1954 Guatemalan coup d ' état The 1954 Guatemalan coup d ’ état ( 18 – 27 June 1954 ) was the CIA covert operation that deposed President Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán ( 1950 – 54 ) , with a paramilitary invasion by an anti – Communist army of liberation , titled Operation PBSUCCESS . Overview . In the early 1950s , the liberal Árbenz Government had effected the socio - economic agrarian reforms of Decree 900 ( 27 June 1952 ) , the national expropriation and distribution to the peasants and of the unused , prime farmlands that multinational corporations ( Guatemalan and US ) had set aside as reserved business assets . The Decree 900 land reform especially threatened the agricultural monopoly of the United Fruit Company ( UFC ) , the American multinational corporation that owned 42 per cent of the arable land of Guatemala ; which landholdings either had been bought by or been ceded to the UFC by the military dictatorship s who had preceded the Árbenz Government ( 1950 – 54 ) of Guatemala . In response to the expropriation of idle farmland assets , the United Fruit Company asked the US Governments of presidents Harry Truman ( 1945 – 53 ) and Dwight Eisenhower ( 1953 – 61 ) to act diplomatically , economically , and militarily against Guatemalan President Árbenz Guzmán . Initially , the US government perceived no threat from the " Guatemalan Revolution " to American economic , financial , and political interests . Yet , Árbenz continued the progressive elimination of the feudalism that had retarded the economic growth and social development of Guatemala throughout its national history . The elimination of Guatemalan feudalism was begun by the predecessor régime of President Juan José Arévalo Bermejo ( 1945 – 51 ) , whose national government was “ favorably disposed , initially , toward the United States , was modeled , in many ways , after the Roosevelt New Deal [ 1933 ] ” . Nevertheless , such political and economic liberalism , in the government of a Latin American country , was worrisome to the corporate and political establishment s of the United States . The perspective of the CIA minimized the social and economic development of Guatemala by the Árbenz Government , and especially dismissed the importance , to Guatemalan societal stability , of the Decree 900 agrarian - reform laws as “ an intensely nationalistic program of progress colored by the touchy , anti - foreign inferiority complex of the " Banana republic " . ” Moreover , the progress of the Árbenz Government towards eliminating feudalism with agrarian reform rendered the Guatemala of President Árbenz Guzmán a dangerously liberal threat to the economic " status quo " in Central America , and thus to the political and economic interests of the U . S . About the geopolitical threat of economic liberalism , the Inter - American Affairs Bureau officer Charles R . Burrows said that the State Department perceived that : Arbenz was to serve as a lesson to other nationalists who held the " belief in their immunity from the exercise of United States power " : In the geopolitical context of the US – USSR Cold War ( 1945 – 1991 ) , the secret intelligence agencies of the US misinterpreted liberal politics , agrarian reform , and resource nationalization as consequences of the communist infiltration of a Latin American government , instigated by order of the USSR . The intelligence analyses aggravated the geopolitical fears of CIA Director Allen Welsh Dulles : that Guatemala would become “ a Soviet beach head in the Western Hemisphere ” , and thus challenge US hegemony over “ America ’ s Backyard ” — the countries and peoples of Central and South America . In the context of US national politics , then enthralled by the over - aggressive anti – Communism of the Red Scare McCarthy era ( 1947 – 57 ) , the US Government , the Central Intelligence Agency , and the American people , all feared the Soviet Union ’ s ideologic , military , and economic presences in the Western Hemisphere . Although the CIA had for years been spying on the Árbenz Government , had determined that Guatemalan agrarian reform endangered US economic interests , and had planned a " coup d ’ état " in 1952 , the Eisenhower Administration ( 1953 – 61 ) had no feasible excuse to attack Guatemala . Fortuitously , the Decree 900 land expropriations from the American fruit companies proved to be a political opportunity for subversive action , especially as presented to the US President by CIA Director Dulles and his brother , John Foster Dulles , the US Secretary of State ; they mislabeled the Árbenz Government of Guatemala as proof of the political infiltration of the Western Hemisphere , by the international communist conspiracy of the USSR . Each man owned capital stock in the United Fruit Company , and some have claimed that each man flouted that inherent conflict of interest with his government job ; thus , the Dulles brothers ’ conflation of public policy ( duelling hegemonies ) and private profit ( corporate ownership ) made feasible the " coup d ’ état " against President Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán , in June 1954 . However , in retrospect , Richard M . Bissell , Jr . , assistant to the CIA Director , denied that the 1954 Guatemalan " coup d ’ état " resulted from the conflation of private , multinational , business interests and US Government foreign policy ; he said that there “ is absolutely no reason to believe ” that the Eisenhower Administration ’ s ( 1953 – 61 ) desire to help the United Fruit Company had “ any significant role ” in deciding to depose the elected Guatemalan government of President Jacobo Árbenz . ( See : The Monroe Doctrine . ) The Guatemalan " coup d ’ état " began with Operation PBFORTUNE ( September 1952 ) , the partly implemented plan to supply exiled , anti – Árbenz rebels with operational funds and " matériel " to organize a counter - revolutionary “ army of liberation ” to depose the Árbenz Government . The paramilitary invasion of Guatemala was contingent upon the confirmation , by the secret intelligence services of the US , that President Árbenz Guzmán was a Communist in service to the USSR , but the lack of proof cancelled Operation PBFORTUNE . Nevertheless , two years later , in June 1954 , Operation PBSUCCESS realised the anti – Árbenz " coup d ’ état " , and installed Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas as President of Guatemala . Afterwards followed Operation PBHISTORY ( July 1954 ) , with the intelligence - gathering remit to find and publish communist documentary evidence — from the Árbenz Government files and from the files of the Guatemalan Labour Party — which