Counter - IED efforts Counter - IED efforts are done primarily by military and law enforcement ( led by intelligence efforts ) with the assistance of the diplomatic and financial communities . It involves a comprehensive approach of countering the threat networks that employ Improvised Explosive Devices ( IEDs ) , defeating the devices themselves , and training others . Counter - IED , or C - IED , is usually part of a broader counter - terrorism , counter - insurgency , or law enforcement effort . Because IEDs are a subset of a number of forms of asymmetric physical attack used by insurgents and terrorist s , C - IED activities are principally against adversaries and not only against IEDs . C - IED treats the IED as a systemic problem and aims to defeat the IED System . This IED System requires multiple actions and resources in order to stage an IED Event . The IED System may be either hierarchical or non - hierarchical but it will contain nodes such as personnel , resources and other actions that are linked . The importance of these nodes and the linkages between them will vary and identifying the critical vulnerabilities within the IED System is an important C - IED activity . Some IED Systems may be part of large , international terrorist organisations and some may be state sponsored . Some may work completely independently , while others may extend from theater down to village level . This span of possibilities increases the complexity of military and law enforcement operations and requires a comprehensive approach to C - IED potentially involving close cooperation and coordination between the diplomatic , military , economic , and informational levers of power . The complexity of the IED System is increased since mobile phones and the internet provide a low - cost and easily accessible medium for information sharing and the swift promulgation of tactical ideas and practises , thereby facilitating the efficient operation of these diverse systems . IED network members also have the ability to operate part - time and can blend back into the civilian population when their actions are completed . Such systems can be extremely resilient , invariably hard to target and are , therefore , survivable . Also , adversary targets can range from the specific such as host nation security force bases and recruiting events to the indiscriminate such as concentrations of people in public places . However , IEDs are not only found within the land environment - other targets may include maritime choke point s and ships alongside , as well as aircraft in flight or on the ground . Due to this robust nature , attacks against only one node of the IED System will not impact decisively upon it , although short term gains may be achieved at a local level . However , IED Systems are vulnerable to systematic attack across all nodes . This will involve a combination of diplomatic , socioeconomic , commercial and military actions . Because of this , C - IED is ideally : The C - IED approach used by NATO involves 3 mutually supporting and complementary pillars of activity which are : " attack the networks " , " defeat the device " , and " prepare the force " . These are all underpinned by " understanding and intelligence " . ( Counter - IED efforts can also be broken up into 6 key operational activities : predict , prevent , detect , neutralise , mitigate , and exploit . ) Countering Threat Networks . " Attack the networks " is the principal pillar requiring a joint , interagency and multinational approach . Attack the network operations are defined as actions , kinetic or non - kinetic , used to disrupt , destroy , or reduce an enemy ’ s capacity to mount terror operations , specifically groups that use IEDs . It consists of largely offensive and proactive activities , driven by intelligence that may go beyond the theater of operations , designed to disrupt the networks of the adversary ’ s IED System . Counter - network operations usually focus on leadership targeting of an organization , which follows the logic that by catching the right hornet , the whole colony dies . What is often overlooked in this approach , however , is that if just a worker bee is killed , the nest is aggravated and a much bigger problem is created . While this concept provides a convenient metaphor to discuss possible targeting methodology , it seldom resembles the facts , because human networks are not directly analogous to a hornet ’ s nest . In other words , not every situation can be resolved by a single kill or capture of the “ queen ” . Activity is focused on the critical vulnerabilities of the IED System , for example , by denying the supply of components , finance , leaders , specialists and recruits and adversary exploitation and isolating the adversary from the local population . AtN / CTN seeks to 1 ) shape and influence IED networks , 2 ) disrupt their operations , and 3 ) undermine their financiers and supply chains . Exploitation is a vital component of the attack the networks activity . Information gained provides a picture of adversary capabilities and intentions , perpetrator relationships and the technical construction of the device . This enables the prediction of forthcoming IED activity , informs the targeting process , and enables follow up activities to further disrupt the IED System . Intelligence gained from exploitation also feeds into the other C - IED pillars . Operating Framework for Executing the Intelligence Cycle . To execute the intelligence cycle , a model is required that it is able to treat the enemy or