United States support for Iraq during the Iran – Iraq war United States support for Iraq during the Iran – Iraq War , against post - revolutionary Iran , included several billion dollars ' worth of economic aid , the sale of dual - use technology , non - U . S . origin weaponry , military intelligence , Special Operations training , and direct involvement in warfare against Iran . Support from the U . S . for Iraq was not a secret and was frequently discussed in open session of the Senate and House of Representatives . On June 9 , 1992 , Ted Koppel reported on ABC ' s " Nightline " , that the " Reagan / Bush administrations permitted — and frequently encouraged — the flow of money , agricultural credits , dual - use technology , chemicals , and weapons to Iraq . " U . S . reaction to the conflict . Diplomatic relations with Iraq had been severed shortly after the 1967 Arab - Israeli Six - Day War . A decade later , following a series of major political developments , particularly after the Iranian Revolution and the seizure of embassy staff in the 1979 – 81 Iran hostage crisis , President Jimmy Carter ordered a review of American policy toward Iraq . According to Kenneth R . Timmerman , the " Islamic revolution in Iran upset the entire strategic equation in the region . America ' s principal ally in the Persian Gulf , the Shah , was swept aside overnight , and no one else on the horizon could replace him as the guarantor of U . S . interests in the region . " During the crisis , Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein attempted to take advantage of the disorder of the Revolution , the weakness of the Iranian military and the revolution ' s antagonism with Western governments . The Iranian military had been disbanded during the revolt and with the Shah ousted , Hussein had ambitions to position himself as the new strong man of the Middle East . " He condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and signed an alliance with Saudi Arabia to block the Soviet - backed attempt to take over North Yemen . In 1979 he also allowed the CIA , which he had once so virulently attacked , to open an office in Baghdad . " Zbigniew Brzezinski , National Security Advisor to President Carter , " began to look more favorably toward Saddam Hussein as a potential counterweight to the Ayatollah Khomeini and as a force to contain Soviet expansionism in the region . " The hint of change in the U . S . attitude toward Iraq was warmly welcomed in Baghdad . . . Saddam Hussein believed that recognition by the United States of Iraq ' s role as a counter to radical , fundamentalist Iran would boost his ambition of becoming the acknowledged head of the Arab world . . . . Saddam had an old score to settle with the Iranians over his southern border . He had never liked the agreement signed with the Shah in 1975 . He felt confident he could regain the lost territory and probably topple the anti - American regime in Tehran by taking swift military action . He had no illusions that the United States would openly support the war he proposed to start . But getting rid of the Ayatollah Khomeini was clearly in the American interest , and in many other ways the United States and Iraq could benefit each other , Saddam believed . It was time to renew diplomatic relations with Washington and to move on quickly to more elaborate forms of strategic cooperation . Biographer and Middle Eastern politician Said K . Aburish , author of " Saddam Hussein : The Politics Of Revenge " , says the Iraqi dictator made a visit to Amman in the year 1979 , before the Iran – Iraq War , where he met with King Hussein and , very possibly , three agents of the Central Intelligence Agency ( CIA ) . Aburish says there is " considerable evidence that he discussed his plans to invade Iran with the CIA agents . " Timmerman records American officials meeting only with King Hussein ( in a meeting unrelated to Iraq ) on precisely this same date , noting that this " top - secret negotiating session was Brzezinski ' s idea . " He later quotes National Security Council staff member and former aide Gary G . Sick : Brzezinski was letting Saddam assume there was a U . S . green light for his invasion of Iran , because there was no explicit red light . But to say the U . S . planned and plotted it all out in advance is simply not true . Saddam had his own reasons for invading Iran , and they were sufficient . According to Zbigniew Brzezinski ' s memoir , the United States initially took a largely neutral position on the Iran – Iraq War , with some minor exceptions . First , the U . S . acted in an attempt to prevent the confrontation from widening , largely in order to prevent additional disruption to world oil supplies and to honor U . S . security assurances to Saudi Arabia . As a result , the U . S . reacted to Soviet troop movements on the border of Iran by informing the