Adlertag Adlertag ( " Eagle Day " ) was the first day of " Unternehmen Adlerangriff " ( " Operation Eagle Attack " ) , which was the codename of a German military operation by the " Luftwaffe " ( German Air Force ) to destroy the British Royal Air Force ( RAF ) . By June 1940 , the Allies had been defeated in Western Europe and Scandinavia . Rather than come to terms with Germany , Britain rejected all overtures for a negotiated peace . Hitler gave the German armed forces ( " Wehrmacht " ) a directive ( Directive No . 16 ) that ordered the preparation for the aerial attack and pacification of Britain . The military invasion of Britain was codenamed Operation Sea Lion ( " Unternehmen Seelöwe " ) . Before this could be carried out , air superiority or air supremacy was required . The " Luftwaffe " was to destroy the RAF in order to prevent it from attacking the invasion fleet or providing protection for the Royal Navy ' s Home Fleet which might attempt to prevent a landing by sea . Hitler ordered the " Luftwaffe " s commander - in - chief , " Reichsmarschall " ( Marshal of the Realm ) Hermann Göring and the " Oberkommando der Luftwaffe " ( High Command of the Air Force ) to prepare for the assault . The essential target was RAF Fighter Command . The service ' s destruction would deny the British their air superiority asset . Throughout July and early August , the Germans made preparations for " Adlertag " . The date of the assault was postponed several times because of bad weather . Eventually , it was carried out on 13 August 1940 . The German attacks on 13 August inflicted significant damage and casualties on the ground , but , marred by poor intelligence and communication , they did not make a significant impression on Fighter Command ' s ability to defend British air space . Göring had promised Hitler that " Adlertag " and " Adlerangriff " would achieve the results required within days , or at worst weeks . It had meant to be the beginning of the end of RAF Fighter Command , but " Adlertag " and the following operations failed to destroy the RAF . The engagements resulting from " Adlertag " became known as the Battle of Britain . During the course of that campaign , the " Luftwaffe " was prevented from gaining air superiority by the RAF . As a result , Operation Sea Lion was cancelled . Background . Strategic overview . After the declaration of war on Nazi Germany by Britain and France in the aftermath of the German invasion of Poland , nine months of stalemate took place along the Western Front . After the Polish Campaign , in October 1939 , the planners of the " Oberkommando der Luftwaffe " ( " Luftwaffe " High Command ) and the " Oberkommando der Wehrmacht " ( Supreme Command of the Armed Forces ) turned their attentions to Western Europe . The German offensive — named " Unternehmen Gelb " ( Operation Yellow ) , and also known as the Manstein Plan — began in the West on 10 May 1940 . The central campaign — the Battle of France — ended in Allied defeat and the destruction of the main French Army forces . The British Expeditionary Force escaped during the Battle of Dunkirk , but the " Wehrmacht " captured Paris on 14 June and overran ⅔ of France . The French surrendered on 25 June 1940 . With Western Europe neutralised , the OKL and OKW turned their attention to Britain , which was now home to the Allied base of operations in Europe . Hitler hoped Britain would negotiate for an armistice , for which he was prepared to offer generous terms . The tentative offers made by Hitler were rejected by the Churchill coalition government . Hitler now ordered the " Luftwaffe " and " Kriegsmarine " to prepare for an amphibious assault of Britain , codenamed Operation " Sealion " . The " Luftwaffe " was to eliminate enemy air power and the " Kriegsmarine " was ordered to make all the necessary preparations for transporting the " Heer " ( Army ) across the English Channel . The " Luftwaffe ' s " task came first . Once the RAF had been rendered impotent , Göring and Hitler hoped that an invasion would be unnecessary . If this proved not to be the case , the " Luftwaffe " would then support the army and prevent the Royal Navy interdicting German sea traffic . Göring named the offensive against the RAF as Operation Eagle Attack ( " Adlerangriff " ) . Background : early battles . The losses of the spring campaign had weakened the " Luftwaffe " before the Battle of Britain . The service was forced to wait until it had reached acceptable levels before