Sino - Indian War The Sino - Indian War ( ) , also known as the Sino - Indian Border Conflict ( ) , was a war between China and India that occurred in 1962 . A disputed Himalayan border was the main pretext for war , but other issues played a role . There had been a series of violent border incidents after the 1959 Tibetan uprising , when India had granted asylum to the Dalai Lama . India initiated a Forward Policy in which it placed outposts along the border , including several north of the McMahon Line , the eastern portion of a Line of Actual Control proclaimed by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1959 . Unable to reach political accommodation on disputed territory along the 3 , 225 - kilometer - long Himalayan border , the Chinese launched simultaneous offensives in Ladakh and across the McMahon Line on 20 October 1962 . Chinese troops advanced over Indian forces in both theatres , capturing Rezang la in Chushul in the western theatre , as well as Tawang in the eastern theatre . The war ended when the Chinese declared a ceasefire on 20 November 1962 , and simultaneously announced its withdrawal from the disputed area . The Sino - Indian War is notable for the harsh mountain conditions under which much of the fighting took place , entailling large - scale combat at altitudes of over 4 , 250 metres ( 14 , 000 feet ) . The Sino - Indian War was also noted for the non - deployment of the navy or air force by either the Chinese or Indian side . Location . China and India shared a long border , sectioned into three stretches by Nepal , Sikkim ( then an independent kingdom ) , and Bhutan , which follows the Himalayas between Burma and what was then West Pakistan . A number of disputed regions lie along this border . At its western end is the Aksai Chin region , an area the size of Switzerland , that sits between the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang and Tibet ( which China declared as an autonomous region in 1965 ) . The eastern border , between Burma and Bhutan , comprises the present Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh ( formerly the North East Frontier Agency ) . Both of these regions were overrun by China in the 1962 conflict . Most combat took place at high altitudes . The Aksai Chin region is a desert of salt flats around 5 , 000 metres above sea level , and Arunachal Pradesh is mountainous with a number of peaks exceeding 7000 metres . According to military doctrine , to be successful an attacker generally requires a 3 : 1 ratio of numerical superiority over the defender for foot soldiers ; in mountain warfare this ratio should be considerably higher as the terrain favours defence . The Chinese Army had possession of one of the highest ridges in the regions . The high altitude and freezing conditions also cause logistical and welfare difficulties ; in past similar conflicts ( such as the Italian Campaign of World War I ) more casualties have been caused by the harsh conditions than enemy action . The Sino - Indian War was no different , with many troops on both sides dying in the freezing cold . Background . The cause of the war was a dispute over the sovereignty of the widely separated Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh border regions . Aksai Chin , claimed by India to belong to Kashmir and by China to be part of Xinjiang , contains an important road link that connects the Chinese regions of Tibet and Xinjiang . China ' s construction of this road was one of the triggers of the conflict . The Johnson Line . The western portion of the Sino - Indian boundary originated in 1834 , with the Sikh Confederacy ' s conquest of Ladakh . In 1842 , the Sikh Confederacy , which at the time ruled over much of Northern India ( including the frontier regions of Jammu and Kashmir ) , signed a treaty which guaranteed the integrity of its existing borders with its neighbours . The British defeat of the Sikhs in 1846 resulted in transfer of sovereignty over Ladakh , part of the Jammu and Kashmir region , to the British , and British commissioners contacted Chinese officials to negotiate the border . The boundaries at its two extremities , Pangong Lake and Karakoram Pass , were well defined , but the Aksai Chin area in between lay undefined . W . H . Johnson , a civil servant with the Survey of India proposed the " Johnson Line " in 1865 , which put Aksai Chin in Kashmir . Johnson presented this line to the Maharaja of Kashmir , who then claimed the 18 , 000 square kilometres contained within . Johnson ' s work was severely criticized for gross inaccuracies , with description of his boundary as " patently absurd " who even extended his claim 80 miles further into China when India and China went into conflict over the border . Johnson was reprimanded by the British Government for crossing into Khotan without permission and resigned from the Survey . According to Francis Younghusband , who explored the region in the late 1880s , there was only an abandoned fort and not one inhabited house at Shahidulla when he was there - it was just a convenient staging post and a convenient headquarters for the nomadic Kirghiz . The abandoned fort had apparently been built a few years earlier by the Kashmiris . In 1878 the Chinese had reconquered Xinjiang , and by 1890 they already had Shahidulla before the issue was decided . By 1892 , China had erected boundary markers at Karakoram Pass . Throughout most of the 19th century the expanding British and Russian empires were jockeying for influence in Central Asia , and Britain decided to hand over Aksai Chin to the Chinese administration as a buffer against a Russian invasion . The newly created border was known as the MacCartney - MacDonald Line , and both British - controlled India and China now began to show Aksai Chin as Chinese . In 1911 the Xinhai Revolution resulted in power shifts in China , and by 1918 ( in the wake of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution ) the British no longer saw merit in China ' s continuing possession of the region . On British maps , the border was redrawn as the original Johnson Line , but despite this reversion , the new border was left unmanned and undemarcated . According to Neville Maxwell , the British had used as many as 11 different boundary lines in the region , as their claims shifted with the political situation . By the time of Indian independence in 1947 , the Johnson Line had become India ' s official western boundary . On 1 July 1954 , India ' s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru definitively stated the Indian position . claimed that Aksai Chin had been part of the Indian Ladakh region for centuries , and that the border ( as defined by the Johnson Line ) was non - negotiable . According to George N . Patterson , when the Indian government finally produced a report detailing the alleged proof of India ' s claims to the disputed area , " the quality of the Indian evidence was very poor , including some very dubious sources indeed " . In 1956 – 57 , China constructed a road through Aksai Chin , connecting Xinjiang and Tibet , which ran south of the Johnson Line in many places . Aksai Chin was easily accessible to the Chinese , but access from India , which meant negotiating the Karakoram mountains , was more problematic . The road came on Chinese maps published in 1958 . The McMahon Line . In 1826 , British India gained a common border with China after the British wrested control of Manipur and Assam from the Burmese , following the First Anglo - Burmese War of 1824 – 1826 . In 1847 , Major J . Jenkins , agent for the North East Frontier , reported that the Tawang was part of Tibet . In 1872 , four monastic officials from Tibet arrived in Tawang and supervised a boundary settlement with Major R . Graham , NEFA official , which included the Tawang Tract as part of Tibet . Thus , in the last half of the 19th century , it was clear that the British treated the Tawang Tract as part of Tibet . This boundary was confirmed in a 1 June 1912 note from the British General Staff in India , stating that the " present boundary ( demarcated ) is south of Tawang , running westwards along the foothills from near Ugalguri to the southern Bhutanese border . " A 1908 map of The Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam prepared for the Foreign Department of the Government of India , showed the