Second Battle of Rappahannock Station The Second Battle of Rappahannock Station took place on November 7 , 1863 , near the village of Rappahannock Station ( now Remington , Virginia ) , on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad , between Confederate forces under Maj . Gen . Jubal Early and Union forces under Maj . Gen . John Sedgwick as part of the Bristoe Campaign of the American Civil War . The battle resulted in a victory for the Union . Background . After the Battle of Gettysburg in July 1863 , the Union and Confederate armies drifted south and for three months sparred with one another on the rolling plains of northern Virginia . Little was accomplished , however , and in late October General Robert E . Lee withdrew his Confederate army behind the Rappahannock River , a line he hoped to maintain throughout the winter . A single pontoon bridge at the town of Rappahannock Station was the only connection Lee retained with the northern bank of the river . The bridge was protected by a bridgehead on the north bank consisting on two redoubts and connecting trenches . Confederate batteries posted on hills south of the river gave additional strength to the position . The bridgehead was an integral part of Lee ' s strategy to defend the Rappahannock River line . As he later explained , by holding the bridgehead he could " threaten any flank movement the enemy might make above or below , and thus compel him to divide his forces , when it was hoped that an opportunity would be presented to concentrate on one or the other part . " The Union Army of the Potomac ' s commander , Maj . Gen . George G . Meade , divided his forces just as Lee expected . He ordered Maj . Gen . John Sedgwick to attack the Confederate position at Rappahannock Station while Maj . Gen . William H . French forced a crossing five miles downstream at Kelly ' s Ford . Once both Sedgwick and French were safely across the river , the reunited army would proceed to Brandy Station . Battle . The operation went according to plan . Shortly after noon on November 7 , French drove back Confederate defenders at Kelly ' s Ford and crossed the river . As he did so , Sedgwick advanced toward Rappahannock Station . Lee learned of these developments sometime after noon and immediately put his troops in motion to meet the enemy . His plan was to resist Sedgwick with a small force at Rappahannock Station while attacking French at Kelly ' s Ford with the larger part of his army . The success of the plan depended on his ability to maintain the Rappahannock Station bridgehead until French was defeated . Sedgwick first engaged the Confederates at 3 p . m . when Maj . Gen . Albion P . Howe ' s division of the VI Corps drove in Confederate skirmishers and seized a range of high ground three - quarters of a mile from the river . Howe placed Union batteries on these hills that pounded the enemy earthworks with a " rapid and vigorous " fire . Confederate guns across the river returned the fire , but with little effect . Maj . Gen . Jubal Early ' s division occupied the bridgehead defenses that day . Early posted Brig . Gen . Harry T . Hays ' s Louisiana brigade and Captain Charles A . Green ' s four gun Louisiana Guard Artillery in the works and at 4 : 30 p . m . reinforced them with three North Carolina regiments led by Colonel Archibald Godwin . The addition of Godwin ' s troops increased the number of Confederate defenders at the bridgehead to nearly 2 , 000 . Sedgwick continued shelling the Confederates throughout the late afternoon , but otherwise he showed no disposition to attack . As the day drew to a close , Lee became convinced that the movement against the bridgehead was merely a feint to cover French ' s crossing farther downstream . He was mistaken . At dusk the shelling stopped , and Sedgwick ' s infantry rushed suddenly upon the works . Col . Peter Ellmaker ' s brigade advanced adjacent to the railroad , preceded by skirmishers of the 6th Maine Infantry . No Union regiment gained more laurels that day nor suffered higher casualties . At the command " Forward , double - quick ! " they surged over the Confederate works and engaged Hays ' s men in hand - to - hand combat . Without assistance , the 6th Maine breached the Confederate line and planted its flags on the parapet of the easternmost redoubt . Moments later the 5th Wisconsin swarmed over the walls of the western redoubt , likewise wresting it from Confederate control . On the right , Union forces achieved comparable success . Just minutes after Ellmaker ' s brigade penetrated Hays ' s line , Col . Emory Upton ' s brigade overran Godwin ' s position . Upton reformed his lines inside the Confederate works and sent a portion of the 121st New York to seize the pontoon bridge , while the rest of his command wheeled right to attack the confused Confederate horde now massed at the lower end of the bridgehead . Confederate resistance dissolved as hundreds of soldiers threw down their arms and surrendered . Others sought to gain the opposite shore by swimming the icy river or by running the gauntlet of Union rifle fire at the bridge . Confederate troops south of the Rappahannock looked on hopelessly as Union soldiers herded their comrades to the rear as prisoners of war . Aftermath . In all , 1 , 670 Confederates were killed , wounded , or captured in the brief struggle , more than eighty percent of those engaged . Union casualty figures , by contrast , were small : 419 in all . For the North the battle had been " a complete and glorious victory , " an engagement " as short as it was decisive , " reflecting " infinite credit upon all concerned . " Maj . Gen . Horatio G . Wright noted that it was the first instance in which Union troops had carried a strongly entrenched Confederate position in the first assault . Brig . Gen . Harry Hays claimed to have been attacked by no less than 20 , 000 to 25 , 000 Union soldiers — a figure ten times the actual number . The battle had been as humiliating for the South as it had been glorious for the North . Two of the Confederacy ' s finest brigades , sheltered behind entrenchments and well supported by artillery , had been routed and captured by an enemy force of equal size . Col . Walter H . Taylor of Lee ' s staff called it , " the saddest chapter in the history of this army , " the result of " miserable , miserable management . " An enlisted soldier put it more plainly . " I don ' t know much about it , " he said , " but it seems to be that our army was surprised . " Lee would later call on subordinates to submit reports on the battle in an effort to determine what had gone wrong , but on the night of November 7 more pressing matters demanded his attention . Loss of the bridgehead destroyed his plans for an offensive and left his army dangerously extended on a now indefensible front . Meade , acting quickly , might pin Lee ' s army against the Rapidan River just as Lee had tried to pin Maj . Gen . John Pope ' s army against the Rappahannock River one year earlier in the Second Battle of Bull Run . Lee immediately canceled his plans for an attack on French and within hours had his army marching south .