Rhodesian mission in Lisbon In 1965 , Britain ' s self - governing colony in Rhodesia decided to open its own diplomatic mission in the Portuguese capital of Lisbon , with Harry Reedman at its head as an accredited representative . Rhodesia intended for this mission to operate independently from Britain ' s embassy in Lisbon . Whitehall refused to endorse the mission when asked on 9 June , but Rhodesia continued nonetheless , officially confirming Reedman ' s appointment 17 days later . The British government attempted unsuccessfully to block this unilateral some months afterwards . The affair came amidst the larger dispute between Whitehall and Salisbury regarding the terms under which Rhodesia could be granted sovereign independence . Rhodesia ' s mostly white government insisted that statehood should come under the constitution introduced with Britain ' s approval in 1961 , while Whitehall insisted that , per its recent change in policy , there could be no independence before majority rule , and black politicians would have to run the country before it could be fully independent . The Rhodesian government ' s stance on this matter caused it to become isolated within the Commonwealth of Nations , which from 1964 excluded it from most of its internal bodies , while the Rhodesian military became unofficially embargoed by its established British and American suppliers . Rhodesia ' s staunch opposition to immediate black rule and its disillusionment regarding Britain propelled it towards Portugal , which governed Angola and Mozambique , territories respectively to the west and east of Rhodesia . Hoping to find new arms suppliers in continental Europe , the Rhodesian government informed Britain of its intent to open an independent mission in Lisbon in June 1965 . The legitimacy of this action was disputed . Rhodesia had run itself as a self - governing colony since 1923 , but ultimate responsibility for foreign affairs remained with Britain . In their attempt to prove that an independent Lisbon mission was legal , the Rhodesians presented an argument based on previous British legislation conferring on the colonial government the right to appoint its own " diplomatic agents , or consular or trade representatives , in countries which are willing to receive them " . The British counter - argued that ultimate purview over Rhodesian foreign affairs still lay with Whitehall , so Rhodesian appointments without prior British assent were illegal . They proposed that Reedman be integrated into the British Embassy in Lisbon as a Rhodesian consul , but Rhodesia refused to accept a lesser post for Reedman than that enjoyed by the independent Rhodesian representatives in Pretoria , South Africa , and Lourenço Marques , Mozambique . Following months of abortive Anglo - Rhodesian talks and unsuccessful attempts by Britain to deter Portugal diplomatically , Reedman travelled to Lisbon in September 1965 to take up his post at the head of an independent Rhodesian mission . The Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs , which insisted it was neutral regarding Rhodesia , accepted his letter of accreditation , much to Whitehall ' s consternation , though Lisbon was careful to avoid provoking Britain , omitting the word " diplomatic " from the titles given to both Reedman and his mission . The Rhodesians still regarded themselves as victorious , saying they had set out to gain an independent diplomatic representative in Lisbon , and now had one . Historian J R T Wood writes that this was " Rhodesia ' s first independent and indeed unilateral veritable straw in the wind . " Less than two months after Reedman ' s investiture , Salisbury went one unilaterally declared its independence from Britain on 11 November 1965 . Background . Responsible government , Federation and the Wind of Change . Having been governed and developed by the British South Africa Company since the 1890s , Southern Rhodesia became a self - governing colony within the British Empire in 1923 , when it was granted responsible government by Whitehall . The Southern Rhodesian capital , Salisbury , was henceforth empowered to run its own affairs in almost all matters , including defence . Foreign affairs was one of the few areas reserved by the British government . As the Empire ' s lone self - governing colony , Southern Rhodesia was considered a " sui generis " case , almost on a par with a dominion . Starting in 1932 , Imperial Conference s included the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister alongside those from the dominions , a unique situation which continued after Imperial Conferences were superseded by Commonwealth Prime Ministers ' Conference s in 1944 . As the Southern Rhodesians saw it , they were as good as independent ; if full autonomy were granted in the form of dominionship , the only practical difference would be a rise in expenses for foreign representation , as Salisbury would have to maintain its own embassies abroad . Believing full dominion status to be effectively symbolic and " there for the asking " , Prime Minister Godfrey Huggins ( in office from 1933 to 1953 ) regarded independence as a non - issue . He twice refused offers of dominion status , and instead pursued an initially semi - independent Federation with the directly administered British colonies of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland . Mandated by the results of the 1953 referendum , Federation began later that year with Southern Rhodesia , the most developed of the three territories , at its head . Salisbury doubled as Federal capital . The Federation was granted several privileges by Britain during its earlier years ; for example , a 1957 British Act of Parliament empowered it to appoint its own " diplomatic agents , or consular or trade representatives , in countries which are willing to receive them " so long as it informed Britain when it was doing so . The most prominent of these appointments was made in 1961 , when the Union of South Africa split from the Commonwealth of Nations and became a republic . An accredited representative of Salisbury was set up in Pretoria soon after , independent of Britain ' s embassy there . An independent office representing the Federation was also set up in Lourenço Marques , the capital of Portuguese Mozambique , while further afield , Federal officials were set up within the British embassies in West Germany , Japan and the United States . The Federation ultimately failed because of the shifting international attitudes and rising black nationalist ambitions of the late 1950s and early 1960s , often collectively called the Wind of Change . Believing colonial