South American dreadnought race A naval arms race among Argentina , Brazil and Chile — the most powerful and wealthy countries in South America — began in the early twentieth century when the Brazilian government ordered three " dreadnought s " , powerful battleship s whose capabilities far outstripped older vessels in the world ' s navies . Previous Argentine – Chilean naval races from 1887 to 1902 , along with the fall of the Brazilian emperor Pedro II in 1889 and subsequent naval rebellions in 1891 and 1893 – 94 , left the Brazilian Navy well behind the Argentine and Chilean navies in quality and total tonnage . When Brazil was finally stable , rising demand for coffee and rubber brought its government a large increase in revenue . Brazilian politicians planned to use this money to address the naval imbalance , as they believed that acquiring a powerful navy would play an essential role in their goal of making the country into an international power . Three small battleships were ordered in late 1905 , but the impact of the decisive Battle of Tsushima and the appearance of the revolutionary British warship caused the Brazilian government to cancel their vessels in favor of the new " dreadnought " battleship . Construction on two ships began quickly with a third to follow . As other countries joined into what quickly became an international dreadnought race , the vessels became a measure of a state ' s international prestige — similar to nuclear weapons today . As the Brazilian order positioned the country as the third to have a dreadnought under construction , the action caused a major stir among the world ' s perceived powers . The Argentine and Chilean governments immediately canceled a pact limiting their navies and ordered two dreadnoughts each ( the and es , respectively ) . Meanwhile , Brazil ' s third dreadnought was canceled in favor of an even larger ship , which was laid down and ripped up several times after repeated alterations to the design . When the Brazilian government finally settled on a design , the coffee and rubber economic booms collapsed , and their ship would be outclassed by larger super - dreadnought s already being built , so they sold the ship , preliminarily named " Rio de Janeiro " , to the Ottoman Empire . They attempted to acquire a more powerful vessel , " Riachuelo " , from British shipbuilders , but the beginning of the First World War caused them to suspend work on foreign warships , effectively canceling the ship . The conflict also induced the British government to purchase the two Chilean battleships before they were delivered . Argentina ' s two dreadnoughts , built in the neutral United States , were handed over in 1915 . The First World War marked the end of the dreadnought race , as the South American countries stopped ordering the warship type . In subsequent decades , all three countries proposed naval expansion plans , some involving dreadnought purchases . While most did not come to fruition , the Chilean government reacquired one of the dreadnoughts ( " Almirante Latorre " ) taken over by the United Kingdom before the war . No other dreadnoughts were purchased by a South American nation , and the ones they did acquire were disposed of in the 1950s . Background : naval rivalry , revolts , and export crops . Argentine – Chilean arms race . Conflicting Argentine and Chilean claims to Patagonia , the southernmost region in South America , had been causing tension between the two countries since the 1840s . This tension was heightened in 1872 and 1878 , when Chilean warships seized merchant ships which had been licensed to operate in the disputed area by the Argentine government . An Argentine warship did the same to a Chilean - licensed American ship in 1877 . This action nearly led to war in November 1878 , when the Argentines dispatched a squadron of warships to the Santa Cruz River . The Chilean Navy responded in kind , and war was only avoided by a hastily signed treaty . Each government was distracted in the next few years , Argentina ' s with intensified military operations against the indigenous population ( 1870 – 84 ) , and Chile ' s with the War of the Pacific ( " Guerra del Pacífico " , 1879 – 83 ) against Bolivia and Peru . Still , several warships were ordered by both nations : the Chileans ordered a protected cruiser , , while the Argentines contracted for two warships , the central battery ironclad and protected cruiser . In 1887 , the Chilean government added £3 , 129 , 500 to the budget for its fleet , whose fleet was still centered around two aging central battery ironclads , and , from the 1870s . They ordered the battleship , two protected cruisers , and two torpedo boat s ; their keels were laid in 1890 . The Argentine government quickly responded with an order for two battleships , and , beginning a naval arms race between the two countries . It continued through the 1890s , even after the expensive Chilean Civil War ( 1891 ) . The two countries alternated cruiser orders between 1890 and 1895 , each marking a small increase in capabilities from the ship previous . Argentina escalated the race in July 1895 by buying an armored cruiser , , from Italy . Chile responded by ordering its own armored cruiser , , and six torpedo boats ; the Argentine government quickly ordered another armored cruiser from the Italian engineering company Ansaldo , and later ordered two more . The race slowed for a few years after a boundary dispute in the Puna de Atacama region was successfully mediated in 1899 by the American ambassador to Argentina , William Paine Lord , but more ships were ordered by both countries in 1901 . The Argentine Navy bought two more armored cruisers from Italy , and the Chilean Navy replied with orders for two " Constitución " - class pre - dreadnought battleships from British shipyards . The Argentines replied by signing letters of intent with Ansaldo in May 1901 to buy two larger battleships . The growing dispute disturbed members of the British government , as war looked like a very real possibility , and an armed conflict would disrupt the extensive British commercial interests in the area . Argentina and Chile both imported British - made goods , while the United Kingdom imported large amounts of Argentine grain , most shipped through the River Plate , and Chilean nitrates . The British government mediated negotiations between the two countries through their envoy in Chile . These were successfully concluded on 28 May 1902 with three pacts . The third limited the naval armaments of both countries ; both were barred from acquiring any further warships for five years without giving the other eighteen months ' advance notice . The warships under construction were sold to the United Kingdom , with Chile ' s battleships becoming the , and Japan , with Argentina ' s armored cruisers becoming the . It is not clear if the two planned Argentine battleships were ordered , but if they were , they were quickly canceled . " Garibaldi " and " Pueyrredón " , along with Chile ' s " Capitán Prat " , were disarmed with the exception of their main batteries , as there was no crane capable of removing the former ' s gun turrets . Brazilian decline and re - emergence . Brazil ' s navy fell into disrepair and obsolescence after an 1889 revolution , which deposed Emperor Dom Pedro II , two naval revolts ( 1891 and 1893 – 94 ) , the Federalist Revolution ( 1893 – 95 ) , and the War of Canudos ( 1896 – 97 ) . The navy had just forty - five percent of its authorized personnel in 1896 , and the only modern armored ships were two small coast - defense vessels launched in 1898 . With such dilapidated defenses , José