Battle of Bardia The Battle of Bardia was fought over three days between 3 and 5 January 1941 , as part of Operation Compass , the first military operation of the Western Desert Campaign of the Second World War . It was the first battle of the war in which an Australian Army formation took part , the first to be commanded by an Australian general and the first to be planned by an Australian staff . Major General Iven Mackay ' s 6th Division assaulted the strongly held Italian fortress of Bardia , Libya , assisted by air support and naval gunfire , and under the cover of an artillery barrage . The 16th Infantry Brigade attacked at dawn from the west , where the defences were known to be weak . Sapper s blew gaps in the barbed wire with Bangalore torpedo es and filled in and broke down the sides of the anti - tank ditch with picks and shovel s . This allowed the infantry and 23 Matilda II tanks of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment to enter the fortress and capture all their objectives , along with 8 , 000 prisoners . In the second phase of the operation , the 17th Infantry Brigade exploited the breach made in the perimeter , and pressed south as far as a secondary line of defences known as the Switch Line . On the second day , the 16th Infantry Brigade captured the township of Bardia , cutting the fortress in two . Thousands of prisoners were taken , and the Italian garrison now held out only in the northern and southernmost parts of the fortress . On the third day , the 19th Infantry Brigade advanced south from Bardia , supported by artillery and the Matilda tanks , now reduced in number to just six . Its advance allowed the 17th Infantry Brigade to make progress as well , and the two brigades reduced the southern sector of the fortress . Meanwhile , the Italian garrisons in the north surrendered to the 16th Infantry Brigade and the Support Group of the British 7th Armoured Division outside the fortress . In all , some 36 , 000 Italian prisoners were taken . The victory at Bardia enabled the Allied forces to continue the advance into Libya and ultimately capture almost all of Cyrenaica . In turn this would lead to German intervention in the fighting in North Africa , changing the nature of the war in that theatre . Bardia boosted the competence and reputation of the Australian Army . Perhaps most important of all , it raised confidence in the possibility of an ultimate Allied victory around the world , which would lead to the Lend - Lease Act being passed in the United States . Background . Italian invasion of Egypt . Italy declared war on the United Kingdom on 10 June 1940 . Bordering on the Italian colony of Libya was the Kingdom of Egypt . Although a neutral country , Egypt was occupied by the British under the terms of the Anglo - Egyptian Treaty of 1936 , which allowed British military forces to occupy Egypt if the Suez Canal was threatened . A series of cross - border raids and skirmishes began on the frontier between Libya and Egypt . On 13 September 1940 , an Italian force advanced across the frontier into Egypt , reaching Sidi Barrani on 16 September , where the advance was halted until logistical difficulties could be overcome . Italy ' s position in the centre of the Mediterranean Sea made it unacceptably hazardous to send ships from Britain to the Middle East via that route , so British reinforcements and supplies for the area had to travel around the Cape of Good Hope . For this reason , it was more convenient to reinforce General Sir Archibald Wavell ' s Middle East Command with troops from Australia , New Zealand and India . Nonetheless , even when Britain was threatened with invasion after the Battle of France and equipment was urgently required to re - equip the British Expeditionary Force after its losses in the Dunkirk evacuation , troops and supplies were still despatched to the Middle East Command . A convoy that departed the United Kingdom in August 1940 brought guns , stores , ammunition , and three armoured regiments , including the 7th Royal Tank Regiment , equipped with Matilda II tanks . On 9 December 1940 the Western Desert Force under the command of Major General Richard O ' Connor attacked the Italian position at Sidi Barrani . The position was captured , 38 , 000 Italian soldiers were taken prisoner , and the remainder of the Italian force was driven back . The Western Desert Force pursued the Italians into Libya , and the 7th Armoured Division established itself to the west of Bardia , cutting off land communications between the strong Italian garrison there and Tobruk . On 11 December , Wavell decided to withdraw the 4th Indian Division and send it to the Sudan to participate in the East African Campaign . Major General Iven Mackay ' s 6th Australian Division was brought forward from Egypt to replace it . Mackay assumed command of the area on 21 December 1940 . Geography . Unlike the Great Sand Sea , the coastal portion of the Libyan Desert is stony rather than sandy , but it is no less arid , and supports little vegetation . Close to the coast , the ground was broken by wadi s . Military vehicles could traverse the stony desert with little difficulty , although the heat , dust and wind caused their rapid deterioration . Because it was so thinly populated , bombs and shells could be used with minimal risk of civilian casualties . Winter nights could be bitterly cold , yet the days could still be uncomfortably hot . There was almost no food or water , and little shelter from the cold , the heat or the wind . The desert was , however , relatively free from disease . Planning and preparation . Italian . After the disaster at Sidi Barrani and the withdrawal from Egypt , Lieutenant General Annibale Bergonzoli ' s