Revolution in Military Affairs The military concept of Revolution in Military Affairs ( RMA ) is a theory about the future of warfare , often connected to technological and organizational recommendations for change in the United States military and others . Especially tied to modern information , communications , and space technology , RMA is often linked to current discussions under the label of " Transformation " and total systems integration in the US military . History . The original theorizing was done by the Soviet Armed Forces in the 1970s and 1980s , particularly by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov . The U . S . initially became interested in it through Andrew Marshall , the head of the Office of Net Assessment , a Department of Defense think tank . It slowly gained credence within official military circles , and other nations began exploring similar shifts in organization and technology . Interest in RMA and the structure of future United States armed forces is strong within the China ' s People ' s Liberation Army and incorporated to current Chinese strategic military doctrine . Many other militaries have researched and considered RMA as an organizational concept , including Canada , United Kingdom , the Netherlands , Sweden , Australia , New Zealand , South Africa , Singapore , Republic of China ( Taiwan ) , India , Russia and Germany . However , the infrastructure and investment demands are very expensive for many countries and nations unwilling to invest substantial sums in defense . Renewed interest was placed on RMA theory and practice after what many saw as a stunning , one - sided victory by the United States in the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq . American dominance through superior satellite , weapons - guiding , and communications technology emphasized the enormous relative power of the US through technological advances , even against an Iraqi military that was by no means an insignificant rival . After the Kosovo War where the United States did not lose a single life , others suggested that war had become too sterile , creating an almost " Virtual War . " Consequently , the U . S . failure to capture Osama bin Laden and the Iraqi insurgency led some to question RMA ' s build - up as a military nirvana . U . S . foes may increasingly resort to asymmetrical warfare to counter the advantages of RMA . In 1997 , the United States Army mounted an exercise code - named " Force 21 " , to test the application of digital technologies in warfare . The goal of Force 21 was to improve the communications and logistics through the application of computers and information technology generated in the private sector and adapted for military use . The specific aims were to increase awareness of one ' s own position on the battlefield and to have a clear sense of the enemy ' s position , in pursuit of the following goals : ( 1 ) increased lethality , ( 2 ) increased control of the tempo of warfare , ( 3 ) the reduction of instances caused by friendly fire , with improvement in Identification Friend or Foe . Areas of focus . One of the central problems in understanding the current debate over RMA is due to many theorists ' use of the term as referring to the revolutionary technology itself , which is the driving force of change . Concurrently , other theorists tend to use the term as referring to revolutionary adaptations by military organisations that may be necessary to deal with the changes in technology . Other theorists place RMA more closely inside the specific political and economic context of globalization and the end of the Cold War . When reviewing the gamut of theories , three fundamental versions of RMA come to the forefront . The first perspective focuses primarily upon changes in the nation - state and the role of an organised military in using force . This approach highlights the political , social , and economic factors worldwide , which might require a completely different type of military and organisational structure to apply force in the future . Authors such as RAND ' s Sean J . A . Edwards ( advocate of BattleSwarm tactics ) , Carl H . Builder and Lt . Col . Ralph Peters emphasized the decline of the nation - state , the nature of the emerging international order , and the different types of forces needed in the near future . The second perspective — most commonly assigned the term RMA — highlights the evolution of weapons technology , information technology , military organization , and military doctrine among advanced powers . This " System of Systems " perspective on RMA has been ardently supported by Admiral William Owens , former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , who identified three overlapping areas for force assets . These are intelligence , surveillance and reconnaissance , command , control , communications and intelligence processing , and precision force . Advanced versions of RMA incorporate other sophisticated technologies , including unmanned aerial vehicles ( UAVs ) , nanotechnology , robotics , and biotechnology . Recently , the RMA debate focussed on " network - centric warfare " which is a doctrine that aims to connect all troops on the battlefield . Finally , the third concept is that a " true " revolution in military affairs has not yet occurred or is unlikely to . Authors such as Michael O ' Hanlon and Frederick Kagan , point to the fact much of the technology and weapons systems ascribed to the contemporary RMA were in development long before 1991 and the Internet and information technology boom . Several critics point out that a " revolution " within the military ranks might carry detrimental consequences , produce severe economic strain , and ultimately prove counterproductive . Such authors tend to profess a much more gradual " evolution " in military affairs , as opposed to a rapid revolution . See also . US military - specific :