Battle of Cochin ( 1504 ) The Battle of Cochin sometimes referred as the Second Siege of Cochin was a series of confrontations , between March and July 1504 , fought on land and sea , principally between the Portuguese garrison at Cochin , allied to the Trimumpara Raja , and the armies of the Zamorin of Calicut and vassal Malabari states . The celebrated heroics of the tiny Portuguese garrison , led by Duarte Pacheco Pereira , in fending off an invading army several hundred times bigger , has led it to be sometimes characterized as the ' Portuguese Thermopylae ' . It proved a humiliating defeat for the Zamorin of Calicut . He not only failed to conquer Cochin , but his inability to crush the tiny opposition undermined the faith of his vassals and allies . The Zamorin lost much of his traditional authority over the Malabar states of India in the aftermath . The preservation of Cochin secured the continued presence of the Portuguese in India . Background . Since the fragmentation of the Chera state in the 10th century , the ruler of the city - state of Calicut ( Port . " Calecute " ; now , Kozhikode ) , known as the Zamorin ( Samoothiri Raja , ' Lord of the Sea ' ) had been generally recognized as overlord by most of the small states on the Malabar Coast of India . Under the Zamorin ' s rule , Calicut grew as a commercial city , emerging as the major entrepot of the Kerala pepper trade and the principal emporium for other spices shipped from further east ( see Spice trade ) . In the opening journey of the Portuguese to India in 1498 , Vasco da Gama immediately made his way to Calicut and tried to secure a commercial treaty with the Zamorin . Unimpressed by Gama , the elderly Zamorin allowed the Portuguese to buy spices on Calicut ' s markets , but refused to accord them any greater privileges . The follow - up expedition of Pedro Álvares Cabral ( 2nd India Armada , 1500 ) arrived better prepared . The old Zamorin having died in the interim , Cabral negotiated a treaty with the new Zamorin , and a Portuguese factory was opened in Calicut . But within a couple of months , quarrels erupted between Portuguese agents and established Arab traders in the city , in which the Zamorin refused to intervene . In December , 1500 , a riot was raised and the factory in Calicut was overrun and numerous Portuguese massacred . Blaming the Zamorin for the event , Cabral demanded that the Zamorin compensate them for their losses and expel all Arab traders from the city . When the Zamorin refused , Cabral bombarded the city of Calicut . Thus began the war between Portugal and Calicut . The Portuguese quickly found local allies among some of the city - states on the Malabar coast which had long grated under Calicut ' s dominance . Cochin ( " Cochim " , Kochi ) , Cannanore ( " Canonor " , Kannur ) and Quilon ( " Coulão " , Kollam ) opened their ports and invited the Portuguese . The succeeding Portuguese armadas to India took to routinely bombarding Calicut , preying on her ships , and driving commercial traffic away from the city . The Zamorin quickly learned that there was little point challenging the Portuguese fleets at sea – the technological gap in ships and cannon was just too great – but on land the difference was not nearly as lopsided . The Portuguese presence in India consisted only of a handful of commercial agents , after all . The Portuguese had come for spices . The Zamorin calculated that if he could exert his traditional authority over the Malabar states and close off access to spices , the Portuguese would either leave or be forced to negotiate terms and make a sensible peace . That meant persuading – or forcing – his errant vassals in Cochin , Cannanore and Quilon into shutting their markets to the Portuguese . In principle , the Zamorin ' s plan was sound . The Portuguese had not exactly endeared themselves to the residents of the Malabar coast . Their fleets had left a brutish calling card , made absurd demands upon the rulers , disrupted trade and daily life all along the coast . It should not have been too difficult to prevail upon the Malabari cities to participate in a general boycott of Portuguese trade , at least temporarily . But the resistance of Cochin to the Zamorin ' s entreaties proved most stubborn . First siege of Cochin ( 1503 ) . The city of Cochin ( " Cochim " , Kochi ) was a growing commercial town perched on the edge of the Vembanad lagoon . The ruling Hindu prince , Unni Goda Varda , the Trimumpara Raja of Cochin , was not secure in his own position . Formally , he was a minor prince , subsidiary to senior family members across the lagoon at Edapalli ( " Repelim " ) , the official overlords of the lagoon . Indeed , it is quite probable Trimumpara was in the midst of a family quarrel and originally sought out the Portuguese alliance to strengthen his own position against his relatives . Sentiment among the Cochinese population was largely against the Portuguese . Cochin was not self - sufficient in food , and the people had suffered much from the general disruption of trade along the Malabar coast . Moreover , Cochin had a significant Muslim population – both expatriate Arabs and local Mappila s – and the Portuguese had made no secret of their hostility towards them . Yet these were usually the very traders upon whom the city ' s subsistence depended . The Cochinese population did not , could not , see the point of the current state of affairs . Sensing the resentment , Trimumpara Raja had the Portuguese factor Diogo Fernandes Correia and his assistants , Lourenço Moreno and Álvaro Vaz , stay at his own palace , and ensured they were always escorted by loyal guards when walking around the city ' s markets . But the Zamorin ' s influence over the Kerala hinterlands had dried up much of Cochin ' s pepper supply . The Portuguese factors were disappointed at the spare findings on Cochin ' s spice markets , and the Trimumpara Raja was painfully aware of their increasing interest in other more promising cities , notably Quilon . If the Portuguese abandoned Cochin , the Trimumpara would have nothing to show for his pains . The Trimumpara ' s advisors argued against the Portuguese alliance , and urged him to pursue a reconciliation with the Zamorin . They warned him that the continued loyalty of the Cochinese Nair s could not be taken for granted in the event of a war . Nonetheless , the Trimumpara Raja refused to abandon the Portuguese . In March , 1503 , as soon as the Portuguese fleet ( 4th Armada ) had set sail back to Lisbon , the Zamorin decided to intimidate the stubborn rebel prince into compliance . The Portuguese had left a small coastal patrol behind , to help defend Cochin . But the patrol ' s commander , Vicente Sodré dismissed the rumors of the Zamorin ' s military preparations and decided to take his patrol to cruise the mouth of the Red Sea . They would not return until the end of the summer . In April , the Zamorin led a large Calicut army of some 50 , 000 troops against Cochin . Along the way , he was to joined by allied Malabari lords , notably the rulers of Edapalli . The Trimumpara ' s son Narayan rushed with a force of 5 , 500 Cochinese troops to block the passage of the Calicut army over a ford near Edapalli ( " Repelim " ) . Narayan valiantly repelled two Calicut assaults , but eventually the Zamorin ' s agents , by bribery and subterfuge , managed to detach many of the Cochinese Nairs from the frontline . In the next assault , Narayan was overwhelmed and killed , along with his remaining forces . Narayan ' s brave stand gave his father and his Portuguese guests enough time to flee Cochin across the water to Vypin island ( " Vaipi " ) with a small core of loyal guards . The Zamorin seized Cochin city and demanded Trimumpara hand over the Portuguese agents , but the rebel prince refused . Vypin ' s natural defenses and the worsening weather prevented the launching of an assault against the island . The frustrated Zamorin limited himself to burning the city of Cochin and vowed to return after the weather improved . [ Before burning down Cochin , the Zamorin of Calicut removed an ancient sacred stone , upon which the old Chera Kings of Malabar were traditionally ceremonially esconsed as lords of the sea and overlords of all the Malabari states . The sacred stone had originally been housed at