Paranhos Jr . , the Baron of Rio Branco and Foreign Minister of Brazil , stated " In such conditions , you . . . understand how upset I am and all the worries I have . All that still protects [ Brazil ] is the moral force and old prestige still left from [ the Imperial era ] when there was still foresight in this land . . . " Meanwhile , although the Argentine – Chilean agreement had limited their naval expansion , they still retained the numerous vessels built in the interim , so by the turn of the 20th century the Brazilian Navy lagged far behind its Argentine and Chilean counterparts in quality and total tonnage . Brazil ' s huge advantage in population — it had almost three times the population of Argentina , close to five times that of Chile , and nearly double of the two combined — led the Brazilian government to believe that it should assume a leading role in naval affairs on the continent . The late nineteenth and early twentieth century demand for coffee and rubber led to Brazil ' s so - called " coffee economy " and " rubber boom . " At the time , it was estimated that seventy - five to eighty percent of the world ' s coffee supply was grown in Brazil , particularly in São Paulo , Minas Geraes , and Rio de Janeiro . The resulting profits meant that the Brazilian government collected much more revenue than in previous years . Simultaneously , there was an effort on the part of prominent Brazilian politicians , most notably Pinheiro Machado and Rio Branco , to have the country recognized as an international power . A strong navy was seen as crucial to this goal . The National Congress of Brazil passed a large naval acquisition program on 14 December 1904 , but it was two years before any ships were ordered or purchased , and while Rio Branco suggested purchasing used warships to fill the gap , nothing came of it . By 1906 , two factions had developed over which types of ships should be ordered . One , supported by the British armament company Armstrong Whitworth ( which eventually received the order ) , favored a navy centered around a small number of large warships . The other , supported by Rio Branco , preferred a larger navy composed of smaller warships . Rio Branco , in support of this measure , stated that " with six small battleships we would be much better . If we lost one or two in combat , there would be still four or five left to fight with . But with three [ larger battleships ] ? With two damaged or destroyed , we would be left with one only . " At first , the smaller warships faction prevailed . After Law no . 1452 was passed on 30 December 1905 , which authorized £4 , 214 , 550 for new warship construction ( £1 , 685 , 820 in 1906 ) , three small battleships , three armored cruiser s , six destroyer s , twelve torpedo boat s , three submarine s , a collier , and a training ship were ordered . Though the Brazilian government later eliminated the armored cruisers for monetary reasons , the Minister of the Navy , Admiral Júlio César de Noronha , signed a contract with Armstrong Whitworth for the planned battleships on 23 July 1906 . The British ambassador to Brazil was opposed to the planned naval expansion , even though the orders went to a British company , for its large cost and its negative effects on relations between Brazil and Argentina . He saw it as " an embodiment of national vanity , combined with personal motives of a pecuniary character . " The American ambassador to Brazil was alarmed , and sent a cablegram to his Department of State in September 1906 , warning them of the destabilization that would occur if the situation devolved into a full naval arms race . At the same time , the American government under Theodore Roosevelt tried using diplomatic means to coerce the Brazilians into canceling their ships , but the attempts were dismissed , with the Baron of Rio Branco remarking that caving to the American demands would render Brazil as powerless as Cuba , whose new constitution allowed the American government to intervene in Cuban affairs . The new President of Brazil , Afonso Pena , supported the naval acquisitions in an address to the National Congress of Brazil in November 1906 , as in his opinion the ships were necessary to replace the losses recently suffered by the navy , most notably the old " Aquidabã " , and the antiquated vessels of the current navy . Catalyst : Brazil ' s opening salvo . After construction began on Brazil ' s three new small battleships , the Brazilian government reconsidered their order and chosen battleship design ( something that would happen during the construction of " Rio de Janeiro " in 1913 ) . This was wrought by the impact of the Battle of Tsushima , which led navies to believe that larger guns were necessary , and the debut of the United Kingdom ' s new dreadnought concept , represented by the surprisingly fast construction and commissioning of the eponymous ship in 1906 , rendered the Brazilian ships obsolete before they were completed . The money authorized for naval expansion in 1905 was redirected to building three dreadnoughts ( with the third to be laid down after the first was launched ) , three scout cruisers ( later reduced to two , which became the ) , fifteen destroyers ( later reduced to ten , the ) , three submarines ( the ) , and two submarine tender s ( later reduced to one , ) . This move was made with the large - scale support of Brazilian politicians , including Pinheiro Machado and a nearly unanimous vote in the Senate ; the navy , now with a large - ship advocate , Rear Admiral Alexandrino Fario de Alencar , in the powerful post of minister of the navy ; and the Brazilian press . Still , these changes were made with the stipulation that the total price of the new naval program not exceed the original limit , so the increase in battleship tonnage was bought with the previous elimination of armored cruisers and decreasing the number of destroyer - type warships . The three battleships on which construction had begun were scrapped beginning on 7 January 1907 , and the design for the new dreadnoughts was approved on 20 February . Newspapers began covering a Brazilian order for dreadnoughts in March , while the full order , including all three dreadnoughts and the two cruisers , was widely reported beginning in August . The Brazilian order for what contemporary commentators called " the most powerful battleship [ s ] in the world " came at a time when few countries in the world had contracted for such armament . Brazil was the third country to have a dreadnought under construction , behind the United Kingdom , with and the , and the United States , with the . This meant that Brazil was in line to have a dreadnought before many of the world ' s perceived powers , like France , the German Empire , the Russian Empire , and the Empire of Japan . As dreadnoughts were quickly equated with international status , somewhat similar to nuclear weapon s today — that is , regardless of a state ' s need for such equipment , simply ordering and possessing a dreadnought increased the owner ' s prestige — the order caused a major stir in international relations . Newspapers and journals around the world speculated that Brazil was acting as a proxy for a naval power which would take possession of the two dreadnoughts soon after completion , as they did not believe that a previously insignificant geopolitical power would contract for such powerful armament . Many American , British , and German sources variously accused the Americans , British , German , or Japanese governments of secretly plotting to purchase the vessels . The " World ' s Work " remarked : On the other side of the Atlantic , in the