Les Aspin Leslie " Les " Aspin , Jr . ( July 21 , 1938 – May 21 , 1995 ) was a United States Representative from 1971 to 1993 , and the United States Secretary of Defense under President Bill Clinton from January 21 , 1993 to February 3 , 1994 . Early life . Aspin was born in Milwaukee , Wisconsin . He graduated from Shorewood High School . He attended Yale University , where he was admitted to the Zeta Psi fraternity , and graduated " summa cum laude " in 1960 with a Bachelor of Arts in history . In 1962 , Aspin received his Master of Arts in economics from Oxford University , where he was a Rhodes Scholar , and his Ph . D in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1966 . As an officer in the U . S . Army from 1966 to 1968 , he served as a systems analyst in the Pentagon under Secretary of Defense Robert S . McNamara , serving in the Office of Systems Analysis . Before his election as a Democrat to Congress in 1970 , Aspin had been active in Wisconsin politics and had taught economics at Marquette University . U . S . Congress . Aspin ran as a peace candidate in 1970 , opposing the Vietnam War . In the Democratic primary he was opposed by Doug LaFollette , who was endorsed by the party . After losing the initial count by a few dozen votes , he demanded a recount and won the primary , by a few dozen votes . In the general election he defeated the incumbent , Henry Schadeberg . Aspin was elected as a Democrat to the 92nd and to the 11 succeeding Congresses and served from January 3 , 1971 , until his resignation January 20 , 1993 . Aspin began his career in the United States House of Representatives as an outsider but soon developed a particular interest and expertise in defense matters . Before and during his tenure in the House , he had opposed the U . S . involvement in the Vietnam War . In his early years in Congress , he often issued press releases critical of shortcomings he detected in the armed forces . In 1973 , he criticized the Air Force for devising a plan to purchase 200 beagle puppies , tie the dogs ' vocal cords , and conduct tests of poisonous gases . After Aspin began a publicity campaign against the Air Force ' s plan , an outraged public sent a record number of letters to the Defense Department , surpassing the amount ever sent about any other subject . In March 1974 , Aspin told an audience at Brown University , including future 4 - star General Wesley Clark and four West Point cadets : " You , the young officer and cadets sitting there - never in your lifetimes will you see us intervene abroad . We ' ve learned that lesson . " By 1985 , when Aspin became chairman of the Armed Services Committee , he was recognized as a leading defense authority . His chairmanship caused controversy among some House Democrats , particularly because he supported the Reagan administration ' s policies on the MX missile and aid to the Nicaraguan Contras . Although temporarily removed from his committee chair by his Democratic colleagues in January 1987 , Aspin weathered the crisis and regained the chairmanship three weeks later . He again broke with many Democrats in January 1991 when he issued a paper supporting the Bush administration ' s intention to use military force to drive the Iraqis from Kuwait . The accuracy of his prediction that the United States could win a quick military victory with light casualties added to his reputation as a military expert . Secretary of Defense . Nomination and confirmation . Aspin served as an adviser to Clinton on defense matters during the 1992 presidential campaign . Given Clinton ' s lack of military experience , appointment of a prominent and respected defense expert to head The Pentagon seemed desirable . Because of his leadership position in the House , Aspin ' s views on defense issues were well known . He was skeptical about the Strategic Defense Initiative , and favored a smaller Navy , a cut in U . S . troops in Europe , and further reduction of military personnel strength . These positions , along with the assumption that Aspin would work toward a substantial cut in the Defense budget , worried the military . Defense industry leaders applauded Aspin ' s selection because he favored maintaining a viable defense industrial base . Although questioned extensively , Aspin won easy confirmation in the Senate . Agenda and early difficulties . " Shortly after he took office , Aspin discussed dangers that had emerged with the end of the Cold War : the uncertainty that reform could succeed in the former Soviet Union ; the enhanced possibility that terrorists or terrorist states could acquire nuclear weapon s ; the likely proliferation of regional conflicts ; and the failure to take adequate account of the impact of the state of the domestic economy on U . S . national security interests . Given these conditions and the end of the Cold War , it seemed clear that the Pentagon was entering a period of potentially profound change . Aspin looked like a sound choice to manage this change . As it turned out , Aspin faced difficulties from the beginning . A serious heart ailment put him in the hospital for several days in February 1993 , after barely a month in office . A month later he was back in the hospital for implantation of a heart pacemaker . Even so , he had to deal immediately with the highly