War in Vietnam ( 1959 – 63 ) The 1959 to 1963 phase of the Vietnam War started after the North Vietnamese had made a firm decision to commit to a military conquest of the South , a buildup phase began , between the 1959 North Vietnamese decision and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident , which led to major U . S . escalation . The Communists saw this as a second phase of their revolution , substituting the U . S . for the French . This is in tune with the theories of Maoism that a revolution could be built in a stage by stage process . By this point the victory of Mao himself in 1949 and then of the Viet Minh over the French appeared to offer two validations of Maoist theory . That in practical terms both had been won in conventional campaigns using the methods of regular , conventional warfare was glossed over at the time and by later generations . Between the 1954 Geneva accords and 1956 , the two countries were still forming ; the influence of major powers , especially France and the United States , and to a lesser extent China and the Soviet Union , were as much an influence as any internal matters . There is little question that in 1957 - 1958 , there was a definite early guerilla movement against the Diem government , involving individual assassinations , expropriations , recruiting , shadow government , and other things characteristic of Mao ' s Phase I . The actual insurgents , however , were primarily native to the south or had been there for some time . While there was clearly communications and perhaps arms supply from the north , there is little evidence of any Northern units in the South , although organizers may well have infiltrated . It can be established that there was endemic insurgency in South Vietnam throughout the period 1954 – 1960 . It can also be established - but less surely - that the Diem regime alienated itself from one after another of those elements within Vietnam which might have offered it political support , and was grievously at fault in its rural programs . That these conditions engendered animosity toward the GVN seems almost certain , and they could have led to a major resistance movement even without North Vietnamese help . There is little doubt that there was some kind of Viet Minh - derived " stay behind " organization between 1954 and 1960 , but it is unclear that they were directed to take over action until 1957 or later . Before that , they were unquestionably recruiting and building infrastructure , a basic first step in a Maoist protracted war mode . While the visible guerilla incidents increased gradually , the key policy decisions by the North were made in 1959 . Early in this period , there was a greater degree of conflict in Laos than in South Vietnam . U . S . combat involvement was , at first , greater in Laos , but the activity of advisors , and increasingly U . S . direct support to South Vietnamese soldiers , increased , under U . S . military authority , in late 1959 and early 1960 . Communications intercepts in 1959 , for example , confirmed the start of the Ho Chi Minh trail and other preparation for large - scale fighting . North Vietnam declared its public support for communist insurgents in South Vietnam and first guerilla attacks against the South . The communist forces in South Vietnam established the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam ( Viet Cong ) and Army for the Liberation of South Vietnam . At the same , the United States helped South Vietnam conducting special war strategy . However , the communist forces still won on the battlefield , fought several large campaigns next to the big cities . President Diem was unable to take control of political crisis and was overthrown by the Council of Revolutionary Military ( some documents of both sides suggest that it was the United States which had turn the green light for this coup ) . After several years of chaos , the Ngo Dinh Diem government came to an end in 1963 and South Vietnam then fell into management crisis . Competing strategies . On April 1959 , a branch of the Lao Dong ( Worker ' s Party of Vietnam ) , of which Ho Chi Minh became Secretary - General in 1956 , was formed in the South , and Communist underground activity increased . Some of the 90 , 000 Viet Minh troops that had returned to the North following the Geneva Agreements had begun filtering back into the South to take up leadership positions in the insurgency apparat . Mass demonstrations , punctuated by an occasional raid on an isolated post , were the major activities in the initial stage of this insurgency . Communist - led uprisings launched in 1959 in the lower Mekong Delta and Central Highlands resulted in the establishment of liberated zones , including an area of nearly fifty villages in Quang Ngai Province . In areas under Communist control in 1959 , the guerrillas established their own government , levied taxes , trained troops , built defense works , and provided education and medical care . In order to direct and coordinate the new policies in the South , it was necessary to revamp the party leadership apparatus and form a new united front group . North Vietnam committed in , May 1959 , to war in the South ; this was confirmed by communications intelligence . Diem , well before that point , had constantly pushed a generic anticommunism , but how much of this was considered a real threat , and how much a nucleus around which he justified his controls , is less clear . Those controls , and the shutdown of most indigenous opposition by 1959 , was clearly alienating the Diem government from significant parts of the Southern population , was massively mismanaging rural reforms and overemphasizing the power base in the cities , and might have had an independent rebellion . North Vietnam , however , clearly began to exploit that alienation . The U . S . , however , did not recognize a