midst of the Anglo – German naval arms race , members of the British House of Commons fretted over the battleships ' possible destinations , though the Admiralty consistently stated that they did not believe any sale would occur . In mid - July and September 1908 , the Commons discussed purchasing the ships to bolster the Royal Navy and ensure they would not be sold to a foreign rival , which would disrupt the British naval plan set in place by the " two - power standard " , though in March and late July 1908 , the Brazilian government officially denied any sale was planned . In March 1909 , the British press and House of Commons began pushing for more dreadnoughts after the First Lord of the Admiralty , Reginald McKenna , asserted that Germany had stepped up its building schedule and would complete thirteen dreadnoughts in 1911 — four more than previously estimated . Naturally , the subject of purchasing the Brazilian dreadnoughts already being built was brought up , and McKenna had to officially deny that the government was planning to tender an offer for the warships . He also stated that a sale to a foreign power would be inconsequential , as " our present superiority in strength in 1909 – 10 is so great that no alarm would be created in the mind of the Board of Admiralty . " Despite the plethora of rumors , the Brazilian government was not planning to sell their ships . Dreadnoughts formed an important role in Rio Branco ' s goal of raising Brazil to an international power , as the " New York Evening Mail " correctly surmised : Counter : Argentina and Chile respond . Argentina was highly alarmed by the Brazilian move , and they quickly moved to nullify the remaining months of the naval - limiting restrictions in the 1902 pact with Chile . In November 1906 , Argentina ' s Minister of Foreign Affairs , Manuel Augusto Montes de Oca , remarked that any one of the new Brazilian vessels could destroy the entire Argentine and Chilean fleets . Despite the seeming hyperbole , his statement — made before the Brazilian government reordered the ships as dreadnoughts — ended up being relatively accurate : in 1910 , at least , the new Brazilian warships were much more powerful than any other vessel in the world , let alone any one ship in the Argentine or Chilean fleets . The Argentine government ' s alarm continued under de Oca ' s successor , Estanisláo Zeballos . In June 1908 , Zeballos presented a plan to the Argentine Congress where they would offer the Brazilian government a chance to give one of their two unfinished dreadnoughts to Argentina . This would allow the two countries a chance to enjoy relative naval parity . Should the Brazilians refuse , Zeballos planned to issue an ultimatum : if they did not comply in eight days , the mobilized Argentine Army would invade what the army and navy ministers claimed was a defenseless Rio de Janeiro . Unfortunately for Zeballos , his plan was leaked to the media , and the resulting public outcry — Argentine citizens happened to not be in favor of their government borrowing large sums of money to mobilize the army and go to war — ensured his resignation . The Argentine government was also deeply concerned with the possible effect on the country ' s large export trade , as a Brazilian blockade of the entrance to the River Plate would cripple the Argentine economy . The acquisition of dreadnoughts to maintain an equal footing with Brazil would , in the words of the Argentine admiral overseeing his countries ' dreadnoughts while they were being constructed , avoid a " preponderance of power on the other side , where a sudden gust of popular feeling or injured pride might make [ a blockade ] a dangerous weapon against us . " Both countries faced difficulty in financing their own dreadnoughts . Although in Argentina the ruling National Autonomist Party supported the purchases , they initially faced public resistance for such expensive acquisitions . An influx of inflammatory newspaper editorials supporting new dreadnoughts , especially from " La Prensa " , and renewed border disputes , particularly Brazilian assertions that the Argentines were attempting to restore the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata , swayed the public to support the purchases . The Argentine President , José Figueroa Alcorta , attempted to ease the tensions with a message warning the Brazilians of a naval arms race should they continue on their present course . The Brazilian government replied with reasoning similar to Pena ' s speech in 1906 , in that they believed the ships were necessary to replace the antiquated equipment left by the long - term neglect of the Brazilian Navy , and they repeatedly insisted that the ships were not meant for use against Argentina . In August , a bill authorizing the Argentine Navy to acquire three dreadnoughts was passed by the Chamber of Deputies seventy - two to thirteen . Three months later , it was defeated in the Senate after they approved an arbitration treaty and the government made a last - ditch offer to purchase one of the two Brazilian dreadnoughts currently being constructed . The Brazilian government declined , so the bill was reintroduced and passed by the Senate on 17 December 1908 with forty - nine in support to thirteen opposed , over socialist objections that the country needed to be populated and the large sum of money ( £14 , 000 , 000 ) could be better spent in other areas of the government . After the Argentine government sent a naval delegation to Europe to solicit and evaluate armament companies ' offers , they received tenders from fifteen shipyards in five countries ( the United States , Great Britain , Germany , France , and Italy ) , and conducted a drawn - out bidding process . The Argentine delegation rejected all of the bids twice , each time recycling the best technical aspects of the tendered designs when crafting new bidding requirements . The reason given for the first rejection was the appearance of the first super - dreadnought , . Still , the shipbuilders were furious , as the process of designing a major warship took large amounts of time and money , and they believed the Argentine tactic revealed their individual trade secret s . A British naval architect published a scathing condemnation of the Argentine tactics , albeit only after the contracts were not awarded to a British company : The United States ' Fore River Shipbuilding Company tendered the lowest bid — in part owing to the availability of cheap steel , though they were accused of quoting an unprofitable price so the ships could act as loss leader s — and was awarded the contract . This aroused further suspicion in the European bidders , who had previously believed that the United States was a non - contender , though Argentina did order twelve destroyers from British , French , and German shipyards to soften the blow . These bidders , along with newspapers like the " Times " ( London ) , turned their anger on the American government under President William Howard Taft , whose so - called " Dollar Diplomacy " policy had led his State Department to go to great lengths to obtain the contracts . Their anger may have been justified : Taft boasted in the high - profile 1910 State of the Union address that the Argentine dreadnought order was awarded to American manufacturers " largely through the good offices of the Department of State . " The Argentine contract included an option for a third dreadnought in case the Brazilian government adhered to its contractual obligations to order a third dreadnought . Two newspapers , " La Prensa " and " La Argentina " , heavily advocated for a third ship ; the latter even started