Channel Dash The Channel Dash , ( codenamed Operation Cerberus by the Germans ) , was a major naval engagement during World War II in which a German " Kriegsmarine " squadron consisting of both s , and heavy cruiser along with escorts , ran a British blockade and successfully sailed from Brest in Brittany to their home bases in Germany via the English Channel . On 11 February 1942 , the " Kriegsmarine " s ships left Brest at 21 : 14 and escaped detection for more than 12 hours , approaching the Straits of Dover without discovery . As the German ships passed through the straits and on into the North Sea , British armed forces intercepted them , and attacks were made by the Royal Air Force , the Fleet Air Arm and Coastal Artillery . The attacks and bombardment were unsuccessful , and by 13 February all the " Kriegsmarine " s ships had completed their transit . In support of the German naval operation , the " Luftwaffe " launched Operation Donnerkeil ( Thunderbolt ) to provide air superiority for the passage of the ships . The Channel Dash remains the only occasion since the Spanish Armada in 1588 that ships belonging to an enemy of Great Britain ( other than the Dutch in the Anglo - Dutch Wars ) have successfully traversed the English Channel . German plan . and had arrived at Brest on 22 March 1941 after operations against Allied shipping in the Atlantic Ocean . " Prinz Eugen " appeared at dawn on 1 June at Brest Harbour after participating in Operation Rheinübung ( Exercise Rhine ) . Here the ships were able to repair and refuel but were also subject to frequent air attacks . In light of this , Adolf Hitler ordered the " Kriegsmarine " to move the ships to their home bases . The Berlin Admiralty preferred the Denmark Strait passage but also considered the shorter but more dangerous route through the English Channel . The matter was quickly resolved by Hitler in favour of the Channel , and all planning for the fleet transfer was passed on to the German Naval Command West in Paris . Although the operation would be under Vice Admiral Otto Ciliax , who commanded the Brest Group ( flying his flag on " Scharnhorst " ) , Naval Command West under Admiral Alfred Saalwächter was responsible for all planning and operational directions . As the operation had been ordered personally by Hitler , mine sweepers were deployed , additional radar jamming stations were set up , U - boats were sent for meteorological observations and several destroyers steamed westward down the Channel to Brest to strengthen the escort screen . Fighter ace Adolf Galland attended planning sessions on " Scharnhorst " and promised day and night fighter cover along the route . Admiral Ciliax , who was personally pessimistic about the success of Operation Cerberus , had his own problems . His great ships were no longer the fine fighting machines they had been , nor did they look like it . While at Brest , many technicians and experts were detailed away for urgent requirements elsewhere . But morale on the ships was good ; there had been no sabotage at Brest and the crews went ashore freely . Among the sullen locals there was no doubt that the ships were preparing to depart . To make the French believe ( and pass on to the British ) that they were heading for the South Atlantic , rumours were spread in town , tropical helmets were brought on board and French dock workers loaded oil barrels marked “ For Use in the Tropics . ” British response . The British commanding officer was Vice - Admiral Bertram Ramsay of the Royal Navy . Available to him were six destroyers , which should have been on four - hour standby in the Thames Estuary but were not . There were also three destroyer escort s , but they had no torpedo tube s and so posed little threat to the well - armoured German ships , while the 32 Motor Torpedo Boat s of the Dover and Ramsgate flotillas under Ramsay ' s command were counterbalanced by the German flotilla of E - boat s . For various reasons , aircraft from the Fleet Air Arm , RAF Coastal Command and RAF Bomber Command were unable to provide an effective level of support . This was partly because all services expected the Germans to time their dash through the Channel so that the most dangerous point at Dover - Calais ( where the ships would need to move within range of British coastal batteries ) would be passed by night . However the Germans considered it far more important to maintain the element of surprise for as long as possible by slipping out of Brest unnoticed at night , thus avoiding the 12 - hour warning that an early daytime departure would have given the British . The British were wrong - footed by the audacious German move . Night reconnaissance patrols of the Fleet Air Arm did not detect the departure of the ships from Brest because their radars failed . The first indication that something was happening came from RAF radar operators under Squadron Leader Bill Igoe , who noticed an unusually high level of German air - activity over the Channel . The ships were then spotted in the Channel by the pilots of two Spitfire s of RAF Fighter Command , but as they were under strict orders not to break radio silence and had not been briefed to look for the German fleet , they did not inform their superiors until they landed . Fighter Command was not expected to be the first to spot the German fleet in the Channel , and valuable time was lost reporting the sighting up the chain of command and on to the Royal Navy and Bomber Command . Uncoordinated attacks by motor boats and six Fleet Air Arm Fairey Swordfish torpedo