rule to be no longer sustainable geopolitically or ethically , Britain adopted a policy of " no independence before majority rule " as it , France and Belgium vastly accelerated their withdrawal from the continent . Amidst a flurry of bloody civil wars , military coups and other disasters , most of the new African countries became autocratic states within a few years . Already wary of black nationalism on racial grounds , Salisbury became increasingly antipathetic towards it as a result of these developments , particularly when the brutal Congo Crisis caused thousands of Congolese whites to become refugees in Northern and Southern Rhodesia . In 1962 , with the Federation in its constitutional death throes amidst Nyasaland ' s clamours for secession and immediate black rule , Federal Prime Minister Roy Welensky was horrified and outraged to be told by Britain ' s Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations , Duncan Sandys , that " we British have lost the will to govern . " " But we haven ' t , " retorted Julian Greenfield , Welensky ' s law minister . Federal dissolution ; Salisbury pushes for independence . The Southern Rhodesians presumed that in the event of Federal dissolution , they would be first in line for independence , and would receive it without major adjustments to their 1961 constitution . Indeed , intergovernmental correspondence during early 1963 did much to confirm Salisbury ' s belief that this was the case . While Federal break - up talks progressed , Sandys issued a letter of intent in which he said that powers conferred on the Federal government by British legislation would transfer to Southern Rhodesia at the end of Federation . It was agreed that Salisbury would keep the Federal overseas missions in Pretoria and Lourenço Marques , as well as the British Embassy desks in Bonn , Tokyo and Washington . Arrangements for Federal dissolution concluded in mid - 1963 , and the Federation formally ended on 31 December that year . Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland became independent during 1964 , respectively renamed Zambia and Malawi , under black majority governments . Southern Rhodesia was denied the same under the no independence before majority rule policy , prompting indignation and fury from the governing Rhodesian Front ( RF ) and its supporters . Prime Minister Winston Field ' s failure to secure independence from Britain during early 1964 led to his forced resignation and replacement by his deputy , Ian Smith , in April that year . Two months into his premiership , Smith was deeply offended when Whitehall informed him that , for the first time since 1932 , Southern Rhodesia would not be represented at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers ' Conference . No reason was given . The quarrel over the terms for independence caused the Southern Rhodesian military ' s traditional British and American suppliers to impose an informal embargo , and motivated Britain to cut off financial aid to Salisbury around the same time . The United States promptly followed suit . Political violence between the rival black nationalist movements in Rhodesia intensified during , leading to jail terms for several prominent nationalists for criminal offences , and concurrent bans for their respective parties . When Northern Rhodesia became Zambia in October 1964 , Southern Rhodesia dropped " Southern " from its name , and initiated legislation to this effect , but Britain refused assent , saying that the colony could not legally rename itself . Salisbury continued using the shortened name anyway , without consequence . The Rhodesian government was ardently , and opposed immediate black rule , which Smith said would cause " the destruction of our country " , pointing to ongoing events such as the Congo Crisis as evidence . Parliament remained mostly white , but Salisbury contended it had close to unanimous support from all races in pursuing independence under the 1961 constitution , citing various tests of opinion it conducted in late 1964 . The Prime Minister stood obdurately against any constitutional change he believed was too radical , regarding this as a matter of national and regional security . According to his memoirs , he worked to prevent a " mad rush into one man , one vote with all the resultant corruption , nepotism , chaos and economic disaster which we had witnessed in all the countries around us . " The Labour Cabinet of British Prime Minister Harold Wilson , which replaced the previous Conservative administration in October 1964 , did not give credence to the Rhodesian tests of opinion , and insisted on majority rule before independence . The Commonwealth repeatedly urged Britain to intervene directly should Rhodesian defiance continue , while British liberals worried that if left unchecked Salisbury might drift towards apartheid . Britain , Portugal and Rhodesia . British policy - makers regarded Portugal as a traditional friend — the Anglo - Portuguese Alliance dated back to 1386 , and both countries were in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ( NATO ) and the European Free Trade Association — but the combined strength of the communist bloc and the lobby in the United Nations forced the British to peel back their support for the pluricontinental " Estado Novo " ( " New State " ) during the early 1960s . Portugal ' s Colonial War , starting in Angola in 1961 , pitted it against a number of guerrilla factions in its African territories , most of which subscribed to communist political thinking . Britain opposed communist encroachment into southern Africa , but knew it would become an international pariah if it publicly opposed general consensus at the UN , which roundly condemned colonialism in all forms and supported communist - backed insurgencies across the region , regarding them as racial liberation movements . It therefore attempted an awkward balancing act whereby it would appear to oppose Portugal without meaningfully doing so . Britain ' s stance towards Rhodesia was influenced in a similar way , with Whitehall unable to back down on the policy of no independence before majority rule without causing international uproar . Also contributory was the disproportionate sway over Britain ' s African policy held by Julius Nyerere , the President of Tanzania , who was a fervent proponent for majority rule across Africa without delay , implemented by military force if need be . British politicians deferred to Nyerere on almost every proposal they made regarding Rhodesia during the 1960s and 1970s . In the immediate post - Federal period , Britain forlornly tried to stifle Rhodesia ' s further