Sweden and the Winter War The Winter War was fought in the four months following the Soviet Union ' s invasion of Finland on November 30 , 1939 . This took place three months after the German invasion of Poland that triggered the start of World War II in Europe . Sweden did not become actively involved in the conflict , but did indirectly support Finland . Message from the King . In the " Statsrådsdiktamen " on 19 February 1940 , Sweden ' s king Gustaf V publicly rejected pleas from Finland ' s government for military intervention in the Winter War to help defend Finland against the Soviet invasion . This statement from the king was aimed at pressuring Finland to accept harsh Soviet peace conditions and to quiet a strong Swedish activist public opinion advocating participation in the war . The statement had this effect , but was also to produce substantial bitterness in Finland . During the war , Sweden ' s government rejected a total of three formal pleas from Finland ' s government to engage militarily in Finland ' s defense against the Soviet Union . Detailed plans for Swedish deployment along Finland ' s border had been made ten years before , and they were regularly updated in secret contacts between the General Staff s of the two countries . However , no formal alliance had been concluded , and a proposed official recognition of cooperative defense of the de - militarized Åland Islands had been rebuffed by Sweden ' s parliament in June 1939 . Background to Swedish policy . According to the dominant view in Sweden ' s foreign ministry , Finland ' s foreign policy had , since her independence and 1918 civil war , been " unsteady and adventurous " . In addition , Finland ' s domestic politics were viewed with great suspicion by Swedish Social Democrat s . After the Socialists ' defeat in the civil war , anti - parliamentarism and Anti - Socialist policies dominated Swedish impressions of Finland . Cooperation with Finland had in the 1920s and 1930s primarily been advocated by fringe right - wing politicians and military officers . Both to the right and to the left , a closer cooperation with Finland was seen as a means to counter the hegemonic position of the Social Democrats in Sweden . After the Abyssinia crisis , both Finland and Sweden were forced to adjust their foreign policies , as the League of Nations seemed to offer only a hollow protection against foreign aggression . In the Baltic region both the reborn Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were seen as likely aggressors , eager to regain territories lost as a result of World War I , and likely to want to expand their influence further , if possible . Finland re - oriented her foreign policy towards Scandinavia and a neutralist policy of the Swedish type . The detailed plans for military cooperation were supplemented by intensified contacts between diplomats and politicians . Social Democrats under Väinö Tanner were rehabilitated and included in the cabinet . Finland ' s embassy in Stockholm was deemed the most important , and Paasikivi became ambassador there . Even though central politicians and officials had been converted and convinced of the necessity for a closer Swedish – Finnish cooperation , parliamentarians and prominent individuals did not change their anti - Swedish or anti - Finnish attitudes as easily . Impressions made ( in both countries ) in connection with Finland ' s independence , civil war , the Åland crisis , language strife , and the Lapua Movement all stuck . These impressions , in turn , were compounded by a tendency in Sweden to emphasize the danger of Nazi expansionism and to view the Soviet Union with a great deal of good will : in Finland , however , the converse view was dominant . The Nordic trend did not officially allow Swedish participation to security managements of the Gulf of Finland with Finland . However , behind the scene , the general staff of Sweden and Finland had negotiated secretly the Gulf of Finland blockade plan in 1929 . Sweden agreed that it would first suggest the Estonians the Gulf blockade in 1930 . Officially Sweden would not participate the cooperation , but it would give materiel and auxiliary troops if the Soviet Union attacked . Litvinov ' s demise as Soviet Foreign Minister in March 1939 signaled an increasing tension and danger for Finland and the Baltic countries , and indirectly for Sweden . Litvinov was known as being friendly towards the West , whereas the new minister , Molotov , had made a more aggressive impression . Litvinov ' s half promises to accept and support joint Finnish – Swedish provisions for the defense of Åland against the potential German threat were not upheld by his successor . As a consequence , Soviet - leaning ministers in Sweden , such as Ernst Wigforss and Östen Undén , proposed Sweden ' s withdrawal from these plans . Parliament agreed , being eager to continue Sweden ' s successful policy , since 1812 , of non - confrontation towards Russia . The political response to the Soviet invasion . In the face of the Molotov – Ribbentrop Pact and the following Soviet aggressions against Poland and the Baltic countries , Finland ' s situation seemed increasingly dangerous . On October 4 , Finland ' s government asked if Sweden was prepared to contribute to Åland ' s defense with military means . The following day , Molotov invited a