USS Scorpion ( SSN - 589 ) USS " Scorpion " ( SSN - 589 ) was a " Skipjack " - class nuclear submarine of the United States Navy and the sixth vessel of the US Navy to carry that name . " Scorpion " was declared lost on 5 June 1968 with 99 crewmen dying in the incident . The USS " Scorpion " is one of two nuclear submarines the US Navy has lost , the other being . In November 2012 , the US Submarine Veterans , an organization with over 13 , 800 members ( all former submariners ) asked the US Navy to reopen the investigation on the sinking of USS " Scorpion " . Service history . " Scorpion " s keel was laid down on 20 August 1958 by the Electric Boat Division of the General Dynamics Corporation in Groton , Connecticut . She was launched on 19 December 1959 , sponsored by Mrs . Elizabeth S . Morrison ( daughter of the last commander of the World War II - era , which had been lost with all hands in 1944 ) , and commissioned on 29 July 1960 , Commander Norman B . Bessac in command . 1960 – 1967 . Assigned to Submarine Squadron 6 , Division 62 , " Scorpion " departed New London , Connecticut , on 24 August for a two - month deployment in European waters . During that period , she participated in exercises with units of the 6th Fleet and of other NATO navies . After returning to New England in late October , she trained along the eastern seaboard until May 1961 , then crossed the Atlantic again for operations which took her into the summer . On 9 August 1961 she returned to New London , a month later , shifted to Norfolk , Virginia . In 1962 , she earned the Navy Unit Commendation . With Norfolk her home port for the remainder of her career , " Scorpion " specialized in the development of nuclear submarine warfare tactics . Varying her role from hunter to hunted , she participated in exercises which ranged along the Atlantic coast and in the Bermuda and Puerto Rico operating areas ; then , from June 1963 – May 1964 , she interrupted her operations for an overhaul at Charleston , South Carolina . Resuming duty off the eastern seaboard in late spring , she again interrupted that duty from 4 August – 8 October to make a transatlantic patrol . In the spring of 1965 , she conducted a similar patrol in European waters . During the late winter and early spring of 1966 , and again in the autumn , she was deployed for special operations . Following the completion of those assignments , her commanding officer received the Navy Commendation Medal for outstanding leadership , foresight , and professional skill . Other " Scorpion " officers and crewmen were cited for meritorious achievement . " Scorpion " is reputed to have entered an inland Russian sea during a " Northern Run " in 1966 where it successfully filmed a Soviet missile launch through its periscope before being forced to use its high speed to flee from Soviet Navy ships . " Scorpion " had a reputation for excellence and as a fast attack submarine it was a plum assignment for officers seeking to move up in a Navy in which submarine officers were gaining increasing clout . Overhaul . On 1 February 1967 " Scorpion " entered the Norfolk Naval Shipyard for another extended overhaul . However , instead of the much - needed complete overhaul , she received only emergency repairs to get her back on duty as soon as possible . Operational pressures and complex and unforeseen problems created by the Submarine Safety Program ( SUBSAFE ) that was initiated after the 1963 loss of , meant that submarine overhauls went from nine months in length to 36 months . Intensive vetting of submarine component quality required by the SUBSAFE program coupled with various improvements and intensified structural inspections – particularly hull welding inspections using ultrasonic testing – were issues that reduced the availability of critical parts such as seawater piping . Cold War pressures prompted U . S . Submarine Fleet Atlantic ( SUBLANT ) officers to hunt for ways to reduce overhaul durations . The cost of that last overhaul was nearly one - seventh of those given other nuclear submarines at the same time . This was the result of concerns about the " high percentage of time offline " of nuclear attack submarines which was estimated to be at about 40 % of total available duty time . As " Scorpion " s original " full overhaul " was whittled down in scope , it was decided it would not receive long - overdue SUBSAFE work . " Scorpion " would not receive a new , central valve control system ; in the event of an emergency , her crew would have to scramble around the engine room to find and manually operate large valves . Crucially , " Scorpion " would not receive a fix for the same emergency system that did not work on " Thresher " , the submarine whose loss was the reason for the existence of the SUBSAFE program . On that sub a pipe leak at depth prompted an emergency shutdown of the submarine ' s nuclear reactor ; powerless , " Thresher " could still have surfaced if the emergency main ballast tank ( EMBT ) blow