Arrest and assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem The arrest and assassination of Ngô Đình Diệm , the president of South Vietnam , marked the culmination of a successful CIA - backed " coup d ' état " led by General Dương Văn Minh in November 1963 . On 2 November 1963 , Diệm and his adviser , his younger brother Ngô Đình Nhu , were arrested after the Army of the Republic of Vietnam ( ARVN ) had been successful in a bloody overnight siege on Gia Long Palace in Saigon . The coup was the culmination of nine years of autocratic and nepotistic family rule in South Vietnam . Discontent with the Diệm regime had been simmering below the surface , and exploded with mass Buddhist protests against long - standing religious discrimination after the government shooting of protesters who defied a ban on the flying of the Buddhist flag . When rebel forces entered the palace , the Ngô brothers were not present , having escaped before to a loyalist shelter in Cholon . The brothers had kept in communication with the rebels through a direct link from the shelter to the palace , and misled them into believing that they were still in the palace . The Ngô brothers soon agreed to surrender and were promised safe exile ; after being arrested , they were instead executed in the back of an armoured personnel carrier by ARVN officers on the journey back to military headquarters at Tân Sơn Nhứt Air Base . While no formal inquiry was conducted , the responsibility for the deaths of the Ngô brothers is commonly placed on Minh ' s bodyguard , Captain Nguyễn Văn Nhung , and on Major Dương Hiếu Nghĩa , both of whom guarded the brothers during the trip . Minh ' s army colleagues and US officials in Saigon agreed that Minh ordered the executions . They postulated various motives , including that the brothers had embarrassed Minh by fleeing the Gia Long Palace , and that the brothers were killed to prevent a later political comeback . The generals initially attempted to cover up the execution by suggesting that the brothers had committed suicide , but this was contradicted when photos of the Ngôs ' corpses surfaced in the media . Background . Diem ' s road to political power began in childhood . His political power began in July 1954 , when he was appointed the Prime Minister of the State of Vietnam by former Emperor Bảo Ðại , who was Head of State . At the time , Vietnam had been partitioned at the Geneva Conference after the defeat of the French Union forces at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu , with the State of Vietnam ruling the country south of the 17th parallel . The partition was intended to be temporary , with national elections scheduled for 1956 to create a government of a reunified nation . In the meantime , Diệm and Bảo Ðại were locked in a power struggle . Bảo Ðại disliked Diệm but selected him in the hope that he would attract American aid . The issue was brought to a head when Diệm scheduled a referendum for October 1955 on whether South Vietnam should become a republic . Diệm won the referendum , which was rigged by his younger brother Nhu , and proclaimed himself the President of the newly created Republic of Vietnam . Diệm refused to hold the reunification elections , on the basis that the State of Vietnam was not a signatory to the Geneva Accords . He then proceeded to strengthen his autocratic and nepotistic rule over the country . A constitution was written by a rubber stamp legislature which gave Diệm the power to create laws by decree and arbitrarily give himself emergency powers . Dissidents , both communist and nationalist , were jailed and executed in the thousands , and elections were routinely rigged . Opposition candidates were threatened with being charged for conspiring with the Vietcong , which carried the death penalty , and in many areas , large numbers of ARVN troops were sent to stuff ballot boxes . Diệm kept the control of the nation firmly within the hands of his brothers and their in - laws , and promotions in the ARVN were given on the basis of religion and loyalty rather than merit . Two unsuccessful attempts had been made to depose Diệm ; in 1960 , a paratroop revolt was quashed after Diệm stalled negotiations to buy time for loyalists to put down the coup attempt , while a 1962 palace bombing by two air force pilots failed to kill him . South Vietnam ' s Buddhist majority had long been discontented with Diệm ' s strong favoritism towards Catholics . Public servants and army officers had long been promoted on the basis of religious preference , and government contracts , U . S . economic assistance , business favors and tax concessions were preferentially given to Catholics . The Roman Catholic Church was the largest landowner in