the ancient Malabari capital of Cranganore , but had since been moved to Cochin . The Zamorin now moved it once more , to Edapalli . ] The main Calicut army returned that same August , and once again Trimumpara Raja and the Portuguese agents were holed up in Vypin . The Zamorin and his Malabari allies were in the process of preparing assault boats against the island , when they spotted six armed Portuguese ships under Francisco de Albuquerque – the vanguard of the arriving 5th Armada – racing towards Cochin . The allied Malabari armies began to melt away immediately . The Zamorin reluctantly dismantled the siege and returned to Calicut . Preparations . Cochin had been saved in the nick of time , but the Zamorin ' s armies were sure to return next Spring , as soon as the 5th Armada left . So the Portuguese immediately set about making preparations for Cochin ' s defense in the fleet ' s absence . In the first order of business , a squadron of Portuguese ships did a tour of the Vembanad lagoon , punishing the local princelets who had given their support to the Zamorin ' s siege . Notable in this campaign was the Portuguese brutal sack of Edapalli , razing the city , with great bloodshed . Smaller towns and villages either met a similar fate , or quickly switched their allegiance over to Cochin . In this manner , the Trimumpara Raja of Cochin was forcibly imposed by Portuguese arms as the overlord of the Vembanad lagoon . In the meantime , the Portuguese commanders persuaded Trimumpara Raja to allow them to erect a fortress on the edge of the Cochinese peninsula ( an area now known as Fort Kochi ) , just a little to the west of the old city of Cochin proper ( around what is now Mattancherry ) . Fort Manuel de Cochim , as it was christened , was the first Portuguese fort in Asia . Built from local coconut palm timber supplied by the Trimumpara himself , the fort was completed in a couple of months . As soon at it was finished , the Portuguese fleet commander Afonso de Albuquerque , against all odds , suddenly agreed to a peace treaty with the Zamorin of Calicut . It was probably a cynical move on both sides – no one really expected the peace to hold , but it bought them a little time . For a few weeks , the Portuguese could finish their defenses , the Zamorin could prepare his forces , without being molested by the other . But the peace was soon broken again in a skirmish over the delivery of a spice shipment in Cranganore . [ Note : It is possible that this ' Diogo Pereira ' is none other than Diogo Fernandes Pereira the lost captain of the third squadron of the 5th Armada , who had discovered Socotra and wintered there , and set on a solo crossed of the Indian Ocean around this time . If so , then the nau " Concepção " might be his ship . ] Intelligence networks in south India were such that both the Zamorin and the Trimumpara knew each other ' s every movement ( the element of surprise was never really an exploitable tactic on the Malabar coast ) . And , sure enough , news soon arrived of the assembly of a large invasion army in Calicut . Unlike the previous one , this army was better equipped . The Zamorin had received a large contingent of firearms ( arquebus es and / or musket s ) from the Turks . Two Venetian agents that had secretly come to India with the 4th Armada had been busy helping Calicut forge better artillery . At least five European large cannons were ready , as well as a couple hundred smaller boat guns . Notices had been sent to the Zamorin ' s allies – the lords ( " caimals " ) of Edapalli , Cranganore , Kottakkal , Tanur ( Vettath raja of Vettattnad ) , Beypore , Chaliyam , Pariyapuram etc . – to prepare their auxiliary forces . News of the size and arms of the Zamorin ' s army filled the Cochinese with dread . Cochin had lost a sizeable part of its own army during the previous year ' s siege . Although , in his new position as lord of the Vembanad backwaters , the Trimumpara Raja could , notionally , call on 30 , 000 troops from around the lagoon , at most 8 , 000 might respond to his call , the remainder being " actively or passively hostile . " Rumors soon spread through Cochin that the Portuguese garrison had no intention to stay , that ships were being prepared to evacuate the Portuguese to Cannanore or Quilon the moment the Zamorin ' s army arrived , and leave the Cochinese to bear the brunt of the assault . The population of Cochin began to evacuate the city . Trimumpara Raja himself began to waver , his advisors urging him to seek out a reconciliation with the Zamorin before it was too late . Duarte Pacheco ' s first order of business was to stiffen Trimumpara Raja ' s resolve , persuading him that the Portuguese were there to stay . Remembering how the Portuguese coastal patrol of Vicente Sodré had abandoned them during last year ' s siege , the Trimumpara had ample reason to doubt Pacheco ' s word . But he also knew his fate was fatally tied to the Portuguese . Shaking off his misgivings , he placed the defense of the city in their hands . Trimumpara issued edicts forbidding anybody to leave Cochin on the penalty of death , and ordering his own officials and soldiers to treat an order from Duarte Pacheco as if it were his own . Of particular concern was the Muslim merchant community in Cochin . The Portuguese had made no secret of their hostility and regarded them suspiciously as a ' fifth column ' for the Zamorin . But Cochin was dependent upon their trade for their food supply and should the siege be prolonged , the fate of the city would be in their hands . Duarte Pacheco went out of his way to secure their cooperation . He addressed an assembly the leading Muslim merchants of Cochin , promising that no harm would come to them . He co - opted a few of their leaders ( notably , a certain Muhammad Marakkar ) and , just in case , held some leading Muslim families hostage , shipping them over the outlet under guard to Vypin island for the duration of the hostilities . Large stores of foodstuffs ( rice , sugar , etc . ) were also stockpiled in Vypin in case the Zamorin ' s agents set fire to the city or it had to be evacuated . In prelude , Duarte Pacheco launched a few minor raids on some small settlements around Edapalli , which were said to be siding with the Zamorin . Their strategic value was minor – it was more a show of force and bravado , to inculcate confidence in the Cochinese population that the Portuguese were itching for a fight . ( However , it seems that these raids may have inadvertently damaged one of the two Portuguese caravels , making it unavailable for the upcoming confrontation ) . The pass of Cambalão . From intelligence networks , Duarte Pacheco Pereira received the details of the Zamorin ' s armed forces and , more importantly , their movements . The Zamorin himself was leading a 57 , 000 strong army of Calicut ( some cite 84 , 000 , which may or may not include auxiliaries ; although certainly most of these were very lightly armed , at best . ) . The Zamorin ' s army was bringing the five European large guns , cast by the two Venetian engineers , and nearly 300 smaller Indian guns . The army was assembled near Cranganore , and were to march south along the east bank of the Vembanad lagoon , and cross the fording passage by Kumbalam ( " Cambalão " ) . The ford was said to be a mere 100 m wide , waist - deep , and passable at all tides , so the vast Calicut army would not need to go through the complicated , disorderly process of loading and unloading ferry - boats . The Calicut fleet was composed of 160 vessels – about 76 of which were " paraus " ( a sail - and - oar - powered Malabari warship , often compared by European writers to a fusta or galiot ) . Each " parau " was armed with two bombards , five muskets and 25 archers . The remaining boats were smaller , some 54 " catures " ( a smaller version of the parau ) and 30 " tones " ( canoes ) , each mounted with a cannon , and 16 soldiers . , The fleet was under the command of the Zamorin ' s nephew ( and heir of Calicut ) , Naubea Daring ( " Naubeadarim " ) , with the lord ( " caimal " ) Elcanol of Edapalli as second - in - command . The fleet was to slip into the Vembanad lagoon via the outlet near Cranganore and then sail down the lagoon , accompanying and protecting the infantry . Being fully informed of the Zamorin ' s plans , Duarte Pacheco Pereira determined that the Portuguese - Cochinese forces needed to block the passage of the army at Kumbalam ford ( " Passo de Cambalão " ) . That meant distributing his forces carefully . He placed the factor Diogo Fernandes Correia and his two assistants , Lourenço Moreno and Álvaro Vaz , with 39 men at Fort Manuel . The large " nau " " Concepção " was loaded with 25 men , artillery and five expert gunners , and placed under the command of Diogo Pereira ( possibly Diogo Fernandes Pereira ? ) and instructed to remain close to the Fort and defend Cochin city ( it would simultaneously guard the Vembanad outlet and prevent Calicut ships from slipping through there ) . Duarte Pacheco placed 26 men in one of the caravels under the command of Pêro Rafael . The other caravel still under repair , Pacheco commandeered two Malabarese " bateis " ( comparable to pinnace s ) , placing one ( with 23 men ) under Diogo Pires , and the other ( with 22 men ) under himself . Each " batel " was armed with four swivel guns . These three vessels would try to hold Kumbalam ford . Cochinese workers had produced a collection of tower shields ( " paveses " ) , thick wooden planks , two fingers thick , which were mounted all along the sides of the caravel and bateis as makeshift crenellation s to protect the crew from missile fire . Rope nets were hung across the masts and sacks filled with cotton were placed throughout the ship ' s deck , and hung all along the sides , to protect the ships from cannonballs . Boatloads of good hard stone had been shipped down from Anjediva island to be carved by Cochinese workers into cannonballs for the Portuguese guns . Cochinese workers had also been quietly producing a large number of 12 - foot - tall poles , sharpened at one end , hardened by fire on the other , with pre - cut grooves to allow them to be snapped tight with crosspoles . The bulk of his army having deserted , Trimumpara Raja of Cochin was left with less than 5 , 000 troops . He assigned around 500 Nair s to join Duarte Pacheco ' s little fleet at Kumbalam pass , retaining the remainder to protect the city . Navigating carefully through the thin brackish narrows and straits of Vembanad lake , Duarte Pacheco ' s three ships ( and accompanying Cochinese boats ) arrived at the Kumbalam ford , a mere 100 m of shallow water . Pacheco ordered the long sharpened poles drilled deep mid - channel and across the length of the ford , a makeshift stockade to block the passage of the infantry . He subsequently ordered the ships tied to each other , and to the banks ( with iron cords , so that they could not be easily cut and set adrift ) . The ships were set with the broadsides facing the shores . Location of the pass . The exact location of the " Passe de Cambalão " , the fording point where Duarte Pacheco Pereira made his stand , is uncertain and disputed in various sources . Portuguese " Cambalão " is probably modern Kumbalam on the elongated islands in the middle - southern part of the Vembanad lagoon – that is " below " Cochin city . However , some historians ( e . g . Logan ( 1887 ) , Whiteway ( 1894 ) , Monteiro ( 1989 ) ) suggest the Portuguese made their stand much further north , at the ford of Edapalli ( Portuguese " Repelim " ) , the same pass which Narayan fruitlessly tried to hold the previous year . There are reasons to justify either location and doubt the other . If Kumbalam was indeed the passage , that would suggest the Zamorin ' s army marched all down the east coast of the lagoon unchallenged . That is not necessarily unlikely . The passage across Kumbalam islands certainly makes a narrow passage for the troops to ford across to the Cochinese peninsula and march calmly up behind Cochin city . The problem is that it also means that the Zamorin ' s fleet sailed the entire length of the lagoon , from the environs of Cranganore down to Kumbalam – that is , their fleet sailed past Cochin without making a lunge at it or being challenged . And that is unlikely , especially as the Portuguese kept their nau on guard before the city . As a result , the alternative theory , that the Portuguese held their position at Edapalli ford makes more sense . The name was simply misunderstood – they were blocking the road " to " Kumbalam , not " at " Kumbalam . But Edapalli pass brings up other inconsistencies – in particular , later in the campaign , the Zamorin sent part of his army to try a different pass to " Palurte " , which is almost certainly Palluruthy , again " south " of Cochin . If they were encamped by Kumbalam , it makes perfect sense – the Zamorin just needed to go back a few steps . But if they were held up at Edapalli ford , that detachment would have had to go across the very pass the Portuguese were holding . If they circumvented it , they would come up below them , which then brings up the question why not attack the Portuguese pass from both sides and finish off the story there ? It is possible that " Palurte " is misidentified , that it is not Pallurthy , but somewhere else ( Logan et al . suggest ' Valanjaca ' , but where that also uncertain . ) If the Zamorin was held at Edapalli ford , crossing the lagoon there would have gotten them only to Vypin island , which would not necessarily be a grave concern for the Portuguese , since that would not place them within marching range of Cochin . A third possibility is that Cambalão is actually Kumbalangy and not Kumbalam – that is the peninsula directly south of Cochin . That means the Calicut army marched much further south , taking a long loop around the southern end of the Vembanad lagoon through the very southerly ' lands of Porquá ' ( Purakkad ) ( or possibly cut across at Perumbalam ) and then marched north through Kumbalangy . The main reasons to contemplate this southern position are : ( 1 ) It is practically a continuous land march – if the Zamorin wanted to avoid ferry boats for his huge army , taking the long loop " under " the Vembanad lake was the least water - clogged option ( 2 ) it places the Portuguese position closer to Cochin – more precisely , the Zamorin would be one ford away from the Cochinese land mass , thus making it a more critical point to hold for the Portuguese ; ( 3 ) Kumbalangy has Aroor to the east , which might be what the Portuguese called " Arraul " island , with an alternate passage to Cochin that is somewhat pointing through Palluruthy ; ( 4 ) the southerly loop route to Kumbalangy passes through or near the lands of Udayamperoor ( " Diamper " ) , Perumbalam ( " Primbalão " ) and / or the very southerly lands of Purakkad ( " Porquá " ) , whose lords were known to have defected from Cochin to Calicut before the battle . The drawbacks to Kumbalangy is the idea of the Calicut fleet sailing there passes even closer to Cochin than before ; Aroor does not really point to Palluruthy , and it is difficult visualize where Palignard ford would have been by comparison . First assault . Duarte Pacheco did not have to wait long before the massive army of the Zamorin of Calicut appeared at Kumbalam ford . The army is said to have moved in and deployed their positions on the banks during the night , without anyone quite seeing them until the dawn of March 31 ( Palm Sunday ) . The sudden sight , in the early morning light , of the Zamorin ' s massive army of 84 , 000 on the banks , already arrayed , in their magnificent arms with flags flying , and guns in position , was a startling sight to the defenders . The intimidating blare of the trumpets and war cries of such a massive army was too much for some of the defenders to bear . The final act in this terrifying prelude was the sudden appearance of the Calicut fleet , 160 armed ships , behind the strait ' s bend . Nerves cracked before this display . Some Cochinese boats started sneaking away , others followed , and soon mass panic set in . The Cochinese boats , with their 500 Nairs , were soon all fleeing back to Cochin . Only the three anchored ships , with 90 or so Portuguese ( plus two Cochinese officials ) remained to face the Zamorin ' s army and fleet . For Duarte Pacheco , the most immediate worry was the five Venetian guns on the shore . Most of the Indian guns were said to have about the ' range and strength of an arm - thrown stone ' , which posed little threat to the cotton - reinforced