Battle of Kolb ' s Farm The Battle of Kolb ' s Farm was fought on June 22 , 1864 , between Union forces under Maj . Gen . Joseph Hooker and Confederate forces under Lt . Gen . John B . Hood . Hood attempted an attack on the Union force , but poor terrain conditions led to its failure . Background . After the Confederate Army of Tennessee , under General Joseph E . Johnston , had settled into the Kennesaw line , consisting principally of the twin elevations of Big Kennesaw Mountain and Little Kennesaw Mountain , on June 19 , the pursuing Federal forces under Maj . Gen . William Tecumseh Sherman began to probe this new line in search of weak spots . After judging the Kennesaw line to be too strong to take by regular assault — even though he would attempt to do just that five days later — Sherman decided to fix Johnston ' s line in place with his left wing , the Army of the Tennessee , under Maj . Gen . James B . McPherson , while maneuvering his center and left wing , the Army of the Cumberland , under Maj . Gen . George H . Thomas , into position to turn Johnston ' s left flank somewhere south of the Powder Springs Road . In obedience to Sherman ' s orders , Thomas moved the XX Corps , under Maj . Gen . Joseph Hooker , into the area ; Hooker would be supported in this operation by the single - corps Army of the Ohio , under Maj . Gen . John M . Schofield , who would guard Hooker ' s far right . Johnston correctly anticipated Sherman ' s movements , and decided to counter them by moving one of his three corps , under Lt . Gen . John Bell Hood , from its reserve position near Marietta south and west along Powder Springs Road to the vicinity of Mt . Zion Church ; this would both extend his left and counter Sherman ' s turning movement . Hood was ordered to pull out of line on June 20 and began the movement on the morning of June 21 . His corps passed through Marietta and was in place by June 22 . Battle . During the early afternoon of June 22 , Maj . Gen . Carter L . Stevenson , commanding one of Hood ' s divisions , advanced his division from its campsite near Mt . Zion Church towards Kolb ' s Farm , which lay on the south side of the Powder Springs Road . Stevenson reported heavy skirmish fire from what turned out to be two Federal regiments , the 14th Kentucky Infantry and 123rd New York Infantry . Shortly afterward , Hood ordered his entire corps — the divisions of Stevenson , Maj . Gen . Alexander P . Stewart , and Maj . Gen . Thomas C . Hindman — to advance west along the Powder Springs Road , driving the Federals before them . Apparently Hood believed one of two things : 1 ) he had passed beyond the Federals ' far right flank and was in an excellent position to " roll them up " by attacking west and then north or 2 ) that the Federal troops in the area were deployed in marching columns and were thus vulnerable to attack . Confederate cavalry forces in the area reported the presence of considerable Federal infantry in the area , not just the two outpost regiments encountered by Stevenson , but this information did not reach Hood in time ; nor , given Hood ' s penchant for aggressive action , is it likely that this information would have changed his mind even if he had received it in a more timely fashion . Hood ' s corps was deployed with Stevenson ' s division astride the Powder Springs Road ( two brigades north of it and two brigades south of it ) and Hindman ' s north of it ; Stewart ' s division remained behind Stevenson ' s to provide support if needed . Hood ' s entire corps , including artillery , numbered around 14 , 000 men . On the Federal side , Hooker had received prior warning of Hood ' s advance , and had begun to entrench his corps in order to receive it . Like Hood , Hooker ' s XX Corps consisted of three divisions , under Maj . Gens . John W . Geary , Alpheus S . Williams , and Daniel Butterfield . Williams ' s division was placed astride of the Powder Springs Road , and thus would receive the brunt of the coming attack . Geary ' s division was positioned on Williams ' s left , and Butterfield ' s division was on Geary ' s left , in reserve . Hooker ' s total force numbered around 15 , 000 men . Hood launched his attack sometime after 5 : 00 p . m . The 14th Kentucky Infantry and 123rd New York Infantry , still on picket duty , received the weight of this initial attack and fell back , although in the process they managed to inflict considerable damage on Stevenson ' s division , particularly its two leftmost brigades under the commands of Brigadier Generals Alfred Cumming and Edmund Pettus . Consequently , these two brigades were forced to pause after driving back the Federal skirmishers , and thus took no part in the coming attack . As the other half of Stevenson ' s division emerged from the woods north of the road where it had begun its advance into the more open area around Kolb ' s Farm , Federal artillery cut into it . Stevenson was forced to withdraw ; his division had suffered too many casualties and too much disorganization during its advance . Falling back to a position near a ravine , which was unfortunately caught in an enfilade fire from Federal artillery , resulting in even greater losses , Stevenson held on until nightfall then withdrew east . Meanwhile , Hindman ' s attack fared even worse ; a patch of marshy ground in the area complicated his advance , and he was forced to withdraw after sustaining heavy casualties from Federal artillery . According to Williams ' account , Hindman ' s division was repulsed by artillery alone , Williams ' s infantry having taken no part in the fighting in that area . Total Confederate casualties in the battle , which one historian referred to as " more a one - sided slaughter than a battle " were approximately 1 , 500 men . Of this amount , two - thirds were suffered by Stevenson ' s division alone . The Federals suffered less than a third of that number , around 250 casualties , with many of them coming in the 123rd New York ( 48 casualties ) and the 14th Kentucky ( 70 casualties ) . Aftermath . The battle demonstrated Hood ' s main deficiency as a battlefield commander : his willingness to attack without adequate reconnaissance . He would go on to make the same error , this time as an army commander , at three future engagements in the Atlanta Campaign — the Battle of Peachtree Creek , the Battle of Atlanta , and the Battle of Ezra Church — with exceedingly costly results . On the Federal side , the victory was marred by growing friction between Sherman and Hooker . Shortly after the last Confederate attack had ended , Sherman sent a message to Hooker asking for a status report . Hooker replied : Sherman took offense to this reply , as did Schofield , for its implication that Schofield ' s corps had not been performing its duty as Hooker ' s right - flank guard . The next day , June 23 , Sherman , Hooker and another officer — either Schofield or one of his subordinates , Brig . Gen . Milo S . Hascall — had a meeting at a local church to discuss the merit of Hooker ' s claims . According to most sources , the meeting ended badly , with Sherman supposedly warning Hooker as he rode away that " such things must not occur again . " This led to a steady decline in Hooker ' s standing with Sherman , which culminated the following month in Sherman ' s decision to promote Maj . Gen . Oliver O . Howard , a junior officer whom Hooker disliked , into a senior position in command of Hooker . Hooker promptly tendered his resignation , which Sherman accepted . Despite the victory , Sherman ' s intended turning movement had been checkmated , which forced him to consider other options for breaking Johnston ' s Kennesaw line , in the end leading him to order the large - scale assault on June 27 . As at least one historian has pointed out , this checkmate had been achieved simply by moving Hood ' s corps into the general area of Kolb ' s Farm ; no attack had been necessary . Nevertheless , an attack had been made , resulting in nothing more than unnecessary casualties for both sides .