the country , and its holdings were exempt from land reform . In the countryside , Catholics were " de facto " exempt from performing corvee labour and in some rural areas , Catholic priests led private armies against Buddhist villages . Discontent with Diệm and Nhu exploded into mass protest during the summer of 1963 when nine Buddhists died at the hand of Diệm ' s army and police on Vesak , the birthday of Gautama Buddha . In May 1963 , a law against the flying of religious flags was selectively invoked ; the Buddhist flag was banned from display on Vesak while the Vatican flag was displayed to celebrate the anniversary of the consecration of Archbishop Pierre Martin Ngô Đình Thục , Diệm ' s elder brother . The Buddhists defied the ban and a protest was ended when government forces opened fire . With Diệm remaining intransigent in the face of escalating Buddhist demands for religious equality , sections of society began calling for his removal from power . The key turning point came shortly after midnight on 21 August , when Nhu ' s Special Forces raided and vandalised Buddhist pagodas across the country , arresting thousands of monks and causing a death toll estimated to be in the hundreds . Numerous coup plans had been explored by the army before , but the plotters intensified their activities with increased confidence after the of U . S . President John F . Kennedy authorised the U . S . embassy to explore the possibility of a leadership change . Surrender and debate . At 13 : 30 on 1 November , Generals Dương Văn Minh and Trần Văn Đôn , respectively the Presidential Military Adviser and Army Chief of Staff , led a coup against President Ngô Đình Diệm , assisted by mutinous ARVN officers . The rebels had carefully devised plans to neutralise loyalist officers to prevent them from saving Diệm . Unknown to Diệm , General Đính , the supposed loyalist who commanded the ARVN III Corps that surrounded the Saigon area , had allied himself with the plotters of the coup . The second of Diệm ' s most trusted loyalist generals was Huỳnh Văn Cao , who commanded the IV Corps in the Mekong Delta . Diệm and Nhu were aware of the coup plan , and Nhu responded by planning a counter - coup , which he called Operation Bravo . This plan involved Đính and Colonel Tung , the loyalist commander of the Special Forces , staging a phony rebellion before their forces crushed the " uprising " to reaffirm the power of the Ngô family . Unaware that Đính was plotting against him , Nhu allowed Đính to organise troops as he saw fit , and Đính transferred the command of the Seventh Division from Cao ' s IV Corps to his own III Corps . This allowed Colonel Nguyễn Hữu Có , Đính ' s deputy , to take command of the 7th Division based at Mỹ Tho . The transfer allowed the rebels to completely encircle the capital and denied Cao the opportunity of storming Saigon and protecting Diệm , as he had done during the previous coup attempt in 1960 . Minh and Đôn had invited senior Saigon based officers to a meeting at Tân Sơn Nhứt Air Base , headquarters of the Joint General Staff ( JGS ) , on the pretext of routine business . Instead , they announced that a coup was underway , with only a few , including Tung , refusing to join . Tung was later forced at gunpoint to order his loyalist Special Forces to surrender . The coup went smoothly as the rebels quickly captured all key installations in Saigon and sealed incoming roads to prevent loyalist forces from entering . This left only the Presidential Guard to defend Gia Long Palace . The rebels attacked government and loyalist army buildings but delayed the attack on the palace , hoping that Diệm would resign and accept the offer of safe passage and exile . Diệm refused , vowing to reassert his control . After sunset , the 7th Division of Colonel Nguyễn Văn Thiệu , who later became the nation ' s president , led an assault on Gia Long Palace and it fell by daybreak . In the early morning of 2 November , Diệm agreed to surrender . The ARVN officers had intended to exile Diệm and Nhu , having promised the Ngô brothers safe passage out of the country . At 06 : 00 , just before dawn , the officers held a meeting at JGS headquarters to discuss the fate of the Ngô brothers . According to Lucien Conein , the US Army officer and CIA operative who was the American liaison with the coup , most of the officers , including Minh , wanted Diệm to have an " honorable retirement " from office , followed by exile . Not all of the senior officers attended the meeting , with having already left to make arrangements for the arrival of Diệm and Nhu at JGS headquarters . General Lê , a former police chief under Diệm in the mid - 1950s , strongly lobbied for Diệm ' s execution . There was no