Operation Badr ( 1973 ) Operation " Badr ( ; " ʻAmaliyat Badr " ) or Plan " Badr ( خطة بدر ; " Khitat Badr " ) was the code name for the Egypt ian military operation to cross the Suez Canal and seize the Bar - Lev Line of Israeli fortifications on October 6 , 1973 . Launched in conjunction with a Syrian assault on the Golan Heights , this attack marked the start of the Yom Kippur War . Operation " Badr " was preceded by training exercises starting in 1968 , operational planning from 1971 onwards and a deception operation . In the opening stages of the attack , known as The Crossing ( العبور ; " al - ' obour " ) , combat engineers used water cannon s to rapidly clear numerous passages through the sand wall lining the east bank of the canal , laid bridges and operated ferries , allowing armor to cross . Egyptian infantry assaulted the Bar - Lev fortifications and were counterattacked by Israeli armor and infantry . The attack surprised the Israelis , and by October 7 the crossing was complete , and the east bank of the canal was occupied by five Egyptian infantry divisions . The infantry proceeded to establish defensive positions in bridgehead s spanning the front . Following a lull in the fighting on October 7 , Israeli armor reserves arrived at the front and launched a counterattack opposite the city of Ismailia . The Egyptian forces were successful in employing anti - tank weapons to repel the Israeli armor and advanced once more . By the end of October 8 , Egypt occupied a strip of territory along the entire east bank of the canal to a depth of approximately . In addition to the canal crossing , Egypt laid a successful naval blockade against Israel in the Red Sea and Mediterranean Sea . Prelude : 1967 – 1970 . At the end of the Six Day War , Israel held the entire Sinai peninsula , with the exception of Port Fouad . Israel ' s victory in the Six Day War brought about a sense of security within Israel ; the occupied territory added strategic depth to the country ' s defense . Consequently , Israel ignored United Nations Security Council Resolution ( UNSCR ) 242 , which called for withdrawal from occupied territories in return for Arab recognition , and negotiations between the countries ceased . Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir aimed to maintain the status quo and believed that her country ' s military strength would secure peace with Arab nations on their terms . The 1967 war severely depleted Egypt ' s military strength , as most of their air force and a large quantity of equipment was destroyed . Soviet assistance helped the Egyptian military to start the rebuilding of their armed forces shortly after the war , and by September 1968 Egyptian ground forces sufficiently recovered to challenge the Israeli presence east of the Suez canal . The War of Attrition began with Egyptian artillery barrages and commando raids into the Sinai , which were countered by deep - striking Israeli airstrikes and heli - borne raids into Egypt . Egypt ' s inability to challenge Israeli air superiority led to the deployment of Soviet - operated air - defense assets to protect parts of Egypt ' s interior , deterring the Israelis from launching their deep penetration raids and allowing the Egyptians to rebuild their air defenses . The defensive upgrades incurred increasing Israeli air losses , leading to an August 1970 ceasefire that lasted until 1973 . Nasser died in September 1970 and was succeeded by Anwar Sadat . Egyptian strategy . President Sadat believed that Egypt ' s economic , political , and military problems were a result of the Six Day War . He believed the solution to these problems lay with erasing the humiliation of the 1967 defeat , which required regaining the Sinai . In 1971 Sadat began the coordinated political and military groundwork to achieve this . In February , he proposed a phased Israel withdrawal from the Sinai , which would involve a reopening of the Suez Canal , and Israeli fulfillment of the UNSCR 242 , including resolving the Palestinian refugee problem . In return Egypt would sign a peace treaty with Israel and reestablish relations with the United States . However Israeli insistence on retention of territory necessary for its security ended diplomatic efforts . Simultaneously , Sadat sought to improve Egypt ' s military capabilities , and in March began the first of four trips to the Soviet Union to obtain arms and munitions to cover those expended in the War of Attrition . He publicly stated his desire to go to war and marked 1971 the " year of decision " . However , the Soviets failed to deliver the promised supplies , and Sadat ruled out an offensive that year . As 1971 drew to a close , Sadat ' s threats were dismissed as hollow Arab rhetoric . Added to their already weak political position , Arab leaders reached a consensus in 1972 that a diplomatic solution to the conflict was hopeless . American mediation steadily declined , ceasing entirely by mid - 1973 . By 1972 the United States and the Soviet Union were focused on détente . The Arabs were worried , as it meant their military situation vis - à - vis Israel would remain at a disadvantage . Believing diplomatic avenues had reached a dead end , Sadat focused on taking decisive military action . A renewed conflict with Israel would disrupt Soviet - American détente , force superpower intervention and make the solution of the Arab - Israeli conflict a center - stage issue to Israel , the US and the USSR . A number of Egyptian commanders wanted to carry out a general war to regain at least a significant part of the Sinai . This view was notably held by the Minister of War , General Mohammed Ahmed Sadek . However , in January 1972 Sadek acknowledged that Egypt ' s Armed Forces were not ready for a land reclamation war before some five to ten years . Sadek cited studies in opposition of a limited offensive ; Egyptian analyses estimated 17 , 000 casualties in a canal crossing , while Soviet estimates placed casualty figures at 35 , 000 troops . Sadek stressed the immense losses that would be sustained would overshadow any military and political gains from a limited offensive , which required following up by liberating all or most of the Sinai . For political reasons , Sadat dismissed Sadek ' s arguments . The government ' s political position was perilous as the Egyptian public , angered by the " No War , No Peace " situation with Israel , demanded action . The economy , already suffering from the loss of the Suez Canal revenues and the Sinai oil fields , could not cope with the country being on a war footing for an extended period . War was a desperate option , and a limited offensive under the current circumstances was the only solution . At a session of the Arab League ' s Joint Defence Council on January 27 – 30 , 1973 , Egypt presented a report stressing that an attack against Israel would have to be carried out simultaneously from Egypt , Syria and Jordan because of the Israeli air superiority . According to the report , Egypt and Syria ' s air forces , if reinforced with 16 air squadrons from other Arab countries would achieve numerical superiority . However , the Israelis offset this by superior training , avionics , aircraft payload and weaponry . A simultaneous Arab attack could dilute the effectiveness of the Israeli Air Force ( IAF ) , and would force Israeli ground forces to fight a two - front war . During that month , Syrian President Hafez al - Assad indicated his intentions of going to war against Israel . Egypt and Syria agreed to coordinate military action via negotiations , and the respective Ministers of War formulated a common military strategy . Egypt enlisted the political support of several more Arab countries , some producers of oil . Sadat discussed the possibility of using oil as an economic weapon to pressure Western governments into adopting more pro - Arab policies . During the war , oil - producing Arab nations , primarily Libya and Saudi Arabia , initiated an oil embargo , and several sent token forces to the front lines . Sadat bred caution into his commanders , even warning his later Minister of War , Ahmed Ismail Ali , " not to lose the army as had happened in 1967 . " On 3 June 1971 he outlined his vision of a limited war : I want us to plan < nowiki > [ the offensive ] < / nowiki > within our capabilities , nothing more . Cross the canal and hold even ten centimeters of the Sinai . I ' m exaggerating , of course , but that will help me greatly and alter completely the political situation internationally and within Arab ranks . Sadat ' s strategy was designed to achieve political success without needing a comprehensive military victory , and hence , and in view of the Egyptian military ' s marked inferiority to the Israeli Defense Forces , this required only a limited war . Background . Planning and Preparations . Major General Mohammed Fawzi , who was Sadek ' s predecessor as defense minister , regularly held command simulations . These exercises had unrealistic objectives and operational aims that were considerably outside the capabilities of the Egyptian military . When Lieutenant General Saad El Shazly became Chief of Staff on 16 May 1971 , no offensive plans yet existed . Rather , there was a defensive plan code named Operation " 200 " , and a more aggressive alternative named Operation " Granite " . Although Granite incorporated raids and assaults into the Sinai , it was essentially defensive . In his assessment of the military ' s capabilities , he concluded the air force was the weakest arm . It was outmatched by its Israeli counterpart in various aspects , and Israeli pilots were also more experienced . A pivotal equipment advantage for the IAF was the F - 4 Phantom II , a third generation fighter / bomber . By the outbreak of the war in October 1973 , the IDF had 122 F - 4E and 6 RF - 4Es ( R denotes the reconnaissance variant ) in service . To compensate for the weaknesses of Egyptian air power , the Egyptians developed their air defenses . They fielded immobile SA - 2 and SA - 3 SAMs , the backbone of the air defenses , as well as mobile SA - 6 SAMs and ZSU - 23 - 4 SPAAG s ( Self Propelled Anti - Air Gun ) , portable infantry SA - 7 s , in addition to thousands of conventional anti - air artillery . These air defenses would provide a protective " umbrella " over Egyptian ground forces . However , the SA - 2 and SA - 3 systems , being immobile , could only be moved over a nine - hour period at best , exposing the air defenses to degradation in case of a redeployment to keep up with advancing forces . On the other hand , the SA - 6 systems were available in limited numbers insufficient to provide adequate protection to advancing armored forces . Due to these restrictions , Shazly supported a limited war to retake only the east bank of the canal , as opposed to Sadek . However , Sadek authorized the planning of two offensive plans , starting in July 1971 . The first was Operation " 41 " , which involved an offensive along the entire Suez Canal with the objective of seizing the key passes of the Sinai . The plan was developed in cooperation with Soviet advisers . As it was , the objectives of the operation were outside the capabilities of the Egyptian military and Shazly saw it only as a means of inducing the Soviets to supply more arms and equipment . The plan would also encourage the Syrians to join in an attack against Israel . Operation " 41 " was completed by September 1971 , and the following month , Sadat and Sadek flew to Moscow to conclude Egypt ' s largest arms deal yet , receiving 100 MiG - 21 fighters , 10 Tu - 16 bombers , SA - 6 anti - aircraft ( AA ) missiles and heavy artillery . Operation " 41 " was renamed " Granite Two " . The second plan — codenamed the " " High Minarets " " — called for a crossing at five separate areas along the length of the canal . The Egyptians would advance , then establish defensive positions . By restricting their advance , Egyptian ground forces would remain within range of their own SAM defences , which would provide a protective " umbrella " , negating the Israeli advantage in the air . In this way the High Minarets was planned in accordance with the capabilities of the Egyptian Army . The plan ' s outline was completed by September 1971 in absolute secrecy . As Sadek continued to refuse the concept of a limited war , tensions rose between him and Sadat . Following a heated meeting of senior commanders , the Minister of War was sacked . His replacement , Major General Ahmed Ismail , was in favor of a limited offensive . The High Minarets continued to be developed as the only viable offensive plan , with the spring of 1973 being a possible launch date . Based on intelligence estimates , the main Israeli counterattacks would take place 6 – 8 hours after the assault began by three armored divisions , while armored support for the crossing would not be available before at least 12 hours . To deal with this , Egyptian infantry would be supplied with large numbers of anti - tank guided missile s ( ATGM ) and rocket propelled grenade s ( RPG ) . The portable anti - tank weapons were principally the RPG - 7 and the less numerous wire - guided AT - 3 Sagger , as well as hundreds of recoilless rifle s and conventional weapons . The manually guided Sagger missile had a long range and a powerful warhead but suffered from low velocity in flight , allowing the target ( such as a tank ) time to take evasive maneuver or return fire . Its minimum range of created a significant area of dead ground , which was to be covered by the RPG , along with the B - 10 and B - 11 recoilless rifle s . In addition , there were RPG - 43 anti - tank grenades . Assault infantry were equipped with night vision device s , infrared scopes , and welder ' s goggles to counter a tactic often used by the Israelis ; mounting xenon floodlights on tanks and vehicles to blind enemy infantry at night . To allow the infantry to carry an assortment of heavy weaponry — ATGMs , RPGs , flamethrowers , machine guns , and mines — before the bridges were laid , was achieved by two steps . Firstly , five different field kits were created that were lighter , accommodated larger water bottles and could carry 24 hours ' food supply . Each field kit was specifically designed to meet the needs of the various assault teams . The other solution was to use four - wheel wooden carts to transport equipment , weaponry and ammunition . Over 2 , 200 such carts would be used in the crossing , providing the capacity to transport nearly 330 tons ( 150 , 000 lb ) of matériel . Rope ladders with wooden steps would be deployed to lift ammunition and heavy equipment , such as the B - 11 recoilless rifle , to the top of the sand wall . The High Minarets called for assault infantry to establish bridgeheads deep and wide . The relatively short perimeter would increase fire density , and initially the attack would receive supporting fire from sand ramparts on the western bank . Once reinforcements and armor crossed , the bridgeheads would be deepened to . This had to be accomplished within 18 hours of the start of the operation . Airborne and seaborne forces would conduct attacks and ambushes to delay Israeli reserves heading for the Bar Lev line . The spring of 1973 passed with no offensive being launched . On 21 August of that year , in complete secrecy , six senior Syrian commanders , using false names and passports , arrived from Latakia at Alexandria harbor in a Soviet passenger liner carrying holiday makers . Among the Syrian commanders were , principally , the Minister of Defense General Mustafa Tlass and the Chief of Staff General Yusuf Shakkour . For the next two days , they convened with their Egyptian counterparts at Egyptian Naval Headquarters in Ras el Tin Palace . By August 23 , two documents were ratified by Shazly and Shakkour concluding that the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces were ready for war . All that remained was to choose a date ; either September 7 – 11 or October 5 – 10 . The date was to be chosen jointly by Presidents Sadat and Hafez al - Assad , and they were required to communicate their decision to their commanders fifteen days before the date of attack . When 27 August , fifteen days before 7 September , passed without a reply from either Sadat or Assad , it was clear no offensive would take place in September . During 28 and 29 August , Sadat met with Assad in Damascus , where they agreed to start the war in October . They specified October 6 as D - Day , and informed Ahmed Ismail and Tlass on 22 September , who in turn relayed the decision to the Chiefs of Staff . At the request of Ahmed Ismail , Sadat produced a presidential directive for war . Therefore it was only in September , less than a month before the attack , that the date October 6 was finally selected as D - Day . The coordinated offensive would begin at 14 : 00 ( Cairo Local Time ) . October 6 was chosen for several reasons . The speed of the water current and the tide were optimal for a crossing operation , and for most of the night there was a full moon , facilitating bridge construction . The date coincided with Yom Kippur , the Jewish Day of Atonement . This was an important factor in choosing October 6 for an attack ; Jews fast on that day , abstain from the use of fire or electricity ( which meant transportation would be at a standstill ) , and much of the Israeli army would be demobilised . October also coincided with the month of Ramadan in the Muslim Calendar , which meant that Muslim soldiers would be fasting . It was in Ramadan that the Muslims won their first victory at the Battle of Badr in the year 634 . Opting for something more inspirational than the High Minarets as a name , Operation " Badr " was chosen by Egyptian commanders as the codename for the assault . Combat engineering . In any crossing of the Suez Canal by Egyptian forces , success was highly dependent on the performance of the Egyptian Corps of Engineers , which had several daunting tasks to accomplish . Israeli engineers had constructed a massive artificial sand barrier spanning of the canal ' s east bank ( except for the Great Bitter Lake , where the width of the canal made a crossing unlikely ) . To prevent erosion , the sand barrier was supported by concrete , which was one meter ( 3⅓ ft ) above the water at high tide , and three meters ( 10 ft ) above water at low tide . The canal was wide and approximately deep . Engineers had to clear seventy passages through this sand wall , each seven meters ( 23 ft ) wide . This meant the removal of of sand for each passage . Initially , conventional methods were tested for breaching the sand wall . It was found that , to clear a single passage required 60 men , 1 bulldozer , 600 lb of explosives and five to six hours , uninterrupted by enemy fire . Since the crossing sites would likely be congested and under enemy fire , these methods proved to be impractical and too costly . The solution to this dilemma was simple but nonetheless ingenious . Late in 1971 , an Egyptian officer suggested the use of small , light , gasoline fueled pumps that could be ferried across the canal in inflatable rafts to blast through the sand barrier . The suggestion proved worthwhile , and the Egyptian Military ordered some 300 British - made pumps . Tests showed that five of these pumps could remove 1 , 500 cubic meters of sand in three hours . In 1972 another 150 more powerful German - made pumps were purchased . A combination of three British - made and two German - made pumps made it possible to clear a passage in two hours . Once the passages were cleared , engineers had to construct ten heavy bridges , five light bridges , ten pontoon bridges and 35 ferries . The passages had to be opened in five to seven hours , immediately followed by the ferries , then the bridges two hours later , all the while under enemy fire . Of the heavy bridges , the Egyptians had only two Soviet - made PMP heavy folding bridges , which could be erected in a shorter time than most other bridges in their inventory , saving a few critical hours . These bridges were also much easier to repair . The speed with which the engineers cleared the passages and laid the bridges and ferries would affect the course of the entire operation . Engineers also had to man