Battle of Ismailia The Battle of Ismailia took place between the Egyptian Army and the Israeli Defense Forces ( IDF ) during the last stages of the Yom Kippur War during October 18 – 22 , 1973 , south of the city of Ismailia , on the west bank of the Suez Canal in Egypt . The battle itself took place as part of the larger IDF - launched Operation Abiray - Lev , in an attempt to seize Ismailia and thereby sever the logistical and supply lines of most of Egypt ' s Second Field Army across the Suez Canal . Breaking out of their newly established bridgehead west of the Canal at the northern end of the Great Bitter Lake , the IDF launched an offensive from Deversoir toward Ismailia . A combined force of Egyptian paratroopers and commandos fought a delaying battle , falling back upon defensive positions further north under increasing pressure from IDF infantry and armor . By October 22 , they were occupying a last line of defense , including positions along the Ismailia canal . Though outnumbered , they repulsed a final Israeli effort to capture the city ; a United Nations ceasefire was then imposed , bringing the battle to an end . The Egyptians registered a tactical and strategic victory in the defense of Ismailia , stopping an encirclement of their large forces on the east bank of the Suez Canal and ensuring their supply lines remained open . Background . On October 6 , 1973 , Egypt launched Operation Badr , which started the Yom - Kippur War . It succeeded in crossing the Suez Canal and establishing bridgeheads on the east bank in Israeli - occupied Sinai , and counter - attacks by launched by Israeli reserves were unsuccessful . By October 10 , fighting along the front had come to a lull . Egyptian President Anwar Sadat soon ordered an offensive to seize the strategic Sinai mountain passes , despite protests and objections by his senior commanders against such an offensive . Sadat hoped to divert Israeli pressure from the Syrians . The October 14 offensive was ill - planned and ill - executed , and culminated in heavy Egyptian losses without achieving any objectives . The failed Egyptian offensive gave the initiative to the Israelis , who immediately launched Operation Abiray - Lev , aiming to cross the canal between two Egyptian armies in order to encircle Egyptian forces on the east banks and cut their supply lines . Optimistically planned , the operation began smoothly , but quickly ran into problems . The Israelis faced difficulties in establishing a corridor to the canal due to unexpectedly determined resistance by Egyptian defenses , in what became known as the Battle of the Chinese Farm . After several days of heavy fighting , they were able to secure the roads to the canal , and by October 18 had two bridges laid down at Deversoir , at the northern end of the Great Bitter Lake . By the next day there were three Israeli armored divisions across the canal . Two advanced south toward Suez City , while the 143rd Armored Division under Major General Ariel Sharon advanced north to seize Ismailia , hoping to sever the supply lines to three Egyptian divisions of the Second Field Army across the canal . Prelude . The west bank of the canal was lined with a series of ramparts up to high , which the Egyptians referred to as " strong points " . These were used during the opening days of the war to allow Egyptian forces to directly fire on the Israelis on the east bank . There were five strong points between the Great Bitter Lake and the Ismailia Canal , from north to south : a pumping station at Deversoir , the village of Serabaeum , Touscan , Heneidac and Jebel Mariam . The area was largely agricultural , intersected with dikes and irrigation ditches , although these did not present significant obstacles . There were several villages and numerous farms , especially orchards of mango and orange trees . The density of foliage made the terrain unsuitable for vehicles . The Israelis called it the " jungle " or " Vietnam " . West of the Suez Canal , and running parallel to it , was the Sweetwater Canal , which distributed freshwater to the inhabitants of the canal zone and its cities . It branched from the Ismailia Canal , running east from the Nile River near Cairo to Lake Timsah at Ismailia . There were four bridges across the Ismailia Canal . The first was the Abu Gamus Bridge at Ismailia . Two bridges , one railroad and one vehicular , were located at the village of Nafisha , on the western outskirts of Ismailia . Further west was the Upper Bridge , as