Battle of Bint Jbeil The Battle of Bint Jbeil was one of the main battles of the 2006 Lebanon War . Bint Jbeil ( , Bint Jubayl ) is a major town of some 20 , 000 , mainly Shia Muslim , inhabitants in Southern Lebanon . Brig . - Gen . Gal Hirsh announced on July 25 that the Israel Defense Forces ( IDF ) had " complete control " of Bint Jbeil . This statement was later discredited . In spite of three sustained attempts by the IDF to conquer the town , it remained in the hands of Hizbullah until the end of the war . The town was the scene of some of the fiercest fighting of the war , with both sides taking heavy losses . Two senior Israeli officers , including Major Roi Klein , were killed in the battle . Hizbullah similarly lost several commanders , most notably Khalid Bazzi , the Hizbullah commander of the Bint Jbeil area . Background . Bint Jbeil was a major center for the Lebanese resistance during the 18 years of Israeli occupation . Following Israel ' s withdrawal from Bint Jbeil in 2000 the town became an important base for Hizbullah . Hizbullah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah held his victory speech in Bint Jbeil after the Israeli withdrawal , in front of a joyful audience of more than 100 000 people , Muslims and Christians , where he belittled Israeli power : According to Israeli journalist Amir Rapaport this speech infuriated the IDF Command which over time developed a " cobwebs complex " . The 2006 Lebanon war finally presented an opportunity to get even . Senior IDF officers , such as Chief of Staff Dan Halutz and Chief of Operations Gadi Eisenkot claimed that Bint Jbeil was an important " symbol " . They hoped to capture the town and bring an Israeli leader to hold a victory speech at the same place where Nasrallah held his speech in 2000 . Instead , according to Rapaport , Bint Jbeil would come to symbolize failure . According to IDF estimates Bint Jbeil and the nearby village of Aynata was defended by 100 - 140 fighters , about 60 of whom belonged to the local garrison and around 40 belonged to the Hizbullah Special Force . The primary aim of the Hizbullah forces in the string of positions along the border was not to hold territory but to bleed the Israelis and slow down their advance . Operation Webs of Steel 2 ( July 23 – 29 ) . Initially , Israel had no intention to capture Bint Jbeil . Rather , the IDF sought to control the city from outside . Brigadier General Shuky Shachrur , the Northern Command ’ s chief of staff , said the plan was to raid specific targets based on intelligence . Brigadier General Gal Hirsch told a Table News Network correspondent that " We can direct precise fire at every point that is needed [ within the town ] and bring the forces to a situation of minimum risk " . However , as the war went on , the Israeli leadership changed its position on Bint Jbeil . Despite the claims of progress there was " nothing tangible to put on display " to show for it , and a clear victory at Bint Jbeil could well be the watershed in the war . A Hizbullah surrender here was hoped to create a " ripple effect " on the other strongholds in South Lebanon . The IDF , however , was divided over exactly how to deal with the town . Some proposed an outright occupation of the town while others a more subtle approach , surrounding it and raiding Hizbullah positions in it . Brigadier General Gal Hirsch of the 91st Division wanted to conquer Bint Jbeil , not just to raid it . It was his division headquarters that came up with the name " Operation Web of Steel " ( ) . The operation was planned as a pincer movement with the Golani Brigade approaching the town from the east and the Paratroopers Brigade from the west . The paratroopers however set out too late and were ordered to halt before reaching their designated positions . Since the painful experiences of the Egoz unit at Maroun ar - Ras , Israeli forces were not allowed to advance in daylight . The northern side of the town was intentionally left open , apparently to provide an escape route for the town ' s defenders . Instead Hizbullah used the opportunity to send in reinforcements to the town . According to the orders issued by the IDF Northern Command on July 22 , the IDF should not enter Bint Jbeil . The town was to be encircled but not occupied . The Israeli advance was preceded by a massive artillery bombardment . An IDF artillery officer , Lt . - Col . Avi Mano , claimed that Bint Jbeil had been hit by 3 , 000 shells by July 25 . According to the officer , IDF cannons could make direct hits on houses and cause " more damage " than Katyusha rockets . According to Time magazine over 5 , 000 Israeli soldiers participated in the siege of Bint Jbeil by July 25 while the number of Hizbullah defenders of the town was estimated to " over 100 " . The battle for Bint Jbeil started on July 24 when Israeli forces approached the nearby town of Aynata from the east and approached the Sadr district . Five Golani soldiers were wounded by friendly fire , and two tanks were sent to evacuate them . The first was hit by a missile , killing the platoon commander and wounding two of the crewmen . The second tank , a Merkava IV , ran over a powerful