Fliegerführer Atlantik Fliegerführer Atlantik ( German : " Flyer Command Atlantic " ) , was a Second World War Luftwaffe naval command " Luftflotte " ( " Air Fleet " ) , dedicated to maritime patrol . In February 1941 , the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe was ordered by Adolf Hitler to form a naval air command to support the German " Kriegsmarine ’ s " ( Navy ) U - Boat operations in the Battle of the Atlantic . Though reluctant , the commander - in - chief of the " Luftwaffe " , Hermann Göring , agreed to the formation of a specialised naval formation which would remain under the command of the Luftwaffe . It was placed under the control of Luftflotte 3 , commanded by Hugo Sperrle . The command had jurisdiction over all Luftwaffe operations in the Atlantic and supported German surface raiders and submarines attacking Western Allied shipping in the Atlantic Ocean , English Channel and Irish Sea . It was disbanded in September 1944 . Background . Naval aviation . In the inter - war period , little effort was made to build a naval air arm . So neglected was this aspect of air warfare , that it was not until 1942 , when an effective purpose - built torpedo - bomber group , " Kampfgeschwader 26 " began operations , that the Luftwaffe possessed an effective anti - shipping capability . Ironically , much of the failure to produce a naval air arm was the fault of the " Reichsmarine " and its successor , the " Kriegsmarine " , in the inter - war period . None of the commanders during 1920 - 1939 paid much attention to the potential of the aircraft in naval warfare . In fact , the most of the effort to plan for a naval air arm came from the Luftwaffe ’ s Hellmuth Felmy but was propositions found only moderate interest from the naval staff . Part of the navy ’ s reluctance to fight for a maritime air force was due to the powerful political position of Hermann Göring , who at that time was the second most powerful man in the Third Reich , second only to Hitler . Göring was intent on curbing naval influence in the affairs of German air power . Early Atlantic operations . The early German military operations were carried out by German submarines in concert with capital ship s . In December 1939 the commerce raider was scuttled after the Battle of the River Plate in the Rio de la Plata estuary , She was successful in sinking a number of Allied ships in the South Atlantic . This marked the last major operation by German capital ships for nearly one year . In the meantime the U - Boats took over the main operations against Allied shipping . Lacking air support – reconnaissance and direct air attack – and having limited endurance due to the enormous distances between German naval bases and the Atlantic shipping lanes , their operations were not as potent was they could have been . At that time British convoy systems were not yet in operation and ships sailed independently making them easy targets for roaming submarines . Faulty German naval torpedoes and limited numbers meant that British shipping losses were much reduced . It is estimated that 300 vessels were saved by the technical failures of German torpedoes in the first year of the war . In the event , it was the Luftwaffe , not the " Kriegsmarine " were to perfect aerial and naval torpedoes in late 1941 . Even considering the limitations of German anti - shipping forces , the sinking of shipping was very high . This situation was to get much worse after July 1940 . Fall of Western Europe . On 10 May 1940 , the Wehrmacht successfully invaded and conquered The Netherlands , Belgium and France within 46 days , securing the French capitulation on 25 June 1940 . The conquest of Western Europe was not an end in itself , but rather a means to an end . The occupation of France positioned the Germans for an air and naval assault on the United Kingdom . The strategic advantage gained by the possession of French air and naval bases on the Atlantic coast put German U - Boats and aircraft some 700 closer to the critical Allied shipping lanes and within range of British ports in the south , east , west and north . This enabled the German submarines to reach much deeper into the Atlantic , all the way to the western seaboard of the United States and Canada – the later being a major source of resources and protection in the shape of the Royal Canadian Navy ; the third largest navy in the world by 1945 . This advantage enabled the U - Boats to avoid the very dangerous passage to the Atlantic through the North Sea , or worse , the heavily mined English Channel . Battle of Britain and the naval war . The Luftwaffe lacked the command structure and resources in a