Battle of Dumlupınar The Battle of Dumlupınar ( ; or , literally " Field Battle of the Commander - in - Chief " ) was the last battle in the Greco - Turkish War ( 1919 – 1922 ) ( part of the Turkish War of Independence ) . The battle was fought from 26 to 30 August 1922 near Dumlupınar , Kütahya in Turkey . Background . Following the attrition battle on the Sakarya River ( Battle of Sakarya ) in August – September 1921 , the Greek Army of Asia Minor under General Anastasios Papoulas retreated to a defensive line extending from the town of İzmit ( Nicomedia ) to the towns of Eskişehir and Kara Hisâr - ı Sahib ( present day Afyonkarahisar ) . The Greek line formed a 700 - km arc stretching in a North - South direction along difficult hilly ground with high hills , called tepes , rising out of broken terrain and was considered to be easily defensible . A single track railway line ran from Kara Hisâr to Dumlupınar , a fortified valley town some West of Kara Hisâr surrounded by the mountains Murat Dağı and Ahır Dağı , and thence to Smyrna ( present day İzmir ) on the coast . This railway was the main supply route of the Greeks . The Greek headquarters at Smyrna was effectively incapable of communicating with the front or exercising operational control . Preparations . Following the unsuccessful outcome of the Battle of Sakarya , the Greek command structure underwent many changes . Significant forces were withdrawn from the line and redeployed in Thrace for an offensive against Istanbul , which never materialised . The remaining Greek forces were under the overall command of Lieutenant General Georgios Hatzianestis , who had replaced General Papoulas in May 1922 , and was widely regarded as mentally unstable . The morale of the Greek troops was low , as many had already been under arms for several years , and there was no prospect for a quick resolution of the war . Political dissent and the fact that they were occupying unfriendly territories further depressed their morale . Despite pressure to attack building up at Ankara , Mustafa Kemal who had been appointed Commander - in - Chief of the TBMM government , waited and utilized the breathing space to strengthen his forces and split the Allies through adroit diplomatic moves , ensuring that French and Italian sympathies lay with Turks rather than the Greeks . This diplomatically isolated the pro - Greek British . He finally decided to strike the Greeks in August 1922 . Knowing that Turkish forces were only adequate to mount one major offensive , he strengthened the Turkish First Army under " Sakallı " Nureddin Pasha , which was deployed against the southern flank of the Greek salient jutting out to Kara Hisâr . It was a risky gamble , because if the Greek Army counter - attacked on his weakened right flank and pivoted south , his forces would be cut off . Opposing forces . Greek forces . The Greek forces were organized in the " Army of Asia Minor " , under Lieutenant General Georgios Hatzianestis , with a total of 220 , 000 men in 12 infantry and 1 cavalry division . The Army HQ was located in Smyrna . The Army of Asia Minor comprised three Corps ( I , II and III ) , under Major General Nikolaos Trikoupis ( I Corps in Kara Hisâr ) , Major General Kimon Digenis ( II Corps in Gazligöl ) and Major General Petros Soumilas ( III Corps in Eskişehir ) . It also included an independent Cavalry division and smaller regiment - sized Military Commands , mainly for interior protection and anti - guerrilla operations . The total Greek front spanned for 713 km . Each Greek corps had 4 divisions . Ι Corps consisted of the 1st , 4th , 5th and 12th divisions . II Corps consisted of the 2nd , 7th , 9th and 13th divisions . III Corps consisted of the 3rd , 10th , 11th and the " Independent " divisions . Each Greek division had 2 – 4 three - battalion regiments and 8 – 42 artillery pieces ( artillery was redistributed between front - line and reserve divisions ) . Although numerically strong , the Greeks were very deficient on heavy artillery ( only 40 outdated pieces existed in the entire front ) and cavalry ( one half - company per division ) . Turkish forces . The Turkish forces were organized in the Western Front , under Mirliva İsmet Pasha ( İnönü ) , with a total of 208 , 000 men in 18 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions . For the purposes of the offensive the Western Front HQ was located on Koca Tepe hill , some 15 km south of Kara Hisâr , very close to the battle lines . The Western Front consisted of the First Army under Mirliva Nureddin Pasha , based also on Kocatepe hill , the Second Army under Mirliva Yakub Shevki Pasha ( Subaşı ) based in Doğlat , the Kocaeli Group under Colonel Halid Bey ( Karsıalan ) and the V Cavalry Corps under Mirliva Fahreddin Pasha ( Altay ) . For the purpose