the same level as the commands of Dwight D . Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur . However , unlike other combat theaters , for example the European Theater of Operations , the CBI was never a " theater of operations " and did not have an overall American operational command structure . The China theater came under the operational command of Generalissimo Chiang Kai - Shek , commander of Nationalist Chinese forces , while the Burma India theater came under the operational command of the British ( first India Command and later Allied South East Asia Command whose supreme commander was Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten ) . The British and Chinese were ill - equipped and more often than not on the receiving end of Japanese offensives . Chiang Kai - Shek was interested in conserving his troops and Allied Lend - Lease supplies for use against any sudden Japanese offensive , as well as against Chinese Communist forces in a later civil war . The Generalissimo ' s wariness increased after observing the disastrous Allied performance against the Japanese in Burma . After fighting and resisting the Japanese for five years , many in the Nationalist government felt that it was time for the Allies to assume a greater burden in fighting the war . However , the first step to fighting the war for Stilwell was the reformation of the Chinese Army . These reforms clashed with the delicate balance of political and military alliances in China , which kept the Generalissimo in power . Reforming the army meant removing men who maintained Chiang ' s position as commander - in - chief . While he gave Stilwell technical overall command of some Chinese troops , Chiang worried that the new American - led forces would become yet another independent force outside of his control . Since 1942 , members of the Generalissimo ' s staff had continually objected to Chinese troops being used in Burma for the purpose , as they viewed it , of returning that country to British colonial control . Chiang therefore sided with General Claire Chennault ' s proposals that the war against the Japanese be continued largely using existing Chinese forces supported by air forces , something Chennault assured the Generalissimo was feasible . The dilemma forced Chennault and Stilwell into competition for the valuable Lend - Lease supplies arriving over the Himalayas from British - controlled India — an obstacle referred to as " The Hump " . George Marshall , in his biennial report covering the period of July 1 , 1943 to June 30 , 1945 , acknowledged he had given Stilwell " one of the most difficult " assignments of any theater commander . Arriving in Burma just in time to experience the collapse of the Allied defense of that country , which cut China off from all land and sea supply routes , Stilwell personally led his staff of 117 men and women out of Burma into Assam , India on foot , marching at what his men called the ' Stilwell stride ' – 105 paces per minute . Two of the men accompanying him , his aide Frank Dorn and the war correspondent , Jack Belden , wrote books about the walkout : " Walkout with Stilwell in Burma " ( 1971 ) and " Retreat with Stilwell " ( 1943 ) , respectively . The Assam route was also used by other retreating Allied and Chinese forces . In India , Stilwell soon became well known for his no - nonsense demeanor and disregard for military pomp and ceremony . His trademarks were a battered Army campaign hat , GI shoes , and a plain service uniform with no insignia of rank ; he frequently carried a . 30 Springfield rifle in preference to a sidearm . His hazardous march out of Burma and his bluntly honest assessment of the disaster captured the imagination of the American public : " " I claim we got a hell of a beating . We got run out of Burma and it is humiliating as hell . I think we ought to find out what caused it , go back and retake it . " " . However , Stilwell ' s derogatory remarks castigating the ineffectiveness of what he termed " Limey " forces , a viewpoint often repeated by Stilwell ' s staff , did not sit well with British and Commonwealth commanders . However , it was well known among the troops that Stilwell ' s disdain for the British was aimed toward those high command officers that he saw as overly stuffy and pompous . After the Japanese occupied Burma , China was almost completely cut off from Allied aid and materiel except through the hazardous route of flying cargo aircraft over the Hump . Early on , the Roosevelt administration and the War Department had given priority to other theaters for U . S . combat forces , equipment , and logistical support . With the closure of the Burma Road and the fall of Burma , it was realized that even replacing Chinese war losses would be extremely difficult . Consequently , the Allies ' initial strategy was to keep Chinese resistance to the Japanese going by providing a lifeline of logistical and air support . Convinced that the Chinese soldier was the equal of any given proper care and leadership , Stilwell established a training center ( in Ramgarh , India , 200 miles west of Calcutta ) for two divisions of Chinese troops from forces that had retreated to Assam from Burma . His effort in this regard met passive , sometimes active , resistance from