international boundary from Bhutan continuing to the Baroi River , following the Himalayas foothill alignment . In 1913 , representatives of Great Britain , China and Tibet attended a conference in Simla regarding the borders between Tibet , China and British India . Whilst all three representatives initialed the agreement , Beijing later objected to the proposed boundary between the regions of Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet , and did not ratify it . The details of the Indo - Tibetan boundary was not revealed to China at the time . The foreign secretary of the British Indian government , Henry McMahon , who had drawn up the proposal , decided to bypass the Chinese ( although instructed not to by his superiors ) and settle the border bilaterally by negotiating directly with Tibet . According to later Indian claims , this border was intended to run through the highest ridges of the Himalayas , as the areas south of the Himalayas were traditionally Indian . However , the McMahon Line lay south of the boundary India claims . India ' s government held the view that the Himalayas were the ancient boundaries of the Indian subcontinent , and thus should be the modern boundaries of India , while it is the position of the Chinese government that the disputed area in the Himalayas have been geographically and culturally part of Tibet since ancient times . Months after the Simla agreement , China set up boundary markers south of the McMahon Line . T . O ' Callaghan , an official in the Eastern Sector of the North East Frontier , relocated all these markers to a location slightly south of the McMahon Line , and then visited Rima to confirm with Tibetan officials that there was no Chinese influence in the area . The British - run Government of India initially rejected the Simla Agreement as incompatible with the Anglo - Russian Convention of 1907 , which stipulated that neither party was to negotiate with Tibet " except through the intermediary of the Chinese government " . The British and Russians cancelled the 1907 agreement by joint consent in 1921 . It was not until the late 1930s that the British started to use the McMahon Line on official maps of the region . China took the position that the Tibetan government should not have been allowed to make a such a treaty , rejecting Tibet ' s claims of independent rule . For its part , Tibet did not object to any section of the McMahon Line excepting the demarcation of the trading town of Tawang , which the Line placed under British - Indian jurisdiction . However , up until World War II , Tibetan officials were allowed to administer Tawang with complete authority . Due to the increased threat of Japanese and Chinese expansion during this period , British Indian troops secured the town as part of the defence of India ' s eastern border . In the 1950s , India began actively patrolling the region . It found that , at multiple locations , the highest ridges actually fell north of the McMahon Line . Given India ' s historic position that the original intent of the line was to separate the two nations by the highest mountains in the world , in these locations India extended its forward posts northward to the ridges , regarding this move as compliant with the original border proposal , although the Simla Convention did not explicitly state this intention . Events leading up to war . Tibet and the border dispute . The 1940s saw huge change in South Asia with the Partition of India in 1947 ( resulting in the establishment of the two new states of India and Pakistan ) , and the establishment of the People ' s Republic of China ( PRC ) in 1949 . One of the most basic policies for the new Indian government was that of maintaining cordial relations with China , reviving its ancient friendly ties . India was among the first nations to grant diplomatic recognition to the newly created PRC . At the time , Chinese officials issued no condemnation of Nehru ' s claims or made any opposition to Nehru ' s open declarations of control over Aksai Chin . In 1956 , Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai stated that he had no claims over Indian controlled territory . He later argued that Aksai Chin was already under Chinese jurisdiction , implying that there was therefore no contradiction with his earlier statement , since China did not regard the region as " Indian controlled " , and that since the British hand - over until 1959 , China had regarded the McCartney MacDonald Line as the relevant border . Zhou later argued that as the boundary was undemarcated and had never been defined by treaty between any Chinese or Indian government , the Indian government could not unilaterally define Aksai Chin ' s borders . In 1950 , the Chinese People ' s Liberation Army annexed Tibet and later the Chinese extended their influence by building a road in 1956 – 67 and placing border posts in Aksai Chin . India found out after the road was completed , protested against these moves and decided to look for a diplomatic solution to ensure a stable Sino - Indian border . To resolve any doubts about the Indian position , Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru declared in parliament that India regarded the McMahon Line as its official border . The Chinese expressed no concern at this statement , and in 1951 and 1952 , the government of China asserted that there were no frontier issues to be taken up with India . In 1954 , Prime Minister Nehru wrote a memo calling for India ' s borders to be clearly defined and demarcated ; in line with previous Indian philosophy , Indian maps showed a border that , in some places , lay north of the McMahon Line . Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai , in November 1956 , again repeated Chinese assurances that the People ' s Republic had no claims on Indian territory , although official Chinese maps showed of territory claimed by India as Chinese . CIA documents created at the time revealed that Nehru had ignored Burmese premier Ba Swe when he warned Nehru to be cautious when dealing with Zhou . They also allege that Zhou purposefully told Nehru that there were no border issues with India . In 1954 , China and India negotiated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence , by which the two nations agreed to abide in settling their disputes . India presented a frontier map which was accepted by China , and the slogan " Hindi - Chini bhai - bhai " ( Indians and Chinese are brothers ) was popular then . However , Nehru in 1958 , had privately told G . Parthasarathi , the Indian envoy to China not to trust the Chinese at all and send all communications directly to him , bypassing the Defence Minister VK Krishna Menon since his communist background clouded his thinking about China . According to Georgia Tech political analyst , Nehru ' s policy on Tibet was to create a strong Sino - Indian partnership which would be catalysed through agreement and compromise on Tibet . Garver believes that Nehru ' s previous actions had given him confidence that China would be ready to form an " Asian Axis " with India . This apparent progress in relations suffered a major setback when , in 1959 , Nehru accommodated the Tibetan religious leader at the time , the 14th Dalai Lama , who fled Lhasa after a failed Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule . The Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party , Mao Zedong , was enraged and asked the Xinhua News Agency to produce reports on Indian expansionists operating in Tibet . Border incidents continued through this period . In August 1959 , the People ' s Liberation Army took an Indian prisoner at Longju , which had an ambiguous position in the McMahon Line , and two months later in Aksai Chin , a clash led to the death of nine Indian frontier policemen . On 2 October , Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev defended Nehru in a meeting with Mao . This action reinforced China ' s impression that the Soviet Union , the United States and India all had expansionist designs on China . The People ' s Liberation Army went so far as to prepare a self - defence counterattack plan . Negotiations were restarted between the nations , but no progress was made . As a consequence of their non - recognition of the McMahon Line , China ' s maps showed both the North East Frontier Area ( NEFA ) and Aksai Chin to be Chinese