significant threat , even with such information as intelligence on the formation of the logistics structure for infiltration . The presentation of hard evidence — communications intelligence about the organization building the Ho Chi Minh trail — Hanoi ' s involvement in the developing strife became evident . Not until 1960 , however , did the U . S . recognize both Diem was in danger , that the Diem structure was inadequate to deal with the problems , and present the first " Counterinsurgency Plan for Vietnam ( CIP ) " Republic of Vietnam strategy . Quite separate from its internal problems , South Vietnam faced an unusual military challenge . On the one hand , there was a threat of a conventional , cross - border strike from the North , reminiscent of the Korean War . In the fifties , the U . S . advisors focused on building a " mirror image " of the U . S . Army , designed to meet and defeat a conventional invasion . Diem ( and his successors ) were primarily interested in using the ARVN as a device to secure power , rather than as a tool to unify the nation and defeat its enemies . Province and District Chiefs in the rural areas were usually military officers , but reported to political leadership in Saigon rather than the military operational chain of command . The 1960 " Counterinsurgency Plan for Vietnam ( CIP ) " from the U . S . MAAG was a proposal to change what appeared to be a dysfunctional structure . Further analysis showed the situation was not only jockeying for power , but also reflected that the province chief indeed had security authority that could conflict with that of tactical military operations in progress , but also had responsibility for the civil administration of the province . That civil administration function became more and more intertwined , starting in 1964 and with acceleration in 1966 , of the " other war " of rural development . An issue that remains unclear is whether or not any of the post - Diem governments seriously explored a neutralist solution through direct negotiations with Hanoi , which would have been against U . S . policy . Contemporary intelligence analyses discount such negotiations , although they remained an undercurrent ; Robert McNamara ' s 1999 book says that " Big " Minh , the leader of the coup that actually overthrew Diem , was actively exploring such an approach without informing the U . S . Throughout this period , there clearly was a disconnect about South Vietnamese motivations . Analyses by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research ( INR ) of the U . S . Department of State define the political problems from a viewpoint different from that of the military . They described the immediate post - coup government , controlled by the popular " Big " Minh with Nguyen Ngoc Tho as figurehead Prime Minister , unable to get control , and the Khanh - led military junta that replaced him simply being a period of instability . INR saw the priority during this period as more a matter of establishing a viable , sustainable political structure for South Vietnam , rather than radically improving the short - term security situation . It saw the Minh - Tho government as enjoying an initial period of popular support as it removed some of the most disliked aspects of the Diem government . During this time , the increase in VC attacks was largely coincidental ; they were resulting from the VC having reached a level of offensive capability rather than capitalizing on the overthrow of Diem . Contrary to the INR analysis , Douglas Pike said that there was a substantial defection from the NLF after the overthrow of Diem , especially among Cao Dai that had considered themselves as especially persecuted by Diem . Pike believed that a portion of the NLF was variously anti - Diem , or simply in search of political power , rather than Communist . When this part left , the NLF came much more under Hanoi ' s control . During this period , INR observed , in a December 23 paper , the U . S . needed to reexamine its strategy focused on the Strategic Hamlet Program , since it was getting much more accurate — if pessimistic — from the new government than it had from Diem . Secretary McNamara , however , testified to the House Armed Service Committee , on December 27 , that only a maximum effort of American power could salvage the situation . Two days later , the Minh - Tho government was overthrown . INR looked pessimistically at Khanh , who claimed that Minh had been making overtures to Hanoi for a neutralist settlement . It was the contemporary assessment of INR that Minh had been making no such overtures , although this is contradicted by Secretary McNamara ' s 1999 book . Whether or not Khanh was right about Minh ' s plan , INR judged Minh as motivated primarily by personal ambition . Where Minh had tried to form a government of technicians , Khanh , admittedly with U . S . urging , brought in political elements , which quickly led to factionalism not present under Minh ' s period of good will . INR saw Khanh as having a contradictory policy in terms of U . S . goals : while he did increase security , he did so by means judged counterproductive in broadening the political base of the government . INR considered new student demonstrations , in April 1964 , as the first warning of a new wave of protest , which became more manifest in August . Those demonstrations contained anti - American messages , but INR was uncertain if they represented true anti - Americanism , or simply opposition to American support of Khanh . As opposed to Diem ' s catastrophic handling of the Buddhist crisis , Khanh responded with moderation , and , on August 28 , INR concluded he was , in fact , improving the political situation . Evidence cited including the dissolution , in the next two weeks , of Minh ' s military triumvirate and Minh ' s election as chairman of a new Provisional Steering