the boats that would cross the assault infantry initially . Finally , they had to breach the minefields around Israeli defenses for the assault infantry . Israeli defences . The Israelis had constructed a series of fortifications along the canal called the Bar Lev Line , which was considered impregnable . The main obstacle of these defences was a massive artificial sand wall erected by Israeli engineers , high with a 45 – 60 degree incline , along the entire Suez Canal . The rampart were reinforced by concrete that also prevented any attempt by amphibious vehicles to climb the sand wall . To blast through the sand barrier the Israelis estimated would take at least twenty - four , probably forty - eight hours . Behind this rampart were a series of 22 fortifications comprising 35 strongpoints . On average , the fortifications were apart . A strongpoint was several stories deep into the sand and provided protection from a 1000 pound ( ~ ½ ton ) bomb . Strongpoints incorporated trenches , barbed wire , minefields 200 meters deep , numerous bunkers and troop shelters , and firing positions for tanks . Each strongpoint had an underground reservoir filled with crude oil . The oil could be pumped into the Suez Canal via a pipe system , and ignited to create temperatures reaching . A second defensive line , behind the main line , was concentrated at likely crossing areas , and designed to be occupied by armored forces , incorporating tank firing positions . A third defensive line , behind the Bar Lev Line ( the defenses on the canal ) , had its defences concentrated on the main roads and principal routes of advance for an attacker . Behind the main line on the canal were concentration areas for armor and infantry , supply depots , numerous artillery positions and so forth . The Israeli command developed a basic defensive plan codenamed Dovecoat ( Shovach Yonim ) , the details of which were known to the Egyptians . The plan divided the Bar Lev Line into three sectors : the northern sector defended Arish on the coast to Qantara , the central sector defended Ismailia to Abu - Ageila , and the southern sector defended the area from the Great Bitter Lake to the end of the Suez Canal , and prevented a thrust to the Mitla and Gedy Passes . The 252nd Armored Division , led by Major General Albert Mandler , was charged with the defense of the Bar Lev Line , and incorporated three armored brigades . Positioned behind the series of fortifications was a brigade of 110 – 120 tanks , led by Colonel Reshef , split into three battalions of 36 – 40 tanks each , with one battalion to a sector . In case of an Egyptian attack , the brigade was to move forward to occupy tank platforms and firing positions along the Bar Lev Line . A further behind the canal were two additional armored brigades led by Colonels Gabi Amir and Dan Shomron , each with around 120 tanks . One brigade was to reinforce the forward armored brigade , while the other brigade counterattacked against the main Egyptian assault . The Sinai garrison numbered 18 , 000 men . The overall commander was Shmuel Gonen , who served as head of the Israeli Southern Command . Of the garrison stationed in the Sinai , one infantry brigade occupied the strongpoints on the canal on October 6 , while a further 8 , 000 could be deployed to the line within 30 minutes to two hours along with the armor . Deception and final days to war . Positioning the Second and Third Armies with their bridging equipment along the canal in preparation for Operation " Badr " would put the Israelis on high alert . Without the element of surprise Egyptian forces would suffer high losses in the attack ( estimates for casualties already ran in the thousands ) . The Directorate of Military Intelligence ( abbreviated Aman ) , which formulated Israel ' s intelligence estimate and was known for its competency , was tasked with detecting troop movements and activity along Egyptian and Syrian forces ; military activity which would be particularly intensive in the last days preceding the assault . The deception plan mounted by the Egyptians , which included their intelligence services , relied on producing a series of events and incidents , militarily and politically , internationally and nationally , aimed at convincing Israeli intelligence analysts that the Arab world was not preparing for war . Among the plan ' s requirements was that senior echelon commanders preserve superficial normality while working secretly on the final preparations for the offensive . The core of the Egyptian deception plan was based on the prevalent Israeli mentality following their lightning - quick victory over Arab forces in the 1967 Six Day War . This mentality is clearly illustrated in the following Israeli saying : In his thesis of the Yom Kippur War , USMC Major Michael C . Jordan explains that this quote and the prevailing opinion it represented pre - October 1973 : . . . also reflects the contempt Israelis held for the military abilities of Arab neighbors Egypt and Syria . The 1967 preemptive victory was so complete and won so cheaply , Israelis viewed their military forces as invincible , their intelligence service as unmatched , and their Arab foes as inferior and incapable . The Israelis expected a forty - eight hour warning beforehand from their intelligence services . At any rate , they were confident that any Arab attack would be swiftly decimated by the IAF . The Egyptians sought to exploit this Israeli belief to their advantage . Ever since assuming office , Sadat had continually threatened Israel with war , engaging in brinkmanship , until his threats became ignored by Israel and the world . In order to position their forces for the attack against Israel , the Egyptians announced an exercise by the canal . Exercises had been conducted numerous times before , and in May and August 1973 false alarms had caused the Israeli army to mobilise in response to these exercises , costing Israel some $ 10 million on each occasion . This time , when the Egyptians began exercises on October 1 to last until October 7 , Aman disregarded the heightened military activity as training maneuvers . Troop movements on the Syrian front were detected as well , but Aman concluded that the Syrians would not go to war without the Egyptians . The pretext of exercises allowed the Egyptians to conceal their preparations . These were further facilitated by the fact that the Egyptian Second and Third Field Armies were normally stationed along the Suez Canal for defence . Troops , armor , and crucially , the bridging equipment , were moved to their concentration areas over a period of fifteen nights up to the night of October 5 / 6 , with a peak of activity during the final five nights . Ever since it occupied the Sinai in 1967 , Israel had openly declared it would remain in Sharm el - Sheikh to ensure the sea lanes to the port of Eilat through the Straits of Tiran remained opened ( the closing of the Straits to Israeli shipping in 1967 was one of the causes of the Six Day War ) . Egypt aimed to nullify Sharm el - Sheikh ' s importance to Israel by imposing a naval blockade at the straits of Bab - el - Mandeb , almost from Israel . To this end , arrangements were made with Pakistan to receive Egyptian vessels for repair early in 1973 . Approval was sought , and obtained , from Sudan and Yemen to receive the submarines on their way to Pakistan in Port Sudan and Aden as a friendly visit . Pakistan ' s approval to receive Egyptian vessels for repairs were made public . On 1 October , a force containing several submarines , destroyers and missile boats set sail on a route planned to ensure their arrival at Bab - el - Mandeb on October 6 . The fleet was fully equipped for combat , and the force was ordered to maintain complete radio silence ; which meant there was no way of recalling the submarines . The commanding officers , unaware of their real mission , were issued sealed envelopes detailing their orders and mission , and were instructed to open the envelopes on 6 October , only a few hours before the war was to begin , whereupon they would break their radio silence . Once the fleet had set sail that day , 1 October , " " the war had effectively begun " " . The military sought to maintain an impression of normality . Just before Ramadan was to begin on 26 September , the Ministry of War publicly announced that military personnel could register to take leave to perform a Umrah ( pilgrimage ) in Mecca . Egyptian newspapers announced that sailboat races would be held , participants of which included several high - ranking officers of the Egyptian Navy . In addition , a visit planned for October 8 ( two days after the scheduled attack ) by the Romanian Minister of Defense to Egypt was also publicized by the Ministry of War , and a program for his visit was announced . This coincidental visit would be promptly canceled once war broke out on 6 October , but it proved useful as part of the deception plan . On 27 September , a large batch of reservists were given orders for mobilization . To lull suspicion , the Cabinet Ministers of the Egyptian Government were invited to an open tour of General Headquarters , where all planning and coordination of the operation took place . Another batch of reservists were called up on September 30 . To quell suspicion once more , the Egyptians publicly announced on 4 October the demobilization of the reservists who had been called up on 27 September , but only demobilized 20 , 000 men . From 1 October onwards , the order for war began to spread outside the circle of senior commanders in Egypt . Generals Saad Mamoun and Abdel Munim Wasel , commanders of the Second and Third Field Armies respectively , were informed of the decision to implement Operation " Badr " . On 3 October , they informed their divisional commanders . Brigade commanders were told on 4 October , battalion and company commanders on 5 October , while platoon commanders and troops were told on 6 October , six hours before the start of the attack . Sadat also played his role the deception plan ; in September he had attended the Non - Aligned conference in Algeria , and upon his return