biplanes launched from Manston ( in an operation formally referred to as " Operation Fuller " ) failed to inflict any damage . However , the courage of the Swordfish crews was noted by friend and foe . Lieutenant Commander Eugene Esmonde — a veteran of the chase of the battleship " Bismarck " — was lost along with his entire detachment of torpedo bombers , and was awarded the Victoria Cross posthumously . Only five crew survived out of eighteen . Ramsay later wrote : " In my opinion the gallant sortie of these six Swordfish aircraft constitutes one of the finest exhibitions of self - sacrifice and devotion to duty the war had ever witnessed " , while Ciliax remarked on : " . . . the mothball attack of a handful of ancient planes , piloted by men whose bravery surpasses any other action by either side that day " . RAF Bomber Command ' s response was tardy ; only 39 of the 242 bombers which took part found and attacked the ships and no hits were scored . In addition to the bombers , 398 Spitfires and Hurricanes of Fighter Command flew several sorties on 12 February 1942 . Altogether , 675 RAF aircraft ( 398 fighters , 242 bombers and 35 Coastal Command Hudsons and Beauforts ) took off to search for and attack the German ships . At noon on 12 February , the Channel guns of the Coastal Artillery went into action . The South Foreland battery with their newly installed K - type radar set started to track the ships of the Brest Group coming up the Channel towards Cap Gris Nez . At 12 : 19 , the first salvo was fired ; since maximum visibility was five miles , there was no observation of fall of shot by either sight or radar . The " blips " of the K - set clearly showed the zig - zagging of the ships and full battery salvo firing began without verifying fall - of - shot . 33 rounds were fired at the German ships , which were moving out of range at , but all missed . The six destroyers assigned to Ramsay were taken by surprise . Instead of being on station , they were practising gunnery in the North Sea . They steamed south to intercept the German fleet , but arrived in time to fire only one salvo of torpedoes , all of which missed . Counter fire from " Gneisenau " and " Prinz Eugen " severely damaged the destroyer , which suffered 27 dead ( 24 died on the 12th and 3 died during the next two days ) and 45 wounded . Several salvoes from " Gneisenau " destroyed the starboard side of the bridge , and the No . 1 and No . 2 boiler rooms . " Prinz Eugen " hit the destroyer a further four times , setting it on fire . Captain Fein , aboard " Gneisenau " , ordered firing to cease , believing the destroyer to be sinking . Outcome . By mid - morning on 13 February , Admiral Ciliax sent a signal to Admiral Saalwächter in Paris : " It is my duty to inform you that " Operation Cerberus " has been successfully completed . " The British services ( RN , RAF and Army ) had failed to stop the ships of the Brest Group before they reached the safety of German home waters and had suffered severe damage to a destroyer and lost 42 aircraft . The Germans had suffered unexpectedly small damage and losses : " Scharnhorst " hit two mines , off Flushing and Ameland , but arrived safely at 10 : 00 on 13 February at Wilhelmshaven ( the damage took three months to repair ) . " Gneisenau " hit one mine off Terschelling , but suffered little damage ; the magnetic mine exploded some metres off the ship , making a small hole on the starboard side and temporarily knocking one of her turbines out of action . The ship was brought back to action after thirty minutes and she continued with the " lucky ship " , the undamaged " Prinz Eugen " , which had suffered one dead from attacking British aircraft . Both ships then tied up at Brunsbüttel North Locks at 09 : 30 . The torpedo boats " T13 " and " Jaguar " were slightly damaged by bomb splinters and machine gun fire , the latter suffering one killed and two wounded ; of the " Luftwaffe " air umbrella over the ships , 17 fighters were lost with eleven pilots . In Britain , the mood was sombre . An editorial in " The Times " of London read : " Vice Admiral Ciliax has succeeded where the Duke of Medina Sidonia failed . Nothing more mortifying to the pride of our seapower has happened since the seventeenth century . [ . . . ] It spelled the end of the Royal Navy legend that in wartime no enemy battle fleet could pass through what we proudly call the English Channel . " However , after the war , author Stephen Roskill noted : " The German Naval Staff , however , summarised the outcome as a ' tactical victory , but a strategic defeat ' " . These three powerful warships were no longer a menace to the Atlantic convoys but were instead re - assigned to the defence of Norway against an imagined invasion . The St Nazaire Raid a few weeks later eliminated the threat to the North Atlantic convoys by capital ships of the " Kriegsmarine " . This elimination of the threat was made even more so when only ten days after the operation , on 23 February , " Prinz Eugen " was torpedoed by the British submarine , destroying her stern and being knocked out for nearly a year . " Gneisenau " s luck ended a few days later on 26 – 27 February at Kiel when she was heavily damaged during British air attacks and effectively put out of the war . Memorial . A granite memorial to all those Britons involved in Operation " Fuller " was erected in Marine Parade Gardens in Dover , to mark the 70th Anniversary Remembrance of the event . Sailors from provided a Guard of Honour as part of the parade held to mark the unveiling .