of the offensive , the Turkish command redistributed its forces , reinforcing the First Army . The First Army consisted of the I Corps ( 14th , 15th , 23rd and 57th infantry divisions ) , the II Corps ( 3rd , 4th and 7th infantry divisions ) and the IV Corps ( 5th , 8th , 11th and 12th infantry divisions ) . The Second Army consisted of the III Corps ( Porsuk detachment ( regiment ) and 41st division ) , the VI Corps ( 16th and 17th infantry divisions plus one provisional Cavalry division ) and the independent 1st and 61st infantry divisions . The Kocaeli Group consisted of the 18th infantry division plus additional infantry and cavalry units . The V Cavalry Corps consisted of the 1st , 2nd and 14th cavalry divisions . Each Turkish infantry division consisted of one assault infantry battalion , 3 three - battalion infantry regiments and 12 artillery pieces , with an average total strength of 7 , 500 men . Opposing plans . Turkish plan . The Turkish plan was to launch converging attacks with the 1st and 2nd Armies against the Greek positions around Kara Hisâr . The First Army would attack northwards , on the Greek positions southwest of Kara Hisâr , held by the Greek A ' Corps . The V Cavalry Corps would assist the First Army by infiltrating through less guarded Greek positions in Kirka valley , and coming behind the Greek front lines . The Second Army would attack westwards , on the Greek positions north of Kara Hisâr . The first objective was to cut the Smyrna - Kara Hisâr and the Kara Hisâr - Eskişehir railroad lines , thus cutting off the Greek forces in and around Kara Hisâr from Smyrna and the C ' Corps in Eskişehir . In a second phase the 1st and 2nd Armies would meet in the area south of Kütahya , closing a ring around the Greek forces in Kara Hisâr and completely encircling them . Greek plan . The Greek high command had anticipated a major Turkish offensive , it was however uncertain of the exact direction it would come . The Greeks expected the Turkish attack to come either along the Ankara - Eskişehir railroad line or the Konya - Kara Hisâr railroad line . Unknown to them at the time , the railroad from Ankara , that the Greeks destroyed in summer 1921 during the withdrawal after the battle of Sakarya , was still not restored and was not operational . Following the withdrawal from the Sakarya , initially the Greek Corps ' commands were disbanded , and the Asia Minor Army was organised into two groups , the North and South groups , each sufficiently strong to fight independently and repel any Turkish attack . Following the replacement of the Army ' s commander , and the coming of Lt . General Georgios Hatzianestis the Greek disposition changed . Hatzianestis re - established the three Corps commands . All three Corps controlled parts of the front , but in essence the B ' corps operated as a general reserve , while the I ( around Kara Hisâr ) and III ( around Eskisehir ) Corps were mostly deployed on the front . In the case of a Turkish offensive the II Corps would fall under the command of the sector which was attacked ( either I Corps to the south or III Corps to the north ) . Hatzianestis , despite reports indicating the opposite , believed that the Greek front - lines were sufficiently strong to withstand any Turkish attack for enough time that the B ' Corps would launch its own flanking counterattack , on the flanks of the attacking Turkish armies . Prior to the Turkish offensive Greek intelligence had revealed the Turkish preparations , but it failed to estimate correctly the size of the Turkish formations and the exact date of the Turkish attack . When the Turkish attack opened Greek reinforcements were still underway to the front . Battle . Turkish attack and breakthrough ( 26 – 27 August 1922 ) . The Turkish attack opened in the night of 25 – 26 August 1922 , when the Turkish V Cavalry Corps passed through the Kirka gorge behind the Greek lines . The gorge was guarded by a patrolling Greek rifle company , which was easily overrun by the advancing Turkish cavalry . The Turkish cavalry proceeded to cut the Greek telegraph lines and the railway line ( by 18 : 00 hours on 26 August both had been cut ) , thus seriously hampering communications between Smyrna and Kara Hisâr . On the morning of 26 August the Turkish First and Second Armies attacked simultaneously . The Second Army ' s attack , following a powerful artillery barrage , took the Greeks by surprise and was able to take some front line positions of the 5th Greek division ( of the Greek I Corps ) . Renewed Turkish attacks had little success . After being reinforced , the Greek 5th division carried limited counterattacks and restored its original front . The Second Army also attacked the positions of the III Corps keeping its forces pinned , thus preventing it from the