George S . Patton slapping incidents In early August 1943 , Lieutenant General George S . Patton garnered substantial controversy after he slapped two United States Army soldiers under his command during the Sicily Campaign of World War II . Patton ' s hard - driving personality and lack of belief in the medical condition then known as " battle fatigue " led to the soldiers becoming the subject of his ire in incidents on 3 and 10 August , when Patton struck and berated them after discovering they were patients at evacuation hospitals away from the front lines and without apparent physical injuries . Word of the incidents spread among troops , eventually reaching Patton ' s superior , General Dwight Eisenhower , who compelled him to apologize . Patton ' s actions were initially suppressed in the news until journalist Drew Pearson publicized them , drawing significant attention in the United States . While Congress and the general public expressed both support and disdain for Patton ' s actions , Eisenhower and Army Chief of Staff George C . Marshall opted not to fire Patton as a commander . He was nonetheless sidelined from combat command for almost a year . Seizing the opportunity the predicament presented , Eisenhower used Patton as a decoy in Operation Fortitude , sending faulty intelligence to Nazi German agents that Patton was leading the Invasion of Europe . While Patton eventually returned to combat command in the European Theater in mid - 1944 , the slapping incidents were an example to Eisenhower , Marshall , and other leaders of Patton ' s brashness and impulsiveness . Patton ' s career was halted as former subordinates such as Omar Bradley became his superiors . Background . The Allied invasion of Sicily began on 10 July 1943 , with Lieutenant General George S . Patton landing 90 , 000 men of the Seventh United States Army near Gela , Scoglitti , and Licata to support Bernard Montgomery ' s British 8th Army landings to the north . Initially ordered to protect the British forces ' rear , Patton took Palermo after Montgomery ' s forces were slowed by heavy resistance from troops of Nazi Germany and the Kingdom of Italy . Patton then set his sights on Messina . He sought an amphibious assault , but it was delayed by lack of landing craft and his troops did not land in Santo Stefano until 8 August , by which time the Germans and Italians had already evacuated the bulk of their troops to mainland Italy . Throughout the campaign , Patton ' s troops were heavily engaged by German and Italian forces as they pushed across the island . By the end of the battle on 16 August , the 200 , 000 - man Seventh Army had suffered 7 , 500 casualties , and had killed or captured 113 , 000 Axis troops and destroyed 3 , 500 vehicles . Patton had already developed a reputation in the U . S . Army as an effective , successful , and hard - driving commander , punishing subordinates for the slightest infractions but also rewarding them when they performed well . As a way to promote an image that inspired his troops , Patton created a larger - than - life personality . He became known for his flashy dress , highly polished helmet and boots , and no - nonsense demeanor . In spite of Patton ' s effectiveness , General Dwight D . Eisenhower , the commander of the Sicily operation and Patton ' s friend and commanding officer , had long noted Patton ' s colorful leadership style . Eisenhower also knew that Patton was prone to impulsiveness and a lack of self - restraint . Battle fatigue . Prior to World War I , the U . S . Army considered the symptoms of battle fatigue to be cowardice or attempts to avoid combat duty . Soldiers who reported these symptoms received harsh treatment . At the time of the incidents , the two soldiers Patton slapped were suffering from " battle fatigue , " otherwise known as " shell shock " or " battle stress . " Today , this condition is characterized as a form of post - traumatic stress disorder , which can result from prolonged severe exposure to death and destruction , among many other traumatic events . While the causes , symptoms , and effects of the condition were familiar to physicians , it was generally less understood in military circles . An important lesson from the Tunisia Campaign was that neuropsychiatric casualties had to be treated as soon as possible , and not evacuated from the combat zone . This was not done in the early stages of the Sicilian Campaign , and large numbers of neuropsychiatric casualties were evacuated to North Africa , with the result that treatment became complicated , and only 15 percent of them were returned to duty . As the campaign wore on , the system became better organized , and nearly 50 percent were restored to combat duty . Some time before what would become known as the " slapping incident , " Patton spoke with Major General Clarence R . Huebner , the newly appointed commander of the U . S . 1st Infantry Division , in which the soldiers both served . Patton had asked Huebner for a status report . Huebner replied : " The front lines seem to be thinning out . There seems to be a very large number of ' malingerers ' at the hospitals , feigning illness in order to avoid combat duty . " For his part , Patton did not believe the condition was real . In a directive issued to commanders on 5 August , he forbade " battle fatigue " in the Seventh Army : Incidents . 