system worked . It did not . ( Later , dockside tests on " Thresher " s sister sub " Tinosa " proved that the EMBT system did not work at test depth ; moisture in the high - pressure air flasks froze in in - line strainers as the ballast tanks were blown . ) Following a dispute between Charleston Naval Ship Yard , which claimed the EMBT system worked as - is , and SUBLANT , which claimed it did not , the EMBT was " tagged out " or listed as unusable . The aforementioned problems with overhaul duration , that saw " Scorpion " selected for a reduced experimental overhaul program , also caused all SUBSAFE work to be delayed as well during 1967 . The reduced overhaul concept " Scorpion " went through had been approved by Admiral David Lamar McDonald , the Chief of Naval Operations on 17 June 1966 . On 20 July , McDonald also allowed deferral of the SUBSAFE extensions , which had otherwise been deemed essential since 1963 . During " Scorpion " s last six months of operational life , at least two sailors , Electrician ' s Mate Second Class Daniel Rogers and Radioman Chief Daniel Pettey , struggled to be released from duty aboard " Scorpion " due to the bad morale problems they witnessed . Rogers sought disqualification from submarine duty – which was then allowed – while Pettey attempted to transfer to the U . S . Army only to be released from " Scorpion " while in the Mediterranean just months before it was lost . Loss . Disappearance . In late October 1967 , " Scorpion " started refresher training and weapons system acceptance tests , and was given a new commanding officer , Francis Slattery . Following type training out of Norfolk , Virginia , she got underway on 15 February 1968 for a Mediterranean Sea deployment . She operated with the 6th Fleet into May and then headed west for home . " Scorpion " suffered several mechanical malfunctions including a chronic problem with Freon leakage from refrigeration systems . An electrical fire occurred in an escape trunk when a water leak shorted out a shore power connection . Upon departing the Mediterranean on 16 May , two men departed " Scorpion " at Rota , Spain . One man left due to a family emergency , while the other , PO1 Joseph Underwood , departed for health reasons . " Scorpion " was then detailed to observe Soviet naval activities in the Atlantic in the vicinity of the Azores . With this completed , " Scorpion " prepared to head back to Naval Station Norfolk . For an unusually long period of time , beginning shortly before midnight on 20 May and ending after midnight 21 May , " Scorpion " was attempting to send radio traffic to Naval Station Rota in Spain but was only able to reach a Navy communications station in Nea Makri , Greece , which forwarded " Scorpion " s messages to SUBLANT . Six days later , she was reported overdue at Norfolk . Navy personnel suspected possible failure and launched a search . The search . A public search was initiated , but without immediate success and on 5 June , " Scorpion " and her crew were declared " presumed lost . " Her name was struck from the Naval Vessel Register on 30 June . Some reports indicate that a large and secret search was launched three days before " Scorpion " was expected back from patrol ; this , combined with other declassified information , leads to speculation that the US Navy knew of the " Scorpion ' s " destruction before the public search was launched . The public search continued with a team of mathematical consultants led by Dr . John Piña Craven , the Chief Scientist of the U . S . Navy ' s Special Projects Division . They employed the methods of Bayesian search theory , initially developed during the search for a hydrogen bomb lost off the coast of Palomares , Spain , in January 1966 in the Palomares B - 52 crash . At the end of October , the Navy ' s oceanographic research ship , , located sections of the hull of " Scorpion " in more than of water about southwest of the Azores . This was after the Navy had released sound tapes from its underwater " SOSUS " listening system which contained the sounds of the destruction of " Scorpion " . Subsequently , the court of inquiry was reconvened , and other vessels , including the bathyscaphe " Trieste II " , were dispatched to the scene , collecting many pictures and other data . Although Dr . Craven received much credit for locating the wreckage of " Scorpion " , Gordon Hamilton — an acoustics expert who pioneered the use of hydroacoustics to pinpoint Polaris missile splashdown locations — was instrumental not only in acquiring the acoustic signals that were used in locating the vessel , but also in analyzing those signals to provide a compact " search box " wherein the wreck of " Scorpion " was finally located . Hamilton had established a listening station in the Canary Islands , which obtained a clear signal of what some scientists believe was the noise of the vessel ' s pressure hull imploding as she passed below crush depth . A little - known Naval Research Laboratory