Battle of Smolensk ( 1943 ) The second Battle of Smolensk ( 7 August – 2 October 1943 ) was a Soviet strategic offensive operation conducted by the Red Army as part of the Summer - Autumn Campaign of 1943 . Staged almost simultaneously with the Lower Dnieper Offensive ( 13 August – 22 September ) , the offensive lasted two months and was led by Generals Andrei Yeremenko commanding the Kalinin Front and Vasily Sokolovsky commanding the Western Front . Its goal was to clear the German presence from the Smolensk and Bryansk regions . Smolensk had been under German occupation since the first Battle of Smolensk in 1941 . Despite an impressive German defense , the Red Army was able to stage several breakthroughs , liberating several major cities including Smolensk and Roslavl . As a result of this operation the Red Army was able to start planning for the liberation of Belarus . However , the overall advance was quite modest and slow in the face of heavy German resistance , and the operation was therefore accomplished in three stages : 7 – 20 August , 21 August – 6 September , and 7 September – 2 October . Although playing a major military role in its own right , the Smolensk Operation was also important for its effect on the Battle of the Dnieper . It has been estimated that as many as 55 German divisions were committed to counter the Smolensk Operation — divisions which would have been critical to prevent Soviet troops from crossing the Dnieper in the south . In the course of the operation the Red Army also definitively drove back German forces from the Smolensk land bridge , historically the most important approach for a western attack on Moscow . The Strategic Operations included smaller operations that were Strategic context . By the end of the Battle of Kursk in July 1943 , Germany had lost all hope of regaining the initiative on the Eastern Front . Losses were considerable and the whole army was less effective than before , as many of its experienced soldiers had fallen during the previous two years of fighting . This left the German army capable of only reacting to Soviet moves . On the Soviet side , Stalin was determined to pursue the liberation of occupied territories from German control , a course of action that had its first major success at the end of 1942 with Operation Uranus , which led to the liberation of Stalingrad . The Battle of the Dnieper was to achieve the liberation of Ukraine and push the southern part of the front towards the west . In order to weaken the German defenses even further , however , the Smolensk operation was staged simultaneously , in a move that would also draw German reserves north , thereby weakening the German defense on the southern part of the front . Both operations were a part of the same strategic offensive plan , aiming to recover as much Soviet territory from German control as possible . Thirty years later , Marshal Vasilevsky ( Chief of the General Staff in 1943 ) wrote in his memoirs : This plan , enormous both in regard of its daring and of forces committed to it , was executed through several operations : the Smolensk operation , . . . the Donbass [ Operation ] , the left - bank Ukraine operation . . . Geography . The territory on which the offensive was to be staged was a slightly hilly plain covered with ravines and possessing significant areas of swamps and forests that restricted military movement . Its most important hills reached heights over , allowing for improved artillery defense . In 1943 , the area was for the most part covered with pine and mixed forests and thick bushes . Numerous rivers also passed through the area , the most important of them being the Donets Basin , Western Dvina , Dnieper , Desna , Volost ' and Ugra rivers . None of these rivers were especially wide at respectively , nor deep at respectively ; but the surrounding wide , swamp - like areas proved difficult to cross , especially for mechanized troops . Moreover , like many south - flowing rivers in Europe , the Dnieper ' s western bank , which was held by German troops , was higher and steeper than the eastern . There were very few available bridges or ferries . Transport infrastructure . For the Soviet troops , the offensive was further complicated by a lack of transport in the area in which the offensive was to be staged . The road network was not well developed and paved roads were rare . After rainfall , which was quite common during the Russian summer , most of them were turned into mud ( a phenomenon known as rasputitsa ) , greatly slowing down any advance of mechanized troops , and raising logistical issues as well . The only major railroad axis available for Soviet troops was the Rzhev - Vyazma - Kirov line . The " Wehrmacht " controlled a much wider network