Rufus S . Bratton Colonel Rufus Sumter Bratton ( September 5 , 1892 - March 19 , 1958 ) was Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch of the Military Intelligence Division ( G - 2 ) in the War Department in December 1941 , when the United States entered World War II . Career Prior to December 1941 . Bratton graduated West Point in 1914 and was posted to Oahu as a Lieutenant in the 1st Infantry Regiment , where he served until the regiment returned to the continental U . S . in 1917 . In 1919 , Bratton returned to West Point as an instructor until reassigned to Fort Benning to teach infantrymen , Bratton himself being a member of the Infantry Branch . From 1922 to 1924 Bratton learned Japanese as a student officer in Japan , followed by an appointment to be an assistant military attaché in Tokyo . In 1926 Bratton became a battalion commander of the 45th Regiment of the Philippine Scouts , then returning to America to attend the General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth in 1929 . Upon completion of this course in 1931 he returned to Japan and attended the Japanese Imperial War College . The next year he became military attaché at the American Embassy . Bratton returned from Japan for another battalion command appointment in 1934 , taking up his new post early the following year . His new battalion was part of the 7th Infantry and was housed at Vancouver Barracks , Washington . His command ended in late 1936 , and he spent the next six months lecturing at the University of Idaho on military science and tactics . In early 1937 he was appointed to the War Department as a member of the Army General Staff ' s Military Intelligence Division with responsibility for the Far East and especially Japan . As Chief of the Far Eastern Section , Colonel Bratton was one of the few men , military or civilian , privileged to be given access to the product of American cryptanalysis efforts against Japanese secret codes , known as . December 7th . Bratton was one of the first officers to receive the intercepted final section of the Fourteen Part Message breaking off diplomatic relations early on the morning of December 7 . Bratton later recalled treating this intercept as , militarily speaking , unimportant , since it added little to what was already known of Japanese intentions for an attack towards Southeast Asia . Shortly afterwards , however , at close to 9 : 00 am , a second message was brought to him , revealing the Japanese government expected Ambassador Nomura to deliver the earlier message by no later than 1pm East Coast Time that afternoon . Bratton remembered later that the deadline message " stunned me into frenzied activity because of its implications " , which were that the suspected Japanese attack would occur very soon after 1 : 00 pm local time . Bratton immediately began attempting to contact both his superiors and other members of the General Staff . His first call , very soon after 9 : 00 am , was to Army Chief of Staff George C . Marshall at Fort Myer , but Marshall was on his customary morning horseback riding excursion , so Bratton left an urgent message with Marshall ' s orderly and telephoned the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence , Brigadier General Sherman Miles , who hurried to his office , arriving just after 10 : 00 am . Soon after Miles arrived , General Marshall called from Fort Myer . Bratton explained the urgent nature of the message , but for security reasons did not explicitly discuss its content . The Colonel offered to drive to Fort Myer with a copy , but Marshall told him he was coming back to his office . Marshall then said he would come to the War Department , but he took 75 minutes to arrive , and didn ' t come to his office until 11 : 25 am . At 11 : 25am Bratton and Miles presented Marshall with both the Fourteen Part Message and the subsequent deadline message . They were soon joined in Marshall ' s office by Brigadier General Leonard T . Gerow , Chief of the War Plans Division , and Colonel Charles Bundy , Chief of the War Plans Group . Upon reading dispatch Marshall realized that it " meant Japanese hostile action against some American installation in the Pacific at or shortly after 1 o ' clock that afternoon " ( 494 ) , and decided that all Army Pacific Commands including Hawaii should be alerted , although the Philippines and Thailand were thought to be more likely targets . Colonel Bratton took Marshall ' s warning message , encoded it , and delivered it to the War Department Message Center . While the Philippines and the Panama Canal Zone received the warning by radio , poor atmospheric conditions were blocking radio communications with Hawaii and the warning was sent as a telegram . By the time the warning message was delivered in Hawaii however , the attack was already underway . The telegram messenger on his way to deliver it was forced to abandon his bicycle and take cover in a ditch and the naval commander in charge of the Pacific fleet Adm Husband Kimmel didn ' t receive it until after the attack was over . Third Army . Bratton remained with the Intelligence Division until assigned to George S . Patton ' s Third Army as Headquarters Commandant , a role he undertook all throughout the subsequent liberation of Europe . Fictional representation . In the 1970 movie " Tora ! Tora ! Tora ! " he was played by E . G . Marshall . The film shows him being summoned by Naval Intelligence Lieutenant Commander Alvin D . Kramer , ( played by Wesley Addy ) . We see Bratton reading a Japanese transcription , nicknamed " Magic " , as it comes out of the decryption machine , codenamed " Purple " . Later on in the film , because of the incoming messages , Bratton becomes convinced that the Japanese are about to attack Pearl Harbor , though he is incorrect about exactly when the attack will occur - thinking it will come on the Sunday before December 7 . The film shows Bratton and Kramer ' s futile efforts to alert higher - ups that an attack is imminent on the night of December 6 and the morning of the 7th .