Battle of Phuoc Long The Battle of Phước Long was a decisive battle of the Vietnam War which began on December 12 , 1974 , and concluded on January 6 , 1975 . The battle involved the deployment of North Vietnam ' s 4th Army Corps for the first time , against determined units of the South Vietnamese Army in Phước Long in Bình Phước Province near the Cambodian border ( to be distinguished from the other Phước Long in Bạc Liêu Province , south of Saigon ) , under the command of Lieutenant General Dư Quốc Đống . On December 12 , 1974 , the North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps launched their campaign against Phuoc Long aiming to achieve three key objectives . Firstly , North Vietnamese leaders wanted to test the reaction of the United States Government , to see if they would actually uphold former President Richard Nixon ' s promises of military retaliation against North Vietnam . Secondly , North Vietnamese field commanders wanted to test the combat readiness of the South Vietnamese Army . And thirdly , the North Vietnamese wanted to solve their logistical problems once and for all , by capturing the district of Phuoc Long and the important transportation routes around it . The North Vietnamese campaign proved to be a major success , because the fall of Phuoc Long showed that the involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War was truly over , especially when the United States Congress repeatedly voted against additional aid for South Vietnam . Militarily , the victory at Phuoc Long also enabled the North Vietnamese to expand their logistical routes from the Central Highlands of South Vietnam to the Mekong Delta , which placed enormous pressure on the Army of the Republic of Vietnam . Background . During the Vietnam War , the district of Phuoc Long played an important role in the defensive posture of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam ( ARVN ) . Phuoc Long is about 120 km north of Saigon ; it shared a border with the South Vietnamese districts of Bình Long in the west , Quảng Đức in the east , and Long Khánh District in the south . Phuoc Long also shares an international border with Cambodia . The district of Phuoc Long and the military zones of Bố Đức , Đôn Luân , Đức Phong , the administrative centre of Phuoc Binh , and Bà Rá mountain lies at the centre of South Vietnam ’ s defensive line in III Corps , which served to defend Saigon and the populous southern provinces . Route 14 , which ran through the district of Phuoc Long and other key military zones , was an important North Vietnamese transportation route which linked the Ho Chi Minh Trail with other Communist - occupied territories in South Vietnam . For that reason , regular units of the South Vietnamese army in Phuoc Long were often placed in a strong position , from which they could disrupt North Vietnamese supply lines . Due to the vulnerability of their supply lines in Phuoc Long and the surrounding areas , North Vietnamese troops at the Viet Cong capital of Loc Ninh and in the Central Highlands , often found themselves isolated from their comrades in the southern provinces of South Vietnam . Combatants . North Vietnam . On July 20 , 1974 , the High Command of the Vietnam People ’ s Army created the 4th Army Corps for the purpose of capturing Phuoc Long from the opposing South Vietnamese . Major General Hoang Cam was appointed as the first commander of the 4th Army Corps . The main body of the North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps included the 3rd and 7th Infantry Divisions . The 165th , 201st and 271st Regiment s formed the 3rd Infantry Division , while the 2nd , 141st and 209th Regiments formed the 7th Division . In addition , the aforementioned units were supported by the 429th Special Forces Regiment , the 25th Engineers Regiment , the 210th and 235th Logistical Groups and the Viet Cong 9th Division . The North Vietnamese campaign against Phuoc Long was planned to take place in two separate phases . In the first phase North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces would capture the military zones surrounding Phuoc Long which included Bu Dang , Bu Na , Bo Duc , Duc Phong , Don Luan , and South Vietnamese firebases around Ba Ra mountain . In the second phase North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units would launch a frontal assault , aimed directly at the district of Phuoc Long , the administrative centre of Phuoc Binh and the strategically important Ba Ra mountain . In both phases of operation , the North Vietnamese army would have to secure Route 14 in order to prevent South Vietnamese reinforcements , which could have come in the form of the ARVN 5th , 25th or 18th Infantry Divisions . South Vietnam . South Vietnam ’ s main defensive assets in and around Phuoc Long included five security battalions and forty - eight platoons of civilian self - defence forces . The defence of Phuoc Long was the