Arthur Schmidt ( soldier ) Arthur Schmidt ( 25 October 1895 – 5 November 1987 ) was an officer in the German military from 1914 to 1943 . He attained the rank of " Generalleutnant " during World War II , and is best known for his role as the Sixth Army ' s chief of staff in the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942 – 43 , during the final stages of which he became its de facto commander , playing a large role in executing Hitler ' s order that it stand firm despite being encircled by the Red Army . He was a prisoner of war in the Soviet Union for twelve years , and was released following West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer ' s visit to Moscow in 1955 . World War I . Schmidt joined the army as a one - year volunteer on 10 August 1914 , attaining the rank of " Leutnant " on 8 May 1915 . World War II . Schmidt held various positions in the " Heer " , including chief of operations in Fifth Army ( 25 . 08 . 39 – 12 . 10 . 39 ) and Eighteenth Army ( 05 . 11 . 39 – 01 . 10 . 40 ) . On 25 October 1940 he served as chief of staff in 5th Army Corps , a position he held until 25 March 1942 , when he moved to the Führerreserve at " Oberkommando des Heeres " ( OKH ) . On 26 January 1942 he was awarded the German Cross in Gold . Schmidt was appointed chief of staff to General Friedrich Paulus in Sixth Army on 15 May 1942 , replacing Colonel Ferdinand Heim after the counter - attack against Marshal Semyon Timoshenko at the Second Battle of Kharkov . The British historian and author Antony Beevor offers the following description of Schmidt : Battle of Stalingrad . Encirclement of Sixth Army . Despite Lieutenant - Colonel Niemeyer ' s frank and pessimistic area briefings , Schmidt severely underestimated the build - up and capabilities of Soviet forces at Stalingrad following the initial Axis successes , a failing that he – unlike Paulus – subsequently did not attempt to excuse . Ignoring Hitler ' s ' Führer instruction ' of 30 June 1942 that Axis formations should not liaise with their neighbours , Schmidt authorised an officer from Sixth Army , Lieutenant Gerhard Stöck , to be issued with a radio and join up with Romanian forces to the north - west of Stalingrad to help with intelligence gathering . Many false reports of the massing of Soviet forces were received from the Romanian sector , so when Stöck radioed at 5 a . m . on 19 November that an offensive ( marking the start of Operation " Uranus " , the Soviet encirclement of Axis forces ) was about to begin , Schmidt , who was furious when disturbed by false alarms , was not informed , although he was awoken twenty minutes later when it became clear that this was no false alarm . Paulus and Schmidt realised that Sixth Army was encircled on 21 November , and , evacuating their HQ at Golubinsky amidst a bonfire of burning files and stores , they flew to Nizhne - Chirskaya that same day , just missing Hitler ' s order that " Sixth Army stand firm in spite of danger of temporary encirclement . " At Nizhne - Chirskaya on 22 November , Schmidt told 8th Air Corps ' s commander , General Martin Fiebig , that Sixth Army needed to be resupplied by air , but was told that " The Luftwaffe doesn ' t have enough aircraft . " Later that day , Schmidt and Paulus held a conference attended by General Hermann Hoth and Major - General Pickert , during which Schmidt " did much of the talking " . He re - emphasised that before Sixth Army could break out to the south , " We must have fuel and ammunition delivered by the Luftwaffe . " When told that this was impossible , he replied that " more than 10 , 000 wounded and the bulk of the heavy weapons and vehicles would have to be left behind . That would be a Napoleonic ending . " Schmidt maintained that the army , which would adopt a " hedgehog " defence , " must " be resupplied , but that the situation was not yet so desperate as there were plenty of horses left that could serve as food . All the while , Paulus remained silent ; the only time he spoke during the conference " was to agree with his chief of staff " . On the afternoon of 22 November , Schmidt flew with Paulus to the new Sixth Army HQ at Gumrak , where that evening the Soviet encirclement of Axis forces was confirmed in a signal Paulus sent to Hitler . Schmidt contacted his corps commanders and they , in defiance of Hitler ' s order to stand firm , agreed with Schmidt that a breakout to the south was desirable . Paulus and Schmidt started planning for the breakout that evening , despite receiving another message from Hitler that they must stand firm and await relief . However , on 24 November Sixth Army received a further Führer order relayed from Army Group B , ordering them to stand firm . Schmidt commented : This decision to stand firm in a " hedgehog " defence sealed Sixth Army ' s fate . When presented with the commander of 51st Corps General Walther von Seydlitz - Kurzbach ' s 25 November memorandum to Paulus , detailing plans for a breakout , Schmidt said : On 19 December , Major Eismann was sent by Field Marshal Erich von Manstein to brief Paulus and Schmidt on Operation " Donnerschlag " , Army Group Don ' s plan , not sanctioned by Hitler , for the Sixth Army to break out and incorporate itself in Manstein ' s Army Group . Beevor states that it is unclear what happened at the meeting , except that Paulus , who still believed in the chain of command , refused to break out without a clear order to do so from a superior , something that the politically deft Manstein refused to give . In his memoirs , however , Manstein states that Schmidt was a " stronger personality " than Paulus , and that he imposed his belief