a main assault against the RAF could be made . Therefore the first phase of the German air offensive took place over the English Channel . It rarely involved attacks against RAF airfields inland , but encouraged RAF units to engage in battle by attacking British Channel convoys . These operations would last from 10 July - 8 August 1940 . The attacks against shipping were not successful ; only was sunk . Mine laying from aircraft had proved more profitable , sinking . The impact on Fighter Command was minimal . It had lost 74 fighter pilots killed or missing and 48 wounded in July , and its strength rose to 1 , 429 by 3 August . By that date , it was only short of 124 pilots . In the second phase of attacks , shipping , coastal airfields , radar and stations south of London were attacked during 8 – 18 August . The " Luftwaffe " gradually increased the frequency of attacks . German bombers also raided targets as far north as Liverpool during night hours . The first major raid inland and against RAF airfields came on 12 August . RAF Hawkinge , Lympne , Manston and radar stations at Pevensey , Rye and Dover were to be destroyed . Portsmouth docks were also targeted . The results of the raids were mixed . The Radar station at Ventnor was badly damaged and others targeted were also damaged , but not destroyed . All were in working order by the following morning . The attacks against the harbour and RAF stations had failed to destroy them . All were not in fully working order by the end of the day , but were back in action the following morning . Unknown to German intelligence , Lympne itself was not even an operational station . This sort of intelligence blunder contributed to the failure of " Adlertag " . The Germans had not achieved a degree of success commensurate with their exertions . Nevertheless , in the belief they were having considerable effect on Fighter Command , they prepared to launch their all - out assault on the RAF the following day . By 12 August , German air strength had reached acceptable levels . After bringing its serviceable rates up , the " Luftwaffe " began " Adlertag " with 71 percent of its bomber force , 85 percent of its Bf 109 units , and 83 percent of its Bf 110 units operational . " Luftwaffe " preparations . Intelligence . Faulty intelligence was the component that was mostly responsible for the failure of " Adlertag . " While the gap between the British and Germans was not yet wide in this regard , the British were starting to gain a decisive lead in intelligence . The breaking of the Enigma machine and poor " Luftwaffe " signals discipline allowed the British easy access to German communications traffic . The impact of Ultra on the Battle of Britain is a matter of dispute , with Official Histories claiming there was no direct impact . Whatever the truth , Ultra , and the Y service in particular , gave the British an increasingly accurate picture of German order of battle deployments . Joseph " Beppo " Schmid was the " Luftwaffe " s intelligence officer . Throughout this time , Schmid made a series of errors . In July 1940 , Schmid grossly overestimated the strengths of the " Luftwaffe " and underestimated the RAF . The most serious mistakes were made concerning radar , airfield identification , and production sites . Schmid asserted that the number of operational airfields in southern England were severely limited ; estimated that the British could produce only 180 – 330 fighters per month ( the true figure was 496 ) and that figure would decrease , indicating that the RAF could not sustain a long battle of attrition . Schmid also claimed the command at all levels was rigid and inflexible , with fighters being tied to home bases . In his list of omissions , Schmid failed to mention the RAF maintenance and organisation operations , which put back damaged aircraft with rapid effect . He anticipated a short battle . Crucially , Schmid failed to mention radar at all . The lack of sustained and concentrated attacks on radar left it free to help direct the deployment of RAF units at opportune moments . Its continued warnings of incoming raids were a crucial benefit to Fighter Command . The " Luftwaffe " also had poor intelligence on the type of RAF airfields . It made repeated errors , often misidentifying airfields as Fighter Command bases , which turned out to belong to RAF Coastal Command and RAF Bomber Command . On " Adlertag " , most of the targets on the " Luftwaffe " s list — if destroyed — would