would substantiate , confirm , and prove the geopolitical opinions of the CIA : that under the Árbenz Government , Guatemala was a communist puppet state , and part of the USSR ’ s hegemony in the Western Hemisphere . In the event , the CIA document - analysis team found no government or communist - party documents that supported the Agency ’ s ideologically mistaken assumption that the Árbenz Government had been infiltrated by Guatemalan communists controlled from the Soviet Union . The PBHISTORY intelligence analyses of Árbenz Government documents further indicated that President Árbenz Guzmán had abided Guatemalan constitutional law by respecting the right of national communists to form political parties , to participate in national politics , to stand for election to the National Congress , and that Guatemalan communists were ideologically independent of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union . The paramilitary invasion of Operation PBSUCCESS ( 1953 – 54 ) featured " El ejército de liberación " , an army of liberation recruited , trained , and armed by the CIA , that was composed of 480 mercenary soldiers commanded by Col . Carlos Castillo Armas , an exiled , right - wing Guatemalan Army officer . The CIA ’ s invasion of Guatemala was part of a complex of diplomatic , economic , and propaganda campaigns meant to subvert the Árbenz Government . To disseminate propaganda and disinformation ( black propaganda ) that misrepresented the Árbenz Government as Communist , the CIA established " Voz de la liberación " ( Voice of Liberation , VOL ) , a radio station that transmitted from suburban Florida , USA — whilst claiming to be in the Guatemalan jungle with the army of Col . Castillo Armas . Likewise , the liberationist propaganda and disinformation misrepresented the VOL as the spontaneous voice of domestic , counter - revolutionary Guatemalan patriots who opposed “ the Communism of the Árbenz Government ” . The compelled resignation of President Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán , on 27 June 1954 , ended the liberal , political experimentation of the Ten Years of Spring , which had begun with the October Revolution of 1944 that established representative democracy in Guatemala . In 1957 , three years after the Guatemalan " coup d ’ état " , President – Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas was assassinated by a presidential bodyguard , and then was replaced with another military government . In 1960 , three years later , began the thirty - six - year - long Guatemalan Civil War ( 1960 – 96 ) , that featured brutal counterinsurgency operations and massacres of peasants , a conflation of Cold War anti – Communism and historical ethnic conflict between " ladino " ( mestizo ) Guatemalans and ethnic Maya ( Indian ) Guatemalans accused of being either communists or “ fellow travellers ” , passive sympathizers to the communist cause . In the 19th century , the U . S . enforced the Monroe Doctrine ( 1823 ) , and , by the 1890s , had replaced European colonial imperialism in the Americas with the hegemony of the United States ; thus the natural resources , and the labour of the peoples , of the Latin American countries and of the island countries of the Caribbean sea , became the purview of the U . S . In Central America , in Guatemala , the military dictators who had ruled the country during the late 19th and the early 20th centuries readily accommodated the financial interests of American multinational corporation s , and the ideological interests of the U . S . Government . Historical background . Yet , unlike military occupation , the direct imperial control of the politics and the economies of countries such as Cuba ( 1899 – 1902 ) , Nicaragua ( 1912 – 33 ) , and Haiti ( 1915 – 34 ) , in Guatemala , the US exerted indirect , hegemonic control of the country , by means of either a sponsored government or an installed government . The political subordinations of the country and the nation were achieved with the close co - operation of the Guatemalan Army and the civil police forces with their counterpart U . S . military and civil police forces ; jointly , they maintained national law and order , which secured the corporate , financial interests of American businesses in Guatemala . Moreover , for such political largesse , the dictators also exempted some U . S . corporations from paying taxes to the Guatemalan national treasury ; sold the public utilities to private business enterprises ; and ceded much prime farmland to foreign corporations , for their sole , private , economic exploitation . Military government . The régimes of Manuel José Estrada Cabrera ( 1898 – 1920 ) and of General Jorge Ubico ( 1931 – 1944 ) opened the land and the economy of Guatemala to unrestricted foreign investment . Moreover , General Ubico especially granted favours — political and financial — to the United Fruit Company , whose investment capital bought controlling shares of the capital stock that financed the construction of the national railroads , the telegraph , and the electric utility company — the private control of the national economic infrastructure of the Republic of Guatemala . In exchange for building the road , rail , and telegraph infrastructure , President – General Ubico ceded physical control of much of Guatemala ’ s prime agricultural land , and " de facto " control of Puerto Barrios , the Caribbean Sea port that grants Guatemala access to the Atlantic Ocean ; resultantly , in labour - and - management relations , the Ubico Government was politically subservient to foreign business interests , especially those of the United Fruit Company . In 1930 , the US supported the presidential ascension of General Jorge Ubico ( 1931 – 44 ) , who , under the guise of public efficiency , installed a national “ March Towards Civilization ” , by which he assumed dictatorial powers , and established a politically repressive régime with police state features , such as internal espionage ( agents provocateur , spies , informants ) , arbitrary arrest , torture , and summary execution of political opponents . Personally , General Ubico was a wealthy aristocrat , with a yearly income of $ 215 , 000 . Politically he was anti – Communist , and so protected the financial and economic interests of the Guatemalan élites ( the feudal landed gentry and the urban bourgeoisie ) in matters of land ownership and labour relations , against the legitimate , legal complaints of the working class , trade unions , and the peasantry . To that effect , General Ubico installed debt slavery , a feudal labour management system of forced labour , the laws of which permitted landlords to