Soviet Union that they would defend Iran in the event of Soviet invasion . The U . S . also acted to defend Saudi Arabia , and lobbied the surrounding states not to become involved in the war . Brzezinski characterizes this recognition of the Middle East as a vital strategic region on a par with Western Europe and the Far East as a fundamental shift in U . S . strategic policy . Second , the United States explored whether the Iran – Iraq War would offer leverage with which to resolve the Iranian Hostage Crisis . In this regard , the Carter administration explored the use of both " carrots , " by suggesting that they might offer military assistance to Iran upon release of the hostages , and " sticks , " by discouraging Israeli military assistance to Iran and suggesting that they might offer military assistance to Iraq if the Iranians did " not " release the hostages . Third , as the war progressed , freedom of navigation , especially at the Strait of Hormuz , was deemed a critical priority . Support . Starting in 1982 with Iranian success on the battlefield , the United States made its backing of Iraq more pronounced , normalizing relations with the government , supplying it with economic aid , counter - insurgency training , operational intelligence on the battlefield , and weapons . President Ronald Reagan initiated a strategic opening to Iraq , signing National Security Study Directive ( NSSD ) 4 - 82 and selecting Donald Rumsfeld as his emissary to Hussein , whom he visited in December 1983 and March 1984 . According to U . S . ambassador Peter W . Galbraith , far from winning the conflict , " the Reagan administration was afraid Iraq might actually lose . " In 1982 , Iraq was removed from a list of State Sponsors of Terrorism to ease the transfer of dual - use technology to that country . According to investigative journalist Alan Friedman , Secretary of State Alexander Haig was " upset at the fact that the decision had been made at the White House , even though the State Department was responsible for the list . " " I was not consulted , " Haig is said to have complained . Howard Teicher served on the National Security Council as director of Political - Military Affairs . He accompanied Rumsfeld to Baghdad in 1983 . According to his 1995 affidavit and separate interviews with former Reagan and Bush administration officials , the Central Intelligence Agency secretly directed armaments and hi - tech components to Iraq through false fronts and friendly third parties such as Jordan , Saudi Arabia , Egypt and Kuwait , and they quietly encouraged rogue arms dealers and other private military companies to do the same : [ T ] he United States actively supported the Iraqi war effort by supplying the Iraqis with billions of dollars of credits , by providing U . S . military intelligence and advice to the Iraqis , and by closely monitoring third country arms sales to Iraq to make sure that Iraq had the military weaponry required . The United States also provided strategic operational advice to the Iraqis to better use their assets in combat . . . The CIA , including both CIA Director Casey and Deputy Director Gates , knew of , approved of , and assisted in the sale of non - U . S . origin military weapons , ammunition and vehicles to Iraq . My notes , memoranda and other documents in my NSC files show or tend to show that the CIA knew of , approved of , and assisted in the sale of non - U . S . origin military weapons , munitions and vehicles to Iraq . The full extent of these covert transfers is not yet known . Teicher ' s files on the subject are held securely at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and many other Reagan Era documents that could help shine new light on the subject remain classified . Teicher declined to discuss details of the affidavit with the " Washington Post " shortly before the 2003 invasion of Iraq . About two of every seven licenses for the export of " dual use " technology items approved between 1985 and 1990 by the U . S . Department of Commerce " went either directly to the Iraqi armed forces , to Iraqi end - users engaged in weapons production , or to Iraqi enterprises suspected of diverting technology " to weapons of mass destruction , according to an investigation by House Banking Committee Chairman Henry B . Gonzalez . Confidential Commerce Department files also reveal that the Reagan and Bush administrations approved at least 80 direct exports to the Iraqi military . These included computers , communications equipment , aircraft navigation and radar equipment . In conformance with the Presidential directive , the U . S . began providing tactical battlefield advice to the Iraqi Army . " The prevailing view " , says Alan Friedman , " was that if Washington wanted to prevent an Iranian victory , it would have to share some of its more sensitive intelligence photography with Saddam . " At times , thanks to the White House ' s secret backing for the intelligence - sharing , U . S . intelligence officers were actually sent to Baghdad to help interpret the satellite information . As the White House took an increasingly active role in secretly helping Saddam direct his armed forces , the United States even built an expensive high - tech annex in Baghdad to provide a direct down - link receiver for the satellite intelligence and better processing of the information . . . < br > < br > The American military commitment that had begun with intelligence - sharing expanded rapidly and surreptitiously throughout the Iran – Iraq War . A former White House official explained that " by 1987 , our people were actually providing tactical military advice to the Iraqis in the battlefield , and sometimes they would find themselves over the Iranian border , alongside Iraqi troops . " Author Barry M . Lando says , by 1987 , the U . S . military was so invested in the correct outcome , that " officers from the Pentagon ' s Defense Intelligence Agency dispatched to Baghdad were actually planning day - by - day strategic bombing strikes for the Iraqi Air Force . " Iraq used this data to target Iranian positions with chemical weapons , says ambassador Galbraith . According to retired Army Colonel W . Patrick Lang , senior defense intelligence officer for the United States Defense Intelligence Agency at the time , " the use of gas on the battlefield by the Iraqis was not a matter of deep strategic concern " to Reagan and his aides , because they " were desperate to make sure that Iraq did not lose . " Lang disclosed that more than 60 officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency were secretly providing detailed information on Iranian deployments . He cautioned that the DIA " would have never accepted the use of chemical weapons against civilians , but the use against military objectives was seen as inevitable in the Iraqi struggle for survival . " The Reagan administration did not stop aiding Iraq after receiving reports affirming the use of poison gas on Kurdish civilians . Joost R . Hiltermann says that when the Iraqi military turned its chemical weapons on the Kurds during the war , killing approximately 5 , 000 people in the town of Halabja and injuring thousands more , the Reagan administration actually sought to obscure Iraqi leadership culpability by suggesting , inaccurately , that the Iranians may have carried out the attack . Military training . Iraqi military personnel received various types of guidance from their American counterparts on U . S . soil . According to Roque Gonzalez , an ex - Special Forces officer with multilingual expertise , Saddam ' s elite troops received instruction in unconventional warfare at Fort Bragg , North Carolina . " The idea was that , in the event of an Iranian victory , the Iraqi soldiers would be able to wage a guerrilla struggle against the occupying Iranian force " , writes Barry Lando , former investigative producer with " 60 Minutes " . Author Joseph J . Trento adds , " We were training thorough the Green Berets , we were [ giving ] counter insurgency training , because we were afraid that if Iran overwhelmed Saddam ' s army , that the units might have to go underground and operate underground , and so they received training in being able to operate as guerillas . " Iraqi helicopter pilots , traveling on Jordanian passports , are reported to have received training in the United States . Foreign Materiel Acquisition and Bear Spares . With the UN - imposed embargo on warring parties , and with the Soviet Union opposing the conflict , Iraqi engineers found it increasingly difficult to repair and replace hardware damaged in battle . According to Kenneth Timmerman , " Saddam did foresee one immediate consequence of his invasion of Iran : the suspension of arms supplies from the USSR . " When he launched his attack , the Soviets were busy playing games in Iran . They were not amused that the Iraqis upset their plans . For generations the KGB had been working to penetrate Iran ' s Shiite clergy . In February 1979 , when Ayatollah Khomeini took power and threw the Americans out of Iran , the Soviets stood to gain more than they had ever believed possible . . . . KGB boss Yuri Andropov [ had ] little difficulty in convincing Brezhnev and Kosygin to agree to an embargo on arms to Iraq . . . The United States assisted Iraq through a military aid program known as " Bear Spares " , whereby the U . S . military " made sure that spare parts and ammunition for Soviet or Soviet - style weaponry were available to countries which sought to reduce their dependence on the Soviets for defense needs . " According to Howard Teicher ' s court sworn declaration : If the " Bear Spares " were manufactured outside the United States , then the U . S . could arrange for the provision of