1st Battalion 24th Marines 1st Battalion , 24th Marines ( 1 / 24 ) is a reserve infantry battalion in the United States Marine Corps located throughout Michigan , Ohio , and Indiana consisting of approximately 1 , 000 Marines and Sailors . Nicknamed " Terror from the North " , they fall under the command of the 24th Marine Regiment and the 4th Marine Division . Mission . Provide trained combat and combat support personnel and units to augment and reinforce the active component in time of war , national emergency , and at other times as national security requires ; and have the capability to reconstitute the Division , if required . History . On July 5 , 1922 the Marines first came to Detroit when a volunteer Marine Corps Reserve company was activated with a strength of 70 men . In 1926 the company designated as the 306th Company of the Fleet Marine Force ( FMF ) Reserve before being redesignated in 1929 as Company " B " of the 8th Reserve Battalion , headquartered in Toledo , Ohio . In October 1938 , Detroit became the home of a second company of Marines , Company " D " of the 8th Reserve Battalion . Shortly thereafter , in November 1940 , the 8th Reserve Battalion was mobilized as an individual active duty battalion before being integrated into the First Marine Brigade in January 1941 . As part of the First Marine Brigade , the battalion fought valiantly in World War II in the South Pacific . In August 1946 , the battalion was formed into the 17th Infantry Battalion . Four years later , the reservists of the 1st Battalion were mobilized and reported to Camp Pendleton , California , where many joined the units of the 1st Marine Division in Korea in the fall and winter of 1950 . In July 1962 , the Marines became Headquarters & Service Company of the 1st Battalion , 24th Marine Regiment when the 4th Marine Division was reactivated . 1 / 24 was mobilized in support of Operation Desert Shield in December 1990 . The unit was sent to Okinawa and the Philippines where they assisted in rescue operations associated with the eruption of Mount Pinatubo . In support of Operation Enduring Freedom during 2003 , 1 / 24 saw the mobilization of companies A , B , and C reinforced with platoons from Weapons company and small elements of H & S company . Company A along with Heavy Machinegun Platoon went to Camp Lemonnier , Djibouti , Horn of Africa . Company B , reinforced by 81mm Mortar Platoon went to support security operations in Kuwait . Company C and the Battalion ' s Javelin Platoon supported security operations in Southern Iraq . Until 2005 , the battalion was based at Brodhead Armory which is an historic building that has served in various capacities over the years . It has served as a submarine base for the United States Navy , a union hall for the Teamsters in the Jimmy Hoffa era , and a professional boxing arena for Joe Louis and other famous boxers . The battalion headquarters and its subordinate Headquarters and Service Company relocated to Selfridge Air National Guard ( SANGB ) Base in 2005 . SANGB is a joint base which accommodates all branches of the armed forces and is located roughly north of Detroit . Global War on Terror . In April 2006 , the battalion began training in Michigan and Camp Pendleton , California to prepare for deployment to the Al Anbar Province of Iraq . The battalion arrived in downtown Fallujah in late September 2006 to serve for seven months with Regimental Combat Team 5 and Regimental Combat Team 6 . They replaced 1 / 25 ' s Area of Operations . During this deployment 1 / 24 participated in Combat Operations in Fallujah , suffering 22 Marines killed in action with another 331 wounded , including 41 amputees . Synopsis of 2006 – 2007 Tour in Fallujah , Iraq . 1st Battalion , 25th Marines turned over its positions in and around Fallujah to another Reserve battalion , 1st Battalion , 24th Marines . Building on the improvements that 1 / 25 had made to Fallujah ’ s infrastructure and community relations after Operation al Fajr , 1 / 24 also borrowed the concept of “ community policing ” from the successful Iraq tour that its sister battalion , 2 / 24 , had employed in the Triangle of Death years earlier . Using aggressive patrolling and intelligence operations that transformed information regarding tribal activities and relationships into “ actionable intelligence , ” 1 / 24 made major contributions to what has become known as the “ Sunni Awakening , ” or the 180 - degree transition of many Sunni tribes in the Anbar Province from supporting the insurgents to supporting the American - led effort in Iraq . Lt . Col . Harold R . “ Odie ” Van Opdorp , 2 / 24 ’ s battalion commander , credited much of the battalion ’ s success to its S - 2 section , and how it had closely integrated intelligence on improvised explosive device s and other enemy activities with current operations . For 1 / 24 ’ s deployment to Fallujah , it recruited two key intelligence officers from 2 / 24 . Capitalizing on their experience and the systems that they had developed in the Babil Province , 1 / 24 was able to capture and understanding of its area of operations that allowed the Marines to operate in a coordinated and intelligence - driven fashion . While the Iraqi insurgency might have many parts , for the most part it was made up of rational and intelligent people . Expressing a level of respect for the shrewdness that insurgents brought to the battle , an understanding by Marines that individual insurgents were rational made the insurgents activities more predictable . This led to the opportunity for 1 / 24 to target specific activities . With more than 1 , 000 Marine intelligence collectors maneuvering constantly throughout the AO , the Intelligence Section ’ s responsibility became collecting the information and