adversary as a system . Operational experience has shown that by using a model based on the generic core functions ( find , fix , strike and exploit ) will ensure key areas and points in the adversary system can be identified , enabling power or influence to be applied . Immediate effects can be organised to affect other parts of the system . For example , covertly observing an IED placement without attacking the placement team could lead to a subsequent operation to identify further elements of the IED System , for example a bomb maker or a cache . By the same process , observing the bomb maker may lead to identifying a supply chain for IED components used for a large number of teams , adding a much higher value to the outcome . The model used to describe this approach is called find , fix , finish , exploit and analyze or F3EA : Activity Modelling and Identifying Critical Vulnerabilities . Nodel activity modelling within an IED System is a useful means of understanding relationships and the networks within . Counter - IED efforts involve conducting specialized analysis to identify vulnerabilities , interdependencies , and cascading effects of the IED System Nodal Activity Model . These vulnerability assessments are the foundation of a risk - based implementation of protective programs designed to prevent , deter , and mitigate the risk of an IED attack . Network Analysis . Further network analysis can be conducted using other models that look at the relationships between and within links and nodes . One of these is component analysis with 2 subsets : individual component analysis looking at the detail of each component part , and nodal component analysis looking at the relationship between nodes . Nodal component analysis has 2 further subsets functional analysis and nodal activity analysis . The former identifies and links the nodes in terms of their function , the latter then seeks to identify activities which take place within the functional node . Center of Gravity Analysis . Center of gravity analysis provides a model for systemically identifying critical vulnerabilities . There are four steps in analyzing the center of gravity of an IED system : Counter - threat Finance . Financial efforts involve seizure of assets and anti - money laundering efforts , for example . The means and methods used to underwrite the costs associated with the IED System may come from charitable organizations , donation s , fundraising , illicit activities like extortion , and money laundering , or may be concealed within the payment of religious tithes or local taxes or foreign government support . Money transfer may be occurring through recognised international channels or an alternative system like hawala brokers . Irregular activity can be inexpensive relative to the costs of countering it . Work must be done comprehensively to identify the physical and virtual networks for raising , moving and hiding money , identify the physical links and break them , and attack the links between illicit activity that generates revenue and adversaries that use it . Counter - threat finance is usually part of a broader effort to administer sanctions regimes , combat terrorist finance , combat the use of conflict diamonds and conflict minerals to finance rebellions against legitimate governments , or disrupt and dismantle the financial networks of the Somali pirate enterprise . Politics and Diplomacy . Diplomatic efforts involve convincing cooperating nations to restrict the sales of precursors , for example . IED networks are ideally attacked through regional and local politics and diplomacy . The subject of IEDs can deliberately be considered as an issue of negotiations within local government as well as other regional and local agendas . Political agreement may be reached that IEDs are often indiscriminate and have a great impact on the local population . In some cases local actions against adversaries and reporting of IED related information could be linked to rewards such as development programmes . In military efforts , the political and diplomatic channels lead the military approach and all elements of the C - IED approach . Political and diplomatic tools for attack the networks will be based upon the political importance of ensuring there is a common sense of purpose and agreement as to the desired outcomes between all those cooperating in resolution of the situation . The political tasks should link with wider political strategies for example creating comprehensive programmes to tackle the root causes of the problem that has led to adversaries ’ use of IEDs . All political activity will need to be coordinated internationally and throughout the government and non - government agencies which will require a political and diplomatic lead and policy to support it . Key areas to address include : the need for a common narrative ; rules for military operations within : and , if necessary , outside of the JOA , other political tasks will lead the reform of the host nation security and justice sectors including : military forces , intelligence services , militia and police , the security sector includes judicial and penal systems , oversight bodies , the Executive , parliamentary committees , government ministries , legislative frameworks , customary or traditional authorities , financial and regulatory bodies . The political lead will determine at the outset levels of military support for the host nation and at a subsequent time agreements involving the reintegration of adversaries . All of the above will contribute to attack