discipline their workforces with capital punishment , when necessary , for the efficient functioning of the business enterprise . Philosophically , as a self - identified fascist , General Ubico openly admired his dictator contemporaries , the Italian Benito Mussolini , the Spanish Francisco Franco , and the German Adolf Hitler . Racially , he disdained the indigenous Maya peoples of Guatemala , whom he described as “ animal - like ” , who needed to be “ civilized ” with mandatory military training , which would be like “ domesticating donkeys ” . As a plutocrat , he ceded thousands of hectares of prime agricultural land to the United Fruit Company , and exempted that corporation from paying taxes to the Guatemalan treasury . Geopolitically , President – General Jorge Ubico the US , when he allowed the establishment of American military bases in Guatemala . Civil government . The thirteen - year dictatorship of General Ubico ended with the October Revolution of 1944 , which initiated “ Ten Years of Spring ” in the national politics of Guatemala . The free election that followed installed a philosophically conservative university professor , Juan José Arévalo Bermejo , as the President of Guatemala ( 1945 – 1951 ) ; and established a new political constitution that allowed the legal possibility of expropriating unused farmland for the benefit of the Guatemalan peasant majority . Yet , the liberal social and economic policies , derived from the new political constitution and the “ spiritual socialism ” philosophy of President Arévalo Bermejo , provoked the ruling class gentry and the urban bourgeoisie to first distrust , and then accuse the President of Guatemala of supporting communism — a serious personal imputation and political accusation during the Cold War , of which the US Government took serious note . Furthermore , in 1947 , the Arévalo Government promulgated a liberal labour law that favoured the rights of workers , and implicitly attacked the exploitative business practices of the United Fruit Company . In turn , the private business complaints of the UFC prompted the US embassy in Guatemala City to send alarmist political intelligence to Washington , DC — that Guatemalan President Arévalo Bermejo allowed political rights to Guatemalan communists . Moreover , in keeping with his spiritual - socialism philosophy , President Arévalo Bermejo supported the Caribbean Legion , a group of reformist Latin American military officer s and intellectuals who advocated the deposition of right - wing dictatorships in Costa Rica , the Dominican Republic , Nicaragua , and Venezuela ; the CIA described the Caribbean Legion as a politically destabilizing force , dangerous to US geopolitical interests in the Western Hemisphere . As a participant in the October Revolution of 1944 , army Captain Árbenz facilitated the transition from military dictatorship and military government to representative democracy , when he , and a comrade officer , Major Arana , forsook the Presidency of Guatemala for constitutional government ; such personal and professional integrity earned them , and the Guatemalan Army , much popular respect as patriots . Later , in 1950 , Árbenz Guzmán as presidential candidate received 65 per cent of the votes . In post - dictatorship Guatemala , the Political Constitution of Guatemala allowed only a six - year term , and forbade presidential re - election . Land reform . For the social and economic reform of the Republic of Guatemala , President Árbenz Guzmán advocated the labour union organization of the working class , and land reform for the landless - peasant majority of the population . In 1951 , to equitably redistribute the prime arable lands of the country , the President worked with the Communist " Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo " ( PGT , Guatemalan Labour Party ) to jointly compose , implement , and establish a realistic agrarian - reform program that would remedy the historically inequitable distribution of farmland , which dated from the Spanish conquest of Guatemala , the Colonial period , and the 20th - century military dictatorships . In 1945 , the Guatemalan bourgeoisie — approximately 2 . 2 per cent of the national population — owned 70 per cent of the arable land of Guatemala , yet economically exploited only 12 per cent of that land , whilst 58 per cent of that farmland remained idle , untilled , and unproductive ; whilst the remaining 97 . 8 per cent of the Guatemalan population were landless labourers . In 1952 , the Árbenz Government promulgated Decree 900 , the agrarian - reform redistribution of farmland ; the landless - peasant majority welcomed the progressive changes to the Guatemalan Old Order of the dictatorships of General Manuel José Estrada Cabrera ( 1898 – 1920 ) and General Jorge Ubico ( 1931 – 44 ) . As with his predecessor , President Juan José Arévalo Bermejo ( 1945 – 51 ) , and because of the liberal changes to the economy of Guatemala , the land - owning upper classes and the political factions of the military establishment publicly accused President Árbenz Guzmán of being unduly influenced by the PGT ’ s four - man Communist - minority in the fifty - six - member National Congress of Guatemala — a serious personal imputation and political accusation during the Cold War , of which the US Government took serious note . The resultant political tensions provoked civil unrest throughout the country , and threatened the Guatemalan business interests of the United Fruit Company . In March 1953 , the Árbenz Government expropriated idle UFC farmlands , for which the company was paid US $ 600 , 000 — as determined by the UFC ’ s public tax - declaration of the financial value of the idle farmland . In October 1953 and in February 1954 , the Árbenz Government further expropriated 60 , 702 hectares ( 150 , 000 acres ) of unused UFC farmland ; to that date , the total area of the farmlands expropriated from the UFC was approximately 161 , 874 hectares ( 400 , 000 acres ) . Consequently , the United Fruit Company complained to and sought financial redress through the US Government ; and , in 1954 , the US State Department demanded that the Árbenz Government pay US $ 15 , 854 , 849 to the UFC , for the true value of its farmland in the Pacific Ocean coast of Guatemala . In turn , the Árbenz Government rejected that demand , as a violation of the national sovereignty of the Republic of Guatemala claiming the demand was usurious . As the land expropriations occurred throughout 1953 , the United Fruit Company asked the Eisenhower Administration to compel the Árbenz Government to rescind the Decree 900 laws . To involve the politically reticent