Soviet offensive plans controversy The Soviet offensive plans controversy refers to the debate among historians on the question of whether Soviet Dictator Joseph Stalin was planning to invade Germany prior to Operation Barbarossa . Background . Immediately after the German invasion of the USSR during World War II , Adolf Hitler asserted that the Soviet Red Army had made extensive preparations for an offensive war in Europe , thus justifying the German invasion as a preemptive strike . After the Second World War , this view was supported by some Wehrmacht leaders , like Wilhelm Keitel . Suvorov , " Icebreaker " , and the 1980s . In the 1980s Vladimir Rezun , a former officer of the Soviet military intelligence and a defector to the UK , reiterated and explored this claim in his 1987 book " Icebreaker : Who Started the Second World War " , ( written using the pseudonym Viktor Suvorov ) and in several subsequent books . He argued that Soviet ground - forces were extremely well organized , and were mobilizing " en masse " all along the German - Soviet border for a Soviet invasion of Europe slated for Sunday , July 6 , 1941 , but they were totally unprepared for defensive operations on their own territory . One of Suvorov ' s pieces of evidence favoring the theory of an impending Soviet attack was his claim regarding the maps and phrasebooks issued to Soviet troops . Military topographic maps , unlike other military supplies , are strictly local and cannot be used elsewhere than in the intended operational area . Suvorov claims Soviet units were issued with maps of Germany and German - occupied territory , and phrasebooks including questions about SA offices — SA offices were found only in German territory proper . In contrast , maps of Soviet territory were scarce . Notably , after the German attack , the officer responsible for maps , Lieutenant General M . K . Kudryavtsev , was not punished by Stalin , who was known for extreme punishments after failures to obey his orders . According to Suvorov , this demonstrates that Kudryavtsev " was " obeying the orders of Stalin , who simply did not expect a German attack . Suvorov offers as another piece of evidence the extensive effort Stalin took to conceal general mobilization by manipulating the laws setting the conscription age . That allowed Stalin to provide the expansive build - up of the Red Army . Since there was no universal military draft in the Soviet Union until 1939 , by enacting the universal military draft on 1 September 1939 , and by changing the minimum age for joining the Red Army from 21 to 18 , Stalin triggered a mechanism which achieved a dramatic increase in the military strength of the Red Army . This specific law on mobilization allowed the Red Army to increase its army of 1 , 871 , 600 men in 1939 to 5 , 081 , 000 in the spring of 1941 under secrecy to avoid alarming the rest of the world . 18 million reservists were also drafted . The duration of service was 2 years . Thus , according to supporters of the Soviet Union Offensive Plans Theory , the Red Army had to enter a war by 1 September 1941 or the drafted soldiers would have to be released from service . Points . Suvorov ' s main points include the following : Reactions and critiques . While most agree that Stalin made extensive preparations for an eventual war and exploited the military conflict in Europe to his advantage , the assertions that Stalin planned to attack Nazi Germany in the summer of 1941 , and that Operation Barbarossa was a preemptive strike by Hitler , are generally discounted . In some countries , particularly in Russia , Germany , and Israel , Suvorov ' s thesis has jumped the bonds of academic discourse and captured the imagination of the public . Among the noted critics of Suvorov ' s work are Israeli historian Gabriel Gorodetsky , American military historian David Glantz , and Russian military historians Makhmut Gareev , Lev Bezymensky , and perhaps his most vehement Russian critic , Alexei Isayev , the author of " Anti - Suvorov " . Many other western scholars , such as Teddy J . Uldricks , Derek Watson , Hugh Ragsdale , Roger Reese , Stephen Blank , Robin Edmonds , agree that the major part of Suvorov ' s writings rest on circumstantial evidence , or even on " virtually no evidentiary base " . According to Jonathan Haslam , Suvorov ' s claim that " Germany frustrated Stalin ' s war " " would be comical were it not taken so seriously " . Soviet - emigre historian Alexandr Nekrich ( extremely critical of Stalin in other contexts ) also rejected Suvorov ' s