the networks within the C - IED approach . Legal . Within the C - IED approach use of the legal process can disrupt international support , seize funds , bring prosecutions , change laws within the host nation ( for example to make the sale , purchase , ownership or transportation of IED components illegal ) or to proscribe membership of a specific group . Legal protocols also underscore the need for the collection and proper handling of evidence to ensure that individuals can be successfully dealt with by appropriate courts . Economic Activity . Overseas investment , international flows of capital and trade , and development assistance provide scope for the exercise of economic influence . Economic power can provide a range of incentives , boycotts , tariffs , pricing structures and sanctions to influence decisions and affect behaviour . Their impact is complicated by the combination of public and private influences , the operation of market forces and the complex relationships between global and national rates of growth and economic activity . Defeating the Device . " Defeat the device " is a mainly military response made up of proactive and reactive activities as a result of the existence of suspect or emplaced devices . The purpose of these activities is to deliver freedom to operate and achieve the wider aims of the operation . Measures taken here to mitigate , detect and neutralise IEDs have an immediate effect and directly save lives . Defeat the device protects the population and delivers physical security to military forces by means of tactical and technical measures as well as information activities . Intelligence from exploitation delivers new understanding and permits the development of new tactical and technical solutions to detect and neutralise devices and to mitigate their effects . Mitigation for C - IED . Mitigation is defined within C - IED as technical , tactical and information actions undertaken to minimise the effects of an IED Event . Mitigation activity will reduce the effect of potentially being compromised as well as reducing the actual IED events if compromised . Mitigation activity will form part of FP measures and as such will use a framework of measures , both proactive and reactive that are supported by iterative risk management . Risk analysis based upon understanding of the threats is required to form management measures for mitigation . Calculating this involves complex variables including the environment , the adversary , the population , the characteristics of the threat posed ( including IEDs ) and military forces . This complexity makes it impossible to model with any certainty and in turn this places heavy demands on the commander ’ s skill and judgement for decision - making . Counter - IED Equipment . Robots . Talon : The Talon is quite possibly the most utilized and best known of the tactical robot family . The TALON transmits in color , black and white , infrared , and / or night vision to its operator , who may be up to 1 , 000 m away . It can run off lithium - ion batteries for a maximum of 7 days on standby independently before needing recharging . It has an 8 . 5 hour battery life at normal operating speeds , 2 standard lead batteries providing 2 hours each and 1 optional Lithium Ion providing an additional 4 . 5 hours . It weighs less than 100 lb ( 45 kg ) or 60 lb ( 27 kg ) for the Reconnaissance version . Its cargo bay accommodates a variety of sensor payloads . The robot is controlled through a two - way radio or a Fiber - optic link from a portable or wearable Operator Control Unit ( OCU ) that provides continuous data and video feedback for precise vehicle positioning . The ( IED / EOD ) TALON Carries sensors and a robotic manipulator , which is used by the U . S . Military for explosive ordnance disposal and disarming improvised explosive devices . Dragon Runner : The Dragon Runner is . . . Packbot : The Packbot is . . . Throwbots : Throwbots are . . . Soldier worn protection . Body Armor : Soldiers , Sailors , Airmen and Marines have a large assortment of wearable protection against the effects of blasts and shrapnel . There have been many advancements made in ergonomics , blast resistant material and infection prevention over the last couple decades . Currently there are many options available for dismounted troops to protect them from all types of danger . Below are a few of the currently fielded systems and what is to come . E - SAPI / X - SAPI ballistic plates : Armored plates ( of a shape and curvature to be placed against the body ) that provide protection from explosively - formed projectiles . Pelvic Protection System : To reduce casualties and minimize damage to vital areas of the body the U . S . Army teamed with other organizations and the industry to develop and rapidly field the Pelvic Protective System . The system is currently composed of two layers , an inner layer ( underwear ) and outer layer ( ballistic protection ) Armored / Mine - Resistant and Counter IED Vehicles . Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles . US - Mine Resistant Ambush Protected ( MRAP ) vehicle : The MRAP program was prompted by U . S . deaths in Iraq . As recently as 2007 , the U . S . military has ordered the production of about 10 , 000 MRAPs at a cost of over $ 500 , 000 each , and planned to order more MRAPs . Currently there are many different variants produced by several different manufacturers . U . S . - Assault Breacher Vehicle ( ABV ) : The M1 ABV is a 70 - ton armored vehicle nicknamed “ The Shredder , ” it is designed to clear paths for troops to advance through minefields or areas where improvised explosive devices might be buried . The ABVs can be equipped with a plow and bulldozer blade to breach obstacles or dig up mines . They can also be equipped with a line charge , packed with C4 explosives that can be launched and detonated from the vehicle . ABVs first got extensive use in Afghanistan in 2010 when the U . S . Marines brought them in to help deal with the IEDs , a popular weapon of the Taliban there . “ The Assault Breacher Vehicle is a tracked , combat - ( engineered ) vehicle designed to provide the capability for deliberate and in - stride breaching of mine fields and complex obstacles for the 1st Heavy Brigade Combat Team according to the 2d Infantry Division . British - Mastiff 3 Protected Patrol Vehicle : The Mastiff is a heavily armored , 6 x six - wheel - drive patrol vehicle which carries eight troops , plus two crew . It is currently on its third variation . It is suitable for road patrols and convoys and is the newest in a range of protected patrol vehicles being used for operations . Mastiff has a maximum speed of 90kph , is armed with the latest weapon systems , including a 7 . 62mm general purpose machine gun , 12 . 7mm heavy machine gun or 40mm automatic grenade launcher . They have Bowman radios and electronic countermeasures and are fitted with additional armor beyond the standard level to ensure they have the best possible protection . Modified Construction Equipment . The Caterpillar D9 is a large track - type tractor designed and manufactured by Caterpillar Inc . It is usually sold as a bulldozer equipped with a detachable large blade and a rear ripper attachment . The D9 , with 354 kW ( 474 hp ) of gross power and an operating weight of 49 tons , is in the upper end of Caterpillar ' s track - type tractors , which range in size from the D3 57 kW ( 77 hp ) , 8 tons , to the D11 698 kW ( 935 hp ) , 104 tons . The size , durability , reliability , and low operating costs have made the D9 one of the most popular large track - type tractors in the world . The Komatsu D275A is one of its most direct competitors . Infantry Fighting Vehicles . US - Bradley Fighting Vehicle The Bradley Fighting Vehicle ( BFV ) is an American fighting vehicle platform manufactured by BAE Systems Land and Armaments , formerly United Defense . It was named after U . S . General Omar Bradley . The Bradley is designed to transport infantry or scouts with armor protection while providing covering fire to suppress enemy troops and armored vehicles . There are several Bradley variants , including the M2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle and the M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle . The M2 holds a crew of three : a commander , a gunner and a driver , as well as six fully equipped soldiers . The M3 mainly conducts scout missions and carries two scouts in addition to the regular crew of three , with space for additional TOW missiles . UK - Future Rapid Effect System ( FRES ) Specialist vehicle US - Ground Combat Vehicle ( GCV ) US - Stryker The IAV Stryker is a family of eight - wheeled , armored fighting vehicles derived from the Canadian LAV III and produced by General Dynamics Land Systems for the United States Army . It has 4 - wheel drive ( 8x4 ) and can be switched to all - wheel drive ( 8x8 ) . The vehicle is named for two American servicemen who posthumously received the Medal of Honor : Private First Class Stuart S . Stryker , who died in World War II and Specialist Four Robert F . Stryker , who died in the Vietnam War . Germany - Puma Main Battle Tanks . U . S . - M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank The M1 Abrams is an American third - generation main battle tank produced by the United States . It is named after General Creighton Abrams , former Army Chief of Staff and Commander of U . S . military forces in the Vietnam War from 1968 to 1972 . Highly mobile , designed for modern armored ground warfare , [ 10 ] the M1 is well armed and heavily armored . Notable features include the use of a powerful gas turbine engine ( multifuel capable , usually fueled with JP8 jet fuel ) , the adoption of sophisticated composite armor , and separate ammunition storage in a blow - out compartment for crew safety . Weighing nearly 68 short tons ( almost 62 metric tons ) , it is one of the heaviest main battle tanks in service . Russia - T - 90 South Korea - K2 Black Panther Turkey - Altay Armored Personnel Carriers . U . S . - M113 APC : APCs are usually armed with only a machine gun . They are usually not designed to take part in a direct - fire battle , but to carry troops to the battlefield safe from shrapnel and ambush . They may have wheels or tracks . Examples include the American M113 ( tracked ) , the French VAB ( wheeled ) , the Dutch / German GTK Boxer ( wheeled ) and the Soviet BTR ( wheeled ) . The infantry fighting vehicle is a further development of the armoured personnel carrier . In addition to the task of carrying infantry to battle safely they are more heavily armed and armoured and are designed for direct combat . US - Marine Personnel Carrier ( MPC ) Brazil - ViaturaBlindadaTransporte de Pessoal , Media de Rodas ( VBTP - MR ) Guarani vehicle procurement program Germany and Netherlands - Boxer France - VéhiculeBlindé Multirole ( VBMR ) South Africa - Sapula China - Mine Resistant Ambush Protected All - Terrain Vehicle ( M - ATV ) Light Multirole Vehicle . U . S . - Joint Light Tactical vehicle ( JLTV ) : The JLTV is a United States military ( specifically