War Plan Orange War Plan Orange ( commonly known as Plan Orange or just Orange ) refers to a series of United States Joint Army and Navy Board war plans for dealing with a possible war with Japan during the years between the First and Second World Wars . Informal studies as early as 1906 covered a number of possibilities , from basing at Gibraltar or Singapore ( an idea revived by the British before World War II ) to " a quick trans - Atlantic dash " to the Pacific . The plan eventually adopted was conceived by Rear Admiral Raymond P . Rodgers in 1911 . The plan was formally adopted by the Joint Army and Navy Board beginning in 1924 . Predating the Rainbow plans , which presumed the assistance of allies , Orange was predicated on the U . S . fighting Japan alone . As originally conceived , it anticipated a withholding of supplies from the Philippines and other US outposts in the Western Pacific ( they were expected to hold out on their own ) , while the Pacific Fleet marshaled its strength at bases in California , and guarded against attacks on the Panama Canal . After mobilization ( the ships maintained only half of their crews in peacetime ) , the Fleet would sail to the Western Pacific to relieve American forces in Guam and the Philippines . Afterwards , the fleet would sail North for a decisive battle against the Imperial Japanese Navy ' s Combined Fleet , and then blockade the Japanese home islands . This was in keeping with the theory of Alfred Thayer Mahan , a doctrine to which every major navy subscribed before World War II , in which wars would be decided by engagements between opposing surface fleets ( as they had been for over 300 years ) . Rodgers ' concept was closer to the one ultimately used in the Pacific War : a " leapfrog " campaign to conquer the Marshalls and Carolines ( held by Japan before the war ) ; liberation of the Philippines ; and blockade . Absent was the " decisive battle " of Mahan , and of Japanese planning . American war planners failed to appreciate that technological advances in submarine s and naval aviation had made Mahan ' s doctrine obsolete . In particular , they did not understand that aircraft could effectively sink battleships , nor that Japan might put the US battleship force ( the Battle Line ) out of action at a stroke — as in fact happened during Pearl Harbor . American plans changed after this attack . Even after major Japanese defeats like Midway , the US favored a methodical " island - hopping " advance , never going far beyond land - based air cover . Meanwhile , blockade was imposed from the very beginning of the war , with the first American submarine , Joe Grenfell ' s " Gudgeon " , arriving off Japan on about 31 December . A number of requirements grew out of Orange , including the specification for a fleet submarine with high speed , long range , and heavy torpedo armament . These coalesced in the submarine " Dolphin " in 1932 ( only to be rejected and returned to with the " Gato " class in around August 1941 ) . The demand for submarines of this size also drove the development of the notorious Mark XIV torpedo ( and its equally notorious Mark VI exploder ) , under the guidance of Commander Ralph W . Christie . The Navy also spent " several hundred thousand dollars " to develop powerful , compact diesel engines , among them the troublesome Hooven - Owens - Rentschler ( HOR ) , which proved useful for railroads . Japanese plans . The Imperial Japanese Navy developed a counter - plan to allow the US Pacific Fleet to sail across the Pacific while using submarines and carrier attacks to weaken it . The Japanese fleet would then attempt to force a battle against the weakened US fleet in a " decisive battle area " , near Japan ( see Kantai Kessen ) , also in line with Mahanian doctrine , which Japan had enthusiastically embraced . It was the basis for Japan ' s demand for a 70 % ratio ( 10 : 10 : 7 ) at the Washington Naval Conference , which was considered necessary to provide Japan superiority in the " decisive battle area " , ( taking into account that the US had naval commitments in other theaters , while Japan did not ) , as well as the US ' s insistence on 60 % , which amounted to parity . Outcome . Actual events were very close to the final plan . Carrier battles overshadowed surface action , but the " leapfrog " campaign was very much as anticipated . The Imperial Japanese Navy , focused with the " decisive battle " doctrine , ignored the vital need for defense against submarines . The German and American submarine campaigns against their opponents ' merchant shipping demonstrated the need for ASW . While the Allies took extensive measures to combat the threat of German U - boats , the Japanese failed to counter the American submarines which ultimately choked Japan ' s industrial production and paralyzed her navy . Japan also notably failed to institute an anti - commerce campaign herself ; systematic use of commerce raider s could have made Allied operations much more complex and conquering and holding Japanese - held islands more difficult .