plotting the data so that the Intelligence Section could “ connect the dots , ” and push that information out to the using units . Repeated analysis of the patterns of IEDs led the battalion to innovative ways to avoid them and also prevent them from being employed . The battalion identified the following as its main threats , in order of importance : Improvised explosive devices ( IEDs ) , direct fire ( particularly from snipers ) , indirect fire ( typically mortars ) , vehicle borne IEDs , a medium - sized attack ( such as two dozen insurgents attacking a fixed position ) , a large - sized counterattack ( such as a hundred insurgents joining an attack on a patrol ) , and a complex attack that might involve several of the previously - described methods . Simplifying the types of threats to a manageable number , then forcing each Marine to “ war game ” his response to each threat situation , was tremendously valuable because it allowed Marines to respond instinctively . At this point in the Iraq War , the central and provincial governments were providing enough police and soldiers to provide a significant boost to American efforts . A key decision within 1 / 24 was to let the Iraqi Police take a leading role in most operations . By asking the Iraqis to take charge of daytime operations and assigning Marines to work under the cover of darkness , 1 / 24 employed its Marines in a more protected environment while pushing credit for success in Fallujah to local Iraqis . 1 / 24 ' s concept of victory in Iraq involved building the local police and military forces to the extent that they would be able to counter the insurgency . 1 / 24 created opportunities for “ local heroes , ” or people within the communities who were willing to stand up to the insurgents and complain about the damage that the insurgents were causing to the community . One of these , he said , was a new Fallujah police chief who was willing to lead the community away from insurgents . Marines said the police chief was just what the city needed . The Marines also said that during 1 / 24 ’ s tour , a group of tribal leaders , or sheiks , were willing to assist the U . S . - Iraqi effort because they had grown weary of the heavy - handed tactics of the insurgents . The willingness of these tribal leaders to provide major assistance in the fight against al Qaeda marked a significant turning point in the war , when Iraqi nationalists were willing to play an important role , in combating al Qaeda , at a significant risk to their lives and status . While violence continued in and around Fallujah , Iraqi Security Forces increasingly handled the violence . 1 / 24 was in what Van Opdorp described as an “ overwatch ” position on the outskirts of Fallujah , providing assistance when needed . An important breakthrough took place , he said , when Col . Faisal ( Iraq Army ) asked the Marines to provide a permanent Quick Response Force ( QRF ) that would be dedicated to supporting Iraqi Police operations . Recognizing the risks , Van Opdorp said that he also recognized that this presented a tremendous opportunity to let the Iraqi Police flex their muscles , so he tasked Bravo Company with providing this force . Maj . Jeffrey M . O ’ Neill said that the QRF was something like a portable fire station , able to respond immediately if the Iraqi Police got into something that was too large for them to handle . This combination was effective , he said , because the Iraqis knew how to get the information and act quickly on tips , while the Americans had the backup firepower to embolden the Iraqi Police to take measured risks . With Marines providing a cordon and Iraqi Police serving as the assault team , the Iraqis detained 82 suspects in two months . This was a total turnaround , he said , as 1 / 24 Marines went from being very suspicious of Iraqi Police to working side - by - side with them . The emergence of Iraqi Security Forces throughout Fallujah allowed the Marines to consider a Civil Affairs “ hearts and minds ” program that many thought Marines would be doing when they first returned to Iraq in 2004 . In this operation , Marines conducted a two - day operation in Sheik Khamis ’ area that included Civil Affairs Officers , Legal Officers , physicians and veterinarians . Van Opdorp said the physicians and veterinarians treated hundreds of Iraqis and herds of sheep and cattle . The Legal Officers , he said , made payments for various small claims that Iraqis in that area had against the American forces . The operation was a tremendous success . “ When you do something like that . . . they come to realize more and more that these guys aren ’ t occupiers , they are just trying to continue to help us so we can help ourselves . ” Van Opdorp said , “ I think that the transition of Fallujah to the 2nd Brigade [ of the Iraqi Army ] and to the Iraqi Police was a tremendous accomplishment that 1 / 24 will look at . ” He credited the 60 % reduction in violent acts during his battalion ’ s tenure in Fallujah to the work his Marines did in creating conditions to return responsibility for certain functions to Iraqi control . Van Opdorp said that the Reserves lived up to their reputations . “ I am not sure that an active duty battalion can enjoy the success that we had , because you ’ re not going to have a twenty - eight - year Chicago Police officer dealing with anti - gangs , or a New York city firefighter who has the amazing charisma to go out and conduct the type of things that he did with his CAG detachment , or a former [ counter - intelligence ] Marine as a company commander who sets up one of the most phenomenal intelligence databases and situational awareness for his AO . These Marines are some of the best that America has to offer , and they just did a phenomenal job . ”