the British , who feared that armed , disciplined Chinese would set an example for Indian insurgents , and from Chiang Kai - shek who did not welcome a strong military unit outside of his control . From the outset , Stilwell ' s primary goals were the opening of a land route to China from northern Burma and India by means of a ground offensive in northern Burma , so that more supplies could be transported to China , and to organize , equip , and train a reorganized , reequipped , modernized , and competent Chinese army that would fight the Japanese in the China - Burma - India theater ( CBI ) . Stilwell argued that the CBI was the only area at that time where the possibility existed for the Allies of engaging large numbers of troops against their common enemy , Japan . Unfortunately , the huge airborne logistical train of support from the USA to British India was still being organized , while supplies being flown over the Hump were barely sufficient to maintain Chennault ' s air operations and replace some Chinese war losses , let alone equip and supply an entire army . Additionally , critical supplies intended for the CBI were being diverted due to various crises in other combat theaters . Of the supplies that made it over the Hump a certain percentage were diverted by Chinese ( and American ) personnel into the black market for their personal enrichment . As a result , most Allied commanders in India , with the exception of General Orde Wingate and his Chindit operations , were focused on defensive measures . Command of the Chindits . During this time in India , Stilwell became increasingly disenchanted with British forces , and did not hesitate to voice criticisms of what he viewed as hesitant or cowardly behavior . Ninety percent of the Chindit casualties were incurred in the last phase of the campaign from 17 May when they were under the direct command of Stilwell . The British view was quite different and they pointed out that over the period from 6 June to 27 June , Calvert ' s 77th Brigade , which lacked heavy weapons , took Mogaung and suffered 800 casualties ( 50 % ) among those of the brigade involved in the operation . Stilwell expected 77th Brigade to join the siege of Myitkyina but Michael Calvert , sickened by demands on his troops which he considered abusive , switched off his radios and withdrew to Stilwell ' s base . 111 Brigade , after resting , were ordered to capture a hill known as Point 2171 . They did so , but were now utterly exhausted . Most of them were suffering from malaria , dysentery and malnutrition . On 8 July , at the insistence of the Supreme Commander , Admiral Louis Mountbatten , doctors examined the brigade . Of the 2200 men present from four and a half battalions , only 119 were declared fit . The Brigade was evacuated , although Masters sarcastically kept the fit men , " 111 Company " in the field until 1 August . The portion of 111 Brigade east of the Irrawaddy were known as Morris Force , after its commander , Lieutenant - Colonel " Jumbo " Morris . They had spent several months harassing Japanese traffic from Bhamo to Myitkyina . They had then attempted to complete the encirclement of Myitkyina . Stilwell was angered that they were unable to do so , but Slim pointed out that Stilwell ' s Chinese troops ( numbering 5 , 500 ) had also failed in that task . By 14 July , Morris Force was down to three platoons . A week later , they had only 25 men fit for duty . Morris Force was evacuated about the same time as 77th Brigade Captain Charlton Ogburn , Jr . , a U . S . Army Marauder officer , and Chindit brigade commanders John Masters and Michael Calvert later recalled that Stilwell ' s appointment of a staff officer specially detailed by him to visit subordinate commands in order to chastise their officers and men as being ' yellow ' . In October 1943 , after the Joint Planning Staff at GHQ India had rejected a plan by Stilwell to fly his Chinese troops into northern Burma , Field Marshal Wavell asked whether Stilwell was satisfied on purely military grounds that the plan could not work . Stilwell replied that he was . Wavell then asked what Stilwell would say to Chiang Kai - shek , and Stilwell replied " I shall tell him the bloody British wouldn ' t fight . " Disagreements with Chiang and the Allies . After Stilwell left the defeated Chinese troops that he had been given nominal command by Chiang Kai - shek ( Chinese generals admitted later that they had considered Stilwell as an ' adviser ' and sometimes took orders directly from Chiang ) , he escaped Burma in 1942 , Chiang was outraged by what he saw as Stilwell ' s blatant abandonment of his best army without orders and began to question Stilwell ' s capability and judgment as a military commander . Chiang was also infuriated at Stilwell ' s strict control of U . S . lend lease supplies to China . But instead of confronting Stilwell or communicating his concerns to Marshall and Roosevelt when they asked Chiang to assess Stilwell ' s leadership after the Allied disaster in Burma , Chiang reiterated his " full confidence and trust " in the general while countermanding some orders to Chinese units issued by Stilwell in his capacity as Chief of Staff . An outraged Stilwell began to call Chiang " the little dummy " or " Peanut " in his reports to Washington , ( " Peanut " originally being intended as a code name for Chiang in official radio messages ) while Chiang repeatedly expressed his pent - up grievances against Stilwell for his " recklessness , insubordination , contempt and arrogance " to U . S . envoys to China . Stilwell would press Chiang and the British to take immediate actions to retake Burma , but Chiang demanded impossibly large amounts of supplies before he would agree to take offensive action , and the British refused to meet their previous pledges to provide naval and ground troops due to Churchill ' s " Europe first " strategy . Eventually Stilwell began to complain openly to Roosevelt that Chiang was hoarding U . S . lend lease supplies because he wanted to keep Chinese Nationalist forces ready to fight the under Mao Zedong after the end of the war with the Japanese , even though from 1942 to 1944 98 percent of U . S . military aid over the Hump had gone directly to the 14th Air Force and U . S . military personnel in China . Stilwell also continually clashed with Field Marshal Archibald Wavell , and apparently came to believe that the British in India were more concerned with protecting their colonial possessions than helping the Chinese fight the Japanese . In August 1943 , as a result of constant feuding and conflicting objectives of British , American , and Chinese commands , along with the lack of a coherent strategic vision for the China Burma India ( CBI ) theater , the Combined Chiefs of Staff split the CBI command into separate Chinese and Southeast Asia theaters . Stilwell was infuriated also by the rampant corruption of the Chiang regime . In his diary , which he faithfully kept , Stilwell began to note the corruption and the amount of money ( $ 380 , 584 , 000 in 1944 dollars ) being wasted upon the procrastinating Chiang and his government . The Cambridge History of China , for instance , also estimates that some 60 % – 70 % of Chiang ' s Kuomintang conscripts did not make it through their basic training , with some 40 % deserting and the remaining 20 % dying of starvation before full induction into the military . Eventually , Stilwell ’ s belief that the Generalissimo and his generals were incompetent and corrupt reached such proportions that Stilwell sought to cut off Lend - Lease aid to China . Stilwell even ordered Office of Strategic Services ( OSS ) officers to draw up contingency plans to assassinate Chiang Kai - shek after he heard Roosevelt ' s casual remarks regarding the possible defeat of Chiang by either internal or external enemies , and if this happened to replace Chiang with someone else to continue the Chinese resistance against Japan . Myitkyina Offensive and aftermath . With the establishment of the new South East Asia Command in August 1943 , Stilwell was appointed Deputy Supreme Allied Commander under Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten . Taking command of various Chinese and Allied forces , including a new U . S . Army special operations formation , the 5307th Composite Unit ( provisional ) later known as Merrill ' s Marauders , Stilwell built up his Chinese forces for an eventual offensive in northern Burma . On December 21 , 1943 , Stilwell assumed direct control of planning for the invasion of Northern Burma , culminating with capture of the Japanese - held town of Myitkyina . In the meantime , Stilwell ordered General Merrill and the Marauders to commence long - range jungle penetration missions behind Japanese lines after the pattern of the British Chindits . In February 1944 , three Marauder battalions marched into Burma . Though Stilwell was at the Ledo Road front when the Marauders arrived at their jump - off point , the general did not walk out to the road to bid them farewell . In April 1944 , Stilwell launched his final offensive to capture the Burmese city of Myitkyina . In support of this objective , the Marauders were ordered to undertake a long flanking maneuver towards the town , involving a grueling 65 - mile jungle march . Having been deployed since February in combat operations in the jungles of Burma , the Marauders were seriously depleted and suffering from both combat losses and disease , and lost additional men while en route to the objective . A particularly devastating scourge was a severe outbreak of amoebic dysentery , which erupted shortly after the Marauders linked up with the Chinese Army in India , called X Force . By this time , the men of the Marauders had openly begun to suspect Stilwell ' s commitment to their welfare . Despite their sacrifices , Stilwell appeared unconcerned about their losses , and had rejected repeated requests for medals for individual acts of heroism . Initial promises of a rest and rotation were ignored ; the Marauders were not even air - dropped replacement uniforms or mail until late April . On May 17 , 1 , 310 remaining Marauders attacked Myitkyina airfield in concert with elements of two Chinese infantry regiments and a small artillery contingent . The airfield was quickly taken , but the town , which Stilwell ' s intelligence staff had believed to be lightly defended , was garrisoned by significant numbers of well - equipped Japanese troops , who were steadily being reinforced . A preliminary attack on