reinforcing the II Corps . The First Army ' s attack was preceded by a devastating and accurate artillery barrage . The much superior Turkish heavy artillery knocked out the light Greek batteries , and caused heavy casualties to the front - line Greek infantry battalions ( some lost up to 50 % of their strength during the artillery barrage alone ) . The artillery barrage was followed by a general Turkish attack by 7 infantry divisions of the I and IV Corps , against 2 Greek divisions ( 1st and 4th ) . The situation for the Greek Ι Corps became almost immediately critical , as they faced overwhelming forces and soon all Corps ' reserves were committed to battle . The Turkish attack was focused mainly on the seam of the Greek 1st and 4th divisions . By noon the Turkish I Corps had succeeded in carrying the Greek 1st division ' s trenches . The arrival as a reinforcement of the II Corps ' 7th division in the afternoon prompted a Greek counterattack which was able to only partially restore the line . The Greek Army HQ in Smyrna had no clear picture of the situation . In its order at 23 : 00 hours on 26 August to the I and II Corps the Army expressed the opinion that the Turks had still not revealed the main axis of their offensive . The Army proceeded with its original plan , by ordering the Greek II Corps to prepare for a counteroffensive on the Turkish right flank , while the I Corps would keep its positions . The counter - offensive was expected to be launched on 28 August . These orders directly conflicted with the orders that the I Corps had already issued to the II Corps , and subsequently the I Corps ordered the II Corps to stop any preparations for a counteroffensive and resume sending its forces south to reinforce the badly battered 1st and 4th divisions . Due to the broken communications , the Army HQ in Smyrna didn ' t receive the notifications of the I and II Corps and had the impression that things developed as it had ordered . At 02 : 00 hours on 27 August ( Day 2 of the Turkish offensive ) Turkish artillery began its barrage again , and at 06 : 00 hours Turkish infantry resumed its attacks . The Turkish forces focused again on the seam of the Greek 1st and 4th divisions , and advancing steadily they managed by 09 : 00 hours to achieve a clear breakthrough in the Greek line when the Turkish IV Corps under Colonel Sami took the high peak of Erkmentepe . At 10 : 30 hours the Greek Ι Corps issued an order of general withdrawal some 20 km to the north of its original line , and the subsequent evacuation of Kara Hisâr . The order was not received by the Greek 1st division , whose telephone contact with the Ι Corps had been cut and couldn ' t establish wireless communication , and remained in position . By 13 : 30 hours its front was collapsing exposing the flank of the 4th division . The 1st division , together with the 7th division retreated without being seriously harassed by the Turks , and by 17 : 00 hours they had reached their new positions . Greek retreat towards Dumlupınar and Alıören ( 27 – 29 August 1922 ) . The commander of the 1st Greek division , Major General Frangou , received contact with the I Corps at 18 : 30 hours , via messengers . However he was only informally informed , and received no written orders . Frangou ordered his forces ( 1st and 7th divisions and other smaller units , henceforth referred to as " Frangou Group " ) to withdraw towards Dumlupınar in the night from 27 to 28 August , assuming this was the plan of I Corps commander Major General Trikoupis . In fact Trikoupis had kept his forces ( the biggest part of I and II Corps , henceforth referred as " Trikoupis Group " ) in position , allowing his men to rest in the night , and preparing for the withdrawal towards Dumlupınar in the next morning of 28 August ( Day 3 of the Turkish offensive ) . The result of this confusion was that a gap opened in the Greek line between Frangou and Trikoupis Groups . The forces of Frangou Group marching in the night withdrew towards Dumlupınar , but in poor order , while desertions began . The Army HQ in Smyrna was losing touch with the situation . In its orders at 17 : 30 hours on 27 August , it ordered the I Corps to counterattack and restore its original line , or if unable , to conduct a fighting withdrawal , while the II Corps would counterattack immediately towards Çobanlar ( southeast of Kara Hisâr ) . Similarly the I Corps with no communication with Frangou Group was not aware that Frangou Group was moving on its own , and gave orders that did not correspond to the actual situation on the field . At 02 : 00 hours on 28 August the Army of Asia Minor HQ cancelled the previous orders for counterattack , and placed the II Corps as well as a division from the III Corps under the Ι Corps and Major General Trikoupis . At 05 : 00 hours on 28 August Trikoupis Group began its movement to the west . Unaware of the absence of Frangou Group ' s units , the Greek 4th division ' s exposed column was attacked at 07 : 00 and taken by surprise , and subsequently broken . The Greek 9th division ( so far uncommitted to battle ) , on its way to the west at about 07 : 00 trapped the Turkish 2nd Cavalry division ( of the V Turkish Cavalry Corps ) , which tried to block the way to the west , and inflicted heavy casualties on it , including prisoners and artillery pieces . Subsequently the 2nd Cavalry division was withdrawn from action and was put in reserve . The rest of Trikoupis Group ( 5th , 12th and 13th divisions ) retreated to the west without problems . Trikoupis Group spent the night of 28 – 29 August around Olucak . At the same time the Frangou Group was under pressure by the incoming Turkish IV Corps . Frangou ' s units were deployed in line around Başkimse . After repeated failed efforts to establish wireless communication with the Greek I Corps Frangou ordered his units to begin their withdrawal to Dumlupınar position at 16 : 00 hours . At 05 : 00 hours on 29 August all units of Frangou Group had reached the positions around Dumlupınar , in good order despite the pressure of the Turkish IV corps . The battle of Hamurköy - İlbulak Dağ ( 29 August 1922 ) . During the night of 28 – 29 August the Turkish VI Corps ( of the Second Army ) had advanced to the west and reached the north of Trikoupis Group . The Turkish V Cavalry Corps and the First Army ' s units ( I , II and IV Corps ) advanced towards the Greek Frangou and Trikoupis Groups . The Turkish I Corps advanced towards Dumlupınar and made contact with the Greek Frangou Group , while the V Cavalry Corps and the IV Corps separated the Greek Trikoupis and Frangou Group . Trikoupis Group was effectively encircled . Trikoupis Group began its movement westwards on the morning of 29 August . Progressively and unexpectedly Greek units started running into the units of the Turkish V and IV Corps . Trikoupis ordered his 9th division to attack and break the Turkish line , in order to open the way to Dumlupınar . Quickly the Greek 9th division found itself attacking against superior Turkish forces ( the 4th Corps ) and fell into defense . The Turkish forces attacked also of the eastern flank of Trikoupis Group where the Greek 12th position was . Trikoupis progressively committed the 5th and 4th divisions in the defense of his Group , while keeping the 13th division in reserve . The battle lasted all day on 29 August , with heavy casualties on both sides . Trikoupis Group had been unable to open the way to Dumupinar or establish communication with Frangou Group . The Turkish forces had similarly been unable to destroy the Trikoupis Group , despite having encircled it with their II , IV , V and VI Corps . At 23 : 00 on 29 August , the badly battered Greek units of Trikoupis Group , disengaged and began marching towards Çalköy , which was thought to be weakly held by Turkish forces . The Greek units had already lost much of their cohesion , and the night march aggravated the mixing of units . The Greek 5th division lost its way and lost contact with the Trikoupis Group . The Frangou Group on 29 August held a 20 km front around Dumlupınar . Its position was attacked by the Turkish 1st Corps and the right flank was broken with little fight . In order to leave open a window of hope to the Trikoupis Group to retreat towards Dumlupınar , Frangou ordered his left flank to hold positions at any cost . The battle of Alıören ( 30 August 1922 ) . In the morning of 30 August , after breaking the weak Turkish force blocking the way , the Trikoupis Group arrived in Çalköy , where after 07 : 00 it began taking fire from Turkish artillery . Turkish columns ( the IV , V and VI Corps ) were visible marching both south and north of Trikoupis Group . Trikoupis made a council with the commanders of his divisions , who proposed that the Group continue its westward march through Alıören to Banaz . Trikoupis rejected this opinion , and ordered his forces to continue south to Dumlupınar . At 11 : 00 hours Trikoupis received the reports from his units , which indicated that the combatant strength of Trikoupis Group was reduced to 7 , 000 infantry , 80 cavalry and 116 artillery pieces . An additional 10 , 000 – 15 , 000 men were completely disorganised and largely unarmed . Food supplies had already been completely exhausted and ammunition stocks were very low . After receiving the reports from his subortinate units Trikoupis , realising that his forces were insufficient to withstand a Turkish attack , changed his mind and ordered continuation of the march to Alıören and then Banaz . Even though the road to Alıören was open , Trikoupis had lost invaluable