alignment with South Africa and Portugal , realising that British influence in the region was severely limited while the three remained so closely linked . A 1965 British government memorandum described the trio as " a defiant and mutually sustaining bloc " . Great personal rapport developed between Smith and his Portuguese counterpart , António de Oliveira Salazar . On first meeting in Portugal in September 1964 , the two Prime Ministers found they shared many common views regarding race relations in their respective countries , Britain ' s handling of the Commonwealth , and what Smith called the " complacency of the major powers of the free world " in the face of what the pair saw as inexorable communist expansionism . After hearing Smith ' s argument in favour of Rhodesian independence , Salazar privately pledged Portugal ' s complete support . The RF called a new general election for May 1965 and , campaigning on an election promise of independence , won a clean sweep of all seats . A week later , Wilson met with Portuguese Foreign Minister Alberto Franco Nogueira , whom he pressed on Portugal ' s secret dealings with Rhodesia . Nogueira categorically denied anything of the sort . Rhodesia seeks British endorsement for a Lisbon mission . Gibbs ' speech on 9 June . Following the Rhodesian Front ' s decisive May 1965 election victory , parliament was opened by the British - appointed Governor , Sir Humphrey Gibbs , on 9 June . For the first time , Rhodesia had an official Leader of the Opposition who was black : Josiah Gondo , leader of the United People ' s Party , now sat opposite Smith and the all - white RF in the House of Assembly . Though Gibbs represented the British Crown in Rhodesia , he had been a local resident most of his life , and had feet in both camps , regarding himself as loyal both to Rhodesia and to the faraway monarch . While opening parliament , he startled Whitehall by professing marked support for the government ' s ambitions . He told the House of Assembly that the RF ' s strengthened majority amounted to " a mandate to lead the country to its full in the speech he referred to this as " our independence " , much to Britain ' s surprise . Gibbs then said that Rhodesia wished to have the best possible relations with its neighbours , and again shocked British observers by saying the government had informed him that it would follow recommendations made by Portugal during recent talks , and would open its own diplomatic mission in the Portuguese capital Lisbon as soon as was practical . Evan Campbell , Rhodesia ' s High Commissioner in London , asked Whitehall the same day to endorse the appointment of Harry Reedman as Rhodesia ' s " accredited representative " to Portugal , reasoning that the 1957 act allowing the Federation to do so still covered Rhodesia under the principle of national succession . The 1963 letter of intent from Sandys confirmed this in Rhodesia ' s eyes . Historian J R T Wood calls this " Rhodesia ' s first independent and indeed unilateral veritable straw in the wind . " Rhodesian motivations . Aside from reinforcing Luso - Rhodesian relations , the Lisbon appointment was designed to secure the African nation a diplomatic foothold in Europe outside of Britain ' s reach and to help Salisbury find new trading partners and diplomatic allies on the continent . Among other things , the Rhodesians intended to make up the shortfalls in military equipment caused by the undeclared Anglo - American arms embargo . Reedman , the former minister for immigration and tourism , was also a retired officer of the British Royal Air Force ( where he had been involved in bomber research ) , and an experienced engineer and businessman : all the right ingredients , the government thought , for someone in the position to source European aircraft , weapons and other equipment , while also representing Rhodesian interests in mainland Europe . Lord Brockway , head of the Movement for Colonial Freedom , believed that Rhodesia was attempting to assert " de facto " independence in the eyes of the international community by deliberately defying Britain over the Lisbon issue . " If Salisbury is permitted to claim diplomatic rights in foreign capitals , its assertion of sovereignty is accepted , " he wrote in an article for the British democratic socialist weekly " Tribune " . Britain refuses . Britain was caught unprepared by Campbell ' s request , and issued no response for over a week . In the meantime Campbell , whose retirement was due , was relieved by the Rhodesian government on 10 June . His replacement , Brigadier Andrew Skeen , took over Campbell ' s London office at Rhodesia House , 429 Strand six days later . Bent on securing Reedman ' s investiture quickly , the Rhodesian government made it publicly known on 19 June that , pursuant to British and Portuguese approval , Reedman would be appointed within seven days . Whitehall still took no action . Wilson and his Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations , Arthur Bottomley , were occupied at Chequers , the official country residence of the British Prime Minister , where they were entertaining the Commonwealth heads of state . In Bottomley ' s absence , his office explored the issue and resolved that Rhodesia could retain its representative in South Africa , but should not be allowed to appoint another in Lisbon ; a consul was acceptable , they concluded , but only as part of the British Embassy staff . Bottomley remained unaware of this progress until a call from his office on 25 June , whereupon he still did nothing . Unwilling to wait , Rhodesia confirmed Reedman ' s appointment the next day , much to Wilson ' s fury . Only now was Bottomley finally jolted into action ; he informed Salisbury of his ministry ' s findings on 29 June , offering them the consul within the embassy , but refusing to sanction an independent office . Early negotiations . Rhodesian disillusionment ; Britain adopts delaying tactics . Independence talks between Britain and Rhodesia continued for a fortnight without major reference to the Reedman appointment , with Britain more concerned with discussing a possible Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence ( UDI ) . Smith delivered an openly defiant speech to his parliament on 30 June , attacking Britain for its handling of the Commonwealth ' s newer members , which he said were unduly influencing British policy in Africa . Britain was desperate to avoid the international humiliation that would accompany the organisation ' s break - up , he claimed , and was therefore attempting to hold it together by appeasing the less prominent members . While making