Evolution of Pakistan Eastern Command plan The Eastern Military High Command of the Pakistan Armed Forces was a field - level military command headed by an appointed senior 3 - star officer , who was designated the Unified Commander of the Eastern Military High Command . After the partition of India by Great Britain , the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was divided into two territories separated by ( prior to the independence of Bangladesh in 1971 ) . Most of the Pakistan armed forces were stationed in West Pakistan ; the role of the Pakistan armed forces in East Pakistan was to hold out until Pakistan defeated India in the west ( in case of war ) . The Pakistan armed forces created the Eastern Military High Command , with one unified commander of the Pakistan armed forces responsible for the command . The armed forces ( particularly the Pakistan Army ) , had drawn up a plan to defend Dhaka by concentrating all their forces along the Dhaka Bowl ( the area surrounded by the rivers Jamuna , Padma and Meghna ) . After Pakistan launched Operation Searchlight and Operation Barisal to curb the Awami League - led political movement in March 1971 ( leading to the creation of Mukti Bahini and insurgency throughout Bangladesh ) , General Niazi ( last unified commander of the Eastern Military High Command ) revised the existing plan according to the Pakistan ' s premier General Headquarters ( GHQ ) directive ( which emphasized the need to prevent the Mukti Bahini from occupying any area of the province and to fight for every inch of territory ) . HQ expected the Indians to occupy a large area of the province , transfer the Mukti Bahini and Bengali refugees there and recognize the Bangladesh government in exile – turning the insurgency into an international diplomatic issue . General Niazi ( and his deputy unified commander , Vice - Admiral Mohammad Shariff ) designated 10 cities ( Jessore , Jhenaidah , Bogra , Rangpur , Jamalpur , Mymensingh , Sylhet , Comilla and Chittagong ) on major communication hubs as " fortress towns " and placed the bulk of his troops near the Indian border . The final plan called for the armed forces to delay Indian attacks at the border and then gradually fall back to the fortress towns . From the fortresses , part of the surviving force was to take up positions near Dhaka and hold out until India was defeated in the west ; Pakistani forces in the fortress towns would delay the bulk of the Indian forces and prevent them from concentrating on Dhaka . Background . The Pakistan Army inherited six infantry divisions and an armored brigade after independence in 1947 from the British Indian Army , deploying most of their armed assets in West Pakistan . East Pakistan had one infantry brigade in 1948 , which was made up of two infantry battalion s , the 1st East Bengal Regiment and the 1 / 14 or 3 / 8 Punjab Regiment . Between them , the two battalions boasted five rifle companies ( a battalion normally had five companies ) . This weak brigade – under the command of Brigadier Ayub Khan ( local rank Major General – GOC 14 Division ) – and a number of East Pakistan Rifles wings were tasked with defending East Pakistan during the Kashmir War of 1947 . The Pakistan Air Force and Navy had little presence in East Pakistan at that time . The reasons for placing more than 90 percent of the armed might in West Pakistan were : 1949 – 1965 . The Pakistan Armed Forces grew exponentially in size between the wars of 1949 and 1965 . The number of infantry divisions jumped from 6 to 13 ; it also boasted two armored divisions and several independent infantry and armored brigades by 1965 . All these formations had the required artillery , commando , engineer and transport units attached to them . The growth in military infrastructure was slower in East Pakistan ; the single division ( 14th Infantry division ) HQed at Dhaka now contained two infantry brigades , with the 53rd Brigade stationed at Comilla and the 107th Brigade deployed in Jessore by 1963 . In 1964 , the 23rd Brigade was created in Dhaka . This under - strength division comprised three infantry brigades , with no armor and supported by 10 EPR wings , 12 F - 86 Saber planes and three gunboats , rode out the 1965 war in the east . The Air Forces had bombed each other ' s bases with the PAF emerging on top , while the BSF ad EPR had skirmished along the border ; although India had one infantry division and one armored brigade posted near East Pakistan , the armies never clashed in the east . Reforms of Yahya Khan . When Yahya Khan , a person destined for infamy in Bangladesh , became Commander - in - Chief of the Pakistan Army in 1966 , he initiated a series of reforms to revamp the combat capability of the Pakistan army . The Army HQ in East Pakistan was upgraded to a corps - level HQ ( initially designated as the III corps ) , but the number of divisions in the East was kept