number of essential areas . It lacked specialised maritime aircraft designs , a staff interested in naval aviation , and possessed a commander - in - chief who was unwilling to cooperate with both Kriegsmarine top officers Erich Raeder and Karl Dönitz , the respective commanders of the " Kriegsmarine " and U - boat force in June 1940 . This ensured that those responsible for the direction of German air power at that time did not immediately recognise the potential damage the Luftwaffe could do to British sea communications , even in its present state . The Luftwaffe was busy replacing its losses from the Western campaign in which it had lost 28 per cent of its aircraft destroyed . It could still command over one thousand medium bomber s in July 1940 . It did not possess many long - range aircraft or effective torpedoes , nor was it experienced in naval warfare , but the potential threat from aircraft against unarmoured and slow merchant ships , and even warships on occasion , became apparent in the Norwegian Campaign , in April – June 1940 during which large numbers of vessels were sunk by both sides . The " OKL " did not view sea communications as the principle target of the air arm . Göring and his chief of staff , Hans Jeschonnek , thought an aerial assault on mainland Britain would destroy its armament factories , the Royal Air Force ( RAF ) , and British morale . The air offensive , they hoped , would be enough to convince the British to sue for peace . Göring and his staff hoped this would avoid a hazardous amphibious landing in Britain , codenamed Operation Sea Lion , from being carried out . Hitler was receptive to this idea , and his " Führer " Directive No . 17 made sure German efforts went into planning and executing Operation Eagle Attack , which led to a prolonged struggle for air superiority over southern England in the Battle of Britain . In this operation , targeting British shipping came behind destroying the RAF and military industries on land . The strategy demonstrated the extent to which the " OKL " hoped to win the war purely by the use of air power against land targets . For the Kriegsmarine , this was the least desirable strategy . Raeder and Dönitz believed the diversion of the Luftwaffe to these tasks was a wasted opportunity and interfered with the demands of the naval staff for support and reconnaissance in the Atlantic . In July and early August 1940 they had convinced the OKL to strike at shipping and ports by mine - laying and it had proven highly effective . The lack of resources meant these operations could not be decisive , but naval staff hoped by striking at the most important centres of British sea communications , the ports of London and Liverpool , and Bristol Channel , in addition to mining , could have decisive results . By October 1940 , the air battles over Britain were dying down . Raeder and Dönitz pressured Hitler to devote more energy to bombing ports as German air strategy shifted to bombing British cities ( The Blitz ) . In the interim period , air attacks on convoys did start once more in November 1940 . Dropping mines was the main tactic . Up until that time it had been practice to drop a few mines over a large area , in order to force the British to use large resources to sweep huge portions of ocean . However , to guarantee the entrances to ports were mined effectively to ensure success , as many mines as possible were dropped at once in confined areas . This was successful in the Thames Estuary where the Germans claimed nine steamers sunk and the river blockaded for 14 days . Not until February 1941 , when Hitler signed " Führer " Directive No . 23 emphasising ports as priority targets , was a serious effort made against sea communications . By the end of the air offensive over Britain in May 1941 , as the Germans prepared for the invasion of the Soviet Union ( Operation Barbarossa ) , the " Luftwaffe " had , on occasion , done serious damage to these targets . Operations against Liverpool were successful . Around 75 % of the ports capacity was reduced at one point , and it lost of shipping to air attacks , with another damaged . However , bad weather and the omnipresent Göring consistently resisted attempts by naval forces to gain influence in air power matters throughout the war . Formation . Origins . Despite Göring ' s resistance , and under pressure from the navy , Hitler gave Raeder one Gruppe ( Group ) from " Kampfgeschwader 40 " ( I . / KG 40 ) , on 6 January 1941 . The furious Göring engaged in political manipulation to have it returned to Luftwaffe control . He proposed that it be returned in exchange for an Atlantic command . Regardless of Raeder ’ s objections , on 28 February 1941 , Hitler agreed and authorised the formation of a " Luftwaffe " naval command , under the control of Luftflotte 3 ( Air Fleet 3 ) and its commander Hugo Sperrle . Named " Fliegerführer Atlantik " , it was based at Lorient . Martin Harlinghausen was elected to command the organisation . He had been a naval officer in the 1920s but had moved to the Luftwaffe and acted as chief of staff for " X . Fliegerkorps " in Norway , and was a leading authority in anti - shipping attacks with bombs . He was a logical choice to lead Atlantic air operations . Order of battle . Harlinghausen was responsible for organising fleet support , meteorological missions and even coastal protection , although he had barely 100 aircraft operational including Arado Ar 196 float aircraft . His commitment to the Mediterranean Theatre of Operation s , while managing the staff of X Fliegerkorps , he was unable to take the post until 31 March 1941 . He agreed with the operational methods of Donitz , who favoured using the four - engine Focke - Wulf Fw 200 " Condors " to shadow convoys and direct U - Boats to their quarry ; then a coordinated air - sea attack could defeat the convoy . Harlinghausen was given meager forced to achieve these ends . KG 40 , based at Cognac and Bordeaux was handed over to him , containing all three groups of the unit ( I . , II . , and III . / KG 40 ) . Küstenfliegergruppe 106 , 406 , 506 , 606 and 906 were also made available , based at Amsterdam , ( Netherlands ) , Brest , Westerland , Lannion , ( France ) , Aalborg , ( Denmark ) . Aufklärungsgruppe 122 , a reconnaissance unit , was based in several locations ; at Amsterdam , Brest and Wilhelmshafen . Stab . / KG 40 was known to have just one Fw 200 on strength on 31 March 1941 . Owing to Hitler ’ s order on 6 January 1941 , I . / KG 40 was initially under the command of Donitz , who at that time was based at Lorient . It had only eight Fw 200s on strength at the end of 1940 , and subsequent strength is unknown . II . / KG 40 was formed with 1 Staffel on 1 January . The 5th and 6th Staffel worked up on Heinkel He 111 and Dornier Do 217 E - 1s into late June 1941 . On 26 July it was declared operational , and transferred to Cognac with 29 Do 217s ( 12 operational ) and one He 111 . III . / KG 40 was known to have been formed on or about 24 March 1941 , and was based at Brest . Strength details are unknown in 1941 , but the unit did operate He 111s and the Fw 200 . It is estimated by April , 1941 , " Fliegerführer Atlantik " had on strength 21 Fw 200s , 26 He 111s , 24 Heinkel He 115 s , and a mixed force of Messerschmitt Bf 110 s and Junkers Ju 88 s , numbering 12 aircraft . The total number of aircraft by July 1941 had reached 155 ; 29 Fw 200s , 31 He 111s , 45 Ju 88s , 18 He 115s , 20 Dornier Do 217 s , 12 Bf 110s and Ju 88 specialised reconnaissance aircraft . Equipment and tactics . The Fw 200 was the main weapon in the early rounds of the Atlantic air war . Its combat prowess rested on three vital capabilities : its ability to find targets , to hit targets and then to evade enemy defences . In 1940 the Fw 200s had only rudimentary capability of finding convoys and other suitable merchant targets . On a typical mission , an Fw 200 would fly about 1 , 500 km from Bordeaux to look for targets , west of Ireland , which would give the aircraft about three hours to conduct its search . Normally , Condors flew quite low ( about 500 – 600 metres off the water ) , which made it easier to spot ships outlined against the horizon and avoided giving Allied shipping much warning . From this low altitude the Condor could search an area approximately the 320 by 120 km ( 200 by 75 nautical miles ) , which several crewman searching for ships with binoculars . In decent weather , which was rare in the Atlantic , the observers might spot a convoy 15 – 20 km ( 10 – 12 miles ) away , but cloud cover could reduce this by half . In 1941 , improved Fw 200s meant longer range , and a four - hour station ( up from three ) could be maintained , which increased the search area by 25 per cent . In December 1942 , the low - UHF band FuG 200 " Hohentweil " ASV radar extended the search area to four times that of 1940 . The radar could detect a ship away and its beam was . There were perennial problems for KG 40 , and the other ‘ Condor units ’ . Lack of numbers and serviceability meant there was no guarantee that one or two sorties of three to eight hours would be active when a convoy passed through air space in range of the Luftwaffe . Thus the ability of " Fliegerführer Atlantik " to find convoys remained sporadic until late in the command ’ s