AirLand Battle AirLand Battle was the overall conceptual framework that formed the basis of the US Army ' s European warfighting doctrine from 1982 into the late 1990s . AirLand Battle emphasized close coordination between land forces acting as an aggressively maneuvering defense , and air forces attacking rear - echelon forces feeding those front line enemy forces . AirLand Battle replaced 1976 ' s " Active Defense " doctrine , and was itself replaced by the modern " Full Spectrum Operations " . DePuy Reforms . Background . The basic concept of the Blitzkrieg and similar doctrines was the buildup of local superiority over the defence , followed by a rapid attack against a limited front and then exploitation and expansion in poorly defended rear areas . For much of the 1950s and early 60s the US war fighting doctrine was based on the use of nuclear weapons , which would break up any attempt to concentrate forces prior to a breakthrough attack of this sort . Air forces were the primary delivery mechanism of these strikes , relegating land forces to a secondary role of briefly holding terrain while the nuclear strikes took their toll . It was expected that any attempt to concentrate forces for conventional land attack would only invite a nuclear strike against them , so if the US Army was to play a role they would have to be dispersed and able to rapidly concentrate . The Army attempted to adapt to this battlefield with their PENTANA concept , but found little interest and were constantly underfunded in their attempts to produce the more mobile force PENTANA demanded . Conventional war . The Vietnam War demonstrated that not only was there a very real role for conventional armed forces , but also that focus on the European theatre as the basis of any future conflict was obviously misplaced . As the war in Vietnam wound down , the US Army started studying their organization and structure , looking for ways to better align it with real - world conflicts . In 1973 they formed the U . S . Army Training and Doctrine Command ( TRADOC ) , under the direction of General William E . DePuy , to study these issues and produce better doctrine for their forces . TRADOC concluded that there were two main possibilities for future conflicts , a major armored conflict in Europe , or a primarily infantry fight in other locations around the world . The latter possibility led to the ill - fated Rapid Reaction Force . The former was more problematic given the Warsaw Pact ' s massive numerical superiority , especially given the ending of Selective Service . Rapid wars , forward defence . When the Yom Kippur War broke out in 1973 , it demonstrated a new lethality of conventional weapons , especially the anti - tank guided missile ( ATGM ) . The new vulnerability of tanks , combined with the improved defensive power of the infantry , led to a revolution of thought within the US Army – that a war in Europe was winnable with conventional weapons . Impressed by the new weapons , DePuy started the process of re - arming the heavy divisions with weapons that would dramatically improve their firepower . In DePuy ' s view , firepower had increased so much that war would be won or lost almost immediately , in the first few massive battles . As Field Manual 100 – 5 noted , " The US Army must above all else , prepare to win the first battle of the next war . " Since forces from the rear could not move forward quickly enough to take place in the titanic battles being envisioned , everyone had to be placed as close to the front lines as possible . The result was a new battlefield organization that moved the vast majority of US and allied forces much closer to the border between East and West Germany , in what became known as " forward defense " . As reinforcements from the US could play only a minor role , the war was a " come as you are " affair . Air power was key ; as the battle increased in tempo and the Soviet forces attempted to break through the defenders , channels would naturally form that would be attacked by air . One problem that was noted soon after the introduction of the 1976 " Operations " was the problem of how to deal with the enemy ' s reserve forces in the rear . There was the possibility that the US could win the first battle , only to meet a second unattrited reserve force soon after . A solution to this problem was not immediately forthcoming . Patterns of Conflict . In 1976 Colonel John Boyd presented " Patterns of Conflict " , a study outlining a number of historical matchups in which the victor was able to disrupt the " observation - orientation - decision - action time cycle or loop " of their enemy . This , he stated , made them " appear ambiguous ( unpredictable ) thereby generate confusion and disorder " . His primary example of such action was the Blitzkrieg , where highly mobile forces were quickly concentrated as small points and then used to force a number of simultaneous thrusts through the front . The Blitz aimed at forcing the enemy into a