3 August . Private Charles H . Kuhl , of L Company , U . S . 26th Infantry Regiment , reported to an aid station of C Company , 1st Medical Battalion , on 2 August 1943 . Kuhl , who had been in the U . S . Army for eight months , had been attached to the 1st Infantry Division since 2 June 1943 . He was diagnosed with " exhaustion , " a diagnosis he had been given three times since the start of the campaign . From the aid station he was evacuated to a medical company and given sodium amytal . Notes in his medical chart indicated " psychoneurosis anxiety state , moderately severe ( soldier has been twice before in hospital within ten days . He can ' t take it at the front , evidently . He is repeatedly returned . ) " Kuhl was transferred from the aid station to the 15th Evacuation Hospital near Nicosia for further evaluation . Patton arrived at the hospital the same day , accompanied by a number of medical officers , as part of his tour of the U . S . II Corps troops . He spoke to some patients in the hospital , commending the wounded . He then approached Kuhl , who did not appear to be injured . Kuhl was sitting slouched on a stool midway through a tent ward filled with injured soldiers . When Patton asked Kuhl where he was hurt , Kuhl reportedly shrugged and replied that he was " nervous " rather than wounded , adding " I guess I can ' t take it . " Patton " immediately flared up , " slapped Kuhl across the chin with his gloves , then grabbed him by the collar and dragged him to the tent entrance . He shoved him out of the tent with a kick to his backside . Yelling " Don ' t admit this son - of - a - bitch , " Patton demanded that Kuhl immediately be sent back to the front , adding , " You hear me , you gutless bastard ? You ' re going back to the front . " Corpsmen picked up Kuhl and brought him to a ward tent , where it was discovered he had a temperature of ; he was later diagnosed with malarial parasite s . Speaking later of the incident , Kuhl noted " at the time it happened , [ Patton ] was pretty well worn out . . . I think he was suffering a little battle fatigue himself . " Kuhl wrote his parents about the incident , but asked them to " just forget about it . " That night , Patton recorded the incident in his diary : " [ I met ] the only errant coward I have ever seen in this Army . Companies should deal with such men , and if they shirk their duty , they should be tried for cowardice and shot . " Patton was accompanied in this visit by Major General John P . Lucas , who saw nothing remarkable about the incident . After the war he wrote : 10 August . Private Paul G . Bennett , 21 , of C Battery , U . S . 17th Field Artillery Regiment , 1st Infantry Division , was a four - year veteran of the U . S . Army , and had served in the division since March 1943 . Records show he had no medical history until 6 August 1943 , when a friend was wounded in combat . According to a report , he " could not sleep and was nervous . " Bennett was brought to the 93rd Evacuation Hospital . In addition to having a fever , he exhibited symptoms of dehydration , including fatigue , confusion , and listlessness . His request to return to his unit was turned down by medical officers . On 10 August , Patton entered the receiving tent of the hospital , speaking to the injured there . Patton approached Bennett , who was huddled and shivering , and asked what the trouble was . " It ' s my nerves , " Bennett responded . " I can ' t stand the shelling anymore . " Patton reportedly became enraged at him , slapping him across the face . He began yelling : " Your nerves , hell , you are just a goddamned coward . Shut up that goddamned crying . I won ' t have these brave men who have been shot at seeing this yellow bastard sitting here crying . " Patton then reportedly slapped Bennett again , knocking his helmet liner off , and ordered the receiving officer , Major Charles B . Etter , not to admit him . Patton then threatened Bennett , " You ' re going back to the front lines and you may get shot and killed , but you ' re going to fight . If you don ' t , I ' ll stand you up against a wall and have a firing squad kill you on purpose . In fact , I ought to shoot you myself , you goddamned whimpering coward . " Upon saying this , Patton pulled out his pistol threateningly , prompting the hospital ' s commander , Colonel Donald E . Currier , to physically separate the two . Patton left the tent , yelling to medical officers to send Bennett back to the front lines . As he toured the remainder of the hospital , Patton continued discussing Bennett ' s condition with Currier . Patton stated , " I can ' t help it , it makes my blood boil to think of a yellow bastard being babied , " and " I won ' t have those cowardly bastards hanging around our hospitals . We ' ll probably have to shoot them some time anyway , or we ' ll raise a breed of morons . " Alleged anti - Semitic component of Patton ' s behaviour . According to historian Antony Beevor in his 2012 book " The Second World War " , Patton was heard by medical staff members after the first incident angrily denying the reality of shell shock to junior officers in his