these weapons to a third country without direct involvement . Israel , for example , had a very large stockpile of Soviet weaponry and ammunition captured during its various wars . At the suggestion of the United States , the Israelis would transfer the spare parts and weapons to third countries . . . Similarly , Egypt manufactured weapons and spare parts from Soviet designs and provided these weapons and ammunition to the Iraqis and other countries . Little today is known about this program as details remain scarce . Chemical and biological exports . On February 9 , 1994 , Senator Riegle delivered a report - commonly known at the Riegle Report - in which it was stated that " pathogenic ( meaning ' disease producing ' ) , toxigenic ( meaning ' poisonous ' ) , and other biological research materials were exported to Iraq pursuant to application and licensing by the U . S . Department of Commerce . " It added : " These exported biological materials were not attenuated or weakened and were capable of reproduction . " The report then detailed 70 shipments ( including Bacillus anthracis ) from the United States to Iraqi government agencies over three years , concluding " It was later learned that these microorganisms exported by the United States were identical to those the UN inspectors found and recovered from the Iraqi biological warfare program . " Donald Riegle , Chairman of the Senate committee that authored the aforementioned Riegle Report , said : U . N . inspectors had identified many United States manufactured items that had been exported from the United States to Iraq under licenses issued by the Department of Commerce , and [ established ] that these items were used to further Iraq ' s chemical and nuclear weapons development and its missile delivery system development programs . . . . The executive branch of our government approved 771 different export licenses for sale of dual - use technology to Iraq . I think that is a devastating record . The U . S . Centers for Disease Control sent Iraq 14 separate agents " with biological warfare significance , " according to Riegle ' s investigators . Diplomatic support . In 1984 , Iran introduced a draft resolution to the United Nations Security Council , citing the Geneva Protocol of 1925 , condemning Saddam Hussein ' s use of chemical weapons on the battlefield . In response , the United States instructed its delegate at the UN to lobby friendly representatives in support of a motion to take " no decision " on the use of chemical munitions by Iraq . If backing to obstruct the resolution could be won , then the U . S . delegation were to proceed and vote in favour of taking zero action ; if support were not forthcoming , the U . S . delegate were to refrain from voting altogether . USDEL should work to develop general Western position in support of a motion to take " no decision " on Iranian draft resolution on use of chemical weapons by Iraq . If such a motion gets reasonable and broad support and sponsorship , USDEL should vote in favor . Failing Western support for " no decision , " USDEL should abstain . Representatives of the United States argued that the UN Human Rights Commission was an " inappropriate forum " for consideration of such abuses . According to Joyce Battle , the Security Council eventually issued a " presidential statement " condemning the use of unconventional weapons " without naming Iraq as the offending party . " Parties involved . According to Russ Baker , writing in the " Columbia Journalism Review " , a " vast network " based in the U . S . and elsewhere , fed Iraq ' s warring capabilities right up until August 1990 , when Saddam invaded Kuwait . Sarkis Soghanalian . Alan Friedman writes that Sarkis Soghanalian , one of the most notorious arms dealers during the Cold War , procured Eastern Bloc and French origin weaponry , and brokered vast deals with Iraq , with the tacit approval of the Central Intelligence Agency . The most prominent [ arms merchant ] was Sarkis Soghanalian , a Miami - based former CIA contractor who brokered tens of billions of dollars ' worth of military hardware for Iraq during the 1980s , reporting many of his transactions to officials in Washington . [ Soghanalian ] was close to the Iraqi leadership and to intelligence officers and others in the Reagan administration . In many respects he was the living embodiment of plausible deniability , serving as a key conduit for CIA and other U . S . government operations . In an interview with William Kistner , Soghanalian stated that he was " working closely with the U . S . government " . According to Timmerman , Soghanalian also helped the Iraqis obtain TOW anti - tank missiles , for which he was later prosecuted by the United States Department of Justice . Banca Nazionale del Lavoro . The " Iraqgate " scandal revealed that a branch of Italy ' s largest bank , Banca Nazionale