Single Integrated Operational Plan The Single Integrated Operational Plan ( SIOP ) was the United States ' general plan for nuclear war from 1961 to 2003 . The SIOP gave the President of the United States a range of targeting options , and described launch procedures and target sets against which nuclear weapons would be launched . The plan integrated the capabilities of the nuclear triad of heavy bombers , land - based intercontinental ballistic missile s ( ICBM ) , and sea - based submarine - launched ballistic missiles ( SLBM ) . The SIOP was a highly classified document , and was one of the most secret and sensitive issues in U . S . national security policy . The first SIOP , titled SIOP - 62 , was finished on 14 December 1960 and implemented on 1 July 1961 ( the start of fiscal year 1962 ) . The SIOP was updated annually until February 2003 , when it was replaced by Operations Plan ( OPLAN ) 8044 . Since December 2008 , the US nuclear war plan has been OPLAN 8010 , " Strategic Deterrence and Global Strike " . Planning process . While much of the United States ' nuclear war planning process remains classified , some information on the former SIOP planning process has been made public . The planning process began with the President issuing a presidential directive establishing the concepts , goal , and guidelines that provided guidance to the nuclear planners . The Secretary of Defense then used the President ' s guidance to produce the Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy ( NUWEP ) that specified basic planning assumptions , attack options , targeting objectives , types of targets , targeting constraints , and coordination with combatant commanders . The NUWEP was then used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff ( JCS ) to create the " Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan ( JSCP ) , Annex C ( Nuclear ) . " This document established a more detailed and elaborate set of goals and conditions that included targeting and damage criteria for the use of nuclear weapons . The final stage in the planning process occurred when the Strategic Air Command ( SAC ) ( from 1961 to 1992 ) or the United States Strategic Command ( USSTRATCOM ) ( from 1992 to 2003 ) took the guidance from the JSCP and created the actual nuclear war plan that becomes the SIOP . As part of SIOP planning , Strategic Air Command ( SAC , later USSTRATCOM ) developed a set of plans and a series of options based on a target set known as the National Target Base ( NTB ) . The number of targets in the NTB varied over time , from 16 , 000 in 1985 to 12 , 500 at the end of the Cold War in 1992 , to 2 , 500 by 2001 . The SIOP was primarily directed against targets in the Soviet Union ( later Russia ) but targets in the People ' s Republic of China , which had been part of the SIOP until the 1970s , were added back into the plan in 1997 . In 1999 , the NTB reportedly included targets in Russia , China , North Korea , Iran , Iraq , Syria , and Libya . United Kingdom participation . Although after World War II the formal military alliance between the United States and United Kingdom no longer existed , American postwar war plans required using British air bases until the United States developed ICBMs and long - range bombers . American general Carl Spaatz and Chief of the Air Staff Lord Tedder informally agreed in 1946 to US aircraft using British bases . The discussions , and the subsequent actions such as extending runways , were so secret that it is unclear whether Prime Minister Clement Attlee was aware of them . By 1948 , the year of the Berlin Blockade , British leaders expected that " in a future world conflict , US and British forces will find themselves fighting side by side " although the alliance had not been formally renewed . The two countries began coordinating their plans for a Soviet attack in Europe after the Czechoslovak coup d ' état of 1948 , and later that year General Curtis LeMay , head of Strategic Air Command ( SAC ) , asked Tedder to allow the basing of American atomic weapons in Britain . By the end of 1948 several British bases were atomic - capable or were close to being so , but the ability to fight an atomic war from Britain did not exist until April 1949 when " Silverplate " atomic - capable B - 29 bombers began rotating through the bases , and no American atomic weapons were present in Britain until 1952 . Aware that with or without bombs the bases made Britain what Winston Churchill called a " bull ' s - eye " for Soviet attack , he and other British leaders repeatedly failed in learning details of American war plans , and not until 1951 did the United States formally , if vaguely , agree to consult with Britain before using atomic weapons based there . As Tedder complained during the Berlin crisis , when war at any moment seemed possible , the defense of the west relied " on the use of a weapon about which we in fact know very little " . British plans such as SPEEDWAY ( December 1948 ) , which discussed American - British - Canadian joint planning for the early part of a war over the next 18 months , likely incorporated some information informally sent by the United States , including projections on future bomb production and targets . The Chiefs of Staff Committee was dissatisfied , however , writing that " We are at a disadvantage in that . . . we do not know the details of the number of [ American ] atomic weapons to be used and so cannot assess with any accuracy the results that can be achieved . " The Americans preferred that the British not develop atomic weapons at all , but as that was not possible they decided that partnership was preferable to losing influence with the United Kingdom . The British sought an independent , domestic nuclear deterrent that by itself could persuade the USSR to not attack , in part because they feared that America might not be willing to defend Europe with its nuclear missiles once the USSR could attack the United States itself , or during wartime not prioritize targets that threatened the United Kingdom . In 1950 RAF Bomber Command asked for , and received , 70 B - 29s from the United States after offering to place them under the control of SAC during wartime . The bombers were becoming obsolete , however . The British never made them nuclear - capable , and the RAF refused the US ' s request for SAC ' s complete targeting control over the sophisticated British - built V bomber s which began deploying in 1955 . Britain ' s goal of an independent deterrent aimed at Soviet cities was so important that , when it offered to place the V Bombers under SACEUR authority in 1953 in exchange for American financial aid to purchase new fighters , it refused to agree to them being used in a tactical role against Soviet targets in Europe . The agreement permitted Britain to commit only nominal forces to SACEUR , and presaged future technology and targeting cooperation . As the USAF began in 1955 helping the RAF to convert V bombers to carry American atomic weapons under Project E and hydrogen weapons under Project X , cooperation increased and the United States began sharing some war plan details . Although both nations remained reluctant to fully share their plans — as late as 1956 , Britain did not have targeting information even for SAC aircraft it hosted — redundancies were eliminated by one side asking the other whether it planned to attack various targets . In February 1959 the USAF agreed to target 150 Soviet bases that threatened Britain with nuclear weapons , while V bombers would use nuclear weapons to attack Soviet air defenses before SAC arrived . The RAF retained a separate plan to attack 30 Soviet cities with hydrogen bombs . The agreement formed the basis for the ongoing nuclear - targeting cooperation between the two countries , and the different target types resembled the two nations ' different priorities during their World War II strategic bombing campaign . The Anglo - American dispute during the 1956 Suez Crisis only briefly disrupted the partnership , and the desire to restore relations to their former level , and the Sputnik crisis , increased American willingness to help Britain improve its atomic weaponry . In March 1957 the United States agreed to sell 60 Thor IRBM s , in 1958 American hydrogen - weapon designs , in 1960 the Skybolt ALBM , and after its cancellation the Polaris SLBM in 1962 as replacement . Polaris was especially notable ; British officials initially refused to believe the Americans ' offer of state - of - the - art submarine missiles at a moderate price , and one scholar later called it " amazing " . While its contribution to SIOP was minor compared to the enormous SAC arsenal of 1 , 600 bombers and 800 missiles , as RAF officers who worked with the Americans rose to leadership positions their experience benefited later partnerships between the two countries . The joint targeting plan changed over time ; the 1962 list for the RAF included 48 cities , six air - defense sites , and three bomber bases , and the 1963 list had 16 cities , 44 airfields and other offensive sites , 10 air - defense sites , and 28 IRBM sites . The degree of cooperation was such by the Cuban Missile Crisis that RAF officers visiting SAC headquarters in Nebraska reported being " treated just like Americans . We went all through their briefings , computers , top secret rooms and so forth " . While some British officers emphasized the continuing importance of maintaining the ability to act alone with an independent deterrent if necessary , by 1962 the independent list was essentially the RAF portion of the joint plan and no active training was done . The British emphasis on retaining an independent capability , however , continued over several decades and changes in government . As the Defence Council stated in 1980 , While current United Kingdom ' s nuclear forces — four Trident " Vanguard " class submarine s — are strictly under UK national control , they had two distinct roles under the SIOP . The first was part of a UK - only retaliatory response to a nuclear attack , whether a full strategic strike , or a limited tactical strike . The second role was one in which the Royal Navy participated in the SIOP , in effect becoming an extension of the U . S . Navy ' s Trident submarines . This role was to be part of a NATO response to a Soviet nuclear strike . The Royal Navy ' s contribution to the SIOP was small . The four " Vanguard " submarines could strike a maximum of 512 separate targets ; equivalent to 7 % of the total U . S . nuclear strike capacity . History . SIOP , and its renamed