Cyprus Missile Crisis The Cyprus Missile Crisis came to worldwide media attention between early 1997 and late 1998 as a tense and rapidly escalating political standoff between the Republic of Cyprus and the Republic of Turkey . The confrontation was sparked by Greek Cypriot plans to install two powerful Russian - made S - 300 air - defence missile sites on their territory , provoking Turkey into threatening an attack or even all - out war if the missiles were not returned to Russia . The crisis effectively ended in December 1998 with the decision of the Cypriot government to transfer the S - 300s to Crete , in exchange for alternative weapons from Greece . Prelude to the crisis . As of 1995 , the Cypriot government had reportedly begun conceptualisation and planning of an integrated air - defence solution to defend the airspace of the Republic of Cyprus , which according to local press reports , was sustaining near daily airspace violations by the Turkish Air Force . Also , the recent sale of ATACMS long - range artillery rockets to Turkey were perceived as a threat by the Greek Cypriots , which evidently determined that it had no means of defence , should these weapons be fired from the southern Turkish coast into the unoccupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus . On 3 January 1997 , an unnamed defence source leaked information to the Cypriot media regarding the purchase of Russian - made surface - to - air missiles , the story was picked up by Reuters and the Cyprus News Agency , amongst others . The leak reported that the date for the conclusion of the sale between Russia and Cyprus for surface - to - air missile systems would be 4 January 1997 . On 5 January 1997 , Cypriot Foreign Minister Alekos Michaelides announced to the world media that the government had acquired an air - defence capability in the form of Russian - made S - 300 air - defence missiles and associated radars . At this stage , details were kept vague , and the media seized upon rumours , ranging from claimed numbers of missiles and capability , to wildly differing claims of the price for the purchase . On the same day , government spokesman Yiannakis Cassoulides made a statement in which he remarked that the Cyprus government had the " legitimate right to enhance it ' s " defence capabilities " , and also said that the weapons purchase was " proportional " to the Turkish military build - up in the north of the island . Concurrently , Turkish Defence Minister Turhan Tayan was reported in Turkey as saying that the action would " undermine peace in the region " . Russia ' s main defence export agency , Rosvooruzheniye , also added its comment to the media frenzy , when spokesman Valery Pogrebenkov stated that the sale of S - 300 missiles to Cyprus would not adversely affect the balance of power in the region , as the weapons were " purely defensive " . Greek Cypriot S - 300 missile capability . Although never publicly revealed in exact detail and widely debated , many observers have concurred that the Cypriot government acquired two batteries of S - 300PMU - 1s , each consisting of at least one 64N6E ( BIG BIRD D ) early - warning and battle management radar , and a minimum of four 5P85TE towed quadruple launchers and sixteen 48N6 missiles . These missiles would have had a maximum range of 150 km . Other equipment likely to have been provisioned in the purchase ( based upon standard deployment practice for this type of weapon array ) , would have included the 83M6E command and control system , as well as support radar infrastructure and mobile engineer support vehicles . The primary evidence for such a combat capability has come from gradual disclosure to the media of S - 300PMU - 1 capabilities in Crete following the 1998 deployment of the weapons to the Greek island . Also , digital aerial and satellite photography , such as that presented by Google Earth , has allowed independent observers to suggest that at least three new military facilities were purpose - built in Cyprus for the deployment of the S - 300s ( two sites for the missile batteries , and one mountain site for the 64N6E radar package ) . According to some of these observers , the radar site and one of the missile sites were installed in heavily fortified positions on the northern face of Mount Olympus , the largest mountain in the Troodos range . Additionally , a second fortified missile site is claimed to exist in the vicinity of Droushia , a coastal village in the extreme west of the island . Turkish reaction . On 11 January 1997 , Cypriot and US media sources reported that Turkey had overtly threatened either a pre - emptive strike to prevent the arrival of the missiles , or an actual war on Cyprus as a response to the arrival of the missiles . Cypriot government sources condemned the threats , the Greek Cypriot armed forces were placed at their highest state of alert and mobilisation since the 1974 invasion of the island by Turkey . Over the following months leading up to June 1997 , the two sides traded political rhetoric and aggressive propaganda as both attempted to justify their positions before the international community . Russian and Greek counter - reactions . Between January and June 1997 , Greece reportedly increased the readiness of her Air Force and Navy assets positioned closest to Cyprus , and moved to tacitly support the Cypriot position that the missiles were designed for , ergo they were intended for defensive uses only . The situation was then escalated , this time by the Greek decision to send a small contingent of F - 16 fighter jets to Cyprus , as well as additional troops to reinforce the Greek ELDYK contingent on the island . Russia initially avoided direct confrontation with Turkey , but insisted repeatedly that the sale of S - 300s to Cyprus would proceed without interference . Turkey consequently looked to her strategic NATO partners , including the United States for reassurances that she would not be prevented from acting against the perceived threat , should the need arise . Evidently , these reassurances did not come , and Turkey instead turned to neighbouring Israel for weapons and training to deal with the S - 300s directly . Further escalation . In September 1997 , the Turkish Navy and Coastguard began to board and search vessels heading to Cyprus , including Russian - flagged vessels in international waters . The situation alarmed not only the Greek Cypriots , but their strategic military and economic partners in Athens and Moscow , evidenced by official statements in October 1997 indicating that Greece and Russia would engage in war with Turkey if Cyprus was attacked or blockaded . By December , reports began to surface in Greece and Cypriot media forums that Russia was in the process of mobilising a large naval force which would include an aircraft carrier with long - range warplanes , a guided - missile cruiser and attack submarines . The presumption was that this force would have two purposes – to transport S - 300 missiles and other military articles via Greek waters to Cyprus , and secondly , to destroy the Turkish Navy should it try to intervene . Cypriot decision to transfer the missiles . Rather than face the political prospect of humiliation by conceding to Turkish demands that the sale be cancelled outright , President Glavkos Clerides finally decided in December 1998 that the S - 300 missile systems would be sent to Crete . Ostensibly , the decision was made to ensure that the deal with Russia proceeded to the latter ’ s economic benefit , and that Greece was compensated for the situation by receiving the defensive capability of the S - 300s for Crete . The Turkish government decried the move as a " cynical attempt " to redirect the S - 300 missile capability against her south - western shores and airspace , while giving much - desired air - defence for Greek ships and aircraft heading from Crete to Cyprus . Greek Cypriot agreement with Greece . The Cypriot government never again seriously entertained the return of the S - 300 air - defence missile systems to Cyprus , for fear of unnecessarily damaging her reputation and position in European political circles . Consequently , in 2007 , the missiles were finally and irrevocably sold to Greece in exchange for alternative military articles , reputed to consist of a significant quantity of short - range TOR - M1 missile systems , and an undisclosed type of medium - range air - defence missile systems . Greece also voluntarily supplied Cyprus with twelve self - propelled 155mm artillery howitzers as partial rental payment for the use of the S - 300s between 1999 and 2006 . References .