U . S . Army , USSOCOM , and U . S . Marine Corps ) program to replace the Humvee that is currently in service [ 2 ] with a family of more survivable vehicles with greater payload . In particular , the Humvee was not designed to be an armored combat and scout vehicle but has been employed as one , whereas the JLTV will be designed from the ground up for this role . Production is planned for 2015 . The U . S . Army planned to buy 60 , 000 and the U . S . Marine Corps planned for 5 , 500 vehicles in 2010 . [ 3 ] U . S . - High Mobility , Multi - purpose , Wheeled Vehicle ( HMMWV ) or " Hummer " ; The HMMWV , commonly known as the Humvee , is a four - wheel drive military automobile produced by AM General . [ 6 ] It has largely supplanted the roles formerly served by smaller jeeps such as the M151 1⁄4 - short - ton ( 230 kg ) MUTT , the M561 " Gama Goat " , their M718A1 and M792 ambulance versions , the CUCV , and other light trucks . Primarily used by the United States military , it is also used by numerous other countries and organizations and even in civilian adaptations . The Humvee ' s widespread use in the Persian Gulf War helped inspire the civilian Hummer automotive marque . Canada - Tactical Armored Patrol Vehicle ( TAPV ) Australia - Protected Mobility Vehicles – Light ( PMV - L ) Tactical Trucks . France - Porteur Polyvalent Terrestre ( PPT ) Canada - Medium Support Vehicle System ( MSVS ) South Africa - Vistula Electronic Warfare . EW support is an asset used in an environment where RCIEDs are a threat . The division of EW known as electronic support measures can search for , intercept , and identify electromagnetic emissions and locate their sources for the purpose of immediate threat recognition . It provides a source of information required for immediate decisions involving Electronic Countermeasures ( ECM ) , and other tactical actions . [ 20 ] The division of EW known as ECM can take action to prevent or reduce an enemy ’ s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum through the use of electromagnetic energy . Electronic warfare includes three major subdivisions : electronic attack ( EA ) , electronic protection ( EP ) , and electronic warfare support ( ES ) . [ 1 ] Electronic attack involves the use of EM energy , directed energy , or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel , facilities , or equipment with the intent of degrading , neutralizing , or destroying enemy combat capability . Electronic protection involves actions taken to protect personnel , facilities , and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum that degrade , neutralize , or destroy friendly combat capability . Electronic warfare support is the subdivision of EW involving actions tasked by , or under direct control of , an operational commander to search for , intercept , identify , and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated EM energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition , targeting , planning , and conduct of future operations . [ 1 ] These measures begin with systems designed and operators trained to make Electronic Intercepts ( ELINT ) and then classification and analysis broadly known as Signals intelligence from such detections to return information and perhaps actionable intelligence ( e . g . a ship ' s identification from unique characteristics of a specific radar ) to the commander . Electronic Countermeasures ( Jammers ) . Duke Version 3 Vehicle mounted CREW system : Duke V3 is a counter radio - controlled improvised explosive device ( RCIED ) electronic warfare ( CREW ) system that was developed to provide U . S . forces critical , life - saving protection against a wide range of threats . It is a field deployable , single - unit system that was designed to have minimal size , weight and power requirements while providing simple operation and optimal performance in order to provide force protection against radio - controlled IEDs . CREW Duke V3 consists of a primary unit known as the CREW Duke V2 and a secondary unit that features advanced electronic warfare subsystems to counter emerging advanced RCIED technologies . Advanced EW components and techniques are implemented to combat complex threat infrastructures in order to provide a maximum protection radius while minimizing the overall system cost and prime power consumption requirements . Thor III dismounted CREW system : The Thor III system consists of three dismounted man - pack subsystems , one battery charger , and twenty - four batteries ( BB - 2590 / U ) . Each subsystem contains a R / T ( low band , mid band or high band ) , a Remote Control Unit ( RCU ) , an integration / pack frame , an Rx / Tx Antenna ( low band , mid band , or high band ) , a GPS antenna , cables , and software . Each subsystem is housed in a separate transit case with protective covers . The purpose of the Thor III dismounted system is to provide the user in the field with a wearable Radio - Controlled Improvised Explosive Device ( RCIED ) jammer that has been designed to counter an array of frequency diverse threats . The system is an expandable , active and reactive , scanning - receiver - based jammer with multiple jamming signal sources that allow it to counter multiple simultaneous threats . Joint IED Neutralizer ( JIN ) : In 2005 , Ionatron attempted to develop an anti IED device that would " zap " IEDs from a distance by using lasers to ionize the air and allow man - made lightning to shoot towards the devices detonating them at a safe distance . By using femtosecond lasers light pulses that last less than a ten - trillionth of a second JIN could carve conductive channels of ionized oxygen in the air . Through these channels , Ionatron ’ s blaster sent man - made lighting bolts . Thor IED Zappers : The vehicular system is mounted on a remotely controlled weapon station , carrying the laser beam director and high - energy laser and coaxial 12 . 