Strategic Hamlet Program The Strategic Hamlet Program was a plan by the governments of South Vietnam and the United States during the Vietnam War to combat the Communist insurgency by means of population transfer . In 1961 , U . S . advisors in South Vietnam , along with the Diem regime , began the implementation of a plan attempted to isolate rural peasants from contact with and influence by the National Liberation Front ( NLF ) . The Strategic Hamlet Program , along with its predecessor , the Rural Community Development Program , played an important role in the shaping of events in South Vietnam during the late 1950s and early 1960s . Both of these programs attempted to create new communities of " protected hamlets " . The rural peasants would be provided security , being physically isolated from Communist insurgents and support services thereby strengthening ties with the central South Vietnam ese government ( GVN ) . It was hoped this would lead to increased loyalty by the peasantry towards the government . In the end , the program led to a decrease in support for Diem ’ s regime and an increase in sympathy for Communist efforts . After Ngo Dinh Diem was overthrown in a coup in November 1963 , the program greatly waned and peasants moved back into their native areas . Future counterinsurgency programs focused on accessing peasants in their existing communities rather than through forced relocation . Background and Precursor Program . Starting around 1954 , Viet Minh sympathizers in the South were subject to escalating repression by the RVN . In December 1960 the National Liberation Front of Southern Vietnam was formed and rapidly achieved de facto control over large sections of the South Vietnamese countryside . At the time , it is believed that there were approximately 10 , 000 Communist insurgents throughout South Vietnam . Recognizing the danger that the guerrillas posed if they had the support of the peasants , President Diem and his brother , Ngo Dinh Nhu implemented the Rural Community Development Program ( later known as " Agroville " ) in 1959 . Based partly on the success of a similar program in Malaya used by the British to suppress a communist uprising beginning in 1948 , the Agroville Plan endeavored to remove the " neutral " population from guerrilla contact . Through direct force and / or incentives , peasants in rural communities were separated and relocated into large communities called " Agrovilles " . By 1960 , there were twenty - three of these Agrovilles , each consisting of many thousands of people . This mass resettlement created a strong backlash from peasants and forced the central government to rethink its strategy . A report put out by the Caravelle group , consisting of among others , Bishop Thuc ( a brother of Diem ) described the situation as follows : Tens of thousands of people are being mobilized … to take up a life in collectivity , to construct beautiful but useless agrovilles which tire the people , lose their affection , increase their resentment and most of all give an additional terrain for propaganda to the enemy . In late 1961 , President Kennedy sent Roger Hilsman , then director of the State Department ' s Bureau of Intelligence and Research , to assess the situation in Vietnam . There Hilsman met Sir Robert Thompson , head of the British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam ( BRIAM ) . Thompson was a veteran of the Malayan counter - insurgency effort and a counter - insurgency advisor to the Diem government . Thompson shared his revised system of resettlement and population security , a system he proposed to Diem later in the year and that would eventually become the Strategic Hamlet Program . The program was implemented on the American side by CIA operative ( and later CIA director ) William Colby . In Vietnam , strategic hamlets would consist of villages consolidated and reshaped to create a defensible perimeter . Relocation was to be minimal . The peasants themselves would be given weapons and trained in self - defense . Moreover , the strategic hamlets would not be isolated ; instead , they would function as a network . The first hamlets would be placed in secure areas , free of the enemy ; new hamlets would then be added slowly to create a secure , expanding frontier in what was known as the " oil blot " principle . But , Thompson said , it was important that the strategic hamlets provide more than just physical security . The hamlets should be used as an administrative tool to institute reforms and to improve the peasants ’ lives economically , politically , socially , and culturally . This would strengthen the tie between the peasants and the central government . Hilsman later summarized this theory of the Strategic Hamlet Program in a policy document entitled " A Strategic Concept for South Vietnam " , which President Kennedy read and endorsed . President Diem also liked the idea of Strategic Hamlets . In an April 1962 speech , he outlined his hopes for the Program : . . . strategic hamlets represented the basic elements in the war undertaken by our people against our three enemies : communism , discord , and underdevelopment . In this concept they also represent foundation of the Vietnamese society where values are reassessed according the personalist revolution where social , cultural , and economic reform will improve the living conditions of the large working class down to the remotest village . Problematic implementation . Although many people in both the U . S . government and the government of South Vietnam ( GVN ) agreed that the Strategic Hamlet Program was strong in theory , its actual implementation , beginning in early 1962 , was criticized on several grounds . Roger Hilsman himself later claimed that the GVN ' s execution of program constituted a " total misunderstanding of what the [ Strategic Hamlet ] program should try to do . " The speed of the implementation of the Program is important to note , as it is one of the main causes for its eventual failure . The Pentagon Papers reported that in September 1962 , 4 . 