a petition to raise money for a new battleship . The American minister to Argentina , Charles H . Sherrill , cabled back to the United States that " this newspaper rivalry promises the early conclusion of a movement which means a third battleship whether by public subscription or by Government funds . " On 31 December 1910 , the Argentine government decided against constructing the ship , after Roque Sáenz Peña , who had been making entreaties to Brazil to end the expensive naval race , was elected to the Presidency . In addition , the intended target of the third Argentine dreadnought , the third Brazilian dreadnought , had already been canceled multiple times . While Argentina ' s principal concern was with Brazil , Chile wished to respond to Peruvian military acquisitions , including a recent cruiser order ( the ) . The Chilean government delayed their naval plans after a financial depression brought on by the 1906 Valparaíso earthquake and a drastic fall in the nitrate market in 1907 , but these economic problems were not enough to stop them from countering the dreadnoughts purchased by their traditional rival ( Argentina ) . Money for a naval building program was allocated in 1910 . Although the Chilean government solicited bids from several armament companies , nearly all believed that a British company would win the contract ; the American naval attaché opined that without anything short of a revolution the contracts were destined for the United Kingdom . The Chilean Navy had cultivated extensive ties with the United Kingdom ' s Royal Navy since the 1830s , when Chilean naval officers were given places on British ships to receive training and experience they could bring back to their country . This relationship had recently been cemented when a British naval mission was requested by Chile and sent in 1911 . Still , the American and German governments attempted to swing sentiment to their side by dispatching modern naval vessels ( and , respectively ) to Chilean ports . Their efforts were futile , and the design tendered by Armstrong Whitworth was chosen on 25 July 1911 . Other South American navies were in no state to respond . The Peruvian Navy , fourth - largest on the continent , had been decimated during the naval campaign of the War of the Pacific ( 1879 – 83 ) . It took the Peruvian government more than twenty years to order new warships — and , scout cruisers delivered in 1906 and 1907 . They were augmented by two submarines and a destroyer ordered from France . Still , with limited resources and little expertise in operating any kind of modern warship , let alone a dreadnought , Peru was far from joining the naval race . Their highest aspirations resulted in the near - acquisition of an obsolete French armored cruiser , , which they began payments on but stopped before finishing . The rest of the South American navies had no experience in operating large modern warships , though many added smaller vessels to their naval forces in the same time period . The Uruguayan Navy acquired a gunboat in 1910 , while the Venezuelan Navy bought an ex - Spanish protected cruiser , " Mariscal Sucre " , from the United States in 1912 . The Ecuadorian Navy added a Chilean torpedo boat to its fleet in 1907 , complementing its fleet of two aviso s , both around , two small steamers , and one minor coast guard ship . Results : construction and trials of the new warships . Brazil ' s , the lead ship , was laid down by Armstrong on 17 April 1907 , while its sister followed thirteen days later at Vickers . Completion of the partial hull needed to launch " Minas Geraes " was delayed by a five - month strike to 10 September 1908 . " São Paulo " followed on 19 April 1909 . Both were christened in front of large crowds by the wife of Francisco Régis de Oliveira , the Brazilian ambassador to the United Kingdom . After fitting - out , the period after a warship ' s launch where it is completed , " Minas Geraes " was put through multiple trials of the speed , endurance , efficiency , and weaponry of the ship in September , including what was at that time the heaviest broadside ever fired off a warship , " Minas Geraes " was completed and handed over to Brazil on 5 January 1910 . The trials proved that the class ' superfiring main battery was viable in that blast from an upper turret would not injure crewmen in a lower turret , and the ship itself managed to reach on an indicated horsepower ( ihp ) of 27 , 212 . " São Paulo " followed its classmate in July , after its own trials at the end of May , where the ship reached at 28 , 645 ihp . Argentina ' s was built by Fore River at its shipyard in Massachusetts , and as called for in the final contract , was subcontracted out to the New York Shipbuilding Corporation of New Jersey . The steel for the ships was largely supplied by the Bethlehem Steel Company of Pennsylvania . " Rivadavia " was laid down on 25 May 1910 — one hundred years after the establishment of the first independent Argentine government , the " Primera Junta " — and launched on 26 August 1911 . " Moreno " was laid down on 10 July 1910 and launched on 23 September 1911 . Construction on both ships took longer than usual , and there were further delays during their sea trials when one of " Rivadavia " s turbines was damaged and one of " Moreno " s turbines failed . The two were only officially completed in December 1914 and February 1915 . Even the departure of " Moreno " was marked by mishaps , as the ship sank a barge and ran aground twice . Chile ' s was launched on 27 November 1913 . After the First World War broke out in Europe , work on " Almirante Latorre " was halted in August 1914 , and it was formally purchased on 9 September after the British recommended it four days earlier . " Almirante Latorre " was not forcibly seized like the Ottoman " Reşadiye " and " Sultân Osmân - ı Evvel " ( ex - " Rio de Janeiro " ) , two other ships being built for a foreign navy , as a result of Chile ' s " friendly neutral " status with the United Kingdom . The British needed to maintain this relationship owing to their dependence on Chilean nitrate imports , which were vital to the British armament industry . The former Chilean ship — the largest vessel built by Armstrong up to that time — was completed on 30 September 1915 , commissioned into the Royal Navy on 15 October , and served in that navy in the First World War . Work on the other battleship , " Almirante Cochrane " , was halted after the outbreak of war . The British purchased the incomplete hulk on 28 February 1918 for conversion to an aircraft carrier , as " Almirante Cohrane " was the only large and fast hull which was immediately available and capable of being modified into a carrier without major reconstruction . Low priority and quarrels with shipyard workers slowed completion of the ship ; it was commissioned into the Royal Navy as in 1924 . Reciprocation : Brazil orders again . " Rio de Janeiro " . After the first Brazilian dreadnought , " Minas Geraes " , was launched , the Brazilian government began an extended campaign to remove the third dreadnought from the contract because of political — backlash from the Revolt of the Lash coupled with warming relations with Argentina — and economic reasons . After much negotiating and attempts from Armstrong to hold the Brazilian government to the contract , the Brazilians relented , due in part to lower bond rates that made it possible for the government to borrow the necessary money . " Rio de Janeiro " was laid for the first time in March 1910 . By May , the Brazilian government asked Armstrong to stop work on the new warship and to submit new designs which took in