the town by two Chinese regiments was thrown back with heavy losses . The Marauders did not have the manpower to immediately overwhelm Myitkyina and its defenses ; by the time additional Chinese forces arrived and were in a position to attack , Japanese forces totaled some 4 , 600 fanatical Japanese defenders . During the Myitkyina siege , which took place during the height of the monsoon season , Marauders ' second - in - command , Col . Hunter , as well as the unit ' s regimental and battalion level surgeons , had urgently recommended that the entire 5307th be relieved of duty and returned to rear areas for rest and recovery . By this time , most of the men had fevers and continual dysentery , forcing the men to cut the seats out of their uniform trousers in order to fire their weapons and relieve themselves simultaneously . Stilwell rejected the evacuation recommendation , though he did make a frontline inspection of the Myitkyina lines . Afterwards , he ordered all medical staff to stop returning combat troops suffering from disease or illness , and instead return them to combat status , using medications to keep down fevers . The feelings of many Marauders towards General Stilwell at that time were summed up by one soldier , who stated , " I had him [ Stilwell ] in my sights . I coulda ' squeezed one off and no one woulda ' known it wasn ' t a Jap who got that son of a bitch . " Stilwell also ordered that all Marauders evacuated from combat due to wounds or fever first submit to a special medical ' examination ' by doctors appointed by his headquarters staff . These examinations passed many ailing soldiers as fit for duty ; Stilwell ' s staff roamed hospital hallways in search of any Marauder with a temperature lower than 103 degrees Fahrenheit . Some of the men who were passed and sent back into combat were immediately re - evacuated as unfit at the insistence of forward medical personnel . Later , Stilwell ' s staff placed blame on Army medical personnel for overzealously interpreting Stilwell ' s return - to - duty order . During the Myitkyina siege , Japanese soldiers resisted fiercely , generally fighting to the last man . As a result , Myitkyina did not fall until August 4 , 1944 , after Stilwell was forced to send in thousands of Chinese reinforcements , though Stilwell was pleased that the objective had at last been taken ( his notes from his personal diary contain the notation , " Boy , will this burn up the Limeys ! " ) . Later , Stilwell blamed the length of the siege , among other things , on British and Gurkha Chindit forces for not promptly responding to his demands to move north in an attempt to pressure Japanese troops . This was in spite of the fact that the Chindits themselves had suffered grievous casualties in several fierce pitched battles with Japanese troops in the Burmese jungles , along with losses from illness and combat exhaustion . Stilwell also had not kept his British allies clearly informed of his force movements , nor coordinated his offensive plans with those of General Slim . Bereft of further combat replacements for his hard - pressed Marauder battalions , Stilwell felt he had no choice but to continue offensive operations with his existing forces , using the Marauders as ' the point of the spear ' until they had either achieved all their objectives , or were wiped out . He was also concerned that pulling out the Marauders , the only U . S . ground unit in the campaign , resulted in charges of favoritism , forcing him to evacuate the exhausted Chinese and British Chindit forces as well . When General William Slim , commander of British and Commonwealth forces in Burma , informed Stilwell that his men were exhausted and should be withdrawn , Stilwell rejected the idea , insisting that his subordinate commanders simply did not understand enlisted men and their tendency to magnify physical challenges . Having made his own ' long march ' out of Burma under his own power using jungle trails , Stilwell found it difficult to sympathize with those who had been in combat in the jungle for months on end without relief . In retrospect , his statements at the time revealed a lack of understanding of the limitations of lightly equipped unconventional forces when used in conventional roles . Myitkyina and the dispute over evacuation policy precipitated a hurried Army Inspector General investigation , followed by U . S . congressional committee hearings , though no disciplinary measures were taken against General Stilwell for his decisions as overall commander . Only a week after the fall of Myitkyina in Burma , the 5307th Marauder force , down to only 130 combat - effective men ( out of the original 2 , 997 ) , was disbanded . Conflict with General Chennault . One of the most significant conflicts to emerge during the war was between General Stilwell and General Claire Lee Chennault , the commander of the famed " Flying Tigers " and later air force commander . As adviser to the Chinese air forces , Chennault proposed a limited air offensive against the Japanese in China in 1943 using a series of forward air bases . Stilwell insisted that the idea was untenable , and that any air campaign should not begin until fully fortified air bases supported by large infantry reserves had first been