of roads and railroads , centered on Smolensk and Roslavl . These two cities were important logistical centers , allowing quick supply and reinforcements for German troops . By far the most important railroads for German troops were the Smolensk - Bryansk axis and the Nevel - Orsha - Mogilev axis , linking German western troops with troops concentrated around Oryol . As part of the Soviet planning the German railroad communication s were attacked by the partisans during the conduct of Operation Concert , one of the largest railroad sabotage operations of World War II . Opposing forces . Soviet offensive sector . As of July 1943 , the shape of the Soviet front line on this part of the Eastern Front was described by a concave with a re - entrant centered around Oryol , offering them the opportunity to attack Wehrmacht defensive lines which became exposed to flank attacks from the north . Therefore , the offensive promised to be quite difficult for Soviet troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts who were predominantly tasked with the operation . The Kalinin Front had assigned for the operation the 10th Guards Аrmy , 5th Army , 10th Army , 21st Army , 33rd Army , 49th Army , 68th Аrmy , 1st Air Army , 2nd Guards Tank Corps , 5th Mechanised Corps , 6th Guards Cavalry Corps . The Western Front would have for the operation the 4th Shock Army , 39th Army , 43rd Army , 3rd Air Army , 31st Army . German defenses . As a result of the shape of the front , a significant number of divisions of Army Group Center were kept on this part of the front because of a ( quite legitimate ) fear of a major offensive in this sector . For instance , at the end of July 1943 , a German staff briefing stated : On the front . . . held by the Army Group Center many signs show a continuous preparation to a yet limited offensive ( Roslavl , Smolensk , Vitebsk ) and of a maneuver of immobilization of the Army Group Center . . . The front had been more or less stable for four to five months ( and up to 18 months in several places ) before the battle , and possessed geographical features favorable for a strong defensive setup . Thus , German forces had time to build extensive defensive positions , numbering as much as five or six defensive lines in some places , for a total depth extending from . The first ( tactical or outer ) defensive zone included the first ( main ) and the second defense lines , for a total depth of , and located , whenever possible , on elevated ground . The main defense line , deep , possessed three sets of trenches and firing points , linked by an extensive communication network . The density of firing points reached six or seven per kilometer ( 0 . 6 mi ) of front line . In some places , where heavy tank attacks were feared , the third set of trenches was in fact a solid antitank moat with a steep western side integrating artillery and machine gun s emplacements . The forward edge of the battle area was protected by three lines of barbed wire and a solid wall of minefield s . The second defense zone , located about behind the outer defense zone and covering the most important directions , was composed of a set of firing points connected with trenches . It was protected with barbed wire , and also with minefields in some places where heavy tank offensives were anticipated . Between the outer and the second defense zones , a set of small firing points and garrison s was also created in order to slow down a Soviet advance should the Red Army break through the outer defense zone . Behind the second zone , heavy guns were positioned . Finally , deep behind the front line , three or four more defense lines were located , whenever possible , on the western shore of a river . For instance , important defense lines were set up on the western side of the Dnieper and Desna . Additionally , the main urban centers located on the defense line ( such as Yelnya , Dukhovshchina and Spas - Demensk ) , were reinforced and fortified , preparing them for a potentially long fight . Roads were mined and covered with antitank devices and firing points were installed in the most important and tallest buildings . First stage ( 7 August – 20 August ) . Main breakthrough . After a day of probing , the goal of which was to determine whether German troops would choose to withdraw or not from the first set of trenches , the offensive started on 7 August 1943 at 06 : 30 ( with a preliminary bombardment starting at 04 : 40 am ) with a breakthrough towards Roslavl . Three armies ( apparently under the control of Soviet Western Front ) were committed to this offensive : the 5th Army ( Soviet Union ) , the 10th Guards Army , and the 33rd Army . The attack quickly encountered heavy opposition and stalled . German troops