presence , claiming that the condition was " an invention of the Jews . " Aftermath . Private reprimand and apologies . The 10 August incident — particularly the sight of Patton threatening a subordinate with a pistol — upset many of the medical staff present . The II Corps surgeon , Colonel Richard T . Arnest , submitted a report on the incident to Brigadier General William B . Kean , chief of staff of II Corps , who submitted it to Lieutenant General Omar Bradley , commander of II Corps . Bradley , who out of loyalty to Patton and aware of his value , did nothing more than lock the report in his safe . Arnest also sent the report through medical channels to Brigadier General Frederick A . Blesse , General Surgeon of Allied Force Headquarters , who then submitted it to Eisenhower , who received it on 16 August . Eisenhower ordered Blesse to proceed immediately to Patton ' s command to ascertain the truth of the allegations . Eisenhower immediately also formulated a delegation to investigate the incidents from the soldiers ' points of view including Major General John P . Lucas , two colonels from the NATOUSA Inspector General office , and a theatre medical consultant , Lieutenant Colonel Perrin H . Long , to investigate the incident and interview those involved . Long interviewed medical personnel who witnessed each incident , then filed a report entitled " Mistreatment of Patients in Receiving Tents of the 15th and 93rd Evacuation Hospitals , " that extensively detailed Patton ' s actions at both hospitals . By 18 August , Eisenhower had ordered that Patton ' s Seventh Army be broken up , with a few of its units remaining garrisoned in Sicily . The majority of its combat forces would be transferred to the Fifth United States Army under Lieutenant General Mark W . Clark . This had already been planned by Eisenhower , who had previously told Patton that his Seventh Army would not be part of the upcoming Allied invasion of Italy , scheduled for September . On 20 August , Patton received a cable from Eisenhower regarding the arrival of Lucas at Palermo . Eisenhower told Patton it was " highly important " that he personally meet with Lucas as soon as possible , as Lucas would be carrying an important message . Before Lucas arrived , Blesse arrived from Algiers to look into the health of the troops in Sicily . He was also ordered by Eisenhower to deliver a secret letter to Patton and investigate its allegations . In the letter , Eisenhower told Patton he had been informed of the slapping incidents . He said he would not be opening a formal investigation into the matter , but his criticism of Patton was sharp . Eisenhower noted that no formal record of the incidents would be retained at Allied Headquarters , save in his own secret files . Still , he strongly suggested Patton apologize to all involved . On 21 August , Patton brought Bennett into his office ; he apologized and the men shook hands . On 22 August he met with Currier as well as the medical staff who had witnessed the events in each unit and expressed regret for his " impulsive actions . " Patton related to the medical staff a story of a friend from World War I who had committed suicide after " skulking " ; he stated he sought to prevent any recurrence of such an event . On 23 August he brought Kuhl into his office , apologized , and shook hands with him as well . After the apology , Kuhl said he thought Patton was " a great general , " and that " at the time , he didn ' t know how sick I was . " Currier later said Patton ' s remarks sounded like " no apology at all , an attempt to justify what he had done . " Patton wrote in his diary that he loathed making the apologies , particularly when he was told by Bennett ' s brigade commander , Brigadier General John A . Crane , that Bennett had gone absent without leave ( AWOL ) and arrived at the hospital by " falsely representing his condition . " Patton wrote , " It is rather a commentary on justice when an Army commander has to soft - soap a skulker to placate the timidity of those above . " As word of the actions had spread informally among troops of the Seventh Army , Patton drove to each division under his command between 24 and 30 August and gave a 15 - minute speech in which he praised their behavior and apologized for any instances where he had been too harsh on soldiers , making only vague reference to the two slapping incidents . In his final apology speech to the U . S . 3rd Infantry Division , Patton was overcome with emotion when the soldiers supportively began to chant " No , general , no , no , " to prevent him from having to apologize . In a letter to Army Chief of Staff General George C . Marshall on 24 August , Eisenhower praised Patton ' s exploits as commander of the Seventh Army and his conduct of the Sicily campaign , particularly his ability to take initiative as a commander . Still , Eisenhower noted Patton continued " to exhibit some of those unfortunate traits of which you and I have always known . " He informed Marshall of the two incidents and his requirement that Patton apologize . Eisenhower stated he believed Patton would cease his behavior " because fundamentally , he is so avid for recognition as a great military commander that he will ruthlessly suppress any habit