territory . In 1960 , Zhou Enlai unofficially suggested that India drop its claims to Aksai Chin in return for a Chinese withdrawal of claims over NEFA . Adhering to his stated position , Nehru believed that China did not have a legitimate claim over either of these territories , and thus was not ready to concede them . This adamant stance was perceived in China as Indian opposition to Chinese rule in Tibet . Nehru declined to conduct any negotiations on the boundary until Chinese troops withdrew from Aksai Chin , a position supported by the international community . India produced numerous reports on the negotiations , and translated Chinese reports into English to help inform the international debate . China believed that India was simply securing its claim lines in order to continue its " grand plans in Tibet " . India ' s stance that China withdraw from Aksai Chin caused continual deterioration of the diplomatic situation to the point that internal forces were pressuring Nehru to take a military stance against China . The Forward Policy . At the beginning of 1961 , Nehru appointed General as army Chief of General Staff , but he refused to increase military spending and prepare for a possible war . According to James Barnard Calvin of the U . S . Navy , in 1959 , India started sending Indian troops and border patrols into disputed areas . This program created both skirmishes and deteriorating relations between India and China . The aim of this policy was to create outposts behind advancing Chinese troops to interdict their supplies , forcing them north of the disputed line . There were eventually 60 such outposts , including 43 north of the McMahon Line , to which India claimed sovereignty . China viewed this as further confirmation of Indian expansionist plans directed towards Tibet . According to the Indian official history , implementation of the Forward Policy was intended to provide evidence of Indian occupation in the previously unoccupied region through which Chinese troops had been patrolling . Kaul was confident , through contact with Indian Intelligence and CIA information , that China would not react with force . Indeed , at first the PLA simply withdrew , but eventually Chinese forces began to counter - encircle the Indian positions which clearly encroached into the north of McMahon Line . This led to a tit - for - tat Indian reaction , with each force attempting to outmanoeuver the other . However , despite the escalating nature of the dispute , the two forces withheld from engaging each other directly . Chinese attention was diverted for a time by the military activity of the Nationalists on Taiwan , but on 23 June the U . S . assured China that a Nationalist invasion would not be permitted . China ' s heavy artillery facing Taiwan could then be moved to Tibet . It took China six to eight months to gather the resources needed for the war , according to Anil Athale , author of the official Indian history . The Chinese sent a large quantity of non - military supplies to Tibet through the Indian port of Calcutta . Early incidents . Various border conflicts and " military incidents " between India and China flared up throughout the summer and autumn of 1962 . In May , the Indian Air Force was told not to plan for close air support , although it was assessed as being a feasible way to counter the unfavourable ratio of Chinese to Indian troops . In June , a skirmish caused the deaths of dozens of Chinese troops . The Indian Intelligence Bureau received information about a Chinese buildup along the border which could be a precursor to war . During June – July 1962 , Indian military planners began advocating " probing actions " against the Chinese , and accordingly , moved mountain troops forward to cut off Chinese supply lines . According to Patterson , the Indian motives were threefold : On 10 July 1962 , 350 Chinese troops surrounded an Indian occupied post in Chushul ( north of the McMahon Line ) but withdrew after a heated argument via loudspeaker . On 22 July , the Forward Policy was extended to allow Indian troops to push back Chinese troops already established in disputed territory . Whereas Indian troops were previously ordered to fire only in self - defence , all post commanders were now given discretion to open fire upon Chinese forces if threatened . In August , the Chinese military improved its combat readiness along the McMahon Line and began stockpiling ammunition , weapons and gasoline . Given his foreknowledge of the coming Cuban Missile Crisis , Mao Zedong was able to persuade Nikita Khrushchev to reverse the Russian policy of backing India , at least temporarily . In mid - October , the Communist organ " Pravda " encouraged peace between India and China . When the Cuban Missile Crisis ended and Mao ' s rhetoric changed , however , Russia reversed course . Confrontation at Thag La . In June 1962 , Indian forces established an outpost at Dhola , on the southern slopes of the Thag La Ridge . Dhola lay north of the McMahon Line but south of the ridges along which India interpreted the McMahon Line to run . In August , China issued diplomatic protests and began occupying positions at the top of Thag La . On 8 September , a 60 - strong PLA unit descended to the south side of the ridge and occupied positions that dominated one of the Indian posts at Dhola . Fire was not exchanged , but Nehru said to the media that the Indian Army had instructions to " free our territory " and the troops had been given discretion to use force . On 11 September , it was decided that " all forward posts and patrols were given permission to fire on any armed Chinese who entered Indian territory " . However , the operation to occupy Thag La was flawed in that Nehru ' s directives were unclear and it got underway very slowly because of this . In addition to this , each man had to carry over the long trek and this severely slowed down the reaction . By the time the Indian battalion reached the point of conflict , Chinese units controlled both banks of the Namka Chu River . On 20 September , Chinese troops threw grenades at Indian troops and a firefight developed , triggering a long series of skirmishes for the rest of September . Some Indian troops , including Brigadier Dalvi who commanded the forces at Thag La , were also concerned that the territory they were fighting for was not strictly territory that " we should have been convinced was ours " . According to Neville Maxwell , even members of the Indian defence ministry were categorically concerned with the validity of the fighting in Thag La . On 3 October , a week before the start of the war , Zhou Enlai visited Nehru in New Delhi promising there would be no war . On 4 October , Kaul assigned some troops to secure regions south of the Thag La Ridge . Kaul decided to first secure Yumtso La , a strategically important position , before re - entering the lost Dhola post . Kaul had then realised that the attack would be desperate and the Indian government tried to stop an escalation into all - out war . Indian troops marching to Thag La had suffered in the previously unexperienced conditions ; two Gurkha soldiers died of pulmonary edema . On 10 October , an Indian Punjabi patrol of 50 troops to Yumtso La were met by an emplaced Chinese position of some 1 , 000 soldiers . Indian troops were in no position for battle , as Yumtso La was 16 , 000 feet ( 4 , 900 m ) above sea level and Kaul did not plan on having artillery support for the troops . The Chinese troops opened fire on the Indians under their belief that they were north of the McMahon Line . The Indians were surrounded by Chinese positions which used mortar fire . However , they managed to hold off the first Chinese assault , inflicting heavy casualties . At this point , the Indian troops were in a position to push the Chinese back with mortar and machine gun fire . However , Brigadier Dalvi opted not to fire , as it would mean decimating the Rajput who were still in the area of the Chinese regrouping . They helplessly watched the Chinese ready themselves for a second assault . In the second Chinese assault , the Indians began their retreat , realising the situation was hopeless . The Indian patrol suffered 25 casualties , and the Chinese 33 . The Chinese troops held their fire as the Indians retreated , and then buried the Indian dead with military honours , as