7mm machine gun to neutralize improvised explosive devices from a safe , standoff distance . Ultra Wide Band High Powered Electro Magnetics : An UWB - HPEM system typically consists of the following components : a battery - based direct current power supply , an actuation system , a semiconductor - based ultra - wideband pulse generator and an ultra - wideband antenna . Depending on the type of threat , it can either set off a sensor - triggered IEDs in a controlled explosion or prevent it from being remotely detonated by radio or mobile phone . A UWB - HPEM system can be loaded onto a vehicle , creating an electromagnetic protection zone for a convoy , potentially in combination with other systems . Other Countermeasures . Ground Ordnance Land Disruptor : G . O . L . D is a user filled , explosively driven Counter - IED system that renders buried IEDs safe through a combination of disruption , component separation and expulsion from the ground allowing the IED to remain biometrically intact . Detection Systems . Counter - IED Reconnaissance Planes : The U . S . Army ’ s Task Force ODIN - E flies manned reconnaissance aircraft that use an array of full - motion video ( FMV ) , electro - optical ( EO ) , infra - red ( IR ) , and synthetic aperture radar ( SAR ) imagery sensors to find IEDs . IED Volumetric Detection : Microwave Based Explosive Caches Detection : Raytheon UK ' s Soteria vehicle - mounted stand - off system provides high - definition IED detection , confirmation and threat diagnostics from a significant distance . Soteria ' s optical processing technology has the following capabilities : a high probability of IED detection with a low false positive rate , detection of high , medium , low and zero metal content IEDs , assisted target recognition , and day and night operability . Soteria is also equipped with ground vibration monitoring capabilities in the front of the vehicle . Non - linear Junction Detector ( NLJD ) : A portable NLJD allows the operator to search voids and areas where they are unable to gain physical or visual access , in order to detect electronic components and determine if the area is free from IEDs . Laser IED Detection : Science fiction is only fiction for a limited time . That being said , many of the things that are now just concepts will soon be reality . We are learning to adapt common , and not so common , devices for alternate purposes every day . Using lasers to detect , or defeat , IEDs is coming to a battlefield near you . Mine detectors : A portable , hand - held or worn device to detect buried IEDs . There are many different models from several different companies currently in use worldwide by U . S . and coalition forces . These are not your run of the mill metal detectors that you can buy at your local store , they are highly sophisticated , ultra sensitive , programmable devices . Unmanned Systems intended for Counter - IED . Aerostats : Aerostat s are balloons equipped with stabilized electro optical , infrared , and radar sensors which are manned 24 hours a day . The Persistent Threat Detection System ( PTDS ) is the largest and most capable Aerostat ever used in combat . First used in 2004 ( Camp Slayer , Iraq ) , It is made by Lockheed Martin and has a volume of 74 , 000 cubic feet . It can sit for months thousands of feet above a base . Known as the " unblinking eye " Aerostats provide real - time High Definition imagery of the surrounding area , day or night , and are strategically placed for surveillance purposes . They enhance situational awareness and improve force protection . Aerostats can be used to reconnoiter routes before friendly forces travel them and to provide over watch for dismounted troops or convoys . They can also serve as a communications and Full Motion Video ( FMV ) relay platform to extend the range and disseminate situational awareness . They are linked with several ground based sensors , including acoustic sensors that detect and locate weapon fire or blasts . Explosive Ordnance Disposal . EOD elements are always in high demand and there is nearly always a shortage of trained personnel . Additionally there is a high level of risk to these personnel . Within EOD , IEDD is the location , identification , rendering safe and final disposal of IEDs . IEDD is a specialist skill requiring specific training and equipment preferably including the use of remote control vehicles . EOD tasks related to C - IED are focused upon the activities of detection , mitigation , IEDD and also exploitation . EOD tasks aim to respond to , identify , render safe and dispose of explosive ordnance , including Chemical , Biological , Radiological and Nuclear ( CBRN ) devices , that threaten / impede manoeuvre . This also includes destroying captured enemy explosive ordnance and assisting in the disposal of unserviceable national and foreign explosive ordnance . UXO , rendering safe of IEDs . Route Clearance and Route Check . Route search and route check are categories of search and describe the process of identifying vulnerable points or vulnerable areas and using 3 categories of search in increasing levels of threat or required assuredness : Route checks are conducted by patrol - search