not have impaired Fighter Command in the slightest . Targets and order of battle . The following targets were chosen for attack on 13 August 1940 : RAF preparations . Detection . The keystone of the British defence was the complex infrastructure of detection , command , and control that ran the battle . This was the " " Dowding System " " , after its chief architect , Air Chief Marshal Sir H . C . T . " Stuffy " Dowding , the commander - in - chief of RAF Fighter Command . Dowding modernised a system created up from 1917 by Major General E B Ashmore . The core of Dowding ' s system was implemented by Dowding himself : the use of Radio Direction Finding ( RDF or radar ) was at his behest , and its use , supplemented by information by the Royal Observer Corps ( ROC ) , was crucial to the RAF ' s ability to efficiently intercept incoming enemy aircraft . The technology was named RDF with misleading intent - the vague description would disguise the full nature of the system to the enemy if its existence ever became known . The first indications of incoming air raids were received by the Chain Home Radio Direction Finding ( RDF ) facilities , which were located along the coastlines of Britain . In most circumstances , RDF could pick up formations of " Luftwaffe " aircraft as they organised over their own airfields in northern France and Belgium . Once the raiding aircraft moved inland , the formations were also plotted by the ROC . The information from RDF and the Observer Corps were sent through to the main operations room of Fighter Command Headquarters at RAF Bentley Priory . The plots were assessed to determine whether they were " hostile " or " friendly " . If hostile , the information was sent to the main " operations room " , which was in a large underground bunker . Plotting raids . Here , the course information of each raid was plotted by Women ' s Auxiliary Air Force ( WAAF ) , who received information by telephone . Additional intelligence was provided by the Y Service radio posts , which monitored enemy radio communications , and the Ultra decoding centre based at Bletchley Park , which gave the RAF intelligence on the German order of battle . Colour - coded counters representing each raid were placed on a large table , which had a map of Britain overlaid and squared off with a British Modified Grid . As the plots of the raiding aircraft moved , the counters were pushed across the map by magnetic " rakes " . This system enabled the main " Fighter Controller " and Dowding to see where each formation was heading , at what height , and in what strength . This allowed an estimate to be made of possible targets . The age of the information was denoted from the colour of the counter . The simplicity of the system meant that decisions could be made quickly . Communication and interception . This information was simultaneously sent to the headquarters of each Group where it was cross - checked through a filter room before being sent through to another operations room , housed in an underground bunker . Because Group had tactical control of the battle , the operations room was different in layout from the main Headquarters at Bentley Priory . The main map on the plotting table represented the Group command area and its associated airfields . Extensive radio and telephone equipment transmitted and received a constant flow of information from the various sector airfields as well as the Observer Corps , AA Command and the navy . The " Duty fighter controller " was the Group GOC ' s personal representative and was tasked with controlling how and when each raid would be intercepted . If the telephone system failed engineers would be on site within minutes to repair the broken links . Battle . KG 2 raid . On the morning of 13 August , the weather was bad and Göring ordered a postponement of raids . However , the Dornier Do 17 s of KG 2 were not informed and took off at 04 : 50 for their target . They were to meet with their escorts from ZG 26 over the Channel . ZG 26 received the cancellation order , but II . , and III . / KG 2 did not . KG 2 had formed up by 05 : 10 , led by " Geschwaderkommodore " Johannes Fink . Part of the ZG 26 formation that had taken off — led by " Oberstleutnant " Joachim Huth — tried to warn the Dorniers of the cancellation . Unable to contact the bombers by radio , Huth tried to signal them by flying in front of them and performing aerobatics . Fink ignored him and flew on . KG 2 flew around the coast to his target , Eastchurch airfield on the Isle of Sheppey . Albert Kesselring had issued orders for bombers to abandon missions if their escorts did not show up , but Fink did not want to be accused on failing to obey orders and continued onward even though the Bf 110s turned back . The return leg would take KG 2 across No . 