charged question of homosexuals in the military , a controversy left over from his predecessor Dick Cheney ' s tenure . That had become an issue in the 1992 campaign , when Clinton had promised to end discrimination against homosexuals . During his confirmation hearings Aspin indicated that he would take action quickly , and on entering office he presented a plan to the president to discuss the matter with Congress and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and presented a timetable leading to an order dealing with the matter . This plan provoked widespread protest from all sides on the issue . " Gender and sexuality in the military . The fallout from the controversy wounded both Clinton and Aspin politically and dragged on until December 1993 , when , after many months of equivocation , confusion , and more controversy , Aspin released new regulations , known as the " Don ' t ask , don ' t tell " policy on homosexual conduct in the armed forces : Applicants for the services would not be asked about their sexual orientation , and homosexual orientation would not disqualify anyone from service " unless manifested by homosexual conduct " ; military personnel would be judged on suitability for service , not sexual orientation ; separation from the service would be based on homosexual acts , same sex marriage , or statements by an individual that he or she was bisexual or homosexual , with the person accorded the opportunity to rebut the presumption of homosexual acts ; DoD criminal investigation or law enforcement organizations would not investigate solely to determine a service member ' s sexual orientation , and sexual orientation questions would not be included in personnel security questionnaires ; finally , service members would be informed of DoD policy on sexual conduct during their training . This compromise policy , issued after an agonizing and divisive public debate , did not completely satisfy any of the concerned parties . Also on the social side , Aspin had to deal with the volatile question of servicewomen in combat . In April 1993 he announced a revised policy on the assignment of women in the armed forces : The services were to allow women to compete for assignments in combat aircraft ; the Navy was to open additional ships to women and draft a proposal for Congress to remove existing legislative barriers to the assignment of women to combat vessels ; and the Army and Marine Corps were to look for opportunities for women to serve in such components as field artillery and air defense . ( This was a response to recommendations made by an ad hoc committee chaired by Barbara S . Pope appointed in the wake of the Tailhook scandal . ) Meanwhile , Secretary of the Air Force Sheila E . Widnall became the first woman service secretary . Defense budget and " bottom - up review " . Development of the Defense budget for FY 1994 , beginning on 1 October 1993 , remained Aspin ' s biggest task . The budget process proved more complicated than usual , owing to Clinton ' s campaign pledge to reduce DoD funding and to a " bottom - up review " of the military structure ordered by Aspin shortly after he took office . The end of the Cold War and the consequent opportunity to cut military costs clearly called for the kind of reevaluation of ends and means that the bottom - up review might contribute . A Pentagon steering group chaired by Under Secretary of Defense ( Acquisition and Technology ) John M . Deutch and including representatives from various OSD offices , the Joint Staff , and the services conducted the review . Because of the growing threat of regional conflicts , Aspin wanted to have a strong capability to carry out limited military operations , including peacekeeping , and to maintain " a strong peacetime presence of U . S . forces around the world " . The bottom - up review report , which Aspin released in September 1993 , took into account strategy formulation , force structure , weapon systems modernization , and Defense infrastructure . The report projected a reduced force structure still capable of fighting and winning two simultaneous major regional conflicts . Forces would include 10 active Army divisions ; 11 carrier battle groups , 45 to 55 attack submarine s , and about 345 ships ; 5 active Marine brigades ; and 13 active and 7 reserve Air Force fighter wings . The report also called for additional prepositioned equipment and airlift / sealift capacity , improved anti - armor and precision - guided munitions , and enhanced Army National Guard combat brigade readiness . The conclusions of the bottom - up review influenced the development of the FY 1994 Defense budget , although detailed work on the budget had begun as soon as Aspin took office . In March 1993 Aspin introduced a FY 1994 budget proposal costing $ 263 . 