unchanged ( although the 57th Infantry Brigade was formed in Dhaka , while the 23rd Brigade was sent to Rangpur ) . In 1970 , the 29th Cavalry was deployed in Rangpur from Rawalpindi , but East Pakistan was not given any corps artillery or armored units . The Pakistan Eastern Military High Command was established in 1962 ; in 1969 , the Chief Martial Law Administrator of the country , General Yahya Khan , sent Vice - Admiral Syed Mohammad Ahsan as Martial Law Administrator of East Pakistan . Syed Mohammad Ahsan , when Commander - in - Chief of the Pakistan Navy , had established the naval forces in East Pakistan ; the naval presence was tripled in East Pakistan with more officers from West Pakistan deployed in the region . Admiral Ahsan officially served as third unified commander of the Eastern Military High Command . The Chief of the General Staff , Major General Yakob Khan , decided to run a series of exercises in East Pakistan to formulate an integrated battle plan for the province in 1967 . Dubbed “ Operation X - Sunderbans - 1 ” , it was run by ( then ) Colonel Rao Farman Ali under the command of Major General Muzaffar Hussain ( GOC 14th Division ) ; the conclusions of this exercise formed the basis for the Pakistani operational plan in 1971 . Operation X - Sundarbans - 1 . Pakistani planners assumed that the main Indian assault would take place on the western border of east Pakistan , and the army in East Pakistan would not defend every inch of the province . Pakistani staff planners identified the following features as significant for setting up a defense plan : Instead of defending every inch of the land , survival of the armed forces was given top priority and the defence of Dhaka was the ultimate objective . Instead of deploying along the - long Indian border , three lines of deployment were chosen : The Pakistani planners were aware of the possible negative political implications among the Bengali population of abandoning forward areas and concentrating the army around the Dhaka Bowl to maximize the defensive potential and achieve better coordination ; however , it failed to come up with an alternative solution . The planners recommended taking advantage of the poor state of infrastructure and natural obstacles to the fullest . In brief , the plan was : Pakistani forces stationed in Sylhet ( surrounded by Indian territory from three sides is extremely difficult to defend ) and Chittagong would look after their own affairs . The planners did not devise a plan where East Pakistan forces would fight a self - sustained , independent action and defend the province on its own . Operation Titu Mir . In 1970 a series of exercises , codenamed " Titu Mir " , was conducted by the Eastern Command . The last was staged in January 1970 ; the conclusions drawn were : The conclusions were submitted to GHQ in Rawalpindi , but no major alteration of the original plan took place at this time . Operations Searchlight and Barisal . During 1971 , Pakistan experienced riots and civil disobedience against the military dictatorship in both east and west . The positions of the Pakistan armed forces under Admiral Ahsan were changed and deployed at the borders to observe Indian intelligence efforts . The magnitude of force was also increased , and logistics efforts were improved under Admiral Ahsan ' s command . His two - year rule saw stability and improvement in government control of the province ; however , the deployment ratio of military forces increased . The Martial Law Administrator of East Pakistan , Vice - Admiral S . M . Ahsan ( who was serving as the Unified Commander of the Pakistan Combatant Forces ) , was East Pakistan ' s governor also . In March 1971 , General Yahya Khan visited Dhaka to break the Mujib - Bhutto impasse . General Tikka Khan ' s staff at the Eastern Military High Command headquarters was the first to present their assessment of the civil and military situation to Yahya Khan and the army and air force ' s top generals accompanying him , and Vice - Admiral Ahsan persuaded General Yahya Khan at the meeting . During this meeting , Admiral Ahsan ' s brief ran counter to the cut - and - dried solutions of West Pakistan representatives and civil servants . The Pakistan Air Force ' s Brigadier - General Mitty Masud stressed the importance of a political solution rather than military action . General Masud backed Admiral Ahsan , as he believed that an autonomous East Pakistan was preferable to the certainty of military defeat if India decided to intervene . General Yahya Khan rejected Masud ' s arguments . Before the start of military operations , a final high - level meeting was held ( chaired by General Yahya Khan ) at the General Headquarters ( GHQ ) , where the participants were unanimously in favor of the military operation ( despite the calls from Admiral Ahsan and General Masud for a political settlement ) . One of the bases of the