remote - controlled mine and rolled over from the blast . One of the crew was killed and the commander of the 52nd battalion , Lt . - Col . Guy Kabili , as well as his deputy , was wounded . An armor - plated D - 9 bulldozer that attempted to rescue the casualties was forced to retreat after being hit by a missile . The wounded were finally evacuated under the cover of a smoke - screen . Altogether 18 soldiers were wounded in the clashes . Hizbullah fighter Marwan Samahat was killed in the clashes in eastern Aynata . Another four fighters were killed in southern Bint Jbeil , near the Maslakh mosque . An Apache Longbow attack helicopter flying support mission for ground forces at Bint Jbeil crashed on the same day on the Israeli side of the border , killing both pilots . IAF at first believed that the helicopter accidentally was hit by Israeli MLRS artillery fire . Hizbullah claimed to have shot down the helicopter . An IAF crash investigation team later said that the crash was caused by a " rare technical fault " . Investigators from Boeing , the helicopter ' s manufacturer , however , ruled out a technical fault as the cause of the crash . By the next day the IDF had taken up positions east , west and south of Bint Jbeil and Aynata but had not yet entered the built - up areas . In spite of this Gen . Hirsch declared victory to the press . " The town is in our control , " he declared on July 25 . " The work is almost completed and the terrorists are fleeing . " The statement would quickly prove disastrously wrong . An Israeli soldier would later describe his feelings when hearing Hirsch ' s words over the radio , while being under Sagger missile attack " from every direction " in the town : " you realize something is wrong . " The soldiers of elite Golani Brigade ' s 51st Battalion had been dreaming of such a mission and were genuinely happy when they were told that they were going to Bint Jbeil . They set out from Avivim and after a night - time march over the Maroun ar - Ras hill reached the southern outskirts of Aynata . In the early hours of the morning on July 26 the orders were suddenly changed . Now the battalion was ordered to sweep into the Bint Jbeil and conquer it . The Golani brigade commander Col . Tamir Yedai did not leave Israeli territory but remote - controlled the battle from kibbutz Malkia , the civilian settlement where the Golani brigade had established its wartime command post . Because of topographical reasons he frequently lost contact with his men in Lebanon . Battalion commander Lt . - Col . Yaniv Asor commanded the first company while his deputy , Maj . Roi Klein commanded the third company . The third company walked into a well - prepared ambush in the outskirts of Aynata , the town immediately to the east of Bint jbeil . Lebanese accounts of this battle refer to it as " the battle of Aynata " as the Israeli forces had not yet entered Bint Jbeil proper . The olive grove where the clash occurred was later renamed " Liberation square " ( ) . The southern section of Aynata was defended by two squads [ majmu ’ a ] . A Hizbullah squad would normally include 7 – 10 fighters . Platoon commander Merchavia and two of his men were killed immediately as they entered the olive grove surrounded by high wall . One Hizbullah unit attacked the Israeli force in the grove while a second unit fired at the reinforcements from positions in the upper stories of buildings with small arms and anti - tank rockets . Most of the soldiers from the platoon that entered the olive grove were eventually killed or wounded . The battalion ' s deputy commander , Major Roi Klein was seriously wounded when he reportedly covered a hand grenade with his body to save his troops . The only soldier who witnessed the episode , Sgt . Shimon Adega , was killed shortly afterward . Klein was later killed by a second grenade . Then the company commander was injured and his deputy was killed . Lt . Itamar Katz , who did not know the names of his men , took over command . 25 immobile wounded lay in the orchard screaming for help . The 51st battalion seemed to be on the verge of breaking . The battalion did not break but the fighting changed drastically from an offensive military operation to a rescue mission . The IDF sent in reinforcements to provide covering fire while the casualties were evacuated . The troops that arrived as reinforcements suffered lower casualties compared to the first wave . Soldiers often risked their lives not only to save the wounded , but to recover the dead and prevent Hizbullah fighters from reaching their bodies . Combat continued for several hours , and was often conducted at point - blank range . The wounded were carried three kilometers to a place where helicopters could land under the protection of smoke grenades and heavy artillery fire , and soldiers often simultaneously shot at enemy fighters while carrying stretchers . Finally , Israeli Air Force Blackhawk helicopter s managed to land under heavy fire and fly the wounded to Rambam Medical Center in Haifa . The commanders decided not to risk pilots to evacuate the dead ; they were carried out under cover of darkness by a company from the Golani Brigade ' s 