was rumored to be ill . Sadat remained , for several days leading up to 6 October , out of public sight . Egyptian intelligence planted false stories of his illness in the press and initiated a search for a home in Europe , where Sadat would receive treatment , adding to the rumor ' s credibility . Implementing the deception operation did not go through entirely without incident . Initially the Soviets were kept in the dark about Egyptian intentions to go to war . Instead , on October 2 , they were told that an Israeli raid was expected . Over the next two days the director of the Defense Intelligence Service , General Fouad Nassar , informed the Chief Soviet Liaison Officer , General Samakhodsky , that the raid was expected to be a large - scale attack , coupled with an air strike . Though Samakhodsky appeared at first to believe Nassar ' s story , it became clear to the Egyptians that the Soviets were suspicious . In particular Soviet advisors serving with Egyptian and Syrian units were by October 3 reporting the unusually heightened activities of the Egyptian and Syrian forces . Both Sadat and Assad decided to inform the Soviets of their intention to go to war on October 3 . Promptly , the Soviets requested permission to evacuate their personnel in Egypt , and both leaders reluctantly agreed . Egyptian commanders were taken completely by surprise , when , beginning late evening on October 4 , Soviet experts serving with field units , embassy personnel and their families were hurriedly evacuated . By October 5 , the evacuation was complete . This incident would be an important factor in convincing the Israelis that war was likely . October 4 also provided another worrying incident to Egyptian commanders , who became aware that evening that EgyptAir , the country ' s national airline , had canceled all its flights and was arranging the protection of its civil air fleet by dispersing its aircraft to refuges outside Egypt . The orders came from the Minister of Aviation , Ahmed Nuh . General Headquarters quickly intervened to reverse the dispersal orders , and by October 5 flights were back to their normal schedule . It was believed the incident was a breach of security and a leak on Egyptian plans for war . It was not clear to Egyptian commanders however , whether the Israelis were aware of the incident . On September 13 , 1973 , an air battle took place between Syrian and Israeli fighters . It was an alarming skirmish in which twelve Syrian aircraft were shot down while the Israelis lost only one fighter . Tension ran high between both countries . The Egyptians in particular were very concerned ; on April 7 , 1967 , an air battle between Syria and Israel had escalated the military situation and was one of the causes of the Six Day War . Aware that war was to be launched only days later , the Syrians chose not to retaliate . The air battle aided the Syrians in concentrating their forces for the war , as the Israelis interpreted it to be a defensive reaction on the part of the Syrians . The Israelis closely monitored this buildup near the front , but their intelligence remained adamant that Syria would not go to war without Egypt , which the Israelis believed was currently occupied with internal issues . Throughout September 1973 , Aman had received eleven warnings , including a warning from Jordan ' s King Hussein , that Egypt and Syria were bent on waging war , but they were all disregarded , as Aman maintained the belief that the Arabs would not launch an attack . Mossad director Zvi Zamir remained of the opinion that war was not an Arab option . However there remained too many signs for the Israelis to ignore , chief among which was the hasty Soviet evacuation from Cairo and Damascus , and the constant buildup of forces on the Syrian front when Egypt , it was assumed , would not enter war . Though the Chief of Staff , David Elazar , was assured that the probability of war remained low , he took precautionary steps on October 5 . Elazar placed the entire military on alert , canceled all leaves , and ordered the Air Force to assume a full - alert posture . He also ordered the 7th Armored Brigade to relocate from the Sinai to the Golan Heights . This raised Israeli numbers in the Golan Heights to 177 tanks and 44 artillery pieces on October 6 . To replace the 7th Armored Brigade , the Armor School , under the command of Colonel Gabi Amir , was ordered to activate its tank brigade for immediate airlift ; it was in the Sinai by October 6 , before the war began . Ultimately though , no orders for mobilization were issued to reservists ; Elazar and other senior commanders still expected a 24 – 48 hour warning from the intelligence services if the Arab nations were bent on war . During the night of October 5 / 6 , Zvi Zamir went to Europe to meet personally with Ashraf Marwan , an Egyptian double agent . Marwan informed Zamir that a joint Egyptian - Syrian attack was imminent . Combined with other warnings and incidents , Marwan ' s warning finally convinced Zvi Zamir of the imminence of war . Eli Zeira , the director of Aman , sent a definite warning of war to the Israeli leadership at 04 : 30 on October 6 . Aman erred when it concluded the Arabs were to attack at 18 : 00 , an estimation in fact four hours late . Israel ' s Prime Minister Golda Meir met with Defence Minister Moshe Dayan and General David Elazar at 08 : 05 for over an hour . Meir asked both men to present their views , which were conflicting : Dayan continued to believe war was not a certainty , while Elazar believed otherwise , arguing for a preemptive air strike against Syria . Dayan also proposed a partial mobilization of reserves , while Elazar favored a mobilization of the entire Air Force , and four armored divisions , totaling around 100 , 000 – 120 , 000 troops . Meir concluded the meeting by stating that no preemptive strike would be launched , in order to ensure the backing of the United States , but she sided with Elazar on the issue of mobilization , and orders were issued to reservists to mobilize . Aman delivered its warning to Israeli commanders just nine and a half hours before the outbreak of hostilities , falling considerably short of the expected 24 – 48 hours warning period . The Arabs had won the intelligence war , achieving full surprise and gaining the initiative on the battlefield . Course of the Operation . October 6 - The Crossing . " Badr " began at 14 : 00 on October 6 , 1973 . As the Israelis expected the attack to begin four hours later , only part of the troops and none of the armor assigned to man the Bar Lev Line were in position , except for a few platoons in the northernmost forts . Sixteen fortifications on the line were fully manned , and another two were partially manned . The operation began with a major air strike involving more than 200 aircraft against three airbases , Hawk SAM batteries , three command centers , artillery positions and several radar stations , employing MiG - 21s , MiG - 17 s , and Su - 7 s . This was in concert with artillery strikes starting at 14 : 05 from nearly 2 , 000 pieces against the Bar - Lev line , and against armor concentration areas and artillery positions , using field guns , howitzers , mortars , tank guns , B - 10 and B - 11 recoilless rifle s . The self - propelled 152 mm howitzers and 130 mm field guns were assigned counter - battery fire missions against Israeli artillery . The 53 - minute long fire preparation , one of the largest in history , was divided into four barrages . The first , fifteen minutes long , was aimed at enemy targets on the eastern bank up to a depth of 1 . 5 kilometers . An estimated 10 , 500 shells were fired against Israeli targets in the first minute alone . With the start of the fire preparation , tank hunting detachments — groups of ten equipped with RPG - 7 rockets , RPG - 43 grenades , and AT - 3 Sagger missiles — crossed the canal to deploy one kilometer deep , quickly occupying the tank ramparts , and proceeded to set up ambushes and lay mines . When the first barrage ended , Egyptian artillery began a second , 22 minute - long barrage , against targets at a depth of 1 . 5 – 3 kilometers . At this time , 14 : 20 , the first wave of assault infantry , 4 , 000 men , began crossing the canal , crying " " Allahu Akbar . . . Allahu Akbar . . . " " ( God is Great ) . Around 2 , 500 dinghies and wooden boats were used to transport the troops . Smoke canisters were used at the crossing points to provide cover . During the night of October 5 , engineers had blocked the underwater pipes on the opposite bank , preventing the Israelis from releasing flammable oil into the canal and igniting it . The first wave was lightly equipped , armed with RPG - 7s , Strela 2 AA missiles and rope ladders to deploy on the sand wall . Among the first wave were combat engineers and several units of Sa ' iqa ( lit . " lightening " ; these were commando forces ) , who were tasked with setting up ambushes on reinforcement routes . The Sa ' iqa attacked command posts and artillery batteries in order to deny the Israelis control over their forces , while the engineers breached the minefields and barbed wire surrounding Israeli defenses . Immediately following them , military engineer s transported the water pumps to the opposite bank and began setting them up . At this time Egyptian aircraft involved in the air strike began returning . Five aircraft were lost , although by the end of the day this rose to ten . The air strike put the Bir Gifgafa and Bir Thamada air bases out of operation for 48 hours , and damaged the Ras Nasrani and Bir Hasanah airbases . Around ten HAWK batteries , at least two 175mm artillery batteries , an electronic jamming center at Umm Khashib , and various radar stations were destroyed . This allowed the Egyptian Air Force to operate for the rest of the war without any ground - based communications interference , as the only other jamming center in the Sinai was located at el - Arish , considerably behind the front . Over a dozen AS - 5 Kelt missiles were fired from Tu - 16 bombers as well . Several were shot down , but at least five hit their targets , including two