attempted numerous counterattacks from their well - prepared defense positions , supported by tanks , assault guns , and the fire of heavy guns and mortars . As Konstantin Rokossovsky recalls , " we literally had to tear ourselves through German lines , one by one " . On the first day , the Soviet troops advanced only , with all available troops ( including artillery , communications men , and engineers ) committed to battle . Despite violent Soviet attacks , it quickly became obvious that the three armies would not be able to get through the German lines . Soviet commanders decided therefore to commit the 68th Army , kept in reserve , to battle . On the German side , three additional divisions ( 2nd Panzer Division , 36th Infantry Division , and 56th Infantry Division ) were sent to the front from the Oryol sector to try to stop the Soviet advance . The attack resumed the following day with another attempt at a simultaneous breakthrough taking place further north , towards Yartzevo . Both attacks were stopped in their tracks by heavy German resistance . In the following five days , Soviet troops slowly made their way through German defenses , repelling heavy counterattack s and sustaining heavy losses . By feeding reserve troops to battle , the Red Army managed to advance to a depth varying from by 11 August . Subsequent attacks by the armored and cavalry forces of the 6th Guards Cavalry Corps had no further effect and resulted in heavy casualties because of strong German defenses , leading to a stalemate . Spas - Demensk offensive . During the Spas - Demensk offensive operation ( Спас - Деменская наступательная операция ) in the region of Spas - Demensk , things went better for the 10th Army . The " Wehrmacht " had fewer troops and only limited reserves in this area , enabling the 10th Army to break through German lines and advance in two days . The 5th Mechanized Corps , relocated from Kirov and committed to battle in order to exploit the breakthrough , failed in its mission , mainly because a poorly organized anti - aircraft defense enabled Luftwaffe dive bomber s to attack its light Valentine tank s with some impunity . The corps sustained heavy losses and had to pull away from combat . Soviet troops eventually advanced a further as of 13 August , liberating Spas - Demensk . Dukhovshchina offensive . As ordered by the Stavka ( the Soviet Armed Forces Command ) , the Dukhovshchina - Demidov offensive operation ( Духовщинско - Демидовская наступательная операция ) near Dukhovshchina started almost a week later , on 13 August . As on other parts of the front , the 39th Army and the 43rd Army encountered serious opposition . During the first day alone , " Wehrmacht " troops attempted 24 regiment al - sized counterattack s , supported by tanks , assault guns , and aviation . Soviet troops managed to advance only over the next five days and , although they inflicted heavy casualties on " Wehrmacht " troops , their own losses were also heavy . Causes of the stalemate . By mid - August , Soviet operations all along the Smolensk front stabilized . The resulting stalemate , while not a defeat " per se " , was stinging for Soviet commanders , who provided several explanations for their failure to press forward . Deputy Chief of General Staff General A . I . Antonov reported " We have to deal both with forests and swamps and with increasing resistance of enemy troops reinforced by divisions arriving from Bryansk region " while Marshal Nikolai Voronov , formerly a Stavka member , analysed the stalemate in his memoirs , publishing what he saw as the eight primary causes : With all these factors considered , Voronov demanded that the 4th Tank Army and the 8th Artillery Corps be transferred from the Bryansk Front and instead committed to support the attack near Smolensk . The stalemate was far from what had been desired by the Stavka , but it had at least one merit : it tied down as much as 40 % of all " Wehrmacht " divisions on the Eastern Front near Smolensk , making the task for troops fighting in the south and near Kursk much easier . The Stavka planned to resume the offensive on 21 August , but decided to postpone it slightly to give Soviet units time to resupply and reinforce . Second stage ( 21 August – 6 September ) . By mid - August , the situation on the Eastern Front had changed as the Red Army started a general offensive , beginning with the Belgorod - Khar ' kov Offensive Operation ( Белгородско - Харьковская наступательная операция ) ( Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev ) ( операция " Румянцев " - 03 - 23 . 08 ) and the Orlov offensive operation ( Орловская наступательная операция ) ( Operation Polkovodets Kutuzov ) ( операция " Кутузов " - 12 . 07 - 18 . 