successors , is most importantly an " integrated " plan that uses both Air Force and Navy delivery systems ; it is " single " only in the sense that it comes out of one planning group . The " plan " actually contains multiple " attack options " that are themselves complex plans . Early targeting after the Second World War . Truman . There is no evidence that the Soviet Union ' s contingency plans from the end of World War II to 1950 were anything but routine and defensive , and the substantial postwar demobilization of the Soviet military supports the view that the USSR did not view a new war in Europe as likely . Although Soviet doctrine believed in the innate hostility of the capitalist powers to Communism , Soviet leader Josef Stalin apparently believed that neither the USSR nor the West could afford to fight another world war , and was skeptical of the Western ability to raise an army large enough to occupy Soviet territory . Soviet planning thus emphasized defenses against nuclear bombing , and attacks on Western European bomber bases . Plans in 1946 and 1948 assumed that during war with an unspecified enemy , Soviet forces in Germany would assume defensive positions within the Soviet occupation zone and wait for reinforcements before counterattacking . Soviet conventional forces greatly outnumbered the West ' s , however , and United States strategic nuclear strike plans were developed accordingly . While the United States was the only nation with the atomic bomb , in 1946 it had only 17 Silverplate B - 29 bombers and 11 atomic bombs . Many early American war plans were based on using hundreds of atomic bombs , but the bombs were not available ; for example , an autumn 1945 plan envisioned using 196 atomic bombs on Soviet industrial targets , but SAC could not deliver such quantities until 1952 . The bombs were of the Mark 3 type , weighing five tons and requiring 39 men two days to assemble . The press reported that " atomic - capable " B - 29s were deployed to Britain in mid - 1948 during the Berlin Blockade , by which time the US possessed about 50 atomic weapons . The Soviets likely knew through espionage , however , that none of the aircraft was a Silverplate ; rather , they would have been used as part of plan DOUBLEQUICK , involving World War II - like sustained conventional bombing raids on Soviet air bases in Eastern Europe . Other than increasing its anti - aircraft defenses the Soviets did not change its military preparations in any way during the blockade , unlike the reaction in the West . Although the Soviets launched an intensive public relations effort in 1949 , aided by sympathetic Western European fellow traveler s , to oppose the formation of NATO , the new alliance ' s military strength was so weak that the Politburo did not bother to discuss it for six months after its formation . Strategic bombing during World War II of key transportation and energy sites was more effective than attacking cities , and early postwar non - nuclear war plans envisioned focusing on the Soviet petroleum industry . US war planners lacked updated maps of the USSR , however , and had to use pre - World War II maps — some older than the Russian Revolution — or perhaps German aerial photos from the war . Due in part to the lack of updated intelligence nuclear planning increasingly focused on urban areas , which were easier to target and offered the potential for " bonus damage " . The early Plan Totality targeted 20 cities with the 30 nuclear bombs then available . Plan BROILER ( November 1947 ) envisioned 34 bombs on 24 Soviet cities . It and later plans such as HALFMOON ( May 1948 ; 50 bombs on 20 cities ) and OFFTACKLE ( December 1949 ; 104 urban targets , 220 bombs , 72 more reserved for follow - up attacks ) envisioned Western forces in Europe slowly retreating while the United Kingdom was reinforced as an air base for atomic attacks on the Soviet Union . President Harry S . Truman hoped for an international ban on atomic weapons and believed that the American people would not support their use for " aggressive purposes " , and ordered JCS to devise a plan for conventional war ; however , Secretary of Defense James Forrestal in July 1948 ordered them to stop and resume atomic war planning due to the Berlin crisis . Officials were pessimistic about the effectiveness of the atomic plans , however . Britain ' s 1948 SPEEDWAY plan assumed that the Soviets would not have atomic weapons , but nonetheless forecast that the west could not " withstand a Russian advance in Western Europe , even with the full defence co - operation of the Western Powers " , including 560 American and British atomic - capable bombers . The American TROJAN ( December 1948 ) envisioned 133 bombs ( although only 50 existed ) hitting 70 cities . A committee led by General Hubert R . Harmon reported in May 1949 that even if all precisely hit their targets , the USSR would not surrender , its leadership would not be seriously weakened , and its military could still operate in Western Europe , the Middle East , and Asia . The attacks would reduce Soviet industrial capacity by 30 to 40 % , but only temporarily without follow - up attacks . The Harmon report had three immediate results : 1 ) It supported those within the United States Navy and elsewhere who criticized the centrality of atomic bombs and mass attacks on cities in American war planning . 