time before ordering the continuation of the march to the west . The Turkish forces had covered much of the northern and southern flank of Trikoupis Group . At 1330 hours the marching Greek column found the road to Alıören blocked by Turkish cavalry of the 14th Turkish Cavalry division . Trikoupis ordered his forces to attack and break the Turkish force . A Greek regiment pushed the Turkish cavalry back but new Turkish reinforcements arrived . It became evident that Trikoupis Group could not avoid a general engagement . Trikoupis ordered his divisions to deploy and defend until darkness arrived , when the march would resume . By 16 : 00 hours , the Turkish artillery became particularly effective , inflicting heavy casualties to the densely concentrated Greek forces . The Turkish IV Corps exercised heavy pressure from the east and south while the VI Corps attacked from the north . The situation for the Greek units became critical . At dusk the Greek western flank was broken . Large numbers of non - combatants fled to the west . At 20 : 30 Trikoupis ordered the remnants of his Group to resume the march to the west . All heavy wagons , field artillery and wounded men unable to march were abandoned . Over 2 , 000 killed Greeks were counted by the Turks the next day in the battlefield , not counting the wounded who died later as a result of their severe wounds . The Trikoupis Group had greatly disintegrated . Its men were completely exhausted , and many were collapsing . Trikoupis Group was divided in three columns which tried to march to the west . A column of 2 , 000 men ( mainly from the Greek 12th division ) surrendered at 2000 hours on 1 September to Turkish cavalry units . Trikoupis ' column , together with 5 , 000 - 6 , 000 of his men eventually surrendered to the Turkish forces at 1700 hours on 2 September . A column of 5 , 000 men managed to escape the Turkish ring , but had lost any combat value . Trikoupis and General Digenis ( CO of II Corps ) were lead to Mustafa Kemal , who informed Trikoupis that he had been appointed as commander - in - chief of the Greek Army in Asia Minor , an episode highlighting the level of confusion in the Greek command . On 30 August , Frangou Group was also attacked , by the Turkish I Corps . Frangou Group held its positions all day , but at 23 : 30 its left flank was breached . Frangou ordered his forces to retreat towards Banaz . Thus the battle for Dumlupınar came to an end , and the Greeks began a fighting retreat west , which did not end until they left Asia Minor . Outcome . The end of the battle of Dumlupınar spelt the beginning of the end for the Greek presence in Anatolia . Trikoupis Group , with some 34 infantry battalions and 130 artillery pieces was destroyed as an effective fighting force . The remaining Frangou Group was too weak to hold against the Turkish onslaught . Greek losses were heavy ; by 7 September , the Greek Army had suffered 50 , 000 casualties ( 35 , 000 killed and wounded and 15 , 000 captured ) . Greek material losses were heavy too . By 4 September , 910 cannon s , 1 , 200 trucks , 200 automobiles , 5 , 000 machine gun s , 11 aircraft , 40 , 000 rifle s and 400 carloads of ammunitions had fallen into the hands of the Turks . In comparison Turkish losses were lower . Between 26 August and 9 September , the Turkish army sustained 13 , 476 casualties ( 2 , 318 killed , 9 , 360 wounded , 1 , 697 missing and 101 captured ) . In two weeks ( 26 August 1922 - 9 September 1922 ) the Turkish army re - captured all the territories which the Greek army conquered since May 1919 . The Turks chased the fleeing Greeks to Smyrna , which was later abandoned by the Greek soldiers . During this period the Greek Army numbered 300 , 000 men with an additional 100 , 000 in reserve . According to the Greek Directorate of Army History , during the Greco - Turkish War , the Greek army suffered ~ 101 , 000 casualties ( 24 , 240 killed 48 , 880 wounded , 18 , 095 missing and 10 , 000 captured ) out of a 200 , 000 - 250 , 000 men strong army stationed in Anatolia . Other sources put the total number of casualties even higher at 120 , 000 - 130 , 000 . By 1921 the war in Anatolia had cost Greece a sum equivalent to US $ 100 , 000 , 000 at the rate of exchange in 1921 . Turkish casualties numbered 13 , 000 killed ( additionally about 24 , 000 died of disease during and after the war ) and 35 , 000 wounded for the whole Turkish War of Independence . The last Greek troops left Anatolia on 18 September . The Armistice of Mudanya was signed by Turkey , Italy , France and Great Britain on 11 October 1922 . Greece was forced to accede to it on 14 October . To commemorate this victory , 30 August ( also liberation day of Kütahya ) is celebrated as Victory Day ( " Zafer Bayramı " ) , a national holiday in Turkey .