XXIII Corps faced the British from within the strong defences of Bardia . Mussolini wrote to Bergonzoli : " I have given you a difficult task but one suited to your courage and experience as an old and intrepid soldier — the task of defending the fortress of Bardia to the last . I am certain that ' Electric Beard ' and his brave soldiers will stand at whatever cost , faithful to the last . " Bergonzoli replied : " I am aware of the honour and I have today repeated to my troops your message — simple and unequivocal . In Bardia we are and here we stay . " Bergonzoli had approximately 45 , 000 defenders under his command . The Italian divisions defending the perimeter of Bardia included remnants of four divisions . The northern ( " Gerfah " ) sector was held by the 2nd " 28 October " Blackshirt Division ; the centre ( " Ponticelli " ) sector by the 1st " 23 March " Blackshirt Division and elements of the 62nd " Marmarica " Infantry Division ; and the southern ( " Mereiga " ) sector by the 63rd " Cirene " Infantry Division and the rest of the 62nd " Marmarica " Infantry Division . Bergonzoli also had the remnants of the disbanded 64th " Catanzaro " Infantry Division , some 6 , 000 Frontier Guard ( GaF ) troops , three companies of " Bersaglieri " , part of the dismounted " Vittorio Emanuele " cavalry regiment , and a machine gun company of the 60th " Sabratha " Infantry Division . These divisions guarded an perimeter which had an almost continuous antitank ditch , extensive barbed wire fence , and a double row of strong points . The strong points were situated approximately apart . Each had its own antitank ditch , concealed by thin boards . They were each armed with one or two 47 mm antitank guns and two to four machine guns . The weapons were fired from concrete sided pits connected by trenches to a deep underground concrete bunker which offered protection from artillery fire . However , the trenches had no fire steps and the weapons pits lacked overhead cover . Each post was occupied by a platoon or company . The inner row of posts were similar , except that they lacked the antitank ditches . The posts were numbered sequentially from south to north , with the outer posts bearing odd numbers and the inner ones even numbers . The actual numbers were known to the Australians from the markings on maps captured at Sidi Barrani and were also displayed on the posts themselves . In the southern corner was a third line of posts , known as the Switch Line . There were six defensive minefields , and a scattering of mines in front of some other posts . The major tactical defect of this defensive system was that if the enemy broke through , the posts could be picked off individually from the front or rear . The defence was supported by a strong artillery component that included 41 Breda Model 35 20 mm antiaircraft guns ; 85 47 mm antitank guns ; 26 Solothurn S - 18 / 1000 anti - tank rifles ; 41 Cannone da 65 / 17 modello 13 65 mm infantry support guns ; 147 Cannone da 75 / 32 modello 37 75 mm and 77 mm field guns ; 76 Skoda 100 mm Model 1916 and Canon de 105 mle 1913 Schneider 105 mm guns ; and 27 120 mm and Obice da 149 / 12 modello 14 149 mm medium howitzers . The large number of different gun models , many of them quite old , created difficulties with the supply of spare parts . The older guns often had worn barrels , which caused problems with accuracy . Ammunition stocks were similarly old and perhaps as many as two - thirds of the fuses were out of date , resulting in excessive numbers of dud rounds . There were also multiple models of machine guns , with seven different types of ammunition in use . The Breda 30 , the principal light machine gun , had a low rate of fire and a reputation for jamming . The Fiat - Revelli Modello 1914 was a bulky and complicated weapon that was also prone to stoppages . Some of these had been rebuilt as Fiat - Revelli Modello 1935 s which , while an improvement , were still unreliable . The principal medium machine gun , the Breda M37 , had its shortcomings , the main one being that it used 20 - round strips of cartridges , which gave it a reduced rate of fire . Shortages of raw materials , coupled with the increased technological sophistication of modern weapons , led to production problems that frustrated efforts to supply the entire Italian Army with the best available equipment . The result was that the firepower of the Italian defenders was neither as great nor as effective as it should have been . As a " mobile reserve " there were 13 M13 / 40 medium tanks and 115 L3 / 35 tankettes . While the L3s were generally worthless , the M13 / 40s were effective medium tanks with four machine guns and a turret - mounted 47 mm antitank gun for its main armament that were " in many ways the equal of British armoured fighting vehicles " . However , their 20 mm armour , while much thicker than that of the tankettes , could still be penetrated by the British 2 pounder and the tankettes were no match for the British Matildas in either armour or firepower . None of the tanks at Bardia were fitted with a radio , making a coordinated counter - attack difficult . Bergonzoli knew that if Bardia and Tobruk held out , a British advance further into Libya eventually must falter under the logistical difficulties of maintaining a desert force using an extended overland supply line . Not knowing how long he had to hold out , Bergonzoli was forced to ration his stocks of food and water so that O ' Connor could not simply starve him out . Consequently , hunger and thirst adversely affected the morale of the Italian defenders that had already been shaken by the defeat at Sidi Barrani . So too did medical conditions undermine morale , particularly lice and dysentery , the results of poor sanitation . Allied . The 6th Division had been formed in September 1939 as part of an expeditionary force , the Second Australian Imperial Force . Prime Minister Robert Menzies ordered that all commands in the division were to go to reservists rather than to regular officers , who had been publicly critical of the defence policies of right wing politicians . These policies favoured the Royal Australian Navy , which received the majority of defence spending in the interwar period . The result was that when war came , the Army ' s equipment was of World War I vintage , and its factories were only capable of producing small arms . Fortunately , these World War I - era small arms , the Lee - Enfield rifle and the Vickers machine gun , were solid and reliable weapons that would remain in service throughout the war ; they were augmented by the more recent Bren light machine gun . Most other equipment was obsolescent and would have to be replaced , but new factories were required to produce the latest items , such as 3 - inch mortars , 25 - pounders and motor vehicles , and War Cabinet approval for their construction was slow in coming . The 6th Division ' s training in Palestine , while " vigorous and realistic " , was therefore hampered by shortages of equipment . These shortages were gradually remedied by deliveries from British sources . Similarly , No . 3 Squadron RAAF had to be sent to the Middle East without aircraft or equipment , which had to be supplied by the Royal Air Force , at the expense of its own squadrons . Despite the rivalry between regular and reserve officers , the 6th Division staff was an effective organisation . Brigadier John Harding , the chief of staff of XIII Corps , as the Western Desert Force was renamed on 1 January 1941 , had been a student at Staff College , Camberley along with Mackay ' s chief of staff , Colonel Frank Berryman , at a time when O ' Connor had been an instructor there . Harding later considered the 6th Division staff " as good as any that I came across in that war , and highly efficient . " Australian doctrine emphasised the importance of initiative in its junior leaders and small units were trained in aggressive patrolling , particularly at night . As it moved into position around Bardia in December 1940 , the 6th Division was still experiencing shortages . It had only two of its three artillery regiments , and only the 2 / 1st Field Regiment was equipped with the new 25 - pounders , which it had only received that month . The 2 / 2nd Field Regiment was still equipped with twelve 18 - pounders and twelve 4 . 5 - inch howitzers . Only A Squadron of the 2 / 6th Cavalry Regiment was on hand , as the rest of the regiment was deployed in the defence of the frontier posts at Al - Jaghbub and Siwa Oasis . The 2 / 1st Machine Gun Battalion had been diverted to Britain . Its place was taken by a British Army machine - gun battalion , the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers . The 2 / 1st Antitank Regiment had likewise been diverted , so each infantry brigade had formed an antitank company ; but 2 - pounders were in short supply , and only eleven guns were available instead of the 27 required . The infantry battalions were particularly short of mortars , and ammunition for the Boys anti - tank rifle was in short supply . To make up for this , O ' Connor augmented Brigadier Edmund Herring ' s 6th Division Artillery with part of the XIII Corps artillery : the 104th Regiment , Royal Horse Artillery , equipped with sixteen 25 pounders ; F Battery , Royal Horse Artillery , with twelve ; the 51st Field Regiment , Royal Artillery , with twenty four ; and the 7th Medium Regiment , Royal Artillery , which was equipped with two 60 - pounders , eight 6 - inch howitzers , and eight 6 - inch guns . There were also two antitank regiments , the 3rd and 106th Regiments , Royal Horse Artillery , equipped with 2 - pounders and Bofors 37 mm guns . Italian gun positions were located using sound ranging by the British 6th Survey Regiment , Royal Artillery . These positions disclosed themselves by firing at Australian patrols , which now went out nightly , mapping the antitank ditch and the barbed wire obstacles . Aerial photographs of the positions were taken by Westland Lysander aircraft of No . 208 Squadron RAF , escorted by Gloster Gladiator biplane fighters of No . 3 Squadron RAAF . British Intelligence estimated the strength of the Italian garrison at 20 to 23 , 000 with 100 guns , and discounted reports of six medium and seventy light tanks as exaggerated — a serious intelligence failure . At a meeting with Mackay on Christmas Eve , 1940 , O ' Connor visited Mackay at 6th Division headquarters and directed him to prepare an attack on Bardia . O ' Connor recommended that this be built around the 23 Matilda tanks of Lieutenant Colonel R . M . Jerrram ' s 7th Royal Tank Regiment that remained in working order . The attack was to be made with only two brigades , leaving the third for a subsequent advance on Tobruk . Mackay did not share O ' Connor ' s optimism about the prospect of an easy victory and proceeded on the assumption that Bardia would be resolutely held , requiring a well - planned attack similar to that required to breach the Hindenburg Line in 1918 . The plan developed by Mackay and his chief of staff , Colonel Frank Berryman , involved an attack on the western side of the Bardia defences by Brigadier Arthur " Tubby " Allen ' s 16th Infantry Brigade at the junction of the Gerfah and Ponticelli sectors . Attacking at the junction of two sectors would confuse the defence . The defences here were weaker than in the Mereiga sector , the ground was favourable for employment of the Matilda tanks , and good observation for the artillery was possible . There was also the prospect that an attack here could split the fortress in two . Brigadier Stanley Savige ' s 17th Infantry Brigade would then exploit the breach in the fortress defences in the second phase . Most of the artillery , grouped as the " Frew Group " under British Lieutenant Colonel J . H . Frowen , would support the 16th Infantry Brigade ; the 17th would be supported by the 2 / 2nd Field Regiment . In the event , the artillery density — 96 guns for an attack on an front — was comparable to the Battle of St . Quentin Canal in September 1918 , when 360 guns supported an attack on a front . Mackay insisted that the attack required 125 rounds per gun . It had to be postponed to 3 January in order for this ammunition to be brought forward . Much depended on the Western Desert Force ' s ability to move fuel , water and supplies forward . The 6th Division ' s Assistant Adjutant General and Quartermaster General ( AA & QMG ) , Colonel George Alan Vasey declared : " This is a Q war . " Captured Italian vehicles and fuel were used to haul supplies where possible . On 12 December , a Reserve Mechanical Transport company took over 80 Italian 5 - and 6 - ton diesel trucks that had been captured at Sidi Barrani . They were joined on 15 December by 50 7½ - ton trucks that arrived from Palestine . However , the British were unfamiliar with diesel engines , and a lack of spare parts , indifferent maintenance , and hard use under desert conditions soon took their toll , leading to many breakdowns . By the end of December the Western Desert Force ' s vehicle fleet was only 40 % of its establishment strength . Supplies were stocked at 8 Field Supply Depot at Sallum , where a jetty was constructed by the Royal Engineers . Troops of the British 16th Infantry Brigade began working the port on 18 December . They were soon joined by two pioneer companies of the Cyprus Regiment and a pioneer detachment from the Palestine Regiment . Stores were hauled to 8 Field Supply Depot by the New Zealand 4th Mechanical Transport Company . The port was subject to long range shelling by medium guns in Bardia , known to the Australians as " Bardia Bill " , and to Italian air attacks . Only one antiaircraft battery could be spared for Sallum . An air raid on Christmas Eve killed or wounded 60 New Zealanders and Cypriots . Without a proper warning network , interception was very difficult . However on 26 December eight Gloster Gladiators of No . 3 Squadron RAAF sighted and attacked ten Savoia - Marchetti SM . 79 bomber s escorted by 24 Fiat CR . 42 biplane fighters over the Gulf of Sallum . The Australians claimed to have shot down two CR 42s , while three Gladiators were damaged . On 23 December the water carrier arrived at Sallum with 3 , 000 tons of water , while the monitor brought another 200 tons . The water was taken to storage tanks at Fort Capuzzo . Efforts were made to stock 8 Field Supply Depot with seven days ' supply of fuel and stores , and 500 rounds per gun of ammunition . The effort to do so proceeded satisfactorily despite Italian air raids and blinding sand storms . Last - minute efforts were made to rectify the 6th Division ' s remaining equipment shortages . Over the last few days before the battle , some 95 additional vehicles were obtained , of which 80 were assigned to hauling ammunition . A consignment of 11 , 500 sleeveless leather jerkin s for protection against the cold and barbed wire were distributed , as were 350 sets of captured Italian wire cutter s . The 17th Infantry Brigade finally received its 3 - inch mortars but found them lacking their sights . An officer dashed back to Cairo to obtain these in time . Some 300 pairs of gloves and of marking tape arrived with only hours to go . The gloves were distributed , but the tape did not reach the 16th Infantry Brigade in time , so rifle cleaning flannelette was torn into strips and used instead . Battle . Air and naval operations . A series of air raids were mounted against Bardia in December , in the hope of persuading the garrison to withdraw . Once it became clear that the Italians intended to stand and fight , bombing priorities shifted to the Italian airbases around Tobruk , Derna and Benina . Air raids on Bardia resumed in the lead - up to the ground assault , with 100 bombing sorties flown against Bardia between 31 December 1940 and 2 January 1941 , climaxing with a particularly heavy raid by Vickers Wellington bombers of No . 70 Squadron RAF and Bristol Bombay bombers of No . 216 Squadron RAF on the night of 2 / 3 January 1941 . Lysanders of No . 208 Squadron RAF directed the artillery fire . Fighters from No . 33 Squadron RAF , No . 73 Squadron RAF and No . 274 Squadron RAF patrolled between Bardia and Tobruk . A naval bombardment was carried out on the morning of 3 January by the " Queen Elizabeth " - class battleship s , and and their destroyer escorts . The aircraft carrier provided aircraft for spotting and fighter cover . They withdrew after firing 244 270 and 240 shells , handing over to HMS " Terror " and the Insect - class gunboat s , and , which continued firing throughout the battle . At one point fire from " Terror " caused part of the cliff near the town to give way , taking Italian gun positions with it . Break in . The assault troops rose early on 3 January 1941 , ate a meal and drank a tot of rum . The leading companies began moving to the start line at 0416 . The artillery opened fire at 0530 . On crossing the start line the 2 / 1st Infantry Battalion , under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Eather , came under Italian mortar and artillery fire . The lead platoons advanced accompanied by sapper s of the 2 / 1st Field