replacement was Admiral Ahsan ' s resignation ; he opposed any military actions in East Pakistan , and was determined to find political solutions rather than military . The GHQ generals in the army and air force ( and the navy admirals ) were determined to curb the political movement with violence and military might . Admiral Ahsan went to East Pakistan , later returning to West Pakistan . General Yaqub Khan temporarily assumed control of the province in place of Admiral Ahsan ; he was replaced by Lt . General Tikka Khan on his refusal to support military action against civilians . Once Operation Searchlight and Operation Barisal launched , Admiral Ahsan resigned from his position as Unified Commander and Martial Law Administrator of East Pakistan , retiring from the Navy in protest . In his place , Rear - Admiral Mohammad Shariff assumed the Eastern Naval Command . Air Commodore Mitty Masud was also replaced by the inexperienced officer Air Commodore Enamul Haque . Masud resigned from the air force due to his apparent opposition to Operations Searchlight and Barisal . Lt . General Tikka Khan ( Chief Martial Law Administrator and Commander of Pakistan Armed forces in East Pakistan ) ordered the formulation and implementation of Operation Searchlight after receiving approval from Pakistan Army GHQ . Major General Khadim Hussain Raja ( GOC 14th Division ) and Maj . Gen . Rao Farman Ali devised the scheme for Operation Searchlight in March 1971 ( to curb the Awami League - led non - cooperation movement through military action ) within 10 days of launching the scheme . Rear - Admiral Mohammad Shariff , commander of the Pakistan Navy in the region , ran violent naval operations that contributed to the insurgency . The Pakistan armed forces had no reserves to meet any unforeseen events , and success depended heavily on reinforcements from West Pakistan . There was no contingency plan for any Indian military action – the main reason Generals Yakub ( GOC East Pakistan ) , Khadim and Farman had opposed launching the operation . Pakistani forces occupied Bangladesh , and Gen . Gul Hassan ) then Chief of General Staff of the Pakistan army and no admirer of Gen . Niazi – GOC East Pakistan from April 11 , 1971 – expressed satisfaction with the situation . 1971 High Command plan . The size and disposition of Pakistan combat forces in East Pakistan changed during Operation Searchlight . The 14th Division was reinforced by the 9th ( made up of the 27th , 313th and 117th Brigades ) and the 16th ( comprising the 34th and 205th Brigades ) Divisions ( minus their heavy equipment and most of their supporting units ) — in all , fifteen infantry and one commando battalion and two heavy mortar batteries by May 1971 . Until the end of 1971 , General Yahya Khan ' s government was unable to find an active military administrator comparable to Admiral Ahsan , as the civil war in East Pakistan intensified . Senior general officers and admirals were unwilling to assume the command of East Pakistan until Lieutenant - General Amir Nazi volunteered for this assignment . General Niazi was made the unified commander of the East Pakistan contingent and the unified commander of the Pakistan Eastern Military Command ( replacing Lt . General Tikka Khan , who remained as Chief Martial Law Administrator until September 1971 ) . Vice Admiral Mohammed Sharif was made second - in - command of the Eastern Military High Command . May 1971 army redeployment . Following the change in command , the 14th Division initially had its brigades posted at Comilla ( 53rd ) , Dhaka ( 57th ) , Rangpur ( 23rd ) and Jessore ( 107th ) before March 1971 . During Operation Searchlight the 57th and the 107th moved to Jessore , while the 53rd had relocated to Chittagong . The Eastern Command moved 9th Division HQ ( CO Maj . Gen . Shawkat Riza ) to Jessore , putting the 107th ( CO Brig . Makhdum Hayat , HQ Jessore ) and the 57th ( CO Brig . Jahanzab Arbab , HQ Jhenida ) under this division . The 16th Division ( CO Maj . Gen . Nazar Hussain Shah ) HQ moved to Bogra , which now included the 23rd ( CO Brig . Abdullah Malik , HQ Rangpur ) , the 205th ( HQ Bogra ) and the 34th ( HQ Nator ) Brigades . The 14th Division ( CO Maj . Gen . Rahim ) HQ remained at Dhaka , with its brigades at Mymensingh ( 27th ) , Sylhet ( 313th ) and Comilla ( 117th ) . The 97th Independent Brigade was formed in Chittagong , while the 53rd Brigade was moved to Dhaka as a command reserve . Changes to Titu Mir . Brig . Gulam Jilani ( later DG ISI ) , chief of staff for Gen . Niazi , reviewed the existing East Pakistan defence plan in June 1971 in light of the prevailing circumstances and left the plan basically unchanged . The following assumptions were made while reevaluating the plan : Gen . Niazi added the following to the plan : No war games were conducted to factor in the new directives , or specific plans drawn up to attain these objectives . The