witnessed by the retreating soldiers . This was the first occurrence of heavy fighting in the war . This attack had grave implications for India and Nehru tried to solve the issue , but by 18 October , it was clear that the Chinese were preparing for an attack on India , with massive troop buildups on the border . A long line of mules and porters had also been observed supporting the buildup and reinforcement of positions south of the Thag La Ridge . Chinese and Indian preparations . Motives . Two of the major factors leading up to China ' s eventual conflicts with Indian troops were India ' s stance on the disputed borders and perceived Indian subversion in Tibet . There was " a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian efforts to undermine Chinese control of Tibet , Indian efforts which were perceived as having the objective of restoring the pre - 1949 status quo ante of Tibet " . The other was " a perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian aggression against Chinese territory along the border " . John W . Garver argues that the first perception was incorrect based on the state of the Indian military and polity in the 1960s . It was , nevertheless a major reason for China ' s going to war . However , he argues the Chinese perception of Indian aggression to be " substantially accurate " . The CIA ' s recently declassified POLO documents reveal contemporary American analysis of Chinese motives during the war . According to this document , " Chinese apparently were motivated to attack by one primary consideration — their determination to retain the ground on which PLA forces stood in 1962 and to punish the Indians for trying to take that ground " . In general terms , they tried to show the Indians once and for all that China would not acquiesce in a military " reoccupation " policy . The secondary reasons for the attack , which had made it desirable but not necessary , included a desire : Another factor which might have affected China ' s decision for war with India was a perceived need to stop a Soviet - U . S . - India encirclement and isolation of China . India ' s relations with the Soviet Union and United States were both strong at this time , but the Soviets ( and Americans ) were preoccupied by the Cuban Missile Crisis and would not interfere with the Sino - Indian War . Regarding why China waited till October of the year to launch the attack , P . B . Sinha suggests that China timed the war exactly in parallel with American actions so as to avoid any chance of American or Soviet involvement . Although American buildup of forces around Cuba occurred on the same day as the first major clash at Dhola , and China ' s buildup between 10 and 20 October appeared to coincide exactly with the United States establishment of a blockade against Cuba which began 20 October , the Chinese probably prepared for this before they could anticipate what would happen in Cuba . Another explanation is that the confrontation in the Taiwan Strait had eased by then . Garver argues that the Chinese correctly assessed Indian border policies , particularly the Forward Policy , as attempts for incremental seizure of Chinese - controlled territory . On Tibet , Garver argues that one of the major factors leading to China ' s decision for war with India was a common tendency of humans " to attribute others behavior to interior motivations , while attributing their own behavior to situational factors " . Studies from China published in the 1990s confirmed that the root cause for China going to war with India was the perceived Indian aggression in Tibet , with the forward policy simply catalysing the Chinese reaction . Neville Maxwell and Allen Whiting argue that the Chinese leadership believed they were defending territory that was legitimately Chinese , and which was already under de facto Chinese occupation prior to Indian advances , and regarded the Forward Policy as an Indian attempt at creeping annexation . Mao Zedong himself compared the Forward Policy to a strategic advance in Chinese chess : India claims that the motive for the Forward Policy was to cut off the supply routes for Chinese troops posted in NEFA and Aksai Chin . According to the official Indian history , the forward policy was continued because of its initial success , as it claimed that Chinese troops withdrew when they encountered areas already occupied by Indian troops . It also claimed that the Forward Policy was having success in cutting out supply lines of Chinese troops who had advanced South of the McMahon Line , though there was no evidence of such advance before the 1962 war . However , the Forward Policy rested on the assumption that Chinese forces " were not likely to use force against any of our posts , even if they were in a position to do so " . No serious re - appraisal of this policy took place even when Chinese forces ceased withdrawing . Nehru ' s confidence was probably justified given the difficulty for China to supply the area over the high altitude terrain over 5000 km from the more populated areas of China . The Chinese leadership initially held a sympathetic view towards India as the latter had been ruled by British colonial masters for centuries . However , Nehru ' s forward policy convinced PRC leadership that the independent Indian leadership was a reincarnation of British imperialism . Mao Zedong stated : " Rather than being constantly accused of aggression , it ' s better to show the world what really happens when China indeed moves its muscles . " Chinese policy toward India , therefore , operated on two contradictory assumptions in the first half of 1961 . On the one hand , the Chinese leaders continued to entertain a hope , although a shrinking one , that some opening for talks . would appear . On , the other hand , they read Indian statements and actions as clear signs that Nehru wanted to talk only about a Chinese withdrawal . Regarding the hope , they were willing to negotiate and tried to prod Nebru into a similar attitude . Regarding Indian intentions , they began to act politically and to build a rationale based on the assumption that Nehru already had become a lackey of imperialism ; for this reason he opposed border talks . Krishna Menon is reported to have said that when he arrived in Geneva on 6 June 1961 for an international conference in Laos , Chinese officials in Chen Yi ' s delegation indicated that Chen might be interested in discussing the border dispute with him . At several private meetings with Menon , Chen avoided any discussion of the dispute and Menon surmised that the Chinese wanted him to broach the matter first . He did not , as he was under instructions from Nehru to avoid taking the initiative , leaving the Chinese with the impression that Nehru was unwilling to show any flexibility . In September , the Chinese took a step toward criticizing Nehru openly in their commentary . After citing Indonesian and Burmese press criticism of Nehru by name , the Chinese critiqued his moderate remarks on colonialism ( People ' s Daily Editorial , 9 September ) - Somebody at the Non - Aligned Nations Conference advanced the argument that the era of classical colonialism is gone and dead . . . contrary to facts . " This was a distortion of Nehru ' s remarks but appeared close enough to be credible . On the same day , Chen Yi referred to Nehru by implication at the Bulgarian embassy reception : ' Those who attempted to ' deny history , ignore reality , and distort the truth and who attempted to divert the Conference from its important object have failed to gain support and were isolated . " On 10 September , they dropped all circumlocutions and criticized him by name in a China Youth article and NCNA report — the first time in almost two years that they had commented extensively on the Prime Minister . By early 1962 , the Chinese leadership began to believe that India ' s intentions were to launch a massive attack against Chinese troops , and that the Indian leadership wanted a war . In 1961 , the Indian army had been sent into Goa , a small region without any other international borders apart from the Indian one , after Portugal refused to surrender the exclave colony to the Indian Union . Although this action met little to no international protest or opposition , China saw it as an example of India ' s expansionist nature , especially in light of heated rhetoric from Indian politicians . India ' s Home Minister declared , " If the Chinese will not vacate the areas occupied by it , India will have to repeat what it did in Goa . India will certainly drive out the Chinese forces " , while another member of the Indian Congress Party pronounced , " India will take steps to end [ Chinese ] aggression on Indian soil just as it ended Portuguese aggression in Goa " . By mid - 1962 , it was apparent to the Chinese leadership that negotiations had failed to make any progress , and the Forward Policy was increasingly perceived as a grave threat as Delhi increasingly sent probes deeper into border areas and cut off Chinese supply lines . Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi commented at one high - level meeting , " Nehru ' s forward policy is a knife . He wants to put it in our heart . We cannot close our eyes and await death . " The Chinese leadership believed that their restraint on the issue was being perceived by India as weakness , leading to continued provocations , and that a major counterblow was needed to stop perceived Indian aggression . Xu Yan , prominent Chinese military historian and professor at the PLA ' s National Defense University , gives an account of the Chinese leadership ' s decision to go to war . By late September 1962 , the Chinese leadership had begun to reconsider their policy of " armed coexistence " , which had failed to address their concerns with the forward policy and Tibet , and consider a large , decisive strike . On 22 September 1962 , the " People ' s Daily " published an article which claimed that " the Chinese people were burning with ' great indignation ' over the Indian actions on the border and that New Delhi could not ' now say that warning was not served in advance ' . " Military planning . The Indian side was confident war would not be triggered and made little preparations . India had only two divisions of troops in the region of the conflict . In August 1962 , Brigadier D . K . Palit claimed that a war with China in the near future could be ruled out . Even in September 1962 , when Indian troops were ordered to " expel the Chinese " from Thag La , Maj . General J . S . Dhillon expressed the opinion that " experience in Ladakh had shown that a few rounds fired at the Chinese would cause them to run away . " Because of this , the Indian army was completely unprepared when the attack at Yumtso La occurred . Recently declassified CIA documents which were compiled at the time reveal that India ' s estimates of Chinese capabilities made them neglect their military in favour of economic growth . It is claimed that if a more military - minded man had been in place instead of Nehru , India would have been more likely to have been ready for the threat of a counter - attack from China . On 6 October 1962 , the Chinese leadership convened . Lin Biao reported that PLA intelligence units had determined that Indian units might assault Chinese positions at Thag La on 10 October ( Operation Leghorn ) . The Chinese leadership and the Central Military Council decided upon war to launch a large - scale attack to punish perceived military aggression from India . In Beijing , a larger meeting of Chinese military was convened in order to plan for the coming conflict . Mao and the Chinese leadership issued a directive laying out the objectives for the war . A main assault would be launched in the eastern sector , which would be coordinated with a smaller assault in the western sector . All Indian troops within China ' s claimed territories in the eastern sector would be expelled , and the war would be ended with a unilateral Chinese ceasefire and withdrawal to prewar positions , followed by a return to the negotiating table . India led the Non - Aligned Movement , Nehru enjoyed international prestige , and China , with a larger military , would be portrayed as an aggressor . However , he said that a well - fought war " will guarantee at least thirty years of peace " with India , and determined the benefits to offset the costs . China also reportedly bought significant amount of Indian Rupee currency notes from Hong Kong , supposedly to distribute amongst its soldiers in preparation for the war . On 8 October , additional veteran and elite divisions were ordered to prepare to move into Tibet from the Chengdu and Lanzhou military regions . On 12 October , Nehru declared that he had ordered the Indian army to " clear Indian territory in the NEFA of Chinese invaders " and personally met with Kaul , issuing instructions to him . On 14 October , an editorial on " People ' s Daily " issued China ' s final warning to India : " So it seems that Mr . Nehru has made up his mind to attack the Chinese frontier guards on an even bigger scale . . . It is high time to shout to Mr . Nehru that the heroic Chinese troops , with the glorious tradition of resisting foreign aggression , can never be cleared by anyone from their own territory . . . If there are still some maniacs who are reckless enough to ignore our well - intentioned advice and insist on having another try , well , let them do so . History will pronounce its inexorable verdict . . . At this critical moment . . . we still want to appeal once more to Mr . Nehru : better rein in at the edge of the precipice and do not use the lives of Indian troops as stakes in your gamble . " Marshal Liu Bocheng headed a group to determine the strategy for the war . He concluded that the opposing Indian troops were among India ' s best , and to achieve victory would require deploying crack troops and relying on force concentration to achieve decisive victory . On 16 October , this war plan was approved , and on the 18th , the final approval was given by the Politburo for a " self - defensive counter - attack " , scheduled for 20 October . Chinese offensive . On 20 October 1962 , the Chinese People ' s Liberation Army launched two attacks , 1000 kilometres apart . In the western theatre , the PLA sought to expel Indian forces from the Chip Chap valley in Aksai Chin while in the eastern theatre , the PLA sought to capture both banks of the Namka Chu river . Some skirmishes also took place at the Nathula Pass , which is in the Indian state of Sikkim ( an Indian protectorate at that time ) . Gurkha rifles travelling north were targeted by Chinese artillery fire . After four days of fierce fighting , the three regiment s of Chinese troops succeeded in securing a substantial portion of the disputed territory . Eastern theatre . Chinese troops launched an attack on the southern banks of the Namka Chu River on 20 October . The Indian forces were undermanned , with only an understrength battalion to support them , while the Chinese troops had three regiments positioned on the north side of the river . The Indians expected Chinese forces to cross via one of five bridges over the river and defended those crossings . However , the PLA bypassed the defenders by crossing the shallow October river instead . They formed up into battalions on the Indian - held south side of the river under cover of darkness , with each battalion assigned against a separate group of Rajput s . At 5 : 14 am , Chinese mortar fire began attacking the Indian positions . Simultaneously , the Chinese cut the Indian telephone lines , preventing the defenders from making contact with their headquarters . At about 6 : 30 am , the Chinese infantry launched a surprise attack from the rear and forced the Indians to leave their trenches . The Chinese troops overwhelmed the Indians in a series of flanking manoeuvres south of the McMahon Line and prompted their withdrawal from Namka Chu . Fearful of continued losses , Indian troops escaped into Bhutan . Chinese forces respected the border and did not pursue . Chinese forces now held all of the territory that was under dispute at the time of the Thag La confrontation , but they continued to advance into the rest of NEFA . On 22 October , at 12 : 15 am , PLA mortars fired on Walong , on the McMahon line . Flares launched by Indian troops the next day revealed numerous Chinese milling around the valley . The Indians tried to use their mortars against the Chinese but the PLA responded by lighting a bushfire , causing confusion amongst the Indians . Some 400 Chinese troops attacked the Indian position . The initial Chinese assault was halted by accurate Indian