Battle of Gang Toi The Battle of Gang Toi ( 8 November 1965 ) was fought during the Vietnam War between Australian troops and the Viet Cong . The battle was one of the first engagements between the two forces during the war and occurred when a company from 1st Battalion , Royal Australian Regiment ( 1 RAR ) struck a Viet Cong bunker system defended by Company 238 in the Gang Toi Hills , in northern Bien Hoa Province . It occurred during a major joint US - Australian operation codenamed Operation Hump , involving the US 173rd Airborne Brigade , to which 1 RAR was attached . During the latter part of the operation an Australian rifle company clashed with an entrenched company - sized Viet Cong force in well - prepared defensive positions . Meanwhile , an American paratroop battalion was also heavily engaged in fighting on the other side of the Song Dong Nai . The Australians were unable to concentrate sufficient combat power to launch an assault on the position and consequently they were forced to withdraw after a fierce engagement during which both sides suffered a number of casualties , reluctantly leaving behind two men who had been shot and could not be recovered due to heavy machine - gun and rifle fire . Although they were most likely dead , a battalion - attack to recover the missing soldiers was planned by the Australians for the next day , but this was cancelled by the American brigade commander due to rising casualties and the need to utilise all available helicopters for casualty evacuation . The bodies of the two missing Australian soldiers were subsequently recovered more than 40 years later , and were finally returned to Australia for burial . Background . Military situation . Although the initial American commitment to the war in Vietnam had been limited to advice and materiel support , by 1964 there were 21 , 000 US advisors in South Vietnam . However , with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam ( ARVN ) weakened by successive defeats at the hands of the communists , the South Vietnamese government faltering , and Saigon threatened with a major offensive , the worsening situation led to a significant escalation of the war in 1965 , with a large - scale commitment of US ground troops under the command of General William Westmoreland . At first the Americans had adopted a cautious strategy , applied to the strictly limited role of base defence by US Marine units . This was abandoned in April 1965 , and replaced by a new " enclave strategy " of defending key coastal population centres and installations . This strategy required the introduction of nine additional US battalion s , or 14 , 000 troops , to bring the total in Vietnam to 13 . Allied nations of the Free World Military Forces were expected to contribute another four battalions . Westmoreland planned to develop a series of defensive positions around Saigon before expanding operations to pacify the South Vietnamese countryside and as a result a number of sites close to Viet Cong dominated areas were subsequently chosen to be developed into semi - permanent divisional - level bases . Such areas included Di An which was intended to become the headquarters of the US 1st Infantry Division , while the US 25th Infantry Division would be based in the vicinity of Cu Chi . However , large - scale military operations to clear the intended base areas had to wait until the dry season . Yet the allied enclave strategy proved only transitory and further setbacks led to additional troop increases to halt the losing trend . With the situation reaching crisis point during the Viet Cong wet season offensive in June 1965 , Westmoreland requested further reinforcement and US and allied forces increased to 44 battalions which would be used to directly bolster the ARVN . Australia ' s growing involvement in Vietnam reflected the American build - up . In 1963 , the Australian government had committed a small advisory team , known as the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam ( AATTV ) , to help train the South Vietnamese forces . However , in June 1965 the decision to commit ground troops was made , and the 1st Battalion , Royal Australian Regiment — originally commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ivan ' Lou ' Brumfield — was dispatched . Supporting 1 RAR was the 1 Troop , A Squadron , 4th / 19th Prince of Wales ' s Light Horse equipped with M - 113 Armoured Personnel Carriers , artillery from 105th Field Battery , Royal Australian Artillery and 161st Battery , Royal New Zealand Artillery , and 161st Reconnaissance Flight operating Cessna 180 s and Bell H - 13 Sioux light observation helicopters ; in total 1 , 400 personnel . The Australian units were attached to the US 173rd Airborne Brigade under the command of Brigadier General Ellis W . Williamson in Bien Hoa and operated throughout the III Corps Tactical Zone ( III CTZ ) to help establish the Bien Hoa – Vung Tau enclave . Although logistics and resupply were primarily provided by the Americans , a small logistic unit — 1st Australian Logistics Company — was