ships . But the Venetian guns could sink them at distance . Pacheco directed all his fire immediately upon those guns , scattering the battery crews , and kept intermittent fire focused on them to prevent them reforming . Fire was also directed at Calicut hatchet - crews which had ventured into the ford to attempt to chop down the ford - blocking stockade . While this was going on , the Calicut fleet began to advance on the Portuguese position . But the very narrowness of the channel chosen by Pacheco had been fortuitous . It did not allow the large Calicut fleet to spread out on a broad front . Instead , they had to approach the anchored Portuguese with a very narrow front . This pitted the three Portuguese ships against only a dozen or so paraus at a time , something the superior Portuguese firepower might handle . The first wave was the most difficult – some 20 boats , tightly tied to each other , advanced together , constituting some 40 bombards and 100 muskets , plus innumerable bowmen . But the tower shields and cotton sacks on the Portuguese ships worked wonders , cushioning the missiles and allowing the Portuguese crossbowmen , musketeers and gunners to pick off the gunners and musketeers on the Malabari boats , which had little or no protection . After a few volleys , four boats were half - sunk , the rest sufficiently damaged or covered in enough dead & wounded to be unable to proceed , and began to retire . They were followed by a second wave of around a dozen boats . But this met much the same fate . Then a third , fourth and fifth , each faring no better . Indeed , it only got easier for the Portuguese , as the sunk , damaged and retiring paraus of earlier waves formed river obstacles ( and a demoralizing sight ) for the next . By midday , the Calicut fleet commanders realized this was not working , and ordered a retreat . Throughout all this , the Zamorin ' s army assembled on the shores had been largely ineffective . The tower shields and nets had fended off most of their constant missile fire . Fire had to be occasionally directed to the shore , to ensure the Italian gun batteries remained out of commission and that the hatchet squads did not reach the ford ' s stockade . It was a humiliating morning for the Zamorin . Chroniclers report that , in this first encounter , the Calicut army and fleet suffered some 1 , 300 dead , while the Portuguese suffered not a single loss . Second assault . A week elapsed until the second assault on the Kumblam ford , on April 7 ( Easter Sunday ) . During this interim , the caravel of Diogo Pires that had been under repair was back in shape and joined the squad at Kumbalam ford . The nau " Concepção " remained as sentinel before Cochin city . The Zamorin had also been busy repairing his ships and raising more troops . This time he had decided on a diversionary tactic . While the main Calicut fleet ( some 150 boats ) headed towards Kumbalam , a fleet of around 70 Calicut paraus would head towards Cochin city itself and engage the nau " Concepção " . The point was to force Duarte Pacheco ' s little squad to abandon Kumbalam to rescue Cochin city , thus leaving the Kumbalam ford open for his army to cross . As soon as he heard of this ( through usual intelligence channels ) , the Trimumpara Raja of Cochin immediately dispatched a message to Duarte Pacheco begging him to return . Pacheco shrugged off the request at first . But around 9 AM , with the tide falling and the wind in his favor , Duarte Pacheco decided that the elements might allow him to take up the appeal . Taking one caravel and one batel , and leaving the remaining pair behind to hold the ford , Pacheco raced up towards Cochin . He arrived just as the nau " Concepção " was in the process of desperately fending off a heavy assault by the Calicut squad . Seeing Pacheco ' s two ships coming in from the rear , the Calicut squad realized they were about to be trapped in the crossfire and quickly broke off the engagement and retired . Pacheco did not pause for greetings or inquiries , but immediately turned his boats around and raced back to the Kumbalam pass . The high tide was coming in and the wind was changing . He arrived back at Kumbalam ford just in time to anchor himself in with the others and prepare to meet the bulk of the Calicut fleet , now bearing down on the ford . The same scene was played out as the week before – Calicut paraus forced to advance in small narrow waves , etc . And it was just as fruitless . After losing around 19 ships to heavy damage and some 290 dead , the Calicut admiral called off the attack . The diversionary gambit had failed . Third assault . The next day , rather than resting and recuperating , Duarte Pacheco launched a surprise attack on some small villages on nearby islands , which were said to have furtively supplied paraus to the Calicut fleet . The value of the target itself was not much . Its principal purpose was to unsettle the Zamorin ' s army psychologically , reminding them that despite all the terrible fighting and casualties of the previous day , the Portuguese were still unscathed and in fresh fighting form . The day after that ( Tuesday , April 9 ) , the Zamorin decided on a new tactic . There would be no more impetuous fleet attacks . The fleet was ordered to hold back until Portuguese ships were sunk or severely damaged by shore cannon . To this end , the Calicut batteries carefully positioned and shielded their Venetian cannons . The battle opened with a barrage from land on the Portuguese ships . But while the Venetian guns had the range to hit the ships , the relatively inexperienced battery crews did not have the aim – certainly not from that distance . Duarte Pacheco apprised the situation quickly , and forbade the ships from firing back . His intention was to give the Calicut battery crews confidence and induce them to move their guns forward for better aim ( and expose themselves ) . Pacheco ' s ruse worked better than he expected . As the guns on the Portuguese ships fell silent , and they just sat there quietly , allowing themselves to be fired upon from land without firing back , the Calicut captains were quick to conclude that the Portuguese must have run out of ammunition ! At this point , the Zamorin ' s cautious plan broke down . Not only did the cannon batteries begin to move out of their shielded positions , the Calicut fleet which had been idling at the mouth of the strait , warily watching the Portuguese , decided this was a golden opportunity . With Portuguese guns out of ammunition , it would be a simple matter for the paraus to rush , grapple , board and overwhelm the Portuguese with their numbers . They impetuously launched themselves downriver towards the Portuguese squad . Duarte Pacheco held fire until the first wave of paraus came close enough , then launched a barrage at point blank range , sinking eight paraus in one massive volley of cannon and musket fire , causing an extraordinary number of casualties . The first wave was broken , but the remainder of the paraus had moved too far forward to pull back now . The very thing the Zamorin had wanted to avoid , was now too late – the fleet was engaging . And it played out as before – small fruitless waves after waves of paraus , broken successively and calmly by Portuguese gunfire . The Venetian gun batteries , now unwisely forward and exposed , were silenced by occasional direct fire on the battery crews . By noon , however , one of the Portuguese " bateis " had caught fire , forcing the crew to divide their attentions . The next wave of Calicut paraus concentrated all their efforts on it , hoping to permanently take at least one of the four Portuguese platforms out of commission . But the crew managed to put out the fire , and fend off the attack . By the end of the day , the Calicut fleet retired , having lost 22 paraus and some 600 dead . Despite the exhaustion of the crews , Pacheco ordered his two " bateis " to give a brief pursuit on the retreating fleet . A little along the way , the bateis disembarked some soldiers near Edapalli , burned down two small villages , and defeated the guard a local lord had rushed to save them . Despite all this action , the Portuguese , again , suffered not a single death , just a few injured . The Zamorin was demoralized after this assault , and