service . Further limitations were a result of the aircraft itself . A lack of proper bombsight equipment and poor forward visibility meant the aircraft had to attack from low level . This meant an approach at just 45 metres at 290 kph ( 180 mph ) and then release of bombs at 240 metres ( 790 ft ) from the target . This was known as the “ Swedish turnip ” tactic by crews . This allowed for a high chance of a direct hit or damaging near miss . The Fw 200 carried four SC 250 kg bombs , ensuring a hit potential . Merchant vessels lacked armour or fire - control systems at that time , so a hit or more would have a high chance of sinking a ship . This meant an average of one ship sunk for every attack made . At low level , it was not uncommon for German crews to achieve three out of four hits . However , many bombs failed to explode at low level , owing to improper fusing of the ordnance . Once the Lotfernrohr 7 D bombsight was introduced — with a similar degree of accuracy to the top secret American Norden bombsight — more accurate bombing from 3 , 000 metres ( 9 , 840 feet ) could take place with an error range of just 91 metres ( 300 feet ) . Later Fw 200s were fitted with heavier machine guns and cannon , so that strikes at low level could also damage the superstructure of ships . Improvements were relatively quick , but the type was a civilian design , converted to military use . Initially Fw 200Bs were built to fly in thin air at high altitude , with no sharp manoeuvring . Kurt Tank – its designer – had made the aircraft ’ s long range possible by using a light airframe that was two to four tons lighter than its contemporaries . This meant the aircraft did not have fuel tank sealant or armour protection . An under - strength structure contributed to these vulnerabilities , which made the Fw 200 unable to sustain much punishment . The engines were also underpowered , meaning it struggled to stay airborne if one was knocked out . The six unarmoured fuel tanks inside the cabin made it exceptionally prone to bursting into flames . When a Condor attempted to manoeuvre to avoid anti - aircraft fire or enemy fighters , its weak structure could be damaged , causing metal fatigue and cracks , resulting in the loss of the aircraft . In the C variant , major improvements were made to its defensive armament , causing fighters to avoid lengthy duels . However , they operated at low level mostly , to avoid attacks from below . This limited their operational range and options . They could ‘ jink ’ to throw an enemy aircraft off its aim , but they could not outrun or outturn an opponent . Poor evasion qualities meant the type was not the ideal operational weapon . High tide : early Atlantic operations . " First Happy Time " . The period , August 1940 to May 1941 , was known by the Germans as the First Happy Time , because of the considerable amount of Allied ships sunk for light losses . Even before the formation of " Fliegerführer Atlantik " , the success of air attack on convoys during this time was almost immediate . Under the command of Donitz , in August 1940 – February 1941 , Fw 200s sank 52 ships for only four losses . By Christmas 1940 , KG 40 had sunk 19 ships of 100 , 000 tons and damaged 37 of 180 , 000 tons . In January , 17 ships were sunk ( 65 , 000 tons ) and five damaged . February was worse for the British , losing 21 ships to Fw 200s , totalling 84 , 301 tons . In January 1941 HX 90 , OB 274 , HG 50 and SL 61 were successfully attacked . The later raid , on 19 January , sank seven ships from HG 50 and SL 61 . On 8 February , U - 37 discovered convoy HG . 53 . The U - Boat reported its presence to " Fliegerführer Atlantik " . I . / KG 40 was dispatched and sank five ships ( 9 , 201 grt ) , although 29 , 000 grt was claimed . The role was reversed a few days later when Convoy OB . 288 was discovered by Fw 200s , and U - Boats sank a number of ships . However , inadequate navigation training , exacerbated by out - of - date meteorological data , created errors in location of reports of up to , while 19 per cent of all reports gave errors in course of up to 90 degrees . It was not always easy , communicating and coordinating with air and sea forces . U - Boats were unable to make accurate navigation using sun or star sightings and even when convoys were located they had trouble homing in bombers because their short - range transmitters were too weak to reach the aircraft . However , they were strong enough to alter British defences . Harlinghausen was irritated when his aircraft communicated accurate locations and the U - Boats failed to respond . Only when he complained to the BdU did he learn from Donitz that the navy failed to inform the Luftwaffe that there were no U - Boats in the area to respond . By the end of March , 1941 , attempts at close cooperation were abandoned in favour of more flexible approached . Donitz noted in his war diary that enemy signals about German air attacks would allow his intelligence ( B - Dienst ) to locate the convoy – he supposed that this would offer a better chance of interception . During the first quarter of 1941 , the Condors sank 171 , 000 grt , the vast majority being lone ships . In one case , a sustained attack upon Convoy OB . 