2 ) It led to a substantial rise in nuclear - weapons production . 3 ) It caused the Joint Chiefs of Staff to , in fall 1949 , assign SAC with the duty of slowing a Soviet invasion of Western Europe as part of NATO . Erroneous US and British intelligence reports led to exaggerated NATO estimates of Soviet conventional forces . One 1951 estimate foresaw 175 combat divisions allegedly prepared to simultaneously attack Western Europe , the United Kingdom , the Balkans , the Middle East , and North America . The perceived imbalance in forces was so great that American planners feared that even Britain would have to be abandoned during the invasion , a possibility they did not discuss with their British counterparts . Stalin did consider the possibility of war in Asia , as opposed to Europe . In January 1950 he approved Kim Il Sung ' s proposal to conquer South Korea in what became the Korean War that summer , believing that that victory there would discredit NATO . The gambit backfired , however ; despite their initial optimism the Communists were unable to defeat the US - led forces in Korea , and the war greatly increased Western military spending , for the first time making NATO a significant threat against the Soviets in Europe . By late 1950 the USSR notified its Eastern European satellites to prepare for war by the end of 1952 , a date matching Western estimates . In early 1951 , based on an alleged NATO plan to launch a European war that year from Western proxy Yugoslavia as a response to its defeat in Korea , he ordered a massive increase in Eastern European forces that hurt the weaker Communist economies . Based on the Korean precedent , the Soviets apparently expected that the West would not use atomic weapons in a European war . During Stalin ' s lifetime Soviet doctrine foresaw the next war as a more destructive version of World War II similarly decided by giant armies supported by massive home fronts , a type of conflict which benefited from the Soviet Union ' s innate strengths . The Soviet Union tested its first atomic weapon in 1949 , but Stalin seems to have viewed possessing it as a political rather than military benefit , and he did not integrate atomic weapons into the Soviet military ' s equipment . By this time Truman was pessimistic about international arms control and told his advisors " Since we can ' t obtain international control we must be strongest in atomic weapons . " He approved the Harmon report ' s recommendation for increased weapons production , and approved another increase soon after the start of the Korean War . JCS decided to emphasize " the destruction of known targets affecting the Soviet capability to deliver atomic bombs " , with refineries , chemical and power plants , and shipyards as secondary and tertiary targets . The three categories were codenamed BRAVO ( blunting ) , ROMEO ( retardation ) , and DELTA ( disruption / destruction ) of the Soviet ability to fight , and formed the basis of American nuclear targeting for almost a decade . When military theorist Bernard Brodie studied the resulting target list , however , he strongly criticized the planners ' ignorance of actual Soviet military capacity and resulting failure to estimate what effect the attacks would have . Brodie later recalled that " There was no calculated strategy for destroying Soviet capability to make war . The planners " simply expected the Soviet Union ' to collapse ' as a result of the bombing campaign . . . People kept talking about the ' Sunday punch ' . " He recommended that targets be chosen based on analysis of the results of their destruction , and that " city - avoidance " strategies be studied . Brodie presented his report in April 1951 , but JCS found SAC head LeMay more persuasive . LeMay objected to the list because of the difficulty of attacking isolated targets and the requirement for pre - attack reconnaissance for many of them . He preferred attacking industrial targets in urban areas so that even if a bomb missed , " a bonus will be derived from the use of the bomb " . The target panel agreed to have SAC review future target lists before sending them to JCS . Eisenhower . By the end of 1953 SAC would have 1 , 000 nuclear - capable bombers and was deploying the B - 47 jet bomber . In January of that year Dwight D . Eisenhower inherited the Truman administration ' s large defense budget . The new president believed such expenditures threatened the economy , and cut $ 5 billion in defense spending that spring . Based on extensive experience with nuclear strategy and targeting from his terms as Chief of Staff of the United States Army and NATO Supreme Allied Commander , the Eisenhower administration ' s NSC 162 / 2 of October 1953 chose a less expensive , defensive - oriented direction for the military that emphasized " massive retaliation " , still primarily delivered by USAF , to deter war . The document formalized efforts begun under Truman to deploy newly developed tactical nuclear weapons small enough for most Air Force and Navy planes . The administration believed that they would be useful both during a general war and to deter a local one in Europe . The doctrine of massive retaliation meant that , for the