Battle of Dujaila The Battle of Dujaila ( ) was fought on 8 March 1916 , between British and Ottoman forces during the First World War . The Ottoman forces , led by Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz were besieging Kut , when the Anglo - Indian relief force , led by Lieutenant - General Fenton Aylmer , attempted to relieve the city . The attempt failed , and Aylmer lost 4 , 000 men . Background . Throughout most of 1915 , the Anglo - Indian expedition , designated Indian Expeditionary Force D , had advanced up both the Tigris and Euphrates rivers . Originally dispatched to capture the Shatt al Arab and Basra , to protect the British oilfields in Iran , Force " D " ' s mission in Mesopotamia expanded gradually as local commanders saw a chance for victories which would burnish the British Empire ' s prestige in the Muslim world . At the battles of Qurna , Nasiriyeh , and Es Sinn , Force " D " defeated elements of the Ottoman Sixth Army . After the Battle of Es Sinn , the Anglo - Indian force controlled the Tigris and Euphrates rivers through much of what is now southern Iraq . Sensing that Baghdad was within their grasp , the commander of Force " D " , supported by the Commander in Chief , India , in Simla , argued for permission to launch a final offensive to capture it . The situation looked promising . The nearest Ottoman reserves , according to British intelligence , were distant in the Caucasus or away at Aleppo in Syria . All that blocked the way to Baghdad were two demoralized , defeated divisions . In London , the India Office was staunchly opposed to a further advance . Secretary of State for India , Austen Chamberlain was concerned that even if Baghdad could be captured , it would only be lost again because no other troops were available to reinforce Force " D " . Eventually , the question of a further advance was taken up by Asquith ' s War Cabinet . Despite warnings from the Imperial General Staff , the decision to advance was given . During the second half of 1915 , Force " D " had only one division , the 6th ( Poona ) Division under Major - General Charles V . F . Townshend , available for offensive operations . Eventually , the question of a further advance was taken up by Asquith ' s War Cabinet . Despite warnings from the Imperial General Staff , the decision to advance was given . Although tactically successful at the Battle of Ctesiphon , it proved to be a Pyrrhic victory . The Poona Division retreated to Kut . The Ottoman Sixth Army , reinforced , pursued and laid siege to the town after attempts to storm the Anglo - Indian positions failed . Failing to take the town by storm , the Ottoman Sixth Army had adopted a passive siege , preferring to starve the Kut defenders into submission . The survival of the garrison became dependent on its food supply . Originally , forecast to be exhausted by the middle of February 1916 , additional food stocks had been discovered in the town at the end of January 1916 , which would extend the defender ' s rations until the middle of April 1916 . With the Poona Division under siege , the high commands in London and Simla began scrambling to put together a relief force . Lieutenant - General Fenton Aylmer was appointed to command the relief expedition , designated as the Tigris Corps . Originally intended to be made up of the 3rd ( Lahore ) Division and 7th ( Meerut ) Division as well as replacements intended for the besieged Poona Division . The Tigris Corps ' first drive to relieve Townshend and the Kut garrison ground to a halt at the Battle of Hanna on 21 January 1916 . Prelude . Following the setbacks at the Hanna on 21 January 1916 , Lieutenant - General Aylmer ' s Tigris Corps spent the month of February refitting and collecting reinforcements . Despite the pause , the Tigris Corps was still unable to be brought back up to full strength . The 13th ( Western ) Division had been dispatched as reinforcements from Egypt where it was being brought back to strength following its evacuation from Gallipoli . However , by the end of February , only the 13th Division ' s first battalions had reached the theatre , and only two of those had been transported up river by end of February . The British position at Kut was becoming more desperate . Food stocks were estimated to last only until the middle of April , even with the discovery of an additional store of grain in late January . Additionally , there was the concern that time was running out in another way : the weather . Based on the known weather patterns of the region , the latest that the Anglo - Indian Tigris Corps could expect favourable weather to hold was the middle of March . After that , the spring thaw would be in full swing . Combined with the coming rainy season , it would turn the areas along the banks of the Tigris into a flooded quagmire . Many of battalions of the Tigris Corps remained understrength at the end of March 1916 . The problem was particularly acute with the British battalions and the British officers of the Indian Army units . To deal with this , survivors of several units were amalgamated into battalions which approached full strength . Furthermore , replacement drafts meant for units besieged in Kut were formed into provisional units . These provisional units included the Highland Battalion ( survivors of 1st Black Watch and 1st Seaforth Highlanders ) , Dorsets ( replacement drafts for 2nd Norfolk and 2nd Dorset regiments in Kut ) , Composite Dogra Battalion ( 37th