continuous battle of maneuver instead of an outright fight , bypassing any strongly defended areas and extending into their rear . In order to guarantee supply movement and avoid being encircled , the enemy is forced to retreat in an attempt to reform continuous defensive lines . The traditional method of dealing with an armored breakthrough was to pick away at its sides , forcing it to maneuver away in order to find less - defended areas of advance . If these spoiling attacks can be set up on both sides of the route of attack , the armored spearhead is forced into an ever - decreasing frontage , eventually being pinched off and losing the ability to maneuver . The classic example of a successful anti - blitz was during the Battle of the Bulge , where US units repeatedly forced the German spearhead inward , eventually pinching it off just short of the Meuse River . However , this approach required the forces to be deployed in depth , and the massive numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact was the reverse of the numbers during the Bulge . Additionally , the concentration of low - mobility forces that formed the channelizing groups would invite nuclear strikes . Instead of meeting the Blitzkrieg head - on , Boyd suggested what he called the " counter - blitz " , where small groups of equally mobile forces would pick away at the lines of thrust and then move on to the next in a series of hit - and - run attacks . There was no necessity to retain any sort of front line , and the attacks deliberately moved from point to point in order to avoid being bogged down or getting trapped . The idea was not to force the blitz to lose its ability to maneuver , but instead upset its ability to understand where it should be maneuvering to — the attacker would have no idea which of these counteroffensives represented a real threat , and would have to respond to all of them . The key idea was to " Smash blitz offensive by inconspicuously using fast - tempo / fluidity - of - action and cohesion of counter - blitz combat teams as basis for shifting of forces and quick focus of air and ground effort to throttle momentum , shatter cohesion , and envelop blitz in order to destroy adversary ' s capacity to resist . " The battle was less about the weapons than it was about the ability to command them ; it was believed that the US ' s devolved command structure would be able to react to changes on the battlefield more quickly than their Soviet counterparts , overwhelming the Soviets ability to maintain cohesion as their higher - echelon commanders became overwhelmed with reports from so many small actions . Whereas Active Defense envisioned the Army units moving from one blocking position to another in a series of largely static defenses , in the counter - blitz they would be far more mobile , conducting a series of limited offensives instead . Another difference was the role of the reserves ; under Active Defense their role was very limited and even battlefield reserves were expected to be placed directly in the front , but under Patterns the reserves could be introduced where and when they became available , and be just as effective as the troops that had been there from the start . Boyd felt that the continual pattern of harassment and shifting positions could continue throughout a conflict , as opposed to attempting to win the entire war at the front in a single battle . When Boyd introduced the concept , the Pentagon was being led by power groups that new inductees considered hidebound and moribund . As illustrated in " The Pentagon Wars " , Boyd and like - minded up - and - comers formed the " Reform Movement " and sought to overturn existing chains of command and introduce new weapons and tactics across the entire armed forces . Extended battlefield . The major driving force in the evolution of AirLand Battle was General Donn A . Starry , who had taken over TRADOC from DePuy in 1977 and had been the primary force in implementing Active Defense . Since its introduction Starry had been attempting to find solutions to the problems of the enemy ' s reserves , and had been developing the concept of the " extended battlefield " . The extended battlefield noted that different commanders had different views of the battlefield in geographical terms . The brigade commander had to consider actions beyond the immediate front lines , up to 15 km into the enemy ' s rear where his artillery was operating . The division commander considered the battlefield as far as 70 km out , while the corps commander had a field of view out to 150 km . Starry introduced the idea that there was not only a geographical dimension to the battlefield organization , but a time dimension as well ; the brigade had perhaps 12 hours to respond to actions , while the division had 24 and the corps 72 . It was this coordination both in space and time that defined the extended battlefield . The reason that the time dimension was important was the result of studies in nuclear weapon