first time , atomic weapons became the basis of NATO strategy rather than an option of last resort . Similarly , the Soviet doctrine of non - atomic warfare began to change after Stalin ' s death in March 1953 . In September that year a general proposed in a military journal that new weaponry might end a war quickly unlike World War II , and in October the Soviet Army held its first military exercise based on the enemy using atomic weapons . In 1954 Soviet forces in Europe received their first tactical atomic weapons , by which time Soviet officers publicly debated in the journal the merits of preemptive war . Prevention versus preemption . Many in the West also seriously discussed the idea of preventive war . Truman rejected the idea , stating that " [ s ] tarting an atomic war is totally unthinkable for rational men " , but his British counterpart Clement Attlee stated in 1945 that " twice is he armed who gets in the first blow " . JCS proposed in 1947 that the president be authorized to use atomic bombs to prevent a nuclear attack . NSC 68 of April 1950 opposed " a military attack not provoked by a military attack on us or on our allies " , but acknowledged " if possible " the benefits of preemptively " landing the first blow " before the Soviet Union did so . In August 1950 Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews publicly advocated a preventive war , but NSC 68 forecast that even after a massive preventive attack the USSR would likely not surrender and its forces could still " dominate most or all of Eurasia . " A committee led by retired general Jimmy Doolittle suggested in spring 1953 that the administration study the possibility of giving the Soviets two years to cooperate , with the threat of possible war otherwise , and an Air Force study in August warned of " The Coming National Crisis " due to having to negotiate with a country run by " the whims of a small group of proven barbarians " . Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles discussed that month their fears that , once the Soviets acquired fusion weapons , the resulting situation might force the United States into either war or dictatorship . While the president and other civilian and military leaders doubted the morality or legality of preventive war , preemptive war was much less problematic given that NSC 5410 / 1 of March 1954 acknowledged that " the survival of the United States " was at risk . The Central Intelligence Agency believed that it could warn of a surprise Soviet attack days or even weeks ahead of time because of the necessary preparation time , and that up to 30 days would be needed to deliver all Soviet weapons . The BRAVO - ROMEO - DELTA targeting strategy continued , with tactical weapons to be used in Europe while SAC delivered strategic weapons to the USSR . SAC obtained almost independent target selection by 1955 . The Air Force often used target lists to justify greater weapons production , then greater spending on delivery systems for the additional weapons . Although other services opposed such " bootstrapping " , they did not have the IBM 704 computer that SAC used to analyze target priorities so could not offer competing selection lists . Its Basic War Plan of March 1954 planned for up to 735 bombers to simultaneously and massively attack all targets , military and urban , in the USSR . Eisenhower preferred to avoid civilian targets , and by 1954 several Air Force planners advocated a " no - cities " strategy . Other planners and USAF leadership , however , believed that the Soviet Union could support its " " immense " armed forces for at least two years of intensive warfare " if industrial and government centers were not attacked . The possibility existed , they believed , that SAC could in fact deliver a " decisive " attack on the USSR , a tempting idea given the power of the 15 - megaton hydrogen bombs being tested . LeMay stated in an 1988 interview that Two studies soon concluded , however , that if such a window existed it had either closed or would soon . Weapons Systems Evaluation Group stated in February 1955 that destroying all known Soviet bases would require twice as large a force as the United States expected to field . A National Security Council study found that by mid - 1958 the only defense against a devastating Soviet attack would be to attack first after being warned , which Eisenhower believed was impossible . Given the apparent impracticality of massive retaliation strategy , Army Chiefs of Staff Matthew Ridgeway and his successor Maxwell Taylor argued within JCS that deterrence , instead of the " worst case " scenario of a full - scale nuclear war , should be the focus . More conventional forces were needed to prevent limited wars from leading to larger nuclear ones ; similarly , tactical nuclear weapons should be avoided in local wars to prevent escalation . Eisenhower , however , believed that tactical weapons should be viewed similarly to very large conventional " blockbusters " , and did not want American forces stalled within small wars . Massive retaliation remained the basis of American war planning , especially since NATO estimated after the Hungarian revolution of 1956 that during wartime Western forces would retreat to the Rhine River within 48 hours . By the 1950s around 5 , 500 