is said to have retired into his tents , in a melancholic mood . Already after the second assault , the Zamorin is said to have realized the pointlessness of repeated attacks on the Kumbalam ford , and had even half - made up his mind to dissolve the campaign and start peace negotiations , rather than subject himself to further humiliations . But he was urged on by his noble captains to give it another try , to restore his honor and keep the faith of his vassals . But now these very same captains , by their impetuosity , had delivered him a third defeat . The passes of Palignar and Palurte . The Zamorin was disposed to call off the campaign , if not for the pressure of his commanders , who proposed to abandon Kumbalam and try to reach Cochin via two passages further north – " Palignar " and " Palurte " . Location of the passes . " Palurte " is almost definitely Palluruthy , south of Cochin . The location of " Palignar " ( alternatively given as Palinhar , Palinhard , Palignard , Pallinganad , Palimbão ) is Panangad an island east of Kumbalam , south of Ernakulam , studded in the Vambanad River . All we know of Palignar is that it is a league or half - league from Palurte ( either to the north or south – surprisingly unclear in the chronicles ) . ' Palignar ' ( or similar - sounding counterparts ) is not easily found in usual geographies of the Kerala backwaters . The chronicles suggest that the passages went via the island of " Arraul " ( or " Darraul " or " Arrail " ) . This could be a reference to Aroor , a southerly peninsula , that indeed might be crossed north towards Palluruthy . Of course , this would require us to consider the location of the original ' Cambalão ' to be Kumbalangy ( rather than Kumbalam ) . This is not outlandish – as Aroor is indeed behind Kumbalangy and it does accord with occasional suggestions ( e . g . Castanheda , p . 228 ) that the main encampment of the Zamorin ' s army between these assaults were in the ' lands of Porquá ' ( probably Purakkad , thus a reference to the southern end of the Vembanad lagoon ) . However , picking Aroor as ' Arraul ' does not really seem to give us an intuitive idea of where Palignar & Palurte might be relative to each other . Geographies of Kerala backwaters show there are plenty of places with ' Aroor ' / ' Aryoor ' - sounding names in the region . And in the documents we have of the Triumpara ' s title , he cites his lordship of Arraul as third in importance ( after Cochin and Vypin ) , suggesting it should not be obscure or a great distance away . Moreover , there are suggestions ( e . g . Castanheda , pp . 224 , 227 ) that the fighting was very close to Cochin city and Fort Manuel . Finally , some of the chronicles suggest that the route via Arraul was a rather direct passage to Cochin city – indeed , the very passage taken by the Zamorin ' s armies in the first siege of 1503 . As a result , one probable hypothesis is that " Arraul " island might be modern Willingdon Island in Kochi harbor ( or rather underlying island located there previously , as most of Willingdon was artificially created in the 1920s ) . Thus ' Palignar ' and ' Palurte ' were passes through it that entered directly onto the landmass where Cochin city sits . However , all this is speculative conjecture . There is no agreement among chronicles , scholars or historians on any of these locations . Redeployment to Arraul . Chroniclers claim that Palignar ( Panangad ) - Palurte ( Palluruthi ) crossings via Arraul ( Aroor ) island were available and unprotected during the Kumbalam ford attacks , but that the Zamorin never attempted them because the Kumbalam destination , once fixed , " became a point of honor " to adhere to . Moreover , the northerly passages were covered by dense forests and thickets unsuitable for the easy passage of his large army . But the biggest drawback is that they were not easily passed – that is , Palignar was only fordable on foot at low tide , whereas Palurte required ferry boats . But such considerations were now set aside . The principal advantage of the Arraul passages is that they were two – that is , that the Portuguese would not be able to defend both Palignar and Palurte simultaneously . In late April , the Zamorin lifted his camp at Kumbalam and began to withdraw – seemingly back to Calicut . But Duarte Pacheco Pereira soon received notice that Zamorin ' s army was in fact heading to the Palignar - Palurte passes , and that advanced troops of the Zamorin , some 500 Nairs , were already on Arraul island , cutting down thickets to ease the passage of the army . Pacheco rushed with a couple of boats up to Arraul , while the Trimumpara Raja dispatched an army of some 200 Cochinese Nairs from Cochin city to join him there . Pacheco took command of them , divided them into two columns , one under himself another under Pêro Rafael , and drove the thicket - cutters back . Duarte Pacheco set about organizing his position before the arrival of the rest of the Calicut army , estimated to be but a mere one day way . His caravels could only go as far as Palurte ferry – lack of water depth prevented the caravels from advancing beyond that . So Pacheco ordered the two caravels ( under Pêro Rafael and Diogo Pires ) to anchor in at Palurte with iron cords , while he proceeded with the two smaller bateis on to Palignar ford . At Palignar , Duarte Pacheco anchored both his " bateis " on the bank , placing them under the command Simão de Andrade and Cristóvão Jusarte [ Note : Correa ( p . 402 ) calls the latter " Jusarte Pacheco " or " Lisuarte Pacheco " , and identifies him as the son of Duarte Pacheco ] . The near bank of the ford was to be held by a 600 - strong force of Cochinese Nairs dispatched by the Trimumpara Raja , under the command of his nephew and heir , Unni Goda Varda ( " Candagora " ) . The factor ' s assistant , Lourenço Moreno , apparently bored of Fort Manuel and wanting some action , showed up at the ford and was assigned to either take command of a land entrenchment or aboard some Cochinese canoes . But perhaps the most critical step , Duarte Pacheco ordered the troops and crews to clear the opposite banks of vegetation , so as to deprive enemy archers and cannons any form of protective cover . The critical key to Duarte Pacheco ' s defense was the tides . Although forced to defend two passages , he realized he did not have to defend them both at once . Palignar ford could only be crossed on foot at low tide , during which time the water at Palurte is too shallow for the Zamorin ' s ships and ferry boats to move . At high tide , boats could move at Palurte , but the infantry could not ford at Palignar . So Duarte Pacheco calculated he could shuttle himself and some of his forces back and forth via shallow launches between the two passes – reinforcing the Nairs and bateis at Palignar in low tide , and then slip down the strait to help the caravels at Palurte at high tide . Fourth assault . The vanguard of the Zamorin ' s army , some 15 , 000 infantry led by Prince Naubeadarim , arrived at Palignar ford a day or two after the skirmish at Arraul . Around the same time , the Calicut fleet , some 250 vessels under lord Ercanol of Edapalli , reached the environs of Palurte . Naubeadrim set himself to seize control of the ford with his army , leaving Ercanol to dislodge the two caravels at Palurte . The attack began at dawn of May 1 . As the tide was high during the morning , Palignar was impassable to Naubeadarim ' s infantry , so Pacheco left the " bateis " with only a small crew under the command of Andrade and Jusarte , and rushed most of his forces on longboats down to Palurte . A contingent of Cochinese Nairs accompanied Pacheco , although the bulk stayed with prince Candagora at the near side of the Palignar ford . The clearing of the vegetation on the opposite banks immediately paid off as , upon reaching Palurte , Pacheco easily noticed a number of Calicut cannons being rolled into position , aiming to sink the anchored caravels . Duarte Pacheco ordered concentrated fire from the ships on their position , scattering the Calicut artillery crews . He then landed a Portuguese - Cochinese assault force on the beach , who rushed up to finish off the lingering Calicut crews and dragged away or spiked the abandoned Calicut cannons . The cannon threat nullified , the troops returned to the caravels to face the arriving Calicut fleet . The strait at Palurte was not as narrow as it had been at Kumbalam , allowing the admiral Elcanol of Edapalli to send in a substantial first wave , a broad front of 40 paraus , tied across , against the caravels . But the speed of Portuguese gunners decimated the advancing fleet . A second wave of nearly the same size was sent after it , but it was also repulsed . By then , the tide had begun to fall , and the Calicut paraus began having trouble moving in the obstacle - ridden shallow waters of Palurte , so the Calicut admiral Ercanol ordered the fleet to retire . News quickly arrived that the Calicut infantry of Naubeadarim was getting ready to wade the passage at Palignar . Duarte Pacheco and his troops went back on their longboats . The tide low enough , Naubeadarim ' s infantry column launched their assault to gain the ford . But they were unable to make much headway or reach the opposite back , held back by the rapid and heavy gunfire from the " bateis " and incessant missile fire from the Cochinese Nairs on the bank . After two heavy - fought but fruitless assaults , the tide began rising again , and Naubeadarim ordered the column to retire . In this first encounter , Calicut is said to have lost some 1 , 000 men and a few ships . The disgusted Zamorin arrived on the scene with the rest of his army soon after , and upbraided both Naubeadarim and Elcanol for what he believed was cowardice in calling premature retreats . The day ' s fight at Palignar and Palurte was probably the heaviest the Portuguese had yet faced . They had little time to prepare proper defenses and were lucky to get away with it . The Portuguese were exhausted and suffered many injured ( but still no deaths , according to the chroniclers ) . Had the Zamorin renewed the assault the next day , his forces might very well have taken the ford . But as luck would have it , torrential downpours prevented resumption of operations , followed quickly by a devastating epidemic of cholera that swept through the Calicut camp . This gave the Portuguese and Cochinese about a week to rest , recuperate and prepare . Fifth assault . Duarte Pacheco used the cholera - induced break from the fighting to repair his ships and strengthen his position at Palignar ford . A strong stockade ( palisade with ramparts ) was erected on the near bank . Sharpened poles , burnt at one end and tied down to each other , were lodged deep into the mud throughout the ford , to severely complicate the infantry ' s passage . [ In more detail , Saraiva ( 1849 : p . 140 ) describes them as flat boards covered in upturned sharp metal spikes and large nails laid across bottom of the Palignar ford to impale the feet of the wading soldiers ; he introduced the poles to serve a double role – as anchors to prevent the planks from floating away or being removed , and as stilts to hold up the planks and prevent them from sinking into the soft river mud . ] The cholera epidemic had taken a heavy toll on the Zamorin ' s army – more than 10 , 000 men were lost . The success of the resistance had also brought back some of the old Cochinese vassals who had earlier abandoned the Trimumpara Raja . According to Correia ( p . 482 ) , these were the lords ( " caimals " ) of " Mangate " ( Alengad ) , " Primbalão " ( Perumbalam ) and " Diamper " ( Udayamperoor ) . Their return was welcome less for any concrete help they might give , and more because they deprived the Zamorin of possible reinforcements . Around May 6 ( date uncertain ) , the Zamorin launched his biggest assault yet , concentrating all his forces on gaining the ford at Palignar . It was spearheaded by some 4 , 000 men with 30 brass cannons , brought forth to sink the bateis . Then came the vanguard column , some 12 , 000 men under Prince Naubeadarim . Ercanol of Edapalli commanded a column of the same size , and the Zamorin himself brought up the rear with some 15 , 000 , including specialized hatchet crews ( some 400 ) to clear the passages and chop down the stockade . At that point , the Portuguese had a mere 40 men on the bateis at Palignar , and only some 200 Cochinese troops at the ford palisade . [ Apparently , the Nairs of the Cochinese vassal lord of " Mangate " ( Alangad ) , assigned to man the palisade , unexpectedly abandoned their posts during the night , leaving only this small number behind . Pacheco dispatched an urgent message to prince Candagora back in Cochin , to rush in reinforcements , but the message did not get conveyed on time . ] The assault on Palignar began with a cannonade duel between the Calicut artillery on land and the " bateis " . The Portuguese artillery got the better of it , and the Calicut batteries were dispersed . But by this time , however , the tide was low , and the bateis , now scraping the riverbed , not easily manoeuvrable into optimal firing positions . The Zamorin gave the order to advance , and Calicut infantry poured into the Palignar ford , to regain the other bank . The spiked planks had their intended effect – the front lines slowed down to watch their step , the rear lines shoved them from behind , and the Calicut army clustered up into a concentrated mob . Portuguese cannons directed their fire on this dense human mass , causing horrific numbers of casualties in the Calicut ranks . Nonetheless , urged on by their officers , the Calicut infantry kept pressing forward . Pêro Rafael directed some of the fire to assassinate the Zamorin himself , and a cannonball landed near enough to his person to cut two of the nobles standing near him to pieces . The blood - covered Zamorin was hurried off the field by his guard , leaving the rest of the assault to Naubeadarim and Ercanol . Enraged at the assassination attempt , Naubeadarim rallied the Calicut troops and pressed forward furiously . Painfully working over the impaling spikes , the vanguard finally reached the palisade on the Cochinese bank . It is said that the Cochinese troops manning the ramparts fell back or fled their positions , and the few Portuguese stationed there were given up for lost . But by this time the tide had begun to rise again , and the bateis were dislodged from the mud and freely manoeuvrable once more . The bateis rushed forward , straight into the ford , and with concentrated fire , broke up the heavy assault on the palisade . Then crossing the ford back and forth with near - point blank cannon , forced the Calicut troops back on to the banks to retreat to the tree line . After nine hours of intense fighting , the high tide was back and the assault was over . The Zamorin ' s army had failed once again . Duarte Pacheco was furious with the Cochinese troops who abandoned the palisade ramparts in the heat of the battle , and even more furious with the troops of the vassal lord of Mangate who had deserted their posts before the fight even began . But Trimumpara Raja sadly reminded him of the general faithlessness of all his vassals , and assured Pacheco that it would not happen again , that his heir , the prince Cadangora , would move to the ford permanently , and supervise the maintenance of the stockade . It is said that sometime during this encounter a detachment of around 2 , 000 Calicut Nairs , using a different little - used passage ( or perhaps landed by paraus ) , managed to circumvent and land behind Portuguese lines . The Nairs were making their way to launch a surprise attack on the ford from the rear , when some local Cochinese peasants working in the rice fields , plucked up their courage and attacked the detachment with their spades , seeing them off rather quickly . Allegedly , the Indian caste system played a significant role , the Nair s fearing defilement by low caste peasants more than any injury from the agricultural implements they were wielding . Pacheco , disgusted with his own Cochinese Nairs , is said to have tried to persuade the Trimumpara Raja to promote these brave peasants to Nairs and assign them to the palisade . The appalled Raja had to give him a lengthy lecture on the intricacies of the caste system . Plots and skirmishes . The depressed Zamorin had no stomach for another failure in the field and dismissed ideas of a renewed direct assault . Delay was also forced by a renewed breakout of the cholera epidemic . Instead , there were just a series of underhanded plots and occasional skirmishes seeking to weaken or draw out the Portuguese position at the passes . As usual , intelligence networks in south India ensured most of the Zamorin ' s plots were leaked . Already earlier , the Zamorin ' s agents had induced a conspiracy by some Cochinese Nairs to assassinate Duarte Pacheco . The plot was uncovered , and Pacheco had two of them flogged and hanged . ( This caused some consternation in Cochinese ranks , as while the execution was acceptable , the flogging of a Nair was a grievous insult to the noble caste . Not wishing to provoke trouble among the Nairs , Duarte Pacheco handed the remaining conspirators over to the Trimumpara Raja to do with them as he will . ) During this interlude , the Zamorin ' s advisors devised a new plan to have agents infiltrate Cochin and bribe victualler s to poison the food and water being sent out to the troops at Palignar ford . But as usual , the plot was leaked . To ensure themselves , new wells were dug on the beaches at Palignar on a daily basis , and victuallers , vendors and transporters were forced to taste their own food at every stage before being distributed to the army . The Zamorin ' s advisors kept concocting more plots – an uprising in Cochin , then a plan to send in boats under the cover of night to Cochin and set the city on fire , then to sneak baskets of venomous cobra s aboard the Portuguese ships , etc . But all these plots were quickly foiled by leaked intelligence . In one of the more famous instances ( reported by Correia , pp . 474 – 75 ) , the Zamorin determined on a night attack . The troops were to cross a ford near Palurte , hitherto unutilized because it was within shot range of the anchored Portuguese caravels . But at night , the caravels would not see them and the troops could wade across . That evening , two Calicut armies set out – the vanguard to go first , and give a torch signal to the second army to advance after they had crossed the ford . But as usual , Pacheco got wind of the plan . And not long after the vanguard started their march , Pacheco gave the pre - arranged torch signal himself and got the second army to advance prematurely . The vanguard , thinking they were being ambushed from behind by a Cochinese column , turned around and attacked the second army . In the dark of the night , the two armies of Calicut did not notice they were fighting each other ! During the interlude , Pacheco repeatedly launched his own excursions to harass the Calicut encampment and raid supporting villages . On one of these excursions , Pacheco is said to have been ambushed and surrounded by a Calicut fleet of some 54 paraus , but managed to defeat them . Sixth assault . Preparations for a new assault on Palignar ford began sometime in late May ( or possibly June . ) 30 , 000 troops were assembled for the new assault on Palignar . The artillery was moved into pre - prepared trench - lines , where the batteries would be better shielded from Portuguese return - fire . Against Palurte , Elacanol of Edapalli repaired and prepared the fleet anew – the vanguard led by 110 well - armed and well - shielded paraus , tied together , followed by some 100 boat transports , packed with soldiers for the grapple . There were a few innovations – firstly , a series of fire - boats ( " brulotes " ) , loaded with inciendiary material , were prepared , intended to be sent into the Portuguese caravels . Then , most peculiar of all , a series of ' floating castles ' ( invented by a certain ' Cogeale ' , an ' Arab of Edapalli ' ) . Essentially , a ' floating castle ' was a wooden siege tower , about 18 hands tall , with heavily reinforced sides , capable of carrying 40 armed men , mounted on two " paraus " lashed together . There were eight such castles , mounted on 16 boats , tied to each other , forming a single imposing line . As usual , Duarte Pacheco was aware of all these preparations , and had himself taken counter - measures . Against the fire - boats , he ordered the construction of a wide raft ( mounted with masts ) , which he anchored firmly across the strait . Hearing of the floating castles , he ordered the erection of wooden structures on the prows of his caravels , to match the height of the Calicut castles . Candagora , prince and heir of Cochin , presented himself with one thousand of the best Cochinese Nairs at Palignar ford . The two " bateis " at Palignar were , as usual , under the command of Cristóvão Jusarte and Simão de Andrade , while Lourenço Moreno , the factor ' s assistant , was placed in command of some Cochinese boats . On the dawn of the day of the attack , the Zamorin ' s infantry began their march towards Palignar . To taunt the sea - king , Pacheco sailed in a boat up to the tip of Arraul island and landed with a small squad to engage in a skirmish with the advance squads of the Calicut army . The irritated Zamorin redirected a large detachment of his forces after him . Pacheco just climbed back on his boat and sailed away . The tide being high , the battle began at Palurte , where the caravels were anchored . The Calicut fire ships were the first to be launched – but they were caught by the anchored raft and burned harmlessly . The row of floating castles were then launched against the caravels . This proved more difficult , as their reinforced sides seemed to resist all the cannon fire the Portuguese had to offer . The situation seemed bleak and Duarte Pacheco is said to have desperately uttered his famous line : " Lord , don ' t make me pay for my sins just yet " , before focusing concentrated heavy fire on the nearest approaching castle and finally breaking its sides . A second soon followed , and the whole apparatus began to drag and fragment , the " paraus " to sink . [ According to Correia ( p . 487 ) Pacheco is said to have offered a bounty of 100 cruzados to any sailor who dared swim out with a torch and set fire to the paraus underneath the castles . ] While the caravels at Palurt were thus engaged , the tide had come down and the Zamorin ' s infantry marched on Palignar ford . Incessant gunfire from the two bateis , joined by continuous missile fire from the Cochinese on the palisade ramparts and in the launches , mowed down line after line of Cochinese infantry as they stepped into the ford . The assault was repelled , until the high tide returned and forced the armies of Calicut to end the attempted crossing . According to Osório ( p . 311 ) , the army of Calicut suffered more casualties on this day than any other ; the Portuguese still had no deaths , only wounded . The victory over the Zamorin ' s greatest assault yet was greeted with great festivities in Cochin . Seventh assault and end . The chronicles are generally scant on details of the subsequent events . It seems the Zamorin ordered a couple of more assaults on the Portuguese positions , one of which used the same floating castles ( now repaired ) , but to no avail . In these assaults , the Zamorin had less troops – depleted by disease and desertion – and , with less enthusiasm and energy , the attacks were largely desultory . By now , the monsoon season had begun to turn , and the heavier rains and winds were working against the Zamorin ' s army – rain spread disease and complicated movement , water levels were higher at the passages , sailing the paraus more difficult . Moreover , one by one , the vassals of Calicut were sneaking away from the Zamorin ' s camp . It was generally anticipated that a new Portuguese armada would be arriving in August . Many of the Zamorin ' s vassals , having lost hope of seizing Cochin by then , figured it was best to negotiate their own peace terms with the Trimumphara Raja before the Portuguese arrived , lest their dominions be slated for vengeful punitive raids . The last of the vassals to make a separate peace with Cochin was the lord Elcanol of Edapalli himself . Finally , on June 24 , 1504 ( Nativity of St . John ) , the Zamorin of Calicut decided he had enough , and abdicated his throne , passing it on to his nephew and heir , Naubeadaraim ( the general who had led the Calicut infantry ) , and retired to a temple , dedicating himself to religious life . But the tired Zamorin was lured by the chiding of his own mother to emerge from the temple and organize