formal vote taken at the meeting , and Lê attracted only minority support . One general was reported to have said " To kill weeds , you must pull them up at the roots " . Conein reported that the generals had never indicated that assassination was in their minds , since an orderly transition of power was a high priority in achieving their ultimate aim of gaining international recognition . Minh and Đôn asked Conein to secure an American aircraft to take the brothers out of the country . Two days earlier , U . S . Ambassador to Vietnam , Henry Cabot Lodge , Jr . , had alerted Washington that such a request was likely and recommended Saigon as the departure point . This request put the Kennedy administration in a difficult position , as the provision of an airplane would publicly tie it to the coup . When Conein telephoned David Smith , the acting chief of the Saigon CIA station , there was a ten - minute delay . The U . S . government would not allow the aircraft to land in any country , unless that state was willing to grant asylum to Diệm . The United States did not want Diệm and Nhu to form a government in exile and wanted them far away from Vietnam . Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman had written in August that " under no circumstances should the Nhus be permitted to remain in Southeast Asia in close proximity to Vietnam because of the plots they will mount to try to regain power . If the generals decide to exile Diệm , he should also be sent outside Southeast Asia . " He further went on to anticipate what he termed a " Götterdämmerung in the palace " . After surrendering , Diệm called Lodge by telephone for the last time . Lodge did not report the conversation to Washington , so it was widely assumed that the pair last spoke on the previous afternoon when the coup was just starting . However , after Lodge died in 1985 , his aide , Colonel Mike Dunn said that Lodge and Diệm spoke for the last time around 19 : 00 on 2 November moments after Diệm surrendered . When Diệm called , Lodge " put [ him ] on hold " and then walked away . Upon his return , the ambassador offered Diệm and Nhu asylum , but would not arrange for transportation to the Philippines until the next day . This contradicted his earlier offer of asylum the previous day when he implored Diệm to not resist the coup . Dunn offered to personally go to the brothers ' hideout to escort him so that the generals could not kill him , but Lodge refused , saying , " We just can ' t get that involved . " Dunn said , " I was really astonished that we didn ' t do more for them . " Having refused to help the brothers to leave the country safely , Lodge later said after they had been shot , " What would we have done with them if they had lived ? Every Colonel Blimp in the world would have made use of them . " Dunn also claimed that Lodge put Diệm on hold in order to inform Conein where the Ngô brothers were so the generals could capture them . When confronted about Dunn ' s claim by a historian , Conein denied the account . It was also revealed that Conein had phoned the embassy early on the same morning to inquire about the generals ' request for a plane to transport Diệm and Nhu out of Saigon . One of Lodge ' s staff told Conein that the plane would have to go directly to the faraway asylum - offering country , so that the brothers could not disembark at a nearby stopover country and stay there to foment a counter - coup . Conein was told that the nearest plane that was capable of such a long range flight was in Guam , and it would take 24 hours to make the necessary arrangements . Minh was astounded and told Conein that the generals could not hold Diệm for that period . Conein did not suspect a deliberate delay by the American embassy . In contrast , a U . S . Senate investigative commission in the early 1970s raised a provocative thought : " One wonders what became of the U . S . military aircraft that had been dispatched to stand by for Lodge ' s departure , scheduled for the previous day . " The historian Mark Moyar suspected that Lodge could have flown Diệm to Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines , which was under American jurisdiction , before taking him to the final destination . Moyar speculated that " when Lodge had offered the jet the day before , he had done it to induce Diệm to give up at a time when the outcome of the insurrection was very much in doubt . Now that the coup clearly had succeeded , Lodge no longer needed to offer such an incentive . " Intended arrest at Gia Long Palace . In the meantime , Minh left the JGS headquarters and traveled to Gia Long Palace in a sedan with his aide and bodyguard , Captain Nguyễn Văn Nhung . Minh had also dispatched a M - 113 armored