targets were listed to receive SAC bomber strikes ; these targets consisted primarily of industrial sites but included counterforce targets . These plans , primarily by the Air Force , tended to be based on selecting targets in order to use up the available weapons , rather than considering the desired effects or strategic outcomes . From a 1957 letter from John H . Moore , former director of nuclear planning , air operations branch , United States European Command , Air Force target planning methodology can be inferred " blast damage frame , " with such references as " damage to concrete structures " and the requirement for a " high probability of cratering runways . " He cited the " destructive and disruptive nature of nuclear weapons " with megaton yields : " the cumulative or ancillary effects may be as great or greater than primary damage . " Specifically , he considered delayed radiation but not thermal effects , but called attention to the idea of " bonus " effects , in which the totality of weapons effects would allow lower - yield weapons to achieve the " desired destruction . " In the letter to the head of the Atomic Energy Commission , Lewis Strauss , Moore noted that the Pentagon " rigorously suppressed " this study and destroyed all copies . Prior to the development of SIOP and survivable command and control , Eisenhower predelegated nuclear release authority to certain senior commanders . In April 1956 , for example , he authorized Air Defense Command to use Genie air - to - air and Nike Hercules surface - to - air missiles during a surprise attack . There have continued to be Continuity of Nuclear Operations Plans ( COOP ) , which designated enough subordinates who , in the event of the National Command Authority and immediate successors being killed in a " decapitation " attack , could still retaliate . While the details have never been made public , Eisenhower ' s predelegation , and a Federation of American Scientists summary , give a framework . Presidential involvement and start of civilian policy direction . In 1958 , George Kistiakowsky , a key Manhattan Project scientist and Science Advisor in the Eisenhower Administration , suggested to the President that inspection of foreign military facilities was not sufficient to control their nuclear weapons . Kistiakowsky was particularly concerned with the difficulty of verifying the number , type , and deployment of nuclear - armed missiles on missile submarines , and proposed that the arms control strategy focus on disarmament rather than inspections . He was also concerned with the short warning times available from Intercontinental Ballistic Missile ( ICBM ) launches , which took away the lengthy decision time available when the nuclear threat came exclusively from manned bombers . Eisenhower sent Kistiakowsky to Strategic Air Command headquarters where he was , at first , rebuffed . At the same time as the early nuclear arms control work , the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , General Nathan F . Twining , USAF , sent a memorandum in August 1959 , to the Secretary of Defense , Neil McElroy , which suggested that the Strategic Air Command be formally assigned responsibility to prepare the national nuclear target list , and a single plan for nuclear operations . Up to that point , the Army , Navy , and Air Force had done their own target planning . That had led to individual targets being multiply targeted by the different services . The separate service plans were not mutually supporting , as , for example , by the Navy destroying an air defense facility on the route of an Air Force bomber going to a target deeper inland . While Twining had sent the memo to McElroy , the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed on the policy during early 1960 . Thomas Gates , who succeeded McElroy , asked President Dwight D . Eisenhower to decide the policy . Eisenhower said he would not " leave his successor with the monstrosity " of the uncoordinated and non - integrated forces that then existed . When Kistiakowsky was not given access , Eisenhower sent him back with a much stronger set of orders giving SAC officers the choice to cooperate with Kistiakowsky , or resign . Kistiakowsky ' s report , presented on November 29 , described uncoordinated plans with huge numbers of targets , many of which would be attacked by multiple forces , resulting in overkill . Eisenhower was shocked by the plans , and focused not just on the creation of the Single Integrated Operational Plan ( SIOP ) , but on the entire process of picking targets , generating requirements , and planning for nuclear war operations . Separate operational plans from the Air Force and the Navy were combined to form the foundation of the SIOP . The first SIOP . The first plan , following the White House policy guidance , was developed in 1960 , consisting of a list of targets ( the National Strategic Target List , or NSTL ) and the assets to be used against each target . This first SIOP was extensively revised by a team at the RAND Corporation to become SIOP - 62 , describing a massive strike with the entire US arsenal of 3 , 200 warheads against the USSR , China and Soviet - aligned states . The early SIOP , however , had little flexibility , treating all Communist countries as a uniform