11 Group ' s territory , which could have been disastrous without fighter escort . But owing to the Observer Corps misjudging the direction of the bombers , owing to low - lying cloud , and the radar not picking up the direction of the German bombers , the WAAF plotted the course of the raid incorrectly and the RAF failed to prevent the target being attacked . For an hour after dawn on 13 August , there were few German tracks upon the plot tables in operations rooms , and none at all in the central and eastern Channel . The first signs of concentration , however , came earlier than usual , for between 05 : 30 and 05 : 40 two formations of 30 or more aircraft were located in the Amiens area . For 30 minutes , they remained over land , but at 06 : 10 they began moving inland . The Observer Corps and radar tracked them and guided the RAF units to intercept . Unaware of the German intent , the controllers directed three full Squadrons and detachments of three others were alerted by 06 : 15 . No . 151 was protecting a convoy in the Thames , No . 111 was protecting RAF Hawkinge and No . 74 Squadron RAF was covering RAF Manston . Parts of No . 85 , No . 43 and No . 238 Squadron RAF were also airborne near London . By 06 : 25 , the German formations were well over the Channel . No . 238 was moved to cover their own base at RAF Warmwell . No . 257 Squadron RAF was also ordered to take off at 06 : 20 to patrol Canterbury . Not satisfied with the strength of the forces already airborne , controllers dispatched No . 601 , 213 , 64 and 87 Squadrons to intercept between 06 : 30 and 06 : 35 . The first combats began at 06 : 30 . Owing to the mistake by the Observer Corps , and the " Geschwader " being missed approaching the eastern , instead of central Channel by radar , KG 2 hit the RAF airfield . KG 2 claimed 10 Spitfires destroyed on the ground . In fact , no Fighter Command fighters were lost . For some time afterward , this wrong claim convinced German intelligence that Eastchurch was a fighter station and the " Luftwaffe " would launch seven fruitless raids on it in the coming weeks . Added to this mistake was the failure to keep up pressure . Raids were spaced out , giving the field time to recover . The station was used by RAF Coastal Command , which lost five Bristol Blenheim s in the attack and one Coastal Command Spitfire . However , severe damage was done to the infrastructure . Much equipment and ammunition was destroyed and 16 of the Command ' s personnel were killed . RAF Eastchurch was back in operation by 16 : 00 . Eventually the bombers were intercepted . KG 2 lost five Do 17s in the attempt . Six Dorniers were also badly damaged . In return , accurate fire from the Dornier gunners shot down two Hurricanes from the attacking Squadrons ; No . 111 , No . 151 and No . 74 Squadron led by Adolph Malan . Malan himself shot down one Do 17 . Another source suggests the destruction of five Do 17s and another seven damaged . German manpower losses amounted to 11 killed in action and nine prisoners of war . Coastal airfields and ports . Most units of " Luftflotte " 2 received the order to abandon morning operations , but some began their attacks aimed at airfields and ports in southern Britain . KG 76 abandoned its attack on Debden but struck at RAF Kenley and other airfields in Kent and Essex . Losses and results are unknown . KG 27 also abandoned most of its operations . III . / KG 27 did attempt to make it through to the Bristol docks , losing one He 111 to No . 87 Squadron RAF in the attempt . Little damage was done . The cancellation order had not reached " Luftflotte " 3 HQ at all . Its commander , Hugo Sperrle ordered attacks to commence . At 05 : 00 , 20 Junkers Ju 88 s of I . / KG 54 took off to bomb the Royal Aircraft Establishment ' s airfield at ' RAF Farnborough ' ( RAE Farnborough ) . At 05 : 05 , 18 Ju 88s from II . / KG 54 took off for RAF Odiham . At 05 : 50 , 88 Junkers Ju 87 s of StG 77 began heading for Portland Harbour . The raids were escorted by about 60 Bf 110s of " Zerstörergeschwader " 2 ( Destroyer Wing 2 ; ZG 2 ) , and V . / LG 1 and 173 Bf 109s from " Jagdgeschwader " 27 ( JG 27 ) , JG 53 and JG 3 , which