mortar fire . The Chinese were then reinforced and launched a second assault . The Indians managed to hold them back for four hours , but the Chinese used sheer weight of numbers to break through . Most Indian forces to withdraw to established positions in Walong , while a company supported by mortars and medium machine guns remained to cover the retreat . On the morning 23 October , the Indians discovered a Chinese force gathered in a cramped pass and opened fire with mortars and machine guns , leading to heavy fighting . About 200 Chinese soldiers were killed and wounded in this action . Nine Indian soldiers were also killed . The fighting continued well into the afternoon , until the company was ordered to withdraw . Meanwhile , the 4th Sikhs made contact with the Chinese and subjected them to withering mortar and machine gun fire as the Chinese set off a brushfire and attempted to sneak forward . Sepoy Piara Singh tried to douse the fire while fighting the enemy , but died after he was wounded and refused to be evacuated . Elsewhere , Chinese troops were launched a three - pronged attack on Tawang , which the Indians evacuated without any resistance . Over the following days , there were clashes between Indian and Chinese patrols at Walong as the Chinese rushed in reinforcements . On 25 October , the Chinese made a probe , which was met with resistance from the 4th Sikhs . As some Chinese soldiers began to close in , Sepoy Kewal Singh charged them with his bayonet and killed a few of them in hand - to - hand combat , but he himself was killed . The following day , a patrol from the 4th Sikhs was encircled , and after being unable to break the encirclement , an Indian unit sneaked in and attacked the Chinese flank , allowing the Sikhs to break free . Western theatre . On the Aksai Chin front , China already controlled most of the disputed territory . Chinese forces quickly swept the region of any remaining Indian troops . Late on 19 October , Chinese troops launched a number of attacks throughout the western theatre . By 22 October , all posts north of Chushul had been cleared . On 20 October , the Chinese easily took the Chip Chap Valley , Galwan Valley , and Pangong Lake . Many outposts and garrisons along the Western front were unable to defend against the surrounding Chinese troops . Most Indian troops positioned in these posts offered resistance but were either killed or taken prisoner . Indian support for these outposts was not forthcoming , as evidenced by the Galwan post , which had been surrounded by enemy forces in August , but no attempt made to relieve the besieged garrison . Following the 20 October attack , nothing was heard from Galwan . On 24 October , Indian forces fought hard hold the Rezang La Ridge , in order to prevent a nearby airstrip from falling to the Chinese . After realising the magnitude of the attack , the Indian Western Command withdrew many of the isolated outposts to the south - east . Daulet Beg Oldi was also evacuated , but it was south of the Chinese claim line and was not approached by Chinese forces . Indian troops were withdrawn in order to consolidate and regroup in the event that China probed south of their claim line . Lull in the fighting . By 24 October , the PLA had entered territory previously administered by India to give the PRC a diplomatically strong position over India . The majority of Chinese forces had advanced sixteen kilometres south of the control line prior to the conflict . Four days of fighting were followed by a three - week lull . Zhou ordered the troops to stop advancing as he attempted to negotiate with Nehru . The Indian forces had retreated into more heavily fortified positions around Se La and Bombdi La which would be difficult to assault . Zhou sent Nehru a letter , proposing Nehru ' s 27 October reply expressed interest in the restoration of peace and friendly relations and suggested a return to the " boundary prior to 8 September 1962 " . He was categorically concerned about a mutual twenty kilometre withdrawal after " 40 or 60 kilometres of blatant military aggression " . He wanted the creation of a larger immediate buffer zone and thus resist the possibility of a repeat offensive . Zhou ' s 4 November reply repeated his 1959 offer to return to the McMahon Line in NEFA and the Chinese traditionally claimed MacDonald Line in Aksai Chin . Facing Chinese forces maintaining themselves on Indian soil and trying to avoid political pressure , the Indian parliament announced a national emergency and passed a resolution which stated their intent to " drive out the aggressors from the sacred soil of India " . The United States and the United Kingdom supported India ' s response . However , the Soviet Union was preoccupied with the Cuban Missile Crisis and did not offer the support it had provided in previous years . With the backing of other great power s , a 14 November letter by Nehru to Zhou once again rejected his proposal . Neither side declared war , used their air force , or fully broke off diplomatic relations ; however , the conflict is commonly referred to as a war . This war coincided with the Cuban Missile Crisis and was viewed by the western nations at the time as another act of aggression by the Communist bloc . According to Calvin , the Chinese side evidently wanted a diplomatic resolution and discontinuation of the conflict . Continuation of war . After Zhou received Nehru ' s letter ( rejecting Zhou ' s proposal ) , the fighting resumed on the eastern theatre on 14 November ( Nehru ' s birthday ) , with an Indian attack on Walong , claimed by China , launched from the defensive position of Se La and inflicting heavy casualties on the Chinese . The Chinese resumed military activity on Aksai Chin and NEFA hours after the Walong battle . Eastern theatre . On the eastern theatre , the PLA attacked Indian forces near Se La and Bomdi La on 17 November . These positions were defended by the Indian 4th Infantry Division . Instead of attacking by road as expected , PLA forces approached via a mountain trail , and their attack cut off a main road and isolated 10 , 000 Indian troops . Se La occupied high ground , and rather than assault this commanding position , the Chinese captured Thembang , which was a supply route to Se La . Western theatre . On the western theatre , PLA forces launched a heavy infantry attack on 18 November near Chushul . Their attack started at 4 : 35 am , despite a mist surrounding most of the areas in the region . At 5 : 45 the Chinese troops advanced to attack 2 platoon s of Indian troops at Gurung Hill . The Indians did not know what was happening , as communications were dead . As a patrol was sent , China attacked with greater numbers . Indian artillery could not hold off against superior Chinese forces . By 9 : 00 am , Chinese forces attacked Gurung Hill directly and Indian commanders withdrew from the area and also from the connecting Spangur Gap . The Chinese had been simultaneously attacking Rezang La which was held by 123 Indian troops . At 5 : 05 am , Chinese troops launched their attack audaciously . Chinese medium machine gun fire pierced through the Indian tactical defences . At 6 : 55 am the sun rose and the Chinese attack on the 8th platoon began in waves . Fighting continued for the next hour , until the Chinese signaled that they had destroyed the 7th platoon . Indians tried to use light machine guns on the medium machine guns from the Chinese but after 10 minutes the battle was over . Logistical inadequacy once again hurt the Indian troops . The Chinese gave the Indian troops a respectful military funeral . The battles also saw the death of Major Shaitan Singh of the Kumaon Regiment , who had been instrumental in the first battle of Rezang La . The Indian troops were forced to withdraw to high mountain positions . Indian sources believed that their troops were just coming to grips with the mountain combat and finally called for more troops . However , the Chinese declared a ceasefire , ending the bloodshed . Indians suffered heavy casualties , with dead Indian troops ' bodies being found in the ice , frozen with weapons in hand . Chinese forces also suffered heavy casualties , especially at Rezang La . This signalled the end of the war in Aksai Chin as China had reached their claim line – many Indian troops were ordered to withdraw from the area . China claimed