08 ) known in German history as the Kursk , and continuing with the Wehrmacht ' s defensive Battle of the Dnieper line in the North Ukraine . Nevertheless , the Wehrmacht command was still reinforcing its troops around Smolensk and Roslavl , withdrawing several divisions from the Oryol region . As a result , the two Soviet counteroffensives that followed the Kursk defensive operation ( Курская оборонительная операция 05 - 23 . 07 ) proceeded relatively easily for the Red Army around Oryol , creating a large salient south of Smolensk and Bryansk . In this situation , the former attack axis , directed southwest towards Roslavl and Bryansk , became useless . The Stavka decided instead to shift the attack axis west to Yelnya and Smolensk . Yelnya offensive . The Yelnya - Dorogobuzh offensive operation ( Ельнинско - Дорогобужская наступательная операция ) was considered the " key " to Smolensk and Wehrmacht troops created a massive fortified defense position around the city . Swampy areas on the Desna and Ugra rivers were mined and heavy gun s set up on hills overlooking the city . The Soviet armies , aware of the Wehrmacht preparations , were reinforced with tanks and artillery during the week from 20 – 27 August . The offensive finally commenced on 28 August by the 10th Guards Army , 21st Army and the 33rd Army ) , supported by three Tank , a Mechanized corps and the 1st Air Army . These four armies were covering a front of only , creating a very high concentration of troops . The troops , however , had fuel and supplies for two weeks at most . Soviet troops moved forward after an intense 90 - minute shelling . The artillery bombardment as well as ground attack aircraft significantly damaged the " Wehrmacht " lines , allowing the Red Army to execute a breakthrough on a sector front and advance by the end of the day . The following day , 29 August , Red Army rifle divisions advanced further , creating a salient wide and deep . In order to exploit the breakthrough , the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was thrown into the battle . In one day , its troops advanced and reached the outskirts of Yelnya . Leaving " Wehrmacht " troops no time to regroup their forces , Red Army troops attacked the city and started to form an encirclement . On 30 August , " Wehrmacht " forces were forced to abandon Yelnya , sustaining heavy casualties . This commenced a full - scale retreat by " Wehrmacht " troops from the area . By 3 September , Soviet forces reached the eastern shore of the Dniepr . Bryansk maneuver . Near Bryansk , things went equally well for the Soviet armies , despite heavy German resistance . However , an identified weakness changed all the previous plans . A surprisingly easy capture of several hills commanding the Dubrovka region north of Bryansk , with numerous German soldiers captured in total absence of battle readiness , came to the attention of General Markian Popov , commander of the Bryansk Front from June to October 1943 . This meant that the Soviet offensive was probably not expected along that particular axis . Therefore , the boundary between the First Belorussian Front and the Western Front was shifted south , and two " new " armies executed a single - pincer movement to Dubrovka and around Bryansk , forcing German forces to withdraw . By 6 September , the offensive slowed down almost to a halt on the entire front , with Soviet troops advancing only each day . On the right flank , heavy fighting broke out in the woods near Yartzevo . On the center , advancing Soviet troops hit the Dnieper defense line . On the left flank , Soviet rifle divisions were slowed as they entered forests southwest of Yelnya . Moreover , Soviet divisions were tired and depleted , at less than 60 % nominal strength . On 7 September , the offensive was stopped , and the second stage of the Smolensk operation was over . Third stage ( 7 September – 2 October ) . In the week from 7 – 14 September , Soviet troops were once again reinforced and were preparing for another offensive . The next objectives set by the Stavka were the major cities of Smolensk , Vitebsk and Orsha . The operation resumed on 14 September with the Smolensk - Roslavl offensive operation ( Смоленско - Рославльская наступательная операция ) , involving the left flank of the Kalinin Front and the Western Front . After a preliminary artillery bombardment , Soviet troops attempted to break through the Wehrmacht lines . On the Kalinin Front ’ s attack sector , the Red Army created a salient wide and deep by the end of the day . After four days of battle , Soviet rifle divisions captured Dukhovshchina , another " key " to Smolensk . On the Western Front ' s attack sector , where the offensive started one day later , the breakthrough was also promising , with a developing salient large and deep . The same day , Yartzevo , an important railroad hub near Smolensk , was liberated by Soviet troops . On the Western Front ' s left flank , Soviet rifle divisions reached the Desna and conducted an assault river crossing , creating several bridgehead s on its western shore . As the result , the " Wehrmacht " defense line protecting Smolensk was overrun , exposing the troops defending the city to envelopment . General Kurt von Tippelskirch , Chief of Staff of the German 4th Army during the Smolensk operation and later commander of the 4th Army , wrote that : " The forces of the Soviet Western Front struck the left wing of Army Group Center from the Dorogobuzh - Yelnya line with the aim of achieving a breakthrough in the direction of Smolensk . It became clear that the salient — projecting far to the east — in which the 9th Army was positioned could no longer be held . " By 19 September , Soviet troops had created a 250 kilometers ( 150 mi ) long and 40 kilometers ( 25 mi ) wide gap in Wehrmacht lines . The following day , Stavka ordered the Western Front troops to reach Smolensk before 27 September , then to proceed towards Orsha and Mogilev . The Kalinin Front was ordered to capture Vitebsk before 10 October . On 25 September , after an assault - crossing of the northern Dnieper and street fighting that lasted all night , Soviet troops completed the liberation of Smolensk . The same day another important city Roslavl was recaptured . By 30 September , the Soviet offensive force were tired and depleted , and became bogged down outside Vitebsk , Orsha , and Mogilev , which were still held by " Wehrmacht " troops , and on the 2 October the Smolensk operation was concluded . A limited follow - on was made to successfully capture Nevel after two days of street fighting . Overall , Soviet troops advanced during almost 20 days of this third part of the offensive . The Battle of Lenino ( in the Byelorussian SSR ) occurred in the same general area on 12 – 13 October 1943 . Aftermath . The Smolensk operation was a decisive Soviet victory and a stinging defeat for the " Wehrmacht " . Although quite modest compared to later offensive operations ( not more than were gained in depth ) , the Soviet advance during this operation was important from several points of view . First , German troops were definitively driven back from the Moscow approaches . This strategic threat , which had been the Stavka ' s biggest source of worry since 1941 , was finally removed . Second , German defense rings , on which German troops planned to rely , were almost completely overrun . Quite a few remained , but it was obvious that they would not last . An essay written after the war by several Wehrmacht officers stated that : Although the vigorous actions of their command and troops allowed the Germans to create a continuous front , there was no doubt that the poor condition of the troops , the complete lack of reserves , and the unavoidable lengthening of individual units ' lines concealed the danger that the next major Soviet attack would cause this patchwork front — constructed with such difficulty — to collapse . Third , as outlined above , the Smolensk Operation was an important " helper " for the Lower Dnieper Offensive , locking between 40 and 55 divisions near Smolensk and preventing their relocation to the southern front . Finally , a once - united German front was now separated by the huge and impassable Pripet marshes , cutting Army Group South off from its northern counterparts , thus greatly reducing the Wehrmacht ' s abilities to shift troops and supplies from one sector of the front to the other . For the first time , Soviet troops entered territories which had been occupied for a long time by German soldiers , and discovered war crime s committed by the SS , " Einsatzgruppen " . In the areas liberated during the Smolensk operation ( occupied for almost two years ) , almost all industry and agriculture was gone . In Smolensk oblast itself , almost 80 % of urban and 50 % of rural living space had been destroyed , along with numerous factories and plants . After the Smolensk offensive , the central part of the Soviet - German front stabilized again for many months until late June 1944 , while the major fighting shifted to the south for the Dnieper line and the territory of Ukraine . Only during January 1944 would the front move again in the north , when German forces were driven back from Leningrad , completely lifting the siege which had lasted for 900 days . Finally , Operation Bagration in summer 1944 allowed the Red Army to clear almost all the remaining territory of the USSR of " Wehrmacht " troops , ending German occupation and shifting the war into Poland and Germany .