3 million people were housed in 3 , 225 completed hamlets with more than two thousand still under construction . By July 1963 , over eight and a half million people had been settled in 7 , 205 hamlets according to figures given by the Vietnam Press . In less than a year , both the number of completed hamlets and its population had doubled . Given this rapid rate of construction , the GVN was unable to fully support or protect the hamlets or its residents , despite the immense funding by the United States government . Vietcong insurgents easily sabotaged and overran the poorly defended communities , gaining much sought access to the South Vietnamese peasants . It is estimated that only twenty percent of the hamlets in the Mekong Delta area were controlled by the GVN by the end of 1963 . In an interview , a resident of a hamlet in Vinh - Long described the situation : " It is dangerous in my village because the civil guard from the district headquarters cross the river to the village only in the daytime … leaving the village unprotected at night . The village people have no protection from the Viet Cong so they will not inform on them to the authorities . " There are several other important problems that the GVN faced in addition to those created by the failure to provide basic social needs for the peasants and over - extension of its resources . One of these was wide public opposition to the Program stemming partly from an aggressive propaganda campaign by the NLF , but also brought about by the inability of the committee to choose safe and agriculturally sound locations for the development of the hamlets . However , according to the Pentagon Papers , the most important source of failure was the inflexible nature of the Ngo family . Forced relocation . In the best case scenario , restructuring peasant villages to create a defensible perimeter would require the forced relocation of some of the peasants on the outskirts of the existing villages . To ease the burden , those forced to move were supposed to be financially compensated , but they were not always paid by the GVN forces . To make matters worse , their old homes were often burned before their eyes . President Diem and his brother Nhu , who oversaw the GVN side of the Program , decided — contrary to Hilsman ' s and Thompson ' s theory — that in most cases they would relocate entire villages rather than simply restructuring them . This decision led to unnecessary amounts of forced relocation that was deeply unpopular among the peasantry . The mostly - Buddhist peasantry practiced ancestor worship , an important part of their religion that was disrupted by being forced out of their villages and away from their ancestors ' graves . Some who resisted the resettlement were summarily executed by GVN forces . Corruption . As stated previously , promised compensation for resettled peasants was not always forthcoming and instead found its way in the pockets of GVN officials . Peasants were also promised money in exchange for working to build the new villages and fortifications ; once again some corrupt officials kept the money for themselves . Wealthier peasants sometimes bribed their way out of working on the construction , leaving more labor for the poorer peasants . Although the U . S . provided materials like sheet metal and barbed wire , corrupt officials would force the locals to " buy " the materials intended to provide them with protection . Security shortcomings . Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of the Strategic Hamlet Program as implemented on the ground was its failure to provide the basic security envisioned by its proponents . This failure was partly due to poor placement of the hamlets . Ignoring the " oil - blot " principle , the GVN began building strategic hamlets as fast as possible and seemingly without considering " geographical priorities , " according to a U . S . official . The randomly placed hamlets were isolated , not mutually supporting , and tempting targets for the Vietcong . Each hamlet was given a radio with which to call for ARVN support , but in fact ARVN forces were unreliable in responding to calls for help , especially when attacks occurred after nightfall . The villagers were also given weapons and training , but were only expected to hold out until conventional reinforcements arrived . Once it became clear those forces could not be relied upon , many villagers proved unwilling to fight even small Vietcong detachments , which could then capture the villagers ' weapons . " Why should we die for weapons ? " asked one Vietnamese peasant . Eventual Failure . Despite the Diem regime ' s attempt to put a positive spin on its execution of the Strategic Hamlet Program , by mid - 1963 it was becoming clear to many that the Program was failing . American military advisors like John Paul Vann started criticizing the Program in their official reports . They also began expressing their concerns to reporters who began to investigate more closely . David Halberstam ' s coverage of the Program ' s shortcomings even caught the eye of President Kennedy . The Strategic Hamlet Program was exposed as an almost complete failure in the aftermath of the November 1 , 1963 coup that left Diem and his brother Nhu murdered . US officials discovered , for example , that only 20 % of the 8600 hamlets that the Diem regime had reported " Complete " met the minimum American standards of security and readiness . The situation had passed the point of possible recovery . The program officially ended in 1964 . On the ground in Vietnam , the demise of the program was much easier to see . By the end of 1963 , empty hamlets lined country roads , stripped of valuable metal by the Vietcong and the fleeing peasants . According to Neil Sheehan , " The rows of roofless houses looked like villages of play huts that children had erected and then whimsically abandoned . " Years later Roger Hilsman stated his belief that the strategic hamlet concept was executed so poorly by the Diem regime and the GVN " that it was useless , worse than useless . "