Finnish delegation to Moscow , with Sweden ' s parliament being informed the day after . On October 12 , it turned out that the political support was deemed insufficient in Sweden for a military engagement on Åland : the Rightist Party was in favor , the Social Democrats were split , and a majority of the Agrarians and all the Liberals were opposed . The opposition to Swedish military assistance on Åland was strengthened by the fear that intervention would become extended to Mainland Finland , which few parliamentarians would support . Publicly , Finland was supported , but Finland ' s Foreign Minister Elias Erkko was informed that Swedish troops were not to be expected . It remains controversial to this day whether he delivered this message to his colleagues and his president . The message perceived by public opinion in Finland , as well as in Sweden , thus differed greatly from the Swedish government ' s intentions . For two months Finland literally fought for her national survival , but by the end of January 1940 , the Soviet Union gave up its plans for a reconquest of the whole of Finland . It was now deemed sufficient if Finland ceded its industrial heartland , including its second largest city Viipuri ( Viborg , currently Vyborg ) . This would mean that the Soviet Union might gain much greater territory than the Red Army had been able to seize control of by military means . Through the so - called " Statsrådsdiktamen , " Sweden ' s king helped the public perception of Sweden ' s intentions converge with the government ' s intentions . Swedish military ' s position . One of the main considerations that led the Swedish government to declare Sweden a non - belligerent state was concern that they might otherwise lose control of the internal situation in Sweden . The Soviet demands on Finland in the months prior to the outbreak of war had roused public opinion . While there had been large demonstrations in support of Finland , Russia was a traditional enemy , and fear of the Russians had been a part of the Swedish mindset since 1719 , when Russian galleys burned Swedish coastal communities during the Great Northern War . Therefore , there was a strong feeling that it was better to defend Sweden on Finnish soil . Swedish military strength was at one of its low points in 1939 , a rearmament program had been decided in 1936 but it hadn ' t yet had any substantial effect on the armed forces . The army only had 16 tanks apart from a small number of tankettes armed with machine guns . Air defence guns were few and the air force only had 36 Gloster Gladiator fighters . Modern artillery was very limited , short range guns of the great war era or older where the norm . Worst of all , training had been very reduced in a 1925 decision to cut back on the armed forces , most units didn ' t have winter training and left army units needing to conduct rehearsal training after a mobilization . Within the Swedish military , officers who had been volunteers in the Finnish civil war were now senior officers . Most notable among them were Axel Rappe , a member of the General Staff , and Archibald Douglas , commander of the Northern Army Corps . The belief that Sweden was best served by a defense in Finland was enacted primarily by Douglas , whose Northern Army Corps comprised around 26 , 600 men who had been mobilised to guard the Swedish border with Finland in case the Russians invaded . He reasoned that the best way he could defend Sweden was to move into Finland and meet the Russians there . When the Russians had reached a certain point inside Finland , the whole Northern Army Corps would move across the border and take up positions along the Kemi river , all without approval of the Swedish government . The fact that the Swedish government did not get news of Douglas ' plan right away makes it entirely possible that the plan could have been implemented . However , when they did find out , and the plan was scrapped , Douglas was allowed to retain command and later rose to become Chief of the Army . The Northern Army Corps , barred from entering Finland , did not end attempts at aid , however . Swedish first line units would at times lose equipment and material that was needed on the other side of the border . The willingness to help out can be traced to officers in charge of Swedish supply units likening the Swedish Army Stores at Boden as a Finnish supply base . It is known that at least 8 , 000 Swedes voluntarily went to Finland to fight alongside the Finns . The Swedish government and public also sent food , clothing , medicine , weapons and ammunition to aid the Finns during this conflict . This military aid included : Several books written about the Winter War include reference to the Swedish volunteers and many older Finns today still acknowledge the contributions of these few individuals . Aftermath . The Winter War also helped reaffirm the Swedish position . Aid to Finland had been as much about aiding a neighbour as about neutralising the public opinion calling for active intervention in the war . It also helped to establish the political priorities before the events of 9 April 1940 , when Germany invaded Denmark and Norway . The goal was now fixed on keeping Sweden out of the growing European conflict ; if they had not gone to war to defend Finland , there was no way that they would do it for Norway .