revised plan was sent to Rawalpindi and approved in August 1971 . During June and July , Mukti Bahini regrouped across the border with Indian aid through Operation Jackpot and sent 2 , 000 – 5 , 000 guerrillas across the border ( the unsuccessful " Monsoon Offensive " ) . Eastern offensive proposal . By July 1971 the Pakistan army had build up an intelligence network to track Mukti Bahini infiltration and counter it through ambush , artillery shelling and minefields along the border with India . Gen . Niazi claimed to have suggested the following measures to Gen . Hamid ( COS Pakistan Army ) during his visit in June : The Indian military at this time was vulnerable , with its main formations posted away from the East Pakistan border . Col . Z . A . Khan ( commander of the Special Services Group in East Pakistan ) also advocated aggressive action against select Indian targets . General Hamid ruled out any provocations that might provoke Indian retaliation , while outlining the main objective of the Eastern Command : to keep the insurgency under control and prevent the formation of a Bangladesh government inside the province . Gen . Niazi remained convinced that his scheme would have forced India to concede terms , but at least one Pakistani source labels his proposal “ sheer folly ” . The main plan remained unchanged until September 1971 : Pakistani units were to fight a series of defensive battles before deploying to defend the Dhaka Bowl , but every inch of the province would not be defended . The Pakistan army occupied all the towns and fortified 90 of the 370 BoPs ( half of the BoPs were destroyed by Indian shell fire by July 1971 to facilitate Mukti Bahini infiltration ) and deployed close to the border to halt Mukti Bahini activity . Western Command strategy . The Pakistani high command began contemplating full - scale war with India to settle all issues as the insurgency in Bangladesh began to escalate after August ; with Mukti Bahini activities more aggressive and effective , Pakistani forces were in disarray . In doing so they had to contemplate fighting in the west and the east , and the ongoing insurgency . Since the defense of East Pakistan rested on overwhelming Pakistani success in the west ( resulting in India withdrawing its forces in the east ) , any formal war would also start when Pakistani forces in West Pakistan were ready to strike . In the summer of 1970 , the western operational plan was revised . The following conclusions were drawn : It was decided to keep part of the reserves to the north of the Ravi River and part to the south . The plan called for the formations near the border to seize favorable lodgement areas , to screen the main attack of the army . In September 1971 the plan was updated to include : Western battle plan . The Pakistani army had thirteen infantry and two armored divisions ( in addition to several independent brigade groups ) in West Pakistan in 1971 . After transferring the 9th and 16th Divisions ( known as " China Divisions " because these formations were given new Chinese equipment ) to East Pakistan , they had a rough parity with the Indian army in infantry and a slight edge in armor . However , they could only hope to attack with 3 : 1 superiority in selected areas where surprise was vital . Pakistan had raised the 33rd Infantry Division , and had started to raise the 35th and the 37th Divisions to replace those sent to Bangladesh ; these formations were active but not fully operational by November 1971 . The Pakistan Army deployed ten infantry and two armored divisions to face an Indian force of three corps ( thirteen infantry , two mountain , one armored division and several battle groups under the Indian Army Western and Southern Commands ) as follows : Aside from these formations , Pakistan also had two independent artillery and two infantry brigade groups deployed on the border . The initial Pakistani plan was to launch diversionary attacks along the whole Indian border to keep Indian reserve forces away from the main target areas , then attack the Poonch and Chhamb sectors and drive back the Indian forces while an infantry brigade ( supported by an armored regiment ) pushed into Rajastan towards Ramgarh . Once India had committed her reserves , II Corps would assemble south of the Sutlej ( near Bahawalpur ) and move east into India , swinging northeast towards Bhatinda and Ludhiana . Then IV Corps would push towards the Indian Punjab . Given that India had a slight edge in forces , Pakistani armored units and the Pakistan Air Force needed to gain the upper hand quickly to ensure this plan succeeded . The overall objective of the Pakistani ground assault was to capture enough Indian territory in the west to ensure a favorable bargaining position with India ( should the Pakistani Eastern Command fail to repel the Indian attack on Bangladesh ) , and by forcing India to commit forces in the west