scientist named Chester " Buck " Buchanan , using a towed camera sled of his own design aboard " Mizar " , finally located " Scorpion " after nearly six months of searching . The towed camera sled , which was fabricated by J . L . " Jac " Hamm of Naval Research Laboratory ' s Engineering Services Division , is currently housed in the U . S . Navy Museum , Washington Navy Yard , Washington , DC . ( Buchanan had located the wrecked hull of " Thresher " in 1964 using this same technique . ) Wreckage . It would appear that the bow of " Scorpion " skidded upon impact with the globigerina ooze on the seafloor , digging a sizable trench which created a significant hazard for the " Trieste II " crews attempting to maneuver close to acquire photographs and assess the wreckage with their own eyes . Much of the operations compartment had disappeared , and most of the debris field was identified as coming from the operations compartment . The sail had been dislodged as the hull of the operations compartment upon which it perched disintegrated , and was lying on its port side . One of " Scorpion " s running lights was in the open position as if it had been on the surface at the time of the mishap , although it may have been left in the open position during the vessel ' s recent nighttime stop at Rota . One " Trieste II " pilot who dived on " Scorpion " said the shock of the implosion may have knocked the light into the open position . The aft section of the engine room had telescoped forward into the larger - diameter hull section . Observed damage . The secondary Navy investigation – using extensive photographic , video , and eyewitness inspections of the wreckage in 1969 – offered the opinion that " Scorpion " s hull was crushed by implosion forces as it sank below crush depth . The Structural Analysis Group , which included Naval Ships Systems Command ' s Submarine Structures director Peter Palermo , plainly saw that the torpedo room was intact , though it had been pinched from the operations compartment by massive hydrostatic pressure . The operations compartment itself was largely obliterated by sea pressure and the engine room had telescoped forward into the hull by collapse pressure , when the cone - to - cylinder transition junction failed between the auxiliary machine space and the engine room . The only damage to the torpedo room compartment appeared to be a hatch missing from the forward escape trunk ; Palermo pointed out that this would have occurred when water pressure entered the torpedo room at the moment of implosion . He also pointed out that the aft escape trunk hatch was open and the fairing was slightly dislodged , though it was still on its hinges . This conclusion was drawn by Palermo eighteen years after " Scorpion " was lost , when he reviewed new and extremely clear images taken by " Jason Junior " and " Alvin " as part of a Navy - Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution survey of " Scorpion " s wreck site . Palermo could not rule out sabotage or collision as " plausible " causes of destruction . Palermo writes that the position of the masts and other evidence possibly indicate " Scorpion " was near the surface " just prior to sinking . " However , other analysis in the COI concludes the damage to masts , antennas , and hoists is mere consequential damage from detachment of the sail and parting of the hydraulic piping . Palermo admits that a precursor signal that occurred some 22 minutes prior to the acoustic train left by the sinking " could have been the results of an internal explosion . " He further states that " some of the remaining 14 acoustic events do have some of the characteristics of explosions , " though he qualifies this by writing that such characteristics " may " also be attributed to other sources . The submersible " Alvin " did take pictures of the inboard end of the propulsion shaft in 1986 . However , the Navy kept this classified for many years and only recently revealed its existence . The picture shows that the locking lip has gone . This lip was required to keep the shaft connected to the drive train in the bolted coupling . Cracking or shear of this lip is the root cause of the detachment of the shaft . Acoustic evidence . An extensive , year - long analysis of Gordon Hamilton ' s hydroacoustic signals of the submarine ' s demise was conducted by Robert Price , Ermine ( Meri ) Christian and Peter Sherman of the Naval Ordnance Laboratory . All three physicists were experts on undersea explosions , their sound signatures and destructive effects . Price was also an open critic of Dr . Craven . Their opinion , presented to the Navy as part of the Phase II investigation , was that the death noises likely occurred at when the hull failed . Fragments then continued in a free fall for another . This appears to differ from conclusions drawn by Dr . Craven and Hamilton , who pursued an independent set of experiments as part of the same Phase II probe , demonstrating that alternate