clear his disdain , the Prime Minister pledged to go on with negotiations , saying that he did not believe Britain truly endorsed its professed line . In dealing with the immovable Smith , Wilson ' s ministers adopted a programme of deliberate frustration and delay : Britain would interminably stonewall the Rhodesian Prime Minister , maintaining the facade of continued negotiation by very occasionally repeating their stance , in the hope that either Smith would back down , or his Cabinet would eventually lose faith in his negotiating prowess and replace him with somebody more malleable . Wood writes that Wilson , Bottomley and their Labour contemporaries were " distracted by their own political agendas " , and did not understand the extent of Rhodesia ' s considerable disillusionment with Britain by this time . Effectively " kicked . . . out of the Commonwealth " , as Huggins later commented , a fortress mentality was developing in Salisbury , propelling it towards unilateral action . Wood concludes that Britain ' s maintenance of this stonewalling tactic was misjudged , and only exacerbated the Rhodesian government ' s feeling of alienation . In the British House of Lords on 26 July , Brockway pressed Lord Taylor , the Under - Secretary of State for the Colonies , on Rhodesia ' s claims , arguing that failure to block the Lisbon appointment would amount to conceding " de facto " recognition to Rhodesia as an independent state . Taylor ' s response was that Britain remained committed to upholding its ultimate purview over Rhodesian overseas relations . Brockway then asked how Rhodesia had attained its independent office in Pretoria ; surely , he said , this provided " a precedent which was rather dangerous ? " Taylor replied that Pretoria and Salisbury had exchanged High Commissioners before South Africa left the Commonwealth in 1961 , and that Britain had granted Rhodesia special dispensation to retain the Pretoria mission thereafter . He stressed that in Britain ' s eyes this was no precedent for Lisbon . Britain despatches Cledwyn Hughes to Rhodesia , 22 – 27 July . The British decided to despatch one of their Commonwealth ministers to Rhodesia for talks during early July , but debated for a while over whether it should be Bottomley or his deputy , Cledwyn Hughes , who should be sent . Wilson considered this a matter of urgency as he had heard a rumour that Rhodesia might declare independence on its main national holiday , Rhodes ' Day ( that year 12 July ) , but this proved false . On 15 July , Britain ' s High Commissioner to Rhodesia , John Baines Johnston , was instructed to propose a week - long round of talks between Smith and Hughes in Salisbury . Johnston was given permission to cave if the Rhodesian Prime Minister insisted on meeting with Bottomley , but this did not prove necessary : Smith cabled back on the 18th accepting Hughes ' visit . The British delegation arrived in Salisbury four days later . Discussions proceeded rapidly during the week , but did not touch on the issue of Lisbon until the fifth day , 26 July , when Hughes and Johnston met with Smith , Deputy Prime Minister Clifford Dupont , and Trade and Industry Minister George Rudland . Dupont opened the discussion by referring to Sandys ' statement from 1963 , which said the Rhodesian government would retain any rights previously granted to the Federation , which Dupont reasoned surely included the ability given in 1957 to appoint its own overseas agents if it informed Britain . As Portugal had indicated its willingness to accept a Rhodesian diplomat , Dupont said , the Rhodesian government was acting perfectly within its rights . Hughes countered that he did not believe the wording of the 1957 document gave Rhodesia the right to devise its own representation overseas without first gaining assent from Britain . The Reedman appointment would probably be seen internationally as a major rise in Rhodesian diplomatic profile , he said , and might damage Britain ' s reputation , which would in turn make the ongoing negotiations for independence more difficult for both sides . He repeated Bottomley ' s previous offer of a consul on the British Embassy staff , adding that the official would not have to be physically located within the embassy , and could set up his own office elsewhere so long as he remained nominally affiliated to it . Smith replied that in his interpretation Rhodesia was required to keep Whitehall informed , but prior British concurrence was not necessary ; if Britain contested this , the Prime Minister said , then surely the 1957 entrustment had never meant anything . Dupont then spoke again , rejecting the idea that the Rhodesian mission should be a mere subsidiary consulate of the British Embassy . Hughes replied firmly that the 1957 despatch did not give the Rhodesians free rein over external matters , and warned them to be more flexible if they intended to find common ground . Eager to avoid open confrontation , Smith told Dupont to reconsider his tone , and changed the subject . Hughes met with several other Rhodesian figures before leaving late on 27 July , but Lisbon remained off the programme most of the time . Just before Hughes departed , Dupont released a statement saying that Reedman would take office in Lisbon on 1 August , and would be " warmly welcomed " by the Portuguese government . Hughes decried this in a brief telephone call to Smith , but could do little more before leaving Rhodesia that evening . On 29 July , Smith fielded questions from the press , commenting on both Lisbon and the independence talks in general . He expressed the belief that Rhodesia had made more progress towards independence talking with Hughes than it ever had before , but qualified this by saying only Wilson ' s reply to the proposals given to Hughes would show if this were indeed true . He said that although he thought Whitehall was keen to resolve the independence issue , he did not believe their line had changed . He declared that he and the RF would not change their stance in any way . Moving to the subject of Lisbon , Smith stressed that this was separate from the independence dispute , then overruled Dupont ' s announcement of two days before : Reedman ' s appointment would remain provisional until further notice , he said . Anglo - Rhodesian animosity deepens . Bottomley tours West Africa , arousing Rhodesian suspicion . Bottomley toured West Africa during early August , and , in Ghana and Nigeria , gave several speeches reassuring his hosts that immediate majority rule was an unconditional requirement for Rhodesian independence . He ruled out the use of military force in the event of a