of his that will tend to jeopardize it . " When Eisenhower arrived in Sicily to award Montgomery the Legion of Merit on 29 August , Patton gave him a letter expressing his remorse about the incidents . Media attention . Word of the slapping incidents spread informally among soldiers before eventually circulating to war correspondent s . One of the nurses who witnessed the 10 August incident apparently told her boyfriend , a captain in the Seventh Army public affairs detachment . Through him a group of four journalists covering the Sicily operation heard of the incident , among them Demaree Bess of the " Saturday Evening Post " , Merrill Mueller of NBC News , Al Newman of " Newsweek " , and John Charles Daly of CBS News . The four journalists interviewed Etter and other witnesses , but decided to bring the matter to Eisenhower instead of filing the story with their editors . Bess , Mueller , and Quentin Reynolds of " Collier ' s Magazine " flew from Sicily to Algiers , and on 19 August Bess gave a summary on the slapping incidents to Eisenhower ' s chief of staff , Major General Walter Bedell Smith . The reporters asked Eisenhower directly about the incident , and Eisenhower requested that the story be suppressed because the war effort could not afford to lose Patton . Bess and other journalists initially complied . However , the news reporters then demanded Eisenhower fire Patton in exchange for them not reporting the story , a demand which Eisenhower refused . The story of Kuhl ' s slapping broke in the U . S . when newspaper columnist Drew Pearson revealed it on his 21 November radio program . Pearson received details of the Kuhl incident and other material on Patton from his friend Ernest Cuneo , an official with the Office of Strategic Services , who obtained the information from War Department files and correspondence . Pearson ' s version not only conflated details of both slapping incidents but falsely reported that the private in question was visibly " out of his head " , telling Patton to " duck down or the shells would hit him " and that in response " Patton struck the soldier , knocking him down . " Pearson punctuated his broadcast by twice stating that Patton would never again be used in combat , despite the fact that Pearson had no factual basis for this prediction . In response , Allied Headquarters denied that Patton had received an official reprimand , but confirmed that Patton had slapped at least one soldier . Patton ' s wife , Beatrice Patton , spoke to the media to defend him . She appeared in " True Confessions " , a women ' s confession magazine , where she characterized Patton as " the toughest , most hard boiled General in the U . S . Army . . . but he ' s quite sweet , really . " She was featured in a " Washington Post " article on 26 November . While she did not attempt to justify Patton ' s action , she characterized him as a " tough perfectionist , " stating that he cared deeply about the men under his command and would not ask them to do something he would not do himself : Public response . Demands for Patton to be relieved of duty and sent home were made in Congress and in newspapers across the country . U . S . Representative Jed Johnson of Oklahoma ' s 6th district described Patton ' s actions as a " despicable incident " and was " amazed and chagrined " Patton was still in command . He called for the general ' s immediate dismissal on the grounds that his actions rendered him no longer useful to the war effort . Representative Charles B . Hoeven of Iowa ' s 9th district said on the House floor that parents of soldiers need no longer worry of their children being abused by " hard boiled officers " . He wondered whether the Army had " too much blood and guts . " Eisenhower submitted a report to Secretary of War Henry L . Stimson , who presented it to Congressman Robert R . Reynolds , Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs . The report laid out Eisenhower ' s response to the incident and gave details of Patton ' s decades of military service . Eisenhower concluded that Patton was invaluable to the war effort and that he was confident the corrective actions taken would be adequate . Investigators Eisenhower sent to Patton ' s command found the general remained overwhelmingly popular with his troops . By mid - December , the government had received around 1 , 500 letters related to Patton , with many calling for his dismissal and others defending him or calling for his promotion . Kuhl ' s father , Herman F . Kuhl , wrote to his own congressman , stating that he forgave Patton for the incident and requesting that he not be disciplined . Retired generals also weighed in on the matter . Former Army Chief of Staff Charles P . Summerall wrote to Patton that he was " indignant about the publicity given a trifling incident " , adding that " whatever [ Patton ] did " he was sure it was " justified by the provocation . Such cowards used to be shot , now they are only encouraged . " Major General Kenyon A . Joyce , another combat commander and one of Patton ' s friends , attacked Pearson as a " sensation mongerer , " stating that " niceties " should be left for " softer times of peace . " In one notable dissention , Patton ' s friend , former mentor and General