Company carrying Bangalore torpedo es — pipes packed with ammonal — as Italian artillery fire began to land , mainly behind them . An Italian shell exploded among a leading platoon and detonated a Bangalore torpedo , resulting in four killed and nine wounded . The torpedoes were slid under the barbed wire at intervals . A whistle was blown as a signal to detonate the torpedoes but could not be heard over the din of the barrage . Colonel Eather became anxious and ordered the engineering party nearest him to detonate their torpedo . This the other teams heard , and they followed suit . The infantry scrambled to their feet and rushed forward while the sappers hurried to break down the sides of the antitank ditch with picks and shovel s . They advanced on a series of posts held by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the Italian 115th Infantry Regiment . Posts 49 and 47 were rapidly overrun , as was Post 46 in the second line beyond . Within half an hour Post 48 had also fallen and another company had taken Posts 45 and 44 . The two remaining companies now advanced beyond these positions towards a low stone wall as artillery fire began to fall along the broken wire . The Italians fought from behind the wall until the Australians were inside it , attacking with hand grenades and bayonet s . The two companies succeeded in taking 400 prisoners . Lieutenant Colonel F . O . Chilton ' s 2 / 2nd Infantry Battalion found that it was best to keep skirmishing forward throughout this advance , because going to ground for any length of time meant sitting in the middle of the enemy artillery concentrations that inflicted further casualties . The Australian troops made good progress , six tank crossings were readied and mines between them and the wire had been detected . Five minutes later , the 23 Matildas of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment advanced , accompanied by the 2 / 2nd Infantry Battalion . Passing through the gaps , they swung right along the double line of posts . At 0750 Lieutenant Colonel V . T . England ' s 2 / 3rd Infantry Battalion , accompanied by the Bren gun carriers of Major Denzil MacArthur - Onslow ' s A Squadron , 2 / 6th Cavalry Regiment moved off for Bardia . Major J . N . Abbot ' s company advanced to the Italian posts , and attacked a group of sangers . The Italian defenders were cleared with grenades . By 0920 all companies were on their objectives and they had linked with 2 / 1st Infantry Battalion . However , the Bren gun carriers encountered problems as they moved forward during the initial attack . One was hit and destroyed in the advance and another along the Wadi Ghereidia . The 2 / 3rd Infantry Battalion was now assailed by half a dozen Italian M13 / 40 tanks who freed a group of 500 Italian prisoners . The tanks continued to rumble to the south while the British crews of the Matildas " enjoying a brew , dismissed reports of them as an Antipodean exaggeration " . Finally , they were engaged by an antitank platoon of three 2 pounders mounted on portee s . Corporal A . A . Pickett ' s gun destroyed four of them until his portee was hit , killing one man and wounding Pickett . The survivors got the gun back into action and knocked out a fifth tank . The portee was again hit by fire from the sixth tank , fatally wounding another man ; but it too was soon knocked out by another 2 pounder . By midday , 6 , 000 Italian prisoners had already reached the provosts at the collection point near Post 45 , escorted by increasingly fewer guards whom the rifle companies could afford to detach . The Italian perimeter had been breached and the attempt to halt the Australian assault at the outer defences had failed . Follow up . Major H . Wrigley ' s 2 / 5th Infantry Battalion of Brigadier Stanley Savige ' s 17th Infantry Brigade , reinforced by two companies of Lieutenant Colonel T . G . Walker ' s 2 / 7th Infantry Battalion , now took over the advance . The battalion ' s task was to clear " The Triangle " , a map feature created by the intersection of three tracks north of Post 16 . Wrigley ' s force had a long and exhausting approach , and much of its movement forward to its jump off point had been under Italian shellfire intended for the 16th Infantry Brigade . Awaiting its turn to move , the force sought shelter in Wadi Scemmas and its tributaries . Wrigley called a final coordinating conference for 1030 , but at 1020 he was wounded by a bullet and his second in command , Major G . E . Sell took over . At the conference the forward observer from the 2 / 2nd Field Regiment reported that he had lost contact with the guns and could not call in artillery fire . A wounded British tank troop commander also reported that one of his tanks had been knocked out and the other three were out of fuel or ammunition . No tank support would be available until these had been replenished . Sell decided that the attack must be carried out without them . The artillery barrage came down at 1125 , and five minutes later the advance began . The sun had now risen , and Captain C . H . Smith ' s D Company came under effective fire from machine guns and field artillery to the north east . Within minutes , all but one of the company ' s officers and all its senior non - commissioned officer s had been killed or wounded . C Company ' s Captain W . B . Griffiths pulled his company back to the Wadi and called on a detachment of 3 - inch mortars and a platoon of Vickers machine gun s of the 1st Battalion , Northumberland Fusiliers to fire at the Italian positions . This proved effective , and Griffith ' s company and a platoon of A Company worked along the Wadi Scemmas , eventually collecting 3 , 000 prisoners . Meanwhile , Captain D . I . A . Green ' s B Company of the 2 / 7th Infantry Battalion had captured Posts 26 , 27 and 24 . After Post 24 had been taken , two Matildas arrived and helped to take Post 22 . As the prisoners were rounded up , one shot Green dead , then threw down his rifle and climbed out of the pit smiling broadly . He was immediately thrown back and a Bren gun emptied into him . Lieutenant C . W . Macfarlane , the second - in - command , had to prevent his troops from bayoneting the other prisoners . The incident was witnessed by the Italians at Post 25 some away , who promptly surrendered . With the help of the Matildas , Macfarlane was able to quickly capture Posts 20 and 23 . At this point , one tank ran out of ammunition ; anti - tank fire already had blown off the track of another in the attack on Post 20 . Nonetheless , Posts 18 and 21 were captured without armoured support , using the now - familiar tactics of grenades , wire cutting and assault . With darkness approaching , Macfarlane attempted to capture Post 16 , but the defenders beat him off . He retired to Post 18 for the night . Upon hearing of the losses to the 2 / 5th Infantry Battalion , Brigade Major G . H . Brock sent Captain J . R . Savige ' s A Company of the 2 / 7th Infantry Battalion to take " The Triangle " . Savige gathered his platoons and with fire support , from machine guns , attacked the objective , away . The company captured eight field guns , many machine - guns and nearly 200 prisoners on the way , but casualties and the need to detach soldiers as prisoner escorts left him with only 45 men at the end of the day . Lieutenant Colonel A . H . L . Godfrey ' s 2 / 6th Infantry Battalion was supposed to " stage a demonstration against the south west corner of the perimeter " , held by the 1st Battalion , Italian 158th Infantry Regiment and 3rd Battalion , Italian 157th Infantry Regiment . Instead , in what military historians consider one of the most " disastrous example of a CO seeking to make his mark " , Godfrey decided instead to launch an attack , in defiance of the clear instructions he had received , and against all basic military logic and common sense . Although poorly planned and executed , Godfrey ' s attack managed to capture Post 7 and part of Post 9 , but Post 11 resisted stubbornly . That evening , Brigadier Savige came forward to the 2 / 5th Infantry Battalion ' s position to determine the situation , which he accurately evaluated as " extremely confused ; the attack was stagnant . " Savige adopted a plan of Walker ' s for a night attack , which began at 1230 . Macfarlane advanced on Post 16 . He sent a platoon around the flank to silently cut the wire on the western side , while he led another platoon against the northern side . A Bren gunner opening fire prematurely , alerting the defenders , but Macfarlane ' s men were able to overrun the post . The same tactic was used to capture Post R11 . Macfarlane was supposed to capture Post R9 , but was unable to find it in the dark . His troops attempted to capture it at dawn , but the defenders were alert and they responded with heavy fire . With the help of a 2 - inch mortar , the second attempt was successful . Meanwhile , Captain G . H . Halliday ' s D Company moved southwards against Post 19 . He drew the defenders ' attention with a demonstration by one platoon in front of the post while the rest of the company moved around the post and attacked silently from the rear . This maneuver took the defenders by surprise and D Company captured the post — and 73 prisoners — at 0230 . Halliday repeated this tactic against Post 14 , which was taken at 0400 with 64 prisoners . Capturing the two posts cost one Australian killed and seven wounded . A third attempt against Post 17 failed : the previous attacks had alerted the post and D Company came under heavy mortar and machine gun fire . A furious battle raged until the post fell shortly before dawn . Another 103 Italians were captured at a cost of two Australians killed and nine wounded . Between casualties and men detached as prisoner escorts , D Company strength fell to 46 men , and Halliday elected to halt for the night . Although the Australian progress had been slower than that achieved during the break - in phase , the 17th Infantry Brigade had achieved remarkable results . Another ten posts , representing of perimeter had been captured , the Switch Line had been breached , and thousands of Italian defenders had been captured . For the Italians , halting the Australian advance would be an immensely difficult task . Bardia falls . On the afternoon of 3 January , Berryman met with Allen , Jerram and Frowen at Allen ' s headquarters at Post 40 to discuss plans for the next day . It was agreed that Allen would advance on Bardia and cut the fortress in two , supported by Frowen ' s guns , every available tank , MacArthur - Onslow ' s Bren gun carriers and the 2 / 8th Infantry Battalion , which Mackay had recently allocated from reserve . Allen gave orders accordingly . During the afternoon the 6th Cavalry Regiment was pulled back to become the brigade reserve and the 2 / 5th Infantry Battalion relieved the 2 / 2nd to free it to advance the next day . That evening , Berryman came to the conclusion that unless the Italian defence collapsed soon , the 16th and 17th Infantry Brigades would become incapable of further effort and Brigadier Horace Robertson ' s 19th Infantry Brigade would be required . Mackay was more sanguine about the situation , and reminded Berryman that his orders had been to capture Bardia with only two brigades . While they were discussing the matter , O ' Connor and Harding arrived at 6th Division headquarters , and O ' Connor readily agreed to the change of plan . The 2 / 1st Infantry