interpretations of the hydroacoustic signals were possibly based on the submarine ' s depth at the time it was stricken and other operational conditions . The Structural Analysis Group ( SAG ) findings argue an explosive event is unlikely , and are highly dismissive of Craven and Hamilton ' s tests . The SAG physicists argued that the absence of a bubble pulse , which invariably occurs in an underwater explosion , is absolute evidence that no torpedo explosion occurred outside or inside the hull of the " Scorpion " . It should also be pointed out that the massive hull of the Russian submarine " Kursk " emitted a huge bubble pulse when its torpedoes detonated at the time of its loss on 12 Aug 2000 . Craven had attempted to prove " Scorpion " ' s hull could " swallow " the bubble pulse of a torpedo detonation by having Gordon Hamilton detonate small charges next to steel , air - filled containers . The real - world example of the " Kursk " which was ripped open by hydrogen peroxide - fueled torpedoes , had a pressure hull twice the size of " Scorpion " s , handily indicating even its massive and strong hull could not absorb the bubble pulse since its own bubble pulse signal exited its hull and was transmitted to geophones across Europe . The 1970 Naval Ordnance " Letter " , the intensive acoustics study of " Scorpion " destruction sounds by Price and Christian , was a supporting study within the SAG report . In its conclusions and recommendations section , the NOL acoustic study states : The Naval Ordnance Laboratory based much of its findings on an extensive acoustic analysis of the torpedoing and sinking of in the Pacific in early 1969 , seeking to compare its acoustic signals to those generated by " Scorpion " . Price , a critic of Craven and Hamilton ' s analysis of the sounds emitted by " Scorpion " , found the Navy ' s scheduled sinking of " Sterlet " fortuitous . Nonetheless , " Sterlet " was a small World War II - era diesel - electric submarine of a vastly different design and construction from " Scorpion " with regard to its pressure hull and other characteristics . Its sinking resulted in three identifiable acoustic signals as compared to " Scorpion " s 15 , something Price could not adequately explain . The mathematical calculations Price used to arrive at his analysis – and dispute some of Craven and Hamilton ' s conclusions – remain unknown to the public . When completed , the NOL acoustics study of " Sterlet " and " Scorpion " sinking sounds provided a highly debated explanation as to how " Scorpion " may have reached its crush depth by anecdotally referring to the uncontrolled and nearly fatal dive of the diesel submarine in January 1969 : In the same May 2003 N77 letter excerpted above ( see 1 . with regard to the Navy ' s view of a forward explosion ) , however , the following statement appears to dismiss the NOL theory , and again unequivocally point the finger toward an explosion forward : Secrecy . At the time of her sinking , there were 99 crewmen aboard " Scorpion " . The boat contained highly sophisticated spy gear and spy manuals , two nuclear - tipped torpedoes , and a nuclear propulsion system . The best available evidence indicates that " Scorpion " sank in the Atlantic Ocean on 22 May 1968 at approximately 1844Z ( Zulu time ; see UTC ) while in transit across the Atlantic Ocean from Gibraltar to her home port at Norfolk , Virginia . Several hypotheses about the cause of the loss have been advanced . Some have suggested that hostile action by a Soviet submarine caused " Scorpion " s loss . Shortly after her sinking , the Navy assembled a court of inquiry to investigate the incident and to publish a report about the likely causes for the sinking . The court was presided over by Vice Admiral Bernard Austin , who had presided over the inquiry into the loss of " Thresher " . The panel ' s conclusions , first printed in 1968 , were largely classified . At the time , the Navy quoted frequently from a portion of the 1968 report that said no one is likely ever to " conclusively " determine the cause of the loss . The Clinton administration declassified most of this report in 1993 , and it was then that the public first learned that the panel considered that a possible cause was the malfunction of one of " Scorpion " s own torpedoes . ( The panel qualified its opinion , saying the evidence it had available could not lead to a conclusive finding about the cause of her sinking . ) However , the court of inquiry did not reconvene after the 1969 Phase II investigation , and did not take testimony from a group of submarine designers , engineers and physicists who spent nearly a year evaluating the data . Present location . Today , the wreck of " Scorpion " is reported to be resting on a sandy seabed at the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean in approximately of water . The site is reported to be approximately southwest of the Azores Islands , on the eastern edge of the Sargasso Sea . The actual position is 32°54 . 