the most recent advance in naval technology , super - dreadnought s . Eustace Tennyson - d ' Eyncourt served as Armstrong ' s liaison to Brazil . The 1911 " Encyclopædia Britannica " specifies this design as a long overall , ship mounting twelve 14 - inch guns and costing near £3 , 000 , 000 . The many requests made by the Brazilian Navy for minor changes delayed the contract signing until 10 October 1910 , and the battleship ' s keel laying was delayed further by a labor dispute with the Worshipful Company of Shipwrights , which led to a lockout . During these delays , a new Minister of the Navy , Admiral Marques Leão , was appointed to replace de Alencar — an important development , as the contract stipulated that the design could only proceed with the approval of the new Minister . Again , however , the Brazilian Navy found itself torn between two schools of thought : Leão and others in the navy favored a reversion to the 12 - inch gun , but others , led by the outgoing Minister of the Navy ( de Alencar ) and the head of the Brazilian naval commission in the United Kingdom ( Rear Admiral Duarte Huet de Bacellar Pinto Guedes ) , were strongly in favor of obtaining the ship with the largest armament — in this case , a design drawn up by Bacellar , carrying eight 16 - inch guns , six 9 . 4 - inch guns , and fourteen 6 - inch guns . D ' Eyncourt , who had departed Brazil in October immediately after the contract was signed , returned in March 1911 to display the various design options available to the Brazilian Navy . Armstrong evidently thought the second faction would prevail , so he also took with him everything needed to close a deal on Bacellar ' s design . By mid - March , Armstrong ' s contacts in Brazil reported that Leão had convinced the recently elected President Hermes Rodrigues da Fonseca to cancel the design with twelve 14 - inch guns in favor of a smaller ship . The credit may not have laid with Leão alone , though ; da Fonseca was already dealing with multiple issues . Most importantly , he had to deal with the fallout from a large naval revolt in November 1910 ( the Revolt of the Lash ) , which had seen three of the new vessels just purchased by the navy , along with one older coast - defense ship , mutiny against the use of corporal punishment in the navy . To make matters worse , the dreadnoughts ' expense combined with loan payments and a worsening economy led to growing government debt compounded by budget deficits . Brazil ' s GDP per capita , a measure of a nation ' s economy , fell from $ 836 in 1911 to a low of $ 780 in 1914 ( both measured in 1990 international dollars ) , and did not fully recover until after the First World War . At the same time , Brazil ' s external and internal debt reached $ 500 and $ 335 million ( respectively , in contemporaneous dollar amounts ) by 1913 , partly through rising deficits , which were $ 22 million in 1908 and $ 47 million by 1912 . In May , the president commented negatively on the new ship : D ' Eyncourt probably avoided proposing any design with 16 - inch guns when he saw the political situation . In meetings with Leão , designs of only ten 12 - inch guns mounted on the centerline were quickly rejected , even though their broadside was as strong as that of the " Minas Geraes " class , but a design with no less than " fourteen " 12 - inch guns emerged as the frontrunner . Author David Topliss attributes this to political necessity , as he believed the Minister of the Navy could not validate purchasing a seemingly less - powerful dreadnought than the " Minas Geraes " class : with larger guns ruled out , the only remaining choice was a larger number of guns . After numerous requests for design alterations from the Brazilian Navy were accommodated or rejected , a contract was signed for a ship with fourteen 12 - inch guns on 3 June 1911 for £2 , 675 , 000 , and " Rio de Janeiro " s keel was laid for the fourth time on 14 September . It did not take long for the Brazilian government to reconsider their decision again ; by mid - 1912 , battleships with 14 - inch guns were under construction , and suddenly it seemed that " Rio de Janeiro " would be outclassed upon completion . Making matters worse , a European depression after the end of the Second Balkan War in August 1913 reduced Brazil ' s ability to obtain foreign loans . This coincided with a collapse in Brazil ' s coffee and rubber exports , the latter due to the loss of the Brazilian rubber monopoly to British plantations in the Far East . The price of coffee declined by 20 percent and Brazilian exports of it dropped 12 . 5 percent between 1912 and 1913 ; rubber saw a similar decline of 25 and 36 . 6 percent , respectively . The Brazilian Navy later claimed that selling " Rio de Janeiro " was a tactical decision , so they could have two divisions of battleships : two with 12 - inch guns ( the " Minas Geraes " class ) , and two with 15 - inch guns . Armstrong studied whether replacing the 12 - inch guns with seven 15 - inch guns would be feasible , but Brazil was probably already attempting to sell the ship . In the tension building up to the First World War , many countries , including Russia , Italy , Greece , and the Ottoman Empire , were interested in purchasing the ship . Russia quickly dropped out , leaving Italy and the rival Greeks and Ottomans . The Italians seemed close to purchasing the ship until the French government decided to back the Greeks — rather than allow the Italians , who were the principal naval rivals of the French , to obtain the ship . The Grecian government made an offer for the original purchase price plus an additional £50 , 000 , but as the Greeks worked to obtain an initial installment , the Ottoman government was also making offers . The Brazilian government rejected an Ottoman proposal to swap ships , with Brazil ' s " Rio de Janeiro " going to the Ottomans and " Reşadiye " going to Brazil , presumably with some amount of money , was rejected . The Brazilian government would only accept a monetary offer . Lacking this , the Ottomans were forced to find a loan . Fortunately for them , they were able to obtain one from French banker acting independent of his government , and the Ottoman Navy secured the " Rio de Janeiro " on 29 December 1913 for £1 , 200 , 000 as - is . As part of the purchase contract , the remainder of the ship was constructed with £2 , 340 , 000 in Ottoman money . Renamed " Sultân Osmân - ı Evvel " , it was eventually taken over by the British shortly after the beginning of the First World War , serving with the Royal Navy as . The Argentine government authorized a third dreadnought in October 1912 in case " Rio de Janeiro " was completed and delivered , but the ship was never named or built . " Riachuelo " . After selling " Rio de Janeiro " , the Brazilian government asked Armstrong and Vickers to prepare designs for a new battleship , something strongly supported by the Navy League of Brazil ( " Liga Maritima " ) . Armstrong agreed to construct the ship without any further payments from Brazil . They replied with at least fourteen designs , six from Vickers ( December 1913 through March 1914 ) and eight from Armstrong ( February 1914 ) . Vickers ' designs varied between eight and ten 15 - inch and eight 16 - inch guns , with speeds between 22 and 25 knots ( the lower - end ships having mixed firing , the higher using oil ) , and displacements between and . Armstrong took two basic designs , one with eight and the other with ten 15 - inch guns , and varied their speed and firing . While most secondary sources do not mention that Brazil ordered a battleship , with the ship ' s entry in the warship