4 billion , about $ 12 billion below current levels , and reflecting cuts in the military services similar to those later included in the bottom - up review . To some critics of high military spending , Aspin ' s budget plan differed little from that of the Bush administration . In the fall of 1993 Aspin began to tell the White House that the five - year Defense budget , reflecting the results of the bottom - up review , would exceed the more than $ 1 trillion projected by the Clinton administration . In December 1993 he put the anticipated shortfall at no less than $ 50 billion , the consequence of inaccurate inflation estimates , a military pay raise , and failure to account for other Pentagon costs , including peacekeeping operations . The size of the force needed to meet the two regional wars scenario contributed to the projected budget shortfall . Furthermore , Aspin was on record as favoring the use of U . S . troops in regional conflicts , as opposed to other decisionmakers , including General Colin Powell , chairman of the JCS . Aspin ' s departure from office early in 1994 left further decisions on the Defense budget to his successor . The final FY 1994 budget amounted to a little under $ 252 billion in total obligational authority . Like his predecessors Carlucci and Cheney , Aspin faced the perennial issue of base closures , which could also affect the Defense budget . In March 1993 he released a plan to close an additional 31 large military installations and to shrink or consolidate 134 other sites , projecting a savings of over $ 3 billion a year beginning in 2000 . A new Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission approved the proposal , which went into effect when Congress accepted it as a package . The SDI program also held important budget implications . In May 1993 Aspin announced " the end of the Star Wars era , " explaining that the collapse of the Soviet Union had determined the fate of SDI . He renamed the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization as the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization ( BMDO ) and established its priorities as theater and national missile defense and useful follow - on technologies . Aspin ' s assignment of responsibility for BMDO to the under secretary of defense ( acquisition and technology ) signified the downgrading of the program . Global crises and initiatives . While seeking solutions to the complex budget and force structure issues , Aspin found himself beset with difficult regional problems and conflicts that demanded decisions and action . In NATO he pushed the U . S . - sponsored " Partnership for Peace " program to bring together NATO members and nonmembers for military activities , including training maneuvers , equipment sharing , search and rescue , antiterrorist efforts , environmental cleanup , and peacekeeping operations . At a meeting in Brussels in December 1993 the NATO defense ministers agreed to consider for future alliance membership those non - NATO nations that participated in the program . Russian President Boris Yeltsin warned that attempts to bring Eastern European nations into NATO would threaten his country ' s strategic interests and endanger hopes for the former Soviet bloc ' s reconciliation with the West . Yeltsin argued that enlarging NATO would reawaken old Russian concerns about encirclement and possibly weaken the cause of democratic reform . The unstable situation in Haiti , where elected president Jean - Bertrand Aristide had been ousted from office by the military in September 1991 , presented another regional problem . The United States pressured the military government to restore Aristide . In July 1993 , the Haitian military regime agreed to reinstate Aristide by October 30 , 1993 , but then refused to step down . In October , in an effort Clinton approved even though Aspin opposed it , the United States sent the USS Harlan County carrying 200 troops to Port - au - Prince , Haiti ' s capital . Met by a hostile mob of armed Haitians , the ship turned away without attempting to undertake its mission , which the Pentagon described as an effort to professionalize the Haitian military and undertake civil assistance projects . Some observers attacked Aspin for not taking a harder stand in the administration against an action he opposed and then aborting the effort in the face of local opposition . During Aspin ' s term the U . S . was concerned that Communist North Korea might have underway a nuclear weapons development program . This gave way to alarm when that country refused to allow full inspection of nuclear sites . In November 1993 North Korea demanded that the United States and South Korea cancel a planned joint training exercise as a precondition during discussions on the nuclear issue . Aspin rejected this demand and announced that the United States would suspend plans to withdraw its troops gradually from the peninsula . In the Persian Gulf area , Iraq remained a problem . In June 1993 two U . S . Navy ships fired Tomahawk missile s against the headquarters building of Iraq ' s intelligence service in Baghdad in response to evidence of a plot to assassinate former President Bush during a visit to Kuwait . Aspin described the attack as a " wake up call " for Saddam Hussein . Two months later Aspin received a report on the U . S . military performance during the 1991 Gulf War , the result of a study undertaken by the House Armed Services Committee when he chaired it . The report concluded that the U . S . Central Command had greatly exaggerated damage done to Iraqi military equipment , such as tanks and naval vessels , by air strikes . Aspin also had to consider the question of health problems of U . S . service personnel who participated in the action against Iraq . He announced that a preliminary review