situated at Bien Hoa airbase . Unlike later Australian units that served in Vietnam , which included conscripts , 1 RAR was manned by regular personnel only . Attached to US forces , 1 RAR would primarily be employed in search and destroy operations using the newly developed doctrine of airmobile operations , utilising helicopters to insert light infantry and artillery into an area of operations , and to support them with aerial mobility , fire support , casualty evacuation , and resupply . The battalion commenced operations in late June 1965 and initially focussed on defeating the Viet Cong ' s wet season offensive . During this time US 173rd Brigade , including 1 RAR , conducted a number of operations into War Zone D — a major communist base area at the junction of Phuoc Long , Long Khanh , Bien Hoa and Binh Duong provinces — as well as in the Iron Triangle in November . Prelude . Opposing forces . By late - 1965 the junction of the Song Be and Song Dong Nai rivers had become a major communist staging area for men , equipment , and supplies for units based around Saigon and the Mekong Delta . Communist communications and resupply routes between War Zones C and D also met the Ho Chi Minh Trail in this area . Westmoreland planned to use the US 173rd Airborne Brigade to keep the Viet Cong off balance and to target their base areas , and consequently a search - and - destroy operation codenamed Operation Hump was planned . Operation Hump marked the half - way point in the twelve - month tour of duty of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade and was named accordingly . The concept of operations envisioned 1 RAR and US 1st Battalion , 503rd Infantry Regiment being inserted by helicopter during an airmobile operation into War Zone D , in an area about north - east of the US airbase at Bien Hoa . The Australian and American area of operations ( AO ) would be separated by the Song Dong Nai , with 1 RAR to deploy into a Landing Zone ( LZ ) to the south , while the US 1 / 503rd Battalion would conduct a helicopter assault onto a LZ northwest of the Song Dong Nai and Song Be . Meanwhile , the US 173rd Airborne Brigade ' s second battalion — 2nd Battalion , 503rd Infantry Regiment — would be left to defend Bien Hoa airbase . The area was thought to be a Viet Cong stronghold and American intelligence initially identified Q762 Main Force Regiment and D800 Main Force Battalion as being nearby . However , unknown to the allied force the Viet Cong 9th Division had likely received forewarning of the operation and had deployed one of its most experienced regiments , supported by a number of Local Force battalions , determined for a test of allied strength . 271 VC Main Force Regiment ( also known as Q761 Main Force Regiment ) subsequently took up defensive positions in the area , while the communist U1 headquarters protected by Company 238 , was situated on the plateau atop the Gang Toi Hills in an area which formed part of 1 RAR ' s objective . U1 was responsible for co - ordinating the Viet Cong regional defence against the Bien Hoa air base and for developing anti - government resistance and had been tasked with rebuilding the covert organisation in Bien Hoa city and the surrounding villages up to the Dong Nai , as well as re - establishing the link between Bien Hoa city and War Zone D , and for planning and executing attacks against the air base itself . Yet having relocated to the rainforest two months earlier , its presence was also unknown to the Australians and Americans . Regardless , A Company 1 RAR was scheduled to conduct a search of the plateau on the fourth day of the operation . Battle . Insertion and patrolling , 5 – 7 November 1965 . On 5 November 1 RAR began the routine search - and - destroy operation , inserting by helicopter south of the Song Dong Nai at 08 : 00 , while the US 1 / 503rd Battalion was inserted onto LZ King north - west of the Song Dong Nai and Song Be rivers at 11 : 00 . The operation started badly for the Australians and Americans with the fly - in delayed . Despite a lengthy preparation by fire , a large Viet Cong force had been observed in the vicinity of LZ Queen prior to the insertion of the lead Australian rifle company — D Company under the command of Captain Peter Rothwell . The escorting helicopter gunships began taking small arms fire as they attempted to provide suppressing fire and Rothwell made the decision to activate the alternate landing zone to the north - east , LZ Princess . D Company was subsequently inserted safely and swept back to LZ Queen , securing it for the remainder of the battalion . By mid - morning 1 RAR occupied LZ Queen , with the 105 mm L5 Pack Howitzer s of 105 Field Battery also flying - in to provide direct support . Augmenting the Australian gunners , the US 3 / 319 Artillery Battalion and 161st Battery , Royal New Zealand Artillery occupied FSB Ace further south . 