Armed Islamic Group of Algeria The Armed Islamic Group ( GIA , " al - Jama ' ah al - Islamiyah al - Musallaha " , from French " Groupe Islamique Armé " ; Arabic الجماعة الإسلامية المسلّحة ) is an Islamist organisation that wants to overthrow the Algerian government and replace it with an Islamic state . The GIA adopted violent tactics in 1992 after the military government voided the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front , the largest Islamic opposition party , in the first round of legislative elections held in December 1991 . During their 1994 hijack of Air France Flight 8969 the GIA announced " We are the Soldiers of Mercy " . Between 1992 and 1998 , the GIA conducted a violent campaign of civilian massacres , sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of operation ( see List of Algerian massacres of the 1990s ; notably the Bentalha massacre and Rais massacre , among others . ) Since announcing its campaign against foreigners living in Algeria in 1993 , the GIA has killed more than 100 expatriate men and women in the country . The group uses assassinations and bombings , including car bombs , and it is known to favor kidnapping victims . The GIA is considered a terrorist organisation by the governments of Algeria and France . Outside of Algeria , the GIA established a presence in France , Belgium , Britain , Italy and the United States . History . Early in 1992 , Mansour Meliani , with many " Afghans " , broke with his former friend Abdelkader Heresay and left the MIA ( Islamic Armed Movement ) , founding the first Armed Islamic Group ( GIA ) around July 1992 . This group dispersed after his arrest that month , but the idea was revived in January 1993 by Abdelhak Layada , who declared his group independent of Heresay and not obedient to his orders . It adopted the radical Omar El - Eulmi as a spiritual guide , affirming that " political pluralism is equivalent to sedition " It was far less selective than the MIA , which insisted on ideological training ; as a result , it was regularly infiltrated by the security forces , resulting in a rapid leadership turnover as successive heads were killed . It explicitly affirmed that it " did not represent the armed wing of the FIS " , and issued death threats against several FIS and MIA members , including MIA ' s Heresay and FIS ' s Kebir and Redjam . From its inception on , the GIA called for and implemented the killing of anyone collaborating with or supporting the authorities , including government employees such as teachers and civil servants . It named and assassinated specific journalists and intellectuals ( such as Tahar Djaout ) , saying that " The journalists who fight against Islamism through the pen will perish by the sword . " It soon broadened its attacks to civilians who refused to live by their prohibitions , and in later 1993 began killing foreigners , declaring that " anyone who exceeds that period [ a one month deadline ] will be responsible for his own sudden death " Guerrilla army . Under Cherif Gousmi ( its leader since March ) , the GIA became the most high - profile terrorist organization in 1994 . In May , FIS suffered an apparent blow as Abderrezak Redjam , Mohammed Said , the exiled Anwar Haddam , and the MEI ' s Said Makhloufi joined the GIA ; since the GIA had been issuing death threats against them since November 1993 , this came as a surprise to many observers , who interpreted it either as the result of intra - FIS competition or as an attempt to change the GIA ' s course from within . On 26 August , it declared a " Caliphate " , or Islamic government for Algeria , with Gousmi as Commander of the Faithful , Mohammed Said as head of government , the US - based Haddam as foreign minister , and Mekhloufi as provisional interior minister . However , the very next day Said Mekhloufi announced his withdrawal from the GIA , claiming that the GIA had deviated from Islam and that this " Caliphate " was an effort by Mohammed Said to take over the GIA , and Haddam soon afterwards denied ever having joined it , asserting that this Caliphate was an invention of the security services . The GIA continued attacking its usual targets , notably assassinating artists , such as Cheb Hasni , and in late August added a new one to its list , threatening schools which allowed mixed classes , music , gym for girls , or not wearing hijab with arson . Cherif Gousmi was eventually succeeded by Djamel Zitouni as GIA head . Zitouni extended the GIA ' s attacks on civilians to French soil , beginning with the hijacking of Air France Flight 8969 at the end of December 1994 and continuing with several bombings and attempted bombings throughout 1995 . In Algeria itself , he continued likewise , with car bombs , assassinations of musicians , sportsmen , and unveiled women as well as the usual victims . Even at this stage , the seemingly counterproductive nature of many of its attacks led to speculation ( encouraged by FIS members abroad ) that the group had been infiltrated by Algerian secret services . The region south of Algiers , in particular , came to be virtually dominated by the GIA ; they called it the " liberated zone " . Later it would be known as the " triangle of death " . During this period , judging from its London - based magazine " Al - Ansar " , it worked out ever broader ideological justifications for killing civilians , with the help of fatwa s from such figures as Abu Qatada . Abu Qatada ' s writings and speeches have been critically assessed by a contemporary Salafi Muslim scholar , Shaykh ' Abdul - Malik ar - Ramadani al - Jaza ' iri , in the book " Takhlis al - ' Ibad min Wahshiyyat Ab ' il - Qataad aladhi yu ' du ila Qatli ' n - Nisa wa Awlad " ( Jeddah : Maktabah Asalah al - Athariyyah , 2001 CE / 1422 AH Reports of battles between the AIS and GIA increased ( resulting in an estimated 60 deaths in March 1995 alone ) , and the GIA reiterated its death threats against FIS and AIS leaders , claiming to be the " sole prosecutor of jihad " and angered by their negotiation attempts . On 11 July , they assassinated a co - founder of FIS , Abdelbaki Sahraoui , in Paris ( although some question the authenticity of their statement claiming credit for this . ) During the 1995 election , the GIA threatened to kill anyone who voted ( using the slogan " one vote , one bullet " ) . Soon afterwards , the GIA was shaken by internal dissension : shortly after the election , its leadership killed the FIS leaders who had joined the GIA – Mohammed Saïd , Abderrezak Redjam , and their supporters , accusing them of attempting a takeover . Other Islamists suggested that they had objected to the GIA ' s indiscriminate violence . This purge accelerated the disintegration of the GIA , leading to suspicion of Zitouni ' s leadership : Mustapha Kartali , Ali Benhadjar , and Hassan Hattab ' s factions all refused to recognize Zitouni ' s leadership starting around late 1995 , although they would not formally break away until somewhat later . The GIA killed the AIS leader for central Algeria , Azzedine Baa , in December , and in January pledged to fight the AIS as an enemy ; particularly in the west , full - scale battles between them became common . In July 1996 , GIA leader Djamel Zitouni was killed by one of the breakaway factions – Ali Benhadjar ' s Medea brigade , later to become the AIS - aligned Islamic League for Da ' wa and Jihad – and was succeeded by Antar Zouabri . Djamel Zitouni had earned notoriety for such acts as the killing of the seven Monks of Tibhirine in March , but his successor would prove to be far bloodier . Under the leadership of Antar Zouabri , its longest serving " emir " ( 1996 – 2002 ) , the GIA became a " takfiri " group , considering Algerian society to be in violation of Islamic precepts , therefore justifying the killing of members of that society as a form of purification of heretical elements . Like some of his predecessors , Zouabri was himself killed in a gun battle with security forces , in February 2002 . The group ' s leadership next passed on to Rachid Abou Tourab , who was allegedly killed by close aides in July 2004 . Next , Boulenouar Oukil was designated leader of the group . On 7 April , the GIA was reported to have killed 14 civilians at a fake road block . On 29 April , Oukil was arrested . Nourredine Boudiafi iwas the last known " emir " of the GIA . He was arrested sometime in November 2004 and the Algerian government announced his arrest in early January 2005 . In Algeria , however , the group ' s repeated massacres of civilians had drained popular support ( although rumors persist that security forces were involved in some of the massacres , or even controlled the group ) . Meanwhile , a 1999 amnesty law that was officially rejected by the GIA was accepted by many rank - and - file Islamist fighters ; an estimated 85 percent surrendered their arms and returned to civilian life . The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat ( GSPC ) splinter faction appears to have eclipsed the GIA since approximately 1998 and is currently assessed by the CIA to be the most effective armed group remaining inside Algeria . Both the GIA and GSPC leadership continue to proclaim their rejection of President Bouteflika ' s amnesty , but in contrast to the GIA , the GSPC has stated that it avoids attacks on civilians . GIA in France . The Algerian state pursued a number of strategies against the GIA . One was to encourage France to take an active part in the fight against the networks of the GIA in France , and thus to cut off its principal means of support abroad . In an unsuccessful attempt to keep France out of the struggle , the GIA hijacked Air France Flight 8969 , which was due to fly from Algiers to Paris in December 1994 . A GIA mole named Omar Nasiri ( a pseudonym for a Moroccan spy and author of " " ) and a police raid of a safe house discovered their plan was to crash it on Paris , a plan prevented when the GIGN stormed the plane at Marseille . The GIA conducted a series of bombings in France from 1995 to 1996 . Analysis of a bomb with a failed trigger mechanism made it possible to identify a conspirator , Khaled Kelkal , who was shot and killed by French gendarmes on 29 September 1995 . In late 1999 , several GIA members were convicted by a French court for the 1995 bombing campaign . In 1998 , prior to the World Cup , France in collaboration with other European countries launched a vast preventive operation against the GIA . About 100 alleged members of the group were arrested throughout Europe . In Belgium , security forces seized weapons , detonators and forged identity papers . On 11 June 1999 , the GIA announced a jihad on French territory in a threatening letter addressed to the media . Claims of Algerian Government involvement . International security analyst Nafeez Ahmed claims GIA atrocities were in fact perpetrated by the state . He claims ‘ Yussuf - Joseph ’ , a career secret agent in Algeria ’ s sécurité militaire for 14 years , defected to Britain in 1997 and told the Guardian that civilian massacres in Algeria , blamed on the GIA , were ‘ the work of secret police and army death squads … not Islamic extremists ’ . GIA terrorism was ‘ orchestrated ’ by ‘ Mohammed Mediane , head of the Algerian secret service ’ , and ‘ General Smain Lamari ’ , head of ‘ the counter intelligence agency ’ . According to Ahmed ' Joseph ' says : ‘ The GIA is a pure product of Smain ’ s secret service . I used to read all the secret telexes . I know that the GIA has been infiltrated and manipulated by the Government . The GIA has been completely turned by the Government … In 1992 Smain created a special group , L ’ Escadron de la Mort ( the Squadron of Death ) … The death squads organize the massacres … The FIS aren ’ t doing the massacres . ’ ' Joseph ' is also supposed to have confirmed that Algerian intelligence agents organized ‘ at least ’ two of the bombs in Paris in summer 1995 . ‘ The operation was run by Colonel Souames Mahmoud , alias Habib , head of the secret service at the Algerian embassy in Paris . ’ According to Ahmed ' s theories , ' Joseph ' s testimony has been corroborated by numerous defectors from the Algerian secret services . Ahmed claims that Western intelligence agencies are implicated . Secret British Foreign Office documents revealed in a terrorist trial in 2000 showed that ‘ British intelligence believed the Algerian Government was involved in atrocities , contradicting the view the Government was claiming in public ’ . The documents referred to the ‘ manipulation of the GIA being used as a cover to carry out their own operations ’ , and that ‘ there was no evidence to link 1995 Paris bombings to Algerian militants ’ .