Rhodesian UDI , and pledged to instead end such a rebellion through economic sanctions . Bottomley ' s dismissal of the use of force drew damning criticism from Joshua Nkomo , the imprisoned leader of the Marxist – Leninist Zimbabwe African People ' s Union , who said this showed Britain was not serious about decolonising Rhodesia as it had its other African possessions . Meanwhile , Bottomley ' s comments increased anti - British sentiment . In his memoirs , Smith describes the mood in forthright terms , accusing Britain of " resorting to politics of convenience and appeasement " . " We waited and waited . . . [ but ] the British were not prepared to make a clear decision , " he writes ; " they were consulting the bankrupt and communist dictatorships before replying to us . " Becoming exasperated by the lack of progress , even the more hesitant members of the Rhodesian government began to see the road leading towards UDI as the only one viable for them . Lisbon , however , remained the immediate bone of contention , and on this issue the Rhodesians became yet more determined not to give an inch . Meeting between Johnston and Smith on 18 August . Smith organised a meeting with Johnston , starting at 09 : 00 on 18 August , where he informed the British High Commissioner that he had considered the Lisbon appointment extensively , with the help of Dupont , several legal advisers , and a judge of the Rhodesian High Court . The judge had examined the relevant documents , and had come to the conclusion that Dupont ' s interpretation of them was correct . Smith therefore felt certain that Reedman ' s appointment was legitimate so long as Portugal agreed . A long argument ensued , with neither man willing to budge . Smith said that he had always tried to be flexible and civil , but that he and his government felt they had to make a stand . By making clear to Lisbon the exact nature of their proposed representative , and informing Britain of their intent , Smith said the Rhodesians had filled every legal obligation . Johnston dismissed Smith ' s argument , asserting that neither the Federation nor Rhodesia had ever made such an appointment ( this was actually false ; the Federal government had opened independent diplomatic missions in South Africa and Portuguese Mozambique , and Rhodesia retained them both ) . Johnston concluded that Rhodesia was trying to prematurely advance its international standing . The previous entrustments , he said , had been made to allow Britain and Rhodesia to cooperate subject to Whitehall ' s ultimate authority , and did not entitle Rhodesia to do as it liked in the field of external affairs , especially if its chosen line ran counter to Britain ' s . In an attempt to intimidate Smith , Johnston sternly asked why the Rhodesian Prime Minister would risk causing a major international incident by deliberately defying Britain ; Smith replied that following Britain ' s several slights against Rhodesia over the previous year and a half , Salisbury would not accept another . The conversation continued in this manner for some time afterwards . Smith proposed that the relevant documents be examined jointly by two judges , one British and one Rhodesian , but Johnston refused this . The meeting ended without agreement . Bottomley returns to Britain . The Rhodesian press reported extensively on the Lisbon controversy during the second half of August , generally predicting that neither Britain , Portugal nor Rhodesia would back down . While most reporters believed that Whitehall would take a strong line , few could see any way it could actually stop Reedman from taking office . On 20 August , Bottomley spoke at his final conference in Lagos , and repeated all he had previously said regarding Britain ' s stance on Rhodesia . Back in London three days later , he reaffirmed his previous stance regarding Lisbon , saying that he would be pleased to have a Rhodesian on the staff of the British Embassy there , but would allow no more . In the same interview , he expressed the belief that Wilson had averted a Rhodesian UDI in October the previous year by warning Salisbury of the economic consequences . Speaking in Gwelo on 27 August , Smith derided this statement , calling it " incredible " . His administration had not even considered a declaration of independence then , he said , but it was contemplated now , and he believed Anglo - Rhodesian relations were at their all - time lowest ebb . He urged Britain to return to the bargaining table quickly . Britain attempts to block the appointment . Wilson resolves to challenge Portugal . The British continued their policy of stalling Smith . At the end of August 1965 , they did not consider a Rhodesian UDI an immediate threat , and therefore focussed on the colony ' s maintained defiance of the mother country regarding Reedman and Lisbon . On 30 August , Johnston summarised Britain ' s stand on the issue for Bottomley ' s Commonwealth Relations Office . According to his understanding , he said , Rhodesia had been told just before Federal dissolution that it would retain the Federation ' s former powers regarding external affairs , but that this entrustment was subject to British discretion , and could not be exercised without extensive prior consultation and conformity to Britain ' s line . Johnston rued bitterly that the Rhodesians had apparently made practical arrangements for an independent office in Lisbon anyway , even going to the trouble of renting the prospective mission premises . He repeated the claim he had made in the meeting with Smith on 18 August , saying once more that the Federal government had not made appointments off its own bat . He accepted that there was an independent Rhodesian envoy in Pretoria , but argued that this was the result of South Africa ' s enforced withdrawal from the Commonwealth . He did not mention the Rhodesian ( formerly Federal ) office in Lourenço Marques , which Wood comments could be considered " precedent for Portugal " . On 5 September , the Salisbury " Sunday Mail " reported that Smith was standing firm on Reedman ' s absolute independence in Lisbon , and that Portugal had accepted the envoy . British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart reacted with alarm , convening an urgent meeting the same day with Hughes and Sir Archibald Ross , Britain ' s ambassador to Portugal . Here Hughes proposed hauling Portugal over the coals , insisting that the Lisbon mission represented " creeping independence " for Rhodesia , and therefore had to be stopped . Ross disagreed , reasoning this would only damage relations between Britain and Portugal , an undesirable prospect given