12th Battalion . " IDF suffered 8 dead , including three officers , and 24 wounded in the fighting in Aynata . On the same day an anti - tank missile fired from Bint Jbeil , hit a paratrooper position in nearby Maroun ar - Ras and one officer was killed and three soldiers were wounded . Hizbullah also suffered casualties in the battle . The IDF released widely different estimates of the number of Hizbullah killed in the battle , from 15 or " at least 20 " to " at least 40 " or " close to 50 " The Lebanese daily as - Safir wrote a year later that only four Hizbullah fighters died in the clash in the olive grove : Amir Fadlallah , Ali as - Sayid , Mahmoud Khanafir and Atif al - Mousawi . The following night Israeli paratroopers infiltrated Bint Jbeil from the west and took up positions in a number of large villas in the Talat Mas ’ ud neighborhood overlooking the town . Sporadic clashes continued over the next days . The IDF claimed that the paratroopers took part in a major engagement on July 29 , when 20 or 26 Hizbullah fighters were killed . According to the Israeli commander , the clashes started when two Hizbullah fighters were killed while approaching a building occupied by the paratroopers . Then , at least seven Hizbullah cells attacked the soldiers , employing anti - tank rockets and RPGs . The commander claimed that " our forces were well prepared and gunned down cell after cell . We saw them falling " . The paratroopers received air support during the battle . The IDF claimed that 26 Hizbullah fighters were killed , and put its own casualties at 6 wounded , one of them seriously ( possibly by one of his own rockets after it malfunctioned ) . Lebanese accounts of the battle do not mention this clash and do not confirm any Hizbullah casualties in Bint Jbeil on this date . Lebanese daily as - Safir reports that a Hizbullah reconnaissance squad attacked IDF positions in Tallat Mas ’ oud on July 28 , prompting an overnight Israeli withdrawal from the district . July 29 , two Hizbullah commanders were killed in an Israeli air strike in the Old City of Bint Jbeil . Khalid Bazzi ( al - Hajj Qasim ) was chief of operations in the Bint Jbeil area , including Maroun al - Ras , Aynata , Aytaroun and Bint Jbeil , while Muhammad Abu Ta ' am was responsible for the town itself . Both had taken part in the abduction of the two Israeli soldiers that had started the war . There are suggestions that Bazzi earlier had refused to obey orders to withdraw from the town saying that he would " only leave as a martyr " . Hizbullah commanders who spoke to Lebanese al - Akhbar a year after the war did not confirm this version of events . According to them the proper place for a commander was with his fighters on the battlefield . Bazzi and Abu Taam however were critizised for violating military regulations by being at the same place during a battle . The IDF had earlier claimed that Bazzi was killed in Maroun ar - Ras several days earlier . Bazzi was succeeded by Muhammad Qansuh ( Sajid ad - Duwayr ) , a special force commander who in turn would be killed 10 days later . On the same day , the IDF pulled its troops from Bint Jbeil , but armored units continued to operate around the town . Respite . On July 30 Israel launched an airstrike on a civilian building in the town of Qana , to the north of Bint Jbeil , in which 28 Lebanese civilians were killed , including 16 children . Under American pressure Israel declared a two - day suspension of air strikes on targets in southern Lebanon . Israel also agreed to allow a 24 - hour “ window ” where the United Nations could assist locals who wanted to leave southern Lebanon . Hizbullah reciprocated and suspended all its rocket attacks on northern Israel . After 19 days of continuous shelling Bint Jbeil at last experienced a lull in the fighting . Large sections of the town had been reduced to rubble and hundreds of survivors , mainly the old and infirm who had been unable to escape from the battlefield , emerged from the ruins . A convoy of ambulances from the Lebanese Red Cross arrived at the town and began evacuating the civilians . The United Nations and Hizbullah fighters also assisted in the evacuation of civilians . The Salah Ghandour hospital was the only hospital in the area and had been hit several times by Israeli shells . It had no fuel for it ' s generators and was finally abandoned during the pause in the fighting . Fouad Taha , the hospital ' s director and only remaining physician , and the other staff helped in the evacuation of the remaining civilians before leaving the town . He had survived a direct hit on his night quarters . " We ' re feeling guilty leaving people behind , " he said . Operation Change of Direction ( August 1 – 9 ) . According to the Winograd report there were ground battles in Bint Jbeil during Operation Change of Direction 8 ( 1 - 3 of August ) but it gives no details . There are no other reports confirming any serious fighting in Bint Jbeil , or of any Israeli casualties , during this period . Lebanese sources claim that " what appeared to be a truce " [ hudna ] was observed from July 29 until August 7 , when Operation Change of Direction 10 was launched . In