290 on 26 February 1941 accounted for seven to nine vessels ( 49 , 865 grt ) , all sunk by KG 40 Fw 200s . However , with never more than eight aircraft operational , this was an exception . Soon , British CAM ship ( catapult aircraft merchantmen ) appeared , and the time of light Condor losses ended . Donitz envisaged a cooperation of air and sea forces in mass attacks against convoys . The wolfpack tactics were proving successful , and he sought to supplement them with the " Luftwaffe " . The Condors were to break up the convoys , and scatter them so the Wolf packs could move in and dispatch the ships while they were unprotected . In March , the " Luftwaffe " won back control of KG 40 had placed under Harlinghausen ’ s control , and success dried up . KG 40 was forced to suspend operations for two weeks ( probably due to insufficient support ) . British retaliation . The British recognised the threat posed by long - range German naval aircraft and set operations in motion to destroy the Condors at base . A Commando mission was considered but dismissed for operational difficulties and the likelihood of failure and heavy casualties . Instead , RAF Bomber Command was asked to destroy the bases on the Atlantic coast . These operations had been carried out before " Fliegerführer Atlantik " had been formed . An RAF raid on 22 / 23 November 1940 destroyed four hangars and two Fw 200s . Follow up raids were unsuccessful , and it was not until 13 April 1941 that three more Fw 200s were lost to air attack . The British failed to disrupt production at the Focke - Wulf plant at Bremen or to destroy more Condors in the field , due to poor bombing accuracy and improved German defences . Donitz , c - in - c of U - Boats , tried to have " Fliegerführer Atlantik " reinforced and handed over to the operational control of the Kriegsmarine . He succeeded in gaining control of KG 40 on 6 January 1941 , but lost within two months after Göring requested Hitler to allow its return to the Luftwaffe , in exchange for creating " Fliegerführer Atlantik " to support the submarines . Hitler obliged and Donitz lost his reconnaissance and air units . Göring was more interested in maintaining control over all air units rather than helping the " Kriegsmarine " knock out British sea communications . With KG 40 back in Göring ’ s hands , he persisted in refusing to lend them to Donitz . They were frequently diverted to other tasks . The situation facing the small German forces were made worse by operational difficulties . After 1941 , " Fliegerführer Atlantik " never had more than 50 aircraft operational . The feeble number of aircraft available denied German air power the chance to have strategic significance in the Atlantic war . First reverses . On 30 / 31 March 1941 , the command missed convoy convoy OB 302 as neither the U - Boats nor Luftwaffe could find it . In April KG 40 was only able to make 74 sorties . Attacks had been carried out on the 6 and 16 April and by the end of the month , seven ships had been sunk . More ominously , RAF Coastal Command was making better efforts to defend convoys against air attack . On 16 April , a Bristol Beaufighter from RAF Aldergrove shot down a Fw 200C - 3 – the first Condor lost in action to an enemy fighter . On 18 April , another Condor was badly damaged by convoy fire from convoy HG . 58 , and crashed in Ireland . Further operations failed . OB 316 , 318 and 122 . html HX 122 escaped the commands shadowing efforts . SL 72 and OB 321 were found on 11 and 14 May , sinking one ship from each convoy , but failed to guide any U - Boats to their targets . In May , only three ships sunk and one damaged . Around this time , the He 111 units were withdrawn owing to heavy losses in the Channel . They were replaced by " Kampfgeschwader 26 " and " Kampfgeschwader 30 " , which had remained under " Luftflotte 5 " after the withdrawal of " Fliegerkorps X " to the Mediterranean . These units made up 20 He 111 and 24 Ju 88s , which operated directly against British shipping and ports . III . / KG 40 also converted to the Fw 200 instead of the