President Eisenhower , the UFC employed the public relations - and - advertising expert Edward L . Bernays to create , organise , and direct a psychologically inflammatory , anti – communist campaign of disinformation , by print and radio , film and television , against the liberal Árbenz Government of Guatemala . The public - opinion pressure generated by the UFC disinformation campaign compelled President Eisenhower to become involved in the private - business vs . national - government quarrel of the United Fruit Company and the Árbenz Government , lest his government appear to be “ soft on Communism ” in Guatemala — a serious personal imputation and great political accusation of which the American public took serious note , especially during the Red Scares of the McCarthy Era ( 1947 – 57 ) of US national politics . Consequently , the US State Department reduced economic aid to and commercial trade with Guatemala , which much harmed the Guatemalan national economy , because 85 per cent of its exports were sold to the US , and 85 per cent of its imports were bought from the US . Such economic sabotage of Guatemala was done in secret , because economic warfare violated the Latin American non - intervention agreement to which the United States was a signatory party ; public knowledge that the US was violating the non - intervention agreement would prompt other Latin American countries to aid Guatemala in surviving such economic warfare . Counter - revolution . In 1951 , Operation PBFORTUNE , the CIA ’ s initial plan to depose the liberal government of President Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán was prepared before the expropriation of the Guatemalan farmlands of the United Fruit Company , because , ideologically : Consequently , to facilitate the unencumbered authorization of their paramilitary invasion , the CIA ensured that the propaganda campaign of Operation PBSUCCESS exaggerated the geopolitical fears of the U . S . Government of President Eisenhower , specifically the fear of a Communist Guatemala , realised by the régime of President Árbenz Guzmán , which facilitated the right - wing counter - revolution that installed Col . Carlos Castillo Armas as President of Guatemala in mid - 1954 . Afterwards , to justify the U . S . intervention to the internal politics of the Republic of Guatemala , the CIA launched Operation PBHISTORY , which unsuccessfully sought Árbenz Government documents , and Communist documents of the Guatemalan Labour Party ( PGT ) , which would have ascertained and proved that President Árbenz Guzmán had made of Guatemala a puppet state of the U . S . S . R . , and thus extended Soviet hegemony to the Western Hemisphere . CIA operational names . The name of the 1954 Guatemalan " coup d ’ état " , Operation PBSUCCESS , is a cryptonym composed of a digraph ( two - character prefix ) , which designates the functional , geographic area where the mission is affected . In the name Operation PBSUCCESS , the prefix PB denotes “ Republic of Guatemala ” , and the words SUCCESS and FORTUNE , respectively indicated the optimism and confidence of the CIA planners . Moreover , in CIA cryptonymic practice , the PBSUCCESS and PBFORTUNE operational names were unusual , because most operational names either were arbitrary - word titles or misleading titles that were meant to hide the true temper of paramilitary actions . ( see : CIA cryptonyms ) Operation PBFORTUNE . Deposition of a “ Communist puppet - state ” . As early as 1951 , before Decree 900 was promulgated in June 1952 , the CIA ’ s geopolitical fear of a communist , political conquest of Guatemala , sponsored by the USSR , prompted the deposition of the liberal Árbenz Government . Ideologically , to the CIA , President Árbenz Guzmán ’ s toleration for “ known Communists ” made him , at best , a “ fellow traveller ” , a communist sympathizer , and , at worst , a Communist , himself . The most feasible way of overthrowing President Árbenz Guzmán was secret support ( financial , logistical , military ) of his ideological opponents — exiled Guatemalan rebel - groups , and right - wing , anti - Communist , and reactionary politicians in Guatemala . To that effect , CIA Director of Central Intelligence ( DCI ) Walter Bedell Smith despatched a secret agent to Guatemala City , to find and investigate potential candidates and organizations who would aid a US " coup d ’ état " against the liberal Árbenz Government — which included four Communists from the Guatemalan Labor Party . In that time , the exiled political opponents of the Árbenz Government were ideologically divided , and thus impotent to overthrow the elected government of Guatemala . In the event , the CIA case officer reported to DCI Bedell Smith that there existed no reliable politician or military officer available to betray the national sovereignty of the Republic of Guatemala . Fortuitously for the CIA , that failed scouting trip coincided with the first US state visit of Anastasio Somoza García , the President of Nicaragua ( 1937 – 47 , 1950 – 56 ) , who told the Truman Administration ( 1945 – 53 ) of the existence of a small , Guatemalan rebel - group commanded by Col . Castillo Armas . In exchange for CIA aid and support , the Nicaraguan dictator offered to help the US depose the Guatemalan president . Somoza further explained that the " coup d ’ état " also would be financially supported by President Rafael Trujillo , dictator of the Dominican Republic , in exchange for the CIA ’ s assassination of Dominican opponents exiled in Guatemala . In June 1951 , DCI Bedell Smith ordered CIA acceptance of the Somoza and Trujillo offers , and the establishment of connections with Col . Castillo Armas and his anti - Communist supporters . The CIA asked the Colonel for a plan for the invasion of Guatemala ; he planned to launch simultaneous attacks from Mexico , El Salvador , and Honduras , which would be co - ordinated with simultaneous anti - Communist insurrections throughout Guatemala . To effect the invasion , the Col . Castillo Armas requested money and " matériel " , yet nonetheless told the CIA that his army of liberation , " El ejército de liberación " , would invade Guatemala , with or without US support . In September 1951 , the US State Department approved Operation PBFORTUNE , a paramilitary " coup d ’ état " against the Árbenz Government . Nevertheless , shortly afterwards , shipment of the Soviet weapons for the CIA ’ s army of liberation was postponed — because , in conversation with other Central American heads of state , the indiscreet Nicaraguan President Somoza García had openly spoken about the CIA ’ s planned deposition of President Árbenz