the beginning of August discussions were held at IDF command about what to do about Bint Jbeil . Chief of Staff Halutz decided to occupy the remaining pockets of resistance close to the border ; Bint Jbeil , Ayta ash - Sha ’ b and Mays al - Jabal . This time Bint Jbeil would be effectively surrounded and attacked simultaneously from all sides . The operation was to be completed by August 8 . On the evening of August 6 , the battle began again . The Israeli advance into Bint Jbeil was slow . The following day a paratrooper was killed and four others were wounded in a clash that lasted several hours . Two Israeli tank crew members , including a senior officer , were killed and two others injured when their tank was hit by an anti - tank missile . The IDF claimed that 5 Hizbullah fighters were also killed during the clash . A column of tanks was ordered to occupy the former Israeli headquarters building in Saff al - Hawa neighborhood in the northern outskirts of the town , close to the place where Nasrallah held his " cobweb " speech in 2000 . Paratrooper Brigade commander Hagai Mordechai was commissioned the task of hoisting the Israeli flag on this building . Thus began the so - called " Battle of the Flag " . At the entrance to Bint Jbeil stood a large ten - story building , later nicknamed " the Monster " by Israeli soldiers , where about ten Hizbullah fighters had taken up positions , preventing further Israeli advance . The Israeli army was reluctant to call in an airstrike because of its proximity to the Salih Ghandour hospital . Although it was assumed to be vacant , Israel did not want to risk a repetition of the disastrous mistake in Qana . While advancing on the building an Israeli soldier was critically wounded in a suspected friendly fire incident . It was clear that the soldier would not survive unless he could be taken to hospital . The wounded soldier was evacuated in a dramatic rescue operation but died in the helicopter before reaching the hospital . Another soldier was killed in the rescue operation . The Israeli Air Force eventually bombed the building , causing it to collapse . Mordechai told his deputy to " take the flag , put it on the building where [ the Israeli ] forces are , take pictures and leave . No one should die for this picture . ” The flag was raised on a different building than intended and a photograph taken ( reproduced here ) . In the end IDF decided not to publish the picture . By the time it was ready to be distributed it had become irrelevant . The IDF had already begun to withdraw from the town . On the same day Chief of Operation Gadi Eisenkot had to inform the Israeli cabinet that the army had not occupied Bint Jbeil and some other localities close to the border . Hizbullah managed to hold its positions in the town throughout the war . In the last days of the war the fighting was concentrated to areas north of the town and there were no reports of heavy fighting in the town itself . Less than three days before the ceasefire Operation Changing Direction 11 was launched with the aim of pushing further into Lebanese territory . About a dozen Israeli soldiers died in the fighting around the villages of Hadatha , Yatar , at - Tiri , Rashaf and Ayta az - Zut , to the north of Bint Jbeil . In spite of the fact that the IDF was ordered once again to capture Bint Jbeil , there are no reports of any offensive Israeli action against Hizbullah positions in the town itself . A New York Times correspondent accompanied a platoon from the Golani 51st Battalion in the last days of the war . The unit occupied an unfinished building in the Bint Jbeil area . A Merkava tank was hit by a Kornet missile wounding two soldiers . After the top floor of the house was hit by a missile strike the IDF soldiers took shelter in the most secure part of the building , the first floor bathroom , and remained there for 36 hours . The experience two weeks earlier made the Golani soldiers wary of casualties . On the last hours before the cease - fire came into effect Lieutenant Adam Kima was ordered to clear a road going westward out of Bint Jbeil . Kima refused to obey orders , claiming a high risk of being exposed to Hizbullah ambushes . The officer and five of his soldiers were arrested and sentenced to prison for 2 – 3 weeks ( though released early ) . By the beginning of September Israeli forces had withdrawn from the area of Bint Jbeil and control was transferred to the Lebanese army and United Nations peacekeeping forces . Some have commented that this battle had a psychological component outweighing its military significance . Uri Bar - Joseph wrote about Dan Halutz in Haaretz " He pushed for ineffectual military initiatives with a high casualty toll , like the conquest of Bint Jbail , which was meant to create a spectacle of victory in the place where Nasrallah delivered his " spider web " speech following the IDF pullout in May 2000 . " The battle of the bodies . IDF has a long standing policy of not leaving wounded or dead soldiers on the battle field and would at times go to great lengths to retrieve them . At the same time Israel has maintained a policy of not returning to families for burial the remains