Battalion began its advance on schedule at 0900 , but the lead platoon came under heavy machine gun fire from Post 54 , and Italian artillery knocked out the supporting mortars . The 3rd Regiment Royal Horse Artillery engaged the Italian guns and the platoon withdrew . Colonel Eather then organised a formal attack on Post 54 for 1330 , following a bombardment of the post by artillery and mortars . The Italian guns were silenced when an Australian shell detonated a nearby ammunition dump . The Australians then captured the post . About a third of its defenders had been killed in the fighting . The remaining 66 surrendered . This prompted a general collapse of the Italian position in the north . Posts 56 and 61 surrendered without a fight and white flag s were raised over Posts 58 , 60 , 63 and 65 , and the gun positions near Post 58 . By nightfall , Eather ' s men had advanced as far as Post 69 and only the fourteen northernmost posts still held out in the Gerfan sector . Colonel England ' s 2 / 3rd Infantry Battalion was supported by the guns of the 104th Regiment Royal Horse Artillery and a troop of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment . The tanks were late in arriving , and England postponed his attack to 1030 . The battalion came under artillery fire , mostly from a battery north of Bardia that was then engaged and silenced by the 104th Regiment Royal Horse Artillery . The advance resumed , only to come under machine gun and artillery fire from Wadi el Gerfan . An eight - man section under Lance Corporal F . W . Squires was sent to reconnoitre the wadi but attacked a battery position instead and returned with 500 prisoners . The wadi was found to contain large numbers of Italian soldiers from technical units who , untrained for combat , surrendered in large numbers . One company captured over 2 , 000 prisoners , including 60 officers . The brigade major , Major I . R . Campbell , ordered MacArthur - Onslow , whose carriers were screening England ' s advance , to seize Hebs el Harram , the high ground overlooking the road to the township of Bardia . MacArthur - Onslow ' s carriers discovered an Italian hospital with 500 patients , including several Australians , and 3 , 000 unwounded Italians . Leaving a small party at the hospital under Corporal M . H . Vause , who could speak some Italian , MacArthur - Onslow pressed on with two carriers to the Hebs el Harram , where they took over 1 , 000 prisoners . The tanks and the remainder of A Squadron continued along the road to Bardia under intermittent artillery fire , followed by C Company of the 2 / 3rd Infantry Battalion . The column entered the town at 1600 , its tanks firing the occasional shot . The 2 / 2nd Infantry Battalion , supported by the three Matilda tanks and the guns of the 7th Medium Regiment , advanced down the Wadi Scemmas towards an Italian fort on the southern headland of Bardia . After some hours of climbing , the 2 / 2nd reached the headland and attacked the fort at 1645 . Inside the fort were two 6 inch guns , two field guns and five other guns of the fort . Fortunately , the 6 inch guns were for coastal defence and were unable to fire inland . One of the tanks made straight for the gate of the fort . The Italians opened the gate , and the tanks moved inside , taking the garrison of 300 prisoners . D Company then followed a goat track that led to lower Bardia . Thousands of prisoners were taken , most from service units . Two carriers of the 2 / 5th Infantry Battalion patrolling near the coast captured 1 , 500 prisoners . Captain N . A . Vickery , a forward observer from the 2 / 1st Field Regiment attacked an Italian battery in his Bren gun carrier and captured 1 , 000 prisoners . By the end of the second day , tens of thousands of defenders had been killed or captured . The remaining garrisons in the Gerfan and Ponticelli sectors were completely isolated . The logistical and administrative units were being overrun . Recognising that the situation was hopeless , General Bergonzoli and his staff had departed on foot for Tobruk during the afternoon , in a party of about 120 men . General Giuseppe Tellera , the commander of the Italian Tenth Army , considered the possibility of sending a force to relieve the Bardia fortress but in the end concluded that such an operation had no chance of success . Final drive . On the morning of 5 January , the 19th Infantry Brigade launched its attack on the Meriega sector , starting from the Bardia road and following a creeping barrage southward with the support of six Matilda tanks , all that remained in working order . The others had been hit by shells , immobilised by mines , or had simply broken down . The company commanders of the lead battalion , the 2 / 11th Infantry Battalion , did not receive their final orders until 45 minutes before start time , at which point the start line was away . As a consequence , the battalion arrived late , and the intended two company attack had to be carried out by just one : Captain Ralph Honner ' s C Company , albeit with all six Matildas at his disposal . Honner ' s men had to literally chase the barrage , and had only just caught up with it before it ceased . As they advanced , they came under fire from the left , the right , and in front of them , but casualties were light . Most positions surrendered when the infantry and tanks came close , but this did not reduce the fire from posts further away . By 1115 , C Company had reached the Switch Line and captured Post R5 and then R7 . B Company , following on the left , cleared Wadi Meriega , capturing Lieutenant General Ruggero Tracchia and Brigadier General Alessandro de Guidi , the commanders of the 62nd and 63rd Infantry Divisions respectively . At