responsibility of ARVN Lieutenant General Du Quoc Dong . The 341st and 352nd Security Battalions were tasked with the defence of Don Luan , the 363rd Security Battalion stationed at Bu Na , the 362nd Security Battalion guard the main roads from Vinh Thuan to Bu Dang , and the 340th Security Battalion was placed in reserve at Phuoc Long district . The 341st , 352nd and 363rd Security Battalions all shared the responsibility of protecting Route 14 and the adjoining roads . Firepower support came in the form of one artillery battalion , which was based at the centre of Phuoc Long district , equipped with 150mm and 155mm artillery guns . Like during the Easter Offensive the strongest units of the South Vietnamese army in III Corps could be deployed to defend Phuoc Long from potential attacks , which included three infantry divisions ( 5th , 25th and 18th Infantry Divisions ) and two armoured units ( 2nd and 7th Armoured Brigade ) . In an emergency the ARVN 18th Infantry Division based at Bien Hoa could reach Phuoc Long in the shortest period of time , and the next closest unit was the ARVN 5th Infantry Division based at Ben Cat . In addition , Lieutenant General Du Quoc Dong could have access to the 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion and more than one hundred helicopters , mainly UH - 1 Huey and CH - 47 Chinook models . While air support could come in the form of fighter - bombers from the 3rd and 5th Air Divisions of the South Vietnamese air force , based at Tan Son Nhat and Bien Hoa . Prelude . The North Vietnamese military opened its campaign against Phuoc Long on December 12 , 1974 , using the 4th Battalion of the 165th Infantry Regiment to attack a South Vietnamese outpost located on Route 14 , which was defended by a single South Vietnamese security company . On the same night the military zone of Bù Đốp was also attacked by a company of Viet Cong special forces from the Phuoc Binh area . During the next few days the South Vietnamese army managed to recapture its positions along Route 14 , but they could not clear the main road . On December 13 ARVN Colonel Nguyen Thong Thanh inspected the Route 14 area , and decided to raise the level of alertness from code ‘ yellow ’ to ‘ orange ’ for all South Vietnamese installations in the area . Due to the heavy rain which flooded the main roads leading to Phuoc Long , the North Vietnamese decided to postpone further attacks which were planned to take place on December 13 . On December 14 , the under strength 271st Regiment of the North Vietnamese 302nd Division launched their attack on the ARVN 362nd Security Battalion , also based in Bù Đốp . After two hours of fighting nearly all members of the 2 / 271st Regiment had sustained injuries , but the 271st Regiment managed to penetrate the South Vietnamese defensive line around Bu Dop , and by 11 . 30am the 271st Regiment successfully overwhelmed the Bu Dop military zone . On the same day , after a night of encirclement , the North Vietnamese 165th and 201st Regiments , both drawn from the 7th Infantry Division , began asserting their authority over the Vinh Thien area and the Bu Dang administrative centre after more than two hours of fighting . On December 15 , soldiers from the North Vietnamese 429th Special Forces Regiment attacked Bu Na , which was defended by one South Vietnamese company from the 363rd Security Battalion , and an artillery platoon . The 363rd Security Battalion , with strong support from South Vietnamese air force fighter - bombers based at Bien Hoa , fought back fiercely in their attempt to defend Bu Na . However , by the end of the day South Vietnamese defenders around Bu Na gave up , when reinforcements from Phuoc Long failed to arrive due to the closure of Route 14 by the North Vietnamese army . On December 16 , Lieutenant General Du Quoc Dong flew out to Phuoc Long to assess the situation around the area , and to bolster the defences of Phuoc Long with the 2 / 7th Regiment , from the ARVN 5th Infantry Division . On the same day , South Vietnamese Colonel Do Cong Thanh also organised a number of counter - attacks against North Vietnamese positions around Route 14 , which connects with the Bu Dang area , but on each on occasion they were pushed back by local Viet Cong units who were guarding the area . Several days later on December 22 , the South Vietnamese 341st Security Battalion at Bố Đức was attacked for the second time by the North Vietnamese 165th Regiment . Subsequently , South Vietnamese units at Phước Tín , Phước Quả , and Phước Lộc were also overwhelmed by the North Vietnamese . The South Vietnamese army attempted to stage a counter - attack on Bo Duc , but they were easily defeated by the North Vietnamese 6 / 165th Regiment , as a result all surviving South Vietnamese units retreated back to the Ba Ra area to lick their wounds . Two days later General Dư Quốc Đống tried to reinforce Phuoc Long with a regiment from the ARVN 