Committee , as well as release of some jailed generals that had supported Minh . INR suggested that Khanh may have caused the unrest by supporting the genuinely popular Khanh . Khanh , however , promptly sent Minh to exile in Thailand . Note that Minh was exiled within the same month as the Gulf of Tonkin incident , with its obvious ramifications of increased U . S . involvement . Communist strategy . The North had clearly defined political objectives , and a grand strategy , involving military , diplomatic , covert action and psychological operations to achieve those objectives . Whether or not one agreed with those objectives , there was a clear relationship between long - term goals and short - term actions . Its military first focused on guerilla and raid warfare in the south ( i . e . , Mao ' s " Phase I " ) , simultaneously improving the air defensives of the north . By the mid - sixties , they were operating in battalion and larger military formation that would remain in contact as long as the correlation of forces was to their advantage , and then retreat — Mao ' s " Phase II " . In the Viet Cong , and in the North Vietnam regular army ( PAVN ) , every unit had political and military cadre to ensure " dau tranh " was carried out . Guerilla attacks increased in the early 1960s , at the same time as the new John F . Kennedy administration made Presidential decisions to increase its influence . Diem , as other powers were deciding their policies , was clearly facing disorganized attacks and internal political dissent . There were unquestioned conflicts between the government , dominated by minority Northern Catholics , and both the majority Buddhists and minorities such as the Montagnard s , Cao Dai , and Hoa Hao . These conflicts were exploited , initially at the level of propaganda and recruiting , by stay - behind Viet Minh receiving orders from the North . Events . 1959 . Diem , in early 1959 , felt under attack and broadly reacted against all forms of opposition , which was presented as a " Communist Denunciation Campaign " , as well as some significant and unwelcome rural resettlement , the latter to be distinguished from land reform . Increased activity in Laos . In May , the North Vietnamese made the commitment to an armed overthrow of the South , creating the 559th Transportation Group , named after the creation date , to operate the land route that became known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail . Additional transportation groups were created for maritime supply to the South : Group 759 ran sea - based operations , while Group 959 supplied the Pathet Lao by land routes . Group 959 also provided secure communications to the Pathet Lao . The Pathet Lao both were operating against the Laotian government , but also working with NVA Group 959 to supply the southern insurgency ; much of the original Trail was in Laos , first supplying the Pathet Lao . Nevertheless . the Laotian government did not want it known that it was being assisted by the US in the Laotian Civil War against the Pathet Lao . U . S . military assistance could also be considered a violation of the Geneva agreement , although North Vietnam , and its suppliers , were equally in violation . In July , CIA sent a unit from United States Army Special Forces , who arrived on CIA proprietary airline Air America , wearing civilian clothes and having no obvious US connection . These soldiers led Miao and Hmong tribesmen against Communist forces . The covert program was called Operation Hotfoot . At the US Embassy , BG John Heintges was called the head of the " Program Evaluation Office . " CIA directed Air America , in August 1959 , to train two helicopter pilots . Originally , this was believed to be a short - term requirement , but " this would be the beginning of a major rotary - wing operation in Laos . Escalation and response in the South . Cause and effect are unclear , but it is also accurate that the individual and small group actions , by the latter part of 1959 , included raids by irregulars in battalion strength . Vietnam was a significant part of the agenda of the U . S . Pacific commanders ' conference in April . Lieutenant General Samuel T . Williams , chief of the U . S . Military Assistance Advisory Group , Vietnam ( MAAG - V ) cited the key concerns as : LTG Williams pointed to the dual chain of command of the ARVN , as distinct from the Civil Guard . The latter was commanded by the Department of the Interior , and controlled by province and district chiefs . This structure let the U . S . Operations Mission ( USOM , the contemporary term for non - military foreign aid from the Agency for International Development financially aid the Guard , they were so dispersed that there could be no systematic advice , much less to the combination of Guard and Army . Under the authority of the commander of United States Pacific Command , it was ordered that MAAG - V assign advisors to the infantry regiment and special troops regiment level , who were not to participate directly in combat . advisers be provided down to infantry regiment and to artillery , armored , and separate Marine battalion level . This move would enable advisers to give on - the - spot advice and effectively assess the end result of the advisory effort . He also requested United States Army Special Forces ( SF ) mobile training teams ( MTT ) to assist in training ARVN units in counterinsurgency . Structural barriers to effectiveness of RVN forces . When the MAAG was instructed to improve the effectiveness of the RVN , the most fundamental problem was that the Diem government had organized the military and paramilitary forces not for effectiveness , but for political control and patronage . The most obvious manifestation of Diem ' s goal was that there were two parallel organizations , the regular military under the Department of National Defense and the