Guzmán . Public knowledge of the betrayed secret - intervention would provoke diplomatic problems for the US — a signatory to the Rio Pact ( 1947 ) , a Latin American non - intervention treaty derived from the Good Neighbor Policy of the FDR Administration ( 1933 – 45 ) . For which reason , President Somoza ’ s public boasting , the State Department and the CIA deactivated Operation PBFORTUNE until its reactivation became politically feasible ; the liberation army " matériel " were stored , and the military " caudillo " services of Col . Castillo Armas were retained , for three - thousand weekly dollars , until the US required him to be " El Presidente " of Guatemala . Operation PBSUCCESS . The " coup d ’ état " . In the post – War US , the departure of the cautious Truman Administration ( 1945 – 53 ) and the arrival of the adventurous Eisenhower Administration ( 1953 – 61 ) , abetted by the right - wing Cold War national political climate , rekindled Presidential interest in covert operations , which reanimated CIA advocacy of a paramilitary invasion of Guatemala to depose President Árbenz and his government . Strategically , President Eisenhower favored the secret warfare of covert operations , as cost - effective means for combating the world - wide hegemony of the USSR . In that context , the US National Security Council revived the Guatemalan " coup d ’ état " after reviewing the malleability of anti – Árbenz politics , and because of the successful , Anglo – American 1953 Iranian " coup d ’ état " effected by the CIA and the SIS against the elected Government ( 1951 – 53 ) of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh . To initiate Operation PBSUCCESS , the CIA selected the Guatemalan politico - military leader who would succeed Árbenz as President of Guatemala , and establish a pro – American Guatemalan government . The three exile candidates were : ( i ) the coffee planter Juan Córdova Cerna , formerly of the Cabinet of Advisors to the reformist President Juan José Arévalo Bermejo ( 1945 – 51 ) , and who also was a business consultant to the United Fruit Company , which he aided in repressing a workers ’ revolt . ( ii ) General Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes , a department governor under General Ubico ; he was pro – Nazi until 1943 , when he changed fascist allegiance for democratic allegiance , and became pro – US ; as such , he mediated the overthrowing of General Juan Federico Ponce Vaides , one of the triumvirate " junta " who succeeded the deposed dictator , General Jorge Ubico . ( iii ) Col . Castillo , a contemporary of Jacobo Árbenz at the Guatemalan national military academy . As the most politically amenable white - horse " caudillo " , the CIA appointed Col . Castillo as leader of the Guatemalan army of liberation , the core of Operation PBSUCCESS . Because of the continual bureaucratic postponements of the paramilitary invasion , the CIA worried that their Guatemalan army of liberation , or any other Guatemalan armed rebel - group , might prove over - eager and prematurely launch a " coup d ’ état " . The worry proved true on 29 March 1953 , when a futile raid against the Army garrison at Salamá , in central Guatemala , was launched by a rebel group associated with Col . Castillo — one of three men whom CIA considered installing as President of Guatemala . Besides the military defeat and the jailing of the seditious rebels , the failed invasion provoked the political response most feared by CIA — the Árbenz Government repressed and jailed the anti - Communists connected with the exiled rebels , and all other potentially treasonous right - wing politicians . Most Guatemalans supported the President ’ s repression , because the exile rebels and the domestic politicians sought to subvert the constitutionally - elected government of Guatemala with the aid of a foreign power , the United States . The jailing of the CIA ’ s Guatemalan secret agents rendered them operationally ineffective ; thus , the CIA then relied upon the ideologically - fragmented Guatemalan exile - groups , and their anti - democratic allies in Guatemala , to realize the " coup d ’ état " against President Árbenz . In December 1953 , the CIA established the operational headquarters of their Guatemalan army of liberation in suburban Florida ; then recruited aeroplane pilots and mercenary soldiers , supervised their military training , established the radio station " La Voz de la Liberación " ( The Voice of Liberation ) to broadcast disinformation and propaganda ; and arranged for increased diplomatic pressure upon Guatemala to reverse Decree 900 — especially as it applied to the United Fruit Company . Moreover , despite being unable to halt the exportation of Guatemalan coffee , the US ceased selling arms to Guatemala in 1951 — meanwhile signing bilateral defense agreements and increasing arms shipments to Honduras and Nicaragua , and promising the Guatemalan military that they too could obtain arms if Árbenz were deposed . In 1953 , the State Department aggravated the American arms embargo by thwarting Árbenz Government arms purchases from Canada , Germany , and Rhodesia . Faced with dwindling supplies of " matériel " , and having noted the unusually armed borders of Honduras , El Salvador , and other neighbor countries , President Árbenz acted upon the intelligence indications of an imminent paramilitary invasion of Guatemala — confirmed by a defector from Operation PBSUCCESS — and bought " matériel " in the Eastern Bloc . The Árbenz Government bought surplus Wehrmacht " matériel " from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic , a Communist satellite country of the USSR . The weapons were delivered to Guatemala at the Atlantic Ocean port of Puerto Barrios , by the Swedish freight ship , which sailed from the port of Szczecin in the People ' s Republic of Poland , a Communist satellite country of the USSR . The US State Department and the CIA tried to halt the arms - laden MS " Alfhem " en route to Guatemala ; in one instance , the CIA seized the freight ship MS " Wulfsbrook " , having mistaken it for the MS " Alfhem " . Nonetheless , despite the intelligence failure having allowed “ Communist Czech arms ” to reach Guatemala , in the American press , to the American public , the CIA misrepresented the arms purchase as a Soviet provocation in “ America ' s Backyard ” . During that time , the US prepared the liberation army of Col . Castillo Armas for their paramilitary war . In " Mandate for Change : 1953 – 1956 " ( 1963 ) , ex - president Eisenhower said : “ Our initial shipment . . . comprised only fifty tons of rifles , pistols , machine guns and ammunition , hardly enough to create apprehension in neighboring states . ” Guatemalan response . The Árbenz Government originally meant to repel the invasion by arming the military - age populace , the workers ’ militia , and the Guatemalan Army . However , resistance from the armed forces , as well as public knowledge of the secret arms purchase , compelled the President to supply arms only to the Army . Although the purchase of surplus " Wehrmacht " arms had been from Czechoslovakia , not from the USSR , the Operation PBSUCCESS propaganda misrepresented the business transaction as proof of direct Soviet interference in the Western Hemisphere — a geopolitical impingement upon the US hegemony established in the Monroe Doctrine ( 1823 ) . To the American public , the US press reported that the Republic of Guatemala was suffering an externally instigated , vanguard party Communist revolution , like the Communist revolutions occurred in the Eastern European countries at the borders of the USSR . The disinformation and propaganda planted in the US news media , about the Guatemalan – Czech arms purchase , and the arrival of the weapons to Guatemala , provoked much popular support for US military intervention . The resultant domestic support allowed the Eisenhower Administration to increase the intensity of its open and secret intervention against the Republic of Guatemala . On 20 May 1954 , the US Navy began air and sea patrols of Guatemala , under the pretexts of intercepting secret shipments of weapons , and the protection of Honduras from Guatemalan aggression and invasion . On 24 May 1954 , the US Navy launched Operation HARDROCK BAKER , a blockade of Guatemala , wherein submarines and surface ships intercepted and boarded every ship in Guatemalan waters , and forcefully searched it for Guatemala - bound weapons that might support the “ Communist Árbenz Government ” . The blockade included British and French ships , which violations of maritime national sovereignty neither Britain nor France protested , because they wished to avoid US intervention to their colonial matters in the Middle East ; additionally , the blockade facilitated further psychological warfare against the Guatemalan Army . To disseminate propaganda , the military aeroplanes of Col . Castillo flew over Guatemala City , dropping leaflets that exhorted the people of Guatemala to : The messages were meant to turn the Guatemalan Army against President Árbenz , personally , and against Communism , as economic policy . Moreover , the rebel aeroplanes flying over the cities were perceived as practicing bombing runs , which Guatemalans perceived as indicative of an imminent invasion . On 7 June 1954 , a contingency evacuation - force of five amphibious assault ships , a US Marines helicopter - assault Battalion Landing Team , and an anti - submarine aircraft carrier , were despatched to blockade the Guatemalan sea lanes . Propaganda and disinformation . The Guatemalan " coup d ’ état " much depended upon psychological warfare , because the 480 - soldier Guatemalan army of liberation was over - matched by the Guatemalan Army ; thus , deception by feint was most important . The CIA used propaganda in the forms of political rumour , air - dropped pamphlets , poster campaigns , and radio ( the mass communications medium that successfully deceived most of the Iranian populace to accept the foreign deposition of the elected PM Mohammad Mosaddegh ) . In third - world Guatemala , few people owned radio receivers ; nonetheless , Guatemalans considered the medium of radio as an authoritative source of information . As directed by CIA case officers , from Florida , right - wing student groups successfully conducted internal propaganda , such as publishing " El combate " ( The Combat ) , a weekly political pamphlet , covering walls and buses with the number " 32 " — referring to Article 32 of the Guatemalan Constitution , which forbade foreign - financed political parties ; the propaganda claims received much attention from the local and the national press . Other psychological warfare techniques included character assassination with signs that read : " A Communist Lives Here " affixed to the houses of Árbenz supporters ; and the month - long daily delivery of false death - notices to President Árbenz , his Cabinet of Advisors , and known Communists . In due course , the disinformation - propaganda campaign provoked the Árbenz Government to politically repress the Guatemalan right wing , by arresting rightist students , limiting freedom of assembly , and intimidating newspapers . Furthermore , the CIA expected gossip ( word - of - mouth ) to assist in propagating anti - Communist claims against the elected Árbenz Government . From Florida , The Voice of Liberation radio station , which claimed to be broadcasting from the Guatemalan jungle , transmitted music , “ news ” , disinformation , and anti – Árbenz propaganda . Most of the radio programming was for the general populace , yet some propaganda specifically was a seditious call - to - arms meant to appeal to the right - wing men of action in the officer corps of the Guatemalan military , whose treasonous complicity was essential to the success of the deposition of the elected Árbenz Government . The collaboration of the Guatemalan army ( ca . 5 , 000 soldiers ) was most important , because , as a professional military force , they could readily out - fight and defeat the CIA mercenary army of liberation led by Col . Castillo . The CIA knew that the Castillo army could not conquer Guatemala with 480 mercenary soldiers . Hence , the importance of propaganda , of the co - optation of the Guatemalan military - officer corps to the usurpation of Guatemalan representative democracy , by overthrowing the “ Communist government ” of President Árbenz . At 8 : 00 p . m . on 18 June 1954 , Col . Castillo ' s " Ejército de liberación " invaded Guatemala ; in four groups , the 480 soldiers entered the country at five key points of the Honduras – Guatemala border and of the Guatemala – El Salvador border . Multiple attacks , along a wide front , were meant to impress the populace that the Republic of Guatemala was being invaded by a military force superior to and of greater size than the Guatemalan Army . The four - group dispersal of the CIA mercenary army meant to minimize the possibility of a militarily decisive rout , and of the " coup d ’ état " being thwarted , with a single , unfavorable battle . Ten saboteurs , tasked to destroy key bridges and telegraph communications , would hinder the Guatemalan national defense , preceded the main attack force of the liberationist army . Nonetheless , the CIA ordered Col . Castillo to avoid fighting the Guatemalan Army — lest the defenders co - ordinate tactics , and either kill or capture the CIA invaders . As psychological warfare , the course of the 1954 Guatemalan " coup d ’ état " invasion was meant to provoke popular panic , by giving the populace the impression of strategically insurmountable odds against successfully defending Guatemala , which , the CIA believed , would compel the national populace and the Guatemalan Army to side with , rather than repel and defeat , the invaders led by Col . Castillo . Throughout the invasion , the Voice of Liberation broadcast false news of a popular , right - wing counter - revolution spontaneously occurring throughout Guatemala ; of great military forces being welcomed , and joined by the local populace , to overthrow the Communist Árbenz Government . Almost immediately , the forces of Col . Castillo met with decisive failure . Invading on foot and hampered by heavy equipment , in some cases , the invaders took days to reach their strategic objectives . The weakened psychological impact of the initial invasion allowed local Guatemalans to understand that they were not endangered . One of the first liberationist units to reach their strategic objective was a group of 122 mercenaries tasked to capture the city of Zacapa ; despite their superior number , they were defeated by a 30 - man platoon of the Guatemalan Army ; only 28 mercenaries survived the battle . Elsewhere , in northern Guatemala , a 170 - mercenary unit was defeated when they attempted to capture the guarded port city of Puerto Barrios . When the chief of police saw the mercenary invaders , he armed the local longshoremen and assigned them defensive positions . Hours later , after the defensive battle , most of the 170 mercenaries had been killed or captured ; some escaped , and fled to Honduras . Within three days , the Guatemalan Army had rendered combat - ineffective two of the four units of Col . Castillo ' s liberation army . To recover the initiative , the Colonel ordered an air attack upon Guatemala City ; the desultory attack upon the national capital failed — a slow aeroplane only managed to bomb a small oil tank , which fire the defenders quickly extinguished . Defeat — crisis of confidence and resignation . Despite his tactical and strategic successes in defending the Guatemalan republic , President Árbenz Guzmán ordered his military commander to allow the liberation army of Col . Castillo Armas to advance deep into Guatemala . Although the mercenary army of the CIA were not a significant military threat , the President and the military commander did fear US military intervention if the Guatemalan military decisively defeated the CIA invasion . In the event , such geopolitical fear — US military occupation — soon panicked the Guatemalan officer corps ; no tactical commander wished to provoke the intervention of the US military forces who were then blockading Guatemala . Psychologically , the presence of the US Navy ’ s amphibious assault force prompted rumours , nationwide , that the US Marines already had established a beachhead in Honduras , and were " en route " to invading Guatemala . President Árbenz Guzmán feared that the military officers would be intimidated to side with Col . Castillo Armas ; days later , the Army garrison at Chiquimula surrendered to the CIA ' s " liberacionista " army . The CIA exerted air power against the Árbenz Government with a “ Liberation Air Force ” of US military and mercenary personnel who conducted air raids against Guatemalan military targets and cities . Early in the morning of 27 June 1954 , a CIA Lockheed P - 38M Lightning attacked Puerto San José and dropped napalm bombs on the British cargo ship , , on charter to the US company W . R . Grace and Company Line , which was being loaded with Guatemalan cotton and coffee . Resistance from Guatemala ' s small air force was scant , as its head had evidently defected to the CIA . At 08 . 00 hrs . President Árbenz Guzmán was told of the air attack and responded with consternation that Col . Castillo Armas and his American mercenary invaders had targeted a foreign merchant ship , in violation of international law regarding the distinctions between combatants and non - combatants in warfare . In the event , the CIA psychological warfare succeeded , and provoked an officers ’ revolt ; which crisis of confidence , the President explained to his Cabinet of Advisors , made his presidency untenable , and , at 21 . 15 hrs . , on 27 June 1954 , Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán resigned the Presidency of Guatemala , for exile in Mexico . US news media reportage . In 1954 , public relations expert Edward Bernays , working for the Eisenhower Administration and the United Fruit Company , helped engineer American popular consent for the 1954 Guatemalan " coup d ‘ état " to overthrow the Guatemalan government . The propaganda operation used the North American press to frighten the US public into believing that President Árbenz was a Communist and a political puppet of the USSR , and , therefore , that Guatemala had become a Soviet beachhead in the Western Hemisphere , the backyard of the United States . The principal American news media — press and radio , television and cinema — misinformed the American public that the Árbenz Government had been overthrown in a Guatemalan " coup d ’ état " as a liberation from Communist tyranny , by Guatemalan freedom fighters who fought to restore democracy to the Republic of Guatemala , instead of by the CIA . A case officer said that the Central Intelligence Agency did little to hide knowledge of its paramilitary invasion of Guatemala from the American public , “ The figleaf was very transparent , threadbare . ” " The New York Times " celebrated the Guatemalan " coup d ’ état " as “ the first successful anti - Communist revolt since the last war . ” Moreover , in the same newspaper , Milton Brackersan misinformed readers , that “ there is no evidence that the United States provided material aid or guidance ” to the anti - Communist freedom fighters , and that “ the overturn meets only part of the problem of Communism . We must convince the Latin Americans that our way of life is superior to that of the Communists . ” " The New York Times " further explained that “ Castillo Armas had the moral support of the United States ; the Árbenz régime had the support of the Soviet Union . ” " The New Republic " magazine said that “ it was just our luck that Castillo Armas did come by some second - hand lethal weapons , from Heaven knows where . ” " Newsweek " magazine said that “ the United States , aside from whatever