encyclopedia " Conway ' s All the World ' s Fighting Ships " even remarking that " Brazil had not selected from the four design variations " , the Brazilian government chose what was labeled as Design 781 , the first of the eight 15 - inch designs tendered by Armstrong , which also shared characteristics with the " Queen Elizabeth " and " Revenge " classes then being built for the United Kingdom . They placed an order for one ship of this design , to be named " Riachuelo " , at the Armstrong Whitworth shipyard in Elswick on 12 May 1914 . Some preliminary gathering of materials was completed for a planned keel laying date of 10 September , but the beginning of the First World War in August 1914 delayed plans . " Riachuelo " was officially suspended on 14 January 1915 and canceled on 13 May 1915 . Decline : instability and public unrest . Brazilian naval revolt . In late November 1910 , a large naval revolt , later named the Revolt of the Lash , or " Revolta da Chibata " , broke out in Rio de Janeiro . The issue began in the racial makeup of the navy ' s crews , which were heavily black or mulatto , as opposed to the mostly white officers . The Baron of Rio Branco commented : " For the recruitment of marines and enlisted men , we bring aboard the dregs of our urban centers , the most worthless lumpen , without preparation of any sort . Ex - slaves and the sons of slaves make up our ships ' crews , most of them dark - skinned or dark - skinned mulattos . " This kind of impressment , combined with the heavy use of corporal punishment for even minor offenses , meant that relations between the black crews and white officers was tepid at best . Crewmen aboard " Minas Geraes " began planning for a revolt in 1910 . They chose João Cândido Felisberto , an experienced sailor , as their leader . The mutiny was delayed several times by disagreements among the participants . In a major meeting on 13 November , some of the revolutionaries expressed a desire to revolt when the president would be inaugurated ( 15 November ) , but another leader , Francisco Dias Martins , talked them out of the idea , insisting that their demands would be overshadowed by a perceived rebellion against the political system as a whole . The immediate catalyst for their revolt came on 21 November 1910 , when an Afro - Brazilian sailor , Marcelino Rodrigues Menezes , was brutally flogged 250 times for insubordination . A Brazilian government observer , former navy captain José Carlos de Carvalho , stated that the sailor ' s back looked like " a mullet sliced open for salting . " The revolt began aboard " Minas Geraes " at around 10 p . m . on 22 November . Soon after , " São Paulo " , the new cruiser " Bahia " , and the twelve - year - old coast - defense ship also revolted , all with relatively little violence . These represented the newest and most powerful ships in the navy ; three of the four ships had been completed and commissioned only months before . Nearly half of the navy ' s enlisted men in Rio at that time ( 2 , 379 ) revolted , and while the other 2 , 630 did not revolt , their loyalty was suspect in the eyes of naval officers . Felisberto and his fellow sailors demanded an end to the ' slavery ' being practiced by the navy , most notably the continued use of whipping despite its ban in every other Western nation . Though navy officers and the president were staunchly opposed to any sort of amnesty and made plans to attack the rebel - held ships , many legislators were supportive . Over the next three days , both houses of the Brazilian National Congress , led by the influential senator Rui Barbosa , passed a general bill granting amnesty to all involved and ending the use of corporal punishment . In the aftermath of the revolt , the two Brazilian dreadnoughts were disarmed by the removal of their guns ' breechblock s . The revolt and consequent state of the navy , which was essentially unable to operate for fear of another rebellion , caused many leading Brazilians , including the president , prominent politicians like Barbosa and the Baron of Rio Branco , and the editor of the most respected newspaper in Brazil , " Jornal do Commercio " , to question the use of the new ships and support their sale to a foreign country . The British ambassador to Brazil , W . H . D . Haggard , was ecstatic at Rio Branco ' s about - face , saying " This is indeed a wonderful surrender on the part of the man who was answerable for the purchase and who looked upon them as the most cherished offspring of his policy . " Rui Barbosa was emphatic in his opposition to the ships in a speech given shortly before the vote on the amnesty bill : In the end , the president and cabinet decided against selling the ships because of a fear of a consequent negative effect in domestic politics — even though they agreed that the ships should be disposed of , possibly to fund smaller warships capable of traversing Brazil ' s many rivers . The executive ' s apprehension was heightened by Barbosa ' s speech given before the revolt ' s end , as he also used the occasion to attack the government , or what he called the " brutal militaristic regime . " Still , the Brazilians ordered Armstrong to cease working towards laying down a third " Minas Geraes " class dreadnought , which induced the Argentine government to not pick up their contractual option for a third dreadnought , and the United States ' ambassador to Brazil cabled home to state that the Brazilian desire for naval preeminence in Latin America was quelled , though this proved to be short - lived . Although the " Minas Geraes " class remained in Brazilian hands , the mutiny had a clear detrimental effect on the navy ' s readiness : by 1912 , an Armstrong agent stated that the ships were in terrible condition , with rust already forming on turrets and boilers . The agent believed it would cost the Brazilian Navy around £700 , 000 to address these issues . Haggard tersely commented , " These ships are absolutely useless to Brazil " , a sentiment echoed by " Proceedings " . Despite the government ' s refusal to sell the two " Minas Geraes " - class ships , this sequence of events , when combined with the Baron of Rio Branco ' s death in 1912 , were major factors in the Brazilian government ' s decision — which was possibly made by January 1913 , but certainly by September — to sell " Rio de Janiero " . Attempted sales . After " Rio de Janeiro " was sold to the Ottoman Empire , the Argentine government bowed to popular demand and began to seek a buyer for their two dreadnoughts . The money received in return would be devoted to internal improvements . Three bills directing that the battleships be sold were introduced into the Argentine National Congress in mid - 1914 , but all were defeated . Still , the British and Germans expressed worries that the ships could be sold to a belligerent nation , while the Russian , Austrian , Ottoman , Italian , and Greek governments were all reportedly interested in buying both ships , the latter as a counter to the Ottoman purchase of " Rio de Janeiro " . The " New - York Tribune " reported in late April that the Argentine government rejected a $ 17 . 