this point , Honner stopped to consolidate his position and allow Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Dougherty ' s 2 / 4th Infantry Battalion to pass through . However , Honner took the surrender of Posts 1 , 2 and 3 and his men did not stop advancing . Meanwhile , the Italian garrisons in the north were surrendering to the 16th Infantry Brigade and the Support Group of the 7th Armoured Division outside the fortress ; the 2 / 8th Infantry Battalion had taken the area above Wadi Meriega ; and the 2 / 7th Infantry Battalion had captured Posts 10 , 12 and 15 . Colonel Godfrey was astonished to discover that the 2 / 11th Infantry Battalion had captured Post 8 . The carrier platoon of the 2 / 6th Infantry Battalion attacked and captured Post 13 while the 2 / 11th captured Post 6 . The only post still holding out was now Post 11 . The 2 / 6th Infantry Battalion renewed its attack , with the infantry attacking from the front and its carriers attacking from the rear . They were joined by Matildas from the vicinity of Post 6 . At this point the Italian post commander , who had been wounded in the battle , lowered his flag and raised a white one . Some 350 Italian soldiers surrendered at Post 11 . Inside , the Australians found two field guns , 6 antitank guns , 12 medium machine guns , 27 light machine guns , and two 3 inch mortars . Godfrey sought out the Italian post commander — who wore a British Military Cross earned in the First World War — and shook his hand . " On a battlefield where Italian troops won little honour , " Gavin Long later wrote , " the last to give in belonged to a garrison whose resolute fight would have done credit to any army . " Aftermath . Casualties . An estimated 36 , 000 Italian soldiers were captured at Bardia and a further 1 , 000 killed and 3 , 000 wounded . Only a few thousand — including General Bergonzoli and three of his division commanders — escaped to Tobruk on foot or in boats . In addition , the Allies captured 26 coast defence guns , 7 medium guns , 216 field guns , 146 antitank guns , 12 medium tanks and 115 L3s , and perhaps most important of all , 708 vehicles . Australian losses totalled 130 dead and 326 wounded . Base development . Bardia did not become an important port . Maintenance by sea continued to run through Salum . However , Bardia became an important source of water . The large pumping station that the Italians had installed to serve the township and Fort Capuzzo was found damaged but was soon repaired . Outcome . The victory at Bardia enabled the Allied forces to continue the advance into Libya and ultimately capture almost all of Cyrenaica . As the first battle of the war to be commanded by an Australian general , planned by an Australian staff , and fought by Australian troops , Bardia was naturally of great interest to the public in Australia . Congratulatory messages poured in . AIF recruitment surged in the wake of the news of the victory . War correspondent John Hetherington reported that : " Men who since childhood had read and heard of the exploits in battle of the First AIF , who had enlisted and trained under the shadow of their fathers ' reputation as soldiers , had come through their ordeal of fire and built a reputation of their own . " In the neutral United States , newspapers praised the 6th Division . Favourable articles appeared in " The New York Times " and the " Washington Times - Herald " , which ran the headline " Hardy Wild - Eyed Aussies Called World ' s Finest Troops " . An article in the " Chicago Daily News " told its readers that Australians " in their realistic attitude towards power politics , prefer to send their boys to fight far overseas rather than fighting a battle in the suburbs of Sydney " . Even while the battle was raging , Wavell had received a cable from General Sir John Dill stressing the political importance of such victories in the United States , where President Franklin D . Roosevelt was attempting to get the Lend - Lease Act passed . It was finally enacted in March 1941 . Mackay wrote in a diary note on 6 January : " Germans cannot possibly keep out of Africa now . " In Germany , the , Adolf Hitler , was unconcerned by the military implications of the loss of Libya , but deeply troubled by the prospect of a political reverse that could lead to the fall of Mussolini . On 9 January 1941 , he revealed his intention to senior members of the Wehrmacht to send German ground troops to North Africa , in what became " Unternehmen Sonnenblume " ( Operation Sunflower ) . Henceforth , German troops would play an important role in the fighting in North Africa . Within the 6th Division , there were recriminations over what was seen as Berryman ' s favouritism towards Robertson , a fellow regular soldier and Royal Military College , Duntroon graduate , in an effort to prove that regular officers could command troops . Savige felt , with some justification , that some of the 17th Infantry Brigade ' s difficulties were of Berryman ' s making , through an over - prescriptive and complicated battle plan . In many ways the 6th Division was fortunate to have drawn a " set piece " type of battle , the type that most suited its Great War - based doctrine and training . At the same time , confidence and experience was generated , and leaders and staffs took away important tactical lessons from the battle . Gavin Long considered Bardia " a victory for bold reconnaissance , for audacious yet careful planning , for an artillery scheme which subdued the enemy ' s fire at the vital time , and a rapid and continuing infantry assault which broke a gap in the enemy ' s line . " To attribute success to the tanks or artillery , he felt , was " to present " Hamlet " without the prince . "