He 111 , to allow it to operate further away from Britain and avoid air attack . The British response to the " Condors " was simple but effective . Merchant ships were still lightly armed with anti - aircraft weapons . So when a formation of German aircraft attacked , instead of staying formed in front of the convoy to protect against U - Boats , they withdrew to the rear and formed a tight defensive circle . They then used all the available firepower they could must to deter attacks . It worked when KG 40 attempted to attack HG 65 using the “ Swedish turnip ” method . The ships drove off the attack . The Germans lost two Fw 200s , one crashed in Portugal , the other in Spain . The Spanish allowed German technical teams to recover the aircraft and crew . OG 66 was also missed . By the end of June , only four ships ( 6 , 000 grt ) had been sunk for four losses . Support for surface raiders . During the German battleship Bismarck ' s sortie " Operation Rheinübung " in May 1941 , " Fliegerführer Atlantik " was tasked with providing cover for its return to port . " Kampfgruppe 100 " , " Kampfgeschwader 1 " , " Kampfgeschwader 54 " and " Kampfgeschwader 77 " were made available for this purpose . They failed and " Bismarck " was sunk . " Fliegerführer Atlantiks " commanding officer , Martin Harlinghausen , came in for much criticism for failing to help the ship . The sinking of " Bismarck " ended German surface vessel activity in the Atlantic for the remainder of the war . The relations between the Kriegsmarine had hardly been improved with the failure of " Rheinübung " . Since 1937 Göring and the " Luftwaffe " had thwarted any attempt by the navy to produce a naval air arm . Not only did the " Luftwaffe " maintain control over all aspects of aviation , the naval commanders , like Raeder and Donitz had to rely , on the Luftwaffe ' s good will to receive support . In order to have air support , the highest authorities in both services had to consult on the use of units . Even if the negotiations were devoid of friction , it was inflexible and inefficient . Struggle to be effective . In June 1941 , the enemy ' s gorwing anti - submarine strength forced Donitz to operate 20°W , beyond the range of the " Condors " , which now interdicted the sea lanes between Gibraltar and Britain . The command ' s aircraft were ordered to Bordeaux for this purpose by July . Donitz ' decision irritated Harlinghausen , who planned a major offensive in the summer and the relations between the two men cooled , only to warm again when the aircraft reverted to reconnaissance roles supporting U - Boats . Gibraltar traffic was easier to monitor . The Fw 200s flew search patterns from 45°N and 34°S and 19°W ( sometimes 25W ) and found targets that way . In July to December 1941 , the success of " Fliegerführer Atlantik " was mixed . After the failed attack on HG 65 , Harlinghausen ordered the abandonment of the “ Swedish turnip ” tactic since they were too vulnerable to improving British defensive armament . In July , the official orders of " Fliegerführer Atlantik " amounted authorisation for reconnaissance only . No attacks were to be made against convoys only individual ships could be attacked . They found four convoys for U - Boats in July , but made no attacks themselves . However , on 18 July , Hauptmann Fritz Fliegel , a Knight ' s Cross of the Iron Cross holder , attempted to attack convoy OB 346 . He targeted the 7 , 046 - ton freighter Pilar de Larrinaga . However the gunners shot his starboard wing off and he crashed into the sea , killing all on board . Another Fw 200C - 3 was shot down west of Ireland by a Lockheed Hudson of No . 233 Squadron RAF . The crew were rescued . In total , four Fw 200s were lost . On 2 August the catapult British ’ concept was validated . From the CAM ship SS Maplin , Lieutenant Bob Everett took off in a Hawker Hurricane and succeeded in downing a Condor shadowing SL 81 . KG 40 had some revenge when a Condor sank a freighter , and a U - Boat attack sank five more ships from the 20 - strong convoy on 5 August . British defences forced the Fw 200s to revert to reconnaissance . However , a major battle developed over to separate convoys ; HG 73 and OG 74 in September . HG 73 was composed of 25 merchantmen and 11 escorts including HMS Springbank , a catapult ship . A Fairey Fulmar launched , and got within range of the Fw 200s , but its guns jammed . Without air cover was , the convoy was subjected to attack by sea and air . The Condors guided the submarines in and the U - Boats sank 10 ships , including Springbank . Simultaneously , the battle for OG 74 began . This convoy had 26 ships and ten escorts