all flew ahead of the bomber stream to clear the airspace of enemy fighters . StG 77 ' s target was obscured by cloud , but KG 54 continued to their target . RAF fighters from RAF Northolt , RAF Tangmere and RAF Middle Wallop intercepted . Four Ju 88s and one Bf 109 from JG 2 was shot down . The German fighters claimed six RAF fighters and the bombers another 14 . In reality , the bombers only damaged five . The Bf 109s destroyed only one and damaged another . Of the five RAF fighters damaged by the bombers , two were write - offs . Of the 20 claimed , just three fighters were lost and three pilots were wounded . None were killed . Further missions by II . / KG 54 to RAF Croydon were cancelled . I . / KG 54 struck at the Fleet Air Arm ( FAA ) base at Gosport . ZG 2 was supposed to provide escort during one these attacks , and in a breakdown of communications , arrived over the target without their Ju 88s , which had been ordered to stand down . One Bf 110 was shot down by No . 238 Squadron RAF . At 11 : 10 , V . / LG 1 Bf 110s took off in advance of a raid by KG 54 , possibly to tempt RAF fighters into battle before the main assault , so the RAF would be out of position . The bomber ' s mission was cancelled . The order did not reach V . / LG 1 who continued to their target area . The 23 Bf 110s continued to the target of Portland . They ran into No . 601 Squadron RAF Hurricanes and lost six Bf 110s destroyed and three damaged . Only one Hurricane was shot down and another damaged . A second source states only four Bf 110s were destroyed , whilst a third gives the loss of five destroyed and five damaged . The " Zerstörergeschwader " optimistically claimed 30 RAF fighters destroyed ( in reality RAF fighter losses in aerial combat amounted to 13 throughout the entire day ) , for a loss of 13 Bf 110s . The morning ' s effort had been a fiasco . The attacks showed a serious German technical failure in air - to - air communication . Renewed attacks . The official go - ahead was given at 14 : 00 . At 15 : 30 , some 58 – 80 Ju 88s from I . , II . , and III . / LG 1 , escorted by 30 Bf 110s of V . / LG 1 , took off to bomb Boscombe Down and Worthy Down . RAF Andover was to be bombed as well , with the support of 52 Ju 87s from StG 1 and StG 2 who were to strike at RAF Warmwell and Yeovil . I . / JG 53 flew a fighter sweep ahead of the bombers from Poole to Lyme Regis in order to tempt the RAF into battle . I . / JG 53 made landfall at 16 : 00 . The sweep failed to attract and divert RAF squadrons . Instead , all it succeeded in doing was to alert the RAF defences a critical five minutes earlier . When the main wave of LG 1 and StG 2 arrived over the coast , they were greeted by 77 RAF fighters . II . , and III . / JG 53 and III . / ZG 76 flew escort for the Ju 87s . ZG 2 and JG 27 flew escort for LG 1 . In response the whole of No . 10 Group RAF intercepted . One " Staffel " ( Squadron ) of II . / StG 2 was badly hit by No . 609 Squadron RAF ; six out of nine Ju 87s were shot down . StG 1 and 2 gave up on their original targets owing to cloud . Both headed for Portland . I . / LG 1 abandoned Boscombe Down and bombed Southampton instead . No . 238 Squadron had been detailed to intercept , but the fighter escort was too strong and the bombers were not diverted from their course . Several warehouses were destroyed and a cold storage plant was also knocked out . All fires were under control by dusk . One III . / LG 1 dropped its bombs by RAF Middle Wallop Sector Station by mistake . Only Andover airfield was hit , and it was used for bomber operations , not fighters . III . / LG 1 lost two Ju 88s . The 13 Ju 88 " Gruppen " ( Groups ) had lost six destroyed and many damaged . They had escaped lightly . The bombing succeeded in destroying a bicycle factory , a furniture warehouse and a refrigerated meat depot . " Luftwaffe " intelligence had not identified the Southampton Spitfire factory — on the water front near the docks — as an important target . Poor intelligence suggested it was a bomber factory . Only later , in September , was it attacked and severely damaged . However , even then the Germans were unaware of the damage inflicted to Spitfire production . The factory would later be broken up and production dispersed . Ju 87 operations . StG 77 was also in action , escorted by JG 27 Bf 109s . StG 77s 52 Ju 87s were joined by 40 Ju 88s of KG 54 . Both formations were heading for No . 