local defense forces under the Ministry of the Interior . Diem was the only person who could give orders to both . Command and control . President Diem appointed the Secretary of State for National Defense and the Minister of the Interior . The Defense Secretary directed of General Staff chief and several special sub - departments . The General staff chief , in turn , commanded the Joint General Staff ( JGS ) , which was both the top - level staff and the top of the military chain of command . There were problems with the military structure , even before considering the paramilitary forces under the Interior Ministry . The JGS itself had conflicting components with no clear authority . For example , support for the Air Force came both from a Director of Air Technical Service and a Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Matériel . The Director was , in principle , under the Chief of Staff , but actually reported to the Director General of Administration , Budget , and Comptroller for fiscal matters ) . Combat units also had conflicting chains of command . A division commander might receive orders both from the corps - level tactical commander who actually carried out the operational art role of corps commanders in most militaries , but also from the regional commander of the home base of the division — even if the division was operating in another area . The chiefs of branches of service ( e . g . , infantry , artillery ) , who in most armies were responsible only for preparation and training of personnel of their branch , and orders only before they were deployed , would give direct operational orders to units in the field . Diem himself , who had no significant military background , could be the worst micromanager of all , getting on a radio in the garden of the Presidential Palace , and issuing orders to regiments , bypassing the Department of National Defense , Joint General Staff , operational commanders , and division commanders . He also consciously played subordinates against one another to avoid the formation of opposition ; the Battle of Ap Bac was a defeat caused by a lack of unity of command , with conflicts between the military commander and province chief . In fairness to Diem , Lyndon Johnson and his political advisors would do detailed air operations planning for attacks in the North , with no input from experienced air officers . Henry Kissinger , in the " Mayaguez " incident , got onto the tactical radio net and confused the local commanders with German - accented and obscure commands . Johnson and Kissinger did have had more military experience than Diem ; Johnson had briefly worn a Navy uniform on an inspection trip before returning to Congress , and Kissinger lectured on politics at the end of WWII and the start of the Occupation , with a high status but an actual rank of Private , United States Army . Diem had never put on a uniform . " The Department of National Defense and most of the central organizations and the ministerial services were located in downtown Saigon , while the General Staff ( less air and navy elements ) was inefficiently located in a series of company - size troop barracks on the edge of the city . The chief of the General Staff was thus removed several miles from the Department of National Defense . The navy and air staffs were also separately located in downtown Saigon . With such a physical layout , staff action and decision - making unduly delayed on even the simplest of matters . " The over - all ministerial structure described above was originally set up by the French and slightly modified by presidential decree on 3 October 1957 . Military Assistance Advisory Group , Vietnam , had proposed a different command structure which would have placed the ministry and the " general staff " in closer proximity both physically and in command relationship . " Diem , however , made a practice of keeping individuals or small groups from having too much authority . The chain of command of both the Civil Guard and Self - Defense Corps , went from the Ministry of the Interior to the province chiefs , district chiefs , and village councils . Even though the province chiefs and district chiefs were often military officers , ARVN units operating in a province or district could not give orders to these units . Instead , they had to pass a request through military channels to the Ministry of Defense in Saigon . If the officials there agreed , they would convey the request to their counterparts in the Ministry of the Interior , who would then send orders down its chain of command to the local units . Local defense forces . Created by presidential decree in April 1955 , and originally under the direct control of President Diem , with control passed to the Ministry of the Interior in September 1958 , the Civil Guard was made up of wartime paramilitary veterans . Its major duty was to relieve the ARVN of static security missions , freeing it for mobile operations , with additional responsibility for local intelligence collection and counterintelligence . in 1956 , had 68 , 000 men organized into organized into companies and platoons , the Civil Guard was represented by two to eight companies in each province . It had a centrally controlled reserve of eight mobile battalions of 500 men each , . Operating on a local basis since 1955 and formally created in 1956 , the Self - Defense corps was a village - level police organization , for protection against intimidation and subversion . It put units of 4 - 10 men into villages of 1 , 000 or more residents . In 1956 , it had 48 , 000 non - uniformed troops armed with French weapons . The Self - Defense Corps , like the Civil Guard , was established to free regular forces from internal security duties by providing a police organization at village level to protect the population from subversion and intimidation . Units of four to ten men each were organized in villages of 1 , 000 or more inhabitants . The Civil Guard and the Self - Defense Corps were poorly trained and ill - equipped to perform their missions , and by 1959 their numbers had declined to about 46 , 000 and 40 , 000 , respectively . 