of killed militants that had engaged in " hostile terrorist activity " . Instead they are buried in fenced - off so called " cemeteries for enemy dead " , maintained by IDF military rabbinate , in what the Israeli human rights organization B ' Tselem considers a " demeaning and shameful manner " . This policy was particularly pronounced in the 2006 Lebanon war and would have a profound effect on the conduct of the war . IDF Chief of Staff Halutz repeatedly ordered Israeli troops during the war to capture the bodies of slain Hizbullah militants to " to show to the media " . During the war Israel also released footage to FOX news of the slain Hizbullah fighter Hadi Hasrallah , the 18 - year old son of Hizbullah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah , killed in a clash in south Lebanon 1997 and whose body was retained by Israel . His remains were returned to Lebanon in an exchange in 1998 . Brig . - Gen . Gal Hirsh , commander of Division 91 , declared on July 25 that IDF " planned to take several bodies of dead guerrillas captive " in the battle of Bint Jbeil . In the first week of August Israel claimed to have captured five Hizbullah operatives in the vicinity of Bint Jbeil . In fact IDF only captured four Hizbullah fighters throughout the war and none in the Bint Jbeil region . The bodies of at least three Hizbullah fighters , who were killed in the battle of Bint Jbeil , were captured by IDF and brought to Israel . The remains of Mousa Khanafir , Zayd Haydar and Marwan Samahat were returned to Lebanon in the prisoner exchange on 15 July 2008 . Veteran Israeli war correspondent Ron Ben - Yishai claimed that " in almost any ground battle , the moment our troops encountered resistance , the force ' s progress stopped , commanders demanded assistance , and the fighting focused on evacuating casualties from the battlefield … you will not find even one story about a force that fought until it completed its mission or a Hizbullah force that was defeated . " Although the Israeli soldiers did not succeed in conquering Bint Jbeil , they fought hard and eventually successfully to prevent the enemy " reaching their comrades ' bodies " . Aftermath . Israel sent the elite of its regular forces , the Golani infantry brigade and the Paratroopers brigade to Bint Jbeil . The IDF enjoyed a tremendous superiority both in numbers and firepower as well as absolute air superiority . The over 5 , 000 IDF soldiers laying a siege around the town were faced by little more than 100 Hizbullah fighters . The IDF failed to conquer the town or to make any other tangible operational achievements . According to Kober the Israeli withdrawal was " correctly interpreted by Hizballah as a great victory for the organization . The Winograd Commission devoted a special chapter to the battle of Bint Jbeil and especially to the deadly clash on July 26 . The commission concluded that what was described as a " division - sized battle " was in reality no more than a " series of limited engagements between IDF forces and Hizbullah fighters on the eastern edge , and to some extent on the western edge of the town . " According to the report the failure capture Bint Jbeil became " a symbol of the unsuccessful action of the Israel Defense Forces throughout the fighting . " Hizbullah considered the battle of Bint Jbeil a remarkable victory . The IDF forces participating in the battle were vastly superior , both in terms of numbers and of firepower . According to Israeli estimates the towns were only defended by a company - sized force ( 100 - 140 men ) and yet Hizbullah fighters succeeded in holding four IDF brigades at bay . Hizbullah commanders later estimated that they were outnumbered 10 or 20 to one in the battles . The IDF often released conflicting estimates of the number of Hizbullah militants killed in the various clashes during the war . No overall estimate was published after the war . A semi - official Israeli study claimed that " dozens " of Hizbullah militants where killed in the battle . The Winograd Commission only claimed that " a large number " were killed . Hizbullah has yet to publish official casualty statistics from the battle or indeed from the war itself . It is clear however that dozens of Hizbullah fighters died in the battle . Local Hizbullah commanders told Lebanese Daily as - Safir that Bint Jbeil lost 18 fighters while Aynata lost 14 in the battle . Among those killed were several commanders , including Khalid Bazzi , the overall Hizbullah commander of the Bint Jbeil area . A Hizbullah commander told as - Safir that most of the fighters who died in the battle were killed by the shelling while only a " small number " died in the clashes with Israeli troops . Hizbullah usually dominated the battle field " because of the courage of the fighters , their steadfastness and knowledge of the terrain " . But the total number of fatalities in the battles in the Bint Jbeil area could well be higher than 32 . Hizbullah sent reinforcements to the town during the war , including 40 members of the elite Special Force unit . The unit ' s commander , Muhammad Qansuh ( Sajid ad - Duwayr ) , from the village of ad - Duwayr was killed in the