1 RAR ' s scheme of manoeuvre dictated that each company undertake a dispersed patrol program in their own Tactical Area of Responsibility , a fact which would allow them to search more ground , but limit their ability to concentrate combat power in the event of contact . A Company , under Major John Healy , patrolled east ; B Company moved north along the Song Be to Xom Xoai , while D Company patrolled south . C Company remained at LZ Queen to protect 105 Field Battery which had established a fire support base ( FSB ) . Over the next two days the Australians patrolled relentlessly through the leech - infested swamps and dense jungle . At midday on 6 November A Company received two mortar rounds which failed to do any damage , but marked the start of a series of minor clashes . A Company had a number of contacts during this time , with the Australians killing a Viet Cong scout for the loss of two wounded in one skirmish . A further contact soon after resulted in two more Viet Cong killed and one wounded . Intelligence gained from these incidents indicated the presence of a Viet Cong Main Force Regiment in the area , while documents recovered contained plans for attacks on ARVN outposts near Bien Hoa Airbase . By nightfall on 7 November , despite the earlier contacts , no major actions had occurred in the Australian AO . With the rifle companies now several kilometres apart , A Company had patrolled into a network of well used roads and tracks that formed part of a branch of the Ho Chi Minh Trail . Healy ' s men spent the night astride the tracks and would resume patrolling the following day along a track which led to Hill 82 . Meanwhile , although unknown to them at the time , the US 1 / 503rd Battalion across the Song Dong Nai had patrolled to within of a major Viet Cong bunker system sited on two spur lines in the vicinity of Hill 65 . Hill 82 , 8 November 1965 . Brumfield arrived by helicopter on the morning of 8 November , just as A Company was preparing to depart its night location at 08 : 00 . With contact now seeming unlikely to the Australians , Healy was instructed to move to a rendezvous from which the battalion would be extracted back to Bien Hoa the following day . A Company subsequently set out on a compass bearing which would take them across the northern edge of the Gang Toi plateau . By 10 : 30 the Australians moved out in single file but had not gone far before a lone Viet Cong scout was observed shadowing them ; he was subsequently shot and killed by the rear section . Crossing a creek line the Australians uncovered a company - sized camp of dugouts and trenches , before being fired upon at 15 : 40 by a single Viet Cong soldier who then fled . A Company halted briefly , and at this time two Viet Cong approached their position , before being killed by 1 Platoon . The Australians continued in single file towards the top of the plateau , with 1 Platoon — under Sergeant Gordon Peterson — leading , followed by 2 and then 3 Platoons . The going was slow in the dense jungle and visibility was limited . By 16 : 30 the lead section was nearing the top of the hill having gone just , while the last platoon — 3 Platoon — was still leaving the harbour . 1 Platoon was suddenly hit by heavy small arms fire from at least three Viet Cong machine - guns in well - sited bunkers , supported by rifles and grenades . The fire engulfed the lead section and platoon headquarters , causing five casualties in the opening minute . Pinned down , the Australians went to ground and began returning fire , allowing all except one of the wounded to crawl to safety . Private Richard Parker , who had fallen directly in front of the bunker system , was unable to be recovered . Failing to respond to the shouts of his comrades , Parker was exposed to further hits , although was probably already dead . To support the beleaguered platoon , Healy subsequently ordered the support section from company headquarters to move forward to provide covering fire , while 3 Platoon moved up on the left flank . However , due to the dispersed patrolling plan adopted , the remaining companies were unable to provide any assistance . Still at the bottom of the hill , 3 Platoon — under Second Lieutenant Clive Williams — had just shot and killed two Viet Cong moving along the creek line . Reaching the top of the hill to the left of company headquarters , Williams turned to the right towards the Viet Cong positions . Moving into extended line on a front the Australians had advanced just before the left flank was engaged by a number of machine - guns from another sector of the Viet Cong position . In danger of being outflanked , 3 Platoon continued to advance regardless , using fire and movement . Just from the bunkers Private Peter Gillson , the machine - gunner in the forward section , was shot has he tried to move around the twisted roots of a tall tree . As he fell two Viet Cong rushed forward to take the M60 machine - gun , however Gillson was still conscious and they were killed at point blank range before he collapsed . Williams radioed Healy of the increasing danger while his platoon sergeant — Sergeant Colin Fawcett — had crawled forward under heavy fire to Gillson , whose body was wedged in the buttress of a large tree . Unable to find a pulse , Fawcett attempted to extract Gillson , but was unable to do so due to heavy fire . Two other attempts to recover the body were also beaten back , and although unsuccessful , Fawcett was later awarded the Military Medal for his actions . Taking heavy fire from both the front and flanks , Williams had little choice but to withdraw . With the Viet Cong moving rapidly to encircle them , and unable to move forward , the Australians had to fight hard using small arms fire and grenades to extract themselves back to company headquarters without further casualties . However , by this time the artillery was beginning to have an impact as A Company ' s Forward Observer , Captain Bruce Murphy , a New Zealander , directed the fires . The Australians had unavoidably been placed in the worst possible position to their supporting artillery , with 105 Battery firing on a line directly towards them from their gun - line on the other side of the Gang Toi plateau . Consequently Murphy was unable to observe the fall of shot , and had to walk the rounds onto target by sound . A slight miscalculation could have sent a round over the hill into the Australian positions , regardless , and despite persistent rifle and machine - gun fire , Murphy calmly directed the artillery throughout the battle . For his skill and bravery he was later awarded the Military Cross . By 18 : 30 , more than two hours since the fighting began , darkness was approaching . The battalion would be unable to concentrate against the Viet Cong position until the following day , and Healy subsequently made the decision to withdraw . With the artillery falling as close as possible , the weight of the indirect fires provided the Australians with a degree of protection and an opportunity to extricate themselves . 2 Platoon — under Lieutenant Ian Guild — was subsequently moved into position to cover the withdrawal , and carrying their wounded the Australians successfully broke contact without suffering further losses . A Company initially moved to a landing zone below the ridgeline which had been cleared to allow the casualties to be evacuated , however there were no helicopters available . As a result the Australians would had to look after their casualties until the following morning , and they proceeded further north to a night harbour as the area was pounded by artillery , aerial bombing and helicopter gunships . Healy assessed that his company had encountered a force of at least company - size . Later it became apparent that they had indeed contacted Company 238 which was tasked with protecting the U1 headquarters and to carry out operations in the Bien Hoa region . Throughout the day Viet Cong reconnaissance parties , perhaps including those that had been contacted intermittently , had observed the approaching Australian force on a line leading directly to the U1 headquarters . During the fighting the Viet Cong company commander — Nguyen Van Bao — had split his force into two , allocating one platoon to fight the advancing Australians , and the other two to protect the headquarters . Following the Australian withdrawal Van Bao had also withdrawn , pre - empting the ensuing barrage , yet the U1 base remained in communist hands . Fighting across the Song Dong Nai . Meanwhile , across the river in the American AO the US 1 / 503rd Battalion had uncovered a large Viet Cong bunker system and became involved in fierce fighting that had included desperate hand - to - hand combat , with both sides resorting to using bayonet s . Throughout the morning the Australians had heard the increasing crescendo of firing as the battle raged , however , as neither they nor the US 2 / 503rd Battalion had been called on to reinforce the US 1 / 503rd Battalion they had pressed on . The American paratroopers had contacted a well - equipped Viet Cong Main Force regiment , complete with khaki uniforms , steel helmets and Soviet automatic weaponry and small arms . The fighting across the Song Dong Nai continued into the afternoon , before subsiding into sporadic sniper and small arms fire in the later afternoon and early evening . During the fighting , Specialist Lawrence Joel — a medic — distinguished himself tending to his wounded comrades while under heavy fire . He was subsequently awarded the Medal of Honor . Brumfield demanded the right to return to Hill 82 in order to destroy the bunker system and to recover the bodies of Parker and Gillson , and he and Major John Essex - Clark — the Operations Officer — began planning a battalion attack . However , with American casualties rising and all available helicopters required for casualty evacuation , the planned operation was cancelled . The thick jungle canopy compounded the issue , and Williamson decided to stage the casualties through an area secured by the Australians at LZ Princess . Operation Hump concluded on 9 November , with the US 1 / 503rd Battalion and 1 RAR being extracted by helicopter and returning to Bien Hoa in the late afternoon . Following 1 RAR ' s return to Bien Hoa Brumfield continued to petition