of the Armies John J . Pershing publicly condemned his actions , an act that left Patton " deeply hurt " and caused him to never speak to Pershing again . After consulting with Marshall , Stimson , and Assistant Secretary of War John J . McCloy , Eisenhower retained Patton in the European theater , though his Seventh Army saw no further combat . Patton remained in Sicily for the rest of the year . Marshall and Stimson not only supported Eisenhower ' s decision , but defended it . In a letter to the U . S . Senate , Stimson stated that Patton must be retained because of the need for his " aggressive , winning leadership in the bitter battles which are to come before final victory . " Stimson acknowledged retaining Patton was a poor move for public relations but remained confident it was the right decision militarily . Effect on plans for Europe invasion . Contrary to his statements to Patton , Eisenhower never seriously considered removing the general from duty in the European Theater . Writing of the incident before the media attention , he said , " If this thing ever gets out , they ' ll be howling for Patton ' s scalp , and that will be the end of Georgie ' s service in this war . I simply cannot let that happen . Patton is indispensable to the war effort – one of the guarantors of our victory . " Still , following the capture of Messina in August 1943 , Patton did not command a force in combat for 11 months . Patton was passed over to lead the invasion in northern Europe . In September , Bradley — Patton ' s junior in both rank and experience — was selected to command the First United States Army that was forming in England to prepare for Operation Overlord . According to Eisenhower , this decision had been made months before the slapping incidents became public knowledge , but Patton felt they were the reason he was denied the command . Eisenhower had already decided on Bradley because he felt the invasion of Europe was too important to risk any uncertainty . While Eisenhower and Marshall both knew Patton to be a superb and aggressive corps - level combat commander , Bradley possessed two of the traits Patton conspicuously lacked that a theater - level strategic command required : a calm , reasoned demeanor and a meticulously consistent nature . The slapping incidents had only further confirmed to Eisenhower that Patton lacked the ability to exercise discipline and self - control at such a command level . Still , Eisenhower re - emphasized his confidence in Patton ' s skill as a ground combat commander by recommending him for promotion to four - star general in a private letter to Marshall on 8 September , noting his previous combat exploits and admitting that he had a " driving power " that Bradley lacked . By mid - December , Eisenhower had been appointed Supreme Allied Commander in Europe , and moved to England . As media attention surrounding the incident began to subside , McCloy told Patton he would indeed be eventually returning to combat command . Patton was briefly considered to lead the Seventh Army in Operation Dragoon , but Eisenhower felt his experience would be more useful in the Normandy campaign . Eisenhower and Marshall privately agreed that Patton would command a follow - on field army after Bradley ' s army conducted the initial invasion of Normandy ; Bradley would then command the resulting army group . Patton was told on 1 January 1944 only that he would be relieved of command of the Seventh Army and moved to Europe . In his diary he wrote that he would resign if he was not given command of a field army . On 26 January 1944 , formally given command of a newly arrived unit , the Third United States Army , he went to the United Kingdom to prepare its inexperienced soldiers for combat . This duty occupied Patton throughout early 1944 . Exploiting Patton ' s situation , Eisenhower sent him on several high - profile trips throughout the Mediterranean in late 1943 . He traveled to Algiers , Tunis , Corsica , Cairo , Jerusalem , and Malta in an effort to confuse German commanders as to where the Allied forces might next attack . By the next year , the German High Command still had more respect for Patton than for any other Allied commander and considered him central to any plan to invade Europe from the north . Because of this , Patton was made a central figure in Operation Fortitude in early 1944 . The Allies fed German spies a steady stream of false intelligence that Patton had been named commander of the First United States Army Group ( FUSAG ) and was preparing for an invasion of Pas de Calais . The FUSAG command was actually an intricately constructed " phantom " army of decoys , props and radio signals based around Dover to mislead German aircraft and to make Axis leaders believe a large force was massing there . Patton was ordered to keep a low profile to deceive the Germans into thinking he was in Dover throughout early 1944 , when he was actually training the Third Army . As a result of Operation Fortitude , the German 15th Army remained at Pas de Calais to defend against the expected attack . The formation remained there even after the invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944 . Patton and the Third Army traveled to Europe and entered combat in July .