Vietnamization Vietnamization was a policy of the Richard M . Nixon administration during the Vietnam War , as a result of the Viet Cong ' s Tet Offensive , to " expand , equip , and train South Vietnam ' s forces and assign to them an ever - increasing combat role , at the same time steadily reducing the number of U . S . combat troops . " This referred to U . S . combat troops specifically in the ground combat role , but did not reject combat by U . S . air forces , as well as the support to South Vietnam , consistent with the policies of U . S . foreign military assistance organizations . U . S . citizens ′ mistrust of their government that had begun after the offensive worsened with the release of news about U . S . soldiers massacring civilians at My Lai ( 1968 ) , the invasion of Cambodia ( 1970 ) , and the leaking of the Pentagon Papers ( 1971 ) . After Nixon ' s election in 1968 , Vietnamization became the policy of the United States . While it was a deliberate policy , the name was rather accidental . At a January 28 , 1969 , meeting of the National Security Council , GEN Andrew Goodpaster , deputy to GEN Creighton Abrams , commander of the Military Assistance Command , Vietnam , said the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam ( ARVN ) had been steadily improving , and the point at which the war could be " de - Americanized " was close . Melvin Laird , the Secretary of Defense , agreed with the point , but not with the language : " what we need is a term like ' Vietnamizing ' to put the emphasis on the right issues . " Nixon immediately liked Laird ' s word . Vietnamization fit into the broader Nixon Administration détente policy , in which the United States no longer regarded its fundamental strategy as containment of Communism , but a cooperative world order in which Nixon and his chief adviser Henry Kissinger were basically " realists " in world affairs , interested in the broader constellation of forces , and the biggest powers . Nixon had ordered Kissinger to negotiate basic U . S . - Soviet policy between the heads of state via Kissinger and Dobrynin , with the agreements then transferred to diplomats for implementation . In like manner , Nixon opened high - level contact with China . U . S . relations with the Soviet Union and China were seen as far more important than the fate of South Vietnam , which certainly did not preclude South Vietnam maintaining its own independence . Nixon said Vietnamization had two components . The first was " strengthening the armed force of the South Vietnamese in numbers , equipment , leadership and combat skills . The second component is the extension of the pacification program in South Vietnam . " The first was achievable , but it would take time . For the U . S . , it was trivial to have a U . S . helicopter pilot fly in support , but helicopter operations were too much part of ground operations to involve U . S . personnel . As observed by LTG Dave Palmer , to qualify an ARVN candidate for U . S . helicopter school , he first needed months of English language training to be able to follow the months - long training , and then additional field time to become proficient . In other words , adding new capabilities to the ARVN would often take two or more years . Palmer did not disagree that the first component , given time and resources , was achievable . " Pacification , the second component , presented the real challenge . . . it was benevolent government action in areas where the government should always have been benevolently active . . . doing both was necessary if Vietnamization were to work . " Nixon Administration analysis of options . Kissinger , earlier , had asked the Rand Corporation to provide a list of policy options , prepared by Daniel Ellsberg . On receiving the report , Kissinger and Schelling asked Ellsberg about the apparent absence of a victory option ; Ellsberg said " I don ' t believe there is a win option in Vietnam . " While Ellsberg eventually did send a withdrawal option , Kissinger would not circulate something that could be perceived as defeat . According to a record , prepared by Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoliy Dobrynin , of discussions between Dobrynin and Kissinger , the crux of the U . S . position , was progress still must be made at the Paris talks and , for domestic political reasons , Nixon " simply cannot wait a year for Hanoi to decide to take some new step and take a more flexible position . " Dobrynin expressed the Soviet position that the U . S . needed to stop trying to divide the Paris Peace Talks into two parts : Dobrynin , however , misunderstood the extent to which the U . S . was willing to apply military force not involving ground troops , culminating in Operation Linebacker II . Preparation under Johnson . Lyndon Johnson had not intended to keep escalating the war throughout his entire presidency . Given his major interests were domestic , and that the war interfered with his domestic focus , he was eager to free his programs from the war — if he could find a way that he considered politically acceptable . Coincidentally , in 