one last assault . But after that failed to go anywhere , the Zamorin returned to religious seclusion permanently . The army of Calicut retired from the shores of the Vembanad lagoon around July 3 . Aftermath . Immediately after the Zamorin withdrew his forces from the vicinity of Cochin ( some say early August , 1504 ) , Duarte Pacheco Pereira , set sail with his caravels out of Cochin for Quilon . There were rumors that Arab traders in the city had raised a conspiracy or riot and attacked the Portuguese factory there , killing at least one Portuguese agent . Almeida captured a squad of Arab merchant ships and exacted his revenge on them . Pacheco was still settling matters in Quilon when the 6th Portuguese India armada , under the command of Lopo Soares de Albergaria reached Cochin in September 1504 . Duarte Pacheco returned to Cochin in late September or October to meet him there . In October , Pacheco participated in a pre - emptive Portuguese - Cochinese raid on Cranganore , where it was said the ( new ) Zamorin was re - assembling his army , to attack Cochin again after the 6th Armada left in January . The razing of Cranganore and the subsequent defection of the ruler of Tanur , one of the Zamorin ' s most important vassals , rolled the Calicut frontline north , and placed the Vembanad lagoon out of the reach of the Zamorin ' s army and fleet . It put an end to any prospect of the Zamorin of Calicut attacking Cochin again via the Kerala backwaters . Assessment . Overall , the Battle of Cochin lasted some five months – from March to July , with most of the assaults concentrated in early April and early May . The Zamorin ' s army , which started out at more than 60 , 000 strong , had suffered heavy casualties : 19 , 000 had died , over 5 , 000 in fighting and 13 , 000 to disease . Wounded were innumerable , ship losses numerous . There are no reported deaths of any of the Portuguese defenders – although many were wounded . Casualties among the Cochinese allies are unknown , but they were also probably not that high , given the few numbers that were actually committed to battle . The battle of Cochin transformed the political landscape of Kerala . The Zamorin of Calicut was humiliated . His mighty army and fleet was unable to crush a minuscule garrison of 150 Portuguese and an abandoned , isolated rebel prince with hardly a soldier to his name . By the end , the Zamorin lost most of the authority , respect and fear in which he had been previously held throughout the Malabar Coast , while the Trimumpara Raja had gone from lonely rebel to acknowledged master of the Vembanad lagoon . The Portuguese , led by Duarte Pacheco Pereira succeeded by a combination of clever positioning , individual heroics and a lot of luck . The Zamorin had demonstrated a bit of resourcefulness and innovation of his own – no two attacks were the same – but failed nonetheless . Ultimately it was probably the role of intelligence networks that proved the critical difference . The Portuguese were fully informed of everything that was going on in the enemy camp , all the way to strategies and plots hatched secretly inside the Zamorin ' s tent . The Portuguese , by contrast , tended to keep their own counsel , the Zamorin ' s spies could only see , but not hear , what the Portuguese were up to . For the Portuguese , it was a ' close - run thing ' . Had Cochin fallen to the Zamorin , it was likely Cannanore and Quilon would have fallen suit ( indeed , talks were already in progress for that eventuality ) . The Portuguese would lose their toehold in India , and unlikely to recover it easily – the Zamorin could use Fort Manuel to keep the future Portuguese armadas at bay . The Portuguese would likely be forced to sue for peace on the Zamorin ' s terms . The Trimumpara Raja came out the great victor . His stubbornness in maintaining the Portuguese alliance , which everyone had advised him against and which , at the beginning of the year , seemed to seal his doom , had paid off . His debt to the Portuguese was immense , but to none so great as to Duarte Pacheco himself , to whom he had , in the course of the desperate battle , become affectionately attached . Rewards of Duarte Pacheco . In the aftermath of the battle , in his capacity as King of Cochin , the Trimumpara Raja gave Duarte Pacheco Pereira a personal grant of arms , described as a red shield ( ' for the immense blood of the Calicut which he shed in this war ' ) , with five golden crowns in saltire ( " for the five kings he defeated ' ) and a white bordure with blue waves , charged with eight wooden castles in green , each mounted on two ships ( " for the two times he defeated these eight castles " ) . Around the shield , are seven pennants , three red , two white , two blue ( " for the seven assaults led by the King of Calecut in person and the seven flags of these colors and shapes he seized " ) , and an open silver helm , mantled in gold and red , and for crest a castle topped with a red pennant ( for Cochin ? ) . Duarte Pacheco Pereira was relieved as commander of Fort Manuel of Cochin by Manuel Teles de Vasconcelos , and set to return to Portugal with the 6th Armada in January 1505 . The Trimumpara Raja is said to have been beside himself with tears at Duarte Pacheco ' s departure , and pleaded endlessly with the admiral Lopo Soares de Albergaria to allow him to stay . Bowing to inevitability , the Trimumpara Raja offered Duarte Pacheco a substantial cargo of black pepper as a personal reward for his services . Knowing how the Trimumpara Raja had been impoverished by the war , Duarte Pacheco declined the offer . Duarte Pacheco Pereira was given a hero ' s welcome back in Lisbon , receiving a grand reception and royal pension from King Manuel I of Portugal and public festivities were held in his honor . In 1505 , the first Portuguese vice - roy D . Francisco de Almeida arrived in India with a golden crown sent by King Manuel I of Portugal to reward the steadfastness of the Trimumpara Raja of Cochin in his Portuguese alliance . But the old Trimumpara Raja had abdicated by this time and taken up a life of religious devotion ; it was his heir , Candagora , who was crowned in a solemn ceremony by Almeida as ' King of Cochin ' . " Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis " . During the lulls in the fighting at the Battle of Cochin , Duarte Pacheco Pereira spent much time making cosmographic observations and taking notes . Upon his return to Lisbon in 1505 , Duarte Pacheco would compile these notes into his famous book , " Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis " , finished in 1509 . It is one of the first " roteiros " ( nautical rutters ) giving precise instructions and references for future navigators on the India run . Of particular importance was the careful notes Duarte Pacheco took on the timing of the tides , which played such a critical importance in the course of the Battle of Cochin . Pacheco is said to have been the first to notice their connection to the moon and establish rules for predicting the progress of tides by reference to lunar observations . He also sifted through his data to correct and improve astronomical observations ( notably correcting the average daily deviation of the moon from the sun ) and constructing nautical measurements to be used by future Portuguese navigators . Later representations . The story of the Battle of Cochin is related by the Portuguese poet Luís de Camões in his 1572 epic poem " Os Lusíadas " . At the opening of Canto X , the sea - nymph Thetis relates to the admiral Vasco da Gama her prophecy about the Battle of Cochin ( Canto X , Stanzas 12 - 21 ) . Camões places this battle at the forefront , the first significant event involving the Portuguese in India after Gama ' s voyage . He showers Duarte Pacheco Pereira with superlatives , " the strongest of the strong " , the " Lusitan Achilles " , and describes some of the more memorable incidents and details of the battle . Thetis also darkly predicts Duarte Pacheco ' s future travails upon his return to Portugal , bewailing the ingratitude of King Manuel I of Portugal , that although Pacheco " gave [ him ] a wealthy kingdom " , he was granted no high rewards , and instead hints at the courtly intrigues and charges that led to his arrest later in life . ( St . 22 - 25 ) .