missiles fitted with anti - radiation seekers that knocked out Israeli radars . The success of the air strike caused the Egyptians to cancel a planned second air strike . Another account however states that 18 Egyptian aircraft were lost , and these losses prompted the canceling of a second wave of airstrikes . At the Great Bitter Lake , the Egyptian 130th Amphibious Brigade performed its own crossing . Composed of the 602nd and 603rd Mechanized Infantry Battalions with 1 , 000 men , including a Sagger anti - tank battalion , an anti - air battalion , 20 PT - 76 tanks and 100 amphibious armored personnel carriers , it was tasked with seeking and destroying enemy installations at the entrances of the Gedy and Mitla Passes . The sand rampart that lined the entire Suez Canal did not exist in the Bitter Lakes , and there were no Israeli defences or units to be encountered , and the brigade reached the opposite bank around 14 : 40 without any losses . The Egyptians discovered a minefield blocking their advance , and military engineer s worked to clear a path . Subsequently , at around 16 : 00 , the 603rd was regrouping outside the minefield when it was attacked by a company of tanks from Kibrit East ( codenamed Putzer by the Israelis ) , a fortification of the Bar Lev located on the Bitter Lake . The battalion had been reinforced with a tank hunting detachment from the 7th Division , and managed to destroy two tanks and three armored vehicles before the Israelis withdrew . Afterwards , its original assignment was canceled and it was ordered to capture the Kibrit East position ( Fort Putzer ) . It occupied the abandoned position on October 9 which the battalion — despite being cut off and coming under numerous attacks — held for the remainder of the war . As for the 602nd battalion , it began to move eastwards some time after dusk , and stumbled upon an Israeli battalion of 35 tanks along Artillery Road , some from the Bitter Lake . The battalion ' s ten PT - 76s with 76 mm guns were outmatched and outnumbered by the heavier Israeli M48 Patton s with 105 mm guns . The manually guided Saggers were difficult to operate at night , and Israeli tanks were employing blinding xenon floodlights . Caught in the open Sinai desert , the 602nd was defeated and lost many of its tanks and armored vehicles , along with significant casualties . The remaining troops retreated to Third Army lines . Some units may have reached their objectives , although this is disputed . Egyptian troops raised their national flag on the eastern bank of the canal at 14 : 35 . By that time company and battalion - size units of Israeli tanks and infantry began reaching the Bar Lev Line , but were prevented from reaching their positions by Egyptian ambushes . Those tanks that broke through came under fire from the west bank ramparts . At 14 : 45 , a second wave of infantry landed on the opposite bank . Subsequent waves of infantry arrived at fifteen - minute intervals . However after the fourth wave , fatigue and technical problems with the boats gradually widened the time intervals . The Egyptians abandoned their schedules , giving priority to anti - tank teams and weaponry that could critically affect the battle . Amphibious vehicles were also used to cross equipment . The wooden carts were ferried to the east bank via boats , where they were initially lifted to the top of the sand wall with their loads . However , this method proved clumsy , and the carts were first emptied then lifted , after which they were re - loaded and dragged to troops on the front line . The carts greatly facilitated the supply and transportation of matériel on the east bank . Meanwhile , Israeli Southern Command attempted to pinpoint the main Egyptian effort to launch a counterattack with Dan Shomron ' s reserve armored brigade , when , in fact , there was no main effort . As a result Southern Command wasted several critical hours without taking decisive action . Tactical errors also showcased themselves when Reshef moved his tank brigade forward ; Israeli commanders neglected to conduct reconnaissance beforehand , causing their units to fall into Egyptian ambushes . In the confusion ensuing the surprise assault , no attempt was made at evacuating the Bar Lev garrison . At 15 : 30 , Egyptian forces captured Fort Lahtzanit , the first fortification of the Bar Lev Line to fall , and by then the infantry had been reinforced with 82mm B - 10 and 107mm B - 11 rifles . At the same time , engineers began operating their water pumps against the sand wall , opening the first passage in less than an hour , and the Egyptians moved up their bridging units to the canal . By 16 : 30 eight waves had brought across the canal ten infantry brigades in all five bridgeheads , totaling 23 , 500 men ( around 4 , 700 at each bridgehead ) . Each bridgehead was on average six kilometers ( 3¾ mi ) wide and around two kilometers deep . The Egyptians had high - velocity 85mm and 100mm rifled anti - tank guns in action on the east bank by that time . At 17 : 30 , three hours into the war , the twelfth and final infantry wave crossed , bringing the total in all five bridgeheads to 32 , 000 men ( around 6 , 400 in each bridgehead ) . By then Israeli armored losses had reached around 100 tanks . The magnitude of Israeli losses stemmed from their insistence to reach their comrades in the Bar Lev Line , and they repeatedly ran into aggressive ambushes by Egyptian soldiers . Taking advantage of dusk , at 17 : 50 four Sa ' iqa battalions were airdropped deep into the Sinai by helicopters flying at low altitude . The Sa ' iqa were assigned the objective of hampering reserves en route from Israel . The helicopters left the range of friendly SAMs and were not assigned air cover , resulting in a number of them being shot down . At 18 : 00 Egyptian armor and anti - tank units on the west bank began moving to the crossing sites . Fifteen minutes later engineers completed the assembly of all 35 ferries and waited for the breaches to be opened . By 18 : 30 the bridgeheads were nearly five kilometers ( 3 mi ) deep . With Israeli artillery on the Bar Lev Line eliminated , the immobile SA - 2 and SA - 3 units were moved forward . From 22 : 30 to 01 : 30 after midnight , all bridges — eight heavy and four light — were laid , and along with the ferries , began transporting reinforcements to the opposite bank . In the far south of the canal , at 19th Division ' s sector , the sand turned into mud making it difficult to clear . Consequently four ferries and three bridges assigned to that division were deployed seven hours behind schedule . Periodically the bridges were relocated to confuse Israeli air strikes targeting them — the Egyptians had opened 60 passages but were operating only 12 bridges , allowing each bridge to be moved to one of five passages . Throughout the night and up to the following morning , tanks and vehicles kept crossing the canal . Military police were responsible for directing this enormous traffic , utilizing color - coded signs . Port Said Sector . The Port Said Sector was an independent military command in the Egyptian Military , unattached to the Second Army . It incorporated Port Said , Port Fouad and their vicinity . The sector contained two infantry brigades . Military operations in this area were directed against three fortifications : Budapest , Orkal and Lahtzanit . As with the rest of the front , the offensive here began with the a fire preparation . However , high trajectory weapons were not employed because Egyptian aircraft were flying through the sector ' s airspace , hence only direct fire guns were used to bombard Israeli positions . Fort Lahtzanit , south of Port Fouad , was isolated by Egyptian infantry prior to the attack , preventing Israeli reinforcements from reaching it . At 15 : 00 , the Egyptians breached the minefield and barbed wire surrounding the fort , at which point approximately a company - sized force of Egyptian troops assaulted the defenses . By 15 : 30 , the fort was declared under Egyptian control . The Egyptians proceeded to clear a few bunkers still occupied by Israeli soldiers , some of whom surrendered when they began facing flamethrower s . By 18 : 00 , the Egyptians had cleared the fort completely . ( see Battle of Fort Lahtzanit ) Fort Orkal , south of Port Fouad , was also isolated prior to an attack . The Egyptians approached by land from Port Fouad , and across the Suez Canal . The attack quickly ground to a halt as the force approaching from the north failed to breach the minefield , leaving the force attacking across the canal pinned down at the sand wall by enemy fire . Subsequently , an infantry company crossed and renewed the attack from the south , seizing several positions . Reinforcements soon allowed more positions to be captured . On October 7 , the remaining defenders made a break - out attempt to join friendly forces , but they were intercepted and either killed or captured . Located on a narrow strip of land southeast of Port Fouad , Fort Budapest was surrounded by water on two sides . The fort came under air and artillery strikes at 14 : 00 . A Sa ' iqa company cut off the only route to the fort for reinforcements , while a battalion attacked from Port Fouad , advancing along a narrow strip of land bereft of natural cover . The battalion ' s attack bogged down at the minefield , which was deep . It soon came under air attacks , as the fort was outside of the SAM " umbrella " , and faced stiff resistance from the fort ' s garrison . The battalion eventually broke off its attack and retreated , while the Sa ' iqa unit east of the fort prevented reinforcements from reaching the fort for four days before it too withdrew . Another attack on October 15 came close to succeeding but ultimately failed , and hence Fort Budapest became the only position of the Bar Lev Line to be remain in Israeli hands . ( see Battles of Fort Budapest ) Naval actions . By October 6 the Egyptian naval task force was at Bab - el - Mandeb where they broke radio silence . When Operation " Badr " began at 14 : 00 , Rear Admiral Fuad Abu Zikry authorized the fleet to proceed with the blockade