1967 , Kissinger attended an Pugwash Conference of scientists interested in nuclear disarmament . Two participants approached Kissinger and offered a disavowable means of communicating American thoughts to the Communist leadership . In particular , Raymond Aubrac , an official of the World Health Organization , knew Ho Chi Minh and would carry a message to him . After discussing the matter with Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara , a message was sent . After a ritualized condemnation , Ho said he would be willing to negotiate if the U . S . Operation Rolling Thunder bombing of the North ceased . Mai Van Bo , Hanoi ' s diplomatic representative in Paris , was named a point of contact . Since Hanoi would not communicate with an American official without a bombing halt , Kissinger served as an intermediary . Johnson made a speech , in San Antonio on September 29 , offering the possibility of talks . They were rejected , although brought it up again in 1967 . End of Americanization . The departure of Lyndon Johnson did not end the war . In fact , it was actually escalated until it spread throughout the whole of Southeast Asia . While the Tet Offensive proved to be a military victory for the US and ARVN , it was a political and media disaster . Public support began to erode as Americans started to question the handling of the conflict . Others doubted Westmoreland ' s ability to command , leading to his replacement in June 1968 , by General Creighton Abrams . While the true strategic intent of the Tet Offensive of January 1968 is still debated , it clearly had an impact on American politics . In February , Walter Cronkite , then the most respected newsman in the U . S . , announced he saw potential for nothing better than a stalemate . Other members of the press added to the call to retrench . President Johnson ' s popularity plummeted and he announced a bombing halt on March 31 , simultaneously announcing he would not run for re - election . Ultimately , it was the media ' s reaction and stressing of a widening " credibility gap " that did the most damage to the Johnson Administration ' s efforts . Noted reporters , such as Walter Cronkite , began to openly criticize Johnson and the military leadership , as well as called for negotiated end to the war . Though he had low expectations , on May 10 , 1968 , Johnson conceded and the peace talks between U . S . and North Vietnamese officials began in Paris . But the bloody war on the ground continued . Nixon policy direction . The election of the Republican hawk Richard Nixon did nothing to improve matters . The American deployment that had started with only 23 , 300 in 1963 rose inexorably to 184 , 000 in 1966 and reached a peak of 542 , 000 in January 1969 as Richard Nixon assumed the presidency . The war was now costing $ 30 billion a year : a huge drain of blood and gold even for one of the richest countries on earth . And the perception grew among Americans that it was unwinnable . The mood was turning against the war even in the American ruling class . But Richard Nixon belonged to that wing that believed that " one last push " could end the war , or at least compel North Vietnam to negotiate a settlement acceptable to Washington . Nixon directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a six - step withdrawal plan . The Commandant of the Marine Corps General Leonard F . Chapman remembered , " I felt , and I think that most Marines felt , that the time had come to get out of Vietnam . " Leading the ground force withdrawals , Marine redeployments started in mid - 1969 , and by the end of the year the entire 3rd Marine Division had departed . While not all of the U . S . support , for reasons of domestic politics , was public , it included air attack on the North Vietnamese movements into the South , and combat service support including intelligence . In 1969 , for some South Vietnamese units , it was a very good year . Palmer cites Sir Robert Thompson as the " year where there was accelerated pacification in the countryside . He points out that by mid - 1971 , all but three remote highways were safe to travel . Palmer agreed that by late 1969 , the Viet Cong could be reduced to " but a nuisance . " Doing so , however , did not remove the threat of PAVN units in sanctuaries within range of Saigon , continuing to present a threat of conventional invasion . Both the South and North Vietnamese planners looked at that threat ; the decision was made to help the ARVN attack the sanctuaries in Cambodia . For other South Vietnamese units , it was the beginning of a long slide into unsustainable situations . After the Tet Offensive , ARVN units in areas where most of the enemy strength had been to NLF - VC , the ARVN were able to take an initiative . The Tet objectives were beyond our strength , concluded General Tran Van Tra , the commander of Vietcong forces in the South : We suffered large sacrifices and losses with regard to manpower and materiel , especially cadres at the various echelons , which clearly weakened us . Afterwards , we were not only unable to retain the gains we had made but had to overcome a myriad of difficulties in 1969 and 1970 . Some ARVN units , especially that had been operating closely with U . S . troops or using facilities , could quickly move into a dominant role in their areas . Others faced more of a challenge . For example , the ARVN 5th Division was directed to move from its existing base camp , Phu Cuong , to that of the U . S . 