personnel carrier and four jeeps to Gia Long to transport Diệm and Nhu back to JGS headquarters . While Minh was on the way to supervise the takeover of the palace , Generals Đôn , Trần Thiện Khiêm and Lê Văn Kim prepared the army headquarters for Diệm ' s arrival and the ceremonial handover of power to the junta . Diệm ' s pictures were taken down and his statue was covered up . A large table covered with green felt was brought in with the intention of seating Diệm for the handover to Minh and Vice President Nguyễn Ngọc Thơ , who was to become the civilian Prime Minister during a nationally televised event witnessed by international media . Diệm and Nhu would then " ask " the generals to be granted exile and asylum in a foreign country , which would be granted . The brothers were then to be held in a secure place at JGS headquarters while awaiting deportation . Minh arrived at the palace at 08 : 00 in full military ceremonial uniform to supervise the arrest of Diệm and Nhu for the surrender ceremony . Diệm ' s escape . Minh instead arrived to find that the brothers were not in the palace . In anticipation of a coup , they had ordered the construction of three separate tunnels leading from Gia Long to remote areas outside the palace . Around 20 : 00 on the night of the coup , with only the Presidential Guard to defend them against mutinous infantry and armor units , Diệm and Nhu hurriedly packed American banknotes into a briefcase . They escaped through one of the tunnels with two loyalists : Air Force Lieutenant Ðỗ Thơ , Diệm ' s aide de camp , who happened to be a nephew of Colonel Ðỗ Mậu , the director of military security and a participant in the coup plot , and Cao Xuân Vy , head of Nhu ' s Republican Youth . After the coup , General Paul Harkins , the head of the U . S . presence in Vietnam , inspected the tunnel and noted that it " was so far down that I didn ' t want to go down to walk up the thing " . The brothers emerged in a wooded area in a park near the Cercle Sportif , the city ' s upper class sporting club , where they were picked up by a waiting Land Rover . Ellen Hammer disputes the tunnel escape , asserting that the Ngo brothers simply walked out of the building , which was not yet under siege . Hammer asserts that they walked past the tennis courts and left the palace grounds through a small gate at Le Thanh Ton Street and entered the car . The loyalists traveled through narrow back streets in order to evade rebel checkpoints and changed vehicles to a black Citroën sedan . After leaving the palace , Nhu was reported to have suggested to Diệm that the brothers split up , arguing that this would enhance their chances of survival . Nhu proposed that one of them travel to the Mekong Delta to join Cao ' s IV Corps , while the other would travel to the II Corps of General Nguyễn Khánh in the Central Highlands . Nhu felt the rebel generals would not dare to kill one of them while the other was free , in case the surviving brother were to regain power . According to one account , Diệm was reported to have turned down Nhu , reasoning that " You cannot leave alone . They hate you too much ; they will kill you . Stay with me and I will protect you . " Another story holds that Diệm said " We have always been together during these last years . How could we separate during these last years ? How could we separate in this critical hour ? " Nhu agreed to remain with his brother . The loyalists reached the home of Ma Tuyen in the Chinese business district of Cholon . Ma Tuyen was a Chinese merchant and friend who was reported to be Nhu ' s main contact with the Chinese syndicates which controlled the opium trade . The brothers sought asylum from the embassy of the Republic of China , but were turned down and stayed in Ma Tuyen ' s house as they appealed to ARVN loyalists and attempted to negotiate with the coup leaders . Nhu ' s secret agents had fitted the home with a direct phone line to the palace , so the insurgent generals believed that the brothers were still besieged inside Gia Long . Neither the rebels nor the loyalist Presidential Guard had any idea that at 21 : 00 they were about to fight for an empty building . Minh was reported to be mortified when he realised that Diệm and Nhu had escaped during the night . Arrest in Cholon . After Minh had ordered the rebels to search the areas known to have been frequented by the Ngo family , Colonel Phạm Ngọc Thảo was informed by a captured Presidential Guard officer that the brothers had escaped through the tunnels to a refuge in Cholon . Thảo was told by Khiêm , his superior , to locate Diệm and prevent him from being killed . When Thảo arrived at Ma Tuyen ' s house , he phoned his superiors . Diệm and Nhu overheard him