del Lavoro ( BNL ) , in Atlanta , Georgia relied partially on U . S . taxpayer - guaranteed loans to funnel $ 5 billion to Iraq from 1985 to 1989 . In August 1989 , when FBI agents raided the Atlanta branch of BNL , branch manager Christopher Drogoul was charged with making unauthorized , clandestine , and illegal loans to Iraq – some of which , according to his indictment , were used to purchase arms and weapons technology . The CIA had previously concealed this information from the Congress , according to senior analyst Melvin A . Goodman . According to the " Financial Times " , the companies involved in the scandal by shipping militarily useful technology to Iraq were Hewlett - Packard , Tektronix , and Matrix Churchill ' s Ohio branch . Even before the Persian Gulf War started in 1990 , the " Intelligencer Journal " of Pennsylvania in a string of articles reported : " If U . S . and Iraqi troops engage in combat in the Persian Gulf , weapons technology developed in Lancaster and indirectly sold to Iraq will probably be used against U . S . forces . . . And aiding in this . . . technology transfer was the Iraqi - owned , British - based precision tooling firm Matrix Churchill , whose U . S . operations in Ohio were recently linked to a sophisticated Iraqi weapons procurement network . " " One entire facility , a tungsten - carbide manufacturing plant that was part of the Al Atheer complex , " Kenneth Timmerman informed the Senate Committee on Banking , Housing , and Urban Affairs , " was blown up by the IAEA in April 1992 because it lay at the heart of the Iraqi clandestine nuclear weapons program , PC - 3 . Equipment for this plant appears to have been supplied by the Latrobe , Pennsylvania manufacturer , Kennametal , and by a large number of other American companies , with financing provided by the Atlanta branch of the BNL bank . " Aside from the " New York Times " , the " Los Angeles Times " , and ABC ' s Ted Koppel , the Iraq - gate story never picked up much momentum , even though the U . S . Congress became involved with the scandal . See an article by journalist William Safire , introduced into the " Congressional Record " by Rep . Tom Lantos . By contrast , Alcolac International , a Maryland company , transported thiodiglycol , a mustard gas precursor , to Iraq . Alcolac was successfully prosecuted for its violations of export control law . Index of American companies . According to German daily newspaper " Die Tageszeitung " , which is reported to have reviewed an uncensored copy of Iraq ' s 11 , 000 - page declaration to the U . N . Security Council in 2002 , almost 150 foreign companies supported Saddam Hussein ' s WMD program . Twenty - four U . S . firms were involved in exporting materials to Baghdad . An even longer list of American companies and their involvements in Iraq was provided by the " LA Weekly " in May 2003 . Energy development and security . Aqaba pipeline project . The United States government supported the construction of new oil pipeline that would run westward from Iraq across land to the Jordanian port city of Aqaba , permitting access from the Red Sea . The Bechtel Corporation was the prime contractor for this project . Donald Rumsfeld discussed the advantages of the pipeline personally with Saddam Hussein in 1983 . The Aqaba project never made it past the drawing board , however , because of its proximity to Israel , which planners insisted upon . So near to the border it would run , the Iraqi leadership feared the Israeli side could disable the pipeline at a later date , simply by " lobbing a few hand grenades " at it . Tanker War and U . S . military involvement . The Tanker War started when Iraq attacked Iranian tankers and the oil terminal at Kharg island in 1984 . Iran struck back by attacking tankers carrying Iraqi oil from Kuwait and then any tanker of the Persian Gulf states supporting Iraq . Both nations attacked oil tankers and merchant ships , including those of neutral nations , in an effort to deprive the opponent of trade . After repeated Iraqi attacks on Iran ' s main exporting facility on Khark Island , Iran attacked a Kuwaiti tanker near Bahrain on May 13 , 1984 , and a Saudi tanker in Saudi waters on May 16 . Attacks on ships of noncombatant nations in the Persian Gulf sharply increased thereafter , and this phase of the war was dubbed the " Tanker War . " Lloyd ' s of London , a British insurance market , estimated that the Tanker War damaged 546 commercial vessels and killed about 430 civilian mariners . The largest of attacks were directed by Iran against Kuwaiti vessels , and on November 1 , 1986 , Kuwait formally petitioned foreign powers to protect its shipping . The Soviet Union agreed to charter tankers starting in 1987 , and the United States Navy offered to provide protection for tankers flying the U . S . flag on March 7 , 1987 . Operation Prime Chance was