trained troops : intermediate route search using trained search teams ; and advanced route search where there is a high threat requiring the intimate support of other C - IED enablers . Route clearance teams are often organized as a Route Clearance Package ( RCP ) within an all - arms grouping and are normally engineer - based . They can be equipped with a mix of general and specialist vehicles , equipment and personnel integrated to conduct route clearance . Their purpose is to eliminate concealment for IEDs , munitions and caches as well as providing systematic detection and deterrence sweeps along cleared routes . A RCP can be used in both general support ( e . g . to maintain main supply routes ) and in close support ( e . g . to provide support to manoeuvre units on tactical road moves ) . RCPs can consist of Mechanized and Combat Heavy Engineers and EOD teams . Another method for organising an RCP is to form 5 elements within the team responsible for command and control , detection , security , improvement , and EOD . Military Search . Military search is the management and application of systematic procedures and appropriate equipment to locate specified targets in support of military operations . Specified targets may include people , information and material resources employed by an adversary . Military working dogs and other C - IED enablers are often integral to search activities . The techniques of military search can be applied to all manner of search tasks to include combinations of personnel , buildings , venues , areas , routes , vehicles , vessels and aircraft . Preparing the Force . " Prepare the force " activity is applicable to all military and law enforcement components and describes the necessary measures to ensure they are prepared for operations and enabled to deliver the C - IED approach and its component capabilities . In order to deliver C - IED capability , coherent and supporting Lines of Development ( LoD ) are required . Not least C - IED efforts must be appropriately organised , interoperable with other military allies and the host nation law enforcement , manned , equipped , sustained , educated in doctrine , and trained in tactics , techniques , and procedures ( TTPs ) to the level required for their operational role . This capability is developed from a mix of the military commander ’ s guidance , the outputs of the residual experience in the operational area , the lessons process , and technology and contributions from the other C - IED pillars . Commanders ideally ensure that intelligence on IEDs and related adversary TTPs are quickly disseminated and that friendly TTPs can be modified to be as up - to - date , appropriate and effective as possible . Counter - IED Training . Education and Individual Training ( E & IT ) comprises the instructional activities that provide skills , knowledge and attitudes required in the performance of assigned duties , and upon which information can be correctly interpreted and sound judgement exercised . E & IT focuses on preparation for a task in order to meet operational requirements and specific needs . The emergence of the IED threat has been a significant change to the historic threat faced by military and law enforcement communities and continues to be the primary casualty - producing weapon and tactic against military forces . To address this significant concern , the Counter - IED community has responded and developed a number of training activities to better prepare themselves for operations in a high threat IED environment . Train the Force , one of three mutually supporting lines of operation , is a critical component of the JIEDDO mission to defeat the IED threat as a weapon of strategic influence . The Joint Center of Excellence is JIEDDO ' s lead organization for the train - the - force line of operation and is responsible for development of training capabilities that enable the services ' and combatant commanders ' mission of preparing U . S . forces to defeat this threat . Combat Hunter Training teaches how to track the emplacer by combined hunter and tracker skills and with determining group dynamics - as an example - using the " street smarts " developed by law enforcement who work in the cities . Various Counter - IED training workshops are provided by the private sector for government agencies and international corporations to help manage and reduce their risks from acts of terrorism , protect their assets , and adapt to ever - changing operational needs . These workshops include training courses on applications , security protocols , and various types of screening equipment . Counter - IED Conferences . NATO holds an annual Counter - IED conference in cooperation with the C - IED Centre of Excellence headquartered in Madrid , Spain . Understanding and Intelligence . Sources of Intelligence for C - IED . Intelligence sources include national military and police agencies ( including counterintelligence ) . The military intelligence component contributes to a C - IED approach in these ways : Intelligence , Surveillance and Reconnaissance . Intelligence , Surveillance and Reconnaissance ( ISR ) is the coordinated and integrated acquisition , processing and provision of timely , accurate , relevant , coherent and assured information and intelligence to support commander ’ s conduct of activities . Land , sea , air and space platforms have critical ISR roles in supporting operations in general . For C - IED air and space platforms can provide valuable input for each of the intelligence disciplines . Land