ideas as unsubstantiated and contrary to Stalin ' s broader policy . Some of Suvorov ' s claims have been shown to simply be inaccurate , such as his claim regarding Soviet conscription only starting in 1939 , when in fact , conscription existed in the RKKA since 1925 Nevertheless , studies by some historians , e . g . , Russian military historian Mikhail Meltyukhov ( " Stalin ' s Missed Chance " ) gave partial support to the claim that Soviet forces were concentrating in order to attack Germany . Other historians who support this thesis are Vladimir Nevezhin , Boris Sokolov , Valeri Danilov , Joachim Hoffmann and Mark Solonin . Offensive interpretations of Stalin ' s prewar planning are also supported by Sovietologist Robert C . Tucker and Pavel Bobylev . Moreover , it is argued by Hoffmann that the actual Soviet troop concentrations were near the German - Soviet border in the former Poland , as were fuel depots and airfields . All of this is claimed to be unsuitable for defensive operations . Source : Mikhail Meltyukhov " Stalin ' s Missed Chance " table 47 , Supporters of the ' Soviet offensive plans ' theory also refer to various facts , such as the publication of Georgy Zhukov ' s proposal of May 15 , 1941 , which called for a Soviet strike against Germany , to support their position . This document suggested secret mobilization and deployment of Red Army troops next to the western border , under the cover of training . However , Robin Edmonds argued that the Red Army ' s planning staff would not have been doing its job well if it had not considered the possibility of a pre - emptive strike against the Wehrmacht , whereas Teddy J . Uldricks pointed out that there is no documentary evidence that Zhukov ' s proposal was ever accepted by Stalin . Another piece of evidence is Stalin ' s speech of 5 May 1941 , when he spoke to graduating military cadets . He proclaimed : " A good defense signifies the need to attack . Attack is the best form of defense . . . We must now conduct a peaceful , defensive policy with attack . Yes , defense with attack . We must now re - teach our army and commanders . Educate them in the spirit of attack " . However , according to Michael Jabara Carley , this speech could be equally interpreted as a deliberate attempt to discourage the Germans from launching an invasion . Other Russian historians , Iu . Gor ' kov , A . S . Orlov , Iu . A . Polyakov , and Dmitri Volkogonov , analyzed newly available evidence to demonstrate that Soviet forces were certainly not ready for the attack . According to Meltyukhov , the January 1941 strategic war games using ' Northern ' and ' Southern ' variants ( conducted respectively on January 2 – 6 and Jan . 8 - 11 1941 , as also depicted in articles by Pavel Bobylev ) did assume that the forces of the ' East ' ( i . e . USSR ) first had to repel an assault by the ' West ' ( i . e . Germany ) , though no concrete actions on how this could take place were covered . Instead , the war games concentrated on the Soviet ' counterattack ' . As the attack of the forces of the ' East ' was more successful in the Southern variant , this area was chosen as the main direction of Soviet forces . Criticism . Among the noted critics of Suvorov ' s work are Israeli historian Gabriel Gorodetsky , American military historian David Glantz , and Russian military historians Makhmut Gareev , Lev Bezymensky , and Dmitri Volkogonov . Many other western scholars , such as Teddy J . Uldricks , Derek Watson , Hugh Ragsdale , Roger Reese , Stephen Blank , and Robin Edmonds , agree that the Suvorov ' s major weakness is " that the author does not reveal his sources " ( Ingmar Oldberg ) . Historian Cynthia A . Roberts is even more categorical , claiming that Suvorov ' s writings are based on " virtually no evidentiary base " . Suvorov ' s most controversial thesis is that the Red Army made extensive preparations for an offensive war in Europe , but it was totally unprepared for defensive operations on its own territory . Thereby Suvorov essentially reiterates the argument put forward by Adolf Hitler in 1941 . According to Jonathan Haslam , Suvorov ' s claim that " Germany frustrated Stalin ' s war " " would be comical were it not taken so seriously " . Suvorov reluctantly revealed his sources , and that much of his thesis is based on circumstantial evidence . Thus , one of Suvorov arguments is that certain types of weapons were mostly suited for offensive warfare and that the Red Army had large numbers of such weapons . For example , he pointed out that the Soviet Union was