gumshoe work the Central Intelligence Agency may or may not have been busy with , had kept hands strictly off ” ; that the Eisenhower Administration could have hastened the overthrowing of President Árbenz , “ overnight , if necessary : by halting coffee purchases , shutting off oil and gasoline from Guatemala , or , as a last resort , by promoting a border incident , and sending Marines to help the Hondurans ; and that , instead , the US followed the letter of the law ” , because President Árbenz was overthrown “ in the best possible way : by the Guatemalans . ” In 1976 , Thomas P . McCann , public relations officer for the United Fruit Company stated : Operation PBHISTORY . After the PBSUCCESS " coup d ’ état " the CIA launched Operation PBHISTORY , a document analysis team in Guatemala with the intelligence remit to collect and analyze Árbenz Government and Guatemalan Labour Party documents that would be evidence to support the CIA ' s ideological and geopolitical belief that , under Árbenz ' s presidency , the Republic of Guatemala was a Western - hemisphere Communist puppet state in the hegemony of the Soviet Union . CIA intelligence analyses , of some 150 , 000 pages of Guatemalan Government and Labor Party documents , found no substantiation of the key geopolitical premise ( Soviet political involvement ) that justified the secret US paramilitary invasion of Guatemala , and the deposition of the elected Árbenz Government . The socialism practiced by the Árbenz Government was unrelated to the Cold War geopolitics of the US and the USSR . Yet , some US businessmen and military officers believed that the nationalism of President Árbenz was a communist threat to the business interests of American multinational corporation s , and advocated and supported the " coup d ’ état " against his government , despite the Guatemalan majority ’ s support and attachment to the original political principles of the October Revolution of 1944 . Aftermath . In the aftermath of the Guatemalan " coup d ’ état " that deposed President Árbenz Guzmán , the usurper government of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas , had difficulty persuading the officer corps of the Guatemalan Army to abandon their Constitutional allegiance to the head - of - state President , and become the Guatemalan Army commanded by Col . Castillo Armas . In the event , most of the officer corps abandoned the elected President of Guatemala , because , as political conservatives , they disliked Decree 900 and the socio - economic changes promulgated , yet neither did they prefer the reactionary régime of Col . Castillo Armas , that soon reversed the progressive changes effected by the deposed Árbenz Government and Decree 900 . The response of the Guatemalan nation , to having had their elected government usurped , by right - wing counter - revolution , varied by social class . The upper - class landowners welcomed the end of Decree 900 , and expected the U . S . to reinstate their monopoly ownership of expropriated agricultural lands . Likewise , the native Maya had political opinions about the counter - revolution , those who benefited from Decree 900 were unhappy , whilst those who lost lands to Decree 900 were happy , especially those Maya whose autonomous communities had lost political power to the Árbenz Government ; other Maya Guatemalans favored President Árbenz Guzmán , like most Guatemalans , because they understood the socio - political importance of Decree 900 for eliminating the feudalism that for centuries had retarded the social , economic , and cultural progress of Guatemalan society . In the cities of Antigua Guatemala , San Martín Jilotepeque , and San Juan Sacatepéquez pro – Árbenz armed groups fought the Castillo Armas Government , because of the forced presidential resignation , and because they had benefited from Decree 900 . In the event , the US - installed military government of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas proved reactionary , and reversed the land - reform expropriations , returned the farmlands to private owners , for which reason some Guatemalan farmers burned their crops as economic protest . In the eleven days after the resignation of President Árbenz Guzmán , five successive " military junta " governments occupied the Guatemalan presidential palace ; each " junta " was successively more amenable to the political demands of the U . S . , after which Col . Castillo Armas assumed the Presidency of Guatemala . As the Guatemalan head - of - state , the Colonel proved an inept administrator , installed a corrupt bureaucracy , and vigorously repressed the civil war that resulted from the Guatemalan " coup d ’ état " in 1954 ; the previous occurrence of violent repression was a decade earlier , before the democratic October Revolution of 1944 . International opinion reviled the Guatemalan " coup d ’ état " , the French and British press , " Le Monde " and " The Times " , attacked the United States ’ coup as a “ modern form of economic colonialism ” . In Latin America , public and official opinions provoked much political criticism of the U . S . , and Guatemala became symbolic to many of armed resistance to the perceived U . S . hegemony over Latin America . The Secretary General of the United Nations , Dag Hammarskjöld ( 1953 – 61 ) , said that the paramilitary invasion with which the U . S . deposed the elected government of Guatemala was a geopolitical action that violated the human - rights stipulations of the UN Charter ; moreover , the usually pro – U . S . newspapers of West Germany condemned the Guatemalan " coup d ’ état " . Historically , the Director of the Mexico Project of National Security Archives , Kate Doyle , said that the 1954 Guatemalan " coup d ’ état " was the definitive deathblow to democracy in the Republic of Guatemala . The thirty - six - year Guatemalan Civil War , between the military government of Guatemala and insurgent Guatemalans , ran from 1960 to 1996 ; the number of casualties of war ranges from 140 , 000 to 200 , 000 dead and missing people . In October 2011 , the government of Guatemala formally apologized to Juan Jacobo Árbenz , the son of the deposed President , Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán . In that light , the national textbooks used in the public school system were revised to restore the good name of Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán , as a Guatemalan patriot and as president of the nation , and also named a highway in his honor . Contemporarily , the Árbenz family continue to request an apology from the government of the United States for having overthrown the government of Guatemala in 1954 .