bloc . Document JCS 2056 / 220 expressed the concerns of U . S . Marine Commandant David Shoup that the 1961 draft was inconsistent with an 1959 NSC policy guidance paper approved by Eisenhower . Shoup was especially concerned with language in the draft SIOP that said The United States should utilize all requisite force against selected targets in the USSR — and as necessary in Communist China , European Bloc and non - European bloc countries — to attain the above objectives . Military targets in Bloc countries other than the USSR and Communist China will be attacked as necessary . The National Security Archive commentary reports that Shoup asked USAF / SAC Commander Thomas Power " . . . what would happen if Beijing was not fighting ; was there an option to leave Chinese targets out of the attack plan ? " Power was reported to have said that he hoped no one would think of that " because it would really screw up the plan " — that is , the plan was supposed to be executed as a whole . Apparently Shoup then observed that " any plan that kills millions of Chinese when it isn ' t even their war is not a good plan . This is not the American way . " SIOP - 63 . During 1961 – 1962 the Kennedy administration revised this plan as supervised by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara . SIOP - 63 , which took effect in July 1962 and remained mostly unchanged for more than 10 years , proposed five escalating attack options : Many smaller target options were also created for possible use . The plan contemplated the possibility that options 1 and 2 be used to prevent an " impending major Sino - Soviet Bloc attack upon the U . S . or its allies " . By 1963 , however , McNamara concluded that such plans were useless , because the situations for which nuclear weapons might be used were so unpredictable that advanced planning was impossible . Counterforce migrates to deterrence and warfighting . Studies began in 1972 – 1973 to provide more flexibility for the use of American nuclear weapons . In January 1974 President Richard M . Nixon approved NSDM - 242 , intended to add more " limited employment options " to help manage escalation , to SIOP - 63 . The related Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy ( NUWEP ) of April 1974 provided targets to achieve various goals ; for example , the document stated that the United States nuclear forces must possess the ability to destroy 70 % of the industrial capacity the Soviet Union needed to recover after a war . These documents formed the basis of SIOP - 5 ( January 1976 ) , sometimes called the Schlesinger Doctrine after Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger . The ever - expanding target lists were split into classes of targets , with a wider range of plans matching strikes to political intentions from counterforce to countervalue , or any mix / withhold strategy to control escalation . Schlesinger described the doctrine as having three main aspects : The SIOP policy was further modified during the Carter presidency under , a key section of which stated The employment of nuclear forces must be effectively related to operations of our general purpose forces . Our doctrines for the use of forces in nuclear conflict must insure that we can pursue specific policy objectives selected by the National Command Authorities at that time , from general guidelines established in advance . ( S ) These requirements form the broad outline of our evolving countervailing strategy . To meet these requirements , improvements should be made to our forces , their supporting C3 and intelligence , and their employment plans and planning apparatus , to achieve a high degree of flexibility , enduring survivability , and adequate performance in the face of enemy actions . The following principles and goals should guide your efforts in making these improvements . ( S ) In other words , PD59 explored a " warfighting " doctrine that suggested that nuclear plans might change during a war , and that nuclear weapons were to be used in combination with conventional weapons . Carter ' s Secretary of Defense , Harold Brown , emphasized selective counterforce , but also explicitly threatened the Soviet leadership themselves . Major improvements in U . S . command , control , communications and intelligence ( C3I ) , including making elements survivable during a nuclear war , were instituted to make the PD - 59 doctrine feasible . By 1982 SIOP - 5 contained more than 40 , 000 possible targets in four categories : Whether Soviet military doctrine recognized the difference between counterforce and a general attack was unknown . A 1982 analysis stated , however , that the technically inferior Soviet attack - assessment system would likely have difficulty in differentiating between such attacks . In any case , given that the majority of Soviet nuclear airfields and missile sites were located west of the Ural mountains , many in major population centers , the analysis concluded that the American plans for flexible use of force were meaningless . The author was also skeptical of whether communications to manage escalation — whether on the Moscow – Washington hotline , or between command authorities and their deployed nuclear submarines and bombers — could be maintained , and observed that use of nuclear