and triggering the withdrawal of Indian forces from the east . From October 1971 onwards , Pakistani units began to take up positions along the border . Importance of airstrikes . To negate Indian superiority in infantry ( in addition to the 13 divisions deployed along the Pakistan border , it could call up the main reserve force if needed ) , the Pakistan Air Force ( OC Air Marshal A . Rahim Khan ) needed to achieve air superiority on the western front . In 1971 it had 17 front - line squadrons facing 26 Indian front - line squadrons ( Chief of Air Staff , Air Chief Marshal Pratap C . Lal , AOC - in - C , Western Air Command , Air Marshal M . M Engineer ) , while India deployed 12 squadrons ( AOC - in - C , Eastern Air Command , Air Marshal H . C . Dewan ) in the east ( against one PAF squadron – CO Air Commodore Enamul Huq ) and had another seven squadrons deployed elsewhere . PAF planners were aware that once India neutralized the lone PAF squadron in East Pakistan , it would be free to concentrate more aircraft in the west after deploying units to negate any Chinese moves . The PAF devised Operation Chengiz Khan to launch preemptive strikes on the IAF and neutralize its advantage at the onset of the war . Naval role . The Pakistan Navy was in no position to counter the Indian threat , despite appeals to enhance naval capabilities . The Pakistan Navy under commander - in - chief Vice Admiral Muzaffar Hasan ( Fleet CO : Rear Admiral MAK Lodhi ) , with one cruiser , three frigate s , five destroyer s , four submarines and several gunboats , faced the Indian Western Fleet ( OC Admiral S . M . Nanda ; Fleet CO : Rear Admiral E . C . “ Chandy ” Kuruvila ) consisting of one cruiser , eight frigates , one destroyer , two submarines and several patrol and missile boats in 1971 . The Pakistan Navy had no aggressive plans except sending the " Ghazi " to the Bay of Bengal to sink the Indian aircraft carrier " INS Vikrant " . On the eastern front , only one destroyer was active with seven gunboats ; therefore , it was impossible to conduct operations in the deep Bay of Bengal . Problems in East Pakistan military . Pakistan Eastern Command HQ began to revise the operational plan from September onwards under the following assumptions : Besides the above , the planners also had to factor in the status of the Pakistani forces in the province , logistical challenges presented by their deployment and the state of communications . Manpower shortage . The East Pakistan garrison was reinforced with two infantry divisions in April 1971 to restore order and fight the insurgency . All divisional heavy equipment needed to fight a conventional war was left in the west . A comparison of the deployed units between March and November shows : According to one estimate , the Eastern Command needed at least 250 , 000 personnel ; it barely had 150 , 000 ( 50 , 000 regular soldiers ) by November 1971 . To fill the manpower gap , the East Pakistan Civil Armed Force ( EPCAF ) ( 17 planes and approximately 23 , 000 personnel ) and Razakars ( 40 , 000 members , against a target of 100 , 0000 ) were raised after June 1971 . The armed police ( 11 , 000 members ) was also reorganized and bolstered with 5 , 000 West Pakistani personnel . Therefore , the army was only fit for “ Police action ” . According to General Niazi , he had requested the following from GHQ in June 1971 : The Pakistan GHQ had to weigh every request to resupply , reequip and reinforce the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan against the need of the West Pakistani forces , and did not have enough reserves of manpower and equipment for a long conflict . The Eastern Command only deemed one of the three divisions fit for conventional warfare . Seven West Pakistan Ranger wings , five Mujahid battalions and a wing of Khyber Rifles , Tochi and Thal Scouts were sent to East Pakistan by November 1971 . Five infantry battalions were sent from West Pakistan in November . Al Badr and Al Shams units contributed another 5 , 000 men each . Ad hoc units . The lack of regular units also forced the Eastern Command to improvise in two ways : creating " ad hoc " formations to mimic regular army formations and mixing regular troops with paramilitary units . When Pakistani planners assumed India would launch its main attack in the east along the Akhaura – Brahmanbaria axis , it had no brigades available to cover this area . The 27th brigade from Mymensingh was moved to Akhaura , while two battalions from the brigade were detached to form the 93rd Brigade in Mymensingh . Similarly , the 313th Brigade was moved from Sylhet to Maulavi Bazar and a battalion from the 313th was kept at Sylhet to form the nucleus of the 202nd " ad hoc " Brigade . The 14th Division ( which covered both the Dhaka Bowl and the Eastern Sector except Chittagong ) was given responsibility for the Eastern Sector only , and the 36th " ad hoc " Division ( containing only the 93rd Brigade ) was created to defend the Dhaka Bowl . Similarly , the 314th ( for Khulna ) and the Rajshahi " ad hoc " Brigades were created and deployed in September . In mid - November , the 39th " ad hoc " Division was created to defend the Comilla and Noakhali districts from the 14th Division units deployed in those areas ; the 14th was tasked to defend the Sylhet and Brahmanbaria areas only . The 91st " ad hoc " Brigade was created to defend the Ramgarh area north of Chittagong as part of the 39th Division in November . The " ad hoc " formations lacked the staff and equipment of regular formations . Deception . General Niazi hoped that by creating five divisional HQs and simulating the signal traffic of numerous brigades , he would deceive the Indian Eastern Command into committing at least 15 infantry divisions and other assorted supporting forces in the east ; this would mean India would have less to deploy in the west after retaining forces to use against any possible Chinese attacks from the north ( or at least deter the Indians from aggressive action ) . While India did not deploy 15 divisions in the east , the measures deceived the Indian Eastern Command to some extent . Subtraction by addition . All paramilitary units ( EPCAF / Razakar / Mujahid ) were not up to army standards in terms of equipment and effectiveness , and the Eastern Command began to mix them with regular units to bolster their efficiency . Pakistani battalions were given two - thirds - companies of paramilitary units , while a company from some battalions was split into platoons and deployed at the BoPs or other places . Paramilitary personnel were attached to the platoons to bring these units up to company strength . The army members were to stiffen these mixed units , but often the paramilitary members proved to be the weakest link . Thus , some of the regular army units lost cohesion and effectiveness when their regular companies were detached from them . Logistical woes . The underdeveloped state of the Bangladeshi communication infrastructures and the river system cutting through the plains was a formidable challenge to the movement of troops and supplies . General Niazi had ordered the Pakistan army to live off the land because of logistical difficulties , and Maj . General A . O . Mittha ( Quartermaster General , Pakistan Army ) had recommended setting up river - transport battalions , cargo and tanker flotillas and increasing the number of helicopter s in the province ( none of which happened ) . Instead , the C - 130 planes ( which had played a crucial role during Operation Searchlight ) were withdrawn from the province , diminishing the airlift capacity of the Pakistani forces further . The Mukti Bahini had sabotaged 231 bridges and 122 rail lines by November 1971 ( thus diminishing transport capacity to 10 percent of normal ) , and complicated the delivery of the daily minimum 600 tons of supplies to the army units . The Eastern Command staff kept the plan unchanged after the review ; Pakistani troop deployments were not altered after the July appraisal . Pakistani units were kept at the border with the intention to withdraw them towards Dhaka after a series of defensive battles . The Eastern Command completed a final revision of the plan in October 1971 , after both generals ( Gul Hassan and Hamid ) had visited the province . Final plan : October 1971 . General Niazi ( along with General Jamshed ( GOC EPCAF ) , General Rahim ( 2IC Eastern Command ) , Brig . Bakir ( COS Eastern Command ) , Rear Admiral Sharif and Air Commodore Enam ) reviewed the existing plan and updated it to factor in the manpower shortage , logistical difficulties , and the directive of the GHQ to defend every inch of East Pakistan . The initial assumptions were : Defensive considerations . The review committee analyzed four strategic concepts when formulating the revised plan : The fortress concept was adopted ; the planners decided on a single defensive deployment of troops on the border , which went against the troop deployments advocated by earlier plans . This was done to stick to the GHQ order of not surrendering any territory to the Mukti Bahini . When devising troop deployments , the planners mixed political considerations with strategic ones and envisioned a forward - leaning defense in depth : Defensive lines . Once the fortress defense was chosen , General Niazi and his staff designated the following cities as fortresses : Jessore , Jhenida , Bogra , Rangpur , Comilla and Bhairab Bazar ( these were located on communication hubs ) , Jamalpur and Mymensingh ( defending the northern perimeter of the Dhaka bowl ) , and Sylhet and Chittagong ( independent defense areas ) . There were four lines of defense : Having chosen the defense concept and defensive lines , the Pakistan Eastern Command outlined its course of action : The divisional commanders were authorised