that a breakout was not necessary – indeed that it would be a disaster – for his superior . " What ultimately decided the attitude of Sixth Army Headquarters [ towards Operation " Thunderclap " , the planned second phase of the breakout ] , was the opinion of the Chief - of - Staff " , wrote Manstein , and , given that this was opposition to a breakout and a belief that it was the duty of Supreme Command and Army Group B to keep Sixth Army supplied , " Paulus himself ended by pronouncing the impossibility of a break - out and pointing out that surrender at Stalingrad was forbidden ' by order of the Führer ' ! " Schmidt as commander in the " Kessel " . Interrogation of captured German officers led Soviet commanders to realise that , because of the toll of events on Paulus ' s nerves , Schmidt was the real commander of the defending forces . According to Beevor : Other historians , such as Mitcham , agree : The decision not to negotiate with the Soviet envoys who bore an ultimatum to Paulus on 8 and 9 January 1943 , was , for example , made by Schmidt , not Paulus , as Colonel Wilhelm Adam told one of the envoys , Captain Nikolay Dyatlenko , during his post - battle interrogation . The envoys were even fired on ; Paulus denied that he had ordered this , so it is possible that Schmidt might have issued the order . When General Hans - Valentin Hube flew into the " Kessel " [ the encircled pocket of Axis forces in Stalingrad ] on the morning of 9 January with Hitler ' s message to stand firm , " this strengthened General Schmidt ' s intransigent position at Sixth Army ' s headquarters . " It has been suggested that much of the reason for Schmidt ' s ascendancy over Paulus lay in the fact that , unlike Paulus , Schmidt was a committed Nazi , and Paulus , afraid of Hitler and conscious of his responsibility for Sixth Army ' s catastrophic position , saw Schmidt as a cipher for the Führer whom he could placate . According to Pois and Langer : Hitler awarded the Knight ' s Cross to Schmidt on 6 January 1943 – on the same day that Paulus signalled to General Kurt Zeitzler : " Army starving and frozen , have no ammunition and cannot move tanks any more " – and made him " Generalleutnant " on 17 January . On 19 January , Major Thiel was sent by VIII Air Corps to assess the runway at Gumrak and see whether further landings by Luftwaffe supply aircraft would be possible . After he concluded that they would not , telling both Schmidt and Paulus so , Paulus reprehended him for the original promise that air supply to Sixth Army would be possible , asking him : " Can you imagine that the soldiers fall upon a horse cadaver , split open its head , and devour the brain raw ? " Schmidt addressed Thiel in the same vein : Thyssen comments that both Paulus and Schmidt seemed to have forgotten Fiebig ' s statements on 21 and 22 November that the Luftwaffe would not be able to supply Sixth Army in the " Kessel " . Schmidt and Paulus set up their HQ in the " Kessel " underneath the Univermag department store on the city ' s Red Square . The signal sent from Sixth Army HQ on the evening of 30 January , that stated that soldiers were " listening to the national anthem for the last time with arms raised in the German salute " , was , according to Beevor , much more likely to have been written by Schmidt than by Paulus . When the forces defending Sixth Army HQ surrendered on the morning of 31 January , Schmidt discussed surrender terms with officers from General Shumilov ' s HQ , while Paulus waited in a room next door . Beevor comments , " Whether this was a ploy to allow Paulus to distance himself from the surrender , or a further example of Schmidt handling events because Paulus was in state of nervous collapse , is not clear . " Schmidt , together with Paulus and Colonel Adam , were taken to Don Front HQ at Zavarykino , where they were interrogated . When their baggage was searched for sharp metal objects , Schmidt , referring to Paulus , snapped at the Soviet officers : Prior to Paulus ' s interrogation , Paulus asked Schmidt how he should respond , to which Schmidt replied , " Remember you are a Field Marshal of the German Army , " apparently ( according to the Soviet interrogator ) using the intimate " " du " " form of address , although Captain Winrich Behr , who was familiar with the relations between the two men , considered this unlikely . Prisoner of war . Of all the senior German officers held at Zavarykino , Schmidt was the most disliked by the Soviets ; on one occasion he apparently reduced a mess waitress to tears during lunch , for which a Soviet officer , Lieutenant Bogomolov , made him apologise . Unlike many German prisoners of war , such as Paulus himself and von Seydlitz - Kurzbach , Schmidt refused to co - operate with the Soviets , despite the NKVD ' s attempt to ingratiate themselves by serving him caviar and champagne in a luxury railway coach . Together with most German officers , Schmidt was moved to Camp 48 at Voikovo , although he was kept away from Paulus by the NKVD , apparently because he was considered to be a bad influence on him . Manstein comments that , disastrous as Schmidt ' s obstinacy was at Stalingrad : After Voikovo , Schmidt was held in the Lubyanka prison . He remained there until 1955 , when a visit to Moscow by West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer led to his release , together with the remaining high - ranking German prisoners . Later life . Following his release , Schmidt remained bitterly hostile to those German officers who had co - operated with the Soviets in the National Committee for a Free Germany . He died in Karlsruhe on 5 November 1987 .