disclosed no connection between chemical weapon agents and the reported health problems . Nevertheless , he formed a panel of outside experts to examine the issue further . The worsening crisis in Bosnia commanded attention and demanded some kind of U . S . response . Aspin did not favor using ground forces to intervene in the civil war involving the Bosnian Muslims , Serbs , and Croats , but thought that the use of sophisticated weapons was a more reasonable option . Eventually the administration decided on an airdrop of humanitarian aid , even though Aspin did not favor the plan . Somalia turned out to be Aspin ' s biggest headache . A civil war involving various clans had engulfed the country since 1991 . Direct U . S . involvement , begun in August 1992 , provided food through a military airlift and other means to the people of Somalia . In December 1992 , shortly before Aspin became secretary of defense , the United States joined a new Unified Task Force ( UNITAF ) to provide security as well as food relief . The United States sent 26 , 000 troops to Somalia to join about 13 , 000 others from more than 20 nations . UNITAF , operating until May 1993 , restored order in Somalia and distributed food widely . In May 1993 Operation Somalia - 2 ( UNOSOM - 2 ) began in an effort to create conditions to enable the Somalis to rebuild the country . The United States cut its troops in Somalia to some 4 , 000 and then added 400 Army Rangers in August 1993 . At that time , confronting criticism at home that the United States was getting more deeply involved in the factional violence in Somalia without a clear rationale , Aspin explained that U . S . troops would remain until order had been restored in Mogadishu , Somalia ' s capital , progress had been made in disarming rival clans , and effective police forces were operating in the country ' s major cities . At the same time the United States increased its military efforts against a leading Somali warlord , Mohamed Farrah Aidid . Criticism and final days in office . In September , General Powell asked Aspin to approve the request of the U . S . commander in Somalia for tanks , armored vehicles and AC - 130 Spectre gunships for his forces . Aspin turned down the request . Shortly thereafter Aidid ' s forces in Mogadishu killed 18 U . S . soldiers and wounded more than 75 in attacks that also resulted in the shooting down of two U . S . helicopters and the capture of one pilot ( see the Battle of Mogadishu ) . In the face of severe congressional criticism , Aspin admitted that in view of what had happened he had made a mistake , but stated that the request for armored equipment had been made within the context of delivering humanitarian aid to Somalia rather than protecting troops . In an appearance before a congressional committee to answer questions about the Somalia disaster , Aspin made an unfavorable impression and appeared weak in response to the detailed probing and criticism of his performance . The president publicly defended Aspin but made clear that the White House was not involved in the decision not to send armor reinforcements to Somalia . Several members of Congress called on Clinton to ask for Aspin ' s resignation . On 15 December 1993 President Clinton announced Aspin ' s resignation , for personal reasons . Given the problems that Aspin encountered during his short term , most obviously the losses in Mogadishu , observers assumed that the president had asked him to step down . Speculation in the media centered on the Somalia embarrassment and on Aspin ' s differences with the Office of Management and Budget over how much the Defense budget should be cut . The secretary ' s health problems , of course , may well have also been a factor . One news magazine stated that Aspin ' s major handicap was " neither his famously unmilitary bearing nor his inability to discipline himself or the enormous Pentagon bureaucracy ; it is his politician ' s instinct for the middle ground on defense issues . " Aspin continued to serve as secretary of defense until February 3 , 1994 , when William J . Perry took office . Final months and death . After leaving his position , Aspin then joined the faculty of Marquette University ' s international affairs program in Washington and was affiliated with the Washington - based think - tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies . In March he became a member of the Commission on Roles and Missions , and in May Clinton chose him to be chairman of the President ' s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board . In March 1995 he began work as chairman of still another study group , this on the Roles and Capabilities of the Intelligence Community . Aspin had had increasing difficulty during the last years of his life with a congenital heart condition ( asymmetric septal hypertrophy ; hypertrophic / obstructive cardiomyopathy ) . It necessitated hospitalization during his tenure as Defense Secretary , with placement of a pacemaker . His cardiac disorder was complicated in May 1995 by a cerebrovascular accident ( stroke ) , which resulted in Dr . Aspin ' s death on May 21 , 1995 in Washington , D . C . . He was interred at Brookfield ' s Wisconsin Memorial Park cemetery . Marquette University named its Washington government center in Aspin ' s honor .