last day of the war . The Israeli army ' s failure in the war in general and especially its inability to conquer Bint Jbeil generated bitterness in Israel . The war had not ended before the recriminations inside the IDF Command started flying . The commander of the 7th Brigade , Col . Amnon Eshel was caught by a TV camera saying that his superior officer Brig . Gen . Gal Hirsh " does not understand what is going on on the battlefield " , a statement that probably ended his military career . Hirsch shot back , accusing Eshel of never once entering Lebanon himself , only watching the war from his " plasma screen " in his HQ in Israel . Former Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon ' s criticism of the Israeli conduct of the war was scathing , calling it a " catastrophe " . Aware of the seriousness of the antitank threat , he says that the IDF should have left the vulnerable tanks at home and stayed away from built - up areas – " no tanks and no houses " – and to operate in a more guerrilla like type of warfare . He was especially critical of the attempted occupation of Bint Jbeil . Commander of Northern Command Udi Adam was practically dismissed on 8 August 2006 - after his failure to capture Bint Jbeil - when the Chief of Staff Dan Halutz sent his deputy , Moshe Kaplinsky , to serve as a " coordinator " at Northern Command . Adam resigned from the army a month after the war . The Chief of Staff himself resigned from his post in January 2007 and his deputy Kaplinsky retired from the army in late 2007 . Gen . Hirsch became the prime target for the widespread frustration in Israel after the war , having direct responsibility both for the abduction affair and the failures at Bint Jbeil and Ayta ash - Sha ' b . He was forced to resign a few months after the war . After his resignation , former Chief of Staff Halutz said that " the most blatant non - achievement or failure " of the war was allowing it to continue for so long . If the initial battles at Maroun al - Ras and Bint Jbeil had been more successful the final ground operation could have been avoided . " We could have achieved a lot more if we had been more determined , ” he said . Israel ' s Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was very disappointed at the army ' s lack of " results " in Bint Jbeil but did not question the courage of the Israeli soldiers . " If Maroun al - Ras had looked different , if Bint Jbail had looked different , it could be that we would not have reached the point we reached . " The 51st Golani Battalion was left scarred by the traumatic experience in Bint Jbeil . Battalion 51 has a dark history in Lebanon , losing 9 men in three days in two incidents in October 1997 . It had suffered 8 dead , including several officers , and 20 wounded . Many of the survivors suffered from shell - shock or post traumatic stress syndrome . Five years later some would still suffer from concentration problems , nightmares and impatience or finding it difficult to cope with their daily lives . Soldiers complained that their mental needs were ignored by their officers . Their battalion commander , Lt . - Col . Asor , was appointed commander on the Egoz unit . He was replaced by an officer from outside the Golani Brigade , who had no understanding for old Golani traditions . When the battalion commander did not show up at a memorial service for the eight Golani dead from the Lebanon war a rebellion broke out . About a hundred soldiers rose up and just walked out of the Tze ' elim training base outside Beer Sheva . This was one of the largest " revolts " in the history of the IDF . One of the leaders of the " Golani rebellion " was St . - Sgt . Shiran Amsili , who received a medal for his part in the battle of Bint Jbeil . He was sent to jail for two months for his involvement in the protest . Another 10 soldiers were sent to jail for one or two months and seven other soldiers were confined to their base for a month . Civilian Casualties . Apparently Chief of Staff Dan Halutz at one time demanded that Bint Jbeil be " wipe [ d ] out from the air " but the demand was rejected by the defence minister . The town was however subjected to intensive artillery shelling throughout the war and the destruction of buildings and other civilian infrastructure was widespread . Israeli journalist Ron Ben Yishai visited Bint Jbeil after the war and observed that " only several houses in the big town are still standing . " According to data from UNDP 2 , 512 housing units in the Bint Jbeil district were destroyed and another 1 , 908 were damaged . Fully 14 , 799 buildings were " impacted " , representing 87 percent of all buildings in the district . According to Lebanese sources in Aynata 27 civilians were killed during the battle while 18 civilians were killed in Bint Jbeil . 41 villagers were killed in Aitaroun . The Lebanese Government prepared a report for the UN Human Rights Council about what it termed " collective massacres " committed by the Israeli army in the 2006 war . The list contained three incidents concerning civilian victims in the village of Aytaroun : Israel Defense Forces fatalities . July 24 , 2006 July 26 , 2006 Aug 7 , 2006 Aug 8 , 2006