9 ' N , 33°08 . 89 ' W . The U . S . Navy has acknowledged that it periodically visits the site to conduct testing for the release of nuclear materials from the nuclear reactor or the two nuclear weapons aboard her , and to determine whether the wreckage has been disturbed . The Navy has not released any information about the status of the wreckage , except for a few photographs taken of the wreckage in 1968 , and again in 1985 by deep water submersibles . The Navy has also released information about the nuclear testing performed in and around the " Scorpion " site . The Navy reports no significant release of nuclear material from the sub . The 1985 photos were taken by a team of oceanographers working for the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in Woods Hole , Massachusetts . Environmental monitoring . The U . S . Navy has periodically monitored the environmental conditions of the site since the sinking and has reported the results in an annual public report on environmental monitoring for U . S . nuclear - powered ships and boats . The reports provide specifics on the environmental sampling of sediment , water , and marine life that is done to ascertain whether the submarine has significantly affected the deep - ocean environment . The reports also explain the methodology for conducting this deep sea monitoring from both surface vessels and submersible s . The monitoring data confirm that there has been no significant effect on the environment . The nuclear fuel aboard the submarine remains intact and no uranium in excess of levels expected from the fallout from past atmospheric testing of nuclear weapon s has been detected by the Navy ' s inspections . In addition , " Scorpion " carried two nuclear - tipped Mark 45 anti - submarine torpedoes ( ASTOR ) when she was lost . The warheads of these torpedoes are part of the environmental concern . The most likely scenario is that the plutonium and uranium cores of these weapons corroded to a heavy , insoluble material soon after the sinking , and they remain at or close to their original location inside the torpedo room of the boat . If the corroded materials were released outside the submarine , their large specific gravity and insolubility would cause them to settle down into the sediment . Unsubstantiated theories about the loss . Accidental activation of torpedo . The US Navy ' s court of inquiry listed as one possibility the inadvertent activation of a battery - powered Mark 37 torpedo . This acoustic homing torpedo , in a fully ready condition and without a propeller guard , is believed by some to have started running within the tube . Released from the tube , the torpedo then somehow became fully armed and successfully engaged its nearest target — " Scorpion " herself . This is considered highly unlikely due to the fact that " Scorpion " would have maintained the ability to destroy the weapon before it reengaged . Although much has been made of claims by Dr . Craven that the SOSUS network tracked the submarine moving back onto its original course , which would be consistent with performing a 360° turn in an attempt to activate a torpedo ' s safety systems , Gordon Hamilton has said that the acoustical data is too garbled to reveal any such details . Explosion of torpedo . A later theory was that a torpedo may have exploded in the tube , caused by an uncontrollable fire in the torpedo room . The book " " documents findings and investigation by Dr . John Craven , who surmised that a likely cause could have been the overheating of a faulty battery . ( Dr . Craven later stated in the book " Silent Steel " that he was misquoted . ) The Mark 46 silver - zinc battery used in the Mark 37 torpedo had a tendency to overheat , and in extreme cases could cause a fire that was strong enough to cause a low - order detonation of the warhead . If such a detonation had occurred , it might have opened the boat ' s large torpedo - loading hatch and caused " Scorpion " to flood and sink . However , while Mark 46 batteries have been known to generate so much heat that the torpedo casings blistered , none is known to have damaged a boat or caused an explosion . Dr . John Craven mentions that he did not work on the Mark 37 torpedo ' s propulsion system and only became aware of the possibility of a battery explosion twenty years after the loss of " Scorpion " . In his book " The Silent War " , he recounts running a simulation with former " Scorpion " executive officer Lieutenant Commander Robert Fountain , Jr . commanding the simulator . Fountain was told he was headed home at 18 knots ( 33 km / h ) at a depth of his choice , then there was an alarm of " hot running torpedo " . Fountain responded with " right full rudder " , a quick turn that would activate a safety device and keep the torpedo from arming . Then an explosion in the torpedo room was introduced into the simulation . Fountain ordered emergency procedures to surface the boat , stated Dr . Craven , " but instead she continued to plummet , reaching collapse depth and imploding in ninety seconds — one second shy of the acoustic record of the actual event . " Craven , who was the Chief Scientist of the Navy ' s Special Projects Office , which had management responsibility for the design , development , construction , operational test and evaluation and maintenance of the UGM - 27 Polaris Fleet Missile System had long believed " Scorpion " was struck by her own torpedo , but revised his views during the mid - 1990s when engineers testing Mark 46 batteries at Keyport , Washington , said the batteries leaked electrolyte and sometimes burned while outside of their casings during lifetime shock , heat and cold testing . Although the battery manufacturer was accused of building bad batteries , it was later able to successfully prove its batteries were no more prone to failure than those made by other manufacturers . Malfunction of trash disposal unit . During the 1968 inquiry , Vice Admiral Arnold F . Shade testified that he believed that a malfunction of the trash disposal unit ( TDU ) was the trigger for the disaster . Shade theorized that the sub was flooded when the TDU was operated at periscope depth and that other subsequent failures of material or personnel while dealing with the TDU - induced flooding led to the sub ' s demise . Soviet attack . The book " All Hands Down " by Kenneth Sewell and Jerome Preisler ( Simon and Schuster , 2008 ) concludes that the " Scorpion " was destroyed while en route to gather intelligence on a Soviet naval group conducting operations in the Atlantic . While the mission for which the submarine was diverted from her original course back to her home port is a matter of record , its details remain classified . Ed Offley ' s book , " Scorpion Down " , promotes a hypothesis suggesting that the " Scorpion " was sunk by a Soviet submarine during a standoff that started days before 22 May . Offley also cites that it occurred roughly at the time of the submarine ' s intelligence - gathering mission , from which she was redirected from her original heading for home ; according to Offley , the flotilla had just been harassed by another US submarine , the USS " Haddo " . Both " All Hands Down " and " Scorpion Down " point toward involvement by the KGB spy - ring ( the so - called Walker Spy - Ring ) led by John Anthony Walker , Jr . in the heart of the US Navy ' s communications , stating that it could have known that the " Scorpion " was coming to investigate the Soviet flotilla . According to this theory , there was a common agreement made by both navies to hide the truth about both incidents . Several USN SSNs collided with Soviet Echo subs in Russian and Scottish waters in this period . Commander Roger Lane Nott , Royal Navy commander of the SSN HMS " Splendid " during the 1982 Falklands War , stated that as a junior navigation officer on the SSN HMS " Conqueror " in 1972 , a Soviet submarine entered the Scottish Clyde channel and " Conqueror " was given the order to ' chase it out ' . Having realised it was being pursued , " a very aggressive Soviet Captain turned his submarine and drove it straight at HMS " Conqueror " . It had been an extremely close call . " The Soviet submarine force was as professional as the British and the Americans . According to a translated article from Pravda , Moscow never issued a ' fire ' command during the cold war . This is disputed by Royal Navy officers , " there had been other occasions when harassed Russians had fired torpedoes to scare off trails . " The Navy court of inquiry official statement was that there was not another ship within 200 miles of " Scorpion " at the time of the sinking . US Navy conclusions . The results of the U . S . Navy ' s various investigations into the loss of " Scorpion " are inconclusive . While the court of inquiry never endorsed Dr . Craven ' s torpedo theory regarding the loss of " Scorpion " , its " findings of facts " released in 1993 carried Craven ' s torpedo theory at the head of a list of possible causes of " Scorpion " s loss . The Navy failed to inform the public that both the U . S . Submarine Force Atlantic and the Commander - in - Chief U . S . Atlantic Fleet opposed Craven ' s torpedo theory as unfounded and also failed to disclose that a second technical investigation into the loss of " Scorpion " completed in 1970 actually repudiated claims that a torpedo detonation played a role in the loss of " Scorpion " . Despite the second technical investigation , the Navy continues to attach strong credence to Craven ' s view that an explosion destroyed her , as is evidenced by this excerpt from a May 2003 letter from the Navy ' s Submarine Warfare Division ( N77 ) , specifically written by Admiral P . F . Sullivan on behalf of Vice Admiral John J . Grossenbacher ( Commander Naval Submarine Forces ) , the Naval Sea Systems Command , Naval Reactors , and others in the US Navy regarding its view of alternative sinking theories :