5 million offer for " Moreno " alone , which would have netted them a large profit over the original construction cost of the ships ( $ 12 million ) . The United States , worried that its neutrality would not be respected and its technology would be released for study to a foreign country , put diplomatic pressure on the Argentine government to keep the ships , which it eventually did . Similarly , the " New - York Tribune " , in early November 1913 , and " Proceedings " , in May and June 1914 , reported that Greece had reached an accord to purchase Chile ' s first battleship as a counterbalance to the Ottoman acquisition of " Rio de Janeiro " , but despite a developing sentiment within Chile to sell one or both of the dreadnoughts , no deal was made . In each of the countries involved in the South American dreadnought arms race , movements arose that advocated the sale of the dreadnoughts to redirect the substantial amounts of money involved toward what they viewed as more worthy pursuits . These costs were rightfully viewed as enormous . After the " Minas Geraes " class was ordered , a Brazilian newspaper equated the initial purchase cost for the original three ships as equaling 3 , 125 miles of railroad tracks or 30 , 300 homesteads . Naval historian Robert Scheina put the price at £6 , 110 , 100 without accounting for ammunition , which was £605 , 520 , or necessary upgrades to docks , which was £832 , 000 . Costs for maintenance and related issues , which in the first five years of " Minas Geraes " s and " São Paulo " s commissioned lives was about 60 percent of the initial cost , only added to the already staggering sum of money . The two " Rivadavia " s were purchased for nearly a fifth of the Argentine government ' s yearly income , a figure which did not include the later in - service costs . Historian Robert K . Massie rounded the figure to a full quarter of each government ' s annual income . In addition , the nationalistic sentiments that exacerbated the naval arms race gave way to slowing economies and negative public opinions which came to support investing inside the country instead . Commenting on this , the United States ' Minister to Chile , Henry Prather Fletcher , wrote to Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan : " Since the naval rivalry began in 1910 , financial conditions , which were none too good then , have grown worse ; and as time approaches for the final payment , feeling has been growing in these countries that perhaps they are much more in need of money than of battleships . " Aftermath : post - war expansions . The First World War effectively ended the dreadnought race , as all three countries suddenly found themselves unable to acquire additional warships . After the conflict , the race never resumed , but many plans for post - war naval expansions and improvements were postulated by the Argentine , Brazilian , and Chilean governments . The Brazilians modernized " Minas Geraes " , " São Paulo " , and the two cruisers acquired under the 1904 plan , and , between 1918 and 1926 . This was sorely needed , as all four ships were not ready to fight a modern war . Although the Brazilian government intended to send " São Paulo " overseas for service in the Grand Fleet , both it and " Minas Geraes " had not been modernized since entering service , meaning they were without essential items like modern fire control for their weapons . Maintenance on the two ships had also been neglected , which was most clearly illustrated when " São Paulo " was sent to New York for modernization : fourteen of its eighteen boilers broke down , and the ship required the assistance of the American battleship and cruiser to continue the voyage . The two cruisers were in " deplorable " condition , as they were able to steam at a top speed of only thanks to a desperate need for new condenser s and boiler tubes . With repairs , though , both participated in the war as part of Brazil ' s main naval contribution to the conflict . The Brazilian Navy also made plans to acquire additional ships in the 1920s and 30s , but both were sharply reduced from the original proposals . In 1924 , they contemplated constructing a relatively modest number of warships , including a heavy cruiser , five destroyers , and five submarines . In the same year , the newly arrived American naval mission , led by Rear Admiral Carl Theodore Vogelgesang , tendered a naval expansion plan of 151 , 000 tons , divided between battleships ( 70 , 000 ) , cruisers ( 60 , 000 ) , destroyers ( 15 , 000 ) , and submarines ( 6 , 000 ) . The United States ' State Department , led by Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes and fresh from negotiating the Washington Naval Treaty , was not keen on seeing another dreadnought race , so Hughes quickly moved to thwart the efforts of the mission . Only one Italian - built submarine , , was acquired during this time . " Minas Geraes " was modernized again at the Rio de Janeiro Naval Yard from June 1931 to April 1938 , but plans to give similar treatment to " São Paulo " were dropped due to the ship ' s poor material condition . During the same period , the Brazilian government looked into purchasing cruisers from the United States Navy but ran into the restrictions of the Washington and London Naval Treaties , which prevented the sale of used warships to foreign countries . They also tried to purchase destroyers from the United States , but eventually contracted for six destroyers from the United Kingdom . In the interim , a plan to lease six destroyers from the United States Navy was abandoned after it was met with strong opposition from both international and American institutions . Three s , based on the American , were laid down in Brazil with six minelayers , all of which were launched between 1939 and 1941 . Though both programs required foreign assistance to complete and were consequently delayed by the war , all nine ships were completed by 1944 . In the 1920s , nearly all of the major warships of the Argentine Navy were obsolete ; aside from " Rivadavia " and " Moreno " , the newest major warship was constructed at the end of the nineteenth century . The Argentine government recognized this , and as part of holding on to their naval superiority in the region , they sent " Rivadavia " and " Moreno " to the United States in 1924 and 1926 to be modernized . In addition , in 1926 the Argentine Congress allotted 75 million gold peso s for a naval building program . This resulted in the acquisition of three cruisers ( the Italian - built and the British - built , twelve destroyers ( the Spanish - built and the British - built / classes ) , and three submarines ( the Italian - built ) . Chile began to seek additional ships to bolster its fleet in 1919 , and the United Kingdom eagerly offered many of its surplus warships . This action worried nearby nations , who feared that a Chilean attempt to become the region ' s most powerful navy would destabilize the area and start another naval arms race . Chile asked for " Canada " and " Eagle " , the two battleships they ordered before the war , but the cost of converting the latter back to a battleship was too high . Planned replacements included the two remaining s , but a leak to the press of the secret negotiations to acquire them caused an uproar within Chile itself over the value of such ships . In the end , Chile only bought " Canada " and four destroyers in April 1920 . All five had been ordered from British yards by the Chilean government before 1914 , but were purchased by the Royal Navy after the British entered the First World War . All were obtained for comparatively low prices ; " Canada " was sold for just £1 , 000 , 000 , less than half of what had been required to construct the ship . Over the next several years , the Chileans continued to acquire more ships from the British , like six destroyers ( the ) and three submarines ( the ) . " Almirante Latorre " was modernized in the United Kingdom from 1929 to 1931 at the Devonport Dockyard . A recession and a major naval revolt then led to the battleship ' s " de facto " inactivation in the early 1930s . In the late 1930s , the Chilean