10 Group RAF ' s airfields . StG 77 was targeting RAF Warmwell . The " Geschwader " failed to find its target , dropping its bombs at random . The other Ju 87 units had attracted much attention and StG 77 escaped unnoticed . " Erprobungsgruppe " 210 were sent further east for an operation to attack targets near Southend . They took off at 15 : 15 and were escorted by ZG 76 . Unfortunately , they found unbroken cloud over Essex . No . 56 Squadron RAF intercepted , but " Erprobungsgruppe " 210 dropped their bombs over Canterbury . II . / StG 1 was sent to bomb airfields near Rochester . It failed to find the target and returned without incident . IV . / LG 1 — also with Ju 87s — was sent after RAF Detling . JG 26 went out on a fighter sweep to clear the skies in advance of the attack . JG 26 lost one Bf 109 over Folkestone from an unknown cause . The Ju 87s bombed the station and 40 Bf 109s strafed it , killing the commander and 67 others without loss to themselves . The operations block was hit , causing high casualties . The losses were disastrous for No . 53 Squadron RAF , which lost a number of Blenheims on the ground . The commander killed was Group Captain E P M Davis . However , Detling was not an RAF Fighter Command station and the attack did not affect No . 11 Group RAF in any way . South East raids . I . , II . , and III . / KG 55 were also in action . III . / KG 55 bombed Heathrow Airport . Results are unknown and losses are unclear . KG 55 suffered heavy losses the previous day , so its operations seemed limited . On 12 August it lost 13 Heinkel He 111 s and their crews . The next day , 14 August , they would lose their " Geschwaderkommodore " ( Wing Commander ) Alois Stoeckl . In the afternoon , a force of 80 Do 17s of KG 3 — escorted by JG 51 , JG 52 , JG 54 and 60 Bf 109s from JG 26 ( some 270 aircraft in all ) — headed for Eastchurch airfield and the Short Brothers factory at Rochester . III . / KG 3 broke away from the main formation and attacked Eastchurch while II . / KG 3 headed for Rochester . Significant damage was done to the factory producing the Short Stirling heavy bomber . The RAF ' s No . 3 , No . 64 , No . 111 , No . 151 , No . 234 , No . 249 , No . 601 and No . 609 Squadron s intercepted . According to the account of JG 26 , the British fighters made little impression on the bombers . Three JG 51 Bf 109s were shot down in skirmishes with RAF fighters . RAF Bomber Command also took part in the day ' s fighting . Although Charles Portal — AOC ( Air Officer Commanding ) — had protested against the pointlessness of attacking airfields in Scandinavia , the Air Ministry insisted on such raids . No . 82 Squadron RAF sent 12 Bristol Blenheim s to bomb KG 30 airfields at Aalborg , Denmark . One pilot turned back complaining of " fuel problems " and was court - martialled . That bomber was the only one to return . The rest fell to AAA fire and fighters . Some 24 airmen were killed and nine were captured . Night raids . As darkness fell at the close of " Adlertag " , Sperrle sent nine " Kampfgruppe " 100 ( Bombing Group 100 ) He 111s to conduct a strategic bombing raid against the Supermarine Spitfire factory at Castle Bromwich , Birmingham . Despite the group being a specialist night strike unit which had high expertise in night navigation , only four of the crews found their targets . The eleven bombs dropped were not sufficient to disrupt fighter production . Around five of the 11 fell inside the compound . Casualties were small as workers had gone to shelter . Serious damage was done only to offices and a tool room , while a gas main was fractured . Another group , led by " Gruppenkommandeur " " Hauptmann " ( Captain ) Friedrich Achenbrenner , dispatched 15 He 111s from bases in Brittany across the Irish Sea to strike at the Short Brothers factory at Queen ' s Island , Belfast Northern Ireland . Five Short Stirling aircraft were destroyed . KG 27 also took part in the missions , and bombed Glasgow during the night although their specific target is unclear . Other bombers , commencing the night stage of " Adlertag " , resolutely flew the length and breadth of Great Britain , bombing Bristol , Cardiff , Swansea , Liverpool , Sheffield , Norwich , Edinburgh and Aberdeen . Very little damage was done , though some rail tracks were cut temporarily and around 100 casualties were suffered . It is unknown if any German aircraft were lost . One German airman was found wandering around the countryside in Balcombe , Somerset . No other traces of the aircraft or other crew