established . Stilwell then argued that all air resources be diverted to his forces in India for an early conquest of North Burma . Following Chennault ' s advice , Generalissimo Chiang rejected the proposal ; British commanders sided with Chennault , aware they could not launch a coordinated Allied offensive into Burma in 1943 with the resources then available . During the summer of 1943 , Stilwell ' s headquarters concentrated on plans to rebuild the Chinese Army for an offensive in northern Burma , despite Chiang ' s insistence on support to Chennault ' s air operations . Stilwell believed that after forcing a supply route through northern Burma by means of a major ground offensive against the Japanese , he could train and equip thirty Chinese divisions with modern combat equipment . A smaller number of Chinese forces would transfer to India , where two or three new Chinese divisions would also be raised . This plan remained only theoretical at the time , since available airlift capacity for deliveries of supplies to China over the Hump barely sustained Chennault ' s air operations , and were wholly insufficient to equip a new Chinese Army . In 1944 , the Japanese launched the counter - offensive , Operation Ichi - Go , quickly overrunning Chennault ' s forward air bases and proving Stilwell partially correct . However , by this time , Allied supply efforts via the Hump airlift were steadily improving in tonnage supplied per month ; with the replacement of Chinese war losses , Chennault now saw little need for a ground offensive in northern Burma in order to re - open a ground supply route to China . This time , augmented with increased military equipment and additional troops , and concerned about defense of the approaches to India , British authorities sided with Stilwell . In coordination with a southern offensive by Nationalist Chinese forces under General Wei Li - huang , Allied troops under Stilwell ' s command launched the long - awaited invasion of northern Burma ; after heavy fighting and casualties , the two forces linked up in January 1945 . Stilwell ' s strategy remained unchanged : opening a new ground supply route from India to China would allow the Allies to equip and train new Chinese army divisions for use against the Japanese . The new road network , later called the Ledo Road , would link the northern end of the Burma Road as the primary supply route to China ; Stilwell ' s staff planners had estimated the route would supply 65 , 000 tons of supplies per month . Using these figures , Stilwell argued that the Ledo Road network would greatly surpass the tonnage being airlifted over the Hump . General Chennault doubted that such an extended network of trails through difficult jungle could ever match the tonnage that could be delivered with modern cargo transport aircraft then deploying in - theater . Progress on the Ledo Road was slow , and could not be completed until the linkup of forces in January 1945 . In the end , Stilwell ' s plan to train and modernize thirty Chinese divisions in China ( as well as two or three divisions from forces already in India ) was never fully realized . As Chennault predicted , supplies carried over the Ledo Road at no time approached tonnage levels of supplies airlifted monthly into China via the Hump . In July 1945 , 71 , 000 tons of supplies were flown over the Hump , compared to only 6 , 000 tons using the Ledo Road , and the airlift operation continued in operation until the end of the war . By the time supplies were flowing over the Ledo Road in large quantities , operations in other theaters had shaped the course of the war against Japan . Stilwell ' s drive into North Burma , however , allowed Air Transport Command to fly supplies into China more quickly and safely by allowing American planes to fly a more southerly route without fear of Japanese fighters . American airplanes no longer had to make the dangerous venture over the Hump , increasing the delivery of supplies from 18 , 000 tons in June 1944 , to 39 , 000 tons in November 1944 . On August 1 , 1945 a plane crossed the hump every one minute and 12 seconds . In acknowledgment of Stilwell ' s efforts , the Ledo Road was later renamed the Stilwell Road by Chiang Kai - shek . Recall from China . With the rapid deterioration of the China front after Japanese launched Operation Ichi - Go in 1944 , Stilwell saw this as an opportunity to gain full command of all Chinese armed forces . In a separate effort based on the same appreciation of the situation , Roosevelt sent an ultimatum to Chiang threatening to end all American aid unless Chiang " at once " place Stilwell " in unrestricted command of all your forces . " An exultant Stilwell immediately delivered this letter to Chiang despite pleas from Patrick Hurley , Roosevelt ' s special envoy in China , to delay delivering the message and work on a deal that would achieve Stilwell ' s aim in a manner more acceptable to Chiang . Seeing this act as a move toward the complete subjugation of China , Chiang gave a formal reply in which he said that Stilwell must be replaced immediately and he would welcome any other qualified U . S . general to fill Stilwell ' s position . On October 19 , 1944 , Stilwell was recalled from his command by President Franklin D . Roosevelt . Partly as a result of controversy concerning the casualties suffered by U . S . forces in Burma and partly due to continuing difficulties with the British and Chinese commanders , Stilwell ' s return to the United States was not accompanied by the usual ceremony . Upon arrival , he was met by two Army generals at the airport , who told him that he was not to answer any media questions about China whatsoever . Stilwell was replaced by General Albert C . Wedemeyer , who received a telegram from General Marshall on October 27 , 1944 directing him to proceed to China to assume command of the China theatre and replace General Stilwell . Wedemeyer later recalled his initial dread over the assignment , as service in the China theater was considered a graveyard for American officials , both military and diplomatic . When Wedemeyer actually arrived at Stilwell ’ s headquarters after Stilwell ’ s dismissal , Wedemeyer was dismayed to discover that Stilwell had intentionally departed without seeing him , and did not leave a single briefing paper for his guidance , though departing U . S . military commanders habitually greeted their replacement in order to thoroughly brief them on the strengths and weaknesses of headquarters staff , the issues confronting the command , and planned operations . Searching the offices , Wedemeyer could find no documentary record of Stilwell ' s plans or records of his former or future operations . General Wedemeyer then spoke with Stilwell ’ s staff officers but learned little from them because Stilwell , according to the staff , kept everything in his “ hip pocket ” . Reassignment . Despite prompting by the news media , Stilwell never complained about his treatment by Washington or by Chiang . He later served as Commander of Army Ground Forces , U . S . Tenth Army Commander in the last few days of the Battle of Okinawa in 1945 , and as U . S . Sixth Army Commander . In November , he was appointed to lead a " War Department Equipment Board " in an investigation of the Army ' s modernization in light of its recent experience . Among his recommendations was the establishment of a combined arms force to conduct extended service tests of new weapons and equipment and then formulate doctrine for its use , and the abolition of specialized anti - tank units . His most notable recommendation was for a vast improvement of the Army ' s defenses against all airborne threats , including ballistic missile s . In particular , he called for " guided interceptor missiles , dispatched in accordance with electronically computed data obtained from radar detection stations . " Death . Stilwell died of stomach cancer on October 12 , 1946 at the Presidio of San Francisco , while still on active duty . His ashes were scattered on the Pacific Ocean , and a cenotaph was placed at the West Point Cemetery . Among his military decorations are the Distinguished Service Cross , Distinguished Service Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster , the Legion of Merit degree of Commander , the Bronze Star , and the Combat Infantryman Badge ( this last award was given to him as he was dying from stomach cancer ) . Aftermath . Stilwell ’ s home , built in 1933 – 1934 on Carmel Point , Carmel , California , remains a private home . A number of streets , buildings , and areas across the country have been named for Stilwell over the years , including Joseph Stilwell Middle School in Jacksonville , Florida . The Soldiers ’ Club he envisioned in 1940 ( a time when there was no such thing as a soldiers ’ club in the Army ) was completed in 1943 at Fort Ord on the bluffs overlooking Monterey Bay . Many years later the building was renamed “ Stilwell Hall ” in his honor , but because of the erosion of the bluffs over the decades , the building was taken down in 2003 . Stilwell ' s former residence in Chongqing – a city along the Yangtze River to which Chiang ' s government retreated after being forced from Nanjing by Japanese troops – has now been converted to the General Joseph W . Stilwell Museum in his honor . Historical viewpoints . In her book " Stilwell and the American Experience in China , 1911 - 45 " , Barbara Tuchman wrote that Stilwell was sacrificed as a political expedient because of his inability to get along with his allies in the theater . Some historians , such as David Halberstam in his final book , " " , have theorized that Roosevelt was concerned that Chiang would sign a separate peace with Japan , which would free many Japanese divisions to fight elsewhere , and that Roosevelt wanted to placate Chiang . The power struggle over the China Theater that emerged between Stilwell , Chennault , and Chiang reflected the American political divisions of the time . A very different interpretation of events suggests that Stilwell , pressing for his full command of all Chinese forces , had made diplomatic inroads with the Chinese Communist Red Army commanded by Mao Zedong . He bypassed his theater commander Chiang Kai - Shek and had gotten Mao to agree to follow an American commander . His confrontational approach in the power struggle with Chiang ultimately led to Chiang ' s determination to have Stilwell recalled to the United States . According to Guan Zhong , President of the Examination Yuan , Stiwell had once