via a codeword . Egyptian submarines and destroyers intercepted ships traveling through Bab - el - Mandeb destined for Eilat , and all Israeli maritime navigation in the Red Sea ceased . The blockade was a strategic success for Egypt , while the Israeli Navy and Air Force were incapable of lifting the blockade due to the long distance between Israel and Bab - el - Mandeb . Mines were laid at the entrance to the Gulf of Suez to prevent Israel from transporting oil from the Sinai fields to Eilat . Historian Gammal Hammad claims that a blockade was also enforced in the Mediterranean , while other sources dispute this . News of the blockade was censored in Israel . Aside from the blockade , the Egyptian Navy carried out several other missions . Coastal artillery at Port Said participated in the fire preparation by bombarding Fort Budapest and Fort Orkal , while coastal artillery at Suez hit targets opposite the Third Army . Missile boats bombarded Rumana and Ras Beyron on the Mediterranean , Ras Masala and Ras Sidr on the Gulf of Suez , and Sharm el Sheikh . Naval frogmen raided the oil installations at Bala ' eem , disabling the massive driller . Several naval engagements took place between Egyptian and Israeli missile boats off the coast between Port Said and Damietta , including one on October 8 , when a flotilla of ten Israeli missile boats attempted to shell coastal targets along the Nile delta . Four Egyptian Osa class missile boat s confronted six of them , leading to Battle of Baltim in which three of the Egyptian missile boats were sunk within forty minutes , with no Israeli casualties . Egypt claimed to have sunk four Israeli " targets " , three they believed to be motor torpedo boats and one missile boat . According to Chaim Herzog , Israel responded with a naval blockade of Egypt which damaged the Egyptian economy . However , the sea routes to Egypt ' s principal ports — Alexandria on the Mediterranean and Port Safaga on the Red Sea — remained secure and open to shipping for the duration of the war . October 7 . In the early hours of Sunday October 7 , just after midnight , Egyptian infantry , now with tank support , advanced to expand their bridgeheads . Israeli armored formations had experienced heavy losses in trying repeatedly to reach the Bar Lev Line and were disorganized and confused . Many Israeli units , however , stubbornly resisted the Egyptian advance . Twice during the night of October 6 to October 7 , groups of tanks and infantry penetrated the bridgeheads to reach the canal line , where they managed to damage two bridges and destroy a number of ferries . Surrounded on all sides , however , these units were soon destroyed . Before sunrise the bridgeheads had reached a depth of , and the attacking Israeli units retreated . With sufficient numbers of armor finally on the east bank , reinforcements of infantry began to cross . Dawn on October 7 saw a total of 50 , 000 men ( around 10 , 000 to each bridgehead ) and 400 Egyptian tanks occupying five bridgeheads in the Sinai across the Suez Canal . Egyptian forces reorganised and entrenched themselves in anticipation of Israeli counterattacks . David Elazar continued to instruct Gonen to evacuate soldiers from strongpoints which were not yet surrounded , even though by October 7 most Israeli defences were encircled . Egyptian losses up to the morning of October 7 were only 280 killed and 20 tanks destroyed . Israeli losses were far more heavy ; the brigade in the Bar Lev Line was completely surrounded and most of its men were casualties while 200 were captured . Armored losses included between over 200 – 300 tanks destroyed . One source puts the losses at roughly 200 by morning , but several battalion - sized attacks to regain the forts around Qantara , and to reach some of the central and southern forts incurred further casualties with over 50 tanks being destroyed . In subsequent days some of the defenders in the Bar Lev Line managed to break though Egyptian forces and return to their lines , or were extracted by Israeli forces in counterattacks that came later on . As the magnitude of Israeli losses became clearer , Gonen made the decision at noon to form a defensive line on the Lateral Road , east of the canal , and ordered his divisional commanders to deploy accordingly . At noon , elements of Abraham Adan ' s 162nd Division and Ariel Sharon ' s 143rd Division began to reach the fronts . Consequently Gonen divided the front into three divisional commands : Adan was deployed in the northern sector , Sharon in the central sector , and Mandler in the southern sector . Air strikes continued throughout the day , and Southern Command received optimistic reports during the afternoon from the IAF , which claimed seven bridges knocked out of action , with the remaining ones to be destroyed by evening . In fact , several of the bridges that had been destroyed were decoy s . The real bridges meanwhile , had their damaged sections quickly repaired and returned to service . Ten heavy bridges had been laid during the crossing ( two bridges in the south were laid but not operational ) . Now , on October 7 , five of these bridges were removed and placed with the two already in reserve , leaving each division with one heavy bridge and one light bridge . Egyptian forces widened their bridgeheads that day to narrow the gaps between them . Meanwhile General Headquarters worked on organizing its forces on the east bank . Egyptian troops had crossed with 24 - hours ' worth of supplies . By Sunday it became necessary to resupply these forces , but administrative and supply units were in disarray , and to the south problems with laying the bridges further handicapped supply efforts there . October 7 offered a relative lull from the intense fighting that had taken place , allowing the Egyptians to organize battlefield administration . At 19th Division ' s bridgehead to the south , all efforts to lay three bridges there were abandoned due to difficulties with the terrain . Instead , supplies and reinforcement destined for the division were transferred over 7th Division ' s bridges to the north , where engineers were more successful in laying the bridges . Fighting throughout the front did not cease entirely for the rest of the day , most of it taking part around the besieged Israeli defences and strongpoints that still resisted . Meanwhile the Sa ' iqa units airdropped into Sinai the previous day began engaging Israeli reserves heading for the front . The main areas of operation were the central mountain passes , the northern coastal routes , and near the Gulf of Suez . One battalion , transported in 18 helicopters , captured the Ras Sidr Pass south of Port Tawfiq , near the Gulf of Suez . En route four helicopters were shot down , but the survivors , including 9 crewmen , managed to regroup with the rest of the battalion . It held its position for the remainder of the war under extremely difficult conditions , preventing Israeli reserves from using the pass to reach the front . Two companies attempted to establish themselves in central Sinai , between Tasa and Bir Gifgafa . Israeli air interdiction resulted in six helicopter making a forced landing after being hit , while two helicopters turned and withdrew . The forced landings incurred many casualties , particularly due to burns , and the survivors trekked their way back to friendly lines . Only four helicopters reached the designated landing zone , and they could not be flown once more , indicating the suicidal nature of these operations . Albeit a third of their original force , the Sa ' iqa managed to block Israeli reserves for over eight hours . Both companies were almost completely destroyed , suffering around 150 dead , including 15 officers . Israeli estimates claim to have downed between ten and twenty helicopters on the first day of the war . In northern Sinai , a company established itself along the coastal road between Romani and Baluza on October 6 . The following day , it ambushed Colonel Natke Nir ' s armored brigade , part of Adan ' s division , destroying around 18 tanks along with other vehicles . The coastal road was blocked for over five hours . Airborne Israeli infantry was committed to support the armor , and in the ensuing battle , another 12 tanks and 6 half - tracks were destroyed . Some 30 soldiers of the brigade were killed , while the Sa ' iqa company lost 75 dead . In addition to delaying Israeli reserves , commandos carried out sabotage operations . The report cards for these operations are highly controversial . Some sources claim the commandos suffered immense casualties and were inneffectual . However , it is clear that these operations inflicted damage and caused confusion and anxiety among the Israelis , who diverted resources to counter these threats , while reservists were slowed down . One Israeli divisional commander also commended the Egyptian Sa ' iqa . Qantara also saw heavy fighting as troops from the 18th Division engaged Israeli forces within and around the town . By early morning the division commander , Brigadier General Fuad ' Aziz Ghali , was able to set up his command post there . Close quarter combat and even hand - to - hand fighting took place as the Egyptians cleared the ghost town building by building . Fighting was intense , and by the end of October 7 , the town and its outskirts as well as two nearby fortifications of the Bar Lev Line were under Egyptian control . Israeli conference at Umm Hashiba . David Elazar , encouraged by reports of IAF successes , decided to visit Israeli Southern Command . He was accompanied by his aide , Colonel Avner Shalev and the former Israeli Chief of Staff , Yitzhak Rabin . Elazar arrived at Gonen ' s advance command post at Gebel Umm Hashiba at 18 : 45 ; chief among those attending were Gonen , Adan and Mandler . Sharon only arrived after the meeting had been concluded . At the conference , in light of the little information available on Egyptian dispositions and intentions , and due to a shortage of infantry and artillery , the commanders agreed they could not relieve the surrounded strongpoints on the canal in the near future . There was a