and fled to the nearby Catholic Church of St . Francis Xavier . Tho drove them to the church which they had frequented over the years . Lieutenant Tho died a few months later in a plane crash , but his diary was not found until 1970 . Tho recorded Diệm ' s words as they left the house of Ma Tuyen as being " I don ' t know whether I will live or die and I don ' t care , but tell Nguyễn Khánh that I have great affection for him and he should avenge me " . Soon after the early morning mass celebrating All Souls ' Day ( the Day of the Dead ) , the congregation emptied from the building . The Ngô brothers walked through the shady courtyard and into the building wearing dark gray suits . It was speculated that they were recognised by an informant while they walked through the yard . Inside the church , the brothers prayed and received Communion . A few minutes later , just after 10 : 00 , an armoured personnel carrier and two jeeps entered the narrow alcove housing the church building . Lieutenant Thơ , who had earlier urged Diệm to surrender , saying that he was sure that his uncle Ðỗ Mậu , along with Đính and Khiêm , would guarantee their safety , wrote in his diary later " I consider myself responsible for having led them to their death " . Convoy to JGS headquarters . The convoy was led by General Mai Hữu Xuân and consisted of Colonels Nguyễn Văn Quan and Dương Ngọc Lắm . Quan was the deputy of Minh and Lắm was the Commander of Diệm ' s Civil Guard . Lắm had joined the coup once a rebel victory seemed assured . Two further officers made up the convoy : Major Dương Hiếu Nghĩa and Captain Nguyễn Văn Nhung . Nhung was Minh ' s bodyguard . Diệm requested that the convoy stop at the palace so that he could gather personal items before being exiled . Xuân turned him down , clinically stating that his orders were to take Diệm and Nhu directly to headquarters . Nhu expressed disgust that they were to be transported in an APC , asking , " You use such a vehicle to drive the president ? " Lắm assured them that the armour was for their own protection . Xuân said that it was selected to protect them from " extremists " . Xuân ordered the brothers ' hands be tied behind their backs before shoving them into the carrier . One officer asked to shoot Nhu , but Xuân turned him down . Assassination . After the arrest , Nhung and Nghĩa sat with the brothers in the APC , and the convoy departed for Tân Sơn Nhứt . Before the convoy had departed for the church , Minh was reported to have gestured to Nhung with two fingers . This was taken to be an order to kill both brothers . The convoy stopped at a railroad crossing on the return trip , where by all accounts the brothers were assassinated . An investigation by Đôn determined that Nghĩa had shot the brothers at point - blank range with a semi - automatic firearm and that Nhung sprayed them with bullets before repeatedly stabbing the bodies with a knife . Nghĩa ugly homie gave his account of what occurred during the journey back to the military headquarters : " As we rode back to the Joint General Staff headquarters , Diệm sat silently , but Nhu and the captain [ Nhung ] began to insult each other . I don ' t know who started it . The name - calling grew passionate . The captain had hated Nhu before . Now he was charged with emotion . " Nghĩa said that when the convoy reached a train crossing , " [ Nhung ] lunged at Nhu with a bayonet and stabbed him again and again , maybe fifteen or twenty times . Still in a rage , he turned to Diệm , took out his revolver and shot him in the head . Then he looked back at Nhu , who was lying on the floor , twitching . He put a bullet into his head too . Neither Diệm nor Nhu ever defended themselves . Their hands were tied . " Attempted cover - up . When the corpses arrived at JGS headquarters , the generals were shocked . Although they despised and had no sympathy for Nhu , they still respected Diệm . One general broke down and wept while Minh ' s assistant , Colonel Nguyễn Văn Quan collapsed on a table . General Đính , the military commander of the III Corps which controlled Saigon , later declared , " I couldn ' t sleep that night " . Đôn maintained that the generals were " truly grievous " over the deaths , maintaining that they were sincere in their intentions to give Diệm a safe exile . Đôn charged Nhu with convincing Diệm to reject the offer . Lodge later concluded , " Once again , brother Nhu proves to be the evil genius in Diệm ' s life . " ARVN reaction . Đôn ordered another general to tell reporters that the Ngô brothers had died in an accident . He went to confront Minh in his office . At this time , Xuân walked into Minh ' s office through the open door , unaware of Đôn ' s presence . Xuân snapped to