that the Indian troops wanted to fight on until the bitter end . However , the war ended with their withdrawal , so as to limit the amount of casualties . The PLA penetrated close to the outskirts of Tezpur , Assam , a major frontier town nearly fifty kilometres from the Assam - North - East Frontier Agency border . The local government ordered the evacuation of the civilians in Tezpur to the south of the Brahmaputra River , all prisons were thrown open , and government officials who stayed behind destroyed Tezpur ' s currency reserves in anticipation of a Chinese advance . Ceasefire . China had reached its claim lines so the PLA did not advance farther , and on 19 November , it declared a unilateral cease - fire . Zhou Enlai declared a unilateral ceasefire to start on midnight , 21 November . Zhou ' s ceasefire declaration stated , Zhou had first given the ceasefire announcement to Indian chargé d ' affaires on 19 November ( before India ' s request for United States air support ) , but New Delhi did not receive it until 24 hours later . The aircraft carrier was ordered back after the ceasefire , and thus , American intervention on India ' s side in the war was avoided . Retreating Indian troops , who hadn ' t come into contact with anyone knowing of the ceasefire , and Chinese troops in NEFA and Aksai Chin , were involved in some minor battles , but for the most part , the ceasefire signalled an end to the fighting . The United States Air Force flew in supplies to India in November 1962 , but neither side wished to continue hostilities . Toward the end of the war India increased its support for Tibetan refugees and revolutionaries , some of them having settled in India , as they were fighting the same common enemy in the region . The Nehru administration ordered the raising of an elite Indian - trained " Tibetan Armed Force " composed of Tibetan refugees . The CIA had already begun operations in bringing about change in Tibet . World opinion . The Chinese military action has been viewed by the United States as part of the PRC ' s policy of making use of aggressive wars to settle its border disputes and to distract from its internal issues . According to James Calvin from the United States Marine Corps , western nations at the time viewed China as an aggressor during the China - India border war , and the war was part of a monolithic communist objective for a world dictatorship of the proletariat . This was further triggered by Mao Zedong ' s views that : " The way to world conquest lies through Havana , Accra , and Calcutta " . Calvin believes that Chinese actions show a " pattern of conservative aims and limited objectives , rather than expansionism " and blames this particular conflict on India ' s provocations towards China . However , Calvin also expresses that China , in the past , has been adamant to gain control over regions to which it has a " traditional claim " , which triggered the dispute over NEFA and Aksai Chin and indeed Tibet . Calvin ' s assumption , based on the history of the Cold War and the Domino Effect , assumed that China might ultimately try to regain control of everything that it considers as " traditionally Chinese " which in its view includes the entirety of South East Asia . The Kennedy administration was disturbed by what they considered " blatant Chinese communist aggression against India " . In a May 1963 National Security Council meeting , contingency planning on the part of the United States in the event of another Chinese attack on India was discussed . Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor advised the president to use nuclear weapons should the Americans intervene in such a situation . McNamara stated " Before any substantial commitment to defend India against China is given , we should recognize that in order to carry out that commitment against any substantial Chinese attack , we would have to use nuclear weapons . Any large Chinese Communist attack on any part of that area would require the use of nuclear weapons by the U . S . , and this is to be preferred over the introduction of large numbers of U . S . soldiers . " After hearing this and listening to two other advisers , Kennedy stated " We should defend India , and therefore we will defend India . " It remains unclear if his aides were trying to dissuade the President of considering any measure with regard to India by immediately raising the stakes to an unacceptable level , nor is it clear if Kennedy was thinking of conventional or nuclear means when he gave his reply . By 1964 China had developed its own nuclear weapon which would have likely caused any American nuclear policy in defense of India to be reviewed . The Johnson Administration considered and then rejected giving nuclear weapons technology to the Indians . The non - aligned nations remained mostly uninvolved , and only the United Arab Republic openly supported India . Of the non - aligned nations , six , Egypt , Burma , Cambodia , Sri Lanka , Ghana and Indonesia , met in Colombo on 10 December 1962 . The proposals stipulated a Chinese withdrawal of 20 km from the customary lines without any reciprocal withdrawal on India ' s behalf . The failure of these six nations to unequivocally condemn China deeply disappointed India . In 1972 , Chinese Premier Zhou explained the Chinese point of view to President Nixon of the US . As for the causes of the war , Zhou asserted that China did not try to expel Indian troops from south of the McMahon line and that three open warning telegrams were sent to Nehru before the war . However , Indian patrols south of the McMahon line were expelled and suffered casualties in the Chinese attack . Zhou also told Nixon that Chairman Mao ordered the troops to return to show good faith . The Indian government maintains that the Chinese military could not advance further south due to logistical problems and the cut - off of resource supplies . While Western nations did not view Chinese actions favourably because of fear of the Chinese and competitiveness , Pakistan , which had had a turbulent relationship with India ever since the Indian partition , improved its relations with China after the war . Prior to the war , Pakistan also shared a disputed boundary with China , and had proposed to India that the two countries adopt a common defence against " northern " enemies ( i . e . China ) , which was rejected by India . However , China and Pakistan took steps to peacefully negotiate their shared boundaries , beginning on 13 October 1962 , and concluding in December of that year . Pakistan also expressed fear that the huge amounts of western military aid directed to India would allow it to threaten Pakistan ' s security in future conflicts . Mohammed Ali , External Affairs Minister of Pakistan , declared that massive Western aid to India in the Sino - Indian dispute would be considered an unfriendly act towards Pakistan . As a result Pakistan made efforts to improve its relations with China . The following year , China and Pakistan peacefully settled disputes on their shared border , and negotiated the China - Pakistan Border Treaty in 1963 , as well as trade , commercial , and barter treaties . On 2 March 1963 , Pakistan conceded its northern claim line in Pakistani - controlled Kashmir to China in favor of a more southerly boundary along the Karakoram Range . The border treaty largely set the border along the MacCartney - Macdonald Line . India ' s military failure against China would embolden Pakistan to initiate the Second Kashmir War with India . However , it effectively ended in a stalemate as Calvin states that the Sino - Indian War had caused the previously passive government to take a stand on actively modernising India ' s military . China offered diplomatic support to Pakistan in this war but did not offer military support . In January 1966 , China condemned the Tashkent Agreement between India and Pakistan as a Soviet - US plot in the region . In the Indo - Pakistani War of 1971 , Pakistan expected China to provide military support , but it was left alone as India successfully helped the rebels in East Pakistan to found the new nation - state of Bangladesh . Involvement of other nations . During the conflict , Nehru wrote two desperate letters to U . S . President John F . Kennedy , requesting 12 squadrons of fighter jets and a modern radar system . These jets