general consensus to attack Egyptian forces throwing them off balance , but disagreed on how to do so . Southern Command expected to have 640 tanks on Monday October 8 , of which 530 tanks would be distributed among three divisions : 200 tanks under Adan , 180 under Sharon , and 150 under Mandler after part of his losses were replaced . Estimates put the number of Egyptian tanks at 400 , when there were in fact 800 tanks across the canal by Sunday evening . In light of the apparent superiority , Gonen recommended a frontal attack at night with Adan ' s 162nd Division crossing to the west bank at Qantara and Sharon ' s 143rd Division crossing into Suez City . Adan however , lacking infantry , urged a cautious approach until more reserves reached the front . Elazar favored caution as well , and decided on a limited attack on the morning of October 8 . Adan would attack southward against Second Army , remaining away from the canal to avoid Egyptian anti - tank weaponry . Sharon would continue the southward probes towards Ismailia as his division moved into its sector , concentrating at Tasa to support Adan if needed . Kept open was the question of an Israeli counter - crossing should such the Egyptians collapse under Israeli counterattacks . Should Adan succeed , Sharon would attack Third Army ' s bridgehead in a manner similar to Adan , and then cross to the west bank . Mandler would remain on the defensive , organizing his division which had been mauled by the fighting , and was down to a few dozen tanks . Elazar clearly emphasized that no canal crossing and no attempt to reach the strongpoints would occur without his approval . The meeting ended at 22 : 00 . Thereafter , Sharon arrived after missing the entire conference . Speaking with Gonen and the other commanders after Elazar had left , Sharon recommended an immediate assault to relieve the beleaguered strongpoints . Gonen pointed out that this had been the Israeli course of action for the past 14 – 16 hours , to no avail . However he did not reject Sharon outright , and indeed told him to prepare for such an attack , promising a final decision on the matter before 6 : 00 at dawn . Nevertheless , Sharon would conform to the original plan for a limited attack on the following day . October 8 . The five division - size bridgeheads consolidated themselves on Monday , October 8 into two army - size bridgeheads : the Second Army with its three divisions occupied Qantara in the north to Deversoir in the south , while the Third Army with two divisions occupied the southern end of the Bitter Lakes to a point southeast of Port Tawfiq ( at the far end of the canal ) . These two bridgeheads incorporated a total of 90 , 000 men and 980 tanks , dug in and entrenched . Each division deployed , in accordance with Operation " Badr " , two infantry brigades in its forward echelon , and one mechanized infantry brigade in the second echelon . In reserve was one armored brigade . The Egyptians had established anti - tank defences along their lines employing Sagger ATGM s , RPGs , B - 10 and B - 11 anti tank recoilless rifles . At dawn a friendly fire incident occurred as the 2nd and 16th Divisions in Second Army were closing the gap between their bridgeheads . While cresting a ridge , two tank platoons from either division confronted each other at . The tank crews were so agitated that they opened fire immediately . Each platoon lost two of its three tanks to direct hits within minutes , and several men were killed . Shazly visited the front in the early morning before the Israeli attack to form an assessment of the situation . He arrived at Second Army Headquarters where he was briefed on the situation , then went to 2nd Division ' s advanced headquarters , where he met Brigadier General Hasan Abu Sa ' ada and visited the frontline troops . Many of the soldiers had not slept for two nights , but the successful crossing was a moral booster , a " tonic " as he described it . Shazly then went southward to 7th Division ' s bridgehead in Third Army ' s sector , where traffic was almost at a standstill . Shazly met with 7th division commander Brigadier General Badawy , who informed him of the bridge - laying problems experienced by 19th Division ' s engineers further south , leading all Third Army supplies and reinforcements to be sent over 7th Division ' s already congested bridges , creating a solid traffic jam . Despite Sunday ' s lull , the situation had not yet improved . This created complications , as soldiers and tank crews lost contact with their units and consequently had no idea of their designated positions . Many troops were low on supplies , and some even returned to the west bank of the canal to replenish their food and water supply . After conferring with the chief engineers of the Second and Third field armies , Shazly became aware that IAF , despite heavy losses , had destroyed so many bridge sections that the Egyptians had lost the equivalent of three heavy bridges , leaving four bridges in reserve along with the five already laid in the canal . This gave rise to concerns about supply in the coming days and weeks . Shazly then discussed the possibility of constructing three bridges in the canal using earth and sand . This would make causeways impregnable against air strikes and artillery . The chief engineer of the Third Army , with whom he discussed the idea , was confidant that , given enough bulldozers , the causeways could be constructed in one week . Israeli counterattack . Shortly after midnight on October 8 , optimistic field reports expecting an imminent Egyptian collapse caused Gonen to alter plans for the attack . Adan would now attack in the direction of the strongpoints at Firdan and Ismailia . The change was not formulated on precise tactical intelligence , and would come to cause some confusion among Israeli commanders for the rest of the day . Adan ' s 162nd Armoured Division was deployed along the Baluza – Tasa road to the north . His division was composed of Colonel Natke Nir ' s armored brigade with 71 tanks , Gabi Amir ' s brigade with 50 M60 tanks , and Aryeh Keren ' s brigade with 62 tanks ( still en route to the area ) for a total of 183 tanks . Adan still planned to avoid Egyptian anti - tank weaponry by having Amir ' s brigade move southward between Lexicon and Artillery roads ( the former road ran immediately alongside the canal , and the latter was east of it ) , to reach a position that would link the brigade to the Hizayon strongpoint opposite Firdan and the Purkan strongpoint opposite Ismailia . Nir would move in a similar manner to link up with Purkan . Keren would move east of Artillery Road and position his brigade opposite the Matzmed strongpoint at the northern end of the Bitter Lakes . A mechanized infantry brigade with 44 Super Sherman s was expected to join in the attack by late morning . Little or no air support would come for the attack ; the IAF was concentrated on the Syrian front . At 07 : 53 , minutes before the Israeli attack was to commence , Israeli forces near Qantara became heavily engaged with a brigade composing the 18th Division ' s right flank , as Egyptian troops sought to secure the town and its vicinity . Fuad , the division commander supported the brigade with two companies of T - 62 tanks . To prevent Israeli forces in the area from being outflanked , Gonen ordered Nir to remain near Qantara to help contain the Egyptian attack . This left Adan with only 50 tanks under Amir ' s command to carry out the attack . Amir began the drive south at 08 : 06 , and was ordered to prepare to reach the strongpoints on Adan ' s signal . Keren was still en route to the area . Once his brigade arrived he would conduct an assault against 16th Division ' s bridgehead in the direction of Matzmed . However , Amir made an error in navigation , and instead of moving from the canal , he moved along Artillery road , away . Consequently , Amir would be forced to conduct a frontal assault in an east - west direction instead of the north - south flanking maneuver which Adan had planned . Amir ' s brigade began to reach the plain between Artillery Road and the Firdan bridge at 09 : 00 . So far no Egyptian resistance of any significance had been encountered . The brigade had the objective of attacking 2nd Division ' s bridgehead . Abu Sa ' ada , the division commander , had the 24th Armored Brigade as the divisional reserve , but he could only commit it in case of an Israeli penetration . Gonen wanted Adan to reach the Hizayon strongpoint , and contacted Elazar in Tel Aviv at 09 : 55 to request a crossing of the canal . Gonen either downplayed or ignored negative reports and only told Elazar of positive developments . Elazar , who was at a meeting , communicated with Gonen through his assistant and approved of a crossing , also giving permission for Sharon ' s division to move south . At 10 : 40 , Gonen ordered Adan to cross to the west bank and Sharon to move towards Suez City . Short of forces , Adan requested that Sharon send a battalion to protect his southern flank . Gonen consented , but Sharon would not comply , and consequently several critical positions would be lost to the Egyptians later on . Just before the assault commenced , one of Amir ' s battalions disengaged to restock on ammunition and fuel . The other battalion proceeded with the assault at 11 : 00 . Some 25 tanks carried out an assault planned to be performed by 121 tanks . The Israelis broke through the first Egyptian troops and advanced to within of the canal . At this point the Israelis came under heavy fire from anti - tank weaponry , artillery and tanks . The battalion lost 18 tanks within minutes , and most of its commanders were either killed or wounded . By now Nir had disengaged at Qantara , leaving a battalion behind , and arrived opposite the Firdan bridge at 12 : 30 with two tank battalions . While Amir and Nir discussed plans for an attack , Keren arrived and Adan ordered him to support Nir and Amir by attacking towards Purkan . Meanwhile Sharon left Tasa and headed for Suez City , leaving a single reconnaissance company to hold vital ridges such as Hamadia and Kishuf , but