the countries ' common membership in NATO , the European Free Trade Association and more . There was much at stake ; Britain enjoyed an annual £48 million trade surplus with Portugal , and Portuguese Railways was in the process of buying 50 diesel locomotive s from English Electric . In the Azores archipelago , Portugal provided NATO with a strategically key air base , which was unprotected by treaty ; given the inclination , Lisbon might close it . Hughes insisted that there was nothing more they could do to deter Rhodesia directly ; they had already threatened to expel Rhodesia ' s representative from the British Embassy in Washington , with no effect . The only open course therefore had to be to take a firmer line with Portugal . Two days later , on 7 September , Wilson discussed the matter with Hughes and Stewart , and agreed with their conclusions , telling them to proceed . Meeting between Johnston and Smith on 8 September ; the appointment is confirmed . The same day , Bottomley wrote to Smith , saying that he and Wilson were disheartened by the lack of progress regarding both independence and the Lisbon appointment . He was willing to visit Rhodesia personally , but could not come until October because he had to be in Blackpool to attend the Labour Party Conference , due to commence on 26 September . The next morning , on 8 September , Johnston told Smith that if Reedman proceeded to Portugal in open disregard for Britain ' s wishes , it would negatively affect future independence negotiations . Rhodesia ' s delay in justifying the appointment was also having a detrimental affect , Johnston asserted . Finally , he threatened to evict the Rhodesian envoys from Washington , Bonn and Tokyo if Rhodesia did not desist . Smith was yet again unmoved . Any procrastination regarding Lisbon was Britain ' s fault , he insisted . He told Johnston to wait for the afternoon session in Rhodesia ' s Legislative Assembly to hear Dupont ' s official announcement of Reedman ' s appointment , as well as the full Rhodesian explanation behind it . Smith said he understood this would irk the British , but insisted that he and his government were no longer willing to wait . He had repeatedly offered to respect the judgement of an impartial arbitration team , he reminded Johnston , but the British had shot this idea down each time . He therefore felt compelled to follow the advice given by his own legal team , which was that the appointment was legitimate . His government would not accept a lesser appointment in Lisbon than in Pretoria and Lourenço Marques . He dismissed Johnston ' s threat to expel the Rhodesian representatives in West Germany , Japan and America ; relations with Portugal and South Africa were far more important , he said , as they were Rhodesia ' s two closest neighbours geographically . Johnston protested that the British government could not take part in the kind of judicial enquiry Smith described , as its sovereignty could not be subject to any outside judgement and there was nothing to arbitrate anyway . Smith was again resolute : why , he queried , was Whitehall so adamant to avoid legal arbitration if its ministers were so sure they were right ? He promised to drop the matter if such a panel ruled against him , but to no avail . Johnston said only that he would telegraph Whitehall to inform them that Reedman ' s appointment was imminent . Dupont confirmed it that afternoon , telling the Rhodesian Legislative Assembly that the mission had been accepted by Portugal . Britain mobilises NATO support against Portugal ; Lisbon insists it is neutral . Meanwhile , Stewart and Ross argued with Nogueira and the Portuguese " chargé d ' affaires " in London , José Manuel de Villas - Boas de Vasconcellos Faria . On 8 September , Nogueira said the Portuguese were accepting Reedman as a Rhodesian representative , but were not defining his status as they wished to remain neutral in what they regarded as an exclusively Anglo - Rhodesian problem . So far as he could see , Nogueira said , Portugal had done no harm to British interests . Stewart firmly told Nogueira that Britain expected Portugal to make a statement within 24 hours saying that it would not deal with Reedman while he remained off the British Embassy staff . Nogueira replied that his government was not going to accord official diplomatic recognition to Reedman , and that Dupont understood this . Ross now threatened to involve NATO if Portugal did not thoroughly explain its conduct . Unmoved , Nogueira said this surprised him ; if the British were so keen to have Reedman on the staff at their embassy , he answered , that was down to them . Portugal was totally neutral in the affair , he insisted . Britain vigorously rallied other NATO countries to take a stand against Portugal over Reedman . France warned that NATO pressure was unlikely to yield results in his matter , but Belgium ' s NATO representative , André de Staercke , agreed to challenge Salazar on 11 September . At his meeting with de Staercke , Salazar denied that Portugal was giving Rhodesia its own diplomatic representation , and said there had been some misunderstanding . Portugal would not obstruct Reedman ' s entry should he arrive , Salazar said , as he was travelling on a ( Rhodesian - issued ) British passport . On 14 September , Nogueira ' s ministry released a statement saying that if Britain challenged Portugal over Rhodesia at NATO , Lisbon would " use the greatest firmness to repel any attempt to attribute particular responsibilities or to make criticism of Portugal ' s position " . Britain raised the issue formally in the North Atlantic Council , NATO ' s most senior political governing body , the same day . Here Portugal ' s delegate , Vasco da Cunha , argued that given the standing existence of independent Rhodesian offices in Lourenço Marques , Pretoria and London , the matter was between Britain and Rhodesia , and not Portugal ' s business . Rhodesia had simply asked to have Reedman head a representative office in Lisbon , and he would not present a letter of accreditation . If Rhodesia had exaggerated this , da Cunha said , that was not Portugal ' s concern . The Italian , Belgian , Danish , French and U . S . delegates in turn sided with Britain , and collectively asked da Cunha to tell his government to publicly declare its non - acceptance of Reedman while he lacked British approval . Da Cunha refused , saying this would only irritate his compatriots " because of the neglect by their allies of their interests in the past " . The meeting broke up without agreement . Whitehall was pleased with the pro - British sentiment displayed therein , while