attention and stated , " " Mission accomplished . " " Shortly after midnight on 2 November 1963 in Washington , D . C . the CIA sent word to the White House that Diệm and Nhu were dead , allegedly by suicide . Vietnam Radio had announced their deaths by poison , and that they had committed suicide while prisoners in an APC transporting them to Tân Sơn Nhứt . Unclear and contradictory stories abounded . General Paul Harkins reported that the suicides had occurred either by gunshot or by a grenade wrestled from the belt of an ARVN officer who was standing guard . Minh tried to explain the discrepancy , saying " Due to an inadvertence , there was a gun inside the vehicle . It was with this gun that they committed suicide . " US reaction . Kennedy learned of the deaths on the following morning when National Security Council staffer Michael Forrestal rushed into the cabinet room with a telegram reporting the Ngô brothers ' alleged suicides . According to General Maxwell Taylor , " " Kennedy leaped to his feet and rushed from the room with a look of shock and dismay on his face which I had never seen before . " " Kennedy had planned that Ngô Đình Diệm would be safely exiled and Arthur M . Schlesinger , Jr . recalled that the U . S . president was " somber and shaken " . Kennedy later penned a memo , lamenting that the assassination was " particularly abhorrent " and blaming himself for approving Cable 243 , which had authorised Lodge to explore coup options in the wake of Nhu ' s attacks on the Buddhist pagodas . Forrestal said that " It shook him personally . . . bothered him as a moral and religious matter . It shook his confidence , I think , in the kind of advice he was getting about South Vietnam . " When Kennedy was consoled by a friend who told him he need not feel sorry for the Ngô brothers on the grounds of despotism , Kennedy replied " No . They were in a difficult position . They did the best they could for their country . " Kennedy ' s reaction did not draw sympathy from his entire administration . Some believed that he should not have supported the coup and that as coups were uncontrollable , assassination was always a possibility . Kennedy was skeptical about the story and suspected that a double assassination had taken place . He reasoned the devoutly Catholic Ngô brothers would not have taken their own lives , but Roger Hilsman rationalised the possibility of suicide by asserting that Diệm and Nhu would have interpreted the coup as Armageddon . U . S . officials soon became aware of the true reasons for the deaths of Diệm and Nhu . Lucien Conein had left the rebel headquarters as the generals were preparing to bring in the Ngô brothers for the press conference which announced the handover of power . Upon returning to his residence , Conein received a phone call from Saigon ' s CIA station that ordered him to report to the embassy . The embassy informed Conein that Kennedy had instructed him to find Diệm . Conein returned to Tân Sơn Nhứt at around 10 : 30 . The following conversation was reported : Conein knew that if he saw the execution wounds , he would not be able to deny that Diem and Nhu had been assassinated . Conein refused to see the proof , realising that having such knowledge would compromise his cover and his safety . He returned to the embassy and submitted his report to Washington . The CIA in Saigon later secured a set of photos of the brothers that left no doubt that they had been executed . The photos were taken at about 10 : 00 , 2 November , showing the dead brothers covered in blood on the floor of an APC . They were dressed in the robes of Roman Catholic priests with their hands tied behind their backs . Their faces were bloodied and bruised and they had been repeatedly stabbed . The images appeared to be genuine , discrediting the generals ' claims that the brothers had committed suicide . The pictures were distributed around the world , having been sold to media outlets in Saigon . The caption below a picture published in " Time magazine " read " ' Suicide ' with no hands . " Media reaction . After the deaths , the military junta asserted that the Ngô brothers had committed suicide . On 6 November , Information Minister Trần Tự Oai declared at a news conference that Diệm and Nhu had died through " accidental suicide " after a firearm discharged when Nhu had tried to seize it from the arresting officer . This drew immediate scepticism from David Halberstam of the " New York Times " , who won a Pulitzer Prize for his Vietnam reporting . Halberstam wrote to the US Department of State that " extremely reliable private military sources " had confirmed that the brothers were ordered to be executed upon their return to military headquarters . Neil Sheehan