a United States Special Operations Command operation intended to protect U . S . - flagged oil tankers from Iranian attack . The operation took place roughly at the same time as Operation Earnest Will , the largely Navy effort to escort the tankers through the Persian Gulf . Under international law , an attack on such ships would be treated as an attack on the U . S . , allowing the U . S . to retaliate militarily . This support would protect ships headed to Iraqi ports , effectively guaranteeing Iraq ' s revenue stream for the duration of the war . Special Operations Forces also assisted in this effort . The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment operated AH - 6 helicopters from a large barge anchored at sea . A second platform was manned by Special Forces from Fort Bragg , piloting OH - 58D s . " These things looked extremely sinister . They were all black and bristling with antennas and had a huge round sight module about two feet in diameter stuck on a mast above the rotor blades . . . . The impression you got , just looking at one of these things on the ground , was of a giant insect staring at you before you die " , a Special Forces officer is quoted as saying . On April 14 , 1988 , the frigate USS " Samuel B . Roberts " was badly damaged by an Iranian mine . U . S . forces responded with Operation Praying Mantis on April 18 , the United States Navy ' s largest engagement of surface warships since World War II . Two Iranian ships were destroyed , killing 55 sailors in the process , and an American helicopter was shot down , killing the two pilots . A number of researchers and former military personnel contend that the United States carried out Black operations against Iranian military targets during the war . Lt . Col . Roger Charles , who worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense at the Pentagon , says the Navy used specially equipped Mark III patrol boats during the night , with the intent of luring Iranian gunboats away from territorial waters , where they could be fired upon and destroyed . " They took off at night and rigged up false running lights so that from a distance it would appear there was a merchant ship , which the Iranians would want to inspect . " Barry Lando writes , " The Americans often claimed they attacked the Iranian ships only after the Iranians first menaced neutral ships plying the Gulf . In some cases , however , the neutral ships which the Americans claimed to be defending didn ' t even exist . " Information collected from Operation Eager Glacier , a top - secret intelligence - gathering program , was also used to bomb manufacturing plants inside Iran by the CIA . The USS Stark incident . An Iraqi jet fighter mistakenly attacked the USS " Stark " in May 1987 , killing 37 servicemen and injuring 21 . But attention in Washington was on isolating Iran ; accepting Saddam ' s apology for the error , the White House criticized Iran ' s mining of international waters , and in October 1987 , the U . S . attacked Iranian oil platforms in retaliation for an Iranian attack on the U . S . - flagged Kuwaiti tanker " Sea Isle City " . Professor Noam Chomsky says the only country to have been granted the " privilege " of attacking a U . S . warship and getting away with it , other than Israel in 1967 , is Saddam Hussein ' s Iraq . The USS Vincennes incident . In the course of these escorts by the U . S . Navy , the cruiser USS " Vincennes " shot down Iran Air Flight 655 with the loss of all 290 civilian passengers and crew on July 3 , 1988 . The American government said that the airliner had been mistaken for an Iranian F - 14 Tomcat , and that the USS " Vincennes " was operating in international waters at the time and feared that it was under attack . The Iranians maintain that the " Vincennes " was in Iranian territorial waters and that the passenger jet was turning away and increasing altitude after take - off . U . S . Admiral William J . Crowe later acknowledged on ABC ' s " Nightline " that the " Vincennes " was inside Iranian territorial waters when it launched the missiles . This event , and the ease with which the United States government accepted the killing of its own servicemen , may have helped convince Iran to agree to a ceasefire . The United States has never formally apologized for the attack in which 290 civilians died . Longer term interests . In October 1989 , President Bush signed NSD 26 , which begins , " Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to U . S . national security . " With respect to Iraq , the directive stated , " Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer term interests and promote stability in both the Persian Gulf and the Middle East . " On August 2 , 1990 , at 2 : 00 am , local time , Iraq launched an invasion of oil - rich Kuwait . America ' s expedient ally had , overnight , become its most bitter enemy .