it was called . Engineers had wired the bridges with demolition charges for destruction should they fall to the Israelis . Second Army ' s reserve included the 10th and 118th Mechanized Infantry Brigades , with the latter occupying a series of fortified defenses on the northern bank of the Ismailia Canal . The 182nd Paratrooper Brigade , comprising the 81st , 85th and 89th Battalions ( each composed of three companies ) under the command of Colonel Ismail Azmy , was assigned responsibility for defending the area south of Ismailia against an Israeli offensive . Azmy arrived at Nafisha with the bulk of his brigade at midnight on October 17 , where he was briefed by Brigadier General Abd el - Munim Khalil , commander of Second Army . Khalil identified the west bank strong points as objectives for the paratrooper s to secure , as the ramparts could be used to provide fire support to Egyptian forces on the east bank . The paratroopers would also hold Serabaeum and the bridges there over the Sweetwater Canal . The 85th Paratrooper Battalion , commanded by Lieutenant Colonel ' Atef Monsif , had been involved in a recent counter - attack against Deversoir . Despite breaking through in certain areas and even seizing part of the airstrip at Deversoir , the paratroopers and their supporting armor were greatly outnumbered and the counter - attack failed . The battalion suffered around a hundred dead , missing or wounded , and by dawn on October 18 it had been pulled back to Inshas Military Base for reorganizing . The only other Egyptian forces in the area were commandos , the 73rd Battalion of the 129th Sa ' iqa ( lightning ) Group . The Sa ' iqa had also been engaged in heavy fighting at Serabaeum , Deversoir and the nearby military base of Abu Sultan . By late October 17 , the battalion ' s two companies had been ordered to withdraw from the vicinity of Deversoir northward to defend Serabaeum . On October 18 , Sharon ' s division across the canal included the 243rd Paratrooper Brigade under Colonel Danny Matt and an armored brigade under Colonel Haim Erez . Sharon , wanting to expand the Israeli bridgehead northward , received permission to cross a third unit , an armored brigade under Colonel Amnon Reshef , to the west bank , and did so on October 19 . The paratroopers and part of the armor had been holding the Israeli bridgehead since October 16 , facing little resistance , while Reshef ' s brigade had been involved in heavy fighting at the Chinese Farm until it was relieved by Israeli reinforcements . Battle . First day . On the morning of October 18 , Israeli paratroopers began their first push northward . Sharon ordered the attack , even though he had not yet received permission to launch an offensive in that direction . An Israeli battalion moved toward Serabaeum , spearheaded by a company mounted in half - track s . The village was then occupied by a company of the 73rd Sa ' iqa battalion , and the defenders received a platoon of reinforcements to compensate losses . The Israelis began receiving fire as they approached the town , but the battalion commander decided to push ahead . As they entered the village , they encountered heavy resistance , and the lead half - track was cut off . Fourteen men including the company commander , Captain Asa Kadmoni , managed to take cover in one of the houses . Kadmoni took up a position covering several approaches and , with ammunition passed on to him by others , held his position for over three hours , engaging the Egyptians at ranges of to , hitting their positions with his LAW anti - tank weapon . Other paratroopers with armor managed to reach the unit and retrieve them , before the Israelis withdrew under Egyptian pressure . The paratroopers suffered 11 killed and 27 wounded in the attack . Kadmoni would be awarded the Medal of Valor for his performance that day . The Sa ' iqa battalion ' s other company was occupying positions just north of Abu Sultan . Despite receiving the order to retreat during the night of October 17 – 18 , the Egyptians were heavily outnumbered and the intensity of the fighting prevented them from withdrawing from their positions . Consequently , Heikal ordered artillery barrages on the area , including the Sa ' iqa company ' s position , inadvertently leading to friendly - fire casualties . Soon after the firing subsided , Israeli paratroopers attacked at morning , and severe fighting , including hand - to - hand combat , ensued . Both sides suffered heavy losses , but the Sa ' iqa