of UPI reported a similar account based on what he described as " highly reliable sources " . Father Leger of Saint Francis Xavier Catholic Church asserted that the Ngô brothers were kneeling inside the building when soldiers burst in , took them outside and into the APC . Lodge had been informed by " an unimpeachable source " that both brothers were shot in the nape of the neck and that Diệm ' s body bore the signs of a beating . Impact and aftermath . Once the news of the cause of death of the Ngo brothers began to become public , the U . S . became concerned at their association with the new junta and their actions during the coup . U . S . Secretary of State Dean Rusk directed Lodge to question Minh about the killings . Lodge cabled back , initially backing the false story disseminated by the generals , saying that their story was plausible because of the supposedly loaded pistol being left on the floor of the vehicle . Rusk was worried about the public relations implications the bloody photographs of the brothers would generate . Lodge showed no alarm in public , congratulating Đôn on the " masterful performance " of the coup and promising diplomatic recognition . Đôn ' s assertion that the assassinations were unplanned proved sufficient for Lodge , who told the State Department that " I am sure assassination was not at their direction . " Minh and Đôn reiterated their position in a meeting with Conein and Lodge on the following day . Several members of the Kennedy administration were appalled by the killings . The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Averell Harriman declared that " it was a great shock to everybody that they were killed . " He postulated that it was an accident and speculated that Nhu may have caused it by insulting the officers who were supervising him . Embassy official Rufus Phillips , who was the US advisor to Nhu ' s Strategic Hamlet Program , said that " I wanted to sit down and cry " , citing the killings as a key factor in the future leadership troubles which beset South Vietnam . According to historian Howard Jones , the fact " that the killings failed to make the brothers into martyrs constituted a vivid testimonial to the depth of popular hatred they had aroused . " The assassinations caused a split within the leadership of the junta and repulsed American and world opinion . The killings damaged the public belief that the new regime would be an improvement over the military junta , turning the initial harmony among the generals into discord . The criticism of the killings caused the officers to distrust and battle one another for positions in the new government . Đôn expressed his abhorrence at the assassinations by caustically remarking that he had organised the armoured car in an effort to protect Diệm and Nhu . Khanh claimed that the only condition he had put on joining the conspiracy was that Diem would not be killed . According to Jones , " when decisions regarding postcoup affairs took priority , resentment over the killings meshed with the visceral competition over government posts to disassemble the new regime before it fully took form . " Culpability debate . The responsibility for the assassinations was generally placed on Minh . Conein asserted that " I have it on very good authority of very many people , that Big Minh gave the order " , as did William Colby , the director of the CIA ' s Far Eastern division . Đôn was equally emphatic , saying " I can state without equivocation that this was done by General Dương Văn Minh and by him alone . " Lodge thought that Xuân was also partly culpable asserting that " Diệm and Nhu had been assassinated , if not by Xuân personally , at least at his direction . " Minh placed the blame on Thiệu , after the latter became President , for the assassinations . In 1971 , Minh claimed that Thiệu was responsible for the deaths by hesitating and delaying the attack by his Fifth Division on Gia Long Palace . Đôn was reported to have pressured Thieu during the night , asking him on the phone " Why are you so slow in doing it ? Do you need more troops ? If you do , ask Đính to send more troops – and do it quickly because after taking the palace you will be made a general . " Thiệu stridently denied responsibility and issued a statement which Minh did not publicly rebut : " Dương Văn Minh has to assume entire responsibility for the death of Ngô Đình Diệm . " During the presidency of Richard Nixon , a U . S . government investigation was initiated into American involvement in the assassinations . Nixon was a political foe of Kennedy , having narrowly lost to him in the 1960 Presidential election . Nixon ordered an investigation under E . Howard Hunt into the murders , convinced Kennedy must have