platforms contribute too , through observation posts , reconnaissance and patrolling activity , surveillance of targets as well as static cameras and sensors for monitoring locations , facilities , networks , individuals , routes etc . By massing ISR assets , allowing a period of immersion , developing layering and cross cueing of sensors , an improved clarity and depth of knowledge can be established . Human Intelligence . Human Intelligence ( HUMINT ) is a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources . Information from the local population and host nation security forces can prove especially valuable not least to establish unusual activity or information about adversaries in a society that may otherwise appear opaque . The view from those that understand the culture and the country best is invaluable in developing understanding . HUMINT is therefore vital to successful CIED . Imagery Intelligence . Imagery Intelligence ( IMINT ) is intelligence derived from imagery acquired by sensors which can be ground - based , seaborne or carried by air or space platforms . For C - IED , imagery allows the physical capture of information for analysis and can be used , for example to : track human movement around suspicious areas ; identify locations of interest ; demonstrate change in an area or disturbance of terrain ; demonstrate physical relationships or networks . IMINT can also provide the necessary proof required for analysis leading to effective targeting and successful prosecution . Signals Intelligence . Signals Intelligence ( SIGINT ) is the generic term used to describe communications intelligence and electronic intelligence when there is no requirement to differentiate between these two types of intelligence , or to represent fusion of the two . For C - IED the analysis of intercepted communications enables hostile plans to be disrupted and to identify hostile personnel and their networks . Materiel and Personnel Exploitation . Materiel and Personnel Exploitation ( MPE ) is the systematic collection and processing of information and dissemination of intelligence obtained as a result of tactical questioning , interrogation and the extraction of data from recovered materiel . It is a multi - source , responsive process that aims to maximize the intelligence value of captured personnel and recovered materiel . MPE activity may be supported by a dedicated intelligence exploitation facility which may include the ability to process captured persons . When MPE produces intelligence for C - IED it can directly feed into understanding of the IED System . The following disciplines / processes are the main components of MPE : Multiple Source Fusion . Multiple source fusion is the synthesis of information and intelligence from a limited number of sources , normally controlled by the same agency . Intelligence staff should fuse the output of multiple sources from the various natures of intelligence . Multiple source fusion activity should be collocated with collection assets . Fusion cells will produce IED trend reporting and intelligence reports to feed current operations or prosecuting follow - on activities as well as intelligence summaries to support future activities for example involving DNA or finger print matches . Single Source Processing . Single source processing is the identification of patterns and intelligence start points within the single source collection environment , and the translation of that single source information into a format useful to the non - specialist . The single source processing capability should be able to re - task collection activity according to priorities ; it should also be collocated with collection assets . Laboratory Services . The Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center ( TEDAC ) was formally established in 2004 to serve as the single interagency organization to receive , fully analyze , and exploit all terrorist IEDs of interest to the United States . TEDAC coordinates the efforts of the entire government , from law enforcement to intelligence to military , to gather and share intelligence about these devices — helping to disarm and disrupt IEDs , link them to their makers , and prevent future attacks . TEDAC consists of a director ( FBI ) , a deputy director ( BATF ) , a Department of Defense executive manager ( JIEDDO ) , and five units relating to forensics , technical exploitation , intelligence , and investigations . TEDAC includes representatives from the Department of Justice ; the Department of Defense ; international partner agencies ; and members of the intelligence community . Intelligence Management Systems . TRIPwire is a secure online portal sponsored by the ' s Office for Bombing Prevention ( DHS / OBP ) . TRIP " wire " is an online network designed to bring technical and operational information on terrorist tactics , techniques , and procedures ( TTPs ) to the desktop of officers in the bombing prevention community . It also facilitates information sharing and networking by offering collaboration tools such as community forums and secure e - mail . TRIPwire allows law enforcement to access and share information and experiences about the IED threat . The Dfuze Intelligence Management System allows secure storage and maintenance of all data related to IED , EOD , criminal gang , terrorist and firearm incidents and operations . The system provides a centralized view of all significant data on record with built - in analytical tools and secure data sharing for data entry , data linking , data searching and data retrieval .