Dogras and 41st Dogras ) and the Composite Territorials ( remnants of 1 / 4 Hampshire and 1 / 5 Buffs ( Royal East Kent Regiment ) ) . In 1916 , there were virtually no paved roads in Mesopotamia between Baghdad and Basra . No rail road had been constructed to connect to the cities . Beyond the port of Basra , transport options were limited to animal power , along unpaved tracks near the river , or river craft . Both required adequate water to operate effectively . Although the Tigris was broad , during much of the year it was so shallow that many ships could not navigate it . Going out further from the track along the Tigris , there were marshlands which would flood , especially during the Spring thaw . This left the river as the primary means of long distance transport . Despite the fact that the river was the primary means of transporting men and supplies in theater , the British had insufficient river craft to adequately meet the Tigris Corps ' supply needs . Given the strength of the Ottoman defences at the Hanna , the Anglo - Indian forces needed to find a way around them . On the left bank of the Tigris , this would mean swinging wide around the Ottoman defenses and marching at least 30 miles through the desert . Then , relying on Shatt al - Hayy for their communications , the force would break through the Ottoman lines and link up with the Kut garrison . The other option was to continue along Tigris River , but switching to the right bank . However , this would mean having to break through the Ottoman defenses at Dujaila . Unwilling to leave the Tigris , which provided the British forces with an easy line of communication to Basra , Lieutenant - General Aylmer made the decision to attempt an advance along the right bank . Like the left bank , the terrain was mostly featureless and devoid of cover . The Ottoman units , with their German advisers , had become adept at camouflaging their positions , making it hard for the British and Indian units to fix them properly . What was known was that Ottomans were in the process of constructing a redoubt at Dujaila . Since there was no way to cover a move across the river and through the Dujaila position , Aylmer and his staff put together a plan that called for a night assault by the majority of his force while a detachment would remain behind on the left bank as a diversion . However , prior to putting the plan into effect , Aylmer had to get approval of the new commander of I . E . F . D , Lieutenant - General Sir Percy Lake . After the Battle of the Hanna , General Lake had begun to lose faith in Aylmer ' s abilities as commander of the Tigris Corps . In order to exert greater control over the coming battle , he had replaced Aylmer ' s chief of staff with his own man , Major - General George Gorringe . Not only did Lake lack faith in Aylmer ' s abilities , Aylmer himself had lost confidence in the abilities of his subordinates . Of his two divisional commanders , Major - General Henry D ' Urban Kearny , GOC 3rd ( Lahore ) Division , and Major - General Sir George Younghusband , GOC 7th ( Meerut ) Division , neither were detailed to the principal commander for the planned operation . Major - General D ' Urban Keary would be assigned to command one of the three columns , the other two being commanded by Major - General George Kemball , one of his brigade commanders . Aylmer made his decision claiming that Kemball was a more energetic commander . Major - General Younghusband , who had been the chief proponent of a desert march to outflank the Ottoman lines entirely , was assigned to command the diversion force on the left bank . Like the British , the Ottoman Sixth Army was also stretched to the limit of logistical support . The lack of any sort of industrial infrastructure ( i . e . paved road capable of military transport or railways ) made it exceedingly difficult for the Sixth Army to be rapidly reinforced . What the Ottoman army did have going in its favor was time . They had recognized that for the time , they were at the extent of their supply line from Baghdad . The Ottomans , who had become adept at trench warfare during their victory at Gallipoli , had put their experience to good use . The Ottoman Sixth Army had invested Townshend ’ s position with an elaborate trench network since December 1915 . Downriver , the Field Marshal von der Goltz and his senior Ottoman commander , Khalil Pasha , erected a series of well sited defensive positions at the Hanna and the Sanniyat on the left bank of the river and the Dujaila along the right bank . Because Townshend had adopted a passive defensive stance , even more so since losing his ability to cross the river with the destruction of the pontoon bridge from Kut to the Woolpress village , Von Der Goltz had been able to shift more and more of his troops south . In all , the Ottoman Sixth Army could muster approximately 25 , 000 men , 1 , 200 cavalry , and 80 artillery pieces . With Townshend ' s passivity , Field Marshal Von Der Goltz was able to move the bulk of his forces south , leaving only about 2 , 000 men to maintain the siege itself . On the left bank , the 52nd , 38th , and part of 35th Ottoman Divisions continued to occupy the Hanna line . 