including the first escort carrier to be built – HMS Audacity . A Fw 200 sank a ship picking up survivors from a U - Boat attack ( Walmer Castle ) . The attack altered two fighters , which dispatched the Condor . The Condors kept their distance . However , they soon picked up OG 75 , another convoy . Despite poor weather and improved defences , the Condors shadowed OG 75 eight days . But the strong escort limited the attacks to one loss . HG 74 made it to Liverpool from Gibraltar without loss . On 6 November , the units of " Fliegerführer Atlantik " engaged OG 76 in a month - long battle , which lasted until 16 December . The convoy had left Liverpool bund for Gibraltar on 28 October . Sighted by KG 40 on 6 November , six Fw 200s were to shadow and direct U - Boats to it . HMS Audacity was present , and launched her fighters against the Condors , downing one Fw 200 . Five U - Boats were guided in , but were repulsed by the escorts and the convoy which made it to Gibraltar unscathed . On 14 December it returned to Liverpool . By 16 December , KG 40 had picked it up . The U - Boats were repulsed again , and the Fw 200s were forced to retreat under fighter attack on 18 December . On 19 December , two Condors were lost to Audacity ’ s fighters . With the Condors out of the battle , the U - Boats tried on their own , sinking one destroyer and two merchant ships . On 21 December , " Audacity " was spotted outside the convoy and was sunk in ten minutes . Five of her six fighter pilots from No . 802 Squadron FAA were saved . With the carrier gone , the Condors returned . They noted the presence of an RAF B - 24 Liberator , but no engagement is known . In October , Martin Harlinghausen himself was wounded . Although unusual for a commander , he took part in operations to experience combat conditions for himself . In an attack on shipping in the Bristol Channel , he was wounded . His deputy Ulrich Kessler temporarily took command . Kessler had not held high rank before now , an indicator of how unimportant the OKL viewed Luftwaffe operations over the Atlantic . The last six months of 1941 had been a severe blow to " Fliegerführer Atlantik " . It had sunk just four ships ( 10 , 298 tons ) and damaged two for the loss of 16 Condors , including seven to convoy defences . The carrier ship had validated the concept of the escort carrier , which the Admiralty pursued with interest . The air war over the Atlantic and battle for Britain ’ s sea communications had turned against the Germans in this period . On 11 December 1941 Hitler declared war on the United States . While this gave German submarines plenty of targets , the order to send more vessels to American waters made less U - Boats available for cooperation with " Fliegerführer Atlantik " . Between 1 August 1940 and 31 December 1941 , Fw 200s made 41 contacts with convoys , 18 were exploited by U - Boats that sank 48 merchant ships ( 129 , 771 grt ) , along with two destroyers , a corvette and " Audacity " . On 5 January 1942 , Harlinghausen was replaced by Ulrich Kessler . His time commanding " Fliegerführer Atlantik " was not a happy one . He was denied thr resources he needed . He was unable to support the U - Boats on the west side of the Atlantic , nor interdict convoy routes while anti - shipping operations turned to the Mediterranean and Arctic Convoys . Italian - designed aerial torpedoes ( F5a ) had proven successful in the " Regia Aeronautica " . However , these weapons were given to KG 26 and other units operating against shipping in the Mediterranean Sea and against the Arctic convoys off Norway . Radar . Radar might have helped detect the convoys regardless of the starvation in resources . However , progress was slow . A 136 MHz FuG " Atlas " was installed in a Fw 200C - 3 / U3 in July 1941 and the similar " Neptune - S " was later trialled off Norway , but proved disappointing . When it was compared to a captured British metric ( 200 MHz ) ASV ( air - to - surface vessel ) MK II from a crashed Hudson in Tunisia , the British radar was found to be far better . By this time " Rostock " , operating 120 MHz with a 16 - nautical - mile ( 30 km ) range was under development , but production was slow and by November 1942 only five Fw 2000C - 4 / U3s in the west had radar , and one of those was the captured British set . The low - UHF band FuG 200 " Hohentweil " , operating at 550 MHz , with a range of 43 nm ( 80 km ) was being developed . It entered service in August 1943 in the Fw 200C - 6 , but Kessler ' s low place in the pecking order meant only 16 Fw 200s out of 26 in III . / KG 40 had radar . It is unknown whether other groups were issued with the radar .