secretly ordered the killings but the inquiry was unable to find any such secret order . Motivation . Conein asserted that Minh ' s humiliation by Diệm and Nhu was a major motivation for ordering their executions . Conein reasoned that Diệm and Nhu were doomed once they escaped from Gia Long Palace , instead of surrendering there and accepting the offer of safe exile . Having successfully stormed the palace , Minh had presumed that the brothers would be inside , and arrived at the presidential residence in full ceremonial military uniform " with a sedan and everything else . " Conein described Minh as a " very proud man " who had lost face at turning up at the palace for his moment of glory , only to find an empty building . More than a decade after the coup , Conein claimed Diệm and Nhu would not have been killed if they had been in the palace , because there were too many people present . One Vietnamese Diệm loyalist asked friends in the CIA why an assassination had taken place , reasoning that if Diem was deemed to be inefficient , his deposal would suffice . The CIA employees responded that " They had to kill him . Otherwise his supporters would gradually rally and organise and there would be civil war . " Some months after the event , Minh was reported to have privately told an American that " We had no alternative . They had to be killed . Diệm could not be allowed to live because he was too much respected among simple , gullible people in the countryside , especially the Catholics and the refugees . We had to kill Nhu because he was so widely feared – and he had created organizations that were arms of his personal power . " Trần Văn Hương , a civilian opposition politician who was jailed in 1960 for signing the Caravelle Manifesto that criticised Diệm , and later briefly served as Prime Minister , gave a scathing analysis of the generals ' action . He stated that " The top generals who decided to murder Diệm and his brother were scared to death . The generals knew very well that having no talent , no moral virtues , no political support whatsoever , they could not prevent a spectacular comeback of the president and Mr . Nhu if they were alive . " Burials of Diệm and Nhu . At around 16 : 00 on 2 November , the bodies of Diệm and Nhu were identified by the wife of former Cabinet minister Trần Trùng Dung . The corpses were taken to St . Paul ' s Catholic Hospital , where a French doctor made a formal statement of death without conducting an autopsy . The original death certificate did not describe Diệm as Head of State but as " Chief of Province " , a post he had held four decades earlier under the French colonial administration . Nhu was described as " Chief of Library Service " , a post which he held in the 1940s . This was interpreted as a Vietnamese way of expressing contempt for the two despised leaders . Their place of burial was never disclosed by the junta and rumours regarding it persist to the current day . The speculated burial places include a military prison , a local cemetery , the grounds of the JGS headquarters at Tan Son Nhut and there are reports of cremation as well . Nobody was ever prosecuted for the killings . Memorial services . The government did not approve a public memorial service for the deaths of Diệm and Nhu until 1968 . In 1971 , several thousand mourners gathered at Diệm ' s purported gravesite . Catholic prayers were given in Latin . Banners proclaimed Diệm as a saviour of the south , with some mourners having walked into Saigon from villages outside the capital carrying portraits of Diệm . Madame Thiệu , the First Lady , was seen weeping at a requiem mass at Saigon ' s basilica . Several cabinet members were also at the grave and a eulogy was given by a general of the ARVN . According to the eulogy , Diệm died because he had resisted the domination of foreigners and their plans to bring great numbers of troops to Vietnam and widen a war which would have destroyed the country . Thiệu sponsored the services , and it was widely seen as a means of associating himself with Diệm ' s personal characteristics . Diệm frequently refused to follow American advice and was known for his personal integrity , in contrast to Thieu , who was infamous for corruption and regarded as being too close to the Americans . However , Thiệu ' s attempts to associate himself with Diệm ' s relative independence from United States influence was not successful . According to General Maxwell Taylor , Chairman of the U . S . Joint Chiefs of Staff , " " there was the memory of Diệm to haunt those of us who were aware of the circumstances of his downfall . By our complicity , we Americans were responsible for the plight in which the South Vietnamese found themselves " " .