held its position . At night , both companies retreated . The 73rd Battalion sustained 85 casualties , including 11 officers , throughout the fighting on October 18 , and subsequently was withdrawn to be reconstituted . That morning , Azmy ' s paratroopers moved south to their objectives , reaching them with relative ease . The 89th Battalion occupied all five strong points between Jebel Mariam and the pumping station . The commander made the mistake of separating his forces equally among all five strong points , rather than concentrating his forces at the southernmost strong points . However , from the rampart at the pumping station , the paratroopers could clearly see the Israeli pontoon bridge at Deversoir , and corrected artillery fire being directed against the bridge . Second Army ' s artillery forces continued to fire almost unceasingly until the following day , sometimes scoring hits on the bridge . Egyptian artillery fire against the bridges would inflict heavy casualties on the Israelis until the end of the war . The accuracy of the Egyptian artillery strikes alerted the Israelis , who attacked the strong point at the pumping station with armor and seized it . Instead of concentrating forces for a counter - attack , the battalion commander used only the forces originally assigned to the strong point in a counter - attack to regain it , which inevitably failed due to the paucity of forces . Meanwhile , the 81st Battalion reached Serabaeum where they established defenses , mainly at a position south of the railway station , at a hill called Orcha by the Israelis . At this point , only these two paratrooper battalions were positioned between Sharon ' s division and the Ismailia Canal . During the afternoon that day , Egyptian Chief - of - Staff Saad el - Shazly arrived at Second Army Headquarters in Ismailia , at President Sadat ' s request . Shazly sought to asses the situation and to work with Khalil on a plan to counter the Israeli advance . They agreed to withdraw the 15th Armored Brigade from the east bank and keep it north of Ismailia as a reserve force , and to have Egyptian forces on the east bank attack southward to sever or at least narrow the Israeli corridor to the canal . Azmy ' s brigade meanwhile would continue defending the area south of the Ismailia Canal , and additional Sa ' iqa units would be committed . Shazly also solved a major problem concerning anti - tank weaponry . Azmy ' s brigade was almost completely lacking anti - tank weapons ; it had been stripped of its anti - tank guided missile ( ATGM ) battalion , equipped with AT - 3 Sagger s and RPG - 7 s , which was sent to the east bank to support the initial offensive . This battalion , and a second belonging to the 118th Infantry Brigade , were now withdrawn from the east bank throughout October 18 and brought back to their units . Shazly and Khalil carried out these orders in relative secrecy , as they were disobeying direct orders from Sadat and the Minister of War , Ahmed Ismail , not to withdraw any units from the east bank . Several measures decided upon were not implemented however . Second day . Amnon Reshef ' s armored brigade completed its crossing that morning , and joined Sharon ' s division , just as the latter received actual approval to begin an offensive toward Ismailia . In the meantime , the 85th Battalion had completed reorganizing at Inshas Base and returned to Ismailia , where it was placed under Azmy ' s command once again . The 129th Sa ' iqa Group retreated to Abu Suweir , north of Ismailia , to reorganize , and Heikal was also informed of his group ' s new area of operations , with the objective of defending the Upper Bridge , and the crucial Cairo - Ismailia Desert Road that incorporated the bridge . Sharon ordered Matt to push northward to Serabaeum again , where paratroopers of the 81st Battalion were occupying defenses . The attack failed once more , and Sharon now sent Reshef on Matt ' s left flank . Using a battalion of some thirty tanks with mechanized infantry , Reshef used his superior maneuverability to flank the Egyptian position . There was heavy , close - quarter fighting in the trenches , and extra units were brought up against the Orcha position . The paratroopers reported their defenses to have been penetrated during the afternoon , and they later withdrew after detonating the bridges over the Sweetwater Canal at Serabaeum . The Israelis captured Egyptian positions in the area , and discovered that Orcha Hill contained a