for permission to conduct the operation . A battalion attack was subsequently planned for 14 November , however Williamson later deferred it dependent on the availability of air and helicopter support , and the start date of the upcoming Operation New Life . Ultimately it was never conducted . Aftermath . Casualties . The Battle of Gang Toi was the first set - piece action between Australian and Viet Cong forces in the Vietnam War . Australian casualties included two missing ( presumed killed ) and six wounded , and despite the efforts of their comrades , the bodies of the Australian dead were unable to be recovered . Against these losses the Viet Cong had suffered at least six killed , one wounded and five captured . Confronted by an equal sized force , dug - in in well - prepared defences , the Australians had performed creditably enough even if they had been forced to withdraw , leaving the battlefield to the Viet Cong . Despite inflicting heavier casualties on the communists than they had suffered themselves , many of the Australians were depressed at having left two soldiers behind , and they longed for the opportunity to return to Gang Toi . In 2007 , more than 40 years after the fighting , an Australian Vietnam veteran — Jim Bourke , MG — and a team of volunteers successfully located the remains of both Parker and Gillson . They had been hastily buried together in a weapon pit the day after the battle by Viet Cong soldiers , and with the assistance of the Australian and Vietnamese governments they were subsequently returned to Australia for burial . Assessment . Although A Company , 1 RAR had been mauled , the experience of the Australians at Gang Toi was relatively minor when compared to that of the Americans . During fierce fighting the US 1 / 503rd Battalion had suffered nearly a 100 casualties , including 40 killed and 51 wounded , while more than 400 Viet Cong were believed killed . American claims were later raised to over 700 killed when captured documents revealed the losses caused by artillery and air strikes . Yet it was questionable as to whether such battles of attrition would be viable , while equally the American battalion had taken casualties far beyond what would have been politically acceptable for 1 RAR . Indeed , their losses had been significant , and although claimed as a victory , the Americans had failed to secure the area even if the Viet Cong had temporarily surrendered control of the battlefield . Ultimately , the communists continued to use the Bien Hoa area as a major supply route for the rest of the war . Brumfield considered Operation Hump to be the least successful operation in which the Australian battalion had participated , and he criticised it as being badly conceived from the start , and mounted with too little intelligence or prior reconnaissance . Indeed from the initial landing zone being occupied by the Viet Cong , failures in the passage of information , the heavy losses suffered by the US 1 / 503rd Battalion and the subsequent difficulties with casualty evacuation , the operation had not run smoothly . The Australians were vengeful for their losses and wanted to return to collect their dead , however with 1 RAR absorbed into other operations the planned battalion attack on Hill 82 never occurred . Regardless , further operations followed in the months afterwards , with 1 RAR subsequently employed on Operation New Life in November and December , and later Operation Crimp in the Ho Bo Woods in January 1966 . Operation Hump was Brumfield ' s last however , with an old football injury forcing his evacuation to Australia in mid - November . He was subsequently replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Alex Preece . Subsequent operations . At the strategic level the ARVN and the South Vietnamese government had both rallied after appearing on the verge of collapse and the communist threat against Saigon had subsided , yet additional troop increases were required if Westmoreland was to adopt a more offensive strategy , with US troop levels planned to rise from 210 , 000 in January 1966 to 327 , 000 by December 1966 . The Australian government increased its own commitment to the ground war in March 1966 , announcing the deployment of a two battalion brigade — the 1st Australian Task Force — with armour , aviation , engineer and artillery support ; in total 4 , 500 men . Additional Royal Australian Air Force ( RAAF ) and the Royal Australian Navy ( RAN ) force elements would also be deployed and with all three services total Australian strength in Vietnam was planned to increase to 6 , 300 personnel . 1 RAR was subsequently replaced and 1 ATF was allocated its own area of operations in Phuoc Tuy Province , thereby allowing the Australians to pursue operations more independently using their own counter - insurgency tactics and techniques . The task force arrived between April and June 1966 , constructing a base at Nui Dat , while logistic arrangements were provided by the 1st Australian Logistics Support Group which was established at the port of Vung Tau .