employment at Fort Sill , Oklahoma , in December 1979 . These studies demonstrated that interdiction in the enemy ' s rear could seriously delay the movements of the rear echelon forces and create " time windows " during which the US would have the tactical advantage . By ensuring that the command structure was aware of the time dimension of the battlefield , they would be better prepared to take advantage of these windows when they occurred . Prior to the 1970s the air forces had been seen primarily as delivery mechanisms for tactical nuclear weapons , or for attacks on enemy air forces . Their counterpart to FM 100 - 5 listed only eight missions , only one of which required direct interaction with the Army forces in the field . During the Vietnam War much of the US air power had been directed against supply buildup and movement points ; roads , bridges , supply depots and the like . Attacking these targets with conventional weapons was an expensive process , requiring considerable amounts of ordnance to be expended to guarantee a " hit " . In the late 1960s and early 1970s the introduction of smart weapon s allowed conventional forces to directly attack point targets like bridges and roads , dramatically improving the ability to interdict the enemy , while at the same time allowing the aircraft to operate from safer , higher altitudes . These had little real impact during Vietnam when they were still very new , but their potential was obvious . Starting in the early 1970s the Air Force took its first steps at looking at a conventional war in Europe . In late 1975 , RAND Corporation completed a study that examined the merits of additional manned aircraft , remotely piloted vehicles , and stand - off munitions for improving air - ground capability in NATO . A follow - up two - day workshop at RAND studied what vulnerabilities the Warsaw Pact might have to NATO airpower , which was followed by a series of additional studies that clearly demonstrated their reliance on the continued movement of supplies . Air planners were beginning to look for ways to best employ these new weapons at the same time Starry was working on the extended battlefield concepts . Starry emphasized the close coordination between the Army and Air Force to produce an integrated attack plan that would use the land forces in a counter - blitz while air power , artillery and special operation forces stopped the movement of the reserves toward the front line . The result would stretch out the Warsaw Pact ' s advance in time , allowing the smaller NATO forces to continually attrit the enemy all along the battlefield while the reinforcements arrived piecemeal . The result was a single AirLand Battle . Although the focus of AirLand Battle was on conventional warfare , it did not ignore the threat of nuclear or chemical warfare . It suggested planning for nuclear strikes or chemical weapon s use from the beginning of combat , using them as a threat from the start that would force the enemy to disperse his forces or run the risk of a nuclear strike as they concentrated . The plans did , however , suggest they only be used if first attacked in kind . The overall message conveyed by the AirLand Battle concept of 1981 was that the Army must leave behind the restricted notion of winning the fight only in the traditional " main battle area . " FM 100 - 5 . When Active Defense had been introduced in 1976 it faced a wave of criticism , both from within the Army , and from highly influential civilian advisers outside . Having witnessed this first - hand , Starry took measures to ensure this would not happen a second time . Foremost in these efforts was the early dissemination of the concept through briefings and wide circulation of Fort Leavenworth ' s draft of the new FM 100 - 5 in 1981 . These were well received , especially its newly offensive orientation , which it summed up neatly with this statement : " . . . once political authorities commit military forces in pursuit of political aims , military forces must win something — else there will be no basis from which political authorities can bargain to win politically . Therefore , the purpose of military operations can not be simply to avert defeat — but rather it must be to win . " AirLand Battle became the primary NATO battleplan in 1984 . Its roll - out required upgrades to the CI equipment of all branches of the military , along with similar changes in the command and control structures to take advantage of the massive amounts of information the new C3I assets would be generating . Today , the Pentagon embraces a new doctrine : network - centric warfare , made possible by the Digital Revolution . In popular culture . " AirLand Battle " stands as part of the title of the sequel to " " , " Wargame : AirLand Battle " . The game is set in the Cold War when AirLand Battle was a major strategy of NATO . The game pits the player playing as either a NATO commander or Warsaw Pact general leading military engagements against the other alliance .