18th Infantry Division , but President Nguyen Van Thieu overturned General Dong ’ s decision on the basis that all deployments at the regimental - level must be made by Thieu himself . As a result , Lieutenant General Dư Quốc Đống had to order Brigadier General Lê Nguyên Vĩ to reinforce the areas around Đồng Xoài with units taken from the ARVN 5th Infantry Division . However , by the time regular units of the South Vietnamese army arrived at their destination , the North Vietnamese had already encircled the Don Luan military zone , so it was within range of the formidable North Vietnamese long - range artillery guns . Even though the South Vietnamese received extensive air support they could only sent one company into Đồng Xoài , so Brigadier General Le Nguyen Vi was forced to withdraw his forces from the area . At 5 . 37am on December 26 , 1974 , the North Vietnamese 141st Regiment opened their attack on the South Vietnamese base at Don Luan from four different directions , after 15 minutes of artillery bombardment from supporting artillery units . Due to the strong presence of North Vietnamese artillery , South Vietnamese artillery units at Don Luan were simply overwhelmed . In addition , the high calibre anti - aircraft guns used by the North Vietnamese 20th Air - Defence Battalion also limited the effectiveness of the A - 1 Skyraider and the A - 37 Dragonfly , used by the South Vietnamese air force to support the ground troops . At 10 . 30am all South Vietnamese units at Đôn Luân capitulated and Major Đặng Vũ Khoái , commander of the 352nd Security Battalion , was captured at Suoi Rat along with his junior officers . Towards the end of the day , the North Vietnamese 141st Regiment also captured other South Vietnamese installations at Ta Be , Phước Thiền , and a helicopter base . In just two weeks the North Vietnamese army had managed to punch several holes in the defensive line of South Vietnam ’ s III Corps , with the capture of Bù Đốp , Bù Na , Bù Đăng and Đôn Luân . For the Army of the Republic of Vietnam ( ARVN ) , the lost of four important outposts in III Corps was a severe blow , especially with opposing North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces controlling all main roads leading to the district of Phuoc Long such as Route 14 , Route 7 , and the provincial roads 1 and 2 . The South Vietnamese army , based at the administrative centre of Phuoc Binh and Phuoc Long , suddenly found themselves surrounded by the strong and well - equipped North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps . Fall of Phuoc Long . To halt the North Vietnamese onslaught at Phuoc Long , Lieutenant General Du Quoc Dong need at least one infantry division and one unit of armoured cavalry , however South Vietnamese infantry divisions based in I Corps were not allowed to be deployed without the approval of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu . On December 29 , realising that the district of Phuoc Long was in serious danger of being overrun , General Cao Van Vien asked President Nguyen Van Thieu to approve a plan to defend Phuoc Long that hed been prepared back in October 1974 . Shortly afterwards General Cao Van Vien received a message from President Nguyen Van Thieu which advised Lieutenant General Du Quoc Dong not to make discretionary decisions , and to try to maintain the morale of the South Vietnamese soldiers at Phuoc Long . While ARVN Lieutenant General Du Quoc Dong was desperate to find additional reinforcements , the North Vietnamese were making their way towards Phuoc Long and Phuoc Binh between December 27 and December 30 , 1974 . On the afternoon of December 30 , North Vietnamese army units took up their positions in the following order : the 165th Regiment was positioned on the south and south - eastern areas of Phuoc Binh , the 141st Regiment was positioned along provincial road no . 2 in the north and northwest leading towards Phuoc Binh , the 271st Regiment blocked Route 309 , the 16th Regiment moved from Tay Ninh to the north of Song Be , the 78th Special Forces Battalion gathered near the foot of Ba Ra mountain , while the 2nd and 209th Regiments were placed in reserve . In addition to the units above , the North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps was strengthened with one artillery company equipped with 130 mm artillery guns , and two armoured companies with 14 T - 54 tanks . On December 31 , 1974 , as Lieutenant General Du Quoc Dong received President Thieu ’ s message , the North Vietnamese began their final assault on the district of Phuoc Long with the 165th Regiment , the 141st Regiment , the 3rd Battalion and several local Viet Cong units leading the attack . However , due to the slow deployment of the 78th Special Forces Battalion and the 271st Regiment , South Vietnamese artillery guns at Phuoc Long were able to respond to initial North Vietnamese assaults , by pounding North Vietnamese positions