Morotai Mutiny The " Morotai Mutiny " was an incident in April 1945 involving members of the Australian First Tactical Air Force based on the island of Morotai , in the Dutch East Indies . Eight senior pilots , including Australia ' s leading flying ace , Group Captain Clive Caldwell , tendered their resignations to protest what they perceived as the relegation of Royal Australian Air Force ( RAAF ) fighter squadrons to strategically unimportant ground attack missions against Japanese positions that had been bypassed in the Allies ' " island - hopping " campaign . A government investigation vindicated the " mutineers " , and three high - ranking officers at First Tactical Air Force Headquarters , including the commander , Air Commodore Harry Cobby , the Australian Flying Corps ' top - scoring ace during World War I , were relieved of their posts . George Odgers summed up the cause of the incident in the official history of the RAAF in World War II as " the conviction of a group of young leaders that they were engaging in operations that were not militarily justifiable — a conviction widely shared also by many Australian soldiers and political leaders . " Odgers concluded that the ensuing inquiry " made it clear that almost everyone concerned acted from the highest motives , and was convinced that , in the crisis , he acted wisely " . Background . First Tactical Air Force ( No . 1 TAF ) , commanded by Air Commodore Harry Cobby , was the main frontline combat formation of the RAAF in 1944 – 45 . It fell under the operational control of United States Army Air Forces ( USAAF ) Lieutenant General George Kenney , the Allied air forces commander in the South West Pacific Area under General Douglas MacArthur . Initially made up of one Bristol Beaufighter and two P - 40 Kittyhawk wings , No . 1 TAF was augmented in 1945 by No . 80 Wing , commanded by Group Captain Clive Caldwell . This wing comprised three Supermarine Spitfire squadrons , whose pilots included veterans of the North African Campaign and the defence of Northern Australia against Japanese air raids . By early 1945 , Japanese air power in the South West Pacific had been virtually destroyed . US Army forces were focused on completing the recapture of the Philippines as a stepping stone to an invasion of Japan . During this time , No . 1 TAF was increasingly assigned to garrison duties and harassing Japanese bases on islands bypassed by MacArthur ' s forces . The Chief of the Air Staff , Air Vice Marshal George Jones , would later contend that the RAAF , in the words of Air Force historian Alan Stephens , " was ' side - stepped ' out of the final victory over Japan by MacArthur , who wanted all the glory for himself " . US Marine Corps aviators from the Air North Solomons command also believed that MacArthur ' s headquarters was favouring the USAAF in the assignment of combat duties . The overall situation led to dissatisfaction and poor morale among No . 1 TAF personnel based on Morotai , particularly the Spitfire pilots who had little opportunity for the air - to - air combat they specialised in and whose aircraft were ill - suited to ground attack missions . Group Captain Wilf Arthur , former Officer Commanding No . 81 Wing and now in charge of No . 78 Wing , became concerned that his units ' expenditure in terms of men , machines and ordnance was not justified by the damage inflicted on enemy targets or by the relative importance of those targets . In December 1944 he asked his Intelligence staff to produce a " balance sheet " to quantify losses versus results . Arthur presented the balance sheet to Air Commodore Cobby , who reviewed it and disseminated it to his headquarters staff , but took no further action . Prelude to the resignations . In March 1945 , frustrated by the lack of response from Cobby and his staff and convinced that operations were becoming yet more wasteful , Arthur began discussing his concerns with other senior No . 1 TAF pilots . First , he spoke to Wing Commander Kenneth Ranger , a senior staff officer who had served with No . 9 Operational Group and had made allegations regarding the leadership of its commander , Air Commodore Joe Hewitt , who was eventually dismissed from his post . Arthur sought out Ranger as someone with " moral guts " , who would take " a stand against the type of operations we were engaged in " . Next , he enlisted Caldwell ' s support , although Caldwell was , at the time , facing charges from Cobby over liquor trafficking which made it a risk that his involvement in a protest over operations would be misconstrued as an attempt to divert attention from the charges . Arthur believed , however , that Caldwell " would go as far as he possibly could to back up his opinions [ which ] were worth a lot more than the opinions of most other people in the area " . Through Caldwell more officers joined the protest , including two other celebrated aces , Wing Commander Bobby Gibbes and Squadron Leader John Waddy , as well as Squadron Leader Bert Grace , Squadron Leader Douglas Vanderfield , and later , Squadron Leader Stuart Harpham . During a series of meetings early in April 1945 , Caldwell proposed that the eight resign " en masse " , and the others agreed . Arthur later stated that , " I meant to make as big a fuss as I possibly could with the object of getting the position corrected . . . All the same , we realised that , to lay ourselves open to any charge of mutiny , we might lessen the force of what we were doing , which was the reason we put the things in as resignations and not as any attempt to unseat people higher up . " Arthur also attempted to secure Cobby ' s support for the protest . The commander of No . 