Lisbon remained unmoved . Appointment . Reedman arrives in Lisbon and receives Portuguese approval . Having spent the previous week in London , Reedman flew into Lisbon Portela Airport on 15 September 1965 . He was met there by the Portuguese Foreign Ministry ' s assistant chief of protocol , Luis Quartim Bastos , and three Rhodesian officials , who had arrived a fortnight before . Nobody from the British Embassy was present . Bastos told a reporter that he was at the airport on Nogueira ' s behalf to accord Reedman " the classic welcome for the arrival of heads of mission " . Speaking the next day , Reedman appeared genial and optimistic . " We [ Portugal and Rhodesia ] have everything in common , " he said , " including the will for survival , an awareness of the true situation overseas , and a greater feeling towards what we are doing . " Two days later , Dupont announced that he had issued a letter of accreditation to Reedman for presentation to Nogueira . The envoy would not present credentials , Dupont explained , as he was representing the Rhodesian government , and not its head of state , Queen Elizabeth II . The Deputy Prime Minister expressed confusion regarding the appointment ' s discussion at NATO , saying that Rhodesia was far outside the organisation ' s geographical area of responsibility . He said that the letter of accreditation would confer on Reedman the title of " Accredited Diplomatic Representative " , and that Reedman would thereafter head the " Rhodesian Diplomatic Mission " in Lisbon , which would operate on the same level as the Rhodesian office in Pretoria . The Portuguese Foreign Ministry quickly issued a statement correcting Dupont ' s wording , saying that Reedman would lead the " Rhodesian Mission " , with no reference to diplomatic status . To Britain ' s alarm and indignation , the Portuguese government announced on 21 September that Nogueira had accepted " a letter of introduction " from Reedman , conferring upon him the title " Chief of the Rhodesian Mission " , with powers to deal with the Portuguese Foreign Ministry in Luso - Rhodesian matters without British interference . This followed the precedent set by Reedman ' s counterpart in South Africa , the statement said . Speaking publicly in Salisbury the same evening , Dupont told reporters that there had never been any intention to claim ambassadorial status for Reedman , and that Rhodesia had constantly kept Britain informed of what was happening regarding the appointment . So far as he was concerned , he said , the Rhodesian government had achieved its objective of attaining an independent diplomatic representative in Portugal , and had not exceeded its mandate in any way while doing so . Britain protested strenuously , saying Portugal was going back on its word . Portugal insisted that its reception of Reedman and his Lisbon mission did not prejudice Britain ' s responsibility over Rhodesia , and was justified because of the long - standing ties between Portugal and Rhodesia , as well as their common involvement in many southern African issues . Rhodesia initiates clandestine arms purchases . Reedman carried instructions from Salisbury to spend up to £3 million on European weapons , aircraft and equipment as soon as he could . The Rhodesian government now believed that it would almost certainly declare independence unilaterally and , knowing the purchase of materiel would be more difficult following this , wished to have the Rhodesian Security Forces ' necessary ammunition , weapons , spare parts and other equipment in place beforehand . Soon after arriving in Portugal , Reedman contacted the Lisbon - based Zoio brothers , José , Luiz and Jean , who had recently supplied the Portuguese Armed Forces in Angola with British - made weapons in direct contravention of NATO ' s embargo against arming Portugal ' s African - based troops . The Zoios were interested in stocking Rhodesia ' s arsenal , and promptly agreed to arrange an order of weapons from a third party on Reedman ' s behalf in exchange for a letter of credit from the Rhodesian government . Pretending their client was the government of Pakistan , the Zoio brothers contacted a licensed arms dealer from England , Major W . R . L . Turp MBE of Bexley , Kent , who quickly agreed in principle , requesting a letter of credit from a Geneva bank and appropriate end - user certificate s for the weapons . Meanwhile , Reedman ' s military attaché , Wing Commander John Mussell , travelled to Belgium to buy starter cartridges for the Rolls - Royce Avon 109 jet engines used by the Royal Rhodesian Air Force ' s English Electric Canberra bombers , as well as engines for Rhodesia ' s Hawker Hunter jet fighters , which were produced in Belgium under licence from Britain . Reedman speaks on Portuguese state radio , 24 September . On 24 September , Reedman appeared on Portugal ' s state - owned national radio station , Emissora Nacional de Radiodifusão , addressing the Portuguese nation as " head of the Rhodesian diplomatic mission to Portugal " . He spoke along lines reminiscent of Smith ' s speech to parliament on 30 June , saying the element " made a mockery of the Commonwealth " and enabled Chinese - initiated communist encroachment into Africa . More than one Commonwealth member state hosted training facilities for black communist guerrillas , he said , which threatened all " civilised states in Africa " . He dismissed one man , one vote as false " trash democracy " , and said that in the present geopolitical climate countries run by black Africans inevitably destroyed themselves . " This your Rhodesian neighbour will not in any circumstances allow , " he pledged . " We [ Portugal and Rhodesia ] stand together in a common cause because of civilisation . " Ross rebuked Nogueira for allowing the broadcast , saying its content was insidious and goading . Nogueira agreed that Reedman ' s words were provocative , but said Portugal could not be blamed as it did not censor public broadcasts . Britain considered withdrawing Ross in protest , but its Foreign Office ruled this out , saying Britain could not afford to be without an ambassador in Lisbon to influence Portugal ' s actions in the event of UDI . British Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend rejected this view , pointing to Lisbon ' s conduct regarding Reedman , which he said showed the Portuguese " ha [ d ] very clearly made up their minds " to support a Rhodesian UDI . The British ambassador would not be able to affect matters , he surmised , and British interests would be better served by immediately taking a firm hand against Portugal , in the hope that this would send