major Egyptian radio intercept station . The capture of Orcha caused the collapse of Egyptian defenses in the area ; the paratroopers pulled back to the village of Ain Ghasin five kilometres north , and Azmy ordered the 89th Battalion to withdraw to the adjacent Touscan strong point , abandoning the ramparts at Serabaeum . These were occupied by the Israelis , which they used to fire on Egyptian positions across the canal . The Egyptians hastily organised defenses at Touscan . This new line of defenses was just over 12 kilometres south of Ismailia . Meanwhile , Egyptian General Headquarters ( GHQ ) in Cairo , sent the 139th Sa ' iqa Group with its two battalions to Ismailia . They were given the objective of eliminating Israeli forces up to the Deversoir area and destroying Israeli bridges across the Suez Canal . A team of frogmen was attached for that end , and the group had no armor or heavy weaponry , and their only transports were large military trucks . GHQ did not include Second Army command in any of the planning , and in fact only notified Second Army of the operation on the morning of October 19 , when the Sa ' iqa Group had already began moving to Ismailia from Cairo . This alarmed Second Army command , and Khalil ordered military police to stop the 139th Sa ' iqa Group ' s vehicles at Abu Suweir , and have its commander , Colonel Osama Ibrahim , arrive at his headquarters in Ismailia . Ibrahim arrived that evening and met Khalil and Shazly . Both men were shocked when they learned of Ibrahim ' s objectives , imaginary as they were and impossible to achieve , an indication of the state of confusion in GHQ at the time . Khalil canceled the entire operation and placed the Sa ' iqa unit under Second Army ' s command instead , and Ibrahim in turn notified GHQ of his new orders . By midnight he was at Khalil ' s headquarters once more , where he was informed GHQ ' s reply : Ibrahim would proceed with his original mission . Third and fourth days . Starting at sunrise on October 20 , the Israeli Air Force launched aerial attacks for the duration of the day , targeting Ismailia , the nearby al - Galaa ' army base , and Jebel Mariam . Close air support was also provided to advancing ground forces . Israeli aircraft employed ordnance fitted with time fuses , as well as napalm to demoralize Egyptian troops . Shazly left Ismailia that evening , returning to Cairo where he presented a grim evaluation of the military situation to GHQ . His recommendation to withdraw armored forces to counter the Israeli threat on the west bank created a serious command crisis , and ultimately no withdrawal took place . Sharon renewed his division ' s attack that day , moving north from Serabaeum on a three brigade front , with Matt on the right , Erez in the center , and Reshef on the left . The advance spanned the entire area between the Suez Canal on the east and the Sweetwater Canal on the west . By dawn , both Touscan and Ain Ghasin were under attack . The 89th Battalion had concentrated all its forces at the Touscan strong point , where it was hard - pressed by superior Israeli armored and mechanized forces . Azmy reported the situation to Second Army headquarters , and requested permission to detonate a nearby bridge on the Sweetwater Canal and flood the area before the advancing Israelis . Khalil however issued strict orders not to do so , since the canal was a crucial source of drinking water to civilians all the way up to Suez city . The situation was deteriorating for the paratroopers however , and Azmy soon had the bridge destroyed and broke down sections of nearby irrigation canals , flooding the entire area and submerging Israeli tanks up to their hulls in muddy water . This led to the paratroopers of Matt ' s brigade spearheading the advance in the center instead , while the armored brigades were forced to have their mechanized infantry push ahead on foot . The Touscan position remained under heavy air and artillery attack , and by midday it was surrounded . Losses due to death and injury left the battalion with some 120 paratroopers still able to fight . Meanwhile , the 81st Battalion was able to hold Ain Ghasin until the afternoon , when it retreated to Nefisha . As for the reconstituted 85th Battalion , it was ordered to occupy Jebel Mariam , Heneidac and Touscan . The battalion ' s commander , Lt . Col . Monsif , found during a reconnaissance that Touscan was surrounded by large Israeli forces and under heavy fire , and so limited his battalion ' s