around Ba Ra mountain . Furthermore , the ARVN 1 / 7th Regiment , 5th Infantry Division , also attacked the North Vietnamese 5th and 6th Battalions , both belonging to the 165th Regiment , at the foot of Ba Ra mountain . As a result , the 141st Regiment had to attack the administrative centre of Phuoc Binh by itself , while 165th Regiment was forced to stop in order to deal with the South Vietnamese counter - attack . At 1 pm on December 31 , North Vietnamese Major General Hoang Cam sent four T - 54 tanks to support the 141st Regiment , but one of the tanks was put out of action when it hit a landmine . The 141st Regiment , with three remaining T - 54 tanks in support , were able to force their way into the centre of Phuoc Binh and capture the local airfield . By 3 pm , the administrative centre of Phuoc Binh had fallen , and the ARVN 2 / 7th Regiment was pushed back towards Soui Dung . Meanwhile on the evening of December 31 , the South Vietnamese air force had flown more than 50 bombing sorties against North Vietnamese positions at the foot of Ba Ra mountain , temporarily stopping attacks from the North Vietnamese 78th Special Forces Battalion . The North Vietnamese responded to South Vietnamese air attacks by rolling out their long - range anti - aircraft guns , which stopped South Vietnamese pilots from hitting North Vietnamese positions until the next day , and allowing the 78th Special Forces Battalion to capture Ba Ra mountain . The capture of Ba Ra mountain enabled North Vietnamese army units to occupy the high ground areas surrounding Phuoc Long , where they could direct artillery fire against South Vietnamese positions . Throughout the day on January 1 , 1975 , the South Vietnamese air force conducted a further 53 bombing sorties , again temporarily delaying the North Vietnamese attack on Phuoc Long . By the end of the day , South Vietnamese pilots claimed to have set ablaze 15 North Vietnamese tanks . On the other side , the South Vietnamese army lost eight 105 mm and four 155 mm artillery guns during the initial North Vietnamese assault on Phuoc Binh . And , by the early hours of January 2 , 1975 , all of Phuoc Long was within range of North Vietnamese artillery . Realising that the South Vietnamese defenders were in danger of being destroyed , ARVN Colonel Do Cong Thanh quickly reorganised all his units . Subsequently , the headquarters of Phuoc Long district was moved to Camp Le Loi , the 340th Security Battalion had to defend the bridges at Suoi Dung , and the 2 / 7th Regiment took up their positions along the main streets of Tu Hien 1 and Tu Hien 2 . As a result , the South Vietnamese were able to put up fierce resistance , thus delaying the advancing North Vietnamese army for another 24 hours . On the morning of January 2 , 1975 , North Vietnamese artillery bombarded South Vietnamese positions in Phuoc Long for about an hour , to pave the way for further assaults from the 141st , 165th and 271st Regiments . In the south of Phuoc Long , the 165th Regiment successfully captured the South Vietnamese camp of Doan Van Kieu , in the west the 141st Regiment clashed with the ARVN 1 / 9th Regiment at Ho Long Thuy , and in the southeast the 271st Regiment were able to secure Tu Hien 1 and Tu Hien 2 . On the morning of January 3 , elements of the 141st Regiment made their way into the district of Phuoc Long , only to find the town isolated . The North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps then decided to bolster the strength of the 141st Regiment , with one battalion taken from the 201st Regiment . To deal with the North Vietnamese , Lieutenant General Do Quoc Dong attempted to land the 8 / 5th Infantry Division in the district of Phuoc Long using helicopters , but fierce anti - aircraft fire from the North Vietnamese 210th Air - Defence Regiment forced South Vietnamese helicopters to turn around . At the same time , South Vietnamese air force transport planes also tried to drop ammunition supplies for South Vietnamese soldiers in the northern areas of Phuoc Long , but the ammunition load landed in the wrong place and was captured by North Vietnamese soldiers . Due to the heavy artillery barrage , the South Vietnamese headquarters at Phuoc Long was heavily damaged with the district ’ s deputy commander dead of his wounds , while the commander of Phuoc Binh suffered severe injuries . On the morning of January 4 , the South Vietnamese air force resumed their attacks on North Vietnamese columns , forcing North Vietnamese units to slow their attacks . In his last - ditch effort to save Phuoc Long , Lieutenant General Du Quoc Dong ordered the 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion to be airlifted into action . But as soon as the first group of the 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion landed on Dac Song , they were quickly decimated by North Vietnamese artillery , with the unit suffering losses equivalent to two companies . The North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps command immediately responded by ordering the 16th Regiment to secure Dac Song and the nearby bridge at Dac Lung , pursuing the surviving elements of the 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion . However , by that stage South Vietnamese defence lines in Phuoc Long had narrowed , leaving only the administrative centre and the local markets still under South Vietnamese control , while most of the town had fallen to the North Vietnamese army . On January 5 , the North Vietnamese 165th and 201st Regiments continued their encirclement of the Phuoc Long administrative centre , as well as shelling key targets in the area . On the following day , the North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps command sent the 201st Regiment , along with ten additional tanks , to reinforce the units already fighting in Phuoc Long . And to cut off the South Vietnamese route of escape , Cach Mang and Dinh Tien Hoang streets were blocked . At 8 pm on January 6 , the last South Vietnamese defensive post , occupied by the surviving elements of the 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion , was captured by the North Vietnamese . During the night a small number of South Vietnamese soldiers who had survived the battle were evacuated from Phuoc Long . At the battle ’ s conclusion , the North Vietnamese claimed they had captured 2 , 444 prisoners , including 26 officers , 5 , 000 small arms of various kinds and more than 10 , 000 rounds of ammunition . Aftermath . Military Effect . The South Vietnamese army in Phuoc Long , under the command of Lieutenant General Du Quoc Dong , used everything they had at their disposal in order to stop the North Vietnamese onslaught . In their efforts to save Phuoc Long and other territories around the district , the South Vietnamese lost more than a thousand soldiers killed in action and 2 , 444 others were captured . The sacrifice of South Vietnamese soldiers in the battle was exemplified by the 250 - men 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion , which lost more than 150 soldiers in their last - ditch effort to save Phuoc Long . In the end , about 850 South Vietnamese soldiers were evacuated from the battlefield . In comparison to their South Vietnamese counterparts , the casualties suffered by the North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps were relatively light with about 1 , 300 killed or wounded . In logistical terms the victory at Phuoc Long enabled the North Vietnamese to connect their supply lines from the Ho Chi Minh Trail , with bases in the Central Highlands and the Mekong Delta . At the same time , with a strengthened supply line which stretched from the north to the southern provinces of South Vietnam , regular units of the North Vietnamese army were able to apply additional pressure on the weakened South Vietnamese army already starved of American supplies . Political Effect . In Hanoi , the capture of Phuoc Long by the 4th Army Corps provided the Communist leadership with clear answers about America ’ s commitment to defend South Vietnam , as well as their willingness to re - enter the conflict . The Battle of Phuoc Long not only gave North Vietnamese political and military planners a greater awareness of South Vietnam ’ s dire military situation , but it also showed that the United States government were no longer interested in the survival of the Saigon regime . Thus , the optimism and confidence of North Vietnamese leaders were significantly strengthened , because they could finally destroy the Saigon regime and win the war once and for all . The lessons learned at Phuoc Long were put into practice during the 1975 Spring Offensive , which ultimately led to the political and military capitulation of South Vietnam on April 30 , 1975 . In Saigon , South Vietnamese political and military establishments did not share the same level of confidence and optimism , because the loss of Phuoc Long in III Corps exposed the severe weaknesses of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam . For General Cao Van Vien , Chief of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam , the military situation was clear : if South Vietnamese units could not hold their own against a single attack , there was no way they could ever stop a large - scale invasion . To make matters worst , the United States Congress repeatedly voted against President Gerald Ford ’ s request to give additional aid for South Vietnam . On January 10 , 1975 , President Nguyen Van Thieu called on the people of South Vietnam to pray for Phuoc Long , as well as renew their determination to retake the district . One month later , Thieu reinforced his previous message by asking the people of South Vietnam to maximise their support of soldiers on the frontline , stabilise the country ’ s internal situation , and increase economic production .