expressed his regret of never having the opportunity to fight alongside the Chinese Communist army , especially with General Zhu De , before his death . Stilwell , a " soldier ' s soldier " , was nonetheless an old - school American infantry officer unable to appreciate the creative developments in warfare brought about by World War II — including strategic air power and the use of highly trained infantrymen as jungle guerrilla fighters . His disagreements with the equally acerbic Gen . Claire L . Chennault came about not only because Chennault over - valued the effectiveness of air power against massed ground troops — a fact proven by the fall of the 14th Air Force bases in eastern China ( Hengyang , Kweilin , etc . ) in the Japanese eastern China offensive of 1944 — but because Stilwell mistakenly believed air power ' s sole use lay in support for ground troops . Stilwell , in fact , clashed with almost every other officer in the theatre with novel ideas , including Orde Wingate , who led the Chindits , and Col . Charles Hunter , officer in charge of Merrill ' s Marauders . Stilwell could neither appreciate the toll constant jungle warfare took on even the most highly trained troops , nor the incapacity of lightly armed , fast - moving jungle guerrilla forces to dislodge heavily armed regular infantry supported by artillery . Accordingly , Stilwell abused both Chindits and Marauders , and earned the contempt of both units and their commanders . In other respects , however , Stilwell was a skilled tactician in U . S . Army ' s land warfare tradition , with a deep appreciation of the logistics required of campaigning in rough terrain ( hence his dedication to the Ledo Road project , for which he received several awards , including the Distinguished Service Cross and the US Army Distinguished Service Medal ) . Stilwell was also a pretty good judge of men . The trust Stilwell placed in men of real insight and character in understanding China , particularly the China Hands , John Stewart Service and John Paton Davies , Jr . , confirms this assessment . Arguably , had Stilwell been given the number of American regular infantry divisions he had continually requested , the American experience in China and Burma would have been very different . Certainly , his Army peers , Gen . Douglas MacArthur and Gen . George Marshall had the highest respect for his abilities , and both saw he replaced Gen . Simon Bolivar Buckner , Jr . as commander of Tenth U . S . Army at Okinawa after the latter ' s death . During the last year of the war , however , the U . S . was strained to meet all its military obligations , and cargo aircraft diverted to supply Stilwell , the 14th Air Force , and the Chinese in the East left air - drop - dependent campaigns in the West , such as Operation Market Garden , woefully short of aircraft . The destruction of 1st Airborne at Arnhem was one result of these competing demands . Although Chiang succeeded in removing Stilwell , the public relations damage suffered by his Kuomintang regime was irreparable . Right before Stilwell ' s departure , " New York Times " drama critic - turned - war correspondent Brooks Atkinson interviewed him in Chungking and wrote , " The decision to relieve General Stilwell represents the political triumph of a moribund , anti - democratic regime that is more concerned with maintaining its political supremacy than in driving the Japanese out of China . The Chinese Communists . . . have good armies that they are claiming to be fighting guerrilla warfare against the Japanese in North China — actually they are covertly or even overtly building themselves up to fight Generalissimo ' s government forces . . . The Generalissimo naturally regards these armies as the chief threat to the country and his supremacy . . . has seen no need to make sincere attempt to arrange at least a truce with them for the duration of the war . . . No diplomatic genius could have overcome the Generalissimo ' s basic unwillingness to risk his armies in battle with the Japanese . " Atkinson , who had visited Mao in Yenan , saw the Communist Chinese forces as a democratic movement ( after Atkinson visited Mao , his article on his visit was titled " Yenan : A Chinese Wonderland City " ) , and the Nationalists in turn as hopelessly reactionary and corrupt ; this view was shared by many of the U . S . press corps in China at the time . The negative image of the Kuomintang in America played a significant factor in Harry Truman ' s decision to end all U . S . aid to Chiang at the height of the Chinese civil war , a war that resulted in the communist revolution in China and Chiang ' s retreat to Taiwan . Film and media . Stilwell was portrayed on film by Erville Alderson in " Objective , Burma ! " ( 1945 ) , by John Hoyt in Samuel Fuller ' s " Merrill ' s Marauders " ( 1962 ) , by Robert Stack in Steven Spielberg ' s " 1941 " ( 1979 ) , and by Yachun Dong in " Chinese Expeditionary Force " ( 2011 ) . On August 24 , 2000 , the United States Postal Service issued the first 10¢ Distinguished Americans series postage stamp honoring Stilwell . The award for the Outstanding Overall Cadet , Senior Division , in the California Cadet Corps is named the General Joseph W . Stilwell Award . Panamanian La Solidaridad Medal 1919