defenses to Jebel Mariam and Heneidac only , occupying the former with the battalion ' s main forces , including two companies of paratroopers , and placing a single company at Heneidac . The 139th Sa ' iqa Group , having had its mission confirmed by GHQ , began moving southward from Ismailia at sunset . Both battalions advanced in columns , each pushing a company ahead as a vanguard . Col . Ibrahim sent four patrols ahead to reconnoitre , and only one returned ; the rest were considered missing . As the Sa ' iqa group moved south , they encountered groups of Egyptian paratroopers from the 81st and 89th Battalions , retreating northward under Israeli pressure . When the unit neared Ain Ghasin they were ambushed by an Israeli force . An intense firefight took place as the vanguard engaged the Israelis , after some of their transports had been hit . Soldiers disembarked their vehicles and took cover in nearby farms and orchards . The vehicles and transports were turned back with great difficulty , and the entire Sa ' iqa group soon began to retreat to a position south of the village of Abu ' Atwa , itself roughly 3 kilometres south of Ismailia . Ibrahim called for artillery support , but the Israelis were jamming and interfering his radio net , and communicated with him in Arabic . This led to Israeli artillery fire falling on his forces instead . The Egyptians suffered few casualties though , due to the density of the mango trees , which minimized the hit radius of artillery rounds and provided cover from shrapnel . Retreat to Ismailia Canal . Meanwhile , Heikal was able to contact Ibrahim and asked him to arrive at headquarters in Ismailia due to a change in orders , and he arrived sometime after midnight . Khalil had managed , after a lengthy and drawn - out conversation , to convince GHQ to cancel the operation and place the 139th Sa ' iqa Group under his command to assist in fortifying Ismailia instead of sacrificing the elite force in a suicidal mission , and GHQ finally acquiesced . Ibrahim was now tasked with occupying and defending Abu ' Atwa and Nefisha . He reorganized his force , and occupied both villages with a battalion each by dawn on October 21 . Despite the near - debacle , the commitment of the Sa ' iqa , along with the paratroopers of the 85th Battalion , had actually reinforced Egyptian defenses and helped defeat the Israeli attack . The battle continued south of Lake Timsah in see - saw fashion , raging back and forth , but by nightfall on October 20 the Israelis had made no progress , and the Egyptian paratroopers were firmly in control of Touscan . According to Trevor N . Dupuy , by this time Israeli artillery fire had made the main Cairo - Ismailia road unusable . Azmy lost contact with the 89th Battalion during the night , due to the intensity of Israeli bombardment on Touscan . At morning on October 21 the Israelis attacked again , and the paratroopers managed to repulse the attack again , before falling back . By dusk the battalion had abandoned the Touscan strong point and managed to retreat northward . Azmy had the 81st and 89th Battalions pulled back to the Ismailia Stadium , where they were to be reconstituted . The Israelis also attacked Heneidac at dawn that day using armor and infantry with air and artillery support , and captured the position before noon . The paratrooper company there pulled back north and joined the rest of the 85th Battalion at Jebel Mariam , now the only defensive position occupied by the 182nd Paratrooper Brigade , and the last position on the Suez Canal before Ismailia . Israeli command conflict . During this time , Major Generals Shmuel Gonen and Chaim Bar - Lev , the heads of Israeli Southern Command and Sharon ' s superiors , continued to press Sharon to send forces to the east bank to widen the corridor to the Israeli bridgehead , while Sharon ignored these commands repeatedly , claiming that the attacks were unnecessary . Gonen finally issued a peremptory order to Sharon to transfer troops to the east bank and conduct a full - scale attack to widen the corridor . Sharon only sent five tanks as reinforcement to the armored brigade on the east bank tasked with launching the attack . Consequently the Israelis suffered heavy losses and the assault was repulsed . Gonen and Bar - Lev were now joined by Lieutenant General David Elazar , and ordered Sharon to renew the attack , this time transferring Reshef ' s brigade . Sharon opposed this however , and argued that if he succeeded in his mission , the Egyptian Second Army would collapse , thereby eliminating any Egyptian threat to the Israeli corridor and bridgehead . He retorted with the claim that had it not been for Southern Command ' s hesitation , he could have encircled Ismailia by now . When his superiors remained adamant , Sharon bypassed the chain of command and contacted the Minister of Defense , Moshe Dayan , who called off any further attacks on the east bank . As a result , Sharon would be able to concentrate his attention and the efforts of his three brigades in the final push to capture Ismailia . Fifth day . Egyptian preparations . With Egyptian forces occupying a final line of defense , Khalil focused on preventing any Israeli crossing of the Ismailia Canal . To this end , he concentrated a large amount of firepower from various artillery units . Following the Israeli crossing , Brigadier General Abd al - Halim Abu Ghazala , commander of Second Army artillery , had managed to reorganize around ten artillery battalions in fire bases north of the Ismailia Canal , and incorporated the divisional artillery of Egyptian units on the east bank of the Suez Canal – an additional eight battalions . Abu Gazala thus had at his disposal between 12 and 16 battalions available for a single barrage incorporating a total of some 280 artillery guns . He also organized anti - tank defenses , emplacing eight Sagger launchers at the easternmost Upper Bridge , and allocating six BRDM s with Sagger launchers . The 118th Mechanized Infantry Brigade was assigned positions occupying the bridges of the Ismailia Canal , and was to defend the city and nearby al - Galaa ' army base . The 85th Paratrooper Battalion was directly ordered by Khalil to " hold Jebel Mariam to the last bullet and the last man " , due to its critical importance and dominance , overlooking Ismailia itself and the main approaches to the city . In addition to Second Army ' s supporting artillery , the 182nd Paratrooper Brigade ' s 120 mm mortar battalion , with eighteen mortars , was attached to the paratroopers at Jebel Mariam , significantly increasing their firepower . As for the 139th Sa ' iqa Group , its two battalions occupied Abu ' Atwa and Nefisha , and a company from the battalion at Nefisha was kept in reserve . While preparing defenses , the Sa ' iqa were confronted with huge numbers of civilians , mainly farmers , fleeing northward with as many belongings and livestock as possible , cluttering and blocking roads . Final Israeli attack . Throughout the night of October 21 / 22 , the large artillery forces the Egyptians had concentrated began harassing the Israelis . The Egyptians had identified command posts and tank concentration areas for attack , especially at Serabaeum and Ain Ghasin , as well likely routes of attack , and continued to provide a withering fire support during the Israeli attack . At morning , Israeli aircraft attacked Egyptian positions , concentrating on Jebel Mariam , Abu ' Atwa , Nefisha , and al - Galaa ' base , and at noon they destroyed the Abu Gamoos Bridge at Ismailia . At this time , company - sized units of armor and infantry advanced against the Upper Bridge and the bridges at Nefisha but were repelled by Sagger missiles . At around 10 : 00 am , the Israelis renewed the attack , moving toward Jebel Mariam , Abu ' Atwa and Nefisha . The paratroopers at Jebel Mariam became engaged in intense fighting but , with their advantageous position , were able to repel the attack by late afternoon . Meanwhile the Israelis concentrated artillery and mortar fire against the Sa ' iqa positions at Abu ' Atwa and Nefisha . At noon , advance Israeli elements engaged with a Sa ' iqa reconnaissance unit , and the Israelis lost two tanks and a half - track . At 1 : 00 pm , an Israeli paratrooper company attacked Abu ' Atwa without first scouting ahead , and was ambushed and annihilated . The attack ended after paratroopers suffered over fifty casualties and lost four tanks . At the same time , two tank companies and mechanized infantry attacked Nefisha , supported with close air support . The Egyptian commando battalion in charge of Nefisha managed to repel the attack after prolonged , heavy fighting that closed to very short distances . The Israelis lost three tanks , two half - tracks , and a large number of men . For their part the Sa ' iqa at Nefisha lost 24 commandos , including four officers , and 42 wounded , including three officers . Edgar O ' Ballance mentions a counterattack by the Sa ' iqa