1 TAF had been the Australian Flying Corps ' leading ace in World War I , as Caldwell was the RAAF ' s in World War II . Arthur reasoned that , although Cobby was partly to blame for the morale issue , " we felt that his value to our move , because of his name with the Public , together with Group Captain Caldwell , would give us a very considerable amount of public support . . . he was the prima donna of one war , and . . . arm - in - arm with the prima donna of the next war , we would put up a reasonable front and attract a lot of attention in the headlines of the newspapers . " Cobby , however , refused to join in and later claimed to be unaware of the depth of feeling among the pilots . " Mutiny " . On 20 April 1945 , the eight pilots presented Cobby with identically worded letters under the heading , " APPLICATION FOR RESIGNATION OF COMMISSION . " The letters read , " I hereby respectfully make application that I be permitted to resign my Commission as an officer in the Royal Australian Air Force , forthwith . " Cobby appeared taken aback and would not accept the resignations . He spoke to seven of the pilots individually , but not Caldwell , as he was already under charge . When the men refused to withdraw the letters or elaborate on the reason for their actions , Cobby contacted his immediate superior , Air Vice Marshal Bill Bostock , head of RAAF Command , the Air Force ' s main operational command . Bostock arrived on Morotai the next day and interviewed the pilots , asking them to tear up the letters , without success . His methods were later construed as an attempt to " make the situation go away or to at least cover it up " . The pilots ' only concession to Bostock ' s entreaty was to resubmit their resignations with the word " forthwith " replaced by " at the end of current operations " . Following these interviews , Bostock signalled Air Vice Marshal Jones to advise him that morale in No . 1 TAF was at a " dangerously low level " and recommend that Jones fire Cobby and replace him with Air Commodore Frederick Scherger . Jones considered the pilots ' action " absurd " , because an officer could not legally resign during wartime , but travelled to Morotai from his headquarters in Melbourne to investigate the matter personally . He also interviewed the pilots , later declaring , " I believed them all to be sincere in what they were stating and what they had attempted to do . . . Yes , sincerely held beliefs , no matter how ill - founded , coupled possibly with a rather exaggerated sense of national duty . " Lieutenant General Kenney also became embroiled in the affair , having been informed by Bostock , and insisted on speaking directly to the pilots himself over Jones ' protest that this was an internal RAAF disciplinary matter . During a visit to Morotai from his Manila headquarters , Kenney tried to persuade the officers to reconsider their positions , but again they refused . He agreed with Bostock that Cobby should be replaced by Scherger , and declared that if the pilots were court - martial led he would appear in their defence . The commander of the Australian Army ' s I Corps , Lieutenant General Leslie Morshead , who was at Morotai preparing for the Borneo campaign , also supported Cobby ' s removal . Morshead and other senior army officers were concerned that the dispute could disrupt preparations for the Australian landings in Borneo and consulted with Kenney on the matter . Jones resolved to dismiss not only Cobby but also his staff officers , Group Captains Gibson and Simms . Scherger took over as Air Officer Commanding No . 1 TAF on 10 May . Aftermath . Ultimately , no court - martial took place for any actions directly related to the " mutiny " , and most of the pilots involved continued on operations until the end of the war . An RAAF investigation found that Jones ' removal of Cobby , Gibson and Simms was justified . Upon Jones ' request , the Australian government also set up an inquiry into events on Morotai , headed by Justice John Vincent Barry . Beginning on 16 May 1945 , the inquiry focused on both the resignations and the reports of illegal trafficking in alcohol between RAAF and US service personnel on the island . While Barry ' s terms of reference encompassed only No . 1 TAF , the inquiry also heard evidence of shortcomings in the Air Force ' s higher command that may have contributed to structural and morale problems on Morotai , particularly a bitter and long - running feud between Jones and Bostock over the division of operational and administrative control of the RAAF in the Pacific . The complete report of the inquiry was released in October , preceded by a summary of findings issued on 14 September 1945 . Judge Barry vindicated Arthur ' s " balance sheet " and the stand taken by the pilots , finding that their motives in tendering their resignations were sincere . No further action was taken against them over the " mutiny " itself , but Caldwell and Gibbes were court - martialled for their involvement in the alcohol racket and reduced to the rank of flight lieutenant . Barry found that Cobby had " failed to maintain proper control over his command " , while Cobby defended his leadership of No . 1 TAF , contending that although there was " some discontent " , it was " a healthy sign of discontent amongst certain officers who wished to do more in the war than they were doing . Unfortunately , it was not within the power of 1st T . A . F . to give them that more important or more interesting work . . . " The incident did not change the RAAF ' s role in the dying days of the war in the Pacific and may have hindered No . 1 TAF ' s preparations for the upcoming Battle of Tarakan . It did however improve the situation on Morotai , as Air Commodore Scherger successfully restored morale . The " mutineers " considered that they had achieved most of their goals by effecting a change of command in No . 1 TAF and instigating a governmental inquiry . News of the resignations , the alcohol racket , and Caldwell ' s court - martial were widely reported in Australia . Following publication of Barry ' s findings , " The Daily Telegraph " in Sydney commented that " the RAAF should have a complete new deal . It is a badly run show and the fault is high up . " The same paper later called Caldwell ' s court - martial a " witch hunt " . Despite this publicity , the action did not become popularly known as the " Morotai Mutiny " until years later . The phrase dated back to the earliest days of the incident , Group Captain Arthur having written it at the top of an " aide - mémoire " . He later said that " the alliteration must have appealed to me " . Shortly after writing it , he crossed out " Morotai " and added a question mark following " Mutiny " . The term did not catch on with the public at the time , but Arthur ' s original words have been credited as the source of the name by which the incident eventually became known .