weapons " are not suited to signalling any precise and unambiguous message " . Return to counterforce , with strategic defense . During the Reagan administration , there was a return to a strong counterforce strategy through NSDD - 13 . This included development of strategic weapons systems that were more accurate , more survivable , or both . Some of these systems eventually took the role of bargaining chips in arms control negotiations , although some , such as the B - 2 " stealth " bomber remained highly classified as potential surprises in war . The B - 2 was also seen as a counter to Soviet deployment of mobile missiles , which only a manned bomber could find and attack . In 1983 , President Reagan gave a speech proposing , at the least , research and development into non - nuclear defense systems against nuclear - armed missiles . The idea of effective strategic defense was a potential disruption to the existing balance of Mutual Assured Destruction , even with its " warfighting " refinements . Renaming and refocusing . On 1 March 2003 , the SIOP was renamed " OPLAN 8022 " , and later CONPLAN ( contingency plan ) 8022 . It went into deployment in July 2004 , but it was reported cancelled in July 2007 . It may have been superseded by an expanded CONPLAN 8044 . Another set of " Global Strike " plans include a jointly coordinated a nuclear option , intended for other than the general nuclear war situations , principally with Russia but possibly also with China , postulated in OPLAN 8022 . Global Strike plans are codified in CONPLAN 8044 . Executing the SIOP . In the United States , the decision to use nuclear weapons is vested in the National Command Authority ( NCA ) , composed of the President of the United States and the United States Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors . The President alone cannot order an attack . The ordering of use , communication of orders , and the release of nuclear weapons is governed by the two - man rule at all times . No one person ever can take such an action . All military personnel that participate in loading , arming , or firing weapons , as well as transmitting launch orders , are subject to the Personnel Reliability Program ( PRP ) . If the NCA decides that the United States must launch nuclear weapons , they will direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ( CJCS ) to do so via the Nuclear Football briefcase . At the NCA / JCS level , the orders will be to execute SIOP strike options , broken into Major Attack Options ( MAOs ) , Selected Attack Options ( SAOs ) , and Limited Attack Options ( LAOs ) . Individual countries or regions can be included in or withheld from nuclear attacks depending on circumstances . The CJCS in turn will direct the general officer on duty in addition to one other officer on duty in the National Military Command Center ( NMCC ) at the Pentagon to release an Emergency Action Message ( EAM ) containing an Emergency War Order ( EWO ) to all nuclear forces ; another officer will validate that order . Additionally , the message will go to the Alternate National Military Command Center ( ANMCC ) , located in Raven Rock Mountain , Pennsylvania , and also to an airborne command post , either the presidential National Airborne Operations Center ( NAOC ) or the military E - 6 Mercury Looking Glass . If the NMCC is destroyed by a first strike , either the ANMCC , NAOC or TACAMO can issue the orders to execute the SIOP . As the orders go down the chain of command , always subject to the two - man rule , intermediate headquarters , and eventually the nuclear delivery platforms themselves , will receive Emergency Action Messages ( EAM ) to arm or launch weapons . For most modern weapons , the EAM will also include codes for Permissive Action Links ( PAL ) . At a minimum , a PAL code will actually arm a weapon for release . The circuitry controlling the PAL is deliberately positioned inside the warhead such that it cannot be reached without disabling the weapon , at a minimum , to a level that would require a full factory - level rebuild . There may be separate PAL codes for arming and launch . Some weapons have " dial - a - yield " functions that allow the power of the nuclear explosion to be adjusted from minimum to maximum yield . Most weapons have additional arming circuitry that , even if a valid launch code is entered , will not arm the warhead unless the weapon senses that it has been released on an expected delivery path . For example , the first steps of the final arming process for a ballistic missile depend on physical characteristics of the weapon release , such as the acceleration of a rocket launch , zero - gravity coasting , and various physical aspects of hypersonic reentry into the atmosphere . A gravity bomb dropped from an aircraft will detect the altitude of release and the decreasing altitude as it falls . Journalist Ron Rosenbaum has pointed out that the SIOP is entirely concerned with the identity of the commanding officer and the authenticity of the order , and there are no safeguards to verify that the person issuing the order is actually sane . Notably , Major Harold Hering was discharged from the Air Force for asking the question " How can I know that an order I receive to launch my missiles came from a sane president ? "