members were found . Aftermath . Effect of raids . The Germans had maintained the attacks on airfields in south - western England which they had started the previous day . On 12 August , most of the Kentish airfields had been attacked ; and on 13 August , the Germans concentrated on the second line airfields south of London . The concentration on Detling and Eastchurch was a failure , as both were Coastal Command stations and bore no relation to Fighter Command . The Germans may have reasoned that if bases such as Manston , Hawkinge and Lympne were neutralised through the attacks on 12 August , then Fighter Command may have had to move onto these airfields . In fact , the bombing of 12 August had failed to knock out these strips , and " Adlertag " had failed to destroy or render Detling or Eastchurch nonoperational . Owing to poor intelligence , weather conditions , and RAF resistance , attacks on other targets had failed or been unsuccessful . Overclaiming . Overclaiming in aerial warfare is not uncommon . During the Battle of Britain ( and , indeed , the rest of the Second World War ) , both sides claimed to have shot down and destroyed more enemy aircraft on the ground and in the air than they had in reality . RAF Fighter Command claimed 78 German aircraft shot down on 13 August 1940 . Another source states that official RAF claims amounted to 64 . Actual German losses amounted to 47 – 48 aircraft destroyed and 39 severely damaged . Conversely , the " Luftwaffe " claimed to have destroyed 70 Hawker Hurricanes and Spitfires in the air and a further 18 Blenheim bombers in the air alone . This was an exaggeration of 700 percent . Another 84 RAF fighters were claimed on the ground . Actual RAF losses in the air amounted to 13 fighters and 11 bombers , with 47 aircraft of various kinds on the ground . Battle of Britain . The failure of " Adlertag " did not deter the " Luftwaffe " from continuing its campaign . The assault against RAF airfields continued throughout August and into September 1940 . The battles involved large numbers of aircraft and heavy losses on both sides . The " Luftwaffe " failed to develop any focused strategy for defeating RAF Fighter Command . At first , it attempted to destroy RAF bases , then switched to strategic bombing by day and night . It tried to achieve the destruction of several British industries at the same time , switching from bombing aircraft factories , to attacking supporting industries , import or distribution networks such as coastal ports . An attempt was even made against unrelated targets , such as destroying the morale of the British population . The failure of the " Luftwaffe " to identify the radar chain and distinguish RAF fighter bases from those of other RAF commands undermined its ability to destroy the British fighter defences . The " Luftwaffe " underestimated British radar , and they had not realised its importance in the British operational system . To the contrary , OKL believed that the radar stations would benefit the German effort by sending RAF forces into large - scale air battles for the " Luftwaffe " to decimate . The RAF aircraft industry supported the losses and its pilots were replaced sufficiently to limit the RAF ’ s decline in strength and deny the Germans victory . Conversely , the RAF were able to ensure the serviceability rates and aircrew numbers of the " Luftwaffe " declined in August – September . Having failed to defeat the RAF , the " Luftwaffe " adopted a different and clearer strategy of strategic bombing known as The " Blitz " . However , as with the campaign against the RAF , the types of targets differed radically and no sustained pressure was put under any one type of British target . Disputes among the OKL staff revolved more around tactics than strategy . This method condemned the offensive over Britain to failure before it had even begun . The end result of the air campaign against Britain in 1940 and 1941 was a decisive failure to end the war . As Hitler committed Germany to ever increasing military adventures , the " Wehrmacht " became increasingly overstretched and was unable to cope with a multi - front war . By 1944 , the Allies were ready to launch Operation Overlord , the invasion of Western Europe . The Battle of Britain ensured that the Western Allies had a base from which to launch the campaign and that there would be a Western Allied presence on the battlefield to meet the Soviet Red Army in central Europe at the end of the war in May 1945 .