8 , 500 men , 1 , 500 cavalry and 32 artillery pieces of the 2nd and 35th Ottoman Divisions defended the right bank of the Tigris at the Dujaila position . Realizing that the British might try to break the siege by advancing on the right bank , the Ottoman commander ordered the construction of the Dujaila redoubt . Aylmer later testified he chose to attack on the right bank because although the redoubt was sited atop the Dujaila depression , construction had only begun a few days after the Hanna battle in January 1916 . By the time of the assault , the Ottomans had significantly improved the position , complete with a glacés estimated to be 25 feet high in some places . Battle . Aylmer ' s plan split his force into three columns ( A , B , and C ) . Columns A and B were grouped together and placed under the command of Major - General Kemball . Column C , under the command of Major - General Kearny , would be the reserve force . On the night of 7 March 1916 , the entire force began crossing the river in preparation for the night march to the Dujualia redoubt . Lacking any real terrain features to help with the night time navigation , each column would have navigate by compass , checking their progress by counting steps , bicycle tachometers , and walking sticks . In the darkness , things started to go wrong . Columns A and B became separated , losing contact with each other , slowing the advance as they tried to find each other in the dark . The artillery became lost and was almost an hour and a half late reaching their assigned positions . Despite the two hour delay , the assault elements of Column A and B were in position just before dawn on 8 March 1916 . The lead elements of 26th Punjabis ( part of 36th Indian Infantry Brigade attached to Column A ) pushed forward , entering the Dujalia position to find them occupied only by a few unsuspecting soldiers . The news was reported back to Kemball that surprise had been achieved . However , despite achieving total surprise , Kemball ordered his units to wait until the pre - planned H - Hour for the assault . He even ordered the Punjabis to withdraw from the Ottoman positions . Three hours would pass before Kemball would allow the 36th Brigade to attack the Dujalia redoubt . By the time Kemball allowed the attack to go in , all hope of surprise had been lost . As the artillery began its preparatory bombardment , Von Der Goltz began ferrying over the 52nd Division from his reserve on the left bank to reinforce the divisions which were now fully alert and manning the trenches . By the end of the battle , nearly 8 , 000 men were ferried across the river and brought into fighting positions , effectively doubling the strength of the Ottoman garrison on the right bank . Although some of Aylmer ' s assault force was in position , some of it was still struggling to sort itself out from the night march as the barrage began . One unit which did reach its start position on time , the 37th Indian Infantry Brigade , was accompanied by Kearny , Aylmer and Gorringe . Despite finding that there a gap in the lines , the Corps and Column commander , as well as the Corps Chief of Staff , held the 37th Brigade back , ordering it to wait and follow the plan ' s timetable . The infantry assault , originally planned for 7 : 15 a . m . did not go in till later . The artillery , which should have started their bombardment earlier , did not get into action until almost 7 a . m . Paradoxically , once the barrage started , all hope of surprise was lost . Through the day , the Anglo - Indian battalions assaulted the Ottoman positions , only to be pinned down and driven back by machine gun and artillery fire . Despite the missed opportunities , the fresh reinforcements , and the strong defensive entrenchments , by late afternoon , the British once again were on the verge of a breakthrough . 59th Scinde Rifles ( Frontier Force ) and 1st Manchester Regiment of the 8th Indian Infantry Brigade succeeded in capturing the first two lines of trenches of the Dujalia Redoubt . However , with no reserves left to exploit the success , the two battalions could do nothing more than hang on to their gains . Slowly but surely , the Ottoman battalions counter - attacked with bayonets and grenades , which were in short supply on the British side , forcing the Manchester ' s and Rifles to retreat in the early evening . Of the 2 , 301 men of the 8th Brigade present , 1 , 174 were casualties by the end of the day . In all , the Tigris Corps suffered almost 4 , 000 casualties . Through the night , the British forces fell back to a rendezvous position approximately 8 , 000 yards from the Dujalia position . When no counter - attack materialized from the Dujalia , Aylmer ordered his troops back across the river , ending the battle . Aftermath . The failure at Dujalia sealed Aylmer ' s fate . On 12 March 1916 , he was relieved of command by Lake after the War Office received the report of the defeat . In his place , Gorringe would be elevated to command of the Tigris Corps . After the defeat , the annual floods began . Melted snow off the Zagros Mountains began the annual re - supply of the rivers . The flooding the Mesopotamian plain began turning it into a sea of mud , flooded nullahs and mud islands . The morale of the Tigris Corps began to drop . When word of the defeat at Dujalia was announced to 6th ( Poona ) Division , Indian Muslim soldiers , already conflicted about fighting their coreligionists , began to desert . For the rest of March , the Tigris Corps would await reinforcements , including the all British 13th ( Western ) Division . Once they were reinforced and concentrated , they would attempt once more to break the siege before Townshend ' s garrison ran out of food .