a strong message to Rhodesia . Ross then protested to the Portuguese about Reedman ' s calling himself " head of the Rhodesian diplomatic mission " on the radio ; Lisbon replied impassively that this was a private expression of views by Reedman , and not Portugal ' s responsibility . Aftermath . Final steps to UDI . While the British remained firmly against separate Rhodesian representation in Lisbon , there was little they could do to stop it . Ross was nominally put on extended leave , but not withdrawn . Deciding that he could no longer wait for Bottomley to fulfil his promise to visit Rhodesia during October , Smith resolved to instead meet with Wilson personally in London , and arranged to travel on 3 October , arriving the next day . While Smith prepared to travel , Britain continued its frantic efforts to curry international anti - Rhodesian sentiment , among other things urging each NATO member government not to deal with Reedman . In London , Britons who sympathised with Smith came out to support him in large numbers , surprising both the British and the Rhodesians . The two Prime Ministers ' talks were largely unproductive , and little common ground was found before Smith flew home on 12 October . Two weeks later , Wilson travelled to Salisbury to continue the talks . The British Prime Minister proposed that future black representation in the Rhodesian parliament might be safeguarded by the revocation of some of Salisbury ' s self - governing powers , held since 1923 . This was a horrific prospect in the eyes of his Rhodesian opponents , and proved the final straw for Smith ' s government . The Unilateral Declaration of Independence was signed by the Rhodesian Cabinet on 11 November 1965 , to almost unanimous international acrimony . The next day the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 216 , which condemned the declaration as an illegal one " made by a racist minority " , and called on all member states to withhold diplomatic recognition . Portugal ' s role in Rhodesian " sanction - busting " . Smith was confident that the British military would never agree to engage in what he said would be a " fratricidal war " against Rhodesia ; he was proven correct when a British Ministry of Defence council , convened by Wilson and headed by Denis Healey , determined such intervention " impossible " , citing various logistical problems , the danger of provoking a pre - emptive Rhodesian attack on Zambia , and the psychological issues that would surely accompany any confrontation between British and Rhodesian troops . Wilson therefore put all his eggs in the sanctions basket , predicting in January 1966 that the embargo would bring Rhodesia to its knees " within a matter of weeks rather than months " . The UN embargo proved ineffective , largely because both Portugal and South Africa refused to participate . Both declared themselves neutral in the Rhodesian affair , and continued to supply Rhodesia with vital resources such as oil , both at a governmental level and privately . Portugal provided the seaports of Mozambique and the oil refinery at Lourenço Marques . Car stickers marked " " — " Thank You Mozambique " — quickly became popular with white Rhodesian motorists . Clandestine trade with other nations continued , initially at a reduced level ; among other things , Portugal illicitly labelled unsold Rhodesian tobacco as Mozambican product , then sold it on Salisbury ' s behalf in Europe and Asia . Through this and a series of similar operations , which Salisbury called " sanction - busting " , Rhodesia avoided the economic cataclysm predicted by Wilson , and , with the help of South Africa and Portugal , gradually became more self - sufficient . The London " Sunday Times " was unequivocal in its verdict on 27 February 1966 , running the headline " " . Wilson altered his tactics and aimed to directly cut off the main supply lines of oil to Rhodesia , namely the Portuguese Mozambican ports at Beira and Lourenço Marques . In March 1966 , Wilson set up the Beira Patrol , a Royal Navy squadron based in the Mozambique Channel . This blockade was endorsed the following month by UN Security Council Resolution 221 . Too small to cover both Beira and Lourenço Marques , and unable to legally fire on tankers once they were in Portuguese waters , the patrol met with little success , but it endured regardless for nearly a decade . The Zoios ' clandestine transaction with Turp initially progressed well , but fell apart in March 1966 , when Turp discovered he would actually be arming Rhodesia rather than Pakistan , reacted with alarm and informed the British government . The British Board of Trade tightened its control over arms transactions , and encouraged its NATO counterparts to do the same , while the Zoios turned their attention to Belgian , Italian and West German arms dealers . In October 1966 , a huge consignment of army and air force equipment arrived in Rhodesia from the seaports of Mozambique , with many of the containers bearing metropolitan Portuguese markings . Prominent amongst the European weapons were FN FAL battle rifles from Belgium , which allowed an unofficial Rhodesian trade delegation to operate quietly in spite of the sanctions . Carnation Revolution ends Luso - Rhodesian cooperation . Rhodesia ' s Lisbon mission remained open throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s , providing a key link between the Rhodesian and Portuguese governments , which remained close . When Rhodesia adopted a republican constitution in 1970 , Portugal bowed to British diplomatic pressure and withdrew its consul - general , João de Freitas Cruz , from Salisbury , but the Rhodesian office in Lisbon remained open . With the Carnation Revolution of 1974 , Portugal ' s African policy was suddenly reversed . By contrast to the former authoritarian government , which had been committed to a pluricontinental Portugal , fighting costly wars against independence movements in its African territories to maintain it , the new leftist administration rapidly initiated moves to withdraw from Africa as quickly as possible . Following hurried negotiations between Portugal and the nationalist guerrillas in each territory , both Mozambique and Angola became independent under communist governments in 1975 . Lisbon ' s stance on Rhodesia altered accordingly . The Portuguese government ordered the closure of the Rhodesian mission in April 1975 , and simultaneously withdrew its own remaining officials from Rhodesia . The Rhodesian mission in Lisbon formally closed on 1 May 1975 . Notes and references . Notes References Newspaper and journal articles Online sources Bibliography