to make plans for limited counterattacks in Indian territory to aid in their defensive objectives ( one of which was to maintain control of the main roads leading into the territory ) . Planned Pakistani deployments . Pakistani planners assumed ( based on intelligence estimates ) that an Indian force of 8 to 12 infantry divisions , an armored brigade and the Mukti Bahini would launch the invasion of East Pakistan during the winter . The Pakistani army had divided the country into four sectors : Northern Sector : This area is to the north of the Padma and west of the Jamuna River , encompassing the Rajhshahi , Pabna , Bogra , Rangpur and Dinajpur districts . Pakistani planners were undecided on whether the Indian attack would come from the Siliguri Corridor south towards Bogura or on the Hili – Chilimari axis ( from southwest to northeast ) to cut the area in two . The division was deployed to counter both possibilities . The 16th Infantry Division ( CO Maj . Gen . Nazar Hussain Shah , HQ Bogra , then Nator ) defended this area . It had the 29th Cavalry , two artillery regiments and a heavy mortar battery ( the 117th Independent Mortar Battery ) , in addition to three infantry brigades : the 23rd ( CO Brig . S . A . Ansari , HQ Rangpur ) , the 205th ( CO Brig . Tajammul Hosain Malik , HQ Bogra ) and the 34th ( Brig . Mir Abdul Nayeem , HQ Nator ) . The general plan of defense was : Western Sector : This area ( south of the Padma and east of the Meghna ) contained the Khulna , Jessore , Kushtia , Faridpur , Barisal and Patuakhali districts and was defended by the 9th Division ( CO Maj . Gen . Ansari ) made up of two infantry brigades : the 107th ( CO Brig . Makhdum Hayat , HQ Jessore ) , covering the border from Jibannagar to the Sunderbans to the south , and the 57th ( CO Brig . Manzoor Ahmed , HQ Jhenida ) , which covered the border from Jibannagar to the Padma in the north . Two artillery regiments , a heavy mortar battery ( the 211th ) and a squadron of tanks were also part of the division . Pakistani planners assumed three likely axes of advance from the Indian army : The 107th Brigade ( the 12th Punjab , the 15th and 22nd FF Battalions ) was tasked with guarding the Benapol axis . This brigade was reinforced with the 38th FF in November , while the Third Independent Tank Squadron was destroyed at Garibpur on November 22 . In addition , the 55th Field Artillery Regiment and the heavy mortar battery was attached to the brigade and the 12th and 21st Punjab Battalions were deployed near its operational area . The 57th Brigade ( the 18th Punjab and 29th Baloch ) was deployed to cover the Darshana and Meherpur areas . The 49th Field Artillery regiment was attached to this brigade , and the 50th Punjab reinforced the unit in November . To defend the Hardinge Bridge , a tank squadron was placed under the Eastern Command control near Kushtia . In September an " ad hoc " brigade – the 314th ( CO Col . Fazle Hamid , one Mujahib battalion and five companies each from EPCAF and Razakars ) was created to defend the city of Khulna . The 57th and 107th Brigades were to defend the border , then fall back to Jhenida and Jessore and prevent the Indians from crossing the Jessore – Jhenida road ( which runs almost parallel to the border ) . The brigades also had the option to fall back across the Madhumati River ( which formed part of the Dhaka outer defense line ) and defend the area between Faridpur , Kamarkhali and Goalanda . Dhaka Bowl : Pakistani planners anticipated a brigade size attack on the Kamalpur – Sherpur – Jamalpur axis , and another along the Haluaghat – Mymensingh axis . They deemed this area impassable because of the hilly terrain on the Indian side and the Modhupur Jungle and Brahmaputra River to the north of Dhaka . The 27th Brigade initially was posted at Mymensingh , and the 53rd was in Dhaka . However , when the 27th Brigade was sent to Brahmanbaria , the 93rd Brigade ( CO Brig . Abdul Qadir Khan , HQ Mymensingh ) was created from units of the 27th Brigade , and the 36th " ad hoc " Division ( CO Maj . Gen . Mohammad Jamshed Khan , HQ Dhaka ) was created to replace the 14th Division . The order of battle of the 36th " ad hoc " Division was : Eastern Sector : This sector included the Chittagong , Noakhali , Comilla and Sylhet districts . The anticipated lines of advance were : Chittagong : Independent defense zone . The 97th independent Infantry Brigade ( CO Brig . Ata Md . Khan Malik , HQ Chittagonng ) was to cover the Chittagong fortress and hill tracks . The 24th FF Battalion ( along with two EPCAF wings and a Marine battalion ) guarded Chittagong itself . The Second SSG was at Kaptai while the 60th and 61st Ranger Wings were posted at Ramgarh and Cox ' s Bazar , respectively . Distribution of artillery and armor . The Eastern Command could not attach an artillery regiment to each of the infantry brigades , so only the 23rd , 205th , 57th , 107th , and 117th brigades were given an artillery regiment each . An artillery regiment ( the 31st ) was split between the 202nd " ad hoc " and the 27th Brigades , while elements of three other artillery regiments ( the 25th , 32nd and 56th ) were proportionately distributed among the other brigades as required . The 29th Cavalry was split into three independent squadrons among the 16th Division troops , while two other tank squadrons ( one with the 107th Brigade and the other with the 117th Brigade ) and two tank troops ( one with the 36th " ad hoc " Division and the other with the 27th Brigade ) were deployed . Last - minute changes : November 1971 . As events unfolded in Bangladesh and the Pakistani Army began to face ever - increasing difficulties , some officers at GHQ began to have second thoughts about the existing operational plan to defend East Pakistan . General Abdul Hamid , COS of the Pakistani Army , approved of the existing deployment of troops close to the border but Lt . General Gul Hassan , CGS , had little faith in the plan Lt . Gen . Niazi had outlined to him in June . Gen . Hassan supposedly tried to get the plan revised several times and insisted on abandoning the concept of defending every inch of the province , wanted the Eastern Command to redeploy regular units away from the border , fight for the BoPs and strong points on a limited scale and ensure Dhaka Bowl had enough reserves instead of the gradual withdrawal of forces to Dhaka outlined in the existing plan . However , GHQ Rawalpindi approved in October 1971 only with the following adjustments : These suggestions were incorporated in the plan without change . From September onwards Pakistani forces had begun to fortify positions with concrete bunkers , anti - tank ditches , land mines and barbed wires . Spiked bamboo was also used , and some areas were flooded to hinder enemy movements . Engineering battalions were sent to construct fortified positions , although some of the strong points and fortresses ( especially those inside the Dhaka outer - defense line ) remained incomplete . Final reinforcements and directives . In November , Gen . Niazi sent Maj . Gen Jamshed and Brig . Bakir Siddiqi to Rawalpindi to request two more divisions as reinforcements ( as well as all the heavy equipment left behind by the 9th and 16th Divisions for East Pakistan ) . The GHQ promised to send 8 infantry battalions and an engineer battalion ; only five battalions were sent to East Pakistan because the GHQ probably could not spare anything else . The first two units ( the 38th FF and 50th Punjab ) were given to the 9th Division . The next three battalions were split up and sent as reinforcements to various areas , as needed . The last three battalions were to replace the 53rd Brigade as command reserves in Dhaka , but never arrived from West Pakistan . At the meeting , the Eastern Command was told to continue its “ political mission ” ( i . e . prevent territory from falling into Mukti Bahini hands ) , although by this time of territory had fallen into their hands . Gen Niazi claims this order was never withdrawn , and Gen . Hassan suggested that Gen . Hamid never altered the plan Gen . Niazi had submitted in October ( including the deployment of troops near the border ) . The GHQ never commented on the deployment plan , while others claim the Eastern Command failed to readjust its deployments despite advice from GHQ . 39th ad hoc Division . In November 1971 , Rawalpindi GHQ warned the Eastern Command that the Indian army would launch the main attack from the east . Gen . Niazi and Gen . Rahim identified the axis of the main attack as : Gen Niazi split the 14th Division and transferred the 117th Brigade to the newly created 39th " ad hoc " Division ( CO Maj . Gen . Rahim , HQ Chandpur ) , which also included the 53rd ( CO Brig . Aslam Niazi , HQ Feni ) and the 91st " ad hoc " Brigade ( CO Brig . Mian Taskeen Uddin , HQ Chittagong ) . The deployment of the troops was : Summary . The final plan was created to meet both political and strategic objectives , and its success depended on two crucial factors : predicting the possible Indian axis of advance correctly , and the ability of the Pakistani troops to fall back to their designated areas in the face of Indian air superiority and Mukti Bahini activity . The Pakistani Eastern Command was fighting a holding action cut off from reinforcements and without any reserves to counter unforeseen developments , and its ultimate success lay in Pakistan defeating India in the west . If any of the factors deviated from the assumed norm of the plan , the Eastern Command was without the resources to win on its own . The Pakistani army had been fighting the insurgency nonstop for eight months and was severely fatigued and short of supplies ; in addition , the deployment near the border had robbed them of the maneuverability needed for a flexible defence .