not the hills to the north , such as Hamutal . Instead , Keren ' s brigade gained responsibility for these areas , but Sharon ' s action further endangered Adan ' s position . Amir ' s brigade was now down to one battalion , which was to attack with Nir ' s brigade of 50 tanks . To Amir ' s surprise , a reserve armored battalion of 25 tanks commanded by Colonel Eliashiv Shemshi arrived in the area , en route to Keren ' s brigade . Short of forces , Amir , with Adan ' s approval , commandeered Shemshi ' s battalion , and ordered him to provide covering fire for Nir ' s assault on the Firdan bridge . At around 13 : 00 , a recon group from 2nd Division discovered around 75 tanks concentrating north east of the bridgehead . Ten minutes later the Egyptians intercepted a radio signal in Hebrew . Nir was informing his command that he was ready to attack within twenty minutes . With little time left , Abu Sa ' ada decided to take a risky move . Estimating , correctly , that the attack would come be directed between his two forward brigades , the weakest point in his lines , Abu Sa ' ada planned to draw Israeli forces into his bridgehead to within three kilometers of the canal before engaging them from all sides , committing all his anti - tank reserves . At 13 : 30 , the attack was carried out by Amir and Nir ' s brigades . A lack of coordination and communication difficulties between both brigades hampered the attack . Nir ' s two battalions attacked at the same time in two echelons . The Egyptians allowed the Israelis to advance , then encircled them . When the attackers entered the prepared killing zone , Egyptian armor of the 24th Brigade opened fire on the advancing tanks , complemented by infantry anti - tank weapons on either flank of the Israeli forces , while tank hunting detachments attacked from the rear . Within just 13 minutes , most of the Israeli force was destroyed — the Egyptians destroyed over 50 tanks and captured eight intact . Among the captured were Lieutenant Colonel Asaf Yaguri , a battalion commander , whose unit lost 32 killed . By the end of the attack Nir had just four operational tanks remaining , including his own . Gabi Amir ' s battalion , attacking to Nir ' s right , was forced to halt his advance after encountering stiff resistance . Amir requested air support several times , but did not receive any . Egyptian advance . Operation " Badr " called for an enlargement of the bridgeheads on October 8 . To accomplish this , each of the five infantry divisions had to reorganize its forces . Mechanized infantry brigades in the second echelon of divisional lines were to advance between the two forward infantry brigades . Thus the mechanized brigade would form the first line , the two infantry brigades would form the second line , and the reserve armored brigade would constitute a third echelon . During the afternoon of the 8th , Egyptian artillery barrages and air strikes took place along the entire front against opposing Israeli forces . The Israelis , who believed they were on the counter - offensive , were surprised at the sight of advancing Egyptian troops . Not all advancing Egyptian units managed to reach the mark necessary to control Artillery Road , but each division held positions more than deep . In Second Army ' s sector , the 16th Infantry Division was the most successful by occupying the strategic positions of Mashchir , Televiza , Missouri and Hamutal after fighting that lasted between 2 : 00 and 4 : 30 PM . Hamutal was from the canal and overlooked the juncture of Ismailia and Artillery Roads . Brigadier General ' Adil Yusri lost his leg while commanding his brigade ' s attack on these positions . The deepest penetration was in Third Army ' s sector , where the bridgehead reached a depth of nearly . The Egyptians also captured several additional Bar Lev forts . The Israelis now made an attempt to regain the lost ground . Keren ' s brigade organized for an assault on Hamutal Hill . One battalion provided covering fire , while two battalions under Lieutenant Colonels Dan Spair and Amir ( not to be confused with the brigade commander Gabi Amir ) attacked with 27 tanks . Nearly from Egyptian positions , Dan Sapir was killed when his tank took a direct hit , disrupting his battalion ' s attack . Amir ' s battalion continued fighting until dusk after losing seven tanks . Gonen , starting to realise the gravity of Adan ' s position , ordered Sharon at 14 : 45 to pull back and return to his initial positions . The Erez Armored Brigade arrived to offer assistance to Keren , but poor coordination between the commanders led to the failure of further attempts to capture Hamutal Hill . By the end of the day Adan ' s division alone had lost around 100 tanks . Aftermath . Operation " Badr " was the opening battle of the Yom Kippur War in the Sinai , and the first major Arab victory against the Israelis in years . By repelling a division - sized counterattack on October 8 , and establishing bridgeheads on the east bank to a depth of around 15 kilometers , the Egyptians had accomplished the objectives of Operation " Badr " . At the start of the war , U . S . Secretary of State Henry Kissinger believed that the better - equipped Israelis would secure victory within a few days , and thus tried to delay a ceasefire in the United Nations Security Council . The counterattack on October 8 however , came against American expectations . Kissinger was taken aback when told of the extent of Israel ' s losses on the morning of October 9 by Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz , and asked " Explain to me , how could 400 tanks be lost to the Egyptians ? " Dinitz may have threatened Kissinger with the use of nuclear weapons against Egypt and Syria in order to underline the urgency of Israel ' s situation and push the U . S . into initiating an airlift to replace Israel ' s losses . Later that day Kissinger relayed U . S . President Richard Nixon ' s decision to initiate Operation " Nickel Grass " — which aimed to replace all of Israel ' s material losses — to Dinitz . The prevailing view of Kissinger and many IDF officers on the Sinai Front was that the tide would quickly turn in their favor . The course of combat on October 8 thus came as a shock . At the end of the day Gonen , commented " It ' s not the Egyptian Army of 1967 . " In a press conference at night on October 8 , not knowing that the counteroffensive had been defeated , Elazar claimed that the destruction of the Egyptian Army was underway , and that the IDF would soon " break their [ the Arabs military personnel ' s ] bones . " He would later regret these statements . Israeli commanders began to doubt Gonen ' s ability . In a meeting with Israeli commanders after midnight on October 9 , Elazar decided to suspend offensive operations until the Syrians had been neutralized , especially since there were just 400 tanks left in the Sinai . Disregarding this new order , Sharon division mounted a major brigade - sized attack the following day . Despite initial successes , the Israelis had been repulsed by the end of the day with no gains , losing around 60 tanks in the process . Gonen was furious at Sharon , not only because of his violation of the decision to remain on the defensive , but also because he had repeatedly disobeyed direct orders from Gonen on a number of occasions . Elazar was equally livid , but rather than remove Sharon , an insubordinate but innovative commander with political connection to the opposition party , Elazar decided to replace Gonen , who had proven to be out of his depth , inept at being an operational commander . Former Chief of Staff Chaim Bar - Lev was brought out of retirement to replace Gonen . To avoid the appearance of firing him , Gonen was retained as deputy to Bar - Lev by Elazar . By October 10 , the front settled into a stalemate . The success achieved by Operation " Badr " surprised Egyptian commanders , whose confidence soared . Sadat came under pressure to press the offensive towards the Sinai Passes , but remained unyielding , holding to the original goal of waging a limited war . Ahmed Ismail and Shazly were also on par with Sadat ' s opinion . However , appeals from the Syrians , whose situation was desperate by October 9 , ultimately forced Sadat to change his mind for political reasons , against the protests of his commanders . Consequently Egypt would lose the initiative to Israel when it launched its unsuccessful attack eastwards on October 14 . Political impact . Soon after the war , many Israelis demanded an impartial inquiry to investigate what became known as the " machdal " ( the blunder ) , with a focus on the shortcomings of the government and the army , particularly their lack of preparedness for the attack and its ramifications . Golda Meir finally agreed to the formation of the Agranat Commission towards the end of November 1973 . War veterans and members of the public attacked Meir and Moshe Dayan , while Israeli generals criticised one another ' s performance . While Meir and the Israeli Labor Party won the elections held in late - December , the release of the Agranat Commission ' s findings in April 1974 and its failure to accuse the nation ' s political leadership of any shortcomings — while recommending the dismissal of several senior officers — led to widespread public outrage . Meir resigned in response to public criticism , but Dayan remained steadfast . Eventually , the 1977 elections saw the end of Labor Party ' s unchallenged reign over Israeli politics with the election of Menachem Begin and the Likud Party . The 1973 war convinced the Israelis of the necessity of negotiations with the Arabs . This unprecedented willingness , coupled with Sadat ' s diplomatic initiatives and intercession by the United States to break barriers of mistrust between Egypt and Israel , made possible the long series of discussions between both nations . The negotiations ultimately resulted in the 1978 Camp David Agreements , and the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979 . Thus , without resorting to another major war , Sadat had been able to regain the Sinai through diplomatic means .