Albert Coady Wedemeyer General Albert Coady Wedemeyer ( July 9 , 1897 – December 17 , 1989 ) was a United States Army commander who served primarily in Asia during World War II . His most notable command was the China theater in the South - East Asia Theater . During the Cold War , Wedemeyer was a chief supporter of the Berlin Airlift . Early life and military career . Albert C . Wedemeyer was born on July 9 , 1897 , in Omaha , Nebraska and was a graduate of Creighton Prep High School . In 1919 , he graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point . As a U . S . officer , he was appointed to the German war college Kriegsakademie in Berlin , 1936 - 38 . Wedemeyer was included in 1938 German maneuvers , which gave him unique insight into German tactical operations . When he returned to Washington , in 1938 , Wedemeyer analyzed Germany ' s grand strategy and dissected German thinking . Wedemeyer thus became the U . S . military ' s foremost authority on German tactical operations , whose " most ardent student " was George C . Marshall . Wedemeyer was greatly influenced , and his career aided , by his father - in - law , Lieutenant General Stanley Dunbar Embick , who was at that time Deputy Chief of Staff and Director of the War Plans Division . At the outbreak of World War II , Wedemeyer ranked as lieutenant colonel and was assigned as a Staff Officer to the war - plans division of the United States War Department . Notably , in 1941 he was the chief author of the Victory Program , which advocated the defeat of Germany ' s armies in Europe as the prime war objective for the U . S . This plan was adopted and expanded as the war progressed . Additionally , Wedemeyer helped to plan the Normandy Invasion . China - Burma - India Command . In 1943 , Wedemeyer was reassigned to the South - East Asia Theatre to be Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander of the South East Asia Command ( SEAC ) , Lord Louis Mountbatten . On October 27 , 1944 , General Wedemeyer received a telegram from General George C . Marshall directing him to proceed to China to assume command of U . S . forces in China , replacing General Joseph Stilwell . In his new command , Wedemeyer was also named Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo Chiang Kai - shek . The telegram contained a host of special instructions and limitations on Wedemeyer ' s command when dealing with the government of Nationalist China . Wedemeyer later recalled his initial dread over the assignment , as service in the China theater was considered a graveyard for American officials , both military and diplomatic . When Wedemeyer actually arrived at Stilwell ’ s headquarters after Stilwell ’ s dismissal , he was dismayed to discover that Stilwell had intentionally departed without seeing him , and did not leave a single briefing paper for his guidance , though departing U . S . military commanders habitually greeted their replacement in order to thoroughly brief them on the strengths and weaknesses of headquarters staff , the issues confronting the command , and planned operations . Searching the offices , Wedemeyer could find no documentary record of Stilwell ' s plans or records of his former or future operations . General Wedemeyer then spoke with Stilwell ’ s staff officers but learned little from them because Stilwell , according to the staff , kept everything in his “ hip pocket ” . During his time in the CBI , Wedemeyer attempted to motivate the Nationalist Chinese government to take a more aggressive role against the Japanese in the war . He was instrumental in expanding the Hump airlift operation with additional , more capable transport aircraft , and continued Stilwell ' s programs to train , equip , and modernize the Nationalist Chinese Army . His efforts were not wholly successful , in part because of the ill will engendered by his predecessor , as well as continuing friction over the role of Communist Chinese forces . Wedemeyer also supervised logistical support for American air forces in China . These forces included the United States Twentieth Air Force partaking in Operation Matterhorn and the Fourteenth Air Force operated by General Claire Chennault . " There is a nice story about Wedemeyer . A British general took great exception to Wedemeyer ' s pronunciation of the word ' schedule ' , which as all Americans do , he pronounced ' skedule ' . ' Where did you learn to speak like that ? ' he asked . Wedemeyer replied : ' I must have learned it at " school " ! ' " On December 7 , 1945 , Wedemeyer with General Douglas MacArthur , and Navy Admiral Raymond A . Spruance , the three top military officers in the Far East , recommended to the Pentagon transporting six more Chinese Nationalist armies into North China and Manchuria . However they also suggested that " the U . S . assistance to China , as outlined above , be made available as basis for negotiation by the American Ambassador to bring together and effect a compromise between the major opposing groups in order to promote a united and democratic China . " The issue of forcing the Nationalists into a coalition government with the Communists would later become a central issue in the fierce " Who lost China " political debates in the United States during 1949 - 51 . On July 10 , 1945 , Wedemeyer had informed General Marshall : If Uncle Sugar , Russia , and Britain united strongly in their endeavor to bring about a coalition of these two political parties [ the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party ] in China by coercing both sides to make realistic concessions , serious post - war disturbance may be averted and timely effective military employment of all Chinese may be obtained against the Japanese . I use the term coercion advisedly because it is my conviction that continued appeals to both sides couched in polite diplomatic terms will not accomplish unification . There must be teeth in Big Three Post - World War II military service . After returning from China , Wedemeyer was promoted to Army Chief of Plans and Operations . In July 1947 , President Harry S . Truman sent Lieutenant - General Wedemeyer to China and Korea to examine the " political , economic , psychological and military situations . " The result was the " " Wedemeyer Report " , " in which Wedemeyer stressed the need for intensive U . S . training of and assistance to the Nationalist armies . Fearful the Nationalists may rise to challenge US hegemony in the Far East , President Truman not only rejected the recommendations in the report , but imposed an arms embargo against the Nationalist government , thereby intensifying the bitter political debate over the role of the United States in the Chinese civil war . While Secretary of State George C . Marshall had hoped that Wedemeyer could convince Chiang Kai - shek to institute those military , economic , and political reforms necessary to defeat the Communists , he accepted Truman ' s views , and suppressed publication of Wedemeyer ' s report , further provoking resentment by pro - Nationalist and / or anti - communist advocates both inside and outside the U . S . government and the armed forces . After the fall of China to Communist forces , General Wedemeyer would testify before Congress that while the loss of morale was indeed a cause of the defeat of the Nationalist Chinese forces , the Truman administration ' s 1947 decision to discontinue further training and modernizing of Nationalist forces , the U . S . - imposed arms embargo , and constant anti - Nationalist sentiment expressed by Western journalists and policymakers were primary causes of that loss of morale . In particular , Wedemeyer stressed that if the U . S . had insisted on experienced American military advisers attached at the lower battalion and regimental levels of Nationalist armies ( as it had done with Greek army forces during the Greek Civil War ) , that aid could have more efficiently been utilized , and that the immediate tactical assistance would have resulted in Nationalist armies performing far better in combat against the Communist Chinese . Vice - Admiral Oscar C . Badger , General Claire Chennault , and Brigadier General Francis Brink also testified that the arms embargo was a significant factor in the loss of China . In 1948 , Wedemeyer supported General Lucius D . Clay ' s plan to create an airbridge during the Berlin Crisis . After the Communist victory in 1949 , Wedemeyer became intimately associated with the China Lobby and openly voiced his criticism of those responsible for the " loss of China . " In 1951 , Wedemeyer retired , but was promoted to General ( 4 - stars ) on July 19 , 1954 . In 1951 , after the outbreak of the Korean War , Senator Joseph R . McCarthy said that Wedemeyer had prepared a wise plan that would keep China a valued ally , but that it had been sabotaged ; " only in treason can we find why evil genius thwarted and frustrated it . " The evil geniuses , McCarthy said , included General George Marshall . Wedemeyer became a hero to the anti - Communist movement in the United States , giving many lectures around the country . In 1957 he was affiliated with the National Investigations Committee On Aerial Phenomena . On May 23 , 1985 , Wedemeyer was presented with the Presidential Medal of Freedom by President Ronald Reagan . Friends Advice , in Boyds , Maryland , was his permanent home throughout his military career and after his retirement in 1951 , until his death in 1989 . It was listed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1992 . On December 17 , 1989 , Wedemeyer died at Fort Belvoir , Virginia .