outfitting large numbers of paratroopers — preparing to field entire parachute armies , in fact — and states that paratroopers are only suitable for offensive action , which the Soviet military doctrine of the time recognized . Suvorov ' s critics say that paratroopers were used in defensive actions and that Soviet paratroopers were poorly trained and armed . In like fashion , Suvorov cites the development of the KT / Antonov A - 40 " flying tank " as evidence of Stalin ' s aggressive plans , while his critics say that development of this tank was started only in December 1941 . David M . Glantz disputes the argument that the Red Army was deployed in an offensive stance in 1941 . According to Glantz , the Red Army was only in a state of partial mobilization in July 1941 , from which neither effective defensive or offensive actions could be offered without considerable delay . Glantz is also explicitly concerned that Suvorov ' s thesis involves condemnation of the Soviet regime and in his view exculpates Germany : " In short these new theories categorically blame the Soviet Union for planning preemptive war against Germany in July 1941 . Enunciation of this theory further condemns the Soviet regime , and more importantly , justifies the German invasion and absolves Germany of blame for the ensuing human suffering " . Middle positions . In a 1987 article in the " Historische Zeitschrift " journal , the German historian Klaus Hildebrand argued that both Hitler and Stalin separately were planning to attack each other in 1941 . In Hildebrand ’ s opinion , the news of Red Army concentrations near the border led to Hitler engaging in a " Flucht nach vorn " ( " flight forward " - i . e . responding to a danger by charging on rather than retreating ) . Hildebrand wrote " Independently , the National Socialist program of conquest met the equally far - reaching war - aims program which Stalin had drawn up in 1940 at the latest " . A middle position seems to be taken by the Israeli historian Martin van Creveld . In an interview in the April 11 , 2005 edition of the German news magazine " Focus " , which is the second largest weekly magazine in Germany , he said : " I doubt that Stalin wanted to attack as early as autumn 1941 , as some writers argue . But I have no doubt that sooner or later , if Germany would have been entangled in a war with Great Britain and the United States , he would have taken what he wanted . Judging by the talks between Joachim von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Molotov in November 1940 , this would have been Romania , Bulgaria , an access to the North Sea , the Dardanelles and probably those parts of Poland that were under German control at that time . " Asked to what degree the leaders of the Wehrmacht needed to feel threatened by the Soviet military buildup , van Creveld replies " very much " and adds : " In 1941 , the Red Army was the largest army in the world . Stalin may , as I said , not have planned to attack Germany in autumn 1941 . But it would be hard to believe that he would not have taken the opportunity to stab the Reich in the back sometime . " The actual documents of the Central Command of the Red Army , headed by George Zhukov for the last 6 months preceding the Nazi invasion , remain classified in Russia . Support . While Western researchers ( two exceptions being Albert L . Weeks and R . C . Raack ) criticised Suvorov ' s thesis , he has gathered some support among Russian historians , starting in the 1990s . Support in Russia for Suvorov ' s claim that Stalin had been preparing a strike against Hitler in 1941 began to emerge as some archive materials were declassified . Authors supporting the Stalin 1941 assault thesis are Valeri Danilov , V . A . Nevezhin , Constantine Pleshakov , Mark Solonin and Boris Sokolov . As the latter has noted , the absence of documents with the precise date of the planned Soviet invasion can ' t be an argument in favor of the claim that this invasion was not planned at all . Although the USSR attacked Finland , no documents found to date which would indicate 26 November 1939 as the assumed date for the beginning of provocations or 30 November as the date of the planned Soviet assault . One view was expressed by Mikhail Meltyukhov in his study " Stalin ' s Missed Chance " . The author states that the idea for striking Germany arose long before May 1941 , and was the very basis of Soviet military planning from 1940 to 1941 . Providing additional support for this thesis is that no significant defense plans have been found . In his argument , Meltyukhov covers five different versions of the assault plan ( " Considerations on the Strategical Deployment of Soviet Troops in Case of War with Germany and its Allies " ( Russian original ) ) , the first version of which was developed soon after the outbreak of World War II . The last version was to be completed by May 1 , 1941 . Even the deployment of troops was chosen in the South , which would have been more beneficial in case of a Soviet assault . Mark Solonin notes that several variants of a war plan against Germany had existed at least since August 1940 , although the differences between them were slight . Solonin also states that no other plans for Red Army deployment in 1941 have been found so far , and that the concentration of Red Army units in Western parts of USSR was done in direct accordance with the May " Considerations on plan for strategic deployment " : Planned and actual Red Army deployment on the Soviet Western Border Notes : - first digit – total number of divisions , second digit – tank divisions , third – motorized divisions - on June 21 , armies expanded in the Southern Theatre of Military Operations , and were divided into two Fronts : South - Western and Southern . The table contains the total number of divisions in the two Fronts and in the Crimea . - according to the Plan of Cover , after the commencement of combat actions , two divisions of the Northwest front , expanded in Estonia , were transferred to the Northern Front , but the table doesn ' t indicate this . Source : Mark Solonin ( 2010 ) ( in Polish ) . 23 czerwca Dzień M ( 1 ed . ) . Poznań , Poland : Dom Wydawniczy Rebis . pp . 204 . ISBN 978 - 83 - 7510 - 257 - 4 . The table is available online on Mark Solonin ' s webiste In " Stalin ' s War of Extermination " , Joachim Hoffmann made extensive use of interrogations of Soviet prisoners of war , ranging in rank from general to private , conducted by their German captors during the war . The book is also based on open - source , unclassified literature , and recently declassified materials . Based on this material , Hoffmann argues that the Soviet Union was making final preparations for its own attack when the Wehrmacht struck . He also remarked that Zhukov ' s plan of May 15 , 1941 had long been known and analyzed . Danilov and Heinz Magenheimer examined this plan and other documents in the early 1990s , which might indicate Soviet preparations for an attack , in the " Austrian military journal " ( " Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift " , nos . 5 and 6 , 1991 ; no . 1 , 1993 ; and no . 1 , 1994 ) . Both researchers came to the conclusion that Zhukov ' s plan of May 15 , 1941 reflected Stalin ' s May 5 , 1941 speech heralding the birth of the new offensive Red Army . In 2006 , a collection of articles ( entitled " The Truth of Viktor Suvorov " ) by various historians who share some views with Suvorov was published . This was followed by a number of sequels , six as of September 2010 . In a 2009 essay entitled " Don ’ t Blame Hitler Alone For World War II " , journalist Eric Margolis endorsed Suvorov ' s assertion that Operation Barbarossa was a " preventive war " forced on Nazi Germany by an alleged impending Soviet attack , and that it is wrong to give Hitler " total blame " for World War II . In another sequel to the collection , entitled the " New Truth of Viktor Suvorov " , Uri Milstein also defended Suvorov ' s positions . Several politicians have also made claims similar to Suvorov ' s . On August 20 , 2004 , historian and former Prime Minister of Estonia Mart Laar published an article in " The Wall Street Journal " titled " When Will Russia Say ' Sorry ' ? " . In this article , he said : " The new evidence shows that by encouraging Hitler to start World War II , Stalin hoped to simultaneously ignite a world - wide revolution and conquer all of Europe " . Another former statesman to share his views of a purported Soviet aggressive plan is Mauno Koivisto , who wrote : " It seems to be clear the Soviet Union was not ready for defense in the summer of 1941 , but it was rather preparing for an assault . . . The forces mobilized in the Soviet Union were not positioned for defensive , but for offensive aims . " Koivisto concludes : " Hitler ' s invasion forces didn ' t outnumber [ the Soviets ] , but were rather outnumbered themselves . The Soviets were unable to organize defenses . The troops were provided with maps that covered territories outside the Soviet Union . 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