were seen as necessary to beef up Indian air strength so that air to air combat could be initiated safely from the Indian perspective ( bombing troops was seen as unwise for fear of Chinese retaliatory action ) . Nehru also asked that these aircraft be manned by American pilots until Indian airmen were trained to replace them . These requests were rejected by the Kennedy Administration ( which was involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis during most of the Sino - Indian War ) . According to former Indian diplomat G Parthasarathy , " only after we got nothing from the US did arms supplies from the Soviet Union to India commence . " In 1962 , President of Pakistan Ayub Khan made clear to India that Indian troops could safely be transferred from the Pakistan frontier to the Himalayas . Aftermath . China . According to the China ' s official military history , the war achieved China ' s policy objectives of securing borders in its western sector , as China retained de facto control of the Aksai Chin . After the war , India abandoned the Forward Policy , and the de facto borders stabilised along the Line of Actual Control . According to James Calvin of Marine Corps Command and Staff College , even though China won a military victory it lost in terms of its international image . China ' s first nuclear weapon test in October 1964 and it support of Pakistan in the 1965 India Pakistan War tended to confirm the American view of communist world objectives , including Chinese influence over Pakistan . Lora Saalman opined in a study of Chinese military publications , that while the war led to much blame , debates and ultimately acted as causation of military modernization of India but the war is now treated as basic reportage of facts with relatively diminished interest by Chinese analysts . India . The aftermath of the war saw sweeping changes in the Indian military to prepare it for similar conflicts in the future , and placed pressure on Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru , who was seen as responsible for failing to anticipate the Chinese attack on India . Indians reacted with a surge in patriotism and memorials were erected for many of the Indian troops who died in the war . Arguably , the main lesson India learned from the war was the need to strengthen its own defences and a shift from Nehru ' s foreign policy with China based on his stated concept of " brotherhood " . Because of India ' s inability to anticipate Chinese aggression , Prime Minister Nehru faced harsh criticism from government officials , for having promoted pacifist relations with China . Indian President Radhakrishnan said that Nehru ' s government was naive and negligent about preparations , and Nehru admitted his failings . According to Inder Malhotra , a former editor of " The Times of India " and a commentator for " The Indian Express " , Indian politicians invested more effort in removing Defence Minister Krishna Menon than in actually waging war . Krishna Menon ' s favoritism weakened the Indian Army , and national morale dimmed . The public saw the war as political and military debacle . Under American advice ( by American envoy John Kenneth Galbraith who made and ran American policy on the war as all other top policy makers in USA were absorbed in coincident Cuban Missile Crisis ) Indians refrained , not according to the best choices available , from using the Indian air force to beat back the Chinese advances . The CIA later revealed that at that time the Chinese had neither the fuel nor runways long enough for using their air force effectively in Tibet . Indians in general became highly sceptical of China and its military . Many Indians view the war as a betrayal of India ' s attempts at establishing a long - standing peace with China and started to question the once popular " Hindi - Chini bhai - bhai " ( meaning " Indians and Chinese are brothers " ) . The war also put an end to Nehru ' s earlier hopes that India and China would form a strong Asian Axis to counteract the increasing influence of the Cold War bloc superpowers . The unpreparedness of the army was blamed on Defence Minister Menon , who resigned his government post to allow for someone who might modernise India ' s military further . India ' s policy of weaponisation via indigenous sources and self - sufficiency was thus cemented . Sensing a weakened army , Pakistan , a close ally of China , began a policy of provocation against India by infiltrating Jammu and Kashmir and ultimately triggering the Second Kashmir War with India in 1965 and Indo - Pakistani war of 1971 . The Attack of 1965 was successfully stopped and ceasefire was negotiated under international pressure . In the Indo - Pakistani war of 1971 India won a clear victory , resulting in liberation of Bangladesh ( formerly East - Pakistan ) . In 1967 , there was a short border skirmish known as the Chola Incident between Chinese and Indian soldiers . In this conflict , China had to retreat from Sikkim . British journalist Neville Maxwell , who was known for his pessimistic views on India wrote that the " hopelessly ill - prepared Indian Army that provoked China on orders emanating from Delhi … paid the price for its misadventure in men , money and national humiliation " . As a result of the war , the Indian government commissioned an investigation , resulting in the classified Henderson - Brooks - Bhagat Report on the causes of the war and the reasons for failure . India ' s performance in high - altitude combat in 1962 led to an overhaul of the Indian Army in terms of doctrine , training , organisation and equipment . Maxwell also claimed that the Indian role in international affairs after the border war was also greatly reduced after the war and India ' s standing in the non - aligned movement suffered . According to James Calvin , an analyst from the U . S . Navy , India gained many benefits from the 1962 conflict . This war united the country as never before . India got 32 , 000 square miles ( 8 . 3 million hectares , 83 , 000 sq . km ) of disputed territory even if it felt that NEFA was hers all along . The new Indian republic had avoided international alignments ; by asking for help during the war , India demonstrated its willingness to accept military aid from several sectors . And , finally , India recognised the serious weaknesses in its army . It would more than double its military manpower in the next two years and it would work hard to resolve the military ' s training and logistic problems to later become the third - largest army in the world . India ' s efforts to improve its military posture significantly enhanced its army ' s capabilities and preparedness . This played a role in subsequent wars against Pakistan . Later skirmishes . India also reported a series of skirmishes after the 1962 war , which were never confirmed by China . One report provided by India shows that in late 1967 , there were two skirmishes between Indian and Chinese forces in Sikkim . The first one was dubbed the " Nathu La incident " , and the other the " Chola incident " . Prior to these incidents had been the Naxalbari uprising in India by the Communist Naxalites and Maoists . Diplomatic process . In 1993 and 1996 , the two sides signed the Sino - Indian Bilateral Peace and Tranquility Accords , agreements to maintain peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control ( LoAC ) . Ten meetings of a Sino - Indian Joint Working Group ( SIJWG ) and five of an expert group have taken place to determine where the LoAC lies , but little progress has occurred . On 20 November 2006 Indian politicians from Arunachal Pradesh expressed their concern over Chinese military modernization and appealed to parliament to take a harder stance on the PRC following a military buildup on the border similar to that in 1962 . Additionally , China ' s military aid to Pakistan as well is a matter of concern to the Indian public , as the two sides have engaged in various wars . On 6 July 2006 , the historic Silk Road passing through this territory via the Nathu La pass was reopened . Both sides have agreed to resolve the issues by peaceful means . In Oct 2011 , it was stated that India and China will formulate a border mechanism to handle different perceptions as to the LAC and resume the bilateral army exercises between Indian and Chinese army from early 2012 .