which took place during the afternoon and pushed some of Sharon ' s troops back along the Sweetwater Canal . The Israeli attack had been thoroughly routed . Aftermath . With nightfall , the ceasefire imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 came into effect at 6 : 52 pm , ending the battle . A large number of Israeli wounded were still on the battlefield . Sharon requested helicopters to evacuate the wounded , but Bar - Lev replied in the negative , as it was dark and too risky to land helicopters near the battlefield . The Israelis worked to extract the wounded from the battlefield anyway , and the rescue operations took some four hours before most of the wounded were finally evacuated . When sunrise arrived , Israeli paratroopers and Egyptian Sa ' iqa sometimes found that there were no more than 20 meters separating their positions , but the ceasefire held . The combined Egyptian paratrooper - commando force managed to achieve a tactical and strategic victory at a time when Egypt ' s general situation on the battlefield was deteriorating , and GHQ was in a state of confusion . Sharon ' s advance toward Ismailia had been halted , and Second Army ' s logistical lines remained secure . According to Dupuy , the Israelis remained about ten kilometers south of Ismailia , now mostly a wrecked city . While the Egyptians attribute their successful defense of the city to their staunch resistance , Sharon would remain adamant after the war that he had failed to capture Ismailia due to Southern Command ' s interference . Sharon – who was a member of the political opposition in Israel – insisted that political issues played into hampering his advance against Ismailia . Sharon would frequently encourage his men by telling them " " The secretary of the Likud Party is here with you . " " Ismail Azmy ' s decision to detonate a bridge over the Sweetwater Canal on October 20 in order to stall an Israeli attack , in violation of direct orders not to do so , led to him being relieved of his command on October 25 , three days after the ceasefire . Captain Asa Kadmoni , who was awarded Israel ' s highest military decoration for his actions on October 18 , later returned his medal as a protest against his government ' s defense policy . Post cease - fire reconciliation . Israeli journalist Abraham Rabinovich , in his account of the Yom Kippur War , writes that despite being involved in intense fighting for several days , the Egyptian and Israeli soldiers in the Ismailia sector who survived the battle were among the first to reconcile , even when the first ceasefire was broken in the south and fighting resumed . On the morning of October 23 , an Israeli paratroop company under Captain Gideon Shamir was deploying near the Ismailia Canal , when Shamir saw Egyptian commandos , probably from the unit he had engaged the night before , encamped in an orchard less than 100 meters away . Wishing to ensure there would be no more killing in his sector , Shamir instructed his men to cover him and , taking a soldier who spoke Arabic , went to the commandos , shouting " Cease - fire , peace " so as not to surprise the Egyptians . The commandos held their fire as the two Israelis presented themselves , and soon summoned their company commander , who identified himself as Major Ali . Both men agreed to avoid shooting , and to avoid getting anyone on either side hurt . Ali even surprised Shamir by predicting that Sadat wanted peace with Israel , not just a cease - fire . In coming days , soldiers from both sides would come out to the clearing between their positions and fraternized . When shooting erupted in nearby sectors , they would return to their respective positions . Initially , the Egyptians would fire if it was nighttime , but the Israelis held their fire , and soon the Egyptians stopped firing as well . Soon , the commandos and paratroopers would meet daily , drinking coffee , playing backgammon and soccer , getting to personally know each other , and occasionally holding a kumzits , with the Egyptians slaughtering a sheep and the Israelis presenting food parcels sent from home . The example set by the Egyptians and Israelis here was soon emulated in other sectors , and even Sharon came to see for himself the " local armistice " that had taken place . At one point , two officers came with Ali to meet with Shamir and said they hoped relations between Egypt and Israel would come to match the relations between Shamir ' s and Ali ' s men . Rabinovich writes of this :