1st Infantry Division in Lai Khe while the U . S . division moved to southeast to Di An , nearer to Saigon . Both locations are districts in Binh Duong Province . This was not a simple replacement of the U . S . 1st ID by the ARVN 5th ; the ARVN unit retained its previous operational responsibility . Also in the new area for the ARVN 5th had been the 1st Cavalry Division ( Airmobile ) , far better equipped with helicopters than a standard U . S . division . In other words , one division was to take over the area covered by three , one of which had exceptional mobility . At Phu Cong , MG Nguyen Van Hieu , the 5th Division commander , was able to use a local Popular Force battalion for base security . Popular Force battalions , however , did not move away from the area in which they were formed . Joint operations against Cambodian sanctuaries . In 1969 , Nixon ordered B - 52 strikes against PAVN bases and supply routes in Cambodia . The orders for U . S . bombing of Cambodia were classified , and thus kept from the U . S . media and Congress . In a given strike , each B - 52 normally dropped of bombs , and each strike consisted of three or six bombers . Surviving personnel in the target area were apt to know they had been bombed , and , since the U . S . had the only aircraft capable of that volume , would know the U . S . had done it . The " secrecy " may have been meant to be face - saving for Sihanouk , but there is substantial reason to believe that the secrecy , in U . S . military channels , was to keep knowledge of the bombing from the U . S . Congress and public . Actually , a reasonable case could be made that the bombing fell under the " hot pursuit " doctrine of international law , where if a neutral ( Sihanouk ) could not stop one country from attacking another from the neutral sanctuary , the attacked country ( ies ) had every right to counterattack . Cambodian change of government . Much of North Vietnamese infiltration went through Cambodia . As well as unacknowledged bombing in Cambodia , Nixon authorized , while U . S . ground troops were still in South Vietnam , a large - scale ground attack into the Cambodian sanctuary . General Lon Nol had overthrown Prince Norodom Sihanouk in March 1970 ; Sihanouk presented himself as a neutralist while aware of the PAVN use of his country . In June 1969 , the NLF ( Viet Cong ) and its allied organizations formed the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam ( PRG ) , recognized by Hanoi as the legal government of South Vietnam . At that time , communist losses dating from the Tet Offensive numbered 75 , 000 , and morale was faltering , even among the party leadership . Joint ground operations . Responding to a Communist attempt to take Cambodia , Nixon in April 1970 authorized a large scale US - ARVN incursion into Cambodia to directly hit the PAVN headquarters and supply dumps . The area bordered ARVN III Corps tactical zone He preannounced the operation in a speech on April 30 . In this campaign , beginning May 1 , U . S . Task Force Shoemaker , of the 1st Cavalry Division operated in the Fishhook area of Cambodia , preceded by B - 52 strikes . TF Shoemaker operated with the ARVN Airborne Brigade . Separate ARVN operations took place in the Parrot ' s Beak area . III Corps tactical zone commander Vietnamese general Do Cao Tri was the most visible ARVN leader . He encouraged the deepest ARVN penetrations . The incursion prevented the immediate takeover of Cambodia by Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge , and cost the PAVN the supply line from the port of Sihanoukville . The Khmer Rouge broke with its North Vietnamese sponsors , and aligned with China . This made American involvement visible to the U . S . population , and there were intense protests , including deaths in a confrontation between rock - throwing protesters and National Guardsmen at Kent State University . Intelligence and security . The first American soldier to die in Vietnam was a member of a communications intelligence unit . The U . S . intelligence collection systems , a significant amount of which ( especially the techniques ) were not shared with the ARVN , and , while not fully declassified , examples have been mentioned earlier in this article . The Communist side ' s intelligence operations , beyond the spies that were discovered , are much less known . While there had been many assumptions that the South Vietnamese government was penetrated by many spies , and there indeed were many , a December 1969 capture of a Viet Cong communications intelligence center and documents revealed that they had been getting a huge amount of information using simple technology and smart people , as well as sloppy U . S . communications security . This specific