Operation Ironside Operation Ironside was a Second World War military deception . Undertaken by the Allies in 1944 , the operation threatened an invasion of France , along the Bay of Biscay , in support of the invasion of Normandy . Ironside formed part of the Operation Bodyguard deception strategy . Planning for Ironside fell to the London Controlling Section , with the operation carried out via double agents . It was intended to play on German fears of an invasion in the Bordeaux region , with the aim of tying down defensive forces there . As with many of the Bodyguard deceptions , the force earmarked for Ironside never existed . The storyline for the supposed invasion included an initial two - division assault from the United Kingdom , followed by a further eight divisions sailing from the United States . Agents " Tate " , " Bronx " and " Garbo " relayed snippets of the plan to their German handlers during May 1944 . There is no indication that Ironside was successful in convincing the Germans of Allied plans to invade the Bay of Biscay . Worried about exposing agents as false , the Twenty Committee sent disinformation with words of caution . In addition , Allied landings around Bordeaux were implausible because it was beyond fighter cover from the United Kingdom . Background . Operation Ironside formed part of Operation Bodyguard , a broad strategic military deception intended to confuse the Axis high command as to Allied intentions during the lead - up to the Normandy landings . The overall aim of Bodyguard was to tie down German forces away from Normandy , by threatening a number of other targets . Ironside ' s objective was to tie up the 17th SS Panzer Division in the south of France . Overall planning for Bodyguard , and Ironside , rested with John Bevan and the London Controlling Section ( LCS ) . The LCS had been set up in 1942 following successes in deception in the Middle East by Dudley Clarke . After some initial attempts at deception planning , the department was tasked with bringing Bodyguard to fruition . In January 1944 , the Allies intercepted communications indicating that German commanders were concerned by the possibility of landings in the Bay of Biscay region of France . During February , German naval and air units undertook anti - invasion exercises in the area . Ironside was intended to amplify these concerns . Planning . The plot for Ironside was that , ten days following D - Day , Allied forces would land in the Bordeaux region , around the Garonne estuary . This force would establish a bridgehead before advancing to meet Operation Vendetta formations ( another deception operation targeting the Mediterranean coast of France ) . At first , Bevan suggested that the fictional invasion force should stage from America , but it was decided this would be implausible . In the end it was agreed that a realistic threat would be to stage an initial assault with two divisions from the United Kingdom , landing a further six divisions direct from the East Coast of the US once a bridgehead had been established . The chosen divisions were the 26th , 94th , 95th , and 104th Infantry , and the 10th and 11th Armored . Lieutenant General Lloyd Fredendall was chosen as the force ' s commander . Operation . Ironside was implemented entirely via double agents , under the control of the Twenty Committee . On 23 May , agent " Tate " ( Wulf Schmidt ) sent a message to his handlers saying that a friend from the US had identified an expeditionary force , consisting of six divisions , preparing to sail . On 29 May , agent " Bronx " sent a coded telegram identifying an invasion targeted at the Bordeaux region within a week . She also sent a follow - up letter explaining that the information came from a drunken British officer in the Four Hundred Club , and that he had later sworn her to secrecy , adding that the operation had been delayed by a month . In June , agent " Garbo " , one of the most important Allied double agents , passed on a report from one of his fictional sub - agents that US divisions had arrived in Liverpool , and were preparing to head to Bordeaux . The Twenty Committee considered that Ironside was quite implausible , and as a result was cautious about using agents to promote it too heavily . Most of the messages were sent with words of caution or uncertainty , to ensure that the asset would not be compromised . Garbo explicitly noted that he was unsure of his informant , and skeptical of the report . Impact . German intelligence documents indicate that there was never any strong belief that the Allies would land in the Bordeaux region . Prior to Ironside ' s execution Axis commanders had considered the idea , and conducted exercises in preparation . Following the deception , intercepted situation reports suggested that the Germans believed rumours of landings in the area to be " cover operations of small caliber " . In fact they believed them part of the cover for a main Allied thrust at Calais , in itself a deception called Operation Fortitude South . Although training continued in the region , and the 17th SS Panzer Division was delayed in mobilizing to Normandy , it appears that the Germans did not consider landings very likely . Part of the problem was that Bordeaux was not a plausible Allied target , because it was out of the range of fighter cover from the United Kingdom . Ironside II . The premise of Operation Ironside was reused in July 1944 , in support of Operation Ferdinand . Because of the vague interest in the original operation by German intelligence , the LCS had continued to promote the idea of an invasion after 28 June ( when the initial deception was supposed to have ended ) . Agent " Rudolff " sent messages on 10 , 12 and 18 July referring to the Ironside force . In mid July , the Allies began deception activities to cover Operation Dragoon , the August invasion of southern France . After some discussion ( Noel Wild and Ops ( B ) , the SHAEF deception planners , were worried about the impact on the continuing Fortitude deception ) it was decided that a new story would be presented to the Germans . It would suggest that the Allies intended to bolster French resistance in the south of the country , seizing Bordeaux to facilitate the landing of heavy weaponry . Again , the deception was implemented via double agents , mostly by reporting the arrival of heavy machinery and bridging equipment in New York , where the invasion force was based . The operation went largely unnoticed and German interest in the Bordeaux region dissipated .