government inquired into the possibility of constructing an cruiser in the United Kingdom , Italy , Germany , or Sweden , but this did not lead to an order . A second plan to acquire two small cruisers was dropped with the beginning of the Second World War . Soon after the attack on Pearl Harbor , the United States attempted to purchase " Almirante Latorre " , two destroyers , and a submarine tender , probably because the Chilean Navy had a reputation for keeping its ships in top - quality condition , but the offer was rejected . At the beginning of the Second World War , the three major South American navies found themselves unable to acquire major warships because the nations they purchased from were at war . With the end of the war , the United States and United Kingdom had many ships that were unnecessary or surplus to the requirements of their post - war navies . The war had proved the obsolete status of battleships , so the South American navies were seeking cruisers , destroyers , and submarines , yet they ran into political difficulties in acquiring anything larger than s and s . They were only able to acquire them when the Red Scare began to strongly affect American and international politics . One of the deals reached under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act ( 1949 ) sold six American light cruisers to Argentina , Brazil , and Chile in January 1951 . While this bolstered the navies of important South American allies of the United States , which would be treaty - bound to assist the United States in any war , naval historian Robert Scheina argues that the American government also used the opportunity to significantly affect the traditional naval rivalry among the three countries . The warships sold unilaterally changed the naval outlook of all three nations , leading them to accept parity ( as opposed to the Argentine pre - war stipulation that its fleet be equal to Brazil ' s and Chile ' s combined ) . With the influx of these relatively modern warships , the battleships of the three countries were quickly sold for scrap , with the Brazilian ships being disposed of first . " São Paulo " was sold in 1951 but sank in a storm north of the Azores while being towed to its final destination . " Minas Geraes " was sold two years later and broken up in Genoa beginning in 1954 . Of the Argentine dreadnoughts , " Moreno " was brought to Japan for scrapping in 1957 , while " Rivadavia " was broken up in Italy beginning in 1959 . " Almirante Latorre " , inactive and unrepaired since an explosion in its engine room in 1951 , was decommissioned in October 1958 and followed " Moreno " to Japan in 1959 . Historiography . The historiography , or works published on a specific historial topic , behind the South American dreadnought race is relatively small in number and coverage , especially in English . General histories of Latin America rarely cover it , while general maritime histories on the period ( c . 1904 – 14 ) avoid the topic and focus on industrialized powers , especially the Anglo - German naval arms race . More specific English - language works in these areas tend to summarize the region ' s dreadnought race , focus on the ships themselves rather than their impact on the region , or look at the closely related Revolt of the Lash . The few who examined the issue in - depth believed that the race had little overall international strategic purpose , particularly after dreadnoughts were constructed in higher numbers , and simply served to destabilize the region , but others have remarked on the race ' s regional implications . Seward Livermore , writing from Brown University , looked at the race about thirty years after its conclusion from an American perspective , meaning he gave emphasis to the Argentine order , the role of the American government in obtaining it , and the attempts to obtain the Chilean order . Livermore was mildly critical of the arms race for its destabilizing effects : British maritime historian Richard Hough , writing in 1966 , remarked on the huge cost of the warships and expressed disbelief that the countries thought they could afford the ships in the first place , let alone maintain them as the years went by . He also wondered as to the original purpose of Brazil ' s ships , as in his view the relations between Brazil and its naval rivals , Argentina and Chile , were quite good given prior context . As Hough saw the situation , the only ones to gain from the arms race were the armament companies involved in the ships ' construction . Robert Scheina , a Latin American naval historian , devoted a chapter of his 1987 book , " Latin America : A Naval History , 1810 – 1987 " , to the dreadnought race . Although this was one of the first comprehensive works on the topic of Latin American maritime history , it was criticized by some reviewers for trying to fit too much information into too short a space . This shows in the dreadnought race ' s coverage , which was dwarfed by more recent events , especially the Falklands War ( seven pages versus fifty - five ) . Still , Scheina included a small conclusion to the chapter , where he outlined ' lessons ' learned by the three countries in the dreadnought race . Like Hough , he highlighted the exorbitant maintenance costs of the dreadnoughts . In addition , they were meant to be used against other dreadnoughts , but as soon as the traditional powers built dreadnoughts in large numbers , the ones owned by Argentina , Brazil , and Chile were much less of a threat . Last , Scheina pointed out the benefits of international attention , in the form of military alliances , brought by the dreadnoughts , but also noted that this resulted in the same outcome as lesson two — as the years went on , the ships dwindled in importance . Jonathan A . Grant examined many of the arms sales from imperial and great powers to lesser - developed countries in the 1800s and early 1900s . As part of this , he devoted half of a chapter to the South American dreadnought race , devoting the other half to the Greco – Ottoman dreadnought race of the same period . He believed that the two dreadnought races showed that democratization does not necessarily lead to peaceful coexistence , as it was the elected legislatures fueling and funding the arms race — absolute leaders were not the only ones to fall prey to the seductive goal of obtaining regional dominance . Overall , he believed that the South American race was another cog in a worldwide tale of the influences of nationalism and imperialism causing states to order armament in attempts to gain prestige , although it was a cog driven along by the aggressive salesmen of the various armament companies . Brazilian historian João Roberto Martins Filho utilized British and Brazilian archival material to focus on the Brazilian dreadnoughts in his Portuguese - language book , " A marinha brasileira na era dos encouraçados , 1895 – 1910 " , or " The Brazilian Navy in the Era of Dreadnoughts " . Martins looked at the race from an entirely different approach and demonstrated that the Brazilian Navy was not ready for the disruptive influence of modern vessels . By focusing on acquiring the powerful new dreadnoughts , rather than adequately training the huge amounts of manpower needed to crew the ships — a third of the entire navy — or the maintenance necessary to keep the dreadnoughts operational , the navy was without the ability to conduct serious operations soon after their delivery . In addition , he proposed that the dreadnoughts ' modern conditions were not compatible with the liberal use of corporal punishment , providing a crucial spark to the Revolt of the Lash .