discovery was by U . S . Army infantry , with interpretation by regular communications officers ; the matter infuriated GEN Abrams — at the communications specialists . Before and after , there had been a much more highly classified , and only now available in heavily censored form , National Security Agency analysis of how the Communists were getting their information , which has led to a good deal of modern counterintelligence and operations security . Some of the material from Touchdown also gave insight into the North Vietnamese intelligence system . For example , the NVA equivalent of the Defense Intelligence Agency was the Central Research Directorate ( CRD ) in Hanoi . COSVN intelligence staff , however , disseminated the tactically useful material . Their espionage was under the control of the Military Intelligence Sections ( MIS ) , which were directed by the Strategic Intelligence Section ( SIS ) of CRD . U . S . direct discussions with North Vietnam . Henry Kissinger began secret talks with the North Vietnamese official , Le Duc Tho , in February 1970 . 1971 . Subsequent congressional action banned further U . S . ground intervention outside the boundaries of South Vietnam , so the next major drive , Operation Lam Son 719 , would have to be based on ARVN ground forces , U . S . air and artillery support , and U . S . advisory and logistical assistance . The Vietnamization policy achieved limited rollback of Communist gains inside South Vietnam only , and was primarily aimed at providing the arms , training and funding for the South to fight and win its own war , if it had the courage and commitment to do so . By 1971 , the Communists lost control of most , but not all , of the areas they had controlled in the South in 1967 . The Communists still controlled many remote jungle and mountain districts , especially areas that protected the Ho Chi Minh Trail . Commanded by Hoang Xuan Lam , known more for loyalty to Nguyen Van Thieu than for military talent , Saigon ' s effort to strike against one of these strongholds , Operation Lam Son 719 , failed in 1971 . The SVN forces , with some U . S . air support , were unable to defeat PAVN regulars . While the operation is detailed in a separate sub - article , the key issues were that the ARVN were inexperienced in executing large operations . They underestimated the needed forces , and the senior officers had developed in a context that rewarded loyalty rather than competence . Let there be no doubt that there were individual ARVN commanders that would be credit to any military , but , Thieu , like those RVN leaders before him , was constantly concerned at preventing a military coup . " . . . promotions were won in Saigon , not in battle . And vital to advancement was the avoidance of risk , even at the price of defeat . " Thieu relieved the operational commander , head of I Corps tactical zone commander Hoang Xuan Lam with the most respected combat commander in the ARVN , Do Cao Tri . Tri died 2 . 5 hours later in his first helicopter crash of inspection . It is known the crash was at low altitude ; it has been argued it crashed due to mechanical failure or enemy fire . Certainly , mechanical failure was less demoralizing . The 25 , 000 - man ARVN force , which U . S . planners had considered half the necessary size , took admitted 25 % casualties , which some estimates put as high as 50 % . 1972 . By the beginning of 1972 , over 400 , 000 U . S . personnel had been withdrawn , virtually all combat troops . Politically , this let Nixon negotiate with China and the Soviet Union without the suggestion he was compromising U . S . soldiers in the field . North Vietnam made a major conventional attack on the South , for which the U . S . provided major air support under Operation Linebacker I , which enabled the ARVN to regain substantial control . When North Vietnam , late in the year , left the negotiating table , Nixon authorized the intensive Operation Linebacker II campaign , which forced the North Vietnamese to negotiate ; a peace treaty was signed and all U . S . combat forces withdrew . 1973 and ceasefire . The Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam had some excellent ground combat units , but still had very serious problems of command , control , and communications at division level and above . Many units had become overdependent on American air support , and , while the RVN Air Force had not developed large - scale interdiction capability , they were also of varied quality for close air support . Beyond the issue that the Air Force was always fragmented to the corps commanders , they also did not receive various expected equipment upgrades . Photoreconnaissance was extremely limited . Armored units had developed the greatest confidence in their ability to fight without U . S . air support . Ground commanders also learned that armored units were not for infantry support and static defenses , but needed to be used as mobile reserves . Neither North nor South Vietnam , however , ever really learned large - scale combined arms methods , compared to a NATO or Warsaw Pact level of proficiency .