1960 . As mentioned in the introduction to this section , the U . S . was urging the RVN to revise its parallel province / district command and military operations command structure ; the Counterinsurgency Plan ( CIP ) was the first of several such proposals . Laotian operations . After the 180 day assignment of the Special Forces personnel in Laos , the name changed to Operation White Star , under COL Arthur " Bull " Simons . Beginning of Phase II raids . On 25 January 1960 , a Communist force of 300 to 500 men escalated with a direct raid on an ARVN base at Tay Ninh , killing 23 soldiers and taking large quantities of munitions . Four days later , a guerilla group seized a town for several hours , and stole cash from a French citizen . These were still in the first Maoist stage , as raids rather than hit - and - run battles . Still , larger guerilla forces broke lines of communications within areas of South Vietnam . There was uncertainty , expressed by Bernard Fall and in a March U . S . intelligence assessment , that there were distinct plans to conduct larger - scale operations " under the flag of the People ' s Liberation Movement , " which was identified as " red , with a blue star . " It was uncertain if their intent was to continue to build bases in the Mekong Delta , or to isolate Saigon . The " Pentagon Papers " stated the guerillas were establishing three options , of which they could exercise one or more ; South Vietnam corruption breeds discontent . On April 1960 , eighteen distinguished nationalists in South Vietnam sent a petition to President Diem advocating that he reform his rigid , family - run , and increasingly corrupt , government . Diem ignored their advice and instead closed several opposition newspapers and arrests journalists and intellectuals . On 5 May 1960 , MAAG strength was increased from 327 to 685 personnel . Formation of the NLF . In December , the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam ( NLF ) formally declared its existence , although it did not hold its first full congress until 1962 . The NLF platform recognized some of the internal stresses under the Diem government , and put language in its platform to create autonomous regions in minority areas and for the abolition of the " U . S . - Diêm clique ' s present policy of ill - treatment and forced assimilation of the minority nationalities " . Such zones , with a sense of identity although certainly not political autonomy , did exist in the North . In the early 1960s , NLF political organizers went to the Montagnard ares in the Central Highlands , and worked both to increase alienation from the GVN and directly recruit supporters . 1961 : Slow U . S . engagement . Not surprisingly , with a change in U . S . administration , there were changes in policy , and also continuations of some existing activities . There were changes in outlook . Kennedy was unquestionably anti - Communist , but his administration did not treat it as the existential crusade that Eisenhower ' s secretary of state , John Foster Dulles , had waged . Defense Secretary Robert S . McNamara ( in office 1961 - 68 ) told President John F . Kennedy ( in office 1961 - 63 ) in 1961 it was " absurd to think that a nation of 20 million people can be subverted by 15 - 20 thousand active guerrillas if the government and the people of that country do not wish to be subverted . " McNamara , a manufacturing executive and expert in statistical management , had no background in guerilla warfare or other than Western culture , and rejected advice from area specialists and military officers . He preferred to consult with his personal team , often called the " Whiz Kids " ; his key foreign policy advisor was a law professor , John McNaughton , while economist Alain Enthoven was perhaps his closest colleague . Still trying to resolve the problems of GVN conflicting command , a new reorganizational proposal , the " Geographically Phased Plan " . The goal was to have a coherent national plan , which was , in 1962 , to be expressed as the Strategic Hamlet Program . Kennedy pushes for covert operations against the North . On January 28 , 1961 , shortly after his inauguration , John F . Kennedy told a National Security Council meeting that he wanted covert operations launched against North Vietnam , in retaliation for their equivalent actions in the South . This is not argue that this was an inappropriate decision , but the existence of covert operations against the North , has to be understood in analyzing later events , especially the Gulf of Tonkin Incident . Even earlier , he issued National Security Action Memorandum ( NSAM ) 2 , directing the military to prepare counterinsurgency forces , although not yet targeting the North . Kennedy discovered that little had progressed by mid - March , and issued National Security Action Memorandum ( NSAM ) 28 , ordering the CIA respond to his desire to launch guerilla operations against the North . Herb Weisshart , deputy chief of the Saigon CIA station , observed the actual CIA action plan was " very modest " . Given the Presidential priority , Weisshart said it was modest because William Colby , then Saigon station chief , said it would consume too many resources needed in the South . He further directed , in April , a presidential task force to draft a " Program of Action for Vietnam " . In April , the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba , under the CIA , had failed , and Kennedy lost confidence in the CIA ' s paramilitary operations . Kennedy himself had some responsibility for largely cutting the Joint Chiefs of Staff out of operational planning . The JCS believed the operation was ill - advised , but , if it was to be done , American air support was essential . Kennedy , however , had made a number of changes to create plausible deniability , only allowing limited air strikes by CIA - sponsored pilots acting as Cuban dissidents . After it was learned that the main strike had left behind a few jet aircraft , he refused a follow - up strike ; those aircraft savaged the poorly organized amphibious ships and their propeller - driven air support . The U . S . Air Force , however , responded to NSAM 2 by creating , on April 14 , 1961 , the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron ( CCTS ) , code named “ Jungle Jim . ” The unit , of about 350 men , had 16 C - 47 transports , eight B - 26 bombers , and eight T - 28 trainers ( equipped for ground attack ) , with an official of training indigenous air forces in counterinsurgency and conduct air operations . A volunteer unit , they would deploy in October , to begin FARM GATE missions . The task force reported back in May , with a glum assessment of the situation in the South , and a wide - ranging but general plan of action , which became NSAM 52 . In June , Kennedy issued a set of NSAMs transferring paramilitary operations to the Department of Defense . These transfers of responsibility should be considered not only in respect to the specific operations against the North , but in the level of covert military operation in the South in the upcoming months . This transfer also cut the experienced MG Edward Lansdale out of the process , as while he was an U . S . Air Force officer , the military saw him as belonging to CIA . Intelligence support . Also in May , the first U . S . signals intelligence unit , from the Army Security Agency under National Security Agency control , entered Vietnam operating under the cover name " 3rd Radio Research Unit . " Organizationally , it provided support to MAAG - V , and trained ARVN personnel , the latter within security constraints . The general policy , throughout the war , was that ARVN intelligence personnel were not given access above the collateral SECRET ( i . e . , with no access to material with the additional special restrictions of " code word " communications intelligence ( CCO or SI ) . Their principal initial responsibility was direction finding of Viet Cong radio transmitters , which they started doing from vehicles equipped with sensors . On December 22 , 1961 , an Army Security Agency soldier , SP4 James T . Davis , was killed in an ambush , the first American soldier to die in Vietnam . Covert U . S . air support enters the South . More U . S . personnel , officially designated as advisors , arrived in the South and took an increasingly active , although covert , role . In October , a U . S . Air Force special operations squadron , part of the 4400th CCTS deployed to SVN , officially in a role of advising and training . The aircraft were painted in South Vietnamese colors , and the aircrew wore uniforms without insignia and without U . S . ID . Sending military forces to South Vietnam was a violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954 , and the U . S . wanted plausible deniability . The deployment package consisted of 155 airmen , eight T - 28s , and four modified and redesignated SC - 47s and subsequently received B - 26s . U . S . personnel flew combat as long as a VNAF person was aboard . FARMGATE stayed covert until after the Gulf of Tonkin incident . Building the South Vietnamese Civil Irregular Defense Groups . Under the operational control of the Central Intelligence Agency , initial U . S . Army Special Forces involvement came in October , with the Rhade . The Civilian Irregular Defense Groups ( CIDG ) , were under Central Intelligence Agency operational control until July 1 , 1963 , when MACV took control . Army documents refer to control by " CAS Saigon " , a cover name for the CIA station . According to Kelly , the SF and CIA rationale for establishing the CIDG program with the Montagnards was that minority participation would broaden the GVN counterinsurgency program , but , more critically , the Montagnards and other minority groups were prime targets for Communist propaganda , partly because of their dissatisfaction with the Vietnamese government , and it was important to prevent the Viet Cong from recruiting them and taking complete control of their large and strategic land holdings . It was in mid - November when Kennedy decided to take on operational as well as advisory roles . Under U . S . a Military Assistance Advisory Group ( MAAG ) , such as the senior U . S . military organization in Vietnam , is a support and advisory organization . A Military Assistance Command ( MAC ) is designed to carry out MAAG duties , but also to command combat troops . There was considerable discussion about the reporting structure of this of the organization : a separate theater reporting to the National Command Authority or part of United States Pacific Command . First Honolulu Conference . After meetings in Vietnam by GEN Taylor , the Secretaries of State and Defense issued a set of recommendations , on November 11 . Kennedy accepted all except the use of large U . S . combat forces . McNamara held the first Honolulu Conference , at United States Pacific Command headquarters , with the Vietnam commanders present . He addressed short - term possibilities , urging concentration on stabilizing one province : " I ' ll guarantee it ( the money and equipment ) provided you have a plan based on one province . Take one place , sweep it and hold it in a plan . " Or , put another way , let us demonstrate that in some place , in some way , we can achieve demonstrable gains . First U . S . direct support to an ARVN combat operation . On 11 December 1961 the United States aircraft carrier " USNS Card " docked in downtown Saigon with 82 U . S . Army H - 21 helicopters and 400 men , organized into two Transportation Companies ( Light Helicopter ) ; Army aviation had not yet become a separate branch . Twelve days later these helicopters were committed into the first airmobile combat action in Vietnam , Operation CHOPPER . It was the first time U . S . forces directly and overtly supported ARVN units in combat , although the American forces did not directly attack the guerillas . Approximately 1 , 000 Vietnamese paratroopers were airlifted into a suspected Viet Cong headquarters complex about ten miles west of the Vietnamese capital , achieving tactical surprise and capturing a radio station . 1962 : Getting in deeper . From the U . S . perspective , the Strategic Hamlet Program was the consensus approach to pacifying the countryside . There was a sense , however , that this was simply not a high priority for Diem , who considered his power base to be in the cities . The Communists , willing to fill a vacuum , became more and more active in rural areas where the GVN was invisible , irrelevant , or actively a hindrance . Special Forces operations . In 1962 , the U . S . Military Assistance Command – Vietnam ( MACV ) established Army Special Forces camps near villages . The Americans wanted a military presence there to block the infiltration of enemy forces from Laos , to provide a base for launching patrols into Laos to monitor the Ho Chi Minh Trail , and to serve as a western anchor for defense along the DMZ . These defended villages were not part of the Strategic Hamlet Program , but did provide examples that were relevant . U . S . ground command structure established . U . S . command structures continued to emerge . On February 8 , Paul D . Harkins , then Deputy Commanding General , U . S . Army Pacific , under Pacific Command , was promoted to general and assigned to command the new Military Assistance Command , Vietnam ( MAC - V ) . Military Assistance Command - Thailand was created on May 15 , 1962 , but reported to Harkins at MAC - V . In a departure from usual practice , the MAAG was retained as an organization subordinate to MAC - V , rather than being absorbed into it . The MAAG continued to command U . S . advisors and direct support to the ARVN . At first , MAC - V delegated control of U . S . combat units to the MAAG . While it was not an immediate concern , MAC - V never controlled all the Air Force and Navy units that would operate in Vietnam , but from outside its borders . These remained under the control of Pacific Command , or , in some cases , the Strategic Air Command . No regular ARVN units were under the command of U . S . military commanders , although there were exceptions for irregular units under Special Forces . Indeed , there could be situations where , in a joint operation , U . S . combat troops were under a U . S . commander , while the ARVN units were under an ARVN officer with a U . S . advisor . Relationships in particular operations often were more a matter of personalities and politics rather than ideal command . U . S troops also did not report to ARVN officers ; while many RVN officers had their post through political connections , others would have been outstanding commanders in any army . At the same time , the U . S . was beginning to explore withdrawing forces . Intelligence support refines . The USMC 1st Composite Radio Company deployed , on January 2 , 1962 , to Pleiku , South Vietnam as Detachment One . After Davis ' death in December , it became obvious to the Army Security Agency that thick jungle made tactical ground collection exceptionally dangerous , and direction - finding moved principally to aircraft platforms . Additional allied support . In addition to the U . S . advisers , in August 1962 , 30 Australian Army advisers was sent to Vietnam to operate within the United States military advisory system . As with most American advisors , their initial orders were to train , but not go on operations . 1963 . 1963 was critical not only because the Diem government fell , but that the North , at the end of the year , chose a more aggressive military strategy . Stability in the South , however , would not improve with increasing dissent , coup attempts , and a major coup . It remains unclear as to what extent the South Vietnamese were exploring solutions based a neutralist Vietnam , but this apparently existed at some level , without U . S . knowledge . Organizations and personnel . Organizations and commands would change with time . In January , for example , Major General Don became Commander - in - Chief of the RVN armed forces , GEN William Westmoreland was named deputy to GEN Paul Harkins to replace him later . In a structural reorganization , the ARVN made the Saigon Special Region the III Corps tactical zone ; the former III Corps for the Mekong Delta became IV Corps tactical zone January 1963 : Question of ARVN effectiveness . South Vietnamese forces , with U . S . advisors , took severe defeats at the Battle of Ap Bac in January . This has been considered the trigger for an increasingly skeptical , although small , American press corps in Vietnam . and the Battle of Go Cong in September . Ap Bac was of particular political sensitivity , as John Paul Vann , a highly visible American officer , was the advisor , and the U . S . press took note of what he considered to be ARVN shortcomings . While the Buddhist crisis and military coup that ended with the killing of Diem was an obvious major event , it was by no means the only event of the year . In keeping with the President ' s expressed desires , covert operations against the North were escalated . Of course , the assassination of Kennedy himself brought Lyndon Baines Johnson , with a different philosophy toward the war . Kennedy was an activist , but had a sense of unconventional warfare and geopolitics , and , as is seen in the documentary record , discussed policy development with a wide range of advisors , specifically including military leaders although he distrusted the Joint Chiefs of Staff . He was attracted to officers that he saw as activist and unconventional , such as Edward Lansdale . Johnson tended to view the situation from the standpoint of U . S . domestic policy , and did not want to render himself vulnerable to political criticism as the man who had " lost Vietnam " . Early after becoming president , as he told Bill Moyers , he had the " terrible feeling that something has grabbed me by the ankles and won ' t let go . " His response was to send Robert McNamara to examine the situation and reassure him . McNamara , at this point as he had been with Kennedy , exuded a sense of logical control ; he was not yet in the deep despair that led him to write , " . . . we were wrong , terribly wrong . We owe it to future generations to explain why . " " Johnson was a profoundly insecure man who craved and demanded affirmation . " When the North Vietnamese did not respond as Johnson wanted , he took it personally , and may have made some judgments based on his emotional responses to Ho . He also spoke with a much smaller advisory circle than Kennedy , and excluded active military officers . The Buddhist crisis begins . While there had been long - standing animosity between Diem and the Buddhists . April 1963 . For unclear reasons , the central government ordered the provincial authorities to enforce a ban on the display of all religious flags . This ban had rarely been enforced , but , since the order went out shortly before the major festival , Vesek ( informally called Buddha ' s Birthday ) , which fell on May 8 , many Buddhists perceived this as a direct attack on their customs . In May , a government paramilitary unit fired into demonstrators . As part of a wave of protests , a Buddhist monk immolated himself ; photographs of his body , apparently seated calmly in the lotus position as he burned to death , drew worldwide attention . By early June , the government was negotiating with the Buddhists as it had never done , with Vice President Tho , a Buddhist , apparently being an effective negotiator in spite of Diem ' s brother and political advisor Ngô Đình Nhu ' s announcing " if the Buddhists want to have another barbecue , I will be glad to supply the gasoline " . May 1963 Honolulu conference ; covert warfare a major issue . At the May 6 Honolulu conference , the decision was made to increase , as the President had been pushing , covert operations against the North . A detailed plan for covert operations , Pacific Command Operations Plan 34A ( OPPLAN 34A ) went to GEN Taylor , now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , did not approve it until September 9 . Shultz suggests the delay had three aspects : It is unclear if Taylor did not believe covert operations should not be attempted at all , or if he regarded it as a CIA mission . If the latter , Kennedy would have been unlikely to support him , given the President ' s loss of confidence after the Bay of Pigs invasion fiasco . Interim government . Diem was overthrown and killed on November 1 . Secretary of State Rusk counseled a delay in meeting with the coup leadership , which had started calling itself the " Revolutionary Committee " , to avoid appearance of it being a U . S . coup . Apparently unknown to the U . S . , the plotters had negotiated , beforehand , with vice - president Nguyen Ngoc Tho , who , himself a Buddhist , had been the chief government negotiator in the Buddhist crisis . In the immediate followup of the coup , Diem ' s cabinet were told to resign , and there were no reprisals . Tho , however , was negotiating with the committee , especially the most powerful general , Duong Van Minh knowing that the military leaders wanted him in the new civilian government . Generals Tran Van Don , chief of staff , and Le Van Kim , his deputy , called at the US Embassy , Saigon on November 3 . Explaining that Minh was , as they spoke , with Tho , they said would be a two - tiered government structure with a military committee presided over by General Duong Van Minh overseeing a regular cabinet that would be mostly civilian with Tho as prime minister . On the 4th , Lodge and Conein met with Lodge , Generals Minh and Don . Afterwards , Lodge reported , " Minh seemed tired and somewhat frazzled ; obviously a good , well - intentioned man . Will he be strong enough to get on top of things ? " The new government was announced on the 6th : General Minh was Chairman , Don and Dinh were Deputy Chairmen , and nine other generals , including Kim , Khiem , " little " Minh , Chieu , and Thieu were members . General Nguyen Khanh , the commander of II Corps tactical zone in central Vietnam , was not in the government . After two assassinations . Kennedy and Diem both died in November 1963 . Lyndon Johnson became the new President of the United States . Johnson was far more focused on domestic politics than the international activist , Kennedy . Some of the Kennedy team left quickly , while others , sometimes surprisingly given extremely different personalities , stayed on ; the formal and logical Robert McNamara quickly bonded with the emotional and deal - making Johnson . McNamara was insistent that a rational enemy would not accept the massive casualties that indeed were inflicted on the Communists . The enemy , however , was willing to accept those casualties . McNamara